(5ornf II 31am Btl^aal Eihtarg KF6289.C7™90r""''''''"'^ M«™?iV.,t,^.? "" •" taxation :inclu 3 1924 019 996 325 The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924019996325 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION INCLUDINa THE LAW OF LOCAI ASSESSMEHTS <^*" BY THOMAS M.^OOLEY, LL D. HiATE Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan and Professor of COHSTITUTIONAL LaW AND POLITICAL SCIENCE IN THE University of Michisan, THIRD EDITION BY ALBERT POOLE JACOBS Of THE Detroit Bar VOL. I. CHICAGO CALLAGHAl^ AND COMPANY 1903 Copyright, 1903, '^ fj BY CALLAGHAN AND COMPANY. f^B ^ 0^ 1904 cm STATE JOURNAL PRINTING COMPANY, PkINTEES and STEREOmtPBRS, MADISON, WIS. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. The following pages have been prepared with a view to present in a shape for practical use, the general rules which must govern the action of all authorities acting in matters of taxation. Had a similar task been previously undertaken; the writer would gladly have been spared the labor; but Mr. BlaokweU's Treatise on Tax Titles covers the ground only in part, and Judge DiUon, though he has done valua- ble service in the same direction, has not, in his work on Municipal Corporations, deemed it advisable to go beyond what seemed necessary to a legitimate and perspicuous pres- entation of that subject. Otiher writers 'Tiave had occasion to discuss only particular topics in the law of taxation, leav- ing a comprehensive examination of the general subject to be stiU entered upon. The decisions in this country on the subject of taxation have become so numerous, that it would be impossible to give abstracts of them all, within any reasonable compass. The author has thought it preferable, instead of attempt- ing a digest of them, to group the references about the con- trolling principles. The tax systems of the several states are so dissimilar, that a mere digest of the cases is exceedingly liable to mislead, by giving, as a general rule of law, what is only a conclusion from a local law or custom. There are, or should be, general principles underlying aU the cases ; and an understanding of these will enable one to make use of decisions under the various tax systems without confusion. The subject of taxation seems to invite some consideration of questions of political eqonomy ; but these have been passed by after bare mention, as not being necessarily involved in a discussion of the legal points. They present considerations IV LAW OF TAXATION. for the legislature in framing tax laws ; but courts and minis- terial officers must enforce tax laws as they are, whether based on sound or unsound principles of political economy. The preparation of any treatise on taxation necessarily involves the presentation of disputed points, and the expres- sion of opinions upon them. This has been done in the fol- lowing pages. It has not been the purpose, however, to take any positions which it was not believed the authorities would justify ; and if this has b«sn done in any instance, the refer- ences which are made to authorities wiU doubtless enable the reader to detect the error. Possibly if may be thought that, on some points, too much importance has been attached to these fundamental principles which restrict the power to tax. But when one considers how vast is this power, how readily it yields to passion, excitement, prejiidice or private schemes, and to what incompetent hands its execution is usually com- mitted, it seems unreasonable to treat as unimportant, any stretch of power — even the slightest — whether it be on the part of the legislature which orders the tax, or of any of the officers who undertake to give effect to the order. Especially is this so when it is understood how little restraint there can be on the ignorant action of a'Ssessors, acting with jurisdic- tion, and how very seldom an effectual remedy can be admin- istered where fraud or corruption exists. And as the benefits of republican government have b6en reached through the efforts of the people to establish and maintain the legitimate restraints upon the power to tax, it seems unwise in a high degree to sUght or disregard any of the checks which the law has provided, whether those which are intrusted to the hands of the judiciary, or those which are the lawful right of the people themselves who aire to bear the burden of the particular tax. Thomas M. Oooley. Untversitt of Michigan, Ann Arbor, January, 1876. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. Since the first edition of this work appeared, several thou- sand cases have been decided by court's of last resort in this country, involving questions of importance in the law of tax- ation, and the time seems to have arrived for bringing to- gether the results of the cases under the appropriate headings. This has npw been done, and the author has reason for be- lieving that this work is very considerably improved thereby. In the original edition pains were taken to present in as clear a light as possible the fundamental principles under^ lying the law of taxation. This involved the necessity for expressions of opinion on some points not yet covered by authoritative decision; but the author is happy to beheve t1hat on no important point have the subsequent decisions shoVa him to be in error. He therefore offers the new edition to the public in confidence that it will not only be found con- venient for professional use, but also a reliable presentation of the results of judicial thought on this very important subject. Thomas M. Cooley. Untvbrsity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, January, 1886. PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. This edition, prepared at the request of Judge Cooley, was far advanced towards completion at the time of his death, but subsequently unavoidably delayed. He himself directed that the second edition should be taken as the basis of the third, and most of the important alterations in the text were examined and affirmed by him. Such alterations as have been made are almost always by way of amplification, for nearly every pas- sage of Judge Oooley's text has been cited with approval by high authority. In its present form the text is supported or illustrated by references to seventeen thousand decisions, more than nine thousand of which were not mentioned in the pre- vious edition. Albert P. Jacobs. ■Detroit, September 1, 1903. PUBLISHfiE's NOTE. The index to this work and the table of cases from L to Z were done by our editorial force. — C. & Co. TABLE OF CONTENTS. VOLUME I. CHAPTER L TAXES, THEIE NATURE AND KINDS. Definition: purpose and justification 1-3 Fundamental requirements 4 Taxes distinguished from otiier charges 5 Particular names of taxes. , 6, 7 Taxing power an incident of sovereignty 7-10 Classification of taxes as direct and indii'ect 10-12 Maxims of policy in taxation 12-15 Taxes in kind, and in labor, 15, 16 Taxes not debts. 17-22 Taxation and protection reciprocal 22-27 Taxes it is customary to lay. 27-43 Capitation taxes 28 Land taxes .' ; 28, 39 Taxes on houses 39 On income 30 On employments '31 On carriage of property 31 On wages of labor 33 On servants, horses, carriages, etc. 32 On interest of money 32 On dividends 33 On successions 32-34 On sales, bills, bullion, etc '. 34 On newspapers 35 On legal process 35 On consumable luxuries 36 On exports and imports ' 36, 37 Op corporate franchises 37, 38 On property by value, ... 38-41 On amusements, etc. 41, 43 CHAPTER IL THE NATURE OF THE POWER TO TAX. Separation of departments of government ." 43-45 The taxing power not judicial 46-50 Till TABLE OF CONTENTS. Protection of rights by the law of the land 51-75 Fourteenth amendment: due process of law 55-71 Equal protection of the laws ~. 7a-o~i CHAPTER IIL LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXmO POWER BY PARAMOUNT LATy. Limitations inherent ^^ Enforcement of limitations 8^ Purpose must be public -=■•■■ 8* Territorial limitations * 84-95 Taxation and representation . , 95-99 The power not to be delegated 99-107 Exception to this rule 101-105 Restriction of power by contract 107-128 State repudiation s . . .- 118-120 Municipal repudiation 120-124 Taxing contracts 134-136 What impairs a contract 126-1'. 8 Exemption of agencies of government 120 General liability '. 129 National and state powers exclusive 139, 130 Federal agencies not taxable by states 130-133 State agencies exempt from federal taxation 138, 184 Inadmissible personal taxes 134 Taxation of public property 135-139 Taxation of occasional public privileges 139-141 Taxation of special-privileges ' 141, 142 Taxes on commerce 142-168 On imports and exports 142-145 Tonnage duties 145-148 Taxes on foreign and interstate commerce 148-168 Taxes in abridgment of privileges and immunities of citizens 168-171 Taxes violative of treaties 171 Limitation of the rate of taxation 173-177 Other restraints on power to tax 177, 178 Restrictions upon federal taxing power 178-180 CHAPTER IV. THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. The general rule 181-184 Presumption in favor of legislation 184r-187 Grade of the government which taxes is important 187-189 General expenses of government 189-193 Public purposes in general 192-197 Religious instruction 197, 198 Secular instruction 198-304 Public charity 304, 205 Private business enterprises 206-208 TABLE OF CONTENTS. IX Moral obligations 208, 309 Amusements and celebrations 210 Publiche^lth gll Irrigation 21 1 Highways and roads 213-317 Municipal water and gas works 217 Military and other bounties 217-219 Protection against calamities 219 Payment of the public debt 319, 230 Miscellaneous expenditures 321, 333 Exclusiveness of public interest. '.^ 323, 224 CHAPTER V. THE PURPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO THE DISTRICT TAXED. The general rule 235-337 State control of municipalities 238, 239 Violations of rules of apportionment 329-331 Taxing districts in general 232-384 Establishment of districts 234-238 Diversity of districts 239, 240 Overlying districts 240-248 Extra-territorial taxation 249-253 CHAPTER VI. EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. Requirement of equality and difficulty in attaining it 254-361 Exemptions, express 262, 363 Implied exemptions 363-369 Allowance for debts 369-273 Provisions in constitutions of the states 374-343 General righ^ito make exemptions , 843-346 Customary exeinptions 346, 347 Charities 348, 349 Education 850 Libraries 851 Literary and scientific institutions 351 Church property 353, 353 Cemeteries 354 Other exemptions 354, 355 State indebtedness 355, 356 Taxability presumed . . 356 Strict construction of exemptions 357-362 Case of local assessments '....". 363-365 Railroad exemptions '. 365-370 Corporate exemption generally 370-380 Inheritances and successions 379, 380 When exemption accrues: loss or surrender 380, 381 Invidious exemptions 381-383 X TABLE OF CONTENTS. Accidental omissions from taxation ■ . ■ 883-385' Invidious assessments 385-887 Duplicate taxation i. 887-39T Presumption against ' 398-407 Commuting taxes 407-409- Diversity of taxation in districts 409 Monopolies 409, 410 Importance of permanence in legislation 410' CHAPTER VII. THE APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES. Necessity of apportionment 411, 412' Specific taxes 412, 41S Ad valorem taxes 413 Taxes apportioned by benefits 413-41& General principles of apportionment 416, 417 Apportionment presumptively just. 41S Apportionment imperative 419 Diverse rules of apportionment 430-425' CHAPTER VIII. OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTERS OF TAXATION. Necessity for official action 426- Officers, who are. 427-439 Officers de facto ,. 439-433- Usurpers 432, 43S Questioning title of officer de facto 433, 434 Validity of acts of officer de facto 435 Officers de facto in tax cases. 436-438 Estoppel against intruders who have acted 439, 440 Action by official boards i 440-443 Officer's duty to act 443, 444= Official returns and certificates 444-44& Presumption of correct action 477,448- CHAPTER IX. , CONSTRUCTION OF TAX LAWS. Rules of construction in general 44^ Legislative intent to govern 450-453 Construction of revenue laws 452-465 Local powers to tax , 465-467 Construction of local power 468, 469' As to objects for taxation 469-473 As to taxables 473-475 Liability of power to abuse 475, 476 Directory and mandatory provisions 476-491 Instances of mandatory provisions 481-48S Of directory provisions 486-491 tabl:6 of contents. xi Eetrospeotive taxation 493-498 Repeals by implication 499-504 General revisions of tax laws 504, 505 CHAPTER X. CCRINa DEFECTS IN TAX PROCEEDINGS. Curative laws in general 506 Conclusive rules of evidence 506-509 Legislative mandates. 509, 510 Special curative acts' 510-519 General curative acts 520, 531 Prospective curative laws. 531-526 Reassessments 536-533 Judicial corrections 533, 534 Corrections by amendment 534-545 CHAPTER XI. THE LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT A TAX SHALL BE LAID. Necessity for legislation 546-548 Revenue bills, statement of purpose 549-553 Contracting debts 553, 554 Municipal taxation 554-557 Determination of amount 557-563 Conditions precedent to levy 562-565 Voting taxes in popular meetings 565-567 Submission to taxpayers only 568, 569 Calling' popular meetings 569-578 Voting the tax 573-576 Record of votes , 576-579 Certifying the vote 580 Adherence to vote 581 Conclusiveness of municipal action 583, 583 Judicial questions 584 Restrictions upon municipal taxation 584-589 The general restriction £88, 589 Excessive taxes ..., 589-593 Exhausting authority 593, 594 CHAPTER XIL LISTLNG OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES FOR TAXATION. General course 595 Nature of proceedings 595, 596 Assessment defined 596, 597 Necessity for assessment ' 597, 598 Statutory requirements 598-604 xii TABLE OF CONTENTS. Date of assessment: omitted property 604-010 Taxpayer's lists 611-630 Oath to 616 Conclusiveness of 616-619 Penalties for not giving 619-624 Examination of books and papers 624 Right to a hearing 624-633 Classifloation of property as real and personal 633-641 Personal taxes in general 641-644 Assessment of personalty 644 General description .....*, 645-650 Place of '. 650-673 Water craft 652, 653 Tangible personalty 653-658 Intangible personalty 65S, 659 Partnership property ; 659, 660 Trust property 660-663 Property of decedents' estates 664-672 Property of persons under guardianship 672 Assessment of corporations; in general 673-676 Franchise taxes 676-681 Dividends 681-683 Income. , 684^686 Taxing franchises as property 686 Taxing by value 687-692 Railroad companies 693-699 Insurance companies , 700-703 Manufacturing companies 704, 705 Building and loan associations 705 Banks 706-710 National banks 710-717 Foreign corporations 717-721 Assessment of real property 731-750 General course 721-723 Classification of lands 723-726 Assessment of occupied lands. . . 726-734; Separate assessment of parcels 734-736 What are separate parcels 737, 738 Assessment of separate interests. : " 739, 74ft Description 740-750 Valuation for assessment 751-759 Value, how ascertained 754-758 Conclusiveness of valuation 758, 759 Omission of dollar mark 759 Authentication of assessment 759-763 Completion of assessment; return 763, 764 Unauthorized alterations 765 766 One assessment for different levies 766, 767 Shifts to evade taxation 767-770 TABLE OF CONTENTS. XIU Review of assessments , 771-788 Powers of board 772, 773 Meetings of board 773-775 Changing individual assessments 776-784 Equalization 784-788 VOLUME II. CHAPTER Xllt THE TAX-ROLL AND WARRANT. The tax-roll 789-793 Different rolls for different taxes 791, 793 Blending taxes 793 The collector's warrant 793-799 Necessity for 793, 794 Statutory requisites 795-798 Signing 789 Sealing 798 Delivery 798 Exhausting authority 798-800 CHAPTER XIV. THE COLLECTION OF THE TAX. Not an element of the assessment 801 Notice to taxpayers 801 Payment of tax 802-811 Who may pay 802-804 What receivable in payment 804^806 Part payment: payment in instalments 806 Proof of payment 807, 808 Tender: attempted payment 808-810 Effect of payment 810. 81 1 Liability for taxes in special cases: subrogation 813-824 Mortgagor and mortgagee 812-815 Vendor and vendeiB 815, 816 Grantor and grantee 817, 818 Tenants for life 818-820 Tenants in common 831 Lessor and lessee 832, 823 Executors, etc. 833, 824 Payment under mistake as to ownership 824 Return of delinquent taxes 834-837 Summary remedies necessary for collection 828, 829 Methods of collection 839-899 Farming out the revenues 831, 833 Collection through third persons 832-834 XIV TABLE OF CONTENTS. Collection by order of court 834, 835 Collection by personal action '. 836-847 Enforcement by mandamus 847 Enforcement by arrest 847, 848 Distress of chattels 848-853 Lien upon chattels 853-856 Sale of chattels 856-858 Detention of goods and chattels 858 Forfeiture of property,taxed 858-864 Levy upon land 864, 865 Lien upon lands , 865-875 Suits in rem against land 875-899 Restraint of waste 899 Interference with collection 899 Penalties for non-payment ■ 899-907 Conditions on exercise of rights 904-907 Collection as between state and municipalities 907-909 CHAPTER XV. THE SALE OF LANDS FOR UNPAID TAXES. When to be made 910 The land must be liable 910, 911 Necessity for regular proceedings 911-915 Onus of proof. ^ 915-933 Presumptions of regularity '. 933-936 Special authority to sell 937, 938 Notice of sale 938-938 Time and place of sale. 938-940 Who may make sale 940, 941 Conduct of sale 941-959 Competition at sale 941-945 Officer not to buy j 945-947 Order for sale 947 Sale in separate parcels 948-951 Surplus moneys. 953, 953 Excessive sale 1'. 953-958 Sale to highest bidder ■ 958 Sale not to be on credit 958 Sale to include all taxes, etc. 959 Inadequacy of price 959 What passes' by the sale 960-963 Who may acquire tax- titles ' 963-977 Bids by the state or county. 977-981 DifEerent sales at the same time 981 Certificate of sale ; . . 988-988 Report of sale 939, 990 Confirmation of sale . . . ^ 990 The tax-deed .' 993^1003 TABLE OF OONTEMTS. XV "Kelation back of deed 1003, 1004 Tax-deed as evidence 1004-1017 Defective title; purchaser's lien 1017-103a CHAPTER XVI. REDEMPTION OF LANDS FKOM TAX SALES. Redemption favored by the law 1023 Gould, 6 Mass. 40, 4 Am. Dec. 80. 19. Andrews v. Auditor, 28 Grat. 115. 135. V. King County, 1 "Wash. St. 46, 23 Pac. 409, 22 Am. St. 136. 338, 1417. V. Linton, 1 Salk. 265. 445. V.Love, 46 Kan. 264, 26 Pac. 746. 1422. V.Love, 50 Kan.' 701, 31 Pac. 1094. 1422. V. People, 75 111. 605. 446, 826^ 828 882 V. People, 83 111. 529. 931. V. People, 84 111. 28. 523, 931. V. People, 164 111. 581, 45 N. B. 965. 1276. V. Rumsay, 75 111. 598. 1061. V. Sellers, 11 Ind. App. 301, 38 N. E. 1101. 852. V. Senter, 32 Me. 394. 949, 950. V. Worcester, etc. Ins. Co., 5 Allen 65. 496. Andrus v. Board of Police, 41 La. An. 697, 6 South. 603, 17 Am. St. 411, 5 L. R. A. 681. 1515. Angell V. Bowler, 3 R. I. 77. 445. V. Cartright, 111 Mich. 223, 69 N. W. 486-. 1280 Angler v. Ash, 26 N. H. 99. 445, 446. Angle, State ex rel., v. Lantz, 53 N. J. L. 578, 22 Atl. 49. 526, 647. Anglo Am. Ins. Co. v. District of Columbia, 5 Mackey 422. 605. Ankenny v. Multnomah County, 4 Or. 271. 270. Ankepy v. Albright, 20 Pa. St. 157. 810. V. Henningsen, 54 Iowa 29, 6 N. W. 65. 1276. Anketell v. Hayward, 119 Mich. 525, 78 N. W. 557. 518. Annan v. Baker, 49 N. H. 161. 545, 916. . Annely v. De Saussure, 12 S. C. 488. 965. Anniston v. Southern R. Co., 112 Ala. 557, 20 South. 915. 18, 161, 276, 836, 1098, 1100, 1121. Anthony v. Caswell, 15 R. I. 159, 1 Atl. 290. 661. V. Sturgis, 86 Ind. 479. 1422. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769, 2 Sup. Ct. 91. 108, 118, 1333, 1370. Apgar V. Hayward, 110 N. Y. 225, 18 N. E. 85. 765. App V. Stockton, 61 N. J. L. 520, 39 Atl. 921. 522, 1247, 1517. Appanoose County v. Vermillion, 70 Iowa 365, 30 Atl. 616. 770. Appeal-Tax Court v. Baltimore Acad., 50 Md. 437. 353. Appeal-Tax Court v. Baltimore Cem.. Co., 50 Md. 432. 117, 360, V. Gill, 50 Md. 377. 389, 402. V.Grand Lodge, 50 Md. 421- 349, 353, 355. V.Patterson, 50 Md. 354. 345,. 356. V.Pullman Palace Car Co., 50 Md. 452. 163. V. Railroad Co., 50 Md. 274. 501, 639, 674, 698. v.Red Men's Hall, 50 Md. 352. 354. V. Regents, 50 Md. 457. 355. , 4 V. Rice, 59 Md. 302. 360, 388. V. St. Mary's Seminary, 50 Md. 333. 354. V. St. ' Peter's Academy. 50 Md. 321. 354. V. Western, etc. R. Co., 50 Md.^ 274. 501, 639, 674, 698. V. Zion's Church, 50 Md. 352.- 354. Appelget, State ex rel., v. Pownell,, 49 N. J. L. 169, 6 Atl. 441. 1400^ 1404,' 1405. Apperson v. Memphis, 2 Flip. 363. 19, 259, 333. Applegarth v. State, 89 Md. 140, 42' Atl. 941. 167, 302, 1148. Applegate v. Ernst, 3 Bush 648, 46" Am. Dec. 272. 216, 693. Appleton V. Hopkins, 5 Gray 530. 19, 21, 829, 848. Appropriations, In re, 13 Colo. 316,^ 22 Patf. 464. 172. Arapahoe County Com'rs v. Cutler, 3 Colo. 349. 652, 1509. Arbegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush 271. 246, 424. Arberry v. Beavers, 6 Tex. 457, 55 Am. Dec. 791. 1370. Archer v. Railroad Co., 102 111. 493. 1418. Arohy, Ex parte, 9 Cal. 147. 168. Ard V. Pratt, 53 Kan. 632, 36 Pac. 995. 975. Ardrey v. Dallas, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 442, 35 S. W. 726. 1518. Arkadelphia Lumber Co. v. Arka- delphia, 56 Ark. 370, 19 S. W. 1053. 1139. Arkansas B. & L. Assoc, v. Madden, 175 U. S. 269, 20 Sup. Ct. 119. 1411. Armand v. Dumas, 28 La. An. 403. 353. Armstrong v. Athens County, 16 Pet. 281. 107, 112, 379. V.Athens County Treasurer, 10' Ohio 235. 363. V. Cashion (Ark.), 16 S. W. 666. .824. V. County Court, 15 W. Va. 190- 1522. TABLE OF OASES. XXVIL Armstrong v. Hufty, 156 Ind. 106, 55 N. E. 443. 996, 1001. V. Jackson, 1 Blackf. 374. 1064. V. Ogden City, 12 Utah 476, 43 Pac. 119. 1414. V. Russellville Dist. T. Co. (Ky.), 29 S. W. 207. 642. T. St. Paul, 30 Minn. 299, 13 N. W. 164. 1264. V. Stedman, 130 k C. 217, 41 S. E. 278. 1420. V.Taylor County Court, 41 W. Va. 602, 24 S. E. 993. 174, 1437. v: Tol^r, 11 Wheat. 258. 907. Armstrong County v. Overseers of Poor (Pa.), 15 Atl. 892. 349. Arn V. Hoppin, 25 Kan. 707. 1020. Arndt v. Cullman, 132 Ala. 540, 31 South. 4718. 1129. Arnett v. Griffin, 60 Ga. 349. 563, 1482. Arnold v. Cambridge, 106 Mass. 352. 236, 1212. V. Davis, 8 R. I. 341. 643. V. Fort Dodge, 11 Iowa 152, 82 N. W. 495. 1240. V. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 560, 8 S. W. 718. 174, 1420. V. Middletown, 41 Conn. 206. 616, 646. v.Yanders, 56 Ohio St. 417, 47 N. E. 50, 60 Am. St. Rep. 753. 152. Arnson v. Murphy, 115 U. S. 579, 6 Sup. Ct. 185. 1486. Arosin, State ex rel., v. London & N. W. American Mortgage Co., 80 Minn. 277, 83 N. W. 339. 91, 273, 306, 652, 1387. Arrington v. Liscom, 34 Cal. 365, 94 Am. Dec. 722. ^ 1450. Arthur v. School District, 164 Pa. St. 410, 30 Atl. 299. 85, 1433, 1440. Arthurs v. King, 95 Pa. St. 167. 724. V. Smathers, 38 Pa. St. 40. 725, 1036. Asberry v. Roanoke, 91 Va. 562, 22 S. E. 360, 42 L. R. A. 636. Il97, 1289 Ash v.Ashton, 3 W. & S. 510. 525. V. Cummings, 50 N. H. 591. 194. V. People, 11 Mich. 347, 83 Am. Dec. 740. 1141, 1143. Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129, 9 Sup. Ct. 1. 152. Asheville v. Means, 7 Ired. 406. 466. Ashley v. Bristol County Com'rs, 166 Mass. 216, 44 N. E. 220. 623. V.Ryan, 49 Ohio St. 504, 31 N. B. 721. 94, 154. V. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 14 Sup. Ct. 865. 94, 95, 154. Ashton V. Rochester, 133 N. Y. 187,. 30 N. E. 965. 1517. , Asken v. Columbia County, 32 Ark.. 270. 1332. Asper V. Moon, 24 Utah 241, 67 Pac. 409. 793, 801, 888, 956, 1005. Assessment, etc. of Taxes, In re, 4' S. D. 6, 54 N. W. 818. 273, 332. Associates, State ex rel., v. Jersey City, 50 N. J. L. 141, 11 Atl. 348.. 776. Association for Colored Orphans v. New York, 104 N. Y. 581, 12 N. E. 279. 349, 350, 352, 380, 496. Astor V. New York, 62 N. Y. 567. 1298 V. New York, 62 N. Y. 580. 526. V. New York, 39 Super. Ct. 120. 1424. Astor,- In re, 50 N. Y. 363. 1252. In re, 53 N. Y. 61,7. 1165. Astrom v. Hammond, 3 McLeans 107. 136. Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 362. 111. Atchison v. Price, 45 Kan. 296, 25 Pac. 605. 1175, 1207,' 1212. Atchison Nat. Bank v. State, 34 Kan. 379, 8 Pac. 367. 1433. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Atchi- son, 47 Kan. 712, 28 Pac. 1000. 28. 202. V. Clark, 60 Kan. 826, 831, 58 Pac. 477, 561, 47 L. R. A. 77. 3, 81, 258, 260, 293. V. County Com'rs, 47 Kan. 722, 28 Pac. 999. 586, 594. V.Francis, 23 Kan. 495. 293. V.Howe, 32 Kan. 737, 5 Pac. 397. 294. V. Jaques, 20 Kan. 639. 816. V. Maquilkin, 12 Kan. 301. 514, 517.' V. Peterson, 58 Kan. 818, 51 Pac. 290. 851, 1232. V.Wiggins, 5 Okl. 477, 49 Pac. 1019. 586, 1420. V. Wilhelm, 33 Kan. 206, 6 Pac. 273. 586, 1438. V.Wilson, 33 Kan. 223, 6 Pac. 281. 1439. V.Wilson, 35 Kan. 175, 10 Pac. 459. 774. V. Woodcock, 18 Kan. 20. 516, 1435. Athens v. Long, 54 Ga. 330. 10, 258, 344. Athens City Water Works v. Athens, 74 Ga. 413. 267. Athens County Treasurer v. Dale, 60 Ohio St. 180, 53 N. B. 958. 835. Atkins V. Hinman, 2 Gilm. (7 111.) 437. 9, 534, 737, 739, 748, 897, 898, 949. XXVlll TABLE OF CASES. Atkins V. Klnnan, 20 "Wend. 241, 32 Am. Dec. 534. 916, 1005. T.Randolph, 31 Vt. 226. 1306, 1307. Atkinson v. Armick, 25 Mo. 404. 852. V. Dunlap, 50 Me. 111. 1093. Atkison v. Butler Imp. Co., 125 Mo. 565, 28 S. W. 861. 995, 997. V.Dixon, 89 Mo. 464, 1 S. "W. 15. 976. Atlanta v. First Presb. Church, 86 Ga. 730, 13 S. B. 252, 12 L. R. A. 852. 362, 1235. V. Gabbett, 93 Ga. 266, 20 S. B. 306. 1174. ♦ V. Georgia Pac. R. Co., 74 Ga. 16. 365. V. Hamlein, 96 Ga. 381, 23 S. B. 408. 1221, 1258. V. Hanlein, 101 Ga. 697, 29 S. E: 14. 1221, 1258. Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. State, 63 Ga. 483. 370, 870. V.Wright, 87 Ga. 487, 13 S. B. 578. 283, 284. Atlanta Nat. B. & L. Assoc, v. Stewart, 109 Ga. 80, 35 S. B. 73. 87, 283, 284, 404, 489, 658, 680, 705, 1096, 1097, 1100. Atlanta St. R. Co. v. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 104. 377. Atlantic City "Water "Works, State ex rel., V. Smith, 47 N. J. L. 473, 1 Atl. 459. 470. Atlantic, etc. R. Co. v. Allen, 15 Fla. 637. 366, 370, 374. V. Clelno, 2 Dill. 175. 816,1514. V. Commissioners, 87 N. C. 129. 369. V. State, 55 Ga. 312. 115. V. State, 60 N. H. 133. 758. Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Lesueur (Ariz.), 19 Pac. 157, 1 L. R. A. 244. 369, 697. V.Yavapai County (Ariz.), 21 Pac. 768. 369, 696, 697, 884, 889, 1383. Atlantic Trust Co. v. Darlington, 63 Fed. 76. 488, 553, 764. Attorney-General v. American Bx- press Co., 118 Mich. 682, 77 N. W. 317. 909. V. Bay ■ State Mining Co., 99 Mass. 148, 96 Am. Dec. 717. 403, 681. V. Bay Supervisors, 34 Mich. 46. 181, 230. V. Burrell, 31 Mich. 25, 210. V. Cambridge, 16 Gray 247. 239, 1297. V. Detroit, 26 Mich. 263. 1432. V. Detroit Common Council, 113 Mich. 388, 71 N. "W. 632. 352, 408, 474. V. Bau Claire, 37 "Wis. 400. 196. Attorney-General v. Ixavenworth, 2 Kan. 61. 428, 600. v.Marston, 66 N. H. 485, 22 Atl. 560, 13 L. R. A. 670. 431. , V. Mining Co., 99 Mass. 148, 96 Am. Dec. 717. 403,, 681. V.Myers, 58 Hun 218, 12 N. Y. Supp. 754. 551. V.Napier, 6 Bxch. 217. 23. V. Pingree, 120 Mich. 550, 79 N. "W. 814. 181. V. Plankroad Co., 11 "Wis. 35. 340. V. Railway Co., 2 H. & C. 792. 32. V. St. Clair Supervisors, 30 Mich. 388. 425. V. Salem, 103 Mass. 138. 1523. V. Supervisors, 34 Mich. 46. 181, 230. V. Supervisors, 42 Mich. 72, 3 N. W.260. 755, 1354, 1383. Attorney-General of Massachusetts V. Western Union Tel. Co., 33 Fed. 129. 93, 140, 141, 164. V. Western "Union Tel. Co., 141 U. S. 40, 11 Sup. Ct. 889. 93, 140, 141, 164. Atwater v. Woodbridge, 6 Conni 223, '16 Am. Dec. 46. 1489. Atwell V. Barnes, 109 Mich. 10, 66 N. W. 583. 1517. v.Zelufe, 26 Mich. 118. 750, 1470, 1476, 1506, 1510. Atwood V. Lincoln, 44 Vt. 332. 572. V. Weems, 99 U. S. 183. 803. Auburn v. Paul, 84 Me. 212, 24 Atl. 817. 1190, 1254. V. Young Men's Christian As- soc, 86 Me. 244, 29 Atl. 992. 112, 352, 357, 757. Auditor v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 6 Kan. 500, 7 Am. 574. 47, 1396, 1474. V. New Albany & S. R., 11 Ind. 570. 396, 688. V. Treasurer, 4 S. C. 311. 1333. Auditor-General v. Ayer, 109 Mich. 694, 67 N. W. 985. 448, 785. V. Ayer, 122 Mich. 136, 80 N. W. 997. 537, 754, 775. V. Bay Supervisors, 106 Mich. 662, 64 N. W. 570. 495, 548, 908, 909, 921. V. Bolt, 124 Mich. 185, 82 N. W. 845. 908. V. Chandler, 108 Mich. 569, 66 N. W. 482. 484, 772, 774. V. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co., 116 Mich. 122, 74 N. W. 505. 382, 521, 524, 546, 576. V. Fisher, 84 Mich. 128, 47 N. W. 574. 1248. TABLE or OASES. XXIX Auditor-General v. Flint & P. M. R. Co., 119 Mich. 682, 78 N. W. 889. 375, 376. T. Gurney, 109 Mich. 472, 67 N. W. 525, 1113. 529. V.Hill, 97 Mich. 80, 56 N. W. 219. 448. v.Hili, 98 Mich. 326, 57 N. W. 168. 564, 785. T.Hutchinson, 113 Mich. 245, 71 N. W. 514, 463, 524, 578, 773, 794, 87,7, 879. T. Iosco Circuit Judge, 58 Mich. 345, 25 N. W. 310. 495. ■ V. Jackson Supervisors, 24 Mich. 237. 425. V. Jenkinson, 90 Mich. 523, 51 N. W. 643. 385, 752, 877. T. Keweenaw Assoc, 107 Mich. 405, 65 N. W. 288. 524, 730, 789, 918. V. Lake George & M. R. Co., 82 Mich. 426, 46 N. W. 730. 838, 849. V. Longyear, 110 Mich. 223, 68 N. W. 130. 448, 524, 577, 785. V. McArthur, 87 Mich. 457, 49 N. W. 592. 228, 524. V. McLaulin, 83 Mich. 352, 47 N. W. 233. 896. V. Maler, 95 Mich. 127, 54 N. W. 640. 892, 1249, 1273. V. Melze, i24 Mich. 285, 82 N. W. 886. 72. V. Menominee Supervisors, 89 Mich. 552, 51 N. W. 483. 414, 425. V. Monroe Supervisors, 36 Mich. 70. 496, 499, 1487. V. Ottawa Supervisors, 76 Mich. 295, 42 N. W. 1101. 908. V.Patterson, 122 Mich. 39, 80 N. W. 884. 908, 921, 922. V. Pioneer Iron Co., 123 Mich. 521, 83 N. W. 260. 382, 385, 386, 1460, 1461. V. Prescott, 94 Mich. 190, 53 N. W. 1058. 382. V. Pullman Car Co., 34 Mich. 59. 533. V. Regents, 83 Mich. 467, 47 N. W. 44b, 10 L. R. A. 376. 265, 352. V. Reynolds, 83 Mich. 471, 47 N. W. 442. 486, 775, 785. V.Roberts, 83 Mich. 471, 47 N. W. 442. 486,. 775, 785. V. Sage Land Co., 129 Mich. — , 88^ N. W. 468, 56 L. R. A. 105. 264, 385. V. Sessions, 100 Mich. 343, 58 N. W. 1014. 777. V. Shiawassee Supervisors, 74 Mich. 536, 42 N. W. 143. 908. Auditor-General v. Sloman, 84 Mich.. 118, 47 N. W. 565. 887. V.Smith, 125 Mich. 576, 85 N. W. 8. 740, 748. V. Sparrow, 116 Mich. 574, 74 N. "W. 881. 448, 524, 537, 576, 578, 748, 775, 777, 785, 793, 7^4, 883. V. Stiles, 83 Mich. 460, 47 N. W.. 241. 796. V. Supervisors of Monroe, 36 Mich. 70. 496, 499, 1487. ■V.Williams, 94 Mich. 180, SS' N. W. 1097. 85. V. Women's Temp. Assoc, 119' Mich. 430, 78 N. W. 466. 351, 353. Auditors v. Benolt, 20 Mich. 176, * Am. Rep. 382. 434, 435, 436. Auer V. Dubuque, 65 Iowa 650, 22' N. W. 914. 632. Augusta v. Central R., 78 Ga. 119. 1099, 1121. V. Dunbar, 50 Ga. 387. 651, 90l. V. Georgia R. etc. Co., 26 Ga. 651. 396. V.Kimball, 91 Me. 605, 40 Atl. 666, 41 L. R. A. 475. 24, 84, 661. V. National Bank, 47 Ga. 562. 473, 585. V. North, 57 Me. 392, 2 Aih. Rep.. 55. 1, 17, 5,85. V. Pearce, 79 Ga. 98, 4 S. B. 104.. 1383 V. Walton, 37 Ga. 620. 466, 474. Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 36 Me. 255, 259. 392.^ Augusta City Council v. Murphey,. •79 Ga. 101, 3 S, B. 326. 1157-, 1201. Augusta Factory v. Augusta City Council, 83 Ga. 734, 10 S. B. 359. 1425. Augusti V. Citizens' Bank, 46 La, An. 529, 15 South. 74. 732. V. Lawless, 43 La. An. 1097, 10" South. 171. 598, 740. V. Lawless, 45 La. An. 1370. 522, 740, 746. Augustine v. Jennings, 42 Iowa 198. 1031. Aulanier v. Governor, 1 Tex. 653. 1113, 1146. Auld V. McAllister, 43 Kan. 162, 23- Pac 165. 806, 1020. Aultman, etc." Co. v. Holde;:, 68 Fed. 467. 152, 154. Aurora v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co.^ 119 111. 246, 10 N. E. 27. 582, 586. V. Lamar, 59 Ind. 400. 221, 1441. V. Lindsay, 146 Mo. 509, 48 S. W. 642. 810. v.McGannon, 138 Mo. 38, 39 S. W. 469. 261, 311, 469, 1095,. 1117. XXX TABLE OF OASES. Aurora v. West, 9 Ind. 74. 289. Aurora Iron Mining Go. v. Iron- wood, 119 Mich. 325, 78 N. W. 126. 1383, 1504. Austen v. Hudson River Tel. Co., 73 Hun 96, 25 N. Y. Supp. 916. 674. Austin V. Austin Gas-Light, etc. Go., 69 Tex. 180, 7 S. W. 200. 335, 344, 408, 567, 573. V. Barrett, 44 Iowa 488. 1073. V. Boston, 14 Allen 359. 131. V. Bremer Gounty, 44 Iowa 155. 1521. V.Holt, 32 Wis. 478. 1003? 1016, 1085. V. Jones, 37 Kan. 327, 15 Pac. 166. 1074. V. Nalle, 85 Tex. 520, 22 S. W. 668, 960. 172, 467. V.Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 667, 27 Pac. 557. 1198. V.Tennessee, 179 TJ. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct. 132. 144. , V. Westchester Tel. Co., 8 Misc. Rep. 11, 27 N. Y. Supp. 77. 838. Austrian v. Guy, 21 Fed. 500. 8. Avant v. Flynn, 2 S. D. 153, 49 N. W. 15. 526, 761, 783, 784. Avery v. De Witt, 72 Mich. 25, 40 N. W. 39. 665. V. Bast Saginaw, 44 Mich. 587, 7 N. W. 177. 772, 752, 785, 1510. V. Judd, 21 Wis. 362. 965. V.Rose, 4 Dev. 549. 939, 953, 1005. -Axtell V. Gerlach, 67 Gal. 483, 8 Pac. 34. 956. Ayer v. Goss, 71 N. H. 66, 51 Atl. 253. 1343. V. Somerville, 143 Mass. 585, xu N. E. 457. 1214. -Ayers v. Chicago Title, etc. Co., 187 111. 42, 58 N. B. 318. 380, 669, 670. V. Lawrence, 59 N. Y. 192. 1437. V. McCalla, 95 Ga. 555, 22 S. B. 295'. 173, 576. V. Moulton, 51 Vt. 115. 438. V. Widmayer, 188 111. 121, 58 N. E. 956. 111. Ayers, Ex parte, 123 V. S. 443; 8 Sup. Ct. 164. 119. Ayres v. Duprfey, 27 Tex. 593, 86 Am. Dec. 657. 445. Aztec Copper Co. v. Auditor-Gen- eral, 128 Mich. 615, 87 N. W. 895. 893, 898, 979. B. :Babbitt v. Johnson, 15 Kan. 252. 978. Babcock v. Beaver Creek T'p, 64 Mich. 601, 31 N. W. 423. 1506. V. Beaver Creek T'p, 65 Mich. 479, 32 N. W. 653. 1505, 1509. v. Bonebrake, 77 Iowa, 710, 42 N. W. 559. 1028,- 1042. V.Granville, 44 Vt. 325. 1382, 1474, 1508. V.Lamb, 1 Cow. 238. 442. Babcock, In re, 115 N. Y. 450, 22 N. B. 263. 597, 820. Bachelder ' v. Epping, 8 Post. 354. 223. V.Thompson, 41 Me. 539. 796, 1482. Bacon v. Board of State Tax Com'rs, 126 Mich. 22, 85 N. W. 307, 86 Am. St. Rep. 524. 87, 305, 345, 389, ^02, 463. V. Callender, 6 Mass. 303.- 1064. V. Savannah, 86 Ga. 301, 12 S. E. 580. 933, 1164, 1211, 1218. V. Savannah, 91 Ga. 500, 17 S. E. 749. 1243. V. Savannah, 105 Ga. 62, 31 S. B. 127. 511, 531, 864, 1245, 1255. V. School District, 97 Mass. 421. 415, 1489. . v. State Tax Com'rs, 126 Mich. 22, 85 N. W. 307. 87, 305, 345, 389, 402, 463. Baer v. Choir, 7 Wash. 631, 32 Pac. 776. 727, 1009. Bagby v. Bateman, 50 Tex. 446. 554. Bagg V. Detroit, 5 Mich. 336. 1251. Bagley v. Castile, 42 Ark. 77. 52, 67, 1024. V. Shoppach, 47 Ark. 72, 14 S. W. 467. 983. Bailey v. Ackerman, 54 N. H. 527, 531. 796 v. Berkey, 81 Fed. 737. 1474. v.Buell, 50 N. Y. 662.. 1379, 1469, 1501. V. Collector (State v. Brown), 53 N. J. L. 162, 20 Atl. 772. 248, 436, 438. V. Doolittle, 24 111. B77. 896, 898. V. Drane, 96 Tenn. 16, 33 S. W. 573. 380, 669, 670. V. Fisher, 38 Iowa 229. 432. V. Puqua, 24 Miss. 497. 866. V. Haywood, 70 Mich. 188, 38 N. W. 209. 590, 826. V. Howard, 55 Iowa 290, 7 N. W. 592. 1072. v.Maguire, 22 Wall. 215. 113, 368. V. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669. 1306. TABLE OF OASES. XXXI ■Bailey v. People, 158 111. 52, 41 N. E. 784. 985. V. Railroad Co., 22 Wall. 604. 370, 405, 682, 850, 1477, 1495. V.Smith, 178 111. 72. 52 N. E. 948. 992, 1036. Bailey's Adm'r v. Campbell, 82 Ala. 342, 346, 2 South. 646. 965. eain V. Richmond & D. R. Co., 105 N. C. 363, 11 S. B. 811, 18 Am. St. Rep 912, 8 L. R. A. 299. 163. "Baird v. Bank of Washington, 11 S. & R. 411; 436. v.Law, 93 Iowa 742, 61 N. W. 1086. 1057, 1074. V. McNamara, 78 Miss. 455, 30 South. 69. 1031, 1051. V. People, 83 111. 387. 239. •Baker v. Allen, 21 Pick. 382. 1470. V. Big Rapids, 65 Mich. 76, 31 N. W. 810. 1502. V.Boston, 12 Pick. 184, 22 Am. Dec. 421. 1130. V. Briggs,'99 Va. 360, 38 S. E. 277. 980. V. Buckner, 99 Va. 368, 38 S. E. 281. 979, 981. V. Cincinnatf, 11 Ohio St. 534. 324, 1141, 1502, 1508. V. Clark, 52 Mich. 22, 17 N. W. 225. 971. -V. Crabb, 73 Iowa 412, 35 N. W. 484. 1041, 1042. -V.Kelly, 11 Minn. 480. 859, 1082. V.King County, 17 Wash. 622, 50 Pac. 481. 712, 1385. -V. Lee, 41 Hun 591. 799. V. McDuffle, 23 Wend. 289. 445. T.Panola County, 30 Tex. 86. 1113, 1146, 1507. V. Scheussler, 85 Ala. 541, S South. 328. 1335. ■V.Seattle, 2 Wash. St. 576,' 27 . Pac. 462. 1301. V. State, 44 Ark. 134. 102. •V. State, 27 Ind. 485. 1474. V. United ^tates (County Court V. Huidekoper), 109 U. S. 229, 3 Sup. Ct. 131. 175. V. Whiting, 3 Sumn. 475. 966. V. Windham, 13 Me. 74. 209. Bakewell v. Police Jury, 20 La. An. 334. 239. Balch V. Shaw, 174 Mass. 144, 54 N E 99 349 "Baldwin v. Buffalo, 35 N. Y. 375. 1401. v.City Council, 53 Ala. 437. 102, 556. V. County Com'rs, 85 Md. 145, 36 Atl. 764. 87, 672. v.lElizabeth, 42 N. J. Eq. 11, 6 Atl. 275. 977, 1413.' Baldwin v. Ellis, 68 Cal. 495, 9 Pac. 652. 785. V.Ely, 66 Wis. 171, 28 N. W. 392. 52, 60, 1027, 1054. V. First Parish, 8 Pick. 494. 672. v. Fuller, 39 N. J. L. 576. 181. V. Hastings, 83 Mich. 639, 47 N. W. 507. 380. V. Hewitt, 88 Ky. 673, 11 S. W. 803. 19, 270, 1420. V. McClinch, 1 Me. 102. 1469. V.Maryland, 179 TJ. S. 220, 21 Sup. Ct. 105. 846. V. Mayne, 42 Iowa 131. 871. v.Merriam, 16 Neb. 199, 20 N. W. 250. 997, 1080, 1082. v. North Brandford, 32 Conn. 47. 218. - v. Shine, 84 Ky. 502, 2 S. W. 164. 50, 92, 428, 609, 617, 619, 650, 664, 1412, 1420. V. State, 89 Md. 587, 43 Atl. 857. 58, 799, 842. V. Trustees, 37 Me. 369. 673. V.Tucker, 16 Fla. 258. 1415. V. Wilbraham, 140 Mass. 459, 4 N. E. 829. 1032. BaUe V. Lammers, 109 Ind. 347, 10 N. E. 92.' 1442. Balfour v. Portland, 28 Fed. 738. 1494. Ball V. Barnes, 123 Ind. 394, 24 N. E. 142. 921, 948. V. Busch, 64 Mich. 336, 31 N. W. 565. 499, lOlO. V. Meridian, 67 MSss. 91, 6 South. 645. 1427. V. Ridge Copper Co., 118 Mich. 7, 76 N. W. 130. 55, 62, 631, 781, 897. Ballance v. Forsyth, 13 How. 18. 949, 954. Ballentlne v. Palaski, 15 Lea 633. 200, 474. Ballerino v. Mason, 83 Cal. 447, 23 Pac. 530. 754, 1474. Balogh V. Lyman, 6 App. Div. 271, 39 N. Y. Supp. 780. 1424. Baltimore v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 6 Gill 288, 48 Am. Dec. 531. 372, 377, 396, 404. V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 57 Md. 31. , 27, 92, 652, 832. V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 84 Md. 1, 35 Atl. 17, 33 L. R. A. 503. 684. v. Boyd, 64 Md. 10, 20 Atl. 1028. 1245. V. Canton Co., 63 Md. 218. 691. V. Cemetery Co., 7 Md. 517. 362, 364, 365, 1182, 1201, 1206, 1234. ■ V. City Passenger R. Co., 51 Md. 31. 27, 92, 652, 832. xxSii TABLE OF OASES. Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375. 1430, 1433 1437. V. Gorter', 93 Md. 1, 48 Atl. 445. 487, 563. V.Grand Lodge, 60 Md. 280. i;l2, 113, 628, 632. V. Greenmount Cemetery Co., 7 Md. 517. 1, 362, 364, 365, 1182, 1201, 1206, 1234. V. Hook, 62 Md. 371. 1246. V.Howard, 6 H. & J. 383. 17, 836 1291 V.Hughes, i'gHI & J. 480, 19 Am. Dec. 243. 231, 422, 1182, 1208, 1209, 1258. V. Husey, 67 Md. 112, 9 Atl. 19. 25, 26, 84, 90, 125, 1507, 1520. V. Johnson, 62 Md. 225. 1251. V. Johns Hopkins Hospital, 56 Md. 1. 1221. V. Keeley Institute, 81 Md. 106, 31 Atl. 437, '27 L. R. A. 646. 1300. V. Marriott, 9 Md. 160, 174. 478. V.Porter, 18 Md. 284, 79 Am. Dec. 686. 1430, 1452. V. Railroad Co., 21 Md. 50. 1415. V. Raymo, 68 Md. 569, 13 Atl. 387. 1280, 1283. V. Scharf, 54 Md. 499. 627, 1221, 1239. V. Smith, etc. Brick Co., 80 Md. 458, 31 Atl. 423. 1256, 1264. V. State, 15 Md. 376, 74 Am. Dec. 572. 191, 192, 357, 1296. V.Stewart, 92 Md. 535, 48 Atl. 165. 1221. V. Stirling, 29 Md. 38. 660. v.Ulman, 79 Md. 469, 30 Atl. 43. 530, 531, 1239. V. Whittington, 78 Md. 231, 27 Atl. 984. 949. Baltimore & E. S. R. Co. v. Spring, 80 Md. 510, 31 Atl. 210, 27 L. R. A. 72. 181, 555. Baltimore & O. .R. Co. v. Allen, 17 Fed. 171. 1333. V. District of Columbia, 2 Mac- key, 122. 358. V. Jefferson County, 29 Fed. 305. 5, 114, 216, 355. V. Marshall County, 3 W. Va. 319 113 358 V. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456. 407, 408. V. Wheeling, 3 W. Va. 372. 358. Baltimore & 0. S. W. R. Co. v. Peo- ■ pie, 156 111. 189, 40 N. E. 834. 584. Baltimore, C. & A. R. Co. v. Com- missioners, 93 Md. 113, 48 Atl. 853. 463, 487, 494, 605, 673, 697. V. Ocean City, 89 Md. 89, 42 Atl. 922. 112, 357, 374. Baltimore County Com'rs v. Mary land Insane Hospital, 62 Md. 127. 266. V. Winand, 77 Md. 522, 26 Atl. 1110. 783, 1357. Baltimore Turnpike Co., Ex parte, 5 Binn. 481. 443. Bambrick v. Campbell, 37 Mo. App. 460. 844. Bammel v. Houston, 68 Tex. 10, 2 S. W. 740. 120. Banaz v. Smith, 133 Cal. 102, 65 Pac. 309. 1218. Bancroft v. Dumas, 21 Vt. 456. 907,. * 1097. v.Lynnfield, 18 Pick. 566, 568.. 209. V. Ttayer, 5 Sawy. 502. 200. Banger's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 7^. 328, 1420. Bangor v. Lancey, 21 Me. 472. 442, 594, 763. V. Masonic, Lodge, 73 Me. 428, 40' Am. Rep. 369. 349. Bangor & P. R. Co. v. Harris, 21 Me. 533. 396, 697. V. Smith, 47 Me. 34. 114. Bangor T'p v. Smith Transp. Co., 106 Mich. 223, 64 N. W. 28. V. Smith Transp. Co., 112 Mich. 601, 71 N. W. 143. 836. Bangs V. Snow, 1 Mass. 181. 472, 546. Bank v. Apthorp. See Portland Bank v. Apthorp.^ V. Maher. See Albany City Bank v. Maher. Bankers' Life Assoc, v. Douglas County Com'rs, 61 Neb. 202, 85 N. W. 54. 1504, 1511. Bank of Augusta v. .Earle, 13 Pet. 519. 95. Bank of Bramwell v. County Court, 36 W. Va. 341, 15 S. E. 78. 611. Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5 Ired. 516. 370, 401, 402. Bank of Champaign County v. Smith, 7 Ohio St. 42. 124, 356. Bank of Chenango v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467. 443, 1482. Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1. 323. Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 313, 29 N. E. 532. 690. V. New York, 2 Black 620. 130, 131, 396, 403, 406, 678. V.Stone (Ky.), 56 S. W. 683. 1398. v. Tennessee, 104 V. S. 493. 358, 375, 378. V.Tennessee, 161 TJ. S. 134, 16 Sup. Ct. 456. 357, 371, 373, 404, 708. TABLE OF CASES. XXXUl Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 163 V. S. 416, 16 Sup. Ct. 1113. 114, 357, 371. Bank- of Commonwealth v. New York, 43 N. Y. 184. 1492. Bank of Garnett v. Ferris, 55 Kan. 120, 39 Pac. 1042. 798, 1425. Bank of Georgia v. Savannah, Dud- ley 130. 370, 398, 400, 401. Bank of Kentucky v. Stone, 88 Fed. 383. 1411, 1412, 1417, 1418. Bank of Marion, In re, 153 111. 516, 39 N. E. 118. 618. Bank of Mendocino v. Chalfant, 51 Cal. 369. ^79, 1485. Bank of Metropolis v. Weber, 41 Fed.. 413. 707. Bank of Ne* York v. Supervisors, 7 Wall. 26. 131, 132. Bank of Oxford v. Board of Super- visors, 79 Miss. 152, 29 South. 825. 611. V. Oxford, 70 Miss. 504, 12 South. 203. 706, 709. Bank of Pennsylvania v. Common- wealth, 19 Pa. St. 144. 7, 8, 48, 673. Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 111. 53. 362. Bank of Rome v. Rome, 18 N. Y. 38. 176.- Bank of Santa Fe v. Buster, 50 Kan. 356', 50 Pac. 356. 709. Bank of Santa Rosa v. Chalfant, 52 Cal. 170. 1501. Bank of State v. New Albany, 11 Ind. 139. 289, 290, 1189. Bank of Tennessee v. State, 9 Yerg. 490. 371. Bank of United States v. State, 12 S. & M. 456. 22. Bank of University v. Athens Sav. Bank, 107 Ga. 246, 33 S. E. 34. 855. Bank of Utica v. Utica, 4 Paige 399, , 27 Am. Dec. 71. 402, 407. Bank of Woodland v. Webber, 52 Cal. 73. 1501. Banks v. McClellan, 24 Md. 62, 82, 87 Am. Dec. 594. 815. Banks, The, v. Mayor, 7 Wall. 16. 131. Bank Tax Cases, 2 Wall. 200. 131, 678. Banning v. McManus, 51 Minn. 289, 53 N. W. 635. 492. Bannon v. Burnes, 39 Fed. 892. 67, 135, 978, 1011. Banta v. Richards, 42 N. J. L. 497. 512. Barber v. Chicago, 152 111. 37, 38 N. B. 253. 1213. V.Evans, 27 Minn. 92, 6 N. W. 445. 1021. Barber v. Parr, 54 Iowa 57, 6 N. W. 134. 1389. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Den- ver, 72 Fed. 336, 19 C. C. A. 139. 1278. V, Gogreve, 41 La. An. 251, 5 South. 848. 98, 175, 1201, 1298. V. Harrisburg, 64 Fed. 283, 12 C. C. A. 100, 28 U. S. App. 108, 29 L. R. A. 401. 1282.' V. New Orleans, 41 La. An. 1015, 6 South. 794. 26, 90. v.Watt, 51 La. An. 1345, 26 South. 70. 455, 1225, 1247, 1252, 1288. Barbour v. Camden, 51 Me. 608. 218. V. Louisville Board of Trade, 82 Ky. 645. 296. V. Nelson, 1 Litt. 60. 859. Barden v. Montana Club, 10 Mont. 330, 25 Pac. 1042, 24 Am. St. Rep. 24, 11 L. R. A. 593. 1114. Bardon v. Land, etc. Imp. Co., 157 U. S. 327, 15 Sup. Ct. 650. 997, 1056, 1084, 1085, 1456. Bardrick v. Dillon, 7 Okl. 635. 54 Pac. 785. 771, 785, 1436, 1437, 1447, 1461. Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N. Y. 238. 1468, 1470. Barke v. Early, 72 Iowa 273, 33 N. W. 677. 913, 1020, 1455, 1458. Barker v. Altschul, 60 Cal. 380. 1288 V.Blake, 36 Me. 433. 725, 735. V. Hesseltine, 27 Me. 354. 725. V.Jones, 62 N. H, 497, 13 Am. St. Rep. 586. 966, 970. V. Mackay, 168 Mass. 76, 46 N. E. 412. 1032. V.Morton, 19 Ind. 146. 855. V. Omaha, 16 Neb. 269, 20 N. W. 382. 626, 1517. V. Southern Const. Co. (Ky.), 47 S. W. 608. 106, 839, 894, 1225, 1252, 1288. V. Watertown, 137 Mass. 227. 655. . Barkley v. Levee Com'rs,'93 U. S. 258. 882, 1351. Barlow v. Tacoma, 12 Wash. 32, 40 Pac. 382. 1515. V. The Ordinary, 47 Ga. 639. 45, 133L Barksdale v. Sampson -County Com'rs, 93 N. C. 472, 16 S. B. 621. 174, 471. Barnard v. Argyle, 20 Me. 296. 1469. V. Gall, 43 La. An. 959, 10 South. 5. 505. V. Graves, 13 Met. 85. 446, 797, 827, 856, 1482. XXXIV TABLE OF CASES. Barnard v. Hoyt, 63 111. 341. 1035, 1039, 1452, 1453. V.Mercer, 54 Kan. 630, 39 Pac. 182. 804. V. Wilson, 74 dal. 512, 16 Pac 307. 964. Barnardiston v. Soane, 6 How. St. Tr. 1096. 1465. Barnes v. Atchison, 2 Kan. 454. 1201, 1218. V. Boardman, 149 Mass. 106, 21 N. B. 208, 3 L. R. A. 785. 950. V. Doe, 4 Ind. 132. 455, 1004. V. Dyer, 56 Vt. 469. 1210. V. Flummerfelt, 21 Wash. 498, 58 Pac. 575. 271. V. Komegay, 62 Fed. 671. 107, 114. V.Lewis, 98 Ga. 558, 25 S. E. 589. 660. V. Marshall County, 56 Iowa 20, 8 N. W. 677. 1398. V.Woodbury, 17' Nev. 383, 30 Pac. 1068. 651. Barnett v. Cline, 60 111. 205. 1425, 1450. V. Jaynes, 26 Colo. 279, 57 Pac. 703. 952, 998, 1002, 1388. Barney v. State, 42 Md. 480. 847, 1374. Barnhard v. White Cloud, 108 Mich. 508, 66 N. W. 387. 1504. Barnum v. Barnes, 118 Mich. 264, 76 N. W. 406. 895, 899, 990. Barnwell v. Marion, 60 S. C. 314, 38 S. E. 593. 813. Barr v. Deniston, 19 N. H. 170. 1430, 1437. V. Omaha, 42 Neb. 341, 60 N. W. 591. 1256. V. Randall, 35 Kan. 126, 10 Pac. 515. 1075. Barret v. Copeland, 18 Vt. 67, 69. 445. Barrett v. Amerein, 36 Cal. 322. 965, 974. V. Cambridge, 10 Allen 48. 1496. V. Crane, 16 Vt. 246. 879, 1346. V.Holmes, 102 U. S. 651. 1072, 1085, 1088. V. Kevane, 100 Iowa 653, 69 N. W. 1036. 136, 1009. V.Love, 48 Iowa 103. 1074. V. Reed; 2 Ohio 409. 436. V. Shannon, 19 Mont. 397, 48 Pac. 746. 1510. Barrett's Appeal, 73 Conn. 288 47 Atl. 243. 1430. Barringer v. Cowan, 2 Jones' Eq. 436. 361. Barrington v. Austin, 8 Gray 444. 440. V Barron v. Mayor, 7 Pet. 247. 55. Barrow v. Davis, 46 Mo. 394. 1411, '1416. v. Wilson, 38 La. An. 209. 1077. V. Wilson, 39 La. An. 403, ' 2 South. 809. 498, 991, 1067, 1076, 1077. Barstow v. Big Rapids, 56 Mich. ,35, 22 N. W. 103. 673. Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall." 129. 171. V. Rohlfs, 71 Iowa 582, 32 N. W. 673. 503, 582. Barthel v. Meader, 72 Iowa 125, 33 N. W. 446. 569. » V. New Orleans, 26 La. An. 340. 1108. • Barthell v. Syverson, 54 Iowa 160, 6 N. W. 178. 813. Bartholemew v. Austin, 85 Fed. 359, 29 C. C. A. 568. 262, 292, 335. V. Harwinton, 33 Conn. 408. 218. V. Leach, 7 Watts 472. 968. Bartlett v. Ambrose, 78 Fed. 839. 1084, 1091. V. Carter, 59 N. H. 105. 678. V. Kinsley, 15 Conn. 327. 572. V.Morris, 9 Port. 266. 450. V. Wilson, 59 Vt. 23, 8 Atl. 321. 72, 336, 611, 760. V.Wilson, 60 Vt. 644^ 15 Atl. 317. 33, 620. Bartley's Heirs v. Harris, 70 Tex. 181, 70 S. W. 797. 1005. Barton v. Gilchrist, 19 W. Va. 223. 934, 989, 990. V. Kalloch, 56 Cal. 95. 280. V. Lattourette, 55 Ark. 81, 17 S. W. 588. 437. V. McWhinney, 85 Ind. 481. 985, 1019. V. Moss, 32 111. 50. 968. Barton's Heirs v. Gilchrist, 19 W. Va. 223. 934, 989, 990. Bartram v. Bridgeport, 55 Conn. 122, 10 Atl. 470. 1242. Baskins v. Winston, 24 Miss. 431. 949, 953. . Basnett v. Jacksonville, 19 Fla. 664. 555. Basnight v. Smith, 112 N. C. 229, 16 S. E. 902. 984. Bass V. Fond du Lac County, 60 Wis. 516, 19 N. W. 526. 529. V. People, 159 111. 207, 42 N. E. 880. 889. V. South Park Com'rs, 171 111. 370, 49 N. E. 548. 1168, 1243. Bassett v. Barbin, 11 La. An. 672. 1350. V. El Paso, 88 Tex. 168, 30 S. W. 893. 586, 587. V. Governor, 11 Ga. 207. 1344. TABLE OF CASES. XXXV Bassett v. Porter, 4 Cush. 487. 847, 848, 1471. V. Porter, 10 Cush. 418. 1471. V. Welsh, 22 Wis. 175. 965, 974. Bassford, In re, 50 N. Y. 509. 1249. Basso V. Benker, 33 La. An. 432. 1028, 1045. , Basten v. Carew, 3 B. & C. 652. 1466. Batchelder v. Cambridge, 176 Mass. 384, 57 N. E. 664. 666. Bate V. Speed, 10 Bush 644. 478. Bates V. Boston, 5 Cush. 93. 1478. T. District of Columbia, 7 Mac- key 76. 532. V. Hamilton, 144 Mo. 1, 45 S. W. 641, 66 Am. St. Rep. 407. 821 T. Kimball, 2 Chip. 77. 46. V. Mobile, 46 Ala. 158. 655, 1104. V. People's, etc. Assoc, 42 Ohio St. 655. 813. V. Sharon, 175 Mass. 293, 56 N. B. 586. 349, 732, 1379. V. York County, 15 Neb. 284, 18 N. W. 81. 1497. Bates' Case, 2 State Trials 371. 95. Bath V. Reed, 78 Me. ^76, 4 Atl. 688. v.Whitmore, 79 Me. 182, 9 Atl. 119. 536, 791, 797, 1384, 1385, 1459. Baton Rouge, etc. R. Co. v. Kirk- land, 33 La. An. 622. 359. Baton Rouge Water Works, In re, 34 La. An. 255. 859. Batterson's Appeal, 72 Conn. 374, 44 Atl. 546. 691, 692. Battle V. Mobile, 9 Ala. 234, 44 Am. Dec. 438. 102. Batty V. Hastings, 63 Neb. 26, 88 N. W. 139. 1081, 1247, 1252, 1253, 1428, 1518. Baugh V. Ryan, 51 Ala. 212. 362. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966. 51, 63, 99, 626, 1161, 1162, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1207, 1237, 1284. Baumgardner v. Fowler, 82 Md. 631, 34 Atl. 537. 508, 929, 930, 991, 1011. Baumgarten, In re, 39 App. Div. 174, 57 N. Y. Supp. 284. 1399. Bausman v. Lancaster, 50 Pa. St. 208. 251. Baxter v. Dickinson, 136 Cal. 185, 68 Pac. 601. 938, 941. V.Jersey City, 36 N. J.' L. 188. 916. T. Vineland Irrig. Dist., 136 Cal. 185, 68 Pac. 601. 938, 941. V. Wade, 39 W. Va. 281, 19 S. B. 404. 946, 995. Bayard v. Inglis, 5 W. & S. 465. 1066. Bayard v. Klinge, 16 Minn. 249. 568. Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499. 4, 181, 206, 411, 419. Bay County v. Brock, 44 Mich. 45, 6 N. W. 101. 1328. Bay Rock Co. v. Bell, 133 Cal. 150, 65 Pac. 299. 1246. Bay Supervisors v. Arenac Super- visors, 11 Mich. 105, 69 N. W. 146. 1352. Bays V. Lapidge, 52 Cal. 481. 840, 882, 884. , V. Trulson, 25 Or. 109, 35 Pac. 26. 948, 950, 1005, 1017. Beach V. Botsford, 1 Doug. 199, 40 Am. Dec. 45. 1482. V. Chicago, 193 111. 369, 61 N. B. 1015. 1245. V. Furman, 9 Johns. 228. 1477. V. People, 157 111. 659, 41 N. B. 1117. ^1271. V. Schoenraaker, 18 Kan. 174. 1455. Beach, Matter of, 154 N. Y. 242, 48 N. B. 516. 380. Beacham v. Gurney, 91 Iowa 621, 60 N. W. 187. 969. Beach's Estate, In re, 154 N. Y. 242. 380. Beale v. Brown, 6 Mackey 574. 989. Beals V. Amador Co., 35 Cal. 624. 209, 258, 280. V. Brookline, 174 Mass. 1, 54 N. E. 339. 1255. v. James, 173 Mass. 591, 54 N. E. 245. 1169, 1404, 1406. V. Providence Rubber Co., 11 R. I. 381, 23 Am. Rep. 472. 823. Beaman v. Board of Police, 42 Miss. 237. 1361. Bean v. Brownwood, 91 Tex. 684, 45 S. W. 897. 930, 931. V. Middlesboro (Ky.), 57 S. W. 478. 1505. V. Parker, 17 Mass. 591, 601. 445. V.Thompson, 19 N. H. 290, 49 Am. Dec. 154. 536, 541, 958. Bear v. Commissioners (N. J.), 48 Atl. 538. 265. Beard v. Allen, 141 Ind. 243, 40 N. E. 654. 874, 965. V. Brooklyn, 31 Barb. 142. 1281. V. Cameron, 3 Murph. 181. 436. V.Green, 51 Miss. 856. 956. V. Supervisors, 51 Miss. 542. 482. Bear Lake, etc. Co. v. Ogden City, 8 Utah, 494, 33 Pac. 135. 380. Beardstown v. Virginia, 76 111. 34. 450. Beaser v. Ashland, 89 Wis. 28, 61 N. W. 77. 1452. XXXVl TABLE OF OASES.' Beatrice v. Brethren Church, 41 Neb. 358, 59 N. W. 932. 363. Beatty v. Mason, 30 Md. 409. 1005. Beaubien v. Hindman, 37 Kan. 292, 15 Pac. 184. 997. Beaufort County Com'rs v. Old Do- minion S. S. Gov, 128 N. C. 558, 39 S. B. 18; 429, 719. Beaumont v. United States, 25 Ct. CI. 349. 1400. V. Willtes-Barre, 142 Pa. St. 198, 21 Atl. 888. 1195, 1201, 1220, 1421. Beaver v. Taylor, 1 Wall. 637. 1091. «^ Belfast Savings Bank v. Kennebec, Beaver Creek T'p Board v. Hast- ings, 52 Mich. 528, 18 K. W. 250. 571. Bebb v. People, 172 111. 376, 50 N. E. 185. 104. Bechdle v. Liiigle, 66 Pa. St. 38. 726. Beck V. Finn, 122 Mich. 21, 80 N. W. 785. 1056. v. Obst, 12 Bush 268. 1249, 1275. Becker v. Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co., 16 Ind. App. 324, 46 N. E. 685. 1267. V. Malheur County, 24 Or. 217, 33 Pac. 543. 1387. Beckwith v. Seborn, 31 W. Va. 1, 5 S. B. 453. 970. Bedard v. Hall, 44 111. 91. 1187. ' Bedford School Directors v. Ander- son, 45 Pa. St. 388. 1355. Bedgood v. McLain, 89 Ga. 793, 15 S. E. 670. V. McLane, 94 Ga. 283, 21 S. E. 529. Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501. 46. Beecher v. Clay County, 52 Iowa , ' 140, 2 N. W. 1037. 1508. V. Detroit, 92 Mich. 268, 52 N. W. 731. 629, 1208, 1232. V. Detroit Common Council, 110 Mich. ,456, 68 N. W. 237. 270. V. Detroit Common Codncil, 114 Mich. 228, 72 N. W. 206. 642, 643. V. Webster Supervisors, 50 Iowa 538. 902. Beechwood Avenue Cases, 179 Pa. St. 490, 36 Atl. 209.- 1174. Beechwood Avenue, In re, 194 Pa. St. 86, 45 Atl. 127. 405, 1168. Beekham v. Bigham, 5 N. T. 366. 1006. Beekman Street, Matter of, 20 Johns. 269. 1383. Beers v. People, 83 111. 488. 523, 775. Beeson v. Johns, 59 Iowa 166, 13 N. W. 97. 758, 926, 944, 1390. Beeson v. Johns, 124 U. S. 56, 8 Sup! Ct. 352. 1382. Behan v. Board of- Assessors, 46 La. An. 870, 15 South. 397. 779, 871. Beidler v. Kochersperger, 171 111. 563, 49 N. B. 716. i359, 1412. Beidler Manuf. Co. v. Muskegon, 63 Mich. 44, 29 N. W. 678. 1253. Belcher v. Mhoon, 47 Miss. 613. 1008. Belden v. State, 46 Tex. 103. 826. Belfast, etc. R. Co. v. Brooks, 60 Me. 568. 576. etc. L. Co., 73 Me. 404. 442. Bell V. Coats, 54 Miss. 538. 447, 1008, 1075. V. Coats, 56 Miss. '776. 1078. V.Gordon, 55 Miss. 45. 997. V. Johnson, 111 111. 374. 927. V. Neiderer, 169 111. 54, 48 N. E. 194. 808. V. Pierce, 48 Barb. 51. 617, 1468, 1470. V. Pierce, 51 N. T. 12.' 643. V. Railroad Co., 4 Wall. 598. 440. V. Stevens, 116 Iowa 451, 90 N. W. 87. 838. Bell County Coke, etc. Co. v. Board of Trustees (Ky.), 42 S. W. 92. 1412. Belle Point v. Pence (Ky.), 17 S. W. 197 228 Belleville Nail Co. v. People, 98 111. 399. 861, 871. Bellevue v. Peacock, 89 Ky. 495, 12 S. W. 1042. 514. Bellevue Imp. Co. v. Bellevue, 39 Neb. 876, 58 N. W. 446. 1249, 1424, 1429, 1441, 1443. Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y. 610. 106, 779, 786, 1505. V. White, 5 Neb: 399. 138, 634. Bellingham Bay & B. C. R. Co. v. New Whatcom, 172 U. S. 314, 19 Sup. Ct. 205. 65, 1241. Bellingham Bay Imp. Co. v. New . Whatcom, 20 Wash. 53, 54 Pac. 774. 46. Bellmeyer v. School District, 44 Iowa 564. 199. Bellocq v. New Orleans, 31 La. An. 471. 875, 962. Bellows V. Elliott, 12 Vt. 569. 916. V. Weeks, 41 Vt. 590. 511, 545, 796. Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 10 Sup. Ct. 533. 26, 65, 73, 77, 95, 169, 631, 676, 832. Belmar Borough v. Kennedy, 53 N. J. Bq. 466, 33 Atl. 1058. 1056. Belo V. Forsyth County, 82 N. C 415, 33 Am. Rep. 688. 404, 678. TABLE OF OASES. XXXVll Belser t. AUman, 134 Cal. 399, 66 Pac. 492. 884, 892. Beltram v. Villere (La.), 4 South. 506. 812, 964, 1076, 1456. Belvidere v. Warren R. Co., 34 N. J. L. 193. 20, 22. Belz T. Bird, 31 Kan. 139, 1 Pac. 246. 1061. Semis v. Boston, 14 Allen 366. 86, 659. V. Caldwell, 143 Mass. 299, 9 N. E. 623. 736, 737. V. Weege, 67 Wis. 435, 30 N. W. 938. 995, 1009. Benbow v. Iowa City, 7 Wall. 313. 1362. Bender v. Bean, 52 Ark. 132, 12 S. W. 180, 241. 1030, 1034, 1052. V. Dugan, 99 Mo. 126, 12 S. W. 785. 997. Bendlxon v. Fenton, 21 Neb. 184, 31 N. W. 685. 996, 1080. Benedict v. Auditor-General, 104 Mich. 269, 62 N. W. 364. 448, 524, 579, 886, 889, 898, 926. V. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 793, 11 South. 41. 347. Benedictine Order v. Central Cov- ington, 99 Ky. 7, 34 S. W. 896. 381 Benefield v. Albert, 132 111. 665, 24 N. E. 634. 1037. Beniteau v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 116, 1 N. W. 899. 1249. Benjamin v. Malaka, 50 Iowa 648. 573. Benmer v. Woll, 86 Minn. 294, 90 N. W. 530. 1035. Benn v. Chehalis County, 11 Wash. 134, 39 Pac. 365. 1446. Bennet v. North Colo. etc. Co., 23 Colo. 470, 48 Pac. 812, 59 Am. St. Rep. 281. 807, 967, 1091. Bennett v. Birmingham, 31 Pa. St. 15. 466, 1110, 1141. V. Blatz, 44 Minn. 56, 46 N. W. 319. 883, 984. V.Buffalo, 17 N. Y. 383. 556, 782, 1005, 1291, 1469, 1512. V. Burch, 1 Denio 141. 1478. v.Chaffe, 69 Miss. 279, 13 South. 731. 1007. V. Darling, 15 S. D. 1, 86 N. W. 751. 447, 952, 1002. V. Davis, 90 Me. 102, 37 Atl. 864. 35, 52, 66, 1005. V. Hunter, 18 Grat. 100. 860. V. Hunter, 9 Wall. 1, 326. 810, 860. V. McWhorter, 2 W. Va. 441. 1336. V. Selbert, 10 Ind. App. 369, 35 N. B. 35. 1204. Benninger, Ex parte, 64 Cal. 291, 30 Pac. 846. 1113. Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178. 182, 183, 568. Benoist v. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179. 245. Bensinger v. District of Columbia, 6 Mackey 285. 627, 750, 760, 1238. Bentley v. Barton, 41 Ohio St. 410. 635. V. Shingler, 111 Ga. 780, 36 S. E. 935. 864, 932. Benton v. Goodale, 66 N. H. 424, 30 Atl. 1121. 956, 1505. V.Hamilton, 110 Ind. 294, 11 N. B. 238. 522. V. Merrill, 68 N. H. 369, 39 Atl. 257. 726, 796, 990. V. Taylor, 46 Ala. 388. 1404. Benzinger v. Gies, 87 Md. 704, 40 Atl. 654. 914, 928. Bergen v. Anderson, 62 Minn. 232, 64 N. W. 561. 1037. V. Clarkson, 6 N. J. L. 352. 230, 848. Berglund v. Graves, 72 Minn. 148, 75 N. W. 118. 959, 979, 1039. Bergman v. Bullitt, 43 Kan. 709, 23 Pac. 938. 955. Berkey v. Burchard, 119 Mich. 101, 77 N. W. 635, 79 N. W. 908. 980, 1056, 1463. Berlien v. Bieler, 96 Mo. 491, 9 S. W. 916. 886. Berlin Mills v. Wentworth's Loca- tion, 60 N. H. 156. 23, 94. Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 Wis. 378. 566. Bernal v. Lynch, 36 Cal. 135, 146. 968, 969. Bernard, St., v. Kemper, 60 Ohio St. 244, 54 N. E. 267. 722, 1247. Bernards T'p (Inhabitants of) v. Allen, 61 N. J. L. 228, 39 Atl. 7l6. 45, 101, 102, 104. Berney v. Tax Collector, 2 Bailey < 654. 10, 130, 418. Berri v. Patch, 12 Cal. 299. 1415. Berrien County Treasurer v. Bun- bury, 45 Mich. 79, 7 N. W. 704. 1325, 1328. Berry v. Bickford, 63 J^. H. 328. 977. V. Des Moines, 115 Iowa 44, 87 N. W. 747. 1273. Bertha Zinc Co. v. Pulaski Super- visors, 88 Va. 303, 13 S. B. 740. 504. Berthold v. Hoskins, 38 Fed. 772. 526, 1027. Bertonneau v. School Directors, 3 Woods 177. 201. Bertram v. Cook, 32 Mich. 518. 964. Berwin v. Legras, 28 La. An. 352. 869. XXXVlll TABLE OF OASES. Besore v. Dosh, 43 Iowa 211. 942, 988, 1020. Bessette v. People, 193 111. 334, 62 N. B. 215, 56 Lr. R. A. 558. 1126, 1133, 1139. Bestor v. Powell, 2 Glim. 119. 940. Bethel v. Mason, 55 Me. 501. 1477. Bettison v. Budd, 21 Ark. 578. (933. Bettman v. Warwick, 108 Fed. 46, 47 C. C. A. 185. 906. Betts V. Dick, 1 Pennewill 268, 40 Atl. 185. 984, 1051. Beverldge v. Livingston, 54 Cal. 54. 1277. Beverly v. Burke, 9 Ga. 440, 54 Am. Dec. 351. 1091. Bibb County Ordinary v. Central R. Co., 40 Ga. 646. 372. Bibbins v. Clark, 90 Iowa 230, 57 N. W. 884 29 L. R. A. 278, 865, 866, 869, 1047, 1398, 1509. V.Polk County, 100 Iowa 493, 69 N. W. 1007. 869, 1046. Bickerdike v. Chicago, 185 111. 280, 56 N. B. 1096. 1173, 1175, 1213, 1231. BickerstafE, In re, 70 Cal. 35, 11 Pao. 393. 1146. Bickford v. Poor, 68 N. H. 443, 44 Atl. 600. 944. Biddle v. Noble, 68 Pa. St. 279. 724. V. Oaks, 59 Cal. 94. 900. Bidleman v. Brooks, 28 Cal. 72. 725, 729, 1010. Bidwell V. Coleman, 11 Minn. 78. 750, 935. V.Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. St. 412, 27 Am. Rep. 662. 1517. V. Tacoma, 26 Wash. 518, 67 Pac. 259. 1018. V. Webb, 10 Minn. 59, 88 Am. Dec. 56. 750, 935. V. Whitaker, 1 Mich. 479. 450. Bierly v. Quick Run & 0. R. T. Co. (Ky.), 29 S. W. 874. 605. Big Black Creek Imp. Co. v. Cont- monwealth, 94 Pa. St. 450. 464. Bigelow V. Boston, 120 Mass. 326. 1249. V.Chicago, 90 111. 49. 1208, 1258, 1274. Bigger v. Ryker, 62 Kan. 482, 63 Pac. 740. 8, 9, 72, 129, 900, 953. Biggins V. People, 96 111. 381. 816, 840. V. People, 106 111. 270. 861, 879. Biggins, Estate of, v. People, 193 111. 601, 61 N. E. 1124. 1252. Biggs V. Buckingham (Del. Ch.), 23 Atl. 858. 778. V.Lawrence, 3 T. R. 454. 907. Bigler v. Karnes, 4 W. & S. 137. 1082, 1083. V. Sacramento, 59 Cal. 698. 47. Big Rapids v. Mecosta Supervisors, 99 Mich. 351, 58 N. W. 358. 264, 266, 267, 1236. Bilbo V. Henderson, 21 Iowa 56. 1514. Billinghurst v. Spink County, 5 S. D. 205, 58- N. W. 272. 91, 627, 631 782 Billings Y. Chicago, 167 111. 337, 47 N. E. 731. 108, 1188, 1204, 1235, 1258, 1263. v.Detten, 15 111. 218. 517. V. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 23 Sup. Ct. 272. 79. *► V. McDermott, 15 Pla. 60. 988. V. People, 189 111. 472, 59 N. E. 798. 79, 669. V.Russell, 23 Pa. St. 189, 62 Am. Dec. 330. 1478. V.Stark, 15 Pla. 296. 442, 983. Billingsley v. State, 14 Md. 369. 440, 1342, 1344. Billlngton v. Sims, 52 La. An. 2083, 28 South. 270. 821. Biloxi v. Borries, 78 Miss. 657, 29 South. 466. 1100. Bingaman v. Pittsburgh, 147 Pa. St. 353, 23 Atl. 395. 533. Bingham v. Birmingham, 103 Mo. 3*5, 15 S. W. 533. 1061. V. Delougherty (Mo.), 13 S. W. 208. 921, 922, 998. V. Smith, 64 Me. 450. 750. Binghamton Bridge Case, 3 Wall. 51. 114. Blnkert v. Jansen, 94 111. 283. 1445. V.Wabash R. Co., 98 111. 205. 854, 867, 871.' Birch V. Fisher, 13 S. & R. 208. 433. Bird v. Benlisa, 142 U. S. 664, 12 Sup. Ct. 323. 483, 727, 729, 747, 1071. V.Jones, 37 Ark. 195. 988. V. McClelland, etc. Co., 45 Fed. 458. 996. V. Perkins, 33 Mich. 28. 8, 431, 480, 603, 759, 760, 799, 1402, 1477, 1479, 1484. " V. Sellers, 113 Mo. 580, 21 S. W. 91. 957. Birdseye v. Clyde, 61 Ohio St. 27, 55 N. E. 169. 586, 1445, 1518. Birket v. Peoria, 185 111. 369, 57 N. E. 30. 1203, 1240. Birkholz v. Dinnie, 6 N. D. 511, 72 N. W. 931. 174. Birmingham v. Klein, 89 Ala. 461, 7 South. 386, 8 L. R. A. 369. 1155, 1184, 1199, 1209. Birmingham B. & L. Assoc, v. State, 120 Ala. 403, 25 South. 52. 488, 777, 1395. Biscoe v. Coulter, 18 Ark. 423. 357, 868. TABLE OP CASES. XXXIX Bishoff V. State (Fla.), 30 South. 808. 1150. Bishoir v. Cone, 3 N. H. 513. 538, 925. T.Lovan, 4 B. Monr. 116. 852. V.Marks, 15 La. An. 147. 1131, 1189 1226 T.Tripp,'l5 R.'l. 466, 8 Atl. 692. 247, 1196, 1246, 1248, 1268. Bishop's Residence Co. v. Hudson, 68 Mo. 133. 4 S. W. 455. 349. V. Hudson, 91 Mo. 671, 4 S. W. 435. 349. Biss V. New Haven, 42 Wis. 605. 1160, 1443. Bissell V. Jeffersonville, 24 How. 287. 564i, 578. V. Kankakee, 64 111. 249, 21 Am. Rep. 554. 181, 206. V. Spring Valley T'p, 110 U. S. 162, 3 Sup. Ct. 555. 564. Blttinger v. Belt, 65 Ind. 445. 216, 481. Bittinger's Estate, 129 Pa. St. 338, 18 Atl. 132. 34, 94. Bltzer V. Becke (Iowa), 89 N. W. 193. 1025, 1026, 1032. V. Thompson, 105 Ky. 514, 49 S. W. 199, 44 L. R. A. 141. 1107. Bixler v. Sacramento Coijnty, 59 Gal. 698. 49. Black V. Boyd, 155 Pa. St. 163, 26 Atl. 5. 1423. V.Brooklyn, 51 Hun 581, 4 N. Y. Supp. 78. 352. V. Commissioners, 129 N. C. 121, 39 S. B. 818. 471, 472. V. Haggerty, 60 Ohio St. 551, 54 N. B. 527. 782. V. Jeffersonville, 36 111. 301. 1152. V.Leonard, 33 Neb. 745, 51 N. W. 126. 881, 987, 1080. V. McGonigle, 103 Mo. 192, 15 S. W. 615. 174, 538, 775. V. Penfield, 1 Ark. 472. 884, 991. V. Sherwood, 84 Va. 906, 6 S. B. 484. 264, 268. V. State, 113 Wis. 205, 89 N. W. 522, 90 Am. St. Rep. 853. 6, 75, 341. Blackburn v. Walpole, 9 Pick. 97. 572, 575. Blackistone v. Sherwood, 31 Kan. 35, 2 Pac. 874. 1034, 1037, 1038. Blackman v. Arnold, 113 Wis. 487, 89 N. W. 513. 1458. V. Houston, 39 La. An. i592, 2 South. 193. 350. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277. 92. V. Taft, 4 Gray 250. 435. Blackstone Manuf. Co. v. Black- stone, 13 Gray 488. 88. Blackwell v. First Nat. Bank, 10 N. M. 555, 63 Pac. 43. 493, 929, 930, 1018. V. Pidcock, 43 N. J. L. 165. 962. Blackwood v. Van Vleet, 11 Mich. 252. 1457. V. Van Vleit, 30 Mich. 118. 505. 975, 976. Blades v. Detroit Water Com'rs, 122 Mich. 366, 81 N. W. 271. 1220, 1309. Blaiden v. Abel, 6 Iowa 5. 499. Blain v. Irby, 25 Kan. 499. 851. Blair v. Atchison, 40 Kan. 353, 19 Pac. 815. 1214. V. Forehand, 100 Mass. 136, 47 Am. Dec. 82, 1 Am. Rep. 94. 1145. V. Luning, 76 Cal. 134, 18 Pac. 153. 1277. Blair Town, etc. Co. v. Scott, 44 Iowa 143i 750, 1000. Blake v. Baker, 115 Mass. 188. 823. V. Howe, 1 Aikens 306, 15 Am. Dec. 681. 965. V. Johnson, 1 N. H. 91. 1484. V. People, 109 Ind. 504. 6, 514, 1241, 1258. V. Sturtevant, 12 N. H. 567. 435, 919. Blakely v. Bestor, 13 111. 714. 748, 974. Blakeney v. Ferguson, 8 Ark. 272. 1004. Blalock V. Gaddis, 33 Miss. 452. 930. Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96. 8, 252. V. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 31 Mich. 43. 216. V. Dow, 32 Me. 557. 1484. V. Goss, 2 N. H. 491. 1477. V. Hatcher, 40 Kan. 350,, 20 Pac. 15. 937, 956. V. Ladd, 135 Cal. 212, 67 Pac. 130 892 v.Ladd,' 135 Cal. 214, 67 Tac. 131. 1268. V.Logan County (Neb.), 89 N. W. 376. 855. , V. Powers, 42 Mich. 619, 4 N. W. 5421 445, 446, 752, 919. Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343. 209, 278, 1185. Blankenburg v. Black, 200 Pa. St. 650, 50 Atl. 198. 550. Blantpn v. Ludeling, 30 La. - An. 1232. 1033. Blaufleld v. State, 103 Tenn. 593, 53 S. W. 1090. 15, 1135. Bleeker v. Ballou, 3 Wend. 263. 363, 1291. xl TABLE OF OASES. Blessing V. Galveston, 42 Tex. 641. 335, 1097. Blevins v. Smith, 104 Mo. 583, 16 S. W. 213, 13 L. R. A. 441. 839, 877, 886, 893. Blickensderfer v. School Directors, 20 Pa. St. 38. 587. Blight V. Atwell, 7 T. B. Monr. 264, 268. 545. V. Banks, 6 T. B. Monr. 192, 17 Am. Dec. 136. 545. Bliss V. Chicago, 156 111. 584, 41 N. B. 160. 1271. Bliss's Estate, Matter of, 6 App. Div. 192, 30 N. Y. Supp. 875. 380. Bliss's Petition, 63 N. H. 135. 168. Block V. Jacksonville, 36 111. 301. 24, 1113, 1147. Blodgett V. German, etc. Bank, 69 Ind. 153. 816, 866. V. Holbrook. 39 Vt. 336. 575, 613, 919. V.Muskegon, 60 Mich. 580, 27 N. W. 686. 660. V. SchafiEer, 94 Mo. 652, 7 S. W. 436. 885. Blodgett's Petition, 91 N. Y. 117. 1245. Blood V. Manchester Electric Light, etc. Co., 68 N. H. 340, 39 Atl. 335. 1436. V. Negrotto, 47 La. An. 1132, 17 South. 596. 1026. V. Sayre, 17 Vt. 609. 86, 642. Bloodgood V. Mohawk, etc. R. Co., 18 "Wend. 9, 31 Am. Dec. 313. 181. Bloomington v. Blodgett, 24 111. App. 650. 1445. V. Bourland, 137 111. 534, 27 N. E. 69^, 31 Am. St. 382. 152. V. Chicago & A. R. Co., 134 111. ' 451, 26 N. B. 366. 1187, 1231, 1271. V. Latham, 142 111. 462, 32 N. E. 506, 18 L. R. A. 487. 1187. V. Reeves, 177 111. 161, 52 N. B. 278. 1247, 1248. Bloomington Cemetery Assoc, v. People, 139 111. 16, 28 N. E. 1076. 362, 1158, 1235. V. People, 170 111. 377, 48 N. E. 905. 357, 361. Blossom V. Van Court, 34 Mo. 390, 86 Am. Dec. 114. 867, 871. Blount V. Munroe County, 60 Ga. 61. 145, 165. Blount County v. Loudon County, 8 Heisk. 854. 252, 414, 415. Bloxam v. Consumers,' etc. Co., 36 Fla. 519, 18 South. 444, 29 L. R. A. 507, 51 Am. St. Rep. 44. 451, 694, 870. Bloxham v. Florida C. & P. R. Co., 35 Fla. 625, 17 South. 902. 374, 511, 700, 769, 850. Blue V. Wentz, 54 Ohio St. 247, 43 N. E. 493. 1169, 1256, 1261. Bluefields Banana Co. v. Board of Assessors, 49 La. An. 43, 21 South. 627. 87, 91. Blue Iron Mining Co. v. Negaunee, 105 Mich. 317, 63 N. "W. 202. 524. Blue Jacket v. Johnson County, 3 Kan. 299. 8, 135. Blue Jacket Consol. Copper Co. v. Scherr, 50 W. Va. 533, 40 S. B. 514. 339, 675, 1411, 1426. Blume V. Bowes, 65 N. J. L. 470, 47 ^Atl. 487. 318. Blumenthal v. Culver, 116 Iowa 326, 89 N. W. 1116. 966, 967, 969. Blunt V. Carpenter, 68 Iowa 265, 26 N. W. 438. 582. Blythe v. Luning, 7 Sawy. 504. 815. Board, etc. of Indianapolis v. Mag- ner, 84 Ind. 67. 468. Boardman v. Beckwith, 18 Iowa 292. ■511, 515. V. Boozewinkel, 121 Mich. 320, 80 N. W. 87. 969, 985, 987, 988. V. Bourne, 20 Iowa 135. 734, 735. V. Goldsmith, 48 Vt. 403. 847. V. Tompkins Supervisors, 85 ' N. Y. 359. 653, 1399. Board of Assessment v. Alabama Cent. R. Co.; 59 Ala. 551. 276. Board of Assessors v. Morris & E. R. Co., 49 N. J. L. 193, 7 Atl. 826. 110, 126. V. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 55 Fed. 206. 1382. V. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 60 Fed. 37, 8 C. C. A. 490. 163, 164, 1382.. Board of Auditors v. Benoit, 20 Mich. 176, 4 Am. Rep. 382. 434, 435, 436. Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Colins (State v. Collins), 60 N. J. L. 367, 37 Atl. 623. 364. Board of Com'rs v. Abbott, 52 Kan. 148, 34 Pac. 416. 46, 104, 1232 V.Anderson, 68 Fed. 341, 15 C. C. A. 471. 621. V. Bearss, 25 Ind. 110; ' 218, 514. V. Blackwell Durham Tobacco Co., 116 N. C. 441, 21 S. E. 423. 69L V.Burpee, 24 Colo. 57, 47 Pac. 539. 1363. V. Chaplin, 5 Wyo. 74, 37 Pac. 370 888 V. Church, 62 Ohio St. 318, 57 N. E. 50, 48 L. R. A. 738. 71, 1303. V.Cole, 62 Kan. 121. 61 Pac. 403. 908. TABLE OF OASES. xli iBoard of Com'rs v. Dailey, 115 Ind. 360, 17 N. B. 619. 1426. V.Dunn, 21 Colo. 185, 40 Pac. 357. 280. V. Elston, 32 Ind. 27, 2, Am. Rep. 327. 1425, 1426. V. Fahlor,. 114 Ind. 176, 15 N. B. 830. 765. 783. V. First Nat. Bank, 48 Kan. 561, 30 Pac. 22. 17, 19. v.Fullen, 111 Ind. 410, 12 N. E. 298. 1250, 1256. T. FuUen, 118 Ind. 158, 20 N. B. 771. 1273. v.Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. E. 124. 175, 177, 237, 238, 239, 240, 1201, 1205. ■V. King, 67 Fed. 202, 14 C. C. A. 421. 1363. V. Leonard, 57 Kan. 531, 46 Pac. 960, 57 Am. St. Rep. 347, 34 L. R. A. 810. 87, 91, 93, 651. V.Lucas, 93 XT. S. 108. 343. V. Mialegvich, 52 La. An. 1291, 27 South. 790. 175, 395, 548, 1176, 1201. V.Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 62 Kan. 168, 61 Pac. 693. 293, 767. V. Mounsey, 115 Ind. 598, 599, 17 N. B. 294. 1455. v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 10 • Mont. 414, 24 Pac. 700. 46. V.Ottawa, 49 Kan. 747, 31 Pac. 788, 33 Am. St. Rep. 396. 1236. V. Plotner, 149 Ind. 116, 48 N. E. 635. 1516. V. Searight Cattle Co., 3 Wyo. 777, 31 Pac. 268. 1388, 1400. V. Senn, 117 Ind. 410, 20 N. E. 276 1398 V. state,' 147 Ind. 476, 46 N. E. 908. 10, 241. ■ V. State, 155 Ind. 604, 58 N. E. 1037. 242, 289, 290, 550. V. Story, 26 Mont. , 69 Pac. 56. 841, 842. V. Whelan, 28 Colo. 435, 65 Pac. 38. 548. V.Wilson, 15 Colo. 90, 24 Pac. 563. 49, 258, 465, 606, 655, 1392. 'See, also. Commissioners, County Commissioners. Board of Council v. Renfro (Ky.), 58 S. W. 795. 297, 468, 550, 1497. 'Board of Councilmen v. Capitol Gas, etc. Co. (Ky.), 29 S. W. 855 345. V. Deposit Bank (Ky.), 60 S. W. 19. 830. V. Farmers' Bank (Ky.), 61 S. W. 458. 490. Board of Councilmen v. Fidelity, etc. Co. (Ky.), 64 S. W. 470. 662. V. Rarick, 102 Ky. 352, 43 S. W. 450. 248, 295. V.Scott, 101 Ky. 615, 42 S. W. 104. 248. 295. V. Stone, 51 L. R. A. 897. (Ky.), 56 S. W. 679. 674. V. StOAe (Ky.), 58 S. "W. 373. 674, 1369. Board of County Com'rs: See Board of , Com'rs; Commissioners; County Com'rs. Board of Directors v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411, 64 N. W. 1086. 7, 8, 10, 51, 177, 185, 211, 1193. V.Houston, 71 111. 318. 104, 1238 1322 V. People, 189 111. 439, 59 N. B. 977. 350, 846. V. People, 193 111. 619, 61 N. B. 1022. 351. Board of Education v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518. 504. V. Board of Trustees, 96 Cal. 42, 30 Pac. 838. 565. V. Commissioners, 111 N. C. 578, 16 S. E. 621. 18 L. R. A. 850. 471. V. Common Council, 128 Cal. 369, 60 Pac. 976. 482, 556, 1361. V. Common Council, 80 Mich. 548, 45 N. W. 585. 565. V. Covington General Council, 103 Ky. 634, 45 S. W. 1045. 1360. V. Kingfisher, 5 Okl. 82, 48 Pac. 103. 486, 565, 603. 12^9. V. Louisville, H. & St. L. R. Co. (Ky.), 62 S: W. 1125. 122, 550. V. McLandsborough, 36 Ohio St. 227, 38 Am. Rep. 582. 8, 9, 177, 209, 1302. V. Old Dominion, etc. Co., 18 W. Va. 441. ■ 2, 17, 19, 866, 881, 882 V. State, 51 Ohio St. 531, 38 N. E. 614, 46 Am. St. Rep. 588, 25 L. R. A. 770. 203. Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657. 107, 1150.' Board of Home Missions v. New York, 91 Hun 642, 37 N. Y. Supp. 96. 352. Board of Imp. v. Little Rock School Dist., 56 Ark. 354, 35 Am. St. Rep. 108, 16 L. R. A. 418. 362,1236. Board of Justices v. Fennimore, Coxe 242. 1342. Board of Levee Com'rs v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. (Miss.), 25 South. 664. 840. xlii TABLE OF OASES. Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 V. S. 531. 1435. V. Thoman, 42 La. An. 605, 8 South. 482. 775, 778. Board of Regents v. Hamilton, 28 Kan. 376. 265. Board of Revenue v. Gas Light Co., 64 Ala. 269. 398, 399, 400, 683. Board of State Tax Com'rs. See • State Tax Com'rs. Board of Street Opening, In re, 64 Hun 59, 18 N. Y. Supp. 727. 1215. Board of Supervisors v. Betts, 53 Hun 638, 6 N. Y. Supp. 934. 488. V. Campbell, 42 111. 492. 408. v. Tallant,, 96 Va. 723, 32 S. B. 479. 105, 454, 457, 469. V.Tate, 78 Miss. 294, 29 S. "W. 74. 607. Board of Trustees v. Barders (Ky.), 8'S. W. 446. 438. V.Bell County C. & I. Co., 96 Ky. 68, 27 S. W. 862. 356, 450. V.Daniel (Ky.), 25 S. W. 746. 248. V.Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.), 30 S. W. 620. 75, 503, 700. Board of Wardens v. Philadelphia, 42 Pa. St. 209. 212. Board of Water Com'rs v. Auditor- General, 115 Mich. 546, 73 N. W. 801. 268, 357, 359. Boatmen's Savings Bank v. Grewe, 84 Mo. 477. 885. V. Grewe, 101 Mo. 625, 14 S. W. 708. 1045, 1047, 1065. Bode V. Holtz, 65 Cal. 106, 3 Pac. 495. 650. V. New England Inv. Co., 6 Dak. 499, 42 N. W. 658. 586, 760, 1059, 1455. - Bodertha v. Spencer, 40 Ind. 353. 868. Boehm v. Botsford, 52 Ark. 400, 12 S. W. 786. 897. V. Porter, 54 Ark. 665, 17 S. W. 1. 932, 1008, 1018. V. Monroe, lOG Mich. 401, 64 N. W. 204. 587,- 1228, 1233. Bogaard v. Independent Dist., 93 Iowa 269. 61 N. W. 859. 1412. Bogardus v. Moses, 181 111. 554, 54 N. E. 984. 814. Bogert V. Jackson Circuit Judge, 118 Mich. 457, 76 N. W. 883. 1413. Bogert, State ex rel., v. Mathe, 51 N. J. L. 216, 17 Atl. 305. 1326. Boggess V. Soott, 48 W. Va. 310, 37 S. E. 661. 1457. Boguechitto v. Lewis, 75 Miss. 741, 23 South. 549. 586. Bohan v. Ozaukee County, 88 Wis. 498, 60 N. W. 702. 1039. Bohler v. Schneider, 49 Ga. 195. 284. V. Verdery, 92 Ga. 715, 19 S. E. 36.- 605. Boles V. McNeil, 66 Ark. 422, 51 S. W. 71. 883, 935. Bolin V. Francis, 72 Iowa 619, 34 N. W. 447. 1042. Boling V. Smith, 79 Ala. 535. 992. Bolles V. Bowen, 45 N. H. 124. 445, 446. Bollman, Ex parte, 4 Cranch 75.. 436. Bolton V. Cleveland, 35 Ohio St. 319. ^ 526. * V. Gilleran, 105 Cal. 244, 38 Pac. 881, 45 Am. St. Rep. 33. 1450. Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 465. 356. V. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592. 86,. 87, 356. Bond V. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 284. 1199,. 1425. v.Pettit, 89 Va. 674, 16 S. E. 666. 990. Bond Debt Cases, 12 S. C. 2007 544. Bonds V. Greer, 56 Miss. 710. 1024,; 1046. Bone V. Tyrrell, 143 Mo. 175, 20 S_ W. 796. 819. Bonham v. Needles, 103 U. S. 648. 564. V.Weymouth, 39 Minn. 92, 38^ N. W. 805. 889, 935, 997, 1007. Bonnell v. Roane, 20 .^rk. 114. 852, 938, 1458. Bonner v. Phillips, 77 Ala. 427. 135. v.Welborn, 7 Ga. 296. 1114. Bennett v. Murdock, 193 Pa. St. 257,, 45 Atl. 317. 914. 'Bonsall. v. Lebanon, 19 Ohio 418.. 1129. Boody V. Watson, 63 N. H. 320. 344. V.Watson, 64 N. H. 162, 9 Atl.. 794. 18, 50, 52, 488, 542, 594, 604, 627, 751, 836, 1350, 1358, 1384, 1391, 1471. Booge V. Ritchie, 2 Kan. App. 714,, 43 Pac. 1144. 1061. Book Agents v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188, 21 S. W. 321, 19 L. R. A. 289. 350. Bookout V. Andrews (Miss.), 25> South. 865. 520. Boomer v. Lalne, 10 Wend. 525. 445. Boon V. Simmons, 88 Va. 259, 13 S. E. 439. 990, 991, 1002. Boone v. Clark, 129 111. 466, 21 N. B. 850, 5 L. R. A. 276. 813. V. Nevin (Ky.), 23 S. W. 512. 1214. Boorman v. Juneau County, 76 Wis. 550, 45 N. W. 675. 495, 755, 1413. Booth V. Booth, 114 Iowa 78, 86 N. W. 50. 819. TABLE OF OASES. xliii Booth T. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118. 4, 182, 186, 218, 411, 514. Booth, etc. Abstract Co. v. Phelps, 8 Wash. 549, 36 Pac. 489, 40 Am. St. Rep. 921, 23 L. R. A. 864. 649. Boothbay v. Giles, 64 Me. 403. 798. V. Race, 68 Me. 351. 614. Boott Cotton Mills v. Lowell, 159 Mass. 383, 34 N. B. 367. 1392, 1510. Bordages v. Hlggins, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 43, 19 S. W. 446, 20 S. W. 184, 726. 838. BqrdeauS; v. Meridian L. & I. Co., 67 Miss. 304, 7 South. 286. 239, 421. Borden v. Houston, 2 Tex. 594. 440. Borgman v. Detroit, 102 Mich. 261, 60 N. W. 696. 1248. Borland v. Boston, 132 Mass. 89, 42 Am. 424. 23, 643, 1504. Boro V. Phillips Co., 4 Dill. 216. 1132. Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374. 415, 1304. Boske V. Security, etc. Co. (Ky.), 56 S. W. 524. 85, 664. Bostickv. State, 47 Ark. 126, 14 S. W. 476. 1140. Boston V. Beal, 51 Fed. 306. 711, 712. V. Beal, 55 Fed. 26. 712, 833. V. Boston & A. R. Co., 170 Mass. 95, 49 N. B. 95. 266, 1157, 1232, 1408. V. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 415. 466, 1141. V. Shaw, 1 Met. 130. 1131. V. Weymouth, 4 Cush. 538. 919. Boston & A. R. Co. v. Common- wealth, 157 Mass. 68, 31 N. B. 696. 689. V. Mercantile T. ^ D. Co., 82 Md. 535, 34 Atl. 778, 38 L. R. A. 97. 833. Boston, etc. Glass Co. v. Boston, 4 Met. 181. 396, 674, 1494,. 1506, 1510. Boston & Me. R. Co. v. Cambridge, 8 Cush. 237. 139, 375. Boston & R. Mill Corp. t. Newman, 12 Pick. 467. 194. Boston, C. & M. R. Co. v. State. 62 N. H. 648. 317, 388, 699. V. State, 63 N. H. 571. 316, 1392, 1510. V. State, 64 N. H. 490, 13 Atl. 874. 486, 1392. Boston Inv. Co. v. Boston, 158 Mass. 461, 33 N. E. 580. 674, 718. Boston Loan Co. v. Boston, 117 Mass. 332. 719. Boston Manuf. Co. v. Common- wealth, 144 Mass. 598, 12 N. E. 362. 1386, 1494. V. Newton, 22 Pick. 22. 637, 722 Boston Seamen's Friend Soc. v. Bos- ton, 116 Mass. 181, 17 Am. Rep. 153. 362. Boston Turnpike Co. v. Pomfret, 20 Conn. 590. 539. Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston, 9 Met. 199. 396, 401, 685. Bostwick, In re, 160 N. Y. 489. 55 N. B. 208. 668. Bosworth V. Danzien, 25 Cal. 296, 750. V.Webster, 64 Cal. 1, 27 Pac. 786. 602, 729, 1370. Bothwell V. Millikan, 104 Ind. 162, 2 N. B. 959, 3 N. B. 816. 877. Bott V. Burnell, 9 Mass. 96. 445. V. Burnell, 11 Mass. 163. 445. Boughton V. State, 7 Humph. 190. 1343. Boul V. People, 127 111. 240, 20 N. B. 1. 499. Bouldin v. Baltimore, ' 15 Md. 18. 466, 468. Bouligny v. Dormenon, 2 Mart. (La.) N. S. 455. 1380. Bourne v. Boston, 2 Gray 494. 1379, 1390. Bouton V. Brooklyn, 15 Barb. 375. 1449. V. Neilson, 3 Johns. 475, 476. 1288. Boutwell V. Parker, 124 Ala. 341, 27 South. 309. 857. Bowditch V. Superintendent of Streets, 168 Mass. 239, 46 N. B. 1026. 1407, 1408. Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl. 112, 19 Am. Dec. 197. 415, 1307, 1319. Bowdre v. Carter, 64 Miss. 221, 1 South. 162. 907. Bowe V. Jenkins, 23 N. Y. Supp. 548, 69 Hun 458. 644. Bowen v. Byrne, 55 111. 467. 906. V.Donovan, 32 Ind. 379. 447, 828 v.DuflBe, 66 Iowa 88, 23 N. W. 277 921 V. Hester, }43 Ind. 511, 41 N. E. 330. 1441. V. King, 34 Vt. 156. 571. V. Newell, 16 R. I. 238, 14 Atl. 873. 344. V. Striker, 87 Ind. 317. 881, 987, 1019. - , V. Striker, 100 Ind. 45. 1057. Bower v. O'Donnall, 29 Minn. 135, 12 N. W. 352. 750. Bowers v. Anderson, 52 Miss. 596. 996. V. Chambers, 53 Miss. 259. 750, 997. V. Hallock, 71 Iowa 218, 32 N. W. 268. 993, 1032, 1034, 1043. xliv TABLE OF OASES. Bowler v. Brown, 84 Me. 376, 24 Atl. 879. 437 938 Bowles V. Clougii, 55 N. H. 389. 725. V, State, 37 Ohio St. 35. 235, 238. Bowling Green v. Barclay, 10 Ky. 66, 14 S. W. 968, 10 Lr. R. A. 778. 710. V.Potter, 91 Ky. 66, 14 S. W. 968. 710. Bowling Green, etc. v. Warren County, 10 Bush 711. 457. Bowinan v. Boyd, 21 Nev. 281, 30 Pac. 823. 642. V. Cockrill, 6 Kan. 311. 976, 998,* 1068, 1088. V. Bchstien,. 46 Iowa 583. 961. V. Middleton, 1 Bay 252. 509. V. Officer, 53 Iowa 640, 6 N. W. 28 968 V. People, li'4 111. 474, 2 N. B. 484. 840. V. Stark, 6 N. H. 159. 540. Bowns V. Mays, 120 N. Y. 357, 24 N. E. 947. 1500. Bowser v. Thompson, 103 Ky. 331, 45 S. W. 73. 1148. Boyce v. Auditor-Generkl, 86 Mich. 549, 49 N. "W. 577. 524, 856, 1514. V. Auditor-General, -90 Mich. 314, 51 N. W. 457. 425, 524. V. Cutter, 70 Mich. 539, 38 N. W. 464. 654. V. Peterson, 84 Mich. 490, 47 N. W. 1095. 524, 559, 773. V. Sebring, 66 Mich. 210, 33 N. W. 815. 425, 586, 590, 591, 775, 785, 789, 1009. V. Sinclair, 3 Bush 261. 511. V.Stevens (Aud. Gen.), 86 Mich. 549, 49 N. W. 577. 524, 856, 1514. Boyd.v. Ellis, 107 Mo. 394, 18 S. "W. 29 874 897 ■ V. Holt, 62 Ala. 296. 1024. V. Hood, 57 Pa. St. 98. 456. V. Hunt, 13 Lea 252. 528. V. Murphy, 127 Ind. 174, 25 N. E. 702. 1273. V. Selma, 96 Ala. 144, 11 South. 393, 16 L. R. A. -729. 87, 644, 645, 651, 1412, 1448! V. State, 46 Ala. 329. 1150. V.Wiggins, 7 Okl. 85, 54 Pac. 411. 9, 25, 46, 48, 64, 409, 609, 1441. V. Wilson, 86 Ga. 379, 12 S. E. 74ft. 864, 865, 935, 945, 1026. Boye V. Giradey, 28 La. An. 220, 717. 298. Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U. S. 689, 5 Sup. Ct. 706. 273, 713, 714, 715, 751. V.Jones, 14 Ind. 354. 621, •624. Boykin v. Jones, 67 Ark. 571, 57 S. W. 17. 967. V. Smith, 65 Ala. 294.' 1004. Boyle V. Manlon (Miss.). 22 South, , 947. 1015. Boynton v. Faulk County, 7 S. D. 423, 64. N. W. 518. 1509. V.Newton, 34 Iowa 510. 1362. V. People, 155 111. 66, 39 N. E. 622. 1254. V. People, 159 111. 553, 42 N. E. 842. 1273, 1413. ' V. People, 166 111. 64, 46 N. E. 791. 935. V. Willard, 10 Pick. 165. 169. 445. Bozeman v. Cadwell, 14 Mont. 480, 36 Pac. 1042. , 848. Bracey v. Ray, 26 La. An. 710. 809. Bracka v. Fish, 23 Wash. 646, 63 pac. 561. 997, 1009. Bracken v. Cooper, 80 111. 221. 966. Bracket v. Norcross, 1 Me. 89, 92. 1064. Brackett v. People, 115 111. 29, 3 N. E. 723. 828. v. Vining, 49 Me. 356. 856, 933, 1484. V. Whidden. 3 N. H. 17. 1514. Bradford v. Bank, 13 How. 57. 816. V. Fox, 171 Pa. St. 343, 33 Atl. 85. 1516. V. Hall, 36 Fed. 801. 989. V. Lafargue, 2f0 La. An. 432. 979. V. Mote, 2 Marvel (Del.) 159, 42 Atl. 445. 348. V.Randall, 5 Pick. 496. 763- v. San Francisco, 112 Cal. 537, 44 Pac. 912. 537. V. Shine, 13 Pla. 393, 7 Am. Rep. 239 1093 V.Walker (Ky.), 5 S. W. 555. 979, 1044. Bradish v. Lucken, 38 Minn. 186, 36 N. W. 454. 1416. Bradley v. Bauder, 36 Ohio St. 28, 38 Am. Rep. 547. 87. V. Bouchard, 85 Mich. 18, 48 N. W. 208. 525, 650. V. Brown, 75 Iowa 180, 39 N. W. 258. 1037, 1045. V.Cole, 67 Iowa 650, 25 N. W. 849. 802, 824. V. Dike, 57 N. J. L. 471, 32 Atl. 132. 817. V. Eaui Claire, 56 Wis. 168, 14 N. W. 10. 1509. V. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335. 1466. V. Hooker, 175 Mass. 142, 55 N. E. 848. 755. V. Laconla, 66 N. H. 269, 20 Atl. 331. 1392. V. Lincoln County, 60 Wis. 71, 18 N. W. 73'2. 529, 547. TABLE OF OASES. xlv Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush 667, 3 Am. Rep. 309. 109, 112, 357, 1165, 1182, 1206. V. New Haven, 73 Conn. 646, 48 Atl. 960. ,1393. V. New York, etc. R. Co., 21 Conn. 305. 181. v. People, 4 Wall. 459. 131, 396, 711. V. Ward, 58 N. Y. 401. 488, 603, 1480. Bradshaw v. Omahau 1 Neb. 16. 181. Bradstreet, Ex parte, 7 Pet. 634. 1353. Bradwell v. State. 16 Wall. 130. 171. Brady v. Bartlett,.56 Cal. 350. 491, 1245, 1284. T. Dowden, 59 Cal. 51. 729, 1016. v. Hayward, 114 Mich. 326, 72 N. W. 233. 1206. V. Kelly, 52 Cal. 371. 1288. v.Klng, 53 Cal. 44. 71, 514, 1217, 1252. V. Offut, 19 La. An. 184. 598. V.Page, 59 Cal. 52. 1269. Brady, Matter of, 46 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 36. 1394. Brady's Petition, 85 N. Y. 268. 1165. 1249. Brainard v. Colchester, 31 Conn. 407. 112, 634. Brainerd v. Head, 15 La. An. 489. 1477, 1479. Braley v. Seaman, 30 Cal. 610. 759. Bramel v. Manring, 18 Wash. 421, 51 Pac. 1050. 273, 833. Bramwell v. Guheen, 2 Idaho 1069, 29. Pac. 110. 555, 1450. Branch v. Charleston, 92 U. S. 677. 370. V. Davis, 29 Fed. 888. 789. V. Marengo, 43 Iowa 600. 710. Brandirff v. Harrison County, 50 Iowa 164. 574, 1431, 1440, 1521. Branham v. Bezanson, 33 Minn. 49, 21 N. W, 861. 976. Branner v. Thomas, 37 Kan. 282, 15 Pac. 211. 646. Brannon v. County Court, 33 W. Va. 789, 11 S. E. 34, 8 L. R. A. 304. 174. Bras V. McConnell, 114 Iowa 401, 87 N. W. 290. 566. Brass v. Rathbone, 8 App. Div. .78, 40 N. Y. Supp. 466. 1423. Bratton v. Johnson, 76 Wis. 430, 45 N. W. 412. 1388. V. Mitchell, 1 W. & S. 516. 735. V. Mitchell, 7 W. & S. 259. 926. Braun v. Chicago, 110 111. 186. 287, 288, 1107. Braun v. Sauerweln, 10 Wall. 218. 1486. Brauns v. Green Bay, 55 Wis. 113, 12 N. W. 463. 386. Braxon v. McDougal, 70 Tex. 64, T S. W. 591. 1062. V.Rich, 47 Fed. 178. 264, 860„ 911, 989, 1044. Bray, etc. Co. v. Newman, 92 Wis. 271, 65 N. W. 494. 309. Brazil v. Kress, 55 Ind. 14. 1502. Breaux v. Negrotto, 43 La. An. 426, 9 South. 502. 508, 517, 993, 1014, 1076, 1077. Breckinridge v. Breckinridge, 9S Va. 561, 31 S. E. 892. 820. Breeze v. Haley, 10 Colo. 5, 13 Pac. 913. 604, 1412, 1415. V.Haley, 11 Colo. 351, 18 Pac. 551. 847, 1446. Brehm v. New York, 104 N. Y. 186,. 10 N. B.'158. 1507. Breisch v. Coxe, 81 Pa. St. 336. 809, 1061. Brennan v. Bradshaw, 53 Tex. 330. 8, 1439, 1523. V. Buffalo, 162 N. Y. 491, 57 N. E. 81. 766. V. Mississippi Home Ins. Co., 70- Miss. 531, 13 South. 228. 310. V.St. Paul, 44 Minn. 464, iT N. W. 55. 1268. V. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289, 14 Sup. Ct. 829. 152. Brennert v. Farrier, 47 N. J. L. 75. 20. Brent v. New Orleans, 41 La. An. 1098, 6 South. 793. 732. Brentano v. Brentano, 41 Or. 15, 67 Pac. 922. 948, 950, 1002, 1010,. 1458. Bressler v. Wayne County, 32 Neb. 834,' 49 N. W. 787, 13 L. R. A. 614. 713, 715. Brevoort v. Brooklyn, 89 N. Y. 128., 763. V.Detroit, 24 Mich. 322. 476, 511, 528, 530, 1206, 1211. V.Randolph, 7 How. Pr. 398. 814. Brewer v. District of Columbia. 5" Mackey 274. 961. V. Irelan4,-67 N. J. L. 31, 50 Atl.. 437. 985. V.King's Sureties, 63 Ala. 511. 1336. V. Springfield, 97 Mass. 152. 1170, 1206, 1227, 1415, 1416,. 1447. ' Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62, 16 Am. Rep. 395. 262, 300, 345, 346. Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138.. 355, 363. :!i:lvi TABLE OF CASES. Brewster v. Hyde, 7 N. H. 206. 576. V.Peru, 180 111. 124, 54 N. B. 233. 1246. V. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116. 209, 238, 1241, 1291. Brickey v. English, 129 111. 646, 22 N. E. 854. 1001, 1042. Brick Presb. Church v. New York, 5 Cow. 538. 1150. Bride v. Watt, 23 111. 507. 1090. Bridge v. Ford, 4 Mass. 641. 879, 1346. V. Mayer, 31 Ohio St. 317. 675. Bridge Co. v. District of Columbia, 1 Mackey 217. 358. V. New Hanover County, 72 N. C. 15. 320, 843. Bridgeport v. Bishop, 33 Conn. 187. 392, 396. 403. V. New York & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255, 4 Am. Rep. 63. 362, 364, 1157, 1181, 1202, 1230, 1235. V.Nichols, 23 Conn. 189, 203. 476. Bridge Proprietors v. State, 21 N. J. L. 384. 9, 49, 112. V. State, 22 N. J. L. 593. 9, 49, 112. Bridges v. Sullivan Supervisors, 92 N. Y. 570. 551, 1302. Bridgman v. Keokuk, 72 Iowa 42, 33 -N. W. 355. 273. Brlggs V. Georgia, 15 Vt. 61, 72. 481. V. Hopkins, 16 R. I. 83, 13 Atl. 109. 438. V. Hubbard, 19 Vt. 86. 1093. V. Johnson, 71 Me. 235. 1448. V. Johnson County, 4 Dill. 148. 199, 243. V. Lewiston, 29 Me. 472. 1505, 1511. V.Morse, 42 Conn. 258. 873. V. Murdoek, 13 Pick. 305. 438, 572. V.Rochester, 16 Gray 337. 643. V. Russellville, 99 Ky. 515, 36 S. W. 558, 34 L. R. A. 193. 248, 295. V.Whipple, 6 Vt. 95. 209. V. Whipple, 7 Vt. 18. 937. V.Whitney, 159 Mass. 383, 34 N. E. 179. 1168. Bright V. Chenango Supervisors, 18 Johns. 242. 1353. V. McCullough, 27 Ind. 223. 227, 289, 290, 291, 383, 409, 546, 1189. V. Slocum, 77 Iowa 27, 41 N. W. 477. 807. Brlghtman v. Kirner, 22 Wis. 54. 364. Brighton v. Wilkinson, 2 Allen 37. 239. Brlgins v. Chandler, 60 Miss. 862. 560, 998, 1379. Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19. 1150. V. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 11 Sup. Ct. 213. 143. Bringard v. Stellwagen, 41 Mich. 54, 1 N. W. 909. 52. Brinkerhoff v. Brumfield, 94 Fed. 422. 65. Brlnson v. Lassiter, 81 Ga. 40, 6 ■ S. E. 468. 865. Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 143. 1497. "►Briscoe v. Allison, 43 111. 291. 592, 1425. v; Coulter, 18 Ark. 423. 739, 1008. Bristol V. Ingham Supervisors, 20 Mich. 95. 512. V. Johnson, 34 Mich. 123. 209, 1302, 1431. V. Morganton Com'rs, 125 N. C. 365, 34 S. E. 512. 1497. V. MurfE, 49 La. An. 357. 31 South. 519. 747, 834, 953. v.New Chester, 3 N. H. 524. 252, 415. V. Washington County, 177 XT. S. 133, 20 Sup. Ct. 585. 58, 91, 841, 880. Bristol Manuf. Co. v. Grldley, 28 Conn. 201, 71 Am. Dec. 56. 1472. British, etc. Co. v. Tax Com'rs. 1 Keyes 303. 673. British P. M. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 42 Fed. 90. 702. Britten v. Clinton, 8 111. App. 164. 239. Broadbent v. Tuskaloosa, etc. As- soc, 45 Ala. 170. 109. Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 124 N. C. 478, 32 S. E. 804, 70 Am. St. Rep. 610. 122. Broad St., In re, 165 Pa. St. 475, 30 Atl. 1007. 363, 1195, 1515. Broadway Baptist Church v. Mc- Atee, 8 Bush 508, 8 Am. Rep. 480. 362, 466, 1165, 1235. Br6adway Christian Church v. Com- monwealth (Ky.), 66 S. W. 32. 839. Brocaw v. Gibson, 73 Ind. 543. 587. Brock V. Bruce, 58 Vt. 261. 438, 762, 763. V. Luning, 89 Cal. 316, 26 Pac. 972: 1243, 1389. Broderick v. Allamakee County, 104 Iowa 750, 73 N. W. 884. 1428. Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624, 88 Am. Dec. 711. 182, 183, 186, 218. Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445, 22 S. W. 99. 266, 349, 353. TABLE OF OASES. xlvii Brodie v. McCabe, 33 Ark. 690. 122, 1364. V. Parsons (Ky.), 64 S. W. 426. 819, 821. Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 244. ' 48, 471. Bromley v. Reynolds, 2 Utah 525. 228, 230. V. Smith, 1 Sim. 8. 1437. Bronson v. Klnzle, 1 How. 311. 128. V. Kukuk, 3 Dill. 490. 136, 138. V. St. Croix, etc. Co., 44 Minn. 348, 46 N. W. 570. 1016. Bronson, In re, 150 N. Y. 1, 44 N. B. 707, 34 L. R. A. 238, 55 Am. St. Rep. 632. 26, 90, 93. Brook V. Shelton, 47 Miss. 243. 1383. Brooke t. Turner, 95 Va. 696, 30 S. E. 55. 958. Brookfield v. Tooey, 141 Mo. 619, 43 S. W. 387. 311. Brookings v. Woodln, 74 Me. 222. 954. Brooklyn t. Breslin. 57 N. Y. 591. 106, 1137, 1147. V. Cleves, Lalor 231. 1151. V. Meserole, 26 Wend. 132. 1416, 1441. Brooklyn Cooperage Co. v. New Or- leans, 47 La. An. 1314, 17 South. 804. 347. Brooklyn E. R. Co. v. Brooklyn, 16 Misc. 416, 38 N. Y. Supp. 154. 749. Brooks V. Arenac T'p, 71 Mich. 23, 38 N. W. 907. 654, 780. V. Auditor-General, 119 Mich. 329, 78 ]Sr. W. 125. ,889, 1463. V.Baltimore, 48 Md. 265. 250, 1154. V. Chicago, 16« 111. 60, 48 N. E. 136. 535, 1213. V. Bighmey, 53 Iowa 276, 5 N. W. 174. 854. T. Hardwick, 5 La. An. 675. 1028. V. Hartford, 61 Conn. Ill, 23 Atl. 697. 663. T. Howland, 58 N. H. 98. 1450. V. Mangan, 86 Mich. 576, 49 N. W. 633, 24 Am. St. Rep. 137. 386, 1120, 1147. T. Matledge, 100 Ga. 367, 28 S. E. 119. 864. V. Satterlee, 49 Cal. 289. 484, 930, 1251. T. State, 54 Ga. 36. 1339. T.Tulare County, 117 Cal. 465, 49 Pac. 469. 922. V.Union T'p (N. J.), 52 Atl. 238. 916, 936, 1058, 1081. Brophy v. Harding, 137 111. 621, 27 N. E. 523, 34 N. E. 253. 1036, 1037, 1270. V. Taylor, 30 111. App. 261. 1034. Brougher v. Conley, 62 Miss. 358. 940. V. Stone, 72 Mss. 647, 17 South. 509. 1079. Broughton v. Journeay, 51 Pa. St. 31. 725, 933, 1036. Brown v.' Allen, 10 N. Y. Supp. 714. 1009. V. Austin, 41 Vt. 262. 739. V.Avery, 119 Mich. 384, 78 N. W. 331. 964. V. Board of Supervisors, 124 Cal. 274, 57 Pac. 82. 1404. V. Castellow, 33 Fla. 204, 14 South. 822. 1071. V.Chicago, 117 111. 21, 7 N. E. 108. 1254. V.Clark, 89 Cal. 196. 26 Pac. 801. 815. V. Cohn, 85 Wis. 1, 54 N. W. 1101, 20 L. R. A. 182. 996. ■ V. Cohn, 95 Wis. 90, 69 N. W. 71, 60 Am. St. Rep. 83. 988. V. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 366, 36 S. E. 485. 454, 455, 1116, 1118. - V. Concord, 56 N. H. 375. 217, 1416. V. Corbin, 40 Minn. 508, 42 ff. W. 481. 888, 897, 1021. V.Davis, 9 N. H. 76. -445. ' V. Day, 78 Pa. St. 129. ^02, 810, 1046. V.Denver, 3 Colo. 169. 1249. V. Denver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 Pac. 455. 83, 626, 1240. V. Fitchburg, 128 Mass. 282. 1173. V. Fodder, 81 Ind. 491. 881, 987, 1019. V.French, 80 Fed. 166. 717, 1451. V. Gates, 15 W. Va. 131. 899. V.Goodwin, 75 N. Y. 409. 825, 1009. V. Grand Junction, 75 Iowa 488, 39 N. W. 718. 1396. V. Grand Rapids, 83 Mich. 101, 47 N. W. 117. 1388. V. Greenhow, 80 Va. 118. 1482. V.Greer, 3 Head 695. 755. V.Hays, 66 Pa. St. 229. 738, ' 744, 748, 1089. V. Herron, 59 Ind. 61. 1422, 1441. V.Hertford, 100 N. C. 928, 5 S. E. 178. 215. V. Hogle, 30 111. 119. 893, 943, 966. V.Houghton, etc. Mining Co., 123 Mich. 117, 81 N. W. 969. 893. V. Houston, 33 La. An. 843. 143, 166. xlviii TABLE OF OASES. Brown v. Houston, 114 V. S. 622, 5 Sup. Ct. 1091. 143, 145. V. Lattimore, 17 Cal. 93. 1336. v.Lunt, 37 Me. 423. 430, 438. T. Markham, 60 Minn. 233, 62 N. W. 123, 36 L. R. A. 64. 627. V. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. 143, 144, 148, 149, 150. V. Massachusetts Mut. L. Ins. Co., 157 Mass. 280, 32 N. B. 2. 814. V. Mullica T'p, 48 N. J. L. 447 (State V. Mullica Tp, 4 Atl. 427). 605. v.Napper, 125 Mich. 117, 83 N. W. 999. 893. V. Nehmer, 128 Mich. 690, 87 N. W. 1035. 1355. V.Noble, 42 Ohio St. 405. 658, 665. V. Oneida County, 103 Wis. 149, 79 N. W. 216. 780, 781, 786. V. Painter, 38 Iowa 456. 1085. V. Painter, 44 Iowa 368. 908, 1073. v.Phipps, 6'S. & M. 51. 1334. V. Pontchartrain L. Co., 48 La. An. 1188, 20 South. 711. 810. T. Pontchartrain L. Co., 49 La. An. 1779, 23 South. 292. 550, 952, 1483. V. Poole, 85 Iowa 412, 52 N. W. 349. 1020. V.Powell, 85 Ga. 603, 11 Pac. 866. 864, 913. V. Rah way (State v. Assessors), 51 N. J. L. 279, 17 Atl. 222. 605. V. Saginaw, 107 Mich.. 643, 65 N. , W. 601. 1208, 1242, 1271. V. School Dist, 12 Or. 345, 7 Pac. 357. 2425. V. Setzer, 39 Minn. 317, 40 N. W. 70. 948, 951. V.Simons, 44 N. H. 475. 813, 965, 970. V.Smith, 24 Barb. 419. 1468, 1470. V. Smith, 15 Beav. 444. 23. V. South Orange (State v. South Orange), 49 N. J. L. 104, 6 Atl. 312. 526, 533. V. State (Ga.), 7 S. B. 915. 1150. V. State, 27 Tex. 335. 1149. V. Storm, 4 Vt. 37. 1064. V. Swander, 121 Ind. 164, 22 N. B. 725. 1004. V. Veazie, 25 Me./359. 725, 728, 914, 1004. V. "Walker, 11 Mo. App. 226. 895, 1001. V. Way, 28 Ga. 531. 445. V.Wright, 17 Vt. 97, 42 Am. Dec. 481. 486, 794, 916. Brown's- Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 72, 2r Atl. 77. 9, 31. Brown, Bx parte, 48 Fed. 435. 79,^ 144. Brown County ' v. Winona & St. P.. L. Co., 39 Minn. 380, 40 N. W. 166. 456, 903. Brown County Com'rs v. Standard' Oil Co., 103 Ind. 302, 2 N. E. 302. 89, 654. Browne v. Carlisle, 62 Miss. 595. 947. V. Finlay, 51 Neb. 465, 71 N. W.. 34. 809, 1458. ' ♦ V.Mobile, 122 Ala. 159, 25 South. 223. 1111. V.Turner, 174 Mass. 150, 56: N. E. 969. 98, 1298. V. Turner, 176 Mass. 9, 56 N. E. 969. 98, 1298. Brownell v. Storm Lake Bank, 63 Iowa 754, 19 N. W. 788. 1456. V. Supervisors, 49 Mich. 414, 13 N. W. 798. 1351. Browning v. Chicago, 155 111. 314, 40 N. E. 565. 532, 1271. V. Smith, 139 Ind. 280, 37 N. E. 540. 1458. Brownlee v. Marion County, 53 Iowa 487, 5 N. W. 610. 812. Brown's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 72, 2 Atl. 77. 9, 31. Brown's Heirs v. Pittsburgh (Pa.), 16 Atl. 43. 354. Brown Univ. v. Granger, 19 R. I. 704, 36 Atl. 720, 36 L. R. A. 847. 330,' 351, 451, 452. Bruce v. Holden, 2 Pick. 187. 445, 446, 827. V. McBee, 23 Kan. 379. 735. V. United States, 17 How. 437. 1337. V. Vanceburg & S. L. T. R. Co. (Ky.), 35 S. W. 112. 426,. 429, 461, 627. Bruecher v. Port Chester, 101 N. T. 240, 4 N. E. 272. 1382, 1492,. 1509. Brule County v. King, 11 S. D. 294,. 77 N. W. 107. 17, 19, 830. Brulie v. Conney (Miss.), 12 South. 463. 1001. Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265, 79 Am. Dec. 176. 144. Brumby v. Harris, 107 Ga. 257, 33' S. E. 49. 864, 865, 1156. Brummell v. Crook, 119 Ala. 670, 24 South. 452. 1061. Brundige v. Maloney, 52 Iowa 218, 2 N. W. 1110. 955. Brundred v. Egbert, 158 Pa. St. 552; 28 Atl. 142. 729. Brunner v. Bay City, 46 Mich. 236, 9 N..W. 263. 1430. TABLE OF OASES. xlix Brunswick v. Dure, 59 Ga. 803. 1363. V. Finney, 54 Ga. 317. 574, 853. V. Litchfield, 2 Greenl. 28, 32. 1307. Brush V. Baker, 56 Vt. 143. 620, 626. V. Cook, Brayt. 89. 436. Bryan v. Central City (Ky.), 54 S. W. 2. 248. V. ChiciUbj 60 111. 507. 106. V. SundBlfe, 5 Tex. 418. 15. Bryan's Adm'r v. Harvey's Adm'r, 11 Tex. 311. 499. Bryant v. Estabrook, 16 Neb. 217, 20 N. W. 245. 746, 984, 986, 1022, 1040, 1521. V. Groues, 42 W. Va. 10, 24 S. B. . 608. 1091. V. Russell, 127 Mo. 422, 30 S. W. 107. 1286. Bryant's Appeal, 104 Pa: St. 372. 870. Bryson v. Spaulding, 20 Kan. 427. 1371. Bubb V. Tompkins, 47 Pa. St. 369. 1048. Buchan v. Broadwell, 88 Mo. 31. 1247. Buchanan v. Adams County, 15 Wash. 699, 46 Pac. 643. 1385. V. Cook, 70 Vt. 168, 40 Atl. 102. 620, 642, 796, 802. V. County Com'rs, 47 Md. 286. 359. V. Litchfield, 102 TJ. S. 278. 564. Buck V. Holt, 74 Iowa 294, 37 N. W. 377. 808, 1020. V. Miller, 147 Ind. 586, 45 N. E. 647, 52 Am. St. 436, 37 L. R.- A. 384. 26, 90, 91, 648, 1425, 1426. T. People, 78 111. 560. 523, 575, 632, 741, 748, 785, 827. Buckley v. Early, 72 Iowa 289, 33 N. W. 769. 913, 1458. V. Tacoma, 9 Wash. 253, 37 Pac. 441. 1252, 1253. V. Taggart, 62 Ind. 236. 976. Buckman v. Cuneo, 103 Cal. 62, 36 Pac. 1025. 1252. V. Landers, 111 Cal. 347, 43 Pac. 1125. 1384, 1388. Bucknall v. Story, 36 Cal. 67. 590, 956, 1004, 1017, 1448, 1450. V.Story, 46 Cal. 595, 13 Am. Rep. 220. 1500. Bucknam v. Ruggles, 15 Mass. 180. 434, 435. Buckner, Ex parte, 4 Eng. (Ark.) 73. 1408. Bucksport V. Spofford, 12 Me. 487. 572 919. V. Woodman, 68 Me. 33. 646. Bucroft V. Council Bluffs, .63 Iowa 646, 19 N. W. 807. 1158, 1266. Budd V. Allen, 69 Hun 535, 24 N. Y. Supp. 5. 251. V.Houston, 36 La. An. 959. 1454. V. State, 3 Humph. 483, 39 Am, Dec. 189. 510. Buddecke v. Ziengenheim, 122 Mo. 239, 26 S. W. 696. 1421. Budge V. Grand Forks, 1 N. D. 309, 47 N. W. 390, 10 L. R. A. 165. 531, 921, 1018. Buell V. Bailey, 59 Barb. 158. 1379. V. Ball, 20 Iowa 282. 192, 246. 1514. V. Boylan, 10 S. D. 180, 72 N. W. 406. 1032, 1051. ' V. Irwin, 24 Mich. 145. 590. Buena Vista County v. Railroad Co., 46 Iowa 226. 1521. Buess, State ex rel., v. West Ho- boken, 51 N. J. L. 267, 17 Atl. 110. 1256. Buffalo V. Baloom, 134 N. Y. 532, 32 N. E. 7. 981. V. Le Couteulx, 15 N. Y. 451. 475, 485. V. Pocahontas, 85 Va. 222, 7 S. B. 238. 1413. V. Webster, 10 Wend. 99. 1141, 1151. Buffalo, Matter of, 78 N. Y. 362. 1249. Buffalo, etc. R. Co. v. Erie County -Supervisors, 48 N. Y. 93. 239, 886, 700. 763. Buffalo Cemetery Assoc, v. Buffalo, 118 N. Y. 61, 22 N. E. 962. 354. Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N. Y. 506.' 363, 1129, 1235. Buffalo Mut. Gaslight Co. v. Erie Supervisors, 144 N. Y. 228, 39 N. B. 86. 1399. Buie v. Fayetteville, 79 N. C. 267. 716. Bulfinch V. Benner, 64 Me. 404. 837. Bulger V. Moore, 67 Wis. 430, 30 N. W. 713. 996. Bulkley v. Callahaii, 32 Iowa 461. 523. V. Williamstown, 3 Gray 493. 42. Bull V. Griswold, 14 R. I. 22. 873. V. Kirk, 37 S. C. 395, 16 S. E. 151. 1009. v.Read, 13 Grat. 78. 102, 199, 1431. BuUis V. Marsh, 56 Iowa 747, 2 N. W. 578, 6 N. W. 177. 942, 1012, 1073. Bullitt V. Selvage (Ky.), 47 S. W. 255. 1164. BuHock V. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171. 214, 466, 546, 568. TABLE OF OASES. Bullock V. Guilford, 59 Vt. 516, 9 Atl. 360. 26, 28, 90, 620, 659. Bummel v. Houston, 68 Tex. 10, 2 S. W. 740. 804. Bump V. Jepson, 106 Mich. 641, 64 N. W. 509. 527, 590, 877, 956. Bunch V. Wolerstein, 62 Miss. 56. 122. Bundy v. Sumtnerland, 142 Ind. 92, 41 N. E. 322. 1426. V. Wolcott, 59 Vt. 665, 10 Atl. 756. 443, 483, 611, 760. Bunker v. Green, 48 111. 243. ■ 906. Bunnell v. Parris, 82 Ind. 393. 447. Burhank v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. An. 1506, 27 South. 947. 634. v; People, 90 111. 554. 828. Burbrldge v. Lemmert, 99 Cal. 493, 32 Pac. SilO. 815. Burch V. Owensboro (Ky.), 36 S. W. 12. 552. V. Savannah, 42 Ga. 596. 284, 392, 1098, 1099, 1143. Burcham v. Terry,. 55 Ark. 398, 18 S. W. 458, 29 Am. St. Rep. 42. 138, 991. Burchard v. Roberts, 70 Wis. Ill, 35 N. ,W. 286, 5 Am. St. Rep. 148. 970. Burd T. Patterson, 22 Pa. St. 219. 1066, 1082. V. Ramsey,- 9 S. & R. 109. 723, 852. Burden v. Taylor, 124 Mo. 12, 27 S. W. 349. 997, 999. Burdick v. Bingham, 38 Minn. 482, 38 N. W. 489. 938. V. Connell, 69 Iowa 458, 29 N. . W. 416. 729. V. Graham, 38 Minn. 482, 38 N. yV. 489. 1021. Bureau County v. Railroad Co., 44 111. 229. 286, 386, 787. Burfiend v. Hamilton, 20 Mont. 343, 51 Pac. 161. 854, 869. Burger v. Carter, 1 McMul. 410. 900. Burges v. Mabln, 70 Iowa 633, 27 N. W. 464. 501. Burgess v. Clark, 13 Ired. i09. 194. V. Jefferson, 21 La. An. 143. 410. V. Pue, 2 Gill 11. 102. V.Winston-, 28 Fed. 559. 1333. Burgett V. McCrary, 61 Ark. 456, 33 S. W. 639. 1034. v.Willlford, 56 Ark. 187, 19 S. W. 750, 35 Am. St. Rep. 96. 1015. Burgin v. Rutherford, 56 N. J. Bq. 666, 38 Atl. 854. 985, 1022, 1027. Burke v. Badlam, 57 Gail. 594. 396. V. Brown, 148 Mo. 309, 49 S. W. 1023. 486, 760, 1068. Burke v. Burke, 170 Mass. 499, 49 N. B. 753. 1005. V. Cutler,- 78 Iowa 299, 43 N. W. 204. 1025, 1028, 1073,1457. V. Blliott, 4 Ired. 355, 42 Am. Dec. 142. 435. V. Lukens, 12 Ind. App. 648, 54 Am. St. Rep. 539. 867, 1275. V.Memphis, 94 Tenn. 692, 30 S. W. 742. 1104. Burke, Matter of, filPN. Y. 224. 1163. Burlew V. Quarrier, 16 W. Va. 108. 989, 990. Burlington v. Beasley, 94 tf. S. 310. 207. V. Bumgardner, 42- Iowa 673. 1126. V.Burlington & M. R. Co., 41 Iowa 134. 18. 836. , V. Davis, 48 Iowa 133. 1133. V. Insurance Co., 31 Iowa 102. 1102, 1140, 1141, 1143. V. Kellar, 18 Iowa 59. 468. V. Putnam Ins. Co., 31 Iowa 102. 1102, 1140, 1141. 1143. V. Quick, 47 Iowa 222. 523, 1242, 1291. V. Railroad Co., 41 Iowa 134. 901, 908, 1073. V. Unterkircher, 99 Iowa 401, 68 N. W. 795. 1102, 1110. Burlington & M. R. Co. v. Buffalo County, 14 Neb. 51, 14 N. W. 539. 1483. V. Cass County, 16 Neb. 136, 19 N. W. 700. 1443. V. Clay County, 13 Neb. 367, 13 N. W. 628. 592, 1450. V. Kearney County, 17 Neb. 511, 518, 23 N. W. 559, 562. 1424. V. Lancaster County, 4 Neb. 293. 315, 578. V. Lancaster County. 12 Neb. 324, 11 N. W. 332. 581. V.Saline County, 12 Neb. 396, 11 N. W. 884. 384, 385, 492, 603. V. Saunders County, 16 Neb. 123, 19 N. W. 698; 580, 1445. V. Seward Coilnty, 10 Neb. 211, 4 N. W. 1016. 384. V. Spearman. 12 Iowa 112. 1235. V. Stewart, 39 Iowa 267. 1521. Burlington Gas Light Co. v. Bur- lington, ).01 Iowa 458. 70 N. W. 628. 488. 764, 772, 784. Burlington Lumber Co. v. Willetts, 118 111. 559, 9 N. B. 254. 88. "Burmeister's Petition, 76 N. Y. 174. 1163, 1259. Burnes v. Leavenworth, 2 Kan. 454. 1418. Burnet v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio 73, 17 Am. Dec. 582. 1452. TABLE OF CASES. li Burnet v. Dean, 60 N. J. Bq. 9, 49 Atl. 503. 318, 495, 548. Burnett v. Maloney, 97 Tenn. 699, 37 S. W. 689, 34 L. R. A. 541. 550. V. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76, 73 Am. Dec. 518. 247, 278, 1185, 1206. V. Scully, Drain Com'r, 56 Mich. 374, 23 N. W. 50. 1403. Burnett, Ex parte, 30 Ala. 461. 15, 1140. Burnham v. Barber, 70 Iowa 87, 30 N. W. 20. 1396. V. Chelsea, 43 Vt. 69. 218. Burhs V. Bender, 36 Mich. 195. 1338. V. Bryne, 45 Iowa 285. 967. V. Edwards, 163 111. 494, 45 N. E. 113. 808, 946, 1090. V. Ford, 124 Minn. 224, 82 N. "W. 885. . 887, 889, 982, 989, 1463. V. Ledbetter, 54 Tex. 374. 1028. V.Lewis, 86 Ga. 591, 13 S. E. 123.' 965. V.Lyon, 4 Watts 363. 743, 940. V. McNally, 90 Iowa 432, 57 N. W. 908. 665, 781. Burpee v. Russell, 64 N. H. 62, 5 Atl. 837. 727, 734. Burr V. Atlanta, 64 Ga. 225. 284, 1119, 1120. V. Carbondale, 76 111. 455. 203, 243, 1316. V.Hunt, 18 Cal. 303. 1450. V. Veeder, 3 Wend. 412. 813. Burr, Ex parte, 9 Wheat. 929. 1353. Burrill v. Auditor-General, 46 Mich. 256, 19 N. W. 273. 1457. Burroughs v. Goff, 64 Mich. 464, 31 ' N. W. 273. 566, 577, 590, 726, 727, 956, 998. v. Lowder, 8 Mass. 373. 1327. V. Vance, 75 Miss. 696, 23 South. 548. 811, 958. Burrows v. Smith, 95 Va. 694, 29 S. E.-674. 273, 715. Burson v. Huntington, 21 Mich. 415, 4 Am. Rep. 497. 906. Burt v. Auditor-General, 39 Mich. 126. 1443. v.Hasselman, 139 Ind. 196, 38 N. E. 598. 795, 957, 1009. Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. St. 151. 1'466, 1474, 1478. v. Perry, 146 111. 71, 34 N. E. 60. 1038, 1041, 1090, 1091. . Burton Stock-Car Co. v. Traeger, 187 111. 9, 58 N. E. 418. 287, 288, 1456, 1459. Busbee v. Lewis, 85 N. C. 332. 979, 1449. Busch V. Huston, 75 111. 343. 964. v. Nester, 62 Mich. 381, 28 N. W. 911. 985. Busenbark v. Clements, 22 Ind. App. 557, 53 N. E. 665. 1516. Bush v. Board of Supervisors, 159 N. Y. 212, 53 N. E. 1121, 70 Am. St. Rep. 538, 45 L. R. A. 556. 83, 84, 182, 208, 219. v. Davison, 16 Wend. 550. 930, 1038. V.Detroit, 32 Mich. 43. 1246. V. Williams, Cooke (Tenn.) 274. 746. v.Wolf, 55 Ark. 124, 17 S. W. 709. 220. Bushnell v. Beloit, 10 Wis. 195. 585. Bushy V. Noland, 39 Ind. 234. 1496. Bussey v. Leavitt, 12 Me. 378. 933, 1469. Bussy V. Gilmore, 3 Me. 191. 470. Buswell V. Board of Supervisors, 116 Cal. 351, 48 Pac. 226. 487, 488, 774. Butin, In re, 28 Tex. App. 304, 13 S. W. 10. 153. Butler V. Bailey, 2 Bay 244. 620. V.Delano, 42 Iowa 350. 942, 1013. V.Dunham, 27 111. 474. 585. ' v.Keyport, 64 N. J. L. 181, 44 Atl. 849. 1267. V. Nevin, 88 111. 575. 798. V. Oswego, 57 Hun 592, 11 N. Y. Supp. 944. 726. V.Porter, 13 Mich. 262. 966, 967. V. Putney, 43 Vt. 481. 218. V. Saginaw Supervisors, 26 Mich. 22. 9, 25, 181, 510, 529, 626. v. Stark, 139 Mass. 19, 29 N. E. 213. 728, 732. V. State, 20 Ind. 169. 446. V. Supervisors, 26 Mich. 22. 9, 25, 181, 510, 529, 626. v. Toledo, 5 Ohio St. 225. 511. v. Watkin's Ex'rs (Ky.), 27 S. W. 995. 841. Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 448, 451. 102, 262, 343, 412, 1094, 1101, 1151. Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 123 111. 535, 17 N. E. 439, 5 Am. ■ St. Rep. 545. 1383, 1461. Buttler V. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402. 1150. Buttrick v. Nashua I. & S. Co., 50 N. H. 392. 956. Butts V. Francis, 4 -Conn. 424. 1008. Butz V. Kerr, 123 111. 659, 14 N. E. 671. 286. V.Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575. 504, ■ 588. lii TABLE OF CASES. Butzman v. Whitbeck, 42 Ohio St. 223. 1115, 1137. Buzzell V. Johnson, 54 Vt. 90. 857. Byam v. Cook-, 21 Iowa 392. 1002. Byars v. Curry, 75 Ga. 515. 864. Byer v. Healy, 84 Iowa 1, 50 N. W. 70. 1048. Byers v. Carll, 7 Tex. Civ. App. 423, 22 S. W. 190. 1083. V. Olney, 16 111. 35. 105, 1100, 1147. Byington v. Bookwalter, 7 Iowa 512, 74 Am. Dec. 279. 1048. V.Hamilton, 37 Kan. 758, 16 Pac. 54. 1032. V.Ryder, 9 Iowa 566. 1045. Byles V. Gennung, 52 Mich. 504, 18 N. W. 238. 1478. V. Golden t'p, 52 Mich". 612, 18 N. W. 883. 1352, 1491. Byram v. Board of Com'rs, 145 Ind. 239, 44 N. B. 357, 33 L. R. A. 476. 240. V. Detroit, 50 Mich. 56, 12 N. W. 912, 14 N. W. 698.' 528, 1515. Byrd v. McDonald (Miss.), 28 South. 847. 938. Byrne v. Covington (Ky.), 21 S. W. 1050. 504, 586. V. Drain, 127 Cal. 663, 60 Pac. 433. 1429. V. Bast Carroll, 45 La. An. 392, 12 South. 521. 567. c. Cable V. Coates, 36 Kan. 191, 12 Pac. 931. 993, 1027. Cabot V. Boston, 12 Cush. 52. 642. V. Given, 45 Me. 144. 436. Cache County (Matthews) v. Jen- sen, 21 Utah 207, 61 Pac. 303. 75, 474, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1143, 1149. Cadmus v. Jackson, 52 Pa. St. 295. ■ 808, 867, 870, 897, 898. Cadwalder v. Nash, 73 Cal. 43, 14 Pac. 385. 736. Caffrey v. Overholser, 8 Okl. 202, 57 Pac. 206. 1428. Cager's Will, Matter of. 111 N. Y. 343, 18 N. E. 866. 380, 669. Cahalan v. Van Sant, 87 Iowa 593; 54 N. W. 433. 745, 1038, 1058. Cahill V. Insurance Co., 2 Doug. 124, 43 Am. Dec. 457. 433. V. Perrine, 105 Ky. 531, 49 S. W. 344. 552. Cahn V. Wright, 66 Ga. 119. 1344. Cahoon v. Coe, 52 N. H. 518, 524. 759. V. Coe, 57 N. H. 556. 455, 626, 628, 633, 939, 1005. Cain V. Commissioners, 86 N. C. 8. 563, 564, 1179, 1193, 1201. Cain V. Hunt, 41 Ind. 466. 1065, 1091. V. Omaha, 42 Neb. 120, 60 N. W. 368. 1256. Cairns v. Chabert, 3 Bdwards Ch. 312. 819. Cairo, etc. R. Co. v. Parke, 32 Ark. 131. 508, 581, 1011, 1070. . V. Sparta, 77 111. 505. 1322. Cairo, V. & R. Co. v.' Mathews, 152 HI. 153. 38 N. B. 623. 523, 749, 869, 889. Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray 597. 1150. V. Ramsey, 66 Tex. 218, 18 S. W. * 502. 1005. Calderon v. Kentucky Lumber Co. (Ky.), 32 S. W. 224. 636. Caldwell v. Carthage, 49 Ohio St. 334, 31 N. E. 602. 51, 627, 1241. V. Harlan, 3 T. B. Monr. 349. 445. V. Harrison, 11 Ala. 755. 442. V.Hawkins, 40 Me. 526. 1477. V. Justices, 4 Jones' Eq. 323. 101. V. Lincoln, 19 Neb. 569, 27 N. W. 647. 1100, 1102, 1503. V. Martin, 55 Ark. 470, 18 S. W. 633. 897. V. Moore, 11 Pa. St. 60. 1505. V. North Carolina, 187 U. S. 622, 23. Sup. Ct 229. 153. V.Rupert, 10 Bush 179. 1214, 1243. V. gtate, 14 Tex. App. 71. 622. V.Ward, 83 Mich. 13, 46 N. W. 1024. 899. V. Ward, 88 Mich. 378. 899. Caledonia T'p v. Rose, 9'i Mich. 216, 53 N. W. 927. 484, 521, 772, 774, 782. Calhoun v. Fletcher, 63 Ala. 574. 1056. V. Lunsford, 4 Port. 345. 1328. V. McLenden, 42 Ga. 405. 510. Calhoun County Com'rs v. ' Ameri- can Em. Co., 93 TT. S. 124. 1460. V.Woodstock Iron Co., 82 Ala. 151, 2 South. 132. Ill, 801, 842. California v. Central Pac. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073. 9, 130, 139, 159, 592, 695, 696, 700. California, etc. R. Co. v. Butte Su- pervisors, 18 Cal. 671. 1408. California & N. R. Co. v. Mecart- ney, 104 Cal. 616, 38 Pact 448. 694, 1037. California & O. Land Co. v. Gowen, 48 Fed. 771. 1114, 1429, 1450. California Imp. Co. v. Moran, 123 Cal. 373, 60 Pac. 969.' 513, 514, 1389. TABLE OF CASKS. liii California L. & T. Co. v. Weis, 118 Cal. 489, 50 Pac. 697. 489, 867, 868, 870, 883. ■California State Bank v. Webber, 110 Cal. 538, 42 Pac. 1066. 815. Calkins v. Spraker, 26 111. App. 159. 1439. Callahan v. Davis, 90 Mo. 78, 2 S. "W. 216. 1080. V. Davis, 103 Mo. 444, 15 S. W. 433. 1080. V.Davis, 125 Mo. 27, 28 S. W. 162. 995. v. Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595, 51 N. E. 176. 33, 670, 671. Callam v. r Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7, 14 N. W. 677. 227, 230, 242, 411, 419, 1297, 1316. Callanan v. Lewis, 79 Iowa 452, 44 N. W. 892. 1043. ' V.Raymond, 75 Iowa 307, 39 N. "W. 511. 1038. V.Wayne County, 73 Iowa 709, 36 N. W. 654. 264, 1058. •Callaway v. Milledgeville, 48 Ga. 309. 1502. ■Camac v. Beatty, 5 Phila. 129. 873. Cambioso v. Mafflett, 2 Wash. C. C. 98. 907. ■Cambon v. Lapene, 40 La. An. 557, 4 South. 165. 1052. •Cambridge v. Chandler, 6 N. H. 271. 933 V.Lexington, 17 Pick. 222. 1297. •Camden v. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398. 1, 17, 19, 20. V. Camden Village Corp., 77 Me. 530, 1 Atl. 689. 264, 267. Camden & A. R. Co. v. Atlantic City, 58 N. J. L. 316, 33 Atl. 198. 698. T. Commissioners, 18 N. J. L. 71. 337, 366, 368, 407. V. Hillegas, 18 N. J. L. 11. 337, 368, 407, 792. ■Cameron v. Burlington, 56 Iowa 320, 9 N. W. 239. 664. V. Cappeller, 41 Ohio St. 533. 617. V. Stephenson, 69 Mo. 372. 1520. Cameron's Petition, 50 N. Y. 502. 486,. 1252, 1253. Camp V. Algansee T'p, 50 Mich. 4, 14 N. W. 672. 1491. V. Simpson, 118 111. 224, 8 N. B. 308. 14l2. Campau v. Detroit, 14 Mich. 276. 1248. Campbell v. Anthony, 40 Kan. 652, 20 Pac. 492. 848. V. Bashford (Ariz.), 16 Pac. 269. 1412. V. Board of Com'rs, 118 Ind. 119, 20 N. B. 772. 1273. Campbell v. Centerville, 69 Iowa 439, 29 N. W. 596. 131. V. McClure, 45 Neb. 608, 63 N. W. 920. 817, 871. V. Minnehaha Nat. Bank, 11 S. D. 133, 76 N. W. 10. 785. V. Packard, 61 Wis. 88, 20 N. W. 672. 751, 1044. V. Riviere (Tex. Civ. App.), 20 S. W. 730. 646. V. Stagg, 37 Kan. 419, 15 Pac. 531. 1074. V.Union Bank, 6 How. (Miss.) 625, 661. 510. V.Webster, 15 Gray 28. 445, 446. V.Wiggins, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 1, 20 S. W. 730. 646. V.Wilson, 1 Watts 503. 525, 724. v.Wyant, 26 W. Va. 702. 851. Campbell County v. Newport & C. Bridge Co. (Ky.), 66 S. W. 526. 838. Campbell County Court v. Taylor, 8 Bush 206. 466, 468, 472, 5^67. Camden Gas-Light Co., State ex rel., V. Comptroller, 54 N. J. L. 135, 23 Atl.il22. 622, 681. Camp Meeting Assoc, v. East Lyme, 54 Conn. 152, 5 Atl. 849. 352, 732. Canal Bank v. Albany, 9 Wend. 244. 1256. Canal Street, Matter of, 11 Wend. 155. 1256, 1383. Canal, etc. Streets, Matter of, 12. ■ N. Y. 406. 1383. Canal Trustees v. Chicago, 12 111. 403. 362. Cauda Manuf. Co. v. Woodbridge, 58 N. J. L. 134, 32 Atl. 66. 514, 571. Canfleld v. Bayfield County, 74 Wis. 60, -41 N. W. 437. 763, 779. Canfleld Salt, etc. Co. v. Manistee T'p, 100 Mich. 466, 59 Atl. 164. 1501, 1503. Cannell v. Crawford County, 59 Pa. St. 196. 796. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wall. 577. 146, 147. Cannon River Manuf. Assoc, v. Rice County, 32 Minn. 516, 21 N. W. 738. 269. Canova v. Williams, 41 Fla. 509, 27 South. 30. 102, 105, 1103. Cantagrel v. Von Lupin, 58 Tex. 570. 1022. Cantwell v. Owens, 14 Md. 215. 450. Cape Elizabeth v. Boyd, 86 Me. 317, 29 Atl. 1062. 838. Cape Girardeau v. Buehrmai;n, 148 Mo. 198, 49 S. W. 985. 611, 632. liv TABLE OF CASES. Cape May v. Cape May Transp. Co., 64 N. J. L. 80, 33 Atl. 948. 1126, 1141. Caperton's Adm'rs v. Caperton's Heirs, 36 W. Va. 479, 15 S. E. 257. 817. Capital City, etc. Co. v. Charter-Oak Ins. Co., 51 Iowa 31, 50 N. W. 579. 638. Capital City Water Co. v. Board of Rev., 92 Ala. 380, 9 South. 326. 754. V. Board of Rev., 117 Ala. 303, 23 South. 970. 178, 1095. Capital State' Bank v. Lewis, 64 Miss. 727, 2 South. 243. 488, 495, 501, 560, 994, 1021. Capron v. Raistrlck, 44 Vt. 515. 926. Capwell V. Hopkins, 10 R. I. 378. 434. Carbon Iron Co. v. Carbon County, 39 Pa. St. 251. 392, 406, 679. Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 182. 539, 572, 576, 578, 727, 798, 958. Cardinel v. Smith, Deady 197. 1514. Caress v. Foster, 62 Ind. 145. 881. Carey v. Giles, 9 Ga. 253. 459. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 21 Sup. Ct. 423.. 68, 77, 160. Carithers v. Weaver, 7 Kan. 110. 965, 969, 1086, 1091. Carleton v. Ashburnham, 102 Mass. 348. 667, 1379, 1502. V. People, 10 Mich. 250, 258. 432. V. Salem, 103 Mass. 141. 1523. v.Whitcher, 5 N. H. 196. 440. Carlin v. Cavender. 56 Mo. 286. 877, 1288. Carling v. Hoboken, 64 N. J. L. 223, 44 Atl. 950. 1403. Carlisle v. Cassady (Ky.), 46 S. W. 490. 1000, 1004. V. Goode, 71 Miss. 453, 15 South. 119. 483, 495, 764. V. Hechinger, 103 Ky. 38, 45 S. W. 358. 1119, 1120. V. Marshall, 36 Pa. St. 397. 660. V. Pullman Palace Car Co.. 8 Colo. 320, 7 Pac. 164, 54 Am. Rep. 553. 89. V. Watts, 78 Ala. 486. 928. V. Yoder, 69 Miss. 384, 12 South. 255. 1079. Carlisle Bank, Case of, 8 Watts 291. 392. Carlisle School District v. Hep- burn. 79 Pa. St. 159. 1385. Carlton v. Newman, 77 Me. 408. 582, 1430. Carlyle v. Clinton County, 140 111. 512, 30 N. B. 782. 531, 1158, 1243. Carman v. Harris, 61 Neb. 635, 85 N. W. 848. 526; 839, 913, 986, 1040. Carmichael v. Aiken, IS La. An. 205. 725. Carncross v. Lykes, 22 Fla. 587. 1000, 1001. 1071. Carney v. Marseilles, 136 111. 401, 26 N. B. 491, 29 Am. St. Rep. 328. 587. Carnoe v. Freetown, 9 Gray 357. 643. Carolina Cent. R. Co. v. Brogden, 74 N. C. 707. 320. V.Wilmington, 72 N. C. 73. 320. Carolina, C. G. & C. R. Co. v. Trib- ble, 25 S. C. 260. 214. Carondelet v. Picott, 38 Mo. 125. 1, I* 17, 19. Carondelet Canal Nav. Co. v. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 394, 10 South. 871. 369, 377. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 17 How. 463. 33. V.Corinth, 62 Vt. Ill, 62 Atl. 417. 1339. V. Dalton, 58 N. H. 615. 613, 1368, 1396. V. Gann, 51 Cal. 193. 953. V. Jones, 117 Mich. 91, 75 N. W. 292. 809. V. School Trustees, 12 R. I. 574. 357. V. Shinners, 108 Cal. 359, 41 Pac. 473. 932. Carr v. Commercial Bank, 16 Wis. 50. 445. V. State, 5 Tex. App. 153. 1113. Carre v. New Orleans, 41 La. An. 996, 6 South. 893. 347. Carrier v. Gordon, 21 Ohio St. 605. 166. Carrington v. Farmlngtori, 21 Conn. 65. 259. V. PeODle, 195 111. 284, 63 N. E. 16'3. 837, 840, 844, 897. Carroll v. Alsup, 107 Tenn. 257, 64 S. W. 193. 333, 385, 442, 548, 631, 752, 774, 776, 777, 782. V. Campbell, 25 Mo. App. 630. 149. V. Mayor, 12 Ala. 173. 1408. V. Perry, 4 McLean 25. 10, 130, 136. V. Safford, 3 How. 441. 136. V. Tuscaloosa, 12 Ala. 173. 1124. Carroll County v. Graham, 98 Ind. 279. 1443, 1515. CarroIIton v. Bazzette, 159 111. 284, 42 N. E. 837, 31 L. R. A. 522. 287, 1119, 1147. Carron v. Denn, ex dem. Martin, 26 N. J. L. (2 Dutch.) 594, 69 Am. Dec. 584. 466, 1405. Carson v. Board of Directors of St. Francis Levee Dist., 59 Ark. 513, 27 S. W. 590. 626. TABLE OF OASES. Iv Carson v. Broady, 56 Neb. 648, 77 N. W. 80, 71 Am. St. Rep. 691. 881, 966, 970, 987. V.Forsyth, 94 Ga. 617, 20 S. E. 116. 394, 864, 1095. Carter v. Brown. 35 Neb. 670, 53 N. W. 580. 802. V. Bustamente, 59 Miss. 559. 973. V. Cullman County Com'rs, 80 Ala. 394. 1409. T.Dow, 16 Wis. 298. 261, 340, 1145. V. Greenhow, 114 tJ. S. 317, 5 Sup. Ct. 928, 962. 18, 1370. V. Hadley, 59 Miss. 130. 1055. V. Harrison, 5 Blackf. 138. 1466r V. Mercer, 9 Ala. 556. 613. V. New Orleans, 33 La. An. 816. 738 V. State] 44 Ala. 29. 1118. V.Tyler County Court, 45 W. 'Va. 806, 32 S. B. 216, 43 L. R. A. 725. " 636, 640. V.Walker, 2 Ohio St. 339. 897. Cartersville Imp. Gas & W. Co. v. Cartersville, 89 Ga. 683, 16 S. E. 25. 344. Cartersville Water Works v. Car- tersville, 89 Ga. 689, 16 S. B. 70. 20, 21, 344, 1435. Carthage v. Rhodes, 101 Mo. '175, 14 S. W. 181, 9 L. R. A. 352. 1126, 1145. Carton v. Board of Com'rs (Wyo.), 69 Pac. 1013. 1400, 1493, 1496, 1489, 1501. Cartwright v. Korman, 45 Kan. 515, 26 Pac. 48. 1002, 1075. V. McPadden, 24 Kan. 662. 951, 1002. V. Sing Sing, 46 Hun 548. 567. Caruthers v. McLaren, 56 Miss. 371. 495, 996, 999. Carville v. Additon, 62 Me. 459. 857, 1479. Gary v. Holmes, 109 Ala. 217, 19 South. 723. 825. V. North Plainfield, 49 N. J. L. 110, 7 Atl. 42. nil. V. Pekin, 88 111. 154, 30 Am. Rep. 543. 247. V. State, 76 Ala. 78. 430. Casady v. Lowry, 49 Iowa 523. 215, 575, 1425. case V. Dean, 16 Mich. 12. 383, 490, 508, 545, 590, '/79, 785, -786, 792, 945, 1010, 1069. V. Detroit, 129 Mich. . — , 88 N. W. 626. 1378. V. Johnson, 91 Ind. 447. 1247. V. Redfield, 7 Wend. 398. 445. V. Skinner, 121 Mich. 206, 79 N. W. 1093. 895. 896, 1016. V. State, 69 Ind. 46. 431. Case V. Wildridge, 4 Ind. 450. 51. Casey v. Burt County, 59 Neb. 624, 81 N. W. 851. 1252, 1453., V. Leavenworth, 17 Kan. 189. 1279. V. People, 165 111. 49, 46 N. B. 7. 897, 1272, 1273. V. School Dist., 64 Iowa 659, 21 N. W. 122. 1442. V.Wright, 14 Mont. 315, 36 Pac. 191. 950, 1443, 1448. Cash, Appellant, 6 Mich. 193. 510. Cass V. Bellows, 31 N. H. 501, 64 Am. Dec. 347. 541, 916, 926, 932. V.Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607. 404. V. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 38. 218, . 219, 1365. Cassady v. Hammer, 62 Iowa 359, 17 N. W. 588. 823. Cassatt V. County Com'rs, 39 Kan. 505, 18 Pac. 517. 1361. Cass County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 25 Neb. 348, 41 N. W. 246, 2 L. R. A. 188. 695. V. Johnston, 95 U. S. 630. 554. V. Morrison, 28 Minn. 257, 9 N. W. 761. 138. V. Security Imp. Co., 7 N. D. 528, 75 N. W. 775. 888. Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 124 Mich. 433, 83 N. W. 108. 70, 1191, 1218, 1280, 1283. V. Detroit, 181 U. S. 396. 52, 55, 63, 70, 1191, 1218. Casselbury v. Piscataway, 43 N. J. L. 353. 920. 921. Cassiano v. TJrsuline Acad., 64 Tex. 673. 351. Cassidy v. St. Germain, 22 R. I. 53, 46 Atl. 35. 906. Casterton v. Vienna. 163 N. Y. 368, 57 N. B. 622. 503. Castle V. Anderson, 69 Iowa 428, 29 N. W. 400. 871. Castillo V. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674, 18 Sup. Ct. 229. 56, 57, 62, 631, 730, 933. ' Castles V. New Orleans, 46 La. An. 542, 15 South. 199. 603. Castner v. Styer, 23 N. J. L. 236. 445. V. Symonds, 1 Minn. 427. 445, 446. Caston V. Gaston, 60 Miss. 475. 911, 931, 940. Gate V. Werder, 114 Wis. 122, 89 >f. W 822 983 Catlin V. Hull, 21 Vt. 152. 9, 24, 91, 124, 645, 660. V. (Trustees of) St. Paul's P. e! Church, 113 N. Y. 133, 20 N. B. 864, 3 L. R. A. 206. 350, 352, 371, 380. Ivi TABLE OF CASES. Catlln V. Trustees of Trinity Coll. See next preceding case. Cato V. Gordon. 63 Miss. 320. 773. Catoir v. Waterman, 38 Oliio St. 319. 1508. Cattell V. Lowry, 45 Iowa 478. 1404. Catterlin v. Douglass, 17 Ind. 213. 825. Cauldwell v. Curry, 93 Ind. 363. 1425, 1441. Caiilfleld v. Bulock, 18 B. Monr. 494. 1466. Caulkins v. Chiamberlain, 37 Hun 163. 1042. , Cave V. Houston, 65 Tex. 619. 844. Cavis V. Robertson, 9 N. H. 524. 926. Cecil V. Clark, 44 W. Va. 659, 30 S. B. 216. 966. Cedar Rapids & M. R. Co. v. Carroll County, 41 Iowa 153. 793, 900, 934. V. Cedar Rapids, 106 Iowa 476, 76 N. W. 728. 695, 1395. Cemetery Co. v. Kern, 147 111. 483, 35 N. B. 240. 354, 357, 1419. Center, etc. Co. v. Black, 32 Ind. 468. 1441. Centeinnial Eureka Mining Co. t. Juab County, 22' Utah 395, 62 Pac. 1024. 546, 1B04, 1508, 1510. Center T'p v. Hunt, 16 Kan. 430. 1432. Central ' Branch, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 23 Kan. 745. 181, 207. Central Covington v. Park (Ky.), 56 S. W. 650. 248, 295. Central, etc. R. Co. v. Howard, 52 Cal. 227. 138. Central Iowa R. Co. v. Wright Su- pervisors, 67 Iowa 199, 25 N. W. 128. 291. V Central Nat. Bank v. United States, 137 U. S. 355, 11 Sup. Ct. 126. 682, 683. Central N. J. L. etc. Co. v. Bayonne, 56 N. J. L. 297, 28 Atl. 713. 504. Central Pac. R. Co. v. Board of Equal.; 60 Cal. 35. 139, 280. V.California, 162 U. S. 91, 16 Sup. Ct. 766. 139, 618, 619. V.Corcoran, 48 Cal. 65. 1432. V. Howard, 51 Cal. 229. 136. V. Nevada, 162 U. S. 512, 16 Sup. Ct. 885. 136. 139. V. Placer County, 43 Cal. 365. 1385, 1405. V. Standing, 13 Utah 488, 45 Pac. 344. 779, 784. Central Park, Matter of, 50 N. T. 493. 210, 1168. Central R. Co. v. Bayonne, 52 N. J. L. 503. 20 Atl. 69. 1273. y. Georgia, 92 U. S. 665. 370. V. State, 54 Ga. 401. 111. Central R. Go. v. State Board, 48 N. J. L. 1, 2 Atl. 789, 57 Am. Rep. 516. 318. V. State Board, 49 N. J. L. 1, 7 Atl. 306. 163, 693, 697, 699, 756, 788, 1400. Central R. Co., State ex rel., v. Bayonne, 51 N. J. L. 428,. 17 Atl. 971. 1254. Central R. & B. Co. v. Common- wealth, 106 Ky. 329, 49 S. W. 456. 837. V. Wright, 164 U. S. 327, 17 Sup. Ct. 80. 368, 372, 474. Central R. etc. Co.'s Appeal, 67 Conn. 197, 35 Atl. 32. 1122. Central Trust Co. v. Ashville Land Co., 72 Fed. 361, 18 C. C. A. 590. 560. T.Condon, 67 Fed. 84, 14 C. C. A. 314. 903. V. New York, C. & N. R. Co., 110 N. Y. 250, 18 N. E. 92, 1 L. R. A. 260. 835. V. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co., 26 . Fed. 11. 663, 1411. V. Wabash, St. L. etc. R. Co., 27 • Fed. 14. 695, 698, 787. Centre Street, In re. Vacation of, 115 Pa. St. 247, 8 Atl. 56. 1161, 1291. Cei;bat Mining Co. v. SVate, 29 Hun 81. 618. Chace v. Durfee, 16 R. I. 248, 14 Atl. 919. 1047. Chad wick v. Maglnnes, 94 Pa. St 117. 359. Chaffee v. Foster, 52 Ohio St. 358, 39 N. E. 947. 820. V. Granger, 6 Mich. 51. 1281. Chaffee's Appeal, 56 Mich. 244, 22 N. W. 871. 4, 181. Chaffln V. Taylor, 114 U. S. 309. 5 Sup. Ct. 924, 962. 120. Chaiker v. Ives, 55 Pa. St. 81. 794, 1481. Challis V. 4tchison, 39 Kan. 276, 18 Pac. 465. 1422. V. Atchison County, 15 Kan. 49. 1441. V. Rigg, 49 Kan. 119, 30 Pac. 190. 775, 785, 786. Challiss V. Hekelnkemper, 14 Kan. 474. 736. 1425." V. Parker, 11 Kan. 394. 235, 236, 238. Chambe v. Wayne Probate Judge, 100 Mich. 112, 58 N. W. 661. 33, 304, 380, 486, 548, 552. Chamberlain v. Abadie, 48 La. An. 587, 19 South. 574. 811. V. Ahrens, 55 Mich. Ill, 20 N. W. 814. 1078. V. Blodgett, 96 Mo. 482, 10 S. W. 44. 887. TABLE OF OASES. Ivii 'Chamberlain v. Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 551. 1243, 1257, 1263. V. Crane, 4 N. H. 115. 540. V. Dover, 13 Me. 466, 29 Am. Dec. 517. 539. V. St, Ignace, 92 Mich. 332, 52 N. W. 634." 448, 785. V.Taylor, 36 Hun 24. 759. V. Walter, 60 Fed. 788. 74, 331, 604. •Chamberlain, Ex parte, 55 Fed. 704. 663, 1417. •Chamberlain Banking House v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516, 83 N. "W. 729. 538. ■Chamberlin v. Gleason, 163 N. Y. 214, 57 N. E. 487. 820, 1202. •Chambers v. Chambers, 20 R. I. 370, 39 Atl. 243. 820, 821, 1202. V. People, 113 111. 509. 828, 896. v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497. 280, 365, 729, 1163, 1185, 1218, 1241, 1287, 1389.' ■Chamblee v. Tribble, 23 S. C, 70. 2, 1424. •Chambliss v. Johnson, 77 Iowa 611, 42 N. W. 427. 1176, 1273. 'Champaign v. Harmon, 98 III. 471. 977. -Champaign County v. Reed, 100 111. 304. 369. Ohampaign County Bank v. Smith, 7 Ohio St. 42. 124, 356. "Chance v. Portland, 26 Or. 286, 38 Pac. 70. 1283. •Chancellor v. Elizabeth, 64 N. J. L. 502, 47 Atl. 454. 263, 318. V. Van Hovenburg (N. J. Eq.), 45 Atl. 439. 265, 868. "Chandler v. Bradish, 23 Vt. 416. 572. V. Chandler, 87 Ala. 300, 6 South. 153. 823. V. Dunn, 50 Cal. 15. 961. v. Keeler, 44 Iowa 371. 1015. V. Keeler, 46 Iowa 596. 942. V. Moulton, 33 Vt. 245. 946. vv. Nash, 5 Mich. 409. 1346. V. People, 161 111. 41, 43 N. E. 590. 1272. V.Reynolds, 19 Kan. 249. 414. V. Spear, 22 Vt. 388, 398. 464, 486, 796, 1089. V. Wilson, 77 Mfe. 76. . 1056. ' tJhaney v. State,' 118 Ind. 494, 21 N. E. 45. 884. Ohanute City v. Trader, 132 U. S. 210, 10 Sup. Ct. 67. 1368. "Chapel V. Franklin County, 58 Neb. 544, 78 N. W. 1062. 1385, 1503. Chapel of Good Shepherd v. Bos- ton, 120 Mass. 212, 354. i.<3hapin v. Curtenius, 15 111. 427. ^1044, 1048. Chapln V. Streeter, 124 U. S. 360, 8 Sup. Ct. 529. 822. V. Worcester, 124 Mass. 464. 1248. Chapin Mining Co. v. Uddenberg, 126 Mich. 375, 85 N. W. 872. 806. Chaplin v. Holmes, 27 Ark. 414. 1450. V. United States, 29 Ct. CI. 231. 819, 1400, 1450. Chapman v. Brooklyn, 40 N. Y. 372. 1492, 1511. V. Commonwealth, 25 Grat. 721. 1337. V. Doe, 2 Leigh 329. 914, 1005. V. Drain Com'r, 49 Mich. 305, 13 N. W. 601. 1402. V. First Nat. Bank, 56 Ohio St. 310, 47 N. E. 54. 715. V. Mull, 7 Ired. Bq. 292. 970. Y. New York, 168 N. Y. 80, 61 N. E. 108, 56 L. R. A. 846. 209. V. SoUars, 38 Ohio St. 378. 922. V. Templeton, 53 Mo. 463. 1089, 1092. Chappee v. Thomas, 5 Mich. 53. 1341. Chappell V. Smith, 40 Neb. 579, 59 N. W. 110. 830. Charles v. Marion, 100 Fed. 538. 626, 627. v.Waugh, 35 111. 315. 882, 887, 916. Charles. River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420. 9. Charleston v. Branch, 15 Wall. 470. 370. V.Johnston, 170 111. 336, 48 N. E. 985. 1172, 1276. V. Lawry, 89 Me. 582, 36 ^tl. 1103. 524,' 790, 838, 839, 840. V.Oliver, 16 S. C. 47. 21, 848, 1095. V. Rogers, 2 McCord 4, 5. 1148. V. Stacy, 10 Vt. 562. 1326. Charleston & S. Bridge Co. v. .Kan- awha County, 41 W. Va. 658, 24 S. E. 1002. 637, 776. Charlestown v. County Com'rs, 101 Mass. 87. 623. V. County Com'rs, 109 Mass. 270. 618, 619, 655, 1410. Charlotte v. Shepard, 120 N. C. 411, 27 S. E. 109. 471. v. Shepard, 122 N. C. 602, 29 S. B. 842. 467. Charlotte B. & L. Assoc, v. Board of Com'rs, 115 N. C. 410, 20 S. E. 526. 612, 705. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 V. S. 386, 12 Sup. Ct. 255. 58, 76, 81. Iviii TABLE OF OASES. Charlotte, C. & A. R. Co. v. Gibbes, 27 S. C. 385, 4 S. E. 49. 330. Charlton v. Kelly, 24 Colo. 273, 50 Pao. 1042. 915, 936, 938, 1455. Charnock v. Fordoche, etc. Co., 38 La. An. 323. 1189. Chase v. Blackstone Canal Co., 10 Pick. 244. 1354. • V. Chase, 95 N. Y. 373. 1449. V. City Treasurer, 122 Cal. 540, 55 Pac. 414. 1389, 1414, 1427, 1448, 1450. V. Evanston, 172 111. 403, 50 N. E. 242. 600. V. Portland, 86 Me. 367, 29 Atl. 1104. 1255. V. Scheerer, 136 Cal. 248, 68 Pac. 768. 1242. Chase County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 58 Neb. 274, 78 N. W. 502. 536, 1503. Chase County Com'rs v. Shipman, 14 Kan. 532. 138, 635. Chattanooga v. Railroad Co., 7 Lea 561. 334. 528, 1460. Chauncey v. Wass, 35 Minn. 1, 30 N. W. 826. 897, 898.- Chauvenet v. Commissioners, 3 Md. 259. 89. Chauvin v. Valiton, 8 Mont. 451, 20 Pac. 658, 3 L. R. A. 194. 62. Chawk 'V. Beville (Ky.), 56 S. W. 414. 1443. Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330, 345. 9, 98, 102, 130, 186, 246, 585. Cheatham v. Howell, 6 Yerg. 311. 937. -y. United States, 92 U. S. 85. 1486. Cheever v. Merritt, 5 Allen 563. 1477, 1481. Chegaray v. Jenkins, 5 N. Y. 376. 1478, 1486. V. Jenkins, ,3 Sandf. 409. 363. V. New York, 13 N. Y. 220. 350. Chehalis Boom Co. v. Chehalis County, 24 Wash. 135, 63 Pac. 1123. 676. 1383. Chenango Bank v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467. 443, 1482. Chenery v. Waltham, 8 Cush. 327. .644. Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587. 10, 456, 1425. Cheraw, etc. R. Co. v. Commission- ers, 88 N. C. 519. 369. Cherokee v. Fox, 34 Kan. 16, 7 Pac. 625. 1119. Cherokee, etc. Ins. Co. v. Justices, , 28 Ga. 121. 673. Cherokee Tobacco, 1 Dill. 264. 171. 11 Wall. 616. 171. Cherry v. Wilson, 78 N. C. 164. 1338. Cherry County v. Thacher, 32 Neb^ 350, 49 N. W. 351. 86. Chesapeake & O; etc. R. Co. v.. Hoard, 16 W. Va. 270. 504. Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. v. Miller^ 114 U. S. 176, 5' Sup. Ct. 813. 116. V.Miller, 19 W. Va. 408. 339^ 1370, 1441. V. Mullins, 94 Ky. 355, 22 S. W> 558. 1239, 124L V. Virginia, 94 U. S. 718. 370. Chesapeake, 0. & S. W. R. Co. v. State,' 13 Lea 348. 610. T. Lauderdale County, 16 Lea 688, 1 S. W. 48. 609. Chesebrough Manuf. Co. v. Cole- man, 44 Hun 545. 674, 705. Cheshire v. County Com'rs, US Mass. 386. 302. V. Howland, 13 Gray 321. 440^ ■ 1331, 1333, 1480. Chesnut v. Elliott, 61 Miss. 569. 761. Chester v. Black, 132 Pa. St. 568, 19 Atl. 276, 6 L. R. A. 802. 1195. V. Eyre, 181 Pa. St. 642, 37 Atl. 837. 1216. V. Pennell, 169 Pa. St. 300, 32' Atl. 408. 528, 531. V. Western Union Tel. Co., 154 Pa. St. 464, 24 Atl. 1134.. 112'2, 1141. Chestnut v. Harris, 64 Ark. 580, 43 S. W. 977, 62 Am. St. Rep. 213. 748, 935. V. Marsh, 12 111. 173. 897. Chicago V. Adcock, 168 HI- 221, 48: N. E. 155. 250, 1175. V. Baer, 41 111. 306. 1187, 1206, 1235. V. Baptist Theo. Union, 115 111.- 245, 2 N. E. 254. 362. V.Blair, 149 111. 310, 36 N. E. 829, 24 L. R. A. 412. 1157, 1159, 1178. V.Chicago, etc. R. Co., 20 IlL- ■ 286. 466. V. Colby, 20 111. 614. 362. V. Collins, 175 111. 445, 51 N. E. 907, 67 Am. St. Rep. 224, 49> L. R. A. 408. 288, 399, 400, 109,5, 1137, 1430. V.Corcoran, 196 111. 146, 63 N.- E..690. 1175. V. Fidelity Bank, 11 111. App. 165. 1495. V. Fishburn, 189 111. 367, 59 N.- E. 791. 287, 553, 596. V. Lamed, 34 111. 203. 244, 420,. 1187, 1206. V. Law, 144 111. 569, 33 N. E.- 865. 1157, 1167. TABLE OF CASES. lix Chicago V. Lunt, 52 111. 414. 1107. V. Manhattan Cement Co., 178 111. 372, 53 N. E. 68, 45 L. R. A. 848. 553, 1303, 1322. V. Middlebrooke, 143 111. 265, 32 N. E. 457. 1090, 1091. V. Nichols, 177 111. 97, 52 N. E. 359. 1435. V. People, 48 111. 416. 1278. / V. People, 56 111. 327. 1278. V. People, 80 111. 384. 268. V. Sheldon, 9 'Wall. 50. 108, 288, 408, 1249, 1275. T. Sherwood, 104 111. 549. 1275, 1449. V.Wilson, 195 111. 19, 62 N. E. 843, 57 L. R. A. 127. 1167. V.Wright, 32 111. 192. 555, 1004. Chicago & A. R. -Co. v. Baldridge, 177 111. 229, 52 N. B. 263. 557, 558, 589. ■ V. Joliet, 153 111. 649, 39 N. B. 1077. 1187, 1218, 1231, 1258. V. Lamkin, 97 Mo. 496, 10 S. W. 200. 174, 240, 312. , V. Livingston County, 68 111. 458. 386, 694, 699, 751, 787. V. People, 98 111. 350. 695. V. People, 99 111. 464. 695. V. People, 129 111. 571, 22 N. B. 864, 695. V. People, 153 111. 409, 38 N. E. 1075, 29 L. R. A. 69. 695. V. People, 155 111. 276, 40 N. B. 602. 563, 586, 587. V. People, 163 111. 616, 45 N. B. 122. 470, 478, 580, 586. V. People, 171 111. 544, 49 N. B. 489. 536. V. People, 177 III. 91, 52 N. E. 439. 586, 594. V. People, 190 111. 20, 6t) N. E. 69.' 488, 561, 573, 574. Chicago & B. I. R. Co. v. John, 150 Ind. 113, 48 N. B. 640. 628, 629. v. State, 153 Ind. 134, 51 N. B. 924. 154. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Arnold, 114 Wis. 34, 90 N. W. 434. 911. V. Auditor-General, 53 Mich. 79, 18 N. W. 586. 370. V. Boiler, 7 111. App. 625. 861. V.Boone County, 44 111. 240. 286. V. Ellson, 113 Mich. 30, 71 N. W. 324. 639, 851. V. Elmhurst, 165 111. 148, 46 N. B. 437. 1230. V.Forest County, 95 Wis. 80, 70 N. W. 77. 550, 851, 1440, 1442. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Langlade County, 56 Wis. 154, 14 N.. W. 844. 430. V. Miller, 72 111. 144. 399. - V. People, 83 111. 467. 883. V. People, 120 111. 104, 11 N. B., 418. 1231, 1258, 1273. V. People, 171 111. 249, 49 N. E> 542. 523. V. People, 171 111. 525, 49 N. B. 538, 632, 85?, 1443. V. People, 174 111. 80, 50 N. B.- 1057. 442, 523, 694, 760. V. People, 183 111. 196, 55 N. E.- 643. 630, 632. V. People, 183 111. 247, 55 N. B. 680. 580. V. People, 184 111. 240, 56 N. E., 367. 571. V. People, 193 111. 539, 61 N. B. 1068. 567, 570, 572, 828. Chicago, B. & K. C. R. Co. v. Mis- souri (ex rel. Guffey), 120 U. S. 561, 7 Sup. Ct. 693, 356, 357, 358, 366. V.Missouri (ex rel. GufEey),122 U. S. 561, 7 Sup. Ct. 693, 1300. 107, 356, 357, 358,. 366, 374. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Board of Com'rs, 67 Fed. 411, 14 C. C. A. 456, 32 U. S. App. 224.- 1425, 1426, 1460. V. Board of Com'rs, 67 Fed. 413,, 14 C. .C. A. 458, 32 U. S. App. 227. 1425, 1426. V. Board of Com'rs, 54 Kan. 781, 39 Pac. 1039. 1460. V.Cass County, 51 Neb. 369, 70' N. W. 955. 85, 723, 1424, 1447, 1452, 1516. V.Cole, 75 111. 591. 1390, 1460. v.Frary, 22 111. 34. 1441, 1452.. V. Hitchcock County, 40 Neb. 781, 59 N. W. 358. 696. V. Kelley, 105 Iowa 106, 74 N. W. 935. 523, 603, 993, 1031,. 1034, 1038, 1043. V.Klein, 52 Neb. 258, 71 N. W. 1069. 174, 222, 596. V. Merrick County, 36 Neb. 176, 54 N. W. 309. 399. V.Nebraska City, 53 Neb. 453. 73 N. W. 952. 85, 1424. V.Nemaha County, 50 Neb. 393, 69 N. W. 958. 172, 174, 586,. 1382, 1424, 1453, 1509. V. Norton County Clerk, 55 Kan.. 386, 40 Pac. 654. 1441. V. Paddock, 75 111. 616. 399, 617. V.Page, 1 Biss. 461. 682. V. Quincy, 136 111. 563, 27 N. B. 192, 29 Am. St. Rep. 334'.. 1223. Ix TABLE OF OASES. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Quincy, 136 111. 660, 27 N. B. 200. 395, 695, 698. V. Quincy, 139 111. 355, 28 N. E. 1069. 109, 1231. T. Richardson County, 61 Neb. 519, 85 N. W. 532. 695, 699. V. Siders, 88 111. 320. 287, 398, 402. V. State, 47 Neb. 549, 66 N. W. 624, 41 L. R. A. 481. 51. Chicago City R. Co. v. Chicago, 90 111. 573, 32 Am. Rep. 54. 1235. Chicago, D. & U. R. Co. v. Coyer, 78 111. 373. 214. Chicago General R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 111. 253, 52 N. B. 880. 72, 289, 680, 1122. Chicago Grain, etc. Exch. v. Glea- son, 121 111. 502, 13 N. B. 204. 622, 1385, 1445, 1459. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Cass County, 8 N. D. 18, 56 N. W. 239. 695. V.Grant, 167 111. 489, 47 N. E. 750. 695. V. Hartshorn, 30 Fed. 541. 501, 589. V. Houston County, 38 Minn. 531, 38 N. W. 619. 639. V. Milwaukee, 89 Wis. 506, 62 N. W. 417, 28 L. R. A. 249. 1229 1234. V.Phillips, 111 Iowa 377, 82 N. W. 787. 546, 1232, 1421. V. Sabula, 19 Fed. 177. 291. V. Supervisors, 48 Wis. 666, 5 N. W. 3. 376. Chicago Packing, etc. Co. v. Chi- cago, 88 111. 221. 1148. Chicago, P. & S. W. R. Co. v. Ray- mond, 91 111. 212. 398, 402. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Alfree, 64 Iowa 500, 20 N. W. 779. 1091. V. Chicago, 139 111. 573, 28 N. E. 1108. 1258. V. Davenport, 51 Iowa 451, 1 N. W. 720. 136, 140, 693. V. Independent Dist., 99 Iowa 556, 68 N. W. 881. 511, 512, 513, 1510. V. Moline, 158 111. 64, 41 N. E. 877. 1188,. 1230. V. Ottumwa, 112 Iowa 300, 83 N. W. 1074. 523, 823, 1154, 1157, 1158, 1183, 1232. V. People, 4 III. App. 468. 695. Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Kentwood, 49 La. An. 931, 22 South. 192. 8, 102, 844. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. v. Bayfield County, 87 Wis. 188, 58 N. W. 245. 363, 376, 1453. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. v. Cuming County, 31 Neb. 374, 47 N. W. 1121. 252. Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co. V.Chicago, 184 111. 154, 56 N. B. 410. 1263. Chicago Theo. Sem. v. Illinois, 188 TJ. S. 662, 23 Sup. Ct. 386. 351. V. People. See Board of Direct- ors V. People. Chicago Union T. Co. v. State Board, li2 Fed. 607. 1355. Chicago University v. The People, 118 111. 565, 9 N. B. Rep. 189. 350. Chicago W. D. R. Co. v. People, 154 III. 256, 40 N. E. 342. 1271, 1273. Chickasaw Cooperage Co. v. Police Jury, 48 La. An. 523,, 19 South. 476. 348. Chickering v. Faile, 38 111. 342. 845, 966. V. Failes, 26 111. 507. 970. Chico High School Board v. Board of Supervisors, 118 Cal. 115, 50 Pac. i275. 102. Chicopee v. County Com'rs, 16 Gray 38. 751. ' Childers v. Schantz, 120 Mo. 305, 25 S. W. 209. , 1080. Children's Seashore House v. At- lantic! City, 65 N. J. L. 488, 48 Atl. 242. 349. Childress v. Calloway, 76 Ala. 128. 1092. V. Vance, 1 Baxt. 406. 816. Childs V. Commonwealth, 4 J. J. Marsh. 577. 624, 901. V. Shower, 18 Iowa 261. 1064. Chiles V. Davis, 58 111. 411. 1093. Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43. 148, 1123, 1135, 1137, 1141, 1151. Chiniquy v. People, 78 111. 570. 447, 523, 741, 744, 827. Chipchase, In re, 56 Kan. 357, 43 Pac. 264. 1122. Chippewa County v. Auditor-Gen- eral, 65 Mich. 408, 32 N. W. 651. 343, 345. V. St. Paul, S. & T. F. R. Co., 42 Minn. 295, 301, 44 N. W. 70, 72. 269. Chippewa Hardware Co. Limited' v. Atwood, 127 Mich. 338, 86 N. W. 854. 650. Chisago County v. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 27 Minn: 109, 6 N. W. 454. 890. Chisholm v. Montgomery, 2 Woods 5C4. 1436. Choat V. Phelps, 63 Kan. 762, 66 Pac.'' 1002. 1040. TABLE OF OASES. Ixi eholsser v. People, 140 111. 21, 29 N. E. 546.-. 1322. Chopin V. PoUet, 48 La. An. 1186, 20 South. 721. 747, 748. Choteau v. Jones, 11 111. 300, 50 Am. Dec. 460. 966, 974. Chouteau v. Hunt, 44 Minn. 173, 46 N. W. 341. 888, 889, 895. Chrigstrom t. McGregor, 74 Hun 343, 26 N. Y. Supp. 517. 838. Chrisman v. Brookhaven, 70 Miss. 477, 14 South. 458. 1192. V. Currie; 60 Miss. 858. 1058. V. Hough, 146 Mo. 102, 47 S. W. 941. 987. Christian v. Ashley County, 24 Ark. 142. 1340. T. Soderberg, 118 Mich. 47, 76 N. W. 126. 944. Christian, Ex parte, 23 Ark. 641. 1340. Christie v. Maiden, 23 W. Va. 667. 1421. Christ's Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300. 111. Christy v. Fisher, 58 Cal. 256. 974. V. Minor, 4 Munf. 431. 914, 1005. Christy's Adm'rs v. St. Louis, 20 Mo. 143, 61 Am. Dec. 598. 1496. Chrystal v. Macon, 108 Ga. 27, 33 S. B. 810. 153. Church v. Baltimore, 6 Gill 391. 1390. V. Nester, 126 Mich. 547, 85 N. W. 1078. 884, 889. V. People, 174 111. 366, 51 N. E. 747. 1234, 1274. V. Smith, 121 Mich. 97, 79 N. W. 892. 993, 1034. V. Sterling, 16 Conn. 387. 440. Church, Matter of, 92 N. Y. 1. 550. Churchill v. Sowards, 78 Iowa 472, 43. N. W. 271. 138. Churchill, Matter of, 82 N. Y. 288. 1216. Churchman v. Indianapolis, 110 Ind. 259, 11 N. E. 301. 920. Church of . See name of Church. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275. 166. Cicero & P. St. R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 111. 501, 52 N. E. 866. 1229, 1230, 1235, 1269. Cincinnati v. Anchor White Lead Co., 44 Ohio St. 243, 7 N. E. 11. 1265. V. Anderson, 52 Ohjo St. 600, 43 N. E, 1040. 1223. T. Batsche, 52 Ohio St. 324, 40 N. E. 21, 27 L. R. A. 536. 1219, 1223. Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio St. 625, 45 Am. Dec. 593. 466, 1110, 1141, 1147. V.Buckingham, 10 Ohio 257. 848, 1151. T. Conner, 55 Ohio St. 82, 44 N. E. 582. 455, 1270. V. Diekmeier, 31 Ohio St. 242. 1282 V. James', 55 Ohio St. 180, 44 N. B. 925. 1445. V. Manss, 54 Ohio St. 257; 43 N. E. 687. 1247, 1518. V. Seasongood, 46 Ohio St. 296, 21 N. B. 630. Cincinnati College v. State, 19 Ohio. 11,0. 363, 1235. V. Yeatman, 30 Ohio St. 276. 739. Cincinnati Gas-Light Co. v. State, .18 Ohio St. 237. 1141. Cincinnati, L. & N. R. Co. v. Cin- cinnati, 62 Ohio St. 465, 57 N. E. 229, 49 L. R. A. 366. 325, 1162. Cincinnati, etc. R. Co. v. Sullivan,. 32 Ohio St. 152. 1148. Cincinnati Mut. H. Assur. Co. v. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85. 95, 703. Cihcinnati, N. 0. & T. P. R. Co. v.. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. 492. 296. V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 51 S. W. 568. 593. V. Commonwealth, 115 IT. S. 321,. 6 Sup. Ct. 57. 65, 76. Citizens' Bank v. Board of Assess- ors, 54 Fed. 73. 357, 381,. 709. V. Board of Assessors, 54 Fed. 1002. 357. V. Bouny, 32 La. An. 239. 299. V.Cannon, 164 V. S. 319, 17 S. C. 89. 1429. V. Sharp, 53 Md. 521. 710. Citizens' Gas Light Co. v. Alden, 44 N. J. L. 648. 495, 1400. Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Columhia County, 23 Wash. 441, 63 Pac. 209. 715, 783, 1428, 1461. Citizens' Savings Bank v. Auditor- General, 123 Mich. 511, 82" N. W. 214. 992. V. Owensboro, 173 V. S. 636, 19 Sup. Ct. 530, 571. 116. Citizens', etc. Sav. Assoc, v. Topeka,. 3 Dill. 376. 181. City Bank v. Bogel, 51 Tex. 355. 473, 690. City Council v. Ahrens, 4 Strob. 241. 1120. V. Birdsong, 126 Ala. 632, 28" South. . 522. 63, 70, 1218,. 1409, 1520. Ixii TABLJE OF OASES. City Council v. Powell (Ky.), 27 S. W. 1. 174. V. St. Phillip's Church, 1 Mc- Mul. Eq. 139, 144. 262. City Council of Charleston ads. State, 2 Speers 719. 386. City Council of Madison v. Fitch, 18 Ind. 33. 357. . City Item Co-operative Printing Co. V. New Orleans, 51 La. An. 713, 25 South. 313. 767, 777. City National Bank v. Baker Co., 180 Mass. 40, 61 N. B. 223. 663. V. Paducah, 2 Flipp. 61. 714, 715, 1431. ■City of . See name of City. Claasen v. Shaw, 5 Watts 468. 1327. Claflin V. Chicago, 178 111. 549, 53 N. E. 339. 1246. V. Hopkinton, 4 Gray 502. • 218. v.- McDonough, 33 Mo. 412. 824, 1499. V. Thayer, 13 Gray 459. 1502. •Claiborne v. Elkins, 79 Tex. 380, 15 S. W. 395. 1002, 1083. Clapp V. Cedar County, 5 Iowa 15. 585. V.Hartford, 35 Conn. 66. 1219, 1227. V.Hartford, 39 Conn. 279, 285. 1173. V. Mason, 94 U. S. 589. 669. V. Pinegrove T'p, 138 Pa. St. 35, 20 Atl. 826, 12 L. R. A. 618. 1018, 1025. •Clark V. Axford, 5 Mich. 182. 1476. V. Blair, 14 Fed. 812. 807. V.Belknap (Ky.), 13 S. W. 212. 622. V. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. St. 129. 438. V. Connor, 28 Iowa 311, 315. 1008. V. Crane, 5 Mich. 151, 71 Am. Dec. 776. 480, 762. V.Darlington, 11 S. D. 418, 78 N. W. 997, 58 Am. St. Rep. 835. 1022, 1458. V. Davenport, 14 Iowa 494. 466, 468, 504. V. Davenport, 95 N. Y. 478. 1449. V. Des Moines, 19 Iowa 199. 181. V. Drain Com'rs, 30 Mich. 618. 1238. V. Dunkirk, 12 Hun 181. 383. V. Ganz, 21 Minn. 387. 1415. V. Hall, 19 Mich. 355." 495, 499. V. Holton, 94 Ga. 542, 20 S.. B. 429. 995, 999. V. Irrigation Co., 45 Neb. 798, 64 N. W. 239. 211. V, Janesvllle, 10 Wis. 136. 585. Clark V. Lancy,' 178 Mass. 460, 59 N. E. 1034: 1033. • V. Leathers (Ky.), 5 S. W. 576. 97, 236, 577, 1420. V. Lindsey, 47 Ohio 437, 25 N. B. 422, 9 L. R. A. 740. 966, 970. V. Louisville Water Co., 90 Ky. 515, 14 S. W. 502. 296. V. McGhee, 87 Fed. 789, 31 C. C. A. 321, 59 U. S. App. 69. 1417. V. Mobile, 67 Ala. 217. 275. V. Mulford, 43 N. J. L. 550. 783. V.Norton, 49 N. Y. 243. 605, 606, 1469. V. People, 146 111. 348, 35 N. E. 60. 1273. V.Porter, 53 Cal. 409. 1288. V.Powell, 62 Vt. 442, 20 Atl. 597. 660, 667. V. Rainey, 72 Miss. 151, 16 South. 499. 966. V. Rowan, 53 Ala. 400. 930, 932, 951. V. Sheldon, 106 N. Y. 104, 12. N. E. 341. 250, 551. V. Thompson, 37 Iowa 536. 983, 1011. V. Titusville, 184 ,U. S. 329, 22 Sup. Ct. 382. 77. V. United States, 60 Ga. 156. 1334. V. Water Co., 90 Ky. 515, 14 S. W. 502. 296. V. Worcester, 167 Mass. 81, 44 N. B. 1082. 1271, 1415, 1422. Clark County Court v. Turnpike Co., 11 B. Mon. 143. 1365. Clark Thread Co. v. Kearney, 55 N. J. L. 50, 25 Atl. 327. 783. Clarke v. Board of Com'rs, 47 Minn. 552, 50 N. W. 615,. 6bl, 1492. V. Board of Com'rs, 66 Minn. 304, 69 N. W. 25. 1381. V.Chicago, 185 111. 354, 57 N. B. 15. 466, 468, 1238, 1243, 1274. V.Clarke, 3 Woods 405. 145, 165. V. County Com'rs, 47 Minn. 552, 50 N. W. 615. 651, 1492. V. County Com'rs, 66 Minn. 304, 69 N. W. 25. 1381. V. Douglass, 86 Ga. 125, 12 S. B. 209. -864. V. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674. 1497. V. Frank, 64 Miss. 827, 3 South. 931. 940. V. Henshaw, 30 Ind. 146. 408. V. Lincoln County, 54 Wis. 580, 12 N. W. 20. 386. TABLE OF OASES. Ixiii Olarke v. Mead, 102 Cal. 516, 36 Pac. 862. 892, 984, 1035. V. New York, 11 N. Y. 621, 19 N. E. 436. 922. T. New York, 55 N. Y. Super. Ct. 259. 956. V. Strickland, 2 Curt. C. C. 439. 935 949 1004. ' V. Tlnkham,'20 R. I. 790, 38 Atl. 926. 615. Clarksdale v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. (Miss.), 29 South. 93. 627, 632. Clarksville v. Montgomery County (Tenn. Ch. App.), 62 S. W. 33. 267. Clary v. O'Shea, 72 Minn. 105, 75 N. W. 115. 71 Am. St. Rep. 465. 1037. ■Clason V. Baldwin, 152 N. Y. 204, 46 N. E. 322. 1036, 1037, 1042. V. New Orleans, 46 La. An. 1, 14 South. 306. 26, 90, 92. Claussen v. Rayhurn, 14 Iowa 136. 1020. Clay V. Grand Rapids, 60 Mich. 451, 27 N. W. 596. 1173. Claybrook v. Owenstaoro, 16 Fed. 297. 75, 201, 294. Clay County Com'rs v. Markle, 46 Ind. 96. 1418. Clayton v. Chicago, 44 111. 280. 900. T. Peig, 179 111. 534, 54 N. E. 149. 808. V. Rehm, 67 Tex. 52, 2 S. W. 45. 1005. V. Tupele (Miss.), 28 South. 994. 673. Clee V. Sanders, 74 Mich. 692, 42 N. ' W. 154. 181, 206, 1415, 1430. T.Trenton, 108 Mich. 293, 66 N. W. 48. 221, 1434, 1436. Clegg V. State, 42 Tex. 605. 1, 22, 499, 598, 881. Cle5chorn v. Postlewaite, 43 111. 428. 628, 632, 783, 1444, 1460. Clemens v. Baltimore, 16 Md. 208. 1291. Clement v. Everest, 29 Mich. 29. 1426. V.Hale, 47 Vt. 680. 626. V. People, 177 111. 144, 52 N. E. 382. 1385, 1465. Clementi v. Jackson, 92 N. Y. 591. 518, 520, 1372. Clements v. Casper, 4 Wyo. 494, 35 Pac. 472. 152, 1147. V. Lee, 114 Ind. 397, 16 N. B. 799. 1516. ' demons v. Lewis, 36 Vt. 673. 797, 857. Cleveland v. Heisley, 41 Ohio St. 670. 230. Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. I. 50. 493, • 1196, 1219, 1240, 1448. v. United States, 111 Fed. 341. 1366. V. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 303. 1162, 1163. V. Yonkers, 51 Hun 644, 4 N. Y. Supp. 84. 1173. Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 513, 33 N. E. 421, 18 L. R. A. 729. 52, 53, 61, 65, 74, 93, 164, 402, 428, 513, 629, 631, 693, 699, 787, 828, 1378, 1383, 1385. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 439, 693, 14 Sup. Ct. 1122. 93, 164, 693. V. Board of Commissioners, 149 Ind. 58, 48 N. E. 51. 776. V. Board of Commissioners, 19 Ind. App. 58, 49 N. E. 51. 772. V. O'Brien, 24 Ind. App. 547, 57 N. B. 47. 1267. V. Randle, 183 111. 364, 55 N. B. 728. 448, 579, 586. V. Waynetown, 153 Ind. 550, 55 N. E. 451. 1441. Cleveland Lit. Inst. v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 253. 349. Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 62 Ohio St. 266, 56 N. E. 1036. 258, 405, 708, 709, 712, 715, 716. V. Lander, 184 U. S. Ill, 22 Sup. Ct. 394. 60. Clewis V. Hartman, 71 Ga. 810. 1064. ■ Clews V. Lee County, 2 Woods 474. 1362, 1375. Clifford V. Michlner, 49 La. An. 1511, 22 South. 811. 734, 956. Clifton V. Wynne, 80 N. C. 145. 176, 1324, 1338.. Clifton Heights Land Co. v. Ran- dell, 82 Iowa 89, 47 N. W. 905. 1038. Cline V. Seattle, 13 Wash. 444, 43 Pac. 367. 526, 531, 1209. Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557, 22 S. W. 494, 37 Am. St. Rep. 415. 263, 266, 363, 1201, 1236, 1287, 1288. V.Portland, 26 Or. 410, 38 Pac. 407. 1274. V. Walliker, 98 Iowa 655, 68 N. W. 431. 512, 517, 518. Clinton School District's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 315. 346, 1383, 1441. Clippinger v. TuUer, 10 Kan. 377. 1371. V. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 315. 223. Ixiv TABLE OF OASES. Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. 114. 458, 460. Clopton V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 54 Pa. St 356. 815. Cloquet Lumber Co., In re, 61 Minn. 233, 63 N. W. 628. 559. Cloud V. Norwich, 57 Vt. 448. 1392. Clough V. Monroe, 34 N. H. 381. 445, 446. Cloutman v. Concord, 163 Mass. 444, 40 N. E. 763. 657. V. Pike, 7 N. H. 209. 1346. Clovesprlng Iron Works v. Cone, 56 Vt. 602. 637, 677, 796. Clugas V. Penaluna, 4 T. R. 466. 907. Cluggish V. Koons, 15 Ind. App. 599, 43 N. E. 158. 1516. Clunie v. Siebe, 112 Cal. 593, 44 Pac. 1064. 48, 770, 1354, 1357. Clute V. Barron, 2 Mich. 192. 946. Clyburn v. McLaughlin, 106 Mo. 521, 17 S. W. 692, 27 Am. St. Rep. 369. 952. Clyde S. S. Co. v. Charleston, 76 Fed. 46.' 158. • Clymer v. Cameron, 55 Miss. 593. 978 Coal Co. V. Baker, 135 111. 545, 26 N. B. 651, 12 L. R. A. 247. 636, 828. Coal Run Coal Co. v. Finlen, 124 111. 666, 17 N. E. 11. 287, 1385. Coale V. Campbell, 58 Kan. 480, 49 Pac. 604. 1074. Coates V. Campbell, 37 Minn. 498, 35 N. W. 366. , 181, 187, 207, 224. Coatesville Gas Co. v. Chester County, 97 Pa. St. 476. 329, 396, 400. Coats V. Hill, 41 Ark. 149. 66. Cobb V. Commissioners, 122 N. C. 307, 30 S. B. 338. 263, 321, 393 V.Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. 1. 20, 176, 320, 322, 503. V. Vary, 120 Ala. 263, 24 South. 442. 1032. Cobban v. Hinds, 23 Mont. 338, 59 Pac. 1. 730, 1442, 1444, 1447, 1454. Coblens v. Abel, 1 Woolw^ 292. 1486. Coburn v. Richardson, 16 Mass. 213, 215. 258. Cocheco Co. v. Strafeord, 51 N. H. 455. 52, 1382. Cochran v. Collins, 29 Cal. 129. 1283. V. Dry-Dock Co., 30 La. An. 1365. 874. V. Guild, 106 MSLSS. 29, 8 Am. Rep. 296. 873. V.Park Ridge, 138 111. 295, 27 N. B. 939. 253. , V. Richberger, 70 Miss. 843, 12 South. 851. 1079. Cockburn v. Auditor-General, 120' Mich. 643, 79 N. W. 931. 993. Cockerill v. Stafford, 102 Mo. 57,. 14 S. W. 813. 1045. Cockrell v. Smith, 1 La. An. 1. 446- Cockrum v. West, 122 Ind. 372, 23 N. E. 140. 1047. Cocks V. Simmons, 55 Ark. 104, 17 S. W. 594, 29 Am. St. Rejf: 28. 950, 966, 969. Coco V. Thieneman, 25 La,. An. 237. 10'57. Codman v. Hall, 9 Allen, 335. 823. V.Johnson, 104 Mass. 491. 364,. 1202. ' Cody V. Lennard, 45 Ga. 85. 1423, 1514. Coe V. Errol, 62 N. H. 303. 166,. 654. V. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 Sup. Ct. 475.- 88, 89, 143, 166, 654. ■ V. Gregory, 53 Mich. 19, 18 N. W. 541. 8, 1521. Gofer T. Brooks, 20 Ark. 542. 1068,. 1086, 1092. Coffin V. Bi-ooklyn, 116 N. Y. 159, 22 N. B. 227. 922. V. Estes, 32 Minn. 367, 20 N. W. 357. 889. Cofflnger v. Rice, 33 Cal. 408. 965. Coffman v. Keightly, 24 Ind. 50S;.. 218. Cogburn v. Hunt, 54 Miss. 675. 748. V. Hunt, 56 Miss. 718. 816, 921. 1021. V.Hunt', 57 Miss. 681. 1021. Coggeshall v. Des Moines, 78 Iowa: 235, 41 N. W. 617. 1517. Cohea v. Hemingway, 71 Miss. 22, 14 South. 734, 42 Am. St. Rep. 449. 966. Cohen v. Alameda, 124 Cal. 504, 57 Pac. 377. 730. V. Sharp, 44 Cal. 29. 1450. Cohn V. Parcels, 72 Cal. 367, 14 Pae. 26. 1438. V. Parker, 41 La. An. 894, ff South. 718. 347. Cohn, Ex parte, 13 Nev. 424. 701,, 703. Coie v. Carl, 82 Hun 360, 31 N. Y: ' Supp. 565. 85L Coit V. Claw, 28 Ark. 516. 1332. V. Grand Rapids, 115 Mich. 493: 73 N. W. 811. 345. V.Sutton, 102 Mich. 324, 60 N; W. 690, 25 L. ' R. A. 819. 152, 154. V.Wells, 2 Vt. 318. 437. 919. 926. Coit & Co. V. Sutton, 102 Mich. 324,, 60 N. W. 690, 25 L. R. A. 8191. 152, 154. TABLE OF OASES. Ixv Coite V. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 36 Conn. 512; 402, 678, 702. V. Society for Savings, 32 Conn. 173. 8, 10, 131, 259, 402, 677, 678, 706. Colbert v. Liake Supervisors, 60 Miss. 142. .605. Colburn v. Ellis, 5 Mass. 427. 435. Colby V. Russell, 1 Me. 102. 1469. V.Russell, 3 Me. 227. 760,762. Cole V. Black River Falls, 57 Wis. 110, 14 N. W. .906. 430, 432. V. Blackwell, 38 Ark. 271. 566. V. Coon, 70 Miss. 634, 12 South*. 849. 990, 1078. T.Gray, 139 Ind. 396, 38 N. B3. 856. 1019. V. Hall, 103 111. 30. 1146. v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct. 416. 181, 183. V.Lamm, 81 Minn. 463, 84 N. ^. 329. 1024, 1055. V.Moore, 34 .Ark. 582. 946. V. Randolph, 31 La. An. 535. 166, 1120. ■ V.Rice, 74 Conn. 680, 51 Atl. 1083. 877. V. Shelp, 98 Mich. 56, 56 N. W. 1052. 62, 631, 897. V. State, 131 Ind. 591, 31 N. E. 458. 443, 444. Coleman v. Broad River T'p, 50 S. C. 321, 27 S. B. 774. 510. V. Eldred, 44 Wis. 210. 1086. V. Peshtigo Lumber Co., 30 Fed. 317. 982, 997, 1016, 1084, 1085. V. Shattuck, 62 N. Y. 348. 926, 1003, 1009. Coleman, Matter of, 30 Hun 544. 1399. Coleman's Estate, 159 Pa. St. 231, 28 Atl. 137. 94, 640. Colerain v. Bell, 9 Met. 499. 1331. Colket V. Rightmlre,.46 N. J. L. 341. 265. Collamer v. Drury, 16 Vt. 574, 578. 1479. Collateral Inheritance Tax, In re, 88 Me. 587, 34 Atl. 530. Collection of Poll Tax, 21 R. I. 582, 44 Atl. 805. 21, 55, 795, 848. Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113. 133, 1119. V. Hubbard, 12 Wall. 1. 1486. College Street, Matter of, 8 R. I. 474. 363. Coller V. Sterling, 11 S. D. 140, 76 N. W. 12. 785. Collier v. Burgin, 130 N. C. 632, 41 S. E. 784. 1119. V.Morrow, 90 Ga. 148, 15 S. E. 768. 629, 776. Collins V. Boring, 96 Ga. 360, 23 S. B. 401. 731, 865. V. Bryan, 124 N. C. 738, 32 S. E. 975. 986, 988. V. Chicago, 4 Biss. 472. 711. V. Green, 10 Okl. 244, 62 Pac. 817. 655, 1425. V. Henderson, 11 Bush 74. 200. V. Holyoke, 146 Mass. 298, 15 N. B. 908. 442, 491, 1240, 1268. V.Long Island City, 132 N. Y. 331, 30 N. E. 835. 533, 726. V. Louisville, 2 B. Monr. 134. 1141. V. Rea, 127 Mich. 273, 86 N. W. 811. 590. V. Sherwood, 50 W. Va. 133, 40 S. B. 603. 640, 1059. V. Storm, 75 Iowa 36, 39 N. W. 161. 927, 1001, 1067. V. Valleau, 79 Iowa 626, 43 N., W. 284, 44 N. W. 904. 1073. V. Welch, 38 Minn. 62, 35 N. W. 566. 889, 935. Collinsville v. Cole, 78 111. 114. 1111. Colman v. Anderson, 10 Mass. 105. 591, 1477. Coloma V. Eaves, 92 U. S. 484. 564. Colorado Co. v. Com'rs, 95 U. S. 259. 136, 137, 138. Colored Orphans' Assoc, v. New York, 104 N. Y. 581, 12 N. B. 279. 349, 350, 352, 380, 496. Colston V. Eastern Cemetery Co. (Ky.), 15 S. W. 245. 354. Colton V. Beardsley, 38 Barb. 29. 434. V. Hanchett, 13 111. 615. 1436. V. Longmeadow, 12 Allen 598. 643. V. Montpelier, 71 Vt. 413, 45 Atl. 1039. 102, 336, 343, 347. Columbia v. Guest, 3 Head 413. 546, 1095. V. Tlndal, 43 S. C. 547, 22 S. B. 341. 264, 267. Columbia & P. S. R. Co. v. Chilberg, 6 Wash. 612, 34 Pac. 163. 368, 377. Columbia Bank v. Jones (N. J. Eq.), 17 Atl. 808. 1022, 1065. Columbia Club v. McMaster, 35 S. C. 1, 14 S. E. 290, 28 Am. St. Rep. 826. 1114. Columbia Conduit Co. v. Common- wealth, 90 Pa. St. 307. 682, 683. Columbia County v. King, 13 Fla. 451. 1365. Columbian, etc. Co. v. Vanderpoel, 4 Cow. 556. 347. Columbus V. Hartford Ins. Co., 25 Neb. 83, 41 N. W. 140. 1096. Columbus, etc. R. Co. v. Grant County, 65 Ind. 427. 441, 1418. Ixvi TABLE OF CASKS. Columbus S. R. Co. v. Wright, 89 Ga. 574, 15 S. E. 293. 82, 283, 549, 699. V. Wright, 151 U. S. 470, 14 Sup. Ct. 296. 76, 80, 82. Columbus Water Co. v. Columbus, 48 Kan. 99, 28 Pac. 1097, 15 L. R. A. 354. 586. Columbus Waterworks Co. v. Co- lumbus, 48 Kan. 378, 29 Pac. 762. 586. Colusa County v. G-lenn County, 124 Cal. 498, 57 Pac. 477. 787. Combs V. Breathitt County, 107 Ky. 379, 46 S. W. 505. 805, 1329, 1334. V. Goff, 127 111. 431, 20 N. B. 9. 956. V.Letcher County (Ky.), 54 S. W-. 177. 221. Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn. 219. 218, 258, 308, 514. V. Polk County, 81 Fed. 921, 27 C. C. A. 1, 52 V. S. App. 399. 834. ■ Comfort V. Ballingal, 134 Mo. 281, 35 S. W. 609. 919, 936. Comins v. Harrisville, 45 Mich. 442, 8 N. W. 44. 415. Commercial Bank v. Chambers, 182 V. S. 556, 21 Sup. Ct. 863. 273, 711, 712, 715. V. Sandford, 99 Fed. 154. 486, 953. V. Sandford, 103 Fed. 98. 954. V. Woodside, 14 Pa. St. 404. 516, 518, 726. Commercial Electric Light & P. Co. V. Judson, 21 Wash. 49, 56 • Pac. 829, 57 L. R. A. 78. 338, 436, . 686. . Commercial F. Ins. Co. v. Board of Revenue, 99 Ala. 1, 14 South. 490, 42 Am. St. Rep. 17. 689. Commercial Nat. Bank v. Chapi- bers, 182 V. S. 556, 21 Sup. Ct 863. 273, 711, 712, 715. V. Chambers, 21 Utah 324, /61 Pac. 560, 56 L. R. A. 346. 93, 271, 273, 560, 692. V. lola, 2 Dill. 353. 195, 206. V. lola, 9 Kan. 689. 195, 206. V.Portland, 2i Or. 188, 33 Pac. 532. 1282. Commissioners v. Alleghany Coun- ty, 20 Md. 449. 301, 409, 1299, 1351, 1361. V. American Bm. Co., 93 U. S. , 124. 1460. V. Arnold, 49 Kan. 279, 30 Pac. 4§6. 1515. V.Atlanta, etc. R. Co., 86 N. C. 541. 1387. V. Blake, 19 Kan. 299. 592. Commissioners v. Blake, 25 Kan. 356. 594. V. Bolles, .94 U. S. 104. 564. V. Buckner, 48 Fed. 533. 683. V.Carter, 2 Kan. 115. 515. V. Carthage Supervisors, 27 111. 140. 1405. V. Clark, 94 U. S. 278. 564. V. Cole, 62 Kan. 121, 61 Pac. 403. 90S. V. Commissioners, 127 111. 581, 21 N. E. 206. 250, 1169, 1230, 1253. V. Dennis, 1 Cheves 229. 1114. V. First Nat. Bank, 48 Kan. 561, 30 Pac. 22. 17, 19. V. Gels, 22 Kan. 381. 1491. V. Grainger, 98 Ky. 319, 32 S. W. 954. 1360, 1362. V. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500, 46 N. B. 124. 175, 177, 237, 238, 239, 240, 1201, 1205. V. Improvement Co., 2 Colo. 628. 138. V.Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196, 18 South. 339. 212; 283. V. Jessup, 22 Minn. 552. 890. V. Jordan, 18 Pick. 228. 1114. V. Krauss, 53 Ohio St. 628, 42 N. E. 831. 1441. V. Land Co., 23 Kan. 196. 1502. V.Lang, 8 Kan. 284. 626. ' V. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108. 215. V. McCormick, 4 Mont. 115, 5 Pac. 287. 1337. V. Markle, 46 Ind. 96. 1418. V. Morrison, 22 Minn. 178. 52. V. Murphy, 107 N. C. 36, 12 S. B. 122. 830. V. Nettleton, 22 Minn. 356. 890. V. Newell, 80 111. 587. 468. V. Ottawa, 49 Kan. 747, 31 Pac. 788, 33 Am. St. Rep. 396. 1236. V. Patterson, 8 Jones Law 182. 102, 1116. V. Rosche, 50 Ohio St. 103, 3'3 N. B. 408, 40 Am. St. Rep. 653, 19 L. R. A. 584. 492. V. Simons, 129 Ind. 193, 28 N. E. 420, 13 L, R. A. 512. 85, 117, 381. V.Smith, 48 Kan. 331, 29 Pac. 565. 294. V. Taylor, 77 N. C. 404. 1337. V. Thayer, 94 U. S. 411. 214. V. Walker^ 8 Kan. 431. 1501. V. Winand, 77 Md. 522, 26 Atl. 1110. 1357. V.Zimmerman, 101 Ky. 432, 41 S. W. 428. 467. Commissioners of Elizabeth, In re, 49 N. J. L. 488, 10 Atl. 363. 46, 511. TABLE OF OASES. Ixvii ■Commissioners of Public Parks, In re, 47 Hun 302. 1233. See, also. Board of Commission- ers; County Commissioners. Common Council v. Board of Asses- sors, 91 Mich. 78, 51 N. W. 787. 57, 91, 124, 272, 388, 640, 702, 776, 815. V. Smith, 99 Mich. 507, 58 N. W. 481. 609, 629, 633. V.Whitney, 53 Mich. 158, 18 N. W. 626. 1367, 1371. Common Council of Albany, Ex parte, 3 Cow. 358. 792, 1361. Commonwealth v. Alleghany Coun- ty Com'rs, 37 Pa. St. 277. 467, 1362. V. Alleghany County Com'rs, 40 Pa. St. 348. 588. T.American Bell Tel. Co., 129 Pa. St. 217, 18 Atl. 122. 719. T.American Dredging Co., 122 Pa. St. 386, 15 Atl. 443, 9 Am. St. Rep. 116, 1 L. R. A. 237. 86, 651, 674. v. American Tobacco Co., 173 Pa. St. 531, 34 Atl. 223. •24,- 1116. V. Anderson, 178 Pa. St. 171, 35 Atl. 632. 30, 329, 550. T. Arrott, Steam Power Mills Co., 143 Pa. St. 69, 22 Atl. 243. 378. T. Ashlln's Adm'r, 95 Va. 145, 28 S. E. 177. 867. T. Beech Creek R. Co., 188 Pa. St. 203, 41 Atl. 605. 688, 692. V.Berkshire L. Ins.' Co., 98 Mass. 25. 702. T.Blrd, 12 Mass. 443. 112. T. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70. 107, 1150. T. Bridge Co., 95 Ky. 60, 23 S. W. 868. 116, 362. v.^rown, 91 Va. 762, 21 S. B. 357, 28 L. R. A. 110. 30, 337, 552. V. Brush Electric Light Co., 145 Pa. St. 147, 22 Atl. 844. 141, 682, 683. T.Byrne, 20 Grat. 165. 1115, 848, 1115, 1143. T.Campbell, 33 Pa. St. 380. 1114. V. Gary, etc. Co., 98 Mass. 19. 403, 678, 1390, 1392. V. Central Dlst. etc. Tel. Co., 145 Pa. St. 121, 22 Atl. 841, 27 Am. St. Rep. 677. 141. V. Central Transp. Co., 145 Pa. St. 89, 22 Atl. 209. 682. Commonwealth t. CharlottesTlUe, etc. Co., 90 Va. 790, 20, S. E. 364, 44 Am. St. Rep.. 950. 404. T. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 27 Grat. 344. 26, 90, 359. V.Chester, 123 Pa. St. 626, 16 Atl. 591. 833. V. Clark, 195 Pa. St. 634, 46 Atl. 286, 86 Am. St. Rep. 694, 57 L. R. A. 348. 77, 327, 328, 329. V. Clary, 8 Mass. 72. 86. T. Cleveland, etc. R. Co., 29 Pa. St. 370. 682. V. Colby Supervisors, 29 Pa. St. 121. 1444. V. Coleman's Administrator, 52 Pa. St. 468. 94. V. Colton, 8 Gray 488. 1145. V. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 150 Pa. St. 245, 24 Atl. 599. 125, 166, 832, 833. V. Delaware Div. Canal Co., 123 Pa. St. 594, 16 Atl. 584, 2 L. R. A. 798. 9, 125, 327, 328, 676, 832, 833. V. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 96, 22 Atl. 157. 94, 163, 651, 692. V. Delaware, S. & S. R. Co., 165 Pa. St. 44, 30 Atl. 522. 690, 1387. V. Dunlop, 89 Va. 431, 16 S. B. 273. -804. v.East Bangor Consol. Slate Co., 162 Pa. St. 599, 29 Atl. 706. 379. V. Bdgerton Coal Co., 164 Pa. St. 284, 30 Atl. 125. 691. V. Edison E. L. Co., 157 Pa. St. 529, 37 Am. St. Rep. 747. 141. V. Edison E. L. & P. Co., 170 Pa. St. 231, 32 Atl. 419. 378. V.Ellis (Ky.), 9 S. W. 221. 613. V. Ellis, 158 Mass. ,555, 33 N. E. 651. 1100. v.Bngle (Ky.), 52 S. W. 811. 613. V. Ewig, 14'5 Mass. 119, 13 N. B. 365. 1114. V. Fall Brook Coal Co., 156 Pa. St. 488, 26 Atl. 1071. 393, 405. V. Fall Brook R. Co., 188 Pa. St. 199, 41 Atl. 606. 617. V. Payette County R Co., 55 Pa. St. 452. 114, 115, 355. V. Fariners' etc. Co., 107 Ky. 1, 52 S. W. 799. 613. V. Ferguson, 137 Pa. St. 595, 20 Atl. 870, 10 L. R. A. 240. 380. Ixviii TABLE OF CASES. Commonwealth v. Ford, 89 Va. 427, 16 S. B. 277. 804. V. Fowler, 10 Mass. 290. 435. V. Gaines, 80 Ky. 489. 88. V.Gardner, 133 Pa. St. 284, 19 Atl. 550, 7 L. R. A. 666. 153. V. Germanla Brewing Co., 145 Pa. St. 83, 22 Atl. 240. 328. V. Gloucester Ferry Co., 98 Pa. St. 105. 148. V. Gormly, 173 Pa. St. 586, 34 Atl. 282. 1117. T. Hamilton Manuf . Co., 12 Al- len 298. 131, 302, 402, 406, 678, 687. V. Harmel, 166 Pa. St. 89, 30 Atl. 1036, 27 L. R. A. 388. ' 153. V. Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 118. 199. V. Hays,' 8 B. Monr. 1. 86, 644. V.Henderson, 172 Pa. St. 135, 33 Atl. 368. 327, 380. V. Hillside Cemetery Co., 170 Pa. St. 227, 32 Atl. 404. 397. V.Holbrcok, 10 Allen 200. 24, 1152. V. Hollidy, 98 Ky. 616, 33 'S. W. 943. 80, 613. v.Holrties, 25 Grat. 771. 1336, 1339. V.Jackson (Ky.j, 61 S. W. 700. 612. V. Juniata Coke Co., 157 Pa. St. 507, 27 Atl. 373, 22 L. R. A. 232 379 V.Keenan, 11 Allen 262. 1152.^ V. Keystone Bridge Co., 156 Pa.' St. 500, 27 Atl. 1. 379. V. Lackawanna Iron, etc. Co., 129 Pa. St. .346, 18 Atl. 133. 359, 378. V. Land Com'rs, 9 Watts 466, 471. 443. v.Lauth (Ky.), 56 S. W. 519. 613. V. Lehigh C. & N. Co., 162 Pa. St. 603, 29 Atl. 664. 404. V. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 104 Pa. St. 89. 598, 676, 832. V. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 388, 18 Atl. 125. 157. V. Lichigh Valley R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 429., 451, 18 Atl. 406, 410. 125, 464, 662, 832, 833. V. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 186 Pa. St. 235, 40 Atl. 491. 25, 84, 676, 832, 833. V. Lippincott Co., 156 Pa. St. 513, 27 Atl. 10. 379. V. Louisville (Ky.), 47 S. "W. 865. 266, 745, 836. Commonwealth v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.), 9 S. W. 805. 366. v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,' 105 Ky. 206, 48- S. W. 1092. 174. V. Louisville, St. L. & K. R. Co. (Ky.), 31 S. W. 464. 366. V.Lowell Gas Light Co., 12 Allen 75. 406, 638, 678, 1115. V.Luzerne County (Pa.), 15 Atl. 548. 908. T. McCarty, 141 Mass. 420. 6 N. E. 102. 1151. V. MoCombs, 56 Pa. St. 436. 432, 436. V. Macferron, 152 Pa. St. 244, 25 Atl. 556, 19 L. R. A. 568. 329, 503, 550. V. McKean County, 200 Pa. St. 383, 49 AU. 982. 406, 598, 908. ' V. Mahoning RoUing-Mill Co., 129 Pa. St. 360, 18 Atl. 135. 377. V. Manor Gas-Coal Co., 188 Pa. St. 195, 41 Atl. 605. 692. V. Martin, 107 Pa. St. 185. 328, 676. V. Masonic Temple, 89 Ky. 658, 13 S. W. 121. 1331. V.Milton, 12 B: Monr. 212, 54 Am. Dec. 522. 95, 171, 1104. V.Moore, 25 Grat. 951. 9, 1116. V. Muir, 180 Pa. St. 47, 36 Atl. 413. 327. V. Myer, 92 Va. 809, 23 S. B.. 915, 31 L. R. A. 379. 151. V.Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co., 93 Ky. 430, 20 S. W. 383. 362. V. National Oil Co., 157 Pa. St. .516, 27 Atl. 374. 328; V. Newburyport, 103 Mass. 129. 1297. V. New England S. & T. Co., IS Allen 391. 258, 406, 491. V. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 463, 18 Atl. 412, 15 Am. St. Rep. 724. 26, 95, 718, 832. V. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 38, 22 Atl. ,212. 157, 171, 684, 832. V. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 57, 22 Atl. 212, 236. 464, 833. V. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 200, 22 Atl. 806, 807. 684. V. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 150 Pa. St. 234, 24 Atl. 609. 166, 394, 399, 406, 451. TABLE OF OASES. Ixix Commonwealtli v. New York, P. & O. R. Co., 188 Pa. St. 169, 41 Atl. 594. 688, 692, 753. V. Northern Elect. L. etc. Co., 145 Pa. St. 105, 22 Atl. 839, 14 L,. R. A. 107. 378, 379. T. Ocean Oil Co., 59 Pa. St. 61. 390, 684, 685. V. Owensboro, etc. R. Co., 95 Ky. 60, 23 S. W. 868. 116, 362. V. Pennsylvania Co., 145 Pa. St. 266, 23 Atl. 549. 444, 538. v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 197 Pa. St. ,551, •47 Atl. 740. 651, 692. V. Pennsylvania Gas Coal Co., 62 Pa. St. 241. 685. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 13 Pa. St. 165. 494. V. Pennsylvania Salt Manuf. Co., 145 Pa. St. 53, 22 Atl. 215. 832, 833. V. People's Passenger R. Co., 183 Pa. St. 353, 38 Atl. 1091. 383. V. People's Savings Bank, 5 Allen 428. 677. V. People's Traction Co., 183 Pa. St. 405, 39 Atl. 42. 688, 833 V. Petty, 96 Ky. 452, 29 S. W. 291, 29 L. R. A. 786. 9, 1138. V. Philadelphia, 27 Pa. St. 497. 1480. 440, 1325, 1480. V. Philadelphia, 157 Pa. St. 550, 27 Atl. 551. 908. V. Philadelphia, 157 Pa. St. 558, 27 Atl. 553. 908. T.Philadelphia & E. R. Co., 164 Pa. St. 252, 30 Atl. 145. 110, 503, 685. V. Philadelphia & R. C. & I. Co., 137 Pa. St. 481, 20 Atl. 580. 832, 833, 835. T. Philadelphia & R. C. & I. Co., 145 Pa. St. 283, 23 Atl. 809. 833; 902. V. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 74, 22 Atl. 235. 688. V. Philadelphia & R. R. Co., 150 Pa. St. 312, 24 Atl. 612. 833. ^ V.Philadelphia County (Pa.), 10 Atl. 772. 908. V. Philadelphia County, 157- Pa. St. 531, 550, 27 Atl. 546. '908. V. Philadelphia County, 158 Pa. St. 527, 27 Atl. 378. 141. V. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 74 Pa. St. 83. 681, 682. Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh & W. R. Co., 166 Pa. St. 453, 31 Atl. 202. 691. V. Pittsburgh Common Council, 34 Pa. St. 496. 504, 588, 1350, 1365. V. Pittsburgh Councils, 88 Pa. St. 6fi. 1365. V. Pomfhret, 137 Mass. 564, 50 Am. Rep. 340. 1114. v.Pottsville I. & S. Co., 157 Pa. St. 500, 27 Atl. 371, 22 ■ L. ,R. A. 228. 379. V. Pottsville Water Co., 94 Pa. St. 516. 112. V. Provident Inst, 12 Allen 312. 131. T. Pullman's Pialace Car Co., 107 Pa. St. 156. 93, 164. V. Richmond & P. R. Co., 81 Va. 355. 114, 380. v. Rodes, 5 T. B. Monr. 318. 1333, 1342. V. Runk, 26 Pa. St. 235. 628. V.St. Bernard Coal Co. (Ky.), 9 S. W. 709. 271. V. Savings Bank, 5 Allen 428. 258, 302, 461, 590. V. Savings Bank, 123 Mass. 493. 677, 708. T. Savings Bank, 126 Mass. 526. 708. v. Scanlan, 200 Pa. St. 250, 51 Atl. 986. 1340. V. Sharon Coal Co., 164 Pa. St. 284, 36 Atl. 127. 76, 82, 328. V. Singer Manuf. Co. (Ky.), 21 S. W. 354. 619. V. Smith, 6 Bush 303. 1147. T.Smith, 92 Ky. 38, 17 S. W. 187, 36 Am. St. Rep. 578. 161. V.Smith, 102 Mass. 144. 1114. V. Snyder, 182 Pa. St. 630, 38 Atl. 356. 79, 168. V. Stambaugh, 164 Pa. St. 437. 30 Atl. 293. 1324, 1329, 1337. V. Standard Oil Co.; 101 Pa. St. 119. 21, 23, 500, 681, 718, 719, 903. V. Stodder, 2 Cush. 562, 48 Am. Dec. 679. 1110, 1141. T. Taylor, 101 Ky. 325, 41 S. W. 11. 258, 296, 297, 550, 598. V.Teller, 144 Pa. St. 545, 22 Atl. 922. Ill8. V. Thackra Manuf. Co., 156 Pa. St. 510, 27 Atl. 13. 379. V. Thayer, 5 Met. 246. 1114. T.Titman, 148 Pa. St. 168, 23 Atl. 1120. 794. T. Thorniley, 6 Allen 445. 1152. Ixx TABLE OF CASES. Commonwealth v. Three Forks Coal Co., 95 Ky. 273, 25 S. W. 3. 825. V. Toncray (Ky.), 52 S. W. 797. 613, 622. V.Union Traction Co., 192 Pa. St. 507, 43 Atl./lOlO. 676. v. West End Coal Co., 182 Pa. St. 353, 38 Atl. 14. bal. V. Western Land & Imp. Co., 156 Pa. St. 455, 26 AU. 1034. 681. V. Westinghouse Air-Brake Co., 151 Pa. St. 276, 24 Atl.< nil, 1113. 378, 379. V. Westinghouse Elect, 'etc. Co., 151 Pa. St. 265, 24 Atl. 1107, nil. 9, 141, 379, 675. V.Wilkes Barre & S. R. Co., 162 Pa. St. 614, 29 Atl. 696. 832. V.William Mann Co., 150 Pa. St. 64, 24 Atl. 601. 379. V. Williams, 11 Pa. St. 61. 215. V.Wilson, Myers (Ky.) 127. 1346. V.Woods, 44 Pa. St. 113. 1172, 1182, 1206, 1259. V. Wyoming Valley Canal Co., 50 Pa. St. 410. 901. Commonwealth's Appeal, 127 Pa. St. 435, 17 Atl. 1094. 670. Commonwealth's Appeal, 128 Pa. St. 603, 18 Atl. 386. 94, 811, 903. Commonwealth's Appeal (Bittin- ger's Estate), 129 Pa. St. 338, 18 Atl. 132. 34, 94. Commonwealth's Appeal, 129 Pa. St. 346, 18 Atl. 133. 359, 378. Commonwealth's Appeal, 161 Pa. St. 181, 28 Atl. 1071. 94, 640.' ' Comptoir National v. Board of As- sessors, 52 La. An. 1319, 27 South. 801. 87, 9i. Comstock V. Beardsley, 15 Wend. 348. 1038. V. Grand Rapids, 54 Mich. 641, 20 N. W. 623. 303, 392, 602, 656, 1383. Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H. 465. 253. Conant v. Buesing, 23 Pla. 559, 2 South. 882. 810. Concordia L. & T. Co. v. Parrotte, 62 Neb. 629, 87 N. W. 348. 964, 965. V. Van Camp, 64 Neb. , 89 N. W. 744. 807, 893, 982, 984. Concordia Parish v. Bertron, 46 La. An. 356, 15 South. 60. 930, 1077. Conde v. Schenectady, 164 N. Y. 258, 58 N. E. 130. 70, 1218, 1449, 1515. Condon v. Galbraith, 106 Tenn. 14, 58 S. W. 916. 486, 989, 992. Condon v. MaTynard, 71 Md. 601, 18 Atl. 957. 842. Cone V. Forest, 126 Mass. 97. 1478, 1484. ■ V.Hartford, 28 Conn. 363. 1131, 1172, 1173, 1206. V. Wold, 85 Minn. 302, 88 N. W. 977. 1430. V. Wood, 108 Iowa 260, 79 N. W. 86, 75 Am. St. Rep. 223. 967, 1034, 1458. Cones V. Wilson, 14 Ind. 465, 466. 852. Coney v. Owen, 6 Watts 435. 1064, 1065, 1066. ' Conger v. Bergman (Ky.), 11 S. W. 84. 231, 1160. V.Graham (Ky.), 11 S. W. 467. 231, 1160. Congregation v. New York, 52 Hun 507, 5 N. Y. Supp. 608. 352. V. Board of Com'rs, 115 N. C. 489, 20 S. E. 626. 352, 353. Congregation, State, v. Brakeley, 67 N. J. L.-176, 50 Atl. 589. 349. Conklin v. Cambridge, 58 Ind. 130. 359. V. Commissioners, 13 Minn. 454. 1433. Conkling v. Springfield, 132 111. 420, 24 N. E. 67. 1397, 1501. V. Springfield, 19 111. App. 167. 1506. Conley v. Chedic, 6 Nev. 222. 1416. V. Chedic, 7 Nev. 336. 89. V. McMillan, 120 Mich. 694, 79 N. W. 909. 883. V. St. Clair Sup'rs, 88 Mich. 245, 50 N. W. 140. 563. Conlin v. Seamen, 22 Cal. 546. 1389. V. Seamen, 22 Cal. 549. 1283. Conn V. Conn, 58 Iowa 747, 13 N. W. 51. 966. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Bulte, 45 Mich. 113, 7 N. W. 707. 969,. 970, 971, 1003, 1004. v. Chicago, 185 111. 148, 56 N. E. 1071. 1243. V. Commonwealth, 133 Mass. 161. 302, 678, 681, 701. V. Ingarson, 75 Minn. 429, 78 N. W. 10. 895. V. State Treasurer, 31 Mich. 6. 548. V. Stinson, 62 111. App. 319. 1027. V.Wood, 115 Mich. 444, 74 N. W. 656. 877, 879, 881, 960, 978, 979, 1455. Connecticut River L. Co. v. Colum- bia, 62 N. H. 286. 89. Connecticut S. C. Assoc, v. East Lynne, 54 Conn. 152. 352, 732. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxi Conners, Appeal of, 103 Pa. St. 356. 468, 575. Connersville v. Bank of Indiana, 16 Ind. 105. 290, 396. V. Merrill, 14 Ind. App. 303. 1212. V. State Bank, 16 Ind. 105. 290, 396., Connolly v. Connolly, 63 Iowa 202, 18 N. W. 868. 965. V.San Francisco (Cal.), 33 Pac. 1109. 1277. V.Paris, 87 Tex. 32, 27 S. W. 88. 1163. V. West Chicago, 162 111. 287, 44 N. E. 1118. 1276. Connors v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 128, 1 N. W. 902. 592, 1426. Conover v. Honce, 46 N. J. L. 347. 1380, 1400. Conrad v. Darden, 4 Yerg. 407. 911, 940. v. Ithaca, 16 N. Y. 158. 1512. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Baker, 135 111. 545, 26 N. E. 651, 12 L. R. A. 247. 636, 828. V. People, 186 111. 134, 57 N. E. 880. 68. Consolidated Blec. S. Co., In re (N. J. Eq.), 26 Atl. 983. 379. Consolidated Gas Co. v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 588, 50 Am. Rep. 237. 361. Consolidated Nat. Bank v. Prima County (Ariz.), 48 Pac. 291. 713. Constant v. East Carroll, 105 La. 286, 29 South. 728. 482, 552. Constitutionality of House Bill, In re, 9 Colo. 623, 21 Pac. 471. 281. Construction of Revenue Law, In re, 2 .S. D. 58, 48 N. W. 813. 332. Consumers' Ice Co. v. State, 82 Md. 132, 33 Atl. 427. 648, 689, 1385. Continental L. & C. Co. v. Board, 80 Tex. 489, 16 S. W. 312. 1482. Contributors v. Delaware County, 169 Pa. :St. 305, 32 Atl. 456. 350. Converse v. Rankin, 115 111. 398, 5 N. E. 504. 1048. Conway v. Cable, 37 111. 82, 87 Am. Dec. 240. 496, 515, 898, 905, 1058, 1060, 1069. V. Taylor, 1 Black 603. 148, 1123. V. Waverley, 15 Mich. 257. 1425, 1450. V. Younkin, 28 Iowa 295. 537. Conwell V. Connersville, 8 Ind. 204. 235, 250. V. Connersville, 15 Ind. 150. 396, 404, 652. V. O'Brien, 11 Ind. 419. 290. Cook V. Auditor-General, 124 Mich. 430, 83 N. W. 96. 1464. Cook V. Burlington, 59 Iowa 251, 13 N. W. 113, 44 Am. Rep. 679. 2192, 399, 404. V. Crandall, 7 Utah 344, 26 Pac. 927. 248. V. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co., 5 Tex. Civ. App. 644, 24 S. W. 544. 1451. V. Hackleman, 45 Mo. 317. lOOS. V. Hall, 123 Mich. 378, 82 N. W. 59, 1463. V. Ipswich Local Board, L. R. 6 Q. B. 451. 528. V. Lasher, 42 U. S. App. 42, 73 Fed. 701, 19 C. C. A. 654. 989 v.Leland, 5 Pick. 236. 664, 666. V.Norton, 43 111. 391. 845. V.Norton, 61 111. 285. 807. V.Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566. 144, 149, 150. V. Port Fulton, 106 Ind. 170, 6 N. E. 321. 652. V. Port of Portland, 20 Or. 580, 27 Pac. 263, 13 L. R. A. 533. 1167, 1194. V. Rounds, 60 Mich. 310, 27 N. W. 517. 811. V. Shroeder Lumber Co., 85 Minn. 374, 88 N. W. 971. 883, 895, 927, 947, 1041. V.Smith, 30 N. J. L. 387. 124. V. State, 33 N. J. L. 474. 366. V. State, 101 Ind. 446. 868, 1285. V. Sumner Manuf. Co., 1 Sneed 698. 207. Cook Co. V. Auditor-General, 79 Mich. 100, 44 N. W. 420. 137, 530. Cook County v. Chicago, .103 111. 646. 268, 1236. V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 35 111. 460, 466. 1411, 1415. Cooke V. Pennington, 15 S. C. 185. 1010. Cook Farm Co. v. Detroit, 124 Mich. 426, 83 N. W. 130. 1305. Cool V. Kelley, 78 Minn. 102, 80 N. W. 861. 982. Coolbaugh v. Huck, 86 111. 600. 772, 782, 785, 1444. Cooley V. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. 148, 149. V. Granville, 10 Cush. 56. 207, 1433. V. O'Connor, 12 Wall. 391, 398. 442. V. Waterman, 16 Mich. 366. 735, 967. Coolidge V. Pierce County, 28 Wash. 95, 68 Pac. 391. 1447. Ixxii TABLE OF CASES. Coombs V. Crabtree, 105 Mo. 292, 16 S. W. 830. 887, 897, 1003. V. GofE, 127 111. 431, 20 N. E. 9. 896, 1040. V. O'Neal, 1 MacA. 405. 845. V. Steere, 8 111. App. 147. 491. V.Warren, 34 Me. 89. 727, 746, 965. Coon V. Congden, 12 Wend. 496, 499. 1478. Coonradt v. Myers, 31 Kan. 30, 2 Pac. 858. 1061. V.Myers, 32 Kan. 270, 4 Pac. 359. 1062. Coons V. People, 76 111. 383. 1325, 1327. cooper V. Ash, 76 111. 11. 286, 408. V. Beers, 143 111. 25, 33 N. B. 61. 90. V. Brockway, 8 Watts 162, 165. 743. V. Bushley, 72 Pa. St. 252. 1052. V. Chamberlin, 78 Gal. 450, 21 Pac. 14. 1500. v. Cook, 108 Iowa 301, 79 N. W. 71. 1028. V. Corbin, 105 111. 224. 854, 855, 867, 871. V. Freeman Lumber Co., 61 Ark. 36, 31 S. W. 981, 32' S. W. 494. 955, 956, 989, 1011. V.Holmes, 71 Md. 20, 17 Atl. 711. 819, 871, 919, 935, 991. V. Jackson, 71 Ind. 244. 730, 1018. V. Jackson, 99 Ind. 566. 965. V. Lee's Heirs, 59 Ark. 460, 27 S. W. 970. 934, 935, 1069. V. Miller, 113 Cal. 238, 45 Pac. 325. 580, 738. V. Moore, 44 Miss. 386. 433, 436. v.Nevln, 90 Ky. 85, 13 S.' W. 841. 526, 1214. V. Savannah, 4 Ga. 68. 881. V. Shepardson, 51 Gal. 298. 1028. V. Springer. (N. J.), 52 Atl. 996. 1355. Cooper, Ex parte, 3 Tex. App. 489, , 30 Am. Rep. 152. 1146. Cooper Hospital v. Burdsall, 63 N. J. L. 85, 42 Atl. 853. 349. Co-operative B. & L. Assoc, v. State, 156 Ind. 463, 60 N. B. 146. 463, 608, 624, 627, 1373. Go-operative S. & L. Assoc, v. Green (Idaho), 51 Pac. 770. 736. Cooper's Estate (Appeal of Com- monwealth), 127 Pa. St. 435, 17 Atl. 1094. 670. Cooter V. Dearborn, 115 111. 509, 4 N. B. 388. 811, 1090, 1071. Copcutt V. Yonkers, 83 Hun 178, 31 N. Y. Supp. 659. 1451. Cope V. Collins, 37 Ark. 649. 1366. V.Rowlands, 2 M. & W. 149. 907. Gopeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 417, 29 S. W. 281. 311. Cope's Estate, In re, 191 Pa. St. 1, 43 Atl. 79, 71 Am. St. Rep. 749, 45 L. R. A. 316. 4, 34, 258, 327. Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev. 106, 108. .481. V. Nutt, 18 Grat. 674. 1024. V. Nutt, 10 Wall. 64. 1024. ,v. Portland, 31 Or. 407, 48 Pac. 428. 7, 8, 175, 466, 467, 555, 586, 594, 1293, 1366. Corbett, Matter of, 171 N. Y. 516, 64 N. E. 209. 668. Corbin v. Board of Gom'rs, 3 Fed. 356. 922. V. Bronson, 28 Kan. 532. 999. V. Hill, 21 Iowa 70. 508. V. Inslee, 24 Kan. 154. 739. V.Morrow, 46 Minn. 522, 49 N. W. 201. 921. V. Washington County Gom'rs, 3 Fed. 356. 922. V. Woodbine, 33 Iowa 297. 1425. V.Young, 24 Kan. 198. 921, 1020. Gorburn v. Crittenden, 62 Miss. 125. 982. Corjield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. G. G. 371, 380. 168, 653. Gorkle v. Maxwell, 3 Blatch. 413. 1495. Corliss V. Corliss, 8 Vt. 373, 390. 492. Cornell v. Barnes, 7 Hill 35. 1478, 1479. V. People, 107 111. 372. 1309, 1310. ' Corning v. Masonville T'p, 74 Mich. 177, 41 N. W. 831. 654. • Corning Town Go. v. Davis, 44 Iowa 622. 728, 957, 1048. Gornoy v. Wetmore, '92 Iowa 100, 60 N. W. 245. 736, 790, 808, 1041, 1043. Cornwall v. Todd, 38 Conn. 443. 450, 462, 464, 664. Coronado v. San Diego, 97 Cal. 440, 32 Pac. 518. 547. Corpus Christie v. Woessner, 58 Tex. 462. 555. Corrigan v. Bell, 73 Mo. 53. 886. V. Hinkley, 125 Mich. 125, 83 N. W. 1020. 985, 1021, 1051, 1065. V.Schmidt, 126 Mo. 304, 28 S. W. 874. 953. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxiii •Corrothers v. Board of Educ, 16 W. Va. 527. 1418, 1431. Corry v. Folz, 29 Ohio Str 320. 1288. •Corson v. Maryland, 120 U. S. 502, 7 Sup. Ct. 655. 152.' V. State, 57 Md. 251. 169. 357. Cousins V. Allen, 28 Wis. 232. 1047. V. Commonwealth, 19 Grat. 80 7. 1116. V. State, 50 Ala. 113, 20 Am; Rep. 290. 1105, 1106, 1108. Covell V. Young, 11 Neb. 510, 9 N. W. 694. 956, 997, 1022. Ixxiv TABLE OF OASES. Coventry County v. Assessors, 16 R. I. 240, 14 Atl. 877. 615. Cover V. Baytown, 12 Minn. 124. 218, 219. Covington v. Arthur (Ky.), 14 S. W. 121. 246. V. Boyle, 6 Bust 204. 106, 870, ' 1218. V. Casey, 3 Bush 698. 424, 1244, 1252. V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 39 S. W. 836. 113, 266, 267. V. Covington Gas-Light Co. (Ky.), 2 S. W. 326. 557. V. Bast St. Louis, 78 111. 548. 504. V. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231, 19 Sup. Ct. 383. 113, 116, 269. V. Nadaud, 103 Ky. 455, 45 S. W. 498. 1515, 1516. V. Powell, 2 Met. (Ky.) 226. 473. V.Rockingham, 93 N. C. 134. 766, 1426, 1441. V. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491. 246. V.Woods, 98 Ky. 344, 33 S. "W. 84. 393, 400. V. Worthlngton, 88 Ky. 206, 10 S. W. 790. 1218, 1244. Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Ken- tucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct 1087. 162, 164. Covington, etc. R. Co. v. Kenton County Court, 12 B. Mon. 144. 569. Covington, etc. Co. v. O'Meara (Ky.), 35 S. W. 1027. 693. Covington City Nat. Bank v. Cov- ington, 21 Fed. 484. 714, 716. Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Audi- tor, 14 Ind. 331. 290. Covington Gas Light Co. v. Cov- ington, 84 Ky. 94. 361, 638, 649, 848, 851. V.Covington, 92 Ky. 312, 17 S. W. 808. 474. Coward, State, v. North PlainHeld, 63 N. J. L. 61, 42 Atl. 805. 1210, 1258. Cowart V. Taxworth, 67 Miss. 322, 7 South. 350. 586. Cowdry v. Cuthbert, 71 Iowa 733, 29 N. W. 798. 968, 1044. Cowell V. Gray, 85 Mo. 169. 885. V.Washburn, 22 Cal. 519. 962. Cowen V. McCutcheon, 43 Miss. 207. 507. Cowgill V. Long, 15 111. 202. 488. 511, 512. COwles V. Brittain, 2 Hawks 204. 52, 54, 1120. Cowley V. Monson, 10 Biss. 182. 1091. Cox V. Clift, 2 N. Y. 118. 1448. T.Forest City & S. R. Co., 65 - Iowa 289, 23 N. W. 672. 582. V. Truitt, 57 N. J. L. 635, 31 Atl. 168. 318. v.Welcher, 68 Mich. 263, 36 N. W. 69, 13 Am. St. Rep. 339. 1504. Coxe V. Deringer, 78 Pa. St. 271. 808, 921. V. Deringer, 82 Pa. St. 236. 1003. I V.Gibson, 27 Pa. St. 160, 67 Am. Dec. 454. 965, 975. V. Sartwell, 21 Pa. St. 480. 1052. V. Wolcott, 27 Pa. St. 1541 965,. 969, 1050, 1052. Coxe Bros. & Co. v. Salomon, 188- 111. 571, 59 N. E. 422. 1412, 1413, 1445. Coxe's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 369, 3T Alt. 517. 669. Coxe's Estate, 193 Pa. St. 100, 44 Atl. 256. 669. . Cox Needle Co. v. Gilford, 62 N.H. 503. 344. Coy V. Lyons City Council, 17 Iowa- 1, 85 Am. Dec. 539. 478, 1362. Coyle V. O'Connor, 121 Mich. 596,. 80 N. W. 571. 886. Craft V. Kochersperger, 173 111. 617,. 50 N. B. 1064. 1441. V. Tuttle, 27 Ind. 332. 716. Crafts V. Ray, 22 R. I. 179,- 46 Atl. 1043, 49 L. R. A. 604. 8, 47, 330, 343. Cragin v. Henry, 40 Iowa 158. 948.. Craig V. Bradford, 3 Wheat. 594. 491. V.Burnett, 32 Ala. 728. 1140.- V. Dimock, 47 111. 308. 906. V. Flanagin, 21 Ark. 319, 901,. 1032, 1060, 1064. V. Pattison, 74 Miss. 881, 21 South. 756. 1116. V. People, 193 111. 199, 61 N. E.- 1072. 1246. V. Philadelphia, 89 Pa. St. 265. 1222, 1314. Cram v. Chicago, 139 111. 265, 28 N. E. 758. 739, 1213, 1267. Cramer v. Armstrong, 28 Colo. 496, 66 Pac. 889. 818, 910, 956, 957. V.Charleston, 176 111. 507, 52 N. B. 73. 1219. Crampton v. Zabriske, 101 U. S. 60L 1433. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, 134, 166. V. Trustees, 51 N. J. L. 138, 16 Atl. 194. 568. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxv Crane v. Dameron, 58 Mo. 567, 12 S. W. 251. 885. V. Janesville, 20 Wis. 305. 735, 1451. V.Randolph, 30 Ark. 579. 935, 950, 1448. V. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303. 861. V. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30, 55 S. W. 955. 231, 244, 1154, 1177, 1305. V. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 153 111. 348, 38 N. B. 943, 26 L. R. A. 311. 1165. Cranmer v. Hall, 4 W. & S. 36. 1066, 1082. V.Williamson, 8 Okl. 683, 59 Pac. 249. 1420, 1447. Cranston v. Smith, 37 Mich. 309, 26 Am. Rep. 514. 1138. Cranston Town Council's Petition, 18 R. I. 417, 28 Atl. 608. 208, 330, 560, 566. Crapo V. Stetson, 8 Met. 393. 19. Craw V. Tolono, 96 III. 255, 36 Am. Rep. 143. 1130, 1187, 1188, 1288. Crawford v. Burrell, 53 Pa. St. 219. 359, 363. V. Carson, 35 Ark. 565. 1338. V. Galloway, 29 Neb. 261, 45 N. W. 628. 802. V. Liddle, 101 Iowa 108, 70 N. W. 97. 1034, 1035, 1039. V.Linn County, 11 Or. 482, 5 Pac. 738. 91, 550. V. People, 82 111. 557. 1183, 1203, 1205. V.Polk County, 112 Iowa 118, 83 N. W. 825. 1383. V. Shaft, 35 Kan. 478, 11 Pac. 334. 1029. V. Stewart, 38 Pa. St. 34. 953. Crawford County v. Laub, 110 Iowa , 355, 81 N. W. 590. 19. Crawfordsville Music Hall Assoc, v. Clements, 12 Ind. App. 464, 40 N. E. 752. 1516. Craycraft v. Selvage, 10 Bush 696. 1214, 1279. Creamer v. Bremen, 91 Me. 508, 40 Atl. 555. 655, 656, 1505. Crecelius v. Louisville (Ky.), 49 S. W. 547. 603, 840, 1380. Credit Mohilier v. Commonwealth, 67 Pa. St. 233. 685. Creighton v. Commonwealth, 83 Ky. 142. 432, 436. V. Manson, 27 Cal. 613. 866. V. Scott, 14 Ohio St. 638. 1178, 1227, 1262, 1278, 1291. V.Toledo, 18 Ohio St. 447. 128;l. Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 6 Rand. 245. ISA. Creote v. Chicago, 56 111. 422. 420. Crescent City R. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 51 La. An. 335,. 25 Atl. 311. 687. V. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 1057, 11 South. 681. 687. Crescent City, etc. Water Co. v. New Orleans, 48 La. An. 768, 19 South 943. 347. Cressey v. Parks, 76 Me. 532. 741, 840. * Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555, 44 S. W. 707. 63, 64. Crim V. Phillippl, 38 W. Va. 122, 18 S. E. 466. 1421. Crisman v. Johnson, 23 Colo. 264, 47 Pac. 296, 58 Am. St. Rep. 224. 939, 952, 1002, 1061, 1070. Crismon v. Reich, 2 Utah 111. 19. Crispin, State v. Vansyckle, 49 N. J, L. 366, 8 Atl. 120. 90, 91, 272, 758. Crittenden v. Mt. Clemens, 86 Mich. 220, 49 N. W. 144. 486. ' V. White, 23 Minn. 24, 23 Am. Rep. 676. 1138. Crocker v. Crane, 21 Wend. 211, 34 Am. Dec. 228. 442. V.Donovan, 1 Okl. 165, 30 Pac. 374. 135. V. Shaw, 174 Mass. 266, 54 N. E. 549. 33. Crogster v. Bayfield County, 99^ Wis. 1, 74 N. W. 635. 533. Cromartie v. Commissioners, 87 N. C. 134. 1366. Cromwell v. MacLean, 123 N. Y. 474, 25 N. E. 932. 505, 520, 913. V. Wilson, 52 Hun 614, 5 N. Y. Supp. 474. 516. Cronan v. Municipality, 5 La. An. 537. 1280. Croner v. Cowdrey, 139 N. Y. 471, 34 N. B. 1061, 36 Am. Rep. 716. 911. Crook v. Anniston City L. Co., 93 Ala. 4, 9 South. 425. 729. Crooke v. Andrews, 10 N. Y. 547. 726, 1450. Crooks V. Whitford, 47 Mich. 283, 11 N. W. 159. 760, 957. Crosby v. Floete, 65 Iowa 370, 21 N. W. 682. 1398. V.Lyon, 37 Cal. 242. 278, 382, 1185. Croskery v. Busch, 116 Mich. 288, 74 N. W. 464. 19, 824, 829, 830, 920, 1018, 1064, 1066. Cross V. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 509. 527. Crossley v. Township Committee, 62 N. J. L. 583, 41 Atl. 712. 716. Crosswell v. Benton, 54 Minn. 264, 55 N. W. 1125. 809. Ixxvi TABLE OF CASES. Crow V. Hudson, 21 Ala. 560. 445. V. State, 14 Mo. 237. 168. Crowder v. Riggs, 153 Ind. 158, 53 N. E. 1019. 770, 1422, 1441, 1443, 1444. 'Crowell V. Goodwin, 3 Allen 535. 953, 954. v.Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9. 184, 218, 219, 514.. V. Jaqua, 114 I&d. 246, 15 N. JS. 242. 505. V. Merrill, 60 'Iowa 53, 14 N. W. 81. 875. v.TJtley, 74 Me. 49. 904. ♦■ "Crowley v. Copley, 2 La. An. 329, 362. 1131, 1226. ■Crown Cork, etc. Co. v. State, 87 Md. 687, 40 Atl. 1074, 53 L. R. A. 417, 67 Am. St. Rep. 371. 141, 142. •Crown Point Overseers v. Warner, 3 Hill 150. 1101. CJroy V. Obion County, 104 Tenn. 525, 58 S. W. 235, "TS Am. St. Rep. 931, 51 L. R. A. 254. 153. Cruger v. Dougherty, 43 N. Y. 107. 1005. 466, 566, 1005. Cruger's Petition, 84 N. Y. 619. 1255, 1257. Cruikshanks v. Charleston, 1 Mc- Cord 360. 52, 472, 546, 1344. ■Crum V. Burke, 25 Pa. St. 377, 381. 808, 926, 1083. V. Carrington Shoe Co., 72 Miss. 458, 16 South. 674. 1097, 1098. V. Cutting, 22 Iowa 411. 960. Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47, 11 Sup. Ct. 851. 158, 160. Crutchfield v. Wood, 16 Ala. 702. 1483. Cruther v. Sterling, 3 Idaho 306. 15. Cruzen v. Stephens, 123 Mo. 337, 27 S. W. 557, 45 Am. St. Ilep. 549. 884, 896, 1000. ■CucuUu V. Brakenridge Lumber Co., 49 La. An. 1445, 22 South. 409. 734, 1009. Culbertson v. Cincinnati, 16 Ohio 574. 1452. V. Floyd County Com'rs, 52 Ind. 361. 643, 644. V.Fulton, 127 111. 30, 18 N. B. 781. 553, 587. V. Munson, 104 Ind. 451, 4 N. E. 57. 986. V. Witbeck Co., 127 tJ. S. 326, 8 Sup. Ct. 1136. 590, 955. ■Cullen's Estate, In re, 142 Pa. St. 18, 21 Atl. 781. 671, 673. Cullman v. Arndt, 125 Ala. 581, 28 South. 70. 168. Culver V. People, 161 111! 89, 43 N. E. 812. 1273, 1276. Culver V. Hayden, 1 Vt. 359. 486. V.Watson, 28 N. J. L. 548. 1033. Cumberland & P. R. Co. v. State, 92 Md. 668, 48 Atl. 503, 52 L. R. A. 784. 679, 844. Cumberland M. R. v. Portland, 37 Me. 444. 396, 404, 697. Cuming v. Grand Rapids, 46 Mich. 150, 9 N. W. 141. 236, 956, 1212. Gumming v. Brooklyn, 11 Paige 596. 1291. Gumming T'p v. Ogemaw County, 93 Mich. 314, 53 N. W. 761. 909. V. Ogemaw County, 100 Mich. 567, 59 N. W. 240. 909. V. Clark, 15 Vt. 653. 435. V. Como (Idaho), 38 Pac. 650. 1031. V. Cummings, 91 Fed. 602. 819, 941, 960, 961, 995. V. Elaston, 46 Iowa 183. 866, 913 ^ V. Fitch', 40 Ohio St. 56. 592, 593, 594. V. Frye, Dudley 182. 459. V. Holt, 56 Vt. 384. 916. V.Hyatt, 54 Neb. 35. 74 N. W. 411. 51, 185, 211. V. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153. 273, 714, 751, 1391, 1417, 1428, 1429, 1460. T. Police Jury, 9 La. An. 503. 1201. "V. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 181 111. 136, 54 N. E. 941. 1248. V.Wilson, 59 Iowa 14, 12 N. W. 747. 994, 1044. Cummins V. Christie, 179 Mass. 74. 60 N. E. 396, 88 Am. St. Rep. 357. 952. Cumru T'p v. Directors, 112 Pa. St. 264, 3 Atl. 578. 349. Cunard S. S. Co. v. Ro~bertson (Head-Money Cases), 112 U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247. 179, 259; Cunningham v. Brown, 39 W. Va. 588, 21 'S. E. 615. 729, 911. V.Jones, 37 Kan. 477, 15 Pac. 572, 1 Am. St. Rep. 257. 968. V. Mitchell, 67 Pa. St. 78. 1476, 1478, 1479. V. Peoria, 157 111. 499, 41 N. B. 1014. 1213. Cunningham, etc. Co. v. Atlanta, etc. Assoc, 73 Miss. 516, 19 South. 234. 1097. Curl V. Watson, 25 Iowa 35, 95 Am. Dec. 763. 1047.. Curnen v. New York, 79 N. Y. 511. 528. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxvii: Curran v. Norris, 58 Mich. 512, 25 N. W. 500. 431. Currie v. Fowler, 3 A. K. Marsh. 504. 995. V. Fowler, 5 J. J. Marsh. 145. 750, 859. V. Van Horn, 40 N. J. L. 143. 486. Curry v. Decatur County, 61 Iowa 71, 15 N. W. 602. 1436. V.Gila County (Ariz.), 53 Pac. 4. 853. V. Hinman, 11 111. 420. 797, 810, €98, 905, 1058. V. Spencer, 61 N. H. 624, 60 Am. Rep. 337. 33, 316. Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1, 33 Am. Rep. 450. 44, 200, 452. Curtenius v. Hoyt, 37 Mich. 583. 1437. Curtis V. Borland, 35 W. Va. 124, 12 S. B. 1113. 968. V. Brown County Supervisors, 22 Wis.*167. 74ti. V. East Saginaw, 35 Mich. 508. 1448. v.Renneker, 34 S. C. 468, 13 S. E. 664. 825. V.Richland T'p, 56 Mich. 478, 23 N. W. 175. 478, 653. V. Smith, 42 Iowa 655. 977. V.Ward, 58 Mo. 295. 653. V.Whipple, 24 Wis. 350, 1 Am. Rep. 187. 182, 184, 194, 202, 204. Curtis, In re, 73 Hun 185, 25 N. Y. Supp. 909. 670. Curtis, In re, 142 N. Y. 219, 36 N. B. 887. 94, 640, 670. Curtiss V. Witt, 110 Mich. 131, 67 N. W. 1106. 1477," 1478. Cushing V. Longfellow, 2G Me. 306. 958. V. Newburyport, 10 "Met. 508, 510. 199, 206, 588, 1299. Cushman v. Taylor (Neb.), 90 N. W. 207. 871, 982. Custer County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 62 Neb. 657, 87 N. W. 341. 362, 1503. Custer County Com'rs v. Story, 26 Mont. , 69 Pac. 56. 841, 842. Custin V. Viroqua, 67 Wis. 314, 30 N. W. 515. 1497. Cuthbert v. Conly, S2 Ga. 211. 1099, 1137. Cutler V. Hurlbut, 29 Wis. 152. 1003, 1016, 1085, 1091. Cutliff V. Albany, 60 Ga. 597. 284, 344. Cutting V. Gilbert, 5 Blatch. 259. 1429, 1486. Cuttle V. Brockway, 24 Pa. St. 145. 525, 925, 953. Cuttle V. Brockway, 32 Pa. St. 45.. 887, 929, 950, 978, 1052. ' Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 350. 103,. 181. ' D. Daggett V. Everett, 19 Me. 373. 450,. 848, 1344. Daily v. Newman, 14 La. An. 580. 897. V. Swope, 47 Miss. 3?7. 43, 468, 546, 1176, 1192, 1226. Dakin v. Hudson, 6 Cow. 221. 879,. 1346. Dakota County v. Chicago, etc. R.- Co., 63 Neb. , 88 N. W. 663. 1503. Dakota Loan, etc. Co. v. Codington, 9 S. D. 159, 68 N. W. 314. 786, 1446. Dalby v. People, 124 111. 66, 16 N. E. 224. 657, 837. Dale V. Frisbie, 59 Ind. 530. 1093. V. Govenor, 3 Stew. 387. 112. V. McEvers, 2 Cow. 118. 868. Dallas Title, etc. Co. v. Oak Cliff, 8~ Tex. Civ. App. 217, 27 S. W. 1036. 738, 838. Dallinger v. Rapello, 14 Fed. 32.- 666., V. Rapello, 15 Fed. 434. 667. V.Richardson, 176 Mass. 77, 57 N. E. 224. 642. Dalrymple v. Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 178, 10 N. W. 141. 1, 3, 365, 1153,. 1155. Dalton V. East Portland, 11 Or. 426, 5 Pac. 193. 772, 776. i V. Fenn, 40 Mo. 109. 996,. 997. V.Lucas, 63 111. 337. 1090. Daly V. Oh Goon, 64 Cal. 512, 2 Pac. 401. 725. V.Morgan, 69 Md. 460, 16 Atl. 287, 1 L. R. A. 757. 301,. 1154. V. San Francisco, 72 Cal. 154, 13 Pac. 321. 1277. Dameron v. Jamison, 143 Mo. 483, 45 S. W. 258. 998, 999. Dancer v. Mannington, 50 W. Va. 322, 40 S. E. 475. 1242. Dane V. Glenhon, 72 Ala. 160. 750,. 913. Danenhower v. District of Colum- bia, 7 Mackey 99. 531. ^ Danforth v. Hinsdale, 177 111. 579, 52 N. E. 877. 1266, 1276. V.Livingston, 23 Mont. 558, 59- Pac. 916. 1413. Ixxviii TABLE OF CASES. Danforth v. McCook County, 11 S. D. 258, 76 N. W. 940, 74 Am. St. Rep. 808. 17, 21, 500, 807, 825. V. Williams, 9 Mass. 324. 20. JJaniel v,. Askew, 36 Ark. 487. 15, 1332^ 1372. V. McGorrell, 10 111. 226. 514. V. Richmond Trustees, 78 Ky. 542. 151, 169. V.Sullivan, 46 Ga. 277. 642. V. Taylor, 33 Pla. 636, 15 South. 313. 725, 727, 930, 994. V. Trustees, 78 Ky. 542. 151, j 16ft. , X)aniells v. Watertown T'p, 61 Mich. 514, 28 N. W. 673. 512, 762. Daniels v. Case, 45 Fed. 843. 998, 1080. V.Nelson, 41 Vt. 161, 98 Am. Dec. 577. 850. V. State, 150 Ind. 348, 50 N. B. 74. 77. V. Watertown, 55 Mich. 376, 21 N. W. 350. 1488. Dann v. Woodruff, 51 Conn. 203. 1285. Danser v. Johnson, 25 W. Va. 380. 1025. Danville B. & T. Co. v. Parks, 88 111. 170. St 389, 402, 404, 665. Darcy, State, v. Darcy, 651 N. J. L. 140, 16 Atl. 160. 360, 386. Darling v. Gunn, 50 111. 424. 626, 772, 783, 1414, 1461. Darlington v. New York, 31 N. Y. 164, 88 Am. Dec. 248. 1303. Darmstaetter v. Moloney, 45 Mich. 621, 8 N. W. 574. 760, 761, 764. Darr v. Wisner, 63 Neb. . 88 N. W. 518. 807, 881, 984. Darrow v. People, 88 Colo. 417, 8 Pac. 661. 430. v. Union County, 87 Iowa 164, 54 N. W. 149. 1049. Darst V. Griffin, 31 Neb. 668, 48 N. W. 819. 102, 1455. Darter v. Houser, 63 Ark. 475, 39 S. W. 358. 956, 989. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518. 108, 114, 117, 1320. Darwin v. Strickland, 57 N. Y. 492. 84. Dasey v. Skinner, 57 Hun 471. 627. Dashiell v. Baltimore, 45 Md. 675. 1248, 1264, 1274, 1291, 1292. Da Silva v. Turner, 166 Mass. 407, 44 N. E. 532. 1045. TJassler, In re, 35 ICan. 678, 12 Pac. 130. 17, 848. Dater v. Earl, 3 Gray. 482. 907. Daugherty v. Thompson, 71 Tex. 192, 9 S. W. 99. 757. Daughdrill v. Insurance Co., 31 Ala. 91. 274, 288, 293, 325, 408. Dauphin, etc. R. Co. v. Kennerly, 74 Ala. 583. 408. Daus v. Macon, 103 Ga. 774, 30 S. "E. 670. 394, 474. Davenport v. Aplin, 70 Mich. 192, 38 N. W. 211. 505. V.Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 38 Iowa 633. 846. V. Dodge County, 105 U. S. 237. 1374. v.Dows, 18 Wall. 626. 1428. V.Knox, 34 La. An. 407. 1020, 1076. V.Newton, 71 Vt. 11, 42 Atl. 1087. 985, 1093. V. Railroad Co., 16 Iowa 348. 9. V. Sadler, 48 Kan. 311, 29 Pac. 168. 1061. Davenport Nat. Bank v. Board of Equal., 64' Iowa 140, 19 N. W. 889. 708, 713. V. Board of Equalization, 123 U. S. 83, 8 Sup. Ct Rep. 73. 713. Davidson v. Commissioners, 18 Minn. 482. 1. V. Lindop, 36 La. An. 765. 495. v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97. 49, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 392, 626, 630, 1241, 1260, 1292, 1446. V.Wallace, 53 Miss. 475. 821. Davies v. Board of Supervisors, 89 Mich. 295, 50 N. W. 862. 173. V.Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184. 277. V.Los Angeles, 86 Cal. 37, 24 Pac. 771. 631, 1266. V. Saginaw, 87 Mich. 439, 49 N. W. 667. 1243, 1245, 1251, 1257. Davis V. Boget, 50 Iowa 11. 197. V.Boston, 129 Mass. 377. 527, 533, 1450. V. Brace, 82 111. 542. 1310. V.Burnett, 77 Tex. 3, 13 S. W. 613. 335, 1414, 1421. V. Carlin, 77 Minn. 472, 80 N. W. 366. 913, 982. V. Chapman, 24 Fed. 674. 967, 985. V. Cincinnatf Campmeeting As- soc, 57 Ohio St. 257, 49 N. E. 401. 353. V. Clinton, 55 Iowa 549, 8 N. W. 423. 52. V. Des Moines, 71 Iowa 500, 32 N. W. 470. 175. V.Dubuque, 20 Iowa 458. 247. V. Fames, 26 Tex. 296. 477, 483, 760, 764. TABLE OB- OASES. Ixxix Davis V. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370, 3 S. W. 184. 103, 1185. V. Gosnell, 113 111. 121. 1042. V. Hare, 32 Ark. 386. 808," 810, 828. V. Harrington, 35 Kan. 134, 10 Pac. 532. 919, 997, 1003. v.How, 52 Minn. 157, 53 N. W. 1139. 750. V. Hurst (Tex.), 14 S. W. 610. 997. V. Jackson, 14 W. Va. 227. 992. V.King, 87 Pa. St. 261. 966. V.Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 114 Ind. 364, 16 N. B. 639. 1253, 1438, 1442. V. Litchfield, 145 111. 313, 33 N. B. 888, 21 L. R. A. 563. 422, 1157, 1187, 1188, 1218. V. Litchfield,, 155 111. 384, 40 N. E. 354. 531, 1248. V. Lynchburg, 84 Va. 861. 1197, 1219. T. McGee, 28 Fed. 867. 626. V.Macon, 64 Ga. 128, 37 Am. Rep. 60. 284, 359, 1108, 1111. Macy, 124 Mass.' 193. 661, 662, 1379. Magouh, 109 Iowa 308, 80 N. W. 423. 138, 929, 931. Minge, 56 Ala. 121. 825, 1011. Minor, 1 How. (Miss.) 183, 28 Am. Dec. 325. 1093. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 144, 25 Atl. 336. 383, 384, 1217, 1233, 1264. Ontonagon Supervisors, .64 Mich. 404, 31 N. W. 405. 181. Otoe County, 55 Neb. 677, 76 N. W. 465. 1504, 1511. Petrinovich, 112 Ala. 654, 21 South. 344, 36 L. R. A. 615. 1096, nil, 1126, 1418\ Point Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 289, 9 S. E. 228. 248. Police Jury, 1 La. An. 288. 430. Read, 65 N. Y. 566. 106. ' Sawyer, 66 N. H. 34, 20 Atl. 100. 485, 541, 801. Schmidt, 68 Miss. 736, 10 South. 64. 939. Sims, 4 Bibb 465. 933. State, 60 Ga. 76. 1339. State, 119 Ind. 555, 22 N. E. 9. 621. State Bank, 7 Ind. 316. 511. Vanarsdale, 59 Miss. 367. 1013. Wilson, 61 111. 527. 1479. Davis's Estate, In re, 149 N. Y. 539, 44 N. E. 185. 33, 497, 670, 903. Davis's Estate, In re, 91 Hun 53,'36 N. Y. Supp. 823. 903. ' Davock V. Moore, 105 Mich. 120, 63 N. W. 424, 28 L. R. A. 783. 98, 211, 1125, 1300. Daw V. Niles, 104 Cal. 106, 37 Pac. 876. 815. Dawley v. Van Court, 21 111. 460. 1090. Dawson v. Aurelius T'p, 49 Mich. 479, 13 N. W. 824. 1491, 1511. V. Crosian, 18 Or. 431, 23 Pac. 257. 837, 1417. V.Dawson, 106 Ga. 45, 32 S. E. 29. 960, 963. v.McCarty, 21 Wash. '314, 57 Pac. 816, 75 Am. St. Rep. 841. 133, 905, 906. V.Peter, 119 Mich. 274, 77 N. W. 997. 508, 997, 1005, 1008, 1011. V.Ward, 71 Tex. 72, 9 S. W. 906. 558. Dawson Compress, etc. Co. v. City Council, 107 Ga. 358; 33 S. E. 419. 503. Day v. Darcy (State v. Darcy), 51 N. J. L. 140, 16 Atl. 160. V.Lawrence, 167 Mass. 371, 45 N. B. 751. 303, 346. V. Needham, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 680, 22 S. W. 103. 1001, 1002. V. Peasley, 54 Vt. 310. 438. V. Pelican, 94 Wis. 503, 69 N. W. 368. 654, 1510. Dayton v. Board of Equal., 33 Or. 131, 50 Pac. 1009. 326, 725, 785, 1396. V. Dayton, etc. Co., 99 Tenn. 578, 42 S. W. 444. 695. V. Multnomah County, 34 Or. 239, 55 Pac. 23. 526, 603, 764, 1385, 1425. V. Relf, 34 Wis. 86. 1030, 1055. V.Rice, 47 Iowa 429. 965. V. Rounds, 27 Mich. 82. 121, 1365. Deal V. Mississippi, 107 Mo. 464, 18 S. W. 24. 208. Dean v. Aiken, 48 Vt. 541. 630. V. Borchsenius, 30 Wis. > 235. 515, 528. V. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590, 99 Am. Dec. 205. 410, 528, 529. V. Charltdb, 27 Wis. 522. 466, 528. V. Davis, 51 Cal. 406. 8, 1411. V. Barley, 15 Wis, 100. 1016, 1085. V. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1. 384. Ixxx TABLE OF CASES. Dean v. Lufkin, B4-Tex. 265. 553, 586, 590, 593, 1435. V.Madison, 9 Wis. 402. 1449, 1451. V.Patterson, 67 N. J. L. 199, 50 Atl. 620. 1233. V. Solon, 97 Iowa 303, 66 N. W. 182. 657. Deane v. Hathaway, 136 Mass. 129. 646. V.Todd, 22 Mo. 90. 1390, 1416. Dear v. Varnum, 80 Cal. 86, 22 Paq. 76. 619, 645, 741, 1500. V. Weineke, 94 Cal. 322, 29 Pac. 646. 645. De Arman v. Williams, 93 Mo. 158, 5 S. W. 904. 57, 387, 394, 849. Deason v. Dixon, 54 Miss. 585, 22. De Baker v. Carillo, 52 Cal. 473. 1500. De Baun, State ex rel., v. Smith, 55 N. J. L. 110, 25 Atl. 277. 716. Deblois v. Barker, 4 R. I. 445. 1129. De Camp v. Bveland, 19 Barb. 81. 256. Decatur County Board v. State, 86 Ind. 8. 1362, 1364, 1366. Decell v. Lewenthal, 57 Miss. 331, 34 Am. Rep. 449. 907, 1097. Decker v. Hughes, 68 111. 33. 1301. V. McGowan, 59 Ga. 805. 284, 1094, 1424. Decker's Estate, In re. 111 N. Y. .284, 19 N. E. 66. 824. De Clercq v. Barber Asphalt Co., 167 111. 215, 47 N. E. 367. 1, 1155, 1202. Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa 12. 432. Dederer v. Voorhies, 81 N. Y. 153. 1238, 1286. Deeds v. Sanborn, 26 Iowa 419. 246. Deen v. Wills, 21 Tex. 642. 807. Deere v. Rio Grande County, 33 Fed. 823. 1364. Deerfleld T'p v. Harper, 115 Mich. 678, 74 N. W. 207. 838. Deerham v. People, 67 111. 414. 825. Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 118, 77 N. W. 568. 5, 181, 205, 207, 308. Deering, In re, 14 Daly 89. 488, 1271. Dees V. Lake Charles, 50 La. An. 356, 23 South. 382. 1439. De Forest v. Thompson, 40 il^ed. 375. 981, 989. De Foresta v. Gast, 20 Colo. 307, 38 Pac. 244. 1091. Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N. W. 505, 32 L. R. A. 744, 63 Am. St. Rep. 584. 819, 967. De Fremery v. Austin, 53 Cal. 380. 1501, 1504, 1510. De Frieze v. Quint, 94 Cal. 653, 30 Pac. 1, 28 Am. St. Rep. 151. 998 D'Gette v. Sheldon, 27 Neb. 829, 44 N. W. 30. 881, 987, 1080. Degner v. Brown, 74 Md. 144, 21 Atl. 697. 835, 853. De GrafC v. Board of County Com'rs of Ramsey County, 46 Minn. 319.. 1500. De Graw v. Taylor, 37 Mo. 310. 1068. De Graw St., Matter of, 18 Wend. 568. 739, 1161, 1206, 1268. Degroot v. Van Dwyer, 20 Wend. 390. 95. Deiman v. Fort Madison, 30 Iowa 542. 247. De Koven v. Lake View, 129 111. 399, 21 N. E. 813. 1267. Dekum v. Multnomah County, 38' Or. 253, 63 Pac. 496. 740, 815, 870. Delamater v. Chicago, 158 111. 575, 42 N. E. 444. 1271, 1276. De Lancy, Matter of, '52 N. Y. 89. 387. Delaney v. Godden, 12 Grat. 266. 1000. Delaplalne v. Cook, 7 Wis. 44. 1008. Delaroderie v. Hillen, 28 La. An. 537'. 1010. Delashmutt v. Parrent, 39 Kan, 548, 18 Pac. 712. 966, 969. Delaware & H. Canal Co. v. Atkins, 48 Hun 456, 1 N. Y. Supp, 80. 1411, 1416. V.Atkins, 121 N. Y. 246, 24 N. E. 319. 1445. V. Commonwealth (Pa.), 17 Atl. 175, 1 L. R. A. 232. 156, 769. Delaware County Inst. v. Delaware- County, 94 Pa. St. 163. 349. Delaware Div. Canal Co. v. Com- monwealth, 50 Pa. St. 399. 530, 901. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. New- ark, 60 N. J. L. 60, 37 Atl. 629. 376. Delaware Railroad Tax Case (Minot V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co.), 18 Wall. 206. 49, 110, 112, 113, 156, 163, 167, 356, 370, 406; 675, 676, 678, 693, 834. Delcambre v. Clere, 34 La. An. 1050. 1138. Del Castillo v. McConnico, 168 XT. S. 674, 18 Sup. Ct. 2?9. 56, 57, 62, 6-31, 730, 933. Delenger v. Higgins, 26 Mo. 180. 445. Delinquent Poll Tax, In re, 21 R. f. 582, 44 Atl. 805. 21, 55. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxxi Delinquent Tax-List v. Territory (Ariz.), 26 Pac. 310. 85, 168. Delinquent Tax-List, In re (Ariz.), 37 Pac. 370. 1425. Delker v. Owensboro (Ky.), 61 S. W. 362. 1201. Delouglirey v. Hinds, 23 Mont. 260, 58 Pac. 709. 1413, 1441, 1442. Delphi V. Bowen, 61 Ind. 29. 1440, 1461. Demarais v. Board of Police, 42 La. An. 799, 8 South. 597. 1515. Demaree v. Johnson, 150 Ind. 419, 49 N. B. 1063. 456, 472, 568, 583. Deming v. Corwin, 11 Wend. 647. ' 879 V. James, 72 111. 78. 1418, 1514. Demoval v. Davidson County, 3 Pickle 214, 10 S. W. 353. 334. Depipsey v. Board of Education, 40 W. Va. 99, 20 S. E. 811. 1361. Dempster v. Chicago, 175 111. 278, 51 TSf. B. 710. 1201, 1461. T. People, 158 111. 36, 41 N. B. 1022. 1286. Den V. Terrell, 3 Hawks 283. 810. Denegre v. Gerac, 35 La. An. 952. 1454. Denike v. Rourke, 3 Biss. 39. 875, 993, 1034. Denise v. Fairport, 11 Misc. Rep. 199, 32 N. Y. Supp. 97. 1173, 1441. Deniston v. Terry, 141 Ind. 677, 41 N. B. 143. 378, 608. Denn v. Diamond, 4 B. & C. 244. 454. Denman v. Steinbach, 29 "Wash. 179, 69 Pac. 751. 1455. Dennehy v. Chicago, 120 111. 627, 12 N. K 227. 1143, 1146. Dennett v. Crocker, 8 Greenl. 239. 808. , , Dennis v. Shaw, 5 Gilm. 405. 1477. Dennison v. Kansas City, 95 Mo. 416, 8 S. W. 429. 1247. V.Keokuk, 45 Iowa 266. 875, 962. V. Williamson County Com'rs, 153 111. 516 (Bank of Mar- ion, In re, 39 N. B. 118). 618. Dennis's Appeal, 72 Conn. 369, 44 Atl. 545. 691. Denny v. Mattoon, 2 Allen, 361. 510, 514. Densmore v. Haggerty, 59 Pa. St. 189. 871. DentV. Bryce, 16 S. C. 1. 581,764. Dentler v. St^te, 4 Blackf. 258. 861, 899, 1036, 1055. Denton v. Carroll, 4 App. Div. 532, 40 N. y. Supp. 19. 850. 1484. f Denton v. Jackson, 2 Johns. Ch. 317. 253. Denver v. Clements, 3 Colo. 484. 264. ViKnowles, 17 Colo. 204, 30 Pac. 1041, 17 L. R. A. 135. 1154, 1186. Denver City R. Co. v. Denver, 21 Colo. 350, 41 Pac. 826, 52 Am. St' Rep. 239, 29 L. R. A. 608. 280, 484, 901. Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Church, 17 Colo. 1, 28 Pac. 468, 31 Am. St. Rep. 252. 88, 89, 163. De Pauw v. New Albany, 22 Ind. 204. 20, '23, 48. De Pauw Plate Glass Co. v. Alex- ander, 152 Ind. -443, 52 N. E. 608. 478, 1398, 1516, 1621. De Peyster, In re, 80 N. Y. 565. 631, 1241. De Peyster's Petition, 80 N. Y. 565. 631, 1241. De Pierris, Petition of, 82 N. Y. 243. 1243, 1244. Deposit Bank v. Daviess "County, 102 Ky. 174, 39 S. W. i030, 44 L. ' R. A. 825. 116, 357, 373, 381, 450, ' 452, 708. Deputron v. Young, 134 U. S. 241, 10 Sup. Ct. 539. 996, 1091. De Puy V. Wabash; 133 Ind. 336, 32 N. E. 1016. 1280, 1413. Dequasie v. Harris, 16 W. Va. 345. ■990. Deraismes v. Deraismes, 72 N. Y. 164. 732, 819. Derby v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 154 111. 213, 40 N. B. 438. 509, 1253. Deringer v. Coxe (Pa.), 10 Atl. 412. 938. De Roux V. Girard's Ex'r, 105 Fed. 798, 112 Fed. 89. 960. Derry Nat. Bank v. Griffln, 68 N. H. 183, 34 Atl. 740. 485, 790, 915, 935. Des Moines v. Dorr, 31 Iowa 89. 1224. Des Moines, etc. R. Co. v. Lowry, 51 Iowa 486, 1 N. W. 782. 1398, 1492. Des Moines Brick Manuf. Co. v. Smith, 108 Iowa 307, 79 N. W. 77. 456, 1285. Des Moines, etc. Co., Appeal of, 48 Iowa 324. 267, 637, 777. Desmond v. Babbitt, 117 Mass. 233. 725. V. Machias, 48 Me. 478. 88. De Soto Bank v. Memphis, 6 Baxt. 415, 32 Am. Rep. 530. 378. De Soto County v. Dickson, 34 Miss. 150. 1343. Ixxxii TABLE OF CASES. De Soto Gold Mining Co. v. Smith, 49 S. C. 188. 27 S. B. 1. 1504, 1509. De Treville v. Smalls, 98 U. S. 517. 899, 107. Detroit v. Detroit City R. Co., 76 Mich. 421, 43 N. W. 447. 110, 113, 116, 117. V. Jepp, 52 Mich. 458, 18 N. W. 458. 19. V.Lewis, 109 Mich. 155, 66 N. W. 958, 32 L. R. A. 439. 91, 650, 652, 660. V. Macier, 117 Mich. 76, 75 N. W. 285. 642, 650. V. Martin, 34 Mich. 170, 22 Am. Rep. 512. 1448, 1500. V. Parker, 181 U. S. 399, 21 Sup. Ct. 624: 55, 63, 70, 1218, 1239. V. Paving Co., 36 Mich. 335. 1281. V. Plank Road Co., 43 Mich. 140, 5 N. "W. 275. 111. V. Recorder's Court Judge, 112 Mich. 588, 71 N. W. 149. 1155, 1204. V. Wayne Circuit Judge, 127 Mich. 604, 86 N. W. 1032. 639, 674, 686, 687, 695, 697, 1396, 1417. V. Wayne Circuit Judge, 128 Mich. 438, 87 N. W. 376. 1438. V.Weber, 26 Mich. 284. 1340. V. Weber, 29 Mich. 24. 1337. Detroit & S. P. R. Co. v. Detroit, - 81 Mich. 562, 46 N. W. 12. 377. Detroit Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Com- mon Council, 125 Mich. 673, 85 N. W. 96, 84 Am. St. Rep. 589. 304, 343, 345, 367, 374, 686, 694, 697, 699, 758,. 765, 782, 1383, 1387. Detroit Common Council v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78, 51 N. W. 787, 16 L. R. A. 59. 57, 91, 124, 272, 388, 640, 702, 776, 815. Detroit F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 118 Mich. 31, 76 N. W. 136. 535, 807, 959, 989. Detroit, G. H. & M. R. Co. v. Grand Rapids, 106 Mich. 13, 63 N. W. 1007, 58 Am. St. Rep. 466, 28 L. R. A. 793. 1232. Detroit, G. R. & W. R. Co. v. Rail- road Com'r, 119 Mich. 132, 77 N. W. 631. 685, 700. Detroit Home & Day School v. De- troit, 76 Mich. 521, 43 N. W. 593, 6 L. R. A. 97. 350. Detroit River Savings Bank v. De- troit, 114 Mich. 81, 72 N. W. 14. 1383, 1388. Detroit St. R. Co. v. Guthard, 51 Mich. 180, 16 N. W. 328. 113, 116, 117, 374. Detroit Transp. Co. v. Board of As- sessors, 91 Mich. 382, 51 N. W. 978. 674. Detroit Union R. Depot, etc. Co. v. Detroit, 88 Mich. 347, 50 N. W. 302. 376. Detroit Water Com'rs v. Auditor- General, 115 Mich. 546, 73 N. W. 801. 268, 357, 359. Detroit Young Men's Soc. v. De- troit, 3 Mich. 172. 748. Devaux v. Detroit, Har. Ch. 98. 1457. Dever v. Cornwell (N. D.), 86 N. W. 227. 508, 512, 514, 559, 930, 932, 1011, 1013. Deveraux v. Taft, 20 S. C. 555. 972. V. Brownsville, 29 Fed. 742. 122, 1362, 1363. JDe Vignier v. New Orleans, 4 Woods 206. 25, 26, 90. V. New Orleans, 16 Fed. 11. 125. Devine v. Franks (N. J. Bq.), 47 Atl. 228. 1445, 1457. Devor v.-McClintock, 9 W. & S. 80. 414. Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 tJ. S. 193, 19 Sup. Ct. 379. 24, 58, 84, 94, 249, 839, 1292. V. Des Moines, 101 Iowa 416, 70 N. W. 605. 1130, 1291, 1292. . V. Donovan, 126 Mass. 335. 961, 1033. ' V. Stratford, 40 N. H. 203. 1382. De Witt V. Elizabeth, 56 N. J. L. 125, 27 Atl. 801. 1172, 1218, 1221. V. Hays, 2 Cal. 463, 56 Am. Dec. 352. 644, 648, 1110. V. Rutherford Borough, 57 N. J. L. 619, 31 Atl. 228. 1264. De Witt County v. Clinton, 194 111. 521, 62 N. E. 780. 1245. Dexter v. Boston, 176 Mass. 247, 57 N. B. 379, 79 Am. St. Rep. 306. 69, 1191, 1219, 1256, 1382, 1489, 1492. Diamond Coal Co. v. Fisher, 19 Pa. St. 267. 919. Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U. S. 82, 23 Sup. Ct. 266. 166. Dibble v. I^eppert, 47 La. An. 792, 17 South. 309. 672, 1014. Dicas v. Lord Brougham, 6 C. & P. 249. 1466. Dick V. Foraker, 155 U. S. 404, 15 Sup. Ct. 124. 887. V. Philadelphia, 197 Pa. St. 467, 47 Atl. 750. 1164. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxiii Dickens v. Jones, 6 Yerg. 483, 27 Am. Dec. 488. 1483. Dickerson v. Acosta, 15 Fla. 614. 8, 508, 860, 1011. V. Breeden, 30 111. 279, 325. 1090. V.Franklin, 112 Ind. 178, 13 N. E. 579. 247. V. Yetzer, 53 Iowa 681, 6 N. W. 41. 136. Dickey v. Chicago, 179 111. 184, 53 N.'B. 395. 1245. V. Paterson, 45 Neb. 848, 64 N. W. 244. 996. V. People, 160 111. 663, 43 N. B. 606. 897, 1273. V.Polk County, 58 Iowa 287, 12 N. W. 290. 772, 1490. Dickhaus v. Alderheide, 22 Mo. App. 76. 1441. Dickinson v. Billings, 4 Gray 42. 1470, 1471, 1488, 1494. Dickinson Supervisors v. Warren, 98 Mich. 146, 56 N. W. 1111. 553. Dickison v. Reynolds, 48 Mich. 158, 12 N. W. 24. 448, 734, 760, 761, 762, 827. ' Dickson v. Gamble, 16 Fla. 687. 804, 805. V.Racine, 65 Wis. 306, 27 N. W. 58. 1396. V. Rouse, 80 Mo. 224. 790. Diefenthaler v. New York, 111 N. Y. 331, 19 N. E. 48. 531, 1449, 1508. Dietrich v. Mason, 57 Pa. St. 40. 525,*735, 950, 1048, 1050. Dietz V. Neenah, 91 Wis. 422, 64 N. W. 299. 627, 1239, 1421. Diggins V. Hartshorne, 108 Cal. 154, 41 Pac. 28.3. 1218, 1283. v.Reay, 54 Cal. 525. 1288. Dike V.' Lewis, 4 Denio 327. 746. TDikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige 484. 1054. V. Parrish, 6 Pa. St. 210, 47 Am. Dec. 455. 1083. Dill V. Roberts, 30 Wis. 178. 528. Dillingham v. Brown, 38 Ala. 311. 1092. V. Snow, 5 Mass. 547. 251,383, 1467, 1471, 1473, 1474, 1475. Dillon V. Merriam, 22 Neb. 151, 34 N. W. 344. 1022, 1458. Dilts V. Taylor, 57 N. J. L. 369, 30 Atl. 599. 820. Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038. 52. Dinsmore v. Westcott, 25 N. J. Eq. 470. 795. Directors of Poor v. Direc'^ors, 42 Pa. St. 21. 263, 264, 268. Disher v. Disher, 45 Neb. 100, 63 N. W. 368. 819. Dishon v. Smith, 10 Iowa 212. 570. Dispensary Com'rs v. Thornton, 106 Ga. 106, 31 S. E. 733. 264, 265. Distilling etc. Co. v. People, 161 111. 101, 43 N. E. 779. 390, 605, 704. District V. Feck, 60 Cal. 403. 1288. v. Taylor, 100 Iowa 617, 69 N. W. 1009. 848, 1398. District of Columbia v. Lyon, 161 ,U. S. 200, 16 Sup. Ct. 450. 1283. V. Oyster, 4 Mackey 285, 54 Am. Rep. 275. 1118. District T'p v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa 262. 450. Dittoe v. Davenport, 74 Iowa 66, 36 N. W. 895. 175, 512, 1240. Divet V. Richland County, 8 N. D. 65, 76 N. W. 993. 548. Dixsn V. Detroit, 86 Mich. 516, 49 N. W. 628. 1283. V. Hockady, 36 S. C. 60, 15 S. E. 342. 810, 1044. V.Mayes, 72 Cal. 166, 13 Pac. 471. 247, 802. V. United States, 1 Brock. 177. 1328. Dixon County v. Bradshear, 38 Neb. 389, 56 N. W. 990. 1499. V. Halstead, 23 Neb. 697, 37 N. W. 621. 770. Doane v. Eldridge, 16 Gray 254. 1335. Dobbins v. Brie County Com'rs, 16 Pet. 435. 131. Dobson, In re, 146 N. Y. 357, 40 N. E. 988. 450. Dodd V. Hartford, 25 Conn. 232. 1412, 1415, 1432, 1441. Dodds V. Marx, 63 Miss. 443. 810. Dodge V. Emmons, 34 Kan. 732, 9 Pac. 951. 941, 1002. Dodge, State, v. Love, 47 N. J. L. 436, 2 Atl. 810. 630, 631. v.Love, 49 N. J. L. 235, 9 Atl. 744. 455, 630, 781, 784, 1384. Dodge V. Mission T'p, 46 C. C? A. 661, 107 Fed. 827, 54 L. R. A. 242. 206. V. People, 113 111. 491, 1 N. B. 826. 1334. V. Van Buren Circuit Judge, 118 Mich. 189, 76 N. W. 315. 181, 1437. V. Woolsey, 18 How. 331. 110, 114, 117, 1436. Dodge County v. Acorn, 61 Neb. 678, 85 N. W. 292. 102. Doe V. Allen, 67 N. C. 346. 939, 995. Ixxxiv TABLE OF CASES. Doe V. Clayton, 81 Ala. 391, 2 South. 24. 1001. V. Deavers, 11 Ga. 79, 86. 53. V. Flagler, 1 Ind. 542. 1004. v.Hearick, 14 ind. 242. 1068. V. Insurance Co., 8 S. & M. 197. 1005. V. Leonard, 5 111. 140. 916. T.McQuilkln, 8 Blackf. 335. 577. V. Railroad Co., 54 Iowa 657, 7 N. W. 118. 138. v.Roe, 2 Hawks 17. lOOS. V. Snaith, 8 Bing. 147, 152. 455. , T. Sweetser, 2 Ind. 649. 1004. Dogan V. Griffin, 51 Miss. 782. 956. Doherty v. Matsell, 54 N. Y. Super. Ct. 17. 1081. V.Real Estate, etc. Co., 85 Minn. 518, 89 N. W. 853. 935, 980, 1037. Dohms V. Mann, 76 Iowa 723, 39 N. W. 823. 973. Dolan V. Trelevan, 31 Wis. 147. 751. Doland v. Mooney, 72 Cal. 34, 13 Pac. 71. 645, 1003. v. Mooney, 79 Cal. 137, 21 Pac. 436. 954, 956. Donahue v. O'Connor, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 301. 1035. V. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 165 111. 640, 46 N. B. 714. 1091. Donald v. McKinnon, 17 Fla. 746. 793, 794, 914. Donnel v. Bellas, 10 Pa. St. 341. 952, 958. T.Bellas, 11 Pa. St. 341. 942, 958. V.Bellas, 34 Pa. St. 157. 958. Donnelly v. Carpenter (Ky.), 47 S. 'W> 336. 253. V. Decker, 58 Wis. 461, 17 N. W. 389, 46 Am. Rep. 637. 182. T.Howard, 60 Cal. 291. 1277, 1278. T. Tillman, 47 Cal. 40. 1245. Donnor v. Quartermas, 90 Ala. 164, 8 South. 715, 24 Am. St. Rep. 778. 966, 969. Donohoe t. Veal, 19 Mo. 331. 1003. Donohue v. Daniel, 58 Md. 595. 819. D6nohugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 306. 349, Donough V. Dewey, 32 Mich. 309. 432. Donovan t. Insurance Co., 30 Md. 155. 612, 622. v.Kloke, 6 Neb. 124. 138. Dool V. Cassopolis, 42 Mich. 547, 4 N. W. 265. 626. Dooley v. Christian, 96 Va. 534, 32 S. E. ^4. ^79, 1028, 1044. ' Dooling V. Ocean City, 67 N. J. L. 215, 50 Atl. 621. 1218, 1221. Doolittle V. Broome Supervisors, 18 N. Y. 155. 1433. Doonan v. Board of Education, 9 W. Va. 246. 1431. Doores t. Varnon, 94 Ky. 507, 22 S. W. 8fe2. 478, 486, 567; Doran t. Phillips, 47 Mich. 228, 10 N. W. 350. 804, 1097. Dore T. Gray, 2 T. R. 358. 1171. Doremus t. Cameron, 49 N. J. Eq. 1, 22 Atl. 802. 867, 873. T. People, 16f 111. 26, 43 N. E. 701. 1273. T. People, ' 173 111. 63, 50 N. E. 686. 795, 796, 1271. Doren v. Lupton, 154 Ind. 396, 56 N. E. 849. 1009. Dorgan v. Boston, 12 Allen 223. 181, 226, 238, 1161, 1162, 1190, 1206. Dorn V. Backer, '61 N. Y. 261. 251, 1469, 1472. V.Baker, 96 Gal. 206, 31 Pac. Rep. 37. 985. Dorr V. Berquist (Neb.), 89 N. W. 256. 884, 983. V.Boston, 6 Gjray 131. 662, 1488, 1494. Dorrance fet.. Matter of, 4 ■ R. L 230. 1182, 1196. Dorris v. Miller, 105 loWa 564, 75 N. W. 482. 8, 687. Dorton v. Hearn, 67 Mo. 301. 197. Dorweiler v. Callanan, 91 Iowa 299, 59 N. W. 74. 1072, 1074. Dorwin v. Strickland, 57 N. Y. 492. 1469, 1472. Doster v. Sterling, 33 Kan. 381, 6 Pac 556 294 Dothage v. Stuart, 35 Mo. 251. 1064. Doty V. Bassett, 44 Kan. 754, 26 Pac. 51. 883, 911. V. Bllsbree, 11 Kan. 209. 1435. Doud V. Blood, 89 Iowa 237, 56 N. W. 452. 994, 1049. Doudna v. Harlan, 45 Kan. 484, 25 Pac. 883. 1026, 1029, 1075. Dougherty v. Crawford, 14 S. C. 628 939. V.Dickey, 4 W. & S. 146. 810. V.Harrison, 54 Cal. 428. 1248. T.Heparie, 47 Cal. 9. 880. T. Miller, 36 Cal. 83. 1283. Doughty V. Hope, 3 Denio 252. 492, 1291. T. Hope, 3 Denio 594. 443, 446, 516, 556, 1005, 1006, 1036, 1041. T.Miller, 50 N. J. Eq. 529, 25 Atl. 153. 804. Douglas T. Dangerfleld, 10 Ohio 152. 735, 974. TABLE OF OASES. Ixxxv Douglas V. Kansas City, 147 Mo. 428, 48 S. W. 851. 1496, 1498. V.Walker, 57 Kan. 328. 937, 956. Douglas, In re, 41 La. An. 765, 6 Soutli. 675. 887, 929, 961, 1014. Douglas Co. V. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 397, 34 S. B. 52. 61, 728, 785. V. Stone, 110 Fed. 812. 1412. Douglas County Agric. Soc. v. Douglas County, 104 Wis. 429, 80 N. W. 740. 358, 361. Douglass V. Anniston, 104 Ala. 291, 16 Soutli. 133. 1099. v. Bishop, 45 Kan. 200, 25 Pac. 628. 996. V.Boyle, 42 Kan. 392, 22 Pac. 316. 1020. V.Dickson, 31 Kan. 310, 1 Pac. 541. 963, 1051. V. Harrisviile, 9 W. Va. 162, 27 Am. Rep. 548. 340, 1198, 1418. V. liowell, 55 Kan. 574, 40 Pac. 917. 1030, 1031, 1075. V.Lowell, 60 Kan. 239, 56 Pac. 13. 1003. V.Lowell, 64 Kan. 533, 67 Pac. 1106. 961. V. McKeever, 54 Kan. 767, 29 Pac. 703. 1025. V. Neill, 7 Heisk. 438. 431. V. Nuzum, 16 Kan. 515. 962, 999. V. Pike County, 101- U. S. 677. 123. V. Placerville, 18 Cal. 643. 466, 1436. V. Short, 3 Dev. 432. 958. V. State, 34 N. J. L. 485. 3p6. V.TuUock, 34 Iowa 262. 1068. V. Wickwire, 19 Conn. 489. 436. Douglass, Matter of, 48 Hun 318. 84. Douglass, Petition of, 46 N. Y. 42. 479, 482. DouglasvillB V. Johns, 62 Ga. 423. 1511. Douthett V. Kettle, 104 111. 356. 951, 955, 977. Dover v. Maine Water Co., 90 Me. 180, 38 Atl. 101. 267, 384, 637, 838. V.Robinson, 64 Me. 183. 1335. Dow V. First Parish, 5 Met. 73. 607. V. Humbert, 91 U. S. 294. 1375. V. Sudbury, 5 Met. 73. 24, 607, 1488, 1494, 1510, 1511. Dowdney' v. Mayor, etc. of New York, 54 N. Y. 156. 872, 873, 1285. Dowell V. Portland, 13 Or. 248, 10 Pac. 308. 529. V.Talbot Paving Co., 138 Ind. 675, 38 N. B. 389. 499. Dowlan v. Sibley County, 36 Minn. 430, 31 N. W. 517. 1191. Dowling V Conniff, 103 Cal. 75, 36 Pac. 1034. 892, 1388. - Downer v. Boston, 7 Cush. 277. 1227. v.Tarbel'l, 61 Vt. 530, 17 Atl. 482. 1003, 1084. V.Woodbury, 19 Vt. 329. 436, 853, 1479. Downer's Adm'r v. Smith, 38 Vt. 464. 966. Downes v. State, 22 Tex. App. 393., 612. Downey v. Lancy, 178 Mass. 465, 59 N. E. 1015. 998, 1045. ' V. Nutt, 19 Grat. 59. 953. Downing v. Roberts, 21 Vt. 441. 1479. V. Rugar, 21 Wend. 178, 34 Am. Dec. 223. 441, 442. Dows V. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108. 1411, 1415, 1441, 1450. V.Dale, 74 Iowa 108, 37 N. W. 1. 913. Dows, Matter of, 167 N. Y. 227, 60 N. E. 439, 88 Am. St. Rep. 508, 52 L. R. A. 433. 668. Dox V. Postmaster-General, 1 Pet. 318. 1340. Doyle V. Connecticut Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535. 95, 192, 703. V. Martin, 55 Ark. 37, 17 S. W. 346. 898, 935, 978. Drainage Com'rs v. Illinois Central R. Co., 158 111. 353, 41 N. B. 1073. 1261. Drainage, Matter of, 35 ' N. J. L. 497. 1156, 1256. Draining Co. Case, 11 La. An. 338. 103, 211, 887, 929, 1128, 1169, 1170, 1189. Drake v. Ogden, 128 111. 603, 21 N. B. 511. 355, 896, 898, 947, 955, 1038, 1039. V.Phillips, 40 111. 388. 466, 1418, 143ft. V. Shurtlife, 24 Hun 422. 1501. Dranga v. Rowe, .127 Cal. 506, 59 Pac. 944. 599. Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass. 53. 644, 767. Drayton's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 172. 94, 640, 670. Dreake v. Beasley, 26 Ohio St. 315. 19, 839. Drennan v. Beierlein, 49 Mich. 272, 13 N. W. 587. 448, 799, 957. V. Herzog, 56 Mich. 467, 23 N. W.' 170. 901. Ixxxvi TABLK OF CASES. Dresden v. Bridge, 90 Me. 489, 38 Atl. 545. 529, 666. V. Goud, 75 Me. 298. 437. Dressman v. Farmers' & T. Nat. Bank, 104 Ky. 694, 38 S. W. 1052. 867, 1285. V. Simonin, 104 Ky. 693, 47 S. W. 767. 867, 1285. Dreutzer v. Baker, 60 Wis. 179, 18 N. W. 776. 1082, 1086. V.Smith, 56 Wis. 292, 14 N. W. 465. 987, 995, 1087. Drew V. Davis, 10 Vt. 306, 33 Am. Dec. 213. 590, 1469. V. Morrill, 62 N. H. 23. 438, 442, 604, 747, 750, 760, 936, 937 964 T.TifEt,'79 Minn. 175, 81 N. W. 839, 79 Am. St. Rep. 446, 47 L. R. A. 525. 33, 308, 380. Drew County v. Bennett, 43 Ark. 364. 586. Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. St. 31. 403, 494, 621, 624, 901, 1098. Driggers v. Cassady, 71 Ala. 529. 750. 598, 873. Droz V. Bast Baton Rouge, 36 La. An. 340. 899. Drummer v. Cox, 165 111. 648, 46 N. B. 716. 468, 555, 1438. Dryden v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 60 Me. 512. 718. Dryfuss v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247. 481. Drysdale v. Pradat, 45 Miss. 445. 1099. Duanesburg v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y. 177. 568, 1317. Du Bignon v. Brunswick, 106 Ga. 317, 32 S. B. 102. 19, 497, 838, 864, 1413. Dubois V. Campau, 24 Mich. 360. 966, 974. V.Hepburn, 10 Pet. 1. 1024, 1044, 1045. Du Bols, Appeal of, 121 Pa. St. 368, 15 Atl. 641. Dubuque v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 47 Iowa 196. 258, 291, 680. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 39 Iowa 56. 2, IS, 292, 345, 697, 831, 83?. V. Life Ins. Co., 29 Iowa 9. 1101. V. Railway Co., 47 Iowa 196. 258, 291, 680. V. Wooton, 28 Iowa 571. 518, 932. Dubuque, etc. -R. Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa 235. 292. V.Webster County, 40 Iowa 16. 1496. Dubuque County v. Railroad Co., 4 Greene (Iowa) 1. 585. Ducat V. Chicago, 48 111. 172, 95 Am. Rep. 529.. 95, 287, 681, 703, 718. V.Chicago, 10 Wall. 410. 26, 95, 171, 681, 703, 718. Duck V. Peeler, 74 Tex. 268, 11 S. W. 111. ' 775, 1388, 1413. Duck Island Club v. Bexstead, 174 111. 435, 51 N. B. 831. 1090. Dudley v. Chilton County, 66 Ala. 593. 1328, 1334. V. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co., 100 Mass. 183. 1115. V. Little, 2 Ohio 504, 15 Am! Dec. 575. 943, 944. V.Ross, 27 Wis. 679. 1513. Dudley Ex'rs v. Oliver, 5 Ired. 227. 580. Duer V. .Small, 17 How. Pr. 201. 3. Duff V. Neilson, 90 Mo. 93, 2 S. W. 222. 838, 883, 998, 999, 1080. Dufflt V. Tuhan, 28 Kan. 292. 964. Dufford V. Smith, 46 N. J. Eq. 216, 18 Atl. 1052. 820. Duffy V. Hobson, 40 Cal. 240, 6 Am. Rep. 617. 906. V. Philadelphia, 42 Pa. St. 192. 875. V. Saginaw, 106 Mich. 335, 64 N. W. 581. 1441. Duffy, In re, 4 Brewster 531. 904. Dugan V. Baltimore, 1 Gill & J. 499. 18. V. Farrier, 47 N. J. L. 383, 1 Atl. 751. 430, 436. ' V. McCullough, 27 Colo. 43, 59 Pac. 743. 526, 771, 919, 993, 1001, 1009. Dugro, In re, 50 N. Y. 513. 410, 1163. Duke V. Brown, 65 Ind. 25. 1019. V. O'Bryan, 100 Ky. 710, 39 S. W. 444. 211, 1256. Dukes V. Rowley, 24 111. 210. 845, 896, 899. Duluth V. Miles, 73 Minn. 509, 76 N. W. 259. 525. Duluth & I. R. Co. V. St. Louis County, 179 U. S. 302, 21 Sup. Ct. 124. 59, 81, 115, 306. Duluth Banking Co. v. Koon, 81 Minn. 486, 84 N. W. 335. 308. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co. v. Douglas County, 103 Wis. 75, 79 N. W. 34. 376. Dumesnil v. Gleason, 99 Ky. 652, 37 S. W. 69. 1214. V. Shanks, 97 Ky. 354, 30 S. W. ■354. 1214. Dumphey v; Auditor-General, 123 Mich. 354, 82 N. W. 55. 748. TABLE OF CASES. Ixxxvii Dumphey v. Hilton, 121 Mich. 315, 80 N. W. 1. 1029. V. Supervisors, 58 Iowa 273. 594. Duncan v. Gillette, 37 Kan. 156, 14 Pac. 479, 999. V. Newcomer, 9 S. D. 375, 69 N. W. 580. 135, 138. V. State (Ga.), 30 S. B. 755. 153. Dundee Mort. etc. Co. v.* Charlton, 32 Fed. 192. 779, 1412, 1413, 1460. V. Parrish, 24 Fed. 197. 550, 626. V. Parrish, 11 Sawy. 92. 91. V. School Dist., 19 Fed. 359. ?i. V. School DIst., 10 Sawy. 52. 91. Dunden v. Snodgrass, 18 Pa. St. 151. 511, 743. Dundy v. Richardson County Com'rs, 8 Neh. 508. 774, 1441, 1443. . Dungan's Appeal, 68 Pa. St. 204. 867. Dungan's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 414. 873, 1046. Dunham v. Chicago, 55 111. 357. 285, 384, 535, 891. V. Cox, 44 N. J. Eq. 273, 14 Atl. 123 318 V. People, 96 111. 331. 210, 1168. V.Rochester, 5 Cow. 462. 1099. Dunkle v. Herron, 115 Ind. 470, 18 N. E. 12. 501, 1169, 1412. Dunlap V. Gallatin County, 15 111. 7. 17, 18, 20, 854. V.Henry, 76 Mo. 106. 996. V. Hunting, 2 Denio 643, 43 Am. Dec. 763. 1478, 1479. V. Minor, 26 La. An. 117. 873. DUnlieth, etc. Bridge Co. v. Du- buque, 32 Iowa 427. 291, 364. Dunmore Borough's Appeal, 52 Pa. St. 374. 415, 1304. Dunn V. Relyea, 6 W. & S. 475. 743. , V. Snell, 74 Me. 22. 905, 964. V.Winston, 31 Miss. 135. 729, 735, 739. Dunnell Manuf. Co. v. Newell, 15 R. I. 233, 2. Atl. 766. 602, 705, 1496, 1499, 1504. V. Pawtucket, 7 Gray 277. 619, 1488, 1494. Dunning v. Drain Com'.r, 44 Mich. 518, 7 N. W. 239. 1402. Dunn's Bx'rs v. Renick,. 33 W. Va. 476, 10 S. E. 810. 823. V. Renick, 40 W. Va. 349, 22 S. E. 66. 824. Dunnovan v. Green, 57 111. 63. 120, 1301. Dunsmuir v. Port Angeles Gas, etc. Co., 24 Wash. 104, 63 Pac. 1095. 813. ' Duntley v. Davis, 42 Hun 229. 438. Dupen V. Wetherby, 79 Wis. 203, 48 N. W. 378. 1084, 1085. Duperier v. Police Jury, 31 La. An. 709. 1367. V. Viator, 35 La. An. 957. 568. Dupre V. Board of Police, 42 La. An. 802, 8 South. 593. 1515. Dupree v. Stanley County, 8 S. D. 30, 65 N. W. 426. 415, 658. Du Puy's Succession, 33 La. An. 258. 834. Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 491. 186, 191, 258, 261, 585, 1094, 1113, 1143. Durant v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 469. 1415, 1470, 1512. V. Kauffman, 34 Iowa 194. 247. V. Supervisors, 26 Wend. 66. 19. Durfee v. Peoria, D. & B. R. Co., 140 111. 435, 30 N. B. 686. 811. Durham v. Board of Com'rs, 95 Ind. 182. 1397, 1501. V. Hussman, 88 Iowa 29, 55 N. W. 11. 137, 1073. V. Linderman, 10 Okl. 570, 64 Pac. 15. 1420. V. People, 67 111. 414. 827. V. State, 116 Ind. 514, 19 N. B. 329. 621, 622. v.. State, 6 Ind. App. 23, 32 N. E. 104. 770. Durkee v. Commissioners, 29 Kan. , 697. 263. V.Kenosha, 59 Wis. 123, 17 N. W. 677, 14 Am. Rep. 480. 1511. Durrett v. Buxton, 63 Ark. 397, 39 S. W. 56. 548. v. Stewart, 88 Ky. 665, 11 S. W. 773. 916. Duryee v. United States Credit System Co., 55 N. J. Bq. 311, 37 Atl. 155. 835, 856. Duryee, In re, 2 Fed. 68. 20. Dutton V. Board of Review, 188 111. 386, 59 N. E. 953. 84, 262. V. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 53 Kan. 462, 36 Pac. 719. 273, 1441. Duval , County Com'rs v. Jackson- ville, 36 Fla. 196, 18 South. 339. 212, 283. Duvall V. Perkins, 77 Md. 582, 26 Atl. 1085. 809, 820, 865, 941. Duxbury v. County Com'rs, 172 Mass. 383, 52 N. B. 535. 655 659. Dwy'er v. Ha&kworth, 57 Tex. 245. 56'8, 632. Ixxxviii TABLE OF OASES. Dwight V. Boston, 12 Allen 316, 90 Am. Dec. 149. 389, 402, 659. V. Springfield, 4 Gray 107. 1404. ■ Dwinnels v. Parsons, 98 Mass. 470. 1470. Dyar v. Farmington, 70 Me. 515. 300, 383. Dyer v. Barstow, 50 Cal. 652. 1288. V. Boswell, 39 Md. 465. 827, 1005. V. Chase, 52 Cal. 440. 1167. V. Miller, 58 Cal. 585. 1247. V. Osborne, 11 R. I. 321, 23 Am. Rep. 460. 389, 402. V. Parrott, 60 Cal. 551. 1274. V. Scalmanini, 69 Cal. 637. 532, 1265. Dyke v. Wiyte, 17 Colo. 296, 29 Pac. 128. 281, 978. Dyker, etc. Co. v. Cook, 3 App. Div. 164, 38 N. Y. Supp. 222. 343,363, 365. Dykes v. Lockwood Mortg. Co., 57 Kan. 416, 46 Pac. 711. 602, 627. V. Lockwood Mortg. Co., 2 Kan. App. 217, 43 Pac. 268. 93, 651. E. Bads V. Retherford, 114 Ind. 273, 16 N. E. 587, 5 Am. St. Rep. 611. 966. Eagan v. Connolly, 107 111. 458. 1009. Bager's Petition, 46 N. Y. 100. 410, 1255, 1383.- Eagle Mamif. Co. v. Davenport, 101 Iowa 493, 70 N. W. 707, 38 L. R. A. 480. ,866, 871, 1276, 1284, 1285. Eagle River v. Brown, 85 Wis. 76, 55 N. W. 163. 606, 655. Eakins v. Eakins (Ky.), 20 S. W. 285. 75, 567, 569, 577, 1427. Barnes v. Johnson, 4 Allen 382. 488, 14^0., Earl V. Camp, 16 Wend. 562. 1479, 1482, 1486. V.Raymond, 188 111. 15. 59 N. E. 19. 775, 780, 1415. Earle v. Henrietta, 91 Tex. 301, 43 S. W. 15. 1005. V.Simons, 94 Ind. 573. 447, 1003." Earles v. Ramsay, 61 N. J. L. 194, 38 Atl. 812. 647, 1407. Barley v. Euwer, 102 Pa. St. 338. 724, 923. Early v. Doe, 16 How. 610. 484, 916, 930, 932. Early v. Whittingham, 43 Iowa 162. 598, 1022, 1073. East Avenue Baptist Church, Mat- ter of, 57 Hun 590, 11 N. Y. Supp. 113. 518, 761. East Brunswick T'p v. New Bruns- wick, 57 N. J. L. 145, 30 Atl. 684. 425. East Eighteenth Street, In re, 142 N. Y. 645, 37 N. E. 568, 75 Hud 603, 27 N. Y. Supp. 591. 1215, 1245. Easterbrook v. O'Brien, 98 Cal. 671, f 33 Pac. 765. 1425. 1 V. San Francisco, 44 Pac. 800. 1489. Eastern Carolina Land, etc. Co. v. State Board, 101 N. C. 35, 7 S. E. 573. 496, 621, 1007. East Feliciana v. Gurth, 26 La. An. 140. 298. Bast Kingston v. Fowle, 48 N. H. 57. 508. Eastman v. Bennett, 6 Wis. 232. 445, 446. V. Curtis, 4 Vt. 616. 445. V. Gurrey, 15 Utah 410, 49 Pac. 310. 751, 912, 913, 914, 935, 936, 953, 956, 1000, 1002. V. Jackson, 10 Lea 162. 1108. V. Little, 5 N. H. 290. 936. V. St. Anthony Falls Water Power Co., 43 Minn. 60, 44 N. W. 882. 1001. V.Thayer, 60 N. H. 408. 7S0, 812, 960, 1448. Easton v. Board of Review, 183 111. 355, 55 N. E. 716. 268. V. Calendar, 11 Wend. 90. 1468, 1470, 1472. v.Doolittle, 100 Iowa 374, 69 N. W. 672. 1049. V.Hayes, 35 Minn. 418, 29 N. W. 59. 921. V.Hayes, 38 Minn. 463, 38 N. W. 364. 1018. V. Perry, 37 Iowa 681. 1012. . V. Savery, 44 Iowa 654. 482, 940, 1013. V. Schofield, 66 Minn. 425, 69 N. W. 326. 740, 966, 969, 1018. Easton Bank v. Commonwealth, 10 Pa. St. 442. 112. East Portland v. Multnomah County, 6 Or. 62. 326. Bast Saginaw v. County Treasurer,_ 44 Mich. 273, 6 N. W. 684. 1372. East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259, 2 Am. Rep. 82. 111. V. Bast Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373. 111. Bast St. Louis v. Albrecht, 150 111. 506, 37 N. B. 934. 531, 1243. TABLE OF CASKS. Ixxxix iEast St. Louis v. People, 124 111. 655, 17 N. B. 447. l76, 1362. V. Trustees, 102 111. 489, 40 Am. Rep. 606. 1138. V. Trustees, 6 111. App. 130. 1366. , V. United States, 120 U. S. 600, 7 Sup. Ct. 739. 1362. v.Wehrung, 46 111. 392. 106, 288, 1102, 1113. V. Wider, 46 111. 351. 1140. V. Zebley, 110 U. S. 321, 4 Sup. Ct. 21. 1365, 1366. East St. Louis Connecting R. Co. v. People, 119 111. 182, 10 N. B. 397. 1385, 1386. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Morristown (Tenn. Ch. App.), 35 S. W. 771. 18, 731, 822. ilaton V. Bennett, 10 N. D. 346, 87 N. W. 188. 480, 598, 760, 1081, 1458. v. Cheseborough, 82 Mich. 214, 46 N. W. 365. 871. V.Harris, 42 Ala. 491. 433. V.Lyman, 33 Wis. 34. 932,995. V. North, 25 Wis. 514. 1047. V. North, 29 Wis. 75. 960, 961, 9,75. V. Union County Nat. Bank, 141 Ind. 136, 40 N. E. 668. 717, 777. V.Union County Nat. Bank, 141 Ind. 159, 40 N. B. 693. 717, 784. Eaton's Appeal, 83 Pa. St. 152. 867, Bbaugh V. Mullinax, 34 S. C. 364, 13 S. E. 613. 825. V. Mullinax, 40 S. C. 244, 18 S. C. 802. 932. EberviUe Coal Co. v. Common- wealth, 91 Pa. St. 47, 54. 392. Eck V. Swennumson, 73 Iowa 423, 35 N. W. 503, 5 Am. St. Rep. 690. 815. Eckrote v. Myers, 41 Iowa 324. 968. Eddy V. Kimerer, 61 Neb. 498, 85 N. W. 540. 867. V.Lee T'p, 73 Mich. 123, 40 N. W. 792. 1424, 1448. V. Wilson, 43 Vt. 362. 2,23, 578, 583 799 Ede V. Cuneo, 126 Cal. 167, 58 Pac. 538. 531, 532, 1252. ■Edenton v. Capeheart, 71 N. C. 156. 98. Edes V. Boardman, 58 N. H. 580. 1383, 1396, 1467, 1471. - Bdgarton v. Hart, 8 Vt. 207. 897. ■Edgefield v. Brien, 3 Tenn. Ch. 673. 878 Bdgerton v. Schneider, 26 Wis. 385. 965. Bdgerton V. Bird, 6 Wis. 527, 70 Am. Dec. 473. 1067, 1085, 1091. V.Huntington School T'p, 126 Ind. 261, 26 N. E. 156. 1236. Edgington v. Cook, 22 Neb. 551, 49 N. W. 369. 137. Edinburg v. Hackney, 54 Ind. 83. 1502. ' Edison Electric Ilium. Co. v. Spo- kane County, 22 Wash. 168, 60 Pac. 132. 686, 780, 1459. Edison Phonograph Co. v. State Board, 55 N. J. L. 55, 25 Atl. 329. 379, 677. Edison United Phonograph Co. v. State Board, 57 N. J. L. 520, 31 Atl. 1019. 379. Bditionds v. San Antonio, 14 Tex. Civ. Ap. 155, 36 S. W. 495. 351. Edmonson v. Cranberry, 73 Miss. 723, 19 South. 676. 996. V. Galveston, 53 Tex. 157. 19, ■ 20, 869. V. Ingram, 68 Miss. 32, 8 South. 257. 808. Edwards v. Chicago, 140 111. 440, 30 N. E. 350. 1175, 1213. V. Fairex, 47 La. An. 170, 16 South. 736. 520, 734. V.James, 13 Tex. 52. 492. V.Lyman, 122 N. C. 741, 30 S. B. 328. 936, 1057, 1058. V. People, 88 111. 340. 273, 523, 558, 589. V. Sims, 40 Kan. 235, 19 Pac. 710. 1075. V.Taliaferro, 34 Mich. 113. 590. v.Upham, 93 Wis. 455, 67 N. W. 728. 809, 922. Edwards, etc. Co. v. Jasper County (Iowa), 90 N. W. 1006. 1156, 1236. Edwards, Succession of, 32 La.' An. 457. 491, 750, 827. Bdye v. Robertson (Head-Money Cases), 112. U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247. 1-79, 259. Egan V. Charles County Court, 3 H. & McH. 169. 1105. V. State (Tex. Cr. App.), 68 S. W. 273. 1117. Egerton v. Green Cove Springs, 19 Fla. 140. 1186. V. Third Municipality, 1 La. An. 435. 899. Eggleston v. Charleston, 1 S. C. Const. R. 45. 22. V.Gage, 33 111. App. 184. 994, 1027. Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495, 72 Am. Dec. 276. 1131, 1176, 1193, 1226. xc TABLE OF CASES. Bide V. Clarke, 57 Minn. 397, 59 N. W. 484. 1038. Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 22 Sup. Ct. 515. 669. Eifert v. Central Covington, 91 Ky. 194, 15 S. W. 180. 248. Eitel V. Poote, 39 Gal. 439. 879, 897. Elam V. State, 25 Ala. 53. 901. Elberg v. San Luis Obispo County, 112 Cal. 316, 44 Pac. 572. 1491. Blbin V. Wilson, 33 Md. 135. 1466. Kl Dorado County v. Meiss, 100 Cal. 268, 34 Pac. 716. 102, 475. , Bldred v. Sexton, 5 Ohio 216. 436. Eldridge v. Kuehl, 27 Iowa 160. 523, 1008, 1067, 1068. T. Richmond, 120 Mich. 586, 79 N. W. 807. 889, 980. Electric Storage Battery v. State Board, 60 N. J. L. 66, 36 Atl. 1090. 356, 677. Electric Traction, etc. Co. v. New Orleans, 45 La. An. 1475, 14 South. 231.- 347, 348, 607. Electro-Pneumatic Transit Co.'s Case, 51 N. J. Eq. 71, 20 Atl. 463. 677, 906. Elevated R. Co., Matter of, 70 N. Y. 327. 550. Elgin V. Picard, 24 111. App. 340. 1109. Elizabeth v. Chancellor, 51 N. J. L. 414,' 17 Atl. 942. 526, 868. v. New Jersey Jockey Club, 63 N. J. L. 515, 44 Atl. 207. 1387. Elizabeth Oom'rs, In re, 49 N. J. L. 488, 10 Atl. 363. 46, 511. Blizabethtown, etc. R. Co. v. Trus- tees, 12 Bush 233. 107, 367, 639. Blizabethtown, L. & B. S. R. Co. V. Carter County (Ky.), 18 S. W. . 370. 216. Blizabethtown Water Co. v. Wade, 59 N. J. L. 78, 35 Atl. 4. 181, 208. Elkhart v. Wickwire, 121 Ind. 331, 22 N. B. 342. 1270. Elkhorn, etc. Co. v. Dixon County, 35 Neb. 426, 53 N. W. 382. 136, 609. Elk Rapids Iron Co. v. Helena T'p, 117 Mich. 211, 75 N. W. 455. 654. Blllcott V. Levy Court, 1 Har. & J. 359. 1351. Elliott V. Berry, 41 Ohio St. 110. 468. V. District of Columbia, 3 MacA. 396. 809. V. Bddins, 24 Ala. 508. 916, 931. V.Louisville, 101 Ky. 262, 40 S. W. 690. 31, 1105. V.Miller, 8 Mich. 132. 1333. Elliott V. Parker, 72 Iowa 746, 32 N. W. 494. 1032, 1051. V. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 573. 902. V. Shaffer, 30 W. Va. 347, 4 S. B. 292. 1024, 1028, 1045. V. Spinney, 69 Me. 31. 733. V. Swartwout, 10 Pet. 137. 1486, 1495, 1497. V. United States, 20 Ct. of CI. 328 952 V. Wiltzl 107 U. S. in, 2 Sup. Ct 128 118 Ellis V. Clark, 39 Fla. 714, 23 South. 410. 989, 996. V.Foster, 7 Heisk. 131. 816. V. Frazier, 38 Or. 462, 63 Pac. 642, 53 L. R. A. 454. 326, 1126, 1140. V.Hall, 19 Pa. St. 292. 251, 724, 725. V. Kenyon, 25 Ind. 134. 916. V. Peck, 45 Iowa 112. 921. V. Witmer, 134 Cal. 249, 66 Pac. 301. 1286. Ellsworth V. Cordrey, 63 Iowa 675, 16 N. W. 211. 969, 1042. V. Cordrey, 65 Iowa 303, 21 N. W. 648. 1038. V. Freeman, 43 Mich. 488, 5 N. W. 675. 1021. V. Grand Rapids,' 27 Mich. 250. 1521. V. Green, 59 Iowa 622, 13 N. W. ' 723. 994. V. Low, 62 Iowa 178, 17, N. W. 450. 1038, 1045, 1047. V.Nelson, 81 Iowa 57, 46 N. W. 740. 941, 1001. V. Van Ort, 67 Iowa 222, 25 N. W. 142. 993, 1034. Bllwood V. Rochester, 122 N. t. 229, 25 N. B. 238. 1216. Elma V. Carney, 4 Wash. 418, 30 Pac. 732. 733. V. Carney, 9 Wash. 466, 37 Pac. 707. 486, 1226. Elmendorf v. New York, 25 Wend. 693. 492, 579. Elmore v. Drainage Com'rs, 135 111. 269, 25 N. B. 1010, 25 Am. St. Rep. 363. 1169. Elmwood V. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289. 1322. El Paso V. Ruckman, 92 Tex. 86, 46 S. W. 25. 8, 843. Elsey V. Falconer, 56 Ark. 419, 20' South. 5. 884. Bison V. Spraker, 100 Ind. 374. 805. Blston V. Kennicott, 46 111. 187.. 845, 1009. Biting V. Gould, 96 Mo. 535, 9 S. W. 922. 137, 885. TABLE OF CASES. XCB Klwell V. Shaw, 1 Greenl. (1 Me.) 339. 590, 956. Elyton Land Co. v. Ayres, 62 Ala. 414. 1411. V. Birmingliam, 89 Ala. 477, 7 Soum. 901. 173, 598, 600, 766. Embden v. Bunker, 86 Me. 313, 29 Atl. 1085. 804. Emeric v. Alvarado, 90 Cal. 444, 27 Pac. 356. 129, 759, 966, 993, 1004, 1034. Emericli v. Indianapolis, 118 Ind. 279, 20 N. B. 795. 1137. Emerick v. Sloan, 19 Iowa 139. 1514. Emert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296, 15 Sup. Ct. 367. 153. Emerson v. Thompson, 59 Wis. 619, 18 N. W. 503. 857. V. Shannon, 23 Colo. 274, 47 Pac. 302, 58 Am. St. Rep. 232. 1002. Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 59 N. E. 763. 960. V.Bradford, 29 Cal. 75. 1185, 1283, 1285, 1389. V. Sanford, 92 Me. 525, 43 Atl. 116. 1471. V. Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345. 1206. V. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 Cal. 345. 2, 43, 278, 362, 1185, 1206. V. San Francisco Gas Co., 31 Cal. 240. 1243. Emmerson v. Saltmarshe, 7 Ad. & El. 266. 1171. Emmet County v. Griffin, 73 Iowa 163, 34 N. "W. 792.. 965. Emmons v. Lewiston, 132 111. 380, 24 N. B. 58, 8 L. R. A. 328. 1119. v. Shaw, 171 Mass. 410, 50 N. E. 1033. 668. Emmons County v. Hennett, 9 N. D. 131, 81 N. W. 22. 979. V. First Nat. Bank's Lan^s, 9 N. D. 583, 84 N. W. 379. 489, 828, 888, 897. V.Thompson, 9 N. D. 598i 84 N. W. 385. 887, 895, 898. Emory v. State, 41 Md. 38. 398, 847, 1374. Empire L. & C. Co. v. Board of Oom'rs, 21 Colo. 244, 40 Pac. 449. 281. Bmporia v. Bates, 16 Kan. 495. 526. • V.Norton, 13 Kan. 569. 528. Emsly V. Memphis, 6 Baxt. 553. 404. Bnaut V. Tax Collectors, 36 La. An. 804, 51 Am. Rep. 14. 353. Endicott v. Corson, 50 N. J. L. 381,. 13 Atl. 265. 664. Endress v. Shove, 110 Wis. 133, 85 N. W. 653. 813. Engelke v. Schlenker, 75 Tex. 559, 12 S. W. 599. 714, 716. Engle V. Sohn, 41 Ohio St. 691, 52 Am. Rep. 103. 1115. Englewood School v. Chamberlain,. 54 N. J. L. 549, 24 Atl. 479. 350. V. Chamberlain,, 55 N. J. L.. 292, 26 Atl. 913. 350. English V. Danville, 150 111. 92, 36- N. B. 994. 1275. V. Mayor, etc., 2 Marvel (Del.) 63, 37 Atl. 158. 63, 1173.. 1204, 1218, 1219, 1240, 1258. V. Oliver, 28 Ark. 317. 16, 186, 466, 1332. V. People, 96 111. 566. 181, 195, 206, 1385. V. Woodman, 40 Kan. 412, 20- Pac. 262. 889, 1057. Engstad v. Dinnie, 8 N. D. 1, 76 N.^ W. 292. ,551, 556. v. Grand Forks County, 10 N. D. 54, 84 N. W. 577. 322, 323, 349, 359. Eno V. New York, 68 N. Y. 214. 526, 1273, 128L Enos V. Bemis, 61 Wis. 656, 21 N_ fi. 812. 733, 1514. V. SpringHeld, 113 111. 65. 1163,. 1187, 1188. Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329, 14 N. B. 400, 15 N. E. 401. 361, 511,- 518, 759, 760, 762, 931, 1081. Enston's Estate, In re, 113 N. Y. 174, 21 N. E. 87, 3 L. R. A. 464.- 33, 86, 89, 90, 457. Bntrekin v. Chambers, 11 Kan. 368. 940. Bnyart v. Trustees, 25 Ohio St. 618. 567. Episcopal Acad. v. Philadelphia' (Trustees v. Taylor), 150 Pa. St.. 565, 25 Atl. 55. 349. Eppinger v. Kirby, 23 111. 521, 76 Am. Dec. 709. 845, 896. Equitable G. & T. Co. v. Donahoe- (Del.), 49 Atl. 373. 548. Equitable L. Assur. Soc. v. Goode, 101 Iowa 160, 70 N. W. 113, 35 L. R. A. 690. 346. Equitable L. Ins. Co. v. Board of" Equal., 74 Iowa 178, 37 N. W. 141. 272. - Equitable Trust Co. v. O'Brien, 55- Neb. 735, 76 N. W. 417. 773, 892,. 1252. Ericks'on v. Brookings County, 3 S- D. 434, 53 N. W. 857, 18 L. R. A.. 347. 922. JCCU TABLE OF CASES. Erie v. First Univ. Church, 105 Pa. St. 278. 365. V. Griswold, 184 Pa. St. 435, 39, Atl. 231. 109, 1195. V.Russell, 148 Pa. St. 384, 23 Atl. 1102. 1175. Brie County v. Erie, 113 Pa. St. 360, 6 Atl. 136. 264, 267. V.Erie Water Works Com'rs, 113 Pa. St. 368, 6 Atl. 138. 266. V. Transportation Co., 87 Pa. St. 434. 366. Erie R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 6g^ Pa. St. 84, "5 Am. Rep. 351. 112, 113, 392. T.Pennsylvania, 158 U. S. 431, 15 Sup. Ct. S96. 155, 167. V. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492. 112, 358. V. State, 31 N. J. L. 531, 86 Am. Dec. 226. 165. Erie R. Co., In re, 65 N. J. L. 608, 48 Atl. 601. 698. Erie R. Co., Taxation of, 64 N. J. L. 123, 44 Atl. 976. 639, 696. Ernst V. Kunkle, 5 Ohio St. 520. 1194, 1218, 1291. , Erskine v. Hohnback, 14 Wall. 613. 1477, 1479, 1485. V. Van Arsdale, 15 Wall. 75. 1486, 1500. Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 256, 55 Am. Dec. 499. 510. Erwin v. Hubbard (Idaho), 37 Pac. 274. 622. Bschbach v. Pitts, 6 Md. 71. 865, 874, 1291. Esohenburg v. County Com'rs, 129 Ind. 398, 28 N. B. 865. 627. Esker v. Hefflernan, 159 111. 58, 41 , N. E. 1113. 1036, 1042. Espy V. Fort Madison, 14 Jowa 226. 1497. Essex V. Board olf Assessors, -153 Mass. 141, 26 N. E. 431. 266. V.Meyers, 27 Ind. App. 639, 62 N. ,E. 96. 996. Essex County,. Inhabitants of, v. Board of Assessors, 153 Mass. 141, 26 N. E. 431. 266. Essex Public Road Board v. Shin- kle, 140 U. S. 334, 11 Sup. Ct. 790. 117. V. Shinkle, 49 N. J. L. 65, 6 Atl. 435. 1257. V. Spear, 48 N. J.'L. 372, 9 Atl. 197. 1160. Bstabrook v. Hapgood, 10 Mass. 313, 314. 445. v.Royon, 52 Ohio St. 318, 39 N. E. 808, 32 L. R. A. 805. 819, 1025. Estell V. Hawkens, 50 N. J. L.. 122, 11 Atl. 265. 780, 790, 797. Estes V. Owen, 90 Mo. 113, 2 S. W. 193. 1165. v.Stebbins, 25 Kan. 315. 1031, 1074. Estey V. Westminister, 97 Mass. 324. 219. Eureka Hill Mining Co. v. Eureka, 22 Utah 447, 63 Pac. 654. 448, 655. Eurigh v. People, 79 111. 214. 523. Eustis V. Henrietta, 90 Tex. 468, 39 S. W. 567. 35, 66, 751, 905, 1060. V.Henrietta, 91 Tex. 325, 43 S. W. 259. 35, 66, 956, 1016. Evans V. Bradford, 35 Ind. 527. 856. V. Commissioners, 89 N. C. 154. 471. V. Commonwealth, 13 Bush 269. 900. V. Denver, 26 Colo. 193, 57 Pac. 696. 511. V. Pall River' County, 9 S. D. 130, 68 N. W. 195. 516, 627. V. Newell, 18 R. I. 38, 25 Atl. 347. 736, 740. V. People, 139 111. 552, 28 N. E. 1111. 1272, 1273. V. Phillipi, 117 Pa. St. 226, 11 Atl. 630. 505. V. Robberson, 92 Mo. 192, 4 S. W. 941, 1 Am. St. Rep. 701. 886, 963, 992. Bvansvllle v. Pfisterer, 34 Ind. 36, 7 Am. Rep. 214. 1516. V. Summers, 108 Ind. 189, 9 N. E. 81. 450. Evansville & I. R. Co. v. Hays, 118 Ind. 214, 20 N. B. 736. 596, 598. V. West, 138 Ind. 697, 37 N. E. 1012. 93, 164, 693. Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. West, 139 Ind. 254, 37 N. E. 1009. 844, 903. Evansville Bank v. Britton, 105 U. S. 322. 715. Evansville Nat. Bank v. Britton, 8 Fed. 867. 273. Bvanston Electric Ilium. Co. v. Kochersperger, 175 111. 26, 51 N. E. 719. 704. Eve V. State, 21 Ga. 50. 1344, 1423 Evening Journal Assoc, v. Stat* Board, 47 N. J. L.. 36, 51 Pac. 820, 465. Everett v. Bebe, 37 Iowa 452. 946. V. Dilley, 39 Kan. 73, 17 Pac. 661. 815. TABLE OF OASES. ZClll- Everhard v. Nesbitt, 182 Pa. St. 500, 38 Atl. '525. 724, 936. Bveritt's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 216. 716, 1383, 1445. Eversole v. Cook, 92 Ind. 222. 91. Everson v. Syracuse, 29 Hun 485. 845. Ewart V. Davis, 76 Mo. 129. 879, 1010. V. Western Springs, 180 111. 318, 54 N. E. 478. 1158, 1177, 1178. Ewing V. Commissioner^' Court, 83 Tex. ' 663, 19 S. W. 280. 220. V. St. Louis, 5 Wall. 413. 1448. Elxcelsior, etc. Co. v. Green, 39 La. An. 455, 1 South. 873. 1176, 1189, 1232. Exchange Bank v. Hines, 3 Ohio St. 1. 3, 382. Exchange Bank Tax Cases, 21 Fed. 99. 514, 517, 518. Exchange Nat. Bank v. Miller, 19 Fed. 372. 714, 715. Express Co. v. Bllyson, 28 Iowa 370. 291. Exum V. Baker, 115 N. O. 242, 20 S. E. 448, 44 Am. St. Rep. 449. 812. Eyerly v. Jasper County, 72 Iowa 149, 33 N. W. 609. 1488. Eyerman v. Payne, 28 Mo. App. 72. 801. Eyermann v. Blakesley, 9 Mo. Ap. 231. 901. Eyke v. Lange, 90 Mich. 592, 51 N. W. 680. 838, 847, 1352. V. Lange, 104 Mich. 26, 63 N. W. 535. 18, 836, 837, 838, 847, 1352. . Eyre t. Jacob, 14 Grat. 422, 73 Am. Dec. 367. 32, 33, 178, 337, 1123. Ezekiel v. Dixon, Kelly 146. 450. Bzell v. Thrasher, 76 Ga. 817. 1119. F. Factory Co. v. Gardiner, 5 Me. 133. 347, 400, 655, 1104, 1469. Fagan v. Cadmus, 46 N. J. L. 441. 817. V. Chicago^ 84 111. 227. 135, 1274. V. Huntress, etc. Lumber Co., 80 Minn. 441, 83 N. W. 382 895. Fagg V. Martin, 53 Ark. 449, 14 S. W. 647. 495. Fahlor v. Wells, 101 Ind. 167. 560. Fahnestock v. Peoria, 171 111. 454, 49 N. E. 496. 1256. Fair v. Brown, 40 Iowa 209. 972.. Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 21 Sup. Ct. 648. 9, 130,. 150, 178. Fairbanks v. Fitchburg, 132 Mass. 42. 1217. v.Kittredge, 24 Vt. 9. 617,. 659, 1469. V. Williams, 24 Kan. 16. ip20. Fairchild v. St. Paul, 46 Minn. 540,. 49 N. W. 325. 1211, 1264. Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Les- see, 7 Cranch 603. 860. Fairfield v. County Com'rs, 66 Me. 385. 1381. V. People, 94 111. 244. 526, 530,- 1435. v.Eatcliffe, 20 Iowa 396. 466,. 1130, 1167, 1201. V. Woodman, 76 Me. 549. 664. Fairfield Chem. Co. v. Tax Com'rs, 5 N. Y. Supp. 87. 692. Fair's Estate, In re, 128 Cal. 607,. 61 Pac. 184. 86, 91, 388, 647, 651. Faison v. Johnson, 70 Miss. 214,. 12 South. 152. 968. Falch V. People, 8 111. App. 351. 932. Faler v. McRae, 56 Miss. 227. 1046. Fales V. Wadsworth, 23 Me. 553. 507. Falkner v. Hunt, 16 Cal. 167. 645. V. Thurmond (Miss.), 23 South.. - 584. 966, 969. Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112, 17 Sup. Ct. 56. 51, 56, 59, 62, 63, 65, 69, 71, 75, 181,. 211, 212, 239, 631, 1170, 1171, 1207, 1216, 1227, 1260. Fallon V. Chidester, 46 Iowa 588, 26 Am. Rep. 164. 966. Fall River v. Bristol County Com'rs, 125 Mass. 567. 302, 397, 638, 689. Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush 660, 661. 98, 250, 1143. Falvey v. Board of Com'rs, 76' Minn. 257, 79 N. W. 302. 1496. Fanning v. Bohme, 76 Cal. 149, 21 Pac. 121. 448, 892. V. Gregorie, 16 How. 524. 148. v. Lewlston, 93 Cal. 146, 28 Pac. 943. 1388. Pant V. Miller, 17 Grat. 47. 905. Farber v. Purdy, 69 Mo. 601. 816. Fargo V. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230; 7 Sup. Ct. 857. 155, 156. V. Stevens, 121 U. S. 230, 7 Sup. Ct. 857. 155, 155. Fargo £ S. W. R. Co. v. Brewer, 3' N. D. 34, 53 N. W. 177. 363, 377. Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396.. 19, 308. :xciv TABLE OF CASES. Faribault Waterworks v. County Com'rs, M Minn. 12, ,46 N. W. 14'3. 488, 774, 784, 1515. Farls V. Reynolds, 70 Ind. 359. 1424. Farmers' Bank v. Commonwealtli, 6 Bush 127. 110, 679. Farmers', etc. Bank v. Board "of Equal., 97 Cal. 318, 32 Pac. 312. 601, 782, 784', 785, 1385. V. Chester, 6 Humph. 458, 44 Am. Rep. 318. 436. V. Dearing, 91 U. S. 329. 71a. V. Hoffman, 93 Iowa 119, 61 N. W. 418. 709, 711, 717, '833. Farmers' & M. Bank v. Vandalia, 57 111. App. 681. 608, 1510. Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. Ansonia, 61 Conn.' 76, 23 Atl. 705. 1220. V. Memminger, 48 Neh. 17, 66 N. W. 1014. 855. V.Newton, 97 Iowa 502, 66 N. W. 784. 705, 1395. V. New York, 7 Hill 261. 402, 407. Farmingdale v. Berlin Mills Co., 93 Me. 178, 45 Atl. 39. 654. Farmington v. Downing, 67 N. H. 441, 30 Atl. 345. 168. Farmington River Water Power Co. V. Berkshire County, 112 Mass. 206. 1407. Farnham v. Jones, 32 Minn. 7, 19 N. W. 83. 735, 948, 951. V. Sherry, 71 Wis. 568, 37 N. W. 577. 136, 137,. 269. Farnsworth Co. v. Lisbon, 62 Me. 451. 300, 345. ' / v.Rand, 65 Me. 19. 525, 851, 1484. Farnsworth Lumber Co. v. Fairley (Miss.), 28 South. 569. 627, 1519. Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush. 260. 746, 747, 935, 937. Farr v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 167 111. 355, 46 N. E. 895. 1264. Farrar v. Clark, 85 Ind. 469. 1012, 1072. V.Clark, 97 Miss. 447. 1457. V. Fessenden, 39 N. H. 268. 578, 579. V. St. Louis, 80 Mo. 379. 1165, 1193, 1201. Farrell v. United States, 99 U. S. 221. 845.' v.West Chicago, 162 111. 280, 44 N. B. 527. 1276. "Farrington v. New England Inv. Co., 1 N. D. 102, 45 N. W. 191. 426, 427, 440, 601, 892, 1061, 1441. Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 tJ. S. 679. 108, 112, 356, 372, 40^. Farris v. Henderson, 1 Okl. 384, 33 Pac. 380. 168. Farrot v. Bast Baton Rouge, 34 La. An. 491. 1367. . Farwell v. Bigelow, 112 Mich. 285, 70 N. W. 579. 814. V.Chicago, 71 111. 269. 1111. V. Des Moines Brick Manuf. Co., 97 Iowa 286, 66 N. W. 176, 35 L. R. A. 63. 247, 362. V.Harding, 96 111. 32. 1455. V. Hathaway, 151 Mass. 242, 23 N. E. 849. 656. Fass V. Seehawer, 60 Wis. 525, 19 N. W. 533. 1247, 1251, 1280, 1283. Faure v. Winans, Hopkihs Ch. 283, 14 Am. Dec. 545. 813. Faure Electric L. Co., In re, 43 N. J. Bet. 411, 5 Atl. 817. 677. Faust V. German Building Assoc, 84 Md. 186, 35 Atl. 890. 559, 600, 647. Pavia V. New Orleans, 20 La. An. 410. 1303. Favor v. Philbrick, 7 N. H. 326, 340. 907. Fawcett v. Dole, 67 N. H. 168, 69 Atl. 693. 1468. Faxon v. Wallace, 98 Mass. 44. 1025. V. Wallace, 101 Mass. 444. 1025, 1045. Fay V. Wood, 65 Mich. 390, 32 N. W. 614. 425, 762. Fayerweather, Matter of, 143 N. Y. 114, 38 N. E. 278. 457. Fayette County Treasurer v. Peo- ple's, etc. Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503, 25 N. E. 697, 10 L. R. A. 196. 323, 326, 710. Feagin v. Jones, 94 Ala. 597, 10 South. 537. 825. Featherly v. Hoffman, 117 Mich. 42, 75 N. W. 278. 889. Fehler v. Gosnell, 99 Ky. 380, 35 S. W. 1125. 1164. Fehringer v. Chicago, 187 111. 416, 58 N. E. 303. 1245. Feigert v. State, 31 Ohio St. 432. 1329 Felch V. Travis, 92 Fed. 210. 426, 978 988 '' Felch'in, Ex parte, 96 Cal. 360, 31 Pac. 224. 1142. Feldman v. Charleston, City of, 23 S. C. 57, 55 Am. Rep. 6. 182, 185, 207, 467. Felix v. Wagner, 39 La. An. 391, 1 South. 926. 97, 395. TABLE OF OASKS. XCV Felker v. New Whatcom, 16 Wash. 178, 47 Pac. 505. 729, 1241, 1254, 1266. Fell T. Cessford, 26 111. 522. 1090. V. State, 42 Md. 71, 20 Am. Rep. 83. 1150. Feller v. Clark, 36 Minn. 338, 31 N. W. 175. 888, 895, 1078. Fellows V. Denniston, 23 N. Y. 420. 635, 948. V.Walker, 39 Fed. 651. 217. Fells V. Barbour, 68 Mich. 49, 24 N. W. 672. 964, 995, 997. Felsenthal v. Johnson, 104 111. 21. 616. Felthousen v. Amsterdam, 69 Hun 505, 23 N. Y. Supp. 424. 1292. Felton V. Hamilton County, 97 Fed. 823, 38 C. C. A. 432. 546, 555. Feltz V. Natalie Aivthracite C. Co., 203 Pa. St. 166, 52 Atl. 82. 979. Fender v. Neosho Falls, 22 Kan. 305. 414. Fenelon's Petition, 7 Pa. St. 173. 1206. Fennell v. Pauley, 112 Iowa 94, 83 N. W. 799. 655. Fenton v. Way, 40 Iowa 196. 1025. Fenwick v. Gill, 38 Mo. 510. 1064. Ferguson v. Clark (Ky.), 52 S. W. 964. 729. V. Btter, 21 Ark. 160, 76 Am. Dec. 361. 964. V. Landram, 5 Bush 230, 96 Am. Dec. 350. 219. V. Miles, 3 Gilm. 358, 44 Am. Dec. 702. 987. V.Pittsburgh, 159 Pa. St. 435, 28 Atl. 118. 902. V. Quinn, 97 Tenn. 46, 36 S. W. 576, 33 L. R. A. 688. 732, - 819, 871, 962. V. Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 36 Pac. 969, 24 L. R. A. 795. 248. V. Stamford Borough, 60 Conn. 432, 29 Atl. 782. 1259, 1274, 1388. Perrell v. Penrose, 52 La. An. 1481, 27 South. 945. 350, 357, 358. Ferrill v. Dlckerson, 63' Miss. 210. ■ 486, 760. Ferris v. Berkshire L. Ins. Co., 139 Ind. 486, 38 N. B. 609. 867. V.Chicago, 162 111. Ill, 44 N. B. 436. 426, 1238, 1263. V. Coover, 10 Cal. 589, 632. 600, 914. V.Kimble, 75 Tex. 476, 12 S. W. 689. 443, 601, 651, 774. V. Vannier, 6 Dak. 186. 42 N. W. 31, 3 L. R. A. 713. 181, 228, 237, 253, 282, 343, 415, 550. Ferrisburgh v. Martin, 60 Vt. 330, 14 Atl. 88. 1334. Perry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 290, 81 N. W. 604, 50 L. R.'a. 92. 32, 52, 62, 512, 627, 628, 668. Ferton v. Feller, 33 Mich. 199. 537. Petterman v. Hopkins, 5 Watts 539. 434. Picklen v. Taxing Dist., 145 U. S. 1, 12 Sup. Ct. 810. 153.' Fidelity, etp. Co. v. Mobile County, 124 Ala. 144, 27 South. 386. 794. Fidelity Trust Co. v. Vogt, 66 N. J. L. 86, 48 Atl. 580. 39, 317, 318, 688. V. Voris's Bx'rs (Ky.), 61 S. W. 474.. 1214, 1258. Field V. Boston, 10 Cush. 65. 607. V.Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495. 465. V. Farmers', etc. Bank (Ky.), 61 S. W. 258. 966. Fields V. Commissioners, 36 Ohio St. 476. 260, 323, 325, 408. V.Russell, 38 Kan. 720, 17 Pac. 476. 272, 647, 779, 786. Pifleld V. Close, 15 Mich. 505. 9, 133, 906. V. Marinette County, 62 Wis. 532, 22 N. W. 705. 1443. Fifty-Fourth Street, In re, 165 Pa. St. 8, 30 Atl. 503. 1166, 1216. Piles V. State, 48 Ark. 529, 3 S. W. 817. 278. Pinch V. York County, 19 Neb. 50, 26 N. W. 589, 56 Am. Rep. 741. 91. Findlay v. Prey, 51 Ohio St. 390, 38 N. E. 114. 1211, 1228, 1270. V. McAllister, 113 U. S. 104, 5 Sup. Ct. 401. 1364. Pingal V. Millvale, 162 Pa. St. 393, 29 Atl. 644. 586. Plnley v. Brown, 22 Iowa 538. 1027. V. Hogan, 60 Ark. 499. 1069. V. Philadelphia, 32 Pa. St. 381. 391, 655. , Finn v. Haynes, 37 Mich. 63. 495. V.Wisconsin River. Land Co., 72 Wis. 546, 40 N. W. 209. 1016, 1085. Pinnegan v. Pernandina, 15 Fla. 379, 21 Am. Rep. 292. 19, 20, 1376, 1418. Pinnen's Bstate, In re, 196 Pa. St. 72, 46 Atl. 269. 33, 350. Finney v. Oshkosh, 18 Wis. 209. 1283. Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136. 95, 190, 340, 703, 1148. V. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith 440. 95 XOVl TABLE OF CASES.' Fire Departmeat v. Stanton, 159 n; Y. 225, 54 N. B. 28. 81, 1144. v.Tuttle, 48 Wis. 91, 4 N. W. 134. V.Wright, 3 B. D. Smith 453. 95. Fire Dist. v. County Com'rs, 108 Mass. 142. 442. Firemen's Benev. Assoc, v. Louns- bury, 21 111. 511, 74 Am. Dec. 115. 95, 190. Firemen's F. ' Ins. Co. v. Common- wealth, 137 Mass. 80. 701. Firemen's Fund "Trustees v. Roome, 93 N. Y. 313. 95,^190, 677. First Baptist Church v. Roberts, 120 Mich. 704, 79 N. W. 910. 895. First Christian Church v. Beatrice, 39 Neb. 432, 58'N. W. 166. 352. First Congregatibnal Church v. Linn County, 70 Iowa 396, 30 N. W. 650. 352. First Div. etc. R. Co. v. Parcher, 14 Minn' 297. 374. First Eccl. Soc. v. Hartford, 38 Conn. 274. 590, 1489. First Nat. Bank v. Albia City Coun- cil, 86 Iowa 28, 52 N. W. 334. 711, 715. V. Americus, 68 Ga. 119, 45 Am. Rep. '476. 1489. V. Ayers,/ 160 U. S. 660, 16 Sup. Ct. 412. 712, 715. V. Bailey, 15 Mont. 301, 39 Pac. 83, 708, 754, 771, 1388. V. Board of Com'rs, 68 Fed. 878, 16 C. C. A. 56. 104. T. Board of Reviewers, 41 La. An. 181, 5 South. 408. 299. V. Brodbecker, 137 Ind. 693, 37 N. B. 340. 777. ' , V. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205, 19 Sup. Ct. 407. 258,' 712, 715. V. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440, 17 Sup. Ct. 629. 712, 713, 717. V. Chehalis County, 6 Wash. 64, 32 Pac. 1051. 715, 717. V. City Council, 86 Iowa 28, 52 N. W. 334. 711, 715. V.Concord, 50 Vt. 257. 182, 564. V. Concord, 59 N. H. 75. 716. V. CAvingtoi, 103 Fed. 523. 494, 714. V.Douglas County, 3 Dill. 298. 1417. V. Swing, 103 Fed. 168, 43 C. C. A. 150. 834', 835. V. Fancher, 48 N. Y. 524. 849. V. Farwell, 10 Biss. 270, 7 Fed. 518. 714, 716. First Nat. Bank v. Greger, 157 Ind, 479, 62 N. B. 21. 1417. V. Illinois Steel Co., 174 111. 140,. 51 N. B. 200. 835. V. Kreig, 21 Nev. 404, 32 Pac. 641. 712. V. Herbert, 44 Fed. 158. 711. V.Hughes, 6 Fed. 737. 717. V. Hungate, 62 Fed. 548. 709, 849, 1417. V.Louisville, 174 U. S. 438, 19 Sup. Ct. 876. 716. V.Lyman, 59 Kan. 410, 53 Pac. 125. 853, 709. V. Meredith, 44 Mo. ' 500. 711,. 1411. V. Morristown, 93 Tenn. 208, 23 S. W. 975. 355. V.Peterborough, 56 N. H. 38, 32 Am. Rep. 416. 716. V. Province, 20 Mont. 374, 51 Pac. 821. 711. V.Richmond, 39 Fed. 309, 42 Fed. 877. 711. V.St. Joseph, 46 Mich. 526, 9 N. W. 838. 759, 796, 926. V. San Francisco, 129 Cal. 96, 61 Pac. 778.. 711. V. Treasurer, -25 Fed. 749. 712. V.Turner, 154 Ind. 456, 57 N. E. 110. 712, 715. V. Waters, 19 Blatchf. 242. 712, 1486. First Parish v. Fiske, 8 Cush. 264, 54 Am. Dec. 755. 435, 1475. First Presb. Church v. Fort Wayne,, 36 Ind. 338, 10 Am. Rep. 35. 352, 486, 1157. V. New Orleans, 30 La. An. 259, 31 Am. Rep. 224. 354. First Unitarian Soc. v. Hartford, 66 Conn. 368, 34 Atl. 89. 352, 353, 354. Fischel v. Mercier, 32 La. An. 704. 926, 1056. Fischer v. Woodruff, 25 Wash. 67, 64 Pac. 923, 87 Am. St. Rep. 742. 814. Fish V. Blasser, 146 Ind. 186, 45 N. B. 63. 1064, 1065, 1072. V. Brown, 5 Watts 441. 724. V. Coggeshall, 22 R. I. 318, 47 Atl. 692. 731. V. Genett (Ky.), 56 S. W. 813. 577, 579, 731, 956, 1020, 1025, 1032. V. Highbee, 22 R. I., 47 Atl. 212, 1483. Fishel V. Mercier, 37 La. An. 356. 921. V. Stark, 49 La. An. 856, 21 South. 595. 962. Fisher v. Charleston, 17 W. Va. 59&. 1362. TABLE OF CASES. XCVU Fisher v. Commissioners, 19 Kan. 414. 659. V. Horicon, etc. Co., 10 Wis. 351. 194. V. People, 84 111. 491. 467, 523. V. People, 157 JU. 85, 41 N. E. 615. 1273. Pisk V. Brunette, 30 Wis. 102. 970. V. Corey, 141 Pa. St. 334, 21 Atl. ■594. 747. Fiske V. Framingham Manuf. Co., 12 Pick. 67. 194. V. Hazard, 7 R. I. 438. 218. Fitch. V. Casey, 2 Greene (Iowa) 300. 1004. V. Pinckard, 5 111. 69. 916. Fitch's Estate, 160 N. Y. 87, 54 N. B. 701. 671. Fitchburg R. Co. v. Prescott, 47 N. H. 62. 396. Fithian v. Wheeler, 125 N. Y. 696, 26 N. E. 141. 419, 628, 782. Fitterer v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 51, 57 S. W. 532, 50 L. R. A. 191. 349, 353, 357, 359. Fitzgerald v. Construction Co., 41 Neb. 374, 59 N. W. 838. 830. V. Spain, 30 Ark. 95. 968. Fitzhugh V. Bay City, 109 Mich. 581, 67 N. W..904. 1517. V. Cotton Belt Levee District, 54 Ark. 224, 15 S. W. 455. 844. Fitzpatrick v. Board of Trustees, 87 Ky. 132, 7 S. W. 896. 235. V.Leake, 49 La. An. 794, 21 South. 597. 960, 961. Fix V. Dierker's Succession, 30 I^a. An. 175. 727, 1020. Flaconer v. Shores, 37 Ark. 386. 794. Flagg V. Palmyra, 33 Mo. 440. 1362. Flanagan v. Dunne, 105 Fed. 828. 598, 729, 730. V. Grimmet, 10 Grat. 421. 859, 999 1092 V. St. Paul, 65 Minn. 347, 68 N. W. 47. 921, 1043. Flanders v. Cross, 10 Cush. 514. 634. V. Merrimack, 48 Wis. 567, 4 N. W. 741. 529. Flatbush, In re, 60 N. Y. 398. 183, • 250, 1168. Flaucher' v. Camden, 56 N. J. L. 244, 28 Atl. 82. 432. Flax-Pond Water Co. v. Lynn, 147 Mass. 31, 16 N. E. 742. 637, 722. Fleece v. Goodrum, 1 Duv. 306. 446. Fleener v. Claman, 112 Ind. 288. 14 N. E. 76. 1419. g Fleetwood v. Read, 21 Wash. 547, 58 Pac. 665, 47 L. R. A. 205. 338, 1118. Fleischauer v. West Hoboken, 40 N. J. L. 109. 732, 916, 929. Fleming v. Dyer (Ky.), 47 S. W. 444. 100, 1361. V. McGee, 81 Ala. 409, 1 South. 106. 825, 980. V. Mershon, 36 Iowa 413. 1436. V. Roverud, 30 Minn. 273, 15 N. W. 119. 922. V.Sinclair (Ky.), 58 S. W. 370. 463. V. Trowsdale, 85 Fed. 189, 29 C. C. A. .106, 54 U. S. App. 574. 47. Flemister v. Flemister, 83 Ga. 79, 9 S. E. 724. 985. Fletcher v. Alcona T'p, 72 Mich. 18, 40 N. W. 36. 656. V.Oliver, 25 Ark. 289. 261, 277, 421. V. Oshkosh, 18 Wis. 232. 1283. V. Post, 104 Mich. 424, 62 N. W. 574. 254, 501, 1514. V. Trewalla, 60 Miss. 963. 764, 1519. Flewellin v. Proetzel, 80 Tex. 191, 15 S. W. 1043. 531. Flinn v. Parsons, 60 Ind. 573. 1019. Flinn, In re, 57 Fed. 496. 152. Flint V. Boston, 99 Mass. 141, 96 Am. Dec. 713. 131. V. Jackson County Com'rs, 43 Kan. 656, 23 Pac. 1048. 1018. V. Republic County Com'rs, 27 Fed. 850. 921. V.Sawyer, 30 Me. 226. 826, 914 930 931. V.Webb, 25 Minn. 93. 1129. Flint & P. M. R. Co. v. Auditor- General, 41 Mich. 635, 2 N. W. 835. 480, 577, 1453. Flint, etc, P. R. Co. v. WoodhuU, 25 Mich. 99, 12 Am. Rep. 233. 115, 191. Flock V. Smith, 65 N. J. 224, 47 Atl. 442. 549, 903. Flora V. Cline, 89 Ind. 208. 1516. Florer v. McAftee, 135 Ind. 540, 35 N. E. 277. 13, 1412. v. Sheridan, 137 Ind. 28, 36 N. E. 365, 23 L. R. A. 278. 290, 608. V.Sherwood, 128 Ind. 495, 28 N. E. 71. 777, 1461. Florida Cent. & P. R. Co. v. Colum- bia, 54 S. C, 266, 32 S. B. 408. 1099, 1121. y. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471, 22 Sup. Ct. 176. 1, 74. XCVIU TABLE OF OASES. Florida Sav. Bank t. Brittain, 20 Fla. 507. 995, 1067, 1071. Flower, In re, 55' Hun"l58, 7 N. Y. Supp. 866. 412. Flowers v. Jernigan, 116 Ala. 516, 22 South. 853. 1069. Floyd V. Barker, 12 Rep. 23. 1465. V. Eatonton, 14 Ga. 354, 58 Am. Dec. 559. 1099. V. Gllbreath, 27 Ark. 675. 1408, 1410, 1411, 1430, 1448. v.'Perrin, 30 S. C. 1, 8 S. E. 14. 214. Flud V. Pennington, Cro. Eliz. 872.A 444. Flynn v. Edwards, 36 Fed. 873. 954, 1064. Foegan v. Carpenter, 117 Mich. 89. 75 N. W. 290. 1464. Fogg V. Hoquiam, 23 Wash. 340, 63 Pac. 234. 881 Foitts V. Hufe, 63 Miss. 594. 1029. Foley V. Bullard, 99 Gal. 516, 33 Pac. 1081. 1277. V.Haverhill, 144 Mass. 352, 11 N. B. 554. 1259, 1493. V. Kirk, 33 N. J. Bq. 170. 965. Folkerts v. Power, 42 Mich. 283, 3 N. W. 857. 415, 791, 1454. Folkes V. State, 63 Miss. 81. 1116. Folmshee v. Amsterdam, 142 N. Y. 118, 36 N. B. 821. 1251, 1264. Folsom V. Carli, 5 Minn. 333, 80 Am. Dec. 429. 445, 446. Fonda v. Louisville (Ky.), 49 S. "W. 785. 436, 524, 580. V. Sage, 48 N. Y. 173. 1456. Fond du Lac v. Otto, 113 Wis. 39, 88 N. W. 917, 90 Am. St. Rep. 830. 665. Fond du Lac Water Co. v. Fond du Lac, 82 Wis. 322, 52 N. W. 439, 16 L. R. A. 581. 780. Font V. Gulf State L. & I. Co., 47 La. An. 272, 16 South. 828. 1009, 1010, 1065. Fontaine v. Schulenherg, etc. Lum- ber Co., 109 Mo. 55, 18 S. W. 1147, 32 Am. St. Rep^ 648. 822. Foote V. Dismukes, 71 Miss. 10, 13 South. 879. 1079. V. Howard County Court, 1 Mc- Crary, 218. 122, 1364. V. Linck, 5 McLean 616. 1417. V.Milwaukee, 18 Wis. 270. 1418. Forbes v. Appleton, 5 Gush. 115. 1501. V. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762. 135. V. Halsey, 26 N. Y. 53. 1008. Ford V. Cartersville, 84 Ga. 213, 10 S. B. 732. 586. V. Clough, 8 Me. 334, 23 Am. Dec. 513. 1324, 1329, 1447. Ford v. Delta, etc. Co., 164 p. S. 662, 17 Sup. Ct. 230. 121, 359, 362, 375. v. Delta & P. L. Co., 43 Fed. 181. 375, 518. v. Durie, 8 Wash. 87, 35 Pac. 1082. V. Kolb, 84 Ind. 198. 1018. v. McGregor, 20 Nev. 446, 23 Pac. 508. 651, 1471. V. North Des Moines, 80 Iowa 626, 45 N. W. 1031. 247. V. State, 51 Ark. 103, 10 S. W. 14. 626. Ford's Petition, 6 Lans. 92. 551. Foree v. Stubbs, 41 Neb.' 271, 59 N. W. 798. 881. Foreman v. Hinchcliffe, 106 La. 225, 30 South. 762. 830, 1065, 1077. Foresman v. Byrns, 68 Ind. 247. 644. V. Chase, 68 Ind. 500. 866, 1443, 1451, Forey v. BIgelow, 56 Ind. 381, 9 N. W. 313. 1019, 1072. Forqueran v. Donnally, 7 W. Va. 114. 921, 1054. Forrest v. Henry, 33 Minn. 434, 23 N. W. 848. 809, 1048. Forrester, Matter of, 58 Hun 611, 12 N. Y. Supp. 774. 349. Forsdick v. Board of Supervisors (Miss.), 25 South. 294. 607. Forster v. Brown, 119 Mich. 86, 77 N. W. 646. 1513. V. Forster, 129 Mass. 5b9. 510, 514, 520. Forsyth v. Hammond, 34 TJ. S. App. 552, 71 Fed. 443, 18 C. C. A. 175. 221. Forsythe V. Hammond, 68 Fed. 774. 56, 221. Fort Des Moines Lodge v. Polk County, 56 Iowa 34, 8 N. W. 687. 354. Fortenbury. V. State, 47 Ark. 188, 1 S. W. 58. 152. Fortier v. Lamb, 25 Can. S. C. R. 422. 12. Fort Scott V. Kaufman, 44 Kan. 147, 24 Pac. 64. 253. Ft. Leavenworth, etc. Co. v. Lowe, 27 Kan. 749. 86, 135. Ft. Leavenworth R. Co. v. .Lowe, 114 U. S. 56, 5 Sup. Ct. 995. 86. Fortman v. Ruggles, 58 111. 207.. 883, ,887. V. Wheeler, 84 Hun 278, 32 N. Y. Supp. 384. 995. Fort Smith v. Ayers, 43 Ark. 82. 1148. Fort St. Union Depot Co. v. Rail- road Com'r, 118 Mich. 340, 76 N. W. 631. 700. TABLE OF OASES. XCIX Fort "Wayne v. Lehr, 88 Ind. 62. 45. V. Shoaff, 106 Ind. 66, 5 N. W. 403. 1179. Fort Worth v. Davis, 57 Tex. 225. 568. Fosdick V. Perrysburg, 14 Ohio St. 472. 504. Foss V. Chicago, 56 111. 354. 106. V. Chicago, 184 111. 436, 56 N. E. 1133. 1245. V. Whitehouse, 94 Me. 491, 48 Atl. 109. 524, 1483. Foster v. Bowman, 55 Iowa 237, 7 N. W. 513. 1046. V. County Com'rs, 7 Minn. 140. 168, 1489. V. Davenport, 22 How. 245. 145. V. Hall, 4 Humph. 345. 642. V. McDivitt, 9 Watts 344. 1083. V.Park Com'rs, 133 Mass. 321. 1168. V. Pierce County, 15 Neb. 48, 17 N. W. 261. 1497. v.Pryor, 189 U. S. 325, 23 Sup. Ct. 549. 245, 325. V.Stevens, 63 Vt. 175, 22 Atl. 78, 13 L. R. A. 166. 371. V. Thurston, 11 Cush. 322. 907. Fountain v. Newark, 57 N. J. Eq. 76, 40 Atl. 212. 529, 530. Fournier v. Municipality, 5 La. An. 298 1280. Foust V. Ross, 1 W. & S. 501. 1083. Fowble V. Kemp, 92 Md. 630, 48 Atl. 379. 627, 834, 848, 849. Fowler v. Bebee, 9 Mass. 231, 6 Am. Dec. 62. 435. V. Campbell, 100 Mich. 398, 59 N. W. 185. 726, 734, 886, 1455. V. Danvers, 8 Allen 80. 218. V. Fairchild, 3 Wash. 747, 29 Pac. 351. 495. v.Halbert, 4 Bibb 52, 1064. V. People, 93 111. 116. 745. V. Russell, 45 Kan. 425, 25 Pac. 871. 785. V. St. Joseph, 37 Mo. 228. 1218, 1416, 1450. V.Springfield, 64 N. H. 108, 5 Atl. 770. 1380. Fox V. Cash, 11 Pa. St. 207. 947. V. Commonwealth, 16 Grat. 1. 505. V.Cross, 39 Kan. 350, 18 Pac. 300. 937, 956. V. Fox, 24 Ohio St. 335. 443. V. Middlesborough Town Co., 96 Ky. 262, 28 S. W. 776. 1517. V.Mohawk & H. R. Humane Soc, 165 N. Y. 517, 59 N. B. 353, 80 Am. St. Rep. 767, 51 L. R. A. 681. 60. V. New Orleans, 4 Wall. 172. 526. v.Rockford, 38 111. 451. 16. Fox V. Turtle, 55 111. 377. 882. V. Zimmerman, 77 Wis. 414, 46 N. W. 533. 1086. Foxcroft V. Nevens, 4 Me. 72. 760, 762, 1330. V. Piscataquis Valley Camp- Meeting Assoc, 86 Me. 78, 29 Atl. 951. 352, 843. V. Straw, 86 Me. 76, 29 Atl. 950. 352, 353, 634. Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 337, 4 Atl. 149. 330, 624, 673. Foy V. Coe Coll., 95 Iowa 689, 84 N. W. 636. 351, 628. Frace v. Tacoma, 16 Wash. 69, 47 Pac. 219. 248, 1439. Fractional School District v. Joint Board, 27 Mich. 3. 1402, 1439. Francis v. Griffin, 72 Iowa, 23, 33 N. W. 345. 1074. V. Gro'te, 14 Mo. App. 324. 1080. V. Railroad Co., 19" Kan. 303. 293, 658. V. Washburn, 5 Hayw. 294. 825, 879. Frank v. Arnold, 73 Iowa 370, 35 N. W. 453. 944, 972. V. Caruthers, 108 Mo. 569, 18 S. W. 927. 972. V. San Francisco County, 21 Cal. 668. 1362. V. ScoVlUe, 48 Neb. 169, 66 N. W. 1113. 996, 1022. Frank, Ex parte, 52 Cal. 606, 28 Am. Rep. 642. 1140. Frank, Ex parte, 52 Cal. 608. 279. Frankford, etc. R. Co. v. Philadel- phia, 58 Pa. St. 119, 98 Am. Dec. 242. 1139, 1148. Frankfort v. Aughe, 114 Ind. 77, 15 N. B. 802. V.Gaines, 88 Ky. 59, 10 S. W. 123. 390, 650. V. State, 128 Ind. 438, 27 N. E. 1115. 1213, 1236. , V. Wlnterport, 54 Me. 250. 223. Frankfort, L.. etc. Turnpike Co. v. Commonwealth, 82 Ky. 386. So8. Franklin v. Mayberry, 6 Humph. 368. 1129. V. Pearsall, 53 N. Y. Super. Ct. 271. 930. Franklin Bank v. State, 1 Black 474. 110. Franklin Coal Co. v. Bertels, 109 Pa. St. 550. 725. Franklin County v. Pennock, 18 ' Kan; 579. 635. V. Railroad Co., 12 Lea 521. 693, 697. Franklin County Court v. Louis- ville & N; R. Co., 84 Ky. 59. 493. Franklin Falls Pulp Co. v. Frank- lin, 66 N. H. 274, 20 Atl. 333. 344. TABLE OF CASES. Franklin Ins. Co. v. State, 5 W. Va. 349. 261, 339. Franklin Needle Co. v. Franklin, 65 N. H. 177, 18 Atl. 318. 347. Franklin St. See. v. Manchester, 60 N. H. 342. 357. Franklin Savings Bank v. Moran, 19 Wash. 200, 52 Pac. 858. 526, 530. Frantz v. Dobpon, 64 Miss. 631, 2 South. 75, 60 Am. Rep. 68. 346 357. V.Jacob, 88' Ky. 525, 11 S. W. 654. 575. Franz v. Krebs, 41 Kan. 223, 21 Pac. 99. 957. Frary v. Dakln, 7 Johns. 75. 1346. Fratz V. Mueller, 35 Ohio St.' 397. 780. Frazer v. McConway, etc. Co., 82 Fed. 257. 80, 81. ' V. Siebern, 16 Ohio St. 614. 1425, 1426. Frazier v. Johnson, 65 N. J. L. 673, 48 Atl. 573. 1044. V. Prince, 8 Okl. 253, 58 Pac. 751. 483, 736, 751, 793, 794, 795. Frederick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 561. 472. V. Seattle, 13 Wash. 428, 43 Pac. 364. 530, 531. Frederick County v. National Bank, 48 Md. 117. 372. Frederick Electric L. & P. Co. v. Frederick City, 84 Md. 599, 36 Atr. 362. 357, 378. Frederickson v. State of Louisiana. 23 How. 445. 33, 172. Free v. Scarborough, 70 Tex. 272, 8 S. W. 490. 479. Freedman v. Siegel, 10 Blatch. 327. -133. Freedom y. County Com'rs, 66 Me. 192. 1381. Freeholders v. Barber, 7 N. J. L. 64. 1141. Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen 570. 181, 183, 184, 218, 219, 572, 1317. Freerfian v. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 617. 867, 870. v. Cornwall, 10 Johns. 470. 1466. v. Cornwell (Pa.), 15 Atl. 873. 809. V. Davis, 7 Mass. 200. 1327.' V. Holcombe, 67' Ga. 337. 1351. V. Kenney, 15 Pick. 44. 1468, 1470. V. Ogden, 40 N. Y. 105. 1401. V. State, 115 Ala. 208, 22 South. 560. 636, 822. V. Thayer, 33 Me. 7,6. 923, 1008. Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 259. 192. Freeport St. R. Co. v. Freeport, 151 111. 451, 38 N. E. 137. 531, 1250, 1233. Freir v. State, 11 Fla. 300. 1333. Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo. 606. 1150. Fremd v. Deposit Bank (Ky.), 42. S. W. 102. 373, 555. Fremont v. Mariposa County, 11 Cal. 361. 1412. Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co. v. Holt County, 28 Neb. 742~, 45 N. W. 163, % 439. French v. Baker, 4 Sneed 193. 1116, 1123. V. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.,. 181 U. S. 324, 21 Sup. Ct. 625. 51, 55, 63, 70, 1205, 1218. V. Bobe, 64 Ohio St. 323, 60 N. B. 292. V.Edwards, 5 Sawy. 266. 544, 545. V. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506. 480, 632, 736, 953. V. Harney County, 33 Or. 418, 54 Pac. 211. 775, 786. V. Kirkland, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 117. 1170. v.Ladd, 57 Miss. 678. 978. V.Patterson, 61 Me. 203. 914, 953, 1004. V. Spalding, 61 N. H. 395. 728. V. State, 53 Miss. 651. 22. V. State, 42 Tex. Grim. Rep., 88 S. W. 1015, 52 L. R. A. 160. 22, 152, 500. V.Whittlesey, 62 N. Y. St. 117, 30 N. Y. Supp. 363. 736. V.Wilmington, 75 N. C. 477.. 322. Frenna v. Sunnyside Liand Co., 124 Cal. 437, 57 Pac. 302. 531, 534. Frentz v. Klotsch, 28 Wis. 312. 967. Fretwell v. Troy, 18 Kan. 271. 1106. 1110. Frevert v. Bayonne, 63 N. J. L. 202, 42 Atl. 773. 1258, 1260, 1401, 1403, 1407, 1517. Frew V. Taylor, 106 111. 159. 828, 879 Frlck V. Sterrett, 4 W. & S. 269. 1066. Friedenwald v. Baltimore, 74 Md, 116, 21 Atl. 555. 1256, 1261. Friedrlch v. Milwaukee, 114 Wis. 304, 90 N. W. 174. 1258. Friend v. Gilbert, 108 Mass. 408. 209. v.Hamill, 34 Md. 298. 1466. Prierson v. Branch, 30 Ark. 453. 973: TABLE OF CASES. ei Frommer v. . Richmond, 31 Grat. 646, 31 Am. Rep. 746. 1108. Frontier, etc. Co. v. Baldwin, 3 Wyo. 764, 31 Pao. 403. 342. Frost V. Belmont, 6 Allen 152. 223. V. Board of Review, 114 Iowa 103, 86 N. W. 213. 781. V. Flick, 1 Dak. 131, 46 N. W. 508. 2, 43, 825, 1418, 1441, 1443, 1446. V. New Orleans, 28 La. An. 417. 1383. Frothingham v. Shaw, 175 Mass. 59, 55 N. B. 623, 78 Am. St. Rep. 475. 33, 644, 650, 657, 671. Frownfelter v. State, 66 Md. 80, 5 Atl. 410. 1328, 1340. Fry V. Booth, 19 Ohio St. 25. 492. Frye v. Bank of Illinois, 11 111. 367. 965. Fryer v. Magill, 163 Pa. St. 340, 30 Atl. 191. 914. Fulcher v. Fulcher, 122 N. C. 101, 29 S. E. 91. 745, 750. Fulham v. Howe, 60 Vt. 351, 14 Atl. 652. 617, 620. Fulkerson v. Treasurer, 95 Va. 1, 27 S. E. 815. 394, 406. Pullam V. Down, 6 Esp. 26. 1502. Fuller V. Armstrong, 53 Iowa 683, 6 N. "W. 61. 1009. V.Butler, 72 Iowa 729, 32 N. W. 283. 1038, 1043, 1073. V.Colfax County, 33 Neb. 716, 50 N. W. 1044. 881, 921, 994. V. Dame, 18 Pick. 472. 223. V. Goulds, 20 Vt. 643. 386, 441, 1466. ^ V.Grand Rapids, 40 Mich. 395. 495, 807. .« v.Groton, 11 Gray 340. 209. V. Heath, 89 111. 296. 16, 104, 174, 804. V. Hodgden, 25 Me. 243. 965. V. Kane, 110 Mich. 549, 68 N. W. 267, 64 Am. St. Rep. 362, 34 L. R. A. 308. 815. v.Shedd, 161 111. 642, 44 N. B. 286, 33 L. R. A. 146. 992, 993. Fullilove V. Police Jury, 51 La. An. 359, 25 South. 302. 214, 215, 569. Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa 404. 246. Funkhouser v. Male, 110 Ga. 766, 36 S. E. 57. 864. Funson v. Bradt, 105 Iowa 471, 75 N. W. 357. 1036, 1040, 1042. Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44. 127. Furman 'Farm Implement Co. v. Long, 113 Ala. 203, 21 S. E. 339. 1119. Furman Farm Implement Co. v. Long, 117 Ala. 581, 23 South. 527. 1117. Furman St., Matter of, 17 Wend. 649. 1201, 1206, 1254. G. Gaar v. Hurd, 92 111. 315. 854, 1469. Gabe v. Root, 93 Ind. 256. 996, 1072. Gable v. Seiben, 137 Ind. 155, 36 N. B. 844. 941, 1045, 1053. Gachet v. McCall, 50 Ala. 307. 903, 934, 1501. V. New Orleans, 52 La. An. 813, 27 South. 348. 264. Gadsby v. Portland, 38 Or. 135, 63 Pac. 14. 174, 586. Gaertner v. Fond du Lac, 34 Wis. 497. 1405. Gage V. Arndt, 121 111. 491, 13 N. E. 138. 1455. V. Bailey, 100 111. 530. 993, 1037. V.Bailey, 102^111. 11. 523, 581, 1037, 1038, 1445. V.Bailey, 115 111. 646, 4 N. E. 777. 992. v.Bani, 141 V. S. 344, 12 Sup. Ct. 22. 993, 1007, 1036, 1038, 1040. V.Billings, 56 111. 268. 1450. V. Busse, 102 111. 592. 1033. V. Caraher, 125 111. 447, 17 N. E. 777. 1008, 1009, 1458. V. Chapman, 56 111. 311. 1450. V. Chicago, 179 111. 392, 53 N. B. 742. 1434. V.Chicago, 192 111. 586, 61 N. B. 848. 442, 443, 1264. V. Chicago, 195 111. 490, 63 N. E. 184. 1276. V. Currier, 4 Pick. 3&9. 1468, 1470. V.Davis, 129 111. 236, 21 N. B. 788, 16 Am. St. Rep. 260. 1036, 1037. V. Dudley, 64 N. H. 437, 13 Atl. 865. 849. V. Dupuy, 134 111. 132, 24 N. E. 866. 1036, 1458. V. Dupuy, 137 111. 652, 24 N. E. 541, 26 N. E. 386. 1036. V. Bddy, 186 111. 432, 57 N. E. 1030. 920, 986. V.Evans, 90 111. 569. 1459. V.Gage, 66 N. H. 282, 29 Atl. 543, 28 L. R. A. 829. 966. V.Goudy, 141 111. 215, 30 N. E. 320. 555, 890, 896, 898, 955, 956. Cll TABLE. OF CASES. Gage T. Graham, 57 111. 144. 97, 1238, 1304. V. Harbert, 145 111. 530, 32 N. B. 543. '1009. V. Harvey, 111 111. 305. 1042. T.Kaufman, 133 U. S. 471, 10 Sup. Ct. 406. 1008. V. Lightburn, 93 111. 248. 1009. V.Lyons, 138 111. 590, 28 N. E. 832. 890, 896, 956, 1038. V. Nichols, 112 111. 269. 1455. V. Nichols, 135 111. 128, 25 N. B. 672. 486, 495, 523, 556, 581, 889, 1458. V.Parker, 103 111. 528. 994, 1027. V. People, 188 111. 92, 58 N. B. 947. 888,^930. V. People, 193 111. 316, 61 N. B. 1045, 56 L. R. A. 916. ,1284. v.Pirtle, 124 111. 502, 17 N. E. 34. 1455. ' V. Punipelly, 115 U. S. 454, 6 Sup. Ct. 136. 1449. V. Reid, 118 111. 35, 7 N. E. 127. 1038. v.Rohrbach, 56 111. 262. 1450. v.Rumsey, 73 111. 473. 745. V. Saginaw, 128 Mich. 683, 84 N. W. 1100, 87 N. W. 1027. 1500, 1503. V. Scales, 100 111. 218. 1048. V. Schmidt, 104 111. 106. _ 1038. V. Stewart, 127 111. 207, 19 N. B. 702. 497, 1038. V. Waterman, 121 111. 115, 13 N. E. 543. 1036, 1038, 1458. V.Webb, 141 111. 533, 31 N. E. 130. 1038. V. Williams, 119 111. 563, 9 N. E. 193. 956. Gager v. Prouty, 48 Ohio St. 89, 26 N. E.' 1013. 458, 492, 493, 511, 609, 619. 771, 782, 903. Gahre v. Berry, 82 Minn. 200, 84 N. W. 733. 1037. Gaines, Ex parte, 56 Ark. 227, 19 S. W. 602. 1508. Gaither v. Green, 40 La. An. 362, 4 South. 210. 445, 501, 1351, 1438. V. Lawson, 31 Ark. 279. 1022, 1066. Galbraith v. McFarland, 3 Cold. (Tejin.) 267, 91 Am. Dee. 281. 431. V. State, 33 Tex. Grim. App. 331, 26 S. W. 502. 622. Galbreath v. Drought, 29 Kan. 71. 971. V.Newton, 30 Mo. App. 380. 1287. , Gale V. Mead, 2 Denlo 160. 488. V. Mead, 2 Denio 252. 492. Gale V. Mead, 4 Hill 109. 789, 1469, 1481. Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705. 121, 478, 1362, 1363. Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 152. 97 252 V. Sear'les, 114 111. 217, 29 N. B. 686. 1187, 1188. Gallagher v. Johnson, 65 Ark. 90, 44 S. W. 1041. 889. Gallaher v. Head, 108 Iowa 588, 79 N. W. 387. 944, 1072. Gallatin v. Alexander, 10 La. An. 475. 664. Galloway v. Jenkins, 63 N. C. 147. 1430. v. Tavares, 37 Pla. 58, 19 South. 170. 16, 17. , Gallup V. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196, 56 N. E. 443. 9, 17, 23, 61, 463, 611, 630, 666, 902, 903. V.Schmidt, 183 U. S. 300, 22 Sup. Ct. 162: 60. Gait V. Chicago, 174 111. 605, 51 N. E. 653. 1258. Galusha v. Wendt, 114. Iowa 597, 87 N. W. 512. 493, 494, 512,- 598, 611. Galveston v. Sydaor, 39 Tex. 236. 1507. Galveston County v. Galveston Gas Co., 72 Tex. 509, 10 S. W. 583. 1339, 1488, 1511. V.Galveston Wharf Co., 72 Tex. 557, 10 S. W. 587. 1123. V. Gorham, 49 Tex. 301. 1507. Galveston Gas Co. v. Galveston County, 54 Tex. 287. 1389, 1451, 1507. Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galveston, 63 Tex. 14. ,264, 268. Gamble v. Auditor-General; 78 Mich. 302, 44 N. W. 329. 563, 576; 577, 580. V. East Saginaw, 43 Mich. 367, 5 N. W. 416. 445, 446, 752, 919. V.Hamilton, 31 Fla. 401, 12 South. 229. 968. v.Horr, 40 Mich. 561. 1058. V. Witty, 55 Miss. 26. 482, 490. Games v. Stiles, 14 Pet. 322. 916, 919, 937. Gammel v. Potter, 6 Iowa 548. 194. Gandy v. Commissioners, 23 Kan. 738. 1425. Gantz, Petition of, 85 N. Y. 536. 1395. Garden City v. Abbott, 34 Kan. 283, 8 Pac. 473. 1105. Gardenhire v. Mitchell, 21 Kan. 83. 500, 987, 994, 99S, 997. Gardiner v. Gerrish, ,23 Me. 46. 965. TABLE OF CASES. cm Gardiner, etc. Co. v. Gardiner, 5 Me. (5 Greenl.) 133. 347, 400, 655, 1104, 1469. Gardner v. Brown, Meigs 354. 958. V. Donaldson, 80 Ga. 71, 7 S. E. 163. 864. V.Early, 69 Iowa 42, 28 N. W. 427. 913, 1458. V. Haney, 86 Ind. 17. 1365. V. Hosmer, 6 Mass. 324. 443. V. People, 20 111. 430. 1146. V. Reedy, 62 S. C. 503, 40 S. E. 947. 1083. V. State, 21 N. J. U 557. 110, 337, 367, 376, 408. Garibaldi v. Jenkins, 27 Ark. 453. 730, 845, 928, 1051. Garland v. Gaines, 73 Conn. 662, 49 Atl. 19, 84 Am. St. Rep. 182 133 V. Garland, 73 Me. 97. 732, 819. Garland County v. Bates, 56 Ark. 227, 19 S. W. 602. 135. ' V. Gaines, 47 Ark. 558, 2 S. W. 460. i508. Garlington v. Copeland, 32 S. C. 57, 10 a E. 616. 941. Garmoe v. Sturgeon, 65 Iowa 147, 21 N. W. 498. 1037, 1040. Garner v. Anderson, 27 La. An. 338. 861. V.Wallace, 118 Mich. 387, 76 N. W. 758. 489, 836, 889. Garnett v. Perrand, 6 B. & C. 611. 1465, 1467. Garratt v. Trustees, 135 N. Y. 436, 32 N. E. 142. 1388. Garrett v. St. Louis, 25 Mo. 205. 1182, 1193, 1206. V. White, 3 Ired. Eq. 131. 1005. V.Wiggins, 2 111. 335, 30 Am. Dec. 653. 916. Garrettson v. Scofield, 44 Iowa 35. 865, 972. Garrick v. Chamherlain, 97 111. 620. 877, 934. Garrigan v. Knight, 47 Iowa 525. 1020. Garrison v. Laurens, 54 S. C. 449, ' 32 S. E. 696, 331, 1371. V.Laurens, 55 S. C. 551, 33 S. E. 577. 612, 1371. Gartside v. East St. Louis, 43 111. 47. 1110. Garvey's Petition, 77 N. T. 523. 1165. Garvin v. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429, 16 N. B. 826, 5 Am. St. Rep. 637. 627, 1241. Garwood v. Hastings, 38 Cal. 216. 746, 963, 965. Gas Light Co. v. Taxing Dist.,,109 U. S. 398, 3 Sup. Ct. 205. 109, 112, 356. Gass V. Stlnson, 2 Sumn. 453. 1335. Gast V. Board of Assessors, 43 La. An. 1104, 10 South. 184. ■347. V.Buckley (Ky.), 64 S. W. 632. 1107. Gatch V. Des Moines, 63 Iowa 718, 18 N. W. 310. 420, 1238. Gatchett v. McCall, 50 Ala. 307". 1502. Gates V. Barrett, 79 Ky. 295. 1420. V.Johnson, 121 Mich. 663, 80 N. W. 709. 524, 893, 897. V. Lawson, 32 Grat. 12. 962. V. Lindley, 104 Cal. 451, 38 Pac. 311 972 Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C. 119. 298, 321, 1118. Gatling v. Commissioners, 92 N. C. 536, 53 Am. Rep. 432. 18, 836. V.Lane, 17 Neb. 77, 22 N. W. 227, 453. 1091. Gault's Appeal, 33 Pa. St. 94. 48, 1024, 1051, 1054, 1182. Gavin v. Shuman,,23 Ind. 32. 916. Gayv. Assessors, 34 La. An. 370. 1393. V. New Whatcom, 26 Wash. 389, 67 Pac. 88. 1361. V.Thomas, 5 Okl. 1, 46 Pac. 578. 48, 85, 167, 320, 340, 415, 550. Gaylord v. ScarfE, 6 Iowa 179. 808, 916, 1055. Gear IV. Brown, 126 N. C. 238, 35 S. E. 470. 526, 825. Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224. 488, 578, 919. Geary v. Kansas City, 61 Mo. 378. 996. Geddes v. Cunningham, 104 La. An. 306, 29 South. 138. 734, 928,1051. Gee V. Clark, 42 La. An. 918, 8 South. 627. 728. Geekie v. Kirby Carpenter Co., 106 U. S. 379, 1 Sup. Ct. 315. 998, 1016, 1070, 1075, 1085. Geer v. Thrasher, 37 Kan. 657, 16 Pac. 94. 921. Geisenger v. Beyl, 71 Wis. 358, 37 N. W. 423. 1062. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175. 123. Gelsthorpe v. Furnell, 20 Mont. 299, 51 Pac. 267, 39 L. R. A. 170. ' 33, 313, 493, 667, 1094, 1123. Gendrey v. Broussard, 32 La. 924. 978. Genella v. Vincent, 50 La. An. 956, 24 South. 690. 845, 928, 930, 1061. Genesee, etc. Bank v. Livingston County, 53 Barb. 223. 1407. CIV TABLE OF CASES. Genet v. Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296, 1 N. E. 777. 319, 365, 1161. Geneva v. Cole, 61 111. 397. 8, 18. Genin v. Auditor, 18 Ohio St. 534. 621. Genther v. Fuller, 36 Iowa 604. 523, 1008. George v. Messenger, 73 Pa. St. 418. 724. V. St. Louis C. & W. R. Co., 44 Fed. 117. 269, 663. V. School Dist, 6 Met. 497. 384, 572, 1506. V.Young, 45 La. An. 1232, 14 South. 137. 1176. George's Creek, etc. Co. v. Alle- ghany County Com'rs, 59 Md. 255. 1372. Georgetown College v. District of Columbia, 4 MacA. 43. 1496. T. Perkins, 74 Md. 72. 842. Georgia v. Atkin§, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 22. 133. V. Atlantic, etc. R. Co., 3 Woods 434. 834, 854, 865. Georgia Midland & G. R. Co. v. State, 89 Ga. 597, 15 S. E. 301. 385, 753, 1381. Georgia Packing Co. v. Macon, 60 Fed. 774, ,22 L. R. A. 775. 150. Georgia State Bldg. etc. Assoc, v. Savannah, 109 Ga. 63, 35 S. E. 67. 283, 679, 705. Georgia Trading Co. v. Marion County, 114 Ga. 397, 40 S. B. 250. 864. Gerac v. Guilbeau, 36 La. An. 843. 1010. Geren v. Gruber, 26 La. An. 694. 2, 7, 17, 596, 861. Gerke v. Puroell, 25 Ohio St. 229. 353. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Van Cleave, 191 111. 410, 61 N. E. 94. 45.0, 701. German-American Bank v. Burling- ton, 54 Iowa 609, 7 N. W. 105. 131, 777. V.White, 38 Minn. 471, 38 N. W. 361. 894, 1018. /German-American F. Ins. Co. v. Minden, 51 Neb 870, 71 N. W. 995. 208, 830, 907. German-American Savings Bank v. Spokane, 16 Wash. 698, 49 Pac. 542, 38 L. R. A. 259. 1282, 1375. German Bank v. Louisville, 108 Ky. 377, 56 S. W. 504. 359, 381, 874. Germania v. State, 7 Md. 1. 1122, 1144. Germania Bank v. St. Paul, 79 Minn. 29, 81 N. W. 542. 1489. Germania L. Ins. Co. v. Common- wealth, 85 Pa. St. 513. 328, 701, 703. Germania Savings Bank v. Darling- ton, 50 S. C. 337, 27 S. B. 846. 344, 348, 766. Germania Savings Bank's Appeal, 91 Pa. St. 345. 869. Germania Trust Co. v. San Fran- cisco, 128 Cal. 589, 61 Pac. 1178. 388, 395. • German Nat. Ins. Co. v. Louisville (Ky.), 54 S. W. 732. 296, 1095. ^Germond v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 365, 33 Pac. 961. 103. Gerry v. Herrick, 87 Me. 219, 32 Atl. 882. 857, 1514. V. Stoneham, 1- Allen 319. 210, 495, 496, 590. Gest V. Cincinnati, 26 Ohio St. 275. 1287. Getchell v. Polk County Supervis- ors, 51 Iowa 107, 50 N. W. 574. 772, 785. Gibons v. Adamson, 44 Kan. 203, 24 Pac. 51. 618. V. District of Columbia, 116 U. S. 404, 6 Sup. Ct. 427. 346, 352. V. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 202. 145. Gibbons, Matter of, 56 Hun 650, 10 N. Y. Supp. 423. 488. Gibbs T. Hampden County Com'rs, 19 Pick. 298. 1354, 1359, 1408, 1522. V. Dortch, 62 Miss. 671. 990, 1013. V. Gale, 7 Md. 76. 507. V. Sawyer, 48 Iowa 443. 1072. Giboney v. Cape Girardeau, 58 M6. 141. 248. Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168. 541, 926. V.Howe, 37 Iowa 168. 264. V. Mason, 5 Nev. 283. 10, 48. V. Owens, 115 Mo. 258, 21 S. W. 1107. 1517. V. Robbins, 9 Watts 156. 1066. V. State Land Office Com'r, 121 Mich. 49, 79 N. W. 919. 214. Gibson County v. Pullman South- ern Car Co., 42 Fed. 572. 161, 680. Giddens v. Mobley, 37 La. An. 417. 1009, 1077. Gifford V. Callaway, 8 Colo. App. 359, 46 Pac. 626. 865, 868, 869. V. New Jersey R. Co., 10- N. J. Ea. 171. 1437. Gifford Draining Dist. , v. Schroer, 145 Ind. 572, 44 N. E. 636. 1132. Gilbert v. Dougherty County, 53 Ga. 191. 1329. I'ABLE OF OASES. CV GUbert v. Dutruit, 91 Wis. 661, 65 N. W. 511. 946, 987. V. Havemeyer, 2 Sand. 506. 1291. V.Lyon County, 30 Kan. 166. 786. V. Pier, 102 Wis. 334, 78 N. W. 566. 911, 979. V. Turnpike Co., 3 Johns. Cas. 107. 937. ■Gllbreath v. Dilday, 152 111. 207, 38 N. E. 572. 1009, 1064, 1065. Gilcrest v. McCartney, 97 Iowa 138, 66 N. W. 103. 1262. Gilchrist v. Dean, 55 Michi 244, 21 N. W. 330. 486, 762. V. Shackelford, 72 Ala. 7. 914. Gilchrist's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 600. 85. Gilfillan v. Chatterton, 37 Minn. 11, 33 N. W. 35, 5 Am. St. Rep. 810. 983. V. Chatterton, 38 Minn. 335, 37 N. W. 583. 950, 997. V. Hobart, 34 Minn. 67, 24 N. W. 342. 747. V. Hobart, 35 Minn. 185, 28 N. W. 222. 982, 983. Gilkerson v. Scott, 76 111. 509. 1183. Gilkeson v. Frederick Justices, 13 Grat. 577. 337, 1119. GUkey v. Cook, 60 Wis. 133, 18 N. W. 639. 995. V. Merrill, 67 Wis. 459, 30 N. W. 733 1422 1428 Gill V. Chandler, 114 Iowa 332, 86 N. W. 300. 1073. V.Dunham (Cal.), 34 Pac. 68. 882, 1253. V. Oakland, 124 Cal. 335, 57 Pac. 150. 1250, 1500. Gillespie v. Gaston, 67 Tex. 599, 4 S. W. 248. 371, 404. Gillett v. Lyon County Treasurer, 30 Kan. 166, 1 Pac. 577. 773. V. McLaughlin, 69 Mich, 547, 37 N. W. 551. 548. Gillette v. Denver, 21 Fed. 822. 63, 1210, 1227, 1240, 1418. V.Hartford, 31 Conn. 351. 245, 1489. Gilliam v. Reddick, 4 Ired. 368. 435. Gillis V. Cleveland, 87 Cal. 214, 25 Pac. 351. 798. V. Green, 54 Miss. 592. 585. Gilman v. Riopelle, 18 Mich. 145. 748, 749, 1077. T. Sheboygan, 2 Black 510. 112, 227, 340, 341, 383, 422. V. Sheboygan County, 79 Wis. 26, 48 N. W. 111. 1454. T.Van Brunt, 29 Minn. 271, 13 N. W. 125. 1448. Gilmore v. Hentig, 33 Kan. 156, 5 Pac. 781. 1241. V. Holt, 4 Pick. 257. 435. V. Thompson, 3 Watts 106. 1065, 1066. V. Utica, 121 N. Y. 561, 24 N. E. 1009. 1252. Gilpatrick v. Saco, 57 Me. 277. 1383, 1478. Gilson V. Board of Com'rs, 128 Ind. 65, 46 N. E. 124, 11 L. R. A. 835. 175, 177, 237, 238, 239, 1201, 1205. V. Munson, 114 Mich. 671, 72 N. W. 94. 628, 629, 1125. Giozza V. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 721. 80. Giraldin v. Howard, 103 Mo. 40, 15 S. W. 383. 1045. Girard v. Bissell, 45 Kan. 66, 25 Pac. 232. 1120. Girardeau, Cape, v. Buehrmann, 148 Mo. 198, 49 S. W. 985. 611, 632. Glrdner v. Stephens, 1 Heisk. 280, 2 Am. Rep. 700. 1093. Girvin v. Simon, 116 Cal. 604, 48 Pac. 720. 1385, 1516. V. Simon, 127 Cal. 491, 59 Pac. 945. 1273. Gitchell V. Kreidler, 84 Mo. 472. 885. V. Messmer, 87 Mo. 131. 886. Givanovich, Succession of, 50 La. An. 625, 24 South. 679. 44, 452. Given v. Wright, 117 U. S. 648, 6 Sup. Ct. 907. 117, 648. Givins v. Chicago, 188 111. 348, 58 N. E. 912. 1310. Gladden v. Chapman, 188 Pa. St. 586, 41 Atl. 735. 868. Glasgow V. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479. 1, 310, 365, 412, 1477, 1478. Glass V. Gilbert, 58 Pa. St. 266. 744, 936. V.White, 5 Sneed 475. 904, 1017, 1061. Glass Co. V. Boston, 4 Met. 181. 400. Glassford v. Dorsey, 2 111. App. 521. 1444. Gleason v. Barnett (Ky.), 61 S. W. 20. 1247. V. McKay, 134 Mass. 419. 676. V.Waukesha Co., 103 Wis. 225, 79 N. W. 249. 72, 1177, 1422. Gledney v. Deavors, 8 Ga. 479. 867, 871. Glenn v. Brown, 99 Va. 322, 38 S. B. 189. 979, 1454. Glidden v. Harrington, 189 IT. S. 255, 23 Sup. Ct. 574. 62. Globe Lumber Co. v. Lockett, 106 La. 414, 30 South: 902. 395, 636. Glos V. Boettcher, 193 111. 534, 61 N. B. 1017. 1038, 1041. CVl TABLE OF CASES. Glos V. Brown, 194 111. 307, 62 N. B. 622. 1458. V. Evanston, etc. Assoc, 186 111. 586, 58 N. B. 374". 1033, 1039. V.Gould, 182 III. 512, 55 N. B. 369. 1042. T. O'Brien Lumber Co., 183 111. 211, 55 N. E. 712. 1458. v. Randolph, 138 111. 268, 27 N. E. 941. 927. V. Swigart, 156 111. 229, 41 N. B. 42. 955. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl- vania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 Sup. Ct. 826. 155, 162, 653. Glover v. People, 194 111. 22, 61 N. B. 1047. 1274, 1275. V. Terre Haute, 129 Ind. 593, 29 N. B. 412. 1439. V. United States, 29 Ct. CI. 236. 1400. Glue Factory v. McMahon, 15 Abb. fN. Y.) N. Cas. 314. 674. Goddard v. Jacksonville, 15 111. 588. 1147. V. Seymour, 30 Conn. 394. 645, 1502. V. Storch, 57 Kan. 714, 48 Pac. 15. 137, 1075. Goddard, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 504, 28 Am. Dec. 259. 1129. Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh 120, 154. 191, 215, 253. Godfrey v. Douglas County, 28 Or. 446, 43 Pac. 171. 785. V. Valentine, 45 Minn. ' 502, 48 N. W. 325. 747, 888. V.Wright, 3 Okl. 151, 56 Pac. 1051. 605. Goenen v. Sohroeder, 8 Minn. 387. 1054. Goetchens v. Mathewson, 5 Lans. 214. 1466. Goetler v. State, 45 Ark. 454. 1101, 1138. Goewey v. tJrig, 18 111. 242. 916. Goff V. Supervisors, 43 Wis. 55. 752. Gold V. Fite, 2 Baxt. 237. 450. Goldgart v. Pepple, 106 111. 25. 91. 644. Gold Hill V. Caledonia, etc. Co., 5 Sawy. 575. 361. Goldsmith v. Augusta, etc. R. Co., 62 Ga. 468. 398, 590, 685, 1381. V. Central R. Co., 62 Ga. 509. 390, 1381. V.Georgia R. Co., 62 Ga. 485. Ill, 398, 1381. V. Huntsville, 120 Ala. 182, 24 South. 509. 175, 1116, 1117. V. Kemp, 58 Ga. 106. 1334. Goldsmith v. New Orleans, 31 La.- An. 646. 1134, 1444. V.Rome R. Co., 62 Ga, 468. 398, 590, 685, 1381. V. Southwestern R. Co., 62 Ga. 495. 1381. Goldsworth v. Thompson, 87 Mo. 233. 887. Goldthwaite v. Montgomery, 50- Ala. 486. 1105. Gomer v. Chaffee, 6 Colo. 314. 454,. 911, 940, 1070. Gonzales v. Sullivan, 16 Fla. 791. ■ 374. ^Gonzalia v. Bartelsman, 143 IIU 634, 32 N. B. 532. 1035, 1037, 1039. Gooch V. Benge, 90 Ky. 393, 14 S. W. 375. 1001. V.Exeter, 70 N. H. 413, 48 AtL 1100. 98, 317, 1296. V.Gregory, 65 N. C. 142. 1362. (xoodal V. Stewart, 2 -Hen. & Munf„ 105, 112. 446. Goodale v. Fennell, 27 Ohio St. 426, 32 Am. Rep. 321. 1364. Goodell V. Harrison, 2 Mo. 124. , 748. Goodenow v. Litchfield,' 59 Iowa 226, 9 N. W. 107, 13 N. W. 86. 846. Goodman v. Nester, 64 Mich. 662,. 31 N. W. 575. 1078. V.Wilson, 54 Kan. 709, 39 Pac. 704. 1075. Goodijough V. Powell, 23 Or. 525, 32 iPac. 396. 1422. GoodnoW V. Burrows, 74 Iowa 256,. 23 N. W. 253, 37 N. W. 322. 802, 824. V. Litchfield, 63 Iowa 275, 19 N. W. 226. 802, 824. V. Litchfield, 67 Iowa 691, 25 N.. W. 882. 802, 824. V. Moulton, 51 Iowa 555, 2 N, W. 395. 802, i824. V. Stryker, 61 Iowa 261, 16 N. W. 486. 804. V. Wells, 54 Iowa 326, 6 N. ,W.. 527. 302. V.Wells, 67 Iowa 654, 25 N. W. 864. 136. V. Wells, 78 Iowa 760, 38 N. W.. 172. 802. Goodrich v. Detroit, 12 Mich. 279'. 12S1. V. Detroit, 123 Mich. 559,. 82 N. W. 255. 1215. V. Detroit, 184 U. S. 432, 22 Sup. Ct. 397. 63. V. Florer, 27 Minn. 97, 6 N. W. 452. 1047. v.Kimberly, 48 Conn. 395. 972. V.Lunenburg, 9 Gray 38. • 528, 587, 590. TABLE OF OASES. evil Goodrich v. Omaha, 10 Neb. 98, 4 N. W. 424. 1163. V. Turnpike Co., 26 Ind. 119. 1162, 1189, 1313. Goodrum v. Ayers, 56 Ark. 43, 19 S. W. 97. 956. V.Carroll, 2 Humph. 490, 37 Am. Dec. 564. 1327. Goodwillie v. Detroit, 103 Mich. 283, 61 N. W. 526. 1517. Goodwin v. Board of Com'rs, 146 Ind. 164, 44 N. E. 1110. 1250. V. Perkins, 39 Vt. 598. 491, 796, 1481. T. Savannah, 53 Ga. 410. 283, 284, 298, 1110, 1429. Goodwin Gas-Stove, etc. Co.'s Es- tate, In re, 166 Pa. St. 296, 31 Atl. 91. 874. Goodykoontz v. People, 20 Colo. 374, 38 Pac. 473. 172. Goold v. Lyon County Supervis- ors, 74 Iowa 95, 36 N. W. 906. 785. Goralski v. Kostuski, 179 111. 177, 53 N. E. 720, 70 Am. St. Rep. 98. 966, 969. Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How. 133. 108, 111. V.Baltimore, 5 Gill 231. 337, 357, 396, 398, 402, 404. V. Becker, 71 Hun, 282, 24 N. Y. Supp. 1018. 723. V. Cornes, 47 N. Y. 608. 203, 235, 243, 1315. V. Farrar, 2 Doug. (Mich.) 411. 1466. V. New Brunswick Bank,, 6 N. J. L. 100. 407. Gordon's Executor v. Baltimore, 5 Gill 231. 337, 357, 396, 398, 402, , 404. Gore V. Mastin, 66 N. C. 371. 1478. Gors;as v. Blackburn, 14 Ohio 252. 1362. Gorham v. Hall, 57 Me. 58. 1331. V. National L. Ins. Co., 62 Minn. 327, 64 N. W. 906. 813, 814. Gorley v. Sewell, 77 Ind. 316./ 22, 499. Gormley v. Bunyan, 138 U. S. 623, 11 Sup. Ct. 453. 813. Gormley's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 49. 812, 870, 871. Goslee v. Tearney, 52 Iowa 45B, 3 N. W. 502. 1074. Gosnell v. Louisville, 104 Ky. 201, 46 S. W. 722. 175, 586, 1189, 1202. Gossett V. Kent, 19 Ark. 602. 927, 938. Goszler vi Georgetown, 6 Wheat. 593. 1163. Gotthelf V. Stranahan, 138 N. Y. 345, 34 N. E. 286, 20 L. R. A. 455. 817. Gould V. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 678. 168,. 1120, 1419, V. Baltimore, 59 Md. 378. 3, 18,. 1077, 1288. V. Board of Com'rs, 76 Minn. 379, 79 N. W. 530. 1493,. 1496, 1497. V. Day, 94 U. S. 405. 911. V.Hammond, 1 McAU. 235.. 1474. V. Mayor, etc. of Baltimore, 59' Md. 378. 3, 18, 1077, 1288. V. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 439. 568. V. Sullivan, 84 Wis. 659, 54 N. W. 1013, 36 Am. St. Rep. 955. 20 L. R. A. 487. 809, 1085. ■ V. Thompson, 45 Iowa 450. 999. Gould's Estate, In re, 156 N. Y. 423,. 51 N. E. 287. 668. Gouverneur v. New York, 2 Paige 434. 1291. Gove V. Epping, 41 N. H. 539. 181,. 184, 218. V.Newton, 58 N. H. 359. 1479. V. Tacoma, 26 Wash. 474, 67' Pac. 261. 922, 1018, 1460. Governor v. Allen, 8 Humph. 176. 1327. V. Humphreys, 7 Jones L. 258. 1328. V. Montgomery, 2 Swan 613.. 440. V. Powell, 23 Ala. 579. 1343. Gower v. Jonesboro, 83 Me. 142, 21 Atl. 846. 656. Gowland v. New Orleans, 52 La. An. 2042, 28 South. 358. 842, 980,. 981. Grace v. Board of Health, 135 Mass. ■ 490. 1253, 1392. V. Mitchell, 31 Wis. 533, 11 Am. Rep. 613. 1479. Graceland, etc. Co. v. People, 92 111. 616. 879. Graff V. Ackerman, 38 Neb. 720, 57 N. W. 512. 136. V. Evans, L. R. 8 Q. B. Div. 373> 1114. Grafty v. /Rushville, 107 Ind. 502,., 8 N. E. 609, 57 Am. Rep. 128. 1119, 1147. Grafton Bank v. Kimball, 20 N. H. 107. 1469. Grafton County v. Haverhill, 68 N. H. 120, 40 Atl. 399. 264, 267, 268. Graham v. Chautauqua County, 31 Kan. 473, 2 Pac. 549. 257. ' V. Chicago, 187 111. 411, 58 N. E. 393. 1204, 1265. -CVIU TABLE OF CASES. ■Graham v. Conger, 85 Kan. 582, 4 S. W. 327. 231, 307, 1160, 1222. V. Florida L. & M. Co., 33 Pla. 356, 14 South. 796. 810, 956, 957, 1071. V.Greenville, 67 Tex. 62. 8, 1439. T.Horton, 6 Kan. '343. 1435. V. Parham, 32 Ark. 656. 1332, 1350, 1351. V.Reynolds, 45 Ala. 578. 1343. V. Russell, 152 Ind. 186, 52 N. K 806. 463. M V. St. Joseph T'p, 67 Mich. 652, 35 N. W. 808. 3, 24, 25, 84, 90, 652, 653. V. State, 71 Miss. 208, 13 South. 883. m8. •Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416. 415. Grand Chute v. Wlnegar, 15 Wall. 355. 564. Grand Gulf R. Co. v. Buck, 53 Miss. 246. 372. ■Grand Haven v. Grand Haven Water Works, 119 Mich. 652, 78 N. W. 890. 638. Grand Island & N. W. R. Co. v. Baker, 6 Wyo. 369, 45 Pac. 494, 71 Am. St. Rep. 926, 34 L. R. A. 835. 587, 588, 1366. ■Grand Island & W. C. R. Co. v. Da-wes County, 62 Neb. 44, 86 N. . W. 934. 594, 1424. •Grand Lodge v. Ne'w Orleans, 44 La. An. 659, 11 South. 149. 111. V. New Orleans, 46 La. An. 717, 15 South. 296. 110. V. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143, 17 Sup. Ct. 523. 111. Grand Prairie T'p v. Schure, 24 Neb. 354, 38 N. W. 735. 779. Grand Rapids v. Blakely, 40 Mich. 367, 29 Am. St. Rep. 539. 760, 1252, 1492, 1508. v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670, 64 N. W. 29, 55 Am. St. Rep. 472, 32 L. R. A. 116. 1142. V.Luce, 92 Mich. 92, 52 N. W. 635. 1260. V.Norman, 110 Mich. 544, 68 N. W. 269. 1120, 1147. V. Wellman, 85 Mich. 234, 48 N. W. 534. 589, 786. Grand Rapids S. F. Co. v. Grand Rapids, 92 Mich. 564, 52 N. W. 1028. 447, 1240, 1255, 1256. V. School Dist. Trustees, 102 Ky. 556, 44 S. W. 98. 1375, 1376. Granger v. Parsons, 2 Pick. 392. 600. Grant v. Bartholemew, 57 Neb. 673, 78 Neb. 314. 893, 922, 986, 1040. - . V. Bartholemew, 58 Neb. 839, 80 N. W. 45. '526, 772, 734, 777, 784, 785, 793, 794, 839, 882, 893, 922, 959, 1022, 1252. V. Davenport, 36 Iowa 396. 292, 335, 344, 1436. v. Iowa R. L. Co., 54 Iowa 673, 7 N. W. 113. 138. V. Joliet, I. & E. R. Co., 128 111. 286, 21 N. B. 609. 811, 1091.' V.Jones, 39 Ohio St. 506. 90, 652, 653. V. Railroad Co., 54 Iowa 673, 7 N. W. 113. 138. Gratwick, etc. Lumber Co. v. Os- coda, 97 Mich. 221, 56 N. W. 600. 603, 614, 130, 799, 1495. Grau V. Board of Health, 135 Mass. 490. 1253. Gravel Road Co. v. Black, 32 Ind. 468. 1383. Graves v. Bruen, 11 111. 431, 442. 919. V. Bwart, 99 Mo. 13, 11 S. W. 97L 877, 886, 961. Graves County v. First Nat. Bank, 108 Ky. 194, 56 S. W. 16. 1399. Gray v. Board of Aldermen, 139 Mass. 328, 31 N. E. 734. 1173. V. Bolles, 74 Mo. 419. 896. V. Boston Street Com'rs, 138 Mass. 414. 273. V. Chapin, 2 Sim. & Stu. 267. 1437. V. Cicero, 177 111. 459, 53 N. E. 91. 1213. V. Coan, 30 Iowa 536. 1052. V. Coan, 40 Iowa 327. 1052. V.Finn, 96 Mich. 62, 55 N. W. 615. 850, 907. V. La Fayette County, 65 Wis. 567, 27 N. W. 311. 353. V.Logan County, 7 Okl. 321, 54 Pac. 485. 711, 712, 867. V.Lucas, 115 Cal. 430, 47 Pac. 354. 531. V. Mount, 45 Iowa 591. 215. V.Richardson (Cal.), 55 Pac. 603. 531. V. Stiles, 6 Okl. 455, 49 Pac. 1083. 596, 600, 601, 771, 772, 785, 1426. Gray's Harbor Co. v. Chehalis County, 23 Wash. 369, 63 Pac. 233. 635. Gray Street Infirmary v. Louisville (Ky.), 65 S. W. 11, 55 L. R. A. 270. 296. TABLE OF OASES. CIX. Great Barrington. v. County Com'rs, 16 Pick. 572. 26, 86, 389, 402. Great Falls Ice Co. v. District of Columbia, 19 D. C. 327. 516. Great Palls Manuf. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N. H. 444. 193. , Greedup v. Franklin County, 30 Ark. 101. 1431, 1450. Greeley v. Cicero, 148 111. 632, 36 N. E. 603. 1251, 1256. V. Provident Sav. Bank, 98 Mo. 458, 11 S. W. 980. 835. Green v. Alden, 92 Me. 177, 42 Atl. 358. 997, 1001. V. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 84. 126. V. Christie (Idaho), 40 Pac. 54. 811. V. Craft, 28 Miss. 70. 726, 856. V. Gruber, 26 La. An. 694. 868. V. Hellman (Neb.), 90 N. "W. 913. 959, 987, 1022. r. Holway, 101 Mass. 243, 3 Am. Rep. 339. 455, 906. V. Shanklin, 24 Ind. App. 608, 57 N. E. 269. 1258,1284. V. Tidball, 26 Wash. 338, 67 Pac. 84, 55 L. R. A. 879. 817, 818. V. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139. 88 V.Ward, 82 Va. 324. 1289. V.Watson, 34 Pa. St. 332. 724. Greenabaum v. King, 4 Kan. 332, 96 Am. Dec. 172. 1305. Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt. 207. 223, 575, 576. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Outa- gamie County, 76 Wis. 587, 45 N. W. 536. 351, 352, 1383. Greene v. Burke, 23 Wend. 488, 492. 435. V. Gardiner, 6 R. I. 242. 643. V. Lowry, 46 Ga. 55. 904. v.Lunt, 58 Me. 518. 747, 748, 936. v. Mumford, 4 R. I. 313. 660. V. Mumford, 5 R. I. 472, 73 Am. Dec. 79. 1416, 1441, 1447. V. Walker, 63 Me. 311. 439, 725, 735. Greene County Com'rs v. Lenoir County Com'rs, 92 N. C. 180. 421, 1179. V. Murphy, 107 N. C 36, 12 S. B. 122. 830. Greenfield v. State, 113 Ind. 597, 15 N. E. 241. 1278. Greenhow v. Vashon, 81 Va. 336. 804. Greenleaf v. Board of Review, 184 111. 226, 56 N. B. 295, 75 Am. St. Rep. 168. 3, 26, 87, 389, 402. Greenley v. Hovey, 115 Mich. 504, 73 N. W. 808. 1454. Greenough v. Fulton Coal Co., 74 Pa. St. 486, 500. 602, 790. v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489,, 51 Am. Dec. 567. 46, 510. Green Mountain S. R. Co. v. Savage, 15 Mont. 189, 38 Pac. 940. 557, 674. Greensboro v. Hodgin, 106 N. C. 182, 11 S. B. 586. 198, 200. v.McAdoo, 112 N. C. 359, 17 S. B. 178. 501, 1248. Greensburg v. Young, 53 Pa. St. 280. 1129, 1206. Green's Estate, In re, 153 N. Y. 223, - 47 N. E. 292. 668. Greenville v. Harvie, 79 Miss. 754,, 31 South. 425. 1205. Greenville Ice & C. Co. v. Green- ville, 69 Miss. 86, 10 South. 574.. 378. Greenwalt v. Tucker, 8 Fed. 792.. 730, 961. Greenwell v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 320. 1338. Greenwood v. Adams, 80 Cal. 74, 21 Pac. 1134. 1003, 1016,. 1018. V.Delta Bank, 75 Miss. 162, 21 South. 747. 1100. V. Gmelich, 175 111. 526, 51 N.. B. 565. 546. V. La Salle, 137 111. 225, 26 N. B. 1089. 749, 841, 844. V.Morrison, 128 Cal. 350, 60 Pac. 971. 1243. Greenwoods Co. v. New Hartford,. 65 Conn. 461, 32 Atl. 933. 652, 752, 1396. Greer v, Covington, 83 Ky. 410. 837, 844. V. Pergerson, 104 Ga.v 552, 30« S. B. 943. 864. V.Howell, 64 Tex. .688. 577. V. Turner, 47 Ark. 17, 14 S. W. 383. 803. V.Wheeler, 41 Iowa 85. 950,. 952, 1002. Gregg V. Jamison, 55 Pa. St. '468. 219, 436. , V. Jesberg, 113 Mo. 34, 20 S. W.. 652. 921, 940. V. Sanford, 65 Fed. 151, 12 C. C. A. 525, 28 U. S. App. 313. 676, 1450. V. Strange, 3 Ind. 366. 446. Gregory v. Ann Arbor, 127 Mich. 454, 86 N. W. 1013. 1254,. 1269. V. Bartlett, 55 Ark. 30, 17 S. W. 344. 887, 898, 1018. V. Brogan, 74 Miss. 694, 21 South. 521. 947. V.Brooks, 37 Conn. 365. 1466,. 1474. ■ex TABLE OF CASES. Gregory v. Wilsoa, 52 Ind. 233. 845. Gregory, Ex parte, 20 Tex. App. 210, 54 Am. Rep. 516. 1110, 1142. Grether v. Wright, 75 Fed. 742. 132. .^reve v. Coffin, 14 Minn. 345, 100 Am. Dec. 229. 992. ■Greves v. Shaw, 173 Mass. 205, 53 N. B. 372. 33, 667, 671. ■Gribhle v. Livermore, 64 Minn. 396, 67 N. W. 213. 897. V. Livermore, 72 Mipn. 517, 75 N. W. 710. 895. Gridley v. Claris;, 2 Pick. 403. 1470. Griffey v. Kennard, 24 Neb. 174, 38 N. "W. 791. 1080. -Griffin v. Board of Review, 184 111. 275, 56 N. E. 397. 388, 646. V. Bruce, 73 Iowa 126, 34 N. W. 773. 913, 1073. V. Crippen, 60 Me. 270. 750, 935. V. Dogan, 48 Miss. 11. 1008, 1015, 1182. V.Ellis, 63 Miss. 348. 950. V.Heard, 78 Tfex. 607, 14 S. W. 892. 132, 272, 768. V. Mixon, 38 Miss. 424. 859. v. Pintard; 25 Miss. 173. 803, 805. V. Powell, 64 Ga. 625. 1111. V. Rising, 11 Met. 339. 404, 1471. V.Turner, 75 Iowa 250, 39 N. W. 294. 1072. V. Tuttle, 74 Iowa 219, 37 N. W. 167. 750, 959, 1040. •Griffin, In re, 2 Am. Law Times, 93. 438. Griffith V. Carter, 8 Kan. 565. 86. V. Silver, 125 N. C. 368, 34 S. B. 544. 619, 967. V.Watson, 19 Kan. 23. 644j 783. ■Griffiths V. Utley, 76 Iowa 292, 41 N. B. 21. 1001, 1036, 1046. Griffith's Bx'rs v. Carter, 64 Iowa 193, 19 N. W. 903. 1072. Griggs V. St. Croix County, 20 Fed. 34L 760. V. St. Croix County, 27 Fed. 333. 233. V. Tacoma, 3 Wash. 785, 29 Pac. 449. 1427. •Grlgsby v. Akiii, 128 Ind. 591, 28 N. B. 180. 886, 1019. V. Minnehaha County, 5 S. D. 561, 62 N. W. 105. 346, 776, 785, 1394. •Grim v. School Dist., 51 Pa. St. 219. 512. T. School Dist, 57 Pa. St. 433, 98 Am. Dee. 237. 4, 218, 258, 515, 1505. Grimes v. Burlington, 74 Iowa 123, 37 N. W. 106. 781. Grimley v. Santa Clara County, 68 Cal. 575, 9 Pac. 840. 1495. Grimm v. O'Connell, 54 Cal. 522. 729, 998, 999, 1016. Grimmell v. Des Moines, 57 Iowa 144, 10 N. W. 330. 1210, 1212, 1424. Grimmer v. Sumner, 21 Wis. 179. 145L Grindley v. Barker, 1 B. & P. 236. 442. Grissom v. Furman, 22 Fla. 581. 749, 1000, 1001. Griswold v. Pelton, 34 Ohio St. 482. 1222, 1236. V. School Dist, 24 Mich. 262. 783, 799. Griswold Coll. v. Iowa, 46 Iowa 275, 26 Am. St Rep. 138. 354. Grosbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329. 508, 1008, 1068. Gross V. Grossdale, 177 111. 248, 52 N. E. 370. 1275. V. People, 193 111. 260, 61 N. B. 1012, 86 Am. St. Rep. 322. 1274. V. Taylor, 81 Ga. 86, 6 S. E. 179. , 962. Grotefend v. Ultz, 53 Cal. 666. 729. Grove v. Benedict 69 Iowa 346, 28 N. W. 631. 1043. Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 6 Am. Dec. 200. 1477. Grundy County v. Tenn. Coal, etc. Co., 94 Tenn. 295, 29 S. W. 116. 72, 1382. Gudger v. Bates, 52 Ga. 285. 866. Gue v. Jones, 2S Neb. 634, 41 N. W. 555. 996. Guenther v. Baltimore, 55 Md. 459. 145. Guerrero, In re, 69 Cal. 88, 10 Pac. 26L 1113, 1126. Guest V. Brooklyn, 8 Hun 97. 551. V.Brooklyn, 69 N. Y. 506, 516. 1181. V. Brooklyn, 79 N. Y. 624. 1452. Guffey V. O'Reiley, 88 Mo. 418, 57 Am. Rep. 424. 997. Guheen v. Curtis, 2 Idaho 1151, 31 Pac. 805. 909. Guidry v. Broussard, 32 La. An. 924. 1010, 1456. Guild V. Chicago, 82 111. 472. 1213. Guilford v. Chenango Supervisors, 18 Barb. 615. 1302. V.Chenango Supervisors, 13 N. Y. 143. 186, 209, 1302. Guillory v. Avoyelles R. Co., 104 La. 11, 28 South. 899. 568, 583. Guinty v. Herrick, 5 Wend. 240. 1477. TABLE OF OASES. CXI Guise V. Early, 72 Iowa 283, 33 N. W. 683. 1458. ■Guisebert v. Btohison, 51 Md. 478. 879, 912. Guittard T'p v. Marshall County, 4 Kan. 388. 909. Gulf & S. I. R. Co. V. Hewes, 183 U. S. 66, .22 Sup. Ct. 26. 309, 374, 677, 678. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. T. Point- . dexter, 70 Tex. 98, 7 S. W. 316. 749. Gulf R. Co. V. Morris, 7 Kan. 210. ,293, 603. Gulf States L. & I. Co. v. Fas- nacht's Succession, 47 La. An. 1294, 17 South. 800. 748, 953, 954. V. Wade, 51 La. An. 251, 25 South. 105. 910. Gulf States Land Co. v. Parker, 60 Fed. 974. 979. Gulf States Land, etc. Co. v. Parker, 72 Fed. 339. 265. Gulick V. Ward, 10 N. J. L. 87, 18 Am. Dec. 389. 223. Gull River Lumber Co. v. Brock, 6 N. D. 276, 73 N. W. 430. 500, 505. Gumberts v. Adams Express Co., 28 Ind. 181. 433. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 TJ. S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. 633. 68, 79, 80, 1124, 1127, 1144. Gunn V. Barry, 15 Wall. 610. 118. V. Pulaski County, 3 Ark. 427. 1353. V. Tackett, 67' Ga. 725. 431. Gunnison v. Hoehne, 18 Wis. 268. 1016, 1085. Gunnison County v. Owen, 7 Colo. 467. 281, 315. Gunter v. Leckey, 30 Ala. 591. 1124. Gunther v. Lewis, 24 Kan. 309. 956. Gurd V. Auditor-General, '122 Mich. 151, 80 N. W. 1005. 921. Gurnee v. Chicago, 40 111. 165. 181, 1165. Gurr V. Scudds, 11 Exch. 190, 192. 455. Gustafson v. State, 40 Tex. Crim. Rep. 67, 45 S. W. 717, 48 S. W. 518, 43 L. ft. A. 615. 335. Gustin V. School District, 10 Gray 85. 562, 723. Gutches V. County Com'rs, 44 Minn. 383, 46 N. W. 678. 1327. Guthrie v. Harker, 27 Fed. 586. 1073. T. Pittsburgh, C, C. & 5t. L. R. Co., 158 Pa. St. 433, 27 Atl. 1052. 92, 660. Guthrie v. Territory, 1 Okl. 188, 31 Pac. 190, 21 L. R. A. 841. 175, 1201. Gutzweller v. People, 14 111. 142. 1150. Gutzwiller v. Crowe, 32 Minn. 70, 19 N. W. 344. 845. Guy V. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434. 147, 148. V. Washburn, 23 Cal. 111. 1505. Guyun v. McCauley, 32 Ark. 97. 974. Gwin V. Vanzant,, 7 Yerg. 143. S37. Gwynn v. Dierssen, 101 Cal. 563, 36 Pac. 103. 733. V.Richardson, 65 Miss. 222, 3 South. 579.^ 771, 927, 957. H. Haaren v. High, 97 Cal. 445, 32 Pac. 518. 1015. Haas V. Misner, 2 Idaho '174. 15, 18, 836. Hackett v. Amsden, 57 Vt. 432. 1343. v. Emporium Borough School Dist., 150 Pa. St. 220, 24 Atl. 627. 467. V. Marmet Co., 52 Fed. 268, 3 C. C. A. 76,. 8 IT. S. App. 149. 811, 1091. V. State, 113 Ind. 532, 15 N. E. 799. 1276. Hackettstown (Inhabitants of) v. Conover, 63 N. J. L. 191, 42 Atl. ,838. 264. Hackley v. Mack, 60 Mich. 591, 27 N. W. 871. 850. Hackworth v. Ottumwa, 114 Iowa 467, 87 N. W. 424. 1183, 1213. V. Stone Co., 106 Ky. 234, 50 S. W. 33. 821. Hadley v. Chamberlain, 11 Vt. 618. 542. V. Dague, 130 Cal. 207, 62 Pac. 500. 70, 1218, 1221, 1280. V. Musselman, 104 Ind. 459, 3 N. E. 122. 858. V. Tankersley, 8 Tex. 12. 1006. Hadsell v. Hancock, 3 Gray 526. 209. Haf ey v. Bronson, 33 Kan. 598, ' 7 Pac. 239. 931, 934. HafC V. Fuller, 45 Ohio St. 495, 15 N. E. 479. 1413. Haffin V. Mason, 15 Wall. 671. 1486. Hagaman v. Cloud County, 19 Kan. 394. 1425. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701, 4 Sup. Ct. 663. cxu TABLE OF CASES. 15, 51, 53, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 626, 630, 1157, 1171, 1300. Hagar v. Supervisors, 47 Cal. 222. 8, 52, 54, 1169, 1170, 1520. V. Supervisors, 51 Cal. 474. 1250. Hagenbuch v. Ho-ward, 34 Mich. 1. 1415. Hagenbuck v. Reed, 3 Neb. 17. 137. Hagenmeyer v. Board of Equaliza- tion, 82 Cal. 214, 23 Pac. 14. 780, 784.' ^Hager v. Burlington, 42 Iowa 661. 1158, 1212. Hagerman v. Territory (N. M.), 66 Pac. 526. 841. Haserty v. Huddleston, 60 Ohio St. 149, 53 N. B. 960. 428, 446, 656. V. State, 55 Ohio St. 613, 45 N. B. 1046. 33, 170, 325. Hahn v. Mosely, 119 N. C. 73, 25 S. E. 713. 803. Haight v. New York, 99 N. Y. 280, 1 N. E. 883. 727. V. Railroad Co., 6 Wall. 15. 403, 676, 683, 833. Haines v. Saginaw Supervisors, 99 Mich. 32, 57 N. W. 1047.- 909. V. School District, 41 Me. 246. 571. V.Young, 132 Cal. 512, 64 Pac. 1079. 1017. Haines Manuf. Co. v. Hargrove, 129 Cal. 90, 61 Pac. 660. 525, 650, 856. Hairston v. Stinson, 13 Ired. 479. 251. Halbert v. Sparks, 9 Bush 259. 200. Hale V. Branscum, 10 Grat. 418. 859. V. County Com'rs, 137 Mass. 111. 646. V. Cushing, 2 Greenl. 218. 438, 487, 491. V.Hughes (Ariz.), 56 Pac. 732. 1037. V.Kenosha, 29 "Wis. 599. 227, 340, 363, 422, 475,, 1157. V. Penn's Heirs, 25 Grat. 261. 1024. Hale's Estate (Commonwealth's Appeal), 161 Pa. St. 181, 28 Atl. 1071. 94, 640. Haley v. Alton, 152 111. 113, 38 N. B. 750. 1212, 1246, 1271, 1273, 1280. V.Elliott, 16 Colo. 159, 26 Pac. 559. 796. V.Elliott, 20 Colo. 379, 38 Pac. 771. 538, 796. , V. Petty, 42 Ark. 392. 1329. Haley v. Philadelphia, 68 Pa. St. 45, 8 Am. Rep. 153. 510. Halinger v. Zimmerman (N. J. Eq.), 51 Atl. 936. 871. Hall V. American Refrig. Transp. Co., 24 Colo. 291, 51 Pac. 421, 65 Am. St. Rep. 223, 56 L. R. A. 89. 89, 163, 697. v.Bain, 18 R. I. 413, 28 Atl. 371. 271. V. Baker, 74 Wis. 118, 42 N. W.. 104. 997. V.Benton, 69 Me. 346. 637. V. Capps, 107 Cal. 513, 40 Pac. 809. 1009, 1040. V. Ceilings, 117 Mich. 6l1, 7S N. W. 72. 426, 941. V. Collins, 4 Vt. 316. 916. V. Commonwealth, 101 Ky. 382, 41 S. W. 2. 1102. V.Dodge, 18 Kan. 277. 950, 1002, 1085. V. Dowling, 18 Cal. 619. 136. V. Fayetteville, 115 N. C. 281, 20 S. E. 373. 88, 650, 653, 661, 1420. ^ V. French, 165 Mo. 430, 65 S. W. 769. 819. V. Greenwood County, 22 Kan. 37. 708, 1388. V. Guthridge, 52 Iowa 403, 3 N. W. 475. 1038. V. Hall, 3 Allen 5. 847. V. Kellogg, 16 Mich. 135. 926, 1010. V. Mann, 122 Mich. 13, 80 N. W. 789 980 V. Murdock, 114 Mich. 233, 72; N. W. 150. 642. V. Perry, 72 Mich. 202, 40 N. W. 324. 495, 499. V. Stabaugh, 69 Mich. 484, 37 N. W. 545. 1516. V. State, 39 Fla. 637, 23 South. 119. 153, 1119, 1147. V. Theisen, 61 Cal. 524. 729. V. Westcott, 15 R. I. 373, 5 Atl. 629. 966, 970. V. Westcott, 17 R. I. 304, 23 Atl. 25. 970. V.Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5. 108. Halleck v. Boylston, 117 Mass. 469.^ 527, 539, 578. Haller v. Blaco, 10 Neb. 36, 4 N. W. 362. 998. Hallgren v. Campbell, 82 Mich. 255, 46 N. W. 381, 9 L. R. A. 408. 431. Hallo V. Helmer, 12 Neb. 87. 603, 760, 773, 786. Halloway v. Clark, 27 111. 483. 1090. Hallowell v. Saco, 5 Me. 143. 643. Halsey v. People, 84 111. 89. 237; 253, 523, 551, 775, 827, 1168, 1298.. TABLE OF OASES. cxm Halsey v. Rumsey, 84 111. 89. 253. Halstead v. Adams, 108 111. 609. 395, 653, 1416. Halsted v. Buster, 140 U. S. 273, 11 Sup. Ct. 782. 1044. Ham V. Sawyer, 38 Me. 37. 249, 468. Hamacker v. Commercial Bank, 95 Wis. 359, 70 N. W. 295. 835, 1516. Hamblin Real Estate Co. v. As- toria, 26 Or; 599, 40 Pac. 230. 1460. Hamer v. Weber County, 11 Utah 1, 37 Pac. 741. 825, 913, 920. ' Hamilton v. Ames, 74 Mich. 298, 41 N. W. 930. 772. V. Amsden, 88 Ind. 304. 4, 45. V. Boggess, 63 Mo. 233. 1091. V. Burum, 3 Yerg. 355. 1005. V. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 490. 521, 1451. V. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 496. 733, 735. V.Rosenblatt, 8 Mo. App. 237. 1459. V.San Diego County, 108 Cal. 273, 41 Pac. 305. 8. V. State, 3 Ind. 452. 1369. V. Valiant, 30 Md. 139. 920, 921. V.Wilson, 61 Kan. 511, 59 Pac. 1069, 48 L. R. A, 238. 294, 382. V.Wright, 30 Iowa 480. 1092. Hamilton, In re, 148 N. Y. 310, 42 . N. B. 717. 263. ; Hamilton, etc. Co. v. L'Anse T'p, 107 Mich. 419, 65 N. W. 282. 524, 760, 1455. Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632. 9, ,132, 398, 402, 406, 678. Hamilton County Com'rs v. Rosche, 50 Ohio St. 103, 33 N. E. 408, 19 L. R. A. 584. 492. i Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Or. 456, 15 Pac. 778. 432. Hammersley v. Franey, 39 Conn. 179. 645. Hammersmith Bridge Co. v. Over- seers, L. R. 6 Q. B. 230. 1111. Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146, 152, 3 Am. Rep. 615. 2, 50', 182, 226, 1162, 1164, 1179, 1201. Hammon v. Nix, 44 C. C. A. 132, 104 Fed. 689. 749. V. Sexton, 69 Ind. 37. 822. Hammond v. Carter, ].55 111. 579, 40 N. E. 1019. 956, 1036, 1038, 1039, 1041. V. Hannin, 21 Mich. 374, 4 Am. Rep. 490. 808. V.Leavltt, 181 111. 416, 54 N. B. 982. 1247. h Hammond v. LoveU, 136 Mass. 184. 815. V.Muskegon School Board, 109 Mich. 676, 67 N. W. 973. 304, 413, 548. V. People, 169 111. 545, 48 N. E. 573. 1258, 1263. V. Place, 116 Mich. 628, 74 N. W. 1002, 72 Am. St. Rep. 543. 585, 586, 587. Hammontree v. Lott, 40 Mich. 190. 590. Hampden's Case, 3 State Trials 825. 95. Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 76. 98, 252, 1307. Hampshire County, In re, 143 Mass. 424, 9 N. E. 756. 1264, 1269, 1273. Hampson v. Dysart (Ariz.), 53 Pac. 581. 776, 780. Hampton v. Hamsher, 46 Hun 144. 251. V. Rouse, 22 Wall. 263. 1044. Hanchett v. Auditor-General, 124 Mich. 424, 83 k. W. 103. 1464. Hancock v. Bowman, 49 Cal. 413. 1287. v. Singer Manuf. Co., 62 N. J. L. 289, 41 Atl. 846, 42 L. R. A. 852. 6, 114, 371. V. Whittemore, 50 Cal. 522. 647. Hand v. Auditor-General, 112 Mich. 597, 71 N. W. 160. 809, 992, 1463. v.Ballou, 12 N. Y. 541. 1008, 1038. V. Fellows, 148 Pa. St. 456, 23 Atl. 1126. 1218. V. Jersey City, 41 N. J. Eq. 663, 7 Atl. 565. 867, 873. V. Savannah, etc. R. Co., 12 S. C. 315. 359. V. Savannah, etc. R. Co., 17 S. C. 219. 107, 381. Handley's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 339, 37 Atl. 587. 34, 94, 628, 632, 640, 669. Handlin v. Weston Lumber Co., 47 La. An. 401, 16 South. 955. 1056. Hanenkratt v. Hamil, 10 Okl. 219, 61 Pac. 1050. 998, 1016. Haney v. Board of Com'rs, 91 Ga. 770, 18 S. B. 28. 283. V.Cole, 28 Ark. 299. 1064. Hanford v. Mass. Ben. Assoc, 122 Mo. 50, 26 S. W. 680. 310. V. Obrecht, 49 JU. 146. 906. Hankins v. Lawrence, 8 Blackf. 266. 194. Hanlon v. Supervisors, 57 Barb. 383. 1411, 1451. Hanna v. Allen County, 8 Blackf. 352. 9, 10. V. Fisher, 95 Ind. 383. 807, 818. CXIV TABLE OF OASES. Hanna v. Palmer, 194 111. 41, 61 N. E. 1051. 819, 967, 1001, 1090. Hannah v. Collins, 94 Ind. 201. 447, 750, 972. Hannell v. Smith, 15 Ohio 134. 827, 927, 933. Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 "Wall. 547. 1411, 1415, 1448,1450. Hannibal v. Guyott, 18 Mo. 515. 1099, 1114. V. Price, 29 Mo. App. 280. 1111. Hannibal R. Co. v. Shacklett, 30 Mo. 550. 357, 372, 376, 396. Hannibal, etc. R. Co. v. State Board, 64 Mo. 294. 698, 779, 1410. Hannig v. Mueller, 82 "Wis. 235, 52 N. B. 98. 966, 969. Hanscom t. Hinman, 30 Mich. 419. 735 V. Omaha, 11 Neb. 37, 7 N. W. 739. 1263. Hansen v. Hammer, 15 "Wash. 315, 46 Pac. 332. 104, 211, 1198. V. Mauberret, 52 La. An. 1565, 28 Pac. 167. 931, 956, iq76, 1455. Hanson v. Haverhill, 60 N. H. 218. 1495. V. "Vernon, 27 Iowa 28, 1 Am. Rep. 215. 1, 172, 181, 183, 185, 202. Hanson, Bx parte, 28 Fed. 127. 150, 151, 1120. Hanson County v. Gray, 12 S. D. 124, 80 N. "W. 175, 76 Am. St. Rep. 591. 17, 19. Hapgood V. Morton, 28 Kan. 764. 735. Harbeck, In re, 161 N. Y. 211, 35 N. B. 850. 33, 451, 457, 668. Harber v. Dyches (Tex.), 14 S. "W. 580. 1002. Y. Sexton, 66 Iowa 211, 23 N. "W. 635: 1020, 1455, 1458. Harbeson v. Jack, 2 "Watts 124. 725. Harbor Com'rs v. Pashley, 19 S. C. 315. 146. V. State, 45 Ala. 399. 242. Harbor Master v. Railroad Co., 3 Strob. 594. 146. Hardaway t. County Court, 5 Humph. 557. 1343. Hardcastle v. State, 27 N. J. L. 551. 572, 576. Hardenburg v. Kidd, 10 Cal. 402. 47, 956, 1450. Hardesty v. Fleming, 57 Tex. 395. 166, 653, 1483. V.Price, 3 Colo. S56. 853. Hardie v. Chrisman, 60 Miss. 671. 998. Hardin v. Crate, 60 111. 215. 1090. Harding v. Bader, 75 Mich. 316, 42 N. "W. 942. 560, 561, 576, 577, 926. V. Brophy, 133 111. 39, 24 N. B. 558. 1041. V. Funk, 8 Kan. 315. 194. V. Goodlett, 3 Yerg. 40, 24 Am. Dec. 546. 194. V. Greene, 59 Kan. 202, ^2 Pac. 436. 750, 1000. V. Railroad Co., 65 111. 90. 214. V. Vaughn, 36 Fed. 742. 1030. V.Logan County Court (Ky.), 23 S. "W. 661. 1326. Hardy v. Yarmouth, 6 Allen 277. 644, 662, 667. Hare v. Carnall, 39 Ark. 196. 486, 802, 947, 1027, 1426, 1450. V. Kennerly, 83 Ala. 608, 3 -South. 683. 173. Hargrove v. Lilly, 69 Ga. 326. 875. Harkness v. Board of Public "Works, 1 MacA. 121. 1004, 1432, 1448. Harkreader v. Clayton, 56 Miss. 383, 31 Am. Rep. 369. 911, 940, 968. V.Lebanon & N. T. Co., 101 Tenn. 680, 49 S. "W. 751. 359. Harlan v. Jones, 104 Ind. 167, 3 N. B. 826. 1019. Harland v. Bastman, 119 111. 22, 8 N. B. 810. 902. Harlan's Heirs v. Seaton's Heirs, 18 B. Monr. 312. 859. Harman v. Chicago, 147 17. S. 396, 13 Sup. Ct. 306. 145, 148. V. New Marlborough, 9 Cush. 525. 414, 606. V. Stead, 8 U. S. App. 477, 8 C. C. A. 414. 962, 1032, 1048. V. Stearns, 95 Va. 58, 27 S. B. 601. 1044. V. Tappenden, 1 Bast 555. 1466. Harmer v. Boling, 8 Cal. 384. 1450. Harmon, V. Chicago, 140 111. 374, 29 N. B. 732, 51 Am. Rep. 698. 148. v. Steed, 49 Fed. 779. 917, 1029, 1032. Harmon's Lessee v. Stockwell, 9 Ohio 94. 827. Harmony v. Osborne, 9 Ind. 458. 466. Ham V. "Woodard, 151 Ind. 132, 50 N. E. 33. 378. Harness v. Cravens, 126 Mo. 233, 28 S. W. 971. 809, 833. V.Williams, 64 'Miss. 600, 1 South. 759. 1116, 1118. Harney v. Applegate, 57 Cal. 205. 1288. V. Benson, 113 Cal. 314, 45 Pac. 687. 1172, 1218, 1243, 1390. TABLE OF CASES. CXV Harney v. Supervisors, 44 Iowa 203. 785. Harper v. Commissioners, 23 Ga. 566. 52, 54, 1344. V. Grand Rapids, 105 Mich. 551, 63 N. W. 517. 1283. v.Lindskog, 13 S. D. 524, 83 N. W. 581. V. M'Keehan, 3 W. & S. 238. 525, 743. V. Mechanics' Bank, 7 W. & S. 204. 516. V. Rowe, 53 Cal. 233. 71, 514, 516, 520, 956, 1022. v.Rowe, 55 Cal. 132. 950, 954, 999. Harper County Com'rs v. Cole, 62 Kan. 121, 61 Pac. 403. 908. Harper's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 9, 1 Atl. 791. 1421. Harpswell v. Orr, 69 Me. 333. 1330. Harralson v. Barrett, 99 Cal. 607, 34 Pac. 342. 815. Harrell v. Enterprise Savings Bank, 183 111. 538, 56 N. B. 63. 985, 1003, 1036, 1042, 1090. Harriman v. School Dist, 35 Vt. 311. 857. Harrington v. Commissioners, 2 McCord 400. 1466. V. Hilliard, 27 Mich. 271. 871. V. Plainview, 27 Minn. 224, 6 N. W. 777. 568. V.Taylor, 17 Bast 378. 444. V.Worcester, 6 Allen 576. 825, 827, 852. Harris v. Arisonia, 73 Conn. 358, 47 Atl. 672. 521. V. Chicago, 162 111. 288, 44 N. E. 437. 1273. V. Curran, 32 Kan. 580, 4 Pac. 1044. 956, 1001, 1003, 1016. V. Drought, 24 Kan. 524. 942, 946. V. Dubuclet, 30 La. An. 662. 183, 553. V. Fremont County, 63 Iowa 639, 19 N. W. 826. 1412, 1440. V. Harsch, 29 Or. 562, 46 Pac. 141. 1017. V. People, 162 111. 288, 44 N. E. 437. 1273. V. Roof, 10 Barb. 489. ^23. V.Runnels, 12 How. 79. 907. V. State, 55 Miss. 50. 1336. V. State, 96 Tenn. 496, 34 S. W. 1017. 486, 599, 764. ^ V. State, 4 Tex. App. 131. 1113. V. State, 8 Tex. App. 216. 1113. V. Supervisors, 49 Cal. 662. 1250. v. Tyson, 24 Pa. St. 347, 64 Am. Dec. 661. 743. Harris v. Wood, 6 T. B. Monr. 641. 21, 53, 849. Harris, In re, 90 Hun 245, 36 N. Y. Supp. 29. 1462. Harris County v. Boyd, 70 Tex. 237, 7 S. W. 713. 266, 363. Harrisburg v. Guiles, 192 Pa. St. 191, 44 Atl. 48. 2, 1326, 1331, 1340. V. McCormick, 129 Pa. St. 213, 18 Atl. 126. 1220. V." McPherran, 200 Pa., St. 343, 49 Atl. 988. 1219. V. Segelbaum, 151 Pa. St. 172, 24 Atl. 1070, 20 L. R. A. 834. Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16. 228, 252, 1302. V.Chicago, 163 111. 129 (Heden- berg V. Chicago, 44 N. B. 395). 443, 760, 1238. V.Haas, 25 Ind. 281. 1425, 1450, 1455. V. Harrison, 56 Miss. 174. 966. V. Owens, 57 Iowa 314, 10 N. W. 674, 1033. V. Roberts, 6 Fla. 711. 970. V. Spencer, 90 Mich. 586, 51 N. W. 642. 1078. V. United States, 20 Ct. of CI. 175. 844. V. Vicksburg, 3 S. & M. 581, 41 Am. Dec. 633. 102, 653. V. Vines, 46 Tex. 15. 1441. V.Williams, 39 Ark. 315. 963. V.Willis, 7 Heisk. 35, 19 Am. Rep. 604. 35. Harrison County Com'rs v. Mc- Carty, 27 Ind. 475. 488. Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Grat. 247. 98. Harrodsburg v. Renfro. See Board of Council V. Renfro. Harshaw v. Taylor, 3 Jones (N. C.) 513. 879. Harshman v. Knox County (United States V. County Court), 122 U. S. 306, 7 Sup. Ct. 1171. 1362, 1368. Hart V. Brooklyn, 36 Barb. 226. 1129. V. Henderson, 17 Mich. 218. 515, 1063. V. Holden, 55 Me. 572. 218. V. Oceana County, 44 Mich. 417, 6 N. W. 863. 1361. V. Plum, 14 Cal. 148. 357, 487. V. Smith, 44 Wis. 213. 930, 1017, 1022. V. Tiernan, 59 Conn. 521, 21 Atl. 521. 838, 837, 882. Hartfield v. Columbus, 109 Ga. 112, 34 S. E. 288. 355. ■ CXVl TABLE OF CASES. Hartford v. Champion, 54 Conn. 436, 7 Atl. 721. 622. V. Champion, 58 Conn. 268, 20 Atl. 471. 499, 643. V. Chlpman, 21 Conn. 488. 1456. T. Franey, 47 Conn. 76. 1327, 1332, 1337, 1338. V.Hartford Theo. Sem.,. 66 Conn. 475, 34 Atl. 483. 350, 351, 353, 728. V. Hills, 72 Conn. 599, 45 Atl. 433. 844. V. West Middle District, 45 Conn. 462, 29 Am. Rep. 687: 1236. Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hart- fprd, 16 Conn., 149. 252, 415. Hartford F. Ins. Co. v. Hartford, 3 Conn. 15. 673. Hartland v. Church, 47 Me. 169. 88. V. Hackett, 57 Vt. 92. 1342. Hartley v. Boynton, 17 Fed. 873, 5 McCrary 453. 1040. V. State, 3 Kelley 233. 1345. Hartman v. Bean, 99 U. S. 393. 870. V. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672. Ii9, 125, 127. V. Reid (Colo. .App.), 69 Pac. 787. 1025, 1044, 1047. Harts V. People, 171 111. 373, 49 N. B. 539.^ 745. V. People,- 171 III. 458, 49 N. E. 538. 745, 1177. Hartwell v. Armstrong, 19 Barb. 166. 211. V.Littleton, 13 Pick. 229. 544. Harvard Coll. v- Boston, 104 Mass. 470. 357, 364. V. Cambridge Assessors, 175 Mass. 145, 55 N. E. 834,- 48 L. R. A. 547. 351. V. Gore, 5 Pick. 370. 643. Harvey v. South Chester, 99 Pa. St 565. 363. V. Thomas, 10 Watts 63, 36 Am. Dec. 141. 193. V.Virginia, 20 Fed. 411. 119, 127. V. Wieland, 115' Iowa 564, 88 N. W. 1077. 905. Harward v. Drainage Co., 51 111. 130. 97, 1238, 1309, 1430. Harwood v. Huntoon, 51 Mich. 639, 17 N. W. 216. 1515. V. North Brookfleld, 130 Mass. ,561. 526, 530, 607. V.St. Clair, etc. Drainage Co., 51 111. 130. 97, 1238, 1309, 1430. Hartzung v. Syracuse, 92 Hun 203, 36 N. Y. Supp. 521. 517. Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37, 80 Am. Dec. 718. 182, 1306, 1307. Hasbrouck v. Milwaukee, 25 Wis. 122. 1362. Hasbrouck Heights Co. v. Lodi Township Committee, 66 N. J. L. 102, 48 Atl. 517. 950. Haseltine v. Mosher, 51 Wis. 443, 8 N. W. 273. 1086. V.Simpson, 58 Wis. 579, 17 N. W. 332. 987. Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 Cal. 281. 20, 484, 932, 1243. V.Putnam, 42 Me. 244. 965. Hassan v. Rochester, 67 N. Y. 528. 383, 1236. Hassen v. Rochester, 65 N. Y.' 516. 383. Hassett v. Walls, 9 Nev. 387. 17. Hastings v. Columbus, 42 Ohio St. 585. 936, 1194, 1280, 1282. Hasting's Bx'rs v. Lexington (Ky.), 43 S.W. 415. 651, 819. Hatch V. Buffalo, 38 N. Y. 276. 1407, 1410, 1449, 1450. V. Reid, 112 Mich. 430, 70 N. W. 889. 804. Hathaway v. Addison, 48 Me. 440. 1488, 1494. V. Ellsbree, 54 Pa. St. 498. 724, 726. V. Fish, 13 Allen 267. '662. V. Goodrich, 5 Vt. 65. 1479. V. Nelson, 52 Neb. 109, 71 N. W. 981. 987. V. Piielps, 2 Aiken 84. ,445. Hatwood V. Fayetteville, 121 N. C."^ 267, 28 S. B. 299. 478, 486, 1510. Hatzfield v. Golden, 7 Watts 152. 223. Havana v. Vanlaningham, 17 111. App. 62. 1110. Havana American Co. v. Board of Assessors, 105 La. 471, 29 South. 938. 299, 348. Havard v. Day, 62 Miss. 748. 750, , 957. Haven v. Essex County Coin'rs, 155 Mass. 467, 29 N. E. 1083. 758. V. Owen, 121 Mich. 51, 79 N. W. 938. 897. Haviland v. Columbus, 50 Ohio St. 471, 34 N. E. 679. 1219. Hawes v. Howland, 136 Mass. 267. 970, 1045. Hawes Manuf. Co., Appeal of (Pa.), 17 Atl. 219. 330. Hawkeye Ins. Co. v. Board of Equal., 75 Iowa 770, 37 N. W. 966. 272. V.French, 109 Iowa 585, 80 N. W. 660. 258, 292. Hawkeye L. & B. Co. v. Gordon, 115 Iowa 561, 88 N. W. 1081. 1038. TABLE OF OASES. CXVll Hawkeye L. & B. Co. v. Marion, 110 Iowa 468, 81 N. W. 718. 1491, 1495. Hawkinberry v. Snodgrass, 39 W. ' Va. 332, 19 S. B. 417. 1057. Hawkins v. Carroll County, 50 Miss. 735. 1, 450, 563. V. Dougherty, 9 Houst. (Del.) 156, ISAtl. 951. 803. V. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 527. 601, 1437. V. Mangum, 78 Miss. 97, 28 South. 872. 309, 428, 520, 1382. V.Sumter County, 57 Ga. 166. 20. Hawks V. Baldwin, Brayt. 85. 445. Hawley v. Fairbanks, 108 U. S. 543, 2 Sup. Ct. 846. 1375. T. Griffin (Iowa), 82 N. W. 905. 1029. V.Mitchell, 31 N. H. 575. 916. Hawthorne v. East Portland, 13 Or. 271, 10 Pao. 342. 1241. Haxton v. Harris, 19 Kan. 511. 946. Hay V. Hill, 65 Cal. 383, 4 Pac. 378. 124. Hayday v. Ocean City, 67 N. J. L. 155, 50 Atl. 584. 1271. Hayden v. Atlanta, 70 Ga. 817. 1186, 1204. V. Dunlap, 3 Bibb 216. 492. V.Foster, 13 Pick. 492. 737, 948, 949, 950. v.Roe, 66 Wis. 288, 28 N. "W. 186. 665. Hayes v. Douglas County, 92 Wis. 429, 65 N. W. 482, 53 Am. St. Rep. 926, 31 L. R. A. 213. 210, 1181, 1226, 1440, 1452, 1458. V. Ducasse, 119 Cal. 682, 52 Pac. 121. 938, 1003. V. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120, 5 Sup. Ct. 785. 564. V. Los Angeles County, 99 Cal. 74, 33 Pac. 766. 478, 921, 1397. V. Viator, 33 La. An. 1162. 732. Hayford v. Belfast, 69 Me. 63. 1475. Hayne v. Deliesseline, 3 McCord 374. 26, 90, 651. Haynes v. Butler, 30 Ark. 69. 1328, 1334. T. Heller, 12 Kan. 381. 998. Hays V. Cincinnati, 62 Ohio St. 116, 56 N. B. 658. 1270. V. Commonwealth, 107 Ky. 655, 55 S. W. 425. 79. V.Drake, 6 Gray 387. 1477, 1481. v.Heatherly, 36 W. Va. 613, 15 S. E. 223. 946. V.Hill, 17 Kan. 360. 1438. Hays V. Hunt, 85 N. C. 303. 917. V. McCormick, 8S Iowa 89, 49 N. W. 69. 803, 811. V. Steamship Co., 17 How. 596. 89, 146, 652. Hayward v. Board of Review, 189 111. 234, 59 N. B. 601. 90. V. Foster, 13 Pick. 492. 735. V. People, 145 111. 55, 33 N. E. 885. 286, 407, 408, 409. V. People, 156 111. 84, 40 N. E. 287. 610. Haywood v. Savannah, 12 Ga. 404. 584. Hazard v. O'Bannon, 38 Fed. 220. 1420, 1445. Hazen v. Essex Co., 12 Cush. .475, 477. 193. Hazlett V. McCutcheon, 158 Pa. St. 539, 27 Atl. 1086. 823. Hazllp V. Nunnery (Miss.), 29 South. 821. 961. Hazzard v. Heacock, 39 Ind. 172. 1291. V. O'Bannon, 36 Fed. 854. 490, 614, 1459. Head v. Amoskeag Manuf. Co., 113 V. S. 9, 5 Sup. Ct. 441. 194, 1170. V. Fordyce, 17 Cal. 149. 1456. Head-Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247. 179, 259. Heard v. Walton, 39 Miss. 388. 1029. Hearn's Petition, 96 N. Y. 378. 514, 522. Hearst v. Bgglestone, 55 Cal. 365. 729, 730. Heath v. McCrea, 20 Wash. 342, 55 Pac. 432. 395, 807, 977. Heath, Ex parte, 3 Hill 43. 492. Heaton v. Knight, 63 Iowa 686, 16 N. W. 532. 1038. Hebardv. Ashland County, 55 Wis. 145, 12 N. W. 437. 174, 1415, 1422. Hebb V. Moore, 66 Md. 167, 7 Atl. 255. 817, 842, 8S0. Hebrew Free School Assoc, v. New York, 99 N. Y. 488, 2 N. E. 399: 352, 353. Hecht V. Boughton, 2 Wyo. 368. 577, 578, 729. Hecock V. Van Dusen, 80 Mich. 359, 45 N. W. 343. 586, 763, 789. Hedenberg v. Chicago, 163 111. 129, 44 N. K 395.' See Harrison v. Chicago. Heffner v. Commonwealth, 28 Pa. St. 108. 1369. HSfner v. Northwestern Mut. L. Ins. Co., 123 U. S. 747, 8 Sup. Ct 337. 960, 961. Heft V. Gephart, 65 Pa. St. 510. 525, 724, 808, 925, 926. CXVUl TABLB OF CASES. Hegar v. De Groat, 3 N. D. 354, 56 N. W. 150. lOSl. Hegeman, State, v. Passaic, 51 N. J. L. 109, 18 Atl. 776. 531. Heil V. Redden, 38 Kan. 255, 16 Pac. 743. 949, 1003. He'ilig V. City Council, 7 Wash. 29, 34 Pac. 164. 604. Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655. 47, 48, 546, 865, 1374. Heinroth. v. Kochersperger, 173 111. 205, 50 N. E. 171. 1175, 1415, 1438. Heiple v. Bast Portland, 13 Or. 97, 8 Pac. 907. 1160. V. Reinhart, 100 Iowa 525, 69 N. i W. 871. 823. Heise v. Columbia, 6 Rich. 404. 1100, 1137. Heiser v. New York, 104 N. Y. 68, 9 N. E. 866. 1205, 1233. Helena v. Dwyer, 64 Ark. 424, 45 S. W."349, 39 L. R. A. 266. 1489, 1497, 1505. V. Hornor, 58 Ark. 151, 23 S« W. 966. 1070. Hellenkamp v. Lafayette, 30 Ind. 192. 1516. Heller v. Alvarado, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 409, 20 S. W. 1003. 843. V.Milwaukee, 96 Wis. 134, 70 N. W. nil. 1201, 1283. Hellman v. Burritt, 62 Conn. 438, 26 Atl. 473. 870, 881. V. Shoulters, 114 Cal. 136, 44 Pac. 915, 45 Pac. 1057. 1254. V. United States, 15 Blatchf. 13. 670. Helm V. National Bank, 43 Ind. 167, 13 Am. Rep. 395. 1138. Helms V. Wagner, 102 Ind. 385, 1 N. E. 730. 325. Helprey v. ReSick, 21 Neb. 80, 31 N. W. 256. 881, 986, 987, 1040. Helvey v. Huntington County, 6 Blackf. 317. 1324. Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534, 57 S. W. 559. 69, 70, 1217, 1218, 1227. v. McLaren, 28 Mo. App. 654. 801. v. Payne, 27 Mo. App. 481. 841, . 892. Hemingway v. Machias, 33 Me. 445. 1470. Hemmingway v. Drew, 47 Mich. 554, 11 N. W. 382. 1003. Henderson v. Baltimore, 8 Md. 352. 556, 1247, 1248, 1252, 1266. V. Ellerman, 47 La. An. 306, 16 South. 821. 887, 929. V. Hughes County, 13 S. D. 576, 83 N. W. 682. 267, 385, 448, 526, 562, 586, 959, 990. Henderson v. Lambert, 14 Bush 24. 245, 1243, 1283, 1284. V.London & L. Ins. Co., 135 Ind. 23, 34 N. E. 565, 41 Am. St. Rep. 410, 20 L. R. A. 827. 190, 290. V. McCullagh, 89 Ky. 448, 12 S. W. 932. 350. V.Marshall (Ky.), 58 S. W. 518. 1110. V. Mayor, 92 U. S. 259. 158, 166. V. Olivar, 28 Iowa 20. 1067, 1068. V. Oliver, 32 Iowa 512. 523, 983. V.Robinson, 76 Iowa 603, 41 N. W. 371. 1024. V. Staritt, 4 Sneed 170. 1061. V. State, 53 Ind. 60. 731, 1352. V. State, 58 Ind. 244. 635. V. Strangers' Rest Lodge (Ky.), 17 S. W. 215. 349. V.White, 69 Tex. 103, 5 S. W. 374. 749, 934, 1002. V. Whitinger, 56 Ind. 131. 823. Henderson Bridge Co. v. Common- wealth, 99 Ky. 623, 31 S. W. 486, 29 L. R. A. 73. 165, 271, 687, 688. V.Henderson, 90 Ky. 498, 14 S. W. 493. 238. V. Henderson, 105 Ky. 32, 36 S. W. 561. 165. 248, 295, 846, 891 V. Henderson, 141 U. S. 679, 12 Sup. Ct. 114. 140, 164. V.Henderson, 173 V. S. 592, 19 Sup. Ct. 553. 22, 56, 73, 124, 165, 248, 258, 295, 357, 361. V.Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 532. 140, 165, 167, 686. Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Wall. 44. 464, 863. Hendrick v. West Springfield, 107 Mass. 541. 1281. Hendrie v. Kalthoff, 48 Mich. 306, 12 N. W. 191. 303, 377; Hendrix v. Boggs, 15 Neb. 469, 20 N.W. 28. 996, 1064. Henkle v. Keota, 68 Iowa 334, 27 N. W. 250. 87, 783. Henley v.. Street, 29 Iowa 429. 1068. Henne v. Los' Angeles County, 129 Cal. 297, 59 Pac 780. 272, 619, 622. Hennel v. Board of Com'rs, 132 Ind. 32, 31 N. B. 462. 495, 1305. Hennepin County v. Bartleson, 37 Minn. 343, 34 N. W. 222. 1241. V.' Grace, 27 Minn. 503, 8 N. W. 761. 349, 352. TABLE OF OASES. CSIX Hennepin County v. St. Paul, M. etc. R. Co., 33 Minn. 534, 24 N. W. 196. 108. gennessey v. Volkening, 30 Abb. N. C. 100, 22 N. Y. Supp. 528. 1007, 1037; 1042. Hennessy v. Douglas County, 99 Wis. 129, 74 N. W. 983. 62, 1217, 1241. Henrietta v. Eustis, 87 Tex. 14, 26 S. W. 619. 836, 838, 878, 1058. Henry v. Bell, 75 Mo. 194. 1481. V. Chester, 15 Vt. 460. 382, 384, 411, 419, 466, 1502. V.Cohen, 66 Ala. 382, 386. 205. V. Bdson, 2 Vt. 499. 1469. V. Florida Land, etc. Co., 38 Pla. 269, 21 South. 19. 1024, 1049. V.Gregory, 29 Mich. 68. 851, 1417, 1447, 1451. V. Horstlck, 9. Watts 412. 816, 1505. V. Sargeant, 13 N. H. 321, 40 Am. .Dec. 146. 1477. Henry County v. Murphy, 100 Ind. 570. 1397. Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312, 316. 452. Hensley T'p v. People, 84 111. 544. 203, 243, 1316. Hentig v. Redden, 45 Kan. 20, 25 Pac. 219. 1063. Hepburn v. Curts, 7 Watts (Pa.) 300, 32 Am. Dec. 760. 512. v. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480. 712, 713. Hereford v. O'Connor (Ariz.), 52 Pac. 471. 997, 1034. Herman v. Oconto, 110 Wis. 660, 86 N. W. 681. 553. Hernsheim v. Atlas Steam Cordage Co., 42 La. An. 726, 7 South. 784. 348. Herr v. Martin, 90 Ky. 377, 14 S. W. 356. 1461. Herrick v. Ammerman, 32 Minn. 544, 21 N. W. 836. 596. V. Big Rapids, 53 Mich. 554, 19 N. W. 182. 667. v.Hutt. 15 Ark. 331. 938. V. Nlesz, 16 Wash. 74, 47 Pac. 414. 497, 1015, 1017. V.Randolph, 13 Vt. 525. 113. Herriman v. Stowers, 43 Me. 497. 24, 641. Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. C. 420, 29 S. E. 368. 471. V. Moses, 71 Miss. 620, 14 South. 437. 951, 1001. Herrlott v. Bacon, 110 Iowa 342, 81 ■N. W. 701. 380, 449. Herrman v. Guttenberg, 62 N. J. L. 605, 43 Atl. 703. 258, 319. Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 472, 26 Am. Rep. 87. 90, 91. V. Murphy (Pa.), 13 Atl. 958. 996. Herr's Will, In re, 55 Hun 167, 7 N. Y. Supp. 852. 349. Hersee v. Porter, 100 N. Y. 403, 3 N. B. 338. 850. Hersey v. Milwaukee County Super- visors, 16 Wis. 185, 82 Am. Dec. 713. 382, 1425. V. Supervisors, 37 Wis. 75. 752, 754. Hershberger v. Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. St. 78, 8 Atl. 381. 483, 522, 627, 632, 1239. Hershy v. Thompson, 50 Ark. 484, 8 S. W. 689. 1001, 1018. Hertert v. Chicago, N. & St. P. R. Co., 114 Iowa 330, 86 N. W. 266. 376. Hertig v. People, 159 111. 237, 42 N. E. 879. 897, 1273. Herzog v. Gregg, 23 Kan. 726. 1034. Hess V. Herrington, 73 Pa. St. 438. 1083. Hessler v. Drainage Com'rs, 53 111. 105. 1238, 1322. Heth V. Radford, 96 Va. 272, 31 S. E. 8. 627, 767. Hewell V. Lane, 53 Cal. 213. 953, 1371. Hewes v. Glos, 170 111. 436, 48 N. E. 922. 1177. V. McLellan, 80 Cal. 393, 22 Pac. 287. 728, 954, 956, 996, 998 ' I v.Rels, 40 Cal. 255. 466. Hewett V. Fenstamaker, 128 Ind. 315, 27 N. E. 621. 1425, 1426. Hewison v. New Haven, 37 Conn. 475. 1305. Hewitt v. Butterfleld, 52 Wis. 384, ■9 N. W. 15. 1057. V. Dean, 91 Cal. 5, 27 Pac. 423'. 815. V. New York, etc. R. Co., 12 Blatch. 452. 115. V. Storch, 31 Kan. 488, 2 Pac. 556. 1000. V. Traders' Bank, 18 Wash. 326, 51 Pac. 468. 1, 17, 833, 854, 1383. V. Weatherby, 57 Mo. 276. 895. V. Week, 59 Wis. 444, 18 N: W. 417. 1057. V. White, 78 Mich. 117, 43 N. W. , 1043. 555, 590. Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55. 248. cxx TABLE OF OASES. Hewlett T. Nutt, 79 N. C. 263. 35, 321. Hewson v. Bnglewood T'p, 55 N. J. L. 522, 27 Atl. 904, 21 L. R. A. 736. 1119. Heyleman, Ex parte, 92 Cal. 492, 28 Pac. 675. 1119. Heywood v. Board of Com'rs, 18 Utah 57, 55 Pac. 79. 1, 3, 959. V.Buffalo, 14 N. Y. 534. 1407, 1411, 1450. Hibtard v. Clark, 56 N. H. 155, 22 Am. Rep. 442. 1, 19, 20. V. Garfield, 102 Mass. 72. 1379. V. Rowe, 51 Ala. 469. 988. Hlbben v. Smith, 158 Ind. 206, 62 N. E. 447. 1222. Hibbs V. Board of Directors, 110 Iowa 306, 81 N. W. 584, 48 L. R. A. 535. 576. Hibernian Ben. Soc. v. Kelly, 28 Or. 173, 42 Pac. 3, 52 Am. St. Rep. 769. 349, 353, 358, 610. Hicjiey v. Hinsdale, 8 Mich. 267, 77 Am. Dec. 450. 492. Hickman v. Dawson, 33 La. An. 441. 1057. V. Dawson, 35 La. An. 1086. 1020, 1066. V.Kemper, 35 Ark. 505. 809, 826, 996, 1016. Hicks V. James's Adm'x, 48 Fed. 542. 1399. T.Nelson, 45 Kan. 47, 25 Pac. 218, 23 Am. St. Rep. 709. 1027, 1037. V. Westport, 130 Mass. 478. 1495. Hier v. RuUman, 22 Kan. 606. 1049. Higdon v. Salter, 76 Miss. 766, 25 South. 864. 950. Hlggins V. Ausmuss, 77 Mo. 351. 1288, 1481. V. Bordages, 88 Tex. 458, 31 S. W. 52. 346, 364, 1228. V. Casks of Lime, 130 Mass. 1. 