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SPEECHES FROM THIICYDDES. 
 
LONDON : PRINTED BY 
 
 SPOTTISWOODE ANU CO., KRW-STREET SQUAUB 
 
 AND PAULIAMENT STilEET 
 
'SPEECHES 
 
 EBOM 
 
 THUCYDIDES 
 
 TEANSLATED INTO ENGLISH. 
 
 FOE THE USE OF STUDENTS. 
 
 "VT-iTu -A.zsr iisrmi03DT7axi03sr A.3sri>. itotbs. 
 
 BY 
 
 HENEY MUSGRAVE WILKINS, M.A. 
 
 FELLOW OF MEIITON COLLEGE, OXFOKD, 
 
 NEW EDITION, CAREFULLY REVISED. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 LONGMANS, GEEEN, AND GO. 
 
 1873. 
 

 X 
 
 l^l?) 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PASS 
 
 Preface xi 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 OHAP. 
 
 I. On the chief Diemctoiibs which be8bt the Teanslator 
 
 OF Thucybiiibs xvii 
 
 § I. The oliscurity of Ms style xviii 
 
 § a. The length and involution of his periods . , . . xxi 
 
 § 3. His use and abuse of antithesis ...... xxii 
 
 § 4.. And of alliteration xxvi 
 
 § 5. Cases in which it is needful to supply a link in order to 
 
 maintain the connection of the sense .... xxviii 
 
 § 6. Passages requiring the transposition of a clause . . xxx 
 
 II. The Speeches, considered in thbie Literary and His- 
 
 lOEicAL Aspects ........ xxxi 
 
 § I. The literary and historical value of the speeches . . xxxi 
 
 § z. The wide difference of the outward conditions under which 
 
 ancient and modem historians wrote, .... xxxii 
 
 § 3. made the introduction of set speeches natural to the former, 
 
 uncongenial to the latter . . .... xxxiv 
 
 § 4. Thucydides, in the composition of his speeches, adheres 
 more strictly than later classic historians to historical 
 truth XXXV 
 
 § 5. In what sense his speeches are authentic : method by which 
 speeches were preserved in the classic seras of Greece 
 and Rome xxxv 
 
 § 6. The degree of authenticity which Thucydides claims for 
 his speeches agrees with the presumptions arisiag from 
 internal evidence xxxvii 
 
viu CONTENTS. 
 
 PAOE 
 CHAP. 
 
 § 7. which seem to indicate that, while the outline of the 
 several speeches has been preserved, the elaboration 01 
 detail, and the speculative or didactic element, is mainly 
 the work of the historian ; • ^^*™" 
 
 § 8. so that the question of the degree of individuality infused 
 into the various harangues, is rather a question of dra- 
 matic consistency than of historic fidelity. The con- 
 siderations which influenced, and the limits which 
 restricted, his observance of ' the law of propriety ;' his 
 delineations of character, natural and artistic . . xl 
 
 § 9. His management of the element of contrast . . . xlu 
 § 10. The impartiality with which he dramatises opinion . . xliii 
 
 §11. The chief principles upon which he regulated the intro- 
 duction of the speeches ....... xlv 
 
 SPEECHES. 
 
 > Speech op the Corcxeean Envoys (Bk. I. chs. 32-37) . . i 
 
 -<Replt q]? the Cokinihian Envoys (Bk. I. chs. 37-44-) . . 10 
 
 Speech or the Cokinihian Envoys at the Spabtan Congress 
 
 (Bk. I. chs. 68-72) 17 
 
 -Speech oe the Athenian Envoys on the same occasion as 
 
 THE PRECEDING (Bk. I. chs. 68-79) *S 
 
 /Speech of KiNa Aechidamus at Spaeta (Bk. I. chs. 80-86) . 33 
 
 ^PEECH op Pericles, addressed to the Athenian Popuiab 
 
 Assembly (Bk. I. chs. 140-145) 51 
 
 ^ Speech op King- Aechidamtis, addressed to the Ofpicees op 
 
 THE Peloponnesian Army (Bk. H. oh. 11) . . . . 60 
 
 >rirNERAL Oration delivered by Pericles (Bk. H. chs. 35-47). 63 
 
 y Speech op Pericles, addressed to the Athenian Popular 
 
 Assembly (Bk. II. chs. 60-65) 78 
 
 > Speech addressed by the Peloponnesian Commanders to the 
 
 Forces on boaed their Fleet in the Gulp op Corinth (Bk 
 
 Il-ch. 87) '. g6 
 
 > Speech op Phormio, the Athenian Admiral, on the same 
 
 occasion as the preceding Address (Bk. II. ch. 89) . o 
 
 --'Speech of the Envoys of Mytilene, at the Olympic Festival 
 (Bk. in. chs. 9-15) 
 
CONTENTS. IX 
 
 wm 
 
 i 
 
 tifr 
 
 I is 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Speech op Teutiapltjs, at Embaifm (Bk. III. ch. 30) . . .101 
 
 Speech op Olbon', delivebei) bepoee the Athenian Populab 
 ■ssjvi Assembly (Bk. III. chs. 37-41) 104:' 
 
 Speech op Diodotus, in keplt id the pkeceding Address (Bk. 
 III. chs. 42-49) .110 
 
 Speech op the Piat^ian Deputies (Bk. III. chs. 53-60) . .119 
 Speech op the Thbbaus ds ebply (Bk. III. chs. 61-68) . .129 
 
 Speech addebssed by Demosthenes to his Soldiebs at Pyios 
 (Bk.IV. ch. 10) 138 
 
 Speech op the Laced.s:monian Ambassadoes bbpobe the Athenian 
 Populab Assembly (Bk. IV. chs. 17-21) 14.1 
 
 Speech op Hebmogbates at the Oongbess held at Gela (Bk. IV. 
 chs. 59-65) 147 
 
 Speech op Beasidas at Aoanihus (Bk. IV. chs. 85-88) . . .155 
 
 Speech op Pasondas to his Soldiebs (Bk. IV. ch. 92) . . .160 
 
 Speech op Hippockates to his Teoops (Bk. IV. ch. 95). . . 163 
 
 Speech op Beasidas to his Soldiebs (Bk. IV. ch. 126) . . . 165 
 
 Speech op Bbasidas at Amphipolis (Bk. V. ch. 9) . . . 168 
 
 Discussion between the Athenian and Melian Neootiatoes 
 (Bk. V. chs. 85-113) 171 
 
 Speech op Nicias at Athens (Bk. VI. chs. 9-15) . . .185 
 
 4 Speech op Alcibiades, in eeply to the preceding Addbess (Bk. 
 
 VI. chs. 16-19) • ■ ■ • ■ 193 
 
 Second Speech op Nicias, at Athens (Bk. VI. cha. 20-24) . . 200 
 ii Speech op Heemoceates, at Syracuse (Bk. VI. chs. 33-35) . .205 
 
 Opposition Speech op Athenagobas, in eeply to Heemoceates 
 (Bk. VI. chs. 36-41) . . .211 
 
 '' Speech op Nicias to his Soldiers (Bk. VI. ch. 68) . . .219 
 
 Speech op Heemoceates at Oamaeina (Bk. VI. chs. 76-81) . . 221 
 
 Speech op Euphemus, in reply to Heemoceates (Bk. VI. 
 chs. 82-88) 229 
 
CONTHNTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Speech op Alcibiabes, at Spabia (Bk. VI. chs. 89-93) . • • *37 
 Speech adbeessed by Nioias to the Athenian and Attiiiiaiit 
 
 POECES EMPIOyDD IN THE SlEGB OE StKACUSE (Bk. VII. chs. 61-65) 244 
 
 Speech addkessed bt Gtxippits to the Fokces engaged in the 
 Depence oe SynAcirsE (Bk. VII. chs. 66-69) .... 249 
 
 Speech op Nicias to his Soldiebs, on commencing theie Betbeat 
 PKOM Steaouse (Bk. VII. ch. 77) 253 
 
PKEFACE. 
 
 In the good old days, before the Ecclesiastical Commission 
 had equalised the revenues of so many of the Anglican 
 sees, a Prelate, on his promotion from a poor to a 
 wealthy Bishopric, received the felicitations of a curate, 
 who piously expressed his ' trust that the honour con- 
 ferred might only prove a prelude to his Lordship's 
 translation to a heavenly mitre.' ' Sir,' replied the 
 Bishop, ' I prefer the original to the translation.' 
 
 The certainty of a similar verdict from the Academical 
 public in my own case, need not deter a writer, who, in 
 the following version of the speeches interwoven with the 
 narrative of Thucydides, has not aspired beyond the 
 modest aim of aiding, so far as lay in his power, the 
 candidate for classical honours at our Universities and 
 Colleges. Such an aim, however, involves no sacrifice of 
 taste or freedom : the style of translation now in vogue 
 in the ' Honour Schools ' of Oxford, and also at that 
 illustrious citadel of scholarship, the University of Cam- 
 bridge, being sufficiently liberal to satisfy the taste of the 
 general reader.^ The opportunities of access to scholars 
 
 * There is much truth in the fol- in which, if all cannot be scholars, 
 lowing remark of the Saturday Re- yet nearly all educated people like 
 view, Jan. 15, 1870 : ' This is an age to know something, even at second- 
 
xii FBEFAGE. 
 
 and professors afforded by residence at College, nave 
 made me familiar with the Oxford standard of trans- 
 lation, which is close but idiomatic. In the execution of 
 my task, I have been much indebted to the valuable coun- 
 sels of the late Professor Conington, and to the kindness 
 with which several Tutors and Examiners, especially the 
 Eev. John E. T. Eaton, late Fellow and Tutor of Merton 
 College, Pubhc Examiner, and Editor of ' The Politics of 
 Aristotle : ' the Eev. Thomas Fowler, Fellow and Tutor 
 of Lincoln College, and Public Examiner : and Mr. Hugh 
 E. P. Piatt, Fellow and Tutor of the same College : have 
 revised portions of my MS. But these gentlemen are 
 not responsible for any errors the version may contain. 
 Clearer evidence of the style of translation fashionable at 
 Cambridge cannot be desired, than that given by the 
 Eev. E. Burn, Fellow and Tutor of Trinity College, in 
 his excellent paper ' On the Course of Eeading for the 
 Classical Tripos.'^ After stating that strict fidehty is 
 required, 'so far as is consistent with elegant and idio- 
 matic English,' he adds, ' The object of the translator 
 should be to present the sense of the whole passage in an 
 
 liandj of the gi-eat works of classical greatly facilitated by tlie use of good 
 
 literature.' — p. 89. Professor Con- models ; those who acquire the clas- 
 
 ington's observations ( Quarterly Re- sical language with little or no help 
 
 vieiD, July, 1861, p. 104) on the from masters — probably an increas- 
 
 increasing demand for, and the edu- ing class— find the book a natural 
 
 cational value of, translations from substitute for the living teacher ; and 
 
 the classics, are worth citing, there is a large class of readers to 
 
 ' Schoolmasters,' he says, ' are, we whom Latin and (>reek are as un- 
 
 fancy, beginning to tolerate, under attainable as Coptic, yet who are 
 
 certain modifications, what they can- interested in knowing what the an- 
 
 not exterminate, while they see that cients thought and said.' 
 
 among their elder pupils at any rate " Studenfs Guide to the Umverstty 
 
 the practice of t3-anslation into Eng- of Cambridge, pp. 120 121 Cam- 
 
 lish — one of the most valuable parts bridge: 1862. ' ' 
 of a classical education — may be 
 
PBEFAGE. XUl 
 
 English dress. All affectation or forced imitation of the 
 peculiarities of any English writer should be avoided, 
 and the version made to flow as naturally as possible.'^ 
 
 At present, so far as Enghsh versions are concerned, the 
 field, for all practical purposes, is occupied solely by the 
 portly pedantry of Bloomfield, the grotesque likeness of 
 Hobbes, the hideous fidehty of Dale, and the vagrant 
 slipshod paraphrase of Crawley. Mr. Dale's version, 
 though in many respects useful, is not always a safe 
 guide even for passmen, for whom it is intended. A 
 purely literal* transcript of so difficult an author often 
 deepens the darkness of the original ; besides, he fre- 
 quently vitiates the sense by his mistranslation of the 
 particles. Thus, he is constantly giving ydp an argumen- 
 tative, when it has what grammarians call an epexegetic 
 sense : as in Bk. II. ch. 37, i : IV. 126, 2 ; he sometimes 
 even confounds ou with (ji.rj, as I have shown in a note on 
 jtAT) ju.oi/oy auTO(pa)poug, Bk. VI. 38, 4; he turns aXXcov, 
 which GoUer would have told him how to construe, into 
 nonsense, Bk. VII. 61, i ; and loses the thread of the 
 argument, Bk. III. 45, 4, by referring roCroo and ro'Ss to 
 the same subject.^ Again (Bk. EH. chs. 38 & 42), he 
 misconstrues the phrase 7\.6yov TrpoSsTvai, which, as Poppo 
 
 • In order to give a clearer idea of ing on ropes with fettered legs : ' 
 the degree of freedom allowed, Mr. remarking of the old school of literal 
 Bum adds : ' The translation of the translators, that ' all their transla- 
 BepiMie of Plato by Davies and tions require to be translated into 
 Vaughan, or that of the Ffusdnis by English.' Dr. Johnson was doubt- 
 Wright, or of the Orations against less right in saying that the first 
 dphobus by Kennedy, may be taken merit of a translation consists in its 
 as examples of the best style of ren- being read with pleasure by those 
 dering.' who do not know the original. 
 
 ^ Dryden, in the Preface to his ' See also notes at pp. 203, 208, 
 
 translation of Ovid's Epistles, com- below, 
 pares verbal translation to 'danc- 
 
XIV PBEFAOE. 
 
 (ed. min., in his note on ch. 38, i) could have informed 
 him, applies to the magistrates who ex officio sanctioned 
 afresh discussion of the Mytilenean question: not, as he 
 takes it, to the politicians who proposed the reopening of 
 the case. See also Schomann, 'De Com. Athen.' pp. 82, 
 108 ; 'Index Oratt. Att.' in voce TrportdrjfA.i. 
 
 The editions on which I have chiefly rehed, are those 
 of Kruger (German), i860: Dr. Arnold, Oxford, 1830- 
 1835: GoUer's second' edition, Leipsic, 1836: 'Notes 
 upon Books I. and II.,' by Messrs. Sheppard and Evans, 
 London, 1857 : the Eev. P. Frost's edition of the Vlth 
 and Vllth books, London, 1867: and, above all, the 
 larger edition of Poppo, 10 vols., Leipsic, 1821-1838, 
 and the smaller one in 4 vols., Lfeipsic, 1 846-1 866. The 
 latter is, on the whole, the best annotated edition of the 
 great historian ; it is not a mere abridgment of the 
 larger work : nor does it dispense with reference to it. 
 Where the same information is contained in both, I have, 
 in almost every instance, quoted the smaller ^ edition, as 
 more likely to be in the student's hands. It seemed 
 needless to cite either edition by the page, save in excep- 
 tional cases : for instance, in a remark on t5)j ^uvaueae 
 TOT£ x.T.'K., p. 13, where the note alluded to wiU be 
 found among the annotations, not on the text, but on the 
 Scholia : and at p. 108, where Poppo, in his 'Commen- 
 tary,' refers the reader to the Prolegomena, vol. i. ed. 
 maj. The text of Poppo, ed. min., has generally been 
 followed. To the aid derived from Mr. Grote's graphic 
 portraiture of that tragic drama of Grecian history, the 
 
 ' Where GoUer is cited, the second » Designated, in the notes by the 
 edition is meant, unless the first is abbreviation, ed. min. : as the lai-ser 
 expressly mentioned. work is by the symbol, ed. maj. 
 
TBEFAGH. XV 
 
 1 Peloponnesian War, my warmest acknowledgments are 
 1 due. Whatever may be thought of his enthusiastic 
 ( advocacy of the popular cause, or of those occasional 
 i blemishes which exact scholarship would have shunned, 
 1 none can fail to admire the originality, the breadth, and 
 symmetry of his views, his masterly analysis of character, 
 I and his forcible delineation of events. 
 J The marginal notes have been restricted, with few 
 
 5 exceptions, to the necessary defence of my choice of 
 1 contested versions of diflBcult passages. There are how- 
 \ ever many knotty points, which the reader must not 
 i suspect me of settling on arbitrary principles, simply 
 r because I have scrupled to encumber my page with 
 ji annotations. In such cases, the grounds which have 
 .; influenced my adoption of particular phrases or construc- 
 , tions, will readily be discovered in one or another of the 
 ,, editions quoted above : chiefly, perhaps, in the smaller 
 J. work of Poppo. 
 
 The ancient grammarians^ noticed the partiality of 
 
 ,, Thucydides for connecting particles : a partiality due, in 
 
 a great degree, to the peculiar structure of his composi- 
 
 ', tion. The embarrassment they cause the student will, I 
 
 j trust, excuse the care I have devoted to their elucidation. 
 
 My chief authority has been the learned and elaborate 
 
 commentary of Klotz on Devarius, Leipsic, 1840: a 
 
 work as precious as it is scarce. Bishop Ellicott, in his 
 
 , admirable annotations on the Epistles of St. Paul, con- 
 
 , stantly cites it : and it is frequently referred to in Poppo's 
 
 minor edition. Several of my renderings, however, 
 
 ' though rarely unsupported by authority, are tendered 
 
 ,i 
 
 "I ' See Mure's lAtei-atttre of Oreece, vol. v. p. 164. 
 
XVI PREFACE. 
 
 only as approximations ; a limitation I beg leave to 
 extend to many of the critical notes. For, if there is 
 any classic on whose text positive dogmatism or con- 
 temptuous censure^ is especially intolerable, it is the 
 author, the most difficult and perhaps the most valuable 
 part of whose historical masterpiece I have attempted to 
 array in the current Enghsh prose of the nineteenth 
 century. 
 
 The pohtical illustration of Thucydides I have been 
 content to leave to some future editor or translator of 
 the whole text. Any venture, of mine within this pro- 
 vince of criticism, even if partially successful, would have 
 swollen my volume to a most inconvenient size. 
 
