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 Cornell University Library 
 JC251 .G39 
 
 Problems in political evolution 
 
 olin 
 
 3 1924 030 444 594 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030444594 
 
PROBLEMS IN 
 POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 BY 
 
 RAYMOND GARFIELD GETTELL, M.A. 
 
 NORTHAM PROFESSOR OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE IN TRINITY COLLEGE 
 
 AUTHOR OF "INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE" 
 
 "READINGS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE" 
 
 U;NIVM'l(i?n Y 
 GINN AND COMPANY 
 
 BOSTON ■ NEW YORK • CHICAGO • LONDON 
 
COPYRIGHT, 1914, BY 
 RAYMOND GARFIELD GETTELL 
 
 ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
 414.2 
 
 J J i |<j 51 of ' 
 
 GINN AND 66MPANY • PRO- 
 PRIETORS ■ BOSTON • U.S.A. 
 
PREFACE 
 
 Never before, perhaps, has there been so keen and widespread 
 an interest in questions of governmental organization and function 
 as exists at present. The extension of political authority to all 
 classes within the state furnishes a means of adding legal effect 
 to public opinion and gives importance to the political views of 
 the masses. The complex social and economic life of to-day offers 
 an enormous field for the extension of state activities in ways that 
 fundamentally affect the interests of every citizen. Political forms 
 and methods, considered ideal and permanent a half century ago, 
 are breaking down under the strain caused by the rapidly changing 
 conditions of modern life ; and states show little hesitation in 
 making important and far-reaching reforms in their efforts to secure 
 better adjustment. 
 
 Moreover, modern states are seriously and honestly trying to 
 apply scientific methods in their attempted reforms. Statistical 
 materials, records of past politics, and data gathered from the four 
 corners of the earth are at the disposal of modern lawmakers and 
 administrators. At the same time, the nature of political problems 
 is often imperfectly understood. Devices of government or methods 
 of regulation that have worked well in one place or at one time are 
 applied in others with the expectation of equally good results, 
 regardless of the fact that different conditions may nullify their ex- 
 pected benefits and produce entirely unlooked-for consequences. 
 The assurance with which politicians refer to the fate of the Roman 
 Empire as an example of what will happen to the United States if 
 it retains its colonial possessions, and the light-hearted and hap- 
 hazard manner in which lawmaking bodies enact sweeping legis- 
 lation with no apparent realization of its direct or indirect results, 
 suggest the desirability of a more accurate knowledge of the laws 
 of political causation and of the complex nature of political evolution. 
 
iv PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 This volume aims to settle no controverted questions. Its prov- 
 ince is to state problems, not to solve them. Its purpose is to show 
 the relativity of political methods and the multiplicity of forces in- 
 volved in each phase of political evolution ; and at the same time 
 to indicate the essential unity and continuous development of the 
 state and the consequent interrelation among all the aspects of 
 political existence. Such a study necessitates numerous broad gen- 
 eralizations, few of which are entirely above criticism. The very 
 intricacy of the process under consideration places limitations upon 
 almost every statement that may be made. In a general way, how- 
 ever, an attempt is here made to trace the evolution of certain 
 phases of the state, to point out some of the problems that have 
 arisen because of the nature of political organization, to indicate 
 the methods that men at various times and places have employed 
 in their attempted solutions, and to bring out the permanence of 
 these problems, the impossibility of their final settlement, the need 
 for constant compromise and adjustment, and the danger of rash 
 experiments and extremes. 
 
 As President Lowell says, human progress is like beating to 
 windward, a tack to starboard and then a tack to port, for mankind, 
 unable to discern absolute truth in shaping its course, moves for- 
 ward by overaccentuating one principle at a time. Human evolu- 
 tion, distinguished from natural evolution by the ability of man as 
 a rational being to modify his environment and to direct deliberately 
 his progress, should be characterized by a narrowing of the range 
 of these extremes, thus making possible a more rapid and continu- 
 ous advance. A better realization of the nature of the state, of its 
 past development and present conditions, and of the chief influences 
 that affect its evolution may aid in this process. 
 
 RAYMOND GARFIELD GETTELL 
 
 Trinity College 
 Hartford, Connecticut 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE I 
 
 I. General Nature of Political Evolution ... i 
 
 II. Limitations on General Process 12 
 
 III. Changes in Political Conceptions 19 
 
 II. INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION . 25 
 
 I. General Nature of Influences ....... 25 
 
 II. The .Physical Environment 27 
 
 III. Economic Conditions 30 
 
 IV. Other Social Institutions 33 
 
 V. Race and Nationality 34 
 
 VI.. Great Men 37 
 
 I . VII. Religion 39 
 
 VIII. Growth of Knowledge 41 
 
 IX. Political Theory 43 
 
 X. Conflict 47 
 
 XI. Cooperation 48 
 
 XII. Imitation 50 
 
 III. THE NATURE OF THE STATE 53 
 
 I. Population 53 
 
 II. Territory 56 
 
 III. Government . .... 60 
 
 IV. Sovereignty 65 
 
 V. Law 69 
 
 IV. THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 77 
 
 I. General Nature of State Origin 77 
 
 II. Kinship and State Origin 82 
 
 ■ III.- Religion and State Origin 87 
 
 v 
 
vi PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 IV. Industry and State Origin 90 
 
 V. War and State Origin 95 
 
 VI. Stagnation and Progress 101 
 
 VII. Origin of Modern States "... 103 
 
 V. THE STATE AND THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL 
 
 INSTITUTIONS 108 
 
 I. The State and the Family 108 
 
 II. The State and the Church 115 
 
 III. The State and the Industrial Organizations. 121 
 
 IV. The State and the Military Organizations . 130 
 
 V. Voluntary Political Organizations 136 
 
 VI. THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 140 
 
 I. Elements affecting the Composition of the 
 
 State 140 
 
 II. Nationality 158 
 
 III. Citizenship 166 
 
 VII. THE FORM OF THE STATE 171 
 
 I. The Community State 172 
 
 II. The World Empire 183 
 
 III. The National State 192 
 
 IV. General Tendencies 196 
 
 VIII. AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 200 
 
 I. General Nature of Problem . 200 
 
 II. Evolution of Civil Liberty 207 
 
 III. Organization of Authority 215 
 
 IV. Evolution of Political Liberty 233 
 
 IX. SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 247 
 
 I. General Nature of Problem 247 
 
 II. Individualism 256 
 
 III. Socialism 266 
 
 IV. Conclusions 277 
 
CONTENTS vn 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 X. RELATIONS AMONG STATES ^83 
 
 I. Nature and Development of International Re-1^* 
 
 lations 283 
 
 II. International Commercial Relations .... 289 
 
 III. International Warfare^. 299 
 
 XI. RELATIONS AMONG STATES (Continued) 314. 
 
 I. International Law and Diplomacy 314 
 
 II. Forms of Union among^States 332 
 
 III. Conclusions 340 
 
 XII. THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 345 
 
 I. Theories as to the Ends of the State . . . 346 
 II. The Interests of Individual, State, and Civili- 
 zation 352 
 
 III. Conclusions 359 
 
 XIII. POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES ... 362 
 
 I. Organization of Authority within the State . 362 
 
 II. Relations among States 372 
 
 III. Conclusions 382 
 
 INDEX 389 
 
PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL 
 EVOLUTION 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 
 
 I. General Nature of Political Evolution 
 
 1. Permanence of the state. Any attempt to discuss the evolu- 
 tion of the state must rest upon certain general assumptions. It 
 takes for granted, first, that' a political institution, called the state, 
 has been a permanent phenomenon in the history of human exist- 
 ence ; and that this institution, possessing at all times the same 
 general essentials, can be separated from other social institutions 
 for purposes of analytic study. Whenever mankind has arisen 
 above the lowest stages of barbarism, an organization of some kind, 
 receiving or enforcing obedience to rules of some sort, has been 
 universal. 1 While conceptions of the state have undergone radical 
 transformations, certain attributes, essential to state existence, have 
 been permanent, invariably included in a more or less perfect form 
 in every manifestation of organized political life. These elements 
 compose the state in the abstract, considered apart from any par- 
 ticular state found at any given time or place. 2 A definition. of the 
 state and an analysis of its essential elements will therefore serve 
 as a starting point in this study, setting forth definitely the nature 
 of the organization to be considered. 
 
 2. Essential elements of the state. A state consists of a num- 
 ber of individuals who occupy a definite territory and who are 
 politically organized by means of a government which formulates 
 
 1 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, Bk. II, chap, i ; 
 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, Introduction ; Seeley, Introduction to 
 Political Science, Lecture I. a Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 14-16. 
 
 1 
 
2 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 and administers, in the form of law, a sovereign will over all the 
 individuals and associations of individuals within the state, and 
 which maintains a sovereign independence by adjusting the mutual 
 rights and obligations of the state in its dealings with other states. 1 
 This definition suggests the essential attributes of the state, which 
 are (i) population, (2) territory, (3) government, (4) sovereignty, 
 and (5) law. Without population a state obviously would be impos- 
 sible. The possession of fixed territory, while possibly not always 
 necessary to rudimentary political existence in the past, has been 
 for a long time a requisite, sovereignty and law having a territorial 
 basis. 2 By its very etymology the word " state " is associated with 
 a fixed abode. In the sense that the physical environment is the 
 setting within which all human life and activity takes place, territory 
 has been, of course, a constant element. Government is necessary 
 as the outward organized manifestation of state existence, and as 
 the only means through which the state may perform its func- 
 tions. Sovereignty includes the idea of legal supremacy internally 
 and legal independence externally, and is the attribute that dis- 
 tinguishes the state from its own parts and from other states. Law 
 is the expression of this sovereignty in a body of rules which the 
 state enforces as its will, and which determine the relations of 
 the state to its individual members and of these individuals one 
 to another. 
 
 3. Evolution of the state. In the second place, it is assumed 
 that the state has passed through an evolution; that is, that, like 
 all forms of life, it has tended to adjust itself to its environment 
 by adaptation of function or by the survival of the fittest types, the 
 environment destroying forms unsuited to it and allowing only the 
 fit to survive. The term " environment," when applied to politi- 
 cal institutions, must, however, be widened to include not only 
 the physical background furnished by nature, but also the social 
 background composed of the various institutions and ideals which 
 affect the life of men in association ; and to both of these must be 
 
 1 For a number of other definitions of the state, see Garner, Introduction to 
 Political Science, pp. 38-41. 
 
 2 On territory as a requisite for the state, see Held, System des Verfassungs- 
 rechts, chap. v. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 3 
 
 added the conscious efforts of men, as rational beings, in modify- 
 ing both the physical and the social environment and in directing 
 to a degree the course of individual and social evolution. As a 
 result, in favorable environments, the state has developed from 
 simple to complex, 1 with resultant integration, by a gradual process 
 of change, influenced by various elements in the physical environ- 
 ment, — geographic features, climate, natural resources ; by the 
 population composing it, sometimes unconsciously, sometimes by 
 purposeful effort ; by changes in other closely related social institu- 
 tions, such as the family, the church, the industrial and the mili- 
 tary groups ; and by its relations with other states, in peace and 
 in war. In tracing this evolution it is necessary to point out, in 
 part at least, the causes and relations that underlie this process, 
 and to find, whenever possible, the general laws and principles 
 upon which political development is based. 2 
 
 4. Laws of political evolution. Some caution must be observed 
 in using the expression " laws of political evolution." A law in 
 science properly implies a connection which is necessary and uni- 
 versal. It states conditions from which certain consequences in- 
 variably result. In tracing social development, however, what is 
 usually ascertained is a general trend of movement. This trend is 
 formulated and inaccurately called the law of the series of changes 
 or movements. While a broad grasp of the successive phases of 
 political development and a description of its tendencies are of 
 scientific value, there still remains, if possible, to discover the 
 permanent conditions upon which such movement depends. The 
 first inquiry usually throws light on the second, since from our 
 
 1 Under favoring conditions evolution frequently transforms complex into 
 simple forms, with resultant disintegration. Spencer's definition of evolution, 
 as development from indefinite incoherent homogeneity to definite coherent 
 heterogeneity, applies only to evolution in environments favorable to progress. 
 While in general civilization has developed from simple forms to complex forms, 
 human evolution even in a favorable environment sometimes shows two diverse 
 tendencies, — one from the complex to the simple, the other from the simple to 
 the complex. The evolution of language, for example, often shows a transition 
 from complex to simpler forms, even among the more advanced peoples. See 
 Kelly, Government or Human Evolution: Justice, pp. 67-69; Boas, Mind of 
 Primitive Man, pp. 193-195. 
 
 2 MacFarlane, " Three Primary Laws of Social Evolution," in Annals of the 
 American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. XX, No. 2. 
 
4 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 knowledge of the direction in which evolution has moved, the forces 
 which have moved it may be discovered. Both of these problems 
 are of great difficulty, since in the development of the state no 
 single trend and no single cause can be found, but rather a com- 
 plex of interrelated movements, difficult to synthesize, and a multi- 
 tude of interrelated conditions, almost impossible to analyze. 
 
 5. Factors in political evolution. In the evolution of the state 
 the fundamental factors that underlie all organic evolution are 
 present. Human beings, like all living species, multiply through 
 reproduction. Heredity secures continuity of the type. Variation 
 takes place because each new individual inherits something from 
 each parent, and because of changing surroundings. Natural selec- 
 tion takes place through the struggle for existence and the elimina- 
 tion of those unsuited to their environment. Competition among 
 the lower classes for food, and among the higher classes for posi- 
 tion and for supremacy, constantly weeds out the unfit. But to this 
 primitive process other factors are added. 1 The evolution of mind 
 plays a most important part. Keen intelligence, the ability to fore- 
 see and to escape danger, the power of adaptation to the environ- 
 ment or of modifying it become more valuable than mere brute 
 strength in human evolution. Besides, cooperation, resulting from 
 association, and creating altruistic sentiments, is of even greater 
 value ; and groups with the best organization and the most loyal 
 spirit are usually most successful. By these methods, human 
 society tries to fit as many as possible to survive and to live well. 
 
 6. Conflict and cooperation. Conflict and cooperation are, there- 
 fore, the two most powerful factors in all social evolution. "While 
 competition characterizes in the main the relation between groups, 
 especially independent political groups, and while cooperation 
 characterizes in the main the relation of the members of a given 
 group to one another, still competition and cooperation are correla- 
 tives in practically every phase of the social life. Some degree of 
 competition, for example, has to be maintained by every group be- 
 tween its members if it is going to maintain high standards of 
 efficiency or of loyalty. If there were no competition with respect 
 to the matters that concern the inner life of groups, it is evident 
 
 1 Kelly, Government or Human Evolution : Justice, pp. 76-137. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 5 
 
 that the groups would soon lose efficiency in leadership and in 
 membership and would sooner or later be eliminated. Conse- 
 quently society, from certain points of view, presents itself to the 
 student at the present time as a vast competition, while from other 
 standpoints it presents itself as a vast cooperation." 1 The qualities 
 developed by both conflict and cooperation are valuable in political 
 evolution. Courage, strength, and self-reliance, valuable for con- 
 flict, lead to selfishness and isolation and must be modified by the 
 amenability to discipline and organization which make possible 
 political life ; without, however, entirely destroying the warlike 
 virtues, lest the group perish at the hands of more aggressive 
 neighbors. Docility sufficient to permit social organization, coupled 
 with courage and strength sufficient to resist aggression, were 
 needed during the period when political evolution was largely de- 
 pendent upon physical struggle ; and the same qualities, applied 
 in a modified form to the conditions of modern life, characterize 
 the successful states of the present day. 
 
 7. Problems in political evolution. In the third place, the con- 
 ception that there have been problems in political evolution im- 
 plies that certain conditions have arisen demanding the purposeful 
 adjustment of means to ends. While much of the process of state 
 development took place before man was conscious of his political 
 life and before he made any effort deliberately to direct or modify 
 his political institutions or activities, even then certain fundamental 
 problems, by their very nature underlying the course of state evo- 
 lution, were taking form and being met in a crude way by primi- 
 tive devices and methods of government. Later, when man realized 
 the existence of the state and the possibility of change through his 
 own efforts, he stated these problems more or less clearly, and 
 began to think and to experiment toward their solution. 
 
 8. Fundamental problems. While endless difficulties constantly 
 arose, even in the minutest details of political organization and 
 function, certain questions stood out above all others, the answers 
 to which determined the essential nature of political forms and the 
 general lines of their development. Some of these fundamental 
 problems, which have existed since the first states arose, which 
 
 1 Ellwood, Sociology and Modern Social Problems, p. 47. 
 
6 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 have been met in various ways, and which mankind is still strug- 
 gling to solve, may be framed as follows : Who shall constitute 
 the state ? What shall be its extent in population and area ? What 
 shall be the bonds holding its members together ? If the state be 
 large, what shall be the proper adjustment of central and local 
 authority ? Who shall rule the state ? On what basis shall their 
 authority rest? On what basis shall governing powers be distributed 
 among the various organs of government ? What shall the state 
 do ? What is the proper limit to its activities ? What, in last 
 analysis, are the proper ends or purposes of the state ? 
 
 9. Necessity of compromise. The solution of each of these 
 problems demands a compromise. The state, by its very nature, 
 involves an adjustment between its own authority and the freedom 
 of its individuals, between that complete sovereignty which is 
 despotism and that complete liberty which is anarchy. Some com- 
 promise must be reached in the dealings of states one with another. 
 The various solutions of these difficulties that have been attempted, 
 the shifting adjustments under changing conditions, the decline 
 of some and the creation of other institutions, — these make up 
 the story of political development, 1 and have demanded the best 
 efforts of many of the world's greatest thinkers and mightiest 
 workers. While much progress has been made in establishing a 
 rational and satisfactory basis for the consideration of these ques- 
 tions, and while some of them are fairly well worked out in mod- 
 ern states, all still occupy the attention of statesmen or arouse the 
 interest of the masses, and some are still sufficiently unsettled to 
 cause internal revolutions or international wars. Since the state 
 is an evolution, no permanent solution of these problems can 
 be expected. The need remains, however, that each people in 
 each age shall make such adjustments as best conserve their 
 best interests under existing conditions, looking at the same time 
 to such modifications of the conditions as may make possible still 
 further progress. 
 
 10. Sources of data. Finally, it is necessary that a body of facts 
 should exist from which information concerning the development 
 of the state may be secured, and that a method of analysis, 
 
 1 Dealey, Development of the State, Part I ; Jenks, History of Politics, chap. i. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 7 
 
 classification, and interpretation should be available in order to de- 
 duce general principles concerning political evolution. 1 Thoughtful 
 students are coming to realize that no science dealing with man has 
 a special field of data to itself. 2 The various social sciences merely 
 view human action from different points of view. Man as a politi- 
 cal animal, acting upon political motives as distinguished sharply 
 from other motives, is a pure abstraction. Instead of a " natural " 
 man, an " economic " man, a " religious " man, or a " political " 
 man, the whole man, influenced by motives of all kinds, performs 
 his duties and observes his obligations in the state as a part of his 
 broader and more complete social life. The state is, indeed, a social 
 as well as a political organism, and has even its physical and psychi- 
 cal elements. A study of political eyolution must therefore draw 
 materials from many fields. Archaeology and anthropology disclose 
 data concerning primitive forms of political life. Geography, ethnol- 
 ogy, and psychology furnish information concerning the influence 
 of nature and of the physical and mental traits of individuals upon 
 political development. 3 History reveals step by step the processes 
 in the origin and development of the state, and makes possible a 
 comparative survey of periods and of institutions. 4 Sociology, eco- 
 nomics, ethics, and jurisprudence contribute material in the form 
 of facts, generalizations, theories, and methods of investigation and 
 interpretation. 5 Governments, through numerous bureaus and pri- 
 vate associations and investigators, obtain data of every sort, histori- 
 cal, descriptive, and statistical. " From this vast heterogeneous 
 mass of materials are coming an ever sounder notion of the origin, 
 
 1 Lewis, Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics. 
 
 2 Beard, Politics, pp. 5-12. 
 
 8 Jellinek, Recht des modernen Staates, pp. 72-120. 
 
 * For the relation of history to political science, see Seeley, Introduction to 
 Political Science, Lecture I ; Bryce, " Relations of Political Science to History and 
 to Practice," in American Political Science Review, February, 1909; Burgess, 
 " Relation of Political Science to History," in Report of the American Historical 
 Association, Vol. I (1896). 
 
 6 On the relations of political science to the other social sciences, see Garner, 
 " Relations of Political Science," in American Journal of Sociology, November, 
 1906 ; Small, " Relation of Political Science and Sociology," in American Journal 
 of Sociology, July, 1906 ; Hadley, " Relation of Political Science and Economics," 
 in publications of the American Economic Association, 1899; Garner, "Relation 
 of Political Science and Ethics," in International Journal of Ethics, January, 1907. 
 
8 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 functions, and tendencies of the state, a higher view of its possi- 
 bilities as the experiments of each nation are placed at the disposal 
 of all, and finally a more scientific theory of causation in politics." 2 
 
 11. Methods of natural and social sciences. A fundamental dif- 
 ference in methods exists between scientific investigation as employed 
 by the physical sciences and that employed by the social sciences. 2 
 In the former, observation, experiment, and verification are the tools. 
 The object under examination must be isolated, exactly described, 
 and contrasted with other objects. The chief purpose is to ascertain 
 its qualities by a series of accurate experiments and studies. In con- 
 trast the social sciences deal with wholes or with a composition of 
 forces that cannot be isolated nor studied as single units. Society 
 is a living organization, whose component units are living beings ; 
 and the laboratory method of study is not available. Hence, chief 
 attention must be directed to great changes, to modifications in the 
 whole so prominent that the effects are conspicuous. Minor causes 
 must be ignored, since it is impossible to isolate and measure them ; 
 emphasis must be placed upon major causes and consequences, and 
 these are clearly seen only after the lapse of a considerable period 
 of time. Experimentation, as carried on in the natural sciences, 
 where phenomena are artificially created and observed with the aid 
 of apparatus, is obviously impossible ; although every deliberate mod- 
 ification of existing political conditions is a form of experiment, 
 and much valuable material may be secured by careful observation 
 of the actual workings of government, of the influence of past tra- 
 ditions and present-day conditions, and of the results of such polit- 
 ical changes as are made from time to time. 3 
 
 12. The biological analogy. The biological analogy, which com- 
 pares the state to a living organism, classifies its parts, describes 
 its structure, analyzes its functions, and traces its life processes 
 according to the methods of the biologic sciences and on the basis 
 of the theory of organic evolution, is of value in emphasizing the 
 unity and continuous development of the state and its dependence 
 
 1 Beard, Politics, p. 8 ; see also Seeley, Introduction to Political . Science, 
 Lecture II. 
 
 2 Patten, Social Basis of Religion, pp. 21-24. 
 
 8 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 22-23. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 9 
 
 upon its physical and social environment ; although the resemblance 
 between the body politic and a living organism is superficial; the 
 laws which determine the growth and evolution of the former being 
 in the main inapplicable to the latter. 1 
 
 13. The psychological and juridical methods. Some writers, 
 especially in France, have attempted to interpret political institu- 
 tions and explain political phenomena by means of psychological 
 laws. 2 Others, especially in Germany, analyze the public law of 
 states and, neglecting the extralegal and social forces that underlie 
 actual government, attempt to deduce the nature of the state from 
 a study of constitutions, treaties, and statutes. 3 
 
 14. The historical method. Probably the most fruitful method 
 is based on a comparative study of historical data. 4 Political insti- 
 tutions can be understood only through a knowledge of their origin 
 and past development. History " brings in review the great politi- 
 cal movements of the past, traces the organic development of the 
 national life, inquires into the growth of political ideas from their 
 inception to their realization in objective institutions, discovers the 
 moral idea as revealed in history and thereby points out the way of 
 progress." 5 Such investigation assembles a mass of material from 
 which, by selection, comparison, and elimination, ideal types and 
 progressive forces may be discovered. To be sure, only those states 
 which are contemporaneous and which have a common historical 
 basis for their political and social institutions may be compared with 
 advantage. Allowance must also be made for the personal bias of 
 historians and investigators, for the constant temptation to confuse 
 what ought to be with what is, 6 and for the danger of depending 
 too largely on written constitutions and laws, on the skeleton of 
 political organization, thereby neglecting the actual working of polit- 
 ical institutions, the administration of the laws, and the influences 
 
 1 For a statement of the biological analogy, see Spencer, Principles of Sociology, 
 Vol. I, Part II ; Schaffle, Bau und Leben des socialen Korpers. For a criticism 
 of the analogy, see Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 35-38. 
 
 2 Le Bon, Lois psychologiques de 1'evolution des peuples. 
 
 8 Jellinek, " Die juristische Methode in der Staatslehre," in Recht des modernen 
 Staates, Bk. I, chap. ii. 
 
 4 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Introduction, chap. ii. 
 
 5 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, p-. 28. 
 
 6 Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 18-22. 
 
IO PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 behind the obvious governmental machinery. 1 Besides, the com- 
 plexity of political evolution renders any attempt to discover general 
 principles liable to error, because of the danger of overlooking cir- 
 cumstances, conditions, or influences, whose omission may invalidate 
 the most important conclusions. 2 This difficulty of generalization 
 leads to an unfortunate tendency toward one of two extremes. On 
 the one hand, there is the danger of theorizing on the basis of 
 very little historical evidence, of elaborating a one-sided hypothesis, 
 chiefly by using the imagination or by neglecting facts that contra- 
 dict the original theory or demand its reconstruction. 3 On the other 
 hand, there is the danger of becoming a mere observer or gatherer 
 of facts, without attempting to bring out their meanings or to for- 
 mulate generalizations. The interest then becomes that of the anti- 
 quarian rather than that of the scientist, and the real problem is 
 lost sight of in the collection of superficially related facts. 4 
 
 15. Political history and political theory. Two phases of history 
 furnish especially valuable data for the study of political evolution, 
 — the history of political theory and the history of political, insti- 
 tutions. The evolution of the state has followed two lines, fairly 
 distinct, yet closely interrelated. One has been the development of 
 the state in actual practice, as manifested in outward organization 
 and activity. This is the state objective as described in political 
 history. It is the story of the various states that have actually 
 existed, their origin, development, organization, and functions. 
 The other phase has been the development of the state subjective, 
 the idea of the state as it has been evolved in the minds of men. 
 This is the field of political theory. 5 Between political theory and 
 political institutions the relation has always been close. Ordinarily, 
 political theories are the direct result of objective political conditions. 
 They reflect the thoughts and interpret the motives that underlie 
 
 1 Lowell, " Physiology of Politics," in American Political Science Review, 
 February, igio. 
 
 2 For a suggestive treatment of the method and scope of inquiry in social evo- 
 lution, see Forrest, Development of Western Civilization, Appendix. 
 
 3 Brooks Adams, Law of Civilization and Decay ; Patten, Development of Eng- 
 lish Thought ; and Simons, Social Forces in American History, are examples. 
 
 4 See Small, " The Sociologists' Point of View," in American Journal of Soci- 
 ology, Vol. Ill, pp. 145-170, for a statement of the proper middle ground between 
 these tendencies, 6 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 14-17. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 1 1 
 
 actual political development. They indicate the spirit and conditions 
 of their age. On the other hand, political theories also influence 
 political development. They are not only the outgrowth of actual 
 conditions, but, as political ideals, they, in turn, lead men to modify 
 their institutions. Political theories are thus both cause and effect. 
 Changing conditions create new theories ; these in turn influence 
 actual political methods. Theory and practice go hand in hand. 1 
 Accordingly, any discussion of the evolution of the state must take 
 into consideration both the state subjective, in political theory, and 
 the state objective, as manifested in political institutions, and must 
 draw its material from the history of both. 2 In addition, an under- 
 standing of the underlying causes and the intricate interrelations of 
 political development demands some familiarity with the general 
 field of history, and. material must be drawn from our knowledge of 
 human life in all its aspects, some of which are directly, others in- 
 directly, connected with the development of the state. At the same 
 time, this mass of material must constantly be viewed from the 
 standpoint of political science, and must be so selected and inter- 
 preted as to throw light on the political life of man, — on that law- 
 enforcing organization and authority that has been found wherever 
 human life has reached any considerable degree of advancement. 
 
 16. The state as static and dynamic. The evolution of the state 
 may be observed from a still different point of view. At any given 
 time the state may be considered as static or dynamic ; that is, it 
 may be viewed as at rest or in motion. Emphasis may be laid on 
 what the state is, or on what it does. Attention may be directed to 
 the -nature of the state in its organization, or to the purpose and 
 functions of the state in actual operation. Any description of the 
 state that omits a consideration of its activities is obviously incom- 
 plete. Hence, in following the development of the state, both the 
 nature of its governmental machinery and the functions performed 
 by this machinery must be described. 3 
 
 1 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, Preface. 
 
 2 Pollock, History of the Science of Politics ; Jenks, History of Politics. 
 
 8 This distinction between what is often called " theoretical " and " applied " 
 politics has been observed by a number of writers, among whom may be mentioned 
 Holtzendorff, Jellinek, Janet, Lewis, Bain, and Pollock. See Garner, Introduction 
 to Political Science, pp. 8-9. 
 
12 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 17. The internal and external aspects of the state. A still 
 further general distinction may be noted. The fundamental re- 
 lations of the state are of two kinds : first, its relation to the indi- 
 viduals composing it ; second, its relation to other states. The state 
 has, thus, its internal aspect, as determined by its municipal law; 
 and its external aspect, as determined by the customs and principles 
 now called international law. 1 In tracing the development of the 
 state, both must be considered. The state determines, from time 
 to time, who are included in its citizen body, what shall be their 
 share in authority and their sphere of freedom against the encroach- 
 ment of other individuals or of the government. In general, the 
 respective interests of the state as a unit and of its individuals 
 must be clearly defined and adjusted. At the same time, the state 
 is involved in relations — diplomatic, commercial, warlike — with 
 other states, and these also affect the process of its development. 
 
 18. General nature of political evolution. In tracing the evolu- 
 tion of the state, therefore, many and varied elements will be found, 
 so closely interwoven as often to be inseparable. Such a study 
 must include an account of the origin of the state and a chrono- 
 logical description of its development from the simple tribal horde 
 of primitive times to the complex organization of the present day ; 
 and this process must be viewed as taking place both in the minds 
 of men, as political theory, and in outward manifestation, as politi- 
 cal institutions. Besides, the state must be considered from the 
 standpoint of both organization and function, and the relation of 
 the state to its component individuals and to other states must be 
 included. By combining all these, a general survey of the historical 
 development of the state in all its forms, relations, and activities 
 
 N may be made, and the state, in its origin and growth, may be con- 
 sidered as one phase of the general evolution of nature and of man. 
 
 II. Limitations on General Process 
 
 19. Geographical limitations. While it is, therefore, possible 
 to trace a general process of state evolution, this has not been a 
 single process, nor has it had a simple or uniform development. 
 
 1 Crane, " The State in Constitutional and International Law," in Johns Hop- 
 kins University Studies, Series XXV, Nos. 6-7. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE. STATE 1 3 
 
 Certain limitations and exceptions must be noted. In the first place 
 a geographic limit must be fixed. Human life has been found in 
 almost all parts of the earth, and some form of organized authority, 
 or state, of a more or less definite type, has been universal. Many 
 of these communities, however, have been isolated and have played 
 no part in the development of modern political life. Others have 
 remained stagnant, showing little evidence of advancement. Still 
 others, for a long time outside the current of political evolution, 
 have only recently taken part in the world movement. Hence, in 
 outlining any continuous process of state development, only those 
 peoples who have contributed to modern political ideas and methods 
 will be considered. States will be included only when they are 
 brought into contact with that movement that has resulted in 
 modern political civilization. 1 
 
 20. Geographical origins of the state. From this standpoint, 
 the origin of the state will be found in the fertile river valleys of 
 Africa and Asia, — the Nile and the Euphrates, ■ — and- in the 
 middle country between these valleys, — the land of the Phoenicians 
 and Hebrews. From this center, political development spread to 
 Persia on the east, and to Greece and Rome on the west. After 
 various phases of state life, the political development of the ancient 
 world culminated in the Roman Empire, civilization centering in 
 the area surrounding the Mediterranean. The barbarian invasions 
 extended the territory of this process to all Europe, and the modern 
 states arose in various parts of that continent. Later, the discovery 
 of America opened up a new world to political evolution, shifting 
 the center of interest from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Still 
 more recently, the Far East has been brought within the compass 
 of modern civilization, and the shores of the Pacific, as well as of 
 the Atlantic, influence present political affairs. During this same 
 time the great nations, in building up their widespread colonial 
 dominions, have been extending their sway into remote parts of 
 the earth, so that, at present, scarcely any region is outside the 
 current of political movement. 
 
 1 That portion of the history of the whole world in which we are especially 
 interested is the history of those nations which in successive stages have created 
 the civilization we enjoy. — Adams, European History, p. 1. 
 
14 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 21. No single line of political development. Even within this 
 gradually expanding area, the evolution of the state has not been a 
 single or continuous process. States have arisen at different times, 
 in different places, by processes by no means uniform, and have 
 manifested themselves in diverse forms and through various activi- 
 ties. Any attempt to find a single origin for the state is impossible. 
 In fact, no definite step can be pointed out as the critical change 
 from a previous, nonpolitical condition to a later, organized state. 
 The origin of the state is itself an evolution, influenced by many 
 conditions, and brought to pass in different ways. When human 
 life, in association, reached a certain general point and came under 
 certain general influences, some form of organized authority, more 
 or less political, resulted ; and numerous states thus arose by a 
 process similar only in its main features. 1 Likewise, in its develop- 
 ment no single line can be traced. Many writers have attempted 
 to find a regular sequence or a rule of general application in the 
 successive transformations through which governments pass. 2 Plato 
 taught that authority in the state was controlled in turn by the best, 
 then by the military, then by the wealthy, then by the mob, result- 
 ing finally in tyranny. 3 According to Aristotle, the state began as 
 a monarchy, which later became an aristocracy. This in time passed 
 through the stages of oligarchy and tyranny, and finally became a 
 democracy. Gradually democracy also tended to break down and 
 was usually replaced by monarchy, the cycle thus starting again at 
 the beginning. 4 More recent scholars have also laid down principles 
 of succession in the evolution of governmental forms. Bluntschli, 
 for example, held that normal states pass through the stages of 
 theocracy, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, with the danger 
 of degenerating into the accompanying abnormal forms of hierarchy, 
 tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy. 5 
 
 22. No universal cycles in political development. History fur- 
 nishes abundant evidence, however, to prove that the evolution of 
 the state follows no universal sequences. Different types of state 
 have existed side by side, the process of growth moving in some 
 
 1 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. I. 
 
 2 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 200-204. 
 
 8 Republic, Bk. VIII. * Politics, Bk. VI. 6 Politik, pp. 310-312. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE IS 
 
 places and among some peoples more rapidly than elsewhere, and 
 the form of each state adapting itself to existing needs and condi- 
 tions. Thus the empire of Alexander was contemporary with the 
 Roman Republic, and the Mohammedan Empire was formed when 
 western Europe was politically disorganized and feudal. Neither 
 has this process worked itself out to any uniform conclusion. 
 Numerous forms of political civilization still survive, no two mod- 
 ern states being alike except in their essential nature. However, 
 if attention be centered on those peoples who have most directly 
 contributed to political progress, a fairly definite and uniform course 
 of development, in certain important phases, may be observed. 1 
 
 23. General process of political development. The state emerged 
 in the form of a loose, tribal horde, held together mainly by bonds 
 of kinship and religion, and by the necessity for cooperation in se- 
 curing order and protection for life and property within the group, 
 and for defense or aggression against other groups. Under the 
 natural conditions prevailing in the East, the tribal horde grew 
 into the despotic Oriental empire, vast and loose-jointed, under 
 the absolute rule of the priestly and military classes. Such was 
 the type of state found in Egypt, Babylon, and Persia, and, more 
 isolated, in India, China, Mexico, and Peru. Under a different 
 environment, the primitive tribes sometimes aggregated into vil- 
 lages, and these, in turn, grew into city states. In Phoenicia, 
 Greece, and, for a time, in Italy, this form of political organization 
 flourished. The expansion and conquests of Rome broke down the 
 independence of these small units, and the incorporation of many 
 cities under one rule established the Roman Empire, — a world 
 state including all the western civilization of that time. Resem- 
 bling in some ways the earlier Oriental empires, the Roman state 
 made valuable contributions to political progress, establishing new 
 concepts of sovereignty, citizenship, and law. The internal decline 
 of the Roman world and the migrations of the barbarian Teutons 
 overthrew this world empire, and during the Dark Ages political 
 life was chaotic. The theory of world empire survived, but the 
 church exercised large temporal powers, and much governing 
 authority fell into the hands of the leaders who confiscated the lands. 
 
 1 Gettell, Introduction to Political Science, chap. vi. 
 
1 6 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 A mingling of personal allegiance, of governing power based on 
 landowning, and of the conflicting claims of church and state char- 
 acterized this period ; and to this condition the term feudal state 
 is applied. Gradually, as civilization advanced, and a more definite 
 organization became possible, a new type of state, with geographic 
 and ethnic unity as its basis, appeared. This was the national state, 
 representing a homogeneous people, occupying a territory with 
 more or less distinct natural boundaries. This type of state repre- 
 sents man's most advanced political product. In it the diminutive 
 size of the city state, too weak to carry on the activities necessary 
 for. public welfare, is avoided, as well as the unwieldy and stagnant 
 uniformity of the world empire. A natural unity in territory and 
 population is utilized and political bonds are strengthened by com- 
 mon interests which seem rational and inevitable. These states, 
 Spain, England, France, and others, arose as absolute monarchies, 
 with national life and international rivalries centering around their 
 kings. More recently, political development has been occupied with 
 the gradual democratization of the state internally, and with the estab- 
 lishment of colonial empires as the most important external activity. 
 24. Limitations on general process. In these broad outlines a 
 general process of state evolution may be observed, the various 
 forms — tribal empire, city state, world empire, feudal state, and 
 national state — marking the main stages of development. 1 How- 
 ever, these stages cannot be regarded as clear-cut types following 
 a regular order of progress. The ideal of world empire, for exam- 
 ple, has often filled the imagination of men, and Alexander, Caesar, 
 Charlemagne, and Napoleon, in widely separated epochs, achieved, 
 more or less completely, its realization. Similarly, the city state 
 has arisen at different periods, the free towns of Italy, Germany, 
 and Flanders in the Middle Ages reproducing many features of 
 earlier Greece and Rome. Neither has this process been continu- 
 ously progressive. Political contributions, worked out after bitter 
 effort, have been destroyed as new conditions placed chief emphasis 
 on new needs, or as new peoples had to be raised from barbarism. 2 
 The democratic principles worked out in Greece were subordinated 
 
 1 Sicjgwick, Development of European Polity. 
 
 2 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. IV, chaps, i-v. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 17 
 
 to the need for strong authority in binding together the extensive 
 and diverse Roman Empire ; and the excellent organization devel- 
 oped by Rome fell in turn before the anarchic individualism of the 
 Teutons. Only after many costly experiments has man acquired 
 his present ability to combine sovereignty and liberty, to secure 
 unity of organization over large areas, and to support authority on 
 the broad basis of popular will. 
 
 25. Evolution not always progressive. It should also be remem- 
 bered that while evolution is usually associated with progress, it 
 may also imply degeneration. Under unfavorable conditions evolu- 
 tion still takes place, but development ceases^and retrogression sets 
 in. The eyeless fish of the dark caves of Kentucky, the moss of 
 the arctic regions, and the sagebrush of the alkali deserts are re- 
 sults of evolution in environments unfavorable to progress. Evolu- 
 tion means growth ; progress means growth in respect of those 
 qualities to which human beings can rationally attach value. "For 
 example, a caste system is a product of social evolution, and the 
 more rigid and narrow the caste, the more complex the hierarchy, 
 the more completely has the caste system evolved. In proportion, 
 that is, as a loose and incipient caste system hardens into an ex- 
 treme and rigid caste system, there is a distinct process of social 
 evolution going forward ; but most of us would question very 
 strongly whether it could be considered in any sense as a phase 
 of social progress. Judged from the standpoint of human values, 
 it looks more like retrogression, or perhaps still more like diver- 
 gence into a side track, from which there is no exit save by going 
 back over a good deal of the ground traveled. So again there is 
 at the present day a vigorous evolution of cartels, monopolies, rings, 
 and trusts ; there is an evolution of imperialism, of socialism, of 
 nationalism, of militarism, in a word, of a hundred tendencies as 
 to the good or evil of which people differ. The fact that a thing 
 is evolving is no proof that it is good, the fact that society has 
 evolved is no proof that it has progressed." 1 
 
 26. Political retrogression. While the history of the state, 
 viewed as a whole, shows increasing perfection of organization and 
 increasing usefulness of function, it also shows political institutions 
 
 1 Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, p. 8. 
 
1 8 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 sinking into decay. Greece and Rome, after their civilizations had 
 borne fruit, fell before more vigorous peoples, and their political 
 forms and methods were replaced by others, not always better in 
 themselves, yet better suited to new conditions. Similarly, within 
 each state, there is an atrophy of institutions no longer useful to 
 the growing organization. . The crown in England has lost most 
 of its former prerogatives, and the methods of the town meeting 
 are no longer possible in modern New England cities. Yet in a 
 broader view, even this retrogression will usually prove to.be a part 
 of a larger progress, 1 and there is as yet no evidence that political 
 advancement as a whole has not been continuous. 
 
 27. The costs of progress. Several causes may be suggested as 
 partially explaining the broken and uneven nature of progress. In 
 primitive times the control of man over nature was small and even 
 the most advanced peoples could not successfully cope with the 
 superior brute strength of their less advanced neighbors. Victory 
 was not to the best but to the strongest, and not until the best be- 
 came the strongest could they secure the permanence of their type. 
 Superior civilizations were repeatedly overthrown by deluges of 
 barbarism ; and it is only in our own time that the physical condi- 
 tions of life have come so far within human control as to render 
 possible a permanent and unbroken development of civilization. 
 Besides, social progress engenders certain internal conditions that 
 cause decay and possible destruction. 2 The same control over ex- 
 ternal nature that makes possible the survival of the higher type 
 causes also social inequality. " The individual, the caste, the race 
 of higher powers will hold the weaker enslaved to their immediate 
 profit, to the gain of industrial civilization, but to the immeasurable 
 loss of much besides. The mechanical developments of the eight- 
 eenth and nineteenth centuries afford the basis for a wholly new 
 type of civilization, but this possibility is not to close our eyes to 
 the lowering of the standard of life and the mechanizing of great 
 masses of human beings which they have entailed. We may go 
 still further, and maintain with Plato that in the civilized world 
 
 1 See Evolution by Atrophy in Biology and Sociology, by Demoor and others. 
 Translated from the French by Mrs. Chalmers Mitchell. 
 
 2 Giddings, Democracy and Empire, chap. v. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 19 
 
 every form of society perishes by its inherent vices as much as 
 by external assault. Thus the states of Plato's own time decayed 
 through internal faction, and the narrowness of the spirit of au- 
 tonomy which forever nipped the shoots of Pan-Hellenic sentiment. 
 The Roman state, enjoying a far higher level of political capacity, 
 could not reconcile liberty with empire, nor even the stability of 
 automatic rule with the power of the soldier and the vast physical 
 extent of the frontiers. For the modern world there remain prob- 
 lems of reconciliation no less grave." x 
 
 III. Changes in Political Conceptions 
 
 28. Conceptions of the nature of the state. During the progress 
 of political development, conceptions of the nature of the state have 
 undergone radical changes. In the beginning, political life was 
 closely bound up with family and religious interests. No distinc- 
 tion was made, in organization or function, between state, family, 
 and church. Ties of kinship and religion united the group, and 
 authority was exercised under patriarchal and priestly sanction. As 
 the state developed, political rule, based on human sanction and 
 distinct from- paternal and divine power, became more definite ; 
 and family, church, and state differentiated, each with its own or- 
 ganization and its own sphere of interests and activities. 2 On the 
 other hand, the idea that the state should carry on certain activi- 
 ties which public welfare demands, and Which individuals cannot 
 or will not undertake, is gaining ground. During the past century, 
 especially, the fundamental changes in political, economic, and 
 social life have caused a complete reversal in the attitude of men 
 to the state. While the private life of individuals is under less 
 state supervision than formerly, there is a growing demand for 
 increased activity on the part of the government in fields formerly 
 private but now affected with a public interest. 
 
 29. Conceptions of law. The conception of law has -likewise 
 undergone a decided transformation. Originating as custom, sup- 
 ported by immemorial tradition and the prevailing belief in divine 
 
 1 Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, pp. 163-164. 
 
 2 See below, Chapter V. 
 
20 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 sanction, 1 law was later considered as existing in nature, to be 
 discovered and applied by man. Only the more advanced peoples 
 ever attained to the idea that law, as the will of the state, should be 
 formulated and administered by its governmental organs. Hence, 
 the state, entering as the arbiter to enforce existing customs and 
 decide disputes arising under them, finally became the source and 
 the sanction of law. The purpose of law has undergone a similar 
 change. The earliest codes were a series of negatives. 2 They 
 aimed at restraint, were composed of prohibitions and compulsions, 
 and enacted punishments. At present, law, instead of being nega- 
 tive, prohibitive, and individual, is positive, permissive, and social. 
 Only a small part of modern law consists of restraints laid upon 
 aggressive, nonsocial individuals ; a much larger portion consists 
 in attempts to prevent wrongdoing or the conditions that make it 
 possible, and to perform services for the promotion of general wel- 
 fare. Law has become one of the chief means by which intelligent 
 selection has replaced natural selection in human evolution. Our 
 legislative bodies constantly act with reference to the effect of laws 
 upon society. 3 
 
 30. Conceptions of the basis of political authority. Besides, 
 changing conditions have modified the conception of the basis 
 of political authority. At first the ruler was lord of his people. 
 The state was a collection of individuals, sometimes without per- 
 manent abode, and obedience was a more or less personal matter, 
 rendered to the chief or king because of his position in the kin- 
 ship group or his supposed relation to the gods. As life became 
 more stable and agriculture and trade necessitated permanent 
 homes, especially after feudalism associated the ideas of govern- 
 ing power and landholding, the concept of territorial sovereignty 
 arose. Kings became lords of the land, rather than of the 
 people, — of England and of France instead of the English and 
 the Franks, — • and questions of citizenship and allegiance became 
 of more importance than those of religion and birth. At present 
 the authority of the state has, fundamentally, a territorial basis, the 
 
 1 Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, pp. 638-668. 
 
 2 For example, the Ten Commandments of the Hebrews. 
 
 s Parsons, Legal Doctrine and Social Progress, pp. 98-101, 216-219. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 21 
 
 jurisdiction of the state coinciding with its area and extending over 
 all persons within its domain. There are, at the same time, certain 
 survivals of personal allegiance, in the form of exterritoriality and 
 exemptions from jurisdiction. 1 
 
 31. Conceptions of the social bond. This same process may be 
 viewed also from the standpoint of the fundamental social bond 
 uniting individuals, or the dominant force which gives its character 
 to the social union at different periods of political development. 
 These primary ties have been, first, kinship ; second, authority ; 
 and third, citizenship. Through all these stages religion has been 
 a powerful bond, strengthening the hold of the other factor upon 
 the minds of men. The lower forms of society rested in a special 
 way upon the blood tie. Whatever principles of descent or of 
 marriage prevailed, primitive societies depended upon kinship, 
 developing naturally from the family instinct and the groupings 
 that result from it, and being supported by the religious worship 
 of ancestors. The growth of society demanded closer integration 
 and more powerful authority. Warfare especially, in increasing 
 discipline and obedience, strengthened the power of the chieftain 
 and, in establishing relations between conquerors and conquered, 
 built up a new form of society based on force. The ruler sur- 
 rounded himself with ceremony, added the religious support of 
 divine right to his position, and strengthened himself by distribut- 
 ing territory and authority to his most powerful followers. In this 
 way the despotic monarchies and the feudal lordships were estab- 
 lished, a fundamental change in the conception of the nature of 
 political organization replacing the earlier kinship grouping, and 
 law as a command imposed by a superior replacing the earlier 
 sacred customs. 
 
 Civilized peoples alone have reached the third stage, where the 
 relations of government and governed are in a fashion reversed. 
 The citizens form the state, and the government is their servant. 
 The civic bond consists in a general realization of obligation as 
 among the individual members of the state, and as between the 
 state and its members. Government comes into close relation with 
 the actual life of the people, and law is an expression of the will of 
 1 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, Part II, chap. iii. 
 
22 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 those who obey it. While the principle of citizenship in modern 
 states is complicated by the necessity of uniting diverse nationali- 
 ties and of dealing with subject peoples, it renders possible a form 
 of union as vital and enduring as the kinship clan, and as wide 
 and orderly as the despotic empire. At the same time it " adds a 
 measure of freedom to the constituent parts and an elasticity to 
 the whole which are peculiarly its own." x 
 
 32. Conceptions of relations among states. In the relations 
 among states, especially great changes have taken place. In 
 ancient times states knew little of one another. Their dealings 
 were mainly in unregulated war, and no rights or obligations 
 were acknowledged except to peoples of the same race. The 
 Greeks developed crude commercial codes, and Rome, in her 
 jus gentium, seemed to find certain natural laws common to all 
 peoples ; but international relations, in the proper sense of the 
 term, did not exist. The establishment of the Roman. Empire, 
 including the whole civilized world, made international relations 
 impossible ; and for a long time, even after Rome's fall, the ideal 
 of a supreme world power prevented the rise of independent and 
 equal states. Toward the end of the Middle Ages the growth of 
 modern national states, nearly equal in power, and with relations 
 in peace and war that demanded regulation, made possible the 
 existing theory of international relations and gave birth to inter- 
 national law. At present, the establishment of colonial empires, 
 protectorates, and spheres of influence, the existence of theories 
 such as the balance of power and the Monroe Doctrine, together 
 with the tendencies toward international unity, as manifested in 
 the recent Hague conferences, — all seem to indicate a new tran- 
 sitional stage in international development, and the results of these 
 contradictory tendencies cannot, at present, be foreseen. 2 
 
 33. Conceptions of relation of state to individual. In the rela- 
 tion of the state to its component individuals, development has 
 followed two main lines. On the one hand has been the necessity 
 for making the authority of the state more definite, sure, and power- 
 ful, and at the same time for marking off clearly and protecting 
 
 1 Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, chap. vi. 
 
 2 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE STATE 23 
 
 absolutely a sphere of freedom, within which the individual may 
 live and act without interference from other individuals or from 
 the government. 1 On the other hand has been the question of the 
 share of the people in governing power, and, as political conscious- 
 ness spread throughout the mass of the population, a constantly 
 increasing popular influence in government has resulted. By these 
 two processes the relation of sovereignty to liberty has been adjusted, 
 and by the establishment of both civil and political liberty, that is, 
 of freedom from interference and of a share in governing, the state 
 has been founded on the secure basis of self-government. Finally, 
 by the principles of local self-government and representation, an 
 organization which secures unity in common affairs without sacri- 
 ficing individual liberty is made possible, and democracy over large 
 areas is at last secured. In this way, also, the activities of the 
 state, formerly feared as representing the irregular and capricious 
 will of a despot, are now welcomed as the will of the people ; and 
 a constantly growing field, in the form of definite and uniform 
 legislation, is opening to collective activity. 2 
 
 34. General conclusions. Several generalizations regarding the 
 process of state evolution may be added. As in the evolution of 
 all advancing organizations, the process has been from the simple 
 to the complex. Governmental organs have differentiated and their 
 functions become more definite, and this process has been charac- 
 terized by increasing unity as the interrelation of part and part 
 became more complete. This process has also been accompanied 
 by the growth of purposeful action on the part of the citizens of 
 the state. Early stages of political union were largely intuitive, but 
 man gradually came to realize the possibilities of change due to his 
 own efforts, and the organization and functions of government were 
 regarded as subject to conscious progress and reform. In general, 
 an increase in the area and population over which the sovereignty 
 of the state extends has characterized the evolution of the state. 
 Man's advance in political ability, making possible the successful 
 working of governmental organization over large areas, the develop- 
 ment of communication and transportation, and the improvements 
 
 1 Scherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, Introduction. 
 
 2 Dealey, Development of the State, chap. xv. 
 
24 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 in economic conditions, enabling a given area to support a dense 
 population, — all tend to increase the size of the state and the 
 number of its citizens. Political development has also been char- 
 acterized by a shifting of emphasis from military to industrial ac- 
 tivities. Improved methods of production and cooperation created 
 an economic surplus. This freed man from the danger of famine, 
 removed much of the temptation to warfare, and encouraged com- 
 mercial relations. It also afforded leisure and made possible the 
 rise of art, literature, science, and philosophy. By such means 
 primitive cultures were changed into civilizations, the struggle for 
 existence was raised above the level of the brute world, and increas- 
 ing dependence was placed on the intellectual and ethical factors 
 in human progress. 1 Improved political methods were both a cause 
 and a result of this process. 
 
 1 Russell, First Conditions of Human Prosperity ; Chapin, Introduction to the 
 Study of Social Evolution ; Ward, Applied Sociology. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 I. General Nature of Influences 
 
 35. Early theories of political development. The intellectual 
 point of view that considers the state a result of evolution is com- 
 paratively recent. 1 Less than a century ago many historians were 
 content to describe facts, usually of a political nature only, and 
 to explain them, if any explanation seemed necessary, on the 
 basis of the " great man " theory, or by a vague reference to the 
 " genius of the age." On the other hand, " philosophies of history " 
 were built up by philosophers who had little knowledge of histori- 
 cal facts. 2 Many viewed social progress as depending fundamen- 
 tally on religion, not realizing that religion is a product as well as 
 a cause of human development. Still others held to the doctrine, 
 which is as old as Aristotle, that the state progressed in a definite 
 way from monarchy to aristocracy, from aristocracy to democracy, 
 and showed a continuous and orderly growth from tyranny to 
 freedom. 
 
 36. Evolutionary theory of political development. The failure 
 of these idealistic explanations cleared the way for those writers 
 who looked to physical rather than psychical forceSj and who em- 
 phasized the importance of the natural environment, 3 and of the 
 economic factors underlying man's material existence. 4 This move- 
 ment, combined with the gradual acceptance of the Darwinian 
 theory of evolution, and its application to the development of 
 social institutions as well as to living organisms, 5 made possible 
 
 1 Seligman, Economic Interpretation of History, Part I, chap. i. 
 
 2 For example, Rousseau's Social Contract. 
 
 8 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws ; Buckle, History of Civilization in England. 
 4 Karl Marx, Capital ; Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, 
 Preface. 
 
 6 Spencer, Principles of Sociology. 
 
 2 5 
 
26 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 a conception of human progress that views the present as a logical 
 outgrowth of the past, that sees the interrelations between institu- 
 tions and environment, and that analyzes, in a partial way at least, 
 the various forces that influence the structure and functions of 
 human society. 
 
 37. Natural and social evolution. At the same time it is real- 
 ized that social institutions, in large part the deliberate work of 
 man, are, to a degree, outside the usual laws of organic evolution. 
 The ability of man consciously to adapt himself to his surround- 
 ings and to modify his environment makes him less and less 
 dependent upon physical conditions and gives prominence again 
 to the psychical elements, since as man conquers nature he be- 
 comes in greater measure the arbiter of his own destiny. 1 The 
 process remains, however, an evolutionary process, with the new 
 and powerful factor of purposeful human effort added. 
 
 38. Importance of the future in present theory. Another, and 
 a more recent, result of the evolutionary conception of human 
 progress has been to shift the emphasis formerly placed entirely 
 on the present and on its relation to the past, to the future and 
 to its relation to the present. 2 Men no longer look forward to 
 an ideal society which is to be perfect and permanent. They 
 realize that progress is continuous, hence in planning for the 
 present they consider also the future ; and, as reasoning crea- 
 tures, realize that the interests of the present and of the indi- 
 vidual must often be subordinated to those of the future and of 
 the- race in general. 
 
 39. Complexity of political evolution. The development of the 
 state, one of the most important and most universal of social organ- 
 izations, illustrates with unusual clearness the principles of social 
 evolution. At the same time, the complexity of the process and 
 the multitude of forces involved make it especially difficult to dis- 
 tinguish the influences that cause or that modify political existence. 
 Forces that appear powerful may be secondary results of hidden 
 causes. Influences affecting one time or place are absent in others. 
 Different conditions yield varying reactions to otherwise similar 
 causes. Physical and psychical elements, individual and social 
 
 1 "Ward, Applied Sociology. 2 Kidd, Western Civilization. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 27 
 
 motives, all in varying combinations and interrelations, exert their 
 influence on the origin, development, organization, and functions 
 of each state; and the relations of states, one to another, further 
 complicate the process. However, without attempting to distin- 
 guish primary from secondary causes or to trace intricate inter- 
 relations, and with no claim to exhaustiveness, we may distinguish 
 some of the more important influences that have affected political 
 evolution. 
 
 II. The Physical Environment 
 
 40. Elements of the physical environment. All political devel- 
 opment takes place under certain physical conditions resulting from 
 geographic location and structure, climate, and natural resources, 
 — mineral, vegetable, and animal. The influence of these factors 
 is always powerful and sometimes decisive. 1 The theory of the 
 predominant influence of the external world on human affairs is 
 chiefly associated with the name of Buckle, although several earlier 
 writers 2 had attacked the " great man " theory, and laid emphasis 
 on the general aspects of society and the influence of the physical 
 environment. Since the time of Buckle, writers who have shown 
 that political and social development is largely determined by the 
 influence of the external world have become numerous. 3 
 
 41. Geographic contour. Geographic contour includes the ex- 
 tent and arrangement of land and water areas, and the size and 
 position of mountains and rivers. It gives an earth divided by 
 nature into a number of land units of various sizes and of various 
 internal formations, whose external natural boundaries are more 
 or less distinct and unbroken. These divisions affect the size of 
 states, since, other things being equal, political areas tend to coin- 
 cide with geographic units. 4 Natural barriers separate peoples in 
 proportion, to the difficulty of surmounting them, to the pressure 
 
 1 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment ; Ripley, " Geography and 
 Sociology," in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. X, No. 4. 
 
 2 Bodin, De Republica Libri Sex, Lib. V, cap. i ; Vico, Principii di una Scienza 
 Nuova d' intorno alia Comune Natura delle Nazioni ; Montesquieu, Spirit of the 
 Laws, Bk. XIV. 
 
 8 For example, Rogers, Ratzel, Loria, Cunningham, Seligman, Patten, Semple, 
 and Brooks Adams. 
 
 4 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 5-29. 
 
28 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of population against them, and to the engineering ability and the 
 development of transportation among those who dwell on either 
 side. Great plains or river valleys are the natural homes of ex- 
 tended empires, while islands or mountain valleys are adapted to 
 smaller and more distinct political units. China, India, and Russia 
 illustrate the former ; Greece, Switzerland, and the British Isles, 
 the latter. Geographic contour also affects the isolation of the 
 state and the direction of its external activity, since social move- 
 ment tends to follow lines of least resistance ; and the trend of 
 migration, conquest, and commerce coincides with natural high- 
 ways on land or sea. 1 The geographic position of a state often 
 determines its greatness ; those peoples who occupied a central 
 position in the civilized world of their day — such as the Phoeni- 
 cians, Greeks, Romans, the inhabitants of the Italian cities, Spain, 
 England, and the United States, in turn — acquiring eminence 
 because controlling the trade routes in all directions. 2 
 
 42. Climate. Climate, including natural conditions of light, 
 heat, and moisture, affects chiefly the individual human being 
 and the fertility of the soil. 3 Climatic extremes of any kind are 
 unfavorable to the highest political life, all the great states having 
 arisen in those parts of the temperate zone that receive a moderate 
 rainfall. Civilization, starting in the subtropical climates of Meso- 
 potamia, China, India, and Egypt, crept north and west as man 
 acquired the art of creating a climate of his own. This movement 
 was different from most of the migrations of peoples, which were 
 usually from a less to a more favorable environment. The rise of 
 states in the cool and bracing air of Europe illustrates the ability 
 of man by intelligent effort to resist and overcome an unfavorable 
 climatic condition and to make more rapid progress in a some- 
 what artificial environment which in the end proves to be better 
 adapted to continuous progress. With the extreme heat of tropical 
 deserts and the extreme cold of arctic ice fields, man is still unable 
 to cope. Climate also affects the birth rate and the age of maturity ; 
 
 1 Fairbanks, Introduction to Sociology, pp. 72-75. 
 
 2 Brooks Adams, The New Empire. 
 
 8 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, chap, xvii ; Huntington, 
 " Changes of Climate and History," in American Historical Review, January, 
 IQI 3. PP- 2 i3- 2 33- 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 29 
 
 and the greater vigor of upland races, long noted for warlike ability, 
 is at least partially due to the influence of rare, dry air. 1 
 
 43. Natural resources. Natural resources — mineral, vegetable, 
 and animal — are powerful factors in state development. In ancient 
 times the use of stone, bronze, and iron for implements and weap- 
 ons marked distinct stages of progress. The use of gold and silver 
 as standards of value revolutionized trade and led to colonization and 
 wars for the possession of these precious metals. 2 In the modern 
 industrial age, deposits of coal and iron are essential. Early states 
 arose where nature furnished food in abundance ; and the great 
 food staples — rice, wheat, corn, the banana, and the palm — have 
 enabled certain areas to support dense aggregations of people, 
 among whom political institutions have of necessity been developed. 
 The importance of spices in the Middle Ages and of cotton in the 
 history of the United States needs but to be mentioned. Among 
 primitive peoples the presence of game and of animals suited to do- 
 mestication have largely determined the status of their civilizations. 
 
 44. General aspects of nature. It has even been claimed that 
 the general aspects of nature influence the type of society. 3 When 
 man is surrounded by terrible earthquakes, volcanoes, hurricanes, 
 avalanches, great mountains, or vast deserts, he hesitates to investi- 
 gate, he lacks self-reliance, he becomes superstitious, and his civili- 
 zation stagnates. If no awful phenomena hold man in terror, his 
 mastery over nature progresses more rapidly, and individualism 
 and reason develop. Of the two types, India and Greece may serve 
 as examples. It is, of course, easy to exaggerate the importance of 
 single influences and to fail to discover underlying causes or com- 
 plex interrelations. The ignorance, superstition, and stagnation of 
 India were also the results of her isolation, while the accessibility 
 and central location of Greece made her an intellectual clearing 
 house and developed imagination and reason. Even political poli- 
 cies frequently have geographic bases. Witness the colonial policies 
 of Holland and England, the militarism of Germany, the European 
 balance of power, and the American Monroe Doctrine. Political 
 
 1 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 20-23. 
 
 2 Brooks Adams, Law of Civilization and Decay. 
 
 8 Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 85-87. 
 
30 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 parties often follow geographic lines of cleavage. North and South 
 in the United States have stood arrayed against each other on 
 many issues ; while in England the southeastern plain and the 
 northwestern highlands were opponents in the War of the Roses, 
 the Civil War, the contest over the repeal of the Corn Laws, and 
 over the Reform Bill of 1832. 1 
 
 III. Economic Conditions 
 
 45. The economic interpretation of history. Of such great in- 
 fluence on the development of social institutions have been the 
 underlying conditions affecting the satisfaction of man's material 
 wants that some thinkers have interpreted all human progress on 
 the basis of economic changes. Aristotle recognized clearly the 
 political influence of economic factors ; 2 Machiavelli believed that 
 the best form of government for a given state depended largely 
 upon the economic condition of its people. 3 Morgan considered it 
 probable "that the great epochs of human progress have been 
 identified, more or less directly, with the enlargement of the 
 sources of subsistence." 4 Marx and Engels developed the theory 
 of socialism fundamentally upon a materialistic conception of the 
 nature of social development. 5 Seligman states the thesis of the 
 economic interpreters of history as follows: "The existence of 
 man depends upon his ability to sustain himself ; the economic life 
 is therefore the fundamental condition of all life. Since human 
 life, however, is the life of man in society, individual existence 
 moves within the framework of the social structure and is modified 
 by it. What the conditions of maintenance are to the individual, 
 the similar relations of production and consumption are to the 
 community. To economic' causes, therefore, must be traced in last 
 instance those transformations in the structure of society which 
 themselves condition the relations of social classes and the various 
 manifestations of social life." 6 
 
 1 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, p. 52. 
 
 2 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, pp. 74, 86, 96. 
 8 Ibid. pp. 307-309. * Ancient Society, p. 19. 
 
 6 Hillquit, Socialism in Theory and Practice, chaps, iii-iv. 
 6 Seligman, Economic Interpretation of History, p. 3. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 31 
 
 46. Importance of the economic environment. In spite of the 
 defect in any theory that attempts a universal explanation from a 
 one-sided viewpoint, and in spite of overdrawn applications of the 
 truths in the theory, the fact remains that the economic influence 
 has always been of the utmost importance in human history and 
 that the organization and the functions of government are pro- 
 foundly affected by the conditions of production and of distri- 
 bution. 1 One of the most convenient ways to characterize the 
 great stages in the evolution of civilization is according to the 
 predominant mode of industry. Thus we speak of the hunting and 
 fishing stage, the pastoral stage, the agricultural stage, the handi- 
 craft stage, and the modern industrial and commercial stage. 2 The 
 growth of man's skill in working metals leads to distinctions be- 
 tween the stone age, the bronze age, and the iron age. Similarly, 
 the transition from barter to the use of money, or from cannibalism 
 to slavery, or from serfdom to free labor, mark the beginnings of 
 new eras. All these broad generalizations show the fundamental 
 importance of the economic environment. 
 
 47. Property and political evolution. The development of 
 property has been responsible for much political progress. Its 
 rise transformed the organization of the family and created that 
 patriarchal type from which the more advanced states emerged. 
 The need of protection for property led to organization, authority, 
 and government. Disputes concerning its possession were respon- 
 sible for much early law. Control over government has often been 
 limited to the wealthy classes ; and modern states retain property 
 qualifications for the suffrage, or give special powers or privileges 
 to the larger property owners. The three-class system of voting in 
 Prussia and the system of multiple voting that obtaineduntil recently 
 in Belgium are examples. 3 
 
 48. Economic bases of state types. The type of state existing 
 at any given time will be found to have an economic basis. In the 
 Oriental empires ease of securing food led to large population, 
 
 1 For a suggestive, but somewhat biased, interpretation of the history of the 
 United States from a materialistic point of view, see Simons, Social Forces in 
 American History. 2 Ely, Evolution of Industrial Society, pp. 26-73. 
 
 8 Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. I, pp. 303-31 1 ; 
 Dupriez, L'Organisation du Suffrage universel en Belgique. 
 
32 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 slavery, and despotism. The comparatively unfertile soil of Greece 
 led to colonies and commerce, her wine and olive oil serving as 
 means of exchange. The causes of both the formation and the 
 decline of the Roman Empire were largely economic, national 
 progress being bound up with the land question. Feudalism rested 
 on land as the sole source of wealth, and on the absence of inter- 
 course, commerce, and trade. The colonial empires of the present 
 day not only contribute to national prestige, but are built up also 
 for the purpose of securing raw materials or of furnishing markets 
 for home industries. Many of the wars of the past two centuries 
 have been fought because of colonial or commercial rivalries, 1 and 
 the condition of present-day international politics is dominated by 
 economic considerations. In some states the party of organized 
 labor is strong enough to hold the balance of governmental power ; 
 while socialism, the only important international political party, 
 rests its assumptions upon an economic interpretation of historical 
 progress. " When we approach the centuries nearer our own time, 
 it has almost become a commonplace to explain in economic terms 
 the political transition of England in the eighteenth century, as 
 well as the French and American revolutions. To take only a 
 few examples from more recent events, it is no longer open to 
 doubt that the democracy of the nineteenth century is largely the 
 result of the Industrial Revolution ; that the entire history of the 
 United States to the Civil War was at the bottom a struggle be- 
 tween two economic principles ; that the Cuban insurrection against 
 Spain, and thus indirectly the Spanish-American War, was the 
 outcome of the sugar situation." 2 
 
 49. Economic bases of human types. Even the type of man's 
 mental ability and character has been largely created by economic 
 conditions. "A savage, like an animal, has no concentration of 
 mind and lacks imagination. He is savage in disposition only 
 when ill-fed or ill-treated. Otherwise he is peaceable, good-natured, 
 and indolent. Patriarchal life, holding as it did the mass of its 
 population at hard labor, developed in them patient endurance and 
 tireless industry, but no high mentality. That developed in the 
 
 1 The Napoleonic wars, the American Civil War, and the Franco-Prussian War 
 were, of course, important exceptions. 
 
 2 Seligman, Economic Interpretation of History, pp. 85-86. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 33 
 
 elders and masters, who, having much leisure, besides domineering, 
 aggressive qualities, developed also mental acumen and philosophi- 
 cal insight, always characteristic of the higher classes of patriarchal 
 systems. Commercial life demands aggressiveness, ingenuity, 
 mental alertness, and ruthlessness in stamping out opposition. 
 An age of production through machinery demands scientific in- 
 sight, executive capacity, and ability to master details. In the 
 type of the dominant peoples of western civilization we find a 
 composite of these qualities. Civilized man is regularly ruthless 
 and merciless to an opponent, but is kindly and sympathetic when 
 opposition has ceased. He is guided by ideals when material 
 interests are not involved, but is selfish and covetous at the possi- 
 bility of gain. He is masterful in dealings with inferiors, resource- 
 ful when necessity arises, capable of patient toil and hardship, yet 
 is fond of ease and relaxation. Energetic, keen-minded, inventive, 
 and idealistic, he combines in himself the best and the worst of 
 humanity." * 
 
 50. Business and politics. At the present day, the connection 
 between business and politics is closer than ever. Most of the laws 
 passed by legislatures have for their purpose some regulation of 
 economic conditions, and most of the influence brought to bear 
 upon government has its source in industrial or commercial interests. 
 At the same time, since all economic action takes place within the 
 framework of the state and is conditioned by its laws, economic 
 forces may be checked or modified by political authority. Tariffs, 
 labor laws, and the regulation of monopolies are examples of 
 governmental interference in the working out of economic forces. 
 The relation between politics and economics is therefore a mutual 
 one, constant action and reaction taking place. 2 
 
 IV. Other Social Institutions 
 
 51. Organizations within the state. The state, as one of the 
 organizations that has developed because of the social relations of 
 mankind, is affected, in its evolution, by other organizations, non- 
 political in nature, that have arisen to meet the varied needs of 
 
 1 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 24-25. 
 
 s Seager, Introduction to Economics, chaps, xx-xxix. 
 
34 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 social life. 1 In some cases the beginnings of these institutions 
 were closely connected with the beginnings of political life, and 
 their evolution was marked by increasing separation and distinct- 
 ness. Of such nature were the kinship and religious groups from 
 which the family and the church arose. The early history of the 
 state shows little differentiation among the affairs of family, reli- 
 gious, and political life. The principle of heredity is a surviving 
 remnant of kinship in politics, and the church has always been a 
 powerful influence in the state. Sometimes groups arose within 
 the state, usually on economic issues, and became strong, enough 
 to influence state evolution. Of such nature were many of the 
 Oriental castes, the Greek and Roman factions, and the medieval 
 guilds. In modern states organized labor and the great financial, 
 industrial, and commercial corporations play no small part in poli- 
 tics. Still other groups have arisen, avowedly for political purposes, 
 yet of a voluntary nature, and largely outside the legal control of 
 the body politic. Of this type, political parties and the political 
 " machine " and " boss " are the best examples. Educational in- 
 stitutions, especially the public schools, have enormous political 
 significance ; democracy would scarcely be possible without them. 2 
 Behind all these institutions stands that mass of public opinion 
 and custom, and those ideals which, though unexpressed in social 
 institutions and sometimes even unformulated, are nevertheless a 
 part of the environment within which political evolution takes 
 place. 3 
 
 V. Race and Nationality 
 
 52. Racial differences. Whatever may have been the causes of 
 original racial distinctions, 4 it is evident to-day that the various races 
 show decided differences in their political ability and ideals, and 
 these are reflected in the. political institutions under which they 
 
 1 See below, Chapters IV-V. 
 
 2 On the relation of the state to education, see McKechnie, The State and the 
 Individual, chap. xxv. 
 
 8 On the power of the idea in history, see Kelly, Government or Human Evolu- 
 tion : Individualism and Collectivism, Bk. I, chap. ii. 
 
 4 For a good discussion of race from the anthropological viewpoint, see 
 Von Luschan, " Anthropological View of Race," in Spiller, Interracial Problems, 
 pp. 13-24. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 35 
 
 live. 1 Numerous recent writers have attempted to explain some 
 of the most important phases of human development by the ex- 
 istence of racial characteristics and race conflicts. 2 The theory of 
 " dominant race," according to which powerful peoples may subdue 
 inferior peoples and compel them to assimilate their conqueror's 
 civilization or be exterminated, is gaining ground at present. This 
 process of conquest and assimilation has been one of the greatest 
 factors in human evolution. Every important race has been re- 
 peatedly strengthened by amalgamation ; decidedly inferior races 
 disappear. 8 Morgan eulogizes the superiority of the Aryan and 
 Semitic peoples and calls them the founders of civilization. 4 The 
 black peoples have never manifested organizing ability and have 
 never developed a true state. Of the yellow races the Chinese, 
 Tartars, and Turks have built up extensive empires, but the Mag- 
 yars and the Japanese alone have thus far been able to assimilate 
 modern political methods. The outcome of the establishment of 
 the Chinese Republic is being watched with interest as an indica- 
 tion of the ability of Oriental races to absorb western political 
 civilization. 5 Diversity of race within a state may cause serious 
 political difficulties, as the experience of the United States in her 
 relations with the Indians, her negro problem, and her troubles 
 over the exclusion of Orientals bears witness. 6 England in India, 
 and France in North Africa, face serious racial distinctions. 
 
 53. National differences within the race. Even in the white 
 race, marked national differences may be observed. The genius of 
 the Semitic peoples seems to have been along the lines of religion 
 and of business. The Greeks found difficulty in political union. 
 Celts and Slavs, on their own initiative, scarcely progressed beyond 
 the clan or village-community stage of organization. Romans and 
 Teutons alone seem to have possessed the ability to govern, to 
 organize widespread empires on a permanent basis, and to work 
 
 1 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. II, chap. i. 
 
 2 Gumplowicz, Der Rassenkampf ; Gehring, Racial Contrasts. 
 
 8 For a good discussion of this theory, see Gumplowicz, " Grundriss der Socio- 
 logie," trans, by F. W. Moore in Annals of American Academy of Political and 
 Social Science, 1899. 
 
 4 Ancient Society, pp. 39-44. 
 
 6 Ross, The Changing Chinese. 
 
 6 Coolidge, United States as a World Power, chaps, ii-iii. 
 
36 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 out successful systems of law. 1 A recent author explains many 
 contrasts in the political development of Grseco- Latin and Teutonic 
 peoples on the basis of differences in national psychology. " The 
 celerity of action in the south throws light on the frequency of 
 assassination .in Latin countries ; it enables us to understand the 
 enthusiastic support received by victorious generals and the speedy 
 disgrace awaiting defeated ones ; it explains many episodes in the 
 revolution of 1789, and furnishes the - reason for the general insta- 
 bility of governments among the Romance races. Likewise the 
 cause of many enactments which are not necessary among calmer 
 peoples. In the French constitution, for example, there are special 
 provisions designed to make sudden changes in the government 
 impossible ; and the inflammability of the Gallic nature necessitates 
 the rule that when the- president of the Chamber of Deputies puts 
 on his hat all argument must cease. The inertia of the Teutons is 
 accountable for the calm deliberation prevailing in Germanic legis- 
 lative bodies ; and it had much to do with the disruption of the old 
 German Empire and its long- inability to revive. The persistency 
 of the Teutons is shown in the patience and diligence of the Ger- 
 man laborer, the tedious researches of the university professor,, 
 the dogged resistance of the English soldier, and the indomitable 
 energy of the Yankee speculator. It may account for their marvel- 
 ous success in colonization and their mastery over the material 
 world ; for the commercial prosperity of the Dutch during the 
 seventeenth century, the English supremacy of the last hundred 
 years, and the German and American emergence of to-day." 2 
 54. National vigor and decadence. Moreover, peoples manifest 
 periods of vitality and of decadence, and their states rise and fall 
 correspondingly. Racial vigor and ability are also affected by 
 migration to new surroundings and by intermarriage with other 
 peoples ; and new nationalities, such as the American, may arise 
 from such causes. National spirit or patriotism, feelings of racial 
 supremacy or, in earlier times, of family or tribal exclusiveness, 
 have also affected the course of political development. Even in the 
 modern world the general tendencies of national genius may be 
 
 1 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 30-40. 
 
 2 Gehring, Racial Contrasts, pp. 96-98. • 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 37 
 
 observed, all the leading states contributing something distinctive 
 to the progress of civilization. " From England came an efficient 
 judicial system, a successful colonial policy and a parliament work- 
 ing out through a joint cabinet an harmonious cooperation of gov- 
 ernmental and civic interests. France, a true daughter of the 
 Roman Empire, as shown by its capacity in war, in law, and in 
 administration, came to the front in the eighteenth century, set 
 fire to the dry tinder of European politics and intoxicated the polit- 
 ical world with the inspiration derived from the ' Marseillaise,' 
 the pursuit of glory, and the ideals of democracy contained in the 
 motto, ' Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.' Germany and Japan are 
 adding their contributions to the world state in the form of applica- 
 tions of scientific principles to governmental functions and organiza- 
 tion, thereby overcoming natural handicaps. The United States 
 also is no mean factor in the modern political world. From it has 
 come the federation, the written constitution, a humanitarianism 
 cosmopolitan in its scope, and a wide application of the principles 
 of democracy." 1 
 
 VI. Great Men 
 
 55. Dependence of great men upon their times. It is easy to 
 overestimate the influence of certain overshadowing individuals on 
 the development of the state. Alexander, Caesar, Charlemagne, 
 Napoleon, Bismarck, and many others seem to have held the des- 
 tiny of states in their hands and to have made and unmade govern- 
 ments at their pleasure. The importance of such men is enormous, 
 and without their thoughts and actions political progress, would 
 doubtless have been considerably delayed. Nevertheless, the great 
 man is fundamentally dependent upon the social environment 
 within which he is created, and his influence is felt only when 
 society is ready for him. 2 His greatness consists chiefly in that he 
 expresses more successfully than others the spirit of his age, or 
 that he is able to persuade his community to accept new ideas as 
 in harmony with their conditions and their ideals. 
 
 1 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 232-233. See also Giddings, Democ- 
 racy and Empire, chap. xix. 
 
 2 James, " Great Men and their Environment," in The Will to Believe and Other 
 Essays in Popular Philosophy. 
 
38 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 56. Importance of the individual. At the same time, the state, 
 as a social institution, is composed of men and may be altered by 
 men. Men are the product of history, but history is made by men. 1 
 " Because one man in certain conditions acts in a specific way, it 
 is by no means certain that another will under the same circum- 
 stances act the same. Simply because an individual acts in this way 
 to-day, it is not perfectly certain that he will take the same action 
 to-morrow. When we are dealing primarily with human beings, we 
 cannot be quite certain what will happen next, although when we 
 deal with individuals in great numbers, so that, as the wit has said, 
 the person under consideration is not a man but a ' statistic,' we 
 may reach some very general conclusions." 2 Free power of action, 
 exercised by individuals and by nations, opposes the fatality of 
 nature and the fatality of historical sequence. 
 
 57. Relative importance of the individual now and formerly. 
 Ancient history seems to be largely the history of a few men; mod- 
 ern history tends to be a history of the people. While this apparent 
 difference is partly due to a lack of historical knowledge among 
 primitive peoples, and to the tendency of early writers to dwell on 
 the picturesque or dramatic achievements of the few, it is also prob- 
 able that in the absence of enlightenment in ancient times, the 
 masses followed rules of habit, whereas in modern times leaders 
 are followed less blindly, and institutions and popular movements 
 perform services which in the past were the work of heroes. On 
 the other hand, the importance of the individual, in some respects, 
 seems to increase with the development of social life. Early society 
 was composed of individuals with like occupations, habits, and 
 ideas. Even in physical make-up it is probable that the most 
 highly civilized peoples show the widest variations. 3 In a highly 
 developed society we find individuality more marked, and special- 
 ized types of men, mentally and physically, result. This differen- 
 tiation is not only a sign of social evolution, it also makes possible 
 those unique individuals who, as leaders or prophets, direct social 
 progress. 
 
 1 Seligman, Economic Interpretation of History, pp. 96-101 ; Hinsdale, How 
 to Study and Teach History, chap. xi. 2 Jenks, Principles of Politics, p. 18. 
 
 8 American Anthropologist, Vol. XI, p. 347. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 39 
 
 VII. Religion 
 
 58. Religion as a political factor. Religion was one of the 
 earliest and has been one of the most powerful and constant influ- 
 ences affecting political development. Early kinship groups were 
 held together by the worship of common ancestors ; 1 and a super- 
 natural sanction, needed to restrain primitive and undisciplined 
 men, was added to the authority of rulers. So closely related, in 
 fact, were religious and political institutions in the early history of 
 the state that little distinction was made between the precepts of 
 religion and the laws of the state, both consisting of customs, sup- 
 ported by usage and divine sanction ; 2 and the duties of priest and 
 of magistrate were combined in the same persons. This super- 
 natural sanction has been added to political authority whenever an 
 uncivilized people has been raised from barbarism. The Teutonic 
 tribes that overthrew the Roman Empire formed the states of mod- 
 ern Europe only with the aid of the Roman church. Religion has 
 also been an able ally of monarchy. The Oriental despots were 
 demigods ; Alexander and the Roman emperors found a divine 
 background useful ; the absolute monarchs of the seventeenth cen- 
 tury depended upon the divine-right theory ; and the . Russian 
 czar and the Japanese mikado still derive support from the reli- 
 gious reverence of their peoples. 
 
 59. Religion as a means of social control. In another respect 
 religion has been a valuable social force. The interests of the in- 
 dividual at a given time and the interests of society as a whole are 
 sometimes antagonistic. In the struggle for existence, unselfish- 
 ness, truthfulness, charity, and other attributes may not further the 
 success of the individual, yet they are valuable social virtues, and 
 indirectly elevate the plane of struggle even for the individual. 
 The supernatural sanction of religion and the consolation which it 
 affords have often been used to induce the individual to sacrifice 
 his interests for the sake of society at large, and to follow a line of 
 conduct that his individual reason could not sanction. 3 The church, 
 instituted at first for culture, became a powerful agent of control. 
 
 1 De Coulanges, Ancient City. 2 Maine, Ancient Law. 
 
 8 Kidd, Social Evolution ; Ross, Social Control. 
 
40 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 60. Religion and patriotism. A common religious zeal has 
 often inspired the spirit of unity that forms nations and states. 1 
 The national spirit of the Hebrews had a distinct religious basis, 
 and the great Mohammedan Empire was largely the embodiment 
 of a religious ideal. In the Middle Ages the theory of the Holy 
 Roman Empire was undoubtedly influenced by the theory of the 
 universal church. 2 The connection between Protestantism, espe- 
 cially of the type of Calvin, and democracy is a commonplace in 
 modern historical knowledge ; 3 and the local government of .New 
 England, originally the organization of religious congregations, 
 laid the foundation for the American Republic. Patriotism in 
 modern Japan is largely a religious sentiment. 
 
 61. Christianity and warfare. The changes during the Middle 
 Ages in the attitude of the Christian church toward warfare fur- 
 nish a good example of the influence of political conditions upon 
 religion and of the reaction of religion upon political development. 
 Early Christianity was a religion of universal beneficence. Its atti- 
 tude was one of passive protest ; its ideal courage was the endur- 
 ance of injustice. The early church taught that no Christian should 
 bear arms, and in the Roman Empire the Jewish Christians were 
 not subjected to military service. As the church spread into the 
 West, active missionary zeal replaced the former idea of passive 
 endurance. Later, the Mohammedan peril compelled the Chris- 
 tian world to organize, first for defense and afterward, when the 
 military spirit of Mohammedanism had passed into Christianity, 
 "every pulpit in Christendom proclaimed the duty of war with 
 the unbeliever, and represented the battlefield as the sure path to 
 heaven." 4 As a result, the church supported the imperialistic 
 spirit and for centuries wars imbued with a religious element 
 widened or narrowed the boundaries of states and created enmities 
 that survive to this day. 
 
 1 On religion as a consolidating and separating influence, see Rhys Davids, 
 ."Religion as a Consolidating and Separating Influence," in Spiller, Interracial 
 
 Problems, pp. 62-67. 
 
 2 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chap. vii. 
 
 8 Osgood, " Political Ideas of the Puritans," in Political Science Quarterly, 
 Vol. VI ; Merriam, American Political Theories, chap. i. 
 
 * Lecky, History of European Morals, Vol. II, pp. 262-290. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 41 
 
 62. Religion as a disruptive factor. At the same time, religion 
 may be a disruptive political force. 1 The fall of the Roman Empire 
 was hastened by the rise of Christianity, which attacked the wor- 
 ship of the emperor, and which weakened patriotism and interest 
 in affairs of government. 2 Similarly, after, the Protestant revolt, 
 wars over religious issues devastated a large part of Europe and 
 delayed the formation of national states. Differences in religion 
 have always been a prime source of hatred, of persecution, and of 
 war ; and a religious cloak has been used, whenever possible, to 
 cover the aggressions of a conqueror. Religious pilgrimages have 
 given rise to commercial and political expansion ; the religious 
 motives of the Crusades covered a vast amount of territorial and 
 commercial greed ; the Thirty Years' War in Germany was waged 
 under a flimsy pretense of religious zeal ; and the establishment of 
 colonial empire has often been preceded by political activity on the 
 part of missionaries. 3 
 
 63. Church and state. While, in many parts of the world, 
 church and state are still allied, the more advanced states have 
 divorced religion and politics. Yet, political parties formed on 
 religious lines are found in several European states, 4 and the legal 
 systems of the most liberal peoples rest on a Christian civiliza- 
 tion which unconsciously influences the nature and the activities 
 of government. Socialism, one of the most powerful factors in 
 present-day politics, has many of the features of a new religion. 5 
 
 VIII. Growth of Knowledge 
 
 64. Natural science and political progress. The growth and 
 diffusion of knowledge has reacted on political evolution in several 
 ways. Intelligence, which distinguishes man from the lower animals, 
 replaces natural evolution by human evolution, creates an artificial 
 
 1 Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, pp. 238-241. 
 
 2 De Coulanges, Ancient City, pp. 519-529. 
 
 8 For the relation between missions and political dominion, see Caldecott, 
 "Influence of Missions," in Spiller,- Interracial Problems, pp. 302-312; Reinsch, 
 Colonial Government, chap. iii. 
 
 1 Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. I, pp. 204-206 ; 
 Vol. II, pp. 12-16. 
 
 6 Patten, Social Basis of Religion. 
 
42 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 environment, and changes the whole nature of the process. 1 In- 
 telligence sometimes interferes with the process of natural evolu- 
 tion by fighting the environment ; at other times it hastens the 
 process of natural evolution by learning the laws of the natural 
 environment and bringing them more fully into effect. Advance 
 in natural science has given man a greater control over nature and 
 has led to inventions that have revolutionized methods of produc- 
 tion, transportation, and communication, with resultant shifting of 
 political boundaries and political influence. The railway and the tele- 
 graph make possible a democratic state with large territorial extent ; 
 improvements in ocean navigation, with resultant commercial and 
 colonial development, have shifted the emphasis from military to 
 naval strength as the decisive factor in international conflicts. 
 
 65. Social science and political progress. Advance in social 
 science — in politics, economics, and sociology — has made possible 
 conscious efforts to improve political institutions, one of the most 
 striking phenomena of the present era in all advanced states. 
 The general diffusion of intelligence has been a powerful influence 
 toward democracy and, by destroying the authority of the narrow 
 classes that formerly monopolized knowledge, — the medieval 
 clergy, for example, — has revolutionized the internal organiza- 
 tion of states and the location of political sovereignty. It is a 
 historical law that the progress of modern civilization is marked by 
 a continually growing ascendancy of scientific, social, and there- 
 fore intellectual or moral factors, over such as are racial, geograph- 
 ical, and climatic. 2 
 
 66. Importance of growth of knowledge. " Mankind has in 
 general shown an unreasoning respect and veneration for the past. 
 Until the opening of the eighteenth century the former times were 
 commonly held to have been better than the present, for the evils 
 of the past were little known while those of the present were, as 
 always, only too apparent. Men looked backward rather than for- 
 ward. They aspired to fight as well, or be as saintly, or write as 
 good books, or paint as beautiful pictures, as the great men of old. 
 That they might excel the achievements of their predecessors did 
 
 1 Kelly, Government or Human Evolution: Justice, Bk. II. 
 
 2 Fouillee, Esquisse psychplogique des peuples europeens. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 43 
 
 not occur to them. Knowledge was sought not by studying the 
 world about them but in some ancient authority. ... It was mainly 
 to the patient men of science that the western world owed its first 
 hopes of future improvement. It is they who have shown that.the 
 ancient writers were mistaken about many serious matters and that 
 they had at best a very crude and imperfect notion of the world. 
 They have gradually robbed men of their old blind respect for the 
 past and, by their discoveries, have pointed the way to indefinite 
 advance, so that now we expect constant change and improvement 
 and are scarcely astonished at the most marvelous inventions." 1 
 
 IX. Political Theory 
 
 67. Origin of political theory. Side by side with the actual 
 development of political institutions has gone, in the minds of 
 men, the development of political theory. The associated life of 
 men, arising spontaneously and growing at first without conscious 
 direction, came later under the scrutiny of man's reason ; and 
 attempts were made, crude enough in the beginning, to explain the 
 nature of political phenomena. Increasing powers of observation 
 and of logical analysis build up a constantly widening sphere of 
 political speculation ; and the development of the state in its 
 objective phase of organization and activity was, accordingly, 
 accompanied by its subjective phase — the theory of the state — 
 in the minds of its citizens. 2 
 
 68. Relation between political theory and political institutions. 
 It is evident that, at any given time, a close relation must exist 
 between the political theory of that period and the actual political 
 conditions then existing. Occasionally, philosophers may speculate 
 concerning the ideal state or may draw pictures of political condi- 
 tions as, in their own opinions, they should be. Even this type of 
 political theory, however, will, if closely examined, prove to be 
 based on the political ideals of its time, and will usually be aimed 
 at certain specific evils to which the conditions then prevailing gave 
 rise. Plato's " Republic," St. Augustine's " City of God," More's 
 
 1 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, pp. 157-158. 
 
 2 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, chaps, i-iv. 
 
44 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 "Utopia," and Bellamy's "Looking Backward" are perhaps the 
 best known of such attempts at political speculation. Yet any 
 student of history can show, in each case, the influence, uncon- 
 scious but powerful, that the spirit of the times exerted, and can 
 point out the connection between the historical facts and the 
 political ideals based upon these facts. 
 
 69. Political theory in a general sense. In its broadest sense, 
 political theory includes all the motives and interests and purposes 
 that direct the opinions of the masses concerning matters of gov- 
 ernment, and that guide the actions of rulers and statesmen. 1 It 
 therefore follows that much of the political theory of any given 
 time is not put into definite or comprehensive statement. It is 
 found tacitly underlying the form of actual political organization 
 and methods. Where there is one philosopher who is occupied in 
 an impartial attempt to build up a complete system of political 
 theory, there are hundreds of politicians who are interested in a 
 more or less selfish or one-sided political principle which they 
 desire to see incorporated into political practice. Questions of 
 policy almost always require a broad theoretical basis for rejection 
 or approval. Accordingly, political theory must be sought, not 
 only in the writings of those who deliberately attempt to formulate 
 a systematic statement of its principles, but even more in the fugi- 
 tive and ephemeral opinions of those engaged in actual politics, 
 and in the public opinion to which they appeal. The political 
 theory of the United States illustrates this fact. Americans have 
 seldom been interested in systematic politics ; our governmental 
 organization and policy have, in fact, been characterized by fre- 
 quent inconsistencies. Yet our whole national history has centered 
 around certain political theories which have been powerful enough 
 to cause men to sacrifice for them their lives, and which have now 
 become a part of our national habit of thought. This general 
 political theory is the mental atmosphere within which political 
 evolution, at any given time, is taking place. It is often inconsis- 
 tent, irrational, and unconscious ; nevertheless it powerfully influ- 
 ences actual political life. 
 
 1 Willoughby, " Value of Political Philosophy," in Political Science Quarterly, 
 March, 1900. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 45 
 
 70. Political theory in a restricted sense. In its more restricted 
 sense, political theory consists of the definitely formulated principles 
 of men who have attempted a more or less comprehensive explana- 
 tion of political phenomena, or who have worked out a more or less 
 complete system of political philosophy. To this class belong Aris- 
 totle, Machiavelli, Bodin, Grotius, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, 
 Austin, and many others. 1 At the present time political theory is 
 of particular interest and importance. The modern state is finding 
 itself, is settling upon its first principles, is directing its growth, and 
 deciding upon the proper nature and extent of its activities. The 
 tendencies of the times point toward an expansion of state function 
 that has enormous possibilities for good or evil. In the complex 
 civilization of the present day, the relations of state to*state and of 
 state to individual demand constant adjustment and readjustment ; 
 and this process should rest upon definite and clearly realized 
 principles as to the nature and purpose of political institutions. 
 A knowledge of the origin and development of political organiza- 
 tions and ideas is essential to any successful attempt at explaining 
 or appreciating those of the present ; and a realization of the proper 
 purpose and limits of state action would both hasten real progress 
 and prevent extreme and radical attempts at the impossible. A 
 knowledge of past political development, an understanding of pres- 
 ent governmental machinery and methods, and a clear conception 
 of future ideals are all needed. 
 
 71. Present tendencies in political theory. Moreover, a funda- 
 mental change of mental attitude is now revolutionizing political 
 'theory. The former attitude was deductive, based on certain axioms 
 as to the traditional nature of political institutions and authority. 
 From these premises conclusions were reached by logic concerning 
 what should be ; and political conditions were judged, not in accord- 
 ance with actual circumstances, but in accordance with prevailing 
 ideals based upon the fundamental assumptions. At present polit- 
 ical theory is inductive. " Political phenomena are observed and 
 classified, and generalizations are made from data thus collected. 
 . . . Instead of 'Considering first what ought to be, the aim is to 
 
 1 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval ; From Luther to Montes- 
 quieu. 
 
46 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 consider first what is. As a result, treatises on government are 
 appearing that are not doctrinal in character, like our older man- 
 uals on civics and politics, but are descriptive and expository, telling 
 simply and plainly how the public authority under consideration is 
 organized, how it works and with what results. They are studies of 
 political structure and function, conceived in the same scientific spirit 
 as that of a zoologist examining the fauna of a particular region." 1 
 
 72. Relativity of political theories. It remains to add that polit- 
 ical theory is essentially relative in its nature. In the past it grew 
 out of actual conditions and of existing methods of thought ; at 
 present it represents our understanding of the political world in 
 which we live and the political ideals in which we believe. No 
 theory of thfe state can be considered ultimate truth. A century 
 hence, under the changed conditions of that -time, our present atti- 
 tude toward political problems may seem as crude and absurd as 
 many of the theories that arose in the past now seem to us. This 
 does not, however, diminish the necessity that each age should 
 build up for itself a philosophy of the state, based upon its devel- 
 opment up to the point then reached, upon the actual conditions 
 then existing, and upon the ideals of the future then held. 
 
 73. Political theory both progressive and conservative. It is at 
 once obvious that political theory may be either a conservative or a 
 progressive force in political development. Existing institutions, 
 especially if of long standing, or if of advantage to some powerful 
 class, gather around themselves a mass of traditions and of belief 
 that gives them a certain sacredness and authority and that makes 
 difficult any change. The theory of divine right in the past and, 
 more recently, of laissez faire are examples. On the other hand, 
 a large part of political theory has consisted in ideals and reforms 
 that aimed to improve existing evils ; and these doctrines have 
 given powerful impetus to political change. The theory of natural 
 rights that underlay the revolutions of the eighteenth and nine- 
 teenth centuries, and modern socialism are examples. The radical 
 theory of one age, if successful, may later become the conservative 
 theory, standing in the way of further progress because out of touch 
 with the conditions then prevailing. 
 
 1 Ford, " Cause of Political Corruption," in Scribner's Magazine, January, ign. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 47 
 
 X. Conflict 
 
 74. Forms of conflict. Whenever individuals are brought into 
 association, or even into contact, a certain amount of conflict results. 
 This is due fundamentally to the pressure of population on the 
 means of subsistence, and is accordingly more important in the 
 earlier stages of human development when conquest was practically 
 the only means of expansion than in later times when the develop- 
 ment of commerce on a large scale and the use of a money econ- 
 omy made possible a more peaceful adjustment of population and 
 subsistence. 1 In its milder stages this conflict takes the form of 
 competition ; in its more strenuous stages, of war. Sometimes in- 
 dividuals or institutions are the units in this contest, the struggle 
 taking place within the group. More often social groups form the 
 units, and conflict arises between' tribe and tribe,' or state and state. 
 Frequently this contest goes on quietly and unconsciously, rival ideas, 
 methods, or interests competing and the most useful or powerful , 
 surviving. At other times the conflict is yigorous and deliberate, 
 and means ruin or death to the individuals or groups unable to 
 stand the strain. 
 
 75. Importance of conflict. In the evolution of the state, con- 
 flict has played a most important part. History shows an incessant 
 movement of peoples, — growth, expansion, and conquest, followed 
 by decline, expulsion, or absorption by new invaders. Europe espe- 
 cially shows traces of countless migrations, the very names of states 
 such as England, France, Scotland, Turkey, and Bulgaria being 
 taken from successful invaders. In early times, efforts to secure 
 favored hunting grounds, ample pasturage, fertile soils, or mineral 
 wealth led to the aggregation of victorious populations in certain 
 areas where first arose civilization and government. By means of 
 war states have been created, combined, and destroyed. Conquer- 
 ing armies built the world states, and naval warfare was a powerful 
 factor in the establishment and rearrangement of modern colonial 
 empires. 2 Much progress could scarcely have taken place without 
 
 1 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Part V, chaps, xvii-xviii ; Robinson, " War 
 and Economics in History and Theory," in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XV, 
 pp. 581-622. 2 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History. 
 
48 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 war ; the suppression of savagery, barbarism, piracy, and despotism 
 has been accomplished only by the use of armed force. 
 
 76. Conflict and internal organization. Moreover, conflict has 
 been largely responsible for the internal organization of govern- 
 ment in states. Intergroup struggle created higher forms of social 
 organization, since success in competition demanded solidarity and 
 competent leadership. Successful war leaders have become political 
 rulers, and the need for concerted action in aggression or defense 
 has strengthened authority within the state. The most primitive 
 tribes were democratic in their form of government, but despotic 
 authority rapidly arose among peoples who were constantly at war. 
 War also created social classes. When agriculture was developed 
 and slave labor had a considerable value, conquered peoples were 
 incorporated as a subject class. These might later become partially 
 free, and later conquests might thus create a series of classes. The 
 presence of these alien elements in the group also necessitated a 
 
 »strong government to keep them in submission, and the author- 
 ity created by warfare was strengthened by the results of warfare. 
 Much law owes its origin to the rules enforced by the victors 
 upon the vanquished, and international law is largely the result of 
 international competition and conflict. 
 
 XI. Cooperation 
 
 77. Cooperation a factor in social evolution. Evolution is not a 
 process depending upon the relation of each individual separately 
 to his environment. Even among animals association and mutual 
 aid give efficiency in the struggle for existence, both against other 
 animals and against nature. 1 Among men, conscious cooperation, 
 beginning probably in the family, soon arose along with competi- 
 tion ; and by mutual aid man secured an increased production of 
 necessities and a better organization against internal disorder or ex- 
 ternal attack. The state was the logical outcome of a certain degree 
 of cooperation ; and developing forms of cooperation, involving a 
 more specialized activity of individuals and a closer interrelation of 
 the whole, constantly demanded a more advanced form of social 
 regulation or government. 
 
 1 Kropotkin, Mutual Aid a Factor of Evolution. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 49 
 
 78. Virtues created by cooperation. Not only does cooperation 
 give greater efficiency in the struggle for existence, but it develops 
 certain virtues that have enormous social value and that would not 
 be developed if competition among individuals were the only 
 means of progress. 1 Sympathy, benevolence, and altruism, which 
 have little place in the keen struggles of noncooperating individ- 
 uals or of rival groups, are found within the group ; and one of 
 the essential features of social evolution is the gradual enlargement 
 of the associated group. The larger the group, the wider the 
 scope of generosity and of pity, and the milder the competition 
 for each individual. In this way the whole plane of the struggle 
 for existence is raised. Devices formerly useful in eliminating 
 the unfit, such as slaughter, slavery, and piracy, fall below the 
 plane of competition and are regarded as crimes, incompatible 
 with civilization. 
 
 79. Cooperation and natural selection. Moreover, since evolution 
 secures the survival of the fittest under the existing environment, 
 and not necessarily the survival of the best, man in association, by 
 deliberately modifying his environment, may avoid much of the 
 waste involved in the struggle for existence, may create a better 
 environment, and thus aid nature in hastening progress and in 
 securing a more advanced product. Modern sanitation prevents 
 much of the reckless loss of life necessary in the slow and crude 
 process of natural selection. By his inventive genius man multi- 
 plies the efficiency of his senses and the skill of his fingers, and 
 secures results impossible for natural selection to accomplish in 
 millions of years. The type of man who would be best fitted to 
 survive under purely natural conditions is not considered the high- 
 est type in modern civilization. Men in association, acting with 
 conscious purpose, make their environment increasingly artificial 
 and gain increasing power over nature. Therefore, true progress 
 means that success will more and more be secured by conforming 
 to ever higher ideals. 
 
 80. Cooperation in political evolution. The process of coopera- 
 tion, with its attendant results, has powerfully influenced the evolu- 
 tion of the state. Early industrial and military groups were also 
 
 1 Drummond, Ascent of Man. 
 
SO PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 political groups, since associated effort demanded direction and 
 authority. The development of sympathy and altruism strength- 
 ened obedience, public spirit, and patriotism ; and the purposeful 
 efforts of man to improve his environment found expression in 
 social legislation and in political reform. 1 Moreover, men in coop- 
 eration, acting through the state, are constantly raising the plane 
 of competition and conflict by legal regulations which exclude 
 certain methods or prevent certain evils. The modern struggle for 
 existence, based largely upon property and contract, takes place 
 almost entirely within the legal framework established by political 
 authority. 
 
 XII. Imitation 
 
 81. Unconscious and deliberate imitation. Social institutions and 
 activities that prove successful are often spread widely by adoption 
 at the hands of peoples other than those among whom they origi- 
 nated. 2 This adoption may be the unconscious result of a general 
 influence, or Zeitgeist, that obtains because of a widespread and uni- 
 form change in fundamental conditions. Of such nature has been, 
 in all civilized states, the growth of democracy and of certain con- 
 cepts of political and civil liberty during the past few centuries. 
 On the other hand, states sometimes create or modify institutions 
 in deliberate imitation of other states ; and in this sense imitation 
 becomes a direct and active force in state evolution. The written 
 constitution of the United States has served as a model for numer- 
 ous later republics, and the parliamentary system of England has 
 been widely copied. A more recent example of political develop- 
 ment by conscious imitation is found in American cities, many of 
 which have in the last few years adopted the commission plan of 
 municipal government. 3 
 
 82. Widening area of imitation. In the past, when life was iso- 
 lated and means of intercourse were few, imitation was practically 
 limited to the transmission of traditions within comparatively small 
 and stable groups. Customs and types of thought were handed 
 down within the group from the remote past. The development 
 
 1 Patten, New Basis of Civilization, chaps, viii-x. 
 
 2 Tarde, Les Lois de limitation. 
 
 s Bradford, Commission Government in American Cities. 
 
INFLUENCES AFFECTING POLITICAL EVOLUTION 51 
 
 of communication in modern times has widened the outlook of the 
 more advanced peoples, and the traditions of each must compete 
 with numerous contemporary influences that originate elsewhere. 
 The breadth of the movement, rather than its length, is noticeable ; 
 all the known past is accessible anywhere, and whatever suits the 
 taste may be appropriated. 1 
 
 83. Dangers. of imitation. One fact connected with this method 
 of growth through imitation needs to be noted. It frequently hap- 
 pens that institutions, when transplanted to alien soil, work in a 
 different manner and follow a different course of development 
 from those upon which they were modeled. The most successful 
 political methods may prove lamentable failures when attempted 
 in other surroundings or by unfit persons. 2 The cabinet system of 
 France will not work like that of England because the party sys- 
 tem, upon which the principle of cabinet government rests, differs 
 decidedly in the two states. 3 In the Latin-American republics, 
 democratic forms of government fail to work in the same way as 
 in the United States because of differences in the peoples and in 
 their basic political conceptions and conditions. 4 Attempts at imita- 
 tion always cause certain modifications in the adopted institutions, 
 due to the different conditions in which they operate. In this way 
 imitation is a force in state evolution, not only in extending certain 
 institutions and methods over wider areas, but also in forming 
 new combinations and in securing variations, some of which may 
 develop into valuable political devices. 
 
 84. Unity of political evolution. While the preceding outline 
 has suggested some of the influences and processes of nature and 
 of man that affect political evolution, and for purposes of analysis 
 has considered them singly, as if they were distinct forces, it should 
 be remembered that social development is a single process, no in- 
 fluence being separable, in its actual nature, from the larger whole 
 of which it forms a part. " The organic view of history denies that 
 any factor or factors are more ultimate than others. Indeed it 
 denies that the so-called factors — such as the mind, the various 
 
 1 Cooley, Social Organization, pp. 335-341. 
 
 2 Lowell, Essays on Government, chap. i. 
 8 Bodley, France, Bk. Ill, chap. v. 
 
 4 Bryce, South America, chap. xv. 
 
52 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 institutions, the physical environment and so on — have any real 
 existence apart from a total life in which all share in the same 
 way that the members of the body share in the life of the animal 
 organism. It looks upon mind and matter, soil, climate, flora, 
 fauna, thought, language, and institutions as aspects of a single 
 rounded whole, one total growth. We may concentrate attention 
 upon some one of these things, but this concentration should never 
 go so far as to overlook the subordination of each to the whole, or to 
 conceive one as precedent to others. History is not like a tangled 
 skein which you may straighten out by getting hold of the right end 
 and following it with sufficient persistence. It has no straightness, 
 no merely lineal continuity, in its nature. It is a living thing, to be 
 known by sharing its life, very much as you know a person. In the 
 organic world — that is to say, in real life — each function is a 
 center from which causes radiate and to which they converge ; all 
 is alike cause and effect ; there is no logical primacy, no independ- 
 ent variable, no place where the thread begins. As in the fable of 
 the belly and the members, each is dependent upon all the others. 
 You must see the whole or you do not truly see anything." 1 
 
 1 Cooley, Social Organization, p. 255. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 THE NATURE OF THE STATE 
 
 85. Essential elements of the state. As already indicated, con- 
 ceptions of the nature of the state have in many respects undergone 
 radical transformations during the process of state evolution. How- 
 ever, the essential elements of the state, whatever form it may take, 
 are permanent ; and a brief consideration of these elements, pre- 
 viously itemized as (i) population, (2) territory, (3) government, 
 (4) sovereignty, and (5) law, 1 will suggest many of the problems 
 that have arisen in political development, will furnish a logical basis 
 for their classification, and will indicate certain angles from which 
 they may be viewed. 
 