143. V.Crosby, 40 111. 260. 965. V. Prater, 91 Ky. 6, 14 S. W. 910. 199, 202. V. Reed, 8 Iowa 298, 74 Am. Dec. 305. 799. v.Rinker, 47 Tex. 393. 464. Higgins's Estate v. People, 193 111. 394, 61 N. E. 1124. 1246. High V. Shoemaker, 22 Cal. 363. 54, 750, 901. Highlands v. Johnson, 24 Colo. 371, 51 Pac. 1004. 793, 927, 1411. High School Dist. v. Lancaster County, 60 Neb. 147, 82 N. W. 380, 83 Am. St. Rep. 525, 49 L. R. A. 343. 314. Hight v. Fleming, 74 Ga. 592. 864. ,, Hightower v. Freedle, 5 Sneed 312. 985. Highway Com'rs v. Bast Lake Forls Special Drainage Dist. Com'rs, 127 111. 581, 21 N. B. 206. 250, 1169, 1230, 1253. v. Newell, 80 111. 587. 468. Hilbish V. Catherman, 64 Pa. St. 154. , 3, 219. v.Howei', 58 Pa. St. 93. 794, H, 1481. Hildreth v. Lowell, 11 Gray 345. 1131. Hiles V. Atlee, 90 Wis. 72, 62 N. W. 940. 996, 997. V. Cate, 75 Wis. 91, 43 N. W. 802. 938, 994, 1009. V. La Flesh, 59 Wis. 465, 18 N. W. 435. 1016, 1084. Hilgenberg v. Marion County Com'rs, 107 Ind. 494, 8 N. E. 294. 920, 921. V. Northrup, 134 Ind. 92, 33 N. B. 786. 1065.. V.Rhodes, 111 Ind. 167, 12 N. B. 149. 1065. V.Wilson, 55 Ind. 210. 387, 394, 604. Hilgers v. Quinney, 51 Wis. 62, 8 N. W. 17. 932. Hill V. Abbeville, 59 S. C. 396, 38 S. E. 11. 331, 1145. V. Atterbury, 88 Mo. 114. 1003. V. Decatur, 22 Ga. 203. 1149. V. Basthampton, 140 Mass. 381. 210. V. Flgley, 25 111. 156. 1477. V. Gordon, 45 Fed. 276. 996. V. Graham, 72 Mich. 659, 40 N. W. 779. 525, 654, 660, 730, 1513. V. Grant, 49 Pa. St. 200. 445. V. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243, 67 Am. Dec. 289. 176, 235, 323, 343, 1183, 1194, 1206, 1291. V. Kricke, 11 Wis. 442. 1016, 1085. V. Livingston Supervisors, 12 N. T. 52. 1489. V.Lund, 13 Minn. 451. 859. V.Mason, 38 Me. 461. 930,933. V. MoWry, 6 Gray 551. 747, 1000, 1001. V.Nicholson, 92 N. C. 24. 929, 930. V. Scotland County Court, 32 Fed. 716. 1363. v.Sellick, 21 Barb. 207. 1466. V.Sherwood, 96 Mo. 125, 8 S. W. 781. 897, 898. TABLE OF OASES. CXXl «111 V. Swingley, 59 Mo. 45, 60 S. W. ' 114. 1266. V. Timmermeyer, 36 Kan. 252, 13 Pac. 211. 1037. V. Townley, 45 Minn. 167, 47 N. W. 653. 814. V. Vanderpool, 15 Fla. 128. 442. V. Wait, 5 Vt. 124. 1479. V. Warrell, 87 Mich. 135, 49 N. W. 479. 486, 726, 1268. V.Wright, 49 Mich. 229, 13 N. W. 528. 1513. /Hilliard v. Asheville, 118 N. C. 845, 24 S. E. 738. 69, 1193, 1194, 1211, 1218, 1413. V. Bunker, 68 Ark. 340, 58 S. W. 362. 579, 580. V. Griffin, 72 Iowa 331, 33 N. W. 156. 941. • Hills V. Chicago, 60 III. 86. 877. V. Exchange Bank, 105 V. S. 319. 714, 715, 803. V. Savings Bank, 26 Hun 161. 1434. "Hillyer v. Farneman, 65 Iowa 227, 21 N. W. 578. 1038, 1043. V. Jonesfleld T'p, 114 Mich. 644, 72 N. W. 619. 1492. Tlilton V. Bender, 69 N. Y. 75. 579, 1006, 14521 V. Dumphey, 113 Mich. 241, 71 N. W. 527. 897. •Hilton V. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339. 24, 95, 1473. V. Singletary, 107 Ga. 821, 33 S. E. 715. 864, 865, 1009. V. Smith, 134 Mo. 499, 33 S. W. 464. 885, 894, 895. ^Himmelman v. Cahn, 49 Cal. 285. 484, 930, 1251, 1253, 1268. V. Carpenter, 47 Cal. 42. 880. v.Cofran, 36 Cal. 411. 532, 594. V. McCreery, 51 Cal. 562. 1252. V.Oliver, 34 Cal. 246. 20. V. Satterlee, 49 Cat 387. 1245. V. Satterlee, 50 Cal. 68. 1167. V. Spanagel, 39 Cal. 389. 20. V. Steiner, 38 Cal. 175. 729. V. Townsend, 49 Cal. 150. 852, 1287. -Hinchman v. Morris, 29 W. Va. 673, 2 S, E. 863. 17, 20, 804, 805, 811, 829. V. Whetstone, 23 111. 185. 1093. 'Hinckley v. Buchanan, 5 Cal. 53. 445. V.Cooper, 22 Hun 253. 762. V. Germania F. Ins. Co., 140 Mass. 38, 1 N. B. 737, 54 Am. Rep. 445. 1145. Hindman v. Aledo, 6 111. App. 436. 1324. Hinds V. Belvidere T'p, 107 Mich. 664, 65 N. W. -544. 732, 783, 13,90, 1494, 1504. V.Wilcox, 22 Mont. 4, 55 Pac. 355. 380. Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186. 177, 365, 1189, 1219, 1227. Hingham, etc. Co. v. Norfolk County, 6 Allen 353. 212, 235, 238, 392, 1297. Hinkel v. Krueger, 47 Minn. 497, 50 N. W. 689. 1035. Hinkhause v. Wilton, 94 Iowa 254, 62 N. W. 782. 672. Hinkle v. Mattoon, 170 111. 316, 48 N. B. 908. 443, 535. Hinkle, In r^, 31 Kan. 712. 432. Hinman v. Stevens, 43 Me. 437. 1468. Hinson v. Lott, 40 Ala. 123. 143, 150, 151. v.Lott, 8 Wall. 148. 143, 150, 151. Hintrager v. Hennessy, 46 Iowa 600. 1072. V. Kiene, 62 Iowa 605, 15 N. W. 568, 17 N. W. 910. 579, 1058. V. McElhinny, 112 Iowa 325, 82 N. W. 1008. 913, 950, 1037, 1042, 1051. V. Mahoney, 78 Iowa 537, 43 N. W. 522, 6 L. R. A. 50. 1048. V. Nightingale, 36 Fed. 847. 934, 935, 948, 996, 1020, 1074. V. Traut, 69 Iowa 746, 27 N. W. 807. '993, 994, 1370. Hinze v. People, 92 111. 406. 1309. Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15. 1114, 1150. Hirsh V. Commonwealth, 21 Grat. 785. 1103. Hitchcock V. Galveston, 96 U. S. 341.' 1157. V. Galveston, 4 Woods 308. 1367. V.Latham, 97 Ga. 253, 22 S. B. 997. 864. V. St. Louis, 49 Mo. 484. 181. Hlttlnger v. Boston, 139 Mass. 17, 29 N. B. 214. 656, 1407. V. Westford, 135 Mass. 258. 655, 657. Hixon V. Eagle River, 91 Wis. 649, 65 N. W. 366. 470, 5^6. V. Oneida County, 82 Wis. 515, 52 N. W. 445. 526, 753, 1440, 1441, 1443. Hoadley v. County Com'rs, 105 Mass. 519. 660. Hobart v. Detroit, 17 Mich. 246, 97 Am. Dec. 185. 410. CXXll TABLE OF CASES. Hobbs V. Clements, 32 Me. 67. 826, 831, .936. V. Hamlet, 106 Ga. 403, 32 S. E. 351. 865. V. Shumates, 11 Grat. 516. 999. V.Tipton County, 103 Ind. 575, 3 N. B. 263. 1456. Hoben v. Snell, 94 Iowa 205, 62 N. W. 739. 790. Hoboken R. etc. Co. v. State Board, 64 N. J. L. 172, 44 Atl. 960. 695. Hobson V. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 172. 1344. V. Button, 9 Kan. 477. .911, 1009. * Hodding v. New Orleans, 48 La. An. 982, 48 South. 982. 1519. Hodgdon v. Burleigh, 4 Fed. 111. 135, 516, 748, 935, 999, 1055. V.Wight, 36 Me. 326. 859, 861. Hodges V. BufEalo, 2 Denio 110. 210. V.Crowley, 186 111. 305, 57. N. B. 889. 553, 555, 561, 586. V. Nashville, 2 Humph. 61. 1144. Hodgkin v. Fry, 33 Ark. 716. 571, 581. Hodgman v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 20 Minn. 48. 581, 1437. Hodgman County Com'rs v. Gar- field County Com'rs, 42 Kan. 409, 22 Pac. 430. Hodgson V. New Orleans, 21 La. An. 301. 298. Hoefling v. San Antonio, 85 Tex. 228, 20- S. W. 85, 16 L. R. A. 608. 335, 469, 1100, 1108. Hoey V. Coleman, 46 Fed. 221. 676, 1412. Hoffeld V. Buffalo, 130 N. Y. 387, 29 N. B. 747. 1227, 1445. Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Pa. St. 444. 477, 486, 525, 724, 995, 1008. V. Groll, 35 Kan. 652, 12 Pac. 34. 921, 931, 934', 1060, 1063. V.Harrington, 28 Mich. 90. 1086. V. Lynburn, 104 Mich. 494, 62 - N. "W. 728. 425, 448, 785. V. Mattesoji's Bx'rs, 16 N. J. Bq. 382 926 V. New York,' 58 Hun 611, 13 N. Y. Supp. 137. 1490. V. Pack, 123 Mich. 74. 81 N. W. 934. 518, 524, 889, 897. V. Woods, 40 Kan. 382, 19 Pac. 805. 722. Hoffman's Bstate, In re, 76 Hun 399, 27 N. Y. Supp. 1086. 669. Hoffman's Estate, In re, 143 N. Y. 327, 38 N. B. 311. 33, 380, 669. Hoffmire v. Rice, 22 Kan. 749. 1022. Hogan V. Smith, 11 Mo. App. 314_ 886. Hoge V. Hubb, 94 Mo. 489. 7 S. W. 443. 968. V. Magnes, 56 U. S. App. 500,. 85 Fed. 355, 29 C. C. A. 564.- 939. V. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 348. Ill, 361. , Hogelskamp v. Weeks, 37 Mich. 422. 448, 581, 762, 791, 793, 827.- Hogg V. Mackay, 23 Or. 339, 21 Pac- 779, 37 Am. St. Rep. 682, 19 L. R. A. 77. 326. Hoggatt V. Bigley, 6 Humph. 236.. 1466. Hogins T. Brashears, 13 Ark. 242. 938. Hoglen V. Cohan, 30 Ohio St. 436. 802. Hohenstatt v. Bridgeton, 62 N. J_ L. 169, 40 Atl. 649. 855, 872. Hoitt V. Burnham, 61 N. H. 620. 797 939. Hoke'v. Atlanta, 107 Ga. 416, 33 S> B. 412. 1495. Holbrook v. Gouveneur, 114 IlL 623, 3 N. B. 220. 1090. Holcomb V. Keliher, 5 S. D. 438, 59- N. W. 227. 655^ Holcombe v. Beauchamp, 101 Ga. 711, 28 S. E. 973. 1027,. 1029. V. Commissioners, 89 N. C. 346, 471. V. Holcombe, 39 N. J. Bq. 592. 667. Holden v. Alton, 179 111. 318, 53 N- B. 556. 1434. V. Chicago, 172 111. 263, 50 N. B. 181. 1245. V.Eaton, 7 Pick. 15. 880. V. Baton, 8 Pick. 436. 1477,. 1480. V.James, 11 Mass. 396, 6 Am. Dec. 174. 1093. Holder v. Aultman, etc. Co., 169 U. S. 81, 18 Sup. Ct. 269. 152, 154. V.Bond (Miss.), 29 South. 769. 252. Holdom V. Chicago, 169 111. 109, 48- N. B. 164. 1217, 1255. Hole V. Rittenhouse, 19 Pa. St. 305- 923 1083 Holland v. Baltimore, 11 Md. 186, 69 Am. Dec. 195. 466, 1452,., 1456. V. Commissioners, 15 Mont. 460,. 39 Pac. 575, 27 L. R. A. 797. 26, 90, 91. V.Davis, 36 Ark. 446. 573. v.Isler, 77 N. C. 1. 1105; V.Osgood, 8 Vt. 276, 280. 492.- TABLE OF OASES. CXXIU Holland v. People, 189 111. 348, 59 N. E. 753. 1252. V. San Francisco, 7 Cal. 361. 1305. V. Silver Bow County Com'rs, 15 Mont. 460, 39 Pac. 575, 27 L. R. A. 797. 26, 90, 91. Holley V. Orange County, 106 Cal. 420, 39- Pac. 790. 748, 1201, 1256. Hollida V. Hunt, 70 111. 109, 22 Am. Rep. 63. 1138." HoUiman v. Hawklnsville, 109 Ga. 107, 34 S. B. 214. 355. HoUingsworth v. Thompson, 45 La. An. 222, 12 South. 1. -300. Hollister v. Sherman, 63 Cal. 38. 1449. , Holloway v. Jones, 143 Pa. St. 564, 22 Atl. 710. 913, 928. Holly River Coal Co. v. Howell, 36 W. Va. 489, 15 S. E. 214. 860. Holly Springs, etc. Co. v. Marshall County Supervisors, 52 Miss. 281, 289, 24 Am. Rep. 668. 112, 679, 770. Holman v. Johnson, 1 Cowp. 341. 907. Holman, Ex parte, 36 Tex. Crim. App. 255, 36 S. W. 441. 152. Holmes v. Andrews, 16 Neb. 296, 20 N. W. 347. 1022. V. Bafeer, 16 Gray 259. 723, 1430, 1439. V. Carley, 31 N. Y. 289. 1223. V.Hyde Park, 121 111. 128, 13 N. E. 540. 1246. V. Jersey City, 12 N. J. Bq. 299. 1162. V. School Dist., 11 Or. 332, 8 Pac. 287. 751. V. Taber, 9 Allen 246. 873. Holroyd v. Bean, 2 B. & Aid. 473. 1465. Hoist V. Roe, 3? Ohio St. 340, 48 Am. Rep. 459. li^l. Holt V. Antrim, 64 N. B. 284, 9 Atl. 389. 185. V.Birmingham, 11 Ala. 369, 19 South. 735. 276, 1100. V. Bast St. Louis, 150 111. 530, 37 ■N. E. 927. 1213. V. Sommeyville City Council, 127 Mass. 408. 1204, 1241, 1244, 1404. v.Weld, 140 Mass. 578, 5 N. E. 506. 959. Holterhoff v. Mead, 36 Minn. 42, 29 N. W. 675. 966. Holton V. Bansor, 23 Me. 264. 389, 1383, 1478. V. Mecklenburg Com'rs, 93 N. C. 430. 320. Helton V. Milwaukee, ^1 Wis. 27, 1162, 1183. Holt's Appeal, 5 R. I. 603. 571. Holt's Heirs v. Hemphill's Heirs,. 3 Ohio 232. 916. Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 500. 115. Holzhauer v. Newport, 94 Ky. 396, 22 S. W. 752. 409, 1189. Home P. Ins. Co. v. Lynch, 19 Utah 189, 56 Pac. 681. 272, 701, 1383. Home for Education, etc. v. Col- lector, 59 N. J. L. 343, 35 Atl. 906. 349. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta,' 50 Ga. 530. 284, 1098, 1099,- 1104,. 1137. V.Augusta, 93 U. S. 116. 1150. V. Board of Assessors, 42 La.. An. 1131, 8 South. 481. 397. V. Board of Assessors, 48 La. An. 451, 19 South. 280. 86, >356, 605, 701, 702, 703. v.New York, 134 U. S. 594, W Sup. Ct. 593. 75, 76, 77, 81, 132, 678. V. Swigert, 104 111. 653. 275,. 287, 298, 703. Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430. 108i 114. Home Sav. Bank v. ' Boston, 131 Mass. 277. 19, 971. Homestead County v. Valley R. Co., 17 Wall. 153. 824. Homer v. Cilley, 14 N. H. 85. 827, 927. V. Bellinger, 18 Fed. 495. 972. Honduras Com. Co. v. State Board, 54 N. J. L. 278, 23 Atl. 668. 149, 153. Hood V. Judkins, 61 Mich. 575, 28 N. W. 689. 654, 840, 1514. V.Lebanon Trustees (Ky.), 15 • S. W. 516. 1179. V. Lynn, 1 Allen 103. 210. V. New Orleans, 49 La. An. 1461, 22 South. 401. 732, 750, 841. Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. St. 106. 88.' Hoodgensville & B. R. Co. v. Com- monwealth (Ky.), 34 S. W. 1075. 36. Hook V. People, 177 111. 632, 52 N. E. 1036. 883. Hooker v. Bond, 118 Mich. 255, 76 N. W. 404. 481, 489, 897. Hooper v. Baltimore, 12 Md. 464. 89 V. Ely,' 46 Mo. 565. 1430, 1437. V. Emery, 14 Me. 375, 379. 183, 184, 207. V. Goodwin, 48 Me. 80. 432. V. Sac County Bank, 72 Iowa 280. 791, 913. •CXXIV TABLE OF CASES. Hooper v. Shaw, 176 Mass. 190, 57 N. B. 361. 349, 671. Hoover v. Engles, 63 Neb. 688, 88 N. W. 869. 838, 841. V. People, 171 111. 182, 49 N. B. 367. 1252, 1287, 1288. Hoozer v. Buckner, 11 B. Mon. 183. 852. Hope V. Deadrick, 8 Humph. 1, 47 Am. Dec. 597. 102. V. Sawyer,. 14 111. 254. 939. Hope Mining Ck). v. Kennon, 3 Mont. 35. 357, 361. Hopkins v. Baker, 78 Md. 363, 28 Atl. 284, 22 L. R. A. 47'J* 654. V. Brown Tobacco Co., 140 Mo. 218, 41 S. W. 776. 394, 657. V.Butte, 16 Mont. 103, 40 Pac. 171. 1494, 1501; V. Lovell, 47 Mo. 102. 1416. V. Mason, 42 How. Pr. 115. 1241. V. People, 174 111. 416, 51 N. B. 757. 546, '556. V.Reading, 170 Mass. 568, 49 N. B. 923. 613. V. Sandidge, 31 Miss. 668, 676. 827, 861, 863. V. Van Wyok, 80 Md. 7, 30 Atl. 556. 607. V. Young, 15 R. I. 48, 22 Atl. 926. 740, 747, 751, 759. Hopper V. Matteson's Bx'rs, 16 N. J. Eq. 382. 926. Horbach v. Omaha, 54 Neb. 83, 74 N. W. 434. 1128, 1251. Horn V. Garry, 49 Wis. 464'. 988. V. New Lots, 83 N. Y. 100, 38 Am. Rep. 402. 1493. ^ V-. Whittler, 6 N. H. 88. 440, 1327. Hopkins v. Scott, 86 Mo. 140. 988, 997. ■ * Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305, 12 Sup. Ct. 403. 26, 76, 95, 154, 171, 379, 718. Home V. Green, 52 Miss. 452. 132, 644. V. Johnson, 87 Ga. 448, 13 S. W. 633. 864. Hornung v. McCarthy, 126 Cal. 17, 58 Pac. 303. 531. Horrlgan v. Wellmuth, 77 Mo. 542. 812, 814. Horse, etc. R. Co v. Donoghue, 127 111. 27, 18 N. E. 827, 11 Am. St. Rep. 90. 783, 1445. Horstmeyer v. Connors, 56 Mo. App. 115. 821. Horton v. Hendershot, 1 Hill 118. 1479. V. School Com'rs, 43 Ala. 598. 199, 1299. Horton v. Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513. 215. Hosbrook v, Schooley, 74 Fed. 51. 1019. Hoskins v. Illinois Central R. Co., 78 Miss. 768, 29 South. 518, 84 Am. St. Rep. 644. 138, 911. Hosmer v. People, 96 111. 58. 497, 828. V. People, 134 111. 317, 25 N. E. 747. 903. Hospers v. Wyatt, 63 Iowa 264, 19 N. W. 204. 1436. Hospital V. Philadelphia County, 24 Pa. St. 229. 355, 1496, 1501. Hotel Co.' V. Lieb, 83 111. 602. See Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb. Hotson V. Wetherby, 88 Wis. 324, 60 N. W. 423. 994, 1002, 1009, 1085. Houdayer's Estate, In re, 150 N. Y. 37, 44 N. E. 185, 55 Am. St. Rep. 642, 34 L. R. A. 234. 92. Hough V. Auditor-General, 116 Mich. 663, 74 N. W. 1045. 809. V. Basley, 47 Iowa 330. 961. Hough, Ex parte, 69 Fed. 330. 152. Houghton V. Austin, 47 Cal. 646. 46, 106, 589, 778, 1432, 1450. V.Boston, 159 Mass. 138, 34 N. B. 93. 805. V. Davenport, 23 Pick. 235. 572, 837 * V.Hall,' 47 Vt. 333. 761. Houghton County v. Auditor-Gen- erali 36 Mich. 271. 1368, 1371. V. Auditor-General, 41 Mich. 28, 1 N. W. 890. 477, .1371. House V. Grumble & Co., 78 Miss. 259, 29 South. 71. 949. V. Los Angeles County, 104 Cal. 73, 37 Pac. 796. 427. V. State, 41 Miss. 737. 504. V. Stone, 64 Tex. 677. 1065. House of Refuge v. Smith, 140 Pa. St. 387, 21 Atl. 353. 849. House Bill, In re, 9 Colo.- 635, 21 Pac. 476. 281, 428, 1311. House Bill, In re, 15 Colo. 593, 595, 26 Pac. 141. 240. House Bill. In re, 23 Colo. 492, 48 Pac. 535. 33, 281. House Resolution, In re, 9 Cblo. 622, 21 Pac. 471. 281. House Roll, In re, 31 Neb. 505, 48 N. W. 275. 173, 566. Housel V. Boggs, 17 Neb. 94, 22 N. W. 226. 1080. Houser, etc. Manuf. Co. v. Har- grove, 129 Cal. 90, 61 Pac. 660.- 525, 650, 856. Houston V. Buer, li7 111. 324, 7 N. E. 646. 1044. TABLE OF OASES. cxxv Houston, etc. Co. v. State, 39 Tex. 149. 836. Houston County v. Dwyer, 59 Tex. 113. 1336. Houston County Com'rs v. Jessup, 22 Minn. .552. 842. Houston, In re, 47 Fed. 539, 4 L. R. A. 719. 153. Hovey v. Board of Com'rs, 56 Kan. 577, 44 Pac. 17. 104. Howard v. Augusta, 74 Me. 78. 866, 881, 1506. V.Bristol, 8 Bush 493. 1247. V. Church, 18 Md. 314. 1206. V. First Indep. Church, 18 Md. 451. 907, 1182, 1247. V. Heck, 88 Mo. 456. 486, 760. V. Proctor, 7 Gray 128. 440, 443, 1477. V. Stevenson, 11 Mo. App. 410. 895. V. Zeyer, 18 I^. An. 407. 1064. Howard County v. Armstrong, 91 Ind.,528. 1397. V. Strother, 71 Iowa 683, 33 N. W. 238. 835, 854. Howard-Harrison Iron Co., Ex parte, 119 Ala. 484, 24 South. 516, 72 Am. St. Rep. 928. 779, 1394. Howard Sav. Inst. v. Newark, 52 N. J. L,. 1, 18 Atl. 672. 529. V.Newark, 63 N. J. L. 547, 44 Atl. 654. 131. Howcott V. Board of Com'rs, 46 La. An. 322, 14 South. 848. 735. Howe V. Barto, 12 Wash. 627, 41 Pac. 908. 1008. V.Boston, 7 Cush. 273. 1379, 1478, 1494. V.Cambridge, 114 Mass. 388. 52, 71. - , V. Genin, 57 Wis. 268, 15 N. W. 161. 1087. V. Howe, 179 Mass. 546, 61 N. E. 225, 55 L. R. A. 626. 668. V. Moulton, 87 Me. 120, 32 Atl. 781. 840. V. People, 86 111. 288. 735. V. Russel, 36 Me 115. 914. Howell V. Bristol, 8 Bush 493. 227, 258, 424, 1182, 1206,' 1314. V.Buffalo, 15 N. Y. 512. 556, 594, 1266, 1512. V. Buffalo, 37 N. Y. 267, 273. 235, 1182. V. Cassopolls, 35 Mich. 471. 716. V. Gordon, 127 Mich. 517, 86 N. W. 1042. 89, 651, 652. V. Jump, 140 Mo. 441, 41 S. W. 976. 819. V.Maryland, 3 Gill 14. 9, 88, 357. V.Richards, 47 N. J. L. 434, 1 Atl. 495. 318, 503. Howell V. Scott, 44 Kan. 247, 24 Pac. 481. 605, 606. V. State, 3 Gill 14. 9, 88, 357. V. Tacoma, 3 Wash. St. 711, 29. Pac. 447, 28 Am. St. Rep. 83. 1228, 1427, 1518. Howell's Estate, Matter of, 147 Pa- st. 164, 23 Atl. 403. 380. Hower's Appeal, 127 Pa. St. 134, 17 Atl. 862. 1393. Howes V. Bassett, 56 Vt. 141. 620,. 1473. V. Reis, 40 Cal. 255. 480. V. Walker, 92 Ky. 258, 17 S. W. 576. 1369. Howe Savings Bank v. Boston, 131 Mass. 2Y7. 20. Howe's Estate, Matter of, 112 N. Y. 100, 19 N. E. 513, 2 L. R. A. 825.. 380. Howland v. Chicago, 108 Ilf. 496. 1110. V. Eldredge, 43 N. Y. 457. 1356,. 1522. V. Pettey, 15 R. I. 603, 10 Atl.. 650. 939, 944, 951, 954. Howze V. Dew, 90 Ala. 178, 7 South. 239, 24 Am. St. Rep. 783. 928. Hoyle V. Southern Athletic Club,. 48 La. An. 879, 19 South. 937. 928. Hoyt V. Chapin, 85 Minn. 524, 89 N.. W. 850. 959, 980. V. Clark, 64 Minn. 139, 66 N. W. 262. 729,^897, 1035, 1040, 1041. V. Commissioners of Taxes, 23' N. Y. 224. 88, 89. / V. Bast Saeinaw, 19 Mich. 39, 2 Am. Rep. 76. 236, 1182, 1191, 1206, 1244. Hubbard v. Auditor-General, 120' Mich. 505, 79 N. W. 979. 805, 1369, 1464. V. Brainard, 35 Conn. 563. 462,. 590, 1502. V. Brush, 61 Ohio St. 25-2, 55 N.. E. 829. 271, 323, 326, 371, 396, 451. V. Garfield, 102 Mass. 72. 529,. 1481. V. Godfrey, 100 Tenn. 15,0, 47 S. W. 81. 1092. V.Johnson, 9 Kan. 632. 1091. V. Shepard, 117 Mich. 25, 75 N. W. 92. 968. V. Sprlngwells T'p Board, 2S- ■ Mich. 153. 214. V.Taunton, 140 Mass. 467, 5 N. E. 157. 211. V. Wlnsor, 15 Mich. 146. 425,, 619, 732, 741, 785, 786, 798. Hubbell V. Campbell, 56 Cal. 527.. 999. -CXXVl TABLE or OASES. Huber v. Pickler, 94 Mo. 382, 7 S. "Vy. 427. 810, 898. Hubley v. Keyser, 2 P. & "Watts 496. 743. Huck V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 86 111. 352. 680, 697, 698, 1443. Huckins v. Boston, 4 Cush. 543. 1489. Hudler v. Golden, 36 N. Y. 446. 1129. Hudson V. Atchison County, 12 Kan. 140. 1429. V. People, 188 111. 103, 58 N. B. 964, 80 Am. St. Rep. 16l5? 810. / Hudson Common Council v. Whit- ney, 53 Mich. 158, 18 N. W. 626. 1367, 1371. Hudson County Catholic Protectory V. Board of T'p Com. of Kearney, 56 N. J. L. 385, 28 Atl. 1043. 364, 1229. Hudson River Bridge Co. v. Patter- son, 74 N. Y. 365. 637. Huey V. Police Jury, 33 La. An. 1091. 1367. V. Van Wie, 23 Wis. 613. 492. Hufe V. Jacksonville, 39 Fla. 1, 21 South. 776. 346, 877. Hugging V. Hinson, 1 Phil. N. C. 126. 1470. Hughes V. Cairo, 92 111. 339. 287, 298. V. Cannedy, 92 Cal. 382, 28 Pac. 573. 998' 1036. V. EarJ, 106 Ky. 533, 50 S. W. , 852. 248, 295. T. Carne, 135 111. 519, 26 N. B. 517. 1038, ^1042. v. Jordan, 118 Mich. 27, 76 N. W. 134. 959, 980, 993, 1056. V. Kelley, 69 Vt. 443, 38 Atl. 91. 801. V.Kline, 30 Pa. St. 227. 1383, 1441, 1445. V. Kline, 30 Pa. St. 230. 1283, 1390. V.Linn County, 37 Or. Ill, 60 Pac. 843. . 795, 826, 1451. V. Momence, 163 111. 535, 45 N. E. 300. 1177. V. Momence, 164 111. 16, 45 N. B. 302. 1177. V. Parker, 148 Ind. 692, 48 N. E. 243. 1395. V. Staunton, 97 Va. 518, 34 S. B. 450. 672. V.Thomas (Miss.), 29 South. 74. 743, 748, 1001. V. Vail, 57 Vt. 41. 636. ■Hughes, Petition of, 93 N. Y. 512. 1443, 1446. Hughey's Lessee v. Horrel, 2 Ohio St. 231. 249, 916, 936. Hughson V. Crane, 115 Cal. 404, 47 Pac. 120. 1393. Huiscamp v. Albert, 60 Iowa 421, 15 N. W. 264. 854. Hulbert v. People, 189/111. 114, 59 N. E. 567. 772, 1383. • Huling V. Enrich, 183 111. 315, 55 N. E. 636. 783. Hull V. Chicago, 156 111. 381, 40 N. E. 937. 1271. V. Oneida Supervisors, 19 Johns. 259. 1353. v. People, 170 111. 246, , 48 N. B. 984. 1274. V. Southern Development Co., 89 Md. 8, 42 Atl. 599. 851. V. State, 29 Fla. 79, 11 South. 79, 30 Am. St. Rep. 95, 16 L. R. A. 308. 1054, 1370. Humboldt County v. Lander Coun- • ty, 24 Nev. 461, 56 Pac. 228. 836. Hume V. Wainscott, 46 Mo. 145. 727, 729, 730. Humes v. Fort Smith, 93 Fed. 857. 68, 80, 277. Humphrey v. Auditor-General, 70 Mich. 292, 38 N. W. 214. 499. V. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244. 110, 114. Humphreys v. Nelson, 115 111. 45, 4 N. E. 637. 616, 1383. Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio St. 395. 1001, 1092. Hun, In re, 144 N. Y. 472, 39 N. E. 377. 2, 1156, 1289. Hundley v. Commissioners, 67 111. 559. 250. V.Taylor (Ky.), 25 S. W. 887. 992. Hunerberg v. Hyde Park, 130 111. 156, 22 N. E. 486. 1246. Hungerford v. Hartford, 39 Conn. 279. 1173, 1207. Hunnewell v. Cass County, 22 Wall. 464. 136, 138. V. Charlestown, 106 Mass. 350. 1415, 1447. Hunsaker v. Wright, 130 111. 146. 285, 288, 408. Hunt V. Chapin, 42 Mich. 24, 3 N. W. 873. 448,' 490, 1003. V. Cicero, 60 111. 184. 600. V. Curry, 37 Ark. 100. 1018. V. Easterday, 10 Neb. 165, 4,N. W. 952. 1427. V. Gaines, 33 Ark. 267. 968, 969. V. Lyman, 76 Iowa 751, 39 N. W. 909. 1049. V. McFadgen, 20 Ark. 277. 808. V. Miller, 101 Wis. 583, 77 N. W. 874. 996. V. Perry, 165 Mass. 287, 43 N. B. 103. 87, 527, 529, 662, 795. TABLE OF OASES. cxxvu Hunt V. School District, 14 Vt. 300, 39 Am. Dec. 225. 576. V.Seymour, 76 Iowa 751, 39 N. W. 909. 1049. V. State, 48 N. J. L. 613, 9 Atl. 199. 495, 936. v.Stinson, 101 Wis. 556, 77 N. W. 961. 1003, 1060, 1066. V. Utica, 18 N. Y. 442. 1281. Hunter v. Borck, 51 Ohio St. 320, 37 N. E. 714. 903. V. Cochran, 3 Pa. St. 105. 810. V. Early, 75 Iowa 769, 37 N. W. 776, 913, 1020. V.Florida L. & M. Co., 33 Fla. 356, 14 South. 796. 810. v.Kirk, 4 Hawks 277. 445, 44.6. Hunter's Appeal, 71 Conn. 189, 41 Atl. 557. 1175, 1255. Hunter's Appeal (Pa.), 10 Atl. 429. 673. Hunter Stone Co. v. Woodard, 152 Ind. 474, 53 N. E. 947. 463, 494, 526, 6p8, 1441. Huntin.gton v. Brantley, 33 Miss. 451. 825. V. Central Pac. R. Co., 2 Sawy. 503. 132, 139, 603, 1450. V. Palmer, 7 Sawy. 355, 8 Fed. 449. 1425. V.Smith, 25 Ind. 486. 1362. v.Worthen, 120 U. S. 97, 7 Sup. Ct. 469. 56. Huntington County v. State, 109 Ind. 596, 10 N. E. 625. 1362. Huntington's Estate, In re, 168 N. 'Y. 399, 61 N. E. 643. 349, 450, 505. Huntley v. Winona-Bank, 69 Miss. 663, 13 South. 832. 586. ' Hunt's Lessee v. McMahan, 5 Ohio 133. 1064. Hurd V. Brisner, 3 Wash. 1, 28 Pac. 371, 28 Am. St. Rep. 17. 1009, 1084. v.Hamill, 10 Colo. 174, 14 Pac. 126. 921, 1017. Hurford v. Omaha, 4 Neb. 336. 1193. v. State, 91 Tenn. 669, 20 S. W. 201. 152. Hurla V. Kansas City, 46 Kan. 738, 27 Pac. 143. 248. HuTlburt V. Green, 41 Vt. 490. 642, 1485. V.Green, 42 Vt. 316. 642, 853. Hurlbut V. Bradford, 109 111. 397. 1090. Hurley v. Hurley, 148 Mass. 444, 19 N. E. 545, 2 L. R. A. 172. 821, 1046. V. Powell, 31 Iowa 64. 523. y. Street, 29 Iowa 429. 940. Hurley v. Texas, 20 Wis. 634. 1489, 1505. V. Woodruff, 30 Iowa 260. 1008. Huron Land Co. v. Robarge, 128 Mich. 686, 87 N. W. 1032. 985, 1051. Hurt V. Hamilton, 25 Kan. 76. 574. Huse V. Glover, 15 Fed. 292. 148. V. Glover, 119 U. S. 543, 7 Sup. Ct. 713. 5, 148. V. Merriam, 2 Greenl. (Me.) -375. 590, 591. Hush V. Commonwealth, 21 Grat. 785. 1117. Hus.s V. Craig, 124 N. C. 743, 32 S. E. 974. 988. Hussman v. Durham, 165 U. S. 144, 17 Sup. Ct. 254. 137, 920. Huston V. Markley, 49 Iowa 162,. 945. V. Tribbetts, 171 111. 547, 49 N. E. 711, 63 Am. St. Rep. 275. 3, 821, 1154, 1155. Hutchens v. Doe, 3 Ind. 528. 590, 956. Hutcheson v. Storrie, 92 Tex. 685, 51 S: W. 848, 71 Am. St. Rep. 884, 45 L. R. A. 289. 69, 1239, 125G, 1389 1392 Hutchins v. Moody, 30 Vt. 165. 873. V.Moody, 34 Vt. 433. 872, 873. Hutchinson v. Board of Equaliza- tion, 66 Iowa 35, 23 N. W. 249. 91, 490, 658, 775, 784. V. Kline, 199 Pa. St. 564, 49 Atl. 312. 636. V.Omaha, 52 Neb. 345, 72 N. W. 218. 47, 772, 774, 1247, 1252, 1382, 1517. V. Oskaloosa Equal. Board, 66 Iowa 35, 23 N. W. 249. 91, 490. 658, 775, 784. V. Oskaloosa Equal. Board, 67 Iowa 182, 25 N. W. 121. 270. - V. Ozark Land Co., 57 Ark. 554, 22 S. W. 173, 38 Am. St. Rep. 258. 227, 277. V.Pittsburgh, 72 Pa. St. 320. 1445. V.Rochester, 92 Hun 393, 36 N. Y. Supp. 766. 869, 1284. Hutson V. Woodbridge Protection Dist, 79 Cal. 90, 21 Pac. 435. 628, 1238 Hutt V. Chicago, 132 111. 352, 23 N. B. 1010. 1255. Hutton V. Webb, 126 N. C. 897, 36 a "pi Q4"l 207 Hyatt V. Allen, 54 Cal. 353. 1358. Hyde v. Supervisors, 43 Wis. 129. 921 Hyde Park v. Ingalls, 87 111. 340. 589. CXXVlll TABLE OF CASES. Hyde Park v. Spencer, 118 111. 446, 8 N. E. 846. 1172. v.Waite, 2 111. App. 443. 529. Hydes v. Joyes, 4 Bush 464, 96 Am. Dec. 311. 105, 1129. Hyland v. Brazil Block Ooal Co., 128 Ind. 335, 26 N. E. 672. 397, 631, 773, 774. V. Central I. & S. Co., 129 Ind. 68, 28 N. E. 308, 13 L. R. A. 515. 13, 689, 1425. Hylton V. United States, 3 Ball. 171. 11. Hynes v. Briggs, 41 Fed. 468. 15»> 1097. I. Iddings V. Cairns, 2 Grant's Cases, 88. 525. Ida V. Finneran, 29 Kan. 569. 275, 288. 325, 408. I. F. & S. C. R. Co. V. Storm Lake Bank, 55 Iowa 696, 8 N. W. 649. 1048. Illinois & St. L. R. & C. Co. v. Stookey, 122 111. 358, 13 N. B. 516. 617, 753, 1385. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Adams, 78 Miss. 895, 29 South. 996. 20, 844. V. Bloomington, 76 111. 447. 1157. V. Commissioners, 129 111. 417, 21 N. E. 925. 1230, 1288. V. Decatur, 126 111. 92, 18 N. E. 315, 1 L. R. A. 613. 1154, 1269. V.Decatur, 154 111. 173, 38 N. E. 626. 362, 363. V.Decatur, 147 U. S. 190, 13 Sup. Ct. 293. 362, 363, 1203. V.Goodwin, 94 111. 262. 369. V.Hodges, 113 111. 323. 1415, 1419. V. Irvin, 72 111. 452. 368. V. Kankakee, 164 111. 608, 45 N. E. 971. 1230. V. Le Blanc, 74 Miss. 650, 21 South. 760. 639, 743, 960, 1001. V. McLean County, 17 111. 291. 274, 288, 293, 325, 408, 1444. V. Mattoon, 141 111. 32, 30 N. B. 773. 362 V. People, 119 111. 137, 6 N. B. 451. 376. V. People, 170 111. 224, 48 N. B. 215. 740, 750, 889, 1230, 1231, 1258, 1288. Illinois Conf. Fern. Coll. v. Cooper, 25 111; 148. 584. Illinois Mut. Ins. Co. v. Peoria, 29* HI. 180. 403. Illinois State Board v. People, 123 111. 227, 13 N. B. 201. 1353. I., M. & N. P. R. Co. v. Schenck, 56 Iowa 628, 10 N. W. 215. 215. Immegart v. Gorgas, 41 Iowa 439. 744, 1013. Incher v. Raleigh, 73 N. C. 267.- 566. Income-Tax Cases. See Pollock v. Farmers' Loan, etc. Co. > Independence v. Gates, 110 Mo. 374, 19 S. W. 728. 1216. V. Noland, 21 Mo. 394. llOOi Independent Dist. v. Taylor, lOO^ Iowa 617, 69 N. W. 1009. 844,. 1398. Independent School Dist. v. Hew- itt, 105 Iowa 663, 75 N. W. 497. 268. Indiana v. American Express Co., 7 Biss. 227. 158. V. Pullman Palace Car Co., li Biss. 561, 16 Fed. 193. 84, 156, 162. Indiana Bridge Co. v. Carr, 95 Fed 594, 37 C. C. A. 187. 1327. Indiana County v. Agricultural. Soc, 85 Pa. St. 357. 329. Indiana, I. & I. R. Co. v. People,- 154 111. 558, 33 N. B. 193. 693. Indianapolis v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30, 36 N. B. 857. 168, 289. V.Holt, 155 Ind. 222, 57 N. B.- 966, 988, 1100. 70, 1222i V. McAvoy, 86 V Ind. 587. 478,. 1351, 1499. V. McLean, 8 Ind. 328. 357. V. Mansur, 15 Ind. 112. 466,. 1163. V.Morris, 25 Ind. App. 409, 58 N. E. 510. 501, 1490. V.Patterson,. 112 Ind. 344, 14' N. B. 55L 1498. V. Sturdevant, 24 Ind. 391. 343. V. Vajen, 111 Ind. 240, 12 N. E 311. 1490. Indianapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Peo- ple, 130 111. 62, 22 N. E. 854. 696: Indianapolis & V. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 609, 33 Ind. 443. 402. V. Capitol Pavingi etc. Co., 24 Ind. App. 114, 64 N. B: 1076. 556, 1157, 1214, 1231. Industrial School v. Brown, 46 Md. 335. 18L Industrial Univ. v. Champaign County, 76 111. 283. 264. Ingersoll v. Des Moines, 46 Iowa 553. 784, 1394. V.Jeffords, 55 Miss. 37: 824; 1021. TABLE OF OASES. CXXIX Inglee v. Bosworth, 6 Pick. 498, 16 Am. Dec. 419. 382, 1468, 1470, 1488, 1494, 1510. Ingraham v. Doggett, 5 Pick. 451. 1470. v.McGraw, 3 Kan. 521. 446. Ingraliam, Matter of, 64 N. Y. 310. 1212. Ingram v. CJowles, 150 Mass. 155, 23 N. E. 48. 657. Inhabitants of . See name of Town, City, County, etc. • Inman v. Coleman, 37 Hun 170. 762. Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238. 146, 147. Innes v. Drexel, 78 Iowa 253, 43 N. W. 201. 994, 1072. Insurance Co. v. Baltimore, 23 Md. 296. 309, 422, 1373. V.Bonner, 24 Colo. 220, 49 Pac. 366. 1405, 1411, 1422, 1425. V. Cappellar, 38 Ohio St. 560. 272. V. Commonwealth, 87 Pa. St. 173, 30 Am. Rep. 352. 701. • V. French, 18 How. 404. 95. v.Lott, 54 Ala. 499. 388. V. New Orleans, 1 Woods 85. 287, 298. V. Sortwell, 8 Allen 217. 580. V. Soule, 7 Wall. 433. 6, 178, 179. v.Yard, 17 Pa. St. 331, 338. 383, 484, 632, 736. Insurance Cos. v. Estes, 106 Tenn. 472, — S. W. — , 52 L. R. A. 915. 133. International, etc. R. Co. v. Ander- son County, 59 Tex. 654. 355. V.Smith County, 54 Tex. 1. 548, 1385. T. Smith County, 65 Tex. 21. 374. T. State, 75 Tex. 356, 12 S. W. 685. 114. International Nav. Co. v. Common- wealth, 104 Pa. St. 38. 675. International Trading St. Co. v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 181, 47 S. W. 136. 105. Interstate B. & L. Assoc, v. Waters, 50 S. C. 459, 27 S. B. 948. 825, 849, 864, 961, 964. lodence v. Peters, 04 Neb. — , 89 N. W. 1041. 884, 986. Iowa & D. I^and Co. v. Barnes County, 6 N. D. 601, 72 N. W. 1019. 922. Iowa Central Pac. R. Co. v. People, 156 111. 373, 40 N. E. 954. 618. Iowa City v. Newell, 115 Iowa 85, 87 N. W. 739. 1107. lova Homestead Co. v. Webster County, 21 Iowa 221. 136, 292. Iowa Land Co. v. Douglas County, 8 S. D. 491, 67 N. W. 52. 17, 21, 825, 841, 853, 869, 874, 881, 910. Iowa R. L. Co. V. Carroll County, 39 Iowa 151. 581, 809, 1441. V.Davis, 102 Iowa 128, 71 N. W. 229. 803. V. Guthrie, 53 Iowa 383, 5 N. W. 519. 804. V. Sao County,' 39 Iowa 124. 468, 558, 934, 1441. V. Soper, 39 Iowa 112. 511, 517. V. Woodbury County, 39 Iowa 172. 582. V. Woodbury County, 64 Iowa 212, 19 N. W. 1915. 1398. Iowa Pipe, etc. Co.'s Appeal, 101 Iowa 170, 70 N. W. 115. 704. Iowa State Savings Bank v. Bur- lington City Council, 93 Iowa 119, 61 N. W. 851. 708. Iowa Union Tel. Co. v. Board of Eqital., 67 Iowa 250, 25 N. W. 155. 675. Irby V. Livingston, 81 Ga. 281, 6 S. E. 591. 1334, 1344. Ireland v. George, 41 Kan. 751, 21 Pac. 776. 934, 935, 936, 938, 959, 1037. , Iron City Bank v. Pittsburgh, 37 Pa. St. 340. 115, 402. Iron River v. Bayfield County, 106 Wis. 587, 82 N. W. 559. 909.' Iron Star Co. v. Wehse, -117 Mich. 487, 76 N. W. 66. 730. ' Irrigation Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360, 18 Pac. 379. 104. Irvin V. Gill, 155 Pa. St. 8, 25 Atl. 649. 556. V. Gregory, 86 Ga. 605, 13 S. B. 120. 1215, V. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 94 111. 105, 34 Am. Rep. 208. 88, 653. Irving V. Brownell, 11 111. 402. 916. Irwin V. Bank of United States, 1 Pa. St. 349. 963. V. Burdick, 79 Iowa 69, 44 N. W. 375. 1040. V.Lowe, 89 Ind. 540. 573. V.Miller, 23 111. 348. 579. V. Pierro, 44 Minn. 490, 47 N. W. 154. 889. V.Trego, 22 Pa. St. 365. 961. y. Trego, 35 Pa. St. 9. 961. Irwin's Succession, 33 La. An. 63. 18, 836. Irwin's Succession, 38 La. An. 75. 457. Isaacs V. Decker, 41 Ind. 410. 867, 868. cxxx TABLE OF OASES. Isaacs V. Shattuck, 12 Vt. 668. 933. V.Wiley, 22 Vt. 674. 437. Isbell V. Crawford County, 40 Iowa 102. 1398, 1490. Isle of Ely, Case of, 10 Rep. 142 b. 1171. Ithaca V. Cornell, 75 Hun 425, 27 N. Y. Sup. 682. 840. , Ivanhoe v. Enterprise, 29 Or. 245, 45 Pac. 771, 35 L. R. A. 58. 1289. Ivens, etc. Co. v. Parker, 42 La. An. 1103, 8 South. 399. 347. Iverslie v. Spauldlng, 32 Wis. 394. 919, 930, 936. ♦ Ives V. Goshen, 63 Conn. 79, 26 Atl. 845. 752. V. Goshen, 65 Conn. 456, 32 Atl. 932. 751, 1396. V. Irey, 51 Neb. 136, 70 N. W. 961. 486, 632, 1252, 1424, 1453. V.Kimball, 1 Mich. 308. 1006. V.Lynn, 7 Conn. 504. , 852, 1025, 1027. Ivey V. Griffin, 94 Ga. 689, 21 S. B. 709. 1052. Ivinson v. Hance, 1 Wyo. 270. 135, 1418. J. Jack V. Weiennett, 115 111. 105, 3 N. E. 445, ,56 Am. Hep. 159. 1, 3, 4, 17, 20, 849, 854. Jackman v. School Dist., 5 Gray 413. 467. Jacks V. Chaffln, 34 Ark. 534. 8, 1001. V.Dyer, 31 Ark. 334. 619, 805, 965, 998, 1066. Jackson v. Atlanta, 61 Ga. ' 228. 1497, 1499. v. Babcock, 16 N. Y. 246. 739, 950. V.Bullock, 12 Conn. 38. 168. V. Challis, 41 Kan. 247, 21 Pac. 87. 247, 937, 956, 1020, 1037. V. Chizum, 78 Iowa 209, 42 N. W. 650. 784. V. County Treasurer, 177 Mich. 305, 75 N. W. 617. 443. v.Bsty, 7 Wend. 148. 1036, 1037. V. Jacksonport, 56 Wis. 310, 14 N. W. 296. 988. V.King; 82 Ala. 432, 3 South. 232. 734, 964, 969. v.Kirksey, 110 Ala. 547, 18 South. 304. 992, 996. V. kittle, 34 W. Va. 207, 12 S. E. 484. 946. V. La Moure County, 1 N. D. 238, 46 N. W. 449. 137. Jackson v. Morse, 18 Johns. 441, 9 Am. Dec. 225. -810. v.Neal, 136 Ind. 173, 35 N. E. 1021. 1050, 1072. V. Newman, 59 Miss. 385, 42 Am. Rep. 367. 1140, 1499. V. People, 9 Mich. Ill, 77 Am. Dec. 491. 1405. v.Relf, 26 Fla. 465, 8 South. 184. 813. V. Sassaman, 29 Pa. St. 106. 724. V. Shepard, 7 Cow. 88, 17 Am. Dec. 502. 446, 916. V. Sloman, 117 Mich. 126, 75 N. W. 282. 742, 1001. V. Smith, 120 Ind. 520, 22 N. E. 431. 1246, 1285. V. Stoetzel, 87 Pa. St. 302. 724. V.Wren, 36 La. An. 315. 912, 1010. V.Young, 5 Cow. 269, 15 Am. Dec. 473. 492. Jackson, etc. Co. v. Snyder, 93 Mich. 325, 53 N. W. 359. 844, 905. Jackson County v. Gullatt, 84 Ala. 243, 3 South. 906. 1331. Jackson T'p v. Wood, 55 Kan. 628, 40 Pac. 897. 240. Jackson T'p Trustees v. Thoman, • 51 Ohio St. 285, 37 N. B. 523. 1509. Jacksonville v. Basnett, 20 Pla. 525. 511. V. Hamill, 178 111. 235, 52 N. E. 949. 1250, 1258. V. Ledwith, 26 Fla. 163, 7 South. 885, 9 L. R. A. 69. 1100, 1140, 1142. Jacob V. Preston, 31 La. An. 514. 874. Jacobs V. Buckalew (Ariz.), 42 Pac. 619. 486, 738, 954. V. Chicago, 178 111. 560, 53 N. B. 363. 1245. V.Porter, 34 Iowa 342, 345. 1047. Jaffray y. Anderson, 66 Iowa 718, 24 N. W. 527. 856, 865. Jamaica & B. R. Co. v. Brook- lyn, 123 N. T. 375, 25 N. E. 476. 1413. James v. Bucks County, 13 Pa. St. 72. 1359. V. Hicks, 110 U. S. 272, 4 Sup. Ct. 6. 1486. V.Louisville (Ky.), 40 S. W. 912. 1179. V. New Orleans, 19 La. An. 109. 1489. Jamison v. Thompson, 65 Miss. 516, 5 South. 107. 1084. TABLE OF OASES. CXXXl Janes t. Wilkinson, 2 Kan. App. 361, 42 Pac. 7^5. 993. Jaques v. Kopman, 6 La. An. 542. 750. Jaqulth V. Putney, 48 N. H. 138. 541, 544, 728, 953. Jarrot v. Moberly, 103 U. S. 580. 181. Jarvis v. Peck, 19 Wis. 84, 960, 961. V. Silliman, 21 Wis. 600. 936. Jasper v. Sheridan, 47 Iowa 183. 415. Jasper County v. Wadlow, 82 Mo. 172. 963. Jatunn v. O'Brien, 89 Cal. 57, 26 Pac. 635. 1003. Jebeles v. State, 117 Ala. 174, 23 South. 676. 844. ■ Jeffiers v., Sydnam (Mich.), 89 N. W. 42. 819. Jefferson v. Paterson, 32 Jnd. 140. 1418. Jefferson, In re, 35 Minn. 215, 28 N. W. 256. 20, 23, 91. Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436. 110. . Jefferson City v. McCarty, 74 Mo. 5g. 881. V. Mock, 74 Mo. 631. 812, 845. V.Whipple, 71 Mo. 519. 750, 865, 883. Jefferson County Com'rs v. John- son, 23 Kan. 717. 578, 750, 761. Jefferson County Savings Bank v. Hewitt, 112 Ala. 546, 20 South. 926. 401, 706. Jefferson Land Co. v. Grace, 57 Ark. 423, 21 South. 877. 988. Jefferson Police Jury v. Marrero, 38 La. An. 896. 1114. Jefferson School T'p v. Yitton, 116 Ind. 467, 19 N. B. 323. 514. Jefferson's Estate, 35 Minn. 215, 28 N. W. 256. 20, 23, 91. Jeffrey v. Brokaw, 35 Iowa 505. 508, 523, 1068. Jeffries v. Clark, 23 Kan. 448. 619, 741, 1022. V.Lawrence, 42 Iowa 498. 468. Jehle V. Brooks, 112 Mich. 131, 70 N. W. 440. 814. Jelliff, State, v. Newark, 48 N. J. L. 101, 2 Atl. 627. 549, 1216, 1257, 1258. V.Newark, 49 N. J. L. 239, 12 Atl. 770. 549, 1165, 1216, 1257, 1258. Jenison v. Conklin, 114 Mich. 9, 71 N. W. 1114. 980, 990. Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94. 102, 584. V. Mclngree, 22 Fed. 148. 1003. Jenkins v. McTigue, 22 Fed. 148. 750, 759. v.Neff, 163 N. Y. 320, 57 N. B. 408. 711. V.Rice, 84 Ind. 342. 1019. V.Rock County, 15 Wis., 11. 1451. V. Sharpf, 27 Wis. 472. 751. V. Stetler, 118 Ind. 275, 20 N. E.' 788. 1516. T.Waldron, 11 Johns. 114, 6 Am. Dec. 359. 1466. Jenkinson v. Auditor-General, 104 Mich. 34, 62 N. W. 163. 524, 989, 1455, 1463. Jenks V. Brewster, 96 Fed. 625. 966. V. Hathaway, 48 Mich. 536, 12 N. W. 691. 1455. V. Horton, 96 Mich. 13, 55 N. W. 372. 819. V. Lima, 17 Ind. 326. 1501. V.Wright, 61 Pa. St. 410. 921, 930, 931, 942, 979, 1035, 1052. ' Jenney v. Mussey T'p, 121 Mich. 229, 80 N. W. 2. 1492. Jennings v. Coal Ridge, etc. Co., 147 U. S. 147, 13 Sup. Ct. 282. 26, 65, 73, 77, 169, 676. V. Collins, 99 Mass. 29, 96 Am. ' Dec. 687. 735, 737, 738. T. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 80, , 34 S. B. 981. 402, 404. v.Le Breton, 80~Cal. 8, 21 Pac. 1127. 1218, 1388. V.Stafford, 1 Ired. 404. 879. Jensen v. Supervisors, 47 Wis. 298, 2 N. W. 320. 1313. Jenswold v. Doran, 77 Iowa 692, 42 N. W. 465. 949, 1039. ■ Jermyn v. Fowler, 186 Pa. St., 595, 40 Atl. 972. 103. Jersey City v. Foster, 32 N. J. Bq. 825. 265, 868. v.Riker, 38 1^. J. L. 225, 20 Am. Rep. 386. 1496. Jesse V. Preston, 5 Grat. 120. 914, 937. Jeudevine v. Jackson, 18 Vt. 470. 544. Jewell V. Board of Trustees, 113 Iowa 47, 84 N. W. 973. 656. %. Truhn, 38 Minn. 433, ^8 N. W. 106. 1042, 1064. Jewett V. Alton, 7 N. H. 253. 442. V. Van Steenburg, 58 N. Y. 85. 571, 632, 1472. Jex V. New York, 103 N. Y. 536, 9 N. E. 39. 1493. Jiska V. Ringgold County, 57 Jowa 630, 11 N. W. 618. 809, 913. CXXXll TABLE OF OASES. Job V. Alton, 189 111. 256, 59 N. B. 622. 64, 70, 1218. T. People, 193 111. 609, 61 N. E. 1079. 1166, 1246. v.Tebbetts, 5 Gilm. (10 111.) 376. 827, 919. Jodon V. Brenbam, 57 Tex. 655. 555, 866, 869. John V. Connell, 61 Neb. 267, 271, 85 N. W. 82. 983, 1022. John and Cherry Streets, Matter of, 19 Wend. 659. 878. John Hancock Ice Co., State, v. ■Rose, 67 N. J. L. 86, 50 Atl. 364.* 654. John M. Welch, The, 18 Blatch. 54. 147. Johns V. Griffin, 76 Iowa 419, 41 N. W. 59. 994, 1058. V.Johns, 93 Ala. 239, 9 South. 419. 966, 1008. y. McKibben, 156 111. 71, 40 N. E. 449. 805. V. Thomas, 47 Iowa 441. 944. Johnson v. Asbury Park, 58 N. J. L. 604, 33 Atl. 850. 319. V. Ballon, 28 Mich. ,379, 396. 1088. T. Branch, 9 S. D. 116, 68 N. W. 173, 62 Am. St. Rep. 857. 966. V. Brett, 64 Iowa 162, 19 N. W. 895. 1454. V. Briscoe, 92 Ind. 367. 825. V. Brown, 71 Iowa 609, 33 N. W. 127. 1032. 1042. V.Campbell, 49 111. 316. 219. V.Christie, 64 Ga. 117. 865. V. Colbnrn, 36 Vt. 693. 590. V. Commonwealth, 7 Dana 338. ' 370, 401, 402. V. Debary-Baya Merchants' Line, 37 Fla. 499, 19 South. 640, 37 L. R. A. 518,. 8S, 653. V. District of Columbia, 6 Mackey 21. 1213, 1223. V. Drummond, 20 Grat. 419. 146, 1431. v.Duer, 115 Mo. 366, 21 S. W. 800. 1173, 1175, 1227, 1246. v.Elwood, 53 N. Y. 431. 760, 1008. V. Finley, 54 Neb. 573, 74 N. W. 1080. 444, 979, 1022. V. Fritch, 57 Miss. 33. 560. V. Goodridge, 15 Me. 29. 442, 762, 1324, 1329, 1469, 1480. V.Hahn, 4 Neb. 139. 825, 826, 1451. V.Harper, 107 Ala. 706, 18 South. 198. 917, 930. v.Hlggins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566. 191. Johnson v. Howard, 41 Vt. 122, 98 Am. Dec. 568. 19, 20. V.Indianapolis, 16 Ind. 227. 1278. V. Kochersperger, 177 111. 64, 52 N. B. 308. 1275. V.Lewis, 115 Ind. 490, 18 N. B. , 490. 627, 628. V.Lexington, 14 B. Monr. 521. 47'3. V. Loper, 46 N. J. L. 321. 159. V. Lumber Co., 52 Wis. 458, 9 , N. W. 464. 751. V. Lyon, 106 111. 64. 605. V. Mclntyre, 1 Bibb 295. 727, 852. V. Malloy, 74 Cal. 430, 16 Pac. 22'8. 765. V. Martinez, 48 La. An. 52, IS South. 909. 1077. V. Mayor, 114 Ga. 426, 40 S. E. 322. 1111, 1151. V. Milwaukee, 40 Wis. 315. 1166, 1257. V. Nfew Orleans, 105 La. 149,. 29 South. 355. 1434. V.Oregon City, 2 Or. 327. 86, 664. V.Oregon City, 3 Or. 13. 86. V. Payne, 11 Neb. 269, 9 N. W. 81. 812. V.Philadelphia, 60 Pa. St. 445. 1139, 1143, 1148. V.Phillips, 89 Ga. 286, 15 S. E. 368. 1004. V.Roberts, 102 111. 655. 640,. 1413, 1425. v.Royster, 88 N. C. 194. 602. V.Sanderson, 34 Vt. 94. 106. V. Smith's Adm'r, 70 Ala. 108. 985. V. Stark County, 24 111. 75. 585. v. State, 116 Ind. 374, 19 N. B.. 298. 884, 1254. V. Steadman, 3 Ohio 94, 96.. 436. ■ V.Stewart, 29 Ohio St. 498. 922. V. Thompson, 4 Bibb 294. 1341. V. United States, 5 Mason 425. 1332 v.Van Horn. 45 N. J. L. 136. 871. V.Wilson, 2 N. H. 202, 206. 440. Johnson, Ex parte, 103 N. Y. 260,. 8 N. B. 399. 1264. Johnson County (Spiech) v. Tier- ney, 56 N«b. 514, 76 N. W. 1090. 526, 738, 747i 748, 761, 777, 819. Johnson County Com'rs v. Sea- right Cattle Co., 3 Wyo. 777, 31 Pac. 268. 1388, 1400. TABLE OF OASES. CXXXUl Johnson House v. Schenectady, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 147, 55 N. Y. Supp. 803. 475. Johnson's Petition, 104 111. 50. 835. Johnston v. Jackson, 70 Pa. St. 164. 1083. V. Louisville, 11 Bush 527. 19, 837. V.Macon, 62 Ga. 645. 1, 105, 283, 284, 408, 1107, 1110, 1111. V. Oshkosh, 65 Wis. 473, 27 N. W. 320. 529. V.Sutton, 45 Fed. 296. 996, 997, 1008. Johnstone v. Scott, 11 Mich. 232. 807, 810, 1391. Jonas V. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio 318. 466, 1178. V. Flanniken, 69 Miss. ' 577, 11 South. 319. 967, 1078. Jones V. Arlington, 91 N. C. 125. 429. v.Blanchard, 62 N. H. 651. 749, 990. V. Board of Public Instruction, 17 Fla. 411. 477, 478, 1252, 1262, 1351. V. Boston, 104 Mass. 461, 6 Am. Rep. 194. 164, 1131, 1182, 1201, 1206, 1270, 1404, 1406. V. Burford, 26 Miss. 194. 808, 810. V.Carter, 12 Mass. 314. 1064. V. Chamberlain, 109 N. Y. 100, 16 N. B. 72. 551, 1038. V.Collins, 16 Wis. 594. 1024, 1030, 1085. V. Columbus, 25 Ga. 610. 94, 386. V.Columbus, 62 Ind. 421. 766. V. Commissioners, 5 Neb. 561. 1388 v; Cullen, 142 Ind. 335, 40 N. B. 124. 1412. V. Davis, 35 Ohio St. 474. 1444. V. Davis, 24 Wis. 229. 974. V. Dills, 18 W. Va. 759. 810, 989. V. District of Columbia, 3 D. C. App. 26. 1218. ' V. Driskill, 94 Mo. 190, 7 S. W. 111. 896, 897, 898, 1003. V. Duras, 14 Neb. 40, 14 N. W. 537. 1027. V. Foley, 121 Ind. 180, 22 TST. E. 987. 1019. V. Gibson, 82 Ky. 561. 17, 20, 21. V.Gibson, 1 N. H. 266, 7 Am. Dec. 690. 436. V. Gillis, 45 Cal. 541. 879, 1464. V. Holzapfel (Okl.), 68 Pac. 511. 1194, 1427. Jones V. Johnson, 60 Ga. 260. 865, 1031. V. Keep's Estate, 19 Wis. 390. 133. V. Kolb,' 56 Wis. 263, 14 N. W. 177 1293 V.Lake" View," 151 111. *663, 38 N. E. 688. 1271, 1275. v.Landis T'p, 50 N. J. L. 374, 13 Atl. 251. 521, 912, 916, 919, 928, 929, 931, 936, 951, 990. V. McLain, 23 Ark. 429. 825, 826. V.Memphis, 101 Tenn. 188, 47 S. W. 138. 333, 334. V. Merrill, 69 Miss. 747. 967. V. Miami County, 30 Kan.. 278, 1 Pac. 76. 1053. V. Miracle, 93 Ky. 639, 20 S. W. 241. 916, 997. V.Page, 44 Ala. 657. 1106. V. Pelham, 84 Ala. 208. 748, 749. • V.Perry, 10 Yerg. 59, 30 Am. Dec. 430. 46. V.Raines, 35 La. An. 996. 347, 361. v.Randle, 68 Ala. 258. 1069. V. Rushville Nat. Bank, 138 Ind. 87, 37 N. E. 338. 777, 1417. V. Rushville Nat. Ins. Co., 135 Ind. 595, 35 N. E. 390. 775, 781. V. Savings Bank, 66 Me. 242. 678. . V. Scanland, 6 Humph. 195. 438, 440. V. Seattle, 19 Wash. 669, 53 Pac. 1105. 1040, 1241. V.Seward County, 10 Neb. 154. 606,. 764, 770. V. Sligh, 75 Ga. 7. 102. V. Summer, 27 Ind. 510. 1441. V. Tiffin, 24 Iowa 190. 537, 545. ■ V. Tonawanda, 158 N. Y. 438, 53 N. E. 280. 8, 531. V. Water Com'rs, 34 Mich. 273. 5, 305, 1220. V. Welsing, 52 Iowa 220, 2 N. W. 1106. 811. V. West Haven, 34 Conn. 1, 12. 1305. V. Western Manuf. Co., 27 Wash. — , 67 Pac. 586. 905. V.Wright, 34 Mich. 371. 1332, 1372. Jones, In re, 78 Ala. 419. 1147. Jones, etc. Manuf. Co. v. Common- wealth, 69 Pa. St. 137. 112, 393, 405. CXXXIV TABLE OF CASES. Jordan v. Brown, 56 Iowa 281, 9 N. W. 200. 1073. V. Higglns, 63 Tex. 150. 1083. V.Hopkins, 85 Me. 159, 27 Atl. 91. 441. V.Kyle, 27 Kan. 190. 940, 1075. V. Rouse, 1 Jones L. 119. 1005. V. Sayre, 29 Fla. 100, 10 South. 823. 964. V. School District, 38 Me. 164. 576. V.Woodward, 40 Me. 317. 194. Jordan, etc. Assoc, v. Wagoner, 3a Ind. 50. 748. Jory v. Palace • Dry-Goods, etc. Co., 30 Or. 196, 46 Pac. 786. 749, 571, 1059. Joseph V. Milledgeville, 97 Ga. 513, 25 S. E. 323. 284. Joslyn V. Rockwell, 59 Hun 129, 13 N. Y. Supp. 311. 808, 912 V. Rockwell, 128' N. Y. 334, 28 N. B. 604. 726, 8J.0, 1012. Joyce V. Bast St. Louis, 77 111. 156. nil. Joyes V. Shadburn (Ky.), 13 S. W. 361. 1214, 1283. Joyner v. Harrison, 56 Ark. 276, 19 S. W. 920. 927, 979. V. School District, 3 Cush. 567. 4, 590, 1469, 1489, 1506. Judah V. Brothers, 71 Miss. 914, 14 South. 455. 1027. V. Brothers, 72 Miss. 61,6, 17 South. 752, 33 L. R. A. 481. 959. Judd V. Anderson, 51 Iowa 345, 1 N. W. 677. 750, 1001. V. Driver, 1 Kan. 455. 1, 15. V. Fox Lake, 28 Wis. 583. 1451, 1489. V. Thompson, 125 Mass. 553. 1469, 1470, 1471. Judevine v. Jackson, 18 Vt. 470. 486. Judge V. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 Pac. 1097. 358, 359. Judkins v. Reed, 48 Me. 386. 251, 644, 1477. Juger, In re, 29 S. C. 438. 35, 1119. Julian V. Stephens (Ky.), 11 S. W. 6. 869. Julien V. Ainsworth, 27 Kan.' 446. 808. Junction v. Burke, 53 Ark. 430, 14 S. W. 622. 1029. Juniata Limestone Co. v. Pagley, 187 Pa. St. 193, — Atl. , 67 Am. St. Rep. 579, 44 L. R. A. 442. 81. Jurey v. Allison. 30 La. An. 1234. 1015. Jury V. Day, 54 Iowa 573, 6 N. W. 893. 944, 971. Jussen V. Board, etc., 95 Ind. 567. 563. Justice V. Logansport, 101 Ind. 326. 875. Justices V. Clark, 1 T. B. Monr. 82, 86. 436. V. Hoodenpyle, 7 Humph. 145. 147. 49. V.Paris, W. & K. R. T. Co., 11 B. Mon. 143. 478, 1361. V. Smith, 2 J. J. Marsh. 472. 1328. K. Kaehler v. Dobberpuhl, 56 Wis. 480, 14 N. W. 644. 528, 1441. V. Dobberpuhl, 60 Wis. 256, 18 N. W. 841. 1514. Kahl V. Love, 37 N. J. L. 5. 805. Kaiser v. Harris, 63 Miss. 590. 1021. Kalamazoo v. Francoise, 115 Mich. 554, 73 N. W. 801. 1209, 1218. Kalkaska T'p v. Fletcher, 81 Mich. 446, 45 N. W. 1006. 656. Kane v. Brooklyn, il4 N. Y. 586, 21 N. E. 1053. 763, 791, 827, 931, 932. Kane's Adm'r v. Garfield's Adm'r, 60 Vt. 79, 13 Atl. 800. 915. Kankakee v. Potter, 119 111. 324, 10. N. E. 212. 1245. Kankakee Stone, etc. Co. v. Kanka- kee, 128 111. 173, 20 N. B. 670. 1261. Kansas v. Balrd, S8 Mo. 215, 11 S. W. 243, 562. 1216. V.Collins, 34 Kan. 434, 8 Pac. 865. 1109, 1119. V. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 81 Mo. 285. 408, 494, 561. V. Johnson, 78 Mo. 661. 503. V. Rice, 89 Mo. 685, 1 S. W. 749. 877, 882. Kansas, etc. R. Co. v. Ellis County, 19 Kan. 584. 49, 617. V.Ridley County, 20 Kan. 141. 779. V.Wyandotte County, 16 Kan. 587. 673, 1508. Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450, 57 S. W. 1045. 70, 175, 1155, 1168, 1201, 1217,1218. V. Grush, 151 Mo. 128, 52 S. W. 286. 311, 1110. V. Kansas City Med. Coll., Ill Mo. 141, 20 S. W. 35. 350. V. Mercantile Mut. H. & L. Assoc, 145 Mo. 50, 46 S. W. 624. 313, 378. TABLE OF OASES. CXXXV Kansas City v. Railroad Co., 77 Mo. ISO. 870. V. Union Pac. R. Co., 59 Kan. 427, 53 Pac. 468, 52 L. R. A. 321. 75, 79, 246, 248. V.Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 35 S. W. 600. 681, 1241. ■ V. Whipple, 136 Mo. 475, 38 S. W. 295, 58 Am. St. Rep. 657, 35 L. R. A. 747. 260, 311. Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. Chapin, 162 Mo. 409, 62 S. W. 1000. 563, 566. V. Smith, 156 Mo. 608, 57 S. W. 555. 885. v. Thornton, 152 Mo. 570, 54 S. W. 445. 804. V. Tontz, 29 Kan. 460. 539, 579. Kansas City, P. & G. A. Co. v. Waterworks Imp. Dist., 68 Ark. 376, 59 S. W. 248. 244, 1229. Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737. ,635. Kansas Pac. R. Co. v. Russell, 8 Kan. 558. 628, 632, 783, 1441. Kansas Mut. L. Ins. Assoc, v. Hill, 51 Kan. 636, 33 Pac. 300. 272, 703, 1441. Karnes v. People, 73 111. 274. 827. Karr v. Washburn, S6 Wis. 303, 14 N. W. 189. 1024, 1029. Karsten v. Milwaukee, 106 Wis. 200, 81 N. W. 948, 1103. 1226. Katzer v. Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 16, 79 N. W. 745. 352, 358. Kauffman's Estate, In re, 104 Iowa 639, 74 N. W. 8. 664. Kaysville City v. Ellison, 18 Utah 163, 55 Pac. 386, 72 Am. St. Rep. 772, 43 L. R. A. 81. 3. Kean v. Kinnear, 171 Pa. St. 639, 33 Atl. 325. 825, 869, 1485. Keane v. Cannovan, 21 Cal. 291, 82 Am. Dec. 738. 448, 916. Kearney v. Covington, 1 Met. (Ky.) 339. 1279. V. Taylor, 15 How. 494. 510. Keasy v. Bricker, 60 Pa. St. 9. 97, 98. Keck V. Keokuk County, 37 Iowa 547. 782. Keech v. Bnriquez, 28 Fla. 597, 10 South. 91. 996, 997, 1092. Keefe v. Bramhall, 3 Mackey, 551. 1004, 1091. Keehn v. McGillicuddy, 19 Ind. App. 427, 49 N. B. 609. 1507. Keel V. Board of Directors, 59 Ark. 513, 27 N. W. 590. 60, 103, 628, 1185. Keeler v. Newhern, 1 Phil. N. C. 505. 432. V. People, 160 111. 179, 43 N. B. 342. 1273. Keely v. Sanders, 99 U. S. 441. 750, 951, 1007, 1027. Keen v. Sheehan, 154 Mass. 208, 28 N. B. 150. 962, 982. Keenan v. Portland, 27 Or. 544,. 38 Pa,c 2 12 S2 Keene v. Houghton, 19 Me. 368. 914, 958. Keener v. Union Pac. R. Co., 31 Fed. 126. 695. Keeper v. Force, 86 Ind. 81. 996, 1012. Keese v. Denver, 10 Colo. 112, 15 Pac. 825. 1219, 1227, 1247, 1274, 1517. Keesling v. Powell, 149 Ind. 372, 49 N. E. 265. 807. v.Winfield, 149 Ind. 709, 49 N. B. 163. 807. ' Kehrig v. Peters, 21 Mich. 475. 1137. Keighley's Case, 10 Rep. 139a. 1171. Keighley's Case, 10 Rep. 142b. 1259. Keith V. Bingham, 100 Mo. 300, 13 S. W. 683. 840, 891, 892, 1182. > V.Boston, 120 Mass. 108. 1274. V.Clark, 97 U. S. 454. 118, 127. V. Freeman, 43 Ark. 296. 796, 982, 1030. V. Hayden, 26 'Minn. 212, 2 N. W. 495. 750, 895. V.Keith, 26 Kan. 26. 964, 974, 1093. V. Philadelphia, 126 Pa. St. 575, 17 Atl. 883. 1222. T.Wheeler, 159 Mass. 161, 34 N. B. 174. 1039. Keithsburg Bridge Co. v. McKay, 42 Fed. 427. 677. Kellar v. Savage, 20 Me. 199. 762, 1329, 1469, 1477. Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525, 69 Am. Dec. 226. 1120, 1146. V.Wilson, 90 Ky. 350, 14 S. W. 332. 977. Kelley v. Barton, 174 Mass. 396, 54 N. E. 860. 1379, 1412. V. McBlain, 42 Kan. 764, 22 Pac. 994. 996. V. Marshall, 69 Pa. St. 319. 219. V. Noyes, 43 N. H. 209. 1477. V. Rhoads, 188 U. S. 1, 23 Sup. Ct. 259. 166, 655. V. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237, 51 Pac. 593, 75 Am. St. Rep. 904, 39 L. R. A. 594. 40, 64, 88. 89, 166, 170, 258, 342, 387, 629, 655, 1488, 1505. V. Rhoads, 9 Wyo. 352, 63 Pac. 935, 87 Am. St. Rep. 959. 88, 655. CXXXVl TABLE OF CASES. Kelley v. SVehn, 63 Neb. 410, 88 N. W. 682. 839, 894. Kellogg V. Ely, 15 Ohio St. 64. 1515. v.Hlggins, 11 Vt. 240. 617. V. McLaughlin, 8 Ohio 114. 916, 919, 926, 932, 1005. V. Supervisors, 42 Wis. 97. 644, 1509. Kellogg, Ex parte, 6 Vt. 509. 897. Kelly V. Atlanta, 69 Ga. 583. 1103. v.Chadwick, 104 La. 719, 29 South. 295. 1180, 1207, 1208, 1218, 1220, 1243,1257, 1280. V. Chicago, 148 111. 90, 35 N. E. 752. 1175. V.Chicago, 193 111. 324, 61 N. B. 1009. 1245. V.Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 468. 1208. V.Corson, 8 Wis. 182. 591, 1393 V.Corson, 11 Wis. 1. 1393. V.Craig, 5 Ired. 129. 480, 485, 760, 794, 825, 927, 933. V.Craig, 5 Ired. 194. 760. V. Dwyer, 7 Lea 180. 1119. V. Herrall, 20 Fed, 364. 67, 508, 596, 750, 939, 1011, 1013. v.Iiuning, 76 Cal: 309, 18 Pac. 335. 514, 520. v.Medlin, 26 Tex. 48. 916, 1017. V. Mehdelsohn, 105 La. 490, 29 South. 894. 1287. V.Minneapolis, 57 Minn. 294, 59 N. W'. 304, 47 Am. St. Rep. 605, 26 L. B. A. 92. 1233 1413 V. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78. 51, 53, 55, 56, 181, 186, 247, 248, 1446. V. Salinger, 53 Ark. 114, 13 S. W. 596, 746, 750. v.Westcott, 91 Iowa 71, 66 N. W. 74. 817. Kelsey v. Abbott, 13 Cal. 609. 477, 727, 729, 914, 965, 968. Kelso V. Boston, 120 Mass. 297. 938, 1408. V.Cole, 121 Cal. 121, 53 Pao. 353. 1243, 1277. V. Robertson,. 51 Ark. 397, 11 S. W. 582. 810, 1059. Kemble's Appeal, 135 Pa. St. 141, 19 Atl. 946. 1446. Kemp V. Cossart, 47 Ark. 62, 14 S. W. 465. 802, 824. Kemper v. King, 11 Mo. App. 116. 1129. V. Mcdlelland'S Lessee, 19 Ohio 308. 590. Kenaga v. Kerr, 123 111. 659, 14 N. B. 671. 286. Kenaston v. Great Northern B. Co., 59 Minn. 35, 60 N. W. 813. 1037. Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524. 99. Kendall's Petition, 85 N. Y. 302. 437, 1259. Kendlg v. Knight, 60 Iowa 29, 14 N. W. 78. 729, 1212, 1214, 1291. Kendrick v. Farquar, 8 Ohio 189, 197. 363. . Kenls'ton v'. Little, 30 N. H. 318, 64 ■* Am. Dec. 297. 1477. Kennard v. Manchester, 68 N. H. 61, 36 Atl. 553. 390. Kenney v. Bigelow, 43 Iowa 74. 1020. V. Dalley, 6 Watts 269. 724. V. Mary Lee Coal & R. Co., 93 Ala. 494, 9 South. 608. 851. , V. Troy, 14 Hun 308. 385, 1210. V.Troy, 77 N. Y. 493. 1407. Kenny v. Harwell, 42 Ga. 416. 150. V. Kelly, 113 Cal. 364, 45 Pac. 699. 1271. Kensett v. Stivers, 18 Blatch. 397. 1424. Kent V. Atlantic Delaine Co., 8 R. I. 305. 434. V.Brown, 38 La. An. 802. 1076. V. Exeter, 68 N. H. 469, 44 Atl. 607. 664, 1380. V. Kentland, 62 Ind. 291, 30 Am. Rep. 182. 291. V. United States, 113 Fed. 232. 1367. V.Warner, 47 Hun 474. 518; 521. Kenton Ins. Co. v. Covington, 86 Ky. 213, 5'S. W. 461. 272, 783. Kentucky Cent. R. Co. v. Bourbon County, 82 Ky. 497. 367. V. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 64, 17 S. W. 196. 873, 884. V. Pendleton County (Ky.), 2 S. W. 176. '367, 787, S38, 844, 884. Kentucky Club v. Louisville, 92 Ky. 309, 17 S. W. 743. 1114. Kentucky Female Orphan School V. Louisville. See Trustees v. Louisville. Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 331, 6 Sup. Ct. 57. 51, 59, 61, 62, 64, 73, 74, 630, 631. Kentz V. Mobile, 120 Ala. 623, 24 South. 952. 1096, 1104, 1111. Keokuk v. Packet Co., 45 Iowa 196. 147. V. Ulam, 4 Okl. 5, 38 Pac. 1080. S5. TABLE OF OASES. CXXXVll JEeokuk & H. Bridge Co. v. Illinois, 175 U. S. 626, 20 Sup. Ct. 305. 140, 165. V. People, 145 111. 596, 34 N. E. 482. 750, 1383. V. People, 161 111. 132, 43 N. B. 691. 535, 675, 692, 890, 1382, 1383. V. People, 161 111. 514, , 44 N. E. 206. 385, 386, 387, 753, 755, 1386. V. People, 176 111. 267, 52 N. E. 117. 140, 165, 637, 1383. V. People, 185 111. 276, 56 N. E. 1049. 1395, 1456. Keokuk, etc. R. Co. v. Lindly, 48 Iowa 11. 1074. V.Missouri, 152 U. S. 301, 14 Sup. Ct. 301. 112, 358, 370, 374, 846. >Kepley v. Fouke, 187 111. 162, 58 N. E. 303. 927, 1003, 1007, 1042. V. Jansen, 107 111. 79. 868. ■Kerfoot v. Chicago, 195 111. 229, 63 N. E. 101. 1211. Kerlin v. Reynolds, 142 Ind. 460, 36 N. E.. 693, 41 N. B. Rep. 827. 239. Kern v. Clarke, 59 Minn. 70, 60 N. W. 809. 895. V. Towsley, 45 Barb. 150. 873. ■Kerner v. Boston Cottage Co., 123 N. C: 294, 31 S. E. 718. 804. fCernitz v. Liong Island, City, 50 Hun 428, 3~N. Y. Supp. 144. 887. :Kerns v. Collins, 40 La. An. 453, 4 South. 498. 734, 1077. Kerr v. Kipp, 37 Minn. 25, 33 N. W. 116. 944. V.Lansing, 17 Mich. 34. 1429, 1430. v.Woolley, 3 Utah 456, 24 Pac. 831. 182, 254, 438, 468, 547, 588, 627, 838, 1429. •Kerr's Estate, Matter of, 159 Pa. St. 512, 28 Atl. 354. 380. 'Kerse v. Miller, 169 Mass. 44, 47 N. E. 504. 813. Kersenbrock v. Muff, 29 Neb. 530, 45 N. W. 778. 814. 'Kershaw v. Jansen, 49 Neb. 467, 68 N. W. 616. ■ 746. Kerslake v. Cummings, 180 Mass. 65, 61 N. B. 760. 733. Kerston v. Milwaukee, 106 Wis. 200, 81 N. W. 948, 1103, 48 L. R. A. 851. 1459. Kerwer v. Allen, 31 Iowa 578. 943. Kessey v. Connell, 68 Iowa 430, 27 N. W. 365. 959, 1038. Ketchem v. Mullinix, 92 Mo. 118, 4 S. W. 447. 999. Ketchum v. Pacific R. Co., 4 Dill. 41. 21, 47, 49. Kettelle v. Warwick & Co. Water • Co. (R. I.), 49 Atl. 492. 517, 615. Keyser v. McKissam, 2 Rawle 139. 436. Keystone Bridge Co.'s Appeal (Pa.), 7 Atl. 579. 326. Keystone Lumber Co. v. Bayfield, 94 Wis. 491, 69 N. W. 162. 13. V. Pederson, 93 Wis. 466. 67 N. W. 696. 857. Kezer v. ClifEord, 59 N. H. 208. 965. Kidd v. Alabama, 188 V. S. 730, 23 Sup. Ct. 401. 77. Kiernan, Matter of, 62 N. Y. 457. 1248. Kilbourne v. St. John, 59 N. Y. 21, 17 Am. Rep. 291. 1434. Kilburn v. Bennett, 3 Met. 199. 642. Kile V. Fleming, 78 Ga. 1. 962. Kiley v. Cranor, 51 Mo. 541. 544. Kilgus t. Trustees, 94 Ky. 439, 22 S. W. 750. 362. Kilpatrick v. Sisneras, 23 Tex. 114. 1091. Kimball v. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 145. 436. V. Corn Exchange Bank, 1 111. App. 209. 1483. V. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 57 Pac. 1, 45 L. R. A. 628. 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 46, 49, 53, 55, 56, 235, 248, 411. v. Merchants', etc. Co., 89 111. 611. 772, 1430. ' V. Milford, 54 N. H. 406. 398, 399, 400. V. National Bank, 1 111. App. 209. 1429. V. People, 160 111." 653, 43 N. E. 710. 1273. V. Rosendale, 42 Wis. 407, 24 Am. Dec. 421. 513, 550. Kimball Carriage Coi v. Manches- ter, 67 N. H. 483. 344. Kimber v. Schuylkill County, 20 Pa. St. 366. 1383, 1395, 1445. Kimmel, In re, 41 Fed. 775. 152. . Kimmell v. State, 104 Tenn. 184, 56 S. W. 854. 153. Kinehart v. Howard, 90 Md. 1, 44 Atl. 1040. 672. King V. Aroostook Co., 63 Me. 567. 212. V. Cappellep, 42 Ohio St. 218. 1115. V. Carmody, 101 Iowa 682, 70 N. W. 734. 965, 969. V.Cooper, 128 N. C. 347, 3^ S. ,E. 924. 1007. V. District of Columbia, MacA. & M. 36. 989. CXXXVUl TABLE OF CASES. King V. Harringtoh, 18 Mich. 213. 1064, 1092. V. King, 2 T. R. 235. 1410. T.Madison, 17 Ind. 48. 290. V. Manning, 40 N. J. L. 461. 91, 272. V. Mount Vernon Build. Assoc, 106 Pa. St. 165. 818. v.MulIins, 111 U. S. 404, 18 Sup. Ct. 925. 59, 61, 66, 79, 828, 859. V.Parker, 73 Iowa 757, 34 N. W. 451. 643, 773, 777, 784. V. People, 193 111. 530, 61 N. B. 1035. 602, 790. V.Portland, 2 Or. 146. 48, 1182, 1194. T. Portland, 38 Or. 402, 63 Pac. 2, 55 L. R. A. 812. 63, 64, 235, 1208, 1216, 1222, 1241. V. Sears, 91 Ga. 577, 18 S. B. 830. 937. V. Townshend, 141 N. Y. 358, 36 N. E. 513. 1451. V. United States, 99 U. S. 229. 595. V.Utah Central R. Co., 6 Utah 281, 22 Pac. 158. 237. V. Whitcomb, 1 Met. 328.' 797, 852, 1482. V.Wilson, 1 Dil; 555. 1430. King, The, v. Bedford Level, 6 Bast 356, 368. 430. V. Beeston, 3 T. R. 592. 442. V. Hepswell, 8 B. & C. 466. 479. V. St. Gregory, 2 Ad, & El. 99. 479. Kingman v. Glover, 3 Rich. 27, 45 Am. Dec. 756. 848. V. Brockton, 153' Mass. 255, 26 N. E. 998, 11 L. R. A. 123. 210. Kingman, In re, 170 Mass. Ill, 48 N. E. 1075. 1204. Kingman, Petitioner, 153 Mass. 566, 27 N. B. 778, 12 L. R. A. 417. 412, 1266, 1300. Kingman County Com'rs v. Leon- ard. See Board of Com'ra, v. -Leonard. King Real Estate Assoc, v. Port- land, 23 Or. 199, 31 Pac. 482. 478. Kingsbury v. Buchanan, 11 Iowa 387. 446. Kingsley v. Supervisors, 49 Wis. 649, 6 N. W. 317. 529. Kinley Manuf. Co. v. Kochersper- ger, 174 111. 379, 51 N. E. 648. 1359, 1445. Kinmundy v. Mahan, 72 111. 462 1115. Kinney v. Beverly, 2 H. & M. 318 859, 861, 863. V. Doe, 8 Blackf. 350. 442. Kinney v. Etheridge, 3 Ired. 360".. 1329. V. Forsythe, 96 Mo. 414, 9 S. W. 918. 893, 894, 895. V. Zimpleman, 36 Tex. 554.. 102, 200, 1299. Kinsworthy v. Austin, 23 Ark. 375.. 803, 808. V.Mitchell, 21 Ark. 145. 590,. 619, 750, 845, 928, 958. Kinyon v. Duchene,, 21 Mich. 498.- 443, 1450. Kiowa County Com'rs v. Dunn, 21 Colo. 185, 40 Pac. 357. 280, 1140.. Kipp V. Collins, 33 Minn. 394, 23 N. W. 554. 894, 927, 932. V.Dawson, 31 Minn. 373, 17 N. W. 961, 18 N. W. 96. 486,. 896. V.Dawson, 59 Minn. 82, 60 N. W. 845. 888. V. Blwell, 65 Minn. 525, 68 N. W. 105, 33 L. R. A. 435. 67.. v.Eernhold, 37 Minn. 132, 33 N. W. 697. 888. V. Fitch, 72 Minn. 65, 75 N. W. 752. 1036, 1037. V. Hill, 40 Minn. 188, 41 N. W. 970. 983. V. Johnson, 31 Minn. 360, 17 N.^ W. 957. 1093. V. Johnson, 73 Minn. 34, 75 N. W.- 736. 497, 1037, 1054,. 1055. V. Paterson, 26 N. J. L. 298, 1101, 1141. V.Robinson, 75 Minn. 1, 77 N. W. 414. 1037. Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258. 7, 10, 241, 247, 257, 392, 393, 461,- 475, 1155. Kirby's Appeal, 134 Pa. St. 309, 19 Atl.. 494. 643. Kirchman v. People, 159 111. 265, 42 N. e: 884. 1273. Kirk V. St. Thomas' Church, 70' Iowa 287, 30 N. W. 569. 352, 946. V. Western Gas, etc. Co. (Ky.), 37 S. W. 849. 651. Kirkland v. Board of Pub. Works,. 142 Ind. 123, 41 N. E. 374. J218. V. Whately, 4 Allen 462. 672. Kirkpatrick v. Davis Clock Co., 49* La. An. 871, 21 South. 594. 1120. v.,Mathiot, 4 W. & S. 251. 967. V. New Brunswick, 40 N. J. Eg: 46. 318, 873. V. State Board, 57 N. J. L. 53,- 29 Atl. 442. 619, 663. V.Taylor, 118 Ind. 329, 21 N. E.- 20. 12(3. TABLE OF CASKS. CXXXIX Kirkwood v. Ford, 34 Or. 552, 56 Pac. 411. 1400. V. Washington County, 32 Or. 568, 52 Pac. 568. 849. Kirlicks v. Interstate B. & L. As- soc, 113 Fed. 290. 965. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 42 Conn. 426, 19 Am. Rep. 546. 86, 124, 279, 652. V. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491. 57, 80, 86, 124, 279, 644, 652. Kissimmee City v.>. Cannon, 26 Fla. ' 3, 7 South. 523. 784, 1455. V. Drought, 26 Fla. 1, 7 South. 525, 23 Am. St. Rep. 546. 738. Kitchen v. Smith, 101 Pa. St. 452. 565. Kitson V. Ann Arbor, 26 Mich. 325. 303, 1113, 1140. Klttanning Coal Co. v. Common- wealth, 79 Pa; St. 100. 329, 679. Klttery v. Portsmouth Bridge, 78 Me. 93, 2 Ati. 847. 722. Kittle V. Bellegarde, 86 Cal. 556, 25 Pac. 55. 1453 V. Shervln, 11 Neb! 65, 7 N. W. 861. 341, 825, 1031, 1385, 1387. Kizer v. Winchester, 141 Ind. 694, 40 N. E. 265. 630. Klein V. Livingston Club, 177 Pa. St. 224, 35 Atl. 606, 34 L. R. A. 94. Kline v. Ascension, 28 La. An! 538. 1367. V. Board of Com'rs, 152 Ind. 321, 51 N. B. 476. 1250, 1251. V. Tacoma, 11 Wash. 193, 39 Pac. 453. 1421. Klokke V. Stanley, 109 111. 192. 1370. Klumpke v. Baker, 131 Cal. 80, 63 Pac. 137, 676. 526, 1015. Knapp V. Charles Mix County, 7 S. D. 399. 64 N. W. 187. 1417. T.Grant, 27 Wis. 147. 1307. V. King County, 15 Wash. 541, 46 Pac. 1047. 1385. V. King County, 17 Wash. 567, 50 Pac. 480. 1460. Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. St. 238. 476. Kneeland v. Auditor-General, 113 Mich. 63, 71 N. W. 477. 992, 1463. V. Hull, 116 Mich. 55, 74 N. W. 300. 951, 983, 1000. T. Hyman, 118 Mich. 56, 76 N. W. 127. 809. V. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454. 340, 382. Kneeland v. Wood, 117 Mich. 174, 75 N. W. 461. 809, 1463, 1464. Knight V. Alexander, 38 Minn. 384, 37 N. W. 796, 8 Am. St. Rep. 675. 827, 883, 888. V.Boston, 159 Mass. 551, 35 N. E. 86. 640. V. Campbell, 76 Iowa 730, 39 N. W. 829. 1039, 1073. V. Flatrock; etc. Co., 45 Ind. 134. 1418. V.Knoblauch, 77 Minn. 8, 79 N. W. 582. 1036. V. Thomas, 93 Me. 494, 45 Atl. 499. 1354, 1358. V. Valentine, 34 Minn. 26, 24 N. W. 295. 807. Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush 599. 466, 486, 584, 1102, 1140. Knisely v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. St. 614, 46 Atl. 861, 50 L. R. A. 86. 73, 328, 329. Knoedler's Estate, In re, 140 N. Y. 377, 35 N. B. 601. 33, 672. Knopf V. Chicago Real Estate Board, 173 111. 196, 50 N. E. 658. 1438. V. First Nat. Bank, 173 111. 331, 50 N. E. 660. 1428, 1430, 1438. V. People, 185 111. 20, 57 N. E. 22, '76 Am. St. Rep. 17. 549, 586, 587. Knote v. Caldwell, 43 Kan. 464, 23 Pac. 625. 1001. Knott V. Peden, 84 Cal. 299, 24 Pae. • 160. 740. Knowles v. Boston, 129 Mass. 551. 1504, 1505. V.Martin, 20 Colo. 393, 38 Pae. 467. 1051. Knowlton v. Moore, 136 Mass. 32. 934 995. V.Moore, Vfk U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747. 11, 12, 14, 33, 34, 129, 130, 179, 180. V. Rock County Supervisors, '9 Wis. 410. 1, 2, 4, 182, 227,' 245, 340. Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. 245. 1016, 1085, 1093. V.Dunn, 22 Kan. 683. 1425. V. Higby, 76 Cal. 264, 18 Pac. 381. 949. V. Huidekoper, 21 Wis. 527. 727. V. Rossi, 25 Nev. 96, 57 Pac. 179, 83 Am. St. Rep. 566, 48 L. R. A. 305. 905, 906. V. Shawnee County, 20 Kan. 496. 389. Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How. 539. -564. cxl TABLE OF CASES. Knox County v. Aspinwall, 24 How. 376. 1362, 1374. Knox County Court v. United States, 109 U. S. 229, 3 Sup. Ct. 131. 1364. Knoxville v. Sanford, 13 Lea 545. 1110. Knoxville & O. R. Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684, 43 S. W. 116, 53 L. R. A. 921. 7, 58, 77, 116, 159, 187, 192, 357, 549, 680, 1121. Knoxville Cigar Co. v. Cooper, 99 Tenn. 472, 42 S. W. 687. 359. 1124. ^ Knudson v. Litchfield, 87 Iowa in, 54 N. W. 199. 1042, 1072. V. Leary, 108 Wis. 203, 84 N. W. 166. 1028. Knupp V. Brooks, 200 Pa. St. 494, 50 Atl. 196. 808. V. Syms, 200 Pa. St. 489, 50 Atl. 210. 968, 969. Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 111. 122, 47 N. B. 321, 41 L. R. A. 446. 33, 287, 380. v.Larned, 172 111. 86, 50 N. E. 198. 1359. Koehler v. Hughes, 4 Misc. Rep. 236, 24 N. Y. Supp. 760. 804. Kohlman v. Glaudi, 52 La. An. 700, 27 S. W. 116. 930, 950. Kohn V. Barr, 52 Kan! 269, 34 Pac. 880. 137. Koon V. Snodgrass, 18 W. Va. 320. 1033. Koones v. District of Columbia, 4 Mackey 339, 54 Am. Rep. 278. 805, 807. Koontz V. Hancock, 64 Md. ,134, 20 Atl. 1039. 437, 766. Kraft V. Keokuk, 14 Iowa 86. 1497. Kratli V. Larrew, 104 Ind. 363, 3 N. E. 267. 562. Kraus v. Montgomery, 114 Ind. 103, 16 N. E. 153. 1033, 1034, 1457. Kregelo v. Flint, 25 Kan. 695. 948. Kreidler v. State, 24 Ohio St. 22. 433. Kreiss v. Seligman, 8 Barb. 439. 907. Kresser v. Lyman, 74 Fed. 765. 107, 1150. Kroop V. Porman, 31 Mich. 144. 1402. Krutz V. Chandler, 32 Kan. 659, 5 Pac. 170. . 1020. V. Fisher, 8 Kan. 90. 965, 968. V.Gardiner, 18 Wash. 332, 51 Pac. 397. 971. Kuehner v. Preeport, 143 111. 92, 33 N. B. 372, 17 L. R. A. 774. 106, 1204, 1230, 1235. Kuester v. Chicago, 187 111. 21, 58 N. B. 307. 1245. Kuhl V. Mayor, 23 N. J. Eq. 84. 444. Kuhn V. Board of Education, 4 W. Va. 499. 102, 589. V. Port Townsend, 12 Wash. 605, 41 Pac. 923, 50 Am. St. Rep. 911, 29 L. R. A. 445. 1521. Kulp T. Kulp, 51 Iowa 341, 32 Pac. 1118, 21 L. R. A. 550. 1029. Kunes v. McCloskey, 115 Pa. St. 461, 9 Atl. 83. 982. Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 127, 97 Am. Dec. 226. 218. Kuntz V. Sumption, 117 Ind. 1, 19 N. E. 474, 2 L. R. A. 655. 627, 630, 631, 783. Kurth V. State, 86 Tenn. 134, 5 S. W. 593. 118. Kyes V. St. Croix County, 108 Wis. .136, 83 N. W. 637. 1437. Kyle V. Fayetteville, 75 N. C. 445. 716. V. Malin, 8 Ind. 34. 466, 555, 1004. Labs V. Cooper, 744, 750. Lackawana County v. Common- wealth, 908. V. National Bank, 398. Lackawanna Iron Co. v. Luzerne County, 375, 392, 406. Lackawanna Iron, etc. Co. v. Fales, 724, 924. Lacey v. Davis, 354, 579, 580, 590, 776, 901, 940, 965, 974, 1008, 1010. Lacy V. Johnson, 968, 987, 1051. Ladd V. Dickey, 990, 997, 999, 1005. V. Dubroca, 1092. V. Gambell, 259, 1194, 1195, 1275. V. Gibson, 771. V. Gilson, 784. V. Portland, 109, 113, 1165. V. Spencer, 1427, 1456. V. Wiggins, 445. Lafayette v. Cox, 214, 1430, 1436. V. Fowler, 1163, 1206, 1515, 1516. V. Jenners, 289, 1189. r. Orphan Asylum, 362, 1235. Lafferty v. Byers, 747. V. Milligan, 818. Lafferty's Lessee v. Byers, 750, 916. Lagrove v. Rains, 485, 930. Lague V. Boagni, 1010. Lahman v. Hatch, 526, 766, 782. Lain v. Cook, 998. V. Shepardson, 1085. Laing v. McKee, 1033. Laird v. Heister, 525, 726, 743, 810, 925. TABLE OF OASES. cxli Laird, etc. Co. v. Pine County, 1411, 1416. Lalie V. Guilllotte, 348. V. Williamsburgh, 1266. Lake Charles t. Police, 844, 1439. Lake County v. Graham, 173. V. State Board, 788. V. Sulphur Bank, 619. V. Sulphur, etc. Mining Co., 562, 603, 730, 741, 749, 845. Lake Levee District v. Dawson, 1199. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Dun- kirk, 1233, 1291. V.Grand Rapids, 359, 362, 364, 374, 375, 1233. V. Smith, 8, 252, 627, 1125. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. v. People, 675, 682, 693, 846. , V. Roach, 851, 1489. Lake Street E. R. Co. v. Chicago, 109, 1231,-1269. Lake Superior S. C. R. & S. Co. v. Auditor-General, 1424, 1457. Lake Superior Ship Canal, etc. Co. V. School Dist., 1454. V. Thompson, 564, 1510. Laketon T'p v. Akeley, 845. Lalor V. New York, 599. Lamar v. Palmer, 388. V. Sheppard, 346, 1028, 1045, 1049. Lamar Water Works v. Lamar, 174, 1201. Lamb v. Burlington, etc. R. Co., 414. V.Connolly, 419, 628, 782, 1009. V. Davis, 941, 969, 976. V.Irwin, 1049. V. Railroad Co., 1521. Lambert v. Craig, 9^7. Lambertson v. Hogan, 510, 512, 1066. Lamborn v. County Com'rs, 1500, 1502. ^ V. County Courts, 965. Lamkin v. Baldwin, etc. Co., 835. Lamm^rs v. Comstock, 1040. Lamoille V. It. Co. v. Fairfield, 563. Lampson v. Drain Com'r, 1402. Lamson Consol. Store-Service Co. V. Boston, 622, 654. Lancaster v. County Auditor, 1044. V. Clayton, 295. V. Du Hadway, 1455. Lancaster County v. Rush, 315, 825, 882, 1439. V. Trimble, 882. Lancy v. Snow, 935, 957. Land v. Smith, 1043. Land Co. v. Soper, 511. Land, etc. Co. v. Brown, 240. V. Oneida County, 415. Land & R. Imp. Co. v. Bardon, 737,. 951, 1084. Land Trust v. Hoffman, 1076. Lander v. Bromley, 1027. V. School District, 576. V. Ward, 939. Landis v. Ashworth, 465. v.Vineland, 486, 902, 915, 989,. 1240. Landis Estate v. Clallam * County, 766, 1426. Landregan v. Peppin, 730,' 1003,. 1036, 1037. Lane v. Bommelman, 845, 896, 916.. V. Burnap, 1402. V. Gorham, 510. V. James, 477, 486. V. March's Succession, 738, 949.. Lane County v. Oregon, 1, 10, 15,, 17, 19, 129, 130, 177, 178, 179. Lanesborough v. County Com'rs,. 616, 618, 653. Lang V. Clapp, 495. Langdon v. Poor, 486, 544, 933, 936.. V. Templeton, 985, 1093. Lange v. Soffall, 1496. Langenburg v. Decker, 428. Langhorne v. Robinson, 235. Langley v. Batchelder, 728, 747, 933, 934, 936, 976, 989, 996,. 1003. v. Chapin, 960. Langlois v. McCuUom, 993, 1034. v. Stewart, 930, 1457. Langohr v. Smith, 927, 1012. Langullle v. State, 1105, 1113. Langworthy v. Dubuque, 246. Lanier v. Macon, 1105. Lannes v. Workingmen's Bank,. 1015. La Norris v. State, 1115. Lansing v. Lincoln, 1215. . Lansing v. State Auditors, 627. V. Van Gorder, 1281. , Lantry v. Parker, 1091. La Plante v. State, 621. Lapp V. Morrill, 1450. Lappin v. Nemaha County, 594, 768.. Laramie County v. Albany, 415. Large v. Fisher, 930, 999. Larimer v. McCall, 516, 627, 724,. 726. V. National State Bank, 920. Larimer County v. National gjtate- Bank, 1495. Larkin v. Wilson, 978. Lamed v. Audreys, 1098. Larrabee v. Hodgkins, 750, 960. Larson v. Dickey, 996, 1008, 1011,. 1014. V. People, 443, 760, 1272. La Rue v. King, 107a ^xlii TABLE OF CASES. La Salle & P. H. & D. R. Co. v. Donoghue, 783, 1445. Lasater v. Green, 387. ,Lasbury v. McCague, 1128, 1249, 1251. Lashier v. McCreery, 860, 923, 989. Lassetter v. Lee, 905, 1064, 1068. Latchman v. Clark, 750. Latham v. Smith, 906. v.Wllmette, 1216, 1276, 1304. Lathers v. Keogh, 816. Lathrop v. Hawley, 917, 928. V. Ide, 847. ■ V. Irwin, 1009. X,atimer v. Lovett, 916, 1006. V. Morgan, 323. Laton V. Balcom, 965, 967. Latonia v. Hopkins, 248, 295. Latonia, etc. Assoc, v. Donnelly, 677. Latrobe v. Baltimore, 91, 660. Latta V. Williams, 1099, 1101, 1109. Laubach v. O'Meara, 1358. Lauer v. Weber, 1039, 1043, 1458. Laughlin v. Denver, 811. V. Miller, 1240. Lauman v. Des ' Moines County, 1398, 1489. Laurens v. Elmore, 152, 153. Laurent v. Muscatine, 354. Laver v. McGlachlin, 438. Lavergne v. New Orleans, 730. Laverty v. Sexton, 1085. Law V. Johnston, 1241. V. People, 210, 286, 386, 523, 693, 741, 745, 750, 787, 961. Xiawrence v. Doolan, 1329, 1330. V. East, 911. V. Past, 845, 896. V. Hornick, 913, 946, 1040. V. Janesville, 616, 1381, 1387. V. Killam, 1425, 1441. V.Kinney, 1016, 1084, 1085, 1093. V. Miller, 948. V. Pond, 445. V. Sherman, 436. V. Speed, 492. V. Trainer, 560, 577, 1437. V.Webster, 1272. V.Wheeler, 1272. V. Zimpleman, 1007, 1449. Lawrence County v. Meade County, 174. Lawton v. Com'rs, 1410. V. United States, 955. Layman v. Hughes, 1441. Layton v. New Orleans, 252, 418, 1302. Leach v. Cassidy, 436. V. People, 432. Leachman v. Dougherty, 1479. League v. State, 492. V.Texas, 903. Leake v. Hayes, 822. Leas V. Gaverich, 1033. Leaton v. Murphy, 857, 955. Leavenworth v. Booth, 294, 1138, 1148. V. Laing, 1285. v. Mills, 1279. V. Norton, 466, 470. V. Rankin, 1279. V. Stille, 1285. Leavenworth County v. Lang, 783, 1246. Leavenworth, etc. R. Co. v. Platte Co., 215. Leavitt v. Bell, 871, 891, 892, 986, 987. V. Mercer Co., 958, 984. Lebanon v. Edmonds, 248, 1520. V. Railway Co., 581, 602, 1418. Le Blanc v.- Illinois Central R. Co, 376. Le Blanch v. Blodgett, 993. Ledoux V. La Bee, 633, 1382. Xie Due V. Hastings, 380. Ledwich v. Connell, 986. Ledyard v. Auditor Gen., 889, 893. Lee v. Bewland, 1015. J. Boston, 642, 643, 1488, 1494. V. Commonwealth, 616, 901. V.Crawford, 507, 577, 760, 761, 8g8, 920, 935, 956. V. Jeddo Coal Co., 1009. V. Mehew, 776, 786, 1461. V. Newland, 996. V. New Orleans, 353. V. Perry, 441. V. Ruggles, 1157, 1187, 1450. i V. Sturges, 391, 404, 451, 615. V.Taylor, 1373. V. Templeton, 1379, 1502. V.Thomas, 245. Lee County v. Abrahams, 35. Leeds v. De Frees, 894, 1181, 1222, 1288. V. Hardy, 817, 841, 1390, 1508. Leeper v. South Bend, 247. Lefavour v. Bartlett, 856. Lefebre v. Negrotto, 810, 1455. Lefevre v. Detroit, 362, 750, 1191, 1235, 1291. Lefferts v. Calumet Supervisors, 387. Lefflngwell v. Warren, 1085. Leftwich v. Richmond, 996. Leggett V. Humphreys, 1335. Lehigh County v. Northampton, 375. Lehigh Crane Iron Co. v. Common- wealth, 405^ 682. Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower Macungie, 329, 340. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Pennsyl- vania, 157. TABLE OF CASES. oxliii Xjehman v. Grantham, 758. V. Robinson, 626. Xieigh V. Everhart's Bx'rs, 1450, V. Green, 877, 884, 888. Lemdecker v. People, 489. Leisy v. Hardin, 152. lieltch V. La Grange, 247. V. People, 1248, 1274. Leitzbach v, Jackman, 808. v Leloup V. Port of Mobile, 140, 147, 149, 155, 158, 160, 162. iieman v. Lake View, 535, 1246. Lemly v. Commissioners, 711, 1387. Lemon v. People, 168. Lemont v. Singer, etc. Co., 1442. Le Moyne v. Chicago, 1256. V. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 1271. Lenawee County Savings Bank v. Adrian, 397, 1417. L'Engle v. Florida Central, etc. R. Co., 729. V. Wilson, 734. Lennig's Bx'rs v. White, 1092. Lent V. TlUson, 51, 52, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 235, 631, 1203, 1241, 1260, 1412. Leominster v. Conant, 795, 1172. Leonard v. Canton, 46fi. V. Cincinnati, 1168. V. Madison County, 1490. V. New Bedford, 88. V. Pilkington, 864. Leon Loan & Abstract Co. v. Equal- ization Board, 649. , Leopold V. Hallheimer, 813. Lepperts v. Calumet Supervisors, 1460. Leppo V. Gilbert, 965. Lerch v. Snyder, 905. Le Roy v. East Saginaw City Ry. Co., 1477, 1482. V. New York, 1408. V. Railroad Co., 110. ■ V. Reeves, 896. Le Seigneur v. Bessan, 488, 734. Leslie v. Leslie, 817. V. St. Louis, 1416, 1452. Lester v. Baltimore, 1497. Lettelle v. Warwick & C. Water Co., 517. Levant v. County Com'rs, 1401. Levee Dist. v. Huber, 1209, 1176. Leverlch v. Adams, 446. Levi V. Coyne, 1274, 1280. V. Louisville, 384, 529. Lervlck V. Brotherllne, 1046. Levy V. Chicago, 1245. V. Ladd, 950, 1000. V.Newman, 502, 1040. •V. Smith, 262. V. Wilcox, 597, 842, 1453. Lewellen v. Lockharts, 402, 1095, 1123, 1146. Lewis V. Albertson, 1278. V. Barnhardt, 1090. V. Bishop, 765, 783, 784. V. Blair, 445, 446. V. Bogue Chitto, 1445. V.Chester County, 662. V. Coons, 980. V. Disher, 1086. V. Dugar, 1109. V. Garrett's Adm'r, 1341. V. Laylln, 1413. V. Manson, 809. V. Monson, 745. V. Pleasants, 1090. V. Rothchild, 880. V.Schmidt, 1232. V. Siebles, 994, 1079. V. Soule, 1074. V. Spencer, 1418. V. State, 362, 1379. V. Symmes, 1519. V. Vicksburg & M. R. Co., 376, 911. V.Ward, 9'67. V. Webb, 510, 1093. V. Withers, 626, 629, 783. Lewis County v. Knowlton, 1021, 1455. V. Tute, 1483. Lewiston, etc. Co. v. Asotin County, 1427. Lewiston Water & P. Co. v. Asotin Co., 394, 396, 398. Lexington v. Butler, 564. V. Fishback's Trustee, 612, 650, 653, 660, 662, 819. V. Headley, 1244. V. McQuillan's Heirs, 4, 98, 227, 238, 411, 418, 420, 1182, 1201, 1225. Lexington & B. K. R. Co. v. Trus- tees, 586. Liberty v. Kurd, 1511. Libby v. Burnham, 590, 594, 1469. V. Mayberry, 1001, 1005. V. West St. Paul, 1409. Lichentag v. Tax Collector, 350. Lick V. Austin, 278, 279. Lieb V. Wheeling, 122. Liebermann v. Milwaukee, 1252, 1421. Lien v. Board of Com'rs, 211, 1132, 1169, 1192. V. Board of Supervisors, 181. Life Assoc, v. Board of Assessors, 477, 483, 754. Ligare v. Chicago, 1211. Light V. West, 988, 1020, 1072. Lightburne v. Taxing Dist., 158. Llghtfoot V. Tenant, 907. cxliv TABLE OF CASES. Lightly V. Oloughton, 434. Lightner v. Mooney, 1051; v. Peoria, 1188, 1211, 1231, 1235, 1275. Lilienthal v. Campbell, 1467. Lillie V. Snow, 1457. Linings V. Detten, 517. Lilly V. Taylorj 467, 1364. Lima v. Cemetery Assoc, 357, 1201, 1235. V. McBride, 8, 546. Lime , Rock Nat. Bank v. Henry, 726. Llnck v. Litchfield, 759, 1254. < Lincoln V. Chapin, 440, 1324, 1475, 1467. V. Street Com'rs, 1191, 1216, 1256, 1263. V.Worcester, 623, 1379, 1408, 1477, 1478, 1480, 1494, 1506, 1510. Lincoln County Com'rs v. Faulkner, 1020. Lincoln Land Co. v. Phelps County, 776. Lincoln Street R. Co. v. Lincoln, 359, 363, 1163. Linde v. Canfield, 982. Lindsay v. Allen, 1482, 1505. V.Chicago, 1243. V.Eastwood, 873. V. Fay, 1016, 1086, 109L Lindsey v. Boone County, 920^ 921, 1495, 1496. V. Sinclair, 968. Linehan R. T. Co. v. Pendergrass, 1412, 1415. Lingle v. Chicago, 920. Lingo V. Harris, 864. Lingonier v. Ackerman, 1497. Link V. Doerfer, 976, 1087. Linn v. O'Neil, 866, 869. Linneus v. Locke, 892. Lin Sing v. Washburn, 261. Linton v. Athens, 247. V. Carter County, 252. V. Childs, 1, 9, 131, 450, 831. Lionberger v. Rowse, 131, 716, 717, 833. Lippincott v. Pensauken T'p, 486, 989. Lipps V. Philadelphia, 1172. Liquidating Com'rs v. Tax-Coli lector, 758, 806, 900. Lisbon V. :^ath, 472, 476, 546. Litch V. La Grange, 1257. Litchfield v. Hamilton County, 136, 793i 939, 1441, 1446. V. McComber, 239, 1291. V. Polk County, 1452. V.Vernon, 236, 365, 466, 546, 1156, 1162, 1179, 1182, 1208. Litchfield v. Webster County, 13^. 902, 1446. Little V. Edwards, 819, 968, 969, 993L V. Gibbs, 938. V. Greenleaf, 1478. V. Herndon, 916, 1008. V. Merrill, 572, 576, 1471, 1469. V.Portland, 1282. Little Falls Electric & Water Co. V. Little Falls, 307. Little Rock V. Board of Improve^ ments, 104. V. Katzenstein, 1154, 1208. V. Prather, 102, 1429. Little Rock & F. S. R. Co. v. Hug- gins, 895. V. Worthen, 278. Little Rock & M. R. Co. v. WiU- iams, 695, 1509. Little Rock, etc. R. Co. v. Payne, 508. Littler v. Jayne, 1434. Littleworth v. Davis, 200. Litz V. Johnston, 349. Livermore v. Bagley, 445. Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 25, 26, 84, 88, 90, 92, 653_ Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 26, 149, 171, 703. Livingston v. Albany, 283, 298. " V. Anderson, 864. V. Hollenbeck, 1449. V.Hudson, 1009. V. New York, 1162, 1201, 1206. V. Paducah, 399. Livingston Co. v. Darlington, 203,- 243, 1316. V. Welder, 230, 1316. Llano Cattle Co. v. Fraught, 415. Lloyd V. Bunce, 1045. . V. Bussee, 1047. V. Lynch, 966. Loan Assoc, v. Topeka, 1, 3, 181^- . 183, 184, 196, 206, 259, 1363. Lobban v. State, 807, 866, 869, 1372: Lochte V. Austin, 1009. Locke V. Cattell, 1457. V.Dane, 511. V. New Orleans, 492. V. Pittsfield, 1379, 1383. Locker v. South Amboy, 1240, 1251. Lockhardt v. Houston, 845. Lockhart v. Harrington, 102. V. Smith, 729. V.Troy, 430. Lockridge v. Daggett, 1073. Lockwood V. Gehlert, 983, 1035, 1042. V. Johnson, 653. V.Roys, 483, 751. T.St. Louis, 363, 1156, 1176,. liai, 1228, 1416, 1450; TABLE OF CASES. cxlv Lockwood V. "Weston, 659, 720. Lodi Water Co. v. Costa, 1156. Loeber v. Lieinlnger, 3, 17, 18, 19, 835. Loeser v. Redd, 533. Lpesnitz v. Seelinger, 1425. Loewenthal v. People, 1354. Loltin V. National Bank, 289, 290, 710. V.Watson, 1332. Logan V. Board of Com'rs, 137. V. Eastern Ark. L. Co., 485, 919. V. Ouachita, 567. V. Pyne, 1133. Logan County v. Lincoln, 425, 1298, 1300. V. United States, 683. Logansport v. Carroll, 447. V. Case, 1019, 1455. V. Humphrey, 921, 977, 1493, 1512. V. La Rose, 1521. V. McConnell, 870, 1426. V. Seybold, 102, 247. V. Uhl, 1516. Lohrs V. Miller's Lessee, 861. Lohrum v. Eyermann, 1155. Lombard v. Antioch College, 1061. V. Culbertson, 1086. V. McMillan, 1061. V. West Side Park Com'rs, 57, , 71 493 V.White, 1009, 1016. London v. East Saginaw, 1495. V. Spellman, 1033. v.WUmington, 320, 1440, 1443. London, etc. Mortg. Co. v. Gibson, 7, .450, 931, 959, 1453. Londonderry v. Derry, 415. Lonergan v. Baber, 746, 990, 991. Lang V. Com'rs of Richmond, 187, 192,, 550, 1435. V. Culp, 138, 635. V.Long, 748. V. Smith, 1026, 1031, 1032. V. Wolf, 1036. Long Branch Police, etc. Com. v. Dobbins, 1218, 1221. Longfellow v. Quimby, 958. Longwortb v. Cincinnati, 1263. v.Wolfington, 1064. Longyear v. Auditor-iSeneral, 505, 594. V. Buck, 303. , Lionsdale v. Carroll County, 921. Look V. Industry, 1509. Loomis V. Jackson, 650. V. Los Angeles County, 921. V. Pingree, 808, 914, 953, 1004, 1046. V.Rogers, 468, 1365. V. Spencer, 1478. Loose V. Navarre, 556, 577. Lorain v. Smith, 940. Lord V. Lancey, 1328. V.Litchfield, 112, 379, 634. V. Parker, 437, 811, 838, 843. Lord, etc. Co. v. State Board, 1487. Lord Foley v. Commissioners, 463. Lord Kolchester v. Kewney, 360. Lore V. Welch, 1009. Lorenz v. Armstrong, 1246. Lorillard v. Monroe, 1511. Lorimer County Bank v. National State Bank, 910. iiOrong V. Groomer, .997. Los Angeles v. Railroad Co., 783. V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 369, 1121. V. State Loan, etc. Co., 378. Los Angeles County v. Ballerino, 837, 840, 1460. V. Bikenberry, 1113, 1143, 1146. Lose V. State, 644. Lothrop V. Ide, 446. Lott V. Cox, 147. V. Dysart, 904. V. Hubbard, 390, 622, 1477. V. Morgan, 146. V. Ross, 466, 546, 644, 1109. V. Trade Co., 147. Loud V. Charlestown, 1415. V.Haley, 1415. V. Penniman, 952, 958. Loud & Sons Lumber Co. v. Elmer T'p, 769. V. Hagar, 728, 795. V. Wager, 729. V. Vienna T'p, 1501. Louden V; East Saginaw, 1489, 1492. Loughborough v. Blake, 99, 1094. Loughbridge v. Harris, 194. V.Huntington, 932. v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 814. Louis V. Bressler, 877. Louis Bridge Co. v. People, 775, 779. Louis Cotinty Com'rs v. Nettieton, 775. Louisiana v. Jumel, 118. V. Miller, 1288. V. New Orleans, 122, V. PHlsbury, 107, 297, 585. V. United States, 1367. Louisiana & N. O. Ice Co. v. Parker, 299, 347. Louisiana Brewing Co. v. Board of Assessors, 1381, 1384, 1388. Louisiana Cotton Manuf. Co. v. New Orleans, 275, 299, .325. Louisiana Lottery, Co. v. New Or- leans, 275, 299, 325, 408. Louisiana Oil Co. v. Assessors, 689. Louisville v. Anderson, 1497. V. Bank of Kentucky, 881, 884. , V. Bank of Louisville, 112, 113, 116. cxlvi TABLE OF CASES. Louisville v. Commonwealth, 263, 265, 266, 267. V.Henderson, 1279. v.Henning, 473, 645. V. Johnson, 507, 841, 842. V. Kimbel, 841. V. L«atherman, 266, 268, 1280. V. Louisville, 840. V. Louisville Board of Trade, 378, 1444'. V. Louisville Gas Co., 884. V. McNaughton, 265, 266, 362, 1155. V. Murphy, 469, 1301. v.Nevin, 264, 268, 1235, 1279, 1280. v.PoweU, 1498. V. Rolling Mill Co., 1156, 1179, 1183. V. Selvage, 1214, 1258. v;Sherley, 672. V. Tatum, 659. V. Trustees, 349. Louisville & E. Mail Co. v. Barbour, 614, 648. Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Com- monwealth, 156, 297, 498, 550, 614, 619, 842. Louisville & N. J. R. Co. v. Com- monwealth, 20, 216, 246, 577, 621, 699, 844, 1496, 1498, 1507. Lioulsville & N. R. Co. v. Barbours- ville, 295, 1523. V. Bullitt County, 517. V. East St. Louis, 749, 1159, 1213, 1231. V.Hopkins County, 216, 844, 1495. V. Louisville, 82. V. Pendleton County, 470. V. Trustees, 209, 451. Louisville, etc.' Co. v. Gaines, 110, 359, 1431. Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Bate,, 1408, 1444. V. Davidson County, 182. V. Palmes, 370, 374. V. State, 290, 334, 621, 697. Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louisville, 165, 246, 248, 295, 750, 801, 838, 846. Louisville Canal Co. v. Common- wealth, 357. Liouisville City R. Co. v. Liouisville, 1139. Liouisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas- light Co., 116, Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. State, 896, 1231, 1291. Louisville, N. O. & T. K. Co. v. Buford, 959, 979. v. Taylor, 370. Louisville R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 295, 297, 370, 619, 673, 687, 691, 753. V. Louisville, 113. Louisville Sinking Fund Com'rs v. Buckner, 1486. Louisville Ste^m-Forge Co. v. An- derson, 244. LouisvUle Tobacco Warehouse Co. V. Commonwealth, 297, 612. Louisville Trust Co. v. Louisville, 373. V. Muhlenburg County, 1376. Liouisville Water Co. v. Common- wealth, 19, 22, 498. V. Clark, 116, 299, 355, 778. V. Hamilton, 267. Love V. Gates, 1005. T. Howard, 823. V. Shartzer, 1064. V. State, 11-16. V.Welch, 940. V. Wilbourne, 953. Lovejoy v. Lunt, 485, 725, 914, 937, 953, 1004. Lovelace v. Tabor, 987. V. Tabor Mines, 998. Lovell V. Sny Inland Levee Drain- age Co., 1250. V. St. Paul, 1281, 1291. Loverin v. School Dist., 201. Lovington v. Trustees, 288, 1325. Lovingston v. Wilder, 1309, 1322. Low V. Austin, 144, 149, 150. V. Galena, etc. R. Co., 1405. V. Lewis, 264, 268. V. Lincoln County Court, 424. V. Little, 1088. Lowe V. Bkey, 1001. V. Martin, 951. V.Weld, 442. Lowell V. Boston, 181, 196, 207, 647. V. Commissioners, 623, 637, 1380, 1381, 1392. V. French, 1291. V. Hadley, 492, 1129, 1183. V. Middlesex County Com'rs, 722, 740, 1382, 1391. V. Oliver, 181, 21^, 258, 514. V. Wentworth, 626, 632. Lower King's River Reclamation Dlst. V. McCuUah, 63, 737, 746. Lowerre v. New York, 1274. Lowry v. State, 630. Lowther v. Earl of Radnor, 1466. Lucas v. Lottery Com'rs, 109, 1099. V. San Francisco, 1277. V.Tucker, 511. Lucas County v. Leonard, 346. Lucia V. Montpelier, 1437. Ludden v. Hansen, 997. Ludeling v. McGuire, 1057. TABLE OF OASES. cxlvii Ludington v. Escanaba, 524, 789. Ludington Water-Supply Co. v. Ludington, 587. Ludlow V. Ludlow, 1019. V. Trustees, 1235, 1245. Ludlow's Heirs v. Joinson, 450. Luehrman v. Taxing District, 123, 192. Luffborough v. Parker, 743. Lulkln V. Galveston, 174, 591, 844, 956, 1012, 1058, 1246. Luling V. Labranche, 1116. Lum V. Bowie, 1421, 1439. V. Vicksburg, 784. Lumber Co. v. Hayward, 1422. Lumberville, etc. Co. v. State Board, 680. Lumsden v. Cross, 1008, 1199. Lund V. Chippewa County, 1301. Lundbom v. Manistee, 1516. Lunenburg v. Walter, 998. Lunt V. Wormell, 725. Luques v. Dresden, 207. Lusher v. Scites, 256. Lusk V. Chicago, 1245. V. Harber, 1058. Lussem v. Sanitary Drainage Dist., 553, 554, 587. Lutman v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 1422. Lutterloh v. Com'rs, 1362. Luttrell V. Knox County, 268. Lutz V. Crawfordsville, 1100. Lybrand v. Haney, 975, 1003. Lycoming v. Union, 209, 1303. Lycoming County v. Gamble, 404. Lydecker v. Palisade Tax Co., 867. Lyford v. Dun, 953. Lyle V. Jacques, 523, 660, 731, 856, 1453. Lyman v. Anderson, 616, 760, 1031. V. Piske, 644, 1468, 1470. V. Howe, 596, 777. V. Hunter, 961. V. People, 735. V. Plummer, 1241. Lynch y. Brudie, 1030, 1064, 1065. T. Donnell, 929, 940. Lynchburg v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 1121. Lynde v. Brown, 733. V. Dummerston, 438. V. Maiden, 593, 921, 957. V. Melrose, 921, 1512. V. Walden, 592. Lyndon v. Miller, 1324. Lyng V. Michigan, 149, 151, 158. Lynn v. Morse, 1032, 1033, 1038, 1042. Lyon V. Alley, 480, 527, 632, 912, 930, 1252, 1272, 1285, 1450. V. GuthArd, 854. V. Hunt, 933, 1004. Lyon V. Morris, 191. V. State Bank, 436. V. Tonawanda, 63. Lyon County v. Goddard, 1512. Lyons v. Board of Equal., 1395. V. Cook, 1489. V. Cooper, 1140. Lyth V. Buffalo, 492, 1249. M. McAdams v. Honey, 604, 821. McAden v. Mecklenburg Com'rs, 715. McAdoo V. Benbow, 450. M'Afee's Heirs v. Kennedy, 194. McArdle v. Jersey City, 550. ■ McArthur v. Peacock, 1047, 1057. V. Pease, 445. McBean Co. v. Chandler, 1197. McBee V. State, 446.' McBride v. Chicago, 362. V. Hoey, 1044. McCabe v. Carpenter, 100, 103, 1311. McCague v. Omaha, 920, 921, 922. McCall V. California, 152, 160. V. Justices, 624, 901. V.Larimer, 19, 519, 598, 743. V. Neeley, 1092. M'Callie v. Chattanooga, 253. McCallister v. Cottrille, 1015. McCallum v. Board of Assessors, 786. V. Bethany, 19, 838. McCann v. Jean, 897. V. Merriam, 956, 997. V. Smith, 1063, 1064. McCarlln v. State, 264. McCarrol v. Weeks, 849. McCarter v. Neil, 898. McCaskell v. State, 21, 31, 276, 848, 1106. McCaughan v. Tatman, 1072, 1074, McCauley v. Mahon, 808. V. Ohenstein, 996. V. People, 889. McCauslin v. McGuire, 988, 998. McChesney v. Chicago, 1178, 1245. V. Hyde Park, 1158, 1172. V. Kochersperger, 889, 894. V. People, 267, 443, 484, 523, 535, 632, 830, 888, 889, 920, 966, 1254, 1272. McClain v. Batton, 1015, 1059, 1455, 1458. V. Pennsylvania Co., 1486. McClaskey v. Barr, 822. V. Cromwell, 450. V. Kunes, 982. V. Webb, 1077. McClaughry v. Cratzenburg, 1514. MoClay v. Lincoln, 1439. cxlviii TABLE OF OASES. M'Clenachan v. Curwen, 215. McClellan v. District' of Columbia, 746. 1243. Y. Pettigrew, 152. T. Railroad Co., 494. McClung V. IJvesay, 1418. V.Ross, 879, 882, 916, 1004. MoClure v. Campbell, 816, 817, 871, 872. V. Lavender, 986. V. Maitland, 860. V. Smith, 760. V. Warner, 603, 1022. MeCollum v. Uhl, 875, 886, 962. McComb V. Bell, 365, 556. McConkey v. Smith, 776, 783, 1418. McConnel v. Bowdry's Heirs, 445. McConnell v. Day, 939. V. Ham, 206. V. Konepel, 966. V. Swepston, 1030, 1068, 1069. McConville v. St. Paul, 1489. McCoppin V. McCartney, 279, 280. McCord V. Bell, 1201. V. Bergautz, 525. V. Sullivan, 913, 930. McCormack v. Patchin, 1165. V.Russell, 1029, 1030. McCormick v. District of Columbia, 1450. V. Edwards, 920, 990. V. Fitch, 305, 436, 470, 624. V. Omaha, 1215. McCoy V. Able, 1516. V.Anderson, 665, 659, 1482. V. Chillicothe, 1416. V.Curtice, 442. V. Michew, 511. McCracken v. Elder, 20, 805. McCrary v. Comanche, 878. McCready v. Virginia, 161. McCreedy v. Sexton, 508, 523, 598, 983, 1068. McCreery v. Schaffer, 814. McCrew v. Kansas City, 1214. McCrickart v. Pittsburgh, 1496. McCrillis v. Mansfield, 843. , McCrowell v. Bristol, 1157, 1197, 1232. V. Richmond, 1163. McCue V. Board of Supervisors, 734. V. Monroe Supervisors, 1399. McCulloch V. Brooklyn, 1291. V.Maryland, 7, 9, 14, 130, 131, 149. V. State, 48. McCuUock v; Stone, 981. HcCuUough V. Board of Review, 350, 359. V.Brooklyn, 1266. V. Hunter, 429. V. Stone, 375, 376. V. Virginia, 119, 127. McCurdy v. Prugh, 258, 323, 324, 753. McCutchen v. Lyon County Super- visors, 482, 599, 785. V. Rice County, 644. McDaniel v. Correll, 510. V. Tebbetts, 1468, 1471. McDermott v. Hoffman, 926, 1089. V. Scully, 928, 940, 997. McDonald v. Conniff, 892, 1213. V. Daniels, 1087. V. Escanaba, 1385. V. GeisendorfE, 985. V. Hannah, 962. v. Leewright, 445, 446. V. Littlefield, 626, 1272. V. Maus, 952. v. Mezes, 1277. V. Murphree, 1411. V. Tekgue, 439, 1441. McDonnell v. Gillon, 1246. McDonough v. Gravier, 480. V. Jefferson Co., 808. V. Merlen, 1000. McDougal V. Brazil, 290. V. Montlezum, 1044, 1076. McDuffiev. Collins, 857, 1484. McEIwaine v. Brush, 55. McBneny. v. Sullivan, 1241. McEwan v. Spokane, 1282. McBweney v. Sullivan, 627. McPadden v. Brady, 524, 897, 889, 989. V. Goff, 960, 961, 987. V. Longham, 72, 83. McFarlane v. Brooklyn, 922. V. Cedar Creek T'p, 1491. V. Chicago, 1165, 1251. McFerron v. AUoway, 236. McGahen v. Case, 887. V. Garr, 916, 1055. McGahey v. Virginia, 119, 127. McGann v. Smith, 1070. McGauley v. SulMvan, 1046. MoGavock v. Pollock, 957. McGee v. Bailey, 1030. V. Fleiing, 898, 919. V. Holmes, 1079. V. Salem, 634, 1382, 1503. McGhee v. Columbus, 1495. V. Martin, 940. v.Mathis, 110, 277, 1131, 1185, 1226. T. Sampselle, 526, 913, 963. V. State, 284, 776, 783. McGillin v. Chase, 1515. McGinnis v. Medway, 1113. McGonigle v. Alleghany City, 1156, 1218. McGoon V. Scales, 136. McGough V. Wellington, 445, 446. McGowan v. Savannah Mut. L. Assoc, 285. TABLE OF OASES. czlis: McGrath v. Newton, 1430. V.Wallace, 544, 545, 990. McGraw v. Williams, 432. McGregor v. Balch, 436. McGregor, etc. R. Co. v. Brown, - 138. V. Montgomery, 851. V. Morrow, 1057. McGregor's Bx'r v. Vaupel, 664. McGrew v. Stewart, 1246. McGulnty v. Herrick, 1477. McGuire v. Brockman, 1155. V. Commonwealth, 1137, 1152. V. Investment Co., 627. V.Parker, 168. V. ITnion Ins. Co., 764. V. Winslow, 1486. McHarg v. Hadden, 979. McHenry v. Alford, 156, 281, 377, 408, 1095. V. Brett, 911. V. Downer, 47, 131, 278, 712, 715. V. Kidder County, 830, 985. V. Selvage, 1214. Molnerny v. Reed, 20, 106, 882, 912, 1285. Mclnnis v. Lyman, 1085. Mclnstry v. Tanner, 435 Mcintosh V. Marathon Land Co., 807, 808, 1026. V. People, 1412. Mclntyre v. White Creek, 780, 1387, 1443. Mclver v. Clarke, 1098, 1106. V. Robinson, 716. McKay v. Batchellor, 851, 855, 1482, 1513. McKee v. Champaign County, 772, 887. V. Lamberton, 1066. V.Pendleton, 1222, 1256. V. Spiro, 1027, 1032. McKeen v. Northampton County, 3, 87, 89, 389, 402, 688. MqKeesport v. Busch, 1220. v.Fidler, 19, 1289, 1290. V. Soles, 247, 1222. McKeown v. Collins, 598, 727, 734, 736, 751, 1071. McKIm V. Somers, 436. McKinney v. Alton, 1107. V. Salem, 1150. V. Springe'r, 1093. V. State, ,892, McKinnon v. Meston, 67, 508, 896, 1011. V. Mixon, 930, 992, 1004. McKune v. Weller, 491. McKuslck "v. Stillwater, 1271. McLachlan v. Carpenter, 1032. McLain v. Baltoij,, 919. V. Button, 946. McLanahan v. Syracusej 804. McLaren v. Shieble, 867, 872. McLaughlin v. Acorn, 812, 971. V.Green, 965, 973. V. Kaln, 735, 739. V. Miller, 818, 1239. V. South Bend, 152. McLauren v. Grand Forks, 1247, 1252, 1518. McLay v. Arnett, 803. McLean v. Cook, 1478. V. Brlanger, 847. V.Horn, 666. V. Jephon, 658. V. Manhattan Medicine Co., 838. V. Meyers, 836, 837, 838. V. New York & S. B. Ferry, etc. Co., 852. V. Wyandance, etc. Co., 674. McLean County v. Bloomington, 1154, 1188, 1236, 1287. McLean County Precinct v. Deposit Bank, 547, 1376. McLemore v. Scales, 1079. McLendon v. La Grange, 283, 284, McLeod V. Burkhalter, 946. V. Receveur, '60, 1383. McLeods v. Brooks Lumber Co., 1004. McLoud V. Mackle, 960. McLewis v. Ferguson, 1338. McMahan v. McGraw, 968, 1086. McMahon v. Palmer, 52, 59, 717. v. Welsh, 634. McManus v. Hornaday, 1164. . V. People, 1248. v; Raymond, 1274. McMasters v. Commonwealth, 1161, 1162, 1206, 1285. McMlchael v. Carlyle, 995. McMlllen V. Anderson, 51, 59, 60, 66, 626, 828. V. Calumet, 893. V. Carter, 614. V. Hogan, 1025, 1029, 1059. V. Lee County, 1430, 1436. V. Robbing, 1005. V. Tacoma, '875, 986, 1201. V. Wehle, 751, 1091. McMlnn v. Whelan, 963, 965, 974. McMorran v. Wright, 779, McNair v. Jensbn, 485, 939. V. Ostrander, 1163. McNamara v. Baird, 1030. V. Bstes, 1068. V. Fink, 524, 984, 1036, 1037. McNamee v. Tacoma, 530, 1385. McNary v. Wrightman, 803, 1372. McNaughton v. Martin, 495, 499. McNeal Pipe, etc. Co. v. Lipplncott, 240. McNeil V. Freeman, 856. V. Hagerty, 394, 395, 398, 663. McNish V. Perrine, 760, 865, 1055. cl TABLE OF CASES. McNutt V. Lancaster, 437. McPhail V. Burris, 495. McPhee v. Constable, 929. McPherson v. Poster, 590, 1445. McPike V. Pew, 571, 1411, 1416. McQuade v. Jaffray, 490, 884, 885, 888, 889, 893, 935, 983. McQueen t. Bush, 743, 744. McQuestion v. Swope, 950, 956. McQuilkiE V. Doe, 21, 499, 500, 956. McQuity V. Doudna, 961, 1040, 1058. McReady v. Sexton, 1011. McReynolds v. Longerberger, 516, 579, 598, 735, 807, 926, 1005, 1083.* McRory v. Malnes, 919. McRue V. Bowers Dredging Co., 834, 835. McSherry v. Wood, 1262, 1388, 1390. McTwlggan v. Hunter, 113, 343, 344, 384, 484, 622, 630, 632, 1431. McVeagh v. Chicago, 847, 1374. McVeigh V. Lanier, 21. MoVerry v. Boyd, 1230, 1421. McWhinney v. Brinker, 447. V. Indianapolis, 920, 921, 1490, 1491, 1493. V. Logansport, 1017, 1497. McWilllams v. Michael, 732, 930. V. Phillips, 804, 853. Mabry v. Harp, 639. V. Taryer, 1095, 1122, 1144, 1343. Mace V. Carteret County Com'rs, 1420. V. Buchanan, 1107. Machlasport v. Small, 441, 796, 1334. Machine Co. v. Gage, 151, 169. Mack V. Price, 998. Mackall v. Canal Co., 381, 911, 1012. MacKenzle v. Wooley, 207, 224. Mackey v. San Francisco, 80, 86, 91, 278, 651, 660, 661, 662, 667, 777, 902, 1425, 1504. Macklot V. Davenport, 291, 1404, 1467, 1513. Macomb v. Lake County, 1429, 1451. V. Twaddle, 16. Macomber v. Center, 1479. Macon v. Central R. Co. etc. Co., 112. V. First Nat. Bank, 716. V. Macon Construction Co., 473. V. Patty, 4, 106, 411, 1129, 1155, 1163, 1192, 1208, 1288. V. Savings Bank, 1107. Macon County v. United States, 586. Macon, etc. R. Co. v. Goldsmith, 117. 1381. Macon Sash, etc. Co. v. Macon, 1103. V. Mayor, 394. Macy V. Nantucket, 1461. Maddocks v. Stevens, 999, 1005. Maddux v. Newport, 1189. Madison v. Fitch, 357. V. Whitney, 652. Madison County v. People, 98, 227, 285, 286, 1322. V. Smith, 1373, 1381. Madland v. Benland, 1003. Madry v. Cox, 248, 252. Madson v. Sexton, 1011. Maenhaut v. New Orleans, 1436. Magee v. Commonwealth, 480, 488, 933, 1218, 1219. V. Cutler, 1403. V.Denton, 1412. Mager v. Grlma,"23, 33, 167. Magic Packing Co. v. Stone Ordean Wells Co., 906. Magill V. Martin, 978, 998. Magneau v. Fremont, 1096. V. French, 105. Magner v. Ins. Co., 965. Magnolia v. Sharman, 1489. Magnolia Dist. T'p v. Boyer Indep. Dist, 1509. Magoun v. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, 32, 33, 73, 75, 76, 77, 79, 343. Magruder v. Augusta, 264. V. Esmay, 861. Maguiar v. Henry, 992, 1011 Maguire v. Board of Mobile, 547. V. Mobile County, 610, 715. V. State Sav. Inst., 1496. Mahanoy V. Comry, 1297. Mahany v. People, 828. Maher v. Brown, 946, 994, 1027, 1458. V. Chicago, 1278. Maina v. Elliott, 732, 958, 1027. Maine v. Gran^ Trunk R. Co., 157, 164, 693. MaiBh V. Arizona, 138, 586, 612, 893, 1386, 1459. Major V. Pavey, 636, 1395. Malchus V. Highlands, 235, 238, 239. Mall V. Portland, 20, 844, 1276. Mallan v. Bransford, 1333. Mallett V. Uncle Sam Co., 438. Mallory v. Millep, 1328, 1343. Maloy V. Marietta, 176, 1183, 1201. . Maltby v. Reading, etc. R. Co., 48, 88, 124, 832. Maltus V. Shields, 98. Mammoth Mining Co. v. Juab County, 361. Manchester v. Furnald,' 1354, 1383, 1522. V. People, 548. Manchester Mills v. Manchester, 1391. Manchett v. Auditor-General, 1464. Mandeville v. Beaudot, 102, 1115. v. Riggs, 1430, 1436. TABLE OF OASES. cli Mandlebaum v. Gregovltch, 1098. Manhattan Co. v. Blake, 707. Manhattan Trust Co. v. Richards, 1045. Manice v. New York, 1266, 1291. V. White, 466. Manistee v. Harley, 4, 522. Manistee & N. B. R. Co. v. Railroad Cpm'rs, 111. Manistee, etc. R. Co. v. Auditor- General, 444, 487. Manistee Lumber Co. v. Springfield T'p, 304, 1496. Manistee River Improvement Co. v. Sands, 5. Manistlque L. Co. v. Witter, 654. Mankato v. Fowler, 457, 1138. V. Debenture, etc. Co., 964. V. Emlen, 528, 530, 531. Manly v. Raleigh, 1430. Mann v. Carson, 750, 887, 933, 980, 997, 1056, 1464. Manning v. Bonard, 965, 1052. V. Den, 522, 1288, 1389. V.Mathews, 582. V. Tuthill, 814. Manor v. McCaJl, 1361. Manresa Inst. v. Norwalk, 352. Manseau v. Edwards, 985. Mansfield v. Martin, 727. Manson L. & T. Co. v. Hestori, 292, 386. Mansur v. County Commissioners, 605. Manufacturing Co. v. Newell, 602. Manuf. Ins. Co. v. Lord, 678. Maple V. Beltzhoover Borough, 1285. V. Vestal, 603, 1426. Marathon v. Oregon, 415. Marathon T'p v.- Oregon T'p, 1350. Marble v. Fife, 981. V. McKenney, 562. . Marchant v. Langworthy, 570, 571. Margate Pier v. Hannam, 438. Margolies v. Atlant.a City, 1141, 1142. MargrafE v. Cunningham's Heirs,' 953. Maricopa & P. R. Co. v. Arizona, 85, 168, 869. Marion v. Epler, 1194, 1206. Marion & M. R. Co. v. Alexander, 466, 468, 586. Marion County v. Coler, 1362. v.Galvin, 616. V. Harvey County, 414. V Kruedenier, 456, 616. V.Louisville & N. R. Co., 220, 517 V. Louisville, 517. Marion County Com'rs v. Barker, 571, 774. Marion County v. Harvey County Com'rs, 575, 591. Marion County Court v. Wilson, 1393. Marion, etc. Gravel Road Co. v. Sheeth, 21, 500. Mark v. Commonwealth, 1147. Market Bank v. Belmont, 529. Markley v. Chicago, 443, 760. V.Rudy, 1381. Marklot v. Da;venport, 1441. Marks v. Purdue Univ., 243. V. Trustees of Purdue Univ., 203. V. Woodbury County, 239. Marlar v. State, 1340. Marley v. Foster, 997. Marlow v. Adams, 1064. Marmont v. State, 1114. Marquette County v. Ishpeming T'p,- 909. Marquette, etc. R. Co. v. Marquette, 1450. Marquette, H. & O. R. Co. v. United States, 686. Marquis of Chandos v. Commis- sioners, 455. Marr v. Enloe, 67, 102. Marrie v. Long, 748. Marsden Co. v. Board of Assessors, 142. V. State Board, 678. Marsh v. Bird, 856. V.Brooklyn, 1009, 1493. V. Burroughs, 118. V. Chestnut, 495, 516, 632, 882, 916. V. Supervisors, 341, 590, 752, 1058, 1084, 1393, 1420, 1443. Marshall v. Benson, 385, 603, 763, 1003. V. Davies, 813. V.Donovan, 75, 201, 294. V.Grimes, 148, 1123. V. McDaniel, 859. V. Silliman, 1099, 1322, 1507. V. Vicksburg, 147, 1123. V. Wadsworth, 847, 864. Marshall County v. Knoll, 17, 18, 19, 836. Marshall County Court v. Calloway County Court, 252, 415. Marshalltown v. Blum, 168. Marti v. Wall, 733. Martin v. Allard, 485, 889, 919, 927, 989. V. Aston, 212. V.Barbour, 437, 485, 919, 920, 927, 930, 932, 936, 980, 989, 1011, 1033, 1070. V. Barnett, 1413. V. Barney, 445. clii TABLE OF CASES. Martin v. Charleston. 262, 357. V. Clay, 1447. V.Cole, 579, 736, 737, 945, 949, 1011. V. Dix, 248, 411, 418. V. Garrett, 998, 1003. V. Hawkins, 887, 889, 897, 990. V.Kearney County, 920, 922. V. Langenstein, 1056. V. Mansfield, 1468. V. Martin, 1093. V. McDiarmid, 482, 556, 931, V. New Orleans, 3.47. V. Portland, 656. • V. Ragsdale, 945. V. Rosedale, S86. V. School Dist., 71, 76. V. Snowden, 802, 803, 914, 953. V. Southern Athletic Club, 727. V. State, 1114, 1150. V. Stoddard, 419, 628, 1039. V. Swofeord, 9,68, 970. V. Tax Collector, 604. V. Wills, 1222. Martin Co. v. Drake, 605. Martinez v. State Tax Collector, 980. Martin's Executrix v. Slaughter, 1024. Martz V. Newman, 1001. Marvin v. Town, 1451. Marx V. Hanthorn, 67, 508, 933, 995, 1007, 1011, 1013, 1017. Marye v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 88, 163, 697. V. Parsons, 118, 1370, 1427. Maryin v. Carron, 827. Maryland v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 500, 903. Mary's Gas Co. v. Elk County, 379. Mason v. Belfast Hotel Co., 790, 840, 843. V. Bemis, 728. V. Chicago, 1213, 1276. v.Crowder, 982, 1080. V. Fearson, 953, 955. V. Gitchell, 886. V. Hazelton T'p Supervisors, 908, 909. V.Johnson, 600, 1504. V. Lancaster, 387, 406, 584, 1102, 1140. V. Muskegon, 1509. V. Pearson, 478. V. People, 612. V. Purdy, 552, 588. V. Rollins, 906. V. Rowe, 590. V. Sargent, 669. V. Sioux Falls, 1246 V. Spencer, 1227. V. Thurber, 672. V.Whitney, 602. Mason County v. Simpson, 847. Masonic Aid Assoc, v. Taylor, 704. Masonic Building Assoc, v. Brown- ell, 97, 729, 730, 745. Masonic Temple Assoc. ' v. Pflanz, 842. Maspereau v. New Orleans, 730. Massachusetts General Hospital ,v. Somerville, 361. Massachusetts Soc. v. Boston, 349. Massenburg v. Grand IjOdge, 349, 353. Massing v. Ames, 730, 733. Mast V. Nacogdoches County, 1325, . 1326. Masters v. Portland, 383, 1216. V. Scroggs, 1171, 1260. Masterson v. Beasley, 1024. Mather v. Curley, 1037. V. Darst, 508, 889, 935, 1060. Matheson v. Mazomanie, 783, 1489, 1491. Mathews v. Buckingham, 808, 950. V. Culbertson, 1072. V. Glenn, 1454. V. Kansas, 1498. V. Sampson County Com'rs, 1420. Mathis V. Board of Assessors, 637. V, Cameron, 1432. Matthews v. Jensen, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1143, 1149. V. Light, 914, 966, 968. V. Ormerd, 815. Matrau v. Tompkins, 1493, 1495. Matson's Ford Bridge Co. v. Com- monwealth, 682, 685. Matteson v. Rosendale, 581, 1491. Mattingly v. Dist. of Columbia, 69, 510, 517, 518, 526, 1205. Mattocks V. McLain L. & I. Co., 795, 978, 987. Mattox V. Stephens, 917. Matzenbaugh v. People, 869. Mauch Chunk V. Shortz, 1172. Maul V. Ryder, 966. Mauldin v. City Council, 1167, 1196. V. Greenville, 52. Maurer v. Clifl, 654, 771. Maug V. Railroad Co., 697. Maxfield v. Wllley, 970, 971, 972. Maxson v. Huston, 1075. Maxwell v. Chicago, 1272. V. Cunningham 736. V. Griswold, 1486. V. Hunter, 809, 1074. V. Paine, 775. V. Palmer, 1058. ' V. People, 85, 262, 672, 773. V. San Luis Obispo County, 1499. May V. Holdridge, 530. V. New Orleans, 144. TABLE OF OASES. cliii May V. Traphagen, 598, 737. Mayall v. St. Paul, 1212, 1450. Maybin v. BUoxi, 244, 574. Mayenno v. Millaudon, .1056. Mayer v. Jersey City, 1446. v. New York, 1266. Mayes v. Brwin, 387. V. Swan, 389. Mayfield v. Bradley, 596. Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Mayfield, 176,'470, 555, 582. Mayhew v. Davis, 827, 1004. Mayo V. Ah Loy, 883, 886. V. Carrington, 822. V. Haynie, 1014. V. Washington, 471. Mayor v. Boyd, 732, 819. V. Lord, 1375. V. McKee, 17, 836. V. Scharf, 1239. Mayor, etc. v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 396, 684. V. Dargan, 4. V. Grand Lodge, 112, 113. V. Green Mount Cemetery, 1. v. Jackson, 343, 502. V.' Lord, 1362. V. Rains, 1411. V. White, 102. Mayor of Macon v. Jones, 26. Mayor of New York v. Bailey, 217. Mays V. Cincinnati, 466, 1117, 1141, 1497. V. Witkovskl, 912. Mayson v. Banks, 978. Maywood Co. v. Maywood, 1175, 1207. Mead v. Gale, 1469. V. James, 1449. V. Lansing, 1509. V. Roxborough, 644. Meade v. Haines, 1388, 13fl0, 1467. Meade County v. Hoehn, 651, 658. Meader v. Lowry, 215. Meadowcroft v. Kochersperger, 1425. V. People, 1273. Mearkle v. Board of County Com'rs, 1500. Mecactney v. Morse, 739. Mechanics' Bank v. Debolt, 110. V. Kansas City, 1450. V. Thomas, 110. Mechanics', etc. Bank v. Town- send, 391. Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Baker, 318, 712, 714, 716. V. Concord, 373, 397. Mechanics' Sav. Bank v. Granger, 707. Meday v. Rutherford, 468. . V. Rutherford Borough, 997. Medford v. Pratt, 252. Medical Soc. v. NefE, 356. Medland v. Connell, 891, 959, 962, 979 1022 V.Linton, 486, 773, 913, 979, 1022, 1252, 1256. V. Walker, 1033, 1038. Meecham v. Newport, 1499. Meek v. Bayard, 218. v.McClure, 601, 1504. Meeker v. Ashley, 215. Meeks v. Whatley, 1021. Meggett V. Eau Claire, 52, 64, 1225, 1455. Meier v. Kelly, 1082. Meigs V. Roberts, 510, 1016. Melcher v. Boston, 131, 1119. Meldahl v. Dobbin, 961. Mellington v. Houston, 841. Melvin v. Weare, 626. Memphis v. American Express Co., 1112, 1140. V. Bing, 450. , V. Brown, 1367.. V. Carrington, 703. V. Ensley, 371. v.Home Ins. Co., 112, 113, 357, 371, 624. V. Looney, 836, 878. V. Memphis City Bank, 112, 357, 371. V. Union & P. Bank, 357, 371. V. Union, etc. Bank, 112. V. United States, 1367. Memphis & L. R. Co, v. Berry, 114. Memphis Gaslight Co. v. "Taxing Dist., 109, 112. Memphis Land & T. Co. v. Clark, 1032. Memphis R. Co. v. Commissioners, 374, 375. Mendenhall v. Burton, 8, 248. V. Hall, 1060. Mendocino County v. Johnson," 1334. Mendota Club v. Anderson, 265, 1002. Menger v. Board of Com'rs, 265. V. Carruthers, 967. Menominee v. Martin Lumber Co., 525, 838. Mentz v. Hamman, 446. Mercantile Library Co. v. Taylor, 35i, 353. Mercantile Libraty Hall Co. v. Pittsburgh, 327. Mercer County v. Hackett, 564. Mercer County Court v. Navigation Co., 561. Mercantile Nat.^Bank v. Hubbard, 714, 715, 777, 783, 1443. T. New York, 133, 134, 711, 712, 713. cliv TABLE OF CASES. Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Shields, 712. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Hart; 805. Merchants' Bank v. Pennsylvania, 61, 631. Merchants', etc. Nat. Bank v. Penn- sylvania, 73, 74, 631, 714, 717. Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Newark, 272, 356. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 491, 601, 623, 692, 1396. Merchants' Nat. Bank v. McWill- iams, 818. Merchants' Realty Co. v. St Paul,<, 750, 1037. Merchants' Warehouse Co. v. Mc- clain, 905. Mercier v. New Orleans, 609. Mercur Gold Mining, etc. Co. v. Spry, 492, 496, 552, 556, 605, 686, 1451. Mercy Hospital v. Chicago, 477. Meredith v. Ladd, 440. V. Phelps, 1040. V. United States, 18. Meriden v. Fleming, 593. lieridian v. George, 1420, 1426. V. Maloney, 869. V. PhilliK 264, 1514. Meriwether v. Garrett, 1, 8, 17, 19, 20, 47, 49, 117, 123, 228, 467, 865, 1300, 1-305, 1326, 1350, 1375. V. Muhlenburg, 486. Merrett v. Coulter, 944. Merriam v. Coffee, 603. V. Davey, 818, 1006. V. Dovey, 760, 761. V. Goodlet, 867, 885, 897. v. Hemple, 1022, V. Knight, 888. V. Moody's Executors, 1285. V. Otoe County, 1509. V. People, 495. V. Rauen, 1022. Merrick v. Amherst, 203, 243, 302, 409, 1190. v. Hutt, 730, 739, 928, 1006. Merrill v. Austin, 1501. V. Dearing, 993, 1034, 1054, 1055. V. Gorham, 1441. V.Humphrey, 385, 387, 1426, 1460. v.Ijams, 882, 922, 986, 1022, 1040. V. Omaha, 921. V. Plainfield, 1437. V. Sherburne, 46. V. Shields, 920. V. Tobin, 802, 824. V. Welsher, 215. Merriman v. Lyman, 1044, 1226. Merritt v. Corey, 548, 1059. v.Farris, 891. V. Kewanee, 830, 1243, 1247. V. Portchester, 1241, 1253, 1452^ V.Thompson, 728, 897. • Mersereau v. Miller, 895. Mesker v. Koch, 870, 1424. Messeck v. Supervisors, 1411. Messenger v. Germain, 726. V. Peter, 785. Megserole v. Brooklyn, 1448. Mestayer v. Carrege, 1126. Metairie Cemetery Assoc, v. A* sessors, 354. Metcalf V. Perry, 897, 990. Methodist Church v. Ellis, 357. Methodist Pr. Church v. Baltimore,- 631. Metropolitan Bank v. New Orleans Brewing Assoc, 802. Metropolitan Board of Works v.- Vauxhall Bridge Co., 1171. Metropolitan L. Ins. Co. v. Newark^ 651. Metropolitan R. v. Fowler, 698. Metz V. Anderson, 1441. V. Hagerty, 495. Meuser v. Risdon, 106. Mexico V. Canthorn, 838. Meyer v. Burritt, 881, 837, 868, 882. V. Covington, 839, 894, 895, 1223^ 1288. V. Dubuque Co., 660, 731. V. Kuhn, 1450. V. Parker, 502. V. Pleasant, '93, 651. V. Rosenblatt, 1383. v.'Tnibee, 730. Meyers v. County Com'rs, 166. V. Shields, 626, 627, 1450. Miami County v. Brackenridge, 357. Michael v. Mattoon, 1271, 1273,. 1276. Michel V. Police Jury, 1280. Micheltree v. Sweezey, 219. Michener v. Philadelphia, 1173,- 1259. Michigan Central R. Co. v. Porter,. 688. Michigan Dairy Co. v. McKenlay, 603, 655. V. McKinley, 653. Michigan Lake Superior Power Co.- V. Atwood, 848. Michigan Land, etc. Co. v. L'Anse,. 13, 216, 561, 577. V. Republic T'p, 252. Michigan L. S. P. Co. v. Atwood,- 761, 850. Michigan Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Kroh,. 825, 1059. TABLE OF CASES. clv Michigan Paving Co. v. Common Council, 1365. Michigan Savings Bank v. Detroit, 1383, 1388. Michigan Southern & N. I. R. Co. V. Auditor-General, 846. Michigan Sugar Co. v. Auditor- General, 181, 206. Middaugh v. Chicago; 1204. Middleboro v. Coal, etc. Bank, 296, 649. Mlddleport v. Insurance Co., 172. Middlesex R. Co. v. Charleston, 396, 401. Middleton v. Berlin, 442. Middletown , Bank v. Bacharach, 970, 972. Midland v. Roscommon, 13. Midland Elevatot Co. v. Stewart, 550, 586. Midland R. Co. v. State, 759, 852, , 639. Midland Supervisors v. Auditor- General, 1405. Midlothian I. M. Co. v. Dahlby, 936. Miles V. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 823. V. Ray, 1445. Milhau V. Sharp, 1306. Millard v. Truax, 896, 989. Millaudon v. Gallagher, 426, 734, 959, 1076, 1077. Mille Lacs County v. Morrison, 883. Milledge v. Coleman, 1016, 1084. Miller v. Amsterdam, 1389. V. Anderson, 869. V. Brown, 893. V. Commonwealth, 94, 350, 361, 640. V.Cook, 1454, 1455. V. Corbin, 942, 1020. V. Corey, 816. V. Davis, 838. V.Douglass, 390. V. Dunn, 220. V. Eheinzweig, 817. V. Embree, 45, 427. V. First Nat. Bank, 621, 619, 712. V. Gorham, 852. V. Gorman, 1160, 1443. V.Graham, 512, 533. V. Grandy, 219, 1433. V. Hageman, 355, 359. V.Hale, 19, 516, 519, 598, 727, 735, 743, 9^0. V. Heilbrun, 715. V. Hixon, 175, 468, 492. V. Hodsdon, 809. V. Howell, 1027. V. Hurford, 314, 447, 603, 807, 825, 1022. V. Kirkpatrlck, 112, 1108. V. Madden, 1412, 1455. , Miller v. Miller, 1009. V. Montague, 1034. V. Pence, 993, 1038. V. Rucker, 1466. V. State, 115, 116. V. Stewart, 1335. V. Troost, 194. v.Vollmer, 649, 1141. V. Vollsner, 1443. v. Williams, 956, 1001, 1040. -V. Wisener, 20, 853. V. Wright, 807. V. Ziegler, 969. Millett V. Early, 837. Millican v. Patterson, 999. Milllgan v. Drury, 634. Millikan v. Ham, 1019. V. La Payette, 921, 936. Milliken v. Benedict, 516, 518, 724, 725, 726. Millikin v. Bloomington, 1422. Mills V. Austin, 1500. ' V.Charleston, 495, 528. V.Charlton, 1307, 1426. V. Collett, 1465. V. Frazier, 326. V. Gleason, 1441. V. Henricks County, 1487, 1495. V.Johnson, 1425, 1441. V. Lowell, 1510. V. Martin, 1346. V. Richard T'p, 566. V.Richland, 442, 447, 448, 926. V. Richland T'p, 576, 774, 760. V. Scott, 982. V. Thornton, 88. V. Thurston County, 855. Mills County v. Brown County, 335. Mills' Guardian v. Hopkinsville,-' 1505. Millsaps V. Jackson, 660, 664, 667. Milner v. Clarke, 477, 933, 934. V. Pensacola, 252. V. Shipley, 839, 887, 893, 895. Milten v. Drain Com'r, 1402. Miltenberger v. Cooke, 1332. V. St. Louis County Court, 1357, 1359, 1522. Milwaukee v. Kaeffer, 1411. V. Milwaukee, 266, 415. V. Momsen, 835. V. Whitefish, 1497. ' Milwaukee Electric R. etc. Co. v. Milwaukee, 177, 341, 343, 360, 376. Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. v. Crawford Supervisor, 376, 408. V. Kossuth County, 414, 574. V. Milwaukee, 368, 376. V. Supervisors, 376. Milwaukee Iron Co. v. Hubbard, 726, 1449, 1460. V. Schubel, 780. >clvl TABLE OF CASES. Milwaukee Steamship Co. v. Mil- waultee, 674. . Milwaukee Town v. Milwaukee, 252. Minces v. Schoenlg, 307. Miner v. Fredonia, 655, 1104. V. McLean, 919, 927, 1004. Miners' Bank v. Iowa, 99. Miner's Lessee v. McLean, 827. Mines v. Schoenig, 1147. Mining Co. v. Juab County, 546. Minneapolis & N. E. Co. v. County Com'rs, 656. V. Trail County, 25, 322, 653. Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. M* Gillivray, 151. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Koer- ' ner, 685. Minneapolis R. T. Co. v. Minnesota Debenture Co., 747. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S.. M. R. Co. V. Dickey County, 1416. Minneapolis Terminal R. Co. v. Minneapolis Debenture Co., 895, 897. Minnesota v. Central Trust R. Co., 854. V. Weyerhauser, 62. Minnesota Central R. Co. v. Don- aldson, 369. Minnesota Debenture Co. v. Dean, 1029. Minnesota Linseed Oil Co. v. Pal- mer, 1258, 1264, 1450. Minor v. Daspit, 1176. V. Mechanics' Bank, 478. Minor Lumber Co. v. Alpena, 1495, 1496, 1501, 1505. Minot V. Philadelphia, etc. Rj Co., 112, 356, 675, 676, 688, 693. V. Railroad Co., 406, 834. ' V: Winthrop, 7, 33, 303, 353, 361, 380. Minter v. Durham, 966, 1001, 1012. Minthorn v. Smith, 1004. Minturn v. Smith, 1452. Miramon v. New Orleans, 841. Mississippi Mills v. Cook, 309. Missouri v. Spiva, 852. Missouri,- K. & T. Trust Co. v. Smart, 569, 1189, 1372. Missouri River, etc. A. Co. v. Mor- ris, 601. Missouri River, etc. R. Co. v. Blake, 602. V.Morris, 602, 693. V. Wheaton, 1412, 1428. Missouri Valley & B. R. Co. v. Har- rison County, 489. Mitchell V. Bratton, 525, 724, 735. V. Deeds, 511. V. Commissioners, 770. V. Craven County, 1461. Mitchell v. Green, 1032. V. Insurance Co., 905. V. Lake T'p, 639, 654. T. Lines, 1074. V. McFarland, 984, 1038. V. Milwaukee, 1451, 1453. V. Negaunee, 235, 248. V. Plover, 653. V.Williams, 1, 1145. Mitchell County v. City Nat. Bank, 558. Mitchell ville v. Supervisors, 267. Mitchum v. Mclnnis, 764. Mix V. Hotchkiss, 813. V. People, 447, 486, 488, 555, 592, 632, 785, 826, 827, 828, 884, 891, 892. V. Shaw, 1130. Mixon V. Clevenger, 771, 947, 1009. V.Stanley, 865, 961, 1045, 1046. Moale V. Baltimore, 734, 1206, 1219, 1292 Moberiy v. Hogan, 1222, 1223, 1288. Mobile V. Baldwin, 89, 653, 1418. V. Craft, 394, '465. V. Dargan, 181, 1184. V. Insurance Co., 110. V. Richards, 1103. V. Stein, 1126. V. Stonewall Ins. Co., 275. V. Street B. Co., 1184. V. Yuille, 1141. • Mobile & O. R. Co. v. Moseley, 372, 1425. V. State, 367. Mobile & S. H. R. Co. v. Kennerly, 114. » Mobile County v. Kimball, 149, 234, 236, 242. Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Pebbles, 1448. Mock V. State, 622. Modoc County v. Churchill, 623, 753. , Moers v. Smedley, 1411, 1450. Mogg V. Hall, 1481. Mohawk & H. R. Co. v. Clute, 1461. Moingona Coal Co. v. Blair, 1074. Molae V. Baltimore, 1253. Moline Plow Co. v. Wilkinson, 154. Moll V. Chicago, 1245, 1273. Monk V. Corbin, 1073, 1074. Monmouth Park Assoc, v. State Board, 695. Mono County v. Flanigan, 89. Monroe v. Fort Howard, 529. V. Greenhoe, 654. V. New Canaan, 645, 752, 772, 779. V. Winegar, 897. Monroe County v. Rochester, 1193, 1449. Monroe Savings Bank v. Rochester, 406, 678. TABLE OF OASES. clvii Monroe Water Oo. v. Frenchtown T'p, 137, 1495. Monroe Water-Works Co. v. Mon- roe, 340. Montana Catholic Missions y. Lewis, 349. Montana Coal, etc. Co. v. Livings- ton, 636. Montclair Mil. Acad. v. Bowden, 350. V. State Board, 350. Montezuma Valley, etc. Co. v. Bell, 19, 829, 830. Montford v. Allen, 964, 940, 1025, 1026, 1027. Montgomery v. Aydelotte, 881, 987, 1020. V. Birge, 952, 1002. V. Burton, 1045. V. Foster, 1167. V. Fullen, 1256. T. Knox, 105, 1106. V. Lebanon, 643. , V. Marydale, 446, 664, 929, 930. V. Meredith, 511, 810. V. Sayre, 1418, 1425. T. Shoemaker, 161. V. State, 466, 555. V. Trumbo, 1455, 1458. V. Wasem, 1254, 1516. V.Whitfield, 964, 969. v.Wyman, 350, 357, 359. Montgomery County v. Elston, 132. V.Menifee County Court, 1360. Montgomery County Supervisors v. Tallant, 394. Monticello v. Banks, 1227. Monticello Distilling Co. v. Balti- more, 465, 1196. v. Mayor, 12, 61, 62, 65, 463, 527, 631. Monticello Seminary v. People, 354. Montis V. McQuiston, 785, 1419. Montpelier v. Clark, 1330. V. East Montpelier, 252, 415. V. Vermont, 1339. Moody V. Chadwick, 1225, 1288. V. Shaw, 33, 671. Moon V. March, 807, 1330. Moore v. Albany, 1444, 1494. V.Allegheny City, 1325, 1475, 1478, 1480. V. Auditor-General, 805, 980. V. Baltimore, 1077. V. Beason, 85, 168. Moore v. Boston Street Com'rs, 618. V. Brown, 916, 932, 1004, 1092. V. Byrd, 1008, 1057, 1058. V. Chattanooga, 899. V. Clackamas County, 1451. V. Commissioners, 653. V. Eufaula, 161. V. Fayetteville, 98, 1104. Moore v. Foote, 547. V. Graves, 436. V. Hp.mlin,.1028. V. Harris, 999. V. Hewitt, 273. V. Holliday, 113, 1424. V. Indianapolis, 107, 1150. v.Irby, 1055. V. Luce, 1093. V. Marsh, 790, 855. V. Mattoon, 443, 760. V. Morledge, 264. V. Moore, 906. V. Newfield, 578. V. New Orleans, 348. V. Paola, 1189, 1434. V. People, 1245, 1267. V. Quirk, 133, 906. V. School Directors, 1467, 1512r V. State, 109, 630. V. St. Paul, 307. V. Sugg, 910. V. Sweetwater, 85. V.Taylor, 352, 818, 1383, 1385.. V. Titman, 970., V. Turner, 1406. V. Woodruff, 264. V. Wyman, 1425, 1442. Mora V. Nunez, 953. Moran v. Commissioners, 564. V. New Orleans, 158. Morange v. Mix, 727. Morbeck v. State, 1333. Morey v. Brown, 1145. V. Duluth, 66, 867, 1271, 1285. Morford v. Ung^r, 183, 246. Morgan v. Beloit, 228. V. Bishop, 1086, 1087. V. Blewett, 773. V. Burks, 910, 965. V. Commonwealth, 120, 159, 337,. 1096. V. Cree, 585. V. Dubuque, 1278. V. Graham, 1433, 1437. V. Hale, 853. V. Louisiana, 373. V. Miami County Com'rs, 1054.- V. Orange, 260. V. Palmer, 1502. V. Parham, 653. V. Pueblo, etc. R, Co., 21. V. Purdy, 552. V. Smith, 732, 738, 749, 948,. 1002. V. Swartz, 1001. V. Tweddle, 486, 895. Morgan County v. Hendricks County, 414. Morgan's L. etc. R. Co. v. Board of Reviewers, 699, 758. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v.- Board of Health, 143, 147. -clviii TABLE OF OASES. Morgan Park v. Wiswall, 1157, 1177. Morgan's R. Co. v. Board of Health, 146. " Moj-iarty v. Boone County, 138. Morley y. Metamora, 1337. Morrill v. Douglass, 603, 940, 979, 980, 998, 1014. V. State, 1120, 1147. V. Swartz, 882. V. Taylor, 447, 760. Morrill's Heirs v. Scott, 1024. Morris v. Burt County, 921. V. Carmlchael, 932, 1086. V. Cuinmings, 466, 1431. V. Davis, 865, 953. V. Jones, 273, 1445. V. Lalaurie, 17, 19, 20, 867, 870. V. Lone Star Chapter, 350, 353. V. Merrell, 1424, 1427. V. Sioux County, 1511. V. State, 149, 1329. V. St. Louis Nat. Bank, 931, 937, 1071, 1453. Morris & E. R. Co. v. Newark, 698. Morris Canal, etc. Co. v. Jersey City, 1450. Morris, etc. R. Co. t. Commission- ers, 504. Morris Ice Co. v. Adams, 344. Morrison v. Bank of Commerce, 825, 944, 968. v.Hershire, 1156, 1163, 1206, 1224, 1286, 1425. V. Jaooby, 985, 1019, 1455. V.Kelly, 810. V. Larkin, 299, 381, 861, 901. V. McLauchlin, 734. V. Norman, 1090. V. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 544, 883. V.St. Paul, 1450.. Morrison County v. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co., 137. Morrow v. Dows, 851, 962. V. Green Bay, 529. V. Lander, 930, 1022, 1453. V.Smith, 526, 927. Morse v. Buffalo, 1269. V. Galley, 436. V. Hodsden, 1327. V.' Smith, '445. V. South, 729, 928. V. W€st Point, 315, 1163. Morton v. Compt. Gen., 2, 554, 558, 1365, 1368, 1435. V. Harris, 743, 949. V. Kirli, 1363. V. Lee, 431. V. Macon, 1102, 1134, 1140. V. Reads, 916, 984. V. Sharkey, 1093. Mosely v. Reily, 885. Moseley v. Tift, 455, 468, 1106, 1109. Moser v. White, 512, 577, 926. Mosher v. Robie, 590. Moss V. Cummings, 385, 752, 1476. V. Kauffman, 911. V. Shear, 414, 976. Mossett V. Newport & C. Bridge Co., 1387. • Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1465. Mott V. Hubbard, 1516. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1431, 1444. V. Reynolds, 543. V.Detroit, 4, 365, 1191, 1218, 1225, 1262, 1283, 1430, 1515. Moultham v. Apking, 905. Moulton V. Blaisdell, 485, 852, 930, 949. V. Doran, 949. Mount V. State, 21, 499, 500. Mount Hermon Boys' School v. Gill, 349, 350. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 1300. Mower County v. Crane, 841. v. Lambert, 880. Mowery v. Salisbury, 1146. Mowrer v. Helferstine, 1313. Mowry v. Blandin, 485, 520, 930, 932. V. Mowry, 574, 575, 591. V. Slatersville Mills, 602, 736, 1515. Mt. Carbon, etc. R. Co. v. Andrews, 1514. Mt. Carmel v. Wabash County, 1115. Mt. Carmel, etc. Co. v. People, 869. Mt. Pleasant v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 1201, 1235. Mt. Pleasant Cem. Co. v. Newark, 126. Mt. Vernon v. People, 266. Muhlenbrinck v. Com'rs, 260. Muhlenburg County v. Morehead, 47, 100, 1362. Muirhead v. Sands, 62, 72, 631, 889, 896, 897, 898, 940, 980, 982, 1054. Mulcahy v. Newark, 504, 1126, 1139, 1140, 1141. Mulford V. Sutton, 1483. MuUan v. Creditors, 507, 835. Muller v. Bayonne, 735, 1267. V. Jackson, 1042. Mulligan v. Hintrager, 901. V. Smith, 1247, 1248, 1520. Mulliken v. Benedict, 736. V. Bloomington, 564. V. Reeves, 731, 1424. Mullins V. Andrews, 555, 580. V. New Jersey, 851. V. Shaw, 451, 598, 794. Mulroy v. Churchman, 354. TABLE OF CASES. clix Multnomah County v. State, 229, 908. Mumford v. Sewell, 9, 91, 388. Muncey v. Joest, 1516. Munday v. Rahway, 47. Mundee v. Freeman, 269, 997, 1009, 1068, 1071. Mundt V. Railroad Co., 450. JMundy v. Van Hoose, 350, 353, 357. Municipality v. Dubois, 298. V. Duncan, 297. V.Dunn, 244, 593, 1165, 1166, 1189. V. Guillotte, 1189, 1283. V. Hart, 899. y. Millandon, 555. V. Pance, 466. V. Railroad Co., 357. V. White, 244, 1201. Munroe v. Winegar, 932, 959. Tlunson V. Board of Com'rs, 1176. V. Minor, 432. V. Munson, 1457. Murdock v. Chaffee, 980. V.Cincinnati, 62, 63, 64, 626, 1238, 1515. V. Ward, 132. Jtfurphrey v. Wilmington, 733, 1172, 1280. Murphy v. Board of Com'rs, 776, 780, 785, 1405. V. Campau, 963. V. Hall, 982. V. Jacksonville, 555. V. Lincoln County Com'rs, 1407. V. People, 497, 903, 1188, 1201, 1273. V. Peoria, 1163, 1254. V. State, 35. V. Smith, 1028. V. Stone, 693. ■Murray v. Bridges, 961. V.Charleston, 125, 127, 249. V. Chicago, 532. V. Hoboken Land Co., 1341. V. Hudson, 812. V. Lehman, 309. V.Tucker, 1242, 1283, 1284. V. United States, 967, 1400. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken, etc. L. Co., 849. Murtland v. Pittsburgh, 1285. Muscatine v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 732, 747, 1214, 1232, 1291, 1516. V. Packet Co., 147, 1501, 1502. V. Railroad Co., 385. V. Sterneman, 906. Mluscatine Western R. Co. v. Hor- ton, 1467, 1476. Muskegon v. Lange, 834, 837. " V. Martin Lumber Co., 448, 524, 838, 840, 926. Muskegon v. Muskegon County, 908. V. Soderberg, 909. Muskegon Lumber Co. v. Brown, 956, 979. V. Meyers, 1034. . Musselman v. Logansport, 511. Musser v. Adair, 50, 428, 1383, 1410. Mussey v. White, 796, 1469, 1482. Mutual F. Ins. Co. v. State, 703. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Supervisors, 396, 702. Mutual L. Ins. Co. v. Sage, 1292. Muzzy V. Shattuck, 1333. V. White, 491. Myers v. Campbell, 388. V. Baltimore County Com'rs, 783. V. Bassett, 961. V. Coonradt, 1075. V. County Com'rs, 145, 656. V. McRay, 883. V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 269. V. Park, 901. V. Railroad Co., 1278. V. Seaberger, 26, 90, 91. Mygatt V. Washburn, 763, 1468, 1472. Myrick v. La Crosse, 1425. K Nabors v. The Governor, 1343. Nalle V. Austin, 555, 592, 845. V. Fenwick, 914, 1005. Naltner v. Blake, 748, 1018. Names v. Highway Com'rs, 1403. Nance v. Hopkins, 596, 901. Napier v. Hodges, 1099, 1100, 1137. Napton V. Leaton, 1062. Narragansett Pier Co. v. Assessors, 616. Nashua & L. R. Co. v. Nashua, 375. Nashua Savings Bank v. Nashua, 86. Nashville v. Althorp, 260, 386. V. Bank of Tennessee, 265. V. Cowan, 18, 836, 878, 962. V. Knight, 1336. V. Smith, 267, 1400. V. Ward, 351. V. Weiser, 632. Nashville & D. R. Co. v. State, 695, 696, 787. IJashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Ala- bama City, 1102, 1151. V. Attalia, 1102, 1151, 1152. V. Taylor, 75, 170, 333. Nashville Gas Light Co. v. Nash- ville, 404. Nashville, M. & S. T. R. Co. v. White, 52. olx TABLE OF CASES. Kason v. Dillingham, 435. V. Fowler, 440. V. Ricker, 736, 934, 1005. Natchez v. Minor, 1005. Nathan v. Louisiana, 9, 167, 1110. National Bank v. Baker Hill Iron Co., 950. V. Baltimore, 712. T. Barber, 1435. * V.Boston, 712, 713, 717. V. Boyd, 783, 1424. V. Commonwealth, 131, 717, 832 V. Cookl 632, 783, 1415, 141^. * V. Danforth, 731, 817, 864. v., Douglass Cotinty, 711. v.Elmira, 1407, 1470, 1472, 1481. V. lola, 195, 206, 515. T.Kimball, 259, 714, 1424. V. Licking Valley, etc. Co., 732, 1458.' V.Long, 711, 716, 1418. V.Louisville, 909, 1005. V. Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co., 486, 1009. V.Mobile, 13L V. Morrison, 717. , V. New Bedford, 690, 1380, 1392. V. Petersborough, 711. V. Richmond, 514. V. Staats, 1385. V. United States, 11, 130. V. "Wells, 714. National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 755. National Bank of Mobile T. Mobile, 711. Nations,! Docks R. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 698. National Dredging Co. v. State, 89, 653. Neal V. Andrews, 978, 990. V. Commonwealth, 1110. V. Frazier, 975. V. Wideman, 979, 990. Nealey v. Overseers, 436. Neary v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co., 367, 408, 452, 639. Neave v. Weather, 1260. Nebraska City v. Gas Co., 2, 17, 20, 344, 598. ' Needham v. Morton, 1326. V. Norton, 844. Neenan v. Smith, 592, 1193, 1218, 1225, 1287, 1288, 1289. V. St. Joseph, 893. V. White, 995. Nef£ V. Bates, 1520. V. Smyth, 889, 927. Negley v. Breading, 725, 726. V. Henderson, 266, 267, 354, Negley v. Henderson Bridge Co., 484, 632, 633, 1420. Negus V. Yancy, 1054. Nehasane Park Assoc, v. Lloyd, 419, 428, 509, 526, 790, 957, 1012, 1157, 1208, 1449. Neiderer v. Bell, 1091. Neil V. Rozier, 1030. V. Spooner, 993. Neill V. Lacy, 725, 812, 976. Nelson v. Abernathy, 522, 526, 934, «936; 948, 951.' V. Becker, 791. V. Broadhack, 1001. V. Campbell, 1441. V. Carman, 1486. V. Central L. Co., 993, 1035, 1042. V. Cheboygan Nav. Co., 148. v.Goebel, 916. V. Homer, 467, 470. V. La Porte, 217. V. Merriam, 1484. V. Milford, 209, 1471. V. Pierce, 576, 619, 728, 937. V. Rountree, 514. V. Saginaw, 763, 1389, 1412. V. St. Martins, 121, 122. V.St. Martin's Parish, 1365. V. St. Paul Title, etc. Co., 704. Nelson Lumber Co. v. Loraine, 89^ 320, 340, 654. V. McKinnon, 848, 852. V. Whitworth, 387. Nesbitt V. Liggitt, 939. Nester v. Busch, 499, 1021, V. Church, 524, 889, 897, 960. Neth V. Crofut, 1477. Netherton v. Ward, 1171. Netterstrom v. Kemeys, 994, 1027. Neu V. Voege, 483, 526, 735, 736, ' 1357. Neuman v. La Crosse, 150G. Neustadt v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 367. Nevada v. Eddy, 1233. Nevada Bank v. Sedgwick, 86. Nevada County v. Dickey, 920. Nevin v. Allen, 1033, 1228. V. Bailey, 1078. V. Roach, 628, 1223, 1283. Nevins, etc. Drainage Co. v. Alkire, 1252. Newark v. Inhab. of Belleville, 268, V. Inhab. of Verona T'p, 265. V. Merchants' Ins. Co., 272. V. Mount Pleasant Cemetery Co., 319, 354. V. State, 512. V.Verona T'p, 349. Newark Banking Co. v. Newark, 712, 713. Newark City Bank v. Assessor, 26, 87. TABLE OF CASES. clxi Newark, etc. Inst. v. Panhorst, 1375. Newaygo Manuf. Go. v. Echtman, 576, 577, 586. New Albany v. Kansas City M. & B. R. Co., 366. New Britain v. Mariners' Savings Bank, 873. New Brunswick Rubber v. Com- missioners, 1210. New Canaan v. Hoyt, 613. ' New England Me^tg. Security Co. V. Board of Revenue, 495. New England Theosoph. Corp. v. Boston, 348, 349, 351. New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 118. New Haven v. Board of Trustees, 350. V. City Bank, 372, 396^ v. Fair Haven & W. R. Co., 638, 1230, 1235. V. Sheffield, 353. New Haven Clock Co. v. Kocher- sperger, 386, 1359, 1445, 1459. 1460. New Haven Sav. Bank v. Atwater, 813. New Iberia v. Weeks, 555, 1157. New Iberia Trustees v. Migues, 1101. New Jersey v. Wilson, 107, 108. V. Yard, 111, 114. New Jersey Mechanics' Nat. Bank V. Baker, 713. New Jersey Sinking Fund Com'rs v. Linden, 528, 530. New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Hancock,, 1382. New London v. Brainard, 210, 1436. V.Colby Academy, 344, 350. V. Miller, 4, 1268. New Men's Christian Assoc, v. Keene, 353. New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 369, 639. New- Orleans v. Arthurs, 347. V. Asylum, 114, v. Bank, 298. V. Banking Co., 1384. V. Becker, 1444. V. Bienvenu, 1119. y. Buckner, 1383. V. Burthe's Estate, 1301. V. Canal Bank, 299, 359. V. Canal, etc. Co., 299, 397, 404, 1390. V. Cannon, 849. V. Cassidy, 741. V. Cazelar, 245, 248. V. Citizens' Bank, 359, 371, 373, 391, 397, 846. V. Clark, 209, 210, 1302. V. Comptoir National, 1095. V. Cordeviolle, 887, 929. V. Davidson, 17, 21, 297. k New Orleans v. Day, 18, 759. V. Drainage Co., 1256. V. Dubarry, 261, 1108. V. Dunbar, 299. V. Eclipse Tow Boat Co., 146, 496. V. Elliott, 1189. V. Ernst, 346. V. Female Orphan Asylum', 349. V. Ferguson, 664. V. Fisher, 1375. V. Fossman, 390. V. Fourchy, 30, 297, 384. V. Graves, 105. V. Great South T. & T. Co., 127, 1122, 1226. V. Hart, 390, 685. V. Hassman, 685. V. Heirs of St. Romes, 630. V. Home Ins. Co., 298. V.Houston, 387, 398, 404. V. Insurance Co., 299, 325, 393, 408, 703, 2931. V. Jackson, 15. V. Jane, 1114. V.Kaufman, 102, 298, 1117. V. Klein, 297, 436. V. Koehn & Co., 1118. V. Le Blanc, 347. V. Leibe, 347. V. L'Hote, 496. V. Longman, 347. V. Louisiana Sav. Bank, etc. Co., 832. V. Mannessier, 348, 1115. V, Meister, 496, 806. V. Metropolitan, etc. Bank, 1103, 1107. V. Metropolitan, etc. Co., 115. V. National Bank, 299. V. New Orleans Coffee Co,, 348, 359. V. New Orleans, St. L. ■ etc. R. Co., '693. V. New Orleans Water Co., 59. V. New Orleans Water Works, 20. V. New Orleans Water Works. Co., 117. V. O'Neil, 347. V. Orphan Asylum, 349. V. People's Bank, 359. V. People's Ins. Co., 393. V. Pohlman, 347. V. Railroad Co., 458, 492, 493, 511, 607. V.Rhenish West Lloyds, 492, 703. V. Russ, 353. V. Savings Co., 299, 359. V. Savings Inst., 706, 1107. V. Semple, 91. v. South Bank, 298. clxii TABLE OF CASES. New Orleans v. Stalger, 298. V. State Nat. Bank, 359. V. St. Charles, etc. Co., 299, 408. V. Stempel, 1442. V. St. Romes, 491. V. Stewart's Estates, 630. V. Sugar Co., 408. V. Sugar Shed Co., 299, 345. V. Turpln, 298. V. Vergnole, 496. V. Wilmot, 147. v.Wire, 1280, 1291. V.Wood, 837. V. Water Works Co., 299, 344. New' Orleans & C. R..Co. v. New Or- leans, 357, 683. New Orleans Canal, etc. Co. t. New Orleans, 419, 1496. New Orleans City & L. R. Co. t. New Orleans, 112, 113, 358, 687. New .Orleans Cotton Exchange v. Board of Assessors, 756, 758, 1391, 1396. New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. As- sessors, 689, 1390. V. New Orleans, 775. New Orleans, M. & T. R. Co. v. Ne- grotto, 729. New Orleans Pac. R. Co. v. Kelly, 136, 600, 947. New Orleans Savings Inst. v. Les- lie, 874. 1 New Richmond Lumber Co. v. Rog- ers, 799, 851. New Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay & B. C. R. Co., 63, 1234. V. Bellingham Bay Imp. Co., 446, 1241, 1262, 1388, 1517. v.Roeder, 17, 20, 844, 903. New York v. Barker, 74. V. Colgate, 1285, 1291. V.Davenport, 229, 786, 909. V. Eden Musee American Co., 1122. . ' V. Promme, 906. V. Goldman, 1326. V. Louisiana, 118. ^ V. McLean, 24, 717, 839. V. Miller, 1148. V. Miln, 166. V.Roberts, 78, 95, 154, 718. V. Second Av. R. Co., 1139. New York & C. G. & S. Exchange v. Gleason, 622, 1385, 1445. New York & E. R. Co. v. Sabin, 48, 375. New York & G.- L. R. Co. v. Town- ship Committee, 1222. New York Biscuit Co. v. Cam- bridge, 648. New York Guaranty, etc. Co. v. r^a- comaR. & M. Co., 634, 695. New York, etc. R. Co. v. Lyon, 837. V. Marsh, 1496. v.Yard, 635, 758. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Prest, ' 1178. New York, L. B. & W. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 3, 5, 256, 262, 324, 694, 699. V.Pennsylvania, 7, 89, 90, 125, 127, 157, 631. New York, L. E. etc. E. Co. v. Hughes, 758. New York, L. & W. R. Co. v. Rail, 677. New York Milk Products Co. v. Damon, 726, 1470. New York, P. & N. R. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 694. New Yotls. Savings Bank v. Grace, 586. Newberg v. Munshow^r, 1479. Newbury v. Platte County, 1155. Newburyport v. County Com'rs, 1407, 1408. Newby v. Brownlee, 135, 993. Newcomb v. Davenport, 1495. V. Police Jury, 1280. V. Smith, 194. Newell V. ^Cincinnati, 525, 1175. V. People, 450. V.Wheeler, 509, 726, 916, 1449, 1451. V. Whittingham, 616. Newkirk v. Fisher, 448, 486, 760, 826. Newland v. Marsh, 46. Newman v. Chicago, 1258. V. Emporia, 516, 530, 1227. V.Livingston Supervisors, 1492, 1511. V. North Yakima, 475. Newport v. Berry, 649, 652, 653. V. Commonwealth, 111, 122, 266, 846. V. Masonic Temple Assoc, 295, 296, 346, 349, 356, 359, 381, 846, 867. V. Mudgett, 74, 273. V. Rlngo's Ex'x, 86, 87, 1497. V. South Covington & C. St. R. Co., 1122. V. Unity, 266. Newport, etc. Co. v. Douglas, 19. Newport Ilium. Co. v. Assessors, 638, 753. Newport Light Co. v. Newport, 361. Newsmeyer v. Railroad Co., 1431. Newsom v. Hart, 1346. Newton v. Marshall, 972. V. Prather, 446. V. Roper, 59, 61, 928, 980. Nlckum V. Gaston, 808, '810, 1082. TABLE OF OASES. olxiii Nichols T. Bridgeport, 1161, 1162, 1182, 1184, 1201. 1202, 1206, 1291. V. McGlatliery, 729, 1013, 1022. V. New Haven, etc. Co., 368, 374, 407, 678, 679, 689. V. People, 889. V. School Directors, 197. V. Walker, 1346. Nicholson v. Board of Assessors, 348. V.Parker, 347.' , Nicklase v. Morrison, 1004. Nicodemus v. East Saginaw, 1489. V. Hall, 667. V.Hull, 1420. V. Young, 913, 1044, 1455. Nicol V. Ames, 11, 179, 180, 829, 1094. V.Nashville, 466. Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Fay, 410.' V. Painter, 410. ' Niklaus v. Conkling, 495, 1157, 1236. Niles V. Shaw, 715. Nitz V. Bolton, 499. Nixon V. Biloxi, 939. V. Clevenger, 743. V. Ruple, 1393. Noble V. Bullis, 981, 1048. V. Cain, 980. V. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 905. V. Douglass, 1075. Noeker v. Howry, 814. Nolan V. Reese, 1283, 1389. V. San Antonio Ranch Co., 395, 655. V. Taylor, 728, 729. Noland v. Busby, 491, 1477. Noonan v. Stillwater, 1192. Nopson V. Horton, 814. Norcross v. Milford, 1379. Norfolk V. Chamberlain, 1179, 1181, 1197. V. Ellis, 1197. V. Norfolk Landmark Pub. Co., 105, 337, 1096, 1119. V.Young, 62, 627, 1239. Norfolk & M. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 766. Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Board, 86, 89, 652. V. Pennsylvania, 159, 179. V. Smyth County, 1496. V. Supervisors, 561, 562. Norfolk Landmark Pub. Co. v. Nor- folk, 34. Norfolk Trust Co. v. Maryee, 804. Norman v. Board, 210. V. Boaz, 75, 1420, 1427. Norridgewock v. Hale, 1338. V.Walker, 524, 764. Norris v. Burt County, 495, 497, 920. V. Coley, 864, 913. Norris v. Commonwealth, 1117. V. Crocker, 500, 903. V. Hall, 495, 896. V.Hayes, 734, 930, 946, 950, 953. V. Russell, 916. V. Waco, 23, 47, 56, 246, 334. ' Norris, etc. Co. v. Jersey City, 1444. Norristown v. King, 935. North American Trust Co. v. Lan- ier, 965. North Carolina v. Temple, 148,7. North Carolina R. Co. v. Alamance, 321, 444. V. Com'rs, 26, 87, 90, 498, 887. North V. Hammer, 1091. North Hempstead v. Hempstead, 252, 253. North Hudson County R. Co. v. Ho- boken, 1141. North Jersey St. Co. v. Jersey City, 1233. North Missouri R. Co. v. Maguire, 8, 9, 112. North St. Louis Gym. Soc. v. Hud- son, 350. North Yarmouth v. Shillings, 228. Northampton v. Hampshire, 82, 258, 303, 412, 653. Northampton County v. Lafayette , Coll., 351. V.Lehigh Coal, etc. Co., 329. V. Easton S. B. & W. B. P. R. Co., 377. V.Lehigh, etc. Co., 366. Northern Bank v. Stone, 114. Northern Ind. R. Co. v. Connelly, 176, 256, 1194, 1221, 1235, 1258, 1287. Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 1, 3, 7, 363, 1177, 1201, 1235, 1291. V. Swain, 1177. Northern Mo. R. Co. v. Maguire, 4, 356. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Barnes, 79, J.56, 281, 377, 408. V. Carland, 140, 369, 614, 627, 633, 1418, 1450. V. Clark, 684, 1425. V. Calvin, 509, 727. V. McGinnis, 137, 281, 377. V. Myers, 138. V.Raymond, 156, 1392. V.Traill County, 136, 137, 138. V.Walker, 79, 137, 281, 1425, 1426. V. Wright, 137. Northern Wis. R. Co. v. Supervis- ors, 136. Northrup v. Maneka, 1463. V. Shook, 1107. V. Trask, 987. clxiv TABLE OF OASES. Northumberland v. Cobleigh, 440. Northwestern C. & L. Co. v. Scott, 838, 1513. Northwestern, etc. Bank t. Spo- kane, 1227, 1271, 1388. Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Aber- deen, 1282. V. Chehalis County, 89, 651, 653, 1417. Northwestern Masonic Aid Assoc. V. Waddill, 310, 457. Northwestern Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 147, 1499. Northwestern U. P. Co. v. St. Paul,^ 147. Northwood v. Harrington, 925. Norton v. Boston, 1447. V.Courtney, 1269. V. Friend, 978. V. Metropolitan L. Ins. 'Co., 814, 970, 972. V. Quimby, 895. V. Shelby County, 432. Norton N. C. & S. B. Co. v. State Board, 379. Norwich v. County Com'rs, 212, 239, 1297. Norwood V. Baker, 51, 69, 70, 258, 1183, 1210, 1256, 1258, 1427. Nottage V. Portland, 510, 837, 894, 1240, 1493. Nouges V. Douglass, 220. Nowell V. Tripp, 1477, 1479, 1480. Nowlen v. Hall, 499, 886. V. Burwell, 1000. V. Hall, 896, 1464. Noxubee County v. Ames, 1445. Noyes v. Hale, 608. V. Haverhill, 856, 1489. V. King County, 747, 1385. Nugent V. Bates, 643, 644, 1388. V. Dilworth, 352. Null V. Zlerle, 1402. Nycum v. Raymond, 1038, 1042. Nye V. Alfter, 1092. o. Oakey v. Healy, 1001. Oakland v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 779. Oakland v. Whipple, 500, 653. Oakley v. Williamsburg Trustees, 1450. Oakland Cemetery Assoc, v. St. Paul, 354, 361. Oates V. Darden, 1347. Oatman v. Barney, 482. O'Brien v. Bradley, 960, 1045. V. Coulter, 916, 953. V. Police Jury, 1280. O'Byrne v. Savannah, 8. Oceana County v. Hart, 489. Oceanic, etc. Co. v. Tappan, 1502. Ockendon v. Barnes, 994. O'Connor v. Auditor-Gceneral, 1021. V. Finhigan, 827. , Oconto City Water Supply Co. v. Oconto, 8, 102, 467, 504. Oconto County v. Jerard, 1016, 1084, 1085, 1091. O'Day V. Bowker, 962, 1044. V. People, 596. Odell V. Atlanta, 1110. Odendahl v. Board of Supervisors, 1495. Odiorne v. tland, 437, 761, 1470. Odlln v. WoodrufC, 1415, 1417. O'Donnell v. Bailey, 584. V. Mclntyre, 486, 760. O'Donohue v. Hendricks, 957. Ogden V. Bemis, 927, 992, 995. V. Forney, 905. V. Harrington, 935. V.Lake View, 1245. V. Saunders, 126. V.St. Joseph, 87, 473, 648, 651, 652. V. Walker, 132, 768. Ogden City v. Armstrong, 1389, 1390, 1411. V. Crossman, 161, 336, 1095, 1102, 1104, 1122. Ogilvie V. Crawford County, 165. Oglesby v. Hollister, 821. O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 591, 727, 957. O'Hara v. Parker, 932. Ohio & M. R. Co. V. Highway Com'rs, 846. V. People, 523, 538, 694, 897. Ohio, etc. R. Co. v. Lawrence- County, 1407. Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. v. Hard, 620, 621. V. Hurd, 771. Ohio Trust Co. v. Debolt, 108, 110. Ohio Valley B. & L. Assoc, v. County Court, 90, 398, 405, 705. Ohio Valley R. Co. v. Common- wealth, 366. Oil City V. Oil City Boiler Works, 1212, 1399. V. Oil City Trust Co., 359, 1139. O'kane v. Treat, 285, 286, 421, 592, 1425. Olcott V. Fond du Lac, 181. V. State, 748. V. Supervisors, 123. O'Leary v. Sloo, 1129. Oldhams v. Jones, 739, 870, 965, 968. Old South Soc. V. Boston, 353. Olds V. Commonwealth, 616,. 624,. 901. Oldtown V. Blake, 437, 745. TABLE OF CASES. clxv Olean v. King, 1325, 1326, 1336. Oleson V. Green Bay, etc. R. Co., 504. V. Railway Co., 503. Oliphant v. Burns, 810, 915. Olive Cemetery Co. v. Philadelphia, 364. Oliver v. Carsner, 593. V. Kelghtley, 1430, 1436. V. Liverpool, etc. Co., 703. V.Lynn, 660, 1495. V. Memphis, etc. R. Co., ,112. V. Montgomery, 966. V. Omaha, 247. V.Robinson, 914, 935, 1011. V.Washington Mills, 7, 25, 26, 90, 125, 126, 168, 225, 403, 677, 1190. V. White, 346. Oliver Finney Grocery Co. v. Speed, 152. Olivier v. Gurney, 888, 935. Olleman v. Kelgore, 819, 967. Ollivier v. Houston, 841. O'Mahoney v. Bullock, 549. O'Malley v. Preeport, 1148. O'Mulcahy v. Florer, 1448. Olmstead v. Camp, 194. Olmsted v. Barber, 507, 809, 890. Olney v. Harvey, 252, 1362. V. Pearce, 435. Olney L. & B. Assoc, v. Parker, 1419. Olsen V. Bagley, 749, 801, 912, 913, 930, 956, 983. Olson V. Phillips, 930. V. Topeka, 1214. Olympla v. Stevens, 892, 1186. Olympla Water Works v. Board of Equalization, 1393. V. Thurston Qounty, 1385. Omaha v. Kountz, 1504. V. Union Pac. R. Co., 548. Omaha Med. Coll. v. Rush, 350. O'Neal V. Bridge Co., 261, 631, 1390. V. School Com'rs, 1325, 1480. ■ V.Virginia, etc. Co., 727, 1441. O'Neil V. People, 1177. V. Tyler, 750, 764, 775, 949, 1006, 1058, 1059, 1062, 1459. V.Virginia & M. Bridge Co., 480, 481. Ontario Bank v. Bunnell, 475, 1478. Ontonagon Supervisors v. Gogebic Supervisors, 414, 909. On Yuen Hai v. Ross, 641. O'Reiley v. Good, 1514. V. Kankakee Valley Draining Co., 1169. V.Kingston, 428, 1218, 1220, 1226, 1233, 1238, 1243. O'Reilly v. Holt, 947, 1030, 1226. Orange & A. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 363, 376, 466, 674. Orange Nat. Bank v. Williams, 706. Ordinary v. Retailers of Liquors, 1099. Ordway v. Ferrin, 1484. Ore V. Wiley, 989. Oregon & W. M. Sav. Bank v. Jor- dan, 602, 615, 627, 777, 782, 1411. v. Croisan, 785. Oregon & C. R. Co. v. Jackson County, 699, 781, 1461. V.Lane County, 136, 782. V. Portland, 1257, 1421. Oregon & M. M. Sav. Bank v. Jor- dan, 1387. , Oregon City v. Moore, 1365. Oregon Coal, etc. Co. v. Coos County, 776, 780. Oregon, etc. Bank v. Catlin, 273. Oregon Real-Estate Co. v. Multno- mah County, 1422. Oregon Short-line R. Co. v. Good- ing, 696.' Oregon Short Line & U. U. R. Co. v. Standing, 1416. Oregon Steam, etc. Co. v. Portland, 466, 468, 593. Oregon S. L. R. Co. v. Yeates, 696. Orion T'i> v. Axford, 667. Orland v. Hancock County Com'rs, 615. Orleans v. Cochran, 298. Orneville v. Palmer, 437. Orono V. Emery, 838, 840. V. Veazie, 750, 905, 1008. V. Wedgewood, 1324, 1329, 1480. Orphan Asylum v. School Dist., 349. Orr V. Baker, 357, 380. V. State Board, 772, 777, 1387. V. Travacier, 939, 1020. Orton V. Brown, 1122, 1123, 1144. V. Noonan, 735, 746. ' Osborn v. Danvers, 1478. V. New York & N. H. R. Co., 377, 398, 399. Osborne v. Adams County, 181. V. Bank of U. S., 131, 1417. V. Ludlow, 1355. V. Mobile, 102, 160. V. Springlake, 1110. V. State, 162. V. United States, 1340. Osborne' County Com'rs v. Blake, 594. Osburn v. Hide, 526. V. Searles, 806. Osgood V. Conway, 208. V. Westover, 987. Oshkosh City R. Co. v. Winnebago County, 1158, 1228, 1234, 1243, 1252. Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board of Equal., 637. clxvi TABLE OF CASES. Oskamp v. Lewis, 60, 609. Osterberg v.. Union Trust Co., 868, 960. Osterhoudt v. Rigney, 1434. V. Supervisors, 1434. Osterhout v. Hyland, 1434. V. Jones, 654. Osterman v. Baldwin, 1090. Ostrander v. Darling, 1042, 1462. Oswald V. Gilbert, 1202. V. Hallowell, 135. V. Wolf, 976. Oswego Starch Factory v. Dollo- way, 404, 675, 688, 758. Oteri V. Parker, 442, 849, 851. Otis V. Boston, 643. V. Boyd, 609. T. Chicago, 877. V. People; 844, 1489, 1496, 1500. . V. Ware, 613, 615, 623, 1380. Otken V. Lamkin, 200. Otoe County v. Brown, 977, 983, 1022. V. Mathews, 865. Ottawa V. Barnes, 1425. V. La Salle, 105, 1100. V. Spencer, 244, 1129, 1187, 1206. V.Walker, 1441, 1452. Ottawa County v. Nelson, 293. Ottawa Gas-Light Co. v. People, 704, 839, 840. Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb, 287, 686, 690, 832, 1385, 1390, 1460. Ottawa Univ. v. Board of Com'rs, 350, 353. Otter Tail County v. Batchelder, 890. Ottumwa, etc. Co. v. Ainley, 518,' 1217, 1223. Ottumwa Savings Bank v. Ot- tumwa, 132. Ouachita & M. R. T. Co. v. Aiken, 147. Ouachita County v. Rumph, 645. Ould V. Richmond, 31, 106, 258, 261, 418, 476, 1098, 1099, 1101, 1105, 1106, 1137. OuUahan v. Sweeney, 1035, 1054. Oulton V. Sav. Inst., 646. Overall v. Ruenzi, 1420, 1425. Overby v. State, 1145. Overing v. Foote, 605, 606, 627, 782, 1451. Overman v. St. Paul, 1239. Overseers of Amenia v. Stamford, 1128. Ovitt V. Chase, 607. Owen County Court v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 715. Owens V. Ranstead, 446. V. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 355. Owensboro v. Callaghan, 493. ' V. Commonwealth, 264, 268. Owensboro & N. R. Co. v. Daviess County, 74, 216, 627. V.Logan County, 699, 758. Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owens- boro, 716. Owners of Ground v. Albany, 1206, 1406. Oxford V. Board of Supervisors, 611. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Terre Haute, 151. Pace V. Burgess, 178. Pacific Bridge Co. v. Kirkham, 216. Pacific Coast Co. v. Wells, 1397. Pacific Coast R. Oo. v. Ramage, 390. Pacific Coast Sav. Soc. v. San Fran- cisco, 645, 646, 651. Pacific County v. Ellis, 1385. Pacific, etc. Co. v. Lieb, 287. Pacific, etc. Tel. Co. v. Common- wealth, 22, 499. Pacific Express Co. V. Seibert, 73, 76, 158, 310, 1411. Pacific Hotel Co. v. Lieb, 523, 675, 686, 1459, 1461. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 11. Pacific Junction v. Dyer, 151. Pacific Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. San Diego County, 1491. Pacific Nat. Bank v. Pierce County, 338, 391, 393, 40^, 707, 717. Pacific Postal Tel. Co. v. Dalton, 1460. Pacific R. Co. V. Cass County, 112, 357, 626, 673. , V. Maguire, 110, 114, 118. Pack V. Crawford, 952, 955, 968, 1002. Packard v. Beaver Valley L. & M. Co., 1076. V. Jefferson Co., 215. V. New Limerick, 1512. V. Tisdale, 19. Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 147, 148, 149. V. Keokuk, 5, 6, 147. V. St. Louis, 147, 148. Packwood v. Briggs, 802. Pacquette v. Pickness, 1064. Padelford v. Mayor, 143, 653. V. Savannah, 1109. Paducah St. R. Co. v. McCracken, 271, 296, 557, 753, 1311, 1393. Page V. Allen, 1431, 1437. V. aeggett, 805, 811, 828, 832. V. State, 1097, 1114. V. St. Louis, 383. V.Webster, 966. Page County v. Burlington & M. R. Co., 1521. Paine v. Boynton, 995, 1028. TABLB OF OASES. clxvii Paine v. Pickey County, 922. V.Ross, 1469. V. Spratley, 176, 362, 1285. Painter v, Blairstown, 1326. v.'Hall, 486. Paldi V. PaldJ, 601, 602, 762, 775. Palfrey v. Boston, 133. Palmer v. Board of Assessors, 728. V. Craddock, 1347. V. Cuyahoga, 148. V.Danville, 500, 1177, 1188, 1256, 1278. ' V. Downey, 443. V. Fitts, 228. V. Frank, 1003. V. Jones, 1363. V. McMahon, 51, 60, 626, 711, 712. V. Napoleon, 1425. V. Palmer, 1370. V. Pettingill, 834, 835, 855, 865, 868. V. Bich, 1450. V. Riddle, 993, 1038. V. State, 15, 1134. V. Stumph, 362, 1157, 1189, 1218, 1516. V. Way, 1129, 1183, 1186. Palmes v. Louisville, etc. Co., 107. Pana v. Bowler, 564. Parcher v. Marathon County, 1506. Pardee v. Freesoil T'p, 654. Pardridge v. Hyde Park, 531, 532, 1009. Parham v. Justices, 10. Paris V. Lewis, 748. V. Norway Water-works Co., 637. Parish v. Eager, 1085, 1458. V. Golden, 762, 763, 1469, 1476. V. Stevens, 1082. Parish Board School Directors v. Police Jury, 478. Park V. Tinkham, 940. Park Com'rs v. Telegraph Co., 1310. Parke County Coal Co. v. Camp- bell, 1256, 1519. Parker v. Altschul, 1288. V.Atchison, 526, 1214, 1251. V. Baker, 435. V. Baxter, 739, 868. V. Boutwell, 1448. V.Branch, 1037. V. Challiss, 236, 1130, 1218. V.Cochran, 727, 957, 1003,1490. V. Goddard, 1018. V. Great Western Ry. Co., 1502. V.Jacksonville, 511, 736, 751, 884, 895. V. Kett, 430. ■ V. La Grange, 1246, 1276. v.Matheson, 881, 986, 987. V. New Orleans Gas Light Co., 530. Parker v. North British & M. Ins. Co., 298. V. Omaha, 1517. V. Overman, 916, 1004. V. Quinn, 350, 353, 356, 3^8. V. Rule's Lessee, 916. V. Sexton, 592, 793, 957. V. Strauss, 88, 92, 125, 299. V. Van Steenburg, 537. V.Vinson, 1091. V. Wayne County, '552. Parker Mills v. Tax Com'rs, 657. Parkersburg v. Brown, 181, 195. V. Tavenner, 1155, 1163, 1172, 1203. Parkersburg & O. R. Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 147. | Parkinson v. Parker, 1471, 1474. Parkland v. Gains, 246. Parks V. Board of Com'rs, 46, 104, 172. V.Boston, 1408. V. Cressey, 838. V. Goodwin, 492. V. Miller, 884. V. Watson, 1034. Parlett v. Dugan, 823. Parmelee v. Chicago, 108, 288, 408. V. Railroad Co., 1425. V. Youngstown, 1216. Parmley v. Railroad Co., Ill, 115. V.Matthews, 1009, 1070. Parrotte v. Omaha, 1161, 1424. Parry County v. Selma, etc. R. Co., '20. Parsons v. Bangor, 644. V. Brown, 1454. V. District of Columbia, 51, 63, 69, 99, 1205, 1218, 1239, 1265. V. Durham, 1380. V. Gas-Light Co., 871. V.Goshen, 229. V. Newman, 979, 981, 1024. V.Parker, 729, 733, 1009. V. Slaughter, 808. Partridge v. Lucas, 1243, 1389. Passaic Water Co. v. Paterson, 686. Pata.psco Guano Co. v. Board of ■ Agric, 143. Patchin v. Brooklyn, 1409. v.Ritter, 1478. Paterson v. Society, etc., 363, 364, 365, 1156, 1291. Paterson & H. R. Co. v. Passaic, 1233. Paterson Rescue Mission v. High, 349. Patten v. Green, 628, 783. Patrick v. Llttell, 768. Patterson v. Barlow, 904. V. Baumer, 1390, 1441, 1515. V. Blackmore, 725. V. Board of Review; 351. clxviii TABLE OF CASES. Patterson v. Brlndle, 1024. V. Carruth, 940. V. Cox, 1501. V. Durfey, 1079. V. Galliher, 526, 996. T. Grettum, 1037. V. Kentucky, 142, 1138. V. Miller, 435. v.New Orleans, 347, 348. V. O'Neille, 867. V. Phillbrook, 511. V. Yuba, 450. Fatten V. Long, 251. V. Luther, 1073. V. Springfield, 244. Paul V. Fries, 733, 975, 1008. V. Linscott, 578. V. McGraw, 717, 1373. V.Pacific R. Co., 778. V. Railroad Co., 1424. V. Stoltz, 1120. V. Virginia, 26, 95, 168, 171, 703. Paulsen v. Portland, 51, 62, 63, 626, 631, 1203, 1240, 1241, 1256,, 1258. Paulson V. Portland, 1431, 1432. V. Rule, 868. Pawnee County v. Railroad Co., 1491. Paxson V. Sweet, 1129. Paxton V. Boss, 913, 1044. V.Valley Land Co., 960. Paxton, etc. Co. v. Farmers', etc. Co., 211. Pay V. Shanks, 853. Payne v. Arthur, 733. V. Lott, 885, 897. V. South Springfield, 1172, 1219. V. Tread well, 228. Paynter v. United States, 952. Payson v. Hall, 437, 914, 945, 1004. V. People, 484, 632, 1252. v. Tufts, 666, 672. Peabody v. County Com'rs, 659. Peacock v. Carnes, 1455. V. Leonard, 1404. Pearce v. Augusta, 474, 653, 1109. V.Hyde Park, 1172, 1238, 1245. V. Perkins, 764, 1001, 1078, 1079. V. State, 1335. V. Titsworth, 486, 998. V. Torrence, 794. Pearsall v. Eaton Supervisors, 448. V. Great Northern R. Co., 370. Pearson v. Canney, 793, 1345. V. Creed, 729, 730, 734, 1003. V. Chicago, 1162. V. Kendrick, 907. V. Lovejoy, 928. V. Patterson, 1026. V. Robinson, 944. V. Seatie, 1151. V. Yewdall, 51. V. Zable, 1241, 1245, 1257, 1258. Pearsons v. American Insurance Co., 1029. Pease v. Chicago, 219. V. Lawson, 1068. V. Smith, 438. V. Whitney, 1469, 1515. Peavey v. Greenfield, 715. V. Robbins,1466. Peay v. Field, 803. V. Little Rock, 1185. Peck V. Holcombe, 432. V. Miami County, 635. v.Raritan T'p, 239. V. School, 1453. V. Sherwood, 820. V. Sexton, 1073, 1085. V. Supervisors, 1366. V. Watros, 1400. Peckham v. Blcknell, 1479. V. Mullikan, 730, 868, 1018, 1455. Peebles v. Pittsburgh, 1501. V. Taylor, 596, 1008. Peet V. O'Brien, 881, 1022, 1055. Peete v. Morgan, 146. Pegram v. Commissioner, 1365. Pegues V. Ray, 152, 455, 1109. Peirce v. Boston, 1. V. Weare, 948. Pejipscott P>roprietors v. Ranson, 435, 925. Pekin v. Smelzel, 1147. Pellecat v. Angell, 907. Pells V. Paxton, 1243. Pelton.v. Bemis, 1510. y. Crawford Co. Supervisors, 804. V. National Bank, 273, 714, 751, 1428, 1460. V. Transp. Co., 674. V. Watson, 1391. Pembina, etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 26, 27, 37, 75, 81, 95, 154, 171. Pemper v. McClelland's Lessee, 590. Pence v. Frankford, 49, 248, 295, 1523. Pence's Adm'r v. Nelson County, 1325. Penick v. High Shoals Manuf. Co., 1419. Peninsular Iron, etc. Co. v. Crystal Falls, 233, 576, 755, 1383, 1388, 1504. Peninsular Savings Bank v. Ward, 582, 1016. v. Wood,'893. Penn v. Clemans, 346, 949, 1030, 1048. Pennell v. Monroe, 932, 948. Pennington v. Jones, 1077. V. Woolfolk, 47, 100. Pennock v. Commissioners, 635. V.Douglas County, 920, 921. V.Hoover, 1182, 1218. TABLE OF CASES. clxix Pennsylvania & N. Y. C. & R. Co. v. Vandyke, 375. Pennsylvania Co. v. Board of Re- vision, 612, 692. V. Commonwealth, 148, 405. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Forth, 606. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Pittsburgh, 394. Penrose v. Chaffraix, 370. v. Doherty, 824, 938. V. Gragard's Succession, 650, 666. Pensacola v. Bell, 601, 604, 1419, 1462. V.Louisville & N. R. Co., 776, 1446, 1462. V. Sullivan, 456, 801. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 95. Pentecost v. Stiles, 447, 615, 776, 982. Pentland v. Steward, 1468. People V. Adams, 694, 748, 767, 776, 1263, 1402, 1403. v.Adelphi Club, 1114. V.Alameda, 1302. v. Albany Assessors, 617, 1405. V. Albany Ins. Co., 495, 682, 683, 769. V. Allegany Supervisors, 1403, 1404, 1406. V.Allen, 200, 571, 1402. V.American Bell Tel. Co., 719. V.Ames, 9, 129, 172, 428, 444, 451, 561, 595, 785, 790. V.Anderson, 352, 359. V. Arguello, 1478. T.Ashbury, 1359, 1385. V. Ashley Lots, 1445. v. Assessors, 112, 264, 684, 686, 699, 1401, 1402, 1403. V.Atkinson, 619, 644. T. Auditor-General, 343, 921, 1357, 1368. V.Austin, 264, 265, 1163, 1185, 1236. V. Badgley, 1402, 1406. V. Ballerino, 829, 837, 840. V. Baptist Theo. Union, 353. V. Barker, 270, 271, 273, 351, 378, 406, 538, 602, 606, 617, 635, 643, 644, 649, 657, 661, 665, 673, 674, 682, 683, 686, 688, 690, 691, 692, 699, 700, 706, 718, 720, 731, 751, 756, 758, 822, 1396, 1399, 1402. V. Barton Assessors, 1357. •V. Batcheller, 98, 181, 1318. V. Beardsley, 639. V. Bennett, 1365. V. Betts, 1400, 1401. V. Biggins, 877, 881. People V. Big Muddy Iron Co., 1385. V. Black Diamond Co., 279. V. Black D. M. Co., 635. V. Bleekwenn, 1028. V. Board, 272. V. Board, etc., 1401. V. Board of Assessors, 9, 141, 142, 350, 537, 634, 689. V. Board of Com'rs, 281, 287, 288, 772, 778, 1350, 1353,, 1394, 1404, 1410. V. Board of Directors, 350, 357, 359. V. Board of Education, 200. V. Board of Review, 773. V. Board of Supervisors, 421. V. Board of Taxes, 1352. V. Boston, 1262. V. Bradley, 404. V. Brenham, 570. V. Brislin, 210, 1168. V. Bringard, 1334. v.'Brooklyn, 2, 3, 4, 9, 48, 235, 238, 256, 365, 411, 412, 520, 1163, 1166, 1172, 1182, 1197, 1200, 1206, 1284, 1291, 1408. V. Brooklyn Assessors, 530, 634, 638, 1405. V. Brown, 440, 444. V. Buffalo, 531, 1207. V. Butt, 1520. - V. Button, 711. V. Cady, 810, 934,951,1036,1039, 1042, 1043. V. Caldwell, 767. V.Campbell, 87, 344, 379, 650, 651, 657, 681, 691, 718, 719, 1038, 1044, 1047. V.Carter, 752, 759, 1402, 1403. V. Cassidy, 634. V. Castro, 566, 571, 729. V. Caty, 1309. V. Cemetery Co., 20, 139, 354. V. Central Pac. R. Co., 238, 297, 409, 550, 839, 844. V. Chapin, 922, 1462. V. Chapman, 1249, 1254, 1273. ' V. Chenango Supervisors, 442, 607, 1352, 1470, 1488, 1494 1511. V.Chicago, 98, 268, 357, 585, 1276, 1303, 1309, 1322. V. Chicago & A. R. Co., 468, 475, 476, 574, 740, 828, 846, 1267. V. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 530, 580. V. Chicago & W. I. R. Co., 695. V.Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 523, 555. V. Chicago Common Council, 1296. V.Chicago, etc. Co., 750. V. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 1390. clxx TABLE Off OASES. People V. Christie, 752, 1402. V. Coffey, 1517. v.Coghill,'442, 443. V. Cohen, 135. V. Cole, 1216. T. Coleman, 9, 270, 272, 345, 371, 378, 538, 658, 661, 665, 676, ,681, 688, 692, 701, 702, 714, 758, 1390, 1395, 1492. v. Collins, 400, 435. V. CoUison, 353, 753.. V. Colman, 343. V. Columbia Supervisors,' 1365. V. Colvin, 1274. v.Com'rs, 112, 131, 270, 271, 320, 343, 357, 391, 398, 404, 496, 605, 691, 692. T. Commissioners of Highways, etc., 1400, 1401. V. Commissioners of Taxes, 145, 340, 355, 359, 1403, 1407. V. Common Council, 113. V. Compagnie, etc., 166. V. Cook, 358, 492, 550, 677, 1267. V. Cooper, 550, 589, 594, 1325. V. Corey, 13*05. V. County Com'rs, 596. T. County Treasurer, 500. V. Cowles, 570. V. Clapp, 699, 758, 763. V. Clark, 105, 486. V. CUfford, 740, 745. V. Cline, 214. V. Crockett, 747. V. Culverwell, 738. / V. Board of Directors, 360. V. Dalton, 450. V. Daniels, 3. V. Davenport, 272, 625. V. Davis, 91, 839. V. Dean, 435. V. Dederick, 270, 378, 661, 687, 692. V. Delaney, 1401, 1403. V. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 683. V. Denahy, 548. V. Detroit & P. R.Co., 25. V. Detroit Common ' Council, 1296, 1305, 1308. V. Detroit Treasurer, 1030. V. Dickinson, 627. V. Dock Co., 704. V. Doe, 264, 265, 26?, 492. V. Dohling, 352. ' V. Dolan, 675, 756, 758. V. Donnelly, 135. V. Dragstran, 740, 1267, 1288. V. Drainage Com'rs, 1238. V. Draper, 192, 1296. V. Dunn, 785. V. Dupuyt, 229. V. Dykes, 274. V. Eastman, 93, 651. People V. East Saginaw, 1373. V.Eddy, 278, 279. ' V. Edwards, 1045, 1050. V. Eggers, 7,40, 1267, 1274. V. Empire, etc. Co.; 759. V. Equitable Trust Co., 720. V. Essex Supervisors, 1358. V. Eureka, etc' Co., 579. V. Feitner, 87, 271, 352, 353, 355, 391, 617, 640, 645, 648, 662, 665, 690, 692, 1395, 1404. V. Ferguson, 758. V. Fields, 228. V. Fire Assoc, 551. V. Fitch, 908. v.Flagg, 181, 184, 231, 1313, V. Flint, 750. V.Forrest, 267, 782. V. Fowler, 1357.' V. Fraser, 320. V. Fredrioks, 1406. V. Frisbie, 510, 635. V. Gale, 861. V. Ganley, 752. V. Gault, 906. V. Gaus, 6i55, 666. V. Gaylord, 251. vV. Gerke, 279. V. Gillespie, 1329. V. dilon, 816, 1233, 1402. V. Givens, 828. V. Goff, 483, 612. V. Gold & Stock Tel. Co., 162. V. Gold Co., 492,. 494. 497. V. Goldtree, 514. V.Gould, etc. Tel. Co., 20. V. Green, 1278. V. Hadley, 775. V. Hagadorn, 597, 601, 775, 956. V. Hagar, 15, 1258, 1269, 1288. V. Haines, 594. V. Haley, 1358. V. Hall, 780. V. Halsey, 1369. . V. Hamilton, 1401. V. Hammond, 952, 1371. V. Hardenburgh, 1358. V. Hartwell, 492, 570. V. Hastings, 437, 600, 602, 758, 1311. v.Haupt, 488, 764. V. Havemeyer, 551. V. Haws, 238, 1303. V. Heggemann, 103^9. V. Henckler, 927. V. Henderson, 636. V. Henion, 627. V. Hess, 267. V. Hibernia Bank, 279. V. Hicks, 699. V. Highland Park, 431. T. Highway Com'rs, 572, 937, 1403. TABLE OF OASES. clxxi People V. Hills, 1245. V. Holley, 492. ' V. HoUiday, 516. V. Holllster, 751. V. Home Ins. Co., 91, 124, 132, 356, 548, 551. ■V. Hopson, 435. T. Horn Silver Mining Co., 95, 379, 681, 719, 901. V.Houston, 1258. v. Hurlburt, 97, 98, 102, 1294, 1305, 1308. V. Hyde Park, 1298. v. Imlay, 95. V. Ingham Supervisors, 512. V. Inspectors of State Prison, 1369. V. Insurance Co., 88. V. Jackson County, 571. V. Jackson Supervisors, 1360. V. Jewell, 272. v. Johr, 1328; V. Jones, 488, 538, 761, 764. V. Kane, 435, 43'8. V. Keator, 756. V. Keener, 828, 891. V. Kelly, 591, 1275. V. Kelsey, 102. V. Kings County Supervisors, 552. V. Kingston, 1409. V. Knickerbocker, 378. V. Knopf, 104, 286, 287, 288, 430, 451, 549, 1310. V. Koeber, 1346. V. Kohl, 605. V. Lake B. & W. R. Co., 586. V.Latham, 279, 280, 881. V. Lathrop, 434, 774. T.Lawrence, 9, 112, 236, 248, 1182, 1208. v. Lee, 555, 599. V. Lieb, 1359. V. Lingle, 1273. V. Lodi High School Dist, 103, 549, 550, 559, 566. V. Lohnas, 106. V.Long Island City, 1402. V. Lothrop, 1, 3, 442, 785. V. Lots in Ashley, 753, 776, 779, 1383. V. Lumber Co., 635. V. Lynch, 514, 516, 1217, 1311. V. Macomb Supervisors, 1300, 1353. V.Madison, 1399. V. Madison Supervisors, 1490. v. Mahaney, 98, 176, 1296. V. Mahoney, 750. V. Many, 1517. V. Markley, 1276. V. Martin, 638. V. Maynard; 1439. People V. McAdams, 197, 202, 1310. V. McCain, 520, 932. V. McCombar, 646, 763, 768. V. McCreery, 1; 2, 265, 278, 279,. 382, 383, 385, 482, 556. v.McCune, 514, 1217. V. McDonald, 512. v.McEwen, 1030, 1047. V. McGuire, 936. V. McLean, 673, 674, 718. • V. McWethy, 499, 1263. V. Mining Co., 135, 635, 751, 763.. V. Moline, 268. V. Monroe County, 565. V. Moore, 617, 643, 717, 792. V. Morgan, 683, 685. V. Morris, 1150. V. Morse, 738. V. Murray, 1146. V.Myers, 908, 1402. V. National Bank, 273, 711, 776^ 779. V. National Fire Ins. Co., 144,. 551, 70L V. National Gold Bank, 711. v.Nearing, 1169, 1170, 1291,. 1402. ' V.Nelson, 288. V. Newberry, 8. V. New Rochelle, 627. V. New York, 1366. V. New York Central R. Co., 450.. V. New York Supervisors, 1353. V. New York Tax Com'rs, 349^ 1357, 1402. V.Nichols, 592, 772. v.Niles, 162, 653. V. Northern Pac. Coast R. Co.^ 20, 903. V. O'Brien, 353, 745. V. Ogdensburg, 1406, 1407. V. Ogdensburgh, 88, 653. V.Ohio, etc. R. Co., 399. V. O'Keefe, 1372. V. Oldstown, 214. V. Olmstead, 1357. V. Onondaga Supervisors, 1302, V. Ontario Supervisors, 1357. V. Orange Supervisors, 551. V. Otis, 882, 884, 991. V. Otsego Supervisors, 1353,. , 1357, 1365, 1369, 1372, 1373, 1399. V. Owyhee Mining Co., 725, 759. V. Palmer, , 725, 811. , V. Park, 645,' 651, 755, 1402. V. Parks, 187, 224, 228, 388, 406. V. Payment, 431. V. Peacock, 495, 902. V. Peck, 357, 359, 378, 492, 505, 571. V. Peoria Mercantile Library Assoc, 351. ■clxxii TABLE OF CASES. J'eople v. Pitt, 1218. V. Pittsburgh R. Co., 633. V. Placerville, etc. R. Co., 280. T. Pontiac, 531, 1359. V. Power, 1302. V. Pratt, 354. V. Preston, 856. v.vPurdy, 349^ 450. V. Purviance, 1358. V. Queens Supervisors, 1403, 1405, 1406, 1522. V. QUigg, 504. T. Railroad Co., 600, 618. V. Raymond, 778. T. Reat, 745. V. Reddy, 617, 1403, 1468. , V. Reed, 698, 699, 758. T. Regents of University, 1369. V. Registrar, 809. V. Registrar of Arrears, 1372. T. Rels, 900. V. Reliance Marine Ins. Co., 495, 701. V. Rice, 677. V. Rickert, 827, 883. y. Roberts, 78, 141, 142, 145, 346, 378, 379, 679, 683, 687, 688, 690, 691, 692, 718, 719, 842, 922, 1462. V. Rochester, 216. V. Root, 735. V. Roper, 112, 363. V. Rowland, 1471. V. Russell, 1143. V. Ryan, 270, 350, 352, 768, 1273. V. Sacramento County, 787. V. Saginaw Supervisors, 216, B15, 1169. v. Salem T'p Board, 2, 4, 43, 181, 183, 196, 227, 411, 420. v. Salomon, 210, 264, 1168, 1309, 1310, 1332. v. S. & C. R. Co., 765. V. San Francisco Supervisors, 1385. v. San Francisco, etc. R. Co., 278, 423. V. Sanilac Supervisors, 303, 388, 392, 405, 647.' V. Sargeant, 600. V. Savings! Bank, 402. V. Savings Union, 516. v. Sawyer, 153, 650, 769. V. School Trustees, 1236. V. Scott, 172. V. Seale, 573. V. Seaman's Friend Soc, 354, 731. V. Sellars, 498, 505, 804, 1333, 1358. V.Seymour, 7, 9, 493, 510, 518. V. Shearer, 135, 136, 635, 1358. V. Sherman, 1203. People V. Shimmings, 896. v..Shimmins, 734. V. Shipper, 615. V.Smith,, 91, 536, 645, 659, 848, 861, 869, 1241, 1326, 1327, 1410. V. Soldiers' Home, 285. V. Soule, 1114. V. Springwells, 231. V. Stahl, 750,' 874. V. State Assessors, 786. V. State Board, 172, 785. V. State Treasurer, 701. V. St. Clair Supervisors, 567, 908. V. Suffern, 564, 763. V. Sullivan, 219. V. Supervisors, 24, 46, 219, 390, 402, 407, 441, 478, 553, 558, 567, 585, 684, 685, 702, 792. V. Supervisors, . etc., 1401. V. Supei-vlsors of Columbia, 218. V. Supervisors of Dutchess, 229. v. Supervisors of Richmond, 231, 235. V. Supervisors of Ulster, 230. V. Syracuse, 478, 1203, 1261. V. "Talmadge, 1274. V. Tax Com'rs, 634, 637, 638, 639, 643, 644, 646, 651, 652, 665, 673, 674, 684, 686, 691. 701, 712, 1380, 1402. V. Terney, 140, 162. V. Thatcher, 495. V. The Mayor, etc., 1322. V. Thurber, 701. V.Todd, 510, 901. V. Toppan, 1302. V. Townsend, 280. V. Treadway, 448. V. Trustees, 91. V. Trustees of Schools, 199, 229. V.Turner, 628, 761, 774, 1016, 1038. V. Ulster, 1357. V.Ulster Supervisors, 286, 1357. V. Ulster County Supervisors, 320, 552. V. Union, 598. V. United States, 135. V.Valentine, 734, 1395, 1402. V. Van Baalen, 1143. V. Van Bpps, 1341; V. Van Nostrand, 752. V. Van Tassel, 908. V. Wabash R. Co., 349, 359. V. Walling, 15, 24. V.Walsh, 1057. V. Walter, 1401. V. Ward, 783. V. Warren, 1478. V. Watseka Camp Meeting As- soc, 352, 359. TABLE OF CASES. clxxiii People V. "Wayne Circuit Judge, 1351. V. Weaver, 247, 273, 596, 597, 681, 715, 756. V.Weber, 877, 885, 896, 1258, 1275. V. Wells, 355. V. Wells, Fargo & Co., 906. v.Wemple, 142, 154, 159, 378, 379, 441, 520, 528, 529, 623, 678, 688, 704, 718, 719, 720, 903, 984, 1025, 1038, 1400, 1402, 1462, 1463. V. Whartenby, 278, 279. V. Whidden, 1284. V. Whipple, 729. V. White, 432, 435, 438. v.Whyler, 212, 256, 259, 279, 357, 461, 1161, 1176, 1228. v. Wilkerson, 249. V. Williams, 355. V.Willis, 357, 473, 648. V.Wilson, 239, 251, 520, 537, 1271, 1357, 1358. V. Wiltshire, 589. V. Winkelman, 840. V. Winter, 811. V. Worthington, 258, 286, 392. V. Wright, 561. V. Yeazel, 1334. V. Young Men's Christian As- soc, 352. V. Zundel, 759, 15l'l. People's Inv. Co. v. State Assessors, 679, 1401. People's Nat. Bank v. Ayer, 478. People's Savings Bank v. Tripp, 866, 1412. Peoria v. Kidder, 362, 1182, 1283, 1390, 1515. Peoria & P. U. R. Co. v. People, 212, 221, 475, 567, 1455. Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. v. Forsyth, 811. v. People, 523, 565, 575, 576, 580, 581, 891. Peoria, D. etc. R. Co. v. Goar, 696, 697. V. People, 420, 501, 502, 504. Pepper v. Philadelphia, 1222. Perce v. Hallett, 35. Percival v. Thurston County, 635, , 856. Perdue v. Ellis, 1146. Perham v. Haverhill Fibre Co., 727, 920, 1458. Perine v. Erzgraber, 1223. V. Forbush, 364, 1388, 1389. V.Lewis, 1262, 1271. Perisho v. People, 1274. Perkins v. Buckley, 807. V.Burlington, 247. V. Dyer, 842. Perkins v. Gaither, 835, 836. V. Iowa, 247. ■ V. Lewis, 585. V. Milford, 9, 48, 219, 1316. V. Nugent, 447. Perklnson v. McGrath, 1519. V. Meredith, 886. Perley v. DollofC, 1441, 1461, 1468... V. Georgetown, 1511. V. Stanley, 726. Perret v. Borries, 808. V. Taylor, 510. Perrigo v. Milwaukee, 646. Perrin v. Benson, 482. V. Jacobs, 646. Perrine v. Farr, 879. Perry v. Big Rapids, 305, 649.. V. Bowman, 1042. v. Brown, 174. V. feurton, 808, 811, 1009. V. Dover, 576, 1489. V. People, 1254, 1272. V. Railroad Co., 275, 597. V. Rockdale, 102. V. TorrenCe, 145. V.Washburn, 15, 17, 19, 20. V. Washington, 1. Perry County v. Railroa'd Co., 530,. 596, 597, 775, 788, 836, 841. V. Selma, etc. R. Co., 18, 44, 452,. 484, 488, 547. V. Troutman, 647. Person v. O'Neal, 728, 939, 1020, 1076. V. Warren R. Co., 1374. Peru V. Bearss, 1440. Peru, etc. R. Co. v. Hanna, 596,. 1231. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 24, 150,. 1152. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory v. Mc- , Mahon, 705. Peters Y- Auditor, 495. V. Grlffee, 1516. V. Heasley, 952, 958, 1066. V. Lynchburg, 33. Peterborough Sav. Bank v. Des- Moines Sav. Bank, 1045. Petersborough v. Lancaster, 925. Petersburg v. Cocke, 98, 1104, 1105. V. Noss, 218. V. Petersburg Benev. Mech._ Soc, 350. Petersburg R. Co. v. Com'rs, 115. Petersburgh v. Railroad Co., 117, 358. Petersilea v. Stone, 430, 431, 435. Peterson v. Kittredge, 174, 177, 956, 991, 992, 1021. V. Peterson, etc. Co., 1037. Petit V. Flint & P. M. -R. Co., 749. V. Shepherd, 1450. Petrie Lumber Co. v. Collins, 524. ^Ixxiv TABLE OF CASES. Pettlbone v. Fitzgerald, 447, 738. V. Smith, 1155, 1202. JPettit V. Black, 447, 1022. V. Duke, 1178. Pettus V. Wallace, 952, 1002. Petty V. Mays, 964. V. People, 530. Pettyjohn v. Leihscher, 804. Peverelly v. People, 1223. Peyrie v. Schreiber, 928. Peyser v. Mayor, 1493. V. New York, 1496, 1508. Peyton v. Bliss, 44, 452. PfefEerle v. Wieland, 982, 1021. Pflster V. State, 1353. Phalen v. Virginia, 1150. Phelan v. Boylan, 965, 966. V. Dunne, 1287. V. San Francisco, 874, 1483, 1500. V. Smith, 855, 866. Phelps V. Alford Bank, 566. V. Harding, 1455. V. Lodge, 8, 546, 1362, 1363. V. Mattoon, 443, 760, 1271. V.Meade, 995, 1013, 1014. T. New York, 1496, 1497. V. Tacoma, 469, 920, 922. V. Thurston, 24, 1480. Phelps Mortg. Co. v. Board of Equal., 781. h Philadelphia v. American Union Tel. Co., 161, 162. V. Ball, 1246. V. Barber, 352, 353. V. Bowman, 1251. V. Church of St. James, 352, 354, 365. V. Commonwealth, 1341. V. Contributors, 111, 112, 363, 1126, 1129. V. Cooke, 870. V. Dibeler, 1165. V. Eastwick, 1224. V. Ehret, 1164. V. Ferry, 495. V. Ferry R. Co., 473, 682. V. Field, 212, 235, 236, 1208. V. Greble, 865. V. Henry, 1167. V. Hiester, 838. V.Hill, 1164. V. Jenkins, 631, 1241. V. Jewish Hosp. Assoc, 349. V. Keystone Battery, 353. V. Ladies' United Aid Soc, 349. V. Marklee, 830. V. Masonic Home, 349. V. Meager, 875. V. Meighan, 950. , V. Miller, 626, 627, 74S, 1050. T. Odd Fellows' Hall Assoc, 1249. Philadelphia v. Overseers, 351. V. Pennsylvania Hosp.. 349. V. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 161, 1141. V.Richards, '536. V. Ridge Av. R. Co., 461, 464, 682, 683. T.Rule, 1222, 1314. V. Sheridan, 247. V. Spring Garden, etc. Co., 1251. V. St. James Church, 1235. v.Tryon, 466, 1130, 1172, 1285. V. Union Burial Ground Soc, 354, 363, 1177. V. Western Union Tel. Co., 140, 161. V. Women's Christian Assoc, 349. Philadelphia & R. C. & I. Co. v. Chi- cago, 1238. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Com- monwealth, 791. Philadelphia Assoc, v. Wood, 1, 2, 182, 205, 410, 452, 1133. Philadelphia Contributorship v. Commonwealth, 679, 685, 686. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Appeal Tax-Court, 639, 697. V. Bayless, 380. V. Maryland, 112. Philadelphia Fire Assoc, v. People, 81. Philadelphia Mortg. & T. Co. v. Omaha, 444, 809, 839, 894, 1424, 1453. Philadelphia Mortgage, etc. Co. v. New Whatcom, 1250, 1282. Philadelphia Savings Fund v. Yard, 392, 708. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Neary, 365, 375, 451, 1429. V. Shiley, 1271. Philbrook v. Kennebeck, 216. V. Smith, 982. Philips V. Wickham, 1170. Philleo V. Hiles, 1058. Phillips V. Albany, 172. V. Elwell, 445, 446. V. Improvement Co., 1052. V. Jefferson County, 1495. V. Minear, 946. V. Myers, 985. V. Appeal Tax-Court, 697. V. New Buffalo, 783. V. Olympia, 1359. V. Sherman, 905, 925, 1004. V. Sioux Falls, 1421. V. Stevens Point, 783, 1379. v.Wilmarth, 961. Phillips Acad. v. Andover, 351, 362, 1178. Phillips County v. Estelle, 350. Phipsburg v. Dickinson, 1337. TABLE OF OASES. clxxv Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Fire Depart- ment, 182, 186, 190, 275. Phoenix Carpet Co. v. State, 276, 555, 1094, 1099, 1150. Phoenix F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Tennes- see, 357, 374. Phoenix Grain, etc. Exchange v. Gleason, 1459. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Omaha, 641. Phoenix Iron do. v. Commonwealth, 407, 679, 682. Piatt V. St. Clair's Heirs, 966. Picard v. East Tenn., V. & G. R. Co., 7, 114, 357. V. Pullman Southern Car Co., 160. V. Railroad Co., 374. Pickard v. Howe, 446. Pickens v. Board of Commissioners, 589. Pickering v. Cambridge, 642, 644. V. Lomax, 888, 935, 1267. V. Pearson, 1329. Picket V. Allen, 491, 797, 939. Pickett V. Hartsock, 882, 893. V.Russell, 567, 1425, 1437, 1438, 1450., V. Southern Athletic Club, 941, 1010. Pickton V. Fargo, 486, 489, 525, 579, 627, 1239, 1244, 1421. Piedmont Club v. Commonwealth, 1114. 1 Piedmont R. Co. v. Reidsville, 159. Pier V. Oneida County, 922, 1018. V. Prouty, 950, 986. Pierce v. .SJtna Ins. Co., 868, 1285. V. Benjamin, 856, 933, 945, 1484, 1509. V.Boston, 19, 20. V. Eddy, 655. V. Richardson, 539, 541, B42, 729, 936. V. Sweetser, 937. v.Weare, 436, 1073. Pierce Co. v. Merrill, 830, 842. Pierpont v. Osmun, 495. Pierre Water Works Co. v. Hughes County, 1393. Pigott V. O'Halloran, 987. Pike V. Carter, 1466. V. Chicago, 1255. V. Cummings, 901. V. Hanson, 434. V. Magoon, 1474. V. Martindale, 486, 760, V. Middleton, 209. V. People, 827. Pike Co. V. State, 1374. Pillow V. Roberts, 916, 1007, 1068, 1092. Pillsbury v. Auditor-General, 425, 511, 1443, 1446. Pine County v. Lambert, 841, 880. v. Tozer, 636. Pineville v. Creech, 246. Pingree v. Auditor-Getieral, 304, 413, 552. Pingrey v. Washburn, 223. Pioneer Iron Co. v. Negaunee, 235, 1386. Pipe Line Co. v. Berry, 319, 638, 681, 719. Piper v.- Singer, 265. Pipes V. Farrar, 1078. Pipher v. People, 1248, 1274. Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 110, 114. Pitcher v. Dove, 825. Pitkjn V. Parks, 730. v.Reibel, 995, 1061, 1062, 1080. V. Shacklett, 995. V. Yaw, 536, 949. Pitts V. Booth, 930. V. Clay, 137. V. Lewis, 941. V. Seavey, 1057, 1072. V. Vicksburg, 1116, 1126. Pittsfield V. Barnstead, 919, 926. Pittsburg V. Danforth, 440. V. Kalchthaler, 1108. V. Tabor, 1326. Pittsburg, etc. R. Co. v. Board of Public Works, 637. V. Chicago, 845. V. Commonwealth, 10. Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 88, 143. Pittsburgh v. Brace, 251. - V. Maxwell, 1273. V. Scott, 1162. Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 52, 53, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 74, 93, 164, 428, 449, 629, 631, 693, 721, 787, 828, 1378, 1383. V. Board of Public Works, 164, 1411. V. Harden, 3, 5, 215, 216. ^70, 871. i. State, 552. V. West Virginia, 60. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Common- wealth, 389, 392. Pixley V. Huggins, 1450, V. Pixley, 998. Plaff V. Terre Haute & I. R. Co., 695. Plainfleld T'p v. Sage, 654. Plalsted V. Lincoln, 359. Planer Co. v. Flournoy, 456. Plant V. Bichburg, 827. V. Fate, 822. Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 126. Planters' Crescent Oil Co. v. As- sessors, 690, 1428. Planters' F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Ten- nessee, 115. clxxvi TABLE OF CASES. Plaquemines v. Roth, 555. Piatt V. Milton, 421. V. Rice, 360. V. Stewart, 1346. Platteville v. Galena, etc. R. Co., 581. Playter v. Cockran, 490, 1028. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 228. V. Kost, 286, 362, 1128. Pleasants v. Rohrer, 1093. V. Scott, 1092. ' Pleuler v. State, 314, 1137, 1150. Plimpton V. Somerset. 1304. Plumer v. Supervisors, 4, 46, 340, 341, 486, 509, 510, 528, 529, 760, 763, 905, 1058. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 149. Plummer v. Coler, 132. Plumstead Board of Works v. In- goldsby, 1291. Plymouth v. Painter, 430, 432, 433, 436. , V. Pettijohn, 98, 1120. Plymouth County v. Moore, 855, 873. Plympton v. Boston Dispensatory, 820. V. Sapp, 939. Poe T. State, 1337. Poillon V. Rutherford, 1239, 1256. V.Rutherford Borough, 938. Point V. "Warner, 1114. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 119, 120, 127, 128. Pointdexter, v. Doolittle, 934. Polenqueen v. McAllister, 1020. Police Jury v. Brookshier, 1329, 1338. V.Mitchell, 6. Polk V. Mitchell, 883, 884. V.Rose, 1005, 1450, 1456, 1484. V. Ross, 916. Polk County v. Des Moines, 1406. V. Kauffman, 523. V. Sherman, 765, 831. Poland V. Dreyfous, 746. Poling" V. Parsons, 1024, 1050. Polk County Savings Bank v. State, 266, 1157, 1279. Pollard v. First Nat. Bank, 769. V. State, 715. Pollock V. Farmers' Loan, etc. Co., 6, 11, 30, 134. Pomeroy v. Parmelee, 446. Pomeroy Coal Co. v. Emlen, 596, 776, 777. , Pompton v. Cooper, 564. Pompton Steel & Iron Co. v. Wayne T'p, 1403. Pond V. Drake, 814. V.Negus, 488, 492, 594. Pons V. State, 502. Pontiac v. Axford, 580, 805. Pool V. Evans, 1439, 1457. Pooley V. Buffalo, 1272, 1495, 1497. Poor V. School Directors, 263, 268. Pope V. Headon, 484, 916, 931, 933, 1004. V. Phifer, 98, 1310. V. Macon, 901, 1061, 1064. V. Wilder, 965. Pope County v. Sloan, 176. Pophill V. Yamhill County, 1387. Poppleton V. Yamhill County, 91, 270, 659, 769, 784. Port Angeles v. Lauridsen, 1444, 1520. Port Huron Tp v. Potts, 838. Port of Mobile v. Watson, 121. Port Townsend v. Elsenbeis, 841, 881. Porter v. Byrne, 926. V. County Com'rs, 613, 623. V. Dooley, 889. V. Railroad Co., 28.7, 782, 1415. V. Rockford, etc. R. Co., 7, 9, 398, 402, 461, 775. V. Rock Island & St. R. Co., 13, 675. V. Tallman, 990. V. Tipton, 1278. V. Whitney, 936. Porterfleld v. Augusta, 644. Portland v. Bituminous Paving, etc. Co., 1165. V. O'Neill, 1124. V. Schmidt, 1102. V. Water Co., 300. V. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co., 661, 674. Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 302; 402, 673, 677. Portland, etc. R. Co. v. Saco, 112, 357, 673. V. Standish, 215. Portland Hibernian Ben. Soo. v. Kelly, 1441, 1442. Portland Univ. v. Multnomah County, 346. Portwood V. Baskett, 1420. V. Montgomery, 252. Post V. Harris, 556, 561. V. Kearney, 816. V. Leete, 873. Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 160. V. Charleston, 140, 161. V. Grant, 1411. V. Richmond, 160. Postmaster General v. Rice, 1328. Poth V. New York, 514. Potosi V. Casey, 843. Potter V. Black, 1388. V. Homer, 1150. V. New Whatcom, 1282. V. Orange, 722, 735, 1409. Potter County v. Oswayo T'p, 909. Potts V. Cooley, 900, 901, 986. TABLE OS OASES. clxxvii PottsvUle Lumber Co. v. Wells, 8, 9, 870. Potwin V. Johnson, 504. V. Oades, 84^. Pound V. Plumstead Board of Works, 1223. Powder River Cattle Co. v. Board of Commissioners, 480, 777, 1382, 1389, 1488. V. County Commissioners, 586. V. Commissioners, 470. Powell V. Board of Education, 199. V. Greenstreet, 886, 963, 1009. V. Jenkins, 1042. V. Lantzy, 976. V.Louisville, 436, 580, 895. V. Madison, 166. V. sTkes, 961, 1039. V. Smallwood, 1029. V. Supervisors, 486, 581, 1496. V. Tuttle, 441. Powell's Ex'r v. Richmond, 504. Power V. Bowdle, 601, 741, 748. V. Kitching, 1091. V. Larabee, 627, 911. V. Stevenson, 895. Powers V. Barney, 457. V. Bowdle, 750. V. Bowman, 1389. V. County Com'rs, 252. V. Fuller, 508. V.Grand Rapids, 1208, 1215, 1216, 1234, 1257. V. Larabee, 750, 772, 774, 1450. V. Penny, 1016. V. Sanford, 1488, 1494. Poyer v. Desplaines, 1148. Pralgg V. Western & P. Supply Co., 1214. Prairie v. Worth, 1336, 1347. Prairie Cattle Co. v. Williamson, 88, 389. Prairie County v. Matthews, 1393. Prather v. Johnson, 1342, 1344. . V. Zulauf, 906. Pratt V. Boston Street Commission- ers, 648. V. Brown, 194. V. Dalrymple, 1286. V. Donovan, 1341. V. Douglass, 820. v. Milwaukee, 1085, 1453. V. Raymond, 1442. V. Swanton, 576. Pray v. Northern Liberties, 1, 365, 1156, 1182. Prentice v. Ashland County, 597. V. Westen, 899. Prescott V. Beebe, 635. V. Hawkins, 541, 645. V.Payne, 924, 927, 1076, 1077, 1455. President v. Elizabeth, 1362. 1 President and Commissioners, etc. V. State, 1312. Press Printing Co. v. State Board, 378, 1446. Preston v. Banks, 913, 1021. , V. Boston, 1488, 1494, 1499, 1506, 1511. V. Detroit Water Com'rs, 5. V. Finley, 151. V. Johnson, 1387. V. King, 642. V. McNamara, 804. V.Roberts, 231, 881, 1205, 1210, 1258. V. Rudd, 421, 1208. V. Van Gorder, 961, 981. V. Water Com'rs, 305. V. Wright, 804. Preswick v. McGreW, 913, 928. Prettyman v. Supervisors, 585. v. Walston, 965. Pretzinger v. Sunderland, 454, 1167. Prezlnger v. Harness, 1516. Price V. Atlanta, 153. V. England, 1042. V. Ferguson, 1030. V. Hunter, 88, 91. V. Kramer, 1381, 1388. V. Lancaster County, 136, 853, 1491. V. Mott, 495, 1048. V. People, 1102, 1112. V. State, 144. Price Co. v. Atlanta, 357, 1109, 1419. Pricket v. People, 436, 1094, 1096. Primghar State Bank v. Rerick, 292. Primm v. Belleville, 286, 382, 383, 384, 422, 1187. Prince v. Crocker, 182, 217, 1433. V. McNeill, 1335. V. Thomas, 1477. Prince George County v. Clarke, 834. Prindle v. Campbell, 518, 521, 590, 930, 940. Pringle v. Wagner, 968. Prish V. Golden, 543. Pritchard v. Madren, 52, 876, 877, 884, 1425. V. Magoun, 215. V. McConnell, 566. ' Probasco v. Moundsville, 343, 355. Proffit V. Anderson, 28. Proprietors v. Board, 266, 354. V. Board, etc., 1235. V. Commissioners, 354. Proprietors, etc. v. Lowell, 353. Prout V. People, 883. Prouty V. Tallman, 490. Providence Athseneum v. Tripp, 351. Providence Bank v. Billings, 7 9 48, 112, 356. ' ' clxxviii TABLE OF CASES. Providence Baiiking Co. v. Webster County, 676. Providence, etc. R. Co. v. Wright, 699. Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 638. Providence Inst. v. Gardiner, 405. Provident Inst. v. Jersey City, 5, 66, 866. V.Massachusetts, 132, 402, 406, 677. Pryor v. Bryan, 658. V. Hardwick, 916, 990. Publishing Co. v. Jersey City, 1404. Pueblo V. Robinson, 1129, 1172, 1173. Puget Sound Agric. Co. v. Pierce County, 136, 138. Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. King County, 501, 712. Pugh V. Commissioners, 868. V. youngblood, 1069, 1452. Puitt V. Gaston County Com'rs, 201. Pulaski County v. Watson, 795, 1327. Pulford V. Wheeler, 1027. V. Whicher, 1456. Pullen V. Commissioners, 9. V. County Com'rs, 48. V. Haynes, 445, 446. Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsyl- vania, 57, 87, 88. V. Twombly, 1415. Pullman Southern Car Co. v. Nolan, 160. Pullman State Bank v. Manring, 273, 339. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Board of Assessors, 163, 164, 193, 697, 1414. V. Commonwealth, 163. V. Kentucky, 93. V.Pennsylvania, 162, 163, 164. V. Twombly, 163, 164. Purifoy v. Lamar, 639, 950. Purish v. Eager, 1016. Purrlngton v. Loring, 1484. 'v. People, 523, 632, 1441. Purssell V. New York, 1489. Purvear v. Commonwealth, 1137. Putnam v. Grand Rapids, 586. V. Man, 445. V. Tyler, 748. V. White Lake, 655. Q. Quartlebaum v. State, 275. Queen v. Axminister, 264. T. Dyott, 626. V. Shee, 264. Quertermous v. Walls, 882, 1070. Quick V. Lake Forest, 1273. Quill V. Indianapolis, 1424. Quimby v. North American, etc. Co., 579. V.Wood, 766, 866. Quincy v. Jackson, 588. V. Lawrence, 135. Quincy Bridge Co. v. Adams County, 370. Quincy, O. & K. C. B. Co. v. People, 695, 698. Quinebaug Reservoir Co. v Union, 637, 722, 765. Quinn v. Kenney, 1030. Quint v., Hoffman, 8, 1425. Quivey v. Lawrence, 598, 635, 1000, > 1012. K Rabsom v. Henderson, 1009. Racine Iron Co.' v. McCommons, 153. Rackliff v. Look, 1005. Radcliffe v. Scruggs, 1011, 1070. Rader v. Road District, 97, 252. Ragor V. Lomax, 970. Ragsdale v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 967, 1458. Rahway v. Com'rs, 265, 868. Rail V. Potts, 1466. Railey v. Board, 25. V. Board of Assessors, 90. Railroad & T. Cos. v. Board of Equalization, 75, 333, 691. Railroad Co. v. Alamance County, 843. V'. Berks County, 366, 375. V. Brogden, 843. V. Brunswick County, 843. V. Carroll County, 490, 523. V. Collector, 91, 125. V. Com'rs, 117, 271, 373, 1500, 1502. V. Counties, 361. V. Gaines, 113, 370, 372, 373, 405. V. Galvin,'508. T. Georgia, 370. V. Hamblen Counfy, 373. V. Husen, 130. V. Jackson, 89, 90, 125, 403, 676, 683, 832. v.Loftin, 110, 373. V. Maine, 116, 370. v. McClure, 118. V. Morris, 136, 137. V. Parks, 956. V. Peniston, 132, 133. V. Pennsylvania, 169. V. Preseott, 136. V. Reid, 372. V. Reidsville, 478, 486. V. Rose, 512. V. Schenck, 215. TABXE OF TIASES. clxxix Railroad Co. v. Stark, 902. V. Storm Lake Bank, 1048. V. Thomas, 358. V. Trempealeau Co., 136. v.Wrfght, 356, 362, 375. Railway Co. v. Cheyenne, 550. V. Goar, 618. V. McShane, 136, 137. V. Miller, 374. T. Olmstead, 1350. V. Preseott, 137, 138. Raisler v. Athens, 1500, 1508. Raleigh v. Peace, 175, 177, 1153, 1180, 1182, 1195, 1201, 1218, 1289 V. Salt Lake City, 1489, 1490, 1506, 1508, 1510. Raleigh & G. R. Co. v. Lewis, 1420, 1424. Raleigh, etc. R. Co. v. Com'rs, 273. v.Reid, 368, 406. Raley v. Guinn, 1014. Ralls County Court v. United States, 467, 1363, 1366. Ramish v. Hartwell, 66, 509, 867, 1011. Ramp V. Marion County, 777, 783. Ramsay v. Hammel, 485. V. Hoeger, 113, 286, 287. Ramsey v. Hommel, 930, 932, 1013. Ramsey County v. Chicago, M. etc. R. Co., 375, 376. V. Church of the Good Shep- herd, 352. V.Lewis Co., 69. V. Macalester Coll., 350. V. Stryker, 350. Rand v. Schofield, 807. Randall v. Dailey, 807. V. Elwell, 697. V. Smith, 571, 1472. V. Watson, 726. Randell v. Bridgeport, 752. Randle v. Williams, 1406. Randolph v. Bayne, 880. V. Gawley, 105. V. Metcalf, 845. V. Yellowstone Kit, 1119. Range Co. v. Carver, 1119. Ranger v. New Orleans, 1333, 1436. Rankin v. Coar, 810, 820. V. Louisville, 44, 452. V. Miller, 950. Ranney v. Bader, 1420, 1477. Ransom v. Burlington, 769. Rapp V. Lowry, 728, 972, 1007. Rasell V. Buck, 1407. Rash V. Farley, 153. Rath V. Martin, 746, 1073. Rathhoiie v. Hooney, 1009. Ratterman v. American Exp. Co., 1508. V. Ingalls, 620, 621, 648.- Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 140, 157. Ravenel v. United States, 1400. Rawson v. Chicago, 1248. v. School Dist., 723. V. Spencer, 228, 856. Ray V. Bank of Kentucky, 1498. V. Jeff^rsonville, 1213. V. Murdock, 430, 438, 1008. Rayburn v. Kuhl, 1010. Raymond v. Cleveland, 501, 1183, 1194, 1201, 1216. V. Morrison, 811. V. Worcester, 650. Raymond Co. v. Maywood,' 1173. Raymond's Estate v. Rutherford, 1218. V. Rutherford Borough, 1221, 1238. Rayner v, Lee, 486, 726, 810. Rea V. Longstreet, 1448. Read v. Crapo, 976. V. Dingess, 1024. V. Goodyear, 923. V. Yeager, 359, 464. Readfield v. Shaver, 1338. Reading v. County Com'rs, 1404. V. Finney, 517, 738, 803, 950. v. Krause's Estate, 855. v.Wier, 733, 734. Ready v. Syracuse, 1281. Ream v. Stone, 854, 871. Rearden v. Henson, 907. Reccius V. Louisville, 841. Reclamation Dist. v. Burger, 8, 844. V. Evans, 54, 1241. V. Gray, 8. V. Hagar, 15, 392, 1185. V. McCullah, 1241. V. Turner, 8. Rector, etc. Co. v. Maloney, 993, 998, 1037, 1041. Red V. Morris, 351. Redd V. St. Francis County, 169. Reddick v. Long, 916, 992, 996, 1092. Redding v. Lamb, 524, 579, 926. Redemptionists v. Howard County, 354. Redemptionist Fathers v. Boston, 354, 357, 359. Redfield v. Bartels, 1486. Redgood v. McLain, 864. Redick v. Omaha, 1441. Redmond v. Banks, 728. V. Com'rs, 91. V. New York, 1500. Red River & Coast Line y. Parker, 1384. Red Willow County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 696, 698. Redwing v. feancock, 904. Redwood v. Winona, etc. Land Co., 306. clxxx TABLE OF OASES. Redwood County v. Winona & P. L. Co., 492, 493. V.Winona & St. P. L. Co., 841, 880, 890, 902, 903. Reed v. Beal, 1098. V. Chandler, 760. V. Crapo, 998, 1519. v. Creditors, 495. V. Earhart, 1019. V. 6ls Creditors, 836. V. Kalfsbeck, 728. V. Louisville, 840, 945. V.Lyon, i015, 1036. V. Merriam, 996, 1022. V. Millikan, 575. V. Morse, 996. V. Reber, 1450. V. Sims, 1045. V. Taylor, 1425. V.Thompson, 993, 1014. V. Toledo, 466,' 1158. V. Tyler, 905. ' Reeds v. Morton, 930. Reedy v. Camfleld, 1090. Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Daw- son, 7, 8, 99, 100, 238, 334, 1127, 1197, 1202. Reems v. Recorder, 949. Rees V. Watertown, 121, 1363, 1374, 1376. Reeve v. Kelly, 945. V.Kennedy, 592, 871, 873, 945, , 957. Reeves v. Bremer County, 1026, 1027. V. Reeves, 445. V. Treasurer, 365. V. Treasurer of Wood Co., 1194. V. Watertown, 48. •v. Wood County, 182. V. Wood County Treasurer, 476, 1169, 1183, 1291. Regina v. Head, 1260. V. Pocock, 352. Reger v. Shaffer, 1044. Reid V. Albany Supervisors, 496. V. Albany County Supervisors, 922. V. Crapo, 964. V. State, 264, 265, 962. V. Taylor, 1450. V. Toledo, 1206. Reiley v. Lancaster, 600, 635. Reilly v. Albany, 1281. V. Blaser, 1078. Reimer v. Newell, 888, 933, 971, 1039, 1041. V.Powell, 1036. Rein v. Lane, 463. Reinach v. Duplantier, 981. Relnboth v. Zerbe Run Co., 967. Reinhart v. McDonald, 89, 93, 163, 164. Reinhart v. Oconto County, 982. Reinig v. Munson, 1402. Reinken v. Fuehring, 1129, 1178, 1189. Reis V. Graff, 520. Reithmiller v. People, 1150. Relfe V. Life Insurance Co., 833. Rellstab v. Belmar, 956. Remey v. Burlington City Council, 84, 1408. Remsen v. Wheeler, 5, 627, 1028, 1239. Renick v. Lang, 989. Renshaw v. Imboden, 932, 959, 1003. Republic L. Ins. Co. v. Pollak, 404, %8, 1385, 1390, 1460. Republlca v. Deaves, 776. Republican & W. R. Co. v. Chase County, 696. Reusens v. Lawson, 1092. Reutchler v. Huckle, 1338. Revell V. Annapolis, 71, 98, 181, 198,. 1299, 1305. Revere v. Boston, 664. Revoir v. State, 85. Rex V. Barlow, 478. V. Calder, 380. V. Commissioners, 1259. V. Elkins, 444. V. Hodge, 1223. V. Inhabitants of Derby, 478. V. Justices, iiOO, 903. V. Manning, 1346. V. Mayor, etc. of Liverpool,. 1346. V. Moreley, 1405. V. Tower Hamlets, 1171, 1212. Rexroth v. Ames, 574., Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister,. 78, 1146. Reynolds v. Bowen, 523, 608, 1441.. V. Duluth, 529. V. Faris, 1440. V.Fisher, 789, 836, 855. V. Lincoln, 953. V. Lofton, 1331. V. McMillin, 855. V. Moore, 1478. V. New Salem, 571. V. Norman, 804. V.Plymouth County, 138. V. Waterville, 1436. Reynolds, etc. Co. v. Monroe, 580. Reynolds Land, etc. Co. v. McCabe,. 567. Rhea v. Umatilla County, 781, 1387.. Rhein Building Assoc, v. Lea, 961.. Rheinbolt v. Raine, 612, 646. Rhett V. United States, 952. Rhoads v. Cushman, 1385. • V. Given, 868. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v- Ar^ington, 820. TABLE OF CASES. dxxxi Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Com'rs of Taxes, 132. Rhodes v. Gunn, 1006. V. Sexton, 793. Rhyno v. Madison County, 650. Rice V. Bates, 1039, 1040. V. Commonwealth, 436. V. Groff, 445. V. Haddock, 1074. V. Jerome, 992, 1027, 1031, 1455. V. Nelson, 1024, ,1045. V. Shipman, 998. V. Smith, 143-6. V. United States, 457. V. Wadsworth, 1477. Rice County v. National Bank, 400, 575, 587, 1350. Rich V. Baskett, 264. V.Braxton, 729, 750, 1044, 1456. V.Chicago, 1172, 1230, 1261, 1271, 1273, 1274. V. Flanders, 507. V. Packard Bank, 717. V. Palmer, 1045, 1047. V. Tuckerman, 842. Rich Hill Mining Co. v. Neptune, 783. Richard v. Carrie, 1009. Richard & D. R. Co. v. Reidsville, 922. Richards v. Clay County, 830, 849. V. Cincinnati, 1223, 1251. V. Cole, 938. V. Comjrs, 19. V. Hanmer, 548. V. Hatfield, 805, 808, 1422. V. Howell, 958. V. Lyon County Sup'rs, 1360. V. Rapallo County, 604, 640, 1491. V. Raymond, 199. V.Richards, 966, 967. V.Rock Rapids, 273, 712, 713, 715, 781. V. Rote, 514. V. Stoggsdell, 19, 804, 1502. V. Tarr, 845. V.Thompson, 993, 1027. V. Wyandotte County Com'rs, 1020. Richardson v. Boske, 421. V.Boston, 731, 839, 864, 1379. V. Denver, 1496, 1497. V. Dorr, 486, 923, 1005. V. Heydenfeldt, 486. V.Morgan, 1131, 1201, 1226. V. Roberts, 906. V. Scott, 1383. V.Simpson, 929, 931, 934, 935. V. St. Albans, 103, 370. Ricjicreek v. Moorman, 1515. Richland v. Lawrence, 1307. Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co., 228, 415. V.Richland Center, 1137. Richman v. Muscatine Supervisors, 510, 517, 529. Richmond v. Brown, 1338. V. Daniel, 466, 473, 546. V. Dickinson, 427. V. Gibson, 248, 2.95. V. Richmond, 469. V.Richmond & D. R. Co., 367, 368, 377, 585. V. Richmond, etc. R. Co., 556. V. Scott, 285, 290, 1338. Richmond & A. R. Co. v. Lynch- l}urg, 1197. Richmond &' D. R. Co. v. Blake, 1425. V. Reidsville, 322, 1510. Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Alamance County, 359, 398, 693, 698, 753, 763. V. Brogden, 320, 321. v. Commissioners, 273, 369, 515, 517, 674. V. Orange County, 320, 321, 1388. Richter v. Beaumont, 745, 809. Rickart v. People, 1114. Ricker v. American L. & T. Co., 662. V. Brooks, 838, 840. V. Butler, 1091. Rickets v. Hyde Park, 931; 1159, 1241, 1283, 1284. Ricketts v. Spraker, 216, 1258, 1274, 1443, 1515. Ricks V. Board of Assessors, 347. Rlcon V. Hart, 823. Ricord v. Jones, 905. Rideout v. School District, 571, 572. Ridgely Lodge v. Redus, 349, 353. Ridgeway Light, etc. Co. v. Elk County, 379, 1421. Riddle v. Bedford, 434. V. Bedford County, 436. V. Messer, 891, 897, 898, 948, 990, 997. Ridley v. Doughty, 537, 1356. Ridpath v. Spokane County, 390, 396, 398. Riebling v. People, 1258, 1271. Rleman v. Shepard, 86, 88, 166. Riggs V. Johnson Co., 121, 1362, 1363, 1375. Rigsbee v. Durham, 201, 568, 1420. Riker v. Jersey City, 1496. Riley v. Rochester, 253. V. Western Union Tel. Co., 1418. Rima v. Cowan, 523, '1011. Ring V. Bwing, 825, 870, 1424. Rish V. Ivey, 810, 864, 1030, 1031. clxxxii TABLE OF CASES. Rising V. Granger, 725, 848. Ritchie V. Mulvane, 8, 438, 439, 106i. V. Smith, 907. V. South Topeka, 503, 1269, 1515. Ritter v. Patch, 1415, 1450. V. Worth, 723, 726. Rivard v. Gardner, 446. Riverton, etc. W^ter 06^ v. Haig, 8, 638. Rivers v. New Orleans, 838, 851. V. Thompson, 1089. Riverside Co. v. Howell, 562. V. Townsend, 496, 1061. Rives V. Thompson, 1092. Rivet V. New Orleans, 126. Roads V. Bstabrook, 745, 746, 891, 1022. Roaring Creek Water Co. v. Girton, 267. Rohb V. Bowen, 1082. V. Robinson, 537, 609. Robbins v. Barron, 490, 960, 961, 1021. V. Magoun, 603. V. Moore, 811, 1091. V. Taxing Dist., 151, 152. Roberts v. Adams County, 921. V. Charlevoix T'p, 88, 653. v. Chan Tin Pen, 545, 948. V. Deeds, 748, 1022. V. Denio, 1513. v.Pargo, 1436. V. First Nat. Bank, 508,. 568, 598, 735, 747, 930, 949, 985, 1011, 1014, 1018, 1054, 1081, 1281. V. Holmes, 542. ' V. Loxey, 893, 1056. V.Smith, 63, 1240. V. Western Land Assoc, 1036. V. Zensler, 1076. Robertson v. Anderson, 756. V. Commonwealth, 158, 1096, 1148. V. Heneger, 1144. V. Land Com'r, 55, 111. V. New Orleans, 347. V. Omaha, 1165. V. Preston, 172, 337. V. Rockford, 585. V. Sewell, 138. V. State Land Office Com'r, 49. Robins V. Commissioners, 1167. V. Latham, 1427. V. New Brunswick, 1130. Robinson v. Bierce, 880. V.Burlington, 1516, 1S19. V. Butte County, 1365. v. Butte Supervisors, 1361, 1365. V.Charleston, 260, 386, 1497. Robinsbn v. Dodge, 107, 561. V. Dover, 659. V. First Nat. Bank, 1012. V. Franklin, 1099, 1101. V. Gaar, 1448, 1450. V.Howe, 1054. V. Huff, 859. V. Langley, 89. V. Lewis, 967. V. Logan, 1252. V. Mayor, 1098. V. Milwaukee, 1284. V. Rowland, 1471. V. Schenck, 290. V. Suiter, 813. V. Supervisors, 121. V. Valparaiso, 1280. V.Williams, 728, 931. V.Wilmington, 56, 1411, 1415. Robson V. Du Bose, 251. V. Osborn, 1064. Roby V. Chicago, 734. Roche V. Dubuque, 485. Rochester v. Rush, 264, 267, 1511. Rochester B. & L. Assoc, v. Roches- ter, 705. Rochford V. Fleming, 807, 962, 1030. Rockafellow v. Wilkins, 775. Rock Creek v. Strong, 564. Rockingham Savings Bank v. Port- land, 1416. Rock Island v. Huesing, 1435. ^ Rockland v. Farnsworth, 642, 650, 843. V. Rockland Water Co., 1383. v.Ulmer, 20, 524, 736, 7;66, 792, 838, 840, 843. Rode V. Siebe, 279, 548. Rodgers v. Kent Circuit Judge, 168. V. McCoy, 151. V. United States, 952. Rodman v. Larue Justices, 1365. V. Washington, 471. Roe V. Lincoln County, 1453. Roedel v. White Cloud, 1505. Roger V. Shaffer, 1024, 1028. Rogers v. Butler, 1045. V. Greenbush, 1494. V.Johnson, 525, 735, 1050,1066,/ 1083. V.Kansas City, T. & W. R. Co., 903. V. Kerr, 573^ V. Randell, 1168. V.St. Paul, il55, 1208, 1242, 1489. V. Voorhees, 1250. V. White, 577. Rohr V. Gray, 12, 1094. Rohrer v. Oder, 867, 883. Rollins V. Wright, 1035, 1054. V. Woodman, 1003. TABLE OF OASES. clxxxiij Rolph V. Fargo, 3, 70, 322, H80, 1194, 1210, 1218. Rome V. Augusta, 1099. V. Cabot, 217. Rome R. Co. v. Rome, 396, 399. Rome, Watertown, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 763, 1423. Ronan v. People, J.167, 1246. Ronkendorf v. Taylor, 436, 438, 750, 826, 934, 1004. Rood V. Mitchell, 601. V.Mitchell County, 596, 1450. Rooney v. Brown, 362. Roosevelt v. Draper, 1433. Roosevelt Hospital v. New York, 2, 363. Ropes V. Clinch, 171. V. Kemp, 998. Rork V. County Com'rs, 921. Roscommon v. Midland, 415. V. Supervisors, 1365. Rose V. Hatch, 1333. Roseberry v. Huff, 1425. Rosedale Lumber, etc. Co. v. Bmsle, 347. Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. Kern, 354, 1419. Rosell V. Buck, 663. Rosenbaum v. Newbern, 321. Rosenberg v. Weekes, 710, 1425. Rosenblatt v. Johnson, 711. Rosenbloom v. State, 848, 1120. Rosetta Gravel, etc. Co. v. JoUi- saint, 868, 1284, 1286. Ross V. Crawford County Com'rs, 1393. V. East Saginaw, 1514. V.Lane, 21, 500. V. Outagamie County, 136. V. Portland, 1453. V. Stackhouse, 1273, 1516. V. State, 884. V. Walton, 1325. Rossiter v. Lake Forest, 1441. Rossman v. Adams, 899. Roth v. Gabbert, 508, 738, 1001, 1011, 1013, 1015. Rothschild v. Begole, 816. Rothwell V. Knox' County, 1417, 1441. Roudanez v. New Orleans, 1436, 1437. Roudebush v. Mitchell, 64, 1171. Rougelot V. Quick, 934. Rounds V. Maymart, 504. Roundtree v. Galveston, 335, 363, 1197. Row V. People, 1391. Rowe V. Friend, 600,- 603, 764, 1474. V. McWllliams, 1094. V. Peabody, 1455. Rowell V. Horton, 582, 620, 795, 796. Rowland v. Brown, 1036, 1038, 1042. V. Doty, 810, 1006. v. School Dist., 1416. Royal Ins. Co. v. South Park Com'rs, 1243, 1272. Royall V. Virginia, 44, 119, 120, 127, 452. Royce v. Aplington, 1286. V. Jenney, 772, 1408. Roy er Wheel Co. v. Taylor County, 613, 777, 1388, 1445. Royster Guano Co. v. Tarboro, 359. Rubey v. Huntsman, 477, 485, 939. Rudderow v. State, 407. Ruddock V. Gordon, 19. Rudolph V. Underwood, 816. Ruggles V. Fond du Lac, 273, 1506. V. Fond du Lac County, 526. Rule V. Parker, 1005. Rumford Chem. Works v. Ray, 602, 1505. Rundell v. Lakey, 816, 817. Ruppert V. Baltimore, 1281. Russ & Sons Co. v. Crichton, 994, 1003, 1448. Russell V. Ayer, 322, 522. V. Carlisle, 258, 634, 785. V. Chittenden, 896. V. Deshon, 873, 1450. V. Green, 88, 387, ^55, 851. V. Hudson, 1020. V.Lang, 599, 750, 1076. V. Mason, 656. V. Mayor,. 1500. V. New Haven, 634, 1497. V. Reed, 974, 978, 1066.' V. Stansell, 1430. V. Werntz, 735, 736, 743. Russellville v. White, 1112. Rustin V. Merchants', etc. Co., 919, 936, 937. Rutherford v. Hamilton, 1219. V. Maynes, 1170. Rutledge v. Brown, 1101. V.Fogg, 18, 836. V. Price County, 1044, 1053. Rutter V. Territory, 1331. Rutz V. Calhoun, 1436. Ruyter v. Reid, 1039. Ryan v. Altschul, 1264, 1271. V. Central City, 295, 733. v. Gallatin County, 18. V. Leavenworth County, 1443. V. McGehee, 964. V. Staples, 934. V. State, 903. V. Sumner, 1213, 1219. V. United States, 1340. V. West, 807, 893, 984. Ryder's Bstatp v. Alton, 1173, 1253. Ryerson v. Brown, 194. V. Laketon, 576. clxxxiv TABLE OF CASES. Ryerson v. Muskegon, 654, 655. v.Utley, 4, 214, 227, 230, 411, 648, 1293. s. Sabatl V. Brlggs, 998. Sacramento t. Crocker, 279, 392,. 418. Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Fricke, 502, 550. / Safe Deposit, etc. Co. v. Wickhem, 946. SafEord v. Basto, 1089. V. Conan, 993. Sage V. Auditor-General, 580. V. Burlingame, 729, 741. V. Laurain, 1466. V. Plattsmouth, 844, 1439. Saginaw v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 1139. Saint V. Welsh, 494. St. Albans v. National Car Co., 832. St. Anthony & D.' B. Co. v. Bot- tineau County, 851, 1505. St. Anthony, etc. Co. v. Greely, 825, 845, 852, 859, 861. St. Bernard t. Kemper, 722, 1247. . St. Charles v. Eisner, 312, 1127. V. Hackman, 1104. V. Nolle, 98, 227, 249, 1110. St. Charles St. R. Co. v. Assessors, 689, 766. T. Board of Assessors, 687. St. Clair v. Cox, 95. V. MoClure, 825, 1451. St. Croix, etc. Lumber Co. v. Ritchie, 997, 1016, 1085. St. Edward's Coll. v. Morris, 351. St. James Church v. New York,, 352. St. James Educ. Inst. v. Salem, 350, 351, 1379. St. John's Nat. Bank v. Bingham, 717, 855, 1415. St. Johnsbury v. Thompson, 1148. St. Joseph V. Anthony, 556, 1201, 1218. V. Ernst, 1113. V. Farrell, 1183, 1288. , V.Kansas City, St. J. & B. R. Co., 838, 884. V. O'Donoghue, 1201, 1206. V.Owen, 1175, 1193, 1201. V. Porter, 1101. V. Railroad Co., 355. V. Rogers, 564. St. Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. Dever- eaux, 376. V. Steele, 140. St. Joseph, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 673. St. Joseph Board, etc. v. Patten, 172, 588. St. Joseph County Com'rs v. Ruck- man, 635. St. Joseph County Court v. Ruck- man, 22, 500, 512. St. Joseph's Church v. Assessors, 351. St. Joseph Hosp, Assoc, v. Ashland County, 350. St. Joseph Supervisors x. Coffin- ♦bury, 1328. St. Landry Cotton-Oil Co. v. Mc- Gee, 348.'' St. Lawrence v. Gross, 1414. St. Louis V. Armstrong, 1206. V. Bircher, 393, 1112. V. Boatman's Ins. etc. Co.. 113, 1139, 1141. V. Bowler, 261, 1101. V. Bressler, 1288. V.Brown, 263, 266, 1216, 1236. V. Clemens, 105, 1206, 1225. V. Consolidated Coal Co., 158, 311, 312. V. Excelsior Brewing Co., 1216, 1258. V.Ferry Co., 653. V. Freivogel, 1108. V. Gorman, 264, 267, 1521. V.Green, 393, 848, 1151. V. Herthel, 1104. y. Holton- Warren Lumber Co., 990. V. Lane, 1215. V. Laughlin, 102, 466, 1101, 1105, 1124. V. McCann, 1094, 1096. V. Oeters, 1208. V. Peters, 1172. V. Provenchere, 1268. V.Rankin, 1239, 1258. V. Savings Bank, 102, 110. V. Siegrist, 1114. V. Spiegel, 260, 311. V.Steinberg, 261, 848, 1105. V. Sternburg, 1151. V. Wenneker, 267, 268, 731. V. Western Union Tel. Co., 140, ^ 1122. V. Woodruff, 1112. , St. Louis B. & T. R. Co. v. People, 1385. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Board of Com'rs, 700. V.Epperson, 561, 791, 1420, 1479. V. Gracy, 471, 526, 563, 1441. V. Holton-Warren Lumber Co.," 887, 889. V.Williams, 695 TABLE OF OASES. clxxxv .St. Louis B. & T. R. Co. v. People, 699, 1386. St. Louis Brewing Assoc, v. St. Louis, 5, 311. 5t. Louis Bridge' Co. v. East St. Louis, 248, 637. V. People, 523. V. Tunnel R. Co., 1383. St. Louis Bridge & T. R. Co. v. Peo- ple, 560. St. Louis Building, etc. Assoc, v. Lightner, 1477. St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Alexander, 1018. V. Anthony, 806. V. Berry, 370. V. Clark, 450. V. Serrell, 617, 779. St. Louis, I. & E. R. Co. v.-Warfel, 1091. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Alex- ander, 501, 1018. V. Miller, 599, 610, 695, 696. V. Worthen, 64, 74, 277, 604, 631. St. Louis, I. M. etc. R. Co. v. State, 358, 608, 610, 790, 894. St. Ix)uis L. Ins. Co. v. Assessors, 392, 405. V. Board of Assessors, 390. :St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Papin, 714. St. Louis Nat. Stock Yards v. Peo- ple, 593. -St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis, 363, 1235, 1236. St. Louis Refrig. etc. Co. v. Lang- ley, 978. St. Louis, R. I. & C. R. Co. v. Peo- ple, 486, 523, 581, 586. St. Mark's Church v. Brunswick, 352. V.Tripp, 354, 736. St. Mary's Gas Co. t. Elk County, 1421. St. Mary's Industrial School v. Brown, 205. St. Monica v. New York, 351. 'St. Paul V. Dow, 1148. V. Merritt, 24, 630. V. Traeger, 1138. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. V. McDonald, 634. V. Robinson, 137. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. v. St. Paul, 376. St. Peter's Church v. Scott County, 857, 750. St. Vincent's Coll. v. Schaefer, 360. Saks V. Birmingham, 1100. Salem Iron, etc. Co. v. Danvers, 398. Salem Iron Factory v. Danvers, 396, 401, 402. Salem Lyceum v. Salem, 351. Salem Marine Soc. v. Salem, 351, 352. Salem Turnpike v. Essex County, , 252, 414. Salem Turnpike, etc. . Co. v. Essex County, 238, 239. Salem Turnpike, etc. Corp. v. Essex bounty, 1297. Saline County Com'rs v. Geis, 1020, 1491. Salinger v. Gunn, 919, 950, 956, 989. Salisbury v. Lane, 357, 358, 359, 461. V. Shirley, 7B9. Salisbury Perm. B. & L. Assoc, v. County Com'rs, 705, 1450. Salmer v. Darst, 1011. v.Lathrop, 948, 950, 996, 1016, 1083. Salmpnd v. Hanover, 1379. Saloy V. Woods, 837. V. New Orleans, 122, 1350. V. "Woods, 866. Salschneider v. Port Howard, 752. Salstonstall v. Birtwell, 1482. Salter v. Burlington, 292. Salt Lake City v. Armstrong, 785. Salt Lake City Nat. Bank v. Gold- ing, 404. • Salt Lake County v. State Board, 697. V. State Tax Collector, 785. Samis v. King, 435, 436. , Sammons v. Haloway, 906. Sample v. Carroll, 750, 1269. Sams V. King, 994, 1008, 1010. Samuels v. Drainage Com'rs, 438, 439, 877, 1286. , San Antonio v. Berry, 502, 562, 586, 878, 894. V. Hoefling, 783. V. Mehafty, 564. San Bernardino v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 158. San Benito County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 139. San Diego v. Higgins, 841, 880. V. Linda Vista Irrig. Dist., 266, 362, 1236. San Diego County v. California South. Pac. Co., 838. V. Riverside County, 694, 871. V. Southern Pac. R. Co., 837. San Diego In v. Co. v. Shaw, 1213, 1252. San Diego L. & T. Co. v. La Presa School Dist, 1498, 1499. San Francisco v. Anderson, 397, 640, 648. V. Canavan, 228. V. Central Pac. R. Co., 695, 696. V. Certain Real Estate, 1274. clxxxvi TABLE OF OASES. San Francisco v. Crocker, etc. Nat. Bank, 711. V. Flood, 619, 645, 648, 741, 1330. V. Fry, 389. V.Jones, 841, 874, 880. V. La Societe Francaise, 360, 617. V. Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co., 95, 190, 703, 1127, 1311. V. Luning, 841. v.Lux, 651, 664. V. Machley, 90. V. Mackey, 86, 90, 388, 396, 651. V. McCain, 932. i V. McGinn, 634. V. Pennie, 526, 666, 824. V. Phelan, 729, 840. V. Quackenbush, 1268. V. Spring, etc. Works, 279, 399. V. Talbot, 653. San Francisco & F. L. Co. v. Ban- bury, 455, 1031. San Francisco, etc. R. Co. v. Board, 548. V. State Board, 64, 74, 106, 107, 589, 602, 617, 695, 696, 746, 776. San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwell, 18, 836. V. San Francisco, 1305. San Francisco Paving Co. v. Bates, 1218. San Gabriel Valley L. & W. Co. v. Wltmer Bros. Co., 490, 606, 750, 815, 831, 840, 892. San Jose v. Railway Co., 1096, 1121, 1140. V. San Jose, etc. R. Co., 680. San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 26, 686, 1383, 1467. San Jose Imp. Co. v. Auzerais, 1389. San Luis Obispo v. Pettit, 605, 610, 662. San Luis Obispo County v. Green- berg, 1114, 1118. V. White, 537, 759, 837. San Mateo County v. Maloney, 848. V. Railroad Co., 279. V. Southern Pacific R. Co., 81, 626, 628. Sanborn v. Hobart, 983. V.Mason City, 486, 1249. V.Mueller, 983, 993, 1034, 1065. V. Rice Co., 98, 227, 305, 1303. Sanderlin v. Thompson, 1457. Sanders v. Brown, 871, 874, 1285. V. Butler, 466,. 474. V. Downs, 726, 1451. V. Levi, 240. V. Ransom, 987, 995. V. Simmons, 1478. V. Yonkers, 1448. Sanderson v. Herman, 530, 1252. Sanderson v. La Salle, 837, 843. V. Scranton, 636. Sandmeyer v. Harris, 1362. Sandrldge v. Hurd, 817. Sandrock- v. Columbus, 1224. Sands v. Davis, 967, 1066. V. Manistee River Imp. Co., 5, 148. V. Richmond, 1130; 1197, 1223. Sandwich v. Fish, 4,40, 481, 736, 1480. S^dy Hill V. Akin, 664. Sanford v. Dick, 383, 1471. V. Gregg, 720, 1450. V.Moore, 1022, 1029. V. New York, 1283. V. People, 750, 1267. V. Prentice, 567. V. Sanford, 954. V. Spencer, 655. V. Savings & Loan Assoc, 124, 740, 813. Sangamon, etc. R. Co. v. Jackson- ville, 239. V. Morgan County, 697. V. Sangamon County, 699. Sanger v. Rice, 988, 995, 1003, 1075, 1286. Sanilac Supervisors v. Auditor-Gen- eral, 548. Sanitary Dist. v. Allen, 807. V. Martin, 268. Sankey v. Seipp, 927, 1455. Santa Barbara v. Eldred, 603. 750, 840, 887. V. Stearns, 1128. Santa Clara County v. Southem Pacific li. Co., 58, 72, 73, 81, 280, 626, 695, 696, 700. ' V. Union Pac. R. Co., 592. Sapp V. Morrill, 1091. V. Walker, 1038. , Saranac Land. etc. Co. v. Comp- troller, 67, 1016. Sarber v. Rankin, 1441. Sargeant v. Bean, 735. Sargent v. Bean, 525, 933. V. New Haven, 1175. v.Tuttle, 20, 844. Satterlee v. San Francisco, 554. Satterwhite v. State, 624, 782. Sauf V. Morgan, 871. "■ Saulters v. Victory, 1512. Saunders v. Springsteen, 251. V. Wilson, 1064. Saunderson v. Herman, 531. Savacool v. Boughton, 1477, 1480, 1486. Savage v. Buffalo, 383, 1216. V. Salem, 1148, 11§1. V. Walsh, 491. Savannah v. Charlton, 392, 1089, 1099. TABLE OF OASES. clxxxvii \ Savannah v. Crawford, 1102. V. Feeley, 1103, 1111, 1489. V. Hartridge, 456, 466. V. Hlnes, 1106. V. Jesup, 368, 835. V. Railroad Co., 467. V. Solomon's Lodge, 349. V. Weed, 1218. Savannah, etc. R. Co. v. Morton, 698, 902. Savannah, T. & I. H. R. v. Savan- nah, 626, 1238. Savannah, T. & I. H. R. v. Savan- nah, 1121. Savings v. Coite, 402. Savings & L. Soc. v. Austin, 388, 645, 1411, 1444. V. Ordway, 965, 1443. V. San Francisco, 359, 645, 1510. Savings & Loan Soc. v. Multnomah County, 125, 129. Savings Association v. Marks, 130. Savings Bank v. Gardiner, 400. V. Nashua, 399. V. New London, 259, 396, 398, 706,708. V.Portsmouth, 398, 1416. V. Rutland, 343. V. United States, 18. V. Worcester, 400 ' Savings, etc. Soc. v. Multnomah County, 57, 80, 91, 640. Savings Society v. Austin, 279. V. Multnomah County, 9, 21, 388. , Sawyer v. Alton, 16, 287, 1128. V. Dooley, 72, 75, 315, 316, 428, 778. V. Gleason, 596. V. Mackie, 734. V. Springfield, 15. V. Steele, 436. Sawyer-Goodman Co. v. Crystal Falls, 216. Saxton Nat. Bank v. Carswell, 52. Saxton V. Nimms, 445, 571, 1469. Sayers v. Burkhardt, 860. V. 'O'Connor, 806. Sayles v. "Davis, 133, 960, 961. Sayre v. Phillips, 386, 1147. V. Tompkins, 1411, 1416. Scales V. Alvis, 446, 825, 936. Scammon v. Chicago, 181, 555, 900, 1004. V. Scammon, 541. Scandinavian-American Bank v. Pierce County, 658. Scarborough v. Parker, 487, 492. Searffbillig v. Scarffbillig, 1062. Scarritt v. Chapman, 797. Scarry v. Lewis, 939, 1009, 1019, 1458. Schackelford v. Coffey, 194. Schackford v. Newington, 218. Schaefer v. Causey, 816. V. Werllng, 1222. Schaeffer v. People, 825, 883, 884. Schaffner v. Young, 1412, 1416. Scharf v. Tasker, 67, 859. Schattler v. CassineUi, 1001. Schaum v. Showers, 806. Schedda v. Sawyer, 968. Schee v. La Grange, 1073. Scheiber v. Kaehler, 533, 751, 763', 827. Schemick v. Chicago, 532, 1253, 1273. Schenck v. JefEersonville, 178, 181, 235, 241, 514. V. Kelley, 970. V. Peay, 441, 808, 860, 861, 1024, 1044, 1045. Schenectady v. Trustees, 1241. V. Trustees of Union College,. 1223. , V. Union College, 1287. Sohenley v. Allegheny City, 186,. 1201. V. Commonwealth, 511, 518, 1156, 1163, 1206, 1211, 1221, 1263, 1284, 1285. Schettler (V. Fort Howard. 752. Scheurman v. Columbus, 933. Schiffman v. Schmidt, 898. Schimmin v. Inman, 933. Schirmer v. Hoyt, 1277. Schissel v. Dickson, 821. Schleicher v. Gatlin, 1005, 1065. Schlencker v. Risley, 435. Schmelz v. Giles, 1214. Schmidt v. Falley, 92, 269, 663. Schmidth v. Neimeyer, 897. Schneewind v. Niles, 173, 553, 586, Schneider v. District of Columbia,. 1284. Schobee v. Bean, 714, 715. Schoenheit v. Nelson, 498, 1022. Schoff V. Gould, 576, 925. Schofleld V. Watkins, 384. V. West's Succession, 870, 1515. Scholey v. Reed, 669. V. Rew, 11, 32. Scholtz V. Smith, 443. School V. School District, 1365. School Com'rs v. County Com'rs, 1351, 1361. Schoolbred v. Charleston, 1354. School Directors v. .^nderson, 1522.. V. Delahoussaye, 1338. V. Fogleman, 566. V. James, 672. V. School Directors, 1439. School District v. Allen County, 499, 1512. V. Atherton, 544, 576. V. Board of Education, 252. clxxxviii TABLE OF OASES. School District v. Board of Im- provement, 264, 266, 268, 436, 438, 439, 1284. v. Bragdon, 926. V. Carr, 1379. V. Clark, 1344. V. County Com'rs, 651. V, Cumberland, 488, 604. V. Garvey, 574. V. Hewitt, 268. V. Howe, 266. V. Long, 1375. V. Merrills, 590. V. Prentiss, 419, 421. V. School Dist., 8. V. Selectmen, 1379. V. Webber, 1300. ■Schoolfield v. Lynchburg, 33. Schoolfield's Bx'r v. XyHchburg, 468. Schoolkill V. Lynchburg, 337.' Schooner Rachel v. United States, 500, 903. Schoonover v. Galernault, 1061, 1062. Schrack v. Covault, 1441. Schraeder v. Grady, 785. Schreiber v. Assessors, 689. V. Moynihan, 979. Schroder v. Overman, 1221, 1268. Schrodt V. Deputy, 447, 730. Schroeder v. Neilson, 804. Schuck V. Lebanon, 17, 248. Schuessler v. Dudley, 1334. Schultes V. Bberly, 100, 102, 103. Schultze V. New York. 1395. Schumacker v. Toberma, 1311, 1431. Schuster v. Weissman, 1329. Schuykill County v. Citizens' Gas Co., 378, 379. V. Commonwealth, 908. Schuykill Nav. Co. v. Com'rs, 377. Schuyler v. Hull, 919. Schwarz v. Boston, 1379. Schwely v. Jones, 455. Schwiesau v. Mahon, 1252. Schwuchow V. Chicago, 1150. Scobee v. Bean, 131, 612. Scobey v. Decatur Co., 21. Scofield V. Council Bluffs, 1264. V. Lansing, 106. 1430, 1450, 1451. V. McDowell, 1026. V. Perkerson, 1344, 1423. Scotland County v. Railroad Co., 117, 343. V. Missouri R. Co., 372. Scott V. Babcock, 916. V. Brackett, 629. V. Brown, 734, 1046, 1069. V. Chickasaw Couhty, 1508. V. Hansheer, 563. V. Hinds, 772. v. Kaufman, 253. T. Mather, 1064. Scott V. Millikan, 1018. V. Mills, 1009. V. Onderdonk, 1448. 1450. V. People, 828, 861. V. Society, 822. T. Society of Russian Israelites, 352 V. State,' 1285. T. Stewart, 864. , V. Toledo, 62, 626, 1238. V. Union County, 560. v.Watkins, 168, 438, 856, 901, 935, 1458. V. "Woodruff, 1008. V.Young Men's Soc, 916, 1006. Scott County v. Hinds, 602, 1219, 1224. Scott Lumber Co. v. Oneida County, 780. Scottish Union & N. Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 81, 95, 292, 701, 703, 1095, 1483, 1508. Scoville V. Cleveland, 412, 434, 1182, 1206, 1211, 1266. Scranton v. Barnes, 1244. V. Bush, 1218, 1222, 1284. V. Jones, 751. V. Koehler, 1219. V. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 1222. - V. Sturgis, 1164. Scripps V. Board of Review, 90, 651. Scruggs V. Gibson, 904. Scudder v. Ames, 824. V. Hinshaw, 1147. V. New York, 1451. Scuffletown Fence Co. v. McAllister, 195, 207. Scully V. People, 29. Seaboard, etc. R. Co. v. Norfolk County, 381. Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Woeston, 1165, 1249, 1283. Seabrook v. Goss, 1324. V. United States, 423. Seabury v. Howland, 565. Sea Isle City v. Board of Assessors, 425, 776. Seaman v. Thompson, 1034. Seamen's Friend Soc. v. Boston, 362. Searing v. Heavysides, 1419, 1430. Sears v. Board, 69. 70. V. Board of Aldermen, 223. V. Board of Street Com'rs, 1166. V. Boston, 643, 1178. V. Cottrell, 51, 52, 54, 851. V. Gabbett, 1174. V. Marshall County, 1511. V. Street Com'rs, 303, 1174; 1179, 1203, 1239. V. "West, 1144. Seashore House v. Atlantic City, 349. TABLE OF OASES. clxxxix Seattle v. Board, 421. V.Hill, 867, 1285, 1515. V. Smith, 1288. V. Whittlesey, 364. V. Yesler, 1198, 1289. Seaver v. Cobh, 977. Seavey v. Seattle, 1282. Second, etc. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 682. Second Nat. Bank v. Caldwell, 710, 716. V. Lansing, 1281. Second Universalist Soc. v. Provi- dence, 363, 1235. Second Ward Savings Bank v. Mil- waukee, 394, 401. Security Co. v. Hartford, 702. V. Hinton, 100'. Security, etc. Co. v: Hinton, 103. Security Ins. Co. v. Buckler, 895. Security Savings Bank v. San Fran- cisco, 279. Security Savings Bank & T. Co. v. Hinton, 467, 503, 707. Securjty Trust Co. v. Von Heyder- staedt, 1286. Sedgwick v. Bunker, 252. v. Stanton, 223. Sedgwick County v. Bunker, 415. Seekins v. Goodale, 857, 1484. Seeley v. Westport, 1418, 1500. Seely v. Pittsburg, 1222, 1314. V. Sebastian, 182. Seger v. Spurlock, 1045, 1046, 1065. Seibert v. Allen, 1288. V. United States, 121, 128. Seigneuret v. Fahey, 807. Seim V. State, 1114. Selden v. Coffee, 495, 750. V. Equitable Trust Co., 706. Sellars v. Barrett, 611, 777. V. Phillips, 1097, 1106. Selma, etc. Assoc, v. Morgan, 22. Selz V. Cagwin, 657. Semans v. Harvey, 814. Semple v. Langlade County, 1460. V. Wharton, 996. S&nichka v. Lowe, 884, 905, 991. Senior v. Ratterman, 1114. Senor v. Board, 1154. V. Board of Com'rs, 363, 423, 1155, 1311. Senour v. Mitchell, 1412. V. Ruth, 26, 90,v91. Serrell v. Patterson,' 442. V. Philadelphia, 245. Serrin v. Brush, 1033. Sentell v. New Orleans, etc. R. Co., 1145. Sessions v. Crunkilton, 211, 1131, 1169. V. McCarthy, 998. Sewall V. St. Paul, 1272, 1450. Seward v. Rheiner, 1520. Sewell V. Watson, 727. Sexton V. Henderson, 1020. Seymour v. Harrison, 975, 1042. V. Hartford, 362. V. Peters, 482, 483, 495, 499, 586,. 590, 726, 789, 825, 827. V. State, 151. Shaarai Berocho v. New York, 352.. Shackelton- v. Guttenberg, 466, 467. Shackleford v. Hooper, 960, 1009. Shaefer v. Causey, 824. V. McCabe, 724. Shalemiller v. McCarty, 1051. Shamokin Borough v. Flannigan,, 1147. Shanahan v. Tomlinson, 811. Shane v. St. Paul, 1500. Shank v. Smith, 1165, 1222. Shannon v. Hinsdale, 1276, 1280. V. Huron, 174, 182, 223. V. Lane, 1020. Sharp V. Dillman, 447. V. Johnson, 556, 825, 827, 916,. 933, 1267, 1291. V. Speir, 1, 365, 466, 912, 1005, 1017, 1157, 1161, 1201, 1247,. 1248, 1252, 1266, 1268, 1285, 1452. Sharp's Executor v. Dunavan, 246. Sharpe v. Dillman, 825, 1018. V. Engle, 487. V. Maney, 487. Sharpless v. Mayor, 2, 43, 48. V.Philadelphia, 182, 186, 227,. 1307, 1319, 1437. Shattuck V. Bascom, 486, 762. V. Daniel, 956. V. New Orleans, 1384, 1390. V. Seaborn, 761. Shaver v. Robinson, 28. Shaw V. Allegheny, 870, 1505. V. Beckett, 1510, 1511. V. Dennis, 231, 235, 238, 258, 414,. 606, 1208, 1297. V. Des Moines County, 497. V. Hartford, 389, 621, 656. V. Hill, 1024. V. Kirkwood, 948. V. Morley,. 495. V. Orr, 750. V. Beckett, 19, 20, 1479. V. State, 1339. Shawler v. Johnson, 934, 939, 1073.- Shawnee Com'rs v. Carter, 515. Shawnee County v. Carter, 466, 480, 553, 1309. Shawnee County Com'rs v. Topeka. Equip. Co., 698. Shay V. McNamara, 968. Sheafe v. Wait, 949. -cxc TABLE OF CASES. Sheaster v. Selvage, 1214. Shear v. Columbia County Com'rs, 1394. Shearer v. Corbin, 1008. V. Murphy, 1438. . T. Woodburn, 1005, 1645. 1082, 1083. Shedd V. Disney,, 912. .Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hos- pital, 363, 1235. V. Good Samaritan Hotel, 364. Sheehy v. Hinds, 940, 1009. Sheely v. Detroit, 1165. Sheets v. Painp, 508, 598, 601, 750, 977, 1012, 1022, 1081. , ^Shefferly v. Auditor Gen., 897. Sheffield v. Board of Com'rs, 265. V. Parsons, 145. -Sheibly v. Rome, 395. Sheik V. McElroy, 1082. Shelby v. Tiddy, 817, 855. V. Towle, 997. V. Randies, 1145i -Shelby County v. Miss. & T. R. Co., 385, 495, 606, 609, 779, 1406, 1410. T.Union & P. Bank, 371, 372, 373. Shelby County Trust Co. v. Board of Trustees, 689. Shelbyville Water Co. v. People, 536, 638, 869. Shelden v. Coates, 438. V. Marion T'p, 425, 1493, 1495. V. Wright, 879. Sheldon v. Kalamazoo, 1512. T. Marion-T'p, 544, 776. V. School Dist., 1432, 1500, V. Steele, 959. ^ V. Van Buskirk, 547, 798, 850, 1478, 1481. Sheldon's Lessee v. Coates, 919. Sheley v. Detroit, 1218. Shell v. Duncan, 867, 868, 940, 961, 1003, 1009. V. Martin, 1450. V. Walker, 966. Shelley v. St. Charles County, 961, 966, 1361. V.Smith, 947, 1038, 1043, 1057, 1073. Shelton v. Dunn, 1425. V. Mobile, 1151. V. Piatt, 1411. Y. Sjlverfleld, 1103. Shepard v. Basterling, 1436. V. Kaysville, 221. Shepardson v. Elmore, 969. v. Gillett, 199, 514, 1425, 1443, 1446. V. Milwaukee, 1451. V. Milwaukee Supervisors, 1449. ■Sheperd v. Burr, 987. Shepherd's Fold v. New York, 205, 228. Sheppard v. Clark, 1020. Shepperd v. Sumter 'County, 149, 169. Sheridan v. Fleming, 1361. V. Rahway, 1373. V. Stevenson, 504. Sherley v. Louisville, 840. Sherlock v. Winnetka, 286, 785. , Sherman v. Benford, 1302, 1431. V. Buick, 193. v. Carr, 209, 1431. V. Langham, 122, 220, 1366. V. Shobe, 899. V. Simons, 564. V. Torrey, 1481. Sherrill v. Christ Church, 352, 361, 496. v. Hewitt, 762, 841. Sherry v. Gilmore, 8, 995. V. McKinley, 750. Sherwin v. Bugbee, 571, 576. V. Mudge, 731. V. Savings Bank, 19, 874. y. Wigglesworth, 861. Sherwood v. District Court, 1169, 1409. Shewalter v. Brown, 1468. Shiek V. McElroy, 1067. Shields v. Chase, 1366. V. Paterson, 909. Shimer v. Mosher, 857. Shimmin v. Inman, 603, 728, 735, 936. Shimmons v. Saginaw, 524, 1166, 1245. Shiner v. Jacobs, 354, 355. Shinkle v. Essex Pub. Road Board, 1241. Shipman v. Forbes, 795. Shoat T. Walker, 1085, 1091. Shoemaker v. Bank, 812. V. Grant County, 1418, 1487. V. Lacy, 961, 981. V. United States, 1207. ShoU V. People, 635, 636, 827, 828. Sholl Bros. V. People, 883. Shont? V. Evans, 215, 573, 575. Short V. State, 16, 17, 171, 829. 864 Shotwell V. Dalrymple, 647. V.Louisville, N. O. & T. R. Co., 124. V.Moore, 132, 324, 607, 770. Shoup V. Central Branch 'N. P. R. Co., 934, 973. y. Railroad Co., 524, 525. Shove y. Manitowoc, 780, 1387. Shreve v. Cicero, 253, 600, 1175, 1238, 1280. Shreveport v. Cole, 122, 176. V. Gregg, 15, 17. TABLE OF OASES. CXCl Shreveport v. Presoott, 468, 482, 486, 555, 1155, 1158, 1189, 1251. V. Shreveport City R. Co., 1258. Shreveport Gas, etc. Co. v. New Or- leans, 347. Shriver v. Cowell, 805, 838. V. Pittsburg, 653. Shucli V. Lebanon, 295. Shuford V. Commissioners, 1179, 1193. Shumway v. Baiter County, 781. Shuttuck V. Smith, 384, 385, 517, 578, 579, 589,^892, 952, 957. Sias V. Badger, 445, 446. Sibley v. Bullis, 523, 945. V. Mobile, 122, 586, 1363. V. Smith, 465, 486, 508, 748, 760, 912, 997, 1008. Sickles V. Union Univ. Co., 1036, 1037, 1038. Sidenburg v. Ely, 732, 813, 819. Sidney v. Mobile, 1366. Siebe v. Superior Court, 1475. Siegel v. Outagamie County, 735, 1451. Sigman v. Lundy, 1054. Silkman v. Water Com'rs, 5, 628. Sillcocks V. Sillcocks, 819. Silsbee v. Stockle, 181, 448, 477, 486, 490, 574, 592, 762, 785, 792, 956, 957, 1009. Silver Bow County v. Davis, 717. Simmons v. Gardner, 1251. V. McCarthy, 956, 1003, 1042. V.Passaic, 1400, 1409, 1410. V. Statfe, 1105, 1124, 1150. V.Wilson, 472, 546. Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 1450. Simmons Medicine Co. v. Ziegen- heim, 204. Simms v. Greer, 825. V. Paris, 248, 355. Simon v. Northup, 227, 549. Simonds v. Turner, 816. Simons v. Drake, 965. Simpkins v. Ward, 1439. Simpson v. Commissioners, 1193. V. Hopkins, 73, 79, 302, 360, 646. V. Kansas, 1157. V.Kansas City, '235, 412, 1154, 1206, 1207, 1211, 1352. V. Meyer, 825. V.Meyers, 914, 1011, 1025. Sims V. Gray, 816. V. Hines, 1265, 1273, 1278. V. Jackson, 298. V. Walshe, 999. V. Warren, 601, 743, 750. Sinclair v. Learned, 383, 518, 762, 960, 1063, 1441. V. Leonard, 385. Sindall v. Baltimore, 359. Singer Manuf. Co. v. County Com'rs, 656. V. Graham, 548. V. Heppenheimer, 6, 114, 371. V.Wright, 76, 77, 81, 151, 170, 450. V. Yarger, 944. Single V. Stettin, 529. Singleton v. Turner, 888. Sinking Fund Com'rs v. Grainger, 1360, 1362. V. Linden, 493. Sinnot v. Davenport, 145. Sintes V. Barber, 997. Sinton v. Ashbury, 1161, 1207, 1302. V. Carter County, 414, 415. Sioux City v. Independent School Dist., 1236. Sioux City & St. P. R. Co. v. Robin- son, 269. Sioux City Bridge Co; v. Dakota County, 85, 773, 1427. Sioux City, etc. R. Co. v. Osceola . County, 603, 1443. V. Washington County, 628, 629, 772, 783. Sisters of Peace v. Westervelt, 349, 352. Sisters of the Poor v. New York, 380. Sivley v. Summers, 816. Sivwright v. Pierce, 1416. Skaneateles Waterworks Co. v. Skaneateles, 127. Skelton V. Sackett, 885. 888. Skinner v. Christie, 504. V. Roberts, 431, 439. V. Williams, 1003. Skowhegan Sav. Bank v. Parsons, 997, 1005. Slack V. Jacobs, 450. V.Norwich, 1491, 1508. V. Railroad Co., 102, 585. V. Ray, 102, 836, 848, 901. Slade V. Governor, 794. Slater v. Maxwell, 943, 951, 955, 960. Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 261, 337. V.Louisville, 17, 427, 428, 488, 516, 598, 599, 600, 751, 772, 773. Slayton v. Chester, 445. Sledd V. Commonwealth, 1109. Sleeper v. Bullen, 1515, 1516. Sleigh V. Grand Rapids, 627. Sleight V. People, 227, 230, 966, 1309, 1321, 1435. V. Roe, 969. V. Rowe, 1001. Sligh V. Grand Rapids, 1239. Sloan V. Beebe, 1129. V. Faurot, 1278. ' V. Pacific R. Co., 112. CXCll TABLE OF CASES. Sloan V. Sewell, 745, 1018, 1019 Smith Slocomb V. Fayetteville, 467. V. Slocum V. Fayette County, 496 V. Slyfield V. Barnum, 1032, 1038, 1041, V. 1043. V. Healy, 1042, 1043, 1073. V. Smale v. Burr, 270. V. Small V. Hagden, 445. V. V. lydwrenceburgli, 1445. V. y. Slocum, 906. V. Smalley v. Burlington, 262, 270, 371. V. Smeich v. York County, 816. V. Smith V. Aberdeen, 102, 1192, 1226. V. V. Abington Savings Bank, 573, V. 1272, 1285. V. V. Adrian, 1146. V. V. Americus, 285. V. V. Auditor General, 22, 499. V. V. Bacon, 1029. y. V. Blackiston, 982, 1020. V. V. Blair, 490, 765. V. V. Blindbury, 819. V. V. BodHsh, 914. V. V. Bohler, 104. V. V. Bondurant,,435. V. V. Buffalo, 517, 1236, 1242. V. V. Buhler, 1036. V. V. Burley, 398, 399, 402. V. V. Callanan, 883, 1033, 1(539. V. V. Carlow, 1517. v.. V. Cassidy, 868, 965. V. V. Chapman, 1008. V. V. Cleveland, 508, 1008, 1016, V. / 1401. V. V. Cofran, 555, 1243. V. Commissioners, 276. V. V. Commonwealth, 1339. V. V. Connelly, 194. V. V. Cox, 748, 894, 913, 939. V. y. Crittenden, 488,- 581, 798, V. 1476. T. Davis, 555, 603, 1158. V. V. Des Moines, 1210, 1268. V. v. Detroit, 531. V. V. Baston, 1011. V. V. Exeter, 389, 396, 399, 400 V. V. Parrelly, 212, 600, 1501, 1504. V. V. Ford, 1086. V. V. First Nat. Bank. 711. V. V. Frankfort, 1028. V. V. Gage, 1038, 1455. V. V. Gallanan,' 913. v., V. Goldsmith, 1424. V. V. Griffin, 996. V. v.Hard, 483, 518, 611, 630, 716, V. 764. y. V. Harvey, 1043. V. V. Heath, 1042. V. V. Hickman, 743. V. V. Hobbs, 1009. V. V. Hornback, 445. V. V. Howell, 239. V. V. Hunter, 906. . V. Jackson, 149. . Johnson, 1092. . Jones, 1074. . Jones County Supervisors^ 1406. . Kelly, 326, 499, 502, 785, 1459. . King, 478, 1400. . Kipp, 888. . Kochersperger, 1412. . Lambert,- 983. .Leavenworth, 602, 1441, 1443_ . Leavenworth County, 603. . Lewis, 965, 974. . Long, 1419. . Longe, 511. . Macon, 97, 112. . Marshalltown, 1383. . Mason, 655. .Mawhood, 907, 1098. . Mayor, 634. . McQuiston, 537, 1389. . Messer, 438, 728, 936. . Milwaukee, 1169. . Minto, 1517. . Newman, 964. . New Orleans, 1001, 1076. . New York, 637. . Northampton Bank, 856. . Omaha, 807, 892, 1207, 1252. r.J)sburn, 346, 1389. ."People, 861. . Peoria, 1336. . Portland, 1054, 1245, 1264. .Prall, 993, 1038, 1042, 109O, 1458. . Readfleld, 1496, 1497. . Reed, 729, 733. . Reeves, 1487. . Rice, 879. .Rude Bros. Manuf. Co., 782, 784, 1425. . Ryan, 852, 956, 959, 984. . Saginaw, 252. . St. Joseph, 1255. , St. Paul, 264. , Schroeder, 1496. , Shattuck, 1091. 1092. , Sherry, 248, 508, 1085, 1086. , Short, 133. . Simpson, 870. . Skow, 868. . Smith, 382, 384, 1064, 1453. ,' Specht, 875, 962. . State, 901. . Stephenson, 988 . Stinson, 1335. . Tallapoosa Com'rs, 1362, 1375. . Tallapoosa County, 1363. . Thurby, 450. . Todd, 987, 988, 995. , Town, 1451. . Union Couaty Nat. BanS^ 142ff.. TABLE OF OASES. cxcm Smith V. Vicksburg, 473. V. Walker, 1035. V. Waters, 456. V.Watson, 992, 996. V. Webb, 711. V. Wbeeler, 936. V. Willis, 237, 252. Smltliberg v. Archer, 556. Smoot V. Hart, 899. Smyth V. Titcomb, 1325, 1342, 1343, 1369. V. NefE, 1039. V. New York, 1501. Snee'd v. Assurance Co., 1097. Snell'v. Chicago, 1310. V. Dubuque, 913. V. Dubuque & S. C. R. Co., 1037, 1458. v.Fort Dodge, 442, 561, 573, 581, 601. 604. V. Leonard, 215. Snoddy v. Leavitt, 812. Snow V. Fitchburg, 1227, 1274, 1408. • V. Weeks, 574. V. Winchell, 1345. Snyder v. Ingalls, 1039. V. Marks, 1411, 1424. V. North Lawrence, 466, 1110. Soady v. Wilson, 1171, 1259. Society v. Coite, 406, 677, 678, 686. V. New Brunswick, 350. Society for Savings v. Coite, 132. Soens V. Racine, 182, 443. Sohn V. Wood, 1019. Solomon v. Oscoda T'p, 1510. V. Tarver, 211, 563; V. Willis, 851. Somerset v. Somerset Banking Co., 529, 552, 560, 837, 844. Somersworth Saflngs Bank v. Som- ersworth, 317. Somerville v. Thrift, 895. V. Waltham, 264, 268. Sommers v. Boyd, 658, 665. V. Ward, 939. Somo Lumber Co. v. Lincoln County, 586. Sorchan v. Brooklyn, 48.6. Soreson v. Davis, 966, 967, 1073. Soudant v. Wadhams, 431. Souhegan Nail, etc. Factory v. Mc- Conihe, 376, 1484. Soukup V. Union Inv. Co., 1009, 1042. Soule V. Seattle, 106, 532. South Bend v. Cushing, 247. V. University, 359, 360, 1425. South Chester v. Garland, 247. South Chicago City R. Co. v. 'Chi- cago, 1269. South Covington & C. St. R. Co. V. Baltimore,- 296, 429, 557, 680, 1311. South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Mor- row, 26, 90, 91, 92, 371, 389, 394, 397, 404, 447, 493, 610, 638, 651. 652, 658, 686, 687, 832, 833. South Park Com'rs v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 1230. South Platte Land Co. v. Crete, 602, 783 1443. V.Buffalo County, 626, 844, 1439. Souther v. South Orange, 780. Southern Bell Tel. etc. Co. v. D'Alemberte, 1122. V. Richmond, 140. Southern Building, etc. Assoc. ▼. Norman, 81. Southern Chem. etc. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 348. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Wemple, 719. Southern Electric & P. Co. v. Phil- adelphia, 379. Southern Exp. Co. v. Mayor, 147. V. Mobile, 161. Southern Hotel Co. v. St. Louis County, 382. Southern Ins. Co. v. Board of As- sessors, 605. Southern Oregon Co. v. Coos County, 795, 1461. Southern Pac. R, Co. v. Laclede, 110. V. Whitaker, 811. Southern R. Co. v. Asheville, 1417. V.Greenville, 1121, 1511. V. Jackson, 367. V. Kay, 502, 552, 557, 596. V.St. Clair County, 178, 199. 465. Southern Warehouse, etc. Co. v. • Mechanics' Trust Co., 524. Southwestern R. Co. v. Wright, 112, 1419. Southwick V. Southwick, 507. Southworth v. Palmyra, etc. R. Co.,. 554. V. Edmonds, 733, 937, 938, 944. V. Edwards, 955. 957. Soutter V. Miller, 1025. Sowles V. Soule, 1501. Spain V. Johnson, 940. Spalding v. Commonwealth, 269> 619, 663. V. Hill, 786. V. Watson, 949. Spangler v. Cleveland, 739, 1268. V. York County, 820. Spanier v. lie Voe, 1028. Spanish River Lumber Co. v. Bay City, 654. Spann v. Commissioners, 563. Spargur v. Romlne, 1441. Sparks v. Hall, 812. CXCIV TABLE OF OASES. Sparkes v. Lowndes, 864. Sparland v. Barnes, 502, 1366. Sparrow v. State Land Office Com'r, .214. Spaulding v. Baxter, 1243, 1517. V. Ellsworth, 985, 1071. V. O'Connor, 889, 897. Speak V. Powell, 1123. Spea,r v. Braintree, 383, 384, 396, 1491. V. Ditty, 438, 480, 933, 939. ' V. Door County, 1454. V. Tilson, 1479. Specht V. Louisville, 248. Speed V. McKhight, 950. V. St. Louis County Court, 135. Speer v. Athens, 627, 1130, 1167, 1180, 1186, 1208, 1241. V. School Directors, 186, 218. Spelr V. New Utrecht, 1518. Spellman v. Curtenius, 737, 827, 883, 887, 916, 949. Spencer v. Joint School Dist., 181. V. Jones, 440. V. Levering, 814. V. Merchant, 8, 9, 51, 53, 56, 60, 63, 71, 181, 234, 493, 531, 626, 969, 1203, 1207, 1208, 1211, 1239, 1260, 1446. V. People, 890, 891. V. Perry, 1324. V. Riverton, 1398. V. State, 450. V. Wheaton, 1418. V. Whiting, 1119. Spencer County Court v. Common- wealth, 1361. Spencer Dist. Education Board v. Cain, 1334. Spengln v. Ferry, 1028. Sperling v. Levy, 445. Sperry v. Flygare, 231, 307, 1160. V. Gibson, 1028, 1036. V.Goodwin, 1038, 1041, 1042. V. McKinley, 1007. Spicer v. Howe, 1001, 1002. V. Rowland, 945. V.' Wheeler, 883. Spiech V. Tierney, 735, 738, 849. Spinney v. Lynn, 659. Spokane v. Browne, 1253, 1269, 1271. Spokane Falls v. Browne, 49, 759, 1189, 1232. V. Tacoma, 1252. Sponable v. Woodhouse, 945, 946. Sprague v. Abbott, 767. V. Bailey, 435, 442, 484, 798, 899, 1471, 1477. V. Birchard, 797. v. Burcbard, 1486. V. Coenen, 810. V.Fletcher, 168, 274, 1485. Sprague v. Lisbon, 640. ■ V. Pitt, 1008, 1068. V. Roverud, 1021. Spratt V. Jacksonville, 281. V.Price, 868, 971, 985. Sprecker v. Wakeley, 1016, 1067, 1085, 1091, 1093. Spring V. Collector, 221. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. People, 1459. Springer v..Bartle, 944, 1020. V. Rosette, 1457. V. United States, 11, 51, 54, 59," 864, 951. Springfield v. Baker, 1183. V. Gay,' 1170. V. Green, 1213, 1223. V.Greene, 535, 1163, 1188, 1211. V. London Ins. Co., 502. V. Malthus, 1245. V. Power, 1298. V. Sale, 535, 1226, 1245. -V. Smith, 109, 112, 357, 359, 1095. V. Springfield Bank, 712. V. Weaver, 1181, 1252. Spring Garden v. Wistar, 1218. Spring Valley Co. v. Schottler, 26. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. People, 386, 387, 523, 536, 1386. Spring Valley Water Works v. Bar- ber, 638. ' V. Schottler, 687. Springwells v. Johnson, 264. Spurlock V. Dougherty, 992, 1079. Squire v. Cartwright, 556, 590, 593. Stackpole v. Hancock, 729. Stadler v. Roth, 544. Staftord v. Albany, 1383. V. Fizer, 867, ,885, 886. V. Hamston, 1171, 1260. V. Lauver, 1003. V. Twitchell, 734. Stahl V. Kansas Educ. Assoc, 351. Stahmer v. State, 776. Stalcup V. Dixon, 1019. Staley v. Columbus, 19, 804, 805. V. Leamans, 975. Stambaugh v. Carlin, 826. Stamposki v. Stanley, 1024. Stanberry v. Jordan, 176, 660, 1331. Stanburg v. Sillon, 1008. Stanclift v. Norton, 813. Standard Cattle Co. v. Baird, 342, 784. Standard Coal Co. v. Angus, 479. Standard Inv. Co. v. Freeman, 1061. Standard L. etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 702. Standard' Life Ins. Co. v. Detroit Assessors, 304. Standard Oil Co. -v. Bachelor, 165, 654. TABLE OF OASES. CXCV Standard OH Co. v. Combs, 143, State 166. V. Standard Underground Cable Co. v. V. Attorney-General, 154, 319, 379. V. Stanford v. San Francisco, 87. Stanley v. Albany, 713. V. V.Albany County, 258, 274, 715, V. 1494. V. V. Albany Supervisors, 1383, V. 1388, 1445. V. V. Baird, 825, 960. V. V. Mining Co., 45, 464, 468. V. V. Supervisors, 234, 715. Stansbury v. Jordan, 794. V. Stanton v. Chicago, 1272. V. V. Harris, 10. Staples V. Mayer, 1048. V. Stapylton v. Haggard, 710. v.Thaggard, 709, 712, 717, 833. V. Stark V. Shupp, 958., V. Starkesboro v. Hinesburg, 16. Starr v. Burlington, 482, 1158. 1517. V. V. Rochester, 1408. V. V. Voss, 807, 893, 984. V. State V. Abbott, 251, 751. V. V. Abraham, 599. V. V. Ada County, 908. V. V.Adams Express Co., 93, 164. V. V.Addison, 350. v.Adler, 837, 838. V. v..ffitna L. Ins. Co., 868, 1285, V. 1290. V. V. Agee, 152. V. Aitken, 548, 550, 1097. V. V. Akins, 272. V. V. Allan, 772. V. V.Allen, 54, 592, 624, 667, 785, V. 849, 1347. V. V. Allmond, 150. V. Alston, 33, 262, 334, 380, 1123. V. V.American Biscuit Manuf . Co., V. 348. V. T. American Sugar Refining V. Co., 78, 348, 359. V. V.Anderson, 358, 626, 685, 686, V. 772, 818. V. Angelo, 1099, 1120, 1141, 1142. V. v.Anniston Rolling Mills, 1116. V. V. Apgar, 512, 623, 1404, 1410. V. V. Archibald, 1354. V. V.Armstrong, 62, 336, 631, 786. V.Arnold, 344, 357, 359, 549. T- V. Ashbrook, 104, 106, 311, 1119, V. 1126. V. V. Ashbrooke, 557, 1311. V. V. Ashland, 1252. V. V. Assessors, 351, 353, 378, 605, V. 770, 1357. V. Atherton, 1340. V.Atkins, 620, 781. V.Atkinson, 586, 1326. V. V.Atlantic City, 553, 586, 1139, 1251. V. I V. Auditor, 554. . Augert, 1288. . Austin Club, 1114. .Austin & If. W. R. Co., '407, 687. .Axtell, 353. . Babcock, 482, 566. .Bailey, §59, 1369. . Baldwin, 489, 844, 891. . Baldwin Univ., 737. . Ballard, 518, 528. .Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 302, 830, 1325. . Baltimore, etc. Co., 368. . Baltimore, etc. R. Co., Ill, 369, 373, 376, 407, 679. .Bank of Commerce, 107, 372, 391, 404, 663, 707, 846. . Bank of Mansfield, 456, 1100. .Bank of Neosho, 526, 603, 710. . Bank of Smyrna, 112, 357. , Bank of Tennessee, 846. . Baker, 809, 869, 890, 891. . Baker County, 908. , Barnes, 1117. .Bates, 1340. .Bayonne, 1245, 1253, 1254, 1273. .Bean, 1126, 1141. . Beaufort, 33*2. .Bell, 9, 49, 130, 350, 550, 622, -1404. . Bellln, 865, 880. . Bellow, 654. .Belolt, 1351, 1362. ■ Bennett, 394, 1096,1097,1113. .Bentley, 26, 45, 87, 371, 402, 1404. .Bergen, 1226, 1410. . Berlin, 874. . Berry, 368, 407. .Bettle, 274, 693, 696, 1387. . Betts, 376. , Beverly Common Council, 1286. . Bienville Water S. Co., 756. . Binninger, 1403. . Bishop, 616, 1380. , Bixman, 73, 143, 151, 311, 313, 548, 1113, 1137. . Blaisdel, 450.^ . Blaser, 298. . Bloomfield, 233. . Blundell, 376. .Board, 144, 471. . Board of Assessors, 86, 266, 347, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 356, 360, 373, 397, 604, 685, 1358, 1403. . Board of Commissioners, 172, 771. . Board of Education, 1365. OXCVl TABLE OP OASES. State T. Board of Equal., 438, 623, State 784. V. Board of Liquidation, 200. V. V. Board of Public Works, 891. V. V. Bock; 1109, 1117. V. V. Bonnel, 1150. v. Borough Commission, 1245. v. V. Boullt, 1373. V. Bowker, 1370. V. V. Boyd, 897, 898, 960. V. V.Bradford Savings Bank, 678. V. Br9,dford Sav. Bank & T. Co., V.' 708. V. V. Bradshaw, 1054, 1370. V. V. Brakeley, 349, 353. V, v.Branin, 26, 87, 371, 382, 402, V. 688. V. V. Bremond, 475, 1441. V. V. Brewer, 457, 655. V. V. Brill, 1203, 1262. V. V. Britton, 251. V. V.Brown, 248, 436, 438. V. Bruce, 921. V. V. Bryant, 802. V. V. Buechler, 332. V. V. Bunyon, 317. V. V. Burbank, 1351. V. V. Burr, 525, 5^6, 672. ' V. V. Butler, 114, 333, 357, 372, 374, V. 1197. V. V. Byers, 1361. V. Cain, 546, 848. V. V. Caldwell, 153. V. V. California Mining Co., 550. V. V. Camp, 875, 960, 961, 979. V. V.Campbell, 739, 871, 886.. V. V.Camp Sing, 1097. V. V.Cannon, 912, 1455. V. V. Caraleigh, etc. Works, 143. V. V. Cargill Co., 68, 77, 160, 1336. V. V. Carney, 1152. • V. V. Carragan, 758, 772. V. V.Carroll, 430, 432,, 433. V. Carson, 339, 429, 503, 664. V. V. Carson City Savings Bank, V. 315, 316, 388, 707, 808. V. Carter, 321, 1108. V. V. Casper, 643. V. V. Cassidy, 259. V. V. Casteel, 920, 921, 1018. V. V. Cather, 1361. V. V. Catron, 709. V. V. Central Pac. R. Co., 52, 135, V. 136, 137, 138, 139, 386, 615, V. 616, 635, 750, 774, 775, 776, V. 777, 779, 807, 808, 843, 1386. V. T. Central Sav. Bank, 37, 378, V. 395, 706. V. V. Chadbourne, 1115, 1117. V. V. Chamberlain, 350, 887. V. V. Chamblyss, 1114. V. Chancellor, 526. V. V. Chapeau, 1118. T. V. Charleston, 146, 261, 407, 472, 546, 1131, 1132, 1206. . Chase, 1134. .Cheney, 66, 859, 860. , Cheraw & D. R. Co., 330, 596, 598, 600. .Chicago, B. & K. C. R. Co., 366, 374. . Christopher, 1163. . Cincinnati, N. O. etc. R. Co., 694.- .Citizens' Bank, 113,372,1098. .City Council, 653, 684, 1120. , Clark, 582. , Clarke, 657. . Cleaver, 377. .Clerk, 446. . Clerk of Bergen, 445. . Clevenger, 415. . Click, 491. .Clinton, 181, 185, 264, 354, 1176. , Clinton County, 1365. . Clinton T'p, 267. . Clothier, 1407. .Clymer, 884, 886. .Cob'b, 1435. .Cohen, 1117, 1118. . Cole, 574. .Collector, 349, 359, 376, 383, 398, 6-64. .Collins, 264, 980. , Columbia, 331. . Commercial Bank, 9. . Commissioners, 471, 626. . Com'rs, etc., 117. . Common Council, 1251. . Comptroller, 622, 681, 1350. . Consolidated, etc. Co., 901. . Consolidated Mining Co., 550. . Cooley,, 268, 308, 366, 48'6, 760. . Cornell, 84, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 210, 647. , Corson, 536. .County Court, 262, 315, 492, 1362. .County Judge, 1369. , Covington, 618, 1356. . Cowgill, 801, 883. . Cox, 900. . Craig, 690. . Cramer, 776. . Crawford, 333, 1147. .Cromer, 1352, 1356, 1522. . Crookston Lumber Co., 919. , Crosl,ey, 765, 779. . Cumberland & P. R. Co., 396. .Cumberland, etc. R. Co., 301. • Cummings, 615, 620, 837. .Cunningham, 440, 772, 785, 841, 843, 892, 893, 1325. . Dally, 722. .Dalrymple, 33, 88, 671. TABLE OF OASES. CXOVH State v. Daniel, 339. State V. Emert, 153, 1119. V. Danger, 1406. V. Empanger, 785. V. Darcy, 360. V. Bndom, 284, 298. V. Daspite, 1338. V. Engle, 89. V. Davenport, 555. V. Ensign, 48, 532, 1166, 1271. v. Daviess County, 581, 840 , 892. v.Brb,.1149. ' v.Dean, 1162, 1201. V.Essex Club, 1114. V. De Bow, 784. V.Essex Public Board, 532, V. Deering, 22, 40. 1278. v. Deering & Co., 387, 658 781. V.Essex Public Road, 1160, 890. 1215. V. Demorest, 218. V.Essex Public Road Board,- T. Des Moines, 99, 100, 103, 1308. 532, 735. V. Dexter, etc. R. Co., 111. V.Eureka, etc. Co., 759. V. Diamond Valley, etc. Co., V. Bvansvllie- Sav. Bank, 836. 603, 623. V. Ewing, 381, 564, 874. V. Dielenschneider, 347. V. Express Co., 2, 4. V. Dlerberger, 431. V. Fagan, 191. V. Dimond, 1523. V. Falk, 803. V. District, 432. V. Falkinberge, 88. V. District. Court, 48, 70, 363, V. Falkinburge, 792, 1408. 375, 432, 530, 531, 639 684, V. Farmer, 597, 740, 748. 1165, 1168, 1192, 1212, 1218, V. Farmers' Bank, 405, 682. 1222, 1250, 1251, 1257, 1258, V. Farmers', etc. National Bank, 1259, 1263, 1269, 1273, lS2(i. 897. V. Dodge County, 779. V. Famey, 486, 940, 1370. V. Dodge County Board, 779, V. Farrier; 436. 1359. V. Fernandez, 1104. V. Dodge County Com'rs, 1238. V. Ferris, 33, 324, 325, 758. V. Doherty, 514. V. Field, 174, 1107. V. Donnelly, 909. V. Fifth Circuit Judges, 546. V. Doon, 15, 1134. V. Findley, 1324, 1326. , V. Douglas County Com'rs, 314. V. Fisk Univ., 351.. V. Douglass, 473. v.Flavell, 45, 376. V. Downing, 1408. V. Fleming, 18, 831, 1113. V. Downing, 1120. V. Flower, 550. V.Drake, 626, 784. ■ V. Foley, 181, 206, 922, 1054. V. Dressel, 921, 922. V. Fo:ftune, 785. V. Duffy, 201. V.Foster, 77, 1095, 1096, 1120, V. Dugan, 990, 1011. 1142, 1147. V. Dulle, 355, 1477. V. Fournet, 1350. v.Duluth & I. R. Co., 113, 305, V. Fowler, 1128.' 306. V. Fragiacano, 838. V. Duluth Gas & Water Co. 677. V. Frame, 1137, 1138. V. Duluti Gas, etc. Co., 273 ,306, V. Franklin, 750. 684, 687. V. Franklin Co., 549. V.Duncan, 878, 1107. V.Franklin Sugar R. Co., 656. V. Dunn, 1407, 1408. V. Franks, 1119. V. Dupre, 347, 348. V. Frappart, 1115. , V. Duryea, 580. V. Frazier, 52, 844, 1278, 1345. V. Eastern Social, etc. Club, V. Freeman, 1145. 1114. V.French, 75, 79, 170, 313, 321, V. Eckendorf , 348, 357, 360 . 1142. V. Eddy, 965. 969. V. Frost, 911. V. Edgar, 741. V. Fuldner, 779. V. Edgefield, 1358. V. Fuller, 359, 365, 1167, 1206, V.Edgefield Com'rs, 1366. 1218, 1221. V. Edwards, 785, 786. V. FuUerton, 494, 842, 881, 1441. V. Egan, 531. v.Fyler, 1362, 1366, 1371, 1381. V. Elizabeth, 357, 376, 531, 748, v.Pylpaa, 496, 1054. 1174, 1179, 1183, 1218, 1258. V. Gadsen County, 581. V.Ellis, 776, 1406. V. GafCney, 264, 267. CXOVIU TABLE OF CASES. State V. Garbrowski, 292. V. Gary, 1522. V. Gaston, 133. V. Gates, 570. V. Gayhart, 993, 1041. v.Gaylord, 443, 652, 773, 776, 1396. V.Georgia Co., 18, 19, 830, 831. V. Georgia R. Co., 111. v.Gerhardt, 107, 1150. V. Gibbs, 1119. ' V. Gibson, 842. V. Gillikln, 4B1. V. Godfrey, 985. V. Godwin, 321. V. Goetze, 152. V. Gold Mining, etc. Co., 765. V. Gordon, 954. V. Gorham, 153. V. Gorman, 35, 307, 380. V. Gosper County Com'rs, 590, 592. V. Gracey, 344. V.Graham, 200, 492, 980. V. Great Falls, 122, 1365. V.Green, 454, 1108, 1484. V. Griftner, 264. V. Guilbeau, 1330. V. Gurney, 1522. V. Haben, 203, 227, 230, 1306, 1435. y. Hackensack Imp. Co., 1238. v. Hager,-556. V. Hagood, 546. V. Hahn, 701. V. Haight, 7, 376, 652, 1406. V. Halden, 1035, 1037, 1040, 1041, 1371. V.Halifax, 16, 1128. V. Halliday, 142, 756. V. Halter, 7, 8, 621. V.Hamilton, 220, 621, 688, 838, 843. V. Hamlin, 33, 300. V. Hamlin Univ., 265, 350. V. Hancock, 366, 368, 376, 864. V.Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 344, 362, 367, 448, 487, 561, 564, 578, 605, 611, 647, 695, 697, 698, 780, 787, 840, 845, 892, 1383, 1519. V.Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 312, 355, 400. V. Hardcastle, 572, 576. *- V. Hardin, 606. V. Harland, 1273. V.Harney, 1329, 1336. V.Harper, 790, 1040, 1333. V. Harrington, 68. V. Harris,, 219, 479, 1334. 1365. V. Harshaw, 366. V. Hathorn, 1339. State V. Hawkins, 780, 790. V. Hay, 251, 1145. v.Hayne, 1105, 1108, 1151. V. Haynes, 786. V. Hays, 191. V. Heman, 492, 511. V.Henderson, 33, 312, 380, 548, 859. V. Herman, 493. V. Hernan, 18. V. Hernando Ins. Co., 371, 404. V. Herod, 1139, 1141, 1148. V. Herrald, 1358. V. Herron, 1350. V. Hibernia Ins. Co., 701. V. Hicks, 1064. V.Hill, 502, 838, 905, 1339. V. Hipp, 1115, 1137. V. Him, 347. V. Hobe, 1373. V. Hoboken, 1141. V. Hodges, 1522. V. Hodgoli, 1119. V. Hoffman, 251. V. Holden, 1026. V. Holliday, 289, 553. V. Holmes, 1117, 1150. V.Holt County Court, 593. V.Hood, 373, 407. V. Hopper, 785. V. Horacek, 1114. V. Horner, 1380. V. Housatonic R. Co., 358. V. Houston, 1018, 1333. V. Howard, 606. V. Howard County Court, 659. V. Howland, 1407. V. Howran, 35. V. Hoyt, 75, 78, 171, 260, 448, 614, 1383. V. Hudson, 1226. V. Hudson Av. Com'rs, 46. V. Hudson City, 1409. V. Hudson County Com'rs, 780, , 785. V. Huftaker, 900. V. Hugg, 1362. V. Humphreys, 586. V. Hunt, 1112, 1141. V. Hunter, 136, 894, 897, 1522. v.Hurt, 730, 761, 840, 874, 892. V. Hutchinson, 874. V. Hynes, 650, 659, 1385. V. Illinois Central R. Co., 699. V. Illyes, 45. V. Indianapolis, 290. V. Insurance Co., 702, 703. V. Irons, 663. V. Irvin, 321, 471, 474, 1097, 1101. V. Irwin, 177. V. Jackson, 8, 131, 134, 597. V.Jacksonville, 1362, 1366. TABLE OF CASES. CXCIX state ,e V. Jersey City, 363, 376, 389. State 398, 399, 480, 500, 533, 553, V. 556, 606, 629, 632, 657, 734, V. 776, 903, 1131, 1183, 1201, V. 1202, 1241, 1252, 1258, 1274, V. 1401, 1409. V. V. Jervey, 1478. V.Johnson, 465, 763, 803, 1031, V. 1115, 1116. V. V.Johnston, 23, 349, 641. V. V.Jones, 58, 93, 164, 321, 324. V. 388, 389,' 570, 664, 665, 688, V. 690, 756, 962. V. Jordan, 998, 1002, 1370. V. V.Judges, 1201. V. V. Justices, 1149. V. V. Kannon, 921. V. Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. V. Co., 588. V. V. Keaough, 486. V. V. Kearney, 526. V. V. Kelly, 103. V. V. Kennington, 1366. V. v.Kenrick, 664, 667, 845. V. Keokuk & W. R. Co., 216. V. v.Kidd, 87, 357, 447, 608, 645. V. V. King, 1047. V. v.Kingsland, 1406, 1410. V. V. Kinkead, 476. v.Kipp, 580,979. V. V. Kirby, 1401. V. V. Klein, 259. V. V. Knox & L. R. Co., 503. V. V. Koster, 106. 574. V. V. Krollman, 352, 361. V. V. La Crosse, 1406. V. V. Lagarde, 152. V. V. Lake, 1342. V. V. Lakeside Land Co., 306, 365, V. 385, 547, 891. V. V.Lancaster, 168, 952, 1370. V. V. Lancaster Co., 35. V. V. Landis, 521. V. V. Landis T'p, 928. V. V. Lange, 354. V. V. Lanier, 1333. V. V. Lantz, 526, 647. V. V. Laramie County Com'rs, 9f)8. V. V. Lathrop, 298. V. V. Lauer, 621. V. v.Law, 803, 860. V. V. Lawler, 780, 1408. V. V. Lean, 481. V. V. Leaphart, 1435. V. V. Leavell, 621. V. V. Leavenworth, 1435. V. V. Lee, 1106, 1119. V. V. Leester, 376. V. v.Leffingwell, 98, 99, 102, 210, V. , 228, 1168, 1311. V. V. Le^rgett, 667. V. V. L'Engle, 173. V. V. Lesueur, 677. . Levee Com'rs, 264. . Lewis, 433. . Lewis Co., 9, 1192, 1218, 1220. . Lien, 779. .Linden Hotel Co., 320, 340, 782. . Linn County, 425. .Lippels, 443, 785. . Lippincott, 647. . Lockyear, 1114. .London & N. W. Am. Mortg. Co., 273, 652, 1387. . Lott, 1331. .Lounsberry, 490, 526, 764. .Love, 318, 630, 632, 781, 784, 1384. .Loveless, 858, 1285. . Low, 810. . Lowenthall, 1339. . Lutz, 1478. .Lyon, 352, 361. . Macon County Court, 175, 472, 1435. .Magill, 978, 1370. . Maginnis, 1176. . Maguire, 594. .Maine Cent. R. Co., 680, 695, 696. . Maloney, 840, 892. . Manchester, 1406. . Manchester & L. R., 685. .Mann, 33, 341, 380. . Manning, 1410. , Mansfield, 376. . Manz, 901, 907. . Maple, 1026. . Marion County, 908. . Marvin, 844. , Mathe, 1326. .Mathews, 660, 1336. .Maxwell, 384, 385. . May, 905. .Mayhew, 52, 1374. .Maysville, 468, 1364. . McAllister, 839. . McBride, 554, 1343, 1347. . McCahn, 201. . McCausland, 650, 662. . McChesney, 616. . McClurg, 1407. . McCrillus, 1365. . McDonald, 1054. . McFarland, 433. .McFetridge, 684, 1121. . McGinly, 491. .McGinnis, 151, 547. . McGrath, 349. ■ Mcintosh, 580, 1333. . McLaughlin, 1432. .McNally, 347, 1477. .Mplroy, 647, 670. cc TABLE OF OASE& State ,e V. Memphis & C. R. Co., 429, 1229, 1233, 1254, 1257, 1259, 492, 836. 1261, 1406, 1407. V. Mercer, 1114. State V. New Brunswick, 1244, 1251. V. Merchants' Bank, 709, 841, V.New Orleans, 121, 122, 123, 893. 176, 496, 611, 1189. 1299, V. Messer, 536. 1364, 1365, 1367. V. Metropolitan St. R. Co., 694, v. New York, 164. ^ 699. V. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., v.Metz, 251. 18, 397, 700, 787, 836. V.Meyer, 831, 838, 1384. V.New York Yearly Meeting, V.Meyers, 776, 785. 349. V.Miami County, 635, 1351. V.Nolan, 504. 1146. V.Middlesex County School- v.Nord, 485, 993, 1034, 1037. Dlst. Trustees, 568, 580. ► V. Norris, 169. V. Miles, 741. V. North, 168, 343. V.Miller, 115, 1109. V. Northern Belle, etc. Co., 783, V. Mills, 363. 842. V. Milwaukee, 1362. . V. Northern Central R. Co., 107, V. Mining Co., 488, 526, 841. 302, 370. V. Mipneapolis & N. Elevator V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 369, Co., 605. 374, 627. 684. V. Minneapolis City Council, V. Northern Trust Co., 618. 478. v.Northville Savings Bank. 18. V. Minnesota Central R. Co., T. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co., 375. 375, 684, 872. 874. V. Minton, 367. V.Norton, 841, 901, 921, 1271. V. Mission Free School, 350, 634. V.Norwich &W. R. Co., 379. V. Mississippi River Bridge Co., T. Norwood, 512. 185, 564, 695, 731. V. Noyes, 102. V.Missouri Pac. R. Co.. 173, V.O'Hara, 297, 298, 1144. 174, 313, 502, 699, 1392. T. Olson, 921. V. Mitchell, 1515. V.Omaha, 563, 1256. V. Mobile, 48. V. Ormsby County, 778, 1379. V.Montague, 1329, 1334. V. Orvis, 570. V. Montclair, etc. R. Co., 523. V. Osawkee, 196. V.Montgomery, 80, 153, 300, V. Osawkee T'p, 181, 204. 301. V. Osborn, 314, 754. 1352. V.Moore, 135, 322, 635. V. Otis, 1216, 1239. V. Morrell, 1147. V. Owsley, 614. V. Morris, 110, 126, 1400. V. Padden, 575. V.Morrison, 1001, 1083, 1109, V.Parker, 113, ,177, 261, 343, 1151. 357, 616, 702, 1380. 1408. V. Moss, 900. V. Parsons, 144. V. Mote, 1523. V. Passaic, 470, 531, 1221. ■ V. Mudgett, 1198. v.Paterson, 48, 1219, 1407. V. Mullica Committee, 604. V. Peirce County, 1360. V. Multnomah County, 559, 908. V. Peltier, 1032. V. Murphy, 922. V. Perrine, 1350. V.Nashville & D. R. Co., 610, V. Person, 674. 694. ' V. Peterson, 905. V.Nashville, C. etc. R. Co., 376. V. Pettit, 647. V. Nashville Sav, Bank, 1107. V. Petway, 404. .v.Neis, 1114. V. Phalen, 1151. V.Nelson, 1372, 1500. V.Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 12. V.Nelson County, 204. 302, 679. V.Neosho Bank, 490, 1383. V.Phillips, 479, 480, 481, 536, V. Newark, 10, 111, 115, 131, 319, , 544. 355, 363, 364, 365, 376, 405, V.Phillips County, 599. 484, 495, 503, 511, 512, 526. V. Piazza, 19. 528, 530, 549, 591, 731, 748, V. Pierson, 438, 753. 827, 869, 931, 1132, 1155, v.Pillsbury, 62, 69, 631, 1192, 1165, 1174, 1182, 1206, 1216, 1219. 1241. 1256. TABLE OF OASES OCl state V. Pinckney, 144, 1120. State V. Rushing, 1331, 1340. V. Plainfleld, 526, 592. 853. V.Rutherford, 1403. V. Planters' F. & M. Ins. Co., V. Saalman, 106, 574, 792. 115, 844. V. Sack, 885. v. Police Com'rs, 1297. V. Sadler, 491, 759, 883, 1381. , V. Police Jury, 1311, 1350, 1363. V, Sage, 137, 752, 842, 880, 900. 1367. V. St. Joseph's Convent, 313. V. Pool, 17. 847. V. St. Louis, 549, 1209. v.Pors, 493, 497, 498, 657. V. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 563, V.' Portage, 420, 1130, 1225, 1262. 599, 698, 798. V.Powell, 1326. 1340. V. St. Louis Club, 1114. V. Powers, 349, 371, 402, 1379, V. St. Louis County, 697. 1406. V.St. Louis County Court, 228, v.Pownell, 1400, 1404. 1408. T. Poynter, 314, 315. T. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 22, 494, V. Prettyman, 1114. 571. V. Pullman Palace Car Co ,157. V. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 369," 637. V. Quaife, 1407. V. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 374, 390. V. Racine, 1362. V. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 376. V. Railway, 1361. , V.St. Paul Trust Co., 465, 489, V. Railroad Co., 165, 357, 370, 615, 618, 673, 689. 571. V. St. Paul Union Depot Co<5 -V. Railroad Com'rs, 269. 684. V. Railroad Corporations, 330. y. Saline County Court, 1432. V. Raine, 771, 776, 785. V. Sanderson, 1432. V. Rainey, 49, 1362. V. Sargeant, 948. 'v. Rkmsey, 371. V. Savage, 1354. V. Rand, 646, 647. V. Savings Co., 299. V. Randolph, 383, 758. V. Schaack, 1030. V. Rankin, 152. V. Schlier, 333, 418. v. Rapp, 1182. V. Schnecko, 1372. V. Rau, 801, 884. V. Schonhausen, 1123. V. Recorder, 263, 979, 980. V. School District, 1363. V. Red River Valley Elevator V. Schooley, 486, 760. Co., 634, 639, 663. ' V. Scott, 151, 840, 892. ' V.Redwood Falls Building & V. Scottish-American Mortg. Co., Loan Association, 272, 9Q, 91. 647. V. Seaboard & R. Co., 413. v.Reed, 616, 1372, 1383, 1468. V. Seaborn, 486, 614, 761, 763. TT. Reeves, 561. V. Segoine, 600, 1383. V. Register of Deeds, 904. V. Seibert, 1326. V. Reimenschneider, 257, V. Severance, 18, 502, 504, 693, V. Reinmund, 703. 694, 697, 779, 836. -ir.Rels, 1159, 1178. V. Sharp, 321. V. Renshaw, 840. V. Shaw, 655. V. Reynolds, 616. V. Sheldon, 582, 623, 650, 776. V. Rhyne, 1116, 1120. V. Shortridge, 175. TT. Rice, 415, 1350. V. Shreveport, 122, 1368. V. Richards, 319, 503. V. Shurts, 647. V. Richardson, 949. V. Sickles, 106, 561, 674. V.Richland, 218. V. Sies, 1H4. TT. Roberts, 1141. V. Silvers, 765. V. Robertson, 363. V. Silverthorne, 352. v. Robinson, 208. V.Simmons, 373, 390, 600, 611. V. Robyn, 838. V. Sinks, 1137. V. Rodecker, 1118. V. Sioux City & St. P. R. Co., V. Rollins, 485, 939. 368. V.Rose, 563, 654. T. Slavens, 1362'. v. Ross,. 85, 97, 350, 1406. V. Sloss, 499, 603, 685, 840. V. Hoyse, 1366. V.Smith, 26, 90, 91, 103, 470, V. Runyon, 388, 493, 631, 652, 716, 786, 1026, 1035, 1094, 659. V. Sned^ker, 1404. con TABLE OF OASES. State V. Snoddy, 153. State V.Snyder, 17, 19, 830, 836, 839, V. 847, 893, 894, 963, 1028. V. Society, 380. V. V. South Orange, 533. V. V. South Penn. Oil Co., 46, 50, V. 598, 636. V. Southern Cotton Oil Co., V. 1404. V. V. Southern R. Co., 173, 548. V. V. Southwestern R. Co., 698. V. Spencer, 629. V. Sponaugle, 52, 54, 526, 860, V. 933, 962, 1084. V. V. Springer, 776, 782, 1405, 1408. V. V. Squires, 512. V. V. Staats, 663. V. V. Stadler, 1383. V. V. Staley, 1372. V. V. State Assessors, 1400. V. V; State Board, 94, 158, 379, 547, V. 617, 639, 785. V. V. State Board of Equal., 623. V. State Tax Collector, 785, V. 1393, 1430. V. V. Steamship Co., 18. • V. V. Stearns, 306. V. V. Stephens, 10, 89, 163, 172, 413, V. 1109, 1117. V. V. Sterling, 399, 706, 1150. V. T. Stevenson, 264; V. V. Stone, 548. V. V. Stonewall Ins. Co., 689. V. V. Strader, 586. V. V. Street, 173. V. V. Stutz, 1152. V. V. Swann, 66, 860. V. V. Switzler, 34, 83, 181, 182, 185, V. 186,- 204, 312, 386, 496, 667, 1336. V. V. Taggart, 830. V. Talley, 555, 766. V. V. Tappan, 182. V. V. Tappin, 669, 1307. V. V. Tavenner, 734, 860. V. V. Taylor, 732, 1351, 1367. V. V. Tax Collector, 779, 1515. V. V.Tennessee Coal, etc. Co., 651, V. 674,758. V. V.Tennessee Coal, I. & R. Co., V. 487, 838, 841, 843. V.Thayer, 345, 751, 752. V. V. Thomas, 1, 336, 404, 482, 599, 652, 758, 776, 785, 828. V. V. Thomas Cruse Savings Bank, V. 133, 314. V. V.Thompson, 581, 598, 634, 727, y. 764, 861, 863, 1371. V. V. Thorne, 429, 778 V. V. Tilley, 1112. V. V. Tittman, 836, 837, 838. V. Tolan, 436. T. V. Toledo, 217. , Tomahawk Common Council^ 1, 8, 117, 446, 553, 588. . Topeka, 16, 17, 11^5. . Town Council, 176, 357, 585. . Township Committee, 259, 260. . Tracy, 413, 1117, 1358. .Traders' Bank, 298. . Travelers' Ins. Co., 18, 27, 65,. 77, 80, 92, 93, 170, 179, 258. 281, 282, 702, 834, 836, 1387. . Treasurer, 1373. .Trenton, 318, 388. .Tucker, 135, 269, 330, 331.' . Tufts, 497. 1027. .Tunis, 372, 396, 4Q1. . Twin Lake^ 1404. .Union, 511, 741, 747, 1209. . Union, etc. Bank, 108. .United States, 680. . United States, etc. Express - Co., 6, 316. . Vaile, 747, 748, 775,' 785. , Vanderbilt, 525. . Van Every, 507, 592, 827. .Vansyckle, 90, 91, 571, 758. . Van Winkle, 571. . Vaughan, 199. . Veile, 774. . Viator, 1331. . Vicksburg Bank, 842, 844. . Virginia, 901. . Virginia & T. R. Co\, 685, 699.. . Volkman, 298. .Wabash, 495, 521, 598. . Wabash R. Co., 746, 750. .Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co.,. 563, 792. .Wabash, St. L,. etc. R. Co.,. 200, 362, 471. . Wade, 1337, 1338. .Wagener, 77, 167, 1125, 1147- . Walker, 550, 1124. . Walton, 1334. . Wapello County, 214, 585. . Ward, 841. 880. . Warford, 251. . Washer, 251. . Washoe County, 477, 772, 785_ 1405. . Waterville Savings Bank, 22,- 500. . Webber, 369. . Weed, 1477. . Weir, 174. ; Welch, 622, 901. . Weld, 808, 904, 1354. .Werner, 962. .West Duluth Land Co., 104,. 480, 487, 1383. . West Hoboken, 1256. TABLE OF CASES. CCllI state V. Western, etc. R. Co., 368. V. Western R. Co., 375. V. Western Union, etc. Co., 231, 300. V. Western Union Tel. Co., 6, 181, 718, 891. V. Weyerhauser, 60, 65, 305, 493, 631. V. Wheeler, 1311. V. Whittlesey, 60, 338, 492, 497, 548, 844, 1008, 1311. v.Whitworth,'l371. V. Wilberts' Sons L. & S. Co., 348. V. Wilcox, 1097. V. Wilson, 372. V. Willard, 660, 1381. T.Williams, 97, 82, 98, 239, 836. V. Williamson, 117. V. Willingham, 151,' 260, 261, ' 342. v.Williston, 735, 966. V. Wingfield, 882. V. Winn, 988. " V. Winona & St. P. L. Co., 456. V. Wise, 526. V. Wolfrum, 621. V. Womble, 185, 321. V. Wood, 778. V. Woodbridge, 744, 1025. V. Woodhouse, 568. V. Woodruff, 357. v.Woodside, 1324, 1329, 1334, 1480. V. Workingmen's Building, etc. Assoc, 290. V. Worth, 174, 1115. V. Wray, 775, 776. V.Wright, 117, 381. v.Yearby, 1108, 1117. V. Yellow Jacket S. M. Co., 1, 17, 18, 19. State Assessors v. Morris & E. R. Co., 375. State Auditor v. Jackson Co., 275, 447, 480, 484, 762, 775, 788, 1009. State Bank v. Bank of Smyrna, 111. V. Board of Revenue, 716. V.Madison, 379, 1362. V. People, 110, 288. V. Richmond, 371, 706. State Board v. Central R. Co., 317, 319, 686, 693, 697. V. Holliday, 546. V. Paterson, ll6. V. Paterson & R. R. Co., 367. State Board of Education v. Aber- deen, 1300, 1435. State Board of Equalization v. Peo- ple, 1357. State Board of Tax Com'rs v. Holli- day, 8, 9. State Center v. Barenstein, 1119. State ex rel. Ranger v. New Or- leans, 1368. State Exchange Bank v. Parkers- burg, 707. State Land Office Com'r v. Auditor- General, 1463. State Lottery v. New Orleans, 110. State Nat. Bank v. Carson, 1425. State Street Lighting Dist. v. Drummond, 239. State Tax Com'rs v. Board of As- sessors, 788. V. Cady, 777. V. Grand Rapids Assessors, 429,, 778. V. Quinn, 443, 601, 777. State Treasurer v. Auditor-General, 370. V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 134, 166. V. Somerville & E. R. Co., 376. V. Wright, 15. State Trust Co, v. Chehalis County,. 650, 654, 728. Staten v. Savannah, 466. Staunton v. Harris, 816. V. Mary Baldwin Sem., 351, 1421. V. Stout's Ex'rs, 664. Stayton v. Hulings, 491. Stead's Ex'rs v. Course, 916,' 923, 953. Stead's Lessee v. Course, 1004. Steam Forge Co. v. Anderson, 1179. Steam Navig. Co. v. Wasco County, 1468. Steamer Block v. Richland,- 159, 1120. Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 155, 156. V. Portwardens, 146. V. Tinker, 147. Stearns v. Miller, 386, 617, 1474. V.Minnesota, 110, 115, 137, 306. Stearns County v. Smith, 889. Stears v. Hollenback, 965. Steaurt v. Baltimore, 1247. Stebbins v. Challis, 745, 1441. V.Guthrie, 984, 1064. V.Kay, 486, 795, 1157, 1218, 1244. V. King, 761. Steckert v. East Saginaw, 579, 1206. Steedman v. Planters' Bank, 1008. Steel V. Fell, 270. - Steele y. Murray, 1038. V. Spruance, 1064. Steen v. Beatrice, 266. Steenberg v. People, 1273. Steeple v. Downing. 1012. Steere v. Walling, 633. <3C1V TABLE OF CASES. Stegeman v. Faulkner, 987. Steiff T. Hartwell, 604. Stein V. Mobile, 102, 112, 637, 1128. Steiner v. Coxe, 1052. V. Franklin County, 1430. V. Sullivan, 71, 226, 227, 236, 242, 258, 306. Staines v. Franklin County, 1437. Stell V. Watson, 761, 782. Stengel v. Preston, 1214. Stenson v. Kempton, 469. Steplian t. Daniels, 514, 521, 1505, 1508. Stephens v. Booneville, 664. V. Holmes, 985, 1051. V. Spokane, 1282. V. Wilkins, 794, 795, 1482. Stephenson v. Martin, 1019. V. Salem, 1520. V. "Wilson, 1086. Stephenson Supervisors v. Manny, 1489. Sterling v. Gait, 1187, 1245, 1258. Sterling, etc. Co. v. Harvey, 594. Sterling Gas Co. v. Higby, 1461. Stetson V. Bangor, 112.' V. Freeman, 1020. V. Kempton, 218, 472, 546, 590, 1469. Steuart v. Meyers, 932, 1453, 1455. Stevens v. Brown, 445. V. Cassady, 1029. V. Hay, 1328. V. Johnson, 1091. V. MdNamara, 914'. V. Melcher, 819. V. Miller, 820. V. Murphy, 1042. V. Newcomb, 1471. V. New York & O. M. R. Co., 269, 829, 1423. v.New York, etc. R. Co., 663. V. Paulsen, 881, 935, 987, 1022. V. Rutland, 1431. V. Rutland, etc. R. Co., 1437. V. State, 1145. V. Williams, 941. Stevens County v. St. Paul, M. & N. R. Co., 374. Stevenson v. Bay City, 1339. V. Black, 886, 897, 899. Steward v. Jefferson, 97, 102. V. Schoenfelt, 516. Stewart v. Allison, 887, 1124, 1485. V. Chase, 1467. V. Collier, 284. V. Commissioners, 1515. y. Corbin. 346,1062. V. Coulter, 750, 896, 992. V. Davis, 357. V. Elliott, 965, 969- V. Flummerfelt, 723. Stewart v. Hawley, 1466. V. Hoboken, 1403. V. Hovey, 1419. V.Kansas Town Co., 586. v.McSweeny, 1008,, 1016. V. Maple, 1383. v. Minneapolis, 983. V. Potts, 1105, 1106. V. St. Clair County Court, 1368. T. Schoenfelt, 735, 743. V. Stringer, 445, 446. V.Trevor, 516, 627, 724, 725, 726, 1082. Stickney v. Bangor, 1470. V. Huggins, 489. V. Orford, 562. Stieff V. Hartwell, 952, 989, 994, 1002. Stierlin v. Daley, 996, 997, 1017. Stifel V. Brown, 769, 1228, 1276. Stiles V. Guthrie, 1432. Stille V. Schull, 1015. Stilwell V. Corwin, 270, 768. Stilz V. Indianapolis, 247, 252, 730, 1441. StlUwell V. Brammell, 993, 1036, 1038, 1042. Stinson v. Boston, 660, 662. V. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co., 70, 813, 1045. V. Crosby, 823. V. Richardson, 968. V. Smith, 1191. V. Snow, 4^5, 446. Stipp V. Brown, 1093. Stockdale v. Ii^surance Co., 512. Stockholders v. Board of Supervis- ors, 658. Stockholders of Bank v. Abingdon, 93. Stockle V. Silsbee, 8, 230, 433, 436, 437, 448, 479, ,956. Stockman v. Robbins, 606. Stockton V. Clark,, 1251. V. Dunham, 728. V. Railroad Co., 95. V. Staples, 644. V. Skinner, 1251. V. Western F. & M. Ins. Co., 840. V. Whitmore, 1239. Stockton, etc. R. Co. v. Stockton, 181. Stockton Savings, etc. Assoc, v. Harold, 821. Stockwell V. State, 963. V. Vietch, 1514. Stoddard v. Johnson, 1212, 1274. Stoelzel V. Jackson, 724. Stokes V. Allen, 992, 1036, 1091. V. State, 870. V. Scott County, 214. Stone V. Bean, 590. TABLE OF OASES. CC¥ Stone v. Bank of Commerce, 112, 116. V. Bank of Kentucky, 1495. V. Cliarlestown, 252. V. Louisville, 611, 788. V.Mississippi, 108, 109, 114, 1150. V. School District, 572. V. Stone, 1044. V. Viele, 1408. T. Woodbury County, 1398, 1492. Stone Co. v. Woodard, 463. Stoner v. Bitters, 835. V. Flournoy, 248. Storm V. Odell, 1402. Storm Lake Bank v. Buena Vista County, 921. Storrie v. Houston City St. R. Co., 115, 1201, 1234. Storrs V. Utica, 1306. Stotesbury v. United States, 1399. Stoudenmire v. Brown, 1007, 1008. Stout V. Coates, 524, 889, 931, 982, 1040. V. Keyes, 987. V. Mastln, 1000, 1001. V. Merrill, 1030. Stoutenburg v. Hennick, 148, 152. Stoutz V. Brown, 136. Stovall V. Austin, 871. V. Connor, 764. V. Fowler, 1091, 1092. Stover V. Mitchell, 1500. Stowe V. Stowe, 505, 1506. Stowell V. Austin, 962. Strachan v. Brown, 1402. Strafford v. Union Bank, 1353. Strand v. Philadelphia, 1172. Strang v. Burrls, 1029. Strassheim v. Jerman, 877. Stratford v. City Council, 152. Stratton v. Collins, 317, 398. Straub v. Gordon, 1095, 1143, 1145. Strauch v. Shoemaker, 511, 743. Straus v. Head, 945. Strauss v. McAllister, 1001. v. Pontlac, 251. Straw V. Poor, 905, 953. Street V. Columbus, 129, 247, 265, 941. Street Lighting Dist. v. Drummond, 440. Street R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 473. Streight v. Durham, 62, 631, 776, 1447. Strenna v. Montgomery City Coun- cil, 1441. Striker v. Kelly, 492, 579, 1006. Strickland v. Stillwater, 1266, 1489. Strode v. Commonwealth, 33, 132. V. Washer, 508, 735, 1011. 1012, 1017. Stroebel v. Seeger, 1009. Strohm v. Iowa City, 1436. Strong V. Burdlck, 972. Strosser v. Fort Wayne, 1521. Strother v. Batton, 1458. V. Reilly, 1022, 1064. Stroud V. Philadelphia, 1130, 1218.. Strough v. Supervisors, 551. Strout V. Portland, 1247, 1518. v. Port H!uron, 1517. Strusburgh v. New York, 1395,. 1449. Stuart V. Commonwealth, 636. V.Kalamazoo, 199, 1299, 1439. V. Palmer, 52, 181, 419, 626, 628,- 632, 633, 1239. V. School Dist., 8. Stubblefield v. Borders, 975, 1092. Studabaker v. Studabaker, 1426,. 1440, 1442. Stull V. De Mattos, .338, 1106, 1140, 1142. V. Moore, 1042. Sturdevant v. Mather, 970. Sturges V. Carter, 371, 492, 493, 511. Sturgls V. Crowninshield, 126, 450, 829, 830. Stutsman County v. Wallace, 921. Stuyvesant v. New York, 584. Styles V. Weir, 936. Suffolk Sav. Bank v. Common- wealth, 707. Sullivan v. Collins, 1070. v. Davis, 750, 920, 921. V. Donnell, 921, 922, 998, V. Eddy, 1041. V. Merriam, 1022. V. Peckham, 765, 1354. V. State, 637. V. Van Kirk L. & C. Co., 137. V. Walton, 582. Sully V. Drennan, 582. V. Poorbaugh, 1022. Summers v. Kanawha County, 961.. V. Ward, 913. Sumner v. Dorchester, 1468, 1488,. 1494. V. Gardiner, 426, 853. V. Pinney, 19. V. St. Paul, 1437. Sumter Co. v. National Bank, 131. Sunbury & Erie R. Co. v. Cooper,. 191, 192. Sun Flower L. & M. Co. v. Watts, 1005. Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Board of Liqui- dation, 200. V. New York, 405, 702. V. Searles, 907, 1097. Supervisors v. Birdsall, 806. v.Bowen, 806. V.Davenport, 653, 662. v. Durant, 1362. • -CCVl TABLE OF CASES. .Supervisors v. Galbralth, 576. V. Kelly, 393, 406. V. People, 414. V. Powell, 1351, 1372. V. Railroad Co., 172. V. Rees, 488, 1339. V. Rogers, 1374. V. Stanley, 715. V. Uu-ied States, 467, 478, 1362. -Supervisors of Will Co. v. People, 212, 230. Suppiger v. People, 239. Surget V. Newman, 734, 861, 863, 1076. * Susquehanna Bank v. Broome Su- pervisors, 1403, 1434. V.Broome County, 1411. V. Supervisors, etc., 1401. Sutherland v. Brooklyn, 952. -V. Governor, 427. Sutherland-Innes Co. v. Bvart, 181. Sutton V. Calhoun, 936. V. Nelson, 952. V. School Dlst, 1236. V. Stone, 996, 1092. •Sutton Manuf. Co. v. Sutton, 527. •Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 4, 381, 1161, 1182. , Suydamv. Keys, 1470. V. Merrick County, 785. Swain v, Fulmer, 1227. Swallow V. Thomas, 660. Swamp-Land Dist. v. Silva, 1263. V. Silver, 8. Swan V. Harvey, 993, 1043, 1045. v. Knoxville, 880. V. Rainey, 820. V. State, 381, 1329. V. Whaley, 987, 1037. V. Williams, 99. Swan Point Cemetery v. Tripp, 354. Swann v. Cumberland, 1408. V. Kidd, 182. Swanson v. Ball, 1335. Sweat V. Boston, etc. R. Co., 131. Sweeley v. Van Steenburgh, 1042. Sweet V. Boyd, 1441. Sweeter v. Hay, 1327, 1328. Sweigle v. Gates, 480, 483, 599, 727, 930, 936, 1081. Swenson v. Greenland, 840, 855, 884. V. McLaren, 1413. V. Mynair, 807. Swift V. Agnes, 974. V.Newport, 246, 247, 467. V. Poughkeepsie, 1383, 1401, 1405, 1492. V. Williamsburg, 1281. Swinney v. Beard, 1418, 1424. Swords V. Baillio, 297, 298. Sydnor v. Palmer, 510, 1085. ;Sydow v. Territory, 151. T. Taaffee v. Downes, 1465. Tabb V. Commonwealth, 871. Taber v. Ferguson, 1244, 1245, 1253, 1254, 1278, 1516. T. Grafmiller, 247, 1167, 1246. V. New Bedford, 1408. V.Wilson, 438, 784. Tabler v. Callanan, 1073. Tabor v. Cook, 1457. Tacey v. Irwin, 802, 808. Tacoma Bituminous Pav. Co. v. Sternberg, 1282. Tacoma L. Co. v. Pierce County Com'rs, 503. Tacoma Land Co: v. Tacoma, 531, 1515. Taft V. Barrett, 536, 591, 793, 930. V. McCullock, 761, 791, 1080< V. Wood, 587, 723, 1471. Tainter v. Lewis, 773. Talbot V. Dent, 215, 1522. V. Hudson, 183. Talbot County Com'rs v. County Com'rs of Queen Anne, 253. Talbott V. Board, 131. V. County Com'rs, 713, 717. Talbutt V. State, 152. Talcott V. Noel, 1275. Talfener v. Dillard, 923. Tallahassee Manuf. Co. v. Glenn, 1460. V. Spigener, 1425. Tallant v. Burlington, 1492, 1519. Tallmadge tt. Supervisors, 785. Tallman v. Butler County, 9, 10, 418. V. Cook, 574, 793. V. Janesville, 527. V. Treasurer, 258. V. White, 466, 468, 556, 747, 827, 1005, 1006. Tampa v. Kaunitz, 344, 382, 384, 426, 440, 500, 790, 1397. V. Mugge, 281, 526, 600, 601, 774, 776, 1425, 1431, 1443, 1446, 1462, 1515. Tanner v. Albion, 1145. V. Page, 17. , Tapp V. Bonds, 968. Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 93, 716. Tarbell v. Central Pacific R. Co., 6. Tarde v. Benseman, 1123. Tarr v. Haughey, 1050. Tarver v. Commissioners, 1365. Tash V. Adams, 210, 1515. Tate V. Board of Trustees, 572, 584. Tatem v. Wright, 95, 405. Tatum V. Trenton, 1497. Tax Court v. Gill, 389, 402. TABLE OF OASES. CCVll 'Tax Court v. Grand Lodge, 355. V. Railroad Co., 501, 639, 674. V. Western, etc. R. Co., 502, 698. V. Zion's Cliurch, 354. Taylor v. Avon T'p, 1492. V. Board of Health, 98, 1300, 1497. V. Boyd, 363, 1163, 1197, 1240. V. Buckner, 1092. V. Burdett, 904. V. Burnap, 1|02. V. Chandler,' 333, 334. V. Corley, 1091. V. Courtnay, 1050, 1093. V. Crawfordsville, 70, 1222, 1412. V. Deveaux, 67, 508, 886, 1005, 1011, 1013. V. Downer, 555, 1158. V. French, 486. v. Hamilton, 1090. V. Henry, 539, 542, 578. V. La FoUette, 1339. V. Lawrence, 807. V.Louisville & N. R. Co., 333, 1410, 1411, 1460. V. McFadden, 220, 467, 487. V. Miles, 508, 1085, 1088. V. Moise, 1026, 1028. V.Moore, 611, 772. V. Narragansett Pier Co., 736, 740, 744. V. Ormshy, 1458. V. Palmer," 2, 9, 362, 1185, 1283, 1287, 1288. •V. People, 827. V. Pine Blufe, 1141. V.Robinson, 269, 635, 857, 1470, 1474. V. St. Louis County Court, 653. TT. Skrine, 436, 438. V. Slingerland, 1021. V. Snyder, 965. V. State, 889, 989, 1502. V. Stringer, 946. V. Thompson, 218, 514, 1425. V. United States., 461. V. Van Meter, 938, 1008. V. Vincent, 1117. V. Waverly, 247. V.Winona & St. Paul R. Co., 1006. V.Wright, 1001, 1009, 1036, 1038^ 1042. V. Youngs, 750. Taylor Bros. Iron Works Co. v. New Orleans, 911. Taylor, etc. Co. v. New Orleans, 347. Taymouth v. Koehler, 573. Taymouth T'p v. Koehler, 577. Tax-payers' Protect. Assoc, v. Kirk- patriok, 939. Tehbetts v. Charleston, 842, 1032. Tebbetts v. Job, 919. Tebo V. Brooklyn, 251. Teegarden v. Racine, 1176, 1273. Telegraph Co. v. Adams, 140, 155, 162. V. Texas, 134, 141, 150, 160. Telfener v. Dillard, 1005. Telle V. Fish, 1010. Temple v. Sumner, 1120. Temple Grove Sem. v. Cramer, 350, 354, 1448. Templeton v. Pierce County, 1383. V. Tekamah, 105. Ten Eyck v. Rector, 823. Tennant v. Crocker, 554. Tennessee v. Bank of Commerce, 108. V. Sneed, 128. V. Whitworth, 112, 114, 334, 356, 370, 373, 387, 398, 399, 404. Tennessee Club v. Dwyer, 1114. Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. East Ala- bama R. Co., 639. Tenney v. Lenz, 340, 1145. Tensas, Delta Land Co. v. Sholars, 930, 1009, 1010. Terhune v. Passaic, 1247. Terre Haute v. Mack, 1213, 1421. Terrel v. Wheeler, 419, 511, 628, 782, 963. Terret v. Sharon, 1430, 1436. Terrett v. Taylor, 1320. Terrill v. Groves, 735. V. New Orleans, 629. Territory v: Clark, 135. V. Co-operative B. & L. Assoc, 378, 647, 689. V. Delinquent Tax List, 26, 90, 91, 754. V. Perea, 734, 987, 1370. V. Reyburn, 836. Terry v. Hartford, 1220, 1221. Texarkana Water Co. v. State, 748, 896, 901, 912, 963. Texas v. Farmer, 872. Texas Banking, etc. Co. v. State, 335, 1097. Texas T. & L. Co. v. Given, 812. Textor v. Shipley, 801, 865, 914, 929, 932, 948, 960, 961, 980. Thaler v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 1243. Thames Bank v. Lovell, 148. Thames Manuf. Co. v. Lathrop, 495, 1472, 1477. Tharp v. Hart, 904, 939, 975, 1061. Thatcher v. Adams County, 1424. V. People, 471, 523, 566, 591, 632, 792, 1515. V. Powell, 825, 882, 879, 887, 916, 1004. Thayer v. Boston, 643, 644, 767. OCVlll TABLE OF CASES. Thayer v. Grand Rapids, 1266. T.Stearns, 445, 572, 598, 792, 1457. Thein v. ,Voegtlander, 194. Theological Seminary v. People, 354. Theus V. State, 1112. Thevenin v. Slocum, 919. V. Slocum's Lessee, ?61. Thibaut v. Dymond, 1116. V. Kearney, 1116. Thibodaux v. Kellar, 660, 750, 934. Thiele v. Thiele, 821. Thiebaud v* Tait, 1520. Third Cong. Soc. v. Springfield, 352. Third Nat. Bank v. Stone, 716. Thomas v. Auditor Gen., 897, 910, 14S0, 1454. V. Board of Supervisors, 647. V. Burlington, 1491. V. Chapin, 761. V. Chicago, 1261. V. Collins, 499. V. Evans, 820. V. Gay, 3, 5, 27, 46, 48, 85, 96, 167, 169, 171, 237, 256, 320, 325, 415, 626, 1209. 1258, 1450. V.Jones, 867, 980, 1456. V. Leland, 183, 209, 212, 215, 242, 484, 620, 632, 1316. V. Moultrieville, 331. V. Sneed, 344, 358, 382. . V. State, 905, 906. V. Stickle, 523, 1067, 1068. Thomas & Co. v. Olympia, 1282. Thomas Manuf. Co. v. Lathrepe, 632. Thomason v. Ashworth, 502. Thomasson v. State, 1143, 1146. Thompson v. Allen County, 830, 1367. V. Burhans, 736, 826, 827, 1034. V. Caldwell, 1093. V. Carroll's Lessee, 727. V. Commonwealth, 501. V. Cox, 952, 990. V.Detroit, 760, 996, 1490, 1503, 1507. V. Ela, 726. V. Fisher, 743. V. Floyd, 102. V. Gardner, 845. V. Highland Park, 1275. V. Hill, 1266. V. Lexington, 1426. V. Merriam, 993, 998. V. McCorkle, 819. V. McCormick, 1059. V. Noble, 816. V.Ocean Camp Grove, etc. As- soc, 260. Thompson v. Pittston, 219. V. People, 1274. V. Rogers, 852. V. Savage, 802, 824, 1020. V. Schermerhorn, 105. V. Sherrill, 1029, 1030, V. State, 1135. V. Tinkcom, 616. V. Ware, 1013. Thompson's Heirs v. Gotham, 916. Thomson v. Highland Park, 1163. V. Dickey, 1039. V. Ebbets, 1461. V. Harris, 490. V. Morris, 1496. V. Pac. R. Co., 133, 139. Thorington v. City Council, 966, 967. Thornburgh v. Cole, 1075. Thorndike v. Boston, 641, 642. V. Camden, 805. V. Inhabitants of Camden, 209. Thornton v. Clinton, 1180, 1193, 1216. V. Jones, 1072. V. Smitji, 1027. Thorrington v. Montgomery, 947. Threadgill v. Railroad Co., 431. Three Rivers Common Council v. Smith, 629. Thrift V. Town Com'rs, 471. Thurston v. Little, 602. V. Miller, 928, 999. V. Sisters of Charity, 359. , V. Stearns, 598. Thurston County v. Sisters of Char- ity, 350. Thweat v. Howard, 991. Thweatt v. Blaci, 934. 1008, 1050. Tidd V. Rines, 845. V. Rives, 911. Tiddy v. Graves, 1027. Tide Water Co. v. Costar, 1256. V. Coster, 50, 411, 419, 422. V. State Board, 157, 660. Tiernan v. Rinker, 151. Tierney v. Brown, 774. , V. Lumbering Co., 1058. Tifft V. Buffalo, 518. Tift V. Griffin, 54, 879, 1343, 1344. Tillis V. County Com'rs, 784. Tillman v. tJavis, 445. TUlotson V. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 501, 548, 1020, 1021, 1064. V. Small, 957. V.Webber, 486, 566, 576, 792, 957. Tilson V. Thompson, 985, 996, 997. Tllton V. Railroad Co., 759. Timberlake v. Brewer, 1330, 1344. Timm v. Harrison, 287, 288. Timmons v. Kidwell, 811, 1091. Tingue v. Port Chester, 530, 1250. TABLE OF OASES. CCIX Tinslar v. Davis, 485, 500. Tinsley v. Rusk Co., 1337. Tisdale v. Auditor-General, 1425. Title Guaranty, etc. Co. v. Chicago, 1213, 1255. Title Trust Co. v. Aylesworth, 735, 1458. Titusville v. Brennan, 386. Toberg v. Chicago, 1272. Tobin V. Gillespie, 733. V. Morgan, 362, 579. Toby V. Wareham, 1446. Todd V. Lunt, 1001. V. KaufEman, 1092. Todd County v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 376. Toledo V. Board of Education, 266. V. Hosier, 267. V. Sheill, 1224. Toledo Bank v. Lucas County Treasurer, 714. Toledo, etc. R. Co. v. Lafayette, 1418. Toll-Bridge Co. v. Osborn, 393, 396, 398, 400, 405. Tolman v. Hobbs, 858, 959, 930. V. Treat, 905. Tomlinson v. Board of Equal., 1385. V. Branch, 110, 370. V. Jessup, 115, 116, 355. V. Long, 446. Tompkins v. Ashby, 455. V. Johnson, 826. V. Johnston, 445. V. Railroad Co., 855, 865. Tonawanda v. Price, 933, 1014. V.Lyon, 55, 70, 1218. Tonella v. State, 1113. Toof V. New Haven, 751. Topeka v. Gage, 106, 1459. Topeka, etc. Co. v. McPherson, 269. Topeka City R. Co. v. Roberts, 783. Topeka Com. Sec. Co. v. McPher- son, 635. Topsham v. Blondell, 845. V. Purlnton, 524, 760, 761. Torbitt V. Louisville, 1497. Torrence v. Shedd, 1043. Torrent v. Gager, 88. V. Yage^, 659. Torrey v. Milbury, 480, 490, . 571, 792, 1510. V. Shawano County, 654, 655. V. Willard, 836. Torrington v. Rickershauser, 1037. Totten V. Nighland, 979. Touchard v. Touchard, 1305. Tousalin v. Omaha, 1424, 1452. Tousey v. Post, 855. Tower v. Welker, 431, 433. Towle V. Holt, 951, 952, 1002, 1027. V. St. Paul, etc. L. Co., 1037. Towle V. St. Paul Perm. L. Co., 929. Town V. Salentine, 967. Town of Bell^ Point v. Pence, 228. Town of Pleasant V. Kost, 16. Towne v. Newton City Council, 1204, 1263, 1384,. 1516. Townsen v. "Wilson, 265, 525. Townsend v. Case, etc. Co., 813. V. Downer, 923, 925. V. Edwards, 1058. V. Manistee, 531. V, Martin, 931, 1011, 1013. V. New York, 552, 1449. V. Prowattain, 875. V. Shaffer, 1044,' 1050. Townsend, etc. Bank v. Todd, 944, 953. Township Board v. Hastings, 571. Toy V. McHugh, 811, 839. Tracy v. Reed, 729, 731, 1011. Traders' Ins. Co. v. Farwell, 1385. Trager v. Jenkins, 991. . Trammel v. Connor, 653, 655. Trammell v. Fraught, 732. Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 6, 147. V. Wheeling, 145, 148. Trapp V. White, 1122. Trask v. Maguire, 356. Travelers' Co. v. Patten, 964. Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Fricke, 20. V.Kent, 350, 462. V. Martin, 1018. V. Oswego T'p, 548. Travers v. McElvain, 808. Traverse v. Inslee, 1514. Traverse County v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 374. Treadwell v. Patterson, 956. Treasurer v. Bates, 1327. Treasurers v. Hilliard, 1331. Treat v. Tolman, 905. V.White, 180, 454. Trego V. Huzzard, 961. Tremont v. Clark, 1477. Tremont &, .S. Mills v. Lowell, 757. Tremont Bank v. Boston, 401, 402, 404, 406. Trenholm v. Charleston, 15, 20. Trenton v. Cole, 1158. V. Dyer, 486, 764. Trescott v. Moan, 440, 1324, 1330, 1480. ' Tresscott v. Hurlbut Land, etc. Co., 85, 168. Trevor v. Emerick, 750. Tribble v. Frame, 445. Trigally v. Memphis, 102. Trigg V. Lewis' Ex'rs, 445, 446. Trimble v. Chicago, 532. V. McGee, 1442. V. Mt. Sterling, 86. OCX TABLE OF CASES. Trimmer v. Rochester, 1492, 1508. Trimmier v. Darden, 820. Trinity Church v. Boston, 354. Trlpler v. New York, 1498, 1499, 1500, 1502. Tripp V. Brown, 643. V. Insurance Co., 1383. V. Torrey, 622. V.Yankton, 62, 70, 1196, 1219, 1240. Tromble v. Hoffman, 887, 889, 893, 897, 898. Troutman v. McClesky, 1439. V. May, 1083. Trowbridge v. Addoms, 133, 906. V. Detroit, 552, 1209. V. Horan, 517, 734. Troy Cotton Co. v. Fall Rirer, 756, 757. Troy, etc. R. Co. v. Kane, 1482. Troy Iron & Nail Factory v. Wins- low, 390. Tioyer v. Wood, 885. Truesdell v. Green, 942. Truett V. Justices, 1088. Trull V. Board of Com'rs. 176. Trulock V. Bentley, 1073. Trumbo v. People, 8. , Trumbull v. White, 107, 561. Trust Co. -^ Mintzer, 819.' V. ParH, 87, 402. Trust & G. Co. V. Portsmouth, 1382. Trustees v. Atlanta, 1128, 1235. V.Bailey, 510. V. Bell County C. & I. Co., 451. V. Bohler, 349. V. City Council, 265, 362, 662. V. Deposit Bank, 399. V. Ellis, 1235. V. Gratz, 352, 528, 530, 1338. V. Guenther, 1450. V.Louisville, 295, 349. V. McCaughey, 511. V. McConnell, 285, 286. V. Patterson, 349, 353. V. Railway Co., 229. V. Rauch, 1278. V. Roomte, 677. V. Shotwell, 265, 268. V. Taylor, 349. V.Trenton, 263, 265, 317, 866, 867. Trustees, etc. v. Roome, 95. Trustees of Firemen's i Fund v. Roome, 190. Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 228. Trustees of University v. Indiana, 114. Tubbesing v. Burlington, 247. Tucker v. Aiken, 430, 438, 440. V.Bond, 446. , V. Carlson, 1001. Tucker v. Drain Com'r, 1403. v.Pergxison, 111, 112, 138. V. Justices, 511, 555, 590. V. Raleigh, 1303. V. Stokes, 1339. V. Tucker, 847, 926, 954, 1045. V.Whittlesey, 950, 1029. TufCree t. Polhemus, 811. Tufts V. Lexington, 1489. Tug River Coal Co. v. Brewer, 1025, 1027, 1032. Tukey v. Omaha, 1437. Tulane Education Fund v. New Or- leans Assessors, 265. Tulle V. De Monasterio, 747. Tuller V. Detroit, 1441. TuUis V. Brawley, 445. TuUy V. Bauer, 933, 938. Tunbridge v. Smith, 515, 517, 760. Tunica County v. Tate, 633. Tupelo V. Beard, 1497. Tupy V. Kocourek, 1024. Turlock Irrig. Dist. v. Williams, 211. Turnbull v. Alpena, 563, 804, 1493. Turner v. Althaus, 10, 50, 1496. V. Boyce, 911, 1026. V. Burlington, 94. V. Franklin, 1477. V.Hand County, 332, 748, 911, 1196. V. Gregory, 885, 888, 947. V.Muskegon, 483, 614. V. New York, 67, 1016. V. Smith, 739, 960, 961, 973. V. State, 143. V. White, 1032. Turney v. Yeoman, 747, 1008. Turnpike Com'rs v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 836. Turnpike R. Co. v. Thomas, 456. Turnwater v. Pix, 1163, 1272, 1390. Turpin v. Burgess, 178. V. Eagle Creek, etc. Co., 1189, 1263. Tuttle V. Gary, 572. V. Everett, 1499. V. Griffin, 1040. V.Polk, 512, 517, 1249, 1271, 1279. Tweed v. Metcalf, 491, 526, 779, 785, 797, 975. Twiggs V. Chevallie, 861. Twin City Gas Works v. .People, 674. Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebecker, 45, 452. Twinting v. Findlay, 808. V. Finlay, 526, 761. Twiss V. Port Huron, 1247. Twltchell V. Shaw, 1479. Twombly v. Klmbrough, 438, 1425. TABLE OF CASES. CCXl Two Rivers Manuf. Co. v. Beyer, 1055. Twycross v. Pitohburg R. Co., 1130. Tygert's Valley Bank v. Phillippl, 1421. Tyler v. Bgacher, 182, 184, 194. ■ v. Cass County, 495, 920, 922. V. Hardwiok, 525. Tyrrell v. Wheeler, 101. Tyson v. School Directors, 4, 50, 183, 219, 1316. V. State, 33. U. Uhl V. Moorhous, 1238. V. Small, 964, 1065. V. Taxing District, 124. Ulman v. Baltimore, 52, 627, 632, 1207, 1239, 1240. TJhrig V. St. Louis, 1182, 1193, 1206. TJnde'rhill v. Calhoun, 899. Underwood v. Brockman, 1498. V.Robinson, 1477. TJnion & P. Bank v. Memphis, 333, 371, 406, 841, 1382, 1429. "Union Bank v. Hill, 133. V. New York, 1501. V. Richmond, 473, 709, 832. V. State, 89, 404. Union Central L. Ins. Co. v. Chapin, 480, 849. V. Durfee, 287, 703. Union Coal Co. v. Campbell, 786. Union Compress Co. v. State, 634. Union County v. James, 1108. Union County Court v. Robinson, 1360. Union,, etc. Bank. v. Memphis, 846. Union, etc. Ins. Co. v. Dice, 1072. Union Improvement Co. v. Com- monwealth, 115. Union Ins. Co. v. Board of Super- visors, 757, 758. V.Weber, 686. Union Metallic Cartridge Co. v. -Teague, 1118. Union Nat. Bank v. Chicago, 131. TJnion Oil Co. v. Campbell, 777, 779. V. Marrero, 348, 1117. Union Pac. R. Co. v. Alexander, 1411. V. Buffalo County, 554. V. Cheyenne, 502, 505, 693, 1411. V. Dawson County, 554, 1436. V. Donnellan, 426. V. Lincoln County, 1411. V. Peniston, 7, 139. V. Philadelphia, 357. V. Pottawatamie Cpunty, 291. V. Ryan, 1427. y. York County, 554. Union 'Passenger R. Co. v. Phila- delphia, 113. Union Paving, etc. Co. v. McGovern, 1516. Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Lynch, 1, 3, 89, lg3, 358, 359, 718. V. State, 88. Union R. Co. v. Skinner, 824. Union S. B. Co. v. BufCalo, 674, 767. Union Stave Co. v. Langridge, 348. Union Trust Co. v. Illinois M. B. Co., 835. V. Wayne, 1094. V. Wayne Probate Judge, 33, 48, 60, 71, 304, 380, 412, 551. V.Weber, 490, 581, 589, 697, 700, 730, 798, 825, 856, 1385, 1390, 1442, 1461. Union Water Power Co. v. Auburn, 637, 722, 757. United States v. Allen, 1114. V. American Bell Tel. Co.,' 142. V. Bacheldor, 436. V. Banks, 667. V. Benzon, 392. V. Barrels of Spirits, 458. V. Boyd, 1335. V. Brice, 670. V. Brooklyn, 903. V. Brooklyn, etc. R. Co., 899. V. Bucaanan County Court, 1371. V. Buffalo Park. 1123. V. Burlington, 466. V. Caddies of Tobacco, 863. V. Calhoun, 1114. V. Central Bank, 683. V. Cases, 458. V.Cicero, 467, 468, 586, 1362. V. Clark County, 175, 1350, 1364. V. County Court, 1362. v. Cruikshanks, 171. V. Cutting, 1107. V. Dandridge, 491. V. Dashiel, 1333. V. Distilled Spirits, 458. V. Eckford, 1337. V. Edmunds, 1207. V. Farrell, 858. V. Fifty-nine Demijohns, 6. V. Fishei*, 450. V. Fisk, 1107. V. Fort Scott, 1281. V. Glab, 660. V. Halloran, 595. V. Hart, 667. V. Hazard, 670. V. Hess, 910. V. Hodson, 458, 461. V. Hogsheads of Tobacco. 863. V. Howell, 1328. V. Huger, 1333. V. Hunnewell, 668, ccxn TABLE OF OASES. United States v. Jackson, 75. V. James, 44, 452. V. Jefferson Co.. 121, 1362. V. Kenton, 1107. V. Keokuk, 1362, 1375. V. Kirkpatrick, 491, 1340. T. Knox County, 175. V. Lalbette County, 1350. v. Lafayette County Court, 1371. V. Lawrence, 1354. V. Lee, 803. V. Leverich, 667. V. Louisville & N. R. Co., 646; ^ V. Macon, 468. V. Macon County, 175, 467, 1363. V. Macon County Court, 470, 804. V. Mathoit, 906. V.Maurice, 427, 440, 1325. V. McKinley, 180, 863. V. Memphis, 122. V.Mobile, 121. V. Morgan, 1332, 1333. V. New Orleans, 7, 48, 121, 467, 588, 1362, 1363, 1366, 1374. V. New York L. Ins. & T. Co., 669. v. Nicholl, 1340. V. Olney, 458. V. Port of Mobile, 1364. V. Pacific R. Co., 21, 595, 825, 866, 869. V. Perkins, 33, 135, 380. V. Frescott, 1333. V. Railroad Co., 1, 2, 91, 134, 390, 403, 676, 683, 832. V. Railway Co., 125. V.Riley, 179, 423. V. Savings Bank, 1513. V. Schellinger, 390. V. School District, 1365. V. Silverman, 1375. • V. Singer, 179. V. Snyder, 875. V'. Spreckens, 863. V. Starnes, 1114. V. Sterling, 1365. V. Stone, 1337. V. Taylor, 502. V. Thomas, 1333, V. Tlngey, 1328. V. Town of Cicero, 175, 221. V. Townsend, 670. V. Truck's Adm'r, 829. V. Tynen, 512. V. Van Zandt, 1340. V.Vernon County, 1362. V. Watts, 457. V. Wilson, 35. V. Wigglesworth, 457. United Copper Mining, etc. Co. v. Franks, 932. United, etc. Co. v. Commissioner, 110. United Lines Tel. Co. v. Grant, 1411. United N. J. R. & C. Co. v. Jersey City, 376, 695, 698. United States Coal Co. v. Randolph County Court, 636. United States Distilling Co. v. Chi- cago, '287, 1146. United States E. P. & L. Co. v. State, 389, 398, 405, 406, 900. United States Express Co. v. EUy- son, 399. United States ' Sec. & Bond Co. v. Wolfe, 1009, 1017. United States Trust Co. v. Atlantic & P. R. Co.. 140. V. New Mexico, 883, 902, 903. V. New York, 1402, 1490, 1492. V. Territory, 500, 609, 621, 700,. 844. Universalist Soc. v. Leach, 434. University v. Multnomah County, 772. T. People, 108, 117, 118, 285, 351. University of South v. Skidmore, 351. Updike V. Wright, 1176, 1238, 1309,. 1322. Upington v. Oviatt, 525, 1218, 1430. Uptagrafft v. Smith, 811. Upton V. Holden. 1477. V.Kennedy, 490, 579, 581, 827, 957, 1005, 1010, 1016, 1519. V. Lawless,, 740. V. People, 745, 1267, 1276. Ure V. Bunn, 958. V. Reichenberg, 807, 893, 984. Urquhart v. Westcott, 1013. Usher v. Colchester, 219. V. Pride, 859. V. Taft,940. Utah & N. R. Co. v. Fisher, 85, 167. Utah, etc. R. Co. v. Crawford, 1440.. V. Vail V. Beach, 357. V.Owen, 1466, 1468, 1470. V. Richards, 1071. Valentine v. St. Paul, 1266, 1489. Valle V. Fargo, 547. V. Ziegler, 1420. Valpy V. Manly, 1502. Van Allen v. Assessors, 131, 396,. 404, 711. 712. "Van Anglen v. Bayonne, 1401. Van Auken v. Highway Com'r, 1403. V. Monroe, 926. Van, Benthuysen v. Sawyer, 1028,. 1048. Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 135. Van Brundt v. Schenck, 1485. TABLE OF, CASES. CCXUl Van Buskirk v. Drain Com'r, 1402. Vance v. Corrigan, 885. V. Little Rock, 468, 555, 592, 593, 594, 1374, 1410. V. Schuyler, 491. Vance v. Van Every, 593. Van Cise v. Carter, 747, 911. Vancleave v. Milliken, 1068. Van Cott V. Milwaukee Supervis- ors, 1416. Vancouver v. Wintler, 516, 522. Vandemark v. Phillips, 486, 826, 827, 913. Vanderbeck v. Rochester, 1499. Vanderbilt v. Adams, 1150. Vandercook v. Williams, 608. Vanderpool v. Bonnell, 776, 783. Vandersyde v. People, 1175, 1274. Van Deventer v. Long Island City, 384. Van Doren v. New York, 1448, 1450. Van Dyke v. Carleton, 660, 850. Van Etten v. Medland, 986. Van Gorder v. Hanna, 1032. Van Gunden v. Virginia Coal, etc. Co., 1093. Van Hook v. Harnett, 1328. Van Horn v. People, 1, 303, 1146. Van Loon v. Engle, 827, 883. Van Matre v. Sankey, 1041. Vanmeter v. Spurrier, 143, 395, 804. Van Nest v. Sargent County, 922, 1496. Van Ormer v. Harley, 966. Vanover v. Justices, 466, 469, 546, 1430. Van Rensselaer v. Witbeck, 762, 1449, 1480. Van Riper v. North Plainfleld, 549. Van Sant v. Stage Co., 1141. Van Schaac v. Robbins, 921. Van Sicklen v. Burlington, 219, 222. Van Slyke v. Wisconsin, 131. Van Steen v. Beatrice, 1236. Van Steenburgh v. Bigelow, 1466. Van Tassel v. Jersey City, 1130, 1156. V. Mayor, 1167. Van Voorhis v. Budd, 729. Van Wagenen v. Board of Super- visors, 1398. V. Supervisors, 652. Van Wagoner v. Paterson, 1130, 1131. Vapor Electric Light Co. v. Kenan, 220. Varney v. Stevens, 965. Varnum v. Shuler, 1057. Vasser v. George, 939, 1192, 1201, 1304. Vastlne v. Laclede Land, etc. Co., 1080. Vaughan v. Bowie, 1431, 1450. V. Commissioners, 471. V. Daniels, 883. y. Murfreesboro, 473. V. Stone, 934. V. Street Com'rs, 667. V. Swayzie, 495, 514, 517, 750, 978. Vaughn v. Ashland, 1157. V. Commissioners, 472. V. Port Chester, 1507. V. School District, 571, 1438. Veazie v. China, 218. Veazie Bank v. Penno, 9, 10, 11, 15, 24, 48, 49, 130, 178, 179, 191, 192. Veghte V. Bernards, 1361. Veit V. Graf, 853. Venable v. Curd, 435. Venard v. Cross, 194. Venice v. Murdock, 564, 568. Vennum v. People, 1252, 1267. Ventura County v. Clay, 829. Verdery v. Dotterer, 961. V. Summerville, 1419. Vermont & C. R. Co. v. Vermont Cent. R. Co., 124, 156, 685, 822, 834. Vermont Central R. Co. v. Burling- ton, 376. 1491. Vernon v. Nelson, 939. Verterly v. McNeal, 1001. - Vesta Ikiills v. Charleston, 1428, 1451. Vestal V. Morris, 727, 802, 913, 1024. Vestry of Bermondsey v. Ramsey, 1291. Vetterly v. McNeal, 1464. Vickers v. Hawkins, 864, 865. Vickery v. Board, 1516. Vicksburg v. Armour Packing Co., 90. V. Butler, 1505. V. Tobin, 147. Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Bradley, 376. V. Lewis, 376. Vicksburg Bank v. Adams, 615, 743, 765, 844. V. Worrall, 308, 309, 67p, 706. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. v. Dennis, 112, 356, 358, 366, 373. V. Scott, 215. V. Traylor, 903. Viele V. Van Steenberg, 1033, 1042, 1043. Vllley V. Jarreau, 852, 941. Vincennes Univ. v. Indiana, 99. Vincent v. Moore, 812, 814, 1362, 1363. Vinton v. Cerro Gordo County, 135, 137. Violett v. Alexander, 627, 1197, 1239. CCXIV TABLE OF CASES. Violett's Heirs v. Alexandria, 1226. Virden v. Bowers, 447, 849, 926, 931, 1008, 1015. Virginia v. Hall, 1130, 1188, 1288. V. Justices, 478. Virginia & Tenn. R. Co. v. Wash- ington County, 337. Virginia B. & L. Co. v. Glenn, 980. Virginia Coal Co. v. Thomas, 67, 526, 1011. Virginia, etc. Co. v. Bristol Land Co., 834, 911. V. County Com'rs, 1359. Virginia, etc. R. Co. r. Washington County, 546, 557. Visscher v. Ottawa Circuit Judge, 887. Vittum V. People, 286, 384. Vocht V. Reed, 1514. Vogel V. Vogler, §72. Voght V. Ayer, 652. V. Buffalo, 1259. Voight V. Detroit, 25, 63. V.Wright, 143, 151. Voigt v. Detroit, 235, 238, 1237, 1239. Volger V. Sidener, 447, 816, 825, 866. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 121, 128. Voorheis v. Houston, 176. Voris y. Thomas, 974. Vose V. Frankfort, 589, 1302. V. Willard, 617, 1468. Voss V. School Dist., 1438. Vrana v. St. Liouis, 1258. Vreeland v. Bayonne, 13, 1174, 1255, 1262. V. Jersey City, 5. V. O'Neil, '5. w. Wabash E. R. Co. v. Com'rs, 124, 1181. Wabash, etc. R. Co. v. Johnson, 1415, 1494. Wabash R. Ca v. Johnson, 627. V. People, 250, 523, 577, 586, 587, 696. Wabaunsee County v. Walker, 1495. Waco V. Texas, 247. Waddell v. Judson, '446. V. Williams, 895. Waddill V. Walton, 959, 992, 1077. Waddlngham v. Dickson, 951, 996, 1002, 1009, 1022. Wade V. Craven County, 1388. V. Matterson, 1469. V, 0£(,kmant, 252. V.Richmond, 252, 1437. V. State, 558. Wadleigh v. Marathon County Bank, 1057, 1085. Wager v. Bowley, .590. Waggeman v. North Peoria, 1161, 1259. Waggener v. McLaughlin, 964. Waggoner v. Mann, 1015, 1073. v.Wolf, 1024, 1044, 1052. Wagner v. Rock Island, 1, 5, 217. V. Stewart, 985, 1030. Wagner Free Inst. v. Philadelphia, 115,. 351. Wagoner v. Evans, 3, 5, 85, 167, 237, 415. 1^ V. Lewis, 1440. V. Loomis, 1461. Wahlschlager v. Liberty, 218. Walt V. Gardiner, 946, 947. ' V. Gilmore, 933. V. McMillajgi, 893. Waite V. Dowley, 717. V. Hyde Park Lumber Co., 691, 794. Wakefield v. Day, 1039. V. Patterson, 571. Wakeley v. Omaha, 773, 1276, 1518, 1519. Wakely v. Nicholas, 1061. Walcott V. Hand, 886, 947. V. People, 303, 553. Walden v. Dudley, 1477. V.Lee County, 563, 1330, 1344.' Waldo V. Portland, 218. Waldron v. Auditor-General, 888, 893 V. Lee, 414, 467, 767, 1342, 1343, i469. V. McComb, 1005. V. Tuttle, 916. Walker v. Ann Arbor, 1228. V. Aurora, 1172, 1226, 1273. V. Boh, 1001, 1075. V. Burlington, 560, 760. V.' Chapman, 480, 632, 736, 1327, 1328, 1343. V. Cincinnati, 186. V. Cochrane, 1380. V. District of Columbia, 106, 426, 759, 1272, 1275. V. Edwards, 487, 587. V. Hallock, 1466, 1467, 1474. V.Harrison, 822, 964. V.Jack, 90, 91, 92. V. Miner, 607, 797. V. Moore, 949. V. New Orleans, 1112. V. People, 828, 1274, 1276. ■ .V.St. Louis, 1496. V. Sioux City, etc. Coi, 1043. V. Springfield, 287, 703. V. Taylor, 997. Walker T'p v. Thomas, 1517. Walkley v. Muscatine, 1362. Wall V. District of Columbia, 962. V. Hinds, 823. TABLE OF GASES. CCXV Wall V. Trumbull, 490, 792, 1466, 1467, 1469, 1476, 1479. v.Wall, 510, 514, 520, 954. Walla Walla v. Ferdon, 1141. V. Moore, 660. Wallace v. Bradshaw, 419. V.Brown, 808, 810, 897. v.BuUen, 754, 771, 776, 777, 785, 1420. V. Cravens, 906. V. Jaeger, 788. V. Menasha, 1511. V. Myers, 33, 73, 132. V. Sexton, 1085. V. Shelton, 418, 1131, 1189, 1204, 1226. V. Scott, 724. V. Stutsman County, 921. Wallahan v. Ingersoll, 993, 1042. Waller v. Hughes, 358, 598, 636. V.Jaeger, 270, 768. ' V. Perkins, 563. Walling V. Michigan; 80i 150, 151, 1326. Wallingford v. Fisk, 949. Wallis V. Smith, 16, 446, 468, 13^2. Walls V. Grosvenor, 1451. V.Jersey City, 1400, 1404. Wally's Heirs v. Kennedy, 510. Wain V. Beverly, 493. V. Shearman, 1069, 1082. Walser v. Board of Education, 810, 1498. Walsh V. Bailie, 1335. V. Barron, 1256. V. Burke, 1042. V. Harang, 734, 1062. V. King, 1460. V. Mathews, 278, 365, 1185, 1285. V. Wilson, 972. Walston V. Nevin, 51, 56, 63, 69, 235, 412, 626, 1203, 1207. Walter v. Bacon, 511. Walters v. Duke, 298. V.Lake, 1163, 1213, 1258, 1273. V. Western, 902. V. Western & A. R. Co., 269, 359, 663, 835. Walthall V. Rives, 970. Waltham Bank v, Waltham, 402, 708. Walton V. Augusta, 167. V. Gray, 810. V. Hollywood, 971. V. Jones, 1328. V. Riley, 258, 489, 560. V. Westwood, 166, 653. Waltson V. Nevin, 73. Wamhole v. Foote, 508, 1011. Wamell v. Reed, 907. Wands v. O'Brien, 948. Wangler v. Black Hawk, 605. Wapello County v. Bigham, 431. Ward V. Alsup, 1388. V. Beale, 1385. V. Board of Com'rs, 738, 759, 1413, 1455. V. Brooklyn, 761. V. Carson, etc. Co., 857. V. Dewey, 1450; V. Flood, 201. V. Gallatin County Com'rs, 825. V. Huggins, 1009, 1091. V. Maryland, 133, 150, 168, 178. • V.Montgomery, 825, 967, 973y 1141. V. Walters, 995. V. Ward, 1451. Warden v. Commissioners, 212. V. Supervisors, 23, 1418. Wardens v. Burlington, 1244. Ware v. First Parish, etc.; 607, 837. V. Jersey ville, 1158, 1252. V. Little, 508, 523. V. Percival, 1468, 1490, 1510. V.Thompson, 735, 949. Waring v. Mayor, 150. V. Savannah, 283, 284, 341, 344, 684. Warley v. Cicero, 921. Warner v. Broquet, 967. V. Shed, 1477. Warner Iron Co. v. Pace, 502, 610, 612. Warren v. Adams, 811, 1092. V. Boston, 1245, 1246, 1265, 1283. V. Chandos, 1252, 1271. V.Chicago, 1178, 1188, 1213, 1267. V. Curran, 290. V. Demary, 881, 987. V. Geer, 1147. V. Grand Haven, 106, 760, 1191, 1226, 1252, 1515. V. Henly, 181, 291, 1225. V. Marcy, 564. V. Paul, 133. V. Putnam, 1085. V. Riddell, 1388. V. Russell, 1246, 1504. V. Thomaston, 644. Warren County v. Nail, 264. Warren Manuf. Co. v. ..Sltna Ins. Co., 171. V. Dalrymple, 654, 722. Warren R. Co. v. Belvidere, 22, 495, 499. Warrensburg v. Miller, 794, 1481. Warrington v. Furbor, 454. Warsaw Waterworks Co. v. War- saw, 127. ' Warshung v. Hunt, 936. Wartensleben v. Haithcock, 825, 894, 916. CCXVl TABLE OF OASES. Warwick, etc. Water Co. v. Carr, 1511. Waseca (jounty Bank V. McKenna, 1428. Washburn v. Cutter, 1086, 1089. V. New Orleans, 347. V. Oshkosh, 111, 248, 655. V. Walworth, 660. Washburn Coll. v. Shawnee County, 357. Washburn Memorial Orphan Asy- lum V. State, 349, 359, 363. Washington v. Hosp, 1040. V. McCombs, 1076. V. Meigs, 1146. V. Miller, 438. V. Nashville, 1129. V. Pratt, 726, 930, 931, 955. V. State, 102, 277, 1095, 1145, 1185. Washington County v. Berwick, 218. V. German American Bank, 838, 1394. Washington, etc. Co. v. Kinnear, 445. Washington Iron Works Co. v. King County, 9, 25, 129, 269. Washington L. & S. Co. v. McKen- zie, 964. Washington Market Co. t. District of Columbia, 634, 1445. Washington Nat. Bank v. King County, 501, 711, 712. Washington State Bank v. Baillie, 174. Washington Supervisors v. Salt- ville Land Co., 337, 420. Washington University v. Rouse, 114. V. Rowse, ^57. Washle v..Behan, 1214. Wass V. Smith, 875, 960, 961. Wasson v. Indianapolis Bank, 715. V. Lamb, 805. Waterbury v. Atlas Cordage Co., 347, 348. V. Ldwler, 1327. Waterbury Sav. Bank v. Lawler, 1418, 1452. Water Com'rs v. Auditor-General,' 357, 359. Waterhouse v. Public Schools, 46, 104, 106. Waterman v. Harkness, 547. V. Davis, 636, 1383. Water Power Co. v. Boston, 398. Waters v. Bonvouloir, 210. V. State, 48, 408, 1325, 1480. Waterson v. Devoe, 971, 1075. Watertown v. Cady, 1362. Waterville v. Kennebec Co., 236, 1297. 'Water-Works v. Schottler, 784. Water-Works Co. v. Monroe, 345. Wathen v. Young, 360. Watkins v. Baton, 1046. V. Enge, 438. V. Green, 819, 961, 967. T. Griffith, 1518. v. Inge, 430. 524, 952, 1002. V. Milwaukee, 1169. Watson V. Campbell, 764. V. Chicago, 1188. V. Com'rs of Pamlico, 252. v.Cowles, 350, 356. 357. V. Davidson, 724. V. Fairmont, 652. T. Phelps, 945. V. Princeton, 384. V. Sawyers, 816. v. Swan, 864. V. Watson, 1477, 1479. Wattles V. Lapeer, 590, 593. 840, 956. Watts V. Bublitz, 887, 888. 897, 933. V. McCleave, 566. Wau-pe-man-qua v. Aldrich, 85, 117, 38}.. Wauwatosa v. Gunyoh, 182, 900. Waverley v. Auditor. 1428. Waycross Lumber Co. v. Burbage. 864. Wayland v. Com'rs, 263. Wayman v. Southard, 46. Wayne Auditors v. Benoit, 366, 375, 435. V. Savannah, 21, 843. Wayne County Savings Bank v. > Roscommon T'p Supervisor, 1361. Weare v. Van Meter, 966, Weatherby v. Thomas, 978. Weatherhead v. Guilford, 620. Weaver v. Arnold, 819, 949, 954. V. Devendorf, 1466, 1470, 1474. V. Grant, 738. 950. V. State, 151, 284, 900. 901. 1118, 1383, 1390, 1411, 1412. T. Templin, 1169, 1241. Weaver's Estate v. State, 86, 672. Webb V. Bidwell, 881, 1021. V. Renfrow, 754, 785, 1377, 1378, 1383, 1460. Webb County v. Gonzales, 1325, 1329. Webber v. Commonwealth, 142, 1104. V. Gay, 1478, 1479. v. Gray, 1478. v. Virginia, 141, 142, 150. Weber v. Dillon, 785, 1432, 1447. v. Lee County, 1362. v. Lutcher, 929. V. Railway Co., 581. V. Reinhard, 48, 227. 259. 328, 596, 1206. TABLE OF CASKS. COXVll Weber v. San Francisco, 1450, 1515. V. Traubel, 502, 557. V. Zimmerman, 1351. Webster v. Auditor-General, 498, 903. V. Baltimore County Com'rs, 221. V. Bell, 160, 161. V. Chicago, 877. V. Fargo, 3, 69, 1203, 1218, 1255. V. French, 491. V. Harwintoii, 218, 1430, 1436. V. Ldncoln, 1385, 1424. V. Hunger, 907. V. People, 468, 546, 555. V. Seymour, 19, 21, 848, 1086. V. Webster, 1090. Webster-Glover Lumber, etc. Co. v. St. Croix County, 754. Webster Lumber Co. v. Munisjng T'p, 576. Wederstrandt v. Freyham, 1034, 1076. Wedgbury v. Caswell, 649. Weed V. Boston, 1219, 1394, 1408. Weeks v. Gilmanton, 251. V. Merkle, 67, 1002, 1011. V. Milwaukee, 365, 382, 383, 420, 1199, 1225, 1451. V. Waldron, 747. Weet V. Brockport, 1512. Wehre v. Lutcher, 748. Weichselbaum v. Curlett, 964. Weightman v. Clark, 199, 229. Weimer v. Bunbury, 52, 53, 1331, 1342, 1346. V. Porter, 1021. Weinreich v. Hensley, 525, 526, 727, 729, 732. Weinstein v. Newbern, 322. Weir V. Day, 200. V. Kitchens, 485, 827. Weismer v. Douglas, 9, 50, 181, 195, 196, 206. Weister v. Hade, 218, 219. Welch V. Astoria, 1425, 1426. V. Clatsop Couijty, 1425. V. Cook, 111. V. Ketcham, 822. Welsch V. Augusti, 1010, 1057,1077. Welsh V. Bell, 445. Welker v. Potter, 525. Weller v. St. Paul, 420, 905, 1392, 1450. Welles V. Battelle, 539, 542, 544. Wellington v. Belmont, 657. V. Small, 838, 840. Wellman v. Willis, 930. Wells V. Atlanta, 217. V. Austin, 563, 727, 801, 940, 941. V. Battelle, 727. V. Board of Education, 574, 1394. Wells V. Buffalo, 1449. V. Burbank, 590, 937. V.Cole, 15. V. Commissioners, 561, 778. V. Dayton, 1422. V. Jackson Manuf. Co., 947. V. Johnston, 979. V. McHenry, 598. V. Salina, 553. V. Savannah, 107, 635. V. Smyth, 596, 764. v. State Board, 776, 779, 786. V. Western Paving, etc. Co., , 1411, 1426, 1442, 1445, 1455. V. Weston, 226, 249, 312. V. Wood, 1277, 1388. Wells County v. Gruner, 627, 1253, 1455. V. McHenry, 48, 54, 60, 136, 137, 500, 526, 547, 551, 559. 785, 881, 828, 873. V. Mounsey, 1455. Wells County Com'rs v. Fahlor, 765. Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Express v. Crawford County, 93, 164, 277, 586, 592, 720, 721, 1383, 1415, 1426. Wellshear v. Kelly, 493, 511, 896. Weimer v. Bunbury, 1344. Welton V. Merrick County, 1497. V.Missouri, 149, 150, 169, 1119. Wendell v. Fleming, 440. V. Whitaker, 10.01. Wendover v. Lexington, 108, 112, 1137, 1145. Wenneker v. Cummings, 1383. Wentworth v. Gove, 440, 1324. Werner v. Galveston, 71, 198, 568, 588. Wesleyan Acad. v. Wilbraham, 351. West V. Bancroft, 217. V.Cameron, 1063, 1075. V. Duncan, 825, 1013, 1027. V. Hayes, 813. V. Negrotto, 962, 1064, 1065. V. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co., 889, 997. V. State, 889. V. Whittaker, 561, 574, 581, 1441. West Baton Rouge v. Moores, 1332. V. Morris, 1338. West Bend v. Brown, 1387. West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester County, 375, 392. West Chester School Dist. v. Dar- lington, 672. West Chicago Park Com'rs v. Dunne, 1173. V. Farber, ,531, 1187, 1209. V. Metropolitan, 1256. V. Sweet, 8, 436, 530, 548, 1250. West Chicago St. R. Co. v. Chicago, 108, 1230, 1269, 1273. v. People, 1273, 1288. OCXVlll TABLE OF OASES. West Hartford v. Board of Water Com'rs, 7. V. Water Com'rs, 264, 266, 267. West Hoboken v. Board of Com'rs, 503. West Michigan Lumber Co. v. Dean, 794. West School District v. Merrills, 575. West Wis. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 111, 114, 115, 136. Westall V. Altschul, 531. Westboro v. Taylor County, 909. Westbrook v. Miller, 484, 486, 762,* 787 995' V. Willey, 932, 1006, 1014, 1034. Western v. Flanagan, 997, 1001. Western Banking Co. v. Murray, 1441. Western Dispensary v. New York, 349. Western, etc. Tel. Co. v. Leib, 95. Western Fund Saving Soc. v. Phila- delphia, 217. Western Ins. Co. v. Murray, 603. Western Invest. Banking Co. v. Murray, 399. Western Land Assoc, v. McComber, 1036, 1038. Western Lumber Co. v. Munlslng T'p, 575. Western New York & P. R. Co. v. Venango County, 375. Western Paving, etc. Co. v. Citi- zens' Street R. Co., 1516. Western Ranches v. Custer County, f26. Western Reserve Coll. v. Cleveland, 1306. Western R. Co. v. Nolan, 386, 843, 1383, 1401, 1438, 1~468. Western R. Corp. v. Nolan, 1407. Western Savings Fund Soc. v. Phil- adelphia, 1306. Western Springs v. Hill, 844, 1187. Western Town Lot Co. v. Lane, 21, 804. Western Transp. Co. v. Scheu, 674. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Charles- ton, 140, 161, 162. V. City Council, 1122, 1140. V. Commonwealth, 140, 141. V. Fremont, 161, 1122. V. Harris, 357, 359. ' V. Indiana, 66, 76, 900, 901. V.Massachusetts, 93, 140, 141, 161, 164. V. Mayer, 7, 171, 323, 325. V. Norman, 58. V. Pennsylvania, 157. V. Philadelphia, 1149. V. Poe, 1411, 1429. V. Richmond, 140, 1101. Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 20, 141, 157, 160, 335, 900, 901, 902, 904. V. State Board, 276. V. Taggart, 93, 149, 141, 162, 164. Westfall V. Preston, 761, 782, 916, 1469, 1481, 1519. '' Westhampton v. Searle, 480, 525, 575, 1379. Westlake v. St. .Louis, 1507. Westminster v. Westminster Sav- ings Bank, 399, 599, 678, 706. Westmore Lumber Co. v. Orne, 359. Weston V. Charleston, 9, 10, 49, 130, 131. V. Luce County, 1500, 1503. V. Manchester, 648. V. Meyers, 1022. V.Monroe, 579, 766, 776. V. Newburg, 573. V. Supervisors, 113. V. Syracuse, 1281. Westport V. McGee, 252, 487, 855, 901. v.Mastln, 106) 547, 556. Wetherbee v. Dunn, 995, 997, 1001, 1008. Wetherell V. Divine, 1310. Wetmore v. Multnomah-County, 326- Wettlg V. Bowman, 1090. Wewell V. Cincinnati, 1274, 1280. Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota, 60, 65, 74, 493. Weymouth, etc., Dist. v. County Com'rs, 228. Weyse v. Crawford, 613, 618. Whalen v. La Crosse, 1283. Whaley v. Commonwealth, 592, 1327, 1509. Wharton v. Birmingham, 1383, 1478. V. School Directors, 48, 583, 1437. Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay Imp- Co., 1271, 1286. Whatcom County v. Fairhaven L. Co., 884, 894, 895, 1395. Wheatly v. Covington, 480. Wheaton v. Mickel, 650. Wheeler v. Addison, 870. V. Anthony, 733. V. Board of Com'rs, 397, 691, 1498. V. Bramel, 729, 825, 1062. V. Chicago, 480. V. County Com'rs, 680, 691, 1401, 1406, 1407. V. Gorman, 812. V. Jackson, 67, 1054. V. Lampman, 445. V. Merrlman, 1»7, 1066, 1092. V. People, 1272. V. Plattsmouth, 47. V. Portsmouth, 468. V. Wall, 97. TABLE OF CASES. CCXIX. Wheeler v. Wilson, 840. V. Winn, 1083. Wheeling v. Black, 1326, 1337. V. Hawley, 530. Wheeling Bridge & T. R. Co. v. Paull, 46. Wheelock v. Archer, 853, 857, 1479. Wheelwright v. Lemore, 1025. Whelen v. Weaver, 885, 887, 888. Whinney v. Brinkler, 1455. Whipple V. Earlck, 1004. Whistler v. Drain Com'r, 1402. Whitaker v. Ashby, 1044. V. Brooks, 389, 402, 404, 605, 619. Whitbeck v. Hudson, 1402. V. Mercantile Bank, 714, 715. ~ V. Minch, 1501. White V. Allen, 1164. V. Alton, 728, 1246. V. Brooklyn, 987, 994, 1018, 1027. V. East Saginaw, 1339. V. Flynn, 508. V. Forris, 1092. T. Greenhow, 120. V. Harris, 1208. V. Hart, 118, 123. V.Kent, 1147, 1151. V. Knowlton, 875. V. Martin, 646. > V. Millbrook T'p, 1501. V. New Bedford, 613. V. People, 1129, 1167, 1183, 1188, 1218. V.Portland, 732, 752, 819, 880, 1454. V. Quarles, 1328. V. Railroad Co., 136. V.Raymond, 1412, 1413, 1415. V. Shell, 1021. V. Smith, 351, 1040, 1046, 1397. V. State, 805. V. Stender, 1416. V.Stevens, 1158, 1217, 1242, 1244. V. Straus, 1029. V. West Chicago, 1276. V.Wheeler, 936, 1008. V. Wilkinson, 927. V. Woodward, 903. Whiteaker v. Haley, 1, 15. White Castle Lumber, etc. Co. v. Browne, 347. Whited, etc. Co. v. Bledsoe, 347. Whitfield V. Longest, 98, 1120. Whiteford v. Probate Judge, 62, 627, 1211, 1239, 1247, 1402. Whitehead v. Curry, 967. V. Farmers' L. & T. Co., 834, 992, 1455. Whitehurst v. Coleen, 1341. V. Gaskill, 929. Whiteley v. Lansing, 120, 1362. White River Bank v. Downer, 445. Whitesell v. Northampton County, 26, 87, 89, 393, 404, 688. White Sulphur Springs Co. v. Rob- inson, 10, 1447. Whities v. Farsons, 1037, 1038. Whiting V. Boston, 1404, 1415, 1438. V. Bradley, 445. V. Blsworth, 542. V. Quackenbush, 1218, 1269, 1274.. V. Sheboygan, etc. R. Co., 182,. 187, 196, 224. V. Townsend, 1218, 1287. V. West Point, 344. V. West Point Council, 466. Whitley V. Lansing, 1361. Whitman v. Taylor, 895. Whitmore v! Learned, 750, 953, 1020.. Whitney v. Gunderson, 751, 974: V. Hudson, 560. V.Marshall, 1008, 1016, ,1085. V. Port Huron, 1504. V. Quackenbush, 1220. V. Richardson, 1064. V. Stow, 252: V. Thomas, 726, 1472. v.Wegler, 889, 1078. Whitney Nat. Bank v. Parker, 715,. 716, 717, 1445. Whittaker v. Deadwood, 486, 939, 1507. V. Sumner, 445. V. Wright, 813. Whitten v. Covington, 1149. Whittlesey v. Clinton, 645. ■ V. Hoppenyan, 994, 996, 997, 1027.. Whyte V. Nashville, 1129. Wickett V. Cicero, 1251. WickofE's Heirs v. Miller, 1077. Widersum v. Bender, 1033, 1303,. 1309. Wiesmann v. Brighton, 1495. Wiggin V. New York, 1448. V. Temple, 997, 1010. Wiggins V. Atchison, T. & S. F. R.- Co., 586. V. Chicago, 1099, 1107. V. Holley, 916. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 148, 287, 358, 1123. Wight ■ V. Davidpon, 51, 63, J203,. 1241, 1516. Wilbert v. Michel, 811. Wilbur V. Springfield, 1213, 1218, 1223. Wilcox V. Commissioners of Mid- dlesex, 403. V. Deer Lodge Co., 1298. V. Eagle T'p, 303, 530. V. Ellis, 659. V. Gladwin, 848, 1481. V. Hunter, 1350. V. Leach, 978, 980, 988, 995. V. Middlesex County, 390. ccxx TABLE OF OASES. Wilcox V. New York, 1501. V. Paddock, 214, 548. V. Rochester, 650. V. Smith, 431, 435, 438. 1477. Wilcoxen v. San Luis Obispo, 1264. Wilder v. Cincinnati, 1218. V. Cockshutt, 1033. V. Savannah, 1103. Wild's Lessee v. Serpell, 859, Wiles V. Hoss, 1278. Wiley V. Bean, 916. / V. Board of Com'rs, 615. v.Flournoy, 477, 481, 484, 773, 774. V. Owens, 1123. v. Palmer, 168. Wilhelm v. Russell, 447. Wilkerson v. Walters, 1413. Wilkes V. Dinsman, 1466. V. Mayor, 1493. Wilkes Barre Deposit Sav. Bank v. Wilkes Barre, 646. Wilkey v. Pekin, 86, 250, 1502. Wilkie V. Chicago, 1101, 1126, .1138. Wilkin V. Keith, 524, 760, 887, 897, 933 V. Wilkin, 1038. Wilkins v. Banning, 946. T. Keith, 888. V. Tourtelot, 740. Wilkins' Lessee v. Huse, 897. Wilkinson v. Bennett, 1329. 1330, 1334, 1339. V. Cheatham, 209, 1297, 1365. V. Hiller, 1057. V. Leland, 510. V. Peru, 1436. Wilkinson County Supervisors v. Fitts, 921. Wilkinson's Heirs v. Huse, 939. Will V. Ritchie, 1065. Will County Supervisors v. People, 1298. Willamette Real Estate Co. v. Hen- drix, 812. Willamette Univ. v. Knight, 351, 353. Willard v. Albertson, 843, 1212. V. Ames, ,968, 1458. V. Blount, 739. V. Newburyport, 222. V.Pike, 350, 351, 396, 489, 637, 766. V. Presbury, 1163, 1165.' V. Redwood County Com'rs, 1462. V. Strong, 965. Willard's Executors v. Common- wealth, 640. Willcheck v. Edwards, 1402. Willey V. Koons, 731. V. Scoville, 949. V. Scoville's Lessees. 603, 735. William v. Wilkin, 1058. William Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 181, 205, 207. Williams v. Albany County, 518, 763, 764. V. Albany County Sup'rs, 60, 510, 713, 1388. V. Athens Lumber Co., 1008. V. Bank of Michigan, 99. - V. Brace, 739. ' V. Bergin, 1277. V. Bettle, 272. V. Blsnago, 1166. V. Bruce, 1130. V. Bruffy, 168. V. Cammack, 10, 49, 256, 1176, 1182, 1192, 1226, 1227. V. Central Land Co., 911. V. Clayton, 431. V. Commissioners, 471. V. Commonwealth, 1100. V. Corcoran, 600. V.Detroit, 3, 4, 238, 303, 412, 593, 1163, 1165, 1191, 1218, 1415, 1447. V. Dolden, 666, 1415, 1416. V. Eggleston, 63, 69, 1239. V. Pears, 78, 149, 169. V. Garigues, 1111. V. Gleason, 893. V. Grant County Court, 1411, 1431. V. Hall, 563. V. Harris, 883, 935. V. Hedrick, 963, 1027. V. Herrick, 820. V. Hilton, 813, 965. V. Holden, 1283, 1325, 1330. V.Hudson, 886, 1045. V. Kirkland, 1007. V. Landry, 729. V. Larkin, 571. V. McDonald, 1269. V. McLanahan, 998. V. Mears, 576, 577, 752. V. Monk, 1202. V. New York, 818. V. Peiney, 1418. V. Peyton, 1004. V. Peyton's Lessee, 916. V. Poor, 586. V. Rees, 287. V.Saginaw, 13g3, 1392, 1470, 1495. V. Sanger, 454. V. School Dist, 182, 183, 383, 435, 442, 488, 576, 583, 792, 1508. V. Segur, 777. V. State, 455, 861, 899, 916, 970, 1004. T. State Board of Assessors, 319. TABLE OF OASES. COXXl! Williams v. Viselich, 1271. V. Weaver, 714, 716, 1467, 1468. T. Young, 725. Williamsburg v. Lord, 456, 904, 914, 1004, 1061. , Williams Coll. t. Assessors, 350, 353. Williamson v. Dow, 857, 1484. , V. Jones, 639. V. Massey, 343. V. Mimms, 9, 493, 610, 898. V. Neeves, 816. V. New Jersey, 73, 117, 349, 505. V. Railroad Co., 495, 964, 965, 1000. v: Russell, 1015. V. White, 865. V. Willis, 440. Williamsport v. Darby, 627, 766. Williamstown v. Brown, 502, 504. v.. Willis, 1330, 1477, 1480. Williamstown Graded Free School Dist. V. Webb, 567. Willimantic v. Windham, 415. Willink V. Miles, 436. Willis V. Crowder, 754. V. Heighway, 799. V. Miller, 119, 127, 804. V. Wetherbee, 849. , Willis' Executor v. Commonwealth, 48, 644. Williston V. Cobbett, 748. V. Colkett, 511. Williston Seminary v. County Com'rs, 350. Willson V. Seavey, 1479. Wilmarth v. Burt, 1479, 1480. , Wilmerton v. Phillips, 1456. Wilmington v. Cronly, 492, 501, 841, 844. v. Macks, 1105. ' T. Patterson, 1147. V. Ricaud, 1498, 1516. v.Roby, 98, 102, 1116, 1120, 1147. V. Sprunt, 847, 856. Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Als- brook, 107, 111, 355, 370. Wilmington, etc. R. Co. v. Bruns- wick County, 320, 1388. V. Reid, 114, 368, 376, 402, 406, 677, 678. Wilmot V. Lathrop, 535, 732, 765, 801, 1046. Wilson V. Anderson, 482. V. Atkinson, 1091. V. Auburn, 1441. T. Boyd, 867. V. Becker, 557. V. Bell, 914. V. Buckman, 218. V. Butler County, 921. V. Cantrell, 954, 969, 1009. Wilson V. Carrico, 965, 1009, 1024. V. Cass Co., 603, 636, 1443. V. Charlotte, 320, 566. V. Chilcott, 1186. V. City Council, 467. V. Crafts, 993, 1014. V. Gianes, 357, 373. V. Hamilton County, 563, 1412. V. Harrington, 864. V. Henry, 1086. T. Hurst's Bx'rs, 445. V. Lambert, 1168, 1450. V. I>emon, 1006. V. Lexington, 1101. V. Longendyke, 1425. V. McKenna, 516, 905, 906, 1034,. 1037. V. Marsh, 386, 617, 1468. V.Marvin, 810, 960. V. New York, 88. V. Pelton, 1499. v.Phillippi, 1129,' 1411, 1421,. 1449. V. Purl, 1091. v. Reasoner, 1075, 1458. v. Russell, 1038, 1043. V. Salem, 64, 1218, 124;1, 1517. v. Seattle, 497, 1409, 1427. V. Seavey, 796, 1485. V. Supervisors, 278, 345, 420,. 422. V. Sykes, 1046. V. Trenton, 1272. V. United States, 952. V. Waterson, 724. V.Weber, 603, 1424. V.Wheeler, 384, 597. V. Wiggins, 79, 613. V. Wood, 67, 982, 987, 1011. V. Wright, 1344. Wilter V. Bachman, 526. Winants v. Jersey City, 265. Winchester v. Cain, 1024. V. Tozer, 909. Windett v. Union Mut. L. Ins. Co.,. 813. Windham v. Portland, 252, 355, 576. Windman v. Vincennes, 1440. Windsor v. Des Moines, 518, 1251. V. District of Columbia, 532. v. Field, 1283, 1389. Wine V. Woods, 994, 1009. Wing V. Hall, 796, 1003. V. Minor, 750. Wingate v. Ketner, 766. V. Sluder, 102, 585. V. Tacoma, 1515. Winfleld Bank v. Nipp, 1516. Winifrede Coal Co. v. Board of Ed- ucation^ 1431. Winkley v. Newton, 88, 94, 389, 656. Winnebago Furn. Manuf. Co. v. Fond -du Lac County, 1517, 1518. •ccxxu TABLE OF CASES. Winning v. Eakin, 526, 990. Winnipiseogee Lake Manuf. Co. t. GlfEord, 25. Winnipiseogee Lake, etc. Manuf. Co. V. Gilford, 94, 637, 722, 740, 756, 757, 759, 902. V. Laconla, 759, 1396. "Winnipiseogee Paper Co. v. North- fleld T'p, 654. Winnissimet Co. v. Clielsea, -612, 614, 615, 622. Winona & St. P. L. Co. v. Minne- sota, 269, 359, 626, 631. Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Deue^ 269. V. Watertown, 363, 1219. Winona, etc. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 51, 60, 62, 64, 65, 74, 306, 493. Winslow V. Morrill, 253. Winstaaley v. Meacham, 1090. Winston V. Johnson, 731. V. Railroad Co., 472. V.Taylor, 653, 1096, 1099, 1104, 1124. Winter v. Atkinson, 966. V. City Council, 875, 964, 1052. V. Montgomery, 341, 1489. Winzer v. Burlington, 247, 1490. Wires v. Farr. 1093. "Wirtz V. Girardy, 298. Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Corn- stock, 136, 1061. T.Lincoln County, 340, 764, , 1457. V.Price County, 136, 137. V. Taylor, 7, 245. V.Taylor County, 340, 341, 343. V.Wisconsin River L. Co., 937. Wisconsin County Com'rs v. Sea- , bright Cattle Co., 1388. Wisconsin Industrial School v. Clark County, 205, 207. Wisconsin Keeley Inst. Co. v. Mil- waukee County, 207, 1301. Wisconsin Tel. Co. v. bshkbsh, 474. Wise V. Hyatt, 966, 973. V. Wi^e Co., 854. Wisman v. McGee, 1442. Wisner v. Davenport, 797. V. Chamberlain, 993, 1037. V. Chamberlin, 811, 1037, 1P42. "V. People, 1271. "Wistar v. Philadelphia, 1164, 1166. Wiswall V. Kunz, 269, 663. Witherspoon v. Duncan, 23, 94, 136, 525, 727. '^Withington v. Corey, 1064. v. Eveleth, 1469. V. Harvard, 1512. V. Howard, 1434. Withnell v. Gartham, 442. 'Witkowski v. Bradley, 586, 590. V. Skalowski, 1404. Witman v. Reading, 1220. Witt v. Armstrong, 265. V. Elizabeth, 1221. V. Mewhirter, 1046. Witter V. Bachman, 1252, 1287. V. Mission School Dist., 266. Witters v. Sowles, 851. Woart V. Wiunlck, 1093. WofEord V. Bailey, 1457. V. McKinna, 1001, 1091. Wolf V. Keokuk, 1130, 1223. V. Lansing, 1115. V. McHargue, 240. V. New Orleans, 494. V.Philadelphia, 807, 1172, 1207, 1289. Wolfe V. Brown, 1079. V. HendersoA, 1054. V. Murphy, 43Q, 771, 773, 787. Wolff V. New Orleans, 121, 467, 588, 1287, 1292, 1362, 1363. Wolfort V. St. Louis, 1215, 1268. Woman's Home Missionary Sac. y. Taylor, 350. Wood V. Bangs, 1429. V. Brady, 1285. V. Bigelow, 877, 879, 1016. V. Curran, 886. V. District of Columbia, 1403, 1407. V. Farmer, 575. V. Helmen, 1427, 144?. V. Henry, 1026. V. Knapp, 931. V. McCann, 223, 1009, 1010, 1084. V. Nickolson, 1000. V. Quimby, 248, 254, 258. V. Schpol Corp., 565. V. Stirman, 1483. V. Strother, 531, 532, 1277, 1371. V. Thomas, 1477. V. Torrey, 664, 666. v.Welpton, 1026, 1044, 1048. Woodall V. Oden, 1338. Woodard v. Isham, 644. Woodbridge v. Allen, 929. V. Detroit, 2, 411, 412, 420, 1129, 1182, 1201, 1235. V. State, 1009, 1400. Woodbridge T'p v. Allen, 916. Woodburn v. Wireman, 949, 950. Woodbury v. Hamilton, 222. V. Swan, 972. Woodland Cemetery v. Everett, 354. Woodland Oil Co. v. Shoup, 953. Woodman v. Auditor-General, 386, 602, 626, 754. Woodmere Cemetery Assoc, v. Springwells T'p, 1382, 1504. Woodruff V. bepere, 529. V. Fisher, 211, 594, 781, 1169. V. Parham, 143, 144, 151, 167. V. Perry, 1450. TABLE OF OASES. CCXXlll Woodruff V. State, 122, 264, B26, 600, 1359, 3,371, 1375. V. Trapnall, 127. Woodruff Place v. Raschig, 1213. Woods V. Freeman, 845, 896, 911. V. Madison Supervisors, 465. V. Varnum, 1337. Woodside v. Wagg, 430, 436. V.Wilson, 743, 744, 745. Woodson V. Murdock, 452. Woodward v. Campbell, 1045. V. Ellsworth, 834. V. French, 607. V. Sloan, 861, 1003. V. Turnbull, 105, 1100.' Woodworth v. Gibbs, 1409. Woody V. Jones, 853, 929. Woolf V. Chalker, 1146. Woolfolk V. Fonbane, 750. Woolfork V. Buckner, 1070. WooUey v. Staley, 1498. Woolman v. State, 392, 1117. Woolsey v. Morris, 1478. Wooten V. Sugg, 812. V. White, 810. Wooters v. Arledge, 1001. Worcester v. Western Railroad Corp., 139. Worcester Agric-. Soc. v. Worcester, 362. Worcester County v. Worcester, 264, 267. WorkingmeDj's Aid Society v. Lynn, 354. Workingmen's Bank v. Lannes, 933, 934,. 952, 953. Workingmen's Banking Co. v. Wolff, 772, 773, 776. Workman v. Worcester, 590, 591,' 1259. Worley v. Cicero, 920, 921. V. Harris, 1422, 1441. Worth V. Ashburn, 371. V. Ashe County, 389. V. Cox, 1336, 1347. V. Fayetteville, 653, 1416. V. Petersburg, etc. R. Co., 321, 372, 686. V. Simmons, 916. V.Wilmington, etc. R. Co., 322, 372. V. Wright, 1097. Worthen v. Badgett, 581, 590, 592, 901, 957, 1421, 1425, 1453. V. Fletcher, 985, 1070. V. Quinn, 836. Worthing v. Webster, 923, 924. Worthington v. Covington, 1245. V.Sebastian, 86, 87, 90. V. Whitman, 598. Wray v. Fay, 1222. V. Fry, 884. V. Litchfield, 744. Wray v. Pittsburgh, 1163, 1201, 1206, 1259. Wright V. Adler, 621. V.Atlanta, 1106. V. Auditor-General, 774. V. Blakeslee, 669, 1486. V. Boscawen, 253. V. Boston, 643, 1156, 1170, 1172, 1206, 1244, 1284, 1390, 1494. V. Briggs, 1130. V. Central R. & B. Co., 864. V.Chicago, 1157, 1187. V. Cradlebaugh, 508. V. Davidson, 62, 63, 69, 631. V. Defrees, 191. V.Dunham, 750, 1008, 1010, 1434, 1512. V. Forrestal, 1396. V. Graham, 1018. V. Lowell, 1380. V. Mattison, 1091. V. Merrimack, 1509. V. Oakley, 1093. V. People, 237, -574, 1168. , V. Railroad Co., 357, 685, 1417, 1424, 1426, 1450. V. Rowley, 1402. V. Sill, 110. V. Southwestern Rf Co., 370, 698. V. Sperry, 1035. V. Stiltz, 716. V. Stinson, 338, 829. V. Tacoma, 1517. V. Thomas, 1517, 1519. V. Wabash, 470. V.Wabash, St. L. etc. R. Co., 174, 586. V. Walker, 968. V. Wigton, 663, 851. Wright Seminary v. Tacoma, 1265, 1271. Wrought-Iron- Range Co. v. Carver, 849. V. Johnson, 152. Wroughton v. Turtle, 455. Wurts V. Hoagland, 69, 71, 73. Wyandotte v. Corrigan, 1122. V. Zeitz, 1279. Wyandotte & K. C. Bridge Co. v. County Com'rs, 1422. Wyandotte County Com'rs v. Ab- bott, 1232. Wyandotte, etc. Bridge Co. v. Wy- ■ andotte County, 1431. Wyatt V. Jackson, 804. V. Quimby, 814. Wyckoff V. King County, 1510. Wyer v. Larocque, 950. Wygant v. Dahl, 965, 1455, 1458. Wyley v. Wilson, 576. Wyman v. Baer, 738, 970. V. Baker, 1039. V. St. Louis, 353. OCXXIT TABLE OF CASES. Wynkoop v. Grand Traverse Cir- cuit Judge, 889. Wynn v. Stone, 804. Wynne v. Eastman, 1117. V. Wright, 1120. Y. Yancey v. Hopkins, 733, 914, 1005, 1456. V. I^ew Manchester, etc. Manuf. Co., 1514. Yacona Cotton Mills v. Duke, 347. Yandell v. Pugh, 748. Yaggy V. Chicago, 889. Yale Univ. v. New Haven, 350, 351, 353, 731. Yarish v. Cedar Rapids, I. F. etc. Co., 567. Yarnill v. Brown, 1273. Yates V. Lansing, 1466. V.Milwaukee, 359, 1455. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Adams, 64, 65, 74, 344, 353, 366, 370, 394, 823, 996, 1385. V. Board of Levee Com'rs, 110, 126, 358, 366. V. Thomas, 357, 359, 366. V. West, 838, 938. Yazoo Delta Ins. Co. v. Suddoth, 771; 773, 774. Yeamans v. Lepp, 950, 951. Yeatman v. Crandall, 365, 1131, 1189, 1226, 1256. Yellow River Imp. Co. v. Wood County, 266, 379, 751. Yelverton v. Steele, 425, 761, 775, 1481. Yenda v. Wheeler, 726, 729, 740, 930, 1006. Yeomans v. Riddle, 1182. Yocum V. First Nat. Bank, 484, 774, 1419, 1426, 1450, 1456. V. Zahner, 1052. Yokum V. Fickey, 860, 1044, 1089. York V. Barnes, 1000. V. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 105, 161, 393, 1096, 1221. V. Goodwin, 837. , Yorty V. Paine, 430, 432, 996. Young V. Beardsley, 508. V. Brand, 971. V. Charnquist, 1038. V. Deputron, 996. V. Goodhue, 968. V. Goodline, 1042. V. Governor, 1107. V. Henderson, 320, 322, 492, 569, 1193. Young V. Joslin, 477, 483, 736, 740, 813, 956. V.Lane, 174, 582. V. People, 897. » V. Rheinecker, 942. V. Thomas, 1105. V. Thompson, 535, 537, 898. V. Ward, 991. Youngblood v. Sexton, 9, 14, 24, 258, 261, 303, 412, 418, 796, 1113, 1137, 1143, 1302, 1415, 1430. Younger v. Santa Cruz Supervisors, 1495. i^Youngerman v. Murphy, 217, 555. Younglove v. Hackman, 739, 1258. Young Men's Christian Assoc, v. Douglas County, 352, 353, 359. Young Men's Prot. Temp. & Ben. Soc. V. Fall River, 349. Youngs V. Auditor-General, 1464. V. Hall, 10. V. Peters, 55, 62, 899. v.Povey, 946, 980. V. State, 481. Youngstown Bridge Co. v. Ken- tucky & I. Bridge Co., 773. ~ Youtsey v. Commonwealth, 269, 663. Yrana v. St. Louis, 345. Yuba County .v. Adams, 389, 834. Yuen Hai Co. v. Ross, 1160. Zabel T. Louisville Baptist Orphans' Home, 349. Zabriskie v. Baudendistel, 818. Zahradnicek v. Selby, 933, 1034. Zanesville v. Richards, 245, 323, 325, 345, 408, 1194, 1351. Zanone v. Mound City, 1115. Zebulon Sanger v. Kennebec County, 1370. Zeigler v. Hopkins, 1248. V. People, 1268, 1271. V. Thompson, 426. Zgielke v. State, 804. Zickler v. Union Bank & T. Co., 502, 505, 550. Zimmerman v. Chicago G. W. R. Co., 1062. Zlngerling v. Henderson, 989, 1078. Zink V. McManus, 729, 1001, 1081. Zion Church v. Baltimore, 1206. Zoeler v. Kellogg, 1183, 1269. Zumstein v. Consolidated Coal & M. Co., 268. Zundel v. Baldwin, 1001. Zweitusch v. Watkins, 1065. LAW OF TAXATION. CHAPTER I. TAXES, THEIR NATURE AND KINDS. Definition. Taxes are the enforced proportional contribu- tions from persons and property, levied by the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs.i The state demands and receives them from 1 Opinions of Justices, 58 Me. 590, 591; People v. Lothrop,3 Colo. 438,460; Linton v. Childs, 105 Ga. 567, 571; Jack V. Weiennett, 115 III. 105, 109; Wagner v. Rook Island, 146 111. 139, 152; Succession of Meroier, 43 La. Ann. 1135, 1143, 1148; Hey wood v. Board of Cksm'rs, 18 Utah 57, 63; State V. Yellow Jacket S. M. Co., 14 Nev. 220, 350. See State v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 98; Union R. T. Co. v. Lynch, 18 Utah 378; Kimball y. Grantsville City, *19 Utah 368; Hewitt v. Traders' Bank, 18 Wash. 336, 330. " Taxes are the burdens or charges imposed by the legislative power of 'a state upon persons or property to raise money for public purposes: " Clegg v. State, 43 Tex. 605, 608. The same defini- tion, in language almost identi- cal, is found in Loan Assoc, v. Topeka, 20 WalL 655, 664; Perry v. Wash- burn, 20 CaL 318, 350; People v. Mc- Creery, 34 CaL 432, 454; Hanson V. Vernon, 37 Iowa 38, 47; Judd v. Driver, 1 Kan. 455, 462; Davidson v. Commissioners, 18 Minn. 483, 486; Hawkins v. Carroll County, 50 Miss. 735,737 ; Glasgow v. Rowse, 43 Mo. 479, 489; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill (N. Y.), 76, 83; Knowlton v. Supervisors, 9 Wis. 1 410,418; Dalrymple V. Milwaukee, 58 Wis. 178, 184; State v. Tomahawk Common Council, 96 Wis. 73. "The word 'taxes ' means burdens, charges or impositions put or set upon persons or property for public uses: " Matter of Mayor, etc. of New York, 11 Johns. (N. Y.) 77, 80; Mitchell v. Williams, 37 Ind. 63, 68; Mayor, etc. v. Green Mount Cemetery, 7 Md. 517, 535: Van Horn v. People, 46 Mich. 183, 185. See De Clercq v. Barber Asphalt Co., 167 111. 315, 318. " A tax is an im- post levied by authority of govern- ment upon its citizens or subjects for the support of the state:" Cam- den V. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398; Lane County V. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 80; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 WalL 333, 326; Meriwether v. Gar- rett, 102 U. S. 473, 514; Augusta v. North, 57 Me. 893, 394; Peirce v. Bos- ton, 3 Mete. (Mass.) 530, 531; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 134, 137; Carondelet v. Picot, 38 Mo. 135, 130; Hibbard v. Clark, 5? N. H. 155, 159; Whiteaker V. Haley, 3 Or. 138, 189; Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13 Pa. St. 104, 107; Pray v. Northern Liber- ties, 81 Pa. St. 69, 71; Philadelphia Assoc. Vi Wood, 39 Pa. St. 73, 83; Board TAXES, THEIE ITATtJEE AlTD KINDS. [oh. I. the subjects of taxation ' within its jurisdiction ^ that it may be enabled to carry into effect its mandates and perform its man- of Education v. Old Dominion, etc. Co., 18 W. Va. 441, 444. "Taxes are the forcible, and, within constitu- tional limits, the arbitrary exactions of the government for its support and use, taken from the substance of the people: " Nebraska City v. Gas Co., 9 Neb. 389, 345. " Taxes are forced^ contributions for the support of the body politic: " Geren v. Gruber, 26 La. Ann. 694, 697. "The ordinary meaning of the term 'tax' is the contribution which the citizen is re- quired to pay for his share of the gen- eral expense of the government, and it may be imposed upon persons or property or both: " In re Hun, 144 N. Y. 473. "A tax is the means by which a burden primarily borne by the state is transferable to the citi- zen: " Morton v. Compt. Gen., 4 S. C. 430, 453. " Taxes are public burdens imposed generally upon the inhabit- ants of the whole state, or upon some civil division thereof, for govern- mental purposes, without reference to particular benefits or particular individuals or property: " Roosevelt Hospital V. New York, 84 N. Y. 108, 113. Assessments on townships to pay subscriptions in aid of railroads are within the terms of a statute pro- hibiting courts from enjoining col- lection of taxes : Chamblee v.Tribble, aSS.C.'J'O. The word "tax "includes a penalty for non-payment, that by the force of the statute becomes part of the tax: Harrisburg v. Guiles, 193 Pa. St. 191. 1 "By the term 'taxation,' the power of imposing taxes upon the property of the citizen: generally for the sup- port of the government is intended: " Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 341, 350. "Taxation is the mode of raising revenue for public purposes: " Sharp- less V. Mayor, 31 Pa. St. 147, 169; Peo- ple V. Salem T'p Board, 30 Mich, 452, 474 And see Allen V.Jay, 60 Me. 124, 137; Wasteney v. Schott, 58 Ohio St. 410, 415; Frost v. Flick, 1 Dak. 139. "The term 'taxation' is ordinarily used to express the exercise of the sovereign power to raise a revenue for the general and ordinary expenses of the government, whether it be the state, county, town or city govern- ment: " Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 38 CaL 345, 357. Taxation is the act of laying a tax; it is the process or means by which the taxing power is exercised: " Knowlton v. Super- visors, 9 Wis. 410, 418. "Taxation is an equal division of public expense: " State V. Express Co., 60 N. H. 219, 250. "Taxation exacts money or services from individuals as and for their re- spective shares 6f contribution to any public burden: " People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 424; Woodbridge v. De- troit, 8 Mich. 375, 280; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146, 152. "That is taxation which compels one to pay for the support of the government from his own gains and of his own property: " United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall 823, 336. "The word ' taxation ' applies to all assessments for public purposes which are called 'taxes' and are authorized by law, including municipal taxes: " Du- buquie v. Illinois Central R Co., 39 Iowa 56, 69. "Tax legislation means the making of laws that are to fur- nish the measure of every man's duty in support of the publip burdens, and the means of enforcing it: " Phila- delphia Assoa V. Wood, 39 Pa. St. 73, 82. 2 A tax is "a cha'rge levied by the sovereign power upon the property of its subjects. It is not a charge upon its own property, nor upon property over which it has no do- minion: " People V. McCieery, 84 CaL 432, 456. OH, I.] TAXES, THEIK NATURE AND KINDS. ifold function's,^ and the citizen pays from his property the por- tion demanded, in order that, by means thereof, he may be secured in the enjoyment of the benefits of organized society.^ The justification of the demand is therefore found in the recip- rocal duties of protection and support between the state and those who are subject to its authority, and the exclusive sov- ereignty and jurisdiction of the state over all persons and property within its limits for governmental purposes.' The person upon whom the demand is made, or w(hose property is taken, owes to the state a duty to do what shall be his just proportion toward the support of government, and the state is supposed to make adequate and full compensation,* in the pro- tection which it gives to his life, liberty and property, and in the increase to the value of his possessions, by the use to which the money contributed is applied.' 1 Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13 Pa. St. 104; Loan Assoc, v. Topeka, 30 Wall. 655; Graham v. St. Joseph T'p, 67 Mich. 652; People v. Lothrop, b Colo, 438; Jack v. Weien- nett, 115 111. 105; Loeber v. Leininger, 175 UL 484. 2 Succession of Mercier, 43 La. 1135; Gould V. Mayor, etc., 59 Md. 378; Heywood v. Board of Com'rs, 18 Utah 57, 63. See Exchange Bank v. Hyde, 8 Ohio St. 1, 10. "Taxes are but the revenue collected from the people for objects in which they are interested; the contributions of the people for things useful and con- ducive to their welfare: " Hilbish v, Catherman, 64 Pa. St. 154, 159. " The public revenues," says Montesquieu, " are a portion that each subject gives of his property, in order to secure or enjoy the remainder: " Spirit of Laws, Bk. 13, oh. 1; Duer v. Small, 17 How. Pr. 301. 8 McKeen v. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 519, 534 * " The theory of all taxation is that taxes are imposed as a compensation for something received by the tax- payer:" Dalrymple v. Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 178; Eolph v, Fargo, 7 N. D. 640; Webster v. Fargo, 9 N. D. 308; People V. Daniels, 6 Utah 388; Kaysville City V. Ellison, 18 Utah 163. " Taxa- tion is based upon some idea of com- pensation, benefit or advantage, di- rect or indirect, to the person taxed: " Williams v. Detroit, 3 Mich. 560. But it is no objection to a tax that the payer derives no benefit from the particular burden: Amesbury N. F. Co. V. Weed, 17 Mass. 53; New Fork, L. E. & W. R. Co. V. Commissioners, 48 Ohio St. 349; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Harden, 137 Ind. 486; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 364; Wag- oner V. Evans, 170 U, S, 588. The legality of a tax cannot be deter- mined by reference to the peotiliar benefits ito the particular property assessed for taxation: Greenleaf v. Board of Review, 184 111. 336. Yet a statute authorizing the levy of a tax for the prevention of prairie fires is" invalid if it excludes from the bene- fit of the tax railway property that is subject to the tax: Atchison, T, & S. F, R. Co. V. Clark, 60 Kan. 836, 831. "People V, Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; In re Tuthill, 163 N. Y, 133; Huston V. Tribbetts, 171 lU, 547; Union R, T. Co, V. Lynch, 18 Utah 378. TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. [oh. Fundamental requirements. Taxes are supposed to be reg- ular and orderly,' and they are commonly required to be paid at regular periods. They differ from the forced contributions, loans and benevolences of arbitrary and tyrannical periods, in that they are levied by authority of law, and by some rule of proportion which is intended to insure uniformity of contribu- .tiouy and a just apportionment of the burdens of government. In an exercise of the power to tax, the purpose always is that a common burden shall be sustained by common contributions, regulated by some fixed general rule, and apportioned by the law according to some uniform ratio of equality.^ So the power is not arbitrary, but rests upon fixed principles of jus- tice, which have for their object the prqtection of the tax- payer against exceptional and invidious exactions,' and it is" to have effect through established rules operating impartially.* The apparent equity of any particular exaction cannot sup- port it as a tax unless it is made in accordance with law ; ' nor, on the other hand, can the seeming injustice of a levy actually authorized by law defeat it, provided it is made under 1 Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9. " A tax is an orderly rate lev- ied on the property of the citizen ac- cording to its value, or a fixed sum levied on his person, for the public use: " Mayor, etc. v. Dargan, 45 Ala. 310, 319. 2 People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. T. 419; Sutton's Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana 28; Knowlton v. Supervisors, 9 Wis. 410; Plumer v. Supervisors, 46 Wis. 163; Williams v. Detroit, 3 Mich. 560; Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 374; Ryerson v. XJtley, 16 Mich. 369; Motz V. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495; People v. Salem T'p Board, 30 Mich. 453; Bay City V. State Treasurer, 33 Mich. 499; Chaffee's Appeal, 56 Mich. 344; Man- istee V. Harley, 79 Mich. 338; Grim V. School Dist., 57 Pa. St. 453; Booth V. Woodbury, 33 Conn. 118; Nev? Lon- don V. Miller, 60 Conn. 113; State v. Express Co., 60 N. H. 319; Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 378; Jack v. Weien- nett, 115 111. 105. 8 " Whenever the property of a citi- zen shall be taken from him by the sovereign will, and appropriated, without his consent, to the benefit of the public, the exaction should not be considered as a tax unless similar contributions be made by that public itself, or shall be exacted rather by the same public will from such con- stituent members of the same com- munity generally as own the sau.e kind of property: " Lexington v. Mc- Quillan's Heirs, 9 Dana 513, 517. Yet courts will not limit the exercise of the taxing power simply because methods are harsh, unreasonable and arbitrary: Robertson v. State Land Office Com'r, 44 Mich. 374 * In re Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. St. 1. * However equitable a land tax may be, it is void unless legally assessed: Joyner v. School Dist., 5 Cush. 567. As when it is demanded contrary to agreement with the state, but to -pay debts for which the state is liable for the party taxed: Northern Mo. R. Co. V. Maguire, 30 Wall. 46. See Hamil- ton V. Amsden, 88 Ind. 304 OH. I.] TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. 