(Sornpll Slam ^^1:^001 Cibratg Cornell University Library KFM8270.A87 Report, 1ffi,j[!Sa,|l%l|l||i^^^ "924 024 700 589 The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024700589 REPORT OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSION. OF MISSOURI 1903, IN(^LUDINa A DIGEST OF THE REVENUE LAWS. JEFFERSON CITY, MO.: Teibunb Peintinq Company, State Pbinthbs and Bindebs. fiSO/H^ REPORT. To Honorable Alexander M. Dockery, Governor of the State of Missouri : The Commission created by the act of the 41st General As- sembly (Session Acts 1901, p. 203), approved April 17th, 1901, to revise the revenue laws of the State, was appointed on the 22nd of February, 1902, and at once entered upon the discharge of the duties assigned. SCOPE OF THE WOEK. No one who has given any thought to the vexed problems of taxation will expect a discussion here of the various theories ad- vanced upon that subject. The tedious and painstaking labor necessary to a proper re- vision of our revenue laws and the difficulty of accomplishing satisfactory results cannot be overestimated. The Commission soon realized that, in the time at the dis- posal of its members, little more could be done in this report than to call attention to the more glaring defects and to recom- mend improved methods of administration. The recommendations are intended simply as the best sug- gestions the Commission can now offer for immediate relief from the evils in our tax system, to which reference is herein- after made. It was deemed best, in order to accomplish practical re- sults, to divide the work and assign a part to each member, and to have occasional meetings for conference and comparison of views. This plan has been followed. COMPARISON OF TAX LAWS OF THIS AND OTHER STATES. There are many defects in our revenue system. It is very far from perfect. But an ideal system of taxation has not been 4 Report of the State Tax Commtsston. devised, or at least, it cannot be safely said that such a system has been put into practical operation. A comparison of our revenue laws with those of other states will show that they have many features in common. The general provisions concerning the assessment and collection of taxes, the subjects of taxation and the method of raising rev- enue in a number of our sister states are not essentially differ- ent from ours. The revenue laws of Missouri in their main provisions com- pare favorably with those of other states. The reports of the various tax commissioners, however, in- dicate a general dissatisfaction with existing conditions. This is true, not only in states whose gene,ral plan of tax- ation is similar to ours, but also in other states where the method of raising public revenue is entirely different. The complaiuts are not confined to any state. Our exam- ination of the reports of the various tax commissions show that there is dissatisfaction in every state, almost without ex- ception, with its tax system and tax laws. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS. Many changes that have been suggested, and some that seem desirable to the Commission, cannot be made on account of Constitutional provisions. The entire article on "Eevenue and Taxation" in the Con- stitution of 1875, or at least a large part of it, should be re-writ- ten, before there can be any deviation from the general plan outlined therein. The Legislature is so hedged about and hemmed in by lim- itations in the fundamental law of the state that, as the Con- stitution stands, no statutory change can be made in the general system of taxation now in force. Statutory, amendments must therefore be confined to sup- plying omissions, remedying defects and providing better meth- ods of administration. GENERAL EEVENUE MEASURE. Many of the provisions of our statutes are well adapted to our present system, and are as satisfactory as any that could Report of the State Tax Commission. 5 be devised under existing conditions. Most of them have been construed by the Supreme Court and have stood the test of actual operation. The various state and county officials, as well as the tax-payers, have become famUiar with them. No changes are needed in a number of sections of the revenue law. The subject of taxation presents many problems about which thoughtful citizens differ. The General Assembly may conclude that some of the changes and additions suggested by the Com- mission should be adopted, while others may not meet with ap- proval. Hence it has seemed unwise to submit a general revenue measure, which could not be changed without destroying its symmetry and effect, but rather to present separate bills con- cemirig the different subjects, and separate amendments to the various sections of the present law in which changes are recom- mended. ABSENCE OF UNIFORM ASSESSMENTS. Each citizen is a partner in the enterprise which requires the raising of public revenues. It is his duty to contribute Ms proportion of the expenditures, and it is his rigM to have others do likewise. Our Constitution "and the laws made in pursuance there- of," measure this duty by the value of the property possessed by the tax-payer. Whether this is the best system it is not our purpose at this time to inquire. It is the plan laid Hown in our Constitution. Equality in the distribution of these burdens is equity. It is guaranteed by the Constitution of Missouri, and is funda- mental in any just system of taxation. It is needless to say that in a plan of taxation based upon the value of property, this equality cannot be secured without uniformity in the assessments. It matters not that the same tax rate is levied upon all property. Unless the same ratio of value is taken as the foundation for the levy, unfair discriminations necessarily result. "Where some property is over valued, and other under valued, the inequality in the tax is just as great as if the state authorities, or the county courts, should fix a differ- ent rate upon the property of different individuals. This would not be tolerated for a moment. 6 Report of the State Tax Commission. The command of our Constitution is that "all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value," and "taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects withia the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax." The difficulty in securing equality is not so much in the laws, as in the method of enforcing them. The complaint has been general that the assessments have not been uniform in the different counties, and that discrim- inations are made even in the same county between different kinds of property. The Commission addressed a letter to the Collector, Clerk of the County Court and Assessor of each county, including the proper officials of the City of St. Louis, asking information upon this subject. Eeports were received from ninety-eight counties and the City of St. Louis. These would be indeed startling if some of the facts stated therein had not been previously known. They show a condition of affairs that should no longer be permitted to continue. It is within the bounds of truth to say that no two counties in the State have the same rule for the assessment of all classes of property, and, generally speaking, there is absolutely no uni- formity as to the proportion of the actual cash value taken as the basis for the assessed value. Some counties value real estate, so these reports show, as low as thirty per cent, of its selling price, while others have a ninety per cent, basis. Some assess real estate at thirty-three and one-third per cent., money and credits at one hundred per cent, and tangible personal property at fifty per cent. There is an absolute want of equality in taxation according to the replies received from these officers, and the absence of any uniform rule throughout the State for assessing property. It .results from this condition that some counties contribute more than their part to the State's expenditures, while others are charged with less than their share. The counties in which local conditio"ns induce higher as- sessment are those which are made to pay the greatest amount of State taxes, and yet, on account of their own needs, they are less able to bear it. Report of the State Tax Commission. 7 The very small tax rate for State purposes makes this in- equality less burdensome to the individual tax-payer than at first might be supposed. The State revenue tax, as is well known, is only fifteen cents on the hundred dollars valuation, and hereafter the sum neces- sary to pay interest on the State certificates of indebtedness to the school and seminary funds will be only two or three cents annually on each hundred dollars valuation. So it will be read- ily seen that the exaction made by the State from the property owner is indeed a very small part of his taxes. Still inequality between counties is wrong in principle and should be remedied as far as possible. Then, too, where the counties have different rules for the assessment of property, or no definite and established rule, it is impossible to fix a proper basis upon which to assess property that extends through several counties. The courts hold, and with manifest justice, that discrim- inations cannot be intentionally made in valuing property for taxation, without violating the constitutional right of the citizen to insist upon uniformity in such assessments. But the uninten- tional discriminations are equally oppressive in their practical results. SEPARATION OF STATE AND COUNTY EEVENTJES. If the state should collect its revenues from other sources than a direct levy upon real and personal property, leaving to the counties the exclusive right to tax such property for local purposes, as advocated by many citizens, each county could adopt its own basis of assessment without, at least, imposing an unfair burden of state taxes upon other localities— however unequal the burdens of county and municipal taxation might be among the tax-payers of such county, by reason of discriminations in the assessment of different kinds of property therein. The aggregate taxes for county, municipal and school pur- poses upon railroad, street railroad, bridge, telegraph and tele- phone companies, and other public service corporations, together with the tax upon foreign insurance companies apportioned to the various counties, have been practically equal to the total taxes for the State Eevenue Fund collected from real and personal 8 Report of the State Tax Commission. property, including the ad valorem tax upon merchandise, or at least there has not been any very great difference between these two amounts, and hereafter there will only be two or three cents on the hundred dollars needed for the State Interest Fund. Any loss to the State would be more than overcome by the dif- ference in the cost of the assessment and collection of the State revenue, which now requires a bi-ennial appropriation of $350,- 000 to $375,000 ; but this expense would be an additional charge upon the counties. By levying a rate upon corporate property now assessed by the State Board of Equalization, sufficient to bring into the State treasury an amount equal to the sum collected at present from these corporations for all purposes, and by retaining the tax upon foreign insurance companies heretofore apportioned to the different counties, the State might forego its tax upon real and personal property, including the ad valorem tax upon mer- chandise, without loss of income. It will also be important to know how the revenues of the different counties will be affected. The Commission has obtained a table to be printed as an appendix to this report showing these facts for the information of the General Assembly. Our Constitution, however, stands in the way of this method of taxation. An amendment, embodying a number of changes in the fun- damental law of the State, must precede any legislation in that direction; and after the necessary constitutional changes shall have been made, the statutes must be adjusted to the new con- ditions. A change of this character, however, cannot properly be made without revising many of the sections in the article con- cerning "Eevenue and Taxation" in the present Constitution. The Constitution of 1875 is so unsuited to a different sys- tem that to make it conform to the proposed change, and so ad- just its various provisions as to avoid conflict and uncertainty, will require a remodeling, substantially, of article X thereof. Section 5 of that article declares that "All railroad cor- porations in this State, or doing business therein, shall be sub- Report of the State Tax Commission. 9 ject to taxation for State, county, municipal and other purposes on real and personal property owned by them, ' ' etc. This clearly stands in the way of withdrawing such property from local taxation. Section 9 provides that no property in any city, town or other municipal corporation shall be released from its propor- tionate share of the taxes to be levied for State purposes. This prohibits the withdrawal of such property from State taxation. Section 8 limits the tax rate for State revenue, when the assessed value of the property of the State has reached nine hundred million dollars, to fifteen cents on the hundred dollars valuation. This limitation cannot be left in force if all property other than that belonging to public service corporations shall be with- drawn from liability for State taxes. Section 11 of the same article limits the maximum rate for county, school and city purposes. Many counties, school dis- tricts and cities derive a substantial part of their revenue from taxes upon public service corporations. If deprived of this, the rate that may be levied by them upon other property must be increased and the limitations of section ].l changed. Then too, the municipal and local taxes on railroads and the property of like corporations now go to the cities, villages and school districts. A change in the maximum rate for county pur- poses would be insufficient to adjust section 11 to the new con- ditions. Great care will be necessary in fixing the rate that may be levied by the various subdivisions of the county upon other property, so that each subdivision may be compensated for the loss of the revenue heretofore received from railroad and similar taxes. The maximum rate, under section 11, that may be levied for local purposes is based upon the assessed value for State and county purposes; and section 12 limits municipal indebtedness to five per cent, of the valuation of the county, city or school district proposing to incur the debt, as shown by the assessment for State and county purposes next before the last assessment. It is apparent that these sections should be altered, in the event the proposed change is carried into effect. 10 Report of the State Tax Lommission. Section 18 makes it the duty of the State Board of Equali- zation to equalize the assessments of real and personal property among the several counties of the State, which would be unnec- essary if a State tax is not collected from such property. Four amendments, involving changes in sections 11 and 12 of article X of the Constitution, were adopted at the last gen- eral election, and these amendments should be considered in connection with the matters to which attention has just been called. These references to the different sections of the Constitu- tion that will be affected by any change of the revenue system, show that it will be impracticable to relieve real and personal property from State taxation, and to levy such taxes wholly upon the property of public service corporations, by an amend- ment to a single section of the Constitution. If separate amendments to the different sections should be submitted, one might be adopted and others defeated. If the General Assembly deems it wise, at this time, to pro- pose a change in the Constitution in the particulars referred to, the best method of accomplishing that result would be to sub- mit a single amendment, repealing the entire article on "Rev- enue and Taxation, ' ' and substituting a new one in lieu of article X, embodying the changes necessary under the proposed plan. A single amendment may include all necessary changes re- lating to one subject, just as a legislative enactment may do. This was recently determined by the Supreme Court in Garbert vs. Eailway Co., 70 Southwestern Reporter, 891. Such an amendment might authorize the Legislature to pro- vide for the change of system without making it obligatory so to do. Another plan for the separation of State and county rev- enues has been suggested and was recommended by the Chamber of Commerce of New York. It is known as the "Purdy Meth- od. ' ' Without undertaking to set out the plan in detail, it pro- vides in effect that the whole amount of revenue needed by the State shall be first ascertained, and then the aggregate of the taxes collected by all of the counties for ordinary county ex- penditures, and each county shall pay the same proportion of the funds required for State purposes that the amount collected Report of the State Tax Commission. 11 by such county for its usual expenses bears to the total sum collected by all the counties for such expenses; or to state it differently, the part a particular county must pay of the State's revenue is found by taking a fraction of the sum needed by the State, of which fraction the amount collected by such county for its ordinary purposes shall be the numerator and the total collected by all the counties for such purposes shall be the de- nominator. In other words each county pays a part of the State taxes in proportion to the revenue collected by it for its usual purposes, and the counties are given local option as to the method of raising the revenues. Local option in the amount of taxes to be collected in a municipality or county in this State may be given by simply re- moving the limitation iu section 11 of the Constitution. In lieu of a separation of the sources of State and county revenue, a third plan has been proposed— that the inequalities in State taxation resulting from the varying assessed values in the different counties might be remedied, if the State Board of Equalization, instead of attempting to equalize the values between different counties, were required to apportion the State tax among the several counties in proportion to the real value of the property without regard to the local assessment. Under this plan the State Board would ascertain the proportion of the real value taken in each county as the assessed value, and apportion the State tax accordingly, so that each county would pay the same amount as if its assessment had been made on a full cash basis. To carry out either of the two plans last mentioned would require as many constitutional changes, and the same can only be safely made in the manner suggested in reference to the first plan. The strong desire expressed by many citizens for some change in the method of raising State taxes has induced the Commission to state the plans that have been proposed and the obstacles in the way of carrying them out, and how the same may be removed. The Commission has set out these plans and the Constitu- tional method by which they can be presented for adoption, and submits it to the Legislature as the representatives of the peo- 12 Report of the State Tax Commission. pie to determine whether it is wise to propose a constitutional amendment to the voters of the State embodying any of said plans. STATUTORY CHA]SrGES. Any changes in our laws that will bring immediate prac- tical results must be made by statutory amendments, conform- able to our present Constitution. DEFECTS IN ADMINISTEATION OF EEVENUE LAWS. Attention has already been called to the want of uniformity in the assessments of property in the different counties, and the consequent inequality in the burden of State taxation. A more serious evil consists in the fact that, under the practical workings of our system, vast amounts of money, notes and credits wholly escape taxation. This condition is so well known and understood that an attempt to present statistics on the subject would be useless. Aside from the enormous loss of revenue to the State, counties and municipalities, such a condition necessarily works a gross injustice to the owners of real estate and other prop- erty fairly listed for taxation. Under present conditions, a large part of the money and credits held in this State escapes its just share of taxation, thus casting an inequitable burden upon real estate, estates of decedents and minors, whose prop- erty is disclosed by the public records ; persons of small means and conscientious tax-payers, who return true assessment lists. This condition is not peculiar to our State. The same com- plaint is made everywhere. The very fact of the inequality and injustice resulting from this wholesale eA''asion of taxation on money and notes is re- garded by many as a sufficient justification or excuse for the concealment or under valuation of their own property. Many contend that they are not called upon to submit to an exaction which their neighbors escape. Ex-President Harrison, in an address delivered in Chicago, February 22nd, 1898, said upon this subject: " It is easy to see how this offense against morality and pa- triotism has grown to such proportions. The very sense that Report of the State Tax Commission. 13 inequality is injustice has promoted it. One man sees that his neighbor is not making a conscientious tax return, and that if he returns Ms property honestly he will pay disproportionately. The result is that his conscience finds a salve in the saying, 'Everybody does it.' " It is also believed that another fruitful cause of this ten- dency to evade taxation on money and notes lies in the fact al- ready pointed out that, in many instances this class of property, ' when fairly given in or found upon the probate records, is as- sessed at a much higher relatiA^e value than other property. Some attempt to excuse themselves from making proper re- turns on this ground. The omissions of inequalities between the assessments in different localities and the discriminations between different classes of property, in this State do not result from any stat- utory provision or Constitutional requirement. On the contrary, the Constitution declares that all prop- erty shall be taxed ia proportion to its value, and all of the pro- visions of the statutes are made for the purpose of carrying out this idea of uniformity. The fault is not in the law, but in its administration. It is doubtless true that inequalities caimot be entirely avoided, but they can be lessened by improved methods of admin- istration. ASSESSED VALUES. The Constitution requires ' ' that all property shall be taxed^ in proportion to its value." To carry out this provision sec- tion 9180 of our revenue act provides that all property shall be assessed at its true value in money. In practice, however, it is a well known fact, conceeded by/ everybody, that this section is wholly disregarded. ^ In consequence there has been an independent scaling down of values in each county according to the individual ideas of the different assessors, until there is no uniformity whatever upon the subject. There is no concert of action among the assessors and no supervisory control by any responsible head to the system such as would bring about uniformity. 14 Report of the State Tax Commission. Local oJBScials have failed to realize that a decrease in local demands for revenue should be met by a reduction in the tax rate and not by a sliding scale of assessments. The practice has so long prevailed throughout the State to assess property at less than its actual cash value, notwith- standing the statutory requirement to the contrary, that every attempt to change the practice has failed. At a meeting of the assessors of the State in 1893— of 1894 —an effort to fix a uniform rule to be acted upon by each as- sessor accomplished no practical results. The Auditor, in his report for 1899-1900, p. 32, calls at- tention to this condition, and suggests that fifty per Cent, of the actual value be adopted as the basis for assessments. The failure to assess property at its actual cash value, not- withstanding the statute so requires, is not peculiar to this State. The custom to assess at less than such value seems to prevail generally in other states. Every attempt to make a change in this practice in these states has also been unsuccessful. The Wisconsin Tax Commission, iu its report for 1901, says : ' ' The mandate of the statute that property shall be assessed at the true or cash value has never been followed. Assessments were made at varjdng percentages of the true value, so that here- tofore no one could form an intelligent judgment of the value of the taxable property in the State. ' ' Agaiu, in the same report : ' ' The usual practice has been to make the assessment at much less than full value. There is little, if any, uniformity in the practice in different assess- ment districts as to the percentage of the true value taken as the basis for assessments. Indeed in many districts it is impos- sible to discover that any definite basis has been employed." The same tax Commission, which appears to have had sup- ervisory control over assessments, and not merely power to re- vise the laws, attempted in 1900 to bring about a compliance with the statutory requirement of an assessment at full value, but the results were not satisfactory. In the report of the Chairman of the Colorado Commission we find this statement : "The Constitution and laws of Colorado require all prop- erty to be assessed at its full cash value. Tet not an assessor Report of the State Tax Commission. lo in the state pretends to obey this law, nor do the county com- missioners or courts attempt to enforce it. Governor Thomas, in his inaugural address says : "In theory this requirement may be just ; ia practice it never was and never can be made effect- ive,' and yet assessors are required to swear that they have so assessed all property in this State. ' ' The Minnesota Commission uses this language: "It is ob- vious that valuations for the purposes of assessment have been but slightly influenced by actual values. ' ' This is the experience in a state where the Constitution itself seems to require that all property shall be assessed at its actual cash value. The same complaint is made in the report of the Kansas Commission. Doubtless the same state of facts exists and similar quo- tations could be made from other states, if it were deemed nec- essary. The failure of every attempt to enforce the provisions of our statute requiring the assessment of property at its full value, furnishes a strong reason for a change of the law. The practice to disregard this requirement leaves every as- sessor at liberty to fix his own rule of valuation, and, in effect, leaves us without any law upon this subject, or at least without any which there is any pretense of following,— which is worse than none at all. The practice has so long prevailed to assess at a percentage less -than the true value, and every attempt to change the custom having failed, it would seem that the only thing remaining is to try some other plan. The Constitution does not require the as- sessment of property at its actual value, but in proportion to its value. It is therefore recommended that the statutes be amended so as to require : SEPAEATE COLUMNS IN THE ASSESSOR'S BOOK FOB ACTUAL AND TAXABLE VALUES. Statutes are in force in some of the states requiring prop- erty to be listed at its full market value in cash, which must be stated in one column of the assessor's book, and a certain per 16 Repori of the State Tax Commission. cent, of this value, fixed by law, is then entered in a second col- umn as the valuation of the property for purposes of taxation. Iowa and Illinois, and probably other states, have adopted this plan and it is reported to have worked well in practice. After the full value of the property has been ascertained and set down in one column by the assessor, a certain per cent, thereof, fixed by law, is entered in another column as the value upon which the taxes are to be- levied. It is not thought or claimed that this will be a complete remedy for the evils resulting from a want of uniform assess- ments. It may not accomplish the results anticipated, but it certainly can be no worse in practice than the system now in vogue. This plan, in view of the custom heretofore prevailing in the State, seems to be more feasible than an attempt to raise all valuations throughout the State at once to a full cash basis. It wUl not be so great an innovation upon the existing custom, and will probably be more readily sustained by public sentiment and more cheerfully executed by public officers. This plan would at least have some advantages over the practice now in force. The tax-payer would be able to make a just criticism of the assessment of his property and that of his neighbors, and the public would have the means of judging of the correctness of the assessor's work; whereas, imder the custom now prevailing, there is no way to determine either. An assessor would be more apt to fix the actual cash value correctly, where only a per cent, thereof is to be taken as the taxable value than if the tax was to be levied upon the full value fixed by him. The rule would also have the effect of enabling anyone to see at a glance the actual value placed by assessing boards and officers upon all property, whether corporate or individual, and would furnish a means of testing its accuracy which does not now exist. The statute should make it obligatory upon the assessor to inspect the property and to state under oath in his assessment book the actual market value, at ordinary private sale, of the property assessed by him. This value should not be based on forced sales. Report of the State Tax Commission. 17 The law slioiild be so plain tliat tliere could be no misunder- standing its purpose. A wilful failure to conform to its requirements should be made an offense punishable by forfeiture of office. The State Tax Commissioner, hereafter suggested; where there is any palpable evasion of the rule, should have the power to require a re-assessment under his supervision. If the aggregate assessments for taxable purposes under this plan should be greatly increased in any county, the local authorities can levy a lower tax rate, so that no more revenue will be collected than is needed. The Legislature also can by law fix the maximum tax rate, so that no more revenue shall be collected, if the assessment for taxable purposes shall be increased, than is now received, and this was done in Iowa when this plan was first adopted there. The percentage of the real value that shall be taken as the taxable value should be sufficiently high to enable the subdi- visions of the State needing the greatest amount of revenue to collect enough taxes under existing constitutional rates to meet their requirements. If the General Assembly deems it proper to try this plan, it should be made applicable to all property upon which an ad va- lorem tax is levied, and should go into effect on the first of June, 1904, when the assessment begins for the taxes of 1905. This assessment must be completed on or before January 1, 1905, and an abstract of the assessment in each county forwarded to the State Auditor on or before February 20th of that year. The Legislature will then be in session, and having definite knowledge of the aggregate amount of such assessments, can properly ad- just the State tax rate, as well as the maximum rate for county purposes to be levied by the county courts at the May term thereafter for the taxes of 1905, so that there need be no change in the total revenue collected, even if the ' ' assessment for tax- able purposes," as distinguished from the actual value set out on the books should be different from former assessments. D-2 18 Report of the State Tax Commission. STATE TAX COMMISSIONER. Some twelve or more states have within recent years es- tablished the office of state tax commissioner, and it would be well for this State to create that office. This officer should be given large supervisory powers over local assessors. It should be his duty to visit the different coun- ties, advise, confer with and instruct the assessing officers; to inspect the work of assessment and see that a proper basis of val- uation is adopted and enforced; to attend the county boards of equalization whenever necessary, and to represent the State, or see that it is properly represented before such boards ; to super- intend the enforcement of the collateral inheritance tax law and the collection of that tax. He should see that the assessors fol- low the requirements of the law and cause them to be proceeded against if they fail or refuse. It should be his duty to investigate the values of the prop- erty of railroad and other public service corporations, as well as the values of property generally throughout the State, and to attend -the meetings of the State Board of Equalization and give the members thereof the benefit of this information. In other words, he should be the supervisor of all matters of assessment. In other states the results of this supervision have fully justified the creation of the office, and the increase in the revenue has been far greater than the expense incurred. The local as- sessors have been more efficient ; the amount of property listed for taxation has been greatly increased, and the inequalities and discriminations have at least been reduced. The Mimiesota Commission says : ' ' The experiences of In- diana, Michigan and other states visited by the present Commis- sion leave no room for doubt as to the wisdom of providing for a permanent tax commission. ' ' The late ex-Governor Pingree, in his farewell message to the Legislature of Michigan, December 31, 1900, indulges in strong language commendatory of the measure creating a tax commission in that state. He thus expresses his views upon the subject: "When you are thoroughly familiar with the result Report of the State Tax Commission. 19 of its work I know you will affirm the statements which I have heretofore made in this message that the law creating it is the most important one ever enacted by a Michigan Legislature:. 1 submit herewith a table which shows the increased valuati du of the real and personal property in the State, made as a result of the work of the Tax Commission. 1899 1900 Assessed valuation of real estate. . .$825,858,711 $1,006,4 5;j,013 Assessed valuation of personal prop. 142,330,376 310,997,015 Tt will be noted that the increase of the assessed ■^■•iluation of the property of the State, as the result of only one year's work of the Commission, is nearly $350,000,000." The Commission believes that the most imporlf.nt recom- mendation it can make, and the best thing that can be done to improve our tax system under our Constitution, is to create the office of State Tax Commissioner, with broad supervisory powers over local assessing officers and boards as above sug- gested. PERSONAL PROPERTY. The inherent difficulty encountered in finy system for the taxation of personal property, and especially intangible prop- erty, consists in the fact that in the end tlie State must rely on a disclosure by the tax-payer. The temptations to evade taxation are great, and the chances of detection small. The very general classification of the kinds of personal prop- erty made in our statute, including the omnibus class for "all property not above enumerated, ' ' affords every opportunity for concealment, evasion and under valuation, and renders it ex- tremely difficult for the assessor or the county board of equali- zation to form any definite idea as to the real amount of prop- erty or the correctness of the valuation. To illustrate, the term "neat cattle" used in the statutory classification may mean anything from cows and calves to steers in the feed-lot. It is evident that a more detailed classification and description of property would furnish a better basis for a proper valuation, and afford better opportunities for the cor- rection of errors. i'U Report of the State Tax Commission. It is also thought that a better opportunity would be af- forded to search the conscience of the property owner and com- pel disclosure of intangible property, if a separate list were re- quired for the assessment of money, notes, accounts and other credits, instead of lumping them in with other property. To this list should be appended suitable interrogatories as to the nature and amount of such property, how and where se- cured, and whether the security on the records stands in the name of the assessed, or of some other person, who has as- signed it to him, to all of which the property owner should be recfuired to make full and direct answers under oath. It might also be provided that these lists should be filed in the o£Sce of the county clerk and be preserved for at least three years. The assessment of different kinds of property will require different lists and different interrogatories to be answered by the tax-payer. The preparation of suitable forms, blanks and interroga- tories to meet varying condidtions should be left to the Tax Commissioner, and assessors should be required to follow his direction in listing property. These recommendations will require the amendment of sec- tions 9144, 9147 and 9180 and some other sections of the general statutes. ASSESSMENT OE EBAL ESTATE, Under the present law real estate is required to be assessed annually. In practice, however, this amounts to little more than an annual recopying of the preceding assessment, and results in no practical good. As a rule, real estate values are fairly stable in this State, so that the cost of annual assessments of such property has been far in excess of any increase of the revenue from that source. It is suggested that one assessment of real property in four years would answer every purpose in this State, and at the same time result in a very considerable saving of expense. More time could then be given to make the assessment, thus enabling the officer to make a personal inspection and accomplish better results in his valuation of lands ; and this would also afford him Report of the State Tax Commission. 21 opportunity for a more careful assessment of the various classes of personal property in other years. Under such an amendment there would be an actual assess- ment of real estate values every four years, whereas, there is now theoretically an annual assessment, but in reality no stated period in which there is an entire re-valuation of such property. The State can well afford to pay a greater compensation for a proper assessment of real estate once in every four years, than is now allowed for each annual assessment, and still save more than one-half of the expense incurred for the assessment of realty. In order to reach any substantial increase of values during the interim, from the erection of improvements and other causes, the assessor, when making the personal assessment, should be required to note any material change in value from improve- ments and other like causes, and report the same to the county board of equalization as a basis for correcting and adjusting the real estate book. In the same way property owners may apply to the board of equalization and obtain reductions, where there has been any material decrease in values from the destruc- tion of improvements or other causes. Changes in ownership can be noted in the same way. It is believed from past experience that only a small percent- age of the property will require such adjustment, and that little trouble or inconvenience will result. There is no need for an annual assessment to meet such unusual cases. The cost is too great for the good accomplished. COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION. Under the present law the power of the county board of equalization is limited to raising or lowering the valuation of such property as appears on the assessment list. It is powerless to add other personal property to the list, except under a pro- ceeding to subject the taxpayer to treble taxation for a fraudu- lent list, as provided in section 9150, E. S. 1899, which is rarely resorted to. The courts hold that the board cannot make an assessment of property. 22 Report of the State Tax Commission. Its duty is to equalize assessments already made. Broader powers should be conferred upon it. The assessor may well hesitate to file a notice, charging one of his fellow citizens with making a fraudulent return, especially in the absence of personal knowledge of the facts. The members of the board may be satisfied from general information, upon which a reasonable man would act in his own affairs, that an assessment list does not contain all of the personal property of the tax-payer, but they cannot now correct it in the absence of a statutory complaint by the assessor. Omis- sions may occur from accident or mistake, as well as fraud. The board may well be entrusted with the general power to revise and correct tax lists and to make additions thereto, from the best information it can obtain. The rights of the tax- payer can be fully protected by requiring notice to him of any change and affording him an opportunity to have any injustice corrected by a hearing before the board. OMITTED PROPERTY. The statutes now provide for the assessment in subsequent years of property omitted from any cause from a previous as- sessment. It is then taxed for the years during which it escaped taxation. It is necessary upon the discovery of such property after the return of the assessor's books for any year to wait until the next annual assessment for the proper remedy. Instances have been called to our attention where money, notes and bonds belonging to an estate have been overlooked and, before the next year's assessment, final settlement was made of the estate. Cases also arise where personal property or real estate, is accidentally or by design kept from the asses- sor's books. Sometimes the omission escapes attention when the next assessment is made. There is no reason why the county court, after notice to the owner, should not be permitted at any time to place the proper value upon such omitted property and by its order of record direct it to be placed as an additional assessment upon the tax books. There is very little danger of injustice to the tax-payer if he is first notified of the intention to assess his property and Report of the State Tax Commission. 23 to add it to the tax books, and an opportunity is given him to be heard in regard thereto. The purpose of the law is to reach all property that is sub- ject to taxation, and every facility to accomplish that result should be provided. The mere fact that the assessor overlooks it need not prevent its assessment by the county board of equali- zation, or even subsequently by the county court, and the law can provide for such cases, and should do so. PUBLICATION OF ASSESSMENT LISTS. The publication of assessment lists prior to the meeting of the county board of equalization would have a good effect. It would direct attention to the manner in which property had been assessed, and would enable each tax-payer to compare his own assessment with that of his neighbors. The assessor would probably be more careful in his work if he knew that it was to be criticised and examined in each neighborhood of his county. Property, too, that escapes taxation would more likely find a place upon the tax books if it was understood that publicity would be given to the assessment lists. Every citizen has the right to know that others are paying their due proportion of the taxes. His own burdens are in- creased unless others pay their shares. The general discussion of the lists in the neighborhood would tend to create public sentiment and would induce better assessments. Under the present system the public has no way of making an investigation unless each individual tax-payer goes^to the county seat and examines the assessor's book. The following language from the address of ex-President Harrison, hereinbefore referred to, may be appropriately quoted here: "We have too much treated the matter of a man's tax return as a personal matter. We have put his transactions with the State on much the same level with his transactions with his banker, but that is not the true basis. Each citizen has a per- sonal interest, a pecuniary interest, in the tax return of his neighbor. We are members of a great partnership, and it is s 24 Report of the State Tax Commission. the right of each to know what ever^ other member is contribut- ing to the partnership and what he is taking from it. It is not a private affair; but -a public concern of the first importance." If such a publication should be made, it should be so as to give the widest possible notice of the contents of these lists. Johnson county, just prior to the assessment in June, 1901, adopted the plan of publishing the total personal assessment of each tax-payer for the preceding year. The same thing was done just prior to the assessment in 1902. The first publication cost $250 and the second $150. C. A. Broyles, Esq., the county clerk of that county, kindly furnished the Commission with the following statement : "The figures below give the value of our 'personal prop- erty' for four years back and you may draw your own con- clusion, towit: Aggregate value as of June 1, 1899 . $2,319,125 Aggregate value as of June 1, 1900 2,367,958 Aggregate value as of June 1, 1901 2,599,035 Aggregate value as of June 1, 1902 2,723,190" The only question about the publication of such lists is the matter of expense, which will depend upon conditions in each county. It would probably be best for the statute to authorize the county court to publish such lists a month before the meet- ing of the county board of equalization, provided the aggregate cost will not exceed a certain amount to be fixed by law, and then leave the matter of publication to the discretion of the county court. TIME OF ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION OF TAXES. It has been suggested that the delay of from fifteen to eighteen months between the assessment and the collection of taxes results in a considerable loss of revenue, through removals and other causes. The Commission believes that it is desirable to have the assessments and collections made during the same year. If, upon further investigation, this plan is found practi- cable, a bill for that purpose will be submitted. FRANCHISES. The franchises of public service corporations, under the laws of this State, are valued in connection with other corporate Report of the State Tax Commission. 25^ property. This practice was adopted by resolution of the State Board of Equalization in 1898 and its action has been upheld by the courts as a proper construction of the statute. The rule of assessing franchises as a part of the corporate porperty has ever since been followed, and is now incorporated in the statute specially enacted upon that subject. Tax conunissions of other states have gone very fully into the question of the best method of reaching such property. Mis- souri has a settled rule upon the subject, which is manifestly fair and proceeds upon a proper principle. The property of a public service corporation, tangible and intangible, is treated as an entity— the property of a going concern. Its entire value is- made up— not from what its tangible property is worth distinct from its franchises, nor from what its franchises are worth dis- connected from its tangible property. The purpose of*the law is to ascertain the value of the tan- gible and intangible property, taken in connection, and for the purposes for which the same may be used. It is not the rails, cars and power houses of a street rail- road, together with its other physical property, that form its value, but the entire plant as a whole, including its tangible and intangible property. All the franchises, privileges and rights- which it enjoys should be taken into consideration by the asses- sing board, and our laws so provide. So also with other fran- chise-holding corporations. The statute is based upon the principle that whatever prop- erty is worth for sale upon the market should be taken as its value in all matters pertaining to its assessment for taxable- purposes. This is the rule as to all other property, and is ap- plicable here. Our laws follow the principle laid down by Jus- tice Brewer when he says : "Now, it is a cardinal rule, which should never be forgot- ten, that whatever property is worth for the purposes of income- and sale it is also worth for purposes of taxation." "Substance of right demands that whatever be the real value of any property, that value may be accepted by the state- for the purpose of taxation, and this ought not to be evaded by any mere confusion of words. ' ' Our statutes are sufficient to subject franchises to taxation,. 26 Report of the State Tax Commission. DELINQUENT TAXES. The method of collecting delinquent taxes upon real estate now in force has proved very effective. Sales under the pro- visions of the statutes are upheld by the courts. Suits must be instituted and prosecuted to judgment in the same manner as in other actions to subject real estate to ordinary liens. There are some amendments that can be made to the pro- cedure by which it may be shortened and simplified, and the costs lessened without affecting the substantial rights of the property owner. Amendments of this kind will be presented. MUNICIPAL TAXES. Under our present law provision is made for the separate assessment and collection of municipal taxes. No good reason is perceived for this additional expense in cities of the fourth class and villages, and possibly in larger cities. The assessment ■cannot be higher for municipal purposes than for state and county purposes. The expense of making out a separate tax book is consider- able, and the collection of such taxes is frequently inefficient, and is attended with more or less annoyance and inconvenience to "the tax-payer, who should be permitted to pay all his taxes at •one time and place, as far as possible. So, too, an examination of one set of books should be sufficient to enable an interested party to determine whether the taxes upon a particular piece •of property have been paid, without having to go to different officers to ascertain that fact. It would be much more simple and less expensive for these municipalities to adopt the same plan as is now carried out in reference to school districts. The municipal officers could fix their tax levy and certify it to the county clerk. It could then be ■extended on the general tax books and the tax-payer could pay all of his taxes to the county collector at once. The county as- sessor in taking the personal assessments could note the resi- dents of the cities and villages, and the real estate book would -show the real property in such municipalities. Report of the State Tax Commission. 27 CAE COMPANIES AND FAST FREIGHT LINES. A proper statute should be enacted for the taxation for county and local purposes, as well as for state purposes, of stock cars, furniture cars, fruit cars, tank cars, refrigerator cars, and 'all other kinds of cars not owned by railroad companies, and which are used a part of the time at least in this State. COEPORATION LICENSES. Business corporations may be organized in this State under the general law. The Constitution requires the payment at the time of the creation of the corporation of a fee of fifty dollars for the first fifty thousand dollars of stock and the further sum of five dol- lars for every additional ten thousand dollars of stock. The statutes permit a corporation so organized to continue in existence for fifty years. "Corporate capacity is a fran- chise." The State confers this franchise and may properly charge therefor. The stockholders, by virtue of the incorpora- tion, acquire by grant from the State charter rights not pos- sessed by other individuals. Personal liability for the debts of the concern is avoided, and continuity of joint property interests is secured. The privilege of corporate existence adds much to the value of the shareholder's property. A corporation with a capital of fifty thousand dollars may, Tinder the laws as they now stand, continue for fifty years upon the advance payment of fifty dollars— that is, one dollar a year. The privilege is worth more than this. The vast number of corporations organized in the State shows that the fee paid is not burdensome. Corporations may be found everywhere and they are organized for almost every purpose. A reasonable annual exaction may justly be required in ad- dition to the amount now paid. This need not be large or bur- densome and no doubt will be cheerfully paid by those who de- sire the continuance of corporate privileges, granted by the State. 28 Report of the State Tax Commission. LICENSES EOE THE SALE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOES. License fees for the privilege of selling intoxicating liquors are not strictly speaking a feature of the revenue system of the State, but are collected as an incident to the regulation of the business under the police power. Nevertheless considerable revenue accrues to the State therefrom, and hence the subject may be properly discussed here. The State under the high license law requires every dram- shop keeper to procure a license, and fixes the amount that shall be paid therefor. An inspection fee is also exacted under the "Beer Inspec- tion Law" for all beer which the State permits to be sold for consumption within its borders. A license fee should also b^required from wholesale dealers in alcoholic liquors, so as to put them upon an equality with the brewers. Dramshop keepers are required to pay a license fee for the privilege of carrying on their business, and are sub- ject to other police regulations prescribed by the statutes. It is a well-known fact that many so-called drug stores are dram- shops in disguise, and in truth there is not much disguise, in some instances, about the purpose of their existence. The parties conducting these places pay nothing for the privilege of selling intoxicating liquors, and are subject to no police regulations at all. This is not only unfair to the dram- shop keeper, who pays for his license, but is unjust to the tax- payers of the State. Such places are breeders of disorder and frequently of crime, and it may be said that the criminal costs are largely augmented on account of their existence. Experience demonstrates that it is practically impossible to eradicate this evil. There are many drug stores where liquor cannot be ob- tained except upon a physician's prescription, as required by law. There are othef places where drugs are kept simply as an excuse for the sale of whiskey. All efforts to break up this illicit business by criminal prose- cutions have failed. Report of the State Tax Commission. 29 Dramshop keepers pay a license of at least one hundred dol- lars a year to the State, and a much larger sum to the county and city for the privilege which the State grants them. In order to reach the sale of intoxicating liquor in small quantities by parties other than dramshop keepers, the only effectual method the Commission can suggest is to require a license from all such retail dealers. It should be provided that no person, other than a dramshop keeper, shall be permitted to sell intoxicating liquors by retail for any purpose without first obtaining a retail liquor dealer's license, for which a fee should be paid to the State. The fee need not be high or so great as that required from dramshop keepers. This would tend in some measure to weed out the so-called drug stores and assist in paying the criminal costs incurred by the State in consequence of the continued existence of others of the same kind. The law to be effective will have to be general and apply to all retail liquor dealers. TAXATION OF MOBTGAGES. A plan for the taxation of mortgages has been suggested in New York. It was proposed to levy a flat rate as an excise duty or tax for state purposes upon all mortgages filed for record, and to collect the same through the recorder's office as a condition precedent to filing the same for record. This fee, license or duty was to be in lieu of all other taxes upon such mortgages. The plan cannot be adopted here without consti- tutional changes. STATISTICS. An earnest effort was made by the Commission to obtain from the different counties statistical reports concerning various subjects relating to taxation. Blanks were prepared and for- warded to the different county officers. Many failed to respond to these inquiries, and the information furnished by others was so meager that it is impossible to make a table that will be of any practical value. The officers of about thirty counties, however, made full and complete reports and we take pleasure in acknowledging our 30 Report of the State Tax Commission. obligation to these oflScers for their efforts to assist the Com- mission in its work. Reports were received, however, from many counties in an- swer to the one inquiry concerning the proportion of the assessed value of the different classes of property to the real value thereof, as stated in the first part of this report, and appears in a table in the appendix. COMPILATION OP TAX LAWS AND DECISIONS. The act creating the commission directs the compilation of all the revenue laws of the State and the decisions construing the same, which is to be published under the supervision of the Commission. This publication cannot be made until the close of the present session of the General Assembly, as the acts passed by it should be incorporated therein, but will be prepared for dis- tribution at that time as required by the statute. BILLS TO BE SUBMITTED. The Commission will submit bills for the consideration of the General Assembly, embodying the recommendations made herein and other minor amendments to the revenue laws, refer- ence to which is deemed unnecessary in this report. All of which is respectfully submitted. W. M. Williams, E. C. Ceow, Peyton A. Paeks, ■ State Tax Commission. Jefferson City, Mo., February 7th, 1903. APPENDIX. TABLE SHOWING THE EFFECT UPON THE REVENUE OF THE STATE AND THE VARIOUS COUNTIES OF A RELEASE OF THE STATE TAX UPON REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY AND THE APPROPRIATION OF ALL TAXES UPON RAILROADS AND SIMILAR CORPORATIONS TO STATE PURPOSES. Counties. Tax surrendered by State. o 0) "5 t3 B= < w 2 ® so raxes surreuder'd by .counties State interest tax. CM 5 P PS Di o 0> ■So. CO C5 Adair Andrew Atchison Audrain Barry Barton Bates Benton Bollinger Boone Buchanan.. . . Butler Caldwell Callaway Camden 0. Girardeau Carroll Carter Cedar Charlton Christian... Clark Clay Clinton Cole Cooper Crawford . . . Dade Dallas Daviess DeKalb Dent Douglas Dunklin Franklin Gasconade. . Gentry Greene Grundy Harrison.... Henry Hickory Holt.. Howard Howell Iron Jackson Jasper.. Jefferson $7,386 29 9,406 06 12,668 37 12,009 00 5,568 81 7,286 90 12,469 57 5,166 22 3,153 63 12,234 39 41,325 69 4,264 00 7.909 78 8,941 23 2,455 65 7,495 39 11,548 32 1,751 80 11,658 87 5,466 91 11,193 71 4,462 27 5,905 22 8,948 60 9,623 15 6,400 45 10,042 13 3,741 58 5,044 56 2.910 86 10,526 25 7,371 00 3,1R1 88 2,667 13 4,870 67 9, 386 03 5,165 45 9,224 13 18, 002 90 7,389 81 11,319 64 11,041 38 3,111 79 9,536 34 8,0.12 19 4,435 71 2,777 00 135,762 00 23,672 48 7 565 05 $221 05 227 37 227 77 323 94 244 18 197 81 440 77 170 21 194 OS 398 24 4,791 17 469 59 249 30 274 28 97 20 392 13 344 88 64 03 280 00 196 10 221 69 227 71 96 95 233 49 182 09 567 74 294 95 123 II 148 91 148 43 313 70 219 18 214 43 100 52 435 09 326 20 278 64 325 58 1,669 41 247 80 409 96 410 62 127 76 378 49 224 12 245 91 164 95 10,495 80 1,106 48 253 45 $7,607 34 9,633 43 12,896 04 13, 333 94 5,752 99 7,481 11 12,910 34 5,336 43 3,347 71 12,632 63 46,116 "" 4,733 59 8,159 08 9,215 51 2,552 86 7,887 52 11,893 20 1,815 83 11,938 87 5,663 01 11,420 43 1,689 6,002 17 9,181 09 9,805 24 6,968 19 10,387 08 3,864 69 5,19.? 