 I. Population 
 
 86. Population the basis of the state. In last analysis, all dis- 
 cussion of the state treats, directly or indirectly, of its population. 
 The individuals comprising the state are the state, and it is only by a 
 legal fiction that the state has any existence as a unit apart from the 
 individuals included within it. Human beings are the constituent 
 elements of the state ; its organization, or government, consists of 
 combinations of individuals ; and all its purposes are expressed and 
 its acts put into execution by its population, acting either singly or 
 in organized association. Certain questions concerning population 
 are of especial importance in their relation to state existence and 
 development. 2 The total number of inhabitants included within 
 the state, resulting either from excess of births over deaths, 8 from 
 immigration, or from the extension of the state's boundaries, deter- 
 mines, in the main, the military and industrial strength of the state, 
 
 1 See above, p. 2. 
 
 2 Patten,"Law of Population Restated," inPoliticalScienceQuarterly,March,i89S. 
 8 Brownell, " Significance of a Decreasing Birth-Rate," in Annals of the American 
 
 Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1894. 
 
 S3 
 
54 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 and influences both the general form of government and the atti- 
 tude which the state takes toward the individual. The distribution 
 of this population within the state, whether urban or rural, whether 
 densely or sparsely aggregated, affects the nature of occupations and 
 the type of civilization in general. The unity or diversity of race 
 and nationality in the state's population opens up important ques- 
 tions as to the stability of its organization and the solidarity of its 
 political consciousness. 1 The separation of the population into 
 classes, based on birth, wealth, or occupation, and the political 
 ability of the people, whether law-abiding and skillful in organiza- 
 tion or turbulent and unpolitical, whether warlike or peace-loving, 
 — all these things affect the form and functions of the states con- 
 cerned. 2 Great men, especially warriors and statesmen, have also 
 powerfully influenced political development. 3 
 
 87. The relations of state to individual. In addition to the im- 
 portance of population as a factor affecting the nature and growth 
 of the state, certain other questions involving the relation of the 
 state, considered as a legal unit, to its population, considered as 
 individuals, lie at the very foundation of political theory. The first 
 of these is concerned with the nature of the state and the proper 
 relation of its authority, or sovereignty, to the liberty, political and 
 civil, of its individuals. This is the endless problem of adjusting 
 government and freedom, the paradox of securing liberty by estab- 
 lishing an authority which sets limits to free action. 4 It involves 
 also a determination of the share of the individual in governing 
 authority, the number who shall possess such power and the method 
 by which it shall be distributed and exercised. 5 The other question 
 has to do with the proper scope of state activity. 6 It must decide 
 whether state or individual is the more important unit to be first 
 considered in case their interests clash ; and whether the func- 
 tions of the state should be limited to the least possible sphere 
 
 1 Munroe Smith, " Law of Nationality," in Lalor's Cyclopedia of Political Science. 
 
 2 Pearson, National Life and Character. 
 8 Carlyle, Heroes and Hero- Worship. 
 
 * Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, Bk. II, chap., i ; 
 Montague, Limits of Individual Liberty. 
 
 6 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 294-296 ; see below, Chapter VIII. 
 6 Ritchie, Principles of State Interference. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 55 
 
 of action or whether they should be indefinitely extended. The 
 diverse views of individualists and socialists represent the two 
 extremes from this point of view. 1 
 
 88. Minimum population of a state. Political philosophers have 
 also considered the question of the number of inhabitants necessary 
 to form a state, and the number, if any, beyond which the state 
 should not expand. Without attempting to establish the exact point 
 at which a previous nonpolitical group is transformed into a politi- 
 cal organization or state, the question regarding the number of in- 
 dividuals that a group must contain before it can be considered a 
 state may arise. On this point Willoughby says : "To our mind 
 no minimum short of one can logically be placed. . . . None of 
 the essential elements of the state are such as cannot conceivably 
 be predicated as well of a small as of a large body of individuals." 2 
 Montesquieu takes a different position, saying that the political 
 power necessarily comprehends the union of several families; 3 and 
 Austin also denies that a state may consist of a single family, say- 
 ing "without an application of the terms which would somewhat 
 smack of the ridiculous, we could hardly style the society a society 
 political and independent, the imperative father and chief a mon- 
 arch or sovereign, or the obedient mother and children subjects." i 
 
 89. Maximum population of a state. As to the limits beyond 
 which the population of a state should not extend, theories have 
 also differed. The Greek philosophers, whose ideal was the city 
 state, naturally believed that no state should exceed in population 
 the number that could successfully'live in a single community. For 
 example, Aristotle says : " Clearly then the best limit of the popu- 
 lation of a state is the largest number which suffices for the pur- 
 poses of life, and can be taken in at a single view." 6 Rousseau 
 placed a limit to the size of the state for a different reason. Be- 
 lieving that direct democracy was the only way of securing that 
 expression of general will by which the state should be ruled, and 
 that democracy was weakened if the population of the state were 
 
 1 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, chap, ix ; see below, Chapter IX. 
 
 2 Nature of the State, pp. 22-23. 
 
 8 Spirit of the Laws, Bk. I, chap. iii. 
 
 4 Province of Jurisprudence Determined, 2d ed., Lecture VI, p. 183. 
 
 6 Politics, Bk. VII, chap. iv. 
 
56 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 so large as to necessitate representation, he urged a limit as fol- 
 lows : " Let us suppose that the state is composed of ten thousand 
 citizens . . . then the sovereign is to the subject as ten thousand 
 is to one. If the people is composed of a hundred thousand men 
 the condition of the subject is not changed, and each bears the 
 whole weight of the laws, but as his suffrage is reduced to a hun- 
 dred thousandth, he has ten times less influence in their formation. 
 . . . From which it follows that the larger the state becomes the 
 less liberty there is." 1 Present political theory sets no limits to 
 the possible number of inhabitants that a state may include. Im- 
 provements in the transmission of intelligence and in the transpor- 
 tation of persons and commodities, together with more perfect 
 devices in governmental organization, such as representation, local 
 self-government, and federation, make possible a successful and 
 stable state with unlimited population. In actual practice, numbers 
 have varied from the few hundreds included within the village com- 
 munity or the feudal fragment to the hundreds of millions over 
 whom the national empires of the present hold sway. 
 
 II. Territory 
 
 90. Elements included under territory. In its broadest sense, 
 the territory of a state includes the whole complex of physical con- 
 ditions that influence its historical development. "The most potent 
 of these are its size and zonal location ; its situation, whether con- 
 tinental or insular, inland or maritime, on the open ocean or an 
 enclosed sea ; its boundaries, whether drawn by sea, mountain, 
 desert or the faint demarking line of a river ; its forested moun- 
 tains, grassy plains, and arable lowlands ; its climate and drainage 
 system ; finally its equipment with plant and animal life, whether 
 indigenous or irnported, and its mineral resources. When a state 
 has taken advantage of all its natural conditions, the land becomes 
 a constituent part of the state, modifying the people which inhabit 
 it, modified by them in turn, till the connection between the two 
 becomes so strong by reciprocal interaction, that the people cannot 
 be understood apart from their land." 2 In its more limited sense, 
 
 1 Social Contract, Bk. Ill, chap. i. 
 
 2 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, pp. 59-60. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 57 
 
 the territory of a state is the definite portion of the earth's surface 
 over which the state exercises jurisdiction. It is the area whose 
 boundaries mark the limit of one state as against its adjacent 
 neighboring states. 
 
 91. Territory essential to state existence. Whether territory, 
 in this sense, is essential to the conception of the state is a dis- 
 puted question. Willoughby argues that permanent possession of 
 a fixed area is not necessary to the existence of a state, as follows : 
 " There has been an inclination' on the part of many publicists to 
 refuse the designation of state to the earlier types of political life, 
 especially to those undeveloped organizations wherein the people 
 have not yet obtained for themselves a settled abode. Those taking 
 this ground must be considered as governed by an empiric con- 
 ception of the state. We cannot refuse the designation of state to 
 a society of men, if politically organized, even though it be in the 
 nomadic stage. Low order of development cannot deprive an insti- 
 tution of its generic name." x 
 
 92. Territorial basis of sovereignty and law. On the other 
 hand, the modern idea of sovereignty and law rests on a territorial 
 basis. In the Middle Ages land-owning gave governing power, 
 and since feudal times the authority of the state has coincided with 
 its geographic boundaries. Hence no state, in the present sense 
 of the term, can exist without permanent territory and fixed fron- 
 tiers. This point of view is expressed in the following : " From 
 the invariable association of land with sovereignty, or in other 
 words of exclusive control, over the members of a specific society, 
 to the necessary association of such control with the possession of 
 land, is a step which could readily be made, and which became in- 
 evitable when no instances were present of civilized communities 
 without fixed seats." 2 
 
 93. Extent of state's territory. The rules of international law 
 determine what constitutes the territory of a state and the nature 
 of a state's boundaries. Lawrence outlines the extent of a state's 
 territory as follows : " It consists, first, of the land and water within 
 that portion of the earth's surface over which the state exercises 
 
 1 Nature of the State, pp. 27-28. 
 
 2 Hall, Treatise on International Law, p. 20. 
 
58 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 rights of sovereignty. . '. . Secondly, a state's territory includes the 
 sea within a three-mile limit of its shores. ... In the third place, 
 a state is held to possess, in addition to the marine league, narrow 
 bays and estuaries that indent its coast, and narrow straits both of 
 whose shores are in its territory. ... In the fourth place, a state 
 possesses the islets fringing its coast." x Because of the recent ac- 
 complishments in aerial navigation, jurisdiction over land and water 
 must now be extended to include the air also, although interna- 
 tional rules covering this field have not yet been agreed upon. 2 
 
 94. Limit to state's territory. Any attempt to set a theoretical 
 limit upon the proper area of the state, or to discuss the necessary 
 effect of territorial extent on the nature of the state, must take into 
 consideration the rapid progress of man in controlling the natural 
 environment, especially the improvements in transportation and 
 communication. States of all sizes have existed in actual fact, and 
 political philosophers have disagreed as to the desirability of large 
 or small areas. Rousseau, desirous of safeguarding democracy, at- 
 tempted to lay down certain general principles concerning the area 
 of the state, as follows : "In general a small state is proportion- 
 ately stronger than a large one. A thousand reasons demonstrate 
 this maxim : First, the administration becomes more difficult at 
 great distances. ... It also becomes more onerous in proportion 
 as degrees are multiplied. . . . All this expense drains the subjects 
 continually. . . . -The government has less vigor and celerity in en- 
 forcing the laws, in preventing vexations, in correcting abuses, and 
 foreseeing seditious enterprises which might arise in remote places. 
 . . . The same laws can not apply to different provinces, having dif- 
 ferent manners and climates and being unable to endure the same 
 form of government. . . . Talents are hidden, wishes not recog- 
 nized, and vices unpunished in a multitude of men. . . . Chiefs 
 burdened with affairs see nothing for themselves ; clerks govern 
 the state . . . and so it is thus that a state too large for its consti- 
 tution becomes worn out, and perishes under its own weight." s 
 
 1 Principles of International Law, pp. 140-147. 
 
 2 Wilson, " Aerial Navigation," in The American Political Science Review, 
 Vol. V, No. 2 ; Hearn, Airships in Peace and War. 
 
 8 Social Contract, Bk. II, chap. ix. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE . $9 
 
 95. Large territory and liberty. On the contrary, Alexander 
 Hamilton believed that liberty was possible only in a state of con- 
 siderable extent. " The smaller the extent of territory, the more 
 difficult will it be for the people to form a regular or systematic 
 plan of opposition ; and the more easy will it be to defeat their 
 early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their 
 preparations and movements ; and the military forces in the pos- 
 session of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the 
 part where the opposition has begun. . . . The natural strength of 
 the people in a large community, in proportion to the artificial 
 strength of the government, is greater than in a small ; and of 
 course more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the 
 government to establish a tyranny." x Madison also argued that lib- 
 erty depends upon the existence of a wide variety of interests, mak- 
 ing difficult the formation of powerful combinations within the state, 
 and that this is best secured in a state of large territorial extent. 2 
 
 96. Geographic unity. More recently, certain writers have laid 
 emphasis on geographic unity, believing that nature sets certain 
 limits to the size of states in various parts of the earth, and that 
 the boundaries of states should coincide with natural frontiers, with 
 mountains, deserts, wide rivers, or the sea. " National unity is the 
 determining force in the development of the modern constitutional 
 states. The prime policy, therefore, of each of these states should 
 be to attain proper physical boundaries. . . . Where two or more 
 independent states are situated in one and the same geographical 
 unity, it is presumably a sound policy which seeks the union of 
 these states in a more general political organization or the absorp- 
 tion by one — the most capable and powerful — of the others. . . . 
 On the other hand, if a state organization extends over several 
 geographic unities, then there is good ground, in sound public 
 policy, to consider whether the political civilization of the world 
 would not be advanced by its separation into several independent 
 states, corresponding in political extent with the boundaries indi- 
 cated by nature." 3 
 
 1 The Federalist, No. 28. See also Merriam, American Political Theories, 
 pp. 103-106. 2 The Federalist, No. 51. 
 
 8 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 40-42. 
 
60 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 III. Government 
 
 97. Nature of government. As already indicated, government 
 is the organization that expresses and administers the will of the 
 state. It is the outward manifestation of state existence, the means 
 by which states carry on intercourse with one another and by which 
 they control the affairs of their own subjects. 1 Every person who 
 shares legally in exercising the authority of the state is included 
 in the government, which may therefore be defined as the sum total 
 of all the individuals and groups of individuals who formulate and 
 put into execution the legal will of the state. Some organs of gov- 
 ernment exercise large powers ; others, small. Some act regularly 
 and frequently ; others, irregularly and infrequently. In some states 
 the government includes a considerable portion of the citizen body ; 
 in others only a few share in authority. Governments show wide 
 variations in their internal organization and in the functions that 
 they perform. But, in every state, some machinery, legally estab- 
 lished and operated, is engaged in exercising political authority ; and 
 this machinery, considered as a unit, is the government of that state. 2 
 
 98. Evolution of government. The evolution of the state has 
 taken place largely through changes in the structure and functions 
 of government. In early times government was simple in its 
 organization, confused with other nonpolitical groups arising from 
 family, religious, or industrial interests ; and its activities were 
 indefinite in nature and irregular and uncertain in fulfillment. 
 With political advancement, governmental organization became 
 more complex, and its powers grew wider and at the same time 
 more definite. As the interests to be regulated expanded, division 
 of labor partitioned authority among numerous departments, and 
 their activities became more intelligently self -directed. Meanwhile, 
 the share of the people in political power was growing, 3 and the 
 government, no longer looked upon with dread as a tyrannous and 
 repressive monster, but rather as the embodiment of a general will, 
 entered upon a constantly widening sphere of usefulness. 
 
 1 Jellinek, Recht des modernen Staates, pp. 152-155. 
 
 2 Dealey, Development of the State, chap. vi. 
 
 3 Scherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, Introduction and Part II. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 6 1 
 
 99. Sources of governmental authority. Before any attempt is 
 made to analyze government or separate it into its elements, the 
 question naturally arises concerning the method of its creation, the 
 source and sanction of its authority. Many organs of government 
 are created by superior preexisting organs, which delegate a part 
 of their authority, limiting the scope of action and sometimes the 
 method of procedure. These delegating organs, in turn, may have 
 been established and their authority outlined by still higher and 
 more powerful bodies ; and thus the hierarchy of organs and offi- 
 cials, with the resultant division of labor and the responsibility to 
 supervision and direction, is built up. Somewhere, however, there 
 must be an authority that creates the fundamental organization of 
 the state, that distributes in a general way the total authority that 
 may be exercised by the government, and that provides a legal way 
 for exercising or delegating the entire sovereignty. This authority 
 is found in what is called the constitution of the state. 1 
 
 100. The constitution. In the broad and proper sense of the 
 term, the constitution of a state is the form of that state, the col- 
 lection of rules and principles in accordance with which the state 
 is organized, the scope of governmental powers outlined, the vari- 
 ous departments and divisions of governing authority established, 
 and the extent and manner of their procedure indicated. Every 
 state, therefore, has a constitution, just as each individual has a 
 character. This constitution comes into existence with the state 
 itself, changing from time to time to accord with prevailing politi- 
 cal conditions and ideals within the state. 2 At any given time this 
 constitution will probably be found expressed in customs sanctioned 
 by common consent and enforced by the authority of the state, in 
 certain fundamental documents created often under unusual condi- 
 tions and by an unusual form of procedure, and in the legislative 
 statutes, administrative decrees, and judicial decisions of the ordi- 
 nary government. 3 From these sources combined are drawn the 
 rules which determine the fundamental relations of the state to its 
 
 1 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 373-377. 
 
 2 Ibid., pp. 402-406. 
 
 8 Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Essay III ; Garner, op. cit., 
 pp. 388-406 ; Lowell, Government of England, Introduction. 
 
62 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 citizens, the field of their liberty and the scope of its authority, in- 
 cluding the legal organization and mode of exercise of the latter. 
 The constitution, considered as a whole, makes provision for the 
 total exercise of the sovereign powers of the state. " Evidently, 
 then, every state from the moment when it begins its existence 
 has a constitution, which may be defined as that fundamental law 
 or body of laws, written or unwritten, in which may be found (i) 
 the form of the organization of the state, (2) the extent of power 
 intrusted to the various agencies of the state, and. (3) the manner in 
 which these powers are to be exercised." x The redistribution of the 
 primary powers of government rests in the hands of that govern- 
 mental organ that may legally modify or amend this constitution. 2 
 
 101. Elements of government. The next question has to do with 
 the component elements of government. Here a distinction must 
 first be made between those organs that act indirectly or irregularly 
 and that are often not recognized as a part of the government, and 
 those organs that act directly and constantly, recognized by all as 
 forming a part of the political organization. In modern states the 
 former class includes two main types of authorities : 3 
 
 1. The electorate. As states develop, a point is reached when 
 civic consciousness spreads throughout the mass of the population, 
 who, accordingly, demand a share in governing authority. This 
 has resulted, often after bitter resistance on the part of the rulers 
 and violent uprisings- on the part of the people, in the political 
 device of voting, by which a voice in the selection of officials and 
 in the formulation of law is conferred upon the electorate. 4 All 
 advanced modern states confer rights of suffrage upon a certain 
 class of their citizens. These persons, as a group whose compo- 
 sition and political functions are determined by law, form a part 
 of the government when exercising the political rights that they 
 possess. 5 By elections they share in selecting administrative officials 
 and law-making representatives ; by the initiative and referendum 6 
 
 1 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 207-208. 
 
 2 Borgeaud, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions, Conclusion. 
 8 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, chaps, xxvii-xxix. 
 
 4 Sloane, " History and Democracy," in American Historical Review, Vol. I. 
 6 Dealey, op. cit., pp. 215-220. 
 
 6 " The Initiative and Referendum," Bulletin No. 1 1, Wisconsin Reference 
 Department. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 65 
 
 they take part in the creation or rejection of law; and by jury 
 service 1 they share in the application and enforcement of law. 
 States differ widely in the extent of their electorates, in the powers 
 exercised directly by their electorates, and in the influence exerted 
 by their electorates over the other organs of government. In all 
 but the most despotic states, however, a fair proportion of the 
 population is permitted to exercise some political authority, and in 
 this way forms a part of the government. 2 
 
 2. Political parties. With the growth of democracy and the 
 winning of political rights by the electorate, some form of organi- 
 zation became necessary in order that the people might continue 
 to formulate and execute their will"; and the groups, through whose 
 efforts democracy was secured, were perpetuated in political parties, 
 or as they were formerly called "factions," by means of which 
 democracy is workable. 3 Political parties arose as voluntary associ- 
 ations of individuals, held together by common purposes or by 
 common grievances ; and for a long time they existed outside the 
 legal organization of the state. Even to-day in many states they 
 are little recognized or controlled by law and exert their political 
 power indirectly. 4 In so far as they are legally recognized and 
 incorporated into the governmental organization, or in so far as 
 their authority is tacitly accepted and enforced by the state, they 
 form a part of the government. In other respects, while un- 
 questionably powerful, their authority must be classed along with 
 public opinion or with the influence of other voluntary associations. 
 The governing authority possessed by political parties differs, de- 
 pending in each state largely on the degree of democracy, the 
 •number of parties, and the work that they must perform. 5 
 
 102. The government proper. In distinction to the electorate 
 and political parties, which form, as it were, the background of 
 modern governmental organization, and which are lacking in primi- 
 
 1 Strictly speaking, juries are a separate and especially chosen organ of govern- 
 ment, not coincident with the electorate, although often chosen by lot from the 
 electorate. 
 
 2 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, chap, xv ; Esmein, Droit consti- 
 tutionnel, pp. 209-248. s Gettell, Introduction to Political Science, chap. xxi. 
 
 4 Goodnow, Politics and Administration, chap. ix. 
 
 6 Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties ; Lowell, 
 Governments and Parties in Continental Europe. 
 
64 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 tive or undeveloped states, there is the government proper, — that 
 organization composed of individuals, variously selected, who are 
 specifically intrusted with the ordinary creation and administration 
 of law. For convenient analysis, government is usually considered 
 under the following heads : 
 
 i . Separation of powers} Organs of government are differenti- 
 ated according to the nature of the functions that they perform. 
 Broadly speaking, they are concerned with either the formulation 
 or the administration of law ; they either create the state's will or 
 enforce it. 2 The ordinary classification, however, divides them into 
 three departments : legislative, executive, and judicial, each depart- 
 ment performing duties fairly distinct, and each sharing to a certain 
 degree in the authority of the others. 3 Administration, distinct from 
 the executive, has indeed practically, become a fourth department. 
 While in primitive times these functions were often combined in the 
 hands of a single man or of a small group, the complexity of the 
 modern state demands a considerable division of labor within each of 
 these departments, leading to extensive subdivision and interrelation. 
 
 2. Division of powers. Organs of government are further differ- 
 entiated according to the areas over which they have jurisdiction. 
 Here the distinction is between national and the various degrees of 
 local organization. 4 All states of the present day are so large that 
 they require division and subdivision into convenient districts of 
 administration ; and the governmental organizations of these various 
 areas differ in their legal position and in the nature of the questions 
 with which they deal. Cutting across .the separation of government 
 into departments, therefore, is a division of government according 
 to area of jurisdiction, certain governing powers being intrusted to 
 the organization of a wider jurisdiction, others to that of a narrower, 
 within each jurisdiction the various departments usually reappear- 
 ing. The principle of local self-government, which is extensively 
 applied in modern states, makes many of these subordinate units 
 of great importance. Modern cities, for example, present political 
 
 1 Bondy, "Separation of Governmental Powers," in Columbia University Stud- 
 ies, Vol. V, No. 2 ; Garner, Introduction to Political Science, chap. xiii. 
 
 2 Goodnow, Politics and Administration, chaps, i-iv. 
 8 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, chaps, xx-xxiv. 
 
 * Goodnow, op. cit., chap, iii ; Sidgwick, op. cit., chap. xxv. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 6$ 
 
 problems of the first magnitude, 1 and colonial possessions are 
 sometimes more advanced in government than the states to which 
 they belong. 2 
 
 103. Summary. The government of a state, then, is determined 
 fundamentally by its constitution, which outlines the total field of 
 governmental authority and distributes this field in a general way. 
 The organs thus established, acting within the scope of their legal 
 competence, subdivide the field and parcel out political authority to 
 the large number of organs that are needed to express and ad- 
 minister properly the state's will. The individual citizens who form 
 the electorate ; the political parties that have a legal status in nom- 
 inations, elections, or expressions of policy ; the various organs, — 
 national, local, and colonial ; legislative, executive, and judicial, — 
 including special commissions or conventions legally created and 
 empowered, and the organ, if any, that may legally amend the 
 constitution and thus redistribute governing powers, — all these 
 combined form the government of the modern state. Other organ- 
 izations, especially religious, industrial, and educational, exert politi- 
 cal influence, and at times have been included as parts of the 
 government ; but unless their influence is legally enforced it is not 
 considered the will of the state, and such organizations at present 
 seldom form part of the political organization, or government. The 
 exact line between government and semipublic organizations is 
 difficult to draw. 
 
 IV. Sovereignty 
 
 104. Nature of sovereignty. A population inhabiting a definite 
 territory and organized by means of a government forms a state if 
 it possesses sovereignty ; 3 that is, if there exists within the state a . 
 supreme and unlimited will that is enforced over all persons and 
 associations belonging to the group, 4 and if the group is legally 
 
 1 Rowe, Problems of City Government. 
 
 2 Reinsch, Colonial Government ; Colonial Administration. 
 
 8 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, Bk. II, chap. i. 
 Some writers, especially in Germany, deny that sovereignty is an essential element 
 of the state. See Laband, Das- Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, Vol. I, 
 pp. 6i ff. ; Jellinek, Die Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen, pp. 36 ff. 
 
 4 Austin, Jurisprudence, Lecture VI. 
 
66 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 free from interference at the hands of other groups. 1 Internal 
 supremacy and external independence are the two aspects of sov- 
 ereignty, the essential principle that distinguishes the state from 
 all other associations and organizations. 2 
 
 105. Limitations on the theory ot sovereignty. In a theoretical, 
 or purely legal, sense all states are internally supreme and ex- 
 ternally independent and equal. In actual operation, the supremacy 
 of internal sovereignty is, of course, limited by the complex inter- 
 ests and motives, many of which are extralegal, that influence the 
 creation and application of law, and that determine political policy 
 and methods. 3 In international relations the theory of legal equality 
 is nullified by actual differences in size, strength, and wealth ; and 
 the theory of independence is modified by the rules of international 
 law, by treaty agreements, by anomalous political situations, such 
 as neutralized states, protectorates, and spheres of influence, and 
 by practical political dogmas, such as the concert of powers and 
 the Monroe Doctrine. 
 
 106. Sovereignty a legal concept. While sovereignty in its ori- 
 gin often results from force, and in last resort depends upon force 
 for its maintenance, since it must be able to compel as well as to 
 command obedience, it is nevertheless essentially a legal concept. 4 
 Internal sovereignty lies at the basis of the municipal law of the 
 state ; external sovereignty is a prerequisite for international law. 
 Law, in the proper sense of the term, consists of those rules that 
 are enforced by the state. They are the expression of the state's 
 sovereign will, enforced by the state's sovereign power. Somewhere 
 within the state, then, there must be a legal lawmaking authority, 
 
 1 Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, Part I, chap. i. Writers on international 
 law usually deny the absoluteness of external sovereignty, placing various limita- 
 tions upon the independence of states. The present tendencies in interstate 
 relations may necessitate modifications in the theory of external sovereignty, or 
 even an admission that the internal and external phases of sovereignty are in 
 reality different concepts. A certain degree of autonomy and independence, that 
 is, a relative freedom from a higher or an external control, and a government 
 which is habitually obeyed are unquestionably essential. See Hershey, Essentials 
 of Public International. Law, pp. 99-1 14, and authorities there cited ; Crane, The 
 State in Constitutional and International Law. 
 
 2 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, chap. viii. 
 8 Lowell, Essays on Government, chap. v. 
 
 * Willoughby, Nature of the State, chaps, vii-ix. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 67 
 
 and in the sum total of organs legally exercising this function the 
 sovereignty of the state is vested. 
 
 107. Distribution of sovereign powers. The original sovereign 
 power of the state is distributed among its governing organs by the 
 original creative process by which the state was formed. 1 This dis- 
 tribution is outlined in the constitution, either written or unwritten, 
 which comes into existence with the state, and a legal method of 
 readjusting the powers of the various governing organs is usually 
 provided in the form of either a definitely written or a commonly 
 accepted method of change. 2 In this way, either by definite legal 
 process or by gradual customary evolution, sovereignty may be re- 
 located, as conditions change, without danger to the state. If, how- 
 ever, the actual sovereignty of the state is not properly organized 
 in its governing machinery, and if the will of the state cannot 
 easily secure legal expression, a revolution is likely to occur. This 
 involves an illegal and often a violent relocation of sovereignty. But 
 if the previously existing, or de jure, sovereignty is overthrown by 
 the actual, or de facto, sovereignty, the latter in turn becomes the 
 legal sovereignty of the state, entitled to obedience when gener- 
 ally acknowledged and able to enforce its will. 3 . 
 
 108. Conclusion. There is, therefore, in every state an organi- 
 zation that represents the state, that legally expresses and admin- 
 isters the supreme will of the state, in the form of law, over all 
 persons and groups of persons included within the state ; and that 
 adjusts the relations of the state with other states. The principle 
 of unity by which the state is supreme over all its component parts 
 and by which it is independent of all other states, the ability to ex- 
 press and to enforce its will in the form of law, — these represent 
 the sovereignty of the state. 
 
 109. Historical development of the conception of sovereignty. 
 The existing legal conception of sovereignty is comparatively 
 recent ; 4 but wherever the state has existed there has been within 
 
 1 Willoughby, op. cit., chap. vi. 
 
 2 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 263-264. 
 
 8 Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, chap, x ; Sidgwick, Elements 
 of Politics, chap. xxxi. 
 
 4 Merriam, " History of the Theory of Sovereignty since Rousseau," in Co- 
 lumbia University Studies, Vol. XII, No. 4. 
 
68 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 it an authority of some nature, enforced more or less perfectly, by 
 some sort of sanction, over all its individuals. There has also been 
 a feeling on the part of the individuals composing the state that 
 they formed a distinct community, having common interests and 
 being somehow or other different from other groups. Hence the 
 crude beginnings of sovereignty, in both its internal and external 
 phases, were found even in the most primitive political organiza- 
 tions ; and the development of the state has been characterized by 
 increasing definiteness in the conception and organization of the 
 state's internal authority and external independence. 
 
 110. Sovereignty in the ancient world. In ancient times the 
 members of the state were held together by ties of kinship and 
 religion, and rulers were obeyed because of customary reverence 
 for the patriarch and the priest. Later, bonds of personal alle- 
 giance bound mankind into groups, and sovereigns ruled as lords 
 of their people. Similarly, in external dealings, differences in race 
 or religion, in personal dependence, or in economic interests sepa- 
 rated group from group. At times the conception of sovereignty 
 slowly evolving was checked by conditions that threatened both in- 
 ternal supremacy and external independence. The confused claims 
 of church and state during a large part of human history, 1 the 
 belief that law was of divine origin or was to be found in nature, 2 
 and the complicated jurisdictions under feudalism, 3 made difficult 
 any unlimited and indivisible sovereignty of the state over all its 
 citizens. So the ideal of world empire and the claims of papal su- 
 premacy prevented the existence of independent and equal states. 4 
 
 111. Conditions creating modern theory of sovereignty. Toward 
 the end of the sixteenth century, when the rise of national states 
 had destroyed the governing institutions of the Middle Ages and 
 demanded a new explanation of political authority, conditions were 
 such as to make possible for the first time the modern theory of 
 sovereignty. The old unity based on kinship had disappeared. 
 Bonds of personal dependence were weakened by the decline of the 
 
 1 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, chaps, v-x. 
 
 2 Willoughby, Nature of the State, chap. v. 
 
 8 Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, chap. ix. 
 * Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chap. vii. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 69 
 
 feudal nobility and the rise of monarchs ruling over more numer- 
 ous subjects. Feudalism, by combining governing power with land- 
 holding, developed the idea of territorial jurisdiction, and the 
 authority of the growing national states was considered to be terri- 
 torial in nature. Meanwhile, the actual existence of a number of 
 states relatively equal in strength, and under the rule of hereditary 
 monarchs, made impossible the former ideals of world empire and 
 of papal supremacy. 1 Under these conditions arose the conception 
 of the state as a supreme political power internally and of states as 
 independent and equal externally. 2 The work of Bodin 3 recognized 
 the indivisible and absolute power of the state over its inhabitants, 
 while that of Grotius 4 emphasized the equality and independence 
 of the state in its relation with other states ; both agreeing that 
 jurisdiction was coincident with territorial boundaries. Although 
 Bodin thought of sovereignty as resting in an absolute monarch, 
 and Grotius based the rules of interstate relations on natural law, 
 the changes in political theory that have swept away these concep- 
 tions have not seriously threatened the fundamental principles of 
 sovereignty as then laid down ; and the writings of more recent 
 scholars, especially of John Austin, 5 have made the concept of 
 sovereignty the foundation for the validity of all law and for all 
 international agreements. 
 
 V. Law 
 
 112. Nature of law. Law is the will of the state enforced by its 
 sovereign authority over all individuals and associations of individ- 
 uals within the state. 6 The sanction of the state legally applied to 
 certain rules and principles is the essential element of law. 7 In 
 ancient times custom furnished most of the rules that were gen- 
 erally observed, and a supernatural sanction was believed to exist 
 in the enforcing authority. 8 Ancient codes dealt as much with 
 
 1 Adams, op. cit., chaps, xii-xviii ; Dunning, op. cit., chaps, ix-xi. 
 
 2 Dunning, Political Theories : From Luther to Montesquieu, chaps, iii-v. 
 8 De la Republique (1576), 
 
 4 De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625). 
 6 Lectures on Jurisprudence (1832). 
 
 6 Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, chaps, ii-iv. 
 
 7 Willoughby, Nature of the State, chap. viii. 
 
 8 Maine, Ancient Law ; Early History of Institutions. 
 
70 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 religion as with civil rights ; contracts were valid only when accom- 
 panied by sacramental formulae. Such law, undistinguished from 
 religion and partaking of its exclusiveness, was intended to govern 
 the actions of citizens only. Strangers and slaves did not share in 
 the rights that it established. However, as the early tribes and 
 cities extended their relations with other groups, it became neces- 
 sary to provide some security for noncitizens. In Rome the praetor 
 peregrinus judged cases involving strangers ; in Athens a similar 
 function was performed by the polemarch who had charge of foreign 
 relations. The demand for written law and the formation of defi- 
 nite codes often resulted from agitation on the part of those who 
 had no legal share in the religion of the state but wished to enjoy 
 the advantages of settled rules. 
 
 113. The law of nature. As population grew and interests be- 
 came more complex, frequent grievances arose because of the for- 
 mality, exclusiveness, and artificiality of ancient law. Since it often 
 seemed to violate elementary notions of justice, there was gradually 
 developed, especially among the Greeks and Romans, the idea of a 
 law less artificial and more just, that is, the law of nature or natu- 
 ral law. This law existing in nature was considered ideal law, to be 
 discovered and applied by man, 1 and during the centuries that fol- 
 lowed, endless discussions arose as to what law did and what law did 
 not belong to the law of nature. Until the last century the doctrine 
 of natural law, and of natural rights based upon such law, survived ; 
 although occasional writers even in the Middle Ages discussed po- 
 litical principles from a more rational standpoint. Machiavelli laid 
 down rules to govern the policies of princes regardless of natural law; 
 Thomas Aquinas made the law of nature identical with the law of 
 reason ; Suarez boldly proclaimed the divine right of the people. 
 Nevertheless, as late as the period of the French and the American 
 revolutions men appealed to natural law, the doctrines of Rousseau, 
 Madison, and Jefferson being based upon a belief in its existence. 
 
 114. The modern conception of law. The idea that law is the 
 will of the state, formulated and enforced by the authority resulting 
 from political organization, and sanctioned in last analysis by human 
 
 1 Scherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, Part I ; Dunning, Political Theories : 
 From Luther to Montesquieu, Index, " Natural Law." 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 71 
 
 force alone is, except for a somewhat imperfect realization during 
 the Roman Empire, a recent conception. To-day, while a part of 
 law exists in the form of customs or of general principles of justice 
 applied by the judiciary, the great body of law consists of definite 
 statutes formulated by authorized lawmaking bodies, — by legisla- 
 tures, administrative officials, conventions, or popular referendums. 
 Enforcement by the state has been, however, the distinguishing 
 characteristic of law during this entire process, 1 and where the 
 law has not been directly formulated by the state, the legal prin- 
 ciple that " what the sovereign permits, he commands " may 
 be applied. 2 
 
 115. Influences affecting the evolution of law : usage. A num- 
 ber of influences have contributed to the historical development of 
 law. 3 The earliest means of social regulation were generally accepted 
 rules of conduct resulting from accidental habits, from evident util- 
 ity, or from general desire for order and justice. No direct action 
 of the state was involved in the creation of such principles, their 
 sanction depending upon immemorial usage or common belief in 
 their divine origin. 4 As long as social relations were simple and 
 common interests few, the value of these customary rules was rec- 
 ognized by all, and the disorder or personal violence that resulted 
 from their occasional nonobservance was not a serious menace to 
 the crude political societies then existing. But under changing con- 
 ditions, such as often resulted from migration to a new environment, 
 transition to other occupations, or contact with other peoples, diffi- 
 culties arose. More numerous controversies led to doubts as to the 
 relative validity of conflicting customs ; in some cases the applica- 
 tion of ancient rules worked undeniable hardships ; new cases fre- 
 quently arose concerning which custom furnished no rule. These 
 conditions led to a new source of law resulting from judicial inter- 
 pretations and decisions. 6 
 
 1 Lee, Historical Jurisprudence ; Pound, " Political and Economic Interpreta- 
 tions of Jurisprudence," in Proceedings of the American Political Science Asso- 
 ciation, Vol. IX, pp. 94-105. 
 
 2 Austin, Province of Jurisprudence Determined, Lecture VI. 
 8 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 144-159. 
 
 * Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, pp. 61-62. 
 
 6 Thayer, " Judicial Legislation : its Legitimate Function in the Development 
 of the Common Law," in Harvard Law Review, Vol. V. 
 
72 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 116. Judicial decisions. The state arose not as the creator of 
 law, but as the interpreter and enforcer of custom. Disputed points 
 were referred naturally to men of recognized importance, the aged 
 patriarch or the war leader, who had authority to enforce their 
 decisions. While in theory each case was decided on its merits 
 by applying long-standing custom, in several ways the decisions 
 of magistrates created new law. In deciding similar cases general 
 rules were established, precedent was followed, and either uncon- 
 sciously or deliberately the law was modified and expanded. When 
 former customs worked injustice, decisions often remedied the evils 
 and created new principles by means of legal fictions. 1 Finally, 
 when no rule existed, general principles of equity were applied, 
 still under the pretense of judicially interpreting laws already in 
 existence. Many decisions of the Roman praetor and of the Eng- 
 lish chancellor are examples of law thus created. In these ways, 
 as social life developed, the strictness and rigidity of old customs 
 were modified, the functions of the state were extended, and its 
 authority was made more definite in expression and more certain 
 in enforcement. 
 
 117. Writings of jurists. Scientific commentaries upon law 
 have also created legal principles. 2 By collecting and arranging in 
 logical form past customs, decisions, and enactments, writers on 
 law have been able to deduce general and philosophical principles, 
 which are often accepted and enforced by the courts and thus be- 
 come law, 3 or which may at least indicate the gaps that remain to 
 be filled in order to have a complete and logical legal system, and 
 which may suggest the proper basis for further enactment. 
 
 118. Legislation. The time came, however, when these methods 
 of legal growth no longer satisfied the demands of developing politi- 
 cal life, and a more direct and immediate means of creating legal 
 rights and obligations was required. Thus arose the comparatively 
 recent function of legislation, when the state became the direct 
 creator of law. At first magistrates and priests alone could create 
 
 1 Such was the fiction in Roman law that considered the wife as the legal 
 daughter of her husband, and in the English law that considered husband and 
 wife as one legal person. 
 
 2 Markby, Elements of Law, section 83. 
 8 Dicey, Law of the Constitution, p. 496. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 73 
 
 law. Representing the power of the gods or the majesty of the 
 state, patriarch and king or, later, praetor and archon were law- 
 givers. In the Roman Empire the emperor was the source of all 
 law ; when national states arose their kings claimed the same pre- 
 rogative, and in some states to-day, in legal phraseology at least, 
 laws are issued by the crown. During this process assemblies of 
 freemen, whose consent and support were needed on important 
 questions, gradually established themselves as part of the govern- 
 ment, and by various methods secured the right to initiate, as well as 
 indorse, new laws. The assemblies in Greece and in Rome and the 
 early Teutonic moots represented this stage. Finally, the system of 
 representation, begun in England, furnished a device that enabled the 
 growing idea of popular sovereignty to manifest itself effectively ; and 
 in modern states legislation is controlled by representative bodies. 1 
 119. Extension of legislation. For a long time the lawmaking 
 powers of government dealt almost entirely with public law, adjust- 
 ing the relation of citizens and state, and leaving the regulation of 
 the private interests of individuals to custom and the judiciary. 
 Only gradually, even after representative assemblies arose, did they 
 attempt more than a general control of public administration. How- 
 ever, as the basis of representation widened, and the people, in 
 their growing political consciousness, realized their power, it was 
 inevitable that, through their representatives, they should enter on 
 a constantly extending field of legislation. Private as well as public 
 interests were regulated, other lawmaking bodies with delegated 
 powers were created, and the present enormous legislative activity 
 was begun. The growth of popular representative government and 
 the idea that the state manifests its sovereignty in detailed legisla- 
 tion are closely interrelated. At present legislation is almost the 
 only source of law. Custom and equity are being replaced by 
 definite enactment ; judicial decisions are limited by codification ; 
 and scientific commentary does little except discuss cases. While 
 the other sources are present, they tend increasingly to be swal- 
 lowed up in legislation. Rigid custom which, when unaltered, 
 caused ancient states to stagnate, has been replaced by a craze for 
 lawmaking which sometimes threatens to go too far in the other 
 
 1 Clarke, Science of Law and Lawmaking. 
 
74 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 direction. 1 At the same time custom still serves as a check on radi- 
 cal action. Laws no longer needed become obsolete, usages grow up 
 outside the legal system, and public opinion constantly influences 
 both the formulation and the administration of law. Traditions of 
 the past, as well as needs for the future, affect the creation of law. 2 
 
 120. Distribution of lawmaking authority. Within every state 
 a legal distribution of lawmaking authority among various organs 
 is now found. In early times, when states were small and govern- 
 ment was a simple process, concentration of lawmaking power in 
 the hands of a few was possible, and in the same hands the ad- 
 ministration of the law was often vested. 3 The expansion of modern 
 states in area and population and the increasing complexity of 
 political interests has necessitated a considerable division of gov- 
 ernmental organization and function. The fundamental body of 
 rules and principles, called the constitution, which underlies the 
 organization of the state, provides in a general way for the formula- 
 tion of the state's will, and further subdivision is secured by a dele- 
 gation of authority to various minor organs. In this way legal 
 provision is made for the total exercise of the lawmaking power 
 of the state, for the total expression of its will. A body of rules or 
 customs sanctioned by the state outlines the various organs that 
 may share in this process and indicates the scope of jurisdiction 
 and general mode of procedure for each. Provision is also made 
 for deciding disputes in case of doubtful or conflicting jurisdiction, 
 and for readjusting the spheres of authority among the various 
 organs as changing conditions may require. 
 
 121. Conclusion. The sum total of the principles enforced by 
 these organs forms the law of the state, all organs acting legally 
 within their spheres of competence creating laws of equal validity. 4 
 On the other hand, the will of any organ not authorized, or the 
 will of an authorized organ expressed in an illegal manner or in 
 a field beyond the sphere of its legal authority is not a law, but a 
 revolutionary act. 6 
 
 1 Report of the American Bar Association, 1906, Part I, pp. 383 ff. 
 
 2 Parsons, Legal Doctrine and Social Progress. 
 8 Dealey, Development of the State, chap. xii. 
 
 4 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 205-214; Laband, Das Staatsrecht des 
 deutschen Reiches, Vol. I, p. 546. 6 Wilson, The State, chap. xiv. 
 
THE NATURE OF THE STATE 7$ 
 
 122. Classification of law: public law. The law of the state 
 may be most satisfactorily classified on the basis of the relations 
 governed. 1 The law which regulates the relations of state and in- 
 dividual is called public law? In public law the state is one of 
 the parties to the right created by the law, at the same time being 
 the power that creates and enforces the law. Public law deals 
 with the organization and functions of the state, and with its rela- 
 tions to its citizens. Its main subdivisions are : 3 (i) constitutional 
 law, which outlines in a general way the fundamental organization 
 of the state and indicates the scope and manner of exercise of 
 governmental powers, at the same time setting apart a sphere of 
 individual liberty within which the government may not enter; 4 
 
 (2) administrative law, which defines in detail the exercise of the 
 governing powers outlined in constitutional law, and indicates to 
 the individual his remedies against governmental encroachments ; 6 
 
 (3) criminal law, which indicates the acts which the state considers 
 as infringements of its rights and for which it will impose penal 
 consequences. 6 
 
 123. Evolution of criminal law. The idea of criminal law is 
 comparatively modern. At first offenses against the state were 
 punished by special laws, and offenses against individuals, even if 
 they threatened general welfare, were considered private acts, to be 
 avenged by individuals or compensated for by money payments. 
 The state, entering as the arbiter that enforced fair play, later came 
 to consider certain acts as offenses both against other individuals 
 and against itself ; and gradually a body of rules appeared concern- 
 ing acts, both against the state and against other individuals, indi- 
 rectly affecting the general welfare. With this came the idea that 
 it was the duty of the state, to prevent and punish such offenses. 7 
 
 124. Private law. The law which regulates the relations of in- 
 dividual and individual is called private law. In private law both 
 parties concerned are private individuals, while the state occupies 
 
 1 Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, Vol. I, p. 7. 
 
 2 Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, pp. 1 21-129. 
 8 Ibid., pp. 358-379. 
 
 4 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 263-264. 
 
 6 Goodnow, op. cit., Vol. I, Bk. I, chap. ii. 
 
 6 Clark, Elementary Law, chap. ix. 7 Dealey, op. cit., pp. 80-87. 
 
76 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 the position of arbiter, creating the law and enforcing it impartially, 
 so that each citizen may secure his rights against other citizens. 
 Private law deals with questions of property, contracts, torts, per- 
 sonal relations, etc. 1 
 
 125. Municipal and international law. Public and private law 
 combined form municipal law, or the law of the state, and are 
 characterized by the presence of an enforcing authority. In 
 contrast to this law which regulates the relations of man to man 
 and of man to state, there are the rules that regulate the relations 
 of state to state, called international law? For this, except as 
 its principles are incorporated into municipal law, no enforcing 
 authority exists, and it is, in the strict sense of the term, not law. 3 
 In fact, the name " international law " is a contradiction in terms, 
 since if it is international it cannot be law, but merely the rules 
 voluntarily observed by sovereign states. On the other hand, if it 
 were law, it could not be international, but would be the municipal 
 law of a world state. By the very nature of internal sovereignty, 
 municipal law is law, while the nature of external sovereignty 
 prevents international law from being law. 4 
 
 126. International law as law. At the same time, since the 
 rules of international law are formed by legal methods and treated 
 as legal in character, it is more convenient to deal with them as a 
 branch of law than as a branch of morals. They are sanctioned 
 by laws passed by separate states, which incorporate the principles 
 of international law into their municipal law and enforce them on 
 their citizens ; by the moral sentiment that exists among nations, 
 and that causes loss of prestige to states violating it ; and, in last 
 resort, by war, in case international differences cannot be other- 
 wise adjusted. 5 
 
 1 Clark, Elementary Law, chaps, x-xix. 
 
 2 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. I, chap. i. 
 
 8 Willoughby, " Legal Nature of International Law," in The American Journal 
 of International Law, Vol. II, No. i. 
 
 4 On the distinction between internal and external sovereignty, see Garner, 
 Introduction to Political Science, pp. 264-265, and the authorities there cited. 
 
 5 Hall, Treatise on International Law, pp. 13-16; Root, "Sanction of Inter- 
 national Law," in Pamphlet published by the Association for International 
 Conciliation, No. 8. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 
 THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 
 
 I. General Nature of State Origin 
 
 127. Relation of state to other institutions. Among the problems 
 of political development that have been troublesome during the 
 entire period of state history are those resulting from the relations 
 of the state to certain fundamental social institutions that arose 
 with the state and that have been closely connected with it at 
 every stage of its evolution. These institutions include primarily 
 the religious organizations, the family groupings, the industrial as- 
 sociations, and the military systems. Since they came into exist- 
 ence with the state itself and were for a long time scarcely to be 
 distinguished from those institutions that were more purely political, 
 any discussion of their nature and of their relation to the state 
 must be preceded by a brief account of the origin of the state and 
 of the part played by them in its creation. 
 
 128. Former theories of state origin. In former times men 
 were inclined to take the state for granted, to consider it as having 
 been always in existence, to view it as established by the gods at 
 the time the human race was created, or as arising spontaneously 
 from the innate political character of man. The problems that en- 
 gaged their attention involved rather examinations into the source 
 and the sanction of political authority. The proper relation of 
 rulers to subjects, of government to freedom, has long been a 
 fiercely contested question ; and in the process of establishing 
 political authority, both sides built up an extensive fabric of political 
 speculation. On the one hand, theories were formed to establish 
 the position of rulers and to compel obedience to their will ; x on the 
 other hand, theories arose to support attacks against the existing 
 
 1 For example, the divine-right theories of the absolute monarchs during the 
 seventeenth century. 
 
 77 
 
78 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 authority, to serve as bases for revolution and reform. 1 The general 
 evolution of the state has been characterized by a conflict between 
 sovereigns and subjects, and this contest was responsible for a large 
 part of political theory. 
 
 129. Relation of theories to their times. In this process the 
 origin of the state was often considered, not so much for the pur- 
 pose of explaining the actual historical method by which the state 
 arose, but rather in a rational attempt to justify the nature of its 
 authority. 2 The universal existence of some form of social organ- 
 ization which enforced rules and set limits to the freedom of individ- 
 uals, led man, when he began to reason and investigate concerning 
 his existence, to attempt an explanation of these phenomena, vari- 
 ous theories of state origin resulting. 3 Each of these theories grew 
 naturally out of the conditions and the intellectual point of view of 
 its time; yet all of them were one-sided, partial explanations, 
 even when they made no claim to historical accuracy. Only 
 recently have scholars, imbued with the historical and scientific 
 spirit, investigated the origin of the state, hot for the purpose of 
 justifying its existence or of supporting any preconceived princi- 
 ple, but of establishing the facts of its actual origin, regardless of 
 resultant conclusions as to the nature of political authority, or the 
 effects of their investigations upon the powers that be. 4 
 
 130. Important former theories. Among the earlier theories 
 which, in considering the nature of the state, discussed indirectly 
 its origin, the most important were the divine theory, which con- 
 ceived the state as established by God ; the force theory, which 
 explained political authority as the compulsory subjection of the 
 weak to the strong ; and the social-contract theory, which found 
 the origin of the state in a voluntary agreement among its mem- 
 bers. 5 Sometimes the same theory reappeared time after time, at 
 
 1 For example, the natural-rights theories underlying the American and French 
 revolutions. 
 
 2 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. IV, chap. i. On the distinction between 
 the historical origin and the philosophic justification of state existence, see 
 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, chap. ii. 
 
 8 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, Introduction, pp. xv-xvi. 
 
 4 Beard, Politics, pp. 7-15. 
 
 6 For brief discussions of the above theories, see Willoughby, Nature of the 
 State, chaps, iii-iv ; Gettell, Introduction to Political Science, chap, vii ; Garner, 
 Introduction to Political Science, chap, iv, and authorities there cited. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 79 
 
 widely separated intervals, when conditions were such as to render 
 it useful. Thus the divine theory did excellent service, in slightly 
 changed forms, in supporting absolute monarchy in all ages and in 
 all parts of the earth. 1 Sometimes the same theory was modified 
 by conditions until it was finally used as a weapon against the in- 
 stitution that it was created to support. Thus the social-contract 
 theory, at first the upholder of royal power, 2 became at length the 
 precursor of democracy. 3 
 
 131. Elements of truth in former theories. Properly under- 
 stood, each of the earlier theories of state origin contains a certain 
 amount of truth. " The divine element appears in the fact that 
 the Creator has implanted in the human breast the impulse which 
 leads to association, and in the part played by religion in bringing 
 primitive man out of barbarism and accustoming him to law and 
 authority. The element of compulsion exercised by those who 
 possess natural superiority is a powerful ally of both religion and 
 evolution in bringing the natural man into political and social rela- 
 tionship with his fellows. Finally, the elements of contract and 
 consent which lie at the basis of all association play an important 
 part in the process of establishing and reorganizing particular 
 governments." i 
 
 132. Present theory of state origin. In contrast to those theo- 
 ries of state origin which arose as subjective deductions when 
 man's thinking was uncritical and unhistorical, or which were 
 deliberately formulated to support the authority of certain privi- 
 leged classes, or which overemphasized certain factors to the 
 neglect of others, the modern theory of state origin tries to ascer- 
 tain the actual facts of human progress, to estimate and combine 
 the various factors involved, to view the entire process in the light 
 of the modern principles of evolution, and to realize that the rise 
 of political institutions is not a separate process, but a phase of the 
 general development of man and of society. It realizes that the 
 state, like other social institutions, has arisen from many sources 
 
 1 For example, in the Oriental empires, the Hebrew theocracy, the Roman 
 Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the seventeenth-century monarchies, and in 
 modern Turkey, Russia, and Japan. 
 
 2 Hobbes, Leviathan. See Graham, English Political Philosophy, pp. 1-47. 
 
 8 Rousseau, Social Contract. See Scherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, 
 Part II. - 4 Garner, op, cit., p. 122. 
 
80 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 and under varying conditions, and that it came into being gradually 
 and almost imperceptibly ; that it is not an artificial creation, but the 
 result of natural historical evolution. As Burgess says, the state " is 
 the gradual and continuous development of human society, out of 
 a grossly imperfect beginning, through crude but improving forms 
 of manifestation, towards a perfect and universal organization of 
 mankind." * 
 
 133. General process of state origin. The earliest permanent 
 human groups were probably formed on the basis of kinship, and 
 were further strengthened by ties of common religion. 2 With the 
 association of man with his kind, social interests necessarily arose. 
 When individual interests and common welfare conflicted, rules 
 were established and an authority of some sort restrained non- 
 social individuals and secured internal order. Hostile influences 
 from without as well as disintegrating forces from within demanded 
 social organization ; and the autonomy of the political unit was 
 secured by armed force, which in turn strengthened its internal 
 solidarity. As common interests and communal property increased, 
 men became conscious of their political unity, and the sentiment 
 of patriotism replaced the weakening bonds of kinship and religion. 
 When permanent homes were acquired, the territorial element was 
 added and the state became a people politically organized on a 
 definite territory. Geographic unity thus became an additional 
 source of strength. As social relations multiplied, the duties of 
 the state widened. Its structure became more elaborate and com- 
 plex, and at the same time more definite. The functions of the 
 state, its relations to its individual members and to other states, 
 were more strictly defined by custom and law, and the exercise of 
 its power became more intelligently controlled and self-directed. 
 By some such process the state was formed. 3 
 
 134. Geographic environment and state origin. Obviously, cer- 
 tain features of the geographic environment have influenced the 
 origin of the state. 4 Nature places certain limitations on the type of 
 human life that can exist in any given place ; and in primitive times, 
 
 1 Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. 59. 
 
 2 Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, Lecture III. 
 8 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 18-30. 
 
 4 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, Index, " State, land basis of." 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 81 
 
 when man was almost completely at the mercy of his environment, 
 those limits were particularly effective. The state emerged in areas 
 where population became fairly dense, where the relations of men 
 to their environment and to their fellows demanded cooperation 
 and regulation ; and those conditions were brought about primarily 
 by geographic and climatic causes. Man was probably born in the 
 tropics. 1 There a fertile soil and a warm, moist, uniform climate 
 abundantly supplied his primitive needs. Progress came in the 
 cooler, drier margin of the temperate zone, where nature subjects 
 man to certain compulsion, where his relaxed energies are toned 
 up by the bracing air of a winter season, and where human effort 
 leads to mutual aid and social organization. 2 The earliest civiliza- 
 tions and the first states arose where the tropics shade off into the 
 north temperate zone, — in protected areas in India and China, in 
 the valleys of the Euphrates and Nile, and in the Mediterranean 
 basin. Similarly, lines of political movement followed certain nat- 
 ural channels ; and the type of state was influenced by the size of 
 the geographic unit, by its isolation or ease of access, by its soil 
 and climate, its mountains and rivers, its animal, vegetable, and 
 mineral resources, its inland, seacoast, or insular position. More- 
 over, by the influence of climate, food supply, occupation, natural 
 selection, and heredity, working through long periods of time, 
 nature differentiated mankind into races and peoples, with their 
 diverse bodily and mental traits. 3 The numbers, virility, and phys- 
 ical stamina of populations, the keenness and flexibility of their 
 mental processes, profoundly affected their social institutions. 4 
 
 135. Factors influencing state origin. In addition to the con- 
 stant influence exerted by the world of nature, within which the 
 whole process of human evolution takes place, certain factors have 
 been of prime importance in creating organized political life. 
 Among these were (i) kinship, which created groups on the basis 
 of some form of family affiliation ; (2) religion, which served as a 
 bond of union and a sanction for authority ; (3) warfare, which 
 
 1 The skeleton of probably the most primitive type of man yet discovered, 
 known as pithecanthropus erectus, was found in the lowlands of Java. See Dubois, 
 Pithecanthropus Erectus. 
 
 2 Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 31-33. 
 
 8 Brinton, Races and Peoples, chap. iii. * Ward, Applied Sociology, Part II. 
 
82 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 added force as a sanction for authority, strengthened organization 
 for offense and defense, increased the authority of rulers, and 
 demanded some adjustment of the rights and obligations of con- 
 querors and conquered ; and (4) industry, which required coopera- 
 tion, with resultant organization, authority, and regulation, and 
 which created property, with resultant rules for its protection and 
 transmission. While all these factors — kinship, religion, warfare, 
 and industry — were usually present in the origin of each state, 
 they were found in different combinations, sometimes one, some- 
 times another predominating. Besides, they were not distinct 
 factors, but were closely interrelated, each affecting all the others. 
 The historic origin of the state, then, must be sought among 
 peoples living under certain physical conditions, influenced by cer- 
 tain ties of kinship and religion, and engaged in certain warlike 
 or peaceful enterprises, — the whole process creating organization, 
 authority, and law ; in other words, the state. 
 
 II. Kinship and State Origin 
 
 136. Importance of kinship in state origin. The most impor- 
 tant bond- of social union among primitive peoples was that of 
 kinship ; and the way in which the tie of blood was conceived, 
 recognized, and extended determined in the main the social order 
 of the greater part of the uncivilized world. Concerning the original 
 form of the family, the process of its development, and its relation 
 to the beginnings of political life, considerable controversy has been 
 waged, and the question is still by no means settled. 1 A few funda- 
 mental facts may, however, be pointed out, sufficient to indicate the 
 important influence of the blood tie, regardless of its controverted 
 details, upon the origin and early development of the state. 
 
 137. Kinship through mother. The system of kinship obviously 
 depends upon two principles : descent, or the relation of parent 
 and child ; and marriage, or the relation of husband and wife. 2 
 The former of these is constant ; the latter, variable. The original 
 group, consisting of mother and child, is determined by nature 
 
 1 McLennan, Patriarchal Theory ; Maine, Early History of Institutions. 
 
 2 Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, pp. 129-134. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 83 
 
 and runs alike through all forms of society, from the earliest to 
 the most advanced. The position of the husband and father, how- 
 ever, may differ and has given rise to two main forms of family 
 grouping. If the union of husband and wife is not permanent, 
 the former remains a member of his own clan or group, while the 
 children become members of the mother's clan or group. 1 In this 
 system, which is widely spread among primitive peoples, descent 
 is traced through mothers, the daughters obtaining husbands from 
 without, and the sons remaining attached to their mother's group 
 and finding wives in other families. 2 The system of society thus 
 arising cuts across the natural family, the tie between children and 
 father or father's kin being weaker than that between children and 
 mother or mother's kin. 
 
 138. Kinship through father. If, however, husband and wife 
 form a permanent union, a family group including father, mother, 
 and children is formed, and in this system the father dominates, 
 the mother becoming a member of his clan. Each new family 
 forms a part of the larger household, descent is traced directly 
 through fathers, and the natural family coincides with the patri- 
 archal system thus formed. The patriarchal family, therefore, 
 offers a more solid basis for social organization, and was the pre- 
 vailing system among those peoples who have contributed most 
 to political evolution. 8 The early history of Hebrews, Greeks, 
 Romans, and our Teutonic ancestors shows traces of a tribal organi- 
 zation based upon the patriarchal family. The ancient Jewish 
 nation consisted of a union of twelve tribes made up of the descend- 
 ants of Jacob, the common ancestor. The patria potestas of the 
 Roman father served as a model for the authority of the ruler. 
 According to Sir Henry Maine, the most notable advocate of this 
 theory of political origin, "the elementary group is the family con- 
 nected by common subjection to the highest male descendant. 
 The aggregation of families forms the gens or house. The aggre- 
 gation of houses makes the tribe. The aggregation of tribes con- 
 stitutes the commonwealth." 4 From this point of view the ancient 
 
 1 Bachofen, Das Mutterrecht. 
 
 2 Morgan, Ancient Society, Part III, chaps, i-iii. 
 
 8 Sidgwick, Development of European Polity, chaps, ii-iii ; Freeman, Com- 
 parative Politics, Lecture II. * Ancient Law, p. 128. 
 
84 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 city was a union of families, within which governing authority 
 rested with the fathers. 1 
 
 139. Kinship through marriage. Kinship, however, does not 
 depend upon direct descent alone ; the tie resulting from marriage 
 must also be added. 2 Whether descent is traced through mothers 
 or fathers, it is an almost universal rule that marriage may not 
 take place within the kin. While rules of exogamy differ, the 
 general result is to compel the union of different families and thus 
 extend the bonds of union resulting from direct kinship. Besides, 
 rules forbidding, the intermarriage of kin are often accompanied 
 by rules requiring marriage between definite groups ; and this 
 principle of endogamy tightens the social bond of union. by making 
 more definite the affiliated groups. 3 
 
 140. Value of patriarchal system. Here again the superiority 
 of the patriarchal system is evident. The marriage regulations of 
 the matriarchal tribe divide the allegiance of its men among the 
 tribe as a whole, the totem group to which they belong but into 
 which they may not marry, and the totem group into which they 
 must marry. Besides, the principle of endogamy, while it secures 
 union among the related groups, also creates isolation by separating 
 these groups from others. In the patriarchal tribe, the allegiance 
 of its men to family, clan, and tribe coincide ; and when the clans 
 widen or combine to form states, the rules of endogamy usually 
 break down, allowing wider circles of intermarriage and unifying 
 the interests of all classes of citizens. For example, the plebs at 
 Rome obtained the jus conubii in b.c. 445. 4 Later this right was 
 extended to the Latins, and finally legal marriage was permissible 
 throughout the whole Roman world. 
 
 141. Mingling of matriarchal and patriarchal elements. These 
 two fundamental systems of relationship are not always found dis- 
 tinct and separate. On the contrary, there are many gradations 
 and blendings of mother-right and father-right, and there is con- 
 siderable evidence to show that the former was the earlier and that 
 
 1 Fowler, City State of the Greeks and Romans, chap. ii. 
 
 2 Westermarck, History of Human Marriage. 
 * Jenks, History of Politics, pp. 9-10. 
 
 4 In the lex Canuleia de conubio. See Granrud, Roman Constitutional History, 
 pp. 58-60. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 85 
 
 the rise of the latter resulted from the development of industry 
 and property among the more advanced peoples. From this stand- 
 point the tribe was the oldest group ; later it broke up into clans ; 
 these in turn subdivided into households and finally were dissolved 
 into the individual members of society. 1 In the transition from 
 matriarchal to patriarchal society, the motive to retain permanent 
 possession of wives and children was furnished by the growing 
 value of labor. Wives secured by capture or purchase became the 
 property of their husbands, and their children became members of 
 the father's group. Sometimes warlike peoples realized the advan- 
 tage of rearing boys or of securing a food supply from the field 
 labor of captured women and their children ; but the chief impetus 
 was given by the rise of industries controlled by men. 2 Such 
 activities, of which the domestication of animals and the care of 
 the pastoral herds were the usual beginnings, gave value to the 
 labor of sons, awakened the masculine ambition for property which 
 could be transmitted to sons, and created the patriarchal family in 
 which wives, children, and slaves were conceived as possessions. 
 The authority of the father was increased by the wanderings of 
 the pastoral group, which separated the wife from the protection 
 of her kinsmen ; and by the rise of ancestor worship, which re- 
 placed the totemic beliefs of the metronymic family by a powerful, 
 supernatural, unifying force controlled by the patriarchal heads. 3 
 
 142. The family and the state. Groups based on kinship, found 
 in all early societies, may be regarded as natural, resulting from 
 the family instinct, which, in the relations of mother and children, 
 and husband and wife, give rise to various ramifications of descent 
 and intermarriage. While such systems are not, strictly speaking, 
 political, the state proper often not developing through the ex- 
 pansion of any form of family, but arising rather from warlike 
 activities, which often combine or destroy kinship groups, and 
 which break down the family authority based on age and heredity, 4 
 nevertheless kinship, in creating systems of social organization, in 
 
 1 Jenks, op. cit, chaps, i-ii ; Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient 
 World, chap. i. 
 
 2 Mason, Woman's Share in Primitive Culture. 
 
 8 Giddings, Principles of Sociology, pp. 285-293. 
 4 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 19-30. 
 
86 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 building up authority and regulations; and in creating feelings of 
 racial unity, often paved the way for political existence by creating 
 both the internal solidarity that made possible the conception of the 
 state, and the external framework that furnished the foundation 
 for the actual organization of the state. Marriage, especially the 
 monogamous form of the more advanced peoples, involves self- 
 restraint; and self-restraint, essential to self-government, lies at 
 the threshold of all political inquiry. 1 
 
 143. The family sometimes antipolitical. It should be added, 
 however, that historical proof of the universal prevalence of either 
 the matriarchal or patriarchal families among primitive peoples is 
 lacking. While particular state organizations have developed on 
 the bases of each of these forms of family, other forces and ele- 
 ments were more important in the process of political organization. 
 " The family and the state are totally different in essence, organi- 
 zation, functions, and purpose." 2 Certain forms of the family, 
 especially the closely organized, exclusive, kinship groups of Greece 
 and Rome, were at times even antipolitical. Each family, having 
 its own religious ritual, had also its own code of law and usage. 
 Supported by numerous retainers (thetae, clientes), powerful fami- 
 lies constituted within the state a veritable imperium in imperio. 
 Members of a gens were bound to render aid to each other even 
 against the state; no member, for example, could bear witness 
 against another. Rivalry among the leading families over the dis- 
 tribution of political office converted each elaborate group of kins- 
 men into a political machine. The Fabian family at Rome even 
 offered to conduct and support a war against the Veii. Not until 
 these centrifugal units were subordinated to a common political 
 authority could the state proper exist. The earliest states arose 
 where kinship ties were less definite and powerful. Tribes whose 
 constituent members were held together by slight feelings of friend- 
 ship and by a recognition of the offensive and defensive value of 
 cooperation in war, and whose governing authority rested in a 
 chieftain chosen mainly for his personal prowess, existed before 
 definite family systems were established. 
 
 1 Kelly, Government or Human Evolution : Justice, pp. 103-137. 
 
 2 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 118-119. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 87 
 
 144. The tribe and the state. The germ of political authority 
 proper "is to be found in the tribe and in the control which it 
 exercised over its members. Even if it be held that some sort of 
 family life existed before the formation of tribal associations, the 
 groups of individuals thus formed can hardly be said to have 
 possessed any political characteristics. It was purely a social insti- 
 tution founded upon the physical facts of parentage. Its member- 
 ship was thus absolutely limited to certain individuals, the bond of 
 union was a temporary one, and the status of the members that 
 of slaves to the family's head, and not that of citizens. In the 
 case of the tribe, on the other hand, the authority that was exer- 
 cised was purely political. Its chief derived his right of rule from 
 the actual sanction of his subjects. No absolute limits were fixed 
 to its membership, nor duration to its existence; no degrees of 
 citizenship were recognized ; so far as the sphere of its control 
 extended, it was sovereign and self-sufficient. It was not one of a 
 number of similar groups of coordinate power, all united into some 
 larger associated form." a 
 
 III. Religion and State Origin 
 
 145. Religion in early, states. The fundamental psychological 
 principle upon which the state is based is that of reverence and 
 obedience. The subjection of barbaric anarchy to law has always 
 been the first problem in state development, and this was accom- 
 plished by the power of religion. Asia, the home of the earliest 
 civilizations, also produced all the world's great religions ; and 
 while she has as yet contributed no great states, she at least laid 
 the foundation for all political development by disciplining the 
 human race through thousands of years in the preliminary princi- 
 ple of subordination to authority. The state emerged in the form 
 of a theocracy or of a despotism based on theocracy, and the same 
 type of organization has been needed each time a new people passed 
 from barbarism to political civilization. 
 
 146. Primitive religious ideas. The earliest forms of religion 
 were probably animistic in nature. Savages worship external ob- 
 jects, such as stones or animals, attributing to them supernatural 
 
 1 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, pp. 8-9. 
 
88 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 powers and usually considering them malevolent deities dealing 
 disease and death and thirsting for human blood. Elaborate cere- 
 monies were therefore developed under the direction of sorcerers 
 or " medicine men," who were supposed to have influence with 
 the deities and to be able to appease their wrath. 1 A somewhat 
 obscure connection also existed between religious beliefs and early 
 social organization, the totem groups, into which primitive tribes 
 were usually divided for the purpose of preventing the intermar- 
 riage of close relatives, being based upon some sacred object or 
 animal, often looked upon as the father of the group. 2 These 
 crude religious ideas were valuable in political evolution, not only 
 in strengthening the foundation for social organization in the totem 
 groups and systems of relationship, and in developing, in the sor- 
 cerers or priests, an authoritative ruling class, but also in establish- 
 ing rudimentary ideas of law. 3 While these were mainly negative 
 ideas, consisting of things which were forbidden or " taboo," and 
 were often connected with the apprehension of danger, the social 
 discipline resulting from the general observance of definite rules 
 was an important step in human organization. 
 
 147. Ancestor worship. With the transition from matriarchal to 
 patriarchal society, totemism as the dominant faith was replaced 
 by the worship of ancestors. The patriarchal families, phratries, and 
 tribes, from which some of the leading states of history were formed, 
 were religious units, held together by the idea of descent from a 
 common father, by the worship of the sacred fire of the hearth, and 
 by sacrifices to a long line of divine ancestors, conducted by the 
 heads of families. 4 " Ancestor worship is still the household cult 
 of China and Japan. Many traces of it remain in the desert tribes 
 of Arabia. All of the historical Semitic peoples ,were ancestor 
 worshippers in their days of tribal organization. 5 The Aryans were 
 ancestor worshippers when they first appeared on the shores of the 
 Mediterranean ; and among the Romans this religion of the house- 
 hold hearth disappeared only with the triumph of Christianity." 6 
 
 1 Spencer and Gillen, Native Tribes of Central Australia. 
 
 a Frazer, Totemism. a Morgan, Ancient Society, Part II. 
 
 * De Coulanges, Ancient City, Bks. I-II. 
 
 6 Robertson Smith, Religion of the Semites. 
 
 6 Giddings, Principles of Sociology, pp. 290-291. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 89 
 
 148. Nature worship. Side by side with these beliefs arose a 
 system of nature worship, partly the result of common superstition 
 at a time when natural phenomena could not be explained in a 
 rational way, and partly a definite cult with its own ceremonies 
 and priesthood. 1 Natural forces were personified and grouped into 
 a family of deities around whom abundant traditions and myths 
 were formed. 2 Accordingly, the earliest cities and states were 
 religious communities, and the acts of men, public and private, 
 were associated with religious observances. Kings were also pon- 
 tiffs, and magistrates were priests. Law was a sacred formula, 
 enforced by divine sanction ; and legal rights were possible only 
 among those having the same religion. Citizenship was the pre- 
 rogative of those only who were members of the enlarged family ; 
 the stranger or the slave had no place in a civic life based upon a 
 worship from which he was excluded. 3 Church and state were 
 practically one in purpose and in spirit ; the rulers were deified as 
 representatives of the gods and supported by a priestly class hav- 
 ing large privileges and powerful authority. Hereditary chieftaincy, 
 resulting from the idea of male descent and ancestor worship, was 
 favorable to authority ; and a perfect continuity of tradition and 
 custom developed. 4 In this way the unity of the tribe, the author- 
 ity of its chief, and the sanctity of its customs were established ; 
 and in the static civilizations thus formed were laid the necessary 
 foundations of discipline and obedience, from which the more 
 advanced political forms might later be evolved. 
 
 149. Religions of practical morals. With the growth of scien- 
 tific knowledge and the rational explanation of natural phenomena, 
 nature worship became merely a system of poetic myths or figures 
 of speech. With the expansion of the state and the breaking down 
 of the earlier kinship groups, ancestor worship, as a bond of political 
 union, disappeared. Its last surviving traces were found in the 
 Roman emperor-worship, in the medieval theory of the divine right 
 of kings, and still exist in the religious support of monarchy in 
 Turkey, Russia, and Japan. The religious systems that arose in 
 
 1 Grote, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 1-87. 2 Hesiod, Theogony. 
 
 8 De Coulanges, op. cit., pp. 258-268. 
 
 4 Freeman, Federal Government, pp.' 123-143. 
 
90 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 their stead were more spiritual in nature and more closely con- 
 nected with practical morality. The Hebrew conception of Jehovah, 
 the systems of the Greek and Roman philosophers, and the teach- 
 ings of great moralists, such as Confucius, Buddha, Christ, and 
 Mohammed, each of whom became the founder of a great religion, 
 represents the new spirit. Religions of this type, however, tightened 
 the bonds of social control, and were closely related to political de- 
 velopment and to the origin of new states. The rise of the Hebrew 
 nation went hand in hand with the increasing clarity of its concep- 
 tion of Jehovah as its tribal god ; the Mohammedan Empire was 
 the direct outcome of the spirit of unity created by the Mohammedan 
 religion ; x and the rise of modern European states was largely aided 
 by the close alliance between, their kings and the Christian church. 2 
 Even the beginnings of the United States and the early forms of 
 its government were powerfully influenced by religious motives ; 3 
 and in all states law now follows closely the moral ideas emphasized 
 by the prevailing religious beliefs. 4 
 
 IV. Industry and State Origin 
 
 150. Phases of economic evolution: primitive life. Since 
 economic life is many-sided, it is not easy to trace a regular and 
 continuous process of growth or to single out the fundamental char- 
 acteristics of its evolution. 5 However, those early stages through 
 which mankind developed when political institutions were being 
 formed may be outlined in broad generalizations as follows : Primi- 
 tive man for a long time must have roamed about in small, inde- 
 pendent groups, living on wild berries, nuts, roots, and herbs. 
 When possible he varied his diet by fishing; in some cases he 
 practiced cannibalism on his enemies or on the aged and useless 
 members of his group ; and when game was plentiful he supple- 
 mented his scanty diet by hunting. During this period he made 
 
 1 Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chaps. 1-lii. 
 
 2 Adams, Civilization dujing the Middle Ages, chaps, vi-viiij Carlyle, History 
 of Medieval Political Theory. 
 
 8 Merriam, American Political Theories, chap. i. 
 
 4 Wundt, Principles of Morality, Part III, chap. iv. 
 
 5 Seligman, Principles of Economics, pp. 66-68. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 91 
 
 some development in technique by utilizing and fashioning weapons 
 and tools, by discovering the use of fire, and, finally, by working 
 in metal. Even a slight cultivation of the soil, or " hoe-culture," 
 largely the work of the women, was sometimes added. Forethought 
 was largely lacking, and magic and ceremony accompanied all acts. 1 
 
 151. Nomadic life. Such primitive groups were nomadic and 
 but slightly organized. Because of their wide wanderings and the 
 fact that land was not held for permanent occupancy and cultiva- 
 tion, the bond holding such peoples to the soil was very slight, 
 although they sometimes regarded certain ill-defined areas as their 
 tribal hunting grounds, and jealously resented any encroachments 
 on the part of neighboring tribes. 2 Except for articles of personal 
 use, which were considered as being parts of the users, property 
 was unknown ; and the difficulty of securing food and the scant 
 returns of labor offered no inducement for the establishment of the 
 institution of slavery. If captives were not killed and eaten, they 
 were sometimes adopted into the tribe. War with surrounding 
 tribes was the rule, and trade was limited to the exchange of gifts 
 or to rude barter. 3 Such economic conditions permitted no concen- 
 tration of population, no division of labor except between the sexes, 
 and hence no evolution of classes. The group was necessarily small 
 and the organization simple ; and when its numbers increased or 
 when the food supply failed, it easily broke up into divisions which 
 might thereafter lead independent existences. 4 
 
 152. Fishing tribes. Fishing tribes alone, whose habitat along 
 rivers or lakes or on the seacoast was determined by nature, and 
 whose life was more sedentary, developed into larger units and, 
 especially when cooperation was needed for pelagic fishing, made 
 some progress toward stable organization. Moreover, where con- 
 ditions of climate and soil permitted, their settled mode of life 
 facilitated the beginnings of agriculture, and their location naturally 
 led to trade. Fishing tribes, therefore, received an early impulse 
 forward in civilization. 6 
 
 1 Abbott, Primitive Industry, chap. xvi. 
 
 2 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, pp. 53-55. 
 " Ely, Evolution of Industrial Society, pp. 26-38. 
 
 4 Roosevelt, Winning of the West, Vol. I, pp. 70-73. 
 6 Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 131. 
 
92 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 153. Pastoral life. The type of economic life that next arose 
 was mainly determined by the conditions of nature and the rela- 
 tions of population to the land. Under certain circumstances, when 
 game grew scarce, it was somehow discovered that by caring for 
 various animals and their increase a permanent and more plentiful 
 food supply might be secured. Hence, when geographic conditions 
 were favorable, nomadic pastoral tribes arose. This transition meant 
 the substitution of an artificial for a natural basis of subsistence and 
 marked an important advance in culture. 1 " From the standpoint 
 of economics, the forward stride consisted in the application of 
 capital in the form of flocks and herds to the task of feeding the 
 wandering horde ; from the standpoint of alimentation, in the guar- 
 antee of a more reliable and generally more nutritious food supply, 
 which enabled population to grow more steadily and rapidly ; from 
 the standpoint of geography, in the marked reduction in the per 
 capita amount of land necessary to yield an adequate and stable 
 food supply. Pastoral nomadism can support in a given district of 
 average quality from ten to twenty times as many souls as can the 
 chase." 2 Famines became less frequent and cannibalism disap- 
 peared. Even before slavery was profitable, private property in 
 herds developed,, with resultant differences in wealth and in social 
 classes, and rules for the inheritance of property were first estab- 
 lished. 3 The social bond was drawn closer, and more authority 
 and organization were needed. 
 
 154. Beginnings of agriculture. A more permanent relation of 
 population to land was also established. Each pastoral tribe was 
 identified with a certain district within whose clearly defined bound- 
 aries its migrations were carried on ; and encroachment upon its 
 pastures or its all-important watering places were frequent causes 
 of strife and demanded the united resistance of the tribe. 4 A crude 
 form of agriculture was often found combined with the hunting 
 and fishing stage ; and a primitive tilling of the soil, as an auxiliary 
 means of support, was carried on by the wives and daughters of 
 
 1 Payne, History of the New World called America, Vol. I, pp. 303-313. 
 
 2 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, p. 61. 
 
 8 Lansdell, Russian Central Asia, Vol. I, chaps, xxii-xxiii. 
 4 Semple, op. cit, pp. 57-58. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 93 
 
 hunters during the pastoral period. 1 Such agriculture was exten- 
 sive and nomadic, the fields being abandoned as soon as they became 
 unproductive. Besides, it was not until the supply of game was 
 practically exhausted that the roving life of the hunter or shepherd 
 gave way to the settled life of the farmer and agriculture formed 
 the chief reliance as a source of food supply. Only where condi- 
 tions of soil and climate were favorable and where a native equip- 
 ment of suitable plant forms were found could the transition from 
 the superficial, intermittent use of the land pass into the systematic, 
 continuous use of the farmer. 
 
 155. Agriculture and the social structure. This change to a 
 settled agricultural life was accompanied by profound changes in 
 the social structure. 2 A marked increase in the density of popu- 
 lation, caused by the better food supply and the new method of in- 
 dustry, brought about new social relations and duties. 3 Slavery, which 
 was not profitable among hunters and herdsmen, became an almost 
 universal institution, 4 and the idea of property in land gradually 
 arose . s While at first each village community was isolated and 
 self-supporting, in time division of labor and the disposal of surplus 
 production led to trade. This prepared the way for handicrafts, 
 commerce, and town life ; and after the introduction of machinery 
 and artificial power, for the industrial and capitalistic organization of 
 the present day. 6 With every increase of the population inhabiting 
 a given area, and with the resultant tightening of the bonds between 
 man and man and between man and the land, came the need for 
 more highly organized government for the purpose both of reduc- 
 ing internal friction and of securing protection against outside at- 
 tack. After the state was firmly established, its relation to economic 
 life remained in its attempts to develop its internal resources and 
 its means of communication and transportation, and in its external 
 territorial expansion and its commercial and colonial activities. 7 
 
 1 Thomas, Source Book for Social Origins, pp. 96-112. 
 
 2 Ely, Evolution of Industrial Society, pp. 46-52. 
 
 8 Ratzel, Anthropo-geographie, Vol. II, pp. 264-265. 
 
 4 Ingram, History of Slavery and Serfdom. 
 
 K Letourneau, Property, its Origin and Development. 
 
 6 Seligman, Principles of Economics, pp. 74-83. 
 
 7 Adams, Law of Civilization and Decay, chaps, xi-xii. 
 
94 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 156. Industry and the state. The preceding brief outline of 
 the beginnings of industrial life shows that they have influenced 
 the origin of the state in two main ways. In the first place, the 
 activities of mankind in securing a living have involved a growing 
 degree of cooperation, division of labor, and organization. As the 
 unit of social life, the horde was replaced by the clan and tribe, 
 these in turn by the patriarchal family, and finally by the state ; 
 and these transitions were probably due more to changes in the 
 economic life than to any other single cause. During the entire 
 process there was evident a growing unity, an expansion and 
 definiteness of function and of authority, that made the state a 
 logical result. The rise of close and complex interrelations within 
 the group necessitated regulation for the maintenance of internal 
 peace and order, and the increasing political consciousness of each 
 group in its relations with others created interstate relations and 
 strengthened internal solidarity. 1 
 
 157. Property and the state. In the second place, the existence 
 of property and its increase in amount and in importance, the 
 direct results of economic activities, have also been powerful factors 
 in creating the state. Property in flocks and herds, in lands, in 
 slaves, or in the products of industry and trade demanded a more 
 and more powerful authority to determine disputes and furnish 
 protection. A large part of early custom and of modern law deals 
 with property rights ; a considerable proportion of state activity 
 in all stages of political life has been needed to determine the 
 ownership, use, and transmission of property ; most wars have been 
 waged to safeguard or to acquire some form of material wealth. 2 
 
 158. Property and social classes. Besides, the growth of prop- 
 erty and its inevitable accumulation in the hands of the strong 
 or the cunning created social classes and powerfully affected the 
 beginnings of political institutions. The relations of master and 
 slave and of rich and poor were directly connected with the origin 
 of authority and obedience, and lay at the basis of the monarchic 
 or aristocratic organizations of all early states. Accordingly, the 
 development of economic interests has been largely responsible 
 
 1 Dealey, Development of the State, chap. ii. 
 
 2 Cunningham, Western Civilization : Modern Times, Bk. V. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 95 
 
 for the types of organization through which the state emerged 
 and, through the existence of property, has created a governing 
 class and furnished a motive for political activity. 
 
 V. War and State Origin 
 
 159. Organization based on kinship. In tracing the origin of 
 the state, a point has now been reached where a fundamental dis- 
 tinction may be noted. All forms of human organization and 
 government are reducible to two main types. 1 The first, in order 
 of time, is founded upon persons and upon personal relations. Its 
 unit is the gens or clan. It is based upon kinship and religion. 
 It arises gradually, and in the main peacefully, from cooperation, 
 from division of labor, and from the need of adjusting the rela- 
 tions of individuals within the associated group. It integrates 
 through the successive stages of gens, phratry, tribe, and confed- 
 eration of tribes. The social organization that results from this 
 process is the people or nation, using the latter term in its etymo- 
 logical sense as meaning a population of common descent. It 
 exhibits combined action, but it is a combined action which 
 primarily conserves the interests of individuals and only second- 
 arily the welfare of society as a whole. 2 It creates a form of 
 government, authority, and law, but it is not yet purely political. 
 
 160. Organization based on territory. The second, and later, 
 form of organization, while retaining many traces of the earlier 
 system, and arising from it by gradual stages, is founded upon 
 territory and upon property. Its unit is the village community or 
 township, a territorial area circumscribed by metes and bounds, 
 together with the persons and property contained therein. It inte- 
 grates through the successive combination of territorial areas until 
 the national domain is reached. It often exhibits combined action 
 primarily for the interests of the group and secondarily for the 
 interests of the individual, and creates a form of government, 
 authority, and law resting upon human sanction and upon force. 
 This social organization is the state proper, and the chief influence 
 in its establishment has been warfare. 
 
 1 Morgan, Ancient Society, pp. 6-7. 
 
 2 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. II, pp. 245-247. 
 
96 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 161. War formerly an economic necessity. During a great part 
 of human history war has been an economic necessity. 1 Among 
 peoples subsisting on products furnished spontaneously by nature, 
 war was the normal condition. The scarcity and uncertainty of 
 food supply demanded much land and, as population increased, 
 overlapping hunting grounds led to wars which restored the equi- 
 librium between population and food supply. Such wars were the 
 only means by which vigorous tribes could increase their sources 
 of subsistence, and usually resulted in the extermination of the 
 weaker social organizations. However, primitive economic con- 
 ditions made it impossible for men to live in large or closely 
 integrated groups, so the victorious tribe in time broke up into 
 smaller tribes, and such warfare caused little progress in political 
 development. 
 
 162. Pastoral life and war. Tribes whose locations were inac- 
 cessible or which were surrounded by other tribes too nearly equal 
 in strength to permit of wars of conquest were compelled, as then- 
 population increased, to devise artificial sources of food supply. 
 In open areas where animals suitable for domestication were avail- 
 able, pastoral life arose. An increased and stable food supply 
 multiplied the population, and the need for protecting the herds 
 and the pastures led to a consolidation of the social organization 
 under the patriarchal system. The numbers, discipline, and mobil- 
 ity of pastoral nomads enabled them to undertake distant expedi- 
 tions and- to make large-scale conquests. 2 The nomad's whole 
 mode of life bred courage; the routine of his daily occupation 
 furnished training in military methods and organization. Accord- 
 ingly, the military and political systems of shepherd races have 
 given them their great historical mission of political consolidation, 
 have superimposed the imperious pastoral nomad upon the peace- 
 ful tillers of the soil as the only stable government among savage 
 and semicivilized races, and have caused the periodical Volker- 
 wandenmgen which have swept over the earth, destroying and 
 founding empires. 3 
 
 1 Robinson, " War and Economics in History and Theory," in Political Science 
 Quarterly, Vol. XV, pp. 581-622. 
 
 2 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, pp. 490-497. 
 8 Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. I, p. 28. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 97 
 
 163. Agricultural life and war. Where animals suitable for 
 domestication or open areas adapted to pasturage were not found, 
 primitive peoples became agricultural. Likewise, pastoral tribes, 
 when confined by geographic barriers or by invincible enemies, 
 slowly became agricultural under the pressure of increasing popula- 
 tion. War, however, sooner or later became again an economic 
 necessity. Crude methods of cultivation could not maintain the 
 equilibrium between food supply and population, and the need for 
 defense against plundering raids led to a new system of social 
 differentiation. 
 
 164. Military systems of agricultural states. Unlike the pas- 
 toral tribe, an agricultural population is not a mobile military or- 
 ganization, ever ready for defense or for far-reaching conquest. 
 It is settled, bound to the soil ; a considerable proportion must till 
 the fields and are therefore not available for warfare. Several de- 
 vices arose to meet this situation. Among the Suevi the men 
 alternately tilled the land and went out to war. 1 Alfred the Great 
 introduced a similar custom in England, dividing the "fyrd" into, 
 two parts, one of which performed military service, while the other 
 remained at home to till the fields. 2 Henry I in Germany com- 
 pelled one soldier in nine to build fortifications, while the others 
 sowed and harvested for him. 3 More often a war of conquest 
 enslaved the conquered and compelled them to labor in the fields 
 for the victors. Another result, closely related and almost uni- 
 versal in the Oriental world, was the rise of a system of castes, 
 with a permanent military class. The great empires that history 
 exhibits as the earliest states were based upon such systems ; they 
 originated from conquest and their chief function was warfare. 
 The time came ultimately when foreign lands had to be secured 
 to feed their peoples, and the only possible relief was expansion, 
 booty, and tribute. 
 
 165. Summary. War, then, was the natural condition among 
 primitive men, the chief source of wealth and honor, and a power- 
 ful influence in the establishment of political institutions. From 
 
 1 Caesar, Commentaries, Bk. IV. 
 
 2 Gardiner, Student's History of England, p. 60. 
 8 Widukind, Res gestae Saxonicae, i, 35. 
 
98 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 this standpoint, the chief causes in the development of social or- 
 ganization in the definite form which created the state may be 
 summarized as (i) increase of population, demanding a larger food 
 supply, (2) increase of wealth, demanding protection, (3) improve- 
 ment in weapons, due to the working of metals, and (4) the rise 
 of a special military class.' The process through which the state 
 was established by means of conquest followed two main forms. 
 Sometimes the war leader, after firmly establishing his authority 
 as ruler of his own tribe, extended his power by a process of con- 
 solidation over neighboring tribes, until he became ruler of a large 
 territory. In this way Anglo-Saxon England was united under the 
 headship of the West Saxon chieftains, 2 and the Frankish kingdom 
 was built up under Clovis and his successors. 3 Sometimes the state 
 was founded by a band of warriors after successful migration and 
 conquest. In this way the. Visigothic kingdom in Spain 4 and the 
 practically independent province of Normandy were established. 6 
 Ward summarizes the natural steps by which states are formed 
 through conquest as follows: 6 (1) subjugation of one race by 
 another ; (2) origin of caste ; (3) gradual mitigation of this con- 
 dition, leaving a state of great individual, social, and political 
 inequality ; (4) substitution for purely military subjection of a 
 form of law, and origin of the idea of legal right ; (5) origin of 
 the state, under which all classes have both rights and duties ; 
 (6) cementing of the mass of heterogeneous elements into a more 
 or less homogeneous people ; (7) rise and development of a senti- 
 ment of patriotism and formation of a nation. 
 
 166. Form of the military state. The type of state established 
 by conquest was quite different from the earlier tribal organization 
 based on kinship and religion. 7 In the first place, it was territorial, 
 not personal, in character. Race feeling declined as fusion slowly 
 took place between conquerors and conquered, usually of different 
 blood, speech, and religion ; or as the successful leader swelled the 
 
 1 Jenks, History of Politics, pp. 73-75. 
 
 2 Cheyney, Short History of England, pp. 56-57. 
 
 8 Adams, Growth of the French Nation, pp. 25-28. 
 * Emerton, Introduction to the Middle Ages, pp. 33-34. 
 6 Johnson, Normans in Europe, chap. iii. 
 
 Pure Sociology, p. 205. See also Gumplowicz, Der Rassenkampf; Ratzen- 
 hofer, Die sociologische Erkenntnis. 7 Jenks, op. cit., pp. 76-82. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 99 
 
 number of his host by importing new followers, or increased his 
 fame and wealth by opening his country to foreign adventurers and 
 merchants or to the teachings of new ideas and religions. Kings 
 became lords of their land, not of their people, and military alle- 
 giance and patriotism replaced the former ties of real or pretended 
 blood relationship and of common worship. 
 
 167. Religion in the military state. Besides, the exclusiveness 
 of the old tribal religions, based largely on ancestor worship, was 
 broken down. The establishment of political institutions proper was 
 accompanied by the rise of religions whose chief characteristic 
 was their universality. The worship of one or of a few great dei- 
 ties or of some real or mythical hero or prophet united the Oriental 
 empires. The Greeks found a common worship in personifying 
 natural phenomena, and the Romans typified and strengthened the 
 political unity of their empire by deifying their emperor. The rise 
 and unification of modern states was intimately connected with the 
 beginnings of Christianity ; and Mohammedanism broke down the 
 tribal divisions of the Arabs and established mighty kingdoms. 
 
 168. Authority in the military state. In the military state the 
 old nobility based on birth or wealth was replaced by a new group 
 composed of men of ability who formed the chief followers of the 
 leader or king. Custom was no longer regarded as sacred and un- 
 changeable. By its nature, warfare is competitive and puts a pre- 
 mium upon ability and upon success, and successful war leaders 
 were often men who disregarded traditions and laid down new 
 rules. Moreover, the very process of migration and conquest created 
 a new environment and gave rise to new situations for which the 
 customary rules furnished no guide. The enforced will of the chief- 
 tain or king became therefore an additional source of law, and the 
 idea of change and progress was introduced. By degrees the vari- 
 ous barriers between the state and its individuals were broken down 
 until a political system such as that of Rome or of the modern 
 state was possible. 
 
 169. General evolution of military type. By some such process 
 the state, as a purely political institution, gradually arose. 1 By war- 
 fare and conquest the state was consolidated within and expanded 
 
 1 Giddings, Principles of Sociology, pp. 299-324. 
 
IOO PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 without. The tribal chief was transformed into the warrior-king, 
 who, however, often borrowed the patriarchal theory of descent and 
 made his office hereditary, and further strengthened his position 
 by allying himself with the church or by claiming divine descent 
 or authority. The council of clan elders was replaced by the coun- 
 cil of the kingdom, composed of the king's followers or com- 
 panions, at first forming a powerful bulwark for royal power, but 
 gradually, as the theory that the king . must consult his council 
 developed, laying the foundations for constitutional government 
 and popular liberty. Over outlying districts the king maintained 
 his control by accepting the allegiance of the former tribal chief- 
 tains or of rival war leaders, using them as his agents, or by placing 
 over the conquered peoples officials of his own choosing. In this 
 way a system of local government was established and the financial 
 and military resources of the state were organized. "Thus at length 
 the gentile is converted into the civil organization of society. Civic 
 association, irrespective of kinship, becomes the basis of political 
 cooperation. Gradually tribal lines are more or less artificially re- 
 drawn, and at length it is forgotten that local boundaries ever 
 marked tribal domains and that village names were once the names 
 of clans. The tribal confederacy has become the territorial state." x 
 170. Interrelation of kinship and military types. Naturally, 
 both types of organization — the patriarchal, personal, industrial 
 type and the political, territorial, military type — existed for a long 
 time side by side ; and even in modern states traces of both systems 
 may still be found. Some, China and India, for example, show the 
 predominant influence of gradual, peaceful integration on the basis 
 of family, religion, and economic influences. Others, such as the 
 Roman Empire and the states of modern Europe, were largely the 
 result of conquest, and exhibit the characteristics of their military 
 origin and purpose. Medieval feudalism, the transitional stage 
 between the tribal and the political forms of organization in western 
 Europe, was an example of the process of fusion ; and essentially 
 similar systems of social structure arose in various other parts of 
 the world under similar conditions of transformation. 2 
 
 1 Giddings, Principles of Sociology, pp. 321-322. 
 
 2 E gypt and Japan are examples of states which passed through a similar feudal 
 form of social organization. See Hazen, Europe since 181 5, pp. 687-695- 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE IOI 
 
 VI. Stagnation and Progress 
 
 171. Causes of stagnation. Several of the causes that created 
 the state tended to discourage further change or growth. It is 
 therefore not surprising that the earliest states made few permanent 
 contributions to political ideas, and that it was only after a long 
 and tedious evolution that the difficult problems of government 
 approached any degree of solution. The warm climates in which 
 social progress began were not conducive to energy ; and large 
 populations, making labor and life of little value, minimized the 
 importance of the individual and prevented initiative and ambition. 1 
 In fact, the very conditions that were most necessary at first 
 became later the greatest evils. That which was most needed in 
 the formation of the state was discipline and organization. Primitive 
 man must subordinate his anarchic selfishness and learn obedience. 
 Under these conditions groups with the best family systems, the 
 strongest religious bonds, and the most rigid customs survived at 
 the expense of more loosely organized groups. Early states arose 
 and maintained themselves only by perfecting their discipline, by 
 making the rule of the patriarch or chief more absolute, the sanc- 
 tion of religion and custom more inviolable. 2 Stagnation, however, 
 is the fate of any organization that fails to adapt itself to changing 
 conditions ; and the ideals which the infancy of political society 
 created formed a system of caste, of custom, of superstition, and 
 of despotism that still controls the greater part of the world. Prog- 
 ress is a recent and, in many respects, an exceptional idea. Early 
 states, cut off from their neighbors by natural barriers or by vast dis- 
 tances, tended toward stagnation. Freedom from external danger 
 led to a decadent race stock, and the lack of competition and 
 conflict among different ideas fixed original customs the more 
 firmly. 3 
 
 172. Beginnings of progress. It has been in comparatively recent 
 times, and in a small part of the earth only, that the fixity of 
 primitive ideas has been replaced by the ideal of progress, and 
 that the modern state has developed. This was made possible by 
 
 1 Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 30-47. 
 
 2 Bagehot, Physics and Politics, chaps, i-iv. 
 
 8 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Part V, chaps, i-v. 
 
102 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 the gradual spread of civilization westward and by the movements 
 of peoples. Aside from the natural advantages of the new environ- 
 ment, mere change of scene and of conditions opened the minds 
 and modified the customs of the newcomers in spite of themselves. 1 
 The contact of tribe with tribe slowly but powerfully affected the 
 ideas of both. New institutions were imitated by some and forced 
 upon others. Change once begun, further change took place moire 
 rapidly. In the fermentation of ideas resulting from these move- 
 ments and conquests, the way for the first time, was opened for 
 individual initiative. Under new .conditions man disregarded the 
 authority of former conventions, and success was followed by 
 further experiment and improvement. It was by some such method 
 that political life, as distinguished from the earlier family- and 
 religious organization, emerged. The contact of peoples, with the 
 resultant mingling or conquest, broke down the unity of kinship ; 
 and narrow tribal religion was replaced by a belief less powerful 
 as it became more cosmopolitan. Thus the bonds of custom that 
 fettered Oriental states were broken by war and by new conditions 
 of life. The idea of individual enterprise and the possibility of 
 conscious change and reform arose, preparing the way for new 
 forms of government and for vastly different ideas of individual 
 liberty. 2 
 
 173. Political results of progress. This progress has taken differ- 
 ent forms and has proceeded with varying rapidity among different 
 peoples. In general it has been marked by the increasing control 
 of man over the natural environment 3 and by the growing intellec- 
 tual ability and social organization of the population. Physical ties 
 of kinship have been replaced by psychic ties of nationality as the 
 basis for state formation, and religious and political functions have 
 become more definite and distinct. In this process, law and author- 
 ity have taken on a human rather than a supernatural sanction ; 
 and the need for order and protection, due to the increasing com- 
 plexity of economic and social life, has become the chief reason 
 for political life. At the same time, unconscious evolution has 
 
 1 Wilson, The State, pp. 28-40. 
 
 2 Bagehot, Physics and Politics, chaps, v-vi ; Ward, Applied Sociology. 
 
 8 Ward, Pure Sociology, chap, xix ; Patten, New Basis of Civilization, chap. i. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 103 
 
 given way to purposeful action ; 1 and, after numerous costly ex- 
 periments, men have learned how to extend governing authority 
 safely over wide areas and how to intrust governing powers safely 
 to a large proportion of the people. 2 In this way authority and 
 liberty have been reconciled, and the state, no longer looked upon 
 with dread as a tyrannous monster, has entered upon a constantly 
 widening sphere of usefulness. Many peoples have contributed to 
 this progress ; 3 and modern states, building upon the foundations 
 of the past, are still occupied in the effort to adjust political insti- 
 tutions to changing conditions of civilization. Even those peoples 
 whose civilization has remained stagnant for centuries show signs 
 of awakening, 4 and the spirit of progress created by the western 
 nations bids fair to secure universal acceptance. 6 
 
 VII. Origin of Modern States 
 
 174. Recent origin of existing states. In contrast to the process 
 by which the earliest states came into being, a process which took 
 place before recorded history begins, may be noted the methods by 
 which those states now existing were established. Most of the 
 ancient states perished centuries ago, and the majority of present- 
 day states were founded within a comparatively recent period. 
 " In the Middle Ages, the state in its modern sense had no exist- 
 ence. Society in the greater part of Europe subsisted under two 
 forms ; the church and the empire, theoretically correlated, and 
 each claiming universal sway. Locally, the peoples were ruled by 
 their princes, secular and spiritual, who, under the gradations of 
 the feudal system and the ecclesiastical hierarchy, formed a double 
 series of related obediences. Each prince had his /tat, his status, 
 which implied some kind of authority ; but the state in its modern 
 sense had no being. With the formation of the national mon- 
 archies, the sovereigns, aided by the people in crushing out the more 
 
 1 Kelly, Government or Human Evolution : Justice, Bk. II. 
 
 2 See below, Chapter VIII, sections 340-366. 
 
 8 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 220-233, 300-314. 
 4 For example, China and Japan. See Robinson and Beard, Development of 
 Modern Europe, chap. xxx. 
 
 6 Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, chaps, i-ii, vi-viii. 
 
104 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 immediate and therefore more oppressive feudatories, gradually as- 
 sumed the authority within their realms, established their law-courts, 
 formed their national armies, and offered a better administration 
 and a more sure protection against wrong and invasion. Through 
 the development of parliaments, assemblies, and finally formal con- 
 stitutions, public authority became less personal and more institu- 
 tional and thus created the state in its modern sense." 
 
 175. Chief influences in origin of modern states. " It is impor- 
 tant to note that, in the process of its evolution, the state has 
 been chiefly the product of will, only dimly guided by intelligence. 
 Neither natural geographic boundaries, nor racial affinities, nor 
 linguistic community have determined its formation. Its primal 
 cause was dynastic interest supported by military force. Only in 
 very recent times has theory had any influence upon the constitu- 
 tion of the state. It sprang from more or less accidental cohesions, 
 in which marriage and the combination of inheritances played a 
 large rdle, and intelligent constructive design comparatively little. 
 Thus came into being certain definite complexes of associated 
 populations, presided over by the more powerful princes through 
 successful competition with the less powerful, dwelling within 
 given territorial areas more or less fortuitously or arbitrarily com- 
 bined, and delimited by the like growth of rival neighbors. Within 
 these areas, through the cooperation of dynastic authority and the 
 community of historic memories created by participation in a com- 
 mon cause of defence, development, and expansion, the national 
 units of Europe have been formed." * 
 
 176. New state not created by internal changes. The formation 
 of a new state must not, of course, be confounded with internal 
 changes or revolutions by which the type of state is changed, its 
 government reorganized, or its sovereign power relocated. Thus 
 the Roman city state became the Roman world state, and its 
 internal organization was transformed in turn from monarchy to 
 republic and to empire. Yet the continuity of its political life was 
 not broken until the barbarian invasions. Such changes mark 
 different periods in the life of the same state, not the establish- 
 ment of new states ; yet the line separating internal changes in 
 
 1 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 16-17. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 105 
 
 governmental organization from the external transformations that 
 create new states is sometimes difficult to draw. 1 
 
 177. Methods of forming modern states. Bluntschli distinguishes 
 three main methods by which modern states have been formed : 2 
 
 1. Original forms, when states take their beginnings among 
 peoples in their own territories, without being derived from already 
 existing states. This process may take place in several ways. The 
 inhabitants of a certain area may, by the gradual evolution of 
 social life as discussed in the preceding part of this chapter, 
 establish political institutions and create a state. Such was the 
 origin, so far as we know, of Athens and Rome. 3 It more often 
 happens that a group of peoples who realize their national unity 
 and who have established political institutions take possession of 
 territory, either by settlement or by conquest, and there set up 
 their state. In this way the Jews created their theocracy in Pales- 
 tine, the Dorian Greeks their city at Sparta, 4 and the Teutonic 
 tribes their kingdoms on the ruins of the Roman Empire. 5 
 
 2. Secondary forms, when states are produced from within, yet 
 are based upon already existing states which either unite them- 
 selves into one or divide themselves into several. The former of 
 these processes usually passes through several stages. States among 
 whom common interests develop first form treaties or alliances. 
 Later they may establish a common government to control affairs 
 of mutual interest, retaining however their independent existence 
 and their supremacy over the common agent. This forms a con- 
 federation, but not yet a new state, the component parts still 
 retaining their sovereignty. 6 The final step is the absorption of 
 all by the stronger, as was practically the case in the establishment 
 of the modern German Empire ; or the voluntary union of all 
 into a single new state, as in the formation of Switzerland and the 
 
 1 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. I, pp. 248-254; Hershey, Essentials 
 of International Public Law, chap. viii. 
 
 2 Theory of the State, Bk. IV, chaps, i-iv. 
 
 8 Fowler, City State of the Greeks and Romans, chap. ii. 
 * Oman; History of Greece, pp. 48-51, 60-80. 
 6 Emerton, Introduction to the Middle Ages, chaps, iii-vi. 
 8 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 142-148; Moore, op. cit, sec- 
 tion 10; Jellinek, Staatenverbindungen, pp. 172-194. 
 
106 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 United States. Frequently states have lost their identity by being 
 involuntarily absorbed by more powerful neighbors, usually as the 
 result of conquest. This can scarcely be considered as the estab- 
 lishment of a new state, but rather as an expansion of the more 
 powerful state. In this way the Greek cities became part of the 
 Roman Empire, Scotland and Ireland became part of Great Britain, 
 and the kingdom of Naples part of Piedmont in the formation of 
 united Italy. States may be divided, with the resultant formation 
 of new states, in several ways. When a state is composed of 
 divergent nationalities, or occupies several distinct geographic units, 
 or contains sections having widely different interests, these tend 
 naturally to fall apart and form separate states when the power of 
 concentration that formerly held them together is weakened. Thus 
 the empire of Alexander fell to pieces after his death, the Roman 
 Empire split into its eastern and western divisions, and in modern 
 times Belgium and Holland separated in 1830, 1 and Norway and 
 Sweden in 1905. 2 During the Middle Ages, when the state was 
 considered the personal property-of the ruler, his death was often 
 followed by the division of the kingdom among his sons. In this 
 way Charlemagne's empire fell to pieces and the foundations were 
 laid for modern France and Germany. 3 A common form of 'sep- 
 aration results from revolt on the part of a certain section of a state 
 against the remainder. If this section declares itself independent 
 and is successful in maintaining its claim, it sets itself up as a new 
 state. 4 In this way the Netherlands became independent of Spain 
 in 1579, the North American colonies from England in 1776, 
 and more recently Greece and the South American republics 
 established themselves as independent states. 5 
 
 3. Derived forms, which receive their impulse and direction from 
 without, not from within. Of such nature was a large part of Greek 
 colonization, consisting of communities deliberately sent out from 
 the home cities with the idea of forming new and independent 
 
 1 Hazen, Europe since 1815, pp. 101-106. 
 * Ibid. pp. 597-600. 
 
 8 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chap, vi ; Emerton, Medieval Europe, chap. i. 
 4 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. I, chap, iii; Hershey, Essentials of 
 International Public Law, chap. vii. 
 