5 such general rules as the wisdom of the legislature has deter- mined are needful and proper for the general good.^ The im- possibility that government should be administered even by the most conscientious rulers without unjust consequences in particular cases is universally recognized; and the state is therefore considered to have performed its full duty when it has devised and established such general rules and regulations as seem calculated to reduce such consequences to a minimum. Taxes distinguished from other charges. The distinction between demands of money under the power to tax and those under the police power, as well as the differences between or- dinary taxes and special assessments for local improvements, will be considered later in this work.^ Other impositions there are, which, though having some of the characteristics of taxes, are, nevertheless, distinguishable from those burdens because laid for different purposes and not necessarily governed by the same rules. Charges for services rendered,.or for conveniences furnished, are in no sense taxes.' Thus, water rates exacted by a public corporation from actual consumers are not taxes, being merely the price of a commodity.* So, tolls for the use of passage over improved water-ways are not taxes.* ]S"or are 1 A tax for school purposes may be cinnati, 56 Ohio St. 47, 67; St. Louis levied upon a manufacturing corpo- Brewing Assoc, v. St. Louis, 140 Mo. ration: Amesbury N. F. Co. v. Weed, 419; Silkman v. Water Com'rs, 152 17 Mass. 53. Or upon a non-resident's N. Y. 337. See Provident Inst. v. cattle: Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264; Jersey City, 113 U. S. 506. But a Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U. S. 588. And sum assessed for a supposed benefit a railroad company may be taxed for arising from the presence or the pub- the improvement of a turnpike: New lie use of water, as distinguished York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Commis- from its private use, is a tax: Eem- sioners, 48 Ohio St. 249. Or even in sen v. Wheeler, 105 N. Y. 578; Matter aid of a rival railroad: Pittsburgh, of Trustees of Union College, 129 C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Harden, 187 N. Y. 308. The provision for colleot- Ind 486; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. ing the amount lent by the state Jefferson County, 39 Fed. R. 305. imder the Minnesota " seed-grain 2 Chs. XIX and XX, post. act " was held not to be taxation, but 3 Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S, 80; a method of foreclosing a statutory Huse V. Glover, 119 U. S. 543. lien for money borrowed: Deering * Jones V. Water Com'rs, 34 Mich. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 108. 373; Preston v. Detroit Water Com'rs, * Manistee River Imp. Co. v. Sands, 117 Mioh^ 589; Wagner V.Rock Island, 53 Mich. 598; Huse v. Glover, 119 14«IlL139;Vreelandv.O'Neil,36N.J. U. S. 543; Sands v. Manistee River Eq. 399 ; Vreeland v. Jersey City, 43 N. Imp. Ca, 133 U. S. 388. ' J. L. 135, 37 N. J. Eq. 574; Alter v. Ciif- 6 TAXES, THEIE NATUEB AND KINDS. [oh. I. railroad fares,' nor charges for wharfage.* A claim by a mu- nicipal corporation for work done by it, for which the citizen is liable, is not a tax.' Particular names of taxes. Particular names are applied to some kinds of taxes whereby they are commonly known and distinguished from all others; but in nearly every case the term is not used with much precision, and its use may, there- fore, be liable to cause confu^on. Thus th& word duty is sometimes used in a general sense as synonymous with tax;* but in common use it means an indirect tax, imposed on the , importation or consumption of goods.* The term impost also, in its general sense, signifies any tax, tribute or duty,^ but is seldom kpplied to any but the indirect taxes. Customs duties, as the term is commonly used, are the duties levied upon im- ports and exports, while excise duties are inland imposts levied upon articles of manufacture and sale, upon licenses to pursue certain trades, or deal in certain commodities, upon special privileges,' etc. Tribute, though frequently synonymous with 1 Tarbell v. Central Pacific R. Co., 84 CaL 61& ^Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Transportation Co. v. Parkers- burg, 107 U. & 691. sPoli6e Jury v. Mitchell, 37 La. Ann. 44. > * " The term ' tax ' has been applied to nearly, if not quite, every burden imposed upon persons, property or business, for the support of the gov- ernment; and in acts for raising a revenue for public purposes it seems to be used as meaning the same thing as'impost, duty or excise: " State v. Western Union TeL Co., 73 Me. 518, 537. The words "tax" or "taxes," used in the revenue law of Illinois, mean " any tax, special assessment, or costs, interest, or penalties im- posed upon property: '' Blake v. Peo- ple, 109 III 504, 535. ' Duties, excises and license laws, having for their ob- ject the common benefit and protec- tion, and designed for the preven- tion or mitigation of evils, are not acts of taxing power: State v. U. S. etc. Express Co., 60 N. H. 319. The term "tax," as used in the last clause of United States Revised Statutes, § 3369, does not include import duties : United States v. Fifty-nine Demi- johns, 39 Fed. R 401. 5 Pollock V. Farmers' Loan, etc. Co., 158 U. S. 601. 6 An impost is a duty on Imported goods and merchandise. In a larger sense it is any tax or imposition: In- surance Co. V. Soule, 7 Wall. 433. An exemption " from any tax or impost whatsoever" includes every forced contribution to the public treasury: Singer Manuf. Co. v. Heppenheimer, 58 N. J. L. 633; JSancock v.' Singer Manuf. Co., 63 N. J. L. 389. ''An excise is a fixed, .absolute and direct charge laid on merchandise, products or commodities, without any regard to the amount of property belonging to those on whom it may fall, or to any supposed relation be- tween money expended for a public CH. I.J TAXES, THEIE NAITUEB AND KIlNDS. tax,' ordinarily means an exaction demanded by a conqueror or by some irresistible -external authority.^ Subsidy, a term scarcely used in American law, denotes a special tax levied for some exceptional occasion or need. The term toll, in its applica- tion to the law of taxation, is nearly obsolete. It was formerly applied to duties on imports and exports; but tolls, as now un- derstood, are applied most exclusively to charges for permission to pass over a bridge, road or ferry owned by the person im- posing them.'' The taxing power incidental to sovereignty. The power of taxation is an incident of sovereignty,* and is possessed by the government without being expressly conferred by the peo- ple." It is a legislative power ; * and when the people, by their object and a special benefit occa- sioned to those by whom the charge is to be paid: Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Alleif 268. And see Bank v. Apthorp, 13 Mass. 253; Minot v. Win- throp, 163 Mass. ,113. A tax upon the stock of a banking corporation is an excise: Bank v. Apthorp, supra. 1 " Tax,'' as the name itself imports from its derivation, means tribute: Northern Liberties v. St John's Church, 13 Pa. St. 107. "Taxation implies tribute from the governed to some form of sovereignty: " West Hartford v. Board of Water Com'rs, 44 Ctonn. 360, 868. 2 " An exaction from ' strangers ' rather than from the 'children:'" Matthew 17: 36. Lawless and arbi- trary exactions are sometimes called tribute when made by the constituted government, as in the remontranoes of the Spanish cortes to their sover- eign against such demands : Hallam's Middle Agas, oh, IV. '"A tax is & demand of sover- eignty; a toll is a demand of propri- etorship: " Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 WalL 333, 378. Railroad fares are not tolls: State v. Haight, 30 N. J. L. 447. But sums paid by one rail- road company to another for the use of tracks are tolls within the mean- ing of a statute taxing gross receipts for "tolls and transportations: " New York, L. E. & W. E. Co. v. Pennsyl- vania, 158 U. S. 481. * MoCulloch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 428; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 561; Union Pacific E. Co. V. Peniston, 18 Wall. 5, 39; Picard V. East Tenn., V. & G. R Co., 130 U. S. 637, 641; People v. Seymour, 16 Cal. 333, 348; Bank of Pennsylva- nia v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 144, 153; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 358, 260; Wisconsin Central E. Co. v. Taylor, 53 Wis. 87, 53; Board of Di- rectors V. Collins, 46 Neb. 411, 434; Western Union TeL Co. v. Mayer, 38 Ohio St. 531, 538; Corbett v. Port- land, 31 Oreg. 407, 417; Eeelfoot Lake Le^ee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151, 158; Knoxville & O. E Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684; State v. Halter, 149 Ind. 293, 297; Geren v. Gruber, 36 La. Aim. 694,697; Union E. T. Co. v. Lynch, 18 Utah 378; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368; London, etc. Mortg. Co. V. Gibson, 77 Minn. 394 s Western Union TeL Co. v. Mayer, 28 Ohio St. 531, 533; Porter v. Eock- ford, etc. E Co,, 76 111. 661, 573; State V. Halter, 149 Ind. 393, 297; Union E T. Co. V. Lynch, 18 Utah 378. * United States v. New Orleans, 98 8 TAXES, THEIE NATPEE AND KINDS. [oh. I. constitutions, create a department of government upon which they confer the power to make laws, the power of taxation is conferred as part of the more general power.* Even a wrong- ful government, if it be for the time being a government de facto, maintaining its authority and enforcing obedience to its laws, may exercise the power of taxation, and the power, so far as it has been completely enforced, must be recognized as lawful.^ But the overthrow of the de facto government de- feats the power; and the rightful government will not there- after aid in enforcing the uncollected levies.* U. S. 381; Meriwether V. Garrett, 103 U. S. 473; Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. V. Smith, 131 Ind. 512; State v. Hal- ter, 149 Ind. 292; State Board of lax Com'rs V. Holliday, 150 Ind. 216; Phelps V. Lodge, 60 Kan. 122; Bigger v.Ryker (Kan.), 63 Pao. Rep. 740; Board of Directors v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411; State V. Jackson, 31 K J. L. 195; Jones v. Tonawanda, 158 N. Y. 488; Lima v. MoBride, 34 Ohio St. 388; Board of Education v. McLands- borough, 36, Ohio St. 327; Corbett V. Portland, 31 Or. 407; Crafts v. Ray, 33 R. L — , 46 Atl. Rep. 1043; Reel- foot Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 151; Union R. T. Co. v. Lynch, 18 Utah 378; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368; State v. Toma- hawk Common Council, 96 Wis. 73; Oconto City Water Supply Co. v. Oconto, 105 Wis. 76. 1 North Missouri R. Co. v. Maguirej 30 Wall. 46;'Extension of Hancock St., 18 Pa. St. 26; Bank of Pennsyl- vania V. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 144. See Blue Jacket v. Johnson County, '6 Kan. 299; Hagar v. Super- visors, 47 Cal. 383; Coite v. Society, 32 Conn. 173. 2 O'Byrne v. Savannah, 41 Ga. 331. See Dickerson v. Acosta, 15 Fla. 614, as to taxation in the period of recon- struction. The collection of taxes levied by a de /qscfo municipal cor- poration will not be enjoined, nor can an action for such taxes be re- sisted, nor may deeds issued upon sale for non-payment of such taxes be held void, nor are such taxes if paid recoverable, on the ground that such municipality was not legally organized: Austrian v. Guy, 21 Fed. R. 500; Dean v. Davis, 51 Cal. 406; Reclamation Dist. v. Gray, 95 Cal. 601; Swamp Land Dist. v. Silver, 98 Cal. 51; Quint v. HofCman, 103 Cal. 506; Reclamation Dist. v. Turner, 104 Cal. 334; Hamilton v. San Diego County, 108 Cal. 278; Geneva v. Cole, 61 111. 397; Trumbo v. People, 75 Bl. 561; People v. Newberry, 87 111. 41; West Chicago Park Com'rs v. Sweet, 167 111. 326; Mendenhall v. Burton, 42 Kan. 570; School Dist. v. School Dist., 45 Kan. 543; Chicago, St L. & N. 0. R Co. V. Kent wood, 49 La. Ann. 931; Stuart V. School Dist., 30 Mich. 69; Stockle V. Silsbee, 41 Mich. 615; Coe V. Gregory, 53 Mich. 19; Riverton, etc. Water Co. v. Haig, 58 N. J. L. 295 Brennan v. Bradshaw, 53 Tex. 330 Graham v. Greenville, 67 Tex. 62 El Paso V. Ruokman, 92 Tex. 86 See Sherry v. Gilmore, 58 Wis. 334 Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96 Ritchie v. Mulvane, 39 Kan. 341; Bird V. Perkins, 33 Mich. 38; Reclamation Dist. V. Burger, 123 CaL 443. ? O'Byrne v. Savannah, 41 Ga. 331. As to collection by state of taxes levied by superseded territorial gov- ernment, see Jacks v. Chaffln, 34 Ark. 534 CH. I.] TAXES, THEIE NATURE AND KINDS. Everything to which the legislative power extends may be the subject of taxation, whether it be person or property, or possession, franchise or privilege, or occupation or right.' Noth- ing but express constitutional limitation upon legislative au- thority can exclude anything to which the authority extends from the grasp of the taxing power, if the legislature in its discretion shall at any time select it for revenue purposes ; ^ and not only is the power unlimited in its reach as to subjects, but in its very nature it acknowledges no limits, and may be carried even to the extent of exhaustion and destruction, thus becoming in its exercise a power to destroy.' If the power 1 CatUn V. Hull, 21 Vt. 153; Brown's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 73; Common- wealth T. Delaware Div. Canal Co., 123 Pa. St. 594; Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196; Boyd v. Wiggins, 7 OkL 85; Mumford v. Sewell, 11 Or. 67; In re Page, 60 Kan. 842; Linton V. Childs, 105 Ga. 567. The au- thority of every state to tax all property, real and personal, within its limits is unquestionable: Savings Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421. The taxing power reaches everything In the state which can be denominated property; it may be made to embrace all equitable cred- its: Washington Iron Works Co. v. King County, 20 Wash- 150. ^ Hamilton Manuf. Co. v. Massachu- setts, 6 Wall. 639; North Missouri R. Co. V. Maguire, 20 Wall. 46; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; In re Mc- Pherson, 104 N. Y. 306; Youngblood V. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; Robertson v. State Land Office Com'r, 44 Mich. 274; Board of Education v. McLands- borough, 36 Ohio St. 227; Adler v. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 539; Common- wealth V. Moore, 25 Grat. 951; State Board of Tax Com'rs v. HoUiday, 150 Ind. 216; Williamson v. Mimms, 49 Ark. 336; People v. Ames, 24 Colo. 422; Bigger v. Ryker (Kan.), 63 Pac. Rep. 740. See Porter v. Rockford, etc. R. Co., 76 la 561. The power of the state to tax is plenary: People V. Seymour, 16 CaL 332; Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196; Butler v. Sag- inaw Supervisors, 26 Mich. 33; State V. Lewis Ca, 73 Minn. 87; Kimball V. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368. ' MoCuUoch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431; Weston v. Charleston, 3 Pet. 449; Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 563; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 430; Nathan V. Louisiana, 8 How. 73; Veazie Bank V. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533; California v. Central Pac. R. Co., 137 U. S. 1; Fair- bank V. United States, 181 U. S. — ; Howell V. State, 3 Gill 14; Atkins v. Hinman, 7 111. 449; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 339; Commonwealth v. Petty, 96 Ky! 452; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me. 315; Fifield v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; People V. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 141; Matter of Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 361; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91; Spencer v. Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585; People V. Board of Assessors, 156 N. Y. 417; Tallman v. Butler County, 13 Iowa 531 ; Davenport v. Railroad Co., 16 Iowa 348; State v. Bell, 1 Phil. (N. C.) 76; PuUen v. Commissioners, 66 N. C. 361; Bridge Proprietors v. State, 31 N. J. L. 384; s. c. on appeal, 22 N. J. L. 593; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 240; State v. Commercial Bank, 7 Ohio 125 ; Hanna v. Allen County, 8 Blackf . 353; Commonwealth v. Westing- house Electric, etc. Co., 151 Pa. St. 265, 371. 10 TAXES, THEIE NATTTEE AND KINDS. [oh. I. be threatened with abuse, security must be found in the respon- sibility of the legislature that imposes the tax to the constitu- ency which must pay it. The judiciary can afford no redress against oppressive taxation, so long as the legislature, in im- posing it, shall kee^ within the limits of legislative authority, and violate no express provision of the constitution.^ The ne- cessity for imposing it addresses itself to the legislative discre- tion, and it is or may be an urgent necessity which will admit of no property or other conflicting right in the citizen while it remains unsatisfied.^ Classification of taxes. Taxes may be either direct or indi- rect. The former include those assessed upon the property, person, business, income, etc., of those who are to pay them ; while indirect taxes are levied upon commodities before they reach the consumer, and are paid by those upon whom they ultimately fall, not as taxes, but as part of the market price of the commodity. Under the second bead may be classed the I "The judicial cannot presenile to the legislative department of the gov- ernment limitations upon the exer- cise of its acknowledged powers. . The power to tax may he exercised oppressively upon persons, but the responsibility of the legislature is not to the courts, but to the people by whom its members are elected. So, if a particular tax bear heavily upon a corporation or upon a class of corporations, it cannot, for that reason only, be declared contrary to , the constitution: " Veazie Bank v, Fenno, 8 WalL 533, 548. See Carroll V. Perry, 4 McLean 25; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 466; Lane County, V. Oregon, 7 Wall. 77; Berney v. Tax Collector, 3 Bail (S. C.) 654; Coite v. Society, 82 Conn. 173; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258; Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co. V. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 73; Hanna v. Allen County, 8 Blaokf. 353; State V. Newark, 26 N. J. L, 519; Tall- man V. Butler County, 13 Iowa 531; State V. Stephens, 4 Tex. 139; Gibson V. Mason, 5 Nev. 283; Youngs v. Hall, 9 Nev. 213; Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54; Williams v. Cammack, 37 Miss. 209 ; Board of Com'rs v. State, 147 Ind. 476; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368. There is no limitation upon the state's power to tax unless found in the constitution itself, though when there found it must be strictly observed: Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587. ^Parham v. Justices, 9 Ga. 841; Athens v. Long, 54 Ga. 330; Ander-_ son V. Mayfield, 93 Ky. 230; Board of Directors v. CoUins, 46 Neb. 411. That property valuable because of a special use has greatly depreciated because of public events, e. g., a re- bellion against the government, con- stitutes no ground for applying to a court of equity to restrain or abate the taxes assessed thereupon: White Sulphur Springs Co. v. Robinson, 3 W. Va 543. A purchaser of lands at a forced sale, even when made by the state, takes the land subject to all lawful taxes: Stanton t. Harris, 9 Heisk. 579. CH. I.] TAXES, THEIR NATUEE AND KINDS. 11 duties upon imports, and the 'excise and stamp duties levied upon manufactures.! The individual states have always de- rived their principal revenues from direct taxes, and the federal government from those which are indirect, but this has been matter of selection and policy merely ; there being no doubt that each government hafe power to levy taxes of both descrip- tions. For the purposes of the general government congress has general power to lay and collect taxes, subject only to the liin- itations imposed by the federal constitution.'' It is provided by that instrument that direct taxes, when laid by the federal gov- ernment, shall be apportioned among the several states accord- ing to representative population.' Question has several times been made as to the meaning of the term "direct taxes" as thus employed. It was held in an early case that a tax on carriages by number was not a direct tax in the sense of the constitution, and it was strongly intimated in the same case that only capitation taxes and taxes on land should be deemed within the provision.* But in 1895 it was decided that as taxes on realty are indisputably direct taxes, so are taxes on the rent or income of realty ; ^ and that taxes on personalty or on the income thereof are likewise direct taxes.* A tax of a specified per cent, upon the circulation of banks is not a direct tax;.' nor is a tax upon each sale of products by an exchange or board of trade ; ^ nor is a tax upon succession to property on the death of the owner.' Under the Maryland bill of rights it has been decided that a tax upon the gross receipts of a railroad oom- 1 Wayland's PoL Eoon., Bk. 4, ch. 3, * Pollock v. Farmers' Loan, etc. Co., § 1. See also Kent's Com. 254; Story 157 U. S. 439, 586, 158 V. S. 601. on Const., §§ 950-957; 1 Montesq. ^ PoUock v. Farmers' Loan, etc. Co., Spirit of the' Laws, Bk. 13, ch. 7; 158 CT. S. 601. Previously it had been Tucker's Pol. Econ., ch. 14; Kogers' held that a tax on income is not a PoL Econ., oh. 23. direct tax: Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 2 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall 463. 7 llValL 433; Springer v. United SU. S. Const., art. 1, § 2,'cL 3. States, 103 U. S. 586. ^Hyltonv. United States, 3 Dall. 'Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall 171. See Springer v. United States, 533. See National Bank v. United 103 U. S. 586. "What was decided States, 101 U. S. 1. in the Hylton Case was that a tax on « Nicol v. Ames, 178 U. S. 609. carriages was an excise, and there- ' Scholey v. Rew, 23 Wall 381; fore an indirect tax: " Fuller, C. J., Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 4L in Pollock V. Farmers' Loan, eta Ca, 158 U, S. 601, 637. 12 TAXES, THEIB NATUEB AND KINDS. [OH. I. pany is not a direct tax upon property.' So, of a license tax.' In Canada it is held that a license fee imposed upon manu- facturers and traders is a direct tax.' Maxims of policy. Writers on political economy lay down certain principles which should govern the imposition of taxes, but these are guides rather to the legislature than to the courts. The author of the " "Wealth of If ations," in particular, has enumerated certain maxims, the substance of which may be stated as follows: 1. That the*Eubjeots of every state ought to contribute to the support of the government as nearly as pos- sible in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under its protection. 2. The tax which each is to pay ought, as respects the time and manner of payment, and the sum to be paid, to be certain and not arbitrary. 3. It ought to be levied at the time and in the manner in which it is most likely to be convenient to the contributor to pay it; and 4. It ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and above what it brings into the public treasury.* Of these maxims, the wisdom of which has secured for them general acceptance,' the second embodies a rule of absolute right from which the authorities are not at liberty to depart; the first* and third address themselves to the legislative which frames the revenue laws ; the fourth also appeals to the legisla- tive wisdom, and is perhaps less observed than either of the others, especially in those states which have never burdened 1 State V. Philadelphia, etc. E. Co., a number of economic writers, con- 45 Md. 361. _ tend that a progressive tax is more 2Rohr V. Gray, 80 Md. 374. just and equal than a proportional ' Fortier v. Lamb, 25 Can. S. C. R. one. In the absence of constitu- 432. ' tional limitation, the question * Smith's Wealth of Nations, Bk. i, whether it is or is not is legislative ch. 3. and not judicial: " Knowlton v. 6 See Mill's Pol. Econ., Bk. 5, ch. 2, Moore, 178 U. S. 109. . "The value of § 3; Tucker's Pol. Econ., ch. 14; Eog- the things owned fixes the measure ers' PoL Econ., ch. 31. of the owner's ability to contribute ""Taxes imposed with reference to in taxes towards the support of the the ability of the person upon whom government. This is an axiom of the burden is placed to bear the political economy no^ less than a same have been levied since the fundamental provision of our organic foundation of the government. So, law: " Monticello Distilling Co. v. also, some authoritative thinkers,and Mayor, etc., 90 Md. 416. en. I.] TAXES, XnEIE NATURE AND KINDS. 13 themselves with heavy debts or been tempted into wild and extravagant expenditures. .In such states a tendency has been apparent to heavy accumulations of money in the state treas- ury; accumulations not only unjust to the people whom they deprive of the use of the money taken from them for consider- able period^, but especially impolitic, as they tempt those hav- ing the custody of the funds to a use of them in loans — pos- sibly in speculation, — which, when not strictly within the law, is always demoralizing and often leads to defalcations. The maxim would justify any state in having its treasury in condi- tion at all times to meet all possible claims upon it, but it con- demns exactions from the people in advance of any needs of the government.^ All these maxims assume that the taxation is laid for the purpose of obtaining a revenue. Within the definitions given, the burden would not be taxation, if revenue were not the purpose. But in laying taxes other considerations not only are but ought to be kept in view ; the question being always not exclusively how a certain sum of money can be collected for public expenditure, but hoW, when, and upon what sub- jects it is wise and politic to lay the necessary tax under the existing circumstances, having regard not merely to the re- replenishing of the public treasury, but to the general benefit and welfare of the political society, and taking notice, there- fore, of the manner in which the laying and collection of the tax will affect the several interests in the state. And upon this it may be observed that : 1. In the laying of taxes, one purpose had in view may be to encourage one branch of industry or trade, though at the 1 It is against the policy of the law crue to property from a main sewer to raise taxes faster than they are at an unknown period when a con- likely to be needed: Midland v. Eos- necting sewer shall be laid: Vree- common, 39 Mich. 434; Michigan land v. Bayonne, 58 N. J. L. 126. On Land, etc. Co. V. L'Anse, 63Mioh.700. the same principle, excessive inter- The accumulation of money by tax- est charges for delay in paying ation to meet a mere contingency — taxes, and heavy penalties exacted such as the liability to pay interest on redemption of land sold for taxes, on railroad aid-bonds in escrow de- are to be condemned. But the col- liverable on the completion of the lection of part of an assessment will road — is not authorized: Keystone not be restrained on the ground that Lumber Co. v. Bayfield, 94 Wis. 491. the money is not yet actually needed And a statute is invalid in so far as to pay bonds or interest: Florer v. it requires a present assessment of McAflEee, 135 Ind. 540. the special benefit hereafter to ao- 14 TAXES, THEIE NATOEE AND KIHDS. [^H. I. expense of others; as where a tax is laid upon certain fabrics received from abroad by the exchanges of commerce for the sake of encouraging the domestic producer of similar articles, on whose industry the tax operates as a bounty.^ Such a bur- den, however, may be so heavy that the market will not war- rant its being paid, and in such case, instead of producing revenue, it merely precludes importation. But a law, which, under the name of taxation, has for its purpose only to em- barrass and, perhaps, to destro^a certain branch of commerce, if enacted by a state, would look to the general police power for its justification; and, if enacted by the general govern- ment, would seem more properly to derive its force from the authority conferred upon the government to regulate com- merce and the intercourse with foreign countries, than to an authority conferred for revenue purposes, which such a law would not aim or tend to subserve.* 2. They may be intended to discourage trades and occupa- tions which may be useful and important when carried on by a few persons under stringent regulations, but exceedingly mischievous when thrown open to the general public and en- gaged in by many persons. An example is the heavy tax im- posed in some states and in some localities of other states on those who engage in the manufacture or sale of intoxicating drinks. Two purposes are generally had in view in imposing such a tax; to limit the business to a few persons, in order to more efficient and perfect regulation, and also to produce a revenue. As no one will pay the tax who does not expect to be reimbursed the expense from the profits of sales, it is obvious that the heavier the tax the fewer can afford to pay it, and it may be made so heavy that no one can afford to pay it, and then it becomes prohibitory.' A tax laid for the double pur- 1 Tucker's PoL Econ., ch. 14 Mr. has not revenue in view, but is only Justice Story, in his treatise on the called a tax in order that it may be Constitution, § 965, asserts Very employed as an instrument of de- broadly the power to tax for other struction. In the recent case of purposes than for revenue. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41. 60, 2 The power to tax involves the it is said that this principle is perti- power to destroy: McCuUoch v. nent only when there is no power to Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431, and tax a particular subject, and has no othercasesoitedojtfe, p. 9. Butitmay relation to a case where such right be questioned whether this justifies exists. an afllrmative exercise of power that 'Youngblood v. Sexton, 83 Mich. CII. I.] TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. 15 pose of regulation and revenue must be grounded in both the police and the taxing power; but the grant of a power to tax would not authorize the imposition of a burden in its nature and purpose' prohibitory.^ Taxes in kind. Taxes are generally demanded in money, and any tax law will be understood to require money when a different intent is not expressed.^ But if the condition of any state, in the judgment of its legislature, shall require the col- lection of taxes in kihd — that is to say, by the delivery to the proper oflBcers of a certain proportion of products — or in gold or silver bullion,' or in anything different from the legal tender currency of the country, the right to make the requirement is unquestionable, being in conflict with no principle of govern- ment, and with no provision of the federal constitution. In- stances of taxes in kind occurred in the colonial period,' and statutes requiring state taxes to be paid in gold and silver, to the exclusion of legal tender treasury notes, have been fully sustained in several of the states.* The exigencies of govern- 406; People v. Walling, 53 Mich. 264. These, and other oases hold that a prohibited business may be taxed.' In the early case of State v. Doon, K. M. Charl. 1, the right to levy a tax of $1,000 on faro tables for the purpose of prohibition was aflSrmed, although the payment of the tax ■would not legalize the use of the tables. Compare Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall 533; Palmer v. State, SaTenn. 563; Blaufleld v. State, 103 Tenn. 593. 1 Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461. ^Amenia v. Stanford, 6 Johns. 93; Bryan v. Sundberg, 5 Tex. 418; Judd V. Driver, 1 Kan. 455; Sawyer v. %ringfleld, 40 Vt. 305; Shreveport V. Gregg, 28 La. An. 836. As to taxes made payable in scrip, see New Or- leans V. Jackson, 83 La. An. 1038. The running of the statute of limita- tions does not excuse a collector from taking scrip when the statute provides for it: Daniel v. Askew, 36 Ark. 487. 3 Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall 71; Williams' Case, 8 Bland Ch. 186, 255; 2 Elves' Life of Madison, 146; Parkman's Old Regime, 302. « Perry v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 818, 350; State Treasurer v. Wright, 28 111. 509; Trenholm v. Charleston, 3 Rich. (N. S.) 347, 349; Whiteaker v. Haley, 2 Or. 128; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; People v. Hagar, 53 Cal. 171; Reclamation Dist. v. Ha- gar, 6 Sawy. 567; Hagar v. Reclama- tion Dist., Ill U. S. 701. Contra, Haas V. Misner, 3 Idaho 174; Cruther V. Sterling, 3 Idaho 806. A state can- not compel state scrip to be received in payment of county, school and district taxes; it not being money and the creditors of the municipali- ties not being compellable to receive it in payment: Wells v. Cole, 27 Ark. 603. But it has also been held that cities and counties cannot disregard the provisions of the acts of the leg- islature for the collection of revenue, because they are but its creatures and have no sovereignty; they have no power whatever to collect a single 16 TAXES, THEIE IfATUEE AND KINDS. [CH. ment have also in some cases seemed to require that the state should make the taxes levied for its municipalities payable in ^tate obligations; and if it shall' so provide, the municipalities have no alternative and must submit to the requirement. A levy is sometimes made payable in labor; but this has commonly been restricted to the labor needed to keep the highways in repair; and while it is in its nature a tax, it par- takes, to some extent at least, of a police regulation. Neither in common speech nor in th^ customary revenue legislation would a burden of this nature be understood as embraced in the term tax ; and statutory provisions for assessment are not therefore applicable to it unless made so in express terms.^ dollar of tax for any purpose what- ever, unless it is conferred upon them by the legislature; their taxing pow- ers are all derived from that source, and they are dependent upon its will for every cent of revenue they raise: English v. Oliver, 28 Ark. 317. See Wallis v. Smith, 29 Ark. 354 Under statutory authority a, city may make its warrants receivable in payment of taxes: Fuller v. Heath, 89 111. 296. 1 Galloway v. Tavares, 37 Fla. 58. See Amenia v. Stanford, 6 Johns. 92; Short V. State, 80 Md. 392. In Saw- yer V. Alton, 3 Scam. 127, a provision of the constitution that "the mode of levying a tax shall be by valua- tion, so that every person shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of the property he or she has' in his or her possession," was held not to pre- vent the levy of a poll tax payable in labor. In Town of Pleasant v. Kost, 29 111. 490, a highway assess- ment on property, payable in labor, was held not to be in the proper sense a tax. And see Fox v. Eock- ford, 38 111. 451; Macomb v. Twaddle, 4 111. App. 254; State v. Topeka, 36 Kan. 78; State v. Halifax, 4 Dev. 845. In Amenia v. Stanford, 6 Johns. 92, 93, where the question was whether one who had worked out a highway poll tax had gained a settlement under a statute which made the set tlement depend on the payment of a tax, it is said: " Taxes, in the popular and ordinary sense of the term (and ill that sense laws are generally to be read), mean pecuniary contribu- tions; and when the word 'paid' is added by way of defining it, the sense becomes more clear and cer- tain." It was therefore held that a settlement was not gained by work- ing out a highway assessment. And see Starkesboro v. Hinesburgh, 13 Vt. 315. Though the public burden assumes the form of labor, it is still taxation and must therefore be lev- ied on some principle of uniformity; but it is a peculiar speoifes of taxa- tion, and the general terms " tax " or " taxation " would not usually be understood to include it: Short v. State, 80 Md. 392. An ordinance re- quiring all able-bodied male resi- dents to work upon the streets for six days in each year does not im- pose a tax in the sense that such word is used in the constitution -and statutes regarding the levy, assess- ment and collection of taxes; such a charge is, however, the imposition of a burden in the nature of a tax, and the town cannot pass it without legislative authority: Galloway v. Tavares, 87 Fla. 68. An assessment of $4 or two days' work on each male OH. I.J TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. 17 Taxes not debts. It sometimes becomes a question whether a tax can be regarded as a debt in the ordinary sense of that term,i so that the ordinary remedies for the collection of debts can be applied to it. In general it will be found that statutes imposing taxes make special provision for their collection, and do not apparently contemplate that any others will be neces- sary; but these may, nevertheless, fail; and the question then arises whether the tax must fail also, or whether resort may be had by the state toisuch remedies as would be available to individuals to enforce demands owing to themselves. But instances have occurred of tax laws which provided for laying the tax, but made no provision whatever for collection. In such case it may well be held that the, legislature contemplated the enforcement of the tax by the ordinary remedies; and therefore, if the tax was assessed against an individual, that assumpsit or debt would lie for the recovery thereof.* The resident over twenty-one and under sixty was held to be a poll tax, and as such forbidden by the constitu- tion of Nevada: Hassett v. Walls, 9 Nev. 387. Compulsory labor upon roads with privilege of substitution or cash payment, held not to be a poll tax: Short v. State, 80 Md. 392; see Gallovay v. Tavares, 37 Fla. 58. So, with a commutation tax in -lieu of working on the streets: Johnson V. Macon, 63 Ga. 645. Requiring labor on streets is not unconstitu- tional as imposing involuntary servi- tude on persons not convicted of crime: Ex parte Dessler,35 Kan. 678; State V. Topeka, 36 'Kan. 76. Indict: ment for failing to work road: State V. Pool, 106 N. C. 698; State v. Sny- der, 41 Ark. 236. 1 Taxes are not " debts " in the or- dinary sense of that term: Lane County V. Oregon, 7 Wall 71; Meri- wether V. Garrett, 102 U. S. 473, 513; Perry v. Washburn, 20 CaL 318; Iowa Land Co. v. Douglas County, 8 8. D. 491; Danforth v. MoCook County, 11 S. D. 358; Brule County v. King, 11 S. D. 294; Hanson County v. Gray, 13 S. D. 134; Dunlap v. Gallatin County, 15 III 7; Jack v. Weiennett, 2 115 IlL 105; Loeber v. Leininger, 175 IIL 484; Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196; Marshall County v. Knoll, 102 Iowa 573; Com'rs v. First Nat. Bank, 48 Kan. 561; Jones v. Gibson, 82 Ky. 561; Slaughter v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 113; Schuck v.Lebanon (Ky.), 53 S.W. Rep. 655; Geren v. Gruber, 26 La. An. 694; Shreveport v. Gregg, 28 La. An. 836; New Orleans v. Davidson, 80 La. An. 541; Morris v. Lalaurie, 39 La. An. 47; Augusta v. North, 57 Me. 392; Carondelet v. Picot, 38 Mo. 125; Ne- braska City V. Gas Co., 9 Neb. 339; State V. Yellow Jacket S. M. Co., 14 Nev. 220; Camden -v. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398; Hewitt v. Traders' Bank, 18 Wash. 326; New Whatcom v. Roeder, 33 Wash. 570; Board of Edu- cation V. Old Dominion, etc. Co., 18 W. Va. 444; Hinchman v. Morris, 39 W. Va. 673; Riddell's Assignment, 93 Wis. 564. It has been held that authority to the vendee of a stock qf goods to pay the vendor's " credit- ors " from funds collectfed justifies the vendee's paying taxes assessed upon stock prior to the purchase: Tanner v. Page, 106 Mich. 155. 2 Baltimore v. Howard, 6 H. & J. 383; Mayor v. McKee, 3 Yerg. 167; 18 TAXKS, THEIE NATUBE AND KINDS. [oh. I. same reasoning would support a proceeding in equity to en- force a lien for the tax when assessed, not against an indi- vidual, but against property; and some courts have gone so' far as to hold that the imposition and assessment of a tax create a legal obligation to pay, upon which the law will raise an assimvpsit, although the statute has given a special remedy .1 But in general, the conclusion has been reached that when the statute -undertakes to provide remedies, and those given do not embrace an action at law, a common-law action for the re- Rutledge v. Fogg, 3 Cold. 554; Ir- win's Succession, 33 La. An. 63; State V. Severance, 55 Mo. 378. See Haas V. Misner, 3 Idaho 174; ^an Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwell, 62 Cal. 641; Dubuque v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 39 Iowa 56; Burlington v. Burlington & M. R Co., 41 Iowa 134; Marshall County v. Knoll, 103 Iowa 573; Eyke v. Lange, 104 Mich. 36; State V. New York, N. H. & H. E. Co., 60 Conn. 326; Gatling v. Com'rs, 92 N. C. 536. Where an actiton lies, the statute of limitations applies to bar the remedy ' after the statu- tory period: Burlington v. Burling- ton & M. R Co., 41 Iowa 134; State V. Yellow Jacket S. M. Co., 14 Nev. 220. And the time may be extended by statute any time before it has fully run: State v. Hernan, 70 Mo. 430. 1 Dugan V. Baltimore, 1 Gill & J. 499; State v. Steamship Co., 13 La. An. 497; Succession 'of Mercier, 43 La. An. 1135; State v. Georgia Co., 112 N. C. 34; Burlington v. Burling- ton & M. R Co., 4 Iowa 184: Perry County V. Selma, etc. R Co., 58 Ala. 546; Anniston v. Southern E. Co., 112 Ala. 557. Early cases in Illinois held that the remedy by distress was not necessarily exclusive: Ryan v. Galla- tin County, 14 111. 78; Dunlap v. Gal- latin County, 15 III 7 ; Geneva v. Cole, 61 IlL 398. But see Loeber v. Leinin- ger, 175 lU. 484. In Louisiana it seems that an action will lie for a special as- sessment notwithstanding there is a lien on the land: New Orleans v. Day, 39 La. An. 41& And in Maryland such an assessment is collectible as a debt against the estate of the de- ceased adjoining owner: Gould v. Mayor, etc., 59 Md. 378. The United States are not precluded by anything in the revenue act of 1866 from em- ploying common-law remedies for the collection of their dues: Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227. Assumpsit lies against an importer for customs dues, though the gov- ernment has a lien on the goods and a bond for the taxes: Meredith v. United States, 13 Pet 486. A stat- ute punishing by fine persons who do business without a license does noi preclude the city's suing in debt to recover such license: State v. Flem- ing, 112 Ala. 179. In Tennessee a privilege tax is a debt and may be sued as such: State v. North ville Savings Bank, 16 Lea 111. There the assessment of a tax creates a per- sonal debt against the person as- sessed: Nashville v. Cowan, 10 Lea 209; East Tenn., V. & G. R Co. v. Morristown (Tenn. Ch. Ap.), 35 S. W. Rep. 771. In New Hampshire taxes are now — by statute — collectible by suit like other debts: Boody v. Wat- son, 64 N. H. 162. And it is pro- vided by statute in Connecticut that " all taxes properly levied shall be- come a debt due from the person , . . against whom they are re- spectively assessed:" See State v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 Conn, 590. CH. !•] TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. 19 covery of the tax as a debt will not lie.* The assessm'ent of the tax, though it may definitely and conclusively establish a demand for the purposes of statutory collection, does not con- stitute a technical judgment; '^ and the taxes are not " contracts between party and party, either express or implied ; but they are the positive acts of the government, through its various agents, binding upon the inhabitants, and to the making and enforcing of which their personal consent individually is not required." ' They do not draw interest, as do sums of money 1 Ruddock V. Gordon, Quinoy's Bep. 58; Andover Turnpike v. Gould, 6 Mass. 40; Pierce v. Boston, 3 Met. 520; Crapo v. Stetson, 8 Met. 393; Ap- pleton V. Hopkins, 5 Gray 530; Home Savings Bank v. Boston, 131 Mass. 277: Newport, etc. Co. v. Douglass, 12 Bush 673; Johnston v. Louisville, 11 Bush 527; Camden v. Allen, 26 N. J. L. 398; Webster v. Seymour, 8 Vt. 135, 140; Shaw v. Peckett, 26 Vt. 483; Packard v. Tisdale, 50 Me. 376; State V. Piazza, 66 Miss. 426; Carondelet V. Picot, 38 Mo. 135; State v. Sny- der, 139 Mo. 549; Loeber v. Lein- inger, 175 111. 484; Perry v. 'Jf^'ash- burn, 20 Cal. 818; Richards v. Stoggs- dell, 31 Ind. 74; Richards v. Com'rs, 40 Neb. 45; McCall v. Lorrimer, 4 Watts 351; Miller v. Hale, 26 Pa. St. 432; McKeesport v. Fidler, 147 Pa. St. 533; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall 71; Board of Education v. Old Dominion, etc. Co., 18 W. Va. 441; Brule County v. King, 11 S. D. 294; Hanson County v. Gray, 12 S. D. 124; Montezuma Valley, etc. Co. v. Bell, 30 Colo. 175; Du Bignon v. Bruns- wick, 1'06 Ga. 317. Compare Durant v. Supervisors, 26 Wend. 66; Meriwether V. Garrett, 103 IT. S. 573; Crismon V. Reich, 2 Utah 111; State v. Yellow Jacket, etc. Co., 14 Nev. 230; Fari- bault V. Misener, 20 Minn. 396; Hib- bard v. Clark, 56 N. H. 155; Dreake V. Beasley, 26 Ohio, St. 315; Apperson V. Memphis, 3 Flip. 363; Board of Com'rs V. First Nat Bank, 48 Kan. 661. In Michigan an action for taxes lies only when expressly given by statute: Staley v. Columbus, 36 Mich. 38; McCallum v. Bethany, 43 Mich. 457; Detroit v. Jepp, 52 Mich. 458; Croskery v. Bnsch, 116 Mich. 388. So in Kentucky: Louisville Water Co. V. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 344; Bald- win V. Hewett, 88 Ky. 673. And see Sherwin v. Savings Bank, 137 Mass. 444. In Iowa the tax imposed by the mulct law on liquor dealers creates a personal liability enforcible by an ordinary action, though there is also given a lien therefor on the real estate whereupon the liquor is sold, and on all personal property con- nected with the business: Marshall CoTznty v: Knoll, 103 Iowa 573. It has been decided in Vermont that if a tax be duly assessed against a /erne sole who afterwards marries, the husband's property, including the personal property acquired by the marriage, is not liable to be distrained for the satisfaction of the tax: Sum- ner V. Pinney, 31 Vt. 717. 2 Johnson v. Howard, 41 Vt 122; Pierce v. Boston, 3 Met. 530; Morris V. Lalaurie, 39 La. An. 47; Hibbard V. Clark, 56 N. H. 155. But in North Carolina a tax list is a judgment, and the tax is a debt collectible by proceedings in the nature of a cred- itor's biU: State v. Georgia Co., 113 N. C. 34 8 Pierce v. Boston, 3 Met. 520; Web- ster V. Seymour, 8 Vt. 185; Johnson V. Howard, 41 Vt. 123; Finnegan v. Fernandina, 15 Fla. 379; Edmonson V. Galveston, 53 Tex. 157; Perry y. Washburn, 20 Cal. 318; Morris v. 20 TAXES, THEIE IfATUEE AND KINDS. [oh. owing upon contract; but only when it is expressly given.^ They cannot be assigned as debts,^ or be proved in bankruptcy as such;' nor, if uncollected, are they assets which can be seized by attachment or other judicial process, and subjected to the payment of municipal indebtedness.* They are not the subject of set-off, either on behalf of the state or the munici- pality for which they are imposed, or of the collector,' or on behalf of the person taxed, as against such state, municipality or collector.* Taxes are not wifcin a statute exempting certain Lalaurie, 39 La. An. 47; De Pauw V. New Albany, 23 Ind. 306; Jones v. Gibson, 83 Ky. 561. v iShaw V. Peckett; 36 Vt. 483; Dan- forth V. Williams, 9 Mass. 334; Perry V. Washburn, 30 Cal. 318; Haskell v. Bartlett, 34 CaL 381; Himmelman v. Oliver, 34 CaL 346 ; People v. Northern Pao. Coast R. Co., 68 tal. 551; People V. Central Pao. E. Co., 105 Cal. 576; Perry County v. Selma, etc. E. Co., 65 Ala. 891; "Louisville & N. J. R.. Co. V. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 531; Anderson v. May field, 93 Ky. 280; ^ Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Adams (Miss.), 39 South Rep. 996; Edmonson v. Gal- veston, 53 Tex. 157; Western Union Tel. Co. V. State, 55 Tex. 314; Camden V. AUei^ 26 N. J. L. 398; Belvidere v. Warren E. Co., 34 N. J. L. 193: Bren- nert v. Farrier, 47 N. J. L. 75; Peo- ple v. Gould, etc. TeL Co., 98 N. Y. 67; New Whatcom v. Roeder, 33 Wash. 570; Rockland v. tJlmer, 87 Me. 357. A statutei authorizing a city to collect interest on overdue ordinary taxes does not authorize the collection of interest on an assessment for a public improve- ment: Sargent v. Tuttle, 67 Conn. 162. See Mall v. Portland, 35 Or. 89. As to interest on unpaid license fees, see Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Fricke, 99 Wis. 367. SMcInerny v. Reed, 33 Iowa 410; Hinchman v. Morris; 39 W. Va. 673. A claim against an estate for taxes is not a debt within the statute pro- viding for the discharge of insolv- ents' debts by voluntary assignment: Riddell's Assignment, 93 Wis. 564. Such a claim takes precedence of ordinary debts against assigned prop- erty: Dunlap V. Gallatin County, 15 III 7; Jack v. Weiennett, 115 IlL 105. But a personal tax is in Minrte- sota a debt for the, purpose of proof against and payment from a deced- ent's estate: Jefferson's Estate, 85 Minn. 315. ' In re Duryee, 3 Fed. Rep. 68. * Mei-iwether v. Garrett, 103 U. S. 472. "Pierce v. Boston, .3 Met. 530; Howe Savings Bank v. Boston, 131 Mass. 277; Johnson v. Howard, 41 Vt. 123. See McCracken v. Elder, 34 Pa. St. 839; Hibbard v. Clark, 56 N. H. 155; Cobb v. Elizabeth City, 73 N. 0. 1; Nebraska City v. Gas Co., 9 Neb. 839. But a state may make municipal obligations a set-off to taxes, and there is no constitutional objection to doing so: Amy v. Shelby Co, Taxing Dist., 114 U. S. 387. SNew Orleans v. New Orleans Water Works, 36 La. An. 433; Mor- ris V. Lalaurie, 39 La. An. 47; Car- tersville Water Works Co. v. Carters- ville, 89 Ga. 689; Trenholm v. Charles- ton, 3 S. C. (N. S.) 894;,Himmelmann V. Spanagel, 39 CaL 389; Hawkins V. Sumter Cbunty, 57 Ga. 166; Mil- ler V. Wisener, 45 W. Va. 59. "To hold that a tax is liable to set-off would be utterly subversive of the power of government, and destruct- ive of the very end of taxation:" Finnegan v. Fernandina, 15 Fla. 379. It is no defense to the payment of a OH. I.] TAXES, THEIE NATTJKE AND KINDS. 21 timber claims from debts; ^ nor are proceedings to enforce them barred by the ordinary statutes, of limitation.^ The law abolishing imprisonment for debt has no application to taxes; and the remedies for their collection may include an arrest if the legislature shall so provide.' The repeal of a tax law puts an end to all right to proceed to a levy of tg,xes under it, even in cases already commenced, unless the right is reserved in tbe repealing statute;^ and statutory remedies for the enforcement of a tax are gone when the statute is repealed without an express saving." But in tax that an overpayment has been made in the tax of a former year: New Orleans v. Davidson, 30 La. An. 541. A similar point is decided in Wayne v. Savannah, 56 Ga. 448. An excess of taxes cannot be made a set- off in favor of the land-owner against taxes thereafter assessed against the land: McVeigh v. Lanier, 50 Ark. 384. A railroad company cannot off- set county taxes with past-due cou- pons of railroad-aid bonds: Morgan V. Pueblo, etc. E. Co., 6 Colo. 478- The fact that a county owes a person taxed a considerable sum is no ground for enjoining payment of a county tax. County authorities have no power to contract in advance of the assessment of a tax, that when levied it shall be considered paid by the county indebtedness: Soobey v. Decatur Co., 72 Ind. 551. One cannot have the collection of city taxes against him enjoined on the ground that the city is indebted to him, and has in its treasury a fund which can- not be legally applied otherwise than by paying his debt: Cartersville Water Works v. Cartersville,' 89 Ga. 689. The surety of a sheriff who pays into the treasury taxes due and unpaid by his principal cannot be subrogated to the state's rignts against the delinquent taxpayers: Jones V. Gibson, 82 Ky, 561. No set- off of independent claims is admissi- ble against federal taxes, even when they are collected by suit: United States V. Pacific R. Co., 4 Dill. 66. Statutory right to set off city war- rants against tax: see Western Town Lot Co. V. Lane, 7 S. D. 599. 1 Danforth v. McCook County, 11 S. D. 358. 2 Iowa Land Co. v. Douglas County, 8 S. D. 491. 'Appleton V. Hopkins, 5 Gray,- 530; Harris v. Wood, 6 T. B. Monr. 641; Charleston v. Oliver, 16 S. C. 47; McCaskell v. State, 53 Ala. 511 ; De- linquent Poll Tax, 21 E. L 582. See post, ch. XIV. A property tax is not a debt within an act of congress ex- empting soldiers from arrest for any "debt or contract:" Webster v. Sey- mour, 8 Vt. 135. ^Ross V. Lane, 11 Miss. 695; Ab- bott V. Britton, 28 La. An. 511. If, after an assessment, the constitution of the state is so amended as to limit the rate of~tax that may be levied, a subsequent levy upon the assess- ment must keep within the limit: Ketchum v. Pacific R. Co., 4 Dill. 41. 6 Mount V, State, 6 Blackf . 25 ; Mc- Quilkin V. Doe, 8 Blackf. 581. This, is so, even as to assessments in pro- oeps of collection: Marion, etc. Gravel Road Co. v. Sheeth, 53 Ind. 35. See Commonwealth v. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St. 119. If a statute giving a right of action is repealed without any saving of pending ac- tions, the right is gone as to such 22 TAXES, THEIE NATOEE AND KINDS. [CH. I. general, when a tax system is revised, with a repeal of the former law, it is safe to assume that the legislative intent is that the new enactment shall be of prospective force only, and shall not disturb existing valid assessments.' Taxation and protection reciprocal. It has been said al- ready that the taxing power of a state is co-extensive with its sovereignty, and that wha'.3ver objects of government- are within its reach are subject to it,, and may be made the basis of' levies.^ It is commonly said that taxation and protection are reciprocal;' and this, if rightly understood, is correct. actions: ' St. Joseph County Court v. Euckman, 57 Ind. 96; French v. State, 53 Miss. 651. Under the genr eral statute of Kentucky for the constr^ction of laws, which provides that no new law shall be constiiued to repeal a former law as to any right accrued or claim arising under the former law before the new law takes effect, the right te sue for de- linquent taxes accrued under a stat- ute is not taken awsiy even by the ' repeal of the statute: Louisville Water Ca v. Commonwealth, 34 S. W. Rep. 1064. 1 In Warren E. Co. v. Belvidere, 35 N. J. L. 587, speaking of a tax-lav7 which was repealed after tax was laid, it is Said : "Such repeal does not affect the tax assessed. That was a matter closed by the assessment, and, be- sides, has been concluded by final judgment since the repeal" But in that case the collection of the tax was provided for not by the law which was repealed, but by a gen- eral law which remained in force. See Belvidere v. R Co., 34 N. J. L., . 193^ Also Gorley v. Sevsrell, 77 Ind. 316; Clegg v. State, 43 Tex. 605; Pa- cific, etc. Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 70. It is competent for the legislature, after an assessment has been made for municipal taxar tion, to repeal the law and refer the power to make the assessment to another authority, even though the constitution forbids retrospective laws: State v. St. Louis, etc. E. Co., 9 Mo. App. 533. In State v. Water- ville Savings Bank, 68 Me. 515, an assessment for which an action was given was held to remain collectible notwithstanding the repeal of the statute under which it was laid. See Smith V. Auditor General, 30 Mich. 898. As against the officer or mu- nicipality the legislature may un- doubtedly take away the right to collect a tax even after proceedings begun: Selma, etc. Assoc, v. Morgan, 57 Ala. 38. A tax is not defeated by the land for which it was levied being set off from the city levying it, but it may be enforced against the owner afterwards: Deason v. Dixon, 54 Miss. 585. 2 The rules for the taxation of prop- erty brought within the limits of a state must be determined by the laws thereof: State v. Deering, 56 Minn. 34. The state may tax a bridge over a navigable river within its limits even though it does not own the soil in the bed of the river upon which the piers of the bridge rest: Hender- son Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U. S. 593. ' Vattel says that the right to tax an individual results from the gen- eral protection afforded to him and his property: Bk.l,ch.30. SeeEggles- ton V. Ciiarleston, 1 S. C. Const. R. 45; Bank of U. S. v. State, 13 S. & M. 456; OH. I.] TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. 23 though some subjects receive the protection of government which are not taxable, and some may be taxed though not pro- tected. The vessels of a foreign nation or of its citizens and the property in them, and the citizens themselves when tem-, porarily in the country for business or pleasure, are protected by our laws, but not taxable under them ; the consideration for the exemption being the like exemption of our own vessels, property and citizens when in foreign lands. Ambassadors and others connected with the public service of foreign coun- tries, though residing here in such service, are also exempt as representatives of the government which accredits or employs them,* but alienage itself does not work an exemption if the alien is domiciled in the country, so far at least as he has prop- erty there to be protected by its laws ; * and tangible property in the country, as stock in trade or manufacture, or for sale, is taxable irrespective of the residence or allegiance of own- ers.' But a very largte proportion of the subjects of gov- ernment are never taxed at all, though they are entitled to protection and are in fact protected exactly as if they were. This is the case generally with all infants and married women not having independent property or business, and with many others who do not come within the rules which the state has prescribed for the apportionment of this species of burden. These rules are prescribed by the state on a consideration of Warden v. Supervisors, 14 Wis. 618; sary connection with the right of De Pauw v. New Albany, 22 Ind. taxation. An alien may be taxed as 204; Commonwealth v. Standard Oil well as a citizen: Mager v. Grima, 8 Co., 101 Pa. St. 119; Berlin Mills v. How. 490; Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wentworth's Location, 60 N. H. 156; Wall. 210. As to what amounts to a Norris v. Waco, 57 Tex. 635; Jeffer- surrender of domicile, see Borland v. son's Estate, 35 Minn. 215. Boston, 132 Mass. 89. A citizen of iVattel, Bk. 1, oh. 19, §216; Brown another state employed for an in- V. Smith, 15 Beav. 444; Attorney- definite period as a laborerf or a local General v. Napier, 6 Ex. 217. It is not corporation was held liable for road the mere employment, however, that duty: State v. Johnston, 118 N. C. exempts them, but the fact that they 1188. are resident in the county only for 3 See post, ch. XII. The authority the purposes of the employment and of a taxing district to require all not domiciled there. Persons domi- classes of property sheltered by it to ciled in a country, but made use of pay its ratable proportion of main- by other countries as consular agents, taining the government is unaffected are taxable where domicile'd. by the owner's residence: Gallup v. 2 Personal allegiance has no neces- Schmidt, 154 Ind. 19& 24 TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. [OH. L what is wisest, and most for the general good; but the exemp- tions they give are only temporary and conditional, and may be changed at any time. Even as regards the exempted sub- jects, taxation and protection may be said to be reciprocal in the sense that those who are protected are liable to taxation whenever the state shall see fit to impose it. On the other hand, one purpose of taxation sometimes is to discourage a business, and perhaps to put it out of existence ; and it is taxed without any idea of protection ^attending the burden. This has been avowedly the purpose in the case of some federal taxes,* while in others the burden has been laid on subjects which by state legislation were put out of the protection of the law. The taxes have nevertheless been sustained.^ The persons who pay these taxes pay them, therefore, not for pro- tection in respect to the subjects taxed, but in consideration of the general benefits of organized society, which are supposed to be infinitely more to every citizen than the privilege of fol-' lowing any particular trade or calling. Where a non-resident is owner of tangible property within the state, and the state imposes taxes upon it, the tax is not a charge against the owner personally, but must be enforced against the property itself. The state has no jurisdiction to assess a tax as a personal charge against non-residents; ' neither can the personalty of a non-resident be taxed unless- it has an iVeazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall, power of the state when neither they 533. nor any of their property are within 2 See License Tax Cases, 5 Wall the state or subject to its jurisdio 462; Pervear v. Commonwealth, 5 tion: Augusta v.^Kimball, 91 Me. 605. Wall. ~ 475; Commph wealth v. Hoi- A non-resident who has voluntarily brook, 10 Allen SCO; 'Block v. Jack- returned some of his property for sonville, 36 111. 301; Youngblpod v. taxation does not thereby oonapnt to Sexton, 33 'Mich. 406; People v. Wall- be taxed for all; and if the assessor ing, 53 Mich. 364; Adler v. Whitbeok, taxes, him for more, he need not ap- 44 Ohio St. 539. peal from the assessment, but may 3 Dow V. Sudbury, 5 Met. 73; Herri- contest the collection: Phelps v. man v. Stowers, 43 Me. 497; Graham Thurston, 47 Conn. 477. Compare V. St. Joseph T'p, 67 Mich. 653; Peo- Hilton v. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339. A pie V. Supervisors, 11 N. Y. 563; New foreign corporation assessed by the York V. McLean, 57 App. Div. (N. Y.) mercantile appraiser without author- ed; St. Paul V. Merritt, 7 Minn. 198; ity may treat the assessment as a Oatlin V. Hull, 31 Vt. 152; Dewey v. nullity, and need not appeal there- Des Moines, 173 U. 8. 193. Persons from: Commonwealth v. American are not amenable to the taxing Tobacco Co., 173 Pa. St 531. GH. I.J TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. 25 actual sitios within the state,' so as to be under the protection of its laws.' The mere right of a foreign creditor to receive from his debtor within the state the payment of his demand cannot be subjected to taxation within the state.* " It is a right that is personal to the creditor where he resides, and the resi- dence or place of business of his debtor is immaterial. The power of taxation, however vast in its character, and searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects within the juris- diction of the state.' These subjects are pei'sons, property and business. "Whatever form taxation may assui^e, whether as duties, imposts, excises or licenses, it must relate to one of these subjects. It is not possible to conceive of any other, though as applied to them the taxation may be exercised in a great variety of ways. It may touch property in every shape, in its natural condition, in its manufactured form, and in its various transmu- tations. And the amount of the taxation may be determined by the value of the property, or Its use, or its capacity, or its pro- ductiveness. It may touch business in the almost infinite forms in which it is conducted, in professions, in commerce, in manu- factures and in transportation. Unless restrained by provisions of. the federal constitution, the power of the state as to the mode, form and extent of taxation is unlimited, where the sub- jects to which it applies are within her jurisdiction."* These are conceded or adjudged principles, and have ceased.to be the subject of discussion or argument. Corporations, it is also con- ceded, may be taxed like natural persons on their property and business.* But debts owing to foreign creditors by either cor- iThat personal property may be Butler v. Saginaw Supervisors, 26 taxed where it is, though the owner Mich. 33; Voigt v. Detroit, 133 Mich, is not a resident, see chs. Ill and XII, 547; Minneapolis & N. Elevator post. Co. V. Trail County, 9 N. D. 313; 2 Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co. v. Board, In re MoPherson, 104 N. Y. 306. See 44 La. An. 760; Kailey v. Board, 44 Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, La. 765; Graham v. St. Joseph T'p, 268; De Vignier v. New Orleans, 4 67 Mich. 653; Commonwealth v. Le- Woods 206; Boyd v. Wiggins, 7 Okl. high Valley E. Co., 186 Pa. St. 385. 85; Washington Iron Works Co. v. 3 Baltimore v. Bussey, 67 Md. 113; King County, 20 Wash. 150. Winnipiseogee Lake Manuf. Co. v. ' People v. Detroit & P. R. Co., 1 GiflEord, 64 N. H. 337; In re Swift, 137 Mich. 458; Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co. v. N. Y, 77. Board of Assessors, 44 La. An. 760. * State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, It is a part of the Californian consti- 15 Wall 319; Savings Society v. tution that corporate franchises are Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421; property, and must be taxed in some 26 TAXES, THEIE NAT0EE AND KINDS. [CH. I. porations or individuals are not the subject of taxation. The creditor cannot be taxed, because he is not within the Juris- diction, and the debts cannot be taxed in the debtors' hands, through any fiction of the law which is to treat them as being, for this purpose, the property of the debtors. They are not property of the debtors.in any sense ; they are the obligations of the debtors, and only possess value in the hands of the creditors. With them they are property, " but to call them property in the hands of the debtors is simply to misuse terms." * Shares in a corporation are also the shares of the stockholder wherever he may have his domicile, arid if taxed to him as his personal estate are properly taxable by the jurisdiction to which his person is subject, whether the corporation be foreign or domestic.^ But the state which grants corporate powers, or consents to their being exercised within its limits when the corporate grant is by somie other sovereignty, may annex to the graijt or consent such terins in respect to taxation as it shall deem expedient;' and it may, and sometimes does, pro- manner proportionately to their value: San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 CaL 614; Spring Valley Co. v. Sohottler, 62 Cal. 11. 1 State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 WalL 300, 319, overruling several Pennsylvania cases. See also Hayne V. Deliesseline, 3 McCord 374; Oliver V. Washington Mills, 11 Allen 368; De Vignier v. New Orleans, 4 Woods 206; Commonwealth v. Chesapeake & O. R Co., 37 Grat. 344; Bullock v. Guilford, 59 Vt. 516; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. New Orleans, 41 La. An. 1015; Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co. v. Assessors, 44 La. An. 760; Bailey v. Assessors, 44 La. An. 765; Clason v. New Orleans, 46 La. An. 1; Senour V. Ruth, 140 Ind. 318; Buck v. Miller, 147 Ind. 586; Baltimore v. Hussey, 67 Md. 113; State v. Smith, 68 Miss. 79; Myers v. Seaberger, 45 Ohio St. 382; South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406; Holland v. Com'rs, 15 Mont. 460; In re Bronson, 150 N. Y. 1; Territory v. Delinquent Tax List (Ariz.), 34 Pac. Rep. 182. In the absence of express authority, a city empowered to tax "all prop- erty" cannot tax its own bonds: Mayor of Macon v. Jones, 67 Ga. 489. As to the taxation of intangible property owned by non-residents, see, further, chs. Ill and XII, post. 2 Great Barrington v. County Com'rs, 16 Pick. 573; Newark City Bank v. Assessor, 30 N. J. L. 13; State V. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; State V. Bentley, 23 N. J. L. 532; Whitsell V. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 536; North Carolina R. Co. V. Com'rs, 91 N. G. 454; Greenleaf v. Board of Review, 184 111. 336. 'Paul V. Virginia, 8 WalL 168; Liverpbol Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566; Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Pembina, etc. Co. v. Penn- sylvania, 135 U. S. 181; Bell's Gap R. Co. V. Commonwealth, 134 IT. S. 232; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305; Jennings v. Coal Ridge, etc. Co., 147 U. S. 147; Commonwealth v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 463. The CH. I.J TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. 27 Tide that the shares of stockholders shall be taxed at the place of corporate business, and the tax be paid by the corporation for all its members.' The state may give the shares of stock held by individual stockholders a special or particular situs for the purposes of taxation, and may provide special modes for the collection of the tax levied thereon ; and it is often conven- ient, as well as perfectly just, to take that course.^ If it were practicable to do so, the taxes levied by any gov- ernment ought to be apportioned among the people according to the benefit which each receives from the protection the gov- ernment affords him; but this is manifestly impossible. The value of life and liberty, and of the social and family rights and privileges, cannot be measured by any pecuniary standard ; and by the general consent of civilized nations, income or the sources of income are almost universally made the basis upon which the ordinary taxes are estimated. This is upon the as- sumption, never wholly true in point of fact, but sufficiently near the truth for the practical operations of government, that the benefit received from the government bears some propor- tion to the property held, or the revenue enjoyed under its protection ; and though this can never be arrived at with ac- curacy, through the operation of any general rule, and would not be wholly just if it could be, experience has given us no better standard, and it is applied in a great variety of forms, and with more or less approximation to justice and equality. But, as before stated, other considerations are always admis- sible; what is aimed at is, not taxes strictly just, but such taxes as will best subserve the general welfare of the political society.' The taxes governments have been accnstomed to lay.* In modern times, governments have been accustomed to levy a absolute power of exclusion includes them liable to reimburse the corpo- the right to allow a conditional and ration where it has paid the tax: restricted exercise of corporate pow- State v. Trsivelers' Ins. Co., 70 Conn, ers within the state: Pembina, etc. 590. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 135 U. S. 181. 2 State v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 1 Baltimore v. City Passenger E. Conn. 590; American Coal Co. v. Co., 57 Md 31. Non-resident stock- County Com'rs, 59 Md. 185; Balti- holders, by becoming or remaining more v. City Passenger E. Co., 57 members of a corporation after the Md. 31. passage of an act taxing their shares, 3 Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 364, 280. assent to such tax so as to render *The state may raise revenue by 28 TAXES, THEIB NATUEE AND KINDS. [OH. I. great variety of taxes ; sometimes relying upon a single kind for all the needs of the state, and sometimes levying a number of different kinds with a view to distribute the burden more equally or more to the general acceptance. None of these can invariably operate with justice,' but all have advantages that may make one desirable under one set of circumstances, and another the best when circumstances have changed. Those which have been most common will be briefly referred to. Capitation Taxes. These are not a common resort in mod- ern times ; ^ and only in a few oases could they be either just or politic. As they regard only the person, they must be shared equally by all,' except under governments where privileged or- ders are recognized, and \lrhere they might be graded accord- ing to the orders to which the several persons taxed belong. If the tax is graded by property, it is obviously something be- sides a capitation tax. Zamd Taxes. These may be measured by the production,"by the rent, or by the value. The first method has seldom been resorted to in enlightened periods.^ To some extent it would operate as a discouragement to industry; and, while it might not be burdensome to the cultivators of very productive estates, it might preclude poor lands, whose production would barely pay for cultivation, from being cultivated at all ; in other words, capitation taxes, by special taxes highways, it is common to assess upon carriages, horses, servants, dogs, every able-bodied male adult one or franchises, and upon every species of more days' labor as a capitation tax. property, and upon all kinds of busi- But sometimes poll taxes are levied ness and trades: In re McPherson, for school purposes. The require- 104 N. Y. 306. ment of a state constitutibn that the iThe taxes assessed by this name poll tax shall be "applied exclusively have not always been taxes levied on in aid of the public school fund," will persons, but sometimes taxes exacted not preclude charging against it the from districts or provinces, and cost of collection: Shaver v. Robin- measured by the capita. Such were son, 59 Ala. 195. A statute was held the capitation taxes levied under void, as imposing, in the form of road the Roman Empire, in apportioning service, a capitation tax in excess of which among individuals, one might the one prescribed by the constitu- represent several capita, according tion: ProflBt v. Anderson (Va.), 20 S. to his wealth in land, while others E. Rep. 887. escaped the tax entirely: Gibbon's ^It was made use of under the Decline and Fall, ch. 17. In provid- Roman Empire: Gibbon's Decline ing for a labor tax for the repair of and Fall, ch. 17. It has been occa- CH. I.J TAXES, THEIE NATUEE ANB KINDS. 29 ■would be equal to the whole rental value. A tax, measured by rents, will usually come nearer to being a tax on the actual revenue of the land proprietor; and this standard is more com- mon. A variety of land taxes, under different names, has been levied in England, merging at last in a general land tax, meas- ured by rent, and apportioned to the municipal divisions. In this country land taxes are commonly laid by value. This is sub- ject to some objections. In order to insure equality, it is nec- essary, in a new and rapidly improving country, that there should be frequent valuations, and this requires a great official force and involves heavy expense. The apportionment of this expense among towns or other small divisions of teri-itory, the people of which are allowed to choose the officers, reconciles them to the burden, and, in many of the states, a new valua- tion is made annually. An objection, theoretically more seri- ous, is that a tax by assessed value is often (where the land is poor and unproductive, or where it is wild and uncultivated) a tax which is paid from capital instead of from revenue. A tax to be thus paid cannot long continue, and is seldom to be pur- posely laid ; but, in particular instances, almost any tax will be such. And in this country where a considerable portion of the community invest in lands with a view to profit from the rise in value, unproductive and uncultivated lands cannot be ex- empted from taxation because of the hardship of individual cases, without exempting a large portion hi the wealth of the state now legitimately invested where it is insuring large profits to the owner. Taxes on Souses. These, except where the houses are treated as appurtenances to lands, have been measured by rents, and sometimes by hearths and windows. A hearth tax was ob- noxious, because, among other reasons, it involved inquisitorial visits of officers to inspect rooms ; and both hearth and window taxes tended to limit among the poor the use of these conven- sionally employed in recent times, taxation, rents which are to accrue Tithes for the support of the Estab- thereafter from the same land, since lished Church in England were so rent to grow due is part of the land measured. itself; an incident to it; and would Where land is assessed for taza- therefore be included in the assess- tion as such, it is not competent at ment of the land: SouUy v. People, the same time to assess, for separate 104 111. 349. 30 TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. [OH. I. iences, so important not only to comfort, but to health. Both are now abolished in England. Taxes on Income} These may be on all incomes, or on all with such exemption as will enable the taxpayer, in a frugal manner, to support himself and his family.'^ The latter is the course usually adopted, and, in some cases, incomes in excess of the exemption have been taxed a larger percentage as they increased in amount. The reasons which favor this discrim- ination would also justify a hea"irier proportionate tax on the thrifty cla'sses in other cases ; and the principle once admitted, there is no reason but its own discretion why the legislature should stop short of imposing the whole burden of government on the few who exhibit most energy, enterprise and thrift. Such a discrimination is a penalty on the possession of these qualities. But any income tax is also objectionable, because it is inquisi- torial, and because it teaches the people evasion and fraud. No means at the command of the government have ever enabled it to arrive with anything like accuracy at the incomes of its citizens, and they resist its inquisitions in all practical modes, not only because they desire to avoid as far as possible the public burdens which they are certain are not to be equally imposed, but also because they are not willing that their pri- vate affairs and the measure of their prosperity should be ex- posed to the public' The taxes imposed on incomes by the general government during and immediately following the war between the states were escaped by a large proportion of those , who should have paid them, and the assessors' returns were a 1 The state may tax income except Va. 763. Under a statute providing as to any part thereof derived from that certain oflScers shall pay a tax non-taxable securities: Opinion of on compensation received in excess Justices, 53 N. H. 634. Income taxes of $3,000, where an officer holds sev- laid by the national government eral offices only one salary should be must be apportioned among the sev- deducted from his gross receipts: eral states according to representa- Commonwealth v. Anderson, 178 Pa. tive population: Pollock v. Farmers' St. 171. Loan, etc. Co., 157 U. S. 439, 158 U.S. 2 New Orleans v. Fourchy, 30 La. 601. A tax imposed on oyster-tong An. 910. men according to the amounts of 'Gibbon refers to torture employed their sales is not an income tax under the Empire to ascertain the within the meaning of a constitu- profits of employments: See Decline tional provision exempting incomes and Fall, ch. 17. Its employment under a certain amount from taxa- upon the Jews in England is a f amil- tion: Commonwealth v. Brown, 91 iar fact in history. OH. I.] TAXES, ''THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. 31 wholly inadequate indication of the annual private revenue of the country. In the United States, also, such a tax is unequal, because those holding lands for the rise in value escape it alto- gether — at least until they sell, though their actual increase in wealth may be great and certain. Taxes on Employments} A tax on the privilege of carrying on a business or employment will commonly he imposed in the form of an excise tax on the license to pursue the employment; and this may be a specific sum, or a sum whose amount is regu- lated by the business done or income or profits earned. Some- times small license fees are required, mainly for the expense of regulation ; but in other cases substantial taxes are demanded, because the persons upon whom they are laid would other- wise escape taxation in the main, if not entirely. Instances of hawkers, peddlers, auctioneers, etc., will readily occur, to the mind. The form of a license, though not a necessary, is a con- venient, form for such a tax to assume, because it then becomes a condition to entering upon the business or employment and is collected without difiiculty. But it is equally comoetent to impose and collect the tax by the usual methods.^ Taxes on the Carriage of Property. There are various meth- ods of imposing these ; as by licensing the business, by taxing the vehicles employed, by tonnage duties, etc. As to tonnage duties, the powers of the states are restricted, as is elsewhere shown. 1 If the constitution does not for- a commodity, convenience or priv- bid, oflSces, posts of profit, oooupa- ilege, which the legislature has, by tions and trades may be taxed. When contemporaneous construction of the so taxed these are properly treated constitution, assumed a right to sell as taxable property by the commis- at a reasonable price; and by parity sioners in deciding whether they are of reason it may impose the same creating an indebtedness beyond a condition upon every other employ- certain per centum of the assessed niient or handicraft: Bank v. Ap- valuation: Brown's Appeal, 111 Pa. thorp, 13 Mass. S52. A city tax upon St. 7i3. lawyers is not open to the objeotton 2 The money re,quired from attor- that it goes to nullify a license held neys and barristers at law, vendue from the state to practice law: Mc- masters, tavern keepers and retail- Caskell v. State, 53 Ala. 511; Ould ■ers is not a proportional tax, nor is v. Richmond, 33 prrat. 464; Elliott v. it an excise or duty upon produce, Louisville, 101 Ky. 263. See further, goods, wares or merchandise. It is 'post, ch. XVIIL 32 TAXES, THEIE NATT3EE AND KINDS. [CH. I. Taxes on the Wages of Labor. These, in a country where wages are only sufiBcient to supply the absolute needs of life, would necessarily fall on the employer; but when the accumu- lations of labor are relied upon for a competency, and even for wealth, the burden might be more felt by the laborer. In modern times such taxes have been unusual. Taxes on Servants, Horses, Dogs, Carriages, etc. These are ' intended as taxes on luxury an(^ ostentation, and can seldom prove burdensome. Each person assesses himself in determin- ing how many he will employ or own.^ The same may be said of taxes on plate and articles of display, when taxed di- rectly. Taxes on the Interest of Money. These are objectionable for the same reasons that apply to income taxes. They lead to the same evasions, and to some others which it is impossible to check or circumvent. They are seldom levied eo nomine. Taxes on Dividends are more easily collected and do not usually involve inquisitorial proceedings. Dividends come from corporations whose proceedings are usually semi-public, and while the privacy of individuals is not invaded, neither are the demands of the government liable to serious evasions. This is a common method of raising revenue. Tajxes on Legacies and Inheritances.^ These are laid in dimi- nution of a new capital which now comes to the hands of par- ties on the death of former owners ; and in theory they should not be burdensonae. In fact, however, except when they are 1 Whether the employees of a rail- Una in 1846; in Delaware in 1869, and, road company are " servants" within more recently, in many other states: a revenue law, see Attorney-General Magoun v. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, V, Railway Co., 3 H. & C. 793. " 170 U. S. 383. See Ferry v. Camp- 2 Such taxes are of great antiquity, bell, 110 Iowa 390. A succession tax having been imx>osed in the days of is not a direct tax upon the land the Emperor Augustus, and by the taken by descent, but is a tax im- nations of Europe in the Middle Ages posed upon the devolution of the as well as in modern times: Eyre v. estate or the right to become bene- Jacob, 14 Grat. 433. See also Will- ficially interested thereto or to the iams' Case, 3 Bland Ch. 186, 358. income thereof. Scholey v. Eew, 23 Pennsylvania adopted an inheritance WalL 831. It is not a tax upon prop- tax law as early as 1836. Similar erty, but upon the right or privilege statutes were enacted in Maryland of disposing of it, or upon the right and Virginia in 1844, in North Caro- or privilege of succeeding to it either CH. I.] TAXES, THEIE NATUKE AND KINDS. 33 upon gifts by will to others than the immediate family, or are on collateral inheritances, they are likely to be felt severely. The property held by the head of, the family is usually, for all purposes of supplying comforts and enjoyments, the property Tinder a will or in case of intestacy: Mager v. Grima, 8 How. 490; Carpen- ter V. Commonwealth, 17 How. 463; Frederickson v. State, 33 How. 445; United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41; Wallace v. Myers, 38 Fed. Rep. 184; Wilmerding's Estate, 117 Cal. 281; Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 111.122; Tyson v. State, 28 Md. 577; State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 298; Minot v. Win- throp, 162 Mass. 118; Callahan v. Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595; Grevesv. Shaw, 173 Mass. 375; .Moody v. Shaw, 173 Mass. 375; Frothingham v. Shaw, 175 Mass. 59; Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge (Mich.), 84 JSr. W. Rep. 1101; In re McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306; In re Swift's Estate, 137 N. Y. 77; In re Knoedler's Estate, 140 N. Y. 377; In re Merriam's Estate, 141 N. Y. 479; In re Hoffman's Es- tate, 143 N. Y. 337; In re Davis's Es- tate, 149 N. Y. 539; In re Shprman's Estate, 153 N. Y. 1; In re Harbeck, 161 N. Y. 211; State v. Ferris, 53 Ohio St. 314; Hagerty v. State, 55 Ohio St. 613; Stroda v. Common- wealth, 53 Pa. St. 181; In re Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. St. 179; In re Finnen's Estate, 196 Pa. St. 73 ;i State v. Als- tofi, 94 Tenn. 674; Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat. 432; Peters v. Lynchburg, 76 Va. 929; Schoolfleld v. Lynchburg, 78 Va. 366. See Curry v. Spencer, 61 N. H. 624; State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469. Such a tax is in the nature of an excise: Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41; Wilmerding's Estate, 117 CaL 381; State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495; Minot V. Winthrop, 163 Mass. 113. It is imposed as a burden on each per- son claiming succession, measured by the value of his interest, and col- lectible out of his interest only: In 3 re Hoffman's Estate, 143 N. Y. 327; In re Westurn's Estate, 152 N. Y. 93. It is not a general but a special tax, reaching only to special cases, and affecting only a special class of per- sons. There must be a clear warrant in law for imposing it : In re Bnston, 113 N. Y. 181. It is not necessary that the property assessed under the collateral inheritance law should also be assessable under the general law, since the two statutes are not in pari materia: In re Knoedler's Es- tate, 140 N. Y. 377. "There is no difference in principle between prop- erty 'pr.ssing by a deed intended to take effect in possession or enjoy- ment on the death of the grantor, and property passed by will. In either case it is after the death of the grantor or testator, and of succeed- ing to it, which is taxed, though the amount of the tax is determined by the value of the property: " Crocker V. Shaw, 174 Mass. 266. On the ground that they are not taxes on property, inheritance taxes have generally been held valid although objected to as opposed to the require- ment that taxation of property should be uniform: Eyre v, Jacob, 14 Grat. 422; In re House Bill No. 123, 33 Colo. 493; Tyson v. State, 38 Md. 577; Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 IlL 133; Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Pro- bate Judge (Mich.), 84 N. W. Rep. 1101; State v. Henderson (Mo.), 60 S. W. Rep. 1093; Gelsthorpe v. Fur- nell, 20 Mont. 399; Magoun v. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283. Contra, Curry v. Spencer, 61 N. H. 624; Drew v. Tifft, 79 Minn. 175. See Chambe v. Wayne Probate Judge, 100 Mich. 112; United States v. Per- kins, 163 U. S. 635. Congress- has 34 TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. [CH. I. of all the family ; and a tax upon their succession to it on his death comes in a time of unusual necessary disbursements to increase the embarrassments and burdens which accompany the loss of their main reliance and support. Sometimes these taxes are levied on testamentary gifts and collateral successions only. Laws imposing inheritance taxes are " based," we are told in a recent case, "upon two principles: 1. An inheritance tax is not one upon the property but on the succession. 2. The ;right to take property by devise or descent is the creature of the law, and not a natural right — a privilege, and therefore the authority which confers it may impose conditions upon it." But where a statute expressly subjects to a tax the property of decedents' estates, it has been held to be a tax law, and not in the nature of an intestate law or of an act regulating the dis- position of property by will.* And where the tax was levied not upon the separate legacy or share of each recipient, but upon the appraised value of the entire estate, it was considered to be not a succession or inheritance tax, but a tax upon prop- erty.* Taxes on Sales, Bills ofMschange, Gold and Silver Bullion, etc. These when laid on the instruments by means of which busi- ness is transacted, and imposed in the form of stamp duties, have the high recommendation that the cost of collection is but a small percentage of the sum realized, and few evasions of payment are practicable. They are besides paid in small sums, as business transactions take place from time to time, and are therefore not much felt. Indeed, on many accounts th^y are the least objectionable taxes that can be levied ; and the repeal of the most of those which were levied by federal authority in this country is probably due to the strong interest in favor of taxation calculated to aid particular branches of authority to tax the transmission or tration, debts, and rightful claims receipt of property upon death: are paid or provided for: In re Or Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41. cutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. St 179. The 1 In re Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. St. 1. collateral inheritance tax imposed estate V. Switzler, 143 Mo. 387. by the Pennsylvania statute of 1887 Generally speaking, however, inher- is said to be a tax upon property itance tax laws do not attach to the passing from the decedent, and not very articles of property of which a mere succession duty imposed on the deceased died possessed; and the the recipient: Bittinger's Estate, 139 tax is usually imposed only on what Pa. St 338; Handley's Estate, 181 Pa. remains after expenses of adminis- St 339. OH. 1.] TAXES, THEIE KATTJEE AND KINDS. 85 trade, l^otes issued with the intent that they shall circulate as currency are also sometimes taxed, with or without stamps.' on Newspapers. These would be likely to be imposed in the form of stamp taxes. The objections are very obvious, and were thought to be conclusive in this country even when the need of revenue was the greatest.* Taxes on Legal Process. These are usually imposed with a view to adjusting, on an equitable basis, as between suitors and the public, the expenses of the administration of justice! They may be imposed as stamp fees on process, fees for per- mission to enter a suit, etc' 1 As to what is taxable as " circu- lation" under the federal revenue laws, see CT. S. v. Wilson, 106 U. S. 630; In re Aldrich, 16 Fed. Rep. 369. 2 The constitutional liberty of the press is not infringed by a license tax upon the business of publishing a newspaper: Norfolk Land mark Pub. Ca V. Norfolk, 95 Va. 564; In re Juger, 29 S. C. 438. ' In certain states there are express constitutional provisions for such tax- ation. That they may be laid without such express authority, see Harrison V.Willis, 7 Heisk.35;. State v.Howran, 8 Heisk. 824. The right is easier de- fended than the policy, as the tax, if heavy, may in some cases be equiva- lent to a denial of justice. In Har- rison V. Willis, supra, the validity of a tax on the unsuccessful party to a lawsuit was sustained. In Arkansas it is held that the fees required by law upon the issue of a writ or the re- cording of an instrument are strictly fees to the public and not taxes within the meaning of the clause in the constitution requiring all prop- erty- to be taxed by valuation: Lee County V. Abrahams, 34 Ark. 166. A charge of $3 to be included in the judgment on any criminal convic- tion does not violate that clause: Murphy v. State, 38 Ark. 514 That entry fees and continuance fees in suits do not violate a constitutional ' provision that every person "ought to obtain right and justice freely and without purchase, completely and without denial, promptly and with- out delay," see Perce v. Hallett, 13 R. L 363. Neither are they by im- plication prohibited by the constitu- tion providing in terms that taxes may be levied on certain specified ballings and kinds of business, and not expressly sanctioning the taxa- tion of lawsuits: State v. Lancaster Co., 4 Neb. 537. See Hewlett v. Nutt, 79 N. C. 363. The exaction, as a con- dition precedent to probate proceed- ings for the settlement of estates, of the payment to the county treasurer of specified sums arbitrarily pre- scribed with>ref^rence to the value of the particular estate, is a tax, and is invalid because contravening the constitutional right to the dis- pensation of justice freely and with- out purchase: State v. Gorman, 40 Minn. 333. A statute requiring pay- ment of taxes as a condition prece- dent to making defense to a void claim of title under a tax sale was held void as refusing a remedy by due course of law for an injury to one's right of property: Eustis v. Henrietta, 90 Tex. 468, 91 Tex. 335. See Bennett v. Davis, 90 Me. 103. 36 TAXES, THEIR. NATUEE AND KINDS. [CH. I. Taxes on Consumable Luxuries. Articles like spirituous and, malt liquors, tobacco, etc., are generally subjected to heavy taxation as constituting mere luxuries, so that however severe may be the tax, it will never, of necessity, prove burdensome to the needy classes. The taxes are laid in various forms: on the importation, the manufacture, and the sale. In the United States the inclination of late has been to make the tax on spir- ituous liquors as heavy as can be collected; but experience demonstrates that a point may*e reached where any accession to the tax, by increasing the temptations to fraud and evasion, will tend to lessen the amount collected. Indeed the same may be said of all taxes; the higher they are the more numer- ous will be the frauds, perjuries, betrayals of ofHcial trust, and evasions of public duty; and when they reach a point where the chances of profit by clandestine manufacture or importa- tion are in excess of the chances of loss by detection, added to the tax, the revenue will be certain to fall off very rapidly even though consumption is not diminished. It has recently been proved by the experience of the federal excise laws that a tax of fifty cents a gallon on spirits may be more productive than one of four times that amount. Great Britain at one time had a similar experience with taxes on tea. Taxes on Mxports. These, if the articles exported are a ne- cessity to foreign countries, tend to transfer to such countries a part of the burden of supporting our own government. If not a necessity, they diminish exportation and production. Ip either case they will usually be impolitic ; in the latter, almost certainly, and in the^ former by inviting retaliatory legislation by the countries affected. In this country the states cannot levy export duties without the consent of congress, except for the purposes of inspection,' nor can congress lay any tax or duty on articles exported from any state.^ Taxes on Imports. These have generally been the chief re- liance of the federal government for its revenue. They have been laid on almost every conceivable article of use, taste or ornament, and upon almost every possible theory and princi- ple. Some tariff laws have perhaps been framed with a view 1 Const. U. S., art. I, sec. 10. ^ Const. U. S., art. I, sea 9. OH. I.] TAXES, THEIE NATURE AND KINDS. 3f to the just distribution of the burden, and for revenue purposes only; others, while having revenue mainly in view, have laid heavier duties on articles which would come into competition with home manufactures, while others, in some of their duties,' have discarded the idea of revenue entirely, and looked solely to protection. We have thus had revenue tariffs, protective tariffs, and revenue tariffs with incidental protection. All have discriminated more or less against articles of mere luxury, but articles of prime necessity have, under some, been taxed very heavily, on the supposition that the burden imposed would be more than made up to those who shared it by .the inci- dental advantages they would receive from the building up of manufactures at home. "Whether the result has answered ex- pectations is a question foreign to the purpose of the present work. Taxees on Corporate FroMcMses} These have been a source of large revenue in some states, while others have only placed corporations on the same footing with individuals, and taxed them on their property, or imposed some specific tax intended as an equivalent for a property tax. A tax on a corporate franchise may or may not be just or, politic. If the business is one of which corporations have a monopoly, a tax on their franchises, however heavy, would not be burdensome, because the result would only be to add to the cost of whatever the corporations supplied to the public, so that the tax would really be paid by the community at large. If, on the other' hand, the business is one open to free competition between corporations and individuals, and in respect to which corporations would enjoy no special privileges or advantages, a tax upon the priv- ilege of conducting the business under a corporate organiza- tion wouLd be wholly unreasonable and unjust,^ because it would give individuals and partnerships an advantage in the competition ; and their competition, keeping down prices, would prevent corporations from indirectly collecting any portion of 1 The requirement that foreign cor- Pembina, etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, porations shall pay a license tax 125 U. S. 181. for the privilege of keeping offices ^gtate v. Central Sav. Bank, 67 withiH the limits of the state is not Md. 290. a tax upon corporate franchises: 38 TAXES, THEIE NATUEE AND KINDS. [OH. I. the tax from the puhlic, and leave them to bear the whole burden of a demand which,, under such circumstances, must prove ruinous. "While, therefore, a tax on the corporate fran- chises of banks of issue, which are not subject to competition, might be entirely just, one on the corporate organization of a trading company, with which every individual niight compete, would usually be wholly unjust, and, if continued, must result in the abandonment of a business which, under such circum- stances, would be C3,rried on at»a ruinous disadvantage. Tawe^ on the Value of Prcrperpy. These have been the main reliance of the states, A common method of raising revenue has been to levy annual taxes on the value of aU the real and personal property of the inhabitants, with limited exceptions, and irrespective of the income which, by means of the prop- erty, is or may be realized. This seems at first view to be just, and, in the belief that it is just, it has been steadfastly adhered to notwithstanding the many and very serious difficulties at- tending it. These difficulties pertain, for the most part, to the taxation of personal property, which is subject to the following very important objections: 1. It cannot be assessed without inquisitorial process of some kind, instituted for the purpose of ascertaining that which is not open to public inspection, and which the individual, except under the compulsion of such process, would not consent to dis- close.* Few persons will voluntarily make a complete exhibit of their affairs to the public, and still fewer, perhaps, have their affairs in such shape that public officers can make an inventory of their personal possessibns, including property in the hands of others or at a distance, and debts owing to thenl, without the assistance of the owners in preparing it. Statutes have • The. reader will find valuable in- was so minute and particular as to formation on this score in the ac- give us no small insight into the do- counts which the current histories of mastic life of that day, and into the England give of taxation in that extent of the comforts and conven- country under the house of Plantag- lences enjoyed by different classes enet A very interesting account of of society. Lingard, in his History taxation under Edward L is found in of England, Bk. 4, oh. 3, describes Audrey's National and Domestic His- the methods of taxation imder Ed- tory of England, Bk. 6, ch. 18. The ward IIL assessment and valuation of articles OH. I.] TAXES, THEIR NATUEE AND KINDS. 39 recognized this diflaculty, and provided for a list to be presented by the taxpayer under oath, or allowed the assessor to tax every person according to his own judgment, leaving the person taxed to reduce the amount by his own oath, if he shall see fit, and be able to do so. This is objectionable, not only as taking away a desirable privacy in business and family concerns, but also as holding out a strong temptation to false swearing in matters where a f9,lse oath would be difficult if not impossible of detection.^ 2. The assessment of personalty holds out constant and very powerful temptations to defraud the state by concealing the knowledge of everything which the taxpayer believes cannot easily be discovered. This is so well understood that it is scarcely expected that citizens will voluntarily state what tiiey possess, or that officers will make much if any effort to dis- cover. Indeed, the assessment of personal property reaches so small a proportion of the amount really protected by govern- ment, that it might almost be said that laws for the purpose remain on the statute books rather as incentives to evasion and fraud in the dealings of the citizen with the state than as a means of realizing a revenue for public purposes. 3. Such taxes are usually unjust in their discrimination be- tween residents and non-residents who enjoy the same protec- tion of the laws. This will be manifest from an illustration : If money is loaned at ten per centum, and the tax upon credits is one per centum of the capital, the resident capitalist may count upon an income of nine per centum'upon his investments. But the non-resident, who could not be taxed in the state upon his loans which are made there and protected and enforced by its laws, would, upon the like investment, count upon ten per centum; and this difference would not only be a serious dis- 1 This difficulty has always existed, forth, and he that in sight of men, Latimer, in his sermon at Stamford, in his cattle, corn, sheep and other in the time of Henry VIIL, inveighs goods, is worth an hundred marks against it in this language: " When or an hundred pound, wUl set him- the parliament, the high court of this self at ten pound; he will be worth realm, is gathered together, and there to the king but after ten pound, it is determined that every man shall Tell me, now, whether this be theft pay a fifteenth part of his goods to or no ? " the king, then commissioners come 40 TAXES, THEIE NATURE AND KINDS. XCH. I. crimiaafcjon against the citizen, but it woald, and does, encour- age further evasions and frauds, and particularly the loaning of moneys in the names of non-residents in order to escape taxation. It also presents an inducement to citizens, whose investments do not require personal attention, to take up their residence abroad ; any saving of the tax being equivalent to an addition of that amount to their incomes. 4. Taxation of personalty leads to duplicate taxation in various ways. Other taxes besides those by valuation reach such property, being laid in the shape of duties, excise and license fees, etc. ; and, moreover, when property is moved from one jurisdiction into ^noth^r, when the time fixed for assess- ment is different, it may for that reason be twice assessed for a tax on valuation for the same period of time.' 5. Such taxation requires a large addition to the force Of revenue officers which otherwise would be sufficient, and it ren- ders necessary more frequent assessments than would be requi- site were taxation confined to that property, or those subjects, which are more permanent in characteristics and ownership.. To make it just, it is generally thought necessary that the tax- payer's debts should be deducted; and this complicates the difficulty of ascertaining what his estate is, and leaves every man, in effect, to make his own assessment, or subjects him to the arbitrary and capricious action of the assessors.^ These are objections which every- one feels and appreciates ; others, which are more obscure, need not be mentioned. A tax on land is not open to these objections. Whenever the law seeks to tax land and personalty with equality, the general result is, that land pays much the greater proportion of the tax, because this can all be reached, and all be taxed ; no inquisitorial pro- ceedings are required to discover it, and no frauds or evasions iSeeKelley v.Ehoads,7 Wyo. 237; mated value, this privilege to the State V. Deering, 56 Minn. 34 taxpayer becomes of no avaiL A 2 Many statutes leave the assessors man having an estate of $30,000 may to estimate the personal estate, but be taxed upon that sum, and be with- allow the taxpayer to reduce an ex- out redress, because he cannot make ^cessive valuation by a statement oath that he is not worth so much, under oath. Under the almost uni- .when if the general valua,tion is at versal custom of valuing property at one-third only, he should be taxed on from one-fourth to one-third its esti- but $10,000. OH. I.] TAXES, THEIE NATTTEE AND KINDS. 41 can conceal it from view. These and oCher reasons have led some political economists to advocate the omission of per- sonalty from the customary taxation by value, and the raising of the ordinary state revenue by a tax laid exclusively on land and a few .other subjects which, like land, are open to constant public observation and inspection, and in respect to which neither would harsh sifting processes be required, nor evasions be practicable, nor frauds invited. Such a tax, it is claimed, while nominally falling upon a few, would in fact be diffused through the whole community, and collected from all by being added to the price of what is produced and distributed by the classes taxed, just as we have found that a tax upon any com- mon article of consumption is paid in the end by the consumer, and is no more burdensome to the dealer who nominally pays it than it is to any other member of the community of con- sumers. Adam Smith declared that " no tax can ever reduce for any considerable time the rate of profit in any particular trade, which must always keep its level with other trades in its neighborhood." ^ And, indeed, in this country, during and after the great civil war of 1861-5, it was generally found that a heavy tax upbn any particular article of consumption gave the business that produced it a new and vigorous impulse of prosperity.^ Ta/xes on Amusements. These constitute a very considerable source of income to the cities and villages of the country, and sometimes to the state itself. When the amusements are of a public nature, like theatrical and other exhibitions and shows, concerts, games of skill or chance, publicly performed, whether for profit or otherwise, races, etc., they seem to be as proper subjects of taxation as property or ordinary business. In fact such a tax is in the nature of a tax on. luxuries, and therefore as unobjectionable as a tax can well be. The limit to the right to tax amusements, if any exists, has never been judicially pointed out, but when the public are invited to share them the right must be clear. On the other hand, it would seem that strictly private and family amusements ought to be considered 1 Wealth of Nations, Bk. V, ch. 11, this general subject with ability in p. 11, art. 4 many publications. 2 Mr. David A. Wells has treated 42 TAXES, THEIE BTATPEE AND KINDS. [OH. I. wholly exempt, except, possibly, when they involve such ex- pense as to be beyond the enjoyment of the people generally, and for that reason to be properly taxable as luxuries. The foregoing by no means embraces all the subjects of tax- ation; some others will be referred to as we proceed, but the enumeration here made may be sufficient for our present pur- poses. Even marriages have sometimes been taxed ; though as a rule the fees imposed in the case of marriages have been only such as were supposed sufficient to cover the cost of proper regulations. . CHAPTEE II. THE NATURE OF THE POWER TO TAX In the creation of three distinct departments of the govern- ment, ^nd the apportionment of power between them, the authority to tax necessarily falls to the legislative.^ This is manifest from the slightest consideration of what taxation is. It is the making of rules and regulations under which the nec- essary revenues for all the needs of government are to be ap- portioned among the people and collected from them.^ While the principles of the British constitution remained unsettled and in dispute, the authority to lay and collect taxes was claimed for the executive, but only as a branch of the supreme authority, which was his by divine right, to rule at discretion.' When this arrogant claim was repudiated and abandoned, it became one of the most inflexible principles of government that the executive could levy no taxes whatsoever except in the .execution of laws that had been made for his observance. Indeed, the principle goes farther than this. It is, that taxes are a grant of the people who are taxed, and the grant must be made by the immediate representatives of the people. AIL revenue laws in Great Britain must, therefore, originate with the popular house of parliament; a body very tenacious of its privileges,* and disposed to class as revenue laws whatever will, even indirectly, bring revenue to the state.' Following 1 See the cases cited ante, page 7, ery v. San Francisco Gas Co., 38 CaL note 6. 345, 357. 2 " Taxation is a mode of raising 3 Speech of the Attdrney-General revenue for public purposes:" Sharp- in Hampden's Case; Hallam's Const, less V. Mayor, 31 Pa. St. 147, 169; Peo- Hist., ch. 7; 3 State Trials, 836; pie V. Salem T'p Board, 30 Mich. 452, Broom's Const. L. 306, and notes. 474 And see AUen v. Jay, 60 Me. < 4 Inst 39; 1 Bl. Com. 169; Vattel, 134,127; Wasteneyv.Sohott, 58 Ohio Bk 1, ch. 20, § 341. The house of St. 410, 415; Frost v. Flick, 1 Dak, lords is not permitted, to amend 139. " The term 'taxation ' is ordi- money bills, and the commons deny narily used to express the exercise the power even to' reject them: See of the sovereign power to raise a rev- resolutions of the 5th and 6th July, enue for the general and ordinary 1860. expenses of the government: " Em- ' While under the federal govern- u THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [oh. II. this precedent, the federal constitution requires all bills for raising revenue to originate in the house of representatives,' ment the term most usually applied to the laws by which taxes are laid and collected is revenue laws, in a number of the states that term is seldom made use of as applying to the laws of the state for the corre- sponding purpose. There is no sut stantial difference, however, in the meaning of the two terms, tax laws and revenue laws. In Peyton v. Bliss, 1 Woolw. 170, 173, Mr. Justice Miller says: J' Any law which pro- vides for the assessment and collec- tion of a tax to defray the expenses of the government is a revenue law. Such legislation is commonly re- ferrred to under the general term 'revenue measures,' and those meas- ures include all the laws by which the government provides means for meet- ing its expenditures. I can imagine no definition of a government rev- enue w^ch would, not include all the money raised by any form of tax- ation." But an act imposing a pen- alty which goes to the government is not for that reason merely a rev- enue law. Revenue laws are those laws only whose principal object is the raising of revenue, and not those under which revenue may incident- ally arise: The Nashville, 4 Biss. 188. Money due the state for a "separate revenue license " to pursue an occu- pation is a tax laid for revenue: Royall V. Virginia, 116 U. S. 573. iThe constitutional provision re- quiring bills for raising revenue to originate in the house does not apply to a bill establishing rates of postage, but relates to bills that draw money from "the people without returning any direct equivalent: United States V. James, 13 Blatchf. 207. Under a provision of the constitution requir- ing all money bills to originate in the house of representatives, the sen- ate has an equal right with the house to institute an inquiry into the re- turns made from the towns, for the purpose of settling a valuation, and of concluding on the proportion of ratable property within each town: Opinions of Justices, 126 Mass. 547. Such a provision is limited to bills "lihat transfer money from the people to the state, and does not include bills that appropriate money from- the state treasury to particular uses of the government, or bestow it upon individuals or corporations: Opinion of Justices, 126 Mass. 557. A mere appropriation of ilioney, though it may lead to the necessity of taxa- tion, is insufficient to characterize a measure aS one for revenue, such as must originate in the house of rep- resentatives and not in the senate: Curryer v. Merrill, 25 Minn. 1. A bill for reducing taxation, if it provides for collecting revenue, is still a bill for raising revenue, and must orig- inate in the house of representatives: Eerry County v. Selma, etc. R. Co., 58 Ala. 546. A statute imposing a suc- cession tax is an act for raising rev- enue, and is unconstitutional if it originated in the senate: Succession of Sala, 50 La. An. 1009; Succession of Givanovich, 50 La. An. 625. A statute authorising a municipal cor- poration to impose for its own main- tenance a license tax is not an act for raising revenue and need not have originated in the house: Rankin V. LouisviUe (Ky.), 7 S. W. Rep. 174. And the act of congress providing a national currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, which act, in the furtherance of that ob- ject, and to meet the expenses at- tending its execution, imposes a tax on the notes of the banks organized under it, is not a revenue bill which the constitution requires to originate in the house of representatives: CH. II.] THE NATUBE OF THE TOWEE TO TAS. 45 and there are corresponding provisions in the constitutions of many of the states.^ While such provisions are of little or no importance in this country, where the members of both branches of the legislature are equally responsible to the people, the requirement that executive officers shall confine themselves strictly to executive duties is one of the most valuable princi- ples of the gqverament. ' Indeed, the division of the powers of government is the most important of the checks and balances by means of which the benefits of orderly government are secured and perpetuated ; and the least encroachment by one department on the powers of the other is usurpation, for which the law is supposed to provide the adequate remedy. Execu- tive and ministerial officers enforce the tax laws ; but, in doing so, they must keep strictly within the authority those laws con- fer, and they cannot add to or vary, in the slightest degree, any tax lawfully levied.^ They neither have, nor can have, any "roving commission to levy and collect taxes from the people without authority of law, but (they) can only do so in the manner prescribed by the law, which would be the govern- ing rule for their conduct in levying taxes ... in all cases.'" So inflexible is this rule, that even the legislature itself, as will be more fully shown hereafter, cannot clothe them with its own authority for this purpose.^ Where the people have located the power, there it must remain and be ex- ercised. Twin City Nat. Bank v. Nebeoker, 87 Ind. 405. No tax can be levied 167 U. S. 196. unless the statute clearly intends it: 1 The right of the popular branch" Stanley v. Mining Co., 6 Colo. 415. of the government to originate and ' Barlow v. The Ordinary, 47 Ga. adopt measures for providing reve- 642; State v. Bentley, 23 N. J. L. 532. nue for public purposes was asserted A city has no power to employ as by the colonial assembly of New Jer- collector any one but the officer sey as early as 1748: See Bernards upon whom the law imposes the T'p V. Allen, 61 N. J. L. 228. duty: Fort Wayne v. Lehr, 88 Ind. estate V. Bentley, 28 N. J. L. 533; 62. A county treasurer charged by State V. Flavell, 34 N. J. L. 870. A the law with the duty of collecting treasurer's assessment of property county taxes cannot be empowered omitted from the roll for a former by the county board to employ coun- year is void if not expressly author- sel to assist him: Miller v. Embree, ized by law: Hamilton v, Amsden, 88 Ind. 138. 88 Ind. 804 A note taken for the * See the next chapter. An act tax that should have been assessed, authorizing the creation of a board but was not, is void: State v. Illyes, of road commissioners, and empow- 4:6 THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [gh. n. The power not judicial. It is still more manifest that the power to tax is not judicial.* " It is the province of the judi- cial power to decide private disputes between or concerning persons, but of legislative power to regulate public concerns, and to make laws for the benefit and welfare of the state." * " The legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judi- ciary construes the laws.'" The legislature must therefore determine all questions of state necessity, discretion or policy involved in ordering a tax and ih apportioning it; * must make all the necessary rules and regulations which are to be observed ering them, among other things, to levy taxes, was held unconstitu- tional: Board of Com'rs v. Abbott, 53 Kan. 148; Parks v. Board of Ctom'rs, 61 Fed. R. 436. The legisla- ture cannot confer upon a state board a discretionary authority to add to the amount which the stat- ute authorizes to be collected by state tax: Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. 646. The legislature must prescribe the rule of taxation, and cannot lea ve it to the local authorities : State V. Hudson Av. Com'rs, 37 N. J. L. 13. And in Tennessee it has no power to delegate the right to tax to any but municipal corporations: Waterhouse \. Public Schools, 8 Heisk. 857, 9 Bax. 400. A New Jersey statute provid- ing for the adjustment, settlement and collection by commissioners of unpaid taxes, assessments, etc., was held not void as conferring on com- missioners the legislative power of taxation: In re Elizabeth Com'rs, 49 N. J. L. 448. ' A statute attaching a railroad right of way to a county " for judi- cial purposes " does not confer on that' county the right to tax it, as that is not 'a judicial power: Board of Com'rs v. Northern Pac. R Co., 10 Mont. 414 2 Richardson, Ch. J., in Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N. H. 199, 204 A stat- ute authorizing a city council) to de- termine the regularity, validity and correctness of an assessment, and providing for an appeal from its de- cision, is not unconstitutional as con- ferring judicial powers on the coun- cil: Bellingham Bay Imp. Ca v. New Whatcom, 20 Wash. 53. • 3 Marshall, Ch. J., in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 46. -See Green- ough V. Grreenough, 11 Pa. St. 489, 494; Bates v. Kimball, 3 Chip. 77; Newland v. Marsh, 19 IIL 876, 883; Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501, 515; Jones V. Perry, 10 Terg. 59, 69; People v. Supervisors, 16 N. Y. 434, 433; Kim- ball V. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368'; State V. South Penn Oil Co., 43 W. Va. 80. A constitutional require- ment that the powers of the several governmental departments shall be kept separate is not contravened by a statute authorizing a court to re- ' view on appeal from the board of public works an assessment for taxa- tion: Wheeling Bridge & T. R. Ca v. Paull, 39 W. Va. 143. "To provide for the whole process of taxation is purely legislative; to construe the process, when enacted, is purely ju- dicial." Therefore, a statutory pro- vision declaring the effect of failure of assessors and other officers to com- ply in certain respects with the law, is void as an intrusion upon the ju- dicial function: Plumer v.. Supervis- ors, 46 Wis. 163. 4 Thomas v. Gay, 169 IT. a 264; Boyd V. Wiggins, 7 Okl. 85. OH. II.] THE NATTJEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. 47 in order to produce the desired returns, and must decide upon the agencies by means of which collections shall be made.' " The judicial tri|)unals of the state have no concern with the policy of legislation. That is a matter resting altogether in the discretion of another co-ordinate branch of the government. The judicial power cannot legitimately question the policy or refuse to sanction the provisions of any law not inconsistent- with the fundamental law of the state."* And it is as incom- petent for the legislature to confer the power to tax upon the judiciary as upon the executive.' If the legislature shall abuse iMcHenryv.Downer,116Cal.30. Al- though the constitution forbids one department of government from in- terfering with the powers of the others, there is no implied exemption from taxation in favor of lawyers arising from their being ofScers of the court and part of the judicial sys- tem: ExparteWilliams,31Tex.Crim. App. 368. 2 Redfleld, Ch. J.. In re Powers, 25 Vt. 361, 365. See Wheeler v. Platts- mouth, 7 Neb. 270. Taxation is a legislative act. Being a legislative power it is not the province of a court to review it, except in cases where the power is limited by legislative restrictions: Crafts v. Ray, 23 E. L — (46 AtL Rep. 1043). s Harden burg v. Kidd, 10 CaL 403. See Bigler V. Sacramento, 59 Cal. 698; Meriwether v. Garrett, 103 U. S. 473; Ketohum v. Railroad C!o., 4 DilL 41; Pennington v. Woolfolk, 79 Ky. 13; Muhlenburg County v. Morehead (Ky.), 46 S. W. Rep. 484; Notris v. Waco, 57 Tex. 635; Munday v. Rah- way, 43 N. J. L. 339. A statute requiring the circuit court, on the demand of bondholders, to levy a tax for the payment of their claims, is void, as imposing a legislative func- tion on a judicial tribunal; Fleming V. Trowsdale, 29 C. C. A. 106. Thff laying of assessments not being a judicial act, a court cannot impose, as a condition to relief against a void tax, the payment of such a tax as would be lawful, where new proceed- ings and a different l>asis of assess- ment are necessary to ascertain what tax is lawful: Hutchinson v. Omaha, 53 Neb. 345. The power to tax being legislative and not judicial, and the valuation of property for taxation being an incident to the taxing power, the supreme court cannot be constituted an appellate tribunal to review the valuations of railroad property made by the board of county clerks: Auditor of State v. Atchison, etc. 'R. Co., 6 Kan. 500. " The court of sessions,- under the constitution, can only exercise powers of a judicial character. The legislature is incom- petent to confer upon the court any other powers. The assessment of taxes i^ not a judicial act; it par- takes of no element of a judicial character. It is a legislative q,ct'; it requires the exercise of legislative power, which, for certain govern- mental purposes in the county may be' devolved upon a board of super- visors, but cannot be delegated to any branch of the judicial depart- ment: " Hardenburg v, Kidd, 10 Cal. 403. In Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 WalL 655, a bill in equity was filed to compel the respondent to levy a tax for the payment of overdue cor- poration bonds. The bill was dis- missed. Miller, J., says: "The power we are here asked to exercise is the very" delicate one of taxation. This power belongs in this country to the 48 THE NATUEE OF THE POWER TO TAX. [CH. ir. its powers and transcend its legislative functions by the enact- ment of that which is called a tax, but which is not such in fact, then, indeed, the abuse may be arrested by the judicial arm;^ but the interference does not proceed on the idea of any au- thority of the judiciary over the subject of taxation. The judi- legislative sovereignty, state or na- tional In the case before us the national sovereignty has nothing to do with it. The power must be de- rived from the legislature of the state. So far as the present case is concerned, the state has delegated the power to the levee commissioners. If that body has ceased to exist, the remedy is in the legislature, either to assess the tax by special statute, or to vest the power in some other tribunal. It certainly is not vested, as in the exercise of an original juris- diction, in any federal court. It is unreasonable to suppose that the legislature would ever select a fed- eral court for that purpose. It is not only not one of the inherent powel-s of the court to levy and collect taxes, but it is an invasion by the judiciary of the federal government of the legislative functions of the state gov- ernment. It is a most extraordinary request; and a compliance with it would involve consequences no less out of the way of judicial procedure, the end of which no wisdom can foresee." See, further, State R. Tax Cases, 93 U. S. 575; United States v. New Orleans, 3 Wtoods 330; Clunie V. Siebe, 113 Cal. 593; Wells County V. McHenry, 7 N. D. 346. Where the legislature, through a failure to levy, leaves property free from taxation, and provides no means for an assessment, the courts cannot remedy the omission: State v. Mo- bile, 73 Ala. 65; Willis's Executor v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 667. See Reeves v. Watertown, 19 Wall 107. Empowering the district cdurt to re- vise and amend local assessments, or to order new ones, is not objectionable as giving authority independent of local government, and as requiring the judiciary to exercise power be- longing to another department: State «v. District Court, 33 Minn. 335; State V. Ensign, 55 Minn. 378. The duty of collecting inheritance taxes being necessarily incidental to the settling of estates, it-is no objection to the validity of the tax law that it im- poses duties not judicial on the pro- bate judge: Union Trust Co. V.Wayne Probate Judge (Mich.), 84 N. W. Rep. 1101. A New Jersey statute wp,s con- strued as not conferring on a certain court power to tax or assess, but merely to apply existing valid laws to the case before it: State v. Pater- son, 49 N. J. L. 380. 1 Maltby v. Reading, etc. R. Co., 58 Pa. St. 140. See Bank of Pennsyl- vania V. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. St. 144; Sharpless v. Mayor, 31 Pa. St. 147; New York & E. R. Co. v. Sabin, 36 Pa. St. 343; Gault's Appeal, 33 Pa, St. 94; Wharton v. School Directors, 43 Pa. St. 358; Weber v. Reinhard, 73 Pa. St. 370; De Pauw v. New Al- bany, 33 Ind. 304; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me. 315; Waters v. State, 1 Gill 303; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 653, 751; Gibson v. Mason, 5 Nev. 383; People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Brodn'ax v. Groom, 64 N. C. 344; Pul- len V. County Com'rs, 66 N. C. 361; Boyd V. Wiggins, 7 OkL 85; King v. Portland, 3 Or. 154; McCulloch v. State, 4 Wheat. 316 ; Providence Bank V. Billings, 4 Pet. 514, 668; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall 533; Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 655. The court will interfere with the exer- cise of the power of taxation only when the constitution or some fixed rule is clearly violated: Gay v. Thomas, 5 Okl. 1; Thomas v. Gay, CH. II.] THE NAT0EE OF THE POWER TO TAX. 49 ciary interposes on the application of any party whose rights are threatened by an unlawful exercise of authority; and it is immaterial with whom or what department the unlawful ac- tion originates, or by what name it is designated. But so long as the legislation in form and substance conforms to the con- stitution, and is not colorable merely, but is confined to the enactment of what is in its nature strictly a tax law, and so long as no bonstitutional limitations are exceeded, or the con- stitutional rights of the citizen violated in the directions pre- scribed for enforcing the tax, the legislation is of supreme au- thority, and the courts, as well as all others, must obey. Taxes may be, and often are, oppressive to the persons and corpora- tions taxed ; they may appear, to the judicial mind, unjust and even unnecessary but this can constitute no reason for judicial interference.^ 169 TJ. S. 264. Upon an application for a mandanms to compel the county court to levy a tax to pay county debts, it was said that "the courts have no more power to assess, or command the assessment of taxes, than the legislature has to adjudge or comman(^ the adjudication of law suits: " Justices of Cannon County V. Hoodenpyle, 7 Humph. 145, 147. And see Delaware R. Tax, 18 Wall. 306. A court may cut down an as- sessment if it exceeds the legal or constitutional limit, but if it does not, it cannot assume the functions of the assessors by reducing the as- sessable value, or by including omit- ted property which was taxable. Its functions are not to value or assess, but simply to decide whether the rate is in excess; at that point its functions cease. And it ha? no more power to equalize assessments than to make them : Ketcham v. Railroad Co., 4 Dill. 41. To the same eflEect is Kansas, etc. R. Co. v. Ellis County, 19 Kan. 584 If property which should not have been placed on the roU is assessed, the court cannot dis- regard it and let the assessment stand for tlje amount justly charge- 4 able against ibe owners; that would be equivalent to making a new roll and a new assessment, which would be beyond the province of the court: Spokane Falls v. Browne, 3 Wash. 81 The regular action of a board of su- pervisors in matters of taxation is not subject to any review in the courts: Bixlerv. Sacramento County, 59 CaL 698. By appealing from an assessment to a board which, not hav- ing judicial power, cannot pass on the validity of the tax, one is not pre- cluded from resorting to the courts : County Com'rs v. Wilson, 15 Colo. 90. 1 See Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533; Weston v. Charleston, 3 Pet. 449; Delaware R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Meriwether v. Garrett, 103 U. S. 472; Pence v. Frankfort, 101 Ky. 534; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bar- boursville (Ky.), 48 S. W. Rep. 985; Williams v. Cammaok, 37 Miss. 309; Dailey v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; State V. Rainey, 74 Mo. 336; Bridge Pro- prietors V. State, 31 N. J. Lt 384, 33 N. J. L. 593; Robertson v. State Land Office Com'r, 44 Mich. 374; State V. Bell, 1 Phil. (N. C.) 76; Kim- ball V. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368. 50 THE NATUEE OF THE POWER TO TAX. [CH. II. Tax legislation may be colorable merely, either because the purpose for which the tax is demand^ is not a public purpose, or because of the absence of some other essential element in taxation. When that is the case, the judiciary is the efficient check, and it must pretect individuals and protect the public against what, in such a case, would be an attempt at lawless exactions.* In som^ of the states the county courts or county justices are empowered to make the coullty levies. But "these, although exercising inferior judicial functions, are really administrative boards, possessing an ?Luthority corresponding to that which is exercised in other states by county commissioners or boards of supervisors.^ Their action in ordering taxes is quasi-legi&- lative, and governed by the same rules as other legislative action. In some states, also, taX proceedings are reviewed and con- firmed by the courts before any sales of property are ordered or demands conclusively fixed against individuals. But this again is not legislaitive. Such a review is supposed to be fa- vorable to the taxpayer, as it gives him an opportunity to take the opinion of the court upon the legality of the demand made upon him, without waiting until the collector comes and seizes his person or his property. The proceeding is the insti- tution of a suit on behalf of the state against each individual taxpayer or item of property taxed, and it calls upon the court " to apply the law to the issues which such a suit presents. Of the judicial nature of such a review no question could well be raised.' 1 Tyson v. School Directors, 51 Pa. son's returns of his property for St. 9; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 taxation acts miiiisteriaUy, not as a Pa. St. 146; Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. ■ judge, and his action is not review- 54; Tide Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. able by the courts on writ of error: Eq. 518; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. Musser v. Adair, 55 Ohio St. 466. But 91; Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. when the county court has passed Monr. 491. upon the legality of the listing of 2 The action of a coi^nty judge in property for taxation, the orr'ers of .assessing property under the Ken- the circuit court on appeal are made tucky statute is ministerial, not in the exercise of its judicial jxswer judicial, so, that the dismissal of an in the proper and ordinary sense: information , filed by the auditor's State v. South Penn Oil Co., 43 W. agent is not a bar to a second one Va. 80. filed for the same purpose: Baldwin a See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 V. Shine, 84 Ky. 503. A county au- U. S. 97; Boody v. Watson, 64 N. H. ditor in making additions to a per- 163. OH. n.] THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. 51 Law of the land. There is a constitutional guaranty which has come to us from Magna Charta, which declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.^ The alterna- iln the fifth amendment of the national constitution, and in the con- stitution of nearly all of the states, this safeguard is expressed thus: •'No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." These words, it is said, "'mean the law of the land; by which is to be understood laws which are general in their operation, and not special acts of legislation passed to affect the rights of partic- ular individuals against their will, and in a way in which the same rights of other persons are not af- fected by existing laws: " Sears v, Cottreli, 5 Mich. 251. " By ' due pro- cess ' is meant one which, following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case and just to the parties to be affected. It must be pursued in the ordinary mode described by the law; it must be adapted to the end to be attained ; and, whenever it is neces- sary for the protection of the parties it must give them the opportunity to be heard respejpting the justice of the judgment sought: " Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701. " In determining what is due process of law, respect must be had to the cause and object of the taking, whether under the taxing power, the power of eminent domain or the power of assessment for local improvements, or none of these; and if found to be suitable or admissible in the special case, it will be judged to be due pro- cess of law; but if found to be arbi- trary, oppressive oi unjust, it may be declared to be not due process of law: " Bradley, J., in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 107. " Due process of law in each particular case means such an exertion of the powers of government as the settled maxims of the law permit and sanc- tion, and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as these maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question belongs: " Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. V. State, 47 Neb. 549; Cum- mings V. Hyatt, 54 Neb. 35. In an- other tax case it is said that due process of law "implies a due course of legal proceedings according to those rules and forms which have -been established for the protection of private rights: " Caldwell v. Cartil- age, 49 Ohio St. 334. The supreme court of Nebraska declares that the term " due process of law," as used in the constitution of that state, '• re- lates primarily to the remedy or means of redress where property rights are invaded, rather than be substantive law: " Board of Direct- ors V. Collins, 46 Neb. 411. For the meaping of "law of the land" or " due process of law " in matters of taxation, see further, McMillen v. Anderson, 95 TJ. S. 37; Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 U. S. 394; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Springer . V. United States, 103 U. S. 586;' Kelly V. Pittsburgh, 104 U. 8.78; Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 XJ. S. 381; Spencer V. Merchant, 135 U. S. 345; Walston V. Nevin, 138 U. S. 578; Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 668; Lent v. Till- son, 140 Cr. 8. 316; Paulsen v. Port- land, 149 U, S. 30; Winona, etc. Land Co. V. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 536; Fall- brook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 113; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548; Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45; Norwood v. Baker, 173 U. S. 369; French v. Barber Asphalt Pav- ing Co., 181 U. S. — ; Wight v. Dav- 52 THE NATUEE OF THE POWER TO TAX. [OH. 11, tive provisions of this guaranty have sometinies been supposed" to mean the same thing, and the guaranty itself to entitle every person* to have any demand made upon him submitted to the determination of a jury of the vicinage. Such a construction applied in tax cases would work a thorough and radical change in the principles on which taxation is now supposed to rest. It would cripple the legislative power, and subject the action of the department whose function it is to make laws on its own views of the questions of public interest and public policy which the laws involve, to a review and possible reversal at the hands of a jury. It would not so much strengthen the ju- dicial department as it would weaken the legislative ; for the courts themselves, though juries sit with and as a part of them, are compelled to recognize a large degree of independence in the action of these assistants. , Such independence is often use- ful, and never can be seriously detrimental when a verdict de- termine^ a single controversy only; but to make juries the assessors of the claims of the state upon individuals could only introduce anarchy ; one jury reaching one conclusion regard- ing the public needs and the justice of its demands, and another another, until the state would be without general rule, and must fall to pieces from the incurable insTjffieiency of its govern- ment. Such a construction of a clause agreed upon as an im- portant provision in a charter of government can never have been intended.' idson, 181 IT. S. — ; Cass Farm Co. Nashville, M. & S. T. R. Co. v. White, V. Detroit, 181 U. S. — ; Bagley v. 92 Tenn. 370; State v. Sponaugle, 45 Castile, 43 Arli. 77; Lent v. Till- W. Va. 415; Baldwin v. Ely, 66 Wis. son, 72 CaL 404; Cleveland, C, C. &. 188; Meggett v. Eau tJlaire, 81 Wis. St. L. R Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 513; 326. Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Ca v. i Cruikshanks v. Charleston, 1 Mc- Backus, 133 Ind. 639; Ferry V.Camp- Cord 360; State v. Mayhew, 3 Gill bell, 110 Iowa 390; Pritchard V. Mad- 487; Harper v. Com'rs, S3 Ga. 566; ren, 24 Kan. 486; Ulman v. Baltl- State v. Frazier, 48 Ga. 137; Hagar more, 72 Md. 587; Bennett v. Davis, v. t'olo Supervisors, 47 Cal. 223; 90 Me. 102; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. Cowles v. Brittain, 2 Hawks 204; 251; Weimer v. Bunbury, 80 Mich. Com'rs v. Morrison, 23 Minn. 178: 301; Bringardv. Stellwagen,41Mioh. Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Ca v. 54; Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038; Backus, 133 Ind. 513; Pittsburgh, C, Saxton Nat. Bank v. Carswell, 136 Mo. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 436; State v. Central Pac. R Co., 21 629; Davis v. Clinton, 55 Iowa 549; Nev. 260; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. Howe v. Cambridge, 114 Mass. 388; 188; McMahon v. Palmer, 103 N. Y. Cocheco Co. v. Strafford, 51 N. H. 176;Mauldinv.Greenville,42S.C.393; 455; Boody v. Watson, 64 N. H. 162. CH. II.] THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. 63 It has long been settled that while one is to be protected in his interests by the "law of the land," he has a right to "the judgment of his peers " only in those cases ii;i which it has ira- memorially existed, or in which it has been expressly given by law. The clause recited from Magna Charta does not imply the necessity for judicial action in every case in which the property of the citizen may be taken for the public use. On the contrary, a legislative act for that purpose, when clearly within the limits of legislative authority, is of itself the law of the land.' And an act for levying taxes and providing the means of enforcement is, as we have seen, within the unquestioned and unquestionable power of the legislature.* It is therefore In Harris v. Wood, 6 T. R Monr. 641, ■it is.remarljed that taxes are recov- erable not only without a jury, but without a judge, and the assessment of ministerial ofBcers has been made to operate as an execution on the cit- izen, and the collector could distrain, and any public collector could be subjected to judgment on motion for the amount. "This process is not founded on a judgment; it issues without a judgment, and it is for this very reason that it is adopted. The state cannot wait the tedious process of getting a judgment. If she were compelled to do this, her honor might be compromittedj and the rights of her citizens jeoparded. Hence she clothes her collecting agents with the power to issue process at once which will at once command her means: " Per Nisbet, J., in Doe v. Deavors, 11 Ga. 79, 86. 1 Spencer v. Merchant, 135 XJ. S. 345; Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. E. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 513; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. E. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 635. 2 Kelly V. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78; Hagar v. Eeolamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368. This subject was much considered in Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 313, where it was said: " There is nothing technical, or we think obscure, in the requirement that process which divests property shall be due process of law. The constitution makes no attempt to define such process, but assumes that custom and law have already settled what it is. Even in judicial proceed- ings we do not ascertain from the constitution what is lawful process, but we test the action by principles which were before the constitution, and the benefit of which we assume that the constitution was intended to perpetuate. If there existed be- fore that instrument was adopted, well-known administrative proceed- ings which, having their origin in a legislative conviction of their neces- sity, had been sanctioned by long and general acceptance, we are no more at liberty to infer an intent in the people to prohibit them by im- plication from any general language than we should be to infer an intent to abridge the judicial authority by the use of similar words. The truth is, the bills of rights in the Ameri- can constitutions have not been drafted for the introduction of new law, but to secure old principles against abrogation or violation. They are conservatory instruments rather than reformatory; and they assume that the existing principles of the common law are ample for the 64: THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [OH. II. the law of the land not merely in so far as it lays down a gen- eral rule to be observed, but in all the proceedings and all the process which it points out or provides for in order to give the rule full operation. As has been well said, " the mode of levy- ing as well as the right of imposing taxes is completely and exclusively within the legislative power, which, it is to be pre- sumed, will always be exercised with an equal regard to the security of the public and individual rights and convenience. The existence of government depending on the prompt and regular collection of revenue must, as an object of primary im- portance, be insured in such a way as the wisdom of the legis- lature may prescribe. There is a tacit condition annexed to the ownership of property that it shall contribute to the public revenue in such mode and proportion as the legislative will shall direct; and if the officers intrusted with the execution of the laws transcend their powers to the injury of an individual, the common law entitles him to redress. Eut to pursue every de- linquent liable to pay taxes through the- forms of process and a jury trial would materially impede, if not wholly obstruct, the collection of the revenue." ' There is no room for the sup- position that in a matter of this public importance, where promptness in collection is always desirable, and often imper- ative, dilatory proceedings of this nature were within the con- templation of the people when consenting to any general provision of the constitution.^ It is safer, and, as we believe, protection of individual rights, when • Taylor, Ch. J., in Cowles v. Brit- onoe incorporated in the fundar tain, 2 Hawks 204^ 207; Crockett, J., mental law, and thus secured against in Hagar v. Yolo Supervisors, 47 Cai violation. We are, therefore, of ne- 223, 233. See Reclamation Dist. v. cessity driven from an examination Evans, 61 Cal. 101 Due process of of the previous condition of things, law does not necessarily require a if we would understand the meaning judicial hearing in matters of taxa- of due process of law, as the consti- tion : State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. tution employs the term. Nothing 415. previously in use, regarded as neces- 2 See Springer v. United States, 102 sary in government and sanctioned U. S. 586; Cowles v. Brittain, 3 by usage, can be looked upon as con- Hawks 204; State v. Allen, 2 Mo- demnedbyit. Administrative pro- Cord 55; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. cess of the customary sort is as much 251 ; High v. Shoemaker, 22 CaL 363; due process of law as judicial pro- Harper v. Com'rs, 23 Ga. 566; Tift v. cess. We should meet a great many Griffin, 5 Ga. 185; Wells County v. and very serious embarrassments in MoHenry, 7 N. D. 246; Adler v. government if this were otherwise." Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 539. And see CH. II.] THE NATUEE OF THE POWER TO TAX. . 55 more correct, to say that our constitutions have been framed and agreed upon in view of an immemorial practice and rule of government, under whicli the whole subject has been in- trusted to the legislative department; and they are to be under- stood and construed in the light of that practice wherever the people have not expressly undertaken to change it. Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the fed- eral constitution this subject has acquired additional impor- tance.' Whenever it is claimed that a revenue law of any state, either in intent or in administration, deprives an owner of his property without due process of law, a federal question may be raised upon which the decision of the supreme court of the United States will be authoritative and conclusive. That tri- bunal, in very recent cases, has said: "It was not the intention of the fourteenth amendment to subvert the systems of the states pertaining to general and special taxation ; that amend- ment legitimately operates to extend to the citizens and resi- dents of the states the same protection against arbitrary state legislation affecting life, liberty, and property, as is afforded by the fifth amendment agaitfst similar legislation by congress ; and the federal courts ought not to interfere when what is complained of is the enforcement of the settled laws of the state, applicable to all persons in like circumstances and condi- tions, but only when there is some abuse of law, amounting to confiscation of property or deprivation of personal rights."^ In order to bring taxation imposed by a state, or under its au- thority, within the scope of the provision of the fourteenth amendment which prohibits the deprivation of property with- Eobertson v. Land Com'r, 44 Mich, cess of law, operates on the general 274, for limitations upon this doctrine, government alone, and was not in- The Michigan tax law allowing a tended to restrict the powers of the writ of assistance to be granted to a states: Barron v. Mayor, 7 Pet 247; tax-tHle jjurchaser is not invalid Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78; as depriving the original owner of McElwaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 158; the right to have the title to his land Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah tried by a jury:^Ball v. Ridge Cop- 368; Delinquent Poll Tax, 21 R. I. per Co., 118 Mich. 7; Youngs v. Pet- 582. ers, 118 Mich. 45. '' Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit, 181 U. S. 1 The prohibition, in the fifth — ; French v. Barber Asphalt Pav- amendment to the national consti- ing Co., 181 U. S. — ; Tonawandav. tutioD, against deprivation of life, Lyon, 181 U. S. — ; Detroit v. Par- liberty, or property without due pro- ker, 181 TJ. S. — i 56 THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE >TO TAX, [oh. II. out due process of law, the case should be so clearly and pal- pably an illegal encroachment upon private rights as to leave no doubt that such taxation by its necessary operation is really spoliation under the power to tax.^ A state has the right to devise its own system of taxation free from federal interference.^ From this amendment the federal courts derive no general jurisdiction to prevent, or to relieve from, oppression under state laws, or to correct errors and mistakes of detail in state administration.' The distinction between the essentials of due 1 Henderson Bridge Co. v. Hender- son,' 173 U. S. 593. This case, holds that bridge property within the lim- its of a city may be regarded as en- joying such benefits from the gov- ernment of the city that, consistently with the federal constitution, it may be subjected to municipal taies under any system established by the state for the assessmeot of property for taxation.' Due process of law is not denied by subjecting to taxation for ordinary city purposes land that has not been laid off into lots, but is used for agricultural purposes only: Kelly V. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78. ^ee Kimball v. Gl-antsville City, 19 Utah 368. The action of assessing oflBcers who included in the valua- tion of railroad property for assess- ment property which a state statute unconstitutionally sought to exempt was held not lacking in due process of law: Huntington v. Worthen, 130 U. S. 97. 2 Kelly V. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78. ' Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701; Spencer V. Merchant, 135 U. 8. 345; Walston v. Nevin, 138 U. S. 578; Lent V. Tillson, 104 U. S. 316; Del Castillo V. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674; Robinson v. WilmingtoUj 35 U. S. App. 144 An owner is not deprived of his property without due process of law by the enforced collection of taxes merely because they work hardship and produce inequality in his particular case: Kelly v. Pitts- burgh, 104 U. 8. 78. See Forsythe v. Hammond, 68 Fed. Rep. 774; Norris V. Waco, 57 Tex. 635. Where a state statute gives the owners of lands in- cluded in an irrigation district a right to be heard on the question of inclusion, and hearing is given be- fore the tribunal so provided in ac- cordance with the statute, the decis- ion of such tribunal in the absence of fraud or bad faith will be conclu- sive on the federal courts: Fall- brook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. lis. Where the assessing board and the state court have acquired jurisdiction to act, errors in the mere , administration of the statute do not justify the federal supreme court in holding that the state is depriving owners of their property without due process of law: Lent v. Tillson, ' 140 U. S. 316. An assessment of cer- tain real estate in New Orleans for draining the swamps of that city having been resisted on the ground that the proceedings deprived the owner of his property without due process of law, it was held that not the corporate agency by which -the work was done, or the excessive price allowed therefor by the statute, or the relative importance of the work to the value of the land as- sessed, or the fact that the assess- ment was made before the work was done, or the fact that the assessment was unequal as regards the benefits conferred, were matters in which OH. II. J THE NATUEE OF THE POWER TO TAX. 57 process of law under the fourteenth amelidment, and matters which may or may not be essential under the terms of a state assessing or taxing law, is that due process of law must be found in the state statute and cannot be departed from with- out violating the constitution of the United States; while the other matters depend upon the law-making power of the state, and may be varied or changed as the legislative will of the state shall see fit to ordain.' The national supreme court has also held that the provision requiring due process of law is not disobeyed by a state law taxing the owner of personalty — even if such owner is not a citizen or resident of the state — where such personalty is, although not the place of the owner's domicile.' Also, that state laws providing for the taxation of the mortgagee's inter- est in land as real estate, regardless of the locality of the mort-- gagee's residence,' and compelling a resident of the state to pay taxes on a debt owed by a non-resident and secured by a mortgage on lands in another state,* are valid. Further, a state tax on the property of an express company within the state, the taxable value whereof is determined by the rule of propor- tion with reference to the whole capital stock of the company, is not a tax on property beyond the jurisdiction of the state, the state authorities are controlled authority subsequently given to by the federal constitution: David- make a new special assessment to pay son V. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97. for the completed work does not vio- iDel Castillo v. McConnico, 168 late the federal constitution: Lom- U. S. 674; Lombard v. West Chicago bard v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, Park Com'rs, 181 U. S. — . Under a 181 U. S. — . state statute requiring the name of ^ Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Penn- theowner, if known, to be placed on sylvania, 141 U. S. 18. It does not the assessment roll, with a descrip- deny due process of law for a state' tion of the property assessed, an as- to provide that as against persons sessment of land in the name of R moving from one county to another Castillo, instead of the owner's full in the state taxes may be collected name, Rafael Maria Del Castillo, can- by sending a tax bill to the sheriff not be regarded as violating the con- of the^county into which such per- stitution where the statute gave both sons have removed: De ArQian v. constructive and actual notice of the Williams, 93 Mo. 158. assessment, and ample opportunity s Savings, etc. Soc. v. Multnomah to the owner to correct or resist the County, 169 U. S. 431. See Common same: Del Castillo v. McConnico, 168 Council v. Board of Assessors, 91' U. S. 674 Where a special assess- Mich. 78. ment to pay for a particular improve- ^Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. ment has been held to be illegal, 491. 58 THE NATUKE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [CH. U. and so void as a taking of property without due process of law.' An allowance of a claim for personal-property taxes against a decedent's estate under state laws preferring claims for taxes to ordinary debts, making them a lien on personalty, providing for enforcing delinquent taxes, and affording appro- priate notice and opportunity to contest, is not without due process of law, although the decedent was a non-resident of the state.^ But a state statute authorizing assessments for local improvements, and %iaking the owners of lots per- sonally liable, for such assessments, cannot be permitted to affect with such a liability non-residents who have nqt been served with process,' although a personal judgment against a resident for an assessment does not raise the question of due process of law.* Private corporations are " persons " Avithin the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment;' and, therefore, a pro- vision of the constitution of California subjecting to separate taxation as real estate, and to deduction from the taxable value of the land, all mortgages except those of railroads, was held, as applied in practice, to take the property of railroad com- panies without due process of law.^ The reserved power to alter, amend, or repeal, a statute which constitutes a contract with a corporation exempting the latter from ordinary taxes, in lieu whereof a gross receipt tax is to be paid, cannot be so exercised as to relieve the state from the effect of the constitu- tional provision against impairing' the obligation of contracts, by a statute which attempts to preserve all the obligations of the corporation in favor of the state, and to take away from 1 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State 3 Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U. S. Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 166 U. S. 185; 193, explaining what was said in State V. Jones, 51 Ohio St. 493. See Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. Western Union TeL Ca v. Norman, 97, oh the subject of personal judg- 77 Fed. Eep. 13. ments for assessments. 2 Bristol V. Washington County, * Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 177 U. S. 133. A statute requiring 97. property in the hands of a non-resi- « Charlotte, C. & A. E. Co. v. Gibbes, dent ward situated outside of the 143 U. S. 386; Railroad Tax Cases, 13 state to be taxed in the county Fed. Rep. 733; Santa Clara County v. within the state where the guardian Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. was appointed is not unconstitu- 385; Knoxville & O. R Co. v. Harris, tional as taking property without 97 Tenn. 684. due process of law: Baldwin v. State, « Santa Clara County v. Southern 89 Md. 587. Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 885. OH. II.J THE NAT0EE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. 59 the corporation the consideration on the part of the state upon which the corporation's contract to pay a gross receipt tax rested ; ' such statute is a mere arbitrary exercise of power, and amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law. But a statute authorizing such a change in a contract made by a city with a water company as modifies the city's right to tax the company has been sustained.^ Due process of law under the fourteenth amendment does not require judicial proceedings in enforcing a tax,' although it is competent to provide for them ; * and, therefore, " as ap- plied to the proceedings for the levy and collection of taxes it does not imply or require the right to such notice and hearing as are deemed essential to the validity of the proceedings and judgments of judicial tribunals." ^ " And whether any notice to the party affected is necessary depends," to use' the words of Mr. Justice Field, " upon the character of the tax and the manner in which the amount is determinable. There are many taxes of which, from their nature, no notice can be given to the taxpayer, nor would notice be of any possible advantage to him, such as poll taxes, license taxes (not dependent upon the extent of his business), and, generally, specific taxes on things, or persons, or occupations. In such cases the legislature, in authorizing the tax, fixes its amount, and that is the end of the matter. Yet there can be no question that the proceeding is due process of law, as there is no inquiring into the weight of evidence, or other element of a judicial nature, and nothing could be changed by hearing the taxpayer, l^o right of his 1 Duluth & I. E. Co. V. St. Louis involved in the laying of an assess- County, 179 U. 8. 303. ment sliall be submitted to a court 2 New Orleans v. New Orleans of justice with notice to the parties Water Co., 143 U. S. 79. concerned, and opportunity on their ' McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; part to appear and make contest. Springer v. United States, 103 U. S. ■■> McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; , 586; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 331; V. S. 701: Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; King v. U. S. 381; Lent v. TiHson, 140 U. S. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404; Lent v. Tillson, 316; King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404 73 Cal. 404; Newton v. Roper, 150 Ind. * Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 630. See McMahon v. Palmer, 103 97; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill N. Y. 176. Notice by statute is gen- U. S. 701; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. erally the only notice given, and that Bradley, 164 U. S. 112. These cases has been held suflBcient: Kentucky hold that it is due process whten the E. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 331. statute provides that the questions 60 THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [oh. II. is therefore invaded." ' Where a law imposes a tax or assess- ment upon property according to its value, notice of every step in the tax proceedings is not necessary; the owner is not de- prived of property without due process of law if he has an opportunity to question the validity or the amount of such tax or assessment either before that amount is finally determined or in subsequent proceedings for its collection." Personal no- 1 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., lit U. S. 701. The summary appropria- tion of a dog for non-payment of a tax, without notice to the owner, is not a taking of property without due process of law; there being no prop- erty in dogs, against the police power of the state: Fox v. Mohawk & H. B. Humane Soc, 165 N. Y. 517. A state statute taxing inheritances not being a tax on property is not unconstitu- tional as taxing private property without due process of law in not providing for a personal notice and opportunity to resist the assessment: Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge (Mich.), 84 N. W. Rep. 1101. ''McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 XJ. S. 97; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701; Spencer v. Mer- chant, 125 U. S. 345; Palmer v. Mc- Mahon, 133 U. S. 660; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Winona, etc. Land Co. v; Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526: Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. West Virginia, 173 U. S. 32; McLeod v. Receveur, 18 O. C. A. 188; Weyerhaueser y. Minne- sota, 176 XJ. S. 550; Qskamp v. Lewis, 103 Fed. Rep. 906; American Refrig. Transit Co. v.Thomas (Colo.), 63 Pac. Rep. 410; Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196; In re Taxes of Itasca County, 68 Minn. 353; Wells County v. Mc- Henry, 7 N. D. 246; State v. Whittle- sey, 17 Wash. 447; Baldwin v. Ely, 66 Wis. 188. A state statute author- izing the governor of the state, when it has been made to appear to him that there has been an undervalua- tion of property for taxation in pre- vious years, to appoint a person to revalue and reassess such property, is not objectionable because it does not provide for a hearing before the governor; he does not act judicially, but merely starts the inquiry, upon which a reassessment may be based: \Veyerhaueser v. Minnesota, 176 IT. S. 550; State v. Weyerhauser, 72 Minn. 519. An assessment for taxation or a collection of taxes does not fail of " due process" though made without a hearing, where a reasonable provis- ion is made for a hearing afterwards, at which errors may be corrected or the taxes refunded: Williams v. Albany County Sup'rs, 122 U. S. 154. Where the laws of the state give a taxpayer an opportunity to object before the tax commissioners to the taxes assessed' against him, and pro- vide for a review by certiorari of the commissioners' decision, a state stat- ute which provides that on the tax receiver's application to a court a delinquent taxpayer may be fined in an amount equal to the taxes assessed against him, does not deprive him" of liberty without due process of law, though he has no opportunity to be heard on such application: Palmer V. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660. A non- resident owner of property assessed under a statute providing that the county auditor shall correct the tax duplicate by adding omitted prop- erty when discovered, but shall notify the owners of such property who are residents of the county, CH. n.J THE NATUBE OF THE POWEB TO TAX. 61 tice is not an essential of due process in taxation ; ' for that notioeis suflBcient which is given by statute,^- or by publica- cannot complain that the statute is unconstitutional for failure to provide for notice to non-residents or to give them a day in court, where the assessment by the county auditor was not a final judgment, but could be challenged by the non- resident by injunction, and where an order was obtained against the non- resident to show cause why he did not pay the taxes, in response to which any defense he had was open to him: Galhip v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196. Assuming that a state cannot, without inquisition or proceeding of some kind, declare a forfeiture of lands for failure dilring a named period to list them for taxation, yet if, before the final sale of such lands, the owner is given an opportunity to pay the taxes and charges, and so relieve his land from forfeiture, he cannot complain that his property has been taken without due process of law: King v. MuUins, 171 U. S. 404. A private sale of land for de- linquent taxes, without notice to the owner other than the notice of a previous public sale at which it had not been sold, does not conflict with the federal constitution: Newton v. Roper, 150 Ind. 630. A state statute requiring a commissioner to enter in the tax-books patented land within his district which has been omitted, and to assess the same according to the assessed value of contiguous lands, and charge taxes against the same with interest for each year during which it was omitted, does not deprive one of his property with- out due process of law, since a com- plete remedy is afforded by the stat- ute authorizing a person erroneously assessed to apply for x-elief within two years after the delivery of the assess- ment books to the treasurer: Douglas Ca V. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 397. 1 Merchants' Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461; Monticello Distilling Co. V. Mayor, etc., 90 Md. 416. 2 Kentucky R. Tax Cases', 115 U. S. 331. It is sufficient if notice be given by a law designating a time and place for parties to contest the jijs- tice of the valuation : Monticello Dis- tilling Co. V. Mayor, etc., 90 Md. 416. Where a state statute taxing the shares of shareholders of national banks through the agency of the banks defines the time when the banks shall make their reports to the audi- tor-general and specifically directs him to hear any stockholder who may desire to be heard, the due process required in respect to the matter of notice in tax proceedings is provided for: Merchants' Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. 8. 461. A stat- ute providing for the assessment for taxation of railroad property by a state board does not fail of due pro- cess in that it does not require per- sonal notice before the assessments are made final, as the statute names the time and place of meeting by the board: Kentucky E. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 331; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U.S. 421; Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 513; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St L. R. Co. V. Backus, 183 Ind. 635. A state statute providing for the assessment of railroad property by a particular board does not fail of due process of law in that it does not require the board to grant a hearing for the correction of errors, where, according to the construction of the act by the supreme court of the state, a right to such hearing is given: Kentucky E. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 331; Pittsburgh, C, 0. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 431. See Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194. The require- 62 THE NATUEE OE THE POWEE TO TAX. [oh. II. tion.^ Where provision is not made for notice or hearing at some stage of the proceedings, due process is wanting.'* If the legislature, in taxing lands benefited by a highway or other public improvement, makes provision for notice,' by pub- lication * or otherwise to each owner of land, and for hearing ment of due process of law is not infringed by the action of a board of equalization in raising the value of all property in the particular di* trict, or in raising the valuation of an individual's property without fur- ther notice than is afforded by the statute which fixes the time for the board's meeting: State v. Armstrong, 19 Utah 117; Streight v. Durham (Okl.), 61 Pac. Eep. 1096. 1 State E. Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 TJ. 8. 97; Hagar v. Eeclamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701; Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S.^321; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316;' Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 431; Winona, etc. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 536; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. V. Bradley, 164 U. S. 113; Del Cas- tillo V. McConnico, 168 U. S. 674; Wright V. Davidson, 181 U. S. — ; Wiley's Petition, 89 Mich. 58; Cole v. Shelp, 98 Mich. 58; Muirhead v. Sands, 111 Mich. 487; Ball v. Ridge Copper Co., 118 Mich. 7; Youngs v. Peters, 118 Mich. 45; Minnesota v. Weyerhauser, 68 Minn. 353, 73 Minn. 519; State v. Pillsbury (Minn.), 85 N. W. Rep. 175. 2 Railroad Tax Cases, 18 Fed. R 733. Notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential to the validity of every assessment? and due process of law is denied where a state provid- ing for taxation authorizes no ap- peal from an ex parte assessment: Monticello Distilling Co. v. Mayor, etc., 90 Md. 416. The requirement of due process of law is violated by a city charter which provides that property shall be assessed at a valu- ation irrespective of the value as as- sessed for the purposes of state taxa- tion, and which contains no provision by which the owner may have the value, as ascertained under said char- ter, reviewed and corrected: Heth v. Radford, 96 Va. 373. Since real property passing by \^ill or inherit- ance vests immediately in the heir or devisee on the owner's death, an inheritance-tax law which author- izes the fixing of the appraisement for taxation without notice or oppor- tunity to the heir or devisee to be heard is unconstitutional as depriv- ing the devisde of his property with> out due process of law: Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 390. ' The necessity of notice and of op- portunity for hearing insisted upon: Scott V. Toledo, 36 Fed. Rep. 385; Mur- dock V. Cincinnati, 44 Fed. Rep. 736; Whitef ord v. Probate Judge, 53 Mich. 130. City charter granting general power to construct and assess need not make express provision for no- tice of assessment; power is subject to requirement of notice: Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30. City charter not unconstitutional for want of pro- vision for notice; such provision may be made by ordinance : Tripp v. Yank- ton, 10 S. D. 516. Assessments for public improvements under a ohar- tej- making no provision whereby per- sons assessed had an opportunity to appear and, contest validity of such assessments did not constitute due process of law: Norfolk v. Young, 97 Va. 738. Assessments for sidewalks valid though made pursuant to char- ter not providing for notice other than annual entry in tax-rolls: Hen- nessy v. Douglas County, 99 Wis. 139. *See note 1, supra. Notice of THE NATUKE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. 63 CH. n.J him at some stage of the proceedings,* upon the question what proportion of the tax shall be assessed upon his land/ his prop- erty is not taken without due process of law.' The right to publication given by viewers to es- timate proportional share, of time and place of first meeting, held to bring proceedings within due pro- cass of law: Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30. Notice by publication pro- vided for by statute held not so short as to constitute lack of due process: Bellingham Bay & B. C. R. Co. v. New Whatcom, 173 U. S. 314; New Whatcom v. Bellingham Bay & B. C. R. Co;, 16 Wash. 131; King v. Port- land (Or.), 63 Pac. Rep. 3. 'Right to no- tice and hearing waived by petition for improvement and agreement to pay: Murdook v. Cincinnati, 44 Fed. Rep. 736. 1 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 XJ. S. 97; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill U. Si 701; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 113; Bauman v. Ross, 167 IT. 548; City Council v. Birdsong fAla.), 38 8. Rep. 533; Cribbs V. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555; Lower Kings River Reclamation Dist. v. McCuUah, 124 Cal. 175. A statute fixing the amount per foot of front- age and square foot of area which property adjoining a sewer shall be assessed for its construction does not deprive the assessed abutters of their property without due process of law, because it does not provide for no- tice and hearing before the assess- ment is levied: English v. Mayor, etc., 3 Marvel (Del.) 63. Where a city's charter provides for construct- ing sewers and levying assessments therefor according to area, regard- less of improvements, and that dur- ing the progress of the work all per- sons interested shall have an oppor- tunity to object to the materials used, the manner in which the work is done, or any supposed violation of the contract, it is unnecessary to pro- vide an opportunity to lot owners to be heard on the assessments after they are levied, the levy being a mere mathematical computation; and making such assessmentsa fixed charge against the lots without no- tice or opportunity of hearing does not constitute a lack of " due process of law: ■' Gillette v. Denver, 31 Fed. Rep. 823. 2'Due process of law does not re- quire notice or hearing as to the leg- islative determination of the assess- ment district, or as to the lands to be included therein, or as to the prop- erty to be considered as benefited by the proposed improvement, or as to the total cost of the work, or as to the total amount of the benefits, or, unless land is to be taken, as to the necessity of the work: Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345; Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U. S. 304; Parsons V. District of Columbia, 170 U. 8. 45; Voigt V. Detroit, 123 Mich. 547; Roberts v. Smith, 115 Mich. 5. Where the cost of a street impi'ovement is to be assessed by frontage, failure to provide for a hearing as to benefits has been held not to be a denial of due process: Detroit v. Parker, 181 U. S. . See Cass Farm Co. v. De- troit, 181 U. S. — ; Wright v. David- son. 181 U. S. — ; Lyon v. Tona- wanda, 181 U. S. — ; French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. 3 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 IT. 8. 97; Spencer v. Merchant, 135 XT. S. 345; Walston v. Nevin, 138 U. S. 578; Lent V. Tillson, 140 U. 8. 316; Paul- sen V. Portland, 149 U. 8. 30; Fall- brook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 IT. S. 112; Bauman v. Ross, 167 IT. S. 548; Parsons v. District of Columbia, 170 U. 8. 45; Wight v. Davidson, 181 U. 8. 64 THE NATUJEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [oh. II. be notii5ed and to bave an opportunity to be beard in tax pro- ceedings is further considered in another chapter.* State legislation may authorize different modes of assessment for different properties provided the rule of assessment remains the same.^ It is also competent to enact that the decision of a designated board shall be, final without rehearing or review.* ; Cribbs v. Benedict, 64 Ark. 555; Roundenbush v. Mitchell, 154 Ind. 616 ; Wilson v. Salem, 34 Or. 504 ; Kinf V. Portland (Or.), 63 Pao. Rep. 2; Meggett V. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 336. Where assessments under a state law for the purpose of reclaiming over- flowed and marshy lands can be en- forced only by a suit in which may be pleaded any defense going either to validity or amount, there is no lack of due process qt law: Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701. An adequate legal remedy and an oppor- tunity to be heard in court were held to be furnished by the Illinois stat- ute which provided, in case of non- payment of a special tax for the construction of a sidewalk, for pro? ceedings according to the general revenue laws of the state: Job v. Alton, 189 IlL 356. By instituting an action in a state court against an abutting owner for the collection of a special assessment, a city affords him the opportunity to present every objection to the validity of such as- sessment, and judgment in such action will constitute due process of law: Murdock v. Cincinnati, 44 Fed.' Rep. 726. iPosi, ch. XIL 2 Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U.S. 421; Winona, etc. Land Co. v. MinnesCta, 159 U, S. 536; Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237. The fact that the statutes of a state provide that the property of railroad ootopanies shall be assessed for taxa- tion by a state board, while other property is originally assessed by a cpunty board from which an appeal may be taken to the state board, is not a deprivation of due process of law: Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Ca V. Backus, 154 U. S, 431. See San Francisco, etc. R. Co. v. State Board, 60 Cal. 13. Nor is due process in- fringed by state statutes providing for the assessment of back taxes of railroad property by commissioners not authorized to assess other prop- erty: Yazoo & lit V. R. Co. v. Adams, 77 Miss. 764 Nor are constitutional rights aflfeoted by the fact that state laws provide for assessment by the county a,uditor of the taxes for previ- ous years in which the property was omitted from the roll by said auditoir; while the assessment of current taxes is made by the county assessor on act- ual view, and is reviewed by a town board of review and a county board of equalization, the rule of assess- ment being the same: Winona, etc. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 536. The mere fact that a statute provides a diflEerence of procedure in respect to a certain class of property from that provided for another class, or from the general procedure in regard to taxation, will not avoid such stat- ute: Boyd V. Wiggins, 7 Okl. 85. Nor is the rule of due process in- fringed by a statute which provides a new method for the collection of taxes that is applicable even as to taxes assessed and returned before the passage of the act; delinquent taxpayers being given a day in court to show the invalidity of the tax: Auditor General v. Reynolds, 83 Mich. 471. 8 Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R Ca OH. II. j THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. 65 Since assessments for taxation do not constitute judicial judg- ments, such as can be set aside .only after notice and an oppor- tunity to be heard, a reassessment of grossly, undervalued prop- erty so as to make such property bear the same burden it would have borne if the true assessment had been made in the first instance does not violate the constitutional requirement of due process of law.*^ It has been held that where the functions of an officer in making examination a6 to property withheld from the tax-list by a taxpayer are judicial in their nature, a stat- ute allowing him a certain commission on taxes so added to the list affects him with such a pecuniary interest as renders proceedings conducted by him nbt due process of law.^ Nor is the provision relating to due process of law violated by a state statute requiring treasurers of corporations to deduct a specified state tax from the interest paid on the corporation's bonds, etc., and to turn the same into the state treasury,' or by an enactment requiring the chief officer of each railroad com- pany to make an annual return to the state auditor of the length of his road within the state, and providing for a board of equalization to receive the returns and equalize the valua- tions, and further providing for the collection of the taxes so assessed by suit against the officers incurred by a failure to pay the taxes levied, or for the recovery of the taxes themselves by action in the courts.* Nor does a state statute imposing on express, telegraph, telephone, and sleeping-car companies a V. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Fallbrook A statute compelling payment of Irrig. Dist V. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112; taxes on stock belonging to non-resi- Winona, etc. Land Co. v. Minnesota, dents was held not to dep/ive insur- 159 U. S. 526; St. Louis, L M. & S. R. ance companies of their property Co. V. Worthen, 52 Ark. 529; Cleve- without due process of law: State v. land, C, C. & St. L. R. Oa v. Backus, Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 590 ; State 133 Ind. 513; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (Conn.), 47 Atl. L. R Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 625: Rep. 299. A statute requiring persons Yazoo &-M. V. R. Co. v. Adams, 77 in possession of distilled spirits to Miss. 764 pay taxes thereon, and giving them 1 Weyerhaueser v. Minnesota, 176 a lien for taxes so paid when they U. S. 550, afiBirmiug State v. Weyer- are not the owners, is reasonable and hauser, 72 Minn. 519. valid; it merely makes the custodi- 8 Brinkerhoff v. Brumfleld, 94 Fed. ans of liquor the agents of the state Rep. 433. .in paying the tax: Monticello Dis- » Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Common- tilling Co. v. Mayor, etc., 90 Md. 416. wealth, 134 U. S. 232; Jennings v. * Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Coal Ridge, etc. Co., 147 U. S. 147. Commonwealth, 115 U. S. 321. 5 66 THE N^TUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [OH. II. penalty of fifty per cent, for non-payment of taxes, violate the f ule of due process.' It has also been held, in applying to state legislation this ita- portant constitutional restriction, that one who takes a mort- gage while laws are in force making water-rents, like taxes and assessments, a charge on the land prior to all other incum- brances, takes subject to this condition whether the water was introduced on the mortgaged lot before or after the giving of the mortgage, and hence he has no ground of complaint that he has been deprived of his mortgage without dne process of law.^ The requirement of due process of law is not Infringed by a statutory provision that one seeking to have the collection of a tax enjoined shall give security when instituting the suit.' Nor can it be said that the "due process" clause forbids the system established by a state's constitution and laws tinder which taxable lands are forfeited to the state for the owner's neglect to enter them for taxation, and, upon petition required to be filed in the proper court in behalf of the 'state, are sold, after actual or constructive service upon the owrter, who may interveije and redeem.* Nor is the legislature of a state pro- 1 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Indi- payment of taxes as a condition pre- ana, 165 U. S. 304. cedent to making defense to a void 2 Provident Inst. v. Jersey City, 113 claim of title under a tax sale, re- U. S. 506. The legislature has power fuses remedy of due course of law to make a special assessment for an for an injury to a right of property: improvement a lien upon the prop- Eustis v. Henrietta, 90 Tex. 468, 91 erty paramount to a prior mortgage: Tex. 835. And due process of law is Morey v. Duluth, 75 Minn. 321. But denied by a statute requiring the a statute providing that a, city assess- owner of land sold for taxes to de- ment should be a first lien on the posit with the clerk of the court the property affected, and that bonds amount of all taxes, interest, and issued therefor should be conclusive costs accrued up to that time before evidence of the validity of said lien, he can contest the validity of the tax was held unconstitutional as depriv- or sale: Bennett v. Davis, 90 Me. 103. ing the owner of his property with- < King v. Mullins, 171 U. S. 404 out due process of law: Eamish v. Due process of law is not violated by Hartwell, 136 GaL 443. state laws providing for the forfeit- s' McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37. ure of lands because of non-entry for Nor by a statute requiring a tender taxation: State v. Cheney, 45 W. Va. of the taxes to be paid before suit, 478; State v. Swann, 46 W. Va. 128. can be brought to recover land from The constitutional prohibition is, the holder of a tax-deed ;■ Coats v. however, contravened by a statute Hill, 41 Ark. 149. It has, however, which provides that owners of unas- been held that a statute requiring sessed military lots shall forfeit all OH. II.] THE NATURE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. 67 hibited from imposing a reasonable limitation upon the period within which, after the time for redemption has expired, a purchaser at a tax sale can enforce his right to a conveyance or lease.^ While it is competent for the legislature of a state to declare that a tax-deed shall he prima facie evidence of the regularity of the sale, and of all proceedings prior thereto, such a deed- cannot be made conclusive evidence of the grantee's title to the land.^ A state law providing that tax-deeds which have been on record two years should, in any action brought more than a specified length of time after the act took effect, be con- clusive evidence that there was no irregularity in the assess- ment of the taxes, was held to be a statute of limitations, and, therefore, was not regarded as depriving the owner of his prop- erty without due process of law in defiance of the federal con- stitution.' It has been declared by the supreme court of the United States that " unless regulations concerning the granting of licenses to sell are so utterly unreasonable and extravagant in their rights to the state unless they establish their title wijthin a desig- nated time: Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378. See Bagley v. Castile, 42 Ark. 77. And by a statute undertaking to confer upon a court jurisdiction to proceed as against lands upon which the state has lost its lieu for taxes, and upon which it has no color of right to enforce collection thereof: Kipp V. Elwell, 65 Minn. 525. 1 Wheeler V. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245. 2 Marx V. Hanthorn, 148 U. S. 172; Taylor v. Deveaux, 100 Mich. 581; MoKinnon v. Meston, 104 Mich. 642; Weeks v. Merkle, 6 Okl. 714. See Wilson V. Wood (Okl.), 61 Pac. Eep. 1045; Kelly v. Herrall, 20 Fed. Eep. 364; Bannon v.Burns,39 Fed. Rep. 892. And further, as to the effect that may be given to tax-deeds, see post, ch. XV. A state statute providing that no action for the recovery of lands sold for taxes shall be main- tained unless it appears that the plaintiff or his predecessor in title was seised or possessed of such lands within the two years prior thereto, cannot be so construed as to deprive an owner of his lands or the right to recover possession because they have been for two years in possession of a purchaser at a tax sale which ap- pears on the face of the proceedings to be void: Alexander v. Gordon, 41 C. C. A. 228. The principle of due process of law is not infringed by a state statute which provides that where land purchased by the auditor for delinquent taxes is not redeemed by the owner within two years, any person may purchase it by comply- ing with the statute, and may pro- cure a deed which can only be de- feated by proof that the taxes were not properly chargeable on the land or had been paid: Virginia Coal Co. V. Thomas, 97 Va. 527. 3 Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90; Saranao Land, etc. Co. v. Comp- troller, 177 U. S. 31& 68 THE NATUEE OF THE POWER TO TAX. [OH. II. their nature and purpose that the property and personal rights of the citizen are unnecessarily, and in a manner wholly arbi- trary, interfered with or destroyed without due process of law, they do not extend beyond the power of the state to pass, and they form no subject for federal interference." ^ Therefore a city ordinance authorizing the issue, upon the payment of $100, of licenses to sell cigarettes, and forbidding the s^le of those articles without such license, was held not to violate the national constitution; the amount of the tax named for the license was considered to be within the power of the std,t6, through the city, to fix ; and it was regarded as competent for the ordinance to delegate to the mayor the entire subject of granting or revok- ing licenses.^ The requirement of a license for a warehouse by a state statute regulating elevators and warehouses on railroad rights of way or lands used in connection with a railway at stations and sidings is not forbitiden by the fourteenth amend- ment in case of a warehouse used exclusively for the storage of the owner's grain, where such warehouse is used for the pur- pose of buying grain from the public, and is a sort of public market, the warehouseman being a party in interest and acting as marketman, weighmaster, inspector, and grader of the grain.' Concerning special assessments for local improvements, it has been declared by the highest court that " In the absence of any more specific restriction than the general prohibition against taking property without due process of law, the legis- lature of the state, having the power to fix the sum necessary to be levied for the expense of a public improvement, and to order it to be assessed, either, like o^her taxes, upon property generally, or upon the lands benefited by the improvement, is 1 Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183. deemed by the seller in " presents," 2GundIingv.Chlcago, 177U. S. 183. held not to take property without Due process of law is not violated by due process of law: Humes v. Fort the requirement, in a state statute Smith, 93 Fed. Rep. 857. Astatestat- relating to the licensing of persons ute requiring the operators of coal doing business in the state, of a de- mines to pay fees for mine inspeo- posit of $500: State v. Harrington, tions therein provided was held not 68 Vt. 623. Statute and ordinance to talre the property of such operators providing for the licensing, under without due process of law: ConsoU- the term of "gift enterprises," of the dated Coal Co. v. People, 186 lU. 134. business of dealers in trading stamps, ' " Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. which are sold to merchants to be 453, affirming State v. Cargill Co., 77 given by them to their customers Minn. 333. with their purchases, and to be re- OH. II.J THE NATUEE OF THE POWER TO TAX. 69 authorized to determine both the amount of the whole tax and the class of lands which will receive the benefit and there- fore bear the burden, although it may, if it sees fit, commit the ascertainment of either or both of these facts to the judg- ment of commissioners. . . . But the legislature has the power to determine, by the statute imposing the tax, what lands which might be benefited by the improvement are in fact benefited ; and if it does so, its determination is conclusive. upon the owners and the courts." ^ The principle is well set- tled that the legislature does not violate the requirement of due process of law in authorizing special assessments, in deter- mining the taxing district wherein they are to be laid, or in directing them to be made in proportion to the frontage, area or market value of the adjoining property.' In a recent opin- ion which has given rise to much controversy, the supreme court of the United States declares that " the exaction from the owner of private property of the cost of a public improve- > ment in substantial excess of the special benefits accruing to them is, to the extent of such excess, a taking of private prop- erty for public use without compensation." ' That was a case 'Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. other matters as they shall deem just 345. See Williams v. Eggleston, 170 and proper," was held invalid as au- U. S. 304. thorizing a taking of property to pay 'Mattingly v. Dist. of Columbia, charges not founded on a special 97 U. S. 687; Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 benefit received: Sears v. Board, 173 U. S. 606; Walston v. Nevin, 128 Mass. 71. Due process of law is not U. S. 578; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. followed by a statute which provides Bradley, 164 U. S. 113; Parsons v. for assessing upon the adjacent own- Dist. of Columbia, 170 U. S. 45; Web- ers according to frontage, the ex- ster V. Fargo, 181 U. S. — ; Wright pense of constructing a sewer to an V. Davidson, 181 U. S. — ; Heman amount not exceeding a certain sum V. Allen, 156 Mo. 534 The statute per lineal foot: Dexter v. Boston, may make each street or portion 176 Mass. 347. A city charter au- thereof a taxing district for the im- thorizing an assessment, on every pro vement thereof: Hilliardv. Ashe- lot in the city in front of which ville, 118 N. C. 845. water pipes are laid, of an annual 3 Norwood V. Baker, 173 U. S. 269. tax of ten cents per lineal foot of the To the same efifeot, Hutcheson v. frontage of such lot, was held invalid Storrie, 93 Tex. 685. A state statute as providing,for the taking of private directing street commissioners to de- property under the guise of taxation termine annually the just and equi- without due process of law: Eamsey table sewer charges to be paid by County v. Lewis Co. (Minn.), 85 N.W. estates in the city, and to take into Rep. 207. See State v. Pillsbury consideration not only the benefits (Minn.), 85 N. W. Rep. 175. received by the estate, but also " such 10 THE NATUEB OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [CH. II, where, under a village ordinance, the entire expense of open- ing a street through the land of a single owner was imposed upon him, irrespective of the question whether the property- was benefited by such opening; and the decision therein was generally construed as laying down the doctrine that the im- position of assessments for local improvements per front foot, irrespective of the question of accruing benefits, is in violation . of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.' But the national supreme court nas settled the point by holding that an assessment of the cost of paving upon abutting prop- erty in proportion to the frontage thereof, without any pre- liminary hearing as to benefits, is not a denial of due process of law when authorized by the legislative power.^ Nor is the 1 See Adams V Shelbyville, 154Ind. 467. In State v. District Court, 80 Minn. 393, the supreme court of Min- nesota held that it was not a fair construction of Norwood v. Baker, supra, to regard all special assess- ments made on the basis of frontage as in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 2 French v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 181 U. S. — ; Tonawanda v. Lyon, 181 U. S. -^;.Cass Farm Co. V. Detroit, 181 U. S. — ; Detroit v. Parker, 181 U. S. — . Prior to these decisions, it was held in Indiana that the statutes of that state relating to the improvement of streets were not unconstitutional, since, although adopting the front rule as a prima facie basis of assessment, they did not exclude an investigation as to the special benefits or prohibit an assessment on that basis: Adams v. Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 487; Indianapo- lis V. Holt, 155 Ind. 333; Taylor v. Crawfordsville, 155 Ind. 403. Assess- ments or special taxation' by front- age, without special inquiry as to benefits, have been sustained in many states as not denying due ■process of law: Job v. Alton, 189 111. 356; Cass Farm Co. v. Detroit (Mich.), 83 N. W. Rep. 108; State v. District Court, 80 Minn. 393; Eolph V. Fargo, 7 _N. D. 140; Conde v. Schenectady," 164 N. Y. 358; Tripp V. Yankton, 10 S. D. 516. See City Council V. Birdsong (Ala.),' 38 S. Rep. 533; Hadley v. Dague, 130 Cal. 307. In Massachusetts, a statute authorizing assessments for street sprinkling to be apportioned accord- ing to lot frontage has been sustained as applied to occupied estates in a large city: Sears v. Board, 173 Mass. 71. Under a city charter providing that if, in condemnation proceed- ings, the jury finds that any tracts or parcels of land within the benefit district are benefited ratably in pro- portion to the assessed value thereof, as shown by the books of the assess- ors, it may so assess the same, the fact that under such circumstances the assessment was by the front foot did not render it unconstitutional as taking private property without due process of law: Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo. 450. A city charter enacting that the whole cost of a district sewer shall be assessed as a special tax against the lots of land in the district, according to their propor- tionate area, without regard to im- provements, is not a deprivation of property without due process of law: Heman v. Allen, 156 Mo. 534 CH. II.j THE NATTJEE OF THE POWEK TO TAX. 71 requirement of due process of law contravened by a statute providing for the organization of irrigation districts, and for an assessment by value of the land benefited by the irrigation, instead of an assessment in proportion to actual benefits con- ferred by the improvement, to pay the cost of constructing the works.* And the fourteenth amendment is not violated by a state law providing for the drainage, and for the assess- ment of the costs thereof upon all lot-owners, of any tract of low or marshy land on proceedings instituted by five or more owners of lots within the tract, and not objected to by owners of the greater part of the tract, all being given an opportunity for a hearing.^ "Where an assessment for improving a street has, after part payment, been declared void for want of any pro- vision for notice and hearing, and where the unpaid part has been canceled, the legislature may direct an assessment of the amount so canceled, to be apportioned upon the lands as to which the original assessment was not paid.' Many points under the requirement that process which divests property by taxation shall be due process of law have been de- cided by the state courts without review by the supreme court of the United States. Some of these have been mentioned ; and others are cited in the margin.* 1 Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, to be paid to such person or to his 164 U. S. 113. next of kin, aifd authorizing and re- 2 Wurts V. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606. quiring a tax levy therefor: Board of See Howe v. Cambridge, 114 Mass. Com'rs v. Church, 63 Ohio St. 318. 388. Nor by a state statute providing that ' Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. a certain county shall pay a certain 845. See Lombard v. West Side Park part of the salaries of the judges of Com'rs, 181 U. S. — . It has, been the district court therein: Steiner held that due process of law is vio- v; Sullivan, 74 Minn. 498. Nor by lated by the selling of land to satisfy state statutes creating a school dis- a void street assessment which the triot and authorizing the levy of a legislature has unconstitutionally at- tax for school purposes by a board, of tempted to validate; Brady v. King, trustees on petition of twenty tax- 53 CaL 44. See Harper v. Rowe, 58 payers: Martin v. School Dist., 57 S. CaL 333; Dundee Mortgage Co. v. C. 135. Nor by the taxation of prop- School Dist., 19 Fed. Kep. 359. erty for free public schools in acoord- * The constitutional requirement ance with the constitution and laws of due process of law is not infringed of the state: Werner v. Galveston, by a state law inflicting — "for the 73 Tex. 33. See Eevell v. Annapolis, suppression of mob violence " — upon 81 Md. 1. Nor by a statute imposing the county in which a person is in- a progressive inheritance tax: Union jured or killed by a mob, a penalty Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge 72 THE NATUKE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [oh. II. Equal protection of the laws. Immediately following those words in the fourteenth amendment which resteain any state from proceeding without due process of law is the provision that no state "shall depy to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." This imposes a limitation upon all the powers of the state which can touch the individ- ua,l or his property, including among them that of taxation.^ As explained by the federal supreme court, this prohibition " was not intended to prevent a«tate from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all, such as churches, libraries, and the property of chari- table institutions. It may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions, and may vary the rates of excise upon various products. It may tax real estate and personal (Mich.), 84 N. W. Eep. 1101. Nor by a city ordinance requiring a street rail- road company to pay an annual tax on each mile of its road, as a condi- tion upon its right to construct and operate its line: Chicago General E. Co. V. Chicago, 176 la 353. Nor by a statute requiring tax-listers to list at double the estimated value the prop- erty of one who refuses to return a sworn inventory: Bartlett v. Wilson, 59 Vt. 23. Nor by state statutes providing that the county trustee shall determine the amount of tax assessments and render judgment thereon, upon which execution may issue, and gauging his compensation by the amount of taxes so collected : Grundy County v. Tennessee Coal, etc. Co.. 94 Tenn. 295. Nor by a stat- ute allowing an assessment of ten per cent, of the estimated cost of a drain to be added thereto for contingent ex- penses: Auditor General v. Melze, 124 Mich. — , 83 N. W. Rep. 886. Nor by a city charter authorizing the cost of gas and water connections when made by the city to be assessed against the owners of property bor- dering on a street which has been ordered paved, even though the gas and water-works are owned by private corporations: Gleason v. Waukesha County, 103 Wis. 225. Nor by a statute authorizing county' treasurers, where the amount of a delinquent tax is less than $300, to sell the property on which the tax is a lien, simply by giving certain notices, instead of bringing suit as in cases where the tax is greater: Sawyer v. Dooley, 31 Nev. 390. Nor by a state statute which has the effect of hastening the time of sale of lands returned delinquent before its passage, and of lessening the time of redemption as to such lands: Muir- head v. Sands, 111 Mich. 487. Nor by statutory provisions permitting the selling of the whole of a tract of land for taxes when a smaller part might be sufiScient to pay them: Bigger v. Ryker (Kan.), 63 Pac. Eep. 740. While the taxing power is great, it is not within legislative authority to direct the collection, as a tax, by ex parte and arbitrary proceedings of a sum that is in fact payable as rent of lands: MoFadden V. Longh^m, 58 Tex. 579. 1 Thov Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 733; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 385. OH. II.] THE NATOEE OF THE POWER TO TAX. 73 property in a different manner. It may tax visible property only, and not tax securities for the payment of money. It may allow deductions for indebtedness, or not allow them. . . . We think we are safe in saying that the fourteenth amendment was not intended to compel the state to adopt an iron rule of equal taxation. If that were its proper construction, it would not only supersede all those constitutional provisions and laws of some of the states whose object is to secure equality of tax- ation, and which are usually accompanied with qualifications deemed material ; but it would render nugatory those discrim- inations which the best interests of society require, which are necessary for the encouragement of needed and useful indus- tries, and the discouragement of intemperance and vice, and which every state, in one form or another, deems it expedient to adopt." ' Equal protection cannot be said to be denied by a statute which operates alike on all persons and property similarly situated,^ or by one which authorizes different modes 1 Bell's Gap E. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 333, 337. See to the same effect, Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 143 U. S. 339; Jennings v. Coal Ridge, etc. Co., 147 U. a 147; Adams Ex- press Co. V. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 166 U. S. 185; Merchants', etc. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. 8. 461; Simpson v. Hopkins, 83 Md. 478; State v. Bixman (Mo.), 63 S. W. Rep. 838: Kniseley v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. St 614. A tax law cannot be chal- lenged under the federal constitution on the ground of inequality in the burdens resulting from its operation: Merchants', etc. Nat. Bank v. Penn- sylvania, 167 U. S. 461. Nor because it exempts from taxation property used exclusively for charitable pur- poses: Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189. 2 Wurts V. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 606; Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 U. 8. 331; Walston V. Nevin, 138 U. S. 578; Ma- goun V. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283. Equal protection exempts any person from any greater burdens or charges than such as are equally imposed upon all others under like circumstances, and forbids unequal exactions of any kind, among them unequal taxation: The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. Rep. 733; Santa Clara County V. Southern Pac. E. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 385. Taxation by a city of a bridge structure, to which the same r«le is applied as is applied to all other property within the municipal limits, does not deny the equal pro- tection of the laws: Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 593. Nor is such denial worked by a statute imposing a collateral inherit- ance tax of five per cent, upon the value of property passing to any per- son not wjthin certain degrees of consanguinity to the decedent : Wal- lace V. Myers, 38 Fed.^ Rep. 184 Nor by a statute providing for the drain- age of marsh lands, which statute is applicable to all lands of the same kind: Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 600. Nor does a statute allowing banks to collect from shareholders and pay into the state treasury an annual tax of a certain percentage 74 THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [CH. n. of assessment for different properties but retains the same rule of assessment,^ or by proceedings for the assessment and oollec- of the par value of their shares, in- stead of the regular tax of half that percentage of the actual value, deny "equal protection," even though it results in some banks paying less than others on the actual value of their property: Merchants', etc. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461. A state constitutional provision that a deduction of debts from credits may be authorized in fixing the as- sessable value of property does not infringe the rule of equal protection: Newport v. Mudgett, 18 Wash. 371. Nor does that rule preclude the tax- ation of goods in the state where they are sold, though the merchant who owns them paid taxes on them in "the state whence they were shipped: Ex parte Thornton, 13 Fed. Rep. 538. 1 Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 IT. S. 381; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 431; Winona, etc. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 536; Weyerhaueser V.Minnesota, 176 U. S. 550. "The equal protec- tion of the laws" does not in any case require an appeal from the as- sessment of taxes to be given, al- though an appeal may be allowed in respect to other persons differently situated: Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 331. And such protection is not denied by the fact that only one hearing, viz., before a state board which assesses their property, is given to railroad companies, while the ordinary taxpayer, whose prop- erty is assessed by county officials, has, after hearing before them, a right of appeal to, and a hearing before the state board: Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 513; Pitts- burgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 183 Ind. 635. See San Francisco, etc. R. Co. V. State Board, 60 CaL 13; Yazoo & M. v. R. Co. v. Adams, 77 Miss. 764. Nor is such protection withheld by state laws which pro- vide that taxes for years in which the property was omitted froip the rolls shall be assessed in a mode different from that prescribed for current taxes, the rule of assessment being, however, the same: Winona, etc. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 536. A corporation is not denied the equal protection of the laws by a state statute which, as construed by the Jiighest court of the state, provides an opportunity, in assess- ing a corporation's property, to cor- rect an undervaluation first made by the assessor, without giving the same opportunity to coi-rect an under- valuation of the property of individ- uals, so long as the corporation is not assessed on any property not legally t-axable, or taxed beyond the actual value of its property; there being, moreover, no proof of any general custom to undervalue the property of individuals: New York v. Barker, 179 U. S. 279; People v. Barker, 158 N. Y. 168. Railroad property includ- ing the land forming part thereof may, without depriving the com- panies of equal protection, be as- sessed annually, while ordinary real estate is assessed but once in two years or even less often; the fact that such property is denominated "real estate "not changing its true character: St. Louis, L M. & S. R Co. V. Worthen, 53 Ark. 539; Cham- berlain V. .Walter, 60 Fed. Rep. 788. See Owensboro & N. R. Co. v. Dar yiess County (Ky.), 3 S. W. Rep. 164. On the same principle, the statutory mode of sale where the delinquent tax is less than a certain sum may CH. II.J THE NATUEE OF THE POWEK TO TAX. 75 tion of taxes which follow the course . customarily pursued in the state.' The inhibition of the amendment was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a spe- cial subject for discriminating and hostile legislation,^ but it does not prohibit special legislation,' or legislation that is lim- ited either in the objects to which it is directed, or by the ter- ritory within which it is to operate.* ISTor does it preclude the be more summary than where the tax is greater: Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 39Q. 1 Pembina, etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181. 2 Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 118. Unjust and illegal discrimination between persons, in taxation, and the denial of equal justice, are within the prohibition of the constitution: Cache County V. Jensen, 21 Utah 207. An assess- ment of property which violates the provisions of a state constitution re- quiring uniformity in taxation, and which is a class discrimination, also deprives the owner of the equal pro- tection of the laws guarantied by the federal- constitution, although the illegality is in the administration of the statute rather than in the statute itself: Railroad & T. Cos. v. Board of Equalization, 85 Fed. Rep. 303. Where, besides 'being in violar tion of the constitution of the state, the statute results in an arbitrary and opi)ressive discrimination in re- gard to a large class of citizens, or a large species of property, it is a denial of the equal protection of the laws: Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Taylor, 86 Fed. Rep. 168. Such denial is ef- fected by a state statute which, being applicable only to peddlers offering for sale goods manufactured within the state, imposes a discriminating tax on such goods in favor of foreign goods: State v. Hoyt, 71 Vt. 59. A statute imposing a license fee of $25 a quarter on every laundry busi- ness employing or engaging more than one person, except steam laun- dries, which are taxed but $15 per quarter, was held void by the federal district court, as imposing a heavier burden upon one kind of laundry business than upon another: In re Yot Sang, 75 Fed. Rep. 983. Contra, State v. French, 17 Mont. 54 It has been held that a state law which discriminates in taxation for the public schools, and taxes only white persons for white schools, and ne- groes for schools for negro children, is void as repugnant to the four- teenth amendment: Clay brook v. Owensboro, 16 Fed. Rep. 297. Contra, Marshall v. Donovan, 10 Bush 681; Norman v. Boaz, 85 Ky. 557; Eakins V. Eakins (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep. 285; Board of Trustees v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.), 30 S. W. Rep. 620. None but a person injured by an al- leged unlawful discrimination can complain of it: United States v. Jackson, 8 Savry. 59; Norman v. Boaz, 85 Ky. 557; Eakins v. Eakins (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep. 285; Kansas City V. Union Pao. R. Co., 59 Kan. 527. 3 Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594. * Magoun v. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283. State statutes creating a school district and author- izing the levy of a tax for school pur- poses by a board of twenty taxpay- ers, are not in violation of the federal constitution as denying the equal protection of the laws, since the legislature may, without violating such provision, delegate its taxing power for specific purposes to the 76 THE NATDEE OF THE pbwEE TO TAX. [CH. II. classification of property for taxation — subjecting one kind of property to one rate of taxation, and another to a different rate — distinguishing between franchises, licenses and priv- ileges, and visible ajid tangible property, and between real and personal property.' The power of the state to distinguish, select and classify objects of taxation has a wide range of dis- electors of a subdivision of the state: Martin v. School Dist., 57 S. C. 135. iHome Ins. Co. v. New York, 134* U. S. 594; Magoun v. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283; Singer Manuf. Co. v. Wright, 38 Fed. Eep. 121. Equal protection of the laws is not denied by a state statute which provides for annual reports by each railroad company's chief officer of the length of his road, and for a board of equalization to ascertain the value and adjust the assessment thereof, and which, in effect, classi- fies- rail road property as a separate class for taxation; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. V. Commonwealth, 115 U. S. 821. ^o, a state statute dis- tributing for taxation the rolling stock and personal property of each railroad company among the several counties traversed by the road, and subjecting the same to the varying rates of taxation prevailing therein, instead of taxing the road in the county of its principal office as is done in the case of individuals and other corporations, is not a discrim- ination in violation of the fourteenth amendment: Columbus S. R. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470. The require- ment of equal protection is not in- fringed by a statute providing that the entire expenses of a railroad com- mission shall be borne by the several corporations owning or operating railroads within the state: Charlotte, C. & A. R Co. V. Gibbes, 143 U. S. 386. A state statute exacting from all corporations doing business in the ■state a tax proportioned to the total amount of their capital stock, with- out regard to what part thereof is eniployed within the state, or to the amount or kind of business done there, is not obnoxious to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment: Horn Silver Mining Co. V. People, 143 U. S. 305. The tax- able value of the property of tele- graph, telephone and express compa- nies in a particular state may be determined with reference to the value of the entire capital stock: Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Au- ditor, 165 U. s! 194, 166 U. S. 185. And the intangible property of an express company may be taxed upon the basis of its mileage within and without the .State: Adams Express Co. V. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171. It is allowable to put express, telegraph, telephone and sleeping-car compa- nies into a class by themselves for taxation, and to provide that a judg- ment against such a company for unpaid taxes shall include a penalty of fifty per cent, of the amount of the tax: Western Union TeL Co. v. Indiana, 165 TJ. S. 804. As the state has a right to tax different kinds of property in different ways, a statute which imposes on express companies a tax on their receipts for business done within the state does not de- prive them of the equal protection , of the laws: Pacific Express Co. v." Seibert, 142 U. S. 339. The legisla- tive power to classify corporations for taxation sustains a statute im- posing a tax of five mills on each dol- lar of the capital stock of one kind of corporations, and a tax of only three mills in the case of other cor- porations: Commonwealth V. Sharon Coal Co., 164 Pa. St. 284. Nor is equal protection of the laws with- held by the Pennsylvania laws tax- CH. II.J THE NATURE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. 77 cretion. Classification must be reasonable, but there is no pre- cise application of the rule of reasonableness, and there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things.* ing bonds and other securities issued by corporations on their nominal in- stead of their face value: Bell's Gap R Co. V. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 233; Jennings v. Coal Ridge, etc. Coal Co., 147 U. S. 147. Nor by a statute which provides that every corporation, with certain exceptions, doing business in the state, shalli be subject to a tax upon its corporate franchises or busi- ness, to a certain amount upon its capital for each per cent, of its divi- dends where they amount to six per cent, upon its capital, a less rate to be paid where the dividends are less than six per cent.: Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594 Nor by a state statute dividing the stockhold- ers of insurance companies into two classes for taxation, subjecting one to municipal taxation and the other to state taxation, and fixing the amount to be paid by non-residents by rules which differ from those ap- plicable to residents: State v. Trav- elers' Ins. Co. (Conn.), 47 Atl. Rep. 299. A specific tax levied under a state statute upon persons engaged in a particular business does not deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, where all persons of a given class, designated and described by the special occupation in which they are engaged,, are subject to the same tax, and the individual com- plaining falls within the class upon which such tax is imposed: Singer Manuf. Co. v. Wright, 97 Ga. 114 An ordinance imposing a tax for general revenue purposes, consisting of a license tax, does not deny the equal protection of the law though classifying wholesale dealers sepa- rately from retailers, and imposing a smaller tax on a wholesaler than on a retailer doing the same amount of business, and though the tax im- posed on persons doing a small amount of business is proportion- ately larger than that imposed on persons doing larger amounts of busi- ness: Commonwealth v. Clark, 195 Pa. St. 634 A state statute provid- ing for a license tax, and providing that the act shall not apply to per- sons engaged in the liquor business as wholesale dealers who do not sell in less quantities than five gallons at a time, does not discriminate in favor of wholesale and against re- tail dealers, so as to infringe the equal protection clause: Daniels v. State, 150 Ind. 348. A state statute requiripg license taxes from persons owning or operating elevators or warehouses on railroad rights of way, or on land used in connection with a railway at stations and sidings, is not forbidden by the fourteenth amendment, being based on a proper classification: Cargill Co. v. Minne- sota, 180 U. S. 453j afiirming State v. Cargill Co., 77 Minn. 223. Nor is equal protection denied by a state statute licensing the business of sell- ing farm products on commission: State V. Wagener, 77 Minn. 483. Nor by a state statute requiring itinerant venders to pay a state license of $200, and a local license of $100, if in a town of less than fifteen thousand inhabitants, and $350 if in a town of more than that number: State v. Foster, 22 R 1 — , 46 AtL Rep. 833. A statute imposing a privilege tax on railroad companies " not paying an ad valorem tax " is not invalid, though there are but two such com- panies, since it applies equally to all companies in like condition, and makes a natural and reasonable classification: Knoxville & O. R Co. V. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684 iMagoun v. Illinois Trust, etc. 78 THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX, [CH. II. An exemption from taxation is valid under the equal pro- tection clause if founded upon a reasonable distinction in prin- ciple, and where the discrimination is not purely arbitrary, oppressive, or capricious, and made to depend on differences of color, race, nativity, religious opinions, political affiliations, or other considerations having no possible connection with the duties of citizens as taxpayers.' The amount of property ex- Bank, 170 IT. S. 283, where it is held that a state inheritance tax law may discriminate between relatives and between them and strangers, and may grade the rate of the tax upon legacies to strangers by the amount of such legacies, increasing progress- ively with such amount. In State v. Hoyt, 71 Vt. 59, it was held that al- though the equality clause of the fourteenth amendment does not pro- hibit classification for the purposes of taxation, it does require that the classification.be founded upon some reasonable basis; and such a basis is not found in the fact that goods for the peddling of which a libense fee is required are manufactured in other states. 1 American S. R. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89. A state statute impos- ing a franchise upon every corpora- tion or company incorporated or organized in the state or elsewhere, and doing business in such state, does not discriminate against a man- ufacturing company incorporated elsewhere and doing business both without and within the state, be- cause such statute exempts from the tax manufacturing companies (wher- ever organized) doing business wholly in such state: New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658, affirming People v. Rob- erts, 158 N. Y. 168. A state law im- posing upon firms and corporations carrying on the business of refining sugar a license tax, from which plant- ers and farmers refining their own sugar are exempt, does not deny the equal protection of the laws to per- sons and corporations in a general *sugar refining business: American S. R Co. V. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, affirming State v. American S. R. Ca, 51 La. An. 563. The exemption, by a state statute, from taxation, of sales of intoxicating liquors by the manu- facturer at the manufactory in quan- tities of one gallon or more, does not constitute an illegal discrimination against a foreign corporation which has its factory in another state; the statute being applicable to such sales at any manufactory in the state with- out regard to the residence, citizen- ship, or domicUe of the person, firm, or corporation which owns the plant: Reymann Brewing Ca v. Brister, 179 TJ. S. 445. The levy of a specific tax upon the occupation of "emigrant agent," meaning a person engaged in hiring laborers to be employed be- yond the limits of the state, does not deny the "equal protection of the laws " in that the business of hiring persons to labor within the state is not subjected to a like tax: WUliams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, affirming s. &, 110 Ga. 584 The equal protection clause is not violated by a state stat- ute which requires merchants or other dealers "who shall buy and sell goods not speciE^lly taxed elsewhere in the act " to pay a license tax on the total amount of purchases in or out of the state, except purchases of firm products from the producer; the exemption does not operate as a discrimination against non-resident farmers, merely because it is prob- able that merchants will buy more products from resident than from non-resident farmers: Ex parte CH. II. 1 THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. 79 empted from a state inheritance law is entirely in the discre- tion of the state legislature, and whether much or little does not render the law invalid as denying the equal protection se- cured by the fourteenth amendment.^ It has been decided that a city ordinance providing reason- able conditions upon the performance of which a license may be granted to sell a certain article does not violate any provis- ion of the federal constitution.^ ISTor is the equality clause of the fourteenth, amendment violated by a state statute which, in addition to requiring a certain bond from an applicant for Brown, 48 Fed. Eep. 435; State v. French, 109 N. C. 723. The require- ment of equal protection is not vio- lated by a state statute exempting tracts of land of less than one thou- sand acres from certain forfeitures under the tax laws to which larger tracts are made liable: King v. Mul- lins, 171 U. S. 404. Nor by a state stat- ute which, in providing for the ex- tension of city boundaries over cer- tain classes of adjoining lands, ex- empts agricultural lands from its provisions: Kansas City v. Union Pac. E. Co., 59 Kan. 427. A statute re- quiring railroad companies to pay into the treasury a certain percentage of their gross earnings in lieu of other taxes on their property, thus exempt- ing land of a railroad company not used in operating its road, does not infringe the provision for equal pro- tection of the laws: Northern Pao. R Co. v. Barnes, 2 N. D. 310. Contra, Northern Pao. R Co. v. Walker, 47 Fed. Eep. 681. Nor is that provision disobeyed by a statute taxing corpo- rate bonds secured by mortgage within the state, while the debt of an individual so secured is exempt: Simpson v. Hopkins, 82 Md. 478. A state statute exempting from tax- ation property already taxed in an- other state does not discriminate between resident and non-resident property holders: Wilson v. Wig- gins, 7 Okl. 517. A state statute re- quiring persons who peddle or sell at auction in a certain county to take out a local license though they may have complied with the general laws, but exempting merchants, peddlers who sell only to merchants, and all citizens of the county who peddle the products of their ovm growth or manufacture, violates the federal constitution by discriminating, on the sole ground of their residence, against citizens residing outside of the county: Commonwealth v. Sny- der, 182 Pa. St. 680. That a statute prescribing a penalty for peddling without a license specifies certain articles for the peddling of which no license is required does not violate the fourteenth amendment, as th^ 'statute does not discriminate be- tween citizens: Hays v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 55 S. W. Eep. 435. iMagoun v. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283. A state inher- itance tax law discriminating be- tween life estates with remainder to lineal descendants, and life estates with remainder to collateral heirs or to strangers in blood, etc., by ex- empting only the second class from the tax imposed, is not a denial of the equal operation of the law: Bill- ings V. People, 189 III 472. iiGundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183. In this case it was held that the requirement of equal protection is not violated by a city ordinance requiring a license fee of $100 for selling cigarettes, and delegating to the mayor of the city the entire subject of granting or revoking li- 80 THE NATUEB OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [OH. ir. a liquor license, imposes a state and county occupation tax, and requires payment of all taxes A year in advance.' The constitutional guaranty of the equal protection' of the laws is not contraiyened by state laws providing for the taxa- tion of the interest of mortgagees in land as real estate regard- less of the locality of the residence of such mortgagees;' nor by a state statute, taxing bonds held by a permanent resident within the state, though issued by a non-resident corporation and secured by a mortgage on property outside of the state.' And it is not impaired by a state statute requiring every non- resident owner to file, under a penalty of a fine for non-com- pliance, a list more particularly descriptive of his realty than is required of the resident tax-payer.* It is, however, violated by a state statute imposing a specific tax on persons engaged in selling liquors at wholesale, or in soliciting or taking orders for such liquors to be shipped into the state, without a similar tax upon persons engaged in the like business in reference to liquors, manufactured in the state.' A person is not entitled, under the fourteenth amendment, to the equal protection of the laws of a state within the terri- torial jurisdiction of which he is not physically present.' The designation of " person " in that amendment is not confined to citizens, but includes' aliens as well,' and also private corpora- censes — the mayor being bound to 446. Nor is such an act rendered exercisejudicial discretion, and there constitutional by a subsequent stat- being no proof of discrimination ute imposing a greater tax upon all against applicants or of abuse of dis- persons engaged in the business of cretion: Gundling v. Chicago, 177 manufacturing or selling liquors in U. S. 183. thestate: Wallingv.Miohigan.swpro. 1 Giozza V. Tiernan, 148 U. S. 657. 6 state v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 A state statute and a city ordinance Conn. 590. concerning the licensing of "gift 'State v. Montgomery, 94 Ma 193; enterprises," as applied to the busi- Frazer v. McConway, eta Co., 83 Fed. ness of dealers in trading stamps. Rep. 357. Equal protection is denied were held not to constitute a denial by a state statute which forbids ped- of equal protection: Humes v. Ft. dling except under a license that can Smith, 93 Fed. Rep.' 857. be granted only to citizens of the -Savings, etc. Soc. v. Multnomah United States, and not to aliens: County, 169 U. S. 421. State v. Montgomery, 94 Me. 193. ' Mackey v. San Francisco, 113 Cal. Also by a state statute imposing a 393; Kirtland v.Hotohkiss, 100 U. S. tax of three cents a day upon em- 491- ployers of foreign-born, unnatura,l- * Commonwealth v. Holidy, 98 Ky. ized male persons, for each day that 616. each of such persons may be em- 5 Walling V. Michigan, 116 U. S. ployed, and authorizing the deduc- OH. II.J THE NATUEE OF THE POWEK TO TAX. 81 tions;^ but the equal protection which a corporation can claim is only that accorded to similar associations within the juris- diction of the state,^ and a state may impose as a condition precedent to the admission within its limits of a corporation of another state or county such license or other tax as it may see fit, even though such tax is not exacted from corporations of its own creation.' Nor does a state statute taxing corpora- tions . deprive any person of the equal protection of the laws tion of that sum from the wages of such employees: Frazer v. MoCon- way, etc. Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 357. A heavy license fee oh the disinterment and removal of a dead body from the place of interment has been sus- tained, though obviously aimed at a class of aliens: In re Wong Yung Quy, 6 Sawy. 443.' 1 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 118 U. S. 394; Pembina, etc. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 135 U. S. 181 ; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594; Charlotte, C. & A. R Co. v. Gibbes, 143 U. S. 386; Railroad Tax Cases, 18 Fed. Rep. 182; San Mateo County V. Southern Pacific R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 723; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 385; Singer Manuf. Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed. Rep. 131. The reserved power to alter, amend, or repeal a statute constituting a contract with a cor- poration, exempting it from ordinary taxes, cannot be exercised so as to relieve the state from the effect of the constitutional provision against impairing the obligation of con- tracts, by a statute which attempts to preserve all the obligations of the corporation in favor of the state, and to take away from the corporation the consideration on the state's part upon which the duty of the corpora- tion to pay a gross-receipt tax rested ; such statute is a mere arbitrary exer- cise of power in denial of the equal protection, of the laws: Duluth & I. R. R. Co. V. St. Louis County, 179 U. 8. 303. Under a constitutional provis- 6 ion that mortgages shall for the pur- pose of taxation be deemed an inter- est in the property, and that, except as to railroads, the value of the property, less that of the mortgage, shall be taxed to the owner, and the value of the mortgage to the mort- gagee, it is a discrimination render- ing the tax invalid to assess to a rail- road company the full value of its mortgaged property without deduct- ing the amount of the mortgages as in valuing the property of natural persons: Santa. Clara County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 385. Where a state statute provid- ing for the levy of a fii-e tax e;xcludes from the benefit and protection which the law should afford the property of railroad companies, it denies to such companies the equal protection ofthelaws: Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Clark, 60 Kan. 836, 881. 2 Pembina, etc. R. Co. v. Pennsyl- vania, 135 XJ. S. 181. ' Philadelphia Fire Assoc, v. Peo- ple, 119 U. S. 110; Pembina, etc. R. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 135 U. S. 181; Scottish Union, etc. Ins. Co. v. Her- riott, 109 Iowa 606; Southeirn Build- ing, etc. Assoc. V. Norman, 98 Ky. 304 The New York statute requir- ing a percentage to be paid to the fire department on all premiums by every fire insurance agent in a cer- tain county of every individual or association not incorporated within the state does not violate the equal protection provision: Fire Depart- ment V. Stanton, 159 N. Y, 335. 82 THE NATUEE OF THE POWEE TO TAX. [oH. II. because it discriminates between 'property owned by corpora- tions and that owned by natural persons.' This provision of the fourteenth amendment secures no right to municipal corporations of a state, as against the state, to the equal protection of the laws, which can limit legislation to charge them with public obligations ; a,nd their inhabitants, as members of such corporations, have no greater immunity with reference thereto.^ !N"or is the amendment violated by a state statute apportioning «for taxation among several town- ships funds of a charity the situs of which is in one township.' Consideration will be given in another chapter* to that clause of the fourteenth amendment of the national constitu- tion which precludes the abridgment -by a state of the privi- leges or immunities of citizens of the United States. 1 Commonwealth v. Sharon Coal counties traversed by the road,, and Co., 164 Pa. St. 284 A statutory pro- subjecting it to the varying rates of vision for the allowance to citizens taxation prevailing therein, instead and not to railway companies of a of taxing it in the county of its discount for the prompt payment of principal oflSce, which is the method taxes is not a discrimination which adopted in the case of individuals renders the act unconstitutional: and other corporations: Columbus Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Louisville S. R Ca v. Wright, 151 U. a 470, (Ky.), 29 S. W. Rep. 865. The same affirming s. C, 89 Gaj 574 is true of a state statute distributing 2gtate v. Williams, 68 Conn. 131. for purposes of taxation the rolling- 3 Northampton v. Hampshire stock and personal property of rail- County Com'rs, 145 Mass. 108. road companies among the several * Post, ch. IIL CHAPTEE III. LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER BY PARAMOUNT LAW. Great as is the power of any sovereignty to levy and collect taxes from its citizens, that power in a constitutional country has very distinct and positive limitations.^ Some of these in- here in its very nature, and exist, whether declared or not de- clared, in the written constitution;^ but some of them it is not uncommon to specify, either out of abundant caution, or to keep them fresh in the minds of those who administer the government. Other limitations spring from the peculiar form of our government, and from the relation of the states to the national authority. Still others are expressly imposed, either by state constitution or by the fundamental law of the Union. Enforcement of limitations. The nature of some limita- tions is such that they address themselves exclusively to the legislative department of the government, and what it shall do will be subject to review by no other authority than the people acting in elections. Such, for example, is the limita- tion that taxes must be determined upon from public motives only, and with the public good in view. It is to be assumed that the legislature will observe it, but whether it has done so can never beoome a. judicial question.' In most cases, how- 1 "Taxation is bounded in its exer- 2 Outside of express constitutional cise by its own nature, essential char- inhibitions there are limitations upon acteristics, and purpose:" Agnew, J., the powers of every branch of our in Matter of Washington St., 69 Pa. governments, state and federal. St. 352, 363. See McFadden v. Long- Every branch has its limitations ham, 58 Tex. 579. The power to im- short of absolute power: State v.- pose taxes, general or local, which Switzler, 143 Mo. 287. It is observ- rests with the legislature, is without able in the state constitutions that much express restriction from the while they enter with considerable constitution, and yet even this power minuteness into declarations of indi- cannot be said to be absolute: Bush vidual right, many of the most im- V. Board of Supervisors, 159 N. Y. 312. pprtant principles of government are There can be no valid tax under an usually not declared at all, but sim- unoonstitutional law: Brown v. Den- ply taken for granted, ver, 7 Colo. 305. ' See ante, p. 46. 84 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. [OH. III. ever, a question whether the limitations ujion the taxing power have been observed is or may be a judicial question, and the final determination of it is with the courts. Public purposes. It is the first requisite of lawful taxation, that the purpose for which it is laid shall be a public purpose.' The decision to lay a tax for a given purpose involves a legislative conclusion that the purpose is one for which a tax may be laid; in other wordsj^^is a public purpose. But the de- termination of the legislature on this question is not, like its decision on ordinary questions of public policy, conclusive either on the other departments of the government, or on the. people. The question, what is and what is not a public pur- pose, is one of law ; and though unquestionably the legislature has large discretion in selecting the object for which taxes shall be laid, its decision is not final.^ In any case in which the legislature shall have clearly exceeded its authority in this regard, and levied a tax for a purpose not public, it is com- petent for any one who in person or property is affected by the tax, to appeal to the courts for protection. This subject will be considered in another chapter.' Territorial limitatious. Persons and property not within the territorial limits of a state cannot be taxed by it. In such a case the state affords no protection, and there is nothing for which taxation can be equivalent.* This rule is applicable to 1 Bush V. Board of Supervisors, 159 not extend can^iot be made the sub- N. Y. 313. jeot of taxatjon in such state: Button 2 State V. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556. v. Board of Review, 188 III 386. As ^Post, ch. IV. tax-laws can have no extraterritorial * See Darwin v. Strickland, 57 N. Y. effect, taxes imposed on non-resi- 493; Baltimore V. Hussey, 67 Md. 113; dents whose property is not in the Graham v. St. Joseph T'p, 67 Mich, state are null and void: Liverpool, 653; Matter of Douglas, 48 Hun 818; etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 51 Dewey v. Des Moines, 178 U. S. 198; La. An. 1038. The state has not juris- Indiana v. Pullman Palace Car Co., diction to tax property of non-resi- 16 Fed. Bep. 193. The taxing power dents which has no actual situs of the state necessarily stops at the within the state: Commonwealth v. state boundary lines. It cannot reach Lehigh Valley R. Co., 186 Pa. St. 335. over into any other jurisdiction to The personalty not within the state, seize upon person or property for pur- of one who has ceased to be a resi- pose of taxation: Augusta v. Kim- dent, cannot be taxed in such state: ball, 91 Me. 605. Property over which Eemey v. Burlington City Council, the sovereign power of the state does 80 Iowa 470. The state cannot tax CH. in.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 85 the lands of aa Indian tribe, which, though they may be within the liitiits of the state, are exempt from its jurisdiction..^ It is also applicable to the Indians themselves while they retain within the state their tribal relations,^ and to persons who re- side on lands purchased by or ceded to the United States for moneys aud credits removed there- from before the date fixed for the listing of the pi-operty, by a guardian who has ceased to be a resident of the state: Maxwell v. People, 189 111. 603. A tax levied upon an entire property, part of which is without the jurisdiction of the taxing body, is invalid as to such part, and ren- ders the whole assessment void un- less the tax against the part within the jurisdiction can be readily sepa- rated: Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Nebraska City, 53 Neb. 453; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 61 Neb. — (84 N. W. 607). The limit of a municipality bounded by a naviga- ble river being the low-water mark unless express language to the con- trary is used in the act of incorpora- tion, it cannot tax the coal beneath the bed of the river conveyed by the state to private persons: Gilchrist's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 600. A township or borough school district cannot tax that part of a tract of land which lies outside of its boundaries, unless the dividing line is also a county line and the mansion house on the tract lies within the district attempting to tax: Arthur v. School District, 164 Pa. St. 410. In the absence of ex- press legislative authority the of- ficers of a school district are without jurisdiction to levy a tax upon real estate not within the limits of their 6[chool district; and the tax so levied, no matter for what purpose, is void: Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co. v. Cass County, 51 Neb. 369. Property in the hands of an administrator with the will annexed cannot be taxed in Kentucky for years during which the testator was a citizen of another state: Boske v. Security Trust & Safety-Vault Co. (Ky.), 56 S. W. Eep. 524. 1 The New York Indians, 5 Wall. 761; Com'rs v. Simons, 139 Ind. 193. See Moore v. Sweetwater, 2 Wyo. Ter. 8. Lands patented to Indians designated as not competent to man- age their own affairs are not taxable: Auditor General v. Williams, 94 Mich. 180. Lands granted in fee to an In- dian chief were held not subject to taxation, the tribal relation having continued: Com'rs v. Simons, 139 Ind. 193; Wau-pe-man-quav. Aldrich, 28 Fed. Eep. 489. Lands within an Indian reservation and patented to an Indian, but after sale to a white man repurchased by another Indian, are not in the latter's hands exempt from taxation: Eevoir v. State, 137 Ind. 333. Railroad property not ex- empt because within Indian reserva- tion: Utah & N. E. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U. S. 28; Maricopa & P. E. Co. v. Ari- zona, 156 U. S. 347. So of cattle and horses belonging to an Indian post- trader, and kept on an Indian reser- vation: Moore v. Beason, 7 Wyo. 392. See Cosier v. McMillan, 32 Mont. 484 So of cattle belonging to 'white men and grazing upon lands reserved to and leased from Indians: Gay v. Thomas, 5 Okl. 1; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 264; Wagoner v. Evans, ITO U. S. 588. See Tresscott v. Hurlbut Land, etc. Co., 73 Fed. Eep. 60. As to taxability of railroad track and right of way through reservations : See De- linquent List V. Territory (Ariz.), 26 Pac. Eep. 310. estate V. Eoss, 7 Yerg. 74 When personalty of Indian becomes subject to taxation : Keokuk v. Ulam, 4 Okl. 5. 86 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWBK. [oh. III. navy yards, forts, arsenals, etc., where the state has reserved no other jurisdiction or righl> than that to serve process.' But it is not necessary that both person and property should be within the jurisdiction in order to be taxable ; it is sufBlcient if either is.^ If a person' is domiciled within the state, his per- sonalty, in contemplation of law, has its situs there also, and he may be taxed in respect of 4t at the place of his domicile.' Within this rule fall debts o#ing from a non-resident to a resi- dent;* and shares owned by residents in foreign corporations 1 Commonwealth v. Clary, '8 Mass. 73. It is otherwise where the state in making the cession or consenting to the purchase reserves the right to tax: Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 27 Kan. 749, 114 U. S. 56. See In re O'Conner, 37 Wis. 379: Cherry County V. 'fhaoher, 33 Neb. 350. 2 In re Swift, 137 N. Y. 76. 3 Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 111. 160; Rie- mau V. Shepard, 27 Ind. 288; Weaver's Estate V. State, 110 Iowa(81 N. W. Eep.' 603); Griffith v. Carter, 8 Kan. 565; Commonwealth v. Hays, 8 B. Monr. 1 ; Newport v. Bingo's Ex'x, 87 Ky. 635; Inha,bitahtS' of Great Harrington v. County Com'rs, 16 Pick. 573; Bemis V. Boston, 14 Allen 366; Nashua Sav- ings Bank v. Nashua, 46 N. H. 389; Enston's Estate, 113 N. Y. 174; John- son V. Oregon City, 3 Or. 337, 3 Or. 13; Commonwealth v. American Dredg- ing Co., 122 Pa. St. 386; Lines's Es- tate, 155 Pa. St. 878; Blood v. Sayre, 17 Vt. 609; Bullock v. Guilford, 59 Vt. 516; Norfolk & W. E. Co. v. Board, 97 Va. 33; San Francisco v. Mackey, 23 Fed. Rep. 603. The per- sonal property of a resident decedent, wherever situated, within or without the state, is subject to the inherit- ance tax: In re Swift, 137 N. Y. 77. Under a city charter which provides that " all property not exempt from taxation under the general laws of this state shall be subject to taxa- tion, as herein mentioned, for city purposes," ohoses in actions may be taxed, the domicile of the owner being the situs of this sort of prop- erty: Trimble v. Mt. Sterling (Ky.), 12 S. W. Rep. 1066. * Bonds of a foreign corporation held outside of the state are taxable at the owner's domicile within the state: In re Fair's. Estate, 128 CaL 607. See Worthington v. Sebastian, 35 Ohio St. 1. Bonds owned by a resideut of one state may be taxed there though issued by a non-resi- dent corporation and secured by a mortgage on lands outside of the state: Mackey v. San Francisco, 113 Cal. 392. A state may tax a resi- dent in respect to a debt owned by a non-resident and secured by a mortgage upon lands in another state: Kirtland v. Hotohkiss, 43 Conn. 436, 100 U. S. 491. Bonds of the state of Georgia, on deposit with the treasurer of that state, and owned by a Louisiana insurance company, are taxable in Louisiana: State v. Board of Assessors, 47 La. An. 1644; Home Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. An. 451. The registered pub- lic debt of a state, whether exempted or taxed by the debtor state, is tax- able by another state when owned there: Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 693. The mere fact that a part of the capital of a bank is invested abroad does not exempt that part from taxation under the internal revenue law: Nevada Bank v. Sedg- wick, 104 U. S. 111. Where a New York corporation holds bonds of for- eign corporations issued to it in pay- CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. 81 may be taxed to the owners even though the corporations themselves are taxed in the jurisdiction where their operations are carried on.' However, the maxim moMlia sequuntur per- sona/m is not of universal application, does not rest on any con- stitutional foundation, and gives way before express law;^ and a state may at its option impose taxes on tangible personal property -within its limits irrespective of the residence or al- ment for patent rights granted, the capital thus invested is taxable in New York, since such bonds have their situs at the owner's domicile unless kept employed outside of the state: People v. Campbell, 138 N. Y. 543. For what moneys and cr'edits without the state a New York cor- poration is taxable, see, also, People V. Feitner, 54 App. Div. (N. Y.) 217. In Georgia it is held that a chose in action owned by a resident, though the debtor is a non-resident, is tax- able wherever the evidence of debt is located: Atlanta Nat. B. & L. Assoc. V. Stewart, 109 (Ja. 80. A statute providing that personalty held in trust by a non-resident, the income whereof is payable to a resi dent beneficiary, shall be assessed to the latter in the place where he re- sides, is valid: Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass. 287. Under the Maryland code personalty in a guardian's hands is taxable in the county where the guardian was appointed, though it is outside of the state, and though both guardian and ward are non- residents: Baldwin v. County Com'rs, 85 Md. 145. 1 Boyd V. Selma, 96 Ala. 144; State V. Kidd, 125 Ala. 413; Trust Co. v. Parks, 80 111. 170; Greenleaf v. Board of Eeview, 184 111. 226; Henkle v. Keota, 68 ^lowa 334; Newport v. Ringo's Ex'x, 87 Ky. 685; Bacon v. State Tax Com'rs (Mich.), 85 N. W. Rep. 307; .Ogden v. St. Joseph, 90 Mo. 522; State v. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; State V. Bentley, 23 N. J. L. 532; New- ark City Bank v. Assessor, 30 N. J. L. 13; North Carolina E. Co. v. Com'rs, 91 N. C. 454; McKeen v. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 519; Whitesell v. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 526; Worthington v. Sebastian, 25 Ohio St. 1; Bradley v. Bander, 36 Ohio St. 28. Stocks and bonds of a foreign corporation, owned at the time of his death by a resident of California, are taxable in that state, though pledged for a loan in an- other state: Stanford v. San Fran- cisco, 131 Cal. 34 (63 Pac. Rep. 145). The statute subjecting to taxation the stock of foreign corporations owned by citizens of Michigan is not in contravention of that provision of the federal constitution which de- clares that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts of every other state; for no state can exempt property from taxation in another state: Bacon v. State Tax Com'rs (Mich.), 85 N. W. Rep. 307, citing Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592. 2 Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Penn- sylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Adams Ex- press Co. V. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185; Bluefields Banana Co. v. Board of Assessors, 49 La. An. 43; Comptoir National v. Board of As- sessors, 52 La. An. 1319. In Board of Com'rs v. Leonard, 57 Kan. 531, it is said that the maxim referred to in the text is subject to so many ex- ceptions and limitations that it is quite as liable to mislead as to fur- nish a correct guide, when consid- ered alone. 88 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. t CH. III. legianoe of the owner,* although this would not be true of I Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; Marye v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 127 U. S. 117; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 V. S. 18; People v. Insurance Co., 29 Cal. 533; Denver & G. R Co. V. Church, 17 Colo. 1; How- ell V. State, 3 Gill 14; Mills v. Thorn- ton, 36 IlL 800; Rieman v. Shepard, 27 Ind. 288; Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. An. 760; Parker v. Strauss, 49 La. An. 1173; State V. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294; Blackstone Manuf. Co. v. Blackstone, 13 Gray 488; Leonard v. New Bed- ford, 16 Gray 293; Hartland v. Church, 47 Ma 169; Desmond v. Maohias, 48 Me. 478; Winkley v. Newton, 67 N. a 80; State v. Fal- kinberge,-15 N. J. L. 320; Hoyt v. Com'rs of Taxes, 23 N. Y. 224; People V. Ogdensburgh, 48 N. T. 390; Wilson v. New York, 4 E. D. Smith 675; Hall V. Fayetteville, 115 N. C. 281; Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. St. 106; Maltbyv. Reading R Co., 53 Pa. St. 140; Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. State, 18 Utah 378. As to taxing personalty where it is located, see Torrent v. Gager, 52 Mich. 506. The property and prop- erty rights of a foreigner found within the state are subject to taxa- tion as is other property: Sala's Suc- cession, 50 La. An. 1009. A succes- sion tax in respect of a non-resident intestate's personalty invested or habitually kept by him in the state was sustained: Romaine's Estate, 137 N. Y. 80. One possessed of tangi- ble property on the day of assess- ment may be taxed for it although it has been sold to a non-resident: Commonwealth v. Gaines, 80 Ky. 489. A state has power to tax property held in trust therein for a non-resi- dent: Price V. Hunter, 34 Fed. Rep. 855. Money or property held by an ancillary administrator is taxable by the state granting such administrar tion: Dorris v. Miller, 105 Iowa 564 A statute imposing a tax on property "passing from any person who may die seised and possessed thereof, being in this state," applies to prop- erty within the state, though the decedent who bequeathed it resided in another state: State v. Dalrym- ple, 70 Md. 394 Coal shipped from Pennsylvania to supply New Orleans was held legally taxable after ar- rival at its destination, though kept on board the flats which carried it, and not sold nor consigned to any specially authorized agent: Pitts- burg & S. Coal Co. V. Bates, 40 La. An. 236. Logs left for safe keeping by an Iowa company in a bayou on the Illinois side of the Mississippi river are taxable in Illinois: Burling- ton Lumber Co, v. Willetts, 118 Dl. 559. A state may tax all property which has a situs within its limits, regardless of the fact that it may have come from, or is destined to, another state: Kelley v. Rhoads (Wyo.), 63 Pac. Rep. 935. In order to render live-stock taxable it is not necessary that such stock should be intended to remain permanently in the state: Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 237. Where cattle owned by non- residents actually ranged in a county in Oklahoma during the en- tire year they were held taxable in such county: Prairie Cattle Co. v. Williamson, 5 Okl. 488. See Russell v. Green (Okl), 63 Pac. Rep. 817. A boat may be taxed where located, though owned by a foreign corpora- tion: Irvin V. New Orleans, etc. R Co., 94 IlL 105. It has been held that a vessel enrolled and licensed under the federal navigation laws does not, by engaging in business within a state, become subject to its taxing power where the owner is a non- resident: Roberts v. Charlevoix T'p, 60 Mich. 197; Johnson v. Debary- CH. III.} LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. property merely passing through the state and not having ac- quired a situs therein.' As property lying beyond the jtirisdiction of a state is not a subject upon whicli its taxing power can legitimately be exer- cised,^ that power does not, as a general rule, extend to the in- tangible personal property of a non-resident, for such property must ordinarily be regarded as having its situs at the domicile of its owner.' It follows that debts and other choses in action Baya Merchants' Line, 37 Fla. 499. But elsewhere it has been held that the enrolment of a vessel at its non- resident owner's domicile does not prevent its taxation in a state within which is its entire business and where it remains indefinitely: National Dredging Co. v. State, 99 Ala. 463. And see Norfolk & W. R Co. v. Board, 97 Va. 33; Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Chehalis County {Wash.), 64 Pao. Rep. 909. An un- paid legacy left to a non-resident de- cedent in the will of a resident de- cedent is not " property within the state" assessable for purposes of tax- ation under the New York inherit- ance tax law of 1887: In re Phipps, 143 N. Y. 641. 1 Hays V. Steamship Co., 17 How. 596; Mobile v. Baldwin, 57 Ala. 63; Chauvenet v. Oom'rs, 8 Md. 359; Hoofer v. Baltimore, 13 Md. 464; Con- ley v. Chedic, 7 Nev. 336; Robinson V. Langley, 18 Nev. 71; Hoyt v. Com'rs, 33 N. Y. 243; State v. Engle, 34 N. J. L. 435; McKeen v. North- ampton County,49 Pa. St.519; White- sell V. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 536; Union Bank v. State, 9 Yerg. 489. One merely driving his sheep through a county cannot be sub- jected to payment for a license tax imposed on persons efagaged in the •business of "raising, grazing, and pasturing sheep " within the county: Mono County v. Flanigan, 130 Cal. 105. Where a non-resident's sheep brought into a state to graze were afterwards driven through it to be shipped into another state, exporta- tion of them did not begin so as to exempt them from taxation until they were started on their final jour- ney by rail: Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 737. Logs cannot be taxed by a state in which they are temporarily de- tained while in transit between two- other states: Coe v. Errol, 63 N. H. 803, 116 U. S. 517; Connecticut River L. Co. V. Columbia, 63 N. H. 386. See Nelson Lumber Co. v. Loraine, 33 Fed. Rep. 54; Brown County Com'rs V. Standard Oil Co., 103 Md. 303. Railway cars in transit through a state so that they have no sitiu there are not subject to assessment or tax- ation in that state: State v. Stephens, 146 Mo. 663. Cars used on a railroad within a state may be taxed by such state as having a situs within its limits even though they are owned by a non-resident corporation, and though they are not continuously in the state: Union Refrig. Transit Co. V. Lynch, 18 Utah 378, 177 U. S. 149; Carlisle V. Pullman Palace Car Co., 8 Colo. 330; Denver & R. G. Co. V. Church, 17 Colo. 1; Hall v. Amer- ican Refrig. Transit Co., 34 Colo. 391; American Refrig. Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70; Reinhart v. McDonald, 76 Fed. Rep. 403. 2 Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 363 ; StateTax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; New York, L. E. & W. B. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 153 U. S. 688. SEns'ton's Estate, 113 N. Y. 174; Small's Estate, 131 Pa. St. 1 ; Howell v. Gordon (Mich.), 86 N. W. Rep. 1043. In 90 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. in. are, with certain exceptions which will be noticed hereafter, taxable only in the state where the owner resides ; ' and the fact that demands owing to a non-resident are secured by mortgages upon property within the state does not give them the case of Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185, it is said that nothing in the federal constitu- tion prohibits a state from taxing a^ its real value intangible property within its limits. 1 Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262; State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; New York, L.. E. & W. R. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 153 U. 8. 628; San Francisco v. Mackey, 33 Fed. Rep. 602; Walker v. Jack, 88 Fed. Rep. 576, 31 O. C. A. 462; De Vignier v. New Orleans, 4 Woods 206; Territory v. Delinquent Tax List (Ariz.), 34 Pac. Rep. 183; Cooper V. Beers, 143 111. 25; Scripps v. Board of Review, 183 111. 278; Hay ward v. Board of Review, 189 111. 284; Senour V. Ruth, 140 Ind. 318; Buck v. Miller, 147Ind. 586; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v.New Orleans, 41 La. An. 1015; Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. An. 760; Clason v. New Orleans, 46 La. An. 1; Liver- pool, etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Asses- sors, 51 La. An. 1038; Baltimore v. Hussey, 67 Md. 112; Oliver v. Wash- ington Mills, 11 Allen 268; Graham V. St. Joseph's T'p, 67 Mich. 653; State V. Smith, 68 Miss. 79; Holland V. Com'rs, 15 Mont. 460; State v. Van- syckle, 49 N. J. L. 366; Enston's Es- tate, 118 N. Y. 174; In re Bronson, 150 N. Y. 1; North Carolina R. Co. v. Com'rs, 91 N. C. 454; Worthington v. Sebastian, 35 Ohio St. 8; Grant v. Jones, 39 Ohio St. 506; Myers v. Sea- berger, 45 Ohio St. 233; Small's Es- tate, 151 Pa. St. 1; Hayne v. Delies- seline, 3 MoCord 374; South Nashville Street R. Co. v. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406; Bullock V. Guilford, 59 Vt. 516; Com- monweg-lth v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 37 Grat. 344; Ohio Valley, B. & L. Assoc. V. County Court, 43 W. Va. 818. Notes and accounts held by an attorney merely for collection and the remission of moneys to the non- resident owner cannot be said to have a sittis in the state for the pur- pose of taxation: Herron v. Keeran, 59 Ind. 473. See State v. Scottish American Mortg. Co., 76 Minn. 155. A foreign insurance company domi- ciled out of the state, but collecting premiums therein through an agent, is not liable for a tax levied on such premiums, they being "credits" hav- ing their situs at the company's domicile: Railey v. Board of Asses- sors, 44 La. An. 765. A non-resident corporation shipped meats to its , place of business in the state, and there its business manager sold them for cash or on thirty days' time, re- mitting daily all moneys collected; and it was held that notes and ac- counts due from such sales did not have such a business situs in the state as to render them taxable there: Vicksburg v. Armour Pack- ing Co. (Miss.), 34 S. Rep. 324 Where a resident of one state owns stock representing the debt of a city of another state, he is not taxable by the latter state therefor: Baltimore V. Hussey, 67 Md. 113. A tax laid upon the stock of a corporation owned entirely by a non-resident of the state, and having all its property in another state, was held void: San Francisco v. Mackey, 33 Fed. Rep. 603. Bonds of a local corporation left at the residence of a non-resident owner are not, at his death, subject to the transfer tax as property within the state: In re Bronson, 150 N. T. 1. A tax on money set apart by a cor- poration to pay interest accruing on CH. III.J LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING (POWER. 91 a situs there for purposes of taxation.^ But a state may tax mortgages upon real estate within its borders even though such mortgages are owned by non-residents;^ and it is also within the taxing power of a state to tax a non-resident's money and credits when the money is invested and the invest- ment controlled by a resident agent of the owner, especially if the agent has in his possession the evidences of indebtedness.' So, credits in the hands of resident trustees in trust for non- resident beneficiaries may be taxed.^ It has been held that a foreign-held bonds is not a tax on the bonds' but on the earnings of the corporation which pays the interest, and is sustainable: Railroad Co. v. Collector, 100 U. S. 595; United States V. Railway Co., 106 U. S. 327. 1 State Tax; on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Territory v. Delinquent Tax List (Ariz.), 24 Pao. Rep. 182; Mackey v. San Francisco, 113 Cal. 392; Goldgart v. People, 106 IlL 25; Senour v. Ruth, 140 Ind. 318; Buck V. Miller, 147 Ind. 586; Latrobe v. Baltimore, 19 Md. 13; State v. Scot- tish Am. Mort^. Co., 76 Minn. 155; State V. Smith, 68 Miss. 79; Holland V. Com'rs, 15 Mont. 460; King v. Mannmg, 40 N. J. L. 461; State v. Vansyckle, 49 N. J. L. 366; Myers v. Seaberger, 45 Ohio St. 23; South Nashville St. R Co. v. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406. 2 Savings, etc. Soc. v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421; Detroit Com- mon Council V. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78; Allen v. National Bank (N. J.), 48 Atl. Rep. 78; Mumford v. Sewell, 11 Or. 67; Crawford v. Linn County, 11 Or. 482; Poppleton v. Yam- hill County, 18 Or. 377 ; Dundee Mortg. Co. V. School Dist., 10 Sawy. 53; Dun- dee Mortg. Co. V. Parrish, 11 Sawy. 92. The first of these cases restricts the language on this point used in State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 WalL 300. 3 Walker v. Jack, 88 Fed. Rep. 576, 21 C. C. A. 462; New Orleans v. Sem- ple, 175 Cr. 8. 309; People v. Home Ins. Co., 39 CaL 534; People v. Davis, 112 IlL 372; Herron v. Keeran, 59 Md. 472; Eversole v, Cook, -92 Ind. 322; Buck V. Miller, 147 Ind. 586; Hutch- inson V. Board of Equalization, 66 Iowa 85; Comptoir National v. Board of Assessors, 52 Lg. An. 1319; Jeflfer- son's Estate, 35 Minn. 315; Pinoh v. York County, 19 Neb. 50; Redmond V. Com'rs, 87 N. C. 122; People v. Trustees, 48 N. Y. 390; People v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576; Billinghurst V. Spink County, 5 S. D. 84; Catlin v. Hull, 31 Vt. 153. See In re Fair's Es- tate, 138 Cal. 607; Board of Com'rs v. Leonard, 57 Kan. 531. Non-negotiable notes representing loans made in Louisiana by the agent of a foreign corporation doing business therein and kept by such agent are taxable in that state: Comtoir National v. Board of Assessors, 53 La. An. 1319. Where a non-resident owner of land in the state sells it by an executory contract which is held in the state by his agent, such contract is taxable as personalty where held; the fiction that a debt follows the creditor's per- son does not govern in such a case: Redmond v. Com''rs, 87 N. C. 133. A foreign corporation having an agent in the state, and placing money in the bank subject to his check, was held liable to taxation on such fund: Blueflelds Banana Co. v. Board of Assessors, 49 La. An. 43. * Detroit v. Lewis, 109 Mich. 155. See Price v. Hunter, 34 Fed. Rep. 355. And the fact that the trustee was ,92 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. III. deposit of money in a bank, although technically a credit, is still money for all practical purposes, aud as such taxable, al- though belonging to a non-resident.' In the case Of a, chose in action represented by a negotiable bond, it may, perhaps, be held that the evidence of title is in such form, and is so impor- tant an element of the value of what it represents, as to make it closely analogous to tangible property, and to give it a situs for taxation where the negotiable evidence of its existence actually is, even though the owner may live elsewhere.^ Shares of corporate stock may be given by the state which creates or licenses the corporation a situs within the state for the purpose of taxation', so as to render them taxable though their owner is a non-resident.' appointed by the court of another state is immaterial: In re Ailman, 17 R. I. 862. Under the Pennsylvania statute' bonds held by an active trustee residing in Pennsylvania and appointed by the will of a resident in that state were held taxable there, though the courts of another state exercised jurisdiction of the settle- ment of the estate of the testator by whose will the trust was created: Guthrie v. Pittsburgh, C.,C.& St. L. E. Co., 158 Pa. St. 433. An administrator residing in the state and holding, as such, stocks and bonds, is liable to taxation on them here, although the distributees or beneficial owners may be non-residents: Baldwin v. Shine, 84 Ky. 503. 1 In re Romaine, 137 N. Y. 80; In re Houdayer's Estate, 150 N. Y. 37. In Clason V. New Orleans, 46 La. An. 1, moneys standing to the credit of a non-resident firm on the books of a bank were held not taxable: but in the somewhat earlier case of Liver- pool, etc. Ins. Co. v. Board of Asses- sors, 44 La. An. 760, an assessment upon the cash deposited in a bank, of a foreign corporation, necessary here for its business purposes, was sustained ; and Parker v. Strauss, 29 La. An. 1173, is authority that the non-resident owner of a bank deposit is not exempt under a statute which purposes to tax all personal property within the state. Money on deposit in a bank in Indiana, held for the re- ceiver of an insolvent mutual benefit assessment society to whom it had been turned over by receivers in other states, and payable to claim- ants scattered over the country, is taxable in Indiana by the county where it is deposited: Schmidt v. Failey, 248 Ind. 159 . 2 See what is said, obiter, in Walker, V. Jack, 88 Fed. Rep. 576, 31 C. C. A. 463, and in State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300. Bonds of a foreign corporation kept with a safety-deposit company in New York at the time of a non-resident owner's death are subject to a succession tax under a statute imposing such tax in respect of " property over which this state has any jurisdiction for the purposes of taxation: " Whiting's Estate, 150 N. Y. 37. In Tennessee it is held that negotiable bonds can con- stitutionally be taxed only by the state or taxing agency which has jurisdiction of their owner: South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406. estate V. Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 590; Baltimore v. City Passen- ger R. Co., 57 Md. 31; American Coal CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 93 In the absence of legislative provision to the contrary, judg- ments, like other debts, have their situs at the domicile of the creditor.' It seems, however, that a state has power to tax all judgments rendered by its courts a,nd remaining unsatisfied, even though owned by non-residents.^ ' The siUos for taxation of the property, tangible or intangible, of a telegraph company, an express company, or a railroad company operating in several different states, is not confined to the state by which the company was .chartered, or in whi,ch its home office is located, but may be regarded as distributed wherever the tangible property is located and the worls is car- ried on; and it is not objectionable, as imposing a tax upon property beyond the jurisdiction, for a state to assess the prop- erty within its limits at such proportion of the value of the entire property or capital stock of the company as the length of line operated in the state bears to the entire length of line.' It has also been held that the exaction, when a domestic cor- Co. V. County Com'rs, 57 Md. 185. See State V. Travelers' Ins. Co. (Conn,), 47 Atl. Rep. 299; Commercial Na- tional Bank v. Chambers (Utah), 61 Pac. Eep. 560. Shares of stock in a New York corporation kept at a non- resident owner's residence are "prop- erty within the state " subject to the transfer tax: In re Bronson, 150 N. Y. 1. It is competent to provide by law for taxing shares in corporar tions at the place where the business is carried on: Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank, 19 Wall 490; Stock- holders of Bank v. Abingdon, 88 Va. 293. 1 Meyer v. Pleasant, 41 La. An. 645; People V. Eastman, 25 CaL 601 ; Dykes V. Lockwood Mortg. Co., 2 K^n. App. 217. 2 Board of Com'rs v. Leonard, 57 Kan. 531. This case holds, however, that there is no statutory provision in Kansas authorizing judgments to be taxed except at the owner's domi- cile. * Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massa- chusetts, 125 U. S. '530; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Attorney-General v. West- ern Union Tel. Co., 141 U. S. 40; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. K Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 439; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Tag- gart, 163 U. S. 1 ; Adams Express Co. V. Ohio State Auditor,' 165 U. S. 194, 166 U. S. 185; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171 ; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Twombly, 29 Fed. Rep. 658; Attorney-General v. West- ern Union Tel. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 129; Reinhart' v. McDonald, 76 Fed. Rep. 403; Cleveland, C, C. & StJ L.' R. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 513; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 625; Evansville & I. R. Co. v. West, 138 Ind. 697; Western Union Tel. Co. V. Taggart, 141 Ind. 281 ; State v. Adams Express Co., 144 Ind. 549; State V. Jones, 51 Ohio St. 543; Com- monwealth V. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 107 Pa. St. 156; Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Express v. Crawford County, 63 Ark. 576. Where the equipment of a domestic railroad company is used interchangeably upon its lines within and without the state, its stock is to be taxed obly in the proportion that the number of miles operated and 94 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. III. poration is consolidated with corporations of other states, of fees proportioned to the capital stock of the new corporation, involves no attempt on the part of the state to extend its tax- ing power beyond the territorial limits.' And a statute pro- viding for the taxation of express companies is not invalid because it provides that in valuing their property their gross earnings from contracts made with railroad companies extend- ing to points without the state may be considered.' Eeal property out of the st^^te cannot be taxed to the owner within it/ while on the other hand all real estate of a non-resi- dent is taxable where it lies, though the tax will be a lien upon the land only, and cannot be made a personal charge upon the non-resident owner.* And as no state is under obligation to NewYork, whose will made an equi- table conversion, the land was held to have become personalty, and, as following the owner's domicile, not to be taxable in Pennsylvania: Cole- man's Estate, 159 Pa. St. 331. Where the conversion is not imperative but only permissive, and rests in the dis- cretion of the executors or others, it does not become operative until the exercise of the discretion, and in the meantime the land retains its normal character: Drayton's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 173; Miller v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. St. 321. It is also held, in Pennsylvania that lands in another state are not subject to the collateral Inheritance tax, notwithstanding di- rections to the executors to sell the lands, where a time in the future is specified for the sale: Hale's Estate (Commonwealth's Appeal), 161 Pa. St. 181; Handley's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 339. In New York the doctrine of equitable conversion, under instruc- tions to an executor, of land in an- other state into personalty, thus ren- dering the property liable to the collateral inheritance tax, has not bepn adopted: In re Swift, 187 N. Y. 77; In re Curtis, 143 N. Y. 219. * Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 TT. S. 193. Where, however, land was per- sonally assessed to a non-resident, and his agent appeared and only ob- equipped in one state bears to the en- tire mileage: Commonwealth V. Del- aware, L. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 96. 1 Ashley v. Eyan, 153 0. S. 436, 49 Ohio St. 504. 2 State V. State Board, 3 S. D. 338. s Withersppon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 310; Jones v. Columbus, 35 Ga. 610; Turner v. Burlington, 16 Mass. 308; Berlin Mills v. Wentworth's Loca- tion, 60 N. H. 156; Winnepiseogee Lake Manuf. Co. v. Gilford, 64 N. H. 337; Winkley v. Newton, 67 N. H. 80; Commonwealth's Appeal, 128 Pa. St. 603. The collateral inheritance tax is within the defect of power to im- pose it on land outside of the state: Commonwealth v. Coleman's Admin- istrator, 53 Pa. St. 468; Bittinger's Estate, 129 Pa. St. 338; Handley's Es- tate, 181 Pa. St 339. Where a testa- tor residing in Pennsylvania had peremptorily directed a sale of his lands in another state, and a distri- bution of the proceeds, the doctrine of conversion was applied, and it was held that the actual situs of the l^nd was ipmaterial, as what passed un- der the will was not the land but the proceeds, which were personalty, and liable to the collateral inheritance tax: Miller v. Commonwealth, 111 Pa. St. 331; Williamson's Estate, 153 Pa. St. 508. So, where land in Penn- sylvania was owned by a testator in OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. 95 permit a foreign corporation to carry on business, or exercise franchises, within its territory, the permission to do so may be granted under such restrictions, or permitted on such condi- tions regarding taxation, as the state may think proper or pru- dent to impose,^ provided such conditions are not repugnant to the constitution of the state,'' or to the constitution and laws of the United States.' Taxation and representation. There is a maxim in our government that the representatives of the people must impose the taxes the people are to pay. The form it sometimes takes is, " taxation and representation go together." The maxim is familiar in English law, where it became established as the result of a long, and at times bloody, controversy between the- representatives of the people on one side, and the crown on the other. The meaning there was the same that had been contended for in other countries ; that the imposition of taxes was essentially a legislative power, and the sovereign could levy none except as they were granted by the representatives of the realm.* In America the corresponding contest assumed jeoted to the valuation, it was held that he could not afterwards, in a suit against the assessors, treat the assessment as void: Hilton v. Fonda, 86 N. Y. 339. 1 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Paul v. Virginia, 8 WalL 168; Ducat V. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; Liv- erpool Ins. Co. V. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566; Doyle v. Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 535; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. 8. 350; Pembina, etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181; Bell's Gap E. Co. v. Commonwealth, 134 U. S. 233; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 XJ. S. 305; Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436; New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658; Fireman's Benevolent Assoc, v. Lounsbery, 21 111. 511; Ducat v. Chi- cago, 48 111. 172; Cincinnati Mut. H. Assur. Co. V. Rosenthal, 55 111. 85; Western, etc. Tel. Co. v. Lieb, 76 111. 172; Scottish Union, etc. Ins. Co. v. Herriott, 109 Iowa 606; Fire Depart- ment V. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith 440; Fire Department v. Wright, 3 E. D. Smith 453; Degroot v. Van Dwyer, 20 Wend. 390; Trustees, etc. v. Roome, 93 N. Y. 313; People v. Horn Silver Mining Co., 105 N. Y. 76; Peo- ple v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; Common- wealth V. Melton, 12 B. Monr. 213; Tatem v. Wright, 33 N. J. L. 439; Commonwealth v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 139 Pa. St. 463; Fire De- partment V. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136. 2 San Francisco v. Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co., 74 Cal. 118. ' 3 Insurance Co. v. French, 18 How. 404; Doyle v. Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union TeL Co., 96 U. S. 1; Pembina, etc. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305; Stockton v. Rail- road Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 14. < See Clermont's note to Fortescue's De Laudibus, p. 28; also Bates' Case, 3 State Trials, 371, Broom's Const. Law 247; Hampden's Case, 3 State Trials 825, Broom's Const. Law 306, and note, 370. Similar but less suc- cessful contests for the same prin- ciple in France and Spain are nar- 96 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. III. a different phase, and the maxim took on a different meaning- as a rallying cry in the contest for independence. The Amer- ican colonies insisted upon the right of the colonial legislatures to vote the local taxes; disputing any such right in the parlia- ment of Great Britain, which was a body in which the colonists had and could have no representatives. That body, it was claimed, could legitimately exercise over them the authority only of an imperial legislature to regulate external concerns, and those of the empire at laijge, leaving internal concerns to the control of their own representatives. What the maxim really meant was, that the local legislature must make the local laws; it was violated in the particular of taxes, and conse- quently brought that subject prominently to notice, though the principle itself was general. The same principle has sometimes been appealed to as if it meant that no person could be taxed unless in the body which voted the tax he was represented by some one in whose selection he had a voice; but it never had any such meaning, and never could have, without excluding from taxation a very large proportion of all the property of the state.' If the privilege of voting for representatives in the gov- ernment were the only or even the principal benefit received from government, there might be the highest reason in exempt- ing the non-voting infant or alien from taxation; but this privilege to any particular individual, as compared with the protection of life, liberty, and property, is really insignificant And so long as all persons cp-nnot participate in government, the limits of exclusion and admission must always be deter- mined on considerations of general public policy. It is not doubted that, so far as can be prudently and safely permitted, all who are to pay taxes should be allowed a voice in raising- them ; if for no other reason, because those they vote they will more willingly and cheerfully pay.^ But the maxim that tax^- rated by Mr. Hallam and other writ- levy of a tax by a territorial govern- ers. ment, upon personal property located 1 The general principle in regard to on an Indian reservation not em- taxation and representation does not, braced in any organized county, is- as practically administered, mean not taxation -without representa- that no person, man, -woman or cHild, tion : Ibid. resident or non-resident, shall be, 2 xhe aini of all the contests from . taxed, unless he was represented which have sprung the liberties of by some one for whom he voted: England and America has been to- Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 364. The establish and defend the principle of OH. in.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. 97 ation and representation go together is only true when under- stood in a territorial sense which embraces the state at large; every person in the state being represented in its legislative body, and that body determining the taxation not only for the state at large, but also, within certain limits, for each division and municipality of the state.' The local right 16 subordinate to this general authority. self taxation, ad that which must constitute the main security against oppression. Mr. Burke insists upon this in his speech on Conciliation of America. And see Works of Madi- son, III, 105. The sense of the op- pression of any burden is greatly increased if they who are to bear it are to do so, not voluntarily, but at the command of others. Locke ex- presses this idea when, in his Treatise on Civil Government, he says, of a burden imposed as compared to one voluntarily assumed, that "it may be all one to the purse, but it worketh diversely to -the courage." This is well illustrated in English history; for heavy taxation dates from the time when the right of the com- mons to grant the taxes became finally settled. But the chief im- portance in the right of those who pay taxes to vote them consists in this: that in monarchical countries it constitutes the only substantial and continuous check upon tyranny, and in any country the only security against robbery under the forms of law. . As the Spanish Cortes said in one of their remonstrances, "their remains no other privilege or liberty which can be profitable to subjects if this be taken away:" Hallam's Middle Ages, ch. IV. The idea is well expressed by Lawrence, J., in Harward v. Drainage Co., 51 111. 130. See, also, Gage v. Graham, 57 111. 144; People V. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44. It is very justly laid down that a tax law is to be so construed as to har- monize with the principle that the 7 people are not to be taxed except with their own consent or that of ofScers truly representing them: Keasy v. Brioker, 60 Pa. St. 9. In Indiana it has been decided that where the boundaries of a township have been extended after it has voted aid to a work of internal im- provement, the territory brought in cannot be subjected to the tax so voted: Alvis v. Whitney, 43 Ind. 83. See Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 IlL 153; Raderv. Road District, 36 N. J. L. 373. A city newly incorporated in a pai'ish, and not represented on the police jury, was held not liable to taxation by such jury: Felix v. Wagner, 39 La. An. 891. * See Steward y. Jefferson, 3 Harr. 335; Clark v. Leathers (Ky.), ^ S. W. Rep. 576; State v. Williams, 68 Conn. 181. The levy of betterments pur- suant to a statute is not an unconsti- tutional exercise of the taxing power, the taxpayers being represented in the legislature which imposed the tax: Masonic Building Assoc, v. Brownell, 164 Mass. 306. That the property of persons who have not the right to vote is taxable, see Wheeler V. Wall, 6 Allen 558; Smith v. Macon, 30 Ark. 17. In State v. Ross, 7 Yerg. 74, 77, Catron, Ch. J., has something to say about the tyranny of taxation without representation, but the case did not call for itv In Marr v. Enloe, I'Yerg. 453, where the power to au- thorize a county court to levy taxes for county purposes was denied, stress was laid on the fact that the members of the court were not 98 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. [CH. III. To what extent the federal government may ,righ,tfully levy taxes in districts not represented in the federal legislature is perhaps not entirely clear. In the District of Colurabia, which by the national constitution was set apart for federal purposes elected by the people. Upon the gen- eral right of the people to tax them- selves through their representatives, see Pope v. Phifer, 3 Heisk. 683; Sanborn v. Rice Co., 9 Minn. 3^; People V. Hurlburt, 24 Mich. 44; Peo- ple V. Chicago, 51 IlL 58; People v. Batoheller, 53 N. T.'l38; State v. Lef- flngwell, 54 Mo. 458. It has often been decided that a state may com- pel a municipality to tax itself for police purposes. See Taylor v. Board of Health, 31 Pa. St. 73; People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481; Davock v. :ioore, 105 Mich. 120; Gooch v. Ex- eter (N. H.), 48 AtL Rep. 1100. And for highways and other like purposes ' of general concern. See Harrison Justices V. Holland, 3 Grat. 347; State V. Williams, 68 Conn. 131; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Gogreve, 41 La. An. 251 ; Revell v. Annapolis, 81 Md. 1; Browne v. Turner, 174 Mass. 150, 176 Mass. 9. But these subjects will be elsewhere considered. Tax laws are undoubtedly to be construed if possible, so as not to impose taxes without the consent of the people taxed, or of their immediate repre- sentatives; so held of a tax for mil- itary bounty purposes: Keasy v. Bricker, 60 Pa. St 9; and see Lexing- ton V. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana 513, 517; Madison Co. v. The People, 58 IlL 456, 463; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 75, 83; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330; Maltus v. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.) 553. And we shall en- deavor to show further on, that, in some cases, this assent is necessary. That a stranger, coming into a town, becomes liable to a license tax as an " inhabitant and member of the cor- poration," see Plymouth v. Pettijohn, 4 Dev. 591; Whitfield v. Longest, 6 Ired. 268. " It is just that it should be so; for, as the defendant has, in^ the security of his property, the ben- efit of the night watch and of the other police establishments, he ought to contribute reasonably towards their expenses." Per Ru£Bn, Ch. J., in Wilmington v. Eoby, 8 Ired. 250, 354; and see Edenton v. Capeheart, 71 N. C. 156. Under proper charter authority a city council may tax both resident and non-resident attor- neys who have their offices in the city and practice their profession there: Petersburg v. Cooke, 94 Va. 344. In Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush 660, 661, an act was srstained which empowered the town of Falmouth to impose a license tax not exceeding $100 on the sale, by retail, of all spir- ituous, vinous or malt liquors in said town, or within one mile thereot This was put on the ground of police regulation. A city ordinance taxing wagons used in the city for pay, can- not apply to wagons owned by those residing outside who employ them in hauling into and out of the city. If it could, it would be taking property for private use — for the use of that particular community of which the owner formed no part: Sfc Charles V. Nolle, 51 Ma 123. Where a town is authorized to tax non-residents doing business within it, with a pro- viso that those taxed should have the right to vote at municipal elections, this proviso may lie repealed without affecting the right to tax. The maxim that taxation and representa- tion go together only applies to po- litical communities: Moore v. Fay- etteviUe, 80 N. C. 154. Where the state undertook to provide a park for the city of St Louis, outside the city CH..in.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 99 and placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of congress, the power is unlimited, and whoever becomes a resident of the district must do so with the understanding that he can partici- pate in the government only to the extent that congress may permit.1 There can be no doubt also of the right of the federal government to levy stamp taxes and Imposts of every descrip- tion, by laws which shall have uniform operation throughout all the states and territories within the jurisdiction of the gen- eral government. But taxes for territorial purposes, corre- sponding to the taxes which are levied by the states for state purposes, it is theoretically at least the right of the people of the territory, when organized with a local legislature, to levy and expend for themselves. It is not to be supposed that the right will be denied by the general government, and if it should be, and the local taxes be imposed and expended by the direct interposition of congressional authority, it is not too much to say that such action would be inconsistent with the maxim of government now under consideration, whether valid in law or not.2 The power not to be delegated. It is a general rule of con- stitutional law that a sovereign power conferred by the people upon any one branch or department of the government is not to be delegated by that branch or department to any other.' This is a principle which pervades our whole political sys- tem, and, when properlj'^ understood, admits of no exception. limits, and created a board of com- triot of Columbia, includes the power missioners not residing in the dis- of taxation: Parsons v. District of trict, who were to levy taxes within Columbia, 170 U. S. 45. And of spe- the district of the park, for its estab- cial taxation or assessment for local lishment and support, it was held improvements: Bauman v. Ross, 167 that they did not constitute a mu- IT. S. 548. nicipal corporation; that the park 2 Upon the subject of territorial was not established for municipal but powers of taxation, the following for general purposes, and that the cases are instructive: Miners' Bank proposed taxes were unwarranted by v. Iowa, 13 How. 1 ; Vincennes Univ. the constitution. State v. Lefflng- v. Indiana, 14 How. 368; Williams v. well, 54 Mo. 458. Bank of Michigan, 7 Wend. 539 ; Swan 1 Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat, v. Williams, 3 Mich. 437. 317, 834 See, also, Kendall v. United 3 State v. Des Moines, 103 Iowa 76; States, 13 Pet. 534. The power of Inhabitants v. Allen, 61 N. J. L. 3S8; congress to exercise exclusive juris- Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Daw- diction in all cases within the Dis- son, 97 Tenn. 151. 100 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [CH.. III. And it is applicable with peculiar force to the case of taxation.^ The power to tax is a legislative power.' The people have cre- ated a legislative department for the exercise of the legislative power; and within that power lies the authority to prescribe the rules of taxation, and to regulate the manner in which those rules shall be given effect. The people have not author- ized this department to relieve itself of the responsibility by a substitution of other agencies.' But it is never assumed by the people that the legisliiture can take such supervision of all the infinite variety of interests in the state, and of all local as well as general affairs, as to be able to determine in every instance precisely what is needed in matters of taxation, and precisely what purposes shall at any time, under the particular circum- stances, be provided for. There is a difference between mak- ing the law and giving effect to the law; the one is legislation and the. other administration. We conceive that the legisla- ture must, in every instance, prescribe the rule under which taxation may be laid ; it must originate the authority under which, after due proceedings, the tax gatherer demands the contribution ; but it need not prescribe all the details of action, or even fix with precision the sum to be raised or all the par- ticulars of its expenditure. If the rule is prescribed which, in its administration, works out the result,' that is suflficient; but to refer the making of th^ rule to another authority, would be in excess of legislative power.* An illustration or two may possibly suflBciently explain the principle. The legislature, with the utmost propriety, may provide for a court of claims or a state board of audit, whose adjudications against the state shall be final upon it ; and may direct that the amounts awarded shall go into the general levy for the year. Here is a rule to be properly worked out by a proper agency. A like provision iSohultea v. Eberly, 83 Ala. 343; < MoCabe v. Carpenter, 103 CaL 469. Eeelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Daw- A statute imposing on the circuit son, 97 Tenn. 151. judge the duty of levying a tax in 2 The legislative branch of the gov- the event of the failure of the county emment has the exclusive power of oflBoials to act, is unconstitutional as taxation, except as far as the power conferring legislative power upon a is restrained by the constitution, or strictly judicial tribunal: Fleming delegated by the legislature or the v. Dyer (Ky.), 47 S. W. Rep. 444; citing constitution to local municipalities: Pennington v. Woolfolk, 79 Ky. 13, Security Co. v. Hinton, 97 CaL 314 and Muhlenburg County v. Morehead » State V. Des Moines, 103 Iowa 76. (Ky.), 46 S. W. Kep. 484 CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 101 for the adjustment of claims against couiities, cities, and town- ships may also be made. A fund for contingent expenses may be put at the disposal of the executive or of other state officers, to be used for public purposes not previously enumerated in detail by the legislature. But to leave to a court of claims or any state officer or board the power to determine whether a tax should be laid for the current year, or at what rate, or upon what property, or how if should be collected, and whether lands should be sold or forfeited for its satisfaction, — all this prescribes no rule, and originates no authority; it merely att tempts to empower some other tribunal to prescribe a rule and set in motion the tax machinery. And this is clearly incom- petent.' The legislature must make the law, but it may pre- scribe its own regulations regarding the ministerial agents that are to execute it.^ There is, nevertheless, one clearly defined exception to the rule that the legislature shall not delegate any portion of its authority. The exception, however, is strictly in harmony with the general features of our political system, and it rests upon an implication of popular assent which is conclusive. This exception relates to the case of municipal corporations. Immemorial custom, which tacitly or expressly has been incor- porated in the several state constitutions, has made these or- ganizations a necessary part of the general machinery of state government, and they are allowed large authority in matters of local government, and to a considerable extent are permit- ted to make the local laws. This indulgence has been carried into matters of taxation; the state in very many cases doing little beyond prescribing rules of limitation within which for local purposes the local authorities may levy taxes ; but with full reserved power, nevertheless, to limit or recall the dele- gation at pleasure.' 1 Inhabitants v. Allen, 61 N. Ji L. tain manufacturing establishments 328. from taxation for a term of years, if 2 It is not a delegation of the tax- the town so votes, is not a delegation ing power where the legislature pro- of legislative power, but a permis- vides for the readjustment and reap- sion to the town to avail itself of the portionment of unpaid back taxes privileges of the statute: Colton v. through the agency of' a city board Montpelier, 71 Vt. 413. of assessors: Tyrrell v. Wheeler, 133 ' Caldwell v. Justices, i Jones Eq. N. Y. 76. A statute exempting oer- 333; Taylor v. Newbern, 3 Jones Eq. 102 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEB. [CH. in. The legislature, however, in thus making delegation of the power to tax, must make it to the corporation itself, and pro- vide for its exercise by. the proper legislative authority of the corporation. It cannot confer upon merely ministerial or ad- 141; Thompson v. Floyd, 3 Jones Law 313; Wingate v. Sluder, 6 Jones Law 553; Com'rs v. Patterson, 8 Jones Law 183; Wilmington v. Eoby, 8 Ired. 350; Steward v. Jefferson A 3 Harr. 335; Lockhart v. Harrington, 1 Hawks 408; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330; Slack v. Railroad Co., 13 B. Monr. 1, 9; Battle v. Mobile, 9 Ala. 334; Stein v. Mobile, 34 Ala. 591; Osborne v. Mobile, 44 Ala. 493; Sohultes V. Eberly, 83 Ala. 343; Har- rison V. Vicksburg, 3 S. & M. 581; Smith V. Aberdeen, 35 Miss. 458; Hope V. Deaderick, 8 Humph. 1; Trigally v. Memphis, 6 Cold. 383; Bull V, Read, 13 Grat. 78; Case of County Levy, 5 Call, 139; Kuhn v. Board of Education, 4 W. Va. 499; Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind. 335; People V. Kelsey, 34 CaL 470; Wash- ington v: State, 13 Ark. 753; Baker V. State,' 44 Ark. 134; Little Rock v. Prather, 46 Ark. 471 ; State v. Noyes, lOFost 379, 293; Burgess v. Pue, 3 Gill 11; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill 383; Kinney v. Zimpleman, 36 Tex. 554; St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559; St. Louis v. Savings Bank, 49 Mo. 574; People v. Hm-lburt, 34 Mich. 44i 108; Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa. Sfc 448; Baldwin v. City Council, 53 Ala. 437, Slack v. Ray, 26 La. An. 674; New Orleans v. Kaufman, 29 La. An. 383; Mayor, etc. iv. White, 46 La. An. 449; Mandeville v. Beaudot, 49 La. An. 336; Chicago, St. L. & N. O. R. Co. v. Kentwood, 49 La. An. 931 ; State v. LefBngwell, 54 Mo, 458; Canova v. Williams, 41 Fla. 509; Oconto City Water Supply Co. v. Oconto, 105 Wis. 76. Unless forbidden by the constitution the legislature may con- fer the taxing power on municipali- ties in such measure as it deems ex- pedient, to the same extent as the state possesses: Col ton v. Montpelier, 71 Vt. 413. It is for the legislature to determine the extent to which it will confer upon any municipal cor- poration the power of taxation to aid it in the discharge of the obligations imposed by the constitution upon itself: Chico High School Board v. Board of Supervisors, 118 Cal. 115. The legislative power to impose a license tax on occupations, whether for regulation or for purposes of rev- enue, may be delegated to municipal corporations: In re Martin (Kan.), 64 Pac. Rep. 43, and cases cited. A legislature which itself has power to impose a poll tax may authorize a municipality to impose one: Perry v. Rockdale, 63 Tex. 451. The power of the legislature to delegate to county boards the authority to tax was denied in the early case of Marr v. Enloe, 1 Yerg. 453, but in the sitb- sequent case of Hope v. Deaderick, 8 Humph. 1, the right to empower local bodies to levy local taxes was fully sustained. In Nebraska the legisla- ture may confer upon counties the power to make local improvements by special assessment or taxation of property benefited: Dorst v. Griffin, 31 Neb. 668; Dodge County v. Acorn (Neb.), 85 N. W. Rep. 393. A statute conferring on county supervisors power to license all legal business carried on in the county — for ex- ample, sheep raising — was sustained. El Dorado County v. Meiss, 100 CaL 368. Where the state constitution pre- scribes the objects for which the tax- ing power may be delegated to coun- ties, it may not be granted or exerted for other purposes: Jones v. Sligh,75 Ga. 7; Adair v. Ellis, 83 Ga. 464 A CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEB. 103 ministrative officers the power to make rules for taxation ; and if such officers are given authority to levy and collect taxes, it must be under rules laid down, for them.^ Neither can the leg- islature confer upon private corporations the power to tax, though it may doubtless create municipal corporations for that especial purpose when not forbidden by the state constitution to do so. In some states this is forbidden.' constitutional provision that the corporate authorities of cities may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes requires a legislative enactment to make it effectual: State v. Kelly, 45 S. C. 659. In au- thorizing freeholders' charters which the legislature cannot change or amend, the power of taxation, being essential to municipal existence, is necessarily implied: Security, etc. Co. V. Hinton, 97 Cal. 214. The dele- gation by statute to proper city au- thorities to make annual assessments in addition to triennial ones, is not unconstitutional: Jermyn v. Fowler, 186 Pa. St. 595. An exemption from taxation is an exemption "by the laws of the state," whether effected by direct vote of the legislature or by the vote of a city to which au- thority had been delegated: Rich- ardson v. St. Albans (Vt.),47 AtL Rep. 100. 1 A statute deleg0,ting to the county superintendent of schools power to levy such tax for high-school pur- poses as he may deem desirable with- out control by the inhabitants or any local board, is illegal: MoCabe v. Carpenter, 103 Cal. 469. A statute providing for a levy of taxes for high- school purposes was held not uncon- stitutional as conferring legislative power on the high-school board, where it merely provided that such board should furnish estimates of cost to the board of supervisors, leaving discretion with the latter: People V. Lodi High School Dist, 124 Cal. 694. Where the whole business df deciding on the improvement and assessing the benefits remains with the city authorities, a statute is not invalid as delegating the city's tax- ing powers to holders of bonds issued upon property benefited: Germond V. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 363: A statute empowering boards of library trust- ees appointed by mayors and coun- cils to fix a rate of taxation for the maintenance of a library fund, is un- constitutional, being a delegation of the taxing power to municipal boards not elected by the people: State V. Des Moines, 103 Iowa 76. 2 See Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 3 Met. (Ky.) 350; State v. Smith, 50 N. J. L. 101. The contrary seems to be assumed in Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199, and Drainage Co. Case, 11 La. An. 338. 'Under the constitution of Ala- bama the legislature cannot delegate the power of taxation to any corpo- ration not municipal; and as a school district created by statute with ap- pointive, not elective, trustees, is not a municipal corporation, although it is a gwast-public one, an act attempt- ing to delegate the power to such trustees is invalid: Schultes v. Eb- erly, 83 Ala. 243. The constitution of Arkansas, which provides that the legislature may delegate the taxing power to the state's subordinate po- litical and municipal corporations, but no farther, does not prohibit the delegation of such power to a levee board: Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370; Keel V. Board of Directors, 59 Ark. 513. In Illinois it was held that a corporation created to construct lev- ees along a river for the benefit of its 104 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. in. In delegating the authority, the state is not limited to the exact measure of that which is exercised by itself, but it may permit the municipalities to tax subjects which for reasons of public policy it has not been deemed wise to tax for more gen- eral purposes. It is not uncommon, therefore, to find cities and villages empowered by law to tax trades and occupations members could not be giren the power to assess the cost on the lands of those who receive the benefit : Board of Directors t. Houston, 71 IlL 318. The irrigation districts contem- plated by the statute of California are gaasi-pijjjlic corporations in the sense that their organization is for the general public benefit, and the power of assessment may be dele- gated to them: Irrigation Dist. v. Williams, 76 CaL 360. The power to assess city property for local im- provements may constitutionally be delegated by the leglslatm'e to a board of assessors, acting independ- ently of the common council: Little Rock V. Board of Improvements, 43 Ark. 152. Under the constitution of Georgia authorizing the granting of the power of taxation to county au- thorities or municipal corporations, that power may be given to a county board of education: Smith v. Bohler, 72Ga.546. A statute giving the board of county cominissioners power to assess and collect town taxes is valid ; they are "corporate authorities " for the town: People v. Knopf, 171 IlL 191; Bebb v. People, 173 IlL 376. The oflBcers of a city may be invested by the legislature with power to levy and collect taxes for the support of the common schools: Fuller v. Heath, 89 IlL 396. A statute authorizing the park board of a city to determine the amount of tax to be levied in the city for park purposes was held valid even though suCh board was an ap- pointive body: State v. West Duluth Land Co., 75 Minn. 456. In New Jer- sey the power of taxation cannot be delegated except to the local municipal bodies; and a statute is invalid in so far as it attempts to confer power upon commissioners appointed by the governor to levy taxes for local government purposes : Inhabitants v. Allen, 61 N. J. L. 338. A constitutional provision authorizing the legislature to vest "the corporate authorities of cities, towns, and vil- lages with power to make local im- provements by special assessments or by special taxation of property benefited," does not impliedly' pro- hibit the granting of such power to other corporations so as to invalidate a statute authorizing a part of a county to form a dyking district, and to establish a system of dykes by a special assessment of the property benefited: Hansen v. Hammer, 15 Wash. 315. An act authorizing the creation of a board of road commis- sioners, and empowering them to levy taxes for the improvement of the road, was held unconstitutional in Kansas: Board v. Abbott, 53 Kan. 148; Hovey v. Board of Com'rs, 56 Elan. 577; Parks v. Board of Com'rs, 61 Fed. Rep. 486; First Nat Bank v. Board of Com'rs, 16 C. C. A. 56. Where the constitution vests the power of taxation for municipal pur- poses in municipal corporations under the authority of the legislature, a statute empowering a board of com- missioners to fix a license tax part of which is to be paid into the city treasury, is invalid: State v. Ash- brook, 154 Mo. 875. In Tennessee the taxing power can be delegated only tp counties and incorporated towns: Waterhouse v. Public Schools, 8 Heisk. 857. OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 105 which the state, for its purposes, abstains from taxing.^ "Where one section of a state constitution empowered the legislature to tax certain named occupations, while another empowered it to authorize corporate authorities of cities, etc., to assess and DoUect taxes, it was held that the legislature was not restricted, in delegating power, to the imposition of the taxes enumerated in the former section.' What is true of the state is equally true of the municipali- ties; that the power they possess to tax must be exercised by the corporation itself and cannot be delegated to its ofBcers or other agencies. This rule applies to whatever is to be done which is legislative in its nature and involves the exercise of discretion, and a city, therefore, cannot delegate to an admin- istrative officer the plan and extent of a municipal improve- ment for which it orders a tax,' and if it should assume to do so, mere acts in affirmance afterwards would not supply to the officer the want of authority.* Not can the city council dele- iMontgomery V. Knox, 64 Ala. 463; constitutional provision that "no Canova v. Williams, 41 Fla. 509; political corporation shall impose a Johnston V.Macon, 62 Ga. 645. "When greater license tax than is imposed the legislature confers upon a munici- by the general assembly for state pality the general power of taxation, purposes," the failure of the state to it grants all the powers possessed by impose any license tax is held to be itself in respect to the imposition of 'an implied prohibition to allmunici- taxes; and a city can then impose pal corporations levying such a tax: taxes in its discretion upon all sub- Neis' Orleans v. Graves, 34 La. An. jects within its jurisdiction, not 890. That special powers conferred withheld from taxation by the legis- in Illinois upon towns to charge lature, whether they are taxed by the license fees are valid, though the like state or not: " Norfolk v. Norfolk licenses are not allowed by the gen- Landmark Pub. Cp., 95 Va. 564. Also eral laws of the state, see Woodward in Virginia it has been held that as v. TurnbuU, 8 Scam. 1; Ottawa v. La the state refrains from taxing for Salle, 13 111. 339; Byers v. Olney, 16 state purposes the capital employed 111. 35. Further on this subject see by merchants in their business, the post, ch. XVIIL county cannot tax it for county pur- ^york v. Chicago, B. & Q. B. Ca, poses: Board of Supervisors v. Tal- 56Neb.573, citing Magneau v. French, lant, 96 Va. 733. A statute empower- 30 Neb. 843; Templeton v. Tekamah, ing a city to levy privilege taxes 33 Neb. 543. confers only the power to tax such ' Thompson v. Sohermerhorn, 6 privileges as have been taxed previ- N. Y. 93; St. Louis v. Clemens, 53, ously by the legislature, or such as Mo. 133; People v. Clark, 47 CaL 456; may afterwards be ordered to be Johnston v. Macon, 63 Ga. 645; Hyde taxed by that body: International v. Joyes, 4 Bush 464 Trading Stamp Co. v. Memphis, 101 < Hyde v. Joyes, 4 Bush 464 And Tenn, 181. In Louisiana, under a see Randolph v. Gawley, 47 CaL 458; 106 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. III. gate to a committee of its members the power to determine ■when sidewalks shall be required,^ nor refer to commissioners the question what portion of the expense of an improvement . shall be assessed on the owners of premises benefited, when the charter requires this to be determined by the council itself.^ Boards of supervisors cannot refer to committees the power of examining the assessment rolls and equalizing tl^e valuations, but these duties must be performed by the boards as such, though, after changes are determined upon, the act of making them is merely clerical.' And where by law a school district is empowered at its annual meeting to vote a precise and definite sum as' a tax upon the people, the meeting cannot delegate to the trustees a discretionary power as to the amount State V. Saalman, 37 N. J. L. 156; State V. Koster, 38 N. J. 308; Waterhouse V. Public Schools, 8 Heisk. 857; West- port V. Mastin, 63 Mo. App. 647. 1 Macon v. Patty, 57 Miss. 878; Bryan v. Chicago, 60 111. 507. See Davis V. Read, 65 N. Y. 566, But it is no delegation of power when a board is commanded to levy a cer- tain percentage on the tax for delin- quency in payment: San Francisco, etc. E. Co. V. State Board, 60 CaL 13., And in Kentucky it has been held to be no delegation of the taxing power to refer to the city engineer and a committee of the council to dbtermine when repairs in a street improvement are needed, and how much of the old improvement can be used in making them: Covington V. Boyle, 6 Bush 304. Where the paving to be done during the year has been let by the foot, an ordi- narice directing" the sidewalks to be paved at the cost of abutting lots, leaving subordinates to measure the work and apportion the tax, is not a delegation of legislative power: Walker v. District of Columbia, 6 Maokey 353. And where the city council fixed the rate of the levy at that rate on the lots liable there- for, there was no improper delega- tion of' power to the clerk: Topeka V. Gage, 44 Kan. 87. 2Scofleld V. Lansing, 17 Mich. 487. The council must fix the amount chargeable to the several property owners in assessing the cost of a street improvement, and cannt leave the matter to the clerk: Barker v. Southern Const Co. (Ky), 47 S. W. Rep. 608. A city cannot delegate to its ministerial officers the power to tax, though they may be authorized, under general regulations, to issue- license when the taxes are paid. See East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 IlL 393. The following cases have dis- cussed to some extent what consti- tutes a delegation of the power to tax: State V. Sickles, 24 N. J, L. 125; Meuser v. Risdon. 36 CaL 139; State V. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 875; Brooklyn V. Breslin, 57 N. Y. 591; Mclnernyv. Reed, 23 Iowa 410; Quid v. Rich- mond, 23 Grat. 464; Foss v. Chicago, 56 lU. 354; Kuehner v. Freeport, 143 111. 93; Warren v. Grand Haven, 30 Mich. 84; Johnson, v. Sanderson, 34 Vt. 94; Soule v. Seattle, 6 Wash. 315. The subject was largely considered for curbing streets, and the clerk, in Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. 646. by the council's direction, merely 3 Bellinger v. Gray, 51 N. Y. 610. computed the amount of assessment See People v. Lohnas, 54 Hun 604* OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. 107 of the tax to be levied.' These cases amply illustrate an im- portant general principle. Restriction or relinquishment of the power by contract. In some cases the state legislature is found to have pledged the state, in definite and formal manner, that on some particu- lar subject of taxation the state should refrain, either wholly or for some definite period, from levying any taxes whatever, or should levy them only to a certain extent. Such pledges are commonly impolitic and unwise, and it is always among the possibilities that, if sustained, they might be carried to the extreme of crippling the sovereign power of the state to per- form its accustomed functions. There has always, therefore, been a strong protest against the doctrine that such pledges could constitutionally be made; the protestants insisting that no legislature is competent to limit the power of its successor, but must transmit to those to come after it the complete power which it received from its predecessor. But the federal su- preme court in an early case, in which the facts were that a state had exchanged lands with an Indian tribe, and stipulated by legislative act that those conveyed to the Indians should not thereafter be subject to any tax, decided that this stipula- tion was binding upon the state as a contract; that the state could not impose taxes in contravention of the stipulation, and that the exemption was available on behalf of those who sub- sequently by legislative permission became purchasers from the Indians.^ The contract derived its character of inviola- iRobinsonv. Dodge, 18 Johns. 351; R. Co. v. Alsbrook, llO N. C. 137; Trumbull v. White, 5 Hill, 46. See, Hand v. Savannah, etc. Co., 17 S. C. further, San Francisco, etc. Co. v. 219; State v. Bank of Commerce, 95 State Board, 60 Cal. 13. - Tenn. 231. That a license is not a 2 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch contract or grant, but a mere permit 164. Compare Armstrong v. Athens or police regulation, which does bot, County, 16 Pet. 381. See, for peculiar generally speaking, prevent the state cases, Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. from requiring the licensee to pay 378; Palmes v. Louisville, etc. Co., 19 tax, see Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Fla. 331, 109 U. S. 344; Chicago, B. & Md. 483; State v. Gerhardt, 145 Ind. Q. R. Co. v. Guffey, 133 U. S. 561; 439; Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Barnes v. Kornegay, 63 Fed. Rep. Mass. 70; Board of Excise v. Barry, 671; Wells v. Savannah, 107 Ga. 1; 34 N. Y. 657; Ex parte Williams, 81 Elizabeth, etc. R. Co. v. Trustees, 13 Tex. Crim. App. 363; Kresser v. Ly- Bush 333; State V. Northern Central ,man, 74 Fed. Rep. 765. And see also R. Co., 44 Md. 181; Wilmington & W. post, ch. XIX 108 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEK. [OH. III. bility from the clause of tlie constitution of the United States inhibiting the states from passing any law impairing the obli- gation of contracts; a clause which applies to the contracts of a state equally with those of individuals.' The pledge, however, in order to constitute a contract, must have the elements of a contract, and the vital elements are consent and consideration. . Consent to the exemption on the part of the state is never by itself suflBcient; but there must be something received by thft state for the relinquishment, or something surrendered on the other side which can be deemed a legal equivalent. In the case first referred to the considera- tion was manifest; the state was bargaining away its lands, and was presenting the exemption from taxation as an induce- ment for better terms on the other side. So if the legislature by law, in order to secure the establishment of a charitable institution, charter a corporation, and in the charter declare that its property shall be exempt from taxation, and indi- viduals, in reliance thereon, invest their means to secure the accomplishment of xthe object of the law, a consideration for the state's promise is thus made out.^ The case would be still plainer if the state received a bonus or other valuable con- sideration for the grant of a franchise, stipulating in the grant to give exemption from taxation,' or if it made the 1 New Jersey v. Wilson, 7 Cranch also, Ohio Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 164 ; Dartmouth College v. Wood- How. 416. ward, 4 Wheat. 518; Hall v. Wiscon- s Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 sin, 103 U. S. 5; University v. People, How. 133; Farrington v. Tennessee, 99 U. S. 309; Antoni v. Greenhow, 95 U. a 679; Tennessee v. Bank of 107 U. S. 769. See Stone v. Missis- Commerce, 53 Fed. Eep. 735; State sippi, 101 U. S. 814 Where a con- v. Union, etc. Bank, 91 Tenn. 546; tract is valid at the time by the laws Wendover v. Lexington, 15 B. Monr. of the state it is not. competent to 258; Hennepin County v. St. Paul, pass an act impairing its obligations, M. etc. R. Co., 33 Minn. 534. An ac- nor can any decision of the courts of cepted ordinance granting to a street the state have that effect: Chicago railway company the privilege of V, Sheldon, 9 Wall 50. using a street, and requiring it to ■ 2 Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, pave and keep in good repair a cer- 8 Wall. 430. The court in this case tain width of street, constitutes a said that no consideration was nee- valid contract exempting the com- essary beyond the benefits to the pany from assessment for improving community which it was to be as- such street: Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Bimiedwere to be anticipated from Wall. 50; Parmeleev. Chicago, 60 the formation of the corporation to 111. 267; Billings v. Chicago, 167 III. accomplish the purpose in view. See, 337; West Chicago St E. Co. v. Chi- OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 109 grant to a corporation on a surrender by it of valuable rights.! The contract of exemption may either be perpetual or, lim- cago, 178 111. 839. But a city which has granted to a lailroad company the privilege of using a street for its tracks may by special tax make nec- essary improvements therein, al- though the company has agreed to make the street safe for crossing ve- hicles: Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Quinoy, 139 IlL 355. A city ordi- nance allowing an elevated railroad company to construct its track over a street, and providing that it shall restore the pavements, etc., in case . they are disturbed in the construc- tion of the road, to as good a condi- tion as they were before the disturb- ance, is not a contract exempting the company's rights and franchise from special taxes for improvement of the street above which the road is built: Lake Street E. R. Co. v. Chi- cago, 188 111. 75. An ordinance au- thorizing a street railway company to change its motive power, and to operate its railway by electricity for a certain period, with the right to collect fares at certain rates, with the duty of keeping in repair the street between the tracks and for two feet on each side, did not thereby ex- empt the company from paying on its cars a license tax which the city was by law authorized to impose, and hence a subsequent ordinance imposing such license was not void as impairing the obligations of a contract: Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo, 645. A provision in a city's char- ter that when a street has once been improved imder the charter such street shall not again be improved at the expense of the adjoining prop- erty owners, but may be repaired, does not constitute a contract be- tween such an owner and the public that his property shall ever there- after be exempt from special assess- ment: Ladd V. Portland, 82 Or. 371. So a statute declaring that it should be lawful for a city council, on the application of three-fourths of the owners of property in any street, to order the street to be graded, etc., and that after such grading.etc, then , the city shall take charge of and keep the street in repair without any further assessment, did not consti- tute a contract that the expense of keeping the street in repair should thereafter be borne by the public: Agens V. Mayor, etc., 35 N. J. L. Ig8. See Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush 667. It has, however, been held that an ordinance providing that thereafter no abatement of city taxes should be' allowed because of a lot's front- ing on a street paved at the expense of the abutting owners, does not af- . feet the vested rights of one who owned a lot abutting on a street paved under ordinances imposing the cost in the first instance upon the abutting lots, but providing that there should be an abatement of city taxes on such lots: Erie v. Griswold, 184 Pa. St. 485. 1 Lucas V. Lottery Com'rs, 11 G. & J. 490. That the franchise to set up a lottery is not a contract, see Moore V. State, 48 Miss. 147; Stone v. Mis- sissippi, 101 U. S. 814 But see, also, Broadbent v. Tuskaloosa, etc. Assoc, 45 Ala. 170. The grant of a franchise in the charter of a gas company does not imply a contract exempting the company from taxation, and a sub- sequent statute imposing a license tax on the privilege so granted is not invalid as impairing the obligation of a contract: Memphis Gaslight Co. V. Taxing Dist., 109 U. S. 398. A statute granting to a Masonic organ- 110 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. III. ited to a defined period,^ and it may be for the tares generally, or only for some portion of them, or it may be a limitation of the tax within some specified bounds.^ The same principles apply in each case. Where a certain sum is specified for a cer- tain percentage upon valuation, or upon receipts or acquisi- tions in any form, this is in the nature of a commutation of taxes, the state agreeing that the sura named is, under the circumstances, a fair equivalent for what the customary taxes would be, or the fair proportion which the person bargained with ought to pay, and the power thus to commute, though liable to abuse, is undoubted.' And this rule applies when a bonus is paid for complete future exemption, to the same ex- ization.long previously chartered an exemption from taxation on prop- erty recently purchased by it so long as it should be occupied as the lodge of the organization, does not consti- tute an irrepealable contract be- tween the state and the organiza- tion: Grand Lodge v. New Orleans, 46 La. An. 717. ■ An act exempting the stock of a railroad company and its real estate from taxation for thirty-six years was sustained as a contract, in Tom- linson v. Branch, 15 WaH. 460; as was a perpetual exemption in Hum- phrey V. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244 See, also, Pacific R. Co. v. Maguire, 20 Wall. 36; Louisville, etc. Co. v. Gaines, 3 Fed. Rep. 266; Southern Pao. R. Co. V. Laclede, 57 Mo. 147; Yazoo, & M. V. R. Co. v. Board of Levee Com'rs, 37 Fed. Rep. 34 An exemption from taxation for ten years, of lands which had been do- nated to the state for reclamation, was keld not subject to repeal after the lands had been sold: McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 148. See this case for the construction of such an exemp- tion. Also Railroad Co. v. Loftin, 105 U. S. 358. An act exempting a railroad' company from taxation until its net earnings equal six per cent, of the amount invested, consti- tutes, when stock has been sold and the road built on the faith of it, a contract between the state and the company which cannot be impaired ' by subsequent legislation: Common- wealth V. Philadelphia & E. B. Co., 164 Pa. St. 353. 2 Dodge V. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Ohio Trust Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416. ' The federal decisions are very f ull> on this subject. See Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 36&; Dodge v. Wool- , sey, IS How. 331; Mechanics' Bank V. Debolt, 18 How. 380; Mechanics' Bank v. Thomas, 18 How. 384; Jef- ferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black 436; Franklin Bank v. State, 1 Black 474; Wright V. Sm, 2 Black 544; Dela- ware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 TJ. S. 333. These decisions are of course conclu- sive, but the same principle has been declared by the state courts in many cases. See, arbong others, Gardner V. State, 31 N. J. L. 557; United, etc. Co. V. Commissioner, 37 N. J. L. 240; State V. Morris, 49 N. J. L. 836; State Lottery v. New Orleans, 24 La. An. 86; Leroy v. Railroad Co., 18 Mich. 233; Detroit v. Detroit City R. Co.. 76 Mich. 431; State Bank v. People, 5 111. 303; St. Louis v. Savings Bank, 49 Mo. 574; Farmers' Bank v. Com- monwealth, 6 Bush 137; Mobile v. Insurance Co., 63 Ala. 570. «3H. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. Ill tent and on the same reasons as when the commutation is for an annual payment.* It is perfectly well settled, however, that an exemption granted from motives of state policy merely, and where the state and -the citizen do not meet on a basis of bargain and con- sideration; is to be deemed expressive only of the present will of the state on the subject; and the law granting it, like laws in general, is subject to modification or repeal in the legisla- tive discretion,^ and it is immaterial that while it continued in force persons have acted in reliance upon it.' It is also well 1 Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 8 How. 133; State Bank v. Bank of Smyrna, 3 Houst. 99. 2 Tucker v. Ferguson, 82 Wall. 537. See West Wis. R. Co. v. Supervisors, •93 U. S. 595; New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U. S. 104; Hoge v. Railroad Co., 99 U. S. 348; Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 363; Parmley v. Railroad Cos., 3 Dill. 25; County Com'rs v. Woodstock Iron Co., 83 Ala. 158; Central R. Co. v. State, 54 Ga. 401; State V. Georgia R Co., 54 Ga. 423; Goldsmith v. Georgia R. Co., 62 Ga. 485; State v. Dexter, etc. R. Co., 69 Me. 44; State v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 48 Md. 49; Robertson v. Land Com'rs, 44 Mich. 274; State v. New- ark, 50 N. J. L. 66; Wilmington & W. R. Co. V. Alsbrook, 110 N. C. 187. A statute exempting from taxation a previously cjiartered hospital was held to give a mere privilege revo- cable at pleasure, and not to consti- tute a contract binding upon future legislatures, being without consider- ation: Christ's Church v. Philadel- phia, 34 How. 300; Philadelphia v. Contributors, 134 Pa. St. 171. See Grand Lodge v. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 659, 166 U. S. 143. A legislative act providing that companies formed for boring for and manufacturing salt in the state should be exempt from taxation, was held to be a mere bounty law, dependent for its continuance upon the dictates of public policy, and the voluntary good faith of the legislature : East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich.259, 13 Wall.873. Andsee Welch V. Cook, 97 U. S. 541; County Com'rs V. Woodstock Iron Co., 83 Ala. 151; Detroit v. Plankroad Co., 43 Mich. 140. A statute exempting from tax- ation city water-works so long as they shall be unproductive, does not give a contract of exemption so as to prevent a repeal; and the fact that no tax was levied upon the water- works at the .time water- works bonds were issued by the city, does not prevent the state from taxing the property in subsequent years: Newport v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 50 S. W. Rep. 845. A statute which ■ .simply enacts that provisions for the taxation of railroads shall not apply to pertain railroads, does not create a contract, but is a mere gratuity subject to repeal by the legislature: Manistee & N. E, R. Co. v. Railroad Com'r, 118 Mich. 349. And it makes no difference that the exemption conferred by such a statute is with- out limit as to time: Ibid, If a leg- islature, in extending a city's bound- aries, provides that the lands an- nexed shall be taxed only at a certain rate, this is no contract and may be repealed: Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453. 'An exemption from taxation of the property of members of the na- tional guard may be repealed even as to one who enlists while it is in 112 LIMITATIONS 01" THE TAXING POWER; [oh. III. settled that the contract must be clearly made out. The power to tax being essential to the very existence of the state, there can be no presumption that it has been either abandoned or restricted, and whoever claims that it has been should be able to show by clear words that an intent is expressed to d6 so, and that consideration existed therefor. And when thus the contract is made out, it cannot be extended by implication be- yond the fair import of its terms.' As has been said by the force and who is in service at the time of the repeal: People v. Asses- sors, 84 N. Y. 610. Gifts made to an incorporated hospital upon the faith of its exemption from taxation do not constitute a consideration for such exemption, since the donors must be presumed to have known that the legislature had power to re- peal the exempting act: Philadel- phia V. Contributors, 134 Pa. St. 171. , Where a statute imposed a certain rate of taxation on insurance com- panies then in existence or thereafter to be formed, it was held that the rate might be increased as to com- panies subsequently formed: Holly Springs,^ etc. Ins. Co. v. Marshall County, 53 Miss. 381. '1 Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Armstrong v. Athens County, 16 Pet. 281; Philadelphia, etc. R, Co. V. Maryland, 10 How. 376; Gilman v. Cheboygan, 3 Black 510; Minot V. Philadelphia, etc. K. Co., 18 Wall 306; North Md. E. Co. v. Ma- guijre, 30 Wall. 46; Erie R. v. Penn- sylvania, 31 Wall. 497; Tucker v. Fer- guson, 33 Wall. 527; Farrington v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 686; Memphis Gas-Light Co. v. Sh-elby County Tax- ing Dist., 109 U. S. 398; Southwestern E. Co. V. Wright, 116 U. S. 331; Vicks- burg, S. & P. R. Co. V. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665; Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 136; New Orleans City & L. E. Co. V. New Orleans, 143 U. S. 192; Keokuk, etc. E Ca v. Missouri, 153 U. S. 301; Stone v. Bank of Com- merce, 174 U. B. 413; Louis viUe v. Bank of Louisville, 174 TJ. S. 439; Stein V. Mobile, 17 Ala. 334; Smith v. Macon, 20 Ark. 17; Oliver v. Mem- phis, etc. R. Co., 30 Ark. 128; Brain- ar(^ V. Colchester, 81 Conn. 407; Lord V. Litchfield, 86 Conn. 116; Macon v. Central R. Co. etc. Co., 50 Ga. 630; Bradley v. Mc Atee, 7 Bush 167 ; Wend- over V. Lexington, 15 B. Monr. 358; New Orleans City & L. R. Co. v. New Orleahs, 40 La. An. 587; Baltimore, C. & A. R. Ca V. Ocean City, 89 Md. 89; Stetson v. Bangor, 56 Me. 274; Portland, etc. R. Co. v. Saoo, 60 Me. 196; Auburn v. Young Men's Chris- tian Assoc, 86 Me. 244; Mayor, etc. V. Grand Lodge, 60 Md. 280; Com- monwealth V. Bird, 13 Mass. 448; North Mo. E. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 17; Pacific E. Co. v. Cass County, 53 Mo. 17; Sloan v. Pacific E Co., 61 Mo. 34; Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo. 645; Dale v. Governor, 8 Stew. 387; Bridge Proprietors v. State, 31 N. J. L. 384, 23 N. J. L. 598; People v. Eoper, 35 N. Y. 628; People v. Law- rence, 41 N. Y. 137; People v. Com'rs, 47 N. Y. 501; Easton Bank v. Com- monwealth, 10 Pa. St. 443; Academy V. Philadelphia, 23 Pa. St. 496; Mil- ler V. Kirkpatrick, 29 Pa. St. 326; Erie E. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 84; Jones, etc. Manuf. Ca v. Com- monwealth, 69 Pa. St. 187; Common- wealth v. Pottsville Water Co., 94 Pa. St. 516; State v. Bank of Smyrna, 3 Houst. 99; Memphis v. Union, ejto. Bank, 91 Tenn. 646; Memphis v. Home Ins. Co., 91 Tenn. 558; Mem- phis V. Memphis City Bank, 91 Tenn. OH. m.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING FOWEE. 113 federal supreme court, " if, on any fair construction of the leg- islation, there is a reasonable doubt whether the contract is made out, this doubt must be solved in favor of the state. In other words, the language used must be of such a character as, fairly interpreted, leaves no room for controversy.^ It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to observe that an unconsti- tutional law cannot establish a contract ; therefore any exemp- tions which the legislature undertakes to grant in disregard of the constitution are of no force.^ By repeated decisions of the federal supreme court it has been authoritatively and conclusively determined that the charter of a private corporation is to be regarded as a contract between the corporators on the one hand, and the state on the other. 574; Herriok v. Randolph, 13.Vt. 525; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Marshall County, 3 W. Va, 319. 1 Bailey v. Maguire, 22 Wall. 215; Covington v. Kentucky, 173 TJ. S. 281; Louisville v. Bank of Louisville, 174 U. S. 439; Moore v. HoUiday, 4 Dill. 53; Mayor, etc. v. Grand Lodge, 60 Md. 280; People v. Common Coun- cil, 76 N. Y. 20; Ladd v. Portland, 32 Or. 271; Memphis v. Home Ins. Co., 91 Tenn. 558; Weston v. Super- visors, 44 Wis. 242. Naming a rate of taxation, but not expressly limit- ing it, does not preclude the rate's being increased or a different form of tax from being imposed: Dela- ware R. Tax, 18 Wall 206; Louisville R. Co. V. Louisville, 4 Bush, 478; De- troit R. Co. v. Guthard, 51 Mich. 180; Detroit v. Detroit City R. Co., 76 Mich. 421; St Louis v. Boatman's Ins. etc. Co., 47 Mo. 150; State y. Parker, 33 N. J. L. 426; Erie R. Co. v. Com- monwealth, 66 Pa. St. 84; Union Passenger R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 83 Pa. St. 429. A charter exemption to a bank from taxation on its capital is not impaired by requiring the bank to pay a license tax: State v, Citizens' Bank, 52 La. An. 1086. A charter of a street railway company providing for an annual tax upon real estate and fixtures was held not 8 an implied exemption from further taxation, and the contract was not impaired by an annual franchise tax: New Orleans City R Co. v. New Or- leans, 143 U. S. 192. 2 Ramsay v. Hoeger, 76 111. 438; Covington v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 38 S. W. Rep. 836. A railroad com- pany in accepting the provisions of an unconstitutional statute relative to taxation upon gross earnings does not acquire any contract right that such method of taxation shall not be changed: State v. Duluth & L R. Co., 77 Minn. 433. If an act unconstitu- tional because not taxing railroads uniformly is repealed, and a different law substituted, the fact that a rail- road company has acted upon the repealed act does not establish a con- tract between it and the state which would preclude the substitution: Railroad Cos, v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697. Where a city council enters into a contract to exempt certain property from taxation in consideration of the transfer to the city of certain other property, the fact that the city has accepted the benefits of the contract will not estop it from avoiding the same on the ground of lack of power to enter into it: McTwiggan v. Hunter, 18 R. L 77& 114 UMITATIOM'S OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. ni. and that whatever stipulations are contained therein, which are intended for the benefit of the corporators, and operate as an inducement to them to accept the charter, are promises by the state based on valid and sufficient consideration, and not subject to recall except with the assent of the corporatiott it- self.* Stipulations respecting taxation come within the prin- ciple, and are, therefore, irrepealable and not subject to change at the mere will of the state, to the prejudice of those on whose behalf they are made.^ Bufthe right to amend or repeal may be reserved in the charter, and when it is reserved it is a part of the contract, and may be exercised by the state at pleasure,' 1 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Trustees of University V. Indiana, 14 How. 368; Bingham- ton Bridge Case, 3 Wall. 51; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. 8. 814. 2Piqua Bank v, Knoop, 16 How. 369; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall 430; Washington University V. Rouse, 8 Wall 439; Wilmington, etc. R. Co. V. Reid, 13 Wall. '364; Humphreys v. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244; Pacific R. Co. V. Maguire, 20 WalL 36; New Jersey v. Yard,, 95 U. S. 104; Pickard v. East Tenn., V. & G. R. Co., 130 U. a 637: Barnes v. Kornegay, 63 Fed. Rep. 671; Mobile & S. H. R. Co. V. Kennedy, 74 Ala. 566; Mem- phis & L. R. Co. V. Berry, 41 Ark. 436; Singer Manuf. Ca v. Heppen- heimer, 58 N. J. L. 633; Hancock v. Singer Manuf. Co., 62 N. J. L. 889; State V. Butler, 86 Tenn. 614; Com- monwealth V. Richmond & P. R. Co., 81 Va. 355. Where a right of exemp- tion is a contract between a state and a corporation, a statute modify-, ing it is ineffectual until accepted by the corporation: In re Stevens County, 36 Minn. 467. An exemp- tion from taxation, by act of legis- lature, for good consideration, of property owned or to be owned by a railroad company or its successors, attaches, to the property, and cannot bo withdrawn, in the absence of pro- vision for forfeiture, for failure to exercise faithfully corporate powers: International & G. N. R. Co. v. State, 75 Tex. 356. The perpetual exemp- tion of the capital stock of a rail- road company from taxation, by the provisions of its charter, covers the individual interests therein of the stockholders, and a subsequent law imposing a tax on the' shares owned by them impairs the obligation of the contract between them and the state, and is void: Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 139. A con- tract obligation not to tax shares of stock beyond the amount named in the charter of a bank, was held not to apply to stock issued to depositors after the adoption of a state consti- tution providing for a greater rate of taxation on all property; the right named in the charter to issue the additional stock in exchange for de- posits not being a valuable franchise of a contractual nature which can- not be impaired by subsequent legis- lation: Bank of Tennessee V.Tennes- see, 163 U. S. 4ia 3 Baltimore & O. R Co. v. JeflEerson County, 39 Fed. Rep. 305; Northern Bank v. Stone, 88 Fed. Rep. 413; New Orleans v. Asylum, 31 La. An. 398; Bangor, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 47 Me. 34; Commonwealth v. Fayette County R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 453; West Wiscon- sin R. Ca V. Supervisors, 35 Wis. 357, OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 115 unless conditions are imposed in respect to its exercise, in which case the conditions must be observed.* To avoid the force of the principle that a corporate - charter is a contract, which oftentimes operates in some unexpected manner, and, per- haps, unjustly to the public at large, the people of some of the states have made express provision by their constitutions that all charters of private incorporation granted by the legislature shall be subject to amendment or repeal at the legislative will. A provision of this nature is a limitation upon the power of the legislature in granting charters ; and while it cannot aflfect any that are in existence when it takes effect, it attaches the quality of modification and repealability to any afterwards granted, and all who accept them do so with full notice of the fact. The charters are still contracts, but contracts with a re- served right on the part of the state to amend or terminate them.^ The rule would be the same if the charter were granted The power to alter, amend, or repeal by vote of the people a statute ex- empting a railroad company from all other taxes on payment of a percent- age of its gross receipts, .cannot be so exercised as to continue in full the obligation as to payment of such percentage, and at the same time deny in whole or in part the exemp- tion conferred by the contract: Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 283; Duluth & 1 B. Co. V. St. Louis County, J79 U. S. 303. ■ 1 See Flint, etc. P. Co. v. WoodhuU, 35 Mich. 99. 2 Tomlinson v. Jessup, 15 WalL 454; Miller v. State, 15 Wall. 478; Penn. CoL Cases, 13 WalL 190; Holyoke Co. V. Lyman, 15 WalL 500; Parmley v. Railroad Co., 3 DilL 35; Hewitt v. New York, etc. E. Co., 13 Blatch. 453; State V. Miller, 30 N. J. L. 868; Same V. Same, 31 N. J. L. 531; State v. Newark, 35 N. J. L. 157; Common- wealth V. Fayette Co. R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 453; Iron City Bank v. Pittsburgh, 37 Pa. St. 340; Union Improvement Co. V. Commonwealth, 69 Pa. St. 140; Wagner Free Inst. v. Philadelphia, 133 Pa. St. 613; West Wis. R Co. v. Supervisors, 35 Wis. 357; S. C. in error, 93 U. S. 595; Atlantic, etc. R. Co. V. State, 55 Ga. 313; New Orleans V. Metropolitan, ete. Co., 37 La. An. 648; Storrie v. Houston City St. R. Co., 93 Tex. 139. Although a charter exempting railroad property from taxation contain a clause reserving the right to the legislature to alter and repeaL imtil such right is exer- cised by the legislature repeal is for- bidden : Petersburg R. Co. v. Com'rs, 81 N. C. 487. Where a charter grant- ing to a corporation immunity from general taxation was not accepted until after the adoption of a consti- tution subjecting all property to tax- ation, and forbidding the granting of immunities, the right to the exemp- tion was revoked by such adoption, notwithstanding subsequent legisla- tive recognition of the corporation: State V. Planters' F. & M. Ins. Co., 95 Tenn. 303; Planters' F. & M. Ins. Co. V. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 163. The term "corporate rights," in a statute providing that it may at anytime be amended or repealed, but that such amendment or repeal shall not alter the corporate rights of companies 116 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. III. while a general law of the state was in force which declared, that all grants of the kind should be subject to the legislative power of alteration and repeal ; for the grantees would accept their franchises with notice of and qualified by such a declara- tion.' Contracts of a state, like the contracts of individuals, may be modified to any extent, subject to constitutional provisions, if any, having a bearing upon the right, by the mutual consent formed thereunder, does not include an incidental privilege or immunity such as a special standard of taxa- tion: Detroit K. Co. v. Guthard, 51 Mich. 180; Detroit v. Detroit City E. Co., 76 Mich. 431. Nor is a charter immunity from taxation a " vested right" within a statute declaring that charters shall be subject to amendment or repeal, but that no amendment or repeal shall impair vested rights: Deposit Bank v. Da- viess County, 102 Ky. 174. "Corpo- rate powers" are not diminished by the imposition of a privilege tax, for they do not include exemption from taxation: Knoxville & O. E. Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684. Immunity from taxation by statute is not a fran- chise: Chesapeake & O. E. Co. v. Miller, 114 U. S. 176. iTomlinson v. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454; Miller v. S^ate, 15 Wall. 478; Eail- road Co. v. Maine, 96 U. S. 499; Louis- ville Gas Co. V. Citizens' Gaslight Co., 115 U. S. 683; Louisville Water Co. V. Clark, 143 U. S. 1; Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231; State Board V. Paterson & E. E. Co., 50 N. J. L. 446. Where an act containing an exemption from taxation is enacted subject to the provision of a general statute that all statutes shall be sub- ject to amendment or repeal at the will of the legislature unless a con- trary intent be plainly expressed, an intent not to repeal or amend must be so directly and unmistakably ex- pressed as to leave no room for doubt , that an irrevocable contract to ex- empt js constituted: Covington v. Kentucky, 173 XT. a 381. Where, after the enactment of such general stat- ute, an act was passed exempting from farther taxation those banks which before a certain time should . consent to the tax prescribed in such act, and should waive and release all right under acts of congress or state charters to a diflferent mode or a smaller rate of taxation, such general statute prevented the acceptance of such act from operating as an irrevo- cable contract for immunity from dif- ferent or increased taxation : Citizens' Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636; Stone v. Bank of Commerce, 174 JJ. S. 413; Louisville v. Bank of Lou- isville, 174 IJ. S. 439; Deposit Bank V. Daviess County, 102 Ky. 174. A statute reserving to the legislature the right to repeal or amend " char- ters or privileges " granted by the legislature to particular persons, does not enable the legislature to repeal an act exempting newly constructed railroad property from taxation for a certain time, as against railroad companies which on the faith of such act constructed their roads before it was repealed: Commonwealth v. Owensboro, etc. E 'Co., 95 Ky. 60. But companies which began the con- struction of their roads after the statute exempting newly-constructed railroad property from taxation was repealed, cannot claim exemption on the ground that they did such con- struction work in the belief that such act was still in force: Ibid. CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 117 of the parties thereto; which, in the case of a charter of pri- vate incorporation, would be the state on the one side and the corporators on the other. The state consents to the modifica- tion when it adopts legislation which will have that effect,' and the corporation when it accepts such legislation.^ A different rule prevails in the case of charters of municipal incorporation. These are not contracts, but regulations of government; and if they contain provisions respecting taxa- tion, such provisions, like everything else in the charter, are subject to change, as the legislative judgment may change re- specting questions of policy and expediency, or as changing circumstances may seem to require.' The Constitution a Law. The constitution of a state is, in the strictest sense, a law: the fundamental and organic law. And the state being disabled to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, it can no more do so by incorporating provisions in its constitution that might have that effect, than by laws enacted by the legislature.* ' 1 Railroad Co. v. Com'rs, 87 N. C. 414 2 Macon, etc. R. Co. v. Goldsmith, 63 Ga. 463; Petersburgh v. Railroad Co., 39 Grat. 773; State v. Com'rs, etc., 37 N. J. L. 240. Long acquies- cence, unexplained, in the imposition of taxes, raises a presumption in favor of the surrender of the priv- ilege of exemption: State V. Wright, 41 N. J. L. 478; Given v. Wright, 117 U. S. 648. See Com'rs v. Simons, 138 Ind. 193; Wau-pe-man-qua v. Aid- rich, 28 Fed. Rep. 489. When a cor- porate charter is subject to legis- lative amendment, it may be so amended as to make stockholders personally liable for taxes: Ander- son V. Commonwealth, 18 Grat. 395. A provision in a charter that it might be amended or repealed, but ,that this should not alter corporate rights, held not to preclude a change In respect to taxation: Detroit R. Co. V. Guthg,rd, 51 Mich. 180; Detroit V. Detroit City R. Co., 76 Mich. 421. A contract in a charter as to taxation is not repealed by a subsequent in- consistent constitutional provision: University v. People, 99 U. S. 309; Scotland County v. Railroad Co., 65 Mo. 133. See Appeal Tax Court v. Cemetery Co., 50 Md. 433. 3 Dartmouth CoUege'v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518; Meriwether v. Garrett, 103 U. S. 472; Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189; Essex Pub. Road Board v. Shinkle, 140 U. S. 334. There is no right of property in the power of taxation conferred upon a municipal corporation.: State v. Will- iamson, 46 N. J. L. 304; Williamson V. New Jersey, supra. A contract made by a water company with a city is subject, so far as the city's rights are concerned, to the will of the legislature, and a statute modify- ing the city's rights to tax the com- pany does not operate as a taking of the property of the city without due process of law: New Orleans v. New Orleans Water-Works Co., 143 U. S. 79. 4 Dodge V. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; 118 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. III. State Repudiation. The contracts of a state respecting tax- ation, though their obligation cannot constitutionally be im- paired, may nevertheless in some cases be subject to repudiation from the impossibility of finding a remedy for its prevention. The diflBculty springs from the 'fact that the state, as a sov- ereignty, is subject to suits only as it may have consented to be; and therefore, if a remedy can only be found in a suit at law or in equity, it may not be found at all, because' the state may not have consented to such a suit. By the constitution of the United States, the federal judicial power, in its applica- tion to the states as political entities, is practically limited to suits between states, and to other suits in which states may be plaintiffs ; it does not extend to suits brought against states by citizens of other states, or by their own citizens, or citizens or subjects of foreign states.^ Therefore, if an individual is holder of a demand against one of the states of the XJnion, which for any reason it sees fit not to perform or recognize, he is entirely without remedy except as the state may furnish one by its own laws. His one state cannot, for the purpose of obtaining justice for him, take an assignment of his demand and bring suit upon it in his interest, since this would be mere evasion of a constitutional inhibition.^ The consequence is, that even if a state issues securities which it expressly agrees to receive in payment for taxes, but afterwards it determines not to receive them, there is commonly no remedy. Mandamus will not lie to compel the state officers to receive the obligations in payment of taxes, since the suit against them would be in legal effect a suit against the state itself; ^ the collector cannot be enjoined at the suit of the creditor from refusing to receive the obligations,* nor is he liable in an action on the case for his refusal.^ Nevertheless, any legislative enactment calculated and de- Eailroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. ^ New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 511; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 61Q; U. S. 76; New York v. Louisiana, White V. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; Paoifio Ibid. E. Co.v. Maguire, 30Wall.36;Marsh ^Atitoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. V. Burroughs, 1 Woods 463; Keith v. 769. See Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 Clark, 97 U. 8. 454; University v. U. S. 711; Elliott v. Wiltz, Ibid. People, 99 U. S. 309. < Marye v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 835. 1 U. S. Const., art. 3, § 3; Amend- » Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 317. ment 11. OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEB. 119 signed to impair the obligation of the state contract is to be treated everywhere as void in law;' and if the case is such that the state, through its officers, is compelled to resort to affirm- ative proceedings in order to give the void enactment effect, the party'proceeded against may defend his rights as he might in any other case of attempted wrong. The same remedies are open to him as in other cases ; for the officer who assumes to act against him, being without warrant of law for his ac- ' tion, must stand before the law as an individual wrong-doer, and cannot claim that a suit against him as a tort-feasor is a suit against the state which has tried, but ineffectually, to give him authority to do what he has attempted. "Where, there- fore, the terms of an act under which state securities are issued are such that the coupons to the same are reqeivable for taxes, and it is made the duty of collectors to receive them when ten- dered, if afterwards the state forbids their reception, and a collector refuses a tender and proceeds to enforce the tax by 1 Hartman v. Greehhow, 103 U. S. 672; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 370; Harvey T. Virginia, 30 Fed. Rep. 411; WiUis v. Miller, 39 Fed. Rep. 238. The revenue license to practice law imposedby the Virginia code is a "tax" within a statute making coupons cut from the bonds of the state receivable for " all taxes," debts, dues, and demands within the state; and after a lawful tender of the proper amount thereof in pay- ment of such license tax, by a person otherwise authorized, he may enter upon practice at once; and any law imposing penalties therefor is void as impairing the obligation of a con- tract: Royall V. Virginia, 116 U. S. 573. The contract obligation to re- ceive such coupons in payment of taxes is not, however, impaired by a statute requiring license fees to be paid " in lawful money of the United States" so far as the payment of licenses to sell intoxicating liquors is concerned, since the state has the right, in the case of such licenses, to impose any conditions it deems best for the public good: McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 663. The contract right to have such coupons received in payment of taxes is not violated by a statute placing on one who ten- ders them in such payment the bur- den of proving that they are genuine : Ex parte Ayers, 123 U. S. 443. But such contract right is impaired by a statute requiring the holders of such coupons to produce in court, in a suit involving their genuineness, the bonds for which they were cut,, and to prove that they were actually cut therefrom; and it is also impaired by a statute providing that expert evi- dence shall not be received as to the genuineness of such coupons, and by a statute requiring one who sells such coupons, or who tenders or passes such coupons for another, to pay a certain high license, and by a statute which in effect prohibits the tender of coupons that are more than a year past due: McGahey v. Vir- ginia, 135 U. S. 663. And see, further, McCuUough V. Virginia, 173 U. S. 103. 120 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. [CH. in. distraint of goods, the taxpayer may bring suit for the goods seized, as he might in any case of wrongful dispossession, and proof of the tender of the coupons will be held an effectual an- swer to any attempted justification by the officer of the seizure.' Thus indirectly, in such a case, would the contract of the state be enforced. Municvpal RepwdiaUon. It is customary, as will be shown hereafter, for the state to permit the municipalities to vote and levy the taxes for their ownl!ocal purposes, and to determine what the amount of these shall be, within limits prescribed by the state to prevent oppression, and also to determine the pur- poses td which the suras raised shall be appropriated. A mu- nicipal debt is in many cases the first step in taxation ; the levy of taxes being the only means whereby the debt can be paid. It sometimes happens that a municipality is found to have con- tracted indebtedness to an extent that is felt to be extremely burdensome; and then a local sentiment may spring up in favor of refusing tt) raise the necessary taxes for its payment. The purpose may be either to avoid the payment altogether or to postpone it for a time, or perhaps to force a compromise with creditors and an abatement. Whatever may be the purpose, the refusal to levy taxes to meet municipal obligations accord- ing to their terms is a public w'rong ; and as the state has ample pow'er to remedy it, its honor is concerned in taking the neces- sary steps for that purpose. The most prompt and effectual remedy may be found to be the levy of a tax to provide for the indebtedness under a law specially adapted to the purpose, and by means of agencies appointed by the state. The power of the state to adopt this course is unquestionable.^ But if the existing law, or any law that should be adopted for the pur- pose, required the municipality itself to levy the tax, its offi- cers might be compelled by mandamus to do so.' It is only 1 Poindexter V. Greenhow, 114 tJ. S. in the coupons, bonds, or other in- 270 ; White v. Greenhow, 114U. S.307; debtedness for the payment whereof Chaffin V. Taylor, 114 U. S. 309; Allen the tax was levied, does not continue, V. Railroad Co., 114 U. S. 311. And see after the taxpayer is in default. Royal! v. Virginia, 116 U. S. 573. The Bammel v. Houston, 6^ Tex. 10. right conferred by the constitution 2 Dunovan v. Green, 57 111. 63. And of Texas to pay taxes levied by a mu- see post, ch. XXL nicipal corporation for the payment ' Whiteley v. Lansing, 37 Mich. 131 ; of a previously existing indebtedness, Morgan v. Commonwealth, 55 Pa. St. OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 121 necessary for this purpose that the amount of the demand shall be conclusively fixed and determined, and that the time has arrived when it has become the duty of the municipality to provide for it;^ and if the amount has been fixed by judg- ment, the court which has rendered the judgment has jurisdic- tion by mandamus to compel the levy of a tax for its pay- ment.^ By one or the other of these remedies, therefore,- it is supposed municipal creditors will secure payment of all just demands. It is possible, however, that the state itself may so far sym- pathize with a debtor municipality as to be disposed to aid it in its obstructive methods to prevent collection; audit may seek to do this by so limiting the municipal power to tax that it shall be impossible for it to pay its debts by taxes raised within the legal limit. Where such obstruction has been attempted, however, it has been judicially determined that the limitation of the power to tax under such circumstances was an impairment of the obligation 6f contracts, and therefore inoperative. The argument shortly stated is, that the state, in conferring upon its municipalities the power to contract debts and to levy taxes for their satisfaction, impliedly contracts with those who become creditors in reliance upon the power, that such power shall not, while their demands remain unpaid, be so limited, impaired or hampered as to preclude the munici- pality's providing for and satisfying such demands according to their terms. Any subsequent legislation, therefore, which could have such injurious effect upon the interests of creditors, and deprive them of the resource of taxation which they had a constitutional right to rely on, will be treated as inoperative and void, and a levy of taxes may be compelled, as it might have been if no such legislation had been attempted.' And 456; Robinson v. Supervisors, 43 Cal. 535, followed in Galena v. Amy, 5 353; Nelson v. St. Martins, 111 U. S. Wall. 705; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 716. And see posi, ch. XXIIL Wall. 166; Rees v. Watertown, 19 1 Nelson v. St. Martins, 111 U. S. Wall. 109; Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 716; Dayton v. Rounds, 37 Mich. 82; U. S. 358; Port of Mobile v. Watson, State V. New Orleans, 34 La. An. 477. 116 U. S. 289; Seibert v. United 2 See United States v. Mobile, 4 States, 122 U. S. 384; Ford v. Delta, Woods mi; post, oh. XXIIL etc. Co., 164 U. S. 663; United States 'The leading case on this subject v. Jefferson Co., 5 Dill. 310; a c, 1 is Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. McCrary, 356; United States v. New 122 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEB. [CH. III. ■where contracts have been entered into under a settled con- struction 'of the state constitution by its judiciary, they cannot Orleans, 3 Woods 330; Sibley v. Mo- bile, 3 Woods 535; Brodie v. MoCabe, 33 Ark. 690; Board of Education v. Louisville, H. & St. L. R. Co. (Ky.), 63 S, W. Rep. 1135; State v. New Or- leans, 37 La. An. 13, 538; Bunch v. Woler3tein, 63 Miss. 56; WoodruflE v. State, 77 Miss. 68: State v. Gre^ Falls, 19 Mont. 518: Broadfoot v. Fayetteville, 134 N. C. 478. See to the same effect, Saloy v. New' Or- leans, 83 La. An. 79; State v. Shreve- port, 33 La. An. 1179, in which it was held that the municipality might complain of the diminution of Its power to tax which would preclude payment of its contracts, even if the creditors did not. It is immaterial whether the incompetent restriction is attempted by legislation or by constitutional amendment: Ibid. See Opinions of Justices, 58 N. H. 633. A grant of power to a munici- pality to levy a tax to pay a judg- ment against it may be repealed if made after the contract upon which the judgment was founded: Dever- eaux V. Brownsville, 39 Fed. Rep. 743, Where, at the time a contract is en- tered into, realty only is taxable for the payment, a subsequent extension to embrace personalty is a mere gra- tuity, and maybe repealed: Foote v. Howard County Court, 1 McCrary, 318. The power which has been con- ferred upon a municipal corporation to tax or to contract debt in aid of a railroad may be taken away at any time before the tax is 'actually laid or the debt contracted, even though the people have voted the aid. And a subscription made by the munici- pal officers after by legislation the power is taken away is void: Lieb v. Wheeling, 7 W. Va. 501. After pav- ing contracts had been made, wards were added to the municipality, and it was provided that the residents should not be liable for previous mu- nicipal debts. Held, that there were no contract obligations between ihe paving contractors and the newly- added residents which would make this incompetent: United States v.^ Memphis, 97 U. S. 384. A constitu- tional provision that no parish or municipal tax for all purposes shall exceed a certain sum has no retro- active effect so as to prevent the en- forcement of improvement contracts prior to its adoption, and so does not violate the law against impairment of contracts: Shreveport v. Cole, 139 U. S. 36. The right given by statute to damages for injury from a mob is not founded on contract, and if legis- lation after the recovery of a judg- ment changes the rate of taxation that may be levied for its payment, the federal courts cannot interfere: Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 385. When mandamus is applied for to compel taxation for the payment of a judgment, the court will look to see whether the judgment is grounded in contract or tort; if the former, and the contract appears to have, been made upon the faith of taxes to be levied, laws modifying the taxing power to the prejudice of the creditor are unconstitutional if thereby he is deprived of all ade- quate and efficacious remedy: Nel- son V. St. Martins, 111 U. S. 716. A special charter reducing a city's power to pay a judgment founded on a tort is not unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of a con- tract: Sherman v. Langham, 93 Tex. 13. A city cannot claim exemption from taxation on a vrater-works owned and operated by it, on the ground that the imposition of the' tax interferes ynth the vested rights of holders of city bonds, the bond- holders not being parties to the pro- ceeding: Newport V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 50 S. W. Rep. 845. OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 123 be invalidated afterwards bj a change in such cbnstruction,^ or by any change in the constitution itself.^ If the state, however, in the amplitude of its power over the municipalities of the state, should see fit to take away alto- gether the corporate powers of the debtor body, and create instead one or more entirely new corporations, which should in law be, not the successors of the other under new names, but new and distinct creations, the creditors might, perhaps, except as to the property of the defunct body, be without remedy. The corporation having ceased to exist, there could no longer be enforcement of their demands through taxation under the old law, and without law it is impossible that taxes should be laid. This was so held where the state by general law abolished a considerable number of municipalities, and made the several communities embraced in the territorial limits of such municipalities respectively taxing distrjcts, in order to provide the means of local government fgr the peace and safety and general welfare of the, district.' And it was also held that the property of individual citizens of the abolished municipalities could not by judicial proceedings be subjected to the payment of corporate debts; neither could the property which the municipalities themselves had held for public uses such as public buildings, streets, squares,' parks, promenades, wharves, landing places, fire engines, hose, etc., or, in general, anything held for governmental purposes. All such public property would pass, when the municipality ceased to exist, under the immediate control" of the state. Even the taxes, levied according to law before' the general law was passed could only be collected under legislative authority, and if no Buoh authority existed, the remedy of the creditors would be an appeal to the legislature, which alone could grant relief.* , 1 Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; limiting the rate of municipal taxa- Olcott V. Supervisors, 16 Wall 678; tion, the obligation of the contract Douglass V. Pike County, 101 U. S. is not impaired, as there was no ob- 677. ligation to exert in the future the 2White V.Hart, 13 Wall. 646; Opin- then existing powers of taxation: ions of Justices, 58 N. H. 623. Where State v. New Orleans, 87 La. An. 436. a contract is made after the adop- ' Meriwether v. Garrett, 103 U. S. tion of a constitutional amendment 473. limiting the satisfaction of contracts ^ Meriwether v. Garrett, 103 U. S. to the revenues of the year, and^ sub- 473. See Luehrman v. Taxing Dis- sequently a constitution is adopted trict, 3 Lea 435. These taxing dis- 124 LIMITATIONS or THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. III. It is possible, therefore, for the state to make use of its power, unjustly, and under circumstances where the political remedy is the only one within the reach of parties wronged. Taxing Conbraats. It has never been supposed that the clause in the constitution of the United States which forbids the states to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts had deprived the states of the power to tax contracts; ^ and it has been customary'for them to tax contracts for the payment of money, or having a money value, as the personal property of the owner. The right to do this, if ever in doubt, is now settled.^ But to render a contract taxable it must be subject to the jurisdiction of the government that assumes to tax it; and it tricts are municipal corporations, and suable as such: Uhl v. Taxing District, 6 Lea 610. A statute abol- ishing a levee district, but fully pro- tecting the rights of the creditors of the levee board, was held not void as impairing the obligation of con- tracts: Shotwell v. Louisville, N. O. «& T. R. Co., 69 Miss.' 541. iThe provisions of the national constitution in regard to the obliga- tion of contracts does not enable a contract between individuals to pre- vent a municipal corporation from exerting, as between it and one of the individuals, any power of taxa- tion it legally possesses: Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592. A statute providing that drain- age assessments shall be a lien on the land assessed, does not violate the obligations of contracts or divest vested rights, even in the case of land subject to a deed of trust executed long prior to the assessment, since drainage assessments are a species of taxation: WabashE. R.Co. v Com'rs, 134 111. 384 2 See Catlin i Hull, 21 Vt. 152; Champaign County Bank v. Smith, 7 Ohio St. 43; Cook v. Smith, 30 N. J. L. 387. The Michigan statute providing for the taxation of real- estate mortgages to the owners thereof was held not to impair the obligation of contracts; but the mort- gagers' agreements existing at the time the act was passed to pay taxes were not affected: Detroit Common Council V. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78. The obligation of a mort- gage contract containing no express provision that the mortgager shall pay taxes, was not impaired by a constitutional provision making the mortgagee primarily liable for taxes assessed against the property, and providing that if the mortgager paid all the taxes he might deduct from the debt the amount assessed against the mortgage: Hay v. Hill, 65 Cal. 383. See Sanf ord v. Savings & Loan Assoc, 80 Fed. Rep. 54 A state may tax mortgages held by residents on land in other states: Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 43 Conn. 436, 100 U. S. 491. See People v. Home Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 534; Malt by v. Beading, etc. Co., 53 Pa. St. 140. ^ statute providing that when a railway is operated under a lease the tax shall be paid by the lessee, and deducted from the rent, is not unconstitutional as im- pairing the obligation of contracts: Vermont & C. R. Co. v, Vermont Cent. R. Co., 63 Vt. 1. CH. III.J LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 125 is not within its jurisdiction unless the owner is domiciled there, or the contra^ct itself is there in the possession and con- trol of an agent of the owner and for the owner's purposes, and not as mere temporary custodian. Corporation bonds given in one state by one of its corporations, but owned and held by persons domiciled in another state, cannot be taxed in the state where ihey are issued, even though they are payable in that state and are secured there by mortgage on realty. Therefore a law imposing such a tax, and requiring the treas- urer of the corporation to pay it and retain the amount from the sum payable to the > bond-holder, is a law which undertakes to tax that which is not within its reach, and is for that reason void.i This principle is as much applicable to public securities as to any others, and it is not, therefore, competent for a city which has issued obligations whereby it has promised to pay certain definite sums, to diminish these payments under the guise of taxing them. A city may be empowered to tax all property within it, but debts are not property, and credits are not property within a city when not held or owned there.* So, while a franchise tax might be imposed upon a corporation, 1 State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, collect the taxes by deducting them 15 WalL 300. See, also, Railroad Co. from the interest, does not impair V. Jackson, 7 WalL 363; Murray v. the obligation of contracts: Corn- Charleston, 96 U. S. 433; Hartman v. mon wealth v. Delaware Div. Canal Greenhow, 103 U. S. 673; New York, Co., 133 Pa. St. 594; Commonwealth li. E. & W. R. Co. V. Pennsylvania, v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 139 Pa. St. 153 U. S. 638; De Vignier v. New Or- 429; Commonwealth v. New York, leans, 16 Fed. Rep. 11; Oliver v. L. E. & W. R. Co., 150 Pa. St. 334; Washington Mills, 11 Allen 368. The Commonwealth v. Delaware & H, language of the case of State Tax, Canal Co., 150 Pa. St. 345. etc., supra, was modified in the re- ^Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 433; cent case of Savings & Loan Soc. v. De Vignier v. New Orleans, 16 Fed. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 481; Rep. 11. Stock representing a city's but it still is authority for the text debt is not taxable against the owner as above. A tax on money set apart who lives out of the state: Baltimore by a corporation to pay interest on v. Hussey, 67 Md. 113. The taxation foreign-held bonds is not a tax on ofcorporatestock to the shareholders the bonds but on the earnings of the without deducting the value of state corporation which pays the tax, and and county bonds exempt from tax- is valid: Railroad Co. v. Collector, ation in the hands of the corporation 100 U. S. 595; United States v. Rail- is not an indirect taxation of^the way Co., 106 U. S. 337. A statute tax- bonds themselves, iand does' not im- ing the indebtedness to residents of pair the obligatiqp of contracts: corporations doing business within Parker v. Sun Ins. Co., 43 La. An, the state, and compelling them to 1173, 126 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [OH. III. measured by dividends, it is not competent for a state to levy a tax directly upon the dividends of foreign stockholders, and require the corporation to pay the tax and deduct it from the dividend paid over.^ What Imjpavrs a Gontraet. The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement.^ This law must govern and control the. contract in every shape in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it aflfect its validity, construction, or discharge. Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner changes the intention of the par- ties discoverable in it, necessarily impairs the contract itself, which is but evidence of that intention. The manner or the degree in which this change is effected can in no respect in- fluence this conclusion ; for, whether the law affect the valid- ity, the construction, the duration, the mode of discharge or the evidence of the agreement, it impairs the contract, though it may not do so to the same extent in all the supposed cases.' It is not by the constitution to be impaired at all. This is not a question of degree or cause, but of encroaching in any re- spect on its obligation; dispensing with any part of its force.* There is no room for any question, therefore, that when the state has stipulated by contract to give exemption f-rom taxa- tion, or has commuted the uncertain taxes for a definite and fixed sum or sums, and afterwards undertakes to tax, in the same manner as it taxes other subjects, the persons, corpora- tions, or property which were the subject of the exemption or commutation, the obligation of the contract is impaired.* So 1 Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 < Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How. AUen268. 301,327. To the same effect is Green 2Sturgesv.Crowninshield,4Wheat. v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 84 See Rivet 133. V. New Orleans, 35 La. An. 134. 8 Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saun- 6 state v. Morris, 49 N. J. L. 286. ders, 12 Wheat. 213, 256; Mt. Pleas- Where the charter of a railroad com- ant Cem. Co. v. Newark, 52 N. J. L. pany has exempted the road from all 539. The latter case holds that a taxation by cities and towns, a levee stipulation in a cemetery company's tax assessed by a levee district, un- charter that no assessment should be der authority of the legislature, is imposed on the burial ground until void as impairing the obligation of a the board of freeholders should order contract: Yazoo & M. V. R, Co. v, otherwise, is leggil, and that au as- Board of Levee Com'rs, 37 Fed. Rep. sessment by an act of the legislature 24. A city, having granted to a water- impairs the contract. works company a non-exclusive f ran- CH, III.J LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 12T if the state by a bank charter agrees that the bills of the bank shall be received in payment of taxes, the agreement consti- tutes a contract between the state and those who shall after- wards become owners of the bills, and any law which denies the right to make such payment impairs the obligation of the contract, and is void.* And if the state, in issuing its own bonds, shall makg a like stipulation for their reception in pay- ment of taxes, the obligation of the contract is impaired by any subsequent law which seeks to preclude the exercise of the right.^ So if the state, in the case of contracts made and pay- able within it, but held by persons domiciled abroad, were to attempt indirect taxation of the holders by requiring the debtor to pay the tax and retain the amount from the credit- ors, this would be a plain impairment of the obligation of tlie contracts, since it would deprive the creditors of a portion of the sum agreed to be paid to them.' chise to construct and maintain a system of waterworks, was author- ized by statute to construct an inde- pendent system of its own. Held, that provisions in the statute author- izing the city to tas the company for the payment of the obligations incurred in constructing the city's works, and to lay a discriminating tax against the company's patrons, were void as impairing the obliga- tions of the contract: Skanea teles Waterworks Co. v. Skaneateles, 161 N. Y. 154 See Warsaw Waterworks Co. V. Warsaw, 161 N. Y. 176. Where, under an ordinance giving it per- mission to erect its lines, a telephone company has been established, it is not within the city's taxing power to impose, "as a consideration for the privilege," a charge of $5 on each pole of the company's lines; the im- position of such new and burdensome consideration impairs the contract: New Orleans v. Great South. T. & T. Co., 40 La. An. 41. The constitutional provision against impairing contract obligations is a limitation upon the taxing pqwer: Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432. 1 Woodruff V. Trapnall, 10 How. 190; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44; Keith V. Clark, 97 U. S. 454 ^Hartman v. Greenman, 103 U. S. 672; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270; Royall v. Virginia, 116 U. S. 573; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 663; McCuUough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102; Harvey v. Virginia, 20 Fed. Rep. 411; Willis v. Miller, 29 Fed. Rep. 238. • ^ State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300. The contract arising from state statutes authorizing a for- eign railroad company to construct and operate its road within the state, and its acting thereon, is impaired by a later statute requiring the com- pany to collect a tax on its bonds held by residents of the state, by de- ducting the tax from the interest on such bonds, they having been previ- ously issued under authority of the state by which the corporation was created, and the iiiterest being pay- able in that state only: New York, L, E. & W. R. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 153 TJ. S. 638. There would be noth- ing incompetent in similar legislar tion if the tax itself were lawful and 128 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [OH. III. The remedy for the enforcement of a contract is a necessary- part of it, without which it could have no legal obligation whatever. But there is, and can be, nothing unchangeable in remedies, and^the state must be left at liberty to change them at discretion.' In the recognition of this right, however, it is always assumed that no change will be made which will leave the party without a remedy for the enforcement of his con- tract substantially equal to and as efficient and valuable as that the law entitled him to claim when his contract was made. If the remedy is wholly, in some distinct and important part, taken away, or is hampered with conditions or restrictions, or other- wise seriously impaired in value, the obligation of the contract is impaired in this particular.^ Where, however, the issues of a certain bank were by law receivable for taxes, and an act was passed which provided that there should be no other remedy in any case of the collec- tion of revenue, or an attempt to collect the same illegally, or in funds only receivable by the collector under the law — the same being other or different funds than such as the taxpayer- may tender or claim the right to pay — than by paying the tax under protest, and within thirty days suing the collector to recover it; the judgment recovered, if any, to be a first claim on the treasury, — it was held that this act did not leave a party without adequate remedy for enforcing his right to pay his taxes m the bills, and did not, therefore, impair the obligation of the state contract.' But if, under the law which provides for the issue of obligations, a tender thereof for taxes is a discharge, the tender, notwithstanding any subsequent legis- lation, will have that effect, and the taxpayer, if his property is seized for the taxes, may reclaim it on legal process.* the corporation were thus indirectly in force at the time when the judg- made the collector of sums its mem- ment was rendered, cannot be altered bers were legally bound to pay: See so as to afford a less e£Scacious rem- ch. XIV. edy without impairing the obligation 1 Bronson V. Kinzie, 1 How. 311. of a contract: Seibert v. United 2 See Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 States, 123 U. S. 284. Wall. 535, and numerous cases cited; ^ Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69. Tennessee V. Sneed, 96 U.S. 69; Poin- Compare Poindexter v. Greenhow, dexter ,y. Greenhow, 114 U. 8. 270. 114 U, S. 370. The law of a state for the collection < Poindexter v. Greenhow,114 U. S. of a tax necessary to pay a judgment, 270. OH. ni] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXIN& POWER. 129 Exemption of agencies of government. ¥6 state can im- pose taxes on persons, property, or other subjects of taxation which are not within its jurisdiction.^ This is self-evident, but it has peculiar application in this country under the federal constitution, which apportions the sovereign authority "between the state and the nation, and gives to each over certain sub- jects an exclusive jurisdiction. Whatever pertains to this ex- clusive' jurisdiction is excluded from the taxing power of the other as much as if it were beyond its territorial limits. The rules upon this subject, as they have been laid down by the authorities, appear to be the following: 1. General Liability. Every person within a state owing temporary or permanent allegiance to it ; all property of every description within the state and entitled to the protection of its laws; every private franchise, pi'ivilege, business, or occupa- tion, is subject to be taxed by the state, in return for the bene- fits received and anticipated from state government_/ind pro- tection.* But they are also on precisely the same grounds subject to be taxed by the federal government, whenever its necessities or policy shall be thought to require it.' 2. National and State Powers Msclusive. It is the theory of our system of government that the state and the nation alike are to exercise their powers respectively in as full and ample a manner as the proper departments of government shall de- termine to be needful and just, and as might be done by any other sovereignty whatsoever. This theory by necessary im- plication excludes wholly any interference by either the state or the nation with an independent exercise by the other of its constitutional powers. If it were otherwise, neither govern- ment would be supreme within what has been set apart for its 1 See ante, pp. 84-86. the restrictions expressly imposed by 'Savings & L. Soc. v. Multnomah the constitution of the United States, County, 169 U. S. 431 ; People v. Ames, the state power of taxation in respect 34 Colo. 433; Bigger v. Eyker (Kan.), to property, business, and persons 63 Pao. Rep. 740; Street V.Columbus, within its limits remains entire. 75 Miss. 833; In re McPherson, 104 There is nothing in the constitution N. Y. 306; Washington Iron Works which contemplates authorizing any Co. V. King County, 30 Wash. 150. It direct abridgment of this power by is said in Lane County v. Oregon, 7 the national legislature. Wall 71, that with the exception of ' Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 58. 9 130 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [OH. IH. exclusive sphere, but, on the other hand, would be liable at any time to be crippled, embarrassed, and perhaps wholly ob- structed in its operations, at the will or caprice of those who for the time being wielded the authority of the other. And that an exercise of the power to tax might have that effect is manifest from a consideration of the nature of the power. Any "power which in its nature acknowledges no limits,"^ and which, even in a lawful and legitimate exercise, may be carried to the extent of an absolute Appropriation of property or de- struction of the franchise or privilege upon which it is exerted,^ must, as a power of one sovereignty, be incapable of being ad- mitted within the jurisdiction of another for exercise at the discretion of the power wielding it.' And the state aijd the nation having each their separate and distinct sphere, within which they are permitted, by the fundamental law, to exercise independent authority, the principle which excludes from one sovereignty the taxing power of another is as much applicable within the American Union to the taxation of state and nation respectively, as it is elsewhere. 3. Federal Agencies. It follows as a necessary add inevitable conclusion, that the means or agencies provided or selected by the federal government as necessary or convenient to the ex- ercise of its functions cannot be subjected to the taxing power of the states, since, if they could be, a state dissatisfied there- with, or disposed for any reason to cripple or hamper the opera- tions of the federal government, might tax them to an extent that would impair their usefulness, or even put them out of existence. On this ground the power of the states to tax the United States Bank was denied, the bank having been chartered iPer Marshall, Ch. J., in Weston v. 316, 431, per Marshall, Ch. J.; Veazle Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 466; Lane Bank v. Fenno, 8 WalL 538, 548, per County V. Oregon, 7 WalL 71; IJank Chase, Ch. J.; National Bank v. of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black United States, 101 U. S. 1; California 620; Carroll v. Perry, 4 McLean 25; v.CentralPac.RCo.,127U.S..l;Fair- Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 330, bank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283; 339; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 WalL Savings Association v. Marks, 3 533, 548; State v. BeU, 1 PhiL (N. C.) Woods 553. 76. Compare Berney v. Tax Collector, ' See Bailroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 2 Bailey 65i 465; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 2 McOuUoch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 60. dH. ni.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 131 as an agency of government.' This principle is applicable to the national banks now in operation, which also have been called into existence by the federal government for its pur- poses — or at least on grounds of national policy.^ But the sovereignty in whose interest the exemption exists is fully protected if it controls in respect to taxation ; and it may, in its discretion, permit its own agencies or its own property to be taxed by the other, under limitations prescribed by itself, as the federal government has permitted the states to tax the national banks as they tax other moneyed corporations within their juris- diction.' On the general principle above stated, the states are precluded from taxing, without federal permission, the salaries or emoluments of national officers,* or the bonds of the United States issued under their constitutional power to borrow money for governmental purposes,^ or the premium on or excess above 1 McCuUoch V. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborne v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738. 2 Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 WalL 578; Austin v. Boston, 14 Allen 359; Flint V. Boston, 99 Mass. 141; State v. Newark, 39 N. J. L. 280; National Bank v. Mobile, 63 Ala. 284; Sumter Co. V. National Bank, 63 Ala. 464; McHenry v. Downer, 116 Cal. 20. An act imposing a tax on "the presi- dents of each of the banks of the state" was held inoperative when sought to be applied to the presi- dents of national banks: Linton v. Childs, 105 Ga. 567. 3 Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 578; National Bank v. Common- wealth, 9 WalL 353; Lionberger v. Kouse, 9 Wall. 468; Talbott v. Board, 139 U. S. 438; Van Slyke v. Wiscon- sin, 154 U. S. 581; Union Nat. Bank T. Chicago, 3 Biss. 82; Soobee v. Bean (Ky.), 59 S. W. Rep. 860. For the assessment of taxes against na- tional banks and their stockholders, see post, ch. XIL * Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 16 Pet. 435. In Mel- cher V. Boston, 9 Met. 73, a clerk in a postoffice was held taxable by the state on his income. See Sweat v. Boston, etc. E. Co., 5 N. B. R. 249. 6 Weston V. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; Bank of Commerce v. New York, 3 Black 620; Bank-Tax Case, 3 WalL 200; Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573; People v. Commissioners, 4 WalL 244; Bradley v. People, 4 WaU. 459; Banks v. Mayor, 7 WalL 16; Bank v Supervisors, 7 WalL 26; German Am. Bank v. Burlington, 54 Iowa 609; Howard Savings Inst. v. Newark, 63 N. J. L. 547. Compare State V. Jackson, 33 N. J. L. 450; Commonwealth v. Hamilton Manuf. Co., 12 Allen 298; Commonwealth v. Provident Inst., 13 Allen 313; Coite V. Society for Savings, 33 Conn. 173. Under the permissory' act of con- gress the taxing ofBcers of a state acquire no power to tax federal securities where there has been no subsequent legislation by the state: Howard Savings Inst. v. Newark, 63 N. J. L. 547. United States bonds and treasury notes are to be de- ducted from a banker's capital in ascertaining the amount thereof for assessment: Campbell v. Center- ville, 69 Iowa 439. What has been paid for United States bonds pur- 132 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. LCH. III. the par value of suoli bonds,' "or the revenue stamps issued by the United States and held by individuals,' or treasury notes issued and circulating as money,' or bonds issued by the Dis- trict of Columbia under authority of congress,* or the messages of the government sent by telegraph.* But the mere "fact that a corporation receives its charter and pecuniary or other aid chased with the general assets of a sayings bank should be deducted from such bank's taxable assets: Ottumwa Savings Bank v. Ottumwa, 95 Iowa 176. A tax on the frian- ohises of a corporation whose capi- tal is in part invested in United States bonds is not a tax on such securities: Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 WalL 594; Provident Inst. V. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611; Ham- ilton Co. V. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632; Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594; People v. Home Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 328. The transfer under state intestate laws or by will of property consisting of or including federal securities is subject to taxa' tion by the state, the tax in such case not b.eing regarded as imposed upon the securities themselves: Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115; Wallace v. Myers, 38 Fed. Rep. 184; Sherman's Estate, 153 N. Y. 1; In re Whiting, 2 App. Div. (N. Y.) 590; Strode v. Com- monwealth, 53 Pa. St. 181. For the same reason the federal tax act of June 13, 1898, applies to, a legacy of United States bonds, although the statute authorizing their issue ex- empts them from assessment or tax- ation: Murdook v. Ward, 178 U. S. 139. The New York collateral in- heritance tax law being limited by its terms to "property within the jurisdiction of this state for the pur- poses of taxation," excludes from valuation for the transfer tax fed- eral bonds: Whiting's Estate, 150 N. Y. 27; Sherman's Estate, 158 N. Y. 1. U. S. Rev. Stat. § 8701, pro- viding that "all stocks, bonds, treas- ury notes, and otl^er obligations of the United States shall be exempt from taxation by or under state, mu- nicipal, or local authority," is not in- fringed by the Ohio statute provid- ing that each person's statement for taxation shall set forth " the monthly average amount or value for the time he held or controlled the same, within the preceding year, of all moneys, credits, or other effects within that time invested in or con- verted into bonds or other securities of the United States:'' Shot well v. Moore, 45 Ohio St. 682. Money in the hands of others, subject to draft, is a credit due the bank, and is not ex- empt though the money originally deposited may have been United States treasury notes: GriflSn v. Heard, 78 Tex. 607. 1 The premium on or excess above the par value of federal bonds is not taxable by state or local authority, being only an incident of the bonds and non-existent apart therefrom: Rhode island Hospital Trust Co. v. Armington, 31 R. L 3; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 76 N. Y. 64. 2 Palfrey V. Boston, 101 Mass. 329. 'Montgomery County v. Elston, 32 Ind. 27; Bank of N. Y. v. Super- visors, 7 WalL 26; Ogden v. Walker, 59 Ind. 460; Home v. Green, 63 Miss. 453. In this last case it was held that the rule of exemption applied to national bank notes. ^Grether v. Wright, 75 Fed. Rep. 742. 6 Huntington v. Central Paa R Co., 2 Sawy. 503; Railroad Ca v. Pen- iston, 18 Wall, 5. See post, p. 140. CH. in.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 133 from the United States does not fix its character as a federal agency, nor does the fact that the United States sometimes make use of it for their purposes, as they might of a similar con- venience brought into existence in some other way.^ And the state may tax the property of federal agencies with other prop- erty in the state, and as other property is taxed, when no law of congress forbids, and when the effect of the taxation will not be to defeat or hinder the operations, of the national gov- ernment. A different rule, as has been well said^ " would re- move from the reach of state taxation all the property of every agent of the government. Every corporation engaged in the transportation of mails or of government property, of every description, by land or water, or in supplying materials for the use of the government, or in performing any service of what- ever kind, might claim the benefit of the exemption,"^ and the efles^t would be to embarrass and injure the state to the benefit of individuals rather than of the nation.' 4. State Agencies. The federal government is also without power to tax the corresponding means or agencies of the states, or the salaries of state oflBcers; the state in the exercise of its functions being entitled to the same immunity from congres- sional interference that the nation is from that of the state.* And a state municipal corporation, being only a portion of its sovereign power, created as a convenient if not a necessary part of the machinery of state government, is as much exempt 'State V. Thomas Cruse Savings 105 Mass. 49. A railroad wholly Bank, 31 Mont, 50. owned by a state and operated by it 2 Thomson V. Pacific R. Co.', 9 Wall, is not taxable under the federal rev- 579, 591. enue laws: Georgia v. Atkins, 1 Abb. ' See Railroad Co. v. Peniston, 18 (XT. S.) 23. Federal statutes requir- Wall. 5. ing revenue stamps to be attached *Ward V. Maryland, 13 Wall. 418, to certain instruments cannot pre- 437, per CM^ord, J.; Collector V.Day, vent such instruments, though not 11 WalL 113; Railroad Co. v. Penis- stamped, from being used in proceed- ton, 18 Wall. 5; Freedman v. Siegel, ings in state courts: Fifleld v. Close, 10 Blatch. 327; Warren v. Paul, 22 15 Mich. 505; Trowbridge v. Addoms, Ind. 376, 379; State v. Gaston, 33 S3 Colo. 518; Dawson v. McCarty, 31 Ind. 1; Fifleld v. Close, 15 Mich. 505; Wash. 314 Bonds issued by a state Union Bank v. Hill, 8 Cold. 335; or under its authority are not tax- Smith V. Short, 40 Ala. 385; Jones v. able by the United States: Meroan- Keep's Estate, 19 Wis. 390; Sayles v. tile Nat. Bank v. New York, 131 U. S. Davis, 33 Wis. 317; Moore v. Quirk, 138. 134 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. [oh. III. from the taxation of the federal government, in all its revenues and property, as the state itself.' 5. Inadmissible Personal Tames. A tax upon persons may possibly, in some oases, tend to embarrass the operations of either national or state government, in which case it Would be void unless imposed by the government which was liable to be inconvenienced by it. And, on this ground, it has been held that a state tax of a certain ^um on every person leaving the state by public conveyance was invalid; the tendency being to embarrass the functions of the national government, by ob- structing the travel of citizens and officers of the United States in the business of the government and the transportation of armies and munitions of war.^ 1 United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 333. In this case the facts were that the city of Baltimore held bonds of the Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. to a large amount. The internal revenue law of the United States then in force required every railroad company indebted upon bonds or other evidence of indebtedness bear- ing interest, or upon coupons repre- senting the interest, to pay a tax of five per cent, upon all such interest or coupons, and authorized the com- pany to retain the amount so paid as a tax from the creditor. The rail- road company in this case refused to make the payment, so far as con- cerned the interest on bonds held by the city of Baltimore, and the court sustained it in the refusal, holding that the tax was not a tax upon the railroad company, but upon its cred- itors, and in the case of the interest in question was no more competent than if imposed directly upon the city. The United States cannot tax the bonds of a municipality of a state, because they would thereby interfere with and obstruct an in- strumentality of a state government: Pollock V. Farmers' Loan, etc. Co., 157 U. S. 439, 459. The bonds of the city of New York are not subject to taxation because they are a means of carrying on the government: Mer- cantile Nat Bank v. New York, 181 U. S. 138. "Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. See Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460. The like principle was recog- nized in State v. Jackson, 33 N. J. 450, where a bounty voted to relieve a town from a draft was held invalid, as tending to defeat the legislation of congress on the subject. That case was decided by a divided court, and the decision is opposed to the current of authority. In State Treas- urer V. Philadelphia, etc. R Co., 4 Houst. 158, a law which imposed a state tax on railroad companies of ten cents on every passenger carried within the state, excepting soldiers and sailors of tlje United States, was held to be not a tax upon the busi- ness of the cairier, measured by the number of persons carried, but a tax upon the persons carried, to be col- lected by the carrier for the state, and, consequently, so f&r as it oper- ated upon persons entering into, de- parting from, or passing through the state, was, in effect, a regulation of commerce between "the states, and, consequently, within the decision in Crandall v. Nevada. OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. 135 6. PuHHg Property. It is customary for the federal govern- ment, in receiving a new state into the Union, to require from that state — though without necessity ' — a stipulation that the public domain lying within its limits shall not be taxed by Cal. 645; People v. Cohen, 31 CaL 210; People v. Mining Co., 37 Cal. 54; People V. Donnelly, 58 Cal. 144. The possessory claim to public lands, which may be taxed as something separate and distinct from the title in fee, is an actual possession, and not a constructive possession, or a mere claim to the land. Mortgaging and leasing public land do not con- stitute actual possession thereof: State V. Central Pac. R. Co., 31 Nev. 247. Where only the possessory claim is assessed the title or interest of the United States will not be af- fected: Ibid. The interest of a lessee in lands leased from the United States is taxable: Garland County V. Bates, 56 Ark. 227. Property oc- cupied for the United States but not owned by it was held taxable to the owner in Speed v. St. Louis County Court, 43 Mo. 383. And the fact that the government has an interest in real estate does not preclude the tax- ation of other interests to the owners. State V. Moore, 12 Cal. 56. As, for example, ore taken from the lands: Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 763. Build- ings erected by the United States for government use on leased lands are not taxable by the state. An- drews V. Auditor, 28 Grat. 115. A post-offlce and custom-house cannot be taxed for a street improvement: Fagan v. Chicago, 84 111. 227. Land acquired by the United States for a post-ofHce held not subject to city taxation: Bannon v. Burnes, 39 Fed. Eep. 893. A legacy to the United States is subject to the so-called suc- cession-tax law which is a limitation on the testator's power rather than a tax upon the property itself: Mer- riam's Estate, 141 N. Y. 479; United 'Van Brooklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 ; Blue Jacket v. Johnson Co., 3 Kan. 399; Duncan v. Newcomer, 9 S. D. 375. Lands purchased by the United States at a tax sale are not "taxable by the state : People v. United States, 93 111. 30; Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151. After the United States have caused a sale of landjn confiscation proceedings they have no title left on the strength of which an exemption from taxation can be claimed: Newby v. Brownlee, 23 Fed. Rep. 330. Where land is ju- dicially known to have belonged to the United States, and there is no evidence of a transfer of title, there can be no presumption that it is tax- able: Bonner v. Phillips, 77 Ala. 427. Lands held not to belong to the United States, so as not to be tax- able, merely because, after entry and payment of taxes, on notice from the land-office, a payment was made to the receiver before issue of the pat- ent: Vinton v. Cerro Gordo County, 72 Iowa 155. The state has a right to tax a private corporation upon railroad property situated within the bounds of a government reservation : Fort Leavenworth, etc. Co. v. Lowe, 27 Kan. 749. And to tax equitable interests and improvements held or owned by individuals in govern- ment lands: Hodgdon v. Burleigh, 4 Fed. Rep. Ill; Oswalt v. Hallowell, 15 Kan. 154; Quincy v. Lawrence, 1 Idaho 313; People v. Mining Co., 1 Idaho 409; State v. Tucker, 38 Neb. 56; Crocker v. Donovan, 1 Okl. 165; Territory v. Clark, 2 OkL 82; Ivinson V. Hance, 1 Wyo. 370. A possessory interest in public lands for mining purposes may be taxed as a species of property: People v. Shearer, 30 136 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [cH. in. the state. The disability remains effective nntil the United States shall have made sale, or other disposition, of the lands, but it thBn terminates, notwithstanding the title may not have passed by the actual execution and delivery of a patent of con- veyance;, the land being actually severed from the public do- main by the saleitself.^- But this principle will not apply in states V. Perkins, 163 U. a 625. A right in a raUroad company to make use, for" its purposes, of property owned by the United States,' is not, under the statutes of Iowa, sepa- rately liable to taxation: Chicago, etc. R. Ca v. iDavenport, 51 Iowa, 451. Lands in Nebraska granted to Alabama for school purposes held not taxable until the state had sold them: Stoutz v. Brown, 5 DilL 445. 1 Carrol v. Safford, 3 How. 441; Astrom v. Hammond, 8 McLean 107; Carrol v. Peryy, 4 McLean 35; Mo- Goon V. Scales, 9 Wall 23; Railwa,y Co. V. McShane, 22 Wall 444; Hun- newell v. Cass County, 33 Wall. 464; Colorado Co. v. Cohi'rs, 95 U. S. 359; Witherspoon y. Duncan, 21 Ark. 340, 4 Wall 210; Bronson v. Kukuk, 8 DilL 490; Northern Wis. R Co. v. Su- pervisors, 8 Biss. 414; Ha'l v. Dow- ling, 18 Cal. 619; People v. Shearer, 30 CaL 645; Central Pac. E. Co. v. Hpward, 51 Cal. 239; Iowa Home- stead Co. V. Webster County, 31 Iowa ' 221; Goodnow v. Wells, 67 Iowa 654; Barrett v. Keva'ne, 100 Iowa 653; Davis V. Magaun, 109 Iowa 808; State V. Hunter, 43 Minn. 313; GraflE v. Ackerman, 38 Neb. 720; Puget Sound Agric. Co. V. Pierce County, 1 Wash. Ter. 180; Ross v. Outagamie County, 13 Wis. 26; Famham v. Sherry, 71 Wis. 568. If, previous to the passage of an act of congress confirming to a state certain l^nds long claimed by it, a tax is laid on such lands in the hands of grantees from, the state, the confirming act makes the state's title relate to the time when the state claimed it, and makes the tax valid. Litchfield v. Hamilton County, 40 Iowa, 66. Rallroad-grant lands are taxable as soon as earned: Wiscon- sin Central R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496; Dickerson v. Yetzer, 53 Iowa 681; Railroad Co. v. Morris, 18 Kan. 302; Elkhorn, eta. Co. v. Dixon County, 85 Neb. 426; Oregon &C. E. Co. V. Lane County, 23 Or. 886; West Wisconsin R. Co. v. Supervisors, 35 Wis. 257; Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Comstook, 71 Wis. 88. Unless some condition precedent is first to be per- formed: White V. Railroad Ca, 5 Neb. 393. See Railway Ca v. Pres- cott, 16 Wall. 603; Railway Ca v. Trempealeau Ca, 93 U. S. 595: North- ern Paa R. Co. v. Traill County, 115 U. S. 600; State v. Central Paa R. Ca, 20 Nev. 373; Wells Coimty v. McHenry, 7 N. D. 246. Land granted in aid of a railroad is taxable, al- though the company has failed to pay the entry fee: Price v. Lancas- ter County, 20 Nev. 353. Lands granted to a railroad company were held after selection by the grantee to be subject to state taxation without further action of the secretary of the interior, and without being patented: New Orleans Paa R. Co. v. Kelly, 53 La. An. 1741. Place lands of a rail- road are taxable after they have been surveyed in the field, although the plat has not been filed in the local land office: Wells County v. McHenry, 7 N. D. 346. That some of the lands in a railroad grant fiiay turn out to be mineral lands, so as to be excepted from the grant, will not preclude the state's taxing the grant even though the question of its non- mineral character is not yet settled: Central Paa R. Co. v. Nevada, 163 U. OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEB. 137 any case until the right to a patent is complete, and the equita- ble title fully vested in the party without anything more to be paid or any act to be done, going to the foundation of the right.i Kor will it apply where, as one of the conditions of S. 518: state v. Central Pac. R Co., 31 Nev. 247; Northern Pac R. Co. v. MoGinnis, 4 N. D. 494; Northern Pac. R. Co. V. Walker, 47 Fed. Rep. 681; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Wright, 51 Fed. Rep. 68, 54 Fed. Rep. 67. As to when land is "contracted to be sold " by a railroad company so as to sub. jeot it to state taxation, see St. Paul & S. C. R Ca V. Robinson, 40 Minn. 360. Where public lands held by the state in trust for the United States are erroneously granted to a railroad, ' a sale thereof under an assessment for taxes against the railroad is void: Sullivan v. Van Kirk L. & C. Co., 134 Ala ^35. "Railroad land-grant" lands reserved and retained by the state, and subsequently sold by it, are subject to taxation in the hands of its grantees, and none but tbe United States can question the state's authority to dispose of them: Mor- rison County V. St. Paul & N. P. R. Co., 43 Minn. 451. See Cook Co. v. Auditor General, 79 Mich. 100. Land entered with militairy bounty land warrants was held taxable from the time of entry: Goddard v. Storch, 57 Elan. 714. So with land purchased of the United States on a forged war- rant which afterwards was ex- changed for money: Wheeler v. Merriman, 30 Minn. 373. See Vinton V. Cerro Gordo County, 78 Iowa 155. Part-paid unpatented lands pur- chased from the United States x>n certain Indian reservations were held subject to state taxation as to the purchasers' interests: Hagen- buok V. Reed, 3 Neb. 17; Edgington V. Cook, 38 Neb. 551; Logan v. Board of Com'rs, 51 Kan. ,747. But lands held by the United States in trust for an Indian tribe are not made tax- able by the fact that an individual has bought them on contract with- out any payment: Railroad Co, v. Morris, 18 Kan. 803. Where a patent was issued for a whole section, three- quarters of which had already been patented, a release to the United States of the whole section by the patentee, followed by a re-entry and patent of the quarter not covered by the prior patent, did not destroy a title acquired at a tax sale of said quarter prior to the release: Etting V. Gould, 96 Mo. 535. Conditions precedent to avoid taxation where entry has been suspended: Farnham V. Sherry, 71 Wis. 56a 1 Railway Co. v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603; Railway Co. v. McShane, 33 Wall. 444; Colorado Co. v. Com'rs, 95 U. S. 359; Northern Pac. R Co. v. Traill County, 115 U. S. 600; Wiscpnsin Central R Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 496; Hussman v. Durham, 165 U. S. 144; Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. 8. 323; Diver v. Friedheim, 43 Ark. 303; Kohn v. Barr, 52 Kan. 369; Durham v. Hussman, 88 Iowa 29; Pitts V. Clay, 37 Fed. Rep. 635. In- demnity lands of the Northern Pa- cific Railroad Company are not tax- able until the selection thereof has been approved by the secretary of the interior: Wisconsin Central R Co. V. Price County, supra; State v. Sage, 75 Minn. 448; Jackson v. La Moure County, 1 N. D. 388; Wells County V. McHenry, 7 N. D. 346. See State V. Central Pac. R, Co., 30 Nev. 378. Where one of the conditions of a grant of land to a railroad com- pany was that the cost of the gov- ernment surveys, selections, etc., should be prepaid by the grantee be- fore the lands should be conveyed. 138 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING EOWEE. [CH. III. the grant, the lands not, sold by the grantee within a time named ^re to be open to pre-emption and settlement like any portion of the public domain,^ or where congress has expressly enacted that land shall be exempt from state taxes until a cer- tain time after issue of patent.^ Land confirmed to a private owner under a treaty with a foreign country becomes taxable when, by treaty or statute, the title passes, and not before;' and until a Spanish grant has been segregated from the public domain by properly approved survey, it is not subject to state taxation.* If congress grants authority to the states to tax railroad-grant lands, the title to which is still in the United States, it may impose such conditions as it deems proper, and a state must proceed, if it proceeds at all, in accordance with the state could not tax the land until such payment had been made: Railway Co. v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603; Northern Pao. R. Co. v. Traill County, 115 U. S. 600. As to sur- veyed lands the rule was changed by act of congress in 1886: State v. Central Pao. R. Co., 30 Nev. 373; 31 Nev. 347, 360; but not as to lands un- Burveyed: State v. Central Pac. R. Co., 31 Nev. 94 And see Cass County V. Morrison, 38 Minn. 237;. Northern Pac. R. Co. V. Myers, 173 U. S. 589. Where the first proof under an entry of government land is rejected and new proof is made, on which patent is issued, the land does not, become taxable by the state prior to the making of the second proof: Dun- can V. Newcomer, 9 S. D. 375. Land taken up under the federal home- stead law is not taxable until the proofs are made which entitle the occupant to a patent: Long v. Gulp, 14 Kan. 413; Chase County Com'rs V. Shipman, 14 Kan. 532; Hoskins v. Illinois" Central R; Co. (Miss.), 29 South. Rep. 518. Or at least until he is entitled to make such proofs: Bellinger v. White, 5 Neb. 399; Mo- riarty v. Boone County, 39 Iowa 634 After a "final certificate" issues to a homesteader on the public domain, and before the patent issues, his land becomes taxable: Burcham v. Terry, 55 Ark. 398. And see, in gen- eral, McGregor, etc. R. Co. v. Brown, 89 Iowa 655; Doe v. Railroad Co., 54 Iowa 657; Grant v. Railroad Co., 54 Iowa 673; Reynolds v. Plymouth County, 55 Iowa 90; Davis v. Ma- goun, 109 Iowa 308; Donovan v. Kloke, 6 Neb. 124; Central, etc. R. Co. V. Howard, 53 Cal. 338; Bronson V. Kukuk, 3 Dill. 490; Hunnewell v. Cass County, 33 Wall. 464; Colorado Co. V. Com'rs, 95 U. S. 359; Litchfield V. Webster County, 101 U. S. 773. 1 Railway Co. v. Prescott, 16 Wall. 603. Compare Tucker v, Ferguson, 22 Wall. 537. 2 Churchill v. Sowards, 78 Iowa 473. s Colorado Co. v. Com'rs, 95 U. S, 259; Com'rs v. Improvement Ca, 3 Colo. 638. See Puget Sound Agrio. Co. V. Pierce County, 1 Wash. 159. * Robertson v. Sewell, 87 Fed. Rep. 536, 34 C. C. A, 107. An objection to the taxation of land that such land is an unconfirmed Mexican grant was not sustained where it was not shown that such grant was not a perfect one the equitable title to which was vested in the taxpayer, or that the land was not in his pos- session and covered with valuable improvements: Maish v. Arizona, 164 U. S. 193. CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. 139 those conditions. The grant of such authority being benefi- cial, acceptance thereof will be presumed ; and state tax laws which would have been applicable to unpatented railroad-grant lands but for the fact that under the national laws the taxa- tion of sdch lands was not permitted, need not be re-enacted to render them operative when an act allowing such taxation has been passed.* 7. Occasional Agencies. Eailroads owned and controlled by private corporations are in a certain sense public conveniences and agencies, but they constitute no branch or part of the gov- ernment, either state or national, and are not properly govern- mental agencies, even though the government may employ them for the transportation of its troops, its mails, etc., or for other purposes. The corporations owning them are conse- quently entitled to claim no exemption based on any implica- tion that they are essential to the operations of the govern- ment. They are therefore taxable as natural persons would be whom the government might employ for the performance of similar services.^ Congress has power to exempt from tax- ation the right of way through the public domain of a railroad corporation chartered by it, the corporation being in a sense 1 State V. Central Pac. R. Co., 21 nito County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., Nev. 247; Central Pac. E. Co. v. Ne- 77 Cal. 518. In the case of a rail- vada, 162 U. S. 513. road company chartered by congress, 2 Thomson V. Pacific E. Co., 9 Wall, and in which the federal govern- 579; Central, etc. R. Co. v. Board of ment 'has important interests with Equal, 60 Cal. 35. Compare People some power of control, the states V. Central Pac. R. Co., 43 CaL 398; cannot tax the operations of the Huntington v. Central Pac. R. Co., 3 road, though they may tax the prop- Sawy. 503; Inhabitants of Worcester erty: Union Pac. R. Co. v. Peniston, V. Western R. Corp., 4 Met. 564, 568; 18 Wall. 5. Where a railroad com- Boston & Me. R. Co. v. Cambridge, 8 pany having a state franchise subse- Cush. 337. But a franchise conferred quently secures a federal one, it may by congress upon a railroad company still be taxed as to the former: Peo- cannot, without its permission, be pie v. Central Pac. R Co., 105 Cal. taxed by a state: California v. Cen- 576. Such state franchise is taxable tral Pac. R. Co., 187 CaL 1. And by the state, although it is subject where such a company has a fran- to a mortgage to the United States: chise from the United States, an or- Central Pac. R Co. v. California, 163 dinance requiring it to take out a U. S. 91. The right to tax a railroad license in order to continue its busi- company is not affected by the fact ness in a county, carrying persons or that its property is mortgaged to the freight for hire, is void as a tax upon United States: Thomson v. Pacific R. the use of such franchise: San Be- Co., 9 Wall. 5791 140 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. in. an instrumentality of the government;' and a grant of such right of way with such exemption excludes the right of a ter- ritory to tax superstructures that are not personalty.* Because an act of congress authorizes the construction of a bridge across a navigable river, giving the right to build a railroad and to take tolls, and declares that such bridge shall be regarded as a post-road, it does not preclude the taxing power of the state from extending to such bridge as well for local as for state purposes.' Telegraph companies which have acquired under the federal statutes the right to construct and maiiitain lines along any military or post-roads of the United States, or over the public domain, are not thereby exempted from state taxation upon their property within the state,* though such a company can- not be required to pay a license tax as a condition of trans- mitting messages between different states,* or be taxed by the 1 Northern Pac. R. Co. v, Carland, 5 Mont. 146. 2 United States Trust Co. v. At- lantic & P. E. Co., 8 N. M. 673. A bridge owned by the United States over which a railroad has a right of passage as over its own track, by rea- son of its paying half the cost of building, is not taxable: Chicago, etc. R. Co. V. Davenport, 51 Iowa 451. 3 Henderson Bridge Co. v. Hender- son, 141 U. S. 679; Henderson Bridge Co. V. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150; St. Joseph & G. L R. Co. v. Steele, 167 U. S. 659; Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. V. Illinois, 176 111. 267, 175 U. S. 626. * Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massa- chusetts, 125U. S. 530; Attorney-Gen- eral V. Western Union TeL Co., 141 U. S. 40, 33 Fed. Rep. 129; Telegraph Co. V. Adams, 155 U. S. 688; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1, 141 Ind. 281; Southern Bell, et& Tel. Co. V. Richmond, 78 Fed. Rep, 858; Western Union TeL Co, v. Com- monwealth; 110 Pa. St. 405; Western Union Tei Co. v. Richmond, 36 Grat. 1; People v.Terney, 57 Hun 357. See Francisco v. Western Union TeL Co., 96 CaL 140. A fortiori a tele- graph company, even though it has accepted the provisions of the federal statutes, is not exempt from state taxation for such part of its line in the state as is not built over or along a military or post road of the United States: Ratterman v. Western Union TeL Co., 137 U. S.,411. And notwith- standing U. S. Eev. Stat. 5263, mu- nicipal corporations may subject tel- egraph companies to reasonable charges for the use of streets by the erection of telegraph poles and wires: St. Louis V. Western Union TeL Co., 148 U. S. 93. See Philad^phia v. Western Union TeL Co., 83 Fed. Rep 797; Philadelphia v. Western Union TeL Ca, 67 Hun 21. 5 Leloup V. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640. A license tax imposed by a city upon telegraph companies " for busi- ness done exclusively within the city . . . and not including any busi- ness done to or from points without the state "or " for the United States," was upheld in Western Union TeL Ca v. Charleston, 56 Fed. Rep. 419; Postal TeL Cable Ca v. Charleston, 153 U. S. 692. OH. III. J LIMITATIONS OF THE, TAXING POWEE. 141 state on messages and reoeiipts therefrom between points within and points without the state.' And while such a company can be taxed for its property within a state in proportion to the length of its lines within the state as compared with the entire length of its lines,^ the statute providing for such taxation is void in so far as it provides for the issue of injunctions to re- strain the company from transacting any business until delin- quent taxes are paid.' 8. Special Privileges. It is not competent for the states to tax the incorporeal rights which the laws of the United States confer upon authors.and inventors.* Were it possible to exert the taxing power against patents and copyrights the purposes of the national constitution might easily be defeated. There- fore a state statute declaring that all itinerant persons vending patent rights should be deemed' peddlers, and imposing a license tax upon peddlers, which for vendors of patent rights was double the amount required of others, was held void as a taxation of a privilege granted by the United States." Capital stock of a corporation invested in or issued for patents or patent rights has been held not taxable by a state ; ^ and it has also ' Western Union TeL Co. v. Seay, state tax upon patent rights them- 132 U. S. 473. See Telegraph Co. v. selves is not forbidden by the consti- Texas, 105 U. S. 460. A telegraph tution of the United States; but nei- company chartered in another state ther does that instrument forbid — in is taxable in Pennsylvania upon its, so many words — state taxation of gross receipts from business carried national post-ofiBces and battleshipsi on within the state: Western Union ' In re Sheffield, 64 Fed. Eep. 833, TeL Ca v. Commonwealth, 110 Pa. 'Commonwealth v. Westinghouse St. 405. ■ Electric, etc. Co., 151 Pa. St. 365; 2 Western Union TeL Co. v. Mass4- Commonwealth v. Philadelphia Co., chusetts, 125 U. S. 530; Attorney- 157 Pa. St. 537; Commonwealth v. General v. Western Union TeL Co., Edison Electric L. Co., 157 Pa. St. 33 Fed. Rep. 139, 141 U. S. 40; West- 529. But the issue of stock by a cor- ern Union TeL Co. v. Taggart, 141 poration to pay for the use of pat- Ind. 281, 163 U. S. 1. ented appliances is not such an in- ' Western Union TeL Co. v. Massa- vestment in patent rights as to re- chusetts, 185 U. S. 530. See In re lie ve it from the operation of the tax Pennsylvania TeL Co., 48 N. J. Eq. 91, laws of the state: Commonwealth v. 4 Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; Central Dist. etc. TeL Co., 145 Pa. In re Sheffield, 64 Fed. Rep. 833; Peo- St. 131; Commoji wealth v. Brush pie V, Board of Assessors, 156 N. Y, Electric Light Co., 145 Pa. St. 147, 417; People v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70. In New Jersey it is held that a tax In the case of Crown Cork, etc. Co. on a corporation which is a franchise V. State, 87 Md. 687, it is said that a and not a property tax is not subject 142 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. in. been decided that copyriglits cannot be considered in deter- mining the privilege tax on a foreign corporation which a state law provides shall be computed on the basis of the capital em- ployed by it in the state.^ But as letters patent do not exclude from the operation of the tax or license law of the state the tangible property" in which the invention or discovery is em- bodied,^ it is competent for a state to require the vepdor of a patented article to take out a license,' and the patented article itself may be taxed at " its t?be value in money " though that value is enhanced by the value of the patent.* So, too, in the case of copyrights, the tangible property which is produced under the protection of the exclusive right granted by the fed- eral government — plates, books, etc. — is subject to taxation by the state.' Taxes on commerce: Imports and Mojporfs. The federal constitution provides , that " ^o state shall, without the con- sent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or ex- ports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws ; and the net produce of all duties and im- posts laid by any state on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States." * The inspection to diminution because some of the against the owners thereof, there can capital is invested in letters patent be no diminution because the corpo- of the United States: MarsdenCo. v. ration's assets include patent rights Board of Assessors, 61 N. J. L. 461, granted by the federal government: See People v. Wemple, 61 Hun 53. Crown Cork, etc. Ca v. State, 87 Md. Under a st^.tute providing that every 687. domestic corporation shall pay an i People v. Roberts, 159 N.'Y. 70. annual tax upon the value of its 2v\rebber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; capital stock employed within, the State v. Halliday, 61 Ohio St. 352. state, a company conveying to vari- ' Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; ous companies outside of the state Webber v. Commonwealth, 33 Grat the right to use its patents, and re- 898. To require a license tax for the ceiving payment therefor in the sale of an article manufactured out stock of such companies, is a mere of the state under a.patent, and ijone investor in such stock, and the capi- for the sale of an article so manufac- tal thus invested is not exempt: tured in the state, is an unlawful People V. Wemple, 68 Hun 444, fol- discrimination, and void: Patterson lowing United States v. American v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501. Bell TeL Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 44 In * State v. Halliday, 61 Ohio St 353. Maryland it is held that in fixing the "People v. Board of Assessors, 156 taxable value of shares of stock so as N. Y. 417. to ascertain the amount of a tax « Art. I, § 10. CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 143 fees which may properly be imposed under this clause are in no sense a duty on imports or exports, but are a compensation for services ;i and the net produce of charges nominally made for inspection is for the United States only when they are im- posed for revenue purposes.^ A charge for inspection will be void as constituting a regulation of commerce if it applies only to an article brought into the state from one or more others named, and not from all;' or if it applies to an article, such as flour, brought into the state, but not to the same article manufactured in the state.* The provision of the constitution above recited has no appli- cation to articles transported merely from one state into an- other.' Articles imported from foreign countries and the duties iPatapsoo Guano Co. v. Board of Agric, 53 Fed. Rep. 690, 171 U. S. 345. In this case it was held that a state statute imposing an inspection tax of twenty-five cents per ton on fer- tilizers is not so excessive as to ren- der the act a mere levying law, ob- jectionable as an unwarrantable in- terference with interstate commerce. The charges imposed on vessels by the Louisiana quarantine laws are exactions in compensation for serv- ices rendered, and are not taxes, du- ties or imposts within the prohibi- tion of the national constitution: Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. Board of Health, 36 La. An. 666, 118 U. S. 455. A state statute providing for the inspection by the local au- thorities of fresh meat offered for sale at places one hundred miles or more distant from the place of slaughter was held, because of the onerous inspection fee of one cent per pound, to go far beyond the pur- pose of legitimate inspection to de- termine quantity and quality: Brim- mer v. Rebman, 188 U. S. 78. 2Padelford v. Mayor, 14 Ga. 438. See Turner v. State, 55 Md. 240, 107 U. S. 38; Addison v. Saulnier, 19 Cal. 83; Vanmeter v. Spurrier, 94 Ky. 33; State V. Caraleigh, etc. Works, 119 N. C. 180. A state statute declaring that no commercial fertilizers shall be sold or offered for sale until the manufacturer or importer shall ob- tain a license from the state treas- urer, for which shall be paid a license fee of $500 per annum for each brand, and appropriating the proceeds of such tax to an industi-ial association and other purposes, is void: American Fertilizing Co. v. North Carolina Board of Agric, 43 Fed. Rep. 609. A state inspection law imposing a charge which it de- clares to be for defraying the cost of inspection will not be held unconsti- tutional as an unwarranted tax on interstate commerce because some of the revenues derived therefrom has in fact been applied to other purposes: Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agric, 171 U, S. 345. ^Higgins V. Casks of Lime, 130 Mass. 1. *Voight V. Wright, 141 U. S. 62. 6 Brown v. Maryland, 13 Wheat. 419; Woodruff v. Parham.S Wall 133; Hinson v. Lott, 40 Ala. 133, 8 Wall. 148; Brown v. Houston, 83 La. An. 843, 114 U. S. 633; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 96 Ind. 179; Pittsburg & S. Coal Co. V. Bates, 40 La. An. 336; State v. 144: LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. [CH. m. paid thereon do not lose their character as imports, so as to be- come subject to state taxation as a part of the mass of prop- erty of the state, until they have either passed from the control of the importer or been broken up by him from the original cases; ^ and a state tax is void whether imposed upon them distinctively as imports or as constituting a part of the im- porter's property.' And a license tax imposed on the importer as such is in effect a tax on imports, and therefore forbidden.* So is a tax on an auctioneer "measured by the amaunt of goods sold, so far as it applies to imports sold for the importer in the original packages.* But a tax on premiums received for in- voicing imports, though they still remain, in the bonded ware- house, is not to be deemed a tax on imports.' A tax on a Bixman (Mo.), 63 S. W. Bep. 828; Pierce v. State, 13 N. H. .536; State V. Pinokney, 10 Rich. 478. iThe box, case, or bale in which the separate parcels or bundles were placed by the foreign seller, manu- facturer, or packer, is to be regarded as the original package; and when it reaches its destination for trade or sale and is opened for the purpose of using or exposing to sale the sepa- rate parcels or bundles, the goods lose their distinctive character as imports, and each parcel or bundle becomes a part of the general mass of property in the state and subject to local taxation: May v. New Orr leans, 178 U. S. 496, 51 La. An. 1064. As to what constitutes an original package, see, also, Austin v. Tennes- see, 179 U. S. 343, and cases cited; State V. Parsons, 124 Mo. 436. 2 Low V. Austin, 13 Wall. 29; citing Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; License Cases, 5 How. 575. See State V. Board, 46 La. An. 145. An importer cannot be taxed with ref- erence to the uncollected price of goods sold by him in the unbroken packages in which they were im- ported: Gelpi V. Schenck, 48 La. An. 1535. 'Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419. A state statute requiring all merchants to pay '* as a license tax one-tenth of one per centum' on the total amount of purchases in or out of the state (except purchases of farm products), for cash or on credit," does not operate as a tax upon im- ports or exports, within the consti- tutional prohibition: Ex parte Brown, 48 Fed. Rep. 435. « Cook V. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 566. * People V. National Fire Ins. Co., 27 Hun 188. It was held in Almy v. California. 24 How. 169, that a state stamp tax on a bill of lading for the transportation of gold and silver from any point within the state to any point without the state was a tax on exports, and therefore inad- missible. The bill in question was drawn for a carriage from one of the states to another; and it was justly said by Mr. Justice Miller in Wood- ruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 137, that "it seems to have escaped the atten- tion of counsel on both sides and of the chief justice who delivered the opinion that the case was one of in- terstate commerce." The case is not reconcilable with the last men- tioned, and though followed as au- thority in Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265, has since the decision of Woodruff V. Parham been regarded as overruled. In Ex parte Martin, 7 OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEK. 145 corporate franchise to be computed on dividends is not held invalid as a tax upon the importation in their original pack- ages of goods manufactured or imported by the corporation;* nor is a state tax on the capital employed in manufacturing of a corporation which sells goods manufactured outside of the state, within the prohibition against a state's taxing imports or regulating interstate commerce.* An article of commerce which has been purchased by the subject of a foreign country for export, and in the hands of his agent in port awaiting shipment, is to be regarded as an export, and therefore, under this provision of the constitution, not taxable by the state.' But a general tax laid by a state upon all property alike cannot be construed as a duty on ex- ports when it falls upon goods not then intended for exporta- tion but which afterwards happen to be exported.* Tonnage Duties. The same clause of the constitution for- bids the states to lay any duty of tonnage without the consent of congress. Notwithstanding this prohibition, vessels are taxable as property in the same manner as other property is taxed ; ' but taxes levied by a state upon ships and vessels as instruments of commerce and navigation are forbidden; and it makes no difference whether the ships or vessels taxed be- long to the citizens of the state which levies the tax or to citi- zens of another state, as the prohibition is general, withdrawing altogether from the states the power to lay any duty of ton- nage under any circumstances without the consent of congress.® Nev. 140, a state stamp tax on a bill Orleans to be there sold for their ac- of exchange drawn in one state and count, and some of it was subse- payable in another was sustained. quenfcly sold for export 1 People V. Roberts, 158 N. Y. 163, * State Tonnage Tax Cases, 13 Wall. 171 U. S. 658. 304, 213 ; Transportation Co. v. Wheel- 2 People V. Roberts, 158 N. Y. 168. ing, 9 W. Va. 170; S. C. in error, 99 'Blount V. Monroe County, 60 Ga. U. S. 373; The North Cape, 6 Biss. 61; Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Woods 405. 505; Guenther v. Baltimore, 55 Md. But the fact that cattle received by 459; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 58 dealers were purchased for export N. Y. 343. does not constitute them exports so ^ State Tonnage Tax Cases, 13 Wall, as not to be liable to taxation: Myers 204, 213; citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 V. County Com'rs, 83 Md. 385. Wheat. 303; Sinnot v. Davenport, 23 « Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 633. How. 388; Foster v. Davenport, 23 Here coal was sent by its Pennsyl- How, 245; Perry v. Torrenoe, 8 Ohio, Tanian owners to their agents in New 534. See, also, Sheffield v. Parsons, 10 146 LIMITATIONS OF- THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. IH. Nor is it important that the vessel is engaged exclusively in navigating the waters of the state which taxes it.^ A duty of tonnage, in the most obvious and general sense, is a duty meas- ured by the capacity or size of the ship or vessel on which it is laid;^ but other duties may be within the intent of this pro- hibition, if they are laid on the vessel as an instrument of commerce, and even though not laid for the benefit of the state itself, but as fees for officers. A fixed sum of $5, required to be paid to the masters and wardens of a port for every ves- sel arriving, whether they performed, in respect to it, any service or not, has been held a duty of tonnage ; ' and it has been well said that " the tax, instead of being called a tax on the vessel, may be called a tax upon the master or upon the cargo, or upon some privilege to be enjoyed by the vessel; as the privilege of coming into a certain port, or of riding at a particular anchorage, or of being served, as she may have oc- casion, by the wardens of a port, or the privilege of engaging in a particular trade — as the trade in wood, in corn or in oys- ters — yet if really and substantially it is a duty of tonnage, it is equally within the prohibition as if the tax had been called by its right name." * Nor is it important that the duty is imposed as a means of enforcing some authority which unquestionably belongs to the state; such as the power to establish quarantine regulations.' 3 Stew. & Port. 303; Harbor Master tion of this clause: Lott v. Morgan, V. Railroad Co., 3 Strob. 594; State supra. V. Charleston, 4 Rich. 386; Lott v. 2 State Tonnage Tax Cases, 13 Wall. Morgan, 41 Ala. 346; Johnson v. 304,335; Steamship Co. v. Portwar- Drummond, 30 Grat. 419; Hays v. dens, 6 WaU. 31; Johnson v. Drum- Steamship Co., 17 How. 596; Steam- mond, 30 Grat. 419, 433. ship Co. V. Port wardens, 6 Wall. 31; 3 Steamship Co. v. Port wardens, 6 Cannon v. New Orleans, 30 Wall 577; Wall 31. A license fee imposed on Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 corporations running tow boats to U. S. 338; Harmon v. Chicago, 147 and from the Gulf of Mexico was U. S. 396; New Orleans v. Eclipse held not to be a tonnage tax in Loui- Tow Boat Co., 33 La. An. 647; Har- siana: New Orleans v. Eclipse Tow bor Com'rs v. Pashley, 19 S. p. 315. Boat Co., 33 La. An. 647. 1 State Tonnage Tax Cases, 13 Wall. * Johnson v. Drummond, 30 Grat. 304, 319, 335 ; Harmon v. Chicago, 147 419-434. U.S. 396; Lott v. Morgan, 41 Ala. speete v. Morgan, 19 Wall. 581; 846. Vessels employed in a harbor Johnson v. Drummond, 30 Grat. 419, as lighters are within the protec- 434; Morgan's R. Co. v. Board of Health, 36 La. An. 666. OH. in.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE, 147 A state may erect wharves and charge wharfage for their use; and a city n^ay do the same and measure the charge by ton- nage ; * but a state cannot make a wharfage^charge to a vessel coming from another state when it makes none to vessels com- ing from ports in its own state.^ Nor can it discriminate in the fees between boats coming through canals within or with- out the state.' A state act which, with certain exceptions, re- quires that all ships or vessels which enter a port, or load or iunload or make fast to any wharf therein, shall pay a certain rate per ton, does not impose a charge for wharfage, but a ton- nage duty, and is therefore void.* On the other hand, a license •Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559. See Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 WaU. 577; Parkersburg & O. R. Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691. See Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 IT. S. 640. A duty of tonnage is a charge for the privilege of entering or trading or lying in a port or harbor; wharfage is a charge for the use of a wharf: Bradley, J., in Transportation Co. V. Parkersburg, 107 V. S. 691, 696. A state may authorize a city to col- lect a wharfage charge on all vessels touching at its own wharves: Mar- shall V. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146; Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. S. 238; Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U. S. 80; Packet Co. v. St. I^uis, 100 U. S. 433; Vicksburg V. Tobin, 100 U. S. 430; Sweeny v. Otis, 37 La. An. 520. The exaction of wharfage is not the lay- ing of a duty of tonnage, and where an ordinance requires steamboats and other water craft to pay f6r the use of the wharves, and no demand is made for entgring, loading or lying in the harbor or port, such charges will not be considered as a duty of tonnage, but of wharfage: Ouachita & M. E. T. Co. v. Aiken, 16 Fed. Rep. 890. The fact that wharfage charges collected by a city for the use of its wharf and which are regulated by the tonnage of the vessel are exorbi- tant in amount, will not render the collection thereof a tonnage tax pro- hibited by the federal constitution: Parkersburg & O. R. Transp. Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U. S. 691. " 2 Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434. A state statute requiring all vessels to pay a fee for examination as to their sanitary condition when they pas^s the quarantine station is not objec- tionable as giving a preference for a port of one state over ports of an- other: Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. V. Board of Health, 118 U. S. 455. 3 The John M. Welch, 18 Blatch. 54. ■> Northwestern U. P. Co. v. St. Paul,- 8 Dill. 454; Inman Steamship , Co. v. Tinker, 94 U. 8. 238. On the general subject see, further. Southern Exp. Co. V. Mayor, 49 Ala. 404; Lott v. Trade Co., 53 Ala. 570; Lott v. Cox, 48 Ala. 697. That wharfage fees can be charged only when the proprietor has constructed works at his own ex- pense which afford facilities to ves- sels loading and unloading, see New Orleans v. Wilmot, 31 La. An. 65. This applies to towns also, and the town must have legislative authority to impose such a charge. And the charge must be fixed in advance,' though it seems it may be graded by tonnage: Muscatine v. Packet Co., 45 Iowa 185; Keokuk v. Packet Co., 45 ' Iowa 199. See, further, N. W. PacRet Co. V St. Louis, 4 Dill. 10. That the states, in the absence of any legislar tion by congress on the subject, may 148 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. III. fee required of those operating ferry-boats is not a tonnage tax, even though the boats ply between different states.^ Neither is a toll imposed for the use of a state improvement of naviga- ble waters,' or, a toll imposed on the carriage of freight by rail- roads.' Foreign and Interstate Commerce, etc. The federal constitu- tion also provides that congress shall have power " To regulate comnaerce with foreign nations, and among the several states and with the Indian tribes." * This constitution, and the laws and treaties made in p'ursuanoe thereof, being supreme overall the states, any exercise of state power, whether by taxation or otherwise, in conflict therewith must be void. In most respects this power over commerce is exclusive to the' extent to which it is conferred; so that a regulation by a state of foreign or ' interstate commerce, or commerce with Indians still maintaining their tribal relations, would be void.' prescribe wharfage charges and regu- late the subject generally, see Cooley V. Board ol Wardens, 13 How. 399; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U. a 373; Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U. S. 433; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434; Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U. S. 559. 1 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 111. 560; s. O. in error, 107 U. S. 365. See Conway v. Taylor, 1 Black 603; Chilvers v. People, 11 Mich. 43; Marshall v. Grimes, 41 Miss. 37; Fanning V. Gregoire, 16 How. 584; Commonwealth v. Gloucester Ferry Co., 98 Pa. St. 105. 2Huse V. Glover, 15 Fed. Rep. S93, 119 U. S. 543; Palmer v. Cuyahoga Co., 8 McLean 336; Thames Bank v. Lovell, 18 Conn. 500; Nelson v. Che- boygan Nav. Co., 44 Mich. 7. See ' Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 133 U. S. 388. The Ordinance of 1787 declaring that navigable waters shall be forever free does not incapacitate a state from levying tonnage duties for a canal and dam it has con- structed in improving a river: Huse V. Glover, sMpr-a And the fapt that a surplus not used in keeping the locks in repair or in collecting tolls goes into the state treasury does not alter the character of the toU as a compensation and not a tajz: Ibid. The exaction by a city tof a license fee from a steam tug engaged in bringing vessels from one of the great lakes into a navigable river cannot be supported upon the ground that the city has from time to. time expended money in deepening the river, when the ordinance does not profess to, require the license fee on any such ground, and no suggestion is made that any such benefit has arisen or can arise to such tugs by such deepening of the river: Harmon V, Chicago, 140 111. 374, 147 U. S. 396. ' Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Common- wealth, 3 Grant 138. This case was reversed in the federal supreme court, but upon another ground. See Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 WalL 333. f other states: Weaver v. State, 89 Ga. 639. See Singer Manuf. Co. v. Wright, 97 Ga. 114. A state statute imposing a heavy occupation tax upon the vendors of certain specifled publications, "or other publications of like character," being applicable to all persons whether residents of the state or not, is not a discriminar tion against the person or the prop- erty of the owners of the publica- tions named, and is therefore not invalid as a regulation of interstate commerce: Preston v. Finley, 73 Fed. Rep. 850. A city order requiring all peddlers and drummers to pay a li- cense tax is not void, as discrimi- nating against the products of other 152 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. in. A state statute or municipal ordinance imposing a license tax upon persons selling goods by sample or catalogue, or so- liciting orders for goods, is void as an interference with inter- state commerce in so far as it applies to agents for non-resident owners or manufacturers of goods outside of the state ; ^ but it states, although, as a matter of fact, few of the residents of the city or state care to sell under it, so that in practice most of the revenue under it is derived from outsiders: Ex parte Hanson, 28 Fed. Eep. 127. A state revenue law imposing upon all mer- chants an "ad valorem tax upon the capital invested in their business equal to that levied upon taxable property," and which provides that the annual amount assessed against a merchant shall not be less than the average of his stock during the pre- ceding year, is not a tax upon the goods, and not an interference with interstate commerce: Oliver Finney Grocery Co. v. Speed; 81 Fed. Rep. 408. In State v. Goetze, 43 W. Va. 495, and In re Minor, 69 Fed. Rep. 233, a statute providing that a cer- taii;i license fee should be paid for selling cigarettes at retail was held void, as a regulation of interstate commerce, so far as it applied to cigarettes imported from another state in the original packages. But see In re May, 82 Fed. Rep. 423. It was held, In re Wilson (N. M.), 60 Fac. Rep. 73, that a statute imposing a license fee as a consideration upon which coal oil might be sold was void so far as applicable to sales in original packages by importers from other J)arts of the United States. As to what constitutes sufScient incor- poration of goods with the mass of property in the district or state to exempt a license tax on the peddler of such goods from the operation of the interstate commerce law, see, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 TJ. S. 100; In re Wilson, 19 D. 0. 341. See, also, ante, p. 144 ^1 Robbins v. Taxing Dist., 120 U. S. 489; Asher v. Texas, 128 U. S. 129; Stoutenburg v. Hennick, 129 IT. S. 141; McCall v. California, 136 IT. S. 104; Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; Holder v. Aultman, etc. Co., 169 U. S. 81; In i^e Kimmel, 41 Fed. Rep. 775; In re Rozelle, 57 Fed. Rep. 155; In re Flinn, 57 Fed. Rep. 496; State v. Lagarde, 60 Fed. Rep. 186; In re ■Mitchell, 62 Fed. Rep. 576; Aultman, etc. Co. V. Holder, 68 Fed. Rep. 467; Ex parte Hough, 69 Fed. Rep. 330; In re Tinsman, 94 Fed. Rep. 648; State v. Agee, 83 Ala. 110; Ex parte Murray, 93 Ala. 78; Wrought Iron Range Co. V. Johnson, 84 Ga. 754; McLaughlin V. South Bend, 126 Ind. 471; MoClel- -Ian V. Pettigrew, 44 La. An. 356; Pegues V. Ray, 50 La. An. 574; Coit & Co. V. Sutton, 102 Mich. 334; Lau- rens V. Elmore, 55 S. C. 477; State v. Rankin, 11 S. D. 144; Hurford v. State, 91 Tenn. 669; Ex parte Holman, 36 Tex, Crim. App. 255; Talbutt v. State, 39 Tex. Crim. App. 64; Adkins v. Richmond, 98 Va. 91; Clements v. Caspar, 4 Wyo. 494. A mimicipal license tax imposed on non-resident ' brokers selling merchandise by sample is unconstitutional as an in- terference with interstate commerce : Stratford v. City Oounoil, 110 Ala. 619. A state statute requiring any one, not the grower, maker or manu- facturer, selling goods within the state, to pay a license proportioned to the amount of his stock in trade, whether situat-ed in the state or out ' of it, is a regulation of interstate commerce as applied to persons out of the state and selling by sample within it: Corson v.Tlaryland, 120 U. S. 502. One who takes out a li- CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 153 is not such an interference to require a license tax from one who as agent for a non-resident, or on his own account, sells goods which have already become incorporated with the gen- eral mass of property in the state,* A yearly franchise tax may be exacted as the price of the right and privilege of being a corporation by the state grant- ing the franchise, no matter how the corporate property may be invested or employed, or where it may be situated, and even though the corporation may be engaged in interstate and foreign commerce.' And it has been held that a statute forbidding foreign corporations froiii keeping offices in the state unless on payment of a' license tax does not as to a'min- cense required by statute and gives bond for payment of a percentage tax on his yearly commissions or charges, cannot afterwards escape payment of the tax on the ground that as his business for the year con- sisted entirely in taking orders for non-resident merchants, the tax would therefore be a burden on in- terstate commerce: Ficklen v. Tax- ing Dist., 145 U. S. 1. lEmert v. Missouri, 156 U. S. 296; Hynes v. Briggs, 41 Fed. Rep. 468; Hall V. State, 39 Fla. 637; Price v. Atlanta, 105 Ga. 858; Duncan v. State (Ga.), 30 S. E. Rep. 755; Chrystal v. Macon, 108 Ga. 27; Racine Iron Co. v. McCommons,lll Ga. 536; Rash v. Far- ley, 91 Ky. 844; People v. Sawyer, 106 Mich. 428; State v. Montgomery, 93 Me. 433; State v. Emert, 103 Mo. 241; State v. Snoddy, 128 Mo. 523; State V. Caldwell, 127 N. C. 521; Com- monwealth V. Gardner, 133 Pa. St. 284; Kimmell r. State, 104 Tenn. 184; Croy V. Obion County, 104 Tenn. 235; In re Rutin, 28 Tex. App. 304. Where agents employed by non-residents were furnished by them with samples and sent orders obtained to their em- ployers, who shipped from another state to the agents the goods ordered for delivery, a single sale by one of the agents of his sample did not alter phe character of his occupation, so as to deprive him of the protection of the interstate commerce law: In re Houston, 47 Fed. Rep. 539. Where a non-resident obtained from a resi- dent an order for a portrait, the resi- dent having the privilege of pur- chasing from the agent a frame from the stock in the state, there was no prosecution of interstate commerce so far as regarded the frame: Chrystal v. Macon, 108 Ga. 27. See, contra, Laurens v. Elmore, 55 S. C. 477. A statute imposing a license tax "on every itinerant who puts up light- ning rods " imposes no burden on in- testate commerce, and binds one acting as agent in the state for the sale of lightning rods manufactured in another state, and who puts up the rods without extra charge when- ever the purchaser requests it : State V. Gorbam, 115 N. C. 731. A statute requiring all persons desiring to ped- dle clocks to make proof before the court of quarter sessions of their good moral character, and to obtain a license, being general arid reason- able, is a proper police regulation, and not in violation of the interstate commerce clause of the federal con- stitution: Commonwealth V. Harmel, 165 Pa. St. 89. 2 Honduras Com. Co. v. State Board, 54 N. J. L. 378. 154 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE, [CH. III. ing company violate interstate commerce, there being no at- tempt to prohibit the transportation or sale of the company's products in the state.' A state law exacting from all corpora- tions doing business in the state a tax proportioned to the total amount of their capital stock, without regard to what part thereof is employed within the state, or to the amount or kind of business done there, imposes purely a franchise tax, and even as applied to a corporation engaged in bringing the products of other states into\he state for sale cannot be con- sidered as a tax upon interstate commerce.^ So, a state fran- chise tax upon private corporations based upon the amount of capital employed by the corporation in the state is not af- fected by the character of the property in which the capital is invested, and, therefore, is not rendered illegal by the fact that such capital is employed in interstate or foreign com- merce.' The imposition by a state of a license or franchise tax upon a domestic manufacturing corporation which manufact- ures its special product in another state is not a regulation of commerce between the states.^ Nor is the fee imposed on corporations for filing articles which they must file before they can be legally incorporated or consolidated a tax upon inter- state commerce, though they are engaged in such business, but it is rather a tax on the right to exist as a corporation.' It has been decided that a state statute providing that contracts made in one state by a foreign corporation which has not paid the license fee prescribed by a statute of that state as a pre- requisite to doing business therein is void as a regulation of commerce when applied to the business of a foreign corporatipn selling its wares in such state by itinerant agents.* 1 Pembina, etc. Co. v. Pennsylva- with corporations of other states, nia, 125 TJ. S. 181. the fees required by statute to be 2 Horn Silver Mining Co. v. People, collected when articles of agree- 143 U. S. 305. See People v. Wem- ment of consolidation are filed may pie, 117 N. Y. 136. be proportioned to the capital stock 'New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. of the new corporation: Ashley v. 658; People v. Wemple, 131 N. Y. 64. Ryan, supra. * Standard Underground Cable Co. * Holder v. Aultman, etc. Co., 169 V. Attorney-General, 46 N. J. Eq. 27a U. S. 81 ; Aultman, etc. Co. v. Holder, 6 Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 49 68 Fed. Rep. 467; Colt v. Sutton, 103 Ohio St. 504; Chicago & E. 1 R. Co. Mich. 324. See Moline Plow Co. v. V. State, 153 Ind. 134. On a con- Wilkinson, 105 Mich. 57. solidation of an Ohio corporation CH. in.J LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE, 165 A summary of the rules governing state taxation of com- panies or corporations engaged in foreign or interstate com- merce is found in one of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States. " It is settled that where, by way of duties laid on the transportation of the subjects of interstate com- merce, or on the receipts derived therefrom, or on the occupa- tion or business of carrying it on, a tax is levied by a state on interstate commerce, such taxation amounts to a regulation of such commerce, and cannot be sustained. But property in a state, belonging to a corporation, whether foreign or domestic, engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, may be taxed, or a tax may be imposed on the corporation on account of its prop- erty within a state, and may take the form of a tax for the privilege of exercising its franchises within the state, if the as- certainment of the amount is made dependent in fact on the value of its property situated within the state (the exaction, therefore, not being susceptible of exceeding the sum which might be leviable directly thereon), and if the pdyment be not made a condition precedent to the right to carry on the busi- ness, but its enforcement left to the ordinary means devised for the collection of taxes. The corporation is thus made to bear its proper proportion of the burdens of the government under whose protection it conducts its operations, while inter- state commerce is not in itself subjected to restraint or impedi- ment." ' It has been decided that a tax upon the income received from interstate commerce is a tax upon the interstate com- merce itself, and is therefore unauthorised.^ "The states cannot be permitted, under the guise of a tax upon busi- ness transacted within their borders, to impose a burden upon commerce among the states, when the business so taxed is itself interstate commerce."' This principle applies to a state tax upon the gross receipts of a steamship company in- corporated under the laws of the state, which receipts are 1 Telegraph Co. v. Adams, 155 U. S. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 688; Erie R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 194. U. S. 431 ; see to the same effect, ^ Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, Gloucester Ferry Co. V.Pennsylvania, 132 U. S. 326; Leloup v. Port of Mo- 114 U. 8. 196; Leloup v. Port of Mo- bile, 127 U. S. 640. bile, 127 U. S. 640; Adams , Express 3 Fargo v. Stevens, 121 U. S. 230. 156 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. [oh. III. derived from the transportation of persons and property be- tween different states and to and from foreign countries.^ It also applies to a state law taxing the gross receipts of railroads for the carriage of freight and passengers into, out of, or through the state;' and to a state statute which levies a tax 1 Steamship Ca v. • Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326. It was held in Ken- tucky that the fact that a ferry com- pany domiciled in that state and doing business over a river between that and another state was engaged in interstate commerce did not de- prive the state of the right to tax its franchise, determining the value thereof by considering its income: Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Com- monwealth (Ky.), 57 a W. Rep. 624. 2 Fargo V. Stevens, 131 U. S. 230; Northern Pao. E. Co. v. Raymond, 5 Dak. 356. See Northern Pao. E. Co. v. Barnes, 2 N. D. 310; McHenry V. Alford, 168 U. S. 651. In the case of the State Tax on Eailway Gross Receipts. 15 Wall. 284, a tax upon the gross receipts of a railroad de- rived in part from the carriage of goods from one state- to another was sustained oh the ground that the states have authority to tax the es- tate, real and personal, of all corpora- tions of their own creation, including •carrying companies, precisely as they may tax similar property belonging to natural persons, and on the further ground that the receipts, when taxed, had become part of the general prop- erty of the corporation, and were in its treasury within the state. It was held in the case of the Delaware R. Tax, 18 Wall 206, that when a line of railroad or canal belonging to any company liable to the tax lay partly in the state and partly in an adjoin- ing state or states, only such part of the net earnings or income of the company should be subject to the tax as would be in that proportion to the whole net earnings or income of the company which the length of the road or canal within the state bore to the whole length of such road or canaL Following Fargo v. Stevens, supra, a state statute imposing a tax upon the entire gross earnings of all railways operated in the state, and providing that if a railway be situ- ated partly within and partly with- out the state, the tax should be pro- portionate to the mileage of trains run within the state, was held un- constitutional as interfering with interstate commerce: Vermont &C. R. Co. V. Vermont,Cent. R Co., 63 Vt. 1. In the case of Indiana v. Pullman Palace Car Co., 11 Biss. 561, 16 Fed. Rep. 193, the imposition of a certain proportionate tax, according to the distance traveled in the state, on the gross receipts of foreign sleeping-car corporations, conveying passengers to, from, and through the state, was held unconstitutional as conflicting with the interstate commerce clause. A state tax upon the receipts de- rived by railway and other transpor- tation companies from commerce between points within the state, and between points without the state but passing through it, is void as a regu- lation of interstate commerce, and it is immaterial that goods destined for points without the state were temporarily detained in the state after transportation had actually be- gun: Delaware & BL Canal Ca v. Commonwealth (Pa.), 17 Atl. Rep. 175. But the transportation of goods and passengers by continuous car- riage from one point in the state to another point in the same state is not interstate commerce, although for a part of the route it 'is over the soil of another state; and therefore CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING rOWEE. 157 upon the gross receipts of a telegraph company for messages between points within and points without the state.^ 'Spr can a state tax a foreign express company on gross receipts not received in the state, or on receipts for transportation of mer- it is within the power of the state to impose a tax on its gross receipts: Lehigh "Valley R Co. v. Pennsyl- vania, 145 U. S. 193, 305; Common- wealth V. Lehigh Valley E. Co., 129 Pa. St. 388. The Wisconsin statute requiring owners of palace, etc., cars to return for taxation "a statement of the gross earnings made by the use of such oars between points within the state of Wisconsin," re- quires a statement only of the earn- ings derived from the use of such cars in transporting passengers who both get on and off at points within the state, and, so construed, is not a regulation of interstate commerce: State V. Pullman Palace Car Co., 64 Wis. 89. A state statute which requires every corporation, person, or association operating a railroad within the state to pay an annual tax to be determined by the amount of its gross transportation receipts, and further that when applied to a railroad lying partly within and partly without the state, or to one operated as a part of a line or system extending beyond the state, the tax should be equal to the proportion of the gross" receipts in the state, to be determined according to a sliding scale proportioned to the average gross earnings per mile within the state for the year preceding the levy of the tax, is merely a way of ascer- taining the value of the privilege, and does not render the tax a charge upon the receipts themselves so as to be an interference with inter- state commerce: Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 143 U. S. 317. Practi- cally the same method of taxation was upheld in New Jersey when ap- plied to a company engaged in trans- porting oil from points in other states to points in that state: Tide- Water Pipe Co. V. State Board, 57 N. J. L. 516. A state statute impos- ing a tax on the gross receipts of transportation companies for tolls and transportation is not, so far as it imposes a tax on tolls paid by a 'company engaged in interstate trans- portation to a company for the use of its railway in the state, an inter- ference with interstate commerce: New York, L. E. & W. E. Co. v. Penn- sylvania, 158 U. S. 431; Common- wealth V. New Yorjc, L. E. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 38. And where a foreign corporation owns a railroad lying partly within and partly with- out the state, the state may tax such portion of the tolls received for the use of the road as was received for the use of the part within the state: Ibid. , 1 Ratterman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 127 U. S. 411; Western Union TeL Co. V. Pennsylvania, 128 U. S. 39; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Seay, 133 U. S. 472. Telegraph companies may, however, be so taxed on mes- sages carried wholly within the state: Western Union Tel. Co. v. Seay, supra. And a single tax assessed under the laws of a state upon the receipts of a telegraph company de- rived partly from interstate com- merce and partly from commerce within the state, but returned and assessed in gross, and without sepa- ration or apportionment, is invalid only in proportion to the extent that such receipts were derived from in- terstate commerce: Ratterman v. Western Union TeL Co., supra. 158 LIMITATIONS 01" THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. III. chandise taken up and delivered out of but carried through the state.' The imposition of a license or privilege tax upon the con- duct of interstate commerce is obviously a regulation of such commerce as well as a burden thereupon, and a state statute laying such a tax is necessarily invalid.'' Thus a foreign cor- poration whose vessels, while en, route between the ports of two different states, stop at the port of a third state, is not liable for a license tax at Such port when all its operations there are an essential part of its interstate commerce business.' A tax upon the masters of vessels engaged in foreign com- merce, of a certain sum on account of every passenger brought from a foreign country into the state, is a tax upon commerce.* A city ordinance requiring vessels to pay for the privilege of towing boats, etc., into or out of the city's harbor, or from one place to another within such harbor, is void as an interference with interstate commerce;* and so is a city ordinance impos- ing a tax on the privilege of navigating the Mississippi river between ISTew Orleans and the Gulf of Mexico.' On the other hand, the requirement of a license tax from any person residing in a house-boat is not, though applicable to navigable rivers between different states, an interference with interstate com- merce.' Nor does a statute requiring a license from all boats 1 Indiana V. American Express Ca, Lyng v. Michigan, 135 U. S. 161; 7 Biss. 237. A state statute imposing Crutoher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47; on companies which carry goods by San Bernardino v. Scuthern Pao. R express, on contract with any rail- Co., 107 Cal. 524. road or steamboat company," a tax s Clyde S. S. Co. v. Charleston, 76 on their "receipts for business done Fed. Rep. 46. within this state," is not an inter- < Passenger Cases, 7 How. 383. It ference with interstate commerce: would make no dififerenoe that the Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, 143 master was permitted to give an in- U. S. 339, 44 Fed. Eep. 310. See demnity bond in lieu of payment: American Express Co. v. St. Joseph, Henderson v. Mayor, 93 U. s! 259. A 66 Mo. 675. A state law providing privilege tax required of steamboat for the taxation of the property, of and railroad agents was held in express companies is not unconsti- Lightburne v. Taxing Dist., 4 Lea tutional because it permits the as- 220, pot to be a tax upon commerca sessing board to take into consider- » St. Louis v. Consolidated Coal Ca ation their gross earnings from con- (Mo.), 59 a W. Eep. 108. tracts made with railroad companies « Moran v. New Orleans, 113 U. S. extending to points without the state : 69. State V. State Board, 3 S. D. 338. ' Robertson v. Commonwealth, 101 ^Leloup V. Mobile, 137 U. S. 640; Ky. 385. CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE.. 159 engaged in planting or taking oysters in certain navigable waters constitute such an interference.^ It has been held that a parish may require a license tax of the owner of a vessel for trading and peddling in its waters.^ A state statute imposing a license tax on residents of the state for the privilege of fish- ing in waters of the state does not encroach on the federal authority to regulate commerce and navigation.^ The assessment in one state of the franchises of a railroad company extending through several states is repugnant to the power of congress to regulate interstate commerce ; * and a city situated on a branch line and not a main line of a foreign rail- way corporation involving interstate commerce cannot impose on the company a license tax for the privilege of engaging in the business of a common carrier within its limits.' It has also been held that a tax against a railroad company, which is a link in a through line of road, and carries freight and pas- sengers in and out of the state, assessed by the state through which the main line passes, as a condition precedent to the company's keeping an oflSce in such state for the use of its offi- cers, agents, and employees, is a tax on the means by which the company is enabled to carry on its business of interstate commerce, and is therefore invalid.* But a privilege tax on railroad companies according to their mileage in the state has been sustained,^ and so has a municipal ordinance, under legis- lative authority, imposing a tax of a specified aniount on every railroad company operating within the corporate limits.' The imposition of a municipal license tax on every railroad agency is, however, a regulation of commerce, so far as it applies to an agent who solicits passenger traffic in the city over a rail- road operated between two points in other states; for the lim- I Johnson v. Loper, 46 N. J. L. 321. tested by the question whether the 2 Steamer Block v.Richland,36 La. city is located upon a trunk or a An. 643. branch line, but rather by the char- 3 Morgan v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. acter of the business in which the 813. railroad company is engaged in the * California v. Central Pac. R. Co., city passing the ordinance. .137 U. S. 1. See People v. Wemple, « Norfolk & W. E. Co. v. Pennsyi- 138 N. Y. 1. ' vania, 136 U. S. 114 ' s San Bernardino v. Southern Pac. ' Knoxville & O. E. Ca v. Harris, R. Co., 107 Cal. 534 This case holds 99 Tenn. 684 that the question of power in a city * Piedmont R. Co. v. Reidsville, 101 to enforce such a license is not to be N. C. 404. 160 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEK. [CH. III. itation on the power of a state to tax interstate commerce extends to all such commerce, though it may not actually pass through its territory, and the agent's business, being carried on to assist the traflBc of his road, is within the protection of the commerce clause though it may not be essential to such traffic* The requirement by a state that persons owning or operating elevators situated on railroad rights of way shall "procure licenses does not infringe the interstate commerce clause.* • It is also incompetent for a state to impose a privilege tax upon sleeping or parlor-car companies engaged' in interstate travel,' or upon foreign express companies transporting goods between points in other states,* or upon the agents of such ex- press companies,' or upon the business of telegraph companies occupied in transmitting messages between different states.* But a state privilege tax on each mile' of wire within the state, imposed on all telegraph companies therein in lieu of all other taxes, is a tax on property and not an interference with inter- state commerce.'' A telephone company will not be enjoined .1 MoCall V. California, 136 U. S. 104. 2CargilI Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 453; State ^. Cargill Co., 77 Minn. 323. spicard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U. S. 34; Pullman Southern Car Co. V. Nolan, 33 Fed. Eep. 376. < Webster v. Bell, 68 Fed. Eep. 183. In the case of Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479, 44 Ala. 498, a city ordinance requiring that every express com- pany or railroad company doing busi- ness in that city ahd having a busi- ness beyond the limits of the state should pay an annual license fee, was held not a regulation of Interstate commerce; but it was said of that case in Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 137 U. S. 640, that "such an ordinance would not be regarded as repugnant to the power conferred upon con- gress to regulate commerce among the several states." 5 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S.47. 6 Leloup V. Port of Mobile, 137 U. S. 640. This case holds that telegraphic communications are commerce, and, if carried on between different states, interstate commerce, and so free from state regulation except of strictly police character. A tax of a specific- sum levied as an occupation tax on telegraph companies for each mes- sage sent, is void as a tax on inter- state and foreign intercourse: Tele- graph Co. V. Texas, 105 U. S. 460. And being invalid as to interstate mes- sages, the whole statute must fall: Western Union Tel. Co. v. State, 6» Tex. 630. A city ordinance imposing on a telegraph company engaged in Interstate commerce a license tax which Is in excess of an ad valorem tax that could be assessed on its- property situated in the city is void, being, a regulation of interstate com- merce: Postal TeL Cable Ca v. Rich- mond (Va.), 37 S. E Rep. 789. 'Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adapas, 155 U. S. 688, 71 Miss. 655. A city has not power to impose pole and wire taxes upon a telegraph company doing interstate business, in excess- CH. III.J LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEB. 161 from transmitting messages from one state to another because of its refusal to pay taxes on business so transacted across state lines, as such business constitutes interstate commerce.^ Although a company or corporation is engaged in interstate commerce, it may nevertheless be taxed upon all local business, but in the imposition of such a tax the interstate business must be discriminated from the *w/ira-state business, or it must be capable of such discrimination, so that it may clearly appear that the m/ra-state business alone is taxed.^ Thus a city or- dinance imposing an occupation tax on railroads having depots in the city, and excepting from the levy all interstate traflBic of such corporations, is not invalid as imposing a burden on interstate commerce.' So, where sleeping-cars are run wholly within a state, the business may be taxed as a privilege.^ A license tax imposed by a city upon telegraph companies for business done exclusively within the city, and not including any business done to or from points without the state, or for the United States, is not invalid as applied to a company partly engaged in transmitting interstate messages, and which has accepted the provisions of the federal statutes so as to be- come an agency of the United States.' It is also held that a city ordinance requiring a certain license fee per instrument to be paid by every person or corporation operating and main- taining a telephone in the city does not interfere with inter- state commerce where it applies only to instruments rented for business of a local nature confined strictly within the city limits.* And a statute which, as construed by the highest of the reasonable expense to the city 56 Neb. 573. See Anniston v. South- of the inspection and regulation ern R. Co., 118 Ala. 557; Alabama G. thereof: Philadelphia v. Western S. R. Co. v. Bessemer, 113 Ala. 668. Union Tel. Co., 83 Fed. Eep. 797. See ^ Gibson County v. Pullman South- Philadelphia V. American Union Tel. ern Car Co., 42 Fed. Eep. 573. Co., 167 Pa. St. 406. In Philadelphia ' Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Charles- V. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 67 Hun 31, ton, 153 U. S. 693; Western Union it was held that license fees imposed Tel. Co. v. Charleston, 56 Fed. Rep. by a city on telegraph poles and wires 419. See Southern Exp. Co. v. Mo- do not constitute a regulation of in- bile, 49 Ala. 404; Montgomery v. Shoe- terstate commerce. maker, 51 Ala. 114; Moore v. Eufaula, iln re Pennsylvania TeL Co., 48 97 Ala. 670; Western Union Tel. Co. N.J. Eq. 91. See Western Union Tel. v. Fremont, 39 Neb. 693, 43 Neb. 499. Co. V. Massachusetts, 135 U. S. 530. ^ ^ Ogden City v. Crassman, 17 Utah 2 Webster v. Bell, 68 Fed. Eep. 183. 66. ' York V. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co., 11 162 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEB. [OH. III. court of the state, imposes a license tax on express companies doing any local business, but none on those doing interstate or foreign business only, is not void as being a regulation of inter- state commerce.^ " Although the transportation of the subjects of interstate commerce, or the receipts derived therefrom, or the occupation or business of carrying it on, cannot be directly subjected to state taxation, yet property belonging to corporations or com- panies may be ; and, whataver the particular form of the ex- action, if it is essentially only property taxation, it will not be considered as falling within the inhibition of the constitution. Corporations and companies engaged in interstate commerce should bear their proper proportion of the burdens of the gov- ernment under whose protection they conduct their operations; and taxation on property, collectible by the ordinary means, does not afiPect interstate commerce otherwise than incident- ally, as all business is affected by the necessity of contributing to the support of the government." * Of course it is necessary, in order to subject to state taxation the property of corpora- tions engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, that such property be within the jurisdiction of the state.' Thus a state may tax telegraph property within its borders, though such property is employed in interstate or foreign commerce;* 1 Osborne v. State, 33 Ala. 163, 164 its property used in that state, can- U. S. 650. not be taxed there on the appraised 2 Per Puller, C. J., in Adams Ex- value of its capital stock. A vessel press Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 cannot be taxed as property in a U. S. 194, 2—. See Gloucester Ferry port where it lies for the temporary Co. V. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, purpose of loading: People v. Niles, 206; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 1S7 35CaL283. And see Indiana v. PuU- U. S. 640, 6—; Pullman's Palace Car man Palace Car Co., 16 Fed. Rep. 193. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; * Western Union TeL Co. v. Attor- Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Ken- ney-General, 125 U. S. 580, 141 U. S. tucky, 154 U. S. 204; Telegraph Co. 40; Western Union TeL Ca v. Tag- V. Adams, 155 U. S. 688; Cleveland, gart, 163 U. S. 1; People v. Temey, C, C. & St. L. B. Co. V. Backus, 138 57 Hun 357. City ordinances im- Ind. 513. posing an annual charge on the poles ' Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl- apd wires of a telegraph company vania, 114 U. S. 196. This case holds within a city are not regulations of that a New Jersey corporation en- interstate commerce: Philadelphia gaged wholly in the transportation v. American Union TeL Ca, 167 Pa. of persons and property between St. 406. In People v. Grold & Stock states, while subject in Pennsylvania TeL Co., 98 N. T. 67, a tax on a tele- to ordinary taxation on the value of graph company whoseline was partly OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 163 and locomotives and cars belonging to; a non-domestic .trans- portation company habitually used, or used interchangeably with others of like ownership, in such commerce in a state, may there be taxed as property, even though in the transac- tion of business they pass into adjoining states and territories.^ The tax may be fixed by taking the average number of a com- pany's cars, etc.,. used in such state,* or by assessing them or the company's capital stock in the ratio which the number of miles operated in the state bears to the total number of miles of the whole line.' As to railroad, telegraph, express, and sleeping-car com- panies engaged in interstate commerce, their property, in the several states through which their lines or business extend, may be valued as a unit for the purposes of taxation, taking into consideration the uses to which it is put, and all the elements making up aggregate value ; and a proportion of the whole, fairly and properly ascertained, — as by taking that part of the value of the entire road which is measured by the ratio of its length in the state to its total length, or by taking as the basis of assessment such proportion of the value of the company's within and partly without the state, Bain v. Richmond, 105 N. C. 363; measured by its capital stock, was Central R. Co. v. State Board, 49 sustained, N. J. L. 1. 1 Marye v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 2 American Refrig. Co. v. Hall, 174 137 U. S. 117; Pullman's Palace Car U. S. 70. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18; ' Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Penn- American Refrig. Co. v. Hall, 174 sylvania, 141 U. S. 18; Pullman's U. ^.70; Union Refrig. Co. v. Lynch, Palace Car Co. v. Twombly, 29 Fed. 177 U. S. 149; Pullman's Palace Car Rep. 658; Pullman's Palace Car Co. Co. V. Twombly, 39 Fed. Rep. 658; y. Board of Assessors, 55 Fed. Rep. Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Board of 306; Board of Assessors t. Pullman's Assessors, 55 Fed. Rep. 206; Board of Palace Car Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 37; Pull- Assessors V. Pullman's Palace Car man's Palace Car Co. v. Common- Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 87; Reinhart v. Mo- wealth, 107 Pa. St. 156. Where the Donald, 76 Fed. Rep. 403; Denver* equipment of a domestic railroad G. R. Co. V. Church, 17 Colo. 1; Hall corporation is used interchangeably V. American Refrig. Transit Co., 84 upon its lines within and without the Colo. 291 ; Pullman's Palace Car Co. state, its capital stock can only be V. Commonwealth, 107 Pa. St. 156; taxed in the proportion that the num- Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Lynch, ber of miles operated and equipped in 18 Utah 878. For cases which held one state bears tothe entire mileage: the contrary, see Appeal Tax Court Comijaonwealth v. Delaware, L. & V. PuUmah Palace Car Ca, 50 Md. W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 96. See Dela- 453; "state v. Stephens, 146 Mo. 662; ware R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206. 164 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. [CH. III. entite capital stoot'as the length of its lines in the state bears to the whole length of its lines — may be taxed lay the state without violating any federal restriction.^ And a state statute providing that when only part of a railroad lies in the state it shall pay taxes on such proportion of the valuation of its capital stock and funded and floating debt as the length of its road lying in the state bears to the entire length of the road, is not unconstitutional as laying a tax on interstate commerce.^ A state statute providing for the taxation of a telegraph com- pany upon its property within the state determined as above is invalid in so far as it provides for the issue of an injunction to restrain the company from transacting business untildelinquent taxes are paid.' While it is not within the power of one of two' states con- nected by a bridge over a navigable river to fix, without the consent of congress or the concurrence of the other state, tolls for passage over the bridge, thus attempting, to- regulate inter- state commerce of which the bridge is an instrument,* yet the fact that the bridge is such an instrument does not exempt_from state taxation so much of it as is within the limits of the state.' And a proportional state tax on the intangible property, within 1 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Massa- Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Express v. Craw- chusetts, 125 U. S. 530; Pullman's ford County, 63 Ark. 576; .Cleveland, Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 C, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 U. S. 18; Attorney-General v. West- Ind. 513; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. E. em Union Tel. Co., 141 U. S. 40; Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 625; Evans- Maine V. Grand Trunk R. Co., 143 ville & L R. Co. v. West, 138 Ind. 697; U. S. 17; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Cleve- 141 Ind. 381; State v. Adams Express land, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, Co., 144 Ind. 549; State v. Jones, 51 154 U. S. 439; Western Union Tel. Co. Ohio St. 543; Commonwealth v. PuU- V. Taggart, 163 U. S. 1; Adams Ex- man's Palace Car Co., 107 Pa. St. 156. press Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 2 state v. New York, N. H. & H. E. U. S. 194, 166 U. S. 185; Adams Ex- Co., 60 Conn. 336. press Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171; ' Western Union TeL Co. v. Massa- PuUman'S Palace Car Co. v. Twom- chusetts, 125 U. S. 530. See In re bly, 29 Fed. Rep. 658;" Attorney-Gen- Pennsylvania Tel. Co., 48 N. J. Eq. 91. eral v. Western Union Tel. Co., 33 * Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Ken- Fed. Rep. 139; Pullman's Palace Car tucky, 154 U. S. 204 Co. V. Board of Assessors, 55 Fed. Rep. * Henderson Bridge Co. v. Hender- 206; Board of Assessors v. Pullman's son, 141 U. S. 679; Pittsburgh, C, C. Palace Car Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 37: Rein- & St. L. R. Co. v. Board of Public hart v. McDonald, 76 Fed. Rep. 303; Works, 172 U. S. 232. CH. III.J LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 165 the state, of a bridge company owning such a bridge, is not a tax on interstate commerce ■vyhen the business of transportation is not carried on by the bridge company but by persons and corporations who pay tolls to it ; ' the fact that the tax may tend to increase the tolls being too remote and incidental to make it a tax on the business transacted.^ So, too, interstate com- merce is not taxe^ by taxing the capital stock of a bridge com- pany which holds an interstate bridge, but does not transact any interstate business over it.' Ifor does the fact that such a bridge is used by the corporation controlling it for purposes of interstate commerce exempt it from taxation by the state within whose limits it is permanently located, although the state can- not by its laws impose direct burdens upon the conduct of in- terstate commerce carried on over the bridge.'' A tax on freight, taken up within a state and carried out of it, or taken up out of a state and brought within it, is a tax upon commerce between the states, and therefore inadmissible ; and it is immaterial that no distinction is made between freight carried wholly within the state and-that brought into or carried through or out of it.* And property delivered to a carrier for transporta- tion, and in its hands for a reasonable time awaiting shipment to points out of the state, is within the protection of this rule and not taxable.^ And if the property is purchased by one who is resident abroad, and is distinctly set apart for export, it is not taxable, though not yet on shipboard.' Still more plainly would the property be non-taxable if it were merely in transit through the state.' Property bought within a state t® be shipped out of it, but not yet started on its destination, and 1 Henderson Bridge Co. v. Ken- 232. See Erie R. Go. v. State, 31 N. tucky, 166 U. S. 150; Henderson J.-^L. 531. Bridge Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. ^ Ogilvie v. Crawford County, 7 623. Fed. Rep. 745: Stats v. Carrigan, 39 2 Henderson Bridge Co. v. Ken- N. J. L. 35. A tax on all coal re- tuoky, 166 U. S. 150. oeived by carriers and to be carried 'Keokuk, etc. Bridge Co. v. lUi- to points either within or without nois, 176 IlL 267, 175 U. S. 626. the state was held to be a tax on ^Henderson Bridge Co. v. Hender- commerce: State v. Railroad Co., 40 son, 173 U. S. 592; Henderson Bridge Md. 22. Co. V. Henderson (Ky.), 36 S. W. Rep. ' Blount v. Munroe County, 60 Ga. 561. See Louisville Bridge Co. v. 61; Clarke v. Clarke, 3 Woods 405. Louisville, 81 Ky. 189. . 8 standard Oil Co. v. Bachelor, 89 5 State Freight-Tax Cases, 15 WalL Ind. 1 ; State v. Carrigan, 29 N. J. L. 166 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. [CH. III. awaiting a finishing process, Is taxable with other property within the state; ^ and so is grain bought on commission for shipment ; "^ and so are cattle owned out of the state but kept in it several months for pasturage.' A tax on travel may be as clearly void as any other tax on interstate or foreign intercourse. The state cannot tax the privilege of passing out of or coming into the state, either di- rectly by levying the tax on the person going or coming, or indirectly by requiring carriSrs to pay a tax in respect to each person carried or brought by them.* A state statute requiring corpoi'ate officers to deduct a state tax in paying interest on bonds 6f the corporation owned by residents of the state is not a regulation of interstate or for- eign commerce.' The requirement by a state that a revenue stamp shall be affixed to a bill of exchange or a bill of lading drawn in one state and payable in another is a tax on com- 35; State Freight-Tax Gases, 15 WalL 233. That cattle received by dealers were purchased for export does not constitute them property in transit: Meyers v. County Com'rs, 83 Md. 385. 1 Powell V. Madison, 21 Ind. 835; Rieman v. Shepard, 37 Ind. 288; Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 96 Ind. 179; Carrier v. Gordon, 31 Ohio St. 605. In this last case it is held that property not yet removed from the place of its purchase cannot be con- sidered as in transit because of any intent to ship it: See Cole v. Ran- dolph, 31 La. An. 535. 2 Walton V. Westwood, 78 111. 135. Coal brought into a state for sale is taxable there: Brown v. Houston, 33 La. An. 843; Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. V. Bates. 156 U. S. 557, 40 La. An. 326. s-Hardesty v. Fleming, 57 Tex. 895; Kelley v. Ehoads, 7 Wyo. 337. * Passenger Cases, 7 ^ow. 283, holding that a tax upon the masters of vessels engaged in foreign com- merce, of a certain sum on account of every passenger brought from a foreign country into the state is a tax upon commerce. It would make no dififerenoe that the master was permitted to give an indemnity bond instead of payment: Henderson v.' Maybr, 93 U. S., 359. A tax on alien passengers is none the less a tax on commerce because levied in aid of state inspection laws; those laws apply to property, not to persons: People V. Compagnie, etc., 107 U. S. 59. And see Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U. S. 275. A state tax of a cer- tain sum on every person leaving the state by public conveyance was held invalid in Crandall v. Nevada, 6 WaE 35; and in State Treasurer v. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 4 Houst. 158, a law imposing a tax on rail-' road companies of ten cents on every passenger carried within' the state, excepting soldiers and sailors of the United States, was held to be in ef- fect, a regulation of Interstate com- merce, and, therefore, invalid. See New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 103. " Commonwealth v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 150 Pa. St. 234; Com- monwealth V. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 150 Pa. St 245. on. m.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING FOWEE. 167 meroe.^ But a tax on exchange and, money brokers;^ a city license tax upon persons engaged in a commercial street brok- erage in the city;' a tax on legacies to aliens;^ a tax on the business of selling farm produce on commission ; " and a tax upon persons engaged in packing or canning oysters, which tax is applicable to oysters caught in and shipped from another state,^ — have all bepn sustained against the objection that in effect they were a tax upon commerce and an interference with the constitutional powers of congress. The fact that taxation tends to increase the expenses at- tendant upon the use or possession of the Hiing taxed does not of itself constitute an objection to such taxation as a burden upon interstate commerce.' " Every tax upon personal prop- erty, or upon occupations', business or franchises, affects more or less the subjects and the operations of commerce ; yet it is not everything that affects commerce that amounts to a regu- lation of it, within the meaning of the constitution."' The interference with the commercial power must be direct, and not the mere incidental effect of the requirempnt of the usual proportional contributions to public maintenance.' The constitutional power of congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes is not interfered with when a state or territory subjects to "local taxation the property of others than Indians upon an Indian reservation ; and where cattle are by outsiders placed for grazing purposes upon such a reservation, taxation of them by a territory is not a violation of the rights of the Indians or an invasion of the jurisdiction and control of the United States over them and their lands.^" It has been de- cided that the property of railway companies traversing Indian reservations is subject to taxation by the states and territories in which such reservations are located.'^ A state tax upon a licensed trader within an Indian reservation has been held 1 Almy V. California, 24 How. 169. 8 State Tax on E'y Gross Receipts, See Woodruff v. Parham, 8 WalL 133, .15 Wall. 383. 137. 'Erie R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 158 2 Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73. U. S. 431; Henderson Bridge -Co. v. 3 Walton V. Augusta, 104 Ga. 757. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 150. < Mager V. Grima, 8 How. 490. "Thomas v. Gay, 169 TT. S. 364; •State V. Wagener, 77 Minn. 483. Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U. S. 588; Gay «Applegarth v. State, 89 Md. 140. v. Thomas, 5 OkL 1. 'Delaware E. Tax, 18 Wall. 306. "Utah & N. R. Co. v. Fisher, 116 168 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. HI. void,' while on the other hand the stock in trade of such a trader, and cattle and horses belonging to him but kept on the reservation with the consent of the Indians, have been de- clared not to be exempt from state and county taxation.* Taxes in abridgment of the privileges and immunities of citizens. The federal constitution provides that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immu- nities of citizens of the several states,' and that no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.* The obvious purpose of the first of these provisions is to preclude the sev- eral states from discriminating in their legislation' against the citizens of other states.' Therefore, a state law which imposes upon citizens of other states higher taxes or duties than are imposed upon citizens of the state laying them, is void,' as is also one which denies to non-residents of the state rights al- lowed to residents under the same circumstances, in respect to deductions from taxable personalty by reason of debts owed by the taxpayer;' and the principle applies to privilege taxes and taxes upon business, and precludes a state from levying upon traders from other states a license tax greater than is re- quired of its own citizens.* Nor can a state, while exempting TJ. S. 38; Maricopa & P. E. Co. v. Ari- Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen zona, 156 U. S. 347. See Trescott 368; Farmington v. Downing, 67 V. Hurlbut Land, etc. Co., 73 Fed. N. H. 441. See Farris v. Henderson, Eep. 60; Delinquent List v. Territory 1 OIsL 384 (Ariz.), 36 Pac. Eep. 310. 'Sprague v. Fletcher, 69 Vt. 69. 'Foster v. Oom'rs, 7 Minn. 84 8 Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; 2 Cosier v. McMillan, 33 Mont. Cullman v. Arndt, 135 Ala. 581 ; Gonld 484; Moore v. Season, 7 Wyo. 393. v. Atlanta, 55 Ga. 678; Indianapolis 8 VJ. S. Const., art. IV, § 3, par. 1. v. Bieler, 138 Ind. 30; Marshalltown *U, S. Const., Amend. XIV. -v. Blum, 58 Iowa 184; McGuire v. 5 Paul V. Virginia, 8 Wall 168 Ward V. Maryland, 13 Wall. 418 Williams v. BrufEy, 96 U. S. 176, 183 Corfleld v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371 Parker, 33 La. An. 833; Eodgers v. Kent Circuit Judge, 115 Mich. 441; Crow V. State, 14 Mo. 337; State v. North, 37 Mo. 464; State v. Lancaster, Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147; Jackson 63 N. H. 367; Commonwealth v. Sny- V. Bullock, 13 Conn. 38; Bliss's Peti- der, 183 Pa. St. 630. A state cannoli tion, 63 N. H. 135; Lemon v. People, refuse a peddler's license to a citizen 20 N. Y. 563. of another state asked for upon the 8 Corfield v, Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. same terms that it grants license? to 371; Wiley v. Palmer, 14 Ala. 637; its own citizens: Bliss's Petition, 63 Scott V. Watkins, 32 Ark. 556, 564; N. H. 135. A tax was held void which CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 16{ its own citizens from a tax on their inheritances, impose sucl a tax on inheritances falling to citizens of other states.' A state law is void which provides that no person shall be licensee to engage in a particular employment unless he has been i resident of the state for a year;^ but mere matters of detail ii revenue legislation which make distinctions in forms and pro cedure in the taxation of residents and non-residents, but whicl have in view the securing of uniformity in the burden, and arc adopted because supposed to be necessary to that end, are noi objectionable, where a difference in circumstances seems tc justify different regulations.' discriminated in favor of goods bought from a resident who had paid his occupation tax against those bought from a non-resident who was liable to no such tax: Albertson v. Wallace, 81 N. C. 479. A provision of a town charter authorizing a tax upon auction sales, except such as are made by citizens of the town or county who are bona fide owners of the property, discriminates against citizens of other states, and is in- valid: Daniel v. Trustees of Rich- mond, 78 Ky. 543. 1 In re Stanford's Estate (Cal.), 54 Pac. Rep. 359. 2 In re Watson, 15 Fed. Rep. 511. The ground of decision in this case was, however, referred to the com- merce power. So it was also in Wel- ton V. Missouri, 91 U. S. 375, where the discrimination was against goods the produce or manufacture of other states. Possibly in each case the in- validity of the law might have been referred to the clause now under consideration. See Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676. The right to fol- ■ low the ordinary employments is one of the privileges of citizens, though the state may regulate them under its police power: Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36. And may require the taking out of a license by those pursuing them, provided there is no discrimination' in doing so against citizens of other states: State v. Nor ris, 78 N. C. 443; Corson v. State, 5' Md. 351. And a state may impose i license tax on one who is engaged ii hiring laborers to be employed in an other state — no distinction beiuj made in the tax against non-resi dents: Shepperd v. Sumter Co., 51 Ga. 535; Williams v. Fears, 110 Ga 584, 179 U. S. 370. 'See Redd v. St. Francis County 17 Ark. 416. A statute levying taxei on personalty only, e. g., cattle graz ing on Indian reservations unde leases granted by the Indians, can not be regarded as an unjust dis crimination against non-residents because exempting real property Treating personal property as on( class and real estate as another is no an illegal discrimination: Thomai V. Gay, 169 U. S. 364. A state statuti requiring the treasurer of each pri vate corporation doing business ij the state to deduct the state ta; from the interest paid on any bond etc., does not contravene the federa constitution as providing for an ur just discrimination in favor of pei sons owning bonds of foreign corpo rations: Jennings v. Coal Ridge Imp etc. Co., 147 U. S. 147, following Rail road Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. £ 333. A state statute providing fo the taxation of shares of capita stock in insurance companies wa 170 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. [CH. III. It has been decided that the privileges or immunities of citi- zens of other states are not abridged by a statute declaring that no commercial fertilizers shall be sold or offered for sale until the manufacturer or importer obtains a license from the state for each brand; ^ or by a state law which provides that every " merchant - ... or other dealer " who shall buy and sell goods not specially taxed elsewhere shall, in addition to- his ad valorem tax on his stock, pay a license tax " on the total amount of his purchases in or out of the state," except pur- chases of farm products from the producer ; ^ or where, by a general tax act, a specific tax is assessed upon every sewing- machine company selling or dealing in sewing-machines by itself or its agents in the state, even though there are, in point of fact, no domestic companies engaged in such business within the state.' Nor are those privileges and immunities impaired by a statute imposing a license tax upon a person who sells or offers for sale by retail manufacturing implements dr machines whereof he is not the owner.^ But when, in addition to being in violation of the constitution of the state, a taxing statute, or a tax laid under a statute, results in an arbitrary and op- pressive discrimination against a large class of citizens or a large species of property, it is an abridgment of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.' It has also been held that the equal-privilege clause of the federal consti- tution does not secure to a merchant who pays taxes in hia held not to contravene the clauses Rep. 299. And a state law imposing- of the federal constitution in regard an inheritance tax is not objeotlon- to tlie privileges and immunities of able because it discriminates among citizens because of its provisions for collateral kindred; the right to re- tbe taxation of non-residents' shares oeive property by inheritance not of capital stock in insurance com- being guaranteed by the constitu- panies. Nor are those clauses in- tion: Hagerty v. State, 55 Ohio St. fringed by a state statute providing 613. that all live stock brought into the * American Fertilizing Co. v. Board state for the purpose of grazing of Agria, 43 Fed. Rep. 609. should be taxed for the fiscal year * state v. French, 109 N. C. 728. during -which it -was brought into ' Singer Manuf. Co. v. Wright, 33 the state, and which vested the Fed. Rep. 121. county assessors with powers to col- ^ American Harrow Co. v. Shaffer, lect the same as soon as the property 68 Fed. Rep. 750, 166 U. S. 718. was brought into their counties : Kel- 'Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. ley V. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 287; State v. Taylor, 86 Fed. Rep. 168. Travelers' Ins. Co. (Conn.), 47 Atl. CH. ni.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. 171 home state the right to sell his goods in all other states free from taxation.^ According to the highest court of Maryland the prdvision of the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits the abridgment by a state of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States does not control the power of a state over its own citi- zens.^ But the supreme court of Yermont holds that the pro- vision in question applies to a discrimination by a state against its own citizens as well as to one in their favor, and that it avoids a statute requiring a license fee from peddlers of goods which are " the manufacture of this state." ' Corporations, Avhether domestic or foreign, are not citizens within the meaning of the clauses of the constitution now under, consideration.^ It is therefore no violation of the privileges and immunities of citizens of other states to require a corpora- tion, of which such citizens are stockholders, to submit to such taxation as the state shall see fit to impose as a condition of doing business therein.' Tiolations of treaty. Congress, in its legislation, may dis- regard a treaty if it shall see fit to do ^o,* but a state la"w im- posing taxation which would be repugnant to treaty stipulations would be void ; the treaty being " supreme law," anything in the constitution or laws of the state to the contrary notwith- standing.' 1 Ex parte Thornton, 18 Fed. Eep. erpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 538. Wall. 566; Ducat v. Chicago, lO Wall. 2 Short V. State, 80 Md. 393. 410; Pembina Consol. Co. v. Pennsyl- ' State V. Hoy t, 71 Vt. 59. vania, 135 U. 8. 181; Horn Silver « Paul V.Virginia, 8 WalL 168; Pern- Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. bina Consol. etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 305; Commonwealth v. New York, 125 U. S. 181; Norfolk & W. R. L. E. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 38. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114; »The Cherokee Tobacco, 11 Wall. Warren Manuf. Co. v. ^tna Ins. 616. See S. C, 1 Dill. 364; Thomas v. Co., 3 Paine 501; Commonwealth v. Gay, 169 U. S. 364; Ropes v. Clinch, Milton, 13 B. Monr. 213; Western 8 Blatch. 304 The case first men- Union TeL Co. V. Mayer, 38 Ohio St. tioned was one where an act of con- 521, 539. See McCready v. Virginia, gress extended the revenue laws over 94 U. S. 391, on the general subject; the Indian territories as respected also Bradweli v. State, 16 Wall 130; tobacco, regardless of provisions in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 18 WalL 129; prior treaties that exempted tobacco UnitedStatesv. Cruikshanks, 93U. S. raised by Indians on their reserva^ 542. tions. sPaul V. Virginia, 8 WalL 168; Liv- ' U. S. Const, art. 6. Treaties with 172 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. in.' Limitation of the rate of taxation. A limitation by con- stitution of tlie rate of taxation is self-executing,^ and so is any provision which takes from a state or its municipalities the power to tax or to contract debts for a specified purpose.* Statutes authorizing the levy of taxes in excess of a constitu- tional limitation upon their rate or amount are A^oid,' and the certain countries held to prevent the application of state laws imposing taxes on inheritances and successions : Succession of Rixner, 48 La. An. 558; Succession of Rabasse, 50 La. An. 746; Matter of Strobel, 5 App. Biv. (N. Y.) 631. See Frederickston v. State, 23 How. 445. 1 St. Joseph Board v. Patten, 63 Mo. 444; Austin v. Nalle, 85 Tex. 510* 2See Middleport'v. Insurance Co., 82 IlL 563; Hanson v. Vernon, 37 Iowa 28; Supervisors v. Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 460; Phillips v. Albany, 38 Wis. 340. This principle is recog- nized in all the railroad-aid cases and in all others where similar ques- tions have arisen. 3 State V. Stephens, 146 Mo. 663, and cases cited; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. V. Nemaha County, 50 Neb. 393, and cases cited. For all ordinary pur- poses of the state the levy cannot ex- ceed the limitations fixed by the con- stitution: People V. Scott, 9 Colo. 432; In re Appropriations, 13 Colo. 816; People v. State Board, 30 Colo. 220; Goody koontz v. People, 20 Colo. 374; Parks v. Com'rs, 23 Colo. 86. Where a section of the constitution, prohibiting an appropriation which would necessitate a state tax beyond the prescribed limit, excepts from its operations expenditures and appro- priations made to suppress insurrec- tion, to defend the state, or assist in defending the United States, the leg- islature may appropriate to pay bonds issued for such purpose any sum required, and may levy any rate of tax necessary to pay the same; but it cannot levy in excess of the prescribed rate to pay bonds issued to provide for the building of a state - capitol or for casual deficiencies: In re State Board of Equalization, 34 Colo. 446. The two-mill limitation imposed by the constitution of South Dakota upon the annual state tax applies only to the items constitut- ing "ordinary expenses" — embraced within the "general appropriation bill:" In re Limitation of Taxation, 3 S. D. 456. Under a constitutional provision that when the assessed val- uation of property in the state shall have reached a certain sum the tax for " state purposes " shall not exceed a rate named, a tax for the support of a state institution must be in- cluded in the rate fixed: People v. Scott, 9 Colo. 433. A tax levied for the completion and repair of the state ' penitentiary was held to be a tax for the support of a state chari- table institution within the excep- tion to the tax-rate limitation in the constitution: State v. Board of Com'rs, 8 Wyo. 104. The levy of a poll tax is not a violation of a pro- vision in the constitution limiting the taxing power of the state to four mills on each dollar of valuation: People V. Ames, 24 Colo. 433. A stat- ute providing for the assessment and taxation of railway cars not belong- ing to railroad companies, and re- quiring car companies to pay a per cent, state tax dn all such cars, was held to be a tax on property, and ob- noxious to an article in the constitu- tion limiting a property tax to two mills: State v. Stephens, 146 Mo. 663. A statute regulating the levy OH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWBE. 173 legislature cannot dispense either directly or indirectly with restrictions imposed by the fundamental law upon the power of municipal corporations to incur debts or raise money by tax- ation,^ but all taxes imposed and all indebtedness incurred be- yond the limit specified by the constitution will be invalid.^ of taxes on railroad property by as- certaining from returns in the county clerk's office the average rate levied for school purposes by local boards, and charging to the railroad taxes at such average rate on the proportion- ate value of railroad property certi- fied to the clerk by, the state, does not conflict with a constitutional provision limiting the rate of taxa- tion for school purposes: State v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 73 Mo. 137; In re Taxes, 78 Mo. 596. Where the total state tax levy has exceeded the constitutional limit, reductions in different levies authorized by the same act of the legislature must be made pro rata if no preference is given in the act. People v. State Board, 20 Colo. 220. 1 See Lake County v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674; Elyton Land Co. 7. Bir- mingham, 89 Ala. 477. A constitu- tional provision fixing the maximum rate of taxation by municipal corpo- rations for educational purposes is violated by a statute prescribing that the state shall levy and collect a tax in excess of the prescribed limit, and pay the same over to the city's board of education: State v. Southern R. Co., 115 Ala. 250. The constitutional limitation upon the power of the legislature to assess and collect a tax for the support of free public schools cannot be exceeded in any form or guige for the support of such schools in a county, and is violated by a statute that attemptsto author- ize a county to issue bonds for pur- chasing a school-site, etc.: State v. L'Engle, 40 Fla. 392. Where the con- stitution provides that "county au-. thorities shall never assess taxes the aggregate of which shall exceed $1.50 per $100 valuation . . . unless- authorized by a vote of the people," the legislature cannot authorize the issue of warrants to an amount that would require a higher rate of taxa- tion: In re House Roll, 81 Neb. 505. A statute authorizing a town to levy a capitation tax of not less than fifty cents for school purposes contra- venes a constitutional provision that the general assembly may levy a capitation tax not to exceed $1 per annum for school purposes, and that counties and corporations may im- pose a capitation tax not exceeding fifty cents for all purposes: Robert- son V. Preston, 97 Va. 296. A consti- tutional provision limiting to a cer- tain sum the amount that boards of supervisors may raise by taxation for constructing or repairing high- ways is violated by a statute author- izing such boards, by means of rqad districts, to levy without limit for the construction, etc., of roads: Da- vies V. Board of Supervisors, 89 Mich. 295. An article of the constitution that no county shall levy an annual tax at a rate greater than oiie-half of one per cent, is not violated by a statute requiring the levy of a spe- cial tax of one-tenth of one per cent, for building bridges: State v. Street, 117 Ala. 203. Where a city charter had been repealed so that the duty of taxing for what formerly were municipal purposes devolved on the legislature, that body could impose a tax in excess of the constitutional limitation for state purposes: Hare V. Kennerly, 83 Ala. 608. ^Ayers v. McCalla, 95 Ga. 555; Schneewind v. Niles, 103 Mich. 801; lU LnHTATIOITS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [CH. III. Nor will the fact that a tax in excess of the constitutional rate is levied pursuant to an order of court validate it.^ And where the constitution provides that the whole tax levy for the ordinary purposes of state and county government cannot ex- Peterson V. Kittredge, 63 Miss. 33: Arnold v. Hawkins, 95 Mo. 560; La- mar Water, eta Co. v. Lamar, 128 Mo. 188; State v. "Weir, 83 Neb. 85; Young V. Lane, 43 Neb. 812; Chical^, B. & Q. R. Co. V. Nemaha County, 50 Neb. 393; State v. Worth, 116 N. C. 1007; Birkholz v. Dinnie,6 N. D. 511; Gadsby v. Portland (Dr.), 63 Pao. Eep. 14; Hebard v. Ashland County, 55 Wis. 145. A provision in the con- stitution limiting the power of cities to tax for municipal purposes does not invalidate a statute providing that the expense of renting a build- ing for a court-house in a certain city shall be paid by the city; any tax levied to meet such rent would be a tax for a state purpose: State v. Field, 119 Mo. 593. A constitutional provision limiting the amount which may be raised by taxation, and re- quiring the levy of a tax sufficient to keep open common schools four months of the year, prohibits exceed- ing the limit, e*en though, by keep- ing within it, the schools cannot be kept open for four months: Barks- dale V. Sampson County Com'rs, 93 N. C. 472. Though an act authoriz- ing a tax in excess of the rate fixed by the constitution would be invalid, yet when the rate has been in- creased by vote of the district as therein authorized, such increased ■ rate becomes the constitutional limit: Chicago & A. B. Co. v. Lam- kin, 97 Mo. 496. That a municipal- ity is indebted to the full constitu- tional limit does not prevent it from levying such taxes as it is author- ized to levy by law, and issuing its warrants within the limits of such levy in anticipation of their collec- tion; and, so long as the warrants issued are within the amounts law- fully levied, they do not create ^an additional debt: Shannon v. Huron, 9 S. D. 356; Lawrence County v. Meade County, 10 S. D. 175. See Fuller v. Heath, 89 111. 296. As to what are taxes for county purposes, or taxes levied by county authorities, so as to-be within constitutional limitations as to rate, see Wright v. Wabash, St. L. etc. E. Co., 120 111. 641; State v. Missouri Pac B. Ca, 123 Mo. 73; Brannon v. Cpunty Court, 33 W. Va. 789. Limitation of taxes in Nebraska in counties under town- ship organization: Chicago, B. & Q. R. Coi V. Klein, 52 Neb. 258. The linjiitation of parish or municipal tax- ation imposed by the constitution of Louisiana permits the levy up to the limit by either the parish or the cor- poration : Washington State Bank v. Baillie, 47 La. An. 1471. Construc- tion of constitutional provision as to litnit of rate of taxation for city or town piirposes : Lamar Water Works V. Lamar, 128 Mo. 188; Lufldn v. Gal- veston, 63 Tex. 437. Constitutional restriction in Kentucky of rate of indebtedness held to apply to school districts: City Council v. Powell (Ky.), 37 S. W. Rep. 1; Common- wealth V. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.), 48 S. W. Rep. 1092; Perry v. Brown (Ky.); 51 S. W. Rep. 457. The mere fact that a county court levies for county orders of former years outstanding and unpaid does not raise the pre- sumption that they represent in- debtedness beyond the constitutional limit: Armstrong v. Taylor County Court, 41 W. Va. 603. 1 Black V. McGonigle, 103 Mo. 192. The courts cannot compel the levy of a tax by a municipal corporation in CH, in.J LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. 175 oeed a certain rate, a tax levy for the state is paramount, and counties can only levy taxes to the extent that the power of taxation has not been exhausted by the state's levy.* It has been determined that a constitutional provision limit- ing city taxes to a certain rate of assessed valuation does not apply to special assessments for local improvements;' and the amount of tax authorized by the constitution and statutes of a state to be levied on property as such has no reference to specific taxes which may be imposed on occupations and priti- leges.' Taxes may be laid to pay debts contracted prior to the adop- tion of a constitution without regard to any limitation thereon as to the amount leviable. Such a limitation must be under- excess of the limit of taxation im- posed on the granting power, even at the suit of a creditor whose debt ■would otherwise remain unpaid, un- less the limitation is such an abridg- ment of the right of taxation existing a.t the time the debt was incurred as in effect to impair the obligation of a contract: Corbett v. Portland, 3J. Or. 407. And a limitation imposed by the law under which county bonds ^re issued upon the rate of taxation that may be levied for their pay- ment, enters into the contract and is -obligatoiy: State v. Shortridge, ,5Q Mo. 136; State v. Macon County Court, 68 Mo. 39. See United States V. Clark County, 96 U. S. 311; United -States V. Macon County, 99 U. S. 583; County Court v. United States, 109 U. S. 339; United States v. Town of Cicero, 50 Fed. Rep. 147; United States V. Knox County, 51 Fed. Rpp. 880. Purchasers of bonds are bound io take notice of the limitations ex- isting at the time of their purchase upon the taxing power: Miller v. Hixon (Ohio), 59 N. E. Rep. 749; United States v. Town of Cicero, 50 Fed. Rep. 147, citing United States v. Macon County, supra. 1 County Board v. Currituck Ctfunty •Com'rs, 107 N. 0. 110. 2 Gilson V. Board of Com'rs, 138 Ind. 65; Board of Com'rs v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500; Gosnell v. Louisville (Ky.), 46 S. W. Rep. 733; Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Gogreve, 41 La. An. 251; Board of Com'rs v. Mialegvich, 52 La. An. 1391; Kansas City v. Bacon, 147 Mo. 359, and cases cited. See Guthrie v. Territory, 1 Okl. 188. The constitution of North Carolina in requiring the legislature to pro- vide for the incorporation of cities, and "to restrict their power of tax- ation, assessment, borrowing money," etc., does not apply to special assess- ments for local improvements: Ral- eigh V. Peace, 110 N. C. 38. Sewer ' assessments are not within the iive per cent, limit beyond which, under the constitution of Iowa, a city may not increase its indebtedness: Davis V. Des Moines, 71 Iowa, 500. The limitation of two mills on the dollar of assessed value, prescribed by stat- ute in Iowa, applies only when the sewerage tax is levied on property without regard to its location, and does not prohibit a greater assess- ment against that which fronts on a street where a sewer is laidi Dittal V. Davenport, 74 Iowa, 66. 8 Goldsmith v. Huntsville, 30 Ala. 183. 176 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. [oh. ni. stood as making tacit exception of debts contracted while the power of the state to tax for their payment was unhampered ; and it would require terms in the constitution plainly applying the restriction to the previous debts to give it that effect.' Some constitutions make it the duty of the legislature, when creating a public corporation and delegating to it the power to tax, to impose restrictions on that power in order that it may not be abused. One object in all written constitutions is the protection of minorities agdfnst oppressive action on the part of majorities. Such oppressive action in the case of local bodies is not unlikely to consist in the levy of enormous taxes, or the incurring of enormous debts under the influence of tempo- rary excitements and passions, and perhaps for purposes which cooler reflection would condemn. The mandate that restric- tion be imposed is, therefore, very proper; but it is addressed to the discretion of the legislature, and there is no extraneous authority to regulate or to enforce its exercise.^ It has been 1 State V. New Orleans, 37 La. An. 13, 528; Stanberry V. Jordan, 145 Mo. 371; Trull v. Board of Com'rs, 78 N. O. 388; Clifton v. Wynne, 80 N. C. 145; Voorheis v. Houston, 70 Tex. 331. See Shreveport v. Cole, 139 TJ. S. 26; Mayfield Woolen Mills v. May- field (Ky.), 61 S. W. Rep. 43; Cobb v. Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. 1. Under a constitution providing that county authorities shall never assess taxes the aggregate of which shall exceed a certain rate, except in the payment of indebtedness existing at the adop- tion of the constitution, a tax above such limit to pay such indebtedness is not to be defeated by the fact that prior taxes had been levied for the same purpose, but misappropriated: Pope County v. Sloan, 92 111. 177. Charter limitation upon ac city's power to levy taxes to pay interest upon its bonds, and to crpate a sink- ing fund for the principal, are re- pealed by the adoption of a constitu- tion enacting that any municipal corporation becoming indebted shall, before or at the time, provide for a direct annual tax sufficient to pay interest as it becomes due and the principal within twenty years; such a provision is self -executing, and au- thorizes taxes sufficient to meet in- debtedness lawfully incurred since its adoption: East St Louis v. Peo- ple, 134 111. 655. 2 People V. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 487. In this case it was decided that the power of a police board to deter- mine what sums should be raised for its purposes was limited, the stat- ute confining the board to the neces- sary police expenses. And see Paine V. Spratley, 5 Kan. 525; Bank of Rome V. Rome, 18 N. Y. 38; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243, 348; Northern Ind. R Co. V. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159, 165; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio St. 636. A provision requiring the legislature to restrict the power of municipal taxation is not infringed by an act authorizing a town council to make such assessment on the in- habitants or persons holding prop-- erty in the town as shall appear ex- pedient: State V. Town Council, 39 CH. 111.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWER. 177 held that the power of the legislature to restrict municipal in- debtedness was not abrogated by a constitutional amendment making certain restriction of such indebtedness;' and a con- stitutional provision that no county shall be denied the. right of raising by special tax money to pay for jails, bridges, and other county conveniences does not preclude the legislature's imposing a limit on the amount of taxes which may be levied, by boards of supervisors, including such special taxes.^ Lim- itations by statute upon the rate of taxation will be considered hereafter.' Other restraints on the power of taxation. Great as is the power of the state to tax, the people may limit its exercise by the legislative authority at pleasure. This, however, can only be done by the consti,tution of the state,* and limitations or restrictions upon the exercise of this essential power of sov- ereignty can never be raised by implication, but the intention to impose them must be expressed in clear and unambiguous language.* And with the exception of the limitations and re- S. C. 5. Nor is such ^ provision vio- lated by an ordinance giving a tovyn "power to levy and collect taxes on all persons and subjects of taxation which it is in the power of the general assembly to tax lor state and county purposes: State v. Irwin, 126 N. C. 989. Such a provision is complied with in an act for a special street assessment by limiting it to an assessment in the middle of the block upon adjacent property: Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Ean. 186. Such a provision does not deprive the legislature of power to exempt the property of municipali- ties from assessments: Milwaukee Electric R. etc. Co. v. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 43. A constitutional provision requiring the legislature to provide ■ for the incorporation of cities, and "to restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money,'' etc., does not apply to special assessments for local improvements: Raleigh v. Peace, 110 N. C. 33. A district irri. gation law was held not unconstitu- 13 tional upon the ground that the power thereby conferred upon dis- tricts to levy taxes was without lim- itation, it being restricted to revenue suffioieijt to meet the obligations vol- untarily assumed by the taxpayers themselves: Board of Directors v. Collins, 46 Neb. 411. A provision In the constitution giving the legis- lature authority to restrict the power of cities in taxation and assess- ments, and to prevent abuses in assessments, will not prevent passing laws to limit the power of courts to set aside assessments: Matter of Mead, 74 N. T. 316. 1 State V. Tomahawk Common Council, 96 Wis. 73. 2 Peterson v. Kittredge, 65 Miss. 38. ^ Post, oh. XL * Board of Education v. MoEands- borough, 36 Ohio St. 337; Gilson v. Board, 138 Ind. 65; Com'rs v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500. 5 Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; State v. Parker, 83 N. J. L. 436, 178 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWBE. [CH. ni. strictions in this chapter mentioned or referred to, it must be taken as generally true that the power to tax is limited in ex- tent, in purpose, and in methods only by the will of the state as expressed in its laws.' Restrictions upon federal taxing power. The taxing power of congress is very extensive. It is given in the na- tional constitution with only one exception and only two qual- ifications:^ no tax or duty ^an be laid on articles exported from any state ; ' capitation or other direct * taxes must be laid in proportion to the federal census or enumeration, according to which the representation of the states in the popular branch of congress is determined; ' and all duties, imposts,' and ex- 435; Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat. 422, 426. In the absence of express, affirmative provision, prohibition of legislative power is not implied from the mere silence of the constitution in regard to any subject: Southern R. Co. v. St. aair County, 124 Ala. 491. A constitutional provision authorizing one county to impose special taxes for school purposes does not prevent the legislature from passing an act permitting another county to levy a local tax for such purposes: Ibid. If the constitution of a state contains no restriction on the legislative power to tax, except as to " prop- erty," the legislature has plenary power as to other subjects of taxa- tion: Capital City Water Co. v. Board of Revenue, 117 Ala. 303. 1 Schenck v. Jefifersonville, 152 Ind. 204 And see ante, p. 9. 2 License Tax Cases, 5 Wall 463; Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall 433; Veazie Bank v. Fen no, 8 Wall 433. See Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall 418. ' U. S. Const, art. I, § 9, par. 5. A tonnage duty on foreign vessels is not a tax on exports, and congress may lay such a duty on such vessels: Aguirre v. Maxwell, 3 Blatch. 140. An act of congress requiring a fee stamp to separate and identify to- bacco intended for exportation, thus relieving it from the tax to which other tobacco was subjected, did not impose a tax or duty on exports within the interdiction of the fed- eral constitution: Pace v. Burgess, 93 U. S. 372; Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U. & 504 But the stamp tax imposed on a foreign bill of lading by the act of congress of June 13, 1898, is in sub- stance and effect equivalent to a tax on the articles included in that bill of lading, and therefore a tax on ex- ports prohibited by the constitution: Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. a 283. * As to what are direct taxes within the meaning of this clause of the federal constitution, see ante, pp. 10, 11. s U. S. Const, art I, § 9, par. 4 S"An 'impost' is a duty on im- ported goods and merchandise. In a larger sense it is any tax or impo- sition ; and ' duties and imposts ' were probably intended to comprehend every species of tax or contribution not included in the ordinary terms 'taxes and excises: ' " Insurance Ca V. Soule, 7 Wall 433. "An impost, or a duty on imports, is a custom or tax levied on articles brought into a country:" Brown v. Maryland, 12 Waa 418. * CH. III.] LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEE. .179 cises * must be uniform ^ throughout the United States.' " There are, indeed," to use the words of an opinion of the federal su- preme court, "certain virtual limitations, arising from the principle of the constitution itself. It would undoubtedly be an abuse of the power if so exercised as to impair the separate existence and independent self-government of the states, or if exercised for ends inconsistent with the limited grants of power in the constitution." * It has been decided that congress has power to impose on ship-owners a tax of a certain sum for each passenger, not a citizen of this country, who is brought into one of our ports. The power to pass such acts is. not in the states, but in the CTnited States; and the burden imposed is not strictly a tax, but is laid under the power to regulate immigration, and in the very act of exercising that power.* It has also been held by the supreme court of the CTnited States that congress, in 1 " ' Excise ' is defined to be an in- land imposition, sometimes upon the consumption of the commodity, and sometim es upon the direct sale ; some- times upon the manufacturer, and ' sometimes upon the consumer: " In- surance Co. V. Soule, 7 Wall. 433. 2 The uniformity here required is a geographical uniformity, synony- mous with the expression " to oper- ate uniformly throughout the United States:" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41; State v. Travelers' Ins. Co. (Conn.)", 47 Atl. Rep. 399. A tax is uniform, within the meaning of the federal constitution, when it oper- ates with the same efifect in all places where the subject of it is found; and it is not wanting in such uniformity because the thing taxed is not equally distributed in all parts of the United States: Head-Money Cases, 113 U. S. . 580. A tax upon distillers is uniform in its operation if it is assessed upon all distillers wherever they are, not establishing one rule for one distiller and a different rule for another, but the same rule for all alike: United States V. Singer, 15 Wall. Ill, 131. The uniformity requisite is that of the law, not of its enforcement; so held of the federal internal revenue law during the rebellion: United States V. Riley, 5 Blatch. 804. Against the objection that the tax upon sales at an exchange or board of trade was not " uniform throughout the United States," it was decided that such sales constituted a proper basis for a clas- sification which excluded from tax- ation all sales made elsewhere: Nicol V. Ames, 173 U. S. 509. This require- ment of uniformity is not violated by the act of congress of June. 13, 1898, levying succession duties, which exempts legacies and distributive shares in - personal property below $1,000. classifies the rate of tax ac- cording to the relationship or ab- sence of the relationship of the tes- tator to the deceased, and provides for a rate progressing by the amount of the legacy or share: Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41. 3U. S. Const, art. I, § 8, par. 1. * Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 WalL 533, 541. And see ante, pp. 133, 134. 6 Head-Money Cases (Edge v. Rob- ertson), 113 U. S. 580. 180 LIMITATIONS OF THE TAXING POWEK. [oH. III. ^imposing a tax upon sales at an exchange or board of trade, does not illegally interfere with the internal commerce of the states by requiring the person selling to iriake a written mem- orandum of the contract.^ Congress has full power to impose a stamp tax upon agreements to sell stock and agreements of sale of stock ; ^ and, although the power to regulate" succes- sions is lodged solely in the several states, congress has author- ity to tax the transmission or receipt of property upon the owners death.' The general rule is laid down by the supreme court of the United States in a recent case where it js said that " subject to a compliance with the limitation of the constitu- tion the taxing power of congress extends to all the usual ob- jects of taxation." * 1 Treat v. White, 181 U. S. 264. This cents on each $100 of face value or case holds that a "call" for stock fraction thereof, which contains an absolute promise 2 Nicol v. Ames, 173 IT. S. 509. to sell the stock aH; any time within s Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41. fifteen days at a certain price, is an < Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, " agreement to sell " within the mean- 68. As to the general power of con- ing of the war revenue act of June gress to tax, see United States v. 13, 1898, requiring a stamp tax of two McKinley, 4 Bre wst. 246. OHAPTEE IV. THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. The general rule. It is implied in all definitions of taxa- tion that taxes can be levied for public purposes only.* Dif- ferences of opinion frequently arise concerning the power to impose taxation in particular cases, but all writers who treat 1 Olcott V. Fond du Lao County, 16 Wall 678; Loan Assoc, v. Topeka, 20 Wall 655; Jarrott v. Moberly, 103 U. S. 580 ; Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U. S. 81; Osborne v. Adams County, 106 U. S. 181; Parkersburg V. Brown, 106 D. S. 487; Osborne v. Adams County, 109 U. S. 1; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1; Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Brad- ley, 164 U. S. 112; Citizens', etc. Sav. Assoc. V. Topeka, 3 Dill. 376; Suther- land-Innes Co. v. Evart, 86 Fed. Rep. 397,50 C. C. A. 305; Mobile v. Dar- gan, 45 Ala. 310; Stockton, etc. R. Co. V. Stockton, 41 Cal. 173; Bradley V. New York, etc. R. Co., 21 Conn. 305; Ferris v. Vannier, 6 Dak. 186; Gurnee v. Chicago, 40 III 165; Scam- mon V. Chicago, 44 111. 269; Bissell v. Kankakee, 64 111. 249; English v. Peo- ple, 96 111. 566: Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 302 ; Sohenck v. Jefferson ville, 152 Ind. 204; Hanson y. Vernon, 27 Iowa 28; Clark v. Des Moiues, 19 Iowa 199; Warren v. Henly, 31 Iowa 31 ; State v. Osawkee T'p, 14 Kan. 418; Spencer v. Joint School Dist, 15 Kan. 262; Central Branch, etc. R. Co. v. Smith, 28 Kan. 745; Cypress Pond Draining Co. v. Hooper, 2 Meto. (Ky.) 350; State v. Clinton, 26 La. An. 561 ; Opinion of Justices, 58 Me. 590; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124; State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 Me. 518; Industrial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 335; Baltimore & E. S. R. Co. V. Spring, 80 Md. 510; Revell V. Annapolis, 81 Md. 1 ; Lowell v. Oli- ver, 8 Allen 247; Freeland v. Hast- ings, 10 Allen 570; Dorganv. Boston, 12 Allen 223; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454; People v. Salem T'p Board, 20 Mich. 453; Bay City v. State Treas- urer, 23 Mich. 499 ; Butler v. Saginaw Supervisors, 26 Mich, 22; Attorney- General V. Bay Supervisors, 34 Mich. 46 ; Silsbee V. Stookle, 44 Mich. 561 ; An- derson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 477; ChaflEee's Appeal, 56 Mich. 244; Davis v. Ontona- gon Supervisors, 64 Mich. 404; Cleev. Sanders, 74 Mich. 692; Dodge v. Van Buren Circuit Judge, 118 Mich. 189; Attorney-General v. Pingree, 120 Mich. 550; Michigan Sugar Co. v. Auditor General, 134 Mich. 674; State V. Foley, 80 Minn. 350; Coates v. Campbell, 87 Minn. 498 ; William Deer- ing & Co. V. Peterson, 75 Minn. 118; Lien v. Board of Supervisors, 80 Minn. 58; Hitchcock v. St. Louis, 49 Mo. 464; State v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287; Bradshaw v. Omaha, 1 Neb. 16; State V. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556; Gove v. Ep- ping, 41 N. H. 689; Baldwin v. Fuller, 39 N. J. L. 576; Blizabethtown Water Co. V. Wade, 59 N. J. L. 78; Matter of New York, 11 Johns. 80; Bloodgood V. Mohawk, etc. R. Co., 18 Wend. 9; People V. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401; People V. BatcheUor, 53 N. Y. 128; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; Spencer v. 182 PURPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [oh. IV. the subject theoretically and all jurists agree in the funda- mental requirement that the purpose shall be public, and they differ, when they differ at all, upon the question whether the particular purpose proposed is within the requirement.^ It is also agreed that the determination what is and what is not a public purpose belongs in the first instance to the legislative department.'^ It belongs there because the taxing power is a branch of the legislative, and the legislature cannot lie under the necessity of requiring the opinion or the consent of an- other department of the government before it will be at lib- erty to exercise one of its acknowledged powers. The inde- pendence of the legislature is an axiom in government; and to be independent, it must act in its own good time, on its own judgment, influenced by its own reasons, restrained only as the people may have seen fit to restrain the grant of legisla- tive power in making it. The legislature must, consequently, determine for itself, in every instance, whether a particular purpose is or is not one which so far concerns the public as to render taxation admissible.' Merchant, 100 N. Y. 585; Bush v. Board of Supervisors, 159 N. Y. 213; In re Tuthill, 163 N. Y. 133; Eeeves V. Wood County, 8 Ohio St. 333 ; Seely V. Sebastian, 4 Oregon 25; Sharpless V. Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 147; Phila- delphia Assoc. V. Wood, 39 Pa. St. 73; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 153; Feldman v. Charleston, 33 S. C. 57; Shaqnon v. Huron, 9 S. D. 356; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Davidson County, 1 Sneed 637; Kerr v. Wooley, 3 Utah 456; Williams v. School Dist, 33 Vt. 371; Tyler v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648, 651; Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178; First Nat. Bank j. Concord, 50 Vt. 357; Knovrlton v. Rock .County, 9 Wis. 410; Soens v. Racine, 10 Wis. 371 ; Hasbrook v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 37; Brodhead v. Milv^aukee, 19 Wis. 624; Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; Whiting V. Sheboygan, etc. R. Co., 35 Wis) 167; Wauwatosa v. Gunyon, 35 Wis.' 271; State v, Tappan, 39 Wis. 664; Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 461. In a constitutional pro- vision that "taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes only," the word " tax " includes every character and kind of tax, general or special; and an excise on the right to receive property by devise or inheritance by state regulations is a tax within such provision; State V. Switzler, 143 Mo. 387. Only for public purposes can the legislature authorize a city or town to tax its inhabitants: Prince v. Crocker, 166 Mass. 847. The delegated power of taxation can be used only for a pub- lic or governmental purpose as dis- tinguished from a private purpose: Shannon v. Huron, 9 S. D. 356. The legislative imposition of a tax-fee of six dollars for the benefit of the su- preme court library in each case de- cided by that court is a legitimate exercise of the taxing power: Swann V. Kidd, 71 Ala. 431. 1 Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Fire Depart- ment, 117 Ala. 631. 2 State V. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556. s Booth V. Woodbury, 33 Conn. 118; Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. CH. IV.] PUEPOSES FOE "WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. 183 But it is also generally admitted that the legislative deter- mination on this subject is not absolutely conclusive. It may be sufiBoiently so to put the ,administrative machinery of the state in motion ; but when the exaction is made of an individ- ual, and the power of the state is made use of to compel sub- mission, he has always the right to invoke the protection of the law. And an appeal to the law for protection of individ- ual property must necessarily render the question, which lies at the foundation of the demand, a judicial question, upon which the courts cannot refuse to pass judgment. It has been forcibly, and yet very truly," said that an unlimited power in the legislature to make any and every thing lawful which it might see fit to call taxation, would, when plainly stated, be an unlimited power to plunder the citizen.^ In attempting to exercise the right, in any particular case, the legislature merely asserts its jurisdiction to act ; but questions of jurisdiction are not usually concluded by a decision in its favor made by the party claiming it; they necessarily remain open, and may be disputed anywhere. This is as true of courts as it is of the legislature; jurisdiction conies from the law, and is not ob- tained by any tribunal through a simple assertion that it exists. "When, therefore, the' question of the validity of taxation be- comes judicial, if it shall appear tha,t the exaction is' made for a purpose not public, the right of the individual to protection is clear. Such an exaction 'is not within the competency of the legislative power, and the attempt to enforce it, however hon- estly made, could only be an attempt to take property from , its possessor under an authority which the law of the land does not recognize. " The theory of our governments, state and national," it has l^een truly said, " is opposed to the deposit of unlimited power anywhere. The executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches of these governments are all of limited 147; Harris v. Dubleuclet, 30 La. An. pie v. Salem T'p Board, 20 Mich. 453, 662; Thomas V. Leland, 24 Wend. 65; 459; Hooper v. Emery, '14 Me. 375, Williams V. School Dist, 33 Vt. 371; 379; Allen v. Jay, 60 Me. 124, 139; Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178; Brod- Talbot v. Hudson, 16 Gray 417, 421 ; head v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624. Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen 570, iLoan Assoc, v. Topeka, 30 Wall. 575; State v. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556; 655; Cole v. La Grange, 113 U. S. 1; In re Flatbush, 60 N. Y. 398; Tyson Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 83, 92; v. School Directors, 51 Pa. St. 9; Hanson v. Vernon, 37 Iowa 28; Peo- Washington Av., 69 Pa. St, 853. 184 PTTEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. [cH. IT, and defined powers. There are limitations on such powers which grow out of the essential nature of >all free governments ; implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the same. ... Of all the powers conferred upon government, that of taxation is most liable to abuse. Given a purpose or object fot which taxation may lawfully be' used, and ^e extent of its exercise is in its very nature unlimited. It is true that express limitation on the amount of tax to be levied or the things to be taxed may be imposed by constitution or statute, but in most instances for which taxes are levied — as the support of government, the prosecution of war, the national defense — any limitation is unsafe. The entire resources of the people should, in some instances, be at the disposal of the government. The power to tax is, therefore, the strongest, the most pervading of all the powers of government, reaching directly or indirectly to all classes of the people. . . . This power can as readily be employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity, to the other, if there is no iinplied limitation of the uses for which the power may be exercised. To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow it on favored indi- viduals to aid private enterprises and build up private fortunes, is none the less a robbery because it is done under the forms of law and is called taxation. This is not legislation. It is a decree under legislative forms." ^ Presumption in favor of legislation. It is not inconsist- ent with this doctrine that in every instance the highest Qon- sideration should be paid to the determination of the legisla- ture that a tax should be laid. It is not lightly to be assumed that its members have come to the examination of the subject with any other than public motives, or that they have failed 1 Miller, J., in Loan- Assoc, v. To- Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Curtis v. peka, 20 Wall. 655,663. And see Free- Whipple, 24Wis. 350; People v. Flagg, land V. Hastings, 10 Allen 570, 575; 46 N. Y. 401; Tyler v. Beaoher, 44 Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375, 379; Vt. 648, 651; Matter of Market St., 49 Allen V. Jay, 60 Me. 124; Gove v. Cal. 546. Epping, 41 N. H. 539; Cfowell v. OH. IV.] PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. 185 to give it due investigation or reflection. The presumption on the other hand must always be that they have considered it with honesty and fair purpose, and that their acti9n is the re- •sult of their deliberate judgment. And with all these pre- sumptions tending to support the legislative action, it would seem but reasonable and proper that the courts should support it when not clearly satisfied that an error has been committed.^ This is the general rule in constitutional law when the validity of legislation is involved,^ and it is applicable with peculiar force to the case of a legislative decision upon the purpose for which a tax may be laid. For, in the first place, there is no such thing as drawing a •clear and definite line of distinction between purposes of a public and those of a private nature.' Public and private in- terests are so commingled in many cases that it is difficult to •determine which predominates ; and the question whether the public interest is so distinct and clear as to justify taxation is 1 Hanson v. Vernon, 37 Iowa 28; State V. Clinton, 26 La. An. 561; State V. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287; Board of Com'rs v. Collins, 46 Neb. 884: State V. Cornell, 53 Neb. 556; Cum- mings V. Hyatt, 54 Neb. 35; Holt v. Antrim, 64 N. H. 284; State v. Wom- ble, 112 N. C. 863; Feldman v. Charles- ton, 23 S. C. 57. A township tax lev- ied to pay railroad-aid bonds will be presumed to have been levied for the payment of bonds issued before the constitutional prohibition of such bonds: State v. Mississippi River Bridge Co., 134 Mo. 321. 2 Story on Const., § 1483, and notes; Sedg. on Const.- and Stat. L. 414; Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 318, and numerous cases cited in notes. ^General Purposes of Taxation. These are enumerated by Adam Smith as follows: 1. The defense of the commonwealth. This includes the expenses of forts, arsenals, ships of war, a standing army and its equipment, the arming and disci- plining of the militia, military roads, and means of transportation of troops, etc. 3. The administration of justice. 3. The expense of public wofks and public institutions, of which he enumerates — (a.) Public works and institutions for facilitat- ing the commerce of the society — (b.) Institutions for the education of youth — (c.) Institutions for the in- struction of people of all ages. 4. The expense of , Supporting the dignity of the sovereign. Doctor Way land enumerates more perfectly the pur- poses for which the public funds are most commonly expended as fol- lows: 1. The expenses for the sup- port of civil government, including in these the compensation of judicial, legislative, and executive oflScers. 2. Expenses for the purposes of edu- cation, classified by him as common education and soientiflo education. 3. Expenses for maintaining relig- ious worship, which, however, he considers inadmissible. 4. Expenses for the improvement of coasts and harbors, and whatever is necessary for the security of external com- merce, and for roads, canals, etc. 5. Expenses of pauperism. 6. The ex- penses of war. 186 PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID, [CH. IV. often embarrassing to the legislature, and not less so to the judiciary. All attempts to lay down general rules whereby the difficul- ties may be solved have seemed, when new and peculiar cases arose, only to add to the embarrassment instead of furnishing the means of extrication from it.^ Money for a particular pur- pose may be raised by tax, it is said in one case, if there be the least possibility that it will b| promotive in any degree of the public welfare.'' "A tax law," it is said in another case, " must be considered valid unless it be for a purpose in which the community taxed has no interest ; when it is apparent that the burden is imposed for the benefit of others, and where it would be so pronounced at first blush.'" And still another presents the same idea in language but little different : . " To justify the court in arresting the proceedings and in declaring the tax void, the absence of all possible public interest in the purpose for which the funds are raised must be clear and palpable; so clear and palpable as to be perceptible by every mind at first blush." * These are very strong and sweeping assertions, but they are supported by many others equallj'^ emphatic and com- prehensive, which are to be met with in the adjudications of courts.* The very emphasis, however, with which the principle 1 Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Fire De- be so grossly perverted as to lose the partment, 17 Ala. 631. character of a legislative function — 2 Booth V. Woodbury, 33 Conn. 118, before the judiciary will feel them- 138, per Butler, J. A statement so selves entitled to interpose on con- strong in terms as to be -very liable stitutional grounds. To arrest the to convey to others a meaning not legislation of a free people, especially present in the judicial mind, in reference to burdens self-imposed ' Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa, for the common good, is to restrain St. 147, 174, following Cheaney v. the popular sovereignty, and should Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 380, 345, And have clear warrant in the letter of see Guilford v. Supervisors of Che- the fundamental law: " Schenley v, nango, 13 N, Y, 143, 149; English v. Allegheny City, 35 Pa, St, 138, 130, Oliver, 28 Ark. 317; State v. Cornell, per TToodward, J. See State v. Switz- 53 Neb, 556. ler, 143 Mo. 387; Durach's Appeal, 63 4 Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis, Pa. St 491, 495. That the motive of 624, 653, per Dixon, Ch, J. And see the legislature, in imposing a privl- Walker v. Cinncinnati, 31 Ohio St. lege tax on railroad companies " not 14; Speer v. School Directors, 50 Pa. paying an ad valorem tax," was to St. 150; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. deprive them of their advantage of St, 170. exemption from ad valorem taxation * " The exercise of the taxing power cannot be urged against the validity must become wantor), and unjust — of the act. The only concern of CH. IV.J PUEP0SE8 FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. 187 is declared renders it peculiarly liable to mislead, unless it is examined in the light of the adjudicated oases in which it has been applied, generally with explanations, and often with nec- essary qualifications.^ Grade of the gOTernment which taxes. In considering the legality of the purpose of any particular tax, a questiori of first importance must always concern the grade of the government which assumes to levy it. The "public " that is concerned in- a legal sense in any matter of government is the public the particular government has been provided for; and the " public purpose "for which that government may tax is one which concerns its own people, and not some other people having a government of its own, for whose wants taxes are laid. There may, therefore, be a public purpose as regards the federal Union, which would not be such as a basis for state taxation, and there may be a public purpose which would uphold state taxation, but not the taxation which its municipalities would be at liberty to vote and collect. The purpose must in every instance pertain to the sovereignty with which the tax origi- nates; it must be something within its jurisdiction so as to jus- courts is the validity of the tax; all tensible purpose of the act, and also else lies beyond their jurisdiction : for the storage of debris from mines. KnoxvUle & O. E. Co. v. Harris, 99 The court says: "The storage of de- Tenn. 684. When county commis- bris is, in its riature, a pripato enter- sioners have legislative povcer in re- prise, in which the few only are in- spect to taxes for ■ local purposes, terested. The drainage of a state is their discretion in deciding how a public purpose, in which the public much of the revenue shall be de- may be( interested. To promote a voted to one purpose, and how much public purpose by a tax levy upon -to others, will not be controlled: the ^ property in the state is within Long V. Com'rs of Richmond, 76 N. C. the power of the legislature; but the 273. And even though the purpose legislature has no power to impose in view in leyying the tax was an taxes for the benefit of individuals improper one, yet this will not pre- connected with a private enterprise, elude the collection of the tax, and even though the private enterprise its appropriation to proper objects: might benefit the local public in a Ibid. remote or collateral way: " People iThis is forcibly put by Dixon, Ch. v. Parks, 58 Cal. 634, 639. Where the J., in Whiting v. Sheboygan, etc. E. purpose for which a statute provides Co., 35 Wis. 167, 180. If a tax is laid taxation is partly public and partly for a public and also for a private private, and the amount to be raised purpose, it is void for excess in leg- for each cannot be distinguished and islative authority. In a drainage severed, the act is void: Coates v. law provision was made for the os- Campbell, 37 Minn. 498. 188 PTTEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. [OH. IV. tify its making provision for it. The rule is applicable to all the subordinate municipalities ; they are clothed with powers to accomplish certain objects, and for those objects they may tax, but not for others, however interf sting or important, which are the proper concern of any other government or jurisdiction. State expenses are not to be provided for by federal taxation, nor federal expenses by state taxation, because in neither case would the taxation be levied by the government upon whose public the burden of the expenses properly rests. To provide for such expenses would consequently not be a purpose in which the people taxed would in a legal sense be concerned. This is the general rule ; some apparent exceptions there unquestion- ably are, ■yvhere the nation and the state have common inter- ests and a common duty, such as may require the action of both, and would justify the levy of a tax by either or both to accomplish the one object. An illustration would be the case of a tax for the common defense against the public enemies, which might be levied by each, because the purpose would, in , a strict sense, be public as to both. The grade of the government is also important for another reason. A municipal government is one of delegated and lim- ited powers, whose authority will receive a somewhat strict construction,. rendering it necessary that it shall find the pur- poses for which it may tax clearly and unmistakably confided to its charge by the state. It is not sufficient that a purpose may seem to belong properly to its jurisdiction, or that the court may believe the municipality ought to have had author- ity over it; but it must be seen that the authority has been conferred in fact. It is otherwise with the state, which has all the> power of taxation not withheld from exercise iti the ■ making of the state and federal constitutions, and in support of whose action, consequently, the most liberal amendments are to be made. It is otherwise with the federal Union also; for though its powers are not general like those of the state, but are limited and defined by the federal constitution, yet as they concern the most important matters of government and relate to subjects not of domestic concern merely, but of inter- national intercourse, and to other matters which sometimes call for broad and comprehensive views, and make a policy of liberal expenditures wise and statesmanlike, it would be neither OH. IT.] PURPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. 189 reasonable nor prudent to subject its action in the matter of taxation to critical rules. That which it decides to be an ob- ject of public expenditure must generally, be so accepted, and error in its action must be corrected by discussion and throug\ public opinion and the elections. General expenses of governmept. Every government mua' provide for its general expenses by taxation ; and in these ar« to be included the cost of making provision for those public needs or conveniences for which, by express law or by genera'' usage, it devolves upon the particular government to supply. As regards the federal government, a geineral outline of these is to be found in the federal constitution. That government is charged with the common defense of the Union, and for that defense it may raise and support armies, create and main- tain a navy, build forts and arsenals, construct military roads, etc. It has a like power over the general subject of postoflBces and post-roads, and over other subjects enumerated in the fed- eral constitution and subjected to its authority. It may con- tract debts, and it must provide for their payment. For all national purposes it may levy taxes, and its power in so doing to select the subjects of taxation and to determine the rate and the methods is as full and complete as can exist in any sovereignty whatsoever, with the exceptions which are pre- scribed by the constitution itself.^ Some taxes levied by the federal government are directly calculated and intended to benefit private individuals. For an' illustration, it gives bounty land or pensions to those who have performed military or naval services for the country, notwith- standing it has made no promise, and is consequently under neither a legal nor a moral obligation to do so. But the pri- mary object in all such bounties is not the private but the pub- lic interest. To show gratitude for meritorious public services in the army and navy by liberal provision for those who have performed them is not only proper in itself, but it may rea- sonably be expected to have a powerful influence in inciting others to self-denying, faithful, and courageous services in the future, when the government, which is so ready to be gener- ous as well as just, shall have need of their assistance. The iSee, as to such exceptions, ante, pp. 178, 179., 190 PUEPOSES POE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [oh. it. same may be said of a like recognition of valuable public services rendered by other persons : the question in every case is not one of power, but of prudence and public policy.^ Imposts laid on any other consideration than the production of revenue have been often objected to as being only colorable taxation, and therefore not warranted by the taxing power. /But where the impost produces revenue, it is a tax, and it can- not be invalid merely because, if laid in some other way or at some other rate, the revenue would have been greater.' Nor 1 Taxation for the benefit of fire- men who have performed duty until they have earned exemption is law- ful, though by the constitution the state is prohibited from giving the money of the state '• to or in aid of any association, corporation, or pri- vate undertaking," it being paid in discharge of a moral obligation rest- ing jipon the state: Trustees of Fire- men's Fund V. Eoome, 93 N. Y. 313; Fire Dep't v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 142. In Phcenix Assur. Co. v. Fire De- partment, 117 Ala. 631, it is held that a statute requiring, fire insurance companies to pay an annual fee to the city fire department, to enable It to reward superior skill and exertion in its members, and provide for sick and disabled members or their fam- ilies, is valid. And in Firemen's Benev. Assoc, v. Lounsbury, 21 111. 510, the supreme court of Illinois held that the legislature may provide that foreign insurance companies shall be burdened for the benefit of a fire- men's benevolent association, and that the revenue resulting therefrom need not be paid into the public treasury. But in Indiana, a statute creating a firemen's pension fund, and providing that foreign insurance companies shall pay part of their net income to the fund, has been held not to be for a public purpose: Hen- derson V. London & L. Ins. Co., 135 Ind. 33. Where a statute provided that every agent of an insurance company should at certain times pay to the treasurer of a county or city a percentage of the premiums re- ceived on property insured by him within the county or city, the money, to constitute a firemen's relief fund, to be expended by the governing body of the fire department of the county or city, it was held that the object of the fund, if it was a public one at all, was a municipal purpose: San Francisco v. Liverpool, etc. Ins. Co., 74 Cal. 113. 2 " No doubt all taxation should be general and, as far as practicable, equal. Legislation either to benefit or bjarden particular classes, under the idea that it is for the good of the state at large, infringes upon the natural and guarantied right of ac- quiring, possessing, and protecting property, subject to fair and equal contributions" to the just and neces- sary expense's of government in the exercise of its proper and legitimate functions. A government which as- sumes the o£Sce of controlling and directing the lawful industry of the citizens into the channels which it may choose to deem best assumes what does not legitimately belong to it. Some states in modern times, in undertaking to find work for the peo- ple, have discovered that it was a sure way to make work for them- selves. But we cannot sit in judg- ment upon the wisdom or expediency of laws. An act of the legislature must clearly transcend the limits of the power confided to that depart- CH. IV.] PTJEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID.' 191 can the motives which have influenced the selection of objects for taxation, or determined the rate, be inquired' into for the purpose of invalidating it: proper motives in the legislature are always conclusively presumed.^ If, therefore, it should be conceded that a tariff of duties discriminating between arti- cles of merchandise in order to protect or encourage particular branches of home industry was unwise, impolitic, or contrary to the spirit of the federal constitution, it could not for that reason be treated as invalid. Of public policy in matters of federal taxation the congress must judge, and the spirit of the constitution is supposed to address Itself to the legislature rather than to the courts. Every tax must discriminate ; and only the authority that imposes it can determine how and in what directions. The motives that influence the members of a legislative body raise questions between them and their con- stituents alone.^ Indeed, it is only when a burden is imposed which it is impossible to bear; one which is laid not for the purpose of producing revenue, but in order to accomplish some ulterior object which the general government lacks the power otherwise to accomplish', that a case is presented which really can be said to be fairly debatable on the score of power. Such , a burden, it may be said with much force, comes under no definition of the word "tax" which is recognized in public law. It demands no contributions for the service of the state; it adds and is expected to add nothing to the public revenue. It annihilates that upon which it is levied, and it difl'ers from confiscation only in this, that confiscation seizes something of value, and appropriates it to the needs of the government, thus making it useful, while this seizes it for the purpose of destrucr tion only, fiut even in such cases, it is held that the presump- ment of government, or, more prop- Cooper, 33 Pa. St. 378; Wright v. De- erly speaking, it must -violate some frees, 8 Ind. 298, 302; Baltimore, 'v. prohibition, either express or neces- State, 15 Md. 876; Newman, Ex parte, sarily implied, either of the federal 9 Cal. 502; Lyon v. Morris, 16 Ga. 480; or state constitutipn, before it can be McCardle, Ex parte, 7 Wall. 506, 514; pronounced by the judicial depart- Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.)566; ment to be unconstitutional and Flint, etc. P. R. Co. v. Woodhull, 35 void." Sharswood, J., in Durach's Mich. 99, 103; State v. Hays, 49 Mo. Appeal, 63 Pa. St, 491, 495. 604» 607; State v. Fagan, 23 La. An. iGoddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh 130, 545. 154; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 533, z See Story on Const., § 1677; Veazie 545, 555; Sunbury & Erie K. Co. v. Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 548. 192 PURPOSES FOE ■WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [OH. ly. tion that correct motives have controlled the legislative action must preclude the judiciary from looking for a purpose in leg- islation beyond what the language imports.^ A like presump- tion supports the action of municipal legislative bodies.* It is sometimes a requirement of law that taxes should be raised for purposes specified in advance, to which alone the moneys can then be devoted ; but in the absence of any con- stitutional or legislative requirement on the subject, the local . authorities are not thus restficted.' Public purposes in general. For the most part the term "public purposes" is employed in the same sense in the law of taxation and in the law of eminent domain. But both in the legislation of the country and in the judicial decisions some dif- ferences have been recognized, and, as we think, with good reason. An appropriation under the right of eminent domain is only a forced sale which one is compelled to make for the public good. As the consideration paid on such sale is- pecuniary, and is supposed to be equal to the full value of what is taken, no injustice results to him whose property is appro- priated. On the other hand, no pecuniary consideration is paid when money is demanded under the power of taxation; and if the money is taken in order to be appropriated to private purposes, the benefits which the taxpayer might be presumed to receive from its being used for the needs of the government,, to enable it to protect and defend him and give him the benefits of organized society in common with its other citizens, are not realized. In such a case the supposed consideration to the indi- vidual for taking his property wholly fails. A more liberal construction of public purposes is consequently admissible in the law of eminent domain, where an error in the direction of , too great liberality could not be seriously detrimental, than in the law of taxation, where a like error would result in injustice which might be seriously harmful. There are provisions in a number of the state constitutions iVea2ii6 Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 278; People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532; 533, 548; Doyle v. Conn. Ins. Co., 94 Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 876. U. S. 535; Luehrman v. Taxing Dis- 2 Freeport v. Marks, 59 Pa. St. 259? triot, 2 Lea 435; Knoxville & O. R Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa 282. Co. V. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684; Sunbury 'Long v. Com'rs of Richmond, 7ft & Erie R. Co. V. Cooper, 83 Pa. St. N. C. 273. CH. IV.J PURPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. 193 under which one needing a private way across the land of an- other may have the way established against the will of the owner, by making out his necessity to the satisfaction of a proper public officer, or of a jury, and by paying such damages as shall be assessed against him. This is an extension of the law of eminent domain,^ but it has its foundation in public policy, and the appropriation is supposed to accomplish a pub- lic purpose in bringing into use a parcel of real property which otherwise would be or might be practically inaccessible. A proposition to make such a private way at the public expense by means of an exercise of the power of taxation would, by general consent, be pronounced wholly inadmissible, as being a proposition to appropriate the public revenues to a private purpose. The difference in the two cases is felt and appre- ciated the moment they are stated, and the wisdom of recog- nizing it in legislation has also been very generally felt. So there are some cases in which, without the aid of constitutional provisions, it has been held that individual property may be appropriated under the law of eminent domain, in order to enable private parties to establish and carry on their business enterprises, notwithstanding it would be incompetent to aid the same enterprises by payments from the public treasury.. An illustration is the case of lands appropriated for the purpose of creating a reservoir for water, by means of which a water power may be made available in private hands for manufact- uring purposes. The right to make the appropriation has been sustained, on the ground that, within the meaning of the law of eminent domain, land is taken for the public use when- ever its taking is for the general public advantage, and that the establishment of power for manufacturing purposes is an object of such great public interest — especially where manu- facturing is one of the great industrial pursuits of the common- wealth — as fully to justify the declaring it a public use and to authorize for the purpose the appropriation of private property by individuals or corporations.^ 1 In a few cases it has been held of Pooopson Road, 16 Pa. St. 15; Sher- that private roads might be laid out man v. Buick, 33 Cal. 241. by compulsory proceedings without ^ Hazen v. Essex Co., 13 Cush. 475, any such constitutional permission: 477, per ShcCw, Ch. J.; Great Falls Harvey v. Thomas, 10 Watts 63; Case Manuf. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N. H. 444, 13 194 PUEPOSES POE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [OH. lY. On the other handj the right to exercise the powet of taxa- tion in aid of the manufacturing enterprises of private persons or corporations has seldom been asserted, and whenever as- serted has been most emphatically denied. It has been well and forcibly said that : " Individuals and corporations embark in manufaptures for the purpose of personal and corporate gain. Their purposes and objects are precisely the same as those of the farmer, the mechanic, or the day laborer. They engage in the selected branch of manufactures for the purpose and with the hope and expectation not of loss but of profit. . . The general benefit to the community resulting from every descrip- tion of well directed labor is of the same character, whatever may be the branch of industry upon which it may be expended. All useful laborers, no matter what the field of labor, serve the state by increasing the aggregate of its products — its wealth. There is nothing of a public nature any more entitling the manufacturer to public gifts, than the sailor, the mechanic, the lumberman, or the farmer. Our government is based upon equality of rights. All honest employments are honorable. The state cannot rightfully discriminate among occupations, for a discriminsTtion in favor of one branch of industry is a dis- crimination adverse to all other branches. The state is equally to protect all, giving no undue advantage or special or exclu- sive preference to any." ^ '458, per Perley, Ch. J. The following Cross, 8 Kan. 348; Harding v. Funk, cases are to the same effect: Fiske v. 8 Kan. 315; Burgess v. Clark, 13 Ired. FraminghamManuf. Co., ISPick. 67; 109; M'Afee's Heirs v. Kennedy, 1 Boston & E. Mill Corp. v. Newman, Lit. 93; Smith v. Connelly, 1 T. B. 12 Pick. 467; Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Monr. 58; Shackelford v. Coffey, 4 Yerg. 41. The courts of Wisconsin J. J. Marsh. 40; Crenshaw v. Slate have sustained such laws: Newcomb River Co., 6 Rand. 245; Ash v. Cumi- V. Smith, 1 Chand. 71 ; Thein v. Voegt- mings, 50 N. H. 591 ; Hankins v. Law- lander, a Wis. 461, 465; Pratt v. rence, 8 Blaokf. 266; Gammel v. Pot- Brown, 3 Wis. 603. But with some ter, 6 Iowa 548. And in the federal hesitation of late: See Fisher v. Hor- supreme court; Head v. Amoskeag icon Co., 10 Wis. 351; Curtis v. Whip- Manuf. Co.^ 113 U. S. 9, where all the pie, 34 Wis. 350; note of Judge Red- cases are collected. Compare Tyler fiOd to Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, v. Beacher, 44 Vt. 648; Ryerson v. 13 Ani Law Reg. 493; s. 0., 60 Me. Brown, 35 Mich. 333; Loughbridge 134; also 11 Am. Rep. 185. They have v. Harris, 43 Ga. 500. also been sustained in other states: i Opinions of Justices, 58 Me. 590, Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532; Jor- 593. This subject is considered a lit- dan V. Woodward, 40 Me. 317; Miller tie further on. V. Troost, 14 Minn. 365; Venard v. OH. IV.] PUEP0SE3 FOR WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. 195 Of like import is the opinion of an eminent federal .judge, in a case in which a town, under an authority which the legis- lature had attempted to confer, had voted its bonds in aid of a private manufacture.^ The same doctrine was afterwards affirmed in the federal supreme court. After consideration of the general nature of the power to tax, the court declare it to be " beyond cavil that there can be no. lawful tax which is not laid for a. public purpose. It may not be easy to draw the line in all cases so as to decide what is a public purpose in this sense, and what is not. It is undoubtedly the duty of the legislature which imposes or authorizes municipalities to im- pose a tax, ,to see that it is not to be used for purposes of a private interest instead of a public use; and the courts can only be justified in interposing when a violation of this prin- ciple is clear and the reason for interference cogent. And in deciding whether, in a given case, the object for which the taxes are assessed falls upon the one side or the other of this line, they must be governed mainly by the course and usage of the government, the objects for which taxes have been cus- tomarily and by long course of legislation levied, what objects or purposes have been considered necessary to the support and for the proper use of the government, whether state or munici- pal. "Whatever lawfully pertains to this, and is sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the people, may well be held to belong to the public use, and proper for the maintenance of good government; though this may not be the only criterion of rightful taxation. " But in the case before us, in which the towns are author- ized to contribute aid, by way of taxation, to any class of man- ufactures, there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public purpose as we have been considering. If it be said 1 Commercial Nat. Bank v. lola, 3 to build and maintain such a fence Dill. 353. See National Bank v. lola, and impose fines and penalties and 9 Kan. 689; Opinions of Justices, 58 levjr a specific tax to insure success. Me. 590, 596; Parkersburg v. Brown, Held, that a land owner who refused 106 TJ. S. 487; English v. People, 96 to pay an assessment could not be 111. 566; Weismer v, Douglas, 64 N. Y. compelled to do so; the undertaking 91. A neck of land between two not being one for which taxes could rivers could most easily be protected be authoriiied: Scuffletown Fence from cattle by a fence from river to Co. v. McAllister, 13 Bush 313. river. A company was incorporated 196 PUBPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [CH. IT. that a benefit results to the local public of a town by estab- lishing manufactures, the same may be said of any other busi- ness or pursuit which employs capital or labor. The merchant, the mechanic, the innkeeper, the banker, the builder, the steamboat owner are equally promoters of the public good, and equally deserving the aid of the citizens by forced contri- butions. No line can be drawn in favor of the manufacturer which would not open the c(jffers of the public treasury to the importunities of two-thirds the business men of the city or town." 1 Further authorities in support of the position that there is a distinction in the meaning of ^'m5Z*c Mse, as employed in the law of eminent domain and of taxation, would seem unneces- sary. Custom must have great influence ill determining the proper limit of either power ; but it is manifest that the adju- dications recognize certain incidental benefits to the public as constituting such a public interest as will Justify an exercise of the eminent domain which, in the case of the power of taxa- tion, are not admitted as constituting any basis whatever for its employment. Few cases have undertaken to point out the distinction,^ but the courts have acted upon it in many cases. iPer Miller, J., in Loan Assoc, v. ney-General v. Ban Claire, 37 Wis. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 664. See, also, 400. Allen V. Jay, 60 Ma 134. Taxation 2 gge, however, Whiting v. Sheboy- in aid of private enterprises is prop- gan, etc. R. Co., 25 Wis. 167, 190, erly characterized by Dickenson, J., People v. Salem T'p Board, 20 Mich, in Opinions of Justices, 58 Me. 590- 452, 477. In the latter case it is said 603, as taxation " to load the tables that the fact that the state may ex- of the few with bounty that the ercise the power of eminent domain, many may partake of the crumbs in behalf of an enterprise does not that fall therefrom." It is not com- determine its right to exercise the petent for a city to levy taxes to loan power of taxation in aid of the same to persons who have suffered from a object. And it is added that the fire (Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454); term "public purpose," as employed or for a town to supply farmers, to denote objects for which taxes whose crops have been destroyed, may be imposed, has no relation to with provisions and seed grain (State the urgency of the public need, or to V. Osawkee, 14 Kan. 418) ; or to pay a the extent of the public benefit to f ol- subscription to a private corporation, low; it is, on the other hand, a term not for a public purpose (Weismer v. of classification to distinguish the Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91); or to erect a objects for which, according to gen- dam with the privilege afterwards at eral usage, the government is to pro- discretion to devote it to either a vide, from those which, by the Uke public or a private purpose: Attor- usage, are to be left to private in- clination, interest, or liberality. CH. IV.J PTJEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. 197 An enumeration of the purposes which are recognized as justifying taxation is not needful, and is scarcely practicable. The most of them pass unchallenged. To preserve the public order; to provide for the enforcement of civil rights and the punishment of crime ; to make compensation to public officers and to others who perform services for the public; to protect public property; to erect and keep in repair the necessary public buildings; to pay the expenses of legislation and of ad- ministering the laws, — all these are purposes which, in a con- sideration of the law of taxation, call for no comment, as each and all are absolutely indispensable in orderly government. All these may therefore be passed by while attention is di- rected to cases not so clear, the determination of which will sufficiently indicate the bounds which usage in representative government has prescribed as the proper limit to a lawful ex- penditure of the public moneys. Religious instruction. This to individuals is an object of the very highest moment, and formerly it was thought to be the duty of government to provide for it. The more enlight- ened opinion of the present day denies the duty, and affirms that any step in that direction is in greater or less degree a species of persecution of those whose views are not favored, and therefore incompetent in any country whose political in- stitutions are based upon the principles of equality before the law.' Religious instruction is, therefore, by common consent, 'Cooley, Const. Lim., oh. 13, and have a right to demand, not because cases referred to in the notes. Dr. they are religious societies, but be- Wayland justly observes that " The cause the exercise of religion is an only ground on which taxes for the innocent mode of pursuing happi- support of religion can be defended ness. If these be not granted, relig- is that its existence i^ necessary for ious men are oppressed, and the the support of civil government, and country where such oppression pre- that it can be sustained in no other vails, let it- call itself what it may, manner than by compulsion. The is not free." Wayland, PoL Econ., first assertion we grant to be true; b. 4, ch. 3, § 3. It has been held not the second we utterly deny. Hence incompetent to permit a public we do not believe that any taxation school-house to be made use of for for this purpose is necessary. All religious purposes when it is not that religious societies have a right wanted for school: Nichols v. School to ask of the civil government is, Directors, 93 111. 61; Davis v. Boget, the same privileges for transacting 50 Iowa 11. Compare Dorton v. their own affairs which societies of Hearn, 67 Mo. 301 ; People v. McAd- every other sort possess. This they ams, 83 IlL 356. 198 PUEPOSES FOE WHICF TAXES MAY BE LAID. [CH. IV. referred exclusively to the voluntary action of the people. It is expressly forbidden by many of the state consljitutions that public moneys shall be appropriated to religious worship. It is true that in selecting the objects of taxation, buildings and other property made use of for that purpose are generally ex- empted from the lists. This is done without discrimination between sects, and is generally defended upon the ground that public worship is a public benefit which may properly be en- couraged in this indirect wa^ The discrimination is opposed by some persons, but whether or not it is proper or politic, it cannot be declared unwarranted by the general principles of government. As already observed, the question what taxes shall be levied, and upon what classes of person^ or property, is always one of public policy which the legislature must solve. But another view is not entirely without plausibility. Who- ever contributes to the support of churches also contributes to pay the taxes, if any, which are imposed upon them. But as most persons who pay taxes at all do, in' some form, and with some regard to their ability, contribute to the support of churches, it is of little'importatce to the general public whether taxes are levied on church property or not, as whatever is col- lected from such property, while it goes to diminish what will be collected from individual property, will at the same time increase to the same extent what the individuals pay for the support of religious instruction, so that the burden in the one case will be substantially the same ^s in the other. We do not say that this view is strictly correct, but it is perhaps safe to say that the inequality occasioned by -the exemption of church property from taxation is not so great as without re- flection one would be likely to suppose. Secular instr action. ^ It may be safely declared that to bring a sound education within reach of all the inhabitants has been a prime object of American government from the 1 The taxation of property for the islation held void as contrary to a con- support of free public schools, in ac- stitutional provision for the county cordance with the constitution and school fund: Greensboro v. Eodgkin, laws of a state, is not a taking of 106 N. C. 483. A statute authorizing property without due process of law. the board of trustees of incorporated Werner v. Galveston, 72 Tex. 92. See towns to levy and collect annual Eevell V. Annapolis, 81 Md. 1. Leg- taxes for the support of town schools CH. IV.J PUEPOSES FOB WHICH TAXES MA.T BE LAID. 199 very first. It was declared by colonial legislation, and has been reiterated in constitutional provisions to the present day. It has been regarded as an imperative duty of the government; and when question has been made concerning it, the question has related not to the existence of the duty, but to its extent. But the question of extent is one of public policy, and addresses itself to the legislature and the people, not to the courts.^ And within their corporation, not exceed- ing a certain rate on the valuation, is not repugnant to a constitutional provision directing the general as- sembly to provide a "general and uniform system of common schools," etc.: Shepardson v. Gillett, 133 Ind. 125. For the most part public educar tion in the United States is in charge of corporations created for the pur- pose, the most of which are invested with power of taxation. But this power is limited strictly to the edu- cational purpose: People v. Trustees of Schools, 78 IlL 136, and cases re- ferred to. Also Wejghtman v. Clark, 103 U. S. 256. The incorporated trustees of an academy held to be a public corporation capable of exer- cising the taxing power conferred upon them: State v. Vaughan, 99 Mo. 332. The fact that a state constitu- tion expressly mentions only a state university and common schools as educational institutions to be pro- vided for does not preclude the es- tablishment and support of state normal schools: Briggs v. Johnson County, 4 DHL 148. A statute im- posing a tax each year for the bene- fit of a college incorporated by law and under state control does not violate a constitutional provision that the fund known as the " com- mon school fund," together with any sum raised in the state by taxation, or otherwise, for purposes of edu- cation, shall be held inviolate for the purpose of sustaining common schools, and that such funds may be appropriated in aid of common schools but for no other purpose: Higgins V. Prater, 91 Ky. 6. Taxation in support of a high school, when duly authorized, will not be held in- competent by reason of the course of study prescribed being different froin that contemplated by law: Richards v. Raymond, 92 IlL 612. See Stuart V. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69. 1 Commonwealth v. Hartman, 17 Pa. St. 118; Powell v. Board of Edu- cation, 97 IlL 375; Bellmeyer V. School District, 44 Iowa 564. See the very interesting case of Cushing v. Inhab- itants of Newburyport, 10 Met. 508. Also Bull V. Read, 13 Grat. 78; Stu- art V. Kalamazoo, 30 Mich. 69. That a tax for the support of free schools is within a general grant of the power to tax for "municipal purposes," see Horton v. School Com'rs, 48 Ala. 598; Opinions of Justices, 67 Me. 582._ "That the education of children, the support of public or common schools — schools not confined to any class but open to all — is a public use supporting taxation, state or local, cannot be doubted:" Southern R Co. V. St. Clair County, 124 Ala. 491. In the same case it is said that corpora- tions or non-residents have a direct interest in the better maintenance of the public schools, and should be taxed for their support, since they have property to protect and greater security from the moral, intellectual, and social improvement of the com- munity by which the property is sur- rounded. See Amesbury N. F. Co. v. Weed, 17 Mass. 53. Under the Mis- souri laws taxes for building school- 200 PUErOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [CH. IV. the tendency on the part of the people has been steadily in the direction of taking upon themselves larger burdens in order to provide more spacious, elegant, and convenient houses of in- struction, and to place within the reach of all a more generous and useful education. And this is usually done by the direct action of the public ; the state or its municipalities construct- ing and owning the edifices, and supporting the schools, acad- emies, colleges, and universities.^ houses cannot be levied on railroad property: State v. Wabash, St. L. etc. E. Co., 90 Mo. 166. Dr. Wayland, in speaking of the liberality of construc- tion in determining the purposes of taxation, says: "It must not, of course, always be expected that the product created by consumption (in public expenditure) will be a visible, tangible, material substance. Thus we see no physical, tangible product as the result of taxes for the support of civil government. But we receive the benefit in security of person, property, and reputation; or in that condition of society which, though it be incapable of being weighed and measured, is absolutely essential both in individual happiness and in- dividual accumulation. The same flnay be said in substance concerning the taxes paid for general education. Here whether the taxpayer receives his remuneration in instruction given , to his own children or not, he yet re- ceives it in the improvement of the intellectual and social 'character of his neighbors, by which his property is rendered more secure, the labor for which he pays is better performed, and the demand for whatever he pro- duces is more universal and more constant. The same may be said of the public expenditure by which the moral and social character of a com- munity is elevated, the taste of a na- tion refined, and an impulse given to efforts for the benefit of man. With this view, no one could oppose the expense incurred in bestowing upon publ ic edifices elegance, or even, in some cases, magnificence of struct- ure, in the public celebration of re- marli;able eras, and in the rewards bestowed upon those who have by their discoveries enlarged the bound- aries of human knowledge, or by their inventions signally improved the useful arts: " Pol. Econ., pt. 4, ch. 3, § 1. 1 When public funds are provided for education under definite regula- tions or restrictions, tbese must be observed: People v. Board of Educa- tion, 13 Barb. 400; People v. Allen, 48 N. Y. 404; Halbert v. Sparks, 9 Bush 259; Collins v. Henderson, 11 Bush 74; State v. Graham, 25 La. An. 440; State V. Board of Liquidation, 29 La. An. 77; Sun Mut. Ins. Co. v. Board ol' Liquidation, 31 La. An. 175; Little- worth V. Davis, 50 Miss. 403; Weir v. Day, 35 Ohio St. 143; Otken v. Lam- kin, 56 Miss. 758 ; Greensboro v. Hodg- kin, 106 N. C. 182. As to power of the state to control school expendi- tures, see Curryer v. Merrill, 35 Minn. 1; Bancroft v. Thayer, 5 Sawy. 502; People V. Board of Education, 55 Cal. 331; Kinney V. Zimpleman, 36 Tex. 554. Taxation for free schools for counties and municipalities is tax- ation for county and corporate pur- poses within the meaning of a con- stitutional provision that gives the legislature power to authorize coun- ties and municipalities to tax for such purposes : Ballentine y. Palaski, 15 Lea 633. A bill to compel the selectmen to assess a tax on a school- CH, IV. j POEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. 201 But to justify taxation for the purpose of education, the rules under wliich the people shall be admitted to the privileges given must not be invidious and partial, but must place all par- ties on a plane of practical equality. The rule is substantially the same here that applies in the apportionment of taxes : equal- ity must be the aim of the law, and it must be assumed the state has no spe@ial favors to bestow; upon privileged classes. But if the rules are impartial it is not a legal objection to them that they fail to provide for every one. Elementary instruc- tion, for example, is commonly offered by the state to children between certain ages only; and if the offer is impartial to thesfe, no just exception can be taken to it. Neither can one complain that he is required to attend the schools in his own neighborhood. But it would not be competent to single; out some one class of the, community and exclude them from the benefits of the public schools on arbitrary grounds. This has been frequently held in the case of the freedmen and other colored citizens.' In some states a practice has prevailed, while making liberal provision for instruction in public schools, also to give assist- ance to institutions owned and controlled by private corpora- tions or by religious bodies or denominations. The legal right to do this has received but little attention. In one case in district to build a school-house on a Dufify, 7 Nev. 342. In Kentucky the lot that is not public property can, law provides for devoting school not be maintained: Loverin v. School taxes collected from colored people Dist., 64 N. H. 616. to the support of schools for colored 1 Whether it is the constitutional children. They cannot, therefore, be right of colored children to attend the taxed for exclusively white schools, same schools with others when the See Marshall v. Donovan, 10 Bush law makes equal provision for them 681; Clay broke vi Owensboro, 16 Fed. elsewhere is a question discussed in Rep. 297. A statute requiring a tax the following cases: State v. DufEy, on polls and property of colored per- 7 Nev. 343; Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. sons to be applied exclusively to the 337; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36; State education of their children was held V. McCann, 31 Ohio St. 198; Berton- to be an unlawful discrimination neau v. School Directors, 3 Woods within the prohibition of the state 177. In several of the states it is ex- constitution relating to taxes, and pressly prohibited by law that any an unlawful "discrimination in favor distinction shall be made. Where the of or to the prejudice of either race: " law contemplates separate schools, Puitt v. Gaston County Com'rs, 94 colored children may nevertheless N. C. 709; Rigsbee v. Durham, 94 attend the regular schools if no oth- N. C. 800. ers are provided for them : State v. 202 PUEPOSES FOR WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [CH. FV. MassachusettSj'under a constitutional provision which required moneys raised for public schools to be applied to those only which were under the order and superintendence of the public authorities, it was denied that the legislature could lawfully authorize a town to take moneys which had been raised for the public schools and appropriate them in support of a school founded bj'^ a charitable bequest, under which the order and superintendence of the school was vested in trustees who, though a majority were to hS" chosen by the inhabitants of the town, were yet limited to the members of certain religious societies.^ And in Wisconsin the authority of the legislature to empower a town to tax its citizens in aid of the erection of' buildings for an educational institution to be owned and con- trolled by a private corporation was denied on general princi- ples. " It strikes us," say the court, " at the first blush, that this is not the levy and collection of money for public pur- poses, as clearly as if the institute were not an incorporated body, but a mere association of private individuals resolved upon the establishment of a like institution. If it were such an institution, or a grammar or classical school, or a seminary built up and established by individual enterprise, as by persons engaged in the profession of teaching, or bj"^ others, and owned and controlled by those contributing towards it, and the emolu- ments belonging to them, we apprehend that no one would contend that the people [of the town] might be taxed for the purpose of donating the moneys to it. The fact that it is an institution incorporated by act of the legislature does not change its character in this respect. It is but a most frivolous pretext for giving to a corporation, where there is no certain and definite personal responsibility, money exacted from the taxpayers, which a just and honorable man engaged in the same business would hesitate to receive though paid without opposition, and to enforce the payment of which, against the win of the taxpayers, he would never think of resorting to coercive measures, provided the same were lawful. It can no more be supported by taxation than if it were unincorporated, or a private school or seminary of the kind above supposed." * 1 Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94 T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Atchison, 47 Kan. See People v. McAdams. 82 III. 356. 612; Hanson v. Vernon, .27 Iowa 28; 2 Curtis V. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350, Higgins v. Prater, 81 Ky. 6. 853, per Dixon, Ch. J. See Atchison, CH. IV.J PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. 203 This is strong language, and has much reason in its support, though it may be affirmed that it has had little or no influence on the course of legislation in other states. It has been decided to be competent for the legislature to authorize a town to tax itself in aid of the erection of build- ings for a state educational institution to be constructed within it.' In the partigular case the purpose, as regards the state at < large, was clearly public, bu|; the locality was allowed to as sume a special burden on the ground of special and peculiar benefits. A case in New York perhaps goes further, inasmuch as it sustains the authority of the legislature to require a vil- lage to render such assistance.^ While it may be entirely proper to regard the incidental benefits to the locality as con- stituting a. just basis for an exceptional tax upon it, no such ruling would be admissible where the building itself was not to be one owned and controlled by the public, and where con- sequently the sole ground for any taxation would be the inci- dental benefits to flow from a private undertaking. This has been so clearly shown in a case from which we have already quoted, that we copy from the opinion, instead of attempting any statement of the general doctrine in our own language: "That is not the kind' of public benefit and interest which, will authorize a resort to the power of taxation. Such benefits accrue to the people of all communities from the exercise in their midst of any useful trade or employment, and the argu- ment, pursued to its logical result, would prove that compul- sory payment or taxation might bp made useof for the purpose of building up and sustaining every such trade or employment, though carried on by private persons for private ends, or the purposes of mere individual gain and emolument. That there exists in the state no power to tax for such purposes is a propo- sition too plain to admit of a .controversy. Such a power would be obviously incompatible with the genius and institu- tions of a free people ; and the practice of all liberal govern,- ments, as well as all judicial authority, is against it. If we 1 Merrick v. Amherst, 13 Allen 500. 2 Gordon v. Comes, 47 N. Y. 608. In See also Marks v. Trustees of Purdue that case, however, there was to be Univ., 37 In4 155; Burr v. Carbon- a grammar school in the state build- dale, 76 111. 455; Hensley T'p v. Peo- ing. free to the children of the vil- ple, 84 111. 544; Livingston County v. lage. Compare State v. Eaben, 22 Darlington, 101 V- S. 407. Wis. 661. 204 PURPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [CH. IV. turn to the cases where taxation has been sustained as in pur- suance of the power, we shall find in every one of them that there was some direct advantage accruing to the public from the outlay,' either by its being the owner or part owner of the property or thing to be created or obtained with the money, or the party immediately interested in or benefited by the works to be performed, the same being matters of public con- cern ; or because the proceeds of the tax were to be expended in defraying the legitimate Expenses of government, and in promoting the peace, good order, and welfare of society. Any direct public benefit or interest of this nature, no matter how slight, as distinguished from those public benefits or interests incidentally arising from the employment or business of pri- vate individuals or corporations, will undoubtedly sustain a tax. In thus endeavoring to define how the public must be beneficially interested in order to justify the raising of money by taxation in cases like the present, we of course do not in- tend to include all purposes for which money may be so raised. Taxes may be levied and collected for charitable purposes, but these constitute a peculiar ground for the exercise of the power which does not exist here. " So claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense, and in gratitude, will support a tax; such claims, however, and we think all others where taxation is proper, except claims founded in charity, may be referred to the general principle above spoken of, of public interest in, or benefits received by, the transaction out of which the claims arose." ' Public charity. The support of paupeis and the giving of assistance to those who, by reason of age, infirmity, or disabil- ity, are likely to become such, is, by the practice and common consent of civilized countries, a public purpose.^ The laws not 1 Curtis V. Whipple, 34 Wis. 350, opinion of Wallin, J., in State v. Nel- 354, per Dixon, C. J. Statutes impos- son County, 1 N. D. 88. The former ing taxes for the benefit of the state case holds that a loan of aid to an im- university free-scholarship fund were poverished class, not yet in the poor- held void, such taxation being for a house, is necessarily a tax for a pri- purely private purpose: State v. vate, purpose. In the latter case a Switzler, 143 Mo. 287; Simmons Med- 'statute authorizing counties to issue icine Co. V. Ziegenhein, 145 Mo. 368. bonds to procure seed-grain for needy 2 See opinion of Brewer, J., instate farmers is upheld on the ground that V. Osawkee T'p, 14 Kan. 434 Also unless succored in some such waj CH. IV.J PURPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. 205 only exempt from taxation the limited means of such persons, but they go further and provide public frfnds with which to furnish them retreats where they can be supplied with the nec- essaries and, to a reasonable extent, with the comforts of life. Hospitals are also provided where dependent classes can receive medical aid and assistance, and asylums where the deaf, the dumb, and the blind may be supported and taught, and where the insane may be kept from doing or receiving harm, and can have such careful and scientific treatment, with a view to their restoration, as they would not be likely to receive elsewhere. He would be a bold man who, in these days, should question the public right to make provision for these benevolent objects. And this provision might not only be made by the establish- ment of institutions for the purpose, but private institutions might undoubtedly be aided with public funds, in consideration of services to be rendered to the public, and expenses to be in- curred by them in assisting and relieving the same necessitous and dependent classes.^ thousands of persons would become paupers. On the other hand the "seed-grain loan " statute of Minne- sota was held void on the ground that its benefits were not confined to those who were a public charge or in im- mediate danger of becoming such: William Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Minn. 118. 1 Henry v. Cohen, 66 Ala. 382, 386. It has been held not competent to levy taxes to be paid over to indi- viduals or associations simply be- cause they are charitable. In the particular case the legislature had required the agencies of foreign in- surance companies to pay over two per centum of their receipts to an as- sociation for the relief of disabled firemen. "If the legislature may command such a contribution as this, we are unable to see why they may not command every citizen to con- tribute, not only to this association but to every charitable association; and, indeed, to every man who spends his money and means in a charitable way. There are associations for all sorts of charity — why may not the legislature require us to contribute to them all, if they may require this class of people to contribute to this one ? We cannot answer this ques- tion: " Loivrie, Ch. J., in Philadelphia Assoc, etc. V. Wood, 39 Pa, St. 73, 83. But in New York it is decided that a constitutional provision that " neither the credit nor the money of the state shall be given or loaned to or in aid of any association, corpora- .tion, or private undertaking," etc., would not preclude taxation by mu- nicipalities in aid of charitable soci- eties and corporations: Shepherd's Fold V. New York, 96 N. Y. 137. But they cannot thus tax without being empowered by legislation, either ex- pressly or by necessary implication: St. Mary's Industrial School v. Brown, 45 Md. 810. The taxing power of the state may be used in repayment of the expense of care and maintenance of children committed to an incor- porated industrial school: Wisoon- 206 PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [CH. IV. Private business enterprises. In comparing the right to tax with the right of eminent domain it lias been shown that taxation cannot be employed to aid mills and other manufac- tories in private hands. The rule there stated is general. However important it may be to the community that indi- vidual citizens should prosper in their industrial enterprises, it is not the business of government to aid them with its means. Enlightened states, while g^ing all necessary protection to their citizens, will leave" every man to depend for his success and prosperity in business on his own exertions, in the belief -that by doing so his own industry will be more certainly en- listed, and his prosperity and happiness more probably secured. It may therefore be safely asserted that taxation for the pur- pose of raising money from the public to be given or even loaned to private persons, in order that th^y may use it in their individual business enterprises, is not recognized as an employment of the power for a public use. ' In contemplation of law it would be taking the common property of the whole community and handing it over to private parties for their ■private gain, and consequently unliawful. Any incidental benefits to the public that might flow from it could not sup- port it as legitimate taxation.^ Thus taxes cannot be imposed r sin Industrial School V. Clark County, warrant a tax: Glee v. Sanders, 74 103 Wis. 651. And the question of Mich, 693. It is not competent to constitutional power must be one of levy a tax for the support of a construction, which might depend woolen mill in private hands, and if largely on the peculiar state expe- the tax is laid and the money col- rience: Bay City v. Treasurer, 23 lected the officers have no right to Mich. 499. pay it over: McConnell v. Ham, 16 1 Allen V. Jay, 60 Me. 134; "Weis- Kan. 338. A statute providing that mer v. Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91. See a certain bounties shall be paid to valuable note to the former case by manufacturers in the state of sugar Judge Bedfleld, 13 Am. Law Reg., from beets grown in the state is un- N. S., 493. Where, in consideration constitutional as authorizing taxa- of D.'s agreement to erect within its tionfora private purpose: Michigan limits a stave-mill giving employ- Sugar Beet Co. v. Auditor-General, ment to seventy persons, a village 134 Mich. 635. See, on the general agreed to expend $1,300 in making subject, Commercial Nat. Bank v. certain public improvements around lola, 3 Dill. 853; Loan Assoc, v. To- the ground to be occupied by the peka, 30 Wall. 655; National Bank mill, the money to be deposited in v. lola, 9 Kan. 689; Bissell v. Kan- the bank subject to D.'s check, this kakee, 64 111. 349; English v. People, was held to be an appropriation for 96 111. 566; Cvishing v. Newburyport, ' private purposes which would not 10 Met. 510; State v. Foley, 30 Minn. CH. IV.] PUErOSES FOE WEIOH TAXES MAY BE LAID. ■ 207 to aid in rebuilding an extensive burnt district ; ' or to defray the cost of the treatment, in private institutions, of persons, not paupers, who are addicted to the use of intoxicants ; "^ or for the purpose of raising a fund, even in part, the income of which is to be devoted to keeping a private cemetery in repair, and to decorating the graves of certain individuals.' Towns cannot raise money for the purpose of abating a particular class of taxes — e. g., poll taxes upon male inhabitants — and consequently cannot appropriate public moneys for that pur- pose.* It has been held in Kansas that where part of the pro- ceeds of a tax upon insurance contracts is to be used for the, benefit of a volunteer fire department of the municipality, such tax is for a private purpose, and void.' If taxation in aid of 350; Cook v. Sumner Manuf. Ca, 1 Sneed 698; Souffletown Fence Co. v. McAllister, 13 Bush 312. A statute authorizing a village to issue bonds to aid in the construction of a dam for the purpose of improving a pri- vate water-power is invalid as pro- viding for public taxation for a pri- vate purpose: Coates v. Campbell, 37 Minn. 498. And a statute author- izing tolls for floating logs on cer- tain streams was held invalid as the tolls authorized were for private benefit and not for public good, and conferred no corresponding benefit on the owner of the logs: Hutton v. Webb, 126 N. C. 897. Taxation in support of a grist mill has been held void, and the payment of bonds issued for the purpose was enjoined: Central Branch U. P. R. Co. v. Smith, 33 Kan. 745. On the other hand, taxation in aid of a public gristmill, the tolls of which the legislature would have a right to regulate, was ■sustained in Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U. S. 310. It is of course conceiv- able that in a new country such a mill may not only be a public neces- sity, but impossible of establishment without public aid. In MacKenzie V. Wooley, 39 La. An. 944, a special tax voted in behalf of a corporation organized to build a railway and to erect a cotton compress was sus- tained to the extent that the pro- ce^eds thereof were to be used for building the railway; that being a public improvement, while the erec- tion of the compress was a mere pri- vate enterprise. 1 Lowell V. Boston, 111 Mass. 454; Feldman v. Charleston, 23 S. 0. 57. In the case of William Deering Co. V. Peterson, 75 Minn. 118, it was held that a statute appropriating mpney for "seed-grain loans" to farmers whose crops had been destroyed by hail or storms was invalid. 2 Wisconsin Keeley Inst. Co. v. Mil- waukee County, 95 Wis. 153. This case is distinguished in Wisconsin Industrial School v. Clark County, 103 Wis. 651, where it is held that, although the taxing power of the state cannot be used to furnish a gratuity to a corporation, it may be used to compensate such corporation- for a public service, such as the care and maintenance of girls committed to an incorporated industrial school 3 Luques v. Dresden, 77 Me. 186. ' * Cooley V. Granville, 10 Cush. 56. See Hooper v. Emery, 14 Me. 375, 379. 5 In re Page, 60 Kan. 842. It is held in Nebraska that cities have power, under proper statute, to impose an occupation tax upon fire insurance 208 PIJEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [CH. IV. private enterprises by -which the public might incidentally be benefited is illegal, much more is the exertion of the 'taxing povrer to furnish mere gratuities to individuals prohibited.' And the fact that a majority of the taxpayers request the levy of a tax that is for a private purpose does not validate the charge. Majorities have not power to impose taxes upon the minority for the purpose of raising money to be devoted to gifts or gratuities to individuals.^ It has been held that a statute authorizing the payment by county boards to agricultural societies of a sum equal to three cents for each inhabitant is for a public purpose.' Moral obligations. There are some cases in which taxation has been allowed for the benefit of private persons on consid- erations not of charity so much as of justice. Any exercise of ,the powers of government is liable to cause injury to particular individuals. When the injury is merely incidental, these indi- viduals have no legal claim to indemnification. Nevertheless, companies doing business in the city, and to apply the proceeds to the maintenance of voluntary Are de- partments: German- American F. Ins. Co. V. Minden, 51 Neb. 870. 1 A tax imposed by a town to pay for voluntary services is invalid, and the selectmen may be restrained from imposing it: Osgood v. Conway, 67 N. H. 100. Where a board of educa- tion is under no obligation to pay a claim asserted against it by a private individual, an act procured by the claimant commanding the board to levy a tax for its payment is uncon- stitutional: Board of Education v. State, 51 Ohio St. 531. A statute con- solidating school districts, and pro- viding for the remission to the tax- payers of each district, out of a fund created by taxation, of the appraised value of the school property in each district, was held void as imposing a tax for a private purpose, levied for benefit of a selected class of persons to reimburse them for moneys pre- viously paid in satisfaction of taxes legally set upon them and appropri- ated to public uses: Blizabethtown Water Co. v. Wade, 59 N. J. L. 78. See, to the same effect. In re Council of Cranston, 18 R. L 417. A statute amending the collateral inheritance tax-law by exempting from such tax certain persons and classes, and pro- viding that such exemptions " shall apply to all property which has passed by will, succession, or transfer since the approval of the act of which such statute is amendatory, except in cases where the tax has been paid," violates the constitutional provision that the legislature shall make, or authorize the making of, any gift of any public money or thing of value to any person or corporation: In re Stanford's Estate, 126 Cal. 112. In Deal V. Mississippi, 107 Mo. 464, a statute was held void because giving bounty to private individuals for growing forest trees upon their own lEtnd. 2 Bush V. Board of Supervisors, 159 N. Y. 212. 3 State V. Robinson, 35 Neb. 401. CH. IV.J PUEP0SE8 FOB WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID, 209 it seems eminently proper and just, in some exceptional cases, to recognize a moral obligation resting on the public to share with the persons injured the damage sustained; and this can only be done by means of taxation. All governments are ac- customed to recognize and pay equitable claims of this nature under some circumstances; claims, for instance, for the de- struction of private property in war, and sometimes for inci- dental injuries occasioned by the construction of a public work, or for loss in performing a contract to construct it.' Ip these cases the legislature is not confined in making com- pensation within- the strict limits of common-law remedies, but it may recognize moral or equitable obligations, such as a just man would be likely to recognize in his own affairs, whether by law required to do so or not. And what the legislature may do for the state, the municipalities, under proper Jegisla- tion, may do for themselves. Thus where their oflBcers have been subjected to responsibility and loss in an honest attempt to perform public duty, they may very justly as well as legally be indemnified by the municipality for which they were act- ing.^ And it has several times been held that what the mu- nicipality might thus voluntarily do, the legislature might require it to do.' It may, therefore, compel a city to issue bonds for a merely equitable demand,* or to lay a tax for its satisfaction.* 1 New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644 ; for such repairs : Louisville & ' N. E. Lyoomiiig v. Union, 15 Pa St 166; Co. v. Trustees (Ky.), 39 S. W. Rep. Friendv. Gilbert, 108 Mass. 408; Guil- 340. A town in Maine cannot assess ford V. Supervisors of Chenango, 13 a tax to reimburse a tax collector N. Y. 143. who has taken a note for certain 2 Nelson v. Milford, 7 Pick. 18, 38; moneys and accounted therefor to Hadsell v. Hancock, 8 Gray 536; Ful- the town as money, but who is there- ler V. Groton, 11 Gray 340; Baker v. after unable to collect the note: Windham, 13 Me. 74; Pike v. Middle- Thorndike v. Inhabitants of Camden, ton, 13 N. H. 378; Briggs v. Whipple, 83 Me. 39. 6 Vt. 95; Sherman v. Carr, 8 R. L ' Guilford v. Supervisors of Che- 431; Bancroft v. Lynnfield, 18 Pick. nango,13N. Y. 143;Brewster v. Syra- 506, 568. Whether this could be done cuse, 19 N. Y. 116; New Orleans v.- in Michigan, see Bristol v. Johnson, Clark, 95 U. S. 644; Board of Educa- 34 Mich. 133. Where a school build- tion v. McLandsborough, 36 Ohio St. ing has been lawfully condemned, 337; Wilkinson v. Cheatham, 43 Ga. and has been repaired out of the pri- 358; Beals v. Amador, 35 Cal. 634; vate funds of the school trustees, Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343. property owners cannot avoid a tax * Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343. afterwards lawfully imposed to pay ' See Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 14 210 PTJEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [oh. IV. Amusements and celebrations. To furnish amusements to its citizens is not one of tiie functiohs of government. But to provide public paries or other grounds which shall be open to the public use and occupation for healthful recreation and enjoyment, is not only proper but highly commendable, and in large towns may almost be said to be absolutely necessary.^ The great public parks of the world are public blessings, in which the poor participate with the rich, and from which they, perhaps, derive the larger share of positive benefit. How far a state or a town should go in making these attractive, the legislative wisdom must provide, and it will be likely to err but seldom in the direction of liberality so long as careful pro- vision is made for an honest expenditure of public funds. Governments sometimes provide for the celebration of im- portant events or eras, and for making exhibits at public fairs.^ It is generally held that cities and towns haves not authority to do this, at least without express legislative provision.' 65; New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U. S. 644. 1 See Matter of Central Park, 50 N. Y. 493; Matter of Prospect Park, 60 N. Y. 398; State v. Leffingwell, 54 Mo. 458; People v. Salomon, 51 111. 37; People v. Brislin, 80 lU. 433; Dun- ham V. People, 96 111. 331; Attorney- General V. Burrell, 31 Mich. 25. 2 An appropriation to enable the state to participate in the World's Fair at Chicago is a valid exercise of legislative power; under a constitu- tion providing that "taxes shall be levied and fcolleoted for public pur- poses only: " Norman v. Board, 93 Ky. 537. To the same effect, Dag- gett V. Colgan, .93 Cal. 53. A statute authorizing counties to participate in interstate expositions, to issue bonds for such purpose, and to levy taxes for their payment, is for a public purpose and valid: State v. Corn&U, 53 Neb. 556. 3 A town has not power to appro- priate nloney to be used in celebrat- ing the fourth of July: Hood v. Lynn, 1 Allen 103; Gerry v. Stone- ham, 1 Allen 319; New London v. Brainard,23Conn.552; Hodges v. Buf- falo, 3 Denio 110. Or the anniversary of the surrender of Yorktown : Taslj V. Adams, 10 Cush. 253. Nor can a municipality raise money to furnish entertainment for its guests: Law v. People, 87 111. 385; Hodges v. Buffalo, 3 Denio 110. A county tax to pay the expense of placing stones from the county building in the state building at the World's Fair is un- authorized and void: Hayes V.Doug- las County, 93 Wis. 439. An appro- priation by a. city council to defray the expenses of a committee to rep- resent the City at a convention of American municipalities is not for a public purpose; nor is it for a neces- sary charge arising in such city: Waters V. Bonvouloir, 172 Mass. 286. An appropriation by a town made in pursuance of a statute to celebrate the centennial anniversary of its in- corporation has been upheld: Hill V. Easthampton, 140 Mass. 381. An appropriation of money by a city for the celebration of holidays has been OH. IV.] PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MA.Y BE LAID. 211 The public health. It is not doabted that the preservation of the public health is a Jsublio purpose of prime importance.^ Sanitary regulations are indispensable in large towns, but they may be made for every locality. The right to provide for draining low lands for the purpose is well settled,^ and the right to protect low lands from overflow may also be justified on the same reasons.' Irrigation. The providing of arid lands with water is gov- erned by principles not different from those applibable to the reclamation of swamps. " "Water used for irrigation purposes upon lands which are naturally arid is used for a public pur- pose, and the tax to pay for it is collected for a public use, and the assessment upon lands benefited is also levied for a public purpose."* held to be for a public purpose: Hub- bard V. Taunton, 140 Mass. 467. 1 Davook V. Moore, 105 Mich. 120. Taxes may be levied for the care of small-pox patients, and to prevent the spread of the disease: Solomon V. Tarver, 52 Ga. 405. 2Wo6druflf V. Fisher, 17 Barb. 224; Hart well v. Armstrong, 19 Barb. 166; Anderson v. Kerns Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199, 203; Draining Company- Case, 11 La An. 338: Sessions v. Crunkilton, 20 Ohio N. S. 347, 149; Duke V. O'Bryan, 100 Ky. 710. The authority of the legislature to enact drainage laws is derived from the police power, the right of eminent domain, or the taxing power, and is undoubted. It is founded in the right of the state to protect the pub- lic health and provide for the public convenience and welfare. There is not full harmony as to the grounds on which the laws are sustained: Lien v. Board of Com'rs, 80 Minn. 58. But the power of taxation cannot be exercised to provide drains for pur- poses merely private: In re Tuthill, 168 N. Y. 133. A proceeding under tiie drainage law cannot be regarded as for private benefit where the ap- plication states that the proposed drain is necessary for public and private health, convenience, and wel- fare, and where the public welfare is kept prominently in view through- out the case: Duke v. O'Bryan, 100 Ky. 710. ' A statute for the purpose of es- tablishing a system of dykes is not invalid as permitting private prop- erty to be taken for other than pub- lic use: Hansen v. Hammer, ISWa^h. 315. * Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112. See, to the same effect, Paxton, etc. Co. v. Farmers', etc. Co., 45 Neb. 884; Clark v. Irrigation Co., 45 Neb. 798; Board of Com'rs V. Collins, 46 Neib. 411. Taxation for a work of internal improvement such as constructing a ditch for the pur- pose of irrigating arid lands is for a public use: Cummings v. Hyatt, 54 Neb. 35j The statute providing for the organization and government of irrigation districts contemplates tax- ation for a public purpose: Turlock Irrig. Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360. To render the use of water for the irrigation of arid lands a public use, every resident of the irrigation dis- 212 PDEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [CH. IV. Highways and roads. One of the most important ;functions of government is the making provision for public roads for the use of the people. The variety of these is great, and the modes of construction and operation are dififerent. No question is made of the competency of the legislature to levy taxes for the common highway, the improved turnpike and macadam- ized road, the planked or paved street, the canal, the tramway, or the railway. Any or all of them may be constructed by the state, or, under state authority, bj' the municipal stibdivic- ions of the state' within whose limits they may be needed.^ They may be supported and kept in repair by taxation of the state or of proper districts, or private corporations may be in- trict need not have the right to use the water. If each land-owner has the right to use a proportionate share upon the same terms as all the others, the use is a public and not a private one: Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 113. 1 County Com'rs v. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196. In Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 320, it was held competent for the legislature to provide for the construction of a free bridge over the Schuylkill, opposite one of the streets of Philadelphia,and to require the expense to be borne by taxation of the city. The cases of Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65; Norwich v. County Com'rs, 13 Pick. 60; Hing- ham, etc. Corporation v. Norfolk County, 6 Allen 353, and Board of Wardens v. Philadelphia, 43 Pa. St. 209, were cited with approval Some of these will be referred to hereafter. The levy of a tax by the county com- missioners to purchase a toll road, and make it free, is a proper public purpose: Warden v. Commissioners; 38 Ohio St. 639. It is a tax and not an assessment when the cost of build- ing a bridge is laid upon the property of a city and of a town connected by the bridge: People v. Whyler, 41 Cal. 351; Smith v. Farrelly, 53 Cal. 77. It has been held that where a city, under competent legislation, improves its own streets, a county tax for roads cannot be laid upon its inhabitants: Martin v. Aston, 60 CaL 63. But it is doubted that this is universally true. For a somewhat peculiar case involving the construc- tion of a statute for taxing to make a county road, see King v. Aroostook Co., 63 Me. 567. The state may, by general law or otherwise, require a county to share with a town in the cost of an expensive bridge' or road, though in general the towns bear the whole cost of such works: Super- visors of Will Co. V. People, 110 111. 511. It is not a diversion of county revenues to other than county pur- poses where a statute directs half of the special road tax levied by county commissioners and realized from taxable property in cities and towns to be turned over to municipal au- thorities to be used in repairing streets, etc., in such cities and towns: County Com'rs v. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 196. A statute providing that in all cities of a certain population all the road and bridge tax levied within the limits of the city shall be paid over to the city treasurer "for city purposes " requires the tax to be paid over for road and bridge pui^ poses only: Peoria & P. TJ. R. Co. v. People, 144 111. 45a CH. IT.] PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. 213 vested with the franchise of constructing them, and taking tolls for their use. Upon these points, also, no question arises. The differences of opinion which are met with, regarding tax- ation for public conveniences of this nature, have principally arisen in those cases in which the legislature has permitted or required the municipal corporations or subdivisions of the state to become stockholders in private corporations organized for the purpose of constructing them, or to make loans or donations to such corporations in order to assist them in their enterprises. On the one hand, it has been insisted that the state cannot subject itself and its property, as a corporatoi;, to the risks of a business conducted and managed in part, perhaps mainly, by individuals for their own benefit ; and that if it can do so in one business, because of benefits that may flow to the public in consequence of their being supplied with convenient facilities for travel and transportation, there is no reason in the nature of things why it may not do so in any other case where ben- efits to the public might reasonably be anticipated in conse- quence of their being furnished any other valuable conveniences or facilities. The public, it has also been claimed, could not he taxed in aid of such private corporations, because the benefits anticipated from them would be purely incidental, not differ- ing in their nature from those which migTit flow from the es- tablishment of a mill for the manufacture of breadstuffs, or from any other manufactory of a useful kind, or from any use- ful and necessary "private business; and, consequently, could not, on the principles already stated and universally recognized as sound, constitute any basis for taxation. On the other hand, the argument has been, that corporations for the con- struction of turnpikes, canals, railroads, etc., have a duplicate nature, and are both public and private; that the taking of property for them is universally recognized as being for a pub- fic use; that the ways they construct or propose to construct are^was^-public highways on which the public at large are en- titled to equal and impartial accommodations, and that for all these reasons there is a public interest in their construction which constitutes them public purposes within the meaning of the law of taxation, and renders the question of public assist- ance to them a question purely of policy and not at all one of power. 214 PUKPOSES FOE WHICS TAXES MAT BE LAID. [OH. IV. The question concerns first, the power of the state, and sec- ond, the power of municipal bodies. So - far as the state at large is concerned, a large preponderance of decisions is in sup- pout of the 'authority to aid these corporations by an exercise of the power to tax, and this by taking stock in such corpora- tions, or by making to them loans or donations.^ As to the municipal bodies, it is conceded that they have no such power unless it is specially confeif ed by the legislature ; the general authority to construct streets, roads, and bridges not compre- hending such a case.^ It is. also conceded that any special authority must be strictly pursued, or the action of the mu- nicipality under it will be invalid.' But w^hen the legislature 1 " Improvement of coasts and hai> bors, and all that is necessary for the security of external commerce, must be done by the public. Internal im- provements, such as roads, canals, railroads, etc., may, in- general, be safely left to individual enterprise. If they would be a profitable invest- ment of capital, individuals will be willing to undertake them. If they would be an unprofitable investment, both parties had better let theni alone. The only case in which a gov- ernment should assume such works is that in which their magnitude is too great to be intrusted to private corporations. Whenever they are undertaken, the principles on which the expenditures should be made are the same as those which govern the expenditure of individuals: " Way- land's Pol. Econ., b. 4, ch. 3, g 3. There are probably not many now who doubt the soundness of this as a rule of public policy, but the rule of policy is not necessarily the rule of constitutional law. In Michigan the constitution provides that the state shall not engage in work of internal improvement, except by granting lands thereto; and taxes by the state for the improvement of roads or riv- ers are, therefore, invalid in that state: Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 369; Hubbard v. Springwells T'p Board, 35 Mich. 153; Anderson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 477; Sparrow v. State Land Office Com'r, 56 Mich. 567; Wilcox V. Paddock, 65 Mich. 38; Gibson v. State LanA Office Com'r, 131 Mich. 49. 2 Bullock V. Curry, 3 Met. (Ky.) 171; Stokes V. Scott County, 10 Iowa 166, 173; State v. Wapello County, IB Iowa 888; Lafayette v. Cox, 5 Ind. 88. See Floyd v. Perrin, 30 S. C. 1. A tax in aid of a railroad, consented to under the provisions of the con- stitution by owners of taxable prop- erty, is not a "parish" tax, but is levied on the theory of local benefits, and the taxes, though collected by the parish authorities, are not parish moneys: FuUilove v. Police Jury, 51 La. An. 859. A tax voted by a town- s}iip to aid in the construction of a railroad is not a state, county, or mu- nicipal tax; and under a statute en- titling a manufacturing company to have refunded its state, county, and municipal taxes, such a company paying a railroad aid tax is not enti- tled to have it refunded: Carolina, C. G. & C. E. Co. V. Tribble, 35 S. C. 360. 8 See among other cases to this ef- fect: Commissioners v. Thayer, 94 U. S. 411; People v. Cline, 63 III 394; Harding v. Railroad Co., 65 111. 90; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Coyer, 79 III 373; People v. Oldstown, 88 III 302; CH. IV.J PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. 215 has thought proper to confer the power, and care has been ob- served to keep strictly within it, in the municipal action, the same oases already referred to sustain the action as standing on the same ground, and as being supported by the same rea- sons which would support the like action when taken by the state itself.' Portland, etc. R. Co. v. Standish, 65 Me. 63; Gray v. Mount, 45 Iowa 591; Packard v. Jefferson Co., 2 Col. 338; Leavenworth, etc. R Co. v. Platte Co., 42 Mo. 171; Horton v. Thompson, 71 N. Y. 513. It is no objection to a, vote of railroad aid that the corpora- tion to be aided is to construct and operate both a railroad and a tele- graph line: Snell v. Leonard, 55 Iowa 558. 1 Talbot V. Dent, 9 B. Monr. 526; M'Clenachan v. Curwen, 3 Yeates 363; Commonwealth v. Williams, 11 Pa. St. 61; Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh 120; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65; Brown v. Hartford, 100 N. C. 928. A statute may authorize a city to levy by vote a tax to assist a domestic corporation, organized for pecuniary profit, in constructing a toll bridge to be used as a highway and for rail- way purposes: Pritchard v. Magoun, 109 Iowa 364. A tax levied by the authorities of a parish on taxable property of one of the wards, on proposition of taxpayers, in aid of a railroad, held constitutional: FuUi- love V. Police Jury, 51 La. An. 359. Where railroad aid has been voted, the vote is not defeated by subse- quent legislation directing that the certificates of stock issued therefor shall be issued to individual taxpay- ers: Commissioners V. Lucas, 93 U. S. 108. 'That the time within which the road should be completed was not fixed in the petition will not authorize ah injunction against the collection of the tax before the com- pletion of the road, since the com- missioners may withhold the money until the road is completed; and no forfeiture of the taxes levied having been legally declared, such collection cannot be enjoined because the con- struction of the road was not com- menced within two years, or because the road was not, completed through the township within three years after the levy of the tax: Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. E. Co. V. Harden, 137 Ind. 486. In Casady v. Lowry, 49 Iowa 523, it was held that no part of a railroad-aid tax is collectible until it is earned. Where aid is voted to a railroad on condition of the road's being constructed to a specified point, it is not a compliance with the condition to purchase an exist- ing railroad to that point: Lamb v. . Anderson, 54 Iowa 190; Meeker v. Ashley, 56 Iowa 188; Railroad Co. v. Schencir, 56 Iowa 628. For a discus- sion of sundry questions arising under the Iowa railroad-aid tax law, see Merrill v. Welsher, 50 Iowa 61. In Louisiana it is held that a special tax for the benefit of a railroad in- ures to the benefit of a corporation resulting from the consolidation of the corporation for which the tax was voted with another; the object of the tax being the construction of the railroad: Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. V. Scott, 52 La. An. 513. A rail- road-aid tax will not be enjoined be- cause a narrow gauge is adopted, the subscription not having specified the gauge: Header v. Lowry, 45 Iowa 684. The validity of a tax is not affected by the fact that the route of the road is changed after the vote, if the route was not a con- dition of the vote: Shontz v. Evans, 40 Iowa 139. A condition to an aid 216 PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. [CH. IV. It has been decided that an assessment for making and opening a road where no road has in fact been laid ont, and where, consequently, the land is the subject of private owner- sjiip, and no highway would exist when the money was ex- pended, would be illegal and void.^ It has also been held that a city has no authority to assess on abutters upon a street the expense of a well-race running through the center of the street and owned by private persons. The duty of the owners of the race to restore the street which they occupied to a passable condition could not thus^be transferred to the public or to any portion of the public." There is no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws for the levy of taxes for the construc- tion of gravel roads.' It has been decided that the taxation of a city for the construction of a subway which shall be leased to a street-car company and used for the carriage of such pas- vote that a station shall be located within the town is competent: Bit- tinger v. Bell, 65 Ind. 445. See Blanchard v. Detroit, etc. R. Co., 31 Mich. 43. A railroad cannot be taxed by a county to pay the county's sub- scription to aid in its construc- tion: Applegate v. Ernst, 3 Bush 648; Louisville & N. E. Co. v. Com- monwealth, 89 Ky. 531. Contra, State V. Keokuk & W. R. Co., 153 Mo. 157. But when a company's franchises have been purchased by a new company, the new company's property in the county, except such as it acquired by the purchase from the old company, is subject to taxar tion for the payment of its part of the county's subscription to aid in the construction of the old road: Owensboro & N. R. Co. v. Daviess County (Ky.), 3 S. W. Rep. 164. See Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hopkins County, 87 Ky. 605. Railroad com- pany's property held liable to taxa- tion for compromise settlement of bonds issued in aid of it: Elizabeth- town, L. & B. S. R. Co. V. Carter County, 18 S. W. Rep. 370. The prop- erty of a railroad company located in a township where a tax is legally levied to aid in the construction of another and competing company is subject to such tax though it did not acquiesce in its levy and may be in- jured by the competing i"oad: Pitts- burgh, C, a & St. L. R. Co. V. Har- den, 137 Ind. 486; Baltimore & 0. P. R. Co V. Jefferson County, 39 Fed. Rep. 305. 1 Philbrook v. Kennebeok, 17 Ma 196. And see People v. Saginaw Su- pervisors, 36 Mich. 23. If a bridge rests on private property an assess- ment for building it is void: Pacific Bridge Co. v. Kirkham, 54 Cal. 558. Where an assessment for a road tax is not made for any existing roads, or in contemplation of any intended to be opened, and it is impossible to use the tax at all in the road-district where it is levied, such assessment is invalid: Michigan Land, etc. Co. v. L'Anse T'p, 63 Mich. 700. The as- sessment of highway taxes for roads that are in contemplation but are not yet laid out is not necessarily illegal: Sawyer-Goodman Co. v. Crys- tal Falls, 56 Mich. 697. 2 People V. Rochester, 54 N. T. 507. 3 Rioketts v. Spraker, 77 Ind. 371. OH. IV.J PUEPOSES FOK WHICH TAXES M4.T BE LAID, 217 sengers as pay the regular fare is taxation for a public pur- pose, and hence valid.^ Municipal water and gas works. The propriety and neces- sity of provision by taxation for a supply of water for the extinguishment of fires, and for the general use of the inhab- itants of large towns, is not disputed. Costly expenditures are sometimes made in the construction of public works for these purposes, and large sums are in some instances paid to corpora- tions or individuals who furnish or contribute to furnish the public supply .2 Cities may also be authorized to construct gas works in order to furnish their citizens with light as well as to supply the corporate needs,' or they may be empowered to contract for the corporate wants with private corporations or persons.* The supplying of cities and towns and their citizens with natural gas for public and private consumption has been held to be a public need or purpose, and hence the taxing power may be exercised to.'provide for the payment of the principal and interest of bonds issued to carry out the purpose of such supply.' Military and other boanties. The general government hav- ing authority to declare war and conduct warlike operations, no question can exist of its right to levy taxes in order to pay bounties for military services performed or promised. The several states may with as little question do the same. But it is no part of the duty of a township, city, or county; as such, to raise men or money for warlike operations ; and under the 1 Prince V. Crocker, 166 Mass. 347. the city for the purpose of supplying 2 Mayor of New York v. Bailey, 3 water for itself and its inhabitants, Denio 433; West v. Bancroft, 82 Vt. and not for purposes of profit: Wag- 367; Rome v. Cabot, 38 Ga. 50; Wells ner v. Rook Island, 146 111. 139. That V.Atlanta, 43 Ga. 67; Youngerman it is competent to provide by legisla- V. Murphy, 107 Iowa 686. Under a tion a special water precinct in a city statute authorizing municipal au- for water works, and levy a tax thorities to construct and maintain TVithin the same, see Brown v. Con- water-works, and to collect from the cord, 56 N. H. 375. inhabitants such rates for water sup- ' See Western Fund Saving Soo. v. plied as shall seem expedient, a city Philadelphia, 31 Pa. St. 175, 185. may levy water rates that will yield ^ See Nelson v. La Porte, 33 Ind. 358. a revenue in excess of the cost of s state v. Toledo, 48 Ohio St. 112. operating the works, even though See Fellows v. Walker, 39 Fed. Rep. they were originally constructed by 651. ■ 218 PTJEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [CH. IV. general grant of municipal powers, they are without authority to impose upon their people any burden by way of taxation for any such purpose.^ No reason is perceived, however, which should preclude them, under the proper legislative sanction, from devoting their funds to ' this purpose tp any extent that may be necessary to enable them to secure a voluntary per- formance of any duty which may rest upon their inhabitants to contribute their proportion to the public defense. And so are the authorities. The several municipal divisions of the state, under proper enabling legislation, may promise and pay bounties to those who will volunteer to fill any call made upon their people for their proportionate contribution to the public armies in time of actual or threatened hostilities.^ They may also pay bounties to those who have voluntarily entered the public service from or as representing their locality in advance of any such promise.' And they may raise moneys by tax in order to refund to individuals any sums advanced by them to relieve the municipality from a draft, or to fill its assigned quota of a call, on an understanding, based upon informal cor- 1 Stetson V. Kempton, 13 Mass. 2'73; Gove V. Epping, 41 N. H. 539, 545; Crowell V. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Baldwin v.North Brandford,33 Conn. 47; Webster v. Harwinton, 83 Conn. 131; Cover v. Baytown, 13 Minn. 124; Petersburg v. Noss, 53 Pa. St. 448; Meek v. Bayard, 53 Pa. St. 217; Fiske V. Hazard, 7 R. I. 438; People v. Su- pervisors of Columbia, 43 N. Y. 130; Alley V. Edgecombe, 53 Me. 446; Wahlschlager v. Liberty, 33 Wisi 863; Wilson V. Buckman, 13 Minn. 441. furnishing a uniform for a volun- tary military company is not within the compass of "town charges:" Claflin V. Hopkinton, 4 Gray 503. \ 2 Speet V. School Directors, 50 Pa. St. 150, 159; Waldo v. Portland, 33 Conn. 363; 'Bartholomew v. Harwin- ton, 33 Conn. 408; Fowler v. Danvers, 8 Allen 80; Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen 247; Cass v. Dillon, 16 Ohio St. 38; Opinions of Justices, 53 Me. 590, 595; Washington County v. Berwick, 56 Pa. St. 466. Where the muhicipality has taken action for the payment of such bounties in advance of legisla- tive authority, it may be conferred retrospectively: Booth v. Woodbury, 33 Conn. 118; Crowell v. Hopkinton, 45 N. H. 9; Schackford v.'Newing- ton, 46 N. H. 415; Ahl v. Gleim, 53 Pa. St. 432; Weister v. Hade, 53 Pa. St. 474; Grim v. School District, 57 Pa. St. 433; Coffman v. Keightly, 34 Ind. 509; Board of Com'rs v. Bearss, 25 Ind. 110; Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn. 319; State v. Demorest^ 33 N. J. L. 538; Taylor v. ThomjKon, 43 lU. 9; Barbour v. Camden, 51" Me. 608; Haft V. Holden, 55 Me. 573; Burn- ham V. Chelsea, 43 Vt. 69; Butler v. Putney, 43 Vt. 481; Lowell v. Oliver. 8 Allen 347. 'Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 634, 653. See,' also, Freeland v. Hast- ings, 10 Allen 570; Cass v. Dillon, 18 Ohio St. 38; State v. Richland, 20 Ohio St. 363; Veazie v. China, 50 Me, 618; Kunkle v. Franklin, 13 Minn. 137. OH. IV.J ' PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAY BE LAID. 219 porate action, that the sums should be refunded when legisla- tion could be had permitting it,' and perhaps, also, where the advancements were made without any such informal action.^ But they cannot be empowered to refund to individuals sums whiph such individuals may have paid in order to procure sub- stitutes, or for commutation in military service, for themselves as individuals, in an impending draft. Such payments being made by the parties in their own interest, the repayment of them by the public could be nothing else than an appropria- tion of public moneys to a private purpose.' Protection against calamities. Under the head of calami- ties against which the government should or might make pro- vision for protection may be mentioned fires,* the overflow of the country by great freshets, the washing away of the shores of the sea, or the banks of rivers in populous districts, destruc- tion of persons or property by wild beasts, and the like. If the danger is sufficiently great and extensive to make the threatened calamity a matter of general concern, the purpose ■ is public ; if not, it will not justify taxation. Payment of the public debt. For whatever purposes taxes may be laid, government may contract debts. The converse of this is equally true, that for whatever purposes debts may be contracted, taxes may be laid. It follows that the payment of the public debt is always a public purpose, not only because ''Weister v. Hade, ,53 Pa. St. 474 kinton, 45 N. K 9; Miller v. Grandy, See People V. Sullivan, 43 111413,413; 13 Mich. 540; Pease v. Chicago, 31 Johnsonv. Campbell, 49111. 316; Sus- 111.500,508; Ferguson v. Landram, 5 quehanna Depot v. Barry, 61 Pa. St. Bush 330; Estey v. Westminster, 97 317. Compare Gregg v. Jamison, 55 Mass. 324; Usher v. Colchester, 38 Pa. St. 468. Conn. 567: Kelley v. Marshall, 69 Pa. ', 2Kelley v. Marshall, 69 Pa. St. 319: St. 319; Perkins v. Milford, 59 Me. Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen 570, 315; Thompson v. Pittston, 59 Me. 585. See .Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 545;. Cover v. Baytown, 13 Minn. 134; Pa. St. 154; Micheltree v. Sweezey, Bush v. Board of Supervisors, 159 70 Pa. St. 378 ; Cass v.' Dillon, 16 Ohio N. Y. 313. St. 38; State v. Harris, 17 Ohio St. , is prima facie not a town purpose, but it may be shown by the vote to levy it to be such by showing that it is to be done as compensation for the use of the meeting-house for town pur- poses: Woodbury v. Hamilton, 6 Pick. 101. A town may appropriate money for the repair of a fire-engine used by the town but owned by (in- dividuals: Allen V. Taunton, 19 Pick. 485. And for the repair and regula- tion of clocks used for the benefit of the citizens of the town generally: Willard v. Newburyport, 13 Pick. 237. OH. IV.] PITEPOSES FOB WHICH TAXES MAT BK LAID. 223 Exclusiveness of public interest. The purposes to be ac- complished by taxation need not be exclusively public in order to warrant an exercise of the power. There are sometimes cases in which the public have equally with private parties an interest, and in which, therefore, an apportionment of the bur- den between the public and such individuals might be appro- priate. In such cases the public interest may properly invoke legislative action for the levy of a tax; and thfe legislative de- termination as to the just proportion to be borne by the pub- lic must be conclusive, so far at least as the public are concerned.! Oases in illustration might be suggested of a build- ing for the common use of the public authorities and of private parties, and of a way for the use of the public, but in which individuals have such a peculiar and special interest that the public authorities may decline to do more than to share with A statute authorizing a city to water certain streets at the expense of the city, and others at the expense of the abutters, was sustained: Sears V. Board of Aldermen, 173 Mass. 71. To what extent municipal corpora- tions may be legally justifled by their general grant of power in levying taxes to defray the expenses of procur- ing legislation for their benefit, has in some cases been made a question. The bounds of such authority must, it is conceived, be very much re- stricted. Probably no case which comes within the principle of the early Rhode Island tax to raise for Mr. Roger Williams £100, to remu- nerate him for obtaining the colonial charter (Arnold's Rhode Island, vol. 1, p. 205), would be questioned. Some attention to the interests of a local .community at the state capital is frequently essential, and perhaps in some cases the expense may be con- sidered a proper municipal charge. See Bacheider v. Epping, 8 Fost. 354. Compare Frankfort v. Winterport, 54 Me. 250. But a town cannot tax its inhabitants to pay for services rendered in securing the passage of an unconstitutional law: Mead v- Acton, 139 Mass. 341. Nor can a city incur 'indebtedness for expenses of a campaign to secure the selection of a city as the capital of the state, and warrants issued in payment of such expenses are void : Shannon v. Huron, 9 S. D. 356. And lobby services are services a municipality has no right to employ and no power to pay. The practice is immoral and corrupting, and will not be tolerated in the law. The subject is fully and satisfac- torily considered and discussed by Chapman, J., in Frost v. Belmont, 6 Allen 153, who, in denying the right of a town to pay for lobby services in procuring its charter, cites with approval the cases of' Pingrey v. Washburn, 1 Aiken 264; Gulick v. Ward, 10 N. J. L.87; Wood v. McCann, 6 Dana 366; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 315; Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489; Sedgwjck v. Stanton, 14 N. Y. 289; Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 473. And see Hatzfield v. Golden, 7 Watts 153. 1 See Eddy v.'Wilson, 43 Vt. 362. Compare Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt. 207. 224 PUEPOSES FOE WHICH TAXES MAT BE LAID. [CH. IT. such parties the expense of the way. Taxation in these cases has relation to the public interest only, and the fact of private interest in the same object is an incidental circumstance of no legal importance.^ 1 Compare and distinguish People Campbell, 37 Minn. 498; Whiting v. V. Parks, 58 Cal. 624; MacKenzie v, Sheboygan, etc. E. Co., 25 Wis. 167, Wooley, 39 La. An. 944; Coates v. 180. OHAPTEE V. THE PURPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO THE DISTRICT TAXED. The general rule. In the preceding chapter we have en- deavored to show that, in order to give validity to any demand made by the state upon its people under the name of a tax, it is essential that the purpose to be accomplished thereby shall be public in its nature. But it is equally essential, as there in- timated, that the purpose shall be one which in an especial and peculiar manner pertains to the district within which it is pro- posed that the contribution called for shall be collected, and which concerns the people of that district more particularly than it does others. The federal constitution recognizes this principle in the provisions it makes to prevent the federal gov- ernment from indirectly imposing its support upon one or more of the states to the relief of others.^ But the power of a state over its municipalities is so great, and its control of taxation for their purposes as well as for its own is so extensive, that some further consideration of the restraints which rest upon state power in this regard will not be out of place or unim- portant. Taxes are collected as proportionate contributions to public purposes.^ But to make them such in any true sense, they must not only be such as between the persons called upon to pay them, but also as between those who ought to pay them. It is therefore of prime necessity in taxation that it should first be determined what public — v.hether state or local — should bear the burden, and that it should then be imposed ratably as between those who constitute that' public. If a single township were to be required to levy upon its inhabitants and collect and pay over to the state whatever moneys were neces- sary to pay the salaries of the several state officers, it would be apparent, "at first blush," that the enactment was not one which, either in its purpose or tendency, was calculated to make lU. S. Const., art. 1, §8, cL 1; §9, 2 Oliver v. Washingtoa Mills, 11 cL i, 5. Allen 368. 15 226 PUEPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. [OH. V. the taxpayers of that township contribute only their several proportions to the public purpose for which the tax was to be levied. If, on the other hand, for the purpose of pu-rchasing and ornamenting a city park or any other improvement of mere local convenience, a tax should be imposed upon the whole state-, it would be equally manifest that equality and justice were not the purpose of the imposition, but that, if carried into effect, the people of the state not residing in the city would be compelled to contribute to a purpose in which, in a legal sense, they had no interest whatever. As has been well said : " If the legislature should arbitrarily designate a certain class of persons on whom to impose a tax, either for general purposes or for a local object of a public nature, without any reference to any rule of proportion whatever, having no regard to the share of public charges which each ought to pay relatively to that borne by all others, or to any supposed peculiar benefit or profit which would accrue to those made subject to the tax which would not inure to others, so that in effect the burden would fall on those who had been selected only for the reason that they might be made subject to the tax, we cannot doubt that the imposition of it would be an unlawful exercise of power, not warranted by the constitution, against the exercise of which a person aggrieved might sue for protection." ^ And it is no more incompetent to select classes of persons for ex- ceptional burdens than it is to select districts of the state for that purpose.^ The cases suggested are extreme cases, but the principle that controls them is universal, and a disregard of it is fatal to the tax; and whether the unjust consequences are slight or serious is unimportant. "Where the principles of taxation are disre- garded, every one is entitled to claim strict legal right; for in no other way can the power be restrained from perversion and 1 Bigelow, Ch. J., in Dorgan v. Bos- elusive benefit of a single county: ton, 13 Allen 333, 337. Steiner v. Sullivan, 74 Minn. 498. But 2 See S/wirswood, J., in Hammett V. if the purpose be , one which pri- Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146, 151. A marily benefits particular political single county cannot be compelled to subdivisions of the state, the whole tax itself for a purpose which will burden may be placed upon them, al- bfenefit all parts of the state in the though the state at large be incident- same degree, nor can all of the coun- ally benefited thereby: Steiner v. tiSBs of the state be taxed for the ex- Sullivan, 74 Minn. 498. OH. V.J PUEPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. 