4: 3,089 29 10,839 95 7,590 18 3,391 11 2,767 65 5,305 76 9,712 23 5,444 09 9,549 71 19,673 31 7,6?7 61 11,769 60 11,452 00 3,239 54 9,916 83 8,256 31 4,631 62 2,941 95 146,257 80 24,778 96 7 818 50 $8,920 82 $1,083 52 6,687 45 357 75 4,635 91 818 96 10,384 76 1,097 77 6,464 67 1,408 75 10, 120 74 985 13 13,717 IE 1,566 11 3,054 04 886 71 3,097 59 881 81 10,633 88 1,448 83 33,333 37 6,908 05 11,355 91 1,004 61 8,070 56 813 01 13,976 82 1,217 68 482 50 4,977 23 724 95 1,381 98 16,952 87 1,328 62 3,555 82 345 36 30,384 66 1,210 56 113 88 893 99 12,894 40 1,465 15 2,496 69 978 35 12,312 16 729 19 17.844 52 995 12 20,229 83 829 46 7,571 19 1,013 58 10.166 21 1,149 59 5,017 77 73156 7,919 98 916 52 1 64 793 03 10,998 23 1,068 12 7,. "139 96 708 69 703 01 733 25 963 95 1,617 33 2,675 33 15,939 63 1,702 62 3,820 02 734 10 3,968 90 1,014 26 36,135 79 2,743 64 12,408 16 901 S3 3.460 42 1,233 52 14,530 49 1,431 27 482 19 532 16 8,399 31 897 72 10,396 27 928 55 7,847 23 1,165 01 5,721 17 501 71 233,406 14 11,962 57 32,320 66 3,947 10 10,288 69 1,450 92 $10,003 34 7,645 20 5,454 87 11, 983 53 7,873 42 11, 105 8' 15,2)i3 29 3,950 75 3,979 40 12,032 76 40,240 32 12,360 52 3,383 60 14, 194 50 1,207 45 6,359 2l! 13,281 49 3,901 18 31, 595 22 1,007 37 14,359 65 3,474 94 13,041 35 13,839 64 21,059 29 8,684 77 11,315 80 5, 749 33 8,K!6 50 793 54 12,066 35 3,248 65 1,436 26 963 95 4,093 16 17,643 20 4,554 12 3,933 16 38,379 43 13,309 44 4,698 94 15,961 76 1,064 35 9,297 03 11,334 82 9,012 24 6,222 83 225,368 71 36,373 76 11,739 61 £4,924 IS 6,270 96 8,445 52 8,006 00 3, 672 53 4,857 93 3,313 11 3,444 17 2,102 40 8, 156 37 27,650 46 3,343 65 5,273 19 5,690 " 1,637 10 4, 996 93 7,707 53 1,167 8' 7,772 68 3,644 63 7,465 31 2,974 85 3,936 31 5,963 73 6,415 40 4,268 97 6,694 75 2,494 36 3,363 05 1,960 56 7,034 48 4,913 97 3, 131 03 1,778 47 3,240 46 6,257 35 3,443 6,149 42 13,001 97 4, 926 63 7,566 44 7,360 90 2,080 52 6,358 90 5,, 354 79 2,957 13 1,851 35 90,508 06 15,78! 66 5 043 36 $147 37 151 68 151 86 215 96 162 70 131 43 293 84 113 48 139 40 265 49 3,194 11 313 07 166 30 182 86 64 80 261 43 329 92 43 68 186 67 130 74 147 80 151 83 64 63 164 99 121 37 378 48 196 84 82 07 99 27 98 96 209 14 146 12 V 142 95 49 93 290 04 217 47 185 76 217 05 1,113 95 165 20 273 31 373 34 85 16 252 33 149 41 163 94 109 97 6,997 20 737 65 168 S3 .32 Report of the State Tax Commission. TABLE SHOWING THE EFFECT 0PON THE REVENUE OF THE STATE AND THE VA- RIOUS COUNTIES OF A RELEASE OP THE STATE TAX UPON REAL AND PER- SONAL PROPEETY AND THE APPROPRIATION OF ALL TAXES UPON RAILROADS AND SIMILAR CORPORATIONS TO STATE PURPOSES-Contlnued. Counties. Tax surrendered by State. o o! 5 o c— Taxes surrender'd by counties et-cl- (P ffl .^ T3M O o » a P'O- cf a State Interest tax. o ® J ohnson . . . Knox Laclede — Laiayette.. Lawrence.. liewls Lincoln Linn Livingston. McDouald... Macon Madison . . . Maries Marlon Mercer JVIlller Mississippi Moniteau.. Monroe Montgomery Morgan New Madrid. Newton Nodaway Oregon Osage Ozark Pemiscot Perry Pettis... Phelps.. Pike Platte.. Polk Pulaski. Putnam. ■Ralls.... Randolph Ray Reynolds Ripley St. Charles.. St. Olalr St. Francois S. Genevieve .St. Louis.... Saline Schuyler Scotland Scott.... _... Shannon Shelby Stoddard Stone Sullivan Taney Texas Vernon Warren Washington. Wayne Webster Worth... Wright . St. Louis city Totals... IU,4H1 __ 5,647 16 4,403 17 14,326 14 8, 393 92 6,878 31 7,006 68 8,8.57 65 8,645 84 3, 538 94 13,508 82 3,56 __ 2, 540 47 11,315 _ 6,083 86 3, 681 99 i),843 12 5,833 70 8,960 48 6,391 43 3,697 15 3, 318 08 7,493 17 17,088 80 2,836 50 4,878 01 1,794 25 3,763 33 4 ' 14, 994 80 3,265 53 10,803 28 7,553 18 6.313 46 2 212 5,823 03 5, 932 97 8,756 22 10,966 22 2,341 31 3,023 76 13, 981 47 5,281 95 7,726 88 3,147 05 41,463 75 16, 798 90 3,951 99 5,381 24 S,096 71 2,812 55 7,580 74 5,450 87 2,179 68 6,786 11 1,817 91 4,501 76 12,210 59 4,209 52 3,778 52 2,932 09 4,082 75 4,574 65 3,655 29 581,661 54 1,581,737 41 64, $375 93 96 87 173 90 553 14 331 85 219 00 191 16 466 72 278 62 146 19 398 13 169 32 88 19 358 05 154 63 187 46 180 85 366 37 197 31 259 30 105 85 214 08 384 83 394 82 111 55 173 28 78 58 335 OS 269 14 444 59 158 76 417 01 ' 164 69 297 81 142 85 140 14 82 33 351 70 236 92 80 21 289 86 592 34 163 00 353 21 144 08 375 65 464 96 105 40 162 52 166 25 120 44 228 07 468 32 45 78 443 30 71 95 165 07 377 30 116 61 121 38 397 44 181 14 165 83 185 13 934 10 $14,837 5,744 4,577 07 14,879 28 8,725 77 7.097 31 7,197 84 9,324 87 8,924 41 2,685 13 13,906 75 2, 734 71 2,628 66 11,673 38 6,238 49 d,869 45 4,023 97 6,250 07 9,157 79 6,650 73 3,803 00 3,532 16 7,878 00 17,483 62 2,948 03 5,051 29 1,873 83 4.098 41 4,767 52 15.439 39 3,424 29 11,220 29 7,71T87 6,611 27 2,355 70 5,963 17 ' 6, 015 30 9,107 92 11,203 14 2,421 52 3,313 62 14,573 81 5,444 95 8,079 09 3,291 13 41,839 40 17,263 86 4,057 39 5,543 5,362 2,932 99 7,808 81 5,919 19 2,335 46 7,239 41 1,889 4,666 83 12,587 89 4,326 13 3,899 90 3,329 S3 4,263 89 4,740 48 3,840 42 646,595 64 110,610 991,692,343 40 $9,901 87 5,694 39 6,829 72 17,367 25 6,784 94 5,758 20 7,093 98 10,611 8S 12,616 72 3,027 65 15,102 77 3,114 59 18,981 35 5,769 86 1,088 48 7,399 07 6,340 74 6,569 14 7,064 85 3,565 53 5,336 33 7,359 86 14,001 22 2,712 72 4,274 14 1, 603 69 395 54 20,208 38 6,612 56 15,498 12 14,338 98 2,363 24 2.541 63 3,927 86 9,879 65 19,359 25 14,355 07 855 75 1,219 74 17, 175 58 6,544 35 8,177 67 265 51 39,707 52 11,787 29 6,761 a 6,446 40 5,565 64 1,980 35 4,277 9,180 82 7,618 70 60 3,082 63 18,777 42 6,213 75 3,852 30 9,924 60 6,089 45 2,675 38 4,909 49 512,895 08 $1,379 44 658 32 933 12 1,888 78 1,531 21 808 93 951 08 1,256 30 1,081 67 797 79 1,629 45 639 75 540 87 1,379 81 746 80 935 49 802 15 842 50 944 31 830 48 689 38 759 68 1,533 92 1,699 57 798 63 840 64 702 09 766 11 853 63 1,715 50 823 35 1,239 20 796 94 1.287 30 622 31 895 61 599 78 1,476 67 1.288 16 474 95 847 92 1,307 29 968 IS 1,433 97 614 52 2,639 47 1,312 39 576 07 654 32 811 00 606 89 828 11 1,514 10 537 28 1.062 19 562 89 1,231 76 1,628 91 538 43 788 47 911 10 974 38 520 68 1.063 38 27,097 32 164,212 34 $n,281 31 6,352 61 7,763 84 19,055 98 8,316 15 6,565 13 8,014 04 11,868 18 13,698 39 3,825 44 16,732 32 3, 754 34 540 67 20,340 96 6,516 66 2,023 9' 8,001 22 7,083 24 7,513 95 7,895 33 4,234 91 6,116 01 8,893 78 15,700 79 3.511 35 3,114 78 702 09 2,389 80 1,249 22 31,933 83 7,434 91 18,737 32 15,125 92 3,650 54 3,183 94 4, 332 37 10,479 43 20,835 92 15,623 23 1,330 70 2,067 86 18,483 85 7.512 53 9,610 64 880 -" 42,346 13,680 18 7,388 05 7,100 72 8,376 64 2,567 24 5, 105 63 10,694 92 537 28 8,880 89 563 29 4,315 39 20,404 33 6,750 18 4,840 77 10,335 70 7,083 73 3,198 08 5,572 87 539,792 40 1,864,079 33 $9,841 30 3,764 75 2,934 79 9,550 76 5,595 95 4,585 57 4,871 04 5,905 10 5,747 - 1,691 47 9,005 74 1,710 26 1,893 64 7,543 32 4,055 91 2,454 65 2,562 11 3, 933 43 5,973 "" 4,260 95 2,464 76 2,212 08 4,995 44 11,392 54 1,890 98 3,252 00 1,196 16 2,508 37 2,998 92 9,993 10 2,176 93 7,202 20 5,035 06 4,208 93 1,475 23 3,881 38 3,955 35 5,837 48 7,810 80 1,580 87 2,015 85 9,320 95 8,521 32 5,1.51 25 2,093 03 27,643 50 11,199 37 2,634 63 3,587 43 3,397 30 1,375 03 5,050 47 3,633 91 1,453 18 4,534 08 1,211 94 3,001 le 8,140 39 2,806 85 2,319 02 1,954 73 2,721 83 3,049 78 7,436 98 387,774 38 1,034,563 83 43,! 73,715 23 Report of the State Tax Commission. 33 ESTIMATED PEE CENT. OF ASSESSED VALUE TO TRUE VALUE. Counties. By Assessors. By Co unty Clerk By Collector. ■■A • ^ . o i 1 la : B CD 1 f ccS • o : 1 If n : a ■ p E CP en 1 •4 • 1 n I Adair 40 65 40 0, 40 60 60 60 3. 4 Barry 4G 100 40 60 40 40 SO 100 60 60 100 60 40 40 50 60 60 ^ Bates fi Benton 30 100 25 40 75 50 7 75 n 50 50 75 60 33 60 q 50 30 . 50 50 30 10 50 11 Caldwell 33>7 '^S 60 30 50 ^fl 40 50 100 100 40 66% 30 70 25 25 ^ SI Holt 40 30 !(<> 33 50 40 40 50 ■65 100 65 60 66% 30 50 50 . 60 50 S't Howell 40 40 75 50 40 ?< S5 ^fi 50 25 50 63K 104 60 50 33Jli 60 60 50 S7 38. S9 Laclede 65 40 33M 33M 35 65 60 100 66?^ 75 50 40 40 50 35 65 33 60 50 W ^^ \'> if'-t 30 33M 50 75 70 60 40 33« 60 41 45 fo^ 66X 70 40 40 60 60 100 66% 100 65 65 33M 50 65 60 40 40 40 46 Macon 50 50 17 4S 75 40 40 00 40 35 40 75 65 65 80 75. 63 100 75 40 60 50 40. 40 50 75 50 75 4q Marion 65 5(1 Mercer. Miller. 51 5?l 40 60 5S 33 40 65 63 100 90 33 50 60 51 Morgan*. 55 5fi 33M 50 50 60 35 50 100 65 50 66 75 50 50 66 57 50 65 50 5R 59 66% 35 40 75 m 66 ftl Pettis . . ■40 65 50 40 fi' Phelps.. 66?i 100 66M 63. Pike 75 100 60 ( No report.) D— 3 34 Report of the State Tax Commission. E3r-r.\T\TED PER OEST. OF A.S3B3SED VALUE TO TRUE VALUE-Continued. By Assessor. By County Olerk By Collector. f Counties. CD 1 .1 SB M t! O ■$ CO • o : p Cfi CD 11 CD m 1 O CDO CD CD 1 ag : " : If 11 : B : E, R4 PI a t.tfi 33 J^ 65 SSVs 33 . 40 33 60 1 60' ■ 65 00 50 50 SO 50 fiS Vulaski 40 33})i 50 50 fi7 RalK 40 40 33!^ 100 40 100 40 40 35 gq Ray 33J^ 1 75 1 95 40 40 00 00 20 70 SO 40 65 40 50 50 70 Reynolds 75 65 71. Kipley 73. St. Olair 90 40 80 65 70 50 40 40 50 50 40 35 33>iS 1 66 1 70 75 00 00 70 50 50 66 70 75 33}^ 66 70 75 86. Worth. 66 70 100 100 70 50 65 70 SO 87 Wrieht 60 City of St. Louis >■ 1 1 per cent. 1 100 per cent. C No report.) BILLS RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMISSIOI. BILLS PEEPARED AND SUBMITTED BY THE STATE TAX COMMISSION, The Commission, as stated in the last paragraph of the re- port, prepared and submitted to the Governor, separate bills, each intended to carry out some of the recommendations and suggestions made in the report. The bills submitted by the Commission are as follows : AN ACT To amend section 9139 of article II, chapter 149 of tlie Revised Statutes of Missouri, 1899, concerning the assessment and collection of the revenue. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows : Section 1. Section 9139 of the. Eevised Statutes of 1899, is hereby amended by striking out the word ' ' two, ' ' between the words "of" and "years," in the fourth line of said section, and inserting the word "four" in lieu thereof; so that said section, as amended, shall read as follows : Section 9139. Term of Office.— Assessors elected under the provisions of this chapter shall enter upon the discharge of their duties on the first day of June next after they shall have been elected, and shall hold their offices for the term of four years, and until their successors are elected and qualified. AN ACT To authorize the publication of assessment lists. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows : Section 1. The coxmty court of each county in this State shall have power to cause to be published in two newspapers of opposite politics, at least fifteen days before the meeting of the 38 Proposed Tax Laivs. county Board of Equalization in eacli year, an alpliabetical list of the tax-payers of said county, arranged by municipal townships, setting out the name of the tax-payer and the total amount of his personal property, as shown by the assessor's books, and also, in another column, the total amount of money, notes and credits assessed to such tax-payer and may also add another column con- taining the total valuation of the real estate of each tax-payer. Before making any such publication such county court shall first ascertain the total cost of such publication and enter into a con- tract therefor. Sec. 2. Whenever the county court shall make an order for the publication of such list, it shall be the duty of the county clerk to prepare the same for the printer, and he shall receive such compensation therefor as the county court may allow. Sec. 3. The publisher of the newspaper in which said list is printed shall deliver to the clerk of the county court at least two copies of said paper for each school district in said comity, without extra charge, and said clerk shall immediately mail one copy thereof to the school district clerk of each school district in said county, who shall have the same present at the annual school meeting thereof, and shall preserve it with the records of said school district for the examination and inspection of all parties interested therein. Sec. 4. The word "tax-payer" shall include all corpora- tions and co-partnerships as well as natural persons. Sec. 5. There being now no method provided for the publi- cation of such lists and it is being deemed essential by the Gen- eral Assembly that said list should be published, an emergency is hereby declared to exist within the meaning of the Constitu- tion, and this act shall become operative from and after its pas- sage and approval by the Governor. AN ACT Concerning the; assessment and taxation of money, notes, bonds and other evidences of debt, and corporate stocks assessable under tlie laws of tWs state to the stoclcholder. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows: Section 1. The county assessor of each county in this State, and the proper officer of the City of St. Louis, shall be fur- Proposed Tas Laivs. 39 Tjished with suitable blanks for the assessment and return for taxation of money, notes, bonds and other evidences of debt, and corporate stocks subject under the laws of this State to be as- sessed to the stockholder, and said lists shall be separate from those prepared for the return for assessment of other property. The blanks shall be in such form as to require the disclosure by the tax-payer of the total amount of money, notes, bonds and other evidences, of debt, and also of corporate stocks owned by him at the date of the assessment and subject by "the laws of this State to be assessed to such tax-payer, and shall further state the nature and amount of such property, and how and where secured, and whether, if of record, the security stands in the name of the assessed or of some other person who has as- signed it to him. Proper blanks shall be prepared and printed for this purpose, and suitable interrogatories shall be contained therein to enable the assessor to obtain full information in re- gard to said matters. One of said blanks shall be furnished eacl) tax-payer in the county by the assessor, and such tax-payer shall be required to raake return thereof to said assessor within the time required by law for the return of assessment lists, and said lists, after the completion of the assessment books, shall be filed in the office of the county clerk, and remain therein for three years, and at the expiration of that time shall be destroyed by the county clerk, under an order of the county court. See. 2. If the assessor shall be of the opinion, from the gen- eral understanding in the neighborhood of such tax-payer, that such list is not a fair and just return of the tax-payer's property, it shall be his dut}" to add to the value of said property so re- turned by said tax-payer such amount as he may deem proper, from the best information he can obtain, and to deliver a copy of the list as made by said assessor to such tax-payer, who shall have the right to appear before the county Board of Equaliza- tion, or the city Board of Equalization of the City of St. Louis, as the case may be, at the next annual meeting of such board, and show to said board that such increase is unjust and unfair, and in that event the board shall equalize and adjust such assess- ment according to the evidence that may be submitted to it. Sec. 3. Any tax-payer of the county or city, as the case may 40 Proposed Tax Laws. be, may file with the assessor at any time prior to the meetmg of the Board of Equalization for such year an objection in writ- ing to the assessment of the money, notes, bonds, evidences of debt and corporate stocks of any other tax-payer of such county or city, and the assessor shall present to the Board of Equaliza--^ tion such written objections at the next meeting thereof for such action as said board may deem proper. ' Sec. 4. In all counties in this State which have township or- ganization the duties to be performed under thi-s act by county assessors shall devolve upon the township assessors, who shall have the same power and proceed in like manner as ia case of ^ county assessors. Sec. 5. All acts and parts of acts in conflict with this act are hereby repealed. Sec. 6. It being important that separate blanks authorized by this act shall be provided for use of the assessors in making the assessment beguming June 1, 1903, an emergency has arisen wi'thin the meaning of the Constitution, and this act shall be in force from and after its passage; AN ACT To require assessing officers and boards to enter upon the assessor's books and records of such boards the true value of all property subject to assessment, and to extend a pen cent thereof as the taxable value in a separate column, and to base the levy of all taxes upon said taxable value. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows: Section 1. It shall be the duty of all assessing officers and boards in assessing and equalizing for taxation, any and all classes of property, to enter in a column in the assessor's books, or the records of the assessing or equalizing boards, as the case maybe, the true value of such property, and to set out in another column forty per cent, of said true value as the taxable value thereof. All assessment and tax books shall be prepared with columns suitable for said purpose. This shall apply to the as- sessment of all classes of property for taxation. The county, city and township assessors, county and city boards of equali- zation, as well as the State Board of Equalization, and all other officers charged with the assessment or equalization of property Proposed Tax Laws. 41 for taxation sliall be governed by this rule in making such assess- ments, and in the equalization thereof, and the necessary columns for that purpose shall be provided in the books, records and cer- tificates used by said officers and boards. Sec. 2. The taxes upon all such property shall be extended upon the taxable value thereof. Sec. 3. All acts and parts of acts in conflict with this act are hereby repealed. Sec. 4. This act shall take effect and be in force from and after June 1, 1904. AN ACT To authorize the county board of equalization to assess and equalize the value of property omitted from the assessor's book; Be if enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows'. Section 1. The county Board of Equalization at its annual meeting in each year, in addition to- the powers now conferred by law, shall have authority to assess and equalize the value of any property that may have been omitted from the assessor's books then under examination by said board, and in case said board shall add any property, real or personal, to said assessor's books, it shall cause notice in writing to be served upon the own- er of such property, stating the kind and class of property and the value fixed thereon by said board, and naming the time and place, not less than five days thereafter, when and where such owner may appear before said board and show cause why said assessment should not be made. At the time fixed said board shall again meet and give an opportunity to said tax-payer to be heard in regard to said assessment and may change or alter the same upon it being shown by said owner that said assess- ment was erroneous or improperly made ; otherwise, said prop- erty and the valuation as fixed by said board, shall be extended upon the assessor's books, as in case of other property. Said notice shall be signed by the clerk of the county court and shall be served by the sheriff of the county, and it shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney, when called upon by the Board of Equalization, to represent said county in any such proceedings. In case of the assessment of real estate belonging to non-resi- dents, publication may be made of the additional assessment, in 42 Proposed Ta^r Lazes. the same manner as publication required by law where the as- sessment has been increased by said board. Sec. 2. There being now no definite provision in the stat- utes for the assessment by the county Board of Equalization of omitted property, an emergency is hereby declared to exist with- in the meaning of the Constitution, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its approval. AN ACT To provide for the assessment and taxation of property omitted from the assessor's book and overlooked by the board of equalization. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows : Section 1. If it shall appear to the county court of any county in this State, after the adjournment of tbe county Board of Equalization for any year and before the time fixed by law for the return of the delinquent list for that year, or to the president of the board of assessors in the" City of St. Louis, after the ad- journment of the city Board of Equalization and before the re- turn of the delinquent list in said city, that any property has been omitted from the assessor's book for such year, it shall be the duty of the county court or the president of the board of assessors in the City of St. Louis, as the case may be, to cause notice in writing to be served upon the owner of said property, naming a time and place when and where said property will be assessed for taxation for said year, and thereupon the county court or the president of the board of assessors, as the case may be, shall, at said time and place, proceed to assess said property and extend the taxes thereon, and cause a certified copy of its action to be delivered to the county collector, who shall proceed 'to collect the same and shall account therefor in the same man- ner as other taxes for said year. Sec. 2. Whenever any property shall be omitted from the tax book for any year or years, the county court, or the presi- dent of the board of assessors of the City of St. Louis, as the case my be, shall have power to assess the same, upon the same notice and in the manner provided in the preceding section and to extend the taxes thereon at the same rate as upon other prop- erty for said omitted year or years, and such taxes shall be cer- tified to the collector and collected and accounted for as other Proposed Tax Lawi. 43 taxes : Provided, however, that the power to so assess omitted property is limited to the three tax years next preceding the time of making such order. AN ACT To amend sections 9144, 9157 awd 9167 of article II, chapter 149 of the Revised Statutes of the State of Missouri of 1899, concerning the assess- ment and collection of revenue, and to provide for the assessment of real estate once in four years in all counties having less than one hundred thousand inhabitants and to fix the compensation of the officers for making such assessment. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as folloivs : Section 1. Section 9144 of article II, chapter 149 of the Re- vised Statutes of the State of Missouri, 1899, concerning the assessment and collection of revenue, is hereby amended by add- ing between the .words "contrary" and "second," in the nine- teenth line of said section, the following words: "Provided, that in counties having less than one hundred thousand inhab- tants, no assessment of real estate shall be made after the as- sessment beginning on the first day of June, 1904, until the first day of June, 1908, and every four years thereafter, unless the county court of such county shall for cause shown require said real estate to be assessed annually;" so that said section, as amended, shall be as follows : "Section 9144. Time of Making Assessment.— What Lists Shall Contain.— The assessor or his deputy or deputies shall, be- tween the first days of June and January, and after being fur- nished with the necessary books and blanks by the county clerk at the expense of the county, proceed to take a list of the taxable personal property in his county, town or district, and assess the value thereof, in the manner following, to-wit : He shall call at the ofSce, place of doing business 6t residence of each person re- quired by this chapter to list property, and shall require such person to make a correct statement of all taxable property owned by such person, or under the care, charge or management of such person, except merchandise, which may be required to pay a license tax, being in any county in this State, in accordance with the provisions of this chapter; and the person listing the property shall enter a true and correct statement of such prop- erty in a printed or written blank prepared for that purpose; 44 Proposed Tax Laws. which statement, after being filled out, shall be signed and sworn to, to the extent required by this chaptei*, by the person listing the property and delivered to the assessor. Such list shall con- tain : First, a list of all the real estate and its value, to be listed and assessed on the first day. of June, 1893, and every year there- after, anything in this or any other section to the contrary: Provided, that in counties having less than one hundred thous- and inhabitants, no assessment of real estate shall be made after the assessment beginning on the first day of June, 1904, until the first day of June, 1908, and every four years thereafter, un- less the county court of such county shall for cause shown re- quire said real estate to be assessed annually; second, a list of all the live stock, showing the number of horses, mares and geld- ings, and their value ; the number of asses and jennets and their value; the number of mules and their value; the number of neat cattle and their value ; the number of sheep and their value ; the number of hogs and their value ; and all other live stock and its value ; third, an aggregate statement of all farm machinery and implements, and their value; fourth, a statement of household property, including the number of pianos and other musical in- struments, clocks, watches, chains and appendages, sewing ma- chines, gold and silver plate, jewelry, household and kitchen fur- niture, and the value thereof ; fifth, money on hand ; sixth, money deposited in any bank or other safe place ; seventh, an aggregate statement of solvent notes, unsecured by mortgage or deed of trust; eighth, an aggregate statement of all solvent notes se- cured by mortgage or deed of trust ; ninth, an aggregate state- ment of all solvent bonds, whether State, county, town, city, township, incorporated or unincorporated companies ; tenth, all other property not above enumerated (except merchandise) and its value; under this head shall be included all pleasure car- riages of all kinds ; all shares of stock or interest held in steam- boats, keel boats, wharf boats and all other vessels; all toll bridges, all printing presses, type and machinery therewith con- nected, and all portable mills of every description, and all post coaches, carriages, wagons and other vehicles used by any person in the transportation of mail (except railway carriages), all carriages, hacks, wagons, buggies and other vehicles of every Proposed Tax Laws. 45 kind and description kept and used by liverymen ; all carts, hacks, omnibusses and other vehicles used in the transportation of per- sons (except railway carriages), and all paintings and statuary and every other species of property not exempt by law from tax- ation." Sec. 2. Section 9157 of article II, chapter 149 of the Ke- vised Statutes of 1899, concerning the assessment and collection of revenue, is hereby amended by striking out after the word "June" in the second line of said section, the words and figures "1881 and every two years thereafter," and inserting in lieu thereof, the words "in each year in which there shall be an as- sessment of real estate ; " so that said section, as amended, shall be as follows : "Section 9157. Delivery of Books to Assessor, and Eeturn to County Clerk.— The clerk of the county court shall deliver to the assessor, on or before the first day of June, in each year in which there shall be an assessment of real estate, the assessor 's book of the last assessment of real estate, and the list of taxable lands furnished by the register of lands and take his receipt therefor; and the assessor, as soon as he shall have completed his assessment and made his assessor's books for the year, shall return the whole of such papers and documents to the clerk." Sec. 3. Section 9167, article II, chapter 149 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, concerning the assessment and collection of revenue, is hereby amended by adding the following words to said section: "Provided, that in counties of less than one hun- dred thousand inhabitants there shall be no assessment of real estate after the assessment beginning June 1, 1904, until the first day of June, 1908, and every four years thereafter, unless the county court of such county shall for cause shown by an order of record direct an annual assessment of such real estate ; ' ' so that said section, when amended, shall be as follows : * ' Section 9167. Eeal Estate— "When Assessed.— Eeal estate shall be assessed at the assessment which shall commence on the first day of June, 1893, and shall be required to be assessed every year thereafter : Provided, that in counties of less than one hundred thousand inhabitants there shall be no assessment of real estate after the assessment beginning June 1, 1904, until 46 Pro pose a i ax i^uwi. the first day of June, 1908, and every four years thereafter, un- less the county court of such county shall for cause shown by an order of record direct an annual assessment of such real estate." Sec. 4. In such county in any year in which there is no annual assessment of real estate, it shall.be the duty of the assessor in taking the list for the assessment of personal prop- erty, to note thereon any change in the ownership of real estate in his county, and also any changes in the value of real estate that may be reported to him or that may come to his knowledge. And he shall report all such changes in ownership and valuation t§ the county Board of Equalization at the next annual meeting thereof, after said changes have been so noted by him. And it shall be the duty of such board to examine the real estate book each year, and cause all changes in ownership to be properly noted thereon, and to raise or lower the valuation of each tract of land, the value of which is found to have been materially chariged since the last assessment. Whenever the board shall raise the valuation of any tract of real estate, as hereinbefore provided, notice thereof shall be given and the same proceed- ings shall be had as required by section 9132 of the Eevised Statutes of 1899. And the taxes upon real estate in such county shall be levied upon the last assessment of real estate ia said county as adjusted and equalized by the county Board of Equali- zation for the year for which such taxes are to be collected, and the county clerk in making out the tax book from the last as- sessment of real estate, shall adjust the same according to the changes made therein by the Board of Equalization for such year. The assessor's real estate book shall contain Suitable blank spaces and columns to permit changes in ownership and valuation to be readily noted, and valuations to be extended for the years in which no assessment of land is made. Sec. 5. In all cases where there shall only be an assessment of real estate once in four years, under the provisions of this act, the assessor shall, either in person or by his deputy, withia the year next preceding the return of his assessment book, ex- amine each farm, separate tract of land or town lot in his county and shall fix the value thereof from such personal inspection, and in lieu of the compensation now allowed for the annual assess- I' ro posed 1 ax Lazvs. 47 ment, shall receive for the assessment of real estate in such fourth year, the sum of ten cents per tract for each tract or town lot assessed hy him and for the noting and reporting of changes in ownership and valuation in the years in which no assessment of real estate shall be made, said assessor shall receive three cents per tract for each tract in which a change shall be made by the Board of Equalization. AN ACT To create the office of State Tax Commissioner, and define the duties and powers of such officer. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows : Section 1. There is hereby created the office of State Tax Commissioner, which shall be filled by appointment of the G-ov- ernor immediately after this act takes effect, and the person so appointed shall hold office until the first day of January, 1905. The State Tax Commissioner shall be elected in the same man- ner as other State officers at the next general election in Novem- ber, 1904, and every four years thereafter, and shall enter upon the discharge of his duties on the first day of January succeeding his election. Nominations shall be made for such office and the election shall be conducted and the returns thereof shall be made as in case of other executive officers of the State. Sec. 2. The State Tax Commissioner shall be a qualified voter, not less than thirty-five years of age, and shall have re- sided in this State the five years next preceding his appoint- ment or election, and before entering upon the discharge of his duties shall be commissioned by the Governor and shall take and subscribe the oath of office prescribed by the Constitution for other State officers, and shall enter into bond to the State of Mis- souri, with sureties approved by the Grovemor, in the sum of five thousand dollars, conditioned for the faithful performance of the duties of his office, which bond, with the approval en- dorsed thereon, shall be filed with the Secretary of State. Sec. 3. Said State Tax Commissioner shall have and exer- cise general supervision over the assessors, county and city Boards of Equalization, collectors and county courts in the mat- ter of the assessment and collection of revenue, ^9 ^h^ e;i<^ ^hat 48 Proposed Tax Laws. all the properties of the State liable for assessment for taxation shall be placed upon the assessment rolls and to secure uniform- ity of tax valuation and tax action throughout the State. He shall provide a uniform method of keeping all books relating to the assessment and collection of taxes in each county of the State ; and shall also prepare the necessary blanks to be used by the assessors in listing property for taxation. The Tax Com- missioner, or his chief clerk, shall, at least once in each year, visit each county in the State and confer with the assessing officials of such county, for the purpose of requiring proper assessment and return of property, the uniform value thereof, and the use of forms and systems of keeping accounts prescribed by said Commissioner. He shall instruct the assessors in regard to their duties and see that the same are properly performed. He shall appear before the county and city Board of Equalization or board of assessors, or the county court of any county and re- quire the proper and uniform assessment and valuation of prop- erty iQ such county, and also shall inform such boards or courts of any complaints of omitted property which may have come to his knowledge. He shall receive complaints of the improper administration of the tax laws of the State in any respect that may be filed with him by any citizen and shall investigate the same and take steps to correct any irregularity, omission or non- performance of duty in that behalf. He shall take charge of and superintend the enforcement of the collateral inheritance law and the collection of taxes provided for therein. Sec. 4. If complaints shall be made to the State Tax Com- missioner after the county Board of Equalization has completed the examination and adjustment of the assessor's book that the assessment of property in any county has not been properly and fairly made as required by the laws of this State, or that prop- erty subject to taxation has been omitted from the assessor's book, or if said State Tax Commissioner shall believe that such facts exist, it shall be his duty to visit said county and investi- gate said matter, and if it shall seem to him that the complaints are well founded, he shall fix a time and place in said county for hearing said matter, and shall notify the assessor and the prop- erty owners whose property is alleged to have been omitted from Proposed Tax Lmvs. 49 said list, or improperly assessed of the time and place of said hearing, and said Commissioner shall, at the time fixed, fully investigate the assessment, and if he shall find that any property has been improperly assessed, or any such property has been omitted from the assessor 's book, may then and there assess said property and cause the same to. be added by the clerk of the county court to the assessor's book. The said Commissioner, upon hearing of said matter, shall have the same power as the circuit court of the county to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books and papers relating to. said matter, and he shall also have power to administer oaths to all such wit- nesses and persons appearing before him. And in any case where it shall appear to the State Tax Commissioner that the entire assessment of any county for any year was so irregular and defective that an adequate compliance with the statutes of the State cannot be had without a re-assessment, he may require such re-assessment to be made of all the property, under his su- pervision and direction, for which re-assessment no additional compensation shall be allowed to the assessing officials of such county. Sec. 5. If, in the opinion of the Commissioner, any county officer has wUfuUy failed and neglected to perform any of the duties devolving upon him, relating to the assessment and col- lection of taxes, he shall notify the Attorney-General and the Attorney-General shall at once proceed against such delinquent officer in the manner provided by law, and the Attorney-General shall be the legal adviser of said Commissioner and shall render said Commissioner all necessary legal assistance in the perform- ance of the duties of his office. Sec. 6. The State Tax Commissioner shall make diligent in- vestigation and inquiry concerning the revenue laws and sys- tems of other states and countries, so far as the same may be known by public reports and statistics and can be ascertained by correspondence with officers thereof, and with the aid of infor- mation thus obtained, together with the experience and obser- vation of our own laws and the operation thereof, recommend to the Governor, in an annual report to be made on the first day of January in each year, such amendments, changes and modifi- er 50 Proposed Tax J^azvs. cations of .our revenue laws as seem proper and requisite to remedy injustice and irregularities in taxation and to facilitate the assessment and collection of public revenue ; and shall state in said report the whole amount of taxes collected in the State for all purposes, classified as State, county, township and mu- nicipal, with the sources thereof, the amount lost; the cause of the loss; the proceedings and work of said Tax Commissioner, and such other matter and information concerning public revenue as he may deem of public interest. And the Governor shall submit said reports to the General Assembly at the next session thereof. Sec. 7- It shall be the duty of the State Tax Commissioner to lay before the State Board of Equalization any facts that shall come to his knowledge with reference to the value of prop- erty to be' assessed or equalized by said board, and by order of said board he shall visit any portion of the State for the pur- pose of obtaining any information desired by the members of the State Board of Equalization in reference to the assessment and taxation of the property in the State. Sec. 8. The State Tax Commissioner shall receive a sal- ary of four thousand dollars per annum, to be paid out of the State treasury, in the same manner and at the same time as the salaries of otiior state officers. Sec. 9. The State Tax Commissioner shall have power to appoint a chief clerk, who shall have all the qualifications of the Commissioner, and shall perform such duties as may be as- signed to him by said Commissioner. He shall have all the powers of the Tax Commissioner, and may, under the direction of the Commissioner, perform any of the acts and duties devolv- ing herein upon the State Tax Commissioner. His appointment, with the oath of office endorsed thereon, shall be filed with the Secretary of State, and he shall hold his office at the pleasure of the Commissioner, and shall receive a salary of two thousand dollars per annum, to be paid in the same manner as the salaries of the chief clerks of the other State officers. Sec. 10. All acts and parts of acts in conflict with this act are hereby repealed. Sec. 11. It being important that there should be provision Proposed Tax Lazi's. 51 for the immediate supervision of the assessment and collection of taxes creates an emergency within the meaning of the Consti- tution, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its approval. AN ACT To amend section 913S of article VI, chapter 149 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, concerning delinquent and back taxes. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows: Sec. 1. That section 9315, article VT, chapter 149 of the Eevised Statutes of 1899, concerning deliuquent and back taxes, be and the same is hereby amended by inserting after the word ''month," in the last line of said section, the following words: "Provided, that where suit is brought for taxes delinquent more than one year, then all taxes, whether delinquent or not at the time of said suit, may be included in said suit and judgment taken for the same, and said real estate sold to pay the same, as provided in other cases;" so that said section, when amended, shall read as follows : Sec. 9315. When Taxes are Hereafter Delinquent.— Here- after as often as any delinquent tax-list or tax-bills shall be re- ceived by the county court or other proper tribunal or officer from collectors at their annual settlements, the same shall be made by the county clerk, if in counties, and if in cities contain- ing a population of five thousand or more inhabitants, by the joroper officer, into a "back-tax-book" containing the same facts and in the same form as provided in section 9300, as to lands, city and town lots now delinquent ; except that in counties where an alphabetical arrangement of the "land list" in the assessor's books shall have been required by au order of the county court, such "back-tax book" shall be made out in alphabetical order, in the name of the owner, if known, and if the OAvner be not known, then in the name of the person to whom the tract or lot was last assessed, and said book shall be delivered to the proper collector; the collector shall proceed to collect the taxes due thereon, but shall not bring suit thereon for one year after such taxes become delinquent, but thereafter he shall proceed with such delinquent taxes in all matters the same as provided in this chapter in reference to taxes now delinquent; all taxes hereafter 52 Proposed Tax Laws. becoming delinquent shall bear one per cent, interest per montli from the time they become delinquent until paid, and shall also be subject to the same fees, commissions and charges as in this chap- ter provided for taxes now delinquent, except that for making the same into the "back-tax book" the clerk or other officer who makes such book shall receive only ten cents per tract, city or town lot. In computing interest under this section, a fraction of a month shall be counted as a whole month : Provided, that where suit is brought for taxes delinquent more than one year, then all taxes, whether delinquent or not at the time of said suit, may be included in said suit and judgment taken for the same, and said real estate sold to pay the same as provided in pther cases. AN ACT To repeal sections 9300, 9301, 9302, 9303 and 9304 of article VI of chapter 149 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, concerning delinquent and back taxes, and enact in lieu thereof new sections, to be designated as sections, 9300, 9301, 9302, 9303a, 9303b, 9303c, 9303d and 9304. Be it enacted by tJte General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows: Section 1. Sections 9300, 9301, 9302, 9303 and 9304 of ar- ticle VI of chapter 149 of the Eevised Statutes of 1899, concern- ing delinquent and back taxes are hereby repealed, and the fol- lowing sections are hereby enacted, to be known as sections 9300, 9301, 9302, 9303a, 9303b, 9303c, 9303d and 9304: Section 9300. Who Shall Make Back Tax-book. -Every two years, within thirty days after the settlement of the col- lector, the several county clerks in each county in this State, or in such cities, the register, city clerk or other proper officer, shall make in a book to be called the "back-tax book," a correct list in numerical order of all tracts of land and town lots on which back taxes shall be due in such county or city, setting forth op- posite each tract of land or town lot the name of the owner, if known, and if the owner thereof be not known, then to whom the same was last assessed; the description thereof, the year or years for which such tract of land or town lot is delinquent or forfeited, and the amount of the original tax due each fund on said real estate (and the interest due on the whole of said tax, at the time of making said back-tax book, together with the clerk's fees then due) in appropriate columns arranged therefor. Proposed Tax Laivs. 53 and the aggregate amount of taxes, interest and clerk's fees charged against each tract of land or town lot for all the years for which the same is delinquent or forfeited; said back-tax book, when completed, shall be delivered by said clerk or other proper officer to the proper collector of the connty or such city, for which he shall take duplicate receipts, one of which he shall file in his office and the other with the State Auditor, and the clerk or other proper officer shall charge such collector with the correct amount of taxes, interest and clerk's fees contained in said back-tax book. In all such cities the said back-tax book shall be made out ia alphabetical order in the name of the owner, if known, and if the owner be not known, then in the name of the person to whom such tract or lot was last assessed. All taxes, interest and clerk's fees hereafter contained in the back tax-book herein described, shall bear interest from the time of the making out of said.back tax-book at the rate of ten per cent, per annum until paid. In computing interest under this article a fraction of a month shall be counted as a whole month : Provided, however, that all taxes which shall have become barred under the statute of limitations under said revenue law, shall be omitted from such back tax-book. Section 9301. Back Taxes, When Collected, How a Party May Eedeem.— The collectors of the respective counties and the collectors of such cities respectively shall proceed to collect the taxes contaiaed in such back tax-book as herein required, and any person interested in or the owner of any tract of land or town lot contained in said back tax-book may at any time before sale for taxes redeem such tract of land or town lot or any part thereof from the State's or such city's lien thereon, by paying to the proper collector the amount of the original taxes as charged against said tract of land or town lot described in said back tax-book, together with the interest on the same and the costs accruing under this article: Provided, that if suit shall have been commenced against any person owing taxes on any tract of land or town lot contained in said back tax-book, for the collection of taxes due on the same, the person desiring to re- deem such tract of land or town lot shall, in addition to the orig- inal tax and the interest and costs accruing under this article. 54 Proposed Tax Lazus. pay all necessary costs incurred in the couf t wliere tlie said suit is pending, together with such attorney's fees as the court may allow. Section 9302. Enforcement of Payment of Taxes by Suit, Etc.— If on the completion of such back tax-book, any of said lands or town lots contained in said back tax-book shall remain unredeemed, it shall be the duty of the collector to proceed to enforce the payment of the taxes charged against such tract or lot, by suit in the courts of competent jurisdiction of the county where the real estate is situated, which said courts shall have jurisdiction without regard to the amount sued on, to enforce the lien of the State or such cities ; and for the purpose of pros- ecuting suits for taxes under this article, the collector shall have power, with the approval of the county court, oi* in such cities, the mayor thereof, to employ such attorneys as he may deem necessary, who shall receive as fees in any suit such sum not to exceed ten per cent, of the amount of taxes actually collected and paid into the treasury, as may be agreed upon in -^riting, and approved by the county court or in such cities the mayor there- of before such services are rendered, which sum shall be taxed as costs in the suit and collected as other costs, and no such at- torney shall receive any fee or compensation for such services except as in this section provided ; and it shall be the duty of the collector when suit shall have been commenced against any tract of land or town lot on said back tax-book, to note opposite said tract or lot, such fact, also, against whom suit has been com- menced : Provided, however, that in case of suit upon any such lot or tract for said taxes it shall be the duty of the collector to include in such suit all taxes against said real estate whether delinquent or not, and to that end may file an amended petition including all taxes due at the time of judgment whether delin- quent or not, but a failure to thus include all taxes shall in no wise affect the validity of said suit or the lien for such taxes as shall not be included in said suit ; and provided further, that in cities of thirty thousand or more inhabitants, the attorney or at- torneys appointed by the collector, with the approval of the mayor of such cities, for the purpose of prosecuting suits for taxes under this article, shall be entitled to a fee in any suit, Proposed Tax Lawi. • 55 sucli fee not to exceed five per cent, after judgment is obtained, collected and paid into the treasury, as may be agreed upon; and if such taxes are paid before judgment is obtained, tbe at- torney collecting tbe same shall be entitled to a fee not exceed- ing two per cent, on all sums collected and paid into the treasury. Section 9303a. Actions, How Prosecuted— The Petition— The Tax BUI.— All actions commenced under the provisions of this chapter shall be prosecuted in the name of the State of Missouri, at the relation and to the use of the collector against the owner of the property ; and all lands owned by the same per- son or persons may be included iti one petition and in one count thereof, for the taxes for all such years as taxes may be due thereon, and said petition shall show the different years for which taxes are due, as well as the several kinds of taxes or funds to which they are due, with the respective amounts due to each fund; all of which shall be set forth in a tax-bill of said back taxes, duly authenticated by the certificate of the collector, and filed with the petition, and said tax-bill or bills shall be prima facie evidence that the amount claimed in said suit is just and correct; and except as herein otherwise provided, all notices and process in suits under this chapter shall be sued out and served in the same manner as in civU actions in the circuit court ; and in case of suits against non-resident unknown parties, or other owners on whom service cannot be ]:ad by ordinary summons, the proceedings shall be the same as now provided by law in civU actions affecting real and personal property, save as in this chapter provided. In all suits under this chapter, the general laws of the State as to practice and proceedings in civil actions shall apply so far as applicable and not contrary to this chapter. But anj^ failure of said collector to include in such pe- tition all lands owned by the same person or persons, or to file with such petition such duly authenticated tax-bill shall in no wise affect the validity of such proceedings and a judgment in such suit shall be as valid as judgments in ordinary actions and subject to attack the same as judgments in ordinary actions and not otherwise. Section 9303b. Petition.— Said petition may be in the fol- lowing form and shall be valid if in such form : ,56 Proposed Tax Laws. The State of Missouri, at the relation and to tlie use of as collector of the revenue of in the State of Missouri, plaintiff, vs. , defendant. Plaintiff states that relator is the legally commis- sioned and qualified collector of the revenue within and for in the State of Missouri. That the following described real estate situate in said county, to-wit : was subject to taxation for years under the laws of this State and that said real estate was duly assessed for taxation for said years and that under and by virtue of the laws of this State there were, by the duly commissioned, qual- ified and acting officers of said county and State (and city in case of suit for city taxes), duly assessed and levied upon said real estate, under duly established rates per centum on duly assessed and equalized valuation, certified and extended by said officers in the manner provided by law, taxes for said years, in the amounts and for the several funds as follows: That said taxes are unpaid on said real estate and the several tracts, as follows : Year. Original taxes. Interest. Co. Clerk's fees. Total. (( II <( ii iC tt II li And that said taxes became delinquent on the first day of Jan- uary following said year and bear interest therefrom at the rate of one per cent, per month together with collector's commission and county clerk's fees as provided by law. That is the duly employed attorney under appointment by said collector duly approved, to prosecute~tliis and other back tax suits for said taxes and is entitled imder such contract to receive as fees in said suits, to be taxed and collected as costs therein . . . per cent, of the amount collected and paid into the treasury. That the defendants are the record owners of said real estate at the time of filing this petition. Proposed Tax Laivs. 57 Wlierefore, the State of Missouri, at the relation and to the use of , as collector of the revenue within and for said in State of Missouri, prays judgment at the relation and to the use aforesaid, in the sum of dollars, aggregate amount of said taxes, interest and clerk's fees, with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent, per annum from April 1, , together with fees, commissions and costs of this proceeding and that the same be declared a lien in favor of the State of Missouri, and all equities of redemption foreclosed, and that said lien be enforced, and said real estate, or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy such judgment, interest, fees, commissions and costs thereon, be sold, and that a special fieri facias be issued thereon. Attorneys for Plaintiff. Section 9303c. Summons.— It shall not be necessary to serve any defendant with a copy of the petition in such cause, but the writ of summons shall describe therein the real estate and years set forth in the petition and service of said writ of summons shall be valid and binding upon such defendants thus served without a copy of such petition. Section 9303d. Publication.— When it shall appear by affi- davit of collector attached to such petition that any defendant is a non-resident of this State, or it shall appear by the return of the sheriff that service can not be had upon any defendant, then such defendant may be served by publication, as provided by law in civil actions affecting real property : Provided, how- ever, that such order of publication addressed to such defend- ant, may be in the following form : OEDER OF PUBLICATION. To , defendant. You are hereby notified that a suit is now pending in the circuit court of county in the State of Missouri, to enforce the State 's lien for taxes on the following described real estate in said county : 58 Proposed Tax Laws. for (State and county or city) purposes for years and for the various funds set forth, in the petition on file in said cause. And that said suit stands for trial and judgment at the next term of court to be begun on the .... day of , . ., A. D. 19 ... , when and where you can appear and defend ; other- wise judgment will be rendered according to the prayer of the petition, as probided by law, and said real estate be sold for said taxes. Dated the .... day of , A. D. 19 . . . Clerk of said Court. Said publication shall be made for four weeks and the last in- sertion shall be at least fifteen days before the first day of the term at which judgment shall be rendered. In case of unknown parties said collector shall state in his petition or affidavit that he cannot insert the name of such un- known parties because they are unknown to him and shall set- forth as far as he is able in said affidavit how said unknown de- fendants are interested in said real estate, and the same recital shall be set forth in the notice or order of publication against said unknown parties. The affidavits for publication may be made by the collector or his deputy or his attorney : Provided, that upon the filing of said affidavit for publication at any time during the pendency of said suit, said order of publication shaU be made and published as hereinbefore required, and shall be valid and binding upon the parties therein named as effectually as if made upon the filing of the petition in said' cause. And the fact that the writ of summons shall have been issued to the sheriff and returned not served, and that no order of court was made upon such return for publication, shall in no wise affect the validity of the judgment rendered upon such publication. Section 9,304. The Judgment and the Sheriff's Duty. -The judgment, if against the defendant, shall describe the land upon which taxes are found to be due ; shall state the amount of taxes and interest found to be due upon each tract or lot, and the year or years for which the same are due, up to the rendition thereof and shall decree that the lien of the State be enforced, Proposed Tax Laws. 59 and tliat the real estate or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy such judgment, interest and costs, be sold, and a spe- cial fieri facias shall be issued thereon, which shall be executed as in other cases of judgment and execution, and such judgment shall be a first lien upon said land. Such special fieri facias may be in the following form : SPECIAL EXECUTION FOR DELINQUENT TAXES. The State of Missouri, to the sheriff of county, greeting : Whereas, the State of Missouri, at the relation and to the use of , collector of the revenue, of , in the State of Missouri on the day of in the year of our Lord, A. D. 19 ... , at our circuit court, at its regular term, A. D. 19 ... , in said coimty of , recovered judgment and decree against , defendants, in the sum of dollars and cents for certain delinquent taxes and interest, as set forth, assessed and found by said court m said judgment and decree to be due and unpaid upon the following described real estate, to-wit : The taxes and interest found due upon said real estate and the years for which the same were assessed, are upon each of the above described tracts as follows, to-wit : and also, certain costs which have been taxed at the sum of dollars and cents, which said several sums of taxes, interest and costs were declared by said court to be a lien in favor of the State of Missouri upon the above de- scribed tracts of real estate; and. Whereas, It was decreed by said court that the lien of the State of Missouri upon said real estate for said taxes, interest and costs be enforced, and that the said real estate or so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy such judgment, interest and costs, be sold according to law ; these are therefore To command you that of the said described real estate you cause to be made the debt, interest and costs aforesaid, and that you have the same before the judge of said court on the 60 Proposed Tax Lams. day of next, to satisfy said judgment and costs. And have you then and there this writ certifying how you have executed the same. "Witness my hand and the seal of said court, etc. Said sheriff shall advertise said property under said writ- by advertising as in cases of ordinary executions, but in making such sales, he shall expose such lands for sale in the order in which they are described in said writ. And whenever enough shall be realized in making such sale in this way to pay all taxes, interest and .penalties and costs on the real estate described in said writ, no more real estate shall be sold; such sheriff shall not be required to expose for sale said real estate in different subdi- visions than those contained in said writ or such portion thereof as may remain delinquent for taxes described in said writ, but any person may, before sale, pay all taxes, interest and pen- alties on any tract described in said writ, and its proportionate part of costs of suit based upon the assessed valuation of the several tracts described in said writ and stop the sale on such tract: Provided, however, any person may pay up the taxes, interest, penalties and costs on all of said real estate or any por- tion thereof and prevent a sale thereof. AN ACT Requiring the payment of an excise or license fee by certain corporations! created by the laws of this State, and certain foreign cbrporations doing business in this State. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows: Section 1. Every corporation organized under the laws of this State and every foreign corporation doing business in this State other than insurance and express companies which pay a part of their gross receipts to the state and except corporations formed for religious, educational and benevolent purposes, shall annually pay an excise or license fee to the State for the right to exercise its corporate powers and corporate capacity in this State. Corporations created under the laws of this State shall pay, as such annual license fee or excise for such right or privi- lege, twenty-five cents on each one thousand dollars of its au- thorized capital stock, and surplus, and foreign corporations do- ing business in this State shall pay the same amount upon the Proposed Tax Laivs. 61 proportion of its capital stock represented by its property in this State. The excise or license fee imposed by this act shall be in addition to any tax imposed by law upDn the value of the property and franchise of any such corporation other than the mere franchise to do business in a corporate capacity. Sec. 2. Each corporation required to obtain a license under this act shall make application therefor to the Secretary of State on or before the first day of July in each year, and shall present to him a verified statement of the amount' of its capital stock and surplus, and in case of foreign corporations, a verified state- ment of the proportion of its capital stock and surplus repre- sented by its property in this State, together with a receipt from the State Treasurer for the amount of the excise or license fee required to be paid by the provisions of this act, and thereupon, the said Secretary of State shall issue to such corporation a li- cense for the ensuing year, and he shall file the receipt of the State Treasurer with the State Auditor, who shall charge the treasurer with the amount of such excise or license fee. Sec. 3. A failure on the part of any corporation to comply with the terms of this act shall forfeit its right to do business in this State, and the Secretary of State shall, within ten days after the first day of July of each year, furnish to the Attorney- General a list of all corporations doing business in this State which have failed to procure a license as required by this act, and the Attorney-General shall thereupon institute proper pro- ceedings to oust said corporations from all corporate right and privilege in this State. AN ACT To provide for the assessment and taxation of railway cars other than those 1 which are the property of railroad companies. Be it enacted by the Gemral Assembly of the State of Missouri, as follows : Section 1. The president or other chief officer of every car company, car trust, mercantile company or corporation, other than a railroad company operating a line of railroad, and every individual owning any stock cars, furniture cars, fruit cars, poultry cars, tank cars, sleeping cars or any other kind of cars, shall, on or before the first day of January in each year, make to the State Auditor a true, full, and accurate statement, verified 62 Proposed Tax Laws. by the affidavit of the officer or person making the same, showing the aggregate number of miles made by their cars over the several lines of railroad in this State during the year next pre- ceding the first day of June, and a further statement showing the average number of miles traveled per day by the cars of the particular class or classes covered by the statement, in the or- dinary course of business during the year. See. 2. The president or other chief officer of every rail- road company whose lines run through or into this State shall, on or before the first day of January in each year, furnish to the State Auditor a statement, verified by the affidavit of the officer or person making the same, showing the total number of miles made by the cars of every such car company, car trust, mercantile company or individual over their lines in this Statj during the year next preceding the first day of June. Such statement shall also show separately the name, and aggregate number of miles traveled over their lines in this State by the cars of each such car company, car trust, mercantile company or individual, and the average number of miles traveled per day by each of the particular class of cars covered by the statement, in the ordinary course of business during the year. Sec. 3. Such statements shall be filed_by the State Auditor and laid before the State Board of Equalization at the time and in the manner as is required concerning the returns of raUroad companies. Sec. 4. It shall be the duty of the State Board of Equaliza- tion to ascertain from said statements the number of cars re- quired to make the total mileage of the cars of each such car company, car trust, mercantile company or individual within the period of one year. The board shall ascertain and fix a valua- tion upon each particular class of such cars, and the number so ascertained to be required to make the total mileage of the cars of each such car company, car trust, mercantile company or individual, within the period of one year shall be assessed to the respective car companies, car trusts, mercantile companies and individuals. For the purpose of naaking this assessment, the board is authorized to base the assessment upon the returns of the several railroad companies, in case any such car company, Proposed Tax Laivs. • 63 car trust, mercantile company or individual shall fail or refuse to make the statement herein required, and in determining the daily average travel of such cars, the board, in so far as may be practicable, shall harmonize the statements of the several railroad companies, car companies, mercantile companies and individuals with respect thereto, fixing a uniform daily average travel of cars of each particular class. Such assessment shall be included in the record and proceedings of the board, and shall be filed in the office of State Auditor on its adjournment. Sec. 5. The State Board of Equalization shall apportion the aggregate value of the whole number of cars of each class assessed to each car company, car trust, mercantile company, or individual, to each county, municipal township, incorporated city and town, in and through which such cars have been run and operated, according to the ratio which the mileage of. such cars over the lines of railroad in such counties, municipal townships, cities and incorporated towns, shall bear to the total mileage of such cars in this State. Sec. 6. The property returned to the State Auditor, as re- quired by section 1 of this act, shall be subject to taxation for State, county, municipal and otlier purposes, to the same extent as the property of railroad companies, and when assessed and apportioned, as provided in this act, shall be certified and the taxes thereon levied at the same time and in the same manner provided by law for the taxation of railroad companies. Sec. 7. The county courts shall levy taxes on such property for State, county, municipal and other purposes in the same manner as provided for the property of railroad companies, and cause such tax levy to be certified to the State Auditor. On or before the first day of August in each year the State Auditor shall make out and transmit by mail to the president or other chief officer of every such car company, car trust, mercantile company or to the individual owner, a certified statement, show- ing the aggregate'mileage of the cars of each of such companies or individual owners, over' the several lines of railroad in this State during the period of one year, the number of cars required to make such aggrregate mileage in one year ; the valuation per car, the aggregate valuation of such cars and the apportionment 64 Proposed Tajc Laws. thereof to the respective counties, municipal townships, cities and incorporated towns and villages, and the amount of State, county, city, school and other taxes due thereon. On or before the first day of January following, every such car company, car trust, mercantile company or individual shall pay in same man- ner as railroad companies, the amount of such State, conuty, municipal and other taxes set out in said certified statement of the State Auditor. Sec. 8. If any such car company, car trust, mercantile com- pany, individual or railroad company shall fail or refuse to make the statement herein required, such car company, car trust, mercantile company, individual or railroad company shall for- feit and pay to the State for such failure or refusal the sum of not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than one hundred dollars per day, for the use of the common school fund, for every day they shall fail or refuse to make such statement. Sec. 9. When 'ever any .such cqr company, car trust, mer- cantile company, individual or railroad company shall fail or refuse to make such statement or to pay such tax for the period of forty days, it shall be the duty of the State Auditor to notify the Attorney-General, giving him a full statement of all the facts under his hand and seal, whose duty it shall be to institute a suit or suits in any court of this State or of the United States having jurisdiction, in the name of the State, and at the relation and to the use of the Attorney-General, for the collection of such taxes, penalty or penalties, as the case may be. The property of any such car company, car trust, mercantile company, indi- vidual or railroad company shall be subject to seizure under execution, by the proper officer in any county in this State; to satisfy a judgment rendered for such taxes, penalty or penalties. Sec. 10. All acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed. AN ACT To amend article VIII of chapter 149 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri, A. D. 1899, entitled "The assessment and collection of the revenue,'' by adding thereto three sections, to be numbered 9351a, 93Sib and 935ic. Be it enacted by_ the General Assembly of the State of Missoun, as follows: Section 1. Article VIII of chapter 149 of the Eevised Stat- utes of Missouri, 1899, is hereby amended by adding thereto Proposed Tax Laws, 65 three sections, numbered 9351a, 9351b and 9351c, and which sec- tions are as follows : Section 9351a. It shall be the duty of the president or other chief officer of every railroad company, car company, car trust, mercantile company or corporation and of every indi- vidual owning, controlling or operating railroad tracks or pri- vate tracks or switches, to make to the State Auditor on or be- fore the first day of January of each year a full and complete statement verified by the affidavit of the officer or person mak- ing the same, showing by their appropriate number or designa- tion the several cars or coaches for freight or passengers be- longing to, operated or controlled by a company not incorpo- rated under the laws of this State or not operating a line of rail- road therein, which may have been on the tracks owned, operated or controlled by such railroad company, car company, car trust, mercantile company or corporation or individual, together with the cash value of same, which may have been on such track or switch during the previous year and the number of days ex- ceeding three each such car or coach may have remained on such track at any time and such statements shall be filed with the State Board of Equalization at the time and in the manner as is required concerning the returns of railroad companies. Section 9351b. Each such car or coach shall be taxed each year as other personal property and shall be assessed for taxa- tion at that proportion of its actual cash value which the number of days that it shall have been on any such track exceeding three each time shall bear to three hundred and sixty-five, and such proportion shall be deemed the value of such car or coach for the purpose of taxation; and an assessment made on such car or coach on the above proportion of its actual cash value, based on the time that it may have been upon any one track at one time, shall not be a bar to-an assessment based on the time it may have been on such track at another time or on the time it shall be on any other track. The cash value of such car or coach may be determined in any manner that the board of equalization may prescribe, subject to review by the courts in any appropriate proceeding. Section 9351c, The tax assessed on any guch car shall be a D— 5 .-'-' 66 Proposed Tax Lazvs. lien on all property of the company owning, operating or con- trolling said car, wliicli may be enforced in any mode prescribed in this chapter, for the enforcement of such liens or the collec- tion of taxes. AN ACT , To require wholesale dealers in distilled spirits to obtain license. Be it enacted by the General' Assembly of the State of Missoiiri, as follows: Section 1. License, To Be Taken Out.— No person, com- pany, association or corporation shall be permitted to sell dis- tilled liquors in this State, including whiskey, brandy, rum, gin and distilled spirits of all kinds in any quantity exceeding ten gallons, without first procuring and having a license as a whole- sale dealer in distilled spirits. Sec. 2. Method of Obtaining Such License.— Any person, company, association or corporation desiring, to engage in selling at wholesale any of the liquors referred to in section 1 of this act shall obtain a license to engage in such business in the manner following : If such person, company, association or corporation desires to engage in business in any county of this State, such person, company, association or corporation shall present a writ- ten application to the clerk of the county court of the county wherein the applicant desires to engage in business, and if such person, company, association or corporation desires to engage in business in the City of St. Louis, the application shall be made to the license collector of the City of St. Louis. The applicant shall specifically set forth in said application the place where said business is to be conducted and shall state by whom the building is owned wherein the applicant expects to engage in business. And said application shall be sworn to by the person seeking the license, or when the applicant is a company, asso- ciation or corporation, the application shall be SAvorn to by the principal officer thereof or its managing agent. Such applica- tion shall also contain the name and residence of all persons com- posing said company, association or corporation or having any interest therein. Sec. 3. License, How Issued.— The clerk of the county court, and in the City of St. Louis the license collector shall, when application is made to him as provided in the preceding section, issue a license authorizing the applicant to conduct the Proposed Tax Laws. 67 business of wholesale dealer in distilled spirits, at the place specifically mentioned in said license for the term of one year from the date thereof; and said license shall be attested by the signature of the clerk and the seal of the county court attached ' thereto, and ia the City of St. Louis by the signature and seal of the license collector. All such licenses when issued shall have endorsed thereon the amount of the license fee hereinafter pro- vided and shall be delivered to the collector of revenue, and in the City of St. Louis to the city collector, and the amount due upon such licenses shall be certified to the State Auditor who shall charge the proper collector therewith, and the collector shall deliver the license to the applicant upon the compliance by the applicant with the other requirements prescribed in the next succeeding section, and upon the payment of the license fee provided therein. Said license shall be in force from and after its delivery to the licensee', and untU said license is de- livered to him said licensee shall not be authorized to conduct said business. Sec. 4. License Fee.— Wholesale dealers in distilled spirits shall pay for the privilege of engaging in that business in this State the sum of two hundred and fifty dollars for the term of one year, which shall be paid into the State Revenue fund by the collector, and in addition thereto shall pay the same ad va- lorem tax upon the highest amount of all goods, wares and mer- chandise which they may have in their possession or under their control whether owned by them or consigned to them for sale at any time between the first Monday in March and the first Monday ia June of each year as is or may be required to be paid by merchants. Such wholesale dealers in distilled spirits shall at the time the license herein provided for shall be delivered to them, execute a bond for the payment of the ad valorem tax upon their stock in the same form and with securities possessing the same qualifications as is or may be required of merchants. and the statement of the amount of goods on hand shall be made at the same time and in the same manner and the value thereof shall be assessed and adjusted and the tax thereon extended on the same book and collected and accounted for in all respects as in the case of the ad valorem tax upon merchandise. 68 Proposed Tax Laws. Sec. 5. Penalty.— Any person who shall sell any of the dis- tilled liquors referred to in this act without first taking out and having a license as a wholesale dealer as required by this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall upon con- viction thereof be punished by fine not less than $100 nor more than $500 for each and every sale. And any corporation, association or company that shall sell any of the distilled liquors referred'to in this act without first taking out arid haying a li- cense as a wholesale dealer shall forfeit and pay to the State a like amount, to be recovered in an action in the name of the State at the relation of the proper prosecuting attorney. AN ACT To amend section 3047 of chapter 23 of the Revised Statutes of 1899, con- cerning drug'gists and tlieir licenses. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Missouri, as foilows : Section 1. Section 3047 of chapter 23 of the Eevised Stat- utes of 1899 is hereby amended by inserting after the word "used" and before the word "any," in the fourteenth Hue of said section, the following words: "But no druggist shall sell intoxicating liquors, as authorized by this section, without first obtaining, in addition to the license now required by law, a drup;- gist's liquor license. Application for such druggist's liquor li- cense shall be made to the county court of the county where the drug store is located or to be located, and in the City of St. Louis to the license collector, and shall be in writing, verified by the affidavit of the applicant, setting out specifically the place where said drug store is to be kept, the value of the stock of drugs therein, and the name of the owner or owners and the per- son by whom said drug store is to be conducted. If it shall be shown to the county court, or in the City of St. Louis to the li- cense collector, that the application is made in good faith for the purpose of keeping a drug store and not for the purpose of sell- ing intoxicating liquor as a beverage, said court, or license col- lector, shall grant to the applicant a license for a term of one year, and the clerk of said court, and in the City of St. Louis the license collector, shall issue and deliver it to the collector of the county and in the City of St. Louis to the collector of the city, and upon payment to him of twenty-five dollars for the use Proposed Tax Lazvs. 69 of the State, to be accounted for by said collector and paid into the State treasury as other licenses, and upon which said col- lector shall receive the same conunission as in case of other licenses, such license shall be delivered by such collector to the applicant, and shall authorize him to sell iatoxicating liquors as a druggist under the provisions of this section, and not other- wise, during the continuance of said license. No such license shall be assignable and it shall not authorize the business to be carried on at any other place than that specified in the applica- tion. If the county court of any county shall not be in session when such application is made, the clerk of said court shall issue a license until the first day of the next regular term, upon the pajTuent of the proper proportion of the annual license fee for such time;" so that said section, when amended, shall read as follows : Sec. 3(147. May Sell or Give Away in What Quantity, When.— No druggist, proprietor of a drug store or pharmacist shall, directly or indirectly, sell, give away or otherwise dispose of alcohol or intoxicating liquors of any kind in any quantity less than four gallons for any purpose, except on a written prescrip- tion, dated and signed, first had and obtained from some reg- ularly registered and practicing physician, and then only whei.. such physician shall state in such prescription the name of the person for whom the same is prescribed, and that such intox- icating liquor is prescribed as a necessary remedy : Provided, that any druggist or pharmacist may sell or give away, in good faith, any wine for sacramental purposes: Provided further, that any druggist may sell alcohol in less quantities than four gallons for art, mechanical and scientific purposes, but only on a written application signed by a person known to the drug- gist to be a mechanic, scientist or artist, in which application shall be stated the purpose for which alcohol is to be used. But no druggist shall sell intoxicating liquors, as authorized by this section, without first obtaining, in addition to the license now re- quired by law, a druggist 's liquor license. Application for such druggist's liquor license shall be made to the county court of the county where the drug store is located or to be located, and in the City of St. Louis to the license collector, and shall be in writing, 70 Proposed Tax Laws. verified by the affidavit of the applicant, setting out specifically the place where said drug store is to be ]iept,the value of the stock of drugs therein, and the name of the owner or owners and the person by whom said drug store is to be conducted. If it shall be shown to the county court, or in the City of St. Louis to the license collector, that the application is made in good faith for the purpose of keeping a drug store and not for the purpose of selling intoxicating liquor as a beverage, said court, or the li- cense collector, shall grant to the applicant a license for a term of 'one year, and the clerk of said court, and in the City of St. Louis the license collector, shall issue and deliver it to the col- lector of the county and in the City of St. Louis to the collector of the city, and upon payment to him of twenty-five dollars for the use of the State, to be accounted for by said collector and paid into the State treasury as other licenses, and upon which said collector shall receive the same commission as in case of other licenses, such license shall be delivered by such collector to the applicant, and shall authorize him to sell intoxicating liquors as a druggist under the provisions of this section, and not other- wise, during the continuance of said license. No such license shall be assignable and it shall not authorize the business to be carried on at ahy other place than that specified in the applica- tion. If the county court of any county shall not be in session ■when such application is made, the clerk of said court shall issue a license until the first day of the next regular term, upon the payment of the proper proportion of the annual license fee for such time. Any druggist who shall violate any of the provisions of this section or any person who shall make a false statement in an application for alcohol, shall be deemed guilty of a mis- demeanor, and on conviction shall, for the first offense, be fined not less than one hundred nor more than five hundred dollars^ and for a second offense shall, on conviction, in addition to such fine, have his certificate of registration as a pharmacist revoked. DIGEST OF Decisions of the Appellate Courts CONSTRUING THE REVENUE LAWS OF THE STATE. DIGEST. The Commission caused to be prepared, urider its direction, by Messrs. J. W. Jamison of the St. Louis Bar and C. D. Corum of the Boonville Bar, a digest of all the decisions of the appel- late courts, construing the revenue laws of the State, which is as follows : ASSESSMENT. 1. A valid assessment is a prerequisite to the lawful exer- ' cise of the power of taxation. State ex rel. Wyatt vs. Wabash Ry. Co., 114 Mo., i. Abbot vs. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162. St. Louis vs. Wenneker, 145 Mo., 230. State ex rel. vs. Thompson, 149 Mo., 441. State ex rel. vs. Mission Free School, 162 Mo., 332. 2. An accurate description of land is necessary to a valid assessment. A description of land for the purposes of taxation cannot be supplied by parol evidence. State ex rel. Wyatt vs. Wabash Ry. Co., 114 Mo., i. 3. The ommission of the assessor's affidavit Trom the as- sessment list invalidates the assessment. State ex rel. vs. Schooley, 84 Mo., 447. 4. The county court should ascertain the average rate of taxation for school and building purposes, under section 7732, E. S. 1889, from the returns of the local school board on file with the county court. Unless the rate is based upon such returns the levy will be invalid. State ex rel. Lane vs. Railway Co., no Mo., 265. 5. Act of March 1] . 1897, Session Acts 1897, p. 215, applies to street railway companies whose lines of road are partly with- 74 Digest of the Revemie Laws. out the limits of an incorporated city as well as those whose lines of road are entirely within a city. Assessments made in the manner required by said act are legal, even though made in a different mode than that prescribed for the assessment of steam railroads. State ex rel. vs. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., i6i Mo., i88. 6. An assessment for taxation of the stocks and notes of a manufacturing company, as ordinary personal property, is not void. It is only an irregularity from which the owner may appeal. If the company does not appeal, it is bound by the assess- ment. State ex rel. vs. Tobacco Co., 140 Mo., 218. 7. . Where property is listed for assessment, under the gen- eral description "personal property" the assessor cannot there- after, without notice and without discovering any specific'prop- erty omitted from the list, make a back assessment against the personal estate. An assessment on "view" of the assessor, without first leav- ing with the absent owner or his family, either the notice or duplicate list of assessment respectively, as required by sectioa 7532, R. S. 1889, is void. Cape Girardeau vs. Buehrmann, 148 Mo., 198. 8. Where defendant company resided in and was assessed by Montgomery county for taxes in November, 1893, but re- moved to St. Louis in December of that year, where it paid a manufacturer's license for 1894, it was nevertheless properly taxed in Montgomery county for the last named year. State ex rel. vs. Tobacco Co., 140 Mo., 218. 9. A clerical error in the date of the assessor's affidavit will be disregarded. State ex rel. vs. Hurt, 113 Mo., 90. 10. The headings of the columns of an assessment roll con- stitute a part of the description of the land assessed. State ex rel. vs. Vaile, 122 Mo., 33. Digest of the Revenue Laii's. 75 11. Irregularities in assessment are matters of defense iu a tax suit, and should be made then. Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. 12. The assessment fixes the basis of taxation for two years. There is no provision in the law authorizing an increase in land values by reason of the erection thereon of any building or other improvement, within the time between biennial assess- ments. State ex rel. The Center Bldg. Co. vs. St. Joseph, 108 Mo., 304. 13. Several lots may be assessed as one tract where they have been enclosed and previously sold and conveyed by one deed. Roth vs. Gabbert, 123 Mo., 21. 14. A tax assessment against "unknown owner" is not valid, though the deed records furnish the names of the patentee. State ex rel. vs. Hurt, 113 Mo., 90. 15. A tax assessment is not rendered iuA'alid by the Board meeting in the court room instead of in the clerk's office, both rooms being in the same building and no one being misled. State ex rel. vs. Vaile, 122 Mo., 33. 16. The tax-payer should go before the Board of appeals for correction of errors in assessments. Where he fails, the courts will not stay the execution of the tax. Deane vs. Todd, 22 Mo., 90. 17. Under the laws of 1872, the assessor could only make the assessment between the first days of August and January. He has no power to administer the tax-payer's oath, after said date. State vs. Cannon, 79 Mo!, 343. 18. Eeal estate values for the purposes of assessment and taxation are fixed by the assessor and not by the tax-payer. The time of valuation is not when the lists are taken, but after the tracts listed have been copied into the book known as "The Land List." 76 Digest of the Revenue Laws. Personal property should be assessed according to its cash price when listed. In the absence of a wilful assessment of land at more than its true value, the tax-payer cannot recover damages for an increase in its value by the assessor, without notice. State ex rel. vs. Reed & Sutton, 159 Mo., yy. 19. Where the tax-payer is not found at his residence or place of business, the right to assess for taxation attaches upoji the leaving of the required notice at either place, the tax-payer failing to respond thereto. An assessment in such case, of a lump sum, instead of list- ing the items of property, is a mere irregularity. The assessment is not void. The tax-payer failing to appeal from such assessment, can not be heard to complain of such irregularity in a suit for tli(> collection of the tax. State ex rel. vs. Cummings, 151 Mo., 49. 20. Where the owner of the property is known, its assess- ment will be void when not made in his name. St. Louis vs. Wenneker, 145 Mo., 230. 21. The assessment for taxation of a tract of land in the name of "the estate of Jacob H. Burrough" is an irregularity. Such assessment, however, is not void as not being made in the name of the real owner. City of Cape Girardeau vs. Burrough,. 112 Mo., 559. 22. Where a tax-payer neglects or refuses to furnish tlio assessor with a list of his property, and the assessor makes tho assessment, his action is judicial and conclusive, except on ap- peal to the Board of Equalization. State ex rel. vs. Hoyt, 123 Mo., 348. 23. 'Where the assessor leaves the lists and notice required in the absence or sickness of the owner, it will be presumed that he left them at the proper place and within the time prescribed by the statute. The notice required by section 7532, E. S. 1889, to the ab- sent tax-payer to furnish a sworn statement of his property, Digest of the Rei'Ciiue Laivs. 77 under penalty, lias no application to section 7567, which au- thorizes the assessor, in the absence or sickness of the head of the family to make out a list of the property on his own view and to leave a duplicate thereof with some member of his family over fifteen years of age, or with the owner himself, if made out in his presence. State ex rel. vs. Seaborn, 139 Mo., 582. 24. Assessors have no jurisdiction to assess property otherwise than is prescribed by statute. Abbott vs. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 166. 25. Land must be assessed in the name of the owner, and when taxes are not paid, judgment must be rendered in the name of the owner of the land. Abott vs. Lindenbower, 42 Mo. 162. Hume vs. Wainscott, 46 Mo., 145. 26. The action of the assessor, that of the Board of Ap- peals and of the county court in assessing property, is judicial in its character. Insurance Co. vs. Charles, 47 Mo., 466. Lee vs. St. Louis County Court, 47 Mo., 594. 27. The intent of the Legislature has been to require the payment of taxes each year and to require assessors and col- lectors to assess and collect taxes which have been omitted in larevious years by accident or mistake. Railroad Co. vs. County Clerk, 57 Mo., 223. 28. Our statute providing the duties of the Board of Equalization when notified by the assessor that a person has falsely listed his property for taxation, and with intent to de- fraud, is not unconstitutional, in that it deprives the accused of the right of trial by jury, or of his property without due process of law. State ex rel. vs. Moss, 69 Mo., 495. 29. A vendee of real estate in possession under a contract of sale, is liable for all taxes assessed after the commencement of his possession. Farber vs. Purdy, 69 Mo., 601. 78 Digest of the Revenue I.azvs. 30. Where tlie ordinance of the town provides that assess- ment of property shall not be made until after the first day of May in each and every year, an assessment made nrior to that date is void. Town of Warrensburg vs. Miller, yy Mo., 56. 31. "Where the assessor demands the owner of property to furnish a list thereof, and the owner neglects or refuses to furnish such list, the assessor may ascertain the taxable prop- erty owned by such party and place it in his book for taxa- tion. Meyer vs. Rosenblatt, 78 Mo., 495. 32. The provision of the statute in reference to the duties of assessor in assessing property, do not prevent the assessor from afterwards assessing property where the owner and the assessor were unable at the time of making the list to estimate the value of the property, and where it was agreed that the as- sessor might afterwards ascertain the value of the property and make the assessment. Nor was it necessary that the owner received notice of the valuation fixed. State ex rel. vs. Stamm, 165 Mo., 73. 33. Mere informalities in making the assessment or in mak- ing the tax list, or that the assessment was not made or com- pleted in the time required by law, do not affect the validity of the tax. State ex rel. vs. Stamm, 165 Mo., 73. State ex rel. vs. Phillips, 137 Mo., 259. 34. Nor does the number of books in which assessments are made affect the legality of the assessment. State ex rel. vs. Stamm, 165 Mo., 73. 35. For the purpose of taxation, the law contemplates that property shall be assessed at its true value in money. State ex rel. vs. Western Union Telegraph Co., 165 Mo., 516. 36. Section 9277 does not require that the order of the county court made thereafter shall specify the taxes that are included in the order. Digest of the Rci'cnue Laivs. 79 It need only show tliat the court is satisfied that there is a necessity for the assessment and levy of other taxes. Nor is it required that the prosecuting attorney sholl state in his petition the facts and reasons why such taxes shall be levied. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 165 Mo., 607. 37. Where the assessment list furnished by the assessor is made out and signed by the president of a bank, and the presi- dent of the bank did not specify the property owned by classes, but instead made a lumping valuation, the bank cannot complain because the list did not specify. City of Lexington ex rel. vs. Bank, 165 Mo., 671. 38. After an assessment of personal properly has been made, the assessor is without authority to increase the original assessment without notice to the tax-payer. State ex rel. vs. Stamm, 165 Mo., 73. State ex rel. vs. Spencer, 114 Mo., 574. 39. In determining the value of the tangible property of a telegraph company located in any state, it is proper to, com- pare the length of its line in that state with the length of the entire, line, or to take the aggregate value of the shares of its capital stock and deduct therefrom such portion of that valua- tion as is proportional to the leng-th of lines without the state, and also to deduct therefrom the value of its real estate and machinery subject to local taxation. Taxes so assessed constitute an excise tax upon the prop- erty or capital of the corporation and not a tax upon any fran- chise. State ex rel. vs. Western Union Telegraph Com- pany, 165 Mo., 516. 40. Dogs are assessed as personal property, and the as- sessor is allowed no increase in his emoluments for assessing them. Williams vs. Chariton County, 85 Mo., 645. 41. The assessor has no authority to make out a list of the tax-payer's property, unless the tax-payer has failed to make out and deliver it. R. S., 1899, 7532 and 7535. State ex rel. sv. Spencer, 114 Mo., 574, 80 Digest of the Revenue Lcnus. 42. If the tax-payer makes out and delivers a list of his personal property to the assessor, and the assessor receives the same without objection, the latter cannot raise the valuation of the property without notice to the tax-payer. State ex rel. vs. Spencer, 114 Mo., 574. 43. A personal tax cannot be assessed against a non-resi- dent; nor can the property of a non-resident be taxed unless it has an actual situs in this State. Corn vs. Citv of Cameron, 19 App., 573. 44. Notice to the tax-payer is .required when the valua- tion of real estate is raised. Notice is not provided for as to personalty. Alining Company vs. Neptune, 19 App., 439. 45. A person owning property on the first day of June is liable for the taxes for the next ensuing year. State ex rel vs. Snyder, 139 Mo., 549. 46. Eeal estate must be assessed in the name of the owner. State ex rel. vs. Thompson, 149 Mo., 441. 47. The assessment of taxes on an incorporated bank must be against the owners of the stock. An assessment of the property of a private bank may be made in the business name adopted by the co-partnership. 'This mode was not changed by the Act of April 1,, 1891. City of Stanberry vs. Jordan, 145 Mo., 371. 48. The assessment of property of a railroad should be in the name of the share holders, not in the name of the cor- poration. Railroad vs. Maguire, 49 Mo., 483. 49. If a tax-payer neglects or refuses to furnish the asses- sor with a list of his property, and the assessor makes the as- sessment, his action is judicial and conclusive unless appealed from. State ex rel. Hoyt, 123 Mo., 348. 50. Under the Act of February 20th, 1865, assessments upon salaries and incomes should be based upon the amoiuJt Digest of the Revenue Laws. 81 thereof received by the person assessed for the year next pre- ceding the time of assessment. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. 51. After the passage of the Act of 1871, pertaining to railroad taxation, (Acts of 1871, page 56), the City of Jefferson had no authority to assess the j)roperty of railroad companies situate within its limits. Railroad vs. Watson, 61 Mo., 57. 52. The Act of May 20th, 1889, providing for the assess- ment of city property in cities of the third class, by the city and county assessors jointly, was not affected by section 1545, TJ. S. 1889, until November first, 1889. State ex rel. vs. Edwards, 136 Mo., 360. 53. The County Boards of Equalization, in hearing com- plaiats and equalizing assessments, act judicially. They have power to equalize assessments on real property bi annually and not amiually. Lead Company vs. Simms, 108 Mo., 222. 54. Annual assessments of real estate in the city of St. Louis are proper, by virtue of the charter of the city and the Legislature of the State. State ex rel. vs. Powers, 68 Mo., 320. 55. An assessment under the law of 1855, in the name of the original patentee, who was not the record or apparent owner of the land, was void. Hubbard vs. Gilpin, 57 Mo., 441. 56. The vendee of i-eal estate, who is in possession, under contract of sale at the date of the time of the assessment, is the owner for the purpose of taxation. Anderson vs. Harwood, 47 App., 660. 57. The meaning of W. S., section 1167, is that all subdivi- fr'ions of a section of land belonging to the same person should be assessed as one tract, whether contiguous or not. Sparks vs. Clark, 57 Mo., 58. D— 6 82 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 58 The county clerk lias no autliority to assess property for school or other taxes. His powers are limited to the computation and apportion- ment of the revenues upon the returns made by the assessor. School District vs. Wickersham, 34 App., 337. 59. Taxes on real property are assessed against the land and not against the owner. Matthews vs. Kansas City, 80 Mo., 231. 60. Under the Act of 1864, taxes must have been assessed against the owner of the property. Gaines vs. Fender, 82 Mo., 497. BACK ASSESSMENTS. 1. Back assesments, for omitted years, may be made and enforced against lands in the hands of a subsequent purchaser. City of Kansas vs. H. & St. J. Ry. Co., 81 Mo., 285. 2. Back assessments should show on their face the specific property omitted. Cape Girardeau vs. Buehrman, 148 Mo., 198. 3. Section three, of the Act of March 10th, 1871, provides only for the assessment and collection of taxes upon property theretofore subject to taxation, which through inadvertance had escaped. This act did not operate retrospectively within the mean- ing of the Constitution. Livingston Co. vs. Railroad, 60 Mo., 516. 4. The Eevenue Act of 1865, page 75, provided that the county clerk should make out a supplemental tax-book for the collection of omitted taxes. State ex rel. vs. County Court, 41 Mo., 503. 5. A purchaser of real estate is presumed to know that it may be thereafter assessed and charged with taxes which have been omitted. The State is not chargeable with the negligence of its offi- cers in omitting land from the assessment books. State ex rel. Fullerton, 143 Mo., 682. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 83 ABBREVIATIONS. 1. Only sueli abbreviations can he used in tax deeds and proceedings as are authorized by statute. 2. Such abbreviations are insufficient where they fail to identify the land. Lowe vs. Ekey, 82 Mo., 286.. 3. The abbreviations "ex" for except, and "a" for acre, and "cor" for corner, in the assessment rolls, being in every- day use and well understood, are sufficient. State ex rel. vs. Vaile, 122 Mo., 33. BANKS. 1. Under the provisions of the forty-first section of the Act of Congress of June 3, 1864, taxes imposed by the State upon stock in national banks must be specifically assessed against the shareholders. Lionberger vs. Rowse, 43 Mc, 67. Bank vs. Meredith, 44 Mo., 500. State ex rel. vs. Dowling, 50 Mo., 134. Springfield vs. Bank, 87 Mo., 441. 2. For the purposes of assessment and taxation, the stat- ute makes no distraction between stock in national banks and banks organized under the laws of this State. State ex rel. vs. Catron, 118 Mo., 280. 3. The State can only impose such taxes upon a national banking corporation as are authorized by the act of Congress creating them. City of Carthage vs. Bank, 71 Mo., 508. 4. The shares of stock in national banks are liable to as- sessment and taxation in this State. Lionberger vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 6y. National Bank vs. Meredith, 44 Mo., 500. Curtis vs. Ward, 58 Mo., 295. 84 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 5. It is. sufficient that tax assessments are made against a private bank in the name under which it does business. State ex rel. vs. Bank of Neosho, 120 Mo., 161. City of Stanberry vs. Jordan, 145 Mo., 371. 6. Under the Act of 1891, (Laws of 1891, p. 195), bank assessments must be made against the owners of the stock and not against the corporation. City of Stanberry vs. Jordan, 145 Mo., 371. ~ Sta.te ex rel. vs. Bank, 160 Mo., 640. 7. The Act of 1895, page 242, concerning assessments, did not change the manner of assessing bank property for the year of 1895. State ex rel. vs. Bank, 160 Mo., 640. 8. The stock of banking corporations, organized under the laws of this State, must be assessed against the shareholders personally. State ex rel. vs. Catron, 118 Mo., 280. 9. Shares of stock in a bank need not be assessed at their par value. They should be assessed at their actual cash value. State ex rel. vs. Catron, 118 Mo., 280. 10. Where a delinquent shareholder fails to pay the taxes due on his bank stock, no property of the bank, except the prop- erty owned by the delinquent, can be sold to enforce payment of the delinquent taxes. Lionberger vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 67, Bank vs. Meredith, 44 Mo., 500. City of Springfield vs. Bank, 87 Mo., 441. 11. Although a bank refused to furnish the assessor with a list of its shareholders, this does not justify making the assess- ment and enforcing the tax against the property of the bank. City of Springfield vs. Bank, 87 Mo., 441. 12. A stockholder of a' banking corporatioji is not person- ally liable for taxes assessed against the property of the corpor- ation. State ex rel. vs. Catron, 118 Mo., 280. 13. Where a bank does not object to an assessment on the ground of irregularity, and is a party to the same, and the as- Digest of the Revenue Laws. 85 sessment is substantially correct, tlie 'bank will not afterwards be permitted to say that the error in assessing the shares to the bank, instead of assessing them to the shareholders, makes the assessment void. Building and Savings Association vs. Lightner, 47 Mo., 393. 14. "Where a bank returns for assessment tlie sliares owned by its stockholders as the property of the bank, it cannot after- wards on certiorari, successfully insist that the property should have been assessed as the property of the stockholders and not as the property of the bank. State ex rel. vs. Springer, 134 Mo., 212. 15. ■ The capital of a private ban]\ , invested in United States bonds, is not taxable by State authority. State ex rel. vs. Rogers, 79 Mo., 283. 16. Section 32 of the Act of 1856 and section 12 of the Act of 1861, created a binding contract between the State and banks incorporated thereimder and exempted them from all lia- bility to pay other taxes than one per cent, of their capital stock. Said sections also prohibited any county, city or town from levying or collecting any tax from such banks. Lionberger vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 67. Bank vs. City of Kansas, 73 Mo., 555. 17. A municipal corporation has authority to levy and col- lect taxes on money and bank notes belonging to a bank, which was organized by virtue of the laws of 1857. Town of Paris vs. Bank, 30 Mo., 575. 18. Although a bank, was incorporated under the laws of 1857, which provided that in consideration of the privileges therein granted, each bank incorporated in this State should pay annually one per cent, of the amount of its capital stock, and that this should be in full of all bonus and taxes, it was held that the law did not prohibit a city from levying and collecting a tax upon the property of such bank. City of Lexington vs. Aull, 30 Mo., 480. 19. Although the charter of a bank declares that one per cent, of the net proceeds of the bank should be paid to the State, gg Digest of the Revenue Laws. for the use of the Missouri Institution for the Blind, this does not prohibit the State from levying other taxes or from dele- gating that power to a city. City of St. Louis vs. Savings Bank, 49 Mo., 574. 20. Section 7538, E. S. 1889, draws a distinction between the manner of the assessment of private banks and incorpora- ted banks. State ex rel. vs. Bank of Neosho, 120 Mo., 161. 21, The business capital of a private bank is taxable where the business is carried on. It does not follow the situs of the owner. State ex rel. vs. Rogers, 79 Mo., 283. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION. 1. The county board of equalization may meet at the branch county clerk's office established by law in a city, instead of at the regular office of the clerk. Such board, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, has the inherent power to adjourn from time to time. The tax assessment is not rendered invalid by the board's meeting in the coiirt room instead of in the clerk's office in the same building. "Wherever the county board of equalization may meet, there a tax-payer from any other township has the legal right to present his case, a custom of the board to the contrary not- withstanding. The acts of the board in the performance of its duties can- not be collaterally impeached. But being a tribunal of limited ijowers, acts outside of its jurisdiction are void. The State Board of Equalization has no authority to ad- just the values of different parcels or of different classes of land in the same county. Its power is limited to equalization of values among dif- ferent counties. Digest of the Rezremie Laws. 8'? Although, the act of the State Board of Equalization in reducing values in a county are void, still the assessment by the county board will be legal. State ex rel. vs. Vaile, 122 Mo., 33. 2. In adjusting values, county boards of equalization act judicially. Under section 6672, E. S. 1879, the county boards -may raise the assessed value of real estate in townships by a single order on a percentum basis for each township where' in their judgment the-assessed value is such per cent, below the true value. "Where a board of equalization makes a mistake in giving the required notice of its meeting, it may adjourn a sufficient length of time to have a correct notice published. Black vs. McGonigle, 103 Mo., 192. 3. The failure of the members of the county board of equali- zation to take the statutory oath before proceeding with their duties will not invalidate the equalization. Unless required by statute, tbe oath need not be in writing. An appearance before the board amounts to a waiver of objections as to want of notice. State ex rel. Lemon vs. Buchanan Co. Board of Equalization, 108 Mo., 235. 4. The county boards of equalization in hearing complaints and equalizing assessments act judicially. Said boards have power to equalize assessments on real property biennially, not annually. St. Joseph Lead Co. vs. Simms, 108 Mo., 222. 5. It is the duty of railroad companies to take notice of the time and place of meeting of the State Board of Equalization. Acts 1877, pp. 56-59. The law did not require the board to preserve the evi- dence upon which it based its valuations. State ex rel. Love vs. Railroad Co., 101 Mo., 120. 6. The -county board of equalization is without authority to add property to an assessment list in the absence of the notice 88 Digest of the Revenue i^cnus. required by section 7537, E. S. 1889, when a false list has been made. State ex rel. vs. Cunningham, 153 Mo., 642. 7. The action of a county board of equalization in the assess- ment of property is subject to review on certiorari. Only matters can be reviewed which appear upon the face of tlie record, or go to the jurisdiction of the board. Under said act the county board of equalization has the authority to increase the value of the corporate stock above that returned by its cashier. Ward vs. Board of Equalization, 135 Mo., 309. 8. One aggrieved by an excessive assessment has a remedy at law by appeal from the assessor to the county board of equali- zation. For such grievance, therefore, an action will not lie in equity to enjoin the collection of the tax. Bank vs. Staats, 155 Mo., 55. 9. The necessary land owned and used by a railroad com- pany for side tracks, and in loading and moving cars is assess- able by the State Board of Equalization. Lands not so used and not required for the purpose speci- lied are subject to assessment of local authorities. State ex rel. vs. Railroad Co., 135 Mo., 618. 10. The board of equalization is authorized to correct and adjust the tax books. Railroad Co. vs. County Clerk, 57 Mo., 223. 11. Under section 7, Act of March 10, 1871, it was the duty of the special board of equalization in assessing rail-v^ay property to consider in aggregate and its entirety all the property owned by each railroad company in the State. The board must adjust and equalize the property of railroads with each other. Washington County ys. Railroad, 58 Mo., 372. 12. Where a board of equalization fails to hear evidence to guide and direct it in equalizing assessments of property, its acts are invalid. Washington County vs. Railroad, 58 Mo., 372. Digest of the Rcvenve Laws. 89 13. At the time of tlie adoption of the Constitution, the State Board of Equalization was composed of the State Senate. Railroad Co., vs. State Board of Equalization, 64 Mo., 294. 14. By virtue of article 10, section 18 of the present Consti- tution, the rrovemor, State Auditor, Treasurer, Secretary of State and Attorney-General constitute the State Board of Equali- zation. Railroad Co. vs. State Board of Equalization, 64 Mo., 294. 15. The Board of Equalization is required to keep a full record of its proceedings and decisions; but not of the evidence adduced. Railroad Co. vs. State Board of Equalization, 64 Mo., 294. 16. The State Board of Equalization had full power to equalize, adjust and assess railroad property under the Act of 1875, and this act is not in conflict with the Constitution. Railroad Co. ,vs. State Board of Equalization, 64 Mo., 294. 17. Legislative boards have the power to select subjects of taxation and to exclude or exempt other subjects and thus hold out inducements to proposed investments of capital unless there is som_e constitutional inliibition. But the exemption must be clear and unambiguous. Scotland County vs. Railroad, 65 Mo., 123. 18. Under the Act of 1871, the Board of Equalization was not authorized to levy taxes upon the road-bed, rolling stock and other real and personal loroperty of railroads. State vs. Railroad, yj Mo., 202. 19. It is the duty of the State Board of Equalization to assess all the property, real and |.)ersonal, including the fran- chises of telegraph companies. State ex rel. vs. Western Union Tel. Co., 165 Mo., Sersonal property on which the tax was claimed. Dixon vs. Rouse, 80 Mo., 224. 40. No means can be resorted to to coerce the payment of taxes other than those provided by statute, and the only manner in which the collector can proceed against personal property for taxes due on it, is, after the required demand and notice, to seize it, as directed by the revenue law, and there can be no lien on it before siezure. State ex rel. vs. Goodnow, 80 Mo., 271. lOi Digest of the Revenue Lazes. 41. Under section 1833. of the revenue law of 1872, a collec- tor mnst apply for judgment against lands returned delinquent at the July term of the county court, unless for good cause he be unable to obtain judgment at that tqrm, when he may apply at a succeeding term. Kinney, vs. Forsythe, 96 Mo., 414. 42. A county collector is, under section 7640, E. S. 1889, entitled to commissions on the taxes levied and not on the taxes collected for any given year. Taxes specially levied to pay judgments against the county on railroad bonds, or county taxes within the meaning of section 7640, R. S. 1889, are to be included in computing the collector's commission. State ex rel. vs. Ewing, 116 Mo., 129. 43. Ah error by the county court as to the amount of the collector's commissions is a mistake of law for which a settle- ment with the latter cannot be avoided, nor any excess paid him be recovered of him and the sureties on his bond. In the absence of fraud, collusion or mistake of fact a settle- ment made by the collector with the county court is binding on the county. State ex rel. vs. Shipman, 125 Mo., 436. 44. In a suit by the city against its tax collector, and his bondsmen for his failure to enforce the payment of a certain tax, it must be both pleaded and proved that the proper tax book or legal warrant was delivered to him. City of Stanberry vs. Jordan, 145 Mo., 372. ,45. A settlement hj the collector with the county court, in which he was allowed certain commissions on back taxes col- lected, is binding and conclusive in the absence of fraud, collu- sion or mistake, whether the court erred in allowing the commis- sions or not. As to back taxes, the collector should be allowed in addition to commissions allowed by section 9260, E. S. 1899, the extra fees provided by section 9309, as costs. State ex rel. vs. Hawkins, 169 Mo., 615. Digest of the Rcz'eiutc Lazvs. lO^ CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE X.-REVENUE AND TAXA- TION. Section 1. Taxing Power, How Exercised.— " The taxing- power may be exercised by the General Assembly for State pur- poses, and by counties and other municipal corporations, under authority granted to them by the General Assembly, for county and other corporate purposes." 1. The State has authority to create a police force for a city, and compel the city to maintain it. The State in such cases, by the act creating the force, and prescribing their pay and directing the city to pay it, levies the tax and directs the city how to apply it. The city does not levy it, and cannot say she has assumed- obligations which are superior to charges imposed upon her revenue by the State. State ex rel. vs. Mason, 153 Mo., 23. 2. A legislative act to be sustained as a police measure,^ must, in some degree, tend to prevent some offense or manifest evil, or have for its aim the preservation of public health, moral safetly or welfare. State ex rel. vs. Ashbrook, 154 Mo., 375. 3. The Legislature is vested with power to levy either general or special taxes. This power may be delegated by the Legislature to municipal assemblies. The State may collect an ad valorem tax on property used in a calling and at the same time impose a license tax upon a pursuit of that calling. Tt may confer such power upon a municipality. State ex rel. City of Springfield vs. Smith, 138 Mo.,. 645. See infra, 13. 4. The Legislature may authorize a city to change its limits and to exercise a taxing power over the added territory. Such a law is a change of its charter and not a local or special law. Copeland vs. City of St. Joseph, 126 Mo,. 417. lOb" Digest of the Revenue Laws. 5. The General Assembly may appropriate the funds of the State for the support of the indigent insane in the insane asy- lum of the city of St. Louis who belong to the city outside of the State. This is true even though such asylum be a private institu- tion of said city and not a State eleemosynary institution. State ex rel. vs. Seibert, 123 Mo., 424. 6. The Legislature may impose a tax upon a particular sub-division or municipality of the State, when in its judgment such tax is for the benefit of such locality as well as the State at large. The State may lawfully use the agency of a city govern- ment to collect a State tax. The idea of equality of taxation has never obtained in this State. Equality of taxation is not feasible. State ex rel. vs. Field, 119 Mo., 593. 7. Taxes illegally collected by a township from a railroad Tinder an unconstitutional law were properly paid into the State "treasury. Being so paid, the general assembly could not refund them "to the to'wnship. The Act of the General Assembly of March 19, 1881, pro- "\Hding for the refunding of such taxes to the townships by the State is unconstitutional. State ex rel. Prairie Township vs. Walker, 85 Mo., 41. 8. Section 15 of the bill of rights does not prohibit the •enactment of retrospective acts which do not disturb private Tights. State ex rel. Kemper vs. Railroad, 79 Mo., 420. 9. The General Assembly may grant to municipal corpora- tions the power to require road la,bor from all male residents ^between certain ages. And may leave it to the council of a city to determine the class between these ages, which shall perform the labor. The Town of Tipton vs. Norman, 72 Mo., 380. See infrc, 11-13. Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 107 10. The Legislature has as much control over the revenue of a county as it has over that of the State, unless restrained by some provision of the Constitution. Hamilton vs. St. Loi'is County Court, 15 Mo., 5. State ex rel. Brown vs. Hollada}', 70 Mo., 137. 11. The Legislature has the right to delegate to a city the power to tax. Express Co. vs. City of St. Joseph, 66 Mo., 675. See supra, 3-9; infra, 13. 12. Power of taxation belongs alone to the State, and can be exercised only by virtue of laws passed by the General Assembly, and there is not such thing as an implied power in a county court to tax. State ex rel. vs. Macon County Court, 68 Mo., 36. De Arman vs. Williams, 93 Mo., 158. 13. The State has the power to tax all professions and may delegate the authority. A city has no right to compel an attorney to pay a tax unless there is a legislative grant in the charter of the city conferring such power. City of St. Louis vs. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559. City of St. Louis vs. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289. Simmons vs. State, 12 Mo., 271. Express Co. vs. City of St. Joseph, 66 Mo., 675. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. 