 6 Paxson, Independence of the. South American Republics. 
 
THE ORIGIN OF THE STATE 107 
 
 political units. 1 Great conquerors . have sometimes used their 
 authority to destroy and to create states. Napoleon rearranged 
 the map of a large part of Europe according to his will. 2 In 
 more recent times the concert of powers, consisting of the leading 
 European states, have exercised similar authority, as their actions 
 at the Congress of Vienna in 1 8 1 5 and at later conferences bear 
 witness. 8 
 
 1 Morris, History of Colonization, Vol. I, chap. iv. 
 
 2 Andrews, Historical Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chap. ii. 
 8 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. I. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 THE STATE AND THE FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 178. Relation of state to other social institutions. The course 
 of social development has been marked by the rise of a number of 
 institutions more or less closely related to that political organiza- 
 tion which finally differentiated from the others and became the 
 state. In some cases these institutions have become so distinct 
 from the state that few points of contact remain. Again they have 
 been thoroughly subordinated to the state and brought under its 
 authority. In other cases they have become separate, but still ex- 
 ercise considerable influence upon the state, in some cases deter- 
 mining its fundamental nature and activities. The four factors, — 
 kinship, religion, industry, and war, — through whose influence 
 chiefly the state was formed, 1 have each created institutions, more 
 or less distinct from the state, namely, the family, the church, the 
 military and police systems, and the industrial and commercial 
 organizations. The evolution of these groups, at first scarcely dis- 
 tinguishable from such political machinery as then existed, to the 
 degree of independence or subordination which they occupy in the 
 modern state, and the influences that they have brought to bear 
 and still exert on political structure and function are among the 
 most interesting phases of political development. 
 
 I. The State and the Family 
 
 179. Political nature of early family. In early group life the 
 kin or family was itself a sort of political society. It was a more 
 or less permanently organized body ; it exercised control over its 
 members which they regarded as rightful authority, not as mere 
 force ; it was not limited by any higher authority ; and it acted 
 with a considerable degree of effectiveness for the interest of the 
 
 i See above, Chapter IV, sections 136-170. 
 108 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 109 
 
 whole. 1 This authority was vested sometimes in the chief or priest, 
 sometimes in the council of elders, sometimes in the head of the 
 household, and reached its highest development in the patria 
 potestas of the Roman father. 2 Associations formed on the basis of 
 sex, such as the men's clubs and secret societies often found within 
 the family groups, were centers of public opinion, formulated and 
 enforced certain customs and ceremonies, and in some cases assumed 
 judicial and punitive authority over their members. 3 The primitive 
 state was, in essence, an enlarged family, and the kinship group 
 performed functions, many of which are now of a purely political 
 nature. Property, with some slight exceptions, belonged to the group 
 and was administered in behalf of the kin as a whole. Marriage re- 
 lations were strictly regulated ; authority over children sometimes 
 included even the power of putting them to death. The entire 
 group was responsible for the actions of all its members, and an in- 
 jury to any member was an injury to the entire group, responsibility 
 sometimes varying with the degree of nearness of kin. 4 Within the 
 group rights existed and justice might be claimed, but an individual 
 had no legal status except in his own kinship group. The stranger 
 was indeed an "outlaw," and exile was a much-dreaded punishment. 6 
 180. Beginnings of separation between state and family. A 
 number of conditions caused the state to outgrow the family and 
 to subordinate its interests and its authority to that of the wider 
 political organization. The expansion of the state in area and pop- 
 ulation, due to improved economic methods or to conquest and the 
 mingling of peoples, broke down the exclusiveness of the family, 
 replaced ties of kinship by feelings of national unity or patriotism, 
 or by the forced subjection of the conquered to a conquering class, 
 and placed governing authority on a territorial rather than on a 
 personal basis. 6 During this process, certain functions, formerly 
 controlled by the family, became of increasing public importance ; 
 and the state, accordingly, took over from the family the regulation 
 of property and of its succession, the rights and responsibilities of 
 
 1 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, pp. 26-27 ; De Coulanges, Ancient City, Bk. II ; 
 Morgan, Ancient Society, Part II, 2 Wilkins, Roman Antiquities, pp. 50-51. 
 
 8 Webster, Primitive Secret Societies. 
 
 * Gray, China, Vol. I, pp. 237 ff. 6 Frisch, Das Fremdenrecht, p. 3. 
 
 • Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, chap. vi. 
 
HO PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 kinship, and the punishment of debt and crime. Thus the Twelve 
 Tables of Roman Law, enacted in the fifth century B.C., made pro- 
 vision for new forms of marriage and of inheritance and placed 
 restrictions upon the power of a father over his sons. 1 
 
 181. Disintegration of the family in the Roman Empire. A 
 little later, when the philosophy of the Greeks and Romans, and 
 especially the ideals of Christianity and the customs of the Teutons, 
 in distinguishing between the family proper and the group of slaves 
 and retainers, gave rise to the monogamous family of modern times, 
 the family was reduced to a natural unit, and a number of private 
 interests were made possible with which the state had little con- 
 cern. In fact, by the beginning of the Christian era relations be- 
 tween the sexes had become very loose, and the family seemed to 
 be breaking down. 2 The destruction of the domestic religion re- 
 moved the foundations of the family. Ancestor worship, adapted 
 to isolated groups, could not withstand the changes in economic 
 conditions which transformed pastoral tribes into agricultural, in- 
 dustrial, and commercial communities, or the changes in political 
 conditions which welded patriarchal groups into cities ; and it was 
 replaced by the worship of nature or by a skeptical philosophy. 
 The growth of divorce and of vice also demoralized family relations. 
 Marriage became merely a civil contract, its continuance depend- 
 ing upon mutual consent, and family obligations were treated with 
 extreme levity. Seneca said that there were women who reckoned 
 their years by their husbands, 3 and St. Jerome asserted that there 
 existed at Rome a wife who was married to her twenty-third 
 husband, she being his twenty-first wife. 4 
 
 182. The medieval church and the family. One of the first 
 tasks of Christianity, therefore, was the reconstruction of family 
 life. 5 The church tried to abolish divorce and fought the vices of 
 concubinage and prostitution which flourished in the pagan world. 
 In order to make the family more stable, marriage was made one 
 of the sacraments, the church constantly opposing the doctrine of 
 the Roman law that marriage was a contract. Thus marriage was 
 
 1 Lee, Historical Jurisprudence, pp. 195-206. s Seneca, De Benefic, iii, 16. 
 
 2 Lecky, History of European Morals, chap. v. 4 St. Jerome, Epistle 2. 
 6 Schmidt, Social Results of Early Christianity, chap. ii. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 1 1 
 
 again regarded as a religious bond and, while the family was organ- 
 ized on a semipatriarchal basis, the wife being subject to her hus- 
 band, the position of women and children was, in some respects, 
 improved. The adoration of the Virgin, in particular, tended to 
 increase the respect in which womankind was held. On the other 
 hand, the ascetic ideals of the church and its attempt to enforce 
 celibacy upon the clergy exerted a demoralizing influence upon 
 family life, encouraged vice, and tended to depreciate the char- 
 acter and position of woman. 1 Accordingly, after the fall of the 
 Roman Empire, and during the political chaos of the Middle Ages, 
 the church almost supplanted the state in its regulation of the 
 family, assuming jurisdiction over kinship, marriage and divorce, 
 inheritance and wills, education, and morals. 
 
 183. The family since the Reformation. The religious theory of 
 the family was undermined by the Reformation, and almost entirely 
 destroyed by the great social changes of the last few centuries. 
 New economic conditions have individualized society, and demo- 
 cratic ideals of government tend to make the individual the polit- 
 ical unit. At the same time, the growth of wealth has resulted, 
 among some classes at least, in lower moral standards and increas- 
 ing laxity in family relationships. 2 The belief that marriage is a 
 private contract again prevails among the mass of the people and 
 is embodied in the laws of many states. The modern state, there- 
 fore, has freed the family from church control and has assumed 
 the regulation of all family relations that are affected with a public 
 interest. " Marriage has become civil, divorce is granted, if at all, 
 by the courts or by lawmaking bodies, kinship rights- and the will 
 are regulated by law, education is secular and largely supported by 
 the state, which also acts in loco parentis in case of parental neglect 
 or incompetency, or of complete orphanage." 3 The family remains 
 as the foundation of the social system in modern society ; but its 
 political authority has disappeared, and it finds its most important 
 functions taken over or regulated by the political organization which 
 it originally was largely instrumental in creating. 
 
 1 Lecky, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 388-390. 
 
 2 Ellwood, Sociology and Modern Social Problems, chap. vii. 
 8 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 108-109. 
 
112 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 184. Present problems in the family. At the present time two 
 problems growing out of the family as a part of the political sys- 
 tem are of prime importance. 1 One has to do with the question of 
 equality or inequality within the family, and opens up the subject 
 of woman's legal and political rights and privileges. The other has 
 to do with the control of the state over the family and centers 
 around the much-disputed question of divorce. Both problems have 
 been brought to a crisis largely through the economic changes of 
 the Industrial Revolution, which transferred production from home 
 to factory, destroyed the former unity of the family as an indus- 
 trial unit, made women more independent by opening to them new 
 occupations, and brought out more strongly by contrast the narrow 
 life and social inferiority of domestic employment. 2 The general 
 growth of intelligence and the theories of political democracy have 
 contributed to the same result. 
 
 185. Political position of woman. While there have been in the 
 past social systems built up on the theory of matriarchal authority, 
 during the greater part of human history man has exercised or has 
 had the legal right to exercise authority. Woman was primarily a 
 member of a group based on sex, and only secondarily a person. 
 In the course of the past century increasing legal rights were 
 granted to women, until in most respects they now possess full 
 equality before the law, although in general the important exception 
 of suffrage still remains. 
 
 186. Woman suffrage. While the doctrine of universal suffrage 
 received consideration in France during the early stages of the 
 French Revolution and was advocated during the past century by 
 many eminent thinkers in England and in America, 3 it is only 
 in recent years that experiments in the practical application of the 
 theory have been permitted. 4 At present, women possess extensive 
 political rights in Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, Norway, 
 Finland, and in several American commonwealths, the right to 
 hold office being somewhat more limited than the right of suffrage. 
 Partial suffrage rights have been granted to women in Canada, 
 
 1 Cooley, Social Organization, chap. xxxi. 
 
 2 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Problems of Modern Industry, chaps, iii-iv. 
 
 8 Mill, The Subjection of Women ; Story, Commentaries, Vol. I, section 579. 
 4 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 508-516. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 113 
 
 England, several European states, and more than half of the 
 American commonwealths. Vigorous agitation for the extension 
 of woman's share in government is being carried on, especially in 
 England and the United States, and a wider application of the 
 principle seems likely. 1 
 
 187. Arguments for woman suffrage. In favor of woman suf- 
 frage it is urged that sex is not a proper test for determining the 
 privilege, since the proper criterion is moral and intellectual, rather 
 than physical. It is further claimed that women need the privilege 
 as a protection, in order that they may defend themselves against 
 unjust class legislation made by a government composed of men 
 alone. Besides, the same reasons that secured the civil and legal 
 rights of women are argued as reasons why political equality should 
 logically follow ; and it is claimed that the admission of women 
 into government and politics would elevate the tone of public life, 
 purify political conditions, and insure better government. 
 
 188. Arguments against woman suffrage. By those who oppose 
 woman suffrage it is held that the active participation of women in 
 government would tend to destroy the family, since the burdens of 
 political life would interfere with the duties of childbearing and 
 the rearing of families. There would also be the possibility of 
 dissension resulting from political disagreement between husband 
 and wife. Some opponents of woman suffrage emphasize the fact 
 that women are by nature unfitted to discharge all the obligations of 
 citizenship, — for example, police duty and service in the army, — 
 and that therefore they have no right to expect the full privileges 
 of citizens. Finally, it is said that women in most states do not 
 desire the suffrage and that where they possess it they fail to take 
 advantage of the privilege. 2 
 
 189. Present position of woman. Opportunities for education 
 and for a complete share in the thought and life of civilization have 
 also but recently been open to women. " Public school education 
 for girls is scarcely a century old. College education for women, in 
 a general sense, is of the present generation. But the conviction 
 has steadily gained that democracy cannot treat half the race as 
 
 1 Schirmacher, Modern Woman's Rights Movement, trans, by C. C. Eckhardt 
 
 2 Sumner, Equal Suffrage. 
 
H4 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 inferior in dignity or exclude it from the comradeship of life." x 
 However, the results of the economic, intellectual, and political 
 emancipation of women upon marriage and the stability of the fam- 
 ily, or upon the form that the family shall take, suggest difficult 
 questions for the future. 2 
 
 190. Divorce. From one point of view the evolution of divorce 
 is a phase of the improving social and legal position of woman. In 
 early times woman was practically a slave, and little restriction was 
 placed on the authority which man might exercise over her. If the 
 wife displeased the husband, she might be killed or driven away. 
 Later, the husband usually contented himself with repudiating her ; 
 next, the severity of the right of repudiation, at first unlimited, was 
 mitigated ; then it was restricted to certain well-defined cases, and 
 some rights were even granted to the repudiated woman. At length 
 her own right was recognized to seek divorce in order to escape 
 from intolerable treatment. 3 When the family was under church 
 control, divorce was regulated by religious authority, as was the 
 case in the Middle Ages, and remains to-day among Roman Catholic 
 peoples. In the absence of church control, the state determined 
 the conditions of divorce, as in the Roman Empire and in most 
 modern states. At present divorces are granted by the courts or 
 by legislative bodies. 
 
 191. Causes of increasing divorce. A number of causes tend to 
 increase the frequency of divorce, with resultant instability of family 
 relations, especially in the United States. 4 The decay of the re- 
 ligious theory of marriage and the family, the growing spirit of 
 individualism resulting from our democratic government, the de- 
 velopment of our industry and our education, and the recent move- 
 ment for the economic, mental, and legal emancipation of women 
 all have weakened family ties. Modern industrialism tends to dis- 
 rupt the home by opening new occupations to women, by setting 
 the sexes in competition with each other, thus emphasizing their 
 individualism and reducing sexual differences, and by unfitting 
 many girls for domestic duties and responsibilities. The conditions 
 
 1 Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 6oo. 2 Bosanquet, The Family. 
 
 8 Letourneau, Evolution of Marriage. 
 
 4 Ellwood, Sociology and Modern Social Problems, pp. 123-132. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 115 
 
 of city life, one result of modern industrialism, seem to be particu- 
 larly unfavorable to the stability of the family. 1 Higher standards 
 of living, while desirable in themselves, prevent many from meeting 
 the demands of a home, and the higher age of marriage, naturally 
 following, makes difficult the temperamental adjustment of husband 
 and wife necessary for satisfactory family life. Increasing laxity in 
 the laws regarding divorce and in their administration, as well 
 as the growing popularization of law and the tendency of all 
 classes to appeal to the law for remedies of all sorts, is an important 
 contributing factor. 2 
 
 192. New type of family in formation. As a result of these 
 general conditions, the semipatriarchal family of a century ago, 
 based on authority, is disappearing, and a new, democratic type of 
 family, in harmony with our democratic civilization, is not yet 
 evolved. During the transition there is naturally much disorgani- 
 zation and disintegration ; and the position of the state, in deter- 
 mining the nature and obligations of the family and in fixing the 
 legal and political position of women, is correspondingly difficult. 
 The problem demands such adjustment as shall secure the greatest 
 degree of individual liberty and of equality between the sexes, 
 without sacrificing the stability of the family or the best interests 
 of the state. 3 
 
 II. The State and the Church 
 
 193. Union of early church and state. In early times state and 
 church were scarcely differentiated. Rulers were also priests and 
 their power was upheld by common belief in their divine origin 
 and authority. The priestly class had special privileges, formed 
 the chief advisers of the rulers, and themselves exercised large 
 governing powers. Church and state were one in organization 
 and in purpose. 4 This condition created a conservative civilization, 
 each powerful force supporting the other, and both opposing any 
 change that would weaken their combined control. 
 
 - 1 Special report on " Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906," Bureau of the Census. 
 2 Wright, Practical Sociology, chap. x. 
 8 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, chap. xxiv. 
 
 1 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 87-91, 128-131 ; Waitz, Grund- 
 zttge der.Politik, pp. 36-42. 
 
Il6 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 194. Divine sanction of early authority. In the Oriental 
 empires religion and politics were indistinguishable, all law find- 
 ing its sanction in the sacred writings, and all authority resting on 
 the divine nature of the rulers. 1 The Hebrews built up their the- 
 ocracy on the belief that their state was not only founded by God, 
 but directly ruled by Him. The Greeks and Romans viewed the 
 state as indirectly divine in origin, resulting from the very nature 
 of man, and believed that the gods continued to influence its 
 destiny ; although in practice the Romans distinguished between 
 divine and civil authority, considering law as created by the state 
 and its final authority as resting in the Roman people. In order 
 to impress his Oriental subjects, Alexander the Great had himself 
 proclaimed the son of Jupiter, and worship of the emperor was 
 required by law in the Roman Empire. 2 
 
 195. Forms of divine-right theory. As the doctrine of the 
 divine nature of the state developed, by some the office of ruler, 
 regardless of its occupant, was considered divine, while others 
 extended the idea of divinity even to the particular individual who, 
 at the given time, held the title. 3 This theory made obedience to 
 political authority a religious duty and naturally accompanied that 
 phase of political development when church and state were united, 
 when churchmen were political leaders, and when supernatural 
 authority was needed to secure obedience or to prevent revolution. 4 
 
 196. Church and state in the Middle Ages. This theory, while 
 forming the unquestioned basis of Oriental political philosophy, 
 and while tacitly underlying the theory of the Greeks and Romans, 
 was not definitely formulated until the Middle Ages. Political 
 doctrines seemed to have little interest for the founder of Chris- 
 tianity. The Golden Rule, upon which Christianity was based, is 
 rather unpolitical, since obedience to its spirit would obviate much 
 of the need for coercive authority. In bringing hope to the humble 
 and oppressed and in disparaging the powerful, the early church 
 
 1 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. VI, chap. vi. 
 
 2 The Amphictyonio Council of the Greeks was a good example of the close 
 connection between religious and political institutions. See Freeman, History of 
 Federal Government, Vol. I, pp. 126-129. 
 
 8 Bluntschli, op. cit., Bk. IV, chap. vii. 
 
 4 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 59-62. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 17 
 
 also exerted an unpolitical influence. 1 In fact, the early Christian 
 church was avowedly an organization claiming dominion over 
 spiritual interests only, and the supremacy of the civil power in 
 temporal affairs was freely admitted. 2 For its first three centuries 
 the new religion struggled against the state, and the distinction 
 between the domain of religion and that of government established 
 during this period had important results on political development. 
 On the one hand, politics was freed from the strict rules formerly 
 laid down by religion and could conform its actions to social needs 
 and the moral law. On the other hand, the action of the state was 
 limited to a control over only a part of man's nature, and a spirit 
 of resistance was aroused against attempts to interfere with freedom 
 of belief and of conscience. 3 
 
 197. Importance of medieval church. After the Teutonic inva- 
 sions, the church became more powerful and more political. Grow- 
 ing up on the ruins of the Roman Empire, it adopted imperial 
 organization under the papacy, and its power was further strength- 
 ened by the superstitious reverence in which it was held by the 
 victorious barbarians. The absence of strong government and the 
 power of religious ideas over the minds of men led the church to 
 take upon itself many functions of the state. Preservation of peace 
 and order was largely in its hands, and with its growing wealth in 
 land came corresponding political authority. Even a separate 
 system of law and of courts was developed, and its monopoly of 
 learning made great churchmen the chief officials and advisers 
 in government. 
 
 198. Formulation of divine-right theory. As the temporal 
 power of the church increased, and the growing struggle between 
 emperor and pope raised practical questions demanding specific 
 theories for their support, a more definite formulation of the proper 
 spheres of church and state was needed. 4 The leaders in this con- 
 troversy, however they might differ in their opinions as to the 
 relative power of civil and spiritual rulers, were agreed that all 
 
 1 Dunning, Political Theories: Ancient and Medieval, pp. 152-154. 
 ! Gettell, Readings in Political Science, p. 113. 
 8 De Coulanges, Ancient City, pp. 519-529. 
 4 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 42-50. 
 
Il8 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 authority came ultimately from God, bestowed by Him upon His 
 earthly vicegerents. 1 Clear statements of this theory were set 
 forth by the popes and the church fathers, 2 the Augsburg Con- 
 fession of 1530 summing up the prevailing belief by declaring 
 that all authority, government, law, and order in the world have 
 been created and established by God himself. 3 Dante, who argued 
 for temporal supremacy, believed nevertheless that political author- 
 ity came from God ; 4 and the leaders of the Protestant Reforma- 
 tion, Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, likewise emphasized the divine 
 origin of political power and the necessity of obedience to civil 
 authority. 5 
 
 199. Divine right in the absolute monarchies. Toward the end 
 of the Middle Ages the growth of strong national monarchies 
 attacked the influence of the church and separated more clearly 
 religious and political ideas, although more than a century of re- 
 ligious wars, civil and international, were needed before this dis- 
 tinction was realized. As the temporal power of the church 
 declined, the contest was no longer one between emperor and 
 pope, but between rulers and subjects ; and in this conflict the 
 divine-right theory was applied, not so much to the origin of politi- 
 cal power, but rather to the authority of the existing monarchs. 
 James I of England 6 and Bossuet in France 7 boldly asserted that 
 kings ruled " by grace of God " and were responsible to Him 
 alone. In the " Patriarcha " of Filmer, who wrote during the latter 
 part of the seventeenth century, the theory reached the height of 
 its extravagance ; and, although completely destroyed as a system 
 of political thought by the writings of Grotius, 8 Hobbes, 9 and 
 Locke, 10 it reappeared in the reaction after the French Revolution, 
 being clearly stated in the treaty of the Holy Alliance in 18 IS. 11 
 
 1 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, chaps, vi-ix. 
 
 2 Gettell, Readings in Political Science, pp. 113-114. 
 
 8 Tschackert, Die unveranderte Augsburgische Konfession. See also Thomas 
 Aquinas, De Regimine Principum. * De Monarchia. 
 
 6 Dunning, Political Theories : From Luther to Montesquieu, chap. i. 
 8 Works of James I, p. 556. 
 
 7 Politique tiree des propres paroles de l'Ecriture sainte. 
 
 8 De Jure Belli ac Pacis. 9 Leviathan. 
 
 10 Two Treatises of Government. 
 
 11 Article II. See Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. I, pp. 317 ff. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 119 
 
 Even to-day monarchs are supported by a shadowy belief among 
 the masses in the divinity of kings ; the rulers of Russia, Turkey, 
 and Japan still rely upon the support of religion ; and even the 
 German emperor has asserted the claim to rule by divine right. 1 
 Several of the American colonies were founded on a religious 
 basis ; 2 Washington in his first inaugural address asserted the 
 active interest of Providence in the establishment of the American 
 nation ; 3 and in the writings of Mulford * and Brownson 5 in 
 America, and of Stahl 6 and Haller 7 in Germany, the divine theory 
 but slightly changed has recently been proclaimed. 
 
 200. Separation of church and state. For centuries, however, 
 many influences have been at work tending to disturb the ancient 
 combination of state and church. 8 Sometimes reformers have 
 attacked evils in both ; frequently church and state, each trying to 
 usurp the functions of the other, have been brought into conflict, 
 resulting sometimes in the subordination of state to church, as 
 during the papal supremacy in Europe about the thirteenth cen- 
 tury, sometimes in the subordination of church to state, as during 
 the latter part of the reign of Henry VIII in England, sometimes 
 in a division of powers, as in the numerous concordats arranged 
 by the Roman Catholic church. 9 In general, the growth of knowl- 
 edge, of intercourse among peoples with different religions, and 
 of material progress, creating new interests and new forms of 
 wealth, have resisted the conservative and often despotic author- 
 ity of the intrenched politico-religious rulers, and have broken 
 down the union of church and state. 10 "When the state became 
 industrial and commercial, the church usually failed to adjust it- 
 self readily to the new environment, and a more or less complete 
 
 1 Schierbrand, Germany, pp. 17, 21. 
 
 2 Osgood, American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 201-202, 323. 
 8 Old South Leaflets, No. 10. 
 
 4 The Nation, chap. iv. 
 
 6 American Republic, p. 126. 
 
 6 Die Philosophie des Rechts. 
 
 7 Restauration der Staatswissenschaft. 
 
 8 Geffcken, Church and State, trans, by E. F. Taylor. 
 
 9 For example, the Concordat of Worms (1122). See Henderson, Historical 
 Documents of the Middle Ages, pp. 408-409. 
 
 10 On the separation of church and state in the United States, see Merriam, 
 American Political Theories, pp. 193-196. 
 
120 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 separation followed. 1 In this process four fairly well-defined stages 
 may usually be distinguished : 2 
 
 i . The state and the church separated in organization, personnel, 
 and function, but worked in harmony. • 
 
 2. The state subordinated the church so effectively that it became 
 virtually a department of governmental administration, dominated 
 by the ruler and his ministers. 
 
 3. The church freed itself from governmental control in spiritual 
 matters, but was financially chiefly supported by the state. 
 
 4. The church became entirely separate from the state and was 
 no longer supported from public funds. 
 
 201. Diminishing scope of church functions. In this conflict 
 the church, becoming a more purely spiritual and devotional insti- 
 tution, lost many of its original functions. As state support and 
 state funds were withdrawn, it became necessary that other social 
 institutions or the state itself should perform, or at least share in, 
 needed services formerly under church control. Among these 
 may be mentioned morals, domestic regulations, charity, education, 
 medicine, scientific investigation, philosophy, and amusements. 
 The influence of the church along these lines, while sometimes 
 powerful, is no longer authoritative. 3 
 
 202. Distinction between law and morality. As a logical result 
 of the increasing separation of church and state, the theory that 
 the state was of divine origin or that its authority has a supernatural 
 sanction is no longer seriously held by political philosophers. The 
 influence of religion in the early stages of political life was indeed 
 enormous ; but the state is, nevertheless, a human institution, whose 
 authority is exercised by human agencies and is dependent upon 
 human sanction. 4 The moral obligations of religion, which refer 
 to motives and are enforced by fear of divine displeasure, are quite 
 different and sometimes directly opposed to the legal obligations 
 of the state, which refer to outward acts and are supported if 
 
 1 Cooley, Social Organization, chap, xxxii. 
 
 9 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 113-114. 
 
 8 For a discussion of the proper relation between the state and religious asso- 
 ciations, see Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, pp. 583-588; Woolsey, Political 
 Science, Part III, chap. xii. 
 
 4 Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, Lecture II. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 121 
 
 necessary by human physical force. 1 Of these outward acts the state, 
 through its laws, attempts to control only such as affect the welfare 
 of men in society, and as can be brought under uniform and prac- 
 ticable regulation. It necessarily follows that many things considered 
 morally wrong are not prohibited by law ; and, on the other hand, 
 law often follows standards of expediency and prohibits things not 
 considered morally wrong. There is, thus, a legal conscience as 
 well as a moral conscience, and they do not always coincide. Some 
 persons prefer to be martyrs to the law rather than to forsake their 
 moral opinions ; others disregard morality so long as they can keep 
 on the safe side of the law. 
 
 203. Connection between law and morality. Probably the closest 
 remaining connection between religion and politics, among those 
 peoples who have separated church and state, is the influence 
 exerted upon legislation by religion and the moral precepts which 
 it supports. Widespread ideas of right and wrong, representing 
 prevailing ethical standards, always tend to be crystallized into law. 
 To be effective, law must represent national habits and beliefs. 
 Laws that attempt too soon to force new moral ideas or laws that 
 are no longer in touch with existing ethical conditions are alike 
 difficult to administer. There is always a mass of public opinion 
 clamoring for legal expression, and a body of law becoming obso- 
 lete because inapplicable under existing conditions. Only such law 
 as has the support of moral sentiment will be respected and obeyed 
 or, if necessary, effectively enforced. 2 
 
 III. The State and the Industrial Organizations 
 
 204. Industry a factor in political evolution. As the cooperative 
 efforts of mankind in satisfying their material wants, in obtaining 
 food and shelter, and in creating and protecting property gave a 
 powerful stimulus to the formation of states, so the various indus- 
 trial organizations resulting from the production and distribution 
 of wealth have always borne a close relation to the political machinery 
 
 1 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 50-53. 
 
 2 On the relations of moral and legal rights, see Wundt, Principles of Morality, 
 Part III, chap, iv ; McKechnie, The State and the Individual, chap, xxvi ; Sidg- 
 wick, op. cit., chap. xiii. 
 
122 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of the state. In creating and supporting property rights and in- 
 enforcing contracts, the state establishes the fundamental institu- 
 tions of economic life. 1 Sometimes the state has publicly controlled 
 industry and commerce as branches of its governmental adminis- 
 tration ; again it has left their management to private hands, 
 contenting itself with more or less extensive regulation. The com- 
 mercial policy of Venice during the later Middle Ages and that of 
 most modern states illustrate the two methods of control. 2 Some- 
 times industrial and commercial organizations have become powerful 
 enough to dominate in the government of the state, and sometimes 
 have determined its fundamental nature. Modern corporations are 
 an example of the former, and the type of state during feudalism 
 illustrates the latter. 
 
 205. Importance of land in political evolution. Land, the basis 
 of all human life, was at first fought over and temporarily utilized 
 for purposes of hunting, fishing, or root-grubbing, with no idea of 
 ownership. In tribal states, after the pastoral and agricultural stages 
 were reached, the grazing grounds or the cultivated fields were the 
 property of the community ; and the ruling bodies, composed of 
 the heads of the families or the war leader and his followers, allotted 
 the shares, adjusted conflicting claims, and enforced the customs 
 of communal management. 3 While the origin of the idea of prop- 
 erty in land must be sought in user and seizure, often the result of 
 violence, it was the means of attaining a higher degree of welfare 
 for the community as a whole. Not only did it increase produc- 
 tion and advance civilization by inculcating qualities, such as thrift, 
 foresight, and energy, without which continuing progress was impos- 
 sible, but, by necessitating communal rules and by increasing the 
 power of the military chieftains who were responsible for defense, 
 it gave an impetus to political development. 
 
 206. Feudalism. With the transition to agriculture and to com- 
 munal landholding, " the former personal and tribal relations gave 
 way to territorial and political relations. In other words, the state 
 developed and the local divisions and counties were put under the 
 
 1 Ely, Outlines of Economics, chap. ii. 
 
 2 Day, History of Commerce, chaps, xi, xxxiv. 
 
 3 For the evolution of property in land, see Letourneau, Property, its Origin 
 and Development; DeCoulanges, Origin of Property in Land. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 123 
 
 protection of the overlords. The tenants or vassals, whether indi- 
 viduals or groups, now paid a portion of their agricultural earnings 
 as the price of protection, and the military occupation of the district 
 by the chieftain before long hardened into the institution of private 
 property. The war lord became the land lord. Thus was ushered 
 in the system of feudalism, based on the preponderance of the 
 manorial lord and the hierarchy of social relations. In some cases 
 the cultivators lost their original prerogatives and dwindled into 
 mere tenants without any property rights at all. In other cases 
 they contrived gradually to free themselves from their rents and 
 other feudal payments, while at the same time the common culti- 
 vation gave way, under the impulse of more modern methods, to 
 individual tillage. The land became thus the private property of 
 either the lord or the peasant. The private property of the feudal 
 chieftain meant the growth of security and social order ; the devel- 
 opment of landed property within the communal group of cultiva- 
 tors was the result of the recognition of the social importance of 
 individual action." 1 
 
 207. Territorial sovereignty. As national monarchies arose in 
 modern Europe, the feudal theory that the king was lord of the 
 soil survived, and on this basis the state assumed supreme juris- 
 diction over all its territory. Even in modern democratic states, 
 by the legal regulation of the holding and transfer of land and by 
 the rights of taxation and eminent domain, the state asserts a claim 
 superior to that of any individual. The private owner's right to 
 use his land is limited by laws enacted for purposes of general wel- 
 fare ; and the right of bequest is modified by inheritance taxes that 
 may amount to practical confiscation. Modern states determine 
 who may or may not acquire property in land, 2 limit the size of any 
 single holding, 3 and are themselves large landowners. 4 Even the 
 theory of land nationalization, by means of the " single tax," has 
 many supporters. 5 At present, states are extending their control 
 
 1 Seligman, Principles of Economics, p. 130. 
 
 2 The right of aliens to own land is limited, even in some parts of the United 
 States. See Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 368-369. 
 
 8 As in New Zealand. 
 
 4 It is estimated that the United States has possessed at one time or another 
 a public domain of 2,825,000 square miles. 
 6 George, Progress and Poverty. 
 
124 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 over land because of the necessity of conserving their natural 
 resources, and because of the growing belief that natural monop- 
 olies should be brought under strict governmental control or even 
 ownership. 1 Mines, forests, and water rights have acquired public 
 importance to such a degree that purely private ownership is some- 
 times dangerous. 2 The high seas and navigable waters with few 
 exceptions are communal property, controlled entirely by public 
 authorities. 3 
 
 208. The state and the food supply. The state has always taken 
 an active part in securing, safeguarding, and increasing the food 
 supply of its people. In some cases, as in Rome, the state under- 
 took a public distribution of food among its citizens. Drainage and 
 irrigation have been public functions for thousands of years. More- 
 over, the need for irrigation fundamentally affects the relative 
 importance of private and public rights over land. " The English 
 common-law conception of private property — the property that 
 reaches, as has been picturesquely said, from heaven to hell — is 
 a product of a moist climate, of conditions where there is an abun- 
 dance or superabundance of water, and where private interest could 
 be safely depended upon to give the best results. But in the arid 
 and semi-arid regions of our western states neither occupation nor 
 labor is deemed to give an equitable title to the river or the adja- 
 cent riparian lands. The new code of private property which is 
 springing up in the West is one in which individual rights are 
 clearly and forcibly held subservient to those of the community." 4 
 When population presses upon the means of subsistence, wars are 
 waged or colonies founded, both under the control of the politi- 
 cal authority. The historical development of the British Empire 
 and the present international position of Germany and Japan are 
 dominated by the necessity that these states shall secure food and 
 employment for their people and markets for their products. 5 
 
 1 Seager, Introduction to Economics, pp. 443-459 ; Ely, Problems of To-day, 
 chaps, xvii-xxi. 
 
 2 Van Hise, Conservation of Natural Resources. 
 
 * Lawrence, Principles of International Law, pp. 187-21 1 ; Hershey, Essentials 
 of International Public Law, pp. 201-219, and authorities there cited. 
 4 Seligman, Principles of Economics, p. 134. 
 6 Reinsch, World Politics, Part I, chaps, iv-v ; Part IV. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 125 
 
 209. Trade and commerce. When trade and commerce began, 
 the state was compelled to protect market places, build and police 
 roads, 1 improve harbors, and establish means of communication. 
 It took over from private hands the establishment of a standard of 
 exchange and the coining of money ; it fixed a system of weights 
 and measures ; 2 and, either by establishing a banking system or 
 by a rigid regulation of private banks, it maintained credit. 3 Some 
 states, such as Venice and Spain, undertook commercial ventures 
 as governmental functions ; others, such as Holland, France, and 
 England, chartered commercial companies under governmental reg- 
 ulation. 4 These companies, possessing governing powers, as well 
 as trading privileges, frequently laid the foundations for colonial 
 empires or established new states. 6 During the seventeenth and 
 eighteenth centuries, contests for the control of colonies and com- 
 merce dominated the international situation in Europe, affecting 
 internal governmental policies and external alliances and wars. 6 
 In the modern world, states negotiate commercial treaties, establish 
 tariff barriers, and maintain a consular service and a navy for the 
 advancement and protection of their foreign trade. 7 Countless 
 regulations affect individuals and corporations engaged in trade, 
 transportation, insurance, and similar ventures within the state. 
 
 210. Slavery. In early states labor came under little govern- 
 mental regulation. Production and manufacture were individual or 
 household affairs, and the first division of labor was probably that 
 between the sexes. 8 During the greater part of human history, 
 slavery or serfdom prevailed as the basis of industry, and political 
 regulation was needed only to define personal rights or to ease the 
 
 1 The Statute of Winchester, enacted in England in 1285, provided that the 
 gates of every town should be closed and watched from sunset to sunrise, and 
 that a clear space should be made for two hundred feet at each side of the high- 
 roads in order to make them safer for travelers and merchants. See Stubbs, 
 Select Charters, pp. 470-472. 
 
 2 Ridgway, Origin of Metallic Currency and Weight Standards. 
 
 8 Dunbar, Chapters on the Theory and History of Banking, chap. i. 
 4 Day, History of Commerce, chaps, xix-xxi, xxv. 
 
 6 Cheyney, European Background of American History, chap, vii ; Reinsch, 
 Colonial Government, pp. 145-166. 
 
 6 Cunningham, Western Civilization : Modern Times, Bk. V, chap. iii. 
 
 7 Fisk, International Commercial Policies. 
 
 8 Ely, Evolution of Industrial Society, pp. 26-39. 
 
126 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 transition from one status to another. Slavery arose where subsist- 
 ence was relatively easy to procure, where private property devel- 
 oped, and where human labor had social value. Slaves were 
 recruited from the victims of war, from those who were unable to 
 pay their debts or who voluntarily sold themselves, from criminals 
 whose punishment fell short of death, and from the offspring of 
 slaves. It was, however, only where markets for agricultual products 
 developed and landed estates were managed as business enterprises, 
 and where large supplies of free land were available, that slavery 
 became extensive. "Thus in classic Greece, slavery developed with 
 the growth of intermunicipal markets, and grew strong with the 
 expansion of the colonies on all sides of the Mediterranean. The 
 great city states became not only the chief marts but also the chief 
 breeders of slaves, and slavery finally dominated industry as well. 
 With the advent of Roman sovereignty, slavery received a new 
 lease of life, and became lucrative not only on the Italian main- 
 land, but in the great stretches of subjugated states. As long as 
 the career of conquest and fresh accessions of territory continued, 
 slavery flourished. In Rome the development of slavery on an 
 extended scale did not take place until the later centuries of the 
 Republic, when slavery on the latifundia became the dominant 
 form of great business enterprise. In the same way the European 
 immigrants into the new world, whose ancestors had just seen the 
 last vestiges of forced labor disappear at home, no sooner reached 
 American soil than they introduced in all its rigor the ancient 
 system of slavery. Slavery became an important factor in America 
 only when the cultivation of tobacco and later of cotton on a con- 
 siderable scale for the foreign market made the labor of slave 
 gangs profitable." 1 
 
 211. Serfdom. When population increased and the supply of 
 new land diminished, the economic defects of the reluctant, un- 
 skillful, and superficial slave labor became obvious, and land- 
 owners found it more profitable to permit laborers to do some 
 work on their own account in order to improve methods of culti- 
 vation and secure more willing service. The growth of free indus- 
 try and commerce in the towns hastened this process. " The slave 
 1 Seligman, Principles of Economics, pp. 157-158. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 127 
 
 in Rome gradually turns into the colonus, just as several centuries 
 later the Anglo-Saxon thegn is replaced by the villein, — the slave 
 by the serf. Serfdom differs from slavery chiefly in that the indi- 
 vidual acquires certain personal rights and is attached to the soil. 
 He goes with the land, but cannot be divorced from it. The serf 
 is still bound to work a certain part of his time for the landlord. 
 With the final exhaustion of free land, however, the landlord finds 
 that he can derive more profit by freeing the serf completely and 
 by letting him occupy the land on a fixed rental, in produce or in 
 money. This process is gradual, differing according to the general 
 economic conditions of each country. Ultimately, however, the 
 last trace of serfdom disappears, and the cultivator becomes the 
 hired man or the free tenant farmer." 1 The existence of a numer- 
 ous servile population, having few legal fights and no political privi- 
 leges, was largely responsible for the aristocratic organization and 
 spirit of ancient and medieval states. 
 
 212. Guilds. The growth of trade and the rise of distinct handi- 
 crafts, especially in the towns, were usually accompanied by the 
 formation of guilds or industrial clans, probably for the purpose 
 at first of better safeguarding the rights of the commercial and 
 industrial classes against the feudal lords. 2 These corporations fre- 
 quently secured charters and in some cities, especially in England, 
 practically controlled the municipal government, citizenship coincid- 
 ing with membership in the corporation, and the officers of the 
 guild acting also as officers of the town. 3 These organizations were 
 encouraged by the state as long as they were useful, but suppressed 
 when their rigidity and exclusiveness offered a barrier to progres- 
 sive industrial development. 
 
 213. Labor unions and labor legislation. In modern states labor 
 has again formed powerful organizations, or unions* At first these 
 were illegal as conspiracies; not until 1824 in England, and later 
 elsewhere, were they legitimized. 8 At present they tend to play a 
 considerable part in politics and will probably come under increasing 
 
 1 Seligman, op. cit., p. 159. 
 
 2 Emerton, Medieval Europe, pp. 520-521. 
 
 8 Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, chap. iii. 
 
 4 The American Federation of Labor has more than two million members. 
 
 6 Seager, Introduction to Economics, pp. 388-392. 
 
128 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 governmental control. 1 Largely as a result of the endeavor of 
 workmen to help themselves through associated action has come 
 legislation in behalf of workers. Such legislation has assumed 
 three principal forms : 2 (i) dealing with the conditions of employ- 
 ment, especially of women and children, the hours of labor, and 
 the protection of life, limb, and health ; (2) dealing with the con- 
 ditions of remuneration, securing the payment of wages in cash 
 at frequent intervals, and in some states the fixing of a minimum 
 wage ; and (3) dealing with the results of employment, especially 
 along the lines of employers' liability, workmen's compensation, 
 and compulsory insurance. 3 The state has encouraged its home 
 industries by granting patents, establishing monopolies, paying 
 bounties, or levying tariffs ; has regulated the production and sale 
 of injurious products, such as opium and alcoholic liquors ; and 
 has, as a form of taxation, itself assumed a national monopoly 
 over certain products, such as salt, matches, and gunpowder, or, 
 in its municipalities, has taken over the water, light, and trans- 
 portation systems. 4 
 
 214. Industrial corporations. Probably the chief industrial prob- 
 lem confronting modern states concerns their proper relation to the 
 powerful combinations of capital assembled in industrial corpora- 
 tions. 5 In their ability to create monopoly or to disregard public 
 welfare, and especially in their sinister influence upon politics, 6 
 these form the most powerful organizations within the state and 
 one of the greatest dangers to modern democracies. 7 The fact that 
 corporations and political parties are each able to furnish what 
 the other most needs, — corporations desiring favorable legislation, 
 exemption from taxation, special privileges and franchises, and 
 political parties desiring campaign contributions and financial re- 
 wards for their leaders, — makes the connection between business 
 and politics close because mutually profitable. Besides, the difficulty 
 
 1 Commons, Trade Unionism and Labor Problems. 
 
 2 Jevons, The State in Relation to Labor. 
 
 8 See also Seligman, Principles of Economics, pp. 430-434; Ely, Outlines of 
 Economics, chap, xxiii. 
 
 4 Bemis, ed. Municipal Monopolies. 
 
 6 Ely, Monopolies and Trusts. 
 
 8 Goodnow, Politics and Administration, pp. 251-254. 
 
 7 Jenks, The Trust Problem. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 129 
 
 of fixing responsibility, both in corporations and in political parties, 
 because of the nature of their organization offers constant tempta- 
 tion for dishonest cooperation. The statement that "business is 
 politics, and politics business " contains, a very important element 
 of truth. Laws aiming to secure publicity of corporation finances, 
 to prevent overcapitalization, to destroy undesirable monopolies and 
 unfair discriminations, and to exclude corporations from political 
 activity are among the more important attempts at trust regulation 
 on the part of modern states. 1 In industries that are naturally 
 monopolistic, government ownership is the logical result in case 
 regulation fails to secure public welfare. 
 
 215. Forms of state regulation of industry and trade. In the 
 regulation of industry and trade, public authority has acted some- 
 times through local organizations, as in the case of the tribal village 
 community, the Greek and Italian city states, and the medieval 
 manors and guilds ; sometimes through wider national organiza- 
 tions, as in the case of the Roman Empire or the legislatures 
 of modern states. The attitude of the state has sometimes been 
 paternal, taking upon itself a detailed control of industrial life. 
 Such was the attitude of ancient Greece and Rome, of the Euro- 
 pean states of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and early eighteenth 
 centuries under the mercantile system, 2 and such a system the 
 theory of socialism recommends to-day. Sometimes states have 
 adopted a laissez-faire attitude, 3 as during the latter eighteenth 
 and early nineteenth centuries, leaving business relations as far as 
 possible to individuals without interference. The obvious evils of 
 extreme individualism have caused a reaction, during the past 
 fifty years, toward increased state control ; and modern states in 
 general adopt the policy of regulation, leaving industry ordinarily 
 in private or corporate hands, but regulating such of its phases as 
 are affected with a public interest, and taking over under state 
 control such enterprises as it is not desirable to trust to private 
 initiative. 
 
 1 Baker, Monopolies and the People, Part II. 
 
 2 Day, History of Commerce, chap, xviii ; Cambridge Modern History, Vol. Ill, 
 chap. xxii. 
 
 8 Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, chap, viii ; Willoughby, 
 Nature of the State, pp. 320-337. 
 
130 PROBLEMS IN. POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 216. Economic classes. Throughout the entire course of state 
 evolution, classes based on occupations or on economic interests 
 have been of importance in political affairs. In the Oriental 
 empires differences in occupation gave rise to castes. In Athens, 
 at the time of Solon, factional strife broke out between the wealthy 
 landowners of the plain, the merchants of the shore, and the shep- 
 herds and small farmers of the mountain. 1 The three estates of 
 the Middle Ages were based upon the fundamental distinctions 
 between the clergy, the nobility, and the serfs. In modern states 
 political parties divide on economic issues, separate labor parties are 
 found in several states, and socialism is an international political 
 party organized on the basis of an economic class struggle. 
 
 IV. The State and the Military Organizations 
 
 217. Force in political evolution. In addition to kinship and 
 religion and to the cooperation of men in industrial activities in 
 forming affiliated groups from which the state could be formed, 
 organized physical force, either in repressing internal disobedience 
 and dissension or in waging offensive or defensive warfare, has 
 been a potent force in state origin. Political development demanded 
 a closer and more powerful organization than the old clans and 
 tribes permitted. When Egypt, Assyria, and Phoenicia showed 
 their strength, the Hebrew tribes cried, " Nay, but we will have a 
 king over us ; that we may also be like all the nations ; and that 
 our king may judge us, and go out before us and fight our battles." 2 
 While the institutions based on kinship and religion — the family 
 and the church — have been separated from the state, subordinated 
 to it, and weakened in authority and in scope of function, the 
 organizations based on force — the army, navy, militia and police 
 systems — remain entirely under the control of the state and still 
 perform duties of prime political importance. "We cannot, with- 
 out ignoring the facts of history, overlook the part hitherto played 
 by armed force in the development of the modern state. Every 
 advance of civilization over barbarism and of public order over 
 anarchy has been won by the better organization of force, and its 
 
 1 Gilbert, Greek Constitutional Antiquities, pp. 142-143. 
 
 2 1 Samuel viii, 19-20. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL- INSTITUTIONS 131 
 
 consecration to higher purposes. The better organization of force 
 has meant the creation of armies and navies, and their more per- 
 fect control by civil authority. The consecration of force to higher 
 purposes has resulted in the suppression of savagery, barbarism, 
 piracy, and despotism. To condemn armies and navies, as mere 
 survivals of an outgrown past, while dangers to civilization still 
 exist, would be to counsel exposure to the perils of recrudescent 
 barbarism ; for it is by no means certain that respect for law has 
 yet become so profound and so universal that a defenceless people 
 may count upon the security of its rights and liberties." 1 
 
 218. Subordination of force to civil authority. However, physi- 
 cal force has been brought increasingly under the regulation and 
 direction of the political organization. " It was a great moment 
 in the evolution of man, when the fighting impulse was redeemed 
 from isolated outbursts of violence and brutality through its organ- 
 ization for tribal protection. Thenceforth, it had a definite social 
 value. When later on it became drilled and disciplined in the per- 
 son of the trained soldier, and was held in reserve for the socially 
 determined occasion for its exercise, the fighting instinct found a 
 new and highly advantageous direction. And, finally, when this 
 organized power became fully responsible to civil authority, it was 
 able to shelter peace, and made possible the development of the 
 modern state." 2 
 
 219. Diminishing proportion of population engaged in war. The 
 proportion of the entire population engaged in military or semi- 
 military occupations has diminished. In the early states all able- 
 bodied freemen were warriors, and sometimes even slaves were 
 used in war. The army was the mobilized community and the 
 community was the army at rest. 3 Political rights were limited to 
 those who performed military services ; the war leader was the 
 civil ruler ; primitive military gatherings were also political gather- 
 ings ; the assembly grew out of the military organization. 4 
 
 1 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 154-155. 
 
 2 Ibid. pp. 152-153. 
 
 8 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. I, pp. 545-552. 
 
 4 For example, the comitia centuriata at Rome. See Abbott, Roman Political 
 Institutions, pp. 20-21, 26-27 > ar *d tne Teutonic Gefolge. See Jenks, History of 
 Politics, pp. 75-76, 88-89. 
 
132 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 220. Property and the army. The early division of society on 
 the basis of sex into men as fighters and women as workers was 
 considerably modified by the growth of property in slaves, herds, 
 and lands. A considerable number of the male population also 
 became workers and ceased to form a regular part of the military 
 organization. The army tended to coincide with the body of free- 
 men who were also landholders, and, extent of estate being the 
 measure of the owner's ability to bear burdens, a direct connection 
 between the amount of land held and the amount of military aid 
 to be rendered was established. " Thus in Greece under Solon, 
 those whose properties yielded less than a certain revenue were 
 exempt from duty as soldiers, save in emergencies. In Rome, 
 with a view to better adjustment of the relation between means 
 and requirements, there was a periodic 'revision of the register 
 of landed property, which was at the same time the levy-roll.' 
 Throughout the Middle Ages this principle was acted upon by 
 proportioning the numbers of warriors demanded to the sizes of 
 the fiefs ; and again, afterwards, by requiring from parishes their 
 respective contingents." l 
 
 221. Taxation and the army. When land ceased to be the only 
 source of wealth, military obligations were also laid on the grow- 
 ing class of free workers who, however, usually were permitted to 
 compound for service in war by the payment of fines, dues, or 
 taxes. 2 Landowners also often preferred to pay scutage rather 
 than furnish men at arms, and with the sums thus secured the 
 kings of the rising national states were able to maintain permanent 
 military establishments and to increase their power at the expense 
 of the feudal nobility. 3 Industrial growth, by increasing the popu- 
 lation from which substitutes could be obtained and by producing 
 the necessary free capital, changed military obligation from personal 
 service to a pecuniary burden and created a class of professional 
 soldiers, the standing armies of modern states. 
 
 222. Standing armies. At present, while all men are liable to 
 military service in case of need, and while states where war is 
 imminent give all men military training and support considerable 
 
 1 Spencer, Principles of Sociology, Vol. II, p. 476. 
 
 2 Perris, War and Peace, chaps, v-vi. 
 
 8 Oman, History of the Art of War : The Middle Ages, pp. 367-368. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 133 
 
 military establishments, the actual army consists of but a small 
 •proportion of the male population ; and in states where war is little 
 feared, only a small standing army is maintained and volunteers 
 form the main reliance in case of need. Germany and France are 
 examples of the former type, each maintaining standing armies of 
 over half a million men ; England and the United States represent 
 the latter type, although all these states maintain powerful navies. 1 
 
 223. Warfare a public function. On the other hand, the entire 
 organization, maintenance, and control of the military forces are 
 more completely in the hands of the state than formerly. Private 
 warfare, common under feudalism, is not permitted ; mercenaries 
 are seldom employed ; plunder is no longer a method of attract- 
 ing or maintaining troops ; and the rights and property of non- 
 combatants are generally respected. War has become an organized 
 contest between the public armed forces of states. 2 In like manner, 
 naval forces, at first supplied by seaport towns or by private mer- 
 chants or companies, are now completely controlled by states, even 
 privateering being forbidden. 3 Peace is now recognized as the 
 normal condition among states, and by international action efforts 
 are being made to reduce armaments, substitute arbitration for 
 warfare, or, if that be impossible, to limit and mitigate the evil 
 effects of. combat. 4 
 
 224. Mitigation of the evils of war. " It is agreed that all un- 
 necessary cruelty and injustice are to be eliminated, the rights of 
 noncombatants are to be respected, and those of neutrals safe- 
 guarded. For these purposes, rules of action have been adopted 
 by practically all civilized states relating to the opening of hostili- 
 ties, the laws and customs of war on land, the rights and duties 
 of neutral powers and persons, the treatment of an enemy's mer- 
 chant vessels at the beginning of hostilities, the transformation of 
 merchant ships into vessels of war, the placing of submarine mines, 
 bombardment of naval forces, adaptation to maritime war of the 
 principles of the Geneva Convention, the restriction of the right 
 of capture in maritime warfare, and a declaration regarding the 
 
 1 Statesman's Year-Book. 
 
 2 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, pp. 415-422. 
 
 3 Declaration of Paris, 1856. See Davis, Elements of International • Law, 
 Appendix C. *■ Holls, Peace Conference at the Hague. 
 
134 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 throwing of projectiles and explosives from balloons. These are 
 some of the results of the Hague Conferences, to which are to be 
 added the proposal of an international prize court on the basis of 
 a naval code worked out by the maritime powers in the Conference 
 of London (1909)." 1 
 
 225. Military forces and revolution. Because of their organ- 
 ized strength, military forces have frequently interfered with or 
 overthrown the established governments of states. The phrase 
 " war begat the king " is at least a half truth, since successful war 
 leaders have frequently assumed political power. Caesar established 
 the Roman Empire with the aid of his army, and the army later 
 made and unmade Roman emperors, in some cases selling the office 
 to the highest bidder. 2 The Selfuk Turks, imported as mercenary 
 soldiers by the caliph at Bagdad, became the rulers of a large part 
 of the Mohammedan world. 3 Cromwell in England and Napoleon 
 in France owed their positions to the support of their armies. As 
 late as 1851 Louis Napoleon made himself emperor of the French 
 by winning over the army, and even in the United States every 
 war of any importance elevated its hero to the presidency. 4 
 
 226. Military power and despotism. The historical connection 
 of military power with despotism has caused most democratic states 
 to dread standing armies. This general theory was voiced recently 
 in the American Senate as follows : " The fighting force of a 
 republic is the great body of the people, and not a paid soldiery 
 called ' regulars.' . . . You must rely upon the people, not upon 
 an army. An army is a vain delusion. It may to-day be for you ; 
 it may be against you to-morrow." 5 France, which has had con- 
 siderable experience with the influence of military institutions upon 
 government, excludes from the suffrage by organic law soldiers 
 and sailors on duty or at their posts. A strong navy, being less' 
 centralized and aristocratic in its organization, and by the nature of 
 its services more removed from direct contact with home politics, 
 
 1 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, p. 168. 
 
 2 Pelham, Outlines of Roman History, Bk. VI, chap. ii. 
 
 3 Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chap. lvii. 
 
 4 For example, Washington, Jackson, Taylor, Grant, and Roosevelt. 
 
 6 Speech by Senator Teller, in Congressional Record, Vol. XXXIV, Part II, 
 pp. 1024 ff. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 35 
 
 is usually considered less dangerous to democratic institutions than 
 an army. 1 Navies can. very rarely be used to oppress the peo- 
 ple of a state as armies frequently have done ; and naval heroes 
 are less likely to become dictators than military conquerors. The 
 growth of freedom in Athens, Holland, England, and the United 
 States may be partially explained by their dependence upon naval 
 rather than military forces. Sparta, Rome, France, and Germany, 
 with their centralized and bureaucratic systems, represent the 
 military types. 
 
 227. Force in internal affairs. The maintenance of internal 
 order and security, at first largely accomplished through family or 
 fraternal groups and under religious authority, has likewise become 
 increasingly a state function. The authority of the family, the in- 
 fluence of private. associations, and the pressure of public opinion 
 accomplish much in this direction, 2 but in last analysis public order 
 is maintained by the organized system of courts and police, sup- 
 ported in case of need by the armed military forces of the state. 
 The state has gradually taken from private hands the accusation, 
 trial, and punishment of crimes against person and property, the 
 settlement of civil disputes, and in some parts of the world is even 
 enforcing arbitration between employers and employed. 3 The evo- 
 lution of this process has been practically uniform. " In primitive 
 life disputes of all sorts are settled by private arrangement of the 
 parties concerned, peaceably or violently, according to circumstances 
 or the nature of the case. Then the state from motives of public 
 policy assumes the office of voluntary umpire ; at a later stage it 
 enforces with the power of the state its decisions, and finally it 
 either compels disputants to refer their grievances to its courts, or 
 it assumes the responsibility of personally investigating grievances 
 and prosecuting and punishing offenders." i Similarly, many tend- 
 encies point at present to the weakening of religious authority as 
 a means of social control, and this places additional responsibility 
 upon the state as the upholder of public order. 
 
 1 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, chap. i. 
 
 2 Ross, Social Control. 
 
 8 Macrosty, " State Arbitration in Australasia," in Political Science Quarterly, 
 Vol. XVIII. 
 
 4 Dealey, Development of the State, p. 86. 
 
136 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 V. Voluntary Political Organizations 
 
 228. Political organizations outside the government. Numer- 
 ous forms of association have sprung up within the state, distinct 
 from its government, for the direct purpose of exercising or influ- 
 encing political power. 1 Sometimes these have been considered 
 dangerous by the state and have been stamped out by its authority ; 
 sometimes they have succeeded in carrying out their plans and 
 have then disappeared ; sometimes they have remained as perma- 
 nent political forces and have been incorporated more or less per- 
 fectly into the governmental organization. In states where liberty 
 is imperfectly developed and where private political initiative is 
 considered dangerous, such associations take the form of secret 
 societies and cabals. Political agitation in England during the 
 seventeenth century, in France during the Revolution, and in 
 Russia to-day is carried on in that fashion. In more advanced 
 states, secret political organizations are resorted to by revolutionists 
 or by criminals, and are usually composed of the lawless and violent 
 members of society. The agitation of the anarchists in Europe 
 and America is carried on through such organizations ; and the 
 Ku-Klux Klan, established in some parts of the South after the 
 Civil War, was a secret society that aimed to prevent the exercise 
 of political rights by the freedmen. 2 Temporary political authority 
 is exercised sometimes by mobs, which condemn and execute ac- 
 cused persons under " lynch law." 3 Of somewhat different nature 
 is the establishment in frontier communities of "vigilance com- 
 mittees " for the purpose of suppressing lawlessness in the absence 
 of any properly constituted government. 4 
 
 229. Political clubs. Clubs that combine political and social 
 functions have been a favorite form of private political organiza- 
 tion. These are usually exclusive, but not secret. The Rota was 
 
 1 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, chap, xxviii ; Giddings, Principles of Soci- 
 ology, pp. 180-196. 
 
 2 Dunning, Reconstruction (American Nation, Vol. XXII), chaps, xv-xvii. 
 8 Cutler, Lynch Law. 
 
 4 For example, at San Francisco, in 1851. See Garrison, Westward Exten- 
 sion (American Nation, Vol. XVII), pp. 315-317; Hittell, California, Vol. II, 
 pp. 724-726. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 137 
 
 established at London in 1659 ; the Club Politique, at Paris in 
 1782. Tammany Hall was originally an association of Democrats 
 whose object was to improve the policy of their party ; 1 Union 
 League Clubs were formed in many of the larger American cities 
 during the Civil War ; in more recent years, organizations for pur- 
 poses of civil service and municipal reforms have been numerous. 2 
 Political clubs still play a conspicuous part in English politics, the 
 Primrose League being probably the most highly organized and 
 most influential of these ancillary political organizations. 3 There 
 are also, in all states, innumerable associations created to promote 
 particular interests, protect certain classes, or secure special legis- 
 lation. Some are permanently organized ; others are temporary 
 in nature. 
 
 230. Political parties. The most important voluntary political 
 associations, and the only ones that have become officially iden- 
 tified with the government, are political parties. With the rise 
 of popular government, some form of organization became neces- 
 sary in order that large bodies of men might formulate and put 
 into effect their will. Crude beginnings, in the form of factions, 
 were found as soon as any share of governing power was extended 
 to a considerable number of the state's population. 4 Machiavelli 
 foreshadowed modern political thinking in pointing out that party 
 contests were not dangerous to the state, but rather furnished an 
 outlet to the ambitions of the people, brought out the ability of 
 their leaders, and created institutions and laws. 6 Sometimes these 
 divisions were formed on racial or class lines ; sometimes they 
 followed cleavages of religious or economic interests ; sometimes 
 they foreshadowed real parties by dividing on issues of political 
 policy, the chief contest being that between the established mon- 
 archs and the growing democratic spirit. At first these contests 
 were violent and revolutionary ; later by means of elections they 
 
 1 Myers, Tammany Hall. 
 
 2 For example, the National Municipal League, the American Civic Associa- 
 tion, the National Civil Service Reform League, and the Short Ballot Organiza- 
 tion. See Munro, Government of American Cities, pp. 360-377. 
 
 8 Lowell, Government of England, Vol. II, chap. xxxi. 
 
 * For example, in Athens, Rome, and the medieval Italian cities. 
 
 6 Discourses, I, 34. 
 
138 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 became more peaceful and orderly. 1 The state, regulating nomi- 
 nations, elections, campaign methods and expenditures, and other 
 party activities, recognized these organizations as legal parts of 
 the political systems ; 2 and in modern states, especially in Eng- 
 land and in the United States, they furnish the fundamental motive 
 force of government. 
 
 231. Present political groupings. While minor parties are 
 often formed on subordinate issues, and while party groupings in 
 European states are still numerous, 3 the general tendency in most 
 democratic states is toward an alignment of population into two 
 broad divisions, conservatives and progressives, with which divisions 
 political parties will probably increasingly coincide. The socialists, 
 representing an extreme radical movement, have even become an 
 international party. 4 In England political parties are thoroughly 
 incorporated into the constitutional system, the present form of 
 government growing up on the basis of party contests. 5 In the 
 United States political parties still stand largely outside the legal 
 organization of the state, their machinery and leadership being in 
 the main irresponsible to law. 6 In both England and the United 
 States, however, the political parties have become so thoroughly 
 a part of the actual governmental system that the differences in 
 policy on which the parties originally separated have largely dis- 
 appeared. 7 In fact, issues have frequently been exchanged, and 
 the real distinction is often between the party in power which 
 tends to be conservative and the party out of power which tends 
 to be radical. 8 Both parties are interested chiefly in securing 
 
 1 Jenks, History of Politics, pp. 136-138; Lowell, Government of England, 
 Vol. I, pp. 435-442- 
 
 2 Beard, American Government and Politics, pp. 141-144, 672-705. 
 
 8 Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. I, pp. 69-136; 
 Vol. II, pp. 8-69, 144-161. 
 
 4 Spargo and Arner, Elements of Socialism, Part IV ; Kirkup, History of 
 Socialism. 
 
 6 Lowell, Government of England, Vol. I, pp. 442-444. 
 
 6 Goodnow, Politics and Administration, chaps, vii-ix ; Beard, American Gov- 
 ernment and Politics, pp. 99-103. 
 
 7 Ford, Rise and Growth of American Politics, chap, xxv ; Lowell, op. cit., 
 Vol. II, chap, xxxvii. 
 
 8 Jenks, Principles of Politics, pp. 70-7 1 ; Macy, Party Organization and 
 Machinery, chap, xviii. 
 
THE STATE AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 139 
 
 control of the machinery of government, and no essential change 
 in the organization or the activities of the state is expected, re- 
 gardless of the party in power. In Europe revolutionary parties, 
 aiming at fundamental changes in the existing systems, may still 
 be found ; * and deep lines of cleavage based upon race, religion, 
 sharp historical conflicts, and economic and social inequalities pre- 
 vent the formation of a public opinion sufficiently homogeneous 
 for the proper working of party government. 2 Popular government, 
 indeed, often magnifies rather than heals such divergences. 3 
 
 1 For example, the Irreconcilables in France, the Republicans in Spain, the 
 Clericals in Italy, and the Poles in Austria. See Lowell, Governments and Parties 
 in Continental Europe, Vol. I, pp. 102-105, 205-206; Vol. II, pp. 120-122. 
 
 2 Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government, chap. iii. 
 
 8 The Irish demand for home rule increased markedly after each extension of 
 the suffrage, and race conflicts in Austria-Hungary were accentuated by the intro- 
 duction of representative institutions. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 
 
 I. Elements affecting the Composition of the State 
 
 232. Physical elements of the state. The physical elements of 
 the state are population and territory. A certain number of indi- 
 viduals occupying a certain part of the earth's surface are the first 
 requisites for state existence. At any given time, then, in the 
 process of social evolution, the politically organized population of 
 the earth will be found to be divided into a greater or less number 
 of organized communities, each having its own government, law, 
 and sovereign authority. In the same way, the politically organ- 
 ized area of the earth will be found to be divided into a greater 
 or less number of territorial units, separated one from the other by 
 natural or artificial political boundaries. Each organized commu- 
 nity of individuals will coincide with a territorial unit, and the 
 result will be a number of states of varying extent and internal 
 composition. 1 
 
 233. The composition of the state. Obviously, one of the first 
 problems in political evolution was concerned with the composi- 
 tion, or fundamental make-up, of the state. Who shall constitute 
 a state ? What shall be its numbers in population and its size in 
 territory ? 2 By what bonds shall these individuals be combined 
 into a political unity and by what distinctions or barriers separated 
 from those adjoining them ? During a large part of human history 
 unconscious evolution determined the answers to these questions, 
 mankind being largely at the mercy of the physical and social 
 environment. Later, men realized the problem and attempted 
 its solution in various ways, sometimes by opposing, sometimes 
 by directing, the action of natural influences. Large states and 
 
 1 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, chap. iii. 
 
 2 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 66-78. 
 
 140 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 14 1 
 
 small states, loose-jointed and compactly organized states, states 
 held together by various bonds of union, have existed in the past, 
 numerous influences determining their make-up, 1 and changing 
 conditions compelling frequent readjustments. 
 
 234. Elements affecting the composition of the state. Among 
 the elements that have affected the composition of the state, the 
 following may be mentioned as of prime importance. Some have 
 chiefly influenced the numbers of the state's population ; others, 
 the size of its territory. Over some of them man has but little 
 control ; others are the direct results of his efforts. 
 
 CONFIGURATION OF THE EARTH'S SURFACE 
 
 Nature has divided the earth into a number of geographic units, 
 separated by mountain walls, by water barriers, by deserts and 
 swamps. 2 Within these natural frontiers lie river valleys, mountain 
 valleys, plains, plateaus, and islands. 3 These units differ in size and 
 shape, in perfection of natural boundaries, and in remoteness from 
 neighboring units. 4 Other things being equal, states tend to coincide 
 with natural geographic units, the direction of political expansion fol- 
 lowing lines of least resistance. 5 Certain parts of the earth, Greece 
 and Switzerland, for example, have been the homes of small, com- 
 pact states during practically all human history. Other areas, such 
 as the Russian plain or the valleys of the Euphrates and the 
 Mississippi, seem destined to be the seats of extended empires. 
 Numerous other elements, to be considered later, interfere with 
 the influence of these geographic features, states sometimes being 
 unable to fill out their natural boundaries, sometimes being able 
 to unite a number of naturally distinct areas. In many cases, how- 
 ever, geographic features have been decisive, and the skill of even 
 the most advanced modern nations is baffled by the limitations 
 placed upon them by geographic conditions. 6 
 
 1 Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, chap. vi. 
 
 2 Semple, op. cit., chaps, vii, xv. 
 8 Ibid. chap. vi. 
 
 4 Ibid. pp. 10-31. 
 6 Ibid. chap. iv. 
 
 6 Hinsdale, How to Study and Teach History, chap, x, pp. 13-15; Keltie, 
 Applied Geography. 
 
142 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 235. Examples in ancient world. A few examples from the 
 history of political development will illustrate the influence of geo- 
 graphic configuration upon the form and extent of the state, due 
 allowance being made, of course, for the fact that, in each case, 
 other influences than physical features were partially responsible. 
 The ancient empires of Egypt, Babylon, India, and China grew up 
 in the natural units created by fertile semitropical river valleys. 1 
 In the New World the table-lands of Mexico and Peru were the 
 seats of the most advanced empires. 2 Phoenicia, limited to a nar- 
 row coastal strip by the surrounding desert, could expand only by 
 Mediterranean colonization. 3 Greece is divided by mountains and 
 the sea into numerous valleys and islands, easily defended, yet, be- 
 cause of the sea, not isolated. These conditions led to the preser- 
 vation of small and distinct political units and to colonization. 
 Facing east, 4 Greece came first into contact with the more advanced 
 peoples of the Orient and was compelled to wage defensive wars. 
 This checked expansion and compelled more concentrated internal 
 development, which, in turn, intensified rivalries among the various 
 units and prevented consolidation. As a result, Greece was united 
 only when conquered by some external power, such as Macedon 
 and Rome. 5 Italy is better adapted for internal unity than Greece, 
 and the absence of harbors and islands offers fewer advantages 
 for external activity. Hence the energy of the Romans was kept 
 at home until Italy under their leadership became a single state. 
 Facing the west, Rome had little contact with eastern nations until 
 her own institutions were well established. On the contrary, com- 
 ing first into relations with the inferior peoples of Gaul, Spain, and 
 Africa, she naturally embarked on that career of conquest and 
 expansion that created the Empire. 6 
 
 1 Maspero, Dawn of Civilization, chap. i. 
 
 2 Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 29-73. 
 
 8 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, pp. 12, 130, 197, 257, 268-269, 
 283,311. 
 
 * The western coast of Greece is mountainous ; most of the good harbors are 
 on the eastern coast; and the numerous islands lying east of Greece serve as 
 stepping stones to Asia Minor. 
 
 6 Curtius, History of Greece, Vol. I, pp. 9-25 ; West, Ancient History, pp. 76-81. 
 
 6 Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. I, chaps, i-ii; West, op. cit., pp. 249-251, 
 254-256. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 143 
 
 236. Examples in modern world. The geographic unity of the 
 British Isles is weakened by the mountains that differentiate Wales 
 and Scotland, arid by the body of water that cuts off Ireland from 
 the larger island ; yet it has been sufficient to create Great Britain 
 by their union and to separate the interests of the island group 
 from those of the continent. England's insular position 1 and 
 water frontiers prevented invasion after the Norman Conquest, 
 even in the face of the power of Spain in the sixteenth century 
 and of France under Napoleon, and compelled the establishment 
 of naval power and the formation of colonial empire when grow- 
 ing population and economic interests demanded expansion. 2 The 
 Appalachian Mountains for a long time limited the English colo- 
 nies in America to the seaboard, while the river valleys of the St. 
 Lawrence and the Mississippi led the French into the interior. 3 
 As both expanded, the final clash came naturally around the head 
 waters of the river system that joins the two areas. The expansion 
 of the United States to the Mississippi after the Revolutionary 
 War necessitated the acquisition of the other half of its valley and 
 the control of its mouth, which followed in the Louisiana Purchase. 4 
 The final growth of the United States to a continental power was 
 geographically determined. 5 
 
 237. Geographic unity of modern states. Conquerors and states- 
 men have frequently ignored geographic limitations, with the result 
 that their work has often been impermanent. Alexander's wide 
 extended empire did not survive his death ; and the separation of 
 the Roman Empire into its eastern and western divisions followed 
 the triple geographic barrier formed by the Adriatic, the Apen- 
 nines, and the mountains of western Greece. In the valleys of 
 the Alps, Switzerland has maintained its local life for more than a 
 thousand years, little disturbed by the powerful states surrounding 
 it. 8 The recent separation of Norway and Sweden (1905) bears 
 
 1 On the influence of islands on ethnic and political development, see Semple, 
 op. cit, chap. xiii. 
 
 2 Mackinder, Britain and the British Seas, chaps, i-ii, xi, xix ; George, Rela- 
 tions of Geography and History, chap. x. 
 
 8 Semple, American History and its Geographic Conditions, chaps, i-iv. 
 4 Ibid, chaps, v-vi. 6 Ibid. chap. xii. 
 
 6 On the influence of mountain environment, see Semple, Influences of Geo- 
 graphic Environment, chap. xvi. 
 
144 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 witness to the impossibility of disregarding physical influences. 1 
 So much importance in modern politics is attached to natural fron- 
 tiers that states make every effort to secure or maintain them. For 
 several centuries France has looked to the Rhine as her natural 
 limit, and the debatable valley of that river has been the battle- 
 ground of Europe. 2 The states of Europe now coincide fairly 
 closely with the geographic divisions of that continent. 3 Where 
 discrepancies exist, they are the results of other important factors 
 in the historical development of the states concerned. 
 
 ETHNIC SIMILARITIES 
 
 Just as the physical features of the earth's surface furnish a natu- 
 ral basis for the state's territory, so ethnic groupings of individuals 
 furnish a natural basis for the state's population. Groups of indi- 
 viduals, held together by feelings of similarity or by common inter- 
 ests, develop that solidarity and that consciousness of political unity 
 that form the subjective phase of the state. 4 The similarities that 
 create the sentiment of unity among men are sometimes physical, 
 sometimes psychical. Race and kinship are examples of the former ; 
 nationality, based on common language, religion, traditions, or past 
 political history, is an example of the latter. 5 
 
 238. Principles of internal unity. At different periods of state 
 development various principles of internal unity have served as 
 the chief bonds of cohesion among the population. Kinship and 
 religion supported the ancient patriarchal theocracies. These bonds 
 were powerful, but inelastic, and their rules became crystallized 
 into rigid customs that prevented progress. Authority, based upon 
 force and conquest, upheld the military despotisms. Empires built 
 upon force were often enlarged by conquest and annexation with- 
 out any common ethnic tie, and therefore soon broke up along the 
 
 1 The union of these states was the work of the Congress of Vienna (1815), 
 which notoriously disregarded national and geographic units. 
 
 2 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chap. ii. 
 
 8 Freeman, Historical Geography of Europe ; Burgess, Political Science and 
 Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 5-29. 
 
 4 Giddings, Principles of Sociology, pp. 17-20, 169-170; Willoughby, Nature 
 of th,e State, pp. 1 19-123. 
 
 6 See below, sections 252-262. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 14S 
 
 lines of old geographic and ethnic cleavage. In the Middle Ages, 
 personal or military allegiance served as the bond of feudal organi- 
 zation, but this limited the state to small areas and confused politi- 
 cal authority with religious, economic, and individual interests. 1 
 Modern states emphasize nationality, citizenship, and patriotism, 
 the most satisfactory bases for political solidarity yet discovered. 2 
 
 239. Ethnic and geographic unity. While ethnic units of popula- 
 tion tend to coincide with geographic units of territory, ethnic dif- 
 ferences often being the result of the different environments created 
 by physical conditions, the correspondence is seldom complete. 
 Most states contain populations of diverse ethnic composition, and 
 some populations of considerable similarity are included within sev- 
 eral states. 3 The laws of the territorial expansion of peoples and 
 of states correspond in general. There are, however, several im- 
 portant exceptions. Ethnic expansion, depending upon natural 
 increase or the gradual assimilation of diverse peoples, is slow and 
 steady, while the political frontiers of a state may be widely extended 
 by conquest far beyond its ethnic boundaries, or may be narrowed 
 after unsuccessful war, with the loss to the state of a part of its 
 population. Besides, the political frontier pf a state fixes the terri- 
 torial limits of its governing authority at a definite line beyond 
 which, except by war, state action cannot pass. For the population 
 of a state, however, the political boundary is an imaginary line, and 
 the pressure of population or the economic opportunities across the 
 border frequently lead, in the absence of legal prohibitions, to an 
 overflow of population into unoccupied territory or into the terri- 
 tory of a neighboring state. This population, if it retains its ethnic 
 ties with the home land, constantly urges the extension of the terri- 
 torial domain of its state to include these new areas. The history 
 of the United States illustrates both these processes. The slow 
 western advance of enterprising settlers constantly beckoned the 
 flag to follow, and territorial expansion absorbed, in great masses, 
 at irregular intervals, what the steady protrusion of the ethnic 
 
 1 Jenks, History of Politics, pp. 73-83 ; Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient 
 and Medieval, chap. v. 
 
 2 Shaw, Political Problems of American Development, chap. ii. 
 
 8 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 1-4. 
 
146 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 frontier had gradually won. 1 Accordingly, the following important 
 law may be laid down. " The more closely the territorial growth 
 of a state keeps pace with that of its people, and the more nearly 
 the political area coincides with the ethnic, the greater is the strength 
 and stability of the state." 2 
 
 240. Ethnic solidarity. In ancient times states jealously safe- 
 guarded their racial purity ; until comparatively recent times states 
 insisted on religious unity ; even to-day states like Germany and 
 Russia try forcibly to assimilate their diverse nationalities. 3 The 
 general tendencies of modern times make it difficult for states to 
 create or maintain a pure, distinct, and uniform ethnic type. At 
 present, physical distinctions among peoples are breaking down 
 before the ease of travel, causing emigrations and intermarriage on 
 a large scale ; and psychical distinctions are disappearing before the 
 spread of a cosmopolitan civilization, caused by the general diffu- 
 sion of intelligence and the breaking down of national prejudices. 
 At the same time, within the state, class divisions are hard to pre- 
 vent and difficult to harmonize, and constantly threaten the internal 
 ethnic solidarity of the state. 
 
 241. Population groupings of political significance. During the 
 course of political evolution, numerous groupings of population 
 having political significance have arisen within the state. 4 Such 
 ethnic divisions are responsible for, some of the most difficult prob- 
 lems of past and present politics. The political and social status 
 of the negroes in the United States, 5 the position of the English 
 in India, 6 and the situation of the Turks in Europe 7 are illustra- 
 tions of present uncertainties caused by race. Diverse nationalities 
 within the state are scarcely less troublesome. The opposition 
 of Irish to English in Great Britain, . the complicated national 
 
 1 Garrison, Westward Extension (American Nation, Vol. XVII). 
 
 2 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, pp. 190-192. 
 
 8 For example, the attitude of Germany in Alsace-Lorraine and of Russia in 
 Finland. See Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. I, 
 pp. 372-376; Hazen, Europe since 181 5, pp. 672-680. 
 
 4 Cooley, Social Organization, Part IV. 
 
 6 Ellwood, Sociology and Modern Social Problems, chap, x ; Stone, Studies in 
 the American Race Problem. 
 
 6 Caldecott and Kirkpatrick, English Colonization and Empire, chap. v. 
 
 7 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. II, chap. xxix. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 147 
 
 hostilities in Switzerland, Germany, and Austria-Hungary, 1 and the 
 question of foreign immigration to the ..United States 2 immediately 
 suggest themselves. Unity within the state has been prevented in 
 certain parts of the world by a division of population into castes, 
 resulting mainly from differences in race, from differences due to 
 immigration or conquest, or from the gradual differentiation of social 
 and economic functions in a formerly homogeneous population. 
 The distinction between freemen and slaves was even more uni- 
 versal. In the Middle Ages, population was separated into well- 
 defined estates, consisting of the clergy, the nobility, and the 
 agricultural and industrial "third estate." 3 The nobility, the middle 
 class, and the peasantry are fairly distinct in modern European 
 states, and the capitalistic, laboring, and professional classes are 
 differentiated even in democracies. 4 A further distinction in all 
 modern states is made between citizens and aliens. The make-up 
 of the state, with reference both to its external extent and to its 
 internal composition, is affected by all such divisions within its 
 population. 
 
 IMPROVEMENTS IN PRODUCTION, TRANSPORTATION, AND 
 COMMUNICATION 
 
 While the geographic divisions of the earth's surface and the 
 ethnic groupings of its population may be considered the under- 
 lying natural factors in determining the composition of states, a 
 number of secondary influences, resulting from the activities of men 
 themselves, have consciously or unconsciously modified the primary 
 political groups, and have expanded or contracted the size of the 
 state's territory or the numbers of its inhabitants. Among these 
 factors may be mentioned improvements in the production of food 
 or marketable commodities, in the transportation of persons and 
 things, and in the transmission of intelligence. All of these tend, 
 in general, to increase the extent and population of the state. An 
 
 1 Gumplowicz, Allgejneines Staatsrecht, pp. 136-156- 
 
 2 Hall, Immigration, Part II ; Shaw, Political Problems of American Develop- 
 ment, chap. iii. 
 
 8 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. II, chaps, viii-xv. 
 
 4 Ibid, chaps, xvii-xviii ; Bryce, American Commonwealth, Vol. II, chap. Ixxxi ; 
 Lowell, Government of England, Vol. II, chap. lxvi. 
 
148 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 increased food supply enables a given area to support a larger 
 population. 1 It also encourages expansion by creating a surplus 
 population eager for external activity and by freeing the military 
 class from the necessity of furnishing their own food supply. In- 
 creased production of other commodities leads to expansion through 
 external commercial relations, which diminish ethnic differences, 
 and through the need for markets, which create colonies and em- 
 pires. 2 Improvements in means of transportation and communi- 
 cation diminish the importance of geographic barriers and break 
 down ethnic distinctions, thereby encouraging the formation of 
 larger political units. The engineering skill that bridges rivers, 
 tunnels mountains, and crosses oceans weakens the influence of 
 natural boundaries. Rapid overland transportation, by means of 
 steam and electricity, and speedy communication, by means of cable, 
 telegraph, telephone, and postal service, reduce the former impor- 
 tance of distance and enable a people to maintain their political 
 unity over large areas. 3 
 
 242. Importance of communication and transportation. Not only 
 do these improvements, by conquering nature, break down the 
 isolation and diversity among earlier geographic and ethnic units, 
 but, because of the larger and denser populations and the com- 
 plexity of their social relations, they demand a more elaborate 
 political organization. 4 They also make possible the practical and 
 successful working of government over large areas. In early times 
 remote sections of extensive empires always tended to revolt, be- 
 cause the difficulties of transportation and communication prevented 
 both assimilation and vigorous administrative control. Expansion 
 sacrificed individual welfare to military expediency and developed 
 a mechanical and despotic structure without organic unity. 5 In 
 the political thinking of the Greeks, before satisfactory means of 
 communication were evolved, effective government was considered 
 possible only over small areas. The number of people could not 
 exceed those that could be easily supervised ; the state must consist 
 
 1 Seligman, Principles of Economics, pp. 48-51. 
 
 2 Reinsch, Colonial Government, pp. 57-71. 
 8 Seligman, op. cit, pp. 45-47. 
 
 * Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 17-47. 
 
 6 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, chap. ii. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 149 
 
 of a single community, not of a people. " What commander," says 
 Aristotle, " could marshal so huge a host, or what herald, save with 
 the voice of Stentor ? " 1 The magnificent system of post roads, 
 with ferries and bridges, excellent inns, and relays of horses helped 
 to create the Persian Empire of Darius the Great. 2 The building 
 of the Roman roads and the suppression of piracy in the Mediter- 
 ranean, and the comparatively advanced system of intercourse that 
 followed, aided in the establishment of Roman authority over wide 
 areas. 3 When transportation and communication were interfered 
 with by the barbarian invasions, the feudal states that arose were 
 again small in size. 4 Improvements in the means and methods of 
 navigation led to the discoveries and explorations of the fifteenth 
 and sixteenth centuries, and opened up new areas for political 
 organization and for world commerce. 5 Similarly, insular colonial 
 possessions became an integral and permanent part of the consti- 
 tutional system of the home state only after advanced methods of 
 ocean navigation and of telegraphic communication made possible 
 effective naval strength, constant commercial intercourse, and close 
 governmental relations. 6 For the purpose of maintaining routes 
 of communication, states are compelled to acquire territory and to 
 interfere in the politics of other peoples. The recent scramble for 
 the acquisition of naval stations, the interest of England in the 
 Suez Canal, and our interest in the Panama Canal and in the 
 stepping stones to the Philippines may serve as illustrations. 7 
 
 243. Communication, transportation, and political unity. At 
 the time of the formation of the American Union many persons 
 doubted the possibility of holding together and governing satis- 
 factorily the thirteen colonies, because of their extent, geographic 
 separation, and sectional differences. Frederick of Prussia, in 1 782, 
 
 1 Politics, Bk. VII, chap. iv. 
 
 2 Wheeler, Alexander the Great, pp. 196-197. 
 
 8 Cunningham, Western Civilization : Ancient Times, Bk. Ill, chaps, ii-iii. 
 
 4 Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, chap. ix. 
 
 5 Day, History of Commerce, chaps, ix, xv ; Adams, op. cit, chap. xii. 
 
 6 The colonies of Phoenicia and Greece tended to become independent cities ; 
 the Venetian colonies were mere trading posts ; modern colonial empires begin 
 with the activities of Portugal and Spain in the sixteenth century. See Morris, 
 History of Colonization, Vol. I, pp. 49-126, 166-218, 230-244. 
 
 7 Reinsch, op. cit., pp. 71-78. 
 
ISO PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 told the English ambassador that the United- States could not en- 
 dure, " since a republican government had never been known to 
 exist for any length of time where the territory was not limited and 
 concentered." 1 Later improvements in transportation and commu- 
 nication aided in destroying the separatist spirit of the original 
 colonies and in extending a vigorous administration and a national 
 spirit to the Pacific. 2 In the same way the American statesmen 
 that built up the prevailing theory during the first half of the nine- 
 teenth century that the interests and destiny of the United States 
 were forever separate and distinct from Europe 3 did not foresee 
 • the inevitable interrelations which later would compel this country 
 to take a prominent place as a world power. 4 
 
 MILITARY AND NAVAL STRENGTH 
 
 The extent and internal composition of states have frequently 
 been determined by their military or naval strength. Artificial 
 boundaries have been established by conquest, regardless of natural 
 geographic features, and populations have been forcibly united or 
 separated, regardless of their ethnic affiliations. Other things being 
 equal, the military strength of states corresponds fairly closely to 
 the numbers of their inhabitants, but many conditions modify this 
 general principle. Populations differ in physical vigor and in war- 
 like spirit, in military organization and equipment, in the number of 
 men under arms and the amount of military training, in the strategic 
 position of their territory and the patriotic loyalty of their citizen 
 body, in the ability of their rulers and generals, and in their economic 
 and financial resources for sustaining a war. 5 
 
 244. Military strength in forming a state. Small states, such as 
 Sparta and Prussia, have occupied positions of historical importance 
 out of all proportion to their size, because of their military strength. 
 Other states, such as Rome, Macedon under Alexander, and France 
 
 1 Hart, Formation of the Union, p. ioo. 
 
 2 Bogart, Economic History of the United States, chaps, xiv, xxii. 
 
 3 For a number of quotations see Gilman, James Monroe, chap, vii (American 
 Statesmen Series). 
 
 4 Coolidge, United States as a World Power, chap, v ; Reinsch, World Politics, 
 Part V ; Latane, America as a World Power (American Nation, Vol. XXV), 
 chap. xv. 5 Bloch, Future of War, trans, by R. C. Long. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 151 
 
 under Napoleon, have created world empires by means of military 
 expansion. The establishment of Roman legions for several cen- 
 turies along the Rhine frontier of the Empire caused the same 
 historical effects that an impassable geographic barrier would have 
 produced, and helps to explain the present separation between the 
 Teutonic and Romance nations, the Protestant and Catholic peoples, 
 the enmity of France and Germany, and the separation of Belgium 
 and Holland. After general European wars the map of the world 
 has been reconstructed by the victorious powers, regardless of the 
 wishes of many of the nations concerned. 1 Gibraltar in Spain and 
 Hongkong in China were forcibly seized by England because of 
 their strategic military and commercial values. Poland was de- 
 stroyed as a state and arbitrarily partitioned among her more 
 powerful neighbors. 2 The Congress of Vienna united Holland 
 and Belgium and separated Norway and Denmark in opposition to 
 ethnic conditions in each case. 3 The potential military strength of 
 the great powers enable them to-day, without actual warfare, to 
 adjust the boundaries and control the destinies of smaller states, 4 
 and to partition among themselves the territory of uncivilized or 
 unwarlike peoples. 5 The validity of the Monroe Doctrine rests 
 essentially upon the supremacy of the United States in the western 
 hemisphere and its ability to enforce its demands. 
 
 245. Naval strength in forming a state. While military strength 
 enables a state to extend its jurisdiction over contiguous territory, 
 naval strength makes possible the political combination of scat- 
 tered islands or strips of coast. Certain elements are chiefly in- 
 volved in the establishment of sea power. 6 The geographical 
 position of a state determines whether its natural expansion should 
 be by land or by water, and whether the extent of its territory 
 
 1 For example, the Peace of Westphalia (1648), the Peace of Utrecht (1713), 
 the Peace of Paris (1763), and the Congress of Vienna (1815). 
 
 2 Cambridge Modern History, Vol. VIII, chap. xvii. 
 
 8 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chap. xvi. 
 
 4 For example, the neutralization by the powers of Belgium and Switzerland, 
 and the recent annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria. 
 
 6 For example, the partition of Africa and the doctrine of " sphere of influ- 
 ence." See Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. I, pp. 267-269. 
 
 6 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, chap, ii ; George, Relations of 
 Geography and History, chap. vii. 
 
1 52 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 and its seacoast demands concentration or dispersion of its naval 
 forces. 1 A central location with interior lines of communication 
 has many strategic advantages, as has also proximity to important 
 trade routes. 2 The physical conformation of a state determines its 
 coast line, harbors, and internal waterways ; and whether its geo- 
 graphic unity is broken by the sea, as in the case of the British 
 Isles, or by mountains, as in the case of Italy. Length of coast 
 line may be a source of strength or weakness, depending some- 
 what upon the size of the state's population and its naval strength. 
 The naval strength of a population depends upon its attitude to 
 commerce, 3 colonies, and adventure, upon the number that ordi- 
 narily follow the sea, or that are available for naval material. The 
 attitude of the government toward shipping and commerce, and 
 toward its navy, forts, naval stations, and equipment is funda- 
 mental. At present the ability to bear the financial burdens in- 
 volved in the building and maintenance of modern war vessels 
 is essential. 4 
 
 246. Importance of central commercial location. During each 
 successive stage of historical development, some state, having 
 access to the sea, has occupied a central geographic position, has 
 developed a navy, built up commerce and colonial empire, and held 
 a foremost place in the political civilization of its day. In ancient 
 times, when civilization centered around the eastern Mediterranean, 
 the Phoenicians, lying between the great empires of Egypt and 
 Babylon, facing the sea, and unable to expand by land because of 
 their powerful neighbors and the desert, naturally became the 
 commercial, naval, and colonial power. 5 With the shifting of 
 civilization westward, their preeminence passed to the Greeks. 
 When the civilized world included the whole basin of the Medi- 
 terranean, Carthage and Rome contested for supremacy. 6 When 
 
 1 Contrast the position of England with her scattered possessions and exten- 
 sive seacoast, necessitating the dispersion of her navy, with that of Germany 
 with her compact territory and limited seacoast, permitting the concentration of 
 her navy. 2 Brooks Adams, The New Empire, chap. v. 
 
 8 Compare the Spanish scorn of the trader with the English and Dutch respect 
 for the merchant class as one reason for their respective naval histories. 
 
 4 " Burden of Armaments," Cobden Club Essays. 
 
 6 Cunningham, Western Civilization : Ancient Times, Bk. I. 
 
 6 Brooks Adams, op. cit., chap. 1. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 153 
 
 commerce revived after the Crusades the commercial center had 
 shifted somewhat to the north, and Venice and Genoa were the 
 leading rivals, with the Hanseatic League coming into importance 
 as a secondary center. 1 During the fifteenth century the old 
 routes to the Orient were closed by the Turks, a new route was 
 opened up by circumnavigating Africa, and America was discov- 
 ered. 2 With the consequent shifting of emphasis from the Medi- 
 terranean to the Atlantic, Portugal and Spain, and, later, France, 
 Holland, and England held the leading positions. 3 To-day, with 
 the opening up of the Orient, the growing importance of the 
 Pacific, and the building of the Panama Canal, 4 the United States 
 holds the strategic position. 5 Facing both oceans, and with no 
 dangerous neighbors, her interest in naval rather than military 
 strength is obvious ; and her recent entrance into the field of 
 colonial activity is the logical outcome of her past history and of 
 the natural laws of political evolution. 6 
 
 IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT 
 
 Improvements in the devices and methods of government form 
 another factor that influences the make-up of states and that makes 
 possible effective organization over large areas. With every increase 
 of the population inhabiting a given territory, and with the con- 
 sequent multiplication of interests among them, comes a growing 
 necessity for a more highly organized government, both to main- 
 tain order within and to secure protection from without. Each 
 increase in the size of the state's territory also demands a more 
 elaborate governmental system. In early times government was 
 satisfactory and stable only over small communities. If the area 
 of the state expanded, difficulties were encountered in holding 
 together its parts. 7 The Oriental empires usually left to their 
 
 1 Day, History of Commerce, chaps, x-xii. 
 
 2 Cambridge Modern History, Vol. I, chaps, i-ii. 
 
 3 Day, op. cit., chaps, xix-xxv. 
 
 4 Coolidge, United States as a World Power, chaps, xv-xix. 
 
 5 Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future ; Brigham, 
 Geographic Influences in American History, chap. xi. 
 
 6 Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies of the United States, chap, i ; 
 Coolidge, op. cit., chap. vii. 7 Perris, War and Peace, pp. 64-73. 
 
1 54 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 conquered provinces their own language, religion, government, and 
 customs, merely demanding payment of tribute and aid in war, or 
 expecting the conquered kings to bring presents to the court of 
 their imperial master. 1 Such conglomerate empires easily fell to 
 pieces, chronic rebellions being checked by severe punishments 
 or by wholesale deportation of dissatisfied inhabitants into distant 
 territories. Assyria made some improvement, breaking up the old 
 kingdoms into provinces ruled by appointed officials. These officials, 
 however, were frequently tempted to make themselves independent ; 
 and the Persians, under Darius, made further improvements, dis- 
 tributing authority in each province between the satrap, who con- 
 trolled administration, and the commander of the military forces. 
 Besides, a royal secretary, known as the " King's Ear," was ex- 
 pected to keep in touch constantly with the capital, and a royal 
 commissioner, known as the " King's Eye," frequently visited the 
 provinces. 2 This general system of administration, the most effective 
 until Roman times, was adopted later by the Saracen and Turkish 
 empires, and certain of its features appeared, during the attempts 
 to build up empires in the Middle Ages, in the missi dominici of 
 Charlemagne, 3 the legates sent out by the pope, and the baillis of 
 the French king. 4 
 
 247. One-sided development of ancient governments. While the 
 lack of uniformity and the danger of revolt were largely overcome 
 in the Roman Empire, with its common language, law, and citizen- 
 ship, it was accomplished only by the establishment of a central- 
 ized bureaucratic despotism which, however paternal and kindly, 
 destroyed valuable local differences, crushed individual freedom, 
 and prevented the extension of political privileges to its citizens. 
 Local affairs were referred to the provincial governors ; these in 
 turn were appointed and controlled by the emperor, the source of 
 all law and authority. 5 The machinery of government, therefore, 
 lacked popular support and frequently got beyond the control of 
 even the best emperors. 6 Until the establishment of modern con- 
 stitutional representative systems, no form of government had been 
 
 1 Sayce, Ancient Empires, pp. 247-250. i Ibid. pp. 427-429. 
 
 2 West, Ancient History, pp. 70-73. 6 Wilson, The State, sections 199-248. 
 8 Emerton, Medieval Europe, pp. 7-8. 6 Dill, Roman Society, pp. 275-281. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 155 
 
 devised that satisfactorily adjusted local and national interests, that 
 combined over large areas efficient administration and individual 
 liberty, that steered clear of the dangers of constant revolt on the one 
 hand and of repressive despotism on the other. Greece developed 
 a considerable degree of individual freedom within small districts 
 but was unable to secure national unity ; Rome created imperial 
 unity, but at the expense of liberty. In the Middle Ages political 
 organization fluctuated between the local anarchy of feudalism and 
 the despotism of the imperial ideal and the growing monarchies. 1 
 248. Value of the federation. Among the governmental devices 
 that have been evolved to remedy these conditions and to give a 
 stable basis for political composition is the federation. 2 States 
 whose, nationality or situation was such as to make union desirable, 
 but whose local differences were too great to permit complete 
 amalgamation, or whose strength was too nearly equal to make 
 conquest possible, were able to unite on this basis without entirely 
 sacrificing their political identity. 3 The control of general interests 
 by a central government, leaving questions that differ in different 
 sections to the people of those areas for solution, combines the 
 strength that results from unity with the vitality and progress that 
 result from variety. In foreign affairs a united front may be pre- 
 sented and a consistent policy pursued ; at the same time, each 
 internal unit may shape its laws in conformity with local customs 
 and conditions. Switzerland, because of its topography and its 
 geographic location, illustrates such an antagonism between two 
 political policies. Divided by mountains into segregated districts, 
 its national ideal was that of communal independence, each canton 
 possessing a maximum of independence and its people a maximum 
 of individual rights ; but a central location in Europe, in the midst 
 of powerful neighbors, compelled union in order to withstand for- 
 eign aggression. Hence developed the federation, and the con- 
 stant compromises between the needs of the union and those of 
 the local units. 4 
 
 1 Wilson, op. cit., chap, v ; Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chap. vii. 
 
 2 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. I, pp. 23-2 5 ; Hart, Introduction to 
 Federal Government; Le Fur und Posener, Bundesstaat und Staatenbund, 
 pp. 186-317. 8 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 148-158, 191-197. 
 
 4 Winchester, The Swiss Republic, pp. 123-124, 145-147. 
 
156 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 249. Process of forming federations. Federalism has thus been 
 the means of uniting many small states that otherwise would never 
 have peacefully surrendered their independence ; while, in the in- 
 ternal organization of the large state formed by their union, the 
 federal system has prevented the rise of a despotic centralized 
 authority and has conserved the political liberty of the people. 1 
 Federations are usually formed after a gradual process, the com- 
 ponent states passing through various degrees of alliance and con- 
 federation before the necessary national spirit arises. 2 Examples 
 of such states are the United States, the German Empire, Switzer- 
 land, and, considered apart from the British Empire, Canada and 
 Australia. Several states, including Mexico and Brazil, have vol- 
 untarily adopted the federal principle, not as a means of union, 
 but for the purpose of adjusting national and local interests ; and 
 imperial federation for the British Empire is seriously urged. 3 
 
 250. Representation and local self-government. Even in states 
 formed by gradual expansion or by conquest, where the federal 
 principle of union was not utilized, a system of internal organiza- 
 tion has been worked out essentially similar in principle. The 
 devices of representation and local self-government, 4 found in all 
 advanced modern states, secure such a balancing of national and 
 local affairs, such a compromise between authority and freedom, 
 that the extension of political unity over large areas without sacri- 
 ficing either efficiency in government or the share of the people 
 in political authority is now possible. Other devices of democracy, 
 such as elections, referendums, and political parties, aid in pre- 
 venting the bureaucratic, despotic methods formerly needed in 
 holding together large areas. 
 
 COMMON INTERESTS 
 
 A population among whom common interests arise tends to 
 form a state or to act as a unit in governmental policy. Common 
 interests result from a variety of causes. Usually they coincide 
 
 1 For advantages and disadvantages of federal government, see Garner, Intro- 
 duction to Political Science, pp. 230-234 ; Gettell, Introduction to Political Sci- 
 ence, pp. 186-189. 2 Freeman, History of Federal Government. 
 
 8 Parkin, Imperial Federation; Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain, Part VII. 
 
 4 See below, Chapter VIII, sections 340-383. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 157 
 
 with ethnic or geographic divisions and strengthen their unifying 
 influence, but occasionally they cut across these units and sometimes 
 create states of apparently diverse elements. The peoples dwelling 
 around the mouth of the Rhine did not differ in any marked degree 
 from those living in its valley, nor were they separated from their 
 neighbors by any natural barriers. Because of their location, how- 
 ever, they developed an industrial and commercial city life, while 
 the population surrounding them was organized into rural agricul- 
 tural units. The consequent difference in interests accounts largely 
 for the original existence of the Netherlands as a state, separate 
 from France and Germany. 1 At present the interest of Germany, 
 whose chief industries are located in the Rhine valley, in securing 
 free outlet at its mouth is a constant menace to Holland's political 
 integrity. 2 Sometimes political expediency or the exigencies of in- 
 ternational politics compel the union of diverse nationalities or of 
 distinct geographic units, or create a state arbitrarily for some politi- 
 cal purpose. The present union of Austria and Hungary is largely 
 a matter of mutual necessity. 3 Turkey owes its survival in Europe 
 to its position on the Bosporus and to the mutual jealousies of the 
 great powers. The Republic of Panama was created because of 
 the interest of the United States in an isthmian canal. 4 
 
 251. Common interests as a disruptive political force. Com- 
 munity of interests may be a disruptive as well as a consolidating 
 influence in politics. When common interests distinguish one part 
 of a state's population in one section of its territory from the re- 
 mainder, that part or section may attempt to break away and form 
 an independent state. The American colonies revolted from Eng- 
 land because their industrial and commercial needs and their prin- 
 ciples of government had become radically different from those of 
 the home land. 5 The sectionalization of interests in the North and 
 the South caused the American Civil War and threatened to di- 
 vide the Union. 6 In most cases interests are so numerous and so 
 
 1 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, pp. 15-16, 130, 284, 350-352. 
 
 5 Barker, Modern Germany, pp. 68-85. 
 
 8 Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. II, pp. 1 19-122; 
 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. II, pp. 123-129. 
 4 Latane, America as a World Power (American Nation, Vol. XXV), pp. 2 1 5-220. 
 
 6 Johnston, American Political History, Vol. I, chaps, i-ii, 
 6 Mace, Method in History, pp. 206-254. 
 
158 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 interwoven that they do not coincide with separate peoples or areas, 
 and hence they influence the internal policies rather than the basic 
 composition of states. In world politics, states whose interests con- 
 flict in one part of the earth may coincide in another. For example, 
 the present alignment of the great powers in European politics is 
 quite different from that in Oriental affairs. 1 Such a condition 
 makes for world peace. So within the state the sections that differ 
 over one-issue often agree upon others. Only a horizontal cleavage 
 that divides the entire population into distinct and hostile classes 
 or a territorial sectionalization of interests is dangerous to political 
 stability. 2 
 
 II. Nationality 
 
 252. Elements in nationality. The most powerful single fac- 
 tor in determining the composition of existing states is probably 
 nationality. 3 Further analysis of this principle and of its relation to 
 political life is therefore needed. Nationality is the characteristic 
 of a population speaking the same language, 4 having a common 
 civilization, common customs and traits of character, a common 
 history, tradition, and literature, and common consciousness of 
 rights and wrongs. 6 Common descent and sameness of race have 
 contributed largely to national existence, and were formerly essen- 
 tial. At present, while they are a powerful aid to the formation of 
 nationality and usually accompany it to a certain degree, the forma- 
 tion of national unity is possible even among peoples of diverse 
 descent. 6 In the same way religion was once a most potent ele- 
 ment in national unity, but modern religious freedom and tolera- 
 tion have greatly weakened its influence. 7 At present the most 
 
 1 Reinsch, World Politics, Part I, chaps, ii-iii ; Part III, chaps, ii-iv. 
 
 2 Lowell, Government of England, Vol. I, pp. 438-439. 
 
 " Laveleye, Gouvernement dans la democratie, Bk. II, chap. iii. 
 
 4 Margoliouth, " Language as a Consolidating and Separating Influence," in 
 Spiller, Interracial Problems, pp. 57-62 ; Giddings, Principles of Sociology, 
 pp. 132-134. 
 
 6 For discussion of the essential marks of a nation, see Willoughby, Nature of 
 the State, pp. 9-12; Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 45-47, and 
 authorities there cited. 
 
 6 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. 2 ; Lecky, Democ- 
 racy and Liberty, Vol. I, p. 5 . 
 
 7 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, pp. 87-88. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 159 
 
 important forces in creating nationality are territorial neighborhood, 
 intercourse, made possible by identity of language and of interests, 
 and a common historic past. Political union advances and political 
 separation retards the development of nationality, which is, there- 
 fore, both a cause and a result of state existence. 1 A small com- 
 pact territory also favors the growth of national spirit. Nationalism 
 first grew in Greece and Italy, protected by mountains and by the 
 sea. In the modern world, England and Japan, with strictly 
 defined boundaries and limited territories, developed an intense 
 nationalism and achieved a strong national organization. 
 
 253. Recent recognition of nationality. The prime importance 
 of nationality as a leading principle in the establishment of states is 
 comparatively recent. In a somewhat unconscious fashion nation- 
 ality has always been an influence in politics. It was the sense of 
 national kinship and the desire for national freedom which inspired 
 the Greeks in their conflict with the Persians, and the Germans in 
 their conflict with the Romans. The division of the Roman world 
 between the Latin and the Greek emperors, 2 and that of Charle- 
 magne's empire into Germany and France, were largely due to 
 national differences. Nationality was not, however, asserted or rec- 
 ognized as a definite political principle. 3 Previous to the French 
 Revolution, when government was vested in kings who considered 
 themselves responsible to God alone, rulers went to war without 
 consulting their subjects and made agreements with other monarchs 
 concerning the distribution, annexation, and division of territory 
 without considering the wishes of those who lived upon it. By 
 
 1 Considerable confusion arises from the fact that publicists do not agree in 
 their usage of the terms " nation " and " nationality." Some use the term " nation " 
 to mean a population of ethnic unity, regardless of its political affiliation ; others 
 widen the term to mean a population having also political unity, and identify 
 "nation" and "state." Some use the term "nationality" to signify the principle 
 or characteristic that creates a nation ; others distinguish nation and nationality 
 by using the former to mean a population of the same race, language, and tradi- 
 tions, inhabiting the same territory and constituting the larger part of its popula- 
 tion, and the latter to mean one of several distinct ethnic groups scattered over 
 an area and forming but a comparatively small part of its population. In this 
 book, " nation " means a population of ethnic, but not necessarily of political, 
 unity ; " nationality " means the essential and composite principle of ethnic unity 
 that creates a nation. 
 