227 oppression. It can therefore be stated with emphasis that the burden of a tax miist be made to rest upon the state at large, or upon any particular district of the state, according as the purpose for which it is levied is of general concern to the whole state, or, on the other hand, pertains only to the partic. ular district. A state purpose must be accomplished by state taxation, a county purpose by county taxation, or a public pur- pose for any inferior district by taxation of such district.^ This is not only just but it is essential. To any extent that one man is compelled to pay in order. to relieve others of a public burden properly resting upon them, his property is taken for private purposes, as plainly and as palpably as it would be if appropriated to the payinent of , the debts or the discharge of obligations which the person thus relieved by his payments might owe to private parties.^ "By taxation," it is said in a leading case, "is meant a certain mode of raising revenue for a public purpose in which the community that pays it has an interest. An act of the legislature authorizing contributions to be levied for a mere private purpose, or for a purpose which, though it be public, is one in which the people from whom they are exacted have no interest, would not be a law, but a sentence commanding the periodical payment of certain sums by one pprtion or class of people to another."^ This principle has met with universal acceptance and approval because it is as sound in morals as it is in law. 'It is held in Arkansas that the Sleight t. People, 74 HI. 47; People v. legislature has not power to create a Salem T'p Board, 30 Mich. 453; St. district for the levy of taxes for gen- Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 133; Steiner eral county purposes which does not v. Sullivan, 74 Minn. 498. Th^t part embrace the whole county: Hutch- of a statute which provided for the inson v. Ozark Land Co., 57 Ark. 554. taxation of the property of a county In general, county burdens are raised for the payment of the debt of a city by unifori)! taxes on property: Cal- within its limits, which debt had lam V. Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7. been incurred in the purchase and 2 Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 construction of certain highways, Dana 513; Howell v. Bristol, 8 Bush wsts held void: Simon v. Northup, 37 493, 497; Wells v. Weston, 33 Mo. Or. 487. 384; Oilman v. Sheboygan, 3 Black ^ Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 31 Pa, 510; State v. Haben, 33 Wis. 661; St. 147, 174. See Washington Avenue, Madison County v. People, 58 IlL 456: 69 Pa. St. 353; Weber v. Reinhard, 73 Bright V. McCullough, 37 Ind. 233; Pa. St. 370; Lexington v. McQuillan's Knowlton v. Rock County, 9' Wis. Heirs, 9 Dana 513; Ryerson v. Utley, 410; Hale v. Kenosha, 39 Wis. 599; 16 Mich. 369; Sanborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 228 P0EPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTRICT TAXED. [CH. V. State control of mnnicipalities. The application of the principle is much complicated by that control which .the state possesses in respect to its niunicipalities, and which for most purposes may almost be said to be absolute ; and also by the fact that the states very generally make the municipalities districts for the purposes of state taxation, and also use them as cpn- • veniences for state purposes in collection. The state not only , confers upon its counties, towns, cities, and villages such pow- ers to tax as they possess, but it may to a large extent take to itself the control and disposition of funds collected, though in doing so it should keep in view the general purposes for which the funds have been called for from the people, as a guide in the expenditure provided f or.^ And" if municipal powers are taken away, the municipal property, including its tax moneys, collected and uncollected, passes to the state, to be treated as a trust, and managed and disposed of for the benefit of the local community.^ But the legislative power over municipali- ties is-not so extensive that they may be required, or even per- mitted, to tax themselves for a purpose foreign to the objects 258. A tax upon personal property in an unorganized county, imposed by and for the exclusive benefit of a contiguous organized county, is an attempt to tax one community for another's benefit, and is therefore void: Ferris v, Vannier, 6 Dak. 166. That the legislature has no power to authorize a local board or corpora- tion to levy taxes within its district for' general purposes, see People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 624; State v. Lefflng- well, 54 Mo. 458; Bromley v. Rey- nolds, 2 Utah "535. ,A tax on one community for the benefit not alone of that community, but for the com- mon benefit of that and a larger community not taxed, is void, though it might be otherwise of a burden laid under the police power : Ex parte Marshall, 64 Ala. 366. So where a statute imposed a tax upon k town to educate an entire school-district of which the town was a part: Town of Belle Point v. Pence (Ky.), 17 S. W. Rep. 197. A school tax assessed on only a part of the school-distri6t is void: Auditor General v. McAr- thur, 87 Mich. 457. 1 See Trustees of Schools v. Tatman, 13 111. 87; Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co.. 13 111. 1; Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Weymouth, etp. Dist. v. County Com'rs, 108 Mass. 142; Raw- son V. Spencer, 113 Mass. 40; State v. St. Louis County Ct., 34 Mo. 546; Palmer v. Fitfs, 51 Ala. 489; North Yarmouth v. Skillings, 45 Me. 133; Payne v. Tread well, 16 Cal. 221; San Francisco v. Canavan, 43 Cal. 541. 2 Meriwether v. Garrett, 103 U. S. 473. See Morgan v. Beloit, 7 Waa 613; Mount Pleasant v. Beokwith, 100 U. S. 514. Though the state controls the moneys, it Is not to be deemed the money of the state, but of the municipality : Shepherd's Fold v. New York, 96 N. Y. 137, citing People v. IngersoU, 58 N. Y. 1; People v. Fields, 58 N. Y. 491. See State v. St. Louis County Ct, 34 Mo. 546. OH. V.J PURPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTRICT TAXED. 229 for which they are called into being; as, for example, a school corporation cannot be allowed to contract debts or levy taxes in aid of a railroad.^ When the state makes the municipalities agents in collection, it may hold them responsible for the collection of the whole state levy within their limits, respectively, and leave them to make good any deficiencies. This is not infrequently 'done,^ and when done it is not competent for the municipalities to burden the state tax with the cost of collection or with other deductions, except as the law may permit.' Tiolations of the rale of apportionment. The general rule of restricting the levy of a tax to the very district concerned, but making it embrace the whole district, is so plain and rea- sonable that it is not likely to be overlooked or disregarded, except in cases in which the facts are such as to raise doubts as to its application. There are some cases in which the character of a proposed public expenditure is such that there may be differences of opinion as to the propriety or justice of its being provided for by a small district or a larger one. Cases of high- v/ays afford an illustration. In many of the states the cost of these is usually borne by the towns, and it is not surprising to find a general impression prevailing in some quarters that the towns must always and ought always to bear it. But there is probably no state that does not provide for highways of more general importance than the ordinary town ways; highways that are very properly called and treated as state or county roads, and which are made and kept in- repair by an expendi- ture of state or county moneys. In such a case the state or th^ county is the proper taxing district, and the town will not be taxed for the purposes of the road, except as ^ part of the larger district to which it belongs.* The state or the county , might possibly be the proper taxing district, even though the work were wholly within the town ; the importance and cost of the work, and not its locality, being in many cases the con- iTrustees v. Bailway Co.,63 111. 299; ^ Multnomah County v. State, 1 Or. People V. Dupuyt, 71 III. 651; People 359. Y. Trustees of Schools, 78 111. 136; < See People v. Supervisors of Dutoh- Welghtman v. Clark, 103 U. S. 356. ess, 1 Hill 50; Parsons v. Goshen, 11 2 This is the case in New York: Pick. 396; post, oh. XXL New York v. Davenport, 93 N. Y. 604. 230 PPKPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTKICT TAXED. [CH. V. trolling consideration.^ In all such- cases legislation must de- termine what the district shall be. In cases where the character of the work, as local or general," -is plain, the rule of rigl^ is clear. If a single locality were to assume to tax itself, or the state were to undertake to tax it, for the construction of a state work or the erection of a state building, no one could hesitate for a moment in saying there was no such right, and that there could be none so. long as taxation by the fundamental law is required to be laid by fixed rules, and is not subject to the arbitrary caprice of legislative bodies.^ A county has therefore no constitutional authority to laiy a tax for a county building on a part of its towns only; neither has it authority, when it has contracted a debt for a county purpose, to levy a tax for the satisfaction of the debt on such part of the towns only as its governing board may think ought in equity to pay it.' TJie rule would be the same if a tax were levied for proper local purposes and the corpora- tion were then to undertake, or the state were to require, its application to purposes not properly local.; as where a city, which embraced parts of two counties, voted city funds towards the court-house of one;* and where the legislature undertook, after a school tax had been levied, to authorize the expenditure of a part of it for purposes outside the district.^ Taxes when authorized to be raised by any public body invested with the power of local taxation must be for public uses under the care of that body; and a county has therefore no constitutional right to lay a tax as for a county purpose, in order that it may be paid over to a part of its towns, ot- even to the whole of them, to be expended by them.^ Such cases would seem to be plain. 1 See Supervisors of Will County the city exclusively for the payment v. People, 110 111. 511. of such debtsf Cleveland v. Heisley, 2 SeeRyerson y. Utley, 16 Mich. 369; 41 Ohio St. 670. State V. Haben, 33 Wis. 661 ; Livings- * Bergen v. Clarkson, 6 N. J. L. 352. ton Co. V. Weider, 64 IlL 437 ; Sleight Construction by city of county court- V. People, 74 111. 47. > house may be authorized: Callam v. ' People V. Supervisors of Ulster, 94 Saginaw, 50 Mich. 7. N. Y. 363, affirming 30 Hun 148. But » Bromley v. Reynolds, 3 Utah 525. ■where a village has been annexed to •> Attorney-General v. Supervisors, a city, and by the terms of annexa- 34 Mich. 46. See Stookle v. Silsbee, 41 tion it is to pay its own debts, it is Mich. 615. But where a statute pro- competent to assess that portion of vided that a state t'ax on telegraph CH. V.J PUEPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTEICT TAXED. 231 More difficult cases arise where the principle of assessments by benefits is resorted to for improvements which commonly are constructed by an expenditure of the ordinary taxes. In no part of the law of taxation has the practice of our state governments left the discretion of the legislature more entirely unfettered than in laying and apportioning such assessments, and the case must be most extraordinary and clearly excep- tional to warrant any court in declaring that the discretion has been abused, and the legislative authority exceeded.^ In Pennsylvania it has been decided that a case of clear abuse existed in an act imposing a special assessment upon the prem- ises fronting on a country road, and others lying within a- certain distance therefrom, for the purpose of constructing the road on a very costly plan ; not, as the court found, for the local, but for the general public benefit. The act, consequently, was adjudged void.^ It must be conceded that this legislative application of the law of special assessment was of very ques- tionable propriety, and the conclusion of the court was doubt- less just, notwithstanding it leaves us in great doubt touching the exact bounds of the legislative discretionary authority in this regard.' companies should be distributed to the towns in proportion to the num- ber of shares held in them respect- ively, it was held that whether such distribution was warranted or not, the fact that it was provided for was no defense to the tax; if unwar- ranted, the remedy was to be sought after payment: State v. Western Union, etc. Co., 73 Me. 518. 1 Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30. 2 In re Washington Av., 69 Pa. St. 352. The owners of property abutting on an ordinary country road cannot be made to bear the expense of im- proving if; the improvement bene- fits, and should be paid for by, tlie whole county: Graham v. Conger, 85 iKy. 583; Conger v. Bergman (Ky.), 11 8. W. Rep. 84; Conger v. Graham (Ky.), 11 S. W. Rep. 467; SpSrry v. Flygare, 80 Minn. 825. The case of People V. Springwells, 35 Mich. 153, in its main facts bears some resem- blance to the foregoing. The legis- lature proposed to assess upon a township the expense of a costly road, which was to be constructed by state agents vinder state authority, and taken out of the control of local oflScers. The act was adjudged in- valid on the ground that by the con- stitution the state was forbidden to engage in internal improvements, and the towns were given control of these local works, and of the ex- penditure of their moneys therefor. See Baltimore v. Hughes, 1 Gill & J. 480: Preston v. Roberts, 12 Bush 570. 3 People V. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 401, may usefully be compared with the case of Washington Avenue. It was a case of compulsory , town taxation for a like expensive road. See, also. People v. Supervisors of Richmond, 80 N. Y. 252; Shaw v. Dennis, 10 IlL 405. 232 PUEPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTEICT TAXED. [CH. V. Taxing districts in general. The cases which have been instanced show that the nature of the purpose to be accom- plished will, in many cases, determine the district within which the tax must be levied and collected. But, in other cases, there may be questions of fact to be examined and considera- tions of equity to be weighed before the proper bounds of a taxing district can be fixed upon. "When a local improvement is to be made or a local work constructed for the general pub- lic good, the general theory of taxation wt)uld seem to require that the cost should be collected from the state at large, or, in other words, from the whole public for whose benefit it is to be made. But, as has already been remarked of the common roads, it is not the custom of the country to provide for these improvenients by general, taxation. Instead of apportioning the cost of each through the state at large, it has been found more satisfactory and more consistent with the general system of local government that the works themselves should be ap- portioned for construction among the divisions of the state in which they respectively are to be made, and that each division should be left to bear the cost of that which falls within it. The advantages of this system are obvious. Presumptively the cost of these works is apportioned through the state as equally and justly in this mode as by spreading the cost of all among the whole people. Moreover, when each community is thus taxed for those works only which are constructed in the immediate vicinity, and the importance of which its members may be supposed to feel and appreciate, it is reasonable to ex- pect that they will bear the cost more willingly and cheer- fully than they would their proportion of a work at a distance, of the necessity of which they could known nothing except. by report, and the demand for construction of which they might attribute to local or personal considerations. These are not the only reasons for leaving highways and other public works of a similar nature to be constructed by the local divisions of the state only. , Such a course has been found conducive to econ- omy in expenditure, because the community upon which the whole cost falls has the opportunity, and will be certain to have the disposition, to watch with reasonable jealousy in order to see that nothing is wasted and nothing plundered. At the same time, as all local improvements tend to confer special CH, v.] PUEPOSE MDST PERTAIN TO DI8TKI0T TAXED.. 233 and peculiar benefits upon the local community beyond what are received by the state at large, the people thus immediately and specially benefited may generally be relied upon to make liberal appropriations for the public works which are to' add to the comforts, conveniences, and, perhaps, the adornment of their neighborhood, because the very moneys they thus vote appear to return to them in the increased value which the ex- penditure confers upon their estates. It is therefore found to be a wise apportionment of the cost of public highways which leaves each separate division of the state, either town or county, to bear the cost which is made within its own limits. And what is said of these will apply equally to school build- ings and to the conveniences required for local courts and the general administration of justice in the several municipalities.^ There is a class of public works, however, which by general consent are not regarded as being general in their nature, though the use thereof must be open to the general public. As an illustration may be taken the case of the pavement of a city street. The street itself is a public highway, but the necessity for a heavy expenditure in paving arises from causes that are purely local, and that, too, in a very restricted sense. More- over, in large cities, the pavement becomes absolutely essential, and must be made by the owners of adjoining property, if not provided for by the public. The ability to make profitable use of their property depends upon it, and they might, perhaps, be safely left to provide for it at their own expense, if all property was improved and occupied; and if, when individual action was relied upon, there was any method of insuring uniformity of action in the time, manner, and expense of improving the streets. The necessity, however, for public supervision and direction is made imperative by the likelihood of such diversity 1 The aggregate amounts of school eral government townships is not taxes levied by a town may be as- necessarily invalid because there are sessed and levied on property in the no roads in two of those townships: town generally, without regard to Peninsular Iron, etc. Co. v. Crystal the fact that the money will be! ap- Falls, 60 Mich. 510. To support a plied for the benefit of specific dis- township tax for a water supply it tricts in the town: Griggs v. St. is not necessary that every part of Croix County, 37 Fed. Rep. 333. 'A the township shall be supplied with highway tax voted by the township water: State v. Bloomfield, 47 N. J. board of a township containing sev- L. 443. 234 PURPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTKIOT TAXED. [CH. 7. of individual -views as would prevent voluntary co-operation among property owners; and the necessity for making the im- provement a local burden is almost equally imperative, since it is not to be supposed that the state at large would understand and appreciate the absolute need of an improvement which was specially important to comparatively few persons. Considered as a city work, the expense of paving a street may be levied upon the whole city, or a system of apportionment may be resorted to analogous to that which is adopted in the construction and working of highways in general; that is to say^ the cost of any such work may be assessed upon that part of the city which receives peculiar benefits from it. Therlatter method would require either a division of the city into taxing . districts for the several local improvements within it, or the creation of a special taxing district for each improvement, set- ting apart for the purpose that portion of the city which was ' believed to receive the special benefits. These special taxing districts are most common, and they are either fixed after an examination of the circumstances of each particular case with a view to ascertaining how far the special benefits extend, and what property shares in them, or they'are determined by some general rule which, though it may not be strictly just in any particular case, will, in the main, it is supposed, apportion all such expenses with reasonable equality and fairness. - Whether one course or the other shall be adopted must be determined by competent legislation.' Establishment of districts. When the nature of the case does not conclusively fix it, the power to determine what shall be the taxing district for any particular burden is purely a legislative power, and not to be interfered with or controlled, except as it may be limited or restrained by constitutional pre visions. Reference to the cases cited in the margin will show that this is a principle which the courts assert with great unanimity and clearness.^ " The judicial tribunals," it has 1 See oh. XX It constitutes no ob- tive scheme: In re Tuthill, 163 N. Y. jection to the power of taxation that 133. the burden thereof should be laid 2 Mobile v. Kimball, 103 U. S. 691 upon the territorial district which is Stanley v. Supervisors, 131 U. S. 550 exclusively affected by the legisla- Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345 OH. T.J PTJEPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTEICT TAXED. 235 justly been said, " cannot interfere with the legislative discre- tion, however onerous it may be." ^ And when it was o.bjected that a certain construction of a statute would throw upon one locality the expense of constructing a road for state purposes, "the conclusive answer" was declared to be, "that the state may impose such a burden where, in the wisdom of the legis- lature, it is considered that it ought to rest."? The right to Walston V. Nevin, 138 U. S. 578; Lent V. Tilson, 73 Cal. 404; Shaw v. Dennis, 10 IlL 405, 416;'Conwell v. Coi^ners- ville, 8 Ind. 358; gchenok v. Jefiferson- ville, 153 Ind. 304; Challis v. Parker, 11 Kan. 394; Simpson v. Kansas City, 46 Kan. 438; Malchus v. Highland^, 4 Bash 547; Hingham, etc. Turnpike ^r. Norfolk County, 6 Allen 353; Mitchell V. Negaunee, 113 Mich. 359; Pioneer Iron Co. v. Negaunee, 116 Mioh. 430; Voigt v. Detroit, 133 Mich. 547; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 435; Bowles V. State, 37 Ohio St. 35; King V. Portland (Or.), 63 Pao. Rep. 3; Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 330; Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368; Langhorne v. Bobinson, 30 Grat. 661. In Howell v. Buflfalo, 37 N. Y. 367, 373, Parker, J., speaking of the legislative power over special as- sessments,says: "The legislature was not bound to apportion the tax among the taxable persons within the city, but might, according to its own view of justice and right, apportion the whole tax among a part of such per- sons. It saw fit to apportion the tax upon the owners of the lands which had been benefited by the improve- ment, in proportion to the amount of such benefit. As it is impossible, under the doctrine adverted to, to say that it had not the power so to do, so it can scarcely be contended that, in so doing, it violated any prin- ciple of justice or right.'* As to the lands which, under the California statute, can properly be included in an irrigation district: 164 IT. S. 113. The legislature has power to cut off a portion of a school district as it ex- isted when an election for the impo- sition of a'tax was held, leaving the burden of taxation upon those resid- ing in the district thus contracted in area, and the authority of the trustees to act therein unimpaired: Fitzpat- ribk v. Board of Trustees, 87 Ky. 133. 1 Ranney, J., Scovill v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 136, 138. The same judge in Hill V. Higdon, 5 Ohio St 343, 845, after speaking of former decisions in the same state, says: "It was there shown . . . that the right to tax for such a purpose necessarily in- cluded the power to determine the extent, and upon what property, the tax should be levied ;^ and that its imposition upon the property par- ticularly and specially benefited by the improvement was but a lawful exercise of the discretion with which the legislative body was invested in apportioning the tax." "We see," he says further on, " no reason to doubt the correctness of these conclusions." See, also, what is said by Rapallo, J., in Gordon v. Comes, 47 N. Y. 608, 61 1. Also Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174, 187; Alcorn v. Hamer, 38 Miss. 653, 761. 2 Johnson, Ch. J., in People v. Su- pervisors of Richmond, 30 N. Y. 353, 355. This statement of the principle is true in a general sense only ; if lit- erally true the state would have despotic powers. It is countenanced by Shaw v. Dennis, 10 111. 405, in which the legislature had required the levy of a special tax upon the taxable property of a single precinct for the purpose of repairing and main- 236 PUEPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTEICT TAXED. [CH. V. do this where the constitutiori has interposed no obstacles is declared to be not now open to controversy, if indeed it ever was.^ The legislature judges finally and conclusively upon all questions of policy, as it may also upon all questions of fact which are involved in the determinatipn of a taxing district.^ taining a bridge over the Rock river at that place. The court declared the act valid, and that it was always in the power of the legislature to deter- mine the district in which a tax shall be levied. See, also, Philadelphia v. Field, 58 Pa. St. 336; Water ville v. Kennebec Co., 59 Me. 80; Mobile County V. Kimball, 103 XT. S. 691; Steiner v. Sullivan, 74 Minn. 498. A county, excluding a city which lies within it, may be constituted a tax- ing district for the construction of turApike roads leading to the city; and while some parts of the district may be benefited more than others, the court cannot undertake to meas- ure the benefits received, when^ de- termining the validity of the act: Clark V. Leathers (Ky.), 5 S. W. Rep. 576. 1 See People v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 137; McFerron v. Alio way, 14 Bush 580: Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 133. Also, oh. XX, where many cases are collected. 2 Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 133, 138. This was a' very peculiar case of a special taxing district for a local improvement. Ctrover, J., states it thus: "An examination of the case shows that, at the time of the pas- sage of the aof, the Long Island Rail- road Company had the right of way in a tunnel constructed in Atlantic street, Brooklyn, for a railroad oper- ated by steam, and were operating their road thereon; that the legisla- ture deemed it expedient to close the tunnel, grade the street, lay a track upon the surface to be operated by horse power, etc., and to authorize the making of a contract with the railroad company for doing the work and effecting the changes for a sum not exceeding $135,000. To carry into effect this design, the act in question was passed, authorizing the commis- sioners, whose appointment was pro- vided for in the act, to make the con- tract, and to make an assessment for the payment of the contract price, together with the incidental expenses, upon the lands and prem- ises situate in the district specified in the act. This local assessment for those purposes, it is apparent, was based upon the ground that the ter- ritory subjected thereto would be benefited by the work and change in question. Whether so benefited or not, and whether the assessment of the expense should for ' this or any other reason be made upon the dis- trict, the legislature was the exclu- sive judge." See, also, Hoyt v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 39, 43. In Kansas it is held that where several streets are to be improved, it is competent to make one district of them all, and apportion . the expense by frontage along them all: Parker 'v. Challiss, 9 Kan. 155; Challiss v. Parker, 11 Kan. 394. And see Arnold v. Cambridge, 106 Mass. 353; Gumming v. Grand Rapids, 46 Mich. 150. A district in Kentucky jfor the purposes of rail- road-aid taxation included an island nearer the Indiana than the Ken- tucky shore, and which could receive no direct benefit from the projected railroad. Held, nevertheless, that the courts could not relieve the island from the taxation, which was im- posed in the discretion of the legisla- ture: McFerron v. Alio way, 14 Bush 580. A wide extension of school dis- trict boundaries, taking in a part CH. V.J PURPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. 237 And having the authority to determine what shall be the taxing districts, the legislature must also be left to its own methods of reaching the conclusion. Most cases will be settled by general law ; but taxes for extraordinary purposes may re- quire special legislation, or at least may justify it. In such cases it may be proper to enter upon such inquiries into the facts as cannot well be made directly by the legislative body of the state, whose duties are too multitudinous to admit of special investigations on a hearing of evidence or on personal examination by its members. Under such circumstances it may be proper and convenient to refer the whole subject to the local authorities; and this in the case of local works or special improvements is the course usually adopted. The state does not determine whether a city street shall be improved and a tax levied therefor, but, by provision in the city charter, or by special legislation, it refers the whole subject to the city com- mon council, under such directions, regulations, and instruc- tions as it may be thought proper or prudent to give or impose. The state does not divide the several counties and towns into school districts, and order the construction of district school- houses; but by general law submits the subject to the people specially concerned. This is the general course, and it has been found to be the satisfactory and therefore the wise course. of certain railroad property which pears that the money raised in one would thus be taxed for the erectipn town was not to be expended in the of a schoolhouse twenty-five miles other: Halsey v. People, 84 111. 89; distant, was held to be authorized: Wright v. People, 87 111. 583. Per- King V. Utah Central R. Co., 6 Utah sonal property in an unorganized 281. Land in a levee district not ac- county may be subjected to taxation tually benefited, but rather injured, in the organized county to which it by the levee, was not thereby exempt has been attached for judicial and from the levee tax (where it did not revenue purposes: Thomas v. Gay, come within the particularexemption 169 U. S. 364; Wagoner v. Evans, 170 made by the constitution), since to U. S. 588. See Ferris v. Vannier, 6 hold otherwise would be an attempt Dak. 186. To raise money to pay on the part of the court to legislate bonds for free gravel roads, the part of a district out of the operation county commissioner may be author- of a tax thereon : Smith v. Willis, 78 ized to levy a special tax upon the Miss. 149. The fact that an improve- property of the townships through ment for which an assessment is which the roads extend: Gilson v. made is partly in one town and partly Board, 128 Ind. 65; Board of Com'rs in another will not vitiate the as- V. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500. sessment unless it affirmatively ap- 238 PUEPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. [CH. And if an apportionment is to be made on the basis.of benefits to property, the local authorities may be and usually are em- powered to refer the assessinent of benefits tb officers or com- missioners chosen for the purpose, whose report, when under the provisions of the law it shall become final, will settle the limits of the special taxing district. These, if not the only methods of giving effect to the legislative authority over this subject, are certainly admissible and proper methods.* Diversity of districts. Taxing districts may be as numer- ous as the purposes for which taxes are levied.^ The district for a single highway may not be the same as that for the school- house located upon it. It is not essential that the political dis- tricts of the state shall be the same as the taxing districts,' but 1 People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419, 430; Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana 413; Williams v. Detroit, 3 Mich. 560; Doi^gan v. Boston, 13 Allen 333; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Hingham, etc. Turnpike Co. V. Norfolk County, 6 Allen 353; Salem Turnpike, etc. Co. v.r Essex County, 100 Mass. 383; Appeal of Powers, 39 Mich. 504; Voigt v. De- troit, 133 Mich. 547. 2 Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Daw- son, 97 Tenn. 151. 'People V. Central E. Co., 43 CaL 398, in which it was decided to be competent to divide a county into revenue districts; Malohus v. High- lands, 4 Bush 547; S. c, 3 Withrow's Corp. Cas. 361, in which an act was sustained which created a special district near Newport, with author- ity to grade and pave, or macadam- ize with rook or gravel, any public road passing through or into the same, on a favorable vote of two- thirds the owners of real estate by or through which any such road may pass. See, also, County Judge v. Shelby R. Co., 5 Bush 335; Shaw v. Dennis, 10 111. 405; People v. Haws, 34 Barb. 69. The legislature, in the exercise of the general power of tax- ation as distinct from the power of local taxation, may create a special taxing district without regard to municipal or political subdivisions of the state, and may levy a tax on all property within such district by a uniform rule, , for the- purpose of constructing or maintaining a public road: Bowles v. State, 37 Oliio St. 35; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. v. Com'rs, 48 Ohio St. 349. A strong illustration of legislative power in es- tablishing districts is afforded when several streets are put into one dis- trict for the purposes of improve- ment, and the cost of improving all is assessed throughout the district; as in Challiss v. Parker, 11 Kan. 394. The legislature may create a city boundary, or designate any other boundary, for a local taxing district, without reference to existing civil or political districts; and a city, as.such a district, may tax property within its limits which it would not be able to tax for municipal purposes only: Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 90 Ky. 498. Special tax districts for road purposes may be created by the legislature without regard to the boundaries of counties, townships, or municipalities: Gilson v. Board of Com'rs, 128 Ind. 65; Board of Com'rs V. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500. In New Jer- OH. V.J PUEPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. 239 special districts may be established for special purposes, wholly- ignoring the political divisions. A school district may be cre- ated of territory taiien from two or more townships or coun- ties, and the benefits of a highway, a levee, or a drain may be so peculiar that justice would require the cost to be levied either upon part of a township or county, or upon parts of sev- eral such subdivisions of the state.^ In some states there may be township government within a city, or a city within the bounds of a township, and the fact will create a necessity for special tax'ng districts, since otherwise taxation for some local purposes could not possibly be properly apportioned.^ And sey taxing districts for specified pur- poses may, without regard to special benefits, be created out of the parts of an existing political district, pro- vided each part is made a political district with 'appropriate powers of self-government: State Street Light- ing Dist. V. Drummond, 63 N. J. L. 493. See Smith v. Howell, 60 N. J. L. 384; Peck v. Raritan T'p, 52 N. J. L. 319. Several, towns may be created a bridge and highway district for the construction and maintenance of a bridge across a river: State v. Will- iams, 68 Conn. 131. As to the lands which, under the California statute, -cnay properly be included in an irri- gation district, see Fallbrook Irrig. Dist. V. Bradley, 164 U. S. 113. 1 County Judge v. Shelby E. Co., 5 Bush 235. See, also, People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 583; Buffalo, etc. E. Co. v. Supervisors of Erie, 48 N. Y. 93 ; Litch- field v. McComber, 43 Barb. 288, 299; Sangamon, etc. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 14I1L 163; Bake well v. Police Jury, SO La. An. 334; Malchus v. Highlands, 4 Bush 547; Norwich v. County Com'rs, 13 Pick. 60; Brighton v. Wil- kinson, 3 Allen 37; Attorney-General V, Cambridge, 16 Gray 347; Salem Turnpike, etc. Co. v. Essex County, 100 Mass. 383; Bordeaux v. Meridian, etc. Co., 67 Miss. 304 A statute pro- viding that the county commissioner, in order to raise money to pay bonds for free gravel roads, shall levy a special tax upon tlie property of the township through which the roads extend, is within the legislative power to assess the cost of local im- provements according to benefits: Gilson V. Board of Com'rs, 138 Ind. 65; Board of Com'rs v. Harrell, 147 Ind. 500. 2 In Iowa if a city is within the. limits of a township, this does not au- thorize township highway oflicers to levy road taxes within the city: Marks v. Woodbury County, 47 Iowa 453. But in Illinois in such a case the highway commissioner taxes alike all property in the city and out- side, but all funds raised in the city by such taxation are to be expended within it: Baird v. People, 83 111. 387; People V. Wilson, 3111. App. 368; Brit- ten V. Clinton, 8 111. App. 164. See Suppiger v. People, 9 111. App. 290. As to meaning of taxes "for road purposes," see People v. Wilson, 8 111. App. 368. It is held in Indiana that property situated within and taxable by a city is not taxable for township purposes in the 'township within which lies the city: Kerlin v. Eey- nolds, 135 Ind. 540, 142 Ind. ,460. It is held in the same state, however, that a statute providing for turn- pikes does not limitl the taxable prop- erty to that outside of incorporated cities and towns: Byram v. Board of 240 PUEPOSB MUST PEETAIN TO DISTRICT TAXED. [oh. V. railroads which extend through several of the ordinary taxing districts may seem to require districts specially created, and having regard to no other property.^ It is compulsory that the political divisions of the state shall be regarded in taxation only -where the tax itself is for a purpose specially pertaining to one of them in its, political capacity, so that, as already stated, the nature of the tax will determine the district.^ Overlying districts. Even»when the purpose for which a tax is demanded pertains to the' state at large, or to one of its divisions, so that a general levy throughout the state or such division is essential, there may be peculiar reasons why a part of the general public who are concerned in the purpose should bear a proportion of the burden greater than that which should be borne by the others. A pertinent illustration might perhaps be the case of a tax for the construction of a state capitol. It would be clear, we should say, that such a tax should be spread Com'rs, 145 Ind. 340. It is for the legislature to determine whether 'property in a city, as well as that outside, is benefited by the repair of free turnpilsres, and should therefore be taxed therefor in common with other property in the county: Ibid. In Kansas, a city of the third class, having property assessed at less than $150,000, is liable to taxation for township purposes in the township where it lies: Jackson T'p v. Wood, 55 Kan. 628. It is held in New Jersey that where the voters residing within a city remain voters of the township, and are, therefore, entitled to vote at town meetings on the amount to be raised for roads, a township road tax can lawfully be imposed upon prop- erty within the city: McNeal Pipe, etc. Co. V. Lippincott, 57 N. J. L. 540. Property owners in an incorporated municipality may constitutionally be required to pay taxes for the im- provement of streets in the munici- pality, and also to pay the general county road-tax: Wolf ^. MoHargue, 88 Ky. 351. The incorporation into a town of a certain district of the parish under the general town in- corporation act does not exempt the inhabitants of such town from jury duty which police juries are author- ized to require of all male inhabit- ants of the parish: Sanders v. Levi, 43 La. An. 406. As to taxes levied by township for support of government of unincorporated village within its limits, see Land, etc. Co. v. Brown, 73 Wis. 394 A bona fide resident of an incorporated city, which, under its charter, has assumed exclusive control over the streets, alleys, and highways within its corporate limits, cannot be required to work the public roa4B outside of the corporate limits of the city: Ex parte Roberts (Tex.), lis. W.Eep. 783. 1 See Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Lam- kin, 97 Mo. 496. 2 Board of Com'rs v. Harrell, 14T Ind. 500. A bill providing for public improvements by special tax' levied upon districts having territorial limits different from the municipal corporation levying the tax is un- constitutional: In re House Bill, !■> Colo. 593, 595. • CH. V.J PUEPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTRICT TAXED. 241 over the state at large, because the purpose is a state purpose, and every individual in the state is directly interested in its ac- complishment. Eut it is also apparent that the people and the property at the place where the structure is proposed to be con- structed would receive special and probably very great benefits in consequence of the construction, beyond what they would receive in common with all- others. The fact is often recog- nized in the voluntary contributions which are mad« by the people to secure the location and construction of state build- ings at the place where they reside or own property; and the question then arises whether these peculiar benefits may not constitute a basis for special taxation. To make them such it would be necessary there should be two taxing districts ; the one embracing the whole state, and the other embracing only the district which, in the opinion of the legislature, was so pe- culiarly benefited as to justify aij exceptional burden upon its people and property. In such a case the people within the minor district, which is also embraced within the larger dis- trict, would contribute twice to the same burden; but this, though apparently a violation of the principles of taxation, is not so in fact, if the establishment of the minor district has only equality and justice in view, and if each taxpayer, though twice called upon, is by the two assessments only required to pay what, as between himself and the rest of the state, has been found to be his just proportion of a burden which, though general in in its nature, distributes its benefits unequally. This doctrine has been applied in Pennsylvania to the case of a county town, which, in addition to its proportion of the county levy, was specially assessed for the expense of con- structing a court-house and jail. " The advantages of a county town," it was said, "are too well appreciated, not to .make every village use all its exertions to have a court-house pro- vided for its benefit and convenience ; and as its inhabitants profited by, not only the disbursement of the tax among them, but a permanent increase of their business and an appreciation of their property, they were morally bound to contribute in proportion. " ^ The same doctrine has been applied in Minne- ^ Gibson, Ch. J., in Kirby v. Shaw, v. State; 146 Ind. 54, 147 Ind. 476; 19 Pa. St. 253, 361. Cases in Indiana Schenck v. Jeffersonville, 153 Ind. to the same effect (Board of Com'rs 204) have been overruled on the 16 24:2 PUEPOSE MUST PEETAIU TO DISTEIOT TAXED. [OH. V. sota by a statute making part of the salaries of the judges of the district court in a certain county a tax upon the county, on the ground that in the judgment of the legislature! such county is benefited to a greater degree than other counties by the administration of justice by that court/ In the state of New York it has also been applied to a state work of public improvement — a canal — which conferred or was likely to confer local benefits on a locality specially taxed.^ It has also been applied to the case of # building erected for the accom- modation of a state educational institution. In one case where a local tax was constructed to meet a portion of the cost of erecting at that place a building for the state agricultural col- lege, the principles which underlie such cases were so clearly stated that a quotation from the opinion will be more satisfac- tory than any synopsis that might be attempted, or any re- statement in our own language. " It may at first sight seem," it was said, " as if the estab- lishment of a college and its endowment and support by the commonwealth for the education of all persons within the state who might wish to receive instruction in certain branches of science or art, would stand on the same footing as the pub- lic schools, and that money raised for such an object ought to be apportioned and distributed in such manner as to bear on all persons and property equally, without resort to local taxa- tion, which would operate partially, and in a certain sense disproportionately. We are not prepared to say that t!iis proposition is in all respects incorrect. "We doubt very much whether it would be competent for the legislature to impose the whole burden of supporting such an institution upon any ground that the statute permitting money required for a court-house for the taxation was a local act forbid- the county: Callam v. Saginaw, 50 den by the constitution to be passed Mich. 7. " for the assessment and collection of ^ Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 65. taxes for state, county, or road pur- See, also. Harbor Com'rs v. State, 45 poses:" Board of Com'rs V. State, 155 Ala. 399. The legislature of a state Ind. 604. Such taxation upon a town- may charge a county with the whole ship is for a county, not a town, pur- cost of an extensive improvement of pose: Ibid. a harbor ^within its limits, even 1 Steiner v. Sullivan, 74 Minn. 498. though the improvement is for the A city can be authorized to raise by benefit of thb whole state: Mobile corporate funds and taxes the entire County v. Kimball, 103 U. S. 691. CH. V.J PUEPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. 243 particular municipality, section, or district of the state. But we are clear in the opinion that there may exist a state of facts which would render it just and expedient, and strictly within the exercise of constitutional authority, for the legisla- ture to enact that a portion of such a public burden should be borne by persons and estates situated within certain limits, and to authorize a special assessment on them for that purpose. If the establishment of a "public institution of general utility or necessity in a particular locality would be productive of direct and appreciable benefit to persons or estates in the vicinity, either by increasing the value of property there situated, or by the opportunities which it would afford to. those residing in the neighborhood to enjoy certain common advantages and privi- leges with greater facility and at less cost than others having an equal right to participate in them, but who reside or own estates more remotely situated, or in distant parts of the state, we can see no reason why these special advantages or bene- fits should not be taken into consideration in determining the mode in which the public burden of defraying the cost of the institution should be apportioned and distributed. While per- fect equality in the raising of money for public charges is in- attainable, it would certainly approximate more nearly to an equitable apportionment of them, to provide that such portion of the expenditure for a public object as will inure directly to the benefit or profit of a certain town or district should be borne by the estates situated and persons resident therein, leaving only that sum to be treated as a public charge, and to constitute a general assessment on all persons and property in the commonwealth, which may reasonably be supposed to be expended for the equal and common benefit of all. Such dis- tribution of a public burden would be reasonable, because it would tend to equality; and it would be proportional, because it would be borne in proportion to the benefits which each would receive." ^ • Bigelow, Ch. J., in Merrick v. Am- son County, 4 Dill. 148. Every such herst, 13 Allen 500, 504 See to the special assessment must of course same effect, Marks v. Pardue Univ., have express legislative authority. 37 Ind. 155; Gordon v. Comes, 47 It could not be made under the gen- N. Y. 608, 614; Burr v. Carbondale, eral power conferred upon a munioi- 76 III 455; Hensley T'p v. People, 84 pality to levy taxes for corporate IlL 544; Livingston County v. Dar- purposes. On this general subject lington, 101 U. S. 407; Briggs v. John- see post, ch. XX. 244 PTJBPOSB MUST PERTAIN TO DISTRICT TAXED. [CH.'V. A like principle is sometimes applied to the construction and improvement of the streets. These, as has been said, consti- tute highways for the accommodation of the general public, but are calculated, by their improvement, to increase largely the value of all property fronting on or lying in the immedi- ate vicinity of them. Should the legislature, determine that the cost of a street improvement should be borne in part by the whole city, and in part by an assessment made on the basis of benefits within a district to which the improvement was exceptionally valuable, we know of no valid legal objec- tion that could be interposed. "Whether "the city shall bear the whole expense, or the adjacent property the whole, or, as "a third resort, the expense be apportioned between two districts, one of which shall include the whole city, and the other the adjacent property only, must be determined by the legislature on a consideration of all the equities bearing on the case.' Other local city improvements may undoubtedly be provided for in the same way. The legislature has sometimes applied the same doctrine to the case of general city taxation; constituting two districts, the one, consisting of the whole city, to be assessed equally, and the other consisting of the more compact portions of the city, which, because receiving a larger share of the benefits of city government, in the protection afforded by the police and fire departments, and the like, was required to pay a greater proportionate share of the expense of such government. It is not perceived that such a case differs in principle from the other cases of overlying districts which have been mentioned. !N"evertheless, in some cases the power of the legislature to dis- criminate in city taxation between what may be designated the out property, and that in the parts compactly built, has 1 See Municipality v. White, 9 La, able . limits, that shall bear the cost An. 446; Municipality v. Dunn, 10 of public Are cisterns: Louisville La. An. 57; Chicago v. Larned, 34 111. Steam-Forge Co. v. Anderson (Ky.), 203; Ottawa v. Spencer, 40 III 211; 57 S. W. Rep. 1188. A city was held Patten V. Springfield, 99 Mass. 627; to have power to levy a tax upon all Crane v. Siloam Springs, 67 Ark. 30; the taxable property within its lim- Kansas City, P. & G. Co. v. Board of its to pave the streets in the heart Waterworks Imp. Dist. (Ark.), 59 S. of its business portion with vitrified W. Rep. 248. The council of a city brick, even though other streets held to have power to define by ordi- were not so paved: May bin v. Biloxi, nance the territory, within reason- 77 Miss. 673. CH. V.j PUBPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTEICT TAXED, 245 teen denied, on the ground that the city constituted the taxing district for city purposes, and such a discrimination would give distinct rules of taxation within the same district, to the num- ber of which there could be no limit except the legislative dis- cretion; a doctrine wholly inconsistent, it was said, with the constitutional idea of taxation.^ This conclusion seems to im- pose restraints on the constitutional power of the legislature to establish taxing districts, which can hardly be justified in reason, or by the decisions in analogous cases. Legislation, such as was thus condemned, has not been uncommon in other states, and in some cases has passed the test of judicial scru- tiny ,2 being sustained on the ground that it is only an equitable apportionment of the burdens of municipal government be- tween those who receive a part of its benefits only, and those who participate in them all." A different case has been presented in some other states. City boundaries having been extended so as to embrace the lands of parties who insisted that their premises were agricult- ural lands merely, and would receive no benefit from the city government, such parties sought the protection of the courts, and prayed for injunction to -restrain the imposition upon them of any tax in excess of what they would have been chargeable with had the boundaries not been extended to embrace them. It is to be observed of such cases that the legislature, "which alone had authority to determine and fix the proper bounds of the municipal divisions of the state,* and also to establish the iKnowlton v. Supervisors, 9 Wis. Conn. 351; Norris v. Waco, 57 Tex. 410; New Orleans v. Cazelar, 27 La. 635. An. 156. Perhaps the Wisconsin case ^ in Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn. • should now be regarded as overruled. 351, 357, Butler, J., delivering the See Wis. Cent. E. Co. v. Taylor opinion of the court, assumes as prob- jCounty, 53 Wis. 37, 69. The Louisi- able that the persons within the city ana case seems to I'ely for the doc- limits whose lands have been brought trine laid down upon a passage from in by an extension of city lines had a text-book, where cases were cited, been so brought in on the application but without approval. of the old corporation and against ^ Serrill v. Philadelphia, 88 Pa. St. their own desire, and that the dis- 355, 358; Henderson v. Lambert, 8 crimination in taxation in their Bush 607; Benoist v. St. Louis, 19 favor was only a just protection Mo. 179; Lee v. Thomas, 49 Mo. 113. against inequality and unfairiless. And see Zanesville v. Richards, 5 < It is the business of the legisla- Ohio St. 590; Gillette v. Hartford, 31 ture to enact general rules by which 246 PITEPOSE MTST PEETAIN TO DISTEICT TAXED. [CH. V„ taxing districts, had proceeded to do so, and in fixing the city boundaries without any provision for a discrimination in the taxation of property within them, had in effect determined that no such discrimination should or ought to be made. The whole subject was one committed by the constitution exclu- sively to the judgment and discretion of the legislature, whose members, as in other cases of legislation, would make inquiry into the facts in their own way, and act upon their own rea- sons. No question could ber made of the complete legislative jurisdiction over the case, and if the action was unfair, and led to unequal and unjust consequences, it seems diflBcult to suggest any ground upon which it could be successfully as- sailed in the courts that would not warrant a judicial review of legislative action in every case in which parties complain of injustice and inequality. Nevertheless in some cases the courts have considered themselves warranted in inquiring into the facts, in order to determine whether in their judgment the ex- tension of municipal boundaries was fairly warranted; andN having reached the conclusion that it was not, and that the extension was made for the purpose of subjecting to taxation adjacent property that would not receive the benefits of municipal government, and was not in fact urban property, they have undertaken to protect the owners of property thus unfairly brovfght in, against the unequal taxation to which the legislation would expose them. In doing this they have not assumed to nullify the legislative action in extending the municipal limits, but they have undertaken to modify and re- lieve against its consequences, and to do this upon the express ground that the motive which h£ls influenced the legislation was not legitimate.^ As the point is stated in one case, it is the boundaries of incorporated dis- port, 7 Bush 37; Louisville Bridge triots may be fixed in the first in- Co. v. Louisville, 81 Ky. 189; Park- stance, and by which additions land v. Gains, 88 Ky. 563; Covington thereto may subsequently be made: v. Arthur (Ky.), 14 S. W. Rep. 131; Kansas City v. Union Pao. R Co., 59 Pineville v. Creech (Ky.), 36 S. W. Kan. 437. Eep. 1101; Louisville & N. E. Co. v. 1 Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. Commonwealth (Ky.), 30 S. W. Rep. 330; Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. 634; Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82; Monr. 491; Sharp's Executor v. Dun- Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa 86; avan, 17 B. Monr. 333; Arbegust v. Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa 404; Louisville, 3 Bush 371; Courtney v. Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa 382; Deeds v. Louisville, 12 Bush 419; Swift v. New- Sanborn, 36 Iowa 419; Davis v. Du- CH. V.J PURPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. 24T the palpable perversion of the power to tax which justifies the judicial interference.^ Some of these decisions are made by very able judges, whose opinions are always entitled to the highest respect; but it seems difficult to harmonize them with the conceded principles gov- erning the law of taxation. For, 1. They do not question legis- lation as being in excess of legislative authority, as might be- done where taxes are voted for a purpose not public ; but they leave the legislation to stand, and only interfere to qualify its effect, on the ground that it has been adopted on improper grounds and will operate unequally. 2. This is done on an inquiry into the facts, and a substitution of the judicial conclu- sion for the legislative on a subject not at all judicial ; a sub- ject, too ^- the proper limits of city extension — upon which persons are certain to differ widely, and where an inquiry into the facts after the judicial method of an examination of wit- nesses is usually much less satisfactory than that personal knowledge and investigation which legislators are supposed to possess or to make. This is certainly laying down a rule which cannot be applied generally ; it being admitted that the judi- ciary has no general authority to correct the injustice of legis- lative action in matters of taxation; ^ and the weight of author- ity clearly is that, as regards these cases, the determination of the legislature is conclusive.' But the legislature has no author- buque, 20 Iowa 458; Deiman v. Fort 138 111. 291; Tabor v. Graf miller, 109 Madison, 30 Iowa 543; Durant'v. Ind. 206; Dickerson v. Franklin, 112 Kauffman, 34 Iowa 194. For decis- Ind. 178; MoKeesport v. Soles, 165 ions under statutes prohibiting or Pa. St. 628. See Philadelphia v. Sher- restrioting the taxation for city pur- idan, 148 Pa. St. 532; South Chester poses of agricultural, implatted, or v. Garland, 162 Pa. St. 91. unimproved lands within city limits, i Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush 37, 40. see Leeper v. South Bend, 106 Ind. 2Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258, 261; 375; Dickerson v. Franklin, 112 Ind. Logansport v. Seybold, 68 Ind. 235; 178; South Bend v. Gushing, 123 Ind. Waco v. Texas, 57 Tex. 635; Streeb v. 290; Winzer v. Burlington, 68 Iowa Columbus, 75 Miss. 832. 279; Tubbesing v. Burlington,' 68 » Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U. S. 78; Iowa 691; Perkins v. Burlington, 77 Oliver v. Omaha, 3 DilL 368; Burnett Iowa 553; Taylor v.Waverly, 94 Iowa v. Sacramento, 13 Cal. 84; Dixon v. 661; Farwell v. Des Moines Brick Mayes, 72 CaL 166; Linton v. Athens, Manuf. Co., 97 Iowa 286; People v. 53 Ga. 588; Gary v.Pekin, 88 IlL 154; ■Weaver,41 Hun 133; Bishop V.Tripp, Stilz v. Indianapolis, 53 Ind. 515; 15 R. L 466. Such lands held sub- Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind. 335; ject to special assessment for local Perkins v. Iowa, 77 Iowa 553; Ford improvements: Leitch v. La Grange, v. North Des Moines, 80 Iowa 636; 248 PrEPOSE MUST PEETAIN TO DISTEICT TAXHD. [oh. ity to bring into a municipality territory not contiguous to it and the attempt to do so for the purpose of increasing the local revenues may be treated as void.' Mendenhall v. Burton, 43 Kan. 570; Hurla V. Kansas City, 46 Kan. 738; Kansas City v. Union Pac. R. Co., 59 Kan. 427; New Orleans v. Oazelar, 27 La. An. 156; Stoner v. Flournoy, 28 La. An. 850; Mitchell v. Negaunee, 113 Mich. 859; Martin v. Dix, 52 As. 58; Giboney v. Cape Girardeau, 58 Mo. 141; State v. Brown, 53 N. J. L. 162; People v. Lawrence, 41 N. Y. 137;. Kelly v. Pittsburg, 85 Pa. St. 170; Hewitt's Appeal, 88 Pa. St. 55; Madry v. Cox, 78 Tex. 588; Kimball V. Grants ville City, 19 Utah 868; Fer- guson V. Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668; Frace v. Tacoma,16 Wash. 69; Davis V. Point Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 289; Washburn v. Oshbosh, 60 Wis. 453. See Cook v. Orandall, 7 Utah 344. Bridge property within the limits of a city may be regarded as so situated with reference to the city that it en- joys such benefits from the city gov- ernment as to jvarrant its subjec- tion to municipal taxes: Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592; s. C. (Ky.), 36 S. W. Rep. 561; St. Louis Bridge Co. v. East St. Louis, 121 111. 238; Point Pleasant Bridge Co. V. Point Pleasant, 82 W. Va. 328- Vacant lands included within the corporate limits of a city, but so re- mote as to receive no benefit from the installation of a plant for electric . lighting, are yet subject to taxation for the improvement unless the legis- lature, in the exercise of its discre- tionary authority to establish taxing districts, makes a discrimination in their favor: Mitchell v. Negaunee, supra. Taxing for fire protection land that is too far away to be bene- fited by the tax is not a taking of private property without just com- pensation: Wood V. Quimby, 30 R. I. 483. Since the adoption of the pres- ent constitution of Kentuokv. reouir- ing all property to be taxed, and that taxation shall be uniform within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, all property within the limits of a city is subject to taxa- tion for city purposes without re- gard to the benefits received, and the cases cited in note 1, page 346, ante, do not apply: Briggs v. Russell ville, 99 Ky. 515; Pence v. Frankfort, 101 Ky. 534; Board of Counoilmen v. Scott, 101 Ky. 615; Board of Council- men V. Rarick, 103 Ky, 853; Richmond V. Gibson (Ky.), 46 S. W. Rep. 703; La- tonia V. Hopkins (Ky.), 47 S. W.Re^). 348; Hughes V. Carroll (Ky.), 50 S. W. Rep. 852; Schuck v. Lebanon (Ky.), 53 S. W. Rep. 655; Bryan v. Central City (Ky.), 54 S. W. Rep. 3; Central Covington v. Park (Ky.), 56 S. W. Rep. 650; Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louisville (Ky.), 58 S. W. Rep. 598; Specht V. Louisville ^(Ky.), 58 S. W. Rep. 607. Even prior ' to the present constitution of Kentucky, lands in- cluded within the boundary of a town at the time the town was in- corporated were subject to taxation by the town authorities, irrespective of the question of local benefit: Cen- tral Covington v. Park, supra. And one whose property had been in- cluded in the boundaries of a city upon a petition, in which he joined, to the general assembly, was es- topped from denying the city's right to tax such property upon the ground that it did not receive its full share of the benefits of the city govern- ment: Lebanon v. Edmonds, 101 Ky. 316. And see Simms v. Paris (Ky.), IS. W. Rep. 543; Board of Trustees v. Daniel' (Ky.), 35 S. W. Rep. 746; Eifert v. Central Coving- ton, 91 Ky. 194. 1 Smith V. Sherry, 50 Wis. 310. OH. v.] PURPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. 249 Extraterritorial taxation. Those cases in which it has been held incompetent for a state or municipality to levy taxes on persons or property not within its limits have generally in- dicated the want of jurisdiction over the subject of the tax as the ground of invalidity. But such a burden would be inad- missible, also, for the further reason that, as to any property or person outside the district in which the tax was levied, the want of legal interest in the tax would preclude its being sub- jected to the burden. A state can no more subject to its power a single person or a single article of property whose residence or legal situs is in another state, than it can subject all the citizens or all the property of such other state to its power.' The accidental circumstance that it may happen to have the means of reaching one and not the rest can make no difiPerence ; there must be an interest in the subject-matter of the tax; there must be between the state and the taxpayer a reciprocity of duty and obligation ; and these in contemplation of law would be wholly wanting in the case supposed.^ A territory, there- fore, — or indeed a state, — has no authority to exercise the power to tax within the limits reserved to an Indian tribe.' And it has been held in Missouri to be incompetent for the legislature to empower a city to tax for city purposes the land outside the city but adjacent to it, and therefore receiving, possibly, some of the benefits of the city government and ex- penditure.* The benefits, it is obvious, would be altogether indirect and incidental, since the city could have no authority to make expenditures outside of its limits for the benefit of 1 State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, it is not competent to provide for its 15 Wall. 300; Dewey v. Des Moines, taxp,tion in either, see People v. Wil- 173 U. S. 193, 204 kerson, 1 Idaho (N. S.) 619. 2 State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, " ' See ante, p. 84 et seq. 15 Wall. 300. See, also, Murray v. * Wells v. Weston, 23 Mo. 384, ap- Charleston, 96 U. S. 482. Where a proved in St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. town had for more than twenty 133. A statute providing that taxes years exercised jurisdiction over assessed upon any railroad in a town, part of another with its acquies- city, or village shall be applied to cence, a tax levied withih this part the redemption of bonds issued by by such first mentioned town was the municipality to aid the railroad, nevertheless held void: Ham v. Saw- is not unconstitutional as imposing yer, 38 Me. 37, 39. And see Hugh- on the other towns of the county a ey's Lessee v. Horrel, 2 Ohio 331. tax for the benefit of the town Whether, when it is doubtful in through which the railroad runs, which of two counties a district lies. As to such other towns it is practi- 250 PUEPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. [CH. V. people there residing.' But in Indiana a statutory provision authorizing a town to tax all property within two hundred yards of the corporate limits was sustained, though not argued by either counsel or court ;^ and in Virginia, a railroad-aid law was held constitutional which extended the power of a qity to tax lands for half a mile outside. These, however, may well be deemed doubtful oases.' It is certainly difficult to understand how the taxation of a district can be defended whose people have no voice* in voting it, in selecting the pur- poses, or in expending it.- Where a license fee is levied for police purposes, there may be excellent reason for allowing a to\j^n specially, interested in it to require its payment of anj' persons in or near the town itself; and as the purpose is one of general interest, the state would have a larger discretion in providing for it than it would possibly possess in the case of ordinary taxation.^ cally the same as if the railroad property was exempted from taxa- tion: Clark V. Sheldon, 106 K Y. 104. iSee Wilkey v. Pekin, 19 111. 159; Hundley v. Com'rs, 67 111. 559. It is said in the case of Oom'rs of High- ways V. Com'rs of East Lake Fork Drainage Dist., 137 111. 581, that the rule that money raised in one town- ship cannot be expended in another has no application where assess- ments are made by the commission- ers of a special drainage district against the highway commissioners of a township. 2Conwell V. Connersville, 8 Ind. 358. 'In In re Flatbush, 60 N. Y. 398, an assessment in Flatbush for a part of the cost of extending Prospect Park, which had previously been in- curred by the city of Brooklyn, was held void for want of legislative power. Compare Brooks v. Balti- more, 48 Md. 265. In that case the mayor and council of Baltihiore had been authorized to open streets and provide for ascertaining the damage or benefit thereby accruing to the owners of ground within or adjacent to the city, for which such owners ought to be compensated or to pay compensation, and to provide for as- sessing and levying either generally upon the city or specially upon the persons benefited, the damages, etc. The court, dwelling upon the dis- tinctions between a general tax and a special assessment upon the per- sons benefited, held that it made no difference whether the property lay upon one side or the other of the city line, if the reason for the exer- cise of the power was applicable; and further, that under the power to assess and levy, the council could sell the property for failure to pay an assessment. One cannot be as- sessed for a sewer which is to run in a district different from that wherein his property lies: Chicago v. Adcook, 168 111. 331. Koad taxes levied in a district through which a railroad runs are not a lien on railroad prop- erty lying within the county but outside the district: Wabash E. Co. i v. People, 137 111. 181. *See Falmouth v. Watson, 5 Bush 661i in which license fees imposed by a town on those selling intoxioat- CH. v.] PUEPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTEICT TAXED. 251, It is provided by general law in some states that where a farm or plantation lies partly in two taxing districts, it may all be taxed in the one in which the mansion house is situate. Such a general rule varies the district to meet the particular case, and it has generally been sustained.' Where one municipality' is set off from another, or where the bounds of an existing municipality are simply changed, so as to set off from it or bring within it persons and property, the case will commonly be one requiring legislation for an adjust- ment of rights in view of the changed coildition of affairs. So ing drinks outside its limits, but near it, were sustained as being im- posed, partly at least, for police pur- poses. A town cannot give its ordi- nance such extraterritorial effect without express authority by stat- ute: Strauss v. Pontiac, '40 111. 301. Water rents due and unpaid on premises beyond city limits are, under the statute, subject to city's lien equally as if on premises within the limits: Pittsburgh v. Brace, 158 Pa, St. 174. 1 Saunders v. Springsteen, 4 Wend. 429; People v. Wilson, 1S5 N. Y. 367; Tebo V. Brooklyn, 134 N. Y. 341; Peo- ple V. Gaylord, 53 Hun 335; Budd v. Allen, 69 Hun 535; Hairston v. Stin- son, 13 Ired. 479; Ellis v. HaU, 19 Pa. St. 293; Bausman v. Lancaster, 50 Pa. St. 208; State v. Metz, 39 N. J, L. 133; State v. Hoffman, 30 N. J. L. 346; State V. Hay, 31 N. J. L. 275; State V. Britton, 43 N. J. L. 103; State v. Abbott, 43 N. J. L. Ill; State t. Washer, 51 N. J. L. 138; Judkins v. Beed, 48 Me. 386. A similar rule is to be observed in apportioning work on highways: Hampton v. Hamsber, 46 Hun, 144. If a farm lying in two, townships is assessed in the one in which the owner does not reside, the assessment is without jurisdiction and the assessors are liable for mak- ing it: Dorn v. Backer, 61 N. Y. 261, reversing 61 Barb. 597. It is held in Pennsylvania that this mode of as- sessment cannot be claimed as a right by the owner. And assessment of the separate parts in the counties, etc., in which they lie is not bad as to either for want of jurisdiction: Patton v. Long, 68 Pa. St. 260. As to the rule of assessment in Georgia, where a plantation lies on the line between two counties, see Eobson v. Du Bose, 79 Ga. 721. In New Jersey, if land owned by a corporation is situated in two towns, it may be taxed in the town where the oflSoe is: State v. ' Warford, 87 N. J. L. 897. In New Hampshire it is said that real estate must be taxed in the town where it lies. Where, on a division of a town, it was provided that each tract through which the divisional line passed should be taxed where the owner lived, this was held not com- petent as a permanent provision, and long acquiescence did not estop from questioning it: Weeks v. Gilmanton, 60 N. H. 501. Where a water-power is created by a dam across a river which is the dividing line between two towns, it is taxable in each town to the extent of the value of the part situated therein, though it is used in only one of the towns: Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. Concord, 66 N. H. 563. Towns cannot even by agreement establish the rule that each may tax lands of its residents lying in the other; there being no statute per- mitting it: Dillingham v. Snow, 5 Mass. 547. 252 PFEPOSE MyST PEETAIN TO DISTEICT TAXED. [CH. V. long as the corporation retains its legal identity, it will be en- titled to retain its property and be liable for its debts ; ^ but unless some provision were made for compensations, there might be injustice which in some cases would be serious. It is customary, therefore, for the legislature to make provision for an apportionment of property and debts in such cases, so as to do justice, as nearly as possible, to the people of all the terri- tory afPected by the changes.^ Should convenience seem to render it desirable, the exis1*g debts might doubtless be pro- vided for through a continued taxation for the purpose within the limits which were before liable.' iSee North Hempstead v. Hemp- stead, 2 Wend. 109, 135; Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hartford, 16 Conn. 149, 171; Windham v. Portland, 4 Mass. 384^800; Hampshire v. Frank- lin, 16 Mass. 76, 85; Medford v. Pratt, 4 Pick. 223'; Montpelier v. East Mont- pelier, 29 Vt. 13,30 ; Milwaukee Town v. Milwaukee, 12 Wis. 98; Olney v. Har- vey, 50111. 458; Wade v. Richmond, 18 Grrat 583; Milner v. Pensaoola, 3 Woods 633. 2 Harrison v. Bridgeton, 16 Mass. 16; Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 76; Salem Turnpike v. Essex Co., 100 Mass. 283; Whitney v. Stow, 111 Mass. 368; Stone v. Charlestown, 114 Mass. 314; Sedgwick v. Bunker, 16 Kan. •498; Bristol v. New Chester, 3 N. H. 534; Portwood v. Montgomery, 52 Miss. 533; Milwaukee Town v. Mil- waukee, 13 Wis. 93; Marshall County Court V. Calloway County Court, 3 Bush 93; Layton v. New Orleans, 13 La. An. 515; School Dist. v. Board of Education, 73 Mo. 637. That when territory is brought within the limits of an existing municipality it be- comes liable to be taxed for the pre- vious debts of the municipality, see Olney v. Harvey, 50 111. 458; Watson V. Com'rs of Pamlico, 83 N. 0. 17; Stilz V. Indianapolis, 81 Ind. 582; Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 181 Ind. 513; Smith v. Saginaw, 81 Mich. 123; Smith v. Willis (Miss.). 28 South. Rep. 878; Holder v. Bond (Miss.), 29 South. Rep. 769; Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co. V. Cuming County, 81 Neb. 374 ; Powers v. County Com'rs, 8 Ohio St. 285, 290; Blanohard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96; Madry v. Cox, 78 Tex. 538. Lands brought into a city after taxes have been levied on the property within the city are not subject to that levy: Westportv. McGee, 128 Mo. 5.53. Where the cor- pora.te limits of a town are changed after the ending of the taxv year, but before the taxes have been collected, ~the collection of the same will not be enjoined: New Decatur v. Nelson, 103 Ala. 556. As to the effect of de- taphing territory from a municipal- ity previously indebted, see Galesburg V. Hawkinson, 75 111. 153; County Com'rs V. County Com'rs, 43 Kan. 409. Where a new borough, though there was no decree authorizing it, paid by special tax its part of the old borough's debts, neither it nor its officers was or were liable to any ac- tion by the taxpayers: Wade v. Oak- mant, 165 Pa. St. 479. 3 See Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 111. 153; Rader v. Road Dist., 86 N. J. L. 373; Alvis v. Whitney, 48 Ind. 83; Blount County v. Loiidon County, 8 Heisk. 854; Linton v. Carter County, 28 Fed. Rep. 535. gee Michigan Land, eta Co. V. Republic T'p, 65 Mich. 638. Where an act sets off one town from OH. v.] PUEPOSE MUST PERTAIN TO DISTEIOT TAXED. 253 To give locality to a purpose in respect to ■which a public expenditure is to be made, it is obviously not essential that the expenditure should be within the district, or that a public work created by means thereof should have its situs within the district. The district interest must be the true test whether an object is or is not a proper object of district taxation; and if the benefits are had by the district, the interest is manifest.^ The case of city water-works located outside its limits is an illustration.^ another, it may provide that taxes to pay existing liabilities shall be as- sessed and collected in both by the existing ofScers as if the act had not been passed: Winslow v. Morrill, 47 Me. 411. 1 Ferris v. Vannier, 6 Dak. 186. ^Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh 120, 155, per Tucker, President; Denton V. Jackson, 3 Johns. Ch. 317,336. But in general, specific authority would be required to enable a m\micipality to expend money outside its terri- torial limits for a purpose which presumptively is not local. Thus, a town under its general authority to vote taxes for township purposes cannot raise money to build or re- pair a bridge outside: Concord V. Bos- 'cawen, 17 N. H. 465. Compare North Hempstead v. Hempstead, Hopk. Ch. 288; Riley v. Rochester, 9 N. Y. 64. But with proper legislative authority it may do this, on the ground of spe- cial local benefit: Talbot County Com'rs V. County Com'rs of Queen Anne, 50 Md. 245. See Halsey v. Rum- sey, 84 111. 89; Wright v. People, 87 111. 583; Concord v. Boscawen, 17 N. H. 465. A city may be authorized to purchase and improve a public park outside its limits: M'Callie v. Chattanooga, 8 Head 317; Halsey v. People, 84 III. 89. A village may make a special assessment for the construction of a sewer which lies partly outside of the corporate lim- its, where it is necessary to extend the sewer beyond such limits in order to obtain an outlet: Shreve v. Cicero, 139 111. 326; Cochran v. Park Ridge, 188 111. 335. Under the Kansas stat- ute it was held that the cost of the construction of a discharging sewer situated wholly outside of a sewer district could not be assessed against the lots and pieces of ground in such district, although it was constructed and used for the sole purpose of a discharge for lateral sewers in such district: Fort Scott v. Kaufman, 44 Kan. 147. Lands outside of a town which are included in the town after the passage of an act providing for the levy of a tax on lands outside of the town for the construction of roads and for keeping the same in repair, are exempt from the tax for repairs: Donnelly v. Carpenter (Ky.), 47 S. W. Rep. 336. CHAPTER VL EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. Requirement of equality. There is no imperative require- ment that taxation shall be equal. If there were, the opera- tions of government must come to a stop, from the absolute impossibility of fulfilling it. The most casual attention to the nature and operation of taxes will put this beyond question. No single tax can be apportioned so as to be exactly just, and any combination of taxes is likely in individual cases to in- crease instead of diminishing the inequality. Theoretically, tax laws should be framed with a view to apportioning the burdens of government so that each person enjoying govern- ment protection shall be required to contribute so much as is his reasonable proportion, and no more. The tax law that comes nearest to accomplishing this is, in theory, the most per- fect.* But to accomplish this it may not be requisite to require the tax-gatherer to call upon every individual, and collect from him in person this reasonable proportion. It may possibly be found that the most equal and just tax can be collected from the fewest persons.^ A tax on an article of prime necessity, which few produce but all use, may be collected of the pro- ducers alone without their feeling the burden beyond what others would feel it, because the tax, in the natural course of business, would be added to the price of the commodity, and would be collected by the producers from the whole commu- nity of consumers. Such a tax would be generally distrib- uted, and would be wanting in equality only because of the fact that articles of prime necessity are not consumed by dif-- iWoodv. Quimby, 30 R. L483. But property by valuation are collected in a general sense it is true that " no from very few persons — five to eight tax is legal which is not equally and per cent, of the whole population.' impartially laid on the taxpayers: " The indirect taxes levied by the fed- Kerr v. WooUey, 3 Utah 456. era;l government reach all or nearly 2 Smith, Wealth of Nations, b. 5, all ch. 3, pt 3, art. 4 State taxes on CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 255 •ferent members of the community in proportion to their means or income, and therefore the poorer classes would pay more than their just proportion. To collect all the revenues of gov- ernment by a tax on breadstuffs exclusively would consequently be to compel unequal contributions to the support of the gov- ernment, by means of the necessities of the poor. A tax on an article which is purely one of luxury would probably be' more equal, and certainly less unjust, and would be diffused with some proportion to income ; every man would tax him- self, amd would abstain or indulge as he felt the disposition and ability to pay. To collect the whole revenue of the state from an article of luxury like spirituous liquors, might, if it were practicable, be as little liable to objection as any other method ; but to attempt the collection of all from one article would require a tax so heavy that it would be difficult of en- forcement, and the purpose of the law would be defeated by diminishing the consumption as the price increased. We have already seen that other kinds of taxes are open to serious ob- jections on the score of equality and justice. A tax on prop- erty by valuation, which seems perhaps most fair of all, is subject, as has been shown, to difficulties which preclude its being laid, apportioned, or collected with absolute justice. A statement of these difficulties need not be repeated here. It being thus manifest that there are serious and often insur- mountable difficulties in the way of equal and perfectly just taxation, it remains to be seen what is the rule of law where in the particular case the inequality can be pointed out and demonstrated. On this subject certain points have already been covered. The legislature must decide when and how and for what public purposes a tax shall be levied, and must select the subjects of taxation. All this is legislative, and the legis- lative conclusion in the premises must be accepted as proper and final. It follows that a tax cannot be attacked on aver- ment and proof that some other tax for the same purpose would have been more just and more equal. An excise tax on one kind of business only is not illegal for the discrimination; it is always to be conclusively presumed that the legislature found good and controlling reasons impelling the action it has taken, and that, in view of all the circumstances which were known 256 EQUALITY ANB TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [OH. VI. to its members, the tax which has been provided for is reason- able.i Yery strong language has been used by the courts in some cases, and a restatement of some of them in this place may illus- trate some of the diflEloulties which are necessarily encountered in all attempts at equal taxation. In the state of Pennsylvania a single borough was allowed to be specially taxed for the cost of a court-house to be erected within it for the county. Tnis was a departure from the gen- eral rule, and the tax was resisted as an unequal burden as be- tween the people of the borough and of the county. But the court had no difficulty in showing that no tax system which had ever existed in the state had resulted in equality. Some property was taxed twice ; some escaped any taxation ; the exi- gencies of the state required changes to reach new sources of revenue; but no one imagined that the inequalities had made the previous taxation unconstitutional. Equality of contribu- tion had not been required by the bill of rights, and probably because it was known to be impracticable. And the court pro- ceeds : 1 See De Camp v. Evelarjd, 19 Barb. 81; Northern Ind. E. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio St. 159, 165; People v. Brook- lyn, 4 N. .Y. 419; Lusher v. Scites, 4 W. Va. 11. In Williams v. Cam^ mack, 37 Miss. 209, 324, Handy, J., speaking of a special levee assess- ment, says: " Nor is it any objection to the constitutionality of the act that it operates injuriously upon the appellant. Every revenue bill, and every work of publie improvement, must, more or less, have such an ef- fect. But they must be submitted to as the necessary action of the ma- chinery of government, and as indi- vidual sacrifices to the general good, in order that the advantages of the social compact may be enjoyed. This principle rests on the very founda- tions of society, and is illustrated in every day's experience; the citizen yielding his natural rights, even of life, liberty, or property, to the public good. But he can only claim immu- nity when it is secured to him by the principles of the constitution." In People v. Whyler, 41 Cal 351, 355, a levee tax was objected to as not equal, because not apportioned ac- cording to benefits. The court held that it was required to be apportioned by value, and Bhodes, Ch. J., says: "A tax is equal and uniform which reaches and bears with the like bjir- den upon all the property within the given district, county, eta It bears the like burden when the valuation of each parcel is ascertained in the same mode — the mode prescribed by law — and when it is subject to the same rate of taxation as other prop- erty within the district, county, etc. Absolute equality is unattainable, and the benefits derived or to be de- rived from the expenditure of the tax cannot be taken into account." See, for applications of the same prin- ciple, Thomas v. Gfay, 169 X!. S. 364; New York, L. E. & W. R. Ca v. Com'rs, 48 Ohio St. 249. OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOKMITT IN TAXATION. 257 " If equality were practicable, in what brancli of the govern- ment would power to enforce it reside ? Not in the judiciary, unless it were competent to set aside a law free from collision with the constitution, because it seemed unjust. It could inter- pose only by overstepping the limits of its sphere, by arrogat- ing to itself a power beyond its province; by producing intes- tine discord, and by setting an example which other organs, of government might not be slow to follow. It is its peculiar duty to keep the first lines of the constitution clear, and not to stretch its power in order to correct legislative or executive abuses. Every branch of the government, the judiciary in- cluded, does injustice for which there is no remedy, because everything human is imperfect. The sum of the matter is, that the taxing power must be left to that part of the govern- ment which is to exercise it. "But what if this power were so managed as to lay the pub- lic burthens on particular classes in ease of the rest ? It is illogical to argue from an extreme ease ; or from the abuse of a power to a negation of it. Every authority, however indis- pensable, may be abused; and if it might not, it would be powerless for good." ^ " Perfect equality in the assessment of taxes," it is said in another case, " is unattainable. Approximation to it is all that can be had. Under any system of taxation, however wisely and carefully framed, a disproportionate share of the public burdens will be thrown on certain kinds of property, because they are visible and tangible, while others are of a nature to 1 Gibson, Ch. J., in Kirby v. Shaw, Williams' Case, 3 Bland. Ch. 186, 320. 19 Pa. St. 358, 360. " Equality of tax- , A gas and lamp tax, required by law ation, as a maxim of taxation, means to be assessed "in equal proportions equality of sacrifice. It means ap- on all lots," is not so assessed when propriating the contributions of each the same sum is assessed on each lot person towards the expenses of gov- without discrimination throughout ernment, so that he shall feel neither the municipality: State v. Eeimen- more nor less inconvenience from schneider, 39 N. J. 635. A statute re- his share of the payment than every quiring the taxation of any of a cer- other person experiences from his. tain kind of property brought within This standard, like other standards the state after a certain specified of perfection, cannot be completely date is void for want of uniformity: realized:" Mill, Pol. Econ., b. 5, ch. 3. Graham v. Chatauqua Co., 31 Kan. § 3. There is a very elaborate exam- 473. ination of this general subject in 17 258 (EQITALITT AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI, -elude vigilance.. It is only where statutes are passed which impose taxes on false and unjust principles, or operate to pro- duce gross inequality, so that they cannot be deemed in any just sense proportional in their effect on those who are to bear the public charges that courts can interpose and arrest the course of legislation by declaring such enactments void." ' "Perfectly equal taxation," it has again been said, "will re- main an unattainable good as long as laws and government and man are imperfect." ^ '^There is no provision in the con- 1 Bigelow, Ch. J., in Commonwealth V. Savings Bank, 5 Allen 438, 436. See Lowell v, Oliver, 8 Allen 247; Ould V. Richmond, 23 Grat. 464,473; Howell V. Bristol, 8 Bush 493. " Taxes seldom bear equally upon all: " State V. Travelers' Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 590. " The requirement of equality and uniformity found in the constitution of some states is complied with when designed and manifest deviations from the rule are avoided: " Stanley V. Albany County, 131 TJ. S. 535. " Equality can never be "but approxi- mation:" Bedfield, J., in Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174, 186. See also as to the exclusi veness of legislative power in matters of taxation, Athens v. Long, 54 Ga. 380; Tallman v. Treas- urer, 13 Iowa 531; Dubuque v. Rail- way Co., 47 Iowa 196; Beals v. Ama- dor Co., 35 Cal. 634. ^Sharswood, J., in Grim v. School Dist., 57 Pa. St. 433, 437. Compare Durach's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 491; Shaw V. Dennis, 5 Gilman 418; People v. ■Worthingtoni 21 IlL 171; Common- wealth V. N. E.. Slate & Tile Co., 13 Allen 391; Youngblood v. Sexton, 33 Mich. 406; Stanley v. Albany County, 131 U. S. 535; Norwood v. Baker, 173 TJ. S. 269, 379; First Nat. Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 TJ. S. 593; Board of County Com'rs v. Wil- son, 15 Colo. 90; Hawkeye Ins. Co. v. French, 109 Iowa 585; Atchison, T, & S. F. R. Co. V. Clark, 60 Kan. 826; Russell V. Carlisle (Ky.), 8 S. W. Rep. 14; Walton v. Riley, 85- Ky. 413; Commonwealth v. Taylor, 101 Ky. 335; Northanlpton v. Hampshire County Com'rs, 145 Mass. 108; Steiner V. Sullivan, 74 Minn. 498; Herman v. Guttenberg,63N. J.L.695; McCurdy V. Prugh, 59 Ohio St 465; Cleveland Trust Co. V. Lander, 62 Ohio St 366; Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. St 1; Wood V. Quimby, 20 R L 483; Kelley v. Rhoades, 7 Wyo. 137. In Coburn v. Richardson, 16 Mass. 213, 315, a tax on the lands of a non-resident for par- ish purposes was objected to. Parker, Ch. J.: "Numerous are the incon- veniences and great is the injustice which may flow from this statute. But it is for the legislature alone to determine whether these are or are not counterbalanced by any great public good which may be expected to be produced by it." In Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn. 319, 332, in which a town bounty tax was contested, on the ground that it benefited in part another town, as in fact it did, Wil- son, Ch. J., holds this language: "It is generally true that a city, town, or county, in expending money for the advancement of its own local inter- ests, either directly or indirectly ben- efits some other subdivision of the state. If it builds a road or bridge, or aids in building a railroad, or in making any other public improve- ment, from which benefit to itself Is expected to accrue, frequently some other subdivision of the state is di rectly and equally benefited; but it OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 259 stitution that taxation shall be equal. Sound policy requires that it should be, so far as possible. But perfect equality is not possible. Indeed, if this was necessary there could be no taxation except such as would include every person and every thing; which would be. manifestly impracticable and unjust.'" " Perfect uniformity and perfect equality of ^taxation," we are told in still another case, "in all the aspects in which the human mind can view it, is a baseless dream." ^ These are strong expressions, but they do not go beyond the demands of strict accuracy. But are there not cases which on their face are manifestly so unequal and unjust as to furnish conclusive evidence that equality has not been sought for, but avoided; that oppression, not justice, ,was desired, and confiscation, not taxation, in- tended ? Such cases it surely is possible to conceive, and if such has never been the intent of legislation, it is certain that it has sometimes been the result. It has already been stated that inequality does noi necessa- rily follow the restricting of a tax to a few subjects only, or even to a single subject. Such a restricted tax might, on the other hand, under some circumstances, be as equal and just as any that could be laid. A tax laid exclusively on merchants' has not been considered that this 393. It is competent to impose a tax would be a legal objection to an ap- on a particular business — liquor sell- propriation or tax for such improve- ing — to jfrovide and maintain an ment If our constitution required asylum for inebriates: State v. Cas- absolute or perfect equality in taxa- sidy, 33 Minn. 318; State v. Klein, 33 tion, such objection would perhaps Minn. 338. have to be admitted. But perfect iSAarswoood, J., in Weber v. Rein- equality is not required, nor is it pos- hardt, 73 Pa. St. 370, 873. See Loan sibla All taxes ' should be as nearly Association v. Topeka, 30 Wall. 655, equal as may be,' in the language of per Miller, J. ; State Railroad Tax the constitution. If the taxes im- Cases, 93 U. S. 575; National Bank v. posed are distributed on just prin- Kimball, 103 U. S. 733; Opinions of ciples applicable alike to all for Justices, 58 M. E. 590; Savings Bank whose benefit the appropriation is v. New London, 30 Conn. 117; Car- made or intended, substantial equal- rington v. Farmington, 31, Conn. 65; ity is attained, and no constitutional Coite v. Society for Savings, 33 Conn, right invaded." Compare People v. 173; State v. Township Committee, Whyler, 41 CaL 351, 854 Perfect 36 N. J. 66; Am. Union Exp. Co. v. equality in a special assessment is St. Joseph, 66 Mo. 675; Apperson v. hardly attainable, and approxima. Memphis, 3 Flip. 863. tion is all that can reasonably be '•* Head Money Cases, 113 U. S. 580. expected: Ladd v. Gambell, 35 Or. 260 EQUALITT AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [OH. VI. goods might not be burdensome to those who, in the first in- stance, paid it, since the effect would only be to increase the price to the consumer, and thus to diffuse the burden through the whole community. A license tax might not be unjust though laid upon a single occupation, provided that it was so laid that none who followed that occupation escaped it.' Let it reach all of a class, either of persons or things, it matters not whether those included in it be one or many, or whether they reside in any particulln" locality or are scattered aU over the state. But when, for any reason, it becomes discrimina- tive between individuals of the class taxed, and selects some for an exceptional burden, the tax is deprived of the necessary element of legal equality, and becomes inadmissible.^ It is immaterial on what ground the selection is made: whether it be because of residence in a particular portion of the taxing district,' or because the persons selected have been remiss in meeting_a former tax for the same purpose,* or because of any other reason, plausible or otherwise; tot- if the principle of selection be once admitted, limits cannot be set to it, and it may be made use of for the purposes of oppression, or even of punishment.' It might also be made use of to give special privileges in the nature of monopolies ; as if loans of money were in general taxed, but those made by named persons, or by resideats of a named locality, were exempted; in which 1 See State v. Willingham (Wyo.), Cold. 554 that where a merchant's 63 Pao. Rep. 797. privilege is taxed, discrlmiliations 2 "Absolute equality in taxation cannot be made; a gr., between those is, of course, unattainable; but a law living within and those without a the manifest purpose and legitimate city: Compare Robinson v. Charles- result of which is discrimination ton, 3 Rich, 317; Fields v. Commis- and inequality cannot be enforced: " sioners, 36 Ohio St. 476. An ordi- Atohison, T. & S. F. R Co. v. Clark, nance is void in so far as it discrimi- 60 Kan. 836. nates against non-resident merchants ' St. Louis V. Spiegel, 75 Mo. 145.- in favor of residents, by requiring * State V. Township Committee, 36 the former to pay a license fee to de- N. J. L. 66. The parties in this case, liver goods, etc. : Muhlenbrinok v. who were specially taxed $1,000, had Com'rs, 43 N. J. L. 365; Thompson v. failed to pay $300 before assessed Ocean Camp Grove, etc. Assoc, 55 against them, for the same purpose. N. J. L. 507; Morgan v. Orange, 50 Had the $300 been reassessed against N. J. L. 389. them, the reassessment could not ^ Kansas City v. Whipple, 136 Ma have been complained of. It was 475; State v. Hoyt, 71 Vt. 5a decided in Nashville v. Althorp, 5 CH. VI.J EQITAUTT AND UNIEOEMITT IN TAXATION. 261 case the injustice would be so manifest that none could defend it.^ Even within the class taxed, however, there may be rules of distinction; and these are perfectly admissible, provided they are general rules and are observed.^ If a state, for exam- ple, were to decide to levy an occupation tax upon one of the learned professions, it might decide to lay the same tax upon each member, or it might discriminate so that the tax should ba proportioned to the professional income. Either course would be admissible, provided the rule were made general,' though the latter may be the more equitable.* But questions of mere equity in taxation are for the legislature, not for the courts.^ 1 See Lin Sing v. Washburn, 30 Cal. 53, a case of exceptional taxation of persons of one race. For the general rule, see Durach's Appeal, 62 Pa. St. 491; Fletcher v. Oliver, 35 Ark. 389; State V. Parker, 33 N. J. L. 436; Youngblood v. Sexton, 33 Mich. 406; Ex parte Marshall, 64 Ala. 366; New Orleans v. Dubarry, 33 La. An. 481. In some cases the selection of sub- jects for taxation has been treated as inadmissible on the principle stated in the text; as in Franklin Ins. Co. V. State, 5 W. Va. 349, in which a tax of three per cent, on the premiums of insurance companies was held void, the constitution re- quiring taxation to be equal and uni- form and this tax law applying to no other class of subjects or corpora- tions, or to individuals. The tax seems to have been regarded as a tax on property. Surely the require- ment of uniformity cannot make it essential that all persons or subjects shall be taxed, nor that all corpora- tions shall be taxed alike. Does it mean any more than that any par- ticular tax shall be laid equally and uniformly upon the persons or sub- jects within the class taxed? Would not a tax of one per cent, on the net earnings of all railroad companies be equal and uniform ? And if this is inadmissible, how can there be any equalization of taxation, as be- tween, for instance, the insurance company and the saloon-keeper, un- less everything is brought to the standard of a property tax, in which case those who ought to pay most would sometimes pay least? See Slaughterv. Commonwealth, 13 Grat. 767; Carter v. Dow, 16 Wis. ^98; State V. Willingham (Wyo.), 63 Pac. Rep. 897. In State v. Charleston, 13 Rich. 703, 733, Dunkin, Chancellor, says: "Essential characteristics of any system of taxation, properly so called, are certainty, equality, uni- versality. All the persons or prop- erty within a state, district, city, or otlier fraction of territory having a local sovereignty for the purpose of taxation, should, as a general rule, constitute the basis for taxation." Like language is made use of by Tuck, J., in O'Neal v. Bridge Co., 18 Md. 1, 33, and it is quite true and just where taxation by values is what the law provides for; but it has but limited application to the taxation of business in any form. 2 St. Louis V. Bowler, 94 Mo. 634; Aurora v. McGannon, 138 Mo. 88. 3 Ould V. Richmond, 33 Grat. 464; St. Louis V. Steinberg, 69 Mo. 389. * Aurora v. McGannon, 138 Mo. 38. 6 The legislature, while acting within the sphere of its authority to 262 EQ0ALITT AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. TI. Exemptions. Every statute for the levy of taxes is in a sense a statute making exemptions; that is to say, it leaves many things untaxed which it would be entirely competent to tax if the legislature had deemed it wise or politic. One state will lay the burden on property only, another on property and corporations, another on property and the diflferent kinds of business, and so on. In each case there is such selection of sub- jects as the legislative wisdom has determined upon, and the determination is conclusive. All subjects for which taxation is not provided are exempted, and the subjects selected are alone, for the time, taxable.^ When, however, the selections have been made, and the gen- eral rule determined upon, it has been customary for the legis- lature to make certain exemptions of either persons or property coming within the general rule, but which, for reasons of gen- eral policy, it is deemed wise not to tax. Some of thescj such as the exemptions of household furniture, tools of trade, etc., tax, is the sole judge of the wisdom and justice of the measure it may adopt, exact justice in matters of taxation being practically unattain- able in any event: New York, L. E. & W. E. Go. V. Com'rs, 48 Ohio St 349. A remarkable case of invidious exemption occurs in the legislation of Arkansas for 1871. A statute purporting to be passed in the in- terest of immigration and manu- factures exempted every species of manufacture and mining, but ex- cluded from its benefits all whose monthly production did not reach a sum named, thus discriminating against small capitalists. 1 See City Council v. St Phillip's Church, 1 McMuL Eq. 139, 144; Mar- tin V. Caiarleston, 13 Rich. Eq. 50, 52; Levy V. Smith, 4 Fla. 154; Brewer County V. Brewer, 62 Me. 63; Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa. St 448; State v. County Court, 19 Ark. 360; State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674. Exemption means free from liability, from duty, from serv- ice. It is a grace, a favor, an im- munity; taken out from under the general rule; not to be like others who are not exempt; to receive, and not make a return. Bartholomew v. Austin, 87 Fed. Eep. 359, 29 C. C. A 568. The word " exempt," as used in a statute relating to appeals from the decision of the board of review, applies to property which is not sub- ject to taxation because having no situs, actual or constructive, within the state; and it is not merely a de- scription of property which has been removed from the operation of the general laws providing for taxation of all property in the state: Button V. Board of Review, 188 III 386; Max- well V. People, 189 IlL 546. Under the Vermont statute allowing de- ductions from taxable property on account of indebtedness, it was held that the phrase " exempt from taxa- tion by the laws of this state " meant " declared by the laws of this state to be exempt from taxation," and not " exempt from the operation of the tax-laws of this state: " Smalley V. Burlington, 63 Vt 44a CH. VI.] EQUALITX AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 263 and the limited personal property which very poor persons may be possessed of, are to be looked upon rather as in the ^nature of limitations of the general rule, than as exceptions from it; the taxation being only of all that is possessed over and be- yond what has been left out as absolutely needful to the owner's support.^ Property made use of for educational "pur- poses though in the hands of private individuals, the property of charitable associations, of cemetery companies, and the like, are excluded from tax rolls for similar reasons ; ' these being supported by contributions collected alike from rich and poor, and having strong claims to public encouragement. Implied exemptions. Before noticing the exemptions ex- pressly made by law, it will be convenient to speak of some which rest upon implication. Some things are always pre- sumptively exempted from the operation of general tax laws, because it is reasonable to suppose they were not within the intent of the legislature in adopting them. Such is the case with property belonging to the state and its municipalities, and which is held by them for governmental purposes. All siich property is taxable, if the state shall see fit to tax it; ^ but to levy a tax upon it would render necessary new taxes to meet the demand of this tax, and thus the public would be taxing itself in order to raise money to pay over to itself, and no one would be benefited but the officers employed, whose compensa- tion would go to increase the useless levy.' It cannot be sup- posed that the legislature would ever purposely lay such a burden upon public property, and it is therefore, a reasonable conclusion that, however general may be the enumeration of 1 Cobb V. Com'rs, 133 N. C. 307. struction of a public building is ex- 2 Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 empt from such tax: In re Thrall's Duv. 295 ; Way land v. C(jm'rs, 4 Gray Estate, 157 N. Y. 46. While it is com- 500; Durkee v. Com'rs, 39 Kan. 697; patent for the law-nlaking power to Trustees v. Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. 667; include public property belonging to Chancellor v. Elizabeth (N. J.), 47 a city or "county within the limits of AtL Rep. 454; State v. Recorder, 45 special assessments for public im- La. An. 566. Prior to the revision, provements, yet such property is not in 1896, of the tax-laws of New York, so included unless by express enact- cities in that state to which bequests ment or clear implication: Clinton had been made were chargeable v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557; St. with the transfer tax: In re Hamil- Louis v. Brown, 155 Mo. 545. ton, 148 N. Y. 310. But now a legacy ^ Directors of the Poor v. School bequeathed to a city for the con- Directors, 43 Pa St. 21, 25. 264 EQUALITY AlTD UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATIOlir. [CH. VI. property for taxation, the property held by the state and by all its municipalities for governmental purposes was intended to be excluded, and the law will be administered as excluding it in fact.* Lands belonging to the state are not, therefore, to be entered for taxation, and if they are sold for taxes the sales are void and pass no title to the purchasers.* And the grant ' School Dist. V. Board of Improve- ment, 65 Ark. 343; People v. Doert86 Cal. 220; Low v. Lewis, 46 Cal. 550; People V. Austin, 47 CaL 353; West Hartford v. Water Com'rs, 44 Conn. 360; Dispensary Com'rs v. Thornton, 106 Ga. 106; State v. Stevenson (Idaho), 55 Pao. Rep. 886; People v. Salomon, 51 III 87; Industrial Uni- versity V. Champaign County, 76 III. 283; Gibson v. Howe, 37 Iowa 168; Moore v. Morledge, 42 Iowa 26; Cal- lanan v. Wayne County, 73 Iowa 709; Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. (Ky.) 295; Louisville v. Nevin, 10 Bush 549; Owensboro v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 49 S. W. 320; Alex- andria V. O'Shee, 51 La. An. 719; Gaohet v. New Orleans, 53 La. An. 813; Camden v. Camden Village Corp., 77 Me. 530; Inhabitants v. Com'rs, 4 Gray, 5D0; Worcester County V. Worcester, 116 Mass. 193; SomervUle v. Waitham, 170 Mass. 160; Big Rapids v. Mecosta Super- visors, 99 Mich. 351, 353: Meridan v. Phillips, 65 Miss. 363; Warren County V. Nail (Miss.), 39 South. Rep. 755; St. Louis V, Gorman, 29 Mo. 593; .Moore V. Woodruff, 146 Mo. 597; Grafton County V. Haverhill, 68 N. H. 120; State V. GafEney, 34 N. J. L. 133; State V. Clinton T'p, 49 N. J. L. 313; State V. Collins, 60 N. J. L. 367; Jn- habitants v. Conover, 63 N. J. L. 191 ; Rochester v. Rush, 80 N. Y. 303; Peo- ple V. Assessors, 111 N. Y. 505; State V. Grif tner, 61 Ohio St. 301 ; Directors of Poor V. School Directors, 42 Pa. St. 31; Brie County v. Erie, 113 Pa. St. 360; Columbia v. Tindal, 43 S. C. 547; Galveston Wharf Co. v. Galves- ton, 63 Tex. 14; Springwells v. John- son, 10 Utah 351; Black v. Sher- wood, 84 Va. 906. See Magruder v. Augusta, 86 Ga. 320; King v. Com'rs, etc., 4 T. R. 730; King v. Inhab. of Liverpool, 7 B. & C. 61; King v. Ter- rott, 3 East 506; Queen v. Shee, 4 Q. B. 2; Queen v. Axminster, 12 A. & E. 3. Where property is dedicated to public use it cannot be assessed and sold for taxes: Alexandria v. O'Shee, 51 La. An. 719. A tax judg- ment for taxes assessed on part of a public street is void for want of ju- risdiction: Smith V. St. Paul, 73 Minn. 473. Cotton grown within a levee district on lands leased by the state is not taxable, such product being the property of the state: State V. Levee Com'rs, 75 Miss. 133. Where, before state taxes a,ssessed thereupon became due, certain ground passed into the city's hands, liability to tax was arrested: Gachet v. New Or- leans, 52 La An. 813. 2 Braxton v. Rich, 47 Fed. Rep. 178; State V. Stevenson (Idaho), 55 Pac. 886; McCarlin v. State, 99 Ind. 478; Moore v. Woodruff, 146 Mo. 597; State V. Grif tner, 61 Ohio St. 201. This is so even though the lands had come to the state by escheat, and though the fact of escheat was not known when the tax was imposed: Reid v. State, 74 Ind. 252. Where land is held by the state it cannot be sold for taxes due the levee board, and lapse of time will not validate a deed made in pursuance of such an attempted sale: Rich v. Baskett, 68 Miss. 250. See Woodruff v. State, 77 Miss. 68 Since the title to all parts of a navi- OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 265 iu general terms to a city of the power to tax will not be held to confer power to tax state or county property;^ and the rule applies, to the property of public educational and charitable in- stitutions which perform public functions under state control,^ and to any other corporation or agency of which the state is substantially the corporator or principal, and which exists for governmental purposes.' It is also held upon the same grounds gable lake is in the state, land cov- ered by part of such a lake is not sub- ject to taxation, and an attempted sale thereof passes no rights: Men- dota Club V. Anderson, 101 Wis. 479. Land under tide-water below high- water mark is not liable to assess- ment for taxes, being the property of the state: Winants v. Jersey City, 42 N. J. L. 349; Colket v. Rightmire, 46 N. J. L. 341 ; Bear v. Com'rs of Taxes (N. J.), 48 Atl. Rep. 588. It is held in Arkansas that until delivery of pat- ent and payment of price school lands are not subject to taxation: Witt v. Armstrong (Ark.), 6 S. W. Rep. 335. See Menger v. Board of Com'rs, 48 Kan. 553. The leasehold interest of a tenant of school lands belonging to the state is subject to taxation : State V. Tucker, 38 Neb. 56. Where land in the sixteenth section has been . leased by the state for a term renew- able forever, at the lessee's option, the land is subject to taxation : Street v. Columbus, 75 Miss. 833. By statute in Louisiana where property acquired by the state for non-payment of taxes is sold, the purchaser from the state and his vendee are liable for the taxes for all the years it was held by the state: Gulf States Land, etc. Co. V. Parker, 72 Fed. Rep. 339. 1 Piper V. Singer, 4 S. & R. 354; Peo- ple V. McCreery, 34 Cal. 433, 456; Peo- ple V. Doe, 86 Cal 330; People v. Aus- tin, 47 Cal. 353; Reid v. State, 74 Ind. 353; Townsen v. Wilson, 9 Pa. St. 270; Nashville v. Bank of Tennessee, 1 Swan 369. See Trustees v. Taylor, 30 N. J. Eq. 618; Trustees v. Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. 667; Jersey City v. Foster, 32 N. J. Eq. 835; Trustees v. Shotwell, 45 N. J. Eq. 106; Rah way v. Com'rs (N. J.), 18 Atl. Rep. 56; Chancellor v. Van Hovenburg (N. J. Eq.), 45 Atl. Rep, 439. 2 Trustees v. City Council, 90 Ga. 634; Trustees v. Champaign County, 76 111. 184: Board of Regents v. Ham- ilton, 38 Kan. 376; Tulane Education Fund V. New Orleans Assessors, 38 La. An. 293; Auditor-General v. Re- gents, 83 Mich. 467; State v. Hamlin Univ., 46 Minn. 816; Trustees v. Tren- ton, 30 N. J. Eq. 667 ; Newark v. Inhab. of Verona T'p, 58 N. J. L. 595. See Louisville v. MoNaughton (Ky.), 44 S. W. Rep. 380. ' Nashville v. Bank of Tennessee, 1 Swan 269. This case holds that a state bank chartered for the benefit of the state, and with the faith and credit of the state pledged for its support, is not taxable by a munici- pality. In the absence of express statute the business of dealing in liq- uors through the medium of the pub- lic dispensary is not subject to taxa- tion. The dispensary commissioners are public ofHcials, not liquor deal- ers: Dispensary Com'rs v. Thornton, 106 Ga. 106< Such comtnissioners were held afterwards to be county authorities within the general tax act imposing a tax on dispensaries conducted by counties or municipal authorities: Sheffield v. Board of Com'rs, 111 Ga. 1. A corporation au- thorized by its charter to improve a river for the running of logs, and to superintend all general drives of logs 266 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. [oh. VI. that preclude general taxation that a city or village cannot, without statutory permission, subject state, county, or school district property to assessment foe local improvements.' • Where a municipality holds property not for governmental purposes, but for the mere convenience of its people, or to sup- ply some need such as water or light, which is commonly sup- plied by a private corporation, the presumption of an intention to exclude such property from taxation would be very slight, and perhaps could not arise at all on the language of the law.^ and charge tolls therefor, was held to be a gwasi-publio corporation, the dams of which, erected for the pur- poses of its incorporation, and valu- able onlj: in connection with its fran- chise, were, not taxable as realty: Yellow Eiver Imp. Co. v. Wood County, 81 Wis. 554. ' iMt. Vernon v. People, 147 111. 359; Polk County Savings Bank v. State, 69 Iowa 34; Louisville v. Leatherman, 99Ky. 813; Baltimore County Com'rs y. Maryland Insane Hospital, 62 Md. 137; Big Rapids v. Mecosta Super- visors, 99 Mich. 351 ; Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557; Steen v. Beat- rice, 36 Neb. 431; Toledo v. Board of Education, 48 Ohio St. 83; Harris County V. Boyd, 70 Tex. 237. See St. Louis V. Brown, 155 Mo. 545. Land belonging to school districts is liable to assessment for street improvement only when not used for school pur- poses: Witter V. Mission School Dist., 131 Cal. 850. The property of a school of reform, which is practically one of the agents of the state, is not subject to assessment for street improve- ments, as one government agency cannot be required to pay for the support of another: Louisville v. Mc- Naughton (Ky.), 44 S. W. Eep. 380. The fact that such an institution is largely supported by the city wherein it is located is also suflScient to ex- empt its property from special assess- ments by the city: Ibid. Special as- sessments for public improvements cannot be laid upon a railroad com- pany's right of way, for the reason that such right of way is property ' appropriated to public uses which should not be made to share the bur- den of paying public expenses: Bos- ton V. Boston & A. R. Co., 170 Mass. 95. That land dedicated by the leg- islature to the perpetual use of the public as a burial grouncl, and ex- empted from all public taxes, cannot be assessed fpr a sewer from which it derives no benefit, see Proprietors v. Board, 150 Mass. 13. 2 Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 295. See West^ Hartford v. Water Com'rs, 44 Conn. 360; State v. Board of Assessors, 35 La. An. 668; Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445; School Dist. V. Howe, 62 Ark. 481; School Dist. y. Board of Irnprove- ment, 65 Ark. 343; San Diego v. Linda Vista Irrig. Dist. 108 Cal. 189; Commonwealth v. Makibben, 90 Ky. 384; Covington v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 39 S. W. Rep. 836; Common- wealth V. Louisville (Ky.), 47 S. W. Rep. 805; Newport v. Commonwealth • (Ky.), 50 S.'W. Rep. 845; Negley v. Henderson (Ky.), 55 S. W. Rep. 55i 59 S. W. Rep. 19; Inhabitants of Essex V. Board of Assessors, lo3 Mass. 141; Newport v. Unity, 68 N. H. 587; Erie County v. ^.Erie Water Works Com'rs, 113 Pa. St. 368. Property held by a city under a contract giv- ing it an option to purchase, but cre- ating no obligation to purchase, is not exempt from taxation: Milwau- kee V. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 424. If a CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 267 Such property is deemed, as is said in one case,' to be (held by the corporation in its social or commercial capacity as a pri- vate corporation, and for its own profit; and therefore it was considered that vacant lots owned by a city, market-houses, fire-engines, etc., were not presumptively excluded from taxa- tion ; ^ but this, unless confined to the case of special assess- ments, would seem to be limiting the implied exemption un- reasonably, and certainly more than other cases limit it.^ city purchases a farm situated in an- other municipality, although for the purpose of obtaining a place for bury- ing its poor, and uses the bulk of the premises for farming purposes, to derive pecuniary profit therefrom, only such reasonable quantity as is used for the burial of the dead will be exempt; State v. Clinton T'p, 49 N. J. L. 313. A municipal corpora- tion cannot hold private property — e. g., a park — in trust for the owners Qf lots fronting on it so as to exempt it from taxes and assessments under general laws: MoChesney v. People, 99 111. 316; see St.. Louis v. Wenne- ker, 145 Mo. 230. Property devised to trustees in trust for a town, with the provision that the rents and profits be applied to maintaining a public park, held subject to taxation: Mitohellville v. Supervisors, 64 Iowa 554, Under a constitutional provis- ion exempting the property of mu- nicipal corporations, property de- vised to a city in tirust for charitable purposes is not exempt: St. Louis v. Wenneker, 145 Mo. 280. In New York the rule which formerly pre- vailed in that state has been changed by statute, and property, such as a water-works system, held by a mu- nicipality for public use, but located beyond the boundaries of such mu- nicipality, is taxable: People v. Hess, 157 N. "$■. 42. A company formed under the statutes of New York for ' the purpose of supplying a village with water is not a governmental agency the property of which is exempt from taxation: People v. Forrest, 97 N. Y. 97. See Athens City Water Works Co. v. Athens, 74 Ga. 413; Appeal of Des Moines, etc. Co., 48 Iowa 384; Louisville Water Co. V. Hamilton, 81 Ky. 517; Dover V. Maine Water Co., 90 Me. 180; Roar- ing Creek Water Co. v. Girton, 142 Pa. St. 92. 1 Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 295; Covington v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 39 S. W. Rep. 836. Com- pare Appeal of Des Moines, etc. Co., 48 Iowa 324: Negley v. Henderson (Ky.), 55 S. W. Eep. 554. 2 The following public property has been held not taxable: A city hall, Louisville v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 295; Columbia v. Tindal, 43 S. C. 547. A town hall, though let for hire when not used for corporate purposes: Camden v. Camden Village Corp., 77 Me. 530. Court-house and jail, Wor- cester County V. Worcester, 116 Mass. 193; Big Rapids v. Mecosta Supervis- ors, 99 Mich. 351; Grafton County v. Haverhill, 68 N. H. 120. Fire-engine house, Erie County v. Erie, 113 Pa. St. 360. Park or common, St. Louis v. Gor- man, 29 Mo. 593; Henderson v. Hughes County, 13 S. D. 576. Gas wells, pipe lines, pumping stations, and machin- ery of public gas plant: Toledo v. Hosier, 54 Ohio St. 418. Water-works, reservoirs, etc., West Hartford v. Water Com'rs, 44 Conn. 360; State v. Gaflney, 34 N. J. L. 131; Rochester V. Rush, 80 N. Y. 302; Clarksville V. Montgbmery County (Tenn. Ch. App.), 62 S. W. Rep. 33; Nashville v. 268 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. The presumption that public property is not intended to be taxed ceases when it has been sold, even though the title has Smith, 86 Tenn. 213. City water board's property temporarily leased to dry dock company, Detroit Water Com'rs V. Auditor-General, 115 Mich. 546. Cemetery, People v. Doe, 36 CaL 220; Louisville v. Nevin, 10 Bush 549. Poor house, Directors of Poor v. School Directors, 42 Pa. St 21. La«d acquired and used by city for obtain- ing gravel to construct streets: ^om- erville v. Waltham, 170 Mass. 160. A city slip, Low v. Lewis, 46 CaL 550. Ferry landing. People v. Assessors, 111 N. y. 505: Black v. Sherwood, 84 Va. 906. Wharf company's stock owned by city, Galveston Wharf Co. V. Galveston. 63 Tex. 14. School fund property, 80 111. 384; Louisville V. Leatherman, 99 Ky. 313. County farms were held taxable where the statute expressly exempted "alms- houses on county farms," thus by necessary implication leaving the farms subject: Grafton County v. Haverhill, 68 N. H. 130. Lands owned by a municipal corporation, and leased for more than fourteen years, without subjection to revalu- ation, were held taxable oifly to the extent of the lessee 's interest therein : Zumstein v. Consolidated Coal & M. Co., 54 Ohio St. 264. Under the Il}i- npis constitution of 1870, providing that the property of counties and other municipal corporations may be exempted from taxation, but only by general law, such property is sub- ject to taxation, unless exempted by statute: Cook County v. Chicago, 108 111. 646; People v. Moline, 138 111. 267; People V. Chicago, 134 111. 536. Lands belonging to a sanitary district are not exempt from taxation under a statute exempting "all market houses, public squares, or other pub- lic grounds, used exclusively for pub- lic purposes," nor under a statute exempting all property of the state: Sanitary Dist. v. Martin, 173 III 343. City warrants for the repayment of moneys advanced are not within a constitutional provision exempting from taxation municipal property, but are taxable as choses in action: Easton'v. Board of Review, 183 111. 355. Under a statute directing the assessment and taxation of all real estate not exempt, property held by the city as trustee may be assessed the same as other property : St. Louis V. Wenneker, 145 Mo. 330. Under a constitutional provision that "pub- lic property used for public purposes" shall be exempt from taxation, the property of a city used in connection with its fire department, and also public parks of the city, are exempt froni taxation by the state: Owens- boro V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 320. The express limitation in New Jersey of property of munici- pal corporations was held not to be limited to property used for public purposes: Newark v. Inhab. of Belle- ville, 61 N. J. L. 455. Though prop- erty of a school district actually used for school purposes is exempt from taxation, land owned by such district but not so used is liable to assess- ment for local improvement: School Dist, V. Board of Imp., 65 Ark. 343. Under the Iowa statutes a school- site cannot be sold for taxes: Inde- pendent School Dist. V. Hewitt, 105 Iowa 663. Market building erected by private corporation upon public square under contract with city, held liable to taxation : Alleghany County V. McEeesport Diamond Market, 123 Pa. St. 164. See State v. Cooley, 62 Minn. 183. So with bridge erected upon piers owned by county but rented to private person: Luttrell v. Knox County. 89 Tenn. 253. The federal supreme court follows the construction put by the highest court OH. VI.J EQUALITY A.ND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 269 not yet been passed; and the purchaser's interest is commonly taxed, the public interest being protected by legislation.^ Property in the hands of a receiver of a court for the pur- poses of a suit pending in such court is not exempt from the operation of the tax laws of the government "within the- juris- diction of which such property is situated.' Allowance for debts. Kevenue laws sometimes permit tax- payers to deduct from the property to be taxed the debts ' of the state upon the state's statutes relating to exemptions of property used "for public purposes: " Ctoving- ton V. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 831. 1 State lands, sold partly on credit, are taxable as the purchaser's prop- erty from the time of sale: Court- ney V. Missoula County, 31 Mont. 591. See State v. Tucker, 38 Neb. 56; Washington Iron Works v. King County, 20 Wash. 150. Land set apart by a state for the contractor as payment for the construction of its new capitol, to be conveyed to the contractor from time to time in the progress of the work, is not sub- ject to taxation under the statute as land "held under a contract for the purchase thereof, belonging to this state: " Taylor v. Robinson, 73 Tex. 364 Contra, Taylor v. Robinson, 34 Fed. Rep. 678. Nor did a lease exe- cuted after the original contract, under which the contractor took pos- session at a stipulated rent of all the land so set apart, until the title should vest in him by the comple- tion of the building, give him such a holding as to make the land tax- able: Taylor v. Robinson, 73 Tex. 364. Internal-improvement fund lands cease to be public lands and become liable to taxation as private prop- erty upon entry at the proper office with evidence thereof: Mundee v. • Freeman, 33 Fla. 539. Under the Wis- consin statute providing that where entries of land have been suspended such lands should not be subject to taxation until such suspension was re- moved, the filing of a certificate of suspension was a condition prece- dent to the owner's right to claim the benefit of exemption: Farnham V. Sherry, 71 Wis. 568. When lands granted by state in aid of railroad become taxable: Winona & St. P. L. Co.. V. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 536; Myers v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 83 Fed. Rep. 358; Chippewa County v. St. Paul, S. & T. F. R. Co., 43 Minn. 395, 801; Sioux City & St. P. R. Co. V. Robinson, 41 Minn. 452; Winona &■ St. P. R. CoT V. Deuel, 3 Dak. 1. Where, in pursuance of a statute, lands had- been set apart and con- veyed absolutely to a private corpo- ration, which improved them for its own benefit, the proceeds of such p&rts of them as were sold by the corporation were taxable as its prop- erty: Cannon River Manuf. Assoc. V. Rice County, 33 Minn. 516. Stat- ute held not to have subjected to taxation undeeded town-site lots in government town-sites, pending con- tests, but only improvements there- on: Topeka, etc. Co. v. MoPherson, 7 Okl. 333. 2-Stevens v. New York & O. M. R. Co., 13 Blatchf. 104; George v. St. Louis C. & W. R. Co., 44 Fed. Rep. 117; Walters v. Western & A. R. Co., ■ 68 Fed. Rep. 1003; Wiswall v. Kunz, 173 111. 110; Schmidt, v. Failey, 148 Ind. 150; Spalding v. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 135; Youtsey v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 63 S. W. Rep. 363; State V. Railroad Com'rs, 41 N. J. L, 235. 'One entitled to a reduction on account of "bonaflde and uncondi- 270 EQUALITY AND TTNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [oh. VI. owing by them. The allowance is not in any proper sense an exemption, but is made by way of reaching the just amount of taxable property. Sometimes the deduction is from the ag- tional debts " is not entitled to a re- duction because of an unconditional liability under a lease for future pay- ments of rent for a term continuing into the future: Beecher v. Detroit Common Council, 110 Mich. 43$. Under the former tax-laws of New- York it was held that a note given by a taxpayer and outstanding is to be allowed as a debt, though it is payable on demand, given for United States securities, and may have been given as a device to escape taxation: People V. Eyan, 88 N. Y. 143, citing Stilwell V. Corwin, 55 Ind. 433; Smale V. Burr, L. E., 8 C. P. p4, In Oregon it is held that a debt contracted for the mere purpose of evading tax- ation is not to be regarded: Popple- ton V. Yamhill County, 8 Or. 337. See Waller v. Yaeger, 39 Iowa 338. The New York statute providing that no deduction from one's taxable prop- erty shall be allowed for debts in- curred in purchasing non-taxable property is not to be construed as applying only where the debt is fraudulently incurred to avoid tax- ation : People v. Barker, 155 N. Y. 330. Under such a statute debts incurred in purchasing the good-will of a busi- ness cannot be deducted, good-will not being made taxable for town, county, and municipal purposes: Peo- ple v. Dederick, 161 N. Y. 195. In Iowa it is held that the test of a tax- payer's right to an allowance for his indebtedness is whether the indebt- edness is founded on an actual con- sideration regardless of notice. If he has given an actual obligation he is indebted: Hutchinson v. Oskaloosa Equal. Board, 67 Iowa 183. An ex- emption having been claimed by rea- son of an indebtedness incurred in an alleged purchase of stock, it was held that the taxpayer never ac- quired- the stock, so that he never became indebted therefor; and the reduction was denied: People v. Cole- man, 61 Hun 636, 133 N. Y. 625. Claims against an estate which are contested by the executor are not " just debts " which may be deducted in determining the value of the es- tate for purposes of assessment: People V. Commissioners, 99 N. Y. 154. As to what is "indebtedness within the state," under an Oregon statute allowing such indebtedness to be deducted, see Ankenny v. Multnomah County, % Or. 371. Under the Oregon statute providing that whenever the assessor, through mis- take or otherwise, shall return as taxable more than should be assessed to any person, the sheriff may remit the excess upon afSdavit that the property was wrongfully assessed, mandamus will riot lie to compel the sheriff to allow a deduction on ac- count of indebtedness, such deduc- tion not being contemplated by the statute: Steel v. Fell, 39 Or. 273. As to deduction of indebtedness in In- diana, see Matter v. Campbell, 71 Ind. 518. For the meaning of a statutory provision allowing deduction on ac- count of other stocks and bonds "ex- empt from taxation by the laws of this state,'' see Smalley v. Burling- ton, 63 Vt. 443. In Kentucky a debt incurred for the purchase price of a railroad was held not available to the purchaser's administrator for the purpose of deduction, the estate hav- ing been released therefrom, and the administrator never intending to pay it; such intention being a require- ment of the statute: Baldwin v. Hewitt, 88 Ky. 673. In New Hamp- shire the rule that the excess only CH. VI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. 271 gregate of personal estate; sometimes it takes the form of an abatement from the taxable valuation of realty on account of of the value of bank-stook over the amount of interest-bearing indebted- ness for which it is pledged is tax- able, applies to non-residents: Farm- ington V. Darling, 67 N. H. 441, A statute providing that non-residents doing business in the state should be assessed and taxed on all sums in- vested in the state "the same as if they were residents " does not permit the deduction of the non-resident's debts from his investment in the state; that deduction is to be made, if at all, from his general personal assets at his own domicile: People v. Barker, 141 N. Y. 118. A non-resident special partner was not allowed to deduct from his investment in New York any debts of the partnership: People V. Barker, 145 N. Y. 239. A iirm doing business in a state and elsewhere cannot deduct, for the pur- poses of taxation, from the amount of its credits held in the state in- debtedness incurred and owing for and on account of the branch of the firm business conducted in a foreign jurisdiction: Barnes v. Flummerfelt, 31 Wash. 498. For a case of allow- ance to a shareholder in a corpora- tion of his proportion of the tax paid by the corporation, see Railroad Co. V. Com'rs, 87 N. C. 414. Under a statute providing that no one shall be taxed for shares in a domestic cor- poration, the property of which is already fully taxed, or for shares in a corporation in another state, which is liable to taxation in the state, and that no one shall be taxed on per- sonal property except on the surplus of his ratable personal estate above his debts, such exempt corporate shares should not be included in the ratable personal estate from which one's debts are to be deducted in de- termining the taxable surplus: Hall V. Bain, 18 R. L 413. Under the pres- ent law of New York the debts of a corporation are to be deducted in assessing its personalty: People v. Dederick, 161 N. Y. 195. See People V. Barker, 141 N. Y. 196; People V. Com'rg, 51 Hun 641 ; People v. Barker, 91 Hun 643. An indebtedness in- curred in purchasing a franchise can- not be deducted from the assets of an elevated railroad company in as- sessing all of its property for tax- ation: People V. Barker, 165 N. Y. 305. The New York statute author- izing corporate debts to be deducted from the assessed value of stock does not authorize the deduction of contingent liabilities: People v. Feit- ner, 166 N. Y. 139. A foreign corpo- ration is not entitled to have de- ducted from the capital employed by it in New York the amount of debts incurred by it in acquiring such capital: People v. Barker, 86 Hun 148. In assessing for taxation the property of a foreign corporation doing business in New York, the cor- poration is not entitled to any deduc- tion on account of debts, whether such debts are due within the state or elsewhere: People v. Barker, 86 Hun 618* For the deduction of their indebtedness formerly allowed to corporations in Kentucky, see Com- monwealth V. St. Bernard Coal Co. (Ky.), 9 S. W. Rep. 709. The present laws of that state do not permit such deduction in assessing a corporation for taxation:' Henderson Bridge Co. V. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 633; Padu-' cah St. R. Co. V. MoCracken (Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 178. Deduction of bona fide debts from taxable credits al- lowed foreign corporation in Ohio: Hubbard v. Brush, 61 Ohio St. 353. For the deduction allowed in Utah, see Commercial Bank v. Chambers (Utah), 61 Pao. Rep. 560. As to what deduction a foreign savings bank 272 EQUALITY AWD UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [oh. VI. mortgages thereon,^ and sometimes it is allowed to be made from credits^ only. The right to have debts deducted from the value of taxable property is not absolute, but is in the nat- ure of a favor, and no constitutional right is violated by a law may claim in New York, see People V. Coleman, 135 N. Y. 231. For the deduction allowed in Texas to private bankers of '' money on deposit," see Griffin v. Heard, 78 Tex. 607. "Vfthat constitutes indebtedness which may be deducted in favor of an insurance company, see Alabama, etc. Ins. Co. V. Lott, 54 Ala. 499; Equitable Life Ins. Co. V. Board of Equal., 74 Iowa 178; Hawkeye Ins. Co. v. Board of Equal., 75 Iowa 770; Kansas Mut. L. Ins. Assoc. V. Hill, 51 Kan. 636; Ken- ton Ins. Co. V. Covington, 86 Ky. 318; People v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574; , Ins. Co. V. Cappellar, 38 Ohio St. 560; Home P. Ins. -Co. v. Lynch, 19 Utah 189. The deduction allowed to rail- road companies under the New Jer- sey statute of 1884 must be made from the local, and not from the state tax: Williams v. Settle, 50 N. J. L. 133. For the deduction from the taxable property of building as- sociations of the monthly instal- ments deposited in them, see State V. Redwood Falls B. & L. Assoc, 45 Minn. 154. Where, without legal right, a stockholder's indebtedness in a bank had been deducted from the taxable value of his property, it was held there was no law by which such deduction could thereafter be placed on the duplicate as an omis- sion and the taxes collected thereon : State V. Akins, 63 Ohio St. 183. iln California the mortgager is entitled to have the amount of the mortgage deducted from the value of the property, even though the mortgage, being made to the regents of the state university, is exempted from taxation: People v. Board, 77 Cal. 136. Where the mortgagee re- sides out of the state, the land-owner in New Jersey is not entitled to a de- duction, and the mortgagee's interest is not assessable: King v. Manning, 40 N. J. L. 461; Crispin v. Vansyckle, 49 N. J. L. 366. As to the deduction of mortgage indebtedness in Michigan, see Detroit Common Council v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78. It has been held that the assessor cannot be pre- sumed to have made deductions for mortgages on land where the entry of the mortgage was not made in the proper column: Henne v. Los An- geles County, 139 CaL 297. In New York no deduction, in assessing land, is made on account of encumbrances thereon: People v. Jewell, 9 Misc. Rep. 647. And in determining the inheritance tax to be imposed upon personalty, where the testator's en- tire estate is devised in trust for his children, the amount of the encum- brances secured by mortgage upon the land is not to be deducted from the amount of the personalty: In re Sutton's Estate, 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 308. Mortgaged chattels are assess- al&le to the mortgager in possession without deduction of the amount of the debt: Fields v. Russell, 38 Kan. 730. The statute providing that no mortgage or debt secured thereby shall be assessed for taxation unless a deduction therefor shall have been claimed and allowed is not appli- cable to a mortgage on commingled realty and personalty: Newark v. Merchants'. Ins. Co., 55 N. J. L. 145. Mortgage bonds exempt unless de duction therefor claimed by owner of land: Merchants' Ins. Co. v. New- ark, 54 N. J. L. 138. 2 Promissory notes are "credits" within the statute from which bona . fide indebtedness of taxpayer may be OH. yi:\ EQUALITY AND TJNIfOEMITY IN TAXATION. 273 that permits the deduction of some debts and not of others.^ Nor does the allowance of credits and deductions establish a want of uniformity where the law operates alike on all per- sons and property similarly situated.^ It has been held that, even though the constitution gives the right to deduct indebt- edness from credits, yet that right can be secured only in the manner provided by law; and therefore a statute requiring applications for reductions on account of debts to be made to the assessor in the first instance is constitutional.^ And, in general, it may be said that one cannot claim this allowance unless he takes the steps required by law for the establishment of his right thereto.* deducted so as to reduce the amount for taxation: Moore v. Hewitt, 147 Ind. 464. Money on hand or on de- posit is held not to be such a credit: Morris v. Jones, 150 111. 542; Gray v. Boston Street Com'rs, 138 Mass. 414; Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Com'rs, 84 N. C. 504; Pullman State Bank v. Manring, 18 Wash. 250. Corporate stocks are not " credits '' from which the owner's debts may be deducted: Bridgnian v.- Keokuk, 72 Iowa 42; Raleigh, etc. R Co. v. Com'rs, 87 N. C. 414. So, the owners of national bank stock have been held not enti- tled to deduct from the assessed value thereof the amount of their debts: Button v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 53 Kan. 462; Commercial Nat. Bank V. Chambers (Utah), 61 Pac. Rep. 560; 183 U. S. 556; Burrows v. Smith, 95 Va. 694. But under a statute provid- ing for exempting from taxation •' so much of the debts due or to become due to any person as shall equal the amount of bona fide and uncondi- tional debts by him owing," it was held that a shareholder in a national bank was entitled to the set-oflE against the amount of his shares: Ruggles V. Fond du Lac, 58 Wis. 436, citing People v. Weaver, 100 H. S. 539; Pelton v. National Bank, 101 TJ. S. 143; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153; Evansville Nat. 18 Bank v. Britton, 8 Fed. Rep. 867: And see Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U. S. 689; Richards v. Rook Rapids, 31 Fed. Rep. 505. In the state of Washington it is held that bona ^de debts maybe deducted from the assessed value of national bank shares: Newport v. Mudgett, 18 Wash. 271; and a stock- holder in a state bank is entitled to have his share of the capital deducted in the credits from which his debt shall be deducted: Bramel v. Man- ring, 18 Wash. 421. Omitting cred- its from tax schedule in compliance with assessor's practice and direc- tion does not cause taxpayer to lose his right of deduction of indebted- ness therefrom: Moore v. Hewitt, 147 Ind. 464. 1 People v. Barker, 155 N. Y. 380. 2 Edwards v. People, 88 111. 340. For a case where such allowance was held void because non-uniform and equal, see In re Assessment, etc. of Taxes, 4 S.-D. 6. See, also, State v. Duluth Gas, etc. Co., 76 Minn. 96. • 3 state V. London & N. W. Mort- gage Co., 80 Minn. 277. 4 A deduction for indebtedness may not be allowed by the board of equalization where no statement of particular indebtedness is made and sworn to as required by the statute: Oregon, etc. Bank v. Catlin, 15 Or. 342. An assessment made uader a 274 I EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATIOK. [OH. VI. Coustitiitional restrictions. Before considering the ex- press exemptions from general taxation which it has been cus- tomary to make in state revenue laws, it will be convenient to examine briefly the constitutional provisions which have been adopted in the several states with the purpose of securing uni- formity in taxation, and to make the rule of uniformity com- pulsory upon the legislature. The differeaces in these provis- ions are very considerable, but enough of them have been the subject of judicial consideration to miake the decisions upon them a sufficient guide to the meaning of all. Alabama. The constitution provided that " No man or set of men are entitled to exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." The legislature granted a charter to an insurance company, and provided therein that "as a full commutation for all taxes, im- positions, or assessments on the capital stock of said company or on any of its property or effects," the company should an- nually pay into the state treasury a specified sum of money ; and the charter was declared unalterable, except with the con- sent of its trustees, for the term of twenty years. The com- mutation being contested, it was held that it must be deemed to have been granted in consideration of advantages to be die- rived by the public from the establishment of the . corporation and the performance of its corporate functions and duties, and that the commutation was not therefore violative of the con- stitutional provision.' law invalid so far as not permitting for which he claims reduction does a set-off of a stockholder's indebted- not give the addresses of some of ness is not invalid unless the stock- the creditors does not authorize the holder has shown the assessor what listers to reduce debts as to which his just debts are and taken the the proper information was given: requisite steps to have his assessment Spragtie v. Fletcher, 69 Vt. 69. Where made out accordingly: Stanley v. the uncontradicted evidence adduced Albany County, 121 U. S. 535. Under before the assessors of a town shows the New Jersey statute relating to that a taxpayer's debts exceed the the taxation of railroads, debts can- value of his personalty, they must not be deducted from the valuation strike out the assessment, and can- o£ the property by the state board of not arbitrarily disregard such proofs assessors unles*s the reduction is ap- because the taxpayer fails to attend plied for under the proper section of before them: People v. Dykes, 64 the act: State v. Bettle, 50 N. J. L. Hun 634 138. The fact that the inventory re- ' Daughdrill v. Insm-ance Ca, 81 turned by a taxpayer of the deb£s Ala. 91. See Illinois Central R. Ca OH. TI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFDEMITT IN TAXATION. 275 Equality of taxation being a constitutional requirement, it is not competent to discriminate against a foreign insurance company to make the tax upon it correspond to the tax im- posed upon home corporations in the state where such foreign corporation has its situs} But there is no unconstitutional discrimination in a law imposing a license tax on " every sew- ing-machine company selling sewing machines," and on " all persons who engage in the business of selling sewing-ma- chines," and exempting " merchants engaged in a general busi- ness, keeping sewing-machines as a part of their stock in trade." ^ And a statute imposing a tax on the business of a particular class of corporations is not invalid because the tax is onerous as compared with the taxation of other business, or because, as compared with the taxation of the business of other kinds of corporations, there is inequality. These considera- tions belong to the legislature.' The constitution as revised afterwards contains a provision that " the property of corporations now existing, or hereafter created, shall forever be subject to taxation, the same as prop- erty of individuals," etc. Under this provision it is not com- petent to provide b^^ law that the taxation of the property of corporations, or of any class thereof, shall not exceed a certain percentage which is below the limit to which the taxation of other property is restricted.* Another provision is that " all taxes levied on property in this state shall be assessed in exact proportion to the value of such property." It is not competent for the legislature under this provision to prescribe or declare an arbitrary or artificial value to the property of individuals or corporations, and assess taxes on such valuation ; and statutes to that effect are void.' V. McLean County, 17 IlL 291; Ide v. companies doing business in a cer- Finneran, 39 Kan. 654; Louisiana tain city to pay an annual fee to the Lottery Co, v. New Orleans, 34 La. fire department of the city was held An. 86. Compare Louisiana Cotton not void for inequality of the tax Manuf. Co. v. New Orleans, 31 La. imposed, it being imposed alike on An. 440, and oases cited. Contra, all fire insurance companies doing Home Ins. Co. v. Sweigert,104 111. 653. business in the particular city. 1 Clark V. Mobile, 67 Ala. 217. * Mobile v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 58 ^Quartlebaum v. State, 79 Ala. J. Ala. 570; Perry v, Bailroad Co., 65 'Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Fire De- Ala. 391; State Auditor v. Jackson pattment, 117 Ala. 631. In this case Co., 65 Ala. 143. a statute requiring all fire insurance ^ The statute in question provided 276 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. And the provision is violated by an act levying a tax of $1 per annum upon each road wagon in a certain county for the bene- fit of the public roads.^ But a license tax on attorneys and physicians does not violate the constitutional requirement of taxation by value ; ^ nor is that requirement, or the one that corporatiqns and individuals shall be taxed at the same rate, infringed by a statute requiring corporations to pay a privilege tax.' Another provision of thfe constitution of Alabama prohibits the general assembly from authorizing cities to pass laws in- consistent with the general laws of the state. This, it has been held, is not violated by a statute authorizing a city to levy a license tax on railroads.* Arkansas. In the fundamental law of this state it is ordained that " All property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value : that value to be ascertained in such manner as the general assembly shall direct, making the same equal and uni- form throughout the state. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than an- other species of property of equal value." This provision does not deny the legislature power to classify property for the pur- pose of taxation ; for example, a statute providing that railroad property shall be assessed annually for taxation, whereas ordi- nary real estate is assessed only once in two years, and providing for the assessment of railroad prop- tion of property, and which is re- erty like other property, ^t added ferred to in the text, is three-fourths that "in no case, where the data of of one per centum on thevalua This such an estimate shall be in the pos- does not invalidate a tax of two per session of the board, shall such prop. cent, on the gross receipts of every erty be estimated at a sum less than telegraph company derived from that which, at an interest of eight business done within the state: West- per cent., would yield the sum shown ern Union TeL Co. v. State Board, 80 by such data to constitute the net Ala. 273. earnings of such property; such net i Smith v. Commissioners, 117 Ala. earnings to consist of the whole 196. earnings, deducting the running ex- 2 McCaskell v. State, 53 Ala. 510. penses of such road; but in no case ^ Phoenix Carpet Co. v. State, 118 nor to any extent is any allowance Ala. 143. or deduction to be made on any * Holt v. Birmingham, 111 Ala. 369; other account." Held void. Board Anniston v. Southern R. Co., 113 Ala. of Assessment v. Alabama Cent. R. 557; Alabama G, S. R. Co. v. Besse- Co., 59 Ala. 551. The limit which the mer, 113 Ala. 668. constitution prescribes for the taxa- OH. VI.J EQUALITY AND 0ISIIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 277 also that railroad property shall be assessed by different in- strumentalities from those employed in the valuation of other property, and failing to provide for an appeal from the assess- ment of railroad property, although an appeal is provided in other cases, is not void for want of uniformity.' Nor is this provision violated by a statute committing the assessment of express companies to the railroad commissioners, and provid- ing that such companies shall be assessed for taxation at such proportion of their capital stock as the mileage over which they do business in Arkansas bears to their total mileage.^ But where the legislature, by a city charter, undertook to exempt the property of the inhabitants from talxation for the construc- tion of roads in the county of which the city formed a part, this was held invalid as a violation of the constitutional rule of uniformity.' And where a statute divided a county into two separate judicial districts, and provided that the clerk should keep separate records of the financial affairs of each district, and that all revenue accruing to such county, from whatever source, should be used for the exclusive benefit in the district in which it should arise, it was held that if such act be deemed to have created two separate taxing districts in such county it was unconstitutional, and a tax for county pur- poses of five mills on property in one of such districts, and of three mills on property in the other, was ioid as conflicting with the constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation.* That requirement, however, does not apply to local taxes and will not prevent taxes on occupations,* or taxes on land by area for levee purposes.* By another provision of the constitution " All laws exempt- ing property from taxation other than is provided " therein " shall be void." This avoids a statute so far as such statute provides that lands sold to the state for taxes, and afterwards donated to a railroad, " shall not be listed or subject to taxa- 1 St. Louis, L M. & S. E. Co.- v. The constitutional provision requir- Worthen, 53 Ark. 529. ' ing equality of taxation -was held 2 Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Express v. violated by a certain statute and or- Crawford County, 63 Ark. 576. dinance as applied to the business 3 Fletcher V. Oliver, 25 Ark. 389. of a dealer in "trading stamps:" ^ Hutchinson v. Ozark Land Co., Humes v. Fort Smith, 93 Fed. Eep. 57 Ark. 554. . 857. 6 Washington v. State, 18 Ark. 753. eMcGehee v. Mathis, 31 Ark. 40. I 278 EQUAUTr AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. tion until conveyed'to actual purchasers." ^ Aad it also avoids a statute directing that certain railroad property not within the classes of property to which taxation is restricted, be omit- ted from assessment.* California. The constitution requires that " taxation shall, be equal and uniform," and that " all property in the state shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law." ' Und^ this the following rulings have been made : 1. That " all property in the state " was to be understood as intending all private property only, and that it did not include the public property belonging to the United States or the state and its municipalities.* 2. That exemptions of private property would be inconsistent with the require- ment of equality and uniformity, and consequently were for- bidden.* 3. That the collateral inheritance tax-law is not un- constitutional because it exempts inheritances not exceeding $500 ; the tax being on the right of succession, and hence not within the constitutional requirement that property shall he taxed according to its value.* 4. That special assessments for local improvements need not be levied by value,' but that what- ever basis was adopted, exemptions of property falling within the class assessed were forbidden.' 5. That a levy to be ex- 1 Files V. State, 48 Ark. 529. a tax in a specified district would be 2 Little Rock & Ft. S. E. Co. v. inconsistent with the requirement Worthen, 130 U. S. 97. of uniformity, and consequently in- s Const. Cal., art. 13, § 1. This pro- valid: Wilsonv.Supervisors,47CaL 91. vision is not self-executing, but " Wilmerding's Estate, 117 Cal. 281. leaves the machinery for ascertain- This case also holds that the statute ing the value of all property for the imposing the collateral inheritance purposes of taxation to be provided tax is not to be held void as discrim- by the legislatura McHenry v. Dow- inating between persons standing in ner, 116 Cal. 20. the same relation merely because it *' People V. McCreery, 34 Cal. 432. does not tax inheritances by brothers 5 People V. McCreery, 34 CaL 432; and sisters and does tax inheritances People V. Whartenby, 38 CaL 461; by children of such brothers and sis- People V. Eddy, 43 Cal. 331; Lick v. ters. Austin, 43 Cal. 590. Where the con- 7 Burnett v. Sacramento, 12 CaL 76; stitution has prescribed that certain Blanding v. Burr, 13 CaL 343; Emory specific things shall be taxed as prop- v. San Francisco Gas Co., 28 CaL 345; erty, the legislature cannot exempt Walsh v. Mathews, 29 CaL 123; them: Mackay v. San Francisco, 113 Crosby v. Lyon, 37 CaL 243. CaL 393. Authority to a board of ? People v. San Francisco, etc. E. supervisors to remit a tax or part of Co., 35 Cal. 608. CH. VI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFt>EMITT IN TAXATION. i 279 pended in protecting a district from inundation was to be con- sidered a tax rather than a special assessment, and must there- fore be made on property by valuation.' 6. That the require- ment of uniformity in the taxation of property was not violated by a tax on business graduated by sales ; ^ but it would be vio- lated by a city ordinance imposing a higher fee upon a mer- chant selling goqds by sample, but not bringing his stock within the corporate limits, than upon one who kept the stock there.' 7. That solvent credits are property, and must be taxed as such to the person who owns them.* 8. That the revenue law is not void for want of uniformity, because it makes unsecured taxes collectible when assessed, and secured taxes collectible several months later; there being a difference between secured and unsecured taxes such as warrants the classification made by the legislature.' 9. That the revenue law is not void for want of uniformity, because of the regula- tions of different counties as regards enforcing collection of delinquent taxes being different,* though it might be if it pro- vided different rules for reaching the valuation of property by different classes, whereby substantial inequality was produced.^ 10. That an act has uniform operation in the constitutional sense if it operates uniformly throughout the municipality which alone is taxable under it.* 11. That it is not incompe- tent, in providing for the relevy of a void tax, to provide for allowing' sums paid thereon previously.' 12. And that the requirement of taxation by value is satisfied by the ascertain- 1 People V. Whyler,41 Cal. 351. tin, 43 CaL 590; Savings Society v. 2Sacramentov. Crocker, 16 CaL 119. Austin, 46 Cal. 415. Under the pro- 8 Ex parte Frank, 53 Cal. 608. vision of the constitution that " mou- * People V. MoCreery, 34 CaL 483; eys, credits, dues," etc., shall be taxed. People V. Gerke, 35 Cal. 677; People loans are taxable, though secured by V. Black Diamond Co., 37 CaL 54; property exejnpt from taxation: Se- People V. Whartenby, 38 CaL 461; curity Savings Bank v. San Fran- People V. Hibernia Bank. 51 CaL 343; cisoo (CaL), 64 Pao. Eep. 898. Bank of Mendocino v. Chalfant, 51 » Rode v. Siebe, 119 Cal. 518. CaL 369. The fact that the debt is « People v/ Central Pac. E. Co., 43 secured by mortgage on land which Cal. 398. is also taxable makes no difference : 'San Mateo Co. v. Bailroad Co., 8 People V. Eddy, 43 CaL 331. See Mc- Sawy. 338; s. c, 13 Fed. Kep. 733w Coppin V. McCartney, 60 CaL 367; ^gan Francisco v. Spring, etc. Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 43 Conn. 436, Works, 54 CaL 571. lOOU. S. 49L Compare Lick V. Aus- » People v, Latham, 53 CaL 598. 280 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. TT. ment of the value as directed by law, even though it be done before the passage of the law for levying the tax.' Colorado. The constitution provides that " all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax," etc., and shall be " levied and collected under general laws which shall prescribe such regulations as will secure a just valuation of all property for the purposes of taxation.* It also authorizes the classifica- tion of property for taxation. Under these provisions a statute making railroad property a distinct class, providing for the as- sessment of all of a railroad company's property as a unit, and apportioning the tax among the counties and municipalities according to the number of miles of track therein, is constitu- tional.^ The requirement of uniformity is not violated by a statute providing for the taxation of railroad cars other than those which belong to companies operating lines of railroad within the state, since adequate procedure for the taxation of such cars is otherwise provided, and the act merely provides a mode of procedure for taxing cars of the particular class. Nor is the provision for uniformity infringed by a tax on in- heritances, such tax being a contribution which the state levies for itself as a condition on which the title to property shall 1 People V. Latham, 52 OaL 598. Fur- to any person the equal protection of ther as to what is equal and uniform the laws" does not apply to corpora- taxation, see Beals v. Amador Co., 35 tions: Central, etc. R. Co. v. Board of Cal. 624; Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Equal., 60 Cal. 35; conira, Santa Clara CaL 497; People y. Placerville, etc. County y. Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 E.Co.,34Cal. 656; Barton y.Kalloch, Fed. Rep. 385. And see owie, p. 81. 56 Cal. 95; People y. Townsend, 56 If a mortgage is not taxable when Cal. 633. A constitutional provision taken the mortgagee has no yested allowing the taxation of railroad cor- right in the exemption, and it may porations without deducting from be made taxable afterwards: Mo- the yalue of their property the Coppin v. McCartney, 60 Cal. 367. amount of any mortgage or lien For a singular provision for the taxar thereon, although it practically per- tion of migratory herds of cattle, mits the taxing of such corporations which was held void on grounds of at a higher rate upon their property inequality, see People v. Townsend, than is assessed upon the property of 56 Cal. 633. others, is not in conflict with the ^ Ames v. People, 36 Colo. 83. fourteenth amendment to the fed- 8 American R. T. Co. y. Thomas, 27 eral constitution. The provision Colo. — (63 Pac. Rep. 410). therein that a state shall not " deny CH. Tl.j EQUALITY AND TTNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. 281 pass on the owner's death.^ A just valuation being a constitu- tional prerequisite to a valid levy, a bill relating to the taxa- tion of mining property is unconstitutional- if it prescribes no regulations for securing such a valuation, but assesses all lode claims, irrespective of their value, at an arbitrary sum, and all placer claims at another arbitrary sum.^ And a bill providing that the entire tax imposed on placer mines shall not exceed $25 per acre, and on all other mining claims shall not exceed $400 per one hundred linear feet, does not secure a just valua- tion of such property, inasmuch as the county tax alone might equal or exceed the prescribed rates.' There is, however, no objection to the legislature's making a gross output of produc- ing mines the criterion to govern assessors in determining the valuation.* A statute in so far as it relates to listing money, notes, or credits for taxation, is not unconstitutional, in that it requires the " amount " instead of the " value " thereof to be stated ; for the listing is not an assessment.^ Another provision of the constitution of Colorado forbids exemptions, with the exception of such as that instrument specifies. Under this prohibition and under the provision re- quiring uniformity, a statute which relieves real estate in cities and villages from county taxation for road purposes, and makes no provision for its taxation for street purposes, is unconsti- tutional.* A constitutional provision that mines and mining claims shall be exempt from taxation for ten years from its adoption, "and thereafter may be taxed as provided by law," renders new legislation necessary in order to render such property taxable at the end of the ten years.'' Connecticut. "There is little in the constitution of this state to limit the discretion of the legislature in imposing 1 In re House Bill No. 123, 23 Colo, ing canals from separate taxation, 493. see Empire L. & C. Co. v. Board of 2 In re House Bill No. 270, 9 Colo. Com'rs, 31 Colo. 344 635. 'In re House Resolution, 9 Colo. » In re House Bill No. 370, 9 Colo. 633. The adoption of the constitu- 635. tional amendment submitted in 1879 * In re House Bill No. 370, 9 Colo, did not extend the period of exemp- 635. tion of mines, etc., beyond the ten s People V. Board of Com'rs (Colo.), years: In re Constitutionality of 59 Pac. Rep. 733. House Bill No. 18, 9 Colo. 633. See 6 Gunnison County v. Owen, 7 Colo, further as to this exemption, Dylse v. 467. As to the exemption of irrigat- Whvte, 17 Colo. 396. 282 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [OH. VI. taxes." ^ Any express provision that " taxation shall be uni- form and equal " is not to be found in the constitution ; and the provisions of that instrument exclude the possibility of a limitation of legislative power by any implied mandate to that effect.2 Dakota. The organic act ' provides that the territory shall not pass any law impairing the rights of private property, " nor make any discrimination in taxing different kinds of property; but all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value." This, It has been held, is not in- fringed by a statute providing for the collection of a territorial tax assessed upon personal property in non-organized counties, leaving real property therein untaxed.* Nor is it contravened by a statute imposing upon railroad companies an assessment upon gross earnings " in full of any and all other taxes and assessments whatever;" for this does not constitute an exemp- tion from taxation but a change in the mode thereof.' Florida. The constitutional requirement that the legisla- ture shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just val- uation of all property, does not apply to municipal taxation.* J^or is the equality or uniformity of a county assessment de- stroyed by a statute directing one-half of the special road tax levied by county commissioners and realized from the taxable property in incorporated cities and towns to be turned over to 1 State V. Traveler's Ins. Go., 70 fer from those applicable to resi- Conn. 590. This case holds that there dents, is nothing in the constitution which . ' Rev. St. U. S., § 1935. militates against the validity of a * Ferris v. Vannier, 6 Dak, 186. statute which, by compelling pay- * Northern Pao. E. Co. v. Barnes, ment of taxes on corporate stock be- 2 N. D. 210; MoHenry v. Alford, 168 longing to non-residents, may prac- U. S. 651. See Northern Pao. R. Co. tically throw upon the latter the v. Walker, 47 Fed. Eep. 681, followed weight of double taxation. in Northern Paa R. Co. v. McGinnis, estate V, Travelers' Ins. Co., 73 4N. D. 494 Conn. 25.5. Here is upheld a statute ^ Spratt v. Jacksonville, 36 Fla. 550. that divides the stockholders of in- Charter provisions held to provide surance companies into two classes, for the uniform and equal rate re- residents and non-residents, subject- quired by the constitution, and to ing one to municipal taxation and prescribe regulations insuring a just the other to state taxation, and that valuation of all the real estate sub- fixes the amount to be contributed ject to taxation in the city: Tampa by non-residents by rules which dif- v. Mugge, 40 Fla, 32& OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND TTNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 283 municipal authorities to be used in repairing streets in such cities and towns.' Georgia. The constitution provides that "All taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects, and ad valorem on all property subject to be taxed within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws." This provision is not contravened by a statute which provides for taxing railroad property for county purposes at the regular rate ad valorem which is levied by the coup ty authorities on other property, each county through which the road runs being allowed to tax at that rate all the comjJany's property, real and personal, located in that county, and in ad- dition thereto a proportion of its rolling stock and other float- ing or unlocated property corresponding to the ratio between its property, real and personal, located in the given county, and the aggregate of its located property'in all the counties, through which the road runs.^ As the rate need only be uniform within the county, it is no objection to a highway act that the rates of taxation provided may vary in different counties.' If the rate of taxation is uniform, the fact that the method applied to realty differs from, that applied to personalty does not render the scheme of taxation unconstitutional.* It seems that the requirement of ad valorem taxation means only that property of each species shall be taxed uniformly, and does not preclude the taxation of realty and personalty at different rates.^ A statute providing for a tax on the stock of a building assdcia- tion, and that it shall be in lieu of all other taxes against said association, is, as to the latter provision, in violation of the con- stitutional provisions requiring taxation to be uniform and ad valorem.* The ad valorem requirement precludes the taxa- tion of animals by the head,'' but income is not property within 1 Commissioners v. Jacksonville,, on the streets for a money payment: 36 Fla. 196. Johnston v. Macon, 63 Ga. 645. 2 Columbus S. R. Co. v. Wright, 89 ^Georgia State Building, etc. Assoc. Ga. 574. V. Savannah, 109 Ga. 63; Atlanta 3 Haney v. Board of Com'rs, 91 Ga. Building, eta Assoc, v, Stewart, 109 ,770. Ga. 80. *McLendon v. La Grange, 107 Ga. ''Livingston v. Albany, 41 Ga. 31. 356. Compare Goodwin v. Savannah, 53 5 Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93. Ga. 410. A city may commute highway labor 281 . EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. its terras,^ nor is business; and occupations as such may be taxed.^ It being necessary only that all taxation be uniform on the same class of subjects, one kind of business or one occu- pation may be taxed and not another;' and taxes on certain vocations may be required to be paid in advance and the per- sons liable for such taxes may be required to register their names and places of business before being authorized to pursue such vocations.* The same tax must, however, be levied on all members of the class taxed.** , Persons engaged in the same occupation, if not taxed alike, should be classified by some clear distinction in business, other than the amount or value of the business ; or, if the tax be scaled according to the amount or value, it should, to correspond with the sense and spirit of the coiistitiition, be ad valorem.^ A city tax on common carriers who drive wagons, drays, etc., is lawfully apportioned according to the number of vehicles used by them respectively, and such apportionment accords with the uniformity rule.'' The require- ment that all taxes shall be levied and collected under general laws avoids special acts creating boards of equalization in two counties.* Another provision of-the constitution of Georgia declares that all laws exempting from taxation property other than what is therein enumerated shall be void. Therefore the legis- lature cannot lawfully exempt from taxation any property ex- cept that which it is expressly authorized to exempt.' And a provision in a city charter exempting from municipal taxation property which under the present constitution cannot be so exempted was abrogated by the adoption of the latter instru- ment.^" A charter provision that the mayor and city Council shall have power to levy and collect an ad valorem tax on all real and personal property within the city, " except such real 1 Waring V. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93. 6, Johnston v. Macon, 62 Ga. 645. -Burch V. Savannah, 43 Ga. 596; See Davis v. Macon, 64 Ga. 138; Burr Bohler v. Schneider, 49 Ga. 195 ; Home v. Atlanta, 64 Ga. 335. Ins. Co. V. Augusta, 50 Ga. 530; Rome '' Goodwin v. Savannah, 53 Ga. 410. V. Mo Williams, 53 Ga. 251; Decker See State v. Endom, 33 La. An. 663. V. McGowan, 59 Ga. 805. e Stewart v. Collier, 91 Ga. 117. ^Cutlifl V. Albany, 60 Ga. 597; « Atlanta Nat. Building, etc. Assoc. ' Weaver v. State, 89 Ga. 639. v. Stewart, 109 Ga. 80. ^McGhee v. State, 93 Ga. 31. I'MoLendon v. Lagrange, 107 Oa. 5 CutlifE V. Albany, 60 Ga. 597. 356. CH. TI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 285 property as is used for farming purposes only," is void in so far as it creates an exemption of farming land, such exemp- tion being prohibited by the constitution.^ But the constitu- tional prohibition of exemptions does not avoid a statute tax- ing a building association on all stock upon which no advances have been made to stockholders merely because of a proviso which, properly construed, means that stock which has no value, because advances have been made upon it up to its full value, need not be taxed.' Illinois. The constitution prescribes that the " general as- sembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property," and that the " general as- sembly may tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, mer- chants, showmen, insurance, telegraph and express interests or business, in such manner as it shall from time to time direct by general law uniform as to the class upon which it operates." Also that " the corporate authorities of counties, townships, school districts, cities, towns, and villages may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes, such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same." As to these provisions it has been decided that they " were manifestly in- serted in the fundamental law for the purpose of insuring equality in the levy and collection of the taxes to support the government, whether levied for state, county, or municipal pur- poses. The design was to impose an equal proportion of these burthens upon all persons within the limits of the districts or body imposing them. Under these provisions the legislature has no power to exempt or release a person or community of persons from their proportionate share of these burthens. Not having such power themselves they are unable to delegate such power to these inferior bodies." ' These provisions pre- clude discrimination in favor of or against any classes of prop- 1 Smith V. Americus, 89 Ga. 810. Dunham v. Chicago, 55 111. 357; Mad- ^McGowan v. Savannah Mut. L. isonCo. v. People, 58111.456. Another Assoc, 80 Ga. 515. provision authorized an exemption of ' Hunsaker v. Wright, 30 HI. 146, property for schools, etc., as to "which 148. See Trustees v. McConnell, 13 seeUniversity v. People, 99 U. S. 309; 111. 138; O'Kane v. Treat, 35 IlL 458; People v. Soldiers' Home, 95 111. 561, 286 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. erty or persons whatsoever, and therefore personalty or im- provements in realty cannot be favored in taxation ^ or the property of railroad companies disfavored.^ The provisions recited require the taxation of loans or any other credils, these being property as much as lands or chattels in possession;' they do not admit of residents in one part of a road district being exempted from taxes for the roads in another part;* nor of one class of counties being taxed a higher rate for state purposes than another class #hich happens to be more largely indebted for local purposes ; ' nor of residents in a city being exempted from county taxes for roads and bridges because of their liability to street taxes.' And they are violated where a special charter of a city declares that parcels of land within the city limits exceeding ten acres in extent shall be exempt from taxation for city revenue as long as they are not subdivided.' They are not, however, contravened by a city charter prohib- iting the town wherein the city lies, or the town officers, from levying or collecting any road tax within the city, and giving the city exclusive control over streets and alleys, and authority to improve and maintain them, and to raise necessary funds by taxation.' Where a county board is the corporate authority for several towns, it must, in making.an assessment in any one of them, observe the rule of uniformity therein.' Equality and uniforipity between taxpayers being the dominant idea of the constitution, which nowhere prevents the legislature from 1 Primm v. Belleville, 59 111. 143. * O'Kane v. Treat, 25 111. 458. The 2 Bureau County v. Railroad Co., 44 exemption was of residents within a 111. 339; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Boone municipal corporation from being County, 44 111. 240. See Law v. Peo- taxed for roads beyond its limits but pie, 87 111. 385. Uniformity would be within the same road district. Corn- destroyed if a municipal board with- pare Pleasant v. Kost, 39 111. 490, 494; - out authority were to reduce a part Madison County v. People, 58 111. 456. of the assessments: Sherlock v. Win^ And see AUhands v. People, 83 III netka, 68 111. 5B0 ; or if a county clerk, 234. in computing the rate of a tax to be * Ramsey v. Hoeger, 76 111. 433. levied upon property in a school dis- * Cooper v. Ash, 76 111. 11. Compare triot for school purposes, were to omit People v. Ulster Supervisors, 94 N. T. property subject to assessment, thus 268. necessitating a greater, rate to be ' Hayward v. People, 145 111. 55. ' levied upon all other property: Vit- ' Eeuaga v. Kerr, 123 III 659. turn V. People, 188 111. 154 'People v. Knopf, 171 111. 191. 3 Trustees v. McConnell, 13 111. 188; People v. Worthiugton, 21 111. 173. OH. VI.] EQTJALITT AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 287 fixing the assessed value at less than the full value, the statute requiring one-fifth of the actual value to be taken as the as- sessed value is not void.^ The provisions of the constitution are not violated by a statute dividing the property of deced- ents' estates into classes, and levying a tax by valuation on the right of succession to certain classes at different rates, and exempting other classes; the right of succession being created by statute the state may impose conditions thereupon.^ The requirement of uniformity is 'not violated by a statutory pro- vision for a board of review, in counties of a certain popula- tion, different from other counties in the state.' The different kinds of corporations may be classified for taxation ; * gas-light companies may be classified separately from other manufao-. turing companies ; * railroad companies may be put in a class by themselves for taxation:* foreign and domestic insurance companies may be put in different classes and taxed differ- ently;' and the companies of a state which in its taxation dis- criminates as between its own and foreign companies may be made a class by themselves for corresponding taxation.' The constitution is not violated by license taxes, if laid uniformly,' «,nd these taxes are only required to be uniform upon all who fall within the same class.^" Persons dealing in intoxicat- ing drinks may be classified according to the kind of drinks they sell." The constitution does not preclude the levy of poll taxes,*^ nor are its provisions violated by allowing parties to 1 Chicago V. Fishburn, 189 Dl. 867. 1 Hughes v. Cairo, 92 IlL 339. See 2 Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 HL Duoat v. Chicago, 48 IlL 173; Walker 133. V. Springfield, 94 IlL 364; Insurance 3 People V. Board of Com'rs, 176 IlL Co. v. New Orleans, 1 Woods 85. 576. See People v. Knopf, 171 IlL 'Home Ins. Co. v. Sweigert, 104 191; Burton Stock-Car Co. v. Trae- 111. 653; Union Cent. K Ins. Co. v. ger, 187 IlL 9. Durfee, 164 IlL 186. Contra, Clark < Coal Bun Coal Co. v. Finlen, 134 v. Mobile, 67 Ala. 317. IlL 666. 9 See Walker v. Springfield, 94 IlL 5 Williams v. Rees, 9 Biss. 405. 364; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. 6 See Eamsey v. Hoeger, 76 HL 483; Louis, 103 III 563; Braun v. Chicago, ' Porter v. Railroad Co., 76 lU. 561; 110 IlL 186; United States Distilling Ottawa Glass Co. j. McCaler, 81 IlL Co. v. Chicago, 113 IlL 19. 556; Pacific, etc. Co. v. Lieb, 83 IlL i» Braun v. Chicago, 110 IlL 186. 1603; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Siders, 88 UTimm v. Harrison, 109 IlL 593. 111. 320; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 '^ Sawyer v. Alton, 4 IIL 137. U. S. 575. 288 EQUALITY AND. UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. TI. commute.' A city ordinance imposing on bicycles and other wheeled vehicles a graduated tax to be created into a " wheel- tax fund " for the improvement of streets, when such vehicles are already subject to an ad valorem tax, part of which is appropriated for the same purpose, and when also such vehicles are of varying values, is void, as being not only double taxa- tion, but as violating the principles of equality and uniformity.^ The proviso, in a statute creating sanitary districts, and pro- viding for the establishmdtot of docks and water-power, that nothing therein contained shall be construed to abridge or prevent the state from thereafter requiring part of the funds , derivfed from such water-power to be paid to the state, is not in conflict with the constitutional provision that taxation shall be uniform, since such proviso is not an exercise of the taxing power.' License fees imposed under the police power do not come under the constitutional provisions referred to, and they may be graduated on other reasons than those of general uniform- ityi^ But equality among the class taxed is nevertheless to be kept in view.* The provision of the constitution of Illinois forbidding the passage of special laws regulating township and county affairs is not violated by a statute providing for counties of a certain population a board of assessors different from the rest of the state.* The classification of the counties of the state as a basis for legislation on the subject of taxation is valid where the legislation is uniform and general ; but a statute is not uniform and general which arbitrarily restricts the powers of munici- palities' in certain counties in respect to incurring indebted- ness and levying taxes.^ An ordinance requiring a particular street railway company to pay an annual tax on each milaof 1 Chicago V. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50; 46 III 393; Lovington v. Trustees, 99 Illinois Central R. Co. v. McLean 111. 564; Timm v. Harrison, 109 111. County, 17 111. 391; Parmelee v. Chi- 593. cago, 60 III. 367. See State Bank v. 5 See Braun v, Chicago, 110 111. 186; People, 5 111. 303 ;Hunsaker V.Wright, East St. Louis v. Wehrung, 46 IlL 30 IlL 146; DaughdriU v. Insurance 392. Co., 31 Ala. 91; Ide v. Finneran, 29 "People v. Board of Com 'rs, 176 111. Kan. 569. 576 ; Burton Stock-oar Co. v. Traeger, 2 Chicago V. Collins, 175 IlL 445. 187 IlL 9. 3 People V. Nelson, 133 IlL 565. ' People v. Knopf, 183 IlL 410. *See East St. Louis v. Wehrung, CH. VI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 289 its road does not conflict with that provision of the Illinois constitution which forbids special laws where a general law is applicable.! Indicma. The constitution provides that " the general as- sembly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such only for municipal, edu- cational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes as may be specially exempted by law."^ It also provides that " the general assembly shall not pass local or special laws " " for the assessment and collection of taxes for state, county, township, or road purposes." ' Of these provisions it has been said, they " do not prohibit local taxation for objects in them- selves local. They require a general, uniform levy for state purposes, but they do not forbid local taxation under general laws. Nor do we think they prohibit indirect taisation by way of licenses upon particular pursuits, etc. Such indirect taxa- tion may be made effectual as a police regulation. , The tax- ing, which is a part of the legislative power of the state, is supreme, except where limitations are imposed. Indirect tax- ation, by way of tariffs, etc., has ever been regarded a legiti- mate exercise of the taxing power, and we do not think a provision in the constitution requiring the general levy of direct taxes for state purposes to be upon a uniform assessment implies a prohibition of all other taxation. Such, a* all events, is not the conventional force of its language." * 1 Chicago General R. Co. v. Chi- lough, 27 Ind. 233, in which the au- cago, 176 HI. 253. thoritiea are reviewed by Elliott, J. 2 " This provision does not confer See Lof tin v. National Bant, 85 Ind. the power of taxation. It is rather a 341. An ordinance imposing a license limitation upon the power to tax: " tax on brewers, distillers, and deal- State v. Holliday, 150 Ind. 216. ers in malt liquors, with the provis- 3 As to what is such a local or spe- ion that it shiall not apply to residents cial law, see Board of Com'rs v. State, engaged in the wholesale business of 155 Ind. 604 bottling and vending bottled beer, is * Perkins, J., in Anderson v. Kerns void as discriminating in favor of Draining Co., 14 Ind. 199, citing La- residents as against non-residents, Fayette v, Jenners, 10 Ind. 70, 75; and in favor of some residents against The Bank v. New Albany, 11 Ind. other residents: Indianapolis v. Bie- 139; Aurora v. West. 9 Ind. 74 To ler, 138 Ind. 30. the same effect is Bright v. McCul- 19 290 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [OH. VI. Nor do these provisions require the rate of assessment to be equal for all purposes throughout the state, but only to be equal and uniform throughout the district for which the tax is levied.' In prescribing regulations "to secure a just valuation of all property," the legislature must exercise a discretion, and unless the method adopted be clearly inadequate to secure the result, the courts cannot interfere. A statute for the taxation , of railroad property, which authorizes the assessors in estimat- ing the value of the road to\ake into consideration its location for business, the competition of other roads, its earnings, etc., cannot therefore be held unconstitutional.^ But a tax imposed on one township only, for the erection therein of a county court-house and jail, is void, the purpose of the tax not being a township purpose, and a tax for a county purpose being re- quired to be uniform and equal throughout the county.' And a statute creating a firemen's pension fund for the pension- ing of disabled firemen, and providing that foreign insurance companies shall pay a portion of their net income to the fund, contra venesjhe constitution, being local and not uniform.* The legislature is not precluded by the constitution from making exei^jptions,^ but the.exemptions must be by uniform rule; they cannot be made to apply to one class of cities and not to ■ others,^ nor to one class of persons and not to others,'' nor can they be allowed except in the cases enumerated by the consti- tution.^ . A tax for a general purpose cannot be levied on one lAdamson v. Auditor ofWarren ment: Robinson v. Sohenck, 102 Ind. County, 9 Ind. 174; Con well v. 307. O'Brien, 11 Ind. 419; Covington 2 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. State, 25 Drawbridge Co. v. Auditor, 14 Ind. Ind. 177." 331; Bright v. McCuUough, 27 Ind. 3 Board of Com'rs v. State, 155 Ind. 223; Richmond v. Scott, 48 Ind. 568; 604. Loftin V. National Bank, 85 Ind. 341. * Henderson v. London & L. Ins. The provision that the legislature Co., 135 Ind. 38. shall provide by law for a general 5 Bank of the State v. New Albany, and uniform system of common 11 Ind. 139. See Connersville v. State schools does not mean that the leg- Bank, 16 Ind. 105; King v. Madison, islature must directly and by a stat- 17 Ind. 48. ute levy all taxes for each locality, * MoDougal v. Brazil, 83 Ind. 311. or that it shall prescribe a, rule for if Exemptions made only to "a every school district in the state; widow, unmarried female, or female but the legislature must, by a gen- minor whose father is deceased," eral law, provide for conducting held void: State v. Indianapolis, 69 schools and securing revenues from Ind. 375; Warren v. Curran, 75 Ind. 309. taxation for their support, through ^ state v. Workingmen's Building, the instrumentalities of govern- etc. Assoc, 152 Ind. 378. This case CH. VI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IS TAXATION. 291 species of taxable property only, and therefore a levy of a spe- cific tax on land by the acre for highway purposes without taxifig personalty is void.' Iowa. The constitution provides that all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation; that the general assem- bly shall not grant to any citizen or class of citizens privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not belong equally to all citizens; that the general assembly shall not pass local or special laws for the collection of taxes, and that " the property of all corporations for pecuniary profit now existing or hereafter created shall be subject to taxation the same as that of individuals." These provisions do not require uniform- ity of methods of reaching property for taxation, or render absolute equality imperative, and if they did they would be impossible of enforcement.^ In the case of railroad, express, telegraph, and other similar property, it is not incompetent to provide for its assessment and valuation by a state board, and for the apportionment of the valuation among the municipali- ties for the purposes of local taxation ; the law for the purpose making nO distinction between such property as may be owned by individuals and that owned by corporations.' A statute providing for the assessment of railroad property every year,' while other property is assessed every alternate year, is valid.* The constitution does not preclude a statute requiring all for- eign insurance companies to pay a heavy tax on their business holds that any law directly or in- 2 Dubuque v.* Chicago, etc. R. Cd, directly exempting the stock of a 47 Iowa 196; Macklot v. Davenport, building and loan association from 17 Iowa 379; Warren v. Henly, 31 assessment at its true cash value is Iowa 40. It is competent to tax a void. railroad bridge separately from the 1 Bright V. McCuUough, 37 Ind. 223. railroad a,nd on a different basis: A statute providing that persons re- Union Pao. E. Co. v. Pottawatamie siding outside of a town, but sending County, 4 Dill. 497. See Chicago, etc. their children to the town school, E. Co. v. Sabrela, 19 Fed. Rep. 177. shall, with their property, be liable ' Dunlieth, etc. Bridge Co. v. Du- to a school tax as if they resided in buque, 33 Iowa 427; Dubuque v. Chi- the town, on all property owned by cago, etc. E. Co., 47 Iowa 196; Ex- them in the township in which the press Co. v. EUyson, 28 Iowa 370. school is located, is not in conflict * Central Iowa E. Co. v. Wright with the constitutional requirement Supervisors, 67 Iowa 199. of uniform and equal taxation: Kent v. Kentland, 62 Ind. 291. 292 EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITT' IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. (lone within the state as a condition of their doing business within its limits, but discriminating in favor of domestic com- panies and against foreign companies by imposing higher tax- ation on the latter.' The fact that under the code national banks are liable for taxes against the stock only in case they hold dividends of the owner, and that under a statute state banks are liable for such taxes absolutely, does not render the latter act unconstitutional as a special law.^ The constitution is not violated by taxing a corporation on its capital and also taxing th'e shareholders on their shares.' A statute exempting from payment of a peddler's tax all persons who have served in the Union army or navy is unconstitutional and void, the classification being unreasonable.f Exemptions of corporate property from taxation are precluded, and consequently the court, in any doubtful case,, should construe a revenue law as not intending to make an exemption.' A statute imposing a tax on the gross earnings of insurance companies, and which exempts them from all other taxation except on real estate and for special assessments, is invalid.* But a statute is not invalid which, while in terms exempting from municipal taxation the franchises and property of a water company, in efi'ect applies the taxes as they would otherwise become due in payment or in part consideration of water rent.'' And where there is no power to make an exemption there is none to release a levy of taxes after it has been made.^ Where the county board orders all property to be assessed at fifty per cent, of its cash value, and afterwards, acting as a board of equalization, orders that fifty per cent, be added to all assessments on money and cred- its, the latter order is void as creating an inequality in the tax- ation instead of equalizing it.' 1 Scottish Union, etc. Ins. Co. v. ' Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa 405. Herriott, 109 Iowa 606. See Bartholomew v. Austin, 85 Fed. 2 Primghar State Bank v. Eerick, Rep. 359, 39 C. C. A. 568. 96 Iowa 238. ^ Dubuque v. Illinois, etc. R. Co., 39 ' Cgok V. Burlington, 59 Iowa 251. Iowa 56. The statute of Iowa ex- * State v. Garbrowski (Iowa), 82 N. empts a homestead from taxation if W. Rep. 959. it is listed for taxation separate from 'Iowa Homestead Co. v. Webster other property: Salter v. Burlington, County, 21 Iowa 221 ; Dubuque, etc. 42 Iowa 531. R. Co. V. Webster County, 21 Iowa SManson L. & T, Co. v. Heston, 83 235. Iowa 377. 6 Hawkeye Ins. Ca v. French, 109 Iowa 585. CH. TI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 293 Kansas. The constitutional provision that " the legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation " is not violated by state assessment of railroads which ^ extend into unorganized territory, even though other property in such territory, by reason of the want of county government and machinery, escapes taxation altogether.^ This provision aims at a certain snd and not at the manner or mode of reach- ing that end; and the legislature may choose different methods for different kinds of property, but keeping in view the uni- formity and equality of rate which the constitution requires.'' For the same reason the requirement as to rate is not violated by the action of a local board in refusing to adopt, when it makes a levy for current expenses of the county, or for any other purpose except state taxes, the valuation fixed by the state board of equalization.' Nor is the rule of uniformity in- fringed by a statute authorizing the levy and collection of state delinquent taxes upon and from all the property of the county — making each county liable for delinquencies in the state tax apportioned to it.* H^Tor does the provision requiring uniform- ity and equality of rate prevent the passage of a " compromise law " for the clearing up of arrearages, where delinquent taxes have accumulated beyond the ability of owners to pay or of the state to enforce.' Nor does it deprive the legislature of power, when the boundary lines of towns are changed or new towns created, to make an adjustment as to pre-existing debts and provide taxation for their payment.* Nor is this provision contravened by a statutp authorizing the county commissioners of a certain county to purchase all or any bridges built on the public highways by any township or private persons, and pay for the same by the issue of county bonds, since it does not at- 1 Francis v. Railroad Co., 19 Kan. < Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Clark, 303. As to the right of a company 60 Kan. 831. so situated to such rebates as are al- 'Ide v. Finneran, 29 Kan. 569; lowed to taxpayers generally, see DaughdrjU v. Insurance Co., 81 Ala. Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. Francis, 23 91; Illinois Ceiitral R. Co. v. McLean Kan. 495. County, 17 111. 291; New Orleans v. 2 Gulf E. Co. V. Morris, 7 Kan. 210; Insurance Co., 31 La. An. 440. Ottawa County v. Nelson, 19 Kan. * Ottawa County v. Nelson, 19 Kan. 234; Board of Com'rs v. Missouri, K. 2^4 There is a general discussion in & T. R. Co. (Kan.), 61 Pac. Rep. 693. this case of the constitutional pro- ' Board of Com'rs v. Missouri, K. & vision recited, T. R. Co. (Kan.), 61 Pac. Rep. 693. 294 EQUALITY AND TJNirOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. tempt to provide for a rate of assessment or taxation to pay the bonds, but merely authorizes the purchase of bridges and the issue of bonds.' The provision is, however, violated by a statute providing for the taxation of personal judgments, bat exempting certain important kinds of judgments.^ And by a statute providing for the taxation of contracts of insurance made outside of the state with insurance companies not author- ized to do business in Kansas, because such statute imposes no tax on policies written within the state by authorized compa- nies, and because, though imposing a property tax, makes no provision for assessment or valuation, and yet attempts to make an arbitrary exaction.' The constitutional restriction as to equality alid uniformity of rate does not apply to license taxes, and the amount of the tax, as well as the method of imposing it, is left to legislative discretion.* And the legislature has power to allow the levy of license taxes by municipalities on insurance companies doing business therein.' Kentucky. While taxes for general purposes should be as- sessed generally upon the subjects of taxation, yet when the benefits of a particular tax are restricted to one class of per- sons, a member of that class cannot be heard to object that those who are excluded from its benefits are not taxed also. Therefore, white persons taxed for schools which are open to vrhite persons only, cannot object to the tax as unconstitutional, because of its not being laid upon colored persons also.^ Under 1 Commissioners v. Smith, 48 Kan. one; but when the beneiits are spe- 331. cial and peculiar, the contributions ^Hamilton v. Wilson, 61 Kan. 511. may be so laid as to exempt from 3 In re Page, 60 Kan. 843. taxation those persons who are by * In re Martin (Kan.), 64 Pac. Eep. the law itself excluded from all par- 43. ' tioipation in the advantages which 5 Leavenworth v. Booth, 15 Kan. are expected to arise from ihe sys- 627. tern, institution, or improvement to 6 Marshall v. Donovan, 10 Bush 681. the establishment, construction, or The court, per JMndspf^, J., says: "As maintenance of which the money a general proposition, taxation to be raised is to be appropriated." In constitutional must be as nearly as Claybrooke v. Owensboro, 16 Fed. practicable equal and uniform. To Bep. 297, the statute for this sepa- that general rule, however, there are rate taxation was held void as op- well recognized exceptions. When posed to the fourteenth amendment all are alike benefited by the taxa- of the federal constitution. Railroad tion, the burden should be a common company not allowed to claim ex- CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. 295 the Bill of Eights, providing that " No man or set of men are entitled to oxclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of public services," it has been held that an act exempting an hotel estate was in- valid.' The new constitution provides that " Taxes shall be levied knd collected for public purposes only. They shall be uniform upon all property subject to taxation within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and all taxes shall be levied by general laws," and " all property whether owned by natural persons or corporations shall be taxed in proportion to its value, unless exempted by this constitution.". These pro- visions preclude the application of the old rule relieving from municipal taxation property which, though brought within the territorial limits of a city, is supposed, owing to its situation or mode of use, not to share in the benefits of city government.^ Therefore provisions of a city charter under which lands used for agricultural purposes were exempt from taxation, became inoperative at once upon the adoption of the constitution,' and a statute extending a city's boundaries was repealed so far as it exempted farming lands from municipal taxation.* Statutes enacted prior to the present constitution are repealed by it so far as they authorize the equalization of assessments upon any other basis than the cash value of the property assessed.* A statute providing for the assessment of distilled spirits in emption as not subject to identifica- 36 S. W. Rep. 561, 173 U. S. 593. In tion by color: Trustees v. Louisville Newport v. Masonic Temple Assoc. (Ky.), 30 S. W. Rep. 620. (Ky.), 56 S. W. Rep. 405, it is said 1 Lancaster v. Clayton, 86 Ky. 373. that the section of the constitution 2 Briggs V. Russell ville, 99 Ky. 515; as to exemptions was designed to Pence v. Frankfort, 101 Ky. 534; narrow them.and to limit them to the Board of Councilmen v. Scott, 101 objects expressly named. It must Ky. 615; Board of Council v. Ra- be fairly construed witb a view to rick, 103 Ky. 353; Richmond v. Gib- promote its purposes, and the ex- son (Ky.), 46 S. W. Rep. 703; La- emptions allowed by it cannot be tonia V. Hopkins (Ky.), 47 S. W. Rep. extended by implication. 248; Hughes v. Carl (Ky.), 50 S. W. 3 Shuck v. Lebanon (Ky.), 53 S. W. Rep. 853; Ryan V. Central City (Ky.), Rep. 655. 54 S. W. Rep. 3; Central Covington * Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bar- V. Park (Ky.), 56 S. W. Rep. 650; boursville (Ky.), 48 S. W. Rep. 985. Louisville Bridge Co. v. Louisville ^ Louisville R Co. v. Common- (Ky.), 58 S. W. Rep. 598. See Hen- wealth (Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 486. derson Bridge Co. v. Henderson (Ky.), 296 EQUALITY AND 0NIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [OH. VI. bonded warehouses by the state board of valuation and assess- ment, instead of by the county assessor, as othei; property is assessed, is not unconstitutional, either as conferring an exclu- sive privilege or as violating the constitutional requirement that all property shall be taxed according to its value, or as not being uniform.^ Statutes subjecting to taxation all the prop- erty, both ta-ngible and intangible, of corporations, are not in- valid for discrimination and non-uniformity, since natural per- sons are also taxed upon all their tangible and intangible prop, erty.^ An act exempting from taxation property of a water company is in violation of the constitution exempting only public property used for public purposes.' A statute exempt- ing from taxation the real estate of a city board of trade is invalid, the service rendered not being " public," and being also gratuitous!* So, also, a city council is prohibited from exempting property from taxation,' nor can a town make a contract with a corporation exempting it from a tax on its franchise.' And an exemption of insurance companies from taxation is repealed by the new constitution.'' As the consti- tution provides that " all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value unless exempted by this constitution," and exempts " institutions of purely public charity," it repeals statutes ex- empting the' property and income of a masonic association " so long " as the same " shall be entirely devoted to masonic and charitable purposes." ' A statute postponing the payment of taxes due on distilled spirits in bonded warehouses until debts due the United States are paid does not violate the constitu- tional requirement of uniformity, distillers being required to pay interest on the deferred taxes.' A statute providing for the taxation of the franchises of corporatigns was held to apply .to all corporations, and therefore not unconstitutional as making a. discrimination.'" But an ordinance fixing a certain 1 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 101 * South Covington & C. St. R. Ca Ky. 325. V. Bellevue (Ky.), 49 S. W. Eep. S3. 2 American Express Co. v. Ken- ' German Nat Bank v. Louisville tucky, 166 U. S. 171. (Ky.), 54 S. W. Rep. 732. 'Clark V. Water Co., -90 Ky. 515. 8 Newport v. Masonic Temple * Barbour v. Louisville Board of Assoc, 108 Ky. 592. Trade, 82 Ky. 645. 9 Commonwealth v. Taylor, 101 " Middleboro v. Coal, etc. Bank Ky. 325. (Ky.), 57 S. W. Rep. 497. loPaduoah St. R. Ca v. MoCracken County (Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 178. , OH. VI.J EQUALITY. AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. 297 fee for a license to sell liquor on any street other than one named, and fixing a larger fee to sell on that street, is invalid to the extent that it discriminates against business conducted on that street, being to some extent special legislation.^ A city council cannot enact local or special legislation to apply to a part of the territory, or to a special person within the limits of the city.' A statute providing that distilled spirits in bonded warehouses shall be assessed by the state board of val- uation and assessment, instead of by the county assessor, is not a special law regulating the assessment of taxes.' The fact that a statute imposes upon corporations, for failure to make report for taxation, a penalty different from that imposed upon an individual who fails to list his property for taxation, does not render it objectionable as special legislation.* Nor is the statute requiring corporations to report to the auditor for the purpose of imposing upon them a franchise tax invalid be- cause it applies only to corporations having some exclusive privilege or possessing intangible property." Louisia/na. A provision that " taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state " applies only to state taxes.* It does not require that all property shall be taxed, but only that such as is fixed upon for the purposes of revenue shall be taxed with equality and uniformity; and, therefore, a revenue law is not invalid because of its excluding from its scope a moder- ate amount of household furniture or of income.' It will not preclude the legislature authorizing the taxation of callings, trades, and professions, or from classifying these for the pur- poses of taxation, provided that all who fall within the same 1 Board of Council v. Eenfro (Ky.), An. 493; Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 58 S. W. Eep. 795. XT. S. 378. A later provision |;hat 2 Board of Council v. Renf ro (Ky.), " Taxation shall be equal and uniform 58 S. W. Rep. 795. throughout the territorial limits of 'Commonwealth v. Taylor, 101 the authority levying the tax" in- Ky. 335. eludes both property taxes and li- ^ Louisville Ferry Co. v. Common- cense taxes: State v. O'Hara, 36 La. wealth (Ky.), 47 S. W. Rep. 877. An. 95; Swords v. Baillio, 105 La. An. s Louisville Tobacco Warehouse 338. Co. V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 49 S. ' New Orleans v. Fourohy, 30 La. W. Rep. 1069. An. 910; New Orleans v. Davidson, s Municipality v. Duncan, 3 La. An. 30 La. An. 554. 183; New Orleans v. Klein, 26 La. 298 EQUALITT AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. [OH. VI. class are taxed alilie.^ The legislature has a broad discretion in the matter of classification,^ and may make junk dealers a class by themselves,' and may also make foreign insurance com- panies a separate class for heavier taxation than is imposed on home companies.* It may fix a license fee of a certain amount upon all banks the capital of which is less than a specified sum.' It may also graduate license fees for entertainments by the population of towns witWn which they are given.^ But it cannot, except by general law, exempt towns of less than 2,500 inhabitants from payment of parish licenses.'' A city cannot impose a license tax for revenue under the police power on tliose who bring garden produce of their own raising within it for sale.' And the legislature cannot authorize a specific tax on property not of uniform value, as of cotton by the pound,' nor, it seems, on drays, wagons, etc., proportioned to the num- ber of animals drawing them.^" A statute providing that corporations, associations, partner- ships, and individuals of foreign governments doing insurance business in the state, shall under certain circumstances pay a tax on their gross receipts creates a property tax, and, being confined to a particular class, violates the constitutional re- quirement that " all property shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law." ^^ Under that 1 Municipality v. Dubois, 10 La. < Insurance Co. v. New Orleans, 1 An. 56; New Orleans v. Bank, 10 La. Woods 85. See Hughes v. Cairo, 92 An. 735; New Orleans v. Staiger, 11 111. 339: Home Ins. Co. v. Sweigerf, La. An. 68; New Orleans v. South 104 111. 653. Bank, 11 La. An. 41; New Orleans v. ^ state y. Traders' Bank, 41 La. An. Turpin, 13 La. An. 56; Merriman v. 329. New Orleans, 14 La. An. 318; State "State v. O'Hara, 36 La. An. 93. v.Volkman, 30 La. An. 585; Hodgson Whether they can tax dealers in V. New' Orleans, 21 La. An. 301; New proportion to extent of dealings, see Orleans v. Home Ins. Co., 23 La. An. East Feliciana v. Gurth, 26 La. An. 449; Boye V. Girardy, 28La. An. 717; 140. And compare Gatlin v. Tarboro, Walters v. Duke, 81 La. An. 668; Par- 78 N. C. 119; Boye v. Girardy, 28 La. ish of Orleans v. Cochran, 20 La. An. An. 220. 373. T Swords v. Baillio, 105 La. 328. 2 See State v. Lathrop, 10 La. An. 8 state v. Blaser, 36 La. An. 363. 398; Insurance Co. v. New Orleans. 1 ^Sims v. Jackson, 22 La. An. 440. Woods 85; Sims v. Ja;ckson, 23 La- See Livingston v. Albany, 41 Ga. 31. An. 440; Wirtz v. Girardy, 31, La. .n State v. Endom, 23 La. An. 663. An. 381. S ee Goodwin v. Savannah, 53 Ga. 410. 8 New Orleans v. Kaufman, 39 La. " Parker v. North British & M. Ins. An. 283. Co., 42 La. An. 428. on. VI.] EQUALITY AND TTNIFORMITT IN TAXATION. 299 requirement and the provision that " the general assembly have power to exempt from taxation property actually used for church, school, and charitable purposes," it is not within the power of the legislature to provide that, upon the payment of $100 per annum to the state and a like sum to the city or mu- nicipality, every cotton or woolen mill then running or put in operation within a specified time should be exempt from further taxation. An act to that effect would either be an act for spe- cific taxation, irrespective of valuation, or an act for an exemp- tion, and in either case would be invalid.' The constitutional provision that " the valuation put upon property for the purposes of state taxation shall be taken as the proper valuation for the purposes of local taxation in every subdivision of the state" was not violated "by a statute creating a levee district and authorizing the commissioners to levy a 1 Louisiana Cotton Manuf. Co. v. New Orleans, 31 La. An. 440. Such an act cannot be sustained as an act for the commutation of taxes. The power to commute is forbidden in denying the power to exempt: New Orleans v. Insurance Co., 28 La. An. 756; New Orleans v. St. Charles, etc. Co., 38 La. An. 498; New Orleans v. Sugar Shed Co., 35 La. An. 548. But it seems to be competent to provide that the payment of a specified sum annually shall be in lieu of any li- cense tax: Louisiana Lottery Co. v. New Orleans, 24 La. An. 86. Where an unauthorized exemption is made to a water supply company the com- pany is entitled to relief in respect to the consideration that was to be made for it: New Orleans v. Water Works Co., 36 La. An. 432. See Louis, ville Water Co. v. Clark,. 143 U. S. 1. An exemption of traders in goods of domestic manufacture from munici- pal license taxes was sustained in, New Orleans v. Dunbar,, 28 La. An. 722. A partial exemption from tax- ation by a corporate charter before the constitution was adopted is not affected by it: Citizens' Bank v. Bouny, 32 La. An. 239; New Orleans V. Canal & Nav. Co., 26 La. An. 396. As to exemptions in general under the constitution, see New Orleans v. Canal Bank, 32 La. An. 104; New Or- leans V. National Bank, 34 La. -An. 892; Morrison v. Larkin, 26 La. An. 699; New Orleans v. Insurance Co., 27 La. An. 519; New Orleans v. Sav- ings Co., 31 La. An. 836; State v. Savings Co., 32 La. An. 1136; Louisi- ana & N. O. Ice Co. V. Parker, 42 La. An. 669; Havana American Co. v. Board of Assessors, 105 La. (29 S. Rep. 938). The words "exempt property " in statutes providing for a reduction therefor from the value of corporate shares in assessing such shares for taxation must be confined to the property enumerated in the consti- tution, and do not apply to federal, state, and city bonds held by the corporation and which are impliedly exempt from taxation: First Nat. Bank v. Board of Reviewers, 41 La. An. 181 ; Parker v. Sun Ins. Ca, 43 La. An. 1172. 300 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. tax on the " assessed valuation " of the property, for the act did not contemplate a new valuation and assessment.' Maine. The constitutional provision that "all taxes upon real and personal estate assessed by authority of this state shall be apportioned and assessed equally, according to the just value' thereof," will not preclude the legislature empower- ing the city of Portland to exempt a water company from tax- ation for a term of years in dbnsideration of its supplying the city with water free of oost.^ But with this provision in force, it is not competent for the legislature to empower the munici- pal corporations of the state to exempt the property of manu- facturing companies from taxation,' or to authorize the levy of a tax for a general purpose upon a part only of the property within the municipality which levies it.* A tax on a telegraph company of a percentage on the value of its line within the state, including poles, wires, instruments, etc., is not in viola- tion of, this provision ; it being a tax not upon property, but on its use or on business of the company.' Nor is the provis-. ion violated by a statute imposing a tax of a certain per cent, of the value upon inheritances and legacies, such charge not being a tax upon property, but an excise.* The constitutional requirement of uniformity is satisfied by a tax upon the trans- niission of property by will or descent to strangers and collat- erals, when it is uniform as to the entire class afifected, although other classes are exempt.' Legislation regulating the business of hawking and peddling by requiring those engaged in it to be licensed, and, to pay proper fees, is within the police power of the state, and does not violate the requirement of equality and uniformity;* nor is it objectionable as discriminating among citizens of the state in that it by exception, permits one to peddle without license " the products of his own labor, or the labor of his family, any patent of his own ipvention or in which he has become interested by being a member of any 1 Hoi lings worth v. Thompson, 45 was to be levied on the property of a La. An. 232. village constituting part of a town. 2 Portland v. Water Co., 67 Me. 135. 5 state v. Western Union, etc. Co., 8 Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 63 73 Me. 518. Me. 63. See Farnsworth Co. v. Lis-. « State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495. bon, 63 Me. 451. ^ State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495. * Dyar v. Farmington, 70 Me. 515. 8 state v. Montgomery, 93 Ma 433. The tax was in aid of a railroad, and CH. VI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. 301 firm, or stockholder in any corporation which has purchased the patent."* Marylcmd. The constitution ordains that "the county com- missioners shall exercise such powers and duties only as the legislature may from time to time prescribe; but such powers and duties and the tenure of office shall be uniform throughout the state." Where the legislature made provision by law for the levy of a tax, by the county commissioners of a single county, for the support of public schools therein, the objection to this legislation, that it gave powers to .and imposed duties on the commissioners of that county which were peculiar and ' exceptional, was held not to be well taken. It was not the purpose of the constitution that all local regulations should be the same in all parts of the state, or that every locality should levy taxes for the same objects, and no others, or that the county commissioners should exercise their uniform powers on precisely the same subjects. And this legislation was not to be regarded as giving exceptional a:uthority, but as requiring a special exercise, in one county, of the uniform power to tax which the commissioners possessed in all the counties.^ The 'bill of rights declares that " every person in the state or person holding property therein ought to contribute his pro- portion of public taxes for the support of the government ac- cording to his actual worth in real or. personal property." It is not competent for the legislature, with this declaration in force, to levy on coal mining companies a specific tax of so much per ton on all coal transported by them for sale, and make this in lieu of .all other taxation.' And a statute pro- viding that the county commissioners of a certain county shall pay to the commissioners of a certain town the amount of tax levied on the real estate in said town, to be used by the town commissioners for the repair of streets, and such other improve- ments as they deem proper, contravenes the bill of rights as appropriating the state and county tax of the town to the maintenance of the roads and making improvements, and ex- empting the town from the expense of the state and county 1 State V, Montgomery, 92 Me. 433. ' State v. Cumberland, etc. R. Co., 2 Commissioners v. Alleghany 40 Md. 33. County, 20 Md. 449. 302 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. [OH. VI. government.^ But railroad companies may be taxed upon their gross receipts; such a tax being upon the franchise, and not upon property,^ and a license tax may be required from every person engaged in packing or canning oysters.' Corpo- rate bonds secured by mortgage on property within the state may be taxed, although the debts of individuals, and the bonds of foreign corporations so secured, as well as non-interest bear- ing corporate bonds and the mortgage debts of homestead and building associations, are exempt.* Corporate franchises are, as property, protected by the constitution from unequal or op- pressive taxation.* Massachusetts. The constitutional provision that the legis- lature shall only impose proportional and reasonable taxes is not violated by permitting a town, in which a state agricultural college is located, to levy a tax to pay an exceptional portion of the cost of erecting buildings for such college.^ iN'either is it violated by laying an excise tax on life insurance companies doing business in the commonwealth, proportioned to the ag- gregate net value of policies in force.'' But the provision is violated if taxes are imposed upon one class of persons or prop- erty at a different rate from that which is applied to other classes, whether the discrimination is effected directly in the assessment, or indirectly through arbitrary and unequal meth- ods of valuation. ■ It is therefore incompetent to provide for the assessment of the reservoirs and dams of a water company on a basis which would only take its land into account, irre- spective of the improvements upon it.* And a statute author- izing the assessment of sewer charges on property is not valid as an assessment of a general tax where not proportionate or equal, in that it is on a particular class of property and requires, in determining the charges, the consideration of facts pertain- iCountyCom'rsv.Com'rs of Laurel, ' Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. 70 Md. 443. , Commonwealth, 133 Mass, 161. 2 state V. Phitadelphia, etc. R. Co., * Cheshire v. County Com'rs, 118 45 Md. 361 ; State v. Northern Cent. Mass. 386, citing Portland Bank v. R. Co., 44 Md. 131. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 353, Common- 8 Applegarth v. State, 89 Md. 140. wealth v. Savings Bank, 5 Allen 438, * Simpson v. Hopkins, 83 Md. 478. and Commonwealth v. Hamilton 6 State V. Baltimore & O. E. Co., 48 Manuf. Co., 13 Allen 398; Fall River Md. 49. V. County Com'rs, 135 Mass. 567. « Merrick v. Amherst, 12 Allen 498. CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND TTNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 303 ing to particular estates ia their relation to the charges. and to previous assessments.^ It is not, however, necessary in 'order that taxes should be proportional, that the rate should be iden- tical in all the municipal corporations of the state; and a stat- ute providing that for purposes of taxation the funds of a cer- tain charitable corpoi*ation should be apportioned among eight towns named, was held valid, although attacked by one of the towns in which the corporation did business as providing for an unreasonable and disproportional tax.^ And an excise upon the transmitting and taking of property by will or descent is not unequal, and so unreasonable, by reason of an exemption of kindred in the direct line,, or of a higher rate as to collaterals and strangers.' A statute exempting from taxation wearing apparel, utensils, and household furniture not exceeding $300 in value is constitutional.^ Michigan. The constitution ordains that " the legislature shall provide a uniform rate of taxation, except on property paying specific taxes, and taxes shall be levied on such prop- erty as shall be prescribed by law," * and that " all assessments hereafter authorized shall be on property at its cash value." These provisions do not preclude the taxing of business as such, although the property employed in the business is also taxed,* nor . do they fprbid the taxing of mortgages,' or, as a police regulation, the taxing of dogs,^ or the taxing of the cars of an individual owner although the railroad companies run- ning them are also taxed,' or the assessment in the following year of school taxes provided by law, but which fail to be as- sessed at the proper time.^" But both of these requirements are violated by a statutory amendment providing that there shall be no deduction from' the assets of banks or insurance com- 1 Sears V. Street Com'rs, 173 Mass. ^Waloott v. People, 17 Mich. 68; 350. Kitson v. Ann Arbor, 36 Mich. 335; 2 Northampton v. Hampshire Youngblood v. Sexton, 83 Mich. 406. County Com'rs, 145 Mass. 108. ' People v. Sanilac Supervisors, 71 3Minot V. Winthrop, 163 Mass. 113. Mich. 16. *Day V. Lawrence, 167 Mass. 371. ^Van Horn v. People, 46 Mich. 183; 6 In Williams v. Detroit, 8 Mich. Hendrie v. Kalthoff, 48 Mich. 306; 560, this provision was held inopera- Longyear v. Buck, 83 Mich. 336. tive until some new rule in conform- ' Comstook v. Grand Rapids, 54 ity therewith should be adopted by Mich. 641. the legislature. " Wilcox v. Eagle T'p, 81 Mich. 371. 304 EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. [OH. VI. panics for mortgages upon which they pay taxes.^ A, tax upon telegraph and telephone companies at a rate which is " the , average rate of all taxes, raised for all purposes, local as well as state, during the previous year, is not within the uniform rule of taxation.^ That rule is infringed by a statute which authorizes the surplufe of highway fund levied for highway purposes upon a surveyed township to be expended for the benefit of another surveyed township (both comprising one township), not contiguous to it and not for highway purposes within the same assessing district.' A statute taxing inherit- ances was held not to be a tax on property, but on the privi- lege of inheriting it, and hence not within the constitutional requirement of uniformity ; * and the fact that the act adopts the progressive rate in ascertaining the amount of inheritance taxes payable under it does not affect its validity on the ground of uniformity.^ The uniform rule of taxation was considered as not contravened by the statute requiring annual fees to be paid by public school teachers for the defraying of the expenses of teachers' institutes." It was, however, violated by a pro- vision that in assessing corporations the value of the stock, less the real estate, should be assessed, as well as the cash value of all personal property less honafide indebtedness, since such as- sessment would result in double taxation if there were no real estate and no debts, and'since, also, the provision as to deduct- ing debts is invalid because it does not conform to the usual method of deducting debts from credits only.' The require- ment of uniforrhity is not, however, violated by a statute plac- 1 Standard Life, etc. Ins. Co. v. Da- as a tax Upon property — because 'troit Assessors, 95 Mich. 466. one section of the act imposed a five 2 Pingree v. Auditor-General, ISO per cent, tax upon transfers of the Mich. 95. , value of |500 or over, while another 3 Manistee Lumber Co. v. Spring- section provided that transfers to a field T'p, 93 Mich. 377. certain class of persons, being those < Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate nearest of kin, shpuld not be subject Judge, 125 Mich. 487. to the tax unless the transfers were 5 Union Trust Co. V.Wayne Probate of the value of $5,000 or more, and Judge, 135 Mich. 487. In Chambe v. then at the rate of one per cent. Wayne Probate Judge, 100 Mich. 113, * Hammond v. Muslcegon School it was held that the uniformity rule Board, 109 Mich. 676. was violated by the so-called inherit- ' Detroit Citizens' St. R. Ca v. ance tax law of 1893 — if the tax Common Council, 135 Mich. 673. thereby imposed was to be regarded CH. VI.J ■ EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 305 ing a tax upon stock in foreign corporations held by residents, which is taxed as capital stock in the state where the corpora- tion was organized, and exempting from taxation stock in do- mestic corporations, the capital stock of Which is taxed in Michigan; it being competent for the legislature to place do- mestic corporations and foreign corporations in different classes for taxation.^ Water rates paid to a city by consumers are in no sense taxes, being merely the price of a commodity; so they need not be uniform, or be based upon property values.^ But a levy for laying water pipes in a street is a tax, and must be apportioned as such.' Under the provision requiring prop- erty to be taxed at its cash value, manuscript books containing abstracts of land titles are not liable to taxation, as they have no intrinsic value, but are valuable only for the information they contain, and which is conveyed by consultation of extracts made therefrom.* Minnesota. The constitution provides that " all taxes to be raised in this state shall be as nearly equal as may be, and all property on which taxes are to be levied shall have a cash valuation, and be equalized and uniform throughout the state," and that " laws shall be passed taxing all moneys, credits, in- vestments in bonds, stocks, joint companies, or otherwise, and also all real and personal property according to its true value in money." Equality and uniformity being required, it is not competent to impose a tax exclusively upon one subdivision of the state to pay a claim or indebtedness which is not peculiarly the debt of such subdivision, or to raise money for any purpose not peculiarly beneficial to such subdivision.' A statute provid- ing for the taxation of property unlawfully omitted from assess- ment and for re-assessment, where there has been a gross under- valuation, does not violate the provisions for equality and uni- formity.^ The legislature has power to provide for the taxation 1 Bacon v. Board of Tax Com'rs, sganborn v. Rice, 9 Minn. 258. (Mich.), 85 N. W. Rep. 307. That the provision would include 2 Jones V. Water Com'rs, 34 Mich, penalties for failure to list property 273; Preston v. Water Com'rs, 117 for taxation, see MoCormick v. Fitch, Mich. 589. 14 Minn. 353. 'Jones V. Water Com'rs, 34 Mich. « State v. sWeyerhauser, 68 Minni 373. ' 353. * Perry v. Big Rapids, 67 Mich. 146. 30 306 EQUALITY AND UHIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. of real property which has escaped taxation in previous years, without providing for the assessment of personalty of that class.i A statute exempting from taxation for, five years the lands granted to aid in the construction of a certain railroad is repug- nant to the constitutional requirement of uniformity, since the legislature cannot say what will be uniform taxation in the future.^ And a statute providing for a system of commuted taxa- tion— ^requiring a percentage of the gross receipts — of the prop- erty of railway companies Snd similar corporations, was uncon- stitutional until it was validated by the constitutional amend- ment of 1871.' So, a statute providing a commuted system of taxation of mining property and products by the payment of a fixed sum per ton for all ore mined and shipped or disposed of, was held a violation of the requirement for equal taxation.* A statute requiring claims for deduction in assessments on credits tobe made in the first instance to the assessor does not infringe the provisions of the constitution requiring all taxes to be eqpal and prescribing what property is subject to taxa- ti6n.° The provision that taxes shall be as nearly equal as may be is not contravened by a statute requiring a county to pay to each of the judges of the district court therein, a certain sum annually.* A tax levied on land to collect the amounts the state has lent to farmers for seed grain is not unequal taxation, or taxation at all, but a statutory method of foreclosing a stat- utory lien for money borrowed from the state.' A statute providing for deducting the total amount of the indebtedness of a corporation or association from its stock, as a basis of as- sessment, violates the provisions requiring equality, uniformity, and cash valuation.' Those provisions are disobeyed by a city's contract with a corporation whereby the latter is to furnish water for city purposes, in consideration of the payment of 1 Winona, etc. Land Co. V. Minne- * State v. Lakeside Land Co., 71 sota, 159 U. S. 536; Redwood v. Wi- Minn. 283. nona, etc. Land Co., 40 Minn. 513. ^ Arosin v. London & N. W. Amer- 2 State V. Duluth & L R. R. Co., 77 ioan Mortgage Co., 80 Minn. 277. Minn. 433. esteiner v. Sullivan, 74 Minn. 498. 3 State' V. Stearns, 73 Minn. 300, fol- 'Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 lowed in State v. Dulutli & I. R. R. Minn. Il8. Co., 77 Minn. 438. But see Stearns v. » State v. Dulutti Gas, eta Co., 76 Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223; Duluth & Minn. 96. ' 1 R. R. Co. V. St. Louis County. 179 U. S. 303. OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 307 taxes by the city on the water-works; for if a city could bind itself by such a contract, it would result in bartering away the taxing power.^ An ordinance requiring the payment of a certain sum for a license to conduct the business of an employ- ment office until the first day of January next following the date of the application, is void, the fee charged being neither uniform nor equal." The requirement of a cash valuation avoids an ordinance taxing the conductors of " gift, fire, and bankrupt sales" two per cent, of the gross receipts of their sales.' A statute authorizingTural highways to be laid out by assessing the entire cost upon lands lying within one mile thereof, according to benefits, violates the provision that all taxes shall be as nearly equal as may be; such a highway is not a local improvement within the meaning of the constitu- tional amendment exempting from the equality provision as- sessments for local improvements by municipal corporations.* A statute requiring as a condition precedent to probate proceed-' ings for the settlement of estates the payment to the county treasurer of specified sums arbitrarily prescribed without refer- ence to the value of the estate in question is void as contrary to the clauses of the constitution requiring equality of taxation.' And if decedents' estates are taxable under such a statute, an exemption of estates not greater than $2,000 from any tax would violate the constitution as it formerly stood, it not being among the specified exemption^ to the rule requiring all prop- erty to be assessed.' Under the constitution in its present form the mandate of equality of taxation applies to inherit- ance taxes exactly as it does to taxes on property, except as otherwise expressly provided in the constitution, to the effect that " Such tax above such exeippted sum may be uniform, or. it may be graded or progressive; but shall not exceed a maxi- mum tax of five per cent. ; " and therefore a statute seeking to impose such a tax is unconstitutional for want of uniformity if it excludes from its operation real property and lays the tax upon successions to personalty alone, if it exempts from its op- eration persons and corporations whose property is by law ex- 1 Little Falls Electric & Water Co. See Graham v. Conger, 85 Ky. 583; V. Little Falls, 74 Minn. 197. Washington Av. Case, 69 Pa. St. 353. 2 Moore v. St. Paul, 48 Minn. 331. » State v. Gorman, 40 Minn. 233. ' Minces t. Schoenig, 73 Minn. 538. •; State v. Gorman, 40 Minn. 338. * Sperry v. Flygare, 80 Minn. 335. 308 EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. empt from taxation, and if it allows a larger exemption to lineal heirs than to collaterals, and does not lay the tax on the excess of the value of the property received above a uniform exempted sum.' It is not, however, invalid because it taxes collateral heirs at a higher rate than lineal heirs, ior the con- stitution now expressly authorizes such graduation of the tax.^ It has been held that the requirement that " taxes raised in this state shall be a,s nearly equal as may be," does not preclude the customary poll taxes and exemptions ia respect to them.' The constitution of Minnesota prohibits special legislation in all cases where general laws can be made applicable, and re- quires such general laws to be uniform in their application throughout the state. Under these provisions a statute to en- force the collection of delinquent taxes in counties in which certain conditions existed at the time therein specified was void.* The constitution also provides that public property used ex- clusively for any public purposes shall be exempt from taxa.- tion. Pursuant to this provision a statute was passed exempt- ing from taxation all public market houses ; and it was held that a building erected for a public market by a private corpo- ration, organized to erect the same, on land owned by the cor- poration, under a contract with the city whereby it secured a franchise for conducting the business for twenty-five years, was not exempt although declared by ordinance a public mar- ket and exempt.^ Mississippi. The constitutional provisions that " Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. All prop- erty shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law," and that " The property of all corporations for pecuniary profits shall be subject to taxation the same as that of individuals," do not avoid a statute requiring banks to pay a privilege tax varied in amount with reference to the capital stock or assets, such tax to be in lieu of all other taxes.* 1 Drew v.Tifift, 79 Minn. 175. not exceeding a certain sum to the acre, to be paid in labor at option, is not void on grounds of inequality because of not providing for the assessment of the tax against city lots and other property.'* The constitution of Nebraska also provides that the legisla- ture " shall have power to tax peddlers, auctioneers, brokers, hawkers, commission merchants, showmen, jugglers, telegraph, and express interests or business, and vendors of patents, in such manner as it shall direct by general law uniform as to the class upon which it operates." This, it has been held, will not preclude the taxation of subjects other than those specified ; and a tax upon parties in respect of the commencement of a suit is not unconstitutional.' Nevada. The constitution requires " A uniform and equal rate of taxation." This is not infringed by the taxation of moneys lent by a savings bank, secured by mortgage, and of the property securing the loan.* And as all property is to be assessed at its actual cash value, the fact that a statute pro- vides that different kinds of property shall be assessed by dif- ferent assessors does not make it conflict with the constitutional requirement, since, the cash value may as well be determined by several men and boards as by one.' A constitutional pro- vision for the taxation of property by value does not exclude privilege taxes; ^ and another provision forbidding special laws for the assessment and collection of taxes is not disobeyed by an act creating a state board of assessors and equalization to 1 State V. Poynter, 59 Neb. 417. County, 40 Neb. 893. Compare Gun- ^Lanoaster County v. Rush, 35 Neb. nison v. Owen, 7 Colo. 467. 119. 5 state V. County Com'rs, 4 Neb. 537. ' Mortensen v. West Point Manuf. * State v. Carson City Savings Co., 13 Neb. 197. Bank, 17 Nev. 146. * Burlington, etc. Co. v. Lancaster ' Sawyer v. Dooley, 31 Nev, 390. 8 Robinson, Ex parte, 13 Nev. 363. 316 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. TI. assess all railroads, and the rolling stock and side tracks of all railroads; such act being simply an exercise of the right of the legislature to classify property for the purposes of taxation and being, as applicable to all railroads in the state, a general law.^ Under a clause of the constitution providing for the taxation of all property except "such as may be exempted therein for the purposes therein enumerated, the exemption of mortgages, not being for any of the enumerated purposes, is invalid.^ Another constitutional provision requiring corpora- tions to be taxed the same as individuals is not contravened by a statute providing that all railroads, however owned, are to be assessed by the state board, and all other property by the county assessors.' New HampsJiire. By the constitution the legislature is given power " to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assess- ments, rates, and taxes upon all the inhabitants and residents within the said state, and upon the estates within the same, to be issued and disposed of," etc., and by the Bill of Eights every member of the community "is bound to contribute his share to the expense of " the state. Equality and justice being, there- fore, the foundation of all constitutional taxation, a statute founded on any other principle cannot be upheld. So a tax of two per cent, on the gross receipts of express companies doing business upon railroads, or in lieu thereof of five dollars per mile for the number of miles of railroad over which the business is done — thus impliedly exempting from its scope the business not done upon railroads, — is not valid because not founded in equal- ity and justice.* The provisions above recited are contravened by the exception, from the otherwise general inheritance tax law, of legacies to husband or wife, children or grandchildren, of the person who died last seized.' And a rule for the computa- tion of taxes which produces a larger sum on certain property than on any similar property is contrary to the constitutional rule requiring equality of taxation.* But a statute limiting 1 Sawyer v. Dooley, 31 Nev. 390. ' Ciirry v. Spencer, 61 N. H. 634 - State V. Carson City Savings * Boston C. & M. R Co. v. State, 63 Bank, 17 Nev. 146. N. H. 571; Amoskeag Manuf. Co. v. s Sawyer v. Dooley, 81 Nev. 390. Manchester (N. H.), 47 Atl. Rep. 74 « State V. United States & C. Ex- press Co., 60 N. H. 319. en. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 317 the rate of taxation of deposits iu savings banks was held not to be unconstitutional ; the court declaring that the savings- ba^lc tax is an anomaly, resting on peculiar grounds of public policy, and is universally understood to have acquired the po- sition of an exception to the constitutional rule of equality." ' A statute requiring a town to pay the expenses of a board of police commissioners appointed by the governor is not objec- tionable as subjecting the town to unequal and unreasonable expense, since it only requires the town to pay its proportional share of the total expenses of policing the state by requiring the payment of the oflBcers within its own limits.^ New Jersey. The constitutional provision that " property shall be assessed for taxes under general laws and by uniform rules, according to its true value," does not require all property to be taxed, but leaves untrammeled the legislative power of selecting the subjects of taxation. It is not infringed by the taxation of bank shares when shares in other corporations are exempted, or by the fact that the shares are rated differently in the different townships, unless the different rating comes from some system of valuation designed to produce it.' Nor is that provision violated by a law for the taxation of property generally and equally, but which provides that a mortgage or debt secured thereby shall not be taxed in any case unless a deduction therefor is claimed by the owner of the land and allowed by the assessor, and that when taxed it shall be in the township or city where the mortgaged premises are situated.* The legislature may create classes on a substantial basis for the convenience of levying taxes according to the true value of the property,* and the right to discriminate among the various classes of property for the purposes of taxation is thoroughly established ; * but the constitution requires that all members of the class selected for taxation shall be included in the taxing law; that the rule applied thereto shall be uniform as to the 1 Somersworth Savings Bank v. See Trustees v. Trenton, 30 N. J. Eq. Somersworth, 68 N. H. 403, citing 667. Boston C. & M. R. Co. v. State, 63 * State v. Bunyon, 41 N. J. L. 98. N. H. 648. ' Fidelity Trust Co. v. Vogt (N. J.), 3Goooh v. Exeter. (N. H.), 48 Atl. 48 Atl. Rep. 580. Rep. 1100. estate Board v. Central R. Co. 3 Stratton v.'^CoUins, 43 N. J. L. 563. (N. J.), 48 Atl. Rep. 146. 318 EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI, whole class, and that the assessmeat shall be made at the true value of the property constituting the class.* The constitu- tional requirement is not disobeyed by a statute merely because such statute provides one method of assessment for shares of resident stockholders in banks and another for those of' non- residents, where there is no substantial difference in the taxa^ tion of these shares.^ Kealty and personalty may be placed in different classes for taxation; and therefore a statute which provides for the taxation of afl lands and real estate mortgaged to or owned by any oflBcer of the state in his oflBicial capacity, and held in trust for the benefit of any person, cannot be ob- jected to as not a general law on the ground that it is confined to real estate and does not extend to all funds held in the man- ner authorized in the act.' On the other hand, a statute pro- viding for the taxation of real and personal property held in trust by the court of chancery was held unconstitutional because it did not apply to like property held in trust by other courts of the state.* A statute providing that " such taxes or assess- ments as may be lawfully levied, imposed, or assessed by any board of trustees of any village or other municipal corporation, . governed by a board of trustees, shall be and remain a first and paramount lien upon the lands or real estate, on account of which the same are so levied or assessed until paid," is uncon- stitutional, the classification by the mere mode of government being illusory and unsubstantial.' The adoption of the con- stitutional provision above quoted abrogated a statute which did not permit a mortgager to deduct the amount of his mort- gage from his taxable property in counties and cities,* and it also annulle,d an act directing the commissioners of appeal to reduce the valuation of an individual's property for the purpose of tax- ation to the sum specified by the owner under oath.' It also re- pealed a previous special law authorizing the taxation of certain personal property " where found." ' A statute is invalid which 1 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Vogt (N. J.), 5 Burnet v. Dean (N. J.), 49 Atl. Eep. 48 Atl. Rep. 580. , 503. - 2 Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Baker "State v. Trenton, 47 N. J. L. 79. (N. J.), 46 Atl.' Rep. 586. 'Blume v. Bowes (N. J.), 47 Atl. 3 Chancellor V. Elizabeth (N. J.), 47 Eep. 487. Atl. Rep. 454. 8 state v. Lov^ 46 N. J. L 133. * Chancellor V. Elizabeth, 64 N. J. li 503. CH. VI.j EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 319 attempts to substitute " as the correct standard, of value," for railroad property, " the assessed value of the real estate of per- sons other than railroad and canal corporations," instead of the true value of the railroad property itself, which is the true basis of a constitutional assessment thereof.* The provision is fatal to a conflicting provision in a special tax-law for a municipal- ity,' but it does not interdict an act that authorizes towns to issue bonds for the purpose of raising money to pay certain bonds and improvement certificates.' The constitutional pro- vision requiring property to be assessed for taxation under general laws impliedly requires exemptions from taxation to be granted by general laws.^ "Where there is a substantial basis for classification the legislature may exempt certain prop- erty from taxation on account of the peculiar use to which it is devoted.' But ah exemption from taxation, which a statute purports to secure, for all the property of savings banks, except realty bought under foreclosure, is not the exemption of an entire class of property, and, therefore, it is contrary to the constitutional paragraph mentioned and is void.* The consti- tution of New Jersey, relating to uniform taxation according to true value, does not refer to license fees for the purpose of transacting business; ^ and a tax laid, though with reference to stock, upon a company for exercising corporate franchises is a a license tax, not necessary to be uniform.* New York. In this state there is no constitutional guaranty that taxation shall be just and equal, although a law plainly departing from the principle of equality in the distribution of public burdens will be justly obnoxious as contrary to natural equity, and as practical confiscation; but the remedy must or- dinarily be found in an appeal to the justice of the legislature.' Laws which modify the general laws for the collection of iWilliamsv. State Board of Asses- 'Johnson v. Asbury Park, 58 N. sors, 51 N. J. L. 512. J. L. 604; State Board v. Central R. ii State. V. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 558. Co., 48 N. J. L. 347; Pipe Line Co. v. SHerrman v. Guttenberg, 62 N. J. Berry, 53 N. J. L. 313; Standard Un- L. 695. derground Cable Co. v. Attorney- * Newark v. Mount Pleasant Ceme- General, 46 N. J. Eq. 370. tery Co., 58 N. J. L. 168. ' Standard Underground Cable Co. 5 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Vogt (N. J.), \. Attorney-General, 46 N. J. Eq. 370. 48 Atl. Rep. 580. ' Genet v. Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296. « State V. Richards, 53 N. J. L. 156. 320 EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. state taxes by devolving on counties the duty of selling, and charging them with unpaid taxes, are constitutional,* and so is a law providing different times for assessments for state taxes.'' "Where an application to reduce an assessment on ac- count of the indebtedness of the person assessed had been de- nied on the ground that certain bank stock included in the assessment was valued at sixty per cent, of its par value, when it should have been valued at fifty per cent, above par, the assessment of such stock in*the hands of other stockholders being, however, left at sixty per cent., it was held that such assessment was invalid for want of uniformity.' North' Carolina. The constitution requires township oflEioers to assess all taxable property within their townships respsot- ively. Under this provision they may tax the land of a rail- road company, even though the state authorities, in taxing the franchise of the company, have taken the land into account.* The provision that "all taxes levied by any county, town, or township shall be uniform and ad valorem upon all property in the same, except property exempted by this constitution," overrules a conflicting provision in a city charter, and taxes must be levied on real as well as personal property.^ The omission , of the stock in trade of merchants from taxation, when real estate is taxed, cannot be defended by showing that, in another way, merchants are taxed to make up the defi- ciency.' It is not for city authorities to substitute their judg- ment for the statutory requirement.^ Solvent credits andstofcks may be taxed under this provision, but must be taxed ad va- lorem.'' The statutory requirement that citizens shall labor on 1 People V. Ulster County Supper- County, 74 N. C. 506; Same v. Brog- Tisors, 36 Hun 491. den, 74 N. C. 707. That the assess- '^ People V. Commissioners, 91 N. Y. ment cannot be made by city au- 593. See Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. thorities, see Carolina Cent. R. Co. v. 264; Nelson Lumber Co. v. Loraine, Wilmington, 72 N. C. 73; Cobb v. 23 Fed. Rep. 54; State v. Lindell Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. 1. Hotel Co., 9 Mo. App. 450; Gay v. scobb v. Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. 1. Thomas, 5 Okl. 1. See Young v. Henderson, 76 N. C. 430. speople V. Eraser, 74 Hun 283. « London v. Wilmington, 78 N. C. * Wilmington, eta R Co. v. Bruns- 109. wick County, 73 N. C. 10. See Bridge '' Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 748. Co. V. New Hanover County, 73 N- C. A tax of $1 on a party to any civil 15; Richmond, etc. R Co. y. Orange action is not' forbidden by this pro- CH. VI.J - EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. 321 the roads is not a tax, and therefore unconstitutional, because it is not levied ad valorem, but a duty required to be rendered the state without compensation.^ It has been held that the legislature may, without violating the principle of equal taxa- tion, discriminate between the different counties of the state as to the times at which the people shall pay their taxes.^ An ordinance imposing a privilege tax on tobacco buyers is not in conflict with the constitutional requirement of uniformity.' Nor is that requirement violated by a statute imposing on hotel-keepers a license tax graduated in amount by the gross receipts, and exempting those whose yearly receipts are less than $1,000.* A tax on traders may be proportioned to the sales during the preceding quarter of the year, and it may be different on wholesale from what it is on retail dealers, or on persons in different kinds of business; it being only required - that the taxation shall be uniform as to all subjects in the same class.^ A statute providing that every merchant or other dealer who buys and sells goods not specially taxed elsewhere in the act shall, in addition to his ad valorem tax on his stock, pay a license tax " on the total amount of his purchases in or out of the state, except purchases of farm products from the producer," is not repugnant to the constitution, but is ex- pressly authorized by a provision that the general assembly may tax trades, professions, and franchises.^ But a statute re- quiring " emigrant agents " to pay a large license fee before they can hire laborers in certain counties of the state to be vision: Hewlett v. Nutt, 79 N. C. 263. tmconstitutional as an attempt to For cases of peculiar charter con- grant a special privilege to particu- traots, see Eichmond, etc. E. Co. v. lar persons: State v. Womble, 113 • Orange County, 74 N. C. 506; Same N. C. 682. V. Brogden, 74 N. C. 707; North Caro- 2 state v. Jones, 131 N. C. 616. Una R. Co. v. Alamance, 77 N. C. ^ s State v. Irvin, 126 N. C. 989, cit- 1 State V. Sharp, 125 N. C. 628. A ing Eosenbaum v. Newbern, 118 N.C. statute levying a road tax on prop- 83. erty in a certain county was held * Cobb v. Commissioners, 133 N. C. void for failing to observe the con- 307. stitutional equation between the tax * Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C. 119. on the poll and the tax on property: See Worth v. Petersburg, etc. R. Co., State V. Godwin, 138 N. C. 697. A 89 N. C. 301; State v. Carter (N. C), statute exempting from working on 40 8. E. Rep. 11. the public roads the officers, serv- « State v. French, 109 N. C. 733. ants, etc., of a certain railroad is not 31 322 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. employed outside of the state, is, if considered as an exercise of the state's taxing power, in contravention of the constitu- tional provision last quoted, and is also void for want of uni- formity.' It is not competent to tax some railroad companies upon gross receipts and others upon capital stock, since this cannot be uniform.^ The requirement of uniformity in taxa- tion applies to local taxes as well as to others,' but it does not invalidate a municipal ordinance imposing, under legislative authority, a tax of a speciflfed amount on every railroad coni- pany within the corporate limits.* A statute fixing a property and a capitation tax is invalid if it fails to observe the constitutional ratio between them.' / North Dakota. The constitution of this state requires that " all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation," and that " laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all property according to its true value in money." It also pro- hibits the legislature from passing local or special laws for the assessment or collection of taxes. These provisions, it has been held, are not violated by a statute providing that grain in any elevator, etc., shall be assessed and taxed in the name of the person or firm owning or operating such elevator.* The former of the two provisions refers exclusively to general tax- ation, and has no reference to local assessments.'' It is also provided by the constitution of this state that " The legislative assembly shall, by a general law, exempt from tax- ation property used exclusively for school, religious, cemetery, or charitable purposes." This provision, it is held, does not of its own force operate to exempt any property from taxation. It is not self-executing. And it is not infringed by a statute of exemptions that is narrow in its terms, or that limits the exemption 6f real estate used for , charitable purposes to such as is devoted to purely public uses, and then only to s6ch as belongs to an " institution." ' Eeal estate belonging to an in- 1 state V. Mbore, 113 N. C. 697. * Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Reids- 2 Worth V. Wilmington, etc. R. Co., ville, 101 N. C. 404. 89, N. 0. 391. , s Eussell v. Ayer, 130 N. C. 180. 'French v. Wilmington, 75 N. C. "Minneapolis & N. E. R. Co. v. 477; Weinstein v. Newborn, 71 N. 0. Traill County, 9 N. D. 313. • 535; Cobb v. Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. ^ Rolph v. Fargo, 7 N. D. 640. 1; Young v. Henderson, 76 N. C.430. , ^Engstad v. Grand Forks County (N. B.), 84 N. W. Rep. 577. \ OH, VI.] BQUALITT AND TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 323 dividual cannot under any circumstances be exempt under the Kevised Code of 1899, section II8O.1 Ohio. The constitution provides that " laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or otherwise, and also all real and personal property according to its true value in money ; but burying grounds, public school-houses, houses used exclu- sively for public worship, institutions of purely public charity, public property used exclusively for any public purpose, and personal property to an amount not exceeding in value $200 for each individual may, by general laws, be exempted from taxation," etc. This provision is mandatory, and directed to the legislature, but no power exists to compel that body to act; and the only purpose such clause can serve is to limit the power of the legislature when it does act by forbidding it to pass laws taxing one class of property by one rule and another class by another rule.^ The provision renders it imperative that all the property of which exemption is not permitted by it shall be taxed, and precludes any other exemptions than those indi- cated.' But it does not avoid a statute which allows a deduc- tion of liabilities from claims or demands in assessing the latter for taxation;* it being held that the term "credits," as used in the constitutional provision, means the excess of the sum of all legal claims and demands due a person, over and above the sura of the legal lona fide debts due him.' On the other hand, 1 Engstad v. Grand Forks County from the value of his property, this (N. D.), 84 N. W. Rep. 577. being inconsistent with the require- 2 McCurdy V. Prugh, 59 Ohio St. 465. ment that all property should be ^Zanesville v. Eicliards, 5 Ohio St. 'taxed; but immediately after these 590. See Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. cases were decided the statute re- 343;WesternUnionTeLCo. V.Meyer, cited in the text was enacted, and 28 Ohio St. 531; Fields v. Commis- this legislative definition, acquiesced sioners, 36 Ohio St. 476. in for many years, has in the case of * Fayette County Treasurer v. Peo- Hubbard v. Brush, mpra, been de- ple's, etc. Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503 ; Hub- oided to accord with the constitution, bard t. Brush, 61 Ohio St. 253, In '= Fayette County Treasurer v. Peo- Bank of Columbus v. Hines, 3 Ohio pie's, etc. Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503. This St. 1, followed by Latimer v. Morgan, case holds that allowing to banks de- 6 Ohio St. 279, it was held that the ductions for their liabilities from constitutional provision in regard to their claims or demands does not exemptions precluded a taxpayer's contravene another provision of the being allowed to deduct his debts Ohio constitution which requires the 324: EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. the provision is contravened by an act authorizing the deduc- "tion of any liabilities of banks from their cash " in possession or transit."^ ' But it does not preclude the taxing of business as such, the licensing of stores, etc.^ Nor does it preclude the taxing of the right to receive or succeed to property by devise or inheritance, this not being a tax on property, but on the right or privilege to receive or succeed.' Nor is that provision contravened by the method adopted in the Eevised Statutes of Ohio for estimating the taxable value" of property converted during the year into non-taxable securities,^ or by the statute providing for the taxation of the intangible property of ex- press, telegraph, and telephone companies doing business within the state upon the basis of such proportion of their capital stock as >the length of the lines operated within the state bears to the entire length of the lines.' But the requirement of tax- a,tion according to the true value in money is violated by a statute requiring all credits payable in money to be listed for taxation at their face value.* The constitutional rule of equal- ity requires that the rate shall be uniform on all property sub- ject to taxation within the taxing districf In raising revenue all property must be taxed except such as is exempted under the constitution ; but this does not pro- hibit the legislature from procuring general revenues from sources other than taxation upon property — for example, from water rents.' A constitutional provision, requiring laws of a general nature . to have a uniform operation throughout the state, is complied with by a law of a general nature that is in full force in every part of the state.' general assembly to provide by law 2 Baker v. Cinoiifnati, 11 Ohio St. for taxing the notes and bills dis- 534 countedorpurchased,moneysloaned, ^State v. Ferris, 53 Ohio St. 314 and all other property, eflEeots, or * Shotwell v. Moore, 45 Ohio St. 633. dues, of every description (without ^ State v. Jones, 51 Ohio St. 493. deduction), of all banks, so that all * McCurdy v. Prugh, 59 Ohio St. 465. property employed in banking shall ' New York, L. E. & W. E. Co. v. always bear a burden of taxation Commissioners, 48 Ohio St. 349. equal to that imposed on the property ' Alter v. Cincinnati, 56 Ohio St. 47. of individuala ' State v. Ferris, 53 Ohio St 314 1 Fayette County Treasurer v. Peo- ple's, etc. Bank, 47 Ohio St. 503. CH. YI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT , IN TAXATION. 325 The Ohio Bill of Eights; declaring that government is in- stituted for the equal protection and benefit of all the people, avoids a statute which imposes a direct inheritance tax, ex- empting the right to receive or succeed to estates not exceed- ing $20,000 in value, and taxing at a higher rate the right to receive or succeed to estates of larger value than tb estates of smaller value." But an act imposing a collateral inheritance tax is not Unconstitutional because of its discriminations among collateral kindred.^ The constitution furnishes the rule for local as well as gen- eral taxation,' and it forbids commutations for taxes, equally with direct exemptions.* But the privilege of a foreign cor- poration to do business in the state is not property, and such corporation may be assessed for taxation by such other stand- ard than an estimate of property by value as the legislature may prescribe.^ Oklahoma. The organic act of this territory forbids "any unequal discrimination to be made in taxing diflFerent kinds of property; but all property subject to taxation shall be, taxed in proportion to its value." This is not contravened by tax laws classifying personal property as one class and real estate as another, even though there are some persons who own person- alty only, and others who own both classes, or authorizing the assessment of different classes of property at different dates, and even of the same classes of property in different localities at different dates; nor can mere difference of statutory pro- cedure in respect to property assessed within organized coun- ties and property assessed in unorganized counties, attached to the former for taxing purposes, be regarded as creating dis- criminations.* 1 State V. Ferris, 53 Ohio St. 314. 31 La. An. 440; Louisiana Lottery ^Hagerty v. State, 55 Ohio St. 613. Co. v. New Orleans, 24 La. An. 86; ^Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio St. Xde v. Finneran, 29 Kan. 569; lUi- 590; Cincinnati, L. & N. R. Co. v. nois Central R. Co. v. McLean Cincinnati, 62 Ohio St. 465. County, 17 111. 291; DaughdriU v. In- * Zanesville v. Richards, 5 Ohio St. surance Co., 31 Ala. 91. 590. See Fields v. Commissioners, 36 * Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mayer, Ohio St. 476; New Orleans v. Insur- 28 Ohio St. 521. anofe Co., 28 La. An. 756; Louisiana « Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 See Cotton Manuf. Oa v. New Orleans, Gay v. Thomas, 5 OkL ■■ 326 EQUALITY AND tTNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. Oregon. The constitution provides that " all taxation shall be equal and uniform," and that the legislature " shall provide by law for uniform and equal rates of assessment and taxation, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property." These provisions were contra- vened by a statute relieving a certain railroad from the pay- ment of all taxes for a period of twenty years, in consideration of its agreement to carry the troops and munitions of war of the state for such time.' The meaning of the requirement that taxes shall be uniform is, that each tax must be uniform through the taxing district; a state tax through' the state, a county tax through the county, etc.^ That requirement does not preclude allowing an assessed valuation to be reduced by deductions for the owner's indebtedness;' nor does it render unconstitutional statutes permitting the state board of equali- zation to increase assessments made at less than the true cash value.^ But that board cannot, by adopting dissimilar classifi- cations, or such as are not' uniform throughout all the counties, as a basis for their deductions, produce the uniformity in values contemplated by the constitution.' The provision requiring an equal and uniform rate of taxation is violated by an act author- izing a tax of a certain sum on bicycles without regard to their value, such vehicles being already taxable under the statute authorizing the assessment of real and personal property, so that this is double taxation from which other property is ex- empti^ Pennsylvania. The constitution of this state provides: "All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax ; ' but the general assembly may, by general laws, exempt from taxation public property used for public purposes, actual places of re- 1 Hogg V. Maokay, 33 Or. 339. s Dayton v. Board of Equal, 33 Or. 2 East Portland v. Multnomah 131. ' County, 6 Or. 62. 6 Mills v. Frazier (Or.), 63 Paa Rep. 8 Wetmore v. Multnomah County, 643. 6 Or. 468. See Fayette County Treas- ' This provision was intended urer v. People's, etc. Bank, 47 Ohio merely to restrict future legislation, St. 503; Hubbard v. Brush, 61 Ohio and did not repeal statutes empower- St. 352. ing a city to levy and collect certain * Smith V. Kelly, 24 Or. 464 taxes: Keystone Bridge Co.'s Appeal (Pa.), 7 Atl. Rep. 579. OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. 327 ligious worship, places of burial not used or held for private or corporate profit, and institutions of. purely public charity." In a recent case it is said that the words " all taxes " in the above provision " must necessarily be construed to include property tax, inheritance tax, succession tax, and all other kinds of tax the subjects of which are susceptible of just and proper classifi- cation. By necessary implication the first clause" recognizes the authority of the legislature to justly and fairly, but never arbitrarily, classify those subjects of taxation with the view of effecting equality of burdens. A pretended classification that is based solely on a difference in quantity of precisely the same' kind of property is necessarily unjust, arbitrary, and illegal."* In another case it is said that the classification should be ac- cording to some reasonable, practical rule, drawn from experi- ence, which would prevent a gross inequality in the burdens of taxation.^ Again : " The right to classify for the purposes of taxation, particularly license taxation, to tax the several classes at different rates, and to exempt classes, cannot now be ques- tioned ; the one condition requisite is that the tax on each class shall be levied alike on all the inhabitants of that class."' To quote from a fourth case, "The moment the power to classify is conceded, the question of uniformity is disposed of; for then ail the constitution requires is that taxes shall be uniform upon the members of a class. Classification for purposes of taxation, as a general rule, is a matter for the legislature." * Professional men may be classified as physicians, lawyers, clergymen, etc.; iln re Cope's Estate, 191 Pa. St. 1. 173 Pa. St. 135. As the constitution This cabd holds that a statute declar- expressly avoids all laws exempting ing that all personal property which from taxation property other than shall pass by will or by the intes- such as it enumerates, a previous tate law shall be subject to a tax statute making other exemptions of two dollars on every one hundred became void when it was adopted: dollars of the clear value thereof, Mercantile Library Hall Co. v. Pitts- and exempting from the payment of burgh (Pa.), 11 AtL Rep. 667. such tax personal property to the ^ Commonwealth v. Delaware Div. amount pf five thousand dollars in Canal Co., 123 Pa. St. 594, cited in all estates, violates the constitutional Commonwealth v. Clark, 195 Pa. St. requirement of uniformity. When, 634 however, the constitution does not ' Commonwealth v. Muir, 180 Pa. require uniformity of taxation, the St. 47. legislature can exempt individuals * Commonwealth v. Delaware Div. from liability for taxes on inherit- Canal Co., 133 Pa. St' 594 ances: Commonwealth v. Henderson, 328 -EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. tradesmen, as merchants, mechanics, etc., and other persons as bankers, manufacturers, etc., and a uniform tax assessed upon each olass.i The legislature , ma,y classify a part of the lands in a city as "rural," and may assess them at a lower rate than other lands in the city.^ Foreign and domestic corporations may be classified separately for purposes of taxation ; ' . a tax may be assessed upon the nominal value of municipal bonds while other like subjects of taxation are assessed at their actual value ; * a statute may impose a tax of five mills on the capital ^tock of certain kinds of corporations,, and a tax of only three mills upon the stock of other kinds ;^ and it is competent to make two classes 'of manufaeturing corporations, one of which is taxed, while the other is not.* The requirement of uniformity of taxation upon the same -class of subjects is not disobeyed by a statute providing that each retail dealer in merchandise shall pay an annual mercantile license tax of two dollars, all persons so engaged to pay one mill extra on each dollar of the whole volume of business transacted annually, that each wholesale dealer in merchandise shall pay an annual mercantile license tax of three' dollars, all persons so engaged to pay one half of a mill additional on each dollar of the whole volume of busi- ness transacted annually, and that each dealer in merchandise at any exchange or board of trade shall pay a mercantile tax of twenty-five cents on each thousand dollars' worth so sold ; for even if the tax be considered as laid specifically on property, instead of being, as it is, a tax on the business of selling mer- chandise, the classification has a proper basis.' An ordinance imposing a license tax on persons dealing in the selling of mer- chandise according to the amount of their sales,, no manu- facturer who is a citizen of the city to be considered a dealer or vendor of merchandise unless he sells goods n<)t of his own 1 Banger's Appeal, 109 Pa. St. 79. ^ Commonwealth v. Sharon Coal 2 Roup's Case, 81i Pa. St. 311. Co., 164 Pa. St. 284 'Germania L. Ins. Co. v. Common- sCommonwealthv.GermaniaBrew- ■wealth, 85 Pa. St. 513. As to equal- ing Co., 145 Pa. St. 83; Common- ity of taxation ib. general, see Weber wealth v. National Oil Co., 157 Pa. V. Eeinhard, 73 Pa. St. 370. St' 516. * Commonwealth v. Martin, 107 Pa. ' Kniseley v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. St. St. 185; Commonwealth v. DeL Div. 614. See Commonwealth v! Clark, Canal Co., 133 Pa. St. 594. 195 Pa. St 634 CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 329 manufacture, affords a proper classification.' Nor is the uni- formity requirement violated by a statute which imposes the same tax on the excess of fees over a certain amount, less office expenses, received bj'^ an officer holding one ofiice, as that im- posed upon the excess of the aggregate fees over the same amount, less office expenses, received by an officer holding several offices.^ The constitutional provision referred to does not require that the real estate of railroad companies shall be taxed as such, or preclude taxing the companies upon their franchises instead of upon their property as such.' An act taxing coal companies according to the quantity of coal mined is a tax on the franchise, and valid as such;* and this, and similar acts in force when the constitution was adopted, are not re- pealed by the constitutional provision that all taxes " shall be levied and collected under general laws," which is mandatory to the legislature, but otherwise inoperative until the legislature takes action under it.' The provision just quoted is not violated by a statute providing for a difference in the number and mode of appointment of the appraisers in the counties generally, and in cities of the first class,® or by acts relating to the classifica- tion of cities, and providing different systems of taxation for the different classes.' A statute imposing a tax of fifty per cent, on fees over a certain amount received by certain county officers in counties having more than 150,000 inhabitants is not a local or special law regulating county affairs within the constitutional inhibition of such laws.' A statute which would be held void if standing alone, as ex- 1 Commonwealth v. Clark, 195 Pa. *Kittanning Coal Co. v. Common- St. 634 Where an ordinance im- wealth, 79 Pa. St. 100. posing a license tax varying accord- ' Lehigh Iron Ca v. Lower Macun- ing to the business done, classifies gie, 81 Pa- St. 483. See, for similar contractors and real-estate agents rulings, Indiana County v. Agrioult- with persons making and effecting ural Soc, 85 Pa. St. 357; Coatesville sales, except that they are exempt Gas Co. v. Chester County, 97 Pa. St. from the tax when doing an annual 476. business of less than $1,000, while ' Kniseley v. Cotterel, 196 Pa. St. the others are not, such exemption 614. is void as class legislation: Ibid. 'i Commonwealth v. Macferron, 153 2 Commonwealth v. Anderson, 178 Pa. St. 344. Pa. St. 17. ' Commonwealth v. Anderson, 178 3 Northampton County v. Lehigh Pa. St. 171. Coal, etc. Co., 75 Pa. St. 461. 330 EQUALITT AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. TI. erapting property of corporations from taxation while taxing that of individuals, has been held valid in view of an existing law taxing the capital stock of corporations.^ As " the reve- nue laws of the commonwealth " referred to in a statute de- claring that taxes laid on manufacturing corporations under such laws are abolished are those which provide revenue for the commonwealth, as distinguished from those which provide revenue for county, borough, school, and township purposes, the statute is not unconstitutional as an attempt to exempt property from all taxation.^ Rhode Island. The constitutional provision, "All laws should be made for the good of the whole ; and the burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens," is advisory, not mandatory; and it does not invalidate a statute authorizing towns to exempt from taxation property of manu- facturing companies.' South CaroUna. The constitution ordains that propei;ty must be taxed in proportion to its value, and that " Taxes upon property shall be laid upon its actual value as the same shall be ascertained by an assessment made for the purposes of lay- ing such tax." Under these provisions an act of the legislature which provides that every railroad shall pay a tax to the county, for the use of the state, in proportion to the length of its track, is void because not laid on property in proportion to value ; * an assessment is necessary to constitute a liability for an ad valorem tax.* A statute requiring that all land-owners in certain counties shall during certain months remove from the running streams on their lands all trash, trees, rafts, etc., is, if it be considered as a tax upon property, unconstitutional as in conflict with the above mentioned provisions of the con- stitution.' Those provisions are, not, however, infringed by a statute authorizing an assessment not exceeding a specified sum on each lot-owner for each lot on a certain island, to keep up the streets, commons, etc., of the island, which had been set 1 Fox's Appeal, 112 Pa. St. 337. * State v. Railroad CorporatioDS, 4 2 Appeal of Hawes Manuf. Co. (Pa.), S. C. 876. 17 Atl. Rep. 319. 'State v. Cheraw & D. R. Co. 54 8 Crafts V. Ray, 22 R. I (46 AtL Rep. S. C. 564. 1044). 6 state v. Tucker. 56 S. C. 515. CH. VI.] EQUALITY AHD UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 331 apart by statute for such citizens as might resort thereto- for their health ; this is an exercise of the police power, and not a tax upon property.' Where railroad property was assessed by the state board of equalization for railroads at eighty per cent, of its real value, under a statutory provision that all property should "be valued for taxation at its true value in money," while all other property in the state was assessed at from fifty to sixty per cent, of the real value, it was held that in view of the general mode of assessing property for taxation in the state there was no such evidence of an intention to violate the require- ments of the constitution, and of a design to put the burden of tax on railroads alone, as would warrant the interference of the court.* A provision in a former constitution that the gen- eral assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and' equal rate of assessment . and taxation was violated by a tax-law which applied only to certain land-owners in certain specified counties of the state.' Under the constitution of 1868 requir- ing all property to be assessed for taxation, a city council had • no power to exempt factories from taxation.^ Another provision of the constitution requires license or privilege taxes to be just. This is not violated by a certain ordinance imposing upon certain occupations and professions a license or privilege tax which is uniform to the members of each class or occupation on which it operates, even though the different classes are not taxed alike. The requirement of uniformity is not applicable.' The constitution of South Carolina also requires that mu- nicipal taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and prop- erty within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same. This is not contravened by the taxation of business as such, or by the classification of different kinds of business for different taxation — no personal distinctions being made.* A further provision of the constitution that the general as- sembly shall require that all property, except that before ex- 1 Thomas v. Moultrieville, 53 S. C. give power to cities to exempt from 181. taxation, except after approval by 2 Chamberlain v. Walter, 60 Fed. the voters: Ibid. Rep. 788. 5 Hill v. Abbeville (S. C), 38 S. E. 3 State v. Tucker, 56 S. C. 516. Rep. 11. * Garrison v. Laurens, 54 S. C. 449. " state v. Columbia, 6 S. C. 1, The constitution of 1895 does not 332 EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. [CH. TI. empted, within the limits of municipal corporations, be taxed for the payment of debts contracted under the authority of law, does not, because of a provision in a city ordinance ex- empting $100 worth of household furniture from the property on which the tax is laid, invalidate the entire ordinance, unless it is shown that by reason of such exemption the taxes on the property not exempted have been increased.' 8o^lth Dakota. The constitution requires all taxes to be im- posed according to the value of the property, equally and uniformly, and prohibits the passage of any law exempting property from taxation otherwise than as provided in the constitution. The former of these requirements was viplated by a statute providing that assessments for the construction of artesian wells and water-courses might be laid upon lands, to be adjusted " with reference to the relative distance of such lands from the well itself and the water-courses." ^ It was also violated by a statute permitting the deduction of indebtedness from one kind of personal property, viz., credits, in making assessments for taxation, and from no other.' But the pro- vision requiring uniformity of taxation has no application to a police regulation of the liquor traffic imposing a license fee thereon calculated partially to prevent and alleviate the sup- posed direful influences and indirect consequences of the busi- ness.* The prohibition of exemptions is violated by a statute allowing deductions of indebtedness from the value of prop- erty liable to taxation.' Tennessee. Here the constitution declares that " All prop- erty shall be taxed according to its value, that value to be as- certained in such manner as the legislature shall direct, so that taxes shall be equal and uniform throughout the state. No one species of property from which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of the same value." It has been held that the mandate " requiring uniform taxation of uniform values " is not self-executing; and, 1 State V. Beaufort, 39 S. C. 5. « State v. Buechler, 10 S. D. 156. 2 Turner v. Hand Countyj 11 S. D. ^ in re Construction of Revenue S'iS. Law, 2 S. D. 58; In re Assessment of ' In re Assessment, etc. of Taxes, Taxes, 4 S. D. & 4 S. D. 6. CH. VI.j EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. 333 therefore, under a statute providing that no tax shall be as- sessed on the capital stock of any bank, but that the shares shall be assessed to the stockholders, no ad valorem tax can be assessed against the capital stock, and an attempted assessment is void.' Under this requirement taxation must always be uniform and equal throughout the extent of the same jurisdic- tion; state taxes must be equal and uniform throughout the state; county taxes must be equal and uniform throughout the county ; and a city tax must be equal and uniform through- out the city, so far as revenues for current expenses or future wants are concerned.' The constitutional requirement cannot be evaded on a mere nominal ground of classification ; ' and it is the duty of the state, where different species of property are to be assessed by different officers or boards, to provide for equality between them.^ For example, the principle of uni- formity is violated by assessing railroad property at its full value when it is the uniform practice throughout the various counties to assess real property at not exceeding seventy-five per cent, of its true value.' Under the constitutional require- ■ ment for taxation by value, and a statute requiring all prop- erty to be assessed at its actual cash value, one whose property has been assessed at less than its cash value, but proportion- ately higher than others, cannot have his assessment reduced, but may have the others raised.* The constitutional provision for taxation by value has no reference to the taxation of privi- leges, and such taxation is in the discretion of the legislature. It is, therefore, competent to authorize a town to l6vy .license taxes on the various occupations carried on therein.' The pro- vision applies to local as well as to general levies,* and forbids 1 Union & P. Bank v. Memphis, 101 < Railroad & Tel. Cos. v. Board of Tenn. 154, citing State v. Butler. 86 Equalizers, 85 Fed. Rep. 302. Tenn. 631. In Railroad & Tel. Cos. ^ Railroad & Tel. Cos. v. Board of V. Board of Equalizers, 85 Fed. Rep. Equalizers, 85 Fed. Rep. 803; Taylor 303, it was held that the provision v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 88 Fed. Rep. in the constitution of Tennessee re- 350, 31 C. C. A. 537. quiring uniformity of taxation is 6 Carroll v. Alsup (Tenn.), 64 S. W. mandatory and self- executing, ap- Rep. 193. plying equally to the assessment of ' Adams v. Somerville, 3 Head 363; property and the levy of taxes State v. Crawford, 2 Head 460. See thereon. State v. Sohlier, 3 Heisk. 381; Ap- 2 Jones V. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 188. person v. Memphis, 3 Flip. 363. 3 Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. e Taylor v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349. Taylor, 86 Fed. Rep. 168. I 334 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VX. [ exemptions except as the constitution in 'express terms allows ^ them,^ and for the purposes of local taxation it precludes a railroad's being apportioned among the municipalities in pro- portion to the length of road within them.^ The collateral in- L heritance tax law of Tennessee was held not unconstitutional as being not of uniform application, or as discriminating be- tween direct descenda,nts and collateral kindred and strangers.' The provisions that " all property," with certain specific ex- ceptions, shall be taxed, anS. that all taxable property shall be taxed " according to its value," apply to all taxation — special assessments as well as general taxes.'' It is held in this state that the legislature has the power to release county taxes.' Texas. The constitution provides that "taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state," and that all prop- erty shall be taxed in proportion to its value, except where the legislature shall by a two-thirds vote exempt it. It has been held that taxes are uniform within the meaning of the consti- tution " when no person or class of persons is taxed at a higher rate than are other persons in the same district upon the same value or thing, and when the objects of taxation are the same, by whomsoever owned or whatsoever thoy may be." ^ An act 1 Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. State, 8 deem expedient, did not forbid ex- Heisk. 663; Chattanooga'v. Railroad empting a railroad company's capi- Co., 7 Lea 561. A statute exempting tal stock: Tennessee v. Whitworth, certain 'territory annexed to a city 117 IT. S. 139. for taxation for certain purposes for 2 Chattanooga v. Railroad Co., 7 a certain time violates the consti- Lea, ^61; overruling on this point tutioual provision for uniform and Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Stale, 8 equal taxation: Jones v. MenlphiB, Heisk. 668. 101 Tena. 188. The collateral in- » State v. Alston, 94 Tenfl. 674 heritance tax is not unconstitutional * Taylor v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349; because of its omitting estates under State v. Butler, 2 Lea 419; Reelfoot $350 in value. The exemption of Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. such estates is not arbitrary or de- 160. void of good reason, as the expenses ' Demoville V. Davidson County, 3 of administration are proportion- Pickle 314 And where the release ately much greater in small than in is of all liability, it extends to the large estates: ^tate v. Alston, 94 liability incurred to counties as well Tenn. 674. Provisions of a former as to the state: Ibid. Release of constitution prohibiting the legisla- druggists liable for liquor taxes, see ture from granting official privileges, Ibid. but conferring power to grant such « Norris v. Waco, 57 Texi 635. charters of corporations as it might CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMItTT IN TAXATION. 335 creating a county out of territory taken from another county must be held void if, in fixing the liability of the new county according to territory, and ignoring the value of property therein, it imposes on the citizen a different burden for the same purpose than he would have to bear if there had been no severance of the county.^ The constitutional provisions above recited are violated by a contract made between a, city and a gaslight company, exempting the company's property from taxation.^ But the requirement of equality and uniformity is not violated by a statute for the levy of local special assess- ments,' or by graduating a tax on business by the population of the town in which the business is carried on,* or according to the business done.' Another provision of the constitution declaring that "all occupation taxes shall be equal and uniform upon the same class of subjects within the limit of the authority levying the tax," requires such a tax to be equal and uniform as a tax upon a given occupation and in its collection, and the failure to com- pel the collection of the tax from all the class alike is an eva- sion thereof.* Utah. Here the constitution provides: "All property in the state not exempt from taxation under the laws of the United States or under this constitution shall be taxed in pro- portion to its value to be ascertained as provided by law," and "The legislature ^hall provide bylaw a uniform and equal Mills County v. Brown County, 85 of Texas exempting from taxation Tex. 391. the property of counties, cities, and 2 Austin V. Austin Gas-Light, etc. towns owned and held only for public Co., 69 Tex. 180. Exempting from purposes," applies to county school taxation the property of a water lands; and, where such lands are company in consideration of the free held under a lease from the county, use of water for municipal purposes they cannot be taxed as the lessee's is not in violation of a constitutional property: Davis v. Burnett, 77 Tex. 3. provision declaring the property of ' Roundtree v. Galveston, 43 Tex. corporations subject to taxation the 613. same as that of individuals; and if * Texas Banking, etc. Co. v. State, the exemption proves to be void the 43 Tex. 636; Blessing v. Galveston, company can recover for water fur- 43 Tex. 641. nished under the arrangement: Bar- 6 Western Union TeL Co. v. State, tholomew v. Austin, 85 Fed. Rep. 859, 55iTex. 314. 39 C. C. A. 568. See Grant y. Daven- 6 Hoefling v. San Antonio, 85 Tex port, 36 Iowa 405. The constitution 338. 336 EQUALITT ASH UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. rate of assessment and valuation on all property in the state according to its Value in money, and shall prescribe by gen- eral law such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of his or her property, so that every person and cor- poration shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her, ,or its property." Under these provisions it has been held that the valuation mus-t be as near as reasonably practicable to the cash price for which the property valued would sell in open market.^ A statute provifting f or the classification and equali- zation of property for taxation does not violate the require- ment of uniformity and equality by excepting money from its operation, for money is, in respect to taxation, the constitu- tional standard of all values.^ The constitutional provisions above detailed are contravened by a statute authorizing county commissioners to remit or abate taxes of certain persons.' It has been held that to prevent the exemption of property not in- cluded within the exceptions of the constitution, express words of inhibition are not necessary ; a positive direction in the con- stitution as to what property shall be exempt contains an im- plication against an exemption of any other property by the legislature.* The direction to the legislature to " provide by law a uniform and equal rate of taxation of all property in the state according to its value in money " has reference to the levy of an ad valorem or direct tax upon property, and does not apply to licenses imposed upon privileges, business, and oc- cupations.' Vermont. The statute exempting certa,in manufacturing es- tablishments from taxation for a term of years if the town so votes is not unconstitutional as providing an exemption by other means than the law of the state, nor does it contravene the provision of the constitution that no part of any person's property can justly be taken from him without his own con- sent." * Virginia. The requirement that taxation shall be equal and uniform does not preclude the state from authorizing a county 1 State V. Thomas, 16 Utah 86. « Ogden City v. Grossman, 17 Utah 2 State V. Thomas, 16 Utah 86. 66. 3 State V. Armstrong, 17 Utah 168. « Colton v. MontpeUer, 71 Vt 413. * State V. Armstrong, 17 Utah 166. OH. TI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. 337 to levy a tax on a county office,^ nor does it require the license taxes on privileges and occupations to be equal or uniform as between different occupations,' though they must be as between those following the same occupation.' Nor is it violated by a statute imposing a license tax on persons selling manufactured articles by retail,* or by an ordinance imposing a license tax on publishers of newspapers,' or by an act imposing a license tax on fishermen within the state, and dividing fishermen into three classes, according to the depth of the water in which they fish, and grading the tax accordingly.* A collateral in- heritance tax is not properly a tax upon property within the requirement of equal and uniform taxation, it being rather a tax upon the privilege of succeeding to the inheritance.' A constitutional provision conferring on each county the right to levy a tax for school purposes is violated by so much of certain statutes as exempts the school district therein pro- vided for from the county school tax in consideration of a tax: to be levied by the district.^ Washington. The constitution provides that "All property in the state not exempt under the laws of the United States or under this constitution shall be taxed, and that the legislature shall provide a uniform and equal rate of taxation on all prop- erty in the state, . . . provided that a deduction of debts from credits may be authorized." The word " uniformity " refers to property or persons of the same class; for example, differ- ent kinds of property may be taxed at different amounts pro- 1 Grilkerson v. Frederick Justices, ' Bx parte Thornton, 4 Hughes 320. 13 Grat 577. See, also, Gordon's Ex- See, for some discussion of the con- eoutor V. Baltimore, 5 Gill 331. Com- stitutional provision, Va. & Tenn. R. pare Camden & Amboy R. Co. v. Co. v. Washington County, 30 Grat. Hillegas, 18 N. J. L. 11 ; Same v. Com- 471. missioners of Appeals, 18 N. J. L. 71; < American Harrow Ca v. Shaffer, and Gardner v. State, 31 N. J. L. 557, 68 Fed. Rep. 750. in which a provision in a charter » Norfolk v. Norfolk Landmark that the corporation should pay a Pub. Co., 95 Va. 564 certain tax. "and no other tax or 6 Morgan v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. impost shall be levied or assessed" 813. upon it, was held to apply to county ' Eyre v. Jacob, 14Grat. 433; Sohool- and town taxes, as well as those im- kill v. Lynchburg, 78 Va. 866. posed for state purposes. 8 Robertson v. Preston, 97 Va. 396; 2 Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Washington Supervisors v. Saltville Grat. 767. Land Co. (Va,), 39 S. E. Rep. 704 33 838 EQUALITY AND 0NIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. viding the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere, with all people and at all times.' The constitutional requirement is not of uniform methods of taxation; and, therefore, a statute under which a bank is assessed for taxation on the shares of stock of other corporations held by it does not violate the rule of uniformity.^ Where one statute provides that all realty and personalty in the state shall be subject to taxation, and where, under another statute, franchises are made subject to sale on execution and on ^reclosure as " any other personal property," a corporate franchise is assessable for taxation.' The provision for a- uniform and equal rate of assessment was held not to be violated by the statute of 1897 relating to the issue of delinquent certificates and redemption therefrom.* A statute providing that live stock driven into the state for the purpose of grazing after the first Monday in April in any year shall be assessed for taxes, as if it had been in the county at ■ the time of the annual assessment is not unconstitutional as discriminating between live stock and other property.' The power to tax professions and occupations is within the absolute control, and rests within! the discretion, of the legislature, and is not within the constitutional provision requiring uniform- ity and equality of taxation, as that provision, refers to prop- erty taxes.* It is held that all penalties for non-payment of taxes must be equally and uniformly imposed upon persons similarly situated and belonging to the same class.' Under the proviso permitting a deduction of debts from credits to be authorized, such deduction must be by general law, and must be uniform and equal ; and therefore an act providing that 1 State V. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447. « Fleetwood v. Read, 31 Wash. 547; An assessor's action in assessing StuU v. De Mattos (Wash.), 63 Pac. mortgages at their face value and Rep. 451. The first of these cases lands at from one-fourfch to one-flfth holds that a city ordinance imposing only of their value, held a violation a license tax of $100 per annum on of the requirement of equality and all merchants using trading stamps uniformity: Andrews v. King is not void as imposing excessive County. 1 Wash. St. 46. burdens; the second sustains an or- 2 Pacific Nat. Bank v. Pierce dinance requiring auctioneers of County, 30 Wash. 675. stocks of merchandise, dress-goods, s Commercial Electric L. & P. Co. jewelry, etc., to pay a license fee of V. Judson, 21 Wash. 49. $35 per day. 4 State V. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447. ' State v. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447. 'Wright V. Stinson, 16 Wash. 36a CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. 339 debts may be deducted from money or credits other than bank stock is invalid.^ The constitution of the state of "Washington also provides that " the property of the United States, and of the state, coun- ties, school districts, and other municipal subdivisions, and such other property as the legislature may by general laws provide, shall be exempt from taxation." The words " and such other property," etc., here used refer, it is held, to property of the same general character as that specially enumerated, and the legislature is not authorized to exempt any private property from taxation.^ A further provision of the constitution of this state that cities and towns and the charters thereof shall be subject to and controlled by general laws, applies to cities of the first class, and authorizes the legislature to change the methods of assessing and collecting taxes in such cities.' West Virginia. Under constitutional provisions that all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed, " but property used for educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes, and public property, may by law be exempted from taxation," it is not within the power of the legislature to ex- empt the property of a railroad corporation from taxation, and an exemption until the profits of the qorporation shall reach a certain percentage is void.* The provision that taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the state, and that all prop- erty, real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to value, has no application to local assessments.* Insurance companies cannot be made a special class by themselves, and taxed differ- ently from other corporations.' A constitutional provision that " the legislature may by law authorize the corpbrate authorities of cities, towns, and villages for corporate purposes to assess and collect taxes; but such taxes shall be uniform with respect to persons and property Pullman State Bank v. Manring, » Douglass v. Earrisville, 9 W. Va. 18 Wash. 350. 162, estate V. Daniel, 17 Wash. 111. 6 Franklin Ins. Co. v. State, 5 W. ' State V. Carson, 6 Wash. 350. Va. 349. Contra, Insurance Co. v. * Chesapeake & O. Co. v. Miller, 19 New Orleans, 1 Woods 85; Hughes v. W. Va. 408. Cairo, 93 IlL 839, and many other cases. 340 EQUALITY AND TINIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. •vvithin the jurisdiction of the" authority imposing the same," must be understood to be prospective in operation, and will not of its own force repeal a law in existence, at its adoption.' Wisconsin. The constitutibnal provision that " the rule of taxation shall be' uniform " extends to taxation by cities, towns, and counties,. as well as that levied by the state.^ Itiloes not preclude license taxes under the police power.' And the state having for a long period been in the practice of collecting spe- "oific taxes from corporations in lieu of the taxes on property levied generally, it was decided, but against the opinion of the judges. as to what the rule should be, that such specific taxes were not in violation of the constitutional requirement of uni- formity.* The provision is not violated by an act which ex- empts from taxation for a term of years lands which have been granted in aid of public improvements, or by an extension of such exemption for a further term thereafter." Nor is it vio- lated where a city contracts with a water company to pay for water a .sum equal to all taxes levied on certain parts of the conlpany's plant: the agreement is not invalid as an exemption - from taxation,' for it contemplates the payment of taxes.* Nor is it violated by permitting real and personal esta.te to be as- sessed as of different days,' or by a rule for ascertaining the value that differs from that of personalty.' But it is necessary under this priovision that all kinds of property not absolutely 1 Douglass V. Harrisville, 9 W.'Va. « Monroe Water- Works' Co. v. Mon- 162. See 'Lehigh Iron Co. v. Lower roe (Wis.), 85 N. W. Rep; 685. Macungie, 81 Pa. St. 482. ' Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Lin- ^Knowltpn v. Supervisors, 9 .AVis. ; coin County, 52 Wis. 137. , A tax-law 410; Hale v. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599; fixing April 1st as the date for as- Gilman, V. Sheboygan, 2 Black 610. sessing saw-logs bfeloiigittg'to non- ■ 'Carter vJ Dow, 16 Wis. 298 (dog residents,- and May Ist for assessing license); Tenneyv.Lep?:,, 16 Wis. 566; ^a:w-logs of residents, was h^ld not Fire Department v. Helfenstein, 16 to violate the principle of uniform- Wis. 136. ity, or to discriminate ■ unjustly ^Kneeland' V. Mllwatikee; 15Wis. against non-residents: NelsOn Lum- 454, overruling Attorney-General v. ber Co. v. Loraine, 22 Fed. Rep. 54. PlankroadCo.,llWis.'35." "■'■ ' S6e' 'People *. Cotnmissioners of 5 Wisconsin Central R..Co. v..Tay- Taxes, 91,N.. Y. 593; Thomas v. Gay, lor County, 52 vC^is. 37.' There 'is a 169 U.S. 264'; State v. Lindell Hotel very full discussion of the stibject in " Co., 9' l&d. App. 450 ; Gay v. Thomas, the light of previous Wisconsin de- 5 6kl. 1. cisions in this casa 8 piumer v. Board of Supervisors, 46 Wis. .163. CH. VI.J EQUALITY AlfD TTIJIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 341 exempt shall be taxed alike, by the same standard of valua- tion, equally with other taxable property, and. co-extensive with the district; and therefore the, levy of a tax for a public improvement which is restricted to real estate is unconstitu- tional and void.' The rjxle of taxation must be uniform within the district for which the tax is laid ; ^ but the constitutional requirement of uniformity may be violated as well by evasion or disregard of duty on the part of officers as otherwise; and if this occurs to an extent that defeats genepal equality and uniformity in the assessment it cannot become the foundation of a valid tax.' The rule of uniformity is violated by a statute requiring the payinent to the county treasurer of a percentage on all estates of dece- dents of more than f 3;000 in counties of 150,000 inhabitants, as a condition precedent to their settlement in probate proceed- ings. The tax is not one upon the succession to an estate, but upon the whole estate at its assessed valuation, whether solvent or insolvent.* The constitutional provision requiring the legislature; to re- strict "the powers of assessment of municipal corporations so as to prevent abuses in assessments" does not deprive the leg- islature of the power to exempt their property from assess- ments.' "Wyoming. The constitution of this state provides that: "All taxation shall be equal and uniform," and that "All property, except as in the constitution otherwise provided, shall be uni- formly assessed for taxatioii, and the legislature shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for tg-xation of all property, real and personal." These provisions are not in- iGiltnan v. Sheboygan, 3 Black ' thority to levy the tax on real and 610. See Kittle V. Sheryin, 11 Ngh. personal estate, the city might not 65; Waring v. Savann3,h, 60 Gra. 9H. legallyconfine the levy to one species In Winter v. Montgomery, 65 Ala. MSj ' of property. the Wy of a tax to . pay TaHroad-aid; , , , 2 Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Tay- bonds on real estate exclusively was lor County, 53 Wis. 37. held to be an irregularity merely, ' Marsh v. Supervisors, 43 Wis. 503. which the parties concerned ought to See Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Tay- have had corrected by. mandamus lor County, 53 Wis. 37; Plumer v. if necessary, and that they" were not ' Supervisors, 46 Wis. 163. entitled, after paying the tax, to sue . * State v. Mann, 76 Wis. 469. and recover baofc The query is sug- ' * Milwaukee Electric R. etc. Co. v. gested, whether, under statutory au- Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 43. 342 EQUALITY AUD TJNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. fringed by a statute providing that all live stock brought into the state " for the purpose of being grazed " shall be taxed for the fiscal year during which it is brought into the state, and vesting the county assessors with power to collect the same as soon as the property is brought into their counties to graze.' It has also been held that a statute regulating the assessment of live stock on the open range is not unconstitutional as spe- cial legislation consisting of an arbitrary attempt to create two classes of live stock fo^'purposes of taxation, not based on any reasonable ground or necessity.'' A statute providing for the assessment of " any personal property " brought or driven into the territory after the regular assessment in any year, but excepting from such an assessment goods brought by a mer- chant to replenish and keep up his stock tp the amount at which it was originally assessed, cannot be held an unlawful discrimination "in taxing different kinds of property," within the federal statute.' And a city ordinance, imposing a license on transient merchants and venders, and exempting from its operation merchants selling goods on which an annual city tax has been paid, and also traveling salesmen, does not contravene the constitutional requirement of equality and uniformity.* It will be shown hereafter that constitutional provisions re- quiring taxation to be uniform and according to value do not, as a general rule, apply to special assessments for local im- provements.^ The construction of the requirement of the federal constitu- tion that " all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States " has been given in an earlier chapter of this work.* The general right to make exemptions. Having now given some of the constitutional provisions which have a bear- ing upon exemptions, we proceed to consider the rule on that subject when the constitution is silent, or at least has failed to cover the subject fully. ' 1 Kelley V. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 337. 'State v. Willingham (Wyo.), 62 2 Standard Cattle Co. v. Baird, 8 Pac. Rep. 797. Wyo. 144 5Pos(, ch.XX. 3 Frontier, etc. Co. v. Baldwin, 3 * Ante, p. 179, note 2, Wyo. 764 \ OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 343 The general rule on the subject is familiar, and has been too often declared to be open to question. The right to make ex- emptions is involved in the right to select the subjects of taxa- tion and apportion the public burdens among them, and must consequently be understood to exist in the law-making power wherever it has not in terms been taken away.^ To some ex- tent it must exist always ; for the selection of subjects of tax- ation is of itself an exemption of what is not selected ; ^ but the power to exempt even from among such subjects is more likely to be restricted than to be altogether prohibited. Where no rule for exemptions is provided in the constitution, the power to make tham is not limited to general taxation, but enables the legislature to exempt from the operation of any form of the taxing power, for example, from special assessments for local improvements.' Exemptions, when properly made, must be determined in the legislative discretion, which is not, however, arbitrary; there must underlie its exercise some principle of 1 Butler's Appeal, 73 Pa. St. 448. See People v. Colman, 4 CaU 46; Ferris v. Vannier, 6 Dak. 186; In- dianapolis V. Sturdevant, 24 Ind. 391 ; Mayor, etc. v, Jackson, 89 Md. 518; State V. North, 37 Mo. 464; Scotland County V. Eailroad Co., 65 Mo; 183; State V. Parker, 33 N. J. L. 312; Dyker Meadow Land, etc. Co. v. Cook, 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 164; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio St. 243; McTwiggan V. Hunter, 18 E. 'l 776; Crafts v. Bay, 22 E. L (46 AtL 1043); Sav- ings Bank v. Rutland, 52 Vt. 463; Colton V. Montpelier, 71 Vt. 413; Williamson v. Massey, 33 Grat. 337; Probasco v. Mounds ville, 11 W. Va. 501; Wisconsin Central R. Co. v. Tay- lor County, 52 Wis. 37. In New Hamp- shire the legislature has the same power to authorize towns to exempt from taxation capital to be invested therein in the erection of summer hotels, as it has to authorize the ex- emption of manufacturing estab- lishments or shipbuilding: Opinions of Justices (N. H.), 50 Atl. Rep. 329. In Michigan the legislature does not infringe the principle of uniformity by exempting property from tax- ation, or by remitting taxes: People V. Auditor-General, 7 Mich. 84; and it may exempt, for a limited time, unsold swamp land given in aid of railroads: Chippewa County v. Au- ditor-General, 65 Mich. 408. See De- troit Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Com-, mon Council, 125 Mich. 673. In New York it is held that the ■ legisla- ture may release property which has heep. assessed for taxation, and this power may be eaeroised in any way and at any time before the com- pletion of the proceedings for tax- ation: People V. Commissioners, 142 N. Y. 348. Unless restrained by the constitution the legislature may di- rect the restitution to taxpayers of property exacted from them by tax- ation: Board v. Lucas, 93 U. 8. 108. 2 Magoun v. Illinois Trust, etc. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 389; McTwiggan v. Hunter, 18 R L 776. 3 Dyker, etc. Co. v. Cook, 3 App. Div. (N. Y.), 164; Milwaukee E. R. etc. Co. V. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 43. 8M EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. public policy that can support a presumption that the public interest will be subserved by the exemptions allowed.' , Pertaining as it does to the sovereign power to tax, the, municipalities of a state have not the exempting, power exoeptj as they are expressly authorized by the state.' And obviously 1 Thomas v. Sneed (Va.), 39 S. E. Rep. 586. 2 Tampa v. Kaunitz, 39 Fla. 684; Morris Ice Co. v. Adams, 75 Miss. AO; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Adams, 76 Miss. 545; State v. Hannibal & St. J. R, Co., 75 Mo. 309; State v. Arnold, 136 Mo. 446; Cox Needle Co. v. Gil- ford, 62 N. H. 503; Franklin Falls Pulp Co. V. Franklin, 66 N. H. 274; State V. Gracey, 11 Nev. 323; Mc- Twiggan v. Hunter, 18 R. L 776; Whiting V. West Point, 88 Va. 905; Thomas v. Sneed (Va.), 89 S. E. Rep. 586. A town cannot extend an ex- emption beyond the amount specified in its charter: New London v. Colby Academy, 69 N. H. 443. Nor can other property than that enumerated in the charter be exempted: Ger- mahia Savings Bank v. Darlington, 50 S. C. 837. A statute authorizing towns to exempt manufacturing property from taxation for a term not exceeding ten years does not confer authority to exempt the same property-for a second period of ten years: Bopdy v. Watson, 63 .N. H. 320. And under a statute permitting manufacturing establishments to be exempted, such an establishment cannot be exempted as to articles purchased by the proprietor: Kim- ball Carriage Co. v.. Manchester, 67 N. H. 483. Where by statute town councils are autl)orized to grant the right to lay water-pipes and. erect reservoirs, and to exempt such pipes and reservoirs from taxation, the exemption can only be made as one of the terms of the grant, and can^ not be given to works already built: Bowen v. Newell, 16 R. I. 238. . Au- thority to tax-commissioners to remit or reduce taxes does not emptfwer them to make exemptions. They can remit no tax except for legal cause, and cannot, therefore, remit; the tax on a medical college and hospital not exempt by law: People V, Campbell, 93 N. Y. 196, In Atheri^ ''■ V. Long, 64 Ga. 330, and Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga, 93, municipalities were held to have the power to make exemptions: see Cutliflf v. Albanyl 60 Ga. 597. But in Carters villa Water- works Co. V. Cartersville, 89 Ga. 689, it is held that a city has not power to exempt by contract the property of a water company from taxation, and that the company cannot take such exemption by way of gratuity or purchase it by way of commuta.' tion. The same is held in other cases, and also with reference to the tyxr- nishingof gas: New Orleans v. Water Works Co., 36 La. 433; Nebraska City V. Gas Light Co., 9 Neb. 339 r Austin V. Austin Gas, etc. Co., 69 Tex. 180; Altgelt V. San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436. On the other hand it seems to be held in Grant v. Davenport, 36 Iowa, 396, that a city, may make an ex- , emption from taxation a part of the consideration for a water company's supplying it with water. In the case of Cartersville Imp., Gas & W. Co. v. Cartersville, 89 Ga. 683, it was de- cided that while a city cannot ex- empt a gas company from taxation, it can contract to pay for gas a stip^ ulated sum per lamp, and, in addition thereto, a sum for all the lamps sup- plied, equivalent to the amount of taxes imposed upon the company, provided this additional sum is a just allowance to compensate for the value of the light, and provided also the stipulation is bona fide, and not in the nature of an evasion of the CH. VI.J EQUALITY AND UHIFOEMITT IN TAXATIOIT. 345 it is not competent to confer a general power to make exemp- tions, since that would be nothing short of a general power to establish inequality.' No state can exempt property from tax- ation in another state.^ Congress, like a state legislature unrestricted by constitu- law. So, a contract between a city and a water company that the city, in consideration of the furnishing of water, shall pay a sum equal to all taxes levied on certain parts of the company's plant, is not invalid as an exemption from taxation, for it con- templates the payment of taxes: Water-works Co, v. Monroe (Wis.), 85 N. W. Rep. 685. Where a person buying a city's gas plant agrees to light the city's streets for a certain sum in consideration of the city's agreeing to pay any city taxes on the gas plant, it is not an exemption from taxation but a consideration tor the purchase of the plant, and the contract can be enforced: Board of Councilmen v. Capitol Gas, etc. Co. (Ky.), 39 S. W. Rep. 855. A city council in consideration of the grant to the city of the right to construct a sewer across certain lands may ex- empt such lands from taxation for the construction of the sewer: Coit v. Grand Rapids, 115 Mich. 493. Where land was dedicated to a city for streets, an express provision that the proprietors of certain lots should not be assessed for special benefits accru- ing from the extension of streets was without they city's power and void: Vrana v. St. Louis (Mo.), 64 S. W. Rep. 180. Where all property is as- sessed its just proportion, a contract by the city to refund to certain pri- vate persons does not render the tax- ation iij valid even though such con- tract is illegal: State v. Thayer, 69 Minn. 170. A contract between a city and a street railroad company, by which the former took a percent- age of the company's earnings in lieu of taxes, was held valid, al- though the city, when it was exe- cuted, had no right to enter into the same but was thereafter authorized: Detroit Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Com- mon Council, 125 Mich. 673. 'Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 63 Me. 63; Farnsworth v. Lisbon, 63 Me. 451. The legislature cannot confer a general power to remit taxes upon a board of supervisors; this being equiv- alent to a general power to make ex- emptions: Wilson V. Supervisors, 47 Cal. 91. See Dubuque v. Illinois, etc. R. Co., 39 Iowa, 56; New Orleans v. Sugar Shed Co., 35 La. An. 548; Zanes- ville V. Richards, 5 Ohio St. 590. Where a statute gave a board " full power and authority over lands au- ■ thorJzed to be appropriated in aid of a railroad, the reservations necessary, and the privileges requisite in the application of such lands to such pur- pose," with a proviso limiting the power of exemption from ta,xatioa, but not in express terms empowering the, board to exempt from taxation, it was held that the language, taken in connection with the proyisp, was broad enough to show that the intent of the legislature was that the board could contract to exempt the lands from taxation: Chippewa County v. Auditor-General, 65 Mich. 408. 2 Appeal Tax Court v. Patterson, 50 Md. 354; Brown v. Tax Com'rs {Slioh.), 85 N. W. Rep. 307. An ex- emption accorded to a savings bank by the laws of the state of its crea- tion is of no avail to exempt property owned by it in another state: People V. Coleman, 135 N. Y. 231. 34:6 EQUALITT AND TTNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [OH. VT. tional provision, may, at its discretion, wholly exempt from taxation certain classes of property in the District of Oolurabia, or may tax them at a rate lower than that imposed upon other property.* Gustoma/ry exemptions. Some of the customary exemptions are in themselves so reasonable that they readily receive uni- versal assent as proper and politic. Such are the exemptions of household furniture, tools of trade, etc., to a moderate" amount,^ and of the personal property of those who by reason of age, infirmity or poverty are unable to contribute to the pub- lic burdens.^ Sometimes a homestead of limited .value is ex- empted.* For the encouragement of manufactures exemptions have also been made in some cases, but on very doubtful 1 Gibbons v. District of Columbia, termining ttie right to be exempt 116 U. S. 404. Tinder the city charter- as it existed 2 See Smith v. Osburn, 53 Iowa under the former constitution is not 474; Equitable L. Assur. Soo.v. Goode, conclusive as to the right to the ex- 101 Iowa 160; Day v. Lawrence, 167 emption for subsequent years under Mass. 371; Frantz v. Dobson, 64 Miss, the charter as amended by the new 681. , constitution: Newport v. Masonic ' When oflBoers have power by law Temple Assoc, 103 Ky. 592. to malse exemptions In special cases, * When it is, the sale of the tract if they refuse to make one, the party which includes the homestead is coijcerned is without remedy unless void: Penn v.' Clemans, 19 Iowa 372; an appeal is given by law: Clinton Stewart v. Corbin, 25 Iowa 144. For School District's Appeal, 56 Pa. St. 315. construction of a homestead exemp- Such a power is only admissible tion, see Oliver v. White. 18 S. C. where an examination into facts is 285. In Georgia a homestead estate essential in order to determine Is liable for all taxes due from the whether the case is within the gen- head of the family: Lamar v. Shep- eral rule of exemption prescribed by pard, 80 Ga. 25. A homestead in law: See Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, Florida is not exempt under the con- 62 Me. 62. An assessor has no au- stitution from sale for taxes or as- thority to assess lands exempt from sessments: Huflf v. Jacksonville, 29 taxation, and his action in deter- Fla. 1. In Texas a homestead is not ■ mining that it is not so used as to subject to forced sale for special as- bring it within the exemption is not sessments for benefits: Higgins v. conclusive: Portland Univ. v. Mult- Bordages, 88 Tex. 458. For an ex- nomah County, 31 Or. 498. A de- emption of a home from the Iowa oision by a controller that a corpora- mulct tax, see Lucas County v. Leon- tion is not subject to a tax is not ard, 107 Iowa 593. Statutory exemp- conclusive upon his successors as to tion of land and improvements "not the liability of the same corporation exceedinginvalue$l,000,"construed: in subsequent years: People v. Rob- Grigsby v. Minnehaha County, 5 S.D. erts, 155 N. Y. 408. A judgment de- N 561. OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 347 grounds,^ and they have also been allowed in favor of persons engaged in mechanical pursuits.' 1 See Gardiner, etc. Co. v. Gardiner, 5 Me. 163; Columbian, etc. Co. v. Van- derpoel, 4 Cow. 556. A, statute ex- empting certain named establish- ments from taxation if the town so votes is not for the purpose of aiding private persons, but to benefit the public: Colton v. Montpelier, 71 Vt. 413. Under a statute authorizing towns to exempt from taxation man- ufacturing establishments to be put in operation therein, and the capital used in operating the same, the ex- emption was held to extend to r^al estate previously taxed which had been bought for the purpose of erect- ing such establishment: Franklin Needle Co. v. Franklin, 65 N. H. 177. Exemption held applicable only to factories subsequently established or revived: Yacona Cotton Mills v. Duke, 71 Miss. 790. A statute ex- -empting manufacturing establish- ments was held applicable to leased property, so that it was no objection that the building and machinery were occupied and used by tenants, and not by the builders and owners: Colton V. Montpelier, 71 Yt. 413. For the construction of a constitutional exemption of property,eto.,empIoyed in the manufacture of furniture and other articles' of wood, etc., see New Orleans v. Le Blanc, 34 La. An. 596; New Orleans v. Ernst, 35 La. An. 747; Jones V. Raines, 35 La. An. 996; New Orleans v. Arthurs, 36 La. An. 98; State V. Board of Assessors, 36 La. An. 347; Martin v. New Orleans, 38 La. An. 397; Carre v. New Orleans, 41 La. An. 996; Washburn v. New Or- leans, 43 La. An. 326; Gast v. Board of Assessors, 43 La. An. 1104; Eose- dale Lumber, etc. Co. v., Brusle, 45 La An. 456; White Castle Lumber, etc. Co. V. Browne, 45 La. An. 459 Brooklyn Cooperage Co. v. New Or leans, 47 La. An. 1314; Nicholson v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. An. 1570 Whited, etc. Co. v. Bledsoe, 49 La. An 325; In re Southern Wood Manuf. Co.; 49 La. An. 936. As td the constitu- tional exemption in Louisiana, of property, etc., employed in the manu- facture of "stationery, i nk, and paper," see State v. Dupre, 42 La. An. 561 Washburn v. New Orleans, 43 La. An, 326; Nicholson v. Parker, 44 La. An, 76; Patterson v. New Orleans, 47 La, An. 275. Exemption of machinery and other property used in boat building Robertson v. New Orleans, 45 La. An. 617. Exemption by the Louisiana constitution of property employed in manufacturing textile fabrics: Cohn ■ V. Parker, 41 La. An. 894; Waterbury V. Atla;s Cordage Co., 43 La. An. 733. For the exemption in the same state of property employed in manufact- uring chemicals, seeShj-eveport Gas, etc. Co. V. New Orleans, 48 La. An. 768. And further as to the exemp- tion, in Louisiana, of "capital, ma^ chinery, and property" employed in the manufacture of certain articles, see State v. Board of Assessors, 41 La. An. 534; Louisiana & N. O. Ice Co. V. Parker, 43 La. An. 669; Waterbury V. Atlas Cordage Co., 42 La. An. 733; Ivens, etc. Co. v. Parker, 43 La. An. 1103; Ricks v. Board of Assessors, 44 La. An. 91 ; Taylor, etc. Co. v. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 554; Benedict v. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 793; Elec- tric, etc. Co. v. New Orleans, 45 La. An, 1475; State v. Boai^d of Assessors, 2New Orleans v. Longman, 43 La. Nally, 45 La. An. 44; New Orleans v. An. 1180; New Orleans v. O'Neil, 48 Pohlman, 45 La. An. 319; New Or- La. An. 1183; State v. Dielenschnei- leans v. Leibe, 45 La. An. 346; State der, 44 La. An. 1116; State v. Mc- ' v. Hirn, 46 La. An. 1443. 348 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXA'tlON. 1_0H. T^. Charities. It is also custqmai'y to exempt from taxatioji the property of charitable corporatioas, institutions, and associa- tions, so far as it is actually made use of for charitable pur- poses. This is upon the ground that they perform service for the public, and to some extent, at least, relieve the state froni expense.^ The questions what is to be regarded as a chari- table institution or organization, and what are to be regarded as charitable purposes, within the meaning of the law making 46 La. An. 859; Moore v. New Or- leans, 48 La. An. 1453; Southern Chem. etc. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. An. 1475; Nicholson v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. An. 1570; Union Stave Co. V. Langridge, 50 La. An. 1343; Union Oil Co. v. Marrero, 53 La. An. 357; Havana American Co. V. Board of Assessors, 105 La. (39 South. Rep. 938). Who are exempt in Louisiana as "manufacturers:" New Orleans v. Mannessier, 33 La. An. 1075; State v. Dupre, 43 La. An.' 561; State v. Eckendorf, 46 La. An. 131: New Orleans v. New Orleans Coffee Co., 46 La. An. 86; State v. Amerioaii Biscuit Manuf. Co., 47 La. An. 160; Patterson v. New Orleans, 47 La. An. 375: Lake v. Guillotte.48 La. An. 870; ^icholson .v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. An. 1570; State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 51 La. An. 563; State v. Wilberts' Sons' L^ & S.' Co., 51 La. An. 1333. As ito what is a manufacturing company within the Constitutional exemption, see Chickasaw Cooperage Co. v. Police Jury, 48 La. An. 533. ' In Louisiana the products of a manuf actory being a mere form into which the capital employed m business has temporarily passed,' they are fexempt from taxa- tion as part' of the 'capital employed in manufacture, so. long as the busi- ness is continued: felectric, etc. Co. V. New Orleans, 45 La. An. 1475. A mill is not exempt under .the constitu. tioa of Louisiana' from taxation f6r the production of cotton'seed meal, which should be used for food pur- poses, and not as a fertilizer: St. Lan- dry Cotton-Oil Co. V. MoGee, 49'La. An. 750. The exemption from taxa- tion, in Louisiana, of property em- ployed in manufactures, is forfeited during the continuance of a lease made for the purpose of closing the factory to limit, production and pre- vent competition; Waterbury v. Atlas Cordage Co., 43 La. An. 733. Nor does that exemption apply, to the capital or business of a firm which has abandoned the business of manufacturing: Electric, etc. Co, v. New Orleans, 45 La. An. 1475, But the exemption is not lost by tempo- rary interruptions in operation: Waterbury v. Atlas Cordage Co., 43 La. An. 733; Hernsheim v. Atlas Steam Cordage Co., 43 La. An. 736. Under the city charter of Newark a manufacturing plant is exempt from taxation, although on account of the owner's insolvency its operation is temporarily suspended: Bradford v. Mote, 3 Marvel (Del.) 159. One who purohEiiSes the plantof amanufactui- ing establishment is without interest to hayp cancellation of the taxes as- sessed against the same prior to his purchase: In re Southern Wood Ii-'anuf, Co., 49 La. An. 936. A statute providing that manufacturers shall receive fi'om county and city treas- urers a certain portion of the taxes they have paid does not exempt them from taxation: Germania Savings Bank v. Darlington, 50 S. C. 337. 1 New England Theosoph. Corp, v. Boston, 173 Mass. 60. •■ ' CH. vi.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION, 349 exemptions, sometimes present difficulties, and have been dis- cussed in many cases which are referred to in the margin.' 'See Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189; Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark, 445; Savannah v. Solomon's Lodge, 58 Ga. 93; Trustees v. Bohler, 80 Ga. 159; Massenbiurg v. Grand Lodge, 81 Ga. 312; People v. Wabash R. Co., 138 III. 85; Zabel v. Louisville Baptist Orphans' Home, 93 Ky. 89; Henderson v. Strangers' Rest Lodge (Ky.), 17 S. W. Rep. 215; Trustees v. Louisville, 100 Ky. 470; Louisville v. Trustees, 100 Ky. 518; Newport v. Masonic Temple Assoc. (Ky.), 56 S. W. Rep. 405; New Orleans v. Orphan Asylum, 38 La. An. 850; State v. Board of Assessors, 34 La. An. 574; New Orleans v. Female Orphan Asy- lum, 37 La. An. 68; State v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. An. 223; Bangor v. Masonic Lodge, 73 Me. 438; Appeal Tax Court v. Grand Lodge, 50 Md. 421; Massachusetts Soc. v. Boston, 142 Mass. 24; Mount Hermon Boys' School V. Gill, 145 Mass. 139; Young Men's Prot. Temp. & Ben. Soo. v. Fall River, 160 Mass. 409; New England Theosoph. Corp. v. Boston, 172 Mass. 60; Balch v. Shaw, 174 Mass. 144; Bates V. Sharon, 175 Mass. 293 ; Hooper V. Shaw, 176 Mass. 190; Hennepin County V. Grace, 37 Minn. 503; Wash- burn Memorial Orphan Asylum v. State, 73 Minn. 843; Ridgely Lodge V. Redus (Miss.), 39 South. Rep. 163; State V. Powers, 74 Mo. 476; Bishop's Residence Co. v. Hudson, 68 Mo. 138, 91 Mo. 671; State v. McGrath, 95 Mo. 193; Fitterer V. Crawford^ 157 Mo. 51; Adelphia Lodge v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 356; Montana Catholic Missions v. Lewis, 13 Mont. 559 ; Alton Bay Camp- meeting Assoc. V. Alton, 69 N. H. 311 ; State V. Collector, 52 N. J. L. 373; Newark v. Verona T'p, 59 N. J. L. 94; Home for Education, etc. v. Collector, 59 N. J. L. 343; Trustees v. Patterson, 61 N. J. L. 420; Cooper Hospital v. Burdsall, 63 N. J. L. 85; Paterson Rescue Mission v. High, 64 N. J. L. 116; Sisters of Peace v. Wester velt, 64 N. J. L. 510; Litz v. Johnston (N. J;), 46 Atl. Rep. 586; State v. Johnston (N. J.), 46 Atl. Rep. 776; Seashore House V. Atlantic City (N. J.), 48 Atl. Rep. 242; State v. New York Yearly Meeting (N. J.), 48 Atl. Rep. 337 ; State V. Brakeley (N. J.), 50 Atl. Rep. 589; Assoc, for Colored Orphans v. New York, 104 N. Y. 581; In re Vassar, 127 N. Y. 1; In re Huntington's Es- tate (N. Y.), 61 N- E. Rep. 643; Matter of Miller, 5 Dem. (N. Y.) 133; Pepple v. New York Tax Com'rs, 36 Hun 311; In re Herr's Will, 55 Hun 167; Peo- ple V. Purdy, 58 Hun 386; Matter of Forrester, 68 Hun 611 ; Western Dis- pensary V. New York, 56 N. Y. Super. Ct. 361; In re Lenox's Estate, 9 N. Y. S. 895; In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 10 N. Y. S. 339; Engstad v. Grand Forks County, 10 N. D. (84 N. W. Rep. 577); Cleveland Lit. Inst. v. Pelton, 36 Ohio St. 353; Hibernian Ben. Soc. v. Kelly, 38 Or. 178; Donahugh's Appeal, 86 Pa. St. 306; Orphan Asylum v. School Dist., 90 Pa. St. 31; Delaware County Inst. V. Delaware County, 94 Pa. St. 163; Thiel College v. Mercer County, 101 Pa. St. 530; Cumru T'p v. Direct- ors, 112 Pa. St. 264; Philadelphia's Appeal (Pa.), 15 Atl. Rep. 683; Arm- strong County V. Overseers of Poor (Pa.), 15 Atl. Rep. 893; Philadelphia V. Women's Christian Assoc, 125 Pa. St. 573; House of Refuge v. Smith, 140 Pa. St. 387; Philadelphia v. Jew- ish Hosp. Assoc, 148 Pa. St. 454; Trustees v. Taylor, 150 Pa. St. 565; Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 154 Pa. St, 9; Philadelphia v. Ladies' United Aid Soc, 154 Pa. St. 13; Phil- adelphia V. Masonic 'Home, 160 Pa. St. 5';;' •■ American Sunday-School Union v. Taylor, 161 Pa, St. 307; Con- QOtN W.LI I *•<••» J ,,K,i I f EB ^ ,; 350 BQUALITT Aim UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATIOH. [OH. VL Educati&n. The property of schools, academies, seminaries, and universities is also commonly exempted, though held and owned by private corporations or individuals. Sometimes the exemption is general, and sometimes it is restricted to a par- ticular class of schools.