14. The sovereign power of taxation and appropriating taxes is lodged in the Ijegislature and in the absence of a con- stitutional inhibition there is no restraint upon the exercise of this power. Railroad vs. Maguire, 49 Mo., 490. 15. The Legislature has the power as general proposi- tion to repeal a temporary rate of taxation and to impose a higher rate or an additional tax; this by virtue of the State's sovereignty over the whole subject of taxation. Under the Constitution the Pacific Eailroad Company was liable for county taxation, notwithstanding that by its amended charter, provision was made in a law for the payment of the State taxes. Pacific Railroad Co. vs. Dulle et al., 48 Mo., 282. 108 Digest of the Rez'cnne Lazes. 16. The Act of March 21, 1868, authorizing county courts to issue bonds to pay for building bridges and for the macadam- izing of roads is consitutional. Steines vs. Franklin Co., 48 Mo., 167. Bradley vs. Franklin Co., 65 Mo., 638. 17. The State has the soverign power of taxation of all property which is not exempt from State taxation by the laws of the United States. It has the power to enforce the collection of taxes by a sale of the property. Abbott vs. Lindenbower, 42 Mc, 166. 18. An act of the General Assembly directing the county to appropriate part of its revenue collected in a particular way is not imconstitutional as being retrospective in its operation. The acts of the Ijegislature providing the objects for which county funds could be appropriated are at all times subject to repeal or alteration. AVhile the Legislature cannot take from the county its property, it may direct the mode in which the property may be used for the benefit of the coimty. State ex rel. vs. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mo., 546. 19. The Legislature has authority to provide that attor- neys' fees may be charged and collected as costs in a suit to en- force the State's lien for taxes. The State vs. Kerr, 8 App., 125. 20. Where money accrues to a county it cannot be so vested as to prevent the control of the same by the Legislature. Conner vs. Bent, t Mo., 140. 21. The license fee exacted by the General Assembly, reg- ulating dramshops, is not a tax in. the meaning of sections 1, 3 and 10, article 10 of the Constitution. It is a price paid for the privilege. Pursuits that are pernicious, that are detrimental to public morals, may be prohibited altogether. State ex rel. Troll vs. Hudson, 78 Mo., 302. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 109 Sec. 2. Power to Tax Corporations Not to Be Surrendered. "The power to tax corporations and corporate property shall not be surrendered or suspended by act of the G-eneral Assembly." 1. The power of taxation will never be considered surren- dered unless it is done expressly or by necessary implication. The charter of a bank declaring that one per cent, of the net proceeds of the bank should be paid to the State for the use and benefit of the Missouri Institute for the Education of the Blind does not prohibit the State from levying other taxes or dele- gating that power to a city corporation. City of St. Louis vs. Manufacturers' Savings Bank, 49 Mo., 574. 2. Not only the original stock, but all after-acquired capital stock of a corporation in private hands, is liable to assessment imder the Revenue Act of 1864. Said law makes a distinction between the liability to tax- ation of the property of a corporation embraced within its cap- ital stock and of the shares of such stock, but the result is or should be the same. In either case, if the officers of the corporation pay the tax, they pay it for the shareholders. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Charles, 47 Mo., 462. 3. Although a corporation of a foreign state itself cannot migrate or go out of the state creating it, it may by its agents go beyond the bounds of the state in which it exists, and thus become liable in other states to service of process upon its agents, and its property locally situated in such states may be subjected to taxation. City of St. Louis vs. Wiggins Ferry Co., 40 Mo., 581. Sec. 3. Taxes for Public Purposes Must Be Uniform.— "Taxes may be levied and collected for public purposes only. They shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority lev;>"ing the tax, and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws." City of Independence vs. Gates, no Mo., 374. 110 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 1. Equality of taxation may be regarded as one of those Utopian visions which neither philosopher nor legislature has ever yet realized. Egyptian Levee Co. vs. Ciimmings, 27 Mo., 495. 2. The idea of equality of taxation has never obtained in this State. Equality of taxation is not feasible. State ex rel. vs. Field, 119 Mo., 593. 3. Perfect equality in taxation is not attainable. De Arman vs. Williams, 93 Mo., 158. 4. Taxation is equal and uniform if all persons engaged in the same business are taxed alike. Express Co. vs. City of St. Joseph, 66 Mo., 675. 5. A city tax when not uniform as to all property withia the limits of the city is void. City of Brookfield vs. Tooey, 141 Mo., 619. 6. An ordinance is unconstitutional that levies a license fee against butchers that is not uniform throughout the limits of the city. City of St. Louis vs. Speigel, 75 Mo., 145. 7. Taxes must be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the same. The unconstitutionality of the exemption clause contained in the Act of March 30th (Session acts, 1887, p. 53), renders the whole of section 5 of said act void. Copeland vs. City of St. Joseph, 126 Mo., 417. 8. The constitutional provisions as to the equality and uniformity of taxes apply to property and not to taxes on priv- ileges or occupations. In the absence of constitutional restriction, the Legislature may authorize a municipality to collect a license from private vehicles using its streets. That said property is taxed as ad valorem does not interfere with the right to impose a license tax on the pursuit. City of St. Lcuis vs. Green et al, 6 App., 591. City of St. Louis vs. Heinrich, 6 App., 591. Digest of the Revenue Laivs. Ill 9. The constitutional provision securing uniformity of tax- ation is restricted to property alone and has no application to occupation taxes. The Constitution does not preclude the division of things taxable into classes and the imposition of taxes bearing equally upon the members of each class, although unequally upon the classes, and the courts cannot interfere with such classification. An ordinance dividing vehicles and teams into different classes for the purposes of imposing an occupation tax does not create a tax on personal property. Though imposed for revenue, it is in the nature of a license. Kansas City vs. Richardson, 90 App., 450. 10. An ordinance of the City of St. Louis taxing a lawyer without regard to liis practice $25 a year is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision which requires that taxes shall be uniform. City of St. Louis vs. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289. 11. An ordinance which assesses an occupation tax against a produce dealer who is clearly a merchant, and does not tax a dry goods merchant, is unconstitutional. A city cannot tax some merchants and exempt others. Kansas City vs. Crush, 151 Mo., 128. 12. The State has the power to collect an ad valorem tax upon the property used iu a calling and at the same time to im- pose a license tax upon the pursuit of that calling. City of Aurora vs. McGannon, 138 Mo., 38. 13. A law authorizing the collection of a license fee of $2 on merchants with a stock of less than $1,000 and a fee of $3 on those with a greater stock is constitutional. City of Auroia vs. McGannon, 138 Mo., 38. 14. A tax levied on patent medicines, under the collateral succession tax law of 1895, is unconstitutional, because the tax provided for is not levied for public purposes. Simmons Medicine Co. vs. Zeigenhein, 145 Mo., 368. 15. The right to assess for taxation, where the tax-payer is not found at his residence or place of busiuess, attaches upon 112 Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. a notice being left by the assessor at either place between June 1st and January '1st, requiring the tax-payer to make a statement -of all his taxable property. .State ex rel. vs. Cummings, 151 Mo., 49. 16. A provision in a city charter permitting discrimina- tion in the levy of a poll tax in favor of those who vote at a gen- eral election discriminates between subjects of legislation in the same class. It violates article 10, section 8 of the Constitution as to uniformity of taxation. As it authorizes a levy against those who fail to vote and exempts from the tax those who do, it is subject to the objection that it imposes a penalty. Kansas City vs. Whipple, 136 Mo., 475. 17. The proviso of section 1466, R. S. 1889, concerning the extension of the corporate limits of cities of the third class, ' ' that all agricultural or pastoral lands included in such extension shall be exempt from taxation for State purposes until they have, by recorded plats or sale, been reduced to tracts of lots of 10 acres or less," violates section 3, article 10 of the Constitution which requires taxes to be uniform upon the same class of sub- jects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax. The attempted exemption of such lands from taxation is void. State ex rel. vs. Wardell, 153 Mo., 319. 18. A provision in a statute to the effect that all railroad property should be assessed by the State Board of Equalization, and that such Board was to ascertain the value of such property within the limits of any city and transmit that amount as the proper assessment in favor of that city, and that their action ia this regard was exclusive of all other officers, either State or mu- nicipal, was not void as violating that provision of the Constitu- tion which declared that taxation on property shall be uniform. State ex rel. vs. Severance, et al, 55 Mo., 378. 19. The Act of March 10, 1871, providing for a Board of Equalization for the purpose of assessing railroads and their Digest of the Revenue Laws. 113 property, does not violate the provision of the Constitution which declares that taxation on property shall be uniform. State vs. Severance, 55 Mo., 378. Washington County vs. Railroad, 58 Mo., 372. Pacific Railroad vs. Watson, 61 Mo., 57. 20. The Act of March 18, 1895, providing a State tax of 2 per cent, in lieu of all other taxes, on ' ' railway cars other than those which are the property of railway companies," imposes a property tax as distinguished from a license tax. The property tax of 2 per cent, imposed by said law for gen- eral purposes exceeds the constitutional limit. Said act provides a whole scheme for the taxation of such railway cars and must all stand or fall together. State ex rel. vs. Stephens, 146 Mo., 662. 21. The license fee exacted by the General Assembly reg- ulating dramshops, is not a tax within the meaning of sections J, 3 and 10 of article 10 of the Constitution. It is a price paid for the privilege. Pursuits that are pernicious, that are detrimental to pub- lic morals may be prohibited by the State altogether. State ex rel. Troll vs. Hudson, 78 Mo., 302. 22. Section 3, article 10 of the Constitution did not repeal those provisions in charters of cities authorizing the levy of taxes. City of Kan.sas vs. Johnson, 78 Mo., 661. 23. A water rate being in the nature of a toll and not a tax, higher charges for one person than another are not pro- hibited by that part of the Constitution which says that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects. Brewing Association vs. St. Louis, 140 Mo., 419. 24. The right of a municipality to make special assess- ments for local improvements is not affected by the Constitu- tion of 1875 relating to the uniformity and equality of taxation. Adams vs. Lindell, 72 Mo., 198. D— 8 114 Digest af the Beveniiie Laws. Sec. 4. Taxes in Proportion to Value.— "All property sub- ject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value." 1. Tbe mandate of tbe Constitution tliat taxes on all prop- erty shall be in proportion to its value does not include every species of taxation. It enjoins a uniform rule in imposing taxes on property. It does not abridge the power of the Legislature to pro- vide revenue from other sources. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. Express Co. vs. City of St. Joseph, 66 Mo., 675. 2. The contsitutional declaration that all property subject to taxation ought to be taxed in proportion to its value, is a prohibition against taxing in any other mode. The word "ought" as therein. used is mandatory. Life Association of America vs. Board of Assess- ors, 49 Mo., 512. 3. The Constitution prohibits discriminations as to valu- ations for the purposes of taxation. State ex rel. vs. O'Brien, 89 Mo., 631. 4. The constitutional provision that property shall be taxed in proportion to its value has no application to local as- sessments for an improvement of the property taxed. Egyptian Levee Co. vs. Hardin, 27 Mo., 495. 5. The 19th section of the Declaration of Rights "that all property subject to taxation in this State shall be taxed ia pro- portion to its value, ' ' is mandatory upon the General Assembly. Hamilton, et al vs. St. Louis County Court, 15 Mo., 3. 6. In levying taxes on property, it sometimes cannot be avoided that the same value will be twice taxed; but this does not make the tax levied illegal as double taxation. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co. vs. Board of Assess- ors, 56 Mo., 503. 7. Taxing shares against stockholders of a corporation, and also the property represented by the capital stock would be duplicate taxation. State vs. Railroad, yj Mo., 202. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 115 8. A provision in a law that the payment of certain fees by life insurance companies shall be received ia lieu of taxes, cannot have the effect of exempting them from taxation. Such provision is rather an exemption than a commutation. Life Association vs. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo., 512. Life Ins. Co. vs. Board of Assessors, 56 Mo., 503. 9. An ordinance of a city dividing vehicles and teams into different classes for the purposes of imposing an occupation tax is not a tax on personal property. Though imposed for revenue it is in the nature of a license. It is a privilege connected with the property. It is not in conflict with the constitutional provision re- quiring all property to be taxed in proportion to its value. Kansas City vs. Richardson, 90 App., 450. 10. The provision of the State Constitution requiring all property subject to taxation to be taxed in proportion to its value does not require that all property shall be taxed. Wlien any species of property is selected for taxation, it shall be taxed in proportion to its value. State vs. North & Scott, 27 Mo., 464. 11. Under the Constitution of the United States, no state can in the exercise of its taxing power discriminate in favor of its own manufacturers as against those of its sister states. It cannot require a merchant of a foreign state to take out a license from the state authorities while it levies no such tax upon resident merchants. State vs. North & Scott, 27 Mo., 464. 12. Section 3 of the Act of March 11, laws of 1873, p. 283, extending the limits of Kansas City and exempting the subdi- visions in the new territory, containing over five acres, from a city tax, is not in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution prohibiting the exemption of private property from taxation and requiring all property to be taxed in proportion to its value. •City of Kansas vs. Cook, 69 Mo., 127. 13. A law authorizing the collection of a license fee of $2 on merchants with a stock of less than $1,000 and a fee of $3 on those with a greater stock is constitutional. 116 Digest of the Revenue Laws. A city of the fourth class may levy a license tax upon a pursuit or calling and at the same time collect an ad valorem tax on the property used in that calling. State ex rel. Aurora vs. McGannon, 138 Mo., 38. 14. The right to assess for taxation, where the tax-payer is not found at his residence or place of business, attaches upon a notice being left by the assessor at either place between June 1st and January 1st, requiring the tax-payer to make a state- ment of all his taxable property. State ex rel. vs. Cummings, 151 Mo., 49. 15. Taxes should be uniform and levied in proportion to the valuation of the property taxed. License fees imposed by law upon those who pursue partic- ular employments are taxes. Lawyers and physicians may be compelled to pay a license fee for practicing their professions. There are three general classes of direct taxes. First, capitation, haA^ing effect solely upon persons. Second, ad valorem, having effect solely upon property. Third, an income, having a mixed effect upon persons and property. The Constitution does not abridge the power of the Legis- lature to provide revenue from other sources than by taxation of property. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. Sec. 5. Railway Corporations, Taxed for What Purposes. "All railroad corporations in this State, or doing business there- in, shall be subject to taxation for State, county, school, mu- nicipal and other purposes, on the real and personal property owned or used by them, and on their gross earnings, their net earnings, their franchises and their capital stock." See taxation of railroads, infra. Sec. 6. Property Exempt From Taxation.— " The property, real and personal, of the State, counties and other municipal corporations, and cemeteries, shall be exempt from taxation. Lots in incorporated cities or towns, or within one mile of the limits of any such city or town, to the extent of one acre, and Digest of the Revenue Laws. 117 lots one mile or more distant from such cities or towns, to the extent of five acres, with the buildings thereon, may be ex- empted from taxation, when the same are used exclusively for religious worship, for schools, or for purposes purely charitable : also, such property, real or personal, as may be used exclusively for agricultural or horticultural societies: Provided, that sucLi exemptions shall be only by general law." 1. Under the Constitution, the property, real and personal, of the State, county and other municipal corporations, is exempt from taxation. State ex rel. vs. Heman, 70 Mo., 441. Fitterer vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 2. The provision of the Constitution, exempting certain property from taxation, has reference only to general taxation for the purpose of revenue. State vs. Linn Count}' Court, 44 Mo., 504. 3. Real estate used as a cemeterj" cannot be assessed for taxes. State ex rel. vs. Wesleyan Cemetery Association, 11 App., 560. 4. The Legislature has the power to exempt from taxation lands in the City of Palmyra which have not been laid out in town lots and which were valuable only for agricultural pur- poses. Lee vs. Thomas, 49 Mo., 112. 5. Section 5 of the Act of March 30, 1887, providing for the extension of the limits of cities of the second class, and exempt- ing certain lands therein from taxation, is unconstitutional. Copeland vs. City of St. Joseph, 126 Mo., 417. 6. That part of section 1466, li. S. 1889, exempting from taxation for city purposes, pastoral lands lying within the cities of the third class, is unconstitutional. Copeland vs. City of St. Joseph, 126 Mo., 417. Westport ex rel. vs. McGee, 128 Mo., 152. State ex rel. vs. Wardell, 153 Mo., 319. 7. Property held by the City of St. Louis as trustee, under a law, is not corporate property of the municipal corporation. 118 Digest of the Revenue Laws. and hence is not exempt from taxation by the Constitution of Missouri. St. Louis vs. Wenneker, 145 Mo., 230. 8. Section 3 of the Act of March 11th, laws of 1873, p. 282, extending the limits of Kansas City and exempting subdivisions in the new territory containing over five acres from a city tax, is constitutional. Said section is not in conflict with the provisions prohibiting the exemption of private property from taxation and requiring all property to be taxed in proportion to its value. City of Kansas vs. Cook, 69 Mo., 127. 9. Wliere the Legislature exempts from taxation a class of property and makes no provision for the collection of taxes al- ready assessed against it, the tax so assessed cannot be collected after the exemption is declared. State vs. Academy of Science, 13 App., 213. See infra, Sec. 7. See also exemptions from taxation, infra. 10. The property of a county or city which is exempt from taxation, is that which is owned by such county or city. St. Louis vs. Wenneker, 145 Mo., 230. 11. The buildings erected by a lessee upon real estate which is exempt from taxation, as belonging to a charitable organiza- tion are subject to taxation. State ex rel. vs. Mission Free School, 162 Mo., 332. 12. Section 5012, E. S. 1879, exempting from road taxes the property of persons residing within the limits of an incorporated village or town, applies to property within such village or town owned by non-residents. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 90 Mo., 166. Sec. 7. Other Exemptions Void.— "All laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property above enumer- ated, shall be void. ' ' 1. In the absence of constitutional restriction, the Legisla- ture has power to grant exemptions from taxation. .Scotland County vs. Railv/ay Co., 65 Mo., 123. Digest of the Revenue Laiws. 119 2. An attempt by the Legislature to autliorize cities to exempt from taxation agricultural lands within the limits of a city, is void as being in conflict with sections 1 and 7, article 10 of the Constitution. Copeland vs. City of St. Joseph, 126 Mo., 417. 3. That section of the Constitution which declares that all laws exempting property from taxation, other than the property enumerated in section 6 of article 10 of the Constitution shall be void, refers only to affirmative legislative exemptions, and does not refer to statutes which do not in terms exempt certain prop- erty, nor to mere casual exemptions. Kansas City vs. Building & Loan Association, 145 Mo., 50. 4. The law of 1873, Session Acts, p. 254, providing that the City of Hannibal should maintain the streets and bridges within its own limits and support and maintain its own poor and granting certain privileges for exemptions to citizens of said city, held constitutional. City of Hannibal vs. County of Marion, 69 Mo., 571. 5. Where an express contract is entered into between a city and a person, whereby certain real property is to be ex- empted from taxation, such undertaking is void. Vrana vs. City Of St. Louis, 164 Mo., 146. City of St. Louis vs. Meier, yy Mo., 13. 6. A Legislature may divest itself and its successors of the power to tax corporations and persons. Scotland County vs. Railroad, 65 Mo., 123. 7. An exemption from State taxes does not operate as an exemption from county taxes. Railroad vs. Cass County, 53 Mo., 17. 8. A state cannot impose taxes on property previously ex- empt or raise the rate of taxation, unless there has been some express contract in limitation of the power. Railroad vs. McGuire, 49 Mo., 490. 9. Legislative bodies have the power to select subjects of taxation and to exempt other subjects. Scotland County vs. Railroad, 65 Mo., 123. 120 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 10. Municipal corporations have no power to grant exemp- tions from taxation, or to commute taxes already assessed. A contract which undertakes to do this is void. State vs. Railroad Co., 75 Mo., 208. .St. Louis vs. Meier, yy Mo., 13. Vrana vs. St. Louis, 164 Mo., 146. 11. Exemption from taxation is a non-transferable per- sonal privilege. •State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 8g Mo., 523. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 99 Mo., 30. 12. Under the Constitution, as it existed in 1853, a Legisla- ture could exempt the property of a college from taxation. St. Vincent's College vs. Schaeffer, 104 Mo., 261. 13. The provisions of sections 6 and 7, article 11 of the Con- stitution of 1875 and 1865, respectively, in relation to exemptiag certain property from taxation, are prospective and do not re- peal a prior special law, exempting from taxation the property of a private corporation. State ex rel. vs. St. Joseph Convent of Mercy, 116 Mo., 575. 14. Where the law omits certain property from taxation, the courts cannot direct how it shall be taxed. Kansas City vs. Building & Loan Ass'n., 145 Mo., 50. Sec. 10. General Assembly Shall Not Tax Municipalities, When.— "The Ceneral Assembly shall not impose taxes upon counties, cities, towns or other municipal corporations or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county, city, town or other municipal purposes but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes." 1. The State has authority to create a police force for a city and to compel the State to maintain it. The State in such cases, by the act creating the force, and prescribing their pay and directing the city to pay it, levies the tax and directs the city how to apply it. The city does not leAry it and cannot say she has assumed Digest of the Revenue Laivs. 121 obligations which are superior to charges imposed upon her rev- enue by the State. State ex rel. vs. Mason, 153 Mo., 23. 2. The license fee exacted by the General Assembly, reg- ulating dramshops, is not a tax in the meaning of sections 1, 3 and 10 of article 10 of the Constitution. It is the price paid for the privilege. Pursuits that are pernicious and detrimental to public morals may be prohibited altogether. State ex rel. Troll vs. Hudson, 78 Mo., 302. 3. A legislative act to be sustained as a police measure,' must, in some degree tend to prevent some offenses or manifest evil, or have for its aim the observation of public health, moral safety or welfare. State ex rel. vs. Ashbrook, 154 Mo., 375. Sec. 11. Rates For Local Purposes— Limits— How In- creased For Schools and Erecting Public Buildings.— "Taxes for county, city, town and school purposes may be levied on all subjects and objects of taxation; but the valuation of property therefor shall not exceed the valuation of the same property in such town, city or school district for State and county purposes. For county purposes the annual rate on property, in counties having six million dollars or less, shall not, in the aggregate, ex- ceed fifty cents on the hundred dollars valuation ; in counties hav- ing six million dollars and under ten million dollars, said rate shall not exceed forty cents on the hundred dollars valuation ; in counties having ten million dollars and under thirty million dol- lars, said rate shall not exceed fifty cents on the Imndred dollars valuation ; and in counties having thirty million dollars or more, said rate shall not exceed thirty-five cents on the hundred dol- lars valuation. For city and town purposes the annual rate on property in cities and towns having thirty thousand inhab- itants or more shall not, in the aggregate, exceed one hundred cents on the hundred dollars valuation ; in cities and towns hav- ing less than thirty thousand and over ten thousand inhabitants, said rate shall not exceed sixty cents on the hundred dollars val- uation; in cities and towns having less than ten thousand and 122 Digest of the Revenue Lazi's. more than one thousand inhabitants, said rate shall not exceed fifty cents on the hundred dollars valuation; and in towns hav- ing one thousand inhabitants or less, said rate shall not ex- ceed twenty-five cents on the hundred dollars valuation. For school purposes in districts, the annual rate on property shall not exceed forty cents on the hundred dollars valuation: Pro- vided, the aforesaid annual rates for school purposes may be in- creased, in districts formed of cities and towns, to an amount not to exceed one dollar on the hundred dollars valuation, and in other districts to an amount not to exceed sixty-five cents on the hundred dollars valuation, on the condition that a majority of the voters who are tax-payers, voting at an election held to decide the question, vote for said increase. For the purpose of erecting public buildings in counties, cities or school districts, the rates of taxation herein limited may be increased when the rate of such increase and the purpose for which it is intended shall have been submitted to a vote of the people, and two-thirds of the qualified voters of such county, city or school district, voting at such election, shall vote therefor. The rate herein allowed to each county shall be ascertained by the amount of taxable property therein, according to the last assessment for State and county purposes, and the rate allowed to each city or town by the number of inhabitants, according to the last census taken under the authority of the State, or of the United States; said restrictions as to rates shall apply to taxes of every kind and description, whether general or special, except taxes to pay valid indebtedness now existing, or bonds which may be issued in re- newal of such indebtedness. ' ' 1. After the adoption of the Constitution of 1875 and until the passage of the Act of March 24, 1877, no authority existed for levying taxes for school purposes exceeding 40 cents on the $100 of value. Piiblic Schools vs. Paines, 62 Mo., 444. State ex rel. vs. Holladay, 66 Mo., 387. State vs. Railroad, 74 Mo., 163. State vs. Railroad, 75 Mo., 526. 2. The limitation of the present Constitution as to the rate of levy for taxes applies only to the years subsequent to its adoption. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, loi Mo., 120. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 123 3. And does not apply- to a debt existing at tlie time of its adoption. Levies may be continued until the indebtedness shall be paid. State ex rel. Collector vs. Schooley, 84 Mo., 447. 4. The provision of the State Constitution limiting the rate of taxation did not require legislative action to enforce it and went into effect at once. And this is true, notwithstanding the proviso allowing the rate of taxation to be increased by legislative action and public vote. St. Joseph Board of Public Schools vs. Patton, 62 Mo., 444. Center B'ld'g. Co. vs. St. Joseph, 108 Mo., 304. 5. Section 11, article 10 of the Constitution of 1875 operates as a limitation upon the power of the General Assembly to au- thorize cities and incorporated towns to levy taxes. This section was self-enforcing, but of its own force con- ferred no power upon cities to levy taxes. Such powers are derived from the General Assembly and not directly from the constitutional provision in question. .State ex rel. Brown vs. Van Every, 75 Mo., 530: 6. The constitutional limitation on the annual rate of tax- ation cannot be exceeded even though the levy be made to pay a judgment against a county, founded on a warrant issued to meet current expenses. Arnold vs. Hawkins, 95 Mo., 569. 7. A tax in excess of the constitutional limit cannot be legally levied even by order of the circuit court. Black vs. McGonigle, 103 Mo., 192. 8. It is the purpose of the present Constitution to put the business of the county upon a cash basis. State ex rel. vs. Payne, 151. Mo., 663. Railroad vs. Thornton, 152 Mo., 570. 124 . Digest of the Revenue Laws. 9. It is the purpose of sections 11 and 12, article 10 of the Constitution to abolish the credit system and establish a cash system in public business. Reynolds vs. Norman, 114 Mo., 509. Wilson vs. Knox County, 132 Mo., 387. State ex rel. vs. Payne, 151 Mo., 663. Railroad vs. Thornton, 152 Mo., 570. 10. The revenues for any one year must be applied to the payment of current expenses of the county of that year, and only the surplus after these have been paid can be used to pay war- rants issued in some other year. Nor can county warrants issued to meet county expenses for one year be received by the collector in the payment of taxes for any other year. See authorities under No. 9, supra. 11. Under section 11, article 10 of the Constitution, stoelrs of goods and merchandise form a distinct class of itself. Such property is not to be included in determining the rate of taxation for couny purposes. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 116 Mo., 15. 12. An annual tax, authorized by section 12, article 10 of the Constitution is not within the limitations of section 11, but may be imposed under the conditions and restrictions of section 12, even though in excess of the rates stated in section 11. (State ex rel vs. Columbia, iii Mo., 365, overruled.) Lamar Water & Electric Light Co. vs. City of La- mar, 128 Mo., 188. 13. A tax in excess of 40 cents on the $100 for county pur- poses in a county whose assessed valuation is between six and ten million dollars cannot be levied unless authorized by two- thirds of the voters of a county voting at an election held for tliat purpose. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 169 Mo., 563. 14. A town of less than ten thousand and more than one thousand inhabitants cannot by a two-thirds vote levy a tax in excess of 50 cents on the $100 valuation for the purpose of pay- Digest of the Revenike Laivs. 125 ing bonds issued for the construction of water works and an electric light plant. State ex rel. vs. To-.vn of Columbia, ill Mo., 365. (Overruled in case of Lamar Water & Electric Light Co. vs. Lamar, 128 Mo., 188.) 15. The annual tax authorized by section 12, article 10 of the Constitution is not within the iahibitions of section 11 of said article. State ex rel. vs. City of Lamar, 128 Mo., 188. Water Works Co. vs. City of Aurora, 129 Mo., 540. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 164 Mo., 208. 16. Under the Constitution a county court cannot create a debt in excess of the current revenue. A debt in excess of the current revenue cannot be created for the improvement of county buildings. Book vs. Earl, 87 Mo., 246. 17. Unless authorized by the required vote, a county court cannot levj a tax for any purpose in excess of the constitutional limit of 50 cents on the $100. The limitations contained in sections 11 and 12 of article 10 include indebtedness in any one year and for any purpose. (Potter vs. Douglas County, 84 Mo., 230, distin- guished and overruled.) Barnard vs. Knox County, 105 Mo., 382. 18. A law authorizing the collection of a license fee of $2 on merchants with stocks of less than $1,000 and of $3 on those with a greater stock is constitutional. State ex rel. vs. McGannon, 138 Mo., 38. 19. A license tax of one per cent, imposed by a municipal- ity upon the wares of a merchant cannot be upheld as an occupa- tion tax. It is a property or ad valorem tax. Being in excess of the constitutional limit, it is void. City of Brookfield vs. Tooey, 141 Mo., 619. 20. Act of March 18, 1895, p. 246, held imconstitutional. It imposes a property and not a license tax. 126 Digest of tfve Revenue Lmi's. The property tax of two per cent, imposed by said law for general purposes exceeds the constitutional limit. State ex rel. vs. Stephens, 146 Mo., 662. 21. Eoad taxes are county taxes within the meaning of section 11, article 10 of the Constitution and cannot be levied in excess of the limitations imposed thereby. The limitation so imposed cannot be evaded by organiziag into townships for road purposes. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 145 Mo., 596. 22. Township taxes imposed under the township organiza- tion law are taxes for "county purposes" within article 10, sec- tion 11 of the Constitution of 1875. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 123 Mo., 72. 23. -Under sections 11 and 12 of article 10 of the Constitu- tion of 1875 and the statutes passed in pursuance thereof, two ways are provided by which a school house may be built. One is to levy a tax and build it with the funds thus provided. The other is to authorize the issuance of bonds by a two-thirds vote of the qualified voters. The levy of a tax to pay annual interest and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal, is the unavoidable concom- itant of the constitutional authority to incur indebtedness. Benton vs. Scott, 168 Mo., 378. 24. Warrants issued for the payment of a judgment ren- dered on county bonds issued prior to the adoption of the pres- ent Constitution and paid, are not charges under section 11, article 10 of said Constitution on the general fund of the year. Such warrants cannot by reason of their priority affect the validity of other warrants drawn on such fund during the year. Wilson vs. Knox County, 132 Mo., 387. (Overruled in Railroad vs. Thornton, 152 Mo., 570.) Sec. 12. Municipal Indebtedness, Limit of.— "No county, city, town, township, school district or other political corpora- tion or subdivision of the State shall be allowed to become in- debted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year, without the assent of two-thirds of the voters thereof voting at Digest of the Revenue Laws. 127 an election to be held for tliat purpose ; nor in cases requiring such assent shall any indebtedness be allowed to be incurred to an amount including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by -the assessment next before the last assessment for State and county purposes, previous to the m- curring of such indebtedness : Provided, that with such assent any county may be allowed to become indebted to a larger amount for the erection of a courthouse or jaU. And provided further, that any county, city, town, township, school district or other political corporation or subdivision of the State, in- curring any indebtedness requiring the assent of the voters as aforesaid, shall, before or at the time of doing so, provide for the collection of an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest on such indebtedness as it falls due, and also to constitute a sinking fund for payment of the priucipal thereof, within twenty years from the time of contracting the same. " 1. Section 12, article 10 of the Constitution limiting ex- penditures does not apply to debts incurred by the county court for the keeping and transporting of prisoners by the sheriff or jailer of another county. Potter vs. Douglas County, 87 Mo., 239. (Overruled in Bax^nard vs. Knox Countv, 105 Mo., 382.) 2. The words ' ' existing indebtedness, ' ' within the meaning of the Constitution, apply as well to a debt regularly created after its adoption under the provisions of the school law as to debts existing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of 1875. After a school board has issued bonds by authority of a vote, the school board may thereafter determine the rate of tax- ation to be levied for the payment of interest on the same with- out submitting the question of rate to the voters of the district. Benton vs. Scott, 168 Mo., 378. 3. The taxation of 50 cents on the $100 valuation for gen- eral revenue, and an additional tax of 25 cents for sinking fund and interest may be properly levied by a city of the fourth class, if the debt thereby sought to be paid was made for any of the 128 Digest of the Revenue Laws. purposes and in the ways mentioned in section 12, article 10 of the Constitution. City of Stanberry vs. Jordan, 145 Mo., 372. 4. County warrants for a past indebtedness, though valid, cannot be paid from the revenue provided for current expenses, until all the warrants drawn for the expenses for the year for which the taxes are levied have been paid. After the payment of the warrants drawn for the expenses for the current year, the surplus revenue, if any, may be applied to the payment of warrants of a preceding year. Andrew County vs. Schell, 135 Mo., 31. 5. A contract by a city to pay a fixed price annually for twenty years for furnishing water does not create an indebted- ness on the part of the city within the meaning of section 12, article 10 of the Constitution. Saleno vs. City of Neosho, 127 Mo., 627. Water Works Co. vs. City of Lamar, 128 Mo., 188. Water Co. vs. City of Neosho, 136 Mo., 498. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 164 Mo., 208. City of Lexington ex rel. vs. Lafayett.e County Bank, 165 Mo., 671. 6. The annual tax authorized by section 12, article 10 of the Constitution is not within the inhibitions of section 11 of said article. See Nos. 14 and 15, supra. 7. In determining what constitutes the income and revenue provided for one year, within the meaning of section 12, article 10 of the Constitution, all sources of income including that from licenses should be estimated. Lamar W. & El. Co. vs. City of Lamar, 128 Mo., 188. 8. It is the purpose of the present Constitution to put the business of a county upon a cash basis. See Nos. 8 and 9 under Sec. 11 supra. 9. The provision of the State Constitution limiting the rate of taxation did not require legislative action to enforce it and went into effect upon the adoption of the Constitution. See No. 4 under Sec. 11, supra. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 129 10. A tax in excess of 40 cents on the $100 for county pur- poses in a county whose assessed valuation is between six and ten million dollars cannot be levied except by authority of two- thirds of the voters of a county voting at an election held for that purpose. .State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 169 Mo., 563. 11. Unless authorized by the required vote, the county court cannot levy a tax for any purpose in excess of the consti- tutional limit of 50 cents on the $100. Barnard vs. Knox County, 105 Mo., 382. 12. The levy of a tax to pay annual interest and to create a sinking fund to pay the principal, is the unavoidable concom- itant of the constitutional authority to incur indebtedness. Benton vs. Scott, 168 Mo., 378. Sec. 18. State Board of Equalization— Members.— "There shall be a State Board of Equalization, consisting of the Gover- nor, State Auditor, State Treasurer, Secretary of State and Attorney-General. The duty of said board shall be to adjust and equalize the valuation of real and personal property among the several counties in the State, and it shall perform such other duties as are or may be prescribed by law. ' ' 1. The Act of March 10, 1871, providing for a Board of Equalization for the purpose of assessing railroads and their .property, does not violate the Yjrovisions of the Constitution, which declare that taxation on property shall be uniform. State vs. Severance, 55 Mo., 378. Washington County vs. Railroad, 58 Mo., 372. Pacific Railroad vs. Watson, 61 Mo., 67. 2. A law requiring all roalroad property to be assessed by the State Board of Equalization ; and that said Board ascertain the value of such property within the limits of any city and transmit that amount as the proper assessment in favor of the city is not void as violating that provision of the Constitution which declares that taxation on property shall be uniform. State ex rel. vs. Severance, 55 Mo., 378. D— 9 130 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 3. By virtue of section 18, article 10 of the Constitution, the Governor, State Auditor, Treasurer, Secretary of State and Attorney-General are constituted the State Board of Equaliza- tion. Railroad vs. State Board of Equalization, 64 Mo., 294. Sec. 19. Money to Be Paid as Appropriated— Limit— How Continued- Receipts and Expenditures.— "No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this State, or any of the funds under its management, except in pursuance of an appropriation by law; nor unless such payment be made, or a warrant shall have issued therefor, within two years after the passage of such appropriation act ; and every such law, making a new appropria- tion, or continuing or reviving an appropriation, shall distinctly specify the sum appropriated, and the object to which it is to be applied; and it shall not be sufficient to refer to any other law to fix such sum or object. A regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be pub- lished from time to time. ' ' 1. A law of the General Assembly appropriating iaoney out of the treasury of the State is unconstitutional where it fails to specify the sum appropriated and the object to which it is to be applied. This is true even though the law appropriates a balance of a prior appropriation. State ex rel. vs. Seibert, 99 ]Mo., 122. CONSTITUTION, GENERALLY. Section 4, article 2.— A^liile the Constitution guarantees to every one the right to "the enjoyment of the gains of his own industry, ' ' this is not an absolute right. It is subordinate to the police power. It is immaterial that a license tax for the privilege of carry- ing on a business is against the occupation and not against the property. St. Louis vs. McCann, 157 Mo., 301. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 131 Section 16, article 2 of the Constitution of 1865 was not de- signed to act retrospectively. Scotland County vs. Railroad, 65 Mo., 123. Section 21, article 2.— An act of the Legislature directing a county to appropriate part of its funds to pay a portion of the police expenses of a city is not an application of property to private uses. Nor is it the taking of private property for a public use, the police commissioners being an agency of the State govern- ment. State ex rel. vs. St. Louis County Court, 34 Mc, 546. Section 28, article 4.— The Act of April 1, 1891, relating to the assessment of banking property is constitutional. State ex rel Ward vs. Board of Equalization, 135 Mo., 309. Section 47, article 4.— The Act of the General Assembly of April 9th, 1895, providing pensions for persons who served as policemen in the City of St. Louis, is imconstitutional for the reason that it is a grant of public money in aid of or to an in- dividual. State ex rel. vs. Zeigenhein, 144 Mo., 283. Section 5, article 8.— E. S. 1889, sections 987-1013, authoriz- ing the payment of the costs of an election and of the office of the recorder of voters in cities having a population more than 100,000 equally out of the county and city treasuries are not un- constitutional as authorizing the levy of a municipal tax for other than local purposes. State ex rel. vs. Owsley, 122 Mo., 68. Section 8, article 9.— Section 8, article 9 of the Constitution of 1865 amounts to a mandate to the Legislature, and provides the means of sustaining a free school in each district in the State, at least four months in each year. , It does not prohibit a more liberal provision. Sharp vs. Miller, 65 Mo., 50. Section 14, article 11.— Under the Act of January 24, 1870, Phelps county could not legally issue bonds in aid of the School 132 Digest of the Revenue Lmvs. of Mines except by sanction of two-thirds of the voters of the county. Sec. 14, article 11 of the State Constitution was not in- tended to be limited to private corporations, but applies as well to those of a public nature. State vs. Curators State University, 57 Mc, 178. Section 14, article 11 of the State Constitution refers to inunieipal corporations and stockholders who loan their credit to private companies, and has no application to a case where a town loans its credit for public school purposes. State ex rel. Dome et al vs. Wilcox, 45 Mo., 458. i The Legislature had power under the Constitution of 1865 to authorize townships to subscribe to the stock of railroad companies, but subject to the restrictions contained in section 14, article 11, which prohibited the making of such subscriptions without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified voters. The township Aid Act of 1868 held constitutional. State ex rel. Woodson vs. Brassfield, 67 Mo., 331. (Overruled in Webb vs. Lafayette Co., 67 Mo., 353.) ANTI DEPARTMENT STORE ACT. (Laws of 1899, p. 72.) Said act is unconstitutional. It shows upon its face that regulation is not its purpose, but that revenue, or undue restriction is the aim in view. It simply imposes a license fee although its title indicates tliat it is an act to regulate the business and trade. By it the General Assembly attempted directly to exer- cise the power to impose an occupation tax for said purposes. The (a^eneral Assembly act only conferred this power upon officers of municipalities by a general law. If it imposes a State tax, then there is no authority in the Legislature to reinit two-thirds of it to the State. It is unconstitutional in that it gives the license commis- sioner power to fix the amount of tax anywhere between a maxi- mum and a minimum amount. Digest of the Revenue Lazi's. 133 An undetermined tax is in la^v no tax. It makes an arbi- trary class of cases of certain merchants upon whom it fixes a license fee and exempts all others therefrom. It fails to provide or guarantee imiformity of taxation. It does not prescribe the life or duration of the license required by it, and is therefore void for uncertainty. It is void because it does not constitute a rule of con- duct and is incomplete. It violates the natural rights of citizens as defined in the Constitution. It is unwarranted class legislation. State ex rel. vs. Ashbrook, 154 Mo., 375. BARBERS ACT. (Chapter78,K. S. 1899.) Said act is constitutional. Its constitutionality may be contested by habeas corpus. It is a police regulation. It is not special legislation since it applies to several cities and wil] apply to others as they attain the specified population. Its restrictions of the Governor's power in the selection of members of the Board of Examiners are constitutional, since the Constitution is silent as to how such appointments shall be made. The refusal of the unions to recom.mend for appointment, as required, would not have the effect to repeal the law. The Constitution does not control the disbursement of the fund authorized to be raised by said act; said fund is not State revenue. Exparte Lucas, 160 Mo., 218. BEER INSPECTION. (Act May 4, 1899.) Said act is constitutional. It is not a revenue measure under the guise of inspection. The right to sell intoxicating liquors is not a natural right. Under the police power the State may prohibit their sale altogether. 134 Digest of the Revenue Laws. The State may authorize their sale under such regulations as it deems proper. The amount of an occupation tax may be fixed in propor- tion to the business done. It is not necessary that the license is of a fixed period, nor that a fixed amount be paid for a fixed time. The legislative power is limited only by the Constitution. One statute may impose a tax upon the privilege of car- rying on a business and another statute may confer the privilege. Said act does not violate the right of interstate commerce. The fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution does not interfere with the exclusive right of a state to make all proper police regulations. State vs. Bixman, 162 Mo., i. COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX. (Act of 1899.) Said act constitutional. It does not impose a tax on the property. It is a duty levied upon the right or privilege of receiving the same. The right to inherit i8 not a natural right. Terms may be prescribed upon which collateral kindred may take the prop- erty of a decedent. Conveyances, devised, etc., to charitable purposes may be exempted from its burdens. It is not required by the Constitution that all revenues first go into one general fund. The Constitution only requires that appropriations be made in the order therein designated. No special lien or priority of payment of one appropria- tion over another is given by the Constitution. State ex rel. vs. Henderson, 160 Mo., 190. COLLATERAL SUCCESSION TAX. (Act of April 1, 1895, and amendatory Acts of March 16 and 17, 1897.) Said acts are constitutional. Said act levied a tax within the meaning of article 10 of the Constitution. Digest of the Revenue Laz^'s. 135 Taxes can be levied only for the public purpose. The State of Missouri may authorize and levy taxes upon the devolution or succession of property for public purposes. A tax levied by said act is not for the public purpose, but for the benefit of certain favored individuals. A collateral inheritance tax levied to support the State University would not be for a public purpose and is unconsti- tutional. The acts in question provide for the gift of public money by the State to private indi^'iduals for private use. The tax provided by said act is a property tax and not a bonus levied upon the right to take the property. It is not uniform within the meanings of the Constitution. Paternalism is pernicious in its tendencies and taxation can not be justified in its name. State ex rel. vs. Switzler, 143 Mo., 287. DEEDS OF TRUST AND MORTGAGES. The amendment adopted at the general election in Novem- ber, 1900, adding two sections to article 10 of the Constitution of Missouri, in reference to the taxation of land, deeds of trust and mortgages, is a violation of the 14th amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Russell vs. Croy, 164 Mo., 69. DOUBLE TAXATION. Taxing shares against the stockholders and also the prop- erty represented by the capital stock of the corporation would be duplicate taxation. State vs. Railroad, yy Mo., 202. In levying taxes on property, it sometimes cannot be avoided that the same value will be twice taxed; but this does not make the tax levied illegal as double taxation. Life Insurance Co. vs. Board of Assessors, 56 Mo., , 503- 136 Digest of the Revenue Laws. Taxation by a city of the second class both by way of license and a tax on the net income of foreign insurance companies is not double taxation. City of St. Joseph vs. Ernst, 95 Mo., 360. A provision that the payment of certain fees by life insur- ance companies shall be in lieu of all fees and taxes whatever, except that they may be taxed upon their pa.id up capital stock the same as other property for county and municipal purposes, does not prevent the taxation of other property owned by com- panies over and above the par value of their capital stock, and such taxation is not double, but the non-taxation of such property would amount to an exemption in violation of the State Consti- tution. Life Ass'n. vs. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo., 512. DUE PROCESS OF LAW. A statute attempting to legalize the sale of land for taxes without notice to the owner is void. Roth vs. Gabbart, 123 Mo., 21. A tax-bill issued under the Laws of 1883, p. 343, to the sheriff of the county to which a person owing personal taxes has removed is "due process of law" within the meaning of the Constitution. De Arman vs. Williams,. 93 Mo., 158. Property sold for taxes in valid exercise of the taxing power cannot be said to be taken from the owner without due process of law. If any steps in the exercise of the power to tax are so in- dispensable that without them no tax can be raised, then the owner cannot by legislation be declared excluded from showing the truth. Abbott vs. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 166. The General Assembly may authorize boards of equaliza- tion by way of penalty to treble the taxes of one who with intent to defraud has given in a false list of his property for taxation. Where the law provides for a hearing for such persons before the Board of Equalization, he is not deprived of the right Digest of the Revenue La-ws. 137 of trial by jury nor is his property taken without due process of law. State ex rel. Ferguson vs. Moss, 69 Mo., 495. FOREIGN CORPORATIONS. The tangible property of a foreign corporation, although it derives its charter from an act of Congress and is a govern- mental agent and an instrument of interstate commerce, is sub- ject to taxation in this State. The franchise of foreign corporations doing business under the laws of this State is property and is subject to taxation either directly in the proportion that the proportion of the fran- chise exercises in this State bears to the proportion of the fran- chise exercised in all states; or, indirectly by being imposed upon the tangible property owned by it in Missouri and by con- sidering the franchise and its tangible property as a system and then assessing the part of the property forming a part of the system located in this State as of its proportionate value of the whole property constitutes the system. State ex rel. vs. Union Tel. Co., 165 Mo., 502. INCOME TAX. The income tax bill, Act of February, 1865, was constitu- tional. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. The State has a right to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors without a license therefor. State ex rel. Troll v,=:. Hudson, 78 Mo., 302. Ausmus vs. State, 10 Mo., 591. .State vs. Lemp, 16 Mo., 389. State vs. Sercy, 20 Mo., 489. State vs. Rixman, 162 Mo. i. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. No state can prohibit the introduction of foreign merchan- dise, if Congress has authorized its introduction, but each state may regulate her internal traffic according to her own pleasure. 138 Digest of the Revenue Laws. Each state can act upon an article of commerce after it has passed from foreign commerce, and becomes a part of the property of its citizens. Crow, et al vs. State, 14 Mo., 237. A tax levied by a state authority upon the gross receipts of an express company whose business consists in receiving goods to be delivered outside of the state is not in conflict with that provision of the Constitution which confines to Congress alone the power to regulate commerce between the several states. Express Co. vs. City of St. Joseph, 66 Mo., 675. LAWYERS AND PHYSICIANS. Lawyers and physicians may be compelled to pay a license for practicing their professions. The license fees which are imposed upon those who pursue particular employments are taxes. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. St. Louis vs. Sternberg, 4 App., 453. See also No. 13, Sec. i, supra. PERSONAL JUDGMENT. (Act of 1877.) The Act of 1877 providing for the enforcement of a tax lien against land without a personal judgment against the owner is constitutional. State ex rel. Rosenblatt vs. Sargent, 76 Mo., 557. State ex rel. vs. Bridge Co., 73 Mo., 442. Said act is not unconstitutional as being retrospective. Wellschear vs. Kelley, 69 Mo., 343. POLICE FORCE. The State has authority to create a police force for a city and compel the city to maintain it. The State in such cases, by the act creating the force, and prescribing their pay and directing the city to pay it, levies the tax and directs the city how to apply it. Digest of the Revenue Laivs. 139 The city does not levy it, and cannot say she has assumed obligations which are superior to charges imposed upon her revenue by the State. State ex rel. vs. Mason, 153 Mo., 23. REFUNDING TAXES. Taxes illegally collected by a township from a railroad un- der an unconstitutional law were properly paid into the State treasury. The Act of the General Assembly of March 19, 1881, provid- ing for the refunding of such taxes to the townships by the State is unconstitutional. State ex rel. vs. Walker, 85 Mo., 41. ROAD TAXES. Eoad taxes are county taxes within the meaning of section 11, article 10 of the Constitution and cannot be levied in excess of its limitation. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 145 Mo., 596. STREET RAILWAYS. (Act of 1897.) Said act held constitutional. State ex rel. vs. Street Railroad, 161 Mo., 188. CONSTITUTION OF 1865. Section 16, article 11 of the Constitution of 1865 did not withdraw the existing exemptions from taxation granted by the Legislature. Barry vs. Cemetery Ass'n, 10 App., 587. State ex rel. vs. Wesleyan Cemetery Ass'n, 11 App., 570- A provision in the statutes of 1865 allowing tax-payers who had subscribed to the capital stock of a railroad company credit on their taxes in proportion to the amounts of their subscrip- tions was repugnant to the provisions of the Constitiition of 1865 and invalid. Cock vs. Stewart, 85 Mo., 575. 140 Digest of the Revenue Laws. ACT OF MARCH i8, 1870. The Act of March 18, 1870, in relation to the assessment of revenues on real estate providing the tax on real estate shall be a lien thereon, and providing for the sale and enforcement of such ]ien is constitutional. State ex rel. vs. Draper, 47 Mo., 29. State ex rel. vs. Magiiire, 47 Mo., 35. COUNTY CLERKS. 1. ITuder the Act of 1877, a statement of the county clerk is not void, because of a mistake in the year the tax is desig- nated delinquent, where it appears that the tax is properly levied. Morrison vs. Railroad Company, 96 Mo., 602. 2. A county clerk in the absence of an order of the county court levying a tax, is without authority to extend the taxes. Railroad Company vs. Apperson, 97 Mo., 300. 3. An extension of the taxes of the county clerk's copy, in- stead of the origiaal assessor's book, does not invalidate the tax. State ex rel. vs. Lounsberry, 125 Mo., 157. 