 2 Seeley, Roman Imperialism, pp. 65-95. 8 Bluntschli, op. cit., pp. 97-98. 
 
160 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 conquest, negotiation, marriage, or inheritance, realms were united, 
 regardless of differences in the nationality of the peoples thus 
 brought together. 1 In fact, the absolute monarchs of that period 
 sometimes considered a diversity of nationalities desirable. Emperor 
 Francis II of Austria once said to the French ambassador : " My 
 peoples are strangers to one another and yet it is for the better. 
 They never have the same ills at the same time. ... I have Hun- 
 garians in Italy and Italians in Hungary. Each suspects his neigh- 
 bor; they never understand one another and in fact detest one 
 another. Their antipathies, however, conduce to order, and their 
 mutual hate to the general peace." 2 
 
 254. Present importance of nationality. Toward the end. of the 
 eighteenth century the idea that rulers were responsible to the 
 people, that every citizen had a right to share in the expression of 
 the general will, and that laws should represent the interests of the 
 nation roused increasing popular interest in political questions. 
 Clear evidences of the growing national spirit were manifest in 
 the opposition called forth, especially in Spain and Prussia, by 
 Napoleon's arbitrary efforts to remodel Europe. 3 Patriotic orators 
 in Italy and Greece also began to arouse enthusiasm by recalling 
 the past glories of those peoples, and the various nations of Europe 
 became conscious that each had a language and traditions that dis- 
 tinguished it from the others. 4 Napoleon is said to have realized 
 this tendency and to have remarked : " The government which 
 first raises the flag of nationality and becomes its defender will 
 dominate Europe." 5 While the Congress of Vienna in 1815 dis- 
 regarded this sentiment and divided territory among the victorious 
 allies, regardless of race, nationality, religion, or past historical ante- 
 cedents, 6 much of their work was impermanent, and the readjust- 
 ments of the past century have been mainly along national lines. 
 Especially since 1840 the right of nations to express their union 
 in a political form has been appealed to as a practical political 
 
 1 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chaps, ii-iii, v. 
 
 2 De Parieu, Principes de la science politique, p. 304. 
 8 Rose, Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, chap. ix. 
 
 4 Robinson and Beard, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 355—357- 
 
 5 Laveleye, Gouvernement dans la democratic, p. 53. 
 
 6 Andrews, Historical Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chap. iii. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 161 
 
 principle, and the dynastic system which Europe inherited from the 
 Middle Ages has been threatened by national demands. 1 
 
 255. Nationality in modern Europe. Nationality "contributed 
 to the political enfranchisement of Greece, Roumania, Servia, and 
 Bulgaria, and ultimately to the independence of some of them ; it 
 brought about the unification of the German and Italian states ; it 
 led to the disruption of the unnatural union between Belgium and 
 Holland, and to the rounding out along national lines of the bound- 
 aries of various other European states. It is to-day at the basis of 
 some of the largest questions of European politics. It overtops all 
 other questions in the politics of Austria-Hungary where the pop- 
 ulation is a conglomeration of different races, speaking different 
 languages, having little common sympathy, and each animated by 
 national aspirations of its own. 2 . . . The principle of nationality 
 is at the bottom of the Pan-Germanistic movement, which seeks 
 to unite under a single state organization all the German-speaking 
 populations of western Europe : the German Empire, Alsace, part 
 of Lorraine, most of Switzerland, part of Holland and Schleswig, 
 and part of Austria. It is at the foundation of the Pan-Slav move- 
 ment which would unite all the Slavs of eastern Europe under a 
 common sceptre : Poles, Slovenians, Moravians, Serbs, Czechs, 
 and Croatians, now found in Prussia, Russia, Austria, Saxony, and 
 Turkey. The same principle would bring together the Scandinavian 
 races : Norwegians, Swedes, and Danes ; establish the independ- 
 ence of Finland ; secure the autonomy of the Flemish population 
 in Belgium ; give home rule to Ireland ; and lead to a readjustment 
 of the boundaries between France and Germany and between Italy 
 and Austria." 3 
 
 256. Nationality and political divisions not always coextensive. 
 While the conditions that create the feeling of nationality are sim- 
 ilar to those that demand the establishment of a state, and the nat- 
 ural tendency of nationality is to find expression in political unity, 
 the identity of the two sentiments should not be assumed. People 
 may possess a well-defined nationality, yet for other reasons have 
 
 1 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, pp. 98-100. 
 
 2 Gumplowicz, AUgemeines Staatsrecht, pp. 136-156. 
 8 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 50-51. 
 
162 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 but little desire for political unity. This was the case for a time in 
 the American colonies after their separation from England, 1 and 
 among the Greeks when waging war against the Persians. On the 
 other hand, political unity is sometimes demanded by peoples who 
 have little ethnic unity, as is the case in Switzerland. 2 Nationality 
 is created by community of race, language, historic traditions, com- 
 mon economic interests, and similar civilization ; political unity may 
 be created by political expediency, — the necessity for self-defense 
 or for offensive strength. 3 
 
 257. National lack of political genius. Neither would the teach- 
 ings of history nor a sound science of government support the' 
 principle that each nation should constitute a separate state. Some, 
 such as the Basques in Spain and several of the minor ethnic 
 groups in the Balkan Peninsula, are too few in numbers to main- 
 tain the responsibilities of political organization in the modern 
 world. Others, with more numerous populations, have shown little 
 political capacity. "Thus, in the whole of western Europe, the 
 Celtic peoples have served as passive material in the formation of 
 Romance and Teutonic states; the diverse nationalities in south- 
 eastern Europe can only maintain a political existence by resting 
 on one another ; the justification of the English rule in India rests 
 on the need of the population for a higher guidance. Strictly speak- 
 ing, only those peoples in which the manly qualities, understanding 
 and courage, predominate are fully capable of creating and main- 
 taining a national state." i Many writers maintain that, in the 
 interests of world civilization, nations more skilled in governing 
 are justified in guiding and directing the politically incapable peo- 
 ples, even against their will, and that it is the duty of civilized 
 nations to assume sovereignty over and force state organization 
 upon backward or uncivilized peoples. 5 The actual result of this 
 process is often the extinction of the backward peoples. 
 
 1 Charming, Students' History of the United States, pp. 236-241. 
 
 2 Wilson, The State, pp. 300-304 ; Lowell, Governments and Parties in Conti- 
 nental Europe, Vol. II, pp. 180-187. 
 
 8 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 121-122. 
 
 4 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, p. 103. See also Burgess, Political Science 
 and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, Bk. I, chap. iii. 
 
 6 Burgess, op. cit., pp. 46-48; Reinsch, World Politics, pp. 15-22. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 163 
 
 258. Several nationalities within a state. Accordingly, while 
 the tendency is toward the organization of states whose boundaries 
 coincide with those of nations, this correspondence is by no means 
 complete. A single state may include within its limits population 
 of several nationalities. The British Empire, the United States, 
 Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Switzerland are examples. If the 
 different nations are intermingled and are not too unlike, assimi- 
 lation usually follows, the higher and stronger nationality dominat- 
 ing the others, although being itself modified somewhat by them. 
 Thus the Anglo-Saxon population of the United States has gradu- 
 ally assimilated Irish, German, and French elements, and is now 
 dealing with the peoples from southeastern Europe. 1 If, on the 
 other hand, the different nations in the state occupy separate areas, 
 living in masses side by side, assimilation is more difficult. If the 
 dominant nation is decidedly superior and more powerful, it may 
 gradually absorb the others. This was the policy of Rome in build- 
 ing up her empire, and is being carried on by Russia to-day. If no 
 nation within the state is decidedly superior, the different peoples 
 may tend toward political separation. The withdrawal of Lombardy 
 and Venice from Austria, of Belgium from Holland, and the atti- 
 tude of Ireland toward England illustrate this tendency. If neither 
 assimilation noi" political separation be possible, the state may either 
 hold its different peoples together by force, or may abandon the 
 idea of securing national unity, allow each of its nations to retain 
 its own life and civilization, and treat them impartially. 2 
 
 259. Several states within a nationality. Sometimes the limits 
 of the state are narrower than those of the ethnic unit. The Ger- 
 manic nation includes the greater part of the German Empire and 
 considerable portions of Austria and Switzerland. The population 
 of Central and South America is essentially similar in ethnic ori- 
 gin and language, yet includes many states. In these circumstances 
 two opposing tendencies may be noted. If the citizens have a 
 strong sense of their political unity, and especially if they are sepa- 
 rated from the remainder of their nation by geographic barriers or 
 by opposing interests, the state may develop a new and distinct 
 
 1 Hall, Immigration, pp. 36-66, 98-120. 
 
 2 Bluntschli, op. cit., pp. 101-103. 
 
164 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 nationality among its inhabitants. Thus, in ancient times, Athenians 
 and Spartans differentiated ; and, later, the American nationality 
 became distinct from the British. If, on the other hand, several 
 states are organized within the limits of a nation, but not separated 
 by geographic barriers or by diverse interests, national impulses 
 tend toward union ; and, either through federation or through the 
 absorption of the smaller states, the formation of a larger and 
 national state follows. By the former process the United States 
 was formed from the thirteen colonies after independence ; by the 
 latter, the German Empire and the Kingdom of Italy were estab- 
 lished. 1 In contrast to the disorder and political impotence of the 
 numerous feudal principalities of the Middle Ages, the formation 
 of larger states on the basis of nationality is now seen to have con- 
 tributed to the best interests of the peoples concerned, to the peace 
 of Europe, and to the civilization of the world. 
 
 260. Further national integration in Europe probable. Further 
 integration along national lines seems not unlikely. " The further 
 rounding out of the European states to accord still more nearly 
 with the boundaries which nature has indicated would be in the 
 interest of the advancement of Europe's political civilization and 
 of the preservation of the general peace. It would expel the Turk 
 from Europe ; it would put an end to the Russian intrigue in the 
 valley of the Danube ; it would give Greece the vigor and power to 
 become a real state ; and it would bring the petty states of Swit- 
 zerland, Denmark, Holland, Luxembourg, Belgium, and Portugal 
 to contribute, in far greater degree, to the political civilization of 
 the world, and receive, in far greater degree, the benefits of that 
 civilization, than their present conditions permit. Even then there 
 would be weak places enough in the boundaries of each national 
 state, but their number would be greatly decreased, and the tempta- 
 tion to invasion which they offer greatly lessened." 2 
 
 261. Efforts to secure national unity. At present, ethnic homo- 
 geneity is a powerful force in maintaining political solidarity and 
 stability, and states make vigorous efforts to secure national unity 
 
 1 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 48, 54-55 ; Bluntschli, Theory 
 of the State, pp. 100-101. 
 
 2 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, p. 41. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 165 
 
 among their respective populations. Thus Prussia compels the use 
 of the German language among the Poles in the province of Posen ; 
 the Russians try to crush out the national spirit of the Finns ; J 
 and the United States excludes certain classes of immigrants. 2 On 
 the other hand, claiming respect for the rights of nationalities, 
 diverse populations within the state threaten to revolt and set up 
 independent states, or demand the recognition of their local lan- 
 guages, laws, and customs. The proper compromise demanded by 
 considerations of humanity and of public policy is a difficult prob- 
 lem in states containing diverse nationalities. 3 While some insti- 
 tutions peculiar to certain nationalities and well suited to their local 
 conditions may safely be left undisturbed, others affecting the politi- 
 cal integrity of the state must be sacrificed. The general tendency 
 toward political integration is unquestionably desirable. 
 
 262. Dangers of national unity. Against the obvious advan- 
 tages of the mononational state in securing solidarity, stability, a 
 vigorous national spirit v and an intense patriotism may be set the 
 danger of narrowness, intolerance, and chauvinism. The presence 
 of foreign elements in a state may keep its people in touch with 
 the civilization of other states and may create a broad and progres- 
 sive policy. 4 The feeling of nationality may, indeed, prove to be 
 only a temporary element in political evolution, and by no means 
 a permanent and perfect basis for state formation. The advancing 
 enlightenment of the people created that consciousness of their 
 individuality and of their national solidarity which made possible 
 the modern democratic national state. As intelligence increases 
 and sympathy becomes more cosmopolitan, and as economic and 
 cultural influences tend more and more to disregard national and 
 political distinctions, a realization of the unity of mankind and of 
 the advantages of international solidarity may deprive the feeling 
 of nationality of its present force. 6 
 
 1 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. II, pp. 285-286. 
 
 2 Shaw, Political Problems of American Development, chaps, i-ii. 
 
 8 Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, Vol. I, pp. 391-396 j Garner, op. cit, 
 
 PP- 5>-54- 
 
 4 Gumplowicz, Allgemeines Staatsrecht, pp. 115 ff. 
 
 6 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 112-114; Bluntschli, op. cit, pp. 103- 
 108. 
 
166 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 III. Citizenship 
 
 263. Citizens and aliens in early states. The internal compo- 
 sition of the state is further complicated by a universal distinction 
 between citizens and aliens. Conceptions of the nature of citizen- 
 ship and of the relative proportions within the state of citizens and 
 aliens have undergone marked changes in the development of 
 political thought and practice. Plato limited citizenship to the 
 select few who devoted themselves exclusively to the service of the 
 state. 1 Any form of business activity was suitable only for slaves 
 and aliens. Aristotle defined a citizen as one who enjoyed politi- 
 cal rights, who shared in the function of lawmaker and juror; 2 
 and he also believed that the working classes were unfit for citizen- 
 ship. In the sixteenth century Bodin defined a citizen as "a free 
 man who is subject to the sovereign power of another." 3 Slaves, 
 women, children under parental authority, and men engaged in 
 certain occupations were considered unfit for public life. The citi- 
 zen class was viewed as composed of the heads of families, asso- 
 ciated in public affairs ; and the population of the state was divided 
 sharply into sovereign and citizens. Within the latter class there 
 might be great diversity of rights and privileges, but all were alike 
 in their subjection to the sovereign. 
 
 264. Citizens and aliens in modern states. The present concep- 
 tion of citizenship is still broader. " Citizens are members of the 
 political community to which they belong. They are the people 
 who compose the community and who, in their associated capacity, 
 have established or submitted themselves to the dominion of a 
 government for the promotion of their general welfare and the 
 protection of their individual as well as their collective rights." 4 
 While the state has, in general, jurisdiction over all persons within 
 its boundaries, 5 and while these persons are distinguished for many 
 important legal purposes from all persons outside its boundaries, 
 yet they are themselves divided into those who are and those who 
 
 1 Laws, VIII, 842, 846. 2 Politics, Bk. III. 
 
 8 De Republica Libri Sex, Lib. I, cap. vi. 
 4 U.S. vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549. 
 
 6 Certain exceptions exist under the principle of " exterritoriality." See Law- 
 rence, Principles of International Law, chap. iii. 
 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 167 
 
 are not members of the state. The former, or citizen class, regard- 
 less of age, sex, or occupation, are fully subject to the sovereignty 
 of the state and are entitled equally to its protection, although they 
 may be subdivided into those who possess full civil and political 
 rights and those who do not. Aliens are persons, permanently or 
 temporarily resident within the state, who are not members of the 
 state, who may even owe allegiance to some other state, and whose 
 political and civil rights are usually somewhat more restricted than 
 those of the citizen class. 1 
 
 265. Evolution of status of aliens. The rights and privileges 
 of aliens have varied considerably- at different periods in political 
 development. In former times the citizen class was narrowly and 
 jealously restricted, and its members alone possessed political privi- 
 leges and legal rights. The stranger stood apart, sharply discrimi- 
 nated from members of the community in both law and religion. 
 Admission to the citizen class was difficult for an outsider, and 
 aliens were looked upon with suspicion and dislike. 2 In the polit- 
 ical thinking of the Greeks, the state consisted of a small group 
 of citizens, supported by a numerous class of slaves and aliens 
 who engaged in manual labor, mercantile pursuits, and mechanical 
 trades. The alien had no legal rights ; by leaving his state he sur- 
 rendered his personal status and became a homeless man. In the 
 treaties made between the city states of Greece, the right of asylum 
 played a prominent part, since a person traveling or residing out- 
 side his own city needed special protection. Otherwise, being with- 
 out legal rights, he might even be made a slave. Later, in Greece 
 a class of persons called proxenoi were charged with the protection 
 of strangers. 8 In early Rome, political rights pertained to' only a 
 part of the population, known as patricians ; the plebs were amal- 
 gamated into the body of Roman citizens only after a long and 
 bitter struggle. At first the foreigners in Rome possessed no legal 
 rights except those of a captive in war. Later, under the institu- 
 tion of hospitium, a Roman, acting as host, could take a stranger 
 
 1 Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, pp. 261-263 an ^ footnotes. 
 
 2 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 83-87. 
 
 8 Phillipson, International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, Vol. I, 
 pp. 147-156. 
 
168 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 under his protection and extend to him temporarily his own rights 
 as a citizen. Still later, the stranger was allowed a legal right of 
 residence, and was judged under the jus gentium by the praetor 
 peregrinus. With the extension of Roman authority over Italy, a 
 qualified citizenship, known as the jus Latii, was granted to many 
 of the allies, and after a serious revolt practically all the peoples 
 south of the Po were, in b.c. 90, admitted to full citizenship. 1 
 Under the Empire, Roman citizenship was gradually extended to 
 the provincials, but not until the third century a.d. did resident 
 strangers secure all the rights of Roman citizens. 2 The Teutonic 
 peoples, while noted for their hospitality, viewed law as personal 
 in nature, and extended no legal rights to strangers as against the 
 members of their closely knit tribal groups. While the influence 
 of Rome and of Christianity widened the legal conceptions of the 
 Teutons, the idea that aliens had legal rights which should be re- 
 spected was recognized slowly and with difficulty. Only a century 
 ago the property of aliens commonly escheated to the state in 
 which they died, or might be partially confiscated. 
 
 266. Present status of aliens. The abolition of slavery and 
 serfdom, and the breaking down of social classes within the state, 
 together with the increasing contact of -diverse nationalities and 
 the widening scope of friendly international relations, have enor- 
 mously expanded conceptions of citizenship during the past few 
 centuries. At present, citizenship has been extended to -practically 
 all classes within the state, few obstacles are placed in the way of 
 aliens who wish to acquire citizenship, practically the same civil 
 rights are extended to aliens as to citizens, and in some cases, as 
 in several commonwealths of the United States, aliens are per- 
 mitted to exercise political rights. 3 The right of aliens to hold 
 property is sometimes limited. For example, aliens are not allowed 
 to own British ships, neither may aliens nor foreign corporations 
 hold land in the District of Columbia. 4 Aliens are regularly ex- 
 empt from military service, but are required to obey the law of the 
 
 1 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, pp. 106-113. 
 
 2 Walker, History of the Law of Nations, Vol. I, pp. 1 19-120. 
 
 8 Aliens who have declared their intention to become citizens may vote in 
 Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota, Texas, Oregon, 
 and Wisconsin. * Act of March 3, 1887. 
 
THE- COMPOSITION OF THE STATE 169 
 
 land and to pay the usual taxes levied on property. In some states 
 certain classes of aliens are especially discriminated against. This 
 is the case with regard to Jews in Russia and with regard to 
 Chinese in the United States. 1 
 
 267. Sources of citizenship : descent and place of birth. The 
 chief source of citizenship is birth or descent. 2 According to the 
 jus sanguinis, the oldest principle of descent, the nationality of 
 children follows that of their parents. 8 This principle of deter- 
 mining allegiance was observed by the ancient states, was incor- 
 porated into the Roman law, and was adopted after the fall of 
 Rome by the Teutonic invaders. The growth of feudalism, how- 
 ever, developing a close relationship between man and the land 
 and introducing the idea of territorial sovereignty, gave rise to the 
 principle of jus soli, according to which the place of birth deter- 
 mined citizenship. This principle became the law of Europe during 
 the Middle Ages, and was carried into England by the Norman 
 Conquest. Toward the end of the medieval period the revived 
 study of Roman law placed emphasis again upon the jus sanguinis, 
 which gradually replaced the jus soli and remains to-day the gen- 
 erally accepted principle in the countries of continental Europe, 
 whose jurisprudence is based upon the Roman system. 4 England 
 and the United States, while retaining the jus soli for children born 
 of aliens within their territories, apply also the jzis sanguinis to 
 children born of their own citizens abroad. A mixed system pre- 
 vails in many states. The inherent contradictions involved in these 
 two principles give rise to frequent conflicts and cases of double 
 nationality, and compel numerous exceptions to the strict application 
 of either principle. They also may leave an individual without any 
 citizenship (the German heimatlos or staatslos), making him in a 
 sense an international outlaw. 5 •» 
 
 1 McClain, Constitutional Law in the United States, p. 176. 
 
 2 Cockburn, On Nationality, pp. 6-14 ; Hershey, Essentials of International 
 Public Law, pp. 237-242. 
 
 8 Of the father, in case of legitimate children ; of the mother, in case of 
 illegitimate. , 
 
 4 The jus sanguinis was given wide currency in Europe through the adoption 
 of the Napoleonic code. See Andreani, La condition des etrangers en France. 
 
 6 For good discussions of citizenship, see Garner, Introduction to Political 
 Science, chap, xi ; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. Ill, chap. x. 
 
170 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 268. Naturalization. Aliens may also be made citizens by formal 
 grant of the state. This method is called naturalization ; * and the 
 conditions under which citizenship may be thus secured are deter- 
 mined by law in each state, the practices of states differing widely. 
 Certain classes are usually excluded, a period of residence is ordi- 
 narily required, and in most cases a formal act of some govern- 
 mental agent is necessary. Naturalization, in its broadest sense, 
 includes the grant of citizenship, under the laws of the state, in 
 any manner, and covers adoption and marriage, by which children 
 and women often transfer their citizenship, together with many 
 exceptional methods permitted by some states, such as the pur- 
 chase of real estate, 2 service in the army or navy, employment by 
 the government, long residence, etc. Citizenship is sometimes con- 
 ferred collectively by public law upon large numbers of persons. 3 
 Of such nature were the treaties and the acts of Congress granting 
 citizenship to certain Indian tribes, the treaties and acts by which 
 the inhabitants of territory acquired by purchase or conquest were 
 granted citizenship, 4 and the treaties by which the independence 
 of new states, formed by revolution, was acknowledged and a new 
 citizenship established. 5 
 
 269. Status of naturalized citizens. In most states naturalized 
 citizens have practically the same rights as natural-born citizens. 
 The only distinction in the United States is the constitutional pro- 
 vision that limits the offices of President and Vice President to 
 natural-born citizens. Several states, France for example, distin- 
 guish between " grand " and " ordinary " naturalization, the former, 
 more elaborate in its requirements, alone placing aliens on terms 
 of political equality with citizens of native birth. 
 
 1 Van Dyne, On Naturalization. 
 
 2 Brazil, Mexico, and Peru consider the purchase of real estate or residence for 
 a term of years as ipso facto evidence of naturalization. 
 
 8 Van Dyne, op. cit., chap. iv. 
 
 4 In some cases treaties permit the inhabitants of ceded territory to retain their 
 old allegiance if they so desire. Examples are the treaties of peace between the 
 United States and Mexico in 1848, and between France and Germany in 187 1. 
 In the case of Porto Rico and the Philippines, the treaty of cession left to Con- 
 gress the determination of the civil status of their inhabitants. Congress declared 
 the inhabitants to be citizens of the islands but not of the United States. 
 
 6 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. Ill, section 376. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 THE FORM OF THE STATE 
 
 270. Types of state in political evolution. On the basis of pop- 
 ulation and territory, the essential elements in state composition, 
 a rough classification may be made of the chief forms assumed by 
 the state in the process of its historical development. 1 Sometimes 
 the political unit has been a compact group, relatively small in 
 numbers, closely knit together by ties of kinship, religion, or per- 
 sonal allegiance, and occupying an area, small in size, so that inti- 
 mate relations could be maintained among all its members. To this 
 form of organization the term community state may be applied. At 
 the other extreme is found the wide extended area, pieced together 
 by conquest and migration, occupied by numerous and diverse 
 peoples, and holding unquestioned supremacy in the world of its 
 day. To this form the term world empire is usually applied. Between 
 these, as a form of compromise, stands the national state, with its 
 emphasis on natural boundaries and geographic unity, and on the 
 predominant uniformity of race, language, and civilization on the 
 part of its population. During the past century the activity of national 
 states in establishing colonial empires and in partitioning among 
 themselves large areas in the undeveloped parts of the earth has 
 given rise to a new type of state, possessing certain characteristics 
 of both the national state and the world empire. For this form the 
 term national empire has been suggested. 2 
 
 271. Types not distinct. Obviously, clear-cut distinctions' cannot 
 always be made among these political types. Each one shades off 
 gradually into the others, the differences being largely those of 
 
 1 States are usually classified on the basis of their governmental organization. 
 See Garner, Introduction to Political Science, chaps, v-vii ; Burgess, Political 
 Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. II, Bk. Ill, chaps, i-ii ; Willoughby, Nature 
 of the State, chap, xiii ; De Parieu, Principes de la science politique, chaps, i-v. 
 
 2 Reinsch, World Politics, Part I ; Giddings, Democracy and Empire, chap, i; 
 Brooks Adams, The New Empire, chap. vi. 
 
 171 
 
172 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 degree. 1 The same state, in the course of its evolution, may pass 
 through several, or all, of these forms. Thus Rome, in its early 
 tribal and city-state periods, was a community state ; for a time, 
 after it had unified Italy, it had many characteristics of a national 
 state; with the extension of its dominion over all the lands bor- 
 dering the Mediterranean, it became a world empire. 2 Besides, the 
 same general type may reappear from time to time, under different 
 conditions, in somewhat changed forms. Thus the community state 
 would include such widely different phases as the tribal village, the 
 Greek city, and the medieval manor ; and the world empire would 
 exhibit such widely different domains as those of Alexander, Caesar, 
 Charlemagne, and Napoleon. 
 
 I. The Community State 
 
 272. Characteristics of community state. The community state, 
 in the form of tribe, village, or city, and with the essential charac- 
 teristics of small, compact territory and limited, closely affiliated 
 population, usually represents a primitive and undeveloped eco- 
 nomic and political life ; 3 although a number of causes have con- 
 tributed to the rise of this particular form of state, and occasionally, 
 as in the city states of Athens, Rome, and Venice, it has accom- 
 panied a relatively advanced degree of culture. 
 
 273. Early forms of community state : the patriarchal tribe. 
 The earliest forms of organized association that displayed distinctly 
 political elements were probably the patriarchal tribe and the agri- 
 cultural village. 4 These units were necessarily small, because a 
 limited food supply restricted the growth and concentration of 
 population, and the exclusiveness of family and religion, while 
 strengthening the internal solidarity of the group, prevented 
 friendly union. Poorly developed trade, transportation, and com- 
 munication, both causes and results of the jealousies and dislikes 
 among the isolated communities, also hindered expansion. The 
 
 1 Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, Lecture IV. 
 
 2 Fowler, City State of the Greeks and Romans, pp. 312-332. 
 
 3 Gomme, The Village Community ; Ely, Evolution of Industrial Society, 
 pp. 25-52. 
 
 4 Jenks, History of Politics, chaps, iii-vi. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 173 
 
 pastoral tribe, except in the steppe and desert regions where it 
 survives in a modified form, disappeared early in the course of 
 political development. 1 Pastoral nomads played a great part in 
 the world's history as conquerors, as transmitters of civilization, 
 and as the originators of great religions, 2 but they could not per- 
 manently compete with the more advanced economic conditions 
 made possible by agriculture, manufacture, and trade, nor with the 
 more efficient political systems of the village, city, and nation. 
 
 274. The agricultural village. As a unit of government, the 
 agricultural village, which grew up when population, still organized 
 in close family groups, became permanently settled upon the land, 
 has had a longer lease of life. 3 With advancing culture, however, 
 the natural tendency has been toward the confederation of a num- 
 ber of villages or their common subjection to a central authority, 
 as took place in the growth of the Oriental empires and of the 
 modern states ; or toward the expansion and integration of the 
 village into a city state, as took place in Greece and in some parts 
 of medieval Europe. Nevertheless, even to-day the village com- 
 munity is the real unit of government in Russia 4 and China, 5 and 
 the extension of the principle of local self-government in the most 
 advanced states shows the fundamental soundness of this form of 
 organization. A local community, village or city, is a natural 
 political unit and has many interests that can be satisfactorily 
 dealt with only when it possesses a considerable degree of local 
 autonomy. 6 
 
 275. The medieval manor. The medieval manor was perhaps 
 the most striking example of the village-community type of gov- 
 ernment, and of the conditions from which it naturally results. 7 
 When the Roman Empire, with its advanced forms of economic 
 
 1 Ratzel, History of Mankind, Vol. II, pp. 79-83 ; Burckhardt, Notes on the 
 Bedouins and Wahabys, Vol. I. 
 
 2 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, pp. 510-515. 
 
 8 Seebohm,.English Village Community ; Howell, Indian Village Community. 
 
 4 Haxthausen, Etude sur les institutions nationales de la Russie ; Hourwich, 
 " Economics of a Russian Village," in Columbia University Studies, Vol. II. 
 
 6 Giles, China and the Chinese, Lecture III. 
 
 6 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, chap. xxv. 
 
 ' Andrews, Old English Manor ; Jessopp, Coming of the Friars, chap, ii j 
 Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, chap. ii. 
 
174 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 and political organization, fell before the Teutonic invaders, its 
 fertile lands were parceled out among barbarian conquerors who 
 were just emerging from _the tribal organization and who disliked 
 the restraints of city life. Trade and commerce disappeared be- 
 cause travel was unsafe and because the newcomers had no desire 
 for commodities other than the simple products of their own lands. 1 
 The centralized political administration of Rome was destroyed 
 by the conquerors, whose ideal of social organization was personal 
 allegiance in small groups to popularly chosen chieftains. In the 
 absence of other forms of wealth, land became the basis of society, 
 and power and authority fell into the hands of the strong and 
 wealthy who held the land. In the turbulent days of the invasions, 
 after the authority of Rome had disappeared, protection of some 
 sort for person and property was needed, and those unable to 
 defend themselves naturally placed themselves at the disposal of 
 some strong neighbor, holding their lands as his vassal. The mass 
 of the conquered population labored as serfs bound to the land. 
 The villa system and the custom of small landholders or landless 
 men placing themselves under the protection of the great land- 
 holders were thoroughly established before the fall of the Empire. 2 
 Among the Teutons existed the institution called the Gefolge (comi- 
 tatus) by which chieftain and warriors were bound by ties of personal 
 allegiance and mutual aid into a closely affiliated group. Under 
 the conditions of the times and with these institutions to serve 
 as bases, that type of social, economic, and political organization 
 called feudalism arose. 3 
 
 276. Feudalism. Accordingly, the agricultural village, isolated 
 and self-supporting, with governing authority resting in the hands 
 of the lord who held the land, became the unit of government 
 over large parts of Europe. 4 These villages were bound together 
 by a complicated system of overlordships, at whose top theoreti- 
 cally stood the king, although the actual power of any centralizing 
 
 1 Gibbins, History of Commerce in Europe, pp. 29-35. 
 
 2 Dill, Roman Society in the Fifth Century, pp. 262-266. 
 
 8 Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, chap, ix ; Emerton, Introduc- 
 tion to the Middle Ages, chap. xv. 
 
 4 For a good discussion of medieval political organization, see Wilson, The 
 State, chap. v. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 175 
 
 authority was for a long time more nominal than real. 1 Especially 
 after the failure of Charlemagne to unify central Europe, the 
 remnants of his empire degenerated into political fragments which 
 for a long time resisted unification. The deterioration of political 
 forms during the Dark Ages was also marked by the reintroduc- 
 tion into political evolution of many primitive features which the 
 more advanced systems of Greece and Rome had to a consider- 
 able extent removed. Among these may be mentioned the close 
 connection between church and state and the crystallization of 
 society into rigid classes or " estates." 2 
 
 277. The city state. In contrast to the warlike, liberty-loving 
 tribes of the mountain and . desert regions, and to the passive, 
 laborious villages of the fertile river valleys, the third type of 
 community state, the city, represented the prosperous commercial 
 life of the seaboard or of the trading centers that arose at points 
 where the natural routes of travel converged. The more advanced 
 economic systems of the cities permitted the concentration of popu- 
 lation within small areas ; and these dense populations, within 
 which growing inequalities of wealth created a leisure class and 
 extensive social contact and the competition of diverse ideas stim- 
 ulated mental activity, naturally became the leaders in culture as 
 well as in wealth. 3 Since they were compelled to maintain a con- 
 stant defense. against the plundering raids of neighboring barba- 
 rians and since they often took the aggressive in attacking rival 
 cities or in subjugating the surrounding peoples, these cities natu- 
 rally developed effective systems of military and political organi- 
 zation ; and the activities and prestige of their rulers brought 
 added importance to those cities which were chosen as the seats 
 of government. While the ancient city states were composed of 
 both urban and rural districts, the natural congregation of inhabit- 
 ants about the citadels and altars gave to these centers a leading 
 position in the social system. Political power centered in the urban 
 rather than in the rural districts. 
 
 1 For the differences between English and continental feudalism, see Sidg- 
 wick, Development of European Polity, pp. 302-315. 
 
 2 Emerton, Medieval Europe, chaps, xiv-xvi. 
 
 8 Rowe, Problems of City Government, chap. i. 
 
176 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 278. City states in the ancient world. Accordingly, in those 
 parts of the earth where conditions made possible accumulated 
 wealth and commercial relations, we find, even in the earliest 
 times, powerful cities, such as Babylon and Nineveh, Memphis 
 and Thebes, Tyre and Damascus. 1 Despotic rulers, surrounded 
 by a powerful and wealthy nobility and priesthood, maintained by 
 the labor of slaves and upheld by a mercenary soldiery, built their 
 palaces and temples, their roads and public works, and waged war 
 for the control of the areas of food supply and for the capture of 
 slaves and of booty. Where plains and river valleys offered little 
 resistance to expansion, these cities became the centers of loosely 
 organized empires, and many of the characteristic features of the 
 community state disappeared. Thus Babylonia, Assyria, Egypt, 
 Phoenicia, and Persia were formed by the union of friendly cities 
 or by the subjugation of many by the most powerful ; and various 
 cities in turn extended a temporary sway over large parts of the 
 known world. 2 
 
 279. City states in Greece. In Greece, however, the narrowness 
 of the plains and the difficulties of the mountain barriers for a long 
 time prevented invasion en masse and directed the early tribal 
 settlements so as to preserve the old elements of social organiza- 
 tion in the new circumstances of city life. 3 In these valleys and 
 islands of Greece, protected against invading hordes, yet led by 
 the sea to intercourse and trade, humanity first became conscious 
 of itself and of its powers. Patriarchal clans, bound by ties of 
 common kinship an'd religion, securing permanent abodes in these 
 small areas, formed compact units and, clustering around some 
 easily defended hill, built their little villages. 4 With permanent 
 settlement, kinship ties relaxed, villages were united around some 
 fortified hill or famous center of religious worship, and a spirit of 
 political union and territorial patriotism accompanied the birth of 
 the city state. 5 Two such communities in Greece — Sparta and 
 Athens — early became preeminent, chiefly because they carried 
 
 1 Fairlie, Municipal Administration, pp. 3-4. 
 
 2 Cunningham, Western Civilization : Ancient Times, Bk. I, chap. i. 
 8 Wilson, The State, pp. 26-41. 
 
 4 De Coulanges, Ancient City, Bk. III. 
 
 6 Fowler, City State of the Greeks and Romans, chap. ii. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 1 77 
 
 the political consolidation of neighboring territory farther than 
 other Greek states. Sparta secured political union in Laconia 
 through subjection, which left lasting class distinctions and com- 
 pelled an aristocratic military organization. Athens, by incorpora- 
 tion, became the only city of Attica ; and the mingling of many 
 elements in her population, together with the cosmopolitan influ- 
 ence of her commercial activity, paved the way for her democratic 
 institutions. 1 The intense life in these city states first developed 
 an independent and consistent political system and gave birth to 
 that spirit of free discussion, that individualism, adaptability, and 
 inventiveness that underlie modern civilization. 
 
 280. Phoenician and Greek colonies. The colonies established 
 by the Phoenician and Greek cities, sometimes as trading posts, 
 sometimes as outlets for surplus population, also took the form of 
 cities which often maintained a loose political connection with 
 their home states, but more frequently became independent politi- 
 cal units. 2 Even the Graeco-Oriental empire of Alexander was based 
 upon the autonomous Greek city community in contrast to the 
 former village life of the East. Alexander himself is said to have 
 founded seventy cities, and about 300 B.C. there were two hun- 
 dred so-called cities in the Hellenized world, of which Alexandria 
 and Antioch were the most famous. While the necessity for a 
 more extensive political organization prevented the independent 
 statehood of these cities and subordinated them to the machinery 
 of the imperial government, their economic life was highly de- 
 veloped and their powers of local government considerable. 3 
 
 281. The beginnings of the city of Rome. In Italy also a num- 
 ber of villages arose, all of which fell finally under the sway of 
 Rome. 4 Among the causes of Rome's preeminence may be noted 
 its central position in Italy, its strategic commercial location at the 
 head of navigation of the chief navigable river of the peninsula, 
 and its exposed position, surrounded by hostile neighbors, neces- 
 sitating military ability and strong organization. Besides, Rome 
 was established by the incorporation of a number of tribes living 
 
 1 West, Ancient History, pp. 106-113. 
 
 2 Morris, History of Colonization, Vol. I, chaps, ii-iv. 
 8 Fairlie, op. cit., pp. 4-18. 
 
 * Rowe, Problems of City "Government, pp. 20-26. 
 
17% PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 on a group of hills in the midst of a fertile plain. The federation 
 of these settlements broke down the rigidity of custom that fettered 
 isolated societies, compelled compromise, and started Rome upon 
 the development of her system of law and her career of external 
 growth that finally created the Empire. Rome expanded by 
 conquering and founding cities. 
 
 282. The Roman municipia. The neighboring Italian cities, 
 first acquired, were treated as allies and, although under Roman 
 political and military rule, were allowed considerable local auton- 
 omy. Even the Greek and Phoenician cities, which were later 
 brought under Roman domination, preserved by treaty many rights, 
 some being even exempt from fiscal burdens. The colonies or new 
 cities founded by establishing veteran soldiers on conquered terri- 
 tory enjoyed much local freedom, although under the constant 
 supervision of the central government. The distinctions between 
 cities gradually disappeared under the empire, and by the third 
 century a.d. all cities were placed on a common basis, the Roman 
 municipal town occupying a legal position similar to that of the 
 modern city. 1 Ancient Italy is said to have had twelve hundred 
 cities, Gaul an equal number, Spain three hundred and sixty, 
 Asia five hundred, and even Africa, three hundred. 2 In the first 
 century a.d. Alexandria had a population of half a million and 
 Rome of from one to two millions. City populations did not again 
 reach such figures for many centuries. Not until the seventeenth 
 century did London and Paris reach the half million mark and, 
 after the fall of Rome, no city had a million inhabitants until the 
 eighteenth century. 3 
 
 283. Causes of the decline of the ancient city states : internal. 
 Several causes mainly were responsible for. the disappearance of 
 the ancient city state. Internally, the chief danger was factional 
 strife, the stasis of the Greeks. 4 Extremes of wealth and poverty, 
 the natural results of city life, and conflicting interests which over 
 a large area would be tempered by distance or by the conservatism 
 
 1 Goodnow, Municipal Government, pp. 46-50. 
 
 2 Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chap. ii. 
 
 3 Weber, " Growth of Cities," in Columbia University Studies in History, 
 Economics, and Public Law, Vol. XI. 
 
 i Fowler, City State of the Greeks and Romans, chap. viii. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 179 
 
 of a scattered rural 'middle class were brought into direct collision 
 in the compact ancient cities, and the feelings of social injustice 
 that resulted kept the cities in a turmoil of factional outbreaks. 
 This disease was so universal and virulent in the Greek world 
 that Aristotle devoted an entire book 1 of his " Politics " to its analy- 
 sis and suggested as remedies a more equal distribution of wealth 
 and universal political education. Rome also suffered from recurrent 
 class struggles and civil wars. 
 
 284. Causes of the decline of the ancient city states : external. 
 Externally, the chief danger was expansion. 2 Sufficient means of 
 subsistence could often not be secured except by holding colonies 
 or dependencies, and that was fatal to the city-state system. As 
 population grew and common interests were established over wider 
 areas, a more extensive and centralized form of organization was 
 needed to secure protection and good order. If a city grew large 
 and powerful and subordinated other cities to itself, the dominant 
 city, having to face new duties and responsibilities, would lose 
 its original character; and the conquered cities, no longer self- 
 governing, would lose their true existence as states. In this way 
 the Roman Empire outgrew the constitution of the Roman city 
 and swallowed up the independent city states of Italy. 3 Sometimes 
 cities tried to avoid this danger by forming a confederation with 
 a common central government. In order to secure the benefits of 
 union, however, each city was compelled to give up some part of 
 its own independence, and the dominant city naturally tended 
 to subordinate the weaker members in its own interest. Thus 
 Athens, Sparta, and Thebes in turn converted leagues of cities 
 into empires and destroyed the independence and vitality of the 
 component units. 4 When authority within the confederation was 
 too evenly balanced to permit the predominance of any city, inter- 
 nal quarrels weakened the strength of all and made easy external 
 conquest at the hands of a larger and more centrally organized foe. 
 Hence Greece, whose leading cities were weakened by mutual 
 
 1 Bk. V. 2 Fowler, op. cit., chap. ix. 
 
 8 Wilson, The State, pp. 107-137. 
 
 * For the process by which the Delian League was transformed into the Athe- 
 nian Empire, see West, Ancient History, pp. 1 57-164 ; Oman, History of Greece, 
 chaps, xxii-xxv. 
 
180 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 enmities, fell easy prey to the kingdom of Mdcedon and later to 
 imperial Rome. Internal factions and external expansion destroyed 
 the ancient city states. 
 
 285. Decadence of cities during Dark Ages. The Germanic in- 
 vasions which caused the downfall of the western Roman Empire 
 led to a retrogression in city life. The Germans disliked urban 
 restrictions and confinement and for a long time did not found 
 cities. 1 Commerce languished during the disorder following the 
 break-up of the Empire, and cities, depending upon trade and man- 
 ufactures, no longer found opportunities for procuring materials 
 or disposing of their products. While the movements of this period 
 did not directly affect the cities of the East, 2 and while some 
 of the old municipalities in Italy, Spain, and southern Gaul main- 
 tained the Roman traditions, city life was narrowed and municipal 
 affairs fell generally under the control of the church, administration 
 resting in the hands of the bishops. 3 
 
 286. Revival of city life. Beginning in the eleventh century, 
 reasonable conditions of peace and renewed commerce resulting 
 from the contact of East and West in the Crusades led to a revival 
 of city life. 4 Italy, the most highly civilized part of Europe, occu- 
 pied the strategic commercial position, and her cities, Pisa, Genoa, 
 and Venice, first felt the effects of the new movement. Urban 
 population increased in numbers and in wealth. New economic con- 
 ditions soon brought about changed political institutions, the cities 
 gradually winning a position as local communities outside the feudal 
 system of the time, especially in those parts of Europe — Italy and 
 Germany — where national unity and strong central authority were 
 lacking. Urban centers, because of the unsettled conditions of 
 the times, were usually surrounded by walls, and this led to the 
 development of a city peace and a civic spirit. The differences 
 between the urban communities governed by bishops and the rural 
 districts under the jurisdiction of feudal officials also emphasized the 
 
 1 Goodnow, Municipal Government, pp. 51-52. 
 
 2 Munro, History of the Middle Ages, chap, x ; Gibbon, Decline and Fall of 
 the Roman Empire, chap. lvii. 
 
 3 Thatcher and Schwill, Europe in the Middle Age, pp. 452-454. 
 
 4 Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, chap, xii j Fairlie, Municipal 
 Administration, pp. 19-31. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 181 
 
 position of the city as a distinct political unit. Contests between 
 kings, nobles, and clergy further favored the independence of the 
 cities, since concessions were granted when aid from the cities was 
 needed and privileges were bought or forced from overlords when 
 their hands were tied with other difficulties. 1 
 
 287. Growth of free cities. One of the chief reasons why the 
 cities desired independence was because the feudal law was not 
 suited to commercial and industrial communities, and the right to 
 make their own law-merchant and to hold their own courts was 
 essential to business prosperity. Within each city the artisan guilds 
 and the associations of merchants formed local communal organ- 
 izations 2 which dealt as a body with the feudal lords or the ecclesi- 
 astical officials and secured freedom from commercial restrictions 
 and rights of local self-government. 3 Hence many cities in Italy 
 and Germany became practically independent political units. As 
 a result of commercial wars, certain Italian cities were subjected 
 to the control of others so that larger states were formed and the 
 city fell into a subordinate position. Milan and Florence repre- 
 sented this tendency. 4 Venice and Genoa, while conquering sur- 
 rounding territory and establishing colonies, remained city states 
 for several centuries. 5 The German cities, compelled to wage a 
 more desperate conflict with the feudal princes, made alliances 
 with other cities, formed leagues such as the great Hanseatic 
 League, 6 and attempted to monopolize trade and obtain dominion 
 over outlying territories. 
 
 288. Cities in France and England. France also was affected 
 by the revival of commerce. Consular cities formed in imitation 
 of the Italian city states arose in the south, and communes secured 
 charters granting self-government from the feudal lords in the 
 north. The growth of the centralized French monarchy, however, 
 soon placed these cities in the position of subordinate members of 
 
 1 Emerton, Medieval Europe, pp. 519-540. 
 
 2 Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, chap, iii ; Gross, The 
 Gild Merchant. 
 
 8 Duruy, History of the Middle Ages, chap. xxii. 
 
 4 Thatcher and Schwill, op. cit., pp. 458-473. 
 
 6 Morris, History of Colonization, Vol. I, chap, iii-iv. 
 
 6 Zimmern, The Hanse Cities ; Day, History of Commerce, chap. xii. 
 
182 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 a larger state. 1 In England, because of the early centralization of 
 royal power, the establishment of a common law not based on 
 feudal principles, and the backwardness of trade and commerce, 
 city states never developed. 2 The growing importance of representa- 
 tives from the towns in the national parliament also emphasized the 
 subordination of the English boroughs to the central government. 
 289. Nature of medieval city states. While these medieval 
 cities, which sprang up in Italy, Germany, and France as a result 
 of the revival of commerce, possessed many characteristics of inde- 
 pendent states, they were not, with perhaps a few exceptions of 
 which Venice was the chief, true examples of the city state. 3 The 
 ancient theory of a distinct religious worship did not lie at the 
 basis of the new municipal organization. Besides, whatever degree 
 of independence the cities possessed, they seldom claimed com- 
 plete immunity from the authority of emperor or king. Finally, 
 the cities were interested not so much in political independence as 
 in freedom from commercial restrictions. 4 When changes in law 
 and government were secured which enabled trade and commerce 
 to be successfully carried on, the medieval cities declined in politi- 
 cal importance. With the widening of social and economic inter- 
 ests, what had been of local concern became of general concern ; 
 and the cities, having fallen into the control of narrow, selfish 
 oligarchies, had no longer any reason to exist as separate and inde- 
 pendent communities. 5 The revival of Roman law as a national 
 state law satisfied the commercial needs of the sixteenth and seven- 
 teenth centuries ; the religious wars of this period destroyed the 
 commercial prosperity of the German cities ; and the closing of 
 the Oriental trade routes by the Turks destroyed the commercial 
 supremacy of the Italian cities. 6 Accordingly, the surviving free 
 cities offered little resistance to the attempts upon the part of the 
 growing national states to subject them to their power. 7 
 
 1 Thatcher and Schwill, Europe in the Middle Age, chap. xvi. 
 
 2 Fairlie, Municipal Administration, pp. 42-49. 
 8 Goodnow, Municipal Government, pp. 55-77. 
 
 * Rowe, Problems of City Government, pp. 27-37. 
 ' 6 Fairlie, op. cit, chap. iii. 
 
 6 Day, History of Commerce, chap. xv. 
 
 7 Goodnow, op. cit., pp. 63-65, 71-77. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 183 
 
 II. The World Empire 
 
 290. Conditions leading to world empire. At the other extreme 
 from the compact and natural political unit formed by the tribe, 
 village, or city stands the empire, which unites under a single 
 political authority wide area and numerous population, regardless 
 of geographic barriers, racial differences, or diversity of language, 
 religion, and law. The imperial idea first arose in the warm, fertile 
 river valleys of Egypt, Babylon, India, and China. 1 These areas, 
 furnishing abundant food with little effort, supported large popu- 
 lations whose complex relations early demanded regulation. Con- 
 flict and intermingling of peoples also resulted when surrounding 
 tribes were attracted toward the fertile areas or when growing 
 population needed room for expansion. Abundant population 
 created a large servile class with resultant social differences, castes, 
 and despotism. 2 The need for controlling primitive men, unused 
 to obedience, led to rigid custom, enormous priestly power, and 
 conservative policy. Political authority rested upon a theocratic 
 basis, and all laws derived their sanction from the will of the gods. 3 
 These conditions created vast empires, despotic and stagnant. 
 
 291. Nature of Oriental empires. The Oriental empires were, 
 indeed, collections of loosely united states rather than single inte- 
 grated political bodies. 4 Built up by conquest, these states had no 
 naturaL_basis for cohesion and fell apart whenever the ruling 
 dynasty was weakened. In many cases the dependency of the 
 parts was limited to the payment of yearly tribute, to the furnish- 
 ing of a quota of soldiers in case of war, or to the acknowledgment 
 of the supremacy of the imperial monarch. The subject nations 
 retained their own languages, customs, and religions, and ofttimes 
 their own rulers. In this way national aspirations were kept alive, 
 with the result that Oriental history is largely a record of the rebel- 
 lions of dependent states against their imperial rulers. If resistance 
 
 1 Perris, War and Peace, chap, ii ; Seignobos, History of Ancient Civilization, 
 chaps, iii-v. 
 
 2 Buckle, History of Civilization in England, Vol. I, pp. 30-85. 
 
 8 Woolsey, Political Science, Vol. I, pp. 495-504 ; Garner, Introduction to 
 Political Science, pp. 128-131. 
 
 4 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, chap. ii. 
 
1 84 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 was repeated, the autonomy of the conquered might be destroyed 
 and satraps sent to rule over them, or in extreme cases the rebel- 
 lious population might be deported to distant lands or even annihi- 
 lated. 1 The empire of Persia under Darius represented the highest 
 development of the Oriental empire. 2 However, the use of the words 
 "kingdom" and "empire," as applied to ancient states, is often 
 misleading, implying the existence of political unity where great di- 
 versity reigned. India, for example, has always been an aggrega- 
 tion of small associations without any consciousness of a common 
 country, and Persia was merely a juxtaposition of peoples and cities. 
 292. The empire of Alexander. The first real world empire was 
 that established by Alexander the Great. The Greek cities, weak- 
 ened by internal factions and mutual jealousies, fell an easy prey 
 to the larger, more warlike, and more centrally organized kingdom 
 of Macedon. 3 The failure of the Greek city states to federate or 
 to consolidate made inevitable their absorption by some outside 
 power ; but Macedon, after subduing the rebellious cities, preferred 
 to pose as the unifier and leader of the Greeks rather than as their 
 conqueror. Hence she aroused a national spirit and disguised the 
 subordination of the formerly independent cities by arranging a 
 common undertaking against Persia, the traditional enemy of the 
 Hellenic peoples. A series of brilliant campaigns extended Greek 
 control over the greater part of the ancient world. Asia Minor, 
 Syria, Egypt, and the Tigris-Euphrates district fell in turn, and 
 the victorious arms of the Greeks were carried across the Asiatic 
 deserts to the river Indus and the mountain passes of the Hin- 
 dukush. 4 East and West were united by Alexander, who hoped by 
 the fusion of their peoples and their civilizations to create a better 
 race stock and a higher culture. The great marriage festivals when 
 thousands of Macedonians took Persian wives symbolized his idea. 5 
 In the building of cities governed under Greek constitutional forms 
 
 1 For example, after frequent revolts a large number of Hebrews were carried 
 captive to Babylon in 586 B.C. Previously in 722 B.C. a large portion of the " Ten 
 Tribes " of Israel had been scattered over the Assyrian Empire. 
 
 2 Sayce, Ancient Empires. of the East, chaps, iv-v. 
 8 Allcroft and Mason, Decline of Hellas. 
 
 4 Budge, Life and Exploits of Alexander the Great. 
 6 Wheeler, Alexander the Great. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 185 
 
 and in planning a system of world commerce, Alexander had far- 
 reaching schemes for the establishment of a universal empire. 1 
 
 293. Dismemberment of Alexander's empire. While the Graeco- 
 Oriental culture resulting from the luxuriant growth of Greek civi- 
 lization in the fertile soil of Asia was a successful result of this 
 fusion and persisted for centuries, the political work of Alexander 
 was impermanent. 2 His own early death, before he had established 
 uniform institutions, hastened the disintegration of his empire, but 
 its fundamental political basis was unsound. " Political ideas were 
 confused by the mixture : the free human view which the Greeks 
 took of the state could not be united with the religious regard of 
 the Persians for a divine kingdom. The Macedonian monarchy 
 could not at the same time be an Asiatic theocracy. The Orientals 
 willingly believed that Alexander was the son of the most high 
 God ; the Europeans were disgusted by his pretensions to divine 
 honors. And races were confused. Hellenic science and culture 
 freed the Oriental world from the limitations of its religious and 
 political bonds ; but their effect was rather to break up the old 
 than to create a new world. The deification of a man drove out 
 reverence for the old gods ; European civilization became dissolute 
 luxury, and helped to complete the degeneracy of the East." 3 
 The political experience which made Greece great was lost in the 
 career of Asiatic expansion ; and the Grseco-Oriental empire, lack- 
 ing any natural bond of union, soon broke up into separate king- 
 doms, many of which fell an easy prey to the legions of Rome. 
 
 294. Establishment of the Roman Empire. The empire of 
 Rome was more enduring and represented the nearest approach 
 to a realization of the ideal world empire. Arising as a city state, 
 formed by the union of several Latin tribes, the internal history 
 of Rome was for a time similar in its main features to that of the 
 Greek cities ; 4 but before this line of evolution had been carried 
 to its conclusion, the whole course of political development in Italy 
 
 1 Gardner, New Chapters of Greek History, chap. xiv. 
 
 2 Mahaffy, Survey of Greek Civilization, chap, viii ; Holm, History of Greece, 
 Vol. IV. 
 
 8 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, pp. 27-28. 
 
 4 Abbott, Roman Political Institutions, chaps, i-ii ; Mommsen, History of Rome, 
 Vol. I, chap. v. 
 
1 86 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 was changed by a series of external events which led in some ways 
 to a reversion to the Oriental type of state and in other respects 
 made important contributions to political progress. Geographic 
 conditions in the main account for the difference in the trend of 
 Greek and Roman politics. Italy is better adapted for internal- 
 unity than Greece. The divisions are larger and less distinct, the 
 plains and uplands better suited to agriculture and grazing, and 
 the absence of harbors and islands offers fewer advantages for 
 commerce. Hence, while civilization came later, energy was kept 
 at home until Italy was united into a single state under Rome's 
 headship. The direction of external effort further affected Rome's 
 political progress. With the Apennines near the eastern coast, 
 and the fertile plains, rivers, and harbors on the west, Rome natu- 
 rally had little contact with Eastern peoples until her institutions 
 were well established. On the contrary, she faced toward Gaul 
 and Spain, and, through Sicily, toward Africa. Her first wars 
 were with inferior nations and led naturally to conquest, to expan- 
 sion of territory, and to the civilizing of fresh, vigorous peoples. 
 Later the East also came under her sway, her central position 
 enabling her to concentrate her forces and conquer her enemies 
 in detail. Rome left no other state powerful enough to protect 
 the seas or to guard the frontiers of the civilized world. It was 
 therefore her plain duty to shoulder this responsibility,' and in so 
 doing she was drawn on from conquest to conquest until she 
 became the mistress of the world. 1 All the civilized peoples bor- 
 dering the Mediterranean were united in a vast empire, three 
 thousand miles long and one thousand miles wide, with a popu- 
 lation of nearly one hundred millions. 
 
 295. Effects of expansion upon Roman government. It was this 
 career-of conquest and expansion that compelled Rome to develop 
 a new form of state. The type of government that was suitable to 
 a compact community was not workable over a large area, and the 
 self-government which was safe and effective among the homo- 
 geneous population of the city could not be extended to the diverse 
 and in some cases politically inexperienced peoples that were in- 
 corporated into the empire. To secure order and unity in the vast 
 
 1 Freeman, Chief Periods of European History, Lecture II. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 187 
 
 area over which Rome's conquests extended required a bureaucratic 
 organization and a powerful authority concentrated under a single 
 head. 1 By its generous policy in extending citizenship and legal 
 rights, by its prosperity and good government, by its uniform law 
 and its easy intercommunication, the Roman Empire molded the 
 manifold races of its realm into a unity and won spiritual dominion 
 over the minds of men. 2 The union was not one of external force 
 alone but was organic. The provinces formed an integral part of 
 the empire and were Roman in culture and in spirit. 3 How well 
 Rome succeeded in creating a satisfactory imperial organization is 
 shown by the fact that her rule lasted for five centuries in the 
 West and for fifteen centuries in the East. The Christian church 
 developed its organization on a Roman basis ; the ideal of world 
 empire long outlived the destruction of actual unity ; and Roman 
 law and Roman methods of colonial and municipal administration 
 underlie modern systems. Sovereignty and citizenship were worked 
 out by Rome, and her methods of binding divergent nations into 
 political unity have never been surpassed. 
 
 296. Evils in Rome's political system. The formation of this 
 united and well-governed empire was not accomplished, however, 
 without accompanying evils. To secure authority, individual free- 
 dom was sacrificed. The corruption of the populace in the capital, 
 the military danger on the frontiers, and the maladministration of 
 the provinces all demanded a single powerful and responsible head. 
 Local self-government and popular authority disappeared as the 
 centralized, bureaucratic administration grew. Rome became mis- 
 tress of the world before she had learned how to rule it, and her 
 constitutional system, satisfactory in a free city or an allied Italy, 
 was not elastic enough to rule the world. 4 From the path of em- 
 pire there was no retreat, but the reaction of the conquests on Rome 
 lowered her own moral tone and contributed to her economic and 
 political decay. 5 Rome's system prevented political education and 
 
 1 Abbott, Roman Political Institutions, pp. 129-149, 266-288. 
 
 2 Thierry, Tableau de l'empire romain. 
 
 8 Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, pp. 20-38. 
 * Fowler, City State of the Greeks and Romans, chap. xi. 
 6 Hodgkin, Italy and her Invaders, Vol. II, pp. 532-613; Adams, op. cit., 
 pp. 76-88. 
 
1 88 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 its very perfection brought about its ultimate fall. Rome contrib- 
 uted to political evolution the principle of unity and centralized 
 organization, but the ability to combine sovereignty and liberty, to 
 make self-government possible over large areas, and to secure the 
 best interests of both individual and state was reserved for a later 
 time and a new people. 
 
 297. Decline of the Roman Empire. Evidences of decline 
 appeared in the Roman world as early as the third century a.d. 1 
 The diminished vitality of the race stock was indicated by the 
 stationary population and by the ravages of terrible pestilences. 
 Unable to make further conquests, Rome was thrown upon the 
 defensive and found increasing difficulty in maintaining her fron- 
 tiers. The imperial power became the spoil of the army and was 
 even auctioned to the highest bidder. Burdensome taxation and 
 the abundance of slave labor destroyed the middle class, and suffi- 
 cient citizen soldiers to recruit the legions could not be secured. 
 While the vigorous reforms of Diocletian and Constantine checked 
 this decline and bolstered up the empire for two more centuries, 
 their work consisted in strengthening the centralized, despotic 
 machinery of the empire and in the end made its fall more cer- 
 tain and complete. 2 Internal decline made it increasingly difficult 
 for Rome to maintain her frontiers against those vigorous Teutonic 
 barbarians whom she had been unable to conquer. Great numbers 
 of these were gradually admitted and many found service in the 
 army. By the fifth century a.d. the boundaries were so indistinct, 
 the army so largely barbarian, and the pressure along the frontiers 
 so great that the declining empire in the West fell to pieces and 
 was parceled out among the various Teutonic tribes. 3 
 
 298. Survival of the ideal of world empire in the Middle Ages. 
 Even after the fall of Rome the ideal of world empire survived. 
 The two leading ideas which expiring antiquity bequeathed to the 
 Middle Ages were those of world monarchy and world religion. 
 .The Christian church, organized on the model of the Roman 
 
 1 Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chaps, iv-xii. 
 
 2 Seeley, Roman Imperialism, pp. 65-95. 
 
 3 Perris, War and Peace, chap, iv ; Emerton, Introduction to the Middle Ages, 
 chaps, iii-vii. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 189 
 
 Empire, served as a bond of unity in western Europe and threw 
 the weight of its authority on the side of the imperial idea. The 
 Frankish monarchy, in alliance with the church, revived the impe- 
 rial title and the Roman name. Charlemagne aimed to unite all 
 the Germanic peoples into a single state and actually ruled over 
 the greater part of the area now included in France, Germany, 
 and Italy ; the Holy Roman Empire of Otto and his successors 
 was universal in theory, although narrower in extent than that 
 of Charlemagne, France having been permanently lost toward 
 the end of the ninth century. The existence of the state as a 
 monarchy, the exact coincidence of its limits and the perfect har- 
 mony of its workings with the limits and workings of the church, 
 and its universality — these were the vital principles of medieval 
 political theory. 1 
 
 299. Nature of the Holy Roman Empire. In actual fact, the 
 medieval empire embraced a number of essentially independent 
 states, formally subject to the emperor but in reality ruled by their 
 local lords. The superiority of defense over offense in medieval 
 warfare made large-scale conquest impossible. 2 The rise of diverse 
 languages and nationalities also prevented unity. The centrifugal 
 forces of feudalism, the conflict between church and state, and the 
 principles of nationality, aristocracy, and popular freedom were too 
 strong for the slender powers of the German king and Roman 
 emperor, and the medieval empire went to pieces, its fragments 
 reappearing on national lines in modern France, Germany, and 
 Italy. 3 For centuries, however, the ideal of the Holy Roman 
 Empire served to counteract the Teutonic overtendency to indi- 
 vidualism and decentralization ; and the imperial idea was the ral- 
 lying point of the best minds as they strove against the anarchic 
 forces of feudalism in behalf of order, peace, and progress. 4 
 
 300. Contributions of the Holy Roman Empire. Modern political 
 civilization owes much to the medieval empire. To its existence is 
 chiefly to be ascribed the prevalence of Roman law throughout 
 
 1 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chaps, vii, xv, xxi ; Carlyle, History of Medieval 
 Political Theory; Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age. 
 
 2 Oman, History of the Art of War: The Middle Ages, pp. 551—553. 
 8 Robinson, History of Western Europe, pp. 148-187. 
 
 * Cf. Dante, De Monarchia. 
 
190 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Europe and its practical importance in our own days. 1 Interna- 
 tional law can also be traced to the same fountain head. 2 Its chief 
 contributions were indirect in nature. " It tamed the barbarous 
 races of the North, and forced them within the pale of civilization. 
 It preserved the arts and literature of antiquity. In times of vio- 
 lence and opression it set before its subjects the duty of rational 
 obedience to an authority whose watchwords were peace and reli- 
 gion. It kept alive, when national hatreds were most bitter, the 
 notion of a great European Commonwealth. And by doing all this, 
 it was in effect abolishing the need for a centralizing and despotic 
 power like itself : it was making men capable of using national 
 independence aright : it was teaching them to rise to that concep- 
 tion of spontaneous activity, and of freedom which is above law 
 but not against it, to which national independence itself, if it is to 
 be a blessing at all, must be only a means." 3 
 
 301. Napoleon's attempt at world empire. The latest attempt 
 to revive the idea of world empire was that of Napoleon in the 
 early years of the nineteenth century. The enthusiasm of the 
 French Revolution became infected with the spirit of conquest, 
 and the improved methods of military armament and organization, 
 destroying the medieval superiority of defense over attack, again 
 made possible extensive campaigns of aggression. 4 The ambition of 
 Napoleon aimed at a vast international state including all Europe, 
 with individual states as members and with imperial power in the 
 hands of the French. By posing as the champion of the liberal 
 ideas of the French Revolution, voluntary support was secured 
 from some of the European peoples. The military strength of 
 France and her allies conquered others ; Prussia, anxious about 
 its very existence, and Austria, proud of its imperial history, offer- 
 ing bitter resistance in repeated wars. At one time Napoleon with 
 his ally Russia controlled practically all of continental Europe, the 
 largest empire ever united under a single authority. 5 
 
 1 Wilson, The State, pp. 184-195 ; Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages ; 
 Morey, Outlines of Roman Law, pp. 167-218; Lee, Historical Jurisprudence, 
 chaps, xiv-xv. 
 
 2 Maine, Ancient Law (Pollock's edition), pp. 92 ff. and Appendix, Note H. 
 8 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, p. 394. 
 
 4 Ferris, War and Peace, pp. 168-169. 
 
 6 Rose, Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, chaps, viii-x. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 19 1 
 
 302. Failure of Napoleon's imperial plans. Napoleon hoped to 
 do in a generation what it had taken centuries for Rome to do, 
 and his plan failed, largely because he underestimated the strength 
 of nationality as a factor in the political life of modern Europe. 
 He failed to overcome the dogged resistance of the Spaniards, 
 who waged guerrilla warfare in the mountain fastnesses of their 
 homeland ; of the English, in whom a historical national spirit 
 was united with Teutonic ideas of independence ; and of the half- 
 barbarous Russians, who withdrew to their frozen steppes defeated 
 but not conquered. The economic distress caused by his conti- 
 nental system and by the heavy taxes resulting from his military 
 enterprises angered his allies and aroused the peoples of Europe. 1 
 Napoleon avoided the weakness of the medieval empire and cre- 
 ated the machinery for a strong and centralized administration, 
 but the nations of Europe felt their independent existence threat- 
 ened by universal empire without being satisfied with the new 
 world unity, and the French were not strong enough to hold them 
 forcibly in permanent subjection. 2 After Waterloo, the Congress 
 of Vienna (1815) recognized a half dozen major states as preemi- 
 nent in European affairs, arranged the boundaries and destinies of 
 the minor states, and inaugurated the regime of the concert of 
 powers which, cross-sectioned by rivalries and alliances, agrees 
 at least in its antagonism to the overshadowing strength of any 
 single state. 3 
 
 303. Value of the imperial ideal. The underlying principles of 
 the imperial ideal, however, have always appealed to intelligent 
 men. The unity of mankind, the supremacy of law based upon 
 reason, the solidarity of all human interests, and the effective or- 
 ganization of peace are among the splendid conceptions that give 
 dignity to the idea of universal empire. As obstacles to the realiza- 
 tion of this ideal, there have appeared in practice the passions, 
 ambitions, and rivalries of leaders, the disparity of races, the spirit 
 of local independence, the conflict between the temporal and spir- 
 itual forms of obedience, and the physical limitations of time and 
 
 1 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution, chaps, xvii-xviii. 
 
 2 Andrews, Historical Development of Modern Europe, pp. 37-85. 
 
 8 Rose, op. cit., chap, xi ; Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern 
 Europe, Vol. I, chap, xvi ; Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IX, chaps, xix-xxi. 
 
192 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 space to central control. 1 Accordingly, every attempt to establish 
 a world empire has been compelled to yield to impulse, interest, 
 self-sufficiency, and experiment, working themselves out in their 
 own independent way under local conditions. It does not follow, 
 however, that because the imperial idea has failed in practice that 
 it must therefore be abandoned. Its principles, fundamentally 
 sound, may have been wrongly applied. As an ideal toward which 
 the evolution of the state is tending and should tend, the universal 
 political organization of mankind still holds its place. Bluntschli 
 says, " Only in the universal empire will the true human state be 
 revealed, and in it international law will attain a higher form and 
 an assured existence. . . . The perfect state is, as it were, the visi- 
 ble body of humanity. The universal state or universal empire is 
 the ideal of human progress." 2 
 
 III. The National State 
 
 304. The nature of the national state. The community state 
 had a logical basis, since it coincided with a natural local unit and 
 since its population was usually of the same kin and worshiped 
 the same gods. In practice this type of state failed because of in- 
 ternal faction and because of the need for wider political organiza- 
 tion as population increased and interests expanded. In theory the 
 world empire is the perfect form of state, being most economical 
 and efficient in administration and best securing peace and unity 
 among all peoples. In practice this type of state has fallen to pieces 
 because of the diverse interests of its parts or because of the gradual 
 stagnation which accompanies uniformity, especially in the despotic 
 and rigid organizations by which alone historic world empires have 
 been controlled. As a compromise between these two extremes, 
 neither of which has proved to be a stable or satisfactory political 
 form, stands the national state, with its emphasis on natural geo- 
 graphic frontiers and an ethnically homogeneous population. 3 
 
 1 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 2-4. 
 
 2 Theory of the State, pp. 26, 32. See also Burgess, Political Science and Con- 
 stitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 85-89 ; McKechnie, The State and the Individual, 
 chap. xi. 
 
 8 Burgess, op. cit.,Vol. I, Bk. I, chap, iv ; Reinsch, World Politics, pp. 3-6. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 193 
 
 305. Evolution of the national state. Traces of the national state 
 in a crude form appeared even in ancient times. Macedon, before 
 it conquered Greece, and Rome, after it had unified Italy, were 
 examples ; but in each case the state in this form was in a transi- 
 tion stage, the same conditions that created unity over the natural 
 area and among the national population urging the state to further 
 expansion and conquests, and transforming the embryonic national 
 state into an overgrown empire. The national state proper arose in 
 Europe, as a result of the fusion of Roman and Teutonic peoples, 
 institutions, and ideas, after the feudal chaos which followed their 
 first contact. 1 Between the fifth and the thirteenth centuries a.d. 
 Europe tried various principles of political organization. Feudal 
 aristocracy and city democracy were both failures in order and per- 
 manence. The ideal of a universal empire was destroyed by the 
 quarrel between emperors and popes. 2 Toward the close of the 
 Middle Ages, as population became stationary and common inter- 
 ests developed, it became increasingly evident that new states would, 
 in general, follow ethnic and geographic lines. Bonds of nation- 
 ality, language, and religion, strengthened by natural boundaries, 
 grouped the feudal fragments into more and more permanent com- 
 binations ; and France, Spain, England, Switzerland, Holland, 
 Russia, and later Germany and Italy arose. 3 
 
 306. Internal organization of national states. During the feudal 
 period each of these areas had contained several distinct and mutu- 
 ally jealous classes, — nobles, burghers, artisans, clergy, peasants, 
 — and social sympathy had followed lines of class cleavage across 
 Europe. 4 The new national states, within their respective terri- 
 tories, welded these classes into one nation with a common patriot- 
 ism. The growth of a strong monarchical government in each of 
 these states, consolidating the feudal authorities under a central 
 and uniform administration, attacked the temporal authority of the 
 church and separated more clearly religious and political ideas. 5 
 
 1 Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, chaps, v, ix. 
 
 2 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chaps, x-xi, xiii ; Hill, Historv of Diplomacy 
 in the International Development of Europe, Vol. I, chap. v. 
 
 8 Guizot, History of Civilization, Lectures X-XI. 
 
 * Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. II, chaps, viii-xv. 
 
 5 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, chaps, ix-xi. 
 
194 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Dangerous sources of internal dissatisfaction and revolt were thus 
 removed, and a stable and organic political form was developed. 
 The contest between kings and peoples for political power was, of 
 course, still to come. 1 The separation of Europe into distinct states, 
 each with its own national spirit, destroyed the idea of a common 
 superior and made possible the rise of international law and the 
 modern theory of the sovereignty and equality of states. 2 
 
 307. International rivalries. Unfortunately, the leading states, 
 emphasizing their distinct identities and their patriotic pride, be- 
 came intensely jealous of each other ; and a long period of inter- 
 national wars, dynastic, territorial, commercial, and colonial, followed. 
 In these wars the essential bases of the national state were often 
 disregarded and Europe was partitioned among the stronger powers 
 with utter disregard of its natural geographic divisions or the wishes 
 of its nationalities. 3 During the last century the principle of nation- 
 ality, clearly realized, has become a dominant force, each nation 
 demanding the right to choose its own form of government and to 
 manage its own affairs in its own way. As a result, ill-assorted col- 
 lections of nationalities, such as the Austrian and Ottoman empires, 
 have been partially dismembered, and new nation-states, such as 
 Germany, Italy, Belgium, and Greece, have been called into exist- 
 ence. This process, checked by international jealousies and by 
 survivals of the older political traditions, is still taking place. 
 
 308. The present international community. Successful nations 
 have thus developed clearly marked individualities, and the medie- 
 val dreams of world unity have been replaced by a community of 
 independent states, each striving to realize its individual character- 
 istics. The political ideal of the modern world is thus far removed 
 both from the uniformity of world empire and from the anarchy 
 of local custom. The balance of power that results has certain ad- 
 vantages. 4 " The sharp rivalry among nations calls for the constant 
 
 1 See below, Chapter VIII, sections 340-366. 
 
 2 Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, pp. 52-54. 
 
 8 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chaps, ii-vii, 
 xv-xvi. 
 
 4 For the origin of the system of balance of power in Europe, see Nys, Les 
 Origines de droit International, chap. viii. For objections to the system of 
 European equilibrium, see Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, 
 PP- i33-!35- 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 195 
 
 exercise of all their powers in order to avoid decadence. " Even 
 with its occasional discords, the present general harmony of the 
 concert of nations is to be preferred to the dead monotone of a 
 world state. Each nationality is in this competition given an oppor- 
 tunity to develop its characteristics freely, and to enrich the general 
 life of the civilized world with its distinctive literature, art, music, 
 and moral ideals. The rapid social progress since the Renaissance 
 is certainly due in great measure to this rivalry of independent 
 nations, constantly invited to self-criticism by the successes and 
 failures of their neighbors." 1 
 
 309. Tendencies toward nationalism. At the present time two 
 tendencies, both powerful, yet in many respects antagonistic, are 
 influencing the form of the state. On the one hand is the empha- 
 sis placed on ethnic and geographic unity. The national state with 
 well-defined natural frontiers and with a homogeneous and united 
 people seems to be the goal toward which the development of the 
 past five centuries" has tended, and states wage war to secure or 
 maintain their natural boundaries, and use every means to increase 
 the solidarity of their populations. France, for example, has aimed 
 for centuries to reach the Rhine ; peoples like the Irish, the Poles, 
 and the Finns are forced into unwilling assimilation with nations 
 superior in organization and strength. A number of well-organized, 
 yet distinct and often rival, national states is the logical outcome 
 of this movement. During the latter half of the nineteenth cen- 
 tury, nationalism was, indeed, exaggerated beyond a healthy de- 
 sire to express the native characteristics of a people, and resulted 
 in prejudices, suspicions, and idiosyncrasies, each nation looking 
 upon itself as the only true leader of civilization. International 
 motives were misunderstood, and competition in armaments and 
 in all fields of human activity took on tremendous dimensions. 
 
 310. Tendencies toward internationalism. On the other hand, 
 many influences interfered with this process. The growth of en- 
 lightenment, which makes sympathy more cosmopolitan and the 
 unity of mankind more real, is breaking down the former narrower 
 ideas of patriotism and national supremacy. The enormous expan- 
 sion of economic interests, by which the whole world has become 
 
 1 Reinsch, World Politics, pp. 24-25. 
 
196 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 a single market, with trade no longer limited by natural or political 
 boundary lines, is striking a powerful blow at the very foundation 
 of the national state. The formation during the last few centuries 
 of great colonial empires, composed of widely scattered areas and 
 most divergent peoples, while emphasizing international rivalries, 
 has tended to destroy the geographic and ethnic unity on which 
 the national state is based. Expansion in population and in eco- 
 nomic interests necessitated expansion in territory ; hence, to nation- 
 alism modern states have added imperialism, and the most remote 
 regions have been parceled out in the fierce scramble for the 
 unoccupied portions of the earth's surface. The nineteenth cen- 
 tury was the age of nationalism ; the twentieth is to be the age of 
 national imperialism. 1 Whether these apparently opposite tenden- 
 cies are in reality only two sides of the same movement, looking 
 to the formation of a world federation on the basis of national 
 units, the future alone will reveal. 2 It is unquestionably true that 
 the past half century, a period of international conferences, asso- 
 ciations, and commissions, has seen remarkable progress toward 
 unity. The spirit of nationality is being modified or supplemented 
 by that of internationalism, and the older conceptions of sovereignty 
 and independence are yielding to ideals of interdependence. 3 
 
 IV. General Tendencies 
 
 311. Increase in area and population. In the evolution of the 
 state's composition, a striking tendency toward increase in the 
 area and population of the political unit may be observed. " Growth 
 has been the law of human societies since the birth of man's gre- 
 garious instinct. It has manifested itself in the formation of ever 
 larger social groups, appropriating ever larger areas. It has regis- 
 tered itself geographically in the protrusion of ethnic boundaries, 
 economically in more intensive utilization of the land, socially in 
 increasing density of population, and politically in the formation 
 
 1 Reinsch, World Politics, pp. 8-14. 
 
 2 On world organization, see Bridgman, World Organization ; Novicow, La 
 Federation de l'Europe. 
 
 3 Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, pp. 73-91. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 197 
 
 of ever larger national territorial aggregates." x Beginning with the 
 primitive pastoral and agricultural communities, this process of 
 territorial expansion and political integration reached its climax in 
 ancient times in the Roman Empire. When, however, political 
 power passed during the medieval period into the hands of the con- 
 quering barbarians, much of the political achievement of the ancient 
 world was for a time destroyed, and the feudal state reverted to 
 the small and isolated local type. With the revival of political 
 progress in modern times, and especially with the colonial activities 
 of the past century, the process of expansion has been renewed ; 
 and the national states of the present day, such as the British 
 Empire, Russia, and the United States, represent the widest ex- 
 tent of territory and the greatest number of persons ever brought 
 under a single permanent political authority. 
 
 312. Former advantages of small area. In the early life of the 
 state, small, compact areas with fixed boundaries had certain advan- 
 tages. In confined regions men pass rapidly from a natural to an 
 artificial source of subsistence, population becomes dense, national 
 solidarity more powerful, and social and political organization more 
 elaborate. Small diversified countries, like Japan, England, and 
 Italy, in creating individuality and national character, have many 
 advantages over the monotonous plains of Russia or America. 2 
 Small favored areas, if occupied by a strong political power, and 
 especially if having outlet to the ocean, frequently secure a per- 
 manent advantage by the early start they get in the occupation of 
 colonial lands. Phoenicia, Crete, Venice, England, and Japan 
 furnish examples. Isolated and protected regions, such as Egypt, 
 Phoenicia, and Venice, encourage the early rise and rapid growth 
 of civilization, but later they cramp progress and are outstripped 
 by larger and more accessible areas. The historical importance of 
 islands, in spite of their naturally dense population, belongs mainly 
 to the early history of the state or to the youth of modern states. 3 
 
 313. Possible dangers of large area. Expansion, however, must 
 not come too soon. The dispersion of a small population over a 
 wide area has disintegrating results that sap the strength of a state. 
 
 1 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, p. 181. 
 
 2 Ripley, Races of Europe, pp. 340-343. 8 Semple, op. cit., pp. 447-465. 
 
198 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 The history of the Oriental empires, of the French in America, 
 and of Russia in Asia show the weakness of a too distant horizon. 
 When peoples in a low stage of political development follow the 
 easiest lines of expansion, their internal development often fails 
 to keep pace with their external growth. 1 But when a certain 
 point in political development is reached, expansion is neces- 
 sary. The large area which dissipates the strength of a primitive 
 people later offers the needed opportunities for a more advanced 
 national life. 
 
 314. Present advantages of large area. Other geographic con- 
 ditions being equal, the larger the area of the state the surer the 
 guarantee of its permanence. A broad geographic base furnishes 
 an abundant food supply and undeveloped resources, the necessary 
 conditions of life and growth. Where physical and economic con- 
 ditions are similar, the number of inhabitants tends to correspond 
 with the size of the state, and this gives the military advantage of 
 numbers to the larger units. The northern hemisphere, with its 
 larger area and its population five times more numerous than 
 that of the southern, is logically the zone of "greatest historical 
 density." The domination of England in the British Isles and of 
 Prussia in Germany is based, partially at least, upon their broad 
 geographic bases. 
 
 315. Military advantages of large area. Large area also serves 
 as a protection, by rendering attack difficult, whereas small areas 
 are easily surrounded. Greece has always been handicapped by its 
 small size and geographic subdivisions. Belgium and Switzerland 
 are separate states only on the sufferance of the great powers who 
 have declared them neutralized. 2 The state that fixes its frontiers 
 without making allowance for future growth limits its development. 
 On the other hand, the advance from a small, self-supporting com- 
 munity to international relations and then to territorial empire 
 breaks down the narrow, secluded clan spirit and makes possible 
 political and cultural progress. The territorial expansion of pro- 
 gressive peoples is both a cause and a result of national growth. 
 It is an accepted mark of national vigor and creates broad views 
 
 1 Mill, Representative Government, chap. xvii. 
 
 2 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. I, pp. 26-27. 
 
THE FORM OF THE STATE 199 
 
 of national life and policy. 1 In the past it was possible for small 
 states, like Athens, Venice, and the Dutch Republic, to be the 
 leaders in civilization and even to wage successful war against 
 larger adversaries. At present great states realize the need of 
 large territory and numerous population. Germany and Japan feel 
 the pressure of narrow frontiers, and their natural ambitions along 
 the line of territorial expansion are among the most powerful influ- 
 ences in the present international situation. Other states, such as 
 the United States, Brazil, the Argentine Republic, and Russia, 
 because of their size, resources, and natural defenses, will unques- 
 tionably become far more important in the international politics 
 of the future than they are at the present time. 
 
 1 Emerson, "The Young American," in Nature Addresses and Lectures, 
 pp. 369-371 (Centenary edition). 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 
 
 I. General Nature of Problem 
 
 316. The organization of authority. Having determined the 
 composition and form of the state", that is, the number of individ- 
 uals who come under its jurisdiction and who form its citizen body, 
 together with the principles upoA which membership and citizen- 
 ship are based, and the area over which the jurisdiction of the state 
 shall extend, the next problem involves the organization of author- 
 ity within the state. " There is a sense in which the molding of an 
 effective citizenship, imbued with a sense of public as distinguished 
 from private well-being, and capable from time to time of fairly 
 harmonious action, is at once the principal task and the highest 
 reward of government. There is another sense in which the shap- 
 ing of an efficient mechanism of government is the chief concern 
 of a well-ordered citizenship. In practice the processes are not 
 very distinct from each other, although to some extent they are 
 separable for purposes of discussion. Both processes give rise to 
 groups or successions of political problems." 1 
 
 317. Authority and liberty. The organization of authority 
 within the state involves the fundamental difficulty of political ex- 
 istence, — the nature of the relation between authority and free- 
 dom, between sovereignty and liberty, between the state as a unit 
 exercising a certain control over its members and the individuals 
 within the state as distinct personalities with wills of their own, 
 naturally desiring to live and act without interference. Upon a 
 satisfactory adjustment of this relation both individual welfare 
 and state existence depend. 2 Apparently there is an irreconcilable 
 
 1 Shaw, Political Problems of American Development, p. 30. 
 
 2 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, pp. 1-26 ; Sidgwick, Elements of 
 Politics, chap. xxxi. 
 
 200 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 201 
 
 contradiction between sovereignty and liberty. If the authority of the 
 state be absolute, how can individual freedom exist ? If the individ- 
 ual has liberty, what has become of sovereignty ? Sovereignty alone 
 is despotism and destroys liberty, while liberty alone is anarchy and 
 destroys sovereignty. The efforts made by states to reach a satis- 
 factory compromise between these two equally undesirable extremes 
 comprise a large part of the history of politics, and no permarient 
 solution has yet been reached. However, a more careful analysis 
 of individual liberty will show its real nature and prove that, instead 
 of being opposed to sovereignty, it is dependent upon it. In fact, 
 it is possible only if sovereignty exists, and becomes more perfect 
 as sovereignty is more completely organized. 1 
 
 318. Natural rights. In the eighteenth century men spoke much 
 of natural rights. 2 Life, liberty, property, the pursuit of happiness, 
 and other similar privileges were considered inalienable rights under 
 the laws of nature. 3 A condition of perfect liberty, existing before 
 governments arose, was conceived, often with a sigh of regret that 
 this " state of nature " could not last forever. Analysis shows the 
 fallacy in such thinking. In a state of nature liberty would be im- 
 possible. Each person would have rights only as he could secure 
 them by force. The natural rights of one would encroach upon the 
 natural rights of others, thus destroying the liberty of all. That 
 every person could have liberty to do as he chose in all things is 
 obviously absurd. The greatest amount of liberty possible is the 
 right to do as one pleases while encroaching least on the wishes 
 of others. This secures the largest amount of liberty for all. 4 
 
 319. Nature of liberty. Liberty in the associated life of man- 
 kind has therefore both a positive and a negative side. It includes 
 right to free action and immunity from interference ; but in order 
 to maintain such a condition some authority is needed that can set 
 
 1 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 55-58 ; Ritchie, 
 Natural Rights. 
 
 2 For the history and development of natural law, see Scherger, Evolution of 
 Modern Liberty, Part I, pp. i-£6. 
 
 8 See Locke, Two Treatises of Government ; Rousseau, The Social Contract ; 
 The American Declaration of Independence; The French Declaration of the 
 Rights of Man and Citizen. 
 
 4 Willoughby, Nature of the State, chap, v ; Seeley, Introduction to Political 
 Science, Lecture V. 
 
202 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 bounds to the liberty of each and enforce the rights of all. 1 The 
 organization that arose for this purpose is the state. It is therefore 
 the only source of real liberty. Since it is sovereign over all, it 
 alone can create and enforce rights and obligations. 2 Its laws are 
 not only limitations on the freedom of individuals, but they are the 
 only guarantees and defenders of individual freedom. Anarchy, 
 instead of creating absolute freedom, would destroy it. Sovereignty 
 and liberty are not contradictory terms, but correlative, — the same 
 thing viewed from different aspects, the former from the state's 
 point of view, the latter from that of the individual. 3 
 
 320. Problems in adjusting authority and liberty. In the de- 
 tailed adjustment of authority and freedom, two practical difficulties 
 are being met. First, how much authority shall the state exercise ? 
 Where shall it draw the line between the acts of individuals which 
 it will regulate or prohibit and those which it will disregard, between 
 its own authority and the freedom of its individual members ? 4 
 Second, by whom shall such authority be exercised ? What par- 
 ticular individuals and what machinery of organization shall repre- 
 sent the state in setting limits to the free actions of its members ? 5 
 How many persons shall share in exercising the sovereign power 
 of the state, and what shall be the extent of the powers of each ? 
 The evolution of the state exhibits a growing realization of both 
 these problems and a general trend of movement, broken by reac- 
 tions and changed in direction by new conditions, toward a rational 
 and satisfactory solution. The first problem has been met by the 
 gradual establishment of a field of civil liberty; that is, of a sphere 
 of free action within which the individual is guaranteed, by the 
 authority of the state, against interference. 6 The second problem 
 has been met by the gradual development of political liberty, that 
 is, of the right of a constantly increasing number of individuals to 
 possess some share of the governing authority of the state, to have 
 
 1 Mill, Essay on Liberty; Lieber, On Civil Liberty and Self-government, 
 chaps, i-iii. 
 
 2 Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, Part I. 
 
 8 Leacock, Elements of Political Science, pp. 71-75; McKechnie, The State 
 and the Individual, chap. xxii. 
 
 * McKechnie, op. cit., Part II ; Ritchie, Principles of State Interference. 
 
 6 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, chap. xix. 
 
 ? gcherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, Parts III-IV. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 203 
 
 a legal way of expressing their wishes and of influencing political 
 action. 1 Civil and political liberty are not necessarily found together. 
 Under the Roman Empire, for example, there was little political 
 freedom, while individual rights were, as a rule, ample and well 
 protected. On the contrary, a high degree of political freedom 
 existed among the early Teutons, with a much smaller protection 
 for private rights. It is possible that individual rights may be dis- 
 regarded in a state with extensive popular government, while an 
 absolute monarchy may establish and protect a wide sphere of civil 
 freedom. 2 
 
 321. Nature of civil liberty. The concept of civil liberty needs 
 further analysis. It includes that sphere of freedom for each indi- 
 vidual which the state creates and safeguards against interference 
 at the hands of other individuals and of the government. This 
 compels the state to decide what relations among its members are 
 of sufficient public interest to come under governmental regulation, 3 
 and to draw up rules by which the free action of all is limited to a 
 certain degree so that the rights of all in the remaining field of 
 activity may be properly safeguarded. 4 It also compels the state to 
 decide what its own relations to its members shall be and where, 
 if at all, 6 the line shall be drawn between the authority that may 
 legally be exercised by its government arid the freedom of its indi- 
 viduals from governmental interference. 6 Whatever field is thus 
 set aside to each individual within which, under the protection of 
 law, he may live and act without molestation by individuals or by 
 government is the sphere of civil liberty for that individual. The 
 conditions obtaining at any given time in each state will determine 
 
 1 Scherger, op. cit., Part II ; Dealey, Development of the State, Part III. 
 
 2 Lowell, Essays on Government, No. II ; Willoughby, Nature of the State, 
 pp. 312-313. 
 
 8 Lee, Historical Jurisprudence, pp. 1-5. 
 
 4 This is the field covered by private law, by which the state regulates the 
 relations among individuals. See Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence, Part I, 
 pp. 121-124, and Part II. 
 
 6 The conception of a sphere of civil liberty into which the government may 
 not legally enter is of recent origin. Previous to the rise of the modern states, all 
 authority was located in the government, against which the individual had no legal 
 defense. See Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 174-177 
 
 This is the field covered by public law, by which the state regulates its rela- 
 tion to its individuals. See Holland, op. cit., Part III. 
 
204 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 what adjustment, of authority and freedom the best interests of the 
 state and of its individual members demand. 
 
 322. Equality before the law. Civil liberty, as developed in 
 the more advanced states, further includes the conception that, 
 within the field over which the authority of the state is. exercised 
 and the freedom of the individual correspondingly limited, all 
 should be on equal terms, or should be " equal before the law." 1 
 Special' rights, privileges, or immunities granted to certain classes 
 or persons, no matter upon what basis such distinctions rest, are 
 necessarily limitations on the liberties of those not so treated. Civil 
 liberty, in its perfect form, therefore, would involve a sphere of 
 individual freedom, created and safeguarded by the state, for each 
 of its members against encroachment at the hands of other indi- 
 viduals and of the government ; with the further guarantee of equal 
 treatment for all in such matters as come under governmental 
 authority. By the development of written laws and constitutions, 
 the rights of men against their fellows and against their political 
 machinery have been given a definite and permanent legal form 
 and guarantee. For the arbitrary and uncertain action of primitive 
 political authority has been substituted a more or less certain and 
 uniform regulation of public affairs. By a corresponding develop-, 
 ment away from the inequalities among men, which early political 
 existence created, an equal status, in some respects at least, before 
 these legal guarantees has been secured for a growing proportion 
 of the state's population. A certain freedom from interference 
 established by law and a relative equality before that law are the 
 results of a long period of political evolution. 
 
 323. Problems of political organization. The development of 
 the correlative of individual freedom, political authority, involves 
 not only the determination of the scope of such authority, 2 but also 
 of the nature of its organization. The method by which the will 
 of the state should be expressed and the machinery through which 
 it should be administered have been among the most perplexing 
 problems in political evolution. The nature of governmental organs, 
 the method of their creation, their personnel, their respective powers, 
 
 1 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, chap, xxiii. 
 
 2 See below, Chapter IX. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 205 
 
 the relation of central to local organs when the state grew too large 
 for a single organization to exercise jurisdiction over its entire area, 1 
 the relations between legislative, administrative, and judicial organs 
 when the business of government became too complex for a single 
 organ to undertake its manifold details, 2 — these were among the 
 practical difficulties that arose in the course of governmental devel- 
 opment. Of especial importance in political history has been the 
 question of the share of the people in government, that is, the pro- 
 portion of the entire population that might at any time or in any 
 way exercise political authority, either directly by making their will 
 and their actions those of the state, or indirectly by choosing offi- 
 cials or representatives and influencing or controlling their wills 
 and their actions. 3 
 
 324. Evolution of political liberty. Governing authority, exer- 
 cised at first by heads of family groups, by priestly representatives 
 of the gods, or by successful leaders in war, and later by special 
 classes based on birth or wealth or occupation, was gradually ex- 
 tended to a considerable number within the state, who, as warriors, 
 taxpayers, or laborers, learned their strength and demanded a voice 
 in determining public policy. 4 Not only equality before a definite 
 law, but also a share in formulating and administering that law was 
 desired. After much strife and many failures, a system of organi- 
 zation by which a fair proportion of the state's members could 
 take part in political activities was developed in certain small 
 and favored regions. 5 For a long time, however, every attempt to 
 extend this system to larger areas failed ; and political integration, 
 resulting from conquest or from the growth of common interests, 
 was accompanied by a reversion to the loosely organized, despotic 
 system under which the members of the state were again subor- 
 dinated to the authority of a narrow and powerful privileged group. 
 
 1 Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, Vol. I, Bk. I, chap, vi ; Politics 
 and Administration, chap. iii. 
 
 2 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk.VII, chaps, v-vii ; Laveleye, Le Gouverne- 
 ment dans la democratic, Vol. I, Bk. VII, chap. i. 
 
 3 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, chap, xxvii. 
 
 4 Wilson, The State, chap, i ; Woolsey, Political Science, Vol. II, Part III, 
 chap. vi. 
 
 6 For example, in Athens, and in Rome under the Republic. See Wilson, 
 op. cit., chaps, ii-iii. 
 
206 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Under this form of organization, political stability and political prog- 
 ress were alike impossible. States tended toward despotism or 
 toward anarchy and perished as the result of stagnation, revolution, 
 or conquest. 
 
 325. Popular sovereignty. The ideal adjustment of authority 
 and freedom requires a sphere of civil liberty sufficient to secure 
 the individual interests of each citizen, and a governmental organi- 
 zation whose commands are definitely expressed and authoritatively 
 enforced. At the same time there must be a minimum amount of 
 friction between government and citizen in order to maintain the 
 stability of the state. Modern states have met this condition by 
 placing sovereignty and freedom in the same hands. The mass of 
 people are given, not only a sphere of freedom, but also a share in 
 authority. 1 Thus they, directly or indirectly, as government, create 
 the rights and enforce the obligations which they possess as citi- 
 zens, — in a word, they govern themselves. By a broad electorate, 
 by frequent elections, by the initiative and referendum, and by a sys- 
 tem of local self-government, the mass of the people retain a direct 
 share in political power. By combining local self-government 
 in small units with representative government over large units, 2 
 and by the principle of federation, 3 a workable organization of 
 popular authority, even over the extended area of national states, 
 is secured. To protect the people against hasty prejudices, authority 
 is distributed among many organs, each of which acts as a check 
 upon the unlimited authority of the others. 4 Finally, by written 
 constitutions, usually difficult to change, a greater stability of organi- 
 zation is secured. 5 In this way the more advanced states of the 
 present day reconcile sovereignty and liberty. Political liberty as 
 well as civil liberty is wide in extent, and the conflict between 
 authority and freedom is largely avoided, since rights are self- 
 created and self-enforced. 6 
 
 1 Maine, Popular Government ; Lecky, Democracy and Liberty. 
 
 2 Jellinek, Recht des modernen Staates, Bk. Ill, chap, xvii ; Garner, Intro- 
 duction to Political Science, pp. 469-488. 
 
 8 Freeman, History of Federal Government ; Dicey, Law of the Constitution, 
 chap. iv. 
 
 4 Garner, op. cit., chap. xiii. 
 
 6 Borgeaud, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions in Europe and America. 
 
 6 Seelev, Introduction to Political Science, Lecture VII, 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 207 
 
 326. Political readjustment. Frequent readjustments of political 
 organization must, however, be made from time to time as new 
 classes are admitted to political privileges or as new peoples must 
 be educated to a consciousness of their political duties and respon- 
 sibilities. Adjustment between central and local organs takes place 
 as the area of the statfi widens or contracts ; as interests, formerly 
 narrow, expand and demand more uniform treatment or more 
 powerful regulation ; 1 and as new units of political organization 
 come into prominence and create new problems of political organi- 
 zation and function. Of this latter class the recent rise of great 
 cities furnishes the best example. 2 The relation between the people 
 and their representatives and officials may be disturbed by the 
 formation of extralegal associations, such as political parties, which 
 take over the selection of candidates and the shaping of policies ; 3 
 or by the entrance into politics of private or corporate interests 
 powerful enough to exert a control over government. 4 In such 
 cases the people may be compelled to assume a more direct exer- 
 cise of political power, 5 or to incorporate these private organizations 
 into their regular governmental machinery, or to bring them under 
 governmental regulation. The authority of the state both in its 
 scope and in its structure changes as conditions change in accord- 
 ance with the general principles of social evolution. 
 
 II. Evolution of Civil Liberty 
 
 327. Necessity of early despotisms. The primary purpose of 
 the state was the establishment of peace and law among individuals 
 and the maintenance of security against external attack. The first 
 difficult step out of barbarism was secured only by creating a public 
 
 1 For example, railways, interstate commerce, and trusts in the United States. 
 See Burton, Corporations and the State; GoodnOw, Social Reform and the 
 Constitution. 
 
 2 Goodnow, Municipal Government ; Fairlie, Municipal Administration ; Rowe, 
 Problems of City Government. 
 
 8 Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Party System. 
 
 4 Goodnow, Politics and Administration, chaps, vi-viii ; Beard, American Gov- 
 ernment and Politics, pp. 663-672 ; Senate Reports, 53d Congress, 2d Session, 
 Vol. X, pp. 655 ff. 
 
 6 Beard and Schultz, Documents on the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall. 
 
208 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 control so powerful and arbitrary that it left little room for indi- 
 vidual freedom. 1 While the actual extent of the authority exercised 
 by primitive government was not large, the rules defining its scope 
 and manner of exercise were indefinite, and no field of individual 
 action was exempt from its possible encroachment. As civilization 
 advanced, this arbitrary and extensive control became irksome. 
 The disposition to obey law and observe order, created by the dis- 
 ciplinary influence of centuries of rigid rules, made it necessary for 
 the state, if it wished to avoid stagnation, to mark out a sphere of 
 free, individual action, narrow at first, within which the govern- 
 ment must refrain from interference and must prevent interference 
 from any other quarter. 2 
 
 328. Oriental despotism. In the Oriental empires personal 
 liberty was unknown, the life, actions, and property of all subjects 
 being at the mercy of an all-powerful ruling class. The theocratic 
 element in the state crushed individual will under a universal sub- 
 jection to divine will ; the despotic element in the state vested its 
 whole authority in a government of unlimited power. 3 " At times 
 certain checks upon the exercise of autocratic power may have 
 been attempted, but in almost universal practice the ruler's will 
 knew no hindrances other than those arising from his own feelings 
 of humanity, his self-interest, his religious superstitions, or the 
 knowledge that there were limits to the endurance of even the 
 most submissive of subjects." 4 
 
 329. Greek conception of liberty. The Greeks identified liberty 
 with the right of citizens to share in government, but there was 
 no part of the life of citizens into which the government might 
 not enter. 5 The Greek was primarily a member of the state, 
 which was conceived as having no existence outside the lives of 
 its citizens and having no interests contrary to theirs. The state 
 was the perfect social whole through which the individual devel- 
 oped his highest powers and lived a complete life. It was a sort 
 of universal person composed of the combined personalities of all 
 
 1 Bagehot, Physics and Politics, p. 21. 
 
 2 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 86-89. 
 8 Maine, Early History of Institutions. 
 
 4 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, p. 18. 
 
 5 Lieber, Political Ethics, Bk. II, chap. iii. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 209 
 
 its citizens. 1 That the individual could have rights outside the 
 state or could desire a sphere of action free from state control was 
 inconceivable. The individual was completely subordinated to the 
 state, not in a forced subjection to an external power, but in a 
 natural absorption in a higher self in whose life he participated. 
 Public and private rights were, therefore, not distinguished, and 
 civic freedom was impossible. 2 
 
 330. Roman conception of liberty. The Roman jurists first de- 
 veloped the distinction between public and private rights. 3 The 
 citizen was viewed as having definite rights and as possessing a 
 sphere of freedom not to be interfered with by other citizens or by 
 the state itself. Individual and state were separated, having recip- 
 rocal rights and duties ; and the main purpose of the state was the 
 establishment and protection of the private rights of its individuals. 4 
 In Roman political thinking, however, the state was identified with 
 the aggregate of its citizens, no distinction being made between 
 the state as an entity apart from its citizens nor between the will 
 of the state and the will of the people. The only liberty that the 
 Roman thought of was that of protection in the exercise of those 
 rights which the law defined. 5 The individualistic conception of 
 civil liberty as a field of natural rights possessed by the individual 
 as such was never developed, and in actual practice the individual 
 was left very much at the mercy of the state, whose regulations 
 entered into almost every phase of his life. 6 
 
 331. Liberty in the Middle Ages. The distinction between public 
 and private rights, worked out by Rome, was destroyed in the 
 Middle Ages by the system of feudalism, which associated the 
 exercise of sovereignty with the possession of property. The hold- 
 ing of land carried with it jurisdiction over those living upon the 
 land. 7 The state as a legal organization no longer existed, and 
 government was regarded, not as a public authority, but as a private 
 possession. Rights and duties were based upon contract between 
 
 1 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, chaps, i-riii. 
 
 2 Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 54-65. 8 Justinian, Institutes, I, 1,4. 
 4 Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 215-217. 
 
 B Dunning, op. cit., pp. 106-129; Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 215-244. 
 
 6 Laboulaye, L'fitat et ses limites, pp. 7-17,. 
 
 7 Wilson, The State, chap. v. 
 
210 PROBLEMS I"N POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 lord and vassal or between master and serf, and were founded 
 upon personal, not political, relations. 1 Liberty existed only as 
 exemptions from burdens or duties, secured separately by certain 
 classes or places. In the confused and tyrannical jurisdictions of 
 church and state, and in the complete subjection of the mass of 
 serfs, any clear conception of civil liberty, except for the privileged 
 classes, was impossible ; although the foundations for modern per- 
 sonal freedom were being laid through the teachings of Christianity 
 and the individualistic ideals of the Teutonic conquerors. 2 
 
 332. Christianity and civil liberty. Christianity differed from 
 the ancient religions in that it had no necessary relation to the 
 state. It appealed to the individual as a man, not to the citizen 
 obeying a government supported by divine sanction ; and to the 
 individuals of all the world, not to the members of a single group 
 held together by a narrow common worship. 3 It also emphasized 
 obedience to God rather than to man ; hence the support that states 
 and their governments received from the earlier state religions was 
 removed. For a time during the Middle Ages the Christian church, 
 extending its doctrines by force, became an instrument of oppres- 
 sion. 4 Freedom of thought was extinguished and heresy treated as 
 the greatest of crimes. The Protestant Reformation of the six- 
 teenth century, however, attacked the principle of authority, 5 de- 
 manded freedom of conscience, and led gradually to a religious 
 toleration that aided the growing conception that there might exist 
 a sphere of individual rights within which interference from any 
 external source should not be tolerated. 6 
 
 333. Teutonic ideals of liberty. In striking contrast to the 
 Roman emphasis on the sovereignty of the state, the Teutonic 
 barbarians, who overthrew the Roman Empire, believed in the 
 freedom of the individual. They, chose their own chiefs and 
 
 1 Scherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, pp. 2, 34-37. 
 
 2 Lieber, On Civil Liberty, pp. 32-36 ; Wilson, The State, pp. 583-585. 
 8 Scherger, op. cit., pp. 3-4. 
 
 4 Lea, History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages, Vol. I, chap, i ; Robin- 
 son, History of Western Europe, pp. 201-225. 
 
 6 Fisher, History of the Reformation, chap, i ; Guizot, History of Civilization, 
 Lecture XII. 
 
 6 Merriam, American Political Theories, chap, i ; Dunning, Political Theories : 
 From Luther to Montesquieu, chaps, i, vii. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 211 
 
 resisted all authority that was not self-imposed ; x they disliked 
 city life ; they opposed the payment of taxes as being suggestive 
 of subservience. The individualistic anarchy of feudalism and the 
 individualistic religious spirit exhibited in the Protestant Reforma- 
 tion were manifestations of the Teutonic genius ; and our modern 
 liberty is primarily their contribution to political development. 2 
 
 334. Natural rights. Of even greater importance, perhaps, was 
 ■ the influence of the theory of natural law and natural rights, 
 which reached its highest development at the time when modern 
 civil liberty was being established. 3 The conception that the source 
 of law was in nature and in reason, rather than in the authority of 
 a humanly established public organization, and that the individual 
 possessed certain absolute, natural, and inalienable rights to life, 
 liberty, property, the pursuit of happiness, etc., which were ante- 
 cedent to the formation of the state, 4 led logically to the idea that 
 the chief duty of the state was to define and protect these rights 
 against interference at the hands of individuals and of .government. 
 This theory, one of the oldest and most powerful conceptions in 
 the history of human thought, originated in early Greek philosophy, 
 passed into Roman jurisprudence, thence into the literature of the 
 Middle Ages, was given prominence in the writings of the ecclesi- 
 astics who opposed the Reformation, was worked into a system by 
 Grotius, Pufendorf, and Locke in the seventeenth century, and, 
 during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the teachings 
 of Wolff, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, Blackstone, Samuel 
 Adams, Madison, and Jefferson, served as the theoretical basis of 
 revolution 5 and as the creed of modern liberty and democracy. 6 
 A parallel reaction against the paternalism of the despotic mon- 
 archies of the eighteenth century and a desire to limit to a mini- 
 mum the state's interference in the lives of individuals were 
 
 1 Tacitus, Germania, cc. 11-12. 
 
 2 Laurent, Etudes sur l'histoire de l'humanit^. 
 
 8 Pulszky, Theory of Law and Civil Society, pp. 77-83 ; Taylor, The Medieval 
 Mind, Vol. II, chap, xxxiii ; Ritchie, Natural Rights, chap, v ; Bryce, Studies in 
 History and Jurisprudence, pp. 546-606. 
 
 4 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 89-115. 
 
 6 M6rriam, op. cit, chap. ii. 
 
 6 Scherger, op. cit., Part I ; Dunning, Political Theories, Index, " Natural 
 Law" and "Natural Rights." 
 
212 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 represented in the writings of Kant, Fichte, 1 Humboldt, Laboulaye, 
 Leroy-Beaulieu, Mill, and Spencer. 
 