^ If the exemption is only of property tributors v. Delaware County, 169 Pa. St. 305; Woman's Home Mission- ary Soo. v; Taylor, 173 Pa. St. 456; In re Finnen's Estate, 196 Pa,^St. 73; State, V. Addison, 2 S. C. 499; Book Agents v. Hinton, 92Tenn. 188; Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 68 Tex. 698; Parker v. Quinn (Utah), 64 Pac. Rep. 961 ; Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 303; Petersburg v. Petersburg Benev. Meoh. Soo., 78 Va. 431; Staunton v. Mary Baldwin Sem. (Va.), 89 S. E. Bep. 596; Thurston County v. Sisters of Charity, 14 Wash. 264; St. Joseph's Hosp. Assoc. V. Ashland County, 96 Wis. 636. In the. absence' of a stat- ute exempting foreign charitable cor- porations from the collateral inherit- ance tax, the courts cannot declare them exempt on the ground that gifts for promotion of Charity, edu- cation, and religion should be en- couraged: Prime's Estate, 136 N. Y. 347. See Alfred Univ. v. Hancock (N. J.), 46 Atl. Rep. 178. An orphan asylum may be liable for the collat- eral inheritance ,tax although its property is exempt from taxation: Miller v. Commonwealth, 37 Grat. 110. 1 Phillips County v. Estelle, 43 Ark. 536; New Haven v. Board of Trustees, 59 Conn. 163; Hartford v. Hartford Theo. Sem., 66 Conn. 475; Yale Univ. V. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316; Mundy V. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 393; Chicago Univ. V. People, 118 111. 565; Mont- gomery V. Wyman, 130 111. 17; Peo- ple V. Ryan, 138 BL 363; People v. Board of Directors, 174111. 177; Mc- Cullough V. Board of Review, 183 111. 378, 186 111. 15; Board of Directors v. People, 189 111. 439; Traveler' Ins. Co. V. Kent, 151 Ind. 349; Ottawa Univ. V. Board of Com'rs, 48 Kan. 460; Henderson v. McCuUagh, 89 Ky. 448; Blackman v. Houston, 39 La. An. 592; Libhentag v. Tax Col- lector, 46 La. An. 573; State v. Board of Assessors, 53 La. An, 323; Ferrell V. Penrose, 52 La. An. 1481; Mount Hermon Boys' School v. Gill, 145 Mass. 189; Williston Seminary v. County Com'rs, 147 Mass. 437; St. James Educ. Inst. v. Salem, 158 Mass. 185; Williams Coll. v. Assessors, 167 Mass. 505; Amherst ColL v. Assessors, 178 Mass. 383; Detroit Home & Day School V. Detroit, 76 Mich. 531; State V. Bell, 43 Minn. 344; State v. Ham- line Univ.,' 47 Minn. 816; Ramsey County V. Mapalester Coll., 51 Minn. 437; Ramsey County v. Stryker, 63 Minn. 144; North St. Louis Gym. Soo. V. Hudson, 85 Mo. 33; St. Vincent's Coll. V. Sohaefer, 104 Mo. 361; Kan- sas City V. Kansas City Med. Coll., Ill Mo. 141; State v. Mission Free School (Mo.), 63 S. W. Rep. 998; Omaha Med. Coll. v. Rush, 33 Neb. 449; Academy v. Irey, 51 Neb. 755; Watson V. Cowles (Neb.), 85 N. W. Rep. 35; New London v. Colby Acad., 69 N. H. 443; State v. Ross, 34 N. J. L. 497; State v. Chamberlain, 64 N. J. L. 549; Society v. New Brunswick, 55 N. J. L. 65: Englewood School v. Chamberlain, 55 N. J. L. 393; Mont- clair Mil. Acad. v. Bowden, 64 N. J. L. 314; Montclair Mil. Acad. v. State Board (N. J.), 47 Atl. Rep. 558; Che- garay v. New York, 13 N. Y. 320; Temple Grove Sem. v. Cramer, 98 N. Y. 131 ; Assoc, for Colored Orphans V. New York, 104 N. Y. 581; Catlin V. St. Paul's P. E. Church, 113 N. Y. 133; In re Vassar, 127 N. Y. 1; Peo- ple V. Board of Assessors, 141 N. Y. OH. VI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. 351 used for school purposes, it will not apply to property held merely for revenue.' Libraries. Where the advantages of a library are offered to the public, if is common to exempt it from taxation,' and the property also which is held for its purposes.' And the pri- vate libraries of individuals are frequently exempted.* Library and scientifio instiHtions. The property of corpo- rations or associations formed for library or scientific pur- poses is often exempted from taxation when occupied by them or their officers for the purposes of their organization.' 476; People v. Barker, 43 Hun 37: St. Monica v. New York, 55 Super. Ct. (N. Y.) 160; Willamette Univ. v. Knight, 35 Or. 33; Appeal of Wagner Inst., 116 Pa. St. 555; Northampton County V. Lafayette ColL, 138 Pa. St. 132; Wagner Free Inst. v. Philadel- phia, 133 Pa. St. 613; Philadelphia v. Overseers, 170 Pa. St. 357; White v. Smith, 189 Pa. St. 323; St. Joseph's Church V. Assessors, 13 E. I. ,19; Brown Univ. v. Granger, 19 R. L 704; Nashville v. Ward, 16 Lea, 37; Uni- versity of South V. Skidmore, 3' Pickle 155; State v. Fisk Univ., 3 Pickle 333; Cassiano v. Ursuline Acad., 64 Tex. 673; Red v. Morris, 73 Tex. 554; St. Edward's Coll. v. Mor- ris, 83 Tex. 1; Edmonds v. San An- tpnio, 14 Tex. Civ. Ap. 155; Wil- lard V. Pike, 59 Vt. 302; Staunton v. Mary Baldwin Sem. (Va.), 89 S. B. Rep. 596; Green Bay & M. Canal Co. V. Outagamie County, 76 Wis. 587. 1 Cdunty Com'rs v. Colorado Sem., 13 Colo, 497; Hartford v. Hartford Theo. Sem, 66 Conn. 475; Yale Univ. v. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316; Foy v, ■Coe Coll., 95 Iowa 689; Board of Di- rectors V. People (111.). 61 N. E. Rep. 1033, and cases cited; Stahl v. Kan- sas Educ. Assoc, 54 Han. 543; State V. Assessors, 35 La. An. 668; Wes- leyan Acad. v. Wilbraham, 99 Mass. .599; Willamette Univ. v. Knight, 35 Or. 33. Compare University v. Peo- ple, 99 U. S. 309. 2 See Mercantile Library Co. v. Tay- lor, 161 Pa. St. 155; Providence Athaeneum v. Tripp, 9 R. I. 559; In re Lenox's Estate, 9 N. Y. S. 895; In re Vanderbilt's Estate, 10 N. Y. 8. 339. ' A building belonging to an incor- porated library association, partly used for a library, and partly leased for business purposes, is subject to taxation, not being expressly ex- emlpted by statute: People v. Peoria Mercantile Library Assoc, 157 111. 869. Property of Young Men's Chris- tian Association held to be exempt to the extent it is used for library purposes: State v. Board of Assessors, 53 La. An. 333. * A law library belonging to a pri- vate person is exempt under the tax- law of Michigan: Patterson V. Board of Review (Mich.), 83 N. W. Rep. 1031. 'See Mount Hermon Boys' School V. Gill, 145 Mass. 139; St. James Educ. Inst. V. Salem, 153 Mass. 185; Salem Lyceum v. Salem, 154 Mass. 15; Salem Marine Soc. v. Salem, 155 Mass. 339; New Engjand Theosoph. Corp. v. Bos- ton, 173 Mass. 60; Phillips Acad. v. Andover, 175 Mass. 118; Harvard ColL V. Cambridge, 175 Mass. 145; Auditor- General V. Women's Temp. Assoc, 119 Mich. 430; Appeal of Wagner 352 EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. Church ^operty. The property owned by religious socie- ties, and made use of for the purposes of public worship, is also commonly exempted ; the exemption being made uniform so as to embrace the property of all sects and denominations of worshipers.^ Free Institute, 116 Pa. St 555; Eegina V. Pocook, 8 Q. B. 729. The Michigan statute exempting from taxation all personal property of literary and scientific institutions does not apply to the state university, but only to such institutions as are incorporated under the geTieral laws of the state for literary and scientiQc purposes: Auditor-General v. Regents, 83 Mich. 467. And a musical society incorpo- rated under another statute cannot claim exemption as an educational or a scientific institution,even though one of its direct or indirect purposes or results is educational or scientific: Attorney-Gteneral v. Detroit Common Council, lib Mich. 388. 1 See Gibbons v. District of Colum- bia, 116 U. S. 404; Copnectiout Spir- itualist, etc. Assoc. V. East Lynne, 54 Conn. 152; Manresa Inst v. Norwalk, 61 Conn. 228; First Unitarian Soc. v. Hartford, 66 Conn. 368; People v. An- derson, 117 111. 50; People v. Ryan, 138 111. 263; People v. Young Men's Christian Assoc., 157 IlL 403; People V. Watseka Camp Meeting Assoc., 160 111. 576; Kirk v. St Thomas Church, 70 Iowa 387; First Congrega- tional Church V. Linn County, 70 Iowa 396; Nugent v. Dil worth, 95 Iowa 49; Foxcroft v. Straw, 86 Me. 76; Foxcroft v. Piscataquis Valley Camp Meeting Assoc, 86 Me. 78; Au- burn V. Young Men's Christian Assoc, 86 Ma 244; Salem Marine Soc. V. Salem, 155 Mass. 329; All Saints' Parish v. Brookline (Mass.), 59 N. E. Rep. 1003; Ramsey County v. Church of the Good Shepherd, 45 Minn. 229; First Christian Church v. Beatrice, 39 Neb. 433; Scott v. Society of Rus- sian Israelites, 59 Neb. 571; Young Mens Christian Assoc, v. Douglas County (Neb.), 83 N. W. Rep. 924; Al- ton Bay Camp Meeting Assoc, v. Al- ton, 69 N. a 811: State v. Silver- thorne, b3 N. J. L. 73; Sisters of Peace V. Westervelt(N. J.),48 Atl. Rep. 789; Hebrew Free School Assoc v. New York, 99 N. Y. 488; Assoc for Colored Orphans v. New York, 104 N. Y. 581; Catlin V. St Paul's P. E. Church, 113 N. Y. 133; Young Men's Christian Assoc V. New York, 113 N. Y. 187; Church of St Monica v. New York, 118 N. Y. 91; Sherrill v. Christ ; Church, 121 N. Y. 701; People v. Dohling, 6 App. Div. (N. Y.) 86; St James Church v. New York, 41 Hun 309; Young Men's Christian Assoc, v. New York, 44 Hun 102; Black v. Brooklyn, 51 Hun 581; Congregation V. New York, 53 Hun 507; In re Van Kleck's Estate, 55 Hun 472; Board of Home Missions v. New York, 91 Hun 642; Shaarai Berocho v. New York,. 60 N. Y. Super. Ct 479; Congregation V. Board of Com'rs, 115 N. C 489; Philadelphia v. Church of St James,. 134 Pa. St 207; Trustees v. Gratz, 139 Pa St 497; Moore v. Taylor, 147 Pa. St 481; Philadelphia v. Barber, 160 Pa. St 133; Green Bay & M. Canal Co. v. Outagamie County, 76 Wis. 587; Katzer v. Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 16. Mission house in corner of church building: People v. Feitner (N. Y), 61 N. E. Rep. 762. Exemption of church property held not to in- clude a parsonage or rectory: St. Mark's Church v. Brunswick, 78 Gku. 541 ; State v. Board of Assessors, 52 La. An. 223; Third Cong. Soc v. Springfield, 147 Mass. 396; Hennepin County V. Grace, 27 Minn. 503; Ram- sey County V. Church of the Good Shepherd, 45 Minn. 339; State v. Lyon, 83 N. J. L. 360; State v. KroUman. 3f CH. TI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 353 In any of these cases if the property which is exeinpted for a particular use is leased or otherwise appropriated to any other use, the exemption is lost;^ but school property will not lose N. J. L. 333; State v. Axtell, 41 N. J. L. 117; People v. Collison, 33 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 53; People v. O'Brien, S3 Hun 580; Gerke t. Puroell, 35 Ohio, St. 339. Rented parsonage held ex- empt: Gray v. La Fayette County, 65 "Wis. 567. Modified exemption of rectory: People v. Feitner (N. Y.), 61 N. E. Rep. 763. Grounds of a camp- meeting association t)f a church which are devoted exclusively to re- ligious purposes are not subjected to taxation because provision is made thereon — without view to profit — for lodging and boarding those who at- tend the meeting: David v. Cincin- nati Camp Meeting Assoc, 57 Ohio St. 357. A bequest to a religious so- ciety in another state, which by the laws of that state wis exempt from taxation, was subject to the special legacy tax: Minot v. Winthrop, 163 Mass. 138; Prime's Estate, 136 N. Y. 347; Smith's Estate, 77 Hun 134 1 Brodie v. Fitzgerald, 57 Ark. 445; New Haven v. Sheffield, 30 Conn. 160; First Unitarian Soc. v. Hartford, 66 Conn. 368; Hartford v. Hartford Theo. Sera., 66 Conn. 476; Yale TJniv V. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316; Massen- burg V. Grand Lodge, 81 Ga. 313; Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 393; Ottawa Univ. v. Board of Com'rs, 48 Kan. 460; New Orleans v. Russ, 37 La. An. 413; Armand v. Dumas, 38 La. An. 403; Lee v. New Orleans, 38 La. An. 436; State v. Board of Asses- sors, 34 La. An. 574; State v. Asses- sors, 35 La. An. 668: Enaut v. Tax Collectors, 36 La. An. 804; State v. Board of Assessors, 53 La. An. 233; Foxcroft V. Straw, 86 Me. 76; County Com'rs V. Sisters of Charity, 48 Md. 34; Appeal Tax Court v. Grand Lodge, 50 Md. 431; Appeal Tax Court V. Baltimore Acad., 50 Md. 437; Pierce 33 V. Cambridge, S Cush. 611; Proprie- tors, etc. V. Lowell, 1 Met. 588; Old South Soc. V. Boston, 127 Mass. 378; Williams Coll. v. Assessors, 167 Mass. 505; Auditor-General v. Women's Temp. Assoc, 119 Mich. 430; Ridgely Lodge V. Redus (Miss.), 39 South. Rep. 163; Wyman v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 835; Fitterer v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 51; Adelphia Lodge v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 356; Young Men's Christian Assoc, v. Douglas County (Neb.), 83 N. W. Rep/ 934; New Men's Christian Assoc, v. Keene (N. H.), 46 Atl. Rep. 186; Trustees v. Paterson, 61 N. J. L. 430; State V. Brakeley (N. J.), 50 Atl. Rep. 589; Hebrew Free School Assoc, v. i New York, 99 N. Y. 488; Congrega- tion V. Board of Com'rs, 115 N. C. 489; Hibernian Ben. Soc v. Kelly, 28 Or. 173; Willamette Univ. v. Knight, 35 Or. 33; Philadelphia v. Barber, 160 Pa. St. 133; Mercantile Library Co. v. Taylor, 161 Pa. St. 155; Morris v. Lone Star Chapter, 68 Tex. 698; Parker v. Quinn (Utah), 64 Pac Rep. 961. A theological institute was held, upon the evidence, not to have diverted the use of its property so as to subject the same to taxation: People v. Bap- tist Thea Union, 171 111. 304. Mere intention to use property for a pur- pose rendering it exempt from taxa- tion will not preclude its being taxed so long as occupied for some other purpose: Young Men's Christian Assoc, v. Douglas County (Neb.), 83 N. W. Rep. 924, But a lot purchased by a military organization with in- tent to erect a building thereon, but abandoned and afterwards sold and the proceeds applied to another lot, was held exempt from taxation dur- ing the interval: Philadelphia v. Keystone Battery, 169 Pa. St. 526. Grounds and buildings owned by a 354: EQUALITY AND UHIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [oh. VI. its exemption by being leased in vacation,' neither will church property by a merely incidental and occasional use for schools,^ or by occasional renting for entertainments.' Cemeteries. The property of cemetery associations is also commonly exempted, so far as it is actually appropriated to the purposes of burial.* But a mere appropriation on paper is not sufficient for the purpose," and the appropriation of one acre in forty would not be sufficient to give exemption to the whole.*. Other exemptions, less often allowed, are mentioned in the margin.' oommaadery of Knights Templars, but used only four days each year for " the appropriate objects of the or- ganization," and used at other times as a summer resort for members and their families, were held not exempt: Laoy V. Davis (Iowa), 83 N. W. Rep. 784. 1 Temple Grove Sem. v. Cramer, 98 N. Y. 121; S. a below, 36 Hun, 309. 2 St. Mary's Church v. Tripp, 14 E. I 307. ' First Unitarian Soc. v. Hartford, 66 Conn. 368. For questions of ex- emptions tinder these heads, see, fur- ther, Griswold Coll. v. Iowa, 46 Iowa 375; Laurent v. Muscatine, 59 Iowa 404; Fort Des Moines Lodge v. Polk County, 56 Iowa 84; Theological Seminary v. People, 101 111. 578; Mon- tioello Seminary v. People, 106 111. 398; Kedemptionists v. Howard County, 50 Md. 449; Appeal Tax Court V. St. Peter's Academy, 50 Md. 331; Same v. St. Mary's Seminary, 50 Md. 333; Same v. Bed Men's Hall, 50 Md. 353; Temple Grove Seminary V. Cramer, 33 Hun 309; People v. Seamen's Friend Society, 87 IlL 846; Chapel of Good Shepherd v. Boston, 130 Mass. 313; Workingmen's Aid Society v. Lynn, 136 Mass. 883; Re- demptionist Fathers v. Boston, 139 Mass. 178; First Presb. Church v. New Orleans, 30 La. An. 359; Trinity Church V. Boston, 118 Mass. 164. *See People v. Cemetery Co., 86 111. 336; Rosehill Cemetery Co. v. Kern, 147 111. 483; Colston v. Eastern Cemetery Co. (Ky.), 15 S. W. Rep. 245; Negley v. Henderson (Ky.), 55 S. W. Rep. 554; Metairie Cemetery Assoc. V. Assessors, 37 La. An. 33; State V. Board of Assessors, 52 La. An. 228; Proprietors v. Board, 150 Mass. 18; Proprietors v. Commission- ers, 152 Mass. 408; State v. Lange, 16 Mo. Ap. 468; Buffalo Cemetery Assoc. V. Buffalo, 118 N. T. 61; People v. Pratt, 139 N. Y. 68; Newark v. Mt. Pleasant Cemetery Co., 58 N. J. L. 168; State v. Clinton, 49 N. J. L, 370. As to what would be exempt as a church burial-ground, see Appeal Tax Court v. Zion's Church, 50 Md. 353; Brown's Heirs v. Pittsburgh (Pa.), 16 Atl. Rep. 43. As to exemp- tion from special assessments, see Oakland Cemetery Assoc, v. Bt Paul, •36 Minn. 539; Philadelphia v. Union Burial Ground Soc, 178 Pa. St. 533; Philadelphia v. Church of St. James, 134 Pa. St. 207. 6 Woodland Cemetery v. Everett, 118 Mass. 354. *Mulroy v. Churchman, 60 Iowa 717. An old burial-ground held by a cemetery company is exempt: Swai( Point Cemetery v. Tripp, 14 R. L 199. ■^ Exemption to encourage the plant- ing of trees: Shiner v. Jacobs, 63 OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXA'BION. 355 Exemptions in these cases are granted on considerations of general public policy ; and, being freely granted, they may as freely be recalled when the legislative view of public policy may have changed. In law they are to be regarded as favors or privileges to the class exempted, granted and to be held at the pleasure of the sovereign power. There is no pledge by the state that they shall be permanent, and no wrong done when they are recalled.^ But repeals by implication of exemp- tions are not favored.* State vnd^tedness. A state sometimes makes the bonds or other evidences of indebtedness issued by itself non-taxable. "When this is done before the indebtedness is incurred, a con- Iowa 393. JBVuit trees are not exempt from taxation as "growing crops: " Cottle V. Spitzer, 65 Cal. 456. As to the exemption in New York of federal pension-money and property bought therewith, see People v. Feitner, 157 N. Y. 363; People v. Williams, 6 Misc. Eep. (N. Y.j 185; In re Peek, 80 Hun 122; People v. Wells, 10 Misc. Rep. (N. Y.) 195; People v. Williams, 80 Hun 501. Exemption from license tax of disabled or indigent confed- erate soldier: HoUiman v. Hawkins- ville, 109 Ga. 107; Hartfield v. Co- lumbus, 109 Ga. 113. Under a con- stitutional provision that the legis- lature shall except from taxation $1,000 worth of personal property in the hands of •' each taxpayer," a mar- ried woman is entitled to such ex- emption though her husband is en- titled to, and has been allowed, the same exemption; and where the situs of such taxpayer's personal property is within the limits of a certain municipal corporation, though she resides outside, she is entitled to the exemption unless it has been allowed to her elsewhere on other taxable personalty: First Nat. Bank v. Mor- ristown, 93 Tenn. 308. As to what constitutes land used for farming or agricultural purposes within statutes exempting from taxation lands used for such purposes, see Allen v. Daven- port, 107 Iowa 90; Windsor v. Polk County, 109 Iowa, 156; Simms v. Paris (Ky.), 1 S. W. Eep. 543; People v. Com'rs of Taxes, 3 N. Y. S. 674. '^Ante, p. 111. See Hospital v. Philadelphia, 24 Pa. St. 239; Common- wealth V. Fayette, etc. R. Co., 55 Pa. St. 453; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138; St. Joseph v. Railroad Co., 39 Mo. 476; State v. Newark, 50 Ijr. J. L. 66; State V. Dulle, 48 Mo. 283; Tomlinson V. Jessup, 15 Wall. 454; Baltimore & O. R. Co. V. Jefferson County, 39 Fed. Rep. 305; Appeal Tax Court v. Grand Lodge, 50 Md. 431; Same v. Regents, 50 Md. 457; Shiner v. Jacobs, 63 Iowa 393; Miller v. Hageman (Iowa), 86 N. W. Rep. 381 ; Probasco v. Moundsvilie, 11 W. Va. 501 ; Yazoo & M; V. R Co. v. Adams (Miss.), 28 South. Eep. 956, 969; State y. Hannibal, etc. R. Co., 60 Mo. 143; Wilmington & W. R. Co. v. Als- brook, 110 N. C. 137; Louisville Water Co. V. Clark, 143 U. S. 1. The case last cited points out that where an exemption from taxation was with- drawn, the obligation whi6h was the consideration for the exemption fell with it. For a discussion as to whether an exemption is a contract, see International, etc. R. Qo. v. An- derson County, 59 Tex. 654. ' 2 Owens V. Yazoo & M, V. R. Co., 74 Miss. 831. 356 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. tract is established between the state and those .who become its creditors, which precludes withdrawing the exemption; but one state cannot make exemptions for others; and the obliga- tion, though not taxable by the state issuing it, may be taxed> in other states if held there.^ Taxability jaresumed. As taxation is the rule, and exemp- tion the exception, the intention to make an exemption ought to be expressed in clear an^ unambiguous terms; it cannot be taken to have been intended when the language of the statute on which it depends is doubtful or uncertain;^ and the burden of establishing it is upon him who claims it.' 1- Appeal Tax Court v. Patterson, 50 Md. 354; Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 593; State v. Board of Assessors, 47 La. An. 1644; Home Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 48 La. An. 451. Under a statute providing that "all bonds made by any state which were not exempted from taxation by the law of said state authorizing the . issue of such bonds; all bonds used by any territory, or by any corpora- tion shall be liable to be valued to the representative owners," it was held that the only exemption was of the bonds of a state which by the law authorizing their issue were ex- empted from taxation: Bonaparte v. State, 63 Md. 465. Municipal bonds upon which the municipality has, by authority of an act of the legislature prior to the adoption of the constitu- tional amendment on the subject of taxation, agreed to pay all taxes, are taxable, but the municipality is bound by such agreement, and must pay such taxes: Merchants' Ins. Co. V. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 138. In Bank v.. Smith, 7 Ohio St. 43, and People v. Home Ins. Co., 39 Cal. 533, a tax on the bonds of the respective states was held valid. 2 See Providence Bank v. Billings, 4 Pet. 514; Minot v. Philadelphia, eta R Co., or the Delaware Kailroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206; Trask v. Maguire, 18 "Wall. 391; Northern Mo. R. Co. v. Ma- guire, 30 WsUl. 46; Farrington v. Ten- nessee, 95 U. S. 584; Gas Light Co. v. Shelby County Tax Dist., 109 U. S. 398; Railroad Co. v. Wright, 116 U. S. 335; Vicksburg, S. & P. R Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665; Tennessee v. Whit worth, 117 U. 8. 136; Chiqago, B. & K C. R Co. V. Missouri, 130 U. S. 3 Board of Trustees v. Bell County Coke, etc. Co., 96 Ky. 68; All Saints' Parish v. Brobkline (Mass.), 59 N. E. Rep. 1003; Courtney v. Missoula County,31 Mont. 591 ; Electric Storage Battery v. State Board, 60 N. J. L. 66; Medical Soo. v. Neff, 34 App. Div. (N. Y.) 83; Parker v. Quinn (Utah-), 64 Pac. Rep. 961. One who claims that his property is not subject to taxar tion must show affirmatively the facts rendering it exempt: Watson V. Cowles (Neb.), 85 N. W. Rep. 35. A claim that a company is exempted by its charter from taxation must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt: Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R Co., 77 Miss. 194. Where the charter of a Masonip association exempts its prop- erty "so long as it ^hall be used for Masonic and charitable purposes," the burden is on a city seeking to tax the property to show that it is not so used: Newport v. Masonic Temple Assoc, 103 Ky. 593. CH. VI.J ■EQUALITY AND TJNIFOKMITY IN TAXATION. 35T Strict construGi-ion of exemptions. It is also a very just rule that, when an exemption is found to exist, it shall not be en- larged by construction. On the contrary it ought to receive a strict construction ; for the reasonable presumption is that 569, 122 U. S. 561; Piokard v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 130 U. S. 637; New Orleans City & L. R. Co. v. New Orleans, 143 U. S. 193; PhcBnix P. & M. Ins. Co. V. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 174; Bank of Commerce v. Ten- nessee, 161 U. S. 134, 168 U. a 416; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592, 617, 618; Citizens' Bank V. Board of Assessors, 54 Fed. Eep. 1003; State v. Kidd, 135 Ala. 413; Bisooe V. Coulter, 18 Ark. 433; Hart V. Plum, 14 Cal. 148; People v. Why- , ler, 41 Cal. 351 ; Wright v. Railroad Co., 64 Ga. 783; Mundy v. Van Hoose, 104 Ga. 293; Price Co. v. Atlanta, 105 Ga. 358; Salisbury v. Lane (Idaho), 63 Pao. E. 383; In re Swigert, 119 111. 83; People V. Chicago, 134111. 686; Mont- gomery V. Wyman, 130 111. 17; Ceme- tery Co. V. Kern, 147 111. 488; Bloom- ington Cemetery Assoc, v. People, 170 III. 377; People v. Board of Directors, 174 HI. 177; Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86; Indianapolis v. McLean, 8 Ind. 328; Madison v. Fitch, 18 Ind. 33; Method- ist Church V. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3; Wash- burn Coll. V. Shawnee County, 8 Kan. 344; Vail v. Beach, 10 Kan. 442; Miami County V. Brackenridge, 13 Kan. 114: Bradley v. McAtee, 7 Bush 667; Louisville Canal Co. v. Common- wealth, 7 B. Monr. 160; Deposit Bank V. Daveiss County, 102 Ky. 174; Mu- nicipality V. Railroad Co., 10 Rob. (La.) 187; State v. Eckendorf, 46 La. An. 131; Ferrell v. Penrose, 53 La. An. 1481; Portland, S. & P. R. Co. v. Saco, 60 Me. 196; Auburn v. Young Men's Christian Assoc, 86 Me. 344; Howell V. Maryland, 3 Gill 14; Gordon v. Baltimore, 5 Gill 331 ; Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376: State v. Railroad Co., 48 Md. 73; Frederick Electric Light, etc. Co. v, Frederick City, 84 Md. 599; Baltimore, 0. &,A. R. Co. t. Ocean City, 89 Md. 89; Harvard Coll. V. Boston, 104 Mass. 470; Redemption- ist Fathers v. Boston, 139 Mass. 178; All Saints' Parish v. Brookline (Mass.), 59 N. E. Rep. 1003; St. Peter's Church V. Scott County, 13 Minn. 395; Water Com'rs V. Auditor General, 115 Mich. 546; Anderson v. State, 23 Miss. 459; Frantz v. Dobson, 64 Miss. 631; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Thomas, 65 Miss. 553; Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 77 Miss. 194; Hannibal, etc. R Co. V. Shaoklett, 30 Mo. 550; Washington Univ. V. Eowse, 42 Mo. 308: Pacific R. Co. V. Cass County, 53 Mo. 17; State V. Arnold, 136 Mo. 446; Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo. 645; Fitterer v. Craw- ford, 157 Mo. 51; Adelphia Lodge v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 356; Hope Mining Co. V. Kennon, 3 Mont. 35 ^ Courtney V. Missoula County, 21 Mont. 591; Watson V. Cowles(Neb.), 85 N. W. Eep. 35; Franklin St. Soc. v. Manchester, 60 N. H. 342; State v. Parker, 32 N. J. L. 476; State v. Woodruff, 37 N. J. L, 139; State v. Elizabeth, 37 N. J. L. 330; People V. Commissioners, 95N. Y. 554; People V. Willis, 133 N. Y. 383; Peo- ple v. Peck, 157 N.Y. 51; Lima v. Cemetery Assoc, 42 Ohio St. 128; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 83 Pa. St. 439; Carpenter v. School Trustees, 12 R. I. 574; Stewart v. Davis, 3 Murphy 344; State v. Town Council, 13 Rich. 330; Martin v. Charleston, 13 Rich. ifiq. 50; State y. Bank of Smyrna, 2 Houst. 99; Wilson V. Gaines, 9 Baxt. 551; State v. Butler, 13 Lea 406; Memphis v. Union & P. Bank, 91Tenn. 546; Memphis v. Home Ins. Co., 91Tenn. 558; Memphis v. Memphis City Bank, 91 Tenn. 574; Knoxville & O. R. Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenu. 684; Western Union Tel. Co. 358 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [oh. VI. tHe state has granted in express terms all it intended to grant at all, and that unless the privilege is limited to the very terms of the statute the favor would be extended beyond what was meant.i On this ground it is held that an exemption of prop- V. Harris (Tenn. Ch. Ap.), 52 S. W. Eep. 748; Judge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 343; Union Eef rig. Transit Co. v. Lynch, 18 Utah 378; Parker v. Quinn (UtalA 64 Pac. Rep. 961,; Thomas v. Sneed ( Ta.), 39 S. E. Rep. 586; Baltimore & O. R Co. V. Marshall County, 3 W. Va. 319; Same v. Wheeling, 3 W. Va. 373; Katzer v. Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 16; Douglas County Agric. S.oc. v. Doug- las County, 104 Wis. 439; Waller v. Hughes (Ariz.), 11 Pac. Rep. 133; Bridge Co. v. District of Columbia, 1 Mackey 317; Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 3 Mackey 133. It being the policy of the' revenue law to tax all private property, mines and mineral lands, the title to which was in a private owner, were held sub- ject to taxation: Salisbury v. Lane (Idaho), 63 Pac. Rep. 383. Under the general rule that all property is liable to taxation for both state and county purposes, and under a statute author- izing the taxation by a county of "all the property of turnpike roads," a turnpike road itself was held tax- able for county purposes: Frankfort, L. etc. Turnpike Co. v. Common- wealth, 83 Ky. 386. Where there is any doubt as to whether the property is liable to taxation, the property should be assessed, and the owner left to his remedy in the courts: Fer- rell V. Penrose, 53 La. An. 1481. The neglect or omission of the taxing of- ficers in previous years to assess the property cannot control the duty im- posed on their successors, or the power of the legislature, on the legal construction of the statute under which exemption is claimed: Vicks- burg, S. & P. R. Co. V. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665; Hibernian Ben. Soc. v. Kelly, 38 Or. 173; St. Louis, L M. etc. R. Co. v.'State, 47 Ark.'333; People v. Roberts, 155 N. Y. 408. If by its charter a ferry company is not to be taxed higher than any other ferry company, this provision is not in it- self an exemption, and is not violated unless some other ferry compaToy is taxed less: Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 U. S. 365. Whether a license fee is a tax within the mean- ing of the provision, see Same v. Same, 103 111. 560. A railroad com- pany having a perpetual lease of a road, held not to be owner so as to be entitled to such a statutory exemp- tion: State V. Housatonic R. Co., 48 Conn. 44 Where a corporation by its charter is exempt from taxation, an amendment of the charter which is accepted by it may repeal the ex- emption: Petersburg!! v. Railroad Co., 39 Grat. 773. An exemption given to a railroad company by its charter was held not to extend to a branch road constructed after the adoption of a constitution forbidding exemptions: Chicago, B. & K. C. E. Co. V. Missouri, 130 U. S. 569, ,133 U. S. 561. The mere fact that the statutes do not fix the method of valuing the franchises of an electric street-rail- way company for the purposes of taxation does not render such fran- chises exempt from taxation: State V. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550. 1 Erie Railway v. Pennsylvania, 81 Wall. 493; Bank of Commerce v. Ten- nessee, 104 U.S. 493; Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co. V. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665; Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 133 U. S. 174; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Board of Levee Com'rs, 133 U. S. 190; New Orleans City & L. R. Co. v. New Orleans, 143 U. S. 193; People v. Cook, 148 U. S. 397; Keokuk & M. R, Co. v. Missouri, OH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITr IN TAXATION. 359 erty from taxation will not preclude business or privilege taxes being imposed on the favored class,' and that bequests to ool- 153 TJ. S. 301; Winona & St. P. L. Co. V. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526; Ford v. Delta, etc. Co., 164 U. S. 662; Louis- ville, etc. Co. V. Gaines, 3 Fed. Rep. 266: Walters V. Western & A. R. Co., 68 Fed. Rep. 1002; Salisbury v. Lane (Idaho), 63 Pac. Rep. 383; People v. Anderson, 117 111.^50; In re Swigert, 123 111. 267; Montgomery v. Wyman, 130 111. 17; People v. Wabash R. Co., 138 111. 85; People v. Watseka Camp- jneeting Assoa, 160 111. 576; People V. Board of Directors, 174 111. 177; McCnllough V. Board of Review, f83 111. 373; Conklin v. Cambridge. 58 Ind. 130; South Bend v; University, 69 Ind. 344; Read v. Yaeger, 104 Ind. 195; Miller v. Hageman (Iowa), 86 N. W. Rep. 281; Newport v. Masonic Temple Assoc. (Ky.), 56 S. W. Rep. 405; Ger- man Bank v. Louisville (Ky.), 56 S. W. Rep. 504; Baton Rouge, etc. R. Co. V. Kirkland, 33 La- An. 632; New Orleans v. New Orleans Coffee Co., 46 La. An. 86; State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 51 La. An. 562; Plaisted v. Lincoln, 62 Me. 91; Buch- anan V. County Com'rs, 47 Md. 286; Sindall v. Baltimore (Md.), 49 Atl. Rep. 645; Redemptionist Fathers v. Boston, 139 Mass. 180; Lake Shore & M. a R. Co. V. Grand Rapids, 103 Mich. 374, 380; Water Com'rs v. Au- ditor-General, 115 Mich. 546; Wash- burn Memorial Orphan Asylum v. State, 73 Minn. 343; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. V. Thomas, 65 Miss. 553; State V. Arnold, 136 Mo. 446; Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo. 645; Fittererv. Craw- ford, 157 Mo. 51; Adelphia Lodge v. Crawford, 157 Mo. 336; Young Men's Christian Assoc, v. Douglas County (Neb.), 83 N. W. Rep. 924; Lincoln Street R. Co., v. Lincoln (Neb.), 84 N. W. Rep. 803; Engstad v. Grand Forks County (N. D.), 84 N. W. Rep. 577; State V. Collector, 38 n! J. L. 370; State V. Fuller, 40 N. J. L. 328; Peo- ple V. Commissioners of Taxes, 83 N. Y. 459, 95 N. Y. 554; People v. Peck, 157 N. Y. 51; Richmond, etc. R. Ca v, Alamance County, 76 N. C. 312; Crawford v. Burrell, 53 Pa. St. 319; Chadwick v. Maginnes, 94 Pa. St. 117; Commonwealth v. Lackawana Iron, etc. Co., 139 Pa. St. 346; Hand v. Sa- vannah, etc. R. Co., 13 S. C. 315; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Harris (Tenn. Ch. Ap.), 52 S. W. Rep. 748; Judge V. Spencer, 15 Utah 842; Union Refrig. Transit Co. v. Lynch, 18 Utah 378; Westmore Lumber Co. V. Orne, 48 Vt. 90; Commonwealth v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co., 27 Grat. 344; Thurston v. Sisters of Charity, 14 Wash. 264; Yates v. Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 352. " Taxation is an act of sov- ereignty, to be performed, so far as it conveniently can be, with justice and equality to all. Exemptions, no iNew Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. 8. 371; Davis v. Macon, 64 Ga. 128; New Orleans v. Savings, etc. Co., 31 La. An. 637; New Orleans v. Canal Bank, 33 La. An. 104; New Orleans v. State Nat. Bank, 34 La. An. 892; Harkreader v. Lebanon & N. T. Co., 101 Tenn. 680. See New Orleans v. People's Bank, 33 La. An 82; Royster Guano Co. v. Tarboro, 136 N. C. 68. A statute providing that the shares, capital, and profits of anybankelectingtopaytothestate a tax of a certain amount shall be exempt from all other taxation under the laws of the state, does not exempt banks from a license under the po lice power: Oil City v. Oil City Trust Co., 151 Pa. St. 454. One who keeps a cigar stand is not exempt from the privilege tax because he also runs another business that is licensed: Knoxville Cigar Co. v. Cooper, 99 Tenn. 473. 360 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. [CH. VI, leges, etc., may be taxed under the general statute taxing be- quests, though after being received they would be exempt under the general statute exempting the property, of such in- matter how meritorious, are of grace, and must be strictly construed." This was said in the case of Crawford V. Burrell, supra, where the court felt compelled to hold that a married woman was subject to a tax for |he raising of county moneys, though her husband was actually in the military service. See, also, Lord Kolohester v^ Kewney, Law R. 1 Exch. 368; Piatt v. Rice, 10 Watts 352. In construing exemptions, the person claiming the benefit of such exemption must bring himself strictly within its plain and obvious intendment: State v. Epkendorf, 46 La. An. 131.. The principle that ex- emptions from taxation are to be construed strictly does not apply where there is no language in the act justifying or requiring construc- tion: Milwaukee Electric R. Co. v. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 43. Where the charter of a theological seminary ex- empted from taxation property be- longing or appertaining to the sem- inary, and also provided that the act " shall be construed liberally in all courts for the purposes therein ex- pressed," it was held that such pur- poses should be ascertained by the application of the general rules of construction, and that after the pur- pose was ascertained liberal rules would be applied to give it effect: People V. Board of Directors, 174 111. 177. The fact that loans made by a bank are secured by property that is exempt from taxation does not ren- der such loans non-taxable: Savings & L. Soc. V. San Francisco (Oal.), 63 Pao. Rep. 665; San Francisco v. La Sooiete (Cal.), 63 Pao. Rep. 1016. Shares of stock of a manufacturing corporation, when held and owned by an insurance company, are tax- able as part of the as.sets of such company, though the company's cap- ital, machinery, and other property are exempt by the constitution: State V. Board of Assessors, 47 La. An. 1498. The fact that, when whiskey is released from bond, certain county bonds, for which a local tax was levied on the whiskey while in bond, have been satisfied by taxes collected from other property, will not exempt the whiskey from the tax:, Wathen V. Young, 103 Ky. 36. An exemption of mortgages from taxation will not be held to include so-called building association mortgages, in which the sum to be paid eventually is uncer- tain: Appeal Tax Court v. Rice, 50 Md. 303. Under a statute providing for the taxation of all corporate bonds owned by residents of the state, and exempting mortgages on property wholly within the state, bonds secured by mortgages on prop- erty partly within and partly with- out the state are taxable: Simpson V. Hopkins, 82 Md. 478. A statute exempting "stocks and other per- sonal estate owned by citizens of this state, situate and being out of this state, upon which taxes shall have been actually assessed," does not exempt a mortgage owned by a resident on land in another state, on which land has been assessed for taxes: State v. Darcy, 51 N. J. L. 140. An exemption of lands from taxa- tion for general city purposes does not exempt from school taxation: South Bend v. University, 69 Ind. 344. An exemption of the lands of a cemetery company will cover its im- provements: Appeal Tax Court v. Baltimore Cemetery Co., 50 Md. 433. But not a separate adjoining lot used for an office and oustodiij.n'8 dwell- OH. VI.j EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 361 stitutions.* So an academy of arts is not exempted under an exemption of "universities, colleges, academies, and school- ing, and containing a well that sup- plies water for the grounds: Bloom- ington Cemetery Assoc, v. People, 170 111. 377. Lands held by an agri- cultural society under lease are not "owned" by, nor are they the " prop- erty" of, such society so as to be exempt from taxation: Douglas County Agric. Soc. v. Douglas County, 104 Wis. 429. A statute pro- viding that "real property of non-res- ident owners, improved or occcupied by a servant or agent, shall be sub- ject to assessment of highway labor and at same rate as real property of resident owners," does not exempt from such tax non-resident lands not so occupied: Ensign v. Barse, 107 N. Y. 329. The exemption of " an endow- ment or fund of any religious so- ciety," etc., vtiill not embrace lands: State v. Krollman, 38 N. J. L. 328, 574; see State v. Lyon, 32 N. J. L. 860. Nor can a legacy "towards the build- ing of a new church, or the renova- tion of the present one," be treated as already a church edifice so far as to be exempt: Sherrill v. Christ Church, 121 N. Y. 701. An exemp- tion of " mines and mining claims " allows of the taxation of surface im- provements: Gold Hill V. Caledonia, etc. Co., 5 Sawy. 575. But it covers an engine and boiler built into a brick foundation and firmly fixed by bolts, and used in working a mine: Mammoth Mining Co. v. Juab County, 10 Utah 232. Where a stat- ute provides that every foreign rail- road company which extends its line within the state shall be subject to taxation, such a company will be liable for taxes upon a line purchased from a domestic corporation which was exempt from taxation: Bail- way Co. v. Counties, 5 Dill. 289. See, for a somewhat similar point, Hoge V. Eailroad Co., 99 U. S. 348. A provision in a city charter that "no land embraced within the city's limits, and outside of ten-acre lots as originally laid off, shall be assessed and taxed by the village council un- less the same is divided or laid out into lots of five acres or less, and un- less the same is actually used and devoted to farming purposes, has no reference "to bridges, their ap- proaches, etc. : Henderson Bridge Co. V. Henderson, 178 U. S. 592. A city charter providing that merchants and others paying a license or spe- cific tax on their business shall be exempt from any ad valorem tax thereon does not exempt from ad valorem taxation the property of a gas company which pays a license or specific tax imposed by the city coun- cil: Newport Light Co. v. Newport (Ky.), 20 S. W. Rep. 434 Gas me- ters, gas mains, and gas pipes are not exempt as part of a gas company's ."machinery actually used in the manufacture " of gas: Consolidated Gas Co. v. Baltimore, 62 Md. 588. Gas pipes, meters, and lamp posts belonging to a gas company are not exempt as "ftiachinery in factories:" Covington Gas-Light Co. v. Coving- ton, 84 Ky. 94. A saw-mill held not exempt as "property employed in the manufacture of textile fabrics, machinery, agricultural implements and furnitui'e, and other articles of wood: Jones v. Raines, 35 La, An. 996. An exemption of unpatented mines was held not to extend to their property: Hope Mining Co. v. Kennon, 8 Mont. 35; 1 Barringer v. Cowan, 2 Jones Eq. 436. See Miller v. Commonwealth, 37 Grat. 110; Prime's Estate, 136 N. Y. 347; Minot v. Winthrop, 163 Mass. 113. See, for a peculiar case, Massachusetts General Hospital v. Somerville, 101 Mass. 319. 362 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION, [CH. VI. houses," ' and a statute for the exemption of factories will not be applied to such as were erected previous to its passage.' I^or will the exemption from taxation of the property of sol- diers in actual service exempt from a tax actually imposed be- ' fore the soldier enlisted.' The rule of strict construction is not, however, to be extended so far as to defeat the legislative purpose.^ Local assessments. The Bdost striking illustration of the rule of strict construction of .exemptions is seen in the' case of spe- cial assessments for local improvements, such as the paving and repair of streets, etc. It is almost universally held that a general exemption from taxation will not extend to such as- sessments.* In the leading case the words of the exemption were 1 Academy v. Philadelphia, 23 Pa. St. 496. 2Baugh V. Eyan, 51 Ala. 313. 8 Tobin V. Morgan, 70 Pa. St. 339. < Under a statute exempting cer- tain persons "from military duty, road-tax," etc., the term " road-tax " means statutory duty of working the public roads, where, unless so construed, it would be inoperative:_ Lewin v. State, 77 Ala. 45. A statute exempting from a road-tax the prop- erty of all persons residing within the limits of an incorporated village or town embraces the property ot non-residents; the spirit of the law embraces all who own property there: State V. Wabash, St. L. etc. R. Co., 90 Mo. 166. 5 Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190; Ford v. Delta & P. L. Co., 164 U. S. 663; Board of Imp. v. School Dist., 56 Ark. 354; Emery v. Gas Co., 38 Cal. 346; Taylor v. Palmer, 31 Cal. 340; San Diego v. Linda Vista Irrig. Dist., 108 Cal. 189; Seymour v. Hartford, 31 Conn. 481; Bridgeport V. New York & N. H. R. Co., 36 Conn. 355; Railroad Co. v. Wright, 68 Ga. 311 ; Atlanta v. First Presb. Church, 86 Ga. 730 : Canal Trustees v. Chicago, 13 111. 403; Chicago v. Colby, 30 IIJ. 614; Bank of Republic v. Hamilton, 21 111. 58; McBride v. Chicago; 33 111. 574; Peoria v. Kidder,, 36 111. 351; Pleasant v. Kost, 39 111. 490, 494; Chi- cago V. Baptist Theological Union, 115 111. 345; Adams County v. Quincy, 130 111. 566; Bloomington Cemetery Assoc. V. People, 139 111. 16; Illinois Central R., Co. v. Mattoon, 141 111. 83: Illinois Central R. Co. v, Decatur, 154 HI. 173; First Presb. Church v. Fort Wayne, 36 Ind. 338; Palmer v. Stumph, 39 Ind. 329; Trustees of Church V. Ellis, 38 Ind. 8; Far well v. Manuf. Co., 97 Iowa 386 ; Allen v. Dav- enport, 107 Iowa 90 ; Paine v. Spratley, 5 Kan. 525; Broadway Baptist Church V. McAtee, 8 Bush 508; Common- wealth V. Nash ville, C. & St. L. R Co., 93 Ky. 430; Kilgus v. Trustees, 94 Ky. 439; Commonwealth v. Bridge Co., 95 Ky. 60; Louisville v. ' Mc- Naughten (Ky.), 44 S..W. Rep. 380; Alexander v. Baltimore, 5 Gill 383, 396; Baltimore v. Greenmount Ceme- tery Co., 7 Md. 517; Crowley v. Cope- ley, 2 La. An. 329; La Fayette v. Orphan Asylum, 4 La. An. 1 ; Rooney V. Brown, 31 La. An. 51; Seamen's Friend Soo. v. Boston, 116 Mass. 181 ; Worcester Agrio. Soc. v. Worcester, 116 Mass. 189; Phillips Acad. v. An- dover, 175 Mass. 118, 138; Le Fevre v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586; Lake Shore & M. OH. VI. J EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 363 that no church or place of public worship " should be taxed by any law of this state." iTpon this the court remarked: " The word taxes means burdens, charges or impositions put or set upon -persons or property for public uses, and this is the S. R. Co. V. Grand Rapids, 103 Mioh. 374, 380; State v. District Court, 54 Minn. 34; Washburn Memorial Or- phan Asylum v. State, 73 Minn, 343; Lockwood V, St. Louis, 20 Mo. 20; St. Louis Public Schools v. St. Louis, 26 Mo. 468; Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Ma 155; Clinton v. Henry County, 115 Mo. 557; Beatrice v. Brethren Church, 41 Neb. 358; Lin- coln Street R Co. v. Lincoln (Neb.), 84 N. W. Rep. 802; Brewster v. Hough, 10 N. H. 138; Paterson v. Society, etc., 24 N. J. L. 385; State v. Robert- son, 24 N. J. L. 504; State v. Newark, 27 N. J. L. 185; State v. Mills, 34 N. J. L. 177; State v. Newark, 35 N. J. L. 157; State v. Newark, 38 N. J. L. 478; State V. Jersey City, 43 N. J. L. 97; Mayor, etc. of New York, 11 Johns. 77; Bleeker v. Ballon, 3 "Wend. 363; Chegaray v. Jenkins, 3 Sandf. 409; People V. Roper, 35 N. Y. 639; Buffalo City Cemetery v. Buffalo, 46 N. Y. 506; Roosevelt Hospital v. New York, 84 N. Y. 108; Dyker, etc. Co. v. Cook,' 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 164; Fargo & S. "W. R. Co. V. Brewer, Z N. D. 34; Kendrick v. Farquar, 8 Ohio 189, 197; Armstrong v. Treasurer of Athens County, 10 Ohio 335; Cincinnati Col- lege V. State, 19 Ohio 110; Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13 Pa. St. 104; Crawford v. Burrell, 53 Pa. St. 319, 220; Harvey v. South Chester, 99 Pa. St. 565; Philadelphia v. Con- tributors, 143 Pa. St. 367; In re Broad St., 165 Pa. St. 475: Philadelphia v. Union Burial Ground TSoc, 178 Pa. St. 533; Second Universalist Soo. v. Prov- idence, 6 R I. 335; Matter of College St., 8 R. L 474; Winona & St. P. R. Co. V. Watertown, 1 S. D. 46; Round- tree v. Galveston, 42 Tex. 612; Allen V. Galveston, 51 Tex. 303; Taylor v. Boyd, 63 Tex. 533; Harris County v. Boyd, 70 Tex. 337; Orange & A. R. Co. V. Alexandria, 17 Grat. 176; Senor V. Board of -Com'rs, 13 Wash. 48; Hale V. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599; Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R.' Co. V. Bayfield County, 87 Wis. 188. Some of the exemptions in these cases seem very strong and comprehensive, but they were gener- ally applied only to the customary taxes. The following instances may be given: A statute exempting a railroad company " from all taxation of every kind except as therein pro- vided" does not exempt it from a special tax to defray the cost of grading and paving a street a.ssessed on land forming part of the com- pany's right of way as benefited hj such improvement: Illinois Central R. Co. V. Decatur, 154 111. 173, 147 U. S. 190. In Buffalo City Cemetery V. Buffalo, 46 N. Y. 506, a cemetery exempt by law from "all public taxes, rates, and assessments," was held not exempt from a paving as- sessment. Folger, J., says: "We think that the current of authorities in this and some of the sister states runs to this result: that public taxes, rates, and assessments are those which are levied and taken out of the property of the person assessed, for some public or general use or purpose, in which he has no direct, immediate, and peculiar interest; being exactions from him towards the expense of carrying on the gov- ernment, either directly and, in gen- eral, that of the whole common- wealth, or more mediately and particularly through the interven- tion of municipal corporations; and that those charges and impositions which are laid directly upon the 364 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. [oh. VI. definition which Lord Coke gives of the word talUage (2 Inst. 232); and Lord Holt (in Carth. 438) gives the same definition in substance of the word tax. The legislature intended by that exemption to relieve religious and literary institutions property in a circumscribed locality to effect some work of local conven- ience, which in its rjesult ia of peculiar advantage and importance to the property especially assessed for*the expense of it, are not public, but are Ipcal and private so far as this stat- ute is concerned." Different holding as to a sewer assessment: Olive Cemetery Co. v. Philadelphia, 93 Pa. St. 139. In Baltimore v. Greenmount Cemetery Co., 7 Md. 517, an exemp- tion from " any tax or public imposi- tion whatever" was held to apply only to " taxes or impositions levied or imposed for the sake of revenue,'' and not to relieve the cemetery from "such charges as are inseparably in- cident to its location |iii regard to other property; " e. g., an assessment for paving the street in front. In Paterson v. Society, etc., 34 N. J. L. 385, the exemption was from " taxes, charges, and impositions; " but it was held not to extend to an assess- ment for grading and paving a street. In State v. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 185, the exemption was from "charges and impositions," and the same rul- ing was had. In Sheehan v. Good Samaritan Hotel, 50 Mo. 155, exemp- tion from " taxation of every kind " was held not to extend to an assess- ment for street improvements. Com- pare Duulieth, etc. Bridge Co. v. Dubuque, 33 Iowa 437; Brightman v. Kirner, 23 "Wis. 64. In Bridgeport V. New York & N. H. R, Co., 36 Conn. 355, the railroad company paid a tax which, by its charter, was to be " in lieu ofall other taxes; " but the com- pany was, nevertheless, held liable to a street assessment. A like case was Lake Shore & M. S. E. Co. v. Grand Eaplds, 103 Mich. 374. A special as- sessment against a homestead for a sidewalk is not a "tax" within the meaning of a constitutional provision subjeo1(ing homesteads to forced sales for taxes due thereon: Higgins v. Bordages, 88 Tex. 458. But see Ferine v. Forbush, 97 Cal. 305. A statute remitting all penalties in excess of a certain per cent, on all state, county, school district, and municipality taxes levied for certain years, and which have not been sold at tax sale to persons other than the county or municipality for which the original tax. was levied, does not include as- sessments levied for local improve, ments: Seattle v. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447. These cases show that the general inclination has been to confine the application of all such general language to the taxes im- posed for ordinary revenue. But in Massachusetts it has been held that an assessment for altering a street is a civil imposition within the mean- ing of a college charter exempting the college^ property from "all civil impojitions, taxes, and rates: '' Har- vard Coll. V. Boston, 104 Mass. 470. An exemption from " all public taxes and assessments" has been held in Minnesota to extend to assessments for local improvements: Oakland Cemetery Assoc, v. St. Paul, 36 Minn. 539. So, an exemption from "taxes or assessments" will exempt from local assessments: State v. Newark, 36 N. J. L. 478 ; Hudson County Catho- lic Protectory v. Board, 56 N. J. L. 385; Codman v. Johnson, 104 Mass. 491. In Pennsylvania a general ex- emption from county and city taxes is held to exempt from special assess- ments: Olive Cemetery Co. v. Phila- delphia, 93 Pa. St. 139; Erie v. First OH. VI.J EQUALITY AND rNlFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 365 from these public burdens, and the samQ exemption was ex- tended to the real estate of any minister not exceeding in value |1,500. But to pay for the opening of a street in the ratio of the benefit or advantage derived from it is no burden. It is no talliage or tax within the meaning of the exemption, and has no claim upon the public benevolence. Why should not the real estate of a minister as well as of other persons pay for such an improvement in proportion as it is benefited ? There is no inconvenience or hardship in it, and the maxim of law that qui sentit commodum debet sentire onus, is perfectly con- sistent with the interests of science and religion." ^ And yet these assessments are a legal exercise of the taxing power, and can only be justified on that ground.^ Railroad exemptions. Cases of the exemption of railroad property from taxation furnish many illustrations of the rule of strict construction, but they depend so much upon their special facts that little can be done here beyond making gen- eral reference.' For the most part these exemptions are in Univ. Church, 105 Pa. St 278. And a statute exempting from taxation all churches, with the necessary grounds, exempts from a "frontage," tax for laying water-pipes in the street: Philadelphia v. Church of St. James, 134 Pa. St. 207. Under a Delaware statute providing that a certain railroad company should pay a stated sum yearly in lieu of all taxes that might become due under any and all laws of the state, it was held that the company was not liable for a local assessment: Phila- delphia, W. & B. R. Co. V. Neary, 5 Del. Ch. 600. 1 People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419. 2 Matter of Mayor, etc.lt Johns. 86; Sharp V. Speir, 4 Hill 76; People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123; In re Van Ant- werp, 56 N. Y. 261; Genet v. Brook- lyn, 99 N. Y. 296; Dyker, etc. Co. v. Cook, 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 164; Walsh V. Mathews, 29 Cal. 123; Chambers V. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 186; Yeatman V. Crandall, 11 La. An. 220; Matter of Street Opening, 20 La. An. 497; Baltimore v. Greenmount Cemetery Co., 7 Md. 517; Motz v. Detroit, 18 Mich. 495; McComb v. Bell, 3 Minn. 256; Glasgow v. Bowse, 43 Mo. 479, 489; Patersou v. Society, etc., 24 N. J. L. 384; State v. Fuller, 34 N. J. L, 227; State v. Newark, 35 N. J. L. 168, 171 ; Reeves v. Treasurer, 8 Ohio St. 333; Pray v. Northern Liberties, 31 Pa. St. 69; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242. The case of People v. Brooklyn, supra, is somewhat ques- tioned in Dalrymple v. Milwaukee, 53 Wis. 178, in which "tax certifi- cates " in a limitation law were held to embrace a certificate on a sale for local assessments, ' In Atlanta v. Georgia Paa B. Co., 74 Ga. 16, it was held that both under statute and independently of it the property of a railroad com- pany used in carrying on its usual and ordinary business is not subject 366 EQUALITY AND UNIFpEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. TI. the nature of commutations, the railroad company paying some prescribed tax as a consideration for exemption from all other taxation.^ But the rule of strict construction is never- theless applicable, though perhaps with less force than when to taxation. What constitutes the "beginning of the construction " of a railroad, so- that a period of exemp- tion may start to run, see Common- wealth V. Louisville, St. L. & 3 R. Co. (Ky.), 31 S. W. Rep. 464; Hoodgens- ville & E. R, Co. v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 34 S. W.' Rep. 1075; Ohio Val- ley R. Ca V. Commonwealth, 49 S. W. Rep. 548. Where a charter provides that the company "shall be exempt from taxation for'd term of twenty years from the completion of said road to the Mississippi river, but not to extend beyond twenty-five years from the date of the approval of this act," the exemption does not begin to run until the road's completion to the river: Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Thomas, 65 Miss. 553, 133 IT. 8. 174; Same v. Board, 37 Fed. Rep. 24 The acquirement of a road to the river by consolidation with another com- pany does not confer exemption, a physical construction being required : Yazoo & M. V. R. Ca v. Adams, 76 Miss. 545. Exemption of road fix- tures, etc., held not to begin to run until after the completion of the road within the limits of the state: Vicksburg, S. etc. R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665. When period of ex- emption began where lands were granted in aid of a railroad, patents for a certain amount of the lands to be issued on completion of each twenty miles of road: State v. Har- shaw, 76 Wis. 230. Property of a branch railroad constructed after the adoption of a constitution pro- hibiting the exemption of railroad property was held not to be exempt although the company's charter au- thorized it to construct branches, and exempted its property from tax- ation: State v. ChioEtgo, B. & K C. " R. Co., 89 Mo. 533; Chicago, B. & K. O. R. Ca V. Missouri, 120 U. S. 569, 133 U. S. 561. A branch road to pro- cure gravel held liable to ordinary taxation: State v. Hancock, 38 N. J. L. 315. Compare State v. Hancock, 35 N. J. L. 537; Atlantic, etc. Ca v. Allen, 15 Fla. 637. Construction of exemption of transportation com- panies from local taxation: Railroad Ca V. Berks County, 6 Pa. St. 70; Erie County v. Transportation Ca, 87 Pa. St. 484; Northampton County V. Lehigh, etc. Co., 75 Pa. St. 461; Wayne County v. Delaware & H. Canal Ca, 3 Harr. 351. ^ A specific state tax on a railroad company held to preclude taxation of its property by valuation: Cam- den & A. R. Co. V. Commissioners, 18 N. J. L. 11. And see State v. Cooki 33 N. J. L. 338; Cook v. State, 33 N. J. L. 474; Douglass v. State, 34 N. J. L. 485. Under a statute taxing rail- roads specifically at the rate of $20,000 per mile, each railroad is re- garded as an entirety, and not sub- ject to fragmentary taxation; hence they are not impliedly subject to local taxation by statute authorizing a county to levy and collect ad va- lorem taxes on all property in the county, liable to taxation for state' revenue purposes: Commonwealth V. Louisville & N. R. Ca (Ky.), 9 S. W. Rep. 805; see New Albany v. Kansas City, M. & B. R. Ca, 76 Miss. 111. An exemption in a railroad charter from any tax which will reduce the divi- dends below a certain percentage is not void for uncertainty, although no limit of capital stock is fixed, and no means provided for fixing the same or ascertaining the dividends: OH. VI.J ' EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 367 the exemption is total.' A general exemption of railroad prop- erty from taxation has been said to be co-extensive with the company's right to take property for its use by condemnation, Mobile & O. R Co. v. State, 153 U. S. 486. Where a railroad company's charter provided that as soon as the net proceeds of the railroad should amount tb seven per cent, upon its cost it should pay to the state a tax of a certain per cent., "provided, that DO other tax or impost shall be levied or assessed upon the said com- pany," it was held that the exemp- tion under the word " provided " was a positive enactment, exempting the company from all other tax: State V. Minton, 23 N. J. L. 539. A statute reciting that certain railroad cor- porations then owning and occupy- ing railroads in the state claimed exemption from all taxation beyond what was provided for by their char- ters or by special laws, and providing that any such corporation might surrender all claims of exemption from taxation, and accept the pro- visions of that act in lieu thereof, did not apply to a company having a repealable charter: State Board V. Paterson & R. R. Co., 50 N. J. L. 446. 1 A statute providing that a certain railroad company shall pay to the state a certain tax and " no more " does not preclude an additional county tax, the exemption being only in relation to an additional state tax: Kentucky Central E. Co. v. Bourbon County, 82 Ky. 497; Kentucky . Cen- tral R. Co. V. Pendleton County (Ky.), 3 S. VV. Rep. 176. That a street rail- road is not taxable by the city on account of the city's contract to ac- cept a percentage of the company's earnings in lieu of all other taxes for ' city purposes does not obviate the necessity of the city's assessing it for state and county taxes: Detroit Citi^ zens' St. E. Co. v. Common Coun- cil, 135 Mich. 673. Payment by a railroad company to the .state of a specific tax under a law which provided that it should not "be as- sessed with any tax on its lands, buildings, or equipments," was held not to preclude municipal taxation: Orange & A. R. Co. v. Alexandria, 17 Grat. 176. Compare this with Rich- mond V. Richmond & D. E. Co., 21 Grat. 604, where an exemption from " any charge or tax whatsoever " was held to cover municipal as well as state charges. See, also. Southern R. Co. v. Jackson, 38 Miss. 334; Neustadt V. Illinois Centra;! E Co., 31 111. 484; Gardner v. State, 21 N. J. L. 557; Neary v. Philadelphia, W. & B. E Co., 7 Houst. (Del.) 419. A road-tax uniform over the whole county, and charged uppn all the property subject to pay a county tax, is a county tax within the meaning of a charter exempting a railroad com- pany from the payment of county taxes: State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 101 Mo. 120. So is a tax levied on all the taxable property i^l the county to pay county bonds given for stock in a railroad company; and, this, though the bonds can Only be paid out of the tax levied for that special purpose: Same v. Same, 101 Mo. 149. But a local tax levied only on property within the limits of a particular township to pay township funding bonds is not " a county tax " within such a charter: Ibid.; State V. Hannibal & St. J. E Co., 113 Mo. 397. Giving to a municipality the power to tax railroads does not of itself authorize it to tax a railroad running through it, which, by its charter, is exempt: Elizabethtown, etc. R. Co. v. Trustees, 13 Bush 333. Under a charter giving a city the 368 EQUALITY AND TTNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. and the limit of such right is the limit of the exepiption.' Such a general exemption has been held to include the franchise,'^ but an exemption of the road-bed, etc., does not preclude the right to tax all property within its limits "which is by law taxable for territorial and coimty purposes," such city cannot iqipose taxes on the property of a railroad company which is exempt by general law from tj^a- tion for territorial and county pur- poses: Columbia & P. S. E. Cci. v. Chilberg, 6 Wash. 613. A statute withdrawing an exemption from taxation may or may not en^ower municipalities to levy local taxes on the property previously exempt: Compare Bailey v. Magwire, 22 Wall. 215, with Savannah v. Jesup, 106 IT. S. 563. The act incorporating a certain railroad company provides as fol- lows: "The . . . stock, property, and assets belonging to said company shall be listed by the president, sec- retary, or other ofiScer, with the auditor of the state, and an annual tax for state purposes shall be as- sessed by the auditor upon all the property and assets of every name, kind, and description belonging to said corporation. Whenever the taxes levied for state purposes shall exceed three-fourths of one per cent, per annum, such excess shall be deducted from the gross proceeds or income herein required to be paid by said corporation to the state, and the said corporation is hereby exempted from all taxation of every kind except as herein provided for." Held, that this exemption did not apply to a wharf- Jjoat and to a steamboat used prin- cipally in conveying the passengers and freight from the terminus of the road to the terminus of another rail- road, thus making connections: Illi- nois Central E. Co. v. Irvin, 73 111. 452. J State V. Hancock, 33 N. J. L. 315; Milwaukee, etc. E. Ca v. Milwaukee, 84 Wis. 371; State v. Western, etc. E. Co., 54 Ga. 428, 66 Ga. 563; State V. Baltimore, etc. Co., 48 Md. 49. A provision in a railroad charter was that "all machines, wagons, vehi- cles, or carriages belonging to the company, with all its works and all the property which may accrue from the same, shall be vested in the re- spective shareholders forever, in pro- portion to their respective shares, and shall be deemed personal estate, and exempt from any charge or tax whatever." This makes all the property of the company, owned and used for its purposes, personal estate and exempt. A city in which the company owns property cannot dis- pute this exeruption on the ground of its lessening its power to pay its debts: Eichmond v. Eichraond & D. E. Co., 21 Grat. 604. A provision in a railroad company's charter that the railroad and its appurtenances shall not be taxed higher than the fixed rate, followed by provisions regulating the tg,xation of the prop- erty of the company by mnnicipal corporations, amounts to a limitation on such taxation: Central E. & B. Co. V. Wright, 164 U. S. 337. Lands granted to a territory in aid of rail- roads, and subsequently conveyed to railroad companies on payment of a gross earnings tax, were held not subject to specific taxation: State V. Sioux City & St P. R Co., 2 Wilmington E. Co. v. Eeid, 13 Wall. 364; Ealeigh, etc. E. Co. v. Eeid, 13 Wall. 269; State v. Berry, 17 N. J. L. 80; Camden & A. E. Co. v. Hillegas, 18 N. J. L. 11; Camden & A. E. Co. V. Commissioners, 18 N. J. L. 71. See Nichols v. New Haven, etc. Co., 42 Conn. lOa CH. TI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFOKMITT IN TAXATION. 369 taxation of the franchise.^ If a railroad company is exempt from taxation on its franchises and capital stock, it is exempt from taxation on gross receipts.* A statutory exemption of the right of way granted to a railroad operates to exempt the land itself — so far as it is made by the act subject to such right of way — and all structures erected thereon, but not the right of way acquired from private persons and not granted by the act.' And where riparian property is exempt as railroad property, riparian rights Incident thereto — for example, sub- merged land — are also exempt.* The effect of the consolidation of railroads upon exemptions or privileges in respect to taxation previously existing in one 83 Minn. 158. That a railro^id company transferred its franchise, but retained part of the land grant, was held not to operate as a sale of the land so as to subject it to specific taxation: Ibid. As to when lands are " sold and conveyed " so as to terminate exemption, see State V.Webber, 38 Minn. 397. Lands of a certain company were held ex- empt where it had given a contract for their sale, but where the con- tract had been declared forfeited for non-performance: Illinois Central R. Co. V. Goodwin, 9^ IlL 263. But the exemption ceases when the contract has been performed, though no deed was given: Champaign County v. Reed, 100 111. 304. Exemption of lands where company's charter had been declared forfeited: Minnesota Central R. Co. v. Donaldson, 38 Minn. 115. Logs cut for sale by a railroad company upon Its lands exempt from taxation are taxable: State v. North- em Pac. R. Co., 89 Minn. 25. Under an amended charter exempting a canal from taxation, all of a com- pany's property which is a constitu- ent part of the canal, incident thereto, and serving the purpose of the company by maintaining its nav- igation, is exempt: Carondelet Canal 24 Nav. Ca v. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 394. 1 Atlantic, etc. R Co. v. Commis- sioners, 87 N. C. 139. ^ State V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 48 Md. 49. 'New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 172 U. S. 171. A charter exemption of the right of way through the public domain includes the road-bed, station buildings, work- shops, etc., constructed on the right of way: Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Car- land, 5 Mont. 146. But see Atlantic & P. R. Co. V. Lesueur (Ariz.), 19 Paa Rep. 157; Atlantic & P. R. Co. v. Ya- vapoi County (Ariz.), 31 Pac. Rep. 768. ' Construction of a railroad ex- emption of right of way, etc. : Rich- mond, etc. R. Ca v. Commissioners, 84 N. C. 504 Where a city granted a right of way to a railroad company " free of any claim for damages or other compensation," it did not part with its right to impose a license tax on this, as on other railroad compa- nies: Los Angeles v. Southern Pac. R Co., 67 Cal. 433. As to whether a change in name, etc., of company de- prives it of the exemption, see Che- raw, etc. R, Co. V. Commissioners, 88 M. C. 519. 4 State V. St. Paul & D. R Co., 81 Minn. 423. 370 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITi: IN TAXATION. [oh. ti. of the roads has been considered and passed upon in many- cases which are so different in their facts as to render useless anything more than a citation in this place.* Corporate stock and property. An exemption of the corporate stock of a corporation is held in certain jurisdictions to be an exemption of the shares.^ Certain other jurisdictions, includ- 1 See Tomlinson v. Branch, 15 Wall 460; Charleston v. Branch, 15 Wall. 470; Delaware R. Tax Case, 18 Wall. 206; Bailey v. Railroad Co., 22 Wall. 604; Branch v. Charleston, 92 U. S. 677; Central R. Co. v. Georgia; 9a U. S. 665; Chesapeake, etc. Co. v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 718; Railroad Co. V. Maine, 96 U. S. 499; Railroad Ca V. Gaines, 97 U. S. 711; Railroad Co. V. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; Louisville, etc. R Co. V. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244; St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Berry, 113 U. S. 465; Tenpessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 189; Keokuk, etc. R. Co. v. Missouri, 153 U. S. 301; Pearsall v. Great Northern R.'Co., 161 U. S. 646; Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S. 1 ; Atlantic, etc. R Co. v. Allen, 15 Fla. 637; Atlanta, etc. R. Co. v. State, 63 Ga. 483; Wright v. South- western R. Co., 64 Gra. 783; Quincy Bridge Co. v. Adams County,. 88 111. 615; Louisville, etc. R Co. v. Com- monwealth, 10 Bush 43; State v. Northern Central R.Co.,44 Md. 131; State V. Railroad Co., 45 Md. 361; State Treasurer v. Auditor-General, 46 Mich. 224; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Auditor-General, 53 Mich. 79; Louis- ville, N. O. & T. R Co. V. Taylor, 68 Miss. 361; Adams v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 77 Miss. 194; Yazoo & M. V. ■ R Co. V. Adams (Miss.), 28 South. Rep. 956; Wilmington & W. R. Ca v. Als- brook, 110 N. 0. 137. 2 Bank of Georgia v. Savannah, Dudley 130; Johnson v. Common- wealth, 7 Dana 338; Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 5 Ired. 516; Rich- ardson V. St. Albans (Vt.), 47 Atl. Rep. 100. In the last named case the court says: "It is clear that an ex- emption of the working capital of a corporation would not afford the re- lief intended if all its stock were taxed to the individual stockholders. The capital of the corporation and the shares of its stock are different forms of the same thing. There is no value to the stock independent of the property which it represents. The property of the corporation is the property of the stockholders who compose it, and the shares held by each represent his interest in the cor- porate assets." In the very recent case of Penrose v. Chaffraix, 106 La. (30 South. Rep. 'TIS), the following language is used by Blanehard, 3.: " Where there is no clause exempt- ing from taxation, Jt may be the power resides in the legislature to levy a tax on both the capital of a corporation and the shares of stock representing that capital. But, where there is an exempting clause, the question becomes one of legislative intent as to the scope and extent of the exemption, rather than one of legislative power. Whether the ex- emption of the capital or the capital stock from taxation includes immu- nity of the shareholders from the imposition of such burden on the shares of stock he]rd by them indi- vidually is to be determined on a consideration of the nature or char- acter of the exemptive clause and the relations established between the ' taxing power and the corporation at the time the charter was granted and maintained since." And in that case it was held that when the CH. VI.J EQITAtITT AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 371 ing the supreme court of the United States, hold that the ex- emption of the capital or capital stock of a corporation from taxation does not necessarily exempt the shares in the hands of the individual stockholders.* While, in the absence of any Louisiana legislature in 1836 ex- empted the capital of the Citizens' Banl: of Louisiana from taxation, it meant to include in the exemption that which represented the capital — the shares in the hands of those who had subscribed to the capital stock. In New Jersey it is held that the ex- emption of a corporation from taxa- tion exempts its shares of stock: State V. Branin, 33 N. J. L. 484; State V. Bentley, 23 N. J. L. 532; State v. Powers, 34 N. J. L. 400. And con- versely, it is also held in that state that an express exemption of the stock owned by the stockholders ex- empts from taxation the company's property and capital stock: Singer Manuf. Co. v. Heppenheimer, 58 N. J. L. 633; Hancock v. Singer Manuf. Co., 63 N. J. L. 289. As to the ex- emption of shares of stock owned by citizens of New Jersey in a foreign railroad company, the property of which, situated outside of the state, has been assessed, see State v. Ram- sey, 54 N. J. L. 546. An act of the legislature of Quebec providing for a direct tax upon the capital of a bank was held to be a tax upon the shares of stock held by its stockholders within the meaning of the Vermont statute exempting from taxation shares of stock in a corporation situ- ated in another state, where all its stock is taxed in such state to the stockholders: Foster v. Stevens, 63 Vt. 175. The same statute of Ver- mont also applies to national banks: Smalley v. Burlington, 63 Vt. 443. Where all the business of a foreign corporation is situated in Ohio, and all of its property situated and held there, shares of its capital held there are exempt in that state from taxa- tion: Hubbard v. Brush, 61 Ohio St. 253. Under the Texas statute ex- empting corporate stock from taxa- tion against the owner when the cap- ital and property of the corporation are required to be taxed, the owner of such stock in a state bank is not taxable, while the property of the bank is, under the law, taxable, al- though the bank does not return its property for taxation: Gillespie v. Gaston, 67 Tex. 599. An exemption of the stock of the stockholders in cor- porations taxable on their shares has no application to stockholders in for- eign corporations taxable only on their property within the state: Stur- ges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511. See Worth V. Ashburton, 90 N. C. 409. A statute exempting from taxation the personalty of every incorporated company not made liable to taxation on its " capital " applies only to cor- porations having a capital stock, and hence a church or a college, or a sav- ings bank having no capital stock is not within the statute: Catlin v. Trustees, 113 N. T. 183; People v. Coleman, 135 N. Y. 231. 1 Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, 163 U. S. 416; Shelby County v. Union & P. Bank, 161 U. S. 149; New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371; Memphis v. Ensley, 6 Baxt. 553; Bank of Tennessee v. State, 9 Yerg. 490; South Nashville St. R. Co. V. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406; Memphis v. Union & P. Bank, 91 Tenn. 546; Mem- phis V. Home Ins. Co., 91 Tenn, 558; Memphis v. Memphis City Bank, 91 Tenn. 574; State v. Hernando Ins. Co., 97 Tenn. 85; Union & P. Bank v. Memphis, 101 Tenn. 554; State Bank V. Richmond, 79 Va. 113. A provision in a bank's charter that the bank 372 EQUALITY AND TTNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH-.TI. words showing a different intent, an exemption of the stock or capital stock of a corporation may imply and carry with it an exemption of the property in which such stock 1$ invested,' yet if the legislature uses language at variance with such in- tention, the courts, never presuming a purpose to exempt any property from its just share of the public burdens, will construe any doubts which may arise as to the proper interpretation of the charter against the exemption."^ An exemption of the Bhould pay to the state an annual tax of one-half of one per cent, on each share of capital stock, which should be in lieu of all other taxes, was held to lay a tax on the shares' not on the capital stock (following < Farrtngton v. Tennessee, 95 U. S. 632), and not to exempt the bank from taxation on its capital stock: Shelby County V. Union & P. Bank, 161 U. S. 149. I 1 New Haven v. City Bank, 31 Conn. 106; Baltimore V. Baltimore & O. R. Co./ 6 Gill 288; Hannibal R. Co. v. Shaoklett, 30 Mo. 550; Scotland County V. Missouri E. Co., 65 Ma 128. See County Com'rs v. Annapolis, etc. Co., 47 Md. 592; Frederick County v. National Bank, 48 Md. 117; State v. Wilson, 53 Md. 638; State v. Butler, 86 Tenn. 614. The exemption of a railroad company's stock from tax- ation includes all the property neceS^ sary and proper for the purpose of laying, building, and sustaining the road: Bibb County Ordinary v. Cen- tral R. Co., 40 Ga. 646. In State v. Tunis,' 23 N. J. L. 546, a statute ex- empting from taxation " so much of the property of incorporated compa- nies,represented by the stock thereof, a^ by virtue of this act is taxed in t,he hands of the stockholders," was con- strued. The court said: "It is per- fectly clear that the capital stock in the haAds of the stockholders repre- sents the entire property of every in- corporated company. All the prop- erty of theoompany gq^s to constitute the value of the stock, and upon the dissolution of the corporation it all goes, to the stockholders in propor- tion to their respective shares." In Railroad Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, it was said that "in general, an exemp- tion of capital stock, without more, may with great propriety be consid- ered, under ordinary circumstances, as exempting thatwhich, in the legit- imate operations of the corporation, comes to represent the capital" Where the property of a corporation and the shares therein are exempt, it cannot be taxed at all: Worth v. Wil- mington, etc. R Co., 89 N, 0. 291; see Worth V. Petersburg, etc. R Co., 89 N. C. 301. An exemption of a cor- poration's stock and property was held to preclude a privilege tax: Grand Gulf R Co. v. Buck, 53 Miss. 246, citing Railroad Co. v. Keid, 18 Wall. 264; Mobile, etc. R. Co. v. Mose- ley, 52 Miss. 127. And if the cp,pital and franchise of a bank are not tax- able the assessment of a privilege tax is void: 'State v. Bank of Commerce, 95 Tenn. 221. Where a bank's capi- tal was exempt from taxation it was held that a referenee, in a statute imposing a license tax to the capital and surplus of banks, was simply for the purpose of classifying the banks and of graduating the license under such classification, and imposed no tax on the capital: State v. Citizens' Bank, 53 La. An. 1086. 2 Central R & B. Co. v. Wright, 164 U. S. 337, where it is also said that "while the word 'stock' has some- times been held to include the prop- erty of the corporation represented by its stock, this is true only when CH. Tl.j EQUALITY AND ITNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. 373 stock of a corporation is an exemption also of its gross income, the latter being but an accessory to the former;^ but an ex- emption of the shares in a bank from general taxation upon the payment of an annual tax of a certain per cent, does not exempt the surplus and undivided profits.^ And the capital stock of a corporation is not exempt because of a charter pro- vision, that its real and personal property shall be taxe^ in the same way as that of individual citizens.' Where a statute for- ever exempts from taxation shares in the capital stock of a rail- road company, such shares continue exempt in the hands of their various holders.? But exemption is not a franchise, and-, therefore, does not pass as such to a purchaser of the corporate property.^ The exemption from taxation must be construed to the context does not require a dif- ferent construction." It vfrasheld in the same case that a provision in the charter of a railroad company deny- ing to municipal corporations the power to tax its "stock," but empow- ering them to tax " any property, real or personal," of the company, is, in ef- fect, a denial of power to tax the shares of stock in the hands of stock- holders. "When the property has been exempted by reason of the ex- emption of the capital stock, it has been because, taking the whole char- ter together, it was apparent that the legislature so intended: " Bail- road Cos. V. Gaines, 96 U. S. 697. In the latter case the capital stock of a rail- road company was by its charter ex- empted forever from taxation, and its road, fixtures, appurtenances, etc., were exempted for. only twenty years; and it was held that the prop- erty might be taxed after the time 161 U. S. 134; Shelby County v. Union & P. Bank, 161 U. S. 149. 'State V. Simmons, 70 Miss. 485. But to avoid double taxation assess- ments of other property should be deducted in determining the value of the stock: Ibid. As to what con- stitutes the "capital" of a bank- under a charter exempting its cap- ital from taxation, see New Orleans V. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371; S^ate V. Board of Assessors, 48 La. An. 35. In New Hampshire it is held that only that part of the surplus capital of a bank is subject to taxation which is not invested in tax-paying prop- erty or property exempt from taxa- tion: Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Con- cord, 68 N. H. 607. Bank's real estate held liable in Kentucky for county and municipal purposes: Louisville Trust Co. V. Louisville (Ky.), 80 S. W. Bep. 991. In that state banks are subject to county, municipal, , and limited(had expired, because it could school taxation: Deposit Bank v. not have been understood that the property waste represent the capital for the purposes of taxation. See Bailroad Co. v. Loftin, 98 U. S. 559, 105 U. S. 358; Vicksburg, S. etc. E, Co. V. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665. 1 State V. Hood, 15 Bich. Law 177. See State v. Baltimore, etc. B. Co., 48 Md.49. 2 Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, Daviess County, 103 Ky. 174; Fremd V. Deposit Bank (Ky.), 43 S. W. Bep. 103. * Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 139, 139. 'Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 317; Bailroad Co. v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697; Bailroad Co. v, Hamblen County, 103 U. S. 373; Bailroad Co. v. Commis- sioners, 103 U. S. 1; Wilson v. Gaines» 374 EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [oh. TI. have been the personal privilege of the very corporation specific- ally referred to, and to have perished with that, unless the express and clear intention of the law requires the exemption to pass as a continuing franchise to a successor. This statutory 103 U. S. 417; Louisville, eta R. Co. V. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244; Memphis R. Co. V. Commissioners, 113 U. S. 609; Railway Co. v. Miller, 114 U. S. 176; Picard v. Railroad Co., 130 U. S.*37; Keokuk, etc. R. Co. v. Misfeouri, 152 U. S. 301 ; Alexandria, etc. Co. v. Dis- trict of Columbia, 1 MacA. 217; B!ox- ham V. Florida C. & P. R. Co., 35 Fla. 635; Baltimore, C. & A. R. Co. v. Ocean City, 89 Md. 89; Detroit City St. R. Co. V. Guthard, 51 Mich. 180; State V. Chicago, B. & K C. R. Co., 89 Mo. 533; State v. Butler, 15 Lea 104. Compare Gonzales v. Sullivan, 16 Fla. 791; Atlantic, etc. Co. v. Allen, 15 Fla. 637. Where a railroad com- pany had not power by its charter to sell its franchises, its exemption from taxation did not pass on a sale of the road to a foreign corporation under a statute providing that any railroad company of another state might lease or purchase any road in the state, with all its privileges, rights, and franchises, but that if it should lease a road in the state, " or make arrangements for operating the same as provided in this act," such part of said road as was within the state should be subject to taxa- tion: State V. Chicago, B. & K. C. R. Co. V. Missouri, 89 Mo. 528; Chicago, B. & K. C. R. Co. V. Missouri, 133 U. S. 561. A subrogation by statute of one corporation to the rights and priv- ileges of a former corporation does not include an immunity from t'axa- tion: Phoenix F. & M, Ins. Co. v. Ten. nessee, 161 U. S. 174; Gulf & S. T. R. Co. V. Hewes (U. S.), 33 Sup. Rep. 36; see Baltimore, C. & A R. Co. v. Ocean City, 89 Md. 89. An exemp- tion granted to a railroad company under a special charter does not apply to lines organized under the general railroad law and subse- quently leased and operated by said company: Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. V. Grand Rapids, 103 Mich. 374. As to taxation of a railroad company which has succeeded to the rights of a canal company, see Nichols v. New Haven, etc. Co., 43 Conn. 103. Where a statute exempts from taxation for five years the property of a railroad company, "its successors and as- signs," it is exempt in the hands of a foreclosure purchaser: Interna- tional & G. N. R. Co. V. Smith County, 65 Tex. 21. The immunity from tax- ation under a contract whereby a street-car company is to pay a per- centage of its earnings in lieu of other taxes for city purposes is as- signable: Detroit Citizens' St. R Co. -v. Common Council, 125 Mich. 673. An exemption of a railroad's property from ordinary taxation on payment of a percentage on gross earnings has been held not to be personal, but to attach to the property: First Div. etc. R Co. v. Parcher, 14 Minn. 397; State v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 30 Minn. 311; State V. Northern Pac. R. Co., 33 Minn. 294; Stevens County v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 36 Minn. 467. The exemption of a railroad com- pany's land-grant was held to be ap- purtenant to the line of road and the lands, and transferable to any com- pany acquiring the road; and the transfer to such a company was not a sale of the land. A lease and con- tract between two railroad compa- nies was held not to be such a sale: Traverse County v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co., 73 Minn. 417. The right to hold exempt from taxation lands granted PH. YI.J EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 375 rule of interpretation is founded upon an obvious public policy, which regards such exemptions as in derogation of the sovereign authority and of common right, not to be extended beyond the exact and express requirement of the grants, construed strictis- simi juris} A general or qualified exemption of the capital stock or a corporation is generally held not to extebd to corporate prop- erty which is not held or used for the necessary purposes of the corporation.^ Tet the question in every case is one of legis- to a railroad corporation in aid of its principal enterprise is a franchise, 'but ancillary and subordinate; and the right to exercise such franchise; and to continue corporate existence for such purposes only, cannot, with- out express or clearly implied legis- lative permission, survive after a sale of the railroad, and the abandon- ment of the company's principal business as a railroad corporation: State V. Minnesota Central R. Co., 36 Minn. 246. By virtue of a lease of an exempt railroad company and of a validating statute, an immunity from taxation was held to have passed to the lessee: State Assess- ors v. Morris & E. R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 193. 1 Memphis R. Co. v. Commission- ers, 113 U. S. 609. In this case a raU- road exempt from taxation had at- tempted to transfer its franchises to another corporation, which thei'efore claimed the exemption and filed its bill to restrain taxation. The bill was dismissed. And see Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. V. Grand Rapids, 103 Mich. 374. 2 Bank v. Tennessee, 104 T7. SI 493; Ford V. Delta, etc. Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 181, 164 U. 8. 663; Philadelphia, W. & B. R Co. V. Neary, 5 Del. Ch. 600; Auditor-General v. Flint & P. M. R. Co., 130 Mich. 683; Ramsey County V. Chicago, M. etc. R. Co., 38 Minn. 537; State v. District Court, 68 Minn. 243; MoCuUoch v. Stone, 64 Miss. 378; Nashua & L. R. Co. v. Nashua; 63 N. H. 603. The property of railroad com- panies, consisting of freight stations, ofiBces and depot-s, round-houses, ma- chine shops, passenger stations, and grounds covered by tracks and used as means of approach to the stations and buildings in connection with the railroads, and all public works of the company used as such, with their necessary appurtenances, that is such property as is ordinarily and properly pertinent to railroads, and strictly necessary for their proper operation in exercising their several franchises, is not liable to taxation as real estate under the general laws of the state: Northumberland County v. Philadel- phia & E. R. Co. (Pa.), 9 Atl. Rep. 504. See Lehigh County v. Northampton, 8 W. & S. 384; Wayne County v. Del- aware & H. Canal Co., 15 Pa. St. 351, 357, where the subject is considered at length; Railroad Co. v. Berks County, 6 Pa. St. 70; New York & E. R. Co. V. Sabin, 26 Pa. St. 243; West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester County, 30 Pa. St. 283; Lackawanna Iron Co. V. Luzerne County, 42 Pa. St. 424; Pennsylvania & N. Y. C. & R. Co. v. Vandyke, 137 Pa. St. 249; Western New York & P. R. Co. v. Venango County, 183 Pa. St. 618; State v. Western R. Co., 66 Ga. 563; Railroad Co. V. Wright, 68 Ga. 311; Boston & Ma R. Co. V. Cambridge, 8 Cush. 287; Auditor-General v. Flint & P. M. R Co!, 114 Mich. 683; State v. N. W. Tel. Exoh. Co. (Minn.), 87 N. W. Rep. 1131; Hannibal & St. J. R 376 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. lative intent, and the cases cited in the margin will abundantly Co. V. Shaokiett, 30 Mo. 550; State V. Hannibal & St. J. E. Ca, 37 Ma 365; Vicksburg & M. R. Co. v. Brad- ley, 66 Miss. 518; Lewis v. Vicksburg & M. R. Co., 67 Miss. 518; Vicksburg & M. R. Co. V. Lewis, 68 Miss. 39; Le Blanc V. Illinois Central R Co., 72 Miss. 669; Souhegan Nail, etc. Fac- tory V. MoConihe, 7 N. H. 809; G^d- ner v. State, 31 N. Js L. 557; State v. Maisfleld, 28 N. J. L. 510; State v. Flavell, 24 N. J. L. 370; State v. Blun- dell, 34 N, J. L; 403; State v. Betts, 24 N. J. L. 555; State v. Newark, 25 N. J. L. 315; State v. Collector, 26 N. J. L. 519; State Treasurer v. Somer- ville & E. R. Co., 38 N. J. L. 31 ; State V. Elizabeth. 38 N. J. L. 103; State v. Leester, 29 N. J. L. 541; State v. Han- cock, 83 N. J. L. 815; State v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 540; United N. J. R. & C. Co. V. Jersey City, 57 N. J. L. 567; Delaware, L. & W. R Co. v. Newark, 60 N. J. L. 60; Orange, etc. R Co. V. Alexandria," 17 Grat. 176, which does not allow the implied ex- emptions; Vermont Central R Co. v. Burlington, 28 Vt. 193; Milwaukee, etc, R. Co. V. Crawford Supervisors,' 39 Wis. 116; Milwaukee, etc. R Co. V. Milwaukee, 84 Wis. 371; Chicago, St. P., M & O. R Ca V. Bayfield, 87 Wis. 188; Milwaukee Electric R etc. Co. V. Milwaukee, 95 Wis. 43; Wil- mington R Ca V. Reid, 13 Wall. 364, 268, per Davis, J. Lands held by a company in view of their probable future use are not exempt: Auditor- General V. Flint & P. M. R Ca, 130 Mich. 683; Ramsey County v. Chi- cago, M. eta R Ca, 83 Minn. 587; St. Paul, M. & M. R. Ca v. St. Paul, 89 Minn. 113; Duluth, S. S. & A R. Ca V. Douglas County, 103 Wis. 75. So of lands acquired for resale, or for the timber thereon: McCuUooh v. Stone, 64 Miss. 378; Todd County v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Ca, 38 Minn. 168. The test of actual use was held inapplicable where the company was engaged in the work of construction; property was exempt which would be necessary for the use of the com- pany when its contemplated im- provements were completed: State V. Haight, 35 N. J. L. 40. Grain ele- vators, built and operated by railroad companies, held exempt: Detroit Union R Depot v. Detroit, 88 Mich. 347; State v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. L. 540; State v. Nashville, C. etc. R Co., 86 Tenn. 488; Chicago, St. P., M. & •O. R. Ca V. Bayfield, 87 Wis. 188; see Hertert v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R Ca (Iowa). 86 N. W. Rep. 366. Otherwise, when erected by a rail- road company and leased, the tolls collected being the results of invest- ment, and not sui generis with those things necessary for the use and operation of the road: Illinois Cen- tral R. Ca v. People, 118 IlL 137; In re Swigert, 119 IlL 83. An exemption from taxation of "property necessa- rily used in operating the railroad " was held to apply to an inn used ex- clusively by persons arriving and de- • parting on the railroad: Milwaukee, etc. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 39 Wis. 116; see Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Supervisors, 48 Wis. 666; Statp v. Baltimore, etc. R Co., 48 Md. 49. An hotel, owned by a railroad corporation and kept by its lessee as an hotel and summer, resort, is not included within the ex- emption from ordinary taxation en- joyed by the corporation in respect to such of its property as is held and used for railroad purposes: State v. St. Paul, M. & M. R Ca, 42 Minn. 23& Gravel pits, owned by a railroad company but not used in the opera- tion of its road, were held taxable by the local authorities: Le Blanc v. Illinois Central R. Co., 72 Miss. 669. And so was a, railroad bridge, not constructed as a part of the road, and used for general purposes of travel: St. Joseph & G. 1 R. Co. v. Devereux, 41 Fed. Rep. 14. Statutes providing OH- TI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOKMITT IN TAXATION. 377 show that the exemptions made are so fardiverse in their terms for the payment, in lieu of all other taxes, of a certain percentage of rail" road companies' gross receipts, were construed as exempting all the prop- erty of such corporations, whether actually used in the operation of railroads or not: Northern Pac. R. Co. V. Barnes, 2 N. D. 310; Columbia & P. S. R. Co. V. Chilberg, 6 Wash. 613; Mciiehry v. Alford, 168 U. S. 651. See Fargo & S. W. R. Co. v. Brewer, 3 N. D. 34; Northern Pac. R. Co. V. MoGinnis, 4 N. D. 494. An exemption to a railroad company of "all machines, wagons, vehicles, or carriages belonging to the company, with all their works," etc., held to apply to their real estate as well as to their rolling stock: Richmond v. Richmond & D. R Co., 31 Grat. 604, citing Baltimore v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 6 Gill 388. A provision that a certain tax on the capital and debts of railroad companies should "take the place of all other taxes on rail- road and horse-railroad property and franchises," held to exempt property whether used for railroad purposes or not: Osborn v. New York & M. H. R. Co., 40 Conn. 491. And see in gen- eral, The Tax Cases, 13 G. & J. 117. A street-car stable, with the land whereon it stands, together with the horses and vehicles therein, are not taxable for county purposes, where they are all owned by a street-rail- way cbmpany and are used by it in its corporate business: Northampton County V. Easton, S. E. & W. E. P. R. Co., 148 Pa. St. 283. A street-railway company exempt from ordinary state taxation will nevertheless be liable for a dog-tax: Hendrie v. Kalthoff, 48 Mich. 306. An exemption of the "road, rolling and live stock" of a street-railway company is not an ex- emption of its lots used for shops, stables, etc.: Atlanta St. R. Co. v. Atlanta, 66 Ga. 104. Lot and toll- gatherer's dwelling-house thereon, owned by a plank-road company, were held exempt from general tax- ation as necessary to enable the com- pany to discharge its duty to the public: Detroit & S. P. R Co. v. De- troit, 81 Mich. 563. A charter ex emption of a canal from taxation covers all the company'^ property which is a constituent part of the canal, incident thereto, and serving the purpose of the company by main- taining its navigation: Carondelet Canal Nav. Co. v. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 394 Where a canal is exempt ■from taxation the toll-house is not taxable: Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Com- missioners, 11 Pa. St. 803. A charter exempting from taxation a canal company's property used for the act- ual and necessary purposes of canal navigation does not include a house and lot used for the residence of the assistant superintendent of the canal : State v.. Cleaver, 46 N. J. L. 467. Buildings of a manufacturing corpo- ration not on the factory grounds and used as dwellings for the em- ployees are not exempt from taxa- tion: Adams v. Tombigbee Mills (Miss.), 39 South. Rep. 470. The cap- ital stock of a rolling-mill company "invested in dwellings reasonably necessary for the use of its employ- ees" is not exempt, as such dwell- ings, though convenient and advan- tageous, have no necessary connec- tion with the business for which the company was incorporated: Com- monwealth V. Mahoning Rolling-Mill Co., 129 Pa. St. 360. A manufacturing corporation which moves its plant into the country, where there are no acoommodntions for its workmen, cannot claim as exempt from taxa- tion capital invested by it in houses and lots for such workmen, since the necessity for the erection of such houses was created by itself, and it 378 EQTJALITT AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI, as to raise many troublesome controversies, the decisions in which are not always harmonious, i cannot urge that they were abso- lutely necessary in its business: Com- ■ monwealth v. Westinghouse Air- Brake Co., 151 Pa. St. 276. A gas company, otherwise exempt, may be taxed for county purposes on a dwell- ing-house situated on its land, but which it does not use in its bus sbss but rents to a tenant: Schuylkill County V. Citizens' Gas Co., 148 Pa. St. 146. A statute abolishing taxes laid upon manufacturing corpora- tions operates simply on capital em- ployed in manufacturing, and does not exempt the capital of a manufact- uring company invested in bonds, mortgages, city lots and store goods, or in quarrying or mining operations : Commonwealth v. Lackawanna L & C. Co., 139 Pa. St. 346. A manufact- uring company claiming as exempt from taxation shares of stock in other corporations owned by it, on the ground that they were taken in exchange for its own manufactured products, has the burden of estab- lishing that fact: Comnaonwealth v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 151 Pa. St. 376. A statute exempting from taxation the real property of a board of trade " so long as such property shall be occupied by said board for the purposes contemplated in its organization " does not exempt such part of a building owned by the cor- poration as is rented to third persons, though the rent is applied to the Ijoard's purposes: Louisville v. Louis- ville Board of Trade, 90 Ky. 409. Where a bank charter provided that the bank might " purchase and hold a lot of ground for the use of an in- stitution as a place of business," and also hold such property' as might be conveyed to it to secure 'debts due the institution, and that, it should pay to the state an annual tax of one-half of one per cent, on each share of capital stock, " which shall be in lieu of all other taxes," held, that so much of the bank building as was not used for its business was taxable; Bank v. Tennessee, 104 U. S. 493. See De Soto Bank v. Memphis, 6 Baxt. 415. ' ' 1 Exemption of deposits in savings banks: People v. Coleman, 135 N.*y, 231; People v. Peck, 157 N. T. 51; " People V. Dederick, 158 N. Y. 414; People V. Barker, 164 N. Y, 133. And of investments of such deposits: State V. Central Savings Bank, 67 Md. 29Q; In re Suffolk Savings Bank, 149 Mass. 1. Exemptions in favor of building and loan pr savings and loan associations: Los Angeles v. State Loan, etc. Co., 109 Cal. 396; * Deniston v. Terry, 141 Ind. 677; Horn V. Woodward, 151 Ind. 133; Kansas City V. Mercantile Mut. B. & L. Assoc, 145 Mo. 50; Territory v. Co- operative B. & L. Assoc. (N. M.), 62 Pac. Rep. 1097. Partial exemption of certain insurance companies from taxation: People v. Coleman, 131 N. Y. 543. What are to be regarded as manufacturing companies or cor- porations so as to be within the terms of exempting statutes, see Frederick Electric L. & P. Co. v. Frederick City, 84 Md. 599; Greenville Ice &C. Co. V. Greenville, 69 Miss., 86; State v. Assessors, 47 N. J. L. 36; Press Print- ing Co. V. State Board, 51 N. J. L. 51, 75; People v. Knickerbocker, 99 N. Y. 181; People v. Wemple, 129 N. Y. 543; People v. Roberts, 145 N. Y. 375; People v. Roberts, 155 N. Y. 1; People v. Roberts, 155 N. Y. 408; Commonwealth v. Arnott Steam-Power Mills Co., 143 Pa. St. 69; Commonwealth v. Northern E. L. & P. Co., 145 Pa. St. 105; Com- monwealth V. Edison E. L. & P. Co., 170 Pa. St. 231. What are compa- nies " engaged in manufacture " so CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 379 Inheritances and successions. The exemptions of persons or of property in the so-called inheritance tax-laws are so numer- ous and so diverse that it is hardly possible to do more in this place than to group some of the many cases in which such ex- as to be exempt, see People v. Horn Silver Mining Ca, 105 N. Y. 76; Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305. As to what are cor- porations "organized exclusively for manufacturing purposes," so as to come within the exemption law of Pennsylvania, see Commonwealth V. Westinghouse E. & M. Co.. 151 Pa. St 365; Commonwealth v. Keystone Bridge Co., 156 Pa. St. 500; Common- wealth V. Pottsville I. & S. Co., 157 Pa. St. 500; Commonwealth v. Ju- niata Coke Co., 157 Pa. St. 507. Under the statute exempting from taxation corporations "organized ex- clusively for manufacturing pur- poses," a corporation chartered to do manufacturing business only, but which engages in other business as well as in manufacturing, or which imiests part of its stock in property not used for manufacturing, is tax- able only as to the amount of its capital employed otherwise than in manufacturing: Commonwealth v. William Mann Co.. 150 Pa. St. 64; Commonwealth v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 151 Pa. St. 276; Common- wealth V. Lippincott Co., 156 Pa. St. 513; Commonwealth V. Juniata Coke Co., 157 Pa. St. 507; Commonwealth v. East Bangor Consol. Slate Co., 162 Pa. St. 599. And so with a corporation char- tered for and engaged in a business not authorized by any statute, in ad- dition to its manufacturing business: Commonwealth v. Thackra Manuf. (3o., 156 Pa. St. 510. And see People V. Campbell, 144 N. Y. 166. For the meaning of the term "carrying on business in this state," applied to manufacturing companiesin the New Jersey tax-law of 1884 as a condition ef exemption, see Norton N. C. & S. B. Co. V. State Board, 53 N. J. L. 564; State V. State Board, 54 N. J. L. 430; Edison Phonograph Co. v. State Board, 55 N. J. L. 55; American Glucose Co. V. State, 43 N. J. Eq. 280; Standard Under-Ground Cable Co. V. Attorney-General, 46 N. J. Eq. 270. Construction of the New Jersey stat- ute exempting from taxation cor- porations fifty per cent, of whose capital stock is invested in manu- facturing within the state: Edison United Phonograph Co. v. State Board, 57 N. J. L. 520; In re Consoli- dated Electric S. Co. (N. J. Eq.), 26 AtL Rep. 983. " Carrying on manu- facture within" the state: People V. Wemple, 138 N. Y. 582. "Wholly engaged in carrying on manufacture within" the state: People v. Camp- bell, 145 N. Y. 587; People v. Eob- erts, 4 App. Div.'(N. Y.)388; People v. Roberts, 90 Hun 533. Exemption of gas and electric illuminating com- panies, as corporations of a public character, from local taxation: Pitts- burgh's Appeal, 133 Pa. St. 374; Com- monwealth V. Northern Electric L. etc. Co.', 145 Pa. St. 105: Schuylkill County V. Citizens' Gas Co., 148 Pa. St. 146; Southern Electric & P. Co. V Philadelphia, 191 Pa. St. 170; St. Mary's Gas Co. v. Elk County, 191 Pa. St. 458; Ridgeway Light, etc. Co. v. Elk County, 191 Pa. St. 465. So of a company chartered to improve a river and to take charge of general drives of logs, from real-estate taxar tion on its dams: Yellow River Imp. Co. V. Wood County, 81 Wis. 554. For other cases of special exemption, see Armstrong v. Athens ^ounty, 16 Pet. 281; State v. Norwich & W. R. Co., 30 Conn. 390; Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Conn, 116; State Bank v. Madison, 380 EQUALITY ' AKD UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [oh. VI. emptions have been passed upon.^ It Jias been decided that the TJnited States are not a corporation " exempt by law from taxation " within the meaning of the New York statute im- posing a tax on legacies to corporations not exempt; the cor- porations meant being such as are organized under the laws of New Torkfor religious, educational, charitable, or reformatory- purposes.* ' When exemption accrue*; loss or surrender. It has been decided that where land has become liable for taxes it remains so for that year although subsequently acquired for purposes rendering if exempt.' The purchase of land by a bank the 8 Ind. 43; Orr v. Baker, 4 Ind. 86; Philadelphia, etc. E. Co. v. Bayless, 2 Gill 355; Baldwin v. Hastings, 88 Mioh. 689; Bear Lake, etc. Co. v. Ogden City, 8 tjtah 494; Common- wealth V. Richmond & P. R. Co., 81 Va. 855; Rex v. Calder, 1 B. & Aid. 263. An act of the legislature giv- ing a corporation power to extend its operations does not change its character or attributes, and there- fore is not a new franchise; and if the original corporation was exempt from taxation the additional fran- chise cannot be taxed though not it- self exempted: State v. Society, 48 N. J. Eq. 410. 1 Wilmerding's Estate, 117 Cal. 281; Stanford's Estate, 136 Cal. 112; Ma- honey's Estate (Cal.), 65 Pao. Rep. 389; Kochersperger V. Drake, 167 111. 122; Ayers v. Title, etc. Co., 187 111. 42; In re McGhee's Estate, 105 Iowa 9; Herriott v. Bacon, 110 Iowa 342; Minot V. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113; Chambe v. Wayne Probate Judge, 100 Mich. 112; Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge, 125 Mich. 487; Le Due V. Hastings, 39 Minn. 110; State V. Gorman, 40 Minn. 282; Drew V. TifEt, 79 Minn. 175; State v. Switz- ler, 143 Ma 287; State v. Henderson, 160 Mo. 190; Hinds v." Wilcox, S3 Mont. 4; Matter of McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306; Matter of Miller, HON. Y. 116; Matter of Gager's Will, 111 N. Y. 344; Matter of Howe's Estate, 113 N. Y. 10; Catlin v. Trustees, 113 N. Y. 138; Matter of Sherwell's Es- tate, 135 N. Y. 376; Matter of Mer- riam, 141 N. Y. 479; Matter of Hoff- man, 143 N. Y. 334; Matter of Lang- don, 153 N. Y. 6; Matter of Beach, 154 N. Y. 842; Matter of Bliss's Estate, 6 A pp. Div. (N. Y.) 193; Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 137 Pa. St. 595; Matter of Howell's Estate, 147 Pa. St. 164; Matter of Pepper's Estate, 159 Pa. St. 508; Mat- ter of Kerr's Estate, 159 Pa. St. 513; Commonwealth v. Henderson, 178 Pa. St. 135; State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. 674; Bailey v. Drane, 96 Tenn. 16; State V. Mann, 76 Wis. 469. 2 United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625; Matter of Merriam, 141 N. Y. 479. 'Colored Orphans' Assoc, v. New York, 104 N. Y. 581. Property tax- able when the books are open for cor- rection of assessments, but after- wards, before they are closed, trans- ferred to a coi'poration the property of which is exempt, does not thereby become exempt: Sisters of the Poor V. New York, 51 Hun 355. Where the tax year, as far as it related to real estate, began January first, and ■ certain lands were declared to be ex- empt from taxation for eight years CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND tTNIEOEMITT IN TAXATION. 381 property of which is exempt from taxation does not divest ex- isting tax liens.' Where a constitution forbidding exemptions goes into effect after the time fixed for the assessment of prop- erty, the right to exemption from taxation for that year is not affected.* Long acquiescence, unexplained, in the imposition of taxes raises a presumption in favor of the surrender of the privilege of exemption.' One may also be estopped by his own action from claiming exemption ; as by procuring the incorpo- ration of a town and the inclusion within its limits of his un- platted land used for farming purposes.* While exemptions may in general be waived, a corporation cannot waive its ex- emption as against its bonds previously issued.' The questipn whether an exemption has not been forfeited cannot be raised in an action between individuals based upon a tax deed given on a sale of exempt lands.' Invidious exemptions. An exemption, it would seem, in order to be admissible, should be made either on the basis of contract, in which case the public is supposed to receive a full equivalent therefor, or it ought to be made on some ground of public policy, such as might justify a pension or a donation of the public funds on som^ general rule of which all who come within it may have the benefit ; or such as, at least, makes the public at large interested in encouraging or favoring the class or interest in whose behalf the exemption is made.'' It is diffi- from May 1, 1876, the term of the right of exemption, see Seabord, etc. exemption began with the year 1877: R. Co. v. Norfolk County, 83 Va. 195; Swan V. State, 77 Ala. 545, Citizens' Bant v. Board of Assessors, 1 State V. Ewing, 11 Lea 173; Ger. 54 Fled. Rep. 73. For the surrender, man Bank V.Louisville (Ky.), 56 S.W. by the acceptance of certain statu- Eep. 504 tory provisions, of the immunity 2 Newport v. Masonic Temple from increased taxation given to Assoc, 103 Ky. 593. Kentucky banks by their charters, 3 State V. Wright, 41 N. J. L. 478; see Deposit Bank v. Daviess County, Given v. Wright, 117 U. S. 648. See 103 Ky. 174, overruling several earlier Wau-pe-man-qua v. Aldrich, 28 Fed. cases. Rep. 489; Commissioners v. Simons, 'Maokall v. Canal Co., 94 U. 8. 308. 139 Ind. 193. ' See, on this subject, what is said * Benedictine Order v. Central Gov- by Robertson, Ch. J., in Sutton's ington, 99 Ky. 7. Heirs v. Louisville, 5 Dana, 38, 81. ' Hand v. Savannah, etc. R Co., 17 Also Morrison v. Larkm, 36 La. An. S. C. 319. For instances of waiver of 699, 3«2 EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITY IK TAXATION. [CH. VI. cult to conceive of a justifiable exemption law which should select single individuals or corporations, or single articles of property, and, taking them out of the class to which they be- long, pialie them the subject of capricious legislative, favor. Sucb favoritism could make no pretense to equality ; it would lack the semblance of legitimate tax legislation.^ It is certain that municipal bodies or taxing oflBcers have no authority to make such exemptions unless expressly empowered by legisla- tion; and to make any wouf^ render invalid the whole tax roll on which the exempted property or person ought to have ap^ peared. The motives of the exemption or the beneficial pur- poses expected to be accomplished by it can make no difference.' JSTo man is obliged to be more generous than the law requires ; each may stand strictly on his legal rights, and refuse to sub- mit to any exaction that purposely is made more burdensome to him than the rules of law permit.' The legislature is equally 1 Hamilton v. Wilson, 61 Kan. 511. 2 Thomas v. Snead (Va.), 39 S. E. Rep. 586. ' Per Paine, J., in Weeks v. Mil- waukee, 10 Wis. 243, 363. The case was one of an exemption of a block in the city of Milwaukee on which a hotel was about to be constructed; the common council directing it to be made "in view of the great pub- lic benefit which the construction of the hotel would be to the city." Com- pare Exchange Bank v. Hines, 8 Ohio St. 1 ; Adams v. Beinan, 10 Kan. 37. In Southern Hotel Co. v. St. Louis County, 63 Mo. 134, the exemp- tion of a hotel from taxation for ten years was enforced without question of the right. In Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt. 460, a tax list was held void because " The plain and obvious req- uisites of the statute in regard to making it up were disregarded, both by important and essential omissions, and by arbitrary additions without even the color of right or legal war- rant. If this may be done and still the list be regarded as legal, so might it with equal propriety if the entire real estate In town were omitted or inserted wholly at random without even the form of an appraisal." See State V. Branin, 33 N. J. L. 484; Her- sey V. Supervisors, etc., 16 Wis. 185; Crosby v. Lyon, 37 Cal. 343; Attor- ney-General V. Pioneer Iron Co., 133 Mich. 531; Primmv. Belleville, .59 111. 143; Kneeland v. Milwaukee, 15 Wis. 454; Snaith v. Smith, 19 Wis. 615; Tampa v. Kaunitz, 39 Fla. 683; Peo- ple V. McCreery, 84 Cal. 433. Where from the tax-roll of a township a large amount of personalty there tax- able was omitted, the real estate of such township being also assessed at one-fourth of its cash value, a sale of lands in other parts of the county for state and county taxes should not be decreed: Auditor-General v. Presobtt, 94 Mich. 190. . If a town- , ship board, in levying highway taxes upon the township's property, ex- empts the property in a particular village, the levy is void: Auditor- General V. Duluth, S. S. & A. R. Co., 116 Mich. 132. Including in the as- sessment persons who ai-e not liable, and against whom a tax cannot be enforced, does not invalidate the tax against the rest: Inglee v. Bosworth,, CH. VI.] EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 383 powerless if the constitution has prescribed a rule of equality which forbids exemptions.^ Such a rule, it has been seen, is prescribed by the constitutions of some of the states, which, in terras or by necessary implication, require all private property in the state to be taxed in proportion to its value.* Accidental omissions from taxation. It has been decided in a number of oases that accidental omissions from taxation, of persons or property that should be taxed, occurring through the negligence or default of officers to whom the execution of the taxing laws i* intrusted, would not have the effect to vitiate the whole tax. The reasons for this conclusion are summarized in one of the cases as follows: "The execution of these laws is necessarily intrusted to men, and men are fallible, liable to frequent mistakes of fact, and errors of judgment. If such errors on the part of those who are attempting in good faith to perform their duties should vitiate the whole tax, no tax could ever be collected. And therefore, though they some- times increase improperly the burden of those paying taxes, the rule which holds the tax not thereby avoided is absolutely essential to the continuation of the government." ' It seems SPiok. 498. See Dillingham V. Snow, 5 tax will be void if it appears that Mass. 547. An illegal exemption by exemptions are made of property theoommoncounoilof one man from which should be taxed: Alexander a sewer tax will not authorize another v. Baltimore, 5 Gill 383, 390; Masters to have his tax enjoined where it ap- v. Portland, 34 Or. 161; Savage v. pears that his payment is not in- Buffalo, 131 N. Y. 568. Compare creased by the exemption: Page v. Page v. St. Louis, 30 Mo. 136. St. Louis, 30 Mo. 136. The principle 2 gee ante, pp. 375-339. Lands is that no one is to be heard to com- owned by the state having been plain of that which works no injury omitted in laying a local assessment, to him. See Sanford v. Dick, 15 Conn, though they were expressly made as- 447; Case V. Dean, 16 Mich. 13; Davis sessable, the roll was held invalid: V. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 144. Hassen v. Rochester, 67 N. Y. 538. 1 It is no^i competent to lay a tax See Same Case, 65 N. Y. 516. Also for a general public purpose exclu- Clark v. Dunkirk, 13 Hun 181. sively on one species of taxable prop- ^Pairte, J., in Weeks v. Milwaukee, erty: Gilman v. Cheboygan, 3 Black, 10 Wis. 343, 363, where the following 510. See Sinclair v. Learned, 51 cases were cited and relied upon: Mich. 335. Or on the property of Spear v. Braintree, 34 Vt. 414; State only one section of the taxable dis- v. Collector, 24 N. J, L. 108; Insur- trict: Dyar v. Parmington, 70 Me. ance Co. v. Yard, 17 Pa. St. 331: 515. Compare Bright v. McCuUough, Williams v. School Dist., 31 Pick. 75. 37 Ind. 333; Primm v. Belleville, 59 See, also, State v. Randolph, 35 N. J. III. 143. In assessing by benefits the L. 437, 431 ; People v. McCreery, 34 38i EQUALITY AND TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. diflBcult to resist the force of this reasoning, and it applies to the case of a mistake of law with the same cogency as to the case of a mistake of fact. Indeed, where the omission has CaL 433; Tampa v. Kaunitz, 39 Fla. 683; Sohofleld v. Watkins, 23 111. 62; Dunham v. Chica;go, 55 111. 357, 361; Vittum V. People, 183 III 154; Anden- son V. Mansfield, 93 Ky. 230; Dover V. Maine Water Co., 90 Me. 180; ¥an Deventer v. Long Island City, 139 N. Y. 133; Shuttuck v. Smith, 6 N. D. 56; McTwiggan v. Hunter, 18 E. L 776 ; Smith v. Smith, 19 Wis. 615. In Watson V. Princeton, 4 Met. 599> 603, Shaw, Ch. J., says that the case of omission, through error of judg- ment or mistake of law, to tax prop- erty thai should be taxed, can give no right of action to recover back any portion of the tax paid by an- other. " Various other remedies may be resorted to to secure just and legal taxation. The law is strict in requiring that the whole valuation, shall be laid before the tax-paying in- habitants in order that any omission, mistake, or irregularity may be cor- rected before the tax is collected. It is for the interest of the town, and of the inhabitants generally, that each inhabitant liable should be taxed, and to the extent of his lia- bility, and therefore it must be pre- sumed to be the inclination of as- sessors to impose rather than .omit a tax, in case of doubt, leaving the in- dividual aggrieved to raise the (Ques- tion if he shall think fit And the final remedy, if the inhabitants believe that their assessors are act- ing upon erroneous principles, is to elect others in their places." See, also, George v. School Dist., 6 Met. 497; Dean v. Gleason, 16 Wis. 1. A mistake without intentional fraud or wrong, whereby personal property which should have been taxed is omitted from the tax-list, will not ih- Talidate the list: Wilson v. Wheeler, 55 Vt. 446, citing Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt. 460; Spear v. Braintree, 34 Vt. 414. And see Burlington, etc. R. v. Seward County, 10 Neb. 211; Sam© V. Saline County, 13 Nel 396; State V. Maxwell, 27 La. An. 722. Where the constitution required an adva- lorem tax to be levied both on realty and personalty, and a city ordinance provided for such tax on realty alone, the omission to assess certain personalty in the mode prescribed did not avoid the entire ordinance, so as to entitle a taxpayer to an in- junction to restrain the collection of taxes thereunder; but a court of equity might require the city council to correct the ordinance by assessifig the personalty omitted from the ad valorem system, its value to be as- certained as of the date when the original assessment was required to be made: Levi v. Louisville, 97 Ky. 394 There has been some disposition in Illinois to hold that, ^ven in the case of intentional omissions, the^ ta£-roll should be sustained and the parties aggrieved should be left to their remedy against the assessor: Schofield V. Watkins, 22 111. 73^ Merritt v. Fari^, 23 111. 303, 811; Dunham v. Chicago, 55 111. 857, 361. But see Primm v.Belleville, 59 111. 142. And see New Orleans v. Fourchy, 30 La. An. 910. The omission by com- missioners assessing benefits for pub- lic improvements to take into con- sideration all property benefited within the area of assessment will not be ground for disturbing their assessment if it did not vary or in- crease the assessment upon the pros- ecutors: Dav^ v. Newark, 54 N. J. L. 144. In Minnesota it was held not a defense .to the application for judg- ment for taxes against land that OH. VI.] EQTJALITX AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 386 occurred through no purpose to evade, or disregard ofl&cial duty, the occasion which produced it seems wholly immaterial.^ Invidious assessments. A tax, when assessed by valuation, may be made unequal and oppressive by the unfairness with which the 'valuation is made. The remedies for an excessive valuation we have no purpose to consider in this place; they belong more properly to a subsequent part of the work. As a general rule, a tax cannot depend for its validity upon the ability of those who lay it to make plain its justice to the sat- isfaction of a court or jury. Value is matter of opinion, and when the law has provided officers upon whom the duty is imposed to make the valuation, it is the opinion of those offi- cers to which the interests of the parties are referred.^ The court cannot sit in judgment upon their errors, or substitute its own opinion for the conclusions the officers of the law have reached.' It is possible, however, that there may be circum- partioular property had been wil- fully omitted from the tax-list: State V. Lakeside Land Co., 71 Minn. 283. 1 Henderson v. Hughes County, 18 S. D. 576. See People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 483, where the mistake was one of law, but the omission was held not to be fatal See, also, Muscatine V. EailroadCo., 1 Dill. 536; Burling- ton, etc. R. Co. -v. Saline County, 13 Neb. 896; State v. Maxwell, 37 La. An. 733; Auditor-General v. Sage Land Co. (Mich.), 88 N. W. Rep. 468. 2 Proof that in some cases there has been an undervaluation is not suf- ficient to avoid a roll: Georgia Mid- land & G. R. Co. V. State, 89 Ga. 597; Keokuk & H. Bridge Co. v. People, 161 111. 514; Shuttuck v. Smith, 6 N. D. 56; Marshall v. Benson, 48 Wis. 558. Even though it is intentional and general: Moss v. Cummings, 44 Mich. 359; Auditor-General v. Jenkin- son, 90 Mich. 538. See State v. Lake- side Land Co., 71 Minn. 383. In such case only the increase imposed on the owners of other property in conse- quence thereof is invalidated: Audi- tor-General v. Jenkinson, 90 Mich. 35 533. But if, by error of judgment, an excessive tax is levied upon realty, a sale of lands for the tax is void: Sinclair v. Leonard, 51 Mich. 385. See Kennedy v. Troy, 14 Hun 808. Where the assessor and board of review in- tentionally remitted a large amount of personalty and realty from the roll, and-greatly undervalued certain per- sonalty and the business and resi- dence property of a city in order to throw a heavier burden of taxation on the outlying land in the city, and there was no basis on which the court could estimate a reduction of the excessive portions of the tax, a decree holding the entire roll void as to all objectors was proper : Attorney- General V. Pioneer Iron Co., 133 Mich. 531. One whose property is assessed at less than its cash value, but pro- portionately higher than others, can- not have his assessment reducedj but may have the others raised: Carroll V. Alsup (Tenn.), 64 S. W. Rep. 193. Further as to undervaluation in as- sessments see post, ch. XII. 3 Shelby County v. Miss. & T. R. Co., 16 Lea 401. 386 iQUALITT AND TJNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [OH. VI. stances under which the action of the officers will not be con- clusive. Suppose it admitted, or established beyond a perad- venture, that a public officer who has been empowered by the law to apportion certain burdens among the citizens, as in his judgment shall be just, has been actuated by a fraudulent pur- pose, and, instead of attempting to carry the law into effect, has wholly disregarded its mandate, declined to bring his judgment to bear upon the question submitted to him, and arbitrarily, with the intenfr and purpose to defeat the equity at which the lavv aims, has determined to impose an excessive burden upon a particular citizen. Suppose this to be unques- tioned or unquestionable, can it be that the citizen has no rem- edy against the wrong intended ? Such a question, it would. seem, could admit of but one an- swer. "A discretionary power cannot excuse an officer for refusal to exercise his discretion. His judgment is appealed to ; not his resentments, his cupidity, or his malice. He is the instrument of the law to accomplish a particular end, through specified means; and when he purposely steps aside from his duty to inflict a wanton injury, the confidence reposed in him has not disarmed the law of the means of prevention. His judgment may indeed be final if he shall exercise it, but an arbitrary and capricious exertion of official authority, being without law, and done to defeat the purpose of the law, must, like all other wrongs, be subject to the law's correction." ' 'Merrill v. Humphrey. 24 Mich. etc. E. Co. v. Canaan, 16 Barb. 244; 170. See Pelton National Bank, 101 Fuller v. Gould, 20 Vt. 643, 644; U.S. 143; Bureau County V. Railroad Stearns v. Miller, 25 Vt. 20; Wilson Co., 44 111. 229; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Marsh, 34 Vt. 352; Clarke v. Lincoln V. Livingston County, 68 111. 458; Law County, 54 Wis. 580; Brauns v. Green V. People, 87 111. ' 385; Spring Valley Bay, 55 Wis. 113. That neither a state Coal Co. V. People. 157 111. 543 ; Keokuk nor a municipality has a right to dis- & N. H. Bridge Co. v. People, 161 111. criminate between residents and non- 514; New Haven Clock Co. v. Koch- residents, see anfe, pp. 168-171; Brooks ersperger, 175 111. 383; Hanson Loan, v. Mangan, 86 Mich. 576; Sayre v. jeto. Co. V. Heston, 83 Iowa 377 ; Adams Phillips, 148 Pa. St. 482 ; City Council V. Beaman, 10 Kan. 37; Woodman v. of Charleston ads. State, 2Speers719; Auditor-General, 52 Mich. 28; Audi- Nashville v. Althorp, 5 Cold. 554. tor-General v. Pioneer Iron Co., 123 Compare Jones v. Columbus, 25 Ga. Mich. 521;nState v. Central Pac. E. 610; Martin v. Eosedale, 130 Ind. 109; Co., 7 Nev. 99; Buffalo, etc. E. Co. v. Eobinson v. Charleston, 2 Rich. 317; Erie County, 48 N. Y. 93; Western R. Titusville v. Brennan, 143 Pa. St. 843. Co. V. Nolan, 48 N. Y. 513; Albany, CH. Tt.J EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. 387 Assessors indeed are clothed with a power which is quasi- judicial, but fra"ud vitiates even the most solemn judgments of courts, and the action of these g'wosi-judicial bodies cannot stand on any higher ground.' It may be that all presumptions should so far favor their action as to protect them against per- sonal actions at the suit of parties aggrieved, but such presump- tions cannot preclude inquiry when their action is questioned for fraud. The policy of the law may protect the person, but it would be defeated if legal effect should be given' to such fraudulent levies.^' Duplicate taxation. It has been remarked on a preceding page,' that, when personal property is taxed, duplicate tax- ation is sometimes imposed. By this was meant that such property sometimes, after being subjected to one levy for the support of government for the current year, is by a change of circumstances subjected to taxation a second time for the sup- port of government during the same period. Such a case might possibly occur in consequence of the removal of the property, after the listing in one jurisdiction, into another where the time of listing was later.* A systeni of indirect taxes, combined with a system of general taxation by vaWe, must often have the effect to duplicate the burden upon some species of property or upon some persons, and the taxation of stockholders in a corporation, and also of the corporation itself, must sometimes produce a like result.' There is also some- 1 The mfere fact of undervaluation ^ See Mayes v. Brwin, 8 Humph, in assessing property does not estab- 390; Hilgenberg v. Wilson, 55 Ind. lish fraud: Spring Valley Coal Co. v. 310; State v. Deering & Co., 56 Minn. People, 157 111. 543; Keokuk & a 34; De Arman v. Williams, 93 Mo. Bridge Co. v. People, 161 111. 514. 158; Lasater v. Green (OkL), 63 Pac. 2 See Lefferts v. Calumet Supervis- Rep. 816; Russell v. Green (Okl.), 63 ors, &1 Wis. 51; Mason v. Lancaster, Pac. Rep. 817; Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 4 Bush 406, 408; Merrill v. Humphrey, Wyo. 337. A tax assessed in April 34 Mich. 170. Proceedings taken by on logs is not a second tax because certain taxpayers which vacate an the land, before the logs vyere cut, assessment as to them, while others, was assessed in the preceding May: who have lost the like right by delay. Nelson Lumber Co. v. Loraine, 33 remain taxed, do not produce in- Fed. Rep. 54 equality in a legal sense, especially ' See Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 if the lands relieved are liable to re- U. S. 139, 136, cited in New Orleans assessment: Matter of De Lancy, 53 v. Houston, 119 U. S. 365, 377, and in N. Y. 89. many later cases. 3 Ante, p. 40. 388 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. [oh. VI. times what seems to be a double taxation of the same property to two individuals; as where the purchaser of property on credit is taxed on its full value, while the seller is taxed to the same amount on the debt.^ How this would operate may be readily perceived by supposing the extreme case that all the property in a town is sold on credit, in which case, if the prop- erty is taxed to the purchasers, and the debts to sellers, it is manifest that the town taxes twice as much wealth as lies within its borders.^ 1 See Savings & L. Soo. v. Austin, 46 Cal. 616. Duplicate taxation being illegal in California (People v. Parks, 58 Cal. 224), if the tangible property of a corporation is in Nevada and is there taxed, the shares cannot be as- sessed to the holders in California: San Francisco v. Mackey, 10 Sawy. 431, 23 Fed. Eepw 602. Taxation of railroad bonds secured by mortgage is invalid in California as double taxation: Germania Trust Co. v. San Francisco, 138 Cal. 589; In re Fair's Estate, 138 CaL 607. The taxation of money lent by a savings bank, se- cured by mortgage, and of the prop- erty securing it, is not double taxa- tion in Nevada: State v. Carson City Savings Bank, 17 Nev. 146. In New Hampshire, railroad bonds, although secured by mortgage, are taxable as money at interest: Boston, C. & M. E. Co. V. State, 63 N. H. 648. The fact that mortgages held by savings banks represent deposits, and depos- itors are taxed, does not render the result produced by the taxation of the mortgages as real estate double taxation: Common Council v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78. A statute providing for the taxation of mort- gages is riot open to the objection of imposing double taxation. It simply makes the holder of the mortgage share in the burden of taxation, in- stead of imposing it all upon the land itself: People v. Sanilac Super- visors, 71 Mich. 16. In Florida the owner of notes secured by mortgage is not relieved from taxation thereon because the mortgaged land is also taxed to the owners: Lamar v. Pal- mer, 18 Fla. 147. Where solvent debts are taxable, a debt supposed to b& collectible in part should be assessed for what it is estimated to be worth: Ibid. In New Jersey the assessor is to deduct from the valuation of land a mortgage upon it, if the owner of the land claims the deduction: State V. Eunyon, 41 N. J. L. 98; Darcy v. Darcy, 51 N. J. L. 140. So though the mortgagee is a national bank: Myers v. Campbell, 64 N. J. L. 186. But a mortgage which is not taxable is not to be deducted: State v. Tren- ton, 40 N. J. L. 89. In Maryland mortgages may be taxed in the hand of the mortgagees, though the land is taxed also: Appeal TaxCqurt V. Eioe, 50 Md. 303. So in Minne-, sota: State v. Jones, 34 Minni 351. So in Alabama: Insurance Co. v. Lett, 54 Ala. 499. So in Netada: State V. Carson City Savings Bank, 17 Nev. 146. And in Oregon: Mum- ford V. Sewell, 11 Oregon, 67; Savings Soo. V. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 431. A contract for the sale of land, to be executed on payment of the purchase price, is a new or additional property, distinct from the property in the land; and taxation levied upon both properties is not double taxatipn: GriflSn v. Board of Eeview, 184 III 375. 2 There is a case in Texas in which the indirect results of taxation were CH. VI.] EQUALITY- AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. 389 ISTow, whether there is injustice in the taxation in every in- stance in which it can be shown that an individual who has been directly taxed his due proportion is also compelled indi- rectly to contribute is a question we have no occasion to dis- cuss. It is sufficient for our purposes to show that the de- cisions are nearly, if not quite, unanimous in holding that taxation is not invalid because of any such unequal results.' followed up somewhat sharply. The law subjected "all property, real and personal," with certain exceptions, to taxation. A planter was taxed on his corn and cotton, but contested the tax as duplicate because he had already been taxed on his slaves and mules by which he produced the corn and cotton. The objection was found by the court to be insurmount- able: State V. Jones, 5 Tex. 383. 1 South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Mor- row, 3 Pickle 406. In this case it is said: " It is not every indirect dupli- cation of a tax which constitutes double taxation. If the duplication be only an incident of the tax it is not double taxation in the sense of the requirement that equality and uniformity must be preserved." It is no objection to a tax graduated by the amount of a merchant's sales that part of the good@ sold had been bought of another who had paid a tax thereon : Mayes v. S wan, 8 Humph. 290. The money of a depositor may be taxed to him, and the deposits of the bank, including this, may also be taxed to the bank: Yuba County v. Adams, 7 Cal. 35. See Knox v. Shaw- nee County, 80 Kan. 496. Where the same property represents distinct values belonging to different per- sons, the fact that eaoh is taxed on the value which the property repre- sents in his hands does not constitute double taxation obnoxious to the or- ganic law of Maryland: United States B. P. & L. Co. V. State, 79 Md. 63. To constitute double taxation property must be twice taxed in the same ju- risdiction: Whi taker v. Brooks, 90 Ky. 68. And therefore a non-resident's personalty may be taxed in the state where it is located, though it is also taxed in the state where it is owned: Winkley v. Newton, 68 N. H. 80; Prairie Cattle Co. v. Williamson, 5 OkL 488. A non-resident carrying on a mercantile business in one state is taxable there, although he has paid in his own state taxes on the prop- erty: Shaw V. Hartford, 56 Conn. 351. Shares of stock in a foreign corpo- ration are taxable to the owner in the state where he resides, even though he or the corporation has paid taxes on the stock or the corpo- rate property in the state where the corporation was organized: Gre'fen- leaf V. Board of Review, 184 111. 326; Whitaker v. Brooks, 90 Ky. 68; Ap- peal Tax Court v. Gill, 50 Md. 377; Great Barrington v. Commissioners, 16 Pick. 573; Dwight v. Boston, 13 Allen 316; Bacon v. Board of Tax Com'rs (Mich.), 85 N. W. Rep. 307; MoKeen v. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 519; Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 73; Dyer V. Osborne, 11 R. L 321. To the same effect are Holton v. Bangor, 23 Me. 264; Smith v. Exeter, 37 N. H. 566; San Francisco v. Fry, 63 Cal. 470: Worth V. Ashe County, 82 N. C. 430, 90 N. C. 409. Where by law the prop- erty of a corporation is to be taied like that of individuals, the shares are taxable also: Danville B. & T. Go. V. Parks, 88 111. 170; Gre'enle^f v. Board of Review, 184 111. 326; State V. Jersey City, 45 N. J. L. 480. Where 390 EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. It cannot be too distinctly borne in mind that any possible system of tax legislation mnst inevitably produce unequal and unjust results in individual instances; and if inequality in re- sult must defeat the general law, then taxation becomes im- the tangible property of a corpora- tion is assessed for taxation it should be deducted as constituting a factor in determining the value of the stock, and because, having been on^ as- sessed, taxation of it again under the name of stock would be double: State V. Simmons, 70 Miss. 485. As- sessment of capital stock held not double taxation in absence of proof of failure to deduct valuation of tangible personalty: Distilling, etc. Co. V. People, 161 111. 101. In Wash- ington it is held that the capital stock of a corporation whose property is properly taxable in the state cannot be assessed to the individual stock- holders resident in the state: Rid- path V. Spokane County (Wash.), 63 Pao. Rep. 361. Taxation of an entire railroad and, in addition, of a wharf whereupon its tracks terminated, held not to constitute double taxa- tion: Pacific Coast R. Co. v. Ramage (Cal.), 37 Pao. Rep. 533. Distillers may be taxed on their whiskey stored in their warehouses, though they have paid a tax on the business of wholesale liquor merchants carried on by them separate from the distil- lery: Frankfort v. Gaines, 88 Ky. 59. A provision that the payment of cer- tain fees by life insurance companies shall be "in lieu of all fees and taxes whatever, except that they rtiay be taxed upon their paid-up capital stock the same as other property in the county for county and municipal purposes," will not prevent the taxa- tion of other property owned by com- panies over and above par value of capital stock: St. Louis M. L. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 56 Mo. 503. In- come may be taxed though invested in real estate which is taxed the same year: Lett v. Hubbard, 44 Ala. 593. See United States v. Sohellinger, 14 Blatch. 71. Taxation of the owner of lands already taxed to long-term lessees because of his net income therefrom is, in effect, taxation of the realty, and is not authorized by law : Kennard v. Manchester, 68 N. H. 61. Income as used in a statute ex- empting incomes from taxation, held to mean the creation of capital, in- dustry, and skill: Wilcox v. Middle- sex County, 103 Mass. 544 See Peo- ple V. Supervisors, 18 Wend. 605; Matter of Western Railway, 5 Met. 596; Commonwealth v. Ocean Oil Coi, 59 Pa. St. 61. Income meaus that which comes in and is deceived from any business or investment of capital without reference to the outgoing expenditures. Profits, on the other hand, are understood to mean the net gain of any business or investment, taking into account both receipts and payments. Income, as applied to the aflairs of individuals, ex- presses the same idea that revenue does when applied to the affairs of government: People v. Supervisors, 4 Hill 30, 7 Hill 504. See Miller v. Douglass, 43 Te:jc 388; New Orleans V. Hart, 14 La. An. 803; New Orleans V. Fossman, 14 La. An. 865. As to difference between "annual value " and "annual income," see Troy Iron & Nail Factory V. Winslow, 45 Barb. 331. " Annual income " as a basis of taxation: See Goldsmith v. Central R. Co., 63 Ga. 509. As to meanings of gross earnings, see State v. St. Paul, etc. R. Co., 30 Minn. 311. As to when the earnings of a railroad are "undivided profits," see United States V. Railroad Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 719. Capital, it has been held signi- fies the actual estate, whether in money or property, whioii is' owned CH. VI.J ■ EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 391 possible," and governments must fall back upon arbitrary ex- actions.^ But no such impracticable principle is recognized in revenue laws. "While equality and justice are constantly to be aimed at, impossibilities are not demanded. Tax legislation must be practical.' It is one of the reasons for levying indi- rect taxes, and other taxes than those on property by value, that they are supposed to diminish the inequalities that would exist if a single species of taxation only were to be levied. The legislature must judge of the general result, and when the law has apportioned the tax, individual hardships must be regarded as among the inconveniences which are incident to regular government. The same necessity that justifies any taxation will justify and sustain any reasonable provisions for giving it effect. The necessity of the state and of reasonable provisions for the security of the individual must be equally considered ; the state is no more to be deprived of its revenue, because of individual hardship, resulting from general rules, than is the individual to be stripped of his property without law, because in its necessity the state finds it more convenient to take it thus than by regular proceedings. The incidental hardship or inconvenience must be submitted to in either case. These general views have often been declared by able jurists. " Property," it is said in one case, " is liable in many oases to be taxed twice, when it would appear difficult or unsafe to- make provision by law to prevent. Thus, stock in trade may be taxed to the owner, while he may be indebted for it to many persons who may be taxed for those debts or the money loaned, to purchase it. Keal estate may be taxed to a mortgager in possession while the mortgagee is. taxed for the money secured by an individual or corporation. In what constitutes the "capital" of a reference to a corporation, it is the bank, see New Orleans v. Citizens' aggregate of the sum subscribed and Bank, 167 U. S. 371. paid in, or to be paid in, by the share- i Pacific Nat, Bank v. Pierce holders, with the addition of profits County, 30 Wash. 675. on the residue, after the deduction 2 Lee v. Sturges, 46 Ohio St. 153. of losses: People v. OoinmissionAs, '"There is nothing poetical about 23 N. Y. 193, 219. See People v. Feit- tax laws. Wherever they find prop- ner, 167 N. Y. 1. In Mechanics', etc. erty they claim a contribution for its Bank v. Townsend, 5 Blatch. 815, protection, without any especial re- capital was held not to include sur- spect to the owner or his oocupa- plus earnings, though undivided, tion." Lowrie, Ch. J., in Finley v. See, to the same efl'pot. State v. Bank Philadelphia, 33 Pa. St. 381. of Commerce, 95 Tenn. 321. As to 392 EQUALITY AND UNIFOKMITT IN TAXATION. ' [OH. VI. by the mortgage. . . . So imperfect are all human institu- tions that perfect equality in the imposition of burdens is not to be expected. These provisions for valuation are not consid- ered to be in conflict with the general purpose to have all prop- erty subjected to taxation once, and only once at the same time." ^ " The power to tax twice," it is said in another case, "is as ample as to tax once."* "We make out, therefore, no 1 Augusta Bank v. Augusta, Z6%le. 355, 259. See People v. Worthington, 31 111. 170; People v. Sanilac Super- visors, 71 Mich. 16; St. Louis L. Ins. Co. V. Assessors, 56 Mo. 503; Kirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 358. For oases of apparent double taxation by a tax on business, see Savannah v. Charl- ton,-36 Ga. 460; Burch v. Savannah, 43 Ga. 596: Sacramento v. Crocker, 16 Cal. 119; Coulson v. Harris, 43 Miss. 738; Woolman v. State, 3 Swan 353. As to the impossibility of avoid- ing inequalities in highway taxes, see Hingham, etc. Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk County, 6 Allen 353, 359. Railroad bonds are taxable to the owner though the company pays a tax on the market value of its stock and on its debt, in lieu of all taxes on property and franchises: Bridgeport V. Bishop, 33 Conn. 187. Taxing an Individual owner's cars and the rail- road companies for earnings is not duplicate taxation: Comstock v. Grand Rapids, 54 Mich. 641. A statute requiring hospital expenses of insane person to be paid out of his estate is not double taxation: Tturburru's Es- tate (Cal.), 66 Pac. Rep. 739. 2 West Chester Gas Co. v. Chester County,..80 Pa. St. 333, per Porter, J., cited with approval in -Pittsburgh, eta-R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 73, 77, 78. See, also, Erie R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 84; Eber- ville Coal Co. v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. St. 47, 54; Davidson v. New Or- leans, 96 U. S. 97; Reclamation Dist. V. Hagar, 6 Sawy. 567. Congress having levied a tax upon an article is not thereby precluded from levy- ing anpther: U. S. v. Benzon, 3 Clifl. 513. In Philadelphia Savings Fund v. Yard, 9 Pa. St. 359, 361, in refer- ring to the case of The Carlisle Bank, 8 Watts 391, the following remarks are made: "The horror of double taxation, manifest in that -case, is unsuited to the times; for it has ob- tained, and must prevail in the exi- gencies of the commonwealth. It exists in the case of ground rents, where the ground itself and the reditum issuing- from it are taxed; in a tax upon a mortgage to the whole value of tbe land, and the land itself. And so, where A. borrows money on mortgage and loans it to C. on bond, and who loans a part of it to D., it is taxed in the current of each actual employment. In the complexity and involutions of business, a dollar is employed many times in a day, and in each actual employment repre- sents the property, business or the person of him who uses it. And in cases of this kind, it is the usufruct, and not the actual or identical money, that is taxed." In Pittsburgh, etc. R Co. V. Commonwealth, 66 Pa. St. 73, 77, it is said double taxation is of frequent occurrence. "The real and personal property of a corpora- tion may be taxed, although it pays a tax on the stock which purchased it: nerly, 74 Ala. 583. •OH. VI.J EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITT IN TAXATION. 409 by the co-ordinate powers of the state, it must clearly appear that the commutation was intended.' Diversity of taxation in different diJstricts. Keference has been made to cases which recognize the right of the state to establish different rules of taxation for the local levies in different districts, even when, by the state constitution, uni- formity and equality in taxation are required. Such different rules are made in view of the universal custom to consult the cir- cumstances of different districts, and, when deemed important, the wishes of their people regarding the taxes to be levied therein as district taxes; and all presumptions are against any purpose to set aside that custom. Local taxes may be levied on a different system in the different municipal districts, and for different, purposes ; not only when they are laid to supply mere local works and conveniences, but also when they are for purposes — like the highways, for instance — which, though paid for locally, are for the benefit of the whole state and the use of all its people.^ Monopolies. It seems scarcely necessary to say that the rule of equality in taxation will, forbid the power being em- ployed for the purpose of building up monopolies. That it is capable of being so employed needs no demonstration; and' that it sometimes has been so employed, especially in the ar- rangement of customs duties, is unquestionable; always, of course, under the pretense of an apportionment of taxes for the public good. Taxation of business and the license taxes are peculiarly liable to abuse in this direction,' especially if they undertake to limit the number to whom permits shall be granted ; and if the state can exempt the large manufacturer from taxa- tion while taxing' his feeble competitor, as has been done in one state at least, it may take in this way a long stride in the < 1 Hay ward v. People, 145 IlL 55. 3 See Judge Nott's article on " Mo- ^ See, in general, People v. Central nopolies " in the International Re- Pac. R. Co., 43 Cal. 398; Bright v. view, vol. 1, p. 870. Charles L was MoCuUough, 37 Ind. 233; Commis- able to exact large suras of money sioners v. Alleghany County, 30 Md. by enforcing a royal proclamation 449, 4S7; Merrick v. Amherst, 13 Al- forbidding the erection of buildings len 500: Boyd v. Wiggins, 7 OkL 85. in extension of London, and grant- Two laws fixing different rates of ing special permits on the payment taxation cannot both obtain at the of large sums for the privilege: same time in the same city: Holz- Green's England, oh, 8, sec. 5, hauer v. Newport, 94 Ky. 396. 410 EQUALITY AND UNIFOEMITY IN TAXATION. [CH. VI. direction of establishing a monopoly. The spirit of a free con- stitution, if not its letter, forbids such legislation, and sound public policy forbids it also. One reason why taxation for private purposes is inadmissible is, that its tendency is to the building up of monopolies at the expense of the public who would suffer from them ; ' it begins in a pretense for the public good, and it ends in crippling the general industry while it excites the general discontent.^ ♦ Permanence in legislation. It should be added that, in order that tax laws may not be oppressive, they should not be subject to frequent changes. Tariff laws frequently changed becortie a serious impediment to the business of the country, from the impossibility on the part of business men to calculate upon the future. To all the other contingencies of business is added this one, which is, perhaps, greatest of all : that the fed- eral legislature may so change the customs laws as to detract considerably from the market value of merchandise on hand, or increase largely the cost of something employed in manu- . facture, or in some other way to change greatly the outlook for any particular trade. The excise laws are seldom changed without serious injury to individuals; and if others, perhaps, malte fortunes by the change, the possibility of such prosperity leads to spqculations in prospective changes, and even to en- deavors by indirect means to procure alterations for speculative purposes. Changes in other tax laws are not so injurious, but they are always liable to be oppressive in individual cases, and for this reason are not to be made except to cure positive evils. Mere inconveniences, to which the people have become accus- tomed, or even impolitic or unequal taxation to which trade and business have adjusted themselves, are usually less harm- ful than considerable changes in the law made with a view to their correction. This is^ a consideration of policy, with which the courts have no concern, but it seems sufBciently important to justify mention in this connection. 1 See Philadelphia Assoc, v. Wood, bidding for the contract to construct 39 Pa. St. 73, 83, per Loivrie, Ch. J. it: Nicolson Pavement Co. v. Fay, 85 2 The right of a city to levy a tax Cal. 695; Same v. Painter, 35 Cal. for the construction of a patented 699; Dean v. Charlton, 23 Wia 590; pavement has been denied in some Burgess v. Jeflferson, 31 La. An. 148. states, on the express ground that Contra, Hobart v. Detroit, 17 Mich, the patent was a monopoly, and 346; In re Eager, 46 N. Y. 100; In re there could be no competition in Dugro, 50 N. Y. 513. CHAPTEE VII. THE APPORTIONMENT OP TAXES. When the state has need of the property of citizens for its sovereign purposes, it may lawfully appropriate it against the will of the owner either under the power to tax or the right of eminent domain. There is a difference in the two cases which is vital. When property is appropriated under the right of eminent domain, a particular item or parcel is taken, because for public purposes there is special ,need of it, and the state takes it under proceedings which amount, so far as the owner is concerned, to a forced sale. But taxation is based upon the idea of calling upon the people for equal and proportional con- tributions to the public wants, that the burdens of government may fall ratably upon all who in justice should bear them.* Apportionment of the burden is therefore a necessary element in all taxation.^ Two things are involved in apportionment. The first is the selection of the subjects of taxation. No state undertakes to tax everything which comes within the reach of the taxing power; and it would be idle as well as mischievous in the last degree if it were to attempt it. For whil6 the state may tax all persons as such, and all property as such, it may also tax all occupations, all amusements, and the very enjoyment of customary rights and privileges, until the exactions would be oppressive from their very number when not otherwise oner- ous, and a free people would, not endure them. The more 1 People V. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419 Booth V. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118 Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 374 V. Grantsville City, 19 Utat 368. And see Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana 513, 516; Martin v. Dix, 53 Eyerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269 ; Macon Miss. 5.3. V. Patty, 57 Miss. 378. The constitu- ^ People v. Salem T'p Board, 30 tional provision prohibiting the dam- Mich. 453; Bay City v. State Treas- aging or taking of private property urer, 33 Mich. 499; Callam v. Sagi- for public use without just compensar naw, 50 Mich. 7; Tide Water Co. v. tion is not a limitation upon the tax- Coste'r, 18 N. J. Eq. 518; Henry v. ing power of the state, but upon the Chester, 15 Vt. 460. power of eminent domain: Eimball 412 APPOETIONMENT OF TAXES. [oH, VII. . reasonable and politic course is to select for taxation as few subjects as possible, consistent with a fair distribution of the burden. The other requisite in apportionment is the laying down of a rule by which to measure the contribution which each of the subjects selected for taxation shall make. This rule only the legislative power of the state is competent to prescribe, and apportionment, therefore, is always an act of legislation.' " The power of taxing and the power of apportioning taxation are identical and inseparable. Taxes cannot be laid without ap- portionment, and the power of apportionment is, therefore, unlimited, unless it be restrained as a part of the power of tax- ation." ^ ' The methods of apportionment are numerous and dissimilar, but most taxes may be classified under the three heads of specific taxes, ad valorem taxes, and taxes apportioried by special benefits. Specific taxes. Under this head may be classed those which impose a specific sum by the head or number, or by some standard of weight or measureolent, and which require no as- sessment beyond a listing and classification of the subjects to be taxed. License taxes and other taxes on business or oc- cupations, stamp taxes, taxes on franchises and privileges, are usually specific, as are also other excise and customs taxes.' iWalston V. Nevin, 138 U. S. 578; method of apportioning the cost Simpson V. Kansas City, 46 Kan. 438; must be provided: Simpson v. Kan- Williams V. Detroit, 2 Mich. p60; sas City, 46 Kan. 438. In Massaohu- Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 374; setts it has been held that the omis- Youngblood v. Sexton, 33 Mich. 406; sion to prescribe a fixed rule for the In re Flower, 55 Hun 158; Sooville v. assesspent of the cost of a sewerage Cleveland, 1 Ohio St. 136. The legis- system with respect to the several lature may apportion for taxation localities to be drained does not con- among several towns funds of a travene the constitutional power charity although one township was vested in the legislature: Kingman, the situs of all such funds: North- Peti^tioner, 153 Mass. 566. ampton v. Hampshire CountyCom'rs, ' The tax on inheritances provided 45 Mass. 108. by the Michigan statute of 1899 is a 2 Ruggles, J., in People v. Brooklyn, specific and not an ad valorem tax, 4 N. Y. 419, 426-7. See Glasgow v. although it is based on the value of Eouse, 43Mo. 479. 489; Butler's Ap- the property inherited: Union Trust peal, 78 Pa. St. 448. In every act Co. v. Wayne Probate Judge, 125 providing for a local improvement a Mich. 487. A statute providing that CH. VII.] ' APPOETIONMENT OF TAXES. 413 As regards all such taxes, the law by which they are liaid is of itself a complete apportionment. Ministerial officers have nothing to do but to list the subjects of taxation; classify them where that is necessary; ascertain the number, weight, measurement, etc., when taxation depends upon it, and collect the sum which the law has definitely fixed.' If the taxes are stamp or license taxes, even the listing may not be required, but the individual who is to pay them will purchase his stamp or his license, and thus make voluntary payment, as 'he may have occasion. Ad valorem taxes. A large proportion of the duties on im- ports are of this description, and so, sometimes, are many of the taxes which make up the internal revenue.^ The statute laying them prespribes the rule, but requires the action of ap- praisers in apportioning them between individuals. By far the larger proportion of all state taxation is also upon property by a valuation, and effect can only be given to it by means of as- sessors, who value the property and apportion the tax by their estimate. Taxes apportioned hy benefits. As between districts., where an object for which taxes are to be levied pertains to two or more, the legislature sometimes makes the apportionnjent by certain ofiBoers shall assess telegraph greatest amount of merchandise on and telephone lines at their true cash hand between given dates, and the value, and levy upon the assessment amouht of such statement, and of a tax at a rate which shall equal the each kind of taxes levied thereon, to average rate of taxes, general, mu- be entered by the county clerk in a nicipal, and local, levied throughout " Merchants' Tax-Book," was held to the state during the previous year, provide for property, not occupation does not provide a specific tax: Pin- taxes: State v. Tracy, 94 Mo. 817. greev. Auditor-General, 120 Mich. 95. Tax of a certain per cent, on railway A statute providing for the oollec- oars held to be' a tax on property: tion of annual fees from public-school State v. Stephens, 146 Mo. 663. A tax teachers, which fees are to be used of a certain sum imposed on each to defray the expenses of teachers' share of a railroad company's stock institutes, does not provide for spe- was considered to be not a property piflc state taxes: Hammond v. Mus- tax, but a price charged under the kegon School Board, 109 Mich. 676. charter contract for the franchise, 1 Adler v, Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. and to be collectible from the com- 539. pany, and not from the stockholders : ^A statute requiring every mer- State v. Seabord & E. Ca, 53 Fed. chant to file a statement ojf the Rep. 4^0. iU APPOETIONMENT OF TAXES. [oh. VII. its own action directly, with reference to the supposed interest of each in such object, or to the benefit each is likely to derive therefrom.^ It may also provide for the apportionment by commissioners appointed for the purpose. This often becomes necessary in the case of roads and bridges lying partly in two or more districts.^ The case of the division of counties and towns affords many opportunities for state apportionment. If one municipality is set off from another, the old one, as has been seen, unless it is otherwise provided by statute, will retain the public property and remain liable for the corporate debts.' It will also retain the right to proceed in the collection of the taxes previously voted, and they will belong to it, though collected in part from the territory now set off.* And this will be the case even as to a special tax levied for a particular local work, the whole bene- fit of which will be received by the old municipality.' The iSee Salem Turnpike v. Essex County, 100 Mass. 282; Shaw v. Den- nis, 10 111. 405; Supervisors v. People, 110 111. 511. 2 See ante, p. 253. A state requir- ing state taxes to be levied for five years on the basis of the last equali- zation does not require an old county from vrhich a new one has been set off to bear the whole burden of state tax as before the division until tKe next equalization. The rule of ap- portionment indicated: Ontonagon Supervisors v. Gogebic Supervisors, 74 Mich. 721. See Auditor-General V. Menominee Supervisors, 89 Mich. 552. 3 Devor v. McClintook, '9 W. & S. 80; Waldron v. Lee, 5 Pick. 323; Bar- man v. New Marlborough, 9 Gush. 535; Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal. 88; Mor- gan County V. Hendricks County, 83 Ind, 334. See Alvis v. Whitney, 48 Ind. 83. Where a county had law- fully issued its bonds in aid of a rslil- road, and part of its territory had been taken to form pther counties by statutes which provided that the citizens and property within the old lipiits should remain liable for the payment of those bonds " as though this act had never been passed," held, that an act which authorized the court of the old county to com- promise the bonds and to issue new obligations in settlement, and to levy and collect t-axes upon all the territory, was constitutional: Sin- ton V. Carter County, 38 Fed. Rep. 585. Where a new county is organ- ized, and by the act authorizing the formation of it the fractions com- posing it are declared liable for their pro ratas of the debts of the old coun- ties from which they were taken, the old county levies the debt upon the fraction, and collects it as if no sepa- ration had taken place, and a bill in equity will not lie to compel the new county to levy taxes to pay such pro rata: Blount County v. Loudon County, 8 Heisk. 854. * Marion County v. Harvey County, 36 Kan. 181. See the same case as to a similar question regardingrailroad- aid taxation, And compare Chand- ler V. Reynolds, 19 Kan. 249; Lamb V. Burlington, etc., R. Co., 89 Iowa 333. 6 Fender v. Neosho Falls, 32 Kan. OH. VII.] APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES. 415 duty of collecting the tax will also be upon the officers of the old municipality.* If this rule results in injustice to either the one party or the other, there can be no remedy except in leg- islation, for neither could have an action against the other based on equities growing out of the division.^ But the legislature has full power to do justice in such cases by making the proper division of property and debts, either directly or through commissioners, or by the aid of the local official boards. And when the apportionment is made, it may compel the necessary taxes to be levied for the payment of any award.' It is not uncommon to provide for such apportionment by general law.* 305 ; Blount County v. Loudon County, 8 Heisk. 854; Sinton v. Carter County, 23 Fed. Rep. 535. Where territory Is detached from a county and or- ganized into a new county, the treas- urer of the old county cannot be re- quired to collect from the taxpayers of the new county taxes levied prior to the division, he having no duty in that regard: State v. Clevenger, 27 Neb. 423. As to the collection and disbursement of taxes in unorganized territory, see Ferris v. Vannier, 6 Dak. 186; Roscommon v. Midland, .89 Mich. 434; Gay v. Thomas, 5 Okl. 1 ; Dupree v. Stanley County, 8 S. D. 80; Llano Cattle Co. v. Faught, 69 Tex. 403; Thomas v. Gay, 169 U. S. 364; Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U. S. 588. Cutting off a part of a school district from a township takes away at once all power of the township as to school taxes in the part set off: Folk- erts V. Power, 43 Mich. 383. But when a new township is erected of territory taken from an old one, it does not become a township as to the assessment, levy, and collection of taxes until it has officers; and until then the old township may con- tinue to tax fot its own use: Com- missioners V. Harrisville, 45 Mich. 442. See Milwaukee, etc. »El. Co. v. Kossuth County, 41 Iowa 57. 'See Laramie County v. Albany County, 93 U. S. 307, where it was held that a county which was largely indebted, and from which another county had been set off, could not, after paying the debt, maintain an action against the new county for contribution, 2 Bristol V. New Chester, 3 N. H. 534; Londonderry v. Derry, 8 N. H. 320; Willimantic v. Windham, 14 Conn. 457; Hartford Bridge Co. v. East Hartford, 16 Conn. 149, 173; Granby v. Thurston, 23 Conn. 416; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 13, 20; Milwaukee v. Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 93; State v. Rice, 35 Wis. 178; Bowdoinham v. Richmond, 6 Greenl. 113; Marshall County Court v. Callo- way County Court, 3 Bush 93; Rich- land County V. Lawrence County, 13 111. 1 : Borough of Dunmore's Appeal, ' 52 Pa. St. 374; Sedgwick County v, Bunker, 16 Kan. 498. 3 See Marathon v. Oregon, 8 Mich. 372; Land, etc. Co. v. Oneida County, '83 Wis. 649. As to what is a " fund due " on the division of a municipal- ity, see Jasper v. Sheridan, 47 Iowa 183. On the creation of a new dis- trict by the union of two districts, the property of both becomes-' its property. It has no power to bar- gain and pay over to the old district the value of its school-house, or to levy a tax for the purpose: Bacon v. School District, 97 Mass. 421. * Ante. oh. VL 416 APPOETIONMENT OF TAXES. [oH. VII. In an earlier chapter ^ the constitutional provisions of a num- bar of the states requiring taxation of property to be by value have been mentioned. A later chapter * will cite those judicial decisions which hold that the local levies, commonly known under the head of assessments, though laid under the taxing power, are not taxes in the technical sense of that term as it is commonly employed in state constitutions, and that therefore they may be laid by some standard other than that of value, if the legislature shall so prescribe. The standard more often established than any other is one which seeks to put upon each item of property a tax proportioned to the special benefit it is to receive from the expenditure. There are two general meth- ods of making the apportionment between individuals, the one or the other of which is prescribed as is thought most just and equal. The first is, the appointment of assessors or commis- sioners empowered to examine the district and apportion the tax according as they shall find that benefits will be received. The second is a determination by the legislature itself that the benefits will be in proportion to value, area, or frontage, and apportionment accordingly. In another place it is shown that either course may be admissible. ' General principles of apportionment. The principles by which the legislative apportionment of taxes is to be tested have been so admirably stated in a Kentucky case that we prefer quoting the language of the court in preference to any attempt at stating them in words of our own:' ""When shall a tax be levied ? To what amount ? Shall it be a capitation or property tax ? Direct or indirect ? Ad valorem or specific ? And what classes of property are the fittest subjects of taxation ? are all questions wisely confided by our constitution to the dis- cretion of the legislative department, subject to no other lim- itation than that of the moral influence of public virtue or responsibility to public opinion. But in some other respects, and so far as the power of taxation may be effectual without being thus limited, it is in our opinion limited by some of the declared ends and principles of the fundamental laws. Among these political ends and principles, equality, as far as practi- cable, and security of property against irresponsible power, > Pos/, oh. XX ^ Post, oh. XX CH. 7II.J APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES. 417 are eminently conspicuous in our state constitution. An exact equalization of the burdens of taxation is unattainable and Utopian. But still there are well defined limits within which the practical equality of the constitution may be preserved, and which, therefore, should be deemed impassable barriers to leg- islative power. Taxation may not be universal, but it must be general and uniform. Hence, if a capitation tax be laid, none of the class of persons thus taxed can be constitutionally ex- empt upon any other ground than that of public service ; and if a tax be laid on land, no appropriation land within the limits of the state can be constitutionally exempted, unless the owner be entitled to such immunity on the ground of public service. The legislature, in the plenitude of the taxing power, ca:nnot have constitutional authority to exact from one citizen, or even from one county, the entire revenue for the whole common- wealth. Such an exaction, by whatever name the legislature might choose to call it, would not be a tax, but would be, un- doubtedly, the taking of private property for public use, and which could not be done constitutionally without the consent of the owner or owners, or without retribution of the value in money. "The distinction between constitutional taxation and the taking of private property for public use by' legislative will may not be definable with perfect precision. But we are clearlj'^ of the opinion, that whenever the property of a citizen shall be taken from him by the sovereign will, and appropriated without his consent to the benefit of the public, the exaction should not be considered as a tax unless similar contributions be made by that public itself, or shall be exacted rather by the same public will from such constituent members of the same community generally as own the same kind of property. " Taxation and representation go together. And represent- ative responsibility is one of the chief conservative principles in our form of government. "When taxes are levied, therefore, they must be imposed on the public in whose name and for whose benefit they are required, and to whom those who im- pose them are responsible. And although there may be a discrimination in the subjects of taxation, still persons in the same class, and property of the same kind, must generally be ' subjected alike to the same common burden. This alone is ■ 37 418' APPOETIONMEHT OF TAXES. [CH. vir. taxation according to our notion of constitutional taxation in. Kentucky. And this idea, fortified by the spirit of our con- stitution, is, in our Judgment, confirmed by so much of the twelfth section of the tenth article as declares, ' Nor shall any man's property be taken or applied to public use without the consent of his representatives, and without just compensation being previously made to him.' " ' Apportionment presuii^tively just. Whatever the rule of apportionment that is thus established by legislation, it is pre- sumptively as just and equal in the opinion of the legislature as the circumstances would permit. It is not, therefore, to be questioned on any grounds of policy, and it cannot be set aside on any showing that in particular cases its operation is unjust.^ 1 Robertson, Ch. J., in Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana 513, 516. See also Youngblood v. Sexton, 33 Mich. 406. The sentence quoted-from the constitution, however, while it formulates a general idea in consti- tutional law, has special reference only to the eminent domain: Martin V. Dix,.53Miss. 53. 2 As to diversity in apportionment, see Anderson v. Kerns Braining Co., 14 Ind. 199; Lay ton v. New Orleans, 13 La. An. 515; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. An. 498. Taxation of mer- chants by sales- is not unequal: Sac- ramento V. Crocker, 16 Cal. 119. See ch. XVIII. That the courts can afford no relief for what is merely an un- wise apportionment, see Tallman v. Butler County, 13 Iowa 531. That a license tax may be apportioned in reference to the size of the town in which the privilege is to be exer- cised, see State v. Schlier, 3 Helsk. 381. A peculiar case of apportion- ment was that in Ould v. Richmond, S3 Grat. 464. The tax was a 'license tax on lawyers, who were classified in six classes by the finance commit- tee of the common council, and the tax was different in the several classes. The tax was sustained against an objection to its inequality. The classification seems to have had in view the value of the privilege the license gave, the extent of the business, the income, etc. In Berney V. The Tax Collector, 3 Bailey 654, 681, O'Neill, J., in speaking of objec- tions which were made to a tax on bank dividends, says: "It may be that the tax on the dividends may operate unequally in that it is vir- tually a tax on money at interest, which is not generally subjected to taxation. This objection, however, is not addressed to the proper /orum; it belongs to the legislature, not to the judiciary, to decide on its pro- priety and force. The legislature may select any property they please, to be taxed. If the tax is to operate generally on every citizen who may own the property declared liable to it, it would be constitutional. If an act purports to exempt one class of citizens,owhing property upon which it imposes a tax in the hands of others, it might be a discriminat- ing tax, and unconstitutional." In • Youngblood v. Sexton, 33 Mich. 406, a tax on business was objected to be- cause the sum levied was uniform and did not discriminate according to the business done; but the court says this is clearly within the power OH. VII.] APPOETIONHENT OF TAXES. 419 Apportionment imperatiTe. But the requirement of ap- portionment is absolutely indispensable in any exercise of the power to tax.i There can be no such thing as valid taxation when the burden is laid without rule, either in respect to the subjects of it or to the extent to ■^hich each must contribute. In this respect the legislature is as powerless as any subordi- nate authority, it being impossible there should be taxation that is at once arbitrary and valid.'' "Whenever, therefore, the of the legislature, which must deter- mine conclusively whether this method is or is not more just and politic than any other. 1 People V. Salem T'p Board, 20 Mich. 453; Bay City v. State Treas- urer, 23 Mich. 499; Callam y. Sagi- naw, 50 Mich. 7; Tide Water Co. v. Coster. 18 N. J. Bq. 518, per Beasley, Ch. J. ; Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt. 460. Before the inhabitants of a township which has elected to work the roads by hire can be warned out, there must be an apportionment of the labor in the same proportion as the taxes as- sessed for the support of the govern- ment: Wallace v. Bradshaw, 56 N. J. L. 339. Taxes must be proportion- ately assessed on persons and prop- erty, but there is no constitutional provision that money raised by tax- ation must be appropriated in such a manner that the several taxpayers or districts of taxpayers will be di- rectly benefited in proportion to the amount of their taxes: School Dist. V. Prentiss, 66 N. H. 145. The New York statute concerning the settle- ment and collection of arrearages of unpaid taxesinBrooklyn,providedfor the hearing by the board of assessors of objections by affected owners, and declared that the board's determina- tion as to the amount to be charged on each parcel of land be conclusive. Held, that the act was not unconsti- tutional as failing to provide for any apportionment of taxes: Lamb v. Connolly, 123 N. Y. 581; Teirel v. Wheeler, 123 N. Y. 76; Fithian v. Wheeler, 125 N. Y. 696; Martin v. Stoddard, 127 N. Y. 61. ^The citizen's right is to pay no more than his just proportion; and the legislature cannot arbitrarily de- termine the amount, although it may fix the aggregate sum to be raised, and the area of the property which shall pay it: In re Union Coll., 129 N. Y. 308; Nehasane Park Assoc. V. Lloyd, 167 N. Y. 431. A legis- lative act which is in effect a selec- tion of individuals from a general class for taxation is not sustain- able by showing that it is no more onerous a burden than they should bear; "this fact does not aflfect the' question of legislative power, and cannot give validity to the act: " Albany, etc. Bank v. Maher, 9 Fed. Eep. 884. See Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183. An act excluding certain lands from the established limits of a drainage district and exempting them from future drainage assess- ments is void. "The improvement necessary or Indispensable to, and undertaken by, a district, must be not merely commenced, but exe- cuted either in whole or in part by the entire district. Unless or until all are released by the execution or failure of the undertaking, " or — ac- cording to circumstances — by the satisfaction of the full or proportion- ate shares of their liability, all are and remain bound:" New Orleans Canal, etc. Co. v. New Orleans, 30 La. An. 1371. A statute authorizing a city to provide a system of sewer- 420 APPOETIONMENT OF TAXES. [OH. VII. tax is to be levied upon property, agencies for the apportion- ment of it by the prescribed rule are as indispensable as the rule its'elf. And the dut}'- they have to perform is, to make the sum demanded of any one person or laid upon any one parcel of property have some fixed ratio, not only to the whole tax, but also to that demanded of every other person, or laid upon every other piece of property. Without. this, as has been forcibly said, the exactions of money for the public are mere forced contributions, and taxation will differ from the eminent domain only in this: that the latter demands the property of the citizen when necessity requires it, and on making compen- sation, while the former exacts it at discretion and without compensation.! In respect to the apportionment of taxes in general, after the subjects of taxation have been determined upon, the following may be stated as general principles; 1. The taxing district through which the tax is to be appor- tioned must be the district which is to be benefited by its col- lection and expenditui'e. . The district for the apportionment of a state' tax is the state, for a county tax the county, and so on. Subordinate districts may be created for convenience, but the principle is general, and in all the subordinate districts the rule must be the same.* age, and to assess taxes therefor under:. Peoria, D. etc. R. Co. v. Peo- against the land-owners benefited, is pie, 116 III.' 401. not invalid because prescribing no i Christianoy, J., in Woodbridge v. special mode of apportioning the Detroit,8 Mich. 374,309,following and taxes, as the city would incidentally approving Lexington' v. McQuillan's have the power to adopt some fair Heirs, 9 Dana 518. Compare Wilson and legal mode: Gatch v. Des Moines, v. Supervisors, 47 Cal. 91 ; Chicago v. 63 Iowa 718. Where a railroad com- Larned, 34 IlL 203; Creote v. Chi- pany's charter has conferred upon cago, 56 111. 433; Weller v. St. Paul, municipalities power to subscribe to 5 Minn. 70; Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 its stock, and, by implication, power Wis. 243, 358; State v. Portage, 12 to levy taxes to mee^; the obligatipn, Wis. 563, a failure to comply with the require- ^ People v. Salem T'p Board, 20 ment of the act that the ordinance Mich. 453; Washington Supervisors shall specify in detail the purposes v. SaltvlUe Land Co. (Va.), 39 S. E. of the appropriations and the amount Rep. 704. The requirement of the appropriated for such purpose, and, New Hampshire constitution that where an apportionment is neces- taxes must be proportionately as- sary, how it shall be made, vitiates sessed " for the public service " is the ordinance and any fovy there- answered if the public money is ap- CH. Vll.] APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES. 421 2. The basis of apportionment which is fixed upon by the general rule must be applied throughout the district.' There cannot be two rules of apportionment for the same tax in the same district ; if there could be, there might be any number, plied to the public uses of the polit- ical division for which it is raised: School Dist. V. Prentiss, 66 N. H. 145. And therefore the statute authoriz- ing towns, at their annual meetings, to direct in what manner the school money shall be assigned to the school districts, is constitutional: Ibid. To warrant an apportionment of the expense of constructing a highway among neighboring towns, such towns Eflust be benefited by the use of the high way for jiurposes of tra v el ; it is not enough that the highway will bring increased trade and busi- ness: Piatt V. Milton, 58 Vt. 608. The fiscal court, consisting of the county judge and magistrates both inside and outside of a city separated from the county for governmental pur- poses, must levy a tax for expenses common to both county and city on all property of the coupty subject to taxation: Richardson v.' Boske (Ky.), 64 S. W. Eep. 919. Adjoining terri- tory in two counties having been made a " no fence " district " under a statute directing that a fence should be erected by county com- missioners around the district, the expense to be met by a tax on all land within the district, it was held that aU the land in the district should be taxed uniformly, although more fencing was required in one county than in another: Greene County Com'rs V. Lenoir County Com'rs, 93 N. C. 180. A statute requiring the board of supervisors of each county to levy upon the taxable property thereof a certain tax for school pur- poses, but which does not include a levy upon the taxable property within the limits of a town which is a separate school district, is not un- constitutional because the schools in the town may get the benefit of a tax on a larger amount of property, in proportion to the number oft chil- dren of school age, than the county: Bordeaux v. Meridian L. & I. Co., 67 Miss. 304. An apportionment of taxes for street improvernent is not governed by the advantage or dis- advantage to any person within the tax district, but by the benefits to the district as a whole, and on this basis property may be assessed which derives no benefit from the improve- ment. But the rule cannot be so ex- tended as to lay on property not benefited a tax exceeding its value, as this would be spoliation, not tax- ation: Preston v. Rudd, 84 Ky. 150. The power of the legislature to dis- tribute a tax for the payment of the expenses of laying out or improving a highway is not necessarily confined to the precise territory in which the expenditure was made: People v. Board of Supervisors, 113 N. Y. 585- 1 Where the boundaries of a city constituting one school district are enlarged, the school fund must be raised from the whole district by equal taxation, regardless of when the assessment period commenced, or the boundaries of the district at such time, or when the money will be expended: Seattle v. Board, 3 Wash. 154. When a city is part of a township it is not competent for the legislature to exempt its inhabitants from the payment of township taxes for highway purposes: O'Kane v. Treat, 35 111. 458. For a similar case, see Fletcher v. Oliver, 35 Ark. 389. An ordinance assessing the cost of fmproving a street as a special tax upon the contiguous property on the 422 APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES, [CH. VII. and in effect there would be none at all, and every man might be assessed arbitrarily.' 3. Though the apportionment must be general, a diversity in the methods of collection violates no rule of right, and is as much admissible as a diversity in police regulations. Indeed, diversity in this regard may, under some circumstances, be an absolute necessity* Of this the country had illustrations in the case of federal taxes diwing the late civil war. The taxes principle of assessing each lot with the cost of improving the part of the street in front of it is void as impos- ing the burden unequally, and'not in proportion to the benefits conferred : Davis V. Litchfield. 145 III. 313. iTide Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518. In Wilson v. Supervisors, 47 Cal. 91, it viras held incompetent to autljorize the supervisors to remit a levee tax on part of the district. And yet it would have been compe- tent originally to so bound the dis- trict as to exclude the part on which it was proposed to remit the tax. That the basis of the apportionment is not necessarily the same for gen- eral and local taxes, even when value is the standard, is illustrated by the case of Insurance Co. v. Baltimore, 33 Md. 396. It appears from that case that for the purposes of an ap- portionment of state taxation among the municipal divisions, the nom- inal capital of private corpora- tions was assumed to be the value. But in imposing the tax on the cor- porations themselves, or their mem- bers, theaotual value was ascertained. This method would be likely to lead to some inequalities in the distribu- tion of state taxation between dis- tricts, but they could not be serious. In this connection may be mentioned several cases in which classes of tax- able property were attempted to be relieved from the appdrtionment. In one of these, the personal property was not to be taxed for the payment of a city debt, for the reason, prob- ably, that the purpose for which the debt was contracted was supposed to have benefited specially the real estate: Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black 510. Others were where, in assessing the real estate for municipal taxes, the value of improvements was re- quired to be excluded. In all these cases, the discrimination has been held to be beyond the constitutional power of the legislature. If the tax is to be assessed for a corporate pur- pose, it mjist be uniform as to per- sons and property. The burden must be imposed upon all the property within the limits to be taxed. Any other rule would utterly destroy the equality ' and uniformity contem- plated by the constitution. If per- sonal property or improvements may be exempted, with the same propri- ety and justice the law might com- pel one-half the real estate within the district to sustain the whole bur- den: Thornton, J., in Primm v. Belle- ville, 59 111. 143, 144; Hale v. Kenosha. 39 Wis. 599. The tax in the Wiscon- sin case was for a railroad debt; in the other for a sewer. In Baltimore V. Hughes, 1 Gr. & J. 480, where a city council had authority to levy a tax for a public improvement on the dis- trict benefited thereby, it was held that if the ordinance providing for the tax showed the improvement to be for the general benefit of the city, and not of the particular district in which the tax was ordered; the tax was void. CH. VII.J APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES. 423 under internal revenue laws were laid by general rules, but special regulations were required for their enforcement in in- surrectionary districts, and were therefore provided. So the federal land tax might be assumed by one state, while in an- other it might be necessary to have elaborate provisions for the sale of the property taxed.' 4. It is no objection to a tax that the rule of apportionment which has been provided for it fails in some instances, or evien in many instances, of enforcement. Evasions of duty are liable to occur under all laws ; but an evasion by one individual can- not give another a legal right to be excused. If the law es- tablishes a uniform rule, its validity cannot depend upon the certainty or uniformity of its enforcement.^ 5. The apportionment of the tax is not to be extended to embrace persons or property outside the district. This is a matter of jurisdiction, and if there are any exceptions to the rule they must stand on very special and peculiar reasons.' 6. Although exemptions may be made, as has beenpreviously shown, special and invidious discriminations against individu- als are illegal.* This, so far as we know, is not disputed ; and 1 The federal direct-tax act of 1861- form in its provisions, can be an- 63 required an apportionment ac- nulled by the refusal of a portion of cording to the last state assessment those on whom it is designed to op- and valuation, and the action of the erate to comply with its provisions, tax commissioners for a certain state If this no(;ion were to prevail, civil in substituting a diflEerent and higher commotion or foreign invasion rate was beyond their authority, so within a small district of the coun- that the excess of the tax could be try would paralyze thti government recovered back: Seabrook v. United and repeal the fundamental law upon States, 21 Ct. of CI. 39. which its existence depends." 2 In United States v. Eiley, 5 Blatch. » See ante, pp. 34, 35, 84-94. 204, 209, Shipman, J., speaking of the * The rule of uniformity applies to internal revenue law, says: "The law wharf and dockage charges laid on is uniform, and thereby conforms to the commerce of a city: People v. the constitution. Its validity does San Francisco, etc. E. Co., 35 Cal. 606. not depend on the celerity or uni- The omission, in apportioning the ex- formity with which it can be exe- pense of a road improvement, of one cuted in some disturbed districts of of the municipalities, cannot be ob- the country. Tax laws, both state jected to by a taxpayer whom such and national, are required to be uni- omissions could not injure: Senor v. form. This is an elementary princi- Board of Com'rs, 13 Wash, 48. A pie of legislation, resting upon the statute requiring taxes to be appor-. solid foundation of justice. But it tioned between owners of land and is a novel doctrine that a law, uni- owners of minerals therein, accord- 424 APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES. [OH. VII. there is plausible .ground for at least a question whether the principle may not apply- in some cases to the establishpaent of small districts for the construction of important public works; districts, the establishment of which, in view of the purpose for which the tax is to be laid, is equivalent to the singling out of a few persons for invidious discrimination. It has been held in one case that a statute was void which, as to certain portions of a - city street, empowered the common council to cause it to be improved in a manner exceptionally expensive, at the cost of the abutting owners and against their will, when as to all the other streets of the city the owners of the larger proportion of the frontage must petition for such an improve- ment before it could be ordered.^ The statute was looked upon as an abuse of the legislative power to apportion taxes; as perhaps it was. But the case must be very extraordinary to warrant the court in holding that the legislature, in acting upon a subject within its admitted authority, has deprived itself of power by abusing it.^ It must in effect be a case in which the legislature, while assuming to do one thing which was within its power, has actually attempted another which was not. Some of the cases which consider the territorial apportion- ing to the value of their respective the large as well as the small lots in- interests, is not objectionable: Low eluded therein; for It is morte oon- V. Lincoln County Court, 37 W. Va. sonant with the entire genius, equal- 785. ity and justice of our constitution 1 Howell V. Bristol, 8 Bush 493, 497. and laws, that each should bear the Compare Covington v. Casey, 3 Bush burdens of that government which 698; Washington Avenue, 69 Pa. St. protects his person and property ac- 353. cording to the worth of his estate, ii In Arbegust v. Louisville, 3 Bush than to discriminate against the 371, 375, Williams, J., has the follow- small in favor of the large property ing remarks regarding the change of holders. But whatever may be said taxing districts by extension of city of the intrinsic justice of such a boundaries: "When, in the judgment measure, there is no power in the of the legislature, the interest of a courts to control this, when the tax- suburban population demands local ing power is conferred in good faith regulations, and the peace, tranquil- to uphold local government and give lity and order of the public indicates police regulations to the population, that such is necessary, we cannot and not merely to embrace taxable doubt its constitutional power to so property for revenue purposes in enact, nor question its power to tax, order to lighten the burdens of for such purposes, the real as well as others-" the personal estate of the peopie, nor OH. VII.J APPOETIONMENT OF TAXES. 425 ment of taxes — for example, of state taxes among the coun- ties, and of county taxes among the townships — are mentioned in the margin.^ It has been decided that as a board of assess- ors, in apportioning state and county taxes, is a special stat- utory tribunal, its action is valid only when performed in the manner and in compliance with the forms prescribed by the state which conferred jurisdiction.^ And where the apportion- ment of a tax between city and county is a mere ministerial act, if the proper oflBcer fails to act the true amounts may be ascertained in some other way.' 'Hubbard v. Winsor, 15 Mich. 146; Marion T'p, 101 Mioh. 356; Hoffman Auditor-General v. Jackson Super- v. Lynburn, 104 Mich, 494} Sea Isle visors, 24 Mich. 337; Pillsbury v. City v. Board of Assessors, 49 N. J. L. Auditor-General, 36 Mioh. 845; At- 483; East Brunswick T'p v. New tomey-General v. St. Clair Supervis- Brunswick, 57 N. J. L. 145; State v. ■ors,80 Mich. 388; Yelverton v. Steele, Linn County, 35 Or. 503. 36 Mich. 63; Fay v. Wood, 65 Mich. 2 gea Isle City v. Board of Assessors, •390; Boyoe v. Sebring, 66 Mich. 310; 49 K J. L. 483. Auditor-General V.Menominee Super- 'Logan County v. Lincoln, 81 IlL visors, 89 Micli. 533 ; Boyce v. Auditor- 156. General, 90 Mioh. 314; Sheldon v. OHAPTEE VIII. OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTERS OF TAXATION. Necessity for official action. — Taxation is an act of govern- ment. Government can only perform its functions by means of officers, and must make all its demands upon its citizens through the medium of official action. However just it may be that an individual, in any condition or under any specified circumstances, should contribute a part of his means to gov- ernment revenues, there is no lawful method of compelling him to do so except through the compulsion of official process. ]S"o individual as such, or by virtue of his citizenship, can com- pel another to perform his duty to the state. He must come clothed with the authority of the state for the purpose, or in contemplation of law he comes as a trespasser, whose lawless intrusion may rightfully be resisted and repelled.' 1 A valid assessment can only be made by a proper ofiflcer: Bruce v. Vanceburg & S. L. T. R. Co. (Ky)., 35 S. W. Rep. 113; Farrington v. New England Inv. Co., 1 N. D.'lOS. An assessments for taxation must be made by an oflScer authorized either de jure or de facto to make it, or it will be invalid: Tampa v. Kaunitz, 39 Fla. 683. Taxes levied by officers having no legal mandate to do so are void: Zeigler v. Thompson, 43 La. An. 1013. The duty of assessing a paving tax having been assigned to the holder of an office which be- came vacant on the expiration of the city's charter, an assessment made by an unauthorized officer is void: Walker v. District of Colum- bia, 6 Mackey 853. An attempted assessment by a deputy appointed without statutory authority by an assessor is absolutely void, and no tax can be predicated thereon: Far- rington V. New England Inv. Co., 1 N. D. 103. The enforcement of an assessment made by an unauthor- ized officer will be enjoined: Union Pac. R. Co. V. Donnellan, H Wyo. 459. Official acts, such as a tax sale, must be performed by the proper officer, not by a clerk not acting under his direction: Hall v. Collins, 117 Mich. 617. A tax deed executed by a special township tax collector is void where no such officer existed und^r the laws of the state at the" time of his appointment: Felch v. Travis, 93 Fed. Rep. 310. One has a right to refuse to work out his high- way tax where there are no officers qualified to demand and collect the taxes or make the proper return: Sumner v. Gardiner, 88 Me. 584. An assessment for a street improvement made by commissioners appointed to assess the cost of improvements in another street is void: Ferris v. Chicago, 163 111. 111. Where the ap- pointment and sittings of a board of CH. VIII.] OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEES OF TAXATION, 427 ■Officers, who are. — An office is defined to be a public charge or employment, and he who performs the duties of that office is an officer.^ There are legislative, executive, and judicial officers, with duties pertaining to their respective departments of the government, and there are also inferior officers, com- monly designated ministerial, whose duty it is to execute man- dates lawfully dipected to them by superiors, whether , of one department or of another.^ The proceedings in tax cases are intrusted by the law in part to officers who perform mere min- isterial duties, and in part are confided to those who, though not belonging to the Judicial department, have functions which' in a certain sense are judicial.' Functions of constitutional equalization are without authority, taxpayers are not required to file complaints of erroneous assessments: Slaughter v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 11:3. The whole course of proceeding from the levy of a^tax to its collection is confided toofiBcers designated by the statute, whose duties and the time and manner of their discharge are specified by the law; the. power to levy and collect taxes conferred upon a city board of supervisors does not imply a power to collect them in any other manner, but the mode of exer- cise of the power conferred being prescribed, the mode prescribed is the measure of the power; and, there- fore, such board has no power to enter into a contract with a private individ,ual to proceed and cause to be collected from owners what may be due on account of sales of real estate made to the state for delinquent taxes, and to pay him a percentage on such collection: House v. Los Angeles, 104 Cal. 73. As the duty of searching for secreted property is not imposed upon city tax officers, a city may, under the general power to levy and collect taxes upon all prop- erty subject to taxation, contract with a private person to search for property secreted and omitted from the tax duplicate: Richmond v. Dick- inson, 155 Md. 345. A co nty treas- urer charged by the law with the duty of collecting county taxes can- not be empowered by the county board to employ counsel to assist him : Miller v. Embree, 88 Ind. 133. 1 Marshall, Ch. J., in United States V. Maurice, 3 Brock. 96, 103. Bouvier's definition of an officer is " one who is law^fuUy invested with an office," which seems to exclude what are known as officers de facto. "A pub- lic office is the right, authority, and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of bhe creating power, an in- dividual is invested with some por- tion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public offi- cer:" Meohem on Public Officers, §1. 2 Bouvier's Dictionary, title " Offi- cers; " Meohem on Public Officers, §g 18-31; Sutherland v. Governor, 29 Mich. 320. 'An assessor, whose acts as such are judicial in their nature, has no authority to appoint a deputy unless expressly authorized by statute: Far- rington v. New England Inv. Co., 1 N. D. 103. A county board of super- visors acts judicially in determining taxes and extending them on the roll ; and, therefore, where it adjourns without completing the roll a super- 428 OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEES OF TAXATION. [CH. VIII. officers cannot be exercised or transferred by the legislature ; ^ but in the absence of constitutional restrictions the legislature visor has no authority to perform any of the omitted acts, as judicial duties cannot be delegated: Ne-Har Sa-Ne-Park Assoc, v. Lloyd, 7 App. Div. (N. Y.) 359; see People v. Hager- dorn, 36 Hun 610. A statutory pro- vision that a judge shall not si^ as such, or take any part in the decision of a cause, if he is related by consan- guinity or affinity to any of the par- ties, does not apply to such quasi-jxx- dicial officers as assessors: O'Reilley V. Kingston, 114 N. Y. 489. Taxing officers and boards are not courts and do not e^xeroise judicial powers as such, and their actions are not judgments: Mussey v. Adair, 55 Ohio St. 466; Hagerty v. Huddleston, 60 Ohio St. 149. See Baldwin v. Shinei 84 Ky. 503. The power to fine and imprison for contempt cannot be conferred upon a state board of tax commissioners, since the board be- longs to the executive department of the state, and the power to punish for contempt belongs exclusively to courts: Langeliburg v. Decker, 131' Ind..471. A statute making the sec- retary of state and the state auditor ex officio members of the state board of tax commissioners is not objec- tionable as clothing executive and administrative officers with judicial powers: Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 188 Ind. 513; Pitts- burgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 625. Members of the exec- utive branch of the government may be charged with the duty of assess- ing property, or of acting on a board of equalization: Sawyer v. Dooley, 21 Nev. 390. In the absence of any constitutional or statutory provision -as to the duties of an assessor, they are such as are usually encumbent upon such officers: People v. Ames, 24 Colo. 422. 1 Assessors being officers created by the constitution, the legislature can- not exerois^ their functions in relar tion to the assessmentof property for taxation, but can only enact " gen- eral laws which shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of 'all prop- erty," etc.: In re House Bill, 9 Colo. 635. A bill nominally providing for the assessment of mining property by the assessor, but declaring that all lode claims shall be valued at a certain sum per acre, and all placer claims at another certain sum per acre, is an attempt by the legislature to make the assessment: Ibid. Where the constitution requires the election for each county of an assessor whose duties are to assess and fix the valua- tion of property for taxation, a stat- ute classifying counties into five classes, and dividing the , lands of each class of counties into eight classes, with fixed values, and requir- ing the assessor, to determine the class of the land assessed,, and then to assess it at the valuation fixed, is unconstitutional, because it usurps the assessor's constitutional right to fix the valuation of property: Haw- kins V. Mangrum (Miss.), 28 South. Rep. 873. An advalorem assessment cannot be made by the legislature: Slaughter v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 113. See, for a case held to be an attempt of the sort, and illegal, Albany, etc. Bank v. Maher, 9 Fed. Rep. 884 Also, Attorney-General v. Leavenworth, 3 Kan. 61. A constitutional provision for the election of an assessor in e^ch county, " with such duties as are now or may be prescribed by law," was held not to preclude legislation au- thorizing the appointment of county boards of equalization: Pulaski County Board of Equal. Cases, 49 CH. VIII.] OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEE8 OF TAXATION. 429 may prescribe the agencies to be employed in tax proceed- Officers de facto. — It is sometimes found that the person who is performing the duties of an oflBce is not the one to whom the law, if properly followed, would have confided it. This Ark, 518. The word " assess " as used in the provision of the Kentucky con- stitution for conferring upon the proper authorities of counties, cities, etc., the power to assess, means to levy a tax, and does not mean the ■ valuation of property for taxation; and, therefore, such provision does not prohibit the general assembly from providing for the valuation Dy the state board of property for local taxation: South Covington & Co. St. R Co. V. Baltimore (Ky.), 49 S. W. Eep. 23. Powers conferred upon a state board of equalization to assess all the railroad property in the state are not unconstitutional because of a provision in the constitution for the election of an assessor in each county without prescribing his duties: Ames V. People, 26 Colo. 83. A provision of a turnpike act authorizing the turn- pike company to appoint a person to make the assessment is void; but as the legislature has power to author- ize the tax, the assessment may be made by the assessor of the county, and returned the same as other lists, subject to the same right of revision : Bruce v. Vanceburg & S. L. T. R. Co. (Ky.), 35 8. W. Rep. 112. Under a statute providing that the corpora- tion commissioners shall constitute a board of appraisers and assessors for railroad, telegraph, canal, and steamboat lines, an assessment of taxes on the capital stock of a, steam- boat company by the county com- missioners is void: Beaufait County Com'rs V. Old Dominion S. S. Co. (N. C.;, 39 S. E. Rep. 18. 1 State Tax'Com'rs v. Grand Rapids Assessors, 124 Mich. 491; State v. Thome (Wis.), 87 N. W. Rep. 797. The Michigan case holds that no right of local self-government is in- fringed by employing a state agency, such as the state board of tax com- missioners, to 'supervise and revise the assessments made by the local assessors. The Wisconsin case sus- tains a statute providing for the re- view of the county equalization of valuations by a commission ap- pointed by the circuit judge for such county. Constitutional pro- visions that for all corporate pur- poses municipalities may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, and that the legislature shall have no power to impose taxes on municipalities for municipal pur-' poses, do not invalidate a statute making the assessment roll of a city of the first class the same as that of the county, and making the county treasurer ex officio collector of taxes for the city: State v. Carson, 6 Wash. 350. A legislature may authorize the collection of back taxes by a sheriff who is liable for them, but whose term of office has expired: Jones v. Arrington, 91 N. C. 125. A charter provision authorizing the city tax- collector to make sales of property for delinquent taxes gives no au- thority to an ex-ooUector to make such sale: McCullough v. Hunter, 90 Va. 699. The state comptroller held to be a "collector" of taxes within the meaning of certain Ten- nessee statutes, and, therefore, a proper ofiScer to assess railroad prop- erty: State V. Memphis & C. E. Co., 14 La. 56. 430 OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTERS OF TAXATION. [CH. VIII. may happen from an uncertainty regarding the method by which the officer should be chosen, a dispute of fact concern- ing the result of the election which has been held, or from many other causes. If, in any such case, a person claiming to be chosen solves the doubt in his own favor, and takes posses- sion of the office, and if the public acquiesce in his assumption, he then performs the duties of the office, and comes within the definition which has been given of an officer. Eut while he is an officer in fact, if he is "hot rightfully such he may at any time be ousted of his position by judicial proceedings, instituted in behalf of the state, at the instance of the public prosecutor. Perhaps also the law of the state will allow the person right- fully entitled, and, who, by the wrongful possession, is excluded from the office, to institute a proceeding for the purpose on his own behalf. From what has beeii said, it will be seen that there may therefore be officers de jure and officers de facto. An officer de jure is one who is not only invested with the office, but has been lawfully appointed or chosen, and there- fore has a right to retain the office and receive its perquisites and emoluments. An officer defaoto is defined to be one who has the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be, and yet is not a good officer in point of law.' He comes in by 1 Parker v. Kett, 1 Ld. Eaym. 658, elected under an unconstitutional 13 Mod. 467, per Holt, Ch. J.; King statute: State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. V. Bedford Level, 6 East, 356, 368, 449, and cases there cited; People v. per Ellenborough, Ch. J.; Gary v. Knopf, 183 111. 410; Cole v. Black State, 76 Ala. 78; Davis v. Police Elver Falls, 57 Wis. 110. Or even Jury, 1 La. An. 388; Petersilea v. tho'u.gh he was not eligible to the Stone, 119 Mass. 465; Ray v. Murdook, office: Lockhart v. Troy, 48 Ala. 579; 36 Miss. 693; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. Darrow v. People, 8 Colo. 417; Wolfe 118. "An officer de facto is one who v. Murphy. 60 Miss. 1; Dugan v. Far- exercises the duties of an office under rier, 47 N. J. L. 383. Or though the color of appointment or election to office to which he was chosen was that office : " Plymouth v. Painter, 17 unlawfully vacated : Watkins v. Inge, Conn. 585, 588, per Storrs, J. To the 34 Kan. 613. Or though the election same effect are Brown v. Lunt, 87 was held without proper notice: Me. 433, 438; Ex parte Strang, 31 Yorty v. Paine, 63 Wis. 154. Or Ohio St. 610. A person exercising though he was appointed when he the functions of a valid public office should have been elected: Chicago, by color of right and with the etc. R. Co. v. Langlade County, 56 Wis. acquiescence of the public will be 154 Or though he has legally for- deemed to be an officer de facto, and feited his office by accepting one his acts will protect third persons that is incompatible: Woodside v. even though he was appointed or Wagg, 71 Me. 307. Or though he has CH. VIII.J OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEES OF TAXATION. 431 claim and color of right, or he exercises the office with such circumstances of acquiescence on the part of the public as at least affords a strong presumption of right, though by reason of some defect in his title, or of some informality, omission, or want of qualification, or by reason of the expiration of his term of service, he is unable to maintain his possession, when called upon by the government to show by what title he holds it.' It is immaterial in what the defect consists, or whether the claim is in good faith or merely colorable. The public acquiescence and reputation attach certain important conse- quences to his occupation of the office, which the interest of the state does not permit to depend upon his own motives or the degree of plausibility which attaches to his claim.^ But to legally forfeited his office by remov- ing from the county: Case v. State, 69 Md. 46; but see People v. High- land Park, 88 Mich. 653. Or though he has not given the prescribed bond: Gunn V. Tacket, 67 Ga. 735; Soudant V. Wadhams, 46 Conn. 318. Or only a defective one: Adams v. Tator, 43 Hun 384 Or though the bond was not duly filed: State v. Dierberger, 90 Me. 369; Douglass v. Neill, 7 Heisk. 438. Or though he has failed to file oath of office and bond within the time prescribed by law: People v. Payment, 109 Mich. 553. Or though he has held over after the expiration of his term: Petersilea v. Stone, 119 Mass. 465; Galbraith v. McFarland, 3 Co;d. 267; Morton v. Lee, 28 Kan. 286; Threadgill v. Railroad Co., 73 N. C. 178; Wapello County v. Big- ham, 10 Iowa 39, A tax execution issued by a tax-collector after he' goes out of office is not a legal pro- cess, and any sale of property is a mere nullity; but if the collector's official term had expired, but his suc- cessor had not qualified, he would still be in office so long as he acted officially: Skinner v. Eoberts, 93 Ga. 366. One cannot be an officer de facto who is constantly in hiding, has no place of business, and can only be communicated with by means of his friends in secret: Will- iams V. Clayton, 6 Utah 86. Where a lawfully appointed officer still claims the office and refuses to yield to a subsequent appointee, the latter cannot be regarded as a de facto of- ficer: Hallgren v. Campbell, 83 Mich. 355. As to what is sufficient proof of official character, see Albright v. Cobb, 30 Mich. 355; Bird v. Perkins, 38 Mich. 38; Curran v. Norris, 58 Mich. 513; Tower v. Welker, 93 Mich. 333. 1 Wilcox V. Smith, 5 Wend. 331. 2 " An officer de facto is one whose acts, though not those of a lawful officer, the' law upon principles of policy and justice will hold valid, so far as they involve the interests of the public and those of third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised: 1. Without a known ap- pointment or election, but under such circumstances of reputation or acquaintance as were calciilated to induce people, without inquiry, to submit to or invoke his action, sup- posing him to be the officer he as- sumed to be. 3. Under color of a known and valid appointment or election, but where the officer has failed to conform to some precedent requirement or condition, as to take an oath, give a bond, or the like. 432 OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEE8 OF (TAXATION. [OH. VIII. support one's acts as those of an ofBcer de facto they must have been done under color of an oflBce the duties of which he hafr discharged.' And there can be no officer de facto where na o^GQ-de jure is provided for by law, as where an office is created by an unconstitutional statute.* Usurpers. It is possible also that one may attempt to per- form the duties of an office, who neither is chosen to do so, pursuant, to law, nor supperted by the public acquiescence. Such a person cannot acquire the reputation of being the officer he assumes to be; he is a mere usurper, and his acts are wholly void for all purposes. No one is under obligation to recognize his claim to the office, and whoever does so must take upon himself the consequences. It is of high importance that the encouragement of such claims should not be allowed to bring disorder and insecurity into public affairs.' But an usurper 3. Under color of known election or appointment, void because the officer was not eligible or because there was a want of power in the electing or appointing body, by reason of some defect or irregularity in its ex- ercise; such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public. 4. Under color of an election or appointment by or .pur- suant to a public iinconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such : " State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 471, per ButUr, Ch. J. See the cases cited in State v. Carroll, swpra, and also Creighton v. Common- wealth, 83 Ky. 143; Sheehan's Case, 133 Mass. 445; Ex parte Strang, 21 Ohio St 610; Hamlin v. Kassafer, 15 Or. 456; Commonwealth v. McCombs, 56 Pa. St. 436. 1 Bailey v. Fisher, 38 Iowa 239. 2 Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 424; Leach v. People, 133 111. 430; People V. Knopf, 183 IlL 410; Deco- rah V. BuUis, 25 Iowa 13; In re Hin- kle, 31 Kan. 713; Carleton v. People, 10 Mich. 250, 358; State v. District Court, 73 Minn. 336; Ex parte Sny- der, 64 Mo. 58; Flaucher v. Camden, 56 N. J. L. 244; People v. White, 24 Wend. 539; Cole v. Black River Falls, 57 Wis. 110; Torty v. Paine, 63 Wis. 154. The rule that there cannot be an officer de facto where there is no office to fill is modified as to offices created by the legislature so long as the statute creating them has not been declared unconstitutional: Don- ough V. Dewey, 33 Mich. 309. ' See Plymouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 583, 593; Munson v. Minor, 53 IlL 594; Hooper v. Goodwin, 48 Me. 80; Keeler v. Newborn, 1 PhiL N. C.505; Peck V. Holcombe, 3 Port. 339; Ham- lin V. Kassafer, 15 Or. 456; MoQraw V. Williams, 33 Grat. 510. Acts of an actual usurper — of who is not and cannot be an officer de jure, be- cause there'Ls not and cannot be an office de juxt, to be filled by any one, and who has intruded upon the functions and performed the acts required by law to be done by offi- cers who exist at the time cie^urea^ well as de facto — cannot be relied upon to sustain the validity of an assessment: State v. District Court, 73 Minn. 236. An assessment made by persons not shown to have been either elected or sworn was held to be by mere intruders who came ift CH. Till.] OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEES OF TAXATION. 433 may become an ofScer de facto if his assumption of the office is acquiesced in.* Questioning title of officer de facto. The case of an officer de facto is different. To deny validity to his acts would lead to insecurity in both public and private affairs. It would com- pel those having occasion to transact business with a public officer, before they could put faith in his official acts, to go into a careful examination of all the evidences of his title, and of the provisions of law bearing upon them, in order to determine whether the assumption of official character is warranted by law, and is supported by a compliance with the necessary for- malities. " It would constitute every citizen a judge of official titles. He must look to the constitution 'to see that the officer was eligible to an election or appointment; to the statute to ascertain when, where and how the election or appointment is required to be made, and to the poll books and archives of the state for the purpose of ascertaining the facts ; and then deter- mine at his peril the mixed question of law and fact involved in the ascertainment of official character."^ The mere state- ment of the case is sufficient to show that such a requirement would in the highest degree be unjust to the private citizen, and detrimental to public interests. But to treat the official acts of a de facto incumbent as void would be equally unjust to him. "When the controversy should arise collaterally, as com- monly it must, the officer himself would not be a party to the record, and would have no opportunity and n© privilege of meeting the issue raised, although the decision might as effect- ually determine his right to act as if he had been proceeded against directly by the appropriate process of quo waframto. " This would be judging a man unheard, contrary to the prin- ciples of natural justice and the policy of the law." Until he ■without color of authority: Birch v. Eaton v. Harris, 43 Ala. 491; Ply. Fisher, 13 S. & R. 308. An officer mouth v. Painter, 17 Conn. 585; Gfum^ ^f ho holds over in good faith, though berts v. Express Co., 38 Ind. 181; without warrant of law, is not an State v. Lewis, 33 La. An. 33; Cahill Tisurper: Kreidler v. State, 34 Ohio v. Insurance Co., 3 Doug. 134; Stookle S£. 33. Compare State v. McFarland, v. Silsbee, 44 Mich. 515; Tower v. 35 La. An. 547.' Welker, 93 Mich. 333; Cooper v. 1 State V. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449. Moore, 44 Miss. 386. 2BIackwellonTaxTitles, 94. See * 434 OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEE8 OF TAXATION. [CH. Till. is removed by proceedings directly instituted for the purpose, and in which he is permitted to be heard, " he holds the oflBce by the sufferance of the state, and the' silence of the govern- ment is construed by the courts as a ratification of his acts, which is equivalent to a precedent authority. When the gov- ernment acquiesces in the acts of such an officer, third persons ought not to be permitted to question them." * When, how- ' ever, the officer himself attempts to build up a right in his own favor, it is not unreasSnable to require him to defend his right, as he would be compelled to do if he should assert title to any article of property as against the true owner. His suit for the legal fees may therefore be successfully resisted, as may any attempt by him to enforce official process by the aid of the law. These are cases in which he is a party, and is prop- erly called upon to demonstrate his title. Besides, if citizens were not permitted to resist his official claims in such proceed- ings, their acquiescence in them, until the state itself should be able to bring to a conclusion the formal proceedings to try the title, would be only an enforced acquiescence, and could not Justly support a title to an office by reputation. The most that public policy could require in such cases would be that his de facto incumbency should be evidence of a vi^t jprima faoie in his favor, but leaving the actual right subject to be dis- proved.^~ And if he is sued for any act which he can only jus- tify as an officer, he is put to the proof that he was duly elected or appointed, and that any conditions precedent have been complied with.' 1 Blackwell on Tax Titles, 94 ; Buck- tax ; but that this prima fade case nam v. Buggies, 15 Miss. 180. See is open to rebuttal See, also, Colton People V. Lathrop, 24 Miss. 335. Pro- v. Beardsley, 38 Barb. 29; Capwellv. ceedingB of a common council in Hopkins, 10 E. X 378; Auditors v. laying atax cannot be contested on Benoit, 20 Mich. 176; Pejepscott Pro- tbe ground that by a change in the prietors v. Ransom, 14 Mass. 145. It charter some of the seats were var was decided in TJniversalist Soo. v. ' cated, if the members continued de Leach, 35 Yt. 108, that if an ineligible facto to act. Sooville v. Cleveland, person is chosen sole prudential com- 1 Ohio St. 126. mittee of a school district, his assess- 2 Kent V. Atlantic Delaine Co.^ 8 ment of a tax voted by the district R. I. 305, where it was held that one is void. suing as collector to recover a tax ' Lightly v. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 113 gives sufficient primo/acie evidence Riddle v. Bedford, 7 8. & R. 386, 393 of his authority if he shows he has Fetterman v. Hopkins, 5 Watts 539 acted as such officer in regard to that Pike v. . Hanson, 9 N. EL 491 ; Colburn OH. Till.] OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEES OF TAXATION. 435 Talidity of acts of officers de facto. On the other hand, the public by whose acquiescence the de facto oflBcer has been permitted to act, and individuals who have transacted official business with him, have a right to rely upon the validity of that which has been done by him, to the same extent precisely, as if the same acts had been performed in the same way by an officer de jure. "When such acts come collaterally in question, neither the public that has thus acquiesced, nor individual citi- zens, are permitted to question them. They are as valid, to all intents and ■ purposes, as if the, title to the office had been unquestionable. This is the general rule, as it has been set- tled on grounds of public policy from the time of the Tear Books.^ V. Ellis, 5 Mass. 437; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass. 231, 234; Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick. 486; Patterson v. Miller, 2 Met. (Ky.) 493; People v. Hopson, 1 Denio 574, 579; Greene v. Burke, 38 Wend. 488, 492; Schlencker v. Risley, 3 Scam. 483; Blake v. Sturtevant, 13 N. H. 567; Cummings v. Clark, 15 Vt 653; Olney v. Pearoe, 1 R. L 393; Samis v. Kip~, 40 Conn. 398, 310; Venable v. Curd, 3 Head 583. In First Parish v. Fiske, it is said that if parish assessors fail to take the oath of oflBce, a tax assessed by them would be Illegal and might be recov- ered back: 8 Cush." 364. But a tax which has been paid cannot be re- covered back on the ground that the collector de facto had never been legally elected and sworn: Williams V. School District, 31 Pick. 75. It is not intended to assert here that in every case in which the state might oust an oflScer by quo wafranio an individual could also take advantage of a defect in his title. The inquiry on behalf of the state may and does go beyond that which individuals may institute. Kpntna facie right is sufficient as against individuals, but only an indefeasible right as against the state. As an illustration of what is meant, the case of one holding a legal certificate of election maybe taken; if a lawful election was held, the certificate may con- clude private parties, but the govern- ment would be at liberty to go be- yond it and show that the election was accomplished by illegal votes, or that for any other reason the prima facie case was defective. See the discussion in Wayne Auditors v. Benoit, 30 Mich. 176. 1 " The law favors the acts of one in a reputed authority, and the infe- rior shall never inquire if his au- thority is lawful: " Vin. Abr., tit. " Officer," G., 3. See Bac. Abr., " Of- fices and Officers," B. ; People v. Col- lins, 7 Johns. 549, 551; Mclnstry v. Tanner, 9 Johns. 135; People v. Dean, 3 Wend. 488; Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend. 331, 334: iParker v. Baker, 8 Paige, 439; People v. Kane, 38 Wend. 414; People v. White, 24 Wend. 520; Fowler v. Beebe, 9 Mass. 331; Com- monwealth V. Fowler, 10 Mass. 390; Nason v. Dillingham, 15 Mass. 170; Bucknam v. Ruggles, 15 Mass. 180; Gilmore v. Holt, 4 Pick. 257; Will- iams V. School Dist, 21 Pick. 75; Blaokstone v. Taft, 4 Gray 250; Peter- silea V. Stone, 119 Mass. 465; Burke V. Elliott, 4 Ired. 355; Gilliam v. Red- dick, 4 Ired. 368; Smith v. Bondju- 436 OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTERS OF TAXATION. [CH. VIII. Officers de facto in tax cases. It remains to be seen whether these general principles are applicable in tax cases. It has sometimes been urged that in tax proceedings there was no proper room for the application of the doctrine which is ap- rant, 74 6a. 416; Farmers' & Mer- chants' Bank v. Chester, 6 Humph. 458; Beard v. Cameron, 3 Mm'ph. 181: Brush v. Cools, Brayt. 89; Tay- lor V. Skriiie, 8 Brev. 516; Plymouth V. Painter, 17 Conn. 585; Douglass v. Wick wire, 19 Conn. 489; State v. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449; Samis v. King, 40 Conn. 398; McGregor v. Balch, 14 Vt. 428; Downer v. Woodbury, 19 Vt. 329; Lyon v. State Bank, 1 Stew. 442; Barret v. Reed, 2 Ohio 409; John- son V. Steadman, 3 Ohio 94, 96; EI- dred v. Sexton, 5 Ohio 216; Ex parte Strang, 21 OJiio St. 610; Justices v. Clark, 1 T. B. Monr. 82, 86; Eice v. Commonwealth, 3 Bush 14; Creigh- ton V. Commonwealth, 88 Ky. 142; Priokett/ v. People, 1 Gilm. 525, 529; Keyser v., MoKissam, 2 Rawle 139; Riddle V. Bedford County, 7 S. & E. 386, 392; Baird v. Bank of Washing- ton, 11 S. & R 411; Neal v. Overseers, 5 Watts 538; McKim v. Somers, 1 Penrose & Watts 297; Common- wealth V. McCoombs, 56 Pa. St. 436; Gregg V. Jamison, 55 Pa. St. '468; Cooper V. Moore, 44 Miss. 386; Kim- ball V. Alcorn, 45 Miss. 145; Cabot v. Given, 45 Me. 144; Woodside v. Wagg, 71 Me. 207; Jones v. Gibson, 1 N. R 266; Moore v. Graves, 8 N. H. 408; Morse v. Calley, 5 N. H. 222; State v. Tolan, 88 N. J. 195; State v. Farrier, 47 N. J. L. 883; Leach v. Cassidy, 23 Ind. 449; McCormick v. Fitch, 14 Minn. 352 ; Auditors of Wayne County V. Benoit, 30 Mict. 176; Druse v. Wheeler, 22 Mich. 439; Stookle v. Silsbee; 41 Mich. 619; Ex parte Boll- man, 4 Cranch 75; Sawyer v. Steele, 3 Wash. C. C. 464; Willink v. Miles, Pet. C. C. 188; Ronkendorf v. Tay- lor, 4 Pet. 349; Lawrence v. Sher- man, 3 McLean 488; United States V. Bachelder, 3 Gall. 15; Pierce v. Weare, 41 Iowa 378; New Orleans v. Klein, 26 La. An. 493. The right of a de facto officer to make an assess- ment cannot be attacked by a tax- payer on certiorari to review such assessment. State v. Brown, 58 N. J. L. 162. The action of a de facto tax-collector in returning property as delinquent for taxes unpaid within the time limited by the statute, and therefore liable to a penalty, cannot be questioned in a collateral proceed- ing: School Dist. V. Board of Imp., 65 Ark. 343. And in an action for a special assessment for improving a street by a board which for more than eight years has exercised, with- out its right being questioned in any direct proceeding, jurisdiction and control over the street, such board cannot be called uipon to prove the regularity of the proceedings by which jurisdiction was ceded to it: West Chicago Park Com'rs v. Sweet, 167 111. 336. A taxpayer appearing before the board of equalization without objection cannot, in a sub- sequent proceeding, attack the va- lidity of its organization: Commer- cial "Electric L. & P. Co. v. Judson, 21 Wash. 49. A taxpayer who has not complained of his a&sessinent cannot complain that the board of equalization was not regularly ap- pointed, or that the persons appointed were not eligible: Powell v. Louis- ville (Ky.), 52 S. W. Rep. 798, citing Fonda v. Louisville (Ky.), 49 a W. Rep. 785. The question whether, where the statute declares that the acts of one who shall presume to exe- cute the duties of an office before taking the official oath shall be " ab- solutely void," such acts can have OH. YIII.] OFFICIAL ACTION US MATTEES OF TAXATION. 4:37 plied in other cases in support of action by oflBcers de facto; that the proceedings are summary and for the most part ex parte; that they may deprive the owner of his freehold by means of process which usually and perhaps necessarily is some- what arbitrary, and that he is therefore entitled of right to have all the security which th& law has intended he should have ; in the character and standing of an oificer duly and prop- erly chosen for the particular duty ; in the ofiBcial oath of such officer, when one is required by law ; in the official bond if one is made necessary ; and indeed such security as would be af- forded by a strict compliance with every provision which has been made by the revenue laws for the protection of taxpayers.^ any validity as those of an officer de facto, is discussed, without reach- ing a decision, in McNutt v. Lan- caster, 9 S. & M. 570. iPayson v. Hall, 30 Me. 319; Coite V. Wells, 2 Vt. 318; Isaacs v. Wiley, 22 Vt. 674; People v. Hastings, 39 Cal. 449. Some of the cases which may seem to support this view are prop- erly to he referred to some other principle. They often turn upon the question whether the statute is man- datory in requiring that something should be done which has been omit- ted, or whether the person who has assumed to act as officer held de facto the particular office to which the duty pertained; or some other ques- tion foreign to the precise point now under discussion. In Oldtown v. Blake, 74 Me. 380, it was held without in terms overruling Payson v. Hall, supra, that a collector who had been duly chosen, and had given bond but not taken the oath of office, was a good officer de facto, payment to whom would disch'arge the tax. And see Stockle v. Silsbee, 41 Mich. 615; Kendall's Petition, 85 N. Y. 302. But where selectmen in Maine are to be- come assessors when none are elected, on taking an oath of office as such, it is held that if they assume to act without taking the oath they are not assessors cfo/fflcto; Dresden v. Goud, 75 Me. 398. And if two of the assess- ors take the oath of office before a person not authorized by law to ad- minister it, the tax assessed by the board is illegal: Orneville v. Palmer, 79 Me. 472. But it has also been held in Maine that' in the absence of any statute requiring village assessors to be sworn, the fact that the oath was administered to them by the corpo- ration clerk does not render an as- sessment of taxes illegal: Lord v. Parker, 83 Me. 530. Record held in- suffipient to show that assessors were sworn: Bowler v. Brown, 84 Me. 377. In Maryland an assessment of taxes is not invalid because of the neglect of assessing officers to take' the oath of office necessary to constitute them officers de jure: Ko'ontz v. Hancock County Com'rs, 64 Md. 134 That in New Hampshire the requirement of an oath to the invoice and assess- ment is directory merely, see Odiorne V. Rand, 59 N. H. 504, and cases cited. In Arkansas it has been held that an assessor regularly elected and quali- fied by taking the oath prescribed- by the constitution is a de facto as- sessor though he neglects to take a certain special statutory oath : Bar- ton V. Lattourette, 55 Ark. 81 ; contra, Martin v. Barbour, 84 Fed. Rep. 701. Upon the construction of a statute in Vermont the listers' failure to 438 OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATrEES OF TAXATION. [CH. VIII. The reasons are plausible, but they are not very conclusive. In- deed if official action of officers de facto in judicial positions can be sustained, as it often has been,' though not only prop- erty but also liberty may depend upon it, -it is difficult to sug- gest any distinguishing reason to remove tax cases from the ap- plication of the same principle. The clear and very strong pre- ponderance of authority is, that the general policy of the law requires the acts of officers de facto to be sustained in tax cases, under the same circumstaftces and on the same imperative reasons that' sustain them in others.^ take the ofScial oath has been held fatal, and a tax paid under protest has been allowed to be recovered back though the list was sworn to: Ayers v. Moulton, 51 Vt. 115. And where listers supplemented the pre- scribed oath with qualifying words, the oath and the tax-list' were viti- ated: Lyndev.Dummerston,61Vt.48. But in Vermont a school-district col- lector need not be sworn, no statute requiring it: Brock v. Bruce, 58 Vt. 261. Where the fact of an official oath is in question it may be shown by parol that the oath was taken though the law requires a record: Briggs v. Murdock, 13 Pick. 305; Pease v. Smith, 24 Pick. 122; Hall v. Gushing, 2 Greenl. 218; and see State V. Board of Equal., 108 Mo. 235; Taber v.Wilson,84Mo. App. 89; Scott v. Wat- kins, 22 Ark. 566; Day v. Peasley, 54 Vt. 310. Where a collector of taxes files his bond within the statutory period, an acceptance of it after that period is valid and relates back to the time of filing: Drew v. Morrill, 62 N. H. 23. Acts done by a tax- collector under his warrant were held not void because done before he filed his bond, where the statute prescribing the time within which the bond should be filed was direct- ory only: Duntley v. Davis, 42 Hun 229. As to requirement of bond from tax-collector, see Board of Trustees V. Barders (Ky.), 8 S. W. Eep. 446; Briggs V. Hopkins, 16 R. L 83. A statute providing for the levy of a tax by school-district trustees was held void as a tax-law because not requiring either oath or. bond for performance of duty by such trust- ees, and for other defects: Kerr v. WooUey, 3 Utah 456. iLord Dacre's Case, 1 Leon. 288; Margate Pier v. Hannam, 3 B. & Aid. 266; Wilcox v. Smith, 5 Wend. 231i People V. Kane, 23 Wend. 414; Peo- ple V. White, 24 Wend. 520; Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me. 423; Taylor v. Skrine, 2 Brev. 516; Mallett v. Uncle Sam Co., 1 Nev. 188; Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. St. 129; Laver v. McGlaohlin, 28 Wis. 364; In re Griffin, 3 Am. Law Times 93. 2Eonkendorf v. Taylor, 4 Pet. 349; Scott v. Watkins, 22 Ark. 556; Twombly v. Kimbrough, 24 Ark. 459, 474; School Dist. v. Board of Imp., 65 Ark. 343; Samuels v. Drainage Com'rs, 125 111. 256; Washington v. Miller, 14 Iowa 584; Allen v. Arm- strong, 16 Iowa 515; Watkins v. Inge, 24 Kan. 612; Ritchie v. Mulvane. 89 Kan. 216, 241; Jones v. Scanland, 6 Hiimph. 195; Hale v. Gushing, 2 Greenl. 218; Ray v. Murdock, 36 Miss. 692; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113; Smith V. Messer, 17 N. H 420; State V. Pierson, 47 N. J. L. 247; State v. Brown, 53 N. J. L. 163;- Sheldon v. Coates, 10 Ohio St. 278; Adams v. Jackson, 3 Aiken 145; Spear v. Ditty, CH. VIII.J OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEES OP TAXATION. 439 Estoppel against intruders who have acted. The rale ■which supports official action may, perhaps, in some cases be carried with propriety even farther than is'above stated. If one has assumed to act as an officer under revenue laws, and has made collections as such, he cannot be permitted, M'hen the government calls upon him for an accounting, to tarn about and say that he was never elected or appointed, but has acted as a mere usurper without right, and that the proper remedy of the government was to have resisted his intrusion, or caused his ouster. On every principle of right and justice he is pre- cluded from denying his official character under such circum- 8 Vt. 419; Downer v. Woodbury, 19 Vt. 329. It was held in Greene v. Walker, 63 Me. 311, that the treas- urer's being only an officer de facto when the tax was laid was no de- fense to. a tax-sale. Where certain territory constituted de facto but not dejure a part of a city, the city as- sessor became and was the assessor de facto for that territory, and the state, county, and school district taxes were valid to the extent that they were recoverable in ejectment brought by the original owner wherein a tax-deed for such taxes, including the void city taxes, was set aside: Hitchie v. Mulvane, 89 Elan. 216, 241. There being an office of drain commissioners, and petitioners having assumed the duties of such office, and now acting as commis- sioners of the drainage district, they are de facto officers, and their acts will be upheld: Samuels v. Drainage Com'rs, 135 IlL 256. Where the tax- list for collection of an assessment is delivered to the duly elected sewer- district collector for collection, he is a collector de facto, though suits are pending as to the right of collection of such taxes: School Dist. v. Board of Imp., 65 Ark. 343. Taxes paid to a county treasurer upon property situated in a part of the county, which, since the assessment of such taxes and before they became due had been organized into a separate county, are recoverable as a payment made to a public officer under color of his office whose authority to re- ceive it had ceased: Fremont, E. & M. V. R. Co. V. Holt County, 28 Neb. 742. A sale for taxes cannot be en- joined on the ground that defendant was not a lawful tax-collector be- cause the county commissioners, in violation of law, allowed him to re- ceive from them the tax-list yithout bis having settled for the taxes of the previous year: McDonald v. Teague, 119 N. C. 604 A tax execu- tion issued by a tax-collector after he goes out of office is not legal pro- cess, and any sale of property there- under is a mere nullity; but if the collector's official term had expired, his successor, however, not having qualified, he would still be in oflioe so long as he acted officially: Skin- ner V. Roberts, 92 Ga. 366. One em- ployed by a city to assist its assessor of taxes- in the performance of his duties, and who does not claim to be and is not recognized as an officer of the city, but is merely an employee to assist the assessor, is not an officer de facto of said city, whose acts as such, in making an assessment of taxes in which the rightful assessor did not participate, will be binding: uo OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEES OF TAXATION. [CH. VIII. stances.^ Such a person has a right at any time to refuse to proceed farther in official action, and if he should do so, he could not be held responsible as for a neglect of duty in such refusal ; but it is doubtful if one under any circumstances, even though he be a mere usurper, who has collected revenue for the government under claim of right, can be permitted to pro- tect himself against an accounting, by showing that he was an intruder without any just pretense to the place. To the extent that he has acted, the goiiernment may properly adopt his agency, and require him to give to taxpayers, who have recog- nized his authority, the benefit of their payments.^ Action' by official boards. In some cases, under the tax laws, official action is required to be taken by a board com- posed of several persons. It may then appear that there has been an impossibility to secure concurrence, or that, through Tampa v. Kaunitz, 39 Fla. 683. And the attempted assessment by a dep- uty appointed without statutory au- thority is absolutely void, and no tax can be predicated thereon: Far- rington v. New England Inv. Co., 1 N. D. 102. 1 Johnson v. Wilson, 3 N. H. SOS, 206; Horn v. Whittaker, 6 N. H. 88; Pittsburg V. Danforth, 56 N. H. 273; . Northumberland V. Cobleigh,59N. H. 250; Nason v. Fowler (N. H.), 47 Atl. Rep. 263; Billingsley v. State, 14 Md. 369; Sandwich v. Fish, 3 Gray 298, 301; Barrington v. Austin, 8 Gray 444; Wendell v. Fleming, 8 Gray 613; Cheshire v. Howland, 13 Gray 331 ; Williamstown v. Willis, 15 Gray 437; Lincoln v. Chapin, 182 Mass. 470; . Jones V. Soanland, 6 Humph. 195; Borden v. Houston, 2 Tex. 594. A tax-collector cannot justify his re- fusal to pay over the receipts to the officers appointed to receive them by a claim that the act creating the district in which the taxes were levied is unconstitutional: Street Lighting Dist. v. Drummond, 63 N. J. L. 4ga 2 Bell V. Railroad Co., 4 Wall 598; United States v. Maurice, 3 Brock. 96; State v. Cunningham, 8 Blackf. 339; Church v. Sterling, 16 Conn. 387; Trescott v. Moan, 50 Me. 347; •Went worth v. Gove, 45 N. H.'160; Pittsburg V. Danforth, 56 N. H. 273; Northumberland V. Cobleigh, 59 N. H. 250; Nason v. Fowler (N. H.), 47 Atl. Rep. 363; Street Lighting Dist. v. Drummond, 63 N. J. L. 493; Com- monwealth V. Philadelphia, 37 Pa. St. 497. A sheriff who has collected taxes without the proper lists is nev- ertheless liable to account: Governor V. Montgomery, 3 Swan 613; see Lin- coln V. Chapin, 133 Mass. 470. Cases ' of sale of the office of collector and the effect thereof are found in Mere- dith V. Ladd, 3 N. H. 517; Carleton V. Whitcher, 5 N. H. 196; Tucker v. Aiken, 7 N. H. 113; Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 418; Spencer v. Jones, 6 Gray 502; Howard v. Proctor, 7 Gray 138; and as to a collector's right to contest the validity of a tax he has collected, see People v. Brown, 55 N. Y. 180. CH. Till.] OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTBES OF TAXATION. 441 neglect or inadvertence, less than the whole board has acted; and it sometimes becomes necessary to determine whether, in any such case, the action can be supported. The rules of law on this subject are well settled. The law contemplates that ail the members of the board, who are to exercise a joint public authority, shall meet to consider the subject of their authority, and that the whole board shall have the benefit of the judg- ment and advice of each of the members.* In revenue cases, especially, and in others in which the oflBcial action may event- uate in divesting the citizen of his estate, it is to be supposed the law intended that this joint deliberation and action should be for the benefit of the citizen also. If, therefore, no such meeting is held, and no opportunity had for joint consultation and action, the joint authority is not well executed, even though all acting separately may have signed such a document as would have been sufficient were it the result of a proper meet- ing. Such action is not the action of the board, but of indi- viduals. It is always presumable that it might have been dif- ferent had there been a meeting and comparison of views, such as the law contemplated. At any rate there can be no con- clusive or satisfactory evidence of what would have been the joint judgment, when it has never been exercised; and the members of the board have no discretion to substitute individ- ual action when the law has required the action of the organized body.'' No custom of the locality, or long continued practice, 1 See post, ch. XII. are chosen the two cannot act: Will- ^See Downing v. Rugar, 31 Wend, iamsburg v. LoM, 51 Me. 599;-and 178, 182, per Cowan, J. ; Lee v. Perry, see Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. 178, 4 Denio 125; Powell v. Tuttle, 3 N. Y. , 183. A tax is void where it was ex- 396; People v. Supervisors, 11 N. Y. tended not by or under the direction 563.; Columbus, etc. R. Co. v. Grant of the county board of supervisors. County, 65 Ind. 437; Fuller v. Gould, but by each individual supervisor 20 Vt. 643. If only two of a board of after the final adjournment of the three qualify and act there is no board: People v. Wemple, 67 Hun board and the action is void: 495. An assessment by a single as- Schenck v. Peay, 1 Dill. 267, 1 sessor without the action or concur- Woolw. 175; Machiasport v. Small> renoe of a majority of the board of 77 Me. 109. An assessment made assessors, as required by law, is by two persons legally chosen and fatally defective: Oteri v. Parker, sworn, and another person chosen 43 La. An. 374. In the absence of and sworn as a selectman only, is any showing it will be presumed void: Jordan v. Hopkins, 85 Me. that a board met on the appointed 159. If only two of a board of three day, and that they had before them 44:2 OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTERS OF TAXATION* [CH. VIII. can sanction a dispensation of this rule of law. The members of the board are oflBcers of law, and must obey the rules that presumably, for beneficial purposes, have been prescribed for them.' But the law does not require impossibility, and it may be found impossible for the members to agree in joint action. In such a case it is to be presumed that the intent was that the law should not fail of execution, but that the action of the majority should be sufficient. And, where a majority have acted, the legal intendmentTn favor of the correctness of official action requires us to conclude that such action is the result of due meeting and consultation, or at least of a meeting duly called, at which all had the opportunity to attend, and a majority did attend. It is therefore prima facie valid,' though the legal the books, etc., necessary to enable them to perforin their duties: Snell V. Fort Dodge, 45 Iowa 564. If an assessment may be made by the mayor and aldermen its validity is not afiEeoted by the fact that they call in another person to assist them in making it: Collins v. Holyoke, 146 Mass. 398. The acts of a ma- jority of a state board of equaliza- tion are not invalidated because one not a member sat with them: Car- roll V. Alsup (Tenn.), 64 S. W. Eep. 193. Evidence held to show that the assessment of each district of a par- ish was subjected within the re- quirements of law to the action of the parish board of assessors: Oteri V. Parker, 42 La. An. 374 1 In Middleton v. Berlin, 18 Conn. 189, a tax-list was sighed" by one only of a board of five assessors. An at- tempt was made to support it by showing a usage of the town to di- vide the town into districts, in each of which one of the assessors acted separately; but the court said, "as- sessors are the oflScers of the law, and must obey the'law, and no direc- tion of the town, or long-continued usage, can justify a departure from the law." See, also, Belfast Savings Bank v. Kennebec, etc. L. Co., 73 Me. 404; People v. Chenango Super- visors, UN. Y. 563. In Kinney v. Doe, 8 Blackf. 850, the list was made by the official lister, but it was not shown that two householders acted with him as the law required, and it was held void. 2 In support of the general princi- ple that the action of a majority is sufficient, see Wadham College, Cowp. 877; Grindley v. Barker, 1 B. & P. 236; The King v. Beester, 3 T. R 592; Withnell v. Gartham, 6 T. E. 888; Cooley v. O'Conner, 13 WalL 391, 398; Caldwell v. Harrison, 11 Ala. 755; People v. Coghill, 47 Cal. 361; People v. Lothrop, 3 Colo. 438; Hill V. Vanderpool, 15 Fla. 138; Bil- lings V. Starke, 15 Fla. 297; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. V. People, 173 111. 617; Gage V. Chicago (111.), 61 N. E. Eep. 848; Johnson v. Goodridge, 15 Ma 29; Bangor v. Lancey, 31 Me. 472; Lowe V. Weld, 53_Me. 588; Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick. 436; Williams v. School Dist., 21 Pick, 75; Fire Dist. v. County Com'rs, 108 Mass. 142; Mills V. Richland T'p, 73 Mich. 100; Serrell V. Patterson, 107 Mich. 234; Jewett v. Alton, 7 N. H. 353; Drew v. Morrill, 62 N. H. 33; Babcock v. Lamb, 1 Cow. 338; Ex parte Rogers, 7 Cow. 526; McCoy V. Curtice, 9 Wend. 17, 19; Downing v. Rugar, 21 Wend. 178; Crocker v. brane, 21 Wend. 211, 218; OH. VIII.] OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTERS OF TAXATION. as presumption in its favor may be overcome by evidence that no such meeting was called or had.^ Where, however, the statute requires joint action by three officers, action by two only can- not be sustained.^ Officer's duty to act. A purely ministerial officer is not authorized to omit the performance of a statutory duty because he deems proceedings by other officers irregular,' or because of any custom in his office ; * nor is it proper for him to refuse to Doughty V. Hope, 3 Denio 594; Che- nango Bank v. Brown, 26 N. Y. 467; Merriam's Petition, 84 N. T. 596; Commonwealth v. Land Com'rs, 9 Watts 466, 471; Ferris v. Kemble, 75 Tex. 476; Bundy v. Woloott, 59 Vt. 157; Soens v. Racine, 10 Wis. 271; State V. Gaylord, 73 Wis. 316; State V. Lippels (Wis.), 87 N. W. Rep. 1093. Under these decisions it is difficult to understand how Howard v. Proc- tor, 7 Gray 128, can be supported. There, one who was selectman, and also assessor, was chosen collector, and it was decided that the choice was valid, though his bond was to be approved by the selectmen, and the assessors, in certain cases, had au- thority to remove him. The decision was put on the ground that these boards might act as majorities, but the very nature of the action was such as to preclude one member of the board from consultation and action with the rest, or, if he could act, made him interested adversely to the public. See, also, Fox v. Fox, 24 Ohio St. 335. Kinyon v. Duchene, 21 Mich. 498, is contra. 1 Doughty V. Hope, 3 Denio 594, 598, per Branson, J. ; Ex parte Balti- more Turnpike Co., 5 Binn. 481. 3 People V. Coghill, 47 Cal.361; Mc- Chesney v. People, 148 111. 221; Ad- cook V. Chicago, 160 111. 611; Harri- son V. Chicago, 163 IlL 129; Moore v. Mattoon, 163 111. 622; Larson v. Peo- ple, 170 IlL 93; Hinkle v. Mattoon, 170 111. 316; Markley v. Chicago, 170 111. 358; Phelps v. Mattoon, 177 111. 169. Compare Palmer v. Downey, 3 Johns. Cases 346. The Illinois cases are explained in Gage v. Chicago (111.), 61 N. E. Rep. 849. ' A county treasurer is not clothed with judicial power to pass upon the regularity of tax proceedings, and he cannot refuse to receive and file re- ports of delinquent taxes returned to him by a city treasurer in pursu- ance of the city's charter: Jackson V. County Treasurer, 117 Mich. 305. It is not an officer's province to omit a statutory duty because he con- ceives that the action of his superiors has not conformed to the law: State Tax Com'rs v. Quinn, 125 Mich. 128. Where, in the exercise of its lawful authority, a board of supervisors has ordered an assessment for a drain to be spread upon the rolls, a supervisor may not refuse so to spread such as- sessment merely because he thinks the proceedings have been irregular: Soholtz V. Smith, 119 Mich. 634. The fact that it appears to the county auditor that the levy by the county commissioners is sufficient for spe- cial purposes, and that a levy by the township trustee is unnecessary, furnishes no ground for his refusal to make an assessment: Cole v. State, 131 Ind. 591. * The failure of a county auditor to assess a school tax directed by a school trustee cannot be excused by any custom in the auditor's office; his duties, as well as those of the 444 OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEES OF TAXATION. [CH. VIII. extend a tax as directed by a statute which has long been ac- quiesced in and the procedure under wtich has become fixed, but the constitutionality of which he questions.' And the state is not to be deprived of its revenues because of oflBcial inertness or mistake.^ Public policy also forbids the applica- tion to the state of the doctrine of estoppel growing out of the conduct and representations of its officers.' Official returns and cei^ificates. It is a general rule that the returns and certificates required of an officer in the per- formance of official duty are to be taken, in the proceeding in which they are made, as of unquestionable verity. They are not to be attacked, and proof entered into in a collateral pro- ceeding, to which the officer is not a party, to show that they are false.* The rule is not universal ; and the case of a return trustee, being prescribed by law: Cole V. State, 131 Ind. 591. 1 People V. Ames, 24 Colo. 423. 2 The state does not forfeit rights by the inertness of its officers in col- lecting taxes: North Carolina E. Co. V. Alamance Com'rs, 83 N. C. 359. A tax-collector's failure, through mis- take, to collect all that is due, cannot deprive the public of its lien for taxes: Johnson v. Finley, 54 Neb. 573. A debt due the state cannot be can- celed by an officer's inaction; as where the railroad commissioner failed to compute the amount of tax due from a particular railroad: Man- istee, etc. R. Co. V. Auditor-General, 115 Mich. 391. Where the state's attorney-general informs the auditor- general that a corporation is not lia- ble to a certain tax, and the tax is therefore not assessed, the error, if any, is due not to a mistake in com- putation by the auditor, but to a mistake in the law by the attorney- general, and the doctrine that the state shall not suffer for the laches of its agents has no application: Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Co., 145 Pa. St. 366. 'People V. Brown, 67 111, 485. In this case the creditor, when applied to by a collector's sureties, gave them, through mistake, an incorrect state- ment of the collector's account, which prevented them from obtaining in- demnity; and it was held that such mistaken statement could not estop the state, in a suit upon the collector's bond against such sureties, from re- covering the true amount due the state. Where a person purchased land relying upon the fact, as evi- denced by a receipt from the proper ' officer, of the payment of taxes lev- ied thereon, which taxes it appeared afterwards had not been paid, it was held on an application for an injunc- tion that the doctrine of estoppel did not (apply, and the injunction was denied: Kuhl v. Mayor, 33 N. J. Eq. 84 And in Philadelphia Mortg. & T. Co. V. Omaha (Neb.), 88 N. W. Rep 533, the doctrine of equitable estop- pel was held not to apply as against a municipality so as to preclude it from collecting taxes marked "Paid" by an employee's mistake. *Com. Dig., Return, G.; Flud v. Pennington, Cro. Eliz. 873; Harring- ton y. Taylor, 17 East 378; Rex v. Elkins, 4 Burr. 3139; Andrews v. Lin- CH. VIII. J OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTERS OF TAXATION. 445 by a collector of the non-payment of a tax to him is ^n impor- tant exception. It is generally held that the taxpayer may show, in opposition to the return, that the tax was paid in fact, and that he may make this showing in any proceeding against him or his property upon it.' And in any case if a false offi- cial return is prejudicial to a party, he has his remedy by action against the 'officer.* ton, 1 Salk. 265; Wheeler v. Lamp- man, 14 Johns. 481, 483; Putnam v. Man, 3 Wend. 893; Case v. Redfleld, 7 Wend. 398; Boomer v., Laine, 10 Wend. 535; Baker v. McDuffie, 33 Wend. 389; Sperling v. Levy, 1 Daly 95, 98; Mo Arthur v. Pease, 46 Barb. 433;, Livermore v. Bagley, 3 Mass. 487, 513; Slay ton v. Chester, 4 Mass. 478; Gardner v. Hosmer, 6 Mass. 3§4, 337; Bott V. Burnell, 9 Mass. 96; Estabrook V. Hapgood, 10 Mass. 313, 314; Bott V. Burnell, 11 Mass. 163; Saxton v. Nimms, 14 Mass. 313, 320; Bean v. Parker, 17 Mass. 591, 601 ; Lawrence v. Pond, 17 Mass. 433; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. 109, 112; Whittaker v. Sum- ner, 7 Pick. 551, 555; Boynton v. Wil- lard, 10 Pick. 165, 169; Bruce v. Hol- den, 21 Pick. 187, 189; PuUen v. Haynes, 11 Gray 379; Campbell v. Webster, 15 Gray 28; MoGough v. Wellington, 6 AUe^ 505; Hathaway V. Phelps, 2 Aiken 84; Stevens v. Brown, 3 Vt. 430; Eastman v. Curtis, 4 Vt. 616; Barret v. Copeland, 18 Vt. 67, 69; White River Bank v. Downer, 29 Vt. 332; Lewis v. Blair, 1 N. H. 68; Whiting V. Bradley,' 2 N. H. 79, 81; Sias V. Badger, 6 N. H. 393; Brown V. Davis, 9 N. H. 76; Angler y. Ash, 26 N. H. 99; Clough v. Monroe, 34 N. H. 381; Ladd v. Wiggins, 35 N. H. 421; BoUes v. Bowen, 45 N. H. 134; Morse v. Smith, 47 N. H. 474; Phillips V. El well, 14 Ohio St. 340; Eastman v. Bennett, 6 Wis. 232; Carr v. Com- mercial Bank, 16 Wis. 50; Blanchard V. Powers, 43 Mich. 619; Gamble v. East Saginaw, 43 Mich.- 367; Tomp- kins v. Johnston, 75 Mich. 181; Cast- ner v. Symonds, 1 Minn. 437; Tullis V. Brawley, 3 Minn. 377; Folsom v. Carli, 5 Minn. 333; Delenger v. Hig- gins, 36 Mo. 180; McDonald v. Lee- wright, 31 Mo. 39; Reeves v. Reeves, 33 Mo. 38; Stewart v. Stringer, 44 Mo. 400; Washington, etc. Co. v. Kin- near, 1 Wash. Ter. 116; Tillman v. Davis, 28 Ga. 494; Brown v. Way, 38 Ga. 531; AUender v. Riston, 3 Gill & J. 86: Tribble v. Frame, 3 T. B. Monr. 51; Cald wells v. Harlan, 3T. B. Monr. 349; MoConnel v. Bowdry's Heirs, 4 T. B. Monr. 393; Smith v. Hornbaok, 3 A. K. Marsh. 378; Small v. Hagden, 1 Litt. 16; Trigg v. Lewis' Ex'rs, 3 Litt. 129, 132; Hunter v. Kirk, 4 Hawks 277; Stinson v. Snow, 1 Fairf. 363; Wilson v. Hurst's Ex'rs, 1 Pet. C. C. 441 ; Hawks v. Baldwin, Brayt. 85; Welsh v. Bell, 32 Pa. St. 12; Fax- on's Appeal, 49 Pa. St. 195; Hill v. Grant, 49 Pa. St. 200; Rice v. Groff, 58 Pa. St. 116; Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Texas 593 ; Angell v. Bowler, 3 R, L 77 ; Castner v. Styer, 33 N. J. L. 236; State V. Clerk of Bergen, 35 N. J. L. 309; Martin v. Barney, 30 Ala. 369; Crow v. Hudson, 31 Ala. 560; Hinckley v. Buchanan, 5 Cal. 53; Gaither v. Green, 40 La. An. 362. 1 See oh. XIV. 2 Wheeler v. Lampman, 14 Johns. 481; Putnam v. Man, 3 Wend- 202; Case V. Eedfield, 7 Wend. 398; Baker V. McDuffie, 23 Wend. 389; Mc Arthur V. Pease, 46 Barb. 423; Livermore v. Bagley, 3 Mass. 487, 513; Slayton v. Chester, 4 Mass. 478; Gardner v. Hos- mer, 6 Mass. 334, 337; Whitaker v.' Sumner, 7 Pick. 551 ; Boynton v. Wil- M6 OFl'IOIAL ACTION IN MATTEES OF TASATION. [CH. VIII. In general it is believed that these rules havp been held to be applicable in tax cases.' In a number of cases the courts have gone so far as to hold that where, as a condition to a sale of land for taxes, the officer must show by his return that he was unable to find goods or chattels from which to make the tax, his return to that effect might be disproved, and the sub- sequent proceedings for a sale of the land defeated by such showing. The point is one of no little difficulty, and there is ground for difference of o^ion upon it.^ lard, 10 Pick. 165, 169; Bruce v. Hol- den, 31 Pick. 187, 189; PuUen v. Haynes, U Gray 379; Campbell v. Webster, 15 Gray 38; McGough v. Wellington, 6 Allen 505; Clough v. Monroe, 34 N. H. 381; Lewis v. Blair, i. N. H. 68; Sias v. Badger, 6 N. H. 393; Angier V. AsH, 36 N. H. 99; Bel- les v. Bowen, 45 N. H. 134; Tomlinson V. Long, 8 Jones L. 469; Albright v. Tapscott, 8 Jones L. 473; McBee v. State, 1 Meigs 133; Oastner v. Sy- monds, 1 Minn. 427; Folsom v. Carli, 5 Minn. 333; Goodal v. Stewart, 2 Hen. & Munf. 105, 113; Triggs v. . Lewis' Ex'rs, 3 Litt. 129; 133; Hunter V. Kirk, 4 Hawks 377; Stinson v. Snow, 1 Fairf. 863; Phillips v. Ewell, 14 Ohio St. 340; McDonald v. Lee- wright, 31 Mo. 39; Stewart v. Stringer, 41 Mo. 400; State v. Clerk of Bergen, 35 N. J. L. 309; Mentz v. Hamman, 5 Whart. 150; Paxon's^ Appeal, 49 Pa. St. 195; Eastman v. Bennett, 6 Wis. 333; Blanchard v. Powers, 43 Mich. 619; Gamble v. East Saginaw, 43 Mich, 367. ' There are oases which hold official returns of ministerial officers to be only prima fade evidence of facts recited: Cookrell v. Smith, 1 La. An. 1; Waddell v. Judson, 12 La. An. 13; Leverich v. Adams, 15 La. An. 810; Wallis V. B6urg, 16 La. An. 176; New- ton V. Prather, 1 Duv. 100; Fleece v. Goodrum, 1 Duv. 306; Kingsbury V. Buchanan, 11 Iowa 387; Pomeroy V. Parmelee, 9 Iowa 140, 150; Owens V. Ranstead, 33 111. 161, 167; Rivard v. Gardner, 39 111. 135, 189; Gregg v. Strange, 3 Ind. 366; Doe v. Attica, 7 Ind. 641; Butler v. State, 30 Ind. 169; Tucker v. Bond, 33 Ark. 368; Ingra- ham V. MoGraw, 3 Kan. 531. In Lothrop V. Ide, 13 Gray 93, a collec- tor sued for arresting a person on a tax warrant relied upon his return as showing that the party had no goods on which to levy, but the plaintiff was allowed to give evidence that he offered to turn out goods in satisfac- tion of the tax; and on exceptions the decision was sustained, the cases of Pickard v. Howe, 13 Met. 307; Bruce v. Holden, 31 Pick. 187, and Barnard v. Graves, 13 Met. 85, being cited. A court of equity is not es- topped, because of the certificate at- tached to an assessment roll, from in- quiring into the facts on which such ' roll is based: New Whatcom v. Bel- lingham Bay Imp. Co., 9 Wash. 639. The record of a board of equalization is not conclusive, but is only prima fade evidence, in a taxpayer's action challenging the legality of a tax or assessment: Hagerty v. Huddleston; 60 Ohio St. 149. The presumptions in favor of the certificate of a tax collector to an assessment roll apply in Louisiana only where tbe owner is notified by publication: Montgom- ery V. Marydale, etc. Co., 46 La. An, 403. 2 Scales V. Alvis, 13 Ala. 617, citing Jackson v. Shepard, 7 Cow. 88; An- drews V. People, 75 111. 605. The re- port held to be prima fade evidence CH. VIII.J OFFICIAL ACTION IN MATTEE8 OF TAXATION. ur Presumption of correct action. The general presumption that public officers have regularly performed their duties ap- plies to oflScial action in tax matters,^ although it cannot estab- ■only: Chiniquy v. People, 78 111. 570; Mix V. People, 81 111. 118; Pike v. Peo- ple, 84 111, 80. In Indiana it is said the personal property must be first levied on and exhausted, provided it is of such a nature and so situated that the treasurer, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, can levy upon it and make the amount of the taxes: Volger V. Sidener, 86 Ind. 545; Lo- gansport v. Carroll, 95 Ind. 156; see Bowen v. Donovan, 33 Ind. 379. That a. sale of land is illegal if the owner has personalty in the county from which the taxes can be made: Schrodt V. Deputy, 88 Ind. 90; Sharp v.Dillman, 77 Ind. 280; McWhinney V. Brinker, 64 Ind. 360 ; Hannah v. Col- lins, 94 Ind. 201. And it would seem that the tax purchaser must take the afiBrmative of showing that there were no goods subject to distress: Earle v. Simonds, 94 Ind. 573. But if «uit is brought against the officer for celling real estate when personalty was within reach, the complaint must show the character of the per- sonalty, and that it was subject to seizure and sale: Bunnell v. Farris, 82 Ind. 393. In Nebraska it has been held that a sale of land for taxes where there was sufficient personal property of the delinquent in the 453 secondary to the mam object — the impelling occasion of the law — it is none the less a sacred duty. Care is taken in con- stitutions to insert provisions to secure the citizen against in- justice in taxation, and all legislative action is entitled to the presumption that this has been intended. "We are therefore at liberty to suppose that the two main objects had in view in framing the provisions of any tax law were,^s^, the providing a public revenue, and second, the securing of individuals against extortion and plunder under cover of the proceedings to col- lect the revenue. The provisions for these purposes are the important provisions of the law. Other provisions may be made for subordinate purposes; to encourage order, regularity; and promptitude in the proceedings, and to give to the govern- ment a security against losses and frauds beyond what might be had in the integrity of oflBcers. The question regarding the revenue laws has generally been whether or not they should be construed strictly. To express it in somewhat different language, the question is whether, when a question of doubt arises in the application of a statute to its subject-matter or supposed subject-matter, the doubt is not to be solved in favor of the citizen, rather than in favor of the state upon whose legislation" the doubt arises, and whether such solution is not most in accord with the general principles applied in other cases. Strict construction is the general rule in the case of statutes which may divest one of his freehold by proceedings not in the ordinary sense judicial, and to which he is only an enforced party. It is thought to be only reasonable to intend that the legislature, in making provision for such proceedings, would take unusual care to make use of terms which would plainly express its meaning, in order that minis- terial oflBcers might not be left in doubt in the exercise of un- usual powers, and that the citizen might know exactly what were his duties and liabilities. A strict construction in such cases seems reasonable, because presumptively the legislature has given in plain terms all the power it has intended should be exercised. It has been very generally supposed that the like strict construction was reasonable in the case of tax-laws. " Statutes," says a learned and able writer, " made for the advancement of trade and commerce, and to regulate the con- duct of merchants, ought to be perfectly clear and intelligible 454 CONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. to persons of their description. By the use of ambiguous clauses in laws of that sort the legislature would be laying a snare for the subject, and a construction which conveys such an imputation ought never to be adopted. Judges, therefore, where clauses are obscure, will lean against forfeitures, leaving it to the legislature to correct the evil, if there be any. With this view, the ship registry acts, so far as they apply to defeat titles and to create forfeitures, are to be construed strictly as penal, and not liberally as%*emedial, laws. In like manner in the revenue laws, where clauses inflicting pains and penalties are ambiguously or obscurely worded, the interpretation is ever in favor of the subject; 'for this plain reason,' said Heath, J., in Hubbard v. Johnstone, ' that the legislature is ever at hand to explain its own meaning, and to express more clearly what has been obscurely expressed.' " The same author on another page says : " It is a well-settled rule of law that every charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language. Acts of parliament which impose a duty upon the public will be critically construed with reference to the partic- ular language in which they are expressed. When there is any ambiguity found, the construction must be iiv favor of the pub- lic ; because it is a general rule that when the public are to be charged with a burden, the intention of the legislature to im- pose that burden must be explicitly and distinctly shown." ^ This statement of the general rule expresses the view which it is believed has always prevailed in England.^ It is also that 1 Dwarris on Statutes, 743, 749. See Williams v. Sangar, 10 East 66, 69 Treat v. White. 181 U. S. 264; Gomer (case of turnpike tolls), Lord Mien- V. Chaffee, 6 Colo. 314; State v. Green, borough says: " In the construction 136 N. C. 1032; Pretzinger v. Sunder- of these tax acts we must look at the . land, 63 Ohio St. 132; Board of Super- strict words, however we may some- visors V. Tallant, 96 iVa. 723; Brown times lament the generality of the V. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 866. expression used in them; but we ^Quotations from a few cases may, must construe those words accord- here be given. In Warrington v. Pur- ing to their plain meaning with ref- bor, 8 East 242, 245 (case of a stamp erenoe to the subject-matter.'' In tax). Lord EUenborough, Oh. J., says: Denn v. Diamond, 4 B. & C. 344 (case "Where the subject is to be charged of an ad valorem duty on sales), Bay- with a duty, the cases in which it is ley, J., says: "It is a well settled rule to attach ought to be fairly marked of law that every charge upon the out, and we should give a liberal con- subject must be imposed by clear struction to words of exception con- and unambiguous language." It was fining the operation of the duty." In therefore held that a conveyance in CH. IX.] OONSTETJOTION OF TAX LAWS. 455 which has been adopted in the several states.^ Like views have been frequently expressed by the federal courts. Thus, Mr. Justice Story, in giving reasons for holding that the rev- enue act of 1841 did not intend to- levy a certain permanent consideration of natural love and affection was not taxable as a " sale. " In Tompkins v. Ashby, 6 B. & C. 541, 543 (case of a stamp duty), Lord Ten- terden, Ch. J., says: "Acts of parlia- ment imposing duties are so to be construed as not to make any instru- ments liable to them unless mani- festly within the intention of the legislature." In Doe v. Snaith, SBing. 147, 152 (case of a stamp duty). Tin- dal. Ch. J., says: " As all stamp acts, being a burden on this subject, must be clearly expressed, wherever they impose the burden, 1 should say that even if there were doubt, we should take the smaller sum." In Wrough- ton V. Turtle, 11 Mees. & W. 561, 567, Park, B., says: "It is a well settled rule of law that every charge on the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous words." In Mar- quis of Chandos v. Commissioners, 6 Exch. 464, 479, Polloek, C, B., says: " It is a well established rule in the construction of revenue acts that a duty cannot be imposed on the sub- ject except by clear words. The meaning of the legislature must be distinctly made out from the terms of the statute." In Gurr v. Soudds, 11 Exch. 190, 193, Pollock, C. B., says: " If there is any doubt as to the mean- ing of the stamp act it ought to be construed in favor of the subject, be- cause a tax cannot be imposed with- out clear and express words for that purpose." The English oases are cited, and theii doctrine approved, in Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 343, 348. ' " Statutes which impose restric- tions upon trade or common occupa- tions, or which levy an excise or tax upon them, must be construed strictly: " Parker, Ch. J., in Sewell'v. Jones, 9 Pick. 413, 414. Statutes im- posing taxes are to be construed strictly: Pegues v. Ray, 60 La. An. 574; Dodge v. Love, 49 N. J. L. 235; Cincinnati v. Conner, 55 Ohio St. 83. "A statute conferring authority to impose taxes must toe construed strictly:" Moseley v. Tift, 4 Fla. 403, 403. "A strict construction of the tax law is fully warranted by the nature and consequences of the proceeding : " Stuart, J., in Barnes v. Doe, 4 Ind. 133, 133, citing Williams v. State, 6 Blackf. 36. The rule of strict con- struction is very strongly expressed in Cahoon v. Coe, 57 N. H. 557, and is there said to be " founded so firmly upon principles of equity and natural justice as not to admit of reasonable doubt." All matters of taxation are resolved in favor of the taxpayer, and express statutes should be found for each item of cost to be imposed upon him: San Francisco & F. L. Co. V. Banbury, 106 Cal. 139. Statutes exercising the power of taxation in any of its forms, or delegating that power to political subdivisions, must be strictly construed and closely pur- sued: Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. Watt, 51 La. An. 1345. Laws impos- ing a license or a tax are strictly con- strued, and where there is doubt as to their meaning or scope they are construed more strongly against the government and in favor of the cit- izens: Brown v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 366. A license law cannot be ex- tended by construction, nor can a license not imposed by the words of the act be exacted; thus a bank with a capital less than the minimum ex- pressed in the revenue license law cannot be required to pay a license- 456 CONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. duty OQ indigo, says: "My reasons for this conclusion are these: In the first place, it is, as I conceive, a general rule in the interpretation of all statutes levying taxes or duties upon subjects or citizens, not to extend their provisions, by implica- fee: State v. Bank of Mansfield, 48 La. An. 1029. The provisions of statutes levying duties or taxes upon citizens are not to be extended by implica- tion beyond the clear -import of ^he language used. Whenever there is a just doubt, that doubt should ab- solve the taxpayer from his burden: Board of Supervisors v. Tallant, 96 Va. 7S3, citing Planer Co. v. Flournoy, 88 Va. 1029. " It is a well-settled rule that every charge under a stamp act must be imposed by clear and unam- biguous words: " Smith v. Waters, 25 Ind. 397, 399. See Savannah v. Hart- ridge, 8 Ga. 33; Williamsburg v. Lord, 51 Me. 590; Boyd v. Hood, 57 Pa. St. 98. The burden of taxation will not be enlarged by implication; thus where a turnpike company's charter authorized the company to levy a tax upon adjoining property owners to aid in constructing the road, t&e com- pany, in the absence of an express charter provision authorizing it to' do so, had no right to borrow money in order to complete the road at an earlier date, and charge the interest paid on the loan to the taxpayer and include it in the tax levied: Turn- pike R Co. V. Thomas (Ky.), 3 S. W. Eep. 907. Eailroad-aid laws should be construed strictly in favor of the rights of property, inasmuch as they impose a burden upon the pub- lic: Demaree v. Johnson, 150 Ind. 419. A statute imposing a penalty upon any person refusing to make the oath which the assessor of taxes is re- quired to administer to persons list- ing their property with him is a penal statute and must be construed strictly; it does~not apply where there has been no express offer by the assessor to administer the oath, but merely a refusal to subscribe a printed form of a£Bdavit, and no re- fusal to take the oath prescribed: Marion County v. Kruedenier, 73 Iowa 93. In Alton v. .ffitna Ins. Co., 83 111. 45, it was held that authority to tax insurance companies to pro- cure fire extinguishing apparatus and build reservoirs would not war- rant a tax for the benefit of the fire department. Under a constitutional power to tax for the payment of the state debt, taxes cannot be levied for interest on state bonds' which remain unsold in the hands of state ofiicers. Cheney v. Jones, 14 Fla. 587. A pro- vision that in an action to enforce a special assessment "any municipal corporation . . . may recover in addition to the amount assessed and interest thereon at ten per cent, five per cent, to defray the expenses of collection," is to be construed strictly; and the additional inter- est cannot be allowed in an action not by the city: Des Moines Brick Manuf. Co. v. Smith, 108 Iowa 807. Under a statute making it the duty of the tax-collector of the county in which a defunct city is situated to collect such taxes as may be assessed by the county tax-assessor, thecounty tax-collector cannot collect back taxes levied by the city assessor of the defunct city: Pensacola v. Sulli- van, id Pla. 1. A statute providing for assessing taxes on property for past years in which such taxes have not been assessed does not authorize penalties for past years to be in- cluded in such assessment: State v. Winona & St. P. L. Co., 39 Minn. 380, 40 Minn. 513. It being " a well-set- tled rule that a citizen cannot be subjected to special, burdens with. OH. IX.] CONSTEtrCTION OF TAX LAWS. 457 tion, beyond the clear import of the language used, or to en- large their operation so as to embrace matters not specifically pointed out, although standing upon a close analogy. In every case, therefore, of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the government, and in favor of the . subjects or citizens, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import. Eevenue statutes are in no just sense remedial laws, or laws founded upon any permanent public policy, and therefore are not to be liberally construed. Hence, in the present case, if it be a matter of real doubt whether the intention of the act of 1841 was to levy a permanent duty on indigo, that doubt will absolve the importer irom paying the *duty beyond the period when it would otherwise be free." ' Duties, it is said by Mr. Justice Nelson, "are never imposed upon the citizen upon vague or doubtful interpretations."^ " The revenue laws," it is said in another case, " are not to be so construed as to extend their meaning beyond the clear im- port of the words used." ' In another case remarks are made by an able circuit judge which apply with great force to nearly all the federal revenue laws! " In construing a severe statute, , declaring a heavy forfeiture (and, according to one construc- tion claimed, for small offenses), it is just to say that those who are called upon to conduct their business affairs in view of ail its provisions ought to be fairly apprised of its require- out the clear warrant of law," a against a county in favor of the doubt whether a particular fund is state, if .the effect of a different con- subject to the transfer-tax act should struotion would unjustly burden the be resolved in the taxpayer's favor, state to the relief of the county: In re Enston's Will, 113 N. Y. 174; State v. Brewer, 64 Ala. 287. See, In re Fayerweather, 143 N. Y. 114; further, Bowling Green, etc. v. War- In re Harbeck, 161 N. Y. 311. A ren County, 10 Bush 711; Mankato statute providing for a tax on " pre- v. Fowler, 32 Minn. 634 miums " does not apply to compa- i United States v. Wigglesworth, 3 nies doing business on the assessment Story 369, 873. To the same effect, plan: Northwestern Masonic Aid Rice v. United States, 53 Fed. Rep. Assoc. V. Waddill, 138 Mo. 628. The 910. See Board of Supervisors v. Tal- right to resort, for the collection of lant, 96 Va. 733. taxes, to a summary remedy of un- 2 Powers v. Barney, 5 Blatoh, 203, usual harshness and rigor, cannot be 303. implied in any case: Irwin's Succes- 'United States v. Watts, 1 Bond *ion, 88 La. An. 75. The rule of strict 580, 583, per Leavitt, J. construction will be applied as 458 CONSTETJCTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. ments and its penalties, of whatever kind. They arp bound to know the law, but law-makers owe to them the duty to make the law intelligible; and those whose business it is to construe or expound a law which is of doubtful or double meaning should not incline to the harshest possible meaning when it is obvious that those to whom it is to be applied may well have been led to trust in another, which is less severe, but equally satisfying its terms. This is not saying that laws of the kind in question are to be strictly construed in favor of the subject and against the state, but only that they should be construed with reasonable fairness to the citizen." ' There are some cases, however, from which, if the expressions made use of in the opinions are taken literally, a different rule might be de- duced. Thus it is said in one case : " A revenue law is not to be strictly construed, but rather the contrary, so as to attain the ends for which it was enacted."^ In other cases it is said that " the penalties annexed to violations of general revenue laws do not make them penal, in the sense which requires them to be construed strictly." ' And in the decision of a recent case in the United States supreme court a similar view seems to be taken. "Revenue statutes," it is said, "are not to be re- garded as penal, and therefore to be construed strictly. They are remedial in their character and to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes of their enactment."* It seems highly probable that the word reniedial has been employed by the learned judge delivering the opinion in this case in a sense differing from that in which it is commonly used in the law. A remedial law, as the term is generally em- ployed, is something quite different from, the revenue laws. An author of accepted authority expresses the ordinary under- standing when he defines a remedial statute to be "one which ' Woodruff, J., in United States v. 395, 406, citing Cliquot's Champagne, Distilled Spirits, 10 Blatch. 428, 433. 3 Wall. 114, 115. Statutes for the as- ^Deady, J., in United States v. sessment of property which had been Olney, 1 Abb. (U. S.) 275, 283. See omitted from the rolls for previous Twenty-eight Cases, 3 Ben. 63. years have been held to be remedial ^ United States v. Barrels of Spirits, statutes and not repugnant to con- 2 Abb. (U. S.) 305, 314, per Dillon, J. stitutional provisions against retro- And see United States v. Cases of active legislation: New Orleans v. Cloth, Crabbe 356. Railroad Co., 35 La. An. 679; Gager * United States v. Hodson, 10 Wall. v. Prout, 48 Ohio St. 89. OH. IX.] OONSTEUOTIOIir OF TAX LAWS. 459 supplies such defects and abridges such superfluities of the common law as may have been discovered ; ^ such as may arise either from the imperfection of all human laws, from change of time and circumstances, from mistakes and unadvised de- terminations of unlearned (or even learned) judges, or from any other cause whatever; and this being done either by en- larging the common law where it was too narrow and circum- scribed, or by restraining it where it was too ]ax..and luxuri- ant, has occasioned another subordinate division of remedial acts into enlarging and restraining statutes. So it seems that a remedial statute may also have its application to, and effect upon, other existing statutes, and give the party injured a rem- edy ; and for a more general definition, ' it is a statute giving a party a mode of remedy for a wrong where he had none or a different one before.' " ^ Mr. Justice Blackstone speaks of statutes against frauds as remedial, but the context shows he is speaking of statutes giv- ing- parties a remedy against frauds; and he adds: " when the statute acts upon the offender and inflicts a penalty, as the pillory or a fine, it is then to be taken strictly, but when the statute acts upon the offense by setting aside the fraudulent transaction, here it is to be construed liberally." ' Another author, in pointing out the distinction between penal and re- medial laws, remarks that " the remedy for breach of a reme- dial statute is by an action for damages, sustained from such a breach, at the suit of the party grieved; that for breach of a penal statute, by an action of debt for the penalty ; or, in more concise terms, the legal distinction between remedial and penal statutes is, that the former gives relief to the party grieved ; the latter imposes penalties for offenses committed." * These considerations would seem to justify the conclusion that the learned judge, in applying the word "remedial " to tax law^, has used it in some political or special, rather than in the strict legal, sense, and that it was not, the intention of the court to 1 Blackstone's Commentaries, voj. ' Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 86. I, p. 88. 2 Potter's Dwarris on Statutes, 73, * 13 Pet. Abr. 397, note. And see citing Chitty's note to Blackstone's Cummings v. Frye, Dudley 183; Commentaries, vol. I, p. 86. The Oaroy v. Giles, 9 Ga. 353. Also the definition in Bouvier's LawTDiction- instance of remedial statutes in Pot- ary is the same. ter's Dwarris on Stat' 831, 345, 4:60 , OONSTEUCTIOlir OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. I overrule the opinion of Mr. Justice Story in "Wigglesworth's case.' There may and doubtless should be a distinction taken in the construction of those provisions of revenue laws which point out the subjects to be taxed, and indicate the time, cir- cumstances, and manner of assessment and collection, and those which impose penalties for obstructions and evasions. There is no reason for peculiar strictness in construing the former. E'either is there reason for liberality. The difference in some cases is exceedingly important. The one method squeezes every- thing out of the statute which the unyielding words do not perforce retain; the other Teaches out by intendment, and brings within the statute whatever can fairly be held embraced in its beneficent purpose. The one narrows the statute as it is studied ; the other expands it. Every lawyer knows how much easier it is to find a remedy in a statute than an offense. There must surely be a just and safe medium between a view of the revenue laws which treats them as harsh enactments to be circumvented and defeated if possible, and a view under which they acquire an expansive quality in the hands of the court, and may be made to reach out and bring within their grasp, and under the discipline of their severe provisions, sub- jects and cases which it is only conjectured may have been within their intent. Revenue laws are not to be construed from the standpoint of the taxpayer alone, nor of the govern- ment alone.^ Construction is not to assume either that the tax- 1 The opinion in United States v. lower court between penal and re- Hodson, 10 Wall. 395, refers to Cli- medial laws is approved and shown quot'sOhampagne, 4 Wall. 114, which to be in accordance with the au- in turn refers to Taylor v. United thorities, it is not clear that the gen- States, 3 How. 193. The opinion in eral remarks of the judge were in- this last case was given by Mr. Jus- tended to go further. It would have tioe Story, and the language made been a remarkable circumstance if use of, which consists largely in a Mr. Justice Story had overruled his quotation from the opinion given in own opinion, delivered so recently the lower court, does not express his that, at that time, his son (and re- own views so clearly as was custom- porter) had not issued the volume ary with that learned judge. What containing it. is manifest in his opinion is, that the ^ ^ construction will not be put point was not regarded as of im- upon a tax-law which would enable portance in that case, the jneaning a person for whom no purpose of ex- of the statute being plain ; and while emption is expressed to escape taxa- the distinction pointed out by the tion altogether: Philadelphia v. Ridge CH. IX.] CONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. 461 payer, who raises the legal question of his liability under the laws, is necessarily seeking to avoid a duty to the state which protects him, nor, on the other hand, that the government, in demanding its dues, is a tyrant, which, while too powerful to be resisted, may justifiably be obstructed and defeated by any subtle device or ingenious sophisna whatsoever. There is no legal presumption either that the citizen will, if possible, evade his duties, or, on the other hand, that the government will exact unjustly or beyond its needs. All construction, there- fore, which assumes either the one or the other, is likely to be mischievous, and to take one-sided views, not on}y of the laws, but of personal and oflBoial conduct. The government in its tax legislation is not assuming a hostile position towards the citizen, but, as we have elsewhere said, is apportioning, for and as the agent of all, a duty among them; and the citizen, it is to be presumed, will perform that duty when it is clearly made known to him, and when the time of performance has arrived. Unjust exactions, if such are made, must be attrib- uted to human imperfection, not to intent; and frauds and evasions are to be supposed exceptional.^ A recent decision of the supreme court of Connecticut lays down a rule, which, as applied to those provisions of the revenue laws which apportion the taxes and give ordinary remedies for their collection, seems not objectionable, though more liberal than is recognized by the authorities generally. The case was a revenue case, and the question was whether a statute for imposing a personal tax on " persons who are residents " of the taxing districts could Av. R. Co., 103 Pa. St. 190. A statu- Whyler, 41 CaL 351. The fact that tory provision that statutes must be one has no occasion to use the road liberally construed to promote jus- on which he was assigned to duty is tice would be violated if revenue no defense to a prosecution for fail- statutes were so construed as to ure to render road duty: State v. exclude a large proportion of prop- Gillikin, 114 N. 0. 833. A law incor- erty in the state owned by individu- porating a turnpike company is not als: Salisbury v. ttane (IdAho), 63 invalidated bythefactthat residents Pac. Rep. 383. of the^taxing district created are also 1 A tax-law is not to be held void residents of and subject to tax in an- simply because in its operation it is other state, or by the fact that they unjust: Porter v^ Eockford, etc. E. receive no benefit from the road built: Co., 76 111. 563. See Kirby v. Shaw, Bruce v. Vanceburg & S. L. T. R. Co. 19 Pa. St. 358; Commonwealth v, (Ky.), 35 8. W. Rep. lia Savings Bank, 5 Allen 438; People v. 462 OONSTKUCTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. be applied to the personalty belonging to the estate of a de- ceased person. In support of such a construction it is said : " The greatest, and perhaps the only, objection that can be urged against this rule is, that we cannot say in strictness that the deceased or his estate is a resident of the district. This objection assumes that the statute is to be strictly construed. But we do not think that the doctrine of strict construction should aply to it. Statutes relating to taxes are not penal statutes, nor are they in derogation of natural rights. Although taxes are regarded by many as burdens, and many look upon them even as money arbitrarily and unjustly extorted from them by government, and hence justify themselves and quiet their consciences in resorting to questionable means for the purpose of avoiding taxation, yet, in point of fact, no money paid returns so good and valuable a consideration as money paid for taxes laid foe legitimate purposes. They are just as essential and important as government itself; for without them, in some form, government could not exist. The small pittance we thus pay is the price we pay for the preservation of all our property and the protection of all our rights. But there, is not only a necessity for taxation, but it is eminently just and equitable that it should be as nearly equal as possible. Hence it is the policy of the law to require all property, except such as is specially exempted, to bear its proportion of the public burdens. Not only so, but the law manifestly contemplates that property rated in the list shall be liable for all taxes — town and school district taxes alike. This is evident from the pro- vision that district taxes shall be laid on- the town list, with special provision for certain changes rendered necessary in order to tax all the real estate situated within the district,' and none situated without, and also to assess the tax in each in- stance upon the right person. In construing statutes relating ■ to taxes, therefore, we ought, where the language will permit, so to construe them as to give effect to the obvious intention and meaning of the legislature, rather than to defeat that in- tention by a too strict adherence to the letter." ' 1 Cornwall v. Todd, 38 Conn. 443, Br,ainard, 35 Conn. 563, 568, by But- 447; Aggers v. People, 80 Colo. 348; ler, J.: "A law imposing a tax is not Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kent, 151 Ind. to be construed strictly because it 349. So it is said in Hubbard v. takes money or property in invitum OH. IX.] OONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. 463 If there should be any leaning in such cases it would seem that it should be in the direction of the presumption that every- thing is expressed in the tax-laws which was intended to be expressed. The laws are framed by the government for its own needs, and, if imperfections are found to exist, the legisla- ture, in the language of Mr. Dwarris, "is at hand to explain its own meaning, and to express more clearly what has been obscurely expressed." But there can be no propriety in con- struing such a law either with exceptional strictness amounting to hostility, or with exceptional favor beyond that accorded to other general laws. It is as unreasonable to sound a charge upon it as an enemy to individual and popular rights, as it is to seek for sophistical reasons for grasping and holding by its (although its provisions are for that reason to be strictly executed), for it is taken as a share of necessary pub- lic burden: nor liberally, like laws in- tended to effect directly some great public object, but fairly for the gov- ernment and justly for the citizen; so as to carry out the intention of the legislature, gathered from the language used, read in connection with the general purpose of the law, and the nature of the property on which the tax is imposed, and the legal relation of the taxpayer to it." In Rein v. Lane, Law R. 3 Q. B. 144, 150, JSlackbum, J., says: "We must construe the words of the statute imposing the duty according to the intention which those words express when used in such a statute for such a purpose." And in Lord Foley v. Commissioners, Law R. 3 Exch. 363, 368, Kelley, C. B., justly remarks that " it is better for the subjects and the state that the ordinary rules of con- struction should be applied." In 3 Parsons on Contracts 387, the proper rule is stated clearly and concisely: "It is a well settled principle that every charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambigu- ous words. . . . But it is equally ■certain that no interpretation will be adopted which must defeat the purpose of the law, provided the lan- guage of the statute admit fairly and rationally of an interpretation which sustains that purpose." See Fleming v. Sinclair (Ky^), 58 S. W. Rep. 370. In the following oases it is held that tax-laws should be construed liber- ally: Gallup V.Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196; Monticello Distilling Co. v. Mayor, 90 Md. 416; Auditor-General v. Hutch- inson, 113 Mich. 345; Bacon v. State Tax Com'rs (Mich.), 85 N. W. Rep. 307. The power of the county com- missioners in respect to the annual levy of taxes and to the assessment of property for taxation should re- ceive a reasonable and liberal con- struction rather than one that is strict and severe: Baltimore, C. & A. R. Co. V. Commissioners (Md.), 48 Atl. Rep. 853. Measures for reaching omitted property are in aid of the common right of the people, who are sovereign, and should not be strictly and narrowly construed, but, rather, they should be liberally interpreted in aid of the taxing power : Co-opera- tive Building & L. Assoc, v. State (Ind.), 60 N. B, Rep., 146, citing Gra- ham V. Russell, 153 Ind. 18fr; Stone Co. V. Woodard, 153 Ind. 474. iQi eONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. [O^. IX. authority every subject of taxation which the drag-net of the official force has brought within its supposed compass. The construction, without bias or prejudice, should seek the real intent of the law; and if the leaning is to strictness, it is only because it is fairly and justly presumable that the legislature, which was unrestrained in its authority over the subject, has so shaped the law as, without ambiguity or doubt, to bring within it everything it was m.eant should be embraced.' In the state revenue lawf the penal provisions are few and by no means severe. In the federal revenue laws, some of them are of a severity very seldom to be met with in penal statutes, and only to be justified by the supposed impossibility of col- lecting the revenue without them. In illustration of what i& here said, reference need only be made to the case of forfeiture of property for the mere indulgence of a fraudulent intent never carried into effect ; a forfeiture, too, which may be vis- ited upon a purchaser who has bought in good faith, and with- out suspicion of the intended fraud.^ If such provisions are to be construed with liberality, there is no reason why any other penal provisions whatsoever should not be. The provisions of tax-laws, like those- of other statutes, are to be given a reasonable construction.' It is said that "the 1 Commonwealth v. New York, L. taxation mines, except the net pro- E, & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 57. It is ceeds thereof, a statute was enacted altogether reasonable to construe which reiterated the permissive Ian- revenue laws as intended to reach all guage of the constitution in respect the subjects of taxation coming to the taxation of such net proceeds, within their reasons: Big Black but contained no mandatory provis- Crfiek Imp. Co. v. Commonwealth, ions on the subject, held, that it did 94 Pa. St. 450; Cornwall v. Todd, 38 not clearly appear that the legisla- Conn. 443. See Higgins v. Einker, 47 ture intended such proceeds should Tex. 393; Philadelphia v. Ridge Av. be taxed: Stanley v. Mining Co., ft R. Co., 102 Pa. St. 190. " We^do not Colo. 415. A city charter prohibit- think it is the proper function of the ing the taxation of property within judicial depaijtment of the govern- the city, for tke repair of roads out- ment to impose taxation, which is a side, had no application to free turn- species of confiscation, by a strained pikes, which were not contemplated construction of doubtful legisla- by the l8lw at the time' the charter tion:" Laughlin's Appeal (Pa.), 10 was granted: Read v. Yeager, 104 AtL Rep. 833; Commonwealth v. Le- Ind. 195. high Valley R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 451; 2 Henderson's Distilled Spirits, 14 Commonwealth v. New York, L. E. "Wall 44. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 57. Where, ' Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt. 388, 898, under a constitution exempting from and oases there cited. Under a stat- OH. IX.] CONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. 465 interpretation of words in their popular sense rather than ac- cording to their scientific meaning is peculiarly required in the construction of tax-laws, in the enactment of which the legislature must needs adopt a classification of persons and property for purposes of taxation . . . according to pop- ular notions or ideas of the propriety of such taxation," ' effect IS to be given, if possible, to every clause of a tax-statute, and it is the duty of courts to reconcile apparently conflicting pro- visions.^ It has been held that a tax-law is to be construed in accordance with the settled policy of the state as announced in the Declaration of Eights.' And unless it is impossible to avoid it a general revenue law should never be declared in- operative in all its parts because a particular part relating to a distinct subject may be invalid." * Local powers to tax.* The fact that the state creates mu- nicipal governments does not by implication clothe them with the power to levy taxes. That power must be conferred in terpis, or must result by necessary implication from the lan- guage made use of in the law.* But it is not requisite that any- ute providing that the county 'treas- urer shall make on a certain date the list of delinquent property taxes, " which he shall immediately certify to the clerk," the word "immedi- ately " is to be given a rational con- struction, and does not necessarily import the exclusion of ady interval of time: State v. St. Paul Trust Co., 76 Minn. 433. A provision of a stat- ute that no tax therein imposed shall exceed seventy-five per cent, of the tax imposed by the last ordi- nance upon the subject must be con- sidered as meaning only that the general tax imposed upon any busi- ness should not exceed seventy-flve per cent, of the tax previously im- posed upon that business, and not as prohibiting the assessment of a tax upon business which had previously been carried on free from taxation: Mobile V. Craft, 94 Ala. 156. In con- struing statutes of doubtful mean- ing, the intention of the legislature 30 is to be taken, or presumed, accord- ing to what is consonant to reason and good discretion: Sibley v. Smith, 3 Mich. 486, 498. 1 Evening Journal Assoc, v. State Board, 47 N. J. L. 36; State v. John- son, 30 Mont. 367. 2 Board of County Com'rs v. Wil- son, 15 Colo. 90. See Woods v. Madi- son Supervisors, 136 N. Y. 403. • 3 Monticello Distilling Co. v. Balti- more, 90 Md. 416. * Field V. Clarke, 143 U. S. 649; Rob- ison V. Miner, 68 Mich. 549. 5 By "local taxation" is intended taxation by counties and by munici- pal corporations having authority conferred by law: Southern R. Co. V. St. Clair County, 134 Ala. 491. School districts are political orgari- izations possessing tbepower of taxa- tion: Landis v. Ashworth, 57 N, J. L. 509. *See the following oases which have laid down and will serve to 466 GONSTEUOTJOlf OF TAX LAWS. {oh. IX. particular technical or legal terms shall be made use of in giv- ing the power; it is enough that the purpose is apparent, and that pn a fair construction of the language employed the legis- lature must be deemed to have intended that the power should illustrate this rule: Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala. 156 ; Montgomery v. State, 38 Ala. 163; English v. Oliver, 28 Ark, 317; Wallis V. Smith, 29 Ark. 354; Doug- lass V. Placerville, 18 Cal. 648; Hewres V. Reis, 40 Cal. 255; Savannah v. Hartridge, 8 Ga. 23; Vanover v. Jus- tices, 37 Ga. 354; Sanders v. Butler, 30 Ga. 679; Augusta v. Walton, 37 Ga. 630; Albany Bottling Co. v. Watson, 103 Ga. 503; Chicago v. Chicago, etc. R, Co., 20 111. 286; Drake v. Phillips, 40 111. 388; Clarke v. Chicago, 185 111. 354; Kyle v. Malin, 8 Ind. 34; Har- mony V. Osborne, 9. Ind. 458; Indian- apolis v. Mansur, 15 Ind. 113; Adams, V. Shelbyville, 154 Ind.,467; Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa 494; Fairfield v. Ratoliife, 30 Iowa 396; Leavenworth V. Norton, 1 Kan. 433; Shawnee County V. Carter, 3 Kan. 115; Snyder V. North Lawrence, 8 Kan. 83; Kniper V. Louisville, 7 Bush 599; Campbell County Court v. Taylor, 8 Bush 306; Broadway Baptist Church v. McAtee, 8 Bush 508; Bullock v. Curry, 3 Met. (Ky.) 171; Municipality v. Pance, 6 La. An. 515; Holland V.Baltimore, 11 Md. 186; Bouldin v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 18; Boston v. Schaffer, 9 Pick. 415; Leonard v. Canton, 35 Miss. 189; Adams v. Greenville, 77 Miss. 181; St. Louis V. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559; St. Charles v. Nolle, 51 Mo. 132; Cajrron V. r^en, 26 N. J. L. 594; Shackelton V. Guttenberg, 39 N. J. L. 660;. Sharp V. Spier, 4 Hill 76; Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio 574; Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66: Manioe v. White, 8 N. Y. 120; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 123; Cruger v. Dougherty, 43 N. Y. 107; Asheville v. Means, 7 Ired. 406 Mays V. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 161 Cincinnati v. Bryson, 15 Ohio St. 625; Reed v. Toledo, 18 Ohio St. 161 ; Jonas V. Cincinnati, 18 Ohio St. 318; Oregon Steam, etc. Co. v. Portland, 2 Or. 81 Corbett v. Portland, 31 Or. 407; Ben- nett V. Birmingham. 31 Pa. St. 15 Philadelphia v.'Tryon, 35 Pa. St. 401 Nicol v./ Nashville, 9 Humph. 352 Henry v. Chester, 15 Vt. 460; Rich- mond V. Daniel, 14 Grat. 385; Orange & A. R. Co. V. Alexandria, 17 Grat. 176: Dean v. Charlton, 27 Wis. 533; State V. Tomahawk Common Coun- cil, 96 Wis. 73; United States v. Burlington, 3 Am. L. Reg. N. s. 894. Where it is a matter of grave doubt whether the legislature intended to empower towns, organized under the general law to enforce a poll tax, the doubt must be resolved against the ta,x: Morris v. Cummings, 91 Tax, 618. The right of a school district to levy a tax, if it exists at all, must be clearly found in the statute: Marion & M. R. Co. v. Alexander (Kan.), 64 Pao. Rep. 978. In the ab- sence of statutory provisions, a town council has no power to assess taxes on property that has been omitted from taxation for any previous year: Whiting V. West Point Council, 89 Va. 741. Without legislative author- ity counties or municipal corpora- tions cannot assess and collect back taxes on railroad property for years during which they had no authority to assess such property: Staten v. Savannah, F. & W. R. Co., Ill Ga. 803. The power to impose taxes for past years as well as for current years must be clearly given before it can be exercised; and it cannot be inferred from a statutory provision that " the mayor and board of aldermen shall levy the municipal taxes at the regu- lar meeting in September of each year, or, in case of failure so to do, CH. rx.] CONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. 46T exist.' Where authority to contract debts is given, authority to tax for their satisfaction may be deemed given also, with- out express words to that effect, if such appears to be the in- tent of the legislature ; ^ but an implication to that effect is not a necessary one,' and a person who contracts with the munici- pality must take notice of its power to tax, and of any limit- ations thereof that may exist.* at any other regular meeting there- after: " Adams y. Greenville. 77 Miss. 881. If city boundaries are ex- tended after the time for the an- nual assessment has passed, it is competent to provide for an assess- ment for the current year of the property newly added: Svyift v. New- port, 7 Bush 37. Compare Waldron V. Lee, 5 Pick. 333; Jackman v. School Dist., 5 Gray 413. 1 " In authorizing 'freeholders charters ' which the legislature can- not change or amend, the power of taxation, being essential to munici- pal existence, that, power is neces- sarily Implied: " Security Savings Bank & T. Co. v. Hinton, 97 CaL 314 In Fisher v. People, 84 III 491, it was held that in creating a school dis- trict for the building and support- ing of a high school, a power to tax had been given though it was not mentioned in terms. A municipal corporation could not. under the gen- eral welfare clause of its charter, levy a school tax: Nelson v. Homer, 48 La. An. 358. A provision abolish- ing previous exemptions from tax- ation will not of its own force give municipalities power to tax; they must show express authority to tax, and not merely a negation of the privilege of exemption: Savannah v. Railroad Co., 3 Woods 432. ^ United States v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381; Wolff V. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358; Ralls County Court v. United States, 105 U. S. 733; Char- lotte V. Shepard, 133 N. C. 603; Slo- comb V. Payetteville, 135 N. C. 363; Commonwealth v. Alleghany County Com'rs, 37 Pa. St. 377; Feidman v. City CouncU, 33 S. C. 62; Wilson v. City Council, 40 S. C. 436; Austin V. Nalle, 85 Tex. 530; Oconto City Water Supply C6. v. Oconto, 105 Wis. 76. See United States v. Ma- con County, 99 U. S. 583; Meriwether V. Garrett, 103 U. S. 473; Lilly v. Taylor, 88 N. C. 489, A city in pro- viding for new bonds to refund an existing indebtedness has power, without express authority in the statute, to provide by ordinance for the levy of a tax to pay them: Com- missioners V. Zimmerman, 101 Ky. 432. Authority conferred upon a city to erect water- works carries with it by implication the power to levy a tax for that purpose, pro- vided the levy does not exceed the limitations prescribed by its charter: Taylor v. McFadden, 84 Iowa 263. Authority to rent buildings for school houses includes power to levy special tax to 'pay rent there- for: Haokett v. Emporium Borough School Dist, 150 Pa. St. 330. 'United States v. Cicero, 41 Fed. Rep. 83. If the power of a munici- pality to levy taxes is expressly lim- ited to a certain amount, an author- ity to contract debts or incur other obligations will not alone justify an inference that the power to levy an additional tax to pay such debts or obligations was also conferred: Shackeltori v. Guttenberg, 39 N. J. L. 660; Corbett v. Portland, 31 Or. 407. * Supervisors v. United States, 18 468 CONSTEUCTION OF T'AX LAWS. [CH. IX„ Construction of local power. When the power is found to have been conferred, if any question arises upon its extent or application, the rule is that the power must be strictly con- strued. It is a reasonable presumption that the state, which is the depositary and source of all authority on the subject, has granted in unmistakable terms all it has intended to grant at all. Municipal authorities, therefore, when they, assume to tax,^ must be able to show warrant therefor in the words of the grant, which alone can justify their action. They are to as- sume that they can tax only as the state in its wisdom has thoug"ht proper to permit, and if tlie state has erred in the di- rection of strictness, the legislature alone can correct the evil.^ Wall. 71; Jeffries v. Lawrence, 43 Iowa 498, citing Iowa E. Land Co. v. Sao County, 39 Iowa 124g Miller v. Hixon (Ohio), 59 N. E. Rep. 749; United States v. Cicero, 50 Fed. Rep. 147, citing United States v. Macon County, 99 U. S. 583. 1 See Wallis v. Smith, 39 Ark. 354: Vance v. Little Rock, 30 Ark. 485: Stanley v. Mining Co., 6 Colo. 415 Moseley v. Tift, 4 Fla. 403; Ex parte Sims, 40 Fla. 433; Albany Bottling Co. V. Watson, 103 Ga. 503; Highway Com'rs V. Newell, 80 111. 587; Web- ster V. People, 98 III. 343; Drummer V. Cox, 165 111. 648; Clarke v. Chi- cago, 185 111. 354; People v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (111.), 61 N. E. Rep. 1064 Adams v. Shelbyville, 154 Ind. 467 Clark V. Davenport, 14 Iowa 494 Burlington v. Kellar, 18 Iowa 59 Marion & M. R. Co. v. Alexander (Kan.), 64 Pao. Rep. 978; Campbell County Court v. Taylor, 8 Bush 306; Board of Council v, Renfro (Ky.), 58 S; W. Rep. 795; Shreveport v. Pres- cott, 51 La. An. 1895; Ham v. Saw- yer, 38 Me. 37; Bouldin v. Baltimore, 15 Md. 18; Loomis v. Rogers, 53 Mich. 135; Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; Adams v. Greenville, 77 Miss. 881; Wheeler v. Portsmouth, 7 Neb. 274; Meday v. Rutherford (N. J.), 48 Atl. Rep. 539; Tallman v. White, 3 N. Y. 66; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. Y. 133; Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Port- land, 3 Or. 81; Appeal of Connera, 103 Pa. St. 356; State v. Maysvil]e,13 S. C. 76; Kerr v. Woolley, 3 Utah 456; Sohoolfleld's Ex'r v. Lynchburg, 78 Va. 366, 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 488. The authority to lay a school tax of a certain per cent, does not warrant the laying of a poll tax: Board, etc. of Indianapolis v. Wag- ner, 84 Ind. 67. Authority to lay a road tax for . future expenses will not justify a tax for prior indebted- ness: Highway Com'rs v. Newell, 80 111. 587. See, for a like point. Appeal of Conners, 103 Pa. St. 356. Power to raise bridge money by tax or loan does not warrant a resort to both methods: Loomis v. Rogers, 53 Mich. 135. Under a statute for improving any road, etc., there is no authority for levying a tax to improve any specified part only of such road: Elliott V. Berry, 41 Ohio St. 110. A power that the legislature itself cannot exercise will not be presumed to have been granted to a municipal corporation: Board of Council v. Renfro, supra. Under a constitu- tional provision that the sum a mu- nicipal corporation may collect as a tax on a given occupation " shall not exceed one-half of the tax levied by the state for the same period on such profession or busin ess," thelegislature CH. IX.J CONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. 4:69 Construction as to objects of taxation. This rule of construc- tion limits municipalities, in the levy of taxes, strictly to the ordinary purposes for which such municipalities are accus- tomed to make levies. The customary grant does not go a step beyond this, because it cannot be supposed that in giving the customary authority the legislature had any but the usual and ordinary objects of local taxation in view. If, therefore, it becomes important that a municipality should raise revenue by taxation, to be devoted to unusUal and extraordinary pur- poses, the authority cannot be found in the general grant and must be conferred specially. This is not only in accordance with the general rule that construes sovereign grants with strictness, but it is also obviously wise. The mischief of a strict construction is easily obviated by the legislature ; but the mischief of a liberal construction may be irremediable before it can be reached.* It is in accordance with this rule that the authority conferred upon a county to levy a tax " for county purposes " was held, in Georgia, not to warrant a tax for the construction of public buildings ; county purposes, as understood in that state, being the support of the poor, public education, and the like.^ In Maine it was held that a general power in a must impose a tax for the benefit of vide by ordinanoe for refunding the state before a municipal corpora- money paid on illegal sales of prop- tion can tax it: Hoefling v. San An- erty for municipal taxes made after tonio, 85 Tex. 328. ' Where the state the passage of the ordinanoe, but not reserves to itself power to tax rail- on sales made before such passage: road property, and provides the Phelps v. Tacoma, 15 Wash. 367. A method, a city whose charter gives tax to be imposed as long as needed it no power to tax such property can- to pay a particular debt means an not tax it: Albany v. Savannah, etc. imposition of the tax until the debt R. Co., 71 Gra. 158. A county cannot is satisfied: Louisville v. Murphy, 86 assess for taxation the capital em- Ky. 53. A general authority given ployed by a merchant in his busi- by a city charter to tax property for ness, the legislature having pre- its purposes does not preclude the scribed no method therefor: Board state's making exemptions within of Supervisors v. Tallant, 96 Va. 723. the city afterwards: Richmond v. And see, further, ante, p. 105, note 1. Richmond & D. R. Co., 21 Grat. 604. The granting of the power to levy 'Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 372; and collect taxes cariies with it the Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me. 446. authority to adopt any reasonable ^Vanover v. Justices, 27 Ga. 354. method to make the power effectual : See Alton v. ^tna Ins. Co., 82 111. 45. Aurora v. McGannon, 188 Mo. 38. Taxes levied by a township board for Under power to regulate the goUec- township, road, and bridge purposes tion of taxes a city may legally pro- cannot be considered as levied for 470 CONSTRUCTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX.- town to tax for corporate purposes would not include the right to tax in order to make a toll-bridge free.' "Whatever doubt might be raised as to this last decision, there can be none, we should suppose, of the correctness of those which have held county purposes: United States v. Maoon County Court, 75 Fed. Eep. 859. The general school tax levied by the county board, and collected from all the property in the county, but apportioned to the several school districts of the county, is not a tax levied for a county purpose within the meaning of a statute fixing a limitation upon the levy for terri- torial and coiinty purposes: Powder River Cattle Co. v. Commissioners, 3 Wyo. 597. As to what is a county tax in Illinois, see Wright v. Wabash & St. L. R. Co., 120 111. 541. What are "county purposes'" in Minnesota: Mo- Cormick v. Fitch, 14 Minn. 252. A school tax is not a tax for a municipal purpose within a constitutional pro- vision authorizing municipalities to levy taxes for such a purpose : Nelson V. Homer, 48 La. An. 258. A tax for heating and repairing purposes was held to be a tax for school purposes, and not for building purposes, within . the school law of 1889 limiting the taxes levied in any one year to an amount not to exceed two per cent. of the assessed valuation for school purposes, and three per cent, for build- ing purposes: Chicago & A. E. Co. v., People, 163 III 616. "School purposes," " public buildings in school districts," and "existing indebtedness" of school districts being each separately re- ferred to in different statutes pro- viding different qualifications for voting thereon, taxes for "school purposes " cannot be levied for build- ing school-houses or paying indebted- 1 Bussy V. Gilmore, 3 Me. 191. Where a city has authority to levy taxes only to a certain percentage on the assessment, the power to Jevy more is not to be implied from the fact that, by the charter, it is the city's duty to erect hospitals, poor-houses, etc., ,and more would be needed for these purposes: Leavenworth v. Nor-; to.n, 1 Kan. 482. Statutory provis- ions authorizing, the county court to levy the county levy, to provide for the maintenance of the county poor, to purchase land for poor-house pur- poses, and to levy a sufficient sum to pay for the improvements, do not authorize the court to levy an ad valorem tax for pauper purposes: Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Pendleton County, 96 Ky. 491. Nor does a stat- ute authorizing a county to levy a tax to purchase land for the purpose of holding thereon agricultural fairs, authorize the county to levy a tax to be paid over to an agricultural so- ciety: Hixon V. Eagle River, 91 Wis. 649. The authority given a city to levy a tax to pay interest on, and provide a sinking fund for the ex- tinction of, an indebtedness, author- izes the levy of a tax to pay instal- ments of such indebtedness, which, by the terms of the contract creat- ing it, fall due from year to year: Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Mayfield (Ky.), 61 S. W. Rep. 43. Where by statute power is conferred on a town- ship committee to order a tax to pay interest on township bonds, the com- mittee may order a tax to pay inter- est on notes given in lieu of certain of the bonds which had matured: State V. Smith, 47 N. J. L. 473. Under a charter power to regulate, clean, and keep in repair, streets, out of a fund raised by taxes each year, the city cannot by resolution expend money for graveling or macadamiz- ing certain streets: State v. Passaic, 46 N. J. L. 124 CH. IX.] CNNSTEUCTION O^ TAX LAWS. 471 that a power to tax for necessary town charges would not war- rant a tax to raise military forces or to pay military bounties. This is clearly no part of the corporate duty of a town, and could not be supposed within the intent of the legislature in ness: State v. Wabash, St. L. etc. R. Co., 8a Mo. 395. A tax levied for the erection of school buildings is one levied for "schools," and therefore leviable without the order of tha county court: St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. V. Gracy, 136 Mo. 473. Under a stat- ute providing that it shall be the duty of county commissioners to lay an annual tax on all taxable property within their respective counties for school purposes, such commissioners have power to levy a tax to satisfy a judgment against the trustees of a school district within the county where the amount belonging to such district is insu£Bcieut to satisfy the same: State v. Board, 13 Mont. 503. In North Carolina, under a constitu- tional provision prohibiting " any tax to be levied or collected by a county, city, or town, except tor the neces- sary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the qualified voters therein," a tax may be levied without such vote for building and repairing pub- lic roads: Broadnax V. Groom, 64N.C. 344; Herring v. Dixon, 132 N. C. 430; State V. Commissioners. 133 N. C. 812; and for constructing free bridges: Evans v. Commissioners, 89 N. C. 154; and for erecting a court-house and jaiU Holcombe v. Commissioners, 89 N. C. 846; Vaughn v. Commissioners, 117 N. C, 429; Black v. Commission- ers (N. C), 39 8. E. Eep. 818. But not for erecting city water-works: Char- lotte V. Shepard, 130 N. C. 411 ; or for procuring water and light for the use of a town's inhabitants: Thrift v. Town Com'ra, 133 N. C. 31; or for erecting an electric-light plant for lighting a city's streets: Mayo v. Washington, 133 N. C, 5; or for school purposes: Rodman v. Washington, 133 N. C. 39. This provision is not infringed by a statute which gives a town the same power of taxation as is possessed by the general assembly for state and county purposes: State V. Irvin, 126 N. C. 989. Another pro- vision of the constitution of North Carolina is that "taxes levied by county commissioners shall never ex- ceed twice the amount of the state levy except for special purposes and with the special approval of the gen- eral assembly." A bridge tax for specified bridges is for a special pur- pose within this provision: Broadnax V. Groom, 64 N. C. 344. So is a spe- cial poll-tax for constructing and re- pairing public roads and bridges in certain counties: Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. O. 430. But a statute author- izing a county to levy a special tax for the purpose of maintaining free public ferries and bridges, and of meeting other current expenses, is not an act authorizing the levy of a tax for a special purpose within the meaning of the above provision: Williams v. Commissioners, 119 N. C. 520. And a statute providing that whenever the school tax levied is in- sufficient to maintain the schools for four months, the county commission- ers shall levy an annual special tax for school purposes, is unconstitu- tional, such tax not being a special tax for county purposes: Board of Education v. Commissioners, 111 N. C. 578, following Barkesdale v. Commis- sioners, 93 N. C. 473. Under these constitutional provisions, while the county commissioners can incur a debt for necessary expenses without a vote of the people, they cannot to 472 CONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. [oh. IX. providing for necessary town charges.' The same may be said of the power to vote aid to a railroad enterprise, or to a cor- poration organized to construct any work of a similar nature, not wholly local in construction or in advantages ; the power to give the aid must be conferred in terms, and must be strictly observed in the proceedings taken under it.* pay it levy a tax in excess of the limit without the special approval of the legislature: Vaughn v. Commre'' sioners, 1 17 N. 0. 429. And if the levy beyond the prescribed limit of a tax for the erection of a court-house is authorized by a special statute, it is not required to be submitted to a vote of the people: Black v. Commission- ers"(N. C), 39 S. E. E6p. 818. 1 The leading case on this point is Stetson V. Kempton, 13 Mass. 373, 378, in which Parker, Oh. J., gives his idea of what constitutes town charges, as follows: "The phrase neo- essary charges is indeed general; but the very generality of the expression shows that it must have a reasonable limitation. For none will suppose that, under this form of expression, every tax would be legal which the town should choose to sanction. The proper construction of the terms must be that, in addition to the money to be raised for the poor, schools, etc., towns might raise such sums as should be necessary, to meet the ordinary expenses of the year; such as the payment of such munici- pal oflScers as they should be obliged to employ, the support and defense of such actions as they might be par- ties to, £bid the expenses they would incur in performing such duties as the laws imposed, as the erection of powder houses, providing ammuni- tion, making and repairing highways and town roads, and other things of a like nature; which are necessary charges, because the effect of a legal discharge of their corporate duty. The erection of public buildings for the accommodation of the inhab- itants, such as town houses to assem- ble in, and market houses for the sale of provisions, may also be a proper town charge, and may come within the fair meaning of the term necessary; for these may be essential to the comfort and convenience of the citizens. But it cannot be sup- posed that the building of a theater, a circus, or any other place of mere amusement, at the expense of the town, could be justified under the term necessary town charges. Nor could the inhabitants be lawfully taxed for the purpose of raising a statue or monument, these being mat- ters of taste and not of necessity, un- less, in populous and wealthy towns, they should be thought suitable or- naments to buildings or squares, the raising and maintenance of which are within the duty and care of the governors or officers of such towns." See Alley v. Edgecomb, 53 Me. 446. Compare Lisbon v. Bath, 21 N. H. 319; Bangs V. Snow, 1 Mass. 181; Cruik- shanks v. Charleston, 1 MoCord 860; State V. Charleston, 2 Speers 623; Simmons v. Wilson, 66 N. C. 386, And see ante, pp. 223, 224. 2 See Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 215, and cases cited arde, p. 314; Camp- bell County Court v. Taylor, 8 Bush 206; State v. Macon Cbunty Court, 68 Mo. 29; Winston v. Railroad Co., 1 Baxt. 61; Demaree v. Johnson, 150 Ind. 419. For construction of a char- ter which was held to give power to construct water-works, see Frederick v. Augusta, 5 Ga. 661." OH. IX.J CONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. 473 Gonstruction as to taxables. A like rule applies as regards the subjects upon wh ch the power to tax may be employed. It does not follow that, because the state has conferred the authority, it lias intended it should be exercised to the same unlimited extent that it might be by the state itself; on the contrary, the discretion to select subjects for taxation rests with the state, and is supposed to have been exercised in granting municipal powers. On this ground it has been held that a power conferred by a city charter to tax " property within the city " would authorize the taxing of visible property only, and not credits,* that a power to tax personal property would not, without further specification, authorize the taxation of corporate stocks,^ and that the power to impose license or by a resident of the city, as the sitvis of- such property is the residence of the owner when the contrary is not declared by statute. A statute au- thorizing the mayor and council of a city to levy and collect a tax upon banking, insurance, and other capital employed therein does not authorize the taxation of the capital stock of a corporation: Macon v. Macon Con- struction Co., 94 Ga. 201. Compare Augusta V. National Bank, 47 Ga. 563, where a general power to tax prop- erty was held to justify taxing bank shares. A statute authorizing a tax on dividends over a certain per cent, on capital means capital actually paid in, and not merely authorized capital: Street R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 51 Pa. St. 465; Philadelphia v. Feriy R. Co., 53 Pa. St. 177. See City Bank V. Bogel, 51 Tex. 355. A city not em- powered to tax the capital of banks nevertheless had power to levy a tax for local purposes upon the shares of stock of a local bank, such a tax not being in effect one upon the bank's capital: Union Bank v. Richmond, 94 Va. 316. An Interpretation of a stat- ute for the assessment of a special tax which will interfere with the gen- eral tax law is not to be adopted un- less there is the clearest language to justify it: State v. Douglass, 33 N. J. L. 363; Smith v. Vicksburg, 54 Misa. 1 Johnson v. Lexington, 14 B. Monr. ■531; Covington v. Powell, 3 Met. ■(Ky.) 336; Louisville v. Henning, 1 Bush 381 ; Vaughan v. Murf reesboro, ^6 N. C. 317. Under a general law ^providing that " all debts owing by inhabitants of this state to persons not residing witWn the United States for the purchase of any real estate shall be deemed personal prop- erty within the town or county where the debtor resides, and, as such, shall be liable to taxation in "the same manner and to the same «xtent as the personal property of citizens of this state," and under a ■village charter providing that taxes may be assessed on property " within the corporation," and giving the vil lage assessors within the village all the, powers of town assessors, laud contracts owned by non-residents of the United States on land within the ■state, and held by an agent residing in the village, are taxable in the vil- lage whether the land is in the vil- lage or not: People v. Willis, 133 N. Y. 383. 2 Richmond v. Daniel, 14 Grat. 385. But in Ogden v. St. Joseph, 90 Mo. ■533, it was held that a statute mak- ing property, real and personal, "in the city " or " within the city," liable to taxation, included intangible per- sonalty such as shares of stock, owned 474 CONSTETJCTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. privilege taxes is not contained in a grant of general local leg- islation.' Power given in general terms by a village charter .to tax for village purposes all property within the village does not authorize a tax upon property which is exempted by the 615, In Pearce v. Augusta, 37 Ga. 597, it was held that a general power in a city to tax "all chattels, moneys, goods, wares, and merchandise, cap- ital invested in sjiipping or tonnage, or capital otherwise invested," would support a tax on factors measured by the amount of sales. Where the con- stitution provided that the state poll tax should not exceed one dollar, and that no county or corporation should levy a poll tax exceeding the amount levied by the state, it was held that a municipal corporation could levy only one such tax, although an amend- ment to the charter might authorize an additional poll tax for school pur- poses: Ballentine v. Palaski, 15 Lea 633. 