4. A county clerk is not entitled to fees under section 5600, K. S. 1879, for filing the assessment lists of taxable property. Nor are these allowed for such filing by the provisions of the General Eevenue Law, section 6862, E. S. 1879. Hubbard vs. Texas County, loi Mo., 210. ' 5. Under the Act of 1867, it is the duty of the county clerk to extend the amount of the school taxes on the assessment books. Brown vs. Harris, 52 Mo., 306. 6. Mandamus will lie to compel a county clerk to extend a school tax upon the tax books, according to the estimate fur- nished him by the district directors ; and this, notwithstanding the extension has been prohibited by an order of the county court. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 141 The county court has no control over the county clerk in re- spect to the extension of school taxes. School District vs. Byers, 67 Mo., 706. 7. Where in counties having adopted an organization law, the county clerk makes out duplicate tax-bills or vouchers for the use of the township collector, the State can be held for any proportion of the fees specified under section 245, W. S., 1872, for services so rendered. State ex rel. vs. Auditor, 61 Mo., 524. 8. The failure of the county clerk to sign and seal the as- sessor's book as required by section 6723, B. S. 1879, renders it of no official validity and affords the collector no authority to enforce the collection of the taxes contained therein. Railway Company vs. Apperson, 97 Mo., 300. 9. A woman is not disqualified, because of her sex, from the office of county clerk in Missouri. The office of clerk of a court is ministerial and its duties may be performed by a woman. State ex rel. vs. Hostetter, 137 Mo., 636. 10. No authority is conferred on a county clerk to assess property for school or other taxes. He is required to assess or extend the amounts of revenue to be apportioned and raised for school purposes. His powers are limited to the computation and apportion- ment upon the tax assessor's returns as made. School District vs. Wickersham, 34 App., 337. COUNTY COURTS. 1. The county court has no implied power to levy taxes. The conditions imposed by the Legislature upon taxing power must be observed. State ex rel. vs. the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company, 87 Mo., 236. 2. The county court is without jurisdiction to act upon a void delinquent list. Howard vs. Heck, 88 Mo., 456. 142 Digest of the Revenue Lcnvs. 3. A railroad interest fund tax can be levied by a county court without strict compliance with section 6799, E. S. 1879. Under said section, an order issued by a circuit judge ia 1882 gave no authority to the county court to re-levy such tax for the year 1880. State ex lel. vs. Railroad Company, 97 Mo., 296. 4. There must be an order of the county court levying taxes before the clerk can legally extend them. Railway Company vs. Apperson, 97 Mo., 300. 5. While the county court, for the purchase of a site for a court house, may anticipate the revenue collected, and to be collected, it cannot bind the county in excess of the annual rev- enue. Sheidley vs. Lynch, 95 Mo., 487. 6. Under the Laws of 1872, it was necessary that the rec- ords of the county court show that the court had examined and corrected the "delinquent list." And, further, that the court directed the corrected list to be certified and filed. State ex rel. vs. Scott, 96 Mo., 72. 7. County courts are simply trustees of the school fund. In the control and management of said fund they must strict- ly conform to the statutory requirements. Montgomery County vs. Auchley, 103 Mo., 492. 8. Under R. S. 1879, section 5405, the county court may fix the salary of the county treasurer. Givens vs. Daviess County, 107 Mo., 603. 9. Levy by the county court to pay railroad township taxes gives rise to the presumption that the preliminary order required to be made by the circuit court, under the Act of March 8, 1879, has been complied with. State ex rel. vs. Railroad Company, loi Mo., 136. 10. A nunc pro tunc order of the county court, in reference to taxation, will be presumed to have been made upon sufficient evidence. State ex rel. vs. Vaile, 122 Mo., 33. Digest of tke Revenue Laws. 143 11. The levy of a tax to pay a judgment against a county ■^ill be void where the court did not comply with the require- ments of section 6799, R. S. 1879. State ex rel. vs. Hager, 91 Mo., 452. 12. An order of the county court, fixing the right of taxa- tion and making the levy, is sufficient, if it is in substantial com- pliance with the statute. State ex rel. vs. Kansas City, 116 Mo., 15. 13. The judges of the county court will be held accountable to the county as trustees for the diversion of the county school fund even though done by mistake. Where the county receives the benefit of the money misap- plied, it should refund to the judges, from the general revenues, such sum as they have been obliged to pay in restoring the mis- applied funds. Knox County vs. Hunolt, no Mo., 67. 14. In a suit for taxes based on a new levy, credit should be allowed for taxes paid on a prior illegal levy. State ex rel. vs. Railway Company, 92 Mo., 137. 15. In the absence of the certificate from the counties, of cities where railroad property is situate, showing the rate of tax- ation levied by the city on all property for city purposes, the county court cannot levy the tax. State ex rel. vs. Railroad Company 135 Mo., 77. 16. The county court will not be compelled by mandamus to issue a warrant on the common fund of the county for the pay- ment of railroad bond indebtedness when the result would be to withdraw from the treasury all the funds necessary for the support of the county government. State ex rel. vs. Macon County Court, 68 Mo., 29. 17. "While the county is ordinarily not liable for a general debt upon a warrant drawn against a special fund, yet, if it di- verts the money of that fund from the payment of the warrant and assesses for other purposes, it becomes liable. Valleau vs. Newton County Court, 72 Mo., 593. 144 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 18. County courts are expressly authorized to hold as many adjourned terms as they deem necessary at any time, provided the period fixed for the adjourned session does not overrun the next regular term. All business done at such adjourned session is considered as done at the same term. Pliggins vs. Ransdall, 13 Mo., 144. 19. County courts have no power to alter the assessment of taxes to build schoolhouses, merely on the alleged ground that the schoolhouse is unnecessary ; the decision of that question is left to the local directors. Petition of Powers, Kilcullen, et al., 52 Mo., 218. 20. Where an injunction suit is brought on behalf of the county against a purchaser of school land to stay waste and the members of the county court executed the injunction bond, they will be entitled to reimbursement out of the purchase money when paid by the vendee of the land into the township fund for any sum which may have been recovered from them on this bond, on dissolution of the injunction. In bringing such suit, and executing such bond, the members of the county court act as ministerial agents of the State for the benefit of the township. Washington County vs. Boyd, 64 Mo., 179. 21. A contract with a county court cannot be established by parol evidence; it is a court of records and can only speak by its records. A verbal contract by a county court is not validated by the fact that the county court has paid part of the money stipulated to be paid and the work vs'as afterwards completed and was accepted and used by the county. It is not the province of the county court to provide a docket for the circuit court or to contract for entering upon such docket satisfaction of the judgments rendered in the latter court. Maupin vs. Franklin County, 67 Mo., 327. 22. Where there is danger that a real estate mortgage to a county to secure the loan of school funds may decrease in value, it is the duty of the county court, if deemed advisable, to demand Digest of the Rez'eiuie Lazi'S. 145 additional security, and, in case of failure to furnish the same, to order an inunediate sale of the property. In the employment of agents, counties have not even the power conferred on ordinary corporations. They act in subordination to and as auxiliary to the State government. Ray County vs. Bentley, 49 Mo., 236. 23. The county court is the trustee for the care and man- agement of the township school funds. In this capacity it may, under certain circumstances, pay out money for which the township is manifestly liable, in order to avoid the expense of litigation, but if it err in so doing, the case is one of misappropriation by a trustee, for which the law has provided sufficient remedies other than mandamus. The county court is also agent or trustee of the State for certain purposes in the general affairs of the county. Township Board of Education vs. Boyd, 58 Mo., 276. 24. County courts have power to compromise disputed claims for taxes. Railway Company vs. Anthony, 73 Mo., 431. 25. County courts, when acting in a judicial capacity, can speak only through and by their records. A county court cannot bind a party with whom it professes to contract by simply reciting the alleged contract on its records. The assent of the contracting parties must appear. Riley vs. Pettis County, 96 Mo., 318. 26. A county court in making a settlement with the county treasurer, under section 6378, E. S. 1879, does not act in a ju- dicial capacity. Cole County vs. Dallmeyer, loi Mo., 57. 27. A levy by the county court to pay a railroad township tax gives rise to the presumption, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the preliminary order required to be made by the circuit court, under the Act of March 8, 1879, has been com- plied with. D— 10 146 Digest of the Revenue Laivs. Where the county court opens a regular term and adjourns from day to day for a number of days, the adjournments are a part of the regular term and taxes may be levied at such ad- journed term. State ex rel. vs. Railway Company, loi Mo., 137. 28. A material alteration on a county collector's bond, made by either the clerk of the court or by the collector in the presence of some of the judges, releases the sureties. State ex rel. vs. Findley, loi Mo., 368. 29. The county court may make transfers to the comity contingency fund from any surplus remaining in the other funds provided for in section 7663, E. S. 1889, and can after such trans- fers are made, pay proper demands on such contingency fund. State ex rel. vs. Appleby, 136 Mo., 408. . 30. A county is not bound by the approval by the county court of a report of the county clerk reciting the fees he has re- ceived, except as to such fees as are mentioned in the report. Callaway County vs. Henderson, 139 Mo., 510. 31. There is no appeal to the circuit court from the action of the county court in auditing the accounts of the circuit clerk and making an order on him directing him to pay into the county treasury the ascertained balance due from him to the county. There is no appeal to the circuit court from the county court from an order touching issues and matters which circuit courts cannot try and determine anew. County courts have full power to settle with circuit clerks after the expiration of their terms of office. Scott County vs. Leftwich, 145 Mo., 26. 32. County courts have power to employ attorneys to rep- resent the county in suits brought against it. Reynolds vs. Clark County, 162 Mo., 680. 33. The statute does not require the order of the county court, requesting the prosecuting attorney to present a petition to the circuit judge for permission to levy taxes in excess of those required for State, county, school and other current pur- ■Digest of the Revenue Lazes. 147 poses, to specify the taxes that are to be included in the ordei* of the cii'cuit court. It is sufficient if the order shows that the county court was satisfied that there was a necessity for the assessment and levy of other taxes. State ex rel. vs. Railroad Company, 165 Mo., 597. 34. Where the justices of a county court have refused to cause a warrant to be drawn to pay a bill of costs taxed against the county, mandamus is a proper proceeding to compel the is- suance of such warrant. State ex rel. vs. Fraker, 166 Mo., 130. CURATOR. 1. Under the statutes of Missouri, a curator has the pos- session of the estate of his ward, both real and personal. It is his duty to list such property to the assessor. If listed by and assessed to the curator, he should pay the taxes out of the money in his hands as curator. The curator must list the property and the assessor should assess it against him. State ex rel. vs. Bnrr, 143 Mo., 209. 2. The personal property in the hands of a curator became liable for taxes on the first of January. The February following, the curator turned over the prop- erty to his ward and was discharged on settlement. Held, he should have given in the property for assessment and on settlement retained sufficient to pay the taxes. Failing to do this, he was personally liable for the asses&- ment made by the assessor. Kansas City vs. Simpson, 90 App., 50. (See situs). 148 Digest of the Revenue Laxvs. COUNTY TREASURER. 1. County courts, in maJiing stated settlement with county treasurers, do not act in a judicial capacity. Sections 5380-5383, B. S. 1879, do not authorize a judgment against the personal representative of a deceased officer. The demand of a county against the delinquent officer may be established by the judgment of the circuit court, or, if he be dead, then by that of the circuit or probate court. Cole County vs. Dallmeyer, loi Mo., 57. 2. A county treasurer may maintain a suit against a county for his salary without first presenting his claim for allowance under E. S. 1879, section 5388. The right of a public officer to a salary cannot be created by a contract. It can only exist as a creation of law. In the absence of constitutional restriction, the salary of a public officer may be increased or diminished during the term of office. The manner of payment may be changed, or the duties en- larged, without impairment of any vested right. Under section 5405, E. S. 1879, the county court may fix the salary of the county treasurer. And the salary so fixed could not be changed without notice to officers. Givens vs. Daviess County, 107 Mo., 603. 3. A bond of a county treasurer executed to the State in- stead of the county, as required by statute, is a good common law bond. State vs. Thomas, 17 Mo., 503. 4. The additional sections 23, 24 and 25, p. 1306, W. S., make it the duty of the county court to require of a county treas- urer, when his official bond becomes insufficient, a single bond in the sum of not less than twenty thousand dollars. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 149 The acceptance of several bonds aggregating that sum is not a compliance with the law and will not have the effect of releas- ing the sureties on the old bond. Such obligation will, however, be good as voluntary bonds, and the sureties in that will be liable. An additional bond required by the statute, does not secure the county merely against defalcation in excess of the amount of his original bond ; but against any that may accrue. State ex rel. vs. Sappington, 67 Mo., 529. 5. A county treasurer who pays a warrant when there is no money in the fund upon which it is drawn, cannot recover the amount from the comity even though payment was made at the instance of the county court and upon their promise to make good the amount. Cook vs. Putnam County, 70 Mo., 668. 6. "Wliere a county treasurer pays a warrant not yet pay- able, an action will lie on his part for the recovery of the money so disbursed. Morrow vs. Surber, 97 Mo., 155. 7. The separate bond required by section 42, p. 1251, W. S., to be given by the county treasurer as custodian of the school money, need not specify those moneys in an action against a county treasurer, on a school fund to recover moneys not ac- counted for. He is not entitled to credit for sums paid on war- rants of county clerks, or the clerk of any township, in excess of the amount received by him from that township. State ex rel. vs. Cook, 72 Mo., 496. 8. The sureties on the general bond of the county treas- urer are not liable for his failure to account for and pay over to his successor in office, county and township school funds. For the special duties imposed upon him by the school law, he is answerable on a separate bond. State vs. Johnson, 55 Mo., 80. 9. Loss of funds of the county through failure of the bank in which they were deposited, will not relieve the treas- urer from liability to account for them: and this is true, although before selecting that bank as the repository, he made strict in- 150 Digesi of the Rei'enue Laws. quiry as to its safety and solvency, and the lawless condition of the county made it impossible to keep the funds safely elsewhere than in a bank. If a county treasurer makes a general deposit of a county's funds in a bank to his credit as treasurer, the bank becomes in- debted to him in his official capacity, and he takes the risk of be- ing able to collect the funds. State ex rel. vs. Moore, 74 Mo., 413. 10. The fact that the treasurer had for years deposited the county 's money in a certain bank, and that the county knew this fact, does not estop the county to deny the treasurer 's authority to make the money realized from the sale of the county bonds a part of the trespasser's general deposit, or to deny his au- thority in any wise to direct it from the purpose to which it v^as created. Butler County vs. Bank, 143 Mo., 13. 11. Judges of the county courts, made trustees of a fund be- queathed for the education of poor young men and women in the county, have a right to employ an agent to handle it, and if the experience, talents, reputation and financial standing of the county treasurer suggests that he is a proper person to receive the custody and management of it, they may make him their agent, and having done so, they are not responsible for the loss or inappropriation of the fund by him. The treasurer's bond, however, is broad enough to embrace trust funds so committed to him. Anderson vs. Roberts, 147 Mo., 486. COUNTY WARRANTS. 1. The ten years statute of limitations applies to county warrants. Valleau vs. Newton County, 81 Mo., 591. 2. Actions on county warrants are governed by the special statute of limitations, section 3195, R. S. 1889, and not by the general statute of limitations. Wilson vs. Knox County, 132 Mo., 387. Digest of the Revemte Lazvs. 151 3. A county warrant, drawn on the general county fund for one year, may be paid out of the general fund of a subsequent year. Wilson vs. Knox County, 132 Mo., 387. 4. The statute of 1845, prescribing the form of county war- rants, is merely directory. Young vs. Camden County, 19 Mo., 309. 5. A county warrant will not draw interest before pre- sentment to the treasurer and refusal of payment. Robbins vs. Lincoln County Court, 3 Mo., 57. Skinner vs. Platte County, 22 Mo., 437. 6. The holder of a warrant, payable out of a particular fund, can look only to that fund for the payment of his claim. Kingsberry vs. Pettis County, 48 Mo., 207. Pettis County vs. Kingsbury, 17 Mo., 479. 7. A county court is not liable generally upon a warrant drawn upon a fund which has become exhausted and which the county court has no power to replenish. Moody vs. Cass County, 74 Mo., 307. 8. The holder of a county warrant payable out of a special fund cannot recoA'^er thereon from the county, when it appears that the fund has been exhausted. Campbell vs. Polk County, 49 Mo., 214. Campbell vs. Polk County, 76 Mo., 57. 9. If a special fund becomes exhausted by the payment of demands not properly charagable to it, a warrant thereon may be enforced against the general fund. Valleau vs. Newton County, 81 Mo., 591. Valleau vs. Newton County, 72 Mo., 593. 10. A county warrant dra-\vn on a fund created by a special act, must be presented for payment and registry, under the general revenue law. Morrow vs. Surber, 97 Mo., 155. 11. Warrants issued for the payment of the ordinary and usual expenses of the county, must be paid in the order in which they are presented and registered. State ex rel. vs. Allison, 155 Mo., 325. 152 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 12. A county court has no authority to issue a county war- rant for money expended by the sureties of a defaulting and ab- sconding caunty treasurer, in apprehending such treasurer and bringing him back, if it appears that the sureties were able to meet the deficit of such treasurer. Hooper vs. Ely, 46 Mo., 505. 13. A county warrant payable out of any money in the treasury, appropriated for county expenditures, is a written ac- knowledgment of indebtedness by the county, and if not paid when presented, may be sued on by the holder. Bank vs. Franklin County, 65 Mo., 105. (Overruling Howell vs. Reynolds County, 51 Mo., I54-) 14. The debts of a county are created when the services are rendered for it, or the goods sold and delivered to it, and not when its warants are issued. Warrants issued when there is money in the proper fund for their payment are not made illegal by the using of said hxmi to pay warrants subsequently issued. Bank vs. Douglas County, 146 Mo., 42. 15. A county warrant lawfully issued in 1889, should be received by the collector in payment of county taxes for ISl'L R. S., 1889, Sections 3205, 7604. Reynolds vs. Norman, 114 Mo., 509. Logan vs. County Court, 63 Mo., 336. Wilson vs. Knox County, 132 Mo., 387. 16. A warrant lawfully issued in payment of an indebted- ness of one year, may be paid out of the revenues of a subsequent year. Reynolds vs. Norman, 114 Mo., 509. Wilson vs. Knox County, 132 Mo., 387. 17. Unless the county revenues for one year are more than sufficient to pay its curent expenses, the revenues for such year cannot be applied to the payment of county warrants issued in other years. Nor can a county collector receive a county war- rant issued for current expenses of one year, in payment of taxes for another year, unless the revenues for the year in which the . Digest of the Rcz'enue Laws. 153- warrant is presented exceed the current county expenses for that year. Andrew County vs. Schell, 135 Mo., 31. Railroad vs. Thornton, 152 Mo., 570. State ex rel. vs. Payne, 151 Mo., 663. (Overruling Reynolds vs. Norman, 114 Mo., 509; Logan vs. Barton County Court, 63 Mo., 336; and obiter in Wilson vs. Knox County, 132 Mo.,. 387.) 18. A payment of valid county warrants for past indebted- ness, must be postponed until the payment of all warrants draAvn for the expenses of the current year, or a special levy may be made for tlie pajTiient of such warrants. Section 7654, R. S., 1889. Andrew County vs. Schell, 135 Mo., 31. 19. A fund raised by a county court, by an additional as- sessment, to pay a past indebtedness upon the petition of the prosecuting attorney, is not controlled by the statutes relating- to the payment of warrants issued to pay current expenses. Such funds should be applied pro rata to all past indebted- ness. A judgment creditor with respect to said funds is in no bet- ter position that the holder of such warrant. State ex rel. vs. Hortsman, 149 Mo., 290. 20. A county warrant, valid when issued, is not rendered invalid because the revenue provided to pay it is not collected during the year for which it was issued. It may be paid out of the surplus revenue of subsequent years. Such wan-ants should be paid out of such surplus in the order of their presentation and registration. They are not payable pro tanto if there is not sufficient funds to pay them all. When a surplus is applicable to the payment of warrants it is the duty of the county treasurer to pay them without wait- ing for an order of the county court. State ex rel. vs. Johnson, 162 Mo., 621. (Overruling obiter in State ex rel. vs. Horstman, 149' Mo., 290.) 154 Digest of the Revenue Lwws. DECEDENTS' ESTATES. 1. Taxes on the personal estate of a decedent, where they accrue before or after his death, are "demands" within the meaning of R. S. 1879, chapter 1, article 9. It is the duty of the administrator to pay such demands without presentation for allowance. Such demands may be established by proceeding in the cir- cuit court. State ex rel. vs. Tittnian, 103 Mo., 553. 2. The claims of the State for taxes are payable by the ad- ministrator without presentation of the demand for allowance. Taxes imposed upon the assets of an estate in process of administration have priority to other demands of the third and lower class. State ex rel. vs. Tittman, 119 Mo., 661. 3. In the absence of fraud in its procurement, a final set- "tlement by an administrator for his decedent's estate cannot be set aside in equity in order that the State may recover its ■taxes. State ex rel. vs. Shaw, 163 Mo., 191. 4. An administrator, after his discharge upon a final set- tlement, cannot be held liable in his representative capacity for taxes assessed against his decedent's estate. Nor can suit be maintained against the heirs for personal taxes for the reason the assessment was not against them. State ex rel. vs. Kenrick, 159 Mo., 631. 5. Suits for delinquent personal taxes due on the estate •of deceased persons haay be brought in the circuit court. State ex rel. Edwards, 162 Mo., 660. 6. The same principle applies to an administrator who vol- untarily pays illegal taxes upon the estate of his intestate, as io a person acting for himself. Neither can maintain action to recover back. Cristy's Administrator vs. Citv of St. Louis, 20 Mo^, 143- Digest of the Revenue Laws. 155 DEEDS. 1. A tax deed does not relate back to the sale. Donohoe vs. Veal, 19 Mo., 331. 2. A tax deed must contain proper recitals. State vs. Richardson, 21 Mo., 420. 3. The Legislature may make a tax deed prima facie evi- dence as to essential matters; but it cannot make the deed eo&- clusive evidence as to such matters. Raley vs. Winn, 76 Mo., 263. Roth vs. Gabbert, 123 Mo., 21. 4. A tax deed xaaj be conclusive evidence as to matters which are merely formal. Raley vs. Winn, 76 Mo., 263. 5. A tax deed cannot be defeated by showing an offer to pay the taxes before the advertisement of the land Por sale. Raley vs. Winn, 76 Mo., 263. 6. Nor can a tax deed be defeated by showing an omission of the dollar mark ($) in the amount of the judgment or by fhowing that the printer failed to affix his oath showing due publication of notice, nor because the presiding justice adds to his signature to the judgment the word "president" instead of his proper official designation. Raley vs. Winn, y6 Mo., 263. 7. Under the laws of 1865, a tax deed acknowledged before any other officer than the countj'- clerk, was void. Dunlap vs. Henry, 76 Mo., 106. 8. A tax deed under the Back Tax Act of 1877 passes only the title of the defendant in the tax suit. Watt vs. Donald, 80 Mo., 195. 9. A tax deed by county treasurer as ex-officio collector^ is void, in the absence of proof of the adoption by the county of township organization. Spurlock vs. Dougfhertv, 81 Mo., 171. 156 Digest of the Revemi-e Lazvs. 10. A tax deed wliicli does- not affirmatively show the proper publication of notice of sale is void. Spurlock vs. Dougherty, 8i Mo., 171. 11. The description of the land in a tax deed must conform to that in the anterior proceedings. Lowe vs. Ekey, 82 Mo., 286. 12. Where the Court had jurisdiction to enter the tax judg- ment, the tax deed cannot be collaterally attacked by showin.j: that a single ju("?,s;Tnent was entered against several lots. (Laws of 1S77.) Brown vs. Walker, 85 Mo., 262. 13. A latent ambiguity in the description of the land in a tax proceeding may be made certain by oral evidence. Brown vs. Walker, 85 Mo., 262. 14. The form of the deed prescribed by statute must be strictly adhered to, and any material variation thereform is fatal to the validity of the deed. Hopkins vs. Scott, 86 Mo., 144. Pierce vs. Titsworth, 87 Mo., 635. Sullivan vs. Donald, 90 Mo., 278. 15. The tax deed must contain necessary recitals of facta even where no form is prescribed by statute. Guffey vs. O'Reilley, 88 Mo., 418. 16. A tax deed must affirmatively show the amount of taxes, interest and cost due upon each tract of land. Guffey vs. O'Reilley, 88 Mo., 418. 17. The statute requires a recital in a deed of the date ou which the land is offered for sale, but does not require a recital of the adjournment of sales from day to day. 2 W. S., p. 1208, Sec. 223. Hill vs. Atterbury, 88 Mo., 114. 18. Under the laws of 1872, unless the deed recites the date of issue of the special execution, it is void. Duff vs. Neilson, 90 Mo., 93. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 157 19. A tax deed based on a sale of land for the taxes of 1874 is held void where no new assessment book was returned verified. Pike vs. Martindale, 91 Mo., 268. 20. In the absence of recitals to the contrary, it will be presumed that the notice required by section 44, page 541, G. S. 1865, was duly posted. Evans vs. Robberson, 92 Mo., 192. 21. A tax deed purporting to convey only the "right, title and interest of the state" in the lands described therein, is void. Kepchen vs. Mullinix, 92 Mo., 118. 22. "Where in a tax sale the proceedings are regular, the deed conveys the land and not only the interest of the owner therein. Allen vs. McCabe, 93 Mo., 138. 23. Where possession has been held under a tax deed that has been of record for ten years, the deed is admissible in evi- dence, though not properly acknowledged. Hoge vs. Hubb, 94 Mo., 439". 24. Under the laws of 1875, a tax deed conveying two tracts of land is invalid, unless it shows that there was a sepa- rate sale of each tract for its own taxes. Allen vs. Buckley, 94 Mo., 158. 25. A tax deed made under the revenue laws of 1872 may be impeached by the records and papers of the county couii. Kenney vs. Forsythe, 96 Mo., 414. 26. A tax deed cannot be collaterally attacked by showing that the taxes for which the land had been sold had been paid prior to the beginning of the suit. Hill vs. Sherwood, 96 Mo., 125. 27. Under the laws of 1872, a tax deed is void unless it contains the recitals required by the statutory form. Bender vs. Dungin, 99 Mo., 126. 158 Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 28. "Where the statutory form of tax deeds calls for a re- cital that the sale was publicly made, its omission from the deed is fatal. 1.^ Birgham vs. Birmingham, 103 Mo., 345. 29. The form of the deed prescribed by the statute must be substantially followed. Even though a tax deed is adjudged invalid, the purchaser may recover the purchase money, taxes paid by him, interest and costs. Birgham vs. Birmingham, 103 Mo., 345. 30. Where a statute prescribes a form for a tax deed, such form must be strictly follow'ed or the deed will be void. Pitkin vs. Reibel, 104 Mo., 505. 31. Unless the tax deed contains proper recitals as to the assignments of the certificate of piirchase, a deed to the assignee will be void. Pitkin vs. Reibel, 104 Mo., 505. 32. The fact that a tax deed may not be valid as to the taxes for one year, does not render it valid as to a conveyance for the taxes of another year. Bird vs. Sellers, 113 Mo., 580. 33. A tax deed describing the land and using apt words of conveyance constitutes color of title. Wilson vs. Taylor, 119 Mo., 626. 34. A description of land in a tax deed as "two acres in the northwest quarter of section six (6), township forty-nine (49), range thirty-three (33), the property of Hester Lucas," is fatally defective. Western vs. Flannagan, 120 Mo., 61. 35. A tax deed must contain recitals showing a compliance with the law. Western vs. Flannagan, 120 Mo., 61. 36. A tax deed under the law of 1872, void on its face and of record for three years, will bar a recovery by the former owner of the land. Bird vs. Sellers, 122 Mo., 23. Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 159' 37. A tax deed void on its face gives color of title. Pharis vs. Bayless, 122 Mo., 116. 38. Possession of a part of a tract of land by one holding a void tax deed to the whole, will vest title, if maintained for the statutory period. Pilaris vs. Bayless, 122 Mo., 116. 39. Under the township laws, act of 1872, page 210, a tax deed executed by the county treasurer, as collector and not as treasurer and ex-officio collector, is void on its face. Callahan vs. Davis, 125 Mo., 27. 40. Where a sale for taxes had been made under an assess- ment against one who had no title, a tax deed given thereunder may constitute color of title. Moss vs. Kauffman, 131 Mo., 424. 41. Under the revenue laws of 1872, the omission from a tax deed of a recital stating the year in which the judgment for taxes was rendered makes the deed void on its face. Dameron vs. Jamison, 143 Mo., 483. 42. The revenue act of 1847 required the collector after having sold land for taxes to return a certified list, furnished by the register with a note opposite each traet, setting forth the disposition made of it; if sold, to whom and the amount paid; and if not sold, the amount for which it was offered for sale and for which it was bid in by the State. Unless these requi- sites are complied with, the deed of the register is a nullity. Donahoe vs. Hartless, 33 Mo., 335. 43. The revenue act of 1857 requires that the register of lands acknowledge deeds of conveyance made by him. Stierlin vs. Daley, 37 Mo. 484. 44. The Legislature may make a tax deed prima facie evi- dence of title; but it cannot make it conclusive evidence as to matters which are vitally essential to a valid exercise of the taxing power. Abbott vs. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 166. 45. The recitals of a collector, that he gave four weeks notice of the intended sale "in the manner required by law," 160 Digest of the Revenue Laws. is insufficient. The notice should state the facts as to how he performed the duty and leave the conclusion of law to the de- termination of the courts. .Spurlock vs. Allen, 49 Mo., 198.' 46. A tax deed must contain a recital of the manner of giving notice of the sale. If it is silent as to this, it conveys no title. Abbott vs. Doling, 49 Mo., 302. 47. A sale for taxes is usually ex parte and the right of the citizen cannot be divested unless it appears on the face of the tax deed that the la.w has been complied with, Abbott vs. Doling, 49 Mo., 302. Spurlock vs. Allen, 49 Mo., 178. La Groue vs. Rains, 48 Mo., 536. Abbott vs. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162. 48. Even where a collector's deed shows by its recitals that the law has been complied with, it may be contradicted as to material matters by evidence in a direct or collateral pro- ceeding. Abbott vs. Doling, 49 Mo., 302. 49. It is the duty of the collector to set forth in. his deed how and in what manner he gave the notice of the sale of the land, and the recit^il that he gave the notice "in the manner and form as directed by law" will not suffice. He must specifically set forth in his deed all the requirements of the statute. Large vs. Fisher, 49 Mo., 307. Moore vs. Harris, 91 Mo., 616. Bender vs. Dungan, 99 Mo., 126. 50. A tax deed given by the register of land reciting only that the lands therein described ' ' were advertised according to law" is void on its face. Yankee vs. Thompson, 51 Mo., 234. 51. A tax deed which recites "that due notice was given of the sale," and failing to recite the manner of the notice is absolutely void. Spurlock vs. Allen, 49 Mo., 178. Abbott vs. Doling 49, Mo,. 302. Large vs. Fisher, 49 Mo., 307. Smith vs. Funk, 57 Mo., 239. Moore vs. Harris, 91 Mo., 616. Cook vs. Farrah, 105 Mo., 492. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 161 52. The tax deed relates back to the date of the sale as against the defendant in a suit, his privies and strangers with notice. State ex rel. Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. 53. "Where possession has been held under a tax that has been of record for ten years, the deed is admissible in evidence, although not properly acknowledged. Hoge vs. Hubb, 94 Mo., 439. 54. "VVTiere a sale by the collector of a city of the second class is an adjourned one, his deed will be void if it does not contain proper recitals as to such adjournments. Gregg vs. Jeselberg, 113 Mo., 34. 55. ■, Where a tax deed is made to an assignee of a certifi- cate of purchase, said deed must contain proper recitals as to the assignment. Pitkin vs. Shacklett, 106 Mo., 571. 56. A tax deed describing the land as the north 46 and two-thirds feet of lots 1 to 5 inclusive, is void for uncertainty. Roth vs. Gabbert, 123 Mo., 21. 57. The statutory requirements as to the form of tax deeds must be substantially complied with. Gregg vs. Jeselberg, 113 Mo., 34. 58. Under the revenue act of 1872, a tax deed is void un- less its recitals conform substantially to the requirements of said act. Pitkin vs. Shacklett, 106 Mo., 571. 59. The name of the county in which the land is situated need not be repeated in the granting clause of the deed. Roth vs. Gabbert, 123 Mo., 21. 60. A recorded deed imparts notice of its contents, even though the record of such deed be subsequently destroyed. Greer vs. Lumber and Mining Co., 134 Mo., 85. 61. A tax deed based upon an action against a person 'who is dead at the ]jistitution of tbe suit, is void. Childers vs. Shantz, 120 Mo., 305. D— u 162 Digest of the Revemie Laws. 62. A tax deed to land forfeited to the State, under the law of 1872, showing on its face that the purchaser of the land had not paid the amount of taxes charged against the land with interest and costs and penalties, is void- Atchison vs. Improvement Co., 125 Mo., 565. 63. Said deed must show on its face that the county clerk issued the order directing the collector to receive the delinquent laxes from the purchaser, and it is void if it fails to contain a proper recital as to the assignment of the certificate of purchase. } Atchison vs. Improvement Co., 125 Mo., 565. 64. A tax deed must he drawn so as to constitute an in- strument which, under the common law, would transfer title. Einstein vs. Gay, 45 Mo., 62. 65. A tax deed purporting to convey "all the right, title and interest, ' ' of the State of Missouri in and to land, and which purports to convey the interest of the owner, does not transfer the legal title. Einstein vs. Gay, 45 Mo., 62. Ketchem vs. Mullinux, 92 Mo., 118. 66. The law of 1865 did not designate the form of tax deed, and a common law conveyance, stating the power of the collector, was sufficient. State ex rel. vs. Mantz, 62 Mo., 258. 67. Where the sheriff's deed in a tax suit is founded on the valid judgment and execution and is in strict conformity to the statute, such deed conveys the land in question and not only the interest of the owner therein. Allen vs. McCabe, 93 Mo., 138. 68. The following description of the land is sufficient: "One acre, being the southeast comer of the northeast fourth of the southeast quarter of secjtion 2, township 43, range 24, Henry county, Mo." Smith vs. Nelson, no Mo., 552. 69. A tax deed should contain recital showing compliaBce with the statutory i^equirements. Western vs. Flanigan, 120 Mo., 61. Burden vs. Taylor, 124 Mo., 12. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 163 .70. If a tax deed contains any recital showing that the statutory requirements have not been fulfilled, it is void. Burden vs. Taylor, 124 Mo., 12. 71. The omission of the tax deed to recite that the sale was public, is fatal. Hopkins vs. Smith, 86 Mo., 144. Sullivan vs. Donald, 90 Mo., 278. Bingfman vs. Birmingham, 103 Mo., 245. 72. A tax deed relates back to the date of judgment. Fleckenstein vs. Ba.sker, 114 Mo., 493. 73. Under the law of 1872 the title to land purchased at a t;ix sale did not vest until the delivery of the deed. Hilton vs. Smith, 134 Mo., 499. 74. Under the revenue act of 1865 tax deeds were to be aclcaowledged before the county clerk. An acknowledgment before a notary public was fatal to their validity. Dunlap vs. Henry, 76 Mo., 106. 75. The charter of 1889 of the city of Kansas authorizes the city treasurer to execute tax deeds. Chrisman vs. Huff, 146 Mo., 102. 76. A tax collector cannot have his deed pass title from one person to another without at least substantially complying with the statutes, under which he derives his authority to sell. Loring vs. Broomer, 142 Mo., i. 77. A revenue law of 1872 required that the tax deed should state the year in which the judgment was rendered. A deed under that law, stating that judg-ment was rendered at the "July term," and omitting the year, is void. Dameron vs. Jamison, 143 Mo., 483. 78. The delivery of the sheriff's deed to the purchaser at the tax sale is necessary in order to transfer title to the pur- chaser. McVey vs. Carr, 159 Mo., 648. 79. Where the deed shows that the sale was unauthorized by law, it is void on its face. Mason et al. vs. Crowder, 85 Mo., 526. 164 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 80. Under the Act of 1825, unless the certificate of. sale was recorded within a reasonable time, the tax deed was void. Reed vs. Morton, 9 Mo., 878. 81. A tax deed conveys only the interest of the defendant in the tax suit. Whelen vs. Weaver, 126 Mo., 430. DEFINITIONS. 1. A tax is not a debt nor in the nature of a debt in its essential characteristics. It is an impost levied by authority of government upon its citizens for the support of the State. City of Carondelet, vs. Picot, 38 Mo., 125. 2. Taxes are contributions levied on individuals for the services of the State. The power to tax is inherent in every sovereignty. 3. It is not necessary that there should be property before a tax can be levied. Lawyers and physicians may be compelled to pay a license for practicing their professions. This is a tax. 4. There are three general classes of direct taxes: capita- tion, having effect solely upon persons ; ad valorem, having effect solely upon property ; and income, having mixed effect upon per- sons and property. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. 5. A tax differs materially from a debt. The one is founded on contract ; the other is not. North Mo. R. R. vs. Maguire, 49 Mo., 490. 6. "The Ordinary Current Expenses of a County."—^ debt created for the remodeling and improvement of the county buildings, is not within the ordinary current expenses of the county. Book vs. Earl, 87 Mo., 246. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 165 7. "Current County Expenditures" mean expenditures for Uie year for which the taxes are levied. State ex rel. vs. Payne, 151 Mo., 663. 8. ^'Necessary Expenses."— The current necessary ex- penses of a city of the fourth class are not restricted to the sal- ary of its officers, and a reasonable police force. "Income and Revenue Provided for Each Year" do not in- clude money arising from the sale of the city's lands. Waterworks Company vs. Carterville, 142 Mo., loi. 9. "Necessary Expenses for Maintaining the Cost of a City of the Fourth Class" are the reasonable salaries allowed by law, to the mayor, council, assessor, marshal, constable, attorney and a reasonable police force of such city. Waterworks Company vs. Carterville, 153 Mo., 128. 10. "All Property," when used in reference to taxation, includes every kind of pro^ierty not expressly or by necessary implication excepted. State ex rel. vs. Railroad Company, 153 Mo., 157. 11. An undetermined tax is, in law, no tax. State ex rel. vs. Ashbrook, 154 Mo., 375. 12. "Taxes for Public Purposes."— A collateral inherit- ance tax of five per cent, on all property descending or devised to nephews, nieces or other collateral kindred, if levied for the State University, is a tax for public purpose. State ex rel. vs. Switzler, 143 Mo., 287. 13. The term "county taxes" includes road taxes within the meaning of the provisions of the charter of the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railway Company, exempting it from county taxes. State ex rel. vs. Railway Company, loi Mo., 120. 14. Merchants within the meaning of the charter of Kansas City, means dealers in every kind of commercial commodities, including produce dealers. Kansas City vs. Lorber, 64 App., 604. 15. The term merchant, in the sense in which it is used in the charter of Kansas City, is sufficiently generic to compre- 166 Digest of the Revenue Laws. hend -within its signification, one who is engaged ia the business of selling fresh meats at wholesale from cars. City of St. Joseph vs. Dye, 72 App., 214. 16. A wholesale dealer, under section 417, of the ordinance of Kansas Ctiy, may be one who sells ice to other ice dealers. There is a distinction in the commercial word between a "wholesale dealer" and a "manufacturer." The terms "wholesale dealer" and "manufacturer" will remain a question for the courts. The fact that the manufacturer sells, does not make him a dealer. Kansas City vs. Butt, 88 App., 237. 17. Ice dealers fall within the definition of merchants in the charter of Kansas City. A "merchant" is one who traffics or carries on trade. He is a trafficer as well as a trader. Kansas City vs. Vindiquest, 36 App., 584. 18. "Peddlers."— The proper signification of the term is said to be a small retail dealer, who, carrying his merchandise with him, travels from house to house, exposing his goods for sale and selling them. The distinctive feature consists in the fact that a peddler goes from house to house, or place to place, carrying his articles of merchandise with him and concurrently sells and delivers. He is an itinerant trader, who goes from place to place and from house to house, carrying for sale and exposing for sale, the goods, wares or merchandise which he carries; a traveling trader ; one who carries about small commodities upon his back, or in a cart or wagon and sells them. State vs. Hoffman, 50 App., 585. City of Moberly vs. Hoover, 93 App., 663. 19. "Mercantile Agent."— One who goes from house to house with samples of goods, soliciting orders for future de- livery; but who does not sell, or offer to sell and deliver the goods ; but when an order is taken by him, it is sent to the busi- ness house in another city for which he delivers, such person is a mercantile agent within the meaning of the statute authorizing Digest of the Revenue Law's. 167 cities of the third class to levy and collect a license on peddlers, drummers and mercantile agents. City of Brookfield vs. Kitchen, 163 Mo., 546. 20. A "butcher^' is one who slaughters animals or dresses their flesh for market, but an ordinance may use the word in a broader sense, as, the keeper of a meat market. City of Rockville vs. Merchant, 60 App., 365. 21. "'Property'^ is noinen generalissimum, and extends to every species of valuable right and interest, iacluding real and personal property, easements, franchises and other incorporeal hereditaments. The words "the road and property of the several com- panies," as used in the Act of March 3, 1857, and as applied to the Cairo & Fulton Railroad Company, mean all the lands as well as the road and its appurtenances. Wilson vs. Beckwith, 140 Mo., 359. 22. The fiscal year of the State begins on January first, and ends on December thirty-first. Wilson vs. Knox County, 132 Mo., 387. State ex rel. vs. Appleby, 136 Mo., 408. 23. A county fiscal year is a calendar year. State ex rel. vs. Allison, 155 Mo., 325. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. 24. To assess a "tax" is to declare it to be payable; to "levy" it, is to raise or collect it. Valle vs. Fargo, i App., 344. 25. Taxation does not mean assessment for taxation. Hotel Company vs. County Court, 62 Mo., 134. 26. In the sense that taxes can be levied only for a public purpose, the word includes every character and kind of tax, gen- eral or special. State ex rel. vs. Switzler, 143 Mo., 287. 27. Taxes are charges imposed upon persons or property to raise money for a public purpose or to defray the expense of administering the government. Sheehan vs. Hospital, 50 Mo., 155. 168 Digest of the Revenue I.azi'S. 28. Revenue.— M.onej raised by taxation is revenue with- out regard to the purposes for which it is appropriated or ap- plied. Railroad vs. Maguire, 49 Mo., 490. DESCRIPTIONS. 1. A description of land in a tax deed must conform to that contained in the anterior proceedings. Lowe vs. Ekey, 82 Mo., 286. 2. An imperfect description of land contained in a tax-bill, judgment, execution and sheriff's deed, may, if the ambiguity is latent and susceptible of oral explanations, be made certain by extrinsic evidence. It is sufficient that the description is such, that the land can be located by one acquainted with the plats and surveys. Brown vs. Walker, 85 Mo., 262. 3. No judgment can be rendered against property differ- ent from that described in the petition and order of publica- tion. Milner vs. Shipley, 94 Mo., 106. 4. The description of the property in the tax-bill as lot 43, block 7, Old Town of Pacific, Frankfort county, and the tax as ' ' school tax ' ' for 1879, sufficiently indicates the fund to which the tax belongs, which is all the tax-bill is required to show. State ex rel. vs. Rau^ 93 Mo., 126. 5. "Where the petition in a tax suit contains no description of the land, although the tax-bill filed therewith does, the judg- ment rendered thereon is void, and open to collateral attack. Vaughan vs. Daniels, 98 Mo., 230. 6. A petition in an action against a railroad for delinquent taxes need not describe the property otherwise than as so many miles of a given value, with a preper proportion of the value of the rolling stock added. State ex rel. vs. Railroad Company, loi Mo., 136. Digest of the Rei'enue Lctivs. 16;) 7. A description in a sheriff's deed, made under a sale for taxes, was as follows : ' ' One acre being tlie southeast comer of the northeast fourth of the southwest quarter of section 2, town- ship 43, ran^e 24, Henry county, Missouri." Held sufficient to convey an acre in a square form. Error in the description of land on the tax books will not be reviewed in ejectment. Smith vs. Nelson, no Mo., 552. 8. The headings of the columns of an assessment roll are part of the lands assessed. State ex rel. vs. Vaile, 122. Mo., 33. 9. A description of land ia a tax deed as "two acres in the northwest quarter of section 6, township 49, range 33, the prop- erty of H. L., ' ' is fatally defective. Western vs. Flanagan, 120 Mo., 61. 10. A tax deed which describes the land conveyed as ' ' the north forty-six and two-thirds (46 2-3) feet of lots one (1) to five (5) inclusive, etc.," is void for uncertainty. Roth vs. Gabbert, 123 Mo., 21. 11. Where the tax judgment describes one tract of land and the order of publication another, the description contaiaed in the order of publication will control and the recital in the judg- ment must be substantially the order itself. Stewart vs. Allison, 150 Mo., 343. 12. A description calling for the south 60 feet or the north 1 21 feet, etc., of lot 4, etc., was descriptive by metes and bounds. Where the description in a tax-bill is sufficient to pass title in a deed, such tax-bill will create such lien upon the property as may be enforced by judicial sale. Adkins vs. Quest, 79 App., 36. EJECTMENT. 1. The recording of a sheriff's deed, made under the Act of 1877, does not authorize the bringing of a suit in ejectment, Ti'here no one is in possession of the land. 170 Digest of the Reveniie Lazvs. It is only the recording of the tax deed made under the Laws of 1872, that will warrant the bringing of an action for possession. Vastine vs. Land and Improvement Company, 135 Mo., 145. 2. Under section 222, p. 209, 2 "W. S., ejectment may be maintained against. the grantee in the tax deed, who has put the same to record, although he is not in actual possession of the land Section 222, p. 1207, 2 W. S., giving a right of action to re- cover possession of land against persons placing tax deeds on record, only applies where the land is vacant. Callahan vs. Davis, 103 Mo., 444. 3. The burden is on the purchaser at a tax sale to show tbat the defendant in a tax suit is the owner of the land. Powell vs. Greenstreet, 95 Mo., 13. 4. Errors of descriptions on tax books will not be reviewed in ejectment. Such defense should be made in a suit for taxes. Smith vs. Nelson, no Mo., 552. 5. Section 7698, E. S, 1889, which provides that any person putting a tax deed on record, shall be deemed to have set up such title as to enable the claimant to prosecute an action for the pos- session, has no application to the sheriff's sale under an execu- tion issued on a judgment on a suit to enforce the State's lien for delinquent taxes Childers vs. Schantz, 120 Mo., 305. In ejectment the title acquired at a tax sale will prevail as against one who derives title under a trust deed. Cowell vs. Gray, 85 Mo., 169. Gitchell vs. Kreidler, 84 Mo., 472. Digest of tlie Revenue Laws. 171 EVIDENCE IN TAX SUITS. 1. A laroperly certified tax bill is prima facie evidence that the amount claimed therein is correct and that the property is liable therefor. Ewart vs. Davis, 76 Mo., 129. State ex rel. vs. Schooley, 84 Mo., 447. .State ex rel. vs. Ran, 93 Mo., 126. State ex rel. vs. Mastin, 103 Mo., 508. State ex rel. vs. Maloney, 113 Mo., 367. State ex rel. vs. Davis, 131 Mo., 457. State ex rel. vs. Tobacco Company, 140 Mo., 218. State ex rel. vs. FuUerton, 143 Mo., 682. State ex rel. vs. Phillips, 137 Mo., 259. 2. Tax bills are prima facie evidence by virtue of the statute. The Legislature has power to enact such a law. City of Kansas vs. Railroad, yy Mo., 180. State ex rel. vs. Hoyt, 123 Mo., 348. State ex rel. vs. Davis, 131 Mo., 457. City of St. Louis vs. Oeters, 36 Mo., 456. 3. The provision of the delinquent tax law, making a colleetor's certificate prima facie evidence of the facts therein recited, is not unconstitutional, as impairing the right of trial hy jury. State ex rel. vs. VanEvery, 75 Mo., 530. 4. The Legislature has no power to make tax deeds con- clusive evidence as to matters which are essential to the valid exercise of the taxing power. Abbott vs. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 162. Railey vs. Guinn, y6 Mo., 263. 5. The burden is on the defendant to show that tax-bills, introduced in evidence, are illegal. State ex rel. vs. Mastin, 103 Mo., 508. State ex rel. vs. Phillips, 137 Mo., 259. 6. The Legislature has power to provide a summary mode for collecting taxes. City of St. Louis vs. Coons, 37 Mo., 45. 172 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 7. A tax-bill, authenticated by the oertificate of the col- lector, and filed with the petition, setting forth the personal back-taxes of the defendant, is admissible in evidence and es- tablishes a prima facie case. State ex rel. vs. Renshaw, i66 Mo., 682. 8. It is only a certified back-tax bill, from a legal back-tax book, made from a correct delinquent list, certified and filed by order of the county court, which is prima facie evidence that the amount claimed is correct. State ex rel. vs. Scott, 96 Mo., 72. 9. If it ajjpears that the county court fails to correct errors in the delinquent list, and to certify it as corrected to the county- clerk, the effect is to overcome the prima facie case made by introducing the tax-bill. And the plaintiff must produce other evidence or fail. State ex rel. vs. Hutchinson, 116 Mo., 399. 10. The tax books are primary and best evidence. State ex rel. vs. Rau, 93 Mo., 126. Vaughan vs. Daniels, ^ Mo., 230. State ex rel. vs. Hutchinson, 116 Mo., 399. 11. If the tax-bills are destroyed, the State may establish its case by other competent evidence. State ex rel. vs. Bank, 144 Mo., 381. 12. Where the tax books have been destroyed, the collector may resort to secondary evidence. State ex rel. vs. Schooley, 84 Mo., 447. 13. If the prima facie case made by the introduction of the tax-bill is overthrown, or if the bill is rejected as evidence, plain- tiff may still make out his case by producing his tax book in evidence, if such book show that the taxes were properly assessed and levied and are unpaid. State ex rel. vs. Hutchinson, 116 Mo., 399. State ex rel. vs. Bank, 144 Mo., 381. 14. Unless the recitals of a tax-bill show compliance with the law, the Auditor's certificate of the sale of land for taxes. Digest of the Revenue Laivs. 173 under tlie Act of January 3, 1827, is not prima facie evidence of a legal sale. Morton vs. Reeds, 6 Mo., 64. 15. The prima facie case made by the introduction of the tax-bill may be overcome by showing that the bill is not based on a valid assessment. The effect of a back-tax bill as evidence is destroyed, when it appears that the county court did not take such action on the delinquent list as is contemplated by section 7669, E. S. 1889. State ex rel. vs. Scott, 96 Mo., 72. State ex rel. vs. Hurt, 113 Mo., 90. 16. Where the tax-bill against a bank, based upon an as- sessment made prior to the taking effect of the act of 1895 (Laws of 1895, page 242), shows that the assessment was made against the bank itself, and not against the stockholders, the prima facie case is overcome. State ex rel. vs. Merchants' Bank, 160 Mo., 640. 17. The prima facie case made by the introduction of the tax-bill, may be impeached by showing that the action of the Board of Equalization was illegal. State ex rel. vs. Cunningham, 153 Mo., 642. 18. Under the act of 1875, certificates duly certified by the clerk of the county court, are prima facie evidence of the lia- bilities of a railroad for city taxes. City of Kansas vs. Railroad, 81 Mo., 285. 19. Section 7728, B.. S. 1889, does not make tax-bills evi- dence in suits against railroads. State ex rel. vs. Davis, 131 Mo. 457. 20. A tax-bill may be amended during trial. State ex rel. vs. Phillips, 102 Mo., 664. 21. Upon a proper showing, a sheriff may amend his re- turn to an execution, issued in a tax judgment. Savings Bank vs. Grewe, 84 Mo., 477. 22. The order of a county court, levying the railroad taxes for omitted years, under section 6879, R. S. 1879, which recites 174 Digest of the Revenue Laws. that the years were omitted, is prima facie evidence of such omission. State ex rel. vs. Railroad ,ioi Mo., 136. 23. Section 212 of the revenue act of 1872, providing that the "assessment book, and all books, papers and records in the office of the clerk of the county court relating to the subject of taxation or copies thereof, duly certified by such clerk, shall be evidence in all courts in controversies concerning the validity on sales of lands for taxes," was repealed by the delinquent tax act of April 12, 1877. Gibbs vs. Southern, 116 Mo., 204. 24. Tax-bills of cities of the third class, when duly certi- fied by the city collector, are prima facie evidence. State ex rel. vs. Edwards, 162 Mo., 660. 25. Evidence of inequality of valuation in the assessment of taxes, is inadmissible. Town of Potosi vs. Casey, 27 Mo., 372. 26. A city may pass an ordinance providing that special tax-bills shall be prima facie evidence of liability. Eyerman vs. Blaksley, 78 Mo., 145. 27. A copy of the tax list, duly certified by the proper of- ficer is admissible in evidence under the rules of the common law. Wilcoxson vs. Darr, 139 Mo., 660. 28. Where the record does not disclose proof of an aver- ment that the tax was levied, there can be no recovery, even though the assessment was admitted. City of Mexico vs. Cauthorn, 25 App., 258. 29. A judgment will not be set aside on the ground that the relator was not the collector of the county where a tax-bill certified to by him as collector, was introduced without objec- tion. State ex rel. vs. Richardson, jj Mo., 589. 30. A deed from the State Auditor for land. sold for taxes in 1834, was insufficient to establish title under the statutes pertaining thereto. Moreau vs. Detchemendy, 41 Mc, 432. Digest of the Revenue Lazes. 175 31. A tax deed made by the county treasurer, as ex officio collector is not admissible in evidence, in the absence of proof that the office of collector had devolved upon the treasurer, by reason of the adoption of township organization. Spurlock vs. Dougherty, 8i Mo., 171. 32. Special bills are prima facie evidence of the liability Avhich they purport to declare. Wolfort vs. City of St. Louis, 115 Mo., 139. 33. It is no defense to a tax suit that informalities occur in making the assessment, in the preparation of the tax list, or that the assessment was not made witliin the time required by law, or that back taxes were not consolidated in one book. State ex rel. vs. Phillips, 137 Mo., 259. EXEMPTIONS FROM TAXATION. 1. The abandonment of the right to tax is never presumed. St. Louis vs. Boatmans' Insurance Company, 47 ^lo., 150. Railroad vs. Cass County, 53 Mo., 17. Railroad Company vs. Maguire 49 Mo., 490. Scotland County vs. Railroad, 65 Mo., 123. Fitterer vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 2. The language exempting property from taxation must be in clear and unambiguous terms. Pacific Railroad Company vs. CasT- County. 53 Mo., 17. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 89 Mo , 523. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 99 Mo., 30. State ex rel. vs. Arnold, 136 Mo., 446. 