 ^ Except, perhaps, wlien the dig- principle, as an awful warning what 
 
 nity of an illustrious classic is vie- to avoid. For though, as logicians 
 
 lated by such an edition as that put say, we cannot define by contraries 
 
 forth by Mr. Bigg: London, 1868. Cfor instance, we cannot logically 
 
 Perhaps it was hardly worthwhile define black as the opposite of white J, 
 
 to refer to his notes, as I have done still, as Aristotle (Shet. iii. 9, 8) tella 
 
 at pp. 4, 5, 47, 49, 67, 77. But they us, we may teach by contraries, 
 have a value — on the drunken Helot 
 
INTKODUCTION. 
 
 t" A COMPLETE REVIEW of the Style of Thucydides lies within 
 the province of an editor of his entire text, or of a work of lite- 
 rary criticism. In the former capacity, the subject has been 
 discussed in the voluminous pages of Poppo : in the latter, it 
 has been essayed by the profound learning, the shallow censure, 
 and pretentious bigotry of Colonel Mure. As a translator 
 of a fraction only of the Attic historian's work, I have thought 
 it better to restrict this Introduction, in the first place, to an 
 exposition of the principal difficulties which beset the translator 
 of Thucydides : and, secondly, to some examination of the 
 speeches themselves, with a view, especially, to the purposes 
 they serve in relation to the narrative. 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 
 ON THE CHIEF DirPICULTIES WHICH BESET THE TEAKSLATOE OP 
 THUCYDIDES. 
 
 Ant complaint of the obstacles arising from the multitudinous 
 array of modern editors and commentators, among whom the 
 wretched translator moves with the ease and fluency of a 
 Dutchman in six pairs of inexpressibles, would be as likely to 
 provoke a smile from the Academical public as the reply of the 
 High Church Curate, who, when asked by the late Bishop of 
 Oxford what was the chief obstacle to his parochial usefulness, 
 answered — ' My Rector.' Yet the student is the more to be 
 pitied, inasmuch as the chief sinners against his peace are those 
 very German editors, through whose interminable lucubrations, 
 
 a 
 
xvui INTRODUCTION. 
 
 now rich in hints of magical felicity, now teasing with obvious 
 comment and torturing with inevitable inference, he is bound, 
 on pain of treason to his author, to plod his dreary way. Of 
 how many annotators on the Attic historian may it not be 
 said : 'Nimium intelligendo faciunt ut nihil intelligant !' While 
 a Poppo exults in an ostentatious parade of authorities,' a 
 GoUer revels in the fantastic subtleties of German criticism, 
 and a Kriiger outdoes his predecessors in the field of conjectural 
 ingenuity. 
 
 ' These leave the sense, their learning to display, 
 And those explain the meaning quite away.' 
 
 I. The obscurity which haunts, like a shadow, the subtle 
 page of Thucydides, is too patent an attribute of his rhetorical 
 style to need more than passing comment. Even in his own 
 days, he seems to have stood in the same relation to his coun- 
 trymen as Dante to the modern Italians; for Dionysius^ posi- 
 tively asserts that the Athenians of the age of Pericles could 
 no more have understood their great historian without an 
 interpreter than they could a foreign tongue. TuUy ^ notes his 
 love of pregnancy and condensation: qualities, he remarks, 
 fatal at times to clearness of expression. ' Some passages,' says . 
 a modern critic,* ' we can hardly be said to read at all, in the 
 familiar sense of the term. We study, decipher, interpret 
 them. But continuous fluent perusal is out of the question.' 
 
 ^ Scholarship, the handmaid of words tioi/ocav Ixovna wpa^ai ruiag & 
 
 the translator, is too often the mis- knivoovniv (ii. ii, 2) are, perhaps, 
 
 tress of the commentator. adequately rendered by the phrase 
 
 * De Thucyd. Jiidic. cap. 49, sub ' heartily wishing us success : ' nor 
 
 fln. He especially condemns (ib. is the assertion, Sid ^viifopHv fi ?ii/i- 
 
 cap. 46) the impenetrable darkness /Snuc kut-' avayKijv iylvcro (vi. 10, 
 
 of the clause, Kai rijv ToXjiav d-rrb 2) unduly compressed by taking 
 
 r^f o/ioiag TVxnC) k.t.\, (Thucyd. iyfi'tro and /cor' aray/cijv together; e.g. 
 
 ii. 62, 5), which, he says, twv ' the convention was extorted by the 
 
 'RpaKKriTiiuiv aKOTHvSiv daa^ftn-ipav pressure of calamity.' Possibly, too, 
 
 ixti rrjv ^ijAwtriv. A version of the the phrase rfi^ iroXiuiQ nf Ttp-mp'tvif 
 
 passage will be foimd at p. 82 of this cnrh tov apx^i-v (bk. ii. 63, i) is fairly 
 
 work. reflected by the English terms ' the 
 
 ^ Brutus, vii. sub fin. It is rarely imperial dignity of our country.' 
 
 indeed that the translator can con- * Mure, Literature of Greece, vol. v. 
 
 dense Thucydides. Opportunities, p. 158. 
 however, do occur : for instance, the 
 
INTBOBUOTION. XIX 
 
 In evolving the difficult problem ' ex fume dare lucem,' it is 
 sometimes requisite to change the entire machinery of a period, 
 in order to bring out the leading idea, which struggles feebly 
 into life, oppressed by the weight of words, and the quaint 
 forms in which it is encased. His irregular constructions, too, 
 are a fertile source of mystery. ' He cannot,' says Professor 
 Sellar,' ' follow the direction of thought which the structure of 
 a sentence seems to force on many writers ; but as his period 
 advances,' he adopts some combination of words, inconsistent 
 with the consecutiveness of his expression, but more exactly 
 representing the particular aspect of the facts on which he is 
 dwelling for the moment.' 
 
 It is impossible to accept the solution proffered by Marcel- 
 linus,'' that, so far from condescending to level his style to 
 popular comprehension, Thucydides courted an obscurity 
 penetrable only by the intellectual and refined. The fact, 
 however, that he was not a popular author with his own 
 countrymen, is undeniable ; it is attested by TuUy,' and 
 jocosely asserted in the well-known lines of the 'Anthology ' :* 
 
 'U 0iXoe, (i ao^bg il, Xa/St fi ig xkpag' ti d'e irkcfiVKag 
 
 vriXg MovfrdtoVf piipov d fii) vohig' 
 et/jil ydp <yb TrdvTeatrt jSaroff • -Travpot S*ayaaavro 
 
 QovkvSlStjp 'OXopoVj KtKpomS^v to ykvog. 
 
 An explanation less improbable may be found in the personal 
 bias ^ of the author : in the imperfect development of the lan- 
 
 ■ Oxford Essays, 1857, p. 309. '"W")) ^t ovra ry ^iau irpoafopov 
 
 ' He speaks of him as aaa<p(ie ry oiVti^t. He adds (cap. 40) that 
 
 Xeymv imTriStQ, 'iva jiq iraaiv tiri the style thus adopted naturally in- 
 
 (Sarof, firjli cvTiXiig ^alvtjrai iravH T(f volved poetical phraseology and con- 
 
 PovXoiiivif voovixtvoQ evx^pioCt aWa struction. MUUer (ij'i. of Greece, 
 
 Toic Xiav ao^oig SoKiiiaS^o/icvog -irapa vol. ii. p. 133) remarks that 'the 
 
 nvroig Bavfia^rirai' — Vita TJmcyd. constructions of Thucydides are 
 
 cap. 35. marked by a freedom more suitable 
 
 * 'Huic (Catoni) amatores desimt, to antique poetry than to prose.' If 
 
 sicuti multis jam ante seculis et ipsi the reader will turn to note *, p. 176, 
 
 Thucydidi.' — Brutus, cap. xvii. below, he will see that I have go- 
 
 ^ Ja.cobs, vol. iv. p. 231. vemed vavicparopaiv by KarfUTpiip^d- 
 
 ^ Marcellinus says that, of the j'oi, understood; a construction which, 
 
 three kinds of style, he chose the in ordinary prose, would have re- 
 
 ' lofty : ' i JijXioirf Tiiv inj/tjXav (xapaK- quired im, but which is in strict 
 
XX INTBOBTIGTION. 
 
 guage, especially in its poverty of abstract' terms, at the time 
 he wrote ; and, to a certain extent, in the classic conception of 
 the style congenial to history ; a style which even Dionysius^ 
 thinks should be poetical rather than prosaic, and endued with 
 a sustained elevation of tone clearly distinguishing it from the 
 dialect of familiar converse. Indeed, it is not as orations 
 intended for delivery, but as integral parts of the history, that 
 the speeches before us must be judged. Such, it is evident, 
 was the light in which they were regarded by some of the 
 ablest of the ancient critics whose opinions are cited by 
 Dionysius. They acknowledged, he says,' that the orations 
 which enliven the narrative of Thucydides were unsuitable 
 models for aspirants to fame in forensic or political discussion : 
 but contended they afforded an excellent training school for 
 intending votaries of history : which, it seems, they assumed 
 would rarely be studied by the people at large, but only within 
 the pale of a privileged clique of the highest culture and re- 
 finement. In a similar vein Quintilian* warns the candidate for 
 the honours of the Forum against an imitation, not of Thucydides 
 alone, but of the great historians in general, on the ground of 
 the wide distinction recognised by taste and fashion between 
 the oratorical and historical styles. ' Historia quoque,' says 
 that excellent rhetorician, ' alere orationem quodam molli jucun- 
 doque succo potest. Verum et ipsa sic est legenda, ut sciamus 
 plerasque ejus virtutes oratori esse vitandas. Est enim proxima 
 poetis, et quodammodo carmen solutum : et scribitur ad nar- 
 randum, non ad probandum : totumque opus non ad actum rei 
 pugnamque praesentem, sed ad memoriam posteritatis et ingenii 
 famam componitur ; ideoque et verbis liberioribus et remotior- 
 ibus figuris narrandi tsedium evitat. Itaque, ut dixi, neque ilia 
 
 analogy with poetical usage; e.g. ' the language sunk under him.' 
 
 jrXijyfis Svyarpog, Eur. Or. 591 : ^ De Thucyd. Jud. cap. 51 : '^yi. 
 
 xiipbg oi irXripoviiiVif, ./Esch. Ag. Si ovTt aixjiripdv na'c aKoafiriTOV Koi 
 
 826, wLWTLK^v Trji/ icTTopiKT^p tlvat TTpay- 
 
 ' ' For nations, like individuals, /iciTeiav almuatp.' av, kXK' txovadv 
 
 first perceive and then abstract. n xal Troirirucdv • ovre iravTairam 
 
 They advance from particula.' images ttoiij-ik^v, aW ixpi^riKviav rrje iv 
 
 to general terms.' (Lord Macaulay, leu. 
 
 Essays, vol. i. p. 12.) Attic prose, ^ j], g^p ^^^ ^^ j^^j^^ 
 
 in the hands of Thucydides, reminds ^ Instit. Orat. x. i. 31. 
 us of Addison's saying of Milton — 
 
TNTBODUGTION. ■ xxi 
 
 Sallustiana brevitas, qua nihil apud aures vacuas atque eruditas 
 potest esse perfectius, apnd occupatum variis cogitationibus ju- 
 dicem, et ssepius ineruditum, captanda nobis est: neque ilia 
 Livii lactea ubertas satis docebit eum, qui non speciem exposi- 
 tionis sed fidem quserit. Adde quod M. TuUius ne Thucydidem 
 quidem aut Xenophontem utiles oratori putat, quanquam ilium 
 bellicum canere, hujus ore Musas esse locutas existimet.' And 
 when Cicero, in a memorable passage,' mentions our author's 
 speeches as embodying the very qualities an advocate should 
 avoid, he is not, as Goller^ shows, looking at their intrinsic 
 value as component parts of a history, but speaking with a 
 view to their practical utility as models for a pleader at the 
 Roman bar. 
 
 2. I need only touch on the necessity of breaking up, in an 
 English version, those long-drawn and complicated sentences, 
 which in the page of other Greek authors,^ as well as Thucy- 
 dides, puzzle the reader from the remarkable contrast they 
 present to the modest unambitious periods of the most popular 
 models of English composition. In the days of Thucydides a 
 natural reaction had set in against the Sententious, or, as 
 Aristotle calls it, ' jointed,' "* structure of the early Greek 
 annalists ; and the easy excursive simplicity of Herodotus, 
 arrayed in the flowing garb of what critics call the Periodic 
 style, had won general admiration. Thucydides, however, in 
 adopting the mode of composition fashionable in his day, has 
 been frequently led, by the fulness of the ideas which crowded 
 on his mind, into a prolixity and involution in the arrangement 
 of his clauses fertile of embarrassment to the student. In 
 many cases he does not seem to have reflected how much of 
 
 ' Orator, ix. ' Thucydides res nomenon of Attic prose : which, in- 
 
 gestas et bella narrat et prselia gra- stead of being based on the forms of 
 
 viter sane et probe, sed nihil ab eo written narrative, like that of mo- 
 
 transfeiTi potest ad forensem usuni dern Europe, was cast in the mould, 
 
 et publicum. Ipsaj illse condones and founded on the principles, of 
 
 ita multas habent obscuras abditaa- public oratory. 
 
 que seutentias, vix ut intelligantur ; * Mhet. iii. 9. The epithet in- 
 
 quod est in oratore ciyili vitium vel dicates the inartificial mode in the 
 
 maximum.' which the sentences of the earlier 
 
 ' Second edition, vol. i. p. 56. writers were linked together, with 
 
 * Mure (Lit. of Ch-eece, vol. iv. p. Little attempt at logical connection 
 
 128) cleverly accounts for this phe- or modulated cadence. 
 
xxii INTBOBUCTION. 
 
 the information he wishes to conyey will fall within the legiti- 
 mate orbit of a period ; at one moment, the sense is obscured by 
 a host of ancillary circumstances which he strives to bring 
 within the scope of a single sentence : at another, by the sus- 
 pension of the main idea in favour of some collateral notion 
 parenthetically ' introduced. 
 
 3. One of the most striking peculiarities of his rhetorical 
 diction, is a studied antithetical arrangement of opinions and 
 arguments. Antithesis — that favourite ornament of Gibbon 
 — is, in itself, not only one of the legitimate graces of style, 
 but, as Aristotle 2 has shown, an essential aid to perspicuity. 
 Thucydides, however, in the oratorical portions of his work, 
 employs the figure with a lavishness in which no succeeding 
 writer of equal eminence has indulged, and which is the more 
 remarkable in one who lay under no temptation to redeem 
 poverty of thought by rhetorical embellishment. The curious 
 contrast, everywhere discernible, between the ease, the graphic 
 power and spirited flow of his narrative, and the wearisome 
 monotony of the decorative art which loads too many^ of his 
 speeches, has been traced to the influence of the literary taste 
 prevalent in his day, seconded by his own personal bias. 
 ' When composition,' says Mure,* ' becomes an art, the new- 
 born zeal of its early professors leads them, in theorising on 
 its principles, to prefer exaggerated or affected forms in their 
 efforts to reduce those principles to practice. And this crisis 
 in the history of literary style as invariably coincides with a 
 similar crisis in the state of intellectual culture at large; 
 artifice and subtlety of expression being accompanied by a 
 proportional amount of artifice and subtlety in doctrine and 
 sentiment.' 
 
 Elsewhere^ he says : ' Thucydides flourished in the very 
 
 ' Dionysiiis (JDe Thucyd. Idiom, tion, and the influeace of his own 
 
 2) pointedly complains of the at strong common sense, had gradually 
 
 ftETalv vaptfiwrdauc, which, he says, taken oif the edge of that extreme 
 
 Sia fiaicpov rijv aKo\ov6iav Kon'ilovTai. suhtlety of thought and expression, 
 
 2 Rhet. iii. 9, 8. under the influence of which he had 
 
 3 Such qualities are, however, far commenced his undertaking.' Murej 
 
 less flagrant in the later than in Literature of Greece, vol. v. p. 596. 
 
 the earlier orations. It seems as if ^ Vol. iv. p. 121. 
 
 'more mature practice in composi- » \o[, v. pp. j6i, 162. 
 
INTUOBJJOTION. XSin 
 
 acme of that period of his native literature, in which the faults 
 exemplified in his pages chiefly prevailed ; when, in the early 
 progress of intellectual culture, subtlety of doctrine and sen- 
 timent was accompanied by rhetorical artifice of style. While 
 he was thus peculiarly exposed to these sophistical influences, 
 the peculiarity of his own genius rendered him the more 
 susceptible of their power. . . . His rhetorical mannerism re- 
 flects the vicious taste of his age, working on his own natural 
 turn for nice distinctions and logical refinements.'' 
 