1 Sanders v. Butler, 30 Ga. 679; Au- gusta V. Walter, 37 Ga. 620. An or- dinance imposing a license tax is void if not within the power granted : Cache County v. Jensen (Utah), 61 Pac. Rep. 303. Under a charter giv- ing a town " power to levy and col- lect taxes upon all persons and sub- jects of taxation which it is in the power of the general assembly to tax for state and county purposes, under the constitution of the state," the town may impose a tax on persons for the privilege of carrying on the business of tobacco buyer, though the charter in enumerating the sub- jects of taxation does not mention tobacco buyers: State v. Irvin, 136 N. C. 989, A city charter which au- thorizes the council to assess and collect taxes " on such real estate in said city, and on such personal es- tate, shares in associations, and mon- eys within the city, or belonging to the inhabitants of said city, as they may designate, and such as now are. or from, time to time may be, tax- able by the laws of this common- wealth," does not authorize a tax on a 'gas company's franchise, since there is no statute authorizing the imposi- tion of a tax on the franchise itself for either state or municipal pur- poses: Covington Gas Light Co. v. Covington, 93 Ky. 313. A statute au- thorizing a city to levy "upon all goods, wares, and merchandise, and upon all articles of trade and com- merce sold in said city, an annual tax not exceeding five mills," does not authorize the levy of a tax on the gross receipts of a natural-gas com- pany doing business in the city: Pittsburgh's Appeal, 108 Pa. St. 163. The power of a bounty to tax prop- erty of a railroad company under a provision in the company's charter giving the power of taxation to mu- nicipal corporations is not affected by the fact that the charter was granted before the county was or- ganized as a municipality: Central R. & B. Co. V. Wright, 164 U. S. 337. Where a telephone company is re- quired to pay a speoiflo state tax in lieu of all taxes for any purposes au- thorized by the laws of the state, a city cannot impose a license tax for revenue: Wisconsin TeL Co. v. Osh- kosh, 62 Wis. 33. See Attorney-Gen- eral V. Detroit Common Council, 113 Mich. 388. A city was held to have authority by its charter to pass or- dinances imposing a business tax on persons selling heer by wholesale, though the matter of license to sell liquors by retail was dealt with in another part of the charter: Davis v. Macon, 103 Ga. 774 A constitutional provision prohibiting the legislature from imposing taxes on counties for CH. IX.] CONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. 475 general laws relating to all taxes.^ Under a statute authoriz- ing highway commissioners to " determine what per cent, of the tax shall be levied on the property of the town for road and bridge purposes," the highway commissioners of a town which includes a city may levy a road and bridge tax in be- half of the town upon all the property in the township.^ "Where a city charter provided that the council might levy an annual ad valorem tax upon all property within the city limits " subject to taxation for state and county purposes," it was held that the state law in force Tyhen the assessment was made must govern, even though such law was passed subse- quent to the charter.' Liability of power to abuse. The liability of the taxing power to abuse is often assigned as a reason why, in particular cases, it should be held not to have been conferred. But this is illogical and unreasonable. " Every authority, however in- disf)ensable, may be abused, and if it might not, it would be powerless for good." * The point is forcibly put by the supreme county purposes, but permitting it by general law to vest in the authori- ties thereof the power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes, al- . lows the imposition by county au- thorities of a general license tax ap- plicable to one doing business in the county, though not a resident thereof, as well as to the residents thereof: El Dorado County v. Meiss, 100 Cal. 288. 1 Johnson House v. Schenectady, 37 App. Div. (N. Y.) 147. ?Peoria & P. U. R. Co. v. People, 144 111. 458. As to the right of a city council to levy highway taxes where city and town are oo-extensive in territory and have to a certain ex- tent become united, see People v. Chicago & A. E. Co., 172 III 71. 3 Anderson v. Mayfield, 93 Ky. 230. Authority to assess " all taxable prop- erty " embraces all property taxable at the time authority is given, and alidade taxable by subsequent legis- lation : Buffalo v. Le Couteulx, 15 N. Y. 451. A provision in a village charter that the levy and collection of taxes shall be made in accordance with the requirements of the " existing general law," or of the "general law now in force," means the general law in force when the tax is levied or collected, and not the general law in force at the time the city was incorporated: Newman v. North Yakima, 7 Wash. 230. A provision in a village charter that the village taxes shall be as- sessed upon the freeholders and in- habitants "according to law,"means, unless otherwise explained, accord- ing to the general laws of the state: Ontario Bank v. Bunnell, 10 Wend. 186, 194. Whenever a tax is author- ized by law, and no special provision is made as to the source whence the revenue is to be derived, the law im- plies that the taxshall be levied upon all property subject to general taxa- tion, and collected as other taxes: Hale V. Kenosha, 29 Wis. 599; State V. Bremond, 38 Tex. 116. iKirby v. Shaw, 19 Pa. St. 258, 260. In Virginia, where a license tax was 476 CONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. [cH. IX. court of Ohio. " It has been strongly urged that this power is peculiarly liable to abuse. It is liable to be abused; perhaps peculiarly so. But so is all government, and all governmental powers. Yet government is nevertheless a necessity among men. It is a very bad government indeed which is not better than the inevitable anarchy and outrage which follow the ab- sence of all government. And the fact that a power is liable to be abused aJBfords no conclusive argument against it."' It is only a reason for caution ill construction, in order to be cer- tain that the power is intended to be given, and for holding the donee of the power to a strict execution of the authority.^ Directory and mandatory provisions. Much use is made in the law of taxation of the words directory and mandatory, as words of classification of the various provisions of tax-laws, as regards the imperative nature of the obligation they impose on the revenue officers to obey them strictly. All the provis- ions of a statute not on their face merely permissory or dis- cretionary are intended to be obeyed, or they would not be enacted at all; and therefore they come to the several officers who are to act under them, as commands. But the negligence of officers, their mistakes of fact or of law, and malny other causes, will sometimes prevent a strict obedience, and when the provisions which haye been disregarded constitute parts of an important and perhaps compli6ated system, it becomes of the highest importance to ascertain the effect the failure to obey them shall have on the other proceedings with which they are associated in the law. The form the question most commonly assumes is this : Some official act which the law provides for, and which constitutes one step to be followed by others in reaching a specified result, having failed to be taken, does the authority to proceed toward the intended result terminate whe'n that particular step has been iieglected, or may the pro- ceeding go on to a conclusion, treating the neglect as imma- terial ? If the proceeding fails at that point, the requirement contested as unjust and unequal, a Nichols, 33 Conn. 189, 303; Kneedler similar idea was expressed: Ould v. v. Lane, 45 Pa. St. 338; State v. Kin- Riohniond„33 Grat. 461 kead, 14 Nev. 117. 1 Reeves v. Wood County Treasurer, 2 People v. Chicago & A. B. Co. (IlL), 8 Ohio St. 338. See Breevort v. De- 61 N. E. Rep. 1064 troit, 34 Mich. 333, 335; Bridgeport v. CH. IX.] , CONSTRUCTION OF TAX LAWS, 477 of the oflBcial act which has been neglected is said to be man- datory, but if it may still proceed, the requirement is directory only; that is to say, the law directs that particular act to be performed, but does not imperatively command it as a condi- tion precedent to anything further.^ In some cases the question assumes a different form. The municipalities, it has been seen, levy and collect taxes not only for their own purposes, but also under state apportionment for the state at large. The power to levy taxes for local uses is usually , conferred upon them in merely permissory terms ; terms implying a discretion to levy them or not at the will of the local majority or the local board. These terms may some- times be open to the question whether they are intended to confer a discretionary authority merely, or, on the other hand, Avhether they are not meant to impose a duty and put the mu- nicipality under an imperative obligation. A solution of this question will commonly depend upon the purpose of the tax for which authority is given. If the tax is for purely local purposes, the permission to levy it can seldom be regarded as anything more than an enabling authority, of which advantage may be taken or not, at discretion ; but if it is for general purposes, the law must be regarded as imposing a duty. Thus, in whatever terms the authority is conferred upon a county to levy its proportion of the state tax, the levy is imperative; and permissory words in the statute may be construed as commands, and a reluctant local authority may be coerced into a performance of the duty.^ The rule is the 1 See, in general, Young v. Joslin, that a statutory provision that com- 13 R. I. 675; Wiley v. Flournoy, 30 missioners may levy a tax for school Ark. 609; Lane V. James, 35 Vt. 481; purposes is mandatory: Jones v. Rubey V. Huntsman, 83 Mo. 501; Mil- Board of Public Instruction, 17 Fla. ner v. Clarke, 61 Ala. 358; State, Au- 411. A provision that the county court, ditor V. Jackson County, 65 Ala. 143 ; when invoked in a special assessment Silsbee v. Stookle, 44 Mich. 561 ; Kel- case, may inquire into the apportion- sey v. Abbott, 13 CaL 609; Hoffman ment between the municipality and V.Bell, 61 Pa. St. 444; State V.Washoe the owners is mandatory: Mercy County, 14 Nev. 140; Life Assoc, v. Hospital v. Chicago, 187 111.400. The Assessors, 49 Mo. 513; Morrill v. Tay- word "may" in the Louisiana stat- lor, 6 Neb. 336; Adams v. Seymour, ute providing that police juries of 30 Conn. 403; Houghton County v. several parishes may levy, for the Auditor-General, 41 Mich. 38; Davis support of common schools, not less V. Fames, 36 Tex. 396. than a certain percentage of the 2 In Florida it has been decided assessed valuation of the property 478 OONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. [oh. IX. same where what is authorized is for the purpose of meeting some legal obligation of the municipality ; for the state has an interest in such obligations being performed; and "where a statute directs the doing of a thing for the sake of justice or the public good, the word may is the same as the word shall" and imports a duty equally imperative.^ In most cases, however, the question whether any particular provision of a tax-law is mandatory or not will arise between the govern- ment and its officers, or some one claiming under their proceed- thereof, is not mandatory but permis- si ve,and such levy cannot be enforced by mandamus: Parish Board School Directors v. Police Jury, 40 La. An. 755. The words " may at its discre- tion appoint " in a charter provision vrere held to be merely permissive, and that a city council might make an assessment itself without the in- tervention of special assessors: King Real Estate Assoc, v. Portland, 33 Ot. 199. Provision that " there may be included " a certain sum for opening and improving a certain avenue, held permissive merely: People v. Syra- cuse, 59 Hun 258. A statute author- izing the extension of the time of payment of assessments for local im- provements is permissive, not manda- tory; "may" is not "must": Siate V. Minneapolis CXty Council, 65 Minn. 298. In a pi-ovision that personal property "shall" be assessed to the owner in the township where he lives, and that personal property under the control of an agent " may " , be assessed to such agent in the town where he lies, the word "may" is not to be read as "shall," and securi- ,ties in an agent's custody may be as- sessed in part to the owner and in' part to the agent: Curtis v. Rich- land T'p, 56 Mich. 478. " May " held to be used in its ordinary meaning as permissive, not as mandatory: People's Nat. Bank v. Ayer, 24 Ind. App. 212. 1 Rex V. Barlow, 3 Salk. 609. See Rex V. Inhabitants of Derby, Skin- ner 370; Mmor v. Mechanics' Bank, 1 Pet. 46; Mason v. Pearson, 9 How. 348; Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall. 435; Galena v. Amy, 5 Wall. 705; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 163 IlL 616; De Pauw Plate Glass Co. V. Alexandria, 153 Ind. 443; Coy v. Lyons City, 17 Iowa 1; Justices v. Railroad Co., 11 B. Monr. 143; Doores T. Varnon, 94 Ky. 507; Baltimore v. Marriott, 9 Md. 160, 174; State v. Harris, 17 Ohio St. 608; Virginia v. Justices, 3 Va. Cases, 9. Where a statute clothes a public body or of- ficer with power to refund taxes il- legally collected, it will be deemed mandatory although the words are merely permissive. So held of a stat- ute which authorized supervisors to refund taxes levied and collected on government securities: People v. Supervisors, 51 N. Y. 401. See, to the same effect: Hayes v. Los Angeles, 99 Cal. 74; Indianapolis v. McAvoy, 86 Ind. 587; Jones v. Board of Public In- struction, 17 Fla. 411; Smith v. King, 14 Or. 10; De Pauw Plate Glass Co. v. Alexandria, 153 Ind. 448. A statute giving power to levy a real-estate tax if a capitation tax would prob- ably be insu£5cient, held mandatory:, Bates V. Speed, 10 Bush 644 So with .a provision that repayment of invalid taxes paid " may be demanded " within thirty days after payment: Railroad Co. v. Reidsville, 109 N. C. 494; Hat wood v. Fayetteville, 131 N. C. 307. CH. IX.] OONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. 479 ings, on the one side, and the person taxed on the other; and the form it will take will be, whether the person taxed is en- titled to dejfeat the proceeding which is being taken adversely to him, by reason of the failure on the part of the officers to observe some direction of the statute under which they derive their authority. If he may, it is because the direction was mandatory, and obedience to it a condition precedent to any further adverse proceedings. The jihraseology of the statute may sometimes settle this question very conclusively. If by the use of negative words it requires a particular proceeding to be taken in a particular time or manner, and makes it void if not so done,^ or gives it effect, provided it is so done,^ br declares that, unless it is taken, subsequent proceedings shall not be had,' or prohibits its being done except at the time the statute prescribes,* or if any terms plainly imperative are employed, the intent is clear, and no discretion can be permitted in construction. It is not often, however, that these or similar words are met with in the statutes which define official duties under the revenue laws, and the construction of particular provisions must be left^for determination in such light as the obvious purpose they were intended to accomplish may afford. And that pur- pose, it would seem, ought generally to be conclusive. No one should be at liberty to plant himself upon the non-feas- ances or misfeasances of officers, under the revenue laws, which in no way concern himself, and make them the excuse for a failure on his part to perform his own duty.' On the other hand, he ought always to be at liberty to insist that directions which the law has given to its officers for his benefit shall be observed. Many eminent judges have endeavored to lay down 1 The King v. Hepswell, 8 B. & 0. joined: Standard Coal Co. v. Angus, 466. 73 Iowa 304 Under a statute pro- 2 The King v. Inhabitants of Grreg- viding that no county tax shall be ory, 3 Ad. & El. 99. levied except at a regular term of 3 Stayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144 the county court, a tax levied at a ^In re Douglass, 46 N. Y. 43. Where called term is illegal: Free v. Soar- the statute provided that no tax borough, 70 Tex. 373. should be levied by a school board » Stookle v, Silsbee, 41 Mich. 615; after the third Monday in May, it vras State v. Phillips, 137 Mp. 359. See held that the collection of a tax Adams v. Seymour, 30 Conn. 403. levied after that date should be en- 480 CONSTEITCTION OF TAX LAWS. [OH. IX. a general rule on this subject, by which the difficulties in tax cases may in general be solved. In one of the most recent, cases in which this has been attempted, the general doctrine- is stated as follows: "There are undoubtedly many statutory requisitions intended for the guide of oflBcers in the conduct of business devolved upon them, which do not limit their power, or render its exercise in disregard of the requisitions ineflfectuaL, Such generally are regulations designed to secure order, sysr- tem, and dispatch in proceeStings, and by a disregard of which the rights of parties interested cannot be injuriously affected. Provisions of this character are not usually regarded as man- datory, unless accompanied by negative words, importing that the act required shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated.^ But when the requisitions pre- scribed are intended for the protection of the citizen, and to- prevent a sacrifice of his property, and by a disregard of which his rights might be and generally would be injuriously af- fected, they are not directory but mandatory. They must be . followed, or the acts done will be invalid. The power of the- officer in all such cases is limited by the measure and condi- tions prescribed for its exercise." ^ The same rule in nearly the same terms has been laid down, in other cases,^ and it seems a sound and. just rule, and may- 1 State V. Phillips, 137 Mo. 259. 154; Bird v. Perkins, S3 Mioh. 31;: Many statutory regulations are de- Flint, etc. R. Co. v. Auditor-General, signed for the information of tax 41 Mich. 635; State v. Jersey City, 35. officials, and a compliance is not a N. J. L. 381 ; Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired. condition- precedent to the validity of 129; Sweigle v. Gates, 9 N. D. 538; the tax: State v. West Duluth Land Eaton v. Bennett (N. D.), 87 N. W.Rep.. Co., 75 Minn. 456. 188; Magee v. Commonwealth,46 Pa.. 2Meid, J., in French V. Edwards, 13 St. 358; Spear v. Ditty, 8 Vt. 419; Wall. 506, 511. See State Auditor v. Powder River Cattle Co. v. Board of Jackson County, 65 Ala. 143. Com'rs, 45 Fed. Rep. 333. Statutes- 8 Lyon V. Alley, 130 U. S. 177 Walker v. Chapman, 32 Ala. 116 Wheeler v. Chicago, 34 Bl. 105, 108 prescribing the mode of assessing and collecting taxes must be pur- sued strictly: Union Central I* Ins. Shawnee County v. Carter, 3 Kan. Co. v. Chapin (Iowa), 85 N. W. Rep. 115; Wheatly V. Covington, 11 Bush 791. All acts required by the statute-^ 18; McDonough v. Gravier, 9 La. An. in order to make the tax chargeable- 546; O'Neal v. Virginia & M. Bridge are conditions precedent and must- Co., 18 Md. 1 ; Torrey v. Milbury, 31 be complied with strictly or the tax Pick. 64; Westhampton v. Searle, 137 cannot be collected: Howes v. Eeis,. Mass. 503; Clark v. Crane, 6 Mioh. 151, 40 Cal. 355. CH. IX.J CONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. 4:81 reasonably be believed to be in accord with the legislative will in the cases to which it is applicable. All legislation must be supposed to take into account the possible, if not probable, mistakes and irregularities of officers in executing the provis- ions of the law, and it is hardly reasonable to infer, an intent, on the part of a legislative body, that a failure of administra- tive officers to comply with any provision made for the bene- fit of the state exclusively, or merely as a guide in orderly proceedings, should deprive the state of all benefit to be de- rived from a compliance with other provisions that embody the main purpose and object of the law.' Nor, on the other hand, is it to be supposed the legislature intended its own securities for the protection of individual rights and property should be disregarded with impunity.* Instances of mandatory provisions. What, then, are the provisions of tax-laws which are made for the benefit and pro- tection of the individual taxpayer ? In many cases this ques- tion, as applied to particular provisions, is easily solved ; in others there is more difficulty.' That the taxpayer shall be entitled to such protection as the official responsibility of offi- 1 State V. Phillips, 137 Mo. 259. The merely, and not conditions prece- form of orders made for the guidance dent. Defects in the warrant or tax- of the county auditor in entering list might be a good excuse fornot the tax levies is not important if the executing the warrant. But to say substance is right and the auditor is that a collector who has collected the not misled by it: .Bittinger v. Bell, money -without objection by the tax- 65 Ind. 445. payers is not liable to account there- 2 Wiley V. Flournoy, 30 Ark. 609; for would be as contrary to the rules Corbett v. Bradley, 7 Nev. 106, 108; of law as to justice. He can only Dryf uss v. Bridges, 45 Miss. 247 ; avail himself of such defects as have Briggsv. Georgia, 15 Vt 61, 72; State prevented his performance of his V. Lean,, 9 Wis. 279, 292. In Sand- duty." wich V. Fish, 2 Gray 298,301, Shaw, 'The distinction between directory Ch. J., in answering an objection and mandatory provisions in tax- made on behalf of a defaulting col- laws is explained in O'Neal v. Vir- lector, that certain provisions re- ginia & M. Bridge Co., 18 Md. 1, 33, garding the authority to collect had by Tuck, J., referring to Youngs v. not been complied with, says: "The State, 7 G. & J. 253, and other Mary- provisions of the statutes as to the land cases. In a recent Michigan form of warrants and tax-lists, case it is said that unless a statute and the place where the lists shall clearly appears to be mandatory it be deposited, are intended for the will be held directory: Hooker v. benefit of the taxpayers. As to Bond, 118 Mich. 255. all other persons they are directory 31 482 CONSTEtJCTION OF TAX LAWS. [oh. IX. cers can give him ; ^ that the tax shall be yotied or levied by the competent authority, and under any conditions which the law has prescribed;^ that there shall be an assessment ' and an ap- 1 In Vermont the decisions are that if the collector appointed to collect any tax assessed on lands for roads and bridges shall fail to give the re- quired bond, any sale made by him is void: Oatman v. Barney, 46^Vt. 594, and cases cited. This is hardly consonant with the current of au- thority. See ante, pp 430, 431. 2 The .statute requiring an adop- tion by popular vote of the amount of tax to be levied to pay bonds is mandatory: State v. Babcock, 31 Neb. 599. So is a law requiring pub- lication, before levy of tax, of an es- timate of necessary parish expendi- tures: Wilson V. Anderson, 38 La. An. 361 ; Constant v. Parish of East Carroll, 105 La. 386. A statute de- ' daring that all resolutions, etc., in- volving taxation shall be published "in all the newspapers employed by the corporation," and not be passed until such notice has been published at least two days, is plainly intended to be imperative: Petition of Doug- lass, 46 N. Y. 43; Petition of Smith, 53 N. Y. 536. Where the statute pre- scribes a certain time for the levy- ing court to convene and levy taxes, a levy by it at any other time is in- valid, though it may have convened and made the levy at such time under a mandamus from the federal court: Martin v. MoDiarmid, 55 Ark. 313. A provision of a city charter that the common council shall, on or before a specified date, levy the , taxes on all property in the city sufBoient to raise revenue to carry on the different departments of the municipal government, is peremp- tory, and a levy made after that date would be void: Board of Edu- cation V. Common Council, 138 Cal. 369, citing People v. McCreery, 34 Cal. 443. In Iowa it is said that if through negligence or mistake a tax is not levied at the proper time it may be levied at the time fixed for the succeeding tax-levy: Perrin v. Benson, 49 Iowa 335. As to a tax prematurely levied, see 'Easton v. Savery, 44 Iowa 654 A tax voted by supervisors at a time when no meeting is authorized for the purpose is illegal: Board v. Supervisors, 51 Miss. 542; Gamble v. Witty, 55 Miss. 36. An ordinance requiring that street improvements shall be ordered by resolution is mandatory, for by such resolution the city acquires ju- risdiction to act: Starr v. Burling- ton, 45 Iowa 87. Where the statute provides for the assessment of a street railway corporation for the pave- ment of the space occupied by its roadbed, the provision is mandatory: Shreveport v. Prescott, 51 La. An. 1895. * Statutory provisions as to classifi- cation of property to be assessed, held mandatory: MoCutchen v. Lyon County Supervisors, 95 Iowa 20; State V. Thomas, 16 Utah 86. Where the statute provided that a tax voted at an annual town meeting in March should be assessed on the tax-list of the May following, it was held mandatory, and the town incompe- tent by vote to authorize the select- men to assess it on the list of the previous year: Alger v. Curry, 38 Vt. 383. Requirement that taxes be en- tered and extended upon the original assessment rolls in the hands of the supervisors, and that the rolls and tax-lists sent to the treasurer shall be copies of the original rolls, is mandatory: Seymour v. Peters, 67 Mich. 415. , Statutory provision' that supervisor require every person to OH. IX.] CON8TE0OTION OF TAX LAWS. 483 portionment;^ that there shall be ofiBcial warrant for any com- pulsory proceedings,^ — all these are manifestly conditions pre- cedent to any lawful demand whatever upon the citizen. They are of the highest importance, because it is only by means of the requirement of official action in an orderly manner and at periodical times that he can be protected against arbitrary and capricious action." Moreover, they go to make up the power which the law gives to its agents over the property and per- sons of the people, and without the power to act all attempted make statement of taxable property is mandatory: Turner v. Muskegon Circuit Judge, 95 Mich. 1. So is the provision of the Vermont statute re- quiring listers to lodge abstracts in town clerk's office: Smith v. Hard, 59 Vt. 13. And list so lodged is in- valid if not signed and certified with time of lodgment minuted: Bundy V. Vifalcott, 59 Vt. 665. A provision that unoccupied lands not claimed to be owned by residents be entered on a separate part of the roll, held mandatory:' Seymour v. Peters, 67 Mich. 415. So with requirement . that lands be assessed to owner or occupant, otherwise to "unknown owner: " Bird v. Benlisa, 143 U. S. 664; see Sweigle v. Gates, 9 N. D. 538. A provision that real estate shall be assessed to the owner and in separate parcels is for the benefit of taxpayers, and mandatory : Young V. Joslin, 13 R. L 675. Eequirenjent that lots or parcels be separately as- sessed, held mandatory: Frazier v. Prince, 8 Okl. 253; Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489. So with a requirement that taxation shall be by value: Life Assoc. V. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo. 518. So with a requirement that the assessor determine and enter the value of each piece of realty listed for taxation; Lockwood v. Roys, 11 Wash. 097. Where a lot omitted from the assessment of the preceding year is to be placed upon the roll with the valuation of the last year when it was assessed, if it never was on the roll it cannot be put on under the provision: People v. Goflf, 53 N. Y. 434. Failure to file assessment roll by date fixed by code held to in- validate it: Carlisle v. Goode, 71 Miss. 453. Where the statute re- quires the tax-list to be certified by an oath "made and subscribed," this means an oath duly certified in writ- ing, and the absence of it is fatal to the proceedings: Davis v. Fames, 26 Tex. 396. That statutory require- ments as to the authentication of the assessment are in general man- datory, see post, oh. XII. Require- ment of notice of meeting of board of reviewers to assess damages and benefits is mandatory: Hershberger V. Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. St. 78. 1 See ante, ch. VIL '^ See post, ch. XIL 2 " The assessor acts under a special and limited authority, conferred by the law and not by the owner of the estate. He is the mere instrument to pass the title. The proceeding must be construed strictly, and the power must be strictly pursued in every particular. The law requires that every prerequisite to the exer- cise of the power to sell the estate must precede its exercise. The agent must pursue the power or his act will not be sustained by it:" Wheeler, Ch. J., in Davis v. Fames, 26 Tex. 396, 297, citing earlier Texas cases. " Many of the provisions of our stat- ute regulating the imposition of taxes must be considered directory merely. 484 CONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. action is a trespass upon individual rights.^ So all provisions designed to give him the opportunity of a review of the assess- ment, whether by the assessors themselves, or on appeal from their conclusions, are exclusively in his interest.* Every no- tice which the statute provides for that end, whether by pub- lication or otherwise, must be givert with scrupulous observance of all its requisites.' The notice cannot be shortened a single day without rendering it,ineffectual ; the presumption beiilg that the law has made it as short as was deemed consistent with due protection.* A published notice cannot be received Some are doubtless conditions; such as those which are intended to secure an equality of taxation or burdens among the citizens, that is, that the citizen may know for what he is taxed, know his valuation, and have notice of the time and place of ap- peal:" Coulter, 3., in Insuraoce Co. V. Yard, 17 Pa. St. 331, 338. 1 See ante, p. 436. 2 See Negley v. Henderson Bridge Co. :(Ky.), 45 S. W. Rep. 171. Pro- visions as to time and place of meet- ing of board of review held manda- tory: Wiley V. Flournoy, 30 Ark. 609; ' Caledonia T'p v. Rose, 94 Mich. 316; Auditor-General v. Chandler, 108 Mich. 569. An order of a county board of review made after the time fixed by law for its session has ex- pired is void: Yocum v. First Nat. Bank, 144 Md. 272. Omission of the proper certificate of equalization held to render a sale void: Westbrook v. Miller, 64 Mich. 129. VVhere, in tax- ing a railroad, the value is appor- tioned among the counties through which it runs, a provision that the auditor shall not thus apportion it until the equalization has been made is mandatory : State Auditor v. Jack- son County, 65 Ala. 142; Perry County V. Selma, etc. R. Co., 65 Ala. 391. So is one that the board of equalization shall keep a record of its proceedings which shall be signed by the mem- bers present: Ibid. 8 Payson v. People, 175 111. 267. In order to give validity to an assess- ment, the statutory requirement as to notice is mandatory: liIoTwiggan V. Hunter, 18 R. L 776. The statutory' provisions requiring notice to the taxpayers apply whether his list is or is not made up by doubling be- cause of his failure to return an in- ventory: Thomas v. Leland, 70 Vt. 333. To obtain jurisdiction by pub- lication, it must affirmatively appear that the statute has been pursued strictly and its provisions complied with: McChesney v. People, 145 IlL 614, 148 111. 231; Payson v. People, supra. A notice given in the mode prescribed by statute, but a day or two later, is of no effect: Thomas v. Leland, 70 Vt. 323. In California it has been held that a statute requir- ing the notice inviting the proposals for a public work to be conspicu- ously posted for five days was not ' complied with unless the notice was kept posted for that time: Himmel- mann v. Cahn, 49'Cal. 385; Brooks v. Satterlee, 49 Cal. 289. In Sprague v. Bailey, 19 Pick. 436, a provision that notice of abatenient to those who should pay their taxes promptly should be posted in public places was regarded as directory merely. The point was not reasoned. « State V. Newark, 36 N. J. L. 288; Pope V. Headon, 5 Ala. 433; Early v. Doe, 16 How. 610; Haskell v. Bart- lett, 34 Cal. 281. CH. IX.] OONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. 485 as the substitute for a notice to be personally delivered to the party concerned,* and where the notice is to be given person- ally and also by publication, a failure in either is fatal.^ The same rules apply to any notice required of subsequent proceedings; if directed to be given within a certain time, or in any prescribed mode, it must be so given.' "Whatever tends to make the right to redeem more valuable to the taxpayer should be observed; and here time may be of the very highest importance; and at no stage of the proceedings should the requisites of notice be more strictly observed.* " When the statute under which the sale is made directs a thing to be done, or prescribes the form, time, and manner of doing anything, such thing must be done, and in the form, time, and manner prescribed, or the title is invalid ; and in this respect the statute must strictly, if not literally, be complied with. But in determining what is required to be done, the statute must receive a reasonable construction; and when no particular form or manner of doing a thing is pointed out, any mode which effects the object with reasonable certainty is suffi- iMoulton V. Blaisdell, 34 Me. 283; Lovejoy v. Lunt, 48 Me. 377. And see Roche V. Dubuque, 43 Iowa 350; La- grolie V. Rains, 48 Mo. 536. 2 Appeal of Powers, 29 Mich. 504. 8 The statute requiring tax-collect- ors to send to known resident own- ers of property a bill of their taxes is mandatory: Davisv. Sawyer, 66 N. H. 34. Under a statute providing that flo sale of real estate for taxes should affect the 'rights of any person not taxable therefor unless a written de- mand was first made upon said per- son by the collector for the payment of said taxes, a tax was assessed to the owner of the equity of redemp- tion, and lands were sold therefor, no demand being made upon the mort- gagee before the sale. Held, that a re- peal of the statute did not leave him liable for the tax: Tinslar v. Davis, 13 Allen 79. Where the statute re- quired the sheriff, at the next term, of the county court preceding a tax sale, to return a list of the lands on which taxes were unpaid, with the names of the owners, if known, and other particulars, which was to be read aloud, recorded in the minutes, and posted in the room, this was held to be mandatory: Kelly v. Craig, 5 Ired. 129. Compare Weir v. Kitph- ens, 53 Misa 74. All provisions re- garding notice of sale and the place of sale are mandatory: Martin v. Barbour, 140 U. S. 634; Martin v. Al- lard, 55 Ark. 118; Logan v. Eastex-n Ark. L. Co., 68 Ark. 348; State V. Rollins, 39 Mo. 367; Rubey v. Huntsman, 83 Mo. 501; McNair v. Jenson, 33 Mo. 313; Mowry v. Blan- din, 64 N. H. 3; Amoskeag Sav. Bank V. Alger, 66 N. H. 414; Derry Nat. Bank v. Griffin, 68 N. H. 183; Ramsay V. Hammel, 68 Wis. 12. And see, fur- ther, post, ch. XV. there being no penalty for non-compliance; and the taxpayer is not shut out from all relief because of his omis- non, 36 Fed. Eep. 854. When Juris- diction has attached in favor of the tax assessor, then the residue of the proceedings may be regarded as di- rectory, And within the domain of statutes providing against mere ir- regularities and omissions: State v. Neosho Bank, 120 Mo. 161. The stat- ute requiring school district trustees on assessing a tax to " prefix to their tax-list a heading showing for what purpose the different items of a tax are levied " is directory only, and failure to prefix such heading does not vitiate the assessment: Thomson v. Harris, 88 Hun 478. A provision that the true value and the equalized value of lands shall appear in distinct columns on the roll is directory only, as the failure to obey it in no way affects the person taxed: Torrey v. Milbury, 21 Pick. 64. So putting a special tax in a column by itself on the roll when it should be put with the town tax is equally harmless, and therefore cannot affect the proceed- ings: "Wall V. Trumbull, 16 Mich. 328. 'Compare Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12; Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich. 561. The statute requiring a specific descrip- tion of property assessed is directory merely, and a failure to comply therewith does not avoid the assess- ment: Board of Councilmen V. Farm- ers' Bank (Ky.), 61 S. W. Rep. 458. The fact that the county clerk ex- tends the taxes on the copy of the assessment book made out for him by the collector, instead of on the original book, does not invalidate the tax. as such requirement, being merely for the purpose of securing order, is directory: State v. Louns- berry, 125 Mo. 157. The failure of the listers to deposit with the town clerk a list of the real estate assessed will not invalidate a quadrennial ap- praisal: Smith V. Blair, 61 Vt. 658. The neglect of the county boards of supervisors to direct the amounts of township or school taxes, when noth- ing is submitted to their discretion, cannot deprive the township author- ities of the right to levy such as have been duly voted: Bobbins v. Barron, 33 Mich. 184; Upton v. Kennedy, 36 Mich. 215; Hunt v. Ghapin, 42 Mich. 34. See Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 111. 346. Under the statute providing that the board of equalization shall levy the requisite taxes for the cur- rent year, " and record the same in the proper book," it is Hot essential to the validity of the tax that it he so entered: Prouty v. Tallman, 65 Iowa 854; Hutchinson v. Oskaloosa, 66 Iowa 35. A statute giving the owner of property the privilege of deducting from the mortgage the amount of taxes paid on the mortga- gee's interest is permissive, not man- ■ datory: San Gabriel Valley L. & W. Co. v. Witmer Bros. Co., 96 Cal. 623. A requirement that the owner's name be given in the published list of delinquent taxes, and, if unknown, that such fact be stated, is directory merely: McQuade v. Jaffray, 47 Minn. 326. The clerk's failure to enter the word sold, in the book opposite the description of the land, as required by the statute, does not defeat the sale: Playter v. Cockran, 37 Iowa 258. See, for similar rulings. Railroad Co. v. Carroll County, 41 Iowa 153; Gam- ble V. Withy, 55 Miss., 26. The re- quirement that a tax-judgment shall be entered on the left-hand page of the judgment book is directory only, and non-compliance with it does not render the judgment void: Country- man V. Wasson, 78 Minn. 244 The CH, IX.] OONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWSv 491 sion to fill out such a list.' "Whete the statute provides that " the acts herein required between the assessment and com- mencement of suit shall be deemed directory merely," the omis- sions of officers to perform the duties required of them between such assessment ajid commencement constitute no defense to a suit for taxes.^ The requirement of a warrant to the town as- sessors, requiring them to assess the state tax, is directory, as this becomes of no moment if they act without it.' And mani- festly the taxpayer has nothing to do with any accounting by the officer, or with any report or document to be made by him, for the security of the public or for the information of superiors only, and which is not to be warrant for, or to affect^ in any manner, subsequent proceedings for enforcing the tax.* In the margin many other cases are referred to in which statutory pro- visions have been decided to be merely directory.' provisions of an ordinance requiring the superintendent of sewers to keep, and submit to the board of aldermen, an account of the cost of construct- ing sewers, and to report a list of persons deriving a benefit from them, are merely directory, and his neglect so to do does not affect the validity of an assessment: Collins v. Holyoke, .146 Mass. 298. 'Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 40 La. An. 371. estate V. Sadler. 21 Nev. 13. 3 Alvord V. Collin, 20 Pick. 418. * Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Mich. 578. The clause in the tax-warrant, " and you are hereby directed to settle with the selectmen by the 20th day of September next," is merely directory, and does not limit the collector's power to that time: Picket v. Allen, 10 Conn. 145. The requirement of the filing of a certificate of approval of a local work will be held directory where it does not appear to be in- tended as a prerequisite to a valid assessment: Brady v. Bartlett, 56 Cal, 350. Where an affidavit to the delinquent list is required for the purposes of record, the requirement will be held only directory if the rec- ord is made without it: Succession of Edwards, 33 La. An. 457. The col- lector's omission to enter upon his warrant the true day and year when he received it does not invalidate his proceedings under it: Goodwin v. Perkins, 39 Vt. 598. The right of the commonwealth to defeat a tax on the market value of the capital stock of a corporation is not defeated by the neglect of the city assessors to make return of the corporation to the treasurer of the commonwealth as" required by statute: Common- wealth V. New England S. & T. Co., 13 Allen 891. 5 Craig V. Bra,dford, 3 Wheat. 594; United States v. Kirkpatriok, 9 Wheat. 720; United States v. Dan- dridge, 12 Wheat. 64; State v. Click, 3 Ala. 35, 26; Savage v. Walsh, 36 Ala. 620; McKune v. Weller, 11 Cal. 49; Adams v. Seymour, 30 Conn. 403; Vance v. Schuyler, 1 Gilm. 160; Webster v. French, 12111. 302; Coombs V. Steere, 8 111. App. 147; State v. Mc- Ginly, 4 Ind. 7; Stayton v. Hulings, 7 Ind. 144; Noland v. Busby, 28 Ind. 154; New Orleans v. St. Eomes, 9 La. An. 573; Hale v. Gushing, 3 Greenl. 218; Muzzy v. White, 3 Greenl. 390; \ 492 CONSTRUCTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. Retrospective taxation. Unless the constitution prohibits retrospective legislation, the basis of an assessment of taxes may as lawfully be retrospective as the reverse; that is to say, it may as well have regard to benefits theretofore received, as to those which may be assessed thereafter.^ It has therefore Scarborough v. Parker, 53 Me. 353; State V. County Com'rs, 39 Ind. 516; Pond V. Negus, 3 Mass. 330; Lowell v. Hadley, 8 Met. 180; Parks v. Gpodwift, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 56; People v. Doe, 1 Mich. 451; Hickey v. Hinsdale, 8 Mich. 367; People v. Hartwell, 13' Mich. 508; Banning v. MoManus, 51 Minn. 389; Burlington, etc. R.-Co. v. Saline County, 13 Neb. 396; Ex parte Heath, 3 Hill, 43; Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill, 39; Jackson v. Young, 5 Cow, 369; Allen v. People, 6 Wend. 486; People V. Peck, 11 Wend. 604; People V. HoUey, 13 Wend. 48] ; Elmendorf V. New York, 35 Wend. 693, 696; Gale V. Mead, 3 Denio 353; Doughty v. • Hope, 8 Denio 253; Pfeople v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; Lyth v. Buffalo, 48 Hun 175;'Allen v. Parish, 3 Ohio 187; PYy V. Booth, 19 Ohio St. 35; Lawrence v. Speed, 3 Bibb 401 ; Hayden v. Dun- lap,. 8 Bibb 316; Edwards v. James. 13 Tex. 53; Holland v. Osgood, 8 Vt. 376, 380; Corliss v. Corliss, 8 Vt. 373, 390; Huey v. Van Wie, 33 Wis. 613. 1 Locke V. New Orleans, 4 Wa:ll. 173; New Orleans v. Rhenish West- phalian Lloyds, 31 La. An. 781 ; Peo- ple V. Gold Co., 93 N. Y. 383; State V. Graham, 8 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cases, 500; Merour, etc. Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 333. The assessment of property for taxation may be provided for by re- trospective laws: State v. Memphis & C. R. Co., 14 Lea 56. The legislature may enact retrospective statutes whenever it is not restrained by con- stitutional provisions: State v. Whit- tlesey, 17 Wash. 447. It is Mot com- petent in North Carolina to levy retroactive taxes: Young v. Hender- son, 76 N. C. 430. A constitutional provision prohibiting retrospective laws avoids a statutory amendment adding five years to the period for whiok extra taxes might be levied under the Ohio one-mile pike law: Miller v. Hixson (Ohio), 59 N. E. Rep. 749. It also avoids an act for the re- funding of taxes erroneously paid, in so far as such act imposes an obli- gation on account of past trahs^ actions: Hamilton County Com'rs v. Rosche, 50 Ohio St. 103. Legislation for the enforcement of back taxes is not forbidden by such a prohibition where no new obligation is imposed: Sturges V. Carter, 114 U. S. 511 ; New Orleans v. Railroad Co., 35 La. An. 679; State v. Heman, 70 Mo. 441; Gager v. Prout, 48 Ohio St. 89. Nor 3oes such a prohibition render un- constitutional an act to provide for the collection of arrearages of taxes for past years: Wilmington v. Cronly, 133 N. C. 383. And such a prohibi- tion is not violated by a statute re- quiring persons desiring, to redeem lands sold to; the state for taxes to pay interest upon such taxes, al- though when the taxes were laid there was no law authorizing the col- lection of interest on them; it being in the power of the state to waive its tax-title on such terms as it deems just: League v. State, 93 Tex. 553. The prohibition avoids the penalty required to be added to the omitted taxes for previous years: Gager v. Prout, 48 Ohio St. 89; see Redwood County V. Winona & St. P. L. Co., 40 Minn. 513. The penalty authorized by a retrospective provision for the taxing of omitted property can be enforced only as to taxes which should have been enforced since the passage of the provision: Galusha v. CH. IX.] CONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. 493 been very properly held that there is no constitutional or other legal objection to the levy of taxes to pay for municipal im- provements which' had previously been made,^ or to the assess- ment or re-assessment of taxes upon property ,which had es- caped taxation, or had been grossly undervalued for taxation in previous years.^ Nor in apportioning the tax between in- Wendt (Iowa), 87 N. W. Rep. 513. In New Jersey a statute providing that the cost heretofore or hereafter in- curred by any city of the third class for improving sidewalks shall be a lien upon the abutting lands and may be collected in the same manner as taxes are in cities, is unconstitu- tional because retroactive: Wain v. Beverly, 55 N. J. L. 544. An inherit- ance tax which applies to estates that have been probated before its passage, but are to be distributed after it takes effect, is not unconsti- tutional as to such estates: Gels- thorpe V. Furnell, 20 Mont. 299. It is competent to make, even as to mort- gages previously given, a provision that the assessor is to deduct from the value of land a mortgage upon it if the owner of the land claims the deduction: State v. Runyon, 41 N. J. L. 98. Statutes providing for a re- assessment where an assessment for municipal improvements is invalid are constitutional, and the re-assess- ment may be made to date back to the date of the original assessment, notwithstanding mesne encumbran- ces: Sinking Fund Com'rs v. Lin- den, 40 N. J. Eq. 27. "Where, at the time a delinquent tax-sale was had, there was no statute giving the pur- chaser at a void sale a lien for money paid or for subsequent taxes, an act thereafter passed does not give such a lien: Blackwell v. First Nat. Bank (N. M.), 63 Pac. Rep. 43. 1 Spencer v. Merchant, 185 U. S. 345; Li,ombard V. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 181 U. S. 33; Cleveland v. Tripp, 13 R. 1 50. 2Sturges V. Carter, 114. U, S. 511; Winona, etc. Land Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 526; Weyerhaueser v. Min- nesota. 176 U. S. 550; People v. Sey- mour, 16 Cal. 338; Galusha v. Wendt (Iowa), 87 N. W. Rep. 513; New Or- leans V. Railroad Co., 35 La. An. 679; Redwood County v. Winona & St. P. L. Co., 40 Minn. 213; State v. Weyerhauser, 68 Minn. 353, 73 Minn. 519; Wellshear v. Kelly, 69 Mo. 343; State V. Herman, 70 Mo. 441 ; Gager V. Prout, 48 Ohio St. 89; South Nash- ville Sfc. R. Co. v. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406. By the Wisconsin statute the re-assessment of omitted property is authorized although such property has passed out of existence: State v. Pors, 107 Wis. 420. A city coun- cil may be vested by the legislature with power to assess such taxable property as has been omitted or con- cealed by the owners: Owensboro v. Callaghan (Ky.), 17 S. W. Rep. 278. Where, under a decision of the court of last resort, certain property re- mained untaxed for several years, after which the court decided that the law had been misinterpreted, it was decided that what had been held to be the law during the years for which taxes were claimed must govern property rights of that pe- riod : Franklin County Court v. Louis- , ville & N. R. Co., 84 Ky. 59. In the absence of a showing to Ijhe contrary it will be presumed that back taxes assessed were the same which the owners of the land would have had to pay had the land not escaped as- sessment: Williamson v. Mimms, 49 Ark. 336. Property which has es- 494 CONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. dividuals is there any valid objection to making it on consid- eration of a state of things that may now have come to an end ; as where a tax is imposed on the extejit of one's business for the preceding year instead of upon an estimate of the busi- ness for the year to come.^ Where taxes are levied for a series of years upon the same valuation of property, they are neces- sarily retrospective, but not therefore incompetent,^ though one may be taxed upon property which he has long ceased to own when the tax is levied. But there is commonly a presumption that any new tax law was not intended to reach back and take for its standard of apportionment a state of things that may no longer be in existence. " New burdens," it is very justly said, " ought always to be prospective," ' and it is reasonable to sup- caped taxation through the negli- gence of the proper officials is sub- ject to taxation in the hands of a subsequent purchaser for the years it has escaped: Kansas v. Hannibal & St. J. E. Co., 81 Mo. 385; State v. FuUerton, 143 Mo. 683. But a tax imposed on property retrospectively lor years when there was no law for taxing it will be invalid as against one who has become a bona ^de pur- chaser of it in the meantime: State V. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 77 Mo. 803. A legislature probably cannot con- stitutionally enact a retroactive law imposing taxes for previous years upon property which was not during such years subject to taxation under any valid law: First Nat. Bank v. Covington, 103 Fed. Rep. 533. In Indiana the county assessor has been held to have power to reach prop- erty that was omitted from the tax- list before the statute authorizing him to assess such property went into eflEect: Saint v. Welsh, 141 Ind. 38^. So with the state railroad com- mission in Mississippi: Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. V. Adams, 73 Miss. 239. In Maryland the coilnty commissioners cannot levy for past years, but are restricted to a levy for the year: Baltimore, C. & A. R. Co. v. Com- missioners (Md.), 48 Atl. Rep. 853. In Hunter Stone Co. ' v. Woodard, 152 Ind. 474, it is said that nothing but payment will discharge the state's claim for taxes against omitted property, and the general law must be liberally construed in aid of the taxing power. A claim for ta'xes omitted from the assessment for pre- vious years by a person since de- ceased will not be sustained in the absence of testimony as to what property decedent had during those years: Galusha v. Wendt (Iowa), 87 N. W. R-ep. 513. 1 Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. St. 31; People v. Gold Co., 93 N. Y. 383. Where a twenty-year exemp- tion expired in March, and an assess- ment was made in April for the cur- rent year, the party assessed was, held entitled to no abatement in re- spect of the time that had already run: McClellan v. Railroad Co., 11 Lea 336. 2 See Wolf V. New Orleans, 4 Wall 173. 3 Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 13 Pa. St. 165. In that case it was decided that a tax measured by dividends '" from and after Janu- ary 1, 1841," would not apply to a dividend declared by the proper committee December 30, 1840, but not passed upon by the directors OH. IX.] CONSTEUOTION OF TAX LAWS. 495 pose the legislature has intended that they should be.' Such a supposition is in harmony with the general rule of law which requires that the courts " always construe statutes as prospect- ive and not retrospective, unless constrained to the^ contrary course by the rigor of the phraseology." ' This rule applies also until January 4, 1841. A statute tax- ing that which has not before been taxed will not be deemed retroactive where such construction is not im- peratively required by the language used: New England Mortg. Security Co. V. Montgomery County Revenue Board, 81 Ala. 110. ' Woodward, J., in Price v. Mott, 52 Pa. St, 315, 316. And see New England Mortg. Security Co. v. Board of Revenue, 81 Ala. 110; Fagg v. Martin, 58 Ark. 449; Thames Manuf. Co. V. Lathrop, 7 Conn. 350; Marsh V. Chestnut, 14 111. 223; People v. Thatcher, 95 111. 109; People v. Pea- cock, 98 111. 172; Lang v. Clapp, 103 lud. 17; Niklaus v. Conkling, 118 Ind. 289; Hennel v. Board of Com'rs, 182 Ind. 32; Da,vidson v. Lindop, 36 La. An. 765; Reed. v. Creditors, 39 La An. 115; Parham's Succession, 51 La. An. 980; Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen 319; Clark v. Hall, 19 Mich. 356; Fuller v. Grand Rapids, 40 Mich. 395; Auditor-General v. Iosco Circuit Judge, 58 Mich. 345; Seymour v. Peters, 67 Mich. 415; Hall v. Perry, 73 Mich. 202; McNaughton v. Martin, 72 Mich. 376; Shaw v. Morley, 89 Mich. 313; Auditor-General v. Bay Supervisors, 106 Mich. 663; Pierpont V. Osmun, 118 Mich. 473; Norris v. Hall, 134 Mich. 170; Selden v. Coffee, 65 Miss. 41; Caruthers v. McLaren, 56 Miss. 371; Vaughan v. Swayzie, 56 Miss. 704; Capital State Bank v. Lewis, 64 Miss. 737; Carlisle v. Goode, 71 Miss. 453; State v. Wabash, St. L. ■& P. R. Co., 97 Mo. 396; Warren R. Co. v. Belvidere, 35 N. J. L. 584; State v. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 93; Citizens' Gas Light Co. v. Alden, 44 N. J. L. ■648; Hunt V. State, 48 N. J. L. 613; Williamson v. Railroad Co., 39 N. J. Eq. 311; Burnet v. Dean (N. J. Eq.), 46 Atl. Rep. 533; People v. Albany Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 458; Matter of Mil- ler, ilO N. Y. 316; Matter of Trustees of Union Coll., 129 N. Y. 308; People V. Reliance Marine Ins. Co., 70 Hun 554; Tyler v. Cass County, 1 N. D. 369 ; Metz v. Hagerty, 51 Ohio St. 531 ; Philadelphia v. Ferry R. Co., 53 Pa. St. 177; Mills v. Charleston (S. C), 38 S. E. Rep. 226; Shelby County v. Mississippi & T. R. Co., lb Lea 401; McPhail V. Burris, 43 Tex. 142; Peters V. Auditor, 33 Grat. 368; Fowler v. Fairchild, 3 Wash. 747; Boorman v. Juneau County, 76 Wis. 550. A stat- ute which provides that a tax shall not be vitiated by any error or in- formality not affecting the substan- tial justice of the tax itself, does not apply to taxes levied before the law was passed; Gage v. Nichols, 135 111. 128. Assessment proceedings had while a statute making assessments for public improvements payable in five instalments was in force, and by virtue of an ordinance passed while such act was in force, were not affected by an amendatory act providing for ten instalments:' Mer- riam v. People, 160 111. 555. A statu- tory provision giving to tax process superiority over liens and mortgages will not be applied to those previ- ously in existence: Finn v. Haynes, 37 Mich. 63. A law requiring the county to hold harmless the pur- chasers of land at a void tax sale applies only to sales made after it took effect: Norris v. Burt County, 56 Neb. 295. A law declaring that certain defenses shall not be made to tax-deeds until the redemction 496 CONSTEtJOTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. to constitutional provisions ; ^ ^nd it obtains not only as a con- struction of the grant of power, but also as to all the incidents ; ^ though a remedial provision may well be presumed to have money is paid -will not apply to prior • sales: Conway v. Cablp, 37 111. 82. In Allen v. Drew, 44 Vt. 174, an act was construed so as to govern the proceedings by one subsequently ap- proved, the two having been pending together, and the one first approved expressly in terms referring to the other. A statute making mortgagees personally liable for taxes on the land after taking possession, held applica- ble to mortgages given before but under which the mortgagees took pos- session after the statute was passed: Andrews v. Worcester, etc. Ins. Co., 5 Allen 65. An amendment to a tax- law making a county guarantor to the state of the validity of the tax and the value of the security is to have prospective operation only: Auditor-General v. Supervisors, 36 Mich. 70. A statute amending a former act so as to limit to six years the righf of a purchaser at an invalid sale to obtain reimbursement from the county is prospective in its op-' eration, and does not affect the rights of a purchaser at a sale prior to its passage: Reidv. Albany Supervisors, 128 N. Y. 364. Collateral inheritance tax-law held not applicable to prop- erty collaterally devised by one who died before the act took effect but whose will was probated subse- quently: Lombard's Appeal, 88 Me. 587; see State v. Switzler, 143 Mo. 287, . and Sloane's Estate, 154 N. Y. 109. A statute providing that judgments and decrees vacating tax-deeds shall be conditioned on reimbursing the grantee is not retrospective: River- side Co. V. Townsend, 120 111. 9. Laws providing that a sheriff's deed for land sold to pay taxes shall be pre- sumptive evidence of certain mate- rial facts do not affect sales made prior thereto: Eastern Carolina L. etc. Co. V. State Board, 101 N. C. 35. A statute extending the time for re- demption from a tax-sale cannot le- gally apply to a sale made prior to its passage: State v. Fylpaa, 3 S. D. 586. A statute exempting certain property from taxation does not ex- empt such property from taxes as- sessed — though not actually levied — before the act takes effect: Associa- tion V. Mayor, etc., 104 N. Y. 581; People V. Commissioners, 142 N. Y. 348; In re American Pine Arts Soc, 151 N. Y. 621; ^tna Life Ins. Co. v. New York, 153 N. Y. 831. A statute providing that the personal estate of certain corporations, including relig- ious corporations, shall be exempt from taxation, and that the collateral inheritance act shall not apply to them, does not apply to a tax due and payable before ■ its passage: Sherrill V. Christ Church, 121 N. Y. 701. 1 New Orleans v. Vergnole, 33 La. An. 35; New Orleans v. Meister, 33 La. An. 646; New Orleans v. Eclipse, etc. Co., 38 La. An. 647; Parham's Succes- sion, 51 La. An. 980; Mercur, etc. Co. V. Spry, 16 Utah 222. Exemptions by constitution are not retroactive: New Orleans v. L'Hote, 35 La. An. 1177: State V. -New Orleans, 40 La. An. 697; Parham's Succession, 51 La. An. 980. 2 In Gerry v. Stoneham, 1 Allen 319, a statute providing that where a party was assessed more than his due and legal proportion, the tax and as- sessment should be void only for the excess, and a recovery by suit should be limited to the excess, was held not applicable to pending actions. See Slooum V. Fayette County, 61 Iowa 169, for a case in which a statute shortening the time for taking ap- peal from assessments was held ap- CH. IX.J CONSTRUCTION OF TAX LAWS. 497 been intended to reach back for the purposes of justice.^ And in cases where a tax is levied to meet expenses previously in- curred, or to pay the cost of something of which the persons plicable to those previously made. It has been held not giving a retroactive effect to a law providing for judicial proceedings in tax cases, when it is applied to unpaid taxes which had been levied before its passage: Hos- mer v. People, 96 111. 58. A law for the raising of taxes is not retroactive merely because of its fixing the amount to be raised by the business of the preceding year: People v. Gold Co., 93 N. Y. 383. A statute providing , that after taxes have become delin- quent the treasurer shall issue delin- quency certificates, etc., is not retro- spective in applying to taxes of previous years which were not delin- quent at the time of the passage of the act: State v. "Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447. An act providing that no pur- chaser of land for taxes shall be en- titled to a deed unless he has com- plied with the conditions of the act in regard to serving notice on the owner of the land is not retrospective though applicable to sales made be- fore its passage, since it in no way affects the sale or precedent stages of the proceeding: Gage v. Stewart, 127 111. 207; see Herriok v. Niesz, 16 Wash. 74 A city which had abandoned its special charter and organized under the general law for the incorporation of cities of the second class was held authorized to sell, under the provis- ions of the general law, lands for de- linquent taxes for years prior to as wellas af terthe reorganization : State V. Tufts, 108 Mo. 418. Under the Iowa code providing that any municipal corporation may, if by ordinance it so elects, cause all delinquent assess- ments and taxes to be certified to the county auditor for collection, a city council may order assessments for street improvements completed at '32 the time of the passage of the ordi- nance to be so certified: Shaw v. Des Moines County, 74 Iowa 679. The general assembly has the power to amend a city's charter so as to change the laws touching the advertisement for sale of property for taxes, and such act is not imconstitutional be- cause it applies to taxes due at the time it was enacted: Du Bignon v. Mayor, 106 Ga. 317. The law prevail- ing when judgment confirming an as- sessment roll was rendered was held to govern in regard to the certifica- tion of the roll and judgment, and in regard to the issue of the warrant for collection, there being nothing in an amendatory statute indicating any intention to affect proceedings instituted before it took effect: Mur- phy v. People, 120 111. 284. In mat- ters relating to inheritance taxes the rights of parties are governed by the law in force when the right of suc- cession accrued, but the procedure by that in force when proceedings are instituted for their appraisal: Matter of Davis's Estate, 149 N. Y. 539. The rights and liabilities of a tax-sale purchaser and the county are to be determined by the statutes in force when the void sale occurred: Norris v. Burt, 56 Neb. 295. So with the right to redeem from a tax-sale and the notice of expiration thereof- Kipp V. Johnson, 73 Minn. 34. Wher6 a later charter provided that the ex- pense of street improvements shall be levied according to frontage, an assessment made by value after the charter took effect was invalid, though the improvement was or- dered under the former charter: Wil- son V. Seattle, 2 Wash. 543. 1 See State v. Pors, 107 Wis. 420. A statute that merely varies the 498 OONSTE0CTION OF TAX LAWS. [oh. IX. to be taxed have already had the benefit, any presumption against an-intent to give the law retroactive operation itiay be overcome by the apjiarent justice of such a construction.^ mode of procedure in proceedings for the abatement of taxes may properly be applied to causes of action, which accrued before its passage, as well as to those accruing thereafter:' Wolf eborough Bank's Petition, fl9 N. H. 84. If a statute authorizing the foreclosure of tax liens, only author- izes an additional remedy, it is not therefore unconstitutional though applicable to taxes then due: Schoen- heit V. Nelson, 16 Neb. 335. A stat- utory amendment decreasing the rate of interest and advertising charges on delinquent taxes was held to apply to all taxes delinquent when the amendment took effect: Webster V. Auditor-General, 133 Mich, 483. The Louisiana statutejvhich declares that "any action to invalidate the titles to any property purchased at tax-sale, under and by virtue of any law of this state, shall be prescribed by the lapse of three years from the date of such sale," is legitimately re- trospective, and operates on tax-sales made prior to its passage, at least from the date of the law: Barrow v. Wilson, 39 La. An. 403. 1 An act provided for the re-assess- ment of the property of certain com- panies for certain years, and the col- lection of taxes thereon which should have been collected for those years, deducting what may already have been paid under former erroneous as- sessments. Held, that such an act was not invalid because it taxed re- trospectively. It does not undertake to impose new burdens upon the com- panies, but to charge the taxable property which has escaped its share of common burdens. Held fur- ther, that it was not void for lapse of time. The tax as a specific debt does not become due until the tax- able property is listed and valued and a definite percentum affixed to such valuation. Nor does the state forfeit rights by its officers' inert- ness: North Carolina R. Co. v. Com- missioners, 83 N. C. 359. A statute may authorize the re-assessment of personalty omitted from assessment prior to its enactment, since it cre- ates no new obligation, but is purely remedial: State v. Pors, 107 Wis. 430. A state board of valuation and as- sessment has power to make retro- spective assessments of franchises omitted from taxation for previous years: Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 57 S. W. Rep. 634. A statute providing that " the board of review shall first assess all property subject to assessment which shall not have been assessed by the assessors," covers cases aris- ing as well before the act took effect as afterwards: People v. Sellars, 179 111. 170. A statute making it the duty of the sheriff to report, and the county clerk to enter on the assess- or's book and certify to the auditor, all, property that may, for any year or years, have been omitted by the assessor, or which corporations may have omitted to list, applies equally to omissions occurring before and since it was enacted: Louisville Water Co. v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 34 S. W. Rep. 1064. Under the Illi- nois drainage act it was held proper for the commissioners to include in a re-classification, to pay bonds issued prior to the act, lands which were not assessed for benefits when the assessment and issue of bonds were made; the act not indicating that it was prospective only in its operation, and it simply providing a means for the correction of mistakes in the as- OH. IX.] CONSTBtrOTION OF TAX LAWS. 499 Repeal of tax -laws. The rule favoring a prospective con- struction is applicable to statutes which repeal tax-laws. Ac- cordingly it is held that where such a statute is not made retro- active a tax assessed before the repeal is collectible afterwards ; ' sessment of benefits, and not Inter- fering with vested ^rights, as the property owner acquired none under the assessment: Boul v. People. 127 111. 840. A statute providing that when a tax-sale should be set aside and the money refunded thereon by a countj% the school district should reimburse the county its share of the expense, was held to apply to a tax laid before the enactment of the statute, but set aside afterwards: School District v. Allen County, 33 Kan. 568. A statutory provision that a contractor might maintain an action to foreclose his lien for work done on a street improvement, and might collect therein a reasonable attorney's fee, applied to an assess- ment levied before the passage thereof: Dowell v. Talbot Paving Co., 138 Ind. 675. 1 State V. Sloss, 83 Ala. 93. When a tax system is revised, and a former law repealed, the legislative intent is assumed, in the absence of any pro- vision to the contrary, to be of pros- pective force only, and prior valid as- sessments are not affected thereby: Smith V. Kelly, 34 Or. 464; Alliance Trust Co. V. Multnomah County (Dr.), 63 Pac. Eep. 498. See Warren R. Co. V. Belvidere, 35 N. J. L. 587. Where the assessor had added to the valua- tion of the property listed by him a penalty for neglect to make out a sworn list, taxes levied thereon may be collected, though the statute im. posing the penalty was repealed after the assessment: Hartford v. Cham- pion, 58 Conn. 368. If an ordinance levying a special assessment is re- pealed after the conflrmation^of the assessment by the county court, the unpaid instalments of the assess- ment do not fall with the repealof the ordinance: People v. McWethy, 165 111. 333. In Indiana it has been said that the repeal of a statute under which taxes are assessed puts an end to the right to collect them unless the repealing statute contains a provision preserving the taxes and the right to collect them: Gorley v. Sewall, 77 Ind. 816, citing McQuilkin v. Doe, 8 Blackf. 581 ; Mount v. State, 6 Blackf. 25; Blaiden v. Abel, 6 Iowa 5; Bry- an's Adm'r v. Harvey's Adm'r, 11 Tex. 311. And see Clegg v. State, 43 Tex. 605; Pacific, etc. Tel. Co. v. Com- monwealth, 66 Pa. St. 70. The repeal of the Indiana tax-law of 1873 did not, however, affect the collection' of taxes assessed under earlier laws: Adams V. Davis, 109 Ind. 10. The revisions of the Michigan tax-laws made in 1869, 1883, and 1885 are prospective in character, so that sales under any one of those statutes for taxes assessed be- fore the passage of the particular act are precluded: Auditor-General v. Monroe, 86 Mich. 70; Thomas v. Col- lins, 58 Mich. 64; Ball v. Busch, 64 Mich. 336; Nester v. Busch, 64 Mich. 657; Seymour v. Peters, 67 Mich. 415: Humphrey v. Auditor-General, 70 Mich. 293; Nitz v. Bolton, 71 Mich. 388; Hall V. Perry, 73 Mich. 203; McNaugh- ton V. Martin, 72 Mich. 276; Nowleh V. Hall (Mich.), 87 N. W. Rep. 333. And stringent provisions therein, de-' signed to favor tax-titles, must be un- derstood to apply to cases originating under the revision in whifih such pro- visions are contained: Clark v. Hall, 19 Mich. 355; Smith v. Auditor-Gen- eral, 20 Mich. 398. That revision, however, contained a section which required every person redeeming from the tax sale to pay, not only the 500 CONSTRUCTION OF TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. and where taxes are levied under a law which is repealed by a subsequent ' act, unless it appears clearly that the legislature intended the repeal to work retrospectively, it will be assumed th^t it intended the taxes to be collected according to the law in force when they were levied.' It is also held that the repeal of a law under which a tax has been levied does not discharge the lien of the tax.^ But the repeal of a tax-law without saving words puts an end to all right to levy taxes thereunder, even in cases already begun,' and does away with all penalties for non-payment.* The repeal, however, cannot affect rights that redemption "money with heavy inter- est to the purchaser, but also a pen- alty of twenty-five per cent, to the state. Now there was no more rea- son and no more justice in the state's exacting a. penalty for the privilege to one party to redeem from the tax purchase of another than there would be for demanding a like pen- alty for the privilege of redeeming from an execution sale, or for volun- tarily paying an honest debt; the ex- action, if legal — which may well be questioned — was unjust and impoli- tic, for it tended to bring about the forfeiture of estates, and every state is interested that this shall not hap- pen to its citizens. It was therefore held to be a reasonable presumption, when this provision was repealed, that the state intended the repeal to apply to past as well as to future sales : People V. County Treasurer, 32 Mich. 260. Compare Tinslar v. Davis, 12 Allen 79, which was a. strong case for the application of the opposite pre- sumption. 1 Oaklg,nd v. Whipple, 44 Cal. 303. '■i Gardenhire v. Mitchell, 21 Kan. 83; State v. Waterville Savings Bank, 68 Me. 515. A statute relating to the assessment, levy, and collection of taxes does not apply to past-due taxes which had become a lien prior to its passage: Danforth v. McCook County, 11 S. D. 258. For a case of destruction of lien by i^epeal of the statute, see Gull River Lumber Co. V. Brock, 6 N. D. 276. , 3 Ross V. Lane, 11 Miss. 695 ; Abbott V. Britton, 33 La. An. 511. Statutory remedies for the enforcement of a tax are gone when the statute is re- pealed without an express saving: Mount V. State, 6 Blackf. 25; McQuil- kin V. Doe, 8 Blackf. 581: St. Joseph County Court v. Ruckman, 57 Ind. 96; French v. State, 53 Miss. 651. This has been held to be so, even as to assessments in process of collec- tion: Marion, etc. Gravel Road Co. v. Sheeth, 53 Ind. 35. An amendment to the city and village act having been passed without a saving clause, the amended section governs all sub- ' sequent proceedings had for the levy- ing of a special tax for a local im- provement, though the improvement was made before the passage of the amendment: Palmer v. Danville, 166 111. 42. *Rexv. Justices, Burr 456: Schooner Rachel v. United States, 6 Cranch 329; Maryland v. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 3 How. 534: Norris v. Crocker, 18 How. 429; State v. Jersey City, 37 N. J. L. 39; Commonwealth v. Stand- ard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St. 119; United States Trust Co. v. Territory (N. M.), 62 Pao. Rep. 987. In North Dakota it is held that the repeal of a penal stat- ute does not affect penalties that have accrued: Wells County v. McHenry, 7 N. D. 346. The same case holds that CH. IX J CONSTEUOTION OP TAX LAWS. 501 have become vested under the repealed law ; ^ and it is usual to provide in tax-revisions and in any change of tax-laws for the saving of accrued rights and of pending proceedings.'' where a complete new revenue law is clearly prospective in its operation there is nothing in its provisions in- consistent with the continued exist- ence of the old statutes regulating interest on delinquent taxes. Ac- crued penalties saved b^general pro- vision: Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Hartshorn, 30 Fed. Rep. 541. 1 Thompson v. Commonwealth, 81 Pa. St. 314. The repeal of a statute securing to the purchaser of land at a void tax-sale a lien on the land for money paid by him therefor does not affect liens existing, complete, and vested before the repeal: Capital State Bank v. Lewis, 64 Miss. 737. So, the repeal of a statute providing that if a tax-sale of lands shall prove to be invalid, the purchaser shall be entitled to recover from the owner the amount of the taxes paid by him subsequent to the sale, and to have the same adjudged against the land, does not affect a right to recover which had vested before the repeal: St. Louis, L M. & S. R. Co. v. Alex- ander, 49 Ark. 190. Where, after a tax had been voted in aid of a rail- road, and after the company had ex- pended, on faith of the vote, money in construction, the act authorizing aid was repealed before levy of the tax, the repeal did not take away the company's right to the tax: Burges V. Mabin, 70 Iowa 633. A railroad company's charter having conferred upon municipalities power to sub- scribe to its stock, by implication, power to levy taxes to meet the obli- gation, a subsequent general law lim- iting the rate of taxation did not apply: Peoria, D. etc. R. Co. v. Peo- ple, 116 IlL 401. 2 Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. King County, 63 Fed. Rep. 546; Dunkle v. Herron, 115 Ind. 470; Indianapolis v. Morris (Ind. App.), 58 N. E. Rep. 510; Gaither v. Green, 40 La. An. 863; Fletcher v. Rose, 104 Mich. 434; In re Moore's Estate, 90 Hun 163; Wil- mington V. Cronly, 123 N. C. 388; Washington Nat. Bank v. King County, 9 Wash. 607. As to what is a " proceeding " within the meaning of a saving clause of a repealing statute, see Raymond v. Cleveland, 43 Ohio St. 533. Where a city charter has been repealed with a saving of acts done and rights accrued, the assessment for a sidewalk improve- ment commenced before the new charter took effect should be made pursuant to the old charter: Greens- borough V. McAdoo, 113 N. C. 359. The saving clause in the charter of Greater New York was held to Ije comprehensive enough to enable an owner to have a review of an assess- ment for a local improvement under the law existing when it was made: In re Munn, 165 N. Y. 149. The rights acquired by tax-title purchasers un- der previous statutory provisions to reimbursement when deeds should be adjudged invalid were preserved by the repealing act of 1883: Tillot- son V. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 97 Mich. 585. When a statute became operative the assessment under a former law was completed, but cer- tain appeals were pending. Held, that the passage of the new law with no express retroactive terms did not destroy or affect the proceedings already taken: Appeal Tax Court v. Railroad Co., 50 Md. 374. Bnder a statute providing that no act of the general assembly shall affect a suit pending at the time of its passage, an act legalizing the quadrennial appraisal of 1894 of a certain city 502 CONSTKUCTION OF TAX LAWS, [oh, IX. Repeals by implication. A revenue law, like any other statute, may be repealed by implication. But there is always a presumption, more or less strong according to circumstances, that a statute is not intended to repeal a prior statute on the same subject unless it does so in express terms. "Without a repealing clause, the two may stand and have effect together, unless they are inconsistent ; and in that case to the extent of the inconsistency the later will rfepeal the earlier ; but even then the two must be given effect so far as practicable," for repeals by implication of revenue and collection laws are not favored.' In the case of grants of power to tax — or indeed for other pur- poses — to municipal bodies, the presumption that it was not intended to modify or repeal these by subsequent general legis- lation is so strong as to be almost conclusive. It is not usual to modify or take away special powers by general laws; and if it is intended to do so in any particular case, it is reasonable to suppose the legislature would do so in unequivocal language.' has no efiEeot on a pending suit to re- cover taxes based on such appraisal and paid under protest: Fuller v. Montpelier (Vt.), 50 Atl. Rep. 544. ■See cases collected in Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 183, and note. Also United States v. Taylor, 104 U. S. 216; Beaumont v. United States, 25 Ct. CI. 349; Auditor v. Franklin School Trustees, 81 Ky. 680;' Appeal Tax Court v. Western, etc. R. Co., 50 Md. 374; Pons v. State, 49 Miss. 1; State V. Severance, 55 Mo. 878; State V. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 92 Mo. 137; Smith V. Kelly, 24 Or. 464; Common- wealth V. Chester. 133 Pa. St. 636; Wilson, etc. Co.'s Estate, '150 Pa. St. 285; Southern R. Co. v. Kay (S. ,C.), 89 S. B. Rep. 785 ; Warner Iron Co. v. Pace, 98 Tenn. 707. An aot authorizing the state to recover taxes on property which could not be seized and sold by a collecting ofHcer was not re- pealed by a subsequent revenue law: Commonwealth v. Louisville (Ky.), 47 S. W. Rep. 865. And a tax pro- viding for drainage by local assess- ment is not impliedly repealed by one providing for drainage to be paid by ccmnty taxes: Duke v. O'Bryan, 100 Ky. 710. A statute which pro- vides for the taxation of railroads as entireties, and for distributing the assessment'among the various coun- ties, 'repeals previous laws for assess- ing in the' counties locally: Union Pac. R. Co. V. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516. Statutes impliedly repealed by later inconsistent constitutional or statu- tory provisions: Thomason .v. Ash- worth, 78 CaL 78; Meyer v. Parker, 41,La. An. 440; Chicago v. James, 114 111. 479; Springfield v. LonjJon Ins. Co., 21 111. App. 156; State v. Hill, 70 Miss. 106; Levy v. Newman, 130 N. Y. 11; Cincinnati v. Holmes, 56 Ohio St. 104: Frontier L. & C. Co. v. Baldwin, 3 Wyo. 764. 2Ziokler v. Union Bank & T. Co., 104 Tenn. 277. SBinkert v. Jansen, 94 111. 383; Weber v. Traubel, 95 111. 427; Spar- land V. Barnes, 98 III. 595; Peoria, D. etc. R. Co. V. People, 116 IlL 401; Mayor, etc. v. Jackson, 89 Md. 589; Williamsport v. Brown, 84 Pa. St 438; Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Frioke, 153 Pa. St. 331 ; San Antonio v. Berry, CH. IX.J CONSTEUCTION OF TAX LAWS. 603 When this is not done the general law will be read as intend- 93 Tex. 319; Tacoma L. Co. v. Pierce County Com'rs, 1 Wash. 482; State v. Carson, 6 Wash. 250; Oleson v. Rail- way Cb., 36 Wis. 383; Fire Depart- ment V. Tuttle, 48 Wis. 91. The re- enactment of a general rule as to taxation of farms divided by a farm line held not to repeal a special law: Casterton v. Vienna, 163 N. Y. 868. A general school-law requiring suits against delinquent taxpayers to be brought in the name of the county superintendent applies only in delin- quencies arising under that law, and leaves unrepealed a special act au- thorizing the district incorporated thereby to levy and collect taxes for school purposes within its limits: Board of Trustees v. Louisville & N.R. Co. (Ky.), 30 S. W. Rep. 6i;0. The rule that a local statute is not repealed by a subsequent general statute incon- sistent with it, unless words of repeal are employed for that purpose, is not applicable to the Pennsylvania stat- ute relating to the division of cities into classes according to population; a city which by virtue of its increase in population has passed out of the third class, and taken its place as a member of the second class, must levy and collect its taxes under the system provided for cities of the sec- ond class: Commonwealth v. Macfer- ron, 152 Pa. St. 244 In Kansas it is held that when a city of the third class is by the governor's proclama- tion, under the statute, declared to be a city of the second class, none of the ordinances regulating th^ levy- ing of taxes is thereby repealed: Ritchie v. South Topeka,38 Kan. 868. A general law taxing corpora,tions does not repeal a statute exempting a particular railroad from taxation until its net earnings equal six per cent, of the amountinvested: Com- monwealth V. Philadelphia & E, R. Co., 164 Pa. St. 253. Where the char- ter of a railroad company provides for the payment of a certain part of its net income in lieu of all taxes, it is not liable for taxes imposed by a subsequent general law: State v. Knox & L. ' R. Co., 78 Me. 92. The Iowa statute providing that no gen- eral laws as to powers of cities or- ganized under the genefal incorpo- ration act shall be construed to af- fect laws of cities organized under special charters, unless special refer- ence is made to such cities,' does not apply to a law authorizing taxation in aid of railroads: Bartemeyer v. Rohlfs, 71 Iowa 581. That a city already had power to appoint as- sessors for real property did not pre- vent the taking effect therein of a general statute so as to allow the election of assessors for personalty: DaWson Compress, etc. Co. v. City Council, 107 Ga. 358. It has been held in California that if there is any conflict between a general law and a city charter in regard to the deduction or taxation of debts or credits, the former governs: Secu- rity Savings B. & T. Co. v. Hinton, 97 Cal. 214. A constitutional pro- vision requiring all taxes to be levied by general law does not repeal char- ter provisions for taxation: Kansas V. Johnson, 78 Mo. 661. But in New Jersey it is held that a constitutional provision that " property shall be as- sessed for taxes under general laws and by uniform rules," puts an end propria vigore to existing special leg- islation for the assessment of taxes: State V. Newark, 40 N. J. L. 558; State V. Richards, 47 N. J. L. 484; see, also, Cobb v. Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. 1. Yet that provision does not repeal a special law applicable to a single county, providing for taxation therein, where the general law sim- ply uses different machinery to ac- complish the same results: West Ho- 504 CONSTEUCTION 01" TAX LAWS. [CH. IX. ing to leave the special powers in force.^ On the other hand, special legislation giving powers of taxation to a municipality by name, or to a class of municipalities, will control, ^to tanto, the existing general law.^ General revisions of tax-laws. A tax-law manifestly in- tended to embrace and include all legislation on that subject will repeal all provisions of former laws not re-enacted and embraced in it without regswd to their consistency or incon- boken v. Board of Com'rs (N. J.), 49 Atl. Eep. 9. Under that provision, however, a general law concerning sewer assessments supersedes city charter provisions on the same sub- ject: Central N. J. L. etc. Co. v. Bay- onne, 56 N. J. L. 397. So, a statute providing for the licensing of dogs was held in New Jersey to supersede any charter power of exacting license fees for dogs: Muloahy v. Newark, 57 N.J. L. 513. And a general statute Hiaking taxes a first lien on real es- tate, and authorizing sale for taxes, applies to all townships, and repeals inconsistent provisions of special laws providing for the sale of land for taxes in townships: State v. MuUicaCommitte, 48 N.J. L.447.1 The new constitution of Kentucky did not divest city governments of the power of taxation under their char- ters, or suspend such powers until the legislature should pass laws for the regulation of such powers in ac- cordance with the provisions of the constitution: Byrne v. Covington (Ky.), 21 S. W. Rep. 1050. As to the effect of general legislation upon special charters, see House v. State, 41 Miss. 737; Board of Education v. Aberdeen, 56 Miss. 518; Morris, etc. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 37 N. J. L. 228; Powell's Ex'r v. Richmond, 94 Va. 79. 1 Covington v. East St. Louis, 78 111. 548; Peoria, D. etc. R. Co. v. Peo- ple, 116 III 401; Clark v. Davenport, 14 Iowa 494; State v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378; Sheridan v. Stevenson, 44 N, J. L, 371; People v. Quigg, 59 N. Y. 83; Cass v. Dillon, 3 Ohio St. 607; Fosdick V. Perry^burg, 14 Ohio St. 473; Rounds v. Maymart, 81 Pa. St. 395; Williamsport v.. Brown, 84 Pa^ St. 438; Chesapeake, etc. Co. v. Hoard, 16 W. Va. 370; Oleson v. Green Bay, etc. R. Co., 36 Wis. 383. 2 Pot win V. Johnson, 108 HI. 70; Skinner v. Christie, 52 N. J. Eq. 730; Bertha Zinc Co. v. Pulaski Supervis- ors, 88 Va. 303. In Iowa it was held that where a special law limits the power of a municipal corporation to levy taxes, a subsequent general law will not give power beyond the prior limitation; Clarke v. Davenport, 14 Iowa 494. Contra, Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575. A grant of power to a municipal corporation to levy a tax for a particular purpose is a repeal, pro tanto, of all prior statutory re- strictions on the power of taxation: Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh Com- mon Council, 34 Pa. St. , 496. So, special authority to a municipality to contract a debt for a specific ob- ject may impliedly repeal, jpro tanto, existing charter limitations upon .the right of taxation: Ocontq City Water Supt)ly Co. v. Oconto, 105 Wis. 76. A village charter authorizing the village council to grant liquor licenses and to restrain and regulate the sale of liquor does not abrogate the general law of the state prohibit- ing sales iwithout license: State v. Nolan, 37 Minn. 16. CH, IX.] CONSTETJOTION OF TAX LAWS. 605 sistency.* But where in such a revision provisions of a former act are identically or substantially re-enacted, those provis- ions of the earlier statute are not regarded as repealed, but as continued in force.^ And where a former law itself repealed provisions of a still earlier statute on a subject not covered by the new general law, those provisions are revived by the re- peal of such former law.' leoting taxes in certain parts of the state was not repealed by a general tax law which expressly excepted from its operationr those parts of the state where a local system was in force: Evans v. Phillippi, 117 Pa. St. 236. Where a new general tax-law only repeals such parts of former laws as contravene its provisions, a levy of taxes for the year in which it was enacted on a rating of prop- erty under the .preceding tax-law was valid: Davenport v. Aplin, 70 Mich. 192; Longyearv. Auditor-Gen- eral, 73 Mich. 405. 2 See Stowe v. Stowe, 70 Vt. 609; Matter of Prime's Estate, 136 N. Y. 347; Commonwealth's Appeal, 138 Pa. St. 603. It is only where the pro- visions of a repealing statute are identical or practically identical with the provisions in the statute re- pealed, that those provisions can be considered as continuing in force without intermission: Gull River Lumber Co. v. Brock, 6 N. D. 876. The repeal of a tax-law which makes deeds on tax-sales prima facie evi- dence of title, where it is done by a new law containing a similar pro- vision, will not prevent deeds given under the repealed law being prima facie evidence of title: the fair pre- sumption of title being that the leg- islature intended that rule to be continuous: Blackwood v. Van Vleet, 30 Mich. 118. 3 Zickler v. Union Bank & T. Co., 104 Tenn. 277. •Williamson v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189; Carroll v. Jaqua, 114 Ind. 246; Barnard v. Gall, 43 La. An. 959; Cromwell v. MacLean, 123 N. Y. 474; People V. Peck, 157 N. Y. 51; In re Huntington's Estate (N. Y.), 61 N. E. Rep. 643; ^tna F. Ins. Co. v. Read- ing, 119 Pa. St. 417; Zickler v. Union Bank & T. Co., 104 Tenn. 277; Fox v. Commpnwealth, 16 Grat. 1. A gen- eral revision of the laws for railroad taxation which provides a general scheme for assessing and taxing the property as a whole, and for distribut- ing it ratably among the counties and their several precincts accord- ing to the length of line in each, necessarily repeals as to such prop- erty the power previously existing in a city to tax it on a different plan: Union Pac. R. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516. An express provision in regard to the assessment of omitted property incorporated into a new general tax-law displaces the provis^ ions of the old law on the subject: People v. Sellars, 179 IlL 170. A gen- eral revenue act was held not to re- peal a prior statute relating to the special subject of collateral inherit- ance taxation, and which was in itself a complete enactment concern- ing that subject, since the enact- ment of a general law will not oper- ate to repeal a special law which treats in a particular manner a sub- ject treated in the later law only in a general way: Zickler v. Union Bank & T. Co., 104 Tenn. 277. A statute providing a method of col- CHAPTER X. CURING DEFECTS IN TAX PROCBEDINGS, Intimately connected with the construction of tax-laws is the question how far the legislatmre by other enactments has power to dispense with strict obedience to the regulations prescribed by itself, and which have had for their manifest purpose the protection of the interests of those who are taxed. This is a subject presenting many intrinsic difficulties, and which has given rise to much contrariety in judicial decisions. Curative laws. An act of dispensation may assume any one of several forms: 1. It may as^me the form of a rule of conclusive evidence intended to preclude a departure from the law being proved. 2. It may take the form of a mandate to officers, command- ing them to give effect to proceedings that have been taken, and to disregard in doing so any irregularities or other defects. 3. It may be a special curative statute to heal defects in cer- tain specified proceedings which have been before taken. 4. It may be a general curative statute to heal irregularities or defects in any proceedings whatsoever previously taken. 5. It may be a general statute for future cases, which, while marking out a course for the officers to pursue, shall at the same time declare that irregularities shall not vitiate any proceed- ings that shall be had under the statute. 6. Besides these, there may be either a special or a general law for re-assessing the tax when the proceedings for its collec- tion have proved ineffectual. Legislation coming under each of these heads is to be met with in the statutes of the several states, and some attention to each seems therefore requisite. 1. Conclusive rules of evidence. ' It is within the province of the legislature to prescribe what rules shall be' observed in the production of evidence in court. In the exercise of its authority over this subject, it has sometime^ provided that the CH. X.J CUBING DEFECTS IN TAX PROCEEDINGS. SOT burden of proof should be' upon one party to a suit rather than the other, and that a particular showing by a party shall make out in his favor a prima facie case. This it has full power to do, and it may make the rules which it prescribes apply to controversies previously in existence, even though retrospective legislation be forbidden by the state constitution.^ Eelying upon 'this undoubted principle of constitutional law, the legislature has in many cases adopted enactments that cer- tain reports, papers, or other documents should \>& prima facie evidence of their own. verity, and perhaps that certain pro- ceedings which should have been taken before the report or other document was made were taken in fact,' leaving the party who denies the truth of what is thus prima facie evi- dence, to make out his case aiHrmatively. Of the power to do this there is no question on the authorities.^ But the legisla- ture cannot pass conclusive rules of evidence; that is to say, it cannot make the showing by one party to a controversy conclu- sive of the truth of the facts shown, thus in effect denying to the other party a hearing. Its power over the rules of evidence is a power to shape and mouldy for the purposes of justice, the rules under which parties are to make a showing of their rights, and not a power to preclude their showing them. "The most iFales V. Wadsworth, 33 Me. 553; are presumptive evidence of the as- Gibbs V. Gfale, 7 Md. 76; Cowen v. sessment and of the claim for the McCutoheon, 43 Miss. 207; Rich v. taxes: MuUan v. His Creditors, 39 Flanders, 39 N. H. 304; Southwick La. An. 397. An assessment, even V. Southwick, 49 N. Y. 510. A stat- though invalid, may be made prima ute making the. tax-deed "prima /acie evidence of the amount justly facie evidence of the regularity of due: Olmsted Co. v. Barber, 31 Minn, all the proceedings from the valua- 256. A statute making the collector's tion of the land by the assessors up certificate prima facie evidence of to the execution of the deed," shows the facts recited does not violate the no intent to make a void or voidable constitutional right to jury trial: tax-deed a valid conveyance of title. State v. Van Every, 75 Mo. 530. A It Is not a curative statute^ and does statute making ;the tax-roll in spe- not preclude showing that the tax cial assessment proceedings for an proceedings are either irregular or improvement prima facie evidence, wholly void: Lee v. Crawford (N. D.), when indorsed by the comptroller, 88 N. W. Bep. 97. of the regularity of all proceedings 2 See ch. XV. A city charter may preliminary thereto, and of the va^ • make a tax-bill ^imia /acie evidence lidity of the tax and tax-roll, does of the liability of the person named not aid jurisdictional defects: Adams therein: Louisville v. Johnson, 95 v. Bay City, 78 Mich. 211. Ky. 254 Tax-bills in the usual form 508 CDEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. [CH. X. formal conveyance may be a fraud or a forgery ; public officers may connive with rogues to rob the citizen of his property; witnesses may testify or officers certify falsely, and records may be coUusively manufactured for dishonest purposes; and that legislation which would preclude the fraud or wrong being shown, and deprive the party wronged of all remedy, has no justification in the principles of natural justice or of constitu- tional law. A statute, therefore, which should make a tax- deed conclusive evidence of a complete title, and preclude the owner of the original title from showing its invalidity, would be void, because not a law regulating evidence, but an uncon- stitutional confiscation of property."' The case supposed is but an illustration of the general rule, which applies as well to all the necessary and jurisdictional steps leading up to the deed.^ The law of the land requires that every party should 1 McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa 356. And see, among many other cases to the same effect, Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U. S. 173; Kelly v. Ferrall, 20 ' Fed. Rep. 364, 368; Marx v. Hanthorn, 30 Fed. Eep. 579; Railroad Co. v. Gal- vin, 85 Fed. Rep. 811; Cairo, etc. R. Co. V. Parks, 33 Ark. 131; Little Rock, etc. R. Co. V. Payne, 33 Ark. 816; Wambole v. Foote, 2 Dak. 1 ; Dicker- son V. Acosta, 15 Fla. 614; White v. Flynn, 23 Ind. 46; Corbin v. Hill, 21 Iowa 70; Powers v. Fuller, 30 Iowa 476; Taylor v. Miles, 5 Kan. 498; Baumgardner v. Fowler, 82 Md. 631 ; Groesbeok v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 339; Case V. Dean, 16 Mich. 13; Taylor v. Deveaux,' 100 Mich. 581; MoKinnon \. Meston, 104 Mich. 643; Dawson v. Peter, 119 Mich. 274; Abbott v. Lin- denbower, 42 Mo. 162, 46 Mo. 891; Roth V. Gabberfc, 123 Mo. 29; Wright V. Cradlebaugh, 3 Nev. 341, 349; Young V. Beardsley, 11 Paige 93; East Kingston v. Fowle, 48 N. H. 57; Sheets v. Paine (N. D.), 86 N. W; Rep. 117; Dever v. Corn well (N. D), 86 N. W. Rep. 337; Strode v. Washer, 17 Or. 50; Mather v. Darst, 13 S. D. 75. 2 The case of Smith v. Cleveland, 17 Wis. 556, contains some very general and unqualified language on this sub- ject. That a deed may be made con- clusive that the mere sale was ac- cording to law has been held in Iowa: McCready v. Sexton, 39 Iowa 356; Ware v. Little, 35 Iowa 384; Jeffrey v. Brokaw, 33 Iowa 505; Sib- ley V. BuUis, 40 Iowa 429. Whether these decisions would be followed generally, may be a question; but where the sale does not conclude the taxpayer, and leaves him a right of payment, there is room to urge that it is a mere formal proceedifag. A tax-deed cannot be made evidence of title when the land does not lie within the taxing district: Smith v. Sherry, 54 Wis. 114. The legislature may make the tax-deed conclusive evidence of compliance with every requirement with which the legisla- ture might, in the original exercise of its discretion, have dispensed: Breaux v. Negrotto, 43 La. An. 436. The legislature can make recitals in tax-deeds conclusive evidence of due performance of tax proceedings within legislative control, but not of jurisdictional matters: Roberts v. First Nat. Bank, 8 N. D. 504. A stat- ute providing that a tax-deed shall CH. X.J CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. 509 have an opportunity for a trial'of such rights as he claims; and there can be no trial if only one party is suifered to produce his proofs.' We may say in general, therefore, that it is not in the power of the legislature to lay down conclusive rules of evidence by way of obviating defects in tax proceedings. 2. Legislative mandates. A mandate to officers command- ing them to give effect to invalid proceedings would be inef- fectual for reasons equally conclusive. If such an act proceeds without an inquiry into the facts, it is a naked attempt to transfer one man's property to another by mere legislation, and this is not an authority which belongs to any legitimate government.* If it assumes to proceed upon evidence, then it be conclusive evidence that all prior proceedings were regular does not cure the defect in the title of lands sold for taxes arising from the de- livery by the county board of super- visors of an incomplete tax-roll to the town supervisors: Ne-Ha-Sa-Ne- Park Assoc, v. Bloyd, 7 App. Div. (N. Y.) 359. A statute providing that the bonds issued for a city assess- ment shall be conclusive evidence of the regularity of the proceedings and of the validity of the assessment lien will be enforced as to proceed- ings not jurisdictional in their nat- ure, and after the city has acquired jurisdiction to make the assessment: Ramish v. Hartwell, 136 Cal. 443. Under a provision that, before issu- ing a warrant for the collection of a local assessment, the assessment shall be examined and certified as correct by certain officers, and that their certificate shall be conclusive evidence of the regularity of the proceedings, such certificate can cover only the formal proceedings; it does not determine the fact that the assessment is made against the proper persons: Newell v. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 486. A statute providing that in an action to avoid a tax a re- assessment ordered pending the ac- tion shall be conclusive evidence of the amount of tax chargeable to the plaintiff, is invalid, as the legislature has no more power to make such re- assessment conclusive evidence of the amount of tax chargeable than to make the original assessment conclusive , evidence of such fact: Plumer v. Supervisors, 46 Wis. 163. A statute conferring power on the court ordering a sale of lands for taxes to cure all defects in the assess- ment and levy, and making the judg- ment conclusive evidence of the reg- ularity of the proceedings, is invalid so far as it relates to jurisdictional defects: Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Gal- vin, 85 Fed. Rep. 811. A statute pro- viding that the orders of the court in the proceedings for the conflrmar tion of special assessments "shall be conclusive evidence of the regularity 'of all previoVis proceedings necessary to the validity thereof," applies only to collateral attacks, and not to are- view on error of the judgment of confirmation: Derby v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 154 111. 313. 1 Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 454, In this connection it is hardly neces- sary to say that no reference is had to cases under statutes of limitation, nor to cases resting on principles of equitable estoppel. 2 Bowman v. Middleton, 1 Bay 353 j 510 OUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOOEEDmGS. [oh. is usurpation of judicial authority, and for that reason void.^ The legislature must prescribe rules, but when questions arise between parties whether rules have been complied with, the judiciary is the appointed arbiter. 3. Special curative acts? That acts to cure defects in tax proceeding previously had may be passed under some circum- stances has been affirmed in a great number of cases, some of which are referred to in the margin.' The power may, there- Wilkinson V. Leland, 3 Pet. 637, 657; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranoh 43; Er- vine's Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 356, 266; Lambertson v. Hogan, 3 Pa. St. 33, 34. 1 An act requiring the board of su- pervisors of a county to proceed to the apportionment and assessment of drain taxes, some portion of which had already been adjudged void, and the others palpably were so, was adjudged void on this ground in Butler v. Sag- inaw Supervisors, 36 Mich. 33. The cases of Lewis v. Webb, 3 Me. 336 ; Lane V.Gorman, 3 Scam. 338,342; Campbell V. Union Bank, 6 Ho-idr. (Miss.) 635, 661 ; Ervine's Appeal, 16 Pa. St. 356, 266; Cash, Appellant, 6 Mich. 193; Mc- Daniel v. Correll, 19 111. 236; Denny V. Mattoon, 3 Allen 861; Budd v. State, *3 Humph. 483; Wally's Heirs V. Kennedy, 3 Yerg. 554, and Piquet, Appellant, 5 Pick. 64, are referred to as illustrating under diflFeren1<^ cir- cumstances the distinction between legislative and' judicial authority. See, also, Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Pa. St. 33; Greenough v. Greenough, 11 Pa. St. 489, 494; Haley v. Philadel- phia, 68 Pa. St. 45; S. C, 8 Am. Rep. 153, 155; Calhoun v. MoLenden, 42 Ga. 405; Trustees v. Bailey, 10 Fla. 238; People v. Frisbie, 36 Cal. 135; Sydnor v. Palmer, 33 Wis. 406, 409; Plumer v. Supervisors, 46 Wis. 163; Wall V. Wall, 134 Mass. 65; Forster V. Forster, 139 Mass. 559. . 2 " ' A curative act,' in the ordinary sense of that term, is a retrospective law, acting on past cases and existing rights. The power of the legislature to enact such laws is therefore con- fined within comparatively narrow limits; and they are usually passed to' validate irregularities in legal pro- ceedings, or to give effect to con- tracts between parties which might otherwise fall for failure to comply with technical legal requirements: " Meigs v. Roberts, 163 N. Y. 871. A' city charter authorizing suit to col- lect assessments illegally levied was held to be a validating act though it did not use the words " rati/y," " con- firm," or " validate : " Nottage v. Port- land, 35 Or. 539. And such act is ef- fective as a defense in an action to recoverillegal assessments paid: Ibid. The effect of a curative act held not to be to take private property with- out just compensation, any more than iu all other cases of taxation for public purposes: Richman v. Muscatine Supervisors, 77 Iowa 513. It has been held in South Carolina that an act authorizing taxation to pay bonds previously issued in vio- lation of the constitution is not a validating act, which would be be- yond the power of the legislature, but an exercise of the power to tax, and, therefore, constitutional: Cole- man V. Broad River T'p, 50 S. C. 331. ' Kearney v. Taylor, 15 How. 494; Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687; Williams v. Albany County, 133 U. S. 154; People v. Sey- mour, 16 Cal. 882; People v. Todd, 33 Cal. 181; Jacksonville v. Basnett, 30 CH. X.] CUEING DE^EOTS IN TAX PKOOEEDINGS. 511 fore, be taken as satisfactorily established, and the questions to be considered relate to the limitations upon it. First, how- ever, may be mentioned some cautions that should attend the exercise of the power, but which rest in policy only, and there- fore address themselves to the legislative judgment and sense of right, but do not constitute limitations upon legislative power. One of these concerns the retroactive character of such legislation; there being a special liability to abuse in re- trospective legislation. The people in some states have felt this so strongly, that, by their constitutions, retrospective laws have been expressly forbidden;' but in the absence of any such Fla. 525; Smith v. Longe, 20 Fla. 697; Bloxham v. Railroad Co., 35 Fla. 635; Parker v. Jacksonville, 37 Fla. 343; Tucker v. Justices, 34 Ga. 370; Cow- gill V. Long, 15 111. 303; Mitchell v. Deeds, 49 111. 416; Davis v. State Bank, 7 Ind 316; Lucas v. Tucker, 17 lad. 41; Musselman v. Logansport, 29 Ind. 533; Boardman v. Beckwith, 18 Iowa 293; Land Co. v. Soper, 89 Iowa 113; Chicago, R L & P. R. Co. v. Independent Dist., 99. Iowa 556; Boyce v. Sinclair, 3 Bush 301 ; Allen V. Archer, 49 Me. 346; Walter v. Bacon, 8 Mass. 468, 473; Patterson v. Phillbrook, 9 Mass. 151, 153; Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 360 ; Brevoort v. Detroit, 24 Mich. 333; Pillsbury v. Auditor- General, 26 Mich. 345; State v. Union, 33 N. J. L. 350; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236; In re Elizabeth Com'rs, 49 N. J. L. 488; Ensign v. Barse, 107 p/. Y. 339; Terrel v. Wheeler, 123 N. Y. 76; Trustees v. McCaughey, 2 Ohio St. 153; Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio St. 235; Strauoh v. Shoemaker, 1 W. & S. 166; McCoy v. Michew, 7 W. & S. 386; Williston v. Colkett, 9 Pa. St. 38; Montgomery v. Meredith, 17 Pa. St. 43; Dunden v. Snodgrass, 18 Pa. St. 151; Schenley v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 39; Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt. 590. 'Provisions of this nature are found in the constitutions of Colo- rado, Georgia, Louisiana, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohic Tennessee, Texas, and, doubtless, of other states. In North Carolina retrospective taxation of sales, pur- chases, and other acts done, is for- bidden. Legislation for the enforce- ment of back taxes is not forbidden by such a constitutional provision, where no new obligation is imposed: Sturges V. Carter, 114 U. S. 511; New Orleans v. Railroad Co., 35 La. An. 679; State v. Heman, 70 Mo. 441; Gager v. Prout, 48 Ohio St.-89. See Wellshear V.Kelly, 69 Mo. 343. Where an ordinance for a street improve- ment was defedtive, an ordinance amending it after the completion of" work so as to make it conform to law was held not to violate a con- stitutional provision against retro- spective laws: Bacon v. Savannah, 105 Ga. 64. A statute enabling a city to assess lots adjoining a sewer for the expense of constructing it after prior assessments had been de- clared invalid because of the city's failure to observe the preliminary steps authorizing the construction of the sewer required by law, is re- pugnant to a constitutional provision prohibiting the enactment of retro- spective laws: Evans v. Denver, 26 Colo. 193. Where a tax is invalid simply because the legislature did not provide for notice of the pro- ceedings by which the amount of 512 CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PE0CEEDING8. [oh. X. express restriction, there is nothing in the fact that curative statutes operate retrospectively which can preclude their pas- sage.' Then it is an obvious objection to such laws that they the tax was to be ascertained, a retroactive amendment may cure such defect: Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 290. 1 Chicago, E. I. & P. R. Co. v. Ii^e- pendent Dist., 99 Iowa 556, and cases cited; Galusha v. Wendt (Iowa), 87 N. W. Rep. 513; People v. Ingham Supervisors, 80 Mich. 95; State v. Newark, 37 N. J. L. 185. A statute which, being but a mode of continu- ing or reviving a tax that might be supposed to have expired, is in this sense retrospective, but which does not give a judicial construction to a former statute, is not unconstitu- tional: Stookdale v. Insurance Co., 30 Wall. 333; Railroad Co. v. Rose, 95 U. S. 78. It is not an objection to a Curative statute that it is passed ' while suits are pending in respect of the defects or irregularities sought to be cured; the court must apply the statute in the pending suits. See Cowgill V. Long, 15 IlL 303; State v. Squires, -36 Iowa 340; Dittoe v. Dav- enport, 74 Iowa 66; Tuttle v. Polk, 84 Iowa 13; Clinton v. Walliker, 98 Iowa 655; State v. Norwood, 13 Md. 195; Miller v. Graham, 17 Ohio St. 1; Hepburn v. Curts, 7 Watts 300; Grim v. School Dist, 51 Pa. St. 319. Defects iu the election of tax offi- cers may be cured retrospectively, even though a suit is pending to take advantage of them: Millikin v. Bloomington, 49 Ind. 63. And the legislature may cure irregularities in an assessment although a certio- rari has been sued out in respect of them: People v. McDonald, 69 N. Y. 363. Certiorari dismissed where a defect in the assessment was cured by special act after it was sued out: State V. Apgar, 31 N, J. L. 358. And tee Bristol v. Ingham Supervisors, 30 Mich. 95; Newark v. State, 33 N. J. L. 453; Ex parte MoCardle, 7 Wall. 506; United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88. But such a statute cannot affect cases already passed into judgment: People V. Saginaw Supervisors, 36 Mich. 33; Lambertson v. Hogan, 3 Pa. St. 33. The legislature has no authority to rever.se judgments di- rectly or indirectly, arid a legislative act legalizing a tax-roll and healing defects therein will be so construed as not to aflfeot an existing judgment for trespass against the collector for seizing and selling property to sat- isfy the illegal tax: Moser v. White, 39 Mich. 59. Where, after property levied on under an irregularly made assessment had been sold, and after the owner had brought suit to re- cover of the township the proceeds of such sale, a curative act was passed legalizing the assessment roll and the acts of officers thereunder, it was held that the rights of parties had become vested before such act was passed, and were not affected thereby : Daniells v. Waterto wn T'p, 61 Mich. 514. A statute attempting to validate an .illegal levy can oper- ate only upon uncollected taxes based on said levy, and cannot vali- . date any tax-sale or deed made or issued prior to its passage: Dever v. Cornwell (N. D.), 86 N. W. Rep. 337. A right given by statute to recover for taxes paid may be taken away, even though suits are pending: St. Joseph County Com'rs v. Ruckman, 57 Ind. 96. In New Jersey it is held that where a town has made an un- authorized levy the people cannot at a subse(^uent meeting validate the levy — their powers being altogether statutory: Banta v. Richards, 43 N. J. L. 497. Under a certain statute CH. X.j OUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOOEEDINGS. 513 may be invidious and inspired by favoritism, since they select for confirmation certain proceedings — those of a single dis- trict, for instance — leaving all others untouched. But the de- fects may be in a single district only, or the circumstances such that the need of legislation is exclusively confined to it. More- over, in different districts difl'erent regulations may have been politic originally; and if so, there can be no very conclusive reason why they may not in effect be made by a retrospective sanction of the regulations actually applied. Cities always have regulations in respect to taxation differing in some par- ticulars from those which prevail in towns ; and, as in the case of police regulations, such rules must be allowed to vary, be- cause in some cases there may be the most conclusive reasons why they should. But we should think the very limit of such legislation would be reached, when a particular assessment and the proceedings under it, in their operation throughout the dis- trict, were confirmed. To discriminate in such proceedings, and say they shall be valid as to a particular purchaser, or against a particular person or estate taxed, would not be legis- lation, because it would establish no rule. Its purpose would be, while leaving in force the rule which defeats the assessment, to exempt from its operation the case of a favored party, No department of the government possesses this authority. And all special confirmations of assessments and other proceedings are forbidden in some states, either by an express constitutional - provision to that effect, or by the requirement that laws on the subject shall be general.^ it was held that a city council could pass local or special laws for the as- notdispense's^ith or correct proceed- sessment and collection, of taxes; ings upon which depended its juris- Kimball v. Rosendale, 43 Wis. 407. diction to make a street assessment : lu Iowa it is held that a special act California Imp. Co. v. Moran, 138 Cal, authorizing a levy of taxes for school 373. ' purposes made by the directors of a iThe power of the legislature to particular district after the time pass curative acts to legalize defect- fixed by statute does not violate a ive proceedings under previous stat- constitutional provision prohibiting utes is dependent on its continued or the enactment of local or special present power to authorize proceed- laws, even though a general law ings like those sought to be so legal- could have been niade applicable ized. A special act to cure defects and operative throughout the state: in certain tax proceedings cannot be Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Inde- passed where under the constitu- pendent Dist., 99 Iowa 556. tion the legislature has no power to 83 514 CUEING DEFEOTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. [CH. One very precise limit to the power to cure these proceed- ings is this : they cannot be cured when there was a lack of jurisdiction to take them. This is a rule applicable to every species of legal proceedings; Curative laws may heal irregu- larities in action, but they cannot cure a want of authority to. act at all.^ And in this regard the rules which apply to retro- spective and to prospective healing acts are the same. What is to be deemed a want of jurisdiction may in some cases be a question of no little nicety, especially in the case of local taxation. The local authorities take their powers from the state, and their acts are void when unauthorized by pre- vious law. But if a town without authority were to contract a debt for a special purpose, the debt might undoubtedly be validated by retrpspective legislation.^ But in such cases there is commonly a general power to incur town liabilities, and the particular debt is not void for want of power to act upon the subject, but because the power conferred is so restricted as not to embrace it. There is room for saying, therefore, that-the 1 People V. Goldtree, 44 Cal. 323; People V. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15; Brady v. King, 53 Cal. 44; Harper v. Rowe, 53 Cal. 233; People v. MoCune, 57 Cal. 153; Kelly v. Luning, 76 Cal. 309; California Imp. Co. v. Moran, 138 Cal. 3734 Daniel •^- McCofrell, 19 111. 226; Blake v. People, 109 IlL 504; Atchi- son, etc. R. Co. V. Maquilkin, 13 Kan. 801; Bellevue t. Peacoiik, 89 Ky. 495; State v. Doherty, 60 Me. 504; Denny v. Mattoon, 3 Allen §61; Wall V. Wall, 124 Mass. 65; Forster v. Fotst ter, 139 Miss. 559;Vaughan v.Swayzie, 56 Miss. 704; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 43 Mo. 163; Canda Manuf. Co. v. Woodbury, 58 N. J. L. 134; Hearn's Petition, 96 N. Y. 37$; Dever v. Corn- well (N. D.), 86 N. W. Rep. 237; Stephan v. Daniels, 37 Ohio St. 537; Richards v. Rote, 68 Pa. St. 248; Nel- son V. Rountree, 33 Wis. 367. The legislature of a state cannot validate a tax which is prohibited by the fed- eral laws: Exchange Bank Tax Cases, 21 Fed. Rep. 99. So a state statute which attempts to legalize taxes lev- ied on the entire stock of a national bank in soUdo against the bank is void: National Bank v. Richmond, 42 Fed. Rep. 877. The board of trustees of a civil town having no authority to levy a tax for a special school fund, such unauthorized levy cannot be legalized by ratification by the board of trustees of theschopl town: Shepardson v. Gillett, 133 Ind. 125. Certain special curative acts held not to have cured the defect that the ex- penditures for which assessments were levied were made under an ille- gal contract: Poth v. New York, 151 N. Y. 16, citing In re New York Inst., 131 N. Y. 334; In re Livingston, 131 N. Y. 94. 2 See Booth v. Woodbury, 32 Conn. 118; Taylor v. Thompson, 42 IlL 9; Board of Com'rs v. Bearss, 35 Ind. 110; Jefferson School T'p v. Yitton, 116 Ind. 467; Schenck v. Jefferson- ville, 153 Ind. 204; Lowell v. Oliver, 8 Allen 247; Comer v. Folsom, 13 Minn. 319; Crowell v. Hopkinson, 45 N. H.9. CH. X.J CUEING DEFEOfS IN TAX PEOOEEDINGS. 515 case is rather one of irregularity than of want of jurisdiction. "What is more important is, that in such a case there is no ad- versary or respondent party; the town is acting for itself ex- clusively, and against no one. Where, however, the town proceeds to levy a tax without authority, the case is different;' it is then proceeding in invitum against individuals who would be entitled, if the proceedings were legal, to have notice and be heard in various stages. If the proceedings are unauthor- ized by law, no one is legally or morally bound to take notice of them, or can have a legal hearing in respect to them, and a retrospective affirmance would, in effect, establish valid claims without opportunity to be heard. It is not believed this is competent.' If the local authorities were to assume in any case to levy a tax for a purpose for which taxation is not permissible, there would be an evident want of power to confirm it, because the legislature could not have authorized it originally. The un- ' authorized acts of individuals cannot confer upon the state a power it did not before possess.^ But the want of power to confirm is the same in all cases where an element in legal tax- - ation is wanting;, and therefore taxation without an assessment must bfe incapable of confirmation, because apportionment is indispensable.' So if the party has been illegally deprived of 1 See Shawnee Com'rs v. Carter, 2 nities to be heard. The same may Kan. 115; Tunbridge v. Smith, 48 may be said of Tucker v. Justices, 34 Vt. 648; Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Ga. 370. See Boardman v. Beokwith, Commissioners, 84 N. C. 504. In 18 Iowa 393, for a more doubtful case. Grim v. School District, 57 Pa. St. 2 National Bank v. lola, 9 Kan. 689, 433, Sharswood, J., speaking of a 696, per Dillon, J. ; Conway v. Cable, bounty tax, says: "It has not been 87 111. 83; Hart v. Henderson, 17 pretended, and could not be, that Mich. 318; Dean v. Borchsenius, 30 the legislature had not the power Wis. 335. antecedent to authorize it. If so, ^ The Pennsylvania statute of 1815 they could cure any irregularity or declared that " no inequality in the want of authority in levying it by a assessment, or in the process or other- retroactive law, even though thereby wise, shall be construed or taken to a right of action, which had been affect the title of the purchaser, but vested in an individual, should be the same shall be declared to be good divested. It is within the principle and legal." Also that only "When of all the decisions of admitted au- the owner or owners of lands sold for thority." But the bounty tax in this taxes shall have paid the taxes due case was not the sole tax levied: it on them previous to the sale, or was additional to other levies, and within two years thereafter shall the taxpayer had all legal opportu- have tendered the amount of the 516 CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOOEEDINGS. [CH. X. the opportunity to be heard in opposition to the assessment, the defect is jurisdictional.^ ' • A tax discriminating against an individual could .not be af- taxes and costs with twenty-flve per I centum additional, and the tender has been refused, shall he or they be entitled to recover the lands by due course of law, and that in no other case and no other plea shall an a(ftion be sustained." Notwithstanding this act it was decided that if an unseated lot was put on the seated list, and then transferred to the unseated without notice to the owner, a sale on this assessment would be void: Milliken v. Benedict, 8 Pa. St. 169,' reviewing and approving Larimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S. 133; and Harper V. Mechanics! Bank, 7 W. & S. 804 In Commercial Bank v. Woodside, 14 Pa. St. 404, 409, Bell, J., says: "It is essential to the validity of every tax sale of lands that the subject of it should be assessed and returned, by some competent authority, as un- seated, or, where it has been rated as a seated tract or lot, that it be transferred to the unseated list, by the commissioners of the county, or their authorized agents, with no- tice to the owner, if that be possible. This is the doctrine of all the cases in which the subject has been treated. They settle indisputably, that an omission. In this particular, is uncured by the act of 1815, which applies only to irregularities in 'the proceeding. It is the assessment, says Larimer v.. MoCall, 4 W. 351, 4 W. & S. 133, which confers the power to sell in the same man- ner as a judgment on which an execution is issued. Without this, there is no authority to divest the title of the owner, and if a tract be returned as seated it cannot be sold for taxea To the same effect are the other adjudications, down to Milli- ken V. Benedict, 8 Pa. St. 169." To the same effect is Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. St. 374. That the want of an as- sessment is not an irregularity capa- ble of being thus cured, see Steward V. ShOenfelt, 13 S. & E. 360; Bratton V. Mitchell, 1 W. & S. 310; Miller v. Hale, 36 Pa. St. 483; McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. St. 13; Vancou- . ver V. Wintler.'S Wash. 378. That the want of a notice required by the constitution is an incurable defect, see Wilson v. McKenna, 53, lU. 43. That a validating act is unconstitu- tional in so far as it attempts to dis- pense with statutory notice to the taxpayer, see Evans v. Fall River County, 9 S. D. 130. An assessment 80 defective as to be totally void can- not be' cured by legislation: People V. Holliday, 35 Cal. 30i3; People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15; Great Falls Ice Co. V. District of Columbia, 19 D. C. 337; Slaughter v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 113; Crbmwell v. Wilson, 53 Hun 614 So with a want of valuation: People V. Savings Union, 31 Cal. 133. The confirmation ^by a city council of a void assessment cannot make it good : Doughty v. Hope, 3 Denio 594. See Hodgdon v. Burleigh, 4 Fed. Rep. 111. Taxes invalid because levied for a street improvement made under a resolvition by the city council and not under an ordinance passed by the mayor and council cannot be validated by a subsequent ordinance; Newman v. Emporia, 33 Kan. 456, Where a levy is made under an act which is void under the constitution because it fails to state the object of the tax, an act to legalize the levy is also void: Atchison, etc. R. Ca v. Woodcock, 18 Kan. 30. See, for a similar principle; Harper v. Rowe, 53 Cal. 333. i Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 IlL 333; CH. X.J OUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. 517 firmed ; but a merely excessive levy for lawful purposes, appor- tioued through the district, might be, for this would only be an enlargement of the original authority, and taxpayers have had their opportunity to be heard on all questions of equality and apportionment.^ But a tax sale that was made after a tax had been paid would be void and incapable of confirmation, the oflBcer losing all jurisdiction to proceed when payment has been made.' ■ The general rule has often been declared, ,that the legisla- ture may validate retrospectively the proceedings which they might have authorized in advance.' Therefore, if- any direc- billings V. Detten, 15 111. 218; Matter of Trustees of Union Coll., 139 N. Y. 308. In the last-named case it is said by Finch, J., that " to ratify in form an vinconstitutional act, and then by retrospective legislation cut off all power of resistance, is a measure neither tolerable nor possible." And see Eiohmdnd, etc. R. Co. v. Commis- sioners, 84 N. C. 504; Tunbridge v. Smith, 48 Vt. 648; Albany City Bank V. Maher, 20 Blatch. 341. If one man's land is taxed to another and sold, the sale is void and cannot be made otherwise by legislation: Abbott v. Lindenbower, 43 Mo. 163. And see Hume V. Wainscott, 46 Mo. 145. If land which is not within a city is taxed by it, the tax cannot be vali- dated though afterwards the land is annexed: Atchison, etc. E. Co. v. Ma- quilkin, 13 Kan. 301. 1 See Iowa R Land Co. v. Soper, 89 Iowa 113. 2 Reading v. Finney, 73 Pa. St. 467. Penalties cannot be imposed in re- spect of the non-payment of taxes which the legislature assumes are ir- regular, and of which it authorizes the correction: Trowbridge v. Horan, 78 N. Y. 489. 'See Mattingly v. District of Co- lumbia, 97 U. S. 687; Exchange Bank Tax Cases, 31 Fed. Rep. 99; State v. Squires, 26 Iowa 340; Tuttle v. Polk, 84 Iowa 13; Richman v. Muscatine Supervisors, 77 Iowa 513; Clinton V. Walliker, 98 Iowa 655; Marion ' County V. Louisville & N. R. Co., 91 Ky. 388; Breaux v. Negrotto, 43 La. An. 436; 'Vaughan v. Swayzie, 56 Miss. 705; Smith v. Buffalo, 159 N. Y. 437; Hartzung v. Syracuse, 98 Hun 303. The legislature can validate a defective levy which it might have authorized to be made in the manner in which it was laid; so held where the state board of supervisors levied, without authority, a state tax which the legislature might have levied or ordered the board to levy: Shuttock V. Smith, 6 N. D. 56. Where a county has authority to levy a head-tax for county purposes, and levies an ad va- * lorem tax instead, the legislature may by subsequent enactments vali- date the levy: Marion County v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,. 91 Ky. 388. Where a township tax was void as exceeding the statutory tpwn-tax limit, the legislature has power to pass an act validating the assessment so erroneously levied, and such an act is constitutional: Kettelle v. Warwick & C. Water Co. (E. L), 49 Atl. Rep. 493. Where a county court was authorized to levy an ad valo- rem tax every five years, a levy for , the sixth year was a mere irregu- larity and could be validated by statute: Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bullitt County, 92 Ky. 380. Although 518 CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. [oh. X. tions of the statute fail of observance, which are not so far of the essence of the thing to be done that they must be provided for in any statute on the subject, the legislature may retro- spectively cure the defect. But there are probably some ex- a statute levyifig a tax on the lands in a levee district for the payment of the levee bonds provided that all lands on which the tax was not mid before a certain day in the year should on that day be sold for the tax, if such lands were sold after the day the irregularity could be cured by legislative act: Ford v. Delta & P. L. Co., 43 Fed. Rep. 181. See Pax- ton V. Land Co., 67 Miss. 96. As the state has the right to sell its title which it has acquired at a sale for delinquent taxes, it may by statute adopt or validate an illegal sale of such title: Hoffman v. Pack, 123 Mich. 74. It is competent for the legislature to provide for the com- pletion of a partly finished drain, and to point out a way for the cor- rection of errors, so as to make it practicable to complete it, although the cost is thereby increased: Anke- tell V. Hayward, 119 Mich. 535. A statute legalizing the incorporation of cities incorporated under pi-ior void statutes, and requiring new as- sessments for local improvements where former assessments have been held void, is valid: State y. Ballard, 16 Wash. 418. The legislature may sanction an improvement which it might have authorized, and may . order an assessment for its cost: Matter of Saokett, etc. Streets, 74 N. Y. 95. The legislature may au- thorize the recovery by a city of im- provements made under a void act, having a right to legalize what it might previously have ordered : Mat- ter of Amberson Av., 179 Pa. St. 634. A statute legalizing unexecuted grading contracts which were in- valid because of defects in the notice of proposals for bids is a valid cura- tive act: Windsor v. Des TVIoines, 101 Iowa 843. See Ottumwa, etc. Co. v. , Ainley, 109 Iowa 386. So is a statute legalizing a city ordinance and reso- lutions thereunder assessing and levying the taxes or special assessr ments for the paving of streets : Clin- ton V. Walliker, 98 Iowa 655. The legislature may legalize an assess- ment irregular in the mode of pro- cedure, when the municipality had jurisdiction of the subject-matter: Tiflt V. Buffalo, 83 N. Y. 304, citing Sohenley v. Comrnonwealth, 36 Pa. St. 29. It is justly said in that case that a party has no vested right to a defense based on mere informalities. The want of a certificate to an as- sessment roll may be cured retro- spectively: Sinclair v. Learned, 51 Mich. 335. See Clementi v. Jackson, 93 N. Y. 591. Other omissions and irregularities held non- jurisdictional and curable: Williams v. Albany County, 133 U. S. 154; Ensign v. Parse, 107 N. Y. 329; Kent v. War- ner, 47 Hun 474; Matter of East Av. Baptist Church, 57 Hun 590; Smith V. Hard, 61 Vt. 469. Even the failure to give opportunity to be heard has been held curable: Exchange Bank Tax Cases. 21 Fed. Rep. 99. The oases of Milliken v. Benedict, 8 Pa. St. 169, and Commercial Bank v. Woodside, 14 Pa. St. 404', turn Upon a failure to give a notice which, in ad- vance, might have been dispensed with. See, also, Prindle v. Campbell, 9 Minn. 313; Dubuque v. Wooton, 28 Iowa 571. But see People v. Sey- mour, 16 Cal. 333. As to what will be held a legislative ratification of an iri'egular assessment, see Mat- tingly V. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687. CH. X.J CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PROCEEDINGS. 619 ceptions to this general rule. If the law has afforded the party an opportunity to be heard, when it might have been dispensed with, he has a right to rely upon this for his protection, and we should doubt the right of the legislature to take it away by retroactive law. There are some, cases which, we think, recog- nize this right to a hearing which the law has given, as con- stituting an exception to the general right of the legislature to cure defects. And the reason of the exception will apply^to all cases in which notice to the party, by publication or other- wise, has been provided for his protection. If this can be dis- pensed with by a healing act, the very provision for a notice for the party's protection becomes a trap for his destruction.' 1 In Miller v. Hale, 36 Pa. St. 433, in which it was decided that a sale of unseated lands, made before the ex- piration of a year from the time when the tax was due and unpaid, could not be validated by the statute cur- ing irregularities, the following re- marks are made by Woodward, J.: " If it be granted that this was a reg- ular assessment, or that its irregular- ities were such as the curative pro- visions of the act of 1815 would remedy, it cannot be claimed that the taxes were ' due and unpaid for the space of one year before' the sale — a condition on which the juris- diction of the treasurer is expressly limited by the first section of the act of 1815. It was said with great truth, by Judge Buston, in McCall V. Larimer, 4 Watts 351, 853, that taxes cannot be due unless they have been assessed. It is, indeed, the assessment that makes the tax. It is the duty of all owners of unseated lands to return them for taxation, and to pay the taxes when assessed; but how is he to pay before they are assessed ? It is not for him to fix the valuation or the rate, but for the county commissioners; and, until they have performed their duty, he has no duty to perform. But, when the assessment has been made and the tax ascertained, there is no au- thority for proceeding to sell the land until the tax shall have remained un- paid a year. A sale short of that period is simply void. It is like a sale where there has been no assess- ment, which has often been declared insufiBoient to pass the title. Nor does the curative provision of the fourth section of the act of 1815 ap- ply to such a sale, for that was in- tended to remedy irregularities in pit)ceedings where jurisdiction had attached, not to confer jurisdiction in cases that were beyond the pur- view of the act. A system was pro- vided by the legislature for enforc- ing the payment of taxes upon un- seated lands, but until a tract has been assessed and the tax remained due and unpaid a year, it is not within the system nor subject to any of its provisions. If such were not ^ the rule of decision, titles could be divested, without .notice to the' owner, whenever it suited the inter- est or caprice of the county officers to expose them to sale. A law in- tending to promote public objects without a wanton sacrifice of private rights would thus become an instru- ment of intolerable mischief, and the doubtsof its constitutionality, which, with all its checks and balances, at- tended its enactment and early his- tory, would grow into a conviction 520 CUEING DEFECTS IS TAX PROCEEDINGS. [CH. X. 4. General curative laws. On the subject of general curative acts to operate retrospectively, little need be added here, as what has already been said in respect to special acts is entirely ap- plicable.^ Indeed the general acts are commonly less objeqtion- that would sweep it from the statute book." See as somewhat analogous, Wall V. Wall, 124 Mass. 65; Forster V. Forster, 139 Mass. 559. A sale under a void tax (as for war taxes m aid of the rebellion) cannot be val- idated by subsequent legislation. Bookout V. Andrews (Miss.), 35 South. Rep. 865. A curative act cannot val- , idate a sale for taxes of land assessed and sold in the name of a person after his decease: Edwards v. Fairex, 47 La. An. 170. Nor can a statute validate a wholly void sale of the owner's real property or an interest therein, under a void assessment: Cromwell v. MacLean, 123 N. Y. 474. That a void sale cannot be confirmed, see, further, Harper v. Eowe, 53 Cal. 338; Clementi v. Jackson, 93 N. Y. 591. Where the enforcement of a lien depends upon an act validating it, the lien cannot be enforced in an ac-' tion begun before the act took effect. See Eeis v. Graff, 51 Cal. 86; People V. McCain, 51 Cal. 360. In California it is held that a statute providing for the ratification of certain orders of a municipal board concerning street work, and providing how assessments shall be made for work already done, does not authorize the board to order property assessed for work ordered, 'and completed before the passage of the statute, when such property was not liable therefor under the law as it existed when the work was or- dered, the legislature having no right to impose such liability: Kelly V. Luning, 76 Cal. 309. 'A statute providing for the re- levying, by the comptroller, of an un- paid tax which shall be ascertained to be illegal or void by reason of any irregularity or defect in the omission of statutory requirements, etc., is a curative statute, and cannot be made applicable where no assessment at all has been mtide, or where the assess- ment was absolutely null and void: People V. Wemple, 117 N. Y. 77. An act authorizing review of unjust as- sessments was held not to validate an assessment which was no assessment at all, because laid under an uncon- ' stitutional statute: Hawkins v. Man- gum, 78 Miss. 97 (88 South. Rep. 873). A statute legalizing the taxes' assessed for the year in a certain town was in- tended to cure defects of irregularity only, and not to make legal an un- authorized assessment of a joint and ■ undivided tax upon lots of land owned by different persons: Mowry v. Blandin, 64 N. H. 3. A general act val- idating "all assessments heretofore laid in said city "will not validate one which was laid without any author- ity or jurisdiction: People v. Brook- lyn, 71 N. Y. 495. A charter provision declaring an assessment which has been confirmed by the common coun- cil to be " final and conclusive " does not apply where the assessment is en- tirely void and without jurisdiction: People y. Wilson, 119 N. Y. 515. An assessment without any valuation, where by statute the power to lay is limited to one-half the value of the land, is laid without authority of law, and therefore is not cured by a stat- ute providing that irregularities, etc., shal 1 not defeat : Matter oS Second M. E. Church, 66 N. Y. 395. A validating statute which confirms all assess- ments of benefits or damages by rea- son of the grading or improvement of any street cannot be construed as embracing assessments by a body having no authority to make assess- CH. X.J CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PROCEEDINGS. 521 able than the special, because they are enacted on general con- siderations, and are not partial or invidious. 5. Prospective curative laws. Laws which undertake to provide that in future proceedings errors or irregularities shall not be fatal, come also under the same restrictions upon legislative authority ;i they cannot, for example, cure a total want of power to tax,^ nor can they relieve against jurisdic- tional defects.' But such laws would seem entitled to liberal ments. It presupposes jurisdiction to make them, and only cures irregu- larities in exercising apower lawful ly possessed: Harris v. Ansonia, 73 Conn. 358. Where atax-sale was made outside of the hours named by the statute, it was validated by a subse- quent act confirming all sales there- tofore or thereafter made, although not made during the prescribed hours: State v. Landis T'p, 50 JS'. J. L. 371 Where an act legalizing defect- ive oaths to assessment rolls provides that it " shall not affect any title to real estate," it means a hostile title, that is, a title acquired otherwise than from the state, and held in hos- tility to a title obtained from the state: Kent v. Warner, 47 Hun 474. 1 See ante, pp. 514, 515. ^Stephan v. Daniels, 37 Ohio St. 537. A statute providing that in case of the county court's failure to levy a tax, or in case of an illegal or erro- neous levy, such tax shall be levied in addition to the regular levy, does not apply where there was no author- ity for levying the tax: State v. Wa- bash, St. L. & P. E. Co., 97 Mo. 396. 'Auditor-General v. Duluth, S. S. & A. E. Co., 116 Mich. 133. The Min- nesota tax-law providing, among other things, that "all the instruc- tions and directions herein given for the assessing of lands and personal property, and the levying and col- lecting of taxes and assessments, shall be deemed only directory, apd no error or informality in the pro- ceedings of any of the officers in- trusted with the same, not affecting the substantial justice of the tax it- self, shall vitiate, or in any wise af- fect, the validity of the tax or as- sessment, or of the title conveyed under the sale for taxes under this chapter," does not embrace such errors and informalities as go to the jurisdiction of the officers charged with the performance of the duties imposed by the chapter, or the valid- ity of their acts, but only such as do not substantially affect the material steps in the proceedings; and the act does not cure a defective notice of sale: Prindle v. Campbell, 9 Minn. 218. An assessment in which the lands of two persons were assessed together under ohe aggregate assess- ment was held in Hamilton v. Fond du Lac, 25 Wis. 490, 495, not cured by a statute providing that an assess- ment should be valid " notwithstand- ing any omission, defect, or irregu- larity," Paine, J., remarking, "it vi-ould be clearly going beyond the scope and intent of this act to say that it made valid an assessment against one person of a tax upon an- other person's lots. That is some- thing more than a mere on:ission, defect, or irregularity in the pro- ceedings.'' Where a tax is vitiated for the failure of the board of review to grant the taxpayer a hearing, the defect is jurisdictional, and does not come within the curative provisions: Caledonia T'p v. Eose, 94 Mich. 216. 522 CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOOBEDINGS. [CH. X. consideration, since the parties concerned would be apprised in advance that they were not to rely upon an exact compliance . with the law, and would be under greater obligation to watch the proceedings.^ Of the very comprehensive curative provis- Where the assessment is absolutely void for want of authority in the municipal authorities to make the improvement, a statute provicliq|g against the setting aside of assess- ments because of irregularity or de- fect in form, or illegality in the mak- ing and levying of the same, has no remedial or curative efEect: App V. Stockton, 61 N. J. L. 520. The curative provisions of a statute do not apply to assessments where the contract for the improvement for which they were laid was illegal be- cause made by the town with its trustee: Benton v. Hamilton, 110 Ind. 394. The Pennsylvania statute can- not be construed to validate an as- sessment made without notice: Herschberger v. Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. St. 78. The Washington statute per- mitting recovery of street assess- ments notwithstanding irregularities and defects in the assessment pro- ceedings has no apJ)lication to cases where there has been no assessment: Vancouver v. Wintler, 8 Wash. 378. Provisions of a city charter author- izing the court, in case an assessment on which suit is brought proves to be irregular or informal, to render judgment against the defendant or the premises for the amount, prop- erly chargeable, of the expense in- curred, does not authorize a suit for a share of the expense, or value of an improvement, the assessment for which has been set aside as illegal and void: Manistee v. Harley, 79 Mich. 338. Nor does a provision that "no assessment shall be held invalid except upon appeal to the city coun- cil," etc., apply to a case where the council is powerless to remedy the defect: Manning v. Den, 90 Cal. 610. An assessment that does not contain a description sufficient to identify the property assessed is void, and therefore not within the curative statute: August! v. Lawless, 45 La. An. 1370. Under a statute declaring that an assessment for a local im- ' provement should notJ)e vacated for any defect, omission, or irregularity, the jurisdiction of the board of su- pervisors to order such an assess- ment depended upon a prior appor- tionment of the expense by the commissioner of public works, but that officer merely certified that the improvement had been completed and accepted, and that " the appor- tionment of the assessment may be made," and it was held that the as- sessment was not validated: Hearn's Petition, 96 N. Y. 378. The provision that no error in a tax-sale shall invali- date it does not cure the effect of the sheriff's failure to designate the prop- erty which he sells for a tax: Nelson V. Abernathy, 74 Miss. 164. ' An act which provides that no tax shall be set aside for any irreg- ularity or defect in form, or ille- gality in assessing, laying, or levying such tax, if the person against whom, or the property upon which, such' tax is levied, assessed, or laid is in fact liable to taxation, and giving the court power to amend and cor- rect all irregularities and defects in the form 'or manner of assessment, should be liberally construed, and the provisions made to apply to taxes assessed before the act was passed. Such a law was applied to a railroad company which had succeeded to the rights of another where a tax had erroneously been assessed to the old instead of the new company: CH. X.] CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. 523 ions applicable to tax proceedings in Illinois the supreme court of that state saj^s: "These enactments were no doubt designed to dispense with the strictness of the common law in the sum- mary proceedings for the levy and collection of taxes; to re- move and wipe out all mere technical objections in the raising of the revenue, thus placing the taxpayer who honestly owes his tax to the government which affords him protection on precisely the same footing as any other person who owes an honest debt. Nor should the courts interpose objections to thwart the legislative will." ' Under a curative statute in force in Indiana it is held that irregularities will not affect the va- lidity of an assessment if the proceedings are substantially cor- rect.^ The cases under the Iowa statute go farther, perha^ps, than any others in sanctioning broad powers in the legislature to cure defects.' Under the Kansas act providing that " no ir- regularity in the assessment roll, nor omission from the same, nor mere irregularities of any kind in any of the proceedings, shall invalidate any such proceeding or the title conveyed by the tax-deed," it has been held the proceeding are not vitiated by the omission of the county clerk's seal from the jurat to the State V. Montclair, etc. R., 43 N. J:L. 111. 543; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. 534. People, 171 111. 249, 174 111. 80; Mo- 1 Beers T. People, 83 111.488. Other Cliesney v. People, 178 111. 542; Peo- oases involving the application of the pie v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 189 111 Illinois statute are: Buck v. People, 397. 78 111. 560; Chiniqjay v. People, 78 111. 2 Reynolds v. Bowen, 138 Ind. 434 570: Purrington v! People, 79 111. 11 ; ' See Eldridge v. Kuehl, 27 Iowa ' Eurighv. People, 79 111. 314; Thatcher 160; McCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa V. People, 79 111. 597; Pacific'Hotel Co. 356; Hurley v. Powell, 31 Iowa 64; V. Lieb, 83 III. 603; Andrews v. Peo- Rima v. Cowan, 31 Iowa 125; Thomas pie, 84 111. 28; Halsey v. People, 84 v. Stickle, 32 Iowa 71; Bulkley .v. 111. 89; Fisher v. People, 84 IlL 491; Callanan, 33 Iowa 461: Henderson v. Law V. People, 87 111. 385; Edwards Oliver, 33 Iowa 512; Ware v. Little. V. People, 88 111. 340; Lyle v. Jacques, 35 Iowa 234; Jeffrey v. Brokaw, 35 101 111. 644; Gage v. Bailey, 103 111. Iowa 505; Gentherv. Fuller, 36 Iowa 11; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. People, 119 604; Sibley v. BuUis, 40 Iowa 439; 111. 207; St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Peo- Railroad' Co. v. Carroll County, 41 pie, 128 111. 433; Gage v. Nichols, 135 Iowa 153; Burlington v. Quick, 47 IlL 138; Wabash R. Co. v. People, 138 Iowa 333; Polk County v. Kauffman, IlL 316; Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. v. 104 Iowa 639; Chicago, B. & Q. R. People, 141 IlL 488; St. Louis, R. L & Co. v. Kelley, 105 Iowa 106; Chicago, C. R Co. V. People, 147 IlL 9; Cairo, R I. & P. R. Co. v. Ottumwa, 112 Iowa V. &.R Co. V. Mathews. 153 IlL 153; 300. Spring Valley Coal Co. v. People, 157 524 CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCKEDINGS. [oh. X, assessor's oath and other affidavits,^ or by a delay in making up the tax-lists and accompanying deeds,^ or by an error in the notice as to the amount required to redeem from tax-sale.' In Kentucky irregularities in the appointment or proceedings of the board of supervisors will not prevent the recovery of taxes.* Under the curative statute in Maine, if the assessors have jurisdiction to assess the particular tax against the particu- lar person, the tax so assessed^will be valid and collectible not- withstanding errors, mistakes, or omissions in procedure by the assessors, collector, or treasurer.' The tax-law of Michigan contains very liberal curative provisions under which no ir- regularity or omission — hot jurisdictional and not prejudicial to the rights of property-owners — in proceedings to levy, assess, or collect a tax, will rendeV the tax void.' In Minne- sota, errors, irregularities, or omissions in assessment that do not go to the jurisdiction are not ground for collateral attack on a judgment for taxes.' Under the curative statute of North 1 Shoup V. Railroad Co., 34 Kan. 547. 2 Stout V. Coates, 35 Kan. 383. 3 Watkins v. Inge, 34 Kan. 612. * Southerly Warehouse, etc. Co. v. Mechanics' Trust Co. (Ky.), 56 S. W. Eep. 162, citing Fonda v. Louisville (Ky.), 49 a W. Eep. 785. ' SFoss V. Whitehouse, 94 Me. 491. See Rockland v. Ulmer, 84 Me. 503; Charleston v. Lowrey, 89 Me. 582. But the healing provisions of the Maine statutes relating to errors and omissions are not applicable until a tax-list is first shown to be in exist- ence under the hands of the assess- ors: Norridgewock v. Walker, 71 Me. 181; Topsham v. Purinton, .94 Me. 354. ^ See Petrie Lumber Co. v. Collins, 66 Mich. 64; Boyce v. Peterson, 84 Mich. 490; Boyce v. Stevens, 86 Mich. 549; Muskegon v. Martin Lumber Co., 86 Mich. 635; Auditor-General v. Mo- Arthur, 87 Mich. 457; Boyce v. Au- ditor-General, 90 Mich. 814; Jenkin- son V. Auditor-General, 104 Mich. 269; Fletcher v. Post, 104 Mich. 434; Shimmons v. Saginaw, 104 Mich. 511; Blue Iron Mining Co. v. Negaunee, 105 Mich. 317; Auditor-General v. Ke- weenaw Assoc, 107 Mich. 405; Ham- ilton, etc. Co. V. L'Anse T'p, 107 Mich. 419; Auditor-General v. Long- year, 110 Mioh. 333; Auditor-General V. Hutchinson, 113 Mioh. 345; Lud- ington V. Escanaba, 115 Mich. 288; Auditor-General v. Duluth, S. S. & A. E. Co., 116 Mioh. 133; Auditor- General V. Sparrow, 116 Mioh. 574; Nester v. Church. 130 Mich. 81; Mc- Fadden v. Brady, 130 Mich. 699; Wilkin V. Keith, 131 Mioh. 66; Gates V. Johnson, 131 Mich. 663; Hoffman V. Pack, 123 Mich. 74. There is also a statutory presumption in Michi- gan, until the contrary is proved, that any certificate, etc., required to be made and filed in any office was made and fil^d in the proper office : Redding v. Lamb, 81 Mioh. 318; Bene- dict V. Auditor-General, 104 Mich, 269. Failure to record proof of pub- lication of notice of hearing on as- sessment will be held immaterial where it is shown such publication was had: Shimmons v. Saginaw, 104 Mich. 511. , 7 McNamara v. Fink, 71 Minn. 66. CH. X.] OUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. 526 Dakota, which declares, in effect, that no errors or omissions in assessing or levying any tax under the act " shall vitiate or in any way affect any such assessment, unless it shall appear that by reason of such error or omission substantial injury has been done to the party or parties claiming to be aggrieved," it is held that where a pretended assessment has been made without authority of any law the aggrieved taxpayer need not allege or prove injury, for injury is presumed.^ By the cura- tive statutes of Ohio, technical irregularities or defects in, and purely formal objections to, special assessments for improve- ments are to be disregarded.^ And under the Pennsylvania statute many irregularities have been held to be cured.' In many of the states there are statutes which provide that a mistake in the name of the owner of the land shall not in- validate a tax.* Other illustrations of prospective curative The comptroller's failure to "make up " and file a " certified statement " as to delinquents is a mere irregu- larity: Duluth V. Miles, 73 Minn. 509. 1 Pickton V. Fargo (N. D.), 88 N. W. Bep. 90. 2 Newell V. Cincinnati, 45 Ohio St. 407. 3 A failure of the assessor to sign his roll: Townsen v. Wilson, 9 Pa. St. 270. A sale of seated land with un- seated; the sale being good as to the proportion of the tax for which the unseated was chargeable, and the title passing after redemption ex- pired: Mitchell V. Bratton, 5 W. & S. 451; Campbell v. Wilson, 1 Watts 503; Harper v. McKeehan, 8 W. & S. 388; McCord V. Bergautz, 7 Watts 487; Dietrick v. Mason, 57 Pa. St. 40. Pay- ing over surplus moneys instead of giving a surplus bond: Rogers v. Johnson, 67 Pa. St. 43, citing and re- lying upon Ash V. Ashton, 3 W. & 8. 510, and Iddings v. Cairns, 3 Grant's Cases, 88. The statute does not cure the want of a deed: Hoffman v. Bell, 61 Pa. St. 444 As to curing irregu- larities in general, see Laird v. Heis- ter, 34 Pa. St. 453; Cuttle v. Brook- way, 34 Pa. St. 145; Heft v. Gephart, 65 Pa. St. 510, 518; Witherspoon v. Duncan, 4 Wall. 310, 317. ' Such a law has been sustained in New Jersey: State v. Vanderbilt, 33 N. J. L. 38. A Massachusetts statute provided that "if in the assessors' list, or their warrant and list, com- mitted to the collector, there shall be any error in the name of any per- son taxed, the tax assessed to him may, notwithstanding such error, be collected of the person intended to be taxed; provided he is taxable, and! can be identified by the assessors." This applied to the case of one taxed by his surname only: Tyler v. Hard- wick, 6 Met. 470. And to the case of land assessed to J. S. & Son, when J. S. owned it; Westhampton v. Searle, 127 Mass. 503. See Sargent v. Bean, 7 Gray 135, where this statute was further considered. And for cases under a. law for a like purpose in Ohio, see Welker v. Potter, 18 Ohio St. 85: Upington v. Oviatt, 34 Ohio St. 238. For other cases on this sub- ject see Weinreich v. Hensley, 131 Cal. 647; Haines Manuf. Co. v. Har- grave, 139 Cal. 90; Shoup v. Railroad Co., 34 Kan. 547; Farnsworth Co. v. Rand, 65 Me. 19; Hill v. Graham, 73 Mich. 659; Bradley v. Bouchard, 85 Mich. 18; Menominee v. Martin Lum- ber Co., 119 Mich, 201; State v. Burr, 143 Mo. 209; Grant v. Bartholemew, 626 CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCBBDINQS. [oh. X. provisions are cited in- the margin, and the number might be enlarged.^ 6. He-assessments? Themethodof curing defects by re-assess- ment' of the tax is less open to abuse than any' that has 58 Neb. 839; Carman v. Harris (Neb.), 85 N. W. Rep. 848; In re Munn, 165 N. Y. 149. 1 See Davis v. McGee, 38 Fed. Eep. 867; Bertbold V. Hoskins, 38 Fed. Rep. 773; San Francisco v. Pennie^gS Cal. 645; Wilter v. Baohman, 117 Cal. 318; Weinreioh v. Hensley, 121 Cal. 647; Lahmau v. Hatch, 134 CaL 1; Klurapkev. Baker (CaL), 63Pao. Eep. 137; Duggan v. JilcCullough (Colo.), 59 Pac. Rep. 743; Tampsi v. Mugge, 40 Fla. 826; Hunter Stone Co. v. Wood- ard, 153 Ind. 474; Cooper v. Nevin, 90 Ky. 85; Millaudon v. Gallagher, 104 La. 713; Osburn v. Hide, 68 Miss. 45; Nelson v. Abernathy, 74 Miss. 164; "Woodruff V. State, 77 Miss. 68; State V. Bank of Neosho, 130 Mo. 161; Sfate V. Lounsberry, 125 Mo. 157; St. Louis 6 S. F. R. Co. V. Gracy, 136 Mo. 473; State V. Burr, 148 Mo. 209; State v. Wise, 12 Neb. 313; Twin ting v. Fin- lay, 55 Neb. 153; Johnson County v. Tierney, 56 Neb. 514; Carman v. Har- ris (Neb.), 8.5 N. W. Rep. 848; State v. Plainfleld, 46 N. J. L. 119; State v. Kearny T'p, 48 N. J. L. 135; State v. Lantz, 53 N. J. L. 578; Astor v. New- York, 62 N. Y. 580; Eno v. New York, 68 N. Y. 214; In re Munn, 165 N. Y. 149; Nehasane Park Assoc, v. Lloyd, 167 N. Y. 481; Patterson v. Galliher, 122 N. C. 511; Gear v. Brown, 126 N. C. 238; Wells County v. McHenry, 7 N. D. 346; Bolton v. Cleveland, 35 Ohio St. 819; Morrow v. Smith (Okl.), 61 Paa Eep. 366; Dayton V. Multnomah County, 34 Or. 339; Avant V. Flynn, 3 S. D. 153; Hender- son V. Hughes County, 18 S. D. 576; Virginia Coal Co. v. Thomas, 97 Va. 537; Franklin Savings Bank v.Moran, 19 Wash. 200; Winning v. Eakin, 44 W. Va. 19; State v. Sponaugle, 45 W. Va. 415; McGhee v. Sampselle, 47 W. Va. 352; Euggles v. Fond du Lao County, 63 Wis. 205; Hixon v. Oneida County, 82 Wis. 515; Hixon v. Eagle Elver, 91 Wis. 649; Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489. ^That assessors have made a de- fective assessment does not preclude their making a valid one: State V. Mining Co., 15 Nev. 385. Where the power to make a reassessment is not impugned, objections to the prior assessment are irrelevant: State V. South Orange, 49 N. J. L. 104. An assessment that has been held void serves no purpose in the re- assessment except to bring the im- provement within the provisions of the charter providing for such re- assessment : Cline v. Seattle, 13 Wash. 338; Bryan v. Summer, 17 Wash. 238. Assessments for street improvements . will not be disturbed because of prior assessments therefor which have been declared void by the district court: Parker v. Atchison, 48 Kan. 574. An injunction against the collection of a tax is inoperative as against a re- assessment: Emporia v. Bates, 16 Kan. 495. The re-assessment is not, however, to be considered a new tax: Fairfield v. People, 94 111. 244 ; Har wood V. North Brookfield, 130 Mass. 561. See Fox V. New Orleans, 4 WalL 173; Mattingly v. District of Columbia, 97 U. S. 687. In New Jersey re-assess- ments cannot be made against lands purchased by the chancellor under foreclosure of mortgages represent- ing funds in court: State v. Chancel- lor, 51 N. J. L. 414 3 As to re-assessment laws in gen- eral, see Tweed v. Metcalf, 4 Mich. 579, 590; State v. Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236; In re Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 361. CH. X.] CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. 52Y hitherto been mentioned. "Whether this be done by general, law, which shall provide for all cases in which tax proceedings prove invalid, and authorize the same tax to be imposed on the persons or property that ought to be charged therewith, by proceedings begun de novo., or, on the other hand, shall assume the form of a special law providing for the like re-assessment in any particular case, it is scarcely possible that it should cause serious injustice beyond what is incident to all tax legisla- tion. In the new proceedings the party concerned will have the opportunity to watch the various steps, and to be heard in review of them, that he has in any case, and he will be pre- cluded by nothing that has taken place in the proceedings which have proved abortive. The re-assessment will be for the purpose merely of enforcing against, him a duty which" he was likely to evade, by reason of the non-feasances or misfeasances of the officers who ought to have enforced it; and as the new proceeding will give him the same opportunity of being heard that is given in other cases, and will be conducted on princi- ples that operate generally, he has no reasonable ground of complaint. The only cases in which hardship is likely to be inflicted by such legislation are those in which a tax is re- assessed upon an estate which has changed hands since the tax should have been collected from it; ' but a proper examination of the records will, in most cases, lead the purchaser to a dis- The acceptance by a board of super- alteration, which would create no visors of a committee's report recom- lien : Lyon v. Alley, 130 U. S. 177. mending that authority be granted i That such a change of title does the township supervisor to re-assess not prevent a re-assessment, see Tall- taxes reported as properly returned, man v. Janesville, 17 Wis. 51; Cross sufficiently authorizes such re-assess- v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 509. Under a ment: Bump v. Jepson, 106 Mich, statute providing that re-assessed 641. What held to be a re-assessment: taxes on real estate shall constitute Hunt V. Perry, 165 Mass. 387. A a lien on the land unless the estate town vote for an assessment " on the has been alienated between the first original appraisal of the school prop- and second assessments, there is an erty " has been held a suflScient ap- alienation where, after an erroneous praisal in Massachusetts: Sutton assessment to the holders of the Manuf. Co. v. Sutton, 108 Mass. 106; legal title to the land, the mortgagee Halleck v. Boylston, 117 Mass. 469. causes the land to be sold and bids it An unauthorized interlineation in a in: Davis v. Boston, 139 Mass. 377. completed assessment roll was held It is held in New York that where an not to be a re-assessment or an officer with competent authority dis- amendment of the original assess- charges an assessment of record, and ment, but simply an unwarranted one buys and pays for the land in 528 CtTEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOOEEDINGS. [CH. X. CO very of the liability, and enable him to provide against' it. Where the tax itself was originally void by reason of having been levied for an illegal purpose, it is obviously impossible to breathe vitality into it by new proceedings.' If it was void be- cause of want of legislation justifying it, it may be re-assessed after proper legislation has been had.^ If it was void because of a disregard of apportionment, or for any reason affecting a part of the list only, it may be re-assessed with the proper cor- rections, where 'corrections Sre practicable.' And here it may \ reliance thereupon, the lien cannot afterwards he revived to his preju- dice on the ground that the dis- charge was by mistake: Curnen v. New York, 79 N. Y. 511. In New Jersey, where an assessment for a municipal improvement is held in- valid, the re-asSessment may be made to relate back to the date of the orig- inal assessment, notwithstanding mesne purchasers or encumbrances: In re Eepprt of Commissioners of Adjustment, 49 N. J. L. 488; New Jersey Sinking Fund Com'rs v. Lin- den, 40 N. J. Eq. 27. All persons are bound to take notice of a statute providing for the relevy of taxes or assessments for public improvements where the first levy is informal for want of suflScient authority, or other cause, and to know that under it all taxes or assessments, coming under its provisions, and not void because of some incurable irregularity, may be made valid by a relevy of the same: Manley v. Emlen, 46 Kan. 655. iDean v. Charlton, 23 Wis. 590; Dean v. Borschenius, 30 Wis. 236; Dill V. Roberts, 30 Wis. 178; Plumer V. Supervisors, 46 Wis. 163. 2 Mills V. Charleton, 29 Wis. 400. See In re Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 261. The re-assessment may be made to cover the defect of the original levy's having been made under an uncon- stitutional statute: Chester v. Pen- nell, 169 Pa. St 300; Chattanooga v. Railroad Co., 7 Lea 561 ; Boyd v. Hunt, 13 Lea 252: Trustees v. Guenther, 19 Fed. Rep. 395. Before re-assessment under the curative act no prior ad- judication to establish the invalidity of an assessment levied under an un- constitutional statute is necessary: State V. Ballard, 16 Wash. 418. Under a statute empowering commissioners to determine, in all cases where any assessment for public improvements remains unpaid, how much of such arrearages ought to be paid, any sum which has been assessed for a public improvement may become in whole or in part an " arrearage," within the meaning of the act, without refer- ence to the validity of the assessment or invalidity of the law under which it was imposed: State v. Newark, 58 N. J. L. 188. s See Dean v. Charlton, 27 Wis. 533; Cook V. Ipswich Local Board, L. R 6 Q. B. 451; Brevoort v. Detroit, 34 Mich. 322. As to re-assessments to cure irregularities, see Emporia v. Morton, 13 Kan. 569; By ram v. De- troit, 50 Mich. 56; People v. Wemple, 53 Hun 197; Kaehler v. Dobberpuhl," 56 Wis. 480. A statute which, in case of an invalid or irregular tax, pro- vides' that it may be assessed by the ' assessors for the time being, " to the just amount to which, and upon the estate or person to whom, such tax at first ought to have been as- sessed," may be used to correct an error which extends to the entire list: Goodrich v. Lunenburg, 9 Gray 38. It authorizes a re-assessment where property held 'in trust by a CH. X.] CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. 529 be observed that a judicial decision against the first proceedings, if based upon errors and defects merely, and not upon the vicious nature of the tax itself, is not a bar to a re-assessment.* Such a decision merely points out the error, and the re-assess- ment may be of all others the most proper and effectual way of correcting it. non-resident trustee has been assessed to the resident eestuis que trustent jointly Instead of severally, their in- terests being several: Hunt v. Perry, 165 Mass. 387. It also justifies a re- assessment, to the wife, of a tax wrongfully put to the husband and abated the previous year: Hubbard V. Garfield, 103 Mass. 73; and see Overing v. Foote, 43 N. Y. 290. Where, in setting off part of a town, it was provided that the estates and in- habitants should pay to the same persons taxes to be collected in the same manner as though there had been no change, a re-assessment could be made of land assessed be- fore the change to the wrong person: Market Bank v. Belmont, 137 Mass. 407. Where a tax levy made by a city council is void for failure to specify the purpose for which the tax was levied, the council may subse- quently make a proper levy: Somer- set V. Somerset Banking Co. (Ky.), 60 S. W. Pep. 5, citing Levi v. Louis- ville, 97 Ky. 394 In Wisconsin, where a tax is set aside for a defect going to the groundwork of the tax, a re- assessment is ordered under judicial supervision: Bradley v. Lincoln County, 60 Wis. 71: Woodruff v. De- pere, 60 Wis. 128; Bass v. Fond du Lac County, 60 Wis. 516. In the ab- sence of statutory authority, after taxes have been assessed to a stranger to the title to land, and, under such assessment, a sale has been made, a city is without power to refund, to , refuse to re-assess to the true owner, and to sell again: Dowell v. Port- land,' 13 Or. 348. Where several 34 parcels of land owned by a non-resi- dent, hut occupied by tenants, were assessed as non-resident lands, and not in the names of the tenants, the assessment was void, and the comp- troller had no authority to relevy the taxes so assessed: People v. Wemple, 53 Hun 197. Where a statute pro- vides that assessors, when they dis- cover that they have by mistake omitted any polls or estate liable to be assessed, may by a supplement assess such poUs-or estate, the "omis- sion " mentioned in the statute does not mean that an erroneous judg- ment of the value of the estate can so be corrected: Dresden v. Bridge, 90 Me. 489. , 1 Richmahv. Muscatine Supervisors, 77 Iowa 513; Auditor-General v. Gur- ney, 109 Mich. 473 ; Reynol ds v. Dul uth, 59 Minn. 532; Howard Savings Inst. v. Newark, 53N. J. L. 1 ; Fountain v. New- ark, 57 N. J. Eq. 76 ; Dean v. Charlton, 33 Wis. 590. Compare Butler v. Saginaw Supervisors* 26 Mich. 33. In Wis- consin, where a judgment is rendered setting aside taxes, a stay of proceed- ings is ordered until re-assessment can be had: Plumer v. Supervisors, 46 Wis. 163; Single v. Stettin, 49 Wis. 645^ Kingsley v. Supervisors, 49 Wis. 649; Monroe v. Fort Howard, 50 Wis. 338; Morrow v. Green Bay, 55 Wis. 113; Johnston v. Oshkosh, 65 Wis. 473. The statute for reassess- ment applies to suits begun before its passage: Flanders v. Merrimack, 48 Wis. 567. As to re-assessment after judgment for taxes has been refused, see Hyde Park v. Waite, 3 111. App. 443. 530 CUBING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. [oh. X. It is no objection to a re-assessment that the officer making it has come into office since the original assessment was made,* or that on the first assessment some persons paid under a stipu- lation that the payments should be allowed on re-assessment.^ Ee-assessments may be authorized to re^oh property before omitted or undervalued,' or where taxes provided by law have failed to be assessed at the proper time,* or where there has been a failure to require jjhe payment of a tax;' and where unpaid taxes constitute a lien on the land the statute of limit- ations does not bar the right to re-assess them." Special assessments for local improvements maybe re-assessed as well as general taxes," but statutory authority is required.^ 1 Trustees v. Guenther, 19 Fed. Rep. 395. 2 Fairfield v. People, 94 111. 244; Petty V. Myers, 49 Ind. 1. 3 Harwood v. North Brookfleld, 130 Mass. 561; People v. Brooklyn Assess- ors, 93 N. "t. 430; Wheeling v. Haw- ley, 18 W. Va. 473. See ante, p. 511. But only under express legislative authority: Perry County v. 'Railroad Co., 58 Ala. 546. Exemption ob- tained without right — error cor- rected by assessing omitted amount on supplemental roll: Parker v. New Orleans Gas Light Co., 44 La. An. 753. * Under a statute providing that if any taxes provided by law for school purposes shall' fail to be assessed at the proper time, the same shall be assessed in the succeeding year, such assessment may be made in the suc- ceeding year whei'e it failed in the proper year on account of the school board's failure to certify it to the township clerk in time for the super- visor to spread it on his roll: Wilcox V. Eagle T'p, 81 Mich. 271. 6 Delaware Div. Canal Co. v. Com- monwealth, 50 Pa. St. 399, which holds that a failure to require the payment of a tax, or the decision of the auditor-general that it is not payable, or the receipt of taxes for subsequent years, works no estoppel against the state. "Cook Co. V, Auditor-General, 79 Mich. 100. 'Brevoort v. Detroit, 34 Mich. 333; May V. Holdridge, 33 Wis. 93. The Kansas curative act providing for re-assessment and relevy of taxes that are for any cause illegal is gen- eral in intent and operation, and an assessment for local improvements, ' duly levied in pursuance thereof, is valid: Newman v. Emporia, 41 Kan. 583. Statutes authorizing re-assess- ments for local improvements held constitutional: West Chicago Park Com'rs V. Sweet, 167 111.326; Manley v. Emlen, 46 Kan. 655; Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469; State v. District Court, 77 Minn. 348; State v. New- ark, 53 N. J. L. 141; New Jersey Sinking Fund Com'rs v. Linden, 40 N. J. Eq. 27; Fountain v. Newark, 57 N. J. Eq. 76; Frederick v. Seattle, 13 Wash. 498; McNamee v. Tacoma (Wash.), 64 Pac. Rep. 791; Sander- son V. Herman, 108 Wis. 663. Where assessments for benefits for a local improvement had been held void because the statute made no pro- vision for notice or hearing, a sub- 8 Tingue v. Port Chester, 101 N. Y. 394; Franklin Savings Bank v. Mo- ran, 19 Wash. 300. CH. X.] CUBING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. 531 In some jurisdictions it is held that where the amount of a special assessment has been received either through payment or through the sale of the assessed property, the right to re- assess such property for the improvement is extinguished even though the assessment is invalid ; ' but in other states payments may be treated as advances and refunded or credited to the owners under the new assessment.^ The conditions upon which re-assessment is allowed vary considerably according to the local laws,' and so does the time within which new assessments sequent law directing another as- sessment, and providing for notice on the question of apportionment as between those who had not paid un- der the void assessment, was held valid: Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U. S. 345. When an assessment for a local improvement is in any respect defective, the legislature has power to assess the tax by its own direct action upon the property benefited, upon notice to the owners, and a reasonable opportunity for hearing; and whatever the legislature can do in this respect can be delegated to {he local authorities: Jones v. Tona- wanda, 158 N. Y. 438. 1 State V. Elizabeth, 51 N. J. L. 485; Diefenthaler v. New York, 111 N. Y. 331; Budge v. Grand Forks, 1 N, D. 309; Danenhower v. District of Co- lumbia, 7 Mackey 99. 2 Wood V. Strother, 76 Cal. 545; Freeport St. R. Co. v. Freeport, 151 III. 451: Philadelphia & R. Coal, etc. Co., 158 111. 9; Tacoma Land Co. v. Tacoma, 14 Wash. 700. See Spencer V. Mercliant, 125 U. S. 845. That some of the property owners under a defective ordinance paid less than the amount required by a proper as- sessment under an ordinance curing the former one was held no defense against such assessment: Bacon v. Savannah, 105 Ga. 63. ' Gray v. Lucas, 115 CaL 430; Gray V. Richardson (Cal.), 55 Pac. Rep. 603; Frenna v. Sunnyside Land Co., 124 Cal.437;Hornungv.McCarthy,126Cal. 17; Westall v. Altsohul, 136 Cal. 164; Eds V. Cuneo, 136 Cal. 167; Pardridge V. Hyde Park, 181 111. 537; Carlisle v. Clinton. 140 111. 512; East St. Louis v. Albrecht,150 111. 506; Freeport St. R. Co. V. Freeport, 151 111? 451; Davis v. Litchfield, 155 111. 384; West Chicago Park Com'rs v. Farber, 171 111. 146; People V. Pontiao, 185 111. 487; Manley V. Emlen, 46 Kan. 655; Baltimore v. Ulman, 79 Md. 469; Townsend v. Manistee, 88 Mich. 468; Smith v. Detroit, 130 Mich. 573; State v. Egan, 64 Minn. 331 ; State v. District Court, 77 Minn. 248; State v. Passaic, 51 N. J. L. 109; People v. Buffalo, 147 ISf. Y. 675; Chester v. Pennell, 169 Pa. St. 800; Flewellin v. Proetzel, 80 Tex. 191; Frederick v. Seattle, 13 Wash. 428; Cline v. Seattle, 13 Wash. 444; Sanderson v. Herman, 108 Wis. 662. Under a city charter pro- viding that whenever a special as- sessment shall, in ithe council's opin- ion, be invalid by reason of any irregularity in the proceedings, the council shall have' power to order a new assessment, the vote of a, ma- jority of the council is sufficient to rescind a resolution passed by a two- thirds vote ordering a special as- sessment: Townsend v. Manistee, 88 Mich. 408. Where the court has ordered a special street assessment to be recast as authorized by the statute, it will be presumed, in the absence of a showing to the con- trary, that the court acted upon suffi- cient cause, and within the power 532 CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PK0CEEDING8. [CH. X. may be issued.^ The same is true of the procedure upon re- assessment.'' Where a tax upon a parcel of land is re-assessed upon a part conferred: Schemick v. Chicago, 151 111. 336. A void assessment cannot be validated by a revision thereof made on the application of a dissatis- fied property owner, and he wil^not be estopped from contesting its va- lidity thereafter: Windsor V. District of Columbia, 7 Maokey 96. See Bates V. District of Columbia, 7 Mackey 76; Re-assessment is not rendered neces- sary by amending an ordinance so as to provide that the payments shall be coUectedin instalments: Trimble V. Chicago, 168 111. 56T. 1 In California it was held, prior to 1889, that when a contractor failed in his suit to foreclose the lien by reason of certain defects in the as- sessment he was entitled to another assessment freed from those defects, and that there was no statutory lim- itation of time for the issue of such re-assessment: Himmelmann v. Coff- ran. 36 Cal. 411; Dyer v. Scalmanini, 69 Cal. 637; Wood v. Strother, 76 Cal. 545. But by the amendment of 1889, the legislature fixed the con- ditions upon which a second as- sessment might be issued, and the time within which an application therefor should be made: Ede v. Cuneo, 126 Cal. 167. Under the Illi- nois city and village act providing that a new assessment for improve- ments may be made when the former one is set aside, the right to make a new assessment accrues only when the former assessment is set aside, and from that time the statute of lim- itations runs: Murray v. Chicago, 175 111. 340. An order of court vacating an assessment roll and ordering anew roll to be prepared, if made while the assessment proceedings are still pend- ing, is not barred by the statute of limitations, although more than twelve years have elapsed since the original assessment was made: Par- dridge v. Hyde Park, 131 111. 537. In New Jersey it is held that the power to appoint new assessors to make a re-assessment in place of one set aside continues until a legal assess- ment is made: State v. Essex Public Roa!d Board, 46 N. J. L. 126. 2 Where, under a city charter, the court on an appeal from a local as- sessment orders a re-assessment, the order should .specify the defects in the assessment, so as to be a guide to the board of public works: State V. Ensign, 55 Minn. 278. The court being expressly authorized by stat- ute to order the assessment recast as to all or part of the land, may order it recast as to lots as to which no ob- jections have been filed, and as to which default has been entered, such an order having the effect of setting aside the default: Browning v. Chi- cago, 155 111. 814. Where a special assessment to pay for a public im- provement is invalid by reason of failure to give the notice required by statute, a new a^essment should be made as provided by the law at the time the contract was made, though in the meantime the city's charter has been amended so as to provide for assessments according to front- age instead of valuation, and for payment by the city for street in- tersections: Soule V, Seattle, 6 Wash. 315. Where the statute authorizes the assessors, when a new assessment has been ordered, to "proceed as pro- vided in the original assessment," they may determine what lands are benefited, ^.nd are not limited to those lands which the original as- sessors deemed to be benefited: State V. Essex Public Road Board, 51 N. J. OH. X.j CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PROCEEDINGS. 533 of it, the re-assessment is void.^ It is not competent on a re- assessment to add penalties which were in the original tax, and which, with that tax, were swept away by statute.^ A re-assess- ment should be on the valuation of the year when the original tax was- laid.' Judicial corrections. Still another method of curing de- fects which may here be noticed is that which is sometimes provided by statutes allowing the parties Vjoncerned to have a judicial review of the proceedings on a proper application.'' We do not refer now to those cases in which proceedings are, under general laws, referred to a courf at some stage for con- firmation, but to those in which the proceedings are attacked L. 166. The report of a re-assess- ment made after partial vacation by the court of assessment for a street improvement will not be vacated merely because on its face it seems to give awards to aill owners of land taken or damaged, and to levy as- sessments on all lands benefited. The court, looking at all the proceed- ings, will hold the legal effect to be to make new awards and assess- ments in lieu only of those pre- viously annulled: State v. South Orange, 49 N. J. L. 104. A curative act providing for the completion of unauthorized public improvements, and the assessment of the cost, con- templates that assessments be made on the basis of a, quantum meruit, and the contracts under which the work was done are competent evidence of the Qost, and may be considered in making the assessment: Binga- man v. Pittsburgh, 147 Pa. St. 353; Appeal of Travers, 152 Pa. St. 139. 1 Seheiber v. Kaehler, 49 Wis. 391. 2 State v. Jersey City, 37 N, J. L. 39. The legislature, in notifying and relevying a void tax, was held to have the power to levy interest on the same from the date of the void assessment: Collins v. Long Island, 133 N. Y. 331. 3 Davis V. Boston, 139 Mass. 377. * For cases of this nature, see State V. Jersey City, 35 N. J. L. 381; Miller V.Graham, 17 Ohio St. 1. The statute under which each of these cases was decided was quite peculiar. That of New Jersey fprbade any collateral questionirig of the proceedings in the case of certain assessments for local objects, but permitted them to be re- viewed at any time on certiorari, or other proper proceeding, in the su- preme or circuit court. There is no constitutional objection to a law which provides for the appointment by the circuit judge of commission- ers to review the valuations made by the county board: State v. Myers, 52 Wis. 638. Where an appeal from the assessment of a corporation by the proper state officer was author- ized to be taken to a court, it was held that the conclusion by the court upon the appeal was in no proper sense a judgment, but only an assess- ment, and therefore error would not lie upon it: Auditor-General v. Pull- man, etc. Co., 34 Mich. 59. Under a statutory authority to a court to amend the proceedings on a special assessment so as to do justice to all, the court will not, on application of a contractor who has failed to ob- tain full payment, make amend- ments which compel any taxpayers to do more than justice requires: Loeser v. Redd, 14 Bush 18. . 534 CDEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. [CH. X. after their conclusion, when they are subjected to a judicial examination with a view to the correction of any errors, if correction shall be found practicable.' Corrections hj amendment. Of the errors that creep into the records of tax proceedings very many are merely clerical, or occur in consequence of a failure to put in proper form the evidence of transactions in themselves correct. Tax proceed- ings must stand by the record; and a failure to make the proper record may be as fatal as a failure to take the proceed- ing of which the record should have been made.^ If, however, the defeet in a record is obviously clerical and nothing more ;. that is to say,^if the record pn its face suflBciently shows that the proper steps have in fact been taken, but there is some error on the part of the recording officer in putting the evidence upon the record in precise conformity to the law ; some omission of a word, or the accidental employment of one word for another, or any similar error which cannot mis- lead,-:- the mistake may be overlooked, and the court, when the record becomes the subject of judicial investigation, may by intendment supply what is omitted, and correct vyhat is errone- ous, and then sustain the record as though the proper correc- tions had been made by the recording officer himself.' But 1 In New York special assessments the ground that they were only cor- were formerly referred to a court for rections of clerical mistakes, and. confirmation, and all parties given could prejudice no person's rights; an opportunity for a hearing. Now, that they brought no new matter in on the other hand, a party objecting the case, and gave no additional effi- to an assessment brings the matter cacy to the proceedings, but simply to the attention of the court on pe- put them in stricter conformity to tition to vacate. the provisions of the statute. And '^ Proof that the facts stated in a it must be remembered that these defective certificate of the city engi- amendments were of the judgment near, required to be recorded as a and precept under the Illinois statute condition to an assessment's becom- of 1839, and the anterior proceeding ' ing a lien, are true, held not to cure on the files of the court furnished the the defect: Frenna v. Sunnyside facts whereon the amendments were Land Co., 134 Cal. 437. based." Blackwell on Tax Titles, 3 Mr. Blackwell, speaking of At- 399. A clerical error in the omission kins V. Hinman, 7 111. 487, 451, says: of the dollar mark, in the certificate "Where, in a collateral action, amend- of levy upon which a special sohool- ments of the tax record were per- tax was extended, in front of the mitted in the circuit court, the amount to be levied, may be cor- Bupreme court sustained them upon rected by amendment in an action to CH. X.] CUEING DEFEC'r8 IN TAX PEOCEKDINGS. 535 corrections cannot be made by intendment unless the necessary facts appear, either in the record as actually made, or in the official documents on file from which the record should have been drawn up; the courts cannot imply the existence of facts which are not recited anywhere in the official proceedings. Where the proceedings are conducted under the supervision of acourt of record, or must go before such a court for confirma- tion, the facts which do not appear of record may be supplied by leave of the court, on a proper showing by affidavit.^ The authority of the court to permit such amendments, in order to make the record correspond to the facts, is probably not dif- ferent from what it is to permit amendments in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. enforce the tax: Keokuk & H. B. R. Co. V. People, 161 III 133. Where the commissioners properly certify to the county court their assessment of benefits, a clerical error in the cap- tion designating the roll as " assess- ment of a special tax," may be cor- rected so as to show it to be an assess- ment for special benefits: Springfield V. Sale, 127 IlL 359. Where an in- spection of an appraisal would show the date thereon to be erroneous, the eiTor is not fatal : Wilmot v. Lathrop, 67 Vt. 671. 1 Young V. Thompson, 14 111. 380, 381. A clerical error in dating the county treasurer's report of a tax- sale is cured by the order confirming the sale: Detroit F. & M. Ins. Co. v.' Wood, 118 Mich. 31. Where the cer- tificate of publication of the collect- or's notice of his intended application for judgment for taxes is deficient, it may, even after judgment, be amended by order of the court, upon notice being given to the opposite party: Dunham v. Chicago, 55 111. 357, citing Coughran v. Gutcheus, 18 111. 390. Pending the application for judg- ment the certificate of publication of a delinquent tax-list may be amended by filing a new certificate, and by adding the name of the county to the file-mark of the clerk of the county court: McOhesney v. People. 178 111. 542. In Illinois' the court has by stat- ute power, where a tract of land owned by one person is arbitrarily divided and each parcel separately assessed, to orier that the sum of the two assessments stand as an assess- ment against the tract: Brooks v. Chicago, 168 111. 60. Under the Illinois statute giving the court power to amend special assessments, an amend- ment stating that it was not intended to include as part of the property as- sessed the soil of the street to improve which the assessment was made is proper: Leman v. Lake View, 131 IlL 388( And an amendment of the as- sessment so as to relieve rear lots improperly assessed maybe allowed: Springfield v. Greene, 120111. 269. An aflSdavit of the mailing of notices of. application for confirmation of a spe- cial assessment may at any time after judgment be amended so as to show the truth of what was done in the way of service, where the bona fide rights of third persons have not in- tervened: Hinkle v. Mattoon, 170 111. 316. A void certificate of a special school-tax cannot be amended by order of court on application for judg- ment for delinquent taxes, by virtue of the Illinois statute allowing on such applications amendtnentsto cure 536 CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEBDINGS. [CH. If the facts to be supplied are such as affect individual cases on the roll, and may prejudice the parties, it would seem to be a matter of right that the persons to be affected should have notice of an application to amend, and an opportunity to meet the showing. This should certainly be so if the applica- tion is made at a stage of the proceedings when the party, if the correction is made, will have no opportunity subsequently to raise any questions regarding the propriety or justice of the amendment. As an illustr^ion, the case may be instanced of a judgment which is erroneous by reason of some defect which it is desired to supply by an amendment; in such case clearly the party against whom the judgment is to be validated should be allowed the privilege to contest tlje truth of that which it is proposed to put upon the record, and by which it is expected to bind him. And the application ought to be a distinct proceeding for the purpose, and not be made in a suit brought to recover lands which have been sold under the judg- ment.^ On such an application counter affidavits would be omissions or defects in the tax pro- ceedings: People V. Sinith, 149 111. 549. This oa,se is distinguished in Spring Valley Coal Co. v. People, 157 111. 543, and followed in Chicago & A. R Co. V. People, 171 III 544, and in People V. Chicago & N. W. K. Co., 183 111. 311. On stich an application a town col- lector's failure to note in writing the cause of the failure to collect a tax on personalty, and to make and enter upon the collector's book a certain affidavit, may be corrected by amend- ing the record: Shelbyville Water Co. V. People, 140 111. 545. As to amending records by leave of court, see, also, Allen v. Archer, 49 Me. 346; Bath V. Whitmore, 79 Me. 182; State V. Phillips, 102 Mo. 664; Smith v. Messer, 17 N. H. 420; Bean v. Thomp- son, 19 N. H. 290; Taft v. Barrett, 58 N. H. 447; State v. Corson, 50' N. J. L. 381; Philadelphia v. Richards, 124 Pa. St. 303. iln an action of ejectment; to re- cover possession of land by virtue of a tax title, niotion was made to amend the precept. Treat, Ch. J., says: '"If such an amendment is al- lowable, it should only be made upon , a distinct application to the court for that purposa The application should have no connection with any other case. A contrary course would in- troduce much confusion and incon- venience into judicial proceedings. A court engaged in tlie trial of a case ought not to be delayed and embar- rassed by a motion to amend the rec- ord of another proceeding, which is but collaterally in question before it. Such an application might involve the necessity of bringing in other parties and different interests before the court: " Pitkin v. Yaw, 13 III 351, 253. In another case, the same judge, in speaking of a defective judgment on a delinquent taxJist, says: "It may be that the circuit court, upon a proper application, will allow the record to be so amended as to show when the judgment was rendered. But until the record is thus perfected no title can be asserted under the CH. X.J O0EING DEFECTS IN TAX PROCEEDINGS. 637 admissible, and the court ought to insist upon a clear showing of the facts, before giving its sanction to the introduction of any changes in a record not originally made under its super- vision. There is a manifest difPerence between such a case and the correction of errors in the record of proceedings which have been taken in the cpurt itself, and of- which the judges themselves may be presumed to have spme recollection. By statute in some states full authority has been conferred upon some statutory board or officer to make or permit to be made such corrections in tax proceedings as may be consistent with justice. Of such statutes it may be said, ji/rst, that the authority they confer cannot go beyond that which might be exercised by the legislature itself in curing defects in tax pro- ceedings; and second, that the authority exercised must be within the permission granted; nothing is to be taken by in- tendment.' proceedings:" Ifomig v. Thompson, 14 111. 380, 381. 1 A supervisor employed to make a new roll, where the one already made is defective, cannot under this au- thority take the old roll, make eras- ures and changes, and deliver it to the collector for the collection of the tax, and if he should do so, and at- tempt be made to collect, both oflB- cera will be liable in trespass: Ferton V. Feller, 33 Mich. 199. Under the California code permitting the as- sessor, with the consent of the dis- trict attorney, to supply or correct omissions, errors, or defects in the as- sessment book at any time before the sale for delinquent taxes, it is com- petent for the assessor, under the dis- trict attorney's written instructions, to supply the omission on the orig- inal roll of the " total tax " in the column provided for it, where the total tax appeared in the column headed " road tax: " San Luis Obispo County V. White, 91 Cal. 433. A su- pervisor's failure to incorporate in his roll any valuation of property does not avoid the tax where the board of review seasonably supplies the de- fect: Auditor-General v. Sparrow, 116 Mich. 574 The date of theioer- tificate of the board of review is immaterial under the statute au- thorizing ithe board of supervisors to remedy amendments and de- fects: Auditor-General v. Ayer, 123 Mich. 136. As to amendments per- mitted by statute in Iowa, see Jones V. Tiffin, 24 Iowa 190; Conway v. Younkin, 38 Iowa 395. The power conferred by the Iowa code upon the county auditor to " correct any cleri- cal or other error in the assessment or tax-book," includes authority to assess lands omitted by the, assessor through mistake: Eobb v. Robinson, 66 Iowa 500; Parker v. Van Steen.- burg, 68 Iowa 174 See, also, as to the county auditor's corrective power, Ridley v. Doughty, 85 Iowa 418; Smith v. McQuiston, 108 Iowa 363. In the latter case it is said that the auditor's authority " includes the power to determine when a mistake has been made." As to the statutory powers of boards of assessors and tax commissioners in New York to cor- rect or supply errors and defects, see People V. Wilson, 119 N. Y. 515; Peo- 538 CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PROCEEDINGS. [CH. X. There are undoubtedly cases in which ministerial oflBcers may correct errors without judicial permission ; ^ and' there are also some cases in which it would be apparent they could have no such power. Still other cases may be open to reason- able doubt. "Where the defect consists merely in the failure to copy into a book of records the official document which evidences some legal transaction, the proper recording officer may correct it at any time, by making the required record. This may be done by the officer who should have done it in the first place, or it may be done by his successor in office. But where the document which should go upon record is defective, a case of more difficulty is presented. Many cases involving the right to make amendments have been considered in the state of Ifew Hampshire, and it may be useful to notice them. In a very early case the validity of a town vote to raise money was in question, and the court, while the cause was on trial, permitted the record to be amended so as to show that the proper vote had been had. The amendment was made by the person who was town clerk at the time the meeting was held; an^ the case does not show that he was still in office. The authority to make the amendment was not much consid- ered ; the judge contenting himself with saying that, " On this point we think that great care must be taken that amendments be made only according to the fact; but we have no doubt that a record may be amended to conform to the truth." ^ pie V. Board of Assessors, 137 N., Y. v. Woolsey, 60 Neb. 516. Where, 201; People V. Coleman, 42 Hun 581'; in the copy of an assessment roll, People V. Jones, 43 Hun 131; People the dollar-mark was omitted be- V. Barker, 11 Miso. Rep. 363. It is fore the valuation figures, the in- held in Pennsylvania that the con- formality may be corrected by the elusion of the auditor-general that a assessor or treasurer: Haley v. El- corporation is not liable under its liott, 20 Colo. 379. The county clerk, charter to a tax on its capital stock before the delivery of the tax-books, cajinot be corrected by his successor may amend his record by showing and the tax account restated, for the when the levy of a road tax was reason that the statute gives him made: Ohio & M. R. Co. v. People, power to correct only clerical errors: 119 111. 207. Power of board of equal- Commonwealth V. Pennsylvania Co., ization, after mistake in published 145 Pa. St. 266. notice, to adjourn and correct its 1 Where, in transcribing assess- proceedings: Black v. McGonigle, 103 nients, clerical error in names is com- Mo. 192. mitted, it may be corrected without ^ Bishop v. Cone, 3 N. H. 513, 516, notice: Chamberlain Banking House per Richardson, Ch. J., who cites. OH. X.J CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOOEEDINGS. 539 In the next case in whioh a like question was raised the point was more fully considered. It was admitted that there were defects in the record of town proceedings which would be fatal to a tax title then under consideration in a case on trial, unless they could be cured. The defects are summed up by the court and the case disposed of as follows: "The return of the post- ing up of the warrant for the town meeting is insufficient. It does not state when it was posted up. Nor does it show that it was posted at a public place. It does not appear that Thirs- ton, who was chosen collector, took the oath of office prescribed by law. And there are defects in the return of the collector, to which exceptions have been taken. " The tenants move that these proceedings may be amended. It has been already settled that the records of towns maybe amended to conform to the truth of the fact.^ The amend- ment must be made by the person who was in office at the time.^ " It seems probable that, in the prior cases where amend- ments have been allowed, the officers who were permitted to make them were not in office at the time ; if they were, it must have been under subsequent election; and the right to have the amendment made cannot depend upon the question whether the officer has again been elected. The form in which such amendments are to be made has never yet been settled. It would be very dangerous to sanction alterations of the books themselves by erasures and interlineations. And we are of opinion that they should be made only upon evidence showing the truth of the facts, and then by drawing out in form the amendment which the facts authorize. The amendment, with the order under which it is made, may then be annexed to the books where the original is recorded, so that the whole matter will appear; and, in furnishing copies, the original and amend- ment should both be furnished. as authority, Welles v. Battelle, 11 i Citing Bishop v. Cone, 3 N.H. 513; Mass. 477, and Taylor v. Henry, 3 Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass. 477; Car- Pick. 397. The record as amended digan v. Page, 6 N. H. 183. See, also, is as conclusive of the facts recited Boston Turnpike Co. v. Pomfret, 30 as it would have been if made cor- Conn. 590; Chamberlain v. Dover, 13 reotat first: Halleok v. Boylston, 117 Me. 466; Allen v. Archer, 49 Me. 846; Mass. 469. See Kansas City, etc. R. Pierce v. Richardson, 37 N. H. 306. Co. V. Tontz, 39 Kan. 460. J Taylor v. Henry, 3 Pick. 397. 540 CUEINGf DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. [CH. X. " But it is objected, on the part of the demandant, that no amendment ought to be made to her prejudice. That, when she purchased, these defects in the vendor's title were apparent, and that she must be presumed to have purchased with knowl- edge that the title was defective. " The general rule is that amendments of records ar6 made with saving of the rights of third persons acquired since the existence of the defect.^ " To apply this rule, however, to all cases of defects in sales of lands for taxes, would, in effect, be very nearly denying a right to amend; as the oAvner of the land sold would attempt to defeat any amendment by conveying to some friend who would bring a suit in his behalf. It would, at least, be neces- sary to confine the application of the principle to cases where the land had been actually conveyed iona fids. " But instances might exist when the purchaser, although he might not have found upon the records all that was necessary to make a formal and valid record, might have been well as- sured, from what he did find, that all that was necessary had in fact been done. " For instance, in relation to the two first defects in the rec- ords in this case — in the return of the warning of the meeting, and in the record of the oath of the collector — although these records are not suflBcient in point of law, they lead the mind of any one to the belief that what was requisite was probably done. And in such cases, where the fact appears to be stated, but not in a formal manner, there is. no reason why he who purchases should not be subjected to the same liability to. have the amendment made, and the record put in form, that his grantor would have been, had he attempted to recover the land. " There are cases where, although all that is required may not appear of record, it may be left to the jury to presume that all that was required was done. As in Bishop v. Cone, — ^al- though the application of the principle in that case may, per- haps, have been questionable, on account of the transactions having been so recent, that, if the truth would have warranted it, an amendment might have been made. Whether that prin- ciple could be applied against a subsequent purchaser, it is not 1 Citing Chamberlain v. Crane, 4 N. H. 115; Bowman v. Stark, 6 N. H. 159. OH. X.] OUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOOEEDINGS. 541 necessary to determine. But where what is necessary is, al- though not formally stated, so far set down as to lead to a be- lief that a correct record might have been made, there seems to be no reason why a purchaser, who has access to the records, should not take it subject to a right to have the record put in form, if the truth will warrant it. " When, on the other, hand, nothing appears upon the record in relation to any particular fact necessary to make out a title, nor is anything set down from which it is naturally to be in- ferred that the fact existed, a subsequent iona fide purchaser ought not to have his title defeated by supplying a record in- stead of amending a record." ^ The subsequent cases in New Hampshire are in accord with these, and fully sustain them in their conclusions.^ It is said 1 Gibson v. Bailey, 9 N. H. 168, 178, per Parker, Ch. J, The judge there- upon proceeds to say that "upon these principles, if the facts will war- rant it," the various defects which he points out in detail may be amended. But he adds, "we must first have evidence to show that these amendments may be made with truth." 2 On the trial of Bean v. Thompson, 19 N. H. 290, involving the validity of a tax voted at a town meeting, it appearing that there was no return upon the warrant calling the meet- ing, the selectmen who were in oflSce when it was held were permitted, on motion, to make the proper return. Woods, J., says: "Leave is often granted to oflBcers, whose returns of their doings, or records of public transactions, are, by law, made evi- dence to correct errors or to supply omissions, to conform to the truth. The interest which the public have in the correctness and fullness of the record, and the responsibility of the ofiicer himself for the accuracy of his own doings, are primarily a good cause for granting such indulgences tending to the promotion of reason- able objects. And it has never been deemed an objection to the amend- ment of a return or record, that pro- ceedings were pending which might be affected by it, except that where rights or claims bona fide have in- tervened, amendments that would entirely defeat them have been in some instances denied." And he re- fers to Gibson v. Bailey, supra, as laying down the proper rule on the subject. In Scammon v. Scammon, 28 N. H. 419, 429, Bishop v. Cone, and Gibson v. Bailey, are again referred to with approval. In Cass v. Bellows, 31 N. H. 501, they also are approved, but the proper person to make the corrections then necessary was dead, and consequently they could not be made. See, further, Presoott v. Hawk- ins, 13 N. H. 19; Pierce v. Richardson, 37 N. H. 306, 309; Jaquith v. Putney, 48 N. H. 138; Davis v. Sawyer, 66 N. H. 34. It is held in Maine that in a suit to recover a tax paid by plaint- iff as illegally assessed because the assessors did not appear to have been sworn, parol evidence is admissible to show that the proper oath was administered, and the court can per- mit the record of the town clerk to be amended accordingly under the statute allowing errors in such rec- ords to be amended on oath, accord- ing to the fact, by the ofiicer who 54:2 CUEING DBFEOTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. [CH. X. that " it has never been held that such amendments could be allowed by any other tribunal than one of the superior courts." ' And yet unless some statute confers upon them the authority, it is not very clear whence they derive it, nor how a township officer, or one who has been such, can, in this collateral way, have authority conferred upon him to do anything Tyhich, with- out such authorization, would be an illegal act.* An early case in Massachusetts, often quoted in Ifew Hamp- shire, involved the validity of a correction by a town clerk, of his own motion, to cure a defect in an entry made by himself. The amendment was sustained; the court expressing the opin- ion that the clerk might have made -it at any time while he held the office, even though under a subsequent election.' But it is held in the same state that the successor of the clerk can have no authority to make corrections in records of transac- tions which were had before he came into office.* In Vermont it has been said that " the practice of amending and altering the records, when a controversy has arisen, to meet a particular case, or in consequence of a decision of the court, cannot be defended."" In a later case the right t» amend, under proper restrictions, was asserted. " While it is obvious," say the court, " some limits must be fixed to such amendments, we do not feel prepared to say, as matter of law, that they are never allowable. If the officer making the rec- ord were- out of office, or were a party to the suit, as in Hadley V. Chaniberlih, 11 Yt. 6l8, and in many other cases, it might be improper. . . . But we think in general it must be re- garded as the right of the clerk of a town, or other municipal corporation, while having the custody of the records, to make any, record according to the facts. And we do not perceive that his having been out of office, and restored again, could should have made them correctly: meeting at which the new clerk was Whiting V. Ellsworth, 85 Me. 301. chosen. 1 Pierce v. Richardson, 37 N. H. 306, 5 Williams, Ch. J., in Hadley v. 311 ; Roberts v. Holmes, 54 N. H. 560. Chamberlin, 11 Vt. 618. The amend- 2 Boody V. Watson, 64 N. H. 162. ment was made in open court on the 3 Welles V. Battelle, 11 Mass. 477, trial of a cause involving the suffi- 481. ciency of the record. One peculiar- * Taylor v. Henry, 2 Pick. 397. The ity of the case was that the officer defect consisted in the failure to re- making the amendment was a party cord the adjournment of the town to the suit, and made it for his own protection. CH. X.] CLEIKG DEFECTS IN TAX PECOEEDINGS. 543 deprive Mm of that right. But even the officer could not alter or amend a record upon the testimony of third persons, ordi- narily, and ought not to do it upon his own recollection, un- less in very obvious cases of omission or error, of which the present might fairly be regarded as one, probably. Such amendments should ordinarily be made by the original docu- ments or minutes."^ It is observable of this case that the amendment, which con- sisted in the signing of the record of warning of a school dis- ■ trict meeting, was made by the clerk on the trial of a cause, where the record was in question, and without the permission of the court. From the case it appears that " the court decided that they had no power over the clerk, and could give him no directions, but said that in the opinion' of the court the clerk had a right, if he chose to do so, to amend the record in that particular, if such amendment would be according to the truth; but that the clerk must judge for himself whether he would or should make such amendment; and the court added that if such amendment was made, the record, in the opinion of the court, would be admissible." This remark distinguishes the case broadly from those in. New Hampshire, and leaves the responsibility of all amendments with the officer himself. In ISTew York, in a case in which the affidavit of the assess- ors, attached to the assessment roll, was found to be defective, the opinion was expressed that it would be competent for the board of supervisors, when in session for the purposes of a re- - view of the rolls, " to send for the assessors of any one town to come before them, and supply omissions and make the neces- sary affidavits where the omission occurred through accident or mistake." ^ This opinion appears entirely reasonable ; and it would seem that the officer who, through any carelessness or error, has executed, or even delivered, a defective process or return, ought to be at liberty to correct it at any time after- wards, before any decisive action has been taken, under the process or document amended, and'while, therefore, there is no possibility that the error can have prejudiced any one. Of course the amendment could not be made by one who was no longer in office, as under such circumstances it woujd 1 Bedfleld, Ch. J,, in Mott v. Key- 2 parish v. Golden, 35 N. Y. 468, 465, nolds, 27 Vt. 306, 208, per Morgan, J. 5M CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOCEEDINGS. [CH. X. not be an official act.' Neither could it be made under circum- stances where it could operate unjustly upon the rights of par- ties. Thus it has been held in Yermont that if a tax sale is fatally defective by reason of the failure of the town clerk to certify in his record that' the advertisements were published as required by law, the clerk cannot make it good by amending his record after the time for redeeming from the sale has ex- pired. The reason is, that the owner, relying upon the record, may have omitted to redeem, inasmuch as his land has not been legally sold.^ But until the rights of third parties have intervened, or conclusive action has been taken in reliance upon the records or documents, as representing in their imperfect ^Shaw, Ch. J., in Hartwell v. Lit- tleton, 13 Pick. 239, 232. " The first question is whether the town clerk of a former year, who does not now hold that office, can be allowed to come in and amend the record of a , former year, made whilst he was in that office; and the court are of opin- ion that he cannot. It has been held an Welles v. Battelle, 11 Mass. 477, that where aolerk continues.in office several years, by repeated annual elections, he may amend the record of a former year, notwithstanding an election has intervened, and though he does not hold the office under the same appointment. But we think there is an obvious distinc- tion in principle between the two cases. In the latter the clerk not only knows the fact in relation to which the amendment is to be made, which is a circumstance common to both, but he still enjoys the confi- dence of the town, is by their vote intrusted with the custody of their records, and is held responsible for their purity and correctness under the sanction of his official oath, and all such other guards as the law has thought it necessary to prescribe in the case of a clerk actually in office. The intervening election is substan- tially a continuance of the clerk in the same office." And see School District v. Atherton, 13 Met. 105. For a case where a deputy county clerk was.permitted to amend the record by affixing his signature which he had omitted during his term of office as county clerk, see Sheldon v. Ma- rion T'p, 101 Mich. 256. In Missouri it has been held that a special tax- bill may be amended to correct the name of the owner of land, by the officer who issued it, though out of office: Stadler v. Roth, 59 Mo. 400; Kiley v. Cranor, 51 Mo. 541. And a defective return of a clerk's state- ment of a tax levy may be amended by the officer who made the return, even after the expiration of his term of office; and the same is true of his statement: Morrison v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R Co., 96 Mo. 602. But where the assessoi''s book has not been au- thenticated by his affidavit, the court, in a suit for delinquent taxes, has not power to authorize the ex- assessor to make and subscribe in the books such an affidavit as he should originally have made: State V. Phillips, 102 Mo. 664. 2 Jeudevine v. Jackson, 18 Vt. 470, approved and followed in Langdon v. Poor, 30 Vt. 13. Compare Jaquith V. Putney, 48 N. H. 138. And see McGrath v. Wallace, 116 Cal. 548; French v. Edwards, 5 Sawy. 266. OH. X.J CUEING DEFECTS IN TAX PEOOEEDINGS. 54:5 state the actual facts, it is not perceived why a mistake once made should be crystallized and preserved as an' instrument for the destruction of all that shall follow, instead of being cor- rected, that legal proceedings may be supported upon it. The question to some extent is one of public policy ; and while un- doubtedly it is wise to hold strictly to the rule that record;^ shall not be tampered with to the injury of parties concerned, there is no principle or reason of public policy which should preclude the correction of errors before rights have become fixed, but many considerations which support it. 'So amendment can make valid a tax-sale that was void for want of a proper description of the land in the assessment and subsequent proceedings.' And if fatal errors occur in tax con- veyances, they can neither be amended by the oflScer, nor cor- rected by motion in a court of law.^ The proper tribunal for that purpose is a court of equity. A court of law, where the defective conveyance was in question, might order the case continued to give opportunity for relief in equity, but could not do more.' An oflBcer to whom return has been made by another has no authority to amend such return,* but a correction in an im- material point can give no one a ground of complaint * 1 Roberts v. Chan Tin Pen, 33 CaL » Annan v. Baker, 49 N. H. 161, 171, 359. citing Prescott v. Hawkins, 13 N. H. 2 For attempts to correct by oflBoers 1 9. years after the sale, see French v. Ed- * Blight v. Banks, 6 T. B. Monr. 193, wards, 5Sawy. 366; McGrathV. Wal- 306; Blight v. Atwell, 7 T. B. Monr. lace, 116 Cal. 548. An unauthorized 364, 268. See Bellows v. Weeks, 41 Vt. alteration of a special bill does not 590, 600; Jones v. TiflBn, 34 Iowa 190. destroy it, but deprives it of its char- * Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12. nctesr ot prima facie evidence: Kef- ferstein v. Elnoz, 56 Mo. 186. 35 CHAPTER XI. THE LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT A TAX SHALL BE LAID. Necessity for legislation. The power to tax being legis- lative, there must be distinct authority of law for every levy upon the people under that power.' The authority may come from the constitution, which, in exceptional cases, will provide for the levy of a specific tax,^ or for a tax for some defined pur- pose; but in general the authority will come from the legisla- ture, and must be expressed in statutory form. The rule is one which applies to federal taxation and to taxation in every state in all its phases, whether it be taxation for state purposes and directly by the state itself, or taxation for municipal pur- poses and by municipal bodies, or taxation in the form of local assessments.' And in the case of local taxation there must 1 Webster v. People, 98 IlL 343; Hopkins V. People, 174111. 416; Green- wood V. Gmelich, 175 111. 526; State Board v. Holliday, 150 Ind. 216; Phelps V. Lodge, 60 Kan. 122; Cotton Exchange v. Assessors, 35 La. An. 1154; Stetson v. Kenipton, 13 Mass. 272; Auditor-General v. Duluth, S.S. & A. R. Co., 116 Mich. 122; Gruik- shanks V. Charleston, 1 MoCord 360; State V. Hagood, 13 S. C. 76; Mining ■Co. V. Juab County (Utah), 62 Pao. Rep. 1024; Virginia, etc. R Co. v. Washington County, .30 Grat. 471; Felton V. Hamilton County, 97 Fed. Rep. 833. A tax is deemed illegal -where there is no law to authorize its levy, or where, there being such law, that law is unconstitutional: State V. Fifth Circuit Judges, 37 La. An. 898. A tax referable to a law which will support it will not be referred to one which would make it void: Lima v. McBride, 34 Ohio St. 338. 2 Poll-tax levied by the constitution itself: State v. Cain, 52 La. An. 2120. 'See Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 Wall. 660; State Railroad Tax Cases, 93 U. S. 575; Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala. 156; Norris v. Russel, 5 Cal. 348: Vanover V. Justices, 27 Ga. 354; Allen v. Pe- oria, etc. R Co., 44 111, 85; Bright v. McCullough, 27 Ind. 283; Bullock v. Curry, 2 Met. (Ky.) 171^ Bangs v. Snow, 1 Mass. 181; Daily v. Swope, 47 Miss. 367; Lisbon v. Bath, 21 N. H. 219; Litchfield v. Vernon, 41 N. T. 133; Simmons v. Wilson, 66 N. C. 336; Columbia v. Guest, 3 Head 413 ; State V. Charleston, 2Speers633; Richmond V. Daniel, 14 Grat. 385. " There can be no taxation except as authorized by statute or co;astitution : " Chicago, M. & St. P. R Co. V. Phillips, 111 Iowa 377. " The levy of taxes is not a ju- dicial function. Its exercise, by the constitutions of all the states, and by the' theory of our English origin, is exclusively legislative: " Heine v. Levee Com'rs, 19 WalL 660; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575. The judiciary has no power to levy taxes. OH. XI.] LEGISLATIVE DETBEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 54:7 commonly be two distinct acts of legislation: first, that by the state giving the power to tax, and second, that by the local legislative or jwasi-legislative authority, laying the tax under the power so given. The term " levy " will be used in this chapter as meaning the legislative act, whether state or local, which determines that a tax shall be laid.^ A legislative act for the levy of a tax, as much as in any other case, must be passed under the restrictions of the consti- tution, or it can have "no validity.^ Therefore, when the con- stitution requires an act to have but one object, which shall be expressed in the title, the requirement must be complied with.' or to collect taxes when the officer appointed to collect refuses to do so: McLean County Precinct v. Deposit Bank, 81 Ky. 254. It is not one of the inherent functions of a court of jus- tice to participate in any way in the levy of a tax; such power is usually 'lodged in administrative officers and boards: Wells County v. McHenry, 7 N. D. 246. Courts will not resort to extra-legislative modes of levying or collecting taxes, except in cases where, for the purpose of administer- ing justice, they have interfered with the operation of the legislative scheme: State v. State Board, 54 N. J. L. 90. A writ of prohibition will not lie, on the petition of one city, to restrain the levy of taxes for the municipal purposes of another city, from which the former has been severed, since the levy of a tax is not a judicial act: Coronado v. San Diego, 97 Cal. 440. 1 Perry County v. Selma, etc. E. Co., 58 Ala. 546; Maguire v. Board of Mo- bile, 71 Ala. 401; State v. McGinnis, 26 La. An. 558. The term is often used to cover much more than the legis- lative act. Thus in Moore v. Foote, 33 Miss. 469, 479, it is said that "levy imports the ascertainment of the amount to be raised, and the per- formance of such acts as would au- thorize the collector to proceed to collect." And see Bradley v. Lin- coln County, 60 Wis. 71; Sheldon v. Van Buskirk, 3 N. Y. 473. On the other hand, the term to levy a tax is sometimes used in the sense "to collect: " Waterman v. Harkness, 2 Mo. A pp. 494; Valle v. Fargo, 1 Mo. App. 344. " Levy " of a special tax means to charge upon the person or property a sum of money already ascertained; an ordinance passed before the work is done, authorizing it to be done, is not such a levy. Nor is the city engineer's work in appor- tioning the cost of grading under a statute providing that a special tax may by ordinance be levied for such work: Westport v. Mastin, 63 Mo. App. 647. " The word ' levy ' as, ap- plied to taxes sometimes means to raise, to exact by authority of gov- ernment, to determine by vote the amount of tax to be raised. It is in this sense that towns, cities, and school districts levy taxes. In other cases it is used with reference to the mere ministerial or executive acts of extending them on the tax-books and collecting them:" State v. Lake- side Land Co., 71 Minn. 383. 2 Utah statute held void as lacking all the proper sanctions and securities of a valid tax-law: Kerr v. Wooley, 3 Utah 456. 3 Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 170- 548 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. When the constitution provides that taxes of a certain kind shall be applied to a particular purpose or fund, a statute im- posing such ,a tax will he invalid if it directs a different ap- plication.' And if local or special laws are forbidden- by the constitution, they will be void in tax cases.^ 181, and cases cited; State v. South- ern R. Co., 115 Ala. 250; San Fran- disco, etc. E. Co. V. Board, 60 Cal. 12; Board of Com'rs y. Whelan (Colp^, 65 Pao. Eep. 38; Equitable G. & T. Co. V. Donahoe (Del.), 49 Atl. Eep. 373; Manchester v. People, 178 111. 285; "West Chicago Park Com'rs v. Swe^t, 167 111. 326; National Bank v. Barber. 24 Kan. 534; Board of Com'rs v, Mialegvich, 52 La. An. 1293; Eyerson V. Utley, 16ilioh.269; People v. Den- ahy, 20 Mich. 349; Connecticut Mut. Ins. Co. V. State Treasurer, 31 Mich. 6; Anderson v. Hill, 54 Mich. 478; Wilooxv. Paddock, 65 Mich. 23; Sani- lac Supervisors v. Auditor-General, 68 Mich. 659; Gillett v. McLaughlin, 69 Mich. 547; Tillotson v. Saginaw Circuit Judge, 97 Mich. 585; Auditor- General V. Bay Supervisors, 106 Mich. 662; State v, Bixman, 162 Mo. 1;' State V. Aitken (Neb.), 87 N. W. Eep. 153; State v. Stone, 24 Nev. 308; Eichards v. Hanmer, 42 N. J. L. 435; Burnett v. Dean (N. J.), 49 Atl. Eep. 503; People v. Home Ins. Co., 92N. Y. 328; Divet v. Eichland County, 8 N. D. 65; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Graham, 8 Or. 17; Carroll v. Alsup (Tenn.), 64 S. W. Eep. 193; International, etc. E. Co. V. Smith County, 54 Tex. 1; Morgan v. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 813; State v. Whittlesey, 17 Wash. 447; Merritt v. Corey, 33 Wash. 444; Travelers' Ins.' Co. v. Os\yego T'p, 59 Fed. Eep. 78, 7 C. C. A. 669; Omaha V. Union Pac. E. Co., 73 Fed. Eep. 1013, 20 C. C. A. 319. 1 Chambe v. Wayne Probate Judge, 100 Mich. 112. See Hammond v. Muskegon School Board, 109 Mich. 676. A statute providing that the collateral^ inheritance tax shall be used for educational purposes is not an appropriation of money within constitutional provisions requiring appropriations to be made for certain specific subjects in a certain pre- scribed order, and forbidding appro- priations for a period more than two years after the passing of the appro- priation act: State v. Henderson, 160 Mo. 190. A tax-levy by the county court to build a court-house was held an appropriation for that purpose within the constitutional provision that no money shall be paid out of the treasury until it shall be appro- priated. The money arising from the collection of the tax became an appropriation by law for the purpose for which it was levied: Durrett v. Buxton, 63 Ark. 397. 2 A statute making unsecured taxes collectible when assessed, and se- cured taxes collectible severalmonths later, is not a " special law for the as- sessment or collection of taxes " pro- hibited by the state constitution: Eode V. Siebe, 119 Cal. 518. A stat- ute providing for taxing railroad property for county purposes at the regular rate ad valorem which is levied by the county authorities on other property, each county through which a road runs being allowed to tax at that rate all the company's property located in that county, and, in addition thereto, a proportion of the rolling stock and other floating property corresponding to the ratio between the company's property lo- cated in the county and the aggre- gate of its located property in all the counties through which the road runs, is a general law, and does not violate the constitutional provision CH. XI.] LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 649 Revenue bills: Statement of purpose. It is provided in the constitution of New York that "every law which imposes, continues, or revives a tax shall distinctly state the tax and the object to which it is to be applied, and it shall not be sufficient against taxation under special laws: Columbus S. R Ca v. Wright, 89 Ga. 574. A statute authorizing a certain county to levy a tax to pay for any turnpike it may buy is amended by the general law providing how all taxes may be levied and collected, and therefore does not infringe the constitutional inhibition of the levy and collection of taxes save by gen- eral laws: O'Mahoney v. Bullock, 97 Ky. 774. A statute authorizing a higher rate of taxation for road im- provements in all counties where the assessed valuation of property is $15,000,000 or over, and having more than 150 miles of macadamized and gravel roads, is not objectionable as being special because, when passed, there existed only one county to which it was applicable; the classifi- cation is proper: State V. Arnold, 136 Mo. 446. Nor is a law special which, designating subjects of taxation, des- ignates one or more classes only; ^s, for example, one or more kinds of busi- ness or of corporations: State v. St. Louis, etc. R. Co., 9 Mo. Ap. 532. A law is not local which provides generally for local government or local taxa^ tion : Van Riper v. North Plainfleld, 43 N. J. L. 349; State v. Franklin Co., 35 Ohio St. 458. Legislation for cities as a class is valid and constitutional, and is not local or special: Flock v. .Smith (N. J.), 47 Atl. Rep. 442. Stat- utory provisions that assessments for improvements under them shall be levied and collected in conformity with existing laws in force in the city where the improvements are made, are not unconstitutional as provisions of special or local char- acter embraced in a general act: State V. Newark, 48 N. J. L. 101, 49 N. J. L. 239. A statute providing for the acc[uirement of a certain bridge and ferry on behalf of and at the expense of a certain city, and re- quiring a tax to be levied to meet the expenses of maintenance and in- terest on the bonds, does not contra- vene the constitutional clause which forbids any special or local laws " for the assessment and collection of taxes:'' Simon v. Northup, 87 Or. 487. An act applicable to all railroad companies " not paying an a/i valo- rem tax is not special legislation, though there are but two such com- panies: Knoxville & O. R. Co. v. Harris, 99 Tenn. 684. A constitu- tional provision that a special tax cannot be levied in any of the com- mon-school districts does not avoid a statute providing for a special tax in a high-school district: People v. Lodi High-School Dist, 124 Cal. 694. A statute providing that in coun- ties of 135,000 inhabitants or more where the aggregate of tax levies certified to the county clerk exceeds five per cent, of the valuation of the taxable property therein it shall be reduced to five per cent., violates the constitutional prohibition of local or special laws regulating the affairs of any city, town, or village, since it im- poses arbitrary restrictions on the only county in the state having such number of inhabitants: People v. Knopf, 183 111. 410; Knopf v. People, 185 111. 20. An act authorizing the relocation of a county seat, and re- quiring, in order to provide funds to erect a court-house and jail, the levy" and collection of a special tax on all taxable property in the township to which the county seat should be trans- ferred, is a local or special law under 55,0 LEGISLATIVE DETBEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [OH, XI. to refer to any other law to fix such a tax or object." There are similar provisions in the constitutions of other states. Where they do not exist it is doubtless competent for a state to levy taxes generally without in the revenue bill giving any specification of object, and, when the taxes are collected, to appropriate them to any purpose which falls within the com- prehension of public objects for the purposes of state care.^ And the state may authorig;e a municipal corporation to levy which a tax for a state, county, township, or road purpose cannot con- stitutionally be imposed: Board of Com*rs V. State, 155 Ind. 604. A stat- ute which excepts organized counties from-the general law as to taxation, and which substitutes limitations ap- plicable to such counties only, is spe- cial legislation: State v. Walker (Minn.), 86N. W. Eep. 104. "Where the constitution prohibits local or special laws concerning liens and ju- dicial sales, an act providing for the levy and collection of, and sales for, taxes in cities of the second class is void: Safe Deposit & T. Co. v. Fricke, 153 Pa. St. 381. An act tociirede- ■ feots in a particular local levy of taxes is void where local laws are for- bidden: Kimball v. Eosendale, 43 Wis. 407. The provision of the Wis- consin constitution forbidding the enactment of special laws " for the assessment or collection of taxes," extends to all the proceedings neces- sary to raise money by taxes, and prohibits a statute restricting the amount to be raised and expended in any one year by a county and its towns: Chicago & N.. W. E. Co. v. Forest County, 95 Wis. 80. So also it prohibits a law which repeals a spe- cial law providing for the drainage of lands, and which authorizes the levy of a tax to pay expenses incurred by drainage commissioners under it: State V. Bell, 91 Wis. 371. Laws spe- cially taking away remedies in tax cases are void when special laws are forbidden: State v. California Mining Co., 15. Nev. 334, 16 Nev. 449; State v. Consolidated Mining Co., 16 Nev. 438. And further as to what are local or special laws in tax cases, see Eailway Co. v. Cheyenne, 118 U. S. 5li'; Dun- dee Mortg. T. Inv. Co. v. Parrish, 34 Fed. Eep. 197; People v. Central Pac. E. Co., 83 Cal. 393, 105 Cal. 576; People V. Lodi High-School Dist., 134 Cal. 694; Ferris v. Vannier, 6 Dak. 186; People V. Cooper, 83 III. 585; People v. Cook County Com'rs, 176 111. 576: Com- monwealth V. Taylor, 101 Ky. 335; Louisville & J. Ferry Co. v. Common- wealth (Ky.), 47 S. W. Eep. 877; Board of Council V. Eenfro (Ky.), 58 S. W. Eep. 795; Board of Education v. Louis- ville, H. & St. L. E. Co. (Ky.), 63 S. W. Eep. 1135; State v. Flower, 49 La. An. 1199; Brown v. Pontchartrain Land Co., 49 La. An. 1779; State v. Aitken (Neb.), 87 N. W. Eep. 153; Mo- Ardle v. Jersey City (N. J.),^ 49 Atl. Eep. 1013; Matter of Elevated E. Co., 70 N. y. 837; Matter of Church, 98 N. Y. 1; Gay v. Thomas, 5 Okl. 1; Crawford v. Linn County, 11 Or. 483; Commonwealth v. Macferron, 153 Pa. St. 244; Commonwealth v. Ander- son, 178 Pa. St. 171 ; Blankenburg v. Black(Pa.),50 Atl.Eep. 198; Biurnett V. Maloney, 97 Tenn. 699; Zickler v. Union Bank & T. Co., 104 Tenn. 377. In Kansas special laws authorizing the levy and collection of taxes are not forbidden: Midland Elevator Co. V. Stewart, 50 Kan. 378. 1 Long V. Eichmond Com'rs, 76 N. 0. 373. OH. XI.J LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 551 taxes in the same general way; the just presumption being in such case that the moneys, when raised, will be lawfully ap- propriated.' Provisions like the one recited may nevertheless prevent some abusei, and considerable importance has been attached to them. But the purposes of government are so infinite in variety that the specification must for 'the most part be very general^ or the constitution could not be complied with ; and in New York it has been held that a statement in a tax law, that the money to be raised is to be paid into the treasury to the credit of the general fund, is a suifioient compliance with the requirement.^ The same ruling was made where the statement was that the moneys raised should be applicable to the payment of the ordinary and current expenses of the state,' and also where an act .in taxing a railroad appropriated part of the taxes to the payment of the bonds issued in aid of the road.* The provision applies only to annually recurring taxes, and taxes imposed generally upon the entire property of the state,^ and is not applicable to succession taxes upon lega- cies,* or to local county taxes,' or to laws authorizing the citi- zens of towns to impose taxes for bounties,^ or to statutes au- thorizing special local assessments.' It is not violated by a provision in a law for taxing foreign insurance companies which grades the tax with reference to that which is or may be im- posed at the place of their domicile upon New York insurance companies," or by an act which creates a board of estimate and apportionment, and authorizes the supervisors to cause the amount certified to them by such board to be raised by taxa- 1 Halsey v. People, 84 III 89. It will 5 Matter of McPherson; 104 N. Y. not defeat a tax that one of the items 306; Jones v. Chamberlain, 109 N. Y. of levy for general county purposes 100. was stated to be for "miscellaneous 'Matter of McPherson, 104 N. Y. , expenses: " Wells County v. Mc- 306; 'Union Trust Co. v. Wayne Pro- Henry, 7 N. D. 346. . bate Judge, 135 Mich. 587. 2 People V. Orange Supervisors, 17 'Jones v. Chamberlain, 109 N. Y. N. Y. 335; Attorney-General v. Myers, 100. 58 Hun 318. ^ Jones v. Chamberlain, 109 N. Y. 'People V. Home Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 100. 338; People v. National F. Ins. Co., 9 Ford's Petition, 6 Lans. 93; Guest 37 Hun 188. v. Brooklyn, 8 Hun 97. See People v. * Bridges v. Sullivan Supervisors, Havemeyer, 47 How. Pr. 494. 93 N. Y. 570; Clark v. Sheldon, 106 w People v. Fire Assoc, 93 N. Y. 311. N. Y. 104; Strough v. Supervisors, 119 N. Y. 313. 552 LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. tion.^ Bat a law dbes not distinctly state the tax imposed where it provides for a tax of three and a half mills on the dollar of valuation " or so much thereof as may be necessary ; " nor does it comply with the constitution when it refers to an- other law for the specification of the object.^ It is not, how- ever, of importance that laws imposing on counties the duty of selling for delinquent state taxes and charging them with un- paid taxes do not state the objects to which the taxes are to be applied, for such laws do not impose, continue,' or revive a tax -within the meaning of those words as used in the constitution.' Cases which have been decided under analogous constitutional provisions in other states are cited in the margin.* It is sometimes a serious question whether a constitutional provision is so far complete and specific in itself as to consti- tute a sufficient law without assistance from legislation. If it is, it must be considered mandatory and self-executing, and effect must be given to it accordingly.' If it is not, it simply lays its mandate upon the legislature, and will fail of effect if 1 Townsend v. New Tork, 16 Hun 362. 2 People V. Kings County Supervis- ors, 53 N. y. 556. 'People V. Ulster County Super- visors, 36 Hun 491. ^Albany Bottling Co. v. Watson, 108 Ga. 503; Youngerman v. Murphy, 107 Iowa 686; Burch v. Owensboro (Ey.), 36 S. W. Rep. 12; Cahill v. Per- rine (Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 344; Somer- set V. Somerset Banking Co. (Ky.), 60 S. W. Rep. 5; Trowbridge v. Detroit, 99 Mich. 443; Pingree v. Auditor- General, 120 Mich. 95; Parker v. Wayne Count'y, 104 N. O. 166; Pitts- burgh, C. &'St. L. R. Co. V. State, 49 Ohio St. 189; Southern R. Co. v, Kay (S. G), 39 S. E. Rep. 785; Common- wealth V. Brown, 91 Va. 763; Mor- gan V. Commonwealth, 98 Va. 812; Mason v. Purdy, 11 Wash. 591. See Chambe v. Wayne Probate Judge, 100 Mich. 113. The constitution of Florida requires county taxes for the support of free public schools to be speoifloally levied for that purpose, differentiated from a levy for other county purposes: State v. L'Engle. 40 Fla. 392. *See Cooley, Const. Lim. (5th ed.) 98-103. A provision that the legis- lature shall levy a capitation tax equal per poll to the tax on $800 of property was held not to be self- executing; but it avoided a statute fixing the capitation tax at $1.S9 per poll, and the property tax at 46 cents per $100: Russell v. Ayer, 120 N. 0. 180. Legislation is necessary to ren- der effective the provision of the Colorado constitution providing for the taxation of mining claims: Mat- ter of Taxation, 9 Colo. 632. A con- stitutional provision that the net annual product of mines and mining claims should "be taxable as pro- vided by law " was held not self- executing, inasmjich as it furnished no rule for its own enforcement, and required legislative action to give effect to the purposes contemplated: Mercur, etc. Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 322. OH. XI.J LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 553 that body neglect to pass the necessary laws to carry out the will of the people expressed in it.^ In the case of provisions like the one referred to, there is- no doubt of their mandatory and self-executing character. They require conformity to their directions in all legislation of a certain class, and if obedience to the requirement does not appear, the legislation is void.^ But they have no application to a case in which the constitution itself makes an appropriation of tax moneys, and the legislature merely gives effect to the provision for the purpose.' Contracting debts. The incurring of a debt by a public corporation is, in a certain sense, the first step in taxation, since debts by such corporations are commonly only to be paid by taxation.* Every ^tate has inherent power to contract debts, subject only to such restraints as the people by the con- stitution may have imposed;" but any officer assuming to pledge the credit of the state must l^ave authority of law for the purpose. Sometimes the extent of indebtedness is re- stricted in amount,^ and any attempt to increase it beyond the restriction would be uli/ra vires. Sometimes the restriction is that a law for the creation of a debt shall only take effect after approval by the people by popular vote. Sometimes it is merely that the law for the purpose shall be passed by two- 1 State Board v. Holliday, 150 Ind. ton, 63 Fed. Eep. 76; Culbertson v. 316. Fulton, 137 111. 30; Hodges v. Crow- 2 People V. Supervisors, 53 N. T. 556 ; ley, 186 111. 305 ; Chicago v. Fishbun, Dean V. Luf kin, 54 Tex. 366. 189 111. 367; Lussem v. Sanitary 'Walcott V. People, 17 Mich. 68. Drainage Dist. (111.), 61 N. E. Eep. any other time is invalid, though it may have convened 'and made the levy at such time under a mandamus from the federal court: Martin' v. McDiarmid, 55 Ark. 213. Taxes to pay a judgment of the fed- eral court, founded upon municipal bonds, can be levied only as pro- vided by the statute, and an attempt fjy the county court to act outside of the law will be enjoined at the state's instance, even though the ac- tion of such court was induced by mandate from the federal court: State V. Hager, 91 Mo. 452. Under a statute providing that the city tax- levy shall be based on the annual appropriation bill for the year, a levy made prior to the adoption of the bill for that year is invalid: Engstad V. Dinnie, 8 N. D. 1. A sale for a mulct tax is void where the supervisors failed to levy such tax in view of a statute making the auditor's certifi- cate of such levy the treasurer's au- thority for collecting the tax: Smith- berg V. Archer, 108 Iowa 215. The power to levy taxes for town pur- poses being expressly given by stat- ute to tha electors at the annual town meeting, the board of town auditors has no Authority to make such levy: Hopkins v. People, 174 IIL 416. 1 Baldwin v. City Council, 53 Ala. 437; Indianapolis & V. R. Co. v. Capi- ■ tol Paving, etc. Co., 24 Ind. App^ 114 Authority to a municipality to levy a particular tax is not to be under- stood as enlarging by implication a CH. XI.] LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 557 legislation to which it will be supplementary.^ And the legis- lation will be expected not merely to originate the power to tax, but to prescribe all necessary rules and regulations to give it complete effect, except as the constitution may already have done so. A municipal corporation or board does not lose its right to tax by failure ,for a time to exercise such right.^ But if an alleged municipality — for example, a school district — never had any legal existence, it never had jurisdiction to levy a tax, and a special tax levied by it will be enjoined.' Determination of amount. There cannot be an imposition of a tax without the amount or the rate being fixqd. An un- determined tax is in law no tax. Therefore, a statute which simply provides that a local tax shall be paid on the franchise of a street railway company, or that every corporation shall pay a local tax on its franchises, is not a levy of a tax, it being left to the local authorities to levy such tax as they may deem necessary.* And an act which divides merchandise into a number of classes pre-arranged into groups, and which pro- hibits any person, firm, or corporation from employing more than fifteen persons, or from selling any merchandise of one of the classes or groups without paying a license for each class, is void for uncertainty, there being notching to show whether the fee is to be exacted for classes or for groups, and the dura- tion of the license to be issued not being fixed.' The amount of a tax need not, however, be prescribed by previously existing legislation upon 'Greeti Mountain S. E. Co. v. Sav- the whole subject of municipal age, 15 Mont. 189. levies: Weber v. Traubel, 95 UL 427. * South Covington & C. H. R. Co. v. ^ 1 Virginia, etc. E. Co. v. Washing- Bellevue(Ky.),49S. W.Rep.23; Padu- ton County, 30 Grat. 471. A consti- cah St. R. Co. v. MoCraoken County tutional provision that taxes for the '(Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 178. subdivisions of the state shall be « State v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375. levied and collected by the respect- Asto when a tax is "ascertained and ive fiscal authorities thereof, con- levied," see Wilson v. Becker, 63 fers administrative powers in the Minn. 61. An order of a county corn- collection of the tax without refer- missioners' court that there shall be ence to its creation: Southern R. levied on all occupations in the Co. V. Kay (S. C), 39 8. E. Rep. 785. county, not specially provided for by 2 Covington v. Covington Gas Light the laws of the state, "a tax of one- Co., 84 Ky. 94; Chicago & A. R Co. half of the state occupation tax, as V. Baldridge, 177 111. 339. levied by the laws of the state," is a 558 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT 'TAX BE LAID. [oH. XI. statute, for if it is determinable by a mere act of computation, the ascertainment of it is' ministerial or executive, and not leg- islative.' Thus, where the constitution required that every law creating a state debt should levy a tax annually sufficient to pay the annual interest of such debt, the requirement was complied with by a provision that " an annual tax, in addition to all other taxes, shall be, levied upon the property of the state sufficient to pay the interest on the loan," etc., there being then in force a general law under which it became the duty of an executive officer to fix the amount of the tax and order its collection.^ So it was held complied with in an act for borrowing money on state bonds, when the provision was that " the faith and credit of the state is hereby pledged for the payment of principal and interest on said bonds, and a suffi- cient amount of taxes is hereby levied to pay the interest ac- cruing on said bonds annually." ' When a state auditing board is provided for by the constitu- tion of the state,- the allowances of the board will perhaps be made conclusive, and be required to go into the general tax- levy for the year.* And in any case there seems to be no ob- jection in principle to legislation under which the salaries of state officers, the general expenses of state government, the interest on state indebtedness, and other demands against the state, which are audited in accordance with general legislation, shall be provided for by a levy, made under general rules with- out the necessity of a special act directing the amount or the rate of the particular tax. Of course the legislature may levy sufficient levy of a tax upon the oo- See Edwards v. People, 88 111. 340; cupation of liquor-dealer, as a state Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Baldridge, 177 statute taxes such occupation a speoi- 111. 229. fled sum: Wade v. State, 23 Tex. 2 Morton v. Controller, 4 S. 0. 430. App. 629. A general county tax is Mitchell County v. City Nat. Bank, not levied by the order of a commis- 91 Tex. 361. sioners' court that "the assessor be, 'Morton v. Controller, 4 S. C. 430. and he is hereby, instructed to assess * See People v. Supervisors, 1 Hill all taxes that he is authorized to. as- 195. Where a statute provides for sess for the county at one-half of the the levy of a tax to pay a judgment amount he assesses for the state, and as soon as possible, a city officer can- the sheriff is hereby authorized to not proceed to levy one unless other- collect the same," etc.: Dav?son v. wise authorized: Iowa R. Land Co. Ward, 71 Tex. 72. v. Sac County, 39 Iowa 134. i Morton v. Controller," 4 S. C. 430. CH. XI.] LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 559 taxes by requiring a gross sum to be collected from the taxable property of the state as well as by fixing a rate per cent. ; ^ and except as prohibited by the constitution the legislature may levy a tax without the intervention of any officer.^ It is not usual for the legislature to fix the precise amount of a local levy ; nor is it indispensable that the amount should be determined by the local legislative body in all cases when not thus fixed, what was said above about the matter of com- putation being equally applicable here.' While the methods provided by legislation for fixing the amount of local levies differ in different states, it can be said that in general the de- termination is left to local boards which are clothed for the purpose with a quasi-legislative authority. These boards for counties will perhaps be boards of supervisors or. commission- ers, or county courts, so called ; for cities or boroughs, common councils; for villages, a village board ; for townships, a town- ship board or board of selectmen, and for other municipal cor- porations some corresponding board. A^l such bodies act by 1 State V. Bailey, 56 Kan. 81. While it is the legislature's duty to provide no more than an amount of revenue sufficient to defray the necessary ex- penses of the state for the fiscal year, yet the legislative determination of the amount of taxes required for the year, and the rate necessary, is con- clusive on the counties: State v. Mult- nomah County, 13 Or. 287. 2 Faust V. German Building Assoc, 84 Md. 186. * Under a stacute authorizing vil- lages to raise by general tax sums not exceeding a certain rate per cent, for the several sums specified, it is sufficient for the council in levying the tax to specify the rate per cent, for each fund, and it need not state the sums to be raised: Boyce v. Peterson, 84 Mioh. 490. But where the statute provides that the village council shall fix the specific amounts of corporate taxes, and that subse- quently the county authorities shall fix the rate per cent, thereof accord- ing to the amount of property as equalized by the state board, a resolu- tion of the council fixing a certain rate per cent, of taxation, and not specifying the amount of the tax, was void: In re Cloquet Lumber Co., 61 Minn. 233. And where, contrary to express statutory provisions, the county commissioners attempted to levy the county tax by percentages and not by specific amounts, and the tax for that year was extended on the tax-list and based on such at- tempted levy, the county tax based oh such levy was void: WellsCounty V. MoHenry, 7 N. D. 246; Oever v. , Corn well (N. D.), 86 N. W. Rep. 277. A statute providing that a high- school board shall furnish to the board oC Supervisors an estimate of the amount required to run the high school for the year, and that the su- pervisors shall levy a special tax suffi- cient to maintain the high school, such tax to be "computed , . . and collected in the same manner as other taxes," is not void as fixing no maximum rate and providing no rule of computation: People v. Lodi High- School Dist, 124 CaL 691 560 LEGISLATIVE BETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI, majorities,' in regular meetings,^ at the time ' and place ^ fixed by law, and any attempt to act otherwise is invalid.' And they cannot refer the authority to tax which is vested in the aggre- 1 A tax levied by less than a quorum of a city council is void: Somerset v. Somerset Banking Co. (Ky.), 60 S. W. Eep. 5. ' What is sufficient evidence that requisite proportion of justices entitled to attend acted in levying tax: Central Trust Co. v. Ashvllle Land Co., 72 Fed. Eep. 361. 18 C. C. A. 590. Council consisting of president and six trustees — no tax to be or- dered except by two-thirds vote of members — if only four votes cast tax invalid: Whitney v. Hudson, 69 Mich. 189. ^ Official action taken by a school board when all its members were present held valid though the meet- ing was neither a regular one nor one specially called in the statutory manner: Lawrence v. Trainer, 136 IlL 474. Where the charter required a resolution for laying taxes to be adopted by aldermen and approved by mayor, it is not well adopted by aldermen and mayor sitting together with no formal approval: Walker v, Burlington, 56 Vt. 131. Where a township board is only authorized to vote to raise money for township ex- penses at a regular meeting, a tax to defray ordinary expenses levied at a called meeting is void where the rec- ords show that only three members of the board were present and do not show that the, fourth member was notified: Harding v. Bader, 75 Mich. 316. Where a statutory meeting of a board of county commissioners is for the sole purpose of school busi- ness, an order for a gravel-road tax is void: Fahlor v. Wells, 101 Ind. 167. A special meeting of the board at which a levy is made will be pre- sumed to have been rightfully held: Brigins v. Chandler, 00 Miss. 862. ' Where commissioners on the day fixed by statute meet to determine the rate of a tax, they may defer ac- tion, and adjourn to a specified day, because of a member's absefice; and a levy on the adjourned day is valid: St. Louis Bridge & T. E. Co. v. Peo- ple, 127 111. 627. A levy of taxes by supervisors at an adjourned meeting, W'hen they had no power to adjourn, is void: Smith v. Nelson, 57 Miss. 188. Where supervisors have power to levy a tax only at their regular ses- sion, if that session is finally ad- journed, and they come together,- change their record so as to show a temporary adjournment, and vote a tax, the vote is void: Scott v. Union County, 63 Iowa 583. Where the stat- ute requires assessors, before begin- ning their assessment, to give three weeks' notice to all taxables to bring in to their meeting their accounts of ratable estate, the special levy to be made " at the next annual assess- ment " is to be ihade at the begin- ning of such assessment: Cranston Town Council's Petition, 18 E. L 417. The election upon the general ques- tion of tax having occurred in March, 1883, a levy in December, 1883, was soon enough, although the act of April 26, 1880, required the levy to be made "immediately" after the election; and a list made from the assessor's returns for 1888 was made " from the last annual assessment," within the meaning of the statute: Walton V. Eiley, 85 Ky. 413. Under a statute taking effect from its pas- sage, and giving the supervisors of a * A levy of taxes by a board of super- visors is void if made at a place where the board has not authority to meet: Johnson v. Fritch, 57 Miss. 88 ; Capital State Bank v. Lewis, 64 Miss. 727. 8 See ante, pp. 440-443. CH. XI.] LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 561 gate body to a committee or clerk with powers of final action.* But what is done by them within the limits of their authority will be construed favorably, and if, where they have the power to make a levy, the record shows an intent to do so, it will amount to a present levy,^ which may he prima faoie evidence county power to levy a tax on the railroad property in their county, based on the assessment per mile of the same property made by the state for its , purposes, such tax can be levied at any time after the passage of the act, based on a state assess- ment made previous to the act: Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Supervis- ors, 87 Va. 5al. The time fixed by statute for laying a tax having ex- pired, the authority for making the levy is ,ended, and, therefore, marir damns will not issue to compel it : Wells V. Commissioners, 77 Md. 135. 1 Mercer County Court v. Naviga- tion Co., 8 Bush 300; Kansas v. Hanni- bal & St. J. R Co., 81 Mo. 285 ; St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. V. Epperson, 97 Mo. 300; State V. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 110 Mo. 265, 135 Mo. 618; State v. Sickles, 24 N. J. L. 125; Robinson v. Dodge, 18 Johns. 351; Trumbull v. White, 5 Hill 46. A tax purporting to be levied by the authorities of two dis- tricts meeting and acting jointly, held void: State v. Reeves, 28 N. J. L. 520. Tax levied in pursuance of joint action by highway commis- sioner with township supervisor and clerk, whereas action should have been commissioner's, held void: Mich- igan Land & T. Co. v. L'Anse T'p, 63 Mich. 700. 2 West V. Whittaker, 37 Iowa 598; Snell V. Fort Dodge, 45 Iowa 564; Harding v. Bader, 75 Mich. 316. A valid levy cannot be accomplished by a mere resolution of a city coun- cil purporting to levy assessments for certain funds for the fiscal year: Engstad v. Dinnie, 8 N. D. 1. A mere order by county commissioners that a levy based on the assessment of a 36 previous year be made for future years amounts to nothing as an act- ual levy of a tax: Hodges v. Crowley, 186 III. 305. Adoption of committee's report held a sufficient compliance with statute in regard to fixing amount of general city tax and or- dering it to be levied: People v. Wright, 68 Hun 264 But where the statute provides that a certain tax shall not be spread unless directed by the board of supervisors, it is not enough for the board to adopt the report of the special committee ap- pointed to recapitulate the reports from the townships: Post v. Harris, 95 Mich. 321. An order otthe county court levying township taxes for prior years, which recites that spe- cial taxes to pay the bonds of a desig- nated township had been omitted for those years, and which then orders the clerk of the county court to ex- tend the taxes on defendant's prop- erty in said township at a certain rate, "said- rate being the same as extended upon other property in said township for said years," is a suffi- cient levy of the tax: State v. Han- nibal & St. J. R. Co., 101 Mo. 136. A record of a township meeting which recites merely that the request of the highway commissioners to gravel cer- tain roads was granted, held sufficient to show the levy of a special road- tax: Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 190 111. 20. A statute providing that the county commissioners "shall cause to be levied "an annual poll-tax, only contemplates a resolution by the board, the actual clerical work ex- tending the tax being the assessor's duty: People v. Ames, 34 Colo. 432. The words "deteirmine amount of 562 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [OH. XI. that the facts existed which fully warranted the board's ac- tion.^ 1 Conditions precedent to levy. Whatever preliminaries are by law made essential to the levy of a tax must be observed or the tax will be void. Thus, if the legal designation of a site is a condition precedent to authority to vote a tax for building a schiol-house, a tax voted for that purpose without such desig- nation is void.^ Where the statute requires an annual appro- priation ordinance to be passed by a city council, failure in any one year to pass such an ordinance is fatal to the validity of salds for the non-payment of taxes for that year.' And under a statute providing for the levy of a tax to pay judgments against a county, a levy by the county board of a tax for the payment of judgments is unauthorized if there are no judgments against the county when the levy is made.* In some special cases of extraordinary taxation it has been customary to provide that no authority should be had for the general tax for current year,'' as used in a statute defining the duties of trustees of incorporated towns, were held to mean final determina- tion as to amount, assessment, and levy: Kratli v. Larrew, 104 Ind. 363. An order for a taix-levy which uses decimal points and figures in such a ■way as clearly to indicate what was meant was held not void because of the omission of the word "cents:" Lake County v. Sulphur; etc. Mining Co., 66 CaL 17. Under a statute requir- ing the county tax levy to be in the form of a certain number of mills on the dollar of valuation, a levy reading " County General Fund 6.006 mills," and stating subsequent charges in the same manner as to the figures, is pre- sumed to intend to levy six mills on every dollar of valuation : Henderson V. Hughes County, 13 S. D. 576. The fact that a levy, when made by the board of supervisors, was entered on the books of the commissioners of revenue, is immaterial, and does not affect the validity of the levy: Nor- folk & W. R. Co. V. Supervisors, 87 Va. 531. That the rate for each fund of the school tax was not separately found and levied does not invalidate the levy of the aggregate tax on rail- road property at the average rate of the school districts of the county: State V. Hannibal & St. J. E. Co., 135 Mo. 618. 1 San Antonio v. Berry, 93 Tex. 319. An order of the county court levying township taxes for prior years was held, in view of its recitals, to be prima fade evidence both that the taxes for the designated years had been omitted, and that the rate for those years was the same As that therein levied: State v. Hannibal Sc St. J. R. Co., 101 Mo. 136. 2 Marble v. McKenney, 10 Me. 332; G-ustin V. School District, 10 Gray 85; Stickney v. Orford, 64 N. H. 399. 8 Riverside Co. v. Howell, 133 111. 356. * Custer County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R Co. (Neb.), 87 N. W. Rep. 341. An order of a county board allowing a claim against the county is not a judgment within the aieaning of the statute providing for the levy of a tax to pay judgments: Ibid. CH. XI.] LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX B^ LAID. 6t)3 taxation, or for contracting debts to be paid for by taxation, unless petitioned for by a specified number of taxpayers and the facts verified in some prescribed form for the action of the proper board.' Frequently an estimate or a statement or re- port by some board or oflBcer of the amount of funds required,^ or an order by some courts judge, or jury, directing the levy ' is provided for,* and the question of compliance therewith is to 'See Couper v. Eowe, 43 Ga. 339; Cain V. Commissioners, 86 N. C. 8. Where a petition from taxpayers is the foundation of the proceedings, mere technical defects will be disre- garded: Scott V. Hansheer, 94 Ind. 1; Jussen V. Board, etc., 95 Ind. 567. Where a statute requires a petition for a township levy to specify the amount sought to be appropriated, but not to exceed two per cent, per annum of the taxable property, a petition which states that it is de- sired to raise " the sum of $3,800, or a sum equal to two per centum of all taxable property in said town- ship," is good: Williams v. Hall, 65 Ind. 129. See Wilson v. Hamilton County, 68 Ind. 507. The fact that a statute which required the publica- tion of a notice of the proposed aj)- plication to the legislature for an assessment of a land tax was not complied with, did not invalidate a sale of land made to satisfy a tax so assessed: Wells v. Austin, 59 Vt. 157. 2 A eertificate of school directors as to the amount of money required to be levied by special tax, held not void though irregular in form: Chi- cago & Jl. E. Co. v. People, 155 HI. 376. The estimates of the school board for a levy for school purposes need not recite that a levy of these taxes was authorized by the board: Kansas City, Ft. 8. & M. R. Co. v. Chapin (Mo.), 63 S. W. Rep. 1000. The omission of a school board to report the amount necessary for each fund, as required by statute, does not invalidate the tax where the value of the property to be assessed has been ascertained, and where the rate necessary to raise the amount needed has been stated: the amounts may be calculated from the data given: St. Louis '& S. F. R Co. v. Gracy, 136 Mo. 473. Written request by presi- dent of board of health that county commissioners levy, tax to defray board's expenses, sufficiently com- plies with statute: State v. Rose, 36 Fla. 117. ' In Georgia county levies are for most purposes recommended by the grand jury: see Couper v. Rove, 43 Ga. 339. But for certain necessary purposes the ordinary and county commissioners may levy taxes: see Waller v. Perkins, 53 Ga. 333; Solo- mon V. Tarver, 53 Ga. 405; Walden V. Lee County, 60 Ga. 396; Arnett v. Griffin, 60 Ga. 349; Spann v. Com- missioners, 64 Ga. 498. 4 See Baltimore v. Horter (Md.), 48 Atl. Rep. 445; TurnbuU v. Alpena, 74 Mich. 631; Gamble v. Auditor-Gen- eral, 78 Mich. 802; Conley v. St. Clair Supervisors, 88 Mich. 345; Hawkins V. Carroll, 50 Miss. 735; State v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 135 Mo. 77; State V. Omaha, 39 Neb. 745; Lamoille V. R. Co. V. Fairfield, 51 Vt. 257. Under the Missouri statute authorizing the county court to levy certain taxes without an order of the circuit court, and prohibiting it from levying any other tax except by such order, a tax not of the former class, levied with- out such order, is void: State v. Wa. 564 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [OH. XI. be certified by some local authority. The verification in these cases would not in general preclude the municipality from showing its falsity, but in favor of lonafide holders of munici- pal securities that may lawfully have been issued in reliance upon the municipal action, the verification will be held conclu- sive.^ But this principle has no application to a case where the municipal authorities have assumed to act and to issue ne- gotiable , securities without tby legislative authority,^ nor to a case where the securities- on their face show a failure to comply with a statutory requirement.' Securities issued under such circumstances cannot be validated -by any act of the officers. Where it is made the duty of some board or officer to ap- bash, St. L. & p. E. Co., 97 Mo. 296; State V. Mississippi River Bridge Go., 134 Mo. 331. But the requirement of such an order has no application to levies to pay judgmerits recovered oil railroad-aid bonds issued prior to such statute: State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 113 Mo. 297; State v. Evping, 116 Mo. 129. A return by the high- way commissioner showing a delin- quent labor-tax ■ is not a necessary preliminary to putting the tax pro- visionally on the assessment roll, where it can be canceled on presen- , tation of receipts showing payment in labor: Lake Superior Ship Canal, etc. Co. v. Thompson, 56 Mich. 493. The failure of the board of supervis- ors to examine all certificates, state- ments, etc., submitted to it showing the moneys to be raised in the sev- eral townships for schools and other purposes was held to be an irregu. larity at most, and in the absence of an affirmative showing of defects or of a denial of a hearing the tax was presumed valid: Auditor-General v. Hill, 98 Mich. 336. 1 Knox County v. Aspinwall, 31 How. 539; Bissell v. Jeflersonville, 34 How. 387; Moran v. ^Commissioners, 2 Black 723; Mercer County v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 83; Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 283; Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 355: St. Joseph V. Rogers, 16 Wall. 644; Rock Creek V. Strong, 96 U. S. 271; San Antonio V. Mehafify, 96 U. S. 313; Warren v. Marcy, 97 U. S. 96; Commissioners VjBolles, 94 U. S. 104; Commissioners V. Clark, 94 U.' S. 378; Pompton v. Cooper, 101 U. S. 196; Buchanan v. Litchfield, 103 U. S. 278; Bonham v. Nefedles, 103 U. S. 648; Pana v. Bow- ler, 107 17. S. 529; Sherman v. Sim- ons, 109 U. S. 735; Coloma v. Eaves, 93 U. S. 484; Venice v. Murdook, 92 U. S. 494. There are many other cases to.the same effect. Where by law the county commissioners are authorized to lay a certain fence tax on application of a majority of legal voters, the determination of the com- missioners upon the application is final, and cannot be attacked on a showing that some of the applicants were not voters: Cain v. Commis- sioners, 86 N. C. 8. See First Na- tional Bank v. Concord, 50 Vt. 257; MuUikin v. Bloomin^ton, 73 Ind. 161. But where the certificate is to be based upon an assessment roll it is void if made when there is no roll: People V. Suffern, 68 N. Y. 321. 2 Hayes v. Holly Springs, 114 U. S. 120. 'Bissell V. Spring Valley, 110 U. S. 163. CH. XI.J LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 665 prove ' a levy, the tax will be void unless such approval is given.^ Toting taxes in popular meetings. Many taxes are re- • quired to be voted by popular assemblages composed of all the voters of the municipality to be tayed, or, in some instances, of certain classes of the voters, supposed to be specially inter- ested in the tax. It is consistent with the practice of early days that this method shall be adopted in all districts whose population is not too great to render it impracticable ; and we find it general in school districts, and to a large extent, also, ' " Approval " of a levy means that it is accepted as good or suflScient for the purpose intended: Board of Edu- cation V. Kingfisher, 5 Okl. 83. 2 Where local overseers authorized to levy a tax with the approval of two justices proceeded to levy with- out such approval, their action was held void: Kitchen v. Smith, 101 Pa. .St. 453. Under the Rhode Island statute the amount of a school-dis- trict tax may be approved by, the school committee after as well as be- fore the district has voted it: Sea- bury v. Hov«-land, 15 R I. 446. County commissioners have nothing to do with levying taxes for independent school districts in the sense of de- termining the amount to be raised or of approving the action of the dis- trict in the matter : State v. Lakeside Land Co., 71 Minn. 283. A resolution of a city council approving the esti- mates of the board of education is not final where the council after- wards submits such estimates to the board of estimates and orders the amount approved by the latter to be levied : Board of Education v. Detroit Common Council, 80 Mich. 548. In Michigan the county board of super- visors has the right to determine whether taxes on assessment rolls re- ceived by it from the township su- pervisors are authorized by law: People V. Monroe County, *8 Mich. 283. Where a oit^ board of trustees was directed by statute to levy a directspecialschooltax which would produce a sum that would make the' amount I'equired by the board of edu- cation, provided the levy should not exceed a certain rate, the amount of the levy within the limit was discre- tionary with the board of trustees, and it was not compelled to levy the amount reported and required by the board of education: Board of Edu- cation V. Board of Trustees, 96 CaL 43; Where a statute required high- way commissioners to levy sums found by them to be necessary, and to report to the town supervisors, affirmative action or order by the supervisors was unnecessary: Peoria, D. etc. R. Co. V. People, 116 IlL 333. Under a statute providing that the trustees of cities should have the power to levy a special tax for school purposes, within certain limitations, and making it the county auditor's duty to make the proper assessment of special school-tax levied by the trustees, and extend the same on the tax duplicate, such trustees have the exclusive right to determine the amount of and make such levy within the limits prescribed, without any action by the county commissioners, since the latter are not charged with any duty relating to the levy or as- sessment of such tax: Wood v. School Corp., 183 Ind. 306. 566 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. in towns, villages, and even some small cities.^ And thougli in the larger districts, like counties, as well, as in the cities gener- ally, the authority is most commonly intrusted to representa- tives of the people, it is sometimes required, even in such cases, that the sense of the people shall be taken upon a proposed corporate debt or tax. The method of doing this must then be to submit distinct propositions, which can be voted upon by ballot.^ A proposition to levy a tax for county buildings is required by the constituttens of several states thus to be submitted. A vote is void if it is taken before there is legisla- tion authorizing it;' and it is void, also, if conditions prece- ' In Illinois it is held that where, by statute, it is provided that it shall not be lawful for a school district to levy a tax for a specified purpose without a vote of the people ordering it, a contract of the district for such a purpose, without a vote, is void, and a tax therefor will be enjoined: School Directors v. Fogleman, 76 III. 189; Thatcher v. People, 93 111, 240; Watts V, McCleave, 16 111. App, 272. In Michigan, where the delinquent taxes for which land is sold include school taxes which were not author- ized by any recorded vote of the electors of the school district, the sale is invalid: Burroughs v. Goflf, 64 Mich. 464. And in that state certain other taxes require a vote of the electors or cannot be voted by the township board unless first submitted ttf them: Mills v. Richland T'p, 72 Mich. 100; Tillotson v. Webber, 96 Mich. 144. Under the constitution and statutes of Missouri an increase of the school tax beyond the annual rate, without any vote of the tax- payerstherefor or estimates furnished by the covmty clerk, is unauthorized and void: Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co. V. Chapin (Mo.), 62 S, W. Rep. 1000. As to when a vote for school taxes is not required in Arkansas and Califor- nia, see County Court v. Robinson, 27 Ark. 116; Cole v. Blackwell, 38 Ark. 271; People v. Castro, 39 Cal. 65; Peo- ple V. Lodi High School Dist., 124 Ca!. 694. As to when a vote for city levies is not required in North Caro- lina, see Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 748; Inoher V. Raleigh, 73 N. C. 267; see, also, ante, p. 471. In Nebraska a statute requiring the' adoption by popular vote of the amount of tax to be levied to pay bonds, is amenda- tory: State V. Babcock, 21 Neb. 599. Town vote not required in Rhode' Island to levy tax after merger of school districts in town: In re Crans- ton Town Council, 18 R. 1, 417. Under the Nebraska constitution providing that county authorities shall never assess taxes beyond a certain aggre- gate unless authorized by a vote of the people, the legislature cannot make a petition by a majority of the electors of the county the equivalent of the popular vote required by the constitution: In re House Roll, 31 Neb. 505. 2 A statute providing that the Aus- tralian ballot system shall be fol- lowed in all elections for public officers, and that the term "city election " so used in the act shall apply to any municipal election, does not apply' to special elections held for the purpose of voting taxes: Pritchard v. McConnell, 109 Iowa 364; Bras v. McConnell (Iowa), 87 N. W. Rep. 290. As to the form of the bal- lots, see the latter case. 3 Phelps V. Alfred Bank, 18 Wis. 432; Berliner v. Waterloo, 14 Wis. CH. XI.J LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 567 dent to the taking of it are not observed,^ or if, under the ex- isting law, there is no provision under which a part of the municipality concerned can take part in the election,^ or if the vote itself is not such as the law requires.' In special cases 378. The provision of the Louisiana constitution relating to the levy of road and bridge ta,xes is self-operar tive, and police juries can hold an election to take the sense of the tax- payers on the question of the levy of a tax without an enabling act : Logan v> Ouachita, 105 La. 499. In People V. Supervisors, 53 N. Y. 556, are some important rulings upon constitu- tional requirements respecting the submission to the people of laws for the creation of debts. 1 Byrne v. East Carroll, 45 La. An. 393; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Peo- ple (111.), 61 N. E. Rep. 1068. An or- dinance providing for a vote to levy an additional tax of one-third mill on the , city's taxable property does not violate the spirit of the Texas statute which permits municipalities to submit a proposition to vote for a tax of a specific per cent.: Austin v. Austin Gas-Light & C. Co., 69 Tex. 180. As to the requisites of an order by a school board directing that the question of an excess tax be sub- mitted to the people: Peoria & P. TT. R. Co. V. People, 183 III 19. A stat- utory provision as to the time when the county judge should make an order preliminary to a popular vote was held mandatory: Doores v. Var- non, 94 Ky. 507. Under a statute re- quiring that notice of an election on the question of voting a railroad-aid tax shall specify points to which the road shall be "fully completed," if the notice speaks of the road's hav- ing " its line of railroad ironed and cars running thereon," this language is the equivalent of the requirement : Yarish v. Cedar Rapids, I. F. etc. Co., 73 Iowa 556. A tax voted in aid of a railroad was held invalid where the election notice failed to state to what point the road must be com- pleted before the tax should become due: AUard v. Gaston, 70 Iowa 781. Though the statute required notice of the election to be given to the " tax-paying electors," notice to the taxable inhabitants is a substantial compliance therewith: Cartwright V. Sing Sing, 46 Hun 548. Notice held sufiicient where it appeared therefrom that the election was to determine whether a tax should be imposed for school purposes: Rey- nolds Land & C. Co. v. McCabe, 73 Tex. 57. Notice of election to deter- mine whether tax should be levied for maintaining a graded free school : Williamstown Graded Free School Dist. V. Webb, 89 Ky. 364. Immate- rial omission in notice of election : Eakins v. Eakins (Ky.), 30-S. W. Rep. 385. A statute relating to tax elec- tions is not inoperative because it does not provide a method, by regis- tration or otherwise, of ascertaining who are the qualified electors of a school district: Pickett v. Russell (Pla.), 38 South. Rep. 764. That lists of registered voters furnished the in- spectors were not certified is not suf- ficient to avoid the election : Ibid. 2 Campbell County Court v. Taylor, 8 Bush 306; People v. St. Clair Su- pervisors, 11 Mich. 63. 3 When, as a condition to a tax, a favorable vote of a "majority of the electors of the township " is re- quired, this means a majority of those who vote at the same election, whether voting on the tax proposi- tion or not: Enyart v. Trustees, 25 Ohio St. 618. As to what is a majoi-- ity vote, see Sanford v. Prentice, 28 Wis. 358. It was held in North Car- 568 LEGISLATIVE DETBEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [oH. XI. statutes have provided that the question of contracting a debt or levying a tax shall be submitted to taxpayers only. In some states, by reason of special provisions in their constitutions, it is held not competent thus to restrict the vote ; ' but in other states such provisions have been supported.^ Fraudulent prac- tices, including bribery, are suflBcient to invalidate an election.' olina that the legislature could au- thorize less than a majority to yote taxes: State v. Woodhouse, 8 Ired. 104, 106, 9 Ired. 496. A statute pro- viding that if a majority of the votes cast in a town shall be in favor of an annual tax for school purposes, the same shall be levied, does not con- flict with a constitutional provision that no tax shall be levied by any town except for necessary expenses, iinless by a vote of a majority of the qualified voters,' ap it sufficiently ex- pres.ses the intent of the legislature: and if a majority of the voters of a town do actually vote the tax, the election will be sustained: Bigsbe? V. Durham, 99 N. C. 207. In New Jersey it was held that a majority of the taxable residents of a school dis- ' trict must be present to vote on a proposition to raise money to buy land and build a school-house: State V. Middlesex County School-District Trustees, 49 N. J. L. ,607. But a ma- jority of the votes of the taxable residents present at the meeting was held sufficient in Crandallv. Trustees, 51 N. J. L. 138. In Texas it is held that under a constitutional author- ity to levy a tax " if two-thirds of the taxpayers of such city or town shall vote for such tax," this does not mean two-thirds of those who vote, but that all must be counted: Fort Worth V. Davis, 57 Tex. 225. But an election having been held, and a fa- vorable result declared, the courts would inquire iilto the truth of the declaration only in a direct proceed- ing to contest the election; not in a suit by a taxpayer to contest the tax: Dwyerv.Hockworth,57Tex245. And in Werner v. Galveston, 72 Tex. 23, it was decided that an act providing that a certain tax may be levied by municipal governments if two-thirds of the taxpayers voting shall vote in favor thereof, does not violate the constitutional provision above re- ferred to. , 1 Harrington v. Plainview, 37 Minn. 234; Bayard v. Klinge, 16 Minn. 249; Duperier v. Viator, 35 La. An. 957. '■« ^ee Bullock v. Curry, 3 Met. (Ky.) 171; Gould V. Sterling, 23 N. Y. 439; Duanesbu,rg v. Jenkins, 57 N. Y. 177; Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 178;, Venice v. Murdook, 93 U. S. 494. 3 Demaree v. Johnson, 150 Ind. 419. The election in this case was to determine whether a town should aid a railroad by taxation. The vio- lation of a statutory provision that no member of a city council shall be interested in any contract entered into by the city would not defeat a tax levied for the purpose of making payments under the contract: Rob- erts V. Fii-st Nat. Bank, 8 N. D. 504 In Louisiana an election to deter- mine upon a proposition to aid a rail- way enterprise may be contested by the taipayers in interest for "fraud, illegality, and irregularity." These words embrace all matters preceding the election and leading up to it, as well as matters affecting the election itself, and the suit must be brought within three months after the promulgation of the result of the election. A timely suit by some taxpayers, afterwards discon- tinued, would not suspend the run- ning of the statute in favor of others j Guillory v. Avoyelles R. Co., 104 La. CH. s!l.] LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 569 An election upon the question of a tax will not, however, be avoided by the setting off from the district, in the interval be- tween the enabling act and the election, of a new district, where no one in the new district is permitted to vote or be taxed.' In Louisiana it is held that parish authorities in an ordinary- election for railroad-aid purposes, announcing the result, and levying taxes, act not as representatives of the respective parishes, but as ministerial public agencies to ascertain the will of the people, and taxes levied under such election are levied by the taxing power of the owners of property, and not by the parishes under legislative authority.^ The repeal of a law under which a municipality was author- ized, on a favorable vote of its electors, to lay a tax for a pub- lic work, will take away the power, even though the vote has been had, if any corporate act remains to be done to render the vote effectual.' Gallmg popula/r meetings. A popular assemblage for any legal purpose must be regularly convened in such manner as the law may have prescribed. The coming together of a ma- jority of the people of a municipality, or even of all the peo- 11, In North Carolina it has been fore the repeal of a statute under held that it is no part of the duty of which a tax in aid of a railroad had the judges of election to decide upon been voted, the railroad company the number of qualified electors, but had expendeji a small amount for simply to declarethe number of votes preliminary surveys, but nothing for cast for or against the special tax, construction, and the road was finally and report that fact to the board of constructed by a lessee of the . com- commissioners; and the declaration pany; but it did not appear that the of the result of the vote is not final, construction was on faith of the tax. but it may be attacked in the courts Held, that the levy of the tax should for fraud or mistake, and the true be enjoined: Barthel v. Header, 73 vote, if there was fraud or mistake Iowa 135. But where a police jury in the declaration of the result by had proclaimed the r.esult of an eleo- the commissioners, ascertained and tion in favor of a special railroad-aid declared by the court: Young v. tax, and had thereafter passed an or- Hendersonville (N. C), 40 S. E. dinance levying the tax in accord- Eep, 89. ance therewith, such jury was with- 1 Eakins v. Eakins (Ky.), 20 S. W. out legal capacity to pass subse- Kep. 285. quently another ordinance repealing ^FuUiiove V. Police Jury, 51 La. the tax; the railway having in the An, 359. meantime been completed and put 3 Covington, etc. R. Co. v. Kenton in operation: Missouri, K. & T. Trust County Court, 13 B. Monr. 144, Be- Co. v. Smart, 51 La. An. 416. 570 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. pie, at a time and in a manner not provided for by law, and the voting upon the levy of a tax, will have no legal force or validity whatever. In levying taxes, or in exercising any other function of government, the local community can only act under regular forms and according to customary legal reg- ulations; and one of the conditions invariably is, that the power shall be exercised in an orderly manner, at a meeting assembled after due notice, and conducted according to legal forms, in order that there m%y be full opportunity for reflec- tion, consultation, and deliberation upon the important work to be done. Nothing short of this will insure deliberative meetings, or prevent popular gatherings degenerating into mobs, and thereby defeating the purposes for which they are authorized. Corporate meeting^ may be appointed by general statute which names a certain day ^ in the year on which they are to be held. In this manner provision is usually made for annual town and school-district meetings. Of such statutes every citizen is required to take notice, and a meeting assembled at the time and place appointed is a lawful meeting. This is probably the rule even where the notice of the meeting, which some statutes require to be given by publication, has been omitted ; the notice by publication being provided for, not as an essential step, but only by way of additional precaution, to remind the people of the statutory provision which they are nevertheless bound to take notice of, whether the publication takes place or not. The right to hold the meeting comes from the statute, not from the published notice.^ The same statute will commonly specify the subjects which may be considered at such meetings, and will limit any power to levy taxes which is permitted to be exercised. But to make the statutory no- tice suflicient, it would be necessary that the place of meeting be fixed, either by the statute itself or by some public act of 1 It fixes the hour also unless it is 235; State v. Gates, 33 Wis. 203. See otherwise determined. Merchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill 646. 2 People V. Brenham, 3 Cal. 477; As to requirement of statement by- State v.. Jones, 19 Ind. 356; Dishon v. clerk in notice of annual meeting Smith. 10 Iowa 312; People v. Hart- that proposition will be submitted, well, 13 Mich. 508; People v. Cowles, see Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. People 13 N. Y. 350; State v. Orvis, 30 Wis. (111.), 61 N. E. Rep. 106& CH. XI.J LEGISLATIVE DETEBMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 571 which the electors were bound to take notice, and that the meeting he held as appointed.* All special meetings must be regularly called as the statute may have prescribed, for no one is under obligation to pay heed to any but the legal notice, and those ^ho come together in pursuance of any other, do not, for legal purposes, represent the electors.^ The following are customary regulations: That lA meetingadjudged to be valid un- der peculiar circumstances, though not held at the place designated: Wakefield v. Patterson, 25 Kan. 709. But a meeting out of the state would be a nullity: Marion County Com"rs V. Barker, 35 Kan. 358. Where a tax- levy was authorized by a town meet- ing in a town having more than one voting-place, it was not necessary that it appear at which place the meeting was held: Chicago & N. W. E. Co. V. People, 184 III 340. z Thatcher v. People, 93 111. 340, and 98 111. 632; State v. Railroad Co., 75 Mo. 526. That a tax can only be voted at a meeting legally warned, see Bowen v. King, 34 Vt. 156; People v. Jackson County, 93 111. 441; State v. Van Winkle, 35 N. J. L. 73; McPike v. Pen, 51 Mo. 63; State v. St. Louis, etc. K. Co., 75 Mo. 526; Township Board V. Hastings, 52 Mich. 528. Where the officers fix the place of meeting, it must be referred to in the notice: Hodgfiin V. Fry, 33 Ark. 716. As to what is a sufficient warning, see Allen V. Burlington, 45 Vt. 203. A school-district tax voted at a meet- ing not legally called is void : Haines V. School District, 41 Me. 346; Ride- out v. School District, 1 Allen 232; People V. Castro, 39 Cal. 65; State v. Van Syokel, 46 N. J. L. 492; Canda Manuf. Co. v. Woodbridge, 58 N. J. L. 134. A tax voted for a purpose not specifljd in the notice' of special meeting is void: Holt's Appeal, 5 R. L 603. Motion at school-district meeting held to indicate that the tax it referred to was that mentioned in the notice of the meeting: Vaughn V. School District, 37 Or. 57. Con- struction of particular notices: Will- iams V. Larkin, 8 Denio 114; Torrey V. Milbury, 31 Pick. 64 A tax voted at a meeting warned without nam- ing the hour of the meeting in the warrant is void, and it will not j ustify the collector in an action of trespass against him for taking property to satisfy the tax: Sherwin v. Bugbee, 16 Vt. 439. The retiwn of a free- holder upon a warrant from the se- lectmen for warning a meeting of the inhabitants of a school district, that he had warned them according to law, was held to be conclusive in an action by one of the inhabitants against the assessors for assessing a tax on him which had been voted at such a meeting: Saxton v. Nimms, 14 Mass. 315. Under a statute which provided that " every town meeting shall be held in pursilance of a war- rant under the hands of the select- men," a warrant signed by one only was held void, and a tax voted at a meeting held pursuant thereto was invalid, and one who had paid it might recover back of the town: Reynolds v. New Salem, 6 Met. 840. As to the eflEect of fraudulent neglect to give notice or giving misleading notice, see People v. Allen, 6 Wend, 486; People v. Peck, 11 Wend. 604; Marchant v. Langworthy, 6 Hill 646; Randall v. Smith, 1 Denio 314; Jewett V Van Steenburgh, 58 N. Y. 85. That in proving notice of a meeting it is not sufficient to state in the affidavit or return that the notice was given 572 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [OH. XI. the meeting shall be called by the officers of the municipality, either on their own motion or on the application oi a certain number of the voters or freeholders;'- that it shall be notified either by a warning^ delivered or its contents stated to the "in accordance with the act," but it should state the facta, see State. v. Hardcastle, 36 N. J. L. 143; Hard- castle v. State, 37 K J. L. 551; Cardi- gan v. Page, 6 N. a 183; Tattle v. Gary, 7 Greenl. 486. Compare People V. Highway Com'rs; 14 Mich. 538. But see Briggs v. Murdock, 13 Pick. 305; Houghton V. Davenport, 33 Pick. 335; Buoksport V. Spofford, 13 Me. 487. Where the defendants in an action of trespass justified as assessors, and showed by the records of the town that they werfe duly elected at a town meeting legally warded, they were held not bound to go behind the records to show that the proceed- ' ings of the warning officer had been regular: Thayer v. Stearns; 1 Pick. 109. 1 A statute requiring that the peti- tion to take the sense of voters upoi^ a proposition to vote a tax for a graded school must be signed by "at least ten legal voters who are tax- payers in the district," the petitioners must themselves be taxpayers, it not being sufficient that their wives pay taxes: Tate v. Board of Trustees (Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 337. As to peti- tion, see, also, Chicago & N. W. R. Co. V. People (111.), 61 N. E. Rep. 1068. ^Diflferenoe between "calling" a meeting and "warning" it: see Stone V. School District, 8 Gush. 593; Ride- out V. School District, 1 Allen 333. And see, as to the call, George v.School District, 6 Met. 497. Where the war- rant for a meeting specified as the object "to adopt such measures in I'elation to their ministerial concerns as may then and there seem ex- I pedient, and to act thereon as they see cause," held sufficient to sjipport a vote of money in fulffilment of a contract between the minister and a committee, under which he was to discontinue the pastoral relation: Blackburn v. Walpole, 9 Pick. 97. A warrant "to choose a district com- mittee and to act on other business that may be thought necessary " does not authorize prescribing a method for calling subsequent meetings by the clerk, and therefore a subsequent meeting called by the clerk cannot , legally vote taxes: Little v. Merrill, 10 Pick. 548. A warning for a school meeting which stated the object to be " to take into consideration the ex- pediency of raising funds for the use of schooling for the year ensuing," held sufficient. A vote was taken " to raise one cent and five mills on the dollar " on the list for the year, with- out naming any time of payment. Held to be sufficiently definite, and the tax would be payable on demand, or within a reasonable time : Bartlett v. Kinsley, 15 Conn. 337. As to the effect of fcustom on the construction of votes of town meetings, see Free- landv. Hastings, 10 Allen 570, 578-9. An article in the warning of a school /neeting, to see whether the district will have a school the ensuing win- ter, and to see what method the dis- trict will take to pay the expenses of said school, is sufficient to author- ize the district to vote a tax upon the grand list to defray the expenses of the school: Chandler v. Bradish, 33 Vt. 416. A warning to see if a town will vote a tax for the purpose of paying a bounty does not author- ize a vote to borrow money for that purpose: Atwood v. Lincoln. 44 Vt 333. Though there is no article in a warrant for a town-meeting to vote for an assessment for a sewer, yet on. XI.J LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 573 several voters, or by notice published or posted in a manner particularly indicated by the statute ; and that the subjects to be considered at the meeting shall be specified in the warning or notice. "With all these provisions there must be careful compliance, and the meeting when held must confine itself strictly to the subjects indicated in the notice or Avarning.^ Voting the tax. In voting the tax the people will be acting in their political capacity, and their action is to be favorably construed, and not to be overruled or set aside by judicial or any other authority, so long as th^y keep within the limits of the power bestowed upon them. Technical defects and irreg- ularities should be overlooked, so long as the substance of a good vote sufficiently appears, for the obvious reason that local business is largely and of necessity in the hands of plain peo- ple who are unskilled in the technicalities of law and unaccus- tomed to critical or even accurate use of language.^ A strict under an article in a warrant for a meeting to see if an assessment will be laid for sewers constructed under the vote of the previous meeting, ac- tion levying such assessment may be ratified: Smith v. Abington Savings Bank, 171 Mass. 178. 1 "Where it is prescribed that an election to vote taxes shall be held as nearly as practicable in conformity with the general election law, and the general law requires the polls to be kept open from an hour after sun- rise till sunset, a tax is void which is voted at an election held only from 1 to 6 o'clock p. m. : People v. Seale, 52 Cal. 71; compare Holland v. Davis, J6 Ark. 416. 2 Chicago & A. B. Co. v. People, 190 UL 20, 22; Irwin v. Lowe, 89 Ind. 540; Tay mouth v. Koehler, 35- Mich. 23. " F. moved to levy a tax," stc, "motion prevailed," held to amount to a present levy, the intent loeing clear: Snell v. Fort Dodge, 45 towa 564 And see Shontz v. Evans, 40 Iowa 139. At a school-meeting it was voted "that there be an appro- priation sufficient to build a house on," etc., and also that " $800 be lev- ied as a school-house tax." Held, that a tax was voted to build a school- house at the place named in the first resolution: Benjamin v. Malaka, 50 Iowa 648. A municipal vote taken on a proposition to levy " a special additional annual tax " was held, within the spirit of the statute, a proposition to authorize the levy of a " specific per cent. : " Austin v. Aus- tin Gas Light & C, Co., 69 Tex. 180. Under an act providing that the votes for school-taxes shall contain the words " for tax " or " against tax," with the sum placed thereafter which each voter prefers, held, that where the votes contained no sums a levy of any tax was illegal: Rogers' V. Kerr, 43 Ark. 100. Election held not to violate provision of city char- ter that if there be more than one object for a special tax proposed at any election, the word "for" or "against" must be placed opposite each one of those objects: Weston V. Newburg, 67 Hun 137. The fact that at the election at which a prop- osition for the issue of bonds for pav- 5T4 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [OH. XI. construction of their doings would inevitably be mischievous, and would defeat the collection of the revenue in very many cases.' It will be found, therefore, that the courts sustain such action wherever sufficient intent appears to make plain the in- tent of the voters, provided the ' intent is warranted by the law.^ On this principle a town vote, taken under a statute requiring a vote for town purposes to be definite, has been sustained where it specified various purposes particularly, and then in general terms mentioned such other expenses as the town might have to defray for the year.' So the vote of "all the law will allow for school purposes " has been held suffi- cient — the law fixing a limit.^ So a vote " for court-house bonds " may support a tax where the board of supervisors by resolution submitted to the people the question of taxation for a new court-house and prescribed the f6rm of ballot.^ So a vote to levy a railroad tax of five mills on the assessment will ing a street was voted on, a proposi- tion for bonds for building a bridge was also voted for, was held not to invalidate taxes for the payment of the bonds: Maybin v. Biloxi, 77 Miss. 673. Under a statute providing that "towns at their annual meetings may determine when their taxes shall be payable, and that interest shall be collected after that time," a vote declaring that interest should be collected after a certain time was not sufficient without a distinct vote declaring when the taxes should be payable, and a treasurer who issued a warrant for the collection of a tax "with interest thereon," without such a vote, was liable to the person arrested under the warrant: Snow v. Weeks, 77 Me. 439. 1 Chicago & A. B. Co. v. People, 190 111. 30, 23; People v. Chicago & A. R. Co. (111.), 61 N. E. Rep. 1064; School District v. Garvey, 80 Ky. 569. 2 Mowry v. Mowry, 20 R. I. 74. In New Jersey towns have no authority to vote money to meet contingencies, but only for specified purposes. A vote for "incidental expenses," or for " incidentals," or for " incident^ purposes," does not designate with sufficient particularity the purpose for which the tax is imposed, and is of no validity: State v. Saalman, 37 N. J. L. 156; State v. Cole, 51 N. J. L. 277; Rexroth v. Ames, 55 N. J. L. 509.V A town cannot by vote delegate to a committee its author- ity to levy taxes: State v. Koster, 38 N. J.L. 308. • 3 Wright V. People, 87 111. 583. See the same case for the right of towns in Illinois to tax in advance to cre- ate a sinking fund. estate V. Sickles, 24 N. J. L. 135. See, further, as to the sufficiency of a vote for a school tax: West v. Whittaker, 87 Iowa 598; Adams v. Hyde, 27 Vt. 321; Adams v. Sleeper, 64 Vt. 544 As to voting school taxes in West Virginia, see Wells v. Board of Education, 20 W. Va. 157. 5 Milwaukee, etc. R Co. v. Kossuth County, 41 Iowa 57. See, further, Brunswick v. Finney, 54 Ga. 317; Tallman v. Cook, 43 Iowa 330; Bran- dirf V. Harrison County, 50 Iowa, 164; Hurt v. Hamilton, 25 Kan. 76; Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich. 561. CH. XI. j LEGISLATIVE, DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 575 be held suflBcient if the particular object of the vote is ascer- tainable by reference to the remainder of the record.' Other cases are mentioned in the margin.* 1 Shontz V. Evans, 40 Iowa 139. As to voting a sum in gross or voting a percentage, see Bucl: v. People, 78 III 560; Reed v. Millikani 79 Ind. 86; Marion County Cotn'rs v. Harvey County Com'rs, 26 Kan. 181; Weston Lumber Co. v. Munising T'p, 133 Mich. 138. When unndoessary that vote should show rate per cent.: Adams v. Sleeper, 64 Vt. 544. Re- quirement that ordinance should state particular manner in which tax is to be assessed: Frantz v. Jacob, 88 Ky. 535. In levying a tax "for judgment fund," or "for city judgment tax," there is no latent ambiguity, and parol evidence is not admissible in a judgment creditors' suit that the city council did not in- tend the tax for the payment of his judgment: Rice v. Walker, 44 Iowa 438. For an exceedingly liberal con- struction of a vote, see Casady v. Lowry, 49 Iowa 533. 2 A warrant for a town meeting stating the object, among other things, " to raise such sums of money as may be necessary to defray town charges for the ensuing year," is suf- ficient to legalize the voting of a tax for interest on the town debt: West Hampton v. Searle, 137 Mass. 503. Where a warrant for holding a town meeting stated that the purpose was to order a tax for specific purposes stated in such warrant, the omission of the vote taken at such meeting to specify the particular purposes fo^which the tax was to be assessed 4id not invalidate the tax: Mo wry v. Howry, 20 R. I. 74. A statement signed by the board of town auditors and authenticated by the clerk which merely says "that twenty-five per cent, of tax shall be levied on the real estate and personal property of said town, including railroad track and rolling stock for town purposes, and for the payment of outstanding orders,'' is too indefinite to justify extending any tax: Peoria, D. & B. R. Co. V. People, 141 111. 483. As to the particularity required in stating the purpose of a town tax, see Blod- gett v., Holbrook, 39 Vt. 336. The omission of a vote at a town meet- ing called to order town taxes to designate the kind of property to be assessed is supplied by a statute pro- viding that at such meeting the electors may levy a tax on the rat- able property of the town: Mowry V. Mowry, 30 R. I." 74. A school tax nominally levied for building pur- poses.but neither needed nor intended for that purpose, will be enjoined: ^ Appeal of Conners, 103 Pa. St. 356. In New Jersey it is necessary that school-district meetings set apart specifically the sums voted by them to the several purposes, and the vote is void if they do not: State v. Pad- den, 44 N. J. L. 151. In Iowa a sub- district in a district township may vote a tax for a school-house in addi- tion to that voted by the whole town- ship; and its certification for levy may be compelled • by mandamus: Wood V. Farmer, 69 Iowa 533. In Connecticut, in a vote of a school district levying a tax for its purposes, it is not essential to its validity that the particular object for which it was laid should be specified: West School District v. Merrills, 12 Conn. 436. A school-house having been erected under invalid votes, the dis- trict may lawfully vote a tax to pay for it: Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt. 307. As to such meetings in general, their regularity and powers, see Blackburn v. Walpole, 9 Pick. 97; lEB /6 " ¥-'^4 &1Q LEGISLATIVE DETEKMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. If a proposition for a tax is voted down by the electors, it may be submitted a second time unless the statute in terms or by clear implication forbids.' And it has been held that, hav- ing the power to vote a tax, the electors have by necessary implication the power to rescind the vote, unless by so doing they interfere with vested rights.^ In some states township boards are given authority to levy taxes for certain necessary purposes where the electors have neglected or refused to vote.' Record of votes. In every case of the levy of taxes, whether they be voted by representative bodies or by the people, it is Perry v. Dover, 12 Piok.i 206; Little V. Merrill, 10 Pick. 543; Williams v. School District, 21 Pick. ?5; School District v. Atherton, 12 Met. 105; Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 183; Nelson V. Pierce, 6 N. H. 194; Brewster v. Hyde, 7 N. H. 306; Lisbon v. Bath, 21 N. H. 319; SohofE v. Gould, 53 N. H. 512; Hiint v. School District, 14 Vt. 300; Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt. 147; Sherwin v. Bugbee, 17 Vt. 837; Wyley V. Wilson, 44 Vt. 404; Greenbanks v. Boutwell, 43 Vt. 207; Allen v. Bur- lington, 45 Vt. 302; Lander v. School District, 33 Me. 339; Jordan v. School District, 38 Me. 164; Belfast, etc. R Co. V. Brooks, 60 Me. 568; State v. Hardcastle, 36 N. J. L. 143; Hard- castle V. State, 37 N. J. L. 551. That the oflScers or the inhabitants merely treat the proceedings of an invalid meeting as valid does not make them so: Pratt v. Swanton, 15 Vt. 147. Under a statute providing for the raising of revenue by a city for school purposes, the mayor and council thereof may levy an annual tax for such purposes, though a municipal election resulted against the issue of bonds for school purposes mentioned in the act; Ayers v. Mc- Calla, 95 Ga. 555. i-Supervisors v. Galbraith, 99 TJ. S. 314. 2 Hibbs V. Board of Directors, 110 Iowa 306. This case holds that where the electors of a school district vote to levy a school-house tax, they may rescind the same at the next annual election when the tax has not been certified or levied by the school board, though one of the electors has begtin an action to compel the board to certify and levy the tax. Under the Iowa code a tax voted for the erection of a court-house may be re- scinded by vote of the electors: Windsor v. Polk County (Iowa), 87 N. W. Rep. 704. 3 See Ryerson v. Laketon, 52 Mich. 510; Peninsular Iron & L. Co. v. Crystal Falls T'p, 60 Mich. 510; Will- iams v. Mears, 61 Mich. 86; Mills v. Eichland T'p, 73 Mich. 100; Hard- ing V. Bader, 75 Mich. 316; Gamble V. Auditor-General, 78 Mich 302; Ne- waygo Manuf. Co. v. Echtman, 81 Mich. 416; Tillotson v. Webber, 96 Mich. 144; Auditor-General v. Duluth, S. S. & A. E. Co., 116 Mich. 123; Audi- tor-General V. Sparrow, 116 Mich. 574; Webster Lumber Co. v. Munis- ing T'p, 123 Mich. 13a In Illinois, where the statute authorizes the electors present at the annual town- ship meeting to levy a tax for all township purposes, the board of town auditors has no power to levy town taxes: Peoria, D. & E.'r Co. v. Peo- ple, 141 111. 483. CH. XI.J LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 5T7 requisite that the action which authorizes the levy or determines anything of importance concerning it shoald'appear of record. This is very justly and properly insisted upon in the decisions of courts. " Every essential proceeding in the course of a levy of taxes," it is said in one case, " must appear in some written and permanent form in the record of the bodies authorized to act upon them. Such a thing as a parol levy of taxes is not legally possible under the laws." ' And in another, in which • Campbell, J., in Moser v. White, 29 Mich. 50. 60. See also Appeal of Powers, 29 Mich. 504; Taymouth T'p V. Koehler, 35 Mich. 22; Flint, etc. E. Co. V. Auditor-General, 41 Mich. 635: Williams v. Hears, 61 Mich. 86; Michigan Land, etc. Co. v. L'Anse Tp, 63 Mich. 700; Burroughs v. Goff, 64 Mich. 464; Rogers v. White, 68 Mich. 10; Harding v. Bader, 75 Mich. 316; Gamble v. Auditor-General, 78 Mich. 308; Newaygo County Manuf. Co. V. Echtman, 81 Mich. 416; Boyce V. Auditor-General, 90 Mich. 314; Loose V. Navarre, 95 Mich. 603; Doe V. MoQuilkin, 8 Blaokf. 335; Lee v. Crawford (N. D.), 88 N. W. Eep. 97; Greer v. Howell, 64 Tex. 688; Hecht V. Boughton, 2 Wyo. 398. Where a tax is ordered for a specific purpose, it must appear^that it was levied for that purpose: Louisville & N. R. Co. V. Commonwealth, 89 Ky. 531. Under a statute requiring the official acts of each school board to be recorded by its clerk, a tax-levy which has been duly signed by th^ directors and filed with the township treas- urer is not invalidated by the failure to record the directors' action in making the levy, since tfie officers charged with carrying the levy for- ward act upon the certificate of levy 3,nd not upon the record of the board: Lawrence v. Trainer, 136 111. 474. Where by law it is the duty of the board of supervisors to cause the amount of the arrearages of the road- tax returned by the overseer of high- ways to be levied and returned like 37 other taxes, it is not necessary to the validity of such a tax that the board's records show it ordered the levy of the tax: Wabash R. Co. v. People, 135 111. 303. County com- missioners, being authorized to sub- scribe to the stock of a turnpike company when satisfied that an amount sufficient to complete each mile subscribed to had been taken by private subscription, subscribed, but there was no record that they were satisfied as to the fact of such subscription. Held, that the levy was not void for the want of record evidence, as it appeared that the pri- vate subscription had been made: Clark V. Leathers (Ky.), 5 S. W. Rep. 576. Entries by school-district board held equivalent' to a formal order imposing tax and fixing rate thereof: Eakins v. Eakms, 20 S. W. Rep. 285. The records of the county court of claims, though inartificially kept, were held sufficient to sustain a tax- levy for ^certain years, as the pro- ceedings of such bodies will be up- held if it can reasonably be done: Fish V. Genett (Ky.), 56 8. W. Rep. 813. A township record showing a vote of highway and contingent taxes upon the day of the annual township meeting, sufficiently shows that the action taken was that of the electors, and it will be presumed that it was taken at the time pro- vided by statute: Auditor-General V. Longyear, 110 Mich. 223. A city common council's failure to make an estimate, as required by the char- 578 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. the actioa of a convention of town delegates in voting a county tax was in question, "a record of the doings of such a conven- tion is the only evidence to show a county tax duly granted." ^ The importance of the record is seen in the fact that it is intended by the law not only for evidence but for the only evidence of the action taken ; and that when properly made up its recitals are conclusive ; evidence to disprove them not being receivable." The records ought to be duly authenticated on their face by the officers who make them, though if they have been kept in the proper custody, and are identified beyond question this is probably not essential.' If the record is lost or ter, of the general expenditures be- fore levying city taxes, will not be presumed fi-om there being no entry thereof upon the council's record where such entry is not expressly re- quired: Auditor-General v. Hutchin- son, 113 Mioh. 245. City taxes voted at a special meeting of a city coun- cil cannot be held void because the record does, not show the members were duly notified of the call for the meeting, all not being present: Au- ditor-General v. Sparrow, 116 Mioh. 574. The recital in an order of the county court, levying a tax for prior years, of the fact that those years had been omitted, and that no tax had been extended on the tax-book against defendant's property, is suflS- cient proof of the omission, and it was not necessary to show that de- fendant's property had been omitted for those years: State v. Hannibal & St. J. E. Co. (Mo.), 11 S. W. Rep. 746. Records of a board of county com- missioners showing levy of a specific amount for each item of county ex- pense, held a sufScient compliance with the law as to such itemized statements: Shuttock v. Smith, 6 N. D. 56. 1 Richardson, J., in Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 183, 191. See Farrar v. Fessenden, 39 N. H. 268, 277. Fowler, J., says: "The. records of taxes were properly received to prove the taxa- tion, which, being matter of record, could be proved in no other way, un- less the loss of the records was first shown." See, also, Paul v. Linscott, 56 N. H. 347; Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wyo. 368. In Nebraska, if the record fails to show that a school district tax was one authorized to be voted, it cannot be collected; but the mere failure to specify in the tax duplicate all the uses to which the moneys are to be applied is not fatal: Burling- ton, etc. R. Co. V. Lancaster County, 4 Neb. 393. In Gearhart v. Dixon, 1 Pa. St. 224, 228, it is said of the record of a school-tax, that " where it was defective it might be explained or supplied by parol testimony. . . . The law does not require school di- rectors to keep a record of their pro- ceedings, although it is better that they should do so." Compare Moor V. Newfleld, 4 Me. 44. The omission from the record of a levy of the words " on the dollar " after the speci- fication of' the number of mills in case of some of the taxes voted, is a mere irregularity, and will not vi- tiate the proceedings: Jefifgrson County Com'rs v. Johnson, 23 Kan. 717. 2 Taylor v. Henry, 3 Pick. 397; Bis- sell V. JeflEersonville, 24 How. 387; 'Halleok v. Boylstoh, 117 Mass. 469, and cases cited; Eddy v. Wilson, 48 Vt. 363. , 3 The proceedings of a levying court in Arkansas were held not in- OH. XI.J LEGISI^ATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 579 destroyed, its contents are subject to parol proof as in other cases, after the necessary preliminary showing has been made.^ But in the absence of evidence that a record ever existed, the fact cannot be made out by pj-esuming it.^ When taxes are voted by a city council or other local body, a common and very useful provision is one that the yeas and nays shall be entered on the journal, so that no member shall escape his proper share of responsibility for the vote. Such a provision is mandatory,' and if disregarded, a subsequent amendatory resolution passed after a change in the member- valid because not signed by the mem- bers of the court, where they were written up by the authorized oflScer: "Hilliard v. Bunker, 68 Ark. 340. A failure of the 'oflScers to sign the record of the board of supervisors does not vitiate a tax levied by it: Laoey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; People V. Eureka, etc. Co., 48 Cal. 143; Martin V. Cole, 38 Iowa 141. But see Weston V. Monroe, 84 Mich. 341. In Kansas it said that if the proper officer has failed to record the levy of a tax the neglect will not be suffered to defeat it: Kansas City, etc. R. Co. v. Tontz, 29 Kan. 460. Though orders of the county court of claims were not signed by the county judge by his own hand, yet, as his name appears to them, it must be presumed to have been placed there regularly: Fish v. Genett (Ky.), 56 S. W. Rep. 613. 1 Irwin V. Miller, 23 111. 348; Farrar V. Fessenden, 39 N. H. 368; Quinby V. North American, etc. Co., 2 Heisk. 596. As to helping out defective rec- ords by proof, see McReynolds v. Longenburger, 75 Pa. St. 13. 2 Hilton V. Bender, 69 N. Y. 75. Where the statute requires a levy of a special tax to appear of record in a book left in th^ office of the city re- corder, the tax-deed, though prima facie evidence, is defeated by show- ing that no record was made ; a mere memorandum by the city recorder will not suffice: Hintrager v. Kiene, 62 Iowa 605. The presumption that public officers did their duty cannot establish jurisdictional facts required to support action by the voters of a town in regard to the question of paying road taxes in labor, such as the filing of a petition and the giving of notice of the meeting: Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Randle, 183 111. 364. In Michigan, by statui;e, proof in tax cases that no record can be found is not proof that it never was made, and the presumption in favor of a tax-title may sustain the proceedings: see Upton v. Kennedy, 86 Mich. 215; Redding v. Lamb, 81 Mich. 318; Benedict v. Auditor-Gen- eral, 104 Mich. 269. ' Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; Pickton v. Fargo (N. D.), 88 N. W. Rep. 90. Compai-e Tobin v. Morgan, 70 Pa. St. 229. A different rule seems to prevail in New York: Striker v. Kelly, 7 Hill 9; Elmendorf v. New York, 25 Wend. 693. A resolution by a city council levying a general city tax is neither an ordinance nor a proposition to create any liability, against the city, or for the expendi- ture or appropriation of its money, so as to require a yea and nay vote: Shuttuok V. Smith, 6 N. D. 56. In Arkansas it is- held that no rule re- quires the yeas and nays to be called and taken down on the voting of an appropriation by the levying court: Hilliard v. Bunker, 68 Ark. 340. 580 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. ship of the body will not save it.' But without such a provis- ion it would be necessary only that the record should show a- quorum present and the proposition adopted.^ Promulgating and certifying the vote. Sometimes the stat- utes provide that public and oflBcial promulgation shall be made of the result of an election held to determine whether a tax should be voted ; and it has been held that such promulgation is essential to the validity of the tax voted.' A tax, when voted by the people, or by a local board, is sometimes required to be certified to some other authority by which final action in the case is then taken. This in several states is the case with school taxes, the votes for which are required to be certified by the proper school district officer to the township or county oflicers for the levy of the tax. It has been held in several cases that the certificate was jurisdictional, and that a levy without it could not be supported.* But if the certificate is given and 1 Pontiac v; Axford, 49 Mich. 69. .2 Where the record stated that A., B., p., and others, justices of the county court, were present, held not enough, as it did not affirmatively appear that'fi majority was present: Dudley's Ex'rs v. Oliver, 5 Ired. 237. Compare State v. Mcintosh, 7 Ired. 68; Insurance Co. v. Sortwell, 8 Allen 217; Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Billiard v. Bunker, 68 Ark. 340. 3 Reynold^ etc. Co. v. Monroe, 45 La. An. 1034. An order making a levy for irrigation purposes need not recite the election authorizing it, though such election is a condition precedent to a valid levy. Cooper v. Miller, 113 Cal. 238. Where the tax-bills are properly authenticated it must be presumed that the pro- ceedings of the city council were duly published: Powell v. Louisville (Ky.), 53 S. W. Rep. 798, citing Fonda V. Louisville (Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 785. * Sage V. Auditor-General, 73 Mich. 638; Gamble v. Auditor-General, 78 Mich. 302; Burlington, etc. R. Co. v. Saunders County, 16 Neb. 183. So if given, but not complying in its es- sentials with the statute: Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. V. People, 141 111. 483; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 163 III. 616; MuUins v. Andrews (Ky.),45 S. W. Rep. 231; State v. Duryea, 40 N. J. L. 266; State v.. Middlesex County School Dist. Trustees, 49 N. J. L. 607. So, where a certificate re- quired to be made by the board of directors of a school district was made and signed by two of the di-( rectors after the board had ad- journed, and without authority from the board: People v. Chicago & N. W. R Co., 183 111. 311, and cases cited. But where the certificate of levy was prepared while the board was in session, and was not signed by the members, as they did not understand it to be necessary that their names should appear therein, the court properly permitted them to sign at the hearing of objections to the rendition of judgment for the taxes levied: Chicago & N. W. R Co. v. People, 183 111. 247. The county authorities cannot levy for one year a school-tax that should have been certified to them for the year before: CH. XI.] LEGISLATIVE DBTEEMINATIOlSr THAT TAX BE LAID. 581 is sufficient in substance, all mere technical defects and infor- malities should be disregarded.^ Such certificate is not, how- ever, conclusive.^ Adherence to the vote. When a proposition is required to be submitted to the people, and is actually submitted and passed upon, any subsequent mpdification by the officers who are to act upon it is ull/ra vires and nugatory.' Those officers must Weber v. Railway Co., 108 111. 451, citing Lebanon v. Eailway Co., 77 111. 539. In Michigan it has been held that if the oflScer to whom the tax should be certifled has no au- thority or discretion in the case, and he actually proceeds to ievy the tax without the proper certificate, the failure to transmit it ought to be held the neglect of a mere formality, and the tax sustained: Smith v. Crit- tenden, 16 Mich. 152. See Upton v. Kennedy, 36 Mich. 315; Iowa R. Land Co. v. Carroll County, 39 Iowa 151; Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 111. 346. But as to this, see Matteson T. Rosendale, 37 Wis. 254; 'Powell v. Supervisors,, 46 Wis. 310; Cairo, etc. R. Co. V." Parks, 32 Ark. 131; Worthen V. Badgett, 33 Ark. 496; Hodgkm v. Fry, 33 Ark. 716. Where a certifi- cate was found in the county clerk's oflBce with the file-mark thereupon, the presumption was that it was filed at the date named in the file- mark, and that the tax-levy was based on it: Gage v. Nichols, 135 IlL 128, distinguishing Gage v. Bailey, 103 III. 11. iWest v. Whitaker, 37 Iowa 598; Snell v. Fort Dodge, 45 Iowa 564. Where a clerk was required to cer- tify the " aggregate amount " of the tax required to be levied, it is enough ' if he certifies that the ' necessary amount of taxes was a Certain per cent, on the town's taxable property. This gives information sufficiently definite, and the form of words is im- material: Gage V. Bailey, 102 111. 11; Burlington, etc. R. Co. v. Lancaster County, 13 Neb. 324. See Dent v. Bryce, 16 S. C. 1; State v.> Thompson, 18 S. C. 538; State v. Gadsen County, 17 Fla. 418; Hodgkin v. Fry, 83 Ark. 716. Where a board of town audi- tors had no authority to levy town taxes, but only to certify claims au- dited, a certificate by it " that we want $100 for town purposes " was insufficient to justify the levy of a tax to raise that sum, since it could not be presumed, in the absence of any certificate of claims audited, that the amount certifled was for the pur- pose of paying such claims: St. Louis, R. L & C. R. Co. V. People, 147 111. 9, following Peoria, D. & E. R. Co. v. People, 191 111. 483. If a certificate for the levy of an agricultural soci- ety tax is required to be signed and sworn to by the president and secre- tary of the society, it is fatally de- fective if signed and sworn to by one of them only: Hogelskampv. Weeks, 37 Mich. 433. 2 Baltimore & O. S. W. R. Co. v. People, 156 111. 189, which holds that although the town clerk certified that a tax was voted at a certain town meeting, a record of such meet- ing showing that no such tax was levied is competent evidence against the tax. 8 Platteville v. Galena, etc. R. Co., 43 Wis. 493; Hodgman v. Railroad Co., 20 Minn. 48; State v. Daviess County, 64 Mo. 30. Under a statute restricting the highway money tax to fifty cents on $100 valuation, a tax of one per cent, voted for highway purposes cannot be treated as though 582 LEGISLATIVE DETEKMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. CH. XI. obey and keep within the vote taken,^ and it is their duty to take positive action to levy a tax for which the popular vote calls.^ Where, however, the conditions on which a tax was voted have not been complied with, the collection of such tax cannot be enforced.' Conclusiveness of municipal action. In all legal proceedings, after proper evidence is given of municipal action, it is always to be assumed that the municipality, whether represented by its people or by its official board, has acted wisely and well upon all matters of policy and of discretion which have been submitted to it, and that the conclusion was warranted by the facts and circumstances which were the basis of its action. The courts have no power to review their action, so long as they are found to have kept within the limits of their author- ity. The legislature, which gives and recalls at pleasure the power to tax, may do so, but not the courts.* A learned and able court has spoken very clearly and point- edly concerning the absence of power in the judicial tribunals one-half of it were for labor, and such tax is void: Peninsular Savings Bank v. Ward, 118 Mich. 87. A reso- lution to raise a sum of money to build a school-house was followed by a resolution that several bonds, pay- able in successive years, should be issued. Held, that it was erroneous to issue a certificate to levy the whole amount in one year: State v. Clark, 52 N. J. L. 291. 1 Sullivan v. Walton, 30 Fla. 552; Carlton v. Newman, 77 Me. 408 j Eowell V. Horton, 57 Vt. 31. The legislature cannot authorize the as- sessment on a school district of an excess expended by the district offi- cers in the absence of a vote by the district to raise such excess: Carlton V. Newman, 77 Me. 408. 2 Iowa R. Land Co. v. Woodbury, 39 Iowa 172. Omission of order making levy to state upon what con- ditions railroad-aid taxes voted at election should be paid did not in- validate levy, especially when clerk's certificate contained the conditions: Bartemeyer v. Rohlfs, 71 Iowa 582. 3 Cox V. Forest City & S. E. Co., 66 Iowa 289. Taxes voted to aid in the construction of a railroad cannot be collected for another company which has acquired the road: Man- ning V. Mathews, 66 Iowa 675; Blunt V. Carpenter, 68 Iowa 265. ■ Where conditions precedent to the levy of a railroad -aid tax are not complied with, if the railroad company as- signs its right to the tax, the as- signee takes it subject to all equi- ties: Sully V. Drennan, 113 U. S, 287. Where a town tax is raised to pay bonds issued in aid of a railroad the voters cannot apply it to any other purpose, even though the bonds are void: Aurora v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 119 111. 246. * Mayfield Woolen Mills v. Mayfield (Ky.), 61 S. W. Rep. 43; Young v. Lane, 48 Neb. 812; State v. Sheldon, 53 Neb. 365. CH. XI.] LEGISLATIYE DETKEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 683 to entertain appeals from the municipal bodies, in the exercise of their discretionary power to tax. The case was one in which the attempt was made to enjoin school directors from the levy of a tax regularly voted. " No such appeal lies, for none is given by law. Most of our tax laws entitle the citizen to a hearing before he is obliged to pay; not to a judicial hear- ing, indeed, but to an appeal to some special tribunals, gener- ally the county commissioners; but the school law gives no such appeal. This is the reason why the ear of the courts should be open to well founded complaints on the part of the citizen ; but where he has no irregularity, no neglect of duty, no excess of authority to complain of, nothing, indeed, but an indiscreet use of clearly granted discretion, he will vex the judicial ear in vain, for the judicial arm can redress no such wrong. The power of taxation, altogether legislative, and in no degree judicial, is committed by the legislature, in the mat- ter of schools, to the directors of school districts. If the di- rectors refuse to perform their duties, the court can compel them. If they transcend their powers, the court can restrain them. If they misjudge their power, the court can correct them. But if they exercise their unquestionable powers un- wisely, there is no judicial remedy."' This is a clear and strong statement of a wise and salutary general principle. When, therefore, a school district, having competent power by statute to do so, determines in due form of law to erect a school-house, no discontented party is to be heard to allege, as a basis for legal relief, that the building was unnecessary or the cost too great, or that in any other particular the action taken was unwise or impolitic. It is conclusive that it has been decided upon by the competent tribunal;^ and if the decision was by a meeting of electors, the record of the meeting is con- clusive that those who met and voted upon the question were competent to do so.' ^Woodward, J., in Wharton v. were alleged: see Demaree v. John- School Directors, 43 Pa. St. 358, 364 son, 150 Ind. 419; Guillory v.Avoy- 2 Williams v. School District, 31 elles R. Co., 104 La. 11. The action Pick. 75; Powers's Petition, 53 Mo. of a town having authority to buy 318; Wharton v. School Directors, 43 and improve a cemetery cannot be Pa. St. 358. attacked on grounds of extravagance . s Eddy v. Wilson, 43 Vt. 863. Pos- when the power has not been ex- sibly it might be otherwise if fraud ceeded: Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 584 LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. Judicial questions. It is possible,, however, for judicial ques- tions to arise under some tax laws, which must first be passed upon by the local authorities, but Tfhere their decision cannot . be final. Many such questions are referred to in later chap- ters of this work. It has been held in Indiana that where a subscription of a township in aid of a railroad was by law to be made by county commissioners when certain facts appeared, the county commissioners in acting upon the facts were acting judicially, and an appeal woilld lie from them to the courts; ' but the cases in which such an appeal would be allowable must ' be very rare. Restrictions upon municipal taxation. All municipal cor- porations and bodies are, in respect to the power to tax, under certain restrictions, some of which inhere in the very nature of government, while others are expressly imposed. We have seen already that the states, by virtue of their membership in the Union, are by implication forbidden to lay any tax which would preclude or embarrass any federal agency, or the exer- cise of any federal power. What the states cannot themselves do, they cannot empower their municipal bodies to do.^ Con- gress, as to the municipalities within the territories and the District of Columbia, might doubtless give larger powers of taxation than could be conferred by the states, but it is not customary to do so. We have also seen that by implication the powers of taxation that are conferred by the state are so restricted as to preclude the taxation of state agencies and state property.^ Also that local taxation must be restricted to local purposes.* Upon these subjects nothing further need be said here. ' But it has been deemed important by the people in many states that they go further arid impose special restrictions, riot, only in respect to local taxation, but also in respect to state 94. That one has participated in an i County Com'rs v. Karp, "90 Ind. election to vote a tax does not estop 236. , him from questioning its validity: - Stuyvesant v. New York, 7 Cow. Tate v. Board of Trustees (Ky.), 49 588; Illinois Con. Fem. Coll. v. Cooper, S. W. Eep. 337. That courts cannot 35 111. 148; Haywood v. Savannah, 13 restrict or restrain a power conferred Ga. 404; O'Donneli v, Bailey, 24 Miss. to grant licenses for reveiiue, see 386. Kniper v. Louisville, 7 Bush 599, cit- » Ante, p. 365. ing Mason v. Lancaster, 4 Bush 406. ^Ante, ch, V. CH. XI. J LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 585 levies; and they have, therefore, done so by their constitutions. Some of these are an absolute negation of taxation for certain purposes ; as, for example, to give aid to private corporations.