3. Exemptions from taxation cannot be extended by con- struction beyond the plain terms of the grant. Laws and ordinances granting exemptions must be strictly construed. City of Springfield vs. Smith, 138 Mo., 645. Fitterer vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 176 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 4. In the construction of laws exempting property from taxation, it is a cardinal principle that they must be strictly con- strued, and it devolves on the person claiming that any specific property is exempt to show it beyond a reasonable doubt. Fitterer vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 5. In no case will an exemption be presumed, and in case of doubt it will be resolved most strongly against the party claiming the exemption. Fitterer vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 6. It is generally held that a charitable or benevolent as- sociation, whose acts of charity are restricted to their own sick and needy members, and their families, and the widows and orphans of their members, are not institutions of purely public charity, and hence the property of such institutions is not ex- empt from taxation. But there is a material difference between what is denomi- nated a public charity and what is meant by the words "used for purposes purely charitable." Therefore, under this statute, the property of a lodge which provides for the care of its sick and needy members and their families, looks to the weKare of the orphans and widows of its deceased members, is exempt from taxation. Fitterer vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 7. A Legislature may divest itself and its successors of the power to tax corporations and persons. Scotland County vs. Railroad, 65 Mo., 123. 8. The provision of the Constitution, exempting certain property from taxation, has reference only to general taxation for the purpose of revenue. State vs. Linn Co. Court, 44 Mo., 504. 9. Where the Legislature exempts property from taxation, .and makes no provision for the collection of taxes already as- sessed, such taxes cannot be collected after the exemption is declared. State ex rel. vs. Academy of Science, 13 App., 213.- 10. Bonds of the Masonic Lodge Association are not ex- Digest of the Rcrrinie Lnu's. 177 «mpt from taxation on tlie ground that the law makes no special provision for taxing such securities. State vs. St. Louis County Court, 47 Mo., 594. 11. The law providing that the stock of a railroad com- pany shall be exempt from taxation, excludes the taxation of its road-bed, depots, lands, machinery, etc. Railroad vs. Shacklett, 30 Mo., 550. State vs. Railroad, 37 Mo., 265. State vs. Dulle, 48 Mo., 282. 12. Eeal estate used as a cemetery cannot be assessed for taxes. State ex rel. vs. Wesleyian Cemetery Association, II App., 560. 13. Although the charter of a cemetery provides that it shall be exempt from taxation, so long as it is dedicated to that purpose, the exemption does not include a lot of ground belong- ing thereto, and which is i-ented for liusbandry. State ex rel. vs. Lange, 16 App., 468. 14. All exemption from State taxes does not operate as an exemption from county taxes. Railroad vs. Cass County, 53 Mo., 17. 15. An act of the Legislature, not founded on a considera- tion, providing that property belonging to a certain body or <'orporation, shall not be taxed, may be repealed by a subsequent Legislature. Washington University vs. Rowse, 42 Mo., 308. 16. One Legislature may gTant certain privileges and im- munities from taxation, and another Legislature may repeal that grant. Abbott vs. Lindenbower, 42 Mo., 166. 17. Property occupied by the National Grovemment is not exempt from taxation, unless owned by it. Speed vs. St. Louis County Court, 42 Mo., 382. 18. The capital stock of a corporation invested in United States bonds, is not subject to taxation by the State. Savings Association vs. Lightner, 42 Mo., 421. D— 12 178 Digest of the Revenue Lcnt'\s. 19. The capital of a private bank, invested in United States bonds, is not taxable by the State. State ex rel. vs. Rogers, 79 Mo., 283. 20. The Act of September 20th, 1852, exempted the Hanni- bal and St. Joseph railroad from State taxation, except as pro- vided in section three of that act. But under that act, the road was not exempt from school tax. Livingston County vs. Railroad, 60 Mo., 516. 21.. A hospital building is exempt from taxation, even though certain patients pay for what they receive, provided that it appears that the profits derived therefrom are applied exclusively to the charitable purposes of the institution. State ex rel. vs. Powers, 10 App., 263. State ex rel. vs. Powers, 74 Mo., 476. 22. Section forty, of Wagner's Statute, page 752, declar- ing that the pajTnent of certain fees from life insurance com- panies shall be received in lieu of taxes, does not have the effect of exempting such companies from taxation. Life Association vs. Board of Assessors, 49 Mo., 512. 23. The Legislature has the power to exempt from taxa- tion, land§ in the city of Palmyra, which have not been laid out in town lots and which were valuable only, for agricultural purposes. Lee vs. Thomas, 49 Mo., 112. 24. Section five of the Act of !March 30, 1887, providing for the extension of the limits of cities of the second class, and exempting certain lands therein from taxation, is unconstitu- tional. Copeland vs. City of St. Joseph, 126 Mo., 417. 25. That part of section 1466, R. S. 1889, exemptin^g from taxation for city purposes, pastoral lands lying within cities of the third class, is unconstitutional. Copeland vs. City of St. Joseph, 126 Mo., 417. Westport ex rel. vs. McGee, 128 Mo., 152. State ex rel. vs. Wardell, 153 Mo., 319. Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 179 26. The State can impose taxes on property previously exempt, or raise the rate of taxation, unless there has been some express contract in limitation of the power. Railroad vs. Maguire, 49 Mo., 490. 27. The Pacific Railroad Company is not exempt from the tax of ten or fifteen per cent, imposed npon it by the ordinance of April 8th, 1865, nor does the Act of February 10th, 1864, amount to such contract as limits the right of the State to impose the tax. Railroad Company vs. Maguire, 49 Mo., 490. Railroad Company vs. Maguire, 51 Mo., 142. Railroad Company vs. Laclede County, 57 Mo., 147. 28. Legislative bodies have the power to select subjects of taxation and to exempt other subjects. Scotland County vs. Railroad, 65 Mo., 123. 29. The charter of a railroad company, exempting its stock from taxation, is not repealed by a constitutional provision, adopted after the acceptance of the charter declaring that no property shall be exempt. Scotland County vs. Railroad, 65 Mo., 123. 30. Under the Constitution, the property, real and per- sonal, of the State, county and other municipal corporations, is exempt from taxation. State ex rel. vs. Heman, 70 Mo., 441. Fitterer vs'. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 31. Section thirty-two of the Act of 1856, and section 12 of the Act of 1861, constituted and created a contract be- tween the State 'and banks incorporated in this State, and ex- empted them from all taxes other than one per cent on their capital, and prevented any county, city or town from levying or collecting a tax from them. Such contracts are binding and neither the Legislature nor the courts have the right to vary or impair them. Lionberger vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 67. Mechanics' Bank vs. City of Kansas, 73 Mo., 555. 32. Municipal corporations have no power to grant ex- 180 , Digest of the Revcmic Lazus. emptions from taxation, or to commute taxes already assessed. A contract which imdertakes to do this is void. State vs. Railroad Company, 75 Mo., 208. St. Louis vs. Meier, yy Mo., 13. Vrana vs. St. Louis, 164 Mo., 146. 33. By the Act passed January 7th, 1853, the capital stock and all other property of the North Missouri Railroad, were exempt from taxation, until January, 1858, and after that date, so long as section six, of the Act of 1853 remained unrepealed, the property of the com-pany was subject to taxation only as personal property. State vs. Railroad, yy Mo., 202. 34. The city of St. Louis is without power to exempt prop- erty from general taxation, or from special assessments. City of St. Louis vs. Meier, yy Mo., 13. Vrana vs. City of St. Louis, 164 Mo., 146. 35. A school building is subject to taxation when used for other than educational purposes. Wyman vs. City of St. Louis, 17 Mo., 335. Gymnastic Association vs. Hudson, 12 App., 342. Gymnastic Association vs. Hudson, 85 Mo., 32. 36. Exemption from taxation is a non-transferable, personal privilege State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 89 Mo., 523. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 99 Mo., 30. 37. Property which is exempt from taxation may be as- sessed with special benefits for local improvements. Sheehan vs. Good Samaritan Hospital, 50 Mo., 155. State ex rel. vs. Kansas City, 89 Mo., 34. City of Clinton ex rel. vs. Henry County, 115 Mo., 557- 38. Under section 5012, E. S. 1879, property within the limits of an incorporated village or town, is exempt from taxa- tion for road purposes, whether owned by a resident or non- resident of such village or town. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 90 Mo., 166. 39. Under section 6659, H. S. 1879, premises used and occupied by the Bishops of the M. E. Church, are exempt from Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 181 taxation on tlie ^Tound that such premises are nsed for pur- poses purely charitable. Bishop's Residence Company vs. Hudson, 91 Mo., 671. 40. The term county tax, within the meaning of the charter of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad Company, includes road taxes and exempts said road from taxation therefor. Love vs. Railroad, loi Mo., 120. 41. A property owner in a town, which is incorporated under a special charter, containing no provisions for exempt- ing the property from taxation for road purposes, is not entitled to such exemptions. State ex rel. vs. Arnold, 136 Mo., 446. 42. The Act of February 16th, 1847, incorporating the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, exempts the stock of said company from taxation for city and county purposes. This exemption includes a tax levied to pay bonds given by the county for stock in said railroad company. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, loi Mo., 136. 43. The Act of March 21st, 1868, to aid in the building of a branch railroad, does not exempt such roads from taxation. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 89 Mo., 523. 44. A township tax levied by a county court to pay bonds issued in aid of a railroad, is not a county tax within the moan- ing of the original charter of the Hannibal and St. Joseph Railroad, exempting it from county taxes. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, loi Mo., 136. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 113 Mo., 297. 45. Section 5012, R. S. 1879, exempting from road taxes the property of persons residing within the limits of an incor- porated village or town, applies to property within such village or town owned by non-residents. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 90 Mo., 166. 46. Under the Constitution, as it existed in 1853, a Legis- lature could exempt the property of a college from taxation. St. Vincent's College vs. Schaefer, 104 Mo., 261. 182 Digest of the Revenue Lmvs. 47. The granting of an exemption from taxation by the Legislature, creates a binding contract on the part of the State, which cannot be abrogated in the absence of the right reserved. St. Vincait's College vs. Schaefer, 104 Mo., 261. 48. Exemption from taxation of a lot, ' ' with the buildings thereon" used for school purposes, does not exempt the office furniture nor a chemical laboratory, not annexed to the build- ing. City of Kansas vs. Medical College, 11 1 Mo., 141. 49. The provisions of sections six and seven, article ten. and of section sixteen, article eleven, of the Constitution of 1875, and 1865, respectively, in relation to exempting certain property from taxation, are prospective and do not repeal a prior special law, exempting from taxation the property of a private corporation. State ex rel. vs. St. Joseph Convent of Mercy, 116 Mo., 575. 50. To be relieved of a road poll tax, one who is listed as an able bodied person, must prove his disability and obtain a certificate of exemption from work by the county court. In the absence of such certificate, the defense of disability cannot be invoked in a suit for the tax. Moore vs. Vaughan, 127 Mo., 538. 51. Property situate in a city incorporated under a special charter, is not exempt from taxation for road taxes, unless the charter contains provisions therefor. State ex rel. vs. Arnold, 136 Mo., 446. 52. Where the law oniits certain property from taxation, tlie courts cannot direct how it shall be taxed. Kansas Citv vs. Building and Loan Association, 145 . Mo., 50. 53. Where words of general description are used, con- cerning the taxation of property, such words include every- thing of that kind not expressly or by necessary implication excepted. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 153 Mo., 157. Digest of the Revenue Laisfs. 183 54. Land, the title to which, is in the Government, is not subject to taxation by the county or State. Moore vs. Woodruflf, 146 Mo., 597. 55. The property of a county or city, which is exempt from taxation, is that which is owned by such county or city. The exemption does not include property held in trust by such county or city, and such property may be taxed under the general law. St. Louis vs. Wenneker, 145 Mo., 230. 56. The buildings erected by a lessee, upon real estate which is exempt from taxation, as belonging to a charitable or- ganization, are subject to taxation. State ex rel. vs. Mission Free School, 162 Mo., 332. 57 Statutory exemptions from taxation, in favor of chari- table institutions, cannot be added to exemptions granted by special charter. State ex rel. vs. Mission Free School, 162 Mo., 332. 58. The Constitution, in express terms, exempts from taxation, the property of the State, the county and other mu- nicipal corporations, and cemeteries. As to property "used ex- clusively for purposes purely charitable, ' ' it provides that such property may be exempted. Fitterer vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 59. In the construction of laws, exempting property from taxation, it is a cardinal principle that they must be strictly con- strued, and it devolves upon the person claiming that any specific property is exempt, to show it beyond a reasonable doubt. Fitterer vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 60. The property of charitable organizations is not exempt from taxation, unless it is exclusively used for purposes purely charitable. And the organization attempting to show that it is exempt on these grounds, must show that it is a charitable organization, and that its tenants, also, are such. Adelphia Lodge vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 356. 61. Masonic lodges are charitable institutions within the meaning of section 7504, R. S. 1889, but the property of such 184 Digest of the Revenue Lazes. lodges is exempt from taxation wlien used exclusively and solely for lodge purposes. And when a part of the building is rented for other purposes, and a part used for lodge purposes, the entire property is subject to taxation. Fitterer vs. Crawford, 157 Mo., 51. 62. The property of a telegraph company in a state, is subject to state taxation like other property. The fact that the company is engaged in inter-state commerce, or that it is an agent of the Government, can afford no immunity from the taxation of its property. State ex rel. vs. Western Union Telegraph Company, 165 Mo., 502. 63. The franchise which the Western Union Telegraph Company derived from the Act of Congress, makes that coia- pany a governmental agent and gives it the right to enter any state in the union and transact biisiness therein, and no state has authority to prevent this. But the Act of Congress does not exempt the tangible property of said company from taxation by a state in which such property is located. State ex rel. vs. Western Union Telegraph Company, 165 Mo., 502. INJUNCTION-WHEN THE REMEDY WILL LIE, AND WHEN IT WILL NOT. 1. An injunction will not usually lie at the instance of the tax-payer to restrain the county court from levying a tax. The bill must show that the damages will be irreparable, or such as cannot be redressed by a law action. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 32 Mo., 496. 2. An injunction will not lie to restrain an officer from col- lecting taxes which have been irregularly and fraudulently levied. Barrow vs. Davis, 46 Mo., 394. 3. Where a county court subscribed for stock of a railroad company before the articles of associations have been executed, Digest of the Revenue Laws. 185- or filed with the Secretary of State, and the court afterwards orders a tax levy to meet such subscription and the tax-payer pays the taxes under such order, such taxes cannot be recovered hack. The remedy of the tax-payer is by injunction. Rubey vs. Shain, 54 Mo., 207. 4. The State, through its Attorney-General or circuit at- torney, or any tax-payer of a municipality, may institute a pro- ceeding by injunction against a municipality to prevent illegal action by it in attempting to increase the rate of taxation. State ex rel. vs. Saline County Court, 51 Mo., 350. Newmeyer vs. Railroad Co., 52 Mo., 81. Matthis vs. Town of Cameron, 62 Mo., 504. 5. An injunction is the proper remedy to prevent the col- lection of a tax levied in excess of the legal limit; but the court should require payment of the taxes confessedly before granting the writ. Overall vs. Ruenzi, 67 Mo., 203. 6. Injunction will not lie against the Board of Education to prevent the collection of a tax levied by the board, when the validity of the tax is questioned on the ground that the board had no corporate existence. Ewing vs. Board of Education, 72 Mo., 436. 7. Where a cloud will be cast on the title of land by reason, of the sale thereof for taxes, injunction will lie. Lockwood vs. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20. Fowler vs. St. Joseph, 37 Mo., 228. Leslie vs. St. Louis, 47 Mo., 474. Bank vs. City of Kansas, 73 Mo., 431. McPike vs. Pen,_5i Mo., 63. 8. A "cloud upon title" refers only to real estate. Lockwood vs. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20. Leslie vs. St. Louis, 47 Mo., 474. Warrensburg- vs. Miller, yy Mo., 56. Sayre vs, Tompkins, 23 Mo., 443. Bank vs. Kansas City, 73 Mo., 555. State ex rel. vs. Wood, 155 Mc, 425. 186 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 9. An injunction will not be granted to restrain the col- lection of taxes on personal property. Lockwood vs. St. Louis, 24 Mo., 20. Fowler vs. St. Louis, 37 Mc, 228. Leslie vs. St. Louis, 47 Mo., 474. 10. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the au- thorities of this State, in regard to granting injunctive relief to restrain the collection of taxes, illegally assessed against per- sonal property. Railroad vs. Lowder, 138 Mo., 533. 11. Injunctive relief to prevent the collection of taxes, as- sessed on personal property should never be granted, if at all, except to avoid a multiplicity of suits or under peculiar cir- cumstances. Railroad vs. Lowder, 138 Mo., 533. 12. The collection of a personal tax will not be enjoined upon the ground that the law authorizing the tax is unconsti- tutional. State ex rel. vs. Wood, 155 Mo., 425. 13. A court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the collection of a personal tax or fee, when the bill shows no ground for appre- hension that the officer will enforce the collection .against the ■complainan t 's property. State ex rel. vs. Wood, 155 Mo., 425. 14. Lijunetion will not lie to stay the collection of an erroneous tax, where the tax-payer fails to appeal to the Board ■of Appeals for correction of errors in the assessment. Deane vs. Todd, 22 Mo., 90. 15. A tax based on an assessment made after the date when the tax became payable, is not, on that account, subject "to be enjoined. Railroad vs. Gracey, 126 Mo., 472. 16. A threatened sale, for taxes, of non-taxable property -will be restrained by injunction. Valle vs. Zeig-ler, 84 Mo., 214. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 187 17. The threatened sale of land for illegal taxes will be enjoined. North St. Louis Gymnastic Society vs. Hudson, 85 Mo., 32. North St. Louis Gymnastic Society vs. Hudson, 12 A. 342. 18. Irregularities in the estimates returned by school dis- tricts in failing to mention the amonnt of the several funds which the levy would produce, and irregularities in computing the average rate of taxation for school buildings, sinking fund and annual interest, are cured by the statute and do not consti- tute ground for enjoining the collection of the tax. Railroad vs. Gracey, 126 Mo., 472. 19. Where the complainant's bill fails to show that the collection of a personal tax will be enforced against property, a court of equity is without jurisdiction to restrain the col- lection. State ex rel. vs. Wood, 155 Mo., 497. 20. Injimction will lie on behalf of the tax-payer to re- strain illegal diversion of public funds. Black vs. Ross, 37 App., 250. 21. Such suit may be instituted by any tax-payer by him- self or on behalf of all others similarly situated. Denison vs. Kansas City, 95 Mo., 416. 22. Mere irregularities in the assessment or levy of taxes, furnish no ground for relief by injunction. Railroad vs. Gracey, 126 Mo., 472. 23. Injunction will lie to prevent the collection of taxes levied without authority. Railroad vs. Apperson, 97 Mo., 300. 24. The remedy does not lie when the assessment was il- legal and void. Sayre vs. Tompkins, 23 Mo., 443. 25. An injunction will not be granted to restrain a county court from le^^dng a tax on the ground that the court had no 188 Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. jurisdiction, nor if it does not appear that the injury to the tax-payer would be irrepairable. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 32 Mo., 496. Sayre vs. Tompkins, 23 Mo., 443. 26. A tax based on the assessment made after the date when the tax was payable is not on that account subject to the in- junctive remedy. St. Louis vs. Gracey, 126 Mo., 472. Daris vs. Rosenblatt, 6 Mo., 601. 27. Nor will an injunction lie unless the circumstances are such that irreparable injury will be wrought. Bank vs. Meredith, 44 Mo., 500. 28. The collection of a tax which is unconstitutional may be enjoined by suit on behalf of the State at the relation of the prosecuting attorney. State ex rel. vs. Town of Columbia, iii Mo., 365. 29. Injunction will lie where taxes are assessed in excess of the legal limit; but in siich case the court will require the payment of tlie taxes confessedly due. Overall vs. Ruenzi, 67 Mo., 203. Dickhaus vs. Olderheide, 22 App., 76. Arnold vs. Hawkins, 95 Mo., 569. Johnson vs. Duer, 115 Mo., 366. Burham vs. Rogers, 167 Mo., 17. 30. If the assessment is erroneous and the party assessed has failed to make his complaint to tlxe court of appeals, sitting lor the correction of errors in assessments, injunction Mdll not lie. Deane vs. Todd, 22 Mo., 90. 31. Injunction will lie to prevent the sale of real estate for taxes, the levy of which is prohibited by law. Bank vs. Kansas City, 73 Mo., 555. 32. Sections 9133 and 9190, E. S. 1889, providing that on& feeling aggrieved by an assessment may appeal from the assess- ment and the county board of equalization, gives a remedy at Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 189 law for such grievance and an action will not lie to enjoin a collection of the tax. Unionville vs. Staat, 155 Mo., 55. State ex rel. vs. Neosho, 120 Mo., 161. Meyer vs. Rosenblatt, 78 Mo., 495. Potosi vs. Casey, 27 Mo., 372. 33. Where the collector seizes the property of a tax-payer, because of the refusal of a tax-payer to pay an invalid assess- ment and threatens to sell the same, such collector will be re- strained by injunction, and his solvency or insolvency is imma- terial. Noll vs. Morgan, 82 App., 112. 34. A collector assessing property under a void levy, can- not be enjoined from enforcing the collection of taxes there- imder. In such cases, he is a trespasser and the injured party has ample remedy at law. Sayre vs. Tompkins, 23 Mo., 443. Barrow vs. Davis, 46 Mo., 394. Hopkins vs. Lovell, 47 Mo., 102. McPike vs. Pugh, 48 Mo., 525. 35. Injunction will lie to prevent the violation of an agree- ment between the coimty court and a tax-payer, where the col- lector was about to enforce the collection of such taxes, con- trary to such agreement. Railroad vs. Anthony, 73 Mo., 431. 36. Injunction will lie to prevent the levying of taxes for the payment of bonds issued under the act of March 23, 1868. (Acts 1868, page 92.) Webb vs. Lafayette County, 67 Mo., 353. State ex rel. vs. Brassfield, 67 Mo., 331. Harris vs. Dowis, 75 Mo., 250. 37. If discrimination exists in the taxation of property, the party discriminated agaiast has the right to enjoin the collec- tion of such portion of the tax as is unjust. State ex rel. vs. Western Union Telegraph Co., 165 Mo., 502. 19D Digest of the Revenue L.aurs. 38. Where the directors of the school have lawfully as- sessed a tax, the collection thereof will not be enjoined, because such directors have failed to perform other official duties, Burnham vs. Rogers, 167 Mo., 17. JUDGMENTS. 1. A personal judgment against the owner of land is un- authorized, in a suit to enforce the State's lien. The judgment must be special and against the land. Milner vs. Shipley, 94 Mo., 106. Mosely vs. Reily, 126 Mo., 124. State ex rel. vs. Taylor, 56 Mo., 492. State ex rel. vs. Snyder, 139 Mo., 549. 2. A personal judgment cannot be entered against the own- er, even where there is personal ser"\nce. Stewart vs. Allison, 150 Mo., 343. State ex rel. vs. Snyder, 139 Mo., 549. 3. A personal judgment may be rendered for personal taxes. State ex rel. vs. Snyder, 139 Mo., 549. 4. The true owner is not bound by a tax judgment, where he was known, and not made a party to the suit; but if un- known, and the proceedings were against the record owner, he is bound. Evans vs. Robberson, 92 Mo., 192. 5. A judgment rendered against one who is ignorant of the suit and pays the taxes, pendente lite, is void. It is void even as to costs of suit, and all subsequent pro- ceedings after the payment are void. City of Aurora vs. Lindsay, 146 Mo., 509. 6. A tax judgment may be invalid as to one defendant, and valid as to others, and vice versa. Williams vs. Hudson, 93 Mo., 524. Neenan vs. St. Joseph, 126 Mo., 89. Railroad vs. View, 156 Mo., 608. Stevenson vs. Black, 168 Mo., 549. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 191 7. Under the law of 1872, a tax judgment is void where the collector's oath is omitted from the delinquent tax list. Duff vs. Neilson, 90 Mo„ 93. 8. A judgment rendered against a dead man is void. Williams vs. Hudson, 93 Mo., 524. Graves vs. Ewart, 99 Mo., 13. 9. If the petition fails to describe the land attempted to be charged with the tax lien, the judgment is void and subject to collateral attack. Vaughan vs. Daniels, 98 Mo., 230. 10. The judgments of circuit courts in tax suits are con- clusive that the assessment was regular. State ex rel. vs. Hunter, 98 Mo., 386. 11. One who acquired title to land by holding adversely to the record owner is not affected by judgment against such owner. Bartlett vs. Kauder, 97 Mo., 356. 12. Under the law of 1872 it was essential to the validity of a tax sale, that the judgment should describe the land and the manner in which notice of the application for judgment was given. Kinney vs. Forsythe, 96 Mo., 414. 13. Under the Jaw of 1872, unless cause for postponement be shown, judgment for taxes should be applied for at the July term of the county court. And if entered at a subsequent term, the judgment is void in the absence of recitals showing cause for postponement. Kinney vs. Forsythe, 96 Mo., 414. 14. A tax judgment of a circuit court is conclusive in a collateral proceeding as to the validity of the assessment. State ex rel. vs. Hunter, 98 Mo., 386. Allen vs. Ray, 96 Mo., 542. 15. A tax judgment may be impeached by the petition and order of publication. Milner vs. Shipley, 94 Mo., 106. 192 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 16. A tax judgment is void if rendered against any other land than that described in the petition. Milner vs. Shipley, 94 Mo., 106. 17. The owner of land, when served by publication, may, within three years thereafter, haA^e the tax judgment reviewed, iind for cause, set aside. Jones vs. Driskill, 94 Mo., 190. " 18. Under the law of 1887, page 384, a judgment cannot be attacked collaterally by showing that taxes for certain years, included in the judgment, had been paid. Jones vs. Driskill, 94 Mo., 190. 19. The recitals in a judgment are not conclusive as to matters appearing in the judgment roll. Blodgett vs. Schaffer, 94 Mo., 652. 20. The general rule as to presumptions in favor of judg- ments, and other legal proceedings, is applicable to tax judg- ments. Allen vs. McCabe, 93 Mo., 138. Brown vs. Walker, 85 Mo., 262. 21. A judgment for taxes will not be affected in a collat- eral proceeding by the fact that the order of publication omitted to name one of the years for which taxes were due. Williams vs. Hudson, 93 Mo., 524. 22. Ijatent ambiguities in the description of the land, in n judgment, execution and tax deed, may be aided by oral evi- ■dence. Brown vs. Walker, 85 Mo., 262. 23. Where the legality, of a tax was settled by a judgment of the Supreme Court, the question cannot afterwards be re- opened. Pitkin vs. Schacklett, 117 Mo., 547. 24. If it is alleged in the petition or in an affidavit filed therewith, that the defendant is a non-resident, an order of pub- lication should be based on such allegation or affidavit. Digest of the Revenue Lams. 193 If such order is not made, and the clerk issue a summons, and a non est return is made thereon, and the order of pub- lication is based on that, the judgment is void. Harness vs. Cravens, 126 Mo., 233. 25. It is proper to include attorneys' fees in a tax judg- ment. State ex rel. vs. Edwards, 144 Mo., 467. 26. If the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and of the defendant, its judgment is valid. A sale thereimder should not be set aside for irregularities before judgment. State ex rel. vs. Boyd, 128 Mo., 130. 27. The omission of the dollar mark from a tabular state- ment in a judgment is immaterial where the aggregate amount of the taxes, interest and costs, in dollars and cents, is recited in the judgment. Coombs vs. Crabtree, 105 Mo., 292. 28. The failure of the assessor to verify the assessment books, will not invalidate a sale made under tax judgment. Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. 29. One who buys with notice of a tax judgment is not an innocent purchaser. 1 , 'Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. 30. A judgment for taxes does not expire within three years. Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. Fleckenstein vs. Baxter, 114 Mo., 493. 31. A tax judgment is special and does not constitute a lien on any other property than that against which the taxes are assessed. Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. 32. Where the defendant appears and defends on the mer- its, he is bound by the judgment. State ex rel. vs. Burr, 143 Mo., 209. D— 13 194 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 33. A judgment of a circuit court in a suit to enforce the lien for back taxes, is conclusive as to all matters that, may have been shown in defense of the action and cannot be at- tacked collaterally. State ex rel. vs. Hunter, 98 Mo., 386. '■ Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mc, 394. Stevenson vs. Black, 168 Mo., 549. 34. A judgment should charge each separate tract of land with the amount of taxes due thereon. It is improper to ren- der a single judgment against several parcels of land collec- tively. Each tract or lot is chargeable with a distinct sum, and one tract or lot cannot be made to answer for the taxes due on another. State ex rel. vs. Kerr, 8 App., 125. State ex rel. vs. Bridge Company, 73 Mo., 449. State ex rel. vs. Finn, 100 Mo., 429. 35. A judgment which specifies the amount of taxes, inter- est and other charges due upon each piece of land, described therein, and declaring the taxes found due, "a special lien and judgment against said tract of land respectively" is sufficient. .State ex rel. vs. Hunter, 98 Mo., 386. 36. A judgment in a tax suit may refer to other parts of the record for particulars. .State ex rel. vs. Hunter, 98 Mo., 386. 37. Where the amount of taxes due at the beginning of a suit are stated in the petition, the fact that the judgment in- cludes interest and costs, does not invalidate the judgment. The amount of the judgment, in such cases, is a matter of law, and not of fact. Kansas City vs. St. Joseph, 78 Mo., 661. 38. A tax judgment binds those who are made parties thereto. Stafford vs. Fizer, 82 Mo., 393. 39. A tax deed is of no validity against one who has ac- quired title to land by adverse possession, and is in possession thereof, unless he ^as made a party to the tax suit. Watt vs. Donnell, 80 Mo., 195. Digest of the Revenue Land's. 195 40. A judgment for taxes against the unknown heirs of a deceased person, will not divest the life estate of the widow. Berlien vs. Bieler, 96 Mo., 491. 41. The validity of a judgment rendered in a tax suit can- not be raised collaterally, because of the want of sufficient alle- gations in the petition. Wellshear vs. Kelley, 69 Mo., 343. 42. Tlie objection that the amount of a judgment is in ex- cess of the amount of taxes stated in the order of publication, can only be made by timely motion directed against the judg- ment, and cannot be raised collaterally. Allen vs. Ray, 96 Mo., 542. 43. Judgments cannot be rendered against land for taxes due on personal property. State ex rel. vs. Powell, 44 Mo., 436. 44. The State has no statutory lien upon personal proj^- erty for taxes assessed against the owner thereof. State ex rel. vs. Rowse, 49 Mo., 586. 45. Although the State has no express lien on personal property for taxes, it has an equitable lien that will prevail over the claims of other creditors. State ex rel. vs. Rowse, 49 Mo., 586. Greeley vs. Savings Bank, 98 Mo., 458. 46. A judgment against a tract of land, which was not described in the order of publication, is void. Stewart vs. Allison, 150 Mo., 343. 47. If the judgment describes one tract of land, and the order of publication another, the description in the order of publication will control. Stewart vs. Allison, 150 Mo., 343. 48. If the owner of property is advised that no suit for taxes has been filed, and pays his delinquent taxes, the lien is discharged and the judgment thereafter rendered is void. City of Aurora vs. Lindsay, 146 Mo., 509. 196 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 49. If a curator fails to pay taxes on the personal property of Ms ward, a personal judgment may be rendered against him therefor. State ex rel. vs. Simpson, 90 App., 50. State ex rel. vs. Burr. 143 Mo., 209. 50. Where the judgment is for plaintiff, it should be en- tered for the amount shown to be due on the face of the tax- bill as interest, in the form and to the effect prescribed by sec- tion 7683, R. S. 1.889. State ex rel. vs. Edwards, 151 Mo., 472. 51. If publication is properly made against a non-resident owner of real estate, a judgment rendered in pursuance thereof is binding on him. This is true, although a resident defendant in the same suit was not served with process, Stevenson vs. Black, 168 Mo., 509. 52. A judgment for taxes, when brought against the proper parties, is conclusive of the question as to the amount of taxes dvie, the regularity of the assessment, and the correctness of the certificate of the collector. It is not open to collateral attack. Railroad vs. View, 156 Mo., 608. Stevenson vs. Black, 168 Mo., 549. 53. Where there is regular process against a part of the defendants in a tax suit, and judgment rendered against them, the sheriff's sale thereunder conveys only their interest. Stevenson vs. Black, 168 Mo., 549. 54. A judgment for taxes may be set aside at a subsequent term of court, for want of sufficient notice. Schiffman vs. Schmidt, 154 Mo., 204. 55. A judgment against a county, or its regular represen- tative, respecting the levy and collection of a tax, is binding on all the citizens of the county. State ex rel. vs. Rainey, 74 Mo., 229. 56. One who is sued by his wrong name; but who appears and defends, is bound by the judgment. State ex rel. vs. Burr, 143 Mo., 209. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 197 57. If the proceedings are against Siemson, and the name of the owner is Simonson, the judgment is void. Simonson vs. Dolan, 114 Mo., 176. 58. As against collateral attack, a judgment for taxes against Jeff. M. Thompson is good against Jeff Thompson. A judgment against Jeff Thompson would be good as against Jeff M. Thompson. Nolan vs. Taylor, 131 Mc, 224. 59. Unless it appears from the records that judgment is void it is not subject to collateral attack. Myers vs. McRay, 114 Mo., 377. 60. Where the service was by a regular publication, the judgment thereunder cannot be collaterally attacked as against an innocent purchaser, Schmidt vs. Neimeyer, 100 Mo., 207. 61. Although a judgment for taxes does not attempt to charge each quarter section of land with its appropriate part of taxes due, this irregularity is not sufficient to invalidate a judgment in a collateral proceeding. Cruzen vs. Stephens, 123 Mo., 337. 62. A judgment in a suit for taxes is one strictly in rem. Neenan vs. City of St. Joseph, 126 Mo., 89. Allen vs. McCabe, 93 Mo., 138. 63. Where an action was for delinquent taxes for two years, and the evidence shows only a legal assessment for one year, the judgment should be rendered for the taxes due for that year only. State ex rel. vs. Phillips, 102 Mo., 664. 64. Judgments of circuit courts are as conclusive in tax suits as in other cases over which such courts have jurisdiction. Jones vs. Driskill, 94 Mo., 190. Milner vs. Shipley, 94 Mo., 106. Hill vs. Sherwood, 96 Mo., 125. Allen vs. McCabe, 93 Mo., 138. Gibbs vs. Southern, 116 Mo., 204. WS Digest of the Revenue Lait's. 65. Where a judgment for taxes on constructive service is in excess of the sum asked for in the petition, such judgment shonld be set aside on motion made for that purpose. State ex rel. vs. Davidson, 87 Mo., 683. 66. A tax judgment is not void because each tract of land is not specially charged with the items of taxes applicable to it. Curzen vs. Stephens, 123 Mo., 337. 67. Although the judgment in a back-tax suit was ren- dered against all of a number of lots for the taxes due, such fact cannot be shown for the purpose of impeaching the judg- ment. Brown vs. Walker, 11 App., 226. Brown vs. Walker^ 85 Mo., 262. 68. Where taxes, although illegally levied have been paid, judgment should not be rendered against the defendant for penalties and attorney's fee. State ex rel. vs. Trust Company, 68 Mo., 463. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 71 Mo., 88. 69. A judgment for taxes in excess of the sum asked for in the petition should be set aside on motion. State ex rel. vs. Davidson, 87 Mo., 683. JURISDICTION. 1. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in cases iavolving the construction of the State revenue laws. Morrow vs. Surber, 97 Mo., 155. Railroad vs. Gracy, 126 Mo., 472. Hilton vs. Smith, 134 Mo., 499. City of Stanherry vs. Jordan, 145 Mo., 371. City of Hannibal vs. Bowman, 167 Mo., 535. State ex rel. vs. Angert, 53 App., 349. Moore vs. Vaughan, 53 App., 632. 2. The constitutional phrase "involving the construction of the revenue laws ' ' is not synonymous with ' ' questions affect- ing the revenue. ' ' State ex rel vs. Tittmann, 31 App., 82. State vs. Sneed, 88 Mo., 138. Digest of the Revenue Lmvs. 199 3. Justices of the peace have no jurisdiction of actions to enforce the State 's lien for taxes. State ex rel. vs. Staley, 76 Mo., 158. State ex rel. vs. Hopkins, 87 Mo., 519. LEGISLATURE. 1. Primarily the Legislature is vested with the power to levy taxes, either general or special. Grading Company vs. Holden, 107 Mo., 305. 2. The General Assembly has control over the revenues of a city as well as over those of the counties and State. It may direct that the expenses of an election of school di- rectors in a city shall be paid out of the city's revenues. State ex rel. vs. Board of Education, 141 Mo., 45. 3. The Legislature may confer power upon a municipality to collect an ad valorem tax on property used in a calling and also to impose a license tax upon the pursuit of that calling. Springfield vs. Smith, 138 Mo., 645. 4. The taxing power belongs to the Legislature and is sub- ject to no restrictions or limitations except the Constitution of the State and the United States. Railroad vs. Board of Equalization, 64 Mo., 294. State ex rel. vs. Springer, 134 Mo., 212. 5. The power of taxation is a sovereign right belonging to the State, and which can only be exercised in pursuance of laws passed by the Legislature. State vs. Shortridge, 56 Mo., 126. 6. The Legislature has full power and control over the subject of taxation. St. Louis vs. Savings Bank, 49 Mo., 574. 7. The Legislature may repeal a temporary rate of taxa- tion and impose a higher or additional rate. Winters vs. Railroad, 39 Mo., 476. Railroad vs. Dulle et al, 48 Mo., 282. 200 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 8. The Legislature may authorize or direct the levying of taxes to pay a pre-existing debt. St. Louis vs. Clemens, 52 Mo., 133. 9. The Legislature alone has the power to provide the man- ner of assessment of property for taxation. St. Louis vs. Wenneker, 145 Mo., 230. 10. Although the Legislature has omitted certain property form taxation, the judiciary of the State cannot direct how it shall be taxed. Kansas City vs. Building and Loan Association, 145 Mc. s'o. 11. The General Assembly may levy, for public purposes, a succession or devolution tax under the Missouri Inheritance Laws and statutes of wills. State ex rel. vs. Switzler, 143 Mo., 287. 12. The Legislature may impose a tax upon a municipal- ity of this State, when in its judgment it is for the benefit of that locality as well as for the State at large. .State ex rel. vs. Mason, 153 Mo.-, 23. 13. The Legislature has control of municipal organizations and may authorize them to levy taxes and issue bonds to meet public improvements. State ex rel. vs. County Court, 44 Mo., 504. LICENSES-GENERALLY. 1. The license fees which are imposed on those who pur- sue particular employments, are taxes. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. 2. When the purpose of an ordinance is to raise revenue by the assessment of a license fee, such license fee is a tax and must conform to the constitutional requirement that taxes "shall Digest of the Revenue Laws. 201 be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the terri- torial limits of the authority levying the taxes." Kansas City vs. Grush, 151 Mo., 129. St. Louis vs. Spiegel, 75 Mo., 145. St. Louis vs. Spiegel, 90 Mo., 587. 3. A city cannot impose a license tax on any business, vocation or calling, unless the same be especially named as tax- able in its charter. Kansas City vs. Grush, 151 Mo., 128. 4. The Constitution enjoins a uniform rule as to the impo- sition of taxes on propeiiy, but it does not abridge the power of the Legislature to provide revenue from other sources. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 47 Mo., 479. 5. The right to license an employment does not imply the right to charge a license therefor with a view to revenue. City of St. Louis vs. Insurance & Trust Co., 47 Mo., ISO. 6. A license is issued under the police power and will usu- ally be limited to such charges as will cover the necessary ex- penses of isstiing it and the additional labor of the officers and the expenses thereby imposed. The exaction of a license fee with a view to revenue, would be an exercise of the taxing power, and unless the charter of a city plainly shows an intent to confer the power of taxation, a municipal corporation cannot assume it. City of St. Louis vs. Insurance & Trust Co., 47 Mo., ■ 150. 7. The omission of the county court to levy a tax upon licenses, when making a general le^^^, does not extinguish their authority to make a levy therefor subsequently. State ex rel. vs. Maguire, 52 Mo., 420. 8. When a tax is levied on a license, it constitutes an in- cumbrance upon it, and the proper time to collect the same is at or before the delivery of the license. State ex rel. vs. Maguire, 52 Mo., 420. State ex rel. vs. Spencer, 49 Mo., 342. 202 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 9. A municipality may not impose a tax lien upon property without express charter authority. Cit}' of Springfield vs. Starke, 93 App., 70. 10. The constitutional provisions of uniformity of tax?ition does not apply to privilege or occupation taxes. Kansas City vs. Richardson, 90 App., 450. 11. The council of a municipal corporation cannot, by defi- nition enlarge its poAver, and the meaning of words must remain a question for the courts. Kansas Cit\- vs. Butt, 88 App., 237. 12. Where an occupation is taxed merely to regulate it, this is the exercise of the police power. But if the object is to produce revenue, it must be referred to the taxing power. City of Lamar vs. Adams, 90 App., 35. 13. "WTiere a county court makes an order requiring li- censes and assessing a tax therefor, before the statute author- izing it goes into effect, such order is null. Neff vs. Maguire, 52 Mo., 493. 14. A right to license implies a right to prohibit. St. Louis vs. Ferry Co., 14 App., 216. Carroll vs. Campbell, 25 App., 630. 15. Where a city charter does not exclude the right of the county court to demand a license, a license from the city or town will not relieve from the obligation to obtain a county license. State vs. Harper, 58 Mo., 530. Harrison vs. State, 9 Mo., 530. 16. Although a license is a mere privilege it is yet so far within the protection of the law that it cannot be abrogated without sufficient cause. State vs. Baker, 32 App., 98. 17. A mimicipal occupation license tax is not a contract within the protection of State or Federal Constitution. St. Charles vs. Hackman, 133 Mo., 634. Digest of the Rei'enue Laws. 203 18. An occupation tax does not create a contractual rela- tion between the municipal corporation and the licensee so as to absolutely require the corporation to permit the occupation for the whole period of the license. The corporation in the exercise of its police power, may prohibit the occupation during the currency of the term of the license, without thereby impairing a contractual obligation of the city. St. Charles vs. Hackman, 133 ]\[o., 634. 19. The tax imposed upon a merchant by the charter of Kansas City, is not for tlie purpose of exercising the privilege of selling goods; but it is a tax imposed upon his goods and wares. It is a personal tax. City of Kansas vs. Johnson, 78 Mo., 661. 20. A State law requiring an importer of foreign goods, who sells the same in the original unbroken package, to take out a license from the State, would be unconstitutional. State vs. North, 27 Mo., 464. 21. Property taxed for revenue may also be subjected to a license tax. City of St. Louis vs. Blrcher, 7 App., 169. 22. ^ It is competent to impose a license on each occupation pursued. St. Louis vs. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 602. 23. The city of St. Louis, under its charter powers, may levy these taxes: a tax on property; a vehicle tax for the use of streets; a tax on business or occupations. St. Louis vs. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600. St. Louis vs. Green, 7 App., 468. St. Louis vs. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 302. 24. Where a municipality has power to tax callings, trades and professions, and taxes persons engaged in the same busi- ness alike, such taxation is equal and uniform. St. Louis vs. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 290. , Express Co. vs. St. Joseph, 66 Mo., 675-. City of St. Louis vs. Bowler, 94 Mo., 630. 204 Digest of the Reveniie Lams. 25. Chapter 89 of the Eevised Statutes of Missouri of 1879, confers no power on a village incorporated thereunder to im- pose a license tax for the privilege of keeping a public scale. Knox City vs. White, 19 App., 528. 26. In granting a license, a city has no authority to adopt the credit system. The money should be paid before the delivery of the license or at least concurrently with its delivery. City of Craig vs. Smith, 31 App., 286. State ex rel. vs. Spencer, 49 Mo., 342. State ex rel. vs. Maguire, 52 Mo., 420. 27. AJthough a license granted by a municipal corpora- tion is a mere privilege, yet it is so far within the protection of the law, that it cannot be abrogated without sufficient cause. State ex rel. vs. Baker, 32 App., 98. 28. So long as goods imported into one of the United States from a foreign countrj'^, remains in the original unbroken package, the importer may sell the same in that form without license. A statute requiring him to first take out a license would be ui conflict with the Constitution of the United States. State vs. Shapleigh, 27 Mo., 344. 29. Where a special provision is applicable to a particular locality and is inconsistent with a general law, the former must prevail, therefore, the charter of the city of St. Louis, as amended and approved, March 4, 1870, authorized said city to regulate or suppress houses of ill fame. State vs. DeBar, 58 Mo., 395. 30. Cities of the second class have authority under the statute to require a licensed coal dealer to weigh his coal on tlie public scales and exact a charge therefor. City of St. Charles vs. Eisner, 155 Mo., 671. 31. A city of the second class may collect a revenue tax both by way of license and a tax on the net income of foreign insurance companies. City of St. Joseph vs. Ernst, 95 Mo., 360. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 205 32. The duty of issuing a merchant license under the city charter is ministerial and its performance may be compelled by mandamus. State ex rel. vs. Ashbrook, 154 Mo., 375. 33. The power to license may imply the power to tax. City of St. Joseph vs. Ernst, 95 Mo., 360. 34. The act of 1825 and supplements thereto, passed in 1829 are constitutional, in so far as they impose a tax on retail dealers. Tracy vs. The State, 3 Mo., 3. 35. The State may collect an ad valorem tax on property used in a calling and at the same time impose a license tax upon the pursuit of that calling. The State may confer such power upon a municipality and a city may exercise the right as a police regulation to raise revenue. A license tax of $10.00 may be imposed by a city upon each ear used by a railway company. City of Sprin^eld vs. Smith, 138 Mo., 645. 36. The eonstitiitional guarantee of the enjoyment of the gains of one's o"v\7i industry, is not an absolute right; but it is subordinate to the police powers of the city. It makes no difference in particular if the tax is against the occupation and not against the property. St. Louis vs. McCann, 157 Mo., 301. 37. In determining what constitutes the income and reve- nue provided for one year within the meaning of section 23, article 10 of the Constitntion, income raised from licenses, should be estimated. Lamar W. E. L. Co. vs. the City of Lamar, 128 Mo., 188. 38. Pursuits that are pernicious and detrimental to public morals may be prohibited altogether. State ex rel. vs. Hudson, 78 Mo., 302. 39. The franchise of a foreign corporation, doing business under the laws of this State, is property and subject to taxa- 206 Digest of the Revenue Laws. tion; either directly in proportion that the portion of the fran- chise exercised in this State hears to the proportion of the fran- chise exercised by the corporation in all states; or indirectly by being impressed upon the tangible property owned by it in Missouri, according to its proportionate value to the whole prop- erty constituting the system. State ex rel. vs. Western Union Telegraph Co., 165 Mo., 516. 40. The Legislature has power to tax all professions and to delegate that authority. Simmons vs. State, 12 Mo., 268. St. Louis vs. Langhlin, 49 Mo., 559. Express Co. vs. City of St. Joseph, 66 Mo., 675. ARCHITECTS. 1. The city of St. Louis has power to impose a license tax upon architects. St. Louis vs. Herthel, 14 App., 467. St. Louis vs. Herthel, 88 Mo., 128. AUCTIONEERS. 1. A licensed auctioneer cannot delegate his authority. Stone vs. State, 12 Mo., 401. 2. Although one receives no compensation for exercising the trade of an auctioneer, he should take out a license. State vs. Rucker, 24 Mo., 557. BANKS. 1. Savings banks, incorporated under chapter 68, G. S. 1865, are liable to be taxed on their capital and property. They are not required to take out a license as brokers. State vs. Field, 49 Mo., 270. 2. A state has no power to authorize taxation of national banks, except on the shares of the banks. Nor can it authorize municipalities to exact license taxes from such banks doing business within the limits of such munic- ipalities. Carthage vs. Bank, 71 Mo., 508. Digest of the Revenue La7jtjs. 207 BOATS. 1. A license fee being a tax -vrithin the meaning of the Con- stitution requiring all taxes to be uniform upon the same das3 of property, the boats of a foreigTi corporation must be taxed the same as those belonging to resident owners in the city of St. Louis. Tliis, without regard to the sitxis of the foreign boats. City of St. Louis vs. Coal Co., 113 Mo., 83. 2. An ordinance of the city of St. Louis, xoroAdding a li- cense on tugs and barges, and authorizing a reduction of forty per cent, of the regular rates, in favor of vessels owned by residents of St. Louis, and taxable there, is unconstitutional. City of St. Louis vs. Coal Co., 113 Mo., 83. DRAMSHOPS. 1. The State has the right to prohibit the sale of intoxi- cating liquors without a license. State vs. Lemp, 16 ^lo., 389. State vs. Searcy, 20 Mo., 489. Austin vs. State, 10 Mo., 591. 2. "Where the power is given to a city to tax and restrain the sale of intoxicating liquors, such power includes the author- ity to grant licenses. Schweitzer vs. City of Liberty, 82 Mo., 309. 3. Under the acts of 1(^8.3, the license fee exacted from dramshop Iteepers is not a tax. It is a price paid for a privilege. State ex rel. vs. Hudson, 78 Mo., 302. 4. Under the act of 1883, it is the duty of the county courts of the counties and the municipal assembly of St. Louis, to fix the amount of licenses that is required of dramshop keepers. State ex rel. vs. Hudson, 78 Mo., 302. 5. Under the law of 18.55, K. C, page 686, towns could not levy a tax for dramshop licenses, greater than that levied for State purposes. Town of Paris vs. Graham, 33 Mo., 94. State vs. Lemp, 16 Mo., 389. State ex rel. vs. Hudson, 78 Mo., 302. 208 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 6. The exclusive power of granting licenses to sell liquor is vested in the county court. State vs. Evans, 83 Mo., 319. Atistin vs. State, 10 Mo., 591. 7. It has long been the established law in this State, that the right to sell spiritous or intoxicating liquors is not a natural right. It is a calling which no one has a right to pursue without first having procured a license so to do. State vs. Bixman, 162 Mo., i. 8. A dramshop license is not a contract. It is a mere permit. The licensee has no vested rights thereimder and it is sub- ject to the police powers of the State government, and may be revoked at any time. Higgins vs. Talty, 157 Mo., 280. DENTISTS. 1. A statute permitting cities to license dentists is valid. State ex rel. vs. Fisher, 119 Mo., 344. 2. A dentist is not a practitioner of medicines or surgery in any of their departments, as defined in section 6771, E. S. 1889. State ex rel. vs. Fisher, 119 Mo., 344. DOGS. 1. A city may, by proper ordinance, impose a per capita tax on dogs by way of license. Such tax is an exercise of the police power of the city, and is not prohibited by the Constitution. City of Carthage vs. Rhodes, loi Mo., 175. ENGINEERS. 1. AxL ordinance passed by the city of St. Louis, in pur- suance of its charter assessing a fine against any company em- ploying an unlicensed engineer, is not unconstitutional. St. Louis vs. Manufacturing Company, 139 Mo., 560. Digest of the Revenue Laics. 209 HOTELS. 1. The citj^ of St. Louis lias the power to require licenses from hotel and boarding house keepers. St. Louis vs. Bircher, 7 App., 169. .St. Louis vs. Bircher, 76 Mo., 431. INSURANCE COMPANIES. 1. Cities of the third class have power to require a license tax of foreign insurance companies for the privilege of carry- ing on their business within the limits of such city. City of Springfield vs. Hubble, 89 App., 379. 2. This right is not taken away by the act of 1895, now section 8043. City of Springfield vs. Hubble, 89 App., 379. 3. The general law, incorporating cities of the second class, expressly authorizes a city organized thereunder to license carry- ing on of the business of insurance, within its limits. City of St. Joseph vs. Ernst, 95 Mo., 360. 4. Cities of the fourth class have power to levy and col- lect a license tax on insurance companies and insurance agents doing business in the city. City of Farmington vs. Rutherford, 94 App., 328. City of Lamar vs. Adams, 90 App., 35. LAWYERS. 1. It is not necessary that there should be property be- fore a tax can be levied. Lawyers may be compelled to pay a license for practicing their profession. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. 2. The State has the right to tax lawyers and others en- gaged in professional life, and to delegate that right. Simmons vs. State, 12 Mo., 271. City of St. Louis vs. Steinburg, 69 Mo., 289. City of St. Louis vs. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559. D— 14 210 Digest of the Revenue Lazus. 3. An ordinance of tlie city of St. Louis imposing a tax of $25.00 a year on every lawyer of the city, without reference to the amount of his practice, is not obnoxious to the consti- tutional provision requiring that taxation shall be uniform. City of St. Louis vs. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289. 4. A city has no right to compel an attorney to pay a tax before he can pursue his professional employment, unless there is a grant in its charter conferring the power. City of St. Louis vs. Laughlin, 49 Mo., 559. MERCHANTS. 1. One engaged in buying and selling potatoes, apples and vegetables of all kinds, and who has some fixed place of busi- ness, is a merchant. Kansas City vs. Crush, 151 Mo., 128. 2. It is immaterial that a merchant changes the form of goods sold. If he deals in selling them at his store, stand or place, he is a merchant. State vs. Whittaker, 33 Mo., 457. 3. One who manufactures and supplies goods on the pre- vious orders of his customers, is not a merchant withiu the mean- ing of the law, although he keeps on hand the materials from which the articles are produced. He is a manufacturer. State vs. West, 34 Mo., 424. 4. One who manufactures and supplies goods on the pre- vious orders of his customers alone, although he keeps on hand, but not for sale, the materials from which the manufactured articles are produced, is not a merchant. State vs. Richeson, 45 Mo., 575. State vs. West, 34 Mo., 424. 5. A dealer in drugs and medicines is a merchant within the meaning of the first section (Laws 1855) of the act to tax and license merchants. State vs. Wells, 28 Mo., 565. Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 211 6. Merchandise is not listed for taxation as other personal property, but the merchant must apply for a license to trade as such. The license gives the merchant the right to engage in mer- cantile pursuits. The tax which a merchant pays on his goods is another and different thing. The license is a tax upon the occupation, the personal tax on the goods is one upon the stock in trade, and is a personal property tax. State ex rel. vs. Tracey, 94 Mo., 217. 7. The charter of the City of Kansas authorized the coun- cil to license merchants. This po-R-er authorizes the municipal government to license dealers in every kind and description of commercial commodities. Kansas City vs. Lorber, 64 App., 604. 8. The act to tax and license merchants, approved Decem- ber 11, 1855, does not require the importer of foreign goods to take out a license to authorize him to sell the same in the orig- inal packages. State vs. Shapleigh, 27 Mo., 344. 