 Independently of this, two special influences seem to have 
 had a share in forming his rhetorical style. Dionysius^ ex- 
 pressly says it was modelled, to a great extent, on the oratoiy 
 of Gorgias, whose eloquence had recently captivated Athens. 
 The scanty remains of the Sicilian sophist curiously illustrate 
 the antithetical mannerism of the historian, of whose turns of 
 thought and expression phrases Hke the following — rm (j}povi/j.a> 
 T-Pj! •yva>fj.t]S Travovrss to a<jipov ttjs f>a>fi7]s^ — Bspdirovrsi [isv t5)V 
 aZUo)! SvaTV')(ovvTCi)V, KoXacrral bs r&v dSiKms svjvxpvvTiov — 
 yprifiaTa KTaaBai fisv (i>s 'Xp&TO, ')(pfia6ai hs d)s ti/jmto* — will 
 forcibly remind the reader. With such evidence, we hardly 
 need the testimony of Cicero, who notes the Sicilian rhetorician's 
 excessive partiality for studied oppositions of thought and 
 language, as well as for the figure termed by Aristotle Pari- 
 sosis, a favourite expedient with Thucydides* for securing the 
 
 ^ A curious parallel may he found had been spoilt by age, he adds, 
 
 in the following remarks of Dr. ' ipse Thucydides, si posterius fuisset, 
 
 Arnold on Thucyd. v. 9 — ' The ex- multo maturior fuisset et 'mitior.' 
 
 traordinary instances of attempted — Brutus, 83. 
 
 antithesis cited by Aristotle from * De Thucyd. Idiom. 2. De Thu- 
 
 Epicharmus may well lead us to cyd. Judic. 24. 
 
 suppose that this sort of false taste ' This very idea is, curiously 
 
 was not uncommon in the earlier enough, repeated by Thucydides, 
 
 writers, or rather in those who flou- with a slight difference of form, in 
 
 rished, like Thucydides, when atten- the sentiment with which Diodotus 
 
 tion first began to be paid to style ; closes his harangue, bk. iii. 48. See 
 
 that is, between the time of the sim- p. 118, below. 
 
 plicity of mere nature, and that of * Fragmenta Gorgise apud Baiter- 
 
 the simplicity of good sense and um, Oratt. Att. §§ 5, 19, 21. 
 
 perfected taste.' Cicero had evi- * Even the favourable criticism 
 
 dently formed a similar opinion. of Marcellinus, the biographer of 
 
 After comparing the style of Thucy- Thucydides,- acknowledges for its 
 
 dides to Ealernian wliose softness client . a limited partiality for this 
 
XXIV INTBODUGTION. 
 
 equipoise of clauses antithetically balanced. ' Parla paribus 
 adjuncta/ says TuUy/ ' et similiter definita itemque contrariis 
 relata contraria, quae su^ sponte, etiamsi id non agas, cadunt 
 plerumque numerose, Gorgias primus invenit, sed iis est usus 
 intemperatius.' Critics have also noticed those coincidences ' 
 between the text of Thucydides and the extant orations of 
 Antiphon, the earliest Attic prose writer of whose works any 
 portion has survived, which go far to confirm the tradition, 
 recognised apparently by Plato,' of the historian's early initia- 
 tion in the rhetorical art by his countryman and cotemporary, 
 whom he has himself mentioned, in accents redolent of a pupil's^ 
 gratitude, as a great master of thought and language. 
 
 The salient feature of the Thucydidean predilection for 
 antithesis is undoubtedly the favourite opposition between 
 Words and Deeds, which, though more or less diffused 
 throughout his work, is nowhere so prominent as in the Funeral 
 Speech which he places on the lips of the Olympian Pericles. 
 In the earlier stages of mental culture, the maxim which gives 
 the tone to the exordium of this oration — that of the propriety 
 of paying honours to the brave in acts rather than words — may 
 have worn an air of novelty ; and it may very possibly have 
 been the original text of the Periclean address. The funda- 
 mental idea, however, which underlies the sentiment, that of 
 the contrast between Words and Deeds, and the implied 
 superior value of the latter in the business of life, is repeated 
 no less than eighteen times in this harangue, of which indeed 
 it may be said to form the keynote. It is singular that a 
 composition replete with admirable maxims of policy, and 
 
 figure : IZn^aiasv kir b\'iyov rkq Top- phrases for abstract nouns : e.g. iv 
 
 ytov Tov AeovTtvov TraptaiiXTEts Kal Tip vfjitrepq) SiKaftp oi'x r^asov ri tv 
 
 rai; avTidkcjEiQ rSJv dvof^ctrwVf tvSo- rqi Ifit^ ' to vjitTipov tviytjiis iraptiQ ' 
 
 KiiiOvaaQ KUT Ueivo Kaipnv Trapa role Antiphon, De Ccede Herod. §§7,96; 
 
 "EKKtiai. — Vita Thuayd. § 36. to Sviioifiivov rije yvdifiric, id. Te- 
 
 1 Orator, c. 52. traloff. i. iii. 3, an expression lite- 
 
 " Not only in tlie artifices of anti- rally adopted by Thucydides, and 
 
 thesis — especially the opposition he- certainly more significant of a tran- 
 
 tween Xd-yoi; and Ipyov, though here sitory state of feeling than an ab- 
 
 the resemblande is very marked — stract noun would be. 
 and alliteration, but in the peculiari- ^ Menexmus, -p. 7.^6. Staph, 
 
 ties of his syntax : such as the sub- * See Dr. Arnold's note on Thrt- 
 
 Btitution of adjectival and participial cyrf. viii. 68. 
 
INTBOBUOTION. xxv 
 
 breathing gome of the noblest sentiments on record, should be 
 disfigured by the tasteless iteration of an antithetical quibble. 
 If the substance of the speech is Periclean, the mould in which 
 it is cast, and the mechanism of its structure, are essentially 
 Thucydidean.' The modern translator, writing at an epoch 
 when the current of popular taste sets strongly in favour of 
 simplicity of style and diction, may claim forgiveness, if, when 
 confronted by such a phenomenon, he tries to tone down rather 
 than bring out in prominent relief the eccentricities of his 
 author. Nor is he guilty of any real infidelity ^ to the original 
 ia so doing ; he is only substituting the idiom of one age for 
 that of another. Without venturing to decide how many 
 varieties of meaning the antithesis in question may have pre- 
 sented to an Athenian, it is impossible not to see that the idea 
 is susceptible of almost indefinite modifications in various con- 
 texts. Thus, in the clause ov roiis Xojovs toIs spjois ^\d^r)v 
 ■^yovfisvoi (bk. ii. 40), the opposition Ues between action and 
 debate ; in the words, ov Xo'ycov KOfmos rdBs fiaWov rj spymv 
 icrrlv aXrj0sia (ib. 41), between a rhetorical vaunt and the 
 actual truth ; in another chapter,' the 43rd of the same book, 
 a more subtle contrast is apparently drawn between the in- 
 centives to patriotism aflTorded, on the one hand, by rhetorical 
 eulogies of that virtue, and, on the other, by the palpable 
 evidence of the power of his country which everywhere greeted 
 the eye of the Athenian.'' Again, a little below, in the noble 
 passage concluding with the clause ttjs yvatfjurfs fiaXKov fj rov 
 spyov evStaiTarai, epyov, as opposed to yvujfir], represents the 
 inanimate memorials of the tomb as contrasted with the living 
 memories of heroic deeds enshrined in the hearts of the brave. 
 In the same chapter, too, we find these identical terms anti- 
 thetically arranged in the phrase yir/vdicrKovTss to, Bsovra, koI 
 
 ' It is impossible not to recognise shirks an antithesis altogether, as 
 
 a studied caricature of the rhetorical Mure has done in his version of the 
 
 style of Thucydides in the Funeral grand passage, hk. ii. ch. 43. See 
 
 Speech embodied in the Menexenus note ', p. 74 of this Work, 
 
 of Plato. The inveterate opposition ' See note ', p. 73, below, 
 
 of \6yos and ipyov, ISif and Srijioiric}, * This idea of the meaning of the 
 
 are pointedly travestied in the first antithesis is shadowed forth in Dr. 
 
 sentence. Arnold's paraphrase of the passage. 
 
 ' Unless, indeed, the translator 
 
XXVI INTBODTJGTION. 
 
 iv Tols spyois ala-xwofisvoi, where the antagonist notions are 
 those of shrewdness in counsel, and sensibility to shame in action. 
 Elsewhere,' X0704 represents 'political debates,' spya 'public 
 business ; ' while, in another passage,'' Xoya is opposed to spyw 
 as ' nominally' to ' really.' It is only now and then that we 
 meet the antithesis in so bald a shape that the translator, driven 
 from the field of compromise, is compelled to take the bull by 
 the horns. An instance of the kind presents itself on the 
 threshold of the closing chapter of the Funeral Speech : where 
 I only regret that I did not feel at liberty to strangle the 
 antithesis.^ 
 
 4. I have acted on a similar principle in those numerous 
 passages where Thucydides subsidises artifice of structure by 
 artifice of sound; in other words, where he has summoned 
 alliteration to the support of antithesis, its natural ally. This 
 figure, one of those aids that nature lends to art to give 
 flagrancy to contrast — its true Aristotelian* function — is em- 
 ployed by Thucydides with a vicious exuberance and a subtlety 
 so perceptibly artifi^cial as to be utterly inartistic ; a Ucense 
 noted by Dionysius as quite out of keeping with the general 
 character of his style, so remarkable for its stately and elevated 
 tone, and with his contempt of mere embellishment^ for its own 
 sake. Some allowance must, however, be made, not only for 
 
 * Bk. vi. 38, 4, tion) riKiara Ttp x'^paKrijpL tovtijI Trpo- 
 ^ Bk. vi. ySj 3. aiiKovregj avuTTjpdv cxovrt T))v ay(trfr\Vf 
 ' ' Another faTOUrite antithetical ical rov Kofi^ov vXilarov a(p(aT7iK6Ti, 
 commonplace of the Historian and k.t.\. (De Thueyd. Idiom. § 17-) ^ 
 his orators, is a similar contrast be- illustration of this last remark, we 
 tween the correlative ideas, Public may observe that similes are much 
 or common (Stjiiotiov, koivov), and less frequent in the speeches of Thu- 
 Private or peculiar (i^toi^), in pro- cydides than in those of Demosthenes, 
 perty, feeling, or interest in the Even Alcibiades, the florid and, at 
 affairs of life.' (Mure, vol. v. p. 595.) times, poetical tone of whose address 
 Sometimes, however, this opposition is noted by Poppo (ed. maj. Corn- 
 ea pregnant with a deeper signifl- meni. vi. 18, 5 — aTopkauip^tv to <pp6- 
 canoe than is obvious at first sight, v-qpa), seems painfully at a loss for 
 See note ', p. 74, below : and the an illustration, where it was not far 
 rendering of Uiov kIvSwov and tcoivfjv to seek, I allude to the passage, 
 biftXiav, iii. 14-, I. bk. vi. 18, 6, where, as the reader 
 ^ Shet. iii. 9, 8. See Miaier, will see, he substitutes, in the words 
 Literature of Greece, vol. ii. p. 135. uairtp tcai aWo n, a vague compari- 
 ' Oi fivpaKiuSiiQ axni'taTiapoi rSiv son for a particular image. See 
 avTidkritiv Ti Boi mipo/ioiuiv (allitera- p. 199, below. 
 
INTROBUGTION. xxvn 
 
 the influence of cotemporary taste — whicb indeed is clearly 
 traceable even iu ^scTiylus — but for the temptations under 
 which a Greek writer lay to play upon words, owing to the 
 facilities afforded by those compound verbs and nouns in which 
 his language was so exuberantly rich,' and by its fertile affini- 
 ties of inflection. So that it is perhaps enough if, in some of 
 these curious passages, the English translator preserves the 
 opposition of sense without re-echoing the coincidence of sound, 
 save when his own language, unforced, yields a ready equiva- 
 lent. Thus, in bk. ii. 62, 3, where a point is made by the 
 apposition of ippovrj/jLart and Karacjjpovi^fiaTL, I have discarded 
 the alliteration and contented myself with the English counter- 
 parts, pride and disdain ;' in another passage, on the other 
 hand (bk. i. 122, 4), I have contrasted Karacjipovricns and d<f)po- 
 avvT} by an approximate rendering, which, as the reader will 
 see, echoes, however imperfectly, the antithesis of sound as well 
 as sense. The — if designed — tasteless alliteration of virspiSiiu 
 and 'jrpoi.Sstv (iv. 62, 2), which Thucydides characteristically 
 places on the Jips of the Sicilian' Hermocrates, I have not 
 condescended to repeat 5 in other cases, I have been obliged to 
 satisfy myself with English representatives, more or less par- 
 tial, of the intended contrast. Perhaps, for instance, the signi- 
 ficant Greek compounds, irpoeinfiovKevsiv and avTSTri^ovXevsiv 
 (i. 33, 4), are sufficiently rendered by the English equivalents 
 ' to forestall ' and ' countermine intrigues ;' sTraviaTrjcrav and 
 dTTEo-Trjcrav, so effectively opposed by Cleon (ii. 39, 2), find ready 
 correlatives in the Latinised terms ' insurrection ' and ' defec- 
 
 ' So mucli so, that similar cadences juxtaposition (ib. 11, 13), says: 'In 
 
 may be found in Demosthenes, where his rebus Demosthenes perquam so- 
 
 the alliteration is probably unstu- brius est, nee, ut lacerates, harum 
 
 died. Later rhetoricians ascribed, elegantiarum avidus ; sed fere omni- 
 
 with characteristic pedantry, a co- bus in locis fieri non posse videtur, 
 
 incidence of sound probably fortuitous ut sententia aUis quam his ipsis verbis 
 
 to a studied use of the figure Paro- exprimatur.' 
 
 moiosis. Such, for instance, is the " Dionysius (de Thuet/d. Jud. 46) 
 
 comment of Hermogenes, who lived marks this alliteration as unworthy 
 
 in the reign of the Emperor M. of Pericles, on whose lips it is placed. 
 
 Aurelius (vol. iii. p. 2S4), on the ac- ' Sicily was the home and nursery 
 
 cidental concurrence of irpoaiiKu and of the florid and elaborate rhetoric 
 
 7rpu9vixaie (Demosth. Olyrdh. i. 9, 5). of Gorgias, Polus and Licymnius. 
 Bremi, in a sensible note on a similar 
 
xxviii INTSODUGTION. 
 
 tion ;' and even Hermocrates, who stands committed to two 
 puns in one chapter, might possibly, considering the great ad- 
 vantage which his adverbial compounds give him over his 
 translator, think his terse antithesis, sinrpsir&s dBiKot, sXOomss, 
 evXoyws dirpaKTOc airUaiv, fairly echoed by the following ver- 
 sion—' They visited our shores with excellent pretexts for 
 doing wrong, and will leave them with excellent reasons for 
 doing nothing.' ' 
 
 5. When Marcellinus^ complaiaed of the difficulty of follow- 
 ing the sense of Thucydides, he may have had in view some of 
 those passages where it is needful to supply a link between two 
 clauses, sentences, or, at times, paragraphs. In many cases 
 this license, if a necessary freedom deserves that name, simply 
 consists in a scholarlike interpretation of that highly significant 
 particle, 70/3 : so reticent to an English, so suggestive to an 
 Athenian, ear, of some notion intended to be mentally suppUed 
 by the quick apprehension of the audience. Yet even in these 
 instances, I have rarely acted without editorial authority, or 
 philological sanction, such as that of Klotz and Hartung. It 
 may, however, be as well to specify the principal passages in 
 which I have availed myself of this expedient ; the reader can 
 then judge for himself of the mode in which I have applied a 
 recognised principle of translation. Thus, at p. 14, bk. i. 40, 
 6, I have represented the notion latent in the particle 70'^ 
 (ft ryap roiis kukov, k.t.X.) by the words ' a principle you dare 
 not infringe,' interposed between the two sentences on Poppo's 
 authority (ed. min.), which I have also followed in a similar 
 case at p. 43, bk. i. 120, i, as a marginal note will show. 
 Again, at p. 19, i. 68, 4, Poppo admits the necessity of supply 
 ing a connecting link between TroXsfi'^crovTai and ov rydp av, 
 K.T.X. In my version, however, I have referred yap to stti- 
 ^ovXsvopTas instead of TrpoTrapecrKsva<7/j,ivovs. In another in- 
 stance, at p. 55, the pregnant force of the same particle in the 
 adjoining sentence (■n-Xgoi' 7aj0 ■^p-sts, k.t.X., i. 142, 5) is brought 
 out, as the note explains, by interpolating the clause ' and we 
 shall find it easy to make descents.' By a similar expedient 
 Poppo and Goller relieve the embarrassed sense in a well- 
 
 • Bk. iv, 61, sub fin. See p. 150, " Vita Thucydidis, cap. 56, wliere 
 
 below. he calls him dawpt'is '"')>' Siavoiav. 
 
INTBOBUGTION. xxix 
 
 known passage in the speech of Demosthenes (iv. lO, 3), as the 
 reader will find from my note at p. 139: and, with the sanc- 
 tion of the former critic,' I have, at p. 52, elicited the latent 
 significance of rydp by introducing the clause, ' And we mar/ 
 meet with reverses,' between the sentence ending with fisra- 
 vois2<T0at and that commencing with svhs')(STai. Again, at p. 
 79, bk. ii. 60, 6, it is evident that 70/3, in the clause o re yap 
 yvovs, K.T.X., denotes the logical relation of the sentence in 
 which it occurs, to some idea not palpably expressed. Perhaps 
 that relation is represented by the clause I have inserted, 
 ' Qualities all indispensable in a statesman.' Similarly, at p. 
 150, bk. iv. 61, 7, the impHcit force of the particle in the 
 clause ov ryap utto rrjs av-rcbv, k.t.X., has, I trust, not been mis- 
 represented by the intervening clause — ' the Athenians would 
 then have nothing to do.' 
 
 Independently of those passages in which the particle yap 
 points to a notion understood, there are several in which, owing 
 to the severe condensation of the Greek, a few explanatory 
 terms are needed to present to the English reader the true 
 connection of the sense. Two instances occur in which sen- 
 tences commence with the personal pronoun ^p,sls, followed by 
 the particle Se ; another, similar in character, and difi^ering only 
 in form, where km stands first and ij/iSs follows. They will 
 be found, severally, in bk. i. 121, i, '^fisls Be aSiKovfisvoi, k.t.X.' 
 ii. II, 6, rjp.sis hs ovh^ siri, k.t.X., vi. 85, I, xai rffias tovto 
 a^sXsl, K.T.X. The pronoun, of course, is by its position 
 emphatic : and, in each case, the particles are retrospective. 
 Their joint office is to apply the general statement which pre- 
 cedes to the particular case or persons denoted by the pronoun. 
 If the reader will turn to the corresponding passages in the 
 translation at pp. 45, 61, and 233, he will see that, in endea- 
 vouring to bring out the logical connection of ideas, I have 
 invoked the aid of a few subsidiary terms. 
 
 The omission of a few words, necessary to the sense, before 
 the conditional particle si, is another characteristic of the 
 studied brevity of Thucydides, and is one of the many points 
 on which he has been imitated by the restless vanity of Tacitus.'' 
 
 ' See his note (ed min.) on ivSs- ' See Poppo's note on Thucyd. iv. 
 X^rai yap, i. 140, i. 86, 4. 
 
XXX INTBOBVOTION. 
 
 Instances occur in bk. i. 40, 2, si iroxppovova-L' lu. 11, 3, st /t?; 
 T4 TjhUovv iv. 86, 4, si TO Trdrpiov vapsis. Ample authority 
 for the words supplied in my version, pp. 14, 96, 157, will be 
 found in the notes of Poppo (ed. min.), and Dr. Arnold. 
 