^ Some such restrictions have been deemed necessary to prevent the state, as well as the municipalities, from engaging in wild schemes and speculative or extravagant enterprises, and they fix a limit to pgwer which must be observed strictly. It is neither incompetent nor unusual for the state to confer upon its counties, townships, cities, and villages a fery general authority to tax for their purposes all the subjects of taxation within their territorial limits as fuUj' as the state itself taxes them.^ But the power, both as to extent and duration, is during the pleasure of the legislature,' subject only to the restrictions already mentioned," that when municipal corporations under competent authority have contracted debts, the creditors have a right to rely upon this power for their security, and it cannot afterwards be so far restricted as to prejudice their demands.'' •In some cases a question has arisen whether such a restriction, when imposed in general terms, was a restriction on the state, and also on its municipalities. Without under- taking to classify them, the following are referred to: Slack v. Railro3,d Co., 13 B. Monr. 1, 16; Dubuque County V. Railroad Co., 4 Greene (Iowa) 1; Clapp V. Cedar County, 5 Iowa 15; State V. Wapello County, 13 Iowa 388 ; Clark V. Janesville, 10 Wis. 186; Bushnell V. Beloit. 10 Wis. 195; Pretty man v. Supervisors, 19 111. 406; Rob- ertson V. Rookford, 31 IlL 451; John- son V. Stark County, 34 111. 75; Pprkins V. Lewis, 24 111. 208; Butler v. Dun- ham, 27 111. 474; People v. Chicago, 51 111. 17, 34; Richmond v. Scott, 48, Ind. 568; People v. Supervisors, etc., 16 Mich. 354; Bay City v. State Treasurer, 33 Mich. 449, 504. An ex- emption from "public taxes," held riot to be an exemption from taxa- tion for municipal purposes: Morgan V. Cree, 46 Vt. 773. _, 2 Wingate v. Sluder, 6 Jones L. 553; Durach's Appeal, 63 Pa. St. 491; Aii- gusta V. National Bank, 47 Ga. 563; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Monr. 830, 339. Authority to assess " all taxable property " embraces all taxable at the time the authority is given, and all made taxable by subsequent legis- lation: Buffalo V. Le Couteulx, 15 N. Y. 451. A statute authorizing the town council of Beaufort to make such assessment on the inhabitants, or persons holding taxable property tkerein, as should appear expedient, conferred the power tp impose suoh taxes as the council might deem ex- pedient, without any specific limita- tion as to the ambunt or rate of such taxes: State v. Town Council, 39 S. C. 5. 3 Augusta V. North, 57 Me. 392; Richmond v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 31 Grat. 604. *8ee ante, p. 131. and cases cited; also, Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 278; Hammond v. Place, 116 Mich. 638; Gillis v. Green, 54 Miss. 592. When by constitutional limitation a city is restricted to a certain per cent, on the valuation at the time when 586 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [C5. XI. The most common of the express restrictions upon the munici- pal power to tax is one limiting the amount or the rate tha^ can be imposed in any one year.' A municipal levy in disregard of the restriction is void.'' city bonds are voted and sold, it is not competent subsequently so to direct the taxing power of the city to other objects as to prevent pay- ment of interest on the bonds. If the taxing power will not produce enough for all purposes, the proceeds should be shared pro rata: Sibley v. Moljile, 3 Woods 535. 1 A provision in the constitution of a state that "the legislature shall re- strict the power of such [municipal] corporations to levy taxes and assess- ments, so as to prevent the abuse of that power," is not self-executing; Henderson v. Hughes County, 13 S. D. 576. 2 For constitutional limitations upon the amount or rate of taxation, see ante, pp. 172-177. For cases bear- ing upon statutory as well as con- stitutional restrictions, see Macon County V. United States. 134 U. S. 833: Maish v. Arizona, 164 U. S. 193; United States v. Cicero, 41 Fed. Rep. 83; Drew County v. Bennett, 43 Ark. 864; Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Express v. Crawford County, 63 Ark. 576; 'Bode V. New England Inv. Co., 6 Dak. 499; Ford V. Carters ville, 84 Ga. 313; Au- rora v. Chicago, B. & Q. E. Co., 119 111. 346; Wright v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R Co., 120 111. 541; Chicago & A. R Co. V. People, 155 ItL 376, 163 111. 616: People v. Lake E. & W. R, 167 111. 383; O'Day v. People, 171 111. 293; St. Louis, R 1 & C. R Co. v. People, 177 III. 78; Chicago & A. R Co. v. People, 177 111. 91; Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. E. Co. V. Handle, 183 111. 364; Knopf V. People, 185 111. 20; Hodges V. Crowley, 186 IlL 305; Wabash R Co. V. People, 187 111. 289; Williams v. Poor, 65 Iowa 410; Atchison, T. & S. F. R Co. V. Wilhelm, 33 Kan. 206; Atchison, T. & S. F. R Co. v. County Com'rs, 47 Kan. 733; Columbus Wa^ ter Co. V. Columbus, 48 Kan. 99, 378; Midland Elevator Co. v. Stewart, 50 Kan. 378; Stewart v. Kansas Town Co., 50 Kan. 553; Marion & M. R Co. V. Alexander (Kan.), 64 Pao. Eep. 978; Byrne v. Covington (Ky.), 21 S. W. Eep. 1050; Gosnell v. Louisville (Ky.), 46 S. W. Eep. 723; Lexington & E. K R Co. V. Trustees, 54 S. W. Eep, 713; Witkowski V. Bradley, 35 La. An. 904; Putnam v. Grand Rapids, 58 Mich. 416; Boycev. Sebricg, 66 Mich. 310; Seymour v. Peters, 67 Mich. 415; Hecock V. Van Dusen, 80 Mich. 359; Newaygo County Manuf. Co. v. Ech- ' tinaw, 81 Mich. 416; Sohneewind v. Niles, 103 Mich. 301; Hammond v. Place, 116 Mich. 628; Cowart v. Tax- worth, 67 Miss. 323; Huntley v. Wi- nona Bank, 69 Miss. 663; Boquechitto, V. Lewis, 75 Miss. 741; Chicago, B. & Q. R Co. V. Nemaha County, 50 Neb. 393; Chase County v. Chicago, B. & Q. R Co., 58 Neb. 374; State v. Atlan- tic City, 49 N. J. L. 558; New York Savings Bank v. Grace, 102 N. Y. 313; State V. Atkinson, 107 N. C. 317; State V. Humphreys, 35 Ohio St. 530; State V. Strader, 35 Ohio St. 537; Birdseye V. Clyde, 61 Ohio St. 37; Atchison, T. & S. F. R Co. V. Wiggins, 5 Okl.477; Wiggins V. Atchison, T. & S. F. R Co., 9 Okl. 118; Corbett v. Portland, 31 Or. 407; Gadsby v. Portland (Or.), 63 Pac. Eep. 14; Fingal v. Millvale, 163 Pa. St. 374: Dean v. Lufkin, 54 Tex. 265; Basset v. El Paso, 88 Tex. 168; Denison v. Foster, 90 Tex. 23; San Antonio v. Berry, 93 Tex 319; Sorao Lumber Co. v. Lincoln County (Wis.), 85 N. W. Rep. 1038; Powder River Cattle Co. v. County Com'rs. 3 Wyp. 597; Grand Island & N. W. E. OH. X1.J LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 587 The legislature, in the plenitude of its power in matters of taxation, may of course make special exceptions, so as to au- thorize the incurring of particular obligations which will re- Co. V. Baker, 5 Wyo. 369. A limita- tion as to one purpose which is speci- fied is not a limitation as to others: Brocaw v. Gibson, 73 Ind. 543. The general laws of Iowa do not ,limit a city's power to tax so that, after levy- ing ten mills for general city pur- poses and road purposes, it cannot levy a tax to pay a judgment against it: Eicev. Walker, 44 Iowa 458. That a school-district tax is not within a statute which limits the amount of a tax for town and county purposes, see Taft v.' Wood, 14 Pick. 363; Good- rich V. Lunenburg, 9 Gray 38, 40; Blickensderfer v. School Directors, 30 Pa. St. 38., Where a village, after a cause of action has accrued against it, reorganizes under the general in^ corporation law, thereby obtaining a right to levy taxes at a higher rate than before, and the cause of action is then reduced to judgment, the vil- lage may levy taxes at the higher rate in order to pay such judgment, since by statute the liabilities of a municipality are not released by such a reorganization: Carney -v. Mar- seilles, 136 III. 401. Under a statute providing for the assessment upon a municipality's taxable property of judgments against the municipality, and for the adding of the amount thereof to other municipal taxes, it is no defense that such assessment will increase taxation above the rate allowed by the charter: Hammond V. Place, 116 Mich. 638. A provision limiting a tax-levy was held not vio- lated by a liability accruing annually though the aggregate of the accruals exceeded the limit: Ludington Water-Supply Co. v. Ludington, 119 Mich. 480. A paving assessment di- vided into five annual instalments, none exceeding five per cent, of the assessed valuation, does not violate a statute limiting the amount to be raised in any one year in any special assessment district to five per cent, of the assessed valuation of the prop- erty included therein: Boehme v. Monroe, 106 Mich. 401. A levy of city taxes, not in excess of the limit prescribed by statute, is not rendered invalid by the making of a subse- quent levy, which, together with the original levy, exceeds such limit: Basset v. El Paso, 88 Tex. 168. Where the statute authorizes a levy for two separate purposes, and requires the amount to be levied for each to be levied separately, in specific sums, the mere fact that a levy for one of those purposes does not exceed the statutory limit does not warrant the inclusion therein of items for the other purpose: Chicago & A. R. Co. V. People, 155 111. 376: Knopf v. Peo- ple, 185 111. 30. Where the extent of a special tax in any one year is lim- ited by the statute to an amount not exceeding the regular annual tax for such year, then if no regular annual tax is levied any attempt to levy a special tax must fail, as such tax in any amount would be in excess of the regular levy : Walker v. Edmonds, 197 Pa. St. 645. Under a statute lim- iting taxes for school purposes to two per cent, of the taxable property, "the valuation to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county taxes," the assessment referred to is not that for the preceding year, although such assessment is still in- complete when the first step toward levying the school tax must be taken : Wabash R. Co. v. People, 147 111. 196. As to what assessment governs, see, also, Culbertson v. Fulton, 137 111. 30; Lussem v. Sanitary Drainage 588 LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. quire taxation in excess of the general limitation to provide for them.i The general restriction,. But the most important, and per- haps the most effective, restriction of all is the rule of law which requires all municipal organizations or boards to show the grant of any authority they may assume to exercise. Towns, it has been said — and the remark applies to all such organizations, — are corporalSons of limited powers ; they can- not vote and assess money upon the inhabitants for all pur- poses indiscriminately, but must be confined to the established powers of towns, as settled by positive enactment or by well They' cannot, therefore, tax ex- defined and ancient usage.^ Dist. (HI.), 61 N. E. Rep. 544; State v. Tomahawk Common Council, 96 Wis. 73. How amount of taxable property in county is determined in order to ascertain ra^e of taxation: State v. Kansas City, St. J. ^ Com'rs, 36 Kan. 181. levy of taxes exceeded the limit of * In New Hampshire an excessive taxation by about three dollars, a tax is held void for the excess only: deed based upon such levy was void: Taft v. Barrett, 58 N. H. 447. In Boyce v. Sebring, 66 Mich. 310. Iowa, where the law limited the ' Case v. Pean, 16 Mich. 113. But amount to be levied to one per cent, an unintentional error may not have and three were levied, it is said the this effect: O'Grady v, Barnhisel, S3 levy to the legal limit may be up- Cal. 387. 396; Kelly v. Corson, 8 Wis. held: McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa 183. See State v. Newark, 35 N. J. L. 48. In Rhode Island a town tax in 399. An excess inserted to cover excess of the statutory limit is not possible contingencies in collecting void as a whole, and will be sus- was held not to render assessors lia- tained as to the part within the limit ble in trespass where they had acted if the rest can be separated by mere in good faith, but only erred in judg- computation: Mowry v. Mo wry, SO 692 LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. purpose.^ Where a party comes into equity for relief against a tax, it will be as proper to make relief depend, upon his paying what is just in a case in which the levy was excessive as in any other.^ But a tax sale for the excessive tax must be void, at least, unless some statute expressly provides to the contrary,' as is done in some states.* And a levy at an excess- E. L 74 Where a county was pro- hibited by the constitution from levying a tax-rate of more than fifty cents in one year, a rate of twenty- five cents, -where thirty-four cents had been levied previously, was void only as to the excess: Whaley v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 61 S. W. Rep. 35. A levy excessive as to the school- tax but not excessive in the aggre- gate was held valid in Massachu- setts: Alvord V. Collin, 20 Pick. 418. As to the effect in Massachusetts of including excessive charges under a statute providing that assessments shall be void qiily to the extent of the illegal excess, see Lynde v. Wal- den, 166 Mass. 244. In Kansas, where a county tax was limited to ten mills a year, a tax of eighteen mills for the current expenses of prior years was not wholly enjoined, the court saying: "It may be that in those years only a small amount of tax was levied, and if so, the county majr levy an additional amount for those years, provided the two levies for any one year do not exceed ten mills: " Commissioners v. Blake, 19 !^n. 399. In Arkansas it was held in Worthen v. Badgett, 33 Ark. 494, that an excessive levy could not be sustained even as to , the amount that might legally have been voted; though when the levy is brought up on certiorari it will be quashed only as to the excess: Vance v. Little Rock, 30 Ark. 485. Also in Arkansas ili is held that the fact that in addi- tion to the five mills to which county taxation is limited, an additional tax was levied, does not render the entire tax void: Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Express v. Crawford County, 63 Ark. 576. In Nebraska the submission to popular vote of the question whether a levy in excess of the legal limit should be made, is void: Burling- ton, etc. R Co. V. Clay County. 13 Neb. 367. And so would the levy be if made, even though the purpose was to pay previous indebtedness: State v. Gosper County Com'rs, 14 Neb. 33. See, on the general subject. State V. Van Every, 75 Mo. 530; Cummipgs v. Fitch, 40 Ohio St. 56. ijWhere part is legal and part is illegal the former will be sustained if they are distinguishable: see O'Kane V. Treat, 35 111. 557; Briscoe v. Alli- son, 43 111. 291; State V. Allen, 43 111. 456; Allen v. Peoria, etc. R. Co., 44 111. 85; People v. Nichols, 49 IlL 517; Mix v. People, 72 111. 241; State v. Plainfield, 38 N. J. L. 93; Nalle v. Austin, 91 Tex. 224; San Antonio v. Berry, 92 Tex. 319. 2,Connors v. Detroit, 41 Mich. 138; Neenan v. Smith, 60 Mo. 292; Com- missioners V. Blake, 19 Kan. 399. sSilsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich. 561. Judgment for entire tax arising upon assessment as a unit of property of different kinds, including property not legally assessable by the state board, and the part of the tax as- sessed against the latter property not being separable from the other part, is void: Santa Clara County v. Union Pac. R. Co., 118 U. S. 194. See Cali- fornia V. Central Pac. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1. * In Iowa a statute provides that a tax-sale shall be upheld if any part of the tax for which the sale was made was legal: see Parker v. Sex- ton, 29 Iowa 421. As to sale on judg- ment for taxes, see Reeve v. Ken- CH. XI.J LEGISLATIVE DETEEMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. 593 ive percentage upon the assessment cannot be sustained by showifig that the valuation was greatly too low, and that the rate would not have been excessive had the valuation been in accordance with the statute.' Exhausting authority. The taxing power once conferred is presumptively continuous, and to be exercised again and again as often as may be required by the exigencies of govern- ment and as often as may be consistent with the act of delega- tion.^ But custom has much to do Avith the construction of such powers, and sometimes a single exercise must be deemed to exhaust the power for the time being, when the custom is to tax but once within a certain period of time; as, for instance, within the year. And this is the general custom in the case of local taxes.' If the amount of tax which by law can be im- nedy, 43 Cal. 643. As to the efifeot of including excessive charges under a statute providing that no sale or levy of taxes shall be avoided by reason of any error whereby a person is as- sessed more than his due proportion: Lynde v. Maiden, 166 Mass. 344. 1 Wattles V. Lapeer, 40 Mich. 624 2 See Municipality v. Dunn, 10 La. An. 57; Williams v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 560; Meriden v. Fleming, 93 Mo. 331; State V. Holt County Court, 136 Mo. 474. Two levies may be made in one year provided they are not made for different years: Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R Co. V. Commonwealth (Ky.), 51 S. W. Rep. 568. 3 See Vance v. Little Rook, 30 Ark. 435; Vance V. Van Every, 75 Mo. 530; Cummings v. Fitch, 40 Ohio St. 56. Where a school board, which had power to levy a tax not exceeding oneper cent, in one year, ordered a tax below the minimum, it exhausted its power for the year: Oliver v. Carsner, 39 Tex. 396. So in Oregon, after one assessment of all the tax- able property has been made and re- turned, and the tax levied thereon, there is no power to make a new as- sessment in order to reach property brought into the district since the regular assessment: Oregon Steam 38 Nav. Co. V. Portland, 3 Or. 81. In Texas if a commissioners' court which has exhausted its authority in making a levy for ordinary purposes makes an additional levy in part for the same purpose, the whole is void: Dean v. Lufkin, 54 Tex. 365. Where the amount fixed by village trustees in their statement of " estimated or- dinary expenditures " to the annual meeting of the village is fully raised in the annual assessment and tax thereafter levied, such trustees have no authority subsequently to levy a special tax for other items of ordi- nary expenditure: Squire v. Cart- wright, 67 Hun 218. Additional levy by highway commissioners for road and bridge purposes to be made only on day of making regular levy: St. Louis Nat. Stock Yards v. People, 127 111. 627. Where the statute provides that the amount to be paid for water- rents " shall be annually raised as a part of the expenses of such village, and shall be levied, assessed, and col- lected in the same manner as other expenses of such village are raised," the trustees have no authority to levy a special tax to pay a part of the amount due on a contract for water-rents made subsequent to the annual meeting: Squire v. Cart- 694 LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION THAT TAX BE LAID. [CH. XI. posed for the year is already levied, the authority is of course exhausted, and a further levy under any pretense is void.? It is of no legal importance that the first levy which exhausted the power was made under the compulsion of judicial man- damus? But an abortive attempt to make an assessment does not exhaust the power, and if no other obstacle exists, the offi- cers may disregard the futile action and proceed anew.' Wright, 67 Hun 218. But an omis- sion of the county court to exact license-taxes when making the gen- erg,! levy does not preclude making them afterwards: State v. Maguire, 53 Mo. 420. Though the electors have voted a levy for highway pui-- poses which |has, been collected and expended, the highway commission- ers may in the same year levy and collect not to exceed $1,000 for re- pairs on bridges: Longyear v. Audi- tor-General, 72 Mich. 415. 1 When the limit prescribed in the grant of the taxing power is reached the power is exhausted, and it is not material that the city will be unable to meet its current expenses and pay the interest on its outstanding in- debtedness: Corbett v. Portland, 31 Or. 407. Where the limit Of railroad- aid tax is five per cent., a county which has voted that to 'one road cannot make a further vote to an- other: Dumphy v. Supervisors, 58 ' Iowa 373. A city authorized to levy taxes not exceeding fifteen mills on the dollar for the year passed an ordinance levying a tax to that ex- tent, and afterwards passed another levying two mills additional for a sinking fund. Held, that the first was valid and the last void. Had the whole been voted in one ordinance it seems the whole would have been void: Cummings V. Fitch, 40 Ohio St. 56. But perhaps it might be sus- tained if the amount actually levied did not exceed the legal limit: Peo- ple V. Cooper, 10 111. App. 384. When the amount of school-house fund tax is limited to ten mills, a further tax to pay a judgment against the school district cannot be levied, although there is a provision that where a judgment has been obtained against the school district the board shall pay it by an order the payment whereof is to be provided for by the district meeting: Sterling, etc. Co. v. HarvBy, 45 Iowa 466. See, for a simi- lar point, Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Peo- ple, 177 111. 91; Osborne County Com'rs V. Blake, 35 Kan. 356. The levy of a one-mill tax for building county bridges the cost of which, by the statute, is made payable out of the fund provided for the current expenses of the county, is unauthor- ized and void where the levy for county expenses is already up to the limit allowed by statute: Atchison, T. & S. F. E. Co. V. County Com'rs, 47 Elan. 733. When county commission- ers have made a levy of nine mills for ■general fund purposes they have no further power to levy an additional tax for payment of outstanding war- rants previously issued against the general fund in excess of the statu- tory limit, unless authorized by popu- lar vote: Grand Island & W. C. E. Co. V. Dawes County (Neb.), 86 N. W. Eep. 934. . ' 2 Vance v. Little Eock, 30 Ark. 435. SHimmelmann v. Cofran, 36 Cal. 411, citing Pond v. Negus, 3 Mass. 330; Libby v. Burnham, 15 Mass. 144: Bangor v. Lancy, 31 Me. 472. On the general subject, see, also, Lappin v. Nemaha County, 6 Kan. 403; Boody V. Watson, 64 N. H. i62; Howell v. Buffalo, 15 N. y. 513 ; People v. Haines, 49 N. Y. 587; WoodrufiE v. Fisher, 17 Barb. 224. CHAPTER XII. LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES FOR TAX- ATION. General course. "When taxes for any particular district have been lawfully voted, it next becomes necessary, before a tax can become, a charge upon either person or property, that a list of taxables should be made by the oflScer to whom by law that duty is intrusted. If the tax to be laid is a capita- tion tax, nothing more may be needful; but capitation taxes are so few and so unimportant, that they scarcely call for more than a passing remark.' But when taxes are to be apportioned among the taxables in proportion to tho value of property, or according to special benefits, or upon the results of business, it becomes requisite that an official estimate should be made for that purpose.^ This estimate, when made under state laws, is commonly called an assessment, and the completed document is given the name tax list or assessment roll, or something equally significant and indicative of its nature. Under state laws general levies are most commonly made upon an assess- ment by the value of property, and it is of such an assessment that we shall speak in this chapter. t Nature of proceedings. The proceedings in the assessment of a tax are not, in any proper sense, hostile to the citizen ; they are, on the other hand, proceedings necessary and indispensable to the determination of the exact share which each resident or property owner should take, and may and should be supposed desirous of taking, in meeting the public necessity for a rev- enue; — proceedings which the willingness of the taxpayer •A certain statute and the terri- the statute itself prescribes the torial custom for thirty years werei amount to be paid, and this can be held to be complete provision of law recovered by suit: King v. United for the assessment and collecting of States, 99 U. S. 339; United States v. military poll-tax: People v. Ames, 34 Halloran, 14 Blatch. 1 ; United States Colo. 433. v. Pacific R. Co., 1 MoCrary 1, 4 2 No assessment is necessary when DilL 71. 596 MSTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [cH. XII. cannot dispense with, and which only become hostile when the duty to pay, once fixed, fails to be performed by payment. Then, and only then, do the steps taken by the government assume a compulsory form ; until then the reasonable presump- tion is that government and taxpayer will act together in har- mony, and that the latter will meet his obligation to pay as soon as the former has performed its duty in determining the share to be paid.^ Definition of assessment. An assessment, strictly speaking, is an official estimate of the sums which are to constitute the basis of an apportionment of a tax between the individual sub- jects of taxation within the district.^ It does not, therefore, of itself lay the charge upon either person or property, but it is a step preliminary thereto, and which is essential to the appor- tionment.' As ^he word is more commonly'employed, an assess- ment consists in the two processes of listing the persons, prop- erty, etc., to be taxed, and of estimati/ng the sums which are to be the guide in an apportionment of the tax between them.* "When this listing and estimate are completed in such form as 1 See Kelly v. Herrall, 30 Fed. Rep. * Chicago v. Fishburn, 189 IlL 367; 364, 367: Peru, etc. R. Co. v. Hanna, Pomeroy Coal Co. v. Emlen, 44 Kan. 68 Ind. 563; Herrick v. Amerman, 33 133, 134, State v. Cheraw & D. R. Co., Minn. 544; Sawyer v. Gleason, 59 54 S. C. 564; Southern R Co. v. Kay N. H. 140; Nance v. Hopkins, 10 Lea (S. C), 39 S. E. Rep. 785. "To assess 508. a tax is to adjudge and determine 2 People V. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539, what proportion of his property the 545; Perry County v. Railroad Co., taxpayer shall contribute to the 58 Ala. 456; Lyman v. Howe, 64 Ark. public, and to levy a tax is to make 436; Chicago V. Fishburn, 189111. 367; a record of this determinatioli and Rood V. Mitchell County, 39 Iowa 444; to extend the same against his prop- Geren v. Gruber, 36 La. An. 694; erty: Chicago, B. & CJ^ R. Co. v. Wells V. Smyth, 55 Pa. St. 159; State Klein, 53 Neb. 358. As used in the V. Cheraw & D. R. Co., 54 S. C. 564; statute with reference to the pre- Southern R. Co. v. Kay (S. C), 39 sumption arising from a tax-deed, the ' S. E. Rep. 785. To assess, in thestat- words " listed and assessed " require utes of Colorado, means to make an that the property sold shall actually oflBcial estimate of value for the pur- appear on the tax-list, and that the pose of taxation: People v. County taxes shall be duly assessed: Pee- Com'rs, 37 Colo. 86. See Gray v. bles v. Taylor, 131 N. C. 3& The ques- Stiles, 6 Okl. 455; Mayfleldv. Bradley, tion, what is an assessment, is dis- 6 OkL 547; State v. Farmer (Tex.), cussed in Weber v. Reinhard. 73 Pa. 59 S. W. Rep. 541. St. 370, a case of taxation of the ' Evan'sville & L R. Co. v. Hays, product of mines by the ton. 118 Ind. 314. OH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 597 the law may have prescribed, nothing remains to be done, in order to determine the individual liability, but the mere arith- metical process of dividing the sum to be raised among the sev- eral subjects of taxation, in proportion to the amounts which they are respectively assessed. Sometimes the word " assess- ment " is used as implying the completed tax list; that is to say, the list of persons or property to be taxed, with the estimates with which they are chargeable, and the tax duly apportioned and extendeid upon it ; ^ but this employment of the word is un- usual except in the cases in which the levy is apportioned by benefits ; and in those cases the act of determining the amount of the benefits is of itself, under most statutes, a determination of the individual liability, and the result only needs to be en- tered upon the roll or list^ to complete the levy. Necessity for assessment. An assessment, when taxes are to be levied upon a valuation, is obviously indispensable. It is re- quired as the first step in the proceedings against individual subjects of taxation, and is the foundation of all which follow it. Without an assessment they have no support, and are nul- lities.' The assessment is, therefore, the most important of all lA statute limiting the time to been delivered to the aldermen as contest taxes " for any error or de- required by st.atute, _,but the taxes feet going to the validity of the as- had not been ascertained and ex- sessment," held to use the word tended on the rolls, it was held that "assessment " as going to the whole at testator's death his taxes had been statutory method of imposing taxes '• assessed " to him within the mean- upon property: Prentice v. Ashland ing of a statute giving a preference in County, 56 Wis. 345; Levy v. Wilcox, payment to taxes assessed on a dece- 96 Wis. 137. Under the constifti- dent's estate previous to his death: tion and statutes of Texas the word In re. Babcock, 115 N. Y. 450. The "assessment" embraces more than proper assessment of taxes by the simply the amount, and includes the board of supervisors under the procedure on the part of the officials New York statutes requires not only Ijy which the property is listed, thfe establishment of a ratio upon valued, and finally the pro rata de- which the tax is to be based, but dared: State v. Farmer (Tex.), 59 also the computation and entry in S. W. Rep. 541. As to the meaning the assessment rolls of the amount of assessment in railroad cases in to be levied: People v. Hagadorn, Alabama, see State v. Jackson 104 N. Y. 516. County, 65 Ala. 143; Perry County ^Por the meaning of "list" and V. Railroad Co., 65 Ala. 391. Where " grand list " in "Vermont, see Wilson a testator's property in a city had v. Wheeler, 55 Vt. 446. been assessed to him before his ' People v. Weaver, 100 TJ. S. 589, death, and the assessment rolls had 545; Perry v. Railroad Co., 58 Ala. 598 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XIL the proceedings in taxation, and the provisions to insure its accomplishing its ofiBce are commonly very full and particular.' Statutory requirements. The assessment being so impor- tant, the statutory provisions respecting its preparation and 456; Driggers v. Cassady, 71 Ala. 539; Elyton Land Co. v. BJrmingham, 89 Ala. 477; Waller v. Hughes (Am.), 11 Pao. Rep. 133; People v. Unionfsi Cal. 138; MoKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276; Quivey v. Lawrence, 1 Idaho 313; Early v. Whittingham, 43 Iowa 163; Worthington v. Whitman, 67 Iowa 190; Galusha v. Wendt (Iowa), 87 N. W. Rep. 513; Slaughter v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 113; August! v. Lawless, 43 La. An. 1097; Thurston v. Little, 3 Mass. 429; Thayer v. Stearns, 1 Pick. 483; MuUins v. Shaw, 77 Miss. 900; Abbott V. Lindenbower, 43 Mo. 163; State V. Wabash R. Co., 114 Mo. 1; State V. Thompson, 149 Mo. 441; Ne. braska City v. Gas Light Co., 9 Neb. 339; Matter of Nichols,' 54 N. Y. 63; Shuttuck V. Smith, 6 N. D. 56; Sheets V. Paine' (N. D.), 87 N. W. Rep. 117; Eaton V. Bennett (N. D.), 87 N. W. Rep. 188;McCall v. 'Larimer, 4 Watts 351; Miller v. Hale, 36 Pa. St. 433; State V. South Penn. Oil Co. (W. Va.), 24 S. E. Rep. 688. The owner of a lot sold for taxes was under no obliga- tion, on finding on, the annual record no valuation thereof, to apply to the taxing officers for correction, since there could be nothing to correct when there was no valuation for' as- sessrflent: May v. Traphagen, 139 N. Y. 478. As an assessment is es- sential to constitute a liability for an ad valorem tax, a statute providing for the recovery of past-due railroad taxes cannot authorize the assess- ment of such taxes in the proceeding brought to recover them: State v. Cieraw & D. R. Co., 54 S. C. 564. The state cannot maintain an action against an owner for taxes until a valid assessment has been made against the property: Clegg v. State, 42 Tex. 610. Where bonds, etc., is- sued by a corporation are to be tax^d according to their actual value, a legal ascertainment of that value is essential to the assessment of a valid tax; the corporation's return of its indebtedness does not constitute an assessment, neither does the account settled by the auditor-general against the corporation: Commonwealth v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 104 Pa. St. 89. "An assessment is in the broadest sense a jurisdictional requirement": Roberts v. First Nat. Bank, 8 N. D. 504. Xnd this defect of jurisdiction cannot be remedied by a curative statute: McReynolds v. Longenber- ger, 57 Pa. St. 13. See Brady v. Offut, 19 La. An. 184; MoCready v. Sexton, 29 Iowa 356. Where there is no as- sessment or levy a tax-judgment cannot be rendered under a statute curing defects in tax proceedings: Wells V. McHenry, 7 N. D. 346. An assessment was invalid where no at- tempt was made to assess the prop- erty except by a board which took action under a void statute: Evans- vkle & I. R. Co. V. Hays, 118 Ind. 314 All proceedings on a void assessment are void (citing Florida cases): Flan- agan V. Dunne, 105 Fed. Rep. 828. That there can be no tax without an assessment is true as a general prop- osition; but that one may make his own assessment by his return of His mortgages for taxation, see Common- wealth V. MoKean County (Pa.), 49 Atl. Rep. 983. 1 Though the provisions of a statute as to the oollectioa of taxes are in- valid, yet if the provisions for assess- ment are invalid they may be en- forced: Commonwealth v. Taylor, 101 Ky. 335. CH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 59.9 contents ought to be observed with particularity.^ They are prescribed in order to secure equality and uniformity in the contributions which are demanded for the public service, and if officers, instead of observing them, may substitute a discre- tion of their own, the most important security which has been devised for the protection of the citizen in tax cases might be 1 Slaughter v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 113. An assessment made within the time and in the manner prescribed by the statute is indispensable in proceedings to enforce the collection of taxes: St. Louis, L M. & S. R Co. V. Miller, 67 Ark. 498. Under a sys- tem of taxation based upon an offi- cial assessment or valuation of prop- erty, no tax can lawf lilly be laid un- til the valuation has been made in substa:'itial conformity to the statute governing such valuation: Sweigle V. Gates, 9 N. D. 538. To be valid, an assessment and levy must be made strictly as provided by law. So where the assessment, equalization, and levy were made under the law pertaining to cities of the fifth class, instead of that pertaining to cities of the fourth class, in which latter class the city in question had just before been incorporated, they were held invalid: Dranga v. Rowe. 137 Cal. 506. The provisions of a statute respecting the classifloatioq of tax- able property for taxation are man- datory: State V. Thomas, 18 Utah 86. Under a statute providing that the board of supervisors shall, at its meeting in January in each year, classify the several descriptions of property to be assessed, and shall de- ftver to each assessor, on or before January 15th, a certificate of such classification, a classification made at the regular session in June is ille- gal: McCutcheon v. Lyon Supervis- ors, 95 Iowa 30. A statutory require- ment a3 to segregating the real and personal property in each district of a city is not abrogated by the fact that to list property otherwise would be more convenient, and render the assessment and collection of taxes less expensive: State v. Abrahams, 6 Wash. 373. Taxes assessed by per- centages, instead of in specific amounts, as required by statute, are void: Wells County v. McHenry, 7 N. D. 346. Where the statute re- quires a map in connection with the assessment of city property, the as- sessment is invalid if a map is dis- pensed with: Lalor v. New York, 13 Daly 335. If the statute requires a municipal assessment to be made by ordinance, an ordinance is indis- pensable: People V. Lee, 113 111. 113. Where the record shows that a sav- ings bank has capital stock which is subject to taxation, no recovery of the tax can be had if the record does not show that the assessment and levy were such as the law required: Westminster v. Westminster Sav- ings Bank, 93 Md. 64. Procedure in assessment of urban property held in accordance with the statute: Kussell V. Lang, 50 La. An. 36. In Kansas the assessment roll should contain the names of all persons who should return personal property as- sessments, even though they have no property not exempt from taxa- tion: State V. Phillips County, 36 Kan. 419. Where taxes on local railroad property are not extended in a separate book as required by the statute, they cannot be collected: State V. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 117 Mo. 1. And a statutory requirement that the board of assessors of rail- road property certify the items and value " with all the facts " to the board of examiners is mandatory: Harris v. State, 96 Tenn. 496. 600 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XII. rendered valueless. The assessment must, therefore, be made by the proper officers, or it will be void.;' and if a board of re- view empowered to appoint the assessors and afterwards to review their work should appoint any of its own members to that office, the appointment would be void, and an assessment iSee ante, pp. 4a6-438; Elyton Land Co. v. Birmingham, 89 Ala. 477; In re Taxation of Mining ClaioiB, 9 Colo. 63i3; Tampa v. Kaunitz, 39 Fla. 684; Tampa v. Mugge, 40 Fla. 326; Gray v. Stiles, 6 OkL 455; State V. Cheraw & D. R. Co., 54 S. C. 564. An ad valorem, assessment cannot be made by the legislature: People v. Hastings, 29 Cal. 449; People v. Union 31 Cal. 138; In re Taxation of Min- ing Claims, 9 Colo. 635; Slaughter v. Louisville, 89 Ky. 113; In re Union Coll., 129 N. Y. 308. See Albany, etc. Bank v. Maher, 9 Fed. Rep. 884; At- torney-General V. Leavenworth, 2 Kan. 61. It is said in Faust v. Building Assoc, 84 Md. 186, that the legislature may makea levy of a tax and the as- sessment, without the intervention of any officer. Where a statute creating a levee district provided a scheme for collecting the taxes authorized in the act, equity has no jurisdiction to assess and collect them : Woodruff V. State, 77 Miss. 68. In California a tax, in order to be valid, must rest upon an assessment duly made by an assessor chosen by the people of the district assessed: People v. Hastings, 29 Cal. 449. See Ferris v. Conover, 10 Cal. 589. A school or other township assessment by county assessors is void: People v. Hastings, 29 Cal. 449'; People V. Sargeant, 44 Cal. 430; Will- iams v. Corcoran, 46 Cal. 553; Reiley V. Lancaster, 39 Cal. 354. A school tax must be assessed by district as- sessors: People V. Railroad Co., 49 Cal. 414. See, for a }ike point. Mason V. Johnson, 51 Cal. 613; Smith v. Far- relly, 52 Cal. 77. See Granger v. Par- sons, a Pick. 393. Under a statute providing for the appointment and term of office of borough assessors, and giving to them the same powers and duties as township assessors, and providingfor the appointment to the borough of its proportion of the state and county taxes, all taxes to be as- sessed on property within a borough must be assessed by th0 borough as- sessor: State V. Segoine, 53 N. J. L. 339: State v. Simpbins, 53 N. J. L. 583. The fact that the officer by whom an assessment is made is_a member of a firm to which property is adjudi- cated at a tax-sale does not invali- date it: New Orleans Pac. R. Co. v. Kelly, 53 La. An. 1741. Inasmuch as a person who is superintendent of special improvements and city col- lector would have a direct intere.^t in increasing the amount of the as- sessments, he is disqualified from act- ing as commissioner of assessments, and if he acts as such the assessment is void: Chase v. Evanston, 173 111. 403. And one owning property to be assessed for a public improvement is so disqualified: Shreve v. Cicero, 139 111. 326. See, also. Hunt v. Cicero, 60 111. 184.' An assessment in pursuance of the grant and apportionment of the state tax would be valid, though made by the assessors of a town with- out a warrant from the state treas- urer, their authority not being de- pendent thereupon. . And if the assessors see fit to complete the as- sessment, including the state tax for the current year, and commit the same to the collector before the issue of the state treasurer's warrant, the taxpayer cannot complain: Rowe v. Friend, 90 Me. 241, following Alvord V. Collin, 20 Pick. 418. on. XII.J LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 601 made by the appointees would be illegal.^ So the assessment will be void 'if the assessors delegate to a clerk the office of making it;^ though if he merely makes it in the first instance, and the assessors examine and supervise the work as it pro- gresses, and adopt it when completed, it may be sustained.' An assessment of land cannot rest in parol, for a definite record evidencing official action is essential.* And if, when an annual 1 Hawkins v. Jonesboro, 63 Ga. 537. The duty and function of assessment cannot be shared by any officer to whom it is not granted by the lan- guage of the statute; Gray v. Stiles, 6 Okl. 455. If a board of supervisors which has no authority to increase an assessment shall assume to do so, and taxes shall be levied upon the increased assessment, the taxes will be void: Rood v. Mitchell, 39 Iowa 444. An assessment is not invali- dated by the fact that the property was added by the assessor tb the in- ventory of the taxpayer's estate at the direction of the board of equaliza- tion: Ferris v. Kemble, 75 Tex:. 476. An order of the board of equalization finding that a bank has omitted prop- erty from the list of its taxable prop- erty, and should be assessed thereon, and directing the assessor toadd such property to its assessment, is not an attempt by the board to add property to the list and exercise assessors' powers, but is a direction that the assessors make such addition, though the order specifies the value of the property to be added; and it is au- thorized by a statute requiring tlie assessor, at the request of the board, to list and assess property which he has failed to assess: Farmers' o obtained is less than his tax- able property, is judicial, and not open to collateral attack: Fulham v. Howe, 60 Vt. 351. If a taxpayer's list is made up by the listers because of his failure to return an inventory, the statutory provisions, requiring notice to the taxpayers apply whether they make up his list by doubfing or not: Thomas v. Leland, 70 Vt. 323. A notice to one who had failed to return an inventory, that the listers " have assessed " him in a stated amount for moneys and cred- its, and, agreeably to the statute, have doubled the same, is not mis- leading, though technically the list- ers could not •' assess " a,nd then double the "assessment:" Meserve V. Folsom, 63 Vt. 504. Further as to the Vermont statute, see Eowell v. Horton, 58 Vt. 1. A petition, in an action for the collection of taxes from one who has refused to give a list of his property, need not set out the district assessoi-'s valuation for each year, and the doubling thereof by the president and board of as- sessors: State V. Cummings, 151 Mo. 49. OH. XII.] LISTING OF PERSONS A.ND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 621 psnalty ' or forfeiture; '^ sometimes to deprivation of any right to object to or to appeal from what the taxpayer may regard as an unjust assessment;' and sometimes to criminal in4ict- 1 See State v. Leavell, 3 Blaokf. 117; State V. Hamilton, 5 Ind. 310; Boyer ■V. Jones, 14 Ind. 854; Louisville, et(!. R. Co. V. State, 25 Ind. 177; State v. Lauer, 116 Ind. 162; Durham v. State, 116 Ind. 514; Davis v. State, 119 Ind. 555; State v. Halter, 149 Ind. 292; La Plante v. State, 152 Ind. 80; Ex parte Lynch, 16 S. C. 32; Genin v. Auditor, 18 Ohio St. 534; Wright V. Adler, 44 Ohio St. 539; Miller v. First Nat. Bank, 46 Ohio St. 424; Williamson's Estate, 153 Pa. St. 508. To make a return of property for taxation false within the meaning of the Ohio statute providing that if any person shall inake a false return or statement of his property in list- ing it for taxation, or shall evade making a return or statement, the auditor shall ascertain , the true amount of his taxable property, and add fifty per cent., the return must be made false intentionally, or through culpable negligence; but though a person is not liable to the penalty if he makes an untrue re- turn through mistake, he becomes liable if, upon learoing of the mis- take, he fails to correct it: Ratter- man V. Ingalls, 48 Ohio St. 468. A wilful undervaluation constitutes a false return : Ohio Farmers' Ins. Co. V. Hard, 59 Ohio St. 248. In an ac- tion to I'ecover the penalty provided by the Wisconsin statute in case a property owner shall " intentionally make a false statement " of his hold- ings to avoid the payment of the tax levied, a verdict that the defendant " is guilty, not criminally, but negli- gently," is one for the defendant: State V. Wolfrum, 88 Wis, 481. The penalty which the Connecticut stat- ute imposes upon a " resident of a town " liable to, give in a list, and pay taxes therein, for neglect or re- fusal to give in his list, cannot be imposed upon a non-resident: Shaw v. Hartford, 56 Conn. 351. Where a railroad fails to list its property for county taxation, and the sheriff re- ports it to the county court as delin- quent, that court has power to di- rect its clerk to assess the road ; but a fine and triple tax, being a penalty, cannot be imposed if more than five years have elapsed since the year for which the tax is claimed : Louisville & N. C. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 85 Ky. 198. Where the penalty for fail- ure to render a true list of property is not added by the asseissor or col- lector to the assessment as made, it cannot be recovered ip a suit for de- linquent taxes: United States Trust Co. V. Territory (N. M.), 62 Pac. Rep. 987. Some statutes, however, make provision for enforcing by suit the penalties for neglect to hand in lists: see Drexel v. Commonwealth, 46 Pa. St. 31. As to state's action to recover penalty for false return, see State v. Halter, 149 Ind. 292. 2 Under a statute providing that any grantee, his heirs or assigns, from the state of any swamp land, who has not listed it for taxation, shall forfeit all right, title, and inter- est in said swamp land, and the same shall ipso facto revert to the state, the title of a person in default is not divested without a proceeding by the state or its assignee: Eastern Caro- lina Land, etc. Co. v. State Board, 101 N. C. 35. 3 Under the amended statute of Montana the assessor has the right to assess the property of taxpayers who fail to file lists of their property: Board of Com'rs v. Anderson, 68 Fed. Rep. 341. In Kentucky, though the valuation of the property may bb fixed by the assessor, he has no au- thority to list it of his own accord on the taxpayer's refusal to do so. 622 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALtTATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. ment.' The right to discriminate in some manner against those who fail to hand in lists has often been judicially recognized.' but must report the fact to the su- pervisors as required by the statute: Clark V. Belknap (Ky.), 13 S. W. Rep. 213. Under the California code a land-owner's refusal or neglect to re- turn a mortgage on his land does not authorize the assessor arbitraril^o assess it to him: Henne v. Los Ange- les, 129 Cal. 297. Assessors in New Jersey have no power, on the mak- ing of an incomplete statement by a gas company, to ascertain and fix the amount of dividend, on which to base their calculations: State v. Comptroller, 54 N. J. L. 135. A stat- ute providing that a person neglect- ing to furnish an account of taxable property shall have no remedy if over-taxed, and requir,ing assessors to make lists of taxable property, distinguishing those who have pre- sented their account from those who have not, does not fail of due process of law: McTwiggan v. Hunter, 18 E. 1. 776. Where assessors, under the Connecticut statute, iill out a tax-list because the taxpayer fails to furnish one, they need not get knowledge of specific property kept back; if they exercise their best judgment and be- lief it is sufficient : Hartford v. Cham- pion, 54 Conn. 436. A" taxpayer hav- ing failed to return a list of his prop- erty, one made by the assessor is valid though it includes " insurance stocks" without designating the companies in which the stocks were held : Hartford v. Champion, 58 Conn. 268. Where a corporation does not submit a list of property to the assess- ors, it cannot object that the valua- tion list contains only the general description "personal estate:" Lam- son Consol. Store-Service Co. v. Bos- ton) 170 Mass. 354. The Illinois stat- tite does not make it the duty of the assessor to examine aproperty owner except when a schedule duly veri- fied has been presented to him by the pei'son listing the property': New York & C. G. & S. Exchange v. Glea- son, 131 111. 503. One who has handed in no list and is over-taxed cannot pay his tax,and recover back on show- ing a mistake in the assessment;, a mistake not rendering the tax illegal: Lott V. Hubbard, 44 Ala. 593. Where a taxpayer fails to furnish the as- sessor, on demand, the sworn state- ment of his property required by statute, the assessor's duty is to assess such taxpayer's property within his j urisdiction, and 4n that case the tax- payer cannot recover taxes paid under protest on property so assessed, though they have been assessed in another countythe same year: Erwin V. Hubbard (Idaho), 37 Pac. Rep. 274. Under a statute providing that a per- son who neglects or refuses the bring in an account of his ratable estate, jf over-taxed, shall have no remedy therefor, a person cannot claim that he was over-taxed, or not subject to taxation, when he had a watch, and neglected to bring in an account, though the assessment with which he was assessed is $5,000: Tripp v. Torrey, 17 R. L 859. Where one fails to return under oath to the assessor a statutory statement of his prop- erty, and the assessor makes a valua- 1 See Durham v. State, 116 Ind. 514; Commonwealth v. Toncray (Ky.), 53 S. W. Rep. 797; Mock v. State, 11 Tex. App. 56; Caldwell v. State, 14 Tex App. 71; Galbraith y. State, 33 Tex. Crim. 'App. 831. ^ See Donovan v. Insurance Co., 30 Md. 155; Winnissimet Co. v. Chelsea, 6 Cush. 477; State v. Welch, 28 Mo. 600; State v. Bell, 1 PhiL (N. C.) 76. See, also, the cases cited in the notes preceding. oil. XII. J LISTING OF PEESOilS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 623 When the discrimination consists merely in submitting the party to the " doom " of the assessor, and depriving him of any appeal, it would seem that there could be no valid objection to it.^ The assessor will be likely, under such circumstances, to malie liberal estimates of property, so that the state, it may be presumed, will not be the loser, and the taxpayer, if he is over-assessed, suffers a misfortune for which no one, unless it be tion, the taxpayer cannot impeach the assessment and levy on the ground that the county board did not meet on the proper day to equal- ize the asses.'iment, as in any event he could not have had a reduction from the board: Modoc County v. Churchill, 75 CaL 173. In Nevada a taxpayer who fails to hand in his list is allowed no standing before the board of equalization: State v. State Board of Equal., 7 Nev. 83. And, therefore, in an action to recover taxes assessed against one who has neglected to return a statement of his property, and refused to sign the one prepared by the assessor, evi- dence that an excessive valuation was placed on the property is not admissible: State v. Diamond Valley, etc. Co., 21 Nev. 86. In New Jersey one loses his right to appeal if he fails to state to the assessor, if to- quired, the particulars of his prop- erty under oath: State v. Apgar, 31 N. J. L. 358. And in that state the assessor's right to estimate the value of propei'ty does not permit an as- sessment to be made against an ab- sentee who has in his charge prop- erty belonging to others, even where the taxpayer was intentionally ab- sent for the purpose of evading the assessor: State v. Sherrer, 49 N. J. L. 610. Under the Massachusetts stat- ute no abatement will be made be- fore a list is brought in, though a sufHcient excuse, is shown for not bringing it in at the proper time: Charlestown v. County Com'rs, 101 Mass. 87. But where a list was not brought in until after the time for it had expired, the delay, however, being chargeable to the assessors themselves, who expressly told the party's agent nothing should be lost by the delay, it was held that the right to apply for an abatement was not lost: Lowell v. County Com'rs, 3 Allen 546. A tenant in common of the fee, occupying the land under an agreement with her co-tenant by which she is to pay the taxes, is not a " tenant " paying rent so as to pre- vent her neglect to bring in a list of the real estate from disabling her to sue for an abatement of the tax: Ashley v. County Com'rs, 166 Mass. 1416. The Louisiana statute provid- ing for the filling out by each tax- payer of a list of his property, t;o be delivered to the assessor, is not man- datory, there being no penalty for non-compliance, and the taxpayer is not shut out from all relief owing to his omission: Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. V. Board of Assessors, 40 La. An. 871. It has been held in New York that where a corporation fails for ten years to comply with the statute re- quiring annual reports to be made to the comptroller, the assessment made by the latter in the absence of such report should not be disturbed unless it clearly appears unjust, or based on an erroneous principle: Peo- ple V. Wemple, 138 N. Y. 583. 1 See Porter v. County Com'rs, 5 Gray 365; Otis Co. v. Ware, 8 Gray 509; Lincoln v. Worcester, 8 Gush. 55; State V. Apgar, 31 N. J. L. 358; State V. Board of Eqi\al,, 7 Nev. 33. 62i LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. himself, is blamable. But when a statute goes further, and subjects the person to penalties of any kind, to be inflicted by a ministerial officer without a hearing, for a neglect that may have been unintentional and perhaps entirely excusable, it is not clear that it is consistent with the genius of the common law, or with general principles of American jurisprudence. But the authorities sustain such, statutes, as is said in one case, " on the ground of state necessity and immemorial usage." ^ It has been decided in Kentucky that penal provisions of this character must be construed strictly; * a decision quite in har- mony with the general rules of construction. But when the construction is clear, they are generally enforced. Examination of books and papers. It has been decided that the constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and sejzures is not violated by a statute giving tax officials the right to examine books and papers of taxpayers for the purpose of listing and assessing property for taxation.' r Right to a hearing. The summary nature of tax proceed- ings has been remarked upon already. They are made summary 1 Ex parte Lynch, 16 ^. C. 32. In (Ind.), 60 N. E. Eep. 146. This case this case the statute required an ad- holds that such an examination may dition to the assessment of fifty per properly extend back to the time cent, as a penalty for default in mak- when the statute was enacted, and ing return of pi-operty for taxation, that mandamus lies to compel a A similar statute has been sustained building association to permit the in Indiana: Boyer v. Jones, 14 Ind. county assessor to examine its books 364; and in Pennsylvania: Fox's Ap- for the purpose of determining peal, 112 Pa. St. 387. It has been de- whether any of its stock has been cided in Minnesota that where the exempted from taxation. A bill lies constitution requires all taxation to against an insurance "company and be by value, it is incompetent to pro- its officers to compel the discovery vide by law for increasing the as- of a list of its stockholders, that sessed valuation by a sum to be added the assessor may know in whose as a penalty for not handing in a list: names to assess the shares of stock: McCormick v. Fitch, 14 Minn. 353. Memphis v. Home Ins. Co., 91 Tenn. And see State V. Allen, 2 MoCord 55. 558. State board of equalization 2 Alexander V. Commonwealth, 1 held to have jurisdiction to require a Bibb 515; MoCall v. Justices, 1 Bibb banker to submit bank's books to ex- 516; Olds V. Commonwealth, 3 A. K. amination by board, and to testify Marsh. 465; Childsv. Commonwealth, whether certain depositors have, 4 J. J. Marsh. 577. In Drexel v. Com- within his knowledge, changed their monwealth, 46 Pa. St. 31, the point deposits into " greenbacks " to escape was raised but not decided. taxation: Satter white v. State, 143 ' Co-operative B. & K Assoc, v. State Ind. 1. CH. XII.J LISTING OF PEE80NS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 625 of neoess'ity. The assessment, if made in compliance with the law, will establish conclusively the basis of periodical taxation. Every inhabitant of the state is liable, by means thereof, to have a demand established against him on the judgment of others regarding the sum which he should justly and equitably contribute to the public revenues. Every owner of property in the state, whether he be an inhabitant or not, is liable to have a lien in like manner established against his property. Moreover, the persons who make the, assessment lighten the burden upon themselves in proportion as they increase it upon others. They must act to a large extent upon imperfect and unsatisfactory information, and the danger that when most honest and fair minded they will misjudge and thus do injustice is always imminent. It is therefore a matter of the utmost importance to the person assessed that he should have some opportunity to be heard and to present his version of the facts before any demand is conclusively established against him; and it is only common justice that the law should make rea- sonable provision to secure him as far as may be practicable against the oppression of unequal taxation, by making the privilege of being heard a legal right. The obligation to secure such a right is recognized by the statutes of the several states, whose provisions, however, are greatly lacking in uniformity. We have just seen that in some states the taxpayers are either required or allowed to bring in lists of their taxable property ; and, when these lists are in due form and properly verified, a certain degree of con- clusiveness is given to them. Where such lists are not required, it is provideid in some states that when the valuation of per- sonal estate is made by the assessor, the person assessed may reduce the assessment by his own oath, which, for this purpose, is made conclusive.' In other states an appeal is allowed to some board of review ; and perhaps there is no state which does not provide some method whereby it is intended that the party assessed shall have a hearing before the assessment becomes fixed and final. If the statutory directions are observed, they perhaps make all the provision that is necessary for the pur- poses of justice. It is unfortunately often the case, however, that statutory 1 See People v. Davenport, 91 N. Y. 574 40 626 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. provisions are not strictly observed, and that either the public or individuals will suffer in consequence. The question pre- sented may then be, whether the provisions which have been disregarded are mandatory, to the officers, or it may arise on the terms of some curative statute which undertakes to heal the defects. In substance the question will be whether the right to be heard in tax cases is a constitutional right and in- defeasible. Upon this subject there is a general concurrence of authorities in the affirmative. It is a fundamental rule that in judicial or gMfflsi- judicial proceedings affecting the rights of the citizen he shall have notice and be given an opportunity to be heard be- fore any judgment, decree, order, or demand shall be given and established against him.* Tax proceedings are not in the strict sense judicial, but they are quasi-jadioia]., and as they have the effect of a judgment, the reasons which require notice of judicial proceedings are always present when the conclusive steps are to be taken.^ Provision for notice is therefore part 1 Queen v. Dyott, L. E. 9, Q. B. 47; Lehman v. Robinson, 59 Ala. 319; Brown v. Denver, 7 Colo. 305; Savan- nah F. & W. R. Co. V. Savannah; 96 Ga. 680; Darling v. G-unn, 50 111. 434; Commissioners v. Lang, 8 Kan. 284; Lowell V. Wentworth, 6 Cush. 331; Butler V. Supervisors, 36 Mioh. 33; Thomas v. Gain, 35 Mioh. 155; Dool V. Cassopolis, 43 Mich. 547; Woodman v. Auditor-General, 53 Mich. 38; Pa-, ciflo E. Co. V. Cass County, 53 Mo. 17; South Platte Land Co. v. Buffalo County, 7 Neb. 358; Melvin v. Wears, 56 N. a 436; Cahoon v. Coe, 57 N. H. 556, 570; Barker v. Omaha, 16 Neb. 369; State v. Drake, 33 N. J. L. 194; State V. Anderson, 38 N. J. L. 83; State V. Commissioners, 41 N. J. L. 83; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. St. 440, 448; Cletnent v. Hale, 47 Vt. 680; Brush V. Baker, 56 Vt. 143. 2 On the general subject of the right to a hearing in some stage of the proceedings, see McMillen v. An- derson, 95 U. S. 37; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Hagar v. Recla- mation Dist., Ill 17. S. 701; Spencer V. Merchant, 135 U. S. 345; Walston V. Nevin, 138 U. S. 578; Palmer v. Mc- Mahqn, 133 U. S. 660; Paulsen v. Port- land, 149 U. S. 30; Winona & St. P. L. Co. V. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 536; Bauman v. Ross, 167 U. S. 548; Bank V. Maher, 8 Fed. Rep. 884; San Mateo County V. Southern Pao. R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 732, 8 Sawy. 238; Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 385; Albany City Bank v. Maher, 30 Blatch. 341; Dun- dee Mortg. etc. Co. v. Parrish, 24 Fed. Rep. 197; Scott v. Toledo, 36 Fed. Rep. 385; Murdock v. Cincinnati, 39 Fed. Rep. 891; Lewis v. Withers, 44 Fed. .Rep. 165; SMurdock v. Cincin- nati. 44 Fed. Rep. 736; Meyers v. Shields, 61 Fed. Rep. 713; Western Ranches v. Custer County, 89 Fed. Rep. 577; Charles v. Marion, 100 Fed. Rep. 538; Ford v. State, 51 Ark. -103; Carson v. Board of Directors, 59 Ark. 513; Hutson v. Woodbridge Protec- tion Dist., 79 CaL 90; McDonald v. en. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AJSTD VALUATION OF ESTATES. 627 of the "due process of law" which it has been customary to provide for these summary proceedings;' and it is, not to be Littlefleld, 5 Maokey Q74; Bensinger V. District of Columbia, 6 Mackey 285; AUman v. District of Columbia, 3 App. D. C. 8; Speer v. Athens, 85 Ga. 49; Garvin v. Daussman, 114 Ind. 429; Wells County v. Gruner, 115 Ind. 224; Johnson v. Lewis, 115 Ind, 490; Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Ind. 1; MoEweney v. Sullivan, 135 Ind. 407; Eschenburg v. County Com'rs, 189 Ind. 398; Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 290; Dykes v. Lock wood Mortg. Co., 57 Kan. 416; Owensboro & N. R. Co. V. Daviess County (Ky.), 3 S. W. Eep. 164; Bruce v. Vanceburg, etc. T. R. Co. (Ky.), 35 S. W. Rep. 112; Balti- more V. Scharf, 54 Md. 499; County Com'rs V. Union Mining Co., 61 Md. 545; Ulman v. Baltimore, 72 Md. 587; County Com'rs v. New York Mining Co., 76 Md. 549; Monticello Distilling Co. V. Mayor, etc., 90 Md. 416; Will- iamsport v. Darby (Md.), 29 Atl. Rep. 605; Fowble v. Kemp, 93 Md. 630; Whiteford v. Probate Judge, 53 Mich. 130; Sleigh v. Grand Rapids, 84 Mich. 497; Lansing v. State Auditors, 111 Mich. 337; State v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 40 Minn. 513; Brown v. Mark- ham, 60 Minn. 233; MoGuire v. In- vestment Co., 76 Miss. 868; Farns- worth Lumber Co. v. Fairley (Miss.), 38 South, Rep. 569; Clarksdale v. Ya- zoo & M. V. R. Co. (Miss.),39 South. Eep. 93; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Garland, 5 Mont. 146; Boody v. Watson, 64 N. H. 163; Overing v. Foote, 65 N. Y. 623; In re McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306; Remsen v. Wheeler, 105 N. Y. 573; In re Union Coll., 139 N. Y. 308; Dasey V. Skinner, 57 Hun 593; People v. Henion, 64 Hun 471 ; People v. New Rochelle, 83 Hun 185: People v. Dick- inson, 1 App. Div. (N. Y.) 19; Power V. Larabee, 3 N. D. 141; Pickton v. Fargo (N. D.), 88 N. W. Rep. 90; Adler V. Whitbeck, 44 Ohio St. 359; Cald- well V. Carthagei 49 Ohio St. 334 Larimer v. MoCall, 4 W. & S. 133 Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. St. 374 Hershberger v. Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. St, 78; Evans v. Fall River County, 9 S. D. 130; Kerr v. Woolley, 3 Utah 456; Violett v. Alexandria, 93 Va. 561 ; Heth V. Radford, 96 Va. 273; Norfolk V. Young, 97 Va. 738; Dietz v. Ne^- nah, 91 Wis. 422. It is not necessary that the taxpayer have notice of every step In the tax prpceedlngs; It is sufficient if he has an opportunity iSee ante, pp. 59-64. The princi- ple of notice and due process of law does not apply to taxation which is uniformly assessed against all prop- ertj' in the same municipality or po- litical subdivision or corporation. No notice is required of the levying of a tax authorized or directed by law: Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Smith, 131 Ind. 518. An assessment for back taxes without notice to the taxpayer, constituting a lien upon his property and a cloud upon his title, is a deprivation of property without due process of law: Meyers V, Shields, 61 Fed. Rep. 713. In add- ing omitted property to the dupli- cate, notice and hearing must be given the owner: Co-operative B. & L. Assoc. V. State(Ind.), 60 N. E. Rep. 146. It was held in Wabash R. Co. V. Johnson, 108 IlL 11, that where as- sessors discover that property has been omitted from the roll, they may put it on without giving notice. See Oregon v. W. M. Sav. Bank, 16 Or. 113; Billinghurst v. Spink County, 5 S. D. 305. A statute providing that the cost of street improvements shall be assessed against abutting property, and providing for no no- tice, was held unconstitutional as not due process of law: Charles v. Marion, 100 Fed. Rep. 538. 628 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. lightly assumed that constitutional provisions, carefully framed for the protection of property rights, were intended or could be construed to sanction legislation under which officers might secretly assess the citizen for any amount in their discretion, without giving him an opportunity to contest the justice of the assessment.' It has often been very pointedly and emphatic- ally declared that it is contrary to the first principles of jus- tice that one should be cqpdemned unheard;^ and it has also been justly observed of taxing officers, that " it would be a dangerous precedent to hold that any absolute power resides in them to tax as they may choose without giving any notice to the owner. It is a power liable to great abuse ; " and it might safely have been added, it Is a power that under such circumstances would be certain to be abused. " The general principles of law applicable to such tribunals oppose the exer- cise of any such power." ' This being the case, it is not to be to question the validity or the amount of the tax or assessment be- fore that amount is finally deter- mined, or in subsequent proceedings for the collection of it, or in some suit where the questions involved may be submitted to a court of jus- tice: Ante, pp. 59-62; Keel v. Board of Directors, 59 Ark. 513: In re Ma- deira Irrig. Dist., 93 Cal. 296; John- son V. Lewis, ills Ind. 490; Chicago ife E. R. Co. V. John, 150 Ind. 130; Nevin V. Roach, 86 Ky. 492; People v. Turner, 117 N. Y. 227; Lamb v. Connolly, 122 N. T. 531; Terrel v. Wheeler, 123 N. Y. 76; Fithian v. Wheeler, 135 N. Y. 696; Martin v. Stoddard, 137 N. Y. 61. The determination of the tax to be paid by a corporation is not void because of being made without notice, where the statute provides for a subsequent notice — which was duly given — and an appeah Com- monwealth V. Bunk, 26 Pa. St. 335. Where property of a college is sub- ject to taxation, notice that it is to be assessed need not be given the college, though in previous years it has not been assessed: Foy v. Coe Coll., 95 Iowa 689. Rents charged by a public corporation for water actu- ally used by private consumers are not in any just sense taxes so that persons against whom they are charged are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before they are established: Silkman v. Water Com'rs, 153 N. Y. 337.' 1 Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Iowa 390. 2 Gaboon v. Coe, 57 N. H. 556, and cases cited; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 188; San Mateo County v. South- ern Pao. R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 732, 8 Sawy. 338. 3 Patten v. Green, 13 CaL 325, 329 Cleghorn v. Postlewaite, 43 IlL 428. If possible, statutes will be so con- strued as to require notice: Kansas Pac. R Co. V. Russell, 8 Kan. 558; Baltimore v. Grand Lodge, 60 Md 280; Gilson v. Munson, 114 Mich. 671 Sioux City, etc. R Co. v. Washing- ton County, 3 Neb. 30. Notice of appraisement for collateral inherit- ance tax should be given legatees, though the statute makes no express provision therefor, but merely gives them the right of appeal: In re Handley's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 339. Where a taxpayer has made due re- OH. XII. J LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 629 supposed that the legislature by any ambiguous or doubtful language has undertaken to confer it. AH reasonable pre- sumptions in construction should favor justice and right.' It is not customary to provide that the taxpayer shall be heard before the assessment is made, except where a list is called for from him ; but a hearing is given afterwards, either before the assessors themselves, or before some court or board of review.^ And of the meeting of that court or board the tax- payer must in some manner be informed: either by personal notice,' or by some general notice which is reasonably certain turn of his personal property with- out any objection being made to the valuation, the assessor cannot raise it without notice to the taxpayer, even though the statutes contain no pi'ovisions . expressly requiring such notice: State v. Spencer, 114 Mo. 574. See, for the same principle, Lewis v. Withers, 44 Fed. Rep. 165. A tax- payer who has voluntarily invoked the benefit of a statutory provision for the selection of persons to do justice touching the assessment of property, by selecting one of such persons, cannot complain that the mode of assessment to which he has thus resorted is unconstitutional be- cause the statute fails to make any provision for notice or hearing, or for any other reason: Collier v. Mor- row, 90 Ga. 148. 1 See Gilson v. Munson, 114 Mich. 671. ^.Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 613; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L., E. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 635; Chicago & E. R Co. v. John, 150 Ind. 130; Kelley v. Rhoads, 7 Wyo. 3.37. Where a city charter provides that after an assessment roll is com- pleted the board of assessors shall give notice thereof, and that the roll will remain in their oflBce for twelve days for inspection of all interested therein, and that at the expiration of such time the board shall, after needful correction, sign and return the roll to the council, this gives those taxed an opportunity to be heard before the board of assessors: Beecher v. Detroit, 93 Mich. 638. Where one has the right to appear "and be heard" before the common council, it is not competent for the council to limit the objections to such as may be made in writing: State V. Jersey City, 35 N. J. L. 309. But neither one who has made writ- ten objection to the assessment, nor those who do not, appear at all, can object: State v. Jersey City, 38 N. J, L. 500. That there must be oppor- tunity afforded for a hearing at the time and place fixed by law, see Sioux City, etc. R. Co. v. Washington County, 3 Neb. 30. The right to a hearing by the village assessor sit- ting as a board of review as pro- vided by the village charter is one of which the taxpayer cannot lawfully be deprived: Three Rivers Common Council V. Smith, 99 Mich. 507. The fact that the person assessed was abroad when the assessment roll was opened for correction, and therefore made no objection, is no defense to the payment of the tax: Terrill v. New Orleans, 37 La. An. 530. 8 Where personal service is re- quired, proof of giving it is a juris- dictional fact: Scott v. Braokett, 89 Ind. 413. A notice does not hold good from year to year; it must be given annually: Dean v. Aiken, 48 630 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. Xn. to reach him,' or — which is equivalent — by some general law which fixes the time and place of meeting, and of which he must take notice. The last is a common method of bringing Vt. 541. It must be definite — a no- tice " to the heirs of A.," held defect- ive: New Orleans v. Heirs of St. Romes, 28 La. An. 17. Compare New Orleans v. Stewart's Estate. 28 La. An. 180. A notice of the da;^and place of the meeting of the listers to hear grievances is sufficient though it does not give the hour; the statute merely requiring it to state " ou what day and plac^ they will meet," and there being no evidence of injury to the taxpayer through the omission: Smith V. Hard, 61 Vt. 469. A statute requiring assessors, " before assessing any tax," to give notice of the time and place of their meeting, which notice shall require all persons and corporations liable to taxation to pre- sent accounts of their estates and the value thereof," at such time as they may prescribe, provides for a notice of but one meeting, for the purpose both of presenting^ accounts and of making assessments: McTwiggan v. Hunter, 18 R. L 776. Under a statute requiring notice to work the road to be given three days before the time . appointed, notice on Saturday to work on the following Tuesday, Wed- nesday, and Thursday, is bad as to Tuesday, but good as to the other days: Moore v. State, 53 Ark. 265. That a conversation regarding the question whether defendant was sub- ject to road duty, had between him and the road overseer, may consti- tute notice, it must appear to have occurred more than three days be- fore the time fixed for the work: Lowery v. State, 52 Ark. 270. Under a statute providing for adding omit- ted property to the tax duplicate, notice to an executor qualified by the county court is notice to a resi- dent of the county, though the ex- ecutor be actually a resident of an- other state: Gallup v. Schmidt, 154 Ind. 196. Where the statute pre- scribes no mode of notifying non- residents of the st^te of assessments to be made, no notice can be deemed required: State v. Love. 47 N. J. L. 436, 49 N. J. L. 235. , There being no jurisdiction to assess a personal tax against a non-resident, he is not chargeable with constructive notice of the action of assessors, and is ubder no obligation to appear before them. As to tangible property which he might have in the state, it would, however, be otherwise: St Paul v. Merritt, 7 Minn. 198. The notice re- quired by statute to be given to each person residing in the district against whom a property road tax is assessed, of the time and place where he may appear and pay his road tax in labor, need not be served upon a railroad company where it has no representa- tive residing in the district, and no depot or station building therein: Chicago & N. W.H. Co. v. People, 183 IlL 196. 1 The legislature may prescribe the kind of notice, and the time when it shall be given, as well as the tribunal before which the hearing may be had: Kizer v. Winchester, 141 Ind. 694 Whether the notice is^ by pub- lication or by personal service, it will sustain jurisdiction provided there is back of it some law providing for notice; but only the la,w can pre- scribe the form of notice, and the law must provide for it: Kuntz v. Sump- tion, 117 Ind. 1. Notice by publica- tion, when authorized by law, is suffi- cient: State R. Tax Cases, 93 U. S. 575; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., Ill U. S. 701 ; Kentucky R. Tax Cases, CH. XII.J LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 631 the assessment to the notice of the taxpayer, and it is perhaps the best of all, because it comes to be generally understood, and is remembered.' "Whatever statutory provisions are made for notice and hear- ing must be regarded, under the rules of construction already given, as mandatory. A compliance with them in all essential 115 U. a 331; Lent v. Tillson, 140 U. S. 316; Paulsen v. Portland, 149 U. S. 30; Pittsburgh, C, Q. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 431; Fall- brook Irrig. Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U. S. 112; Del Castillo v. MoConnico, 168 U. S. 674; Wright v. Davidson, 181 TJ. a 371; Da vies v. Los Angeles, 86 CaL 37; Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Ind. 1; Wiley's Petition, 89 Mich. 58; Cole V. Shelp, 98 Mich. 58; Muirhead v. Sands, 111 Mich. 487; Ball v. Ridge Copper Co., 118 Mich. 7; State v. Weyerhauser, 68 Minn. 353, 73 Mina. 519; State v. Pillsbury, 83 Minn. 359; Kansas City v. Ward, 184 Mo. 173; In re De Peyster, 80 N. Y. 565; Phila- delphia V. Jenkins, 162 Pa. St. 461. And such notice suffices even though the proceeding is for taxes omitted in previous years: Winona & St. P. L. Co. v. Minnesota, 159 U. S. 536. 1 Carroll v. Alsup (Tenn.), 64 Pac. Bep. 193. That in general the tax- payer must take notice of the gen- eral law fixing the time ai)d place of hearing, see State Railroad Tax Cases, 93 TT. S. 601; Kentucky R Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 331; Pittsburgh, > C, C. & St. L. R Co. V. Backus, 154 TJ. S. 421; Merchants' Bank v. Penn- sylvania, 167 U. S. 461; Pulaski Equal. Board Cases, 49 Ark. 518; St. Louis, L M. & a R. Co. v. Worthen, 53 Ark. 529; Lent v. Tilson, 73 Cal. 404; Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 138 Ind. 513; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 635; Methodist Pr. Church v. Baltimore, 6 Gill 391; O'Neal v. Bridge Co., 18 Md. 1, 36; Monticello Distilling Co. v. Mayor, etc., 90 Md. 416; State v. Runyon, 41 N. J. L. 98, 103; Streight v. Durham (Okl.), 61 Pac. Rep. 1096; New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. V. Pennsylvania, 139 Pa- St. 463; Billinghurst v. Spink County, 5 a D. 305; Stat? v. Armstrong, 19 Utah 117. A statute taxing bonds and other securities issued by cor- porations on their nominal instead of their actual value, and requiring the treasurer of the corporation to deduct the tax from the interest payable to their bondholders, cannot be held invalid as making no pro- vision for notice; the law itself gives notice of the tax and of the mode of its collection: Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 333. A stat- ute requiring every mining corporar tion to make out a sworn statement of its property, to be laid before the county board of equalization, which " shall value and assess the capital stock in the maimer provided for by law," is sufficient notice to such a corporation that the board will act on its statement, and no other notice of that fact need be given: Hyland V. Brazil Block Coal Co., 128 Ind. 335. Where a statute fixes the time when a bank shall make its report to the auditor-general of the value of its shares, and directs him to hear the stockholders, it satisfies the re- quirements of notice both as to time and place at which the assessment is to be made, the rule being that official proceedings are always, in the absence of express provision to the contrary, to be had at th^ office of the officer chai-ged with the duties: Merchants', etc. Nat. Bank V. Pennsylvania, 167 U. 8. 461. 632 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH.^ XII. particulars should therefore be held a condition precedent to any further proceedings.^ It is not enough to sustain a tax under such circumstances that the officers have acted with just intent, or even that the assessment is relatively fair ; the con- clusive answer to any suggestion of the kind is that the party has been denied his lawful right to meet such a claim at the proper time.^ "When, therefore, either directly by the statute, or by some officer or boar(^ under its authority, a certain time is fixed for the meeting of a board -of review, and the board fails to meet; or a certain time for the return and filing of the assessment for inspection before the meeting of the board, and it is not filed, whereby opportunity for inspection is lost, — the tax proceedings must be regarded as having failed to become I French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506, 511; Lyon v. Alley, 130 U. S. 177; Albany City Bank v. Maher, 19 Blatch. 175; Walker v. Chapman, 23 Ala. 116; Thomas Manuf. Co. v. La- throp, 7 Conn. 550, 555; Marsh v. Chestnut, 14 111. 223; Cleghorn v. ' Postlewaite, 48 111. 438; Nashville v. Weiser, 54 111. 245; Mix v. People, 73 IlL 241; National Bank v. Cook, 77 III 632; McChesney v. People, 145 IlL 614, 148 ni. 221; Chicago & N. W. R Co. V. People, 171 111. 535, 183 111. 196; Payson v. People, 175 111. 367; Kan- sas Pao. R. Co. V. Russell, 8 Kan. 558; Negley v. Henderson Bridge Co. (Ky.), 54 S. W. Rep. 171; Lowell v. Wentworth,6 Cush. 221; Clarksdale V. Yazoo & M. V. R Co. (Miss.), 29 South. Rep. 93; Girardeau v. Buehr- mann, 148 Mo. 198; Ives vi. Irey, 50 Neb. 136; State v. Love, 47 N. J. L. 436; Insurance Co. v. Yard, 17 Pa. St. 331, 338; Hershberger v. Pittsburgh, 115 Pa. St. 78; Handley's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 339; McTwiggan v. Hunter, 18 R L 776; Thomas v. Leland, 70 Vt. 333. In the Connecticut case cited, the assessment was held void because an abstract thereof which the law required should be filed by the 1st of December was actually not filed until the 20th, although this was ten days before the meeting of the board of review. A similar error would not now be fatal in Illinois under the statute: see Buck v. Peo- ple,' 78 IlL 560; Purrington v. People, 79 lU. 11; Thatcher v. People, 79 111. 597, and other cases referred to in those. 2 See Stuart v. Palmer, 74 ,N. Y. 183; Jewell V. Van Steenburgh, 58 N. Y. 85. and cases cited; State v. Jersey City, 25 N. J. L. 309. The fact that the assessment would have been the same if the owner had had notice does not make it valid: Ulman v. Baltimore, 73 Md. 587. If there is any ground on which a tax levied without notice to a taxpayer can be applied, the party claiming its va- lidity must show that a notice would have been unavailing: Auer v. Du- buque, 65 Iowa 650. The provisioils made by the legislature for a review of city assessments cannot be changed by city ordinance: Dwyer v. Hack- worth, 57 Tex. 245. But where the party taxed applies to a court of equity to enjoin the tax, but relies exclusively on a failure to follow the law, and alleges no injustice or in- equality, his suit will be dismissed; Albany, etc. Co. v. Auditor-General, 37 Mich. 291. And see Baltimore v. Grand Lodge, 61 Md. 280. OH. XII.J LISTING OF PEES0N8 AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. G33 effectual, because of the failure of the officers properly to fol- low them up as required by law. No argument cau be ad- missible in such a case which proposes the acceptance of some- thing else as a substitute for the securities the statute has pro- vided. To substitute anything would require legislation; and even legislation for the purpose would be of doubtful validity if it failed to provide what Tirould fully accomplish the same substantial purpose.* Classification of property; Real and personal. It is cus- tomary to classify property for taxation as real and personal, and to assess the two classes on somewhat different principles.^ The classification is commonly made on common-law distinc- tions; but this is not necessarily the oase^ and it will frequently be found that the enumeration of property in statutes as real or personal for the purposes of taxation differs considerably from what it would be for other purposes in the same state.' The method provided for enforcing the tax may also by impli- cation make some change in the common-law distinctions. A few oases will be referred to. , Where land is owned by one person and buildings thereon by another, the two are to be 1 Gaboon v.Coe, 57 N. H. 556; Stuart ment of due process of law: People V. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 193. An assessor v. Pittsburg R. Co., 67 Cal. 625. has no aihbority to assess for the ^ ^n assessment which assesses in first time personal property at the mass realty and personalty, in disre- time and place he has noticed for the gard of the law, is void: Northern review of his complete roll: Common Pao. R. Co. v. Carland, 5 Mont. 146. Council V. Sm'ith, 99 Mich. 507. Where certain property had been Where the statute provides that if annually listed as personalty, and so the' value fixed by the assessor be assessed, it was held upon a bill to greater than that fixed by the tax- restrain sale for taxes, that, even as- payer, it shall be the assessor^ duty suming the property to be in fact to notify the taxpayer at the time realty, the facts furnished no basis of the assessment, and to report to for an attack on the validity of the the board of supervisors a list of all assessments: Ledoux v. Bee, 83 Fed. taxpayers whose lists have been in- Rep. 761. Where land is assessed, creased, an assessment is void to the and a valuable mill is afterwards extent that it is increased without erected thereon, and it is reported by such notice to the taxpayer and re- the tax-collector as an additional as- port to said bo^rd: Negley v. Hen- sessment, an assessment thereon is derson Bridge Co. (Ky.), 54 S. W. Rep. not void because the oolleotor gives 171. A statute authorizing an as- in the mill as personal property: sessment in a city after the time Tunica County v. Tate, 78 Miss. 294. within which the board of equaliza- ' See Steere v. Walling, 7 R. I. 817. tion can meet violates the require- 634 LISTING OF PBSSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. separately assessed, and the assessment of the buildings as real estate is proper.^' It is proper also thus to assess the build- ings when the land is exempt from taxation.^ Where the law declares that for purposes of assessment and taxation a lease for ninety-nine years "shall be taken and considered as a de- terminable fee," the property is taxable as though held in fee.' When land purchased of the United States or of the state has been paid for, or when the right to a complete title has in any way been acquired, it is proper to tax the party who is then, in contemplation of equity at least, the real owner, for the land as land;* but the state may provide by law for taxing im- 1 People V. Tdx Com'rs, 80 N. Y, 573, 83 N. Y. 459; People v. Brooklyn Assessors, 93 N. Y. 308. This rule ap- plies to buildiags erected by a tenant on leased land: Union Compress Co. T. State, 64 Ark. 136; Russell v. New- Haven, 51 Conn. 259; Milligan v. Drury, 130 Mass. 438; People v. Cas- sidy, 46 N. Y. 46; Smith v. Mayor, 68 N. Y. 553; People v. Board of Assess- ors, 34 Hun 559. Compare Flanders V. Cross, 10 Cush. 514. And It ap- plies also even though the land is leased from a municipality: San Francisco v. McGinn, 67 Cal. 110; Burbank v. Board of Assessors, 53 La. An. 1506. One who builds on lands under a parol license in perpet- uam given by a camp-meeting asso- ciation is a tenant in possession, and the house and lot may be assessed to him: Foxoroft v. Straw, 86 Ma 76. Where a lease provided that build- ings which, the lessee might erect on the premises should not become a part of the realty but remain the lessee's property, an assessment of all the property to the lessor was ille- gal and void : State v. Mission Free ' School, 163 Mo. 333. And a petition t6 "enforce the state's lien for taxes, directed against the lessee without previous assessment of the leasehold, and without averring the nature of the lease, the length of the term, or the lessee's liability to pay the taxes, is insufficient: State v. Thompson, 149 Mo. 441. Under the Massachu- setts statute buildings cannot be taxed as real estate except in con- nection with the land to which they are affixed: McGee v. Salem, 149 Mass. 238. Where a street-railroad company may properly be taxed as the owner, for the purposes of taxa- tion, of leased land upon which its power-house and plant are in part situated, such buildings are taxable as part of the realty: New York Guaranty, etc. Co. v. Tacoma R & M. Co., 93 Fed. Rep. 31, 35 C. C. A. 193. In Kentucky it is held that stores are properly treated as personal prop- erty : Russell V. Carlisle (Ky.), 8 S. W. Rep. 14. 2 People V. Brooklyn Assessors, 93 N. Y. 308; Russell v. New Haven, 51 Conn. 359, citing Brainard v. Col" Chester, 31 Conn. 407, and Lord v. Litchfield, 36 Conn. 116. 8 Washington Market Co. v. District of Columbia, 4 Mackey 416. *See Appeal of Maish (Ariz.), 37 Pac. Eep. 370; Bellinger v. White, 5 Neb. 399: McMahon v. Welsh, 11 Kan. 280 ;ttnie, pp. 135-139. Whether mortgage of land-grant lands was in effect a conveyance so as to subject lands to taxation: St. Paul & S. C. E. Co. V. McDonald, 34 Minn. 183. . OH. XII.J LISTING OF PBES0N3 AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 635 proveraents as such, though made upoa government lands.^ Lands bought of the state and not yet paid for are generally made taxable to the purchaser, though his interest may be merely equitable ; ^ and that interest is sometimes taxed as real and sometimes as personal estate.' It is entirely competent to provide for the assessment of any mere possessory right in lands, whether they are owned by the government or by pri- vate individuals,* as well as for any inchoate title to land which has been bought and in part paid for.* It is to be un- derstood, however, that while the statute might treat the in- terest assessed as either real or personal, no greater interest could be sold than that to which the person was entitled.^ Mines and quarries, though the ownership of them is severed from that of the surface, are taxable as real estate ;' so is stand- 1 See People v. Mining Co., 1 Idaho 109; People v. Lumber Co., 1 Idaho 430; New York, etcj E. Co. v. Yard, 43 K. J. L. 131. A statute providing that "personal property for the pur- pose of taxation shall be construed to embrace and include ... all improvements upon lands the fee of which is still vested in the United States, or in the state of," etc., in- cludes improvements on state lands lying within harbor lines: Peroival V. Thurston County, 14 Wash. 586. Shed built upon a pier belonging to a city by lessee was held to be the city's property and not taxable as the property of the lessee: People v. Barker, 153 N. Y. 98. 2 See Wells v. Savannah, 87 Ga. 397 ; St. Joseph County Com'rs v. Ruck- man, 57 Ind. 96; Henderson v. State, 58 Ind. 344; Taylor v. Robinson, 34 Fed. Rep. 678. A wharf and ware- house on tide-lands held under con- tract of purchase from the state are taxable as part of the lands, and not separately: Gray's Harbor Co. v. Chehalis County (Wash.), 63 Pac. Rep. 338. 3 See Prescott v. Beebe, 17 Kan. 320;Bentley v. Barton, 41 Ohio St. 410. As to assessment of Indian lands after the Indian title is extinguished by treaty, see Fellows v. Denniston, 23 N. Y. 420; State v. Miami County, 63 Ind. 497; Franklin County v. Pen- nook, 18 Kan. 579; Kansas Indians, 5 Wall 737; Peck v. Miami County, 4 Dill. 370; Pennock v. Commission- ers, 103 U. S. 44. * State V. Moore, 13 Cal. 56; People V. Frisbie, 31 Cal. 146; People v. Black D. M. Co., 31 Cal. 54; Reiley v. Lancaster, 39 CaL 354. It is a good answer, when one is assessed for a possessory claim to land, to deny such claim and plead that whatever claim one has is exempt from taxation: State V. Central Pac. R. Co., 31 Nev. 247. 5 See People v. Shearer, 30 CaL 645. Inchoate homestead titles not tax- able in Kansas: Long v. Gulp, 14 Cal. 413; Chase County v. Shipman, 14 Kan. 533. 6 Topeka Com. Sec. Co. v. McPher- son, 7 OkL . 332. This case upholds the validity of the act taxing town- site lots. A sale of public land for the.tax against the person having the inchoate title would, of course, be in- competent: Quivey v. Lawrence, 1 Idaho 313. 'Shell V. People (III), 61 N. E. Rep. 636 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. ing timber, though owinecl separately from the land whereon it grows.' A logging ditch has a vialue separate and distinct from the land through which it runs, and may be assessed sepa- 1133; Stuart v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 595; Sanderson v. Scranton, 105 Pa! St. 469; Waterman v. Davis, 66 Vt. 83. Coal in place belonging to one who does not own the surface under which it lies may be assesi^d as land apart from the surface : Con- solidated Coal Co. V. Baker, 135 111. 545. And the owner of land who has cohveyed it, reserving the coal there- under, and the right to mine the same, may be taxed for such mining right though there is no pro9f of the existence of any coal on the land: Major V. Pavey, 134 111. 19. Coal and similar privileges or interests, if not held in fee or for life but limited to a term of years, are not held as free- hold estates, and should not be as- sessed separately on the land-books to the licensee or lessee: United States Coal, etc. Co. v. Randolph County Court, 38 W. Va. 301; State V. South Penn. Oil Co., 43 W. Va. 80. The right to enter on land and man- ufacture rooflbg-slate therefrom, so long as suitable material may be found, the owner of the land reserv- ing the full use for farming purposes of all the land not needed for work- ing the ledges, etc., is not taxable to the lessee as real estate: Hughes v. Vail, 57 Vt. 41. The prospective pro- duction of oil from a leased well is not properly chargeable on personal- property books to the lessee: Carter V. Tyler County, 45 W. Va. 806. Where. the owner of land conveys the surface and reserves the mineral, he should notify the county commis- sioners of that fact, and if he fails to do so, and thereafter the lands are as to the entire estate assessed as unseated lands, and are sold as such at a tax-sale, the owner of the sur- face may purchase at such sale and acquire a good title to the minerals: Hutchinson v. Kline, 199 Pa. St. 564. K those who are taxed on a mining right claim that their interest is an easement and not taxable, they have the burden of showing such fact: ShoU V. People (111.), 61 N. E. Rep. 1133. Assessment against one whose interest was confined to a share in a quarry held not to imply an assess- ment of the surface to him: Water- man y. Davis, 66 Vt. 83. As to taxa- tion of mines and mining claims, see, further. Waller v. Hughes (Ariz.), 11 Pac. Rep. 133; People v. Hender- son, 13 Colo. 869; Montana Coal, etc. Co. V. Livingston, 31 Mont. 59. ' 1 Fletcher v. Alcona T'p,.7aMich. 18; Globe Lumber Co. v. Lockett (La.), 30 South. Rep. 903. These cases explain that the timber should be as- sessed in the name of its owner, while the land itself is assessed to the owner of the fee. Trees bought by a lum- ber company for the purpose of al- lowing them to stand for several years before cutting them are tax- able in the county where they are situated, irrespective of the com- pany's domicile: Calderon v. Ken- tucky Lumber Co. (Ky.), 33 S. W. Rep. 334. Nursery stock growing on land should be assessed with the land if owned therewith, instead of as per- sonalty: Wilson V. Cass County, 69 Iowa 147. The right of a lessee to enter upon railroad lands, which are not taxable to the railroad company, and remove therefrom the merchant- able timber, is an interest which is subject to 'taxation: Pine County v. Tozer, 56 Minn. 388. Where a lease of lands contains the right of the vendee to cut off timber during a certain number of years, his special timber interest in the land is taxable: Freeman v. State, 115' Ala. 308. A mere right to cut and remove timber OH. Xll.J LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 637 rately therefrom.' Eiparian rights, until separated by the owner from the abutting shore property, are not independently subject to taxation.^ Water-powers and rights in reservoirs of ' water are interests in the lands upon which they are created.' A pier constructed in a harbor is taxable as realty.* So is a boom of floating timber chained to fixed piers.' So is a bridge across a river.* "So are the aqueducts, pipes, and conduits of water companies,' the water-mains and electric wires of a water for a series of years is not taxable as realty: Clove Spi-ing Iron Works v. Cone, 56 Vt. 602. 1 Sullivan v. State, 117 Ala. 314. One who contests an assessment on the mileage value of a log ditch is liable for the length of the ditch proved to be owned by him. He is not entitled to a verdict when the state fails to prove him the owner of the entire length claimed: Ibid. 2 State V. St. Paul & D. R. Co., 81 Minn. 432. The land between a levee and the river, if used by the riparian owner, or if he derives an income therefrom, is subject to taxation: Mathis V. Board of Assessors, 46 La.- An. 1570. 3 Wionipiseogee Lake Manuf. Co. V. Gilford, 64 N. H. 337. See Amos- keag Manuf. Co. v. Concord, 66 N. H. 562; Quinebaug Reservoir Co. v. Union, 73 Conn. 294; Union Water Power Co. v. Auburn, 91 Me. 60; Bos- ton Manuf. Co. v. Newton, 22 Pick. 23; Flax-Pond Water Co. v. Lynn, 147 Mass. 31 ; Lowell v. Commissioners, 152 Mass. 872. If one holds real es- tate within a city and in connection therewith an exclusive right to sup- ply the city with water, this intan- gible right is subject to taxation and valuation like other property:- Stein V. Mobile, 17 Ala. 284 1 Smith V. New York, 68 N. Y. 553. See People v. Tax Com'rs, 52 N. Y. 659. 5 Hall V. Benton, 69 Me,. 346. ' Pittsburg, etc. R. v. Board of Pub- lic Works, 173 ,U. S. 32; KeithsbUrg Bridge Co. v. McKay, 42 Fed. Rep. 427; Alexandria, etc. Co. v. District of Columbia, 1 Mackey 217; St. Louis Bridge Co. v. East St. Louis, 121 111. 338; Hudson River Bridge Co. v. Pat- terson, 74 N. Y. 365. Bridge propgr and the approach 1;hereto assessable together: Keokuk & H Bridge Co. V. People, 176 111. 267. Under the West Virginia statute relating to the taxation of toll bridges and ferries, the assessment must be placed on the personal-property books, the as- sessment of real estate not being pro- vided for: Charleston & S. Bridge Co. V. Kanawha County, 41 W. Va. 658. ' Appeal of Des Moines, etc. Co., 48 Iowa 824; Oskaloosa Water Co. v. Board of Equal., 84 Iowa 407; Paris V. Norway Water-works Co., 85 Me. 380; Dover v. Maine Water Co!, 90 Me. 180; Monroe Water Ca v. French- town T'p, 98 Mich. 481; Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202. In the first two of these cases it was held that "the mains of a water company were tax- able where the buildings, machinery, etc., were located, though extending into another township; while in the next two oases, water pipes, etc., were held taxable in the town where they were laid, although the com- pany owned no other property in that town, and although the works were situated in another town. Where a watercompany is chartered to supply a certain county and city therein with water, the mere fact that the company's pipes pass 638 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. and light company,^ the mains, tanks, and service-pipes of gas companies,^ the underground pipes of pipe-line companies,' the foundations, columns, and superstructure of an elevated railroad in a city,* the track of a surface street-railway,^ and through the adjoining county does not make its franchise taxable there: Spring Valley Waterworks v. Barber, 99 Cal. 36. Pipes laid under a b*- ough's public streets by a water com- pany, used to convey water from its water-works in an adjoining town- ship, and fire plugs connected with the pipes in the borough, whether considered as realty or personalty, are prop'erly taxable in the borough: Riverton & P. Water Co. v. Haig, 58 N. J. L. 295. Prior to the passage of the act of 1893 there was no author- ity in Michigan to assess a water company's underground pipes as personalty in wards wherein the company had no abiding place: Grand Haven v. Grand Haven Water Works, 119 Mich. 658. iShelbyville Water Co. v. People,140 111. 545. Electric wires and poles con- nected with an electric light plant are not part of the realty or appurtenant thereto for purposes of taxation, where some of the poles are on pri- vate property, and some are' placed on the public highways, under revo- cable licenses: Newport Ilium. Co. v. Assessors, 19 S, I. 633. The same case holds an electric switchboard with the connecting wires, and steam dynamos, all of which are removable without injuring the freehold, to be personal property for purposes of taxation: Ibid. 2 People V. Martin, 48 Hun 193. The mains of a gas-light company are appurtenant to its lots, "and are only taxable therewith unless other- wise provided by statute: Capital City, etc. Co. v. Charter-Oak Ins. Co., 51 Iowa 31. See Fall River v. County Coni'rs, 135 Mass. 567. In determin- ing the value of a gas company's property, the value of the franchises granted by the village, and - of the contract with the company furnish- ing the gas, is not to be oonsid«red: People V. Martin, 48 Hun 193. In Commonwealth v. Lowell Gas Light Co., 13 Allen 75, the word " machin- ery " was held to include gas-pipes laid under the streets, and, gas-me- ters. See Providence Gas Co. v. Thurber, 3 R. L 15; People v. Brook- lyn Assessors, 39 N. Y. 81. Under the provision of a charter authorizing the levy of an ad valorem tax on real estate in the city, and on such per- sonal estate " as the city council may designate," it is sufficient for the purpose of taxing gas-pipes, meters, lamp-posts, and the like, that they be designated under the general term "personal estate, and any property of any kind subject to taxa- tion under the laws of this common- wealth: " Covington Gas-Light Co. V. Covington, 84 Ky. 94. 3 Pipe-Line Co. v. Berry, 53 N. J. L. 308; Tide- Water Pipe Co. v. Berry, 53 N. J. L. 313. Such line is taxable as real estate in the several town- ships through which it runs, though the fee of the land and the posses- sion of the surface are in another: Ibid. * People V. Tax Com'rs, 83 N. Y. 459. ', 6 New Haven v. Fair Haven, etc. fj. Co., 38 Conn. 433; People v. Cassidy, 46 N. Y. 46.' The easement in the streets of a city which a street-car company has acquired by contract with the city is an interest in realty, and taxable as such: South Nash- ville St. R Co. v. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406. Though real estate, the track of a street-railway company is not to CH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 639 the right of way, road-bed, embankments, bridges, culverts, and tracks of a steam railroad.^ The rolling-stock of railroads is sometimes treated as personalty, and sometimes as fixtures, under tax-laws; and perhaps, under some laws, it may be both ; that is, it may be included in the assessment of the road as realty, but be subject to be taken as personalty on process issued for the enforcement of the tax levied.^ be assessed in parcels — at least with- out express statutory authority: State V. District Court, 31 Minn. 354. Compare Appeal of Eailway Co., 33 CaL 499; Appeal Tax-Court v. Rail- road Co., 50 Md. 374; Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. V. Appeal Tax-Court, DO Md. 397. In Michigan the franchises of a street-railway company and the track or road are held — by statute — to be personalty: Detroit v. Wayne Circuit Judge (Mich.), 86 N. W. Rep. 1033. 1 Tennessee, etc. R. Co. v. East Ala- bama E. Co., 75 Ala. 516; Piirifoy v. La;nar, 113 Ala. 133; Neary v. Phila- delphia, W. & B. R. Co. (Del.), 9 Atl. Rep. 405; People v. Beardsley, 53 Barb. 105. It is immaterial whether a railroad is laid upon the surface, placed on pillars, or carried through a covered way or tunnel, the struct- ures adapted to sustain it, or facili- tate and protect its use are, within the meaning of the law, land, and for them the railroad company is liable to be taxed: People v. Tax Com'rs, 101 N. Y. 833. Designating by name impi-ovements upon a rail- road's right of way, and giving some of such improvements a separate valuation, do not vitiate their assess- ment as real estate, and make it one of personal property; it is mere de- scription: New Mexico v. United States Trust Co., 174 U. S. 545. A grain elevator standing on the lands of a railroad company owned by it, and constituting a part of its real estate, is not taxable as personal property of the corporation: Chi- cago, M. & St. P. R. Co. V. Houston County, 38 Minn. 531. But elevators owned by other persons on the right of way of a railroad coqipany are personalty for purposes of taxation : State V. Red River Valley Elevator Co., 69 Minn. 131, See Taxation of Erie R. Co., 64 N. J. L. 183. Where a railroad was constructed on an- other's land under a parol arrange- ment with the^owner,the works con- structed for use for railroad pur- poses — embankments, dredges, cul- verts, and tracks, were assessaVjle for taxation to the railroad company: State V. State Board, 63 N. J. L. 561. Railroad tracks wrongfully laid do not pass by a tax-sale of the land on a decree against the railroad company canceling its interest therein: Illi- nois CentraPR. Co. v. Le Blanc, 74 Miss. 650. , A private railroad owned by a partnership is real property, and hence should be assessed in the township where situated, and not at the terminal point of such road: Mitchell V. Lake T'p, lS6 Mich. 367, 2 Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v EUson, 113 Mich. 30, which case held that coal stored in the company's sheds was subject to levy for a tax. In Kentucky cars and engines cannot be sold under a tax- warrant: Eliza- bethtown, etc. R. Co. v. Trustees, 18 Bush 833. Locomotives presumed, as between a railroad company and a tax-collector, to be personalty: Midland R. Co. v. State, 11 Ind. App. 433. SeeMabry V. Harp, S3Kan.398: Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 331. 640 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XIL It has been held that in the assessment of mills the ma- chinery contained therein should be included, even though it was personalty by common-law Tules, and the owner a non- resident.^ And the legislature has power to require fixtures to be listed and taxed as personalty.^ A seat in a stock exchange has been held not to be personal property within, a statute de- fining personalty for purposes of taxation, and therefore not taxable to a non-resident within the statute providing that a non-resident's personal property should be assessed "to the same extent " as if owned by a resident.' A ground-rent, being realty, is improperly entered on the personal-property book for taxation; and where no provision has been made for the taxation of rent-charges on land, such property is not taxable.* It is held in Pennsylvania that a di- rection in a will to executors to sell land in pther states, and distribute the proceeds among specified persons, converts such land into personalty so as to subject it to the collateral-inher- itance tax.^ In some jurisdictions the interest of the holder of a mortgage upon land is by statute made taxable as realty.' 1 Sprague v. Lisbon, 30 Conn. 18. 2 Johnson v. Roberts, 103 111. 655. There the fixtures were a steam- engine, boiler, etc., afSxed to the soil. Under the West Virginia stat- ute providing for the assessment of taxes, the words "personal property " apply to all fixtures attached to land, if not included in the valuation in the land book: Carter v. Tyler County Court, 45 W. Va. 806. The assessors cannot, of their own au- thority, tax as personal estate what in fact is real: see Richards v. Wa- pello County, 48 Iowa 507. 3 People V. Feitner, 167 N. Y. 1. See San Francisco v. Anderson, 103 Cal. 69. * Willard's Executors v. Common- wealth, 97 Va. 667. BMiller v.Commonwealth.lU Pa.St. 331; Williamson's Estate, 153 Pa. St 508; Coleman's Estate, 159 Pa. St. 231. See Drayton's Appeal, 61 Pa. St. 172; Commonwealth's Appeal, 161 Pa. St. 181; Handley's Estate, 181 Pa. St. 339. This rule is not adopted in New York ; In re Swift, 187 N. Y. 77; In re Cur- tiss, 142 N. Y. 319; In* re Sutton's Estate, 3 App. Div. (N. Y.) 208. "See Savings, etc. Soo. v. Mult- nomah County, 169 U. 8. 421, and cases there referred to. Under the Massachusetts statute providing that when any person has an interest in taxable real estate as holder of a duly- recorded mortgage, the amount of bis interest shall* be assessed as real- estate, etc., bonds secured by mort- gage to trustees represent a loan or inortgage of real estate, and are tax- able to the trustees as real-estate and not to the landholders as personalty: Knight V. Boston, 159 Mass. 551. Where lands covered by an existing mortgage lie within two or more taxing districts, the amount of mort- gage interest to be taxed in each district will be that proportion which the value of the land lying in that district bears to the whole: Common Council V. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78. CH. XII.] LISTING OF PEKSONS AND VALUATIO]^ OF ESTATES. 6il The earned premiums of insurance companies doing business in a state are personal property there within a statute relating to the taxation of personalty, and are taxable for municipal purposes.' " • Personal taxes in general. Where one has no domicile within the state, he is not assessable there for any mere per- sonal tax not connected with actual presence of property or business within its jurisdiction, though he himself may formerly have been domiciled in the state, and may at the time be within it.^ But when a party is actually domiciled in the state, some latitude in determining where he shall be taxed — though not a broad one — is allowable. Statutes prescribing the place for personal taxation sometimes make use of the word domi- cile, sometimes inhabitancy, sometimes place of abode, or some similar term or phrase. Probably these are in general used in the same sense, or nearly so, in tax laws.' "No exact definition can be given of domicile; it depends upon no one fact or combination of circumstances, but from the whole taken togpthei- it must be determined in each par- ticular case. It is a maxim that every man must have a domicile somewhere; and also that he can have but one. Of course it follows that his existing domicile continues until he acquires another; and vice versa, by acquiring a new domicile he relinquishes his former one. From this view it is manifest that very slight circumstances must often decide the question. It depends upon the preponderance of evidence in favor of two or more places; and it may often occur that the evidence of facts tending to establish the domicile in one place would be entirely conclusive were it not for the existence of facts and circumstances of a still more conclusive and decisive character which fix it beyond question in another. So, on the contrary, 1 Phoenix Ins. Ca v. Omaha, 33 1 Met. 580. Laborers in a cbunty Neb. 313. on a temporary job are not taxable 2That poll taxes are only to be as- there: On Yuen Hai Co. v. Ross, 8 sessed at the place of one's domicile, Sawy. 384. A citizen of another state see Herriman v. Stowers, 43 Me. 497; employed for an indefinite period as State V. Boss, 33 N. J. L. 517. That a laborer for a local corporation was one living on land under the exolu- held liable for road duty: State v. sive jurisdiction of the federal gov- Johnston, 118 N. C. 1188. ernment is not subject to state taxa- ^ Thorndike v. Boston, 1 Met 243. tion on polls, see Opinions of Justices, 41 642 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XII, very slight circumstaaces may fix one's domicile, if not con- trolled by more conclusive facts fixing it in another place.^ If a seaman without family or property sails from the place of his nativity, which may be considered his domicile of origin, although he may return only at long intervals, or even be ab- sent many years, yet if he does not, by some actual residence or other means, acquire a domicile elsewhere, he retains his domicile of origin." ' So going abroad with one's family and actually taking up one's residence in a foreign city, but with iHall V. Murdock, 114 Mich. 333. 2 Shaw, Ch. J., ;ii Thorndike v. Bos- ton, 1 Met. 243, 245. See Bowman v. Boyd, 31 Nev. 281 ; Daniel v. Sullivan, 46 Ga. 377; Cabot v. Boston, 13 Gush. 53; Lee v. Boston, 3 Gray 484; Bulk- ley V. Williamstovrn, 3 Gray 493; Kil- burn V. Bennett, 3 Met. 199; Beecher V. Common Council, 114 Mich. 338; Detroit v. Macier, 117 Mich. 76; Mat- ter of Nichols, 54 N. Y, 63; Foster v. Hall, 4 Humph. 345; Buchanan v. Cook, 70 Vt. 168. The last residence of a decedent is not fixed for purposes of taxation by a finding of the probate court lor the purpose of settling the estate: Dallinger v. Richardson, 176 Mass. 77. The action of the tax-list- ers of a town in settling the list of a decedent's estate in a certain school district is not conclusive as to the question of the decedent's last resi- dence: Preston v. King, 61 Vt. 606. Assessors of taxes, though chosen by the city or town, are public officers. Their acts in omitting to assess a tax against an individual are biit expres- sions of their opinion, and not only do not conclude the town as to the fact of residence, but are Bot entitled to be considered as evidence upon that subject; and, therefore, in an ac^ tion to recover a tax resisted on the ground that defendant was not an inhabitant of B., the assessor's rec- ords for eight years, showing she was not taxed as an inhabitant of R., were held inadmissible: Rockland V. Farnsworth, 93 Me. 178. On an issue as to plaintiflE's liability to as- sessment in the town of W., it was competent to show by a lister of the town where he claimed residence, and also by the tax-list, that he was not listed in that town ; it may also be shown that he paid no taxes there, and was not allowed to vote there: Meserve v. Folsom, 63 Vt. 504. In. an action to recover back taxes paid to a city on the ground that plaintiff was not, at the time the taxes were assessed, an inhabitant of said city, declarations of his to persons not rep- resenting the city, in which he stated that he was a resident of a town in another state, are inadmissible, and so is evidence that prior to the year in which the taxes were assessed he declined to accept a nomination for office, or to serve if elected, because he " had no connection with or in- terest in the affairs of" the city: Pickering v. Cambridge, 144 Mass. 344. A town which taxes a man as a resident takes the burden of show- ing that he is such, if the right is questioned: Hurlburtv. Green, 41 Vt. 490, 43 Vt 316. Consent by a person to be taxed where he does not reside does not give jurisdiction, and would not bind him: Blood v. Sayre, 17 Vt. 609. For a case where evidence was held to show that the lands upon which resided persons seeking to re- strain the collection of a tax were within the district assessed, see Arm- strong V. Russellville Dist. T. Co. (Ky.), 39 S. W. Rep. 307. CH. XII.] LISTJNG OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 643 the intention at some time of returning, does not deprive one of his domicile of birth, or the authorities of the place of domicile of the right to tax him.^ So if one before the time of making an assessment has left the state with the intention of not returning, he is still taxable at the place of his domicile in it unless he has actually acquired a domicile in another state, or at least has fixed upon one and is m, itinere thither.^ If a party having a domicile in the country takes a house in a city and lives there winters, but continues to live in the country summers, this is no change of domicile,' and he must be assessed for taxation where he thus retains his domicile, even though at the time of assessment he resides at the other place.* A domi- 1 Sears v, Boston, 1 Met. 350; Otis V. Boston, 13 Gush. 44; Carnoe v. Free- town, 9 Gray 357; Borland v. Boston, 133 Mass. 89. See Hallowell v. Saco, 5 Me. 143. ^Borlandv. Boston, 133 Mass. 89; Colton V. Longmeadow, 13 Allen 598. Briggs V. Eochester, 16 Gray 337, seems to be overruled by Borland v. Boston. See , Culbertson v. County Com'rs, 53 Ind. 361. To effect a change of domicile a residence must be acquired so permanent as to ex. elude an existing intention to return to the old one, or to make a domicile elsewhere than at the new place of residence. Hartford v. Champion, 58 Conn. 268. 3 Harvard Coll. v. Gore, 5 Pick. 870. See People v. Barker, 70 Hun 397 ; Kirby's Appeal, 134 Pa. St. 309; Ar- nold V. Davis, 8 E. I. 341; Tripp v. Brown, 9 R. I. 340. Where a farmer removed his family to a neighboring town to have his children educated, he did not abandon his domicile, and his personalty was not subject to municipal taxation: Montgomery v. Lebanon (Ky.), 64 S. W. Rep. 509. « Lee V. Boston, 2 Gray 484; Wright v. Boston, 126 Mass. 161;, Thayer v. Boston, 134 Mass. 133;People v. Moore, 52 Hun 13; People v. Barker, 63 Hun 630, 17 N. Y. Supp. 788, 789. In New Jersey, where one is taxed where he resides on the day appointed for be- ginning the assessment, the residence is held to be that which would en- title one to vote: State v. Casper, 36 N. J. L. 367. A different conclusion was reached in New York under a different statute: see Bell v. Pierce, 51 N. Y. 13. Compare Mugent v. Bates, 51 Iowa 77; Greene v. Gardiner, 6 R. I. 343. An unmarried man was held properly taxed in the county where he spent most of his time, and where his interests were, notwith- standing he kept trunks and cloth- ing in another county: King v. Parker, 73 Iowa 757. In People v. Tax Com'rs, 68 N. Y. Supp. 548, the statutory presumption that theresi- deuce of a taxpayer in a tax district shall be presumed to^ continue, for purposes of taxation, until he ac- quires another residence in the state or removes therefrom, was held to be overcome by the uncontradicted evi- dence. A finding that a person in- tended to fix his domicile in the city wherein he was taxed for personal property was held to be sustained by the evidence that he had actually re- sided therein for four years and had built there an expensive house with the evident intention of making it a home ; this against his own ,testimony as to his intention, etc. : Beecher v. Common Council, 114 Mich. 238. 644 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XII. cile cannot be lost by mere abandonment, though it be with definite purpose not to return to it.' "Where one is taxed for his personalty at the place of domi- cile, it is in general immaterial that some or even the whole of it is at the time out of the state.^ Assessment of personalty. It will be expected of any law for the levy of taxes that it will specifically or otherwise enu- merate the kinds of property to be taxed. This is essential, since all property is never taxed, and the assessor is without guide unless the statute supplies it.' Perhaps the most com- 1 Warren v. Thomaston, 43 Me. 406. See, further, Stockton v. Staples, 66 Me. 197; Nugent v. Bates, 51 Iowa 77. A change in domicile cannot be ef- fected by an intention in the m;nd to make the change, unless it is accom- panied by an actual change in the place of abode: Pickering v. Cam- bridge, 144 Mass. 244. A wife cannot change domicile for her husband: Parsons v. Bangor, 61 Me. 457; Porter- iield V. Augusta, 67 Me. 556. If one engages in business in another state, but leaves his family permanently at his former place of residence, he re- mains taxable there: Culbertson v. Floyd County, 53 Ind. 361. See Mc- Cutcheon v. Rice County, 7 Fed. Rep. 558. A merely colorable change of. residence to avoid taxation will not be regarded: Draper v. Hatfield, 124 Mass. 53. See Thayer v. Boston, 124 Mass. 133. If a line runs through one's house he must be taxed in the town which includes the most neces- sary and indispensable part. He can- not be taxed in both: Judkins v. Reed, 48 Me. 386; Chenery v. Waltham, 8 Cush. 827. If he is assessed in two towns, his election to pay in one rather than the other is not conclu- sive, but he is liable in the one of his actual inhabitancy: Lyman v. Fiske, 17 Pick. 231; Chenery v. Waltham, 8 Cush. 327. See, also. Hardy v. Yar- mouth, 6 Allen 377, 284. His being taxed in one is not evidence that his residence and proper place of taxa- tion are jiot in another: Meadv. Rox- boroiigh, 11 Cush. 363. See People v. Atkinson, 103 IlL 45. For decisions under the New York statute pro- viding that a person having two or more places of residence shall be taxed upon his personalty at the place where bis principal business has been transacted, see People v. Tax Com'rs, 3 N. Y. Supp. 674; People V. Barker, 17 N. Y. Supp. 789. 63 Hun 630; Bowe v. Jenkins, 23 N. Y. Supp. 548, 99 Hun 458. On the general sub- ject, see, further, Woodard v. Isham, 43 Vt. 123; Kellogg v. Supervisors, 52 Wis. 93. 2 Boyd V. Selma, 96 Ala. 150. See Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491; Goldgart v. People, 106 IH. 25; Fores- man V. Byrns, 68 Ind. 347; Lose v. State, 73 Ind. 385; Griffith v. Watson, 19 Kan. 33; Commonwealth v. Hays, 8 B. Monr. 1; Frothingham v. Snow, 175 Mass. 59; Home v. Green, 53 Miss. 452. 'Lott v. Ross, 38 Ala. 156, citing Moseley v. Tift, 4 Fla. 403; De Witt V. Hays, 3 Cal. 463. Where the legis- lature has omitted to provide for the assessment of a certain kind of prop- erty, it is not within the province or the power of the court to make the assessment. No property can be as- sessed until the legislature has made proper provision for this purpose: Willis's Ex'rs 'v. Commonwealth, 97 CH. XII.J LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 645 mon method of assessing one for his personalty is to assess him a gross sum supposed to represent the value of all ; but under sorae statutes an enumeration of articles is required, and under others there is an enumeratiDn of some things and a valuation in gross of all others. Whatever may be the system prescribed by the statute it must be acted upon,' and there must be suffi- cient appearing on the face of the tax-lisl; to show as to any- thing specified that it is apparently taxable.' But taxability \!o\x\Aprirna facie appear if the description of the thing brihgs it within the enumera'tion of things specified in the statute to be taxed, and it is not necessary in listing to negative a pos- sible exemption.' General description. " Property," in a statute authorizing the imposition of taxes, will be held without further specifica- tion to include solvent credits,* such as promissory notes,^ Va. 667. Legislation held to be nec- essary in order to render taxable pat- ented mining lands previously ex- empt: Taxation of Patented Mining Lands, 9 Colo. 633. The value of a seat in the NewYork Stock Exchange, is "capital invested in business in the state," but is not taxable, as the tax- ing statute does not cover it: People V. Peitner, 167 N. Y. 1. iSee Falkner v. Hunt, 16 Cal. 167; People V. Smith, 88 CaL 613. Respect- ing the assessment of personal as dis- tinguished from real property, it is in general sufficient to uphold the pro- ceedings if the description be made with such reasonable certainty as will .inform the taxpayer for what he is to be taxed: State v. Kidd, 135 Ala. 413. A description of property as " mining stock " is sufficient for pur- poses of assessment: San Francisco V. Flood. 64 Cal. 504. The term " loans on stocks and bonds," used in describing an -item of property assessed to a savings bank, suffi- ciently describes the property: Sav- ings & L. Soc. V. San Francisco, 131 CaL 356. Under the California code providing that a failure to enu- merate personal property in detail shall not invalidate the assessment, an assessment not showing the num- ber, kind, amount, or quality of the property is valid: Dear v. Varnum, 80 Cal. 86; Dear v. Weineke, 94 Cal. 333. Where the law provided that mortgages should be deemed, for pur- poses of taxation, an interest in the property, an assessment describing the property as a mortgage upon ber- tain premises is sufficient: Dolandv. Mooney, 73 CaL 34. 2 Adam v. Litchfield, 10 Conn. 137; Whittlesey v. Clinton, 14 Conn. 73. Compare Goddard v. Seymour, 30 Conn. 394; Hammersley v. Franey, 39 Conn. 179. ' ' 3 Monroe v. l^Tew Canaan, 43 Conn. 309. * Boyd V. Selma, 96 Ala. 149; Sav- ings & L. Soc. V. Austin, 46 CaL 415; Pacific Coast Sav. Soc. v. San Fran- cisco, 133 CaL 14. See People v. Park, 33 Cal. 138; Louisville v. Henning, 1 Bush 381; Catlin v. Hull, 31 Vt. 153, " Ouachita County v. Eumph, 43 for the price of land is taxable as Ark. 535, holding that a note given well as the land itself. 6i6 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XIL bonds issued for the payment of money,^ deposits in bank,* sums owing on agreements for. the purchase of land,' indebt- As to when a; claim is a " debt due " within the meaning of the statute for the taxing of such debts, see Bucksport V. Woodman, 68 Me. 33; Arnold v, Middletown, 41 Conn. 206; Deane v. Hathaway, 136 Mass. 139; Hale V. County Com'rs, 137 Mass.«lll. All debts of every kind are taxable under the Mississippi code, and there- fore debts due a delinquent taxpayer for daily wages may be levied upon for taxes: White v. Martin, 75 Miss. 646. Debts, securities, andobligations are taxable though they are not due: People V. McComber, 24 N. Y. Super. Ct. Rep. 903. 1 A city in assessing property may include its own bonds held by a res- ident: People V. Tax Com'rs. 76 N. Y. 64. Under a statute which expressly includes banks and corporations in the enumeration of taxable owners, and makes "all public loans " taxable except those issued by the common- wealth or the United States, interest- bearing bonds of a city held by a savings bank are taxable: Wilkes Barre Deposit &' Sav. Bank v. Wilkes Barre, 148 Pa. St. 601. The federal act of July 14, 1870, ^relating to tax- ation of railroad bonds, applied only to interest actually paid during the year 1871, not to interest merely pay- able: United States v. Louisville & N. E. Co., 83 Fed. Kep. 829. Under the Maryland code corporate bonds secured by mortgage on property partly within and partly without the state are taxable: Simpson v. Hop- kins, 83 Md. 478. Bonds issued by a railroad company chartered by con- gress are not public stocks or secu- rities, but are taxable as debts due: Hale V. County Com'rs, 137 Mass. 111. 2 See Pacific Coast Sav. Soo. v. San Francisco, 183 CaL 14, and cases cited. While money deposited in a bank subject to the depositor's sight check is usually held to be a mere debt against the bank (see Pacific Coast Sav. Soo. v. San Francisco, supra), yet under the tax-laws of Texas It is regarded as money on hand: Campbell v. Wiggins, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 1; Campbell v. Riviere (Tex. Civ. App.), 30 S. W. Rep. 730. And see ante, p. 93. Where certifi- cates of deposit are taxable, an entry on a pass-book was held to be one: Oulton V. Sav. Inst., 1 Sawy. 695, 17 Wall. 109. 3 GrifHn v. Board of Review, 184- 111. 375; Perrin v. Jacobs, 64 Iowa 79; State v. Rand, 39 Minn. 503: Rheinbolt v. Raine, 53 Ohio St. 160. An agreement to sell real estate upon conditions precedent, no notes being given for the purchase-money, time being stipulated to be the essence of the agreeme^nt, and neither the legal nor th'e equitable title to the land being transferred, is npt a "credit," and is not taxable: Branner v. Thomas, 87 Kan. 382. A contract for the purchase of land by a city for park purposes, providing for pos- session by the city on part payment, and for a conveyance on payment within ten years, at the city's option, of the rest of the price with interest, and of all taxes levied in the mean- time, but declaring, as required by statute, that the agreement created no liability against the city, did not create a debt taxable against the vendors, or a taxable " effect . ' . . having a marketable value; " Per- rigo V. Milwaukee, 93 Wis. 236. Under the Minnesota statute pro- viding for the listing and taxation of "credits," a credit consisting of part of the purchase price of land formerly owned in common should not be listed as a whole against the vendors, even though they all live in the same taxing district, but the OH. XII.J LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 647 edness secured by mortgage,^ annuities,^ etc., but will not be considered as embracing undetermined claims for dam. ages for lands taken by the public,' or as including a mere interest of each should be listed against him ; State v. Eand, 39 Minn. 502. 1 People V. Sanilac Supervisors, 71 Mich. 16. In Pennsylvania niort-, gages and judgments ovping by solv- ent debtors are taxable whether they bear interest or not: Perry County V. Troutman, 144 Pa. St. 361. The New Jersey statute providing that " hereafter no mortgage or debt secured thereby shall be assessed for taxation unless a deduction therefor shall have been claimed by the owner of the land and allowed by the assessors," does not apply to a mortgage on lands which are exempt from taxation, and the mortgage must be assessed to the mortgagee at the place of his domicile: State v. Lantz, 53 N. J. L. 57& The Mary- land statute concerning the taxation of mortgages does not apply to mort- gages given by members of a build- ing association to whom is advanced the matured value of their stock to secure the payment of interest on such matured value and all dues and fines: Faust v. German Building Assoc, 84 Md. 186. In Minnesota mortgages to building associations are taxable as such where the stock of the association has not been taxed : State V. Redwood Falls B. & L. Assoc, 45 Minn. 154. Where personal prop- erty is in possession of the mort- gager on the first day of March, it is subject to assessment and taxation as his property, and he is not entitled to credit on the assessment for the amount due on the mortgage: Fields V. Russell, 38 Kan. 730. Mortgages securing loans of corporations are personal property and taxable under the laws of New Mexico: Territory V. Co-Operative B. & L. Assoc. (N. M.), 63 Pac Rep. 1097. In California the bonds of private domestic corpora- tions secured by mortgage or deed of trust can only be taxed by assess- ing the value of the security as an interest in the property encumbered for their payment. They cannot be assessed as mere personal debts or credits, and such an assessment is void: Fair's Estate, 138 Cal. 607. A person to whom a sum of money se- cured by mortgage is payable at the death of one therein named is sub. ject to be assessed for it according to its present value, to be computed by rules of chancery: State v. Lip- pincott, 50 N. J. L. 349. A mortgage canceled in good faith is no longer rated as personal property for the purpose of taxation : Earles v. Ram- sey, 61 N. J. L. 194. Where the grantor's right in a deed upon con- dition was to repurchase only, the grantee was not liable to taxation as a mortgagee: Thomas v. Board of Supervisors, 67 Miss. 754. 2 Annuitants -are only taxable in respect of sums which have become due and remain unpaid: Ex parte McComb, 4 Bradf. 151; State v. Cor- nell, 31 N. J. L. 374; State v. Hanson, 36 N. J. L. 50; State v. Pettit, 39 N. J. L. 654; State v. Shurts, 41 N. J. L. 379; Shot well v. Dalrymple, 49 N. J. L. 530. The holder of a mortgage bond given to secure an annuity dur- ing her life on account of her dower in certain land can be assessed for taxation only on the sum actually due and unpaid on the annuity at the time of the assessment: State v. Melroy (N. J.), 19 Atl. Rep. 733. 3 Lowell V. Boston, 106 Mass. 540. See Hancock v. Whittemore, 50 Cal. 533., 648 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. right to collect wharfage fees in the future,' or a seat in a stock exchange, which is merely " a personal privilege of being and remaining a member of a voluntary association with the assent of the associates." ^ Under a statute taxing all prop- erty within the jurisdiction of the state, and classifying cred- its as personalty, it has been decided that bonds, notes, stock, etc., within the jurisdiction of the state are taxable, without regard to where the debtor lives or where the debt was con- tracted.' Debts due to a corporation are not taxable under a statute providing for the taxation of " goods, wares, merchan- dise^ and other stock in trade." * A promise to pay at a future day is not a " sum invested " within the meaning of a statute providing that non-residents doing business in the state " shall be assessed and taxed on all sums invested in any manner in 1 De Witt V. Hays, 2 CaL 463. 2 San Francisco v. Anderson, 103 Cal. 69. See .People v. Feitner, 167 N. T. 1. SBuckv. Miller, 147 Ind. 586. Where a statute makes property real and personal "in the city," or " within the city," liable to taxation, it includes intangible personal property such as shares of stock owned by a resident' of the city: Ogden v. St Joseph, 90 Mo. 533. Shares of stock in corpora- tions were taxable under the Cali- fornia constitution of 1849, and under the revenue laws in force in that state in 1877: San Francisco v. Flood, 64 Oal. 504. Under the Massachusetts statutes the shares of stock of a cor- poration organized under the laws of that state to build a railroad in a foreign country are taxable to the owner for state, county, or town pur- poses: Pratt V. Boston Street Com'rs, 139 Mass. 559. Where a statute speci- fying the property to be listed for taxation incluiies all property not ex- empt from taxation, whether manu- factured, purchased, or otherwise procured, and all property of every sort and description, but does not in- clude stocks upon which the corpora- tion is required to pay the taxes, the stock held by members of a steam- boat company is to be listed, but not specific property owned by the cor- poration: Louisville S^ E. Mail Co. v. Barbouii 88 Ky. 73. Shares of stock pledged as collateral security for loans, with power to the pledgee to transfer the shares to his own name, and, in case the loans are not paid, to sell, but which stand on the com- pany's books in the name of the pledgor, are taxable in the pledgor's name: Batterman v. Ingalls, 48 Ohio St. 468. Under the Maryland statute unissued shares of stock cannot be taxed: Consumers' Ice Co. v. State, 83 Md. 133. Under the New Hamp- shire statute providing that the as- sessment of taxes on money at inter- est shall only be for the amount in- excess of money on which the person whose money is assessed pays inter- est, national bank stock is to be reckoned as money at interest: Wes- ton V. Manchester, 62 N. H. 574 Tax- ability in village of land contracts owned by non-residents of United States on land not within village, where such contracts are held by agent residing in village: People v. Willis. 133 N. y. 383. *New York Biscuit Co. v. Cam- bridge, 161 Mass. 326. See cases in last two notes. Also Coite V. Society, 33 Conn. 173; Society V. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; Monroe Bank v. Rochester, 37 N. Y. 365. See Westmin- ster V. Westminster Savings Bank, 93 Md. 62. A tax assessed against an elec- tric light company doing business in New York under patents controlled by it is not a projierty tax a.ssessed on the patents but a tax on the cor- poration's franchise or business: Peo- ple V. Wemple, 63 Hun 444. A state has a right to impose by law a fran- chise-tax on the basis of capital stock, even though the company's property is invested in property which by the federal laws the state cannot tax: Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 594: Marsden Co. v. State Board, 61 N. J. L. 461. In Bank of Commerce v. New York, 3 Black 630, it was held that while a tax on a bank's nominal capital, without regard to the nature or value of the property composing it, was a fran- chise-tax, a tax measured by the value of the capital was a tax on property, and any part of the capital invested in non-taxable securities must be deducted from the valuation. This was followed in Bank Tax CSses, 3 Wall. 300. See Wilmington, etc. R. Co. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264; Gulf & S. L R. Co. V. Hewes (U. S.), 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36; and compare Delaware R. Tax, IS Wall. 306. ' Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 133 Mass. 161. 8 Coite V. Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co., 36 Conn. 513. See Bank of Com- merce V. New York, 2 Black 620; Belo V. E'orsyth County, 83 N. C. 415. CH. XII. J LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 679 Stock and by the funded and floating indebtedness was adjudged a property tax, and the earlier cases were questioned.' In Georgia a state tax on the stock of a building and loan associa- tion was held a tax against the stockholder's property, and not on the franchise of the association.^ In Pennsylvania the fol- lowing have been held to be franchise taxes: a tax on a mining company measured by the product mined ;^ a tax on the, net earnings; and the tax will not be affected by the fact that a part of the earnings was derived from non-taxable, securities;* a tax on the capital stock as such,^ and a tax measured by dividends.* In Maryland a tax on gross receipts has been held to be not a tax on property but on the franchise.'' A tax on 1 Nichols V. New Haven, etc. Co., 43 Conn. 103. 2 Georgia State B. & L. Assoc, v. Savannah, 109 Ga. 63. ' SKittanning Coal Co. v. Common- wealth, 79 Pa. St. 100. * Philadelphia Contributorship v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. St. 48. 5 Carbon Iron Co. v. Carbon County, 39 Pa. St. 351. And see Farmers' Bank v. Commonwealth, 6 Bush 137. A tax on the capital stock irrespect- ive of value was held to be a privilege- tax and valid, though the whole capital was invested in non-taxable securities: Holly Springs Co. v. Marshall County, 58 Miss. 381. Real estate owned by a bank constitutes part of its assets within the meaning of a statute providing that banks shall pay a privilege-tax, whose amount varies with their "capital stock or assets," in lieu of all other taxes: Vicksburg Bank v. Worrell, 67 Miss. 47. A franchise-tax on cor- porations cannot be ascertained by using capital stock authorized as a basis for calculation; the amount issued and outstanding is such basis: People's Inv. Co. v. State Board (N. J.), 48 Atl. Rep. 579. The N'ew York stat- ute imposing a franchise-tax on cor- porations recognizes the distinction between share stock and capital stock; capital stock on its par value being equivalent to share stock, and appraised capital to capital stock: People V. Roberts, 155 N. Y. 1. Good-, will of a foreign corporation may, though intangible, be considered as one of the items of the capital em- ployed by it in the state, on which the New York statute of 1896 pro- vides its privilege-tax shall be based: People V. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70. Under a statute providing that a foreign corporation shall be taxed on its " franchise or business " on the basis of " the amount of capital stock em- ployed within the state," such cor- poration is not taxable to a greater extent than the par value of the capital stock authorized by its char- ter: People V. Roberts, 4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 388, 39 N. Y. Supp. 448. 6 Phoenix Iron Co. v. Common- wealth, 59 Pa. St. 104. In this case it was held that a company paying such a tax and none specifically on dividends was liable under the gen- eral law of the state to a tax on earn- ings. 7 State V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 45 Md. 361; Cumberland & Pa. R. Cb. V. State, 92 Md. 668. A tax measured by gross receipts cannot be imposed where the corporate franchises and property are exempt from taxation: State V. Baltimore, etc. R. Co., 48 Md. 49. The franchise-tax -imposed in 680 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XII. the gross receipts of express companies was held in Georgia to be an occupation, not a property' tax,' while the Ohio tax upon an express company's tangible and intangible property has been declared not to be a " privilege tax." ^ In Maine it has been ruled that a tax on railroads laid on an estimate of the roadways, rolling-stock, and franchises, leaving the build- ings and local fixtures to be taxed by the municipalities where situated, is not a tax upon property but upon franchises.' As the right of corporate existence is in its nature indivis- ible, a license fee therefor must necessarily be an entirety, no matter where the company's property is situated, or how its capital is invested or employed.* The legislature may give authority to a town or city to levy a tax upon corporate fran- chises;* and an excise-tax may be imposed upon foreign cor- Maryland upon guaranty companies was held limited to the gross receipts on their business within the state: State V. United States Fidelity, etc. Co. (Md.), 48 Atl. Rep. 918. , 1 Atlanta Nat. B. & L. Assdo. v. Stewart. 109 Ga. 80. 2 American Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185. 3 State V. Maine Cent. R. Co., 74 Me. 376. In Iowa a tax on railroad com- panies of one per cent on gross earn- ings, one-half to be paid to the state and the other half apportioned among the munioipalitiesj was sus- tained in Dubuque v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 47 Jowa 196, and wafe held ap- plicable to unincorporated owners of roads. A statute declaring that cer- tain corporations, among them " rail- road companies not paying an ad valorem tax," shall each pay a cer- tain amount per year, according to the mileage operated or controlled, declares the business of the class of railroads designated to be a privilege, and imposes a tax thereon, and does not attempt to declare to be a priv- ilege, and to tax as such, the condi- tion of "not paying an ad valorem tax: " Knoxville & O. R. Co. v. Har- ris 99 Tenn. 684. < Lumberville, etc. Co. v. State Board, 55 N. J. L, 589. The Tennes- see statute providing for the taxa- tion of sleeping-cars is confined to one privilege-tax for the state, and does not impose a privilege-tax for counties upon sleeping-cars run wholly within the state: Gibson County V. Pullman Southern Car Co., 42 Fed. Rep. 573, 6 South Covington &.C. St. R. Co. V. Bellevue (Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 23. In Maine legislation has not author- ized the municipal assessors to im- pose a tax upon a corporation by reason of its franchise: Wheeler v. County Com'rs, 88 Me. 174. Under a statute providing that a city may permit the construction of a street railway upon such conditions as it deems best for the public interest, the city may require a street-railway company to pay an annual tax for each mile of its track as a condition to its right to construct and operate its line: Chicago General R. Co. v. Chicago, 176 111. 253. As to munici- pal taxation of the' franchises of railroad companies, see Huck v. Chi- cago, etc. R. Co., 86 111. 352; San Jose V. San Jose, etc. R. Co., 53 Cal. 476. CH. XII.J LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 681 porations doing business in the state.^ But a tax on foreign corporations, however measured, cannot, as to one not actually- doing business within the state, be a franchise-tax.^ A domes- tic corporation, on the other hand, is in respect of its business taxable by the state which created it, although it does not do business there.' Sometimes, however, domestic corporations are taxed for so much only of their capital as is "employed ■O'ithin " the state.* Dividends. An excise-tax is sometimes measured by divi- dends, and when that is the case, anything divided as profit, and actually passed to the stockholders, is to be deemed divi- dend, whether, actually declared or not.' And if a dividend ^Ante, p. 95; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 111. 172, 10 Wall. 410; Attorney-Gen- eral V. Bay State Mining Co., 99 Mass. 148; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 133 Mass. 161 ; People V. Horn Silver Mining Co., 105 N. Y. 76. 2 Commonwealth v. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St. 119. See Pipe-Line Co. V. perry, 53 N; J. L. 308. In Peo- ple V. Coleman, 135 N. Y. 231, it is said that a statute providing for the taxation of the "privileges and fran- chises '■ of savings banks manifestly has no application to foreign savings banks. "As to corporations organ- ized under the laws of this state, the legislative power to tax their busi^ ness and franchises is general; but as to foreign corporations, the juris- diction is gained from the business which they do in this state, and the taxis upon that business:" People V. Weaver, 139 N. Y. 558. 3 People v. Weaver, 139 N. Y. 558. ■ * Under a statute taxing domestic corporations for so much of their capital as is "employed within this state," the capital of such a corpora- tion to the extent of stock held by it in other home corporations is a basis of taxation in the state: Pepple V. Campbell, 138 N. Y. 543. Other- wise as to stock held by it in foreign corporations: Ibid.; People v. Camp- bell, 148 N. Y. 690. But bonds of foreign corporations held by it are a basis of taxation: People v. Camp- bell, 138 N. Y. 543. The capital stock of a railroad company invested in cars permanently out of the state is not subject to the franchise-tax: People v. Campbell, 88 Hun 544, 138 N. Y. 543. The amount of capital employed by any corporation within the state is a question of fact for the comptroller: People v. Campbell, 70 Hun 507. And his determination as to such amount will not be dis- turbed unless clearly shown to be erroneous: People v. Weaver, 139 N. Y. 558. 5 Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, etc. E. Co., 74 Pa. St. 88; Common- wealth v. Western Land & Imp. Co., 156 Pa. St. 455. The earnings or profits of a gas company, fairly devoted to the betterment of its plant, cannot be considered as " dividends earned or declared ": State v. Comptroller, 54 N. Ji L. 185. Where a bridge owned by an unincorporated bridge company was declared a county bridge, and the damages awarded, which were in excess of the capital stock, were divided among the share- holders proportionately, such excess represented a profit which the com- pany made in its business, and, as 682 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XII. is declared, the tax is payable upon it, whether earned or not.^ It is immaterial, as regards the tax whether the dividend is paid in money or in certificates which go to increase the stock of the several shareholders,^ though a mere arithmetical increase in shares without passing anything out of the corporate treas- ury or property is no dividend.' A franchise-tax measured by dividends may be imposed, though the corporation is at the same time taxable on net egirnings.* "Where the tax is to be measured by dividends made above a certain percentage ck the capital, this will be taken to mean the capital actually paid in, and not the authorized capital.* Surplus accumulations made before the law for taxing dividends took effect, though dividends afterwards, will not be held to be such dividends as the law intended.^ When a tax is measured by divi- 'suoh, was taxable: Matson's Ford Bridge Co. v. Commonwealth, 117 Pa. St. 265. > Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, etc. R. Co., 74 Pa. St. 83; Columbia, etc. Co. V. Commonwealth, 90 Pa. St. 307. Bank's act in declaring dividend and making sworn return of taxes due thereon was conclusive as to lia- bility, and bank could not avoid pay- ing tax by showing that because of an undiscovered embezzlement by cashier thei'e were no "earnings, in- copie, or gains " for the year, and that dividends were in fact ignorantly paid out of capital and accumulated surplus of former years: Central Nat. Bank v. United States, 137 U. S. 355. ^ State v. Farmers' Bank, 11 Ohio 94; Commonwealth v. Cleveland, etc. E. Co., 29 ta. St. 370; Lehigh Crane Iron Co. V. Commonwealth, 55 Pa. St. 448. See Bailey v. Railroad Co., 22 Wall. 604; Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. V. People, 46 Mich. 193. 'Commonwealth v. Pittsburgh, etc. R Co., 74 Pa. St. 83. A boftajide reduction of capital stock, effected by issuing certificates at $38 a share in lieu of the original certificates of $50' and paying the stockholders §12 per share, was not a dividend: Com- monwealth V. Central. Transp. Co., 145 Pa. St. 89. * Phoenix Iron Co. v. Commcta- wealth, 59 Pa. St. 104. * Second, etc. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 51 Pa, St. 465; Philadelphia v. Ferry Pass. R. Co., 33 Pa. St. 177; Phila- delphia V. Ridge Av. R. Co., 103 Pa. St. 190. 6 People V. Albany Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 458. See, also, Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Page, 1 Biss. 461. A dividend will be regarded as prima facie evidence that the same was earned during the year in which it was declared, the burden being on the corporation to show that the dividend was made out of the accumulated earnings of previous years: Commonwealth v. Brush Electric Light Co., 145 Pa. St. 147. The amount of a dividend de- clared by a corporation before the date fixed for the assessment of prop- erty for taxation, but payable at a future date, does not constitute a part of the corporation's surplus funds which are taxable under the statute, but is a debt which the cor- poration is entitled to have deducted from its taxable assets: People v. Barker, 86 Hun 131. When taxation is by property value, dividends, until OH. Xll.] LISTING OF PEES0N8 AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 683 dends the corporation cannot deduct a sum which its mem- bers have contributed to make up a loss.^ If the tax is meas- ured by dividends exceeding a specified percentage, this will be held to mean the aggregate dividends for the year, and the corporation cannot, by declaring several, each of which is be- low the percentage named, escape the tax.^ A corporation otherwise subject to a tax upon the basis of its dividends is not exempt therefrom by the fact that the dividends are earned outside the state, and that its business within the state is with- out profit.' It has been held, that a federal tax imposed upon all dividends declared to stockholders " as part of the earnings, income, or gain of any bank " was assessable against the bank for the whole amount of dividends so declared, although the bank had paid a sum to the state under a state law imposing a tax against the stockholders upon the value of their shares, and requiring the bank to retain the amount thereof from the divi- dends due them until it was made to appear that their tax was paid.* Other points of less importance relating to the taxation of dividends are considered in the cases cited in the margin.' actually paid over, are taxable to the corporation, but after being paid over are taxable as property of the payees: Board of Revenue v. Gas Light Co., 64 Ala. 2(^9. A tax paid by a railroad company on its undis- tributed surplus is a tax upon its own property, and '^oannot be re- garded as a payment of a tax upon a stock dividend thereafter de- clared by the company; so a county which owned stock could not claim recovery on the ground that it was exempt from taxation on stock held by it: Logan County V. United States, 169 U. 8. 355. 1 Columbia Conduit Co. v. Com- monwealth, 90 Pa. St. 307. Dividends as a means of arriving at the value of the franchise: New Orleans* C.R. Co. V. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 1053; People V. Albany Ins. Co., 92 N. Y. 458; People v. Barker, 144, N. Y. 94, Dividends are not proof of the earn- ing power of the corporate property, but are competent evidence on that question: People v. Barker, 81 Hun 23. 2 Philadelphia v. Ridge A v. R. Co., 102 Pa. St. 190. The average capital employed for the preceding year, not the highest sum employed at any one time, is to be taken as a basis for as- certaining, for taxing purposes, the rate of dividends: People v. Morgan, 57 App. Div. (N. Y.) 335. As to as- certaining the percentage of capital to which dividends for the year amount, see People v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 54 Hun 598; Common- wealth V. Brush Electric Light Co., 145 Pa. St. 147. 3 People V. Roberts, 155 N. Y. 408. * Central Nat. Bank v. United States, 137 U. S. 355. 6 Haight V. Railroad Co., 6 Wall. 15; Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 7 Wall. 262; United States v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 323; United States v. Cen-, tral Bank, 15 Fed. Rep. 232; Commis- sioners V. Buckner, 48 Fed. Rep. 683. Where a corporation ia exempt from 684 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. Income. 'Where the tax is to be measured by income, this must be understood as gross income, and it will be chargeable even though there be no profits.^ If a railroad company which taxation, the stockholders are not taxable in respect of dividends re- ceived from it: State v. City Coun- cil, 5 Rich. 561. If a corporation is- sues scrip to its members wUch represent funds in its hands, to be paid at some future day to the mem- bers, but which in the meantime is contingently liable for demands, the corporation should be taxed in re- spect of this fund: People v. Tax Com'rs, 31 Hun 261, citing People v. Assessors, 76 N. Y. 303. 1 People V. Supervisors, 18 Wend. 605. See Waring v. Savannah, 60 Ga. 93, and compare Matter of West- ern Railway, 5 Met. 596; Common- wealth V. Ocean Oil Co., 59 Pa St. 61. And see ante, p. 390. Park tax on gross receipts of street railway companies held not to apply to elec- tric railroads originally constructed outside the city on a private right of way: Mayor, etc. v. Baltimore, etc. B. Co., 84 Md. 1. A statute providing for the taxation of railroad companies by requiring them to pay a percentage of their gross earnings does not apply to street railroa,ds: State v. Duluth Gas, etc. Co., 76 Minn. 96. To what rail- roads such tax applies: State v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 36 Minn. 207; State V. District Court, 54 Minn. 34. Company failing to pay percentage tax became subject to assessment on its lands in the various counties, and an assessment accordingly made be- fore the repeal of the. percentage law was not invalidated by such re- peal: Northern Pac. E. Co. v. Clark, 153 U. S. 253. Union depot company held not liable to pay, as taxes, a percentage on its receipts or gross earnings, since payment of such per- centage by the railway companies which own all the stock and use the terminal facilities of the depot company constitutes payment of taxes on all the property of the lat- ter: State v. St Paul Union Depot Co., 42 Minn. 143. Ascertaining rate of percentage payment: State v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 36 Minn. 207. Where, for iixing the license-tax, railroads are divided into classes ac- cording to the gross earnings '"per mile per annum of operated road," the class is fixed by the amount of earnings within the year, whether time of operation was less than the year or not: State v. McFetridge, 64 Wis. 130. Rental paid for a leased road is not to be deducted from the gross earnings; but the amount re- ceived for the use of leased cars in excess of the amount paid for the use of cars of other companies is a part of the gross earnings: Ibid. Money received by one railroad com- pany from another for the use of its tracks is a toll within the meaning of a statute imposing a certain tax on the gross receipts of a railroad company " for tolls and transporta- tion:'' Commonwealth V. New York, P. & O. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 38; but tolls received by one railroad com- pany from another for the joint use of the former's track, computed at a certain specified sum per ton or per passenger, are not within a statute providing that a railroad company owning, operating, or leasing any railroad shall pay a tax upon the gross receipts "received from passen- gers and freight: " Commonwealth V. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 300. Construction of provis- ion for gross-earnings tax upon prop- erty of certain companies: State v. Northwestern Tel. Exch. Co. (Minn.), 87 N. W. Rep. 1131. Under a statute CH. XII.] LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 685 is taxable on gross income leases its road to another, receiving nothing but rent, it is nevertheless liable on the net income of the road.' Income, when not qualified in a tax-law, may be held to mean that which comes in or is received from any service, business, or investment of capital, without reference to outgoing expenditures ; and it thus differs from net income, net earnings, or profits, which mean the gain with both receipts and expenditures taken iiito the account.^ ( In the case of such a tax no deduction is to be made in re- spect of any part of the income derived from non-taxable se- curities.' "When a tax is measured by profits, the issue of cer- tificates to the shareholders certifying that they respectively have an Increased interest in the corporation to an amount proviijing that certain railroads shall pay as a privilege-tax an annual license fee equal to a certain per- centage on the gross earnings within the state, but that such gross earn- ings shall not include earnings de- rived from business of an interstate character, a railroad company is not liable to an assessment on gross earn- ings derived from carrying United States mails when such earnings in- clude moneys received from carry- ing interstate and foreign mails, and -it is impossible to determine the pro- portion of mail which originates and terminates within the state: People V. Morgan, 168 N. Y. 1. Assessment held void as not showing gross re- ceipts or percentage tax thereon: State V. Sloss, 87 Ala. 119. 1 Goldsmith v. Railroad Co., 63 Ga. 468; Wright v. Railroad Co., 64 Ga. 783, 794. Under the gross-earnings law the purchase of a railroad sub- ject to the one per bent tax by a railroad subject to the three per cent tax does not operate as a merger, or entitle the state to take into consid- eration the earnings of the former in estimating the gross earnings of the latter: Minneapolis & St, L. R. Co. v. Koerner (Minn.), 88 N. W. Rep. 430. See Vermont & C. R. Co. v. Vermont Cent, R. Co., 63 Vt. 1. 2 See New Orleans v. Hart, 14 La. An. 803; New Orleans v. Hassman, 14 La. An. 865; State v. Board of As- sessors, 48 La. An. 1156; Opinions of Justices, 5 Met. 596; Detroit, G. R. & W. R. Co. V. Railroad Com'r, 119 Mich. 182; State v. Virginia & T. R. Co., 23 Nev. 283, 24 Nev. 53; State v. Manchester & L. R. (N. H.), 48 Atl. Rep. 1103; People v. Super- visors, 4 Hill 20; People v. Super- visors, 18 Wend. 605; Common- wealth V. Ocean Oil Co., 59 Pa. St. 61; Commonwealth v. Penn Gas Coal Co., 63 Pa. St. 341; Matson's Ford Bridge Co. v. Cofnmonwealth, 117 Pa. St. 265; Commonwealth v. Philadel- phia & E. R. Co., 164 Pa. St. 253. An enterprise in which corporate stock- holders as such engage, making large profits, but in which they are person- ally liable, is not to be considered the corporation's enterprise, and the cor- poration is not taxable in respect of such profits: Credit Mobilier v. Com- monwealth, 67 Pa. St. 338. As to meaning of income and profits see ante, pp. 390, 391. 8 Philadelphia Contributorship v. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. St. 48. For a case in which income was held not taxable because shares were taxable, see Boston Water Power Co. v, Bos- ton, 9 Met. 199. 686 LISTING OF PERSONS AND V^iLUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. specified is evidence that such profits have been made.' If a mine's net product is to be assessed for one year, the amount of the assessment cannot be ascertained by taking the net prod- uct for the year before.^ Taxing franchises as properly. In some states all taxation as far as possible is brought to an ad valorem standard. Franchises are property,' and in such states may be taxed by a ;7aluation, being estimatell for the purpose either separately or as a part of the aggregate corporate property.* 1 People V. Assessors, 16 Hun 196, 76 N. y. 202. As to surplus earnings, see People v. Tax Com'rs, 76 N. Y. 64; People V. Barker, 144 N. Y. 94, 146 N. Y. 308. The federal statute pro- viding for a tax on all undivided profits of railroad corporations "which have accrued and been earned and added to any surplus, contingent or other fund," does not authorize a tax on profits not di- vided but used in construction: Mar- quette, H. & O. R. Co. V. United States; 123 U. S. 722. A loss on securities bought years before cannot be used to diminish a tax measured by an- nual earnings: Philadelphia Contrib- utorship V. Commonwealth, 98 Pa. St. 48. 2 Merour, etc. Co. v. Spry, 16 Utah 233. 3 Society v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594; State Railroad-Tax Cases, 93 U. S. 575; San Jose Gas Co. v. January, 57 Cal. 614;' Ottawa Glass Co. v. McCaleb, 81 111. 556; State Board v. Central R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 146, 283; Worth v. Peters- burgh, etc. R. Co., 89 N. C. 801; South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406; Commercial Electric L. & P. Co. V. Judson, 31 Wash. 49; Edi- son Electric Ilium. Co. v. Spokane Comity, 23 Wash. 168; State v. An- derson, 90 Wis. 550. A state which has chartered a bridge company to build a bridge over a river forming a boundary of the state may properly include the franchise thus granted in the valuation of the company's prop- erty for taxation: Henderson Bridge Co. V. Kentucky, 166 U.«S. 150. In- tangible property, such as franchises, adding to the value of street rail- roads, is taxable in Michigan : Detroit Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Common Coun- cil, 135 Mich. 678. There it is to be treated as personalty, assessable in the municipality where the track or road is located, used, or laid: Detroit V. Wayne Circuit Judge (Mich.), 86 N. W. Rep. 1033. An electric street railway company's franchises are taxable with the property necessary for their exercise in the assessment district in which the company's principal oflBce is located: State v. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550. Franchise not real estate under statute enumer- ating what shall be regarded as real estate fbr purpose of taxation, but not including franchises in such enumeration ; therefore corporation's francliise is not to be included in de- duction of value of real estate: Peo- ple v. Tax Com'rs, 104 N. Y. 340. Franchises of corporations held not taxable under New Jersey statutes enumerating realty and pei-sonalty, but excluding franchises from the enumeration: Passaic Water Co. v. Paterson, 56 N. J. L. 471. * Pacific Hotel V. Leib, 83 IlL 602: Union Ins. Co. v. Weber, 96 111. 846: South Nashville St. R. Co. v. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406; State v. Anderson, 90 Wis. 550. An assessment of the cor- OH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 687 Taxing ly value. It has been shown in preceding pages that in whatever form the corporation is taxed, it is competent also to tax the shares of the corporators, though this, in effect, may be double taxation.^ This statement must be taken with the implied exception that the shares of non-resident share- holders are not taxable,^ unless their taxability at the corpo- rate place of business is annexed as an incident to the corporate privilege,^ in which case they may not only be taxed, but the porafce franchise of a street-car com- pany, together with its easement in the streets, at a gross sum, is not 6b- jentionable as being a separate and independent assessment upon the franchise: South Nashville St. R. Oo. V. Morrow, 3 Pickle 406. Street-rail- way company's franchise and track or road assessable together for taxa- tion : Detroit v. Wayne Circuit Judge (Mich.), 86 N. W. Bep. 1033. Statute of Minnesota for listing and assess- ing franchises for taxation consid- ered: State V. Duluth Gas, etc. Co., 76 Minn. 96. The Kentucky statutory provision for taxing the "franchises" of corporations, etc., is to be con- strued not as a tax upon, the fran- chise in the technical sense, but upon all the intangible property of the corporation: Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 166 U. S. 171. Under the New York franchise-tax law good- will is taxable with the franchise as forming part of the value of the share-stock: People y. Boberts, 154 N. Y. 101, 159 N. Y. 70. But good- will, as such, is not taxable for gen- eral town, county, or municipal purposes: People v. Dederick, 161 N. Y. 195. In California the market value of the shares of stock, with the value of corporate realty and per- sonalty deducted,is deemed the value of the franchise: Spring Valley Wa- ter Works v. Sohotter, 62 Cal. 69. Similar rule in Kentucky: Hender- son Bridge Co. v. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 633; Louisville E. Co. v. Com- monwealth (Ky.), 49 S. W. Bep. 486. The question as to how far the value of a corporation's franchise is affected by the fact that it is to exist only for a limited time is for the board of valuation and assessment, and its finding as to that matter is conclu- sive: Ibid. Determining value of franchise from earning capacity, etc.: New Orleans C. & L. B. Co. v. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 1055; Cres- cent City B. Co. V. New Orleans, 44 La. An. 1057; Crescent City B. Co. v. Board of Assessors, 51 La. An. 835; St. Charles St. R. Co. v. Board of As- sessors, 51 La. An. 459. Form of assessment of taxes on railroad fran- chise held invalid: State v. Austin & N. W. B. Co. (Tex.), 63 S. W. Bep. 1050. 1 Ante, pp. 389, 390, 403, 404. 2 Ante, pp. 86, 87. In Ehode Island non-residents afe not to be called upon to pay taxes upon personal property because of their ownership of corpo- rate stock, other than upon the spe- cific personalty mentioned in the statute; and therefore a tax upon a mortgage owned by a corporation is not collectible when it would com- pel non-resident stockholders to pay proportionately: Newport Reading Boom, etc.. Petitioners, 31 B. I. 440. The fact that some of the stockhold- ers are non-residents will not exempt a corporation from paying an excise tax, even though it be measured by the market value of its stock: Com- monwealth V. Hamilton Manuf. Co., 13 Allen 398. 1 Ante, pp. 93, 93. 688 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. payment of the tax enforced through the corporation by re- quiring it to withhold the amount from dividends.^ Under a statute tequiring the whole amount of a company's shares to be taxed, they need not be taxed at their par value when it is less than the true value.^ When the purpose of the law is to tax the corporation on the value of its property, this may be done either by assessing the actual capital stock as being presumptively the actual meas- ure of its property,' or by assessing the property specifically on 1 Minot V. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co., 18 Wall. 206. See Railroad Tax Cases, 93 U. S. 595. And see post, ch. XIV. 2 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Vogt (N. J.), 48 Atl. Bep. 580. 'The word '"stock," in a statute authorizing the taxation of stock in corporations, means not only the stock subscriptions, but the actual tangible property of the corporation: State V. Hamilton, 5 Ind. 310; Audi- tor V. New Albany & S. E., H Ind. 570; Michigan Central It Co. v. Por- ter, 17 Ind. 380; State v. Branin, 33 N. J. L. 484; Whitesell v. Northamp- ton County, 49 Pa. St 536; MoKeen V. Northampton County, 49 Pa. St. 519. A tax on the stock of a corpo- ration is a tax on its property and assets, including franchises: Com- monwealth V. New York, P. & O. R. Co., 188 Pa. St. 169; Commonwealth V. Beech Creek R Co., 188 Pa. St. 203. The term " capital stock " in a taxing law held to include the entire prop- erty, real and personal, tangible and intangible, as well as the value of the franchise: Henderson Bridge Co. V. Commonwealth, 99 Ky. 633. When the capital stock of a corporation is required to be assessed at its " actual value," this means above or below the par value, according to the fact: Oswego Starch Factory v. Dolloway, 31 N. Y. 499. Only when the value of the capital stock is unknown to the assessors may they consider the value of the shares as indicative of that of the capital; and where the amount and value of the capital are disclosed, and the assessors have no reason to disbelieve the statement, they cannot assess the capital stock at a valuation derived from the mar- ket value of the shares: People v. Coleman, 136 N. Y. 433. In determin- ing the capital, the true value of the corporate assets, less the debts, and not the market value of the shares, is to be considered: People v. Wem- ple, 138 N. Y. 583. To the sameeflfect. People V. Barker, 146 N. Y. 304. But for the valuation under a statute re- quiring the capital stock to be ap- praised at its actual cash value, " not less, however, than at the average price at which said stock sold for during said year," see People v. Rob- erts, 90 Hun 537, 36 N. Y. Supp. 34; People V. Roberts, 4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 334, 38 N. Y. Supp, 734; Common- wealth V. Philadelphia & R. R Ca, 145 Pa. St. 74. In Ohio it is held that the selling value of the capital stock of a corporation may be considered by the assessors in valuing the cor- porate property within the state: State V. Jones, 51 Ohio St. 49a In Pennsylvania it is said that in ap- praising for taxation a corporation's capital stock, the average selling price of the shares of stock during the tax year should be taken as the basis, and not the average amount paid in by the stockholders on their stock during the year: Common- wealth V. People's Traction Ca, 183 Pa. St 405. How such selling price CH. Xir.J LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 689 an estimate of value.^ If the property is to be listed and taxed as in the case of natural persons, what is said elsewhere on ascertained, and how stock should be appraised ^vhere there have been no sales of shares and there is no evi- dence of their value: Ibid. Eflfect of allotment of additional stock to shareholders: Ibid. " When the value of the stock is par it is of no impor- tance that the tangible property in which the capital is invested is worth less than cost: St Charles St. R. Co. v. Assessors, 31 La. An. 853. See Nichols v. New Haven, etc. Co., 43 Conn. 103. In Louisiana the tax- able value of that part of the capital of a corporation represented by shares is, for assessment purposes, held to be the total par value of the shares when they are above par: New Orleans, etc. Co. v. Assessors, 33 La. An. 19. See New Orleans Gas- Light Co. V. Assessors, 31 La. An. 475; Louisiana Oil Co. v. Assessors, 34 La. An. 618. Stock of cotton exchange held taxable under statute providing for taxation of all shares of stock and everything " possessing any money value: " Schreiberv. Assessors, 37 La. An. 908. A corporation hol'ding cer- tificates of stock in another corpora- tion is not taxable therefor, since the property represented by such certifi- cates is taxable against the corpora- tion issuing them: People v. Board of Assessors, 80 N. Y. Supp. 448. Under the New Mexico statute corporate stock is held taxable whether pledged or not, and assessable at its cash value in the name of the corporation : Territory v. Co-operative B. & L. Assoc. (N. M.), 53 Pac. Rep. 10^7. Un- issued shares held non-assessable: Consumers' Ice Co. v. State, 83 Md. 133; Boston & A. R. Co. v. Common- wealth; 157 Mass. 68. Entire stock subscribed fpr held to be " issued and outstanding " for purposes of taxa- tion: American Pig-iron Storage Co. V. State Board, 56 N. J. L. 389. Cor- 44 poration held taxable on its entire capital stock though only part paid in : Shelby County Trust Co. v. Board of Trustees, 91 Ky. 578. No part of the capital stock of a corporation the property of which is listed for taxa- tion is taxable where the value of the real or personal property exceeds the value of the capital stock: State V. St Paul Trust Co., 76 Minn. 433. The Indiana statute providing that where the tangible property of a cor- poration is listed and assessed, the shares of its capital stock shall not be listed or assessed, is only intended to prevent double taxation, and does not prohibit the assessment of the excess of the capital stock of a cor- poration over the amount of its tan- gible property as shown by its veri- fied schedule: Hyland v. Coal Co., 139 Ind. 68. A statutbry provision that the capital stock of private cor- porations, etc., shall be taxable, ex- cept so much as may be invested in property otherwise taxed, was only intended to prevent double taxation of taxable property, and does not render taxable such part of the cap- ital stock of an insurance company as is invested in non-taxable bonds: State V. Stonewall Ins. Cp., 89 Ala. 385. Since one sum of money cannot serve as capital for two companies, and the capital of domestic corpora- tions must be certified to the state, a domestic insurance company is es- topped from asserting that part of its capital stock is not taxable because invested in property otherwise taxed, viz., in the capital stock of a state bank: Commercial F. Ins. Co. v. Board of Revenue, 99 Ala. 1. Where capital is exempt, money in the cor- porate treasury cannot be assessed: Fall River v. County Com'rs, 135 Mass. 567. 1 In determining the taxable value 690 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XII. those subjects will not need repetition here. It was held in a recent New York case that the actual value of a corpo- ration's capital stock is to be ascertained for taxation by taking the value of its assets, deducting its liabilities and ex- emptions, and adding the value of the good-will of its busi- ness, including its right to conduct the same under its fran- chise.^ In another case it is said that " neither the par value of the property of a oorporatio * it will be presumed, when the contrary is not shown by its return, that all of its property is used in the trans- action of its business: Adams Ex- press Co. V. Ohio State Auditor, 16G U. S. 185. As the earning capacity of real estate owned by individuals may be considered in fixing its value for taxation, so the selling value of a corporation's capital stock may be considered by the assessors in valu- ing the corporate property within the state: State v. Jones, 51 Ohio St. 492. In taxing a bank's property with property in general, losses and gains cannot be disregarded: City Bank y. Bogel, 51 Tex. 355. A cor- poration organized for the planting of hedges was held taxable not upon its capital stock, but upon the true value of its real and personal estate; and contracts held by it to pay for hedges planted, the money to become due in future instalments, and the company meanwhile to maintain hedges, were taxable for their true value, computed as of the day when taxes were assessable: State v. Craig, 51 N. J. L. 437. 1 People V. Roberts, 154 N. Y. 101. Held proper to take into considera- tion the franchises owned by the corporation :' Commonwealth v. Delar ware, S. & S. R. Co., 165 Pa. St. 44. The cash value of a corporation's stock and franchise may be ascer- tained by taking the fair cash value of the stock subscribed and paid for, adding to this the fair cash value of the corporate indebtedness, except for current expenses, and from this deducting the equalized value of the tangi ble property. This is not a tax- ation of the debts: Ottawa Glass Co. V. McCaleb, 81 111. 566. Bank shares are worth for taxing purposes what their market value is at the time of assessment, and not what their value may be on the consum- mation of a contemplated closing of the bank's business, and division made among the stockholders: Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 313. To the same effect, see National Bank v. New Bedford, 175 Mass. 357. In valuing corporate stock for taxation the present, and not the prospective, value of the stock must be taken: People v. Roberts, 4 App. Div. (N. Y.) 384, 38 N. Y. Supp. 724 When corporate shares have been withdrawn from the market, the value of them may be ascertained from other sources: and when they have been exchanged for other se- curities, this value fixed upon them in the exchange is a proper basis for the assessment: Planters' Crescent Oil Co. V. Assessor, 41 La. An. 4137. Where tax commissioners, in valu- ing capital stock, acted solely on the statement made by the corporation as to its assets, and did not impugn any facts stated therein, an assess- ment based upon a valuation greater than that so claimed will be set aside if there is nothing from which the court can find that the assets were in fact greater: People v. Barker, 144 N. Y. 638. See People v. Barker, 91 Hun 642; People v. Feitner, 41 CH. XII.] LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 691 nor the stock-market quotations of the stock and bonds of a railroad or telephone company furnish a proper basis for the assessment of its property ; nor do its gross earnings, leaving out of consideration thd operating expenses." ' Often it is provided that the value of real property, or of realty and per- sonalty, owned by the corporation shall be deducted from the aggregate value of the shares of stock in order to ascertain the taxable value of such shares ; ^ but personalty outside of the App. Div. (N. Y.) 571. Further as to valuation of corporate stock, see People V. Barker) 139 N. Y. 55; Peo- ple V. Commissioners, 51 Hun 313, 641; People v. Campbell, 70 Hun 507; People 'v. Barker, 75 Hun 6; People V. Roberts, 83 Hun 313, 90 Hun 537, 91 Hun 146. 1 Railroad & T. Cos. v. Board of Equalizers, 85 Fed. Rep. 303. Gross earnings may be considered in fix- ing the value of corporate stock: Louisville R. Co. v. Commonwealth (Ky.), 49 S. W. Rep. 486. See Common- wealth v. Pittsburgh & W. R. Co., 166 Pa. St. 453. "The amount and the rate per cent of dividends made, and the amount carried to surplus and sink- ing fund during the tax year, do not furnish an absolute indication or measure of the actual value in cash of the capital stock of a corporation, but are to be considered, with all other relevant facts, in determining what is its actual value in cash;" large earnings in coal mining may indicate large exhaustion of the coal,' and consequent impairment of the capital: Commonwealth v. Edgerton Coal Co., 164 Pa. St 284. So, the ap- praisal of shares of a coal-mining cor- poration at five-sixths of their par value, where the net earnings for the year had been more than sixteen per cent, will not be disturbed merely because its lease of coal lands would soon expire, and might not be re- newed : Commonwealth v. West End Coal Co., 183 Pa St. 853. Where a corporation may, subject only to the penalty that the trustees shall be personally liable for its debts, declare a dividend though there be no sur- plus, and where such corporation is not governed by the prohibition against impairment of capital stock, no presumption, as against its sworn statement, arises as to the value of 4ts assets from the fact that it has just declared an eight per cent divi- dend on the full value of its capital stock: People v. Barker, 141 N. Y. 251. Where, in proceedings to review the assessment of an elevated rail- road, it appeared that a dividend had been paid on its capital stock, the presumption that such capital was unimpaired may be rebutted by evi- dence that the company owed mort- gages, etc. : People v. Barker, 165 N. Y. 305. 2 See Batterson's Appeal, 73 Conn. 374; Dennis's Appeal, 73 Conn. 369; Wheeler v. County Com'rs, 88 Me. 174; People v. Tax Com'rs, 104 N. Y. 340; People v. Barker, 144 N. Y. 94; Board of Com'rs v. Blackwell Dur- ham Tobacco Co., 116 N. C. 441. It is immaterial whether' a tax upon the corporation's real estate is paid in money or in any other way ; its value must be deducted: Wheeler v. Board of Com'rs, 88 Me. 174; Waite v. Hyde Park Lumber Co., 65 Vt. 103. No deduction from value of shares be- cause of reversionary interest in leasehold estates for ninety-nine years renewable forever: Baltimore v' Canton Co., 68 Md. 318. Where part of the capital stock of a domes- 692 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XU, state need not be deducted.^ Unpaid purchase-money due to a corporation for land situated in another state and sold by the corporation is to be considered in fixing the value for taxation of its capital stock, although the corporation has taken a mort- gage on the property to secure the price.'' , It is also held that a corporation's debts are to be considered in valuing its stock, but are not to be deducted specifically from the assets.' An investment of a mining company's profits, accumulated by passing dividends, in the stock of a railroad to facilitate work- ing the mines, is not to be considered as capital for the pur- pose of taxation, since it is derived from a wasting property in which the capital of the company was invested.* tic corporation represents the value of a leasehold interest in a railroad entirely without the state, the amount thereof should he deducted in computing the value of the capital stock as a basis for taxation: Com- monwealth V. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 145 Pa. St. 96. Actual, and not assessed, value of realty outside of the ^tate to he deducted: Fairfield Chem. Co. v. Tax Com'rs, 5 N. T. Supp. Eep. 87. Assessed valuation of outside realty treated as actual value: People v. Coleman, 115 N. Y. 178. In Louisiana corporations are liable to assessment only for excess of market value of their capital stock over and above tangible property otherwise assessed and taxed: Mer- chants' Mut. Ins. Co. V. Board of Assessors, 40 La. An. 371. In estimat- ing net surplus for purpose of valu- ing shares it is proper not to treat capital stock as a liability: Batter- son's Appeal, 73 Conn. 374 As to taxation of mortgages held by cor- porations liable to tax on capital stock, see Pennsylvania Co. v. Board of Revision, 139 Pa. St. 612. 1 People V. Commissioners, 51 Hun 813; Common wealtt v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 197 Pii. St. 551; Commercial Nat. Bank v. Chambers, 21 Utah 324. 2 Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Coal Ca, 197 Pa. St 551. ' Commonwealth v. New York, P. & O. R. Co., 188 Pa. St. 169; Common- wealth V. Manor Gas-Coal Co., 188 Pa. St. 195; Commonwealth v. Beech Creek Coal jCo., 188 Pa. St. 203. In New York a corporation's debts are to be deducted in assessing its per- sonalty for town, county, and mu- nicipal taxation: People v. Dederick, 161 N. Y. 195. In estimating the capital of corporate property for tax- ation the commissioners are not war- ranted in presuming that the com- pany's bonded or other indebtedness represents actual property to the amount of such indebtedness, in ad- dition to that represented by its capital stock: People v. Barker, 146 N. Y. 304 Refusal to set oflf indebt- edness because of supposititious un- disclosed assets, held erroneous: Peo- ple V. Feitner, 41 App. Div. (N. Y.) 471. Where the corporation's debts exceed its capital stock, so as to de- prive it of any actual value, it is immaterial that the capital stock assessment was by the board of equalization based on a capital stock in excess of its actual capital stock, but at an amount less than the in- debtedness: Eeokuk & H. Bridge Co. V. People, 161 III 133. * People V. Roberts, 156 N. Y. 585. A tax on the "capital " of a corpora- tion is not void for not setting out OH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 693 Railroad companies} "The property of railroad and canal companies constitutes a legitimate class of property for the purposes of taxation — a class which, in order to treat it fairly in the matter of taxation, must be treated separately."^ Indeed the difficulties of assessing, in the same way that prop- erty in general is assessed, lines of railroad extending through many municipalities are so great and so obvious that in many states it is not attempted, and a franchise tax is imposed as a substitute for ati other taxation. But in other states a rail- road is listed, assessed, and valued as an entirety, and the value is then apportioned for taxation among the several municipali- ties by some standard prescribed by law, which generally is the length of line within the municipalities respectively. There is no constitutional objection to that method of taxing this species of property,' and it is perhaps more just than any other.* the items in which the capital is in^ vested: "New Orleans v. New Orleans, St. L. etc. R Co;, 37 La. An. 45. For peculiar questions respecting the tax- ation of capital, see Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. V. People, 46 Mich. 193. 1 Bridge company held not to have been constituted by the statute a railroad company within the laws as to taxation: Covington, etc. Co. V. O'Meara (Ky.), 35 S. W. Rep. 1027. A certain company held to be a rail- road corporation gjnd taxable under the "act for the taxation of railroad arid canal property: " State v. Bettle, 50 N. J. L. 13a 2 State Board v. Central R. Co., 48 N. J. L. 146, 278. Railroads consti- tute by themselves a class for the purposes of taxation: State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575. 3 State Railroad Tax Cases, 93 U. S. 575; Union Pac. R. Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516; Maine v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 142 U. S. 17; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 431; Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 439; Law v. Peo- ple, 87 111. 385; Cleveland, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. V. Backus, 133 Ind. 513; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 133 Ind. 635; Bvansville & L R. Coi V. West, 138 Ind. 697; Chi- cago, etc. R. Co. V. Davenport, 51 Iowa 451; Missouri River, etc. R. Co. V. Morris, 7 Kan. 310; State v. Sev- erance, 55 Mo. 378; Richmond, etc. R. Co. v. Alamance County, 84 N|. C. 504; Franklin County v. Railroad Co.. 13 Lea 521. See Minot v. Phila- delphia, etc. R. Co., 18 Wall. 206. The New Jersey .statute directing the valuation of railroad property to be made in a distributive mode, (1) on the main stem: (3) the other real property used for railroad purposes; (3) the tangible personal property; (4) the franchises, sustained: Central R. V. State Board, 49 N. J. L. 1. As to the distribution of the assessment among the municipalities in a county, see Indiana, I. & I. R. Co. v. People, 154 III. 554. In determining the length of a railroad for the pur- poses of apportionment among coun- ties, only the length of the main track is to be considered: Murphy v. Stone, 119 Mo. 668. Apportionment of rail- « State Railroad Tax Cases, 93 U. S. 575; Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. R. Cp. V. Backus, 154 U. S. 431; Applegate v. Ernst, 3 Bush 648. 694 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. In some states the assessing board apportions the aggregate value among the municipalities according to the estimated value of that part of the road with its improvements ' lying within the limits of each,'' and in still others the road-bed, right road property among school-districts for taxation: People v. Adams, 125 N. y. 471; New York, P. & N. R. Co. V. Board of Supervisors, 92 Va. 661. Apportionment to be among tMe towns and not among the road-dis- tricts in a town: Ohio& M. R. Co. v. People,119I11.207; Chicago &N.W.R. Co. V. People, 174111.80. Company can- not object to apportionment among road-districts in the county if aggre- gate of tax is not too large: State v. Cincinnati, N. O. etc. R. Co., 13 Lea 500. Railroad track running through atax-disti-ict created under the " one- mile assessment pike- law " is taxable in such district in the proportion that the mileage of its track therein bears to the whole track : New York, L. E. & W R Co. V. Commissioners, 48 Ohio St. 349. The apportionment among counties and cities of the franchise and roadway of a railroad must, in case of a re-assessment to take the place of an invalid assess- ment, be made to the counties as they existed at the time of the re- assessment: San Diego County v. Riverside County, 125 Cal. 495. As to what railroad property is " distribu- ' table," see State v. Nashville & D. R. Co., 96 Tenn. 385. Under the Mis-' souri statute it was held proper to assess the whole property of a street railroad whose line lay partly in two cities, and a part not within any city, in the manner prescribed for the assessment of the distributable prop- erty of other raih'oads: State v. Met- ropohtan St. R. Co., 161 Mo. 188. That a street-railway system consists of several power plants at diflEerent places on the line, which line ex- tends through or into several taxing districts, and also includes a plant outside the city, not assessable by the city board, is no obstacle to the assessment of the property as a unit: Detroit Citizens' St. R. Co. v. Com- mon Council, 125 Mich. 673. The Florida statute regulating the assess- ment of "railroads" by the state comptroller applies to an electric street railroad located in the streets of one city, and wholly situated in one county: Bloxham v. Consumers' E. K & St. R. Co., 36 Fla. 519. Where the value of railroad property is to be apportioned to each county ac- cording to the ratio of mileage, the assessment of a railroad by a county need not describe the property other than as so many miles of road of a given value; and a petition, in a suit to recover delinquent taxes, is suffi- cient if it sets forth the number of miles of road owned by the defend- ant railroad in a designated county: State V. Hannibal & St. J. R Co., 101 Mo. 136. Further as to such petition, see Ibid. 1 In Illinois the improvements upon the realty are not to be valued sepa- rately: Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Living- ston County, 68 111. 458. A consti- tutional provision that " land " and the improvements thereon shall be assessed separately avoids an assess- ment against a railroad which de- scribes the " land " occupied by the company as a right of way "together with" the track, etc.: California & N. R. Co. V. Mecartney, 104 Cal. 616. 2 See State v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378. The estimates furnished by the directors of the school districts in the county sufficiently fix the rates from which to deduce an average rate for the taxation of railroad property for school purposes: State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 135 Mo. 618. OH. XII.J LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALtTATION OF ESTATES. 695 of way, and superstructure are assessed as a whole by a state board,^ while the buildings and local improvements are left to } See State v. Maine Central R. Co., 74 Me. 376; San Francisco, etc. R. Co. V. State Board, 60 CaL 12. A rail- road operated by electricity, and only used for carrying freight, was held not to be a street railway, and hence taxable only by the state board of assessors: Hoboken R. etc. Co. V. State Board, 64 N. J. L. 173. A road was held to be a street railway and therefore not within the statute providing for the assessment of rail- roads for taxation by the state exec- utive council: Cedar Rapids & M. C. R. Co. V. Cedar Rapids, 106 Iowa 476. A railroad not the property of a rail- road company nor operated under a franchise is not subject to taxation by the state board of assessors: Mon- mouth Park Assoc, v. State Board, 60 N. J. L. 372. A short line of rail- road built and used by a manufactur- ing company for hauling its own materials was held not to be within the statute providing for assessment of railroad property by a state board: Dayton v. Dayton, etc. Co., 99 Tenn. 578. As to what is included in the terms "right of way," "roadway," •■road-bed," and "railroad track," see Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 118 U. S. 417; California V. Central Pac. R Co., 137 U. S. 1; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. etc. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 14; Keener V. Union Pac. R. Co., 81 Fed. Rep. 136; New York Guaranty, etc. Co. v. Tacoma R. etc. Co., 93 Fed. Rep. 51, 35 C. C. A. 193; Nashville & D. R. Co. V. State (Ala. !, 30 South. Rep. 619; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Miller County, 67 Ark. 498; San Francisco V. Central Pac. R. Co., 63 Cal. 467; Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. People, 4 111. App. 468, 98 III. 350, 99 111. 464; Peo- ple V. Chicago & W. L R Co., 116 111. 181; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. People, 139 111. 571; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. V. Quincy, 136 111. 660; Quincy, O. & K C. R. Co. V. People, 156 111. 437; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Grant, 167 111. 489; Plaff v. Terre Haute & I. R. Co.-, 108 Ind. 144; Detroit v. Wayne Circuit Judge (Mich.), 86 N. W. Rep. 1033; State v. Mississippi River Bridge Co., 134 Mo. 331 ; United N. J. R Co. V. Jersey City, 55 N. J. L. 139; Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Cass County, 8 N. D. 18. A railroad bridge across a navigable river and owned by a railroad company as part of its line is assessable by the state board and not by the local assessor: Anderson v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 117 111. 36; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Richardson County (Neb.), 85 N. W. Rep. 532 (overruling Cass County y. Chicago, B. & q.n.Co.,25 N6b.348). A railroad bridge must be assessed with the railroad, though it is used also for the passage of carriage and foot-pas- sengers, for which tolls are charged, and though railroad companies other than the one owning it are given the right to use it: State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co, 97 Mo. 348. The state board may decide that railway bridges within a city's limits shall be assessed and taxed as part of the road-bed and superstructure: Cen- tral Trust Co. V. Wabash, St. L. etc. R. Co., 37 Fed. Rep. 14. Bridges owned by bridge company but used by railroad company under lease or contract, held not property of rail- road company for tax purposes, but subject to taxation as bridges: St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Williams, 58 ♦ Ark. 58; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Peo- ple, 153 111. 409; State v. Mississippi River Bridge Co., 109 Mo. 353, 134 Mo. 331. A steamboat used exclusively for railroad purposes could not be as- sessed by the county assessor, even if omitted by the railroad assessors: Lit- tle Rock & M. R. Co. v. Williams, 101 696 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. be assessed locally like the property of natural persons.^ In thus assessing the road as a whole, the law in some states takes Tenn. 146. Steamers used by a rail- road company in transporting oars across water between its tracks are not taxable as part of the " roadway " of*'road-bed," and therefore the state board cannot assess them: California V. Central Pao. R. Co., 127 U. S. 1.; San Francisco v. "Central Pac. R. Co., 63 Cal. 467. Fixed and stationary machinery attached to shops on a right of way is assessable only by the state board; otherwise as to a steam-boiler and engine not perma- nently attached to the realty : Peoria, D. etc. R. Co. V. Goar, 118 111. 134. A round-house, unless used as a repair ' shop, so as to make it such shop as ■well a,i a round-hous^, should be as- sessed by the state board and not by the local assessor: Red Willow County V. Chicago, B. & Q. R Co., 26 Neb. 660. Where the property has been returned to the state board as used for railroad purposes, and has escaped local taxation, it is too late to claim exemption from the valuation by such board: State v. Settle, 50 N. J. L. 132. Under the Illinois statute it is sufQcient to de- scribe railroad property in the lists of property upon which road-taxes are levied as " railroad track," " pro- portion of rolling-stock," "rolling stook-nlain line," and "main brack: " Wabash R Co. v. People, 137 111. 181. XTnder the Arizona statute the value of each item need not appear in the assessment roll, and where it ap- peared that the board regarded the right of way and franchise as not taxable, the value of those items was not included in the total: Atlantic & P. R Co. V. Yavapai County (Ariz.), 31 Pac. Rep. 768. 1 See Nashville & D. R. Co. v. State (Ala.),^0 South. Rep. 619; St. Louis, 1 M. & S. R Co. V. Miller County, 67 Ark. 498; San Francisco, etc. R Co. V. State Board, 60 Cal. 13; Oregon S. L. R. Co. V. Yeates, 2 Idaho 365; Ore- gon Short-Line R. Co. v. Gooding (Idaho), 59 Pac. Rep. 831; State v. Maine Central R. Co., 74 Me. 376: Re- publican V. & W. R Co. V. Chase County, 33 Neb. 759. The local as- sessors have no authority to assess the lands on which a railroad's stock- yards are located: St. Louis, I. M. & S. R, Co. V. Miller County, supra. Fences along the line of a railroad are not " roadway " to be assessed by the state board of equalization, but are " improvements " assessable by the county authorities: Santa Clara County V. Southern Pac. R. Ca, 118 U. S, 394. A railroad company's buildings are subject to taxation, like other property, at the local rates fixed in the districts where situated, and not at the average rate through- out the county: State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 110 Mo. 365. An elevator, built, owned and operated by private persons, is not taxable property used for railroad purposes, but is liable to taxation by the local authorities un- der the general law, even though such property may be used for the con- venience of such companies in the conduct of their business: Taxation of Erie R Co., 64 N. J. L. 133. Build- ing material of a railroad company must be listed for taxation in the county in which it is situated: Chi- cago, B. & Q. R. Co, V. Hitchcock County, 40 Neb. 781. A railroad com- pany which has omitted some of its property from the schedule returned by it for assessment by the state board is estopped from asserting that such omHtted property cannot be as- sessed by the town assessor because it should have been included in such scltedule: Indianapolis & St. L. R Co. V. People, 130 111. 62. Local as- sessors cannot assess a railroad right CH. XII.J LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 697 into account _ the franchise as property, and requires it to be valued with the rest; > in others it does not. The rolling-stock and other personalty of the company should be assessed at the place of its home office unless some other provision is made by law;^ but under some statutes the rolling-stock is considered real estate, and is estimated with the road itself.' of way, even where, by mistake, but without fraud, the railroad company has not returned as right of way area enough to the state board : Peo- ria, D. etc. R. Co. V. Gear, 118 111. 134. Where a building is erroneously in- cluded in the taxation, for schools, of a railroad company's "road-bed, rolling-stock, and movable property," the county cannot recover the excess represented by the value of the build- ings: State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 135 Mo. 618. ■ 1 See Huck v. Chicago, eta R. Co., 86 111. 353 ; State Board v. Central R. Co., 48 K J. L. 146; Central R. Co. v. State Board. 49 N.J. L. 1; Franklin County v. Railroad Co., 12 Lea 531. Ip Michi- gan the tangible property of a street railroad should be assessed as a unit, and privileges inseparably connected with the road should be considered, thus indirectly taxing the franchise: Detroit Citizens' St. E.Co. v. Common Council, 135 U. S. 673. See Detroit Citizens' St. R. Co. v.'Wayne Circuit Judge (Mich.), 86 N. W. Rep. 1033. 2 See ante, p. 674. The situs of roll- ing-stock is where it is habitually used. If constantly changing the amount may be fixed by the average amount so used: Atlantic & P. R. Co. V, Lesueur (Ariz.), 19 Pac.Eep. 157 ; At- lantic & P. R Co. V. Yavapai County x " on all personal property, money, and credits, including all capital stock," a bank's personal property is to be ascertained by adding to the paid-up capital the stockholders' demand-notes for unpaid stock bearing in- terest and held by the bank.^ In ascertaining the amount of property of a savings bank liable to taxation, the amount of its deposits, being a liability, is to be deducted from its gross assets;^ and federal bonds owned by the bank are to be de- ducted from its apparent surplus over and above deposits.* A 1 An institution is a bank, within the lot whereon it is erected, of any the meaning of a law imposing a bank, is to be assessed to the bank license-tax on banks, if it receives in the district where it is located, deposits, allows interest tl^ereori, and and the value of such house and- lot makes loans: New Orleans v. Sav- is not to 1)6 considered in determin- ings Inst., 33 La. An. 537. A trust ing the assessable value of shares in company whose only business is in- stockholders' hands: Orange Nat. vesting its own capital in mortgages Bank v. Williams, 58 N. J. L. 45. and selling such securities with the * State Bank v. Bichniond, 79 Va. company's guaranty is not a bank- 113. ing corporation : Selden v. Equitable ^People v. Barker, 154 N. Y. 1S8. Trust Co., 94 IT. S. 419. The case As to the taxation of savings societies arose under the federal revenue in general, see Savings Bank v. New laws. London, 20 Conn. Ill; Coite v. So- 2Vicksburg Bank v. Worrell, 67 ciety, 32 Conn. 173; State v. Ster- Miss. 47. Where a bank has not paid ling, 20 Md. 502; State v. Central taxes as provided by a statute im- Sav. Bank, 67 Md. 292; Westminster posing a tax measured by the entire v. Westminster Savings Bank, 93 assets in lieu of all other taxes, it is Md. 62. It was held in the last- not entitled to the benefits of the named case that the securities in apt, and it is to be taxed at the mar- which the deposits of a savings bank ket value of its capital paid in: Bank are invested are not taxable, of Oxford V. Oxford, 70 Miss. 504. 6 People v. Barker, 154 N. Y. 128. ' County Sav. Bank v. Hewitt, 112 See, however, Westminster v. West- Ala. 546. The banking-house with minster Savings Bank, 92 Md. 62. OH. XII.] LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. Y07 bank should be assessed for taxes upon the stock of other cor- porations which it has acquired in the course of its business.' It is held iri Khode Island that the reserved profits of a sav- ings bank, the charter of which empowers the directors by majority vote to "divide the whole property among the depos- itors in proportion to their respective interests therein," be- long to the depositors, and are not taxable as the bank's prop- erty.^ But deposits in a bank are, according to the general doctrine, its property, and taxable to it as such.' It is, how- 1 Pacific Nat Bank v. Pierce County, 20 Wash. 675. 2 Mechanics' Sav. Bank v. Granger, 17 E. I. 77. Tennessee statutes held to authorize the assessment of a bank's surplus and undivided profits: State V. Bank of Commerce, 95 Tenn. 221. 3 State V. Carson City Sav. Bank, 17 Neb. 146. In Security Sav. Bank, etc. Co. V. Hinton, 97 Cal. 214, the 6ontention that debts of a loan and savings bank vrere not taxable to the bank because not ordinary deposits, but debts for borrowed money, re- payablain the exact sum borrowed, was not sustained. Deposits in a state bank by stockholders to the face value of their stock, for which certificates of deposit were issued, were taxable to the bank: State Ex- change Bank v. Parkersburg, 112 Iowa 104 A savings bank is taxable for the amount of its deposits if the value of its assets is equal to that amount, although it receives no in- come from some of them : Union, etc. Savings Bank's Petition-, 68 N. H. 384. And one bank is not entitled to abatement of taxes because its sur- plus is not as large, relatively, as other such banks possess: Ibid. When the assets of a savings bank have been reduced in value below the amount due depositors, a petition for a corresponding abatement may be maintained: Wolfeborough Sav. Bank's Petitioif, 69 N. H. 84, Under a statute laying upon savings Banks a percentage tax on the average amount of deposits for thesix months preceding, the tax is to be computed on the amount deposited, together with the interest and dividend ac- cruing and payable to depositors, and does not include the bank's guar- anty fund or undivided profits: Suf- folk Sav. Bank v. Commonwealth, 151 Mass. 103. The word " deposits" as used in such statute means all the funds which the bank holds for in- vestment: In re Sufifolk Sav. Bank, 149 Mass. 1. Cheques and drafts upon other city banks constitute part of a bank's deposits "subject to payment by cheque or draft," and should be used in detertnining the average daily deposits for the pur- pose of taxation under the federal statute; but cheques of country banks deposited with such bank, which were not considered as sub- ject to payment on cheque or draft until they had been sent to the re- spective country banks against which they were drawn and returned as good, should not have been included in the average daily deposits until such return was made: Bank of the Metropolis v. Weber, 41 Fed, Rep. 413. Moneys placed in a bank by the state treasurer to be disbursed by the bank as agent of the state, and which were held by^ the bank at its own risk, mixed with the general funds, were true "deposits," and computable as such in determining the sum subject to the federal tax: Manhattan Co. v. Blake, 148 U. S. 412. 708 LIFTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. ever, held in Kentucky that banks are not required to pay taxes on money deposited with them by their customers, or on assets representing it ; banks being regarded in that state, by reason of the peculiar character of their business, as quasi trustees of the depositors, who are required under the law to pay a tax on the money deposited.^ A time-deposit in a pri- vate bank is taxable to the depositor.^ Where a tax upon the average amount of deposits is assessed against every bank doing business in the state, such tax is a franchise-tax; and as the right t® lay it is measured in point of time by the exercise on the bank's part of the rights and privileges essential to the operation of its business, it cannot be assessed while a receiver is winding up the bank's affairs.' If a bank is subject to a specific tax on its capital, it is not tEixable on collaterals deposited for loans.* Under an act pro- viding for the assessment of the " paid-up capital " of savings banks, all money and moneyed assets resulting from payments on subscriptions and other obligations, where such payments are set apart and reserved as capital, are taxable,' and so are surplus moneys and credits.* It has been said in a recent case that in taxing the property of an incorporated state bank thegeneral assembly may impose a tax either on the property or on the shares ; but if they differ materially in value, the tax must be on the shares.'' A tax imposed on each share of a bank's capital stock in lieu of all other taxes was construed by the supreme court of the United States as applying to the shares of stock in the hands of the individual stockholders, and not to the capital stock.* If the 1 Deposit Bank v. Daviess County, ' Davenport Bank v. Equalization 102 Ky. 174, 214 Board, 64 Iowa 140. 2 Hall V. Greenwood County, 37 * Iowa State Savings Bank v. Bur- Kan. 37. See Savings Bank v. New lington City Council, 93 Iowa 119. London, 20 Conn. Ill; Philadelphia 'Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, Sav. Fund Soo. v. Yard, 9 Pa. St. 359. 62 Ohio St. 266. As to the statement 'State V. Bradford Sav. Bank & T. required from bank officers showing Co., 71 Yt 234. In Commonwealth amount and number of shares, etc., V. Savings Bank, 126 Mass. 526, and see First Nat. Bank v. Bailey, 15 Mont^ Commonwealth v. Savings Bank, 123 301. Mass. 493, it was held that a bank is ^Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, taxablethough temporarily enjoined. 161 U. S. 134 And see ante, pp. 371, < Waltham Bank v. Waltham, 10 37a Met 334 CH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 709' statute requires that the shares of incorporated banks shall be listed for taxation at their true value in money, the value of United States bonds held by a bank is not to be deducted from the capital stock in fixing for taxation the value of the shares held by its stockholders.^ Where the statutes provide that bank-shares shall only be assessed after deducting the value of real estate taxed to the bank, and that mortgages upon realty shall be deemed an interest in land, mortgages held by a bank must be taxed to the bank and deducted from the value of the shares of its capital stock, though the mortgagers have agreed to pay the taxes.^ Often the laws provide that taxps on shares of bank stock shall be paid by the bank, and that they may recover from the owners of Such shares the amount so paid by them.' ' A statute providing that state and national banks, and " other institutions of loan and discount," shall be taxed in a certain 1 Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 62 Ohio St. 366. The nature of the way in which a bank's assets are invested (e. g. in non-taxable bonds) in no way aflfeots its 1 lability to taxation : Bank of Oxford V. Oxford, 70 Miss. 504 2 Detroit Common Council v. Board of Assessors, 91 Mich. 78, 509. 'See First Nat. Bank v. Hungate, 63 Fed. Eep. 548: Stapylton v. Thag- gar4, 91 Fed. Eep. 93, 33 C. C. A. 353; Farmers' & T. Nat. Bank v. Hoffman, 93 Iowa 119; Bank of Santa Fe v. Buster, 50 Kan. 356; First Nat. Bank V. Lyman, 59 Kan. 410; State v. Ca- tron, 118 Mo. 380; State v. Merchants' Bank, 160 Mo. 640; Union Bank v. Richmond, 94 Va. 316. Evidence that bank had not declared a dividend for a year previous to the levy of an as- sessment on its capital stock, and that the surplus which it reported after the assessment was made was worthless by reason of the shrinkage of the securities composing it, sus- tains a finding that after the assess- ment the bank had no money of the shareholder with \yhich to pay the tax : Farmers,' etc. Nat Bank v. Hoflf- jnan, 93 Iowa 119. A tax imposed on the shares of a bank under the Louisi- ana statute which requires the bank to pay the tax and then look to divi- dends and to the stockholders-for re- imbursement, was, in Citizens' Bank V. Board of Assessors, 54 Fed. Rep. 73, held to be a tax upon the bank itself. Under authority to le^vy a tax on the shares of stock ef a bank, the tax may be collected from the bank instead of the individual stockhold- ers, the statute making the place where the bank is located the situs of its stock for>the purposes of taxa- tion: Union Bank y. Richmond, 94 Va. 316. On an assessment of bank stock under a statute making banks agents for their respective sharehold- ers, and authorizing the collection from each bank of taxes on its stock assessed against it as such agent, if the statute is not complied with by charging the bank on the assessment roll, the bank not being even referred to by its proper corporate name in the assessments against the share- holders, the warrant to the collector conferred no authority' to Seize the bank's property for the purpose of enforcing the payment of taxes charged against shareholders: First Nat. Bank v. Hungate, 63 Fed. Rep. 548, 710 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [cH. XII. manner in full of all state, county, and municipal taxes, has ref- erence only to incorporated " institutions," and does not apply to a private unincorporated bank; the latter is taxable under the general law.^ Where an act relating to private banks pro- vides that a statement shall be made before a notary public setting forth the name in which the business is to be conducted, it will be presumed that the name under which the business is conducted was the one selected by the parties in interest, against which, upon a return by the president, tax assessments may properly be made.^ Under a statute taxing the " average value of the moneys and credits which have been in the posses- sion or under the control " of a private banker, only his own moneys and credits are taxable.' National hanks. By the act of congress of June 3, 1864, the shares of stock held by any person or body corporate in any of the national banks are allowed to be included in the valuation of personal property *' in the assessment of taxes imposed by or under state authority, at the place where such bank is lo- cated, and not elsewhere, but not at a greater rate than is as- sessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such state," and not exceeding " the rate imposed upon the shares of any of the banks organized under the au- thority of the state " where the bank is located; and nothing in the act is to exempt the real estate of such banks " from either state, county, or municipal taxes, to the same extent, ac- cording to its value, as other real estate is taxed." * Under this 1 Bowling Green v. Potter, 91 Ky. Fed. Rep. 93. As to the taxation of 66. Error in amount of taxes of un- real estate of national banks, see incorporated bank, resulting from Second Nat. Bank v. Caldwell, 13 an erroneous deduction, may be cor- Fed. Rep. 429. The realty of national reoted by the county auditor upon banks held not taxable under the the current duplicate: Fayette statutes of Texas: Rosenburg t. County Treasurer v. People's, etc. Weekes, 67 Tex. 578. The value of Bank, 47 Ohio St 503. the realty must be deducted in tax- 2 State V. Bank of Neosho, 120 Ma ing national bank shares if it is de- 161. ducted in taxing shares of a state 3 Branch v. Marengo, 43 Iowa 600. bank: Loftin v. Citizens' Nat. Bank, As to tax on commissions, see Citi- 85 Md. 341. Where a national bank zens' Bank v. Sharp, 53 Md. 521. is taxed for lands paid for out of its ^ A state cannot tax a bank char- capital stock, the assessment upon tered by congress except upon its real its shares should be made after de- property: Stapylton v. Haggard, 91 ducting from its cash value the value OH. XII.J LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 711 act, if no tax is imposed by the state on shares in state banks, the shares in the national banks are not taxed at all.' This diificulty was met with in states whose laws taxed the capital of banks, but not the shares thereof.^ The act was not intended to restrict the state power of taxation, but only to prevent unfriendly discrimination in taxation against the mon- eyed capital invested in national banks.' The act does not admit of the taxation of the capital as such,* or of the personal property as such,' or of mortgages of such lands: First Nat. Bank v. City Council, 86 Iowa 38. Under the New York tax law the assessed and not the actual value of realty should be deducted in assessing national bank stock: Jenkins v. NefE, 163 N. Y. 330. The assessed value of real estate owned by a bank in states other than that in which the bank is lo- cated is not to be deducted in deter- mining the amount of the assessable property of the bank, unless author- ized by the laws of the state in whiclj the bank is situated: Commercial Nat. Bank V. Chambers, 183 U. S. 556, iVan Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wall. 573: Bradley v. People, 4 Wall. 459. 2 Bradley v. People, 4 Wall. 459; Smith V. First Nat. Bank, 17 Mich. 479. 3 Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 131 U. a 138; Palmer v. MtjMahon, 133 U. S. 660; First Nat. Bank v. Herbert, 44 Fed. Rep. 158. A case of discrimination against national banks within the pUrview of the act of congress 'arises only when the moneyed capital employed in the hands of individual owners in carry- ing on operations of the same char- acter as those of national banks is of some considerable amount, and is exempt by operation of law or by the wilful act of the assessors: Washing- ton Nat. Bank v. King County, 9 Wash. 607. A statute for taxing the surplus capital of banks will be applied to national and state banks alike: National Bank V.Peter borough, 56 N. H. 38. As to the assessment of the surplus of a national bank, and the distribution of the amount among the individual shareholders, see People v. Button, 63 Hun 684. < Collins V. Chicago, 4 Biss. 473; First Nat. Bank v. Richmond, 39 Fed. Rep. 309, 43 Fed. Rep. 877; Boston v. Beal, 51 Fed. Rep. 306; Smith v. First Nat. Bank, 17 Mich. 47.9. See National Bank v. Douglass County, 3 Dill. 330; National Bank of Mobile V. Mobile, 63 Ala. 384; People v. Na- tional Gold Bank, 51 Cal. 508; Farm- ers,' etc. Bank v. Hoffman, 93 Iowa 119; Smith v. Webb, 11 Minn. 378; First Nat. Bank v. Meredith, 44 Mo. 500; Lemly v. Commissioners, 85 N. C. 379; Gray v. Logan County, 7 Okl. 331. The shares in a national bank cannot be listed and valued in the aggregate, and such aggre- gate placed on the tax-list in the bank's name. Such shares when 5 Rosenblatt v. Johnson, 104 U. S. 462; Mercantile Nat, Bank V. New York, 131 IT. S. 138; San Francisco V. Crocker, etc. Nat. Bank, 93 Fed. Rep. 273; National Bank v. Long (Ariz.), 57 Pao. Rep. 639; People v. National Bank, 133 Cal. 53; First Nat. Bank v. San Francisco, 139 Cal. 96; First Nat. Bank v. Province, 30 Mont. 374. The property of a na- tional bank continues exempt after insolvency as well as before: Rosen- blatt V. Johnson, supra. T12 LISTING OF PEKSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. held by national banks ; ^ and the shares must be taxed by the same standards which are applied in the case of other moneyed capital.^ If the state law, justly administered, would produce listed and valued for taxation are required to be placed on the proper tax-list in the names of the respect- ive owners: Miller v. First' Nat. Bank, 46 Ohio St 424 The refusal of the officers of a national bank to furnish the assessor with a list of shareholders does not warrant as- sessing and enforcing the tax against bank property. An assessment of t^xes against national bank stpok .must be against the shareholders personally: Springfield, v. Spring- field Bank, 87 Mo. 441. Taxes upon national bank shares cannot b6 col- lected against the receiver of an in- solvent national bank, as this would in effect be taxing the capital stock: Boston V. Beal, 51 Fed. Rep. 306, 55 Fed. Eep. 26; Stapylton v. Thag- gard, 91 Fed. Rep. 93, 33 C. C. A. 353; Gray v. Logan County, 7 Okl. 331 ; Baker v. King County, 17 Wash. 632. 1 First Nat. Bank v. Kreig, 31 Nev. 404. 2 Van Allen v. Assessors, 3 Wail. 573; People v. Tax Com'rs, 94 U. S. 415; First Nat. Bank v. Treasurer, 25 Fed. Rep. 749; Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. King County, 57 Fed. Rep. 433; McHenry v. Downer, 116 Cal. 20; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 62 Ohio St. 266. "Moneyed capital" means money employed in a busi- ness the object of which is to make profit by investing in securities by way of loan, discount, or otherwise, which from time to time are reduced again to money and reinvested: Mer- cantile Nat. Bank v. Shields, 59 Fed. Rep. 952. See, to the same effect. First Nat Bank v. Turner, 154 Ind. 456. The term does not include, capital that does not come into competition with the business of national banks: and exemptions from taxation. made for reasons of publ'o policy, and not as an unfriendly discrimi- nation against investments in na- tional banks, are not forbidden. It must be made to appear satisfacto- rily by the proofs that the moneyed capital claimed to be ^iven an unjust advantage is of the obnoxious charac- ter: First Nat Bank v. Ayers, 160 U. S. 660; First Nat Bank v. Cheha- lis County, 166 XJ. S. 440; First Nat Bank v. Chapman, 173 U. S. 305, 319; Commercial Nat. Bank t. Chambers, 183 U. S. 556; Mechanics' Nat Bank V. Baker (N. J.), 48 Atl. Re;). 583; Washington Nat. Bank v. King County, 9 WashT 607. Where capital is not so employed as to come intq competitioq with the business of na- tional banks, although in a general sense it is " moneyed capital," it may be taxed at a different rate from banking capital: National Bank v. Baltimore, 100 Fed. Rep. 34, 40 C. C. A 254. The fact that bank shares are taxed at a higher rate than shares in other than moneyed corporations is not material provided they are not taxed higher than shares in other moneyed corporations or than per- sonal property: First Nat. Bank v. Waters, 19 Blatchf. 343: see Hepburn V. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480; Pal- mer V. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660. Thus exemptions from taxation of depos- its in savings banks are not a discrim- ination against national banks: Mer- cantile Nat Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138; Newark Banking Co. v. Newark, 131 U. S. 163: National Bank v. Boston, 135 U. S. 60; Mer- cantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 28 Fed. Rep. 776; Richards v. Rock Rap- ids, 31 Fed. Rep. 505. So with the exemption of the stopks and bonds of insurance, wharf, and gas com- OH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 713 uniformity, but the officers knowingly and purposely apply a different rule of valuation to the shares of national banks, in panies, or other non-competing cap- ital or credits: First Nat. Bank v. Ghehalis County, 166 U. S. 440. So with a state law that taxes savings banks on the amount of their paid- up capital, and does not tax their shares held by individuals; it not ap- pearing that a discrimination pro- hibited by the federal statute exists or was intended: Davenport Nat. Bank v. Board of Equal., 123 U. S. 83, 64 Iowa 140. The New York banking law does not bring trust companies into competition with na- tional banks, within the federal stat- ute prohibiting states from taxing national bank shares at a greater rate than other moneyed capital: Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138; Jenkins v. Neff, 163 N. Y. 320. See, however, as to New Jersey, Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Baker (N. J.), 48 Atl. Rep. 583. Fail- ure to tax shares of stock in building and loan associations does not inval- idate a tax on national bank shares : Consolidated Nat. Bank v. Pima County (Ariz.), 48 Pac. Rep. 291. Nor is the omission to tax municipal bonds, or the securities of life insur- ance companies, or the stock, owned in the state, of foreign corporations, a prohibited discrimination: Mer- cantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 121 U. 8. 138; Newark Banking Co. v. Newark, 121 U. S. 163. Nor is the national bank law violated by state legislation imposing franchise taxes upon life insurance companies with respect to the number of their shares, upon trust and similar companies with regard to the amount of their deposits, and upon telephone com- panies based on the number of tele- phones which they use: National Bank v. Boston, 135 U. 8. 60. The federal statute concerning taxation of shares of national banks is not in- fi'inged by an act exempting shares in corporations the entire capital of which is invested in assessable prop- erty in the territory: Talbott v. County Com'rs, 139 U. S. 438; Silver Bow County v. Davis, 6 Mont. 306. As to what exemptions of pther property would invalidate taxation of na- tional banks, see Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U. S. 689. The owner of national bank stock is not discriminated against by a statute taxing unincor- porated state banks on a valuation based on the difference between their assets and liabilities: Bressler V. Wayne County, 32 Neb. 834. The valuation of shares in national banks is not necessarily limited to the par value: Hepburn v. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480. A rule adopted by a city board of assessors to assess at par all shares of stock in state and national banks in the city, without regard to their actual or market value, but making the requisite re- duction for real estate owned by the banks, does not conflict with the fed- eral statute: Stanley v. Albany County, 121 U. S. 535; Williams v. Albany County, 123 U. S. 154. Be- fore an assessment of national bank shares can be held invalid it must be shown that there is in fact a higher tax imposed on them than on other moneyed capital, and it is not enough to show merely that the state laws provide a different mode of taxing moneyed capital invested in savings banks or other corpora- tions: Richards v. Rock Rapids, 31 Fed. Rep. 505. A state law taxing national banks upon the valuation of their shares, while state banks are taxed upon a valuation of their franchise, is prima facie discrimina- tive, and can only be sustained by proof that in operation the two methods of valuation ar« equivalent: 714 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. order to impose disproportionate taxes upon them, the courts will give relief.^ Such shares are not taxable under a state First Nat. Bank v. Covington, 103 Fed. Rep. 533. Contra, Scobee v. Bean (Ky.), 59 S. W. Rep. 860. A statute requiring shares of national banks to be assessed and taxed for previous years during which an in- valid law for the taxation of such Aanks was in existence, is invalid where there is no corresponding pro- vision in any law of the state for the retroactive taxation of moneyed cap- ital in the hands of state banks or of individuals: First Nat. Bank v. Cov- ington. 103 Fed. Rep. 533. The fed- eral statute does not forbid discrim- ination between national banks, but only as between such banks and state banks, or other moneyed cap- ital in the hands of private individ- uals; and a state statute which gives both state and national banks the same privileges is not objection- able: Merchants', etc. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461. 1 Pelton V. National Bank, 101 U. S. 143; Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153; Whitbeck v. Mercantile Bank, 137 U. S. 193; St. Louis Nat. Bank v. Papin, 4 Dill. 39: Covington City Nat. Bank v. Covington, 31 Fed. Rep. 484; Exchange Nat. Bank v. Miller, 19 Fed. Rep. 373. See Boyer V. Boyer, 113 TJ. S. 689. The use of separate assessment rolls cannot be mad^ a means of discrimination against national bank shares: Peo- ple V. Coleman, 44 Hun 47. The case must, however, be plain to jus- tify interfering to enjoin the tax: First Nat. Bank v. Farwell, 10 Biss. 370, 7 Fed. Rep. 518; see National Bank v. Kimba^U, 103 U. S. 733. The mere fact that property other than that of a' national bank was assessed at a lower rate without any design or systematic effort on the assessors' part would not justify an injunction to restrain the collection of the tax: Albuquerque Nat. Bank v. Perea, 147 U. S. 87. But a tacit understanding whereby, throughout the state, na- tional bank shares are in fact disr criminated against, affords ground for an injunction; as where the state board of equalization adopts one standard for national banks and a lower standard for state banks, a discrimination against the former thus resulting: Toledo Bank v. Lu- cas County Treasurer, 35 Fed. Rep. 749. Where it is sought to restrain collection of taxes on national bank shares as higher than those on other moneyed capital, a custom to assess property at fifty per cent of its value is not established by evidence that a few persons were assessed at that rate: , Engelke v. Schlender, 75 Tex. 559. Whether national bank stock is, in violation of the act of congress, assessed at a rate greater than other moneyed capital in the hands of in- dividual citizens of the state, is a question of fact to be decided by the evidence: Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Baker (N. J.), 46 Atl. Rep. 586. And stockholdevs may require the courts to determine the question : Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Baker (N. J.), 48 Atl. Rep. 583. Mere eVrors in assessing national bank stock will raise no federal question : W illiams v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 547. A bank may, in be- half of its stockholders, have illegal taxation enjoined: Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153; Hills v. Exchange Bank, 105 U. S. 319; Nar tional Bank v. Wells, 18 Blatohf. 478; Albany Nat. Bank v. Maher, 9 Fed. Rep. 884; City Nat. Bank v. Paducah, 3 Flipp. 61; First Nat. Bank v. Cov- ington, 103 Fed. Rep. 533; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Hubbard, 105 Fed. Rep, 809. Or bring an action in its own name to secure relief against excess- ive taxation of the ca'pital stock: CH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND YALUATION OF ESTATES. 715 statute for the taxation of personal property generally.^ What- ever deductions are allowed in assessing shares of state banks or other moneyed capital must be allowed also in assessing the shares of national banks.^ A license tax cannot be imposed Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Columbia County, 23 Wash. 441. But a share- holder cannot complain o£ legislation that does not injure him: Hills v. Exchange Banli, 105 U. S. 319: Super- visors V. Stanley, 105 U. S. 305; Stan- ley V, Supervisors, 21 Blatchf. 241, 15 Fed. Rep. 483. iMcHenry v. Downer, 116 Cal. 20. It was held in Scobee v. Bean (Ky.), 59 S. W. Rep. 860, -and in Owen County Court v. Farmers' Nat. Bank (Ky.), 59 S. W. Rep. 7, that as the statutes intended to apply to the taxation of banking associations and bank stocks had been declared void as to the national banks, shares in the latter were taxable in the owners' hands under the gener^ law providing for the taxation of real and personal estate of every kind. 2 People V. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539; Evansville Bank v. Britton, 105 U. S. 322; Boyer v. Boyer, 113 0. S. 689; Stanley v. Albany County, 121 U. S. 535; Whitbeck v. Mercantile Nat. Bank, 137 U. S. 193; City Nat. Bank V. Paduoah, 3 Flipp. 61; Richards v. Rock Rapids, 31 Fed. Rep. 505; Whit- ney Nat. Bank v. Parker, 41 Fed. Rep. 402; Pollard v. State, 65 Ala. 628; Maguire v. Mobile County, 71 Ala. 401; Miller v. Heilbrun, 58 Cal. 133; Wasson v. Indianapolis Bank, 107 Ind. 206; First Nat. Bank v. City Council, 85 Iowa 736; Peavey v. Greenfield, 64 N. H. 384; Mo Aden v. Mecklenburg Com'rs, 97 N. G 355; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 63 Ohio St. 266. Where, under the laws of the state, shares of stock are not included in the " credits " from which a taxpayer is allowed to deduct his bona fide indebtedness, the sharehold- ers of national banks are not entitled to deduct their indebtedness from their shares of stock: First Nat. Bank V. Chapman, 173 U. S. 205; Commer- cial Nat. Bank v. Chambers, 183 U. S. 556; First Nat. Bank v. Turner, 154 Ind. 456; Bressler v. Wayne County, 33 Neb. 834; Niles v. Shaw, 50 Ohio St. 370; Chapman V. First Nat Bank, 56 Ohio St. 310; Burrows v. Smith, 95 Va. 694; First Nat. Bank.v. Che- halis County, 6 Wash. 64. Statutory provisions permitting deduction of indebtedness from " credits," which are defined to include deposits, in savings banks and shares in building, associations, do not necessarily dis- criminate against national banks and in favorof "other moneyed capital: " Mercantile Nat. Bank v. Hubbard, 98 Fed. Rep. 465. The mere fact that state laws permit some debts to be deducted from some moneyed capi- tal for the purposes of taxation, but not for that which is invested in the shares of national banks, does not show a violation of the federal law unless it appears that the amount of moneyed capital in the state from which debts may be deducted was, as compared with the moneyed capi- tal invested in national bank shares, so large and substantial as to amount to an illegal discrimination against national bank shareholders: First Nat. Bank v. Ayers, 160 IT. S. 660. Under the Iowa code, in assessing national bank stock the holder thereof is entitled to deduct from its cash value the amount of his debts: First Nat. Bank v. City Council, 86 Iowa 28. Permitting private banks to deduct their deposits from their taxable assets does not discriminate against national banks, which, in the 716 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XII. upon national banks,^ nor can the states exercise any control over them except as permitted by congress.^ The shares can- not be taxed by municipalities when the shares of state banks are not so taxable.' But the fact that two banks, by their charter, are specially taxed, will not preclude the taxation of the shares in the national banks by general law;* neither are the shares to be excluded from taxation because some other classes of moneyed capital aj-e exempt from taxation by laws of limited application.' In assessing the shares it is not nec- essary to make a deduction in respect to capital invested in national securities,* unless such deduction is allowed to be made by individuals.' The state may tax the shades at the place where the bank is located, without regard. to the residence of shareholders,* and may require the tax to be paid by the sworn statement they are required to render of the number, of their shares, each share for its actual value, necessarily deduct deposits, as debts due the bank, in determining such value: Engelke v. Schlender, 75 Tex. 559. In State Bank v. Board of Rev- enue, 91 Ala. 217, it is held that if a statute allows the owner of shares in a national bank to deduct his in- debtedness from their assessed value, this deduction may likewise be made from shares in a state bank, for a discrimination is forbidden by the state constitution. 1 Owensboro Nat. Bank v. Owens- boro, 173 U. S. 664; Third Nat. Bank V. Stone, 174 U. S. 438: First Nat. Bank v. iouisville, 174 U. S. 438; Macon v. First Nat. Bank, 59 Ga. 648. See Second Nat Bank v. Caldwell, 13 Fed. Rep. 439. 2 Farmers', etc. Bank v. Bearing, 91 U. S. 339; Covington City Bank v. Covington, 21 Fed. Eep. 484; Macon V. First Nat. Bank, 59 Ga. 648. 3 Craft V. Tuttle, 27 Ind. 333; Wright V. Stiltz, 27 Ind. 338. See National Bank v. Long (Ariz.), 57 Pac. Rep. 639; Howell v. Cassopolis, 35 Mich. 471. * Lionberger v. Bowse, 43 Mo. 67, 9 Wall 46a SEveritt's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 216. See Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19; Albany, etc. Bank v. Maher, 19 Blatchf. 175. 8 First Nat. Bank v. Farwell, 10 Biss. 270, 7 Fed. Rep. 518;- First Nat Bank v. Peterborough, 56 N. tt 38; First Nat. Bank v. Concord, 59 N. H. 75; Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Baker (N. J.), 46 Atl. Rep. 586. . 7 Whitney Nat. Bank v. Parker, 41 Fed. Rep. 402; Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander, 62 Ohio St. 266. • 8McIver v. Robinson, 53 Ala. 456; Mechanics' Nat. Bank v. Baker (N. J.), 46 Atl. Rep. 586; Williams v. Weaver. 75 N. Y. 30; Kyle v. Fayette ville, 75 N. C. 445. See Tappan v. Merchants' Nat Bank, 19 Wall. 490; Buie v. Fay- etteville, 79 N. C. 267. But national bank stock cannot be taxed in any state other than that where the bank is located: State v. Smith, 55 N. J. L. 110. A non-resident's shares must be assessed in the taxing district where the bank is located : Crosfely v. Township Committee, 62 N. J. L. 583. Where the owner of national bank stock does not live in the ward where the bank is located, and has no real estate there, his shares may be as- sessed on a special list, although he lives in another ward where he ia CH. XII.] LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 717 bank,^ even though state banks are not compelled to do the sarae.^ The shares of stock of a national bank are taxable, although owned by another national bank.^ National banks may be compelled to make disclosure of property, etc., as in other cases,* the ordinary process for collection may be ap- plied to them,' and they are garnishable for the collection of the state's claims against stockholders for taxes.* The federal act relating to the taxation of national banks applies to terri- tories as well as to states.' , ' Foreign corporations. Foreign corporations ' doing business in the state are taxable the same as domestic corporations if assessed on personalty: MoMahon v. Palmer, lt)3 N. Y. 176 Under stat- utes providing in terms for the taxa- tion of national bank shares for state, county, and town purposes only, and for uniform taxation, the shares of holders who reside within an organ- ized fire-district in the town wherein the bank is situated cannot be as- sessed for fire-district purposes: Rich V. Packard Bank, 138 Mass. 537. Own- ers of national bank stock cannbt be subjected to a personal liability for the taxes thereon : New York v. Mo- Lean, 57 App. Div. (N. Y.) 601. 1 National Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 353; Lionberger v. Rowse, 9 Wall. 468; First Nat. Bank v. Chehalis County, 166 U. S. 440; Merchants' etc. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461; Whitney Nat. Bank v. Parker, 41 Fed. Rep. 402. But a national bank cannot be compelled to use its assets to pay a tax on shares of its stock where it cannot reim- burse itself against the stock as al- . lowed by the statute: St. John's Nat. Bank v. Bingham T'p, 113 Mich. 203. See Stapylton v. Thaggard, 91 Fed. Rep. 93, 33 C. C. A. 858; Farmers' & T. Nat. Bank v. Hoffman, 98 Iowa 119. Such a bank is not liable primarily or as agent of the stockholders: Al- buquerque Nat. Bank v. Perea (N. M.), 35 Pac. Rep. 776. Case of voluntary listing by bank of stockholders' shares as its property for taxation; question of relief in equity: Ibid, In Brown v. French, 80 Fed. Rep. 166, it was held that a national bank which returned its capital foj taxar tion was not estopped from setting up that the same was not subject to taxation. 2 Merchants', etc. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461. 3 National Bank v. Boston, 125 U. S. 60; Pacific Nat. Bank v. Pierce County, 20 Wash. 675. *Waite v. Dowley, 94 U. S. 537; First Nat. Bank v. Hughes, 6 Fed. Rep. 737. State legislation empower- ing assessors to make demand for the lists of shareholders required by the act of congress to be kept subject to the inspection of the " oflScers duly authorized to assess taxes under state authority," is unnecessary: Paul v. McGraw, 3 Wash. 296. Indiana stat- utory provisions in regard to listing, etc., held inapplicable to national banks: Eaton v. Union County Nat. Bank, 141 Ind. 136, 159. 5 National Bank v. Morrison, 1 Mc- Crary 204. 6 First Nat Bank v. Chehalis County, 6 Wash. 64 ' Talbott V. County Com'rs, 139 U. S. 438; People v. Moore, 1 Idaho 504; Sil- ver Bow County v. Davis, 6 Mont. 306. 8 This term Includes corporations organized under the laws of other 718 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. the terms of the statute are such ,as to warrant it.^ But it is customary to classify them separately for taxation. A state may impose upon them any conditions it may see fit as a pre- requisite to their doing any business within its borders;^ thus it may require them to pay a specific license tax,' or a sum pro- portioned to the amount of their capital within the state.* The states of the Union: Horn Silver JCjn- ingCo. V. New York, 143 U. S. 305. 1 People V. McLean, 80 N. Y. 354 A statute providing tliat all person- alty within or without the state shajU be assessed to the owner in the city or town where he is an inhabitant on the first day of May does not apply to foreign corporations, as the word "inhabitant "means one whose dom- icile is in the place referred to, and the domicile of a corporation is in the state of its origin, and it retains that domicile irrespective of the resi- dence of its o£Qcers or the place where its business is transacted: Bos- ton Inv. Co. V. Boston, 158 Mass. 461. '^ Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York. l43 U.^S. 305; Dry den v. Grand Trunk R Co., 60 Me. 513; State v. Western Union Tel. Co., 73 Me. 518, 535; Commonwealth V. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 129 Pa. St. 463. And see the cases cited' ante. p. 95. 3 Ducat V. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410; New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658; Ducat V. Chicago, 48 111. 173. ^Horn Silver Mining Co. v. New York, 143 U. S. 305; New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658. As to what constitutes an employment of capital within the state, see People v. Camp- bell, 138 N. Y. 543, 139 N. Y. 68; Peo- ple V. Roberts, 154 N. Y. 1 ; People v. Roberts, 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 201. Real estate within the state purchased by a foreign corporation with surplus moneys, and not occupied by it, is not a part of its capital within the state forming a basis for taxation: People V. Wemple, 150" N. Y. 46, 78 Hun 63. A foreign corporation's ac- counts receivable, payable in New Yor^ for goods sold there at its New York house, are taxable there as cap-, ital invested : People v. Barker, 155 N. Y. 665, 157 N. Y. 159. Good-will of foreign corporation may, though intangible, be considered as one of the items of the capital employed by it in the state, on which a privilege tax is to be based: People v. Roberts, 159 N. Y. 70. In estimating the amount of capital stock employed in the state, the value of all goods on hand, and property and money on deposit and in business in the state, may be considered, but not sales made by sample at its business offices in the state to persons without the state, with delivery from its factory in another state: People v. Wemple, 133 N. Y. 333. Under the Pennsyl- vania statute requiring foreign cor- porations "doing business" in the state to pay a tax on their "capital stock," they were held taxable not on their whole capital stock, but only to the extent that they should bring their property for employment within the state: Commonwealth v. Standard Oil Co.', 101 Pa. St. 119. As- sessment as for sums invested in busi- ness in the state held not excessive: People V. Barker, 73 Hun 63a The comptroller's decision in fixing the amount of capital employed within the state by a foreign company will not be disturbed unless cleariy erro- neous: People V. Campbell, 145 N. Y. 587; People v. Roberts, 82 Hun 353. Fixing the. amount of capital stock in the case of a corporation whose capital is only partly employed OFT. XII.] LISTING OF PEES0N8 AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. T19 cases cited in the margin illustrate what constitutes, on the part of a foreign corporation, a "doing business within the state" so as to subject it to taxation there.^ In an earlier within the state: People v. Horn' Silver Mining Co., 105 N. Y. 76. Under a statute providing that a foreign corporation shall be taxed on its " franchise or business " on the basis of " the amount of capital stock employed within the state," such cor- poration is not taxable to a greater extent than the par value of the cap- ital stock authorized by its charter: People V. Roberts, 4App. Div. (N. Y.) 288, 39 N. Y. Supp. 448. Such pro- portion of the whole value of the stock of a non-resident corporation as the value of its tangible property in the state bears to the entire value of its tangible property is taxable as capital within such state: County Com'rs V. Old Dominion S. S. Co. (Va.), 39 S. E. Rep. 18. 1 Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Wem- ple, 44 Fed. Rep. 34; People v. Horn Silver Mining Co., 105 N. Y. 76; Peo- ple V. American Bell Telephone Co., 117 N. Y. 341; People v. Wemple, 138 N. Y. 617; People v. Campbell, 139 N. Y. 68; People v. Roberts. 154 N. Y. 1. In New Jersey a pipe-line com- pany organized under the laws of an- other state, but having a pipe-line extended across part of New Jersey, was liable to the license- tax: Pipe- Line Co. V. Berry, 53 N. J. L. 308. It was held in Pennsylvania that the ownership by an Ohio corporation of individual interests in partnerships doingbusinessinPennsylvaniaconsti- tuted a " doing of business " within the state, but that its ownership of shares in Pennsylvania corporations did not constitute such a " doing of business," nor did its ownership of oil bought in the state through brokers and others, and shipped out of the state to be refined, nor its ownership of interests in statutory limited part- nerships: Commonwealth v. Stand- ard Oil Co., 101 Pa. St. 119. The capital stock of a foreign telephone company having no office or agent in Pennsylvania, and doing business there ojily in renting instruments to other corporations, which own the wires, etc., and operate the tele- phones under contracts made outside the state, is not taxable there, al- though the instruments remain the property of the company, which re- serves the right in certain events to take possession of and operate them: Commonwealth v. American Bell TeL Co., 139 Pa. St. 317. To the same effect is People v. American Bell Tel. Co, 117 N. Y. 341. where it was held the local companies were the li- censees, not the agents, of the Out- side company which owned the tele- phones and licensed their use, and that the latter was not " doing busi- ness " in New York within the mean- ing of a statute taxing the gross earnings of telephone companies 'doing business" in that state. As, to what are a " shop " and the " stock in trade " of a foreign corporation doing business in the state, see Bos- ton Loan Co. v, Boston, 117 Mass. 338. A foreign corporation which did some of its manufacturing in New York, thoiigh the greater part was done elsewhere, was within the ex- ception of a statute providing that any foreign corporation- doing busi- ness in New York should be taxable there, except manufacturing corpo- rations "carrying on manufacture . . . within this state: " People Vi Wemple, 133 N. Y. 333. As to what constitutes the establishment by a ' foreign corporation of a " continuous business " in New York, thus making merchandise imported by it for sale 720 LISTING OF PBESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. chapter ' are considered the jurisdiction of a state to impose taxes upon foreign corporations, and the effect of the inter- state commerce clause of the federal constitution upon the, power to tax such companies. An express company's situs for taxation is not confined to the state by which the company was chartered or in which its home office is located.^ Its intangible property, created by the acqui- sition of franchises or privileges, and the combined use of its tangible property in the several states, is distributed wherever the tangible property is located and the work done.' Whether such a company is a corporation or a joint-stock partnership,* the property owned by it may be assessed at the value thereof for the use to which the same is put, considering the company's entire business as a unit ; * and in determining the value of such in the state taxable as capital in- vested in personal property, see Peo- ple V. Barker, 157 N. Y. 159. A foreign corporation doing business in the state may be taxed on the business or the franchise; but a statute for the taxation of its business will be construed as intending the business in the state: People v. Equitable Trust Co., 97 N. Y./887. i-4wfe, ch. Ill 2 See ante, p. 93. 3 Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185. 4 Under statutes taxing the stock of companies incorporated by other states and doing business in Pennsyl- vania, the capital stock of an express company which is a joint^tock as- sociation organized in New York and having its property vested in trustees in whose name all legal pro- ceedings are conducted, the inter- ests of the members being repre- sented by transferable shares, and the company not being dissolved by a shareholder's death or insolvency, is not taxable, such a company not being a corporation: Sanford v. Gregg, 58 Fed. Rep. 620. A statute providing that personal property in the state, not exempt from taxation, shall include all stocks not issued by the United States, applies to foreign express companies in the nature of partnerships, created for a specific period, and whose stock is divided into transferable shares: Lock wood V. Weston, 61 Conn. 311. And such statute applies to the stock of a for- eign express company, whether it be an association or corporation: Ibid. An express company in New York was held to be not a mere private partnership, but a joint-stock com- pany organized or incorporated un- der the laws of the state, and taxable under a statute requiring a fran- chise-tax from "evqry corporation, joint-stock company, or association whatever, now or hereafter incor- porated or organized under any law of this state . . . and doing busi- ness in this state: " People v. Wem- ple, 117 N. Y. 136. s Wells, Fargo & Ca's Express v. Crawford County, 63 Ark. 576. And hence an assessment of the property of such company is not excessive merely because it exceeds the value of the appliances used by the com- pany, considered merely as appli- ances: Ibid. CH. XII.J LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 721 property for taxation on the mileage basis,^ it will be presumed, when the contrary is not shown by the company, that all owned in the several states in which the company operates is directly employed in the company's business.^ Assessment of real property. Tax laws in general give very careful and specific directions for the assessment of real property, and in doing so have in view for the most part the interests of those who are responsible for or may be concerned in their taxation. Very simple proceedings might suffice to enable the state to collect its revenues from lands if only its own interests were to be regarded; but as rights in any partic- ular parcel of land are liable to be diversified and numerous, and as the duty to pay the tax, if neglected by the party pri- marily liable, is likely to fall secondarily on others who may be in ignorance of the neglect, a government careful of the in- terests of its 'individual citizens will not fail to make such provisions as will be reasonably certain to notify every party concerned of any default, and give him ample opportunity to protect his interest from sacrifice or forfeiture. The duty to do this becomes particularly manifest when it is remembered that real estate when sold for taxes seldom brings more than a small fraction of its real value. It may be assumed, there- fore, as the general fact, that the directions given are intended to be carefully observed.' General course. It is not customary to assess the owners of land for a sum in gross, estimated to be the value of the real estate owned or possessed by them; but. the land is described and valued in parcels, in order that, if the owner fails to make 1 See ante, pp. 93, 94. If special ^ Adams Express Co. v. Ohio State circumstances exist which require Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 166 U. S. 185. the value of a part of the property It will also be presumed that the of an express or a railroad company board of commissioners in assessing to be deducted from the value of its an express company considered that plant, as expressed by the sum total part of the company's capital stock of its stock and bonds, before any was not based on business done on valuation by mileage could properly railroads: Wells, Fargo & Co.'s Ex- be arrived at, such should be shown: press V. Crawford County, 63 Ark. Pittsburgh, C, C. & St. L. E. Co. v. 765. Backus, 154 U. S. 431 ; Adams Express ' As to the requisites of a valid as- Co. V. Ohio State Auditor, 165 IT. S. sessment, see ante, pp. 598-604 194. 46 722 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XH. payment, the land itself may be proceeded against.^ No one can be taxed in respect to his ownership-of land unless the land itself is within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority ; his personal liability depending on the right to reach and tax the lapd.' The general policy of our law favors the taxing of ail real property where situate ; ' and the exceptions to this, as in the case of water-power,* or of farms divided by township lines,* I In Ohio, taxes and assessments, unless otherwise provided by statute, are levied upon the corpus of real property, and not upon the titles by which the same may be held: St. Bernard v. Kemper, 60 Ohio St. 244 2Seeaji Rising V. Granger, 1 Mass. 48; Des- mond V. Babbitt, 117 Masa 233. 'Bowles V. Clough, 55 N. H. 389; 726 LISTING OF PEES0N8 AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. Tork,^ Pennsylvania,^ and in so many other states that any question that might once have been an open one must now be regarded as finally settled.' Assessment of oeoujpied lands. There is a general concur- rence of authority that, when the statute provides for the assess- ment of occupied or seated lands to the owner or occupant, the i87; nas Perley v. Stanley, 59 N. H. 583 Thompson v. Ela, 60 N. H. 563. Lands in possession of a tenant in common who is a resident, and does not refuse to be taxed for the whole property, cannot be taxed as non-resident: Randall v. WatsOn (N. H.), 46 Atl. Rep. 6S8.. Under a statute providing that unimproved lands of non-residents shall be taxed in the owners' name, if known, the selectmen are not re- quired to tax lands in a claimant's name when the owner's is unknown : Lime Roo)£ Nat. Bank v. Henry, 69 N. H. 298. Payment of taxes on non-resident lands is not such con- clusive evidence of ownership as to > entitle the taxpayer to be treated by the collector as the true owner; but the repeated payment by the true owner of taxes assessed on non-resi dent lands in a decedent's name is sufficient to warrant a continuance of such assessment:. Benton v. Mer- rill, 68 N. H. 369. 1 Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N. Y. 281; Crooke v. Andrews, 40 N. Y. 547; Newell V. Wheeler, 48 N. Y. 486; Rit- ter V. Worth, 58 N. Y. 637; Joslyn v. Rockwell, 138 N. Y. 334; Sanders v. Downs, 141 N. Y. 433. Realty of a foreign corporation having a place of business in New York Ojutside of the taxing district in which such realty is located is taxable as realty of a non-resident: New York Milk Products Co. V. Damon, 57 App. Div. (N. Y.) 361. An assessment of a non- resideht's unoccupied lands was not rendered void by the insertion of the owner's name in the assessment roll, such insertion being mere surplus- age: Collins V. Long Island City, 133 N. Y. 331. And see Butler v. Oswego, 57 Hun 593. 2 Milliken v.-Benedict, 8 Pa. St. 169. As to the effect of consent to land's being assessed in the wrong list, see Larimer v. McCall, 4 W. & S. 133; Milliken v. Benedict, supra; Negley V. Breading, 33 Pa. St. 325; Hatha- way V. EUsbree, 54 Pa. St. 498. And as to an erroneous listing in general, see Commercial Bank v. Woodside, 14 Pa. St. 404; Stewart v. Trevor, 56 Pa. St. 374. Lands assessed as seated cannot be transferred to the unseated list without notice to the owner where practicable: Larimer v. Mo- Call, 4 W. & S. 133; Milliken v. Bene- dict, 8 Pa. St. 169; Coimmeroial Bank V. Woodside, 14 Pa. St. 404; Stewart V. Trevor, 56 Pa. St. 374; Bechdle v. Lingle, 66 Pa. St. 38. But if a parcel has been on no list for several years, the owner has no such right: Bech- dle V. Lingle, supra. Nor generally, it seems, in case of abandonment: Laird v. Hiester, 24 Pa. St. 453. 8 See Washington v. Pratt, 8 Wheat. 681 ; Messenger v. Germain, 6 111. 631; Raynor v. Lee, 20 Mich. 384; Bur- roughs v. Goff, 64 Mich. 464; Sey- mour V. Peters, 67 Mioh. 415; Hill v. Warrell, 87 Mich. 135; Fowler v. Campbell, 100 Mich. 398; Green v. Craft, 28 Miss. 70: Milwaukee Iron Co. V. Hubbard, 29 Wis. 51, 56. Where the land is required to be assessed to the patentee when the owner is un- known, any other assessment is in- valid: Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Tex. 408; Thompson v. Ela, 60 N. H. 563. An assessment is void if, no name of any CH. XII.] LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 727 rtquirementthat it shall fte so assessed is imperative.^ Such an assessment is intended to establish a personal liability, and it is very manifest that assessors can have no power to charge one class of persons when the statute specifies a different class for the purpose. Thus, if the statute says the owners shall be assessed, the assessors cannot lawfully charge occupcmts who are not owners,^ though, if the statute only requires the assess- owner or occupant being given, the land is not assessed as " unknown " as required by law: McKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276. A statute re- quiring lands to be assessed ,to " unknown owner," if there is no oc- cupant or known owner, is manda- tory: Bird V. Benlisa, 143 U. S. 664. The assessment of a non-resident's unoccupied land in the name of a person not the owner, held void: Baer v. Choir, 7 Wash. 631. Putting to an assessment of non-resident lands the name of a former owner, held immaterial: Alvord v. Collin, 20 Pick. 418. See Miller v. Hale, 26 Pa St. 432; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. St. 440: O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23 Cal. 287; O'Neal v. Virginia, etc. Co., 18 Md. 1. In Louisiana vacant prop- erty may be assessed in the name of its deceased non-resident owner if it still belongs to his estate: Sewell v. Watson, 31 La. An. 589. But if it never belonged to him the assess- ment is void: Fix v. Dierker's Succes- sion, 30 La. An. 175. If one is owner when proceedings are commenced, an assessment to him is not rendered invalid by a change in ownership, of which the assessors have no notice, before such proceedings are con- firmed: Morange v. Mix, 44 N. Y. 315. 1 Northern Pac. R Co. v. Galvin, 85 Fed. Rep. 811; Martin v. Southern Athletic Club, 48 La. An. 1051; Bur- roughs V. GofiE, 64 Mich. 464; State v. Thompson, 149 Mo. 441 ; Perham v. Haverhill Fibre Co., 64 N. H. 3; Bur- pee V. Russell, 64 N. H. 63; Vestal v, Morris, 11 Wash. 451. A statute re- quiring lands, to be assessed to the owner or occupant, or, if there is no occupant or known owner, to "un- known owner," is mandatory: Bird V. Benlisa, 143 U. S. 664. See, to the same effect, Weinreich v. Hensley, 121 Cal. 647, and cases cited there; Sweigle v. Gates, 9 N. D. 538. An assessment of occupied land as " un- known," under a statute which only authorizes "unoccupied land if the owner is unknown," to be assessed " without inserting the name of any person," is void: Daniel V. Taylor, 33 Fla. 636. Land need not be assessed to any particulq,r person unless the statute requires it: Thompson v. Car- roll's Lessee, 22 How. 422; Wither- spoon V. Duncan, 4 Wall. 210, 219. See Haight v. New York, 99 N. Y. 280; Wells v. Austin, 59 Vt. 157. A duly made assessment of taxes to the owner is not ■ invalidated by the omission of the owner's name in transcribing the tax into the tax-list : Parker v. Cochran, 64 Iowa 757. 2 Mansfield v. Martin, 3 Mass. 419. But the assessment of a company's lands .to one member who was in possession as agent was held suflH- cient, and the addition of " agent " to his name was treated as surplus- age: Wells V. Battelle, 11 Mass. 477. See further, Kelsey v. Abbott, 13 Cal. 609; Coombs v. Warren, 34 Me. 89; Abbott V. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 163, 46 Mo. 391; Hume. v. Wainscott, 46 Mo. 145; Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 183; Ains worth v. Dean, 21 N. H. 400; Johnson v. Mclntyre, 1 Bibb 395; Knox V. Huidekoper, 21 Wis. 537. Y28 LISTING OF PERSONS ,AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. ors to list in the names of the owners respectively, if hnown, if they omit the name in the list, or set down the lands as be- longing to persons unknown, the presaraption that they per- formed their duty in endeavoring to ascertain the owner may support the assessment until evidence that the officers did know the owner overcomes this presumption.^ The sale of an individual's land as- sessed as state land is void: Eedt" mond V. Banks, 60 Miss. 393. 1 Stockton V. Dunham, 59 Cal. 608; Hewes v. McLellan, 80 CaL 393; Mer- ritt V. Thompson, 13 III. 716; White V. Alton, 149 lU. 636; Corning Town Co. V. Davis, 44 Iowa 633; Brown v. Veazie, ^5 Me. 359; Shimmin v. In- man, 36 Me. 338; Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. a 182; Nelson v. Pierce, 6 N. H. 194; Smith v. Messer, 17 N. H. 420; Ainsworth v. Dean, 31 N. H. 400; Jaquith v. Putney, 48 N. H. 138. In Corning Town Co. v. Davis, swpra, such an assessment is said to be a mere irregularity. An assessment against lands described as belonging to persons who appeared as the own- ers in the last tax duplicate, held valid as against the actual owner: Reed v. Kalfsbeck, 147 Ind. 148. Land is properly assessed to the person shown by the records to have the title: State Trust Co. v. Chehalis County, 79 Fed. Rep. 383; Hartford v. Hartford Theo. Sem., 66 Conn. 475; Gee V. Clark. 43 La. An. 918; Palmer V. Board of Assessors, 48 La. An. 1122; Butler v. Stark, 139 Mass. 19; Loud & Sons Lumber Co. v. Hagar, 118 Mich. 453; Douglas Co. v. Com- monwealth, 97 Va. 397. To ascer- tain, for assessment, the ownership of land, the officer may resort to the duly-certified copy of entries made on the books of any register of a federal land office on file in the county: Nolan v. Taylor, 131 Mo. 324. Where the selectmen have no knowl- edge of a change in ownership, land is properly assessed by them to the former owner, if at the time of the assessment they believe him to be the owner: Langley v. Batchelder, 69 N. H. 566. The statute requiring the assessment list to give the names, if known, of non-resident owners, does not require selectmen to determine conflicting questions of ownership, or to incur risk of a mis- take. In case of reasonable doubt land may be taxed in unknown own- er's name: French v. Spalding, 61 N. H. 395. In Louisiana land cannot be assessed as " unknown " without an honest endeavor first to ascertain the owner: Rapp v. Lowry, 30 La. An. 1273. See Person v. O'Neal, 28 La. An. 338. So in Alabama: 58 Ala. 4a An assessor finding a person in quiet possession of property as owner under • title from a judicial sale may assess it in such person's name without ex- amining court records to test the va- lidity thereof: Mason v. Bemis, 38 La. An. 935. Where it appears that in previous years property had not been assessed to any one, and the as- sessor is unable to obtain from the ' records of conveyances, or by in- quiry of the adjacent owners, the name of the proprietor, it is permis- sible to list the land as that of an unknown owner: Robinson v. Will- iams, 45 La. An. 485. The statute providing that the asse.ssment should show "the owner of each lot (if known to the superintendent), if un- known, the word 'unknown' shall be written opposite the number of the lot," etc., it was held that when the assessment was returned with the word " unknown," thus placed, CH. XII.j LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 729 Care should be taken that the name given in the list ' be the correct one ; for any misleading error would be f atal,^ unless, "it amounted to an official certifi- cate, by the proper oflacer, that in point of fact the owner of the par- ticular lot designated was unknown to him," and this was conclusive of the fact certified, and could not be called collaterally in question in an action brought to recover the tax: Chambers v. Satterlee, 40 Cal. 497, 518. For further decisions in Cali- fornia, see Grotefend v. Ultz, 53 Cal. 666; Grimm v. O'Donnell, 54 Cal. 533; Hearst v. Egglestone, 55 Cal. 365; Brady v. Dowden, 59 Cal. 51; Hall v. Theisen, 61 Cal. 534; San Francisco v. Phelan, 61 Cal. 617; Bosworth v. Webster, 64 Cal. 1; Weinreich v. Heusley, ISt Cal. 647. Although in a proper case land may be assessed to " owner unknown," yet if it be so assessed, and at the same time be assessed to the owner by name, the assessment is void: Nichols v. Mo- Glathery, 43 Iowa 189. Where, under the heading " owners' names " in an assessment book, spaces were left blank, it was held that assessments must be deemed made to unknown owners: Burdick v. Connell, 69 Iowa 458. Ditto marks under the word "unknown" in the column in the assessment roll headed "In whose name assessed," held a sufiBcient statement that the owner's name is unknown: Hoyt v. Clark, 64 Minn. 139. 1 That where land required to be assessed to the owner or occupant is assessed to another the proceedings are void, see Bird v. Benlisa, 143 IT. S. 664; Rich v. Braxton, 158 U. S. 375; Tracy v. Reed, 38 Fed. Rep. 69; New Orleans, M. & T. R Co. v. Negrotto, 40 Fed. Rep. 428; Morse v. South, 80 Fed. .Rep. 306; Flanagan v. Dunne, 105 Fed. Rep. 828; Crook v. Anniston City L. Co., 93 Ala. 4; Kelsey v. Ab- bott, 18 Cal. 609; Bidleman v. Brooks, 38 Cal. 72; Himmelman v. Steiner, 38 Cal. 175; People v. Castro, 39 Cal. 65; L'Engle v. Florida Central, etc. R. Co., 21 Fla. 353; Stackpole v. Han- cock, 40 Fla. 362; Wheeler v. Bramel (Ky.), 8 S. W. Rep. 199; Williams v. Landry, 47 La. An. 5; Lockhart v. Smith, 47 La. An. 121 ; Dunn v. Wins- ton, 31 Miss. 135; Abbott v. Linden- bower, 43 Mo. 162; Hume v. Wains- cott, 46 Mo. 145; Zink v. McManus, 49 Hun 583; Parsons v. Parker, 80 Hun 381; Brundred v. Egbert, 158 Pa. St. 553; Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Tex. 408; Cunningham v. Brown, 39 W. Va. 588; Hecht v. Boughton, 2 Wyo. 368. Assessment and sale of land in name of firm of which owner was a member, held void: Ferguson v. Clark ( Ky.), 53 S. W. Rep. 964. As- sessment on land owned by a mem- ber of a firm in accordance with in- structions given to township treas- urer by firm's agent, sustained as against firm: Sage v. Burlingame, 74 Mich. 120. Where agent of record owners of land returned assessment list of such land in his own name as agent, without naming his principals, and land was set in agent's list, no lien for taxes was acquired which could be foreclosed against record 2 People V. Whipple, 47 Cal. 591; Pearson v. Creed, 69 Cal. 588; Emeric V. Alvarado, 90 CaL 444; Smith v. Reed, 51 Conn. 10. Mistakes in names will not vitiate if not calculated to mislead: Kendig v. Knight, 60 Iowa 39; Masonic Building Assoc, v. Brown- ell, 164 Mass. 806; Loud & Sons Lumber Co. v. Wagar, 118 Mich. 453; Nolan V. Taylor, 131 Mo, 284; Pierce V. Richardson, 37 N. H. 306; Van Voorhis V. Budd, 39 Barb. 479; Felker V. New Whatcom, 16 Wash. 178. 730 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. as is frequently the case, there is statutory provision that mis- take in designating the owner shall not invalidate an assess- ment.' Where land is required to be assessed to the owner, assessment to an occupant who holds the legal title, but has given a trust-deed as security, is proper.^ An assessment to a mort- gagee is invalid.' So is an assessment to one who has conveyed the land, but who buys it back after the assessment day, the deed given by him. being destroyed, unrecorded, to revest the title.* "Where one is in possession, of land under a parol gift owners: Meyer v. Trubee, 59 Conn. 423. Where land is to be assessed to the occupant, an assessment to a oompa,ny when it is owned by an in- dividual and occupied by ^lis agent is void: Hearst v. Egglestone, 55CaL 365. If the land is without buildings, and only used as a garden, an assess- ment to the owner may be sustained : Massing v. Ames, 37 Wis. 645. An assessment to "S. B. Q. Mining Co. F. Agent," is an assessment to the company: Lake County v. Sulphur Bank Quicksilver Mining Co., 68 Cal. 14 Under the present statutes of many states an assessment is not void because not made in the owner's name, or .because made in the name of a person other than the owner, if the land is in other respects suffi- ciently described; Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark. 331; Kinsworthy v. Mitchell, 21 Ark. 145; Garibaldi v. Jenkins, 37 Ark. 453, 456; Landregan v. Peppin, 86 Cal. 133; Cooper v. Jackson, 71 Md. 244; Stilz v. Indianapolis, 81 Md. 582; Schrodt v. Deputy, 88 Ind. BO; Peckham V. MuUikan, 99 Ind. 352; Hill V. Graham, 72 Mich. 659; Au- ditor-General V. Keweenaw Assoc, 107 Mich. 405; Iron Star Co. v. Wehse, 117 Mich. 487 ; Abbott v. Lindenbower, 43 Mo. 162, 46 Mo. 391; Hume v, Wainscott, 46 Mo. 145; State v. Hurt, 113 Mo. 90. Under the Montana statute the listing of land in the name of a person other than the owner is but an irregularity or in- formality, which of itself does not avoid the assessment: Cobban v. Hinds, 23 Mont. 338. That land bene- fited by improvements was assessed in the name of the former owners will not defeat the assessment where it does not appear that any one was prejudiced thereby: Masonic Build- ing Assoc. V. Brownell, 164 Mass. 306. In Illinois the listing of a railroad right of way to the railroad com- 'pany, when it was in the possession of the construction company, was sustained: Union Trust Co. v. Weber, 96 111, 346. 1 See Del Castillo v. De McConnico, 168 U. S. 674; Pearson v. Creed, 69 Cal. 538; Landregan v. Peppin, 86 Cal. 132; Cohen v. Alameda, 124 Cal. 504; Gratwict, etc. Lumber Co. v. Oscoda, 97 Mich. 321. See also, ante, p. 525. An assessment to a married woman in her maiden name has been upheld: Lavergne v. New Orleans, 28 La. An. 677. Where property bought by a woman divorced with legal right to resume her original name was recorded under that name, the assessment,of it under her former name as a married woman could not be the basis of a legal tax-title: Mas- pereau v. New Orleans, 38 La. An. 400. 2 Greenwalt v. Tucker, 8 Fed. Rep. 792. ' Flanagan v. Dunne, 105 Fed. Eep. 828. In New Hampshire a mortgagee in possession is not bound to pay taxes: Eastman v, Thayer, 60 N. H. 408. 4 Pitkin V. Parks, 54 Vt. 301. CH. Xn.] LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 731 it should be assessed to the donor who is still the legal owner.i One who owns the fee, rather than one who owns an easement to which it is subject, is liable for taxes thereon.'^ And where a grantor retains no beneficial interest in the land conveyed, his only authority being to enter upon it for a special purpose, an assessment to him is erroneous.' By the owner of property for the purpose of assessment is meant the legal, and not the equitable, owner;* therefore trustees having the legal title are properly assessed;" and where land is sold by executory contract it is rightly assessed to the vendor until the vendee becomes entitled to a con- veyance.* The lessor of real estate is the " owner " thereof within a statute declaring that all property shall be assessed in the owner's name.' It has been decided in Massachusetts 1 MuUikin v. Reeves, 71 Ind. 281. 2 Winston v. Johnson, 42 Minn. 398. 8 State V. Newark, 50 N. J. L. 66. < Tracy v. Reed, 38 Fed. Rep. 69; People V. Seaman's Friend Soo., 87 111. 246. 5 Richardson v. Bostbn, 148 Mass. 508; St. Louis v. Wenneker, 145 Mo. 230. See Collins v. Boring. 96 Ga. 360.- Where an assignee in bankruptcy held the record title to land, it was proper to assess such land In his name: Fish v. Genett (Ky.), 56 S. W. Rep. 813. " Sherwin v. Mudge, 137 Mass. 547. See Tracy v. Reed, 38 Fed. Rep. 69. In Iowa, if a vendee by contract has paid part of the price he should be taxed for the land and the vendor for the money due : Meyer v. Dubuque County, 49 Iowa 193. Compare Willey V, Koons, 49 Ind. 273; Henderson v. State, 53 Ind. 60. Land may be treated as belonging either to the maker or the holder of a bond for title, when the latter is in possession: National Bank v. Danforth, 80 Ga. 55. One whose offer to purchase real es- tate had not been accepted was not an equitable owner thereof so as to authorize the assessment against him of a tax on the property: Fish v. Coggeshall, 22 R. L 818. Property bought with borrowed money is to be considered the purchaser's property though the lender holds a lien upon it for the money due: Lyle v. Jacques, 101 111. 644. ' East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. v. Morristbwn (Tenn. Ch. App.), 35 S. W. Rep. 771. The general rule, where the lease is silent upon the subject. Imposes upon the lessor the obliga- tion to pay the taxes upon the leased land: People v. Barker, 153 N. Y. 98. A lease in perpetuity, containing a clause of defeasance in case of the , lessee's failure to comply with ,its terms, -does not constitute the lessee the owner of the premises for the purposes of taxation: State v. Missis- sippi River Bridge Co., 134 Mo. 321. As against a town, agreements of tenants with their landlord to pay taxes are inoperative, and the prop- erty is assessable to the latter: Yale Univ. V. New Haven, 71 Conn. 316. Where a camp-meeting association conveyed by instruments in the form of leases to lessees, their heirs and assigns, lots forfeitable on certain conditions, the lessees took a lease fee, and buildings erected by them on lots were taxable to them and not 732 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [OH. XII. that one who buys land at a tax-sale and has his deed recorded is " the person appearing of record as owner," to whom the land should be taxed, notwithstanding a right of redemption still remains;^ but an assessment to persons claiming under a void tax-deed is nugatory.^ If land is held by two or more as tenants in common, it should either be assessed to all jointly, or undivided interests assessed to the owners severally; they cannot be assessed for distinct quantities.' A life-tenant should be assessed as owner during the continuance of the life-estate.* If the husband has to the association: Camp Meeting Assoc. V. East Lyme, 54 Conn. 153. A railroad company which has acquired from a city the right to the perpetual possession of certain land, and which is in the actual occupancy thereof, is liable for the taxes thereon, though it does not own the title to the fee: Muscatine v. Chicago, R. L & P. R. Co., 79 Iowa 645. As to the construc- tion of the Texas sta.tute providing that property held under a lease for a term of three years or more, be- longing to the state, or exempt by law from taxation in the owner's hands, shall be considered, for all purposes of taxation, as the property of the lessee, see State v. Taylor, 73 Tex. 297; Trammell v. Faught, 74 Tex. 557. 1 Butler V. Stark, 139 Mass. 19. A tax-title fair on its face, and suffered to remain unquestioned on the rec- ord of deeds, is a sufScient basis for an assessment, whether the title is valid or not: Augusti v. Citizens' Bank, 46 La. An. 539. The assess- ment of taxes against the adjudi- catee of confiscated property, during his tenure thereof, is valid: Brent v. New Orleans, 41 La. An. 1098. It has been held in California that one in possession of lands after his title has been cut off by a tax-sale is not taxable for the land: Maina v. Elli- ott, 51 Cal. a Whether, under the Michigan tax-law, lands bid off to the state for delinquent taxes, and still held by the state, could be as- sessed to the person who, but for such sale, would be the legal owner, quaere: Hinds v. Belvidere T'p, 107 Mich. 664 2 Mc Williams v. Michel, 43 La. An. 984 'See Hayes v. Victor, 83 La. An. 1162; National Bank v. Licking Val- ley, eta Co. (Ky.), 33 S. W. Rep. 881; Morgan v. Smith, 70 Tex. 637. An assessment in a joint owner's name, with words indicating the other joint owners, held not invalid: Hood V. New Orleans, 49 La. An. 1461. An assessment to one of two tenants in common was sustained in Fleisch- auer v. Hoboken, 40 N. J. L. 109. But under the California code where an assessment had been made against only one of two owners, the judg- ment for the enforcement thereof was not binding on the other owner: Weinreioh v. Hensley, 121 Cal. 647. It is proper to assess partnership lands to the partnership instead of to the individual partners: Hubbard V. Winsor, 15 Mich. 146. * White V. Portland, 67 Conn. 373; Garland v. Garland, 73 Me. 97; Mayor v. Boyd, 64 Md. 10; Bates v. Sharon, 175 Mass. 293; De Raesines V. De Raismes, 73 N. T. 154; Siden- burg V. Ely, 90 N. T. 257; Anderson V. Hensley, 8 Heisk. 834; Ferguson V. Quinn, 97 Tenn. 46; Wilmot v. OH. XII.] LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 733 the care and occupancy of the wife's land,- it may be assessed to him as occupant.' Where a statute provides for the assess- ment of the estates of deceased persons to heirs or devisees without specifying names until they give notice of its division, an assessment to heirs is bad where the property has vested in In some states an assessment of the lands of a de- Lathrop, 67 Vt. 671. As to appor- tionment between tenants for life and the remaindermen of assess- ments for permanent improvements, see post, ch. XIV. iPauI V. Fries, 18 Fla. 573; South- worth v. Edmands, 153 Mass. 203; Mas- sing V. Ames, 87 Wis. 645; Enos v. Bemis, 61 Wis. 656. In an earlier Wis- consin case an assessment of the wife's separate estate to her husband, he liv- ing with her upon it, was void under a statute requiring lands to be assessed to the owner or occupant : Hamilton v. Fond du Lao, 25 Wis. 496. Where hus- band and wife do not live together, and he does not occupy the land, such an assessment would be void: Smith V. Reed, 51 Conn. 10. A wife is not estopped from denying the va- lidity of an assessment to her hus- band of her land by the fact that her husband, ashei; agent, annually sent for and paid the tax-bills, and never informed the assessors that the land had been conveyed to her: Parsons V. Parker, 80 Hun 281, 30 N. Y. Supp. 134. An assessment to the husband a^one for street grading on the com- munity property of himself and wife held sufficient where she was made a party to the suit to foreclose the lien: Elma v. Carney, 4 Wash. 418. An assessment of community prop- erty to the wife alone was held void, and a sale thereof under a decree in an action against her to foreclose the lien of the assessment did not aflfeot the husband's title: Gwynn v. Dierssen, 101 Cal. 563. A tax upon a wife's realty and personalty was held not illegal because such property was set in the grand list in the name of the husband and wife; such error being harmless: Adams v. Sleeper, ,64 Vt. 544. That land belonging to a mother and her son was, upon a list- ing by the son, listed in the name of the father, the head of the family, was held not ground for enjoining the collection of the tax: Eyan v. Central City (Ky.), 54 S. W. Rep. 2. 2 Elliott V. Spinney, 69 Me. 31; To- bin T. Gillespie, 152 Mass. 219. In Kansas, where land descends at once to the heir, the administrator is not bound to pay tkxes upon it unless he proceeds to sell it: Reading v. Wier, 29 Kan. 429. An assessment to an heir as owner of the whole property will be upheld as to his interest in the succession: Marti v. Wall, 51 La. An. 946. An assessment for public improvements on land, as that of the owner's heirs, although it had in fact been sold to sundry purchasers by the heirs, is valid, and collection will not be enjoined at the instance of the purchasei-s: Murphey v. Wil- mington, 5 Del. Ch. 281. Listing of an estate's land to decedent's "widow and heirs," was held sufficient in Wheeler v. Anthony, 10 Wend. 346. Assessment of a decedent's land to the widow alone held not legal : Yan- cey V. Hopkins, 1 Munf. 419; Lynde V. Brown, 143 Mass. 337; Kerslake v. Cummings (Mass.), 61 N. E. Rep. 760. Where the land of a decedent is listed in his widow's name for tax- ation, though he left heirs to whom the land descended, a tax-sale of the land conveys only the widow's dower: Payne v. Arthur (Ky.), 29 S. W. Rep. 860. An assessment in the wife's name, after the dissolution of 734 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XH. cedent to his estate is valid,' while in others it is held to be void.^ An assessment of land in the name of a deceased owner is in general void unless authorized by statute.' Separate assessment of parcels. It is also generally made imperative that separate and distinct parcels of land shall be assessed separately. This is certainly essential where the lands are resident or seated, and in the occupancy of different' persons, each of whom has a right to know exactly what de- mand the government makes upon him.* A failure to observe this requirement is not a mere " omission, defect, or irregular- the community by the death of her husband, was held valid as against the widow and her heirs: Le Leig- neur v. Bessan, 52 La. An. 187. The same case holds that where lands were assessed in a husband's name while he was the head of the com- munity, the filing of a delinquent tax-list containing his name di- vested the community of title, though he had died previous to the fil- ing. iMoalev. Baltimore, 61 Md. 224; Diokison v. Beynolds, 4S Mich. 158; State V. Jersey City, 34 N. J. L. 108. Where a person has died, and the heirs have not been put in possession of his property, an assignment of the succession to his estate is sufficient: Surget v. Newman, 43 La. An. 873. 2 Jackson v King, 83 Ala. 432; L'Engle v. Wilson, 21 Fl'a. 461; Ter- ritory V. Perea (N. M.), 62 Pao. Rep. 1094; Trowbridge v. Horan, 78 N. T. 439; MoCue v. Board of Supervisors, 162 N. T. 235; People v. Valentine, 5 App. Div. 520; Morrison v. McLauch- lin, 88 N. C. 351. Under the Michi- gan tax-law of 1889 an assessment of land to a decedent's estate after ad- ministration and the discharge of the executors, instead of to the devisees, whose names were easily ascertain- able, was erroneous: Fowler v. Campbell, 100 Mich. 39a See, fur- ther, Reading v. Wier, 29 Kan. 429; Norres v. Hayes, 44 La. An. 907. 'Scott V. Brown, 106 Ala 604; Pear- son v. Creed, 69 Cal. 538; Stafford v. Twitchell, 33 La. An. 520; Kerns v. Collins, 40 La. An. 453; Edwards v. Fairex, 47 La. An. 170; Walsh v. Har- ang, 48 La. An. 985; CucuUu v. Brak- enridge Lumber Co., 49 La. An. 1445; Millaudon v. Gallagher, 104 La. 713; Sawyer v. Mackie, 149 Mass. 269; Burpee v. Russell, 64 N. H. 63; State V. Tavenner (W. Va.), 39 S. B. Rep. 649. An assessment for taxes in the assessment year of the owner's death, and in fieri when he died, was held to bind his heirs: Clifford v. Michi- ner, 49 La. An. 1511. Under the Louisiana statute of 1900 property can be taxed in the! name of the per- son appearing on the register to be the owner, whether he isdead oralive; and unless the actual owner notifies the assessors of the former owner's death, and otherwise complies with the law, he cannot complain of an assessment in the wrong name, or of errors in description: Geddes v. Cunningham, 104 La. 306. Under the Nebraska statute the name of the person against whom the prop- erty is listed, or the sale is made, is immaterial, and therefore an assess- ment of land in a decedent's name is not invalid: Grant v. Bartholo- mew, 58 Neb. 889. < People v. Shimmins, 43 CaL 121; McKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 276; Roby V. Chicago, 48 III 130; Board- CH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALTTATION OF ESTATES. Y35 ity," which can be overlooked, under a statute which provides that assessments for taxation shall be valid " notwithstailding any omission, defect, or irregularity " in the proceedings.^ The like separate assessment is also essential in other cases if the statute requires it. The reasons are sufficiently manifest. If separate parcels of land belonging to different individuals, and presumably of different values, can be assessed together, neither of the owners has any means of determining the amount of tax which is properly chargeable to his property, and conse- quently no means of discharging his own land from the lien, and of protecting his title, except by paying the whole of a demand some undeiined and undefinable portion of which is neither in equity nor in law a proper charge against him.^ Nay, when the two parcels are owned by thfe same person, if the man v. Bourne, 80 Iowa 13.5; Ware v. Thompson, 29 Iowa 65; Howcott v. Board of - Com'rs, 46 La. An. 383; Barker v. Blake, 36 Me. 438; Greene V. Walker, 63 Me. 311; Spieoh v. Tier- ney, 56 Neb. 514; State v. Willistori, 30 Wis. 338. The owner of tax-sale <;ertiflcates on part of the lots in a plat has such an interest as entitles him to insist on the assessor's enter- ing the lots separately on the assess- ment roll: Neu v. Voege. 96 Wis, 489. 1 Roberts v. First Nat. Bank, 8 N. D. 504; Hamilton v. Fond du Lac, 35 Wis. 490. Compare Sargeant v. Bean, 7 Gray 125; Strode v. Washer, 17 Or. 50; Title Trust Co. v. Aylesworth <0r.), 66 Pac. Rep. 376; Stewart v. Schoenfelt, 13 S. & R. 360; Bratton V.Mitchell, 1 W. & S. 310; Mitchell T. Bratton, 5 W. & S. 451; Russell v. Werntz, 34 Pa. St. 337; Miller v. Hale, 26 Pa. St. 432; McReynolds v. Longenberger. 57 Pa. Sfa 13; Dietrich V. Mason, 57 Pa. St. 40; -Rogers v. Johnson, 67 Pa. St. 43. 2 See Terrill v. Groves, 18 Cal. 149; Howe V. People, 86 111. 288; Shimmin V. Inman, 36 Me. 228; Barker v. Blake, 36 Me. 433; Haywood v. Fos- ter. 13 Pick. 492; Jennings v. Collins, fl9 Mass. 39; Cooley v. Waterman, 16 Mich. 466; Hanscoin v. Hinman, 80 Mich, 419; Farnham v. Jones, 33 Minn/ 7; Dunn v. Winston, 31 Miss. 135; Roberts v. First Nat. Bank, 8 N. D. 504; Willey v. Scoville's Lessee, 9 Ohio 44; Douglass v. Dangerfield, 10 Ohio 152, 156; Strode v. Washer, 17 Or. 50; Title Trust Co. v. Ayles- worth (Or.), 66 Pac. Rep. 376; Mc- Laughlin V. Eain, 45 Pa. St. 113; Crane v. Janesville, 30 Wis. 305; Or- ton V. Noonan, 35 Wis. 672, 677; Sie-, gel V. Outagamie County, 26 Wis. 70. Land-owner's omission to appeal could not validate such an assess- ment: Lyman v. People, 3 III. App. 389. Where land has been regularly platted into city lots, an assessment by the acre as before is bad: Bruce V. McBee, 23 Kan. 379; Hapgood v. Morton, 38 Kan. 764. What is a suf- ficient plat when property is de- scribed with reference to it, see People V. Root, 107 111. 581. As to what is a f lot " within the meaning of a tax-law, see MuUer v. Bayonne, 55 N. J. L. 103; Potter v. Orange, 63 N/ J. L. 193. An assessment is not invalid because on part instead of the entire parcel of land: State v. Essex Public Road Board, 46 N. J. L. 136. 736 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH XII. statute requires a separate assessment, obedience to the require- ment is essential to the validity of the proceedings. It cannot be held in any case that it is unimportant to the taxpayer whether this requirement is complied with or not. Indeed it is made solely for his benefit; it being wholly immaterial, so far as the interest of the state is concerned, whether separate es- tates are or are not separately assessed. And where a require- ment has for its sole object the benefit of the taxpayer, the necessity for a compliance with it cannot be made to depend upon the circumstances of a particular case, and the bpinion of a court or jury regarding the importance of obedience to it in that instance. That method of construing statutes would abol- ish all certainty.^ 1 French v. Edwards, 13 Wall. 506, 511; Walker V. Chapman, 33 Ala. 116; Cadwallader v. Nash, 73 CaL 43; Parker v. Jacksonville, 37 Fla. 343; McKeown v. Collins, 38 Fla. 376; Mar- tin V. Cole, 38 Iowa 141, 153; Challis V. Hekelnkemper, 14 Kan. 474; Nason V. Ricker. 63 Me. 381; Allegany County Com'rs v. Mining Co., 61 Md. 545; Sandwich v. Fish, 3 Gray 398, 301; French V. Whittlesey, 63 N. Y. St. Rep. 117, 30 N. Y. Supp. 363; Frazier V. Prince, 8 Okl. 353; Insur- ance Co. V. Yard, 17 Pa. St. 331, 338; Young V. Joslin, 13 R. 1 675; Evans v. Newell, 18 R. I. 38; Taylor v. Narra- gansett Pier Co., 19 R I 13B; Neu v. Voege, 96 Wis. 489. An assessment of land as an entire tract, where it was returned in separate parcels, some of which were not taxable, is invalid: St. Mary's Church v. Tripp, 14 R L 307; Mowry v. Slaterville Mills, 30 R L 94. It makes no differ- ence that the aggregate tax of an owner of land is not increased by the grouping: Allegany County Com'rs V. Mining Co., supra. A non-resident parcel which never has been subdi- vided cannot be assessed for taxa- tion in parcels: Thompson v. Bur- hans, 61 N. Y. 53. The grouping of two or more parcels owned by the same person was held, in Russell v. Werntz, 34 Pa. St. 337, to be an irregularity merely, and therefore cured under a statute which pro- vided that "no irregularity in the assessment, or in the processor other- wise, shall be construed or taken to affect the title of the purchaser, but the same shall be declared to be good and legal" But this would not vali- date the assessment of ui^seated land on the seated list, and then transfer- ring it to the unseated without no- tice: Mulliken v. Benedict, 8 Pa. St 169. In an action by a city to re- cover taxes it is no defense that an appraisal was made in gross of three separate and non-contiguous lots, in- stead of a separate appraisal for each lot: Rockland v. TJlmer, 84 Me. 503. That land was taxed as a whole in- stead of in parcels, held not shown: Comoy V. Wetmore, 93 Iowa 100. It was held in Maxwell v, Cunningham (W. Va.), 40 S. E. Rep. 499. that the owner of contiguous tracts should have them assessed as a whole, and not in different parcels. So in Co- operative Savings & L. Assoc, v. Green (Idaho), 51 Pac. Rep. 770, it was declared that two contiguous town lots owned by the same person might be assessed jointly. And in Bemis OH. XII.] LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 737 What are separate parcels. Assessors are sometimes embar- rassed by the necessity for determining what is to be regarded a separate parcel for the purposes of taxation. "A dwelling- house with the land and appurtenances occupied with it, a warehouse so occupied, a farm or other parcel of real estate let to the same tenant by one and the same lease, parcels de- tached from each other and used and occupied for different purposes, may res]l)ectively be regarded as separate and dis- tinct estates. "When this can be done, they must be deemed to be separate and distinct estates, to be distinctly valued and assessed." ' But in the case of unimproved lands the general understanding appears to be that an assessment as one parcel of that which was purchased by the owner as such is sufiBcient, though by the government survey it was subdivided, for the purpose of being offered for sale, into several parcels, each of which might have been sold separately. Thus, an assessment of the whole south half of a section has been held good, though it contained four distinct eighty-acre lots.^ This is on the as- sumption that the whole is still owned as one parcel,' or at least V. Caldwell, 143 Mass. 299, it was held that although owners of a lot have divided it, it may be assessed as one lot if the description is such that the owners could not be misled. 1 Shaw, Ch. J., in Hayden v. Foster, 13 Pick. 492, 497. Where land is di- vided into blocks and parts of blocks, and grouped for assessment in the same manner, each block is a sepa- rate parcel: State v. Baldwin Univ., 97 Tenn. 358. Where certain land which had formerly comprised one lot appeared on the ward map, after a change thereof, as two lots, an as- sessment of such lots in gross was void: May v. Traphagen, 139 N. Y. 478. 2 Atkins V. Hinman, « Gilm. 437, 443. And see Spellman v. Curtenius, 13 IlL 409, where the two halves of a half section were separately de- scribed but assessed together. The assessment and sale of a quarter sec- tion as a whole were sustained in Land & R. Imp. Co.^v. Bardon, 45 47 Fed. Rep. 706. So as to an entire sec- tion, Martin v. Cole, 38 Iowa, 141. There is a good deal of discussion in this case as to what isto be regarded as a separate parcel for the purpose of assessment and sale. In Lower Kings River Reclamation Dist. v. Mo- CuUah, 134. Cal. 175, the statute was held not to require lands assessed for reclamation to be described in the smallest legal subdivisions under the governmental survey. 3 In Jennings v. Collins, 99 Mass. 39, 31, several lots were assessed to- gether to one Packard, who was owner of a part of them only. Wells, J., says: " If the lots had all been the property of Packard at the time the tax was laid, the mere fact that he had divided the land into small lots for the purposes of sale would not re- quire the assessors to make a separate valuation of each lot. But where lands are separated, either by the use or purpose to which they are devoted, or by the mode of their occupation, 738 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. that it is not known to the assessors to have been divided by sale. But an assessment which divides such a parcel into the loT?(rest legal subdivisions cannot prejudice the owner where the land is unoccupied and unimproved,' and would seem to be unobjectionable. The authorities in general are imperative in holding that an unauthorized division of a tract in the assess- ment, which, tract has no known legal subdivisions, is as fatal as an unauthorized grouping of distinct parcels would be.^ or are disconnected in location, a tax laid generally upon an entire valua- tion cannot be made a lien upon each separate parcel, even virhen they are * all owned and occupied by the same person." In California the decisions are that blocks of land in a city may be assessed by blocks when assessed to the owner, even if they had been subdivided into lots: People v. Cul- verwell, 44 Oal. 630; People v. Morse, 43 Cal. 534. iSee Jennings, V. Collins, 99 Mass. 39, 31. If two town lots are occupied and used as one lot, the buildings thereon being partly on each, they may be sold for taxes together as one lot, their use and nature deter- mining that they are to be regarded as" one parcel: Weaver v. Graut, 39 Iowa 394 A block belonging to one person, and covered with buildings facing on several streets, but so joined together as to appear like one build- ing, is properly assessed as one piece of property: Jacobs v. Buokalew (Ariz.), 40 Pac. Rep. 619. Contiguous lots so situated as to be incapable of separate valuation may be assessed together: Spiech v. Tierney, 56 Neb. 514. Contiguous lots owned by one person are properly assessed as one parcel if used together and having thereon a building which covers part of each: Cooper v. Miller, 113 Cal. 338. Parts of several lots are prop- erly assessed as one body where they have frequently been so conveyed, and are inclosed by one fence: Roth V. Gabbert, 133 Mo. 31. Until. the contrary appears it will be pre- sumed that lots were so situated as to render necessary their assessment together: Pettibone v. Fitzgerald (Neb.), 88 N. W. Rep. 143. If a tax- payer lists and values several parcels as one, and they are so assessed, he cannot, nor can his grantee, after- wards.objeot toguch assessment : Al- bany Brewing Co. v. Meriden, 48 Conn. 243; Kissimmee City v. Drought, 26 Fla. 1 ; Dallas Title & T. Co. v. Oak Cliff, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 317. See Lane v. March's Succession, 33 La. An. 554; Carter v. New Orleans, 33 La. An. 816; Ward v. Board of Com'rs, 13 Mont. 33. 2 Reading v. Finney, 73 Pa. St. 467; Wyman v. Baer, 46 Mich. 418; Mor- gan V. Smith, 70 Tex. 637. In Brown v. Hays, 66 Pa. St. 289, it appeared that a certain warrant containing 1026 acres, of which all but sixteen were in P. township, was assessed in P. by its number, and the taxes paid for several years. Afterwards it was assessed by numbet in P., as 736 acres, and the remaining 300 acres in the other township. The owner paid the taxes in P., and the rest was sold. Held, that the payment by the num- ber of the warrant was payment in full, and that the sale of 300 acres was wholly void. The assessor had no right to divide the tract in P. into two parcels when not divided by the owner; and the assessment with a wrong specification of quantity would not be notice to the owner that the remainder was assessed OH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 739 Separate i/iiterests. In a majority of the states the rule pre- scribed by the" statutes is that lands and other real estate shall be assessed as such, irrespective of the separate estates that individuals may have in them. Under such a practice, he who, - for the time being, enjoys the possession of the real estate and the pernancy of the profits may be charged with the tax.' The practice, however, has not been universal ; in some states, and particularly in some special proceedings, the statutes have required separate interests to be separately assessed.^ When the whole is assessed as an entirety, provision is usually made under which the respective owners may pay their proportions of the tax, and have their respective interests discharged of the lien.' Eeference has been made to the separate assessment of elsewhere. For a case where a divis- ion of taxes was attempted after a subdivision into lots made subse- quent to a forfeiture for taxes, see Mecartney v. Morse, 137 IlL 481. In Illinois a city making assessments for house-drains and service water- pipes cannot subdivide property into lots, and assess each, but must proceed against property according to the description by which it is le- gally known and designated: Cram V. Chicago, 139 IlL 265. Where a street is out through a city lot two lots remain for assessment purposes: Spangler v. Cleveland, 35 Ohio St. 469; Tounglove v. Hackman, 43 Ohio St. 69. As to the assessment of parts of a building as separate tenements, see Cincinnati College v. Yeatman, 30 Ohid St. 376. 1 Turner v. Smith, 14 Wall 553; Merrick v. Hutt, 15 Ark. 331 ; Briscoe V. Coulter, 18 Ark. 423; Atkins v. Hinman, 2 Gilm. 437, 449;' Parker v. Baxter, 3 Gray 185; Willard v. Blount, 11 Ired. 624; Brown v. Austin, 41 Vt. 262. And seeposf, ch. XIV. 2State V. Campbell (Tenn.), 41 S. W. Rep. 937. Separate interests in Pennsylvania assessed and sold sep- arately. See McLaughlin v. Kain, 45 Pa. St. 113. As to Mississippi, see Dunn V. Winston, 31 Miss. 135. As to Kentucky, see Oldhams v. Jones, 5 B. Monr. 464. In the case of special assessments it has been more usual to assess distinct interests separately, sometimes, however, providing for a sale of the fee. See Jackson v. Bab- cock, 16 N. Y. 246; Matter of De- Graw St., 18 Wend. 568. And see, further, Williams v. Brace, 5 Conn. 190. The case of Jackson v. Babcock, 16 N. Y. 246, was this: The statute provided for proceedings in court under which, in street-opening cases, where there were distinct interests in lands which were subject to a lien for the assessment, one owner of an interest might prpceed in the su- preme court against all the others, including unknown owners, for an equitable apportionment of the as- sessment, and, after advertising for the appearance of the unknown own-^ ers, obtain an order for an absolute sale of the fee; the proceeds to be applied, so far as necessary, to the discharge of the assessment. This statute was held to be valid, and ef- fectual to out off all contingent as well as vested rights. sCorbine v. Inslee, 24 Kan. 154, " While there is authority under the statute for redeeming an undivided 740 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. , [oH. XII. buildings,' and of mining and timber interests.^ If easements are appurtenant to the realty they are taxed as a part of the land to which they belong, but easements in gross must be valued and taxed separately from the land out of which they are granted.' Under the statutes of certain Jurisdictions the exe- cution of a mortgage divides realty into two parts, the right to loreclose for the mortgage debt, and the mortgager's title, and these are assessed to #their respective owners, and each may be sold for unpaid taxes against it.* Description. In listing the land it must be described with particularity sufficient to afford the owner the means of identi- fication, and not to mislead him.* Great strictness is some- interest from a tax-sale, we find no authority for assessing land or as- sessing taxes thereon in any such un- divided portions:" Easton v. Soho- field, 66 Minn. 435. 1 Ante, p. 634. 2 47ife, pp. 635, 636. 3 Winnipiseogee Lake Manuf. Ca V. Gilford, 64 N. H. 387. The land in and under a canal flowing through the premises of a manufacturing company is not taxable to it; the fee being in another and the company having no right to use the water: Lowell V. Middlesex County Com'rs, 153 Mass. 373. But such land is tax- able to a manufacturing company which owns the fee and the right to use the water subject to the right of other persons to have the water flow through the canal for use beyond the company's premises: Ibid. * Dekum v. Multnomah County, 38 Or. 353. The California constitu- tional provision requiring interests of mortgagers and mortgagees to be assessed separately, and avoiding any ' contract whereby the debtor is bound to pay the tax of the mortgage inter- est, applies to a trust deed intended as a mortgage: Sanford v. Savings & L. Soa, 80 Fed. Rep. 54 The as- sessor's failure to enter the value of the mortgage in the property own- ers assessment, and to deduct it from the value of the property, avoids the assessment: Knott v. Feden, 84 Cal. 399. 5 People V. Chicago & A. E. Ca, 96 IlL 369; People v. Dragstrain, 100 III 386; People V. Eggers, 164111. 515; People v. Clifford, 166 DI. 165; Illi- nois Central R. Co. v. People, 170 111. 334; Upton v. People, 176 Hi. 633; Augusti V. Lawless, 43 La. An. 1097, 45 La. An. 1870; Young v. Joslin, 13 R L 675; Hopkins v. Young, 15 R L 48; Evans v. Newell, 18 R 1 38; Taylor v. Narragansett Pier Ca, 19 R L 138. That a falsity in descrip- tion affects all subsequent proceed- ings, see Wilkins v. Tourtelot, 38 Kan. 825; Yenda v. Wheeler, 9 Tex. 408. So, if an assessment is void for uncertainty of description, the state is not entitled to the lien provided by the constitution: State v. Farmer (Tex.), 59 S. W. Rep. 541. And where the description in the original assess- ment was too indefinite to be made the basis of a tax, a reassessment unde^ a resolution of the board of supervisors providing for a levy on the same land on which it was oHg- inally assessed is invalid, though it- self containing a definite description: Auditor-Greneral v. Smith, 135 Mich. 576. But where the assessment of CH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 741 times insisted upon in the description, on the idea that the government in taxing is proceeding jn hostility to the inter- ests of the person taxed. But this has veyy little foundation. A description that would be sufficient in a conveyance be- : tween individuals would generally be sufficient here. It Ib, nevertheless, possible for cases to arise in which such a crite- rion would be an unsafe one to apply. In a deed which one executes for the purpose of conveying a particular description of land, if errors of description occur, they may well be re- jected and the deed sustained, if, after rejecting them, a suffi- cient description remains to identify the land intended; be- cause the erroneous circumstances which were added could not have misled the party conveying, who, all the time, had in mind a particular parcel which the erroneous particulars did not fit. But the same errors in a description prepared by another might very likely mislead the owner, who would be informed of no error, and who must, from the description alone, discover what land was intended. The same may be said of any imperfection in the description; the owner, if it has been prepared by himself, will read it in connection with his own knowledge of those surrounding circumstances, in the light of which he has framed it ; ^ but an equally imperfect lands for taxatiori creates a personal 80 Cal. 86; Jeffries v. Clark, 33 Kan. charge, the tax may be collected 448; Hubbard v. Wlnsor, 15 Mich, though the description is bad: State 146; Sage v. Burlingame, 74 Mich. V. Union, 36 N. J. L. 309. A desorip- 130. Under the North Dakota stat- , tion sufiBoient to ascertain location ute the assessor is officially respon- and extent is only indispensable to slble for the legal sufficiency of the create a lien, and in its absence the description of all parcels of real es- tax may be enforced by any other tate returned by him, and where his lawful proceeding: State v. Miles, return seeks to describe a parcel of 48 N. J. L. 450. See Law v. People, land, but the description is fatally 84 111. 142; State v. Edgar, 36 La. An. defective, it cannot be remedied by 786; New Orleans v. Oassidy, 37 La. showing that it corresponds to a An. 704 An action lies to recover a descriptjion furnished the assessor tax upon real estate though it is as- by the owner, or by any one else, sessed as a fixed number of acres in since the public and bidders at tax- a town without other identification sales, as well as owners, are inter- or description: Cressey v. Parks, 76 ested in the descriptions of real es- Me. 53B. . tate in tax-records and tax-titles: ' A taxpayer is bound by a de- Power v. Bowdle, 3 N. D. 107. No scription which he himself has fur- one can object to his own tax be- nished: San Francisco v. Flood, 64 cause another's land is misdescribed: dal. 504; Lake County v. Sulphur Buck v. People, 78 111. 560. See Bank, 68 Cal. 14; Dear v. Varnum, Chiniquy v. People, 78 111. 570. 742 LISTING OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. description, prepared by another and unaccompanied by any such circumstances, would fail to convey to his mind any idea that his own land was intended. It certainly would be much less likely to do so than where he himself had formulated it.^ The purposes in describing the land are: first, that the owner may have information of the claim made upon him or his prop- erty; second, that the public, in case the tax is not paid, may be notified what land is to be offered for sale for the non-pay- ment ; and third, that the pSrchaser may be enabled to obtain a sufficient conveyance. If the description is sufficient for the first purpose, it will ordinarily be sufficient for the others also. Several attempts have been made to lay down some general rule ^s to what is sufficient, and what not, for a description in the listing. " Notice," it is well said, " or at least the means of knowledge, is an essential element of every just proceeding which afifects rights of persons or of property. But how can the duty of the payment of taxes be performed without the identity of the subject-matter of the duty being made known to him who is to perform it, by name or description ? A thing, whether land or chattel, to be the subject of legal action, must be proceeded against by name or by description, but a name is descriptive only because it has become associated with the person or thing named. A name, therefore, which has never become connected in any manner with any title or possession of land, clearly infers no means of its identification. So the mathematical contents expressed in figures is not a mark of identity peculiar to the land ; but, like a common noun, has no immediate or cognate relation to a particular tract. . . . Identity is said to be a matter for the jury. Certainly this is so ; but from its very nature, the fact of identity is dependent on circumstances which attach themselves to the land. It is because the thing described answers to the circumstances of description, we are able to identify it. The evidence of iden- tity is the record which contains the description and fixes the 1 A description that would be suflS- of a designated fractional section of cient in a conveyance between in- land is void for discrepancy of de- dividuals is not necessarily so in pro- scription, where they are assessed ceedings for the levy and collection as part of the " F. &sP. M. subdivision of taxes. An assessment of lots in- of part of N. E. J of " such subdivis- eluded in a recorded plat of the " F. ion: Jackson v. Sloman, 117 Mich. & P. M. Park subdivision of part " 126. OH. XII.] LISTING OF PEESONS AND , VALUATION OF ESTATES. 743 duty. Assessment is, from its legal requirement, and the neces- sity of preserving its evidence, a written entry, and must de- pend upon the records of the commissioner's office, and not upon parol testimony, or the private duplicate of the as- sessor." ^ And,after an examination of cases decided,it is added : "The result of the whole is, that where the assessment wholly fails to lead to identiiication, so that neither the owner nor the officer can tell that his land is taxed, the duty of payment can- not be performed, and the assessment is void." ^ The .rule thus 1 Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. St. 440, 448, per Agnew, J., citing and commenting upon MoCall v. Lari- mer, 4 Watts 351, 355, 4 W. & S. 133; Dunn V. Relyea, 6 W. & S. 475; Ste\F- art V. Shoenfelt, 13 S. & R. 360; Luff- borough V. Parker, 16 S. & R. 351; Morton v. Harris, 9 Watts 319, 335; Hubley v. Keyser, 3 P. & Watts 496; Strauch v. Shoemaier, 1 W. & S. 166; Burns v. Lyon, 4 Watts 368 Harper v. McKeehan, 3 W. & S. 338 Russel V. Werntz, 24 Pa. St. 337 Laird v. Hiester, 34 Pa. St. 453; Mil- ler V. Hale, 36 Pa. St. 433; Cooper v. Brockway, 8 Watts 163, 165; Thomp- son V. Fisher, 6 W. & S. 530; Dunden V. Snodgrass, 18 Pa. St. 151; Wood- side V. Wilson, 83 Pa. St. 53. These cases pass upon a great variety of descriptions, some of which are held sufficient, and some ai-e not. It is provided by statute in Mississippi that parol testimony shall be admis- sible to apply a description of land on an assessment roll or in a tax- deed, when such testimony will show what land was assessed and sold. Under this statute, where a tax-deed and the decree confirming it describe the property as " fractional 38 acres in S. E. i of N. W. j," assessed to C, evidence showing the title and loca- tion of two acres in such forty-acre tract, not assessed to C, is admissible to identify the thirty-eight acres: Illinois Central R Co. v. Le Blanc, 74 Miss. 650. But oral evidence as to what land was indended to be as- sessed and sold is inadmissible : Sims V. Warren, 68 Miss. 447; McQueen v. Bush, 76 Miss. 383. And the statute quoted does not authorize parol tes- titnony to fix on any particular tract of land a description in an assess- ment and a tax-deed as " part of lots 19, 20, and 31, in square B., J. W. W.'s survey: " Hughes v. Thomas (Miss.), 39 S. W. Rep. 74. A ^description of. land on the assessment-roll and in a conveyance for taxes was held insuffi- cient to be applied to a particular tract by parol testimony under the Mississippi statute: Smith v. Hick- man (Miss.), 34 South. Rep. 973. But where an assessment is not com- plete and is undergoing direct ad- judication in a suit, a misdescription therein may be shown by parol: >Vicksburg Bank v. Adams, 74 Miss. 179. Where land was described in assessment-roll and tax-deed as "E. i west of Bowie, Sec. 33, T. 5 N., R. 13 W.," the land intended being the E. i of section 33, which lay west of the Bowie river, it was held that the application of the description to the land in question was shown without parol evidence by a state- ment, in the complaint in a suit to cancel the tax-deed as a cloud on title on account of the ambiguity arising from the failure to designate Bowie as a river — that the land m question lay west of the Bowie river: Nixon V. Clevenger, 74 Miss. 67. 2 Harris v. Tyson, 34 Pa. St. 347; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Pa. St. 440, 744 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [oH. XII. given is quite as liberal in support of imperfect and inaccurate descriptions as would be applied to conveyances inter partes. In another case in the same state it is said a sale " will pass the title, although assessed in a wrong name or by a wrong number, if otherwise designated and capable of identification. The reason for this is the recognized principle that it is the land, and not the owner, which is chargeable, and to be charged, with the tax. It must, however, be susceptible of identification as the land assessed, otherwise the sale would be void." ' But identification may possibly be made out to the 455. See, also, Glass v. Gilbert, 58 Pa. St. 366. It is the return of the tract by the assessors which fixes its identity and liability to taxation: Brown v. Hayes, 66 Pa. St. 339. In some states, however, provision is made by law for a correction of the descriptions by the county board. 1 Thompson, J., in Woodside v. Wil- son, 32 Pa. St. 53, 54. This state- ment would, of course, be inappli- cable to the case of an assessment of resident land. When the law re- quires it to be assessed to the owner, it must be so assessed. See ante, pp. 736, 737. Under a statute re- quiring the assessment-roll to fur- nish a clew for the identification of assessed land, a bill to confirm a tax- title cannot furnish a clew: Mc- Queen -r. Bush, 76 Miss. 383. The name of a person to whom land is assessed is not descriptive and can- not be considered in aid of a descrip- tion in the assessment roll: Ibid. But it is held that in the absence of more controlling features to distin- guish the individual halves of a tract of land respectively entered as be- longing to different owners, the own- ers' names furnish sufficient signs for distinguishment: Wray v. Litch- field, 64 Minn. 309. An assessment which includes several tracts of land under the common description of "beach" is invalid, where it appears that such description does not iden- tify the land with certainty, and the owner cannot tell from it whether other lands than his own are not included therein: Taylor v. Narragansett Pier Co., 19 R L 133. In a proceeding for assessments for street work, a recorded diagram in which there is nothing to indicate the points of the compass whereby an owner can determine, from an inspection of the diagram and assess- ment, where upon the map his land is platted, is insufficient: Labs v. Cooper, 107 CaL 656. An assessment to N. of " land, forty acres in road district No. 21, in the township of Woodbridge," was held good where N. owned no other land in the dis- trict: State V. Woodbridge, 42 N. J. L. 401. Where land is assessed as six acres in the corner of a tract, it will be taken to be six acres in square form, and the assessment held good: Immegart v. Gorgas, 41 Ind. 439. Land assessed as the east end of a block, etc., held to be the east half: Chiniquy v. People, 78 111. 570. A description of land by the number in a certain square, fixed also by num- ber, bounded by four named streets, with correct measurements, held identified as suflflciently as if the as- sessor had followed the description given in the act of purchaser In re Wenok, 53 La. An. 376. A listing of lots as in "T.'s Addition" without showing to what town or. city it was CH. XII.J LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 745 satisfaction of a jury by a description that would be extremely likely to mislead the owner himself; the jury having their at^ tention called to the errors or defects which exist, and the owner not being aware that there are any, but having a right to assume, until notified to the contrary, that all descriptions in the list have accurate application to some particular pieces of property, and fit some others when not appearing to fit his. A more satisfactory rule would seem to be that " the designa- tion of the land will be sufficient if it afford the means of identification, and do not positively mislead the owner," ^ or be calculated to mislead him.'' It is thus expressed in a New an addition, but sworn to before the assessor of the precinct in which T.'s addition was situated, and filed in the proper county office, was sus- tained: Alexander v. Hunter, 29 Neb. 259. Where lands were described as parts of lots in an assessor's plat not made by the. county surveyor as re- quired by the statute, such descrip- tion was held insufficient: People v. Eeat, 107 IlL 581; Upton v. People, 176 111. 632. Where part of a city plat has been vacated, the assess- ment can no longpr bd made of the land as city lands: Stebbins v. Chal- lis, 15 Kan. 55. An assessment ac- cording to a plat made by some one else than the owner is bad: Gage v, Rumsey, 73 111. 478. Unless such plat has been recognized by the real owner: Harts v. People, 171 111. 878, 458. An assessment according to the description in an unrecorded plat is invalid; but not so where lots have been conveyed and improvements made with reference to the plat: People V. Clifford, 166 111. 165; Roads V. Estabrook, 35 Neb. 397. That a town plat laying ou;t'land into lots and blocks has never been vacated, held not to invalidate an assessment describing the land by governmental subdivisions: Cahalan v. Van Sant, 87 Iowa 593. Land-owner held not bound, as matter of law, to take no- tice, in paying tax6s, of a new map giving a new description of his lands, which map has been used in assess- ing such lands: Richter v. Beau- mont, 67 Miss. 285; Lewis v. Monson, 151 U. S. 545. 1 Thompson, J., in Woodside v. Wil- son, 82 Pa. St. 52, 55: Fuloher v. Ful- cher, 122 N. C. 101. 2 An assessment is said to be suffi- cient if by it a competent person could identify the land: Sloan v. Sewell, 81 Ind. 180. See Oldtown v. Blake, 74 Me. 280; Law v. People, 80 111. 268; Fowler v. People, 93 111. 116. An assessment against "Trustees First Congregational Church," the property assessed being described as "parsonage" without stating the quantity of land assessed, is not mis- leading: People V. O'Brien, 53 Hun 580. An assessment of the "w;harf property " of a city was held suffi- • cient under a statute providing that no informality in the description of property assessed should invalidate the assessment if the property could with reasonable certainty be located from the description given: Com- monwealth V. Louisville (Ky.), 47 S. W. Rep. 865. An assessment for betterments, describing the land as- sessed as belonging to certain per- sons, and situated on the east side of the street on which the improve- ments were made, is not void for in- deflniteness: Masonic Building Assoc. 746 LISTIN& OF PEESONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. [CH. XII. Tork case: "An assessment of non-resident land is fatally de- fective and void if it contain such a falsity in the designation or description of the parcel assessed as might probably mislead the owner and prevent him from ascertaining by the notices V. Brownell, 164 Mass. 306.' A descrip- tion "one- hundred yards square,'' with definite boundaries on three , sides, is sufBcient: Garwood v. Hast- ings, 38 Cal. 316. A description heM sufficient though one call was given erroneously, where the identity of the land was apparent from other calls: Lower King's River Reclama- tion Dist. V. McCullah, 124 Cal. 175. An assessment of street lots by the boundaries derived from the act by which the property was conveyed, giving the changed names whereby two of the boundaries were known when assessed, and stating the num- ber of lots as they were given in the act, was su£Scient to support a tax- sale, though the depth of the lots was incorrectly stated: Poland v. Dreyfous, 48 La. An. 83. Assessment void if describing the property as lots of specified numbers in a certain square, when there are no such numbers in that square, and the lots intended to be assessed are in realty numbered otherwise: August! v. Lawless, 45 La. An. 1370. An assess- ment of lots 41 and 42 of square 69 as lots 41 and 42 without mentioning the square is unintelligible and void: McClellan v. District of Columbia, 7 ■ Mackey 94. "William Bush's heirs, 2,560 acres," held insufficient: Bush V. Williams, Cooke (Tenn.) 274. So where the description was "Moses Bufifum, house and land," Buffum not being the occupant: Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Cush. 260. Compare Coombs V. Warren, 34 Me. 89. Where the statute provides that for the assessment of railroad property the assessment shalt be sufficient " by metes and bounds or other descrip- tion sufficient for redemption," an assessment of the roadway is suflfi- cient which gives the termini, courses, and distances: San Fran- cisco, etc. R. Co. VI State Board, 60 Cal. 13. An assessment against prop- erty belonging to a railroad company as " the undivided half of G.'s addi- tion to the city of K., except all that part thereof assessed by the state board of equalization," was rendered too indefinite by the exception : State V. Wabash R. Co., 114 Mo. 1. A sale of land for unpaid taxes according to the legal description of the land is invalid where the same land ha s been assessed under a dififei-ent de- scription, which, though not technic- ally correct, was sufBcient to iden- tify the property, and the taxes according to such latter description had been paid before the sale: Rath V. Martin, 93 Iowa 499. To the same effect, Kelly v. Salinger, 53 Ark, 114; Lonergan v. Baber, 59 Ark. 15. In Curtis V. Brown County Supervisors, 22 Wis. 167, it is denied that a de- scription sufficient as between par- ties will be sufficient always in an assessment, or that particulars in it which are erroneous can be rejected as surplusage. To the same point is Dike V. Lewis, 4 Denio 327. See, also, Orton V. Noonan, 23 Wis. 102, in which it is said words cannot be supplied^ by intendment. It is to be observed of this case, however, that the words it was proposed to supply would wholly have changed the ap- parent meaning. It is held in Ker- shaw V. Jansen, 49 Neb. 467, citing Bryant v. Estabrook, 16 Neb. 217, and Roads V. Estabrook, 35 Neb. 297, that a description for taxation is sufBcient if it describes the land with such cer- tainty as to afford notice to the CH. XII.J LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 747 that his land was to be sold or redeemed. Such a mistake or > falsity defeats one of the obvious and just purposes of the stat- ute — that of giving to the owner an opportunity of prevent- ing the sale by paying the tax." ' Under thts rule each case must depend so much upon its own special facts that little service could be done by giving all of the decided oases in de- tail here. It has been held that the headings of the columns of an assessment roll are a part of the description of the land assessed.^ The designation or description of land by which it is commonly known is sufficient for assessment purposes though it be not technically or exactly the proper name of the same.^ An assessment as definite as the grant under which the land is held is sufficient.^ So is a description of the land owner; and, accordingly, the owner of land subject to taxation cannot avoid tbe payment of taxes because the description of the land on the assessment-roll and tax-list does not refer to a lawfully existing recorded plat or subdivision. That lots were assessed as " fractional " lots, when the official plat does not contain such term, held immaterial: Noyes v. King County, 18 Wash. 417. Where part of a city lot is condemned by a railroad company for a right of way, the rest is suflBciently described for taxation as a fractional lot: Johnson V. Tierney, 56 Neb. 514 ' Buggies, J., in Tallman v. White, 2 N. Y. 66, 71. See, also. Green v. Lunt, 58 Me. 15; Farnum v. Buffum, 4 Gush. 260; Hill v. Mowry, 6 Gray 551; Amberg v. Eogers, 9 Mich. 332; State v. Union, 36 N. J. L. 309; Laf- ferty v. Byers, 5 Ohio 458; Turney v. Yeoman, 16 Ohio 24; Fisk v. Corey, 141 Pa. St. 334; Van Cise v. Carter, 9 S. D. 234. In New Hampshire if an assessment of non-resident land omits to state the number of acres of land taxed, as required by statute, such omission is fatal: Weeks v. Waldron, 64 N. H. 149. But the de- tails required in the description of non-resident land are not required in describing lands in voiced as resident: Drew V. Morrill, 63 N. H. 23; Langley V. Batchelder, 69 N. H. 566. 2 State V. Vaile, 128 Mo. 33. SGilfiUan v. Hobart, 34 Minn.- 67; Godfrey v. Valentine, 45 Minn. 502; Minneapolis R. T. Co. v. Minnesota Debenture Co., 81 Minn. 66; Hopkins V. Young, 15 E. I. 48. Descriptive name sometimes used, but not known to the official record of title, held in- sufficient under the Florida statute, especially where the acreagegiven was materially different from that of the tract intended to be described : Bird V. Benlisa, 142 U. S. 634. 1 People V. Crockett, 33 Cal. 150; San Gabriel Valley L. & W. Co. v. Witmer Bros. Co., 96 Cal. 623; Mus- catine V. Chicago, E. I. & P. R Co., 79 Iowa 645; Tulle v. De Monasterio, 48 La. An. 1232. An assessment ac- cording to the description of the* property in a partition proceeding and on record is sufficient: Bristol V. MurfE, 49 La. Ani 357. Description for a paving assessment according to the title as it appears of record is good: Eoberts v. First Nat. Bank, 8 N. D. 504 It is not essential to the validity of an assessment that it fol- low exactly the deed of the property to the tax debtor: Chapin v. Pol let. 748 LISTING OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATE^. [CH. XII. by well-understood abbreviations.^ Error, however great, in stating the quantity of the land will not vitiate,^ But where the description in an assessment could apply to either of two pieces of land, it is void for uncertainty,' as is also a descrip- tion which is part of a section, block, or lot, without showing how much or giving boundaries/ The omission of the num- 48 La. An. 1186. An assessment which fails to conform to the statute requiriiig a reference to the recordea titles of the land assessed cannot support a tax-sale: Gulf States L. & 1 Co. V. Fasnacht's Succession, 47 La. An. 1394. } HoUey v. Orange County, 106 Cal. 430; Sibley v. Smith, 3 Mich. 486, 503; Auditor - General v. Sparrow, 116 Mich. 574; State v. Vaile, 133 Mo. BS. See, also, Hodgdon v. Burleigh, 4 Fed. Rep. Ill: Atkins v. Hinman, 3 Gilm. 437; Olcott v. State, 5 Gilm. 481; Blakely v. Bestor, 13 IlL 714; Buck V. People, 78 111. 560; Paris v. Lewis, 85 111. 597; Long v. Long, 3 Blackf. 393; Jordan, etc. Assoc, v. Wagoner, 33 Ind. 50; Goodell v. Har- rison, 2 Mo. 134; State v. Newark, 36 N. J. L. 388: Stevens v. HoUister, 18 Vt. 594. The description "N. E. S. E., Sec. 34, Tp. 13, E. T. 40 acres," is sufficient in an assessment list and notice of sale for taxes, under a stat- ute providing that lands shall if practicable be designated according to governmental surveys: Chestnut V. Harris, 64 Ark. 580. Such combi- nations of letters and figures in an assessment roll as N W,* N W * of N E4, NE SW, W^ S W, are insuffi- cient and invalid as descriptions of parts of sections of land, since such writing is not English as it is ordi- narily' used, and is without the sano- tioij of any general usage arnong the masses of the people: Power v. Bowdle, 3 N. D. 107. See Turner v. Hand County, 11 S. D. 348. An as- sessment against property described as "V. C. N. E. Cedar & Tennes- see,"is insufficient for indeBniteness: Smith V. Cox, 115 Ala. 503. 2 Oilman v. Riopelle, 18 Mich. 145; People v.* Adams, 10 N. Y. Supp. 395; Williston v. Cobbett, 9 Pa. St. 88; Brown v. Hays, 66 Pa. St. 329; Put- nam V. Tyler, 117 Pa. St. 570. The description by subdivisions of land purchased from the state will con- trol the number of acres claimed to exist in the tax-roll and tax- deed: Wehre v. Lutcher, 45 La. An. 574. 3 State v. Farmer (Tex.), 59 S. W. Rep. 541. A description of land in the tax roll for D. township as "Sec. 8, T. 6, R. 6," held sufficient, although there were other townships in the state numbered 6inRang&7: Dum- phey V. Auditor-General, 183 Mich. 354. An assessment against P. of "a bouse and lot on B. street," was held void for uncertainty where P. owned another house and lot in the same street, and where the statute required real property to be'taxed by num- bers, or in some way by which it might be known: Jones v. Pelham, 84 Ala. 308. * Texarkana Water Co. v. State, 63 Ark. 188; Naltner v. Blake, 56 Ind. 137; Roberts v. Deeds, 57 Iowa 330; Green v. Lunt, 58 Me. 518; Detroit Young Men's Soo. v. Detroit, 3 Mich. 173; Yandell v. Pugh, 53 Miss. 295; Cogburn v. Hunt, 54 Miss. 675; Hughes V. Thomas (Miss.), 39 South. Rep. 74; JolinsOn County v. Tier- ney, 56 Neb. 514; State v. Eliza- beth, 39 N. J. L. 689; Marrie v. Long, 3 Ohio 387, 389. An assessment de- scribing the property as the center 23 feet of a certain lot is too indefi- nite: Auditor-General v. Smith, 135 Mich. 576. So is a description of land as a " fraction of lot No. 3 " in a OH. XII.] LISTINa OF PERSONS AND VALUATION OF ESTATES. 749 ber of a town lot, or the name of the owner, is fatal where the law requires these to be given.' And where the legislature has declared explicitly how a particular kind' of property should be assessed on the assessment roll, the statute should be regarded as mandatory, not directory.^ It has been held that the provisions of a city charter requir- ing railroad property to be designated on the assessment rolls by lot and block number do not apply to railroad tracks, tele- graph lines, etc., in the street, but only to lots.' Under a stat- certain block: Jory v. Palace Dry Goods, etc. Co., 30 Or. 196. And the description " 74Jxl65, lot 5, block 33, plat B," without any other descrip- tion, when lot 5 had an area of 10x30 rods, is also too uncertain: Eastman V. Gurrey, 15 Utah 410. An assess- ment roll describing land as the, '■fractional part of section 4" is fatally defective, (;here being nothing to designate what part of the section is assessed: Grissom v. Furman, 23 Fla. 581. But the description " that part of private claim 61, lying east of the north branch of the river Ecorse" in a township named, is sufficient: Gilman v. Biopelle, 18 Mich. 145. And an assessment of " balance of S. i block 8 " is not void for uncertainty where it is immedi- ately preceded by an assessment of the first part of the half block, de- scribing it by metes and bounds, which renders the balance determi- nable: Greenwood V. La Salle, 187111. 235. Description of property as " parts of blocks 8 and 9, and the right of way across Broadway," and state- ment of assessment thereon as $13,500, without stating the location of said blocks, or what part of them is assessed, or whether they are im- proved or not, held insufficient: Louisville & N. E. Co. v. East St. Louis, 134 111. 656. Where land is assessed as W.'s 80 acres "on" the N. W. iof section 33, the sale of it for taxes is void under a statute pro- viding that in assessing real estate it shall be referred to with reason- able certainty as to locality and quantity: Olsen v. Bagley, 10 Utah 493. An assessment of real property described as " a tract of land entered by Frozier in section 13, township 13, range 7, is void for indeflniteness: Lake County v. Sulphur Bank Quick- silver Mining Co., 66 Cal. 17. And see Petit v. Flint & P. M. R. Co., 114 Mich. 363. 1 Ex ppte Thacl