 335. Civil liberty in the national state. An additional aid to 
 the reestablishment of the distinction between public and private 
 rights and to the creation of a sphere of civil liberty were the 
 destruction of feudalism and the formation of national states. In 
 the small areas of the ancient city states and of the medieval feudal 
 groups, the control of the community over the individual was al- 
 most absolute ; but as the extent of territory and the number of 
 inhabitants increased, the control of the state over its citizens was 
 likely to diminish. The impossibility of all taking direct part in 
 government and the necessity or delegating authority to a few made 
 more evident the distinction between people and government, and 
 gave rise to the idea of a sphere of individual interests apart from 
 those of the people as a whole. That is, the very conditions which 
 until recently tended to destroy political liberty furnished the 
 opportunity .for the establishment of civil liberty. It was, accord- 
 ingly, in the Roman Empire that the idea of private rights first 
 arose ; and it was in England, the state in which feudalism had 
 least hold and in which a national spirit and a national organiza- 
 tion were first developed, that modern civil liberty originated. 2 
 
 336. Civil liberty in England. Magna Charta, the Habeas Corpus 
 Act, the Petition of Right, and the Bill of Rights are examples of 
 declarations of popular rights drawn up by Englishmen during the 
 course of their political evolution. 3 The development of the princi- 
 ples of civil liberty in England was not so much the result of abstract 
 conceptions of natural rights as it was of an attempt of the English 
 nobility and people, working in harmony, to weaken the preroga- 
 tives of the English king, the strongest and therefore the most dan- 
 gerous power in the state, to secure redress against certain specific 
 grievances, and to obtain a guarantee for the possession of privileges 
 which experience showed most necessary to individual development. 4 
 
 1 In his later writings, Fichte modified his earlier individualistic views. See 
 his Der geschlossene Handelsstaat. 
 
 2 Wilson, The State, pp. 557-560 ; Lieber, On Civil Liberty, chap. v. 
 8 Hill, Liberty Documents, chaps, i-x. 
 
 4 Ogg, Governments of Europe, chaps, i-ii ; Medley, English Constitutional 
 History, chap. ix. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 213 
 
 337. Civil liberty in the American colonies. The ideas of civil 
 liberty known as the fundamental rights of Englishmen were 
 brought to America by the early settlers, 1 many of whom repre- 
 sented that element in England most interested in the maintenance 
 of such rights ; 2 and under the favorable conditions existing in the 
 new environment 'and aided by a prevalent belief in the theory 
 of natural rights, these principles received a further development 
 and a more direct application in practical pontics. 3 The people of 
 the American colonies, Massachusetts and Virginia taking the 
 lead, drew up declarations of rights which they claimed to possess 
 as men. 4 These declarations, later called " bills of rights," were 
 also prefixed to the state constitutions drawn up during the Revo- 
 lutionary period ; and the new idea of incorporating such state- 
 ments into political programs and into the fundamental written 
 documents by which the organization and functions of government 
 were prescribed was thus added. This idea spread to France dur- 
 ing the French Revolution, and the Declaration of the Rights of 
 Man and of Citizen, drawn up by the National Assembly in 1789 
 and prefixed to the constitution of 1791, was of enormous impor- 
 tance in the evolution of civil liberty on the continent. 6 A concise 
 and well-stated bill of rights was added, in the form of ten amend- 
 ments, to the Constitution of the United States in 1791 ; 6 and 
 the Parliament of Frankfurt, which attempted prematurely to form 
 
 1 The charter granted by James I to the London Company in 1606 contained 
 the following guarantee : 
 
 Also, we do, for us, our heirs, and successors, declare, by these presents, that all and 
 every 1 the persons, being our subjects, which shall dwell and inhabit within every and any 
 of the said several colonies and plantations, and every of their children, which shall happen 
 to be born within any of the limits and precincts of the said several colonies and plantations, 
 shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunities within any of our other domin- 
 ions, to all intents and purposes, as if they had been abiding and born, within this our realm 
 of England or any other of our said dominions. 
 
 See MacDonald, Select Charters, p. 8. 
 
 2 Merriam, American Political Theories, chap. i. 
 
 8 Hart, Actual Government, pp. 21-30 ; Ford, Rise and Growth of American 
 Politics, chaps, i-ii. 
 
 4 Scherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, Part III ; Hill, op. cit, chap. xiii. 
 
 5 Anderson, Constitutions and Documents, No. 15 ; Scherger, op. cit., Part IV. 
 
 6 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, pp. 184-252 ; Ames, Pro- 
 posed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, pp. 183 ff. ; Beard, 
 American Government and Politics, pp. 63-65. 
 
214 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 a united Germany, 1 drew up a declaration of fundamental rights 
 in 1849. The constitutions of many states now contain similar 
 guarantees of civil liberty. 
 
 338. Present conception of civil liberty. The theory of natural 
 rights, one of the most potent factors in the creation of modern 
 liberty, is no longer held. 2 The state is now considered the sole 
 source of individual rights, the only creator and protector of civil 
 liberty. The individualism that considered the state a necessary 
 evil, whose activities should be restricted to the narrowest limits, 
 is also abandoned, and the liberty of the individual is in many 
 ways being diminished by the expansion of governmental inter- 
 ference. The idea that it is the duty of the state to increase the 
 general welfare of its people by public action, even though such 
 action may narrow the freedom of its individual members, now 
 holds sway. 3 A considerable sphere of civil freedom, nevertheless, 
 remains to the individual. While the elements of individual liberty 
 are not identical in all states 4 and the constitutional guarantees 
 against governmental encroachment show considerable variation, 
 a fair degree of uniformity has been reached in the sphere set 
 apart for free action by leading modern states. The elements of 
 civil liberty are more generally and uniformly recognized than the 
 elements of political rights. The rights of the individual to free- 
 dom of the person, equality before the law, security of private 
 property, freedom of opinion and of its expression, and freedom of 
 conscience are among the rights 5 generally recognized and fairly 
 well safeguarded. 
 
 339. Evolution of legal equality. Equality before the law Jias 
 been secured with great difficulty and is still somewhat relative in 
 nature. In ancient times the general principle that rights were 
 possessed only by members of the narrow tribal groups and that 
 
 1 Hazen, Europe since 181 5, pp. 183-185; Henderson, Short History of Ger- 
 many, Vol. II, pp. 352-369. 
 
 2 Ritchie, Natural Rights ; Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 103-1 18. 
 8 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 291-293. 
 
 4 Compare the bill of rights contained in Articles 62-79 0I tne Russian Con- 
 stitution of 1906 with the first ten amendments to the American Constitution. 
 See Jahrbuch des offentlichen Rechts, Vol. II (1908), pp. 423 ff. 
 
 6 On the evolution of religious liberty and liberty of the press in England, see 
 Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional History, pp. 587-605. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 215 
 
 no obligations were owed to aliens or strangers, together with the 
 universal prevalence of slavery, which removed a numerous class 
 from the possession of civil rights, prevented any degree of equality. 
 'The class distinctions of feudalism, the different legal status of 
 noble, freeman, and serf, 1 and the right of the clergy to be tried 
 under .separate law in their own courts 2 likewise destroyed this 
 phase of civil liberty. Only in the modern state, in which slavery 
 and serfdom have been abolished, in which aliens are granted 
 practically the same civil rights as citizens, and in which class dis- 
 tinctions, in so far as they affect legal status, have been largely 
 destroyed, is the principle of equality conceivable. Absolute equal- 
 ity is, however, as impossible of obtainment as absolute liberty. 
 Inequality is a law of nature, and equality before the law merely 
 means that the state will apply impartially such law as exists. It 
 does not imply that the law itself is just or that any degree of 
 equality among individuals is secured by the application of the 
 law. The degree to which it is possible or desirable for the state 
 to secure physical, intellectual, moral, social, and economic equality 
 among its citizens opens up many difficult questions. 3 
 
 III. Organization of Authority 
 
 340. Nature of problem. The organization of authority within 
 the state involves the broad problem of the nature and make-up 
 of governmental machinery. The will of the state must be formu- 
 lated and administered by some of its members, who are selected, 
 according to some principle or method, who are grouped into a 
 system of political organs with various duties and powers, and who 
 are authorized to act in the name of the state. 4 In the historical 
 development of government, two general lines of evolution may be 
 traced. 
 
 1 Eraerton, Introduction to the Middle Ages, pp. 80, 88. 
 
 2 Lee, Historical Jurisprudence, chap, xii ; Emerton, Medieval Europe, 
 pp. 582-592. 
 
 8 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, chap, xxvi ; Spargo and Arner, 
 Elements of Socialism, pp. 207-211. 
 
 4 Dealey, op-, cit., pp. 127-145; Jellinek, Recht des modernen Staates, 
 pp. 152-155. 
 
216 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 341. Extension of political authority of the people. In the first 
 place, a constantly increasing proportion of the state's population 
 has secured a share, and a growing share, in the exercise of politi- 
 cal authority. In early states large numbers of individuals, occupy- 
 ing the position of slaves, serfs, aliens, or unprivileged classes, 
 had no voice in the management of public affairs. 1 Even within 
 the active citizen class, governing power was concentrated in the 
 hands of a few, upon whose actions little influence could be exerted 
 and few effective checks placed. 2 In modern states political power 
 is widely distributed. A fair proportion of the entire membership 
 of the state shares, at least in a small degree, in the direct exercise 
 of governing authority, and the organs that carry on the ordinary 
 business of the state show extensive subdivision according to 
 function performed and to area of jurisdiction, so that a consider- 
 able number of citizens devote their entire time to public service. 3 
 Among these organs power is distributed in such a way as to pre- 
 vent any from becoming tyrannical ; 4 and over the whole, through 
 elections, referendums, party policies, and public opinion, the in- 
 fluence, direct or indirect, of the general citizen body is constantly 
 exerted. 5 
 
 342. Extension of popular government over large areas. In the 
 second place, the system of popular government has been applied 
 over constantly widening areas. 6 The first attempts to extend polit- 
 ical power to any considerable proportion of the state's member- 
 ship were workable only in small areas. Direct participation in a 
 general assembly seemed the only practicable method of self- 
 government ; 7 and territorial expansion or the incorporation of 
 additional population broke down the principle of popular control 
 
 1 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. II, chaps, vii-xviii. 
 
 2 Ibid. Bk. VI, chaps, vi-xix. 
 
 3 Even in the city state of Athens it is estimated that in the time of Pericles 
 (444-429 B.C.) no less than twenty thousand Athenians found employment in the 
 service of the city as soldiers, jurymen, councilors, or magistrates. See Wilson, 
 The State, p. 83. The federal government of the United States demands the serv- 
 ices of about three hundred fifty thousand persons in its administrative depart- 
 ments alone. See Beard, American Government and Politics, p. 223. 
 
 4 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Bk. XI, chap, iv ; Blackstone, Commentaries, 
 Bk. I, chap. ii. s Dealey, Development of the State, pp.. 220-230. 
 
 6 Cooley, Social Organization, chap. xi. 
 
 7 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 64-85, 91-113. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 217 
 
 and caused a reversion to the earlier despotic systems in which 
 certain classes within the state or me peoples in certain parts of 
 the state were excluded from any participation in politics. 1 Modern 
 states, by extending citizenship to all classes, by establishing a wide 
 electorate, by the devices of representation, local self-government, 
 and federation, by the adoption of written constitutions, and by the 
 formation of national political parties, have worked out a system 
 of governmental organization within which popular government 
 may be maintained, regardless of the size of the state. 2 
 
 343. Factors contributing to political liberty. It is at once 
 obvious that certain changes in other factors of human evolution 
 were largely responsible for these developments, and that any pre- 
 mature attempt to extend political rights among the people 3 or 
 to extend a system of popular government over too large an area 
 would be dangerous to political stability and progress. A consider- 
 able degree of intelligence and of political consciousness among 
 the masses must exist before they can secure for themselves or can 
 safely be intrusted with political power. As long as slavery, serf- 
 dom, or systems of caste sharply divided the population, as long 
 as priests controlled knowledge and tyrannized over men's minds 
 through superstitious fear, as long as the accident of birth bestowed 
 governing authority upon a group of nobility, and as long as a mil- 
 itary class monopolized force through their control of arms and 
 organization, no widespread and equable distribution of govern- 
 mental authority was possible. Theocracies and despotisms, based 
 upon fear and force, were perhaps needed at first to tame the an- 
 archistic nature of primitive man ; but in the evolution of the state, 
 progress has been secured by the gradual destruction of those once 
 useful systems. 4 Whatever tended to break ^own the rigidity of 
 the old organizations, to attack the sanctions upon which their 
 authority rested, or to destroy the inequalities and class distinc- 
 tions among their individuals aided the rise of popular sovereignty. 
 
 1 For example, in the Hellenic world under Alexander and in the Roman 
 Empire. See Mahaffy, Story of Alexander's Empire, chaps, i-iv ; Wilson, op. cit, 
 
 PP- iiS-^- 
 
 2 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 219-230; Laveleye, Gouverne- 
 ment dans la democratic ; Dealey, op. cit., chap. xv. 
 
 8 For example, in France at the time of the Revolution. See Brownell, French 
 Traits, chap. ix. 4 Bagehot, Physics and Politics, chaps, v-vi. 
 
218 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 The gradual diffusion of intelligence and of wealth, the rise of 
 intellectual and religious freedom and of economic opportunity, 
 the emancipation of the individual in other respects, were natu- 
 rally accompanied by dissatisfaction with a political system monop- 
 olized by the few, and led to the gradual extension of political 
 privileges to the masses. 1 
 
 344. Democratic development not continuous. Many forces con- 
 tributed to this process, which shows by no means a uniform and 
 continuous development. Elements valuable in destroying the sur- 
 viving traces of earlier tyrannies created new ones of their own. 
 Thus Christianity, an important factor in the ultimate establish- 
 ment of modern popular sovereignty, 2 created a powerful privileged 
 class in the medieval clergy, 3 and until recently upheld absolute 
 monarchy by its theory of the divine right of kings. 4 So the rise 
 of modern industry and trade, of a money economy and a capital- 
 istic method of production, 5 valuable in destroying the narrow feu- 
 dal regime and in elevating the serfs to the position of free laborers 
 and tenants, 6 has resulted in an industrial tyranny of capital over 
 labor and in the rise of a new class consciousness and class* hatred 
 that is one of the chief dangers in modern democracies. 7 
 
 345. Democratic progress through tyrannies. Similarly, the first 
 efforts of the people to seize political power usually resulted in the 
 substitution of one form of tyranny for another. Established polit- 
 ical authority could be successfully attacked and overthrown by the 
 masses only in proportion as they were able to work together, 
 to organize, to follow leadership. Unorganized mobs or local 
 riots never accomplished a great revolution. But in proportion as 
 the people organized to accomplish successfully their purposes, 
 they placed themsetyes under the control of the leaders of their 
 
 1 Cleveland, Growth of Democracy ; Borgeaud, Rise of Modern Democracy. 
 
 2 Scherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, pp. 89-147 ; Laurent, Etudes sur 
 l'histoire de l'humanite, Vol. IV, chap. iii. 
 
 ' 8 Emerton, Medieval Europe, chap, xvi ; Robinson/History of Western Europe, 
 chap, xvi ; Prevost, L'Eglise et les campagnes au moyen age. 
 4 Figgis, Theory of the Divine Right of Kings. 
 6 Hobson, Evolution of Modern Capitalism. 
 
 6 Cunningham, Western Civilization : Modern Times, Bk. VI. 
 
 7 Ghent, Mass and Class ; London, War of the Classes ; Kautsky, The Class 
 Struggle. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE • 219 
 
 organization. Aristocracy usually gave way to democracy through 
 the intermediate stage of a dictatorship. Oligarchy in Athens was 
 followed by the tyrants before democracy was secured. 1 As the 
 aristocratic control of the feudal nobility and clergy weakened, the 
 people of the rising national states did not at once secure control 
 of their governments. Several centuries of absolute monarchy came 
 first. 2 Cromwell in England and Napoleon in France obtained 
 their enormous powers as leaders of popular uprisings directed 
 against the rule of privileged groups. In all these cases, however, 
 what appeared retrogression toward despotic authority was in real- 
 ity a natural stage in the evolution of popular government. The 
 authority of the new rulers rested upon the people by whose aid it 
 was secured. Its concentration in the hands of a single person 
 made it easier to recognize and to attack ; and the gradual process 
 by which self-government was finally secured through a peaceful 
 and legal adjustment was hastened by the temporary authority of 
 the dictator created by the original revolutionary movement. 
 
 346. Factors contributing to territorial expansion of democracy. 
 Similarly, the extension of popular government over large areas 
 was made possible, not only by the application of certain devices of 
 government, — elections, representation, and the like, — but even 
 more by improvements in the means of communication and trans- 
 portation, which broke down the narrowness and isolation of earlier 
 political units. The invention of printing, 3 the building of railroads 
 and of steamships, the laying of telegraph and cable lines, 4 and the 
 use of machinery in a large-scale production, which draws raw ma- 
 terials from widely scattered sources, which assembles many persons 
 in factories and towns, 5 and which seeks markets in all parts of the 
 world, — these were potent factors in the development of national 
 
 1 Mahaffy, Problems in Greek History, pp. 78-86 ; Greenidge, Greek Constitu- 
 tional History, pp. 27-35. 
 
 2 Stephens, Syllabus of Lectures on Modern European History, Lecture LXI ; 
 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chap. x. 
 
 8 Whitcomb, History of Modern Europe, pp. 28-29 ; De Vinne, Invention of 
 Printing. 
 
 4 Samuelson, Civilization of our Day, pp. 91-138 ; Robinson and Beard, op. cit., 
 Vol. II, pp. 318-328. 
 
 6 Hobson, op. cit., chap, xvii ; Robinson and Beard, op. cit., Vol. II, chap, xviii ; 
 Rowe, Problems of City Government, chaps, i-v. 
 
220 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 democracies. In all large states established prior to the last few 
 centuries, any weakening of the despotic authority of their rulers 
 or any attempts to permit self-government were followed by revolts 
 and political disintegration as the particularistic interests, far more 
 powerful than any common interests, manifested themselves. Even 
 as late as the eighteenth century, Montesquieu held that republican 
 government is appropriate only to small territories ; monarchic gov- 
 ernment, to territory of modern extent; and despotism, to very 
 great regions ; and that expansion is fatal to self-government. 1 At 
 present, with an economic system of production and distribution 
 that unites vast numbers and widespread areas into a complicated 
 system of interdependence, and with the means for diffusing com- 
 mon ideas and creating a common public opinion over almost un- 
 limited areas, political consciousness rests on a broad basis and in 
 some respects is practically world-wide. 2 
 
 347. Limitations upon democracy. In both the extension of a 
 share in governmental authority to all classes within the state and 
 the extension of popular government over large areas, compromises 
 are demanded, there being at any given time in each state a point 
 of diminishing political returns beyond which it is not safe to widen 
 democracy within or to expand democracy without. Efficiency in 
 administration and consistency and far-sightedness in governmental 
 policy may often be better secured in a government controlled by a 
 small, aristocratic, and public-spirited class 3 than in a democracy 
 with its extravagance, prejudices, and waves of emotional public 
 sentiment. 4 Against the efficiency of government by the select and 
 experienced few must be placed, however, the political education 
 and the leveling upward that result from popular control of gov- 
 ernment. 5 Besides, in an aristocratic system, 6 even if the class in 
 
 1 Spirit of the Laws, Bk. VIII, chaps, xvi-xx. Montesquieu believed, however, 
 that a federation of small republics might solve the difficulty. Ibid. Bk. IX, chap. i. 
 See also Jellinek, Recht des modernen Staates, p. 74 ; Mill, Representative Gov- 
 ernment, chap. xvii. 
 
 2 For a brilliant study of the connection between the formation of an economic 
 surplus and the rise of democracy, see Weyl, The New Democracy, chap. xiii. 
 
 8 Bagehot, .English Constitution, pp. 260-266. 
 
 4 Maine, Popular Government ; Lilly, First Principles in Politics, pp. 181-183. 
 
 5 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 197-200. 
 
 6 De Parieu, Principes de la science politique, chap. iii. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 221 
 
 control refrains from using its power deliberately for its own advan- 
 tage, the masses dread authority in which they have no share, 1 and 
 have little of that enthusiastic national spirit, that interest in public 
 affairs, and that voluntary respect for law and order that are found 
 in self-governed communities and that stable and satisfactory polit- 
 ical life requires. 
 
 348. Compromises needed. Hence, depending upon conditions 
 in each state and upon the relative importance of efficient govern- 
 ment, which would exclude many from participation, and of the 
 creation of an intelligent and interested citizen body who, through 
 many mistakes, are learning self-government, each state must de- 
 termine the proportion of its population who may share in govern- 
 ment and the amount of the share of each. In the same way, the 
 efficiency of a centralized, bureaucratic system in governing large 
 areas must be set against the deadening influence of routine, the 
 danger of revolt, the disregard of local differences, and the lack 
 of patriotism in the provinces which can be remedied only by ex- 
 tending popular government even into the remote parts of the 
 largest empires. 2 Here again the degree of intelligence among 
 the various parts of the population and the relative need for effi- 
 cient administration and for political education must determine the 
 adjustment. 3 
 
 349. Summary. The historical evolution of government, there- 
 fore, after authority was once established and peace, order, and 
 safety were secured under law, was largely occupied with the prob- 
 lems of extending a share in government to as many as possible 
 
 1 It is a significant fact that individualism was associated with democracy when 
 government was controlled by the few and that socialism is associated with de- 
 mocracy now that government is in the hands of the many. The expansion of 
 political liberty has thus fundamentally modified the conception of the proper 
 extent of civil liberty. 
 
 2 Block, Dictionnaire de la politique, Vol. I, pp. 271-275; Mill, op. cit., 
 pp. 109 ff. (Universal Library edition) ; Toulmin- Smith, Local Government, 
 pp. 12, 20. 
 
 8 For example, compare the efficiency of the Dutch administration in Java, in 
 which the native population takes no part, with the policy of the United States 
 to educate the inhabitants of the Philippines in self-government by extending to 
 them a share in authority even before they are fitted to exercise it. See Day, The 
 Dutch in Java ; Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies of the United States, 
 chaps, vi-viii ; Congressional Record, Vol. XXXIV, Part I, pp. 8 ff. 
 
222 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 within the state and to extending this ideal, with necessary modi- 
 fications in the form of its organization, over as large an area as 
 possible. Some of the important stages in this process may be 
 broadly outlined as follows. 
 
 350. Authority in the Oriental empires. Political organization, 
 more or less distinct from religious and family systems, first 
 emerged in the great Oriental empires which history exhibits as 
 the early homes of civilization. In these states abundant popula- 
 tion and frequent conquests created a superabundance of labor, a 
 large servile class, and wide differences in social and economic 
 status. 1 The exercise of governmental authority was concentrated 
 under the control of monarchs, aided by small groups of autocratic 
 officials and powerful priests. The connection between religion 
 and politics led to rigid custom and unprogressive policy. 2 Based 
 on conquest, with no common interests uniting their diverse peoples, 
 these loosely organized empires had no real solidarity and fell apart 
 whenever the power of the ruling dynasty declined. 3 Each province 
 retained its own language, customs, and religion ; and the ruler of 
 each province, whether a conquered and tribute-paying king or a 
 satrap representing the central despotism, was frequently tempted 
 to revolt. 4 Governmental authority, based on fear, represented to 
 the peoples of these states only the slave driver and the tax col- 
 lector. Neither unity in the state nor a share in government for 
 the individual was possible under such conditions. 
 
 351. Authority in the Greek city states. In striking contrast 
 to the organization of authority in the widespread empires of the 
 Orient was that in the compact city states that arose in the moun- 
 tain valleys of Europe and on the islands of the Mediterranean. 
 These cities were confederations of kinship clans, and the chief 
 sanction of social order was religion, controlled by the heads of 
 the clans. 5 Government at first rested in a council of clan elders, 
 
 1 Perris, War and Peace, chap, ii ; Cunningham, Western Civilization : Ancient 
 Times, Bk. I, chap. i. 2 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. VI, chap. vi. 
 
 8 Maspero, Struggle of the Nations. 
 
 4 West, Ancient History, pp. 70-73 ; Wheeler, Alexander the Great, pp. 187- 
 207. 
 
 6 Fowler, City State of the Greeks and Romans 1 , chap, ii ; De Coulanges, The 
 Ancient City, Bk. III. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 223 
 
 presided over by a patriarchal king ; J and an assembly of the people, 
 that is, of the recognized members of the religio-kinship groups, 
 expressed freely their approval or disapproval of the plans sub- 
 mitted by the elders. 2 A series of changes, however, later subor- 
 dinated the organization and authority of the family groups to that 
 of the city as the fundamental social unit ; and political institu- 
 tions based upon the earlier system grew more distinct and more 
 authoritative as the family organization disintegrated. While the 
 political development of these cities was by no means uniform, 
 Sparta, for example, because of the conditions of her origin and 
 situation, exhibiting a singularly stable system quite unlike that of 
 her neighbors, 8 a general view of the typical process may be had. 4 
 352. Democratic development in the city states. The duties of 
 the king were divided among a board of magistrates, the hereditary 
 principle and life tenure were abolished, and election for short 
 terms at the hands of a widening electorate became the method of 
 choice. 6 Eligibility to office, at first limited to certain families or 
 to those of noble blood, also tended to become universal. By a 
 series of reforms the privileges of the original narrow citizen class 
 were diminished, and the various classes within the state, excluding 
 of course the slaves, were admitted to some share in active citizen- 
 ship. In some cases the original tribes and clans were broken up 
 and replaced by artificial units of administration. 6 Written laws 
 were secured, making the customs formerly controlled by the few 
 definite and public ; and property, rather than birth, gave political 
 advantages. 7 The earlier council of clan elders was replaced by 
 a larger body, such as the Council of Four Hundred, instituted 
 by Draco in Athens, or the Senate in republican Rome; and 
 
 1 Bluntschli, op. cit, Bk. VI, chap. viii. 
 
 2 Wilson, The State, pp. 26-34 ; Fowler, op. cit., chap. iii. 
 
 8 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 54-64 j Bluntschli, op. cit., Bk. VI, chap. xvii. 
 
 * Fowler, op. cit., chaps, iv-vi ; De Coulanges, op. cit., Bk. IV ; Wilson, op. cit., 
 pp. 64-87. 
 
 6 For example, the archons, who assisted the Athenian kings, were at first 
 chosen for life ; later, for ten years ; finally, annually. 
 
 6 Grote, History of Greece, chap, xxxi ; Gilbert, Greek Constitutional Antiqui- 
 ties, pp. 145-153. 
 
 7 Economic changes were largely responsible for many political reforms, espe- 
 cially those of Solon in Athens and of the Gracchi in Rome. See Wilson, op. cit., 
 pp. 69-71, 122-124. 
 
224 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 an assembly composed of all citizens finally secured the right to 
 initiate as well as to assent in lawmaking. 1 The administration 
 of justice was also popularized, 2 and in Athens the device of 
 ostracism 3 was added, by which the new democracy could protect 
 itself against demagogues or against any who threatened to become 
 too powerful. 
 
 353 . Territorial limitations of early democracy. This democracy, 
 adapted to the city state, was effective only over small areas ; popu- 
 lar government meant the direct share of every citizen in a general 
 lawmaking assembly. 4 Each city, allowing much liberty and large 
 powers of self-government to its own citizens, developed an intense, 
 patriotic life, regarding neighboring cities as enemies ; and the per-* 
 fection of democracy in each city intensified jealousies among the 
 cities. Lack of unity was the chief weakness in the Greek political 
 system. While a sense of nationality, resting upon a common Hel- 
 lenic blood, common traditions, and common religion and civiliza- 
 tion, pervaded the Greek cities of the ancient Mediterranean world, 
 their inbred political habits and their wide geographical extension 
 prevented every movement toward national governmental union. 5 
 Self-government and individual liberty were developed on a local 
 scale, but the remainder of the world was not yet ready for democ- 
 racy, much in the way of authority and organization first being 
 needed. This unity was secured by Macedon and Rome at the 
 expense of democracy, and the work necessary for modern civiliza- 
 tion destroyed temporarily the Greek contribution to politics. 
 
 354. Authority in early Rome. The earlier internal develop- 
 ment of Rome showed the same tendencies as the Greek city 
 states, although military efficiency was chiefly aimed at in many 
 of the administrative changes ; and the Roman constitution was 
 altered with less revolutionary abruptness than in Greece. 6 King, 
 
 1 Gilbert, Greek Constitutional Antiquities, pp. 285-310. 
 
 2 Ibid. pp. 376-415. 
 
 3 Oman, History of Greece, pp. 1 59-161. 
 
 * Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. VI, chaps, xx-xxi. 
 
 5 After the break-up of Alexander's empire, the Greek cities did unite in 
 advanced forms of confederation, but these soon fell before Roman expansion. 
 See Holm, History of Greece, Vol. IV. 
 
 8 Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, Essays XIV-XV ; Fowler, 
 City State, of the Greeks and Romans, chap. vii. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 225 
 
 council, and assembly grew out of the patriarchal family organiza- 
 tion ; 1 monarchy was replaced by aristocracy, 2 as consuls, praetors, 
 and senate divided governing powers ; and a strong movement 
 toward democracy was indicated by the widening of the assem- 
 blies and the increased privileges of the plebeians. 3 Before this 
 tendency toward a democratic, compact city state could be car- 
 ried to its logical conclusion, a new series of events changed the 
 whole course of Roman development, and resulted in a new type 
 of governmental organization and in several important contribu- 
 tions to politics. 
 
 355. Expansion fatal to democratic beginnings. Rome's career 
 of conquest and expansion demanded the extension of government 
 over large areas and the teaching of political civilization to fresh, 
 vigorous, but barbarous peoples. 4 The city-state constitution broke 
 down when applied to a wide empire, and the tendency toward 
 democracy was checked by the need for a vigorous, consistent policy 
 in dealing with peoples in all parts of the earth. 5 It was impossible 
 to control the magistrates who governed the provinces, nominally 
 as servants of the people of Rome, without giving the provincials 
 a share in the government ; but it was impossible to give the pro- 
 vincials part in a system that knew nothing of representative assem- 
 blies and consequently nothing of citizenship except in the form 
 of privileges which could be exercised only in Rome itself. Real 
 power fell into the hands of the army, which alone could control 
 the provinces, and of the mob at Rome, who alone exercised 
 political rights ; and the attempts of various leaders to control one 
 or both of these established a selfish and corrupt oligarchy and 
 finally resulted in the series of civil wars that marked the end of 
 the republic. 6 
 
 356. Establishment of the Roman Empire. Empire was the 
 inevitable outcome of such conditions. 7 Concentration of authority, 
 uniformity of law, centralized organization, — these were needed to 
 
 1 Abbott, Roman Political Institutions, Part I. 2 Ibid. Part II. 
 
 3 Wilson, The State, pp. 91-120. 
 
 * Kingsley, The Roman and the Teuton, chap, i ; Tacitus, Germania. 
 6 De Coulanges, Ancient City, Bk. V. 
 
 6 Fowler, op. cit., chap, viii ; West, Ancient History, pp. 340-386. 
 
 7 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 120-140 ; Abbott, op. cit., Part III, chaps, xii-xvi. 
 
226 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 bind the wide domain of Rome into a state and to secure order 
 throughout her realms. 1 While retaining for a time the old forms 
 of popular government, actual authority centered in the emperor, 
 who became the state personified: 2 A new and complex official 
 organization dependent upon the emperor gradually developed. 3 
 The city of Rome was leveled with the provinces, the empire was 
 looked upon as a whole, and the departments of administration, 
 each organized into a hierarchy of officials, were all made respon- 
 sible to a single head. To provide against military adventurers, 
 civil and military functions were separated. Subordinate officials 
 of all kinds throughout the provinces multiplied. 4 The household 
 officers of the emperor grew into state officers, each the head of 
 an extensive system ; s the forms of monarchy, with the character- 
 istic trappings of the Oriental court, were introduced ; and the last 
 traces of republican institutions disappeared. To divide the burdens 
 of administration, two capitals, one at Rome and one at Constanti- 
 nople, were established, and two emperors for a time ruled jointly, 
 each the head of a systematic hierarchy. Later this division became 
 complete, the West falling under the Teutonic barbarians in the 
 fifth century, the East surviving until overthrown by the Turks 
 in the fifteenth century. 
 
 357. The perfection of centralized despotism. The final result of 
 Roman political development, therefore, was a centralized bureau- 
 cratic despotism, a vast, highly complex machine, effective in pre- 
 serving order, but fatal to self-government and, in the end, to unity. 6 
 Universal enfranchisement logically followed, since all were citi- 
 zens where all were subjects ; but citizenship gave no voice in the 
 government. Political liberty ceased to exist. To secure authority, 
 individual freedom was sacrificed; local self-government disap- 
 peared as centralized administration grew. Rome's system made 
 
 1 Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. I, chap. ii. 
 
 2 Bury, Students' Roman Empire, pp. 12-38, 165-166, 509-515. 
 
 3 Abbott, Roman Political Institutions, Part III, chaps, xvii-xxi. 
 
 4 Arnold, Roman Provincial Administration. 
 
 6 The development of governmental machinery from the organization of the 
 royal household has taken place several times, notably in the empire of Charle- 
 magne and in medieval England. The departments developed in Rome have 
 influenced all modern cabinets. 
 
 6 Bury, Later Roman Empire, Bk. I, chap. iv. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 227 
 
 no provision for political education ; the mass of the population 
 had no interest in a government in which they had no share ; no 
 place existed for local independence or for self-direction. In per- 
 fecting effective administration and uniform law over large area, 1 
 Rome contributed much of permanent value to political evolution, 2 
 but in so doing she destroyed the beginnings of political liberty 
 and again concentrated governing power in the hands of a narrow 
 group within the state. 
 
 358. Authority among the early Teutons. When the Roman 
 Empire in the West fell before the Teutonic barbarians, govern- 
 ment was again organized within local units. The undeveloped eco- 
 nomic life of the period, 3 making land the only important form 
 of wealth, as well as the political system that developed as Roman 
 and Teutonic institutions mingled, prevented wide . dominion. 4 
 Before entering the Roman world, the Teutons had lived in tribal 
 villages. Chiefs, elected in village meeting, acted as magistrates, 
 but important questions were determined by general assemblies of 
 the freemen. 5 Each village managed its own affairs, though fre- 
 quently uniting with other villages, especially in war. War leaders 
 were chosen for personal prowess and frequently gathered round 
 themselves groups of military companions bound by ties of close 
 personal allegiance. 6 In contrast to the subordination of the Roman 
 citizen to the state, the Teutons were intensely individualistic ; and 
 their idea of authority, in contrast to the centralized despotism of 
 Rome, was personal in nature and local in scope. 7 They, there- 
 fore, brought into the' Roman world the ideals and the govern- 
 mental methods upon which self-government could again be based. 8 
 
 359. Authority in the feudal state. The migrations of the Teu- 
 tons emphasized the bonds of personal allegiance and increased 
 the powers of the leaders, although they tended to destroy the 
 
 x Morey, Outlines of Roman Law, Part I. 2 Wilson, The State, chap. iv. 
 
 8 Day, History of Commerce, chaps, v-ix ; Forrest, Development of Western 
 Civilization, chap. iii. 
 
 * Emerton, Introduction to the Middle Ages, chap. xv. 
 
 6 Henderson, Short History of Germany, Vol. I, chap, i ; Gibbon, op. cit., 
 Vol. I, chap. ix. 
 
 6 B^mont and Monod, Medieval Europe, chap. ii. 
 
 7 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 162-171. 
 
 8 Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, chap. v. 
 
228 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 popular assemblies. Conquered territory was distributed by the 
 chiefs, now becoming kings, to petty chiefs who supported them, 
 political power thus being split up into feudal fragments. 1 The 
 state was disintegrated, authority based upon personal allegiance 
 founded upon land ownership filtering from the higher grade to 
 the lower, and the mass of the conquered population degenerated 
 into agricultural serfs bound to the soil. 2 Such a condition naturally 
 resulted in disorder and anarchy, in conflicting laws and authori- 
 ties, in the complete subordination of the mass of the people. 
 Neither unity nor liberty was possible in feudalism ; 8 the world 
 empire of Rome had been destroyed and as yet no new form of 
 state had arisen to replace it. 
 
 360. Temporal authority of the medieval church. A large share 
 of political power was exercised by the Roman Catholic church 
 during the Middle Ages. Growing up on the ruins of the Roman 
 Empire, it developed a centralized organization, 4 and when Chris- 
 tianity became the state worship it acquired important governing 
 power. When the empire fell, the church remained as the sole 
 bond of unity in western Europe. Preservation of peace and order 
 was largely in its hands. 5 Its bishops exercised political authority 
 in many cities ; as a landholder the church was drawn into the 
 feudal system ; and by its alliance with the Franks it became an 
 important temporal power. 6 Organized into a centralized hierarchy' 
 under the pope, and creating its own system of law and courts, the 
 church for a time wielded the most powerful authority in Europe. 7 
 
 361. Attempts to restore the imperial organization. Various 
 efforts were made during the Middle Ages to revive the Roman 
 idea of centralized government over considerable area. The nearest 
 
 1 Hallam, Middle Ages, chap, ii ; Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, 
 chap, ix; Wilson, The State, pp. 171-178. 
 
 2 Jessopp, Coming of the Friars, pp. 87-112; Cheyney, Industrial and Social 
 History of England, pp. 31-52; Ashley, Introduction to English Economic History, 
 Vol. I, pp. 10-43. 
 
 3 Jenks, Law and Politics in the Middle Ages, chaps, iii, vii. 
 
 4 Fisher, History of the Reformation, chap. ii. 
 
 5 Emerton, Medieval Europe, pp. 568-571. 
 
 6 Sidgwick, Development of European Polity, chap, xv; Emerton, op. cit., 
 chap. ii. 
 
 7 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chap, x; Tout, The Empire and the Papacy; 
 Lee, Historical Jurisprudence, chap. xii. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 229 
 
 approach to success was that of Charlemagne. 1 By a series of con- 
 quests and with the aid of the church, he unified the Teutonic 
 states of continental Europe and maintained a somewhat effective 
 national administration by placing officials responsible to himself 
 in the local divisions of his empire, and by sending supervisors 
 (the missi dominici) from time to time to keep them in order. 2 
 This empire fell apart after his death, however, although the theory 
 of the Holy Roman Empire survived and a line of emperors, chosen 
 from various feudal houses, carried the titles of Rome throughout 
 the Middle Ages, keeping alive the idea of unity and the Roman 
 theory of government and law. 3 In actual practice governmental 
 authority was distributed among the local leaders, a hereditary, mil- 
 itary, landholding nobility sharing with the church the exercise of 
 political power. Traces of Roman municipal organization survived 
 in the cities of south Europe ; 4 although in many towns, especially 
 in the north, a semifeudal organization of trade and industry created 
 guilds which, in addition to controlling industrial affairs, had large 
 powers of government. In Italy and Germany, where no centralizing 
 movement gained strength, these towns became practically inde- 
 pendent states, governed by administrative boards and councils 
 variously chosen. 5 While the suffrage was strictly limited, a broader 
 basis of popular government existed in the cities than on the rural 
 manors. 6 
 
 362. Growth of the absolute monarchies. Out of the chaos of 
 feudalism a definite form of political life gradually appeared. 7 At 
 first the strongest centralizing force was the ambition of the great 
 nobles. By conquest, William of Normandy unified England, super- 
 imposing a centralized feudalism upon the democratic local organi- 
 zation of the Anglo-Saxons. 8 By conquest, by marriage, and by 
 
 1 Hodgkin, Charles the Great. 
 
 2 University of Pennsylvania Translations and Reprints, Vol. VI, No. 5, 
 pp. 16-27; Bemont and Monod, Medieval Europe, chap, xiii; Adams, op. cit., 
 pp. 1.56-163. 
 
 8 Bryce, op. cit., chaps, vi-xviii; Adams, op. cit., chap. viii. 
 
 4 Thatcher and Schwill, Europe in the Middle Age, pp. 435-445, 452-473. 
 
 6 Sidgwick, op. cit., chaps, xvi-xx ; Fairlie, Municipal Administration, chap. ii. 
 
 6 Guizot, History of Civilization, chap. vii. 
 
 7 Perris, War and Peace, chap. vi. 
 
 8 Stubbs, Constitutional History of England, chap, v ; Taswell-Langmead, Eng- 
 lish Constitutional History, chap. ii. 
 
230 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 fraud, the House of Capet in France drew the various feudal sov- 
 ereignties into its possession. 1 Gradually ethnic ties of language, 
 race, and religion created nationalities, and the influence of the 
 geographic divisions of Europe manifested themselves, and on 
 these bases the states of modern Europe arose. In each state a 
 strong national spirit destroyed the medieval idea of a common 
 superior, and a strong national government attacked the influence 
 of the church and separated religious and political ideas. 
 
 363. Destruction of the feudal nobility. These national states 
 emerged as absolute monarchies, whose existence was justified 
 because of their work of consolidation and nationalization. " Pop- 
 ular government could make no headway until provinces were 
 consolidated into kingdoms, classes and races into nations, and con- 
 flicting jurisdictions were unified. It was the mission of absolute 
 monarchy to establish the sovereignty of the national state in the 
 place of the rival authorities of the church, of feudalism, of free 
 cities, and of other obstacles which stood in the way of the devel- 
 opment of the modern state." 2 The great enemies of centralized 
 authority had been the feudal nobles, and their destruction was 
 necessary before a strong state could exist. The Crusades 3 killed 
 off many of these nobles and ruined others ; in England the Wars 
 of the Roses served the same purpose. 4 The growth of industry 
 and commerce and the rise of towns 5 created other forms of wealth 
 in addition to land, making the nobles no longer the only wealthy 
 class ; 6 and the invention of gunpowder destroyed their military 
 supremacy. 7 As the power of the nobility diminished, their strength 
 
 1 Adams, Growth of the French Nation, chaps, vi-viii. 
 
 2 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, p. 207. 
 
 3 Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, pp. 274-275. 
 
 4 Green, Short History of the English People, chap, vi, sections 2-3 ; Macy, 
 English Constitution, chap. xvi. 
 
 6 Munro, History of the Middle Ages, chap, xiv ; Day, History of Commerce, 
 chaps, x-xiv; Lodge, Close of the Middle Ages, pp. 419-450. 
 
 6 The beginnings of modern democracy were closely associated with the rise 
 of new forms of wealth. An economic condition that demanded capacity and 
 intelligence in the workers tended to bestow political rights on that class. A share 
 in political power was demanded by those who had proved their ability by economic 
 success. The broad, idealistic principles of universal brotherhood and of equal 
 political privileges for all came later. Conservative democracy is based upon the 
 former conception ; radical democracy, upon the latter. 
 
 7 Seignobos, History of Medieval and Modern Civilization, pp. 235-236. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 231 
 
 passed into the hands of the rising kings. The mass of the people, 
 just rising from serfdom, ignorant and unorganized, were no match 
 for the monarchs when the nobles, who had so long stood between 
 them and the kings, were gone. In fact, in many cases the people 
 welcomed the strong government of their kings, partly because 
 they desired peace and security, and partly because of the growing 
 national spirit that centered around the monarch as representing 
 the state. In this general way arose the absolute monarchy of the 
 Tudors in England, of Philip II in Spain, of Francis I in France. 
 A national state with centralized government under an absolute 
 monarch — organization again without freedom — was the imme- 
 diate outgrowth of the decaying feudal system. 1 
 
 364. Development in different states. The evolution of national 
 states was not uniform, local conditions and past historic develop- 
 ment giving each its own peculiar form. In England, where the 
 strong monarchy of the conquering Normans had early secured 
 unity, feudalism never flourished ; and the Teutonic population, 
 retaining their democratic institutions, soon began the struggle 
 against royal authority. 2 It was only when the nobles, who were 
 allied to the lower classes more closely in England than elsewhere, 
 had been weakened that this gradual democratic development was 
 checked and the absolute monarchy of the Tudors and Stuarts 
 became possible. 3 On the other hand, absolute monarchy was 
 the logical outcome of French conditions. Starting with the most 
 complete feudal decentralization, the Capetian line had been grad- 
 ually extending its territory, perfecting its administration, securing 
 uniformity of law and a national army and finance. 4 A centralized 
 French monarchy had been their ambition for centuries. 5 Germany 
 and Italy, because of their connection in the Holy Roman Empire, 
 
 1 West, Modern History, pp. 132-133; Seignobos, op. cit., chaps, xvi, xxiii ; 
 Sidgwick, Development of European Polity, chaps, xxii-xxiii. 
 
 2 Wilson, The State, pp. 364-378 ; Ogg, Governments of Europe, chap, i ; 
 Seignobos, op. cit., chap, xi.' 
 
 8 Cheyney, Short History of England, chaps, xii-xiv. 
 
 4 Wilson, op. cit., pp. 198-213; Adams, op. cit., chap. xiii. 
 
 6 It may also be noted that in England the judicial function of the state was 
 well developed before the administrative organization grew strong, and the attempts 
 of monarchs to increase their administrative authority was resisted by a highly 
 organized system of law courts. On the continent, the administrative authority 
 of the state developed before the judicial, and the law courts were never able to 
 
232 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 because of their long struggle with the papacy, and because they 
 were the battle-ground of Europe in both religious and territorial 
 wars, were unable to secure national unity and strong government 
 until the nineteenth century. 1 
 
 365. Conflict between king and people. The next step was con- 
 cerned with the conflict of king and people within the state. With 
 the growth of intelligence and wealth, the mass of the people 
 demanded more political rights and privileges. 2 The overthrow of 
 the feudal system destroyed the innumerable vertical groups of 
 society and led to a horizontal division into classes or estates that 
 had common aims and interests. In addition to this, representative 
 government was created. Thus both the motive and the machinery 
 of democracy existed, and absolutism in reality hastened its prog- 
 ress. Power concentrated under a monarch was more apparent 
 and more easily attacked than when possessed by a number of 
 feudal aristocrats, and when the divine authority of the ruler was 
 questioned, 3 the people began to realize that power lay in their 
 hands if they wished to wield it. The last century witnessed the 
 rise of democracy, accompanied by more or less disturbance in 
 proportion as the old order was established and refused to yield. 
 
 366. Course of democratic development. Here again the process 
 was not uniform in all states. In England the growth of democracy 
 — the completion of a process long begun — was, in the main, 
 gradual and peaceful. 4 In France it meant a complete break with 
 past tendencies, and caused the terrors of the Revolution and the 
 rise of a Napoleon. 5 Elsewhere the monarchs learned wisdom by 
 
 bring the strong administrative officials under their control. Separate administra- 
 tive law and courts still exist in continental Europe, and the control of the people 
 over their government and the legal guarantee of their civil liberty are correspond- 
 ingly diminished. See Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, 
 Vol. I, pp. 47-68 ; Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, Vol. II, Bk. VI, 
 pp. 144-261. 
 
 1 Emerton, Medieval Europe, chaps, vii-x; Robinson, History of Western 
 Europe, chaps, xxix, xl. 
 
 2 Seignobos, History of Contemporary Civilization, chap. iii. 
 
 8 Dunning, Political Theories : From Luther to Montesquieu, chap, x ; Scherger, 
 Evolution of Modern Liberty, chaps, v-vii. 
 
 4 Note the Revolution of 1688, the Act of Settlement (1701), the Reform Acts 
 of 1832, 1867, 1884, the Parliament Act of 1911. See Hayes, British Social 
 Politics, chap. ix. 6 Guizot, History of Civilization, chap. xiv. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 233 
 
 experience, and yielded as political consciousness spread among 
 their peoples. 1 Local self-government, with representation for com- 
 mon affairs, has been the usual arrangement that resulted. In 
 many cases the king has remained as a historic figurehead, but 
 real sovereignty has passed to a larger proportion of the population, 
 and the state rests on a broad basis. 
 
 IV. Evolution of Political Liberty 
 
 367. Democratic governmental devices. The preceding broad 
 outline indicates the main steps leading to the formation of modern 
 national democracies. A more detailed account of the evolution.of 
 certain governmental devices that have been most valuable in the 
 organization of democracy may now be noted. Several of these 
 have already been referred to. The federation, 2 in which the prin- 
 ciples of local self-government and representation are applied on 
 a large scale, has proved valuable in extending political liberty 
 over large areas and in avoiding the centralized bureaucracy of 
 earlier empires. 3 The widening of citizenship within the state, 4 
 following the disappearance of narrow, privileged classes, which 
 for a long time were alone admitted to full membership in the 
 political community, has furnished a necessary background for 
 self-government. 5 Political parties, 6 by means of which public 
 opinion is crystallized and a constant influence exerted on both 
 governmental policy and the selection of governmental officials, 
 have invariably accompanied democracy. Standing between the 
 citizens and the machinery of the state, they furnish an agency 
 for coordinating and expressing the general will under the broad 
 principle of majority rule. 7 When organized on national lines they 
 furnish a form of centralized organization for the entire population 
 
 1 Note the waves of revolution that swept over Europe in 1820, 1830, and 
 1848. See Seignobos, op. cit., chaps, x, xix. 
 
 2 See above, Chapter VI, sections 248-249. 
 
 8 Sidgwick, Development of European Polity, chap. xxix. 
 
 4 See above, Chapter VI, sections 263-269. 
 
 6 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. II, chaps, vii-xvii. 
 
 6 See above, Chapter III, section 101. 
 
 7 Jenks, History of Politics, pp. 135-139; Macy, Party Organization and 
 Machinery, Introduction ; Jenks, Principles of Politics, chap, iv ; Lowell, Public 
 Opinion and Popular Government, Parts I— II. 
 
234 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of the state that tends to bind together the various departments 
 and divisions in complex modern governments, and to secure a 
 necessary unity in policy and harmony in administration. 1 
 
 368. Written constitutions. Written constitutions 2 have also 
 been associated with democracy. 3 By putting into a fundamen- 
 tal document a statement of the nature, scope of authority, and 
 methods of procedure of the organs of government, arbitrary and 
 despotic power may be prevented. Charters of popular rights, 
 secured by force, by purchase, or by voluntary gift, were the first 
 definite limitations on royal prerogatives. 4 ' Charters in which a 
 detailed form of government was laid down were granted during 
 the Middle Ages to cities and to variens corporations, and the 
 royal grants under which the English colonies in America were 
 settled were easily transformed into written bases for colonial 
 government. 8 In 1638 the people of Connecticut drew up the 
 famous Fundamental Orders, the first written constitution that 
 created a government ever drawn up by the people or by their 
 representatives. 6 During the English Commonwealth, Cromwell's 
 army drew up written schemes of government, of which the Agree- 
 ment of the People (1647) was the most important. This was 
 incorporated into the Instrument of Government in 1653 by the 
 
 1 Goodnow, Politics and Administration, pp. 24-34; Beard, American Gov- 
 ernment and Politics, pp. 99-103. It is a suggestive fact that in the United States, 
 where the government is highly decentralized and largely in local hands, the 
 organization of the parties is highly centralized and on a national basis ; in France, 
 where the administration is centralized under national control, the parties are 
 numerous and largely local in nature. See Beard, op. cit., pp. 166-184; Bodley, 
 France, Bk. IV. It also follows that under the centralized system of party organ- 
 ization in the United States the political bosses, who stand at the top of the 
 hierarchy, are the most important political figures and the chief dangers to 
 democracy ; and their irresponsibility, since the parties exist largely outside the 
 legal organization of the state, increases the danger of political corruption. In 
 England, where party organization is centralized, the party bosses are responsible 
 leaders in the government. See Goodnow, op. cit, chaps, vii-x; Lowell, 
 Government of England, Vol. I, chap. xxiv. 
 
 2 See above, Chapter III, section 100. 
 
 8 Leacock, Elements of Political Science, pp. 123-728. 
 
 4 Hill, Liberty Documents, chaps, i-ii, iv, vi. 
 
 5 Cheyney, European ■ Background of American History (American Nation, 
 Vol. I), chaps, vii-viii ; Schouler, Constitutional Studies, chap. ii. 
 
 6 MacDonald, Select Charters, No. 14 ; Andrews, " River Towns of Connecti- 
 cut," in Johns Hopkins University Studies, Vol. VII, Nos. 7-9. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 235 
 
 Council of Officers and formed the first and only written constitu- 
 tion in England. 1 While this document was never really operative 
 and disappeared with the restoration of the monarchy, some of its 
 underlying ideas were carried out in colonial charters and govern- 
 ments, and reappeared later in the American state and federal 
 constitutions. When the American Revolution broke out, all the 
 American states created documentary constitutions ; and the 
 Articles of Confederation and finally the Federal Constitution 
 applied the same idea on a national scale. 2 During the French 
 Revolution several written constitutions were drawn up by the 
 various popular assemblies, these documents including, as in 
 America, both bills of rights and frames of government. 8 The 
 series of popular revolutions that swept over Europe during the 
 second quarter of the nineteenth century resulted in the granting 
 of written constitutions in many of the states of continental Europe 
 and in the establishment of republics with written constitutions in 
 Latin America. 4 At present the connection between written con- 
 stitutions and democratic government is firmly fixed, and except 
 for Great Britain and Hungary, 5 whose organizations rest upon 
 custom and usage, a few important scattered documents variously 
 created, and a series of legislative statutes, all important states 
 base their governmental systems upon fundamental written state- 
 ments either created by popular authority or secured by popular 
 demands. 6 
 
 369. The electorate. Even more fundamental in the evolution 
 of political liberty was the development of the electorate and the 
 system of representation. The theories upon which the composi- 
 tion of the electorate has been based have differed widely. 7 In the 
 ancient tribes and in the Greek and Roman cities, no distinction 
 
 1 Hill, op. cit., chap. vii. 2 Ashley, American Federal State, chaps, iv-v. 
 
 3 Anderson, Constitutions and Documents, Nos. 1 5, 39, 50, 58 ; Ogg, Govern- 
 ments of Europe, pp. 289-295. 
 
 4 Borgeaud, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions in Europe and America, 
 Part I. 
 
 G Leacock, op. cit., pp. 1 2 1-1 23 ; Lowell, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 1-1 5 ; Ogg, op. cit., 
 pp.. 489-490. 
 
 6 Dodd, Modern Constitutions. 
 
 7 Shepard, " Theory of the Nature of the Suffrage," in Proceedings of the 
 American Political Science Association, Vol. IX, pp. 106-136. 
 
236 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 was made between man as an individual and as a member of his 
 state. The life of the state was a part of the life of each individual, 
 and the individual had no life or interests except as a member of 
 his political group. Political life was a necessary part of man's 
 existence, and this political life was manifested by sharing in 
 government. 1 Especially when the interests of the community 
 became complex and the hereditary patriarchal system of organi- 
 zation no longer truly represented the ideas and interests of the 
 whole community, a demand for the representation of all interests 
 and localities led to a series of reforms 2 that finally resulted in 
 the bestowal on every citizen of a voice in the affairs of govern- 
 ment. While the citizen class was narrow at first, excluding those 
 of different blood and religion, or later large numbers of slaves and 
 aliens, it coincided with the electorate ; and the widening of the 
 citizen class made possible democracy in the ancient cities. By 
 formal votes cast on stated days, by membership in the general 
 lawmaking assembly, by service in the jury courts, the electorate 
 exercised a considerable share of governing power. This early 
 electorate disappeared, however, when the state expanded. In the 
 absence of a system of representation, political privileges could be 
 exercised only at the capital, and the obstacles offered by distance 
 and by numbers broke down the theory that all citizens should 
 share in political power. Public assemblies were demoralized by 
 their increase in size, and when the ancient cities were merged 
 into a world empire an electorate became impossible, citizenship 
 implying civil protection rather than political rights. 3 
 
 370. Evolution of the modern electorate. Feudalism minimized 
 the necessity for the democratic device of the electorate except in 
 the commercial centers of Italy and Germany. 4 A national electo- 
 rate was created first in England when municipal corporations and 
 county or shire courts were authorized to send delegates to assist 
 the council in advising the king and to furnish their quota of 
 
 1 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, pp. 54-67 ; De Cou- 
 langes, Ancient City, Bk. Ill, chaps, xii, xvii ; Bk. IV, chap. ix. 
 
 2 For example, those of Solon and Cleisthenes, of Servius Tullius and of the 
 patrician-plebeian contest. See Wilson, The State, pp. 64-120. 
 
 3 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, pp. 111-113. 
 
 4 Sidgwick, Development of European Polity, chaps, xvi-xx ; Symonds, Ren- 
 aissance in Italy : The Age of the Despots, chap. iv. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 237 
 
 money grants. 1 The rising tide of democracy during the fifteenth' 
 and sixteenth centuries again brought the idea of an electorate into 
 prominence. The medieval theory of the electorate was, however, 
 based upon the divisions of society into feudal estates. Men repre- 
 sented the corporate interests of their class ; voting went with a 
 man's status or with his ownership of land ; 2 it was a privilege 
 that could be inherited. The membership of the corporate bodies 
 who possessed the suffrage in shire and in town was narrow, and 
 their privileges were for a long time jealously guarded. 3 The mod- 
 ern association of voting rights with landholding or with tax-paying, 
 the English system of permitting a man to vote wherever he pos- 
 sesses certain property qualifications, 4 the Prussian 5 and Belgian 6 
 methods of granting additional suffrage rights to the larger tax- 
 payers, are survivals of the medieval theory. 
 
 371. Manhood suffrage. The political philosophy of the eight- 
 eenth century taught that every citizen had a natural and inherent 
 right to participate in government. 7 This was a logical consequence 
 of the Protestant Reformation, with its emphasis on individualism 
 and the equality of man, and of the social-contract theory, with its 
 conception of sovereignty as general will. 8 The right of suffrage, 
 therefore, was a gift of nature, belonging to all citizens alike ; and 
 this doctrine of universal suffrage was a powerful factor in the 
 development of modern democracy. Manhood suffrage was pro- 
 posed by the Levelers in England at the time of the Puritan 
 Revolution ; 9 Montesquieu, Robespierre, Condorcet, and Rousseau 
 in France believed that all citizens should share in the formation 
 
 1 Hill, Liberty Documents, chap, iii ; Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional 
 History, chaps, vii-viii. 
 
 2 McCrary, Law of Elections, section 9. 
 
 8 Sidgwick, op. cit, pp. 302-310, 324-326. 
 4 Lowell, Government of England, Vol. I, pp. 214-215. 
 
 6 Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. I, pp. 303-308 ; 
 Ogg, Governments of Europe, pp. 258-260. 
 
 6 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 496-498 ; Dupriez, Le Suffrage 
 universel en Belgique ; Ogg, op. cit., pp. 539-542. 
 
 7 Suggestions of the natural-rights basis of the suffrage may be found even 
 during the medieval period. See Shepard, "Theory of the Nature of the Suf- 
 frage," in Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, Vol. IX, 
 pp. 1 1 4-1 1 6. 
 
 8 Scherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, Part II. 
 
 9 The Clarke Papers, Vol. I, pp. 263-264, 300-323. 
 
238 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of law and in the selection of officials ; 1 Jefferson and his school 
 in America represented the same point of view. 2 The narrow 
 electorate of feudal origin was gradually widened under the influ- 
 ence of these principles. The French constitutions of the Revolu- 
 tionary period reduced the qualifications for voting and established 
 the principle of a wide suffrage. While the restoration in France 
 required a large tax contribution from electors, the revolutions of 
 1830 and of 1848 finally established direct manhood suffrage. 3 
 In England the electorate was widened by the Reform Acts of 
 1832, 1867, and 1884 ; i in the United States the wave of demo- 
 cratic sentiment associated chiefly with the names of Jefferson and 
 Jackson broadened the narrow electorate of colonial times. 5 
 
 372. Present theory of suffrage. At the present time the politi- 
 cal doctrine that suffrage is a natural right of citizens is no longer 
 held. It is recognized that the right to vote is a privilege granted 
 by the state to such persons as are likely to exercise it for the 
 public good. The electorate has, in fact, become an organ of gov- 
 ernment. 6 Its composition and functions are determined by law. 
 Efficiency in .performing its part in the government may, there- 
 fore, restrict the electorate to persons possessing certain qualifica- 
 tions ; almost all states impose some conditions upon the privilege 
 of voting. 7 At the same time, the value of the suffrage as a means 
 of developing the full powers of the individual is realized ; 8 and 
 the political education and social stability resulting from universal 
 suffrage is considered of more importance than the mere question 
 of governmental efficiency alone. 9 The movement toward the 
 complete enfranchisement of the masses still continues, therefore, 
 the best thought of the present day favoring as wide an extension 
 of the elective franchise as is consistent with good government. 
 
 1 Esmein, Droit constitutionnel, pp. 210-21 1 ; Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, 
 Bk. XI, chap, vi ; Rousseau, Social Contract, Bk. IV, chap. ii. 
 
 2 Merriam, American Political Theories, chap. iv. 
 " Esmein, op. cit., pp. 222-236. 
 
 4 Lowell, Government of England, Vol. I, pp. 202-218. 
 
 6 Ford, Rise and Growth of American Politics, chaps, x, xiii ; Merriam, op. cit, 
 chap. v. 6 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 215-220. 
 
 7 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 491-508. 
 
 8 Dole, Spirit of Democracy. 
 
 Laveleye, Gouvernement dans la d^mocratie, Vol. II, Bk. IX, chap, i; Dealey, 
 op. cit., pp. 304-307. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 239 
 
 373. Direct and indirect authority of the electorate. The extent 
 of the electorate alone is not a test of the share of the people in 
 government. 1 The authority exercised by the electorate indirectly, 
 by means of its control over the ordinary organs of government 
 through elections 2 and political parties, and the degree in which 
 the electorate exercises authority directly, by means of the initiative 
 and referendum, determine the real extent of popular control. 3 
 The actual authority exercised by the organs under popular con- 
 trol must also be considered. "In the election of the members of 
 the German Reichstag, for example, there is no educational or 
 property qualification required for voting. We might therefore 
 conclude that the German government was more nearly a popular 
 government than that of Great Britain, where there is a property 
 qualification. On the other hand, if we consider the influence that 
 the voters can exert, we must conclude that the British form of 
 government is more popular than that of Germany, because in 
 England the members of the House of Commons, chosen by the 
 voters, can exert a very much greater influence in governmental 
 affairs than can the members of the Reichstag in Germany." 4 
 
 374. Popular legislation and popular administration. It is also 
 of importance to note whether popular control is exerted over the 
 expression of the state's will, over the administration of the state's 
 will, or over both. " When the Greek spoke of democracy he had 
 in his mind the conduct of the administration. He meant the con- 
 trol by the mass of citizens of the questions of peace and war, of the 
 relations with the allies and the colonies, of the finances, the army, 
 and the fleet. In Athens at the time of Demosthenes all these 
 things had been placed in the hands of the assembly of the people, 
 which managed them as far as possible directly, or by means of 
 committees chosen for short periods by lot. But the same methods 
 were not applied to legislation. To the Greek mind the laws were 
 normally permanent and unchangeable. ... In Athens, therefore, 
 the administration was conducted directly by the people, but the 
 
 1 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, chap, xxvii. 
 
 2 Including the number of officials chosen by election, whether election is 
 direct or indirect, and the length of term of elected officials. 
 
 8 Gettell, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 205-207, 211-219. 
 4 Jenks, Principles of Politics, pp. 42-43. 
 
240 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 power of legislation was far less under their control. Now in 
 Switzerland precisely the reverse is true. It is hard to conceive 
 how the control of legislation by the people could be rendered 
 more absolute than it is made by the referendum and the initiative ; 
 but, on the other hand, the executive of the Confederation is 
 removed as far from popular influence as is possible in a commu- 
 nity where every public authority is ultimately based on universal 
 suffrage. The federal councillors virtually hold office for life, and 
 they are chosen, not by the people, but by the assembly, whose 
 members enjoy in their turn a singularly stable tenure." x Modern 
 democracies aim at popular control of both legislation and adminis- 
 tration, limiting the former by the device of representation because 
 of the large areas of the states, and by written constitutions as a 
 check on arbitrariness and impulsiveness, and limiting the latter 
 by the devices of appointment, competitive examination, and per- 
 manent tenure because of the need for efficiency in government. 
 
 375. Diffusion of authority in modern democracies. It is, in 
 fact, almost impossible to locate the final source of political author- 
 ity in modern democracies. " It is evident that, in the diffusion 
 of political power among the masses the state has lost its ancient 
 definiteness of form, for it is difficult to discover not only who 
 compose the state from the standpoint of law, but also where among 
 those enjoying nominal sovereignty is the real power. As we pass 
 from the relatively simple state such as we find in England shortly 
 after the Norman conquest, when the king was the virtual sov- 
 ereign, to the state as we find it to-day, it becomes increasingly diffi- 
 cult to determine precisely the seat of real authority. True, it is 
 relatively easy to ascertain the precise number of British who are 
 by law entitled to vote for members of Parliament, and one might 
 say that this is the legal sovereign in Great Britain. But if we 
 press the analysis further, we must go behind the ballot box to the 
 psychological forces controlling the action of the individuals com- 
 posing the state, and when we try to get hold of power in a politi- 
 cal sense we find it exceedingly elusive. It is clear that these 
 thousands of units making up the state are not all equal in intelli- 
 gence or influence. It is also evident that a great portion of them 
 
 1 Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol. II, pp. 333-334. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 241 
 
 do not exercise the power which they lawfully have, that another 
 portion has no very lively consciousness of the motives on which 
 it acts, and that the actual will of the state in any one instance 
 is merely that of a majority at best." 1 
 
 376. Political liberty distinct from civil liberty. Finally, the 
 extent to which the people share in government is no necessary 
 criterion of the amount of their civil liberty. "In a popular gov- 
 ernment a very large proportion of the people of proper age vote. 
 That fact, however, does not necessarily imply that the average 
 citizen has a greater degree of liberty to do as he pleases than he 
 might have in a despotism. All depends upon the regulations 
 which a government makes to direct or control the actions of indi- 
 vidual citizens. A free state is one that, relatively speaking, inter- 
 feres little with the individual in carrying out his wishes. A 
 despotism might therefore from this point of view be really a free 
 state, the despot choosing to interfere with the individual very little. 
 In a popular government, inasmuch as the individual takes an 
 active part in selecting the members of that government, we are 
 naturally more likely to find freedom than in a despotism ; _ but 
 this is not necessarily the case. We may properly speak of the 
 tyranny of the majority." 2 
 
 377. Representative government. The principle of represen- 
 tation was practically unknown in the ancient world. 3 Provincial 
 assemblies were sometimes held, 4 and the leagues of cities that 
 were formed in Greece after the fall of Alexander's empire ap- 
 proached very closely the establishment of a representative system. 5 
 The ancient ideal of democracy, however, sought to divide political 
 rule equally among all citizens, and the assemblies which sanctioned 
 proposed laws were composed of freemen meeting in their personal 
 capacities. 6 Not until the Middle Ages did representative govern- 
 ment become of importance. " Two conditions facilitated this : 
 
 1 Beard, Politics, p. 19. See also Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Govern- 
 ment, chaps, i-ii. 
 
 2 Jenks, Principles of Politics, pp. 43-44. 
 
 8 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Bk. XI, chap. viii. 
 4 Arnold, Roman Provincial Administration, p. 202. 
 
 6 Freeman, History of Federal Government, Vol. I, chap, ii, and pp. 219-229 ; 
 West, Ancient History, pp. 237-245. 
 
 6 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, Bk. VI, chaps, xx-xxi. 
 
242 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 the states were of a feudal character, the component parts of each 
 claiming a certain independence within the general body, and they 
 were large. The first circumstance implied that the different parts 
 should have a certain share in the management of common affairs ; 
 the second circumstance made it necessary that only some of the 
 persons inhabiting each component part could meet in common. 
 Thus the representative system originated. There is no country 
 in Europe that has passed through the feudal stage which has not, 
 at some time or other, had a representative assembly organized in 
 ' Orders.' In most countries absolutism put an end to the existence, 
 even the formal existence, of these institutions ; but they survived 
 in a few." 1 
 
 378. Evolution of modern representation. The modern repre- 
 sentative system developed from the Teutonic folkmoots 2 and 
 first reached its national form in England. 3 The Anglo-Saxon 
 Witanagemot, 4 a modified folkmoot applied to a large area, came, 
 under the name of the Commune Concilium after the Norman 
 Conquest, to contain a number of members who were representative 
 in character. To the original council, consisting of the greater 
 nobles and the higher clergy, members from the shires and from 
 the boroughs were added, and these members were finally chosen 
 by certain qualified voters in their respective districts. 5 Thus the 
 three estates of the realm — the clergy, the nobility, and the com- 
 mons — were represented, and the English Parliament, dividing 
 into two houses during the fourteenth century, entered upon the 
 process of development that finally placed complete governmental 
 authority in the hands of a popularly chosen representative assembly. 6 
 
 1 Lange, " Tendencies towards Parliamentary Rule," in Spiller, Interracial Prob- 
 lems, pp. 114-115. 
 
 2 Stubbs, Constitutional History of England, Vol. I, chaps ii— iii. 
 
 8 For a good discussion of the evolution of Parliament, see Medley, English 
 Constitutional History, chaps, iii-vi ; Wilson, The State, pp. 364-402. 
 
 4 Stubbs, op. cit., Vol. I, chap. vi. 
 
 6 Stubbs, op. cit, Vol. I, chap. xiii. 
 
 6 The English assembly came when that country was breaking away from 
 agriculture and developing commerce and manufactures, and when kings, ever 
 engaged in war or the suppression of rebellion, were forced to rely more and 
 more upon the support of the common people and on taxes raised from urban 
 centers. So constantly was the king in need of money grants and military sup- 
 port, that the first two hundred years of the history of the assembly of the 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 243' 
 
 379. Representation in England. The spirit of unity among the 
 classes and sections was greater in England than elsewhere during 
 the Middle Ages, and the continuous development of the medieval 
 assembly of estates into the modern Parliament was correspondingly 
 aided. 1 The insular position of England hastened the fusion of its 
 peoples, and freedom from external danger weakened the distinc- 
 tion between the military nobility and the nonmilitary agricultural 
 gentry and city merchants. Besides, the disintegrating effects of 
 feudalism were absent in the strong government established by 
 the Norman Conquest ; a uniform or common law subordinated 
 the local customs ; 2 and the English principle of descent, nobility 
 passing to the eldest son only, broke down the barriers between 
 the classes. Even the feudal nobles and the merchant princes had 
 no quarrel as they had on the continent. A homogeneous and 
 united people, 3 therefore, undertook the contest against the vigorous 
 monarchy ; and by the end of the fourteenth century, Parliament 
 had become a regular part of the government, the financial needs 
 of the crown being the opportunity of the people's representatives. 4 
 
 380. Representation on the continent. Representative institutions 
 on the continent, receiving their chief impetus from the growth of 
 semidemocratic cities, came later and were less popular in com- 
 position than in England. Sometimes, as in France, the impulse 
 to their formation proceeded from considerations of policy, chiefly 
 of finance, on the part of the monarchs ; sometimes, as in Germany, 
 they represented a spontaneous movement of voluntary association 
 
 commons marked an almost steady growth in its power and prestige. During the 
 sixteenth century the historic council of nobles and clergy, who formed the house 
 of lords, was relatively weak. This was due to its depletion in numbers owing to 
 the civil wars and to the nationalization of the church, which deprived that body 
 of much of its power and representation. In consequence the two houses during 
 the Tudor period were fairly equal, and were firmly welded together into a parlia- 
 ment. The rapid development of commerce and manufactures under the Tudors 
 and Stuarts gradually transferred the balance of power from the lords to the 
 commons as the representatives of these interests, and the rise of England to 
 world supremacy in the nineteenth century made the commons supreme in 
 governmental policy. — Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 189-190. 
 
 1 Sidgwick, Development of European Polity, pp. 310-315. 
 
 2 Lee, Historical Jurisprudence, chap. xvi. 
 8 Macy, English Constitution, chap. 1. 
 
 4 Feilden, Short Constitutional History of England, chap. v. 
 
244 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 among persons and bodies in the same social condition. The 
 national assemblies of the Middle Ages represented groups and 
 classes ; the deputies of each class were often summoned separately 
 and sat and voted separately. The delegates had narrow powers, 
 acted under strict instructions, 1 and represented the interests of 
 their class, not of the state as a whole. 2 A legislative assembly, or 
 Cortes, containing representatives of the cities, existed in Castile 
 ' and in Aragon in the twelfth century. The French king summoned 
 a general parliament, or states-general, composed of representatives 
 of the clergy, the nobility, and the townspeople, in 1302. A 
 system of representation by classes developed in Germany during 
 the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 3 None of these bodies, 
 however, represented a united people, and all disappeared under 
 the growing centralization of the national monarchies. 4 
 
 381. Representation in America. A democratic representative 
 system first appeared in America. English political ideas, trans- 
 planted into a new environment where marked social distinctions 
 did not exist and where local self-government flourished, 5 created 
 representative assemblies resting upon the whole people and based 
 upon territorial districts rather than upon classes of population. 6 
 The Virginia House of Burgesses, consisting of twenty-two dele- 
 gates from eleven local communities, was assembled in 16 19. 7 
 Colonial assemblies were later established in all the colonies ; 
 representative rule was firmly founded in the constitutions of the 
 
 1 On instructed and uninstructed representation, see Mill, Representative 
 Government, chaps, xii-xiii ; Garnerjntroduction to Political Science, pp. 478-488. 
 
 2 Jellinek, Recht des modernen Staates, Bk. Ill, chap, xvii; Sidgwick, Develop- 
 ment of European Polity, pp. 302-310. s Garner, op. cit., pp. 474-478. 
 
 4 The French states-general, after meeting irregularly for several centuries, 
 ceased to assemble in 1614 and was not again summoned until 1789, at the out- 
 break of the Revolution. See Rose, Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, pp. 34-40. 
 
 6 Fairlie, Local Government in Counties, Towns, and Villages, chaps, i-ii ; 
 Hinsdale, American Government, pp. 38-43. 
 
 6 For differences between theories of representation in England and in the 
 colonies, see Channing, Students' History of the United States, pp. 162-166. 
 
 7 In the words of the " briefe declaration," written a few years later, " That 
 they might have a hande in the governinge of themselves, yt was graunted that a 
 general Assemblie shoulde be helde yearly once, whereat were to be present the 
 Governor and Counsell with two Burgesses from each Plantation, freely to be 
 elected by the Inhabitants thereof, this Assemblie to have power to make and 
 ordaine whatsoever lawes and orders should by them be thought good and 
 profitable for our subsistence." — Thwaites, The Colonies, p. 73. 
 
AUTHORITY WITHIN THE STATE 245 
 
 states after they declared their independence ; and the same prin- 
 ciple was applied to federal affairs in the constitution of 1 789. 1 A 
 compromise between representation of the entire population and of 
 the separate territorial units was necessary because of the unwilling- 
 ness of the several states to lose their separate political identities, 2 
 but no attempt was made to represent classes or interests. 3 
 
 382. Recent extension of representation. Not until the eight- 
 eenth century did the estates system in Europe give way to a 
 national system of representation. 4 Even after the fall of Napoleon 
 few states possessed representative institutions. England, Sweden, 
 and Norway had more or less democratic representative systems 
 suited to the social needs of their peoples. The restored dynasties 
 in France and Holland granted constitutions and representative 
 assemblies in order to strengthen their own positions. In Switzer- 
 land direct popular rule in some cantons and representative assem- 
 blies in others survived from an earlier period. Hungary, Poland, 
 and Finland had constitutions permitting assemblies, but they 
 existed chiefly on paper. The other European states remained 
 autocratic. Succeeding revolutions, however, extended the prin- 
 ciple of popular representative government to one state after 
 another, 5 and by 1880 only two important states in Europe — 
 Russia and Turkey — had autocratic constitutions. In America 
 not a single state existed without representative institutions ; a 
 number of self-governing British colonies organized themselves 
 on a representative basis; and Japan in Asia imitated the Euro- 
 pean system in her constitution of 1889. 6 The Russo-Japanese 
 War of 1905 gave a new impetus to the extension of popular gov- 
 ernment, leading to the establishment of a representative Duma in 
 
 1 The Federalist, Nos. 9-10, 39, 52-63. 
 
 2 Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, Vol. I, pp. 522-523 ; Landon, 
 Constitutional History and Government of the United States, pp. 82-91. 
 
 8 The Federalist, Nos. 35-36. 
 
 4 For comparison of medieval and modern ideas of representation, see Bornhak, 
 Allgemeine Staatslehre, pp. 99-114. 
 
 6 Lange, "Tendencies towards Parliamentary Rule," in Spiller, Interracial Prob- 
 lems, pp. 1 1 5-1 18; Borgeaud, Adoption and Amendment of Constitutions in 
 Europe and America, pp. 3-43. 
 
 6 Zumoto, " Government of Japan," in Proceedings of the American Political 
 Science Association, Vol. VI, pp. 163-169; Gollier, Essai sur les institutions 
 politiques du Japon. 
 
246 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 the Russian Empire. 1 A revolutionary upheaval forced the Persian 
 shah to grant a constitution in 1906, and in 1908 a peaceful revo- 
 lution in Turkey established a parliamentary regime in that state. 2 
 Representative institutions have been provided for in the newly 
 established Chinese Republic, 3 and in India and Egypt native 
 parties are working for popular and representative government. 
 
 383. Value of representation. While the actual workings of 
 these systems vary widely and the degree of local self-government 
 and of popular control over national affairs shows marked diver- 
 gences in different states, the general principle of democratic, 
 representative government is universally accepted. In contrast to 
 the imperial administration of large states in the ancient world, 
 which worked from the center outward, gave the people no share 
 in political rights, and made little provision for local interests, the 
 modern system of organizing large areas places extensive powers, 
 direct or indirect, within reach of the masses, leaves local affairs 
 to the people chiefly concerned, and delegates the consideration of 
 general interests to an assembly composed of deputies .chosen by 
 the people and representing the varied interests of all sections of 
 the state. 4 In this way political unity and popular government are 
 combined ; 5 and stability even in the largest state is possible 
 because of the broad basis upon which political organization rests. 6 
 
 1 Hourwich, " The Russian Duma," in Proceedings of the American Political 
 Science Association, Vol. VII, pp. 53-64; Hazen, Europe since 1815, chap. xxxi. 
 
 2 Lybyer, " The Turkish Parliament," in Proceedings of the American Political 
 Science Association, Vol. VII, pp. 65-77 ; Hazen, op. cit, pp. 636-644. 
 
 8 Asakawa, " The New Regime in China," in Proceedings of the American 
 Political Science Association, Vol. VI, pp. 123-147. 
 
 4 Jenks, Principles of Politics, chap, v ; Seeley, Introduction to Political 
 Science, chaps, iv-v. 
 
 6 Giddings, Democracy and Empire, chap. i. 
 
 6 Macy, " Twentieth Century Democracy," in Political Science Quarterly, 
 Vol. XIII ; Sloane, " History and Democracy," in American Historical Review, 
 Vol. I ; Seeley, op. cit., chaps, vi-viii. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 
 
 I. General Nature of Problem 
 
 384. Importance of state function. While the composition and 
 form of the state are being determined under the influences that 
 affect the grouping of peoples into political units within certain 
 areas, 1 and while the nature of its governmental organization is being 
 developed under the influences that affect the creation of political 
 machinery and that determine the share of the people in govern- 
 ment, 2 another problem of prime importance comes into prominence 
 concerning the scope of state activities. What shall the state do ? 
 The existence of the state is of importance only as it functions. 
 The machinery of government in motion rather than at rest repre- 
 sents the real life of the state. 3 Even the most negative phase of 
 state existence, that in which it creates and safeguards the civil 
 liberty of its individuals, 4 demands a certain amount of positive 
 action ; and all states have carried their activities far beyond that 
 point, entering vigorously into the promotion of certain interests 
 and the repression of others. 
 
 385. Classification of state functions. In the broadest sense the 
 functions performed by government are twofold, consisting in the 
 formulation and the execution of the state's will. 5 For purposes of 
 organization the, functions of government are usually divided into 
 
 ' three classes, legislative, executive, and judicial. 6 A more complete 
 
 1 See above, Chapters VI-VII. 
 
 2 See above, Chapter VIII, sections 340-383. 
 
 8 Lowell, " Physiology of Politics," in American Political Science Review, 
 Vol. IV, No. 1. 4 See above, Chapter VIII, sections 316-339. 
 
 6 Goodnow, Politics and Administration, pp. 9-22. 
 
 6 Bondy, " Separation of Governmental Powers," in Columbia University / 
 Studies, Vol. V, No. 2 ; Garner, Introduction to Political Science, chap, xiii ; 
 Lowell, Essays on Government, No. II ; Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, Bk. XI, 
 chap. vi. 
 
 247 
 
248 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 analysis of the highly differentiated functions performed by modern 
 states shows the following main divisions: 1 (i) The deliberative 
 function, which is to determine the state's will. Some part of the 
 government must be authorized to settle upon the general policy 
 of the state. In former times, kings and their councils decided 
 questions of policy ; later, representative assemblies shared in the 
 function ; at present, special bodies, practically distinct, formulate 
 a large part of legislative policy. Examples are the cabinet in 
 England, 2 the permanent committees in American legislatures, 3 
 and the constitutional conventions, 4 which represent the wishes of 
 the electorate. (2) The legislative function, which is to enact into 
 law the policies thus formulated. This function, formerly exercised 
 by the priests or kings who declared the wishes of the gods or by 
 the elders who handed down the traditional customs, is to-day mani- 
 fested in the statutes of representative bodies, in the referendums 
 of the electorate, in the decrees or vetoes of executive officials, 5 
 and in many judicial decisions. 6 (3) The executive function, which 
 is to supervise the carrying out of the law. This involves the exer- 
 cise of oversight and the power of enforcing obedience. Executive, 
 legislative, and judicial officials all share in this function. 7 (4) The 
 administrative function, which is to perform the routine of govern- 
 ment business. The greater part of the administration acts under 
 the direction of the executive department, but part of it is controlled 
 by legislatures and courts. 8 The clearest separation of the adminis- 
 trative from the other functions of government exists in France, 9 
 although a tendency in that direction is manifest in all modern 
 states. (5) The judicial function, which is to interpret the law and 
 to apply its remedies and penalties in particular cases. Separate 
 
 1 Dealey, Development of the State, pp. 127-136. 
 
 * Lowell, Government of England, Vol. I, chaps, ii-iii, xvii-xviii, xxii-xxiii. 
 8 McConachie, Congressional Committees ; Beard, American Government and 
 Politics, pp. 276^279, 291-293. 
 
 4 Dodd, Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions, chaps, ii-iii, v. 
 6 McClain, Constitutional Law in the United States, chap. xxi. 
 
 6 Willoughby, Nature of the State, chap, vii ; Gray, Nature and Sources of 
 the Law. 
 
 7 Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, Vol. I, pp. 25-26, 29-30. 
 
 8 Goodnow, op. cit, Vol. II, pp. 135-143. 
 
 9 Goodnow, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 217-239 ; Lowell, Governments and Parties in 
 Continental Europe, Vol. I, pp. 34-68. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 249 
 
 judicial organs usually exercise this power, although legislatures and 
 executives still retain traces of their former judicial functions. 1 
 
 386. Subdivisions of general problem. In discussing the prob- 
 lems of state function a clear distinction must be made between 
 the consideration of what the state actually has done or is doing 
 and of what the state should do. The former may be further sub- 
 divided into the functions that states in fact perform and the con- 
 ceptions or theories of state function upon which the acts of states 
 are based. The functions performed by states do not show wide 
 differences in kind during the entire process of political evolution. 
 Changing historical circumstances have affected the method and 
 extent of the exercise of governmental functions ; functions have 
 been performed by various organs, in different ways, and for dif- 
 ferent purposes, depending upon conditions in each state and at 
 each period. Certain particular activities have appeared or disap- 
 peared, depending upon the stage of civilization and the interests of 
 those controlling the government, but the actual practices of states 
 show differences in degree rather than in fundamental nature. 2 
 
 387. Essential and optional functions. For example, every state 
 has found it necessary to enforce certain rules and laws for the 
 protection of person and property from disorder and violence, to 
 maintain justice in civil disputes and to define and punish crime, 
 to determine the political duties, privileges, and relations of its 
 citizens, to raise and expend certain revenues, to regulate dealings 
 with other states, and secure safety against external danger by main- 
 taining some sort of organized force. 3 These are essential func- 
 tions, necessitated by the very nature of the state ; i and the extent 
 to which the control of the state must be exercised is determined 
 
 1 For example, in the pardoning power and in impeachment. See Dealey, 
 op. cit., chap. viii. Also in the off-hand decision of many administrative questions. 
 
 2 Wilson, The State, pp. 615-628. 
 
 8 Dealey, op. cit., pp. 65-87. The historical order in which objects of public 
 expenditure appeared has been stated as follows : (1) external security, (2) security 
 within the community, ('3) promotion of material interests, (4) benevolence, (5) edu- 
 cation, (6) labor. See Ely, Outlines of Economics, p. 566. 
 
 4 Numerous attempts have been made to classify the functions of the state. See 
 Gettell, Introduction to Political Science, chap, xxv ; Garner, Introduction to Polit- 
 ical Science, pp. 318-320; Wilson, op. cit, pp. 612-615; Leacock, Elements of 
 Political Science, Part III, chap, iii; Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 310-311, 343-350- 
 
2SO PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 mainly by the character of the people governed and by their state 
 of civilization. States have also been interested in some form of 
 internal improvements, ranging from the temples, palaces, and 
 tombs built by state slavery in the Oriental empires, through the 
 road-building of Persia and Rome, the medieval draining of marshes 
 in Holland and England, to the state roads, bridges, canals, and 
 railways and the irrigation and conservation projects of the present 
 day. States have safeguarded or promoted the physical, moral, and 
 intellectual life of their citizens, and have controlled or regulated 
 industry and trade. 1 All these functions, in one shape or another, 
 governments have undertaken. Sometimes the state has entered 
 extensively into the lives of its members ; sometimes it has left 
 much to individual initiative and control. Sometimes its interfer- 
 ence has aimed at its own benefit ; sometimes at that of its citizens. 
 388. General similarity in state functioning. In the adminis- 
 tration of these functions at different times, emphasis has been 
 shifted from one to another ; some have been widened, others 
 narrowed ; the purposes aimed at have varied. Roman roads, for 
 instance, were built chiefly for the moving of armies ; modern high- 
 ways are fundamentally arteries of trade. Ancient states regulated 
 commerce for the purpose of securing sufficient food for their citi- 
 zens ; in the eighteenth century states were interested in a favorable 
 balance of trade ; modern states aim at revenue, or the protection 
 of their manufactures, or a well-rounded economic development. 
 Ancient states compelled men to be frugal by law ; modern states 
 command compulsory education. Uniformities of practice, how- 
 ever, far outrun differences. 2 These similarities are due " to the 
 fact that after all man is man everywhere and at all times, and that 
 all political organization of men must therefore have ultimately the 
 same ends, and must adopt in a general way the same methods for 
 their satisfaction." 3 
 
 1 Ely, Outlines of Economics, chap, xxvi ; Seager, Introduction to Economics, 
 chap, xxii ; Seligman, Principles of Economics, chaps, xxx, xxxiii. 
 
 2 For the scope of administration in Athens, see Gilbert, Greek Constitutional 
 Antiquities, pp. 214-416. For the functions performed by government in early 
 England, see Stubbs, Constitutional History of England, Vol. I, chaps, xi, xiii. 
 For the functions performed in early cities, see Fairlie, Municipal Administration, 
 chaps, i-ii. s Goodnow, Politics and Administration, p. 7. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 251 
 
 389. Ancient theory of state functions. A notable contrast may 
 be drawn between ancient and modern conceptions of the theory 
 underlying governmental function. The ancient state absorbed the 
 whole life of its members. Individual rights as contrasted with the 
 rights of the state were unknown. 1 No limit to state functions 
 was fixed even in theory, since no distinction was made between 
 the interests of the individual and of the political unit of which he 
 formed an integral part. While expediency determined the func- 
 tions that government actually performed, all agreed that the state 
 might do what it chose and that the interests of men in association, 
 not of men as individuals, were of prime importance. The citizen 
 existed for the state. The conception that there were individual 
 rights, digtinct from those created by the state, 'and that there ex- 
 isted a sphere of individual activity into which the state should not 
 enter, came into the world through the religious teachings of Chris- 
 tianity 2 and through the political ideals of the Teutons. 3 The first 
 attempts to fuse these revolutionary ideas with the political princi- 
 ples of the Roman world were followed by the anarchy of feudal- 
 ism. The elements of the state disintegrated ; and government, 
 divided piecemeal, existed where it could and functioned as it could. 4 
 
 390. Modern theory of state functions. As the national mon- 
 archies emerged, their kings, modeling political principles upon 
 Roman jurisprudence, attempted to restore the ancient theory of 
 state function and to concentrate its unlimited prerogatives in their 
 own persons. 6 The opponents of the king, however, developed the 
 new ideas into the doctrine of natural rights and the social con- 
 tract, and upon these principles successfully waged their revolu- 
 tionary struggles for a limitation on governmental authority and a 
 guaranteed sphere of free action for the individual. 6 While the 
 principles upon which this contest was won are now discredited, 
 the fundamental change that it caused in the conception of state 
 
 1 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, pp. 160-166. 
 
 2 Scherger, Evolution of Modern Liberty, pp. 28-33, 36-43- 
 
 * Wilson, The State, pp. 583-584. i Ibid. pp. 166-168, 584-585 
 
 6 The theory of divine right and the hereditary principle of succession even 
 gave a vague basis for reviving the ancient religio-kinship idea of the state as an 
 enlarged family and the king as the father of his people. See Filmer, Patriarcha. 
 6 Scherger, op. cit, Introduction; Part I, chaps, ii-iii; Parts III-IV. 
 
252 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 functions still survives. The state no longer absorbs the individ- 
 ual ; it exists rather to serve his interests. Each man aims to live 
 his own life and to make his own social relations, many of them 
 entirely outside the limits of the state's control. 1 The state is now 
 conceived as the representative of the citizens, and its activities, 
 even though more extensive in many respects than those of the 
 ancient states, rest on a conception of political institutions that 
 emancipates the individual and limits the scope of state functions 
 in principle as well as in practice. 2 
 
 391. Relation between organization and function. It is at once 
 obvious that the form of the state and the nature of its govern- 
 mental organization have been intimately connected with the ex- 
 tent of state activity, and that changes in the type of state or of 
 government have invariably caused changes in the nature of polit- 
 ical functioning. For example, in the local political units of the 
 Middle Ages, extensive and detailed regulation of economic life 
 was possible and in many ways desirable. The customs of the 
 manor and the rules of the guilds restricted competition in the in- 
 terest of all and controlled in most minute detail the conduct of 
 their members. Local customs and local regulations largely deter- 
 mined the direction of industrial activity. 3 When national states 
 arose, the theory that economic life should be under political con- 
 trol still survived, and the national governments of the new states 
 attempted to formulate similar detailed regulations and enforce 
 them over the area of the entire state. Labor, manufacture, and 
 commerce, both domestic and foreign, were brought under the new 
 
 1 Cooley, Social Organization, pp. 21-22 ; Giddings, Descriptive and Historical 
 Sociology, pp. 429-432. 
 
 2 The broad distinction between ancient and modern states is frequently ex- 
 pressed by saying that the former were essentially socialistic and the latter individ- 
 ualistic. The same principle is involved in Maine's generalization that society 
 progresses from status to contract. Spencer traces the development of social 
 organization from the system of compulsory cooperation to voluntary cooperation. 
 While no one-sided law of progress is adequate, and while it is chiefly the form 
 and degree of social regulation that change from time to time, it is nevertheless 4 
 fair to hold that in the ancient state the freedom of the individual was largely 
 limited, while in modern states the powers of government have been compara- 
 tively diminished. 
 
 8 Seager, Introduction to Economics, pp. 2-6 ; Fisk, International Commer- 
 cial Policies, pp. 14-16; Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, 
 chaps, ii-iii. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 253 
 
 national regulations, and little freedom was allowed to individual 
 enterprise or to competition. 1 It was soon found, however, that 
 conditions in the national state and in the economic life that devel- 
 oped in it made a large part of these regulations ineffective and 
 many of them injurious. 2 Specific laws concerning labor and 
 wages could not be enforced during the transition period between 
 the stable, agricultural life of the Middle Ages and the mobile, 
 competitive industry of the early towns. 3 Detailed specifications 
 concerning qualities of goods and prices were inapplicable when 
 methods and costs of production were changing rapidly during the 
 Industrial Revolution. 4 Uniform laws worked hardships and at- 
 tempts at discrimination created worse evils. Arguments against 
 government regulation arose, therefore, and the policy of laissez 
 faire was adopted. 5 The change in the form of the state from the 
 medieval community to the modern nation was one cause of the 
 new theory of state function. 
 
 392. Forms of government and state functions. Similarly, 
 changes in the composition of government affected popular con- 
 ceptions of state function. Throughout a large part of human his- 
 tory political authority was exercised by a narrow minority within 
 the state, often for their own selfish interests. Accordingly, law 
 was conceived by the masses as something enforced upon them by 
 a more or less alien and hostile power. Freedom was associated 
 with limitation on governmental action. Men desired protection 
 against interference long before they dreamed of sharing in au- 
 thority. 6 As long as law was merely a rule enforced by a superior, 
 there was a distinct antithesis between what the state did for its 
 
 1 Ingram, History of Political Economy, chap, iv ; Seager, op. cit., pp. 6-12; 
 Cheyney, op. cit., chap. vi. 
 
 2 Smith, Liberty and Liberalism, chap, vi ; Hume, History of England, Vol. II, 
 chap. xvi. 
 
 8 Seager, op. cit., pp. 12-19 ! Cheyney, Short History of England, pp. 244-245, 
 314-316, 337-339- 
 
 4 Toynbee, The Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England ; 
 Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, chap. viii. 
 
 6 Ingram, op. cit, chap, v ; Cunningham, Western Civilization : Medieval and 
 Modern Times, Bk. VI. 
 
 6 For example, the great documents associated with the growth of English de- 
 mocracy — Magna Charta, the Petition of Right, the Bill of Rights, etc. — provide 
 for exemptions from political interference rather than for popular participation 
 in government. 
 
254 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 citizens and what they did for themselves. In modern democra- 
 cies, however, state action expresses the will of most of the citi- 
 zens. 1 Self-government means that the desires of the people may 
 often be best carried out through the state machinery. Opposition 
 to state action accompanied the origin of democracy, but a grow- 
 ing confidence in state action follows as democratic institutions 
 develop. 2 As men secure a share in authority, .they are interested 
 in what the state can do for them as well as in what it can protect 
 them against, and are willing to extend the scope of activity of an 
 organization which acts as their agent and is under their control. 
 
 393. Democracy and, expanding governmental activity. Hence, 
 with the advance in constitutional, representative institutions and 
 the widening of the electorate in modern states, the theory of 
 laissez faire has been modified. Labor, industry, and commerce 
 have again come under political control. 3 Government regulation 
 aims to remedy the injustices and evils of free competition, and 
 the state undertakes positive action on a large scale for the welfare 
 of its citizens or for its own economic and political aggrandize- 
 ment. 4 The growth of socialism as a political movement represents 
 the extreme manifestation of this tendency. The functions per- 
 formed by the state depend largely upon the composition of the 
 organization that represents the state. 5 
 
 394. Relativity of proper governmental functions. From a 
 slightly different point of yiew it may be stated that "in a very 
 homogeneous society, where all the people are of one race, one 
 allegiance, and one religion, there will be a general adherence to 
 the same customs, a general sympathy with the same ideals' of life, 
 and there will be little difficulty in maintaining laws which could 
 only be imposed upon an alien race by means of extreme severity. 
 In such a society, then, the sphere of the state can quite usefully 
 be extended to functions, which, in a complex empire govern- 
 ing men of different nationalities and rival religions, will produce 
 
 1 Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, pp. 140-141, 190-192. 
 
 2 Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 143-147. 
 
 8 Farrer, The State in its Relation to Trade j Cheyney, Industrial and Social 
 History of England, chap. ix. 
 
 4 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, chap. iii. 
 
 6 Giddings, Democracy and Empire, chap, vi ; Kelly, Government or Human 
 Evolution : Individualism and Collectivism, pp. 505-533. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 255 
 
 confusion and the breaking-up of laws. One cannot, then, lay down 
 general rules as to the functions of the state which will apply to 
 all times and places. Our only general rule will be that, seeing 
 that the state is a form of association and is limited by the fact 
 that its functions have to be crystallized in definite institutions, ex- 
 pressed in universal laws, and in large measure carried out by the 
 use of compulsion, their sphere must be determined by consider- 
 ing how far the objects of social cooperation can be furthered by 
 methods of this kind, or how far, on the other hand, the nature 
 of the methods necessary will itself conflict with the ends desired." 1 
 " What government does must arise from what government is ; and 
 what government is must determine what government ought to do." 2 
 395. Controversy over proper scope of state activity. It is 
 around the question of what the state should do that chief contro- 
 versy has been waged and that interest has centered. At present 
 there are many who question the right of the state to interfere 
 with vested interests or with individual inclinations. There are 
 many others who cry to the government for help, assuming that 
 the state can and must give aid. 3 The difference between those 
 who oppose and those who favor freedom of action is often more 
 apparent than real, the nature of the interference rather than the 
 principle of interference itself being thought of. " The railway 
 magnate restricts his own liberty by pooling arrangements, but 
 objects to interference by the shipper. The slave owner wanted 
 freedom of trade, but scouted freedom of man. The manufacturer 
 demands protection against his foreign competitor, but objects to 
 factory laws. The cotton grower acclaims the rise of prices brought 
 about by manipulation on the exchange, while the spinner decries 
 the liberty of speculation. The factory owner joins the selling 
 bureau which restricts output or fixes prices, but objects to the 
 tyranny of the labor union. The labor union adopts provisions 
 relating to apprenticeship, the open shop, and the boycott, but 
 opposes lockouts and trusts." i 
 
 1 Hobhouse, op. cit, pp. 188-189. 
 
 2 Wilson, The State, p. 613. 
 
 8 Goschen, " Laissez Faire and Government Interference," Address to the Edin- 
 burgh Philosophical Institution. 
 
 * Seligman, Principles of Economics, p. 171. 
 
256 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 396. Classification of theories of state function. Excluding the 
 doctrines of the anarchists, who believe that the state could be 
 done away with entirely, 1 the theories concerning the sphere of 
 the state may be roughly divided into (i) the individualistic, or 
 laissez-faire, theory ; (2) the socialistic, or. collectivistic, theory ; 
 and (3) the general-welfare, or compromise, theory. 2 The individ- 
 ualist holds that the scope of state activity should be restricted to 
 the narrowest limits consistent with the maintenance of peace, 
 order, and security. The socialist contends for a maximum rather 
 than a minimum of government, believing that the state should 
 actively promote the common economic, moral, and intellectual 
 interests of the people. Those holding the middle position realize 
 that no hard and fast rule governing the division of functions be- 
 tween state and individual can be laid down, but that as the con- 
 ditions and needs of society change, the nature of state activities 
 must change correspondingly, each case being decided separately 
 if necessary. This does not mean that no action should be taken 
 until evils arise and that they should then be tinkered with until 
 they disappear. This attitude, often taken by so-called " practical 
 politicians," is neither scientific nor effective. Attacking symptoms 
 rather than the disease is more likely to drive the illness inward 
 toward a vital part than to effect a cure. " If any general rule may 
 be formulated, it must be deduced from a consideration of the 
 question whether the purpose of state intervention in a given case 
 is for the common good, whether the proposed action is likely to 
 be effective, and, if so, whether it can be done without doing more 
 harm than good." 8 
 
 II. Individualism 
 
 397. Early foundations of individualism. The political ideals 
 of the Teutons, the religious teachings of Protestantism, and the 
 belief in natural law prepared the way and furnished certain 
 elements for the individualistic conception of state functions. 
 
 1 Zenker, Anarchism ; Eltzbacher, Anarchism, trans, by Byington ; Yarros, A 
 Plea for Liberty ; Tucker, Instead of a Book. 
 
 2 A division into five solutions, the opportunistic, the socialistic, the individ- 
 ualistic, the compromise, and the organic, is made in McKechnie, The State and 
 the Individual, Part II, chap. xii. 
 
 8 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 321-322. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 257 
 
 Individualism as a distinct political doctrine, however, arose during 
 the latter part of the eighteenth century, 1 largely as a reaction 
 against the evils of overgovernment in Europe 2 and in connec- 
 tion with the changing economic principles concerning the proper 
 relation of the state to industry and commerce. 3 The mercantile 
 system, 4 which obtained from the early part of the sixteenth cen- 
 tury until late in the eighteenth century, and according to which 
 each state aimed to increase its stock of precious metals, maintain 
 a favorable balance of trade, increase its population, and foster its 
 manufactures, had resulted in an enormous expansion of govern- 
 mental activities in the new national states of the modern world. 
 In carrying out these theories statesmen turned to the law, and 
 restrictions were multiplied until mercantilism became practically 
 synonymous with governmental interference. 
 
 398. Development of individualism. During the eighteenth cen- 
 tury the expansion of international relations and the growth of the 
 foreign market tended to modify the intense rivalries of the separate 
 states and led to a broader and more cosmopolitan view. The dis- 
 advantages of the restrictive system began to outweigh its advan- 
 tages, especially in England, whose commercial position had become 
 so strong that her industries were crippled by the very laws that 
 had protected their beginnings. 6 The doctrine of natural law, coming 
 into prominence as the theoretical basis for revolution and democ- 
 racy, emphasized private property and individual liberty, and this 
 was interpreted to uphold noninterference in internal industry and 
 in external trade. The Physiocrats 6 in France believed in natural 
 
 1 Michel, L'Idee de l'Etat, Introduction and Bk. III. 
 
 2 Johnson, Age of the Enlightened Despot, pp. 254-259. 
 
 8 Individualism is mainly an economic theory and is closely connected with 
 the evolution of private property. See Kelly, Government or Human Evolution : 
 Individualism and Collectivism, Bk. I, chap. iii. 
 
 4 Represented by the policies of Cromwell in England, Colbert in France, and 
 Frederick the Great in Prussia ; and by writings such as Serra, A Brief Treatise 
 on Causes which make Gold and Silver abound where there are no Mines ; Mun, 
 England's Treasure by Foreign Trade : or the Balance of our Trade the Rule of 
 our Treasure. See Cunningham, Growth of English Industry and Commerce in 
 Modern Times, Part I ; Schmoller, The Mercantile System, trans, by W. J. 
 Ashley. 6 Cunningham, op. cit., Part II. 
 
 6 Turgot, Gournay, and Quesnay were the leaders in this movement, and 
 Quesnay's Tableau e"conomique was the best expression of their views. See 
 Ingram, History of Political Economy, pp. 57-70 ; Higgs, The Physiocrats. 
 
258 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 rights and, as a corollary to their economic principles, taught the 
 political doctrine that the government should not interfere with 
 private enterprise. Adam Smith, in his " Inquiry into the Nature 
 and Causes of the Wealth of Nations," taught the doctrines of free 
 trade, noninterference, and natural law. He opposed governmental 
 restrictions and emphasized the importance of allowing each indi- 
 vidual to follow his own self-interest as the best means of promot- 
 ing national prosperity. The doctrine of natural liberty was defended 
 and developed by Ricardo and Malthus in England, by Bastiat, 
 Say, De Tocqueville, and Taine in France, and by Kant, Fichte, 
 and Humboldt 1 in Germany. More recently, Laboulaye 2 and Leroy- 
 Beaulieu 3 in France and Mill 4 and Spencer 5 in England became 
 the leading exponents of the individualistic principles. 
 
 399 . Essential principles of individualism. While there are many 
 different degrees of individualism, varying from an ill-defined desire 
 to protect the liberty of citizens against unnecessary interference 
 at the hands of a bureaucratic despotism to a deliberate attempt to 
 abolish government entirely, the following general statement indi- 
 cates the individualistic point of view. 6 The theory^of individualism 
 considers the state an evil, necessary only because of the ignorance 
 and selfishness of mankind. Its sole duty is to protect the life, 
 liberty, and property of individuals against fraud or violence. Indi- 
 vidualism regards restraint in itself as undesirable, and holds that 
 every extension of state function is a corresponding narrowing of 
 individual liberty. From this point of view the state is justified in 
 interfering only for the purpose of protecting its citizens against 
 worse interference on the part of other citizens and, in the opinion 
 of many individualists, is not justified in further activity, even for 
 
 1 Humboldt's Essay, written in 1791, but for political reasons withheld from 
 publication until 1852, is one of the ablest arguments against extensive state 
 functioning. This essay, under the title Sphere and Duties of the State, has been 
 translated into English by J. Goulthard. 
 
 2 L'fitat moderne et ses limites. 
 8 The Modern State. 
 
 4 Essay on Liberty ; Political Economy, Vol. II, Bk. V. 
 
 6 Social Statics ; The Man versus the State. 
 
 6 For brief statements of the modern theory of individualism, see Donisthorpe, 
 Individualism; Mackay (editor), A Plea for Liberty; Sidgwick, Elements of 
 Politics, chaps, iii-x ; Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 274-282 ; 
 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 320-337. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 259 
 
 purposes admittedly beneficial. 1 Its function is to restrain not to 
 promote. Individualism is frequently accompanied by the belief 
 that, as the sense of order and morality becomes more perfect,, the 
 need for state action will diminish, and tha't the ideal condition 
 would be that in which the state no longer exists because no longer 
 needed. The chief duty of the state becomes therefore to prepare 
 for its own demise. 2 
 
 400. Arguments supporting individualism. Individualism, as a 
 theory of state function, has been supported by numerous argu- 
 ments, but a broad classification of these arguments places them 
 under three main heads : 3 (1) on ethical grounds it is claimed that 
 justice and the best interests of the individual demand freedom 
 from state interference ; (2) on scientific grounds it is argued that 
 individualism is in harmony with nature and the principles of evolu- 
 tion ; (3) on economic grounds it is held that freedom from restraint 
 is profitable and that competition under economic law secures the 
 best results. Each of these lines of argument will be briefly stated 
 and criticized. 4 
 
 401. Individualism as a natural right. One phase of individu- 
 alism was closely connected with the doctrine of natural rights and 
 the social contract. The political philosophers of the later eight- 
 eenth and early nineteenth centuries greatly emphasized the private 
 rights of men to life, liberty, and property. These were considered 
 inalienable under the laws of nature ; and the purpose of the state 
 was conceived to be merely the protection of these rights. It was 
 natural that, as democracy arose, the idea of self-government 
 
 1 Adam Smith would have restricted the functions of government to three : 
 to protect the nation from the attacks of other nations, to protect each person in 
 the nation from the injustice and violence of- other individuals, and to carry on 
 certain educational or similar institutions which were of general utility, but not 
 to any one's private interest. Many of his successors would have cut off the last 
 duty altogether. — Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, pp. 227-228. 
 
 2 At this point, to which individualism logically leads, it shades off into anarchism. 
 For statements of the desirability of the ultimate disappearance of the state, see 
 Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 321-322. 
 
 8 A broader distinction between individualism based upon abstract rights and 
 upon political and economic expediency is often made. See McKechnie, The 
 State and the Individual, chaps, xv-xvi. 
 