 Before quitting this branch of the subject, I would also 
 refer to p. 151, bk. iv. 62, 3, where, as a marginal note ex- 
 plains, some introduction is required to the train of reflections 
 which rather abruptly commence the paragraph ; to p. 137, 
 bk. iii. 67, 7 (tjp ol ^ys/iovss, k.t.X.), where I have restored the 
 construction — a curious specimen of confusion — on Dr. Arnold's 
 authority; to p. 226, bk. vi. 79, 2 (ItteI ovB' oi'Prjylvoi), where 
 the argumentative force of ivsi requires full expression : ' and 
 to pp. 235, 236, bk. vi. 87, where, at several points, the ideas 
 seemed to demand a little expansion. 
 
 6. In four instances, it has been found needful to transpose 
 clauses, in order to preserve the connection of the sense. In 
 two cases (bk. vi. 11, 4, and 12, 2), the necessity for this ex- 
 pedient is so glaring, that one cannot but suspect the inversion 
 to be due to the error of some early copyist. See pp. 189^ 
 note 2, and 190, note ^, below : and Poppo's notes (ed. min.) on 
 the passages above referred to. Again, if the reader will turn 
 to bk. iv. 126, 4, and to p. 166, note ^, of the translation, he 
 will see that the clauses commencing with the words Kal yap 
 oa-a, K.T.\., require to be reversed ; for, if they are taken in the 
 order of the text, the student, on reaching the next sentence- 
 that beginning with oSrot Ss — is obliged to revert to the first 
 clause of the preceding sentence, in order to recover the con- 
 nection. The only other instance occurs in bk. v. iii, 4, 
 where Thucydides, in laying down, with his usual sententious- 
 ness, a political maxim, has, with a curious imbecility of arrange- 
 ment, thrown into the shade, instead of bringing out in clear 
 relief, the term of the proposition which relates to the case 
 under discussion — the position of Melos towards the Athenian 
 empire.'' See p. 183, note *, below. 
 
 1 As in the similar case of intl sinuate the policy of obedience to a 
 
 Kw, bk. vi. 1 6, 4.. See p. 1 94., note \ stronger power, and therefore un- 
 
 below. obtrusively introduced the principle 
 
 '' Perhaps it may be thought that as the second clause of a general 
 
 the sneaker intended covertly to in- maxim. But the principle in ques- 
 
INTBOBUOTION. xxxi 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 THE SPEECHES, CONSIDEKED IN THEIB LITEEART AUD HISTOKICAL ASPECTS. 
 
 I. ' The history of Thucydides,' says Sir Gr. Cornwall Lewis,i 
 ' forms by itself a great epoch in politics, both as furnishing a 
 model of accurate, trustworthy, and impartial narrative, and as 
 embodying aU the practical sagacity of the ablest statesmen of 
 Greece (including Pericles), who had lived before and during 
 the Peloponnesian war. For close, cogent, and appropriate 
 reasoning on practical political questions, the speeches of Thu- 
 cydides have never been surpassed ; and, indeed, they may be 
 considered as having reached the highest excellence of which 
 the human mind is capable in this department.' Earl Chat- 
 ham, says Lord Lytton,^ while he ' left to professional teachers 
 the legitimate routine in the classic authors, made it his parti- 
 cular desire that Thucydides, the eternal manual of statesmen,^ 
 should be the first Greek book which his son read after coming 
 to college ;' and Bishop Tomline, in his ' Life of Pitt,' men- 
 tions the ease and freedom with which his youthful pupil used 
 to translate the orations which relieve, illustrate, and adorn the 
 narrative of that historian.* 
 
 tion had been so strongly maintained on one occasion only.' 
 
 in the earlier stages of the confer- * Whatefer .may be thought of 
 
 ence that there could be no reason Lucian's statement that Demosthenes 
 
 to shrink from its open assertion at copied the whole history of Thucy- 
 
 the critical stage of its final enforce- dides eight times, there seems to be 
 
 ment. every reason to believe that the histo- 
 
 ' Methods of Observation and Rea- rian's work was ' the object of the 
 
 aiming in Politics, vol. i. p. 6i. great orator's peculiar study and imi- 
 
 " Miscellaneous Prose Works, vol. i, tation.' (Grote, Sist. of Greece, vol. 
 
 p. 214. xi. p. 379.) y^olt (ad Demosth. Lep- 
 
 ' Probably an undesigned, though tin.^. 51) finds but few traces of 
 
 an excellent version of the celebrated direct imitation. Dionysius (de 
 
 expression tcrfiiia ig ait (i. zz), which, Thucyd. Jud. §§ 53, 54., 55) does not 
 
 says Miiller {Literature . of Greece, agree with this criticism : mention- 
 
 vol. ii. p. 126), 'opposes the work of ing several passages from Demos- 
 
 Thucydides, which people were to thenes closely modelled, in his 
 
 keep by them and read over and opinion, on the historian's style. He 
 
 over again, to a composition which however expressly states that the 
 
 was designed to gratify an audience imitation was limited to the finest 
 
XXxii INTBOBUGTION. 
 
 2. Goller ' remarks that the critics of the eighteenth century, 
 writing at an epoch when ParHamentary government and 
 political freedom were rare, were more disposed than they 
 would be now to regard the speeches of Thucydides as a 
 literary anomaly, or, as Col. Mure expresses it, ' a vicious 
 excrescence on the body of a historical work.' In a similar vein 
 Poppo, in contrasting the ancient with the modern style of 
 historical writing, observes that the embodiment of the specu- 
 lative element of history, the illustration of the play of consti- 
 tutions, of the working of deliberative assemblies, and of the 
 characters of the chief actors in the national drama, in set 
 speeches by the classic historians, is characteristic of the 
 different political conditions of the two seras. Writing in the 
 year 182 1, when, to speak generally, continental affairs were 
 regulated, not, as at Athens in the days of Pericles, by the free 
 pulse of popular government, but by the clockwork machinery of 
 despotism, he says,^ in a tone amusingly querulous — ' Hodie, dum 
 civitates e cubiculis principum eorumque uxorum, amicorum 
 amicarumve reguntur, atque omnia modo per literas transi- 
 guntur, ridiculum esset, si quis de secretis rerum causis in conci- 
 onibus actum fingeret, quoniam hoc omnino careret verisimUi- 
 tudine : nam si quae hodie a principibus eorumque familiaribus 
 orationes publice habentur,hoc non fit, ut vera doceatur populus, 
 sed ut caligo ei offundatur, atque de rebus ita judicare consuescat, 
 ut placet regibus ; tales autem fraudulentse orationes eternae ob- 
 livioni sunt tradendae (!). Aliter res se habebat apud veteres, in 
 quorum liberis rebus publicis libere ac palam quisque sententiam 
 suam profiteri potuit. Ibi de rebus gravissimis coram populo 
 verba faciebant oratores, nee quicquam erat, quod quidem om- 
 nium civium intererat, de quo, si non publice disputatum est, non 
 posset certe disputari.' ' It must be acknowledged,' says Sir 
 G. C, Lewis,* ' that the practice' of introducing speeches of 
 
 qualities of Thucydides ; adding, lively, nervous yet flowing, pleasant 
 
 elsewhere (de Admir. Vi Demosth. yet pungent, sententious yet impas- 
 
 § 8), that the orator disdained allegi- sioned ; imhued, in short, with all 
 
 ance to any one model, but ' wrought the versatile attributes of Proteus.' 
 out of many a style of composition * Thucyd. Second edition. Vol. i. 
 
 sublime yet simple, redundant yet p. 54.. 
 concise, refined yet familiar, decla- * Ed. maj. Prolog, p. 4.7. 
 
 matory yet natural, dignified yet ' Loc. cit. p. 241. 
 
INTIiODUGTION. xxxiu 
 
 the historian's composition ' has been the means of giving us 
 many well-written orations, and of showing in what light the 
 transactions described were viewed by the historian. Thucy- 
 dideSj for example, rarely comments^ upon the events ; and his 
 construction of the facts is principally to be derived from the 
 arguments which he puts into the mouths of his speakers. In 
 antiquity, moreover, when there were no standing embassies, 
 and no diplomatic correspondence between independent states, 
 negotiations were chiefly carried on by envoys, who delivered 
 their message in a public meeting, and argued in its support. 
 Hence, many important transactions were conducted orally,^ in 
 an ancient state, which would now be contained in despatches 
 between the ministers of different courts and in collections of 
 state papers. There was, therefore, greater inducement to give, 
 in the form of a speech, arguments which would now be cited 
 from authentic documents. It is further to be borne in mind, 
 that in the ancient republics public affairs were decided in 
 popular assemblies after debate, in which the leading politicians 
 took part ; whereas, in all the states of modern Europe, except 
 England, the decisions were generally made by the king or his 
 ministers in private.' ' 
 
 If, under these conditions, ancient history, in comparison 
 with modern, suffers in the one point of fulness of detail,^ it 
 
 ^ There are but few exceptions to with the single exception of the 
 
 this statement ; for instance, the Melian negotiation. In all these 
 
 reflections on the causes of the ca- instances, says Sir G. C. Lewis, 
 
 lamitous catastrophe of the war (bk. ' modern practice would have sub- 
 
 ii. 65); on the evils engendered by stituted a written communication 
 
 the prevalence of faction (iii. 82 between the ministers of the several 
 
 seqq.) ; on the personal influence of governments, or between the ambas- 
 
 Brasidas in promoting the fortunes sador of one government and the 
 
 of Sparta (bk. iv. 81) ; on the reasons minister of the other.' — P. 242. 
 
 which inclined Athens and Lacedse- ' To appreciate the naturalness 
 
 mon to peace (v. 14 seqq.). "We may and consistency of the practice of 
 
 perhaps add the characters of The- introducing set speeches by the his- 
 
 mistocles(i. 138), of Pericles(ii. 65), torians of Greece and Rome, we 
 
 and Alcibiades (vi. 15). must remember the vast influence 
 
 ^ Thus, the Corcyrean and Oorin- of eloquence upon the conduct of 
 
 thian envoys address themselves public afiairs in the classic world, 
 
 direct to the public assembly at See p. xlv. below. 
 
 Athens(bk. i. chs. 32seqq., 37 seqq.), * See Professor Sellar's Essay: 
 
 an example followed in every simi- Oxford Essays, 1857, p. 310. 
 lar case throughout Thucydides, 
 
xxxiv INTBODUOTION. 
 
 indemnifies itself by the clearness of the light it reflects on the 
 motives and causes of political action. The records of diplo- 
 macy, such as the archives of Simancas, even in the hands of a 
 Prescott or a Motley, probably afford a less trusty clue to the 
 real history of an epoch, than Thucydides derived from the 
 simplicity and transparency of the agencies which evolved the 
 great events of his day : from the prevalent freedom and pub- 
 licity of political discussion : and the dependence of action on 
 the will of states instead of on the secret counsels of ministers 
 or the arbitrary rule of princes. 
 
 3. It is rarely indeed that we find an ancient critic object, 
 on the ground of principle, to the introduction of speeches of 
 the historian's composition. Even Dionysius, no indulgent 
 censor of Thucydides, pronounces them essential to a true 
 conception of the political evolutions of the ancient world : 
 remarking that they were as often the hinges of great events 
 as battles and sieges." And Diodorus Siculus, who has some- 
 times been quoted on the opposite side, in discussing the sub- 
 ject in the preface to his twentieth book, admits their value as 
 a relief to the narrative, and as a means of elucidating the 
 motives of the principal actors on the political stage. Lucian, 
 too, in his ' Essay on History,' insists only on the congeniality 
 of the address to the speaker, on the clearness of its style, and 
 its adaptation to the subject. And when Cratippus,^ a cotem- 
 porary and editor of Thucydides, censures his speeches as an 
 obstacle to the current of the narrative, and as tiresome to the 
 reader, his objections rest on literary, not on historical grounds. 
 Polybius stands alone in denouncing imaginary speeches as 
 foreign to the historian's province, which he limits to the record 
 of what has been actually said and done.' Modern history, 
 with a few exceptions,'' conforms to the rule of the annalist of 
 
 ' Antiq. Moman. vii. 66. ' Bk. ii. 56, 10 : Stl rbv my- 
 
 ^ Dionys. de Thueyd. Judie. c. 16. ypafka ov roig ivStxop.ivovQ \6yovQ 
 
 Oratippus even pledges Thucydides Irirtiv, k.t.X. 
 
 to the same opinion, which, he says, * Guicciardini, for instance, who, 
 
 accounts for the omission of speeches in his second book, represents 
 
 in the eighth book, although nego- speeches delivered in a consultation 
 
 tiations, orally conducted, and public of Florentine citizens, upon the com- 
 
 oratory, had been the channels of parative advantages of popular and 
 
 many of the transactions it records. aristocratic government, after the 
 
INTBOBUOTION. xxxv 
 
 the Punic wars^ and it is now a recognised principle that ' no 
 speech which was not actually delivered, and of which an 
 authentic cotemporary report has not been preserved, is admis- 
 sible in a history.'' 
 
 4. Compared, however, with later classic historians, Thucy- 
 dides maintains, in the composition of his speeches, a jealous 
 adherence to historical truth. Tacitus and Livy, says Sir G. 
 C. Lewis, looked upon ' a deliberation in a popular body, or a 
 military harangue, as an opportunity for rhetorical display, 
 and composed speeches in prose with as much freedom as a 
 dramatist would use in verse.''' Not content v/ith inserting 
 speeches of their own invention when no record of the address 
 really delivered had been preserved, they sometimes substituted 
 their own harangues when the original speech was extant, and 
 even introduced speeches on occasions where none had been 
 delivered. Thus, Tacitus, instead of reporting the genuine 
 address of the Emperor Claudius — preserved to this day on 
 brazen tablets in the museum at Lyons — invented^ an oration 
 for him ; and Livy,'' after mentioning a speech of Cato in the 
 Senate, characteristically adds : ' non inseram simulachrum viri 
 copiosi, quae dixerit referendo ; ipsius oratio scripta exstat, 
 Originum quinto libro inclusa.' Disdaining to cite, or even 
 to make a faithful abstract of, the real, speech, he would readily 
 
 lave composed one of his own invention,^ 
 
 5. Thucydides himself tells us plainly what degree of 
 authenticity his speeches claim. In his preliminary exposition 
 of his method of historical research, he remarks that, finding it 
 difficult to remember the exact terms of the speeches he had 
 
 fashion of the debate attributed by duces two fictitious speeches, one of 
 
 Herodotus to the Persian conspira- which he attributes to Cineaa, the 
 
 tors on the relative advantages of other to Appius Csecus. See pp. 
 
 monarchy, oligarchy and democracy. 485-94. 
 
 His example has been followed by ^ Sir G. 0. Lewis, 1. c. p. 240. 
 
 Botta, who, in his Storia d' Italia '' Loc. cit. p. 235. 
 
 dal 1780 al 1814, lib. iii., gives his ' Ann. xi. 24. 
 
 own version of the speeches deli- ^ Lib. xlv. 25. 
 
 vered by two Venetian senators, in * As in the case of the fictitious 
 
 1793, on the questions arising from speech he attributes to the mother 
 
 the French invasion of Italy under of that rather apocryphal personage, 
 
 Bonaparte. Niebuhr, in the third Coriolanus, lib. ii. 40. 
 
 vol. of his Roman History, intro- 
 
 b 2 
 
 J 
 
xxxvi INTEODUCTION. 
 
 heard, cr to collect accurate reports of those at whose delivery- 
 he had not been present, he had attributed to each speaker 
 the arguments he considered most suitable to the questions 
 from time to time under discussion, keeping as close as he could 
 to the general tenor of what was actually said.' And here, 
 before entering on the considerations suggested by the his- 
 torian's candid declaration, we must remember that the 
 Athenians had no 'Hansard': that the 'Times' reporter did 
 not attend the debates of their assembly ; and that, although 
 speeches on critical political issues were documents of the 
 highest historical value, the Greek historians had no other 
 authority for their accounts of public deliberations than the 
 recollection of persons present on the occasion, save when the 
 orator published his own speech. Such was the practice of 
 Demosthenes, Isocrates, Andocides, Lysias, and others; but 
 Plutarch^ expressly declares that Pericles left no written 
 speech ; and the orations current in his name, vaguely' men- 
 tioned by Cicero, were either spurious, as Sir G. C. Lewis 
 thinks, or, as Col. Mure suggests, those imputed to him by 
 Thucydides.'' Unless we credit the apocryphal statement of 
 Diogenes Laertius that Xenophon used shorthand notes to 
 take down the conversations of Socrates published in his 
 ' Memorabilia,' we must accept Plutarch's* assertion that short- 
 hand writers (aTj/isioypd^oL) were employed for the first time 
 by Cicero to report the debate in the Senate on the fate of the 
 Catilinarian conspirators. Towards the close of the Eepublican 
 sera, the reporting of speeches on special occasions came into 
 fashion ; thus the original speech in defence of Milo, so dif- 
 ferent from the oration afterwards composed by Cicero, is said 
 to have been preserved from the reporter's notes ; ^ and, 
 although under the imperial regime no complete series of the 
 Seiiatorial debates was ever published at E.ome, the practice of 
 
 1 Bk. i. 12, 1. ties to Pericles, Alcibiades, and 
 
 ^ Zife of Pericles, eh. 8. Thucydides. If he identified their 
 
 ' ' Periclem, cujus soripta qusedam styles, it could only have been in 
 
 feruntur.' — Brutus, 7. the historian's pages. 
 