9. Cities of the fourth class may impose a license on mer- chants in proportion to the value of the stock owned by each, A license of $2.00, on merchants with a stock of less than $1,000.00, and of $3.00 on merchants with a greater stock is not unconstitutional. Cities of the fourth class may levy a license tax upon pur- suits or callings, and at the same time collect an advalorem tax upon the property used in that calling. City of Aurora vs. McGannon, 138 Mo., 38. 10. The act of 1849, imposing a tax upon merchants and grocers is constitutional. Merchants engaged in business in a town on any day be- tween the first Monday in March and June, must file the state- ment required by section 854.6, E- S. 1899. State ex rel. vs. Rodecker, 145 Mo., 450. 212 Digest of the Revenue Laivs. 11. The charter of the City of Kansas, specifically enu- merates merchants as being among the persons and occupations to be licensed by said city. City of Kansas vs. Vindquest, 36 App., 584. 12. Taxes may be collected from merchants and grocers, under the authority of the act of 1849. Crow vs. State, 14 Mo., 239. 13. The act to tax and license merchants, approved De- cember 11, 1855 (E. C. 1855), in so far as the same requires merchants, dealing in the manufactures of sister states, to take out licenses from the State, and to pay a tax on the same, is unconstitutional. State vs. North, 27 Mo., 464. 14. A dealer in drugs and medicines, is a merchant within the meaning of the first section of the act of 1855, to tax and license merchants. State vs. Wells, 28 Mo., 565. 15. Under the charter of Kansas City, a merchant's lia- bility for the payment of taxes for a given year, does not de- pend upon the fact of his being a merchant during the fiscal year, beginning on the third Monday of April of that year; but it depends upon the fact whether upon the first day of January of that year, and at any time within three months before such first day of January, he had on hands, as a merchant, goods, wares and merchandise. City of Kansas vs. Johnson, 78 Mo., 661. 16. The tax imposed upon a merchant by the charter of Kansas City is not for exercising the privilege of selling goods. It is a tax imposed upon his goods. It is a personal tax on the goods of a merchant, as dis- tinguished from the personal tax of others. City of Kansas vs. Johnson, 78 Mo., 661. 17. The third section of W. S., page 938, imposed an in- direct tax on property and not a mere ordinary charge for the exercise of a privilege. City of Cape Girardeau vs. Riley, 72 Mo., 220. Digest of the Revenue Lai^^s. 213 18. A license tax of one per cent, per annum upon the cash vahie of the goods, wares and merchandise imposed hy a city upon merchants, cannot be upheld as an occupation tax. It is a plain property or ad valorem tax, and being in excess of the limit permitted by the Constitution, is void. It is void because not uniform as to all personal property within the city. City of Brookfield vs. Tooey, 141 Mo., 619. PEDDLERS. 1. Section twelve, of the code of 1834, page 429, requires a license to peddle clocks, Avhether such clocks are manufactured in this State or elsewhere. Page vs. State, 6 Mo., 203. 2. The correct interpretation of section 6472, E. S. 1879, •is, that the license shall be issued to the person actually using it. The doctrine of principal and agent does not ai)ply. State vs. Downing, 22 App., 504. 3. One going from place to place, selling medicine and de- livering same at the time and place of sale, is a peddler within, the meaning of tbe Revised Statutes of 1889, section 7211. State vs. Parsons, 124 Mo., 436. State vs. Smithson, 106 Mo., 149. 4. 1 peddler vending single bottles of medicine manu- factured in anotlier state, and which were taken from the box in which several bottles were separately wrapped and shipped into this State, cannot invoke the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution against tbe statutes of this State, defining a peddler and imposing a license on the vocation. State vs. Parson, 124 Mo., 436. 5. One who goes from place to place in this State, offering for sale and sells machines manufactured in another state, the property of a citizen of the latter state, is a peddler within the meaning of Eevised Statute of 1889, section 7211. State vs. Einert, 103 Mo., 241. 6. The statutes of this State, defining who are peddlers and prohibiting them from dealing without a license, make no dis- 214 Digest of the Revenue La-d's. tinction between articles manufactured and owned by residents of this State and such as are manufactured and owned by resi- dents of other states, and such statutes are not in conflict with section 1, of article 8, of the Constitution of the "United States, delegating to Congress the whole power to regulate commerce among the states. State vs. Einert, 103 Mo., 241. 7. The act requiring a license on peddlers is not in con- travention of the State or Federal Constitution. State vs. Smithson, 106 Mo., 149. 8. The statute existing in 1876, in reference to the com- pulsion of peddlers to pay a license, was unconstitutional. State vs. Browning, 62 Mo., 591. (Overruling State vs. Welton, 55 Mo., 288.) 9. The Act of 1825, imposing a tax on peddlers in so far as the same applies to the sale of merchandise not in the original package, is constitutional. Tracey vs. State, 3 Mo., 3. 10. A person traveling from place to place in a two horse vehicle, selling wares, is a peddler and should obtain a license, though his wares were manufactured by him in this State. State vs. Holmes, 62 App., 178. PHYSICIANS. 1. Physicians may be compelled to pay a license for prac- ticing their profession. Glasgow vs. Rowse, 43 Mo., 479. 2. The statute authorizing cities to license doctors has been sustained. State vs. Hathaway, 115 Mo., 36. STEAM LAUNDRIES. 1. The statutes of this State do not autkorize cities of the third class to levy a tax on steam laundries. City of Independence vs. Cleveland, 167 Mo., 384. 2. Nor has such city any authority to impose a license tax on an agent of any such laundry, who does business in such Digest of the Revenue Laws. 215 city; nor can it fine such agent for doing business as an agent of a laundry located elsewhere. City of Independence vs. Cleveland, 167 Mo., 384. 3. Cities of the second class have the power to license and tax steam laundries. City of St. Joseph vs. Lung, 93 App., 626. TELEPHONE COMPANIES. 1. Telephone companies are ejusdem generis with tele- graph companies under sub-division 5, section 26, article 3, of the charter of the city of St. Louis, giving the mayor and as- sembly power to license telegraph companies and all other busi- ness trades, vocations and professions. City of St. Louis vs. Bell Telephone Company, 96 Mo., 623. VEHICLES. 1. An ordinance dividing vehicles and teams into dif- ferent classes and imposing an occupation tax on the separate classes, is not a tax on personal property, but is in the nature of a privilege connected with, property and not in conflict with the constitutional provision requiring all property to be taxed in proportion to its value. Kansas City vs. Richardson, 90 App., 450. 2. Where the charter of the city provides that it may im- pose a tax on vehicles for street use and also a tax on occupation, it may require the payment of a license tax on vehicles used in a particular occupation, in addition to that imposed for street use. St. Louis vs. Weitzel, 130 Mo., 600. 3. The city of St. Charles passed an ordinance requiring a license tax for wagons used for pay and attempted to impose a tax upon wagons of persons residing outside of the city and engaged in hauling into and out of the city. The ordinance was void. It would in effect have been taking property for private use, St. Charles vs. Nolle, 51 Mo., 122.. 216 Digest of the Revenue Lazi'S. 4. Ordinance No. 10494, of the city of St. Louis, imposing a license tax upon vehicles using the streets of the city, is valid. City of St. Louis vs. Green, 70 Mo., 562. 5. The city of St. Louis, under its charter, has power to impose and by criminal prosecution to enforce penalties for violation of an ordinance exacting a license from vehicles using the streets of the city. City of St. Louis vs. Green, 6 App. 590. City of St. Louis vs. Green, 7 App., 468. City of St. Louis vs. Green, 70 Mo., 562. City of St. Louis vs. Sternberg, 69 Mo., 289. 6. The ordinance of St. Louis provided that "public vehi- cles used on streets of the city for trade or traffic or other purposes," should pay a tax. One engaged in the business of sprinkling the streets with water for compensation paid by the owners of the property fronting on the streets and using tanks mounted on wheels and driven through the streets, was liable to pay the license tax. City of St. Louis vs. Woodruff, 71 Mo., 92. 7. A city may require a license plate to be attached to a vehicle for use in a particular occupation, nothwithstanding such vehicle already has a license plate for street use attached, and the reasonable expense of furnishing such special license plate may be charged. St. Louis vs. \Yeitzel, 130 Mo., 602. 8. A statute granting the power to license and regulate dram shops, public shows, theatricals and other amusements, cannot be intended to include the power of licensing wagons run for hire by virtue of a general clause at its close, granting power to pass other ordinances for police regulations. Knox City vs. Thompson, 19 App., 523. 9. Police powers conferred by section 5110, statutes of 1879, cannot be used for the purposes of revenue. An ordinance, therefore, which imposes a license fee of twenty-five cents per wagon, and an additional license of $2.00 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 217 for each six months, is an ordinance for revenue purposes and void. Knox City vs. Thompson, 19 App., 523. St. Louis vs. Green, 7 App., 468. St. Louis vs. Insurance & Trust Co., 47 Mo.. 15T. 10. A power granted in a municipal charter to "license, tax, and regulate street railroads, cars and companies, hackney carriages, omnibuses and all other vehicles, and all other busi- ness trades whatever," does not empower a city government to impose a license tax on vehicles used exclusively for private purposes. City of Hannibal vs. Price, 29 App., 280. LIEN. 1. The covenants contained in the words, ' ' grant, bargain and sell, " in a conveyance of land is a covenant against the in- cumbrances caused by the taxes assessed to the owner of land at the date of the assessment. Blossom vs. Van Court, 34 Mo., 390. 2. State and county taxes constitute a lien on real estate from and after the first Monday in September and the then owner will be liable to subsequent purchasers on his covenant of war- ranty, even though the sale is prior to the assessment. McLaren vs. Sheble, 45 Mo., 130. 3. For the payment of taxes on the personal property of a debtor, the State has an equitable lien which will prevail over the claims of creditors. In case of such assignment, the collector has authority under the statute to assess and sell the property in the hands of the assignee. State vs. Rowse, 49 Mo., 586. 4. A city has no lien for taxes and no power to impose penalties for non-payment of taxes unless given by the charter. City of Jefferson vs. Whipple, 71 Mo., 519. 218 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 5. Under the Laws of 1872, a lien was created for city taxes due upon real property. State ex rel. vs. Shepherd, 74 Mo., 310. 6. Under tlie Act of March 10, 1871, providing a system of assessing and collecting taxes on railroads, there was no lien upon the property of the company for the taxes due. State vs. Railway Company, ^'^ Mo., 202. 7. A lien of the State for taxes on realty cannot follow severed fixtures as personal property. State ex rel. vs. Goodnow, 80 Mo., 271. 8. The lien of the State for taxes is superior to all other liens, whether prior or subsequent. Stafford vs. Fizer, 8j2 Mo., 393. 9. A tax lien on land is superior to one created by a trust -deed, although junior thereto. Gitchell vs. Kreidler, 84 Mo., 472. 10. The statutory lien for taxes, under the Law of 1877, held enforcible for school taxes, duly assessed and levied under the Act of 1867, although not entered on the tax book by the county clerk as required by the later act. State ex rel. vs. Harper, 83 Mo., 670. 11. The lien of the State for taxes is superior to all other liens. Allen vs. McCabe, 93 Mo., 138. Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. 12. The State's right to be paid taxes due it on property in the hands of a receiver, is paramount to the claim of other creditors. Greeley vs. Provident Savings Bank, 98 Mo., 458. 13. A tax lien is not merged in a tax judgment so as to -expire in a general judgment lien in three years. Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. 14. The State 's lien for taxes is paramount to the interest -of the widow in her deceased husband 's estate, and such interest may be sold for the payment of taxes. Rohrer vs. Oder, 124 Mo., 24. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 219 15. No lien is created for taxes until the tax is levied and extended on the tax book. City of Westport vs. McGee, 128 Mo., 152. 16. Unpaid taxes constitute a prior and paramount lien to all other liens. A tax lien is declared by the public records and there can be no innocent purchaser of lands without notice of such lien. A tax lien is not merged into a judgment lien, so as to expire in three years, and in case of a general judgment. Fleckenstein vs. Baxter, 114 Mo., 493. 17. A vendor, having a lien on the land for the purchase money may pay delinquent taxes thereon^ and recover the same as a part of the lien debt. Brown vs. Brown, 124 Tslo., 79. 18. A tax lien, whether prior in point of time or not, to a deed of trust, is a superior lien. Williams vs. Hudson, 93 Mo., 524. 19. The failure of the collector to properly return the de- linquent list, or of the county court to collect and authenticate that list, will not impair the State 's lien for taxes arising from ■a valid assessment. State ex rel. vs. Hurt, 113 Mo., 90. LIFE TENANTS AND REMAINDER MEN. 1. A tenant for life is bound to pay the annual taxes, even though holding under a deed which purports to convey title in fee. Bone vs. Tyrrell, 113 Mo., 175. 2. On the death of one of two co-tenants, it is the duty of th-^ other to pay the taxes for the current year against the common property. It is the duty of the probate court to allow hini credit for one-half of the amount so paid against the estate of the deceased. Bates vs. Hamilton, 144 Mo., i. 220 Digest of the Revenue La-ws. 3. It being tlie duty of the osvner of the life tenant in this case solely to pay taxes on the land, there is no forfeiture of the title by the reversioner, because he has not paid taxes. Howell vs. Jump, 140 Mo., 442. LIMITATIONS. (General Statute.) 1. The general statute of limitations has no application to the demand of the State for delinquent taxes. State ex rel. Ellison vs. Piland, 81 Mo., 519. 2. One taking possession of land under a certificate of pur- chase issued under the revenue laws of 1872, before the receipt of a deed, became a tresspasser. The statute of limitations would run in his favor from the date of his entry. Parsons vs. Viets, 96 Mo., 408. 3. A void tax deed may constitute color of title under the general statute of limitations. Bartlett vs. Kauder, 97 Mo., 356. 4. Statutes of limitations do not apply to actions brought by the State unless clearly so provided by law. The short limitation found in the Administration Act does not apply to actions brought by the State for the collection of taxes. Nor does the general limitation law of 1879 apply in such case. State ex rel. vs. Tittnian, 119 Mo., 661. 5. The mere paj^ment of taxes on a vacant lot will not create title by adverse possession. Cashman vs. Cashman's Heirs, 123 Mo., 647. 6. The right to recover taxes paid by the holder of a deed, being incident to his failure to recover in ejectment, is not barred if the action is brought in the alternative and within ten years from the date of the deed. Zimmerman vs. Ry. Co., 156 Mo., 561. Digest of the Reveiwe Laivs. 221 7. Suit for taxes may be brouglit at any time -n^itliin five years after the tax becomes delinquent. State ex rel. vs. Fullerton, 143 Mo., 682. State ex rel. vs. Edwards, 136 Mo., 360. 8. The five years statute of limitation runs against a special tax-bill. Connoyer vs. La BeamneJs Heirs, 45 Mo., 139. 9. The two years limitations contained in the statute re- lating to the treasury department ("Wag. Stat. 1326, section 24), did not bar an action against the State Auditor to compel the payment of that portion of the reveniie set aside annually for the purpose of the State university. State ex rel. vs. State Auditor, 60 Mo., 596. 10. The general statute of limitation does not run against a demand of the State for State taxes. Rosenblatt vs. Heman, 70 Mo., 441. City of Jefferson vs. Whipple, 71 Mo., 519. 11. An action on a special tax-bill issued by the City of St. Louis on account of a street improvement is barred by the five years statute of limitations. (Gen. Stat. 1865, chapter 191, section 10.) City of St. Louis vs. Newman, 45 Mo., 138. 12. In an ordinary suit between a city and an individual against whom taxes are assessed, the plea of the statute is a good defense. City of Jefferson vs. Whipple, 71 Mo., 519. SPECIAL STATUTE. (Wag. Stat. Sec. 221, p. 1207.) 1. The special three years statute of limitations begins to run in favor of a legal tax deed from the time it is recorded. Skinner vs. WilHams, 85 Mo., 489. 2. It did not run in favor of a void deed. Mason, et al vs. Crowder, 85 Mo., 526. Hopkins vs. Scott, 86 Mo., 140. 3. This is true even where the purchaser takes and holds possession under the deed. Callahan vs. Davis, 90 Mo., 78. 222 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 4. A ta:^ deed void on its face will not set the special stat- ute of limitations in motion. Laws of 1872, W. S., p. 1 198, Sec. 190. Duff vs. Neilson, 90 Mo., 93. Kinney vs. Forsythe, 96 Mo., 414. 5. Section 221, 2 W. S. 1872, p. 1267, was repealed by the revision of 1879. Blodgett vs. Schaffer, 94 Mo., 652. 6. Said statute is of no avail to one claiming under an un^ recorded tax deed. Blodg-ett vs. Schaffer, 94 Mo., 652. 7. Section 221, p. 1207, W. S., has no application to a tax deed made under the revenue Act of 1877. Bartlett vs. Kauder, 97 Mo., 356. 8. Where the tax sale and proceedings are regular and the deed has been of record for three years, the special statute of limitations is a complete bar to the right of the owner to re- cover the land. Allen vs. White, 98 Mo., 55. 9. The limitation contained in section 221, Acts of 1872, did not run in favor of a void tax deed. Pitkin vs. Reibel, 104 Mo., 505. 10. . A tax deed valid on its face puts the special statute of limitations in operation from the time of its being recorded. 11. Where the statute was repealed before the three years had run, the title by limitation could not be acquired under it. Bird vs. Sellers, 113 Mo., 580. 12. It did not apply to actions brought by the State for the collection of taxes. State ex rel. vs.' Tittman, 119 Mo., 661. 13. Under the Laws of 1872 the statute of limitations be- gins to run against an action on a tax deed from its date. Taft vs. McCullock, 135 Mo., 588. Under the Act of 1895, concerning delinquent personal taxes, tax suits were not barred but could be brought under that act at any time before January 1, 1896, State ex rel. vs. Edwards, 162 Mo., 660. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 223> OFFICERS. 1. The right of a public officer cannot be created by con- tract, it can only exist as a creation of law. In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the salary of public officers may be increased or diminished during their term of office. The manner of payment may be changed, or the basis en- larged, without the impairment of any vested right. Givens vs. Daviess County, 107 Mo., 603. 2. The penalty provided by the criminal law, for the misap- propriation of county funds, is not a substitute for any civil remedy. Knox County vs. Hunolt, no Mo., 6"/. 3. In order to justify taking any steps ia the collection of taxes, the officer must act under some statute. The uniform doctrine is, that statutes creating a tax, or pro- viding for their assessment, must be strictly construed. State ex rel. vs. St. Louis County Court, 13 App., 53. 4. An officer intrusted with public funds and his sureties are prima facie liable for balances for which his official books show him indebted. Pundmann vs. Schoenich, 144 Mo., 149. PARTIES TO TAX SUITS. 1. Suits for taxes should be brought against the record owner. Vance vs. Corrigan, 78 Mo., 94. State ex rel. vs. Sack, 79 Mo., 661. Cowell vs. Gray, 85 Mo., 169. Mining Company vs. Zeitinger, 45 App., 114. St. Joseph vs. Baker, 86 App., 310. Payne vs. Lett, 90 Mo., 676. Evans vs. Robberson, 92 Mo., 192. Troyer vs. Wood, 96 Mo., 478. Allen vs. Ray, 96 Mo., 542. Hilton vs. Smith, 134 Mo., 498. Crane vs. Dameron, 98 Mo., 567. 224 Digest of the Revenue Lazus. 2. The law requires the owner of land to be made a party to an action to recover taxes due thereon. The owner, in the absence of notice to the contrary, is the person who so appears by the county records. Nolan vs. Taylor, 131 Mo., 224. 3. The owner of land in contemplation of the statute, is the actual owner if known; if unknown, the owner is the apparent owner as shown by the records of land title. In the absence of notice that any person is in fact the owner, tax suits should be brought against the person who appears from the record of deeds to be the owner. Hunt vs. Sack, 79 Mo., 661. Simonsen vs. Dolon, 114 Mo., 176. Payne vs. Lott, 90 Mo., 676. 4. The owner of land is a necessary party in a suit to en- force the State's lien for taxes, even though the action be one in rem. Tooker vs. Leake, 146 Mo., 419. 5. Eeference must be had to the deed records and not to the records in the collector's office to ascertain who is the record owner. Eeference may be had both to the certified plats of the United States land office on file in the office of the county clerk, and also to the deed records. Payne vs. Lott, 90 Mo., 676. Watt vs. Donnell, 80 Mo., 195. 6 The law of 1877 requires that tax suits must be brought against the owner of the property, and the collector in bringing the suit, and the purchaser at a tax sale must take notice of the record of deeds. A purchaser at a tax sale, where the record owner is not made a party, gets only the interest of the de- fendants in the suit. Vance vs. Corrigan, 78 Mo., 94. State ex rel. vs. Sack, 79 Mo., 661. Cowell vs. Gray, 85 Mo., 169. Evans vs. Robberson, 92 Mo., 192. Payne vs. Lott, 90 Mo., 676. Allen vs. Ray, 96 Mo., 542. Digest of the Reventte Laws. 225 7. Suits for railroad taxes, Tinder the Act of 1871, are properly brought in the name of the county. Livingston County vs. Railroad, 6o Mo., 516. 8. The sheriff of the city of St. Louis was the proper person to bring an action for the collection of taxes under the law as it existed in 1876. Webster vs. Smith, 13 App., 323. 9. It is not necessary to make persons defendants who have acquired interest in the land subsequent to the assessment. State ex rel. vs. Miller, 16 App., 539. 10. If the remainder men are not made parties, this will not make the judgment void. Hogan vs. Smith, 11 App., 314. 11. In a suit to enjoin the collector from collecting taxes levied to pay interest on alleged illegal bonds issued to a rail- road company, the county court that issued the bonds and levied the tax, and the railroad company, should be made parties thereto. State ex rel. vs. Sanderson, 54 Mo., 203. 12. The trustee in a deed of trust need not be made a party to a suit for the enforcement of the collection of taxes. Keating vs. Craig, 73 Mo., 507. 13. Since the passage of the revenue law of 1872, the city of Hannibal has no right to enforce the lien for taxes in her own name. Tlie lien must be enforced by suit in the name of the State. State ex rel. vs. Van Every, 75 Mo., 530. 14. In a suit to enforce a lien for taxes, the holder of an inferior encumbrance should be made a party. Stafford vs. Fizer, 82 Mo., 393. 15. The cestui que trust, in a trust deed of record, should be made a party. Cowell vs. Gray, 85 Mo., 169. n— 15 226 Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 16. One who has obtained title to land by holding adverse possession thereto, against the record owner, should be made defendant. If not, his title will not be affected. Watt vs. Donnell, 80 Mo., 195. 17. A wife's interest and her separate real estate is not affected by a tax suit against her husband. Gitchell vs. Messmer, 87 Mo., 131. 18. Under the charter of the Citj- of Kansas, a proceeding to enforce a lieu for taxes due on land, should be brought against all persons having an interest in the land at the commencement of the suit. City of Kansas City vs. Railroad, 77 Mo., 180. 19. All officers upon whom the law imposes a duty in re- gard to the collection of revenue, may well be made parties defendant in a suit brought to enjoin illegal proceedings for the collection of taxes. Railroad vs. Anthony, 73 Mo., 432. 20.^ The assignee of a note, secured by deed of trust on real estate, is a necessary party to a suit to enforce the tax lien. Bank vs. Grewe, 84 Mo., 478. 21. Where the proceedings are brought against a dead man, the judgment is void. Williams vs. Hudson, 93 Mo., 524. 22. A suit for taxes against the "unknown heirs" of a deceased person will not divest the life estate of the widow. Berlien vs. Bieler, 96 Mo., 491. 23. Suits for delinquent taxes, under the law of 1872, in cities containing less than five thousand inhabitants, must be brought in the name of the State to the use of the county col- lector. State to use vs. Robyn, 93 Mo., 395. 24. Under the law as it existed in 1879, the city collector, in cities of over five tliousand inhabitants, was the proper per- son to bring a suit in the name of the State for back taxes. State ex rel. vs. Hamilton, 94 Mo., 544. Digest of the Revenue Lazus. 227 25. Collectors were with out authority, by the Act of 1872, to institute suits for taxes against railroads, after the expir^ tion of their term of office. They were authorized to continue the prosecution of suits begun by them. Gordon vs. Lafayette County, 74 AIo., 426. 26. Where a widow was not made a party to a tax suit, the sale of the land does not bar her right to dower. Blevins vs. Smith, 104 Mc. 583. 27. An heir who was not made a party to a tax proceed- ing to sell his decedents lands, may recover his aliquoit part thereof in a suit brought to recover the whole tract. AV'alcott vs. Hand, 122 ?ilo., 621. 28. The State is the real party interested in a tax suit and it is not necessary, when a collector retires from office, to make his successor a party. The suit may be continued in the style commenced. State ex rel. vs. Sanford, 127 Mo., 368. 29. A mistake in the letter of a name, where the correct parties are before the court, does not affect the validity of the proceedings. State ex rel. vs. Burr, 143 Mo., 209. 30. Where a petition was against the "unknown heirs," and the title was in fact in certain devisees, a sale under sucli a proceeding does not affect the interest of such devisees. Hartman vs. Hornsby, 142 j\Io., 368. 31. The purchaser at a tax sale can obtain no interest in the property sold, except the right, title and interest of such parties as are made defendants. Moore vs. Woodruff, 146 Mo., 597. 32. The remedy provided by the laws of 1897, page 219, for the collection of taxes due the city of St. Louis, does not impair the right of the collector to maintain an action therefor in the name of the State. State ex rel. vs. Cummings, 151 Mo., 49. 33. Suits for delinquent city taxes, accruing during the years 1891, 1892 and 1893, should be brought in the name of 228 Digest of the Revenue Laws. the city at the relation of the city collector; and not in the name of the State, at the relation of the county collector. City of Aurora vs. Lindsay, 146 Mo., 509. 34. A mere squatter and his grantees, even though their deeds are of record, if not in possession at the time the suit is brought, are not record owners within the meaning of the revenue laws. Railroad vs. View, 156 Mo., 608. 35. If a curator fails to pay the taxes due on his ward's estate, action may be brought against the curator and a per- sonal judgment rendered against him. State ex rel. vs. Burr, 143 Mo., 209. 36. State and county taxes can be sued for, only in the name of the State, at the relation of and to the use of the collec- tor of the county. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 169 Mo., 563. PAYMENT. 1. Although a tax may be illegal, yet if it is voluntarily paid it cannot be recovered back. Christy vs. City of St. Louis, 20 Mo., 143. Ruby vs. Shain, 54 Mo., 207. County of Lewis vs. Tate, 10 Mo., 650. Walker vs. City of St. Louis, 15 Mo., 563. State ex rel. vs. Powell, 44 Mo., 436. Robins vs. Latham, 134 Mo., 466. 2. One claiming to be the owner of land cannot recover taxes paid thereon by mistake. It would be otherwise where the mistake is made by the collector in the numbers of the land. Mathews vs. City of Kansas, 80 Mo., 231. 3. Under the revenue laws of 1872 the grantee in a void tax deed might recover taxes and purchase money paid by him. Pitkin vs. Reibel, 104 Mo., 505. 4. An illegal city tax, voluntarily paid under a mistake of law cannot be recovered. Couch vs. Kansas City, 127 Mo., 436. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 229 5. Bonds were issued without authority of law and taxes levied to pay the interest on them. One who paid the taxes to meet the interest on such illegal bonds cannot afterwards maintain an action against the collector for the recovery of the money so paid. Rubey vs. Shain, 54 Mo., 207. Ranney vs. Bader, 67 Mo., 476. 6. Although the county court has not proceeded regularly in levying taxes against a railroad, yet when such taxes are voluntarily paid under such circumstances, they cannot be re- covered back. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 165 Mo., 597. 7. "Where the acts of a city attempting to extend the boundaries thereof are void and taxes are voluntarily paid to the city by the owners of the property taken into its limits by such void extension, such taxes are paid under a mistake of law and cannot be recovered back. Couch vs. Kansas City, 127 Mo., 436. 8. Under the law of 1865, delinquent tax-bills on person- ality did not bear interest and where a party made vain ap- plication for the abatement of interest and only paid it under threat of levy by the collector, he has his action to recover the in- terest so obtained. Maguire vs. Savings Association, 62 Mo., 344. 9. An ordinance of the city of St. Louis provided that in case consumers refused to pay the prescribed rate for water, the water should be turned off. Where plaintiff pays the water rate under such circumstances, it is compulsory, and if the rate charged is excessive, the excess may be recovered from the city. Brewing Association vs. St. Louis, 140 Mo., 419. Button vs. St. Louis, yy Mo., 47. 10. Where the officers of a city exact an unauthorized and illegal license tax under threat of immediate arrest in case of refusal, and they are clothed with the power to carry their threat into execution at once, a payment of tax made to avoid 230 Digest of the Rei'enne Laws. sucli consequences is not voluntary and the money may be re- covered back. Maguire vs. Savings Association, 62 Mo., 344. Claflin vs. McDonough, 33 Mo., 415. Button vs. St. Louis, yy Mo., 47. Wolfe vs. Marshall, 52 Mo., 167. Douglas vs. Kansas City, 147 Mo., 428. 11. Wbere a tax collector sold lands for taxes under tlae law of 1872 and relied upon a tax-book which had not been authenticated by the seal of the county court, his sales were in- valid and the purchaser at such sale who pays taxes charged up- on a like unauthenticated tax-book, cannot recover them from the successful claimant of the property. Burke vs. Brown, 148 Mo., 309. 12. County warrants legally issued in 1893, 1894 and 1895, are receivable for county taxes levied in 1896, and warrants lawfully issued in 1889, should be received in payment of county taxes for 1891. R. S., 1889, Sees. 3205, 7605. Logan vs. Barton Co., 63 Mo., 336. Reynolds vs. Norman, 114 Mo., 509. Wilson vs. Knox Coiinty, 132 Mo., 387. f Overruled. See cases nejct below.) 13. County warrants issued to meet county expenses for one year, cannot be received by the collector in payment of taxes for any other year. Book vs. Earl, 87 Mo., 246. Andrew County ex rel vs. Schell, 135 Mo., 31. State ex rel. vs. Payne, 151 Mo., 663. Railroad vs. Thornton, 152 Mo., 570. PETITION. 1. The misnomer of a defendant in the petition and tax- bill, who has been personally served with summons, after a trial to the merits, is cured by the statute of jeofails. State ex rel. vs. Burr, 143 Mo., 209. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 231 2. Unless the allegations of tlie jDetition as to unknown heirs is verified nncler oath, the judgment and all subsequent proceedings will be void. ]^Iyers vs. ^McRay, ii-! ^To., 377. 3. It is the petition and not the tax-bill which must state the cause of action. Yanghan vs. Daniels, 98 A[o., 230. State ex rel. vs. Ran, 93 AIo., 126. 4. If, from the description in the petition, tax-bill and other evidence the land can be identified with reasonable cer- tainty, the tax judgTnent will be affirmed. State ex rel. vs. Cowgill, 81 ;\Io., 381. 5. The petition should describe the land sought to be cliarged with a tax lien. Milner vs. Shiple}-, 94 ^lo., 106. Vaughan vs. Daniels, 98 ]\To., 230. City of Jefiferson vs. Whipple, 71 Mo., 519. 6. No pleading or statement other than the tax-bill is required in a proceeding by the collector in the probate court against the estate of a decedent for the collection of back taxes. State ex rel. vs. Seaborn, 139 Mo., 582. 7. A petition in an action against a railroad for delinquent taxes, B. S. 1879, section 68S9, need not describe the property otherwise than as so many miles of a given value. State ex rel. Trammel vs. The Han. & St. J. Ry. Co., loi Mo., 136. 8. The petition in tax suit should expressly allege that the land has been returned delinquent or has been forfeited to the State; but where it may be gathered from the allegations of the petition that such is the fact, the petition will be good after verdict. Wellshear vs. Kelley, 69 INIo., 343. 9. A defective petition in a tax suit containing an imper- fect statement of a good cause of action is good after verdict, where no specific demurrer was filed. State ex rel. vs. Renshaw, 166 Mo., 682. 232 Digest of the Revenue Law:. 10. A petition to establish a demand against the estate of a decedent for taxes ought to set out the taxes for each year in separate counts. State ex rel. vs. Titmann, 103 Mo., 554. 11. A petition which avers the assessment of personal prop- erty to a special amount; the levy of specific taxes thereon by the constituted authorities; the effort of a collector to collect the taxes; his failure to do so, the return of such taxes as delinquent; the necessity for the suit for taxes, and incidental penalties, costs and attorneys fees, is sufficient. State ex rel. vs. Cummings, 151 Mo., 49. 12. In a suit against an administrator by a widow for money paid by her for taxes on the estate during the administration to prevent the sale thereof, the general allegation in her peti- tion that the taxes were duly levied is sufficient. She need not point out all the details of the revenue law or assert a com- pliance with them. State to use vs. White, 61 Mo., 441. 13. Under the statutes of 1889, in actions for taxes by cities of the second class, all that is necessary to aver with respect to the taxes is the amount thereof, the rate of interest and date from which it is claimed, the property upon which it is charged, the name of the owner thereof and the year or years for which the same was levied. If a special tax, the date and title of the ordinance under which it was levied and that such tax has not been paid, should be alleged. Such petition need not allege that a sale had been discontinued or the realty had been bid off by the city, or that the taxes became delinquent before the pass- age of the Act of May 15, 1877. City of St. Joseph vs. Railroad, 118 Mo., 671. 14. A petition to restrain the collection of taxes, on the ground of excessive valuation, failing to allege that the assessor failed to demand a list is defective. Meyer vs. Rosenblatt, 78 Mo., 495. 15. A petition against a city collector for wrongfully levy- ing on plaintiff's projierty to satisfy a tax, which attacks the Digest of the Revenue Laws. 233 form and manner of making the assessment, but sets out no fact showTUg that the assessment was void, is bad on demurrer. City of Jefferson vs. Opel, 49 Mo., 190. 16. Although it may appear from the petition that the Board of Equalization assessed the actual value of railroad prop- erty in a county, instead of a share in the aggregate value, pro- portioned to the number of miles of road, yet, if from the general tenor of the petition, it appears that the sum assessed was as- certained as the ]aw prescribed, the pleading will be sufficient. Washington County vs. Railroad, 58 Mo., 372. 17. The general averment that a sale of the smallest sub- division of land would have yielded enough to have paid the judgment and costs, in a suit to set aside a tax sale is suffi- cient, where it further appears that the entire tract of land was sold for more than seven times the debt. Yeaman vs. Lepp, 167 Mo., 61. PERSONAL PROPERTY-SITUS. 1. The necessary land for side tracks in use by a railroad company in unloading and moving cars is assessable by the State Board of Equalization and not by the local assessor. Lands not so owned and used are subject to an assessment by the local authorities. State ex rel. vs. Railroad Co., 135 Mo., 618. 2. Where defendant manufacturing company resided in and was assessed by Montgomery county for taxes in November 1S93, but removed to St. Louis of that year where it paid a manufacturer's license for 1894, it was nevertheless properly taxed in Montgomery for the last named year. State ex rel. vs. Tobacco Co., 140 Mo., 218. 3. The cars of foreign corporations, though carried in transit through the State of Missouri, can be subject to a prop- erty tax on such cars only in the State of its domicile, where said cars attach to its business as an incident thereto. 234 Digest of the Revenue Laws. Cars in the State of Missouri only in transit have no situs in the State. Cars so used are instruments of interstate commerce and cannot be taxed in this State. State ex rcl vs. Stephens, 146 Mo., 662. 4. All personal property without regard to where the «anie may be is assessable and taxable in the county where the owner resides. If the property belongs to minors, their and their curator's removal from the county will prevent the further taxation ol their property therein. State ex rel vs. McCausland, 154 Mo., 185. 5. The residence of its owner on the first day of June, 1882, fixes the status of money for the purposes of assessment. His subsequent remoA'^al to another county and the invest- ment of the money in merchandise and the payment of a license tax will not prevent the collection of a tax by the former county. De Annan vs. Williams, 93 Mo., 158. 6. The residence of the owner of shares of stock in a busi- ness corporation fixes the situs of such property for the pur- poses of taxation. Ogden- vs. City o,f St. Joseph, 90 Mo., 522. 7. Under the law of 1879 bonds kept in New York in good faith by a citizen of this State are not taxable here. Valle vs. Ziegler, 84 Mo., 214. 8. The business capital of a private bank is taxable where the business is carried on. Such capital does not follow the situs of the owner. State ex rel. Davis vs. Rogers, 79 Mo., 283. 9. The personalty of a deceased person is taxable in the domicile in which he resided at the time of his death and not at the domicile of the personal representatives. For many purposes movables are deemed in law to have no situs except that of the domicile of the owner. Stephens, Adnir. vs. Mayor of Boonville, 34 Mo., 323- Digest of the Rcz'cmie Likm. 235 10. Personal property of a resident of this State which is situated beyond its limits cannot be taxed here. Cit_\ of St. Louis vs. Wiggins Ferry Co., 40 Mo., 581. 11. Taxation of personal property does not necessarily fol- low the domicile of the owner; bi;t depends upon the situs of the property, 12. AVhere a corporation is created under the laws of an- other state, but has an office and does business within this State and has property here, it is a resident of this State within the meaning of the revenue law. City of St. LoLiis vs. Wiggins Ferry Co., 40 Mo., 531. 13. The actual situs of personal property and not the dom- icle of its owner determines what sovereignty shall exercise the taxing power. Personal property in the hands of an administrator in this State, belonging to a person who lived and died in another state is taxable here. State of ]\Iissouri ex rel. Taylor & Lee vs. St. Louis County Court, 47 Mo., 594. 14. Personal property which is capable of having an- ac- tual situs, is taxable in the county where it is situated. Other personal property having no situs is taxable in the county where the owner resides. The rolling-stock of a railroad company which is in a county in transit or temporary, is not taxable in such county, but is to be assessed and taxed in the county which is the legal residence of the corporation. Railroad Co. vs. Cass Co., 53 Mo., 17. 15. Persona] property of non-residents, if found situated within this State, is taxable here, regardless of in whose hands it happens to be. St. Louis vs. Ferrv Co., 40 Afo., 581. 16. Municipal bonds belonging to a person who has his domicile in this State, when sent into another state for safe keeping and not for the purpose of avoiding taxation, are not taxable here. State ex rel. vs. Howard Co. Court, 69 Mo., 454. 236 Digest of the Revenue Laivs. 17. Where the evidence shows the residence of the owner of notes secured by mortgage to be in the town where the notes were left with a bank for collection on the first day of June of the year assessment was made, the situs of the property is sufficiently established for the purpose of taxation in that county. Where there is evidence to support the finding of the jury that the owner of property was a resident of this State at the time the property was assessed, the finding of the jury on that point will not be reviewed or disturbed. State ex rel. vs. Renshaw, i66 Mo., 682. 18. Steamboats are subject to taxation at their home port, and where their nominal owners reside. St. Joseph vs. Saville, 39 Mo., 461. 19. Cars belonging to a foreign corporation, but leased and operated by railroads in this State, are taxable as a property of such corporation and should be taxed in the county in which such corporation has its chief place of business. State of Missouri ex rel. vs. St. Louis Co. Cctu-t, 13 App., 53. 20. Personal property of non-residents, if situate within this State, is taxable here regardless of in whose hands it hap- pens to be. Curtis vs. Ward, Adm'r., 58 Mo., 295. 21. A railroad company in this State cannot be taxed under the Act of 1871 upon the cars of the Pullman Palace Car Com- pany, leased and operated by said railroad. State ex rel. vs. St. Louis County, 84 Mo., 234. 22. The rolling stock of a railroad should, as a general rule, be taxed where the corporation has its residence. But it was legal for the Legislature to pass a law by which such property should be distributed in the counties, cities and towns through which the road passes, in proportion to the length of the road in such localities. * State ex rel. vs. Severance, 55 Mo., 378. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 237 23. Property purchased by a railroad company for future yard purposes, but used by a lessee for manufacturing purposes, is assessable as local property. State ex rel. vs. Railway Company, 117 Mo., i. 24. Such yards and other real property necessarily appur- tenant to a railroad, effected as a means of traffic, are not sub- ject to taxation by local authorities. It is to be assessed by the State Board of Equalization. State ex rel. vs. Railroad Company, 162 Mo., 391. PUBLICATION-SERVICE BY. 1. A strict compliance with the statutory requirements as to constructive service is necessarj^ Myers vs. McRay. 114 Mo., 377. Charles vs. Morrow, 99 Mo., 638. Harness vs. Cravens, 126 Mo., 233. State ex rel. vs. White, 75 Apj)., 257. 2. Where the statute provides the mode for proving the due publication of notice of a tax sale, such mode is exclusive and cannot be supplied by other e^ddence. Comfort vs. Ballingal, 134 Mo., 281. 3. It is sufficient to designate the owner in the order of publication by the name disclosed by the record. Elting vs. Gould, 96 Mo., 535. 4. if there is any conflict between recitals in the judgment, as to the terms of the order of publication and the order itself, then the latter recitals must control. Milner vs. Shipley, 94 Mo., 106. Crow vs. Meyer.sieck, 88 Mo., 411. Adams vs. Cowels, 95 Mo., 501. Stewart vs. Allison, 150 Mo., 343. 5. Notice by publication in a tax suit is sufficient where it names the defendants so as to clearly indicate their identity. Cruzen vs. Stephens, 123 Ale, 337. 238 Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 6. The order of publication, when regularly made, cannot be collaterally attacked, as against an innocent purchaser at a tax sale. Schmidt vs. Niemeyer, loo Mo., 207. 7. In a tax suit against unknown parties, the fact authoriz- ing notice by publication must be veritied. It is not sufficient to merey allege non-residence. An unverified allegation is sufficient as to named defendants. Rohrer vs. Oder, 124 Mo., 24. State ex rel. vs. Staley, 76 Mo., 158. 8. The order of publication is as much a part of the record proper as the judgm.eut itself. Unless both the order and notice of publication describe the land, the judgment is void. Stewart vs. Allison, 150 Mo., 343. 9. It is not necessary that the order of publication in a back tax suit should contain a description of the land. Goldsworthy vs. Johnson, 87 Mo., 233. Allen vs. Ray, 96 Mo., 542. (Overruled. See cases next below.) 10. In all suits for delinquent taxes, the purpose of whicb is to enforce the State's lien against the land, and the service is by publication, the land must be described in the order of publication; otherwise the judgment is void. Winningham vs. Triieblood, 149 Mo., 572. Stewart vs. Allison, 150 Mo., 343. Lumber Company vs. Lasley, 88 App., 370. 11. The allegation of the non-residence of named defend- ants in an unverified petition, is sufficient to support an order of publication, as to them. Eking vs. Gould, 96 Mo., 535. Payne vs. Lott, 90 Mo., 676. 12. The fact that the order of publication omitted one of the years for which taxes are due, will not effect the judgment in a collateral proceeding. Williams vs. Hudson, 93 Mo., 524. 13. Where the court found from the sheriff's return that the defendant was a non-resident and made an order of publi- Digest of the Rez'enue Lazvs. 239 cation tliereon, if it afterwards appear that t)ie defendant was in fact a resident of the State, the judgment will be set aside upon a writ of error, prosecuted for that purpose. State e.x rel. vs. White, 75 App., 261. 14. The collector's affidavit for order of publication may be upon information and belief. It need not state that sei'vice could not be had by ordinary summons. Coombs vs. Crabtree, 105 ^Mo., 292. 15. Section 17, chapter 164, Gr. S. 1865, (and not section 5, chapter 175, Gr. S. 1865, amended laws of 1887, page 344), is applicable to publication in newspapers, of the orders of pub- lication of notice to non-residents. Coombs vs. Crabtree, 105 Mo., 292. 16. The interest of the defendants and how derived must be set out in the petition and order of publication. State ex rel. vs. Staler, 76 ]\Io., 158. 17. When the plaintiff alleges in his petition, or files an affidavit alleging the non-residence of defendant, an order of publication must be made even though defendant be a resi- dent. When such steps are taken, there is no discretion in the judge or clerk to refuse the order. la the absence of sucli allegation or affidavit and upon a return upon a regular summons of "not found," the court has jurisdiction to investigate whether defendant can be found and to make an order of publication if it be of opinion that he can- not, but it has no jurisdiction upon such retui-n to examine into the question of non-residence. The sheriff's return of "not found" is the basis for the order of publication under section 2024. E. S. 1889. Tooker vs. Leake, 146 Mo., 419. 18. Where a petition in a suit for back taxes is signed by the collector, and he makes affidavit at the end thereof, "that he has good reason to believe, and does believe, that the de- 240 Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. fendant is a non-resident of the State," this answers the re- quirement of the statute. Allen vs. Ray, 96 Mo., 543. 19. An order of jjublication to Miller, is a nullity as to one whose name is Millen. Chamberlain vs. Blodgett, 96 Mc, 482. 20. Publication against Daniel Tragar, is a nullity against Daniel Troyer, and those claiming under him. This is true, even though in recording Troyer 's deed the name was mistakenly recorded Trager. Troyer vs. Wood, 96 Mo., 478. Chamberlain vs. Blodgett, 96, Mo., 482. 21. Service by publication on Q. E. Noland is void as to Quinces E. Noland. Skelton vs. Sackett, 91 Mo., 377. 22. Publication to Etta E. Fisher and Fisher, her husband, is valid, as against collateral attack. Cruzen vs. Stephens, 123 Mo., 337. 23. It is sufficient in an order of publication to designate Eichard 0. Elting as E. 0. Elting. Elting vs. Gould, 96 Mo., 365. 24. Publication to C. T. Clements is sufficient where the land is recorded in the name of Charles T. Clements. Mosley vs. Reily, 126 Mo., 124. 25. Publication to H. Ij. Downs is not sufficient where the owner's name is Hudson L. Downs. Riffle vs. Lumber Company, 93 App., 41. 26. Publcation addressed to Henry Wheler is a nullity as to Henry Whelen. Whelen vs. Weaver, 93 Mo., 430. 27. Publication, against Owen Corrigan is- a nullity as to John Owen Corrigan. Corrigan vs. Schmidt, 126 Mo., 304. Digest of the Revenue Lazes. 241 28. Publication to PJlisha Corrigan is a nullity as to Eliza- beth Alicia Corrigan. Corrigan vs. Schmidt, 126 Mo., 304. 29. Publication to Vaughn Turner is a nullity as to Single- ton Vaughn Turner, and the judgment rendered thereunder is subject to collateral attack. Turner vs. Gregory, 151 Mo., 100. PURCHASER AT TAX SALES. 1. A purchaser at a tax sale acquires the interest of the defendant in the tax suit. Graves vs. Ewart, 99 Mo., 13. L. & L. Co. vs. Tie Co., 87 App., 167. Powell vs. Greenstreet, 95 Mo., 13. Jasper County vs. Wadlow, 82 Mo., 172. 2. If the defendant had only an equity, the purchaser at a tax sale acquires that only. Jasper County vs. Wadlow, 82 Mo., 172. 3. The liolder of a junior lien who was not made a party to the suit to enforce the State's lien for taxes may redeem from the purchaser imder the tax sale. ' .Stafford vs. Fizer, 82 Mo., 393. 4. A purchaser of lands at a tax sale who discourages bid- ding by representing that he is buying in the land for the owner, becomes a ti'ustee for such owner or the sale may be set aside. Merett vs. Poulter, 96 Mo., 237. 5. A county collector has the right to purchase at a sale of lands for taxes under an execution issued to a sheriff. Walcott vs. Hand, 122. Mo., 621. 6. The purchaser acquires a title superior to that of a pur- chaser at a trustee's sale. Allen vs. McCabe, 93 Mo., 138. D— 16 242 Digest of the Revenue Laivs. 7. One wJio is under no obligation to pay taxes on real estate niaj^ purchase the same at its sale for taxes. Atkison vs. Dixon, 89 Mo., 464. 8. The rights of a purchaser at a tax sale cannot be superior to those of the State. If the State had no valid charge on the land, the party who purchases at such a sale only becomes sub- rogated to the State's claim. Where, therefore, lands were sold for taxes by a collector upon tax-books which have not been authenticated by the seal of the court, the proceeding was with- out authority of law, and a purchaser at such sale who p:iys taxes charged upon a like un authenticated book, cannot recover them from the successful claimant. Burke vs. Brown, 148 Mo., 309. 9. The purchaser of land at a tax sale, or one holding under him who has made valuable improvements on the land under the belief that his title is good, will be allowed compensation for his improvements in an action against him to redeem. Burk vs. Green, loi Mo., 625. 10. Where a tax deed is held invalid because not executed substantially as provided for in the statute, the grantee therein may recover his purchase money, interest, penalties and costs. Bingham vs. Birmingham, 103 Mo., 345. 11. Under the reveniie law of 1872, the title to land pur- chased at a tax sale does not vest in the purchaser until the delivery of the tax deed. Hilton vs. Smith, 134 Mo., 499. 12. A purchaser at an invalid tax sale who subsequently pays taxes on the land cannot in the absence of statutory pro- vision—and there has been none in this State since 1877— re- cover from the owner of the land the amount paid for the land at the sale, or the amount of the tax subsequently paid. Carter vs. Phillips, 49 App., 319. 13. A purchaser at a subsequent tax sale does not become liable for money paid by a former purchaser under an older assessment. Smith vs. Laumeier, 12 App., 546. Smith vs. Laumeier, 84 Mo., 672. Digest of the Revenue L.azvs. 243 14. AltliongU a copy of the assessor's book furnished to the collector by the clerk of the coimty court was not anthenti- catecl by the seal of the court, this does not defeat the right of a purchaser at a tax sale to recover the sum paid from the OAvner together with interest and penalties. Taft vs.. ?iTcCullock, 135 Mo., 588. 15. A puchaser at a tax sale who fails in his ejectment suit is entitled to recover the purchase price at the sale and the taxes afterwards paid by him, even though his tax deed is void. Gregg vs. Jesburg. 113 Mo., 34. 16. Where the holder of a tax deed is defeated, the success- ful claimant should pay him taxes, interest, costs and redemp- tion money. The amount necessary to redeem the land should be included is his judgment. Second Wagoner Statute, page 1202, Allen vs. Buck- ley, 94 Mo., 158. White vs. Shell, 84 Mo., 569. 17. The title does not pass to the purchaser at a tax sale until the execution of a deed to him. But a sheriff's deed re- lates back to the sale as to the defendant in the execution, and his privies and strangers with notice. Porter vs. Mariner, 50 Mo., 364. Leach vs. Koenig, 55 Mo., 451. Ford vs. French, 72 Mo., 250. Lewis vs. Curry, 74 Mo., 49. Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. Fleckenstein vs. Baxter, 114 Mo., 493. 18. No purchaser at a tax sale can obtain an interest in the land sold that the defendant in the tax suit never held or owned. He can acquire only the right, title and interest of such parties as are made defendants therein. Moore vs. Woodruff, 146 Mo., 597. 19. In an action to vacate a judgment for taxes, the pur- chaser of a part of land sold under the judgment was made a party defendant. The cou.rt found that sticli purchaser bought the land in good faith without notice of any of the facts alleged. 244 Digest of the Revenue Laws. and held that such, purchaser could not complain of the action of the trial court in setting aside the .-judgment for taxes. Bagley vs. Furnace Co., 120 Mo., 248. 20. A purchaser at a sheriff's sale looks to the judgment, execution, levy and sheriff's deed. All other questions are be- tween the parties to tlie judgment and the sheriff. Lenox vs. Clarke, 52 Mo., 115. Hewitt vs. Weatherby, 57 Mo., 276. Childers vs. Schantz, 120 Mo., 305. State ex rel. vs. Sargent, 12 App., 228. 21. The rights of a purchaser at a tax sale are determined by the law in existence at that time. State ex rel. vs. Mantz, 62 Mo., 258. 22. Where a deed has been duly recorded, subsequent pur- chasers are bound to take notice of it, even though the deed record be destroyed and the tax suit be brought against the ap- parent record owner. Crane vs. Dameron, 98 Mo., 567. 23. The purchaser at a tax sale, under the Eevenue Act of 1872, if defeated in an action for the recovery of the land may nevertheless recover his purchase money with taxes afterwards paid, penalties, interest and costs. Pitkin vs. Miller, 106 Mo., 577. Pitkin vs. Shacklett, 106 Mo., 571. 24. An owner of land sold for taxes, who with full knowl- edge of all the facts accepts a part of the process of the sale, recognizes and ratifies its validity will not be heard to ques- tion it. Clyburn vs. McLaughlin, 106 Mo., 521. 25. A sale of land for taxes carries the legal title. Myers vs. Bassett, 84 Mo., 479. 26. The assignee of a purchaser at a tax sale, who is un- able to recover the land, may recover under the law of 1872, taxes penalties, interest and costs, paid by such pnrohaser. Pitkin vs. Reibel, 104 Mo., 505. Pitkin vs. Shacklett, 106 Mo., 571. Pitkin vs. Miller, T06 Mo., 577. Digest of the Revenue La-a's. Mb 27. Under the Act of 1847, if the collector fails to make the return required l^y law, the piirchaser took nothing. Donohoe vs. Hartless, 33 Mo., 335. 28. A purchaser under a deed which purports to convey to him "all the right, title and estate of the State of Missouri, in and to the premises," receives no title. Einstein vs. Gav, 45 Mo., 62. Ketcliem vs. Mullinix, 92 Mo., 118. 29. The collector who brought the suit for taxes may pur- chase. Walcott vs. Hand, 122 Mo., 621. Turner vs. Gregory, 151 Mo., 100. 30. Although a judgment for taxes be set aside for want of sufficient notice, yet if the property had been sold under said judgment and the purchaser was not notified of the proceedings to set aside the same, his deed is not affected by the order vacat- ing the judgment. Schiffman vs. Shmidt, 154 Mo., 204. 31. The purchaser at a tax sale under a valid judgment against a non-resident, succeeds to whatever right the judgment defendant had against a trespasser. Stephens vs. Black, 168 Mo., 549. RAILROADS. 1. Under the Act of 1875, the road-bed of railroads for the purpose of assessment is not local property. The school taxes on the same are to be apportioned among the districts of the county in the proportion that the number of the children in each district bears to the whole number in the county. In the matter of the apportioning of taxes, 78 Mo., 596. 2. Unless the townships have made valid subscriptions to the railroads, under the Act of 1877, the railroad taxes are dis- tributable ratably among a!l the school districts in the county. 246 Digest of the Revenue Laws. Taxes arising from land, shops and other buildings belong- ing to the railroad, go to the school districts in which said prop- erty is situated. School District vs. Rhoades, 8i Mo., 473. 3. Under section 6880, E. 8. 1879, taxes can be levied against railroad property for the purpose of building a schoolhouse. State ex rel. Brown vs. Railroad, 83 Mo., 395. 4. Under the Act of 1871, p. 56, Pullman cars operated by a railroad company under a lease are not subject to taxation. State ex rel. Pullman Car Co. vs. St. Louis County, 84 Mo., 234. 5. County courts must conform strictly to the requirements of section 6799, E. S. 1879, in levying a railroad interest and sink- ing fund tax. State ex rel. Clinton Co. vs. Railroad, 87 Mo., 236. 6. A railroad bridge, though constituting a part of the track, if used as a toll bridge is taxable as a bridge. If not so used it is taxable as a part of the railroad. State ex rel. Tillery vs. Railroad, 89 Mo., 98. 7. Laws of 1868, p. 90, did not exempt from taxation branch railroads. Nor was property acquired under section 2, Laws of 1870, p. 90, exempt from taxation. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 89 Mo., 523. 8. Taxes can be levied on railroads to build schoolhouses. Only the taxes for school purposes proper can be levied against railroads. State ex rel. Setzer vs. Railroad, 90 Mo., 166. 9. The same rule of taxation under the Act of 1875, p. 119, must be applied to both railroad and general property. State ex rel. Brown vs. Railroad, 92 JMo., 137. 10. Taxes to pay interest on railroad fund can only be levied in conformity to section 6791, E. S. 1879. State ex rel. Brown vs. Railroad, 92 j\Io., 137. Digest of the Revenue Laivs. 247 11. Section 6885, E. S. 1879, anthorizing the levy of a school tax on railroad property and providing a mode therefor is con- stitutional. State ex rel. Brown vs. Railroad, 92 Mo., 137. 