 4 Good brief statements of 'the arguments for and against individualism may 
 be found in Garner, op. cit., pp. 282-298 ; Leacock, Elements of Political Science, 
 pp. 358-368. , 
 
260 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 should be confused with the similar idea of individual freedom, 
 and that men who were opposing the arbitrary and extensive action 
 of unpopular governments should uphold the theory of noninter- 
 ference. The idea of self-government was associated with the idea 
 of a minimum amount of government. 1 In Germany, France, and 
 England, the natural rights of men were invoked to limit the scope i 
 of state activity ; in America, where a long contest had been waged 
 against the royal governors 2 and against the restrictions of English 
 control, an intense belief in individual rights accompanied the 
 formation of the Union. 3 
 
 402. Fallacies in the theory of natural rights. This basis of 
 individualism was completely destroyed when the fallacies inherent 
 in the philosophical theory of natural rights were pointed out. 4 
 Since no individual rights exist except those created and safe- 
 guarded by the state, there can be no legal limit to the scope of 
 state function ; and any desired limitation of governmental activity 
 must be based on other grounds. Besides, the protection of life, 
 liberty, and property involves a certain amount of state interfer- 
 ence, and the degree to which the state shall act in order to pro- 
 tect even the so-called natural rights must rest on a more or less 
 utilitarian basis. 5 Complete individual freedom would either compel 
 every individual practically to refrain from action or would introduce 
 a contest of all against all. 6 
 
 403. Individualism and individual development. Aside from the 
 natural-rights basis of individualism, it is sometimes argued that 
 ethical considerations require the state to limit its interference in 
 order that the individual may develop harmoniously, may become 
 
 1 Absolute claims to exemption from the control of government have been set 
 up in behalf of rights of individual liberty, rights of conscience, contractual and 
 proprietary rights, rights of the church, the family, and the voluntary association, 
 rights of subject nationalities, and the rights of man considered generally. — 
 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, p. 227. 
 
 2 Beard, American Government and Politics, pp. 4-5 ; Greene, The Provincial 
 Governor, chaps, viii-x. 
 
 8 In the writings of Jefferson, Madison, Paine, and others. See Merriam, 
 American Political Theories, chaps, ii-iv ; Smith, Spirit of American Government, 
 chaps, xi-xii. 
 
 4 Ritchie, Natural Rights; Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 103-115. 
 
 6 Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, chap. iv. 
 
 6 Ward, " Political Ethics of Spencer," in Annals of the American Academy 
 of Political and Social Science, Vol. IV, No. 4. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 261 
 
 enterprising and self-reliant, and may realize fully the ends of his 
 existence. 1 Governmental interference is accused of preventing 
 the development of character and of lowering the social level. 
 Against this point of view, in spite of its element of truth, it may 
 be pointed out that character is developed as much through dis- 
 cipline and restraint as through freedom, that the most highly de- 
 veloped man is the social, not the natural man, and that each 
 individual owes a large part of his character to his social and 
 political environment. That the individual could attain a higher 
 development or a more desirable personality if freed from political 
 restraint or from the limitations imposed upon his freedom of 
 action by the necessities of social life is not likely. 
 
 404. Individualism a corollary of natural evolution. On a 
 scientific basis individualism has been supported by the belief that 
 it is in harmony with the doctrine of evolution. 2 It is held that by 
 leaving each individual free from interference the natural struggle 
 for existence will eliminate the unfit elements in society and allow 
 only the strong and the fit to survive. This theory assumes that 
 self-interest is the basic principle of human action, that each in- 
 dividual knows his own interests best and in the absence of re- 
 strictions will follow them, that the free competition that results 
 from the efforts of each individual will develop the highest human 
 possibilities and advance the welfare of all. Against this line of 
 reasoning it may be pointed out 3 that altruism as well as self- 
 interest is a motive in human action, that men are often ignorant 
 of their own best interests or unwilling to follow them, 4 and that 
 in the absence of restraint free competition is sometimes impos- 
 sible, the contesting parties being too unequal in strength. 6 State 
 
 1 Humboldt, Sphere and Duties of the State, chaps, i-ii ; Mill, Political 
 Economy, Vol. II, pp. 561-567. 
 
 2 This point of view is worked out especially by Spencer in The Man versus 
 the State. 8 Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 326-329. 
 
 4 For example, in education, sanitation, and the like, many are ignorant of 
 their best interests until compulsion is applied. 
 
 6 For example, in competitive bargaining between labor and capital in the 
 present organization of economic society, the single laborer is too weak to com- 
 pete fairly. By means of government regulation or by trade-unions, which limit 
 the freedom of the individual laborer, a truer competition results. See Taussig, 
 Principles of Economics, Vol. II, pp. 262-266; Seager, Introduction to Eco- 
 nomics, chap. xxii. 
 
262 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 action, by equalizing conditions, may actually promote real compe- 
 tition and raise its moral plane. 1 
 
 405. Political evolution psychic rather than physiological. 
 Finally, the assumption that individualism is a corollary of evo- 
 lution fails to consider the essential difference between the devel- 
 opment of mankind and of the lower forms of life. While the 
 latter are at the mercy of their environment and are transformed 
 by it, man transforms his environment and can thus remove the 
 great waste that the process of natural selection otherwise neces- 
 sitates. Besides, since the survival of the " fittest " means only 
 the fittest under given circumstances, and not necessarily the sur- 
 vival of the best, man, by improving those circumstances, can make 
 the fittest a far more desirable product. 2 Besides, struggle takes 
 place between groups — races, tribes, states — as well as between 
 individuals, and the survival or success of a given group does not 
 guarantee that its individuals separately are the fittest or the most 
 desirable types. The law of evolution holds good among men in 
 its psychic rather than in its physiological aspects, 3 and men are 
 justified in using all their efforts to restrict the working of the 
 competitive principle when it is found to be harmful to that devel- 
 opment to which men rationally attach value. In consideration of 
 the nature of human evolution, 4 a more intelligent law of state 
 function might be formulated as follows : " First, where the Dar- 
 winian law in its application to social man is too cruel or wasteful, 
 or works in any way to destroy those who from the broad and 
 highest standpoint of race improvement are best fitted to survive, 
 to that extent the law is to be checked or regulated if possible by 
 the organized effort of society. Secondly, where the law does not 
 
 1 Adams, " Relation of the State to Industrial Action," in American Economic 
 Association Publications, 1887 ; Ely, Outlines of Economics, chap. xxvi. 
 
 2 Criticisms of the individualistic doctrine as based upon evolutionary prin- 
 ciples may be found in Ward, Psychic Factors of Civilization ; Ritchie, Darwinism 
 and Politics ; Huxley, " Evolution and Ethics," in Collected Essays, Vol. IX. 
 
 8 Ward, " Mind as a Social Factor," in Mind, Vol. IX, No. 36, pp. 563-573. 
 
 * For an extended discussion of the distinction between human and natural 
 evolution and the essential injustice in the latter, see Kelly, Government or 
 Human Evolution : Justice, Bk. II ; and for the application of this distinction to 
 the scope of state activities, see Kelly, Government or Human Evolution : Indi- 
 vidualism and Collectivism. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 263 
 
 so operate as to eliminate those essentially unfit to survive, the 
 impeding cause is to be removed and the operation of the law 
 rendered possible." 1 
 
 406. Individualism as an economic concept. The chief defense 
 of individualism has rested upon economic grounds, the claim 
 being that it is more profitable in industry and commerce for every 
 one to follow his own interests free from governmental restraint. 
 This argument may be stated as follows : "If individuals are left 
 free to follow their own choice in the use of their capital, the sale 
 of their labor, or the renting of their property, the liberty of each 
 will be in the general interest of all. For capital and labor will by 
 this means be directed to those operations in which they are most 
 profitably employed, and in which the remuneration for them is in 
 consequence the highest. A similar reasoning applies to prices ; 
 for if articles are freely exchanged, an increased demand for any 
 commodity will tend to raise the price and to call forth an addi- 
 tional supply, until by the operation of these balanced forces an 
 equilibrium is obtained. International exchange of goods, if left 
 unrestricted, will be effected in the quantity and kind most profit- 
 able to those making the exchange : every country will prefer to 
 direct its labor towards the production of those articles for which 
 it has the greatest adaptability and will rely on its trade with other 
 nations to supply the commodities whose production it finds rela- 
 tively difficult. We have thus a general economic harmony in which 
 every individual seeks to obtain the greatest advantage for himself 
 to the general well-being of all. In such a state of things govern- 
 ment interference becomes needless and necessarily injurious." 2 
 
 407. Evils of governmental interference with economic laws. 
 The advocates of this theory point to the unsuccessful attempts 
 of states in the past to interfere with the working of economic 
 laws ; they note the evils that resulted from excessive and meddle- 
 some state regulations, and hold that better economic results are 
 obtained by leaving the conduct of industry as far as possible to 
 private enterprise. 3 They also believe that most things are done 
 
 1 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 335-336. 
 
 2 Leacock, Elements of Political Science, pp. 364-365. 
 8 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 285-287. 
 
264 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 more efficiently by individuals than by governments, since the 
 people understand their own business better and are more inter- 
 ested in its success than governmental officials, who are notoriously 
 extravagant . and unenterprising. 1 Governmental action shows a 
 marked tendency toward formalism and red tape. Just because the 
 state is the most ancient and elaborate form of social organization, 
 it is apt to be mechanical, rigid, and costly. 
 
 408. Free trade. The effects of these doctrines, which were 
 put into practice, especially in England, 2 during the early part of 
 the last century, were momentous. Restrictions were removed both 
 from internal industry and trade and from foreign commerce. The 
 resulting free movement of capital, labor, and commodities was 
 accompanied by an enormous increase in the volume of production 
 and in many ways by marked improvements in economic condi- 
 tions. 3 Certain unforeseen conditions soon arose, however, which 
 compelled states, while retaining their fundamental basis of indi- 
 vidualism, to modify their attitude and to extend the scope of their 
 activities. The cosmopolitan theory of free trade, while advanta- 
 geous for England with her advanced methods of industry, proved 
 dangerous to the economic existence and national interests of other 
 states, and a reaction toward protection set in. 4 
 
 409. Free competition. Similarly, the idea that free competition 
 among buyers and sellers would automatically adjust prices accord- 
 ing to the cost of production was nullified by the formation of trusts 
 and monopolies and by agreements among sellers, which interfered 
 with the free play of economic forces. 5 Monopoly prices follow 
 quite different laws from those that govern free competition ; 6 and 
 modern states have in many cases been compelled to use their legis- 
 lative power to protect their citizens against extortion. 7 Natural 
 monopolies in particular have come under government regulation, 8 
 
 1 Rae, Contemporary Socialism, p. 409. 
 
 2 Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, pp. 228-235; on the 
 growth of paternalism in England, see Lowell, Government of England, Vol. II, 
 chap. lxv. 8 Hobson, Evolution of Modern Capitalism, chap. xvii. 
 
 4 See below, Chapter X, sections 446-456. 
 
 6 Ripley (editor), Trusts, Pools, and Corporations ; Jenks, The Trust Problem. 
 6 Ely, Monopolies and Trusts, chap. iii. 7 Macrosty, Trusts and the State. 
 
 8 Especially railroads. See Johnson, American Railway Transportation, Parts 
 III-IV; McPherson, Transportation in Europe, chap. viii. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 265 
 
 and modern states, especially in their municipal units, 1 own and 
 operate various forms of enterprise. 
 
 410. Reaction toward governmental regulation. The attitude 
 of modern governments toward labor also shows a decided reaction 
 against the individualism of a century ago. 2 A general recognition 
 of the idea of social solidarity and of social duties has caused a re- 
 adjustment of the rights and privileges of a growing laboring class 
 to accord with modern conditions. 3 Legislation for this purpose 
 began in England, 4 where the evils of the laissez-faire principles 
 as applied to new industrial conditions first became apparent, and 
 spread later to the remainder of Europe and to America. 5 States 
 regulate conditions of employment, fixing age limits for child labor, 6 
 limiting the hours of labor, and protecting employees against acci- 
 dent or disease due to dangerous or unhealthy trades. Laws affect- 
 ing the conditions of remuneration have compelled regular and 
 frequent payment of wages in cash, and in some states have fixed 
 a minimum wage. 7 Employers' liability for injuries sustained by 
 workmen has been extended and compulsory insurance of laborers 
 against accident, illness, old age, and death has been founded. 8 
 At present the line between protective legislation, guaranteeing the 
 individual against injury, and paternal legislation, compelling the 
 individual in a positive direction for his own good, is difficult to 
 draw ; and individualism in its economic aspects is to a consider- 
 able degree discredited in theory and disregarded in practice. 
 
 411. General fallacies of individualism. A few fallacies in the 
 general conception of individualism may also be pointed out. 9 The 
 assumption that the state is an evil is not borne out by facts. While 
 
 1 Darwin, Municipal Trade; Bemis (editor), Municipal Monopolies; "Munici- 
 pal and Private Operation of Public Utilities," in National Civic Federation 
 Report, 1907. 2 Adams and Sumner, Labor Problems. 
 
 8 Brooks, The Social Unrest ; Dicey, Law and Opinion in England. 
 
 * Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Problems of Modern Industry, chap, iv ; Hutchins 
 and Harrison, History of Factory Legislation. 
 
 6 Seager, Introduction to Economics, chap, xxii ; Jevons, The State in Relation 
 to Labor. e Murphy, The Case against Child Labor. 
 
 7 Clark, Labor Movement in Australia. 
 
 8 Willoughby, Workingmen's Insurance ; Taussig, Principles of Economics, 
 Vol. II, chap, lviii; Seager, Social Insurance. 
 
 9 Two distinctions concerning the method of state control may help to explain 
 much of the objection to governmental activities. Control of certain interests at 
 
266 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 particular states may have governed badly and while governments 
 have frequently made mistakes, history shows that the progress of 
 civilization is largely due to political action, and that the transition 
 from a lower to a higher stage of culture is intimately connected 
 with the rise and development of state organization and activities. 
 It is also a fundamental error to consider the authority of the state 
 as inherently hostile to liberty. 1 Liberty is possible only under 
 authority, and the restrictions placed by the state upon certain forms 
 of action guarantee freedom for all within the remaining field. The 
 state promotes as well as restricts, and often increases freedom by 
 removing obstacles or hindrances. It is also an error to consider 
 the interests of individuals as essentially distinct from those of the 
 state, or as opposed to them in nature. Man considered apart from 
 the other members of society is a mere abstraction ; his interests 
 instead of being distinct are bound up in the interests of his fellow 
 men ; his own nature and character are largely determined by the 
 social environment in which he lives. There is no province which 
 is absolutely that of the state in the sense of excluding individual 
 action, and there is equally no province of the isolated individual 
 which excludes the organized life of society as manifested in the 
 state. 2 
 
 III. Socialism 
 
 412. Socialism no new conception. The socialistic theory of state 
 function, which places few limits upon the extent of political activ- 
 ities and exempts almost no phase of individual life from public 
 control, is not a new conception. It is in many respects a return to 
 the theory of the early state when public and private interests were 
 not distinguished and when political, ethical, and social considera- 
 tions were confused. In the evolution of many kinds of property, 
 
 the hands of a centralized national organization may be opposed when similar 
 action taken by local authority would not be objectionable. See Pollock, History 
 of the Science of Politics, p. 123. Likewise, control through administration may 
 appear oppressive when control through legislation would seem reasonable. See 
 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, pp. 268-269. Individualists often ob- 
 ject to the method of political control rather than to the control itself. 
 
 1 This has already been discussed. See above, Chapter VIII, sections 3:6-326. 
 
 2 Ritchie, Principles of State Interference, p. 11 ; McKechnie, op. cit., pp. 167- 
 170, 264-269. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 267 
 
 communal ownership preceded private ownership ; in ancient states 
 almost all forms of industry were regulated under public authority. 1 
 Strong elements of socialism existed in the organized life of the 
 Greek cities. 2 State intervention regulated life in all its aspects ; 
 but this early communism was unconscious and immature, existing 
 largely because the processes of differentiation had not yet been 
 developed. Besides, the small area of early states, making it pos- 
 sible for the whole community to share directly in the entire life 
 of the state, and the existence of a large slave population, giving 
 the citizen-class leisure to acquire culture and to attend to public 
 affairs, created peculiar circumstances which prevent a fair compar- 
 ison between their political civilization and that of the present day. 
 Traces of socialism were scattered also through the Middle Ages, 
 especially in the organizations of the Roman Catholic Church ; 3 
 and the whole feudal" system was in some respects a vast collectivist 
 scheme. The idealistic plans of government drawn up by political 
 philosophers usually contained socialistic principles in greater or 
 less degree ; 4 and numerous attempts to create socialistic commu- 
 nities on the basis of voluntary association were made during the 
 past two centuries, especially in the United States. 5 
 
 413. Conditions leading to modern theory of socialism. The 
 origin of the modern theory of socialism was closely associated 
 with the Industrial Revolution, which began in England toward 
 the end of the eighteenth century, and with the parallel revolution 
 in thought, which found its most prominent expression in France. 6 
 
 1 Letourneau, Property, its Origin and Development, chap, xx ; Spencer, Princi- 
 ples of Sociology, Vol. II, chap. xvii. 
 
 2 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, pp. 57-65. 
 
 8 The various religious orders usually rested on a communistic basis. See 
 Woolsey, Communism and Socialism, pp. 24-41; Emerton, Medieval Europe, 
 pp. 572-581 ; Harnack, Monasticism. 
 
 4 For examples, Plato, Republic (fourth century B.C.); More, Utopia (1516) ; 
 Campanella, City of the Sun (1623); Bacon, New Atlantis (1627); Harrington, 
 Oceana (1656); Morelly, Basiliade (1753); Cabet, Voyage en Icarie (1839); 
 Bellamy, Looking Backward (1887) ; Morris, News from Nowhere (1892). See 
 Spargo and Arner, Elements of Socialism, chap, xvi ; Kaufmann, Utopias, or 
 Schemes of Social Improvement. 
 
 6 Woolsey, op. cit., pp. 42-84 ; Nordhoff, Communistic Societies of the United 
 States ; Goldwin Smith, " Communism in the United States," in Essays on the 
 Questions of the Day, Appendix. 
 
 6 Kirkup, History of Socialism, pp. 14-18. 
 
268 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Not until industry had been organized into a vast social operation 
 as a result of the use of artificial power and machinery, the rise of 
 capitalism, and the establishment of the factory system, could the 
 economic principles of socialism be formulated. 1 Not until con- 
 ceptions of the supremacy of reason and the dignity of labor, and 
 ideals of freedom and equality had arisen could the philosophical 
 and political principles of socialism be formulated. 2 In England 
 the new economic evils of the factory system were most obvious ; 3 
 in France the ancient social and political evils of a decadent feu- 
 dalism were most apparent. 4 Individualism offered little promise of 
 improvement, hence the idea of collective effort, either voluntary 
 or under political direction, logically followed. 
 
 414. The founders of socialism. As early as 1793, William 
 Godwin, in his " Inquiry concerning Political Justice," propounded 
 socialistic doctrines. 5 In 181 7 Robert Owen laid his scheme for 
 a socialistic commune 6 before the poor-law committee of the House 
 of Commons ; and in the same year the speculations of Saint- 
 Simon 7 in France took a socialistic direction. Until 1850 there 
 were parallel developments in France and in England, Fourier, 
 Proudhon, and Louis Blanc carrying on the movement in France, 8 
 while the Christian Socialists, led by Maurice and Kingsley, took up 
 the work begun by Owen in England. 9 After the middle of the cen- 
 tury, the most prominent leaders of socialism were German thinkers, 
 especially Lassalle, Rodbertus, Engels, and Marx ; 10 and the move- 
 ment became international in its principles and in its organization. 11 
 
 1 Hillquit, Socialism in Theory and Practice, chaps, iii-iv. 
 
 2 Spargo, Spiritual Significance of Modern Socialism. 
 
 3 Hobson, Evolution of Modern Capitalism, chaps, xi-xvii ; Cheyney, Indus- 
 trial and Social History of England, pp. 235-239, 244—262. 
 
 4 Lowell, Eve of the French Revolution ; Robinson and Beard, Development 
 of Modern Europe, Vol. I, pp. 203-217. 
 
 6 Godwin's views leaned toward philo'sophical anarchism. 
 
 6 Podmore, Life of Robert Owen ; Seligman, Owen and the Christian Socialists. 
 
 7 L'Industrie(i8i7); LeNouveauChristianisme(i825). See Janet, Saint-Simon 
 et le Saint- Simonisme. 9 Kirkup, History of Socialism, pp. 19-54. 
 
 9 Ibid. pp. 55-68; Kaufmann, Theory of Christian Socialism ; Headlam, Chris- 
 tian Socialism. 
 
 10 Kirkup, op. cit., pp. 69-154; Rae, Contemporary Socialism, chaps, iii-iv; 
 Ely, French and German Socialism in Modern Times. 
 
 11 Kirkup, op. cit., chap, viii; Winterer, Le Socialisme international; Spargo 
 and Arner, Elements of Socialism, chap. xxi. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES ' 269 
 
 415. Early socialism idealistic. In its first phases socialism 
 was a humanitarian rather than a political movement. It proceeded 
 from private effort and experiment. The early socialists knew little 
 of the true laws of social evolution and, influenced by the doctrines 
 of natural law and of the social contract, they had excessive faith 
 in the possibilities of human nature and in the ability of men to 
 create artificially a perfect social structure. 1 This Utopian socialism, 
 in keeping with the idealistic philosophy of the period, led to the 
 establishment of communistic societies and to the belief that the 
 world would be converted by the successful results of these experi- 
 ments. Modern or scientific socialism, resulting largely from the 
 efforts of Marx, 2 arose when speculation gave way to research, 
 when positivism destroyed the former idealism, and when the in- 
 tricacies of modern economic life and the importance of economic 
 conditions in the process of social evolution were better understood. 3 
 
 416. Early socialism autocratic and revolutionary. Early so- 
 cialism, especially that of Owen and Saint-Simon, was marked by 
 an autocratic spirit. 4 At present socialism tends to ally itself to the 
 most advanced forms of democracy, 5 claiming in fact that it is the 
 economic complement of democracy and that future democratic 
 development will be largely in the direction of economic equality. 6 
 
 1 The most elaborate and ingenious Utopia of this period was the Phalange, 
 devised by Fourier. See Gatti de Gamond, Fourier et son systeme. 
 
 2 Spargo, Karl Marx, his Life and Work. 
 
 8 Hillquit, History of Socialism in the United States, pp. 16-18 ; Kirkup, op. 
 cit., chap. xii. 
 
 4 Owen had no faith in the political reforms of 1832. He appealed to royal 
 personages and to leading statesmen, and believed in the necessity of paternal 
 guidance until the workmen were trained to rule themselves. Saint-Simon wished 
 to supersede the feudal aristocracy by an aristocracy of labor, and first proposed 
 his scheme to Louis XVIII. Socialism originated during the reaction against the 
 democratic ideas of the French Revolution and was for a time influenced by the 
 reactionary political tendencies of that p'eriod. 
 
 6 A socialist state without democracy would be an impossibility. . . . The de- 
 struction of capitalism must be the work of the whole people, and there is no 
 reason to suppose that the ideals of democracy which have become so firmly in- 
 trenched will be abandoned when their realization becomes possible. — Spargo and 
 Arner, Elements of Socialism, p. 217. 
 
 6 As we can follow through the feudal epoch the development of the monar- 
 chical idea which was to destroy feudalism, and as we can follow across the 
 monarchical epoch the development of the national idea which was to throw dy- 
 nastic interests back into the second place, so we can follow across the history of • 
 
270 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Socialism as a political movement first took a revolutionary form, 
 aiming at the immediate overthrow of the system of capitalism. 
 Such was the purpose of the socialists who took an active part in 
 the revolutions of 1 848 in France, Germany, and elsewhere. 1 The 
 failure of that movement and a realization of the difficulties involved 
 in social improvement led to the adoption of constitutional and 
 legal methods of securing practical reforms. 
 
 417. Socialism in present politics. At present socialistic politi- 
 cal parties are powerful forces in actual government. In conti- 
 nental states, where party groups are numerous, they often hold 
 the balance of power, and they have recently become of consider- 
 able importance in England and in the United States. 2 Numerous 
 reforms in social legislation have been either the direct work of 
 socialism in politics, the indirect results of its influence, or conces- 
 sions to its strength. The evils pointed out by socialism are becom- 
 ing generally recognized, a serious feeling of social responsibility is 
 replacing the individualism of the past century, and many socialistic 
 doctrines have been given practical application in modern states. 3 
 
 418. Elements of present socialistic theory. The present theory 
 of socialism includes, first, a destructive criticism of the existing 
 organization of society, especially in its economic phases, 4 and, 
 secondly, a constructive program for the transfer to the state of 
 control over land and the means of production, limiting private 
 property to things actually used by each individual. 5 The state 
 
 the last two centuries the development of economic and industrial interests, the social 
 idea, which is destined to overthrow the national. — M. Monod, in Revue Historique. 
 
 1 Largely through the influence of Louis Blanc. See Kirkup, History of Social- 
 ism, pp. 40-54 ; Andrews, Historical Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, 
 chaps, viii-x. Chartism in England was a similar manifestation. See Gammage, 
 The Chartist Movement. 
 
 2 For socialism in modern politics, see Sparg o and Arner, Elements of Social- 
 ism, Part IV ; Hillquit, Socialism in Theory and Practice, Part I, chap, vi, and 
 Appendix ; Ogg, Governments of Europe, Index, " Social Democrats." 
 
 8 For a good discussion of the relation of modern states to the problems of in- 
 dustrial organization, see McVey, Modern Industrialism, Part III. For a summary 
 of the accomplishments of socialism, see Kirkup, op. cit., pp. 223-235. 
 
 4 On socialism as a criticism, see Spargo and Arner, op. cit., Part I ; Ghent, 
 Our Benevolent Feudalism ; George, The Menace of Privilege ; Hunter, Poverty ; 
 Reeve, The Cost of Competition. 
 
 6 For the constructive theory of Socialism, see Spargo and Arner, op. cit., 
 Parts II-III ; Ely, Socialism and Social Reform, Part I ; Schaffle, Quintessence 
 of Socialism ; Hillquit, op. cit., Part II. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 27 1 
 
 would thus manage all industrial enterprises and would replace 
 private initiative and competition by state control through managers 
 and laborers employed, paid, and directed by governmental depart- 
 ments. 1 In addition, the state would enter upon an expanding 
 field of activity for the purpose of increasing the social welfare of 
 its citizens. This does not mean necessarily that socialists are 
 hostile to individual liberty. They believe that the real freedom 
 of each individual may be better secured through state action than 
 through the policy of laissez faire, which permits unchecked 
 competition. 2 
 
 419. Socialistic theory of state functions. The necessary func- 
 tions of the socialist state are outlined by an able supporter of this 
 theory as follows : " Any state must maintain order, and suppress 
 violence. It must have the power to define crime and apprehend 
 and punish criminals, and to restrict the liberty of those persons 
 who by their conduct would deny equal liberty to others. It must 
 determine the manner in which the political activities of the indi- 
 vidual shall be exercised. It must determine the rights and limita- 
 tions of the ownership of property. It must enforce contracts and 
 administer justice in civil affairs. It must have the power to collect 
 taxes and use the proceeds of taxation in the public interest. And 
 it must deal with foreign states in the adjustment of international 
 relations and have the power to protect itself from external aggres- 
 sion. In addition to these general powers, the socialist state must 
 have the power to own and operate industries and transportation 
 systems of all kinds, in so far as they can be so owned and operated 
 to the public advantage. It must have the power to regulate private 
 and cooperative industries and to protect the broader interests of 
 all the people against the special interests of individuals and 
 groups. It must guarantee a minimum compensation to labor and 
 provide opportunities for its productive employment. It must have 
 the power to make and enforce rules of sanitation. It must 
 administer a comprehensive system of social insurance. It must 
 
 1 On the socialist state, see Spargo and Arner, op. cit, chaps xviii-xix ; Hill- 
 quit, op. cit., Part I, chap, v ; Kelly, Twentieth Century Socialism, Bk. I, chap, iii ; 
 Bk. Ill, chaps, i-ii ; Ely, op. cit., Part I, chap. iv. 
 
 2 On socialism and social reform, see Hunter, Socialists at Work, chaps, vi-viii ; 
 Ensor, Modern Socialism, chaps, xxii-xxviii. 
 
272 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 provide full educational opportunities for all, both cultural and 
 technical, and must provide opportunities for the advancement of 
 knowledge through research and experimentation." 1 
 
 420. Method of establishing socialism. Socialists are not agreed 
 as to the process by which a socialistic organization of society may 
 be accomplished. 2 Revolutionary socialists anticipate a general 
 uprising of the masses, who will establish a socialistic state by 
 overthrowing or securing control of existing governments and 
 confiscating property in private hands. Other less radical socialists 
 believe that this revolution will take place voluntarily, approved by 
 all because of the increasing evils of the present system. The 
 majority of intelligent socialists look forward to socialism as an 
 ideal to be realized by gradually extending governmental functions 
 and by increasing public control over great industrial combinations. 3 
 
 421. Distribution of income in the socialistic state. Socialists 
 differ also in the details of their proposed organization, especially 
 in the method of distributing income among the members of a 
 socialistic state. Some believe that, under the economies and im- 
 proved production of socialism, distribution would present few 
 difficulties because of the abundance of wealth. Others recommend 
 that everything should be held in common, each producing accord- 
 ing to his capacity and receiving according to his needs. Another 
 group advocates equality of wages, sometimes with the proviso 
 that all persons perform equal amounts of labor, according to 
 a system of units of labor-time, based on the attractiveness or re- 
 pulsiveness of the occupation. The plan upheld by the majority 
 of socialists bases wages on efficiency. Production, as a department 
 of government, would be controlled by elected officials, who would 
 manage all industry, assign laborers to their duties, and arrange 
 wages and promotions. 4 While aiming at approximate equality of 
 income, chief emphasis would be laid on distributing to workers a 
 maximum quantity of goods for a minimum time spent in labor. 
 
 1 Spargo and Arner, Elements of Socialism, p. 216. 
 
 2 Kampffmeyer, Changes in the Theory and Tactics of the Social Democracy ; 
 Ely, Socialism and Social Reform, Part I, chap. viii. 
 
 8 Wilshire, Socialism Inevitable ; Bernstein, Evolutionary Socialism. 
 4 For an elaborate scheme of organization under socialism, see Kelly, Govern- 
 ment or Human Evolution : Individualism and Collectivism, pp. 387-432. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 2;3 
 
 422. Advantages of socialism. Among the advantages 1 claimed 
 for socialism is that it will remedy the injustice, wastefulness, and 
 haphazard methods of present industry. It is pointed out that un- 
 restrained competition leads to unemployment, low wages, 2 cheap 
 goods, and overproduction. Socialists claim that under private 
 ownership of land and the increasing use of machinery and com- 
 bination of capital, the laborer, unable to apply himself directly to 
 the means of production, must make a forced bargain with land- 
 lord or capitalist ; that under this system the laborer receives far 
 less than his proper share of the product, 3 landlords and capitalists 
 receiving enormous rents and profits ; 4 and that as population 
 increases and the present system of industry is further developed, 
 the gulf between capitalists and laborers will widen, causing finally 
 the overthrow of the present system and the establishment of a so- 
 cialistic state. 5 It is argued as a matter of justice that the land and 
 its resources should belong equally to all, 6 and as a matter of expedi- 
 ency that the other instruments of production should be socially 
 controlled in order to secure the good of the greatest number. 
 
 423. Economic advantages. In pointing out the economic ad- 
 vantages of their system, socialists emphasize the enormous extrav- 
 agance and economic waste involved in the duplication of services 
 under the existing organization of industry. 7 Socialism, they claim, 
 would secure economy of production, since the needs of the com- 
 munity could be scientifically and accurately estimated and the 
 available land, labor, and capital so apportioned as to produce just 
 the kind and quantity of goods needed. In this way the duplica- 
 tion of plants, the overproduction of particular goods, the expense 
 
 1 For brief general statements of the advantages and disadvantages of socialism, 
 see Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 301-308 ; Seager, Introduction 
 to Economics, pp. 525-531 ; Ely, op. cit., Parts II— III. 
 
 2 Hobson, Problems of Poverty ; Devine, Misery and its Causes. 
 " Menger, The Right of Labor to the Whole Product. 
 
 * Veblen, Theory of the Leisure Class. 
 
 6 The most elaborate development of this line of reasoning is found in Marx, 
 Capital. See also Hyndman, Economics of Socialism; Spargo and Arner, 
 op. cit., chaps, xii-xiii. 
 
 6 Cox, Land Nationalization ; Dawson, Unearned Increment ; George, Progress 
 and Poverty. 
 
 7 Hyndman, Commercial Crises of the Nineteenth Century ; Simons, The 
 American Farmer ; Spargo and Arner, op. cit, chap. iii. 
 
274 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of advertising and competitive selling, and the excessive profits 
 of middlemen and speculators could be avoided. 1 Besides, the 
 production of goods that are harmful rather than beneficial could 
 be better regulated, thus improving the health and happiness of 
 the entire community. The saving in productive power secured 
 by this more rational adjustment could be applied to increase the 
 amount of goods produced, to shorten the hours of labor, or both. 
 
 424. Moral advantages. From a moral standpoint it is claimed 
 that socialism would replace self-interest as the leading motive of 
 human action by a broad, altruistic desire for social usefulness. 2 
 " Instead of depending upon self-interest as a spur to industrial 
 activity, socialism relies upon the love of activity for its own sake, 
 the desire to contribute to the common good, the sense of duty 
 in the performance of tasks that are largely voluntary, and the 
 ambition to win social esteem and social distinction through con- 
 spicuous social service." 3 Such a mental attitude should produce 
 a high type of individual character and make possible a large 
 degree of individual freedom. 
 
 425. Actual success of the state in business. Finally, socialists 
 point to the successful working of the state in those fields where 
 it has already abolished competition and introduced the coopera- 
 tive principle under government control. 4 Government manage- 
 ment of the postal service and of coinage is universal ; in some 
 states railroads, telegraphs, mines, and other industries of large 
 public importance are satisfactorily operated by the state ; munici- 
 pal governments have in many cases taken over the ownership 
 of public utilities. 5 It is argued that the success of these experi- 
 ments justifies the doctrines of socialism, and that by such methods 
 alone can the advantages already secured under political democracy 
 be widened to include also the economic life of the people. 6 
 
 1 Ely, Socialism and Social Reform, Part II, chap. ii. 
 
 2 Ely, op. cit, Part II, chap, iv ; Medley, Socialism as a Moral Movement. 
 
 3 Seager, Introduction to Economics, p. 525. 
 
 4 Seligman, Principles of Economics, chap, xxxiii; Ely, Problems of To-day, 
 chaps, xvii-xxi ; Outlines of Economics, chaps, xxvi, xxix. 
 
 5 Foote, Municipal Public Service Industries ; Pond, " Municipal Control of 
 Public Utilities," in Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Pub- 
 lic Law, Vol. XXV ; Ely, Evolution of Industrial Society, pp. 225-254. 
 
 6 Howe, The City, the Hope of Democracy. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 275 
 
 426. Objections to socialism. However, the principles of social- 
 ism rest upon several fallacious or one-sided premises and meet 
 numerous practical difficulties in any attempt at actual application. 1 
 Socialists ascribe an undue share of production to labor alone, 2 not 
 recognizing the important contribution of capital to production and 
 the necessity and justice of paying interest as well as wages. 3 
 Their doctrine of class struggle 4 fails to consider sufficiently the 
 important middle class, which does not sympathize exclusively 
 with either capital or labor, and which is perhaps numerous enough 
 to hold the balance of power. Socialists also overemphasize the 
 economic interpretation of history, 6 and fail to give proper weight 
 to intellectual and spiritual forces in human evolution. 6 In partic- 
 ular, socialists overestimate the capacity and efficiency of the state. 
 The success of governmental regulation of monopoly or of govern- 
 mental operation of types of business that affect directly the pub- 
 lic interest does not in itself argue for public control of all industry. 
 It is quite probable that some forms of production are better left 
 to private management. By overburdening the state with a mul- 
 tiplicity of duties socialism might seriously impair the efficiency of 
 government. 7 
 
 427. Socialism unfavorable to progress. It is also asserted that 
 socialism is unfavorable to progress. If the incentive of competi- 
 tion and the hope of reward were removed, experiments and 
 improvements would be retarded, individual initiative would be 
 checked, and, in attempting to remove inequalities, there would 
 
 1 For criticisms of socialism, see Block, Le Socialisme moderne ; Bramwell, 
 Economics versus Socialism ; Guyot, Tyranny of Socialism ; Hill, Principles and 
 Fallacies of Socialism ; Schaffle, Impossibilities of Social Democracy. 
 
 2 Boudin, Theoretical System of Karl Marx ; Spargo and Arner, Elements of 
 Socialism, chaps, xii-xiii. 
 
 8 Bbhm-Bawerk, Capital and Interest, Bk. VI, trans, by W. Smart. 
 
 * London, War of the Classes ; Kautsky, Class Struggle ; Simons, Class Strug- 
 gle in America ; Spargo and Arner, op. cit., chap. xi. 
 
 6 Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Preface; Hillquit, 
 Socialism in Theory and Practice, chaps, iii-iv; Spargo and Arner, op. cit., 
 chap, ix ; Rogers, Economic Interpretation of History. 
 
 6 Seligman, Economic Interpretation of History ; Hinsdale, How to Study 
 and Teach History, chap, xi ; Ward, Applied Sociology ; Psychic Factors of 
 Civilization. 
 
 7 Robertson, " Impracticability of Socialism," in Mackay (editor), A Plea for 
 Liberty ; McKechnie, The State and the Individual, chap. xiii. 
 
276 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 be danger of reducing life to the dull uniformity of stagnation. 1 
 Socialism, therefore, would involve, not an enlargement of freedom, 
 but virtual slavery, with a corresponding deterioration of individual 
 character. 2 As in the sphere of religion in the past, so in the 
 sphere of economic life in the future, the principle of compulsory 
 cooperation may be found incompatible with human progress. 
 
 428. Psychological obstacles to socialism. Socialists, indeed, 
 are inclined to be too optimistic in underrating the psychological 
 obstacles to their plan. 3 The average man is neither so inclined 
 to work nor so zealous for common welfare as socialism demands. 
 Neither is the sense of duty sufficiently developed, nor public 
 opinion, on which social esteem must depend, sufficiently dis- 
 criminating to obviate the necessity of compulsion. When man- 
 kind is morally perfected to the point that socialism demands, it 
 will make little difference what form of organization is adopted. 
 In other respects, socialists are too pessimistic with respect to the 
 present. 4 They overemphasize starvation and misery at one ex- 
 treme and luxury and extravagance at the other, but they neglect 
 the gradually rising standards of living, the increased production of 
 necessities and of comforts, the premium on energy and thrift, and 
 the opportunities open to those of ability and initiative. Socialists 
 attempt to foresee the course of social evolution too far in advance ; 
 many of the predictions made by Marx and his followers have not 
 been realized ; 5 it is not impossible to eliminate many of the evils 
 of to-day without departing from our fundamental institutions. 6 
 
 429. Difficulties in administration. Besides, the difficulties of 
 administration in a socialistic state would be enormous. Such ques- 
 tions as the apportionment of laborers among the various depart- 
 ments of industry, the assignment of values to products and to 
 
 1 Mallock, Social Equality. 
 
 2 Spencer, The Coming Slavery ; Ely, Socialism and Social Reform, Part III, 
 chap. v. 3 Le Bon, Psychology of Socialism. 
 
 4 Ely, op. cit., Part III, chap. iii. 
 
 6 For example, neither, the concentration of land into the hands of a few 
 owners, nor the increasing pressure of population upon food supply, both of which 
 formed basic principles of the Marxian theory, has materialized. Economic 
 changes that could not be foreseen prevented these developments. See Weyl, 
 The New Democracy, chap. xii. 
 
 6 Ely, op. cit., Part IV. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 277 
 
 labor, the quantity of goods to be produced, the relative propor- 
 tion of capital goods and consumers' goods, and the distribution of 
 income — all of which are now regulated, imperfectly to be sure, 
 by economic laws — are complex problems whose artificial adjust- 
 ment would require administrative ability of the highest order. 
 Serious dangers would also arise because of the opportunities for 
 corruption, intrigue, and personal spite. Against the power of 
 unjust officials in a socialistic state there would be little possibility 
 of resistance and little chance of fair play. The connection at 
 present between business and politics is the source of many evils 
 in government ; 1 strengthening that connection until they become 
 practically identical would, under present moral conditions, scarcely 
 tend toward improvement. 2 
 
 IV. Conclusions 
 
 430. Modern theory a compromise. Neither individualism nor 
 socialism represents the best modern view of the sphere of the 
 state. 3 Neither -is it possible to draw a hard and fast line between 
 proper and improper governmental activities. " In the first place, 
 as nothing that affects the part can be indifferent to the whole, the 
 state is bound by its laws and government to aim jointly with the 
 citizens at the perfect development of every individual in the com- 
 munity. Nothing is beyond the proper sphere of government in 
 pursuing this high end. In the second place, while nothing is suf- 
 fered to remain outside the state, fit provision must be made for 
 every individual enjoying a full free life within it." 4 
 
 The presence of certain characteristics in a given function is 
 favorable to state activity. Among these may be mentioned the 
 
 1 Weyl, op. cit., chaps, viii-x ; Brooks, Corruption in American Politics and 
 Life. 
 
 2 Attempts to answer the objections to socialism may be found in Spargo and 
 Arner, Elements of Socialism, chap, xxv ; Vail, Principles of Scientific Socialism, 
 chap, xiii ; Kelly, Twentieth Century Socialism, Bk. I, chap. iii. 
 
 8 For good brief statements, from different points of view, of the modern 
 theory of state function, see Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 320- 
 329 ; Montague, Limits of Individual Liberty ; Willoughby, Nature of the State, 
 PP- 337 _ 343> 345 - 35°i Ritchie, Principles of State Interference; McKechnie, 
 The State and the Individual, chaps, xviii-xxii; Stephen, Liberty, Equality, 
 Fraternity. * McKechnie, op. cit., pp. 266-267. 
 
278 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 inadequacy or harmfulness of other agencies that would act if the 
 state did not, the applicability to the function in question of simple 
 and uniform methods, and the likelihood that the action of the 
 state in the given case will be subjected to the constant and careful 
 scrutiny of public opinion. 1 As the conditions and needs of society 
 change, the work that men in their corporate capacity should do, 
 both in the way of restraining individual action and in promoting 
 individual welfare, changes also. " Every political theory contains 
 the seeds of its own destruction, because it must be to some extent . 
 inaccurate, and the more thoroughly it is put into practice the more 
 fully its defects appear. The result is that .when a principle seems 
 to be generally accepted, when it has become acknowledged as the 
 spirit of the age, the time of its overthrow is usually close at hand." 2 
 431. Utilitarian basis of modern theory. The theory of the 
 proper scope of state activities depends upon the conception of 
 the proper ends or purposes of the state ; 3 the determination of 
 just what powers shall be assumed by a particular state at a given 
 time is a question of expediency. " In each instance the circum- 
 stances of the case must determine whether or not the advantages 
 to be derived from the public control are more than offset by -the 
 weakening of the self-reliance of the people, by the encroaching 
 upon their personal freedom, by the opening of the way to corrupt 
 influences in government, or by the creating of precedents for the 
 assumption of activities by the state that will be detrimental to the 
 general interests. This is practically the rule followed by all modern 
 civilized states." 4 Almost every one agrees that the state should 
 do more than merely maintain peace, order, and security among 
 its members. This primitive state function widens in an advanced 
 political civilization into the duty of the state to contribute to national 
 well-being and progress. 6 " Matters connected with the maintenance 
 of domestic tranquillity and defense from foreign aggression or wrong 
 enter but slightly into our general thought. Our legislatures are 
 mainly concerned with economic matters, such as the levying of 
 
 1 Jevons, Methods of Social Reform, p. 355. 
 
 2 Lowell, Government of England, Vol. II, p. 521. 
 8 See below, Chapter XII. 
 
 4 Willoughby, Nature of the State, p. 338. 
 6 Leroy-Beaulieu, The Modern State, chap. v. 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 279 
 
 proper import duties, with the control of trusts, with problems con- 
 nected with railroads, with interstate commerce, with the assess- 
 ment of taxes, with the provision of circulating currency, and the 
 maintenance of sufficient banking facilities." 1 
 
 432. Present tendency toward expanding governmental powers. 
 While the general presumption is against state interference, indi- 
 vidual freedom of action being considered the rule and state inter- 
 vention the exception, at the same time the present tendency of 
 states is to push their activities farther into domains formerly left 
 to individual initiative. 2 " Three powerful forces are now at work 
 pressing for an increase in the functions of government. First in 
 order of historical importance is paternalism, or the effort of the 
 upper classes, through sympathy or fear, to advance the interests 
 and security of the working class. . . . This form of. state interfer- 
 ence, which originated in the quasi-paternal relationship of feudal 
 lord and dependents, and in the desire of benevolent despots like 
 Frederick the Great to increase the arms-bearing and tax-paying 
 population, is less popular among the more purely individualistic 
 industrial nations where the cash nexus has more fully supplanted 
 the. personal relation. A second group of advocates of increased 
 government activity is fundamentally individualistic in the old sense 
 of the word, insomuch as its members seek to use the arm of the 
 law to destroy, or closely restrict, large corporations in order to 
 encourage the diffusion of real property and the intensification of 
 competition. Thus we have the paradox of extreme individualists 
 calling on the government to interfere in economic matters to a 
 certain degree for the purpose of forestalling the possibility of a 
 future intervention on a larger scale. ... A third force working for 
 
 1 Willoughby, op. cit., p. 343. The interest of government in economic and 
 social issues, rather than in what are more purely political issues, is characteristic 
 of present conditions. Mankind, having worked out a fairly satisfactory form of 
 political organization, is using that organization in attempting to solve the more 
 pressing social and economic difficulties. By assuming this burden a correspond- 
 ing strain is put upon the political organization ; and political forms, previously 
 satisfactory, may show weaknesses under the added duties. See Leacock, " Limita- 
 tions of Federal Government," in Proceedings of the American Political Science 
 Association, Vol. V, pp. 37-52. 
 
 2 For certain limitations placed on state action by the very nature of political 
 authority, see Bluntschli, Theory of the State, pp. 324-326; Bosanquet, Phil- 
 osophical Theory of the State, chap. viii. 
 
280 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 state interference is the constant increase in the huge industrial 
 army that inevitably accompanies the advance of mechanical rev- 
 olution in production and distribution. The medieval system in 
 which each worker owned and controlled his simple implements 
 and conducted his business in his own fashion has disappeared 
 forever and in place of it has come a divorce of the laborer from 
 his tools — the ownership and management of which have passed 
 largely into the hands of a relatively small proportion of the 
 population. . . . 
 
 " As the doctrines of divine right formerly had no permanent 
 validity for the rising middle class, so the doctrines of individual 
 liberty — trial and indictment by jury and due process of law — 
 do not have the same reality to the workingman that they have to 
 members of the possessing group. Freedom of contract between 
 an employer and an employee with a few days' supplies behind him 
 obviously cannot have the same meaning that it has between persons 
 similarly situated as far as economic goods are concerned. To dis- 
 course on the liberty afforded by jury trial to a man who has never 
 appeared in a court but often suffers from considerable periods of 
 unemployment is to overlook the patent fact that liberty has eco- 
 nomic as well as legal elements. Quite naturally this new industrial 
 democracy is evolving a political philosophy of its own, confused 
 and inarticulate in divers ways, but containing many positive ele- 
 ments ranging from minor modifications of the labor contract to 
 the socialist doctrine that the passive ownership of property is 
 merely a special privilege to be eliminated by the use of the gov- 
 ernment as the collective instrument for the administration of all 
 important forms of concrete capital. . . . 
 
 "Asa result of all these forces and the growing complexity of 
 our civilization, along with the increasing possibilities of effective 
 collective action, the burdens of our governments tend to multiply, 
 and the stress once laid on individual liberty in the juristic sense 
 is being diminished. For example, all the numerous constitutions 
 of France from 1791 to 1875 laid great emphasis on the rights of 
 man, but the last and most enduring omits practically all references 
 to the primordial principles. The imperial constitution of Germany 
 has no section on private rights; the new constitution of the 
 
SCOPE OF STATE ACTIVITIES 281 
 
 Australian commonwealth leaves individual liberty without a clause 
 while empowering the government to establish old age and invalid 
 pensions, provide for industrial conciliation, and acquire railways 
 and other forms of property. Moreover, our own Congress, in 
 obedience to these new economic forces, seems willing to stretch 
 to its utmost its powers of regulating industrial operations and pro- 
 tecting the working-class ; and in its extension of the notions of 
 the police power, the Supreme Court reveals the existence of this 
 new pressure in our political jurisprudence." l 
 
 433. Influences favorable to individualism. It may be noted, 
 however, that, in addition to the forces that tend to encourage and 
 increase state activity, there are others that will probably render 
 less necessary a resort to governmental control. Factors developing 
 the individuality of man exist side by side with those increasing 
 his social nature. " With increasing civilization will come higher 
 morality, broadened altruism, and widened intellectual horizon. 
 These are the forces which may be depended upon for the correc- 
 tion of imperfect conditions as they arise, without the intervention 
 of the state. The more enlightened a people become, morally and 
 intellectually, the more inclined and more able will they be to 
 depend upon their own individual and voluntary powers for the 
 regulation of their own affairs, and the less likely they will be to 
 tolerate a regime in which a broad field of freedom of individual 
 action is not secured. Their intellectual advancement will enable 
 them to discover the means, in very many cases, whereby to cor- 
 rect abuses, without calling in the assistance of the state, and 
 increased morality will render possible the practical operation of 
 these means." 2 
 
 434. General expansion of human activities. That the functions 
 of the state are expanding out of proportion to the growth in extent 
 and complexity of social activities in general should not be arbitra- 
 rily assumed. " In our day there is a tendency toward extension 
 of state functions which after all is perhaps no more than sym- 
 metrical in view of the general expansion of larger structures in 
 every sphere. It does not seem to outstrip the growth, for instance, 
 
 1 Beard, Politics, pp. 26-29. 
 
 2 Willoughby, Nature of the State, p. 350. 
 
282 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of private corporations, or labor unions, or of individual wealth. 
 It is easy to see a tendency to state socialism if you look only at 
 the new functions of the state; easy to see an opposite tendency 
 if you fix your attention on private organization. Whether or not 
 the state is relatively increasing its sphere is not easy to decide. 
 The new conditions of life bring men closer together, creating a gen- 
 eral need of wider organization ; and, so .far as now appears, this 
 need is to be met by the simultaneous development of various struc- 
 tures already well begun ; such as popular government and educa- 
 tion, private industrial and commercial corporations, labor unions, 
 mutual-aid societies, philanthropical associations, and so on." 1 
 
 1 Cooley, Social Organization, p. 410. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 RELATIONS AMONG STATES 
 
 I. Nature and Development of International Relations 
 
 435. Early beginnings of international relations. While inter- 
 national relations, in the modern sense of the term, and the prob- 
 lems to which they give rise could not exist until the present 
 community of sovereign and independent states was formed at the 
 close of the medieval period, yet relations of some sort were main- 
 tained even among the earliest political communities. 1 Relations 
 among primitive states were largely controlled by force. Disputes 
 were settled or advantages secured by appeal to arms, and the 
 right of the stronger to the person and property of the conquered 
 was generally recognized. War was the natural condition of man- 
 kind ; peace was an artificial state secured by special agreement. 
 Foreigners, having no share in the common worship of the primi- 
 tive groups and lacking the tie of real or fictitious kinship, were 
 usually regarded as enemies, without legal rights or obligations. 2 
 Early political units possessed little sense of intertribal or inter- 
 community obligations. War was, of course, not perpetual among 
 all peoples. Mutual aid and peaceful intercourse sometimes took 
 place even among the most backward races ; 8 and certain states, 
 such as Egypt, China, and India, were peaceful agricultural and 
 industrial empires except when their populations were driven to 
 warfare by great conquerors. 
 
 436. International relations in the Orient. More than a thou- 
 sand years before the Christian era, Egypt was carrying on friendly 
 relations with Assyria and the Hittites by exchanging letters, pres- 
 ents, and embassies, by forming marriage alliances, and even by 
 
 1 For an excellent summary of international relations in ancient and medieval 
 times, see Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, chap. iii. 
 
 2 Frisch, Das Fremdenrecht. 
 
 8 Kropotkin, Mutual Aid, a Factor of Evolution, chap. iii. 
 
 283 
 
284 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 negotiating treaties. 1 At the same time the Egyptians were cruel 
 in warfare and barbarously abused their enslaved captives. The 
 Assyrians, Babylonians, and Persians, more warlike than the Egyp- 
 tians, were more arrogant and brutal in their conquests. Whole 
 populations were put to death, enslaved, or transported, and muti- 
 lation and torture were freely practiced. 2 The Persians, however, 
 also used bribery in dealing with other peoples, and treated foreign 
 visitors with hospitality. The ancient Hebrews, although they 
 waged a war of extermination against the inhabitants of Palestine, 3 
 gave to the world the ideal of universal peace in the vision of Isaiah. 
 "And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their 
 spears into pruninghooks ; nation shall not lift up sword against 
 nation, neither shall they learn war any more." 4 The Phoenicians 
 and Carthaginians, the first commercial peoples in history, founded 
 colonies by violence, and engaged in trade as a species of piracy 
 and brigandage. The hope of plunder was a guiding motive in 
 their foreign policy and the most extreme measures were used to 
 secure a monopoly of trade in the Mediterranean. 5 
 
 437. International relations among the Greeks. Conditions in 
 the Hellenic world, with its numerous independent city states, were 
 more favorable to the growth of interpolitical relations, although 
 love of city autonomy was stronger than national feeling among 
 the Greeks, and no definite intermunicipal law was developed. The 
 Greek cities were, however, bound together by ties of race, lan- 
 guage, religion, common customs and interests, and their organ- 
 ized relations included religious leagues, 6 confederacies, 7 attempts 
 to maintain the balance of power, 8 and acknowledgment of the. 
 political headship of a single city. 9 While warfare among the 
 
 1 Brugsch, Egypt under the Pharaohs, Vol. II, pp. 171-176. 
 
 2 Maspero, Struggle of the Nations, pp. 634 ft. 8 Exodus xxxiv, 10-16. 
 
 4 Isaiah ii, 4. 
 
 5 Cunningham, Western Civilization : Ancient Times, Bk. I, chap. iii. 
 
 6 On the part played by religion in the intermunicipal relations of early cities, 
 see De Coulanges, The Ancient City, pp. 273-280. 
 
 7 Freeman, History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy, chaps, iv-ix. 
 " Phillipson, International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, 
 
 Vol. II, pp. 101 ff. 
 
 9 Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and Macedon each held the position of leader, or 
 hegemon, in Greece. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 285 
 
 Greeks, as among other early peoples, was marked by great cruelty, 
 certain customs, such as the inviolability of heralds, the right of 
 asylum, and the sacred obligation of peace during the national 
 religious festivals, were recognized. 1 In the field of maritime law, 
 the commercial cities of Greece made some progress and devel- 
 oped codes to regulate peaceful and legitimate commerce. 
 
 438. Contributions of Rome to international development. Rome, 
 from its foundation, was engaged in relations with neighboring 
 cities. Its career of expansion was begun when it became the head 
 of the Latin League, and it united Italy into a powerful con- 
 federacy of Latin allies under Roman headship by diplomacy and 
 intrigue as well as by force. Later, international conquests, extend- 
 ing over all the Mediterranean world, created the empire. Under 
 these conditions Rome developed the idea of a common superior 
 to whom all nations and all peoples owed allegiance. In their 
 treatment of foreigners, their rules of warfare, and their procedure 
 in peaceful negotiations, the Romans, like the Greeks, observed 
 religious rules and ceremonies. 2 In the jus gentium were gathered 
 together the principles and customs common to all the peoples 
 over whom Rome administered justice. 3 This body of rules became 
 later an important factor in the growth of international law. 
 
 439. International relations in the Middle Ages. During the 
 Dark Ages, following the fall of Rome and the invasions of the 
 Teutons, relations among the barbarian chieftains were those of 
 unregulated warfare ; and international traditions practically dis- 
 appeared in western Europe. In the Eastern Empire and among 
 the Saracens, international practices survived. 4 Even after the 
 semipolitical system of feudalism had arisen, the relations among 
 the feudal groups were of the loosest kind. Private warfare was 
 common, 5 violence prevailed, travel was unsafe, and for a time 
 trade and commerce almost disappeared. The influence of the 
 
 1 On the Olympic Games, see Gardner, New Chapters in Greek History, 
 
 PP- 273-3 02 - 
 
 2 On the jus fetiale, the religious rules for declaring war and ratifying peace, 
 see Hill, History of Diplomacy, Vol. I, pp. 8-1 1. 
 
 8 Maine, Ancient Law, chap. iii. 
 
 * Walker, History of the Law of Nations, pp. 57 ff. 
 
 6 On feudal warfare, see Munro and Sellery, Medieval Civilization, pp. 177-187. 
 
286 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Roman Catholic church and the authority of the Frankish em- 
 perors, however, were exerted to establish peace and to restore the 
 idea of world unity, and for a time the pope was powerful enough 
 to act as the international arbiter of Europe. 1 Feudalism also 
 emphasized the doctrine of sovereignty as based on land in dis- 
 tinction from the personal sovereignty of earlier times. 
 
 440. International relations at the close of the Middle Ages. 
 The most important single influence upon international relations 
 during the Middle Ages was the Crusades. 2 These brought to- 
 gether diverse peoples in a common undertaking, awakened Europe 
 to a new civilization, weakened the feudal overlords, enfranchised 
 towns, freed the third estate, made possible a feeling of unity 
 throughout Christian Europe, and laid a broader basis in comity 
 for later interstate relations. The Crusades gave especially an 
 impetus to trade and maritime commerce, which emphasized the 
 rights and duties of nations. The Italian cities, in spite of war and 
 piracy, developed an extensive sea, trade with the Orient and both 
 a sea and an overland trade with the remainder of Europe. 3 A 
 secondary center of trade was formed by the German cities united 
 in confederations for mutual defense. 4 To regulate this extensive 
 commerce, codes of maritime law were created, 5 and consuls were 
 maintained to look after the interests of merchants and sailors in 
 the Oriental trading posts. 6 
 
 441. Beginnings of international relations proper. Interstate 
 relations proper, however, could not arise as long as Europe was 
 split up into feudal fragments, with their overlapping jurisdictions 
 and their confused and rival sources of internal authority. Neither 
 were international relations possible as long as men believed in 
 the theory of a united Christendom under universal rule, claimed 
 by both pope and emperor. The mighty forces set in motion by the 
 
 1 For example, the Bull of Pope Alexander VI in 1493 fixed a boundary line 
 between the colonial possessions of Spain and Portugal. See Hart, American 
 History told by Contemporaries, Vol. IV, pp. 40-43. 
 
 2 On the results of the Crusades, see Adams, Civilization during the Middle 
 Ages, chap, xi ; Milman, History of Latin Christianity, Vol. IV, Bk. VII, chap. vi. 
 
 8 Day, History of Commerce, chaps, ix-xi. 
 
 4 Ibid. chap. xii. 
 
 5 Davis, Elements of International Law, pp. 8-10. 
 
 6 Halleck, International Law (Baker's ed.), Vol. I, pp. 369-370. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 287 
 
 Renaissance and Reformation completed the destruction of feudal- 
 ism, separated political from religious authority, and destroyed the 
 idea of a common superior in Europe. 1 After a long series of 
 politico-religious wars, the treaty of Westphalia (1648) 2 revealed 
 the modern system of a community of states based on the idea of 
 absolute territorial sovereignty and legal equality, and with an 
 equilibrium of forces among them. 
 
 442. Rise of the international community. These states, repre- 
 sented by their monarchs with whose person the idea of sovereignty 
 was associated, declared war, made alliances and treaties, sent and 
 received embassies, gained or lost territory, and developed intricate 
 and important international relations. The king was the head of 
 the state, its territory and property were vested in him, and his 
 marriages, his personal enmities, or his judgment as to political 
 expediency determined its interstate relations. 3 With the estab- 
 lishment of constitutional checks upon the powers of the monarch 
 and the evolution of representative institutions, the sovereignty of 
 the monarch was transformed into the sovereignty of the state, 
 and international relations assumed their modern aspect. 
 
 443. Classification of international relations. An analysis of the 
 modern relations between state and state shows the following main 
 elements. Interstate activities may be carried on either by private 
 citizens or by the authorized public agents or governments of states. 
 In the former case, the interest of the state is indirect and it may 
 or may not regulate the actions or safeguard the interests of its 
 citizens in their extraterritorial relations. A state may demand 
 passports from aliens traveling or residing in its territory. 4 It may 
 protect the lives and property of its citizens, especially in the less 
 civilized parts of the earth. 5 It may even make political capital of 
 the work of its missionaries or investors, and establish spheres of 
 influence which are later transformed into political dependencies. 6 
 
 1 On the influence of the Reformation on political theory, see Dunning, Politi- 
 cal Theories ; From Luther to Montesquieu, chaps, i-iv. 
 
 2 Bernard, Four Lectures on Diplomacy, No. II. 
 8 Amos, Science of Law, p. 336. 
 
 4 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. Ill, chap. xii. 
 
 On consular and international courts, see Lawrence, Principles of Interna- 
 tional Law, pp. 254-258. 6 Reinsch, Colonial Government, Part I. 
 
288 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 The foreign commercial activities of its individuals and corporations 
 are of especial interest to the state. Because of their influence on 
 the national wealth and prosperity, and because they frequently lead 
 to colonization and war, states have, from earliest times, by restric- 
 tions on foreigners, by granting monopolies, by subsidies and tariffs, 
 exercised some authority over the movement of international trade. 1 
 In some cases, as in medieval Venice and in sixteenth-century 
 Spain and Portugal, foreign commerce was carried on practically 
 as a part of the work of government ; 2 modern states charter com- 
 mercial corporations and actively regulate international trade by 
 means of customs duties ; a large proportion of existing treaties 
 are concerned with commercial problems. 
 
 444. International private law. In general, however, the actions 
 of private individuals, as long as they keep within the law of the 
 land concerned, are little interfered with in the more advanced 
 modern states and are seldom considered as having international 
 significance. 3 Science, art, literature, and civilization in general 
 are diffused over the world, regardless of political boundaries, and 
 financial and commercial interests are world-wide in scope. In case 
 of dispute between two conflicting systems of law in the decision 
 of cases affecting private persons and relating to private interests, 
 for example, questions concerning the limits of national jurisdic- 
 tion, validity of foreign marriages, wills and contracts, and questions 
 of residence, domicile, and nationality, a body of principles called 
 international private law or conflict of laws has been developed. 4 
 This body of rules depends upon a feeling of comity among states 
 and is a part of the municipal law in each state. " It derives its 
 force from the sovereignty of the states administering it ; it affects 
 only the relations of individuals as such ; and it consists in the 
 rules by which courts determine within what national jurisdiction 
 a case equitably falls, or by what national force it is just that it shall 
 be decided." s 
 
 1 Farrer, The State in its Relation to Trade ; Hobson, International Trade. 
 
 2 Day, History of Commerce, chaps, xi, xix. 
 
 3 On individuals as objects o£ international law, see Hershey, Essentials of 
 International Public Law, chap. xvi. 
 
 4 Minor, Conflict of Laws ; Wharton, Conflict of Laws, Preface. 
 6 Hall, Treatise on International Law, p. 51. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 289 
 
 445. Nature of relations among states. The greater number of 
 international problems have resulted from direct relations among 
 states, carried on by means of their respective governments or 
 authorized public agents. These relations have been either warlike 
 or peaceful. The former include the long series of conflicts, 1 mili- 
 tary and naval, that have been such potent factors in the origin 
 and development of the state, and in determining its form and 
 organization. The latter include the development of the principles 
 of international law, the formation of a consular and diplomatic 
 service, the negotiation of treaties, the holding of conferences, and 
 the establishment of commissions or courts for the regulation of 
 international interests or the settlement of international disputes. 
 While warfare, as the final means of solving international difficulties, 
 is by no means obsolete, it has at least ceased to be the normal 
 condition among states ; and state evolution has been marked by 
 the gradual strengthening of peaceful international relations, look- 
 ing toward the substitution of the same legal means of settling 
 interstate problems that has been so satisfactorily worked out in 
 adjusting the relations of individuals within the state. As a result 
 of both warlike and peaceful international relations, various forms 
 of union among states, falling short of the establishment of new 
 states, have been formed. The nature and problems of these inter- 
 national alliances, leagues, and confederations also falls within the 
 scope of this study. 
 
 II. International Commercial Relations 
 
 446. Commerce in the ancient world. The essentials for exten- 
 sive commercial relations were lacking in ancient states. Absence 
 of facilities for transportation and communication limited trade to 
 objects of great value and small bulk. Insecurity of person and 
 property compelled commerce to be carried on by armed caravans 
 or convoys, so that war and Gonquest often followed. Trade in 
 ancient times frequently partook of the nature of plunder and 
 piracy, and consisted largely in dealings between civilized peoples 
 
 1 From B.C. 1496 to a.d. 1861, a total of 3357 years, there were 227 years of 
 peace and 3130 years of war. Bloch, Future of War, p. lxv. 
 
290 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 and barbarous peoples, the latter distrusting and fearing the for- 
 mer. Commerce within the state was carried on chiefly by non- 
 residents, who were protected by the ancient right of hospitality 
 from the characteristic dislike of strangers in the ancient world. 1 
 Land trade between Egypt and the Eastern civilizations was car- 
 ried on across the deserts by the caravans of the Arabs. Both land 
 and sea trade were developed by the Phoenicians, whose industrial 
 and commercial centers, Tyre and Sidon, extended their activities 
 over the Mediterranean, Black, and Red seas, as well as along the 
 coasts of the Atlantic and Indian oceans. 2 Trade in the early 
 Hellenic world was largely controlled by the Phoenicians ; but with 
 the establishment of colonies on the neighboring islands and shores, 
 the Greeks became more actively engaged in commerce. Greece 
 had the same advantage over Phoenicia that England had over 
 Holland in the seventeenth century — she was nearer to the new 
 lands and safer from the old. 3 Various cities, at different times, 
 held political dominance over Greek trade. Rome, while establish- 
 ing security throughout the Mediterranean by suppressing piracy, 
 and maintaining peace upon the land by means of her military 
 system and roads, was passive in trade, her commerce being 
 largely in the hands of the Greeks. 4 
 
 447. Commerce in the Middle Ages. During the Dark Ages, 
 between the fall of Rome and the Crusades, commerce was in a 
 chaotic state, such trade as survived the barbarian invasions center- 
 ing in the Eastern Empire and later in the Mohammedan world. 5 
 Overland trade was hindered by robbery and by the burdensome 
 tolls levied by the feudal lords ; sea trade was hindered by piracy 
 and by the backwardness of the art of navigation. 6 The Crusades 
 gave an enormous impetus to industry and trade, directly by their 
 demands for transportation and equipment, and indirectly by in- 
 creasing the demands for Eastern commodities. As a result, old 
 
 1 Biicher, Industrial Evolution, p. 62. 
 
 2 Cunningham, Western Civilization : Ancient Times, pp. 54-70. 
 8 Perris, War and Peace, p. 48. 
 
 4 On Greek and Roman commerce, see Day, History of Commerce, chaps, iii-iv ; 
 Cunningham, op. cit., pp. 71-195. 
 
 5 Gibbins, History of Commerce in Europe, pp. 27-33 i Cunningham, op. cit., 
 pp. 196-209 ; Munro, History of the Middle Ages, chaps, ix-x. 
 
 6 Robinson, History of Western Europe, pp. 246-248. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 291 
 
 commercial centers revived and new cities sprang up in western 
 Europe. The Italian cities, especially Venice, advantageously 
 located on the new trade routes, became the leaders in European 
 trade. In northern Europe, Flanders became the industrial center ; 
 and the Hanseatic League, with its capital at Liibeck, soon num- 
 bered almost one hundred cities and added to its protection of 
 commerce important political functions. With its fleet and army 
 and its trading factories in various countries, it dominated the com- 
 mercial and industrial life of north Europe as Venice did that of 
 the south. 1 
 
 448. Organization of medieval commerce. No national commercial 
 policy was developed in ancient or medieval times, trade being 
 organized on a municipal basis ; although some of the medieval 
 city leagues were quasi-national in character. 2 In the medieval 
 cities minute regulations were laid down to control all phases of 
 commerce, and every effort was made to limit trade to native 
 citizens. In foreign cities trading quarters were secured by special 
 concessions, within which the home merchants carried on their 
 business and administered their own law through officers called 
 consuls, chosen sometimes by themselves, sometimes by the home 
 government. Fairs, to which merchants from various countries 
 brought their wares, also demanded regulation at the hands of the 
 lord on whose territory they were held, and tended to break down 
 the restrictive commercial policy of the cities. 3 In the Middle 
 Ages, commerce was looked upon rather as a privilege which the 
 governments granted to their citizens than as an economic right. 
 Regulation of trade was used as a political weapon, and for a long 
 time, even after the rise of modern states, the ports of a king- 
 dom were the " king's gates," which he could open or close at his 
 pleasure. 
 
 449. Growth of commerce at close of Middle Ages. Toward the 
 close of the Middle Ages, improvements in the art of navigation, 
 the closing of the Oriental trade routes by the Turks, the finding 
 
 1 On medieval commerce, see Gibbins, op. cit., pp. 34-67 ; Day, op. cit., 
 pp. 70-112; Cheyney, European Background of American History (American 
 Nation, Vol. I), chaps, i-ii. 
 
 2 Fisk, International Commercial Policies, pp. 14-18. 
 
 3 Day, op. cit., chap. viii. 
 
292 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of a sea route to the Indies, and the discovery of America shifted 
 the commercial centers of Europe from the Mediterranean to the 
 Atlantic coast, and enormously stimulated over-sea trade. 1 With 
 the growth of commerce a final blow was struck at feudalism, 
 already weakened by the Crusades and the forces of the Renais- 
 sance. Wealth drawn from trade created a powerful merchant class 
 in the cities as rivals to the landed nobility. Growing wealth gave 
 to the kings a source of increasing revenue with which standing- 
 national armies could be maintained. The invention of gunpowder 
 was also turned to the king's use and destroyed the military 
 supremacy of the medieval armed horseman. As a result the 
 modern national states, governed by strong kings, jealous of one 
 another's strength, arose. 2 Spain and Portugal, and later Holland, 
 France, and England, became the leading commercial powers ; the 
 independence of the cities was subordinated to the authority of 
 centralized monarchies, with whose military, naval, and financial 
 strength they could no longer compete ; and commerce was car- 
 ried on and. regulated along national rather than municipal lines. 3 
 450. The mercantile system. To the principles that were ap- 
 plied by states in their attempts to regulate international trade for 
 national aggrandizement during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and 
 eighteenth centuries, the name mercantilism is given. Among its 
 prominent characteristics was the overestimation of the impor- 
 tance of money as the most valuable form of national wealth. 
 After the Crusades precious metals were drained off to the East 
 in payment for Oriental commodities, and the growing need for 
 money to pay for standing armies, government officials, and ex- 
 pensive courts led the national monarchies to make every effort to 
 retain gold and silver within their boundaries. Since no European 
 states possessed extensive mines of these metals, and since the 
 American mines were monopolized by Spain, foreign commerce 
 was the only means of bringing money into the state. Foreign 
 trade was therefore considered of more value than domestic in- 
 dustry. Specie exportation was prohibited, the coinage was debased, 
 
 1 Cambridge Modern History, Vol. I, chap. i. 
 
 2 Day, History of Commerce, pp. 123-127, 161-166. 
 
 3 Fisk, International Commercial Policies, chap. ii. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 293 
 
 and minute regulations attempted to direct the course of exchange 
 for the purpose of preventing precious metals from going to for- 
 eigners. When these restrictions were found too burdensome, the 
 theory developed, in England especially, that the welfare of the 
 state depended upon maintaining a " favorable balance of trade." 
 States, therefore, attempted to regulate commercial development 
 so that the value of exports always exceeded the value of imports, 
 leaving a balance payable in money due to the home state. The 
 most noteworthy attempts to legislate along these lines were the 
 English Navigation Acts. 1 Foreign and domestic trade were limited 
 to native ships and sailors. Domestic manufactures were encour- 
 aged, as was the importation of raw materials ; and the expor- 
 tation of finished products was facilitated in every way. The 
 proportionately large value of manufactured commodities was 
 expected to yield a favorable balance of trade, while their pro- 
 duction would give employment to labor, increase the population, 
 and thus strengthen the state in its rivalry with other states. Ship- 
 ping and the fisheries, as feeders of the national navy, were 
 regarded with special favor. 2 
 
 -451. Results of the mercantile system. While the mercantile 
 system failed in accomplishing its intended purpose, since all 
 states were applying the same principles, and economic laws were 
 more powerful than political legislation, the indirect results of this 
 theory of commercial regulation were important. It checked the 
 exchange of commodities among states, each aiming to be self- 
 supporting, and furnished a natural basis for the system of national 
 protective tariffs, which still survive. It also influenced the politi- 
 cal grouping of states during the frequent wars of the period. 
 England, for example, was the ally of Portugal, because Portugal 
 bought English manufactures and sold in return wine and other 
 commodities not produced in England ; while the traditional hatred 
 of France was kept alive in England because the trade with that 
 country showed regularly an unfavorable balance of trade. The 
 view that the advantages of trade were one-sided and benefited 
 
 1 MacDonald, Select Charters, Nos. 22, 23, 25, 28, 34, 43, 50, 56. 
 
 2 On mercantilism, see Schmoller, The Mercantile System. For a good brief 
 criticism of mercantilism, see Fisk, op. cit., pp. 27-29. 
 
294 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 those states that sold more than they bought, led states to strive 
 to exercise political authority over large areas in order to control 
 their trade. This resulted in a policy of colonial exploitation. The 
 opening up of the New World was chiefly due to the eager search 
 for precious metals and to the work of chartered commercial com- 
 panies. 1 States that established colonies considered it their duty 
 to see that other states did not rob them of the benefits of colonial 
 trade, and expected their colonies to enrich the home land, espe- 
 cially as producers of raw materials and as purchasers of finished 
 products. Colonists were expected to remain patriotic citizens of 
 their native state ; and in a period of bitter warfare among states 
 it was considered the plain duty of colonists to contribute by their 
 commerce, one of the mainstays of military and naval power, to 
 the resources on which the strength of the nation depended. 2 
 
 452. The laissez-faire theory. The mercantile theory was a 
 natural reaction against the decentralization of the Middle Ages, 
 and represented the strenuous nationalism of the rising modern 
 states. It was soon found, however, that its complicated regula- 
 tions retarded industrial and commercial growth ; and, during the 
 eighteenth century, a new school of political and economic think- 
 ing arose. 3 The political side of this movement, represented by 
 the writings of Locke in England, Rousseau in France, and 
 Jefferson in America, emphasized individualism and natural rights, 
 and underlay the French and the American revolutions. The 
 economic reaction, which was based on the doctrine of laissez 
 faire? was represented by the Physiocrats in France and the free- 
 trade movement in England. The Physiocrats emphasized the 
 superiority of agriculture over industry and commerce in produc- 
 ing national wealth ; and, believing it useless to devise regulations 
 that interfered with the natural order of growth, taught the doctrine 
 that things should be let alone (laissez f aire)!' In England the 
 
 1 Cheyney, European Background of American History (American Nation, 
 Vol. I), chaps, vii-viii. 
 
 2 On mercantile colonial policy, see Seeley, Expansion of England, Lectures IV, 
 VI. For a criticism of the old colonial system, see Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 
 Bk. IV, chap, vii, Part 2. 8 Fisk, International Commercial Policies, chap. iii. 
 
 4 Ingram, History of Political Economy, chap. v. 
 
 6 On the Physiocrats, see Higgs, The Physiocrats ; " Physiocrats," in Palgrave, 
 Dictionary of Political Economy. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 295 
 
 epoch-making ' ' Wealth of Nations ' ' of Adam Smith, which appeared 
 in 1776, taught that free trade, which enabled each state to buy 
 in the lowest and sell in the highest market, and to produce those 
 things that it could produce at least cost, was a necessary condition 
 for economic development. It also taught that trade might be 
 mutually advantageous to both states, and that free competition, 
 based on the interests of individuals, would result also in social gain. 
 453. Tendencies toward free trade. The supremacy of England 
 as a manufacturing state, made possible by her Industrial Revolu- 
 tion 1 during the period when the peoples of the continental states 
 were withdrawn from industry by the Napoleonic wars and when 
 the Americans, as the chief neutrals, found the carrying trade 
 more profitable than manufacturing, 2 caused England to look with 
 favor on the doctrine of free trade as a means of opening to her 
 manufactures the markets of the world and allowing her to buy 
 cheap food for her laboring population. As a result, the Naviga- 
 tion Laws were repealed, duties on the import of food stuffs were 
 removed, 3 and the principle of low tariffs for revenue only was 
 established. In the United States the competition of English man- 
 ufactures, after the War of 18 12, compelled for a time a high 
 tariff to protect the newly established industries to which American 
 capital had turned when the carrying trade was ruined ; i but dur- 
 ing the middle of the century (1833-1860), when the southern 
 agricultural classes controlled the government, the United States 
 followed England in removing her high protective duties. 5 On the 
 continent also, while the financial burdens of the Napoleonic wars 
 and the ruinous competition with England's manufactures were 
 followed by a period of high tariffs for both revenue and protection, 
 the European states were soon attracted by the doctrines of the 
 free traders and by the demands of their agricultural classes for 
 free markets; and between i860 and 1870 a number of treaties 
 providing for a marked lowering of customs duties were negotiated. 6 
 
 1 Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, chap. viii. 
 
 2 Bogart, Economic History of the United States, chap. viii. 
 
 8 On the Corn Laws, see Nicholson, History of English Corn Laws. 
 
 4 Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, pp. 1-108. 
 
 6 Ibid. pp. 109-154. 
 
 6 Morley, Life of Cobden. 
 
296 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 454. Reaction toward protective tariffs. While many persons 
 believed that an era of world-wide free trade was at hand, a de- 
 cided reaction in favor of higher tariffs was soon evident. 1 This 
 growth of protection during the past half century may be explained 
 on several grounds. In contrast to the earlier laissez-faire theory, 
 which regarded the state as a necessary evil, properly limited in 
 its scope to the protection of life and property, modern theory, 
 influenced largely by the " historical school " 2 of German thinkers, 
 considers the state as an organ for the promotion of general wel- 
 fare, properly engaged in any activity that furthers the interests of 
 its citizens. Besides, the great wars of this period, especially the 
 American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, were extremely 
 costly ; and the need for increased revenues was partially met by 
 placing tariffs on articles imported from foreign states. 3 Finally, 
 the rapid recent growth of foreign trade has led to renewed inter- 
 national competition. Western Europe and the United States, in 
 selling their manufactured goods all over the world, compel states 
 with undeveloped industries to protect themselves by high import 
 duties ; the agricultural classes of western Europe also show resent- 
 ment against the influx of food products from countries, such as 
 Russia, the United States, and Argentina, with whose agricultural 
 resources they cannot successfully compete. 4 High tariffs lead to 
 reprisals in kind, and tariff wars follow. While England, in spite 
 of her declining economic supremacy, still clings to the general 
 policy of free trade, and considerable progress is being made along 
 the line of reciprocity, 5 most modern states maintain protective 
 
 1 Fisk, International Commercial Policies, chap. iv. 
 
 2 Ingram, History of Political Economy, chap vi. The formation of the Ger- 
 man Empire had an important influence on the development of economic theory 
 in Germany during the period 1850-1875. In contrast to the cosmopolitan eco- 
 nomic principles of the classical economists, based on conditions in the British 
 Empire, the new theory emphasized nationalism and restriction, and aimed at the 
 amalgamation of the diverse elements in the new state and the protection of its 
 industries. The new theory was a product of its own time and its own environ- 
 ment. See Ely, Outlines of Economics, pp. 669-670 ; McVey, Modern Industri- 
 alism, chap iv. 
 
 8 Taussig, Tariff History of the United States, pp. 155-193 ; Dawson, Protec- 
 tion in Germany. 4 Smart, Return to Protection. 
 
 6 Osborne, " Development of Policy of Reciprocity," in Forum, Vol. XXV, 
 pp. 683 ff. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 297 
 
 tariffs as a means of securing revenue and of furthering their 
 national interests, both economic -and political. 1 
 
 455. Commercial treaties. Whenever the commercial dealings 
 among states reached a certain degree of advancement, interna- 
 tional agreements or treaties were negotiated to regulate such trade. 
 Treaties governing the trade relations of Rome and Carthage date 
 back at least to B.C. 509 ; after the twelfth century the Italian 
 city states negotiated numerous commercial treaties, both among 
 themselves and with surrounding countries ; when trade arose 
 toward the end of the Middle Ages among the states of western 
 Europe, they also drew up commercial agreements. 2 Even the 
 trading relations between Christian Europe and the Turks, after 
 the capture of Constantinople in 1453, were based upon grants 
 made by the sultan to the rulers of the western states. During 
 the seventeenth century, the mercantile theory of trade and the bit- 
 terness of international rivalries prevented the negotiation of many 
 commercial agreements ; but by the eighteenth century treaties of 
 the modern type were enacted. In the Methuen Treaty of 1703, 
 England and Portugal made mutual concessions and arranged for 
 preferential tariffs. 3 By the end of the century, even England 
 and France had made modifications favorable to both in their ex- 
 clusive commercial policy ; and the United States, after it had won 
 independence, negotiated important commercial treaties with most 
 of the European states. 4 The political disturbances that followed 
 the French Revolution checked for a time the enactment of inter- 
 national agreements ; but after the fall of Napoleon, the free-trade 
 tendencies of the period were reflected in a number of treaties 
 providing for lower tariffs. Of these the Cobden Treaty of 1 860 
 between England and France was the best expression. 5 The reac- 
 tion toward protection after 1870 was indicated in the commercial 
 treaties negotiated by Germany, France, and the United States, 
 
 1 On the economic principles underlying international trade, see Taussig, 
 Principles of Economics, Vol. I, Bk. IV; Seligman, Principles of Economics, 
 pp. 501-516. 
 
 2 See article on " Commercial Treaties " in Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
 
 8 See Hertslet, Treaties and Conventions between Great Britain and Foreign 
 Powers. * Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V. chap, xviii. 
 
 6 McCarthy, History of our own Times, Vol. II, chap. xli. 
 
298 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 maximum and minimum tariffs usually being fixed, although reci- 
 procity was in some cases provided for 1 or " most-favored-nation " 
 clauses 2 were included. 
 
 456. Development of freedom of navigation. Navigation, as the 
 Chief instrument of commerce, has also been a source of international 
 difficulties and has come under international regulation. 3 The lim- 
 ited areas of the water basins known to the ancient world enabled 
 them to be appropriated, controlled, and policed. The Greeks ex- 
 cluded the Phoenicians from the Mgean, and Carthage drew the dead 
 line against the Romans at the Lacinian Cape. The whole Med- 
 iterranean finally became a Roman sea, the mare nostrum, and was 
 effectively policed ; the Roman jurists even developing the theory 
 that the sea was open to the free use of all mankind. During the 
 Middle Ages, however, because of the revival of trade and the 
 prevalence of piracy, the principle of mare clausum i was developed, 
 according to which the maritime powers asserted sovereignty over 
 portions of the high seas. Venice, for example, maintained sover- 
 eignty over the Adriatic ; 5 England claimed dominion over the 
 Channel and the North Sea; and Denmark and Sweden. divided 
 the control of the Baltic. The growth of commerce after the dis- 
 covery of America, and the extreme lengths to which Spain and 
 Portugal 6 carried their claims of jurisdiction over almost all the sea, 
 led to a reaction against this principle. 7 In the "Mare Liberum" 
 of Grotius, published in 1609, the contention was urged that 
 the sea is by nature incapable of appropriation or occupation ; 8 
 
 1 For a brief sketch of American reciprocity, see Fisk, International Commer- 
 cial Policies, chap. xii. 
 
 2 On the most-favored-nation clause, see Moore, International Law Digest, 
 Vol. V, sections 756-769 ; Herod, Favored Nation Treatment. 
 
 8 Fisk, op. cit, chap. xvii. 4 Seldon, Mare Clausum seu de Dominio Maris. 
 
 6 Venice maintained on the Adriatic a powerful patrol fleet under a Capitano 
 in Golfo, which policed the sea for pirates and seized ships laden with contraband. 
 Foreign vessels were searched and compelled to discharge two thirds of their 
 cargo at Venice. Venice even appealed to the pope to confirm her dominion over 
 the sea. See Pompeo Molmenti, Venice in the Middle Ages, Vol. I, pp 117, 
 121-123, 130. 
 
 6 Spain tried to monopolize the Caribbean Sea, and even the Pacific Ocean. The 
 Indian Ocean was held a closed sea by Portugal. 
 
 7 On the great controversy waged over the question of mare clausum, see Nys, 
 Les Origines de droit international, pp. 379-387. 
 
 8 Cf. Bynkershoek, De Dominio Maris, pub. in 1702. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 299 
 
 although England for a time persisted in her claims 1 and waged 
 war with the Dutch over the control of their adjacent waters. At 
 present, 2 international law recognizes the sovereignty of a state 
 over the high seas for a distance of three miles from its shores, 
 and over bays that indent its coast ; otherwise the high seas are 
 open equally to all. 3 Free navigation of straits, inland seas, and 
 rivers came later. 4 Until 1857 Denmark levied sound dues on 
 vessels navigating the entrance to the Baltic ; 5 the Black Sea was 
 a Turkish lake until it was neutralized by the Treaty of Paris in 
 1856. 6 At present navigable rivers, even though wholly within the 
 boundaries of states, and interoceanic canals, built and maintained 
 at great expense by certain states, are open to peaceful navigation 
 by vessels of all states. States still secure certain advantages to 
 their national shipping by excluding certain lines of navigation or 
 classes of merchandise from foreign competition. Thus the United 
 States since 1 8 1 7 has limited its coastwise trade to the vessels of 
 its own citizens. 7 Sometimes foreign ships, while allowed to share 
 in the trade of a country, are subject to financial burdens from 
 which domestic ships are exempt ; sometimes the merchant marine 
 of the home state is aided by subsidies, directly or indirectly granted 
 by the state. 8 Such subsidies, of which England has been the chief 
 exponent, usually aim, not only at developing national trade and 
 shipping, but also at building up the potential naval resources of 
 the state. 
 
 III. International Warfare 
 
 457. Causes of war. Wars result partly from the physical and 
 psychological make-up of human individuals, partly from the social, 
 economic, and political environment in which they live. Certain 
 
 1 Not until 1805 did England give up her claim to sovereignty over " The 
 Narrow Seas." 
 
 2 For the Bering Sea controversy, the last dispute involving the principle of 
 mare clausum, see Snow, Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy, pp. 471-509. 
 
 3 Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, chap. xiii. 
 
 4 For the development of the principle of free navigation of important rivers, 
 see Hershey, op. cit, pp. 205-209, and authorities there cited. 
 
 6 Schuyler, American Diplomacy, pp. 306-316. 
 
 6 Hazen, Europe since 1815, pp. 615-616. 
 
 7 Johnson, Ocean and Inland Water Transportation, chap, xviii. 
 
 8 Johnson, op. cit., chaps, xxi-xxii. 
 
300 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 human factors, such as hunger, greed, racial aversion, national 
 jealousy, love of glory, and national vanity, lead to strife when 
 the prevailing physical, social, or political conditions make it diffi- 
 cult to gratify these desires without recourse to violence. 1 An 
 examination of the chaotic material of early history brings to light 
 several primary distinctions. The expansion of population, by 
 which the earth was filled and states were created, showed pre- 
 dominantly a character of either conquest or colonization ; the 
 former by armed force, the latter by voluntary enterprise. As the 
 human swarm settled, their social organization was marked by a 
 preponderant tendency toward either despotism or democracy. The 
 economic activities on which both expansion and organization 
 depended displayed the essential attributes of either exploitation 
 or cultivation. Shading off from one another by infinitesimal 
 degrees, these motives and methods, depending largely upon the 
 balance of energy and upon favorable conditions and opportunities, 
 led broadly in the direction of either war or peace. In early his- 
 tory the balance unquestionably turned toward war ; and the typical 
 states, formed by conquest, were forcible unions of peoples, differ- 
 ing in race, religion, economic status, and political rights. 2 
 
 458. War among primitive peoples. War was the normal 
 condition among primitive tribes. In the natural economy that 
 prevailed, scarcity of food invariably necessitated conquest and 
 expansion, or extermination. When increasing population caused 
 hunting grounds to overlap, when failure of pasturage or drought 
 caused pastoral tribes to migrate, or when the law of diminishing 
 returns began to press upon an agricultural population, war was the 
 logical outcome. 3 Oriental empires were formed by conquest, and 
 conquest remained their chief end.? In spite of division of labor, 
 improved means of production, and the exploitation of a slave class, 
 all of which increased the available food supply, war ultimately 
 became an economic necessity. States instinctively turned to con- 
 quest as a means of opening up foreign lands and securing booty 
 
 1 Hershey, " Causes of War," in The Independent, Vol. LVII, pp. 1036 ff. 
 
 2 Perris, War and Peace, chap. i. 
 
 3 Robinson, " War and Economics in History and in Theory," in Political 
 Science Quarterly, Vol. XV, pp. 581 ff. 
 
 4 Perris, op. cit., chap. ii. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 301 
 
 and tribute. 1 Not until the empty lands were all occupied and every 
 state's borders met those of others of nearly equal strength did the 
 new economy of cooperative effort and commerce become imperative, 
 and peace become the normal condition. So highly developed 
 were methods of warfare in the ancient empires that little progress, 
 save in engineering equipment, was made for thousands of years. 
 459. War among the Greeks. Among the early Greeks, wars 
 were waged for herds, slaves, and fertile lands. Piracy was an 
 honorable occupation and private warfare a recognized method of 
 obtaining property. Greek literature of the early period clearly 
 indicates that war was the chief source of wealth and honor. 2 In 
 the limited areas of the Greek states the effort to find support for 
 a growing population dominated every economic, military, and 
 political movement. 3 The Dorian migration was the work of a 
 hardy mountain tribe that established itself by conquest in a more 
 fertile territory. The Greek colonies were founded, partly at least, 
 through plundering raids. 4 The Persian invasion was the logical 
 result of the clash between the Greek colonies in Asia Minor and 
 the expanding Persian Empire. 5 Even the growth of commerce 
 intensified conflict by dividing Greece into two parties, — the con- 
 tinental, military, natural-economy group that formed the Spartan 
 League, and the maritime, commercial, naval, money-economy group 
 that fell under the control of Athens. The Peloponnesian War 
 that resulted was merely an expansion of the earlier struggle for 
 existence, and weakened the leading cities in turn. Later, when 
 the gold and arms of -Macedon had united the rival states and 
 imposed peace, the Asiatic campaign was planned to provide for 
 the idle and turbulent landless men in the Greek cities. The wealth 
 and weakness of Persia, discovered by the Greeks under Xenophon, 
 attracted the adventurers who accompanied Alexander ; and in the 
 wake of his conquests cities were established and Greek emigration 
 into the fertile lands of the Orient flowed unchecked for centuries. 6 
 
 1 Cunningham, Western Civilization : Ancient Times, pp. 24-38. 
 
 s Iliad, III, 69-74; Odyssey, XIV, 210-234, 258-272; Thucydides, I, 1-21. 
 
 8 Cunningham, op. cit., pp. 99-119. 
 
 * Morris, History of Colonization, Vol. I, pp. 85-125. 
 
 6 Seignobos, History of Ancient Civilization, chap. xiii. 
 
 6 Robinson, op. cit., pp. 586-593. 
 
302 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL" EVOLUTION 
 
 460. War in early Rome. The early Romans, living in the pas- 
 toral and agricultural stages, were dependent on war to enlarge 
 their lands. Even after the transition to a money economy during 
 the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., the policy of conquest continued. 
 The inland location of the city prevented large-scale commerce and 
 the tradition that the Romans, descended from the war god, were 
 destined to conquer and rule became firmly fixed in Roman thought. 
 The Romans therefore despised commerce and considered it their 
 destiny to conquer and govern the commercial states and levy tribute 
 upon them. Economic conditions and national traditions both fos- 
 tered the Roman policy of conquest and exploitation. 1 The temple 
 of Janus at Rome, whose gates remained open while the Roman 
 people were engaged in war, was closed but once, and that for only 
 a few years, during the five centuries of the republic. 
 
 461. The Roman conquests. Rome began by subjecting her 
 neighbors, and these were the hardest and slowest of her conquests. 
 Four centuries were required to unite Italy under Roman rule. 2 
 Through Sicily, Rome came into contact with Carthage, and three 
 terrible wars resulted in the destruction of Carthage and the con- 
 quest of Africa. The Orient, decadent after the death of Alexander, 
 fell an easy prey to Roman arms ; but the barbarous and warlike 
 peoples of the West offered more resistance. A century was required 
 to subdue Spain ; the wars against the Gauls, though short, were 
 extremely bloody ; and the Teutons finally checked the expanding 
 Roman frontiers. The Romans did not from the first plan to con- 
 quer the world. Even after winning Italy and Carthage, to whose 
 conquest conditions naturally led, they waited a century before sub- 
 jecting the Orient, which practically laid itself at their feet. Rome 
 was led from conquest to conquest partly by necessity, partly by 
 tradition, but chiefly for the profits of victory. A successful general 
 gained popularity, honor, and power. The soldiers seized much 
 booty and secured large sums from their commanders. Every new 
 
 1 Robinson, " War and Economics in History and in Theory," in Political 
 Science Quarterly, pp. 593-595. 
 
 2 This process was the result of agricultural colonization and road building, and 
 not of conquest alone. The organic nature of Italian unity was shown by the 
 faithfulness of the Latin allies in spite of frequent opportunities to revolt. See 
 Perris, War and Peace, chap. iv. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 303 
 
 conquest gave a new area to exploit ; taxes were abolished when 
 the treasure of Macedon was carried to Rome. War was a lucrative 
 enterprise in the ancient world. 1 All roads leading to Rome were 
 channels for the booty and tribute of the provinces, and in Rome 
 the ideal of conquest was realized in unrivaled splendor. However, 
 the extensive system of slavery resulting from the wars, and the 
 absence of industry in a state dependent upon tribute were prime 
 causes in the later decline of the empire. 2 
 
 462. The Christian church and warfare. The influence of 
 Christianity at first favored peace. Its doctrines of self-sacrifice, 
 endurance, and brotherly love and its cosmopolitan ideal of a 
 universal spiritual commonwealth were in striking contrast to the 
 narrow exclusiveness of other religions ; and the gradual accept- 
 ance of these ideals removed many of the former causes of war. 
 Warfare and slavery, the great buttresses of the military empires 
 of the ancient world, were both attacked by the teachings of the 
 early church. The followers of Christ were told to disarm at once 
 and by their patience and suffering to shame their persecutors. 
 Against the ideal of patriotism, the church placed the ideal of 
 universal benevolence. Courage as a martial virtue took a new 
 form in passive resistance of violence, and the early church 
 fathers 3 held that no Christian could bear arms or shed blood. 
 As the church developed its centralized organization on the basis 
 of Roman legal ideas, became reconciled with the state under 
 Constantine, and acquired temporal authority by its alliance with 
 the Frankish monarchy i after the fall of the Roman Empire, its 
 attitude toward warfare changed. Force was needed to protect its 
 growing property in land ; the hope of miraculous success in war 
 offered to the barbarians a powerful motive for conversion and 
 aided the missionary work of the church. 5 Especially when 
 Christendom was in mortal fear of the Moslem peril did the war- 
 like spirit pervade the church, which taught the duty of war 
 
 1 Seignobos, History of Ancient Civilization, pp. 237-247. 
 
 2 Robinson, op. cit., pp. 595—597. 
 
 3 For example, Tertullian, Clement, Origen, and Basil. 
 
 4 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chap. iv. 
 
 6 Cf. the conversion of Clovis. See Gregory of Tours, Ecclesiastical History 
 of the Franks, Bk. II. 
 
304 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 against the infidel and offered a heavenly reward for death on the 
 field of battle. 1 The church had become thoroughly imperialized. 
 463. Warfare in the Middle Ages. Among the northern bar- 
 barians war was conceived as the natural and honorable occupation 
 of free men. 2 Need for food and for more extended lands com- 
 pelled frequent migrations and constant warfare. Chosen bands 
 of youths or sometimes the whole nation set forth to find new 
 homes or to perish. 3 In return for land the barbarians were willing 
 to serve in the Roman armies ; revolts and wars followed only 
 when the demand for land and food was refused. The fall of the 
 Western Empire resulted from such migrations and from the 
 seizure of government by those who already controlled the army. 
 After the barbarian invasions, further wars resulted when new 
 tribes attempted to settle in the fertile provinces or to secure for 
 themselves a share of the revenues derived from the subjugated 
 population. 4 Some of these attempts, for example those of the 
 Normans in France, of the Arabs in Africa and Spain, and of the 
 Magyars and Turks in the East, succeeded ; but in general they 
 failed because the social and political organization of feudalism, 
 which arose to meet these attacks, gave to the defenders a superior 
 military system. 5 In feudalism war and government were private 
 undertakings. In the absence of money, industry, and trade, land 
 was the only source of wealth. The peasants, laboring on the land, 
 were useless for war ; hence ar standing army of soldiers and offi- 
 cials, paid by grants of land, was intrusted with defense and 
 administration. Private warfare, the only form of business under- 
 taking, enriched the successful feudal lords through lands, booty, 
 and ransom. 6 The Hundred Years' War between England and 
 France, the nearest approach to an international war, was essen- 
 tially a feudal contest on a large scale. 7 Wars, not very dangerous 
 
 • 1 Perris, War and Peace, pp. 55-64. 
 
 2 Tacitus, Germania, 14. 
 
 8 On the ver sacrum, a similar custom among the Latin peoples, see Smith, 
 Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities ; Frazer, The Golden Bough, Vol. II, 
 P- 54- 
 
 4 Oman, Bark Ages, chap. xxiv. 
 
 6 Oman, History of the Art of War : The Middle Ages, Bk. III. 
 
 6 Robinson, War and Economics in History and Theory, pp. 599-600. 
 
 7 Adams, Growth of .the French Nation, chap. ix. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 3°5 
 
 to men protected by armor, filled the lives of the feudal knights ; 
 and in some parts of Europe the right to private warfare remained 
 until the fifteenth century. 1 
 
 464. The Crusades. The rise of the Mohammedan religion and 
 the formation of its empire furnished the cause and the opportunity 
 for a new series of wars. The Mohammedan faith was spread, 
 not by missionaries, but by armies. 2 Mohammed himself had 
 said " Fight the infidels until all resistance ceases and the religion 
 of Allah is the only one. War against the infidels is a sacred war ; 
 Allah is with the combatants, and those who fall in battle will pass 
 straight to Paradise." The Crusades were the reaction of Christian 
 Europe against the Mohammedan power, which, starting in Arabia 
 in the seventh century, had spread by conquest over Persia, Syria, 
 Egypt, North Africa, and Spain, and had been checked only by 
 the vigorous efforts of Constantinople in the East and of the 
 Franks in the West. 3 Many motives led men to join the vast armies 
 which set out for the Holy Land. Religious fervor, fired by tales 
 of the persecution of pilgrims and the desecration of holy places, 
 was combined with the desire to seize the fabulous wealth of the 
 Orient, which was considered the rightful prey of Christians. The 
 increasing population of Europe and the attempts of the church 
 and of the rising kings to prevent private war and to destroy the 
 power of the feudal nobility drove many to find an outlet for their 
 adventurous spirit and to seek their fortunes in new fields. The 
 demands for transportation and supplies for multitudes of men 
 stimulated trade and shipping ; and in the wake of the Crusades, 
 commerce between the East and the West was revived. 
 
 465. Wars caused by revival of commerce. The latter part of 
 the Crusading period became therefore increasingly important in 
 its political and economic aspects, as the religious fervor died and 
 the attempts at building up feudal principalities in the Orient 
 failed ; and the early movement, typified by the religio-warlike 
 zeal of the military monkish orders, was replaced by the business 
 ventures engineered by the Italian cities. 4 The economic expansion 
 
 1 Seignobos, History of Medieval and Modern Civilization, pp. 71-79. 
 
 2 Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chap. li. 
 
 8 On the Battle of Tours (732), see Creasy, Fifteen Decisive Battles, chap. vii. 
 4 Adams, Civilization during the Middle Ages, chaps, xi-xii. 
 
306 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 that followed occupied the energies of Europe and prevented 
 any further large-scale movement of peoples until after the dis- 
 covery of America. The last wars of the Middle Ages resulted, 
 accordingly, from commercial rivalries and the attempts to secure 
 commercial monopolies on the part of the growing cities. Venice 
 and Genoa in particular, and also other cities in Italy, 1 Germany, 
 and the Netherlands, waged incessant wars. Against the robber 
 knights, tempted by the wealth of the towns, against pirates who 
 infested the seas, and against commercial rivals, the cities were 
 compelled to defend themselves or to wage aggressive campaigns. 2 
 Internal strife between factions within the cities complicated the 
 situation and increased the turmoil. 3 
 
 466. Wars caused by dynastic rivalries. Toward the end of 
 the Middle Ages, when a money economy based upon industry 
 and trade replaced land as the measure of wealth, military service 
 was commuted for money payments, and feudal levies were changed 
 into standing armies, controlled by the kings of the rising national 
 states. Rivalries among these states for territory and for trade led 
 to wars of national expansion, increasing in magnitude and destruc- 
 tiveness as the states that waged them grew in size and strength. 
 The first half of the sixteenth century was marked by a bitter con- 
 flict between France and the Hapsburg Empire, the most powerful 
 states of that day. Royal ambition, territorial gain, and the control 
 of the Italian cities and their trade were among the motives for 
 this war ; and England, entering the contest, first on one side, then 
 on the other, was brought into the current of European politics, and 
 the way was paved for the principle of the balance of power. 4 
 
 467. The religious wars. The period from the middle of the 
 sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century was character- 
 ized by a series of wars, civil and international, resulting partially 
 from the division of Europe into rival camps by the Protestant 
 Reformation. 6 In the civil wars of the period, religious motives 
 
 1 On the Lombard League, see Freeman, History of Federal Government in 
 Greece and Italy, pp. 592-617. 
 
 2 Cunningham, Western Civilization: Modern Times, pp. 121-129. 
 
 8 Symonds, The Renaissance in Italy : Age of the Despots, chaps, iii-iv. 
 * Johnson, Europe in the Sixteenth Century. 
 
 6 Perris, War and Peace, chap, vi ; Robinson, History of Western Europe, 
 chaps, xxvi-xxx. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 3°7 
 
 were mingled in Germany with the desire of the princes for per- 
 sonal advantage and for independence against the emperor; in 
 France, with a contest for the throne ; and in England, with the 
 struggle between king and parliament. Sweden entered the Thirty 
 Years' War to gain territory on the shores of the Baltic ; France, 
 a Roman Catholic state, .aided the Protestants in Germany in order 
 to weaken the Austrian Hapsburgs and to gain territory toward the 
 Rhine ; Holland waged her war of independence against Spain 
 largely because of economic and commercial oppression, and built 
 up her commerce and secured colonies at the expense of her former 
 ruler ; England combined religion, politics, and business when her 
 seamen seized the Spanish treasure ships and defeated the Armada. 
 The Peace of Westphalia (1648), which closed this era, 1 marked the 
 beginnings of recognized international relations and the holding of 
 international conferences, and the rise of international law. 
 
 468. Commercial and colonial wars. Out of the national rival- 
 ries and the religious wars grew the commercial and colonial wars, 
 which continued until the end of the eighteenth century. These 
 wars were the logical outcome of the mercantile theory and the 
 attempts of all states to maintain a monopoly of trade. As long as 
 Spain was the leading world power and controlled the New World, 
 the maritime states directed their efforts against her. When her 
 sea power was broken, England and Holland engaged in a series 
 of wars for commercial supremacy. The rise of France to head- 
 ship in Europe, as the Hapsburg power declined, compelled the 
 other states to combine against her ; and after 1688, when William 
 of Orange became also king of England, the rivalry of Holland and 
 England came to an end. During the following century, France 
 and England were the chief rivals in a series of wars waged in 
 Europe, on the sea, in America, and in India, the issue at stake 
 being European headship as well as commercial and colonial su- 
 premacy. The success of England created the British Empire, 
 gave it naval and commercial preeminence, and left France, in the 
 Treaty of Paris (1763), stripped of her colonial dominions. 2 Dur- 
 ing the latter part of this contest, Austria and Prussia began their 
 
 1 Gindely, History of the Thirty Years' War, trans, by A. Ten Brook. 
 
 2 Caldecott, English Colonization and Empire, chaps, iii-v. 
 
308 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 struggle for the control of Germany. The attempt of England to 
 enforce commercial monopoly in her American colonies led to the 
 American Revolution, in which France and Spain, hoping to weaken 
 England, aided the revolting colonies to win their independence. 1 
 Spain, France, and England, in turn, therefore, occupied the dom- 
 inant position in European affairs after the rise of national states ; 
 Portugal and Holland, powerful for a time, lacked the territorial 
 basis to maintain the struggle against the larger states. 
 
 469. Wars of the nineteenth century ._ The wars of the French 
 Revolution started in a conflict between monarchy and democracy, 
 but soon widened into a general European contest in which France 
 and England, as the chief contestants, renewed their rivalry for 
 European supremacy and for commercial empire. 2 The defeat of 
 Napoleon and the failure of his continental system left England 
 unquestionably supreme. During this war both sides plundered 
 American commerce, the growth of which alarmed the European 
 states ; and the resultant War of 1 8 1 2 destroyed England's hope of 
 regaining her American possessions. 3 The wars of the nineteenth 
 century resulted mainly from the attempts of peoples to secure con- 
 stitutional government and of nations to secure political organiza- 
 tion. 4 The waves of revolution that swept Europe in 1820, 1830, 
 1848 illustrate the former ; the wars by which Germany and Italy 
 were unified illustrate the latter. 5 Territorial and commercial rivalries 
 remained as powerful motives and underlay the Crimean War, the 
 Russo-Japanese War, and many minor conflicts. 6 Recent wars may 
 be classified as resulting from the following causes : desire for com- 
 mercial and colonial expansion ; desire to secure or maintain political 
 or racial supremacy ; motives of humanity, mingled with political 
 and commercial interests ; desire to secure political unity on national 
 lines ; conquest or aggression ; suppression of revolutionary or 
 democratic movements ; and desire for political independence. 7 
 
 1 Trevelyan, The American Revolution. 
 
 2 Rose, Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, chaps, viii-xi. 
 
 3 Von Hoist, History of the United States, Vol. I, pp. 226-272. 
 
 4 Perris, War and Peace, chap. x. 
 
 6 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. II, chaps, xvii- 
 xxii. 6 Ibid. chap, xxix-xxx. 
 
 7 On the causes of war, see Amos, Political and Legal Remedies for War, 
 PP- S7-I30- 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 309 
 
 470. Methods of waging war. In the evolution of the state 
 through warfare, important consequences on both territorial bound- 
 aries and internal organization have followed improvements in 
 weapons or changes in methods of waging war. The use of bronze 
 or iron gave certain tribes decided advantages over others still de- 
 pendent upon wood and stone. The wearing of armor, the length- 
 ening of weapons, the invention of implements to hurl missiles, 
 and the use of war chariots and cavalry were other improvements 
 that gave military supremacy to states devising them. The Spartan 
 hoplites, the Macedonian phalanx, and the Roman legion were in 
 turn the most effective organizations for military purposes. The 
 English long bow was a decisive factor in the early part of the 
 Hundred Years' War, 1 and the invention of gunpowder, in de- 
 stroying the military supremacy of the feudal nobility and creat- 
 ing standing armies of peasant infantry, aided the rise of national 
 monarchies and prepared the way for modern democratic states. 
 