 * A supposition materially streng- * Life of Cato, ch. 23. 
 
 thened by a passage in Cicero's trea- ^ Merivale's Roman Emperors, 
 
 tise, De Orat. iL 22, where he vol. i. p. 543. 
 
 attributes the same oratorical quali- 
 
INTRODUCTION. xxxvu 
 
 reporting became so prevalent that the word actuarius, 
 originally denoting the scribe who registered the acts of a 
 public body, gradually acquired the sense of * reporter ; ' ' and 
 the art of the shorthand writer is described by the popular 
 authors of the epoch in terms which would aptly characterise 
 the Parliamentary reporters of the present day.^ 
 
 6. Even had Thucydides made a less explicit revelation of 
 the authorities which served as a basis for his speeches, internal 
 evidence would have led his readers to the conclusion he him- 
 self suggests. Aristotle twice cites in his ' Rhetoric '^ an illus- 
 tration from the Funeral speech of Pericles, in which that 
 orator had compared the damage Athens had sustained from 
 the sacrifice of her youth in the war, to the damage the seasons 
 would suffer from the loss of spring. Of this comparison we 
 find not a vestige in the Ko^/os e-rriTajtios in which Thucydides 
 impersonates the Athenian statesman. It is also observable 
 that the historian, in ushering in his speakers, studiously era- 
 ploys terms'* implying that he is only reproducing the substance 
 of what they said. Col. Mure,* however, is certainly not 
 entitled to argue that the fact of * many of these harangues, 
 though dressed up in all the conventional unities of composition 
 and delivery, as single orations, being described as spoken not 
 by a single orator, but by commissions of diplomatic agents, 
 " Athenian envoys," " Corinthian envoys," in their collective 
 capacity, is itself conclusive proof of their unreality.' They of 
 course were delivered by one or more spokesmen, whose name 
 the historian may not have remembered, or may have thought 
 
 ^ Suetonius (Casar, o. 55) says a Ann. v. 
 
 speech in defence of Q. Metellus ^ As in Martial's clever epigram, 
 
 was attributed to Julius Caesar, but xiv. 208 : 
 
 that Augustus thougbt it had been- , Currant verba licet, maiius est 
 
 imperfectly reported, and never re- yelocior illis • 
 
 vised by the speaker. The words ^^^^^^ j; j^ ^^^^ ^^^^^.^ 
 
 are, 'quam non immerito Augustus peregit opus.' 
 existiniat magia ab actuariis excep- 
 
 tam, male subsequentibus verba ^ Bk. i. 7, 4; iii. lo, 7. 
 
 dicentis, quam ab ipso editam.' Si- * The formula is, 'iXiyov, ilirov 
 
 milarly, Seneca {Epist. 33, § 9) uses TOiiSe, roiavra, 'they spoke to the 
 
 the words ' actuarii vice fungitur,' following effect : ' not e\tyov rdSf, or 
 
 in a sense equivalent to the English ravTa. 
 
 'performs the part of a reporter.' * lAterahire of Greece, vol. v. p. 
 
 See Lipsius, Extmrs, ad Tacit. 104. 
 
xxxviii INTRODUCTION. 
 
 it only worth his while to mention on important occasions, such 
 as the defence of the Platasans, of whose advocates he has 
 preserved the names. Undue stress, too, has perhaps been 
 laid, in dealing with this branch of the question, on what has 
 been termed the prophetic import of some passages in the 
 earlier speeches ; upon the Spartan king's anticipation of the 
 length and obstinacy of the war (bk. i. 80) ; his conception of 
 the policy of the alliance subsequently formed between Persia 
 and Sparta against Athens (i. 82) ; and the allusion to the 
 project of occupying a fort in the Attic territory (i. 122, 142): 
 an expedient obvious enough to strike any military eye at 
 the outset of the war. Critics surely cannot seriously insist 
 that passages like these uniformly betray not the foresight of 
 the speaker, but the later experience of the writer. Occa- 
 sionally, however, we find a significant revelation of the fact, 
 that if the memoranda of a speech were collected near the date 
 of its delivery, its actual composition, as it appears in the pages 
 of Thucydides, was delayed till a much later period. Mr. 
 Grote^ remarks that it is only on this theory we can explain 
 the allusion in a speech of Hermocrates, B.C. 424. (bk. iv. 60), 
 to the presence of a small Athenian squadron in the Sicilian 
 waters. The fleet in question must have consisted of at least 
 fifty sail ; and it was only by comparison with the great armar 
 mentof 415 B.C. — a comparison obvious enough to Thucydides, 
 writing at the close of the war — that any Greek could have 
 called it small.^ 
 
 7, But these are minor points. Assuming the truth of his 
 own statement that he adhered as closely as he could to the 
 tenor of what was actually said, the question still remains, in 
 what proportion he has blended with the record of the various 
 speeches his own moral and political axioms, sentiments, gene- 
 ralisations, maxims ? On the threshold of this enquiry, we are 
 met by the very phsenomena the historian's admission would lead 
 us to expect. On the one hand, the advocacy of the various 
 lines of policy is characterised, even in the most elaborate of 
 these orations, by a plainness and simplicity, and the argu- 
 ments which enforce them by a practical, and sometimes 
 
 • History of Greece, vol. vii. p. ^ A similar instance will be found 
 
 188, note. in note *, p. 175, below. 
 
INTEOBUGTION. xxxix 
 
 businesslike, tone, whicli does not strike us as transcending the 
 capacity, or as foreign to the genius, of any of the speakers, 
 or those whom they addressed, and which lends probability to the 
 writer's assertion of his fidelity, wherever it was attainable, to 
 the general outline of what was really said. On the other 
 hand, the tissue of ethical and political comment so copiously 
 interwoven with the thread of the main argument, seems to 
 reflect the genius of Thucydides himself. We can hardly 
 attribute to miscellaneous audiences of Spartans, Corinthians, 
 Athenians, Boeotians, Mytileneans, Sicilians, a degree of in- 
 tellectual culture and refinement of thought scarcely to be 
 realised in the most highly educated assemblies of modern 
 days ; and our only alternative lies in accepting the personal 
 authorship, for the most part, of the speculative and didactic 
 element of the speeches ; a theory rendered so intrinsically 
 probable by the abstract tone which pervades this part of the 
 work — a tone suggestive of individual rather than aggregate 
 intelligence — by the equability of the intellectual standard 
 maintained throughout : by the general prevalence of a rhetorical 
 mannerism peculiar to the historian's style when he touches 
 the same theme with his own pencil : ' by the frequency with 
 which certain general views^ of human affairs are reproduced : 
 and by the curious coincidences of thought and even expression 
 between sentiments uttered by Thucydides in his iiarrative 
 and arguments attributed to particular speakers.^ It is this 
 
 1 For instance, in the celebrated of action. Not that he negatives the 
 
 passage containing his reflections on influence of supernatural agencies 
 
 the prevalence of faction, and its in- (see note '^, p. 179, belowj : but he 
 
 fluence on the social and political builds his theories of life and action 
 
 morality of Greece. — Bk. iii. chs. on the basis of visible causation and 
 
 gz, 83. actual experience. Thus, while 
 
 * Such, for instance, as the idea, Herodotus ascribes to Nemesis the 
 
 attributed impartially to characters abasement of pride and prosperitj', 
 
 so dissimilar as those of Hermocrates, Thucydides attributes such reverses 
 
 Nicias, Archidamus, Pericles, and to natural causes — the undue elation 
 
 reminding us, by its frequent recur- and the gambling spirit engendered 
 
 renoe, of the refrain of a Greek by unexpected success. 
 
 Chorus, of the uncertainty of fortune : ' See note ^, p. 19, below, where 
 
 an element flowing from the limita- the reader will observe that Thucy- 
 
 tions imposed upon the power' of didesascribesto the Athenian speaker 
 
 man, whose will and capacities he the very sentiment he had himself 
 
 still regards as the only known causes uttered in the nineteenth chapter of 
 
xl INTBOVUGTION. 
 
 general uuiformlty of mould and casual variety of feature 
 which has induced a critic to compare his method to 'the 
 practice of modem painters, accustomed to design their prin- 
 cipal female figures after some favourite living model, whose 
 original form and features everywhere reappear, under the 
 several attributes of a Minerva or a Madonna, a Herodias or 
 a Lucretia.' ' 
 
 8. If we were contending for the absolute authenticity of 
 the speeches, the question of the degree of individuality infused 
 into them would be one of cardinal importance. The historian, 
 however, by discarding all pretensions to a purely literal 
 report of the various harangues, virtually resolves the question 
 into a point of assthetical rather than historical interest. In re- 
 lation to Thucydides, it is far less a problem of historic fidelity 
 than of dramatic consistency. To the latter principle he is 
 true, so far as the general law of his work permits. But he 
 does not confound it with a mimic representation of national 
 or personal peculiarities ; the same idea of the dignity of his- 
 tory which made it impossible for him to be vulgar even when 
 he personated Cleon, and forbad him to sacrifice the artistic 
 unity ^ of his work and destroy its harmony of colouring by 
 chequering his page with the motley varieties of dialect, limited 
 his observance of the ' law of propriety ' to the portraiture of 
 broad features and salient points, and threw into the shade the 
 minor attributes of style, manner, and degrees of intellectual 
 power.' We look in vain for any trace of Boeotian stolidity in 
 
 the aame bcok. For a similar in- to say that the speeches in Thucy- 
 
 stance, see note ^, p. 2z. dides are more consistent with the 
 
 ' Mure, Literature of Greece, vol. v. conceptions we form of the characters 
 
 p. 148. of the speakers from the acts recorded 
 
 ' On this point, see Poppo (ed. of them than they might have been 
 
 maj.), Proleg. p. 4.9 ; Miiller, Litera- if they were a literal account of what 
 
 ture of Greece, vol. ii. p. 129. was actually spoken. States are not 
 
 8 ' There is not indeed much dra- necessarily represented by individuals 
 matic imitation of manner, or of the whose characteristics resemble the 
 lifelike attributes of the orators. national type, nor do men at all 
 In these respects Thucydides is less times express theiliselves in con- 
 dramatic than Herodotus or Plato, formity with what to lookers-on ap- 
 who bring before us something of the pears the master-passion of their 
 outward man as well as the inward lives.' — Professor Sellar, Oxford 
 thought. It may seem paradoxical Bsaai/x^ p. 298. 
 
INTBOBUGTION. xli 
 
 the Theban reply to the Plattean petitioners for mercy; yet 
 the truth of the picture is redeemed by the moral apathy and 
 heartlessness of tone characteristic of the men who had played 
 the traitor to their country's cause in the great struggle of the 
 Persian war. In harmony with nature, we find national traits 
 relieved by personal varieties ; Archidamus, for instance, in a 
 speech which is a living embodiment of Spartan pride, and of 
 the circumspect policy and conservative feeling of his country- 
 men, represents the higher, Sthenelaidas the lower, type of 
 Lacedaemonian character. Satisfied perhaps with a single 
 exhibition of laconic bluntness and coarseness of tone in the 
 person of the Ephor, the historian pointedly disclaims, in the 
 speech of the Spartan deputies at Athens, any affectation of 
 qualities of style or manner which, if they did not baffle the 
 exposition of the case, would have paralysed its effect on an 
 Athenian ear ; vindicating, at the same time, his general con- 
 sistency by bringing out in full relief the systematic mediocrity 
 of aim, the timid, creeping policy, and the cynical disregard of 
 the rightful claims of other powers,' which one of his sjDeakers^ 
 subsequently describes as an inveterate trait of Spiirtan diplo- 
 macy abroad. The rival addresses of the envoys of Corinth 
 and Corcyra symbolise the spirit of the mercantile communities 
 they represent ; they realise our idea of the insular state as a 
 commercial republic of inferior caste, and respond to our con- 
 ceptions of the higher strain of policy and aim which inspired 
 the counsels of Corinth. The Corcyrean arguments scarcely 
 ascend above the sordid Carthaginian level of mere advantage ; 
 the question of expediency is the staple of their address : they 
 appeal, not to Athenian honour, but to Athenian policy ; and 
 the question of right is only presented in the shape of a 
 sophistical^ construction of a clause in the Thirty Years' Truce, 
 the hollowness of which the speaker admits by its partial re- 
 tractation in the thirty-sixth chapter, and by a clumsy attempt 
 to criminate the Corinthians as the first aggressors. Corinth, 
 on the other hand, though far from blind to the instincts of 
 
 ' See note '•', p. 141, below. notes referred to, I have followed 
 
 ^ See p. 180, below. MuUer's views on this point in pre-> 
 
 ^ See note', p. 6, and ^, p. 14., ference to those of Mr. Grote. 
 below. As I have explained in the 
 
xlii INTBODUOTION. 
 
 policy, appeals warmly to the sentiments of honour and of 
 moral obligation : resting her claim on the impregnable grounds 
 of international law, and a just construction of the clause her 
 opponents had perverted ; on the natural instincts of gratitude 
 for her repeated support of the Athenian cause, and on the 
 harmony of true policy with right. The third speech attributed 
 to Pericles paints that statesman in the very colours of the 
 sketch subsequently given of his character. The spirit with 
 which he braves the resentment and bridles the passions of his 
 audience, is a living echo of that diguified contempt of mere 
 popularity which Thucydides, in the sixty-fifth chapter of his 
 second book, imputes to him in pointed contrast with succeed- 
 ing politicians, whom he describes as more on a level with one 
 another, and forced to redeem the poverty of their personal 
 pretensions to ascendancy by servile adulation of the tyrant 
 people. From the opening chapter of the statesman's last 
 address the poet Ion might have reinforced his censure of that 
 haughty and defiant self-esteem which he so unfavourably com- 
 pared with the unpretending simplicity of his patron Cimon.' 
 
 9. In speaking of the representative or dramatic element of 
 the speeches, we must not omit to note the historian's manage- 
 ment of the principle of contrast. Mr. Grrote has remarked 
 the eifect with which the bright colours and cheerful tone in 
 which Pericles portrays the social life and political grandeur 
 of Athens, are succeeded by the graphic detail of the ravages 
 of the pestilence, with its attendant train of social horrors, 
 general demoralisation, and political despondency. And we 
 find a true specimen of tragic irony in the contrast between 
 the ruthless abuse of Athenian power at Melos and the over- 
 whelming catastrophe of the Sicilian invasion, to the prepara- 
 tions for which Thucydides, with much dramatic effect, shifts 
 the scene, the moment the curtain drops on the consummation 
 of the island massacre. Turning to the portraiture of indi- 
 vidual life aiid character, we cannot fail to remark the truth- 
 fulness to nature with which the rival actors are contrasted. 
 In the historian's pages, the figures of the drama are not 
 opposed in the sharp epigrammatic antithetical style which 
 modern history, to give flagrancy to contrast, has so often 
 ^ Plutarcli, Pericles, c. 5. 
 
INTEODUGTION. xliii 
 
 borrowed from the alien province of the satirist ; ' they stand out 
 from the canvas — not, however, as personified qualities, but as 
 men. The versatile but unprincipled energy of Alcibiades ^ 
 and the timid superstitious desponding temperament of Nicias, 
 are the more effectively contrasted, because the writer never 
 oversteps ' the modesty of nature' by artificial elaboration or 
 exaggerated colouring. The modest genius of Brasidas and 
 the braggart arrogance of Cleon are brought out in clear hut 
 natural relief; and we feel the reality with which two very 
 different types of Spartan character are embodied in the intel- 
 ligence of the dignified Archidamus and the coarseness of the 
 ill-educated Ephor.* Farther on, amid the opening scenes of 
 the Sicilian war, the grave and decorous tones of the patrician 
 Hermocrates, the tribunician vehemence and the pungent and 
 contentious satire with which Athenagoras declaims against 
 the aristocratic votaries of war, present a lively image of the 
 varieties of character formed by the natural play of life and 
 manners at an epoch when personal idiosyncrasies were inten- 
 sified by the embittered strife of faction. 
 
 10. If, as Miiller' thinks, the impartiality with which our 
 historian dramatises the opinions of conflicting parties or states- 
 men is in some degree due to the sophistical exercises which 
 taught the art of pleading both sides of a question, he has 
 turned the lessons of Gorgias and Antiphon to excellent 
 account. ' Thucydides,' says Professor Sellar, ' apjiears in 
 every case to throw himself strongly into the situation of the 
 speaker ; not, in general at least, to discover palliatives by 
 which he might deceive himself and others as to the true 
 grounds on which he was acting ; but to find some intellectual 
 basis — a position consistent with some elements in human 
 nature — on which the real motives of his actions could logically 
 be maintained. In this respect, too, his practice is dramatic, 
 g,nd analogous to that of the Greek tragedians. To the worst 
 
 ' See Lord Macaulay's Essays, enough to the strong provocation 
 
 vol. i. p. i6i. which invited the retort. 
 
 * Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that ' See p. xli. above, 
 
 the abruptnesawith -which Alcihiades * Literature of Greece, vol. ii. p. 
 
 commences his reply to the opposi- 130, 
 tion speech of Nicias, is congenial 
 
xliv INTEODUOTION. 
 
 cause, and to the speakers with whom he had least sympathy, 
 he lends the aid of all his intellectual power. He allows them 
 to enunciate immoral principles, rather than to sacrifice their 
 self-respect by condescending to the use of argumentative 
 sophistry.' None of his speeches are characterised by more 
 ability and thought than that in which Cleon advocates the 
 massacre of the Mytileneans. The insolent strength of the 
 Athenians at Melos is endowed with a terrible force of prac- 
 tical logic and defiant sarcasm.'^ Mr. Grote^ seems inclined 
 to endorse the perverse commentary of Dionysius,'* who stig- 
 matises the grounds upon which the Athenian envoys found 
 their claim to the submission of Melos, as worthy of pirates, 
 and quite out of character with the highly civilised state whose 
 chivalrous patriotism had saved Greece in the struggle with 
 the Mede.- A shallow censure, sufficiently rebuked by Poppo's 
 remark, that, if Athens was capable of treating Melos and 
 Scione as she did, the arguments of her representatives were 
 a fair mirror of the national sentiments ; ahd by the calm and 
 dispassionate assertion of ' the right of the strongest,' volun- 
 teered by the Athenian representative at Camarina on an 
 occasion when intimidation offered nothing, a concihatory tone 
 everything. In the Melian debate Thucydides doubtless in- 
 tended to dramatise the existing phase of political morality 
 
 ' Marcelliiius (Fife r/jMCJ/rf., § 56) yei'valois Kal typwuo/v f^^owut So^ar, 
 
 notes and accounts for his remarkal^le XoyovQ iipwvsiaQ Kai Tvavovpylaq inpi- 
 
 abstinence from the use of what he nPsj/ni ..... Texvirov yAp av- 
 
 terms Figures of thought as opposed Spbg ipvXd^m roTg TrpotrunroiQ riiv im- 
 
 to Figures of speech. He describes {iaWovtrav So^av Kal to7q Trpdyjiaai tov 
 
 him as 7rotKt\w-aroe p-'^v iv rotg r^t' aKoKovQov Koapov. ' We rarely^' says 
 
 \'iS,tii}<; axfipaiTi, Kara Sk r^v hdvoiav Ool. Mure, ' meet in his speeches 
 
 TovvavTwv unxipnTKTTog' ovre yap with the favourite expedients of later 
 
 tipujvtiaiQ ouT-f iiTiTipri'urnv oxiTS ra'iQ rhetoricians for influencing an audi- 
 
 £K TrXuyiov pijaiaiv ovre aWaig rial ence ; e. g. the taunting interrogatory 
 
 wavovpywis irpbg rhv aKpoaTi]v icixpl- Qp<>''''1l'-a), the sudden brealdng off of 
 
 TatjTov ^ripoa^'hvovQ paXiara iv TovToiQ an argument or statement (arrfriw- 
 
 iiriitiKvvpimv t^v Btivoriira. Olpai Tri/ryit;), the affectation of impartiality 
 
 Se oiiK ayi'oiq, (TxripaTiapov tov Kara (lipuivdn), or of a feai" of overstating 
 
 Siavoiav Trapuiai tov BovKvSi.Sr)v to one's case, or undervaluing that of 
 
 ToiovTor, ciKXa rolg viroKtipivoig Trpoffw- an opponent.' — Mure, vol. v. p. 166. 
 