12. The constitutional limitation of 40 cents on the $100 valuation of railroad property for school purposes may be in- creased by a vote. When so increased, the net rate becomes a constitutional limit. Railroad Co. vs. Lamkin, 97 Mo., 496. 13. Under section 6901, R. S. 1879, a railroad bridge owned by a railroad company and used as a part of its track is taxable as a part of the road. This is true although it be used in part as a toll bridge for ordinary travel, and the State Board of Equalization has no power to assess it. State ex rel. Tillery vs. Railroad, 97 Mo., 348. 14. As amended the Laws of 1885, p. 230, with respect to the levy of school taxes for building purposes against railroad property, is constitutional. Railroad Co. vs. Lamkin, 97 Mo., 496. 15. A petition in an action against a railroad for delinquent taxes, R. S. 1879, section 68S9, need not describe the property otherwise than as so many miles of a given value. State ex rel. Trammel vs. Railroad, lOi Mo., 136. 16. The order of the county court which directs the clerk to extend the specified tax at a specified rate on the tax book against railroad property for the omitted years is a sufficient levy. State ex rel. Trammel vs. Railroad, loi Mo., 136. 17. Adjournments of the county court from day to day for a number of days are a part of the regular term within the mean- ing of R. S. 1879, section 6879. State ex rel. Trammel vs. Railroad, loi Mo., 136. 18. A provision of the law incorporating the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad company exempted the stock of said company 248 Digest of the Revenue Laws. from city and county taxes— held that the exemption included a tax levied to pay bonds given by it for stock in the railroad com- pany. State ex rel. Trammel vs. Railroad, loi Mo., 136. 19. The portion of a railroad bridge across the Mississippi river, lying in the State of Missouri is, while owned by a bridge company, taxable as a bridge and not as a part of a railroad line, although operated and used by the railroad company under a lease. State ex rel. vs. Mississippi River Bridge Co., 109 Mo., 253. 20. A railroad company's buildings should be taxed for school purposes at a local rate fixed in the districts where situ- ated and not at the average rate throughout the county. State ex rel. Lane vs. Railroad, no Mo., 265. 21. A township tax levied to pay bonds issued in aid of a railroad is not a county tax within the meaning of the provision in the company's charter exempting it from county taxes. Section 6790, E. S. 1879, in so far as it applies to levies is unconstitutional. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 117 Mo., 297. 22. Taxes specially levied on railroad land to pay judg- ments against- a county, are county taxes within the meaning of section 7640, fi. S. 1889, and are to be included in computing the collector's commissions. State ex rel. vs. Ewing, 116 Mo., 129. 23. Held, under the facts in this case, that certain property purchased by a railroad company for future yard purposes was subject to local assessments and taxation. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 117 Mo., i. 24. Cities existing under special charter on March 30, 1884, were without authority to levy or sue for taxes on railroad property. After becoming a city of the second class, the general stat- ute governed in the matter of assessing, levying and suing for taxes. City of St. Joseph vs. Railroad, 118 Mo., 671. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 249' 25. Only the length of the main track of a raib'oad is to be considered by the State Board of Equalization in determining the length of roads for the purpose of apportioning its property for taxation. State ex rel. vs. Stone, 119 Mo., 668. 26. The irregularities in the estimates returned by school districts in failing to mention the amount of the several funds which the levy will produce and in computing the average rate of taxation for school buildings, sinking fund and annual interest, are cured by the statute and do not constitute ground for enjoin- ing the collection of the tax. Railroad vs. Gracy, 126 Mo., 472. 27. A bridge across the Mississippi river, the legal title ta which is in the bridge company, is taxable as a bridge and not as a part of the railroad to which it is leased. Under section 7564, R. S. 1889, a tax for city purposes against a bridge is invalid unless levied by authority of the cir- cuit court or judge in vacation. State ex rel. vs. Bridge Co., 134 Mo., 321. 28. The necessary land owned and used by a railroad com- pany for side-traks and used in loading and moving cars is assess- able by the State Board of Equalization, but other lands owned by railroads and not so used nor required for the purposes spec- ified are subject to assessment by a local authority. State ex rel. vs Railroad, 135 Mo., 618. 29. The county clerl?: derives no authority to extend school taxes upon the projierty of a railroad company from an order of the county court. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 135 Mo., 618. 30. In levying taxes on a railroad's distributable property,, the county court and other officers act in invitum and not as a judicial tribunal. Whether the taxes are legally levied is a question to be de- termined by an action brought iu the circuit court. A railroad company cannot be heard to say that the average- rate at which its property has been assessed for local school taxes is too low. 250 Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. The aggregate levy of the tax at the average rate of the school districts of the county is not invalidated by the failure to separately find and levy the rate for each fund. Estimates furnished by the school districts in the county held to have sufficiently fixed the rates from which to deduce an average rate for taxation of railroad property for school pur- poses. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 135 Mo., 618. 31. Cars in the State of Missouri only in transit have not such situs in this State as will authorize their taxation. Cars so used are instruments of interstate commerce and cannot be taxed in this State. State ex rel. vs. Stephens, 146 Mo., 662. 32. The rate of taxation to be levied against railroad prop- erty for school building purposes must be determined by the county courts. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 149 Mo., 635. 33. The property of a railroad company in a county subject to taxation for general purposes is also subject to taxation to pay bonds issued to it by a county exchanged for stocks subscribed by it in the railroad company. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 153 Mo., 157. 34. Switches and yards and other real property belonging to and used by a railroad company as a means of traffic and for the purposes of a carrier are not subject to taxation by local authorities. Lands owned in excess of what is necessary for such pur- poses are subject to be taxed by the local authorities. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 162 Mo., 391. 35. Where the assessor of Cass county for 1869 made no assessment of the property of a railroad company, an order sub- sequently made by the county board of equalization assessing the property for that year was void : 1. Because no notice was given as required by the Act of 1868. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 251 2. Because the board had no authority to make an assess- ment. It only had the power to increase or diminish the valua- tion made by the assessor. Railroad Co. vs. Cass Co., 53 Mo., 17. 36. Where an illegal railroad tax has been collected from a tax-payer he cannot recover back the amount. Rubey vs. Shane, 54 Mo., 207. 37 Under the Act of March 10, 3871, all railroad property was to be assessed by the State Board of Equalization. Said Board was to ascertain the value of such property within the limits of cities and certify the amount to them as the proper basis for an assessment in favor of a city. Said act is not void as violating that provision of the State Constitution that declares that taxation on property shall be uniform. As a general rule, the rolling stock of a railroad company should be assessed and taxed where the corporation has its resi- dence. The failure of the Act of March 10, 1871, to designate a par- ticular mode by which cities and towns may collect taxes from railroads under the valuations made by the Board of Equaliza- tion does not invalidate the act. .State ex rel. vs. Severance, et al, 55 Mo., 379. 38. An assessment of valuations made by a board of equali- zation without any evidence before it would be invalid. Washington County vs. Railroad Co., 58 Mo., 372. 39. Under the Act of September 20, 1852, it was made the duty of the president of the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Com- pany to furnish under oath a statement showing actual value of the railroad property from which statement the auditor should assess the railroad State tax. This provision did not amount to a contract between the State and the company. Therefore the Act of 1871, p. 56, subjecting a road to assess- ment and taxation by a board of equalization repealed the former act so far as the two were inconsistent and provided a different mode of assessment. State vs. Railroad, 60 Mo., 143. 252 Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. 40. After the passage of the Act of March 10, 1871, confer- ring the authority upon the State Board of Equalization to fix the vahies of railroad property for the purposes of assessment, the City of Jefferson no longer had authority under its charter to assess the property of railroad companies situated within its limits. Pacific Railroad vs. Watson, 6t Mo., 57. 41. Sec. 8 of the Act of March 15, 1875, p. 121, providing a method for the apportionment of the amount of the ''land con- tracts" of the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad to the counties, cities and towns along the route of the roads and its branches was constitutional. The Constitution of the United States and of the State, con- stitute the only restriction or limitation upon the taxing power of the Legislature. Under the acts above mentioned, the State Board of Equali- zation had power to equalize, adjust and assess railroad prop- erty without the hearing of testimony. It had the same power under the Constitution. Railroad Co. vs. State Board of Equalization, 64 Mo., 294. 42. "While section 11, article 10 of the Constitution of 1875 authorized an increase in the rate of taxation for the purpose of erecting public buildings upon a two-thirds vote of the qualified voters, this provision of the Constitution requires legislation to enforce it. From 1875 until the Act of May 24, 1877, there was no au- thority to increase the tax levy under said section of the Con- stitution. State ex rel. Board of Education vs. Railroad, 74 Mo., 163. 43. After the adoption of the Constitution of 1875 and until the passage of the Act of March 24, 1877, no authority existed for levying taxes for school purposes exceeding 40 cents on the $100 valuation. State vs. Railroad, 75 Mo., 526. 44. Until the Act of March 10, 1871, providing uniform sys- tem therefor, railroad property was not by the general law sub- ject to taxation in specie. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 253 The only form was for a tax against the shareholders upon their shares. For this there was no lien on the property of the company. Where the property of the North Missouri Eailroad had not been subject to taxation and was sold to a new owner, a leyy of back assessments against the railroad after the purchase could not be enforced against said owner as he was an innocent purchaser and the act was retrospective and void as to him. The special board of equalization created by the Act of March 10, 1871, was not authorized by that act to levy taxes for the year 1871 or previous years on the real and personal prop- erty in specie of any corporation which had not before that act been subject to taxation in that form. State vs. Railroad, yy Mo., 202. 45. Assessment of stock of a railroad company in the name of the shareholders is irregulai'. But the action of the assessor in such case is judicial. The assessor therefore would not be liable to a tax-payer for the amount collected under such assessment. Railroad Co., et al vs. McGiiire, 49 Mo., 482. 46. As a general propostion the Legislature has power to re- peal a temporary rate of taxation and impose a higher rate. Where, however, there has been some express contract in limitation t)f this power upon a consideration which is a part of the value of the grant in the charter of a company, this cannot be done. Where under the laws applicable to a railroad company, provision was made as to the State tax, still under the considera- tion the company was liable for its county taxes. State to use of Railroad vs. DuUe, et al, 48 Mo., 282. 47. The subdivisions of the road-bed of a railroad within tlie limits of a county or school district are not to be treated as local property under the Acts of 1875. School taxes on such road-bed are to be distributed among the school districts of the county as required by the Act of 1875. In the matter of the apportioning of taxes, 78 AIo., 596. 254 Digest of the Revemie Lazvs. 48. The lands granted by the State to the Hannibal & St. Joseph Kailroad Company by the Act of September 20, 1852, are not taxable for State and county purposes under the general revenue law. The property of the company is represented by its shares of stock. And there cannot be any other property over and above the stock held by the stockholders. State of Missouri vs. JRailroad Co., 37 Mo., 265. 49. Under the Act of 1871, pp. 56-59, it is the duty of the railroads to take notice of the time and place of the meeting of the State Board of Equalization. The law did not require the preservation of the evidence upon which the board based its valuation. Nor did it designate the evidence upon which such valuation should Jae made. It cannot be presumed that the Board acted arbitrarily from the fact that it fixed the same valuation as it did for preceding years. The property of a railroad being subject to a school tax for the years 1867-1872 may be taxed for the omitted years, although not subjected thereto by appropriate legislation until the Act of 1871. The term "county taxes" includes road taxes within the meaning of the provision of the charter of the Hannibal & St. Joseph Eailroad Company, exempting it from county taxe.s. State ex rel. Love vs. Railroad, loi Mo., 120. 50. A railroad company whose stock is by law exempted from taxation caimot be taxed on property owned by it in the operation of its railway. A charter granted by the Legislature and accepted by a rail- road corporation constitutes a contract between the corporation and the State. This obligation cannot be impaired by a State Constitution subsequently adopted. Provisions in special charters of railroad companies when inconsistent with previous laws must be understood as removing previous restrictions. Digest of the Kez'enue Laws. 255 "Where by a special act in the charter of a railroad company the stock of the company is exempted from taxation for a term of years, the exemption could not be subsequently withdrawn after the organization of the company unless the right of amend- ment was reserved by said act of the Legislature. Scotland County vs. Railroad Co., 65 Mo., 124. 51. The exemption of the stock of the Hannibal & St. Joseph Eailroad Company from all State and county taxes contained in the original charter, was modified by the acceptance on the part of said company of the Act of September 20, 1852. Corporate property, although representing the stock was subject to taxation under the latter law. The road-bed, machinery and depots of said railroad and other property used by it in operating its road for the purposes of taxation were to be considered as part of and represented by the capital stock of said company. Such property was not taxable under the general revenue law. Railroad vs. Shacklett, 30 Mo., 550. 52. Under the Act of March 10, 1 87] , railroad property was not subjected to taxation in specie. Prior to said enactment the tax was to be levied against the shareholders upon their shares. There was no lien on the property of the company. Where the property of a railroad company changes owner- ship it cannot be taxed for back years in the hands of the new owners, who were innocent purchasers under a general act pro- viding for the levying of taxes for back years. The Act of March 17, 1868, amending the charter of the North Missouri Eailroad Company did not change the method of taxation provided by the general revenue law. The special board of equalization created by the Act of March 10, 1871, was not authorized to levy taxes for that or previous years on real and personal property in specie of any corporation which had not before been subjected to taxation in that form. State vs. Railroad Co., 77 Mo., 202. 256 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 53. The convention ordinance of 1865 providing that an annual tax of 10 and 15 per cent, of the gross earnings of the North ]\Iissouri Railroad Cornpany should be paid to the State in lieu of other taxation, etc., is not in conflict with the Federal (Constitution. In the absence of a constitutional restriction the right of determining what portion of the burdens of taxation shall be borne by an individual or class of individuals must be determined by the Legislature. North Mo. Kailioad Co., et al vs. McGuire, 49 Mo., 490. 54. The Pacific Railroad Company of Missouri was subject to the tax of 10 and 35 per cent, imposed upon it by the ordi- nance of April 8, 1865. The right of the State to impose such tax was not limited by the Act of February 10, 1864. Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McGuire, 51 Mo., 142. 55. In a suit by a county against a railroad company to re- cover taxes assessed against it by the board of equalization, the State Auditor's certificate to the county court is not competent •evidence to prove the action of the board. The record of the board's proceedings or its exemplification is the best and only proper evidence for that purpose when at- tainable. Valuations made by the board of equalization without any evidence in support thereof are invalid. Where a levy has been made of a tax against the property •of a railroad, its action will not be disturbed on the ground of imperfections in the Auditor's certificate, if it further appear from other testimony that the action of the board of equalization was such as to authorize the levy. Washington Co. vs. Railroad, 58 j\Io., 372. 56. The Southwest Branch Railroad was entitled to the ex- emptions granted the Pacific Railroad by the Act of December 25, 1852. The acceptance by the last named railroad of the 12th sec- tion of the act referred to operated as a contract between the Digest of the Revenue Laivs. 2bl State and that company as to the exemptions of the property of the railroad from taxation for two years after its completion. Railroad Co. vs. Laclede Co., 57 Mo., 147. 57. Under the Acts of 1.S75, p. 120, railroad companies were liable for taxes for the year 1876 on property owned by them on August 1st, 1876, at the same rates as were levied on all other property in the State owned on the last named date, for the year 1877. State ex rel. Pettis Co. vs. Union Trust Co., 68 Mo., 463- 58. The Act of September 20, .1 852, exempting the Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad Companj'' from State taxation, except as provided in said act was not such a contract between the State and the road as could not be altered or repealed by a subsequent legislation. Under said acts the road was subject to a school tax. By the Acts of 1871, p. 58, it was not intended that railroads should pay school taxes in any other districts than those through which it passed, or in which it held property. The average rate of taxation referred to in the act was to be made up from those districts and none other. The Act of 1871, providing for back assessment of railroad property did not operate retrospectively within the meaning of the Constitution. Livingston Co. vs. St. J. Railroad, 60 Mo., 516. 59. Under the Acts of 1871, there was no authority vested in county assessors to assess the lands of railroad companies. All railroad property is to be valued and apportioned by a special board of equalization. Upon this valuation the county (courts levied taxes for county purposes. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 82 Mo., 683. 60. Under the Act of March 15, 1875, a city was authorized to sue in its own name for city taxes assessed against railroads. Property which has escaped taxation through the State is liable to taxation for the omitted years in the hands of a subse- quent purchaser. D— 17 258 Digest of the Revenue Lams. Under the Act of March 24, 1873, the county clerk could only certify to cities the amount due from railroads for city taxes by order of the county court. If certified by the clerk without such order, collection of the tax could not be enforced. City of Kansas vs. Railroad, 8i Mo., 285. 61. Under the Laws of 1877, p. 365, when no valid subscrip- tion had been made by townships to railroads, the fund arising from the taxation of railroads was distributable ratably among all the districts of the county except the tax arising from land, depots, workshops, etc., should go to the districts wherein the property was situated. School District No. i vs. Rhoades, 81 Mo., 473. 62. Under section 7730, E. S. 1889, the authorities of every city wherein any railroad property is situated are required to certify to the county court, on or before the 10th day of May of each year, a statement of the assessments and the rate of taxation levied by the State on all property for municipal purposes. Under section 7731 it is made the duty of the county court on the receipt of such certificate to levy taxes on the railroad property in such city for the ensuing year at the rate so certified. Under said act, unless the required certificate was made within the time required, the county court was without jurisdic- tion to levy the tax. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 135 Mo., "/";. 63. In levying taxes on a railroad company's distributable property, the county court and other officers do not act as judi- cial tribunals but in invitum. In the absence of an order of the county court, the county clerk has no authority to extend the school tax upon the prop- erty of a railroad. A railroad company cannot be heard to say that its property has been assessed for local school taxes at too low a rate, as an objection to the taxes. The aggregate tax on railroad properly for school pur- poses is not invalidated by the fact that the rate for each fund of the school tax was not separately found and levied. Digest uf the Revenue Laws. 259 Held, in this case, that the estimates furnished by the school districts of a county furnish a sufficient basis from which to ascertain an average rate for the taxation of railroads for school purposes. Lands used as a part of a railroad bed upon which are laid side tracks necessary for the movement of cars are assessable by the State Board of Equalization. The are not assessable within the meaning of section 7728, E. S. 1899, as local property. Where a portion of the yards is used for purposes other than those incident to the operation of the railroad it is subject to assessment by the local authorities. State ex rel. vs. Railroad Co., 135 Mo., 618. 64. An ordinance imposihg a street railway tax for each car operated by it and a fine on the company for operating its cars until the payment of such license is void. Exemptions of railway and other companies from taxation are not to be extended by construction. A contract on the part of the city not thereafter to levy and collect a tax from a railroad company is void. City of Springfield vs. Smith, 138 Mo., 645. 65. Only the length of the main track of a railroad is to be considered by the State Board of Equalization in determining the length of a road in order to apportion its property for taxation under section 7725, E. S. 1889. State ex rel. vs. Stone, 119 Mo., 668. 66. A township tax levied by the county court to pay bonds issued in aid of a railroad is not a county tax within the meaning of the company's charter exempting it from county taxes. Section 6790, E. S. 1879, requiring an order of the circuit court or judge to authorize the county court to make a tax levy to pay township railroad aid bonds is unconstitutional as applied to a levy to pay bonds after the date of the enactment of said statute. Such an order was therefore unnecessary in order for the county court to make a levy to pay such prior bonds. Where in an action to collect such taxes there is no evidence 260 Digest of the Revenue Laws. showing the date of the bond, the court may presume they were issued prior to the enactment referred to. When a statute directs proceedings to be done in a certain way or at a certain time and a strict compliance with these pro- visions of time and form does not appear essential to the judicial mind, the proceedings will be held valid, though the command of the statute is disregarded or disobeyed. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 113 Mo., 297. 67. The exemptions graiited to a railroad company in its charter cannot be extended by a consolidation of the latter with another railroad. Exemptions attempted to be granted by the Legislature to a railroad after the adoption of the Constitution of 1865 are void. Exemptions from taxation must be granted in terms too plain to be mistaken. A former adjudication in favor of a railroad company against the validity of a tax on the ground that its property was exempt will not bar an action for taxes subsequently accruing. State ex rel. Wine vs. Railroad, 99 Mo., 30. 68. County courts of the respective counties have exclusive jurisdiction to ascertain the rate of taxation for school building purposes to be levied upon railroad property. The action of the county court in such matter is judicial in its character and the rate fixed by it cannot be increased or de- creased by the circuit court. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 149 Mo., 635. 69. Cars used by a railroad company organized under the laws of another state as an incident to its biisiness in this State loaded in Kansas and sliipped into and through the State of Missouri, are not subject to taxation in this State. Such cars are only subject to taxation in the State where the railroad has acquired a domicile. Cars used in this state only in transitu are instruments of interstate commerce and are not subject to be assessed and taxed in this State. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 261 The Act of March 18, 1895, providing for a State tax of 2 per cent, in lieu of all other taxes, on railway cars other than those which are the property of railway companies, imposed a property tax and being in excess of the constitutional limit, said act is void. This is tme, although the total tax thereby required for State purposes may not exceed the maximum allowed by the Constitution for State, county, city and school purposes. Said Act of March 18, 1895, being a whole scheme for the taxation of certain kinds of property and the rate fixed and the method to be employed for its collection being insepp,rately welded together, the whole act is void. State ex rel. vs. Stephens, 146 Mo., 662. 70. The lien of a special tax bill against a railroad attaches neither to the main line nor to the side tracks on the right of way. McCutcheon vs. Railroad Co., 'j2 App., 271. 71. Revenue statutes taxing railroads do not include special tax bills. McCutcheon vs. Railroad Co., 72 App., 271. 72. The Act of March 11, 1897, providing a uniform assess- ment for taxation of street railroads applies to a street railway company whose line of road is partly within the city and partly without. Assessments made in accordance with said act are not void because of a recital in said act requiring street railway property to "be assessed and taxes thereon levied and collected in the manner now provided by law for the assessment and taxation of other railroad property. ' ' And under said act an assessment of all the property of a street railway by the State board is not void, nor is the levj^ng of the same rate of taxation on its property in each school dis- trict as was levied upon the property of private persons therein, void. State ex rel. vs. Metropolitan Street Railway Co., 161 Mo., 188. 73. Switch yards and other real property necessarily appur- tenant to a railroad's efficient equipment as a means of traffic are not subject to taxation by local authorities. 262 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 'b Such property comes within the class required to be as- sessed by the State Board of Equalization. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 162 Mo., 391. 74. The statute does not require an order of the county court requesting the prosecuting attorney to present a petition to the circuit judge for permission to levy taxes in excess of those required for State, county, school and other current purposes to specify the taxes that are to be included in the order of the cir- cuit court. It is only necessary that the order show that the county court was satisfied that there was necessity for the assessment and levy of such taxes. Nor is it neecssary that the prosecuting attorney state ia his petition the facts and give the reasons why said additional taxes should be levied. The petition of the prosecuting attorney and order of the circuit judge should show the several amounts of bonded in- debtedness of the townships on which the extra assessment is to be leAaed and the condition df the general county revenue as ap- plicable thereto. However, where they both substantially show that a bonded indebtedness existed, they are sufficient to author- ize an extra assessment of the county court on the townships to pay such bonded indebtedness. The extra tax assessment provided by statute for paying township railroad bonds, must be entered in a separate book known as the railroad tax book; otherwise the assessment is fatally defective. In a suit for taxes by the collector, the assessment being regular, his right to recover does not depend on affirmative proof of the delivery by the clerk of the tax book to him. A county court is without authority to issue in favor of a railroad company refunding warrants upon the county treasury for taxes voluntarily paid by 'a railroad company upon an in- sufficient levy. Section 1809, E. S. 1899, authorizing the refunding of money collected under an illegal tax does not apply to money subse- quently collected to pay township bonded debts. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 165 Mo., 598. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 263 SALES. 1. Under the Eeveniae Act of 1877, every parcel of land is liable for its own taxes. The surplus from the sale of one parcel could not apply to the payment of taxes on another parcel. State ex rel. Rosenblatt, vs. Sargent, 76 Mo., 557. 2. It is not necessary that the notice of sale should state between what hours the sale shall be made. Evans vs. Robberson, 92 Mo., 192. 3. Under the Act of 1872, the sale was invalid unless the special execution record included a copy of the judgment and order of sale of the county court, duly certified. Ewart vs. Davis, y6 Mo., 129. 4. A sale is not affected by the fact that the judgment is not against each tract separately. Jones vs. Driskill, 94 Mo., 190. 5. Where the owner of land pays the taxes shown to be due by the back tax-book, he is not bound to take notice of a sub- sequent proceeding for a sale for additional taxes found to be due. Hoge vs. Hubb, 94 Mo., 489. 6. The omission of the initial letter of defendant's middle name does not constitute a misnomer. Corrigan vs. Smith, 126 Mo., 304. 7. W. S., page 610, section 45, fixes the hours between which sales for taxes must be made. Evans vs. Robberson, 92 Mo., 192. 8. Although a sheriff selling land under an execution at a tax sale does not sell the land in its smallest legal sub-division, this does not invalidate the sale. Hix vs. Perry, 7 Mo., 346. Rector vs. Hartt, 8 Mo., 448. Wellshear vs. Kelley, 69 Mo., 343. 264 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 9. A remainder man holding under an independent title is not affected by a tax snit against tlie life tenant. Allen vs. De Groodt, 98 Mo., 159. 10. A sale under the city ordinance is invalid unless due notice of the same has been given. Nelson vs. Goebel.. 17 Mo., 161. 11. Under the Session Acts of 1872, a ' ' successful claimant ' ' is one who claims adversely to the revenue law and not one who claims under a subsequent tax sale. Smith vs. Laumicr, 84 Mo., 672. 12. Under the laws of 1872, land forfeited to the State for want of bidders could not be legally resold again on the same day. Mason et al. vs. Crowder, 85 Mo., 526. 13. "Where the owner of land paid all the back taxes shown to be due by the tax-book, a subsequent proceeding whereby the land was sold for additional taxes found to be due is not bind- ing on him. Hoge vs. Hubb. 94 Mo., 489. 14. Under 2 W. S., page 1206, section 219, if the owner would redeem from an illegal sale, he must pay taxes, interest and costs. Allen vs. Buckley, 94 Mo., 158. 15. Under the Act of 1845, the title to land sold for taxes did not pass until the execution of the deed. The deed does not relate back to the sale. Donohoe vs. Veal, 19 Mo., 331. 16. Where the court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and the defendant, its judgment is not void and a sale thereunder should not be set aside for any irregularity before judgment. Nor in the absence of the fraud should the sale be set aside because of inadequacy of price. State ex rel. vs. Boyd, 128 Mo., 130. 17. A suit against and the sale of the interest of "unknown heirs" in a tract of land for taxes does not effect the title there- in of a devisee. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 265 18. Such devisee did not ratify the sale, to which he was not a party, by accepting surplus of its proceeds. Hartman vs. Hornsby, 142 Mo., 368. 19. Without a substantial compliance with the statutes, a sale by a county collector of lands for taxes is void. Mere inadequacy of price is insufficient to set aside a judi- cial sale. To set aside a sale on the ground of inadequacy of price, the inadequacy must be so gross as per se to amount to proof of fraud. Walters vs. Hermann, 99 Mo., 529. 20. Where the execution is special against several lots, each lot being charged for a separate sum, one lot cannot be made to answer in part for the sum due on the others. State ex rel. Beckwith vs. P'inn, 100 Mo., 429. 21. Where a lot was sold for an inadequate price at a tax sale, and it was susceptible of division, and a part of which would have satisfied the lien for taxes, such sale will be set aside at the instance of a minor defendant in the tax suit. Corrigan vs. Smith, 126 Mo., 304. 22. Where a tax sale is void as to some of the defendants and voidable as to others, a suit in equity by all will lie to set aside the same. Corrigan vs. Smith, 126 Mo., 304. 23. Jurisdiction at a tax sale against an apparent owner of the land, will not be protected against the real owner, although the record of the deed of the real owner was destroyed. Greer vs. Lumber and Mining Co., 134 Mo., 85. 24. Under the laws of 1872, page 130, section 224, lands cannot be forfeited and sold at private sale on the same day they were offered under the execution. Bender vs. Diingan, 99 Mo., 126. 25. The life estate of the widow of a deceased person is not affected by suit for taxes against the unknown heirs. Berlien vs. Bieler, 96 Mo., 491. 266 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 26. In a suit lor taxes, a stranger cannot intervene through, a motion to quash the execution and levy. State ex rel. Carter vs. Clymer, 8i Mo., 122. SCHOOL TAXES. 1. Under section 7654, E. S. 1889, no order of the circuit court is necessary to the assessment or levy of taxes for school buildings, or of any tax for schools. Railway Company vs. Gracy, 126 Mo., 472. 2. County courts have no power to order the assessment of taxes to build schoolhouses on the ground that the school- house is unnecessary. The decision of that question is left to the local directors. Petition of Powers, Killcullen, et al, 52 Mo., 218. 3. Where a building fund of a school district is not all used, the remainder may be afterwards applied to the construc- tion of additional rooms to the buUding for which the sum was originally set apart, and this without further vote. Endly vs. Whitsett, 85 App., 79. 4. Under the laws in force in 1868, school corporations in towns and villages were authorized to include merchants' state- ments as taxable, and to collect school taxes upon such state- ments. .State of Missouri ex rel. vs. Kinney et al, 48 Mo., 373. 5. Under the Act of March, 1871, it is not intended that railroads should pay school taxes in any other districts than those through which it passed, or in which it held property. The average rate of taxation spoken of in that section on which to base the railroad tax, was to be made up from those districts and none others. Livingston County vs. Railroad, 60 Mo., 516. 6. School warrants are not negotiable. State ex rel. vs. Huf¥, 63 Mo., 288. Digest of the Revenue Laivs. 267 7. The public school law of 1874 does not create a separate fund for the support of colored schools, upon which warrants for the payment of teachers of such schools must be drawn. Under said law, warrants for the payment of teachers, of both white and colored schools of the same district, are properly drawn upon the teachers' fund of said district. State vs. Thompson, 64 Mo., 26. 8. The Constitution authorizes the limit of forty cents on the hundred dollars valuation of railroad property for school purposes to be increased by vote. Railroad Company vs. Lamkin, 97 Mo., 496. 9. Under section 7732, E. S., 1879, it is the duty of the county court to ascertain the average rate of taxation for school and building purposes from the official returns of the local school boards filed with the county clerk. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, no Mo., 265. 10. No authority is conferred on a county court clerk to assess property for school or other taxes. He is only authorized to assess or extend the amount of revenue to be apportioned and raised for school purposes, upon the property assessed and returned by the regular tax assessor for each school district. School District vs. Wickersham, 34 App., 337. 11. In levying a tax upon the property of a railroad, for the purpose of raising funds wherewith to build a courthouse, there must be an order of the county court levying the tax. If the county clerk extends the tax, without such order, such taxes are void. Railroad Company vs. Apperson, 97 Mo., 300. 12. Although set apart by law for a special purpose, a county sdiool fund belongs to the county. For its misappropriation, the judges are severally liable. Knox County vs. Hunolt, no Mo., 67. 13. A tax levied by a county district for school purposes, in excess of forty cents, unless authorized by the district, is void. 268 Digest of the Revenue Lazvs. "A sinking fund" and "interest fund" tax to pay existing indebtedness may be levied without a vote of the 'district. Railway Company vs. Chapin, 162 Mo., 409. 14. Where the voters of a school district adopt a proposi- tion to increase the tax for school purposes of one hundred cents on the one hundred dollars, the power to apportion the tax among the several funds rests in the school board. The board is not bound by any suggestion in the election notes, as to how the apportionment should be made. The voters have nothing to do with the apportionment of the tax. State ex rel. vs. Phipps, 148 Mo., 31. 15. The clerk of the county court is required to assess the amount of estimates returned to him by a school district on the taxable property therein. He cannot assess one district with the estimates of another. Nor can he ignore the decision of the commissioner, forming a new district. State ex rel. vs. Burford, 82 App., 343. 16. Under the Act of March 11th, 1879, taxes are to be assessed against street railway property, and levied and col- lected in the manner already provided by law, for the assess- ment and taxation of other railroad property. State ex rel. vs. Street Railway Company, 161 Mo., 189. 17. Keal estate belonging to the public schools in the City of St. Louis is liable to be assessed under the ordinances of said city, for the construction of sewers, paving of sidewalks, opening streets, etc. Public Schools vs. City of St. Louis, 26 Mo., 468. 18. Under the Act of 1867, it was the duty of the county clerk to extend the amount of school tax on the assessment books. Brown vs. Harris, 52 Mo., 306. 19. A tax was assessed and levied by the directors of the school district for the erection of a schoolhouse. Before the tax was collected, the district was subdivided and a new district ere- Digest of the Revenue Laws. 269 ated. In such case, the money could be paid out only for the pur- pose for which it Avas levied and the township board had no right to apportion money collected between the two new districts. Rice vs. McClelland, 58 Mo., 116. 20. The county court was trustee for the care and manage- ment for township school funds. Township Board of Education vs. Boyd, 58 Mo., 276. 21. Under the Act of March 11th, 1867, a certain portion of the State revenue was annually set aside for the support of the State University. In mandamus against the State Auditor to compel the payment of the annuity for five years, he could not plead the two years statute of limitations. State ex rel. vs. State Auditor, 60 Mo., 596. 22. The public school law of 1874 did not create a separate fund for the support of colored schools and the payment of the salary of such teachers. Warrants for the payment of both white and colored teachers should be drawn on the teachers' fund of the district. Section 90 of the Act of 1874 provides that the money raised by taxation for building purposes, could be applied only for that purpose and money raised for other purposes could not be used to supply the building fund. State ex rel. vs. Thompson, 64 Mo., 26. 23. Under the Act of 1867, page 165, a township board of education may set off from any district in said township so much territory as will, in their estimation^ advance the general inter- est of education and annex the same for school purposes to any city, town or village, and upon the passage of such resolution by such township board, and the approval thereof by the board of education in such town or city, such act became effectual. Sharp vs. Miller, 65 Mo., 50. 24. Section 80, article 9 of the Constitution of 1865, amounts to a mandate of the Legislature to provide the means of sustain- ing a free school in each district in the State, at least four months in each year. It does not prohibit a more liberal pro- vision. Sharp vs. Miller, 65 JVEo., 50. 270 Digest of the Rez'enue Lmvs. 25. Mandamus will lie to compel a county clerk to extend a school tax upon the tax books according to the evidence fur- nished him by the district directors, and this is true, notwith- standing the clerk has been directed not to extend the tax by order of the county court. The county court has no control over the county clerk in respect to the assessment and extension of school taxes. School District vs. Byers, 67 Mo., 706. 26. Injunction does not lie against the board of education to prevent the collection of a tax levied by the board, when the validity of the tax is disputed on the ground that the board has no corporate existence. Ewing vs. Board of Education, 72 Mo., 436. 27. After the adoption of the Constitution of 1875, and until the passage of the Act of March 24th, 1877, no authority existed for levying taxes for school purposes, exceeding forty cents on the one hundred dollars of value. St. Joseph Board of Public Schools vs. Patten, 62 Mo., 449. State ex rel. vs. Holladay, 66 Mo., 387. State vs. K. C. & N. Railway Connpany, 74 Mo., 163. State vs. St. Louis and Northern Railway Company, 75 Mo., 526. 28. The distribution of school taxes lies wholly within the control of the Legislature. State vs. Holladay, 70 Mo., 137. School District vs. Weber, 75 Mo., 558. 29. Under section 9749 the qualified voters of a school dis- trict have the power to determine the rate, if any, in excess of forty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation to be levied for school purposes. Nor does section 9750, E. S. 1899, require the board of directors to first determine the rate and submit same to the annual meeting. Benton vs. Scott, 168 Mo., 378. 30. Under sections 11 and 12 of article 10 of the Constitu- tion of 1875, and the statiites passed in pursuance thereof, two ways are provided by which a schoolhoiise may be built. One is to levy a tax and build it' with funds thus provided. The other Digest of the Revenue Laws. 271 is to authorize the issuance of bonds by a two-thirds vote of the qualified voters, voting at an election held for that purpose. Benton vs. Scott, i68 Mo., 378. 31. After bonds have been issued under section 9752, and the board has negotiated the bonds, it then becomes the duty of the directors to provide for an annual interest and sinking fund. Benton vs. Scott, 168 Mo., 378. 32. The levy of a tax to pay annual interest and sinking fund to pay the principal, is the inevitable concomitant of the constitutional aiithority to incur indebtedness. Benton vs. Scott, 168 Mo., 378. 33. Under the Act of 1875, school taxes on railroad prop- erty are to be apportioned among the districts of the county in the proportion that the number of children in each district bears to the whole number in the county. In the matter of the apportioning of taxes, 78 Mo., 596. 34. Unless the townships have made valid subscriptions to the railroads, under the Act of 1877, school taxes derived from railroads are to be distributed ratably among all the districts of the county. School District vs. Rhoades, 81 Mo., 473. 35. Taxes arising from land, shops and other building be- longing to the railroads go to the school districts in which said property is situated. School District vs. Rhoades, 81 Mo., 473. 36. Under section 6880, R. S. 1877, school taxes can be levied against railroad property for the purpose of building a schoolhouse. State ex rel. Brown vs. Railroad, 83 Mo., 395. State ex rel. Setzer vs. Railroad, 90 Mo., 166. 37. Taxes for school purposes proper can be levied on rail- roads. State ex rel. Setzer vs. Railroad, 90 Mo., 166. 272 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 38. Section 6885, E. S. 1879, authorizing the levy of a school tax on railroad property and providing a mode therefor is con- stitutional. State ex rel. Brown vs. Railroad Co., 92 Mo., 137. 39. The constitutional limitation of 40 cents on the $100 valuation of railroad property for school purposes may be in- creased by a vote. Railroad Co. vs. Lamkin, 97 Mo., 496. 40. Section 6880, R. S. 1879, as amended by the laws of 1889, page 230, with respect to the levy of school taxes for building purposes against railroad property is constitutional. Railroad Co. vs. Lamkin, 97 Mo., 496. 41. The order of a county court directing the clerk to ex- tend a specified tax at a specified rate on a tax-book for omitted years is a sufficient levy. State ex rel. Trammel vs. Railroad, loi Mo., 136. 42. A railway company's building should be taxed for school purposes at the local rates fixed in the district where situ- ated and not at the average rate throughout the county. State ex rel. Lane vs. Railroad, no Mo., 265. 43. The county court should ascertain the average rate of taxation for school and building purposes under section 7732, E. S. 1889, from the returns of the local school boards on file with the county clerk. Unless the rate is based upon such returns, the levy will be invalid. State ex rel. Lane vs. Railroad, no Mo., 265. 44. Under section 7654, E. S. 1889, no order of the circuit court is necessary for the assessment or levy of taxes for school buildings or for any school taxes. Railroad vs. Gracy, 126 Mo., 472. 45. The county clerk derives authority to extend school taxes on the property of a railroad company from an order of the county court. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 135 Mo., 618. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 273 46. A railroad company cannot be heard to say that the average rate at which its property has been assessed for local school taxes is too low. The aggregate levy of the tax at the average rate of the school districts oE the county is not invalidated by the failure to separately find and levy the rate for each fund. The estimates furnished by the school districts of the county, held, under the facts in this case, to have sufficiently fixed the rates from which to deduce an average rate for taxa- tion of railroad property for school purposes. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 135 Mo., 618. 47. Where the voters of a school district adopt a proposi- tion to increase the tax for school purposes, the authority to ap- portion the tax among the several funds is in the school board. Said board is not bound by any suggestion in the election notices as to how the apportionment should be made. The voters have nothing to do with the apportionment of the tax. State ex rel. vs, Phipps, 148 Mo., 31. 48. The rate of taxation to be levied against railroad prop- erty for school building purposes must be determined by the county courts. No other tribunal is vested with the power to ascertain such rate. Legislative enactments with respect to power of taxation are mandatory. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 149 Mo., 635. 49. The first school meeting held in a newly formed country district, in obedience to a proper notice, has authority to author- ize an increase in the taxes over the 40 cents limitation to pur- chase a site and to erect and furnish a school house. Jt was not necessary that the notices of the meeting should specify the intention to vote on the proposition to so increase the levy. State ex rel. vs. Edwards, 151 ^lo., 472. D— 18 274 Digest of the Revenue Laws. 50. A tax levy by a country district for school purposes is void unless authorized by a vote of the district. "Sinking fund" and "interest fund" tax to pay existing indebtedness may be levied without such vote. Railroad Co. vs. Chapin, 162 Mo., 409. 51. Under the law of 1877, the lien for school taxes, when legally assessed, may be enforced, although such taxes be not extended on the tax-book by the county clerk. State ex rel. Watson vs. Harper, 83 Mo., 670. 52. Although set apart by law for a special purpose, the county school fund belongs to the county. Knox County vs. Hnnolt, no Mo., 67. STATE TREASURER. 1. "Without a special act of the Legislature, the State Treasurer has no power to pay any money except on the war- rant of the Auditor drawn upon some appropriated fund. State ex rel. vs. Bishop, 42 Mo., 504. 2. The Treasurer has no discretionary power, and can only disburse money as the law making power shall direct. State ex rel. vs. State Treasurer, 49 Mo., 604. 2f. The State Treasurer may pay a demand upon the treas- ury by a check upon a bank where he has money on deposit, that mode of payment being in accordance with immemorial usage. State ex rel. vs. Gates, Gy Mo., 139. 4. Funds deposited by the State Treasurer, as security, under the Act of 1893, touching bond investment companies, are affected with a statutory trust. No court order in regard to that should be made without first giving opportunity to the State Treasurer to show cause against it. And the funds should, in no event, be ordered from the present custodian until actually required for some lawful pur- pose. Glover vs. Bond Investment Company, 138 ]Mo., 408. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 275 THE TAX-BOOK. 1. The assessor's book is of no official validity unless signed and sealed by the county clerk. Unless so signed and sealed the book affords no authority to a collector. The St. L. & S. F. Ry. Co. vs. Apperson, 97 Mo., 300. State ex rel. vs. Cook, 82 Mo., 185. 2. Unless the assesment book was duly verified as required by law, the sale of the land for taxes will be void. Pike vs. Martindale, 91 Mo., 286. Howard vs. Heck, 88 Mo., 456. 3. The law authorizes but one assesor's book. State ex rel. Harvey vs. Cook, 82 Mo., 185. 4. Where the assessor makes two books, one for personal and one for real property, and fails to verify the latter, the as- sessment is invalid. State ex rel. Harvey vs. Cook, 82 Mo., 185. 5. The failure to verify the assessment books will not af- fect nor iuvalidate a sale under a tax judgment. Nor does it matter after judgment and sale how irregular the assessment may have been. Boyd vs. Ellis, 107 Mo., 394. 6. A tax is not rendered void by the failure of the assessor to return real and personal property in one book, nor by the fact that he returns the original assessor's book and not a copy. State ex rel. vs. Bank of Neosho, 120 Mo., 161. 7. The assessor's book when filed in the eoimty clerk's office, imparts notice to every tax-payer of the valuation placed upon his land by the assessor. State ex rel. vs. Reed & Sutton, 159 Mo., jy. 8. When an assessor makes out his assessor's book in proper form, jurisdiction attaches. The rest of the proceedings are directory. 276 Digest of the Revenue Laws. Mere informalities in making the assessment, or in the tax listS; do not invalidate the tax. State ex rel vs. Phillips, 137 Mo., 259. 9. Assessments against railroad companies must be en- tered in the Ijook known as "the railroad tax-book." State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 165 Mo., 609. 10. The requirements of the revenue law which does not affect the rights of the tax-payer, and which are intended simply for the purpose of system and convenience, are merely directory. A liberal compliance therewith, is not essential. The tax-book, therefore, may be bound and certified in two volumes as contemplated by the revenue act. Thomas vs. Chapin, 116 Mo., 396. 11. Section 7571, E. S. 1879, providing that the assessor shall, make oiit and return to the county clerk "a fair copy of the assessor's book," means the assessor's book, and not a copy thereof. It means a fair, legible assessment book. The fact that the county clerk does not extend the taxe^ on the assessor's book, but extends them on a copy thereof, made out by him for the collector, does.not invalidate the taxes. State ex rel. vs. Lounsberry, 125 Mo., 157. 12. After the assessor's book has been returned to the county coiirt, and corrected and adjusted, it cannot be authenti- cated by the affidavit of the assessor, after the expiration of his term of office. State ex rel. vs. Phillips, 102 Mo., 664. 13. Although the copy of the assessor's book furnished the collector by the county clerk was not authenticated by the seal of the county court, this does not affect the validity of the taxes. Although the affidavit of the assessor to the land assess- ment book fails to show in express terms that lie was the as- sessor of a particular county, it is sufficient. Taft vs. McCiiUock, 135 Mo., 588. Digest of the Revenue Laws. 211 14. Where taxes are levied on the property of a railroad for the purpose of building a court house, there must be an order of the county court levying the tax, before the county clerk can extend the same on the tax-books. Railroad Company vs. Apperson, 97 Mo., 300. 15. A sale of land for taxes, under the law of 1872, where the tax had not been authenticated by the seal of the county court, was void. An.d a purchaser at a sale upon such unauthenticated tax- books got no title. Taxes assessed and collected in this way, were illegal and arbitrary exactions which the State had no right to collect. Burke vs. Brown, 148 Mo., 309. 16. The oath prescribed by the statute (R. S. 1899, section 9188), to be affixed to the assessor's book, must be followed substantially. A materia] departure therefrom will invalidate the assess- ment. State ex rel. vs. Seahorn, 139 Mo., 582. 17. If the collector bases his report of a delinquent tax list upon an unverified tax-book, such report is void. Howard vs. Heck, 88 Mo., 456. 18. An addition of an item of taxes to the tax-book by the collector is void. Higgins vs. Ausmuss, yy Mo., 351. 19. A folded sheet of paper is not a tax-book within the meaning of section 7733, E. S. 1889. State ex rel. vs. Railroad, 135 Mo., 77. INDEX rage A Abbreviations 83 Absence of tTniform Assessments 3 Administrator 154 Advalorem Tax 213 Anti-Department Store Act 132 Appeals 198 Appropriations 130 Architects 206 Assessed Values 13 Assessments 73 Assessment, Back 82 Assessment and Collection of Taxes, Time of <. . . 24 Assessment of Eeal Estate 20 Assessment Lists, Publication of 23 Assessor 73, 275 Assessor's Book 275 Auctioneers 206 B Banks 83, 206 Back Assessemnts .' 82 Barbers' Act 133 Beer Inspection Act 133 Bills Prepared and Submitted by the Commission 37, 70 Board of Equalization 86 Boats 207 Book, The Tax 275 Bridges : 93 Butcher 167 C Capitation Tax , 116 Car Companies and Fast Freight Lines 27 Cestui Que Trust 225 Certiorari 94 Charitable Organizations 176 Collateral Inheritance Tax 134 Collateral Succession Tax 134 Collectors 96 II INDEX. Page Comparison of Tax Laws of this and other States 1 Constitution 105 Constitution Generally 130 Constitutional Limitation i Corporation Licenses 27 County Board of Equalization 86 County Collector 96 County Clerk 140 County Court 141 County Treasurer '. . . . 148 County Warrants 150 Current Expenses 164-165 Curator 147 D Decedents' Estates 154 Deeds 155 Deed, The Tax 155 Deeds of Trust and Mortgages 29, 135 Defects in Administration of Eevenue Laws 12 Definitions 164 Delinquent Taxes 26 Dentists 208 Department Store Act 132 Descriptions 168 Dogs 208 Domicile 233 Double Taxation 135 Drampshops 207 Due Process of Law 136 E Ejectment 169 Engineers , 208 Equality of Taxation 110 Equalization, Board of 86 Estates, Decedents 154 Evidence 171 Exemptions from Taxation ^ 175 Exercise of Taxing Power 105 F • Fast Freight Lines, Car Companies and 27 Fiscal Year 167 Foreign Corporations 137 Franchises 24, 184 G General Assembly 199 General Assembly Cannot Surrender Power to Tax Corporations 109 General Assembly Shall Not Tax Municipalities 120 General Eerenue Measure 4 GoTernment Lands 177 INDEX. Hotels III 209 I Ice Dealer 166 Idem Sonans 240 Income Tax 137 Injunction 184 Insurance Companies 209 Interstate Commerce l^T Intoxicating Liquors 13'^ J Judgments 190 Jurisdiction 198 I. Laundries, Steam 214 Lawyers 138, 209 Licenses, Generaliy 200 Licenses for Sale of Intoxicating Liquors 28 Liens 217 Legislature 199 Life Tenant 219 Limit of Municipal Indebtedness 121 Limitations 220 M Manufacturer 166 Merchants 165 Mortgages 29, 135 Municipal Corporations 120 Municipal Taxes 26 Municipal Indebtedness, Limit of 121 N Non-residents 233 Notice to Tax Payers 90' Occupation Tax 211 Officers 223 Omitted Property 22 r Parties to Tax Suits 223 Payment 228 Peddlers 213 Personal Property 19 Personal Property, Situs of 233 Personal Judgment iqq IV INDEX. Page Petition 230 I'liysician t38, 214 Police Force X38 Power to Tax Corporations Not to be Surrendered 109 Pioperty Exempt From Taxation IIG, 175 Property Sliall be Taxed in Proportion to' its Value 114 Publication 287 Publication of Assessment Lists 23 Pullman Cars 236 Purchaser at Tax Sales 241 E Railroads 245 Real Estate, Assessment of ', 20 Recitals 155 Record Owners 224 Refunding Taxes 139, 228 Remainder men 219 Revenue Laws, Defects in Construction of ; 12 Road Taxes 139 Sales 263 Sale, Tbe Tax 263 Scliool Taxes 266 Scope of the Work 1 Separate Column In Assessor's Boolt for Actual and Taxable Values 15 Separation of State and County revenue 7 Service by Publication 237 Shares of Stoct 83 Situs 233 State Board of Equalization, Members of 129 State and County Revenue, Separation of 7 State Tax Commissioner 18 State Treasurer 274 Statistics 29, 31- 34 Statutory Changes 12 Steam Laundries 214 T Tax Book 275 Tax Deed 155 Tax Lien 217 Tax Rates for Local purposes '. . . 121 Tax Sales, Generally 263 Taxation in Proportion to Value 114 Taxation of Mortgages 29 Taxes for Public Purposes Must be Uniform 100 Taxing Power, How Exercised 105 Telegraph Companies 184 Time of Assessment and Collection of Taxes 24 Treasurer, County 148 Treasurer, State 274 INDEX. V I'agf! U Unknown Heirs 22G Uniformlt.' of Taxation 109 V Valuation 114 Value of Pi'operty, Taxes in Proportion Thereto 1]4 Vehicles 215 Voluntary Payment 228 W Warrants, County 150 Wholesale Dealer 16G Widow 227