 471. Importance of sea power. Sea power early became an ele- 
 ment in international warfare. It has, except during the Dark 
 Ages, constantly increased in importance, and it promises to be 
 the decisive factor in any future war between important states. 2 It 
 was the navy of Athens that built up her empire and supported 
 her preeminence in the Hellenic world ; the expansion of Rome 
 beyond Italy was possible only after her new navy had shattered 
 the sea power of Carthage. With the revival of commerce after the 
 barbarian invasions, the Italian cities became the naval leaders and 
 the centers of trade and culture. As national states arose, Portu- 
 gal and Spain, the leading maritime powers, were able to monopo- 
 lize for a time the benefits of the New World and the new routes 
 to the Orient. Sweden, inheriting the naval preeminence of the 
 Hanseatic League in north Europe, had a brilliant, though brief, 
 career in the Baltic region. England and Holland, the naval powers 
 of the seventeenth century, acquired colonies and built up com- 
 merce, securing thereby a position in world politics out of all pro- 
 portion to their limited territorial areas and small populations. The 
 failure of France to keep her navy up to the high standard of her 
 
 1 Oman, History of the Art of War : The Middle Ages, Bks. VII-VIII. 
 
 2 George, Relations of Geography and History, chap. vii. 
 
310 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 land forces was largely responsible for the loss of her colonial 
 possessions x and for the failure of Napoleon's imperial plans. 2 In 
 both cases, England's sea power proved the stumblingblock to 
 French expansion. In the formation of the United States 3 and in 
 the more recent rise of Japan, naval strength played a prominent 
 part ; and the recent growth of the German navy has seriously 
 affected international politics. Sea power for states with extensive 
 commerce, scattered colonies, or insular position, is absolutely nec- 
 essary for national existence ; and the possession of sea power, de- 
 manding coaling and naval stations in various parts of the world, 
 leads in turn to national expansion and to the occupation of stra- 
 tegic points on the great routes of international traffic. Thus the 
 Portuguese and the Dutch occupied the Cape of Good Hope as a 
 port of call on the voyage to the East Indies ; Singapore and Aden, 
 the " coal holes of the East," are among the most valued of British 
 possessions ; and the United States, since acquiring the Philippines, 
 has secured stepping-stones across the Pacific. 4 
 
 472. Economic and political consequences of war. In the rela- 
 tion of economic and political development to warfare, several 
 broad generalizations may be made. In early times the pressure 
 of population upon the food supply and the prevalence of slavery 
 led to the predatory conquests of early empires, seeking captives 
 and tribute. Later, when land became the chief source of wealth, 
 and society consisted of feudal lords and serfs, constant warfare 
 obtained in petty local units, the aim of each being to increase its 
 domains and secure additional revenue. A search for wider lands, 
 the growth of commerce, and the introduction of a money economy 
 led to national wars for territory, trade, and colonies. The varying 
 rates of progress in states differently situated and the clash of differ- 
 ent economic systems have been fertile causes of warfare. Similarly, 
 changes in the political system resulted in wars. The break-up of 
 the ancient empires was followed by centuries of feudal anarchy 
 and strife. The collapse of feudalism led to the bitter dynastic 
 
 1 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, chaps, i-viii. 
 
 2 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire. 
 
 8 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon History, chaps, ix-xiv ; Sea Power in 
 its Relations to the War of 1812. 
 
 4 Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 3*1 
 
 wars that marked the rise of modern states. In turn, absolute 
 monarchy was replaced by democracy within these states only after 
 a series of revolutions and wars of national liberation. 1 
 
 473. Influences favorable to peace. Several causes of war, for- 
 merly dangerous, have almost disappeared in modern times. 2 Racial 
 hatreds, caused originally by the exclusiveness of early groups based 
 on common kinship and religion, are less powerful in the cosmo- 
 politan states of modern times, although recent contact between 
 Orientals and Occidentals seems to indicate racial antipathies 3 
 that may create difficulties. Religious wars have almost disappeared 
 and no wars have recently been waged for dynastic interests or to 
 maintain the balance of power. Instead, a system of alliances and 
 the joint action of the great powers in the concert of Europe have 
 prevented general disturbances. The growth of commerce operates 
 as a cause both of war and of peace. Industrial conditions within 
 the state and the growth of international trade bind many interests 
 into a unity regardless of political boundaries, while on the other 
 hand industrial and commercial rivalries have been a chief source 
 of recent international disputes. The mighty forces of nationality 
 and democracy, which have become prominent during the past 
 century, while they may finally insure peace, have thus far worked 
 themselves out largely in connection with armed conflict. The inte- 
 gration of the modern world into larger political units, especially by 
 the process of federation, has also removed many former causes of 
 strife. Other powerful influences in favor of peace are the organiza- 
 tion of labor along international lines, the growth of international 
 judicial, legislative, and administrative systems, 4 and the general 
 tendency among western nations toward an arrest of population 
 through a decreasing birth rate. Philosophical doctrines in favor 
 of peace, based upon rational and humanitarian grounds, while not 
 new, exert an unprecedented influence upon modern thought. 5 
 
 1 Perris, War and Peace, pp. 247-252. 
 
 2 Grane, The Passing of War. 
 
 8 Weale, The Conflict of Color. 
 
 4 Bridgman, First Book of World Law ; World Organization ; Reinsch, Public 
 International Unions. 
 
 6 Pamphlets published by the American Association for International Concilia- 
 tion ; Hirst, The Arbiter in Council ; Butler, The International Mind ; Graham, 
 Evolution and Empire. 
 
312 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 474. The costs of war. Chief among the forces strengthening 
 at present the tendency toward international peace is the cost of 
 war and warlike preparations. 1 About six millions of people are 
 in arms in Europe, withdrawn from industry, costing, in addition 
 to what they might produce, at least six to seven billions of dollars 
 annually. This is an enormous burden upon the community at 
 large. The economic competition among nations is leading the 
 European states to realize that the burden of their standing armies 
 puts them at a disadvantage in the world's markets, especially when 
 competing with the United States. The movement toward reduc- 
 tion of armaments that led to the First Hague Conference was 
 based upon this fact. The rescript issued by the czar affirmed 
 that " the moral and physical forces of the nations, labor and capi- 
 tal, find themselves turned aside from their natural course and con- 
 sumed in a non-productive manner " 2 by the cost of armaments. 
 War of the most deadly character is constantly being waged to-day 
 without firing a shot. Tariffs are used with more effect than were 
 armies in former times. Weaker states, unable to compete in' the 
 world's markets or to bear the financial burdens of armies and 
 navies, are forced to the wall. War to-day more than ever before 
 is a conflict of resources and civilizations. Not only are enormous 
 financial burdens laid upon states by the preparations for war and 
 the destruction of property resulting from actual hostilities, but it 
 is even doubtful whether successful war brings any adequate returns. 
 A recent book 3 undertakes to prove that armaments do not pay, 
 because the smaller states, with feeble armaments, enjoy better 
 financial credit — - their government bonds selling at higher prices 
 — than the great military powers ; that war indemnities do not pay, 
 because the relations of trade are disturbed by the transfer of large 
 sums from one country to another ; that annexations do not pay be- 
 cause the cost of assimilation is not repaid by the taxes derived from 
 them ; and that war in general does not pay because property cannot 
 be confiscated on a large scale without disturbing trade and credit. 4 
 
 1 Bloch, The Future of War ; Jordan, Unseen Empire ; Ferrero, Militarism. 
 
 2 Holls, Peace Conference at The Hague, pp. 18 ff. 
 
 8 Angell, The Great Illusion. A criticism of the somewhat one-sided point of 
 view of this book is found in Mahan, Armaments and Arbitration, chap. vi. 
 4 See also Novicow, War and its Alleged Benefits, trans, by T. Seltyer. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 313 
 
 475. Permanence of certain causes of war. At the same time, 
 as long as the law of diminishing returns puts pressure upon popu- 
 lation in its efforts to secure food, and as long as the existence of 
 independent states creates national rivalries, war, necessary for 
 growth and expansion, will probably remain as the final form of 
 national business undertaking and the final manifestation of national 
 strength and spirit. Permanent and desirable peace demands such 
 methods and organization of production and distribution that all 
 may be guaranteed a sufficient share of the proceeds, and such a 
 political organization of humanity that universal and local interests 
 — world sovereignty, national autonomy, and individual freedom — 
 may be justly balanced. That such an equilibrium between popula- 
 tion and food supply and such an adjustment of the machinery of 
 a democratic world federation are possible or even desirable is by 
 no means assured. 1 It is even believed by some that the elasticity 
 of diplomacy, supported if necessary by force, is preferable to the 
 rigidity of world law in deciding, according to principles of equity, 
 questions affecting the fundamental interests of peoples. 2 
 
 1 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, chap, vii ; Trueblood, 
 Federation of the World. 
 
 2 Mahan, op. cit., chaps, i-vi. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 RELATIONS AMONG STATES (Continued) 
 I. International Law and Diplomacy 
 
 476. Conception of family of nations. Man is not only a fight- 
 ing animal, carrying on a desperate struggle with his environment 
 and with his fellows, but he is in addition a social and political 
 being who realizes that cooperation and organization are also essen- 
 tial to human progress. 1 Men, therefore, from the earliest times 
 have lived in groups within which mutual aid has modified compe- 
 tition. After a time, cooperation was extended also to relations 
 among groups which, as the primitive hordes widened into modern 
 political units, now include all civilized states. A recognition of 
 the community of interests in international relations led to the 
 growth of customs and to the formation of rules that should guide 
 the actions of states, not only in peaceful intercourse but even in 
 time of war. Accordingly, the conception finally arose of a family 
 of states, each sovereign and independent, yet with a strong feeling 
 of interdependence, possessed of equal rights and obligations under 
 a body of principles called international law. 2 
 
 477. International rules in ancient world. International law as 
 a system of well-established rules observed among a community 
 of legally equal and territorially sovereign political units could not 
 exist previous to the rise of modern national states toward the 
 close of the Middle Ages. 3 Certain rules and customs, usually 
 with a religious sanction, were observed, however, in intercommu- 
 nity intercourse even in antiquity. 4 In the ancient world peoples 
 
 1 Pulszky, Theory of Law and Civil Society, chap. vi. 
 
 2 Lawrence, International Problems and Hague Conferences, chaps, i-iii. 
 
 3 For the historical development of International Law, see Walker, History of 
 the Law of Nations ; Hill, History of Diplomacy in the International Develop- 
 ment of Europe. Good brief accounts are found in Hershey, Essentials of Inter- 
 national Public Law, pp. 26-90 ; Wilson and Tucker, International Law, chap. iii. 
 
 4 Hershey, " History of International Relations during Antiquity and the' Middle 
 Ages," in American Journal of International Law, October, 191 1. 
 
 3H 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 3*5 
 
 of the same race acknowledged certain duties to one another, but 
 states as such possessed no rights and were subject to no obliga- 
 tions. The tie of kinship, real or fictitious, chiefly determined the 
 condition of the individual within the state and prescribed the 
 duties of the state to other states. 1 Nevertheless, the relations of 
 early states were not entirely unregulated or directed by unre- 
 strained, self-interest alone. A crude form of international law 
 and diplomacy existed in ancient China. 2 Treaties of alliances, 
 cemented by marriages and providing for mutual extradition and 
 humane treatment of political refugees and immigrants, were 
 negotiated by the Egyptians with their neighbors earlier than 
 B.C. 1200. 3 In India the Code of Manu, compiled about b.c. 500, 
 provided for humane treatment of both combatants and non- 
 combatants. 4 The Persians recognized the value of arbitration as 
 a means of preventing war ; 5 and the Mosaic Code of the Hebrews 
 contained germs of a higher law of warfare in placing limits on the 
 right of devastation. 6 
 
 478. Progress of international principles among the Greeks. 
 The dispersion of the Greeks in many cities and colonies, which 
 were practically independent communities, led to intercourse and 
 the recognition of general obligations. Based upon the idea that 
 all Hellenic peoples, being of the same race and similar religion, 
 were united by bonds that did not exist between them and other 
 peoples, crude forms of international comity were developed and 
 rudimentary international rules arose. 7 The persons of heralds 
 were respected, ambassadors were sent and received, 8 and alliances 
 were made. Certain customs — for example, the right of asylum 
 in temples, truces to bury the dead, and suspension of hostilities 
 for religious purposes, such as the Olympic games — were generally 
 observed. 9 Agreements to submit disputes to the arbitration of 
 
 1 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, pp. 17-19. 
 
 2 Martin, The Lore of Cathay, pp. 22-23. 
 
 8 Breasted, History of Egypt from the Earliest Times, pp. 437-438. 
 4 The Ordinances of Manu, trans, by Bumell and Hopkins, Lecture VII, 
 Nos. 90-93. 6 Herodotus, VI, 42. 
 
 6 Deuteronomy xx, 10-20. 
 
 7 Bluntschli, Das moderne Volkerrecht, Introduction. 
 
 8 On the Amphictyonic Council, see Freeman, History of Federal Government 
 in Greece and Italy, chap. iii. 9 Grote, History of Greece, chap, xxviii. 
 
316 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 individuals, friendly cities, or the Oracle of Delphi were frequently 
 included in treaties ; and agreements were made even with for- 
 eigners for reciprocity of civil rights and for the settlement of 
 commercial disputes. 1 During the third century B.C., when Rhodes 
 became the chief naval and commercial state of the ^Egean, a 
 maritime code arose, which was generally observed in the Hellenic 
 world. From this Rhodian Sea Law many of the commercial 
 regulations of the Roman Empire were derived ; its influence 
 probably affected the codes of the Middle Ages after the revival 
 of commerce ; and its principles form part of the modern law of 
 naval capture and of commercial regulation. 2 
 
 479. International position of Rome. The diplomatic relations 
 of Rome with other states began with her membership in the 
 Latin League, a group of cities of which she finally became the 
 head. Later, the various steps by which the unification of Italy 
 was brought about were accomplished by statecraft as well as by 
 force. The Roman policy — divide and conquer — underlay many 
 of the treaties of this period ; and the peoples of the peninsula 
 were gradually isolated from one another and united in alliances of 
 various degrees of dependence with Rome. 3 After the wars with 
 Carthage, Rome embarked on her career of world conquest and 
 created the empire, thus making impossible international relations 
 in a world under one sovereignty. 4 Rome, therefore, contributed 
 to international law chiefly in extending her own law to wider 
 spheres and in adjusting her legal ideas to conditions in remote 
 territories. Her work influenced international private law rather 
 than international public law ; 6 and the idea that the world was 
 dominated by a common superior survived throughout the Middle 
 Ages, typified in the theory of the Holy Roman Empire and of 
 the papacy. 6 By reducing all states to a common subjection, Rome 
 paved the way for later legal relations among states. 
 
 1 Phillipson, International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome, 
 Vol. I, chaps, v-xii ; Vol. II, chap. xx. 
 
 2 Ashburner, The Rhodian Sea Law. 
 
 " Belloch, Der italische Bund unter Rom's Hegemonic 
 4 Westlake, Principles of International Law, Vol. I, pp. 18-23. 
 6 Wilson and Tucker, International Law, p. 14. 
 
 6 Bryce, Holy Roman Empire, chap, vii ; Lawrence, Principles of International 
 Law, pp. 20-23. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 317 
 
 480. Roman law and international law. Nevertheless, two 
 branches of Roman law influenced the subsequent development 
 of international law proper. The jus fetiale consisted of a set of 
 rules, ceremonial and formal in character, that determined the 
 actions of a special body of priests known as the College of 
 Fetiales. 1 Their principal functions were to give advice upon 
 questions concerning war and peace, to act as heralds and ambas- 
 sadors, to receive and entertain envoys from foreign states, and to 
 give effect to formal declarations of war that had been sanctioned 
 by the authority of the Roman assemblies. 2 The powers of this 
 body were later merged in the general authority of the emperor. 
 The jus gentium consisted of the body of usages and principles 
 common to all nations among whom Roman magistrates adminis- 
 tered justice. 3 It originated from the necessity of giving a legal 
 status to the alien class in Rome and in securing to them some 
 measure of protection for person and property. In the relations 
 between Romans and foreigners and in the jurisdiction of the 
 praetor peregrinus over aliens, rules of law common to Rome 
 and to a number of her subject peoples were applied. By the 
 later Roman jurists, the principles of this law found existing 
 among all nations were practically identified with the laws of 
 nature. In common with the canon law and the civil law, the 
 jus gentium influenced the legal conceptions of the medieval 
 period and helped to subordinate the barbaric violence of the 
 Teutons to the reign of peace and order, first within the state, 
 later among states. Besides, the jus gentium was erroneously 
 considered by many early modern interpreters of Roman law to 
 have been a system of rules intended for the adjustment of inter- 
 national relations ; and some of its principles were directly appro- 
 priated by the founders of international law. and were applied to 
 international practice. 4 
 
 481. International conditions in the Middle Ages. After the 
 fall of the Roman Empire, the theory of a common superior over 
 states still survived. The spell of world-wide dominion and the 
 
 1 Hill, History of European Diplomacy, Vol. I, pp. 8-n. 
 
 2 Phillipson, op. cit., Vol. II, chap. xxvi. 
 
 8 Phillipson, op. cit., Vol. I, chap, iii ; Bryce, Studies in History and Jurispru- 
 dence, pp. 570-586. 4 Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 38-42. 
 
318 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 tradition of the benefits of the pax Romana remained after the 
 barbarian invasions ; and men believed that the empire was to be 
 eternal as well as universal. For a time, after Rome ceased to be 
 the actual seat of government, the world was ruled, in name at 
 least, from Constantinople ; the coronation of Charlemagne in 800 
 shifted imperial power to the new line of Frankish sovereigns ; 
 later, the papacy, which had been the chief agent in creating the 
 new or Holy Roman Empire, became its rival for temporal power 
 and for a time exercised undisputed sway over Christendom. In 
 actual fact, the medieval period was an age of organized anarchy, 
 of regulated violence ; and, in spite of legal forms and customary 
 law, interfeudal relations were of the lowest kind. 1 In the eleventh 
 century attempts were made by the church to establish peace by 
 means of the Truce of God and the Peace of God ; 2 and a similar 
 result was aimed at by the King's Peace in England and the vari- 
 ous Landesfrieden in Germany ; 3 but private warfare was not sup- 
 pressed until the beginnings of the modern period. 4 
 
 482. Tendencies hostile to international law. During the Mid- 
 dle Ages there was but little consciousness of a direct legal relation 
 among sovereign princes outside of the graded obligations of the 
 feudal system. Separate principalities existed, but the sense of 
 unity was so deep that the idea of distinct and reciprocal relations 
 among them was lacking. The bond of relationship was felt, not 
 so much among themselves as with the higher authority to which 
 they all were subjected. Disputes not settled by warfare were 
 sometimes submitted to the arbitration of the pope, and until the 
 thirteenth century his decisions were usually obeyed. 5 Kings, 
 bishops, eminent jurists, and even cities were sometimes chosen 
 as arbiters during the Middle Ages ; 6 but the practice did not 
 materially mitigate warfare, and few general principles for the 
 guidance of intercommunity relations were developed. For a time, 
 indeed, there was even a tendency toward the view that states, in 
 
 1 Nys, Les Origines de droit international, chap. v. 
 
 2 Thatcher and McNeal, Source Book for Medieval History, Nos. 240-244. 
 8 Ibid. Nos. 245-249. 
 
 * Luchaire, Manuel des institutions francaises, pp. 228-234. 
 6 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 78-80. 
 6 Moore, International Arbitrations, Vol. V, pp. 4825-4831. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 319 
 
 their mutual dealings, need recognize no law but the right of the 
 strongest or most cunning. Machiavelli in The Prince (1513) set 
 forth the doctrine that in matters of state ordinary rules of moral- 
 ity did not apply. 1 Fortunately, other tendencies were leading in a 
 different direction and were preparing the way for a more rational 
 and humane conception of interstate relations. 
 
 483. Influences leading to international law proper. In addi- 
 tion to the unifying influence of the Roman Empire and the 
 humanitarian cosmopolitanism of the Christian church, to the 
 legal influences of the civil and the canon law, to the unifying 
 of national interests and the broadening of international comity 
 in the Crusades, and to the emphasis upon honor and equitable 
 dealing resulting from chivalry, 2 several main lines of movement 
 contributed chiefly to the rise of international law and to modern 
 diplomatic relations. Foremost among these was the revival of 
 commerce which, centering in the Italian cities, was greatly stimu- 
 lated by the Crusades. In spite of feudal disorder, piracy, and 
 heavy port exactions, trade was gradually extended to north Europe 
 by overland routes and by the sea ; and leagues of cities, foremost 
 among which was the Hanseatic League, were formed for its pro- 
 tection and extension. Later, the opening of new routes to the 
 Orient and the discovery of America transferred the center of 
 commercial activity to the Atlantic and extended the range of 
 external relations. As the result of international dealings due 
 to commerce, various codes of maritime law were formed. Chief 
 among these was the Consolato del Mare, s a collection of prin- 
 ciples that regulated the .trade of the Mediterranean. Some of its 
 rules concerning the rights of belligerents and neutrals on the sea 
 in time of war have stood to the present day. The Laws of Oldron 4 
 formed the maritime code for western Europe and the Laws of 
 
 1 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, chap. xi. 
 
 2 Ward, Enquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in 
 Europe, Vol. I, pp. 155-230. 
 
 8 Published at Barcelona in 1494 ; but its rules had been applied for several 
 centuries before that time, and were probably based in part upon the Amalfitan 
 Tables, which date to the eleventh century. See Wheaton, History of the Law of 
 Nations, pp. 63-65. 
 
 4 Compiled in the latter part of the twelfth century by Richard I or by his 
 mother, Queen Eleanor. 
 
320 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Wisby 1 ruled the sea traffic of the Baltic nations. The Hanseatic 
 League compiled a system of marine law 2 toward the end of the 
 sixteenth century ; and in the famous French Marine Ordinance 
 of 1 68 1, 3 drawn up by a commission appointed by Louis XIV 
 of France, was issued the most comprehensive and systematic 
 presentation of this branch of international jurisprudence. 
 
 484. Establishment of consuls.- Closely connected with the 
 development of medieval maritime law was the establishment of 
 consuls. 4 As early as the eleventh and twelfth centuries, consular 
 officials, chosen by the seamen or merchants of the Italian cities, 
 settled disputes affecting their countrymen in foreign lands, and 
 assisted by advice and information the merchants of their home 
 states. 5 Consuls were at first sent only to Oriental countries, but 
 during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the institution spread 
 to the West. The right of choosing the consuls, at first in the 
 hands of mercantile associations, soon passed to the government 
 of the state to which the merchants belonged. 6 The establishment 
 later of permanent embassies, the rise of the doctrine of territorial 
 sovereignty, and the extension of the jurisdiction of the national 
 courts of law destroyed the judicial functions of consuls in the 
 more advanced states, reducing them to the position of commercial 
 agents. In Mohammedan countries and in the Orient, 7 consuls 
 still possess large immunities and exercise important jurisdictions, 
 both civil and criminal, over citizens of their own states. 8 
 
 485. Importance of territorial sovereignty in international law. 
 Of even more importance than the maritime codes in the evolution 
 of international law was the influence of feudalism in associating 
 
 1 Compiled about 1288. 
 
 2 The/us Hanseaticum Maritimum, compiled in 1591 and expanded in 1614. 
 
 3 Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, pp. 107-161. 
 
 4 Known at first as consules marina-riorum et mercatorum. 
 
 5 Halleck, International Law, Vol. I, pp. 369-370. 
 
 6 It is said that the first consul appointed by England was to Pisa, Italy, in 
 1 175, the government acting at the request of a British commercial organization 
 in Pisa, which was unable to agree in the selection of one of its own members. 
 The advantages of this practice being demonstrated, it became the custom, first 
 for England and then for other governments, to appoint consuls to act in foreign 
 countries. — Van Dyne, Our Foreign Service, p. 118. 
 
 7 Except in Japan, where these privileges of consuls were abolished in 1899. 
 
 8 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, chap, xvi ; Lippmann, I)ie Konsu- 
 larjurisdiktion im Orient. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 321 
 
 political rights with the possession of land, thus leading to the idea 
 of territorial sovereignty. 1 The kings, standing at the apex of the 
 feudal hierarchy, from being lords of their peoples became lords of 
 their peoples' lands. While direct royal authority was limited dur- 
 ing the medieval period both by the actual strength of the feudal 
 nobility and by the belief in a common European superior, as 
 feudalism fell into decay and the powers of emperor and pope 
 diminished, the kings, supported by monarchical doctrines made 
 familiar in the revived study of Roman law, finally stood forth as 
 absolute sovereigns over the territory of separate and independent 
 national states. The long contest between papacy and empire, 2 the 
 controversies between the pope and the rising national monarchs, the 
 Great Schism, 3 and, finally, the Protestant Reformation destroyed 
 the sense of unity and divided Christendom into hostile camps. 
 Since the bond of common religious faith was broken, the fact 
 that a group of states in the modern sense had come into existence 
 could not long escape observation. Few rules existed, however, to 
 determine the proper relations among these growing and rival 
 political units ; and the kings of the period, flushed with a sense 
 of unlimited power, were guided by self-interest alone in matters 
 of state policy. In the early modern period, unscrupulous bad 
 faith characterized statecraft and wars were barbarously cruel and 
 destructive. 4 
 
 486. Forerunners of Grotius. These conditions prepared the 
 way, toward the close of the sixteenth century, for thinkers who 
 asserted that there were ethical rules, or natural law, applicable 
 to the intercourse of states, even though no earthly authority had 
 power to enforce obedience. 5 Ayala, a Spanish military judge, at- 
 tacked the doctrine of unregulated war and argued for a jus naturale 
 and for a jus gentium established by common consent. 6 Gentilis, 
 an Italian who taught at Oxford, maintained that there was a law 
 
 1 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, pp. 26-28. 
 
 2 Emerton, Medieval Europe, chaps, vii-x. 
 
 8 Milraan, History of Latin Christianity, Bk. XIII, chaps, i-v. 
 
 4 On the barbarities of the wars of this period, see Lawrence, Essays on 
 Modern International Law, No. IV. 
 
 6 On the writers who paved the way for international law, see Figgis, From 
 Gerson to Grotius ; Nys, Le Droit de la guerre et les precurseurs de Grotius. 
 
 6 De Jure et Officiis Bellicis, published in 1581. 
 
322 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of war based on reason and consent. 1 Suarez, a Spanish Jesuit, 
 frankly recognized the separation of states, but insisted on the 
 moral unity of mankind. He argued therefore that there must be 
 a community of states and a law, furnished by reason and general 
 custom, to regulate their dealings. 2 " Although every perfect state, 
 whether a republic or a kingdom, is in itself a perfect community 
 composed of its own members, still each such state, viewed in its 
 relations to the human race, is in some measure a member of that 
 universal unity. . . . For just as custom introduced law in a state, 
 so it was possible for laws to be introduced in the whole human 
 race by the habitual conduct of nations." 
 
 487. The work of Grotius. The development of political prin- 
 ciples and the actual conditions of political existence made possible, 
 therefore, the work of Grotius, the founder of the science of inter- 
 national law. 3 Grotius started with the universally accepted idea 
 of natural law, based upon reason and the innate sociability of man, 
 and claimed its sanction for the law of nations. He also borrowed 
 many principles from the Roman jus gentium, a body of positive 
 rules sanctioned by general agreement ; and thus laid the basis for 
 the modern theory, which arose after the doctrine of natural law 
 had been proved untenable, 4 that international law derives its sanc- 
 tion from the common consent of nations. The fundamental con- 
 ceptions of Grotius — the legal equality and the territorial sovereignty 
 and independence of states — still form the basic principles of 
 international jurisprudence. 5 Several reasons for the enormous 
 influence exerted by the work of Grotius may be mentioned. In 
 addition to his attractive style and his marvelous display of erudi- 
 tion, gathering instances from all history and piling precedent upon 
 
 1 De Jure Belli Libri Tres, published in 1 598. 
 
 2 Tractatus de Legibus et Deo Legislatore, published in 1 61 2. For translation of 
 the most important part, see Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International 
 Law, chaps, xxvi-xxvii. 
 
 3 De Jure Belli ac Pacis, published in 1625. For a good analysis, see Walker, 
 History of the Law of Nations, sections 143-148. 
 
 4 For a criticism of the law of nature, see Willoughby, Nature of the State, 
 pp. 103-118; Lawrence, Principles of International Law, pp. 33-38. 
 
 5 Note the correspondence between the theory of external sovereignty held 
 by Grotius and the contemporary theory of internal sovereignty worked out 
 by Bodin. See Dunning, Political Theories: From Luther to Montesquieu, 
 chaps, iii, v. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 323 
 
 precedent, he based his system upon doctrines accepted by the 
 leading thinkers of his period. The law of nature, territorial sov- 
 ereignty, and the principles of Roman law were approved ingre- 
 dients for his constructive system. The ideas of world church, 
 world empire, and feudal independence that he attacked were already 
 discredited. Finally, the evils due to the absence of morality in 
 interstate dealings and to the constant and barbarous wars led men 
 to realize the need of a system under which principles of justice 
 and honor might be applied to the relations among states. 
 
 488. The Peace of Westphalia. Accordingly, in the Treaty of 
 Westphalia (1648), 1 which brought the terrible Thirty Years' War 
 to an end, many of the principles of Grotius were applied. This 
 treaty " ended forever both the political and spiritual aspirations 
 after universal empire. It distinctly recognized a society "of states 
 based upon the principle of territorial sovereignty, and settled the 
 doctrine that law goes with the land and that each territorial state 
 is independent and possessed of jural rights which all others are 
 bound to respect. It was thus a declaration, not only that a society 
 of states exists, but that its members may make their appeal to law. 
 What is most important of all perhaps is the equal recognition of all 
 forms of government without distinction. The Venetian Oligarchy, 
 the Dutch Republic, the Swiss Confederation, and the Hanseatic 
 Cities were all embraced in it with the same legal rights as the 
 proudest and most ancient monarchies, including the Holy Roman 
 Empire. 2 Practically all the Christian states of Europe, not excepting 
 the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, were embraced within its provisions. 
 Only the Ottoman Empire was excluded from it." 3 
 
 489. Permanent embassies. Other agents in the reorganization 
 of Europe that led to the modern conception of international rela- 
 tions were the establishment of permanent embassies and the doc- 
 trine of the balance of power. Permanent resident embassies were 
 unknown in ancient times. Special envoys were sent when messages 
 
 1 Henderson, Short History of Germany, Vol. I, pp. 489-497. 
 
 2 Of the 355 German states whose sovereignty was practically recognized, 
 1 50 were secular states governed by hereditary princes, 62 were free city states, 
 and 123 were ecclesiastical states governed by archbishops and other church 
 officials. — Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, p. 60. 
 
 8 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 93~94- 
 
324 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 were to be delivered or negotiations carried on, but the first per- 
 manent diplomatic representatives in foreign states were probably 
 established by Venice in the thirteenth century. By the fifteenth 
 century the Italian cities had permanent representatives in France, 
 Spain, Germany, and England ; and in the sixteenth century some 
 of the leading states of western Europe established organized 
 embassies among themselves. 1 In spite of the convenience of this 
 practice, the sending of diplomatic agents was compelled to win 
 its way against a mass of suspicion caused largely by the unscru- 
 pulous nature of early diplomacy. Louis XI of France, probably 
 the first sovereign in western Europe to send regular embassies, 
 intended his ambassadors to act as sort of chartered spies in the 
 courts of his neighbors ; Henry VII of England would not allow 
 ambassadors from other states to remain in his territory after their 
 business was finished ; and as late as 1660 the Diet of Poland 
 threatened to treat the French ambassadors as spies if they did 
 not return home. 2 Not until the period of Richelieu, Mazarin, and 
 Louis XIV in the seventeenth century was the system of resident 
 embassies generally established. 3 
 
 490. The balance of power. The idea of the balance of power, 
 or the doctrine that any state that attempted to destroy the nice 
 adjustment of international equilibrium might be attacked by others 
 whose relative importance would be diminished if it were allowed 
 to carry out its projects, is not altogether modern. Ancient states 
 frequently united to prevent the growth of a neighboring power 
 whose preponderance threatened their independence. 4 The first 
 modern application of the theory, however, was found during the 
 fifteenth century in the interstate relations of the Italian cities. 
 Later this principle was extended to the wider field of European 
 politics. In the sixteenth century, France and England, in their 
 policies toward the great Hapsburg Empire, recognized the value 
 of the principle ; but the balance of power, as a European system, 
 
 1 On the struggle for precedence that formerly prevailed among the diplomatic 
 agents of states, see Bernard, Lectures on Diplomacy, Lecture I. 
 
 2 Ward, History of the Law of Nations, Vol. II, p. 484. 
 
 8 Nys, Les Origines de droit international, chap, xiv ; Oppenheim, International 
 Law, Vol. I, sections 358-359. 
 
 4 Hume, Essays Moral, Political, and Literary, No. VII. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 325 
 
 was not definitely established until the latter part of the seventeenth 
 century. It was first formally stated in the Peace of Utrecht (171 3), 1 
 frequently appeared in later treaties and state papers, 2 and remained 
 a fundamental maxim of European diplomacy until the latter part 
 of the nineteenth century. 3 
 
 491. The preeminence of France. During the period between 
 the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of Utrecht (1713), 
 France was the leading state in Europe. Her ambitious policies 
 under Louis XIV led to a series of wars that disturbed the balance 
 of power until a general coalition, headed by England, checked the 
 aggressive designs of France and restored the European equilib- 
 rium. 4 While the principles of international law as laid down 
 by Grotius and his followers were frequently disregarded in the 
 warfare and diplomacy of this era, certain permanent advances 
 were made. The right of legation and the international status of 
 ambassadors were established, and the French language gradually 
 took the place of Latin in international intercourse. 5 The doctrine 
 of the freedom of the high seas made considerable progress ; 6 
 the general principles of neutral trade were laid down ; rules 
 concerning the right of visit and search, blockade, and contra- 
 band were adopted ; and numerous commercial treaties indicated 
 the growth of international intercourse. 7 During this period the 
 writings of the great international jurists were diligently studied 
 and widely discussed, and the spirit of men and of states became 
 more tolerant. 
 
 1 The object of that treaty is stated as " ad firmandam stabiliendamque pacem 
 ac tranquillitatem christian! orbis justo potentiae equilibro." 
 
 2 For example, in the Preamble to the old British Mutiny Act : " And whereas 
 it is adjudged necessary by his Majesty and this present Parliament that a Body 
 of Forces should be continued for the Safety of the United Kingdom, the De- 
 fence of the Possessions of His Majesty's Crown, and the Preservation of the 
 Balance of Power in Europe." 
 
 8 Dupuis, Le Principe d'equilibre, etc. ; Nys, op. cit., chap. viii. 
 4 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chaps, ii-iii. 
 6 A result of the declining influence of the Holy Roman Empire and of the 
 preeminence of France. 
 
 6 Grotius, Mare Liberum (1609) ; Selden, Mare Clausum (1635) ; Bynkershoek, 
 De Dominio Maris (1702). 
 
 7 Concerning the conditions of maritime capture, one of the most discussed 
 questions of this period, see Hall, Treatise on International Law, Part IV, chaps, 
 vii, ix; Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations, Bk. V, chap. vi. 
 
326 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 492. International development during the eighteenth century. 
 
 In the eighteenth century, Russia was admitted to full member- 
 ship in the family of nations, and Prussia grew into a power of 
 importance. 1 Many difficult questions concerning the occupation 
 and boundaries of territory were opened up by the colonization of 
 •4he New World ; 2 the American fisheries question appeared ; and 
 international regulations concerning commerce multiplied. The 
 Peace of Paris (1763) settled many questions of territorial juris- 
 diction, made England the dominant state in America, and ex- 
 tended her power in the East. 3 On the continent the issues were 
 dynastic, economic, and territorial. Succession to the various royal 
 thrones' was a frequent topic of international discussions ; 4 the 
 balance-of-power theory was repeatedly affirmed and disregarded ; 
 and international diplomacy was dominated by selfish and oppor- 
 tunistic motives. Treaties were violated, wars were undertaken on 
 the slightest pretexts, and the most sacred rights of nations were 
 ruthlessly disregarded. Thus Frederick the Great seized Silesia 
 in 1 740 ; the Pragmatic Sanction was ignored by almost all the 
 states that agreed to it ; and Poland was removed from the map of 
 Europe by the partitions of 1772, 1793, and I795- S On the other 
 hand, some progress was made in the rules of maritime capture, 
 the Armed Neutrality of 1780 laying down the general principle 
 of " free ships, free goods." 6 
 
 493. International development during the French Revolution. 
 The American Revolution of 1776 and the French Revolution of 
 1789 introduced new problems and new principles. The fact that 
 the state was a legal entity distinct from the person of its king was 
 made clear and the ideals and methods of democracy, nationalism, 
 and federation became valuable factors in state development. The 
 French Revolution, starting with advanced conceptions of world 
 peace and altruistic doctrines of the rights of men and of nations, 7 
 
 1 Robinson and Beard, Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chap. iv. 
 
 2 The Roman law of occupatio was applied as the basis of territorial acquisition. 
 
 3 Chalmers, Collection of Treaties, Vol. I, pp. 467-483. 
 
 4 For example, the Spanish succession (1700) and the Austrian succession 
 (1740), both of which led to general European wars. 
 
 6 Robinson and Beard, op. cit, Vol. I, chap. v. 
 
 8 Wheaton, History of the Law of Nations, pp. 295 ff. 
 
 ' Anderson, Constitutions and Documents, Nos. 1-63. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 327 
 
 soon degenerated into the aggressive conquests of Napoleon. 
 Against his designs were formed a series of coalitions, headed by 
 Great Britain ; and to the practices of Great Britain the states of 
 Europe turned for the principles of international law. Because of 
 the superiority of France on land and of England on the sea, the 
 chief rivals in the great Napoleonic struggle were for some time 
 able to attack each other only in an indirect way, and many funda- 
 mental customs of international law, especially of maritime capture, 
 were violated. 1 The continental system of Napoleon, as stated in 
 his Berlin and Milan decrees of 1806 and 1807 respectively, and 
 the retaliation of England in the British Orders in Council almost 
 ruined neutral commerce. 2 The United States, with the largest 
 neutral carrying trade, was the chief sufferer and became the cham- 
 . pion of the rights of neutral commerce. The regulations in regard 
 to neutrality set forth by the United States as early as 1793 sub- 
 sequently became generally recognized. 3 Jefferson's Embargo and 
 the American War of 181 2 were by-products of the Napoleonic 
 contest. 4 
 
 494. The Congress of Vienna. After the downfall of Napoleon, 
 the balance of power in Europe was again restored by the Congress 
 of Vienna (18 is). 5 While this Congress was dominated by a re- 
 actionary spirit and based its work on the principle of legitimacy, 
 ignoring the growing forces of nationalism and democracy, it made 
 some progress in settling international problems. " It defined the 
 relations of ministers, envoys, and ambassadors ; declared in favor 
 of the abolition of the African slave trade ; and agreed upon gen- 
 eral principles intended to secure freedom of navigation on great 
 international rivers, at least by coriparian states. Among the polit- 
 ical acts of the Congress of Vienna should be particularly noted : 
 the union of Norway and Sweden and of Belgium and Holland ; 
 the reorganization of the new Germany of thirty-nine states into 
 
 1 Mahan, Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire. 
 
 2 Manning, Law of Nations, Bk. V, chap. x. For the decrees, see University 
 of Pennsylvania Translations and Reprints, Vol. II, No. 2. 
 
 8 Moore, American Diplomacy, chaps, ii-iii. 
 1 American Nation, Vols. XII-XIII. 
 
 6 Rose, Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, chap, xi; Robinson and Beard, 
 op. cit., Vol. I, chap. xvi. 
 
328 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 a loose confederacy; and, in general, the restoration of the old 
 dynasties in France, Spain, Italy", and Germany." 1 
 
 495. The Holy Alliance, the concert of Europe, and the Monroe 
 Doctrine. The reactionary influence, of which Metternich was the 
 leading spirit, continued during the first half of the nineteenth 
 century, largely through the efforts of the Holy Alliance, composed 
 of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, to suppress popular revolutions. 2 
 When England, and later France, joined these powers and peri- 
 odical meetings were held at which the affairs of the continent 
 were discussed and settled, the concert of Europe was estab- 
 lished. This system replaced the old equilibrium of forces in a 
 European community of states by the authority of a committee of 
 the great powers, which considered it their prerogative to inter- 
 fere in the affairs of the smaller states or of uncivilized peoples, 
 and to enter upon a positive policy of concerted action. 3 The great 
 powers, however, distinctly avowed it to be their purpose to 
 observe strictly the principles of the law of nations. 4 When an 
 attempt was made to extend the intervention of the Holy Alliance 
 to America for the purpose of restoring the Spanish colonies, 
 which had won their independence, to their former status, the 
 United States, supported by England, objected. The Monroe 
 Doctrine, promulgated at this time, while never formally made a 
 part of international law, has been maintained and expanded as a 
 fundamental principle of American international policy and has 
 been respected on numerous occasions by other states. 5 The rec- 
 ognition of the independence of Spanish America added Mexico 
 and the South American states to the family of nations. Finally, 
 by the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, the doctrines of absolutism 
 
 1 Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, pp. 70-71. 
 
 2 Seignobos, Political History of Modern Europe, chap. xxv. For the text of the 
 Holy Alliance, see Robinson and Beard, Readings in Modern European History, 
 Vol. I, pp. 384-385. 
 
 8 Hazen, Europe since 1815, pp. 16-19; Hill, World Organization and the 
 Modern State, pp. 139-141. 
 
 4 In the Declaration of the Five Cabinets at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. See 
 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, Vol. I, p. 573. 
 
 6 Edgington, The Monroe Doctrine ; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. 
 VI, chap, xx ; Coolidge, United States as a World Power, chap. v. See, however, 
 Bingham, The Monroe Doctrine, an Obsolete Shibboleth. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 329 
 
 and legitimacy were overthrown, and the principles of nationality 
 and democracy were recognized. 1 
 
 496. The period of international conferences. The latter half of 
 the nineteenth century was a period of frequent international con- 
 gresses, and of great 'progress in the improvement and codification 
 of international law and in the establishment of administrative 
 and judicial machinery of world organization. As a result, the 
 principle of nationality, which reached its climax in the unifications 
 of Italy and of Germany in 1870, 2 was modified by the growth of 
 internationalism ; and the earlier emphasis on sovereignty and 
 independence was, partially at least, replaced by the present con- 
 ception of interdependence. In the Declaration of Paris, signed 
 in 1856 after the Crimean War, Turkey was admitted to full 
 standing in the family of nations, and epoch-making principles of 
 maritime law concerning privateering, neutral commerce, and 
 blockade were finally agreed upon. 3 The laws of land warfare 
 were codified, beginning with the Instructions for the Guidance of 
 the Armies of the United States in the Field in the Civil War, 4 
 being more generally adopted after the Brussels Conference 
 (1874), and receiving their present form in the Hague Codes of 
 1899 and 1907. 5 The Geneva Convention of 1864, providing for 
 the neutralization of persons and things connected with the sick 
 and wounded of armies, was signed by practically all civilized 
 states. 6 Since 1850 there have been held hundreds of interna- 
 tional conferences, public and private, dealing with subjects of all 
 sorts. 7 Many of these resulted in the establishment of permanent 
 commissions and bureaus, and in the adoption of numerous agree- 
 ments leading toward a desirable uniformity of international 
 practice. 8 
 
 1 Andrews, Historical Development of Modern Europe, Vol. I, chaps, v-x. 
 
 2 Stillman, Unification of Italy ; Seignobos, Political History of Europe since 
 1814, pp. 451-484- 
 
 8 Wilson and Tucker, International Law, Appendix II. 
 
 4 Drawn up in 1863 by Dr. Francis Lieber. See Wilson and Tucker, op. cit, 
 Appendix I. 6 Wilson and Tucker, op. cit., Appendix V. 
 
 6 Wilson and Tucker, op. cit., Appendix III. 
 
 7 For a partial list, see American Journal of International Law, Vol. I, 
 pp. 808-829. 
 
 8 Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, sections 458-471, 578-591. 
 
330 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 497. Arbitration and armaments. The international situation 
 during the past quarter century brought into especial prominence 
 the questions of international arbitration and limitation of arma- 
 ments. International arbitration, frequently utilized during the 
 Middle Ages, declined under the absolute monarchies of the 
 seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when recourse was had to 
 war and diplomatic intrigue in order to settle international differ- 
 ences. After the Napoleonic wars, when conditions in Europe 
 became more settled, international arbitration was revived. 1 This 
 movement, in which England and the United States at first took 
 the leading parts, became of general importance as a result of the 
 recent Hague conferences. 2 The burden, economic, social, and 
 moral, of enormous armaments also demanded some method for 
 the peaceful solution of international disputes. Since the Franco- 
 Prussian War of 1870, Europe has been an armed camp ; and the 
 recent interest in colonial imperialism and commercial expansion 3 
 has led to naval rivalries even more costly. For the purpose, 
 therefore, of " seeking by means of international discussion, the 
 most effectual means of insuring to all peoples the benefits of a 
 real and durable peace, and above all, of putting an end to the 
 progressive development of the present armaments," the First 
 International Peace Conference met at The Hague in 1 899 at the 
 call of the Russian czar. 4 
 
 498. The Hague conferences. The twenty-six states represented 
 soon realized -the impracticability of limiting military and naval 
 preparations, but arbitration was recommended, a code of. arbitral 
 procedure was adopted, and a permanent tribunal of arbitration was 
 established. 5 In addition, conventions regarding land and mari- 
 time warfare were adopted and several minor declarations issued. 6 
 Forty-four states were represented at the Second International 
 Peace Conference in 1907. This conference was characterized 
 
 1 The Jay Treaty of 1794 referred several questions to arbitration. 
 
 2 Between 1899 and 1908 about 130 arbitration treaties were negotiated. For a 
 partial list, see American Journal of International Law, Vol. II, pp. 824-826. 
 
 3 Reinsch, World Politics, Part I. 
 
 4 For the Rescript of August 24, 1898, see Holls, Peace Conference at The 
 Hague, pp. 18 ff. 6 Foster, Arbitration and the Hague Court. 
 
 6 For full text of the conference, see Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 331 
 
 by an increasing interest in principles of jurisprudence as afford- 
 •ing the true" foundation of international agreements. The most 
 important results were the establishment of an international court 
 for maritime prizes, the agreement not to collect contractual debts 
 by force until adjudication had been obtained, or at least proposed 
 and refused, 1 and the project for a permanent court of arbitral 
 justice. A resolution stating the desirability of limiting military 
 burdens was adopted and thirteen conventions and several rec- 
 ommendations were drawn up. 2 The failure of the Second Hague 
 Conference to reconcile differences of opinion regarding maritime 
 law and procedure led Great Britain to call a conference of the 
 leading maritime powers, which met at London in the winter of 
 1 908- 1 909. An unexpected consensus of opinion resulted, and 
 the Declaration of London, a code of seventy-one Articles, con- 
 taining important provisions relating to the law of blockade, con- 
 traband, and other phases of the rights of neutrals and belligerents 
 with respect to neutral commerce, was drawn up. 8 This declara- 
 tion was agreed to by the delegates of the ten leading powers 
 represented at the conference, and the adhesion of states not 
 represented was invited. 
 
 499. Contributions of the United States to international law. 
 The United States, largely on account of its isolation, which made 
 it possible to regard principle because less influenced by policy, 
 has contributed largely to the progress of international law during 
 the past century. 4 The United States has advocated advanced 
 principles regarding the immunities and obligations of neutrals, 
 freedom of commerce and navigation, and the open-door policy 
 in the Far East. 5 It has taken the lead in establishing laws of war 
 on land and sea, and has cordially supported arbitration as a means 
 
 1 On the Drago Doctrine, around which this question centered, see Hershey, 
 "The Calvo and Drago Doctrines," in American Journal of International Law, 
 Vol. I, pp. 692-726. 
 
 2 For full text of the second conference, see Scott, The Two Hague Confer- 
 ences, Vol. II. , 
 
 3 Bentwick, The Declaration of London ; Stowell, " The International Naval 
 Conference and the Declaration of London," in American Political Science 
 Review, November, 1909. 
 
 4 Wilson and Tucker, International Law, pp. 27-31. 
 
 6 Latane, America as a World Power (American Nation, Vol. XXV), chap. vi. 
 
332 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of peaceful settlement of international disputes. While its policies 
 have not always been consistent nor disinterested when its own 
 welfare was affected, 1 it has in general taken a liberal and progres- 
 sive position upon international questions ; and its attitude has 
 had increasing weight in the councils of nations as its power has 
 grown and as its traditional policy of exclusiveness, as crystallized in 
 the Monroe Doctrine, has necessarily been modified by its present 
 importance in world politics. 
 
 II. Forms of Union among States 
 
 500. Unions among states. One of the most confusing results 
 of international intercourse has been the establishment of forms 
 of union or relations of dependence among states, ranging all the 
 way from simple alliances or vague spheres of influence, where the 
 external independence of the states concerned is restricted in only 
 the slightest degree and no common government is created, to 
 federations, where the former states lose their sovereignty and be- 
 come component members in a new state. Since a logical classifi- 
 cation of these political forms is difficult, 2 and their effects on the 
 nature of the states concerned and on the modern theory of sover- 
 eignty are in much dispute, only a brief description of the various 
 forms and a general statement of the leading problems involved 
 will be attempted. 
 
 501. Alliances. The simplest form of union among states is 
 that created by a treaty of alliance. 3 In this case the states retain 
 full control of their own internal affairs and, without creating any 
 permanent common organ, agree to act jointly for some specific 
 purpose. Such concerted action as is necessary is had through 
 
 1 For example, in Chinese exclusion, in the Bering Sea controversy, and in 
 the Panama tolls. 
 
 2 Perhaps the most important discussion of this topic is found in Jellinek, Die 
 Lehre von den Staatenverbindungen. A suggestive classification is that of Crane 
 in The State in Constitutional and International Law, pp. 75-78. 
 
 3 Every international treaty provides for the regulation of certain common in- 
 terests, and in a sense places certain formal limits upon the complete sovereignty 
 of the states involved. Absolute external independence among a community of 
 states having dealings one with another is as impossible as full natural rights 
 among a group of individuals living in a state of nature. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 333 
 
 governmental organs of the individual states, and no juristic union 
 or fusion of the contracting states is intended. Alliances may be 
 temporary, may be brought into operation only in case certain con- 
 tingencies arise, or may be permanent, in which case the states 
 form a sort of league. Such agreements are usually formed for 
 purposes of common aggression or defense. Examples in history 
 are numerous, notably the alliances among the Greek cities in 
 ancient times, among the Italian and the German cities in medie- 
 val times, and the Holy Alliance, the Triple Alliance, and many 
 others among modern states. 
 
 502. International administrative unions. A further step is 
 taken when combinations of states are formed by treaty agreements 
 or by international conferences for the common regulation of par- 
 ticular interests, for which purposes permanent administrative 
 authorities are created. Many such international administrative 
 unions have been formed in recent years. 1 The commission for 
 the regulation of navigation upon the Danube, established by the 
 Congress of Paris in 1856, but given its present form in 1883, 
 practically forms a distinct international person, having the power 
 of prescribing and enforcing penalties for the violation of its regu- 
 lations. 2 Other examples are " the Universal Postal Union, estab- 
 lished by thirty states in 1878, after the successful experiment by 
 twenty-one states begun four years earlier, and now augmented to 
 sixty members, covering practically the whole civilized world, with 
 congresses every five years, and a permanent central office at 
 Berne ; the Universal Telegraphic Union, established in 1 868, 
 comprising thirty states, also with a permanent central office ; the 
 Union for Railway Transportation, established in 1890, of which 
 the chief European states are members ; the Union for the Pro- 
 tection of Industrial Property, established in 1883; that for the 
 Protection of Works of Literature and Art, formed in 1886 ; and 
 the Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, formed in 1 890." 3 
 As a result of the actions of these international conferences and 
 commissions, a body of laws and regulations, to which the name 
 
 1 Reinsch, Public International Unions. 
 
 2 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. I, pp. 630-631. 
 
 8 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State; p. 127. 
 
334 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 of international administrative law is applied and which is admin- 
 istered by international commissions and by national agencies, is 
 gradually being formed. 1 
 
 503. Personalunions. When two or more states are temporarily 
 united under the same ruler, a personal-union is formed. 2 Each 
 state retains its own sovereignty and remains a distinct and sepa- 
 rate subject of international law. 3 Each of the associated states 
 remains entirely independent of the others, having its own consti- 
 tution and laws, its own political organization, citizenship, and local 
 institutions. The common ruler legally possesses as many political 
 personalities as there are states under his rule, and may possess 
 widely different powers in each. Accidents of descent may cause 
 such unions, and differences in the laws of inheritance in the states 
 concerned may bring them to an end. Historic examples were 
 the union of Spain and the Holy Roman Empire under Charles V, 
 of Great Britain and Hanover from 17141.0 1837, and of Holland 
 and Luxemburg from 1815 to 1890. The annexation of the Congo 
 Free State by Belgium in 1908 destroyed the last existing union 
 of this type. 
 
 504. Realunioms. When two or more states, otherwise sovereign 
 and independent, are permanently united under the same dynasty, 
 so that they form a single person in international relations, a real- 
 union is formed. 4 Each member of the union retains its territorial 
 integrity, its own constitution, and its internal sovereignty. But 
 a common ministry or joint councils assist the monarch, usually 
 in questions of war and peace, foreign affairs, army and navy, and 
 finances. 5 Until 1905 Norway and Sweden formed a realunion. 
 Austria-Hungary is the only surviving example. In this state, be- 
 sides the common monarch, there are common ministries for foreign 
 affairs, war, and finance, and the rudiments of a common legislature. 6 
 
 1 Reinsch, " International Unions and their Administration," in American 
 Journal of International Law, Vol. III. 
 
 2 Juraschek, Personal- und Realunion ; Rivier, Principes du droit des gens, 
 Vol. I, pp. 93-97. 8 Jellinek, Die Lehrevon den Staatenverbindungen, p. 212. 
 
 4 Le Fur und Posener, Bundesstaat und Staatenbund, section 73 ; Moore, In- 
 ternational Law Digest, Vol. I, section 9. 
 
 6 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 139-142. 
 
 6 On the government of the Dual Monarchy, see Wilson, The State, pp. 333- 
 363 ; Ogg, Governments of Europe, chaps, xxiv-xxvii, xxxi. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 335 
 
 505. Confederations. The confederation is a permanent union 
 of states joined by a compact or treaty for purposes of common 
 defense and general welfare. 1 The union has governmental organs 
 and functions of its own, especially for the conduct of foreign 
 affairs, but each component state retains its sovereignty and inde- 
 pendence and its personality in international law. The usual organ 
 of common government. consists of a diet, or congress, of dele- 
 gates from the states forming the union. This body exercises such 
 powers as are delegated to it by agreement among the states, and 
 in its decisions the vote of each state is usually cast as a unit. 
 This central congress does not ordinarily deal with the individuals 
 of the several states, but with the states directly ; and its resolutions 
 are usually inoperative until adopted by the governments of the sep- 
 arate states and given the force of law within their jurisdictions. 2 
 
 506. Historical importance of confederations. This form of 
 union has been of great historic importance in political evolution. 
 The first steps toward political integration among states that are 
 too nearly equal in strength to permit of expansion through con- 
 quest, and that, in spite of common interests, wish to retain their 
 separate identities and oppose complete amalgamation may be best 
 taken by means of confederation. The confederacy is evidently a. 
 temporary form of government and usually results in a growing 
 spirit of unity in consequence of which a single state is formed. 
 It is, of course, possible for the states in confederation to destroy 
 the common government and remain entirely separate. At present 
 no good example of a confederacy exists, although the United 
 Netherlands from 1580 to 1795, the United States from 1781 to 
 1789, the Swiss Confederacy before 1798 and from 1815 to 1848, 
 and the Germanic Confederation from 1815 to 1866 were forms 
 of this political type. 3 In all these cases the union of states was 
 later transformed into a single sovereign state and, except for the 
 United Netherlands, the resultant state took the federal form of 
 organization, the former independent states retaining their terri- 
 torial bases and their governments and reappearing as legislative, 
 
 1 Hart, Introduction to Federal Government, chaps, i-iv ; Jellinek, op. cit., 
 pp. 172-194. 
 
 2 Garner, op. cit., pp. 142-145. s Garner, op. cit., pp. 145-148. 
 
336 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 administrative, and judicial districts with certain inherent and 
 nondelegated powers within their own spheres in the new state. 
 
 507. Federations. In the federation, governmental authority 
 is fundamentally distributed between a central organization and a 
 number of commonwealth organizations, each being supreme in 
 its own field and none having the right to interfere with or destroy 
 the others. 1 The federal union, however, is not a union among 
 states, but a single, sovereign and independent state, enjoying com- 
 plete international personality, the relations between the union 
 and the parts being a question of constitutional rather than of 
 international law. 2 
 
 508. Dependent states. Many writers do not consider sover- 
 eignty an essential element of the state for international purposes, 
 and they therefore classify as part-sovereign or dependent states 
 those communities that, dependent to a greater or less extent upon 
 other states, more often in the conduct of their foreign relations, 
 but sometimes in their internal affairs as well, nevertheless retain 
 considerable powers of self-government and a certain degree of 
 international personality. 3 Relations of this kind are necessarily 
 vague, difficult to maintain, and usually end in the absorption or 
 the independence of the subordinate members. No general rules 
 for these anomalous political forms can be laid down, the degree 
 of autonomy and the international status of each depending upon 
 the particular circumstances of each case. 
 
 509. Semisovereign states. The members of federal states, 
 while they seldom possess international personality, are sometimes 
 considered semisovereign states 4 because of their distinct consti- 
 tutional organization and their large powers of internal jurisdiction. 
 The weight of authority is against this point of view. Vassal states, 
 or states under suzerainty, are portions of states that, during a 
 process of gradual disruption, secure certain of the powers of an 
 independent community. 6 In theory, the vassal community has 
 
 1 See above, Chapter VI, sections 232-251. 
 
 2 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 238-275. 
 
 " Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, pp. 105-114. 
 
 * The members of the German Empire possess limited rights of legation and 
 treaty making. See Howard, The German Empire, chap, ii ; Ogg, Governments 
 of Europe, pp. 205-209. 6 Nys, Le Droit international, Vol. I, pp. 357-364. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 337 
 
 such rights only as are conferred upon it by the paramount state. 
 In actual practice it is often well-nigh independent of its suzerain. 
 The terms suzerain and vassal were originally used to describe 
 the relations of feudalism, and were applied to the medieval con- 
 nection between the Holy Roman Empire and the German prin- 
 cipalities. The terms were revived during the past century and 
 applied to such relations as those of the Balkan States to Turkey 
 before they became entirely independent. For example, Bulgaria, 
 which declared its complete independence in 1908, was made a 
 tributary and autonomous principality under the suzerainty of 
 Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin in 1898. Egypt, the main sur- 
 viving example, is nominally under the suzerainty of Turkey, but 
 its administration is actually under the control of Great Britain, 
 and its real position is that of a protectorate. 1 
 
 510. International protectorates. An international protectorate 
 exists where a weak or inferior state has, through treaty or other- 
 wise, been placed under the protection of a more powerful state 
 for the sake of greater safety or because it was virtually forced into 
 such a position. 2 The modern protectorate is ostensibly established 
 for the benefit of the weaker state, but is frequently employed as 
 a means of exploitation and disguised conquest. Protected states 
 retain all rights and privileges not expressly yielded, as well as a 
 certain international capacity. The protecting state is internation- 
 ally responsible for the conduct of the protected state, and this 
 gives a right of intervention in internal as well as in external 
 affairs, which reduces the protectorate to a position of consider- 
 able dependence. Great Britain exercised a protectorate over the 
 Ionian Islands from 1815 to 1863, and over the Transvaal from 
 1 88 1 to 1902. Madagascar was a French protectorate previous to 
 its annexation as a colony in 1896 ; and Korea was a protectorate 
 of Japan from 1904 until it was annexed in 19 10. At present 
 the chief international protectorates are those of Great Britain over 
 Egypt and Zanzibar, of France over Tunis and Morocco, and of 
 
 1 Lowell, Government of England, Vol. II, pp. 428-429 ; Rose, Development 
 of the European Nations, Vol. II, pp. 143-227. 
 
 2 Hershey, op. cit., pp. 107-1 10 ; Despagnet, Essai sur les protectorats ; Rivier, 
 Principes de droit des gens, Vol. I, pp. 79-93. 
 
338 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 the United States over Cuba. 1 In a slightly different situation are 
 the protected states of Panama 2 and the San Marino Republic. 3 
 
 511. Colonial protectorates : spheres of influence. Colonial pro- 
 tectorates are formed when a state, while not definitely claiming 
 sovereignty over a certain area occupied by uncivilized peoples 
 standing outside the rules of international law, at least aims to 
 exclude other states from action within such territory. 4 Such a 
 protectorate affords a means of preparing the way for annexation 
 without incurring the burdens of government and the international 
 responsibilities involved in real occupation. A certain responsi- 
 bility for the maintenance of order is, however, incurred. 5 Large 
 parts of Africa and certain sections of Asia have been partitioned 
 among the leading states by this process. 6 A further application 
 of this form of international expansion in recent years has led to 
 the establishment of spheres of influence. These are based upon 
 agreements either among the great powers, which promise to respect 
 the primary interests of one another within certain specified areas, 
 or between a great power and a weaker state, in which the latter 
 promises not to grant concessions to any other state within an area 
 where the great power claims certain privileges. 7 A still more 
 vague and undefined condition exists in certain parts of the world 
 where the great powers are interested because their citizens have 
 large financial or commercial interests, or where the territory is 
 considered of strategic importance to national welfare or to future 
 expansion. The relation of the United States to Latin America, 
 especially to Mexico and Central America ; 8 of Germany to parts 
 
 1 Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. VI, pp. 56-239 ; Coolidge, United 
 States as a World Power, pp. 124-130, 285-289. 
 
 2 Latane, America as a World Power (American Nation, Vol. XXV), chap, xii; 
 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1904, pp. 543 ff.; Coolidge, op. cit., 
 chap. xv. 
 
 3 This is under the " exclusive protective friendship " of Italy. 
 
 4 Reinsch, Colonial Government, chap. viii. 
 
 6 Macdonell, " International Law and Subject Races," in Spiller, Interracial 
 Problems, pp. 398-409. 
 
 6 Keltie, Partition of Africa; Reinsch, World Politics, Part II. 
 
 7 Westlake, International Law, Vol. I, pp. 1 19-140; Reinsch, Colonial Govern- 
 ment, chap. vii. 
 
 8 Coolidge, op. cit., chap, xvi ; Latane\ op. cit., chap, xv ; Proceedings of the 
 American Political Science Association, Vol. IV, pp. 28-48 ; Vol. VIII, pp. 1 52-172. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 339 
 
 of Asia Minor and of South America; 1 and of Russia to the 
 Balkan States 2 may be taken as examples. 
 
 512. Neutralized states. A state whose independence and terri- 
 torial integrity are guaranteed and which is forbidden, by the joint 
 action of other states, to engage in offensive war is called a neu- 
 tralized state? In return it is usually guaranteed immunity from 
 attack. In all other respects save the waging of aggressive warfare 
 or the negotiating of treaties that might lead to hostilities, the neu- 
 tralized state is fully sovereign and independent. The purpose of 
 neutralization has been to maintain the balance of power and the 
 peace of Europe by setting apart as buffer areas small states so 
 situated geographically that they are a temptation to aggression 
 on the part of their rival neighbors, 4 or that they are in danger of 
 having their neutrality disregarded by the opposing belligerents in 
 case of war. Whether permanently neutralized states remain fully 
 qualified members of the community of states is a much-disputed 
 point. 5 Malta was declared neutral by France and England in the 
 Treaty of Amiens in 1 802, but that treaty never went into effect. 
 The neutrality of the city of Cracow was guaranteed by Austria, 
 Prussia, and Russia in 1815, but that city was annexed by Austria 
 in 1846. The Congo Free State was partially neutralized in 1885, 
 but was annexed in 1908 by the also neutralized state of Belgium. 
 The existing neutralized states are Switzerland, since 1815 ; Bel- 
 gium, since 1831 ; Luxemburg, since 1867; and probably Norway, 
 since 1907. 6 
 
 513. Relativity of external sovereignty. This analysis of the 
 effects of international relations upon the separate existence and 
 independence of states shows that external sovereignty cannot be 
 understood in an absolute or unrestricted sense. 7 In actual practice 
 
 1 Reinsch, World Politics, pp. 273-286; Coolidge, op. cit., pp. 205-212; 
 Colquhoun, Greater America, pp. 399-409. 
 
 2 Duggan, " The Balkan Problem," in Political Science Quarterly, March, 1913, 
 pp. 95-122. 
 
 8 Nys, Etudes de droit international public et de droit politique, Vol. II, 
 pp. 47-163. 4 Semple, Influences of Geographic Environment, p. 130. 
 
 6 Tswettcoff, De la situation juridique des etats neutralises. 
 
 6 Wicker, Neutralization; Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 163-164. 
 
 7 Crane, " The State in Constitutional and International Law," chaps, iv, vi, in 
 Johns Hopkins University Studies, Series XXV, Nos. 6-7. 
 
340 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 it is very much limited and wholly relative. Although states must 
 possess a certain degree of autonomy and independence in order 
 to possess an international status, the interdependence and inter- 
 national solidarity of modern states must also be considered. On 
 its external side sovereignty may be formally limited by the rules, 
 principles, and customs of international law, by treaty agreements, 
 by certain delegations of sovereignty and international servitudes, 1 
 and by relations of suzerainty and vassalage or protection and 
 dependence that are supposed not to be in derogation of sover- 
 eignty. 2 If, however, a state " parts with its rights of negotiation 
 and treaty, and loses its essential attributes of independence, it can 
 no longer be regarded as a sovereign state, or as a member of the 
 great family of nations." 3 The determination of the exact point at 
 which a degree of independence has been secured sufficient to 
 form a state, or a degree of independence has been lost sufficient 
 to destroy a state, is one of the most difficult problems in both 
 theoretical and practical politics. 
 
 III. Conclusions 
 
 514. Interrelation among all phases of international dealings. 
 
 The preceding brief summary of the development of international 
 relations, especially along the major lines of commerce, warfare, 
 and diplomacy, brings out the complexity and contradictions of the 
 process and at the same time suggests several lines of continuous 
 and progressive evolution. Each element of interstate dealings, 
 taken singly, has, under varying conditions, led to widely divergent 
 results. The establishment of commercial relations among states 
 has, for example, been a powerful influence toward peace and a 
 frequent cause of war. Commercial intercourse leads to the invest- 
 ment of capital in developing resources or building up trans- 
 portation, regardless often of political boundaries, and creates a 
 community of interests among states that not only opposes the 
 destruction that accompanies war but removes many of the causes 
 that lead to war. On the other hand, rivalries for markets or for 
 
 1 Oppenheim, International Law, Vol. I, sections 203-208. 
 
 2 Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, pp. 99-101. 
 8 Halleck, International Law, Vol. I, p. 69. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 341 
 
 sources of food supply and of raw material have always been prime 
 causes of strife. 1 Commercial relations may lead to political inte- 
 gration, as, for example, the Prussian Zollverein paved the way 
 for the German Empire ; 2 on the contrary, divergent commercial 
 interests between different parts of a state may lead to rebellion or 
 even independence, as in the establishment of the United Nether- 
 lands and of the United States. The commercial relations of states 
 that are complementary or noncompeting may establish strong inter- 
 national friendships, as in the case of England and Portugal during 
 the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries ; while conflicting commer- 
 cial interests between states whose needs are similar may cause in- 
 ternational hostility, as in the case of England and Germany at the 
 present day. 
 
 515. Relativity of commercial policies. Bounties, subsidies, free 
 trade, reciprocity, and tariff barriers represent various attitudes of 
 states toward trade, depending upon conditions within the states 
 concerned. The theories that underlie the commercial policies of 
 a given state at a given time are usually based upon practical con- 
 siderations of national policy. Thus, free trade is the natural policy 
 for the state with most advanced economic and industrial condi- 
 tions. Such a state, able to undersell its competitors, desires free 
 access to all markets. It also wishes to purchase raw materials and 
 food for its laborers from the cheapest and best available sources 
 of supply. England was in this position a century ago, after her 
 Industrial Revolution. 3 A state with poor resources or with unde- 
 veloped industries needs protection against rivals with whom it can- 
 not compete. This was the position a century ago of the United 
 States. 4 At present, England feels the competition of Germany 
 and the United States, and seriously considers the advisability of a 
 protective tariff; the United States at present approaches the 
 position of England in the nineteenth century, and logically expects, 
 to benefit by a material reduction in her tariff. As long as the world 
 is composed of separate and independent states, each interested in 
 
 1 Reinsch, Colonial Government, pp. 57-94. 
 
 2 Henderson, Short History of Germany, Vol. II, p. 340. 
 8 Seager, Introduction to Economics, pp. 12-19. 
 
 4 Bogart, Economic History of the United States, chap. xi. 
 
342 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 its own economic and commercial advantage, protection and free 
 trade will be relative terms, depending upon the conditions obtain- 
 ing within each state and in the community of states, and having 
 important political as well as economic bearings. 1 
 
 516. Various results of warfare. Warfare also produces con- 
 tradictory results in interstate relations. By the very nature of war- 
 like operations, commercial dealings are interfered with or prevented 
 during the continuance of hostilities, even the foreign trade of non- 
 combatants coming under a special status of neutrality when a war 
 of importance is being waged. A war, therefore, often acts like a 
 high tariff in stimulating internal industry and tends to make states 
 self-supporting. Thus the Napoleonic wars caused Jefferson's 
 Embargo, and the War of 1812 stimulated manufacturing in the 
 United States. 2 On the other hand, when the war is over, espe- 
 cially if territory has been transferred, population and commerce 
 tend to flow into the conquered region. The merchant treads close 
 upon the heels of the conqueror, and commerce very often " follows 
 the flag." Wars may combine states into larger units, either by 
 subordinating the conquered to the conqueror, as in the formation 
 of the empires of Rome and Great Britain, or by creating a spirit 
 of unity among states fighting against a common foe, as in the 
 case of Switzerland, the American colonies, and to a degree the 
 German Empire. In the former case, the compulsory union will 
 usually create a centralized, unitary state ; in the latter case, vol- 
 untary union may result in federation, the former states retaining 
 large powers of self-government in the new union. Wars may 
 divide states or shatter them into fragments, as in the breaking 
 up of the great world empires or in the establishment of former 
 colonies as independent states. 
 
 517. General international tendencies. Side by side with these 
 paradoxes in the evolution of interstate relations, several broad and 
 fairly consistent tendencies may be traced. International intercourse 
 has gradually been extended over more and more of the earth's 
 surface until to-day only the remote corners are of no value in 
 commerce, have escaped the grasp of the conqueror, and are 
 
 1 Seligman, Principles of Economics, pp. 513-516. 
 
 2 Coman, Industrial History of the United States, chap. vi. 
 
RELATIONS AMONG STATES 343 
 
 outside the influence of international law. While the political units 
 or states included within this expanding field have sometimes been 
 large and sometimes small, sometimes few and sometimes many, at 
 least a constantly increasing number of individuals and an expanding 
 area of territory have been brought under orderly governmental 
 regulation and into relations of some sort, peaceful or hostile, with 
 their neighbors. This process shows in general a tendency to sub- 
 ordinate war and to develop peaceful commercial and diplomatic 
 relations. A body of rules, more extensive, more definite, and 
 more universally observed, has gradually arisen to regulate inter- 
 state dealings ; and the legal organization of world law and of 
 world administration has, especially in recent years, made remark- 
 able progress. 
 
 518. Irregular nature of process. However, this process has not 
 been uniformly progressive. The organization of peace, accom- 
 plished after centuries of effort, has been overthrown by the need 
 of applying it to less advanced peoples, by the rise of new condi- 
 tions or the decadence of old institutions. Thus the pax Romana 
 was followed by the constant warfare of feudalism after the bar- 
 barian invasions ; the rise of the Mohammedan religion and the 
 establishment of the Mohammedan Empire led to a long series of 
 religious wars, as did the Protestant Reformation later ; and the 
 formation of national states was accompanied by renewed wars 
 on a larger international scale. Similarly, the growth of commerce 
 has been checked by warfare, by destruction of the means of ex- 
 change or communication, by danger from robbers or pirates, or by 
 decline in the standards of living. Thus the barbarian invasions 
 destroyed much of the trade of the Roman world and led to the 
 isolated, self-supporting, rural life of the medieval manor. 1 Simi- 
 larly, the Turks, by closing the medieval trade routes to the Orient, 
 compelled trade to seek new channels, shifted the centers of com- 
 merce, and caused the decline of formerly prosperous communities. 
 
 519. Conclusion. The evolution of interstate relations, as is the 
 case with all social evolution, has followed an involved and intri- 
 cate channel ; and as soon as its problems are apparently solved, 
 a number of new conditions, caused in part by the supposed 
 
 1 Cheyney, Industrial and Social History of England, chap. ii. 
 
344 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 solutions, arise, demanding new adjustments and new compromises. 
 The foreign relations of states create changes in the internal affairs 
 of the states, and these in turn react upon foreign policy. 1 For ex- 
 ample, the increasing power of the national government and of the 
 national executive in the United States is partly a result of the 
 growing importance of the United States in foreign affairs, and 
 in turn strengthens its position in world politics by giving it a 
 more effective machinery for carrying on international relations. 2 
 The problems of the composition of the state, of its internal gov- 
 ernmental organization, and of its proper functions are inextri- 
 cably mingled with the problems of interstate relations ; and 
 changes taking place in each unavoidably create new difficulties 
 in all the others. 
 
 1 Morris, " Some Effects of Outlying Dependencies upon the People of the 
 United States," in Proceedings of the American Political Science Association, 
 Vol. Ill, pp. 194-209. 
 
 2 Reinsch, World Politics, pp. 327-355. 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 
 
 520. Nature of problem. In final analysis, all problems concern- 
 ing the proper organization and functions of the state are depend- 
 ent upon the answer to the question : What is the proper end or 
 purpose of the state ? It would seem that rulers and statesmen, in 
 determining upon lines of policy or action, should have in mind a 
 clear conception of the reasons for which the state exists ; other- 
 wise their purposes will show inconsistencies and often defeat them- 
 selves. The history of political evolution shows, however, that men 
 engaged in practical government seldom set before themselves clear 
 ideas of the ultimate purposes of the state, their actions necessarily 
 being more or less opportunistic, or else aiming at certain definite 
 results, to the achievement of which the authority of the state is 
 applicable. The aims of the state are essentially relative. " What 
 the state should aim at now is likely to be quite different from what 
 it either did or could aim at in ancient Rome, or Sparta, or Persia, 
 or India." 1 Moreover, considerable disagreement exists even among 
 political philosophers who have deliberately set themselves to an 
 examination of the proper sphere of the state. Accordingly, the 
 following chapter will be devoted, first, to a brief statement of some 
 of the more important theories that have been propounded con- 
 cerning the ends of the state. Then, an analysis will be attempted 
 of the theory that meets with most general acceptance at present, 
 for the purpose of showing its connection with the fundamental 
 relations of the state, of pointing out some of the complexities in- 
 volved in any statement of state functions, and of emphasizing the 
 essential contradictions and the need for compromise in dealing 
 with this problem as with most problems of political development. 
 
 1 Seeley, Introduction to Political Science, p. 39. 
 345 
 
346 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 I. Theories as to the Ends of the State 
 
 521. Theory of state purpose in ancient world. In the ancient 
 world, when political speculation was just beginning, the state was 
 generally considered as an end in itself, rather than as a means to 
 the realization of an end. The idea of individual interests as dis- 
 tinct from the general interests of society did not exist. In the 
 Oriental empires and among the Hebrews the individual was com- 
 pletely subordinated to the control of the state, even the minutest 
 details of daily life being regulated by the customs or laws enforced 
 by the idea of divine sanction as well as by public authority. Tra- 
 dition and usage reigned supreme, demanding unthinking submis- 
 sion to fixed customs in every particular of life, social, political, and 
 religious. Under such a regime no discussion of the proper sphere 
 of the state was possible and no system of individual rights ever 
 made its appearance. The individual existed for the state, not the 
 state for the individual. 1 
 
 522. Theory of state purpose among the Greeks. The Greeks 
 also considered the state an end in itself, and its interests superior 
 to those of its individuals. 2 Because of their belief that their gods 
 represented principles of right and reason, and. that law was de- 
 rived from abstract conceptions of order and justice existing in 
 nature, the Oriental feeling of subjection to an external power or 
 to a mysterious fate was replaced by possibilities of individual free- 
 dom. Such individual freedom, however, was regarded only as a 
 part of national freedom, and received no protection if it opposed 
 the welfare of the state. The state, being necessary for man's high- 
 est welfare, was regarded as the product of nature ; man was, by 
 nature, a political animal. " The state was not conceived of as 
 having an existence outside of, or independent of, the lives of the 
 citizens, much less as ever having interests contrary to theirs. 
 Rather, it was regarded as a living social whole, in whose life each 
 individual participated, and in and through whose glories and per- 
 fections he was able to employ his faculties, to develop his inher- 
 ent powers, and to satisfy his highest spiritual desires. ... As 
 
 1 Willoughby, Political Theories of the Ancient World, chap. ii. 
 
 2 Dunning, Political Theories : Ancient and Medieval, chaps, i-iii. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 347 
 
 thus conceived, a political existence, as the highest possible form 
 of human life, came to have in the eyes of the Greeks an absolute 
 value. Instead of being viewed as a mechanism, the state was re- 
 garded as a living organic whole. To it was ascribed, in effect if 
 not in theory, an existence and interests of its own. It became 
 indeed in their thought a sort of universal person absorbing in its 
 life all individual personalities. Thus to them it appeared in many 
 ways to have a higher and more perfect individuality and person- 
 ality than did its citizens, for from its personality and from its life 
 the citizen was supposed to derive all that was valuable to him as 
 a man." 1 
 
 523. Theory of state purpose among the Romans. Beginning 
 with the Romans, a distinction was made between the rights of the 
 individual and of the state. The Romans gradually built up their 
 system of private law on the principle that each individual possessed 
 a number of legal rights, that these rights made up his legal per- 
 sonality, and that it was the duty of the state to define and protect 
 these rights. The basis was thus laid for a conception of civic 
 freedom and equality. The individual and the state were sepa- 
 rated, and while the interests of the state were first considered, 
 and the citizen expected to make every sacrifice for the public wel- 
 fare, yet the state did not swallow up the whole life of the indi- 
 vidual, its actual interference in private affairs leaving to the citizen 
 a considerable sphere of freedom. 2 
 
 524. Rise of modern theory of state purpose. With the growth 
 of individualism in medieval and modern times, due largely to the 
 influence of Christianity and the institutions of the Teutons, the 
 theory that the state is an end in itself gradually disappeared. 8 In 
 fact, the theorists of the latter eighteenth and early nineteenth 
 centuries went to the other extreme and argued that government 
 and law are necessary evils and that the proper purpose of the 
 state is merely to protect the natural liberty of its individuals. 4 
 The keeping of order, the protecting of property, and the enforc- 
 ing of contracts were considered the only proper aims for the state. 
 
 1 Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 55-56. , 
 
 2 Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 215-218 ; Dunning,- op. cit., chap. iv. 
 8 Wilson, The State, pp. 583-586. 
 
 * Mill, On Liberty ; Spencer, The Man versus the State. 
 
348 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Some writers, however, among whom Bluntschli may be mentioned, 
 still hold that the state is both an end and a means. " On the one 
 hand it is a means for the advantage of the individuals who com- 
 pose it. From another point of view it has an end in itself, and 
 for its sake the individuals are subordinate and bound to serve it. 
 The one-sided view of the ancients, which overlooked the individ- 
 ual in the nation, seriously endangered his liberty and his welfare, 
 and led up directly to the conception of the omnipotence, which 
 easily degenerated into the tyranny, of the state. The equally one- 
 sided view of the modern, which is unable to see the wood for the 
 trees, fails to recognize the majesty of the state, and thus tends to 
 dissolve it into a confused mob of individuals and to encourage 
 anarchy." x While the state, if considered as an institution distinct 
 and apart from the citizens that compose it, and as having no re- 
 lations with them except as members of the body politic, may be 
 considered an end in itself, 2 modern political thought views the 
 state rather as an institution or means through which the ends of 
 individuals in association may be realized, acknowledging also that 
 government and law do not merely exercise negative authority over 
 individuals, but that they render essential and important services 
 for them. 3 
 
 525. Statement of modern theory. The modern theory, in its 
 more general aspects of the ends for which society exists, is stated 
 by Giddings as follows : " The immediate results of efficient social 
 organization are certain general conditions of well-being, in which 
 all members of the community share, or may share if they like, 
 and which, though external to the individual personality, are yet 
 necessary to its perfection and happiness. They include the secur- 
 ity of life and of possessions, which is maintained by the political 
 system ; the liberty and the justice, which are maintained by the 
 legal system ; the economic opportunity and material well-being, 
 which are created and maintained by the economic system ; cultural 
 opportunity, knowledge, and fearlessness, created and maintained 
 by the cultural system. . . . Life itself is the ultimate social end, 
 
 1 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, p. 307. 
 
 2 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 316-318. 
 
 8 Garner, Introduction to Political Science, pp. 311-312, 320-329. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 349 
 
 but not life irrespective of form or quality. It is life in its higher 
 developments, especially its moral and intellectual developments, 
 that society creates and perfects. . . . This social personality — 
 the moral, intellectual, and social man, the highest product of evo- 
 lution — is the ultimate end of social organization." 1 
 
 526. Broad generalizations in modern theory. Numerous recent 
 writers have attempted formulations of the ends of the state, in 
 some cases in statements so broad and general that, while no great 
 fault can be found with them, they throw little light on the real 
 reasons for state existence. Of such nature are the statements that 
 the purpose of the state is to maintain " justice " or promote " gen- 
 eral welfare," to make possible "the realization of the best life by 
 the individual," 2 or to secure " the good of mankind." 8 Distinction 
 is made sometimes between the ends of the state in general and 
 those of a particular state, the former being " the highest con- 
 ceivable purposes that may be subserved by the state's existence " ; 
 the latter being " the aims of a given state that are practicably 
 attainable under given objective conditions." 4 Other writers dis- 
 tinguish between the ideal and the real ends of the state, and most 
 political philosophers separate the ultimate ends of the state from 
 those that are immediate or proximate. 5 
 
 527. General similarity in modern theories. The following 
 statements, showing essential similarity, may be taken as fairly 
 representative of the best modern thinking. Holtzendorff con- 
 sidered the real ends of the state to be : first, the development of 
 the national power ; second, the maintenance of individual liberty ; 
 and, third, the promotion of the social progress and civilization of 
 the people. 6 Bluntschli considered the direct end of the state to 
 consist in the development of the national capacities and the 
 perfecting of the national life. The indirect ends consisted in the 
 maintenance of individual freedom and security. 7 Burgess classi- 
 fies the ends of the state as primary, secondary, and ultimate, and 
 
 1 Giddings, Descriptive and Historical Sociology, pp. 522-523. 
 
 2 Ritchie, Principles of State Interference, p. 102. 
 
 8 Locke, Two Treatises of Government, section 229. 
 
 4 Willoughby, op. cit., p. 309. 6 Garner, op. cit., p. 313, note. 
 
 6 Principien der Politik, chaps, vii-viii. 
 
 7 Theory of the State, Bk. V, chap. iv. 
 
3 SO PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 states their historical order as : " first, the organization of govern- 
 ment and liberty, so as to give the highest possible power to the 
 government consistent with the highest possible freedom in 
 the individual ; to the end, secondly, that the national genius of the 
 different states may be developed and perfected and made objective 
 in customs, laws, and institutions ; from the standpoints furnished 
 by which, finally, the world's civilization may be surveyed upon all 
 sides, mapped out, traversed, made known and realized." 1 Villey, a 
 recent French writer, says : " The end of the state is first of all 
 the maintenance of the national independence from without and the 
 social order within ; then the development and perfection of the 
 national life, in a word, progress." 2 Willoughby makes the follow- 
 ing analysis of governmental functions, as regards their aims : 
 " first, those concerned with the power of the state, . . . namely, 
 those that concern the maintenance of order and the preservation 
 of the state's political autonomy in the family of nations. . . . 
 The second aim of the state is, or should be, that of creating and 
 maintaining the widest possible degree of liberty. . . . Thirdly, 
 and finally, there are those functions of the state that, apart from 
 any considerations of power or maintenance of individual liberty, 
 tend by their exercise to promote the general welfare, either eco- 
 nomically, intellectually, or morally." 3 Lilly, speaking specifically 
 of the modern state, says : " Obviously, the first function of the state 
 is to maintain, in a condition of the utmost efficiency, such fleets 
 and armies, and other preparations for war, as its security against 
 rival states demands. . . . Equally obvious is its function to main- 
 tain its internal tranquillity by its magistrates and police. . . . 
 Again, the right of the state, as we have seen, is not merely to 
 existence, but to a complete existence, noble and worthy existence, 
 an existence in accordance with the dignity of human nature. 
 Hence, among its functions must be reckoned the promotion of 
 civilization." 4 Garner, in his recent book, adds the following : 
 "The original, primary, and immediate end of the state is the 
 
 1 Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, p. 89. 
 
 2 Le R61e de l'etat dans l'ordre economique, p. 18. 
 " Nature of the State, pp. 344-345. 
 
 4 First Principles of Politics, pp. 54-55. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 351 
 
 maintenance of peace, order, security, and justice among the indi- 
 viduals who compose it. . . . Secondly, the state must look be- 
 yond the needs of the individual as such to the larger collective 
 needs of society — the welfare of the group. . . . Finally, the pro- 
 motion of the civilization of mankind at large may be considered 
 the ultimate and highest end of the state." * 
 
 528. Elements in the problem. The preceding statements ex- 
 hibit essential agreement in pointing out the fact that the interests 
 of individuals, of the state as a unit, and of the civilization of the 
 world as a whole must be considered. They also agree in the 
 proposition that general welfare is the final aim of the state. 
 Burgess, in addition, points out the historical order in which these 
 ends have been and must be sought, and the fact that each end 
 becomes, in turn, a means for the accomplishment of the succeed- 
 ing end. 2 On the other hand, little effort has been made to show 
 the relations of these ends, one to another, or to point out the diffi- 
 culties involved in keeping all of them in view or of properly 
 subordinating the- lesser to the greater. Emphasis on any one — 
 on the welfare of individual, state, or world in general — places 
 considerable strain upon the others, and at any advanced stage of 
 political evolution, more or less adjustment and compromise among 
 them is demanded. Further analysis of these aims is therefore 
 needed. All questions concerning the proper end or purpose of 
 the state must center around the fundamental political relations, — 
 those of state to individual, and of state to state, — in other words, 
 around the internal and external phases of state existence and 
 activity. There are, therefore, three units to be considered : the 
 individual, the state, and the collection of states that comprises 
 the world as a whole. The welfare of each of these units must be 
 kept in mind, and their interests may not always be identical. 
 The authority to determine the relative importance of these in- 
 terests lies, not in the individual or in the combination of states, 
 but in each state separately. This authority is, of course, largely 
 influenced by the demands of the individuals included in the state, 
 and by the pressure of international conditions and relations. 
 
 1 Introduction to Political Science, pp. 316-317. 
 
 2 Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, Bk. II, chap. iv. 
 
352 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 529. General tendencies. In general, states have, up to the 
 present time, subordinated the welfare of the world at large to that 
 of their citizens and to the needs of their own existence. National 
 rivalries have: been stronger than international unity. Within the 
 state there has been considerable difference of opinion as to the 
 relative importance of the individual and of the state, sometimes 
 resulting in a paternal despotism or a socialistic commune, when 
 the welfare of the state has been chiefly emphasized ; sometimes 
 resulting in an unregulated individualism, tending toward anarchy, 
 when the individual man, rather than the social group, has been 
 given first place. Obviously, in the majority of cases, the interests 
 of individual, state, and civilization in general are closely interre- 
 lated. What promotes the welfare of the average man will ordinarily 
 be for the advantage of his state, and of the community of states. 
 However, this is not always the case ; and the relative weight given 
 to these various interests determines largely the attitude and policy 
 of each state as to its proper sphere of action. 
 
 II. The Interests of Individual, State, and Civilization 
 
 530. Relations among individuals. Before the state in the 
 proper political sense of the term could be said to exist, the rela- 
 tion of individuals, one to another, and of all to the common 
 authority, had to be determined. This, then, was the primary 
 purpose of the state, and it still remains its chief function. 1 The 
 adjustment of sovereignty to liberty, the maintenance of order and 
 security, the establishment of a government and of a sphere of 
 individual freedom, — these first demanded attention, and their 
 chief object was to reconcile the conflicting interests of individuals, 
 to make possible a peaceful and organized social existence, and to 
 secure safety from external danger. Such a process was, indeed, 
 one of the first steps out of barbarism, and it was in the beginning 
 unconscious and undirected. 
 
 531. Need for authority and discipline in early states. To ac- 
 complish this purpose, chief emphasis was laid on authority and 
 obedience. The quantity of government was more important than 
 
 1 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 86-87. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 353 
 
 its quality. 1 The sanction of custom and religion was added to 
 physical force and to such public opinion as then existed. Primitive 
 man had first to acquire discipline and subordination ; the whole 
 power of the state was exercised by the government ; and individual 
 freedom was impossible, because unsafe. Despotic government, 
 in compelling men to obedient and concerted action ; war, in com- 
 pressing men into nations ; and slavery, in overcoming the indo- 
 lence, inertia, and lack of application inherent among primitive 
 natures, played a useful and perhaps essential part in the develop- 
 ment of civilization. 2 In those times, when mankind was unaccus- 
 tomed to order and obedience, and when the relations among 
 communities were those of unregulated warfare, political and civil 
 rights were overshadowed by the necessity of strengthening the 
 power of the state against its unruly members and against its ex- 
 ternal foes, Hence the theory naturally arose that considered the 
 state to be an end in itself. No part of the life of the individual 
 was free from its interference or authority ; every detail of his 
 conduct was minutely regulated, and no conception of individual 
 interests, except as they contributed to general interests, was possi- 
 ble. Such was the theory of the state that prevailed among the 
 ancient Hebrews, Greeks, and Romans, and, to a greater or less de- 
 gree, it has accompanied the rise of political life wherever found. 3 
 532. Beginnings of individual liberty. This condition, however, 
 if permanent, leads to stagnation. 4 After its end has been accom- 
 plished, that is, after the disposition to obey law and observe order 
 has been established, it must be modified before further progress 
 can take place. A certain sphere of free action must then be 
 allowed to the individual. When men are able to live and work 
 together in a well-developed social organization, the earlier com- 
 pressive legal forces become colossal evils and must be removed if 
 stagnation is to be avoided. The state must mark out a field, nar- 
 row at first, but widening as political intelligence grows, within 
 which it guarantees the individual against interference at the hands 
 not only of other individuals but also of the government. Within 
 
 1 Bagehot, Physics and Politics, pp. 25-30. 
 
 2 Parsons, Legal Doctrine and Social Progress, pp. 98-102. 
 
 8 Esmein, Droit constitutionnel, p. 377. 4 Bagehot, op. cit., chap. vi. 
 
354 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 this field individuals or nonpolitical associations of individuals are 
 to be unmolested, though they may be aided, by the state. This 
 process includes also such perfection of the governmental machin- 
 ery that a considerable proportion of the state's population may 
 share in the exercise of political power, and such a direction of the 
 activities of the state that its- citizens may become progressively 
 more capable of exercising this freedom. 1 
 
 533. Adjustment of authority and liberty. The creation, then, 
 of the respective spheres of authority and liberty, their adjustment 
 from time to time, as conditions change, the organization of gov- 
 ernment to create and administer the will of the state within the 
 field of authority, the determination of the political privileges and 
 the civil rights of its citizens, — these form the primary ends of 
 the state and must be accomplished in order that there may be a 
 state, in order that men may live peaceful and orderly and safe lives 
 in organized association. It is often good policy for the state, not 
 only to protect the liberty of its citizens, but to aid them in work 
 that they could not otherwise accomplish, or to authorize the gov- 
 ernment itself to undertake such enterprises. As states pass from 
 barbarism to civilization, their duty becomes broader than that of 
 merely safeguarding life and liberty, and includes the develop- 
 ment of the wealth and well-being, morality, and intelligence of 
 their members. 2 To establish a reign of law and of justice, and to 
 secure real liberty, requires more than mere negative regulation. 
 It often involves active and varied intervention by the state in the 
 social and economic affairs of its people, especially for the pur- 
 poses of removing the surviving traces of injustice and inequality 
 that were necessary accompaniments of state origin. 3 
 
 534. Development of the state as a unit. When this primary 
 purpose of the state is in a fair way toward realization, a secondary 
 end becomes important. During the process of establishing gov- 
 ernment and liberty, of maintaining order and justice, the state 
 becomes conscious of its own existence. It realizes its own unity 
 
 1 Willoughby, Nature of the "State, p. 345. 
 
 * Leroy-Beaulieu, The Modern State, chap. v. 
 
 8 Burgess, Political Science and Constitutional Law, Vol. I, pp. 87-88; Laveleye, 
 Gouvernement dans la democratic, Vol. I, p. 19 ; Kelly, Government or Human 
 Evolution: Justice, Bk. Ill, chap. iii. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 355 
 
 and sets to work to perpetuate and strengthen its own life. This 
 necessitates certain activities both within the state and without. 
 The state must perfect its internal unity and must safeguard its 
 external independence; To this end efforts will be made to secure 
 definite and natural territorial frontiers, to surround the state on 
 all sides with natural barriers, — mountains or the sea, ■ — and to 
 strengthen its exposed frontiers, if it is unable to conquer the ad- 
 jacent territory, by fortifications and garrisons, or by treaty agree- 
 ments with its neighbors. Efforts will also be made to perfect the 
 ethnic homogeneity of its people. Aliens will be excluded from 
 political privileges, regulations will be set up against promiscuous 
 immigration, and efforts will be made to secure uniformity of race, 
 language, and religion, to develop a feeling of national solidarity. 
 Other states will be watched with a jealous eye lest they grow too 
 wealthy or too powerful. Tariff barriers will be established, and 
 balance-of -power theories will arise. 
 
 535. Perfection of national genius. The secondary aim of the 
 state becomes, therefore, by this process, the perfection of its own 
 national life. 1 Instead of acting only as an arbiter to maintain 
 peace and security, the state takes a more active part in promoting 
 the common welfare. No rights of the individual are allowed to 
 stand in the way of this purpose. The needs of the state may de- 
 mand the sacrifice of the citizen. If the existence of the state is 
 threatened, the lives of all its members are at its disposal and may 
 be freely spent in war. In times of national crises the spirit of self- 
 sacrifice that leads men voluntarily to undertake heavy burdens or 
 to risk their lives can only be explained on the assumption that 
 men place the safety and welfare of their state ahead of their own, 
 and that the collective life of the nation has a higher value than 
 the lives of many individuals. 2 The state, through taxation, may 
 deprive the individual of his property, to be used as public pur- 
 poses may demand. Very often the state, for its own preservation 
 or for the sake of future generations, makes heavy demands upon 
 its present members. 3 
 
 1 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 57-76. 
 
 2 Bluntschli, Theory of the State, p. 308. 
 
 8 For example, heavy taxation caused by war or by extensive and permanent 
 internal improvements. 
 
356 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 536. Expansion of state activities. Again, the needs of public 
 welfare may call for extraordinary aid from the state. Whatever 
 cannot be done efficiently or economically by private individuals or 
 associations, or whatever affects the public welfare, may be regu- 
 lated or managed by the state. Tariffs and subsidies may build up 
 one interest or section and destroy another. " In the German states, 
 where most railroads are owned and managed by the government, 
 rates and fares have been fixed with a view ... to protecting 
 German industries against foreign competition, to aid in the ex- 
 portation of- German productions, to strengthen the efficiency of 
 the military forces of the state, and to further numerous philan- 
 thropic and educational aims." * Evidently the purpose aimed at 
 in this process is the establishment of well-organized, powerful 
 states, each determining the relation of sovereignty to liberty in its 
 own organization from the standpoint of both individual and state 
 needs, and each determining its relation to other states from the 
 standpoint chiefly of its own safety and aggrandizement. The re- 
 sultant national states are the most satisfactory political organiza- 
 tions that the world has yet seen, and the development of the 
 national capacities is, therefore, a legitimate end in state existence. 
 
 537. Rise of internationalism. However, this process leads to 
 a third, and what may be considered the final, purpose of the state, 
 — a process just beginning. The relations arising among states, 
 at first largely hostile in nature, lead in time to mutual understand- 
 ings and interests. An international public opinion develops, com- 
 mercial relations and means of .communication and intercourse 
 bind the whole civilized world into a unity. Intermarriage and 
 migration break down ethnic differences. Improved means of 
 transportation diminish the influence of natural barriers, religious 
 toleration arises, and imitation creates a civilization fairly uniform 
 over a large part of the earth. Under these conditions the interests 
 of the world as a whole loom large and receive consideration, even 
 when they conflict with the interests of its component political 
 units. Altruism, in addition to egotism, becomes a national as 
 well as an individual virtue. 2 " A well-organized state is the result 
 
 1 Johnson, American Railway Transportation, p. 292. 
 
 2 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, chap. xi. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 357 
 
 of the determination to protect the rights of person and property 
 by just laws. When this has been accomplished within the state, 
 it is easy for a community to fix its attention upon the solidarity of 
 its own interests, as against the rest of the world, and to overlook 
 the rights of other communities. This is merely a sign of imper- 
 fect development ; which, however, need not be permanent. But 
 at this stage of growth, nations usually pass through a period when 
 they think of themselves as entirely distinct entities, without bonds 
 of common interest and obligation uniting them with other nations ; 
 just as young children often centre their thoughts entirely upon 
 their own immediate desires, until their moral sense is awakened. 
 Savage tribes continue, under arrested development, permanently 
 to exist upon this lower level, living in a state of perpetual isolation 
 and instinctive hostility to one another ; but in the process of civili- 
 zation communities gradually extend their sense of social solidarity 
 beyond their borders, until it embraces others of like kind. . . . 
 We of course perceive, when we stop to think of it, that there is 
 the same reason for establishing perfect justice between different 
 nations as between different men of the same nation." 1 
 
 538. Increasing world unity. This attitude is as yet only im- 
 perfectly realized, but many indications point to its further ex- 
 tension. International understanding and sympathy, international 
 agreements, conferences, and organizations, and the expansion of 
 international law and adjudication illustrate this tendency. The 
 formation of colonial empires, composed of divergent and scattered 
 parts, is breaking down the geographic and ethnic unity upon which 
 the modern national states are based. The efforts of states to 
 educate and civilize inferior peoples and to aid worthy projects, 
 wherever found, show a feeling of responsibility and duty regard- 
 less of political boundaries ; and some things, for example, science, 
 literature, and art, scientific technique and industrial efficiency, are 
 little affected by the separation of mankind into distinct govern- 
 mental units. One of the most striking of the newer political 
 developments is the internationalism of capital. "In order that 
 natural forces may be utilized to their fullest extent, it is necessary 
 that technical management and power may be readily transferred 
 1 Hill,. World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 59-60. 
 
358 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 to any place where it is needed. Capital is controlled by the law 
 of the highest returns. It therefore instinctively and consciously 
 seeks to cooperate with the forces of nature ; its returns are most 
 ample where nature herself has created the proper conditions. 
 From this point of view, it is necessary that the entire earth should 
 be opened to industrial enterprise, that the capital and energy of 
 any nation should be free to engage in the development of natural 
 resources wherever found, and should be safe in undertaking such 
 development. The web and woof of financial power, human energy, 
 industrial enterprise, human labor, and natural resources are making 
 real that possibility of universal interdependence which the technical 
 advance of the world has promised for some time." 1 
 
 539. Ultimate aim of the state. The final aim of the state 
 would thus be the furthering of the civilization and progress of the 
 world ; 2 and the logical result in political organization would be a 
 world state or a world federation. In this process the present states 
 might, of course, sacrifice their own existence ; they would certainly 
 lose much of their external independence. Just as the perfection 
 of national life demands the subordination of the individual, so the 
 perfection of international life demands the subordination of the 
 state. Modern states have not yet reached the point where they 
 are willing to sacrifice their national independence and identity, and 
 considerable difference of opinion exists as to the relative advan- 
 tages and disadvantages that would result if it were accomplished. 
 Self-conscious national units, as nuclei of human force and ideals 
 developed by long historical struggles, are still valuable in protect- 
 ing and furthering human progress. Just as the relation of state 
 to individual gave rise to numerous difficulties, now fairly well ad- 
 justed, yet by no means finally or unanimously settled, so the 
 relation of state to state creates problems whose solution is far from 
 being in sight. The relative value of individual, state, and civiliza- 
 tion in general, and the proper adjustment of each to secure the 
 best net results, — these are the questions upon whose answer 
 depends the proper statement of the end and purpose of the state. 
 
 1 Reinsch, " Influence of Geographic, Economic, and Political Conditions," in 
 £piller, Interracial Problems, p. 54. 
 
 2 McKechnie, The State and the Individual, chap. iii. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 359 
 
 III. Conclusions 
 
 540. Summary. Judging by past historical development and by 
 present conditions and tendencies, the ends of the state may be 
 summarized as follows : 
 
 1 . The advancement of the welfare of the individual. This is 
 accomplished by the establishment of government and law, by the 
 creation of a domain of individual freedom, by the maintenance of 
 peace, order, and justice, and by state action for the purpose of 
 promoting economic, intellectual, and moral well-being. The total 
 authority to be exercised by government, with the correlative sphere 
 of individual liberty, and the proper share of the individual in 
 governing authority are the chief questions demanding adjustment. 
 
 2. The advancement of the welfare of the state, that is, of in- 
 dividuals in their collective national capacity. This involves the re- 
 lation both of the state to its citizens and of the state to other states, 
 and may at some points conflict with the first aim, — the welfare 
 of the individual. The end sought is the strength, stability, inde- 
 pendence, and progress of the state, considered as an organized unit. 
 
 3. The advancement of the welfare of civilization at large, that 
 is, of mankind in its broadest social capacity. This involves pur- 
 poses of a universal character and demands the proper adjustment 
 of the needs of society with the interests of separate states and 
 of single individuals, all of which may sometimes be divergent. 
 " There would seem, then, to be no objection to making the full 
 development of the national self the ultimate end of the state's 
 existence, provided that a true, full, and sufficiently noble con- 
 ception is formed of what that self includes. The truth must be 
 clearly grasped, that in its nature are included intimate relations 
 both to the other states and to its own individual subjects. The 
 national self is an organic member of the wider whole of humanity, 
 and is itself the smaller organism of which each citizen is part. In 
 this view, self-realization may be taken as comprising the whole duty 
 of a state, just as it is that of an individual. . . . The end of the 
 state is thus seen to be the present welfare and future perfection of 
 all the citizens considered as an integral portion of humanity." 1 
 
 1 McKechnie, op. cit, pp. 86, 88. 
 
360 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 541. Historical order of state ends. The end to which a state, 
 at any given time, should chiefly direct its efforts depends, of 
 course, upon the point that has been reached in its development. 
 No state is in a position to extend its national influences and 
 authority until it has set its own house in order and arranged sat- 
 isfactorily its own organization and its relations to its component 
 individuals. Neither can a state further the progress of civiliza- 
 tion beyond its own boundaries until it has developed its peculiar 
 national genius. These aims show a historical order as well as a 
 development of philosophical conception ; and the existence, side 
 by side, of states with various points of view as to their main pur- 
 poses, due to the stage of their political developments, further 
 complicates the already great difficulties in the way of a general 
 consensus of political purpose. 
 
 542. Interrelation among state ends. Moreover, these ends are 
 closely interrelated and very delicately balanced. Each succeeding 
 end is based upon the one that preceded it, which, when accom- 
 plished, becomes the means by which the following end is secured. 
 That is, the establishment of authority and of liberty serves as 
 the basis for the development of political unity and solidarity, and 
 this in turn lays the foundation for the progress of civilization in 
 general. At the same time, each succeeding purpose lays a strain 
 upon the preceding stage, which weakens or threatens to destroy 
 it. The exercise of authority by the state is by its very nature 
 a limitation upon the freedom of action of its members ; and 
 when the interests of the two conflict, the problem resolves itself 
 into the proper adjustment between them. The strengthening 
 of national solidarity and power threatens individual liberty, and 
 often results in a military or bureaucratic despotism. No state can 
 turn its attention to foreign affairs and play an important part in 
 world politics without withdrawing attention correspondingly from 
 internal affairs, with resultant dangers of political corruption or 
 unsolved domestic problems. 1 No state can shoulder the burden 
 of elevating an inferior people without placing this burden upon 
 its own citizens. 2 No state can promote the cause of civilization 
 without diminishing the intensity of its own patriotism and national 
 
 1 Reinsch, World Politics, pp. 347-356. 2 Reid, Problems of Expansion. 
 
THE PURPOSE OF THE STATE 361 
 
 spirit. Hence, consideration must be given, not only to the proper 
 means of attaining each of these ends, considered separately, but 
 also to the proper shifting of emphasis from one to the other, each 
 of which is valuable and necessary, and to the modifications that 
 must be made in each so that the others may, at the right time, 
 be brought into evidence. 
 
 543. Conclusion. The purpose of the modern state, accordingly, 
 includes a more or less composite aim at securing order and jus- 
 tice for its citizens, providing for its own continued and developing 
 existence, and promoting the progress of the world at large. The 
 proper adjustment among these and the proper means of securing 
 each of them open up important questions concerning state func- 
 tion. On this point modern theory ranges all the way from an 
 extreme individualism that views the state as a necessary evil, 
 whose activities must be limited to the narrowest scope, to an 
 extreme socialism that considers desirable the extension of state 
 function to include the whole field of human activity. 1 Between 
 these extremes are found all shades of opinion, much of this dis- 
 agreement resulting from a confusion as to what are the proper 
 ends or purposes of the state or, when these ends are more or less 
 clearly realized, as to their relative importance and the proper 
 order in which they should be attempted. As to the relations 
 among states, less difference of opinion exists. Among civilized 
 states, at least, the point has been reached where they can safely 
 subordinate much of their isolated self-interest to broader inter- 
 national relations and to the advancement of world progress as 
 a whole. 
 