 TTOig TTpsKOvrac /cai dppoZovTag avvTt- ^ Oxford Essays, 1857: p. 297. 
 
 QtvTa Toig Xoyovg' ov yap iirpiirs ' History of Greece, vol. vii. p. 
 
 XltpiK\ii Kal '&pxi-Sdpij> Kal NiKij Kal 157. 
 
 'Bpaa'ifi} dv9pmTroig piyoKc-^joat Kal * Jud.de Thiicyd. chs. 38, 39. 
 
INTRODUCTION. xlv 
 
 among his countrymen, and to paint the influence of the 
 atrocities of the war in the deepening profligacy of the times. 
 And he has drawn the picture with inimitable truth and con- 
 sistency. The maxims so unblushingly propounded in the 
 Melian conference are the legitimate fruit of that utter dis- 
 organisation of society so graphically sketched by the historian 
 as the disastrous effect of factious and revolutionary violence, 
 culminating in the overthrow of all the sanctions of religion, 
 morality and natural aff'ection. In that sketch, he redeems 
 himself, ethically, from any suspicion of his own infection with 
 the debased principles which historical truth forces him to 
 impute to his countrymen. Politically, too, he vindicates him- 
 self, implicitly, by qualifying any impression we might build 
 on the brilliant panegyric of Athenian democracy so con- 
 sistently placed on the lips of Pericles, by describing, in marked 
 contrast with his usual reticence, the government of Five 
 Thousand as the best constitution Athens had enjoyed in his 
 time. These casual glimpses of his own sentiments are the 
 more interesting, because, as he does not treat his materials 
 judicially, after the fashion of modern historians, but analyti- 
 cally and dramatically, our impressions of his views on moral 
 and social questions would, apart from such occasional gleams, 
 be purely conjectural. 
 
 II. If we look to the principle upon which Thucydides has 
 regulated the introduction of his speeches, we shall find that, 
 so far from resorting to them for mere rhetorical eifect, he has 
 availed himself of this machinery for purposes partly Eesthetical, 
 chiefly historical ; bringing it into play, for instance, when the 
 influence of an eloquent address formed the key to some im- 
 portant decision or critical event: an influence without a 
 parallel, in modern times, even in free countries like our own. 
 With us, public opinion acts on the executive slowly, through 
 Parliament and the press ; any sudden political movement is 
 instantly confronted by formidable obstacles ; at Athens, pub- 
 lic opinion found a rapid and direct expression, without any 
 intermediate organ or check, in the decisions of an assembly 
 composed of the whole people ;' decisions always influenced by, 
 
 ^ Thus, the fate of the Mytileneans an adjoumment; and the decision 
 was settled in one day, without even was reversed on the following day, 
 
xlvi IXTBODUGTION. 
 
 and sometimes formed under the immediate impulse of, oratory, 
 which, thus became the chief instrument and prime mover of 
 political action. The .same machinery serves, in the hands of 
 Thucydides, to introduce the chief actors on the political arena : 
 to give an impartial and many-sided picture of the springs of 
 action : to bring out, in a vivid representative form, the most 
 critical situations of the war : to relieve the narrative : to con- 
 tribute, in a classic sense, to the artistic perfection of the 
 work : to represent the various -phases of public feeHng and 
 opinion : to paint the demoralising influence of long-protracted 
 hostilities in not only violating the recognised standard, but in 
 substituting a new standard, of principle and duty : to serve as 
 a vehicle for the exposition of ethical and political truths, 
 which, though often mere summaries of current experience, 
 aggregates of facts and tendencies, analytical and tentative ia 
 form, and sometimes failing to seize the ultimate law — a 
 natural feature of an epoch of early speculative activity, seek- 
 ing rather to raise than to settle social questions — will yet be 
 found to contain, in many cases, the first germs of conceptions ' 
 more fully expanded in subsequent times, and to constitute, on' 
 the whole, one of the most valuable legacies which the long 
 and calamitous experience of ages has bequeathed to the prac- 
 tical wisdom of our own days. 
 
 Dionysius, while he extols several of the speeches, especially 
 the first oration of Pericles, the first address of Nicias, and, , 
 above all, the pathetic oratory of the Platseans, objects to the 
 speeches in the first book, as tediously disproportionate to the 
 importance of the events recorded ; complaining, at the same 
 time, of the omission of the debate which resulted in the adop- 
 tion of Cleon's decree for the massacre of the Mytileneans : 
 and of the Funeral oration of Pericles, as misplaced in point of 
 time and circumstance.^ These censures, however, show a 
 curious tendency to recoil upon their author : the points chal- 
 
 under the same influence as that volving the most momentous issues. 
 
 which had produced it. See also ^ Such, for instance, as the recog- 
 
 the passage (hk. i. ch. 85, p. 39, nition of the political truth embodied 
 
 below) in which Archidamus depre- in the term 'Balance of power,' p. 95, 
 
 cates a decision, within the brief below, 
 
 span of an hiur, on a question in- " Jud. de Thiicyd. §§ 17, i8. 
 
INTBODUGTION. xlvii 
 
 lenged by the critic being found, when considered in their true 
 aspects, to support the theory for which I contend, and to 
 illustrate the historian's economy of the dramatic elament of 
 his work. With regard to the first ground of objection, it is 
 clear that, if the representative element of history is to be 
 brought fully into play, its use is very appropriate in the 
 earlier scenes of the drama, if only to introduce the actors, and 
 allow them to speak for themselves. While, so far from the 
 particular speeches in the first book being misplaced, they 
 serve to bring out many interesting featuies which no other 
 machinery could have developed so effectively. The envoys 
 of Corinth and Corcyra discuss opposite views of international 
 law and colonial relations with a picturesqueness that the his- 
 torian's formal exposition could never have achieved: the 
 speeches of the Corinthians at Sparta are pregnant revelations 
 of the causes of the jealousy prevalent against Athens, of the 
 attributes of Spartan policy, the relations of Sparta to her 
 allies, and the terror inspired by her foe, terror betrayed by 
 the speaker's vehement insistance on the need of rapid and 
 combined action against the common enemy. The first address 
 of Archidamus, too, serves as an admirable vehicle for the 
 illustration of many of the cardinal issues on which the fortune 
 of the war hinged. He bases his counsel of a defensive policy 
 on a forcible contrast of the vital differences between the Pelo- 
 ponnesian and Athenian power ; urging the advantage which 
 a maritime and commercial empire, amply supplied with ' the 
 sinews of war,' supported by tributary allies, so despotically 
 governed as to ensure unity to the central executive, enjoyed 
 over a confederacy constitutionally different — composed of a 
 variety of states, agricultural and inland for the most part, 
 comparatively independent of the direct control of their federal 
 chief, distracted by conflicting interests, enfeebled by diversity of 
 race, mere voluntary contributors to the federal exchequer, and 
 devoid of capitalised wealth. Thucydides, having these points 
 to bring out, had the option of presenting them, in harmony 
 with' the general law of his work, in a dramatic form — a form 
 combining many advantages, those especially of animation and 
 contrast, set off" by the semblance, and often the substance, of 
 reality : or of descending to what a classic writer would have 
 
xlviii INTBODUGTIOK 
 
 thought the inferior office of personal exposition. Had he 
 chosen the latter alternative, his method would have resembled 
 that of Hume, whose celebrated ' Summaries,' mere hypo- 
 thetical integrations of opinion, for the most part, do not seem, 
 when tried by the light of later research, to rival the claims of 
 our historian's speeches even to authenticity, while they carry 
 a far less lively air. 
 
 The second objection urged by Dionysius falls by its own 
 weight; had Thucydides recorded the first debate on the 
 Mytilenean question, he would have traversed the same ground 
 twice : for Cleon's defence of the decree doubtless reiterates the 
 arguments which had led to its adoption. The fallacy of his 
 censure of the Funeral oration attributed to Pericles, as mis- 
 timed, considering the trifling numbers of the slain at that 
 early date of the war, and the insignificance of the encounters 
 which had taken place, has been so well exposed by Mr. Grote 
 (' Hist, of Greece,' vol. vi. p. 205), that it is needless here to 
 refute the malignant criticism of a writer who apparently 
 sought to found a reputation on the greatness of the author he 
 attacked, and who, intending murder, has committed suicide. 
 
SPEECHES 
 
 FBOM 
 
 THUCYDIDES. 
 
 SPEECH OF THE CORCYREAN ENVOYS, 
 
 Delivered before the Athenian popular assembly, B.c. 433. 
 Thucyd. Bk. I. chs. 32-37. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 CoECYEA, one of the Oorinthian colonies, was the founder of the 
 city of Epidamnus on the lUyrian coast in the Ionic gulf. This 
 settlement, torn by internal feuds and harassed by the neighbouring 
 lUyrians, joined by the partisans of an oligarchical government 
 which had been overthrown in a recent revolution, sent representa- 
 tives of the democratic party then in power to petition Corcyra for 
 aid. This was refused, the exiled oligarchs having strong interest, 
 through fana.ily connections, with the mother city. The rejected 
 suitors then applied to Corinth, from whom, in compliance with 
 Grecian usage, Corcyra had been obhged to select the founder of 
 Epidamnus. The Corinthians readily promised the required suc- 
 cour, partly from jealousy of Corcyra, partly from a sense of the 
 obUgations supposed to be involved in their relationship to the dis- 
 tressed city. On this, the oligarchical exiles appealed to Corcyra, 
 who despatched a fleet of forty ships to blockade Epidamnus. 
 Finding, however, that Corinth was about to attack the place with 
 a much stronger force, she took measures, in conjunction with 
 mediators from Sparta and Sicyon, to settle the dispute by arbitra- 
 tion. (Thucyd. i. 28.) Corinth refased the equitable terms offered, 
 and an engagement ensued, in which Corcyra gained a complete 
 victory, B.C. 435. 
 
2 SFEEGHES FROM THUGYBIBE8. 
 
 The two ensuing years were employed by Corinth in preparing a 
 formidable axmament ; and as Corcyra thns found that she was 
 exposed to the attack of a more powerful fleet than her own — 
 Corinth having a hundred and fifty, Coroyra only a hundred and 
 twenty ships — she found it needful, contrary to her habitual pohcy 
 of systematic neutrality, to court the protection of some powerful 
 state ; and as her enemy was an influential member of the Lacedae- 
 monian league, Corcyra, though of Dorian race, had no alternative 
 but that of soliciting admission, through an embassy, to the Athe- 
 nian Confederacy, B.C. 433. 
 
 Ch. 32. It may fairly be expected, Athenians, that 
 those who have repaired to a foreign ^ state, as we ^ liave 
 at the present crisis, to entreat succour, without any 
 previous claim either on the score of substantial service or 
 of alliance in arms, should first prove,^ if possible, that 
 what they request is really conducive to the interests of 
 the country to which they apply, or, failing this, that at 
 any rate it is not prejudicial ; in the second place, they 
 should also show that their gratitude will be a good 
 investment ; and in case they succeed in establishing 
 neither of these propositions clearly, they ought not to be 
 indignant at the failure of their suit. 
 
 Now the Corcyreans, when they despatched us to soli- 
 cit your alliance, felt convinced that they could give you 
 satisfactory assurances on these points. Chance, however, 
 has ordained that the same line of pohcy should at once 
 
 ' See Poppo (ed. min.) on oi wiXac. in hoc verbo cum prsep. composito 
 
 ^ "Qairep Kai ri/iiis- Kai here refers praepositio ilia vim suam amittit.' 
 
 to the general statement, which, in The Athenians, perhaps, were not 
 
 the original, precedes the clause in entirely free from the Ciceronian 
 
 which it occurs, and which is sup- love of copiousness of sound, even 
 
 posed to he made up independently where it does not directly emphasise 
 
 of the particular case, which, in the the sense. Poppo, however (ed. min.), 
 
 clause wcTTrfp, K.7-.X., claims to fall ex- contends that dva has an intensive 
 
 actly within the conditions described, force ; and Goller, in his 2nd ed., 
 
 5 Liddell and Scott regard avaSi- takes no notice of the question. See, 
 
 SdKai as equivalent simply to SM^at however, Poppo's note (ed. min.) on 
 
 here. So also Goller^ ist ed. : wpoaXaii^avuu iciv£vmvQ,i\. 61. 
 ' Pleonasmus est partis vocabuli, nam 
 
THE COBOYBEAN ENVOYS. 3 
 
 strike you as inconsistent with our appeal for support, 
 and prove inexpedient for our own interests at the pre- 
 sent juncture ; inconsistent, since we, who have never 
 hitherto been voluntary confederates of any state, are now 
 come to sohcit aUiance from others ; inexpedient, because, 
 in consequence of this ^ isolation, we had no friends to 
 help us when we entered on our present war with Corinth ; 
 and the resolution not to share in the risks of a foreign 
 confederacy at the discretion ^ of another country, though 
 it formerly gained us credit for prudence, has now turned 
 out palpable impolicy and weakness. 
 
 In the recent naval engagement, indeed, we repulsed 
 the Corinthians single-handed ; but, as they have embarked 
 against us with a larger armament,^ drawn from Pelopon- 
 nese and the rest of Greece, and we are convinced of ouf 
 inability to contend successfully against them with our 
 native force alone ; as, at the same time, we are threat- 
 ened with serious danger in the event of our subjugation 
 by them, we are compelled to beg assistance from you 
 and from every other state. And we claim forgiveness 
 for venturing on a course directly opposed to our former 
 neutrality, if, as we contend, we are acting with no sinis- 
 ter views, but because we were disappointed in our 
 hopes.* 
 
 ' Here, as in ch. 68, below, and ponnesian seaports, but also to the 
 
 bk. iy. eh. i8, Tbucydides uses niro islands under the empire of Athens, 
 
 where other Attic writers would have in order to take into their pay the 
 
 used Tovro. See Col. Mure, Litera- best class of seamen.' — Grote, vol. vi. 
 tare of Greece, vol. v. p. 586. ' p. 74. 
 
 ^ Ty TOO TriXus yvwfiy Poppo (ed. * That is, in the hopes they had 
 
 min.) construes by ' aliorum arbi- founded upon a systematic isolation 
 
 tratu.' from the troubled sea of Grecian 
 
 ^ ' The Corinthians employed politics. I have followed the punc- 
 
 themselves for two entire years after tuation as well as the version of 
 
 the battle in building new ships and Poppo (ed. min.), who thus explains 
 
 providing an armament adequate to the passage : S,vyyvi>iiri d (on) ry 
 
 their purpose j and, in particular, Trpdnpov dirpay^oavvy kvavrla roX^uJ- 
 
 they sent round not only to the Pelo- iitv, eivcp tovto jrowvpev /n^ fiiri 
 
 a 2 
 
4 SPEHOEES FROM THUGYBWES. 
 
 3 J. Now, if you comply, the petition we prefer at 
 this juncture ^ will in many respects prove highly aus- 
 picious for you : in the first place, because your aid will 
 be conferred upon the wronged, and not on the aggres- 
 sors; next, because, by allying yourselves with men 
 whose highest interests are at stake, you will invest ^ the 
 favour bestowed to the greatest advantage, giving us a 
 proof of good-will that can never fade from our remem- 
 brance. Besides, next to yourselves, we are the strongest 
 naval power in Greece. Consider, too, what piece of 
 good fortune is more rare or more disheartening to an 
 enemy than your own, when a power whose accession to 
 your cause you would have valued above much material 
 and moral strength, spontaneously presents itself, volun- 
 teering its alliance without danger and without expense ; 
 and, moreover, ensuring you a high character in the eyes 
 of the world, gratitude in those whom you aid, and 
 aggrandisement for yourselves ; advantages which, in the 
 
 KaKiaq, do^tje St jiaWov ajxapT ig , ■whicli is surely not merely 'the occurrence 
 last clause he explains as equivalent of our request,' as Dr. Arnold takes 
 to dW on do^ris fiixapTiiKafisv. Other it, but ' the conjuncture of our re- 
 versions ■would require oi instead of quest' with existing circumstances, as 
 /xri fiira KaKias' it is clear that fifi Sheppard and Evans (p. 52) explain it. 
 can only be used here either in a " Poppo (ed. min.) reads KaraBiick, 
 conditional or in a deprecative sense, but prefers Karnejjfftffef, which Kriiger 
 A6Kr)e aii.apTi(f has been translated approves and Dr. Arnold adopts. But, 
 ' an error of policy ' : had this been as Poppo explains KardBtityBt by re- 
 the meaning of Thucydides, he would peating Karafl^ffwfc, the construction 
 
 probably have written yvuijl-ng ajxap- being KaTaQi)inaBe w? S.v iiaXiara Kara- 
 
 Tiq,. Mr. Bigg's version, ' And it is eriaBc, the point is of little conser 
 
 pardonable if with no sinister inten- quence to the translator. Mr. Bigg, 
 
 tions, but rather from an error of after ascertaining from Dr. Arnold's 
 
 opinion, we force ourselves to adopt note that KarnfirjaiaBc contains ' a 
 
 a line of conduct so directly opposed metaphortakenfromlayingupmoney 
 
 to our former modest isolation,' turns in a bank that it may be drawn out 
 
 the text into nonsense, by pledging afterwards with interest,' instantly 
 
 the Corcyreans to an avowal that stranglesthe metaphor by translatirg 
 
 their appeal for Athenian aid was the passage, ' you will win a gratitude 
 
 ' an error of opinion.' that is bound up vsdth the most im- 
 
 ' 'H iwTvxia Ttj^ riniTtpaQ xpEioi; perishable testimony possible !' 
 
TSE GOBGYBEAN ENVOYS. 5 
 
 whole lapse of time, have fallen collectively to the lot of 
 few indeed ; and few, when suitors for alliance, present 
 themselves rather as bestowing upon those whose aid they 
 invoke, than as destined to receive, security and honour. 
 Then, as to the war — the contingency on which our use- 
 fulness to you depends — if any of you think it will not 
 break out, he is mistaken, and is shutting his eyes to the 
 fact that the Lacedasmonians, through their fear of you, 
 are longing for war ; that the Corinthians, influential 
 with them and hostile to you, are now trying to demolish 
 us to pave the way for their attack on you, so as to pre- 
 vent our combining, with the instinct of a common 
 hatred, against them ; and to enable them to secure, 
 before they assail you, one of two advantages, either ^ our 
 ruin, or the consolidation of their own power. To defeat 
 this policy, it devolves upon us, by the offer of alliance on 
 our part, and its acceptance on yours, to get the start of 
 them, and rather to forestall than to have to countermine 
 their schemes against us. 
 
 34. Should they, however, deny your right to receive 
 their colonists as alHes, it wiU be time to remind them that 
 every colony, when fairly treated, honours its mother 
 city, but becomes estranged when wronged : for colonists 
 are sent out on the understanding that they shall be, not 
 
 ' Mr. Bigg, who mistranslates min.), who thus renders the passage : 
 jSePaMaaaOai, complains that ' the ' Neve duobus excidant, sed alteru- 
 antithesis is not very clearly cut; trum potius prius [quam in vos im- 
 that it is not easy to see the distinc- petum faciant] consequantur, ut aut 
 tion between the security of Corinth nos malis afficiant, aut se ipsos cor- 
 and the overthrow of her enemies.' roborent.' He adds, as if in solution 
 Surely the antithesis is clearly cut : of Mr. Bigg's doubts, ' alterutrum 
 Corinth might ' ruin ' Corcyra by a enim Corcyreis aut perditis, aut sibi 
 sudden attack; or, by gentler methods, adjunctis, effecturi erant.' Svotv de- 
 she might unite the Corcyrean navy pends on aiiapTuiaiv tjiUd'Tai is inter- 
 to her own, and thereby ' consolidate posed, because it applies to either 
 her own power.' This view of the alternative, 
 meaning is supported by Poppo (ed. 
 
6 SPEECHES FROM T3UGYDIDES. 
 
 the vassals, but the equals of their countrymen at home. 
 Now, that the Corinthians were in the wrong is clear ; 
 for when challenged to submit the affair of Epidamnus to 
 arbitration, they determined to prosecute their charges at 
 war rather than at equity. Let their conduct, too, to- 
 wards us, their kinsmen, be to some extent a warning to 
 you, to save you from being cajoled by their crafty diplo- 
 macy, or from becoming their tools when they openly^ 
 prefer their request ; for the man who has the least reason 
 to reproach himself with playing into the hands of his 
 foes stands the best chance of prolonged immunity from 
 danger. 
 
 35. Further, your reception of us, allied as we are to 
 neither party, will not involve a breach of the existing 
 treaty ^ with the Lacedemonians ; for one of the articles 
 declares that any Grecian state which is not enroUed in 
 either confederacy^ is entitled to join whichever side it 
 pleases. And it is monstrous that the Corinthians should 
 be allowed to man their ships from among the members 
 of the Peloponnesian league, as well as from the rest of 
 Greece, especially from your own dependencies, and still 
 exclude us from our propo sed alliaiice, and from every 
 other source of aid ; and then declare themselves ag- 
 grieved if you comply with our petition. We, on the 
 other hand, shall have far better reason to consider our- 
 
 ' The Scholiast takes is rov iWioc Years' Truce (Thucyd. i. 35) can only 
 
 ■with vTTovpyiiv. Poppo (ed. min.) be this: States not included in the 
 
 and Gbller construe it, as I have alliance may join whichever side 
 
 done, with Sfofitvoit, they please, by which means they 
 
 * The Thirty Years' Truce, con- come within the treaty, and the 
 
 eluded B.C. 445. Thucyd. i. 115. alliance guarantees their safety. But 
 
 ' Miillev (Dorians, vol. i. p. 2 1 4) con- if a state already at war with an- 
 
 troverts this argument of the Corey- other state, a party to the treaty 
 
 rean envoy ; which, indeed, is met by (ev(rirovSos) , is assisted, a war of this 
 
 the Corinthian Speaker in the fortieth description is like one undertaken 
 
 chapter, below. Miiller says : 'The by the confederacy of the assisting 
 
 meaning of the article in the Thirty state.' 
 
TKE GOBGYBEAN ENVOYS. 7 
 
 selves aggrieved if you refuse ; for, in rejecting us, you 
 will be rejecting suppliants friendly to you, in their hour 
 of peril, while you will not merely fail to check Corinth, 
 your enemy and our assailant, but will even allow her to 
 enlist recruits out of your own dominions. You ought, 
 on the contrary, either to prohibit her, as ^ well as our, 
 enhstment of mercenaries from your empire, or else, by 
 way of compensation,^ to send us succour on whatever 
 terms you may consent to grant it. Your true policy, 
 however, is to give us open countenance and support. 
 
 The advantages of such a course, as we intimated 
 before, are many ; and the foremost among them is the 
 fact that, as we said,^ the power which is our enemy is 
 yours also, and in this you have the strongest guarantee 
 of our good faith : that power, too, far from being weak, 
 is strong enough to chastise defection; besides, as the 
 alliance offered to you is that of a maritime, not of an 
 inland state, to decHne it is a greater sacrifice. For it is 
 your interest, above aU things, not to allow, if possible, any 
 other state to possess a navy : if, however, you cannot 
 
 ' This use of /cai, so common in present with a few explanatory or 
 
 Thucydides, is well explained in the retrospective terms; e.g. Plato, Crit. 
 
 valuable commentary of Klotz on p. 4.7, d. : (f si fxti dKo\ov6ri<70fiev, 
 
 Devarius, vol. ii. p. 636, where he 6in^9ipovfi£v ekhvo xal XcofiijaSfisdaf 3 
 
 says : ' Si preeter earn rem quam tijj iiiv Biicaiij> piXriov lyiyvtro, njT dk 
 
 ponimus, de alia quoq^ue significare aSkii) AirdWvro, 'which, according 
 
 volumus, ponimus kciI partieulam, si to our view of the matter, is always 
 
 aut duas personas taciti oontendimus, sure .to improve in the good man, 
 
 aut dum de ima actioue dicimus, de and to he destroyed in the wicked 
 
 alia quoque comparationis causa co- man.' The student of Aristotle will 
 
 gitamus.' rememher the frequent retrospective 
 
 " This seems to be the meaning of use of the imperfect />, by virtue of 
 
 the second Kai, that which precedes which the great Ethician assumes a 
 
 riiiZv. It falls under the same cate- proposition, the grounds of which 
 
 gory as the instance illustrated in he has previously worked out. The 
 
 the preceding note. Corcyrean envoy refers especially to 
 
 ' 'Hcrar is one of those pregnant im- what he had said above in the 3 3rd 
 
 perfects idiomatically used in Greek, chapter : Toig KopivSiouc — ifiiv ix- 
 
 where in English we employ the Opove, k.t.\. See Poppo, ed. mia. 
 
8 SPEECHES FBOM THUGYBIBES. 
 
 prevent it, you should court the fidendship of the strongest 
 naval power. 
 
 36. Should any of you think these proposals, thus 
 advanced, advantageous, yet fear lest his compliance 
 with them may involve an infringement of the treaty, let 
 him be assured that his alarm, if he be strengthened by 
 an alliance with us, is a feeling which his foes ought to 
 entertain ' rather than himself ; and that the confidence 
 he may repose in his observance of the treaty will, if he 
 rejects our offer, not be likely to alarm them, because 
 it will leave him weak while they are strong. At the 
 same time, he should remember that the subject of his 
 present deliberations is not so much the interests of Cor- 
 cyra as those of Athens, and that he is not adopting the 
 best policy for his country, when, looking forward to the 
 impending and all but actually prevailing war, he hesitates, 
 ?<,^afterj_carefaljurvey of the political horizon, to embrace 
 the alliance of a state whose friendship or enmity confers 
 or withholds the most critical advantages. For it is con- 
 veniently situated on the line of the coast navigation in 
 the direction of Italy and Sicily, enabling its possessors to 
 stop the transit from those countries of naval reinforcements 
 for the Peloponnese, and to convoy squadrons from your 
 own shores to that part of the world, besides being in 
 many other respects a most advantageous station. 
 
 The question in all its bearings '■* may be briefly summed 
 up in one consideration, which alone ought to warn you 
 not to forsake us. Greece possesses three considerable 
 
 ' It is difficult to render this pas- is one of those puerUe oppositions 
 
 sage into readable English. Thucy- for which the nearest English equi- 
 
 dides, with his usual predilection valent must he sought, and which, 
 
 for antithesis, has made fo^aov the in an idiomatic version, cannot be 
 
 predicate of to SeSioi; — a piece of literally rendered, with Kriiger, 
 
 ialse taste worthy, says Kruger, of ' embracing the whole and every 
 
 the Sophists. particular,' 
 
 * Tol£ Tt t,vfiita<jt Kai KaO' SKoaruv 
 
THE COBOYBEAN ENVOYS. 9 
 
 navies — your own, ours, and the Corinthian : now, if you 
 allow two out of the three to be combined, and the Corin- 
 thians subjugate us before you help us, you will have to 
 contend at sea with the united fleets of Corcyra and the 
 Peloponnese ; whereas, if you embrace our alliance, you 
 will be enabled to encounter your foes with superior 
 numbers on your own side. 
 
lO SPEEGEE8 FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 SPEECH OF THE COEINTHIAN ENVOYS, 
 
 Delivered before the Athenian popular assembly, in reply to the preceding harangue of 
 the ambassadors from Corcyia, B.C. 432. Bk. I. chs. 37-44. 
 
 Ch. 37. Since the Corcyreans, in addressing this ^ as- 
 sembly, have not confined themselves to the question 
 of their acceptance as your allies, but have also charged 
 us with wronging them, and declared themselves unjustly 
 attacked ; it is essential that we, in our turn,^ should 
 notice both these points, before we proceed with the rest 
 of our argument, if only to enable you, before' you 
 decide, to form a true idea of the justice of our claim, 
 and to save you from rejecting, without full consideration, 
 the petition their distress * compels them to prefer. 
 
 They allege that upon grounds of prudence they never 
 yet embraced the alliance of any state : this policy, how- 
 ever, they espoused with evil instead of honest intentions : 
 it did not suit them, considering the iniquities they com- 
 mitted, to have any ally, because he might either* be a 
 witness of their crimes, or a succour they would blush to 
 invoke. At the same time, the geographical indepen- 
 dence of their country tends to make them their own 
 
 1 Tuvds. See Poppo, ed. min. ture, ovn fiaprvpa instead of ovii 
 
 ° See note ', p. 7. On oiirw Kai, /idprvpa, whicli, as Dr. Arnold says, 
 
 see note *, p. 37. greatly improves the sense. Poppo 
 
 ' This seems to he the force of (ed. min.) retains nidi. His text may 
 
 the preposition in TrponS^re. be rendered, ' They did not wish, 
 
 ■* Triv TuipSe xP'''^^ interpretare considering the iniquities they com- 
 
 ' horum necessitatem,' i.e. preceg, ad mitted, to have any confederate, or 
 
 quas hos necessitas cogit. Poppo, even a witness of their crimes, or to 
 
 ed. min. he put to the blush when they ap- 
 
 ^ I have adopted Dobree's conjee- pealed for aid.' 
 
TRE GOBINTEIAN ENVOYS. II 
 
 judges when they injure others, instead of allowing ^ 
 arbiters to be appointed by mutual agreement ; because, 
 while they very rarely make expeditions to neighbouring 
 states, they are continually receiving foreigners whom 
 stress of weather drives to their ports. Such is the 
 essence of that plausible profession of neutrahty which 
 they have put forward as a convenient screen ; a policy 
 adopted not to secure them against implication in the 
 crimes of others, but to enable them to be all alone in 
 their criminal career ; to play the tyrant whenever they 
 possess the power ; to overreach whenever they can escape 
 detection ; and to spare their blushes on any fresh acquisi- 
 tion of spoil. If, on the contrary, they really were, as 
 they affect to be, honest men, the less they were exposed 
 to foreign interference, the more clearly might they have 
 proved their good qualities, by granting to others, and 
 accepting for themselves, that equitable mode ^ of settling 
 disputes which their power enabled them to decline. 
 
 j8. Such, however, has not been the character of 
 their policy ^ either towards others or ourselves ; on the 
 contrary, although our colonists, they have all along 
 discarded their connection with us, and are now openly 
 at war, protesting that they did not contemplate ill-treat- 
 ment in becoming colonists. To this Ave reply that we 
 did not found the colony to be insulted by the colonists : 
 we hoped to become their political leaders, and to be 
 treated with due respect. The rest of our colonies, at 
 any rate, honour us, and we are very much beloved by 
 
 ' See Poppo's note, ed. min. dotus (vii. i68) of the duplicity of 
 
 Kriiger gives a different explanation. Corey ra when solicited to aid the 
 
 * Settlement by arbitration is cause of Greece against the Persian . 
 
 meant. See Poppo's note (ed. min.) invaders, lends colour to the un- 
 
 on this text, and on the similar favourable character given them by 
 
 phrase in chs. 140-1, below. the Corinthians here. 
 
 ' The description given by Hero- 
 
12 SPEECHES FROM TEUCTDIDES. 
 
 them ; and it is clear that, if we are popular with the 
 majority, there can be no good reason why we should be 
 unpopular with the Corcyreans only ; nor are we attack- 
 ing ^ them unwarrantably,^ unprovoked by signal injury. 
 It would have been honourable in them, even supposing 
 we had been in error, to have shown some deference to 
 our feeling, while it would have been disgraceful in us to 
 have outraged their forbearance. Instead of this, how- 
 ever, besides the numerous wrongs which, in their inso- 
 lent and hcentious prosperity, they have heaped upon us, 
 they persist in retaining possession of Epidamnus, our 
 colony, which they carried by storm, as soon as we 
 advanced to its relief, though in its hour of distress they 
 took no notice of it. 
 
 39. They pretend, too, that they were anxious that 
 the matter should be decided by arbitration ^ at an earher 
 stage ; but surely it is not the man who challenges arbi- 
 tration from a vantage ground * and a footing of security 
 who deserves to be listened to, but rather the man who, 
 by his acts as well as his professions, places both parties 
 on terms of equality before he brings the contest to an 
 issue.* Instead of acting thus, they resorted to their 
 plausible proposal of arbitration — not, indeed, previous 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) and Gbller take damnus, which the Corinthian 
 
 the present tviuTpaTtioiiev to denote speaker contends should have heen 
 
 the habitual policy of Corinth. But delivered over to a neutral power, 
 
 this hardly suits the context. pending the decision of a court of 
 
 * Goller's explanation of iicirpeirioe arbitration. 
 
 by Hoi '■«« TTpiwovTos seems the most ' Poppo (ed. min.) interprets vplv 
 probable, backed as it is by the Siayuivi^tadai, 'priusquam armis de- 
 similar use of iKirptTTiirrtpov, bk. iii. cernat;' other commentators, ' prius- 
 ch. 55. quam judlciodisceptet.' If either of 
 ' Qrote (vol. vi. p. 72) details the these explanations must be adopted, 
 circumstances under which this pro- the context favours the former. But 
 posal for an arbitration was made by it seems better to take the words in 
 Oorcyra. a more general sense. As GoUer 
 
 * The ' vantage ground ' is of remarks, ' orator sententiam proponit 
 course the actual possession of Epi- universalem.' 
 
TEE CORINTHIAN ENVOYS. 1 3 
 
 to their siege of the city — but only when they thought 
 we should not overlook their proceedings ; and they now 
 present themselves before you, not content with the cri- 
 minal part they have enacted there, but actually summon- 
 ing you to join them, not in confederacy, but in crime, 
 and to accept their alliance while at variance with us. 
 They ought, on the contrary, to have applied to you 
 when they were perfectly safe, and not at a moment 
 when we have been wronged, and they are in peril ; nor 
 when you, to whom they lent no share of their former ^ 
 power, will now have to lend them aid; when you, 
 though no accomplices in their misdeeds, will yet be held 
 equally responsible by us. No ! they ought formerly to 
 have shared with you their power, if you are now to 
 share its consequences with them. 
 