 1 See above, Chapter IX. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 PRESENT POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 
 
 544. Leading tendencies in present political evolution. Two 
 
 phases of political evolution exhibit at present the most interesting 
 features and present the most difficult problems. The first, repre- 
 senting one side of the internal life of the state, is characterized 
 by the development of popular control of government. The growth 
 of democracy, the creation of devices of government that aim to 
 render public opinion more effective, to prevent its worst excesses, 
 and to secure efficient and vigorous administration ; and the exten- 
 sion of the functions of government, especially in the direction of 
 securing further economic equality, since religious, social, legal, 
 and political equality have in large measure been secured, — these 
 are the most obvious tendencies in the organization and functions of 
 authority within the state. The second, resulting from the external 
 relations among states, exhibits the contradictory tendencies of the 
 growth of internationalism and world unity on the one side and -the 
 intensification of national spirit and national rivalries on the other. 
 The same influences that widen popular control within the state tend 
 to expand the area of world politics, democracy and its extensive ac- 
 tivities being closely connected with both the growing interdepend- 
 ence of world civilization and the national solidarity of separate states. 
 
 I. Organization of Authority within the State 
 
 545. Popular control over legislation and administration. The 
 
 enactment of wise laws and their effective administration are the 
 proper functions of government. How far the organization and 
 activities of modern states give promise of properly performing 
 these functions may in some degree be determined by observing 
 certain present political tendencies. The most striking feature in 
 the recent internal development of states has been the extension 
 of popular control over government. 1 " Ever since the rise of 
 
 1 Brown, The New Democracy ; Ramsey, Socialism and Government. 
 
 362 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 363 
 
 popular education in the last century and its vast development 
 since have assured a thinking weight to the masses of the people 
 everywhere, the advance of democratic opinion and the spread of 
 democratic institutions have been most marked and most signifi- 
 cant." x By widening the suffrage, a share in political power has 
 been extended to a considerable proportion of the state's popula- 
 tion ; by popular control of parties, nominations, and elections, the 
 selection of governmental officials has been brought under demo- 
 cratic influence ; by weakening the power of lawmaking bodies that 
 are not popularly chosen, by popular control of representatives 
 already selected, and by direct popular legislation, the people share 
 more extensively in expressing the will of the state. In adminis- 
 tration, while popular control is being extended, especially in those 
 states retaining most traces of past monarchic and feudal organiza- 
 tion, efficiency, trained ability, and scientific methods are receiving 
 chief emphasis in the more democratic states. 2 
 
 546. Widening of the suffrage. The widening of the suffrage 
 is still taking place and will probably continue. Each step in demo- 
 cratic progress leads to a further one, the masses gaining strength 
 with each concession and increasing their demands accordingly. 
 The party in power is tempted to broaden the franchise for the 
 popular support thus secured, and when the suffrage is once 
 broadened its subsequent restriction seems almost impossible. In 
 political laboratories, such as Finland and Australasia, 3 practically 
 universal suffrage exists. In states possessing extensive manhood 
 suffrage, such as England 4 and the United States, 5 the woman- 
 suffrage movement is gaining strength. 6 In continental Europe, 
 
 1 Wilson, The State, p. 581. 
 
 2 On advantages and disadvantages of democracy, see Garner, Introduction to 
 Political Science, pp. 219-230, and authorities there cited. 
 
 8 Parsons, Story of New Zealand. 
 
 * Electoral reform looking to the abolition of the plural vote and the separate 
 representation of the universities, as well as to the simplification of registration 
 and of residence qualifications, is under serious consideration in England. About 
 525,000 men in England are entitled to more than one vote, some possessing the 
 necessary qualifications in fifteen or twenty constituencies. See King and Raffety, 
 Our Electoral System : the Demand for Reform. 
 
 5 For a discussion of the existing restrictions upon the suffrage in the United 
 States, see Dealey, " Trend of Recent Constitutional Changes," in Proceedings 
 of the American Political Science Association, Vol. VIII, pp. 56-60. 
 
 8 Mason, Story of the Woman's Suffrage Movement. 
 
364 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 efforts are being made to remove the surviving feudal restrictions 
 upon the electorate and to secure equal suffrage for all classes. 
 Electoral reform is a vital issue in Prussian politics, the govern- 
 ment thus far, in spite of popular demonstration and the efforts 
 of the radical parties, preventing direct and equal suffrage. 1 In 
 France, electoral reform has been the paramount issue in internal 
 politics since the separation of church and state in 1905. 2 In 
 Belgium, however, electoral reform has recently been secured, the 
 Socialists and Liberals, united in opposition to the plural vote, 
 securing the adoption of their principle of un homme, un vote? 
 
 547. Expanding powers of the electorate. The widening of the 
 electorate in numbers has been accompanied by a parallel extension 
 of its powers. Locke believed 4 that liberty could be maintained 
 only by reserving to the people the right of revolution against a 
 despotic government. Rousseau taught 8 that popular freedom could 
 be secured only by retaining sovereignty in the whole people and 
 by making the government its agent. At present Locke's right of 
 revolution is applied in the form of periodic elections by which the 
 people maintain or remove the government in power. In addition, 
 the people, through the expansion of direct popular legislation, are 
 adopting a form of the Rousseauan doctrine and are reducing the 
 government more and more to the position of an administrative 
 agent, subject to the direct control of the electorate. 
 
 548. Increasing governmental importance of political parties. 
 In those states in which popular government in its modern form 
 first developed, political parties arose as organizations through 
 which the electorate could express and carry out its policies and 
 could manage its nominations 6 and elections. 7 As the chief point 
 
 1 Ogg, Governments of Europe, pp. 260-263 i Matter, " La Reforme electorate 
 en Prusse," in Annates des sciences politiques, September, 1910. 
 
 2 Garner, " Electoral Reform in France," in American Political Science Re- 
 view, Vol. VII, No. 4, pp. 610-638. 
 
 8 Ogg, op. tit, pp. 539-548 ; Barthelemy, L'Organisation du suffrage et l'ex- 
 pe>ience beige. 4 Two Treatises of Government, Bk. II, chap. xix. 
 
 6 Social Contract, Bk. III. 
 
 6 Dallinger, Nominations for Elective Office, Parts I— II. 
 
 7 Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Party System, chaps, i-x ; Macy, Party 
 Organization and Machinery, pp.'ix-xvii, 15-24 ; Lowell, Government of England, 
 Vol. I, chap. xxiv. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 3^5 
 
 of contact between people and government, the parties exercised 
 large powers ; and in some cases, through machine organization 
 and boss rule, they practically nullified the democratic system which 
 they were intended to promote. 1 Popular control of political parties, 
 therefore, became essential to political democracy, and considerable 
 progress has recently been made in that direction. Political parties, 
 arising as voluntary associations of individuals, have come under 
 increasing legal regulation and are now a recognized part of the 
 governmental system in the more advanced states. 2 
 
 549. Popular control of nominations and elections. In order 
 that the people may control the choice of their elected officials and 
 representatives, popular nomination is demanded. By means of 
 laws controlling the party caucus and convention, and by direct 
 primaries, the people are enabled to select their own candidates. 3 
 By means of laws against corrupt practices, 4 compelling publicity of 
 party finances and preventing campaign contributions from office- 
 holders 5 and from corporations, the alliance between dishonest 
 business and corrupt politics is weakened. 6 In these ways the 
 political party is being democratized. By means of similar laws 
 controlling elections, securing a secret ballot, an honest vote, and 
 a fair count, elections also are being brought under popular control, 7 
 and the intimidation or bribery of voters is correspondingly reduced. 8 
 
 550. Antipopular tendencies in government. Absolutely demo- 
 cratic selection of representatives is still prevented by gerrymandered 
 electoral districts, 9 by indirect elections, and by nonrepresentation 
 of minorities, or in some cases even of majorities. 10 In many states, 
 
 1 Ostrogorski, op. cit., chaps, xi-xii ; Steffens, Struggle for Self Government ; 
 Dallinger, op. cit., Part III; Woodburn, Political Parties and Party Problems in 
 the United States, chaps, xiv, xvi-xvii. 
 
 2 Beard, American Government and Politics, pp. 672-705. 
 
 8 Merriam, Primary Elections ; Woodburn, op. cit., chap. xx. 
 * Lowrie, Corrupt Practices at Elections. 
 6 Woodburn, op. cit., chap, xviii. 
 
 6 Jones, Readings on Parties and Elections, pp. 302-319. 
 -' Jones, op. cit., pp. 212-225; Allen, "Ballot Laws and their Workings," in 
 Political Science Quarterly, Vol. XXI, No. 1. 
 
 8 Ostrogorski, op. cit., chaps, xiv-xvi ; Dallinger, op. cit., Part IV ; Woodburn, 
 op. cit., chap. xv. 
 
 9 Ogg, op. cit., pp. 223-224 ; Woodburn, op. cit., chap. xix. 
 10 Commons, Proportional Representation. 
 
366 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 especially in continental Europe, the selection of governmental offi- 
 cials is still largely outside popular control. Even in the United 
 States, because of the desire for efficient government, simplicity of 
 elections, and concentration of responsibility, a marked tendency in 
 opposition to the frequent election of large numbers of candidates 
 is indicated by the growing popularity of the short ballot move- 
 ment, 1 the commission form of government in cities, 2 and the civil 
 service reform, 3 with its principles of competitive examination, 
 appointment, and permanent tenure. 
 
 551. Popular control over governmental officials. The problem 
 of controlling candidates after election is more difficult. Represent- 
 atives act under compulsory instructions in few legislative bodies. 4 
 The generally accepted theory of modern representation is that 
 each delegate represents the people of the entire nation and should 
 exercise his own best judgment on the questions at issue. 5 Short 
 terms and frequent elections compel officials to consider the wishes 
 of their constituents if they desire reelection, but this method has 
 serious disadvantages. An intelligent public opinion and means 
 for its expression is often effective. A new solution is the recall. 6 
 This device, useful perhaps during a period of political transition 
 or as a potential threat against suspected representatives, is opposed 
 to present tendencies toward a permanent, trained administration, 
 and will scarcely be needed if present tendencies toward direct 
 legislation continue. 
 
 552. Conflicting tendencies. Movements in modern democracies 
 are often contradictory. While some influences are at work bring- 
 ing the political party under legal control and making it a useful 
 part of the democratic system, other influences tend to weaken the 
 
 1 Childs, Short Ballot Principles. 
 
 2 Bradford, Commission Government in American Cities; Woodruff (editor), 
 City Government by Commission. 
 
 8 Fish, Civil Service and the Patronage. 
 
 4 An exception is the German Bimdesrath, but its members represent the gov- 
 ernments of the commonwealths from which they are sent, not the people. Some 
 attempt has been made by state legislatures to instruct United States senators. 
 See Lieber, Political Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 324-362. 
 
 6 Mill, Representative Government, chaps, xii-xiii; Laveleye, Gouvernement 
 dans la democratie, Vol. II, Bk. VIII, chap. xiv. 
 
 6 Jones, Readings on Parties and Elections, pp. 351-354 ; Munro, Government 
 of American Cities, pp. 350-356, and authorities there cited. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 367 
 
 party and destroy its main functions. 1 Similarly, while the repre- 
 sentative system is being democratized and made more effective, 
 it is also being displaced by a direct democracy in which the people 
 themselves propose and enact legislation. 
 
 553. Initiative and referendum : advantages. Direct popular 
 legislation is made possible by the devices of the referendum, which 
 enables the people to veto undesired legislation, and of the initia- 
 tive, which enables the people to enact desired legislation. 2 These 
 give a final appeal from the people's representatives to the people 
 themselves and, in comparison with representative government, 
 have certain advantages and disadvantages. 3 They enable the 
 people to vote for measures as well as for men, and to vote sep- 
 arately on a large number of issues, instead of giving a rough 
 verdict in favor of one party, many of whose policies may be un- 
 acceptable. They enable the people to force action upon apathetic 
 legislatures or to prevent legislation that does not represent the 
 wishes of the community ; and in local areas they enable the people 
 to adapt general laws to the needs of particular localities. They 
 also may serve to check; corruption, to give the people a larger 
 measure of political control, and to make possible an extensive 
 campaign of political education, awakening public sentiment and 
 interest in government by giving the people questions of impor- 
 tance to consider and to decide. 
 
 554. Initiative and referendum : disadvantages. On the other 
 hand, direct legislation has decided limitations. It wearies the voters 
 if used too freely, experience showing that the electorate takes little 
 interest in the greater number of questions submitted, and that the 
 results tend to be conservative, the people usually rejecting new 
 proposals, especially if the expenditure of money be involved. 4 It is, 
 indeed, almost impossible to frame complicated statutes concerning 
 
 1 For example, the movement in favor of nomination by petition. 
 
 2 Oberholtzer, Referendum in America ; Beard and Schultz, Documents on the 
 Initiative, Referendum, and Recall. 
 
 8 Lobinger, " Objections to Direct Legislation examined," in Arena, Vol. 
 XXXIV, pp. 234-240; Beard, Readings in American Government and Politics, 
 
 PP- 4I9-43 1 - 
 
 * For the working of the initiative and referendum in Switzerland and in the 
 United States, see Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government, chaps, xi-xv, 
 and Appendix. 
 
368 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 economic or social questions in such a way that a simple affirm- 
 ative or negative vote will indicate the real will of the people. The 
 referendum destroys the sense of responsibility of legislatures and 
 executives. Unwise laws are often passed by weak-kneed legislators 
 in the expectation that popular vote will destroy them. The advan- 
 tages of having laws framed by a group of men specially selected 
 and trained are thus lost ; and able men, losing initiative and self- 
 esteem, are tempted to withdraw from offices in which they have 
 ceased to be representatives possessing personal opinions and have 
 become mere delegates, checked and thwarted by every current of 
 popular sentiment and prejudice. 
 
 555. General tendency toward democracy in legislation. What- 
 ever may be the respective merits of representative and direct 
 democracy, 1 or whatever compromise between the two may be es- 
 tablished in modern states, 2 the fact remains that present political 
 methods tend to obtain a fairly accurate expression of general will 3 
 and to afford some assurance that such general will is an intelligent 
 one. 4 The democratization of lawmaking and the extension of 
 political education work toward such ends. Means are provided 
 for a wide interest in political affairs by public education, by the 
 press, and by the campaigns of the political parties, the enjoyment 
 of political privileges by the people furnishing the most effective 
 means of further education. In these respects the popularly organ- 
 ized governments of to-day show a vast superiority over the auto- 
 cratically organized systems that controlled human action during 
 the greater part of political history. In spite of many survivals of 
 the older systems and in spite of the opposition of rulers and states- 
 men who have no confidence in the political ability of the masses, 
 
 1 Oberholtzer, Referendum in America, chap. xvi. 
 
 2 Roschen, Politik, pp. 308-454. 
 
 8 Cooley, Social Organization, chaps, xii-xiii. 
 
 4 Governments now recognize that the common people are intelligent creatures 
 worthy and capable of indefinite intellectual improvement. In past centuries rulers 
 regarded their subjects principally as taxpayers, laborers, and soldiers ; but educa- 
 tion has now been declared an indispensable part of the advancement of public 
 welfare, — the avowed aim of all modern governments. The success of democratic 
 experiments depends upon the intelligence of the average citizen ; the competition 
 for markets requires skilled workmen and managers ; and the widening interests 
 of mankind demand the means of acquiring knowledge. — Robinson and Beard, 
 Development of Modern Europe, Vol. II, pp. 380-381. 
 
r 
 
 POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 369 
 
 the trend among all civilized peoples is toward the more effective 
 legal expression of general will and the increasing responsibility of 
 political officials to popular control. 
 
 556. Weakness of democracy in administration. In obtaining 
 a proper and efficient administration of the general will so formu- 
 lated, the popularly organized government is less effective. Democ- 
 racy is inherently weak in administration. The forces of public 
 opinion are critical, analytical, and destructive, rather than directive 
 and constructive. 1 The people as a whole cannot form clear-cut, 
 comprehensive policies nor carry on with consistent vigor and skill 
 the complex activities of the modern state. 2 " The governments 
 which have been remarkable in history for sustained mental ability 
 and vigor in the conduct of affairs have generally been aristo- 
 cratic." 8 Bureaucratic government, in spite of its obvious dangers, 
 has at least the merit of producing a corps of expert administrators, 
 public service forming a career which a man follows through life. 
 From the purely administrative standpoint, benevolent despotism 
 offers the highest possibilities of excellence. In a democracy, per- 
 manence of tenure is unnatural. The people dread the loss of 
 their freedom and of their power under permanent officials. 
 Equality is insisted upon in a democracy, and results in the idea 
 of giving many men a part in public affairs. In order that men 
 may govern themselves offices are thrown open to all aspirants, 
 and short terms, with infrequent reelections, or choice by lot seems 
 the simplest method of securing popular control. Democracy, by 
 emphasizing diffusion rather than distinction, leads to mediocrity 
 in statesmanship. 4 In Athens every free citizen was considered fit 
 to occupy any civic position ; the executive offices were usually 
 collegiate and many were filled by lot. This system, which worked 
 fairly well when Athens was a simple community, broke down 
 under the strain of the increasing complexity of public interests, 
 and could not compete with the more effective organization of mo- 
 narchic Macedon. In republican Rome also the principle of rota- 
 tion in office was applied, although the class from which public 
 
 1 Wilson, An Old Master and Other Essays, pp. 112, 130. 
 
 2 See however S'mythe, Constructive Democracy. 
 
 8 Mill, Representative Government, chap. vi. See also Montesquieu, Spirit of 
 the Laws, Bk. Ill, chap. iv.. 4 Cooley, op. cit., chap xv. 
 
370 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 officials were chosen was narrower than in Greece. As long as 
 Rome was a simple Italian city, the lack of trained experts was 
 not felt, but the democratic administration broke down under the 
 burdens accompanying expansion ; and efficiency was restored only 
 by creating the permanent bureaucracy of the empire. Democracies 
 in the past were small or short-lived. 
 
 557. Need of efficiency in administration. Modern democracies, 
 arising in the belief that representation would successfully accom- 
 plish the formerly impossible task of working democracy over large 
 areas, are awakening to the fact that, however satisfactory in 
 legislation, popular government is weak in administration. 1 Hence, 
 in those states that departed furthest from the systems of the 
 national monarchies, a decided reaction in favor of .permanent 
 political experts in the executive departments of government is 
 apparent. 2 A realization of the value of training for public service 
 as a permanent profession is replacing the former blind confidence 
 in the inherent wisdom of popularly selected officials, and expert 
 advice in governmental matters is increasingly requested and fol- 
 lowed. The complexity of present political civilization and the 
 enlarging sphere of governmental action are added reasons for this 
 development. The problem of modern democracies 3 is to com- 
 bine with their broad legislative machinery based on an intelligent 
 general will a corps of efficient, permanent, and public-spirited ad- 
 ministrators, keeping the latter responsible to the former without 
 destroying the effectiveness of either. 4 
 
 558. Popular legislation and efficient administration. A broad 
 generalization, then, regarding present tendencies in the internal 
 organization of states shows a movement toward increasing demo- 
 cratic control of lawmaking, secured both by direct popular legisla- 
 tion and by direct popular selection of lawmaking representatives, 
 and a movement toward increasing efficiency in administration, 
 
 1 Freund, " American Administrative Law," in Political Science Quarterly, 
 Vol. IX, No. 3. 
 
 2 Lowell, "Expert Administration in Popular Government," in American Politi- 
 cal Science Review, Vol. VII, No. 1, pp. 45-62. 
 
 8 Godkin, Problems of Modern Democracy. 
 
 4 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 430-435 ; Ford, Rise and Growth of 
 American Politics, chap, xxviii. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 37 1 
 
 secured by the permanent tenure of a corps of trained experts in 
 the various departments of government and by the application of 
 scientific knowledge and methods to the questions with which 
 government is concerned. 1 The former confidence in representative 
 legislative bodies is somewhat declining. 2 On the one hand, com- 
 missions .of experts are being created to deal with problems re- 
 quiring more specific knowledge than a large body of legislators is 
 likely to possess ; on the other, the people are extending their 
 authority over the field of legislation. "The principle of expert 
 administration in modern governments is balanced by that of public 
 discussion in parliaments. The danger of bureaucratic narrowness, 
 which may be present even in men guided by scientific judgment, 
 is met by calling upon the public in general to participate in state 
 affairs, to make known its opinions, and to select representatives 
 who will constitute a great inquest of the nation. Thus there is sup- 
 plied a corrective of administrative decisions and a motive power 
 which gives original strength and energy to the acts of govern- 
 ment." 8 Public opinion and expert knowledge must constantly 
 cooperate and compromise in efficient democratic government. 
 
 559. Dangers of democracy. In conclusion, several of the chief 
 dangers confronting modern democracies may be pointed out. The 
 attainment of political democracy leads inevitably to the demand 
 for social and economic equality. 4 " Equality in political rights, 
 along with great inequalities in social conditions, has laid bare the 
 social question, which is no longer concealed, as it formerly was, 
 behind the struggle for equality before the law and for equality 
 in political rights." 6 Accordingly, whatever tends to separate 
 the community into distinct classes of rich and poor, to empha- 
 size class conflict, to make possible the selfish tyranny of either 
 a minority or a majority, is fatal to democracy. At the same 
 time, any attempt on the part of the people, when political 
 power rests in their possession, to secure by state action material 
 
 1 Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government, chaps, xvii-xix. 
 
 2 Godkin, Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy, pp. 96-144. 
 
 8 Reinsch, " Influence of Geographic, Economic, and Political Conditions," 
 in Spiller, Interracial Problems, p. 56. 
 
 4 Laveleye, Gouvernement dans la d^mocratie, Bk. VI, chaps, v-vii. 
 6 Ritchie, Natural Rights, p. 258. 
 
372 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 equality before intelligence and morality are sufficiently wide- 
 spread is equally fatal to justice and individual liberty. 1 
 
 560. Industrial and social program of democracy. The indus- 
 trial and social program of a people who have attained political 
 democracy are stated by a thoughtful student of modern conditions 
 as follows : " The industrial goal of the democracy is the socializa- 
 tion of industry. It is the attainment by the people of the highest 
 possible industrial control and of the Jargest possible industrial 
 dividend. . . . With a government ownership of some industries, 
 with a government regulation of others, with publicity for all, to 
 the extent that publicity is socially desirable, with an enlarged 
 power of the community in industry, and with an increased appro- 
 priation by the community of the increasing social surplus and 
 of the growing unearned increment, the progressive socialization 
 of industry will take place. To accomplish these ends the democ- 
 racy will rely upon the trade union, the association of consumers, 
 and other industrial agencies. It will, above all, rely upon the 
 state. . . . The social goal of the democracy is the advancement 
 and improvement of the people through a democratization of the 
 advantages and opportunities of life. This goal is to be attained 
 through a conservation of life and health, a democratization of 
 education, a socialization of consumption, a raising of the lowest 
 elements of the population to the level of the mass." 2 
 
 II. Relations among States 
 
 561. Growth of international interests. The most obvious tend- 
 ency in the relation of states to each other is the increasing inter- 
 nationality of interests that accompanies present political evolution. 3 
 Organic relations, world-wide in scope, unite peoples in all parts 
 of the earth. World unity is superseding the effects of geographic 
 
 1 As examples, in widely separated fields, of efforts tending to enforce some 
 degree of equality and to destroy natural differences may be mentioned the 
 activities of labor unions, the theories of socialism, and the principles of inter- 
 national arbitration. All of these have both desirable features and dangerous 
 extremes. 
 
 2 Weyl, The New Democracy, pp. 276, 297, 320. See also Smith, Spirit of 
 American Government, chap. xv. 
 
 8 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 404-406; Driault, Le Monde actuel. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 373 
 
 isolation, of economic exclusiveness, and to some extent of political 
 nationalism. 1 Upon the economic side, improved means of trans- 
 portation and communication have hastened this movement. 2 
 Distance has been annihilated and the most remote lands have 
 become next-door neighbors. Prices of staple commodities depend 
 now upon world supply and world consumption. The money 
 market is affected by the financial conditions of each state. Inter- 
 national labor congresses represent the expansion of industrial 
 organization beyond state boundaries, and numerous economic in- 
 terests are regulated by international administrative commissions. 
 The technical and scientific processes employed in industry and 
 commerce are also standardized upon a uniform basis. Upon the 
 ethical, intellectual, and social side, world unity is progressing, 
 because a broader understanding of national peculiarities is re- 
 moving former prejudices and because of the growing humanita- 
 rianism of the age. 3 Excepting language, almost all the elements 
 that make up the life of civilized nations, industry, commerce, 
 science, arts, manners, and political customs, have become common 
 to all nations. 4 
 
 562. Growth of international agreements. From the more purely 
 political standpoint, international relations have already become 
 definite and numerous. The society of states is now much wider 
 than the European Christendom within which interstate relation- 
 ships originated, and includes practically all the habitable parts of 
 the globe. 6 Over this area the generally accepted principles of 
 international conduct form a considerable body of procedure. 6 The 
 sovereigns of Europe, in the Declaration of Aix-la-Chapelle in 
 18 1 8, agreed "never to depart, either among themselves or in 
 their relations with other states, from the most strict observance of 
 the principles of the law of nations." In the Hague Conferences, 
 
 1 Reinsch, " Influence of Geographic, Economic, and Political Conditions," in 
 Spiller, Interracial Problems, pp. 49-57. 
 
 2 Hazen, Europe since 1815, pp. 723-726; Day, History of Commerce, chaps. 
 xxx-xxxi. 
 
 8 Maurenbrecher, Moral and Social Tasks of World Politics. 
 4 Seignobos, History of Contemporary Civilization, pp. 443-446. 
 6 Lawrence, International Problems and Hague Conferences, chaps, i-iii. 
 8 Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, pp. 1-24 ; de Martens, 
 Traits de droit international, Vol. I, pp. 45-52. 
 
374 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 all states declared their intention to establish " the principles of 
 equity and right upon which repose the security of states and 
 the welfare of peoples." These rules, no longer drawing their 
 support from the philosophical and theological conceptions of 
 natural law, 1 rest increasingly upon a universal recognition of 
 their utility and upon the general consent of states ; and this con- 
 sent tends to be a voluntary and express consent, diplomatically 
 given, to carefully formulated propositions. States are united by 
 treaties for offense and defense, and more particularly for the 
 regulation of common economic and political interests. 2 Many in- 
 ternational difficulties that would formerly have been decided by 
 the sword are now settled peaceably by arbitration, 3 and a consid- 
 erable machinery of international administration and adjudication 
 is now in existence. All these facts tend to strengthen the bonds 
 of friendship among states and to make less likely resort to arms 
 in case of disagreement. 4 
 
 563. Influences hostile to internationalism. There are, how- 
 ever, factors that operate in the other direction. Modern states are 
 often economic rivals, and economic rivalry is usually settled in 
 the end by war.^ Commerce is a bond of peace between those who 
 buy and those who sell, but it sets at enmity those states that 
 engage extensively in the same line of industry and that compete 
 for the same markets. 6 The pressure of population upon food 
 supply is the fundamental fact of history. This pressure is the 
 source of progress and at the same time the source of poverty and 
 of war. 7 Population and subsistence can be equalized only by 
 checking the growth of the former or by increasing the latter. 8 
 
 1 Lawrence, Principles of International Law, pp. 32-53. 
 
 2 Foster, Practice of Diplomacy, chaps, xii-xvi ; Amos, Remedies for War, pp. 
 173-188 ; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, chap, xvii ; Fisk, International 
 Commercial Policies, chaps, xi-xii. 
 
 8 Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, chap, xxi, and authorities 
 there cited. 
 
 4 Jenks, Principles of Politics, pp. 171-175. 
 
 6 Robinson, "War and Economics in History and in Theory," in Political 
 Science Quarterly, Vol. XV, pp. 604-619. 
 
 6 The Federalist, No. 6 ; Dicey, " War and Progress," in Eclectic Magazine, 1867. 
 
 7 Spencer, " Progress, its Law and Cause," in Essays. 
 
 8 Fetter, "Population or Prosperity," in American Economic Review, Vol. Ill, 
 No. 1, Supplement, pp. 5-19. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 375 
 
 The growth of a state in population may be checked without war 
 by disease, famine, artificial limitation of the birth rate, or emigra- 
 tion. Advancing civilization, by lowering the death rate, prevents 
 the natural limitation of population, and emigration can take place 
 only so long as there are unoccupied lands. Present indications 
 point to an indefinite increase of the world's population. 1 
 
 564. Pressure of population upon food supply. The available 
 food supply of a given state,, after the point of diminishing returns 
 has been reached, 2 can be increased only by conquest or by com- 
 merce, the latter turning the people to manufacture in order to ex- 
 change their commodities for food which their own land cannot 
 supply. Because of improvements in the methods of production, 
 commerce is capable of indefinite expansion, but finally the law of 
 diminishing returns again becomes applicable. As population in- 
 creases it becomes more and more difficult to create a surplus of 
 agricultural goods for purposes of exchange. At some point in this 
 process states cease to offer a market for manufactured goods, and 
 their people must starve, emigrate, manufacture, or go to war. 
 The number of manufacturing states is constantly increasing ; the 
 number of agricultural states is diminishing. The result is a rivalry 
 for markets whose crisis- may be postponed for a time by the open- 
 ing up of new lands or by improved methods of agriculture, but 
 whose pressure is growing stronger each year. Tariffs and the 
 financial burdens of armaments are used to-day as indirect means 
 of warfare with deadly effect, ruining the weaker states in the com- 
 petition ; but the cause of war remains and, as long as separate 
 states exist, war, necessary to secure or to maintain foreign markets, 
 will for a long time to come, even if all other causes of conflict be 
 removed, be an imminent danger. 3 
 
 1 While the numbers among peoples of inferior civilization are increasing very 
 slowly, and in some cases are actually diminishing, the more advanced peoples are 
 growing very rapidly. European whites have doubled their population during the 
 past thirty-four years ; the Semitic peoples, whose numbers have doubled in twenty- 
 five years, showing the most rapid increase. See Seligman, Principles of Economics, 
 chap, iv; Ross, Foundations of Sociology, chap, ii ; Bonar, Malthus and his Work. 
 
 2 Scientific methods of increasing the food supply during the past century have 
 made possible higher standards of living in spite of the rapid increase of popu- 
 lation. The limits of this development have by no means yet been reached. 
 
 8 Robinson, op. cit., pp. 620-622. 
 
376 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 565. National rivalries. Problems of race and nationality also 
 tend to prevent world harmony. The national spirit has made it- 
 self felt frequently in the division and unification of states during 
 the past century, usually to the accompaniment of war ; and this 
 spirit is still actively expressed in the demand for autonomy made 
 by nations joined by political ties to alien peoples. Nationalistic 
 sentiments and prejudices naturally accompany the first stages of 
 a new democracy, 1 and in the revolutions and wars of the last 
 century the principles of nationality and democracy were often 
 combined. 2 The clearly marked individuality which characterizes 
 national states, each striving to realize its distinct characteristics, 
 is not conducive to the broadest humanitarianism. 
 
 566. Colonial rivalries. Besides, expansion in population, neces- 
 sitating expansion in territory, leads modern states to extend their 
 control over as large a portion of the earth's surface as their ener- 
 gies and opportunities permit. 3 By the exploitation of undeveloped 
 regions, national empires are built up ; i and the existence side 
 by side of a number of powerful states, each emphasizing the im- 
 portance of national solidarity as a requisite for success and each 
 watching with jealous eye the colonial policies of its neighbors, 
 stimulates national ambitions unduly and .is a constant menace to 
 world peace. 5 Interest in world politics not only tends to check 
 democratic development and reforms within the state, but by re- 
 viving the idea of world empire may ultimately lead to world con- 
 flict. 6 Under present conditions the importance of navies, naval 
 stations, and sea communications needs but to be mentioned. 7 
 
 567. Inferior civilizations. The fact that, by far the larger part 
 of humanity lives under backward civilizations in tropical or semi- 
 tropical lands, and that some degree of authority over them is usu- 
 ally exercised or claimed by the more advanced peoples underlies 
 
 1 Lange, " Tendencies toward Parliamentary Rule," in Spiller, Interracial Prob- 
 lems, pp. 1 19-120. 
 
 2 Judson, Nineteenth Century, pp. 64-70. 
 
 " Reinsch, World Politics, Part I, chap, i ; Jenks, Principles of Politics, 
 pp. 160-165; Leroy-Beaulieu, De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes. 
 4 Reinsch, Colonial Government, Part I. 
 6 Jordan, Imperial Democracy ; Giddings, Democracy and Empire, chap. xvii. 
 
 6 Reinsch, World Politics, Part I, chap. v. 
 
 7 Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 377 
 
 many of the most difficult problems of modern politics. 1 Questions 
 of acclimatization, 2 especially of the influence of the tropics upon 
 the white race, 3 of amalgamation and the results of race mingling, 4 
 and of civilization and its effects upon backward peoples have far- 
 reaching importance. 5 A most significant fact is the rapid numeri- 
 cal increase of the white race. Two centuries ago the pure-blooded 
 whites numbered less than one hundred millions, or ten per cent 
 of the world's population, and were limited to Europe and North 
 Africa. At present the European whites alone number five hun- 
 dred millions, or one third of the entire population of the earth. 
 In addition, nonresident whites of European descent have increased 
 from ten millions to over one hundred millions during the past 
 century. Teutons, Slavs, and Hebrews in particular have increased 
 in numbers and in influence. Whether these aggressive peoples 
 are justified in seizing undeveloped resources, policing unpolitical 
 areas, and civilizing, by force if necessary, inferior peoples opens 
 up problems of prime importance in interstate relations and in 
 general political evolution. 6 
 
 568. World federation. Many thinkers, both speculative phi- 
 losophers and practical statesmen, have looked forward to the aboli- 
 tion of war through the formation of a world federation. 7 Erasmus, 
 Grotius, William Penn, Montesquieu, Turgot, and Kant expressed 
 their beliefs that the permanent removal of the causes of armed 
 strife among states could be accomplished only through some form 
 of world organization. In the seventeenth century, Henry IV of 
 France and his famous minister Sully planned a grand republic of 
 the fifteen leading states of Europe ; 8 a century later the Abbe" 
 
 1 Kidd, Control of the Tropics ; Ireland, Tropical Colonization ; Mahan, The 
 Problem of Asia. 
 
 2 Ripley, Races of Europe, chap. xxi. 
 
 8 Sambon, " Acclimatization of Europeans- in Tropical Lands," in Geographical 
 Journal, Vol. XII ; Ripley, " Acclimatization," in Popular Science Monthly, 1896. 
 
 4 Finch, " Effects of Racial Miscegenation," in Spiller, Interracial Problems, 
 pp. 108-113. 6 Brinton, Races and Peoples, Lecture X. 
 
 6 Treitschke, Politik, section 4 ; Von Hoist, Constitutional History of the 
 United States, Vol. Ill, pp. 269-272 ; Burgess, Political Science and Constitu- 
 tional Law, Vol. I, pp. 44-48 ; Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, pp. 321-327. 
 
 7 Von Stengel, Weltstaat ; Chittenden, War or Peace, chap, vi ; Novicow, La 
 Federation de l'Europe ; Trueblood, Federation of the World. 
 
 8 Kitchin, History of France, Vol. II, pp. 472-477. 
 
378 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 St. Pierre, in his " Project of Perpetual Peace," 1 proposed a similar 
 scheme. Rousseau and Bentham also considered a world state de- 
 sirable, and numerous recent writers, especially Bluntschli, have 
 urged its practical possibility. 2 The success of the federal principle 
 in uniting the hostile and distrustful elements that originally com- 
 posed the United States and the German Empire is pointed to as 
 justifying the extension of the federal principle to the entire world. 3 
 569. Existing elements of a world state. Several important 
 elements of a constitution for a world state already exist. 4 As a 
 nucleus for an international legislature there is the Interparliame'n- 
 tary Union, established in 1889, and composed of over three thou- 
 sand members of the lawmaking bodies of those states that have 
 representative institutions. In addition, the Hague peace confer- 
 ence, containing an equal representation of states, as is the case 
 in the senates of several existing federations, and meeting at 
 regular intervals, forms a sort of upper house. The Hague Court 
 and the International Prize Court form an international judiciary. 
 International administration has attained imposing proportions. 
 What may be denominated an international Department of Trans- 
 portation includes the Universal Postal Bureau, the International 
 Telegraph Bureau, and the International Bureau of Railways ; a 
 Department of Agriculture and Labor includes the International 
 Institute of Agriculture and the International Labor Office ; a De- 
 partment of Commerce and Colonization includes the International 
 Colonial Institute, the International Bureau of Weights and Meas- 
 ures, and the International Bureau for the Publication of Customs 
 Tariffs ; a' Department of Health includes the International Office 
 of Public Hygiene ; a Department of Arts and Sciences includes 
 the International Bureau for Ocean Exploration, the International 
 Geodetic Bureau, the International Seismological Bureau, and the 
 International Scientific Catalogue ; a Department of Justice in- 
 cludes the Bureau of the International Court of Arbitration and 
 
 1 Janet, Histoire de la science politique, Vol. II, pp. 305 ff. 
 
 a Theory of the State, Bk. I, chap. ii. 
 
 * Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 135-137. 
 
 £ La Fontaine, " Existing Elements of a Constitution of the United States of 
 the World," Pamphlet No. 47 of the American Association for International Con- 
 ciliation ; Bridgman, World Organization. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 379 
 
 International Bureaus of Patents and Copyrights. These depart- 
 ments spend upwards of five hundred thousand dollars annually, 
 which may be considered an international budget. 
 
 570. Obstacles to world unity. Several conditions, however, 
 render unlikely the complete federation of the world, at least for 
 some time to come. Inequalities of political development and 
 capacity among states and the existence of peoples under rudi- 
 mentary forms of juristic organization make impossible equal union 
 among all mankind. Even among the leading members of the 
 family of nations there are antipathies of tradition and conflicts of 
 interest that are plainly incompatible. Besides, national independ- 
 ence is still necessary to the preservation and development of val- 
 ues fixed and gained in the struggle of history. The obliteration of 
 nationality might involve immense loss to mankind, and humanity 
 might be leveled down to an indiscriminate mass if the ideals and 
 traditions binding men to their political past were destroyed too soon. 
 
 In actual practice, the society of states, each unwilling to submit 
 to the dictates of a superior power, and at the same time desiring 
 to avoid the disturbances and uncertainties of constant warfare, 
 have developed several international policies that permit a com- 
 promise between the rule of law and the rule of force, and that 
 strike a rough balance between the theory of the legal equality of 
 states and the actual differences among them in size, strength, and 
 importance. The ancient custom of forming treaties of alliance 
 has been developed into the principle of international equilibrium, 
 or the balance of power. 1 In spite of numerous failures this prin- 
 ciple has produced certain useful results. The domination of 
 Europe by a single power was prevented by the union of the 
 smaller states, first against the House of Hapsburg, then against 
 the House of Bourbon. At present the Triple Alliance 2 is theo- 
 retically balanced by the Dual Alliance. 3 
 
 1 Dupuis, Le Principe de Wquilibre et le concert europeen ; Donnadieu, Essai 
 sur la theorie de l'equilibre. 
 
 2 Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, formed in 1882. 
 
 8 France and Russia, formed in 1891. The adhesion of England to this com- 
 bination forms the Triple Entente. See Tardieu, " Bird's-Eye View of European 
 Politics," in the Century, April 1913, pp. 821-827 ; Seignobos, Political History of 
 Europe since 1814, pp. 827-831 ; Tardieu, France and the Alliances. 
 
380 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 571. Weakness of the balance of power. The system of the 
 balance of power is defective, however, in that it is founded upon 
 the idea of hostility. Such alliances are in constant danger of 
 being destroyed by the. appearance of new interests leading to the 
 formation of new groupings of states, 1 by the creation of suspicions 
 among former friends, and by the cultivation of the fear of hostili- 
 ties by the weaker states in order to increase their own importance. 
 Besides, since the value of a state under this system depends upon 
 its warlike strength, chief emphasis is laid upon the increase of 
 armaments. This not only places heavy financial burdens upon 
 states but also develops a military spirit and increases the danger 
 of war. 2 Finally, there has grown up, as a corollary of the balance 
 of power, the doctrine of compensation, according to which each 
 side of the balance claims the right to increase its power if the 
 other side acquires new strength. 3 This often results in unjustifi- 
 able seizure of territory and in absolute disregard of the wishes of 
 the weaker peoples. 4 
 
 572. International neutralization. The danger of international 
 disturbance has also been diminished by agreements among the 
 great powers according to which certain buffer states, especially 
 likely to become areas of hostilities or sources of contention among 
 the greater powers, have been internationally neutralized. 5 While 
 this principle may be applied successfully to small states or to areas 
 likely to become spheres of rivalry in colonial expansion, it does 
 not solve the more important problem of satisfactorily adjusting the 
 relations of the larger national states. 
 
 573. Intervention. Another recognized principle of world pol- 
 itics is the right of the great powers to interfere in the affairs of 
 less perfectly organized and less highly developed states whose 
 
 1 For example, the opening up of the Orient has caused considerable modifica- 
 tion in the alignment of states from that formerly based upon European politics 
 alone. See Reinsch, World Politics, Parts II-III. 
 
 2 Seignobos, Political Histpry of Europe since 1814, pp. 831-832. 
 
 8 Examples of the application of this principle may be seen in the recent 
 agreements between France and Germany, by which both have increased their 
 possessions in Africa; and between England and Russia, by which both have 
 extended their control in Central Asia. 
 
 4 Hill, World Organization and the Modern State, pp. 133-135. 
 
 5 Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg are examples. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 381 
 
 chronic misgovernment or persistent wrongdoing produces ex- 
 ternal complications and endangers civilization. 1 The concert of 
 Europe, composed of the six leading states of the continent, 2 con- 
 trolled the political destinies of the Old World during the past 
 century, sometimes in a selfish spirit of national aggrandizement 
 and mutual jealousy. The affairs of the Ottoman Empire espe- 
 cially have furnished a field for their activity. 3 The traditional 
 policy of the United States, represented by the Monroe Doctrine, 
 aims to exclude European intervention from the American con- 
 tinent; and this places a corresponding responsibility upon the 
 United States to maintain order and good government and to miti- 
 gate international nuisances in this hemisphere. 4 The attempts of 
 the European concert, toward the close of the nineteenth century, 
 to extend their system to the Far East 5 met the diplomatic oppo- 
 sition of the United States 6 and the armed resistance of Japan. 7 As 
 a consequence, the United States, modifying its principle of keep- 
 ing aloof from foreign complications, has joined with the European 
 concert and with Japan in a new world concert, Asia and Africa, 
 as well as Europe and America, forming at present parts of the 
 world system. 
 
 574. Conclusion. The combination of these various principles 
 and movements in the relations among states makes impossible 
 any conclusive generalizations regarding present international tend- 
 encies. Over against the theoretical independence and equality of 
 states may be placed the actual differences distinguishing great and 
 small states, and the actual interference of the powerful in the 
 affairs of the weak. 8 In opposition to the tendencies toward world 
 peace and unity, as manifested by the growth of internationalism 
 
 1 Amos, Remedies for War, pp. 75-81, 139-162 ; Lawrence, Principles of Inter- 
 national Law, pp. 268-288 ; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. VI, chap. xix. 
 
 2 England, Germany, Russia, France, Austria- Hungary, and Italy. 
 
 8 Driault, La Question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'i nos jours ; Holland, 
 The European Concert in the Eastern Question. 
 
 4 Moore, op. cit., Vol. VI, pp. 518-529 ; Coolidge, United States as a World 
 Power, chap. xvi. 
 
 6 Douglas, Europe and the Far East. 
 
 6 Coolidge, op. cit., chaps, xvii-xix ; Reinsch, op. cit., Part V, chap. i. 
 
 7 Dyer, Japan in World Politics. 
 
 8 Hershey, Essentials of International Public Law, pp. 147-157. 
 
382 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 and by the emergence of a considerable degree of world organiza- 
 tion, there exist strong national rivalries, especially in colonial and 
 commercial relations, and increasing competition in the prepara- 
 tions for war. Between these extremes stand various groupings 
 and alliances, more or less permanent, and various principles of 
 international expediency that may conserve peace or that may, under 
 slightly changed conditions, precipitate war. No phase of political 
 development exhibits such contradictory factors as the external 
 relations of states. Common civilization creates an international 
 current which contributes to the solidarity of peoples ; political and 
 economic rivalries create national currents which induce states to 
 treat each other as enemies. While the scope of international in- 
 terests is undoubtedly growing wider and the rules of international 
 morality are increasing in number and in force, the establishment 
 of a world state, requiring existing states to surrender their sover- 
 eignty and independence, and the abolition of war as the final resort 
 in case of international dispute are ideals unlikely of immediate 
 fulfillment. 1 
 
 III. Conclusions 
 
 575. Complexity of political evolution. Several important con- 
 clusions may be drawn from the attempt in this volume to sketch 
 in broad outlines some phases of the development of political 
 theories, institutions, and activities. In the first place, even the 
 most superficial study of political evolution brings out clearly the 
 marvelous complexity of the process. The rise and progress of 
 state existence takes place as the result of constant action and reac- 
 tion among a multitude of forces, intricately interrelated. Hence 
 it is necessary to go over the same ground many times, from dif- 
 ferent points of view. The historical development of the state, as 
 a chronological process, has never twice followed identical chan- 
 nels. The origin of each state resulted from conditions peculiar to 
 its time, and the development of each state has taken forms of its 
 own. This historical process must also be viewed, in the case of 
 each state, from the standpoint of both organization and function. 
 
 1 Willoughby, Nature of the State, pp. 406-410 ; Hill, World Organization and 
 the Modern State, pp. 199-201. ' 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 383 
 
 Sometimes chief interest centers around the form, composition, 
 and machinery of the state ; sometimes, around the nature and 
 scope of its activities. At any given time in the process of political 
 evolution, attention must be directed to what each particular state 
 is, and to what it does ; each of these affects the other and, either 
 unconsciously or as the result of man's deliberate efforts, both are 
 constantly changing to accord with changing conditions in the politi- 
 cal environment. Moreover, the process is complicated by the three- 
 fold relations with which states are concerned : those of individual 
 to individual, of individual to state, and of state to state. Each of 
 these, in some respects distinct from the others, is in a broader 
 view intimately connected with them or dependent upon them. 
 
 576. Impossibility of final solutions. In the second place, the 
 consideration of each phase of political development ends in a 
 problem, sometimes in a dilemma. Because of the evolutionary 
 nature of state growth, all questions of political organization and 
 function are necessarily relative. A perfect and permanent form 
 is impossible, and definite and final laws cannot be laid down. 
 Just as men have ceased to look to a "golden age" in the past 
 and have turned their attention to improving the present, so in- 
 telligent men have ceased to assign universal validity to theories 
 true enough under certain conditions or to place implicit dependence 
 upon speculative theories and Utopias. " The modern scholar, 
 solemnly warned by the fate of the older doctrinaires, is on his 
 guard against formulating into a transcendental philosophy either 
 the emotions connected with the status quo or the "ecstatic delight 
 derived from contemplating a perfected humanity." 1 The scien- 
 tific methods of the historical school, ably supplemented by the 
 principles of evolution, have made possible some conception of the 
 nature of political problems, of the process by which they have 
 arisen, and of the manner in which they may from time to time 
 be more or less satisfactorily adjusted. " Politics confronts not 
 axioms of law or polity set like the hills, but complicated social 
 questions to be settled, not in the closet with the philosophers, but 
 amid the multitudinous experiences of the market place where 
 society daily meets the pressing needs of life." 2 
 
 1 Beard, Politics, p. 12. 2 Ibid. p. 11. 
 
384 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 577. Compromises the only solutions. Finally, it follows that, 
 as these problems approach any degree of satisfactory adjustment, 
 such adjustment takes the form of a compromise between extremes, 
 each of which exhibits undesirable features. The state, by its very 
 nature, is a compromise between authority and freedom ; its com- 
 position, its organization, and its functions all show the effects of 
 its paradoxical nature. The size of the state in area and popula- 
 tion also fluctuates between the small, compact community and the 
 vast, extended empire, both of which have elements of strength 
 and of weakness. Various bonds of internal unity and varying 
 degrees of external compulsion determine the composition of each 
 state, but no form is permanent. Rome could not check her ex- 
 pansion after she had absorbed Gaul and humbled Carthage. The 
 responsibilities of maintaining order along her frontiers and of 
 policing the Mediterranean compelled further conquests. The 
 United States could not avoid further territorial growth after her 
 western boundary reached the Mississippi. It was inevitable that 
 the mouth and the western tributaries of that river should also 
 come under her sway. 1 The momentum acquired in the formation 
 of a state tends naturally to carry it forward until the point of equi- 
 librium is reached between the internal pressure for expansion and 
 growth and the external resistance of neighboring states or the 
 difficulties involved in holding together the larger area and in 
 governing the increased population. Then it becomes difficult to 
 maintain what has been accomplished, growth carrying with it the 
 seeds of decline. Thus political units combine and divide, states 
 rise and fall, the conditions that are operative at any given time 
 determining what distribution of the world's area and of its 
 inhabitants into political units shall be made. 
 
 578. Dangers in conclusions drawn from comparisons. However, 
 this process follows no single line and no uniform cycle, nor can 
 the decline of one state for certain reasons argue a similar fate for 
 another state for the same reasons. The fact that external expan- 
 sion and the government of remote provinces weakened Rome 
 does not guarantee that the British Empire will feel similar effects 
 from the possession of her diverse and scattered dependencies. 
 
 1 Semple, American History and its Geographic Conditions, chaps, ix-xii. 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 385 
 
 Numerous other elements also enter into consideration, interfering 
 with the analogy. Improvements in the means of communication 
 and transportation and in the methods and fundamental bases of 
 government revolutionize the whole problem. What is at one time 
 an element of weakness may in another age become a source of 
 strength. A change in implements of warfare, or in processes of 
 manufacture, or in intellectual beliefs may result in important 
 readjustments of all the boundary lines on the map. 
 
 579. Compromises in state organization. The organization of 
 the state also demands a series of compromises. The adjustment 
 of sovereignty to liberty must avoid the dangerous extremes of des- 
 potism and of anarchy. A degree of collective authority sufficient 
 to restrain the actions of nonsocial individuals and to promote the 
 general welfare must be combined with a degree of freedom suffi- 
 cient to protect the interests of the individual. Where the line 
 between the state as a unit and its members as units should be 
 drawn is a relative question, depending, upon conditions in each 
 age and in each state. The civil liberty that is demanded as a 
 minimum in modern democracies would have been considered de- 
 structive of all law and order in former states. The proper share 
 of each individual in government is also a relative problem, some 
 states reaching the point where it is safe and desirable to extend 
 political authority to the masses of their populations, other states 
 being in positions where such a policy would be fatal. A less 
 amount of political liberty than that which secures conservative and 
 stable government in England and in the United States creates 
 frequent revolutions in Latin America. 
 
 580. Compromise between national and local authorities. The 
 adjustment between national and local government has also been 
 a problem in all states that exceeded a comparatively small size. 
 The advantages of centralized and decentralized governments, of 
 unitary and federal governments, of hierarchies of officials and of 
 systems of representation all have had historic support, each state 
 adopting the forms best suited to its circumstances and to the in- 
 telligence of its people. Here again many of the systems contain 
 elements that lead to their own destruction. For example, the 
 federation, one of the most satisfactory compromises in political 
 
386 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 development, by its very establishment gives an impetus toward 
 further integration which tends to destroy the federal form. The 
 existence of a common government, whose working becomes in- 
 creasingly familiar to all citizens, cannot fail to strengthen the 
 national spirit, whose beginnings at least the. federation indicated. 
 Common action, particularly in war or foreign relations, increases 
 national at the expense of local patriotism ; and the former units, 
 losing their political identity, tend to become mere convenient 
 districts of administration. 
 
 581. Compromises in state functions. So the functions of each 
 state must follow that compromise line between socialism and 
 individualism that best conserves the interests of both state and 
 individual. The relations among states must vary between the 
 cosmopolitan point of view resulting from international interests 
 and the national point of _view resulting from the interests of each 
 state separately. The final purpose of the state requires attention 
 to the welfare of individual, state, and civilization in general. From 
 whatever angle political development is viewed, adjustment of means 
 to ends and of forms to environments is seen. Political evolution 
 is a complex and confusing process ; man's consciousness of the 
 existence of this process and of his own ability to modify or direct 
 it leads to problems that are being more and more clearly realized 
 in their entirety and in their interrelations. The essential relativity 
 of all political principles and the need for frequent, yet conserva- 
 tive and constructive, readjustments, based on the fullest knowledge 
 of the nature and strength of all the influences involved, are the 
 chief lessons of history and of politics. Only recently has this 
 point of view been realized and even yet many political practices 
 ignore it. The most promising feature of present politics is the 
 serious effort in many places to make practical application of its 
 teachings. 
 
 582. Conclusion. " It is here that we realize the concrete mean- 
 ing of the idea of harmony as the touchstone of social develop- 
 ment. All one-sided progress cramps as much in one direction as 
 it liberates in another. True development is comparable to organic 
 growth — the opening out of each element furthering instead of 
 retarding that of others. Such a development is not in conflict 
 
POLITICAL CONDITIONS AND TENDENCIES 387 
 
 with immovable laws of evolution but is continuous with the line 
 of advance which educed the higher from the lower animal forms, 
 which evolved the human out of the animal species, and civilized 
 from barbaric society." 1 " This, then, is the sum of the whole 
 matter : the end of government is the facilitation of the objects 
 of society. The rule of governmental action is necessary coopera- 
 tion. The method of political development is conservative adap- 
 tation, shaping old habits into new ones, modifying old means to 
 accomplish new ends." 2 What elements of the old shall be re- 
 tained and what tendencies of the present shall be chiefly followed 
 in making the needed modifications remain constant problems. 
 The so-called " spirit of the age " is not an entirely safe guide. So 
 rapidly do conditions change in the modern world that when any 
 spirit of the age has been generally recognized it is time to scan 
 the horizon for signs of a new era. 3 Each political form and each 
 political theory contains within itself the possibility of dangerous 
 extremes and the germ of its own decay. No phase in political evo- 
 lution may safely be assumed to be perfect and permanent. Con- 
 servative and intelligent compromise and adjustment are essential 
 for political progress. 
 
 1 Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, p. 204. 
 
 2 Wilson, The State, p. 639. 
 
 8 Lowell, Public Opinion and Popular Government, p. 303. 
 
INDEX 
 
 Absolute monarchy, 229-231 
 
 Acclimatization, 377 
 
 Activities of the state, 247-282 
 
 Adams, G. B., on important nations in 
 history, 13 
 
 Adams, Samuel, 211 
 
 Administration, as a department of 
 government, 64; popular control 
 over, 239-240, 362-363 ; as a func- 
 tion of the state, 248 ; in socialistic 
 state, 276-277 ; weakness of democ- 
 racy in, 369-371 
 
 Administrative law, 75, 232 note 
 
 Advantages, of federation, 155; of 
 world empire, 191-192 ; of small 
 area, 197 ; of large area, 198-199 ; of 
 written law, 204 ; of representation, 
 246 ; of socialism, 273-274 ; of initia- 
 tive and referendum, 367 
 
 Agreement of the People, 234 
 
 Agricultural village, 1 73-1 75 
 
 Agriculture, in state origin, 92-93 ; re- 
 lation to warfare, 97 
 
 Aix-Ia-Chapelle, Declaration of, 373 
 
 Alexander VI, Papal Bull of, 286 note 
 
 Alexander the Great, 16, 37, 39, 106, 
 116, 150, 172, 177, 184 
 
 Alfred the Great, 97 
 
 Aliens, 166-169 
 
 Alliances, 332-333 
 
 Altruism, 261, 356 
 
 Amalfitan Tables, 319 note 
 
 American Civil War, 157, 296 
 
 American colonies, civil liberty in, 213- 
 214 ; charters in, 234 ; representation 
 in, 244-245 
 
 American Federation of Labor, 127 
 note 
 
 American Revolution, 235, 308, 326 
 
 Amphictyonic Council, 116 note, 315 
 note 
 
 Anarchy, 201-202, 228, 259 note 
 
 Ancestor worship, 88 
 
 Animism, 87-88 
 
 Arbitration, during Middle Ages, 318 ; 
 recent, 330-331 ; present tendencies 
 in, 373-374 
 
 Archon, 73, 223 note 
 
 389 
 
 Area of states, influence of nature on, 
 26-27 ; as essential element, 56-59 ; 
 tendencies toward increase, 196-199 ; 
 influence on form of government, 
 220, 224-225 
 
 Aristocracy, efficiency of, 220-221, 369 
 
 Aristotle, on political cycles, 14, 25 ; 
 on maximum population of state, 55 ; 
 on citizenship, 166; on factional 
 strife, 179 
 
 Armada, 307 
 
 Armaments, costs of, 312; interna- 
 tional conferences on, 330-331 ; as 
 present method of international com- 
 petition, 375, 380 
 
 Armed Neutrality of 1780, 326 
 
 Army, proportion of population in, 131 ; 
 relation to property, 132 ; relation to 
 taxation, 132 ; as a permanent organ- 
 ization, 132-133 
 
 Articles of Confederation, 235 
 
 Asia, home of earliest states, 13, 27 ; 
 religious importance of, 87 
 
 Aspects of state, 10-12 
 
 Assimilation of nations, 163-165, 355, 
 
 377 
 
 Augsburg Confession, 118 
 
 Austin, J., on minimum population of 
 state, 55 ; on sovereignty, 69 
 
 Authority, conception of, 20-21 ; in 
 military state, 99 ; relation to liberty, 
 200-207, 354; organization of, 215- 
 233 ; emphasis on, in early states, 
 
 352-353 
 Ayala, B. de, 321 
 
 Baillis, 154 
 
 Balance of power, 22, 29, 194, 306, 324- 
 
 325. 379-380 
 
 Basques, 162 
 
 Bastiat, F., 258 
 
 Beard, C. A., on data of political sci- 
 ence, 7-8 ; on diffusion of authority 
 in modern governments, 240-241 ; on 
 expansion of governmental activities, 
 279-281 ; on necessity of compro- 
 mise in political evolution, 383 
 
 Bentham, J., 378 
 
39° 
 
 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Bering Sea controversy, 299 note, 332 
 note 
 
 'Berlin Decree, 327 
 
 Bill of Rights, 212, 253 note 
 
 Biological analogy, 8-9 
 
 Bishops in medieval city government, 
 180, 228 
 
 Bismarck, Otto von, 37 
 
 Blackstone, Sir W., 211 
 
 Blanc, L., 268 
 
 Bluntschli, J. K., on political cycles, 14 ; 
 on methods of forming states, 105- 
 IQ7 ; on political genius of nations, 
 162; on Alexander's empire, 185; 
 on value of world empire, 192 ; on 
 purpose of state, 348-349 
 
 Bodin, J., 69; on citizenship, 166; on 
 sovereignty, 322 note 
 
 Bossuet, 118 
 
 British Mutiny Act, 325 note 
 
 British Orders in Council, 327 
 
 Brownson, O. A., 119 
 
 Brussels Conference, 329 
 
 Bryce, J., on Holy Roman Empire, 190 
 
 Buckle, H. T., on influence of physical 
 environment, 27-28 
 
 Buddha, 90 
 
 Bundesrath, instructed representation 
 in, 366 
 
 Bureaucracy, in Roman Empire, 187, 
 226-227 ; efficiency of, in adminis- 
 tration, 369 
 
 Burgess, J. W., on geographic unity, 
 59-60 ; on evolutionary origin of 
 state, 80 ; on ends of state, 349-350, 
 
 Business, relation to politics, 33, 365 
 
 Cassar, 16, 37, 134, 172 
 Calvin, J., 118 
 
 Campaign contributions, 365 
 Capitano in Golfo, 298 note 
 Caste, 33, 97, 130, 147, 217 
 Charlemagne, 16, 37, 159, 172, 189, 229 
 Charters as forerunners of written con- 
 stitutions, 234 
 Chauvinism, 165 . 
 Checks and balances, 206 
 Chinese exclusion, 332 note 
 Chinese Republic, 34, 246 
 Chivalry, influence on international law, 
 
 3 IQ . 
 
 Christian Socialists, 268 
 
 Christianity, attitude to warfare, 40 
 303-304 ; influence on family life, 
 iio-iii; influence on relation of 
 church and state, 1 16-1 21 ; influence 
 on civil liberty, 210; influence on 
 
 democracy, 218; temporal power of, 
 228 ; influence on individual rights, 
 251 
 
 Church, relation to state, 41, 115-121, 
 188-189, 228-229 
 
 Church fathers, attitude to warfare, 303 
 
 Cities, historical development of, 175- 
 182; causing political readjustment, 
 207 ; commission government in, 366 
 
 Citizenship, 166-170; in Roman Em- 
 pire, 226; in modern democracies, 
 233 ; relation to suffrage, 236-238 
 
 City state, as type of state, 15 ; in Greece 
 and Rome, 175-178; causes of de- 
 cline, 178-180 ; in Middle Ages, 180- 
 182; government in, 222-225 ; inter- 
 national relations of, 284-285 
 
 Civil authority, subordination of force 
 to, 131 
 
 Civil liberty, nature of, 23, 202-204; 
 evolution of, 207-215 ; distinct from 
 political liberty, 241 
 
 Civil service reform, 366 
 
 Class consciousness, 218 
 
 Clericals in Italy, 139 note 
 
 Clientes, 86 
 
 Climate, influence on state, 28-29 
 
 Clovis, 98 
 
 Club Politique, the, 137 
 
 Coast line, effect on naval strength, 1 52 
 
 Cobden Treaty, 297 
 
 Code of Manu, 315 
 
 College of Fetiales, 317 
 
 Colonies, Phoenician and Greek, 177 ; 
 influence of mercantilism on, 294; 
 wars caused by, 307-308; rivalries 
 over, 376 
 
 Co/onus, 127 
 
 Comitates, 174' 
 
 Comitia centuriata, 131 note 
 
 Commerce, relation of state to, 125; 
 strategic location f or, 1 52-1 53 ; effect 
 on rise of cities, 176-177, 180-181 ; 
 in ancient world, 289-290 ; in Middle 
 Ages, 290-292 ; theories of state 
 regulation of, 292-297; treaties con- 
 cerning, 297-298 ; wars of, 305-308 ; 
 influence on international law, 319- 
 320; relativity of policies of, 341- 
 342; in presentinternational relations, 
 375-376 
 
 Commercial companies, 125 
 
 Commission government in cities, 366 
 
 Common interests, as factor in state 
 composition, 156-158; recent growth 
 ° f > 372-374 ' 
 
 Commune Concilium, 242 
 
 Communes, 181 
 
INDEX 
 
 391 
 
 Communication, improvements in, as a 
 factor affecting state composition, 
 147-150; as a factor in democracy, 
 219-220; present importance of, 373 
 
 Communism, 267, 272 
 
 Community state, 171, 172-182 
 
 Compensation, international policy of, 
 380 
 
 Competition in theory of individualism, 
 264-265 
 
 Competitive bargaining, 261 note' 
 
 Composition of the state, 140-170 
 
 Compromise, necessary in political evo- 
 lution, 6; between sovereignty and 
 liberty, 200-207 > m establishing de- 
 mocracy, 220-221 ; in all phases of 
 political evolution, 382-387 
 
 Compulsory education, 250 
 
 Compulsory insurance, 128, 265 
 
 Concert of powers, 66, 191, 311, 328, 381 
 
 Concordats, 119 
 
 Condorcet, M. J. A., 237 
 
 Confederation, among Greek cities, 179, 
 224 note ; nature of, 335-336 
 
 Conference of London, 134, 331 
 
 Conflict as a factor in political evolu- 
 tion, 4-5, 47-48, 299-313 
 
 Conflict of laws, z88 
 
 Confucius, 90 
 
 Congo Free State, 334, 339 
 
 Congress of Vienna, 107, 144 note, 151, 
 160, 191, 327, 328 
 
 Consolato del Mare, 319 
 
 Constantine, 188 
 
 Constitution, nature of, 61-62 ; written, 
 206; bills of rights in, 213-214; in 
 evolution of democracy, 234-235 
 
 Constitution of the United States, 213, 
 
 235. 245 
 
 Constitutional law, 75 
 
 Consuls, 286, 291, 320 
 
 Continental system, 191, 308, 327 
 
 Contractual debts, 331 
 
 Cooley, C. H., on unity of political evo- 
 lution, 51-52 ; on expansion of social 
 activities, 281-282 
 
 Cooperation as a factor in political evo- 
 lution, 4-5, 48-50 
 
 Corn Laws, 30 
 
 Corporations in politics, 32, 207 
 
 Corrupt practices, laws against, 365 
 
 Cortes, 244 
 
 Costs, of progress, 18-19 ; of war, 312 
 
 Council of Four Hundred, in Athens, 
 223 
 
 Crimean War, 308, 329 
 
 Criminal law, 75 
 
 Cromwell, Q., 134, 219 
 
 Crusades, 41, 153, 180, 230, 286, 292, 
 
 3oS. 3i9 
 Custom as a source of law, 19 
 Cycles in political development, 14-15 
 Czar of Russia, rescript calling Hague 
 
 Conference, 312, 330 
 
 Dante, 118 
 
 Dark Ages, 15, 180 
 
 Data, sources of, in political science, 
 6-8 
 
 Dealey, J. Q., on economic bases of 
 human types, 32-33; on political 
 contributions of nationalities', 37 ; on 
 nature of constitution, 62 ; on rela- 
 tion of state and family, 1 1 1 ; on state 
 in settlement of disputes, 135 
 
 Declaration of Aix-la-Chapelle, 373 
 
 Declaration of London, 331 
 
 Declaration of Paris, 133 note, 329 
 
 Declaration of the Five Cabinets, 328 
 
 Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
 of Citizen, 213 
 
 De facto sovereignty, 67 
 
 Definition, of state, 1-2; of sovereignty, 
 2 ; of law, 2 ; of constitution, 61-62 ; 
 of kinds of law, 75-76; of nation and 
 nationality, 159 note ; of citizenship, 
 166; of alien, 167 ; of types of state, 
 171 ; of civil liberty, 202 ; of political 
 liberty, 202-203 ; of international pri- 
 vate law, 288 ; of international admin- 
 istrative union, 333 ; oipersonalunion, 
 334 ; of real-union, 334 ; of confed- 
 eration, 335; of federation, 336; of 
 international protectorate, 337 ; of 
 colonial protectorate, 338 ; of sphere 
 of influence, 338 ; of neutralized state, 
 
 339 . 
 
 Dejure sovereignty, 67 
 
 Deliari* League, 179 note 
 
 Deliberation as a function of govern- 
 ment, 248 
 
 Delphic Oracle, 316 
 
 Democracy, evolution of, 200-246 ; in- 
 fluence on theory of state function, 
 253-254; relation to socialism, 269- 
 270 ; present tendencies in, 362-372 
 
 Dependent states, 336 
 
 Despotism, early need for, 207-208, 2r7, 
 222; in Roman Empire, 225-227 
 
 De Tocqueville, M., 258 
 
 Dewey, J., and Tufts, J. H., on present 
 political position of woman, 11 3-1 14 
 
 Dictator created by popular revolution, 
 219 l 
 
 Diet of Poland, 324 
 
 Diocletian, 188 
 
392 
 
 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Diplomacy, development of, 314-332. 
 
 Disadvantages, of national unity, 165 ; 
 of large area, 197-198; of socialism, 
 275-277; of initiative and referen- 
 dum, 367-368; of democracy, 369- 
 
 372 
 Distribution in socialistic state, 272 
 Divine-right theory, 78-79, 89, 116-119, 
 
 218, 232, 251 note 
 Division of powers, 64 
 Divorce, iio-m, 114-115 
 Dorian migration, 301 
 Draco, 223 
 
 Drago Doctrine, 331 note 
 Dual Alliance, 379 
 Duma, 245-246 
 Dynamic, state as, 1 1 
 Dynastic wars, 306 
 
 Economic classes, 130 
 
 Economic conditions, as a factor in po- 
 litical evolution, 24, 29-33 > m state 
 origin, 90-95 ; as a cause of war, 96 ; 
 as a factor in modern democracy, 230 
 note ; as a basis of individualism, 263- 
 265 ; in international relations, 374- 
 
 375 
 Economic interpretation of history; 30- 
 
 3i. 2 7S 
 
 Efficiency, weakness of democracy in, 
 220-221, 369-371 
 
 Egypt, international position of, 337 
 
 Election, popular control of, 365 
 
 Electoral reform, 363-364 
 
 Electorate, as an element of govern- 
 ment, 62 ; in political organization, 
 206, 216-217 ; rise of, in early cities, 
 223 ; evolution of, 235-238 ; authority 
 of, 239 ; widening of, 363-364 
 
 Elements, of state, 1-2 ; of political evo- 
 lution, 2-5; of state origin, 81-82; 
 affecting composition of state, 14c— 
 1 58 ; in nationality, 1 58-1 59 ; of so- 
 cialism, 270-271 
 
 Ellwood, C. A., on conflict and cooper- 
 ation, 4-5 
 
 Ely, R. T., on historical order of public 
 expenditures, 249 note 
 
 Embargo, Jefferson's, 327 
 
 Embassies, establishment of, 323-324 
 
 Employers' liability, 128 
 
 Ends of the state, 345-361 
 
 Engels, F., 30, 268 
 
 England, influence of physical environ- 
 ment on, 27-29, 143, 152-153; civil 
 liberty in, 212-213; democratic de- 
 velopment in, 231-232; written con- 
 stitutions in, 234; political parties 
 
 in, 234 note ; evolution of electorate 
 in, 236-237 ; widening of suffrage in, 
 238 ; representation in, 242-243 ; mer- 
 cantilism in, 257 ; free trade in, 264- 
 265, 294-296. 
 .English Navigation Acts, 293, 295 
 
 Environment, of state, 2-3; physical, 
 27-30 
 
 Equality before the law, nature of, 
 204; evolution of, 214-215 
 
 Erasmus, 377 
 
 Essential functions, of the state, 249- 
 250 
 
 jStat, 103 
 
 Ethnic unity, 144-146, 164-165 
 
 Evolution, of state, 2-3 ; laws of, 3-4 ; 
 factors in, 4-5; problems of, 5-6; 
 data on, 6-8 ; general nature of, 12 ; 
 limitations on, 12-19; no single line 
 of, 14 ; no universal cycles in, 14-15 ; 
 general process of, 15-16; not al- 
 ways progressive, 17-18 ; conclusions 
 concerning, 23-24 ; influences affect- 
 ing, 25-52 ; of government, 60 ; of 
 sovereignty, 67-69 ; of criminal law, 
 75 ; of political liberty, 205-206, 233- 
 246 ; of civil liberty, 207-21 5 ; of elec- 
 torate, 235-238 ; psychic nature of, 
 261-263 ; general conclusions con- 
 cerning, 382-387 
 
 Executive department, 247-248 
 
 Expansion, caused by economic prog- 
 ress, 147-150; in decline of city 
 state, 179-180; effect of, on Roman 
 government, 186-187 ; importance of, 
 at present, 198-199; effect of, on gov- 
 ernment, 205-206, 216-217, 224-2^5 ; 
 of governmental activity, 279-280; 
 of electorate, 364 
 
 Experimentation in political science, 8 
 
 Experts in public administration, 369- 
 
 ' 37i 
 
 Exterritoriality, 21, 166; of consuls, 
 320 
 
 Factions in Greek and Roman cities, 
 178-179 
 
 Factors in political evolution, 4-5 
 
 Factory system, 268 
 
 Fairs, 291 
 
 Family, in state origin, 82-87 ; relation 
 to state, 1 08-1 1 5 
 
 Family of nations, 314, 373 
 
 Favorable balance of trade, 250, 293 
 
 Federation, value of, 155; process of 
 forming, 156; aid to popular sov- 
 ereignty, 206, 217, 233 ; nature of, 
 336; in world politics, 377-378 
 
INDEX 
 
 393 
 
 Feudal state, as type of state, 16; as 
 transition form, ioo ; economic basis 
 of, 122-123, 174-175; authority in, 
 227-229 ; international relations of, 
 285-286 
 
 Feudalism, 173-175, 209-210, 227-231, 
 304-305, 320-321 
 
 Fichte, J. G., 212 
 
 Filmer, Sir R., 118 
 
 Fishing tribes, 91 
 
 Food supply, as a cause of war, 96- 
 97 ; relation of state to, 124; present 
 importance of, 374-375 
 
 Force, in political evolution, 1 30-131 ; 
 in maintaining internal order, 135 
 
 Force theory of state origin, 78-79 
 
 Ford, H. J., on present political theory, 
 46 
 
 Fourier, Ch., 268 
 
 France, development of democracy in, 
 231-232; political parties in, 234 
 note ; widening of suffrage in, 238 ; 
 Physiocrats in, 257-258 ; preemi- 
 nence of, 325-326 ; electoral reform 
 in, 364 
 
 Francis I, of France, 231 
 
 Francis II, of Austria, on desirability 
 of national diversities, 160 
 
 Franco-Prussian War, 296, 330 
 
 Frederick the Great, 149-150, 326 
 
 Free cities, 181-182, 229 
 
 Free trade, 258, 264, 294-296 
 
 Freedom, of opinion, 214; of religion, 
 214 
 
 French Marine Ordinance, 320 
 
 French Revolution, theory of suffrage 
 during, 112; divine-right theory after, 
 118; recognition of nationality dur- 
 ing, 159; world empire resulting 
 from, 190; civil liberty in, 213; writ- 
 ten constitutions during, 235 ; effect 
 on tariffs, 297 ; wars of, 308 ; influ- 
 ence on international law, 326-327 
 
 Function of the state, 247-255 ; the- 
 ories of, 256-277 ; present theory of, 
 277-282 ; compromises in, 386 
 
 Fundamental OrdersofConnecticut,234 
 
 Future, importance of, in present po- 
 litical theory, 26 
 
 Fyrd, 97 
 
 Garner, J. W., on historical method in 
 political science, 9 ; on truth in former 
 theories of state origin, 79 ; on state 
 and family, 86 ; on nationality, 161, 
 164; on absolute monarchies, 230; 
 on state function, 256; on ends of 
 state, 350-351 
 
 Gefolge, 131 note, 174 
 
 Gehring, A., on Teutonic and Latin 
 characteristics, 36 
 
 General aspects of nature, 29-30 
 
 General-welfare theory of state func- 
 tion, 256, 277-282 
 
 Geneva Convention, 133, 329 
 
 Gens, 83, 86 
 
 Gentilis, A., 321 
 
 Geographic contour, 27, 141-144 
 
 Geographic unity, 59-60, 141-144, 145- 
 146 
 
 Geography, influence on political evo- 
 lution, 1 2-: 3; influence on state 
 origin, 80-81 ; influence on form of 
 state, 141-144 
 
 Gerrymander, 365 
 
 Gibraltar, 151 
 
 Giddings, F. J., on ancestor worship, 
 88 ; on transition from tribal to 
 political society, 100 ; on purpose of 
 state, 348-349 
 
 Godwin, W., 268 
 
 Golden Age, 383 
 
 Golden Rule, 116 
 
 Goodnow, F. J., on similarities in state 
 functioning, 250 
 
 Government, essential element of state, 
 2 ; nature and elements of, 60-65 ; 
 influence on state composition, 153- 
 1 56 ; organization of, 204-207 ; evolu- 
 tion of, 215-246; form of, and state 
 function, 253-254 ; popular control 
 over, 362-372 
 
 Government regulation, of industry 
 and trade, 128-130; of political 
 parties and corporations, 207 ; as a 
 state function, 254-255; inefficiency 
 of, 263-264 ; tendencies toward, 265, 
 279-281 
 
 Gracchi, the, 223 note 
 
 Great men, political importance of, 37- 
 
 38 
 
 Great Schism, 321 
 
 Greece, influence of physical environ- 
 ment on, 141, 142, 152; city states 
 in, 176-177; colonies of, 177; world 
 empire in, 184-185 ; liberty in, 208- 
 209; conception of authority in, 
 222-224; international relations in, 
 284-285 ; war in, 301 ; international 
 law in, 315-316; theories of state 
 purpose in, 346-347 ; administration 
 in, 369 
 
 Grotius,H.,69, 1 18, 211,298,322,323,377 
 
 Guilds, 33, 127, 181, 229, 252 
 
 Gunpowder in decline of feudalism, . 
 230, 292, 309 
 
394 
 
 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Habeas Corpus Act, 212 
 
 Hague Codes, 329 
 
 Hague conferences, 22, 134, 312, 330- 
 33 1 . 373-374. 378 
 
 Hague Court, 378 
 
 Hall, W. E., on territory essential to 
 state, 57 ; on conflict of laws, 288 
 
 Halleck, H. W., on external sov- 
 ereignty, 340 
 
 Haller, L. von, 119 
 
 Hamilton, Alexander, on extent of 
 territory and liberty, 59 
 
 Hanseatic League, 153, 181, 291, 309, 
 319-3,20 
 
 Hegemon, 284 note 
 
 Heimatlps, 169 
 
 Henry I of Germany, 97 
 
 Henry IV of France, 377 
 
 Henry VII of England, 324 
 
 Henry VIII of England, 119 
 
 Heredity, 4 
 
 Hershey, A. S., on Congress of Vienna, 
 327-328 
 
 Hill, D. J., on origin of modern states, 
 103-104 ; on warfare in political evo- 
 lution, 130-13 1 ; on mitigation of 
 the evils of war, 133-134; on Treaty 
 of Westphalia, 323 ; on internation- 
 alism, 356-357 
 
 Historical method in political science, 
 9-1 1 
 
 " Historical school," 296 
 
 Hobbes, T., 118 
 
 Hobhouse, L. T., on political retro- 
 gression, 17 ; on costs of progress, 
 18-19; on citizenship as a social 
 bond, 22 ; on governmental func- 
 tions, 254-255; on nature of social 
 evolution, 386-387 
 
 Hoe-culture, 91 
 
 Holtzendorff, F. von, on ends of state, 
 
 349 
 Holy Alliance, 118, 328, 333 
 Holy Roman Empire, 189-190, 229, 
 
 23 1 . 3 l6 > 334 
 Hongkong, 151 
 Hospitium, 167 
 
 House of Burgesses in Virginia, 244 
 House of Capet, 230 
 House of Commons, 239 
 Humboldt, W., 212 
 Hundred Years' War,~304, 309 
 
 Imitation in political evolution, 50-52 
 Imperial federation, 156 
 Imperialism, 195-196 
 Individual, relation to state, 23, 54-55 ; 
 importance of, 37-38 
 
 Individual liberty, nature of, 200-207 ; 
 civil, 207-215; political, 233-246; 
 beginnings of, 3 53-3 54 
 
 Individualism, associated with democ- 
 racy, 221 note ; among Teutons, 227 ; 
 as theory of state function, 256-266; 
 influences favorable to, 281 
 
 Industrial corporations, 128-129 
 
 Industrial Revolution, 31, 112, 267, 295, 
 
 34i 
 Industrialism, effect on family, 114-115 
 Industry, in state origin, 82, 90-95 ; in 
 state evolution, 121-130; govern- 
 ment regulation of, 1 29 
 Initiative, 206, 367-368 
 Instructed representation, 366 
 Instructions for the Guidance of the 
 Armies of the United States in the 
 Field, 329 
 Instrument of Government in Eng- 
 land, 234 
 Integration, tendencies toward, 164- 
 
 165 
 International administrative law, 334 
 International Administrative Unions, 
 
 333-334. 378-379 
 International conferences^ 329-331 
 International law, nature of, 76; influ- 
 ence of Roman law on, 190; condi- 
 tions leading to, 194; evolution of, 
 314-332 ; present tendencies in, 373- 
 
 374 
 International neutralization, 380 
 International private law, 288 
 International prize court, 331, 378 
 International protectorate, 337-338 
 International relations, conceptions of, 
 22; tendencies in, 194-196; devel- 
 opment of, 283-289; commercial, 
 289-299; warlike, 299-313; present 
 conditions in, 372-382 
 Internationalism, 195-196, 356-358, 
 
 372-379 
 Interparliamentary Union, 378 
 Intervention, 380-381 
 Inventions, influence on democracy, 
 
 219-220 
 Irreconcilables, 139 note 
 
 James I of England, charter granted 
 
 by, -213 note 
 Janus, temple of, 302 
 Japan, influence of religion in, 39-40 ; 
 
 now a world power, 381 
 Java, efficiency of Dutch administration 
 
 in, 221 note 
 Jefferson, Thomas, 211, 239, 294 
 Jenks,E., on political and civil liberty, 241 
 
INDEX 
 
 395 
 
 Johnson, E. R., on German railways, 
 
 356 
 Judicial decisions as source of law, 72 
 Judicial department, 247-249 
 Juridical method in political science, 9 
 Jurists, influence on law, 72 
 Jus conubii, 84 
 Jusjetiale, 285 note, 317 
 Jus gentium, 22, 168, 285, 317,321-322 
 Jus Hanseaticum Maritimum, 320 note 
 Jus Latii, 168 
 Jus naturale, 321 
 Jus sanguinis, 169 
 Jus soli, 169 
 
 Kant, I., 212, 377 
 
 " King's ear," 1 54 
 
 " King's eye," 154 
 
 " King's gates," 291 
 
 "' King's peace" in England, 318 
 
 Kingsley, C, 268 
 
 Kinship, relation to state, 19, 21 ; in 
 state origin, 81-87 ; organization 
 based on, 95 ; institutions resulting 
 from, 108-115; basis of authority in 
 early cities, 222-223 
 
 Knowledge, influence on political evo- 
 lution, 41-43 ; importance in democ- 
 racy, 368 
 
 Ku-Klux Klan, 136 
 
 Labor legislation, 128, 265 
 
 Labor unions, 127-128 
 
 Laboulaye, E., 212 
 
 Laissez Jaire, 46, 129, 253, 254, 256, 265, 
 271, 294-296 
 
 Land in political evolution, 122-124 
 
 Landesfrieden, 318 
 
 Lange, Ch., on origin of representation, 
 241-242 
 
 Language of diplomacy, 325 
 
 Lassalle, F., 268 
 
 Latifundia, 126 
 
 Latin America, written constitutions in, 
 235 ; political methods in, 385 
 
 Latin League, 285, 316 
 
 Law, essential element of state, 2 ; con- 
 ceptions of, 19-20 ; relation to sov- 
 ereignty, 66-67 > nature of, 69-7 1 ; 
 sources of, 71-74; classification of, 
 74-76; relation to morality, 12c— 
 i2i ; equality before, 204, 214-215; 
 changed theory of, 253-254 
 
 Law of nature, 70, 201 
 
 Lawrence, T. J., on territory and bound- 
 aries, 57-58 
 
 Laws of Oleron, 319 
 
 Laws of Wisby, 320 
 
 Leacock, S., on economic basis of indi- 
 vidualism, 263 
 Lecky, W. E. H., on Christianity and 
 
 warfare, 40 
 Legal equality, see Equality before the law 
 Legislation, as source of law, 72-74; 
 popular control over, 239-246, 362- 
 363 ; as function of government, 
 247-248 ; in modern democracies, 
 368-372 
 Leroy-Beaulieu, P., 212 
 " Levelers " in England, 237 
 Lex Canuleia de conubio, 84 note 
 Liberty, relation to authority, 260-207 ; 
 
 civil, 207-215; political, 233-246 
 Lilly, W. S., on ends of state, 350 
 Limitations, on political evolution, 12- 
 19 j on political generalizations, 382- 
 
 387 
 Local self-government, 23, 156, 206, 217, 
 
 233 
 Locke, John, 118, 211, 294, 364 
 Lombard League, 306 note 
 London, Declaration of, 331 
 London Company, civil liberty in 
 
 charter of, 213 note 
 Louis XI of France, 324 
 Louis XIV of France, 324-325 
 Louis Napoleon, 134 
 Lowell, A. L., on popular control of 
 
 legislation and administration, 239- 
 
 240 ; on relativity of political theory, 
 
 278, 387 
 Luther, M., 118 
 Lynch law, 136 
 
 Machiavelli, 70, 137, 319 
 
 Machinery, influence on democracy, 
 
 219-220 
 McKechnie, W. S., on classification of 
 
 state functions, 256 note ; on modern 
 
 theory of state function, 277-278 ; on 
 
 individual rights, 260 note ; on ends 
 
 of state, 359 
 Madison, James, on extent of territory 
 
 and liberty, 59 ; on natural rights, 
 
 211 
 Magna Charta, 212, 253 note 
 Maine, Sir II., on kinship in state 
 
 origin, 83 ; on transition from status 
 
 to contract, 252 note 
 Malthus, T. R., 258 
 Manhood suffrage, 237-238, 363-364 
 Manor, 173-175, 252 
 Mare clausum, 298 
 Mare nostrum, 298 
 Maritime law, among Greeks, 285 ; in 
 
 Middle Ages, 286 
 
396 
 
 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Marriage, influence on forms of kin- 
 ship, 84; evolution of, 109-m 
 
 Marx, Karl, 30, 268, 269, 276 
 
 Matriarchal family, 82^83, 85 
 
 Maurice, F. D., 268 
 
 Mazarin, 324 
 
 " Medicine men," 88 
 
 Mercantile system, 129, 257, 292-294 
 
 Methods of natural and social sciences, 
 8-1 1 
 
 Methuen Treaty, 297 
 
 Metternich, 328 
 
 Middle Ages, land owning and govern- 
 ment in, 57 ; sovereignty in, 68-69 > 
 law in, 70 ; family in, 1 10-1 1 1 ; divine- 
 right theory in, 1 16-1 18 ; social classes 
 in, 130 ; organization of army in, 132 ; 
 bond of unity in, 145 ; government 
 in, 155; form of state in, 174-175; 
 ideal of 'world empire in, 188-190; 
 conception of liberty in, 209-210; 
 authority in, 227-229 ; theory of suf- 
 frage in, 237 ; state functions in, 
 252 ; international relations in, 285- 
 286; warfare in, 304-306; interna- 
 tional law in, 317-318 
 
 Milan Decree, 327 
 
 Military organizations, relation to state, 
 
 Mill, J. S., 212; on administrative ef- 
 ficiency of aristocracies, 369 
 
 Minimum wage, 265 
 
 Missi dominici, 154, 229 
 
 Mohammed, 90 
 
 Mohammedan Empire, 15, 40, 90, 305 
 
 Monarchy, 229-231 
 
 Money in mercantilism, 292-293 
 
 Monod, M., on social evolution, 269 
 note 
 
 Monopoly price, 264 
 
 Monroe Doctrine, 22, 29, 66, 151, 328, 
 
 332. 381 
 Montesquieu, Ch. de, 211, 220, 237, 
 
 377 
 
 Morality, religions based on, 89-90; 
 relation to law, 1 20-1 21 
 
 Morgan, L. H., on economic interpre- 
 tation of history, 30; on superiority 
 of Aryan and Semitic peoples, 35 
 
 Mosaic Code, 315 
 
 " Most-favored-nation " clause, 298 
 
 Mulford, E., 119 
 
 Municipal law, 76 
 
 Munictpia in Roman Empire, 178 
 
 Napoleon, 16, 37, 107, 134, 151, 160, 
 
 172, 190, 219, 308, 327 
 Napoleonic Code, 169 note 
 
 National Assembly in France, 213 
 
 National empire, 171 
 
 National state, as type of state, 16, 171, 
 192-196 ; civil liberty in, 212 ; author- 
 ity in, 229-233 ; regulation of indus- 
 try in, 252-253 ; as end in political 
 evolution, 355-356 ; rivalries among, 
 376 
 
 Nationality, 35-37, 158-165, 191, 192- 
 
 IQ 5> 2 30, 379 
 
 Natural evolution, relation to social 
 evolution, 26; as basis of individ- 
 ualism, 261-263 
 
 Natural law, 211, 257 
 
 Natural monopolies, 264-265 
 
 Natural resources, 29 
 
 Natural' rights, 201, 2i:-2i2; as basis 
 of suffrage, 237-238 ; as basis of in- 
 dividualism, 259-260 
 
 Natural science, methods of, 8 ; rela- 
 tion to political progress, 41-42 
 
 Natural selection, 2, 4; influence of 
 cooperation on, 49 
 
 Naturalization, 170 
 
 Nature worship, 89 
 
 Naval stations, importance of, 310, 376 
 
 Navigation, freedom of, 298-299 
 
 Navy, influence on politics, 134-135 ; 
 influence on state composition, 151- 
 152 ; in present politics, 375-376 
 
 Neutralized state, 151 note, 198, 339, 
 380 
 
 Nomads, 91, 173 
 
 Nomination, popular control of, 365 
 
 Nomination by petition, 367 note 
 
 Occupatio, 326 note 
 
 Oligarchy in Rome, 225 
 
 Olympic Games, 285 note, 315 
 
 Open-door policy, 331 
 
 Optional functions of state, 250 
 
 Organization, of state, 60-65 > relation 
 of authority to liberty in, 200-246; 
 compromises in, 385 
 
 Oriental empire, as type of state, 15, 
 183-184 ; despotism in, 207-208 ; au- 
 thority in, 222 ; international rela- 
 tions in, 283-284 ; war in, 300-301 ; 
 international law in, 314-315; theo- 
 ries of state purpose in, 346 
 
 Origin of the state, geographical, 13; 
 historical, 77-107 
 
 Ostracism, 224 
 
 Outlaw, 109 
 
 Owen, R., 268, 269 
 
 Panama Canal, 149, 153, 157 
 Panama Canal tolls, 332 note 
 
INDEX 
 
 397 
 
 Pan-Germanism, 161 
 
 Pan-Slavism, 161 
 
 Paris, Declaration of, 133 note, 329; 
 Treaty of, 299, 307, 326 
 
 Parliament in England, evolution of, 
 242-243 
 
 Parliament of Frankfurt, 213 
 
 Passports, 287 
 
 Pastoral tribes, 92 ; in warfare, 96 ; as 
 form of state, 172-173 
 
 Paternalism, present tendencies to- 
 ward, 19; in absolute monarchies, 
 211 
 
 Patria potest as, 83, 109 
 
 Patriarchal family, 83-85 
 
 Patriarchal tribe, 172-173 
 
 Patriotism created by democracy, 220- 
 221 
 
 Pax Romana, 318, 343 
 
 Peace, influences favoring, 311-312; 
 
 372-374. 377-379 
 
 Peace of God, 318 
 
 Peace of Paris, 151 note 
 
 Peace of Utrecht, 1 51 note 
 
 Peloponnesian War, 301 
 
 Penn, William, 377 
 
 Personal allegiance in feudal state, 
 227-228 
 
 Personalunion, 334 
 
 Petition of Right, 212, 253 note 
 
 Phalange, 269 note 
 
 Philip II of Spain, 231 
 
 Philippines, political education in, 221 
 note 
 
 Phoenicia, influence of physical envi- 
 ronment on, 142, 152; colonies of, 
 
 177 
 
 Physical environment, 27-30 ; influence 
 on state origin, 80-81 ; as basis of 
 state, 140-144 
 
 Physiocrats, 257, 294 
 
 Pithecanthropus erectus, 81 note 
 
 Plato on citizenship, 166 
 
 Plebs, 84 
 
 Poland, partition of, 326 
 
 Polemarch, 70 
 
 Political " boss," 234 note 
 
 Political clubs, 136-137 
 
 Political conceptions, changes in, 19-23 
 
 Political education, resulting from de- 
 mocracy, 22c— 221, 238; resulting from 
 initiative and referendum, 367-368 
 
 Political evolution, nature of, 2-3, 1 2 ; 
 laws of, 3-4 ; factors in, 4-5 ; prob- 
 lems in, 5-6 ; data of, 6-8 ; methods 
 of study, 8-10 ; limitations on, 12-19 > 
 theories of, 25-26; complexity of, 
 26-27 ; influences affecting, 27-52 ; 
 
 social institutions resulting from, 
 108-139; eno =s °f state m > 346-361 ; 
 present tendencies in, 362-387 
 
 Political genius, of nations, 162 ; as end 
 of state, 354-356 
 
 Political history, 10-11 
 
 Political liberty, nature of, 23, 202- 
 203, 204-206 ; evolution of, 233-246 ; 
 distinct from civil liberty, 241 ; in 
 present democracies, 362-372 
 
 Political party, as element of govern- 
 ment, 63; economic basis of, 130; 
 as voluntary political organization, 
 137-138; in present states, 138-139; 
 as extralegal association, 207 ; as 
 aid to popular sovereignty, 217, 233- 
 234 ; relation to centralized and de- 
 centralized governments, 234 note; 
 increasing importance of, 364-365 
 
 Political science, methods of, 7-1 1 
 
 Political theory, as data in political 
 evolution, 10-1 1 ; origin of, 43 ; re- 
 lation to institutions, 43-44 ; nature 
 of, 44-45 ; present tendencies in, 
 45-46 ; relativity of, 46 ; in Middle 
 Ages, 188-190 ; of civil liberty, 214 ; 
 of the suffrage, 235-238; of state 
 purpose, 345-361 
 
 Pope, temporal power of, 228 
 
 Popular legislation, 362-363, 367-369, 
 
 370-371 
 Popular sovereignty, 205-207, 216-222, 
 
 233-246, 362, 365-366, 367-369 
 Population, as element of state, 2, 53- 
 
 56; tendencies toward increase in, 
 
 196-199; relation to food supply, 
 
 374-375 
 
 Praetor peregnnus, 70, 72, 168, 317 
 
 Pragmatic Sanction, 326 
 
 Preferential tariffs, 297 
 
 Primrose League, the, 137 
 
 Private law, 75-76 
 
 Private rights, 209 
 
 Private warfare, 285, 304 
 
 Problems, in political evolution, 5-6; 
 in family, 112; in political organi- 
 zation, 204-205, 215 
 
 Production, improvements in, 147-148 
 
 Progress, in evolution, 17-18 ; costs of, 
 18-19; relation to stagnation, 101- 
 103; in socialism, 275-276; real 
 nature of, 382-387 
 
 Property, in political evolution, 31, 94- 
 95 ; right of aliens to, 168 
 
 Protected state, 338 
 
 Protective tariffs, 295-297, 375 
 
 Protectorate, international, 337-338 j 
 colonial, 338 
 
398 
 
 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Protestant Reformation, see Refor- 
 mation 
 
 Proudhon, P. J., 268 
 
 Proxenoi, 167 
 
 Psychological method in political 
 science, 9 
 
 Public law, 75 
 
 Public opinion, necessary for political 
 parties, 139; influence on govern- 
 ment, 362-369 
 
 Public order based on force, 135 
 
 Public rights, 209 
 
 Pufendorf, S. L-, 211 
 
 Puritan Revolution, 237 
 
 Purpose of the state, 345-361 
 
 Race, 34-35 
 
 Readjustment, necessity 0^207,380-387 
 
 Realunion, 334 
 
 Recall of elected officials, 366 
 
 Reciprocity, 296 
 
 Referendum, 206, 367-368 
 
 Reform Acts in England, 30, 238 
 
 Reformation, influence, on family, 1 1 1 ; 
 on civil liberty, 210; on suffrage, 
 237 ; on international relations, 287 ; 
 wars of, 306-307 ; influence on inter- 
 national law, 321 
 
 Reichstag, 239 
 
 Reinsch, P. S., on international rivalry, 
 195 ; on international unity, 357-358 ; 
 on expert administration, 37 1 
 
 Relativity, of external sovereignty, 339- 
 340; of commercial policies, 341- 
 342 ; of state purpose, 359-361 ; of 
 political methods, 382-387 
 
 Religion, relation to state, 19, 21 ; as a 
 factor in political evolution, 39-41 ; 
 .in state origin, 8i, 87-90 ; in military 
 state, 99; basis of early authority, 
 222-223 ; wars of, 306-307 
 
 Renaissance, 287, 292 
 
 Representation, 23, 154-155, 206, 217, 
 232-233 ; evolution of, 241-246 ; 
 growing distrust of, 362 ; instructed, 
 366 ; popular control of, 367 
 
 Restraint in early law, 20 
 
 Retrogression, political, 17-18 
 
 Revolution, relation to sovereignty, 67 ; 
 relation to military forces, 134 ; in 
 securing democracy, 232-233 ; in 
 securing written constitutions, 235 ; 
 in widening suffrage, 238 ; in creating 
 representative assemblies, 245-246; 
 in early socialism, 270 
 
 Revolution of 1848, 270 
 
 Rhodian Sea Law, 316 
 
 Ricardo, 1)., 258 
 
 Richelieu, 324 
 
 Ritchie, D. G., on equality of social 
 rights, 371 
 
 Robespierre, 237 
 
 Robinson, J. H„ and Beard, C. A., on 
 importance of growth of knowledge, 
 43 ; on necessity of intelligence in 
 democracies, 368 note 
 
 Rodbertus, K, 268 
 
 Roman Catholic Church, temporal 
 authority of, in Middle Ages, 228 ; 
 socialistic elements in, 267 
 
 Roman law, influence of, on medieval 
 cities, 182 ; preservation of, in Middle 
 Ages, 189-190 ; influence of, on inter- 
 national law, 317 
 
 Rome, influence of physical environ- 
 ment on, 142, 186; city state in, 177- 
 178 ; world empire in, 185-188 ; liberty 
 in, 209 ; authority in, 224-227 ; inter- 
 national relations of, 285 ; wars of, 
 302-303 ; international law in, 316- 
 317 j theories of state purpose in, 
 347 ; administration in, 369-370 
 
 Rota, the, 136-137 
 
 Rousseau, J. J., on maximum population 
 of state, 56; on extent of territory, 
 58; on natural rights, 211, 237; on 
 laissez faire, 294; on popular sover- 
 eignty, 364 ; on world state, 378 
 
 Russian Constitution of 1906, 214 note 
 
 Russo-Japanese War, 245-246, 308 
 
 St. Jerome on marriage in the Roman 
 
 Empire, no 
 Saint-Pierre, Abbe, 378 
 Saint-Simon, H. de, 268, 269 
 Satrap, 154, 222 
 Say, J, B., 258 
 Scutage, 132 
 Sea power, importance of, 1 51-1 53, 309- 
 
 3 J o, 37° 
 
 Seager, H. R., on moral advantages of 
 socialism, 274 
 
 Seeley, Sir J. R., on aim of state, 345 
 
 Seizure, 122 
 
 Self-government, nature of, 206; evo- 
 lution of, 215-^246 
 
 Seligman, E. R. A., on economic inter- 
 pretation of history, 30-31, 32; on 
 economic basis of feudalism, 1 22-1 23 ; 
 on private property, 124; on slavery 
 and serfdom, 126-127 ; on state func- 
 tions, 255 
 
 Seljuk Turks, 134 
 
 Semisovereign states, 336-337 
 
 Semple, E. C., on elements of physical 
 environment, 56; on pastoral tribes, 
 
INDEX 
 
 399 
 
 92 ; on ethnic and geographic unity, 
 •146 ; on increase in area and popula- 
 tion, 196-197 
 
 Senate in Rome 223 
 
 Seneca on marriage in the Roman 
 Empire, no 
 
 Separation of powers, 64, 247 
 
 Serfdom, 126-127, 174, 215, 228 
 
 Shaw, A., on citizenship and govern- 
 ment, 200 
 
 Shipping subsidies, 299 
 
 Short ballot, 366 
 
 Single tax, 123 
 
 Slavery, 91-93, 125-126, 215 
 
 Slavs, 34 
 
 Smith, Adam, on individualism, 258- 
 259 ; on free trade, 295 
 
 Social bond, conception of, 21-22 
 
 Social-contract theory, 78-79, 251 
 
 Social evolution, relation to natural 
 evolution, 26 
 
 Social institutions, 33-34 ; relation to 
 state, 108-139 
 
 Social sciences, interrelations of, 7-8 ; 
 methods of, 8-10 ; relation to politi- 
 cal progress, 42 
 
 Socialism, 41, 129, 130, 138 ; and de- 
 mocracy, 221 note ; as theory of state 
 function, 254, 256, 266-267 
 
 Solon, 223 note 
 
 Sound dues, 299 
 
 South American republics, independ- 
 ence of, 106 
 
 Sovereignty, essential element of state, 
 2 ; nature of, 65-67 ; evolution of, 
 67-69 ; relation to liberty, 200-207 ; 
 relativity in external phase, 339-340 
 
 Spanish-American War, 32 
 
 Spargo, J., and Arner, G. L., on func- 
 tions of socialist state, 271-272 
 
 Spartan League, 301 
 
 Spencer, H., on property and the army, 
 132; on individualism, 212; on prog- 
 ress of social organization, 252 note 
 
 Sphere of influence, 287, 338-339 
 
 Staatslos, 169 
 
 Stagnation, 101, 208 
 
 Stahl, F. J., 119 
 
 Standing armies, 132-133 ; dread of, 
 
 •34-135 
 
 Stasis, 178 
 
 State, permanence of, 1 ; essential ele- 
 ments of, 1-2 ; evolution of, 2-3 ; as 
 objective and subjective, 10-11; as 
 static and dynamic, 1 1 ; internal and 
 external aspects of, 12; types of, 1 5- 
 16; conceptions of nature of, 19; 
 relation to state, 22 ; relation to 
 
 individual, 22-23 i nature of, 53-76 ; 
 origin of, 77-107 ; relation to family, 
 108-115; relation to church, 115- 
 121 ; relation to industrial organiza- 
 tions, 121-130; relation to military 
 organizations, 130-135 ; relation to 
 voluntary political organizations, 135- 
 139; composition of, 140-170; forms 
 of, 1 71-199; organization of author- 
 ity in, 200-246; functions of, 247- 
 282 ; relation to other states, 283- 
 344 ; purpose of, 345-361 ; present 
 tendencies in, 362-387 
 
 States-general, 244 
 
 Static, condition of state, 1 1 
 
 Statute of Winchester, 125 note 
 
 Suarez, F. de P., 70, 322 
 
 Suevi, customs in warfare, 97 
 
 Suez Canal, 149 
 
 Suffrage, of women, n 2-1 14; theories 
 of, 235-238 ; widening of, 363-364 
 
 Sully, Duke of, 377 
 
 Supreme Court of the United States 
 on citizenship, 166 
 
 Switzerland, influence of nature on, 27, 
 141, 143; popular sovereignty in, 
 240; initiative and referendum in, 
 367 note 
 
 Taboo, 88 
 
 Taine, M., 258 
 
 Tammany Hall, 137 
 
 Tariff, relativity of policies of, 341- 
 
 342 
 Taxation, relation to army, 132 
 Teller, Hon. H. M., on standing armies, 
 
 134 
 Territorial sovereignty, 20-21, 57, 123- 
 
 124; in international law, 320-321 
 Territory, essential element of state, 2, 
 
 56-59; organization based on, 95; 
 
 tendencies toward increase in, 196- 
 
 199 
 Teutons, 15, 16, 34, 39, no, 174, 188, 
 
 203, 210, 227, 377 
 Theocracy, 87, 208, 217, 222 
 Theory, of political development, 25- 
 
 26 ; of the state, 43-46 ; of state 
 
 origin, 77-80 ; of state function, 251- 
 
 252 
 Thetae, 86 
 
 Thirty Years' War, 41, 307, 323 
 Thomas Aquinas, 70 
 Totem, 88 
 
 Trade, relation of state to, 125 
 Transportation, improvements in, 147- 
 
 150 ; relation to democracy, 219-220 ; 
 
 relation to world politics, 375 
 
400 
 
 PROBLEMS IN POLITICAL EVOLUTION 
 
 Treaties, commercial, 297-298; dip- 
 lomatic, 373-374 
 
 Tribal state, 172-173 
 
 Triple Alliance, 333, 379 
 
 Triple Entente, 379 note 
 
 Tropics, in state origin, 81 ; influence 
 on white race, 376-377 
 
 Truce of God, 318 
 
 Tudors, in England, 231 
 
 Turgot, A. R. J., 37? 
 
 Turks, 226 
 
 Twelve Tables of Roman Law, no 
 
 Types, of state, 15-16; economic bases 
 of, 31-32, 171-196 
 
 Union for the Publication of Customs 
 Tariffs, 333, 378 
 
 Union for Railway Transportation, 333, 
 378 
 
 Union League, 137 
 
 Unions among states, 332-340 
 
 United States, influence of physical 
 environment on, 27-29, 141, 143, 153 ; 
 political parties in, 234 note ; widen- 
 ing of suffrage in, 238 ; influence on 
 international law, 331-332 ; foreign 
 relations in, 344 
 
 Universal Postal Union, 333, 378 
 
 Universal Telegraphic Union, 333, 378 
 
 Usage as a source of law, 7 1 
 
 User, 122 
 
 Utility, as basis of state function, 278- 
 279 ; as basis of international law, 
 
 374 
 Utopian socialism, 269 
 Utopias, 267 note 
 Utrecht, Peace of, 325 
 
 Variation, 4 
 
 Ver sacrum, 304 note 
 
 Vienna, Congress of, see Congress of 
 
 Vienna 
 Vigilance committees, 136 
 Villa, 174 
 Village community, 173-175 ; authority 
 
 in, 227-228 
 Villey, E., on ends of state, 350 
 Virgin, worship of, and position of 
 
 woman, in 
 Volkerwanderungen, 96 
 Voltaire, 211 
 
 War of 1812, 295, 308, 327 
 War of the Roses, 30, 230 , 
 
 Ward, L. F., on conquest and state 
 origin, 98 
 
 Warfare, creates social bonds, 21—22; 
 relation to Christianity, 40, 303-304 : 
 in state origin, 81-82, 95-100; insti- 
 tutions resulting from, 130-135 ; 
 causes of, 299-300 ; among primitive 
 peoples, 300-301 ; among Greeks 
 and. Romans, 301-303; in Middle 
 Ages, 304-305 ; modern causes of, 
 305-308 ; methods of, 309 ; sea power 
 in, 309-310; consequences of, 310- 
 311; costs of, 312; permanence of, 
 313, 375 ; various results of, 342 
 
 Washington, George, 119 
 
 Westphalia, Treaty of, 151 note, 287, 
 307, 323, 325 
 
 Weyl, W. E., on industrial and social 
 program of democracy, 372 
 
 William the Conqueror, 229 
 
 Willoughby, W. W., on minimum popu- 
 lation of state, 55; on territory as 
 essential to state, 57 ; on tribe and 
 state, 87 ; on Oriental despotism, 208 ; 
 on so'cial evolution, 262—263 ; on state 
 function, 278-279 ; on tendencies 
 toward individualism, 281 ; on Greek 
 political theory, 346-347 ; on ends 
 of state, 350 
 
 Wilson, W., on state function, 255 ; on 
 growth of democracy, 362-363 ; on 
 nature of political development, 387 
 
 Witanagemot, 242 
 
 Wolff, Ch. von, 211 
 
 Woman suffrage, n 2-1 14 
 
 Workmen's compensation, 128 
 
 World federation, 196, 377-378 
 
 World politics, 158; present tenden- 
 cies in, 372-382 
 
 World state, as type of state, 15-16, 
 171; in Orient, 183-184; of Alex- 
 ander, 184-185; of Rome, 185-188; 
 in Middle Ages, 188-190; of Napo- 
 leon, 190-191 ; advantages of, 191- 
 192 ; existing elements of, 377-379 
 
 World unity, tendencies toward, 377— 
 382 
 
 Written constitutions in growth of 
 democracy, 234-235 
 
 Written law, advantages of, 204, 223 
 
 Zeitgeist, 50 
 Zollverein, 341 
 Zwingli, U., 118 
 
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