 40. We have, then, clearly shown that we appear 
 before you with charges amply sufficient to sustain our 
 plea, and that the conduct of the Corcyreans has been 
 marked by rapacity and a selfish usurpation of the rights 
 of others ; we have now to convince you that you cannot, 
 consistently with the pubhc law of Greece, receive them 
 as allies. Eor if it is stipulated in the articles, that any 
 state not enrolled in either confederacy may join which- 
 soever side it pleases : that clause ^ was not inserted for 
 the benefit of communities enlisting in a league to the 
 prejudice of other powers, but of those who, without 
 seceding from another state, need protection, and who 
 will not involve those who receive them in war in 
 
 1 Tijc' Sma/ietof nwrwi' rore nv fiera- revolt of Samos in 44.0 B.C., and the 
 
 Xa^ovTig. I have followed Poppo, previous struggle with ^gina (see 
 
 who connects tote with on du^nM- Herod, vi. 89), when Corinth main- 
 
 ffrarni tiaiiv (ed. maj. p. 283). Gbl- tained a friendly, Corcyra a neutral, 
 
 ler, however, thinks the Corinthian attitude towards Athens, 
 
 envoy refers specifically to an epoch of » See note ', p. 6, above. 
 Athenian embarrassment, during the 
 
14 8PEEGEES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 exchange for peace — which, indeed, they will not allow 
 them to do if they know their own interests.' Such, how- 
 ever, will be your fate if you do not hsten to our remon- 
 strance ; for you will not only become their allies, but 
 also our enemies in lieu of being connected with us by 
 treaty ; ^ since, if you espouse their cause, you must needs 
 be involved in our retaliation upon them. Tour true 
 policy, indeed, is to maintain neutrality, if possible, 
 towards both parties ; if you cannot do this, instead of 
 aiding them, you should march with us against them 
 (with Corinth, indeed, you are already in alliance ; with 
 Corcyra you have never had so much as a truce) ; and 
 you should avoid estabhshing a precedent in favour of 
 welcoming deserters from other leagues. In our case 
 especially, since, on the revolt of Samos, our vote did not 
 prejudice your interests when the rest of the Peloponne- 
 sians were divided on the question of the policy of aiding 
 them. No ! we openly maintained, in opposition to 
 others, that each imperial state had a right to coerce its 
 own dependencies. A principle you dare not infringe, 
 because, if you choose to receive and to aid aggressors, 
 there will be found to be full as many of your own allies 
 who will come over to us as of ours who will join you ; 
 and the precedent you will sanction wiU prejudice your- 
 selves rather than Corinth. 
 
 41. These then are the pleas, adequate according to 
 the public law of Greece, upon which we found our 
 appeal to you ; and we venture to add our counsel, and 
 
 • Dr. Arnold's explanation of this with Mr. Grote's view of the right 
 
 passage is very felicitous. Comp. of Athens to contract even a defen- 
 
 Poppo, ed. min. siye alliance with Corcyra, contend- 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) points out that ing, as the Corinthian envoy does 
 
 ivavovSoi signifles those included in here, that it involved a breach of the 
 
 the Thirty Years' Truce. Miiller (Dor- truce. 
 lann, vol. i. p. 214.) entirely disagrees 
 
THE GOBINTHIAN liJWOYS. 15 
 
 to urge that qualified claim upon your gratitude, which 
 men in our position — neither avowed enemies nor fami- 
 liar friends — may safely declare to be justly due to them 
 at this conjuncture. At a former period, when you were in 
 want of vessels of war for the prosecution of your contest 
 with ^gina,^ before the struggle with Persia, you received 
 twenty ships from Corinth ; and the service we rendered 
 you then, and again on the defection of Samos ^ — when 
 we prevented the Peloponnesians from succouring the 
 island — enabled you to overwhelm ^gina and to chastise 
 the Samians. That support, too, was given at one of 
 those critical junctures when men are apt to overlook 
 every consideration but * success ; when they welcome 
 anyone who abets them as a friend, though he was an 
 enemy before, and construe opposition, even if coming 
 from a friendly quarter, as a proof of hostility ; nay, they 
 even mismanage their private aflfairs through their absorb- 
 ing interest in the strife. 
 
 42. These considerations, duly weighed — and the 
 younger members of your assembly may well listen to 
 the experience of age— should induce you to support us 
 as we supported you. Nor should you listen to the fancy, 
 that though our arguments may be just enough, yet 
 policy, should war break out, will dictate a different 
 course. The straightest path is generally found to be 
 the most politic ; and the prospect * of war, which the 
 Corcyreans use as a weapon of terror to urge you to a 
 violation of political right, is still uncertain, and it is not 
 worthy of you to elate yourselves with a mere possibility, 
 and to incur thereby from henceforth an overt and no 
 
 ' See Herod, vi, 89. quering.' See Poppo's, note ed. min. 
 ' See Herod, iii. +8 seqq. * Poppo (ed. min.) construes rb 
 
 ^ Dr. Arnold wrongly translates /isXXoi/ tov ttoXe/hou by ' utruna bellum 
 
 jrapd TO viKfv, ' for the sake of con- oriturum sit, necne.' 
 
1 6 8PEEGHES FROM TEVOYDIBES. 
 
 longer a threatened enmity with Corinth. The wiser 
 course would surely be to mitigate the jealousy which 
 your protection^ of Megara has raised against you, 
 remembering that an act of kindness at the eleventh 
 hour, though comparatively slight, can, if critically timed, 
 cancel an offence quite disproportionate to itself. Nor 
 ought you to be influenced by the Corcyrean offer of an 
 important naval alliance ; abstinence from all injustice to- 
 wards a rival state is a more reliable source of power 
 than a grasping policy pursued in the midst of danger and 
 stimulated by the prospect of some temporary advantage.^ 
 43. Fortune has brought us within the range of the 
 principle which we avowed with our own lips at Lace- 
 daemon, the principle that each metropolitan state should 
 have the control of its dependencies ; and we now claim 
 its recognition in our favour at your hands, instead of 
 receiving injury from your vote — injury in return for 
 assistance from ours. Give us then our equivalent, in the 
 assurance that this is the very crisis when the party who 
 aids is a genuine friend, and the party who withstands 
 a bitter foe. Eefuse either to receive these Corcyreans 
 as allies in opposition to us, or to abet their criminal 
 career; for by so doing you wiU be acting as becomes 
 you, and will be adopting a course the most conducive to 
 your own interests. 
 
 ' See Thucydides, ch. 103, below, 
 
 ' That of uniting tlie Corcyrean to the Athenian navy. 
 
TEE COBINTEIAN ENVOYS. 1 7 
 
 SPEECH OF THE COEINTHIAN ENVOYS 
 
 Before the general assembly of Spartan citizens, at the Congress of the Lacedsemonian 
 Confederacy held at Sparta, b.o. 432. Bk. I. chs. 68-72. 
 
 INTBODUCTION. 
 
 Athens, having contracted a defensive alliance witli Oorcyra, 
 sent at first ten, and afterwards twenty, sHps to protect her. The 
 arrival of the second squadron prevented the Corinthians from im- 
 proving a decisive advantage which they had gained over the Cor- 
 cyreans in a naval action off Chimerium, a promontory opposite 
 Corcyra. This disappointment inspired Corinth with a deadly 
 enmity to Athens. In conjunction with Perdiccas, king of Mace- 
 donia, she at once took steps to detach Potidsea, one of her colonies, 
 and a tributary ally of Athens, from her enemy's league. Athens 
 lost no time in protecting her interests in the threatened quarter : 
 she sent, B.C. 432, a formal requisition to her suspected ally, one of 
 those continental seaports over which her control was far less secure 
 than over her insular dependencies. This requisition was answered 
 by an evasive embassy from Potidsea to Athens, intended to gain 
 time while another legation, backed by Corinthian deputies, suc- 
 cessfully appealed to Sparta for a promise to invade Attica, in case 
 of an Athenian attack on Potidrea. That city then revolted, in 
 concert with the Ohalcidians, whose defection had also been insti- 
 gated by Corinth. Various operations ensued during the same 
 year, B.C. 432, between the Potidseans and their allies — ^the Corin- 
 thian auxiliary force under the command of Aristeus, and the 
 Athenian troops, sent successively under Archestratus, CalKas, and 
 Phormio ; the result being the complete investment of Potidssa by 
 the Athenian force. 
 
 Corinth, thus foiled, sununoned a congress of the Peloponnesian 
 confederacy to discuss the situation of affairs at Sparta. Her com- 
 plaints were seconded by many other naembers of the league; 
 especially Megara, who had revolted from Athens fourteen years 
 previously, and whose defection — ^not to mention two other offences 
 specified by Thucydides, i. 1 39 — had been punished by a prohibition. 
 
 C 
 
l8 SPBEGHU8 FROM TRUGYBIBB8. 
 
 of commercial intercourse with Athens, or any of her allies, ^gina, 
 though not formally represented on the occasion, complained of 
 Athenian violations of the independence secured her by treaty — a 
 complaint whose justice there seems reason to doubt. See Gb-ote, 
 vol. vi. p. 104. 
 
 The Coriathian deputies reserved their harangue to tho last, not 
 coming forward tUl their audience had been sufficiently exasperated 
 by the representatives of other states, when they delivered a speech 
 to the following effect before the general assembly of Spartan 
 citizens. 
 
 Ch. 68. The, good faith, Lacedgemonians, which per- 
 vades your internal government and social intercourse Ls 
 apt to render you rather sceptical when we have com- 
 plaints to prefer against other powers ; it is a quality which, 
 while it gains you a character for moderation, leaves 
 you comparatively ignorant of foreign affairs. Thus,^ 
 although we were constantly forewarning you of the 
 injuries we were destined to receive from the Athenians, 
 you made no attempt to test the truth of the suspicions 
 we from time to time imparted to you, but rather inferred 
 that in these imputations we had our private interests in 
 view ; and, in consequence of this distrust, you convoked 
 this council of allies, not before our interests had suffered, 
 but only when we had already been wronged ; a council 
 before whom it especially becomes us to speak, inasmuch 
 as we have very serious grounds of complaint against 
 Athenian outrage and Lacedaemonian neglect. 
 
 If, indeed, the encroachments of Athens on the liber- 
 ties of Greece had been made in the dark, you might 
 have been ignorant of the facts, and they would then 
 require full exposition ; as it is, there is no need of a 
 detailed account, when you see with your own eyes that 
 some of us are already enslaved,^ and that the Athenians, 
 
 • Vap is here introductory, not ar- ii. p. 235. 
 Kumentative. See Klotz, Devar. vol. * ^gina, for instance. 
 
TEIS GOBINTEIAN ENY0Y8. 19 
 
 fully provided by long preparation, in case war should be 
 declared against them, are systematically sapping the 
 freedom of others,^ and, above all, of our allies. That 
 such are their designs is clear, otherwise they would not 
 have detached Corcyra by an intrigue,^ and retained it in 
 defiance of us ; nor would they have besieged Potidtea, 
 whereof the one is a capital base of operations, enabling 
 you to push your influence in the Chalcidic, and the other 
 would have contributed a powerful navy to the Pelopon- 
 nesian cause. 
 
 69. Now, you are responsible for these calamities, 
 because, in the first place, you sufiered them to fortify 
 their city after the Persian invasion, and subsequently to 
 erect their long waUs ; and because you have ever since 
 been continually withholding freedom, not only from 
 those whom Athens has enslaved, but at last even from 
 your own allies. For it is not the state which is the mere 
 instrument of subjugation, but the state which, with the 
 power to rescue, remains passive, that is really the author 
 of their slavery, especially if, as in your own case, it 
 claims an honourable name as the champion of Grecian 
 freedom. It was difficult to convene this meeting ; and 
 even at this moment we have no definite issue to solve. 
 Instead ^ of debating the general question of our wrongs, 
 we ought to be considering the means of our defence ; 
 
 * PotidseaandMegaraareprobaMy connecting particle. See note ', p. 
 meant. By ' our allies,' Poppo (ed. 142. Poppo, however (ed. min.), re- 
 min.) understands the Corintliian gards yap as pointing to a suppressed 
 colonies along the coast of the Ionian clause, which he supplies as follows : 
 sea, «t yap sTri favspolg ^vviiKBofitv^ XP^^i 
 
 * 'YiroXaPsXv, says Poppo, ' est K T.X. The passage might then be 
 fraudulentS, molitione partibus suis rendered: 'If we had a definite 
 adjungere.' issue before us, we should not be 
 
 * Xpiji' yap. I think yap here is weighing the general question of our 
 simply expository, not argumenta- wrongs, but considering our means 
 live. Such a sentence, in English, is of defence, as we ought (xp?") to be 
 often better introduced without any doing ; for,' &c. 
 
 c 2 
 
20 SPTSTSCEES FROM THUCYDIDIES. 
 
 for the aggressors,^ with their plans fully matured, are 
 already, and without any hesitation, advancing against you, 
 who are still undecided. We are well aware by what 
 insidious paths, and by what gradual .usurpations, Athe- 
 nian encroachment travels : as long as tirat-resttess-peDpfe) 
 imagine they escape detection through your dulness of 
 perception, they are not so venturous ; but, once assured 
 that you see, but shut your eyes to their career of 
 aggrandisement, they will press more resolutely forward. 
 The fact is,^ you, Lacedsemonians, are the only power in 
 I Greece which systemati cally courts neutrality ; you repel 
 your enemies not with arms in your hands, but with 
 threatening demonstrations ; you alone are for cutting 
 down a hostile power, not in its bud, but in its full 
 bloom. Yet you have generally been held safe men : 
 your reputation, however, turns out ^ to have exceeded 
 your merits ; for our own recollections remind us that 
 the Mede marched from the world's end to Peloponnese 
 before you were ready to encounter him with an ade- 
 quate * force ; and now you are closing your eyes to the 
 encroachments of Athens, who is not, like the Mede, afar 
 off, but close at hand ; and, instead of vigorously attack- 
 ing her, you prefer simply to stand on the defensive when 
 she attacks you, and to set everything on the cast of a 
 die by deferring the conflict till her power has vastly 
 increased. And this, although you are well aware that 
 the barbarian may in general be said to have split on no 
 other rock than his own folly, and that, in struggling with 
 the Athenians themselves, we have on many occasions 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. mia.) takes ol with Grammar, p. 605. 
 
 SpuivTig, and Gbller connects npog ov ' See Madvig's Greek Syntax, p. 
 
 I. witli impxovrai, translating tlie 257, on the particle dpa. 
 
 •words, ' incessvmt nos non confirma- ■• The limitation implied in a^ms 
 
 tort consilio.' excludes the expedition under Leo- 
 
 * rap. See Donaldson's Greek nidas. 
 
TRE CORINTHIAN ENVOYS. 2i 
 
 owed our safety rather to their errors than to your sup- 
 port ; indeed, the hopes you^ have held out have ere now 
 proved the ruin of states that I could mention,^ whose 
 confidence in you had actually induced them to disarm. 
 Do not, however, for a moment imagine that these stric- 
 tures are the invectives of enmity, when they are only the 
 remonstrances of friendship. Eemonsti'ances we address 
 to the errors of friends, invectives we reserve for the out- 
 rages of foes. 
 
 70. At the same time, we believe ourselves especially 
 entitled to criticise the policy of other powers, considering 
 the magnitude of the interests we have at stake, in con- 
 nection with which you do not appear, as far as we can 
 see, to understand, nor even to have reflected, against 
 what sort of antagonists — how widely, nay, how utterly 
 different from yourselves — you will have to contend in 
 the Athenians. They, for instance, are fond of innova- 
 tion, clever in forming plans, and in carrying their 
 resolves into execution ; you are clever ^ only in saving 
 what you have, in scouting every project of reform, and 
 in falling short, in action, of what is absolutely requisite. 
 Again, they are enterprising beyond their strength, ad- 
 venturous against their better judgment, antl sanguine in 
 the midst of perils ; your achievements, on the other 
 hand, are unworthy of your power ; you distrust * even 
 the surest conclusions of your judgment, and you despair 
 
 • re emphasises vninpai, and per- sarcasmo quodam dictum sit.' — Pop- 
 haps its force may he given hy italics. po, ed. min. 
 
 ' This seems to he the force of * Livy must have had this passage 
 iron. Reference is prohably made to in his eye when he wrote the fol- 
 the people of Thasos (Thucyd. i. lowing : ' Atheniensium populum 
 loi), of Euboea (i. 114), as well as fama est celerem et supra vires au- 
 to the citizens of Potidaea (i. 58).—. dacem esse ad conandum; Lacedse- 
 8heppard and Evans, p. 8 1 . moniorum cunctatorem, et vix in 
 
 ' ' Ad totum alteram membrum ea, quibus fidit, ingredientem.' — Lib. 
 
 o^iis ita repetendum est, ut cum xlv. 13. 
 
22 SPEECHES FROM THUOYDIDES. 
 
 of extrication from your difficulties. Moreover, they are 
 as active as you are dilatory ; they are often abroad, you 
 are always at home ; for they think they may gain some 
 advantage by their expeditions,^ you fancy that enterprise 
 abroad may endanger your interests at home. They push 
 to the utmost every success gained over their foes : if 
 they meet vrith a check, they recoil as little as possible. 
 Their lives, too, they lavish in their country's behalf as if 
 they were the hves of other men : their intellectual 
 /powers they husband for her service with as much jea- 
 / lousy as if they had a monopoly of them. When they 
 ' fail to carry out a scheme, they hold themselves robbed 
 of their own property ; when they make an acquisition, 
 they regard it as only a trifling instalment of the triumph 
 that awaits, them. They indemnify themselves for the 
 casual miscarriage^ of an enterprise by forming fresh 
 hopes ; their execution of their plans being so prompt, 
 that with them it is the same thing to hope and to obtain.^ 
 Such are their lifelong toils, aU accompanied with hard- 
 ships and dangers. They have very little leisure for 
 enjoying, because they are always engaged in getting; 
 they look upon a holiday * as simply an opportunity for 
 action, and think indolent repose a greater calamity 
 than laborious occupation. To sum up their character, it 
 may be truly said that they were born neither to enjoy 
 
 ' Dukas, quoted by Poppo (ed. and its confirmation by Thucydides 
 
 min.), takes dwovcriif to mean ' ab- himself at an eventful crisis in the 
 
 sence on foreign military service,' history of the war. See bk. viii. ch. 
 
 ludriiiOVVTfc El's iKOTpaTtiai;. I have 96. 
 
 used a neutral term. * ' There seems to be some tacit 
 
 * Literally, ' should they, after all reference to the practice of the La- 
 
 (^apa'), chance to fail in an attack on cedsemonians, who, as on the occa- 
 
 any power.' sion of Marathon, would not go forth 
 
 ' There is a curious coincidence upon even the most necessary ex- 
 
 between this expression of opinion pedition during the time of a festival.' 
 
 on the part of the Corinthian envoys — Sheppard and Evans, p. 82. 
 
THE OOBINTHIAN ENVOYS. 23 
 
 peace and tranquillity themselves, nor to allow others to 
 enjoy them. 
 
 7 1 . Yet, with such a state as this drawn up in battle 
 array against you, you persist in delaying, and have no 
 idea that permanent peace is most likely to be enjoyed 
 by communities which, while they content themselves 
 with reasonable armaments,^ clearly evince their deter- 
 mination not to brook insult. No ! your notion of fair 
 dealing is based on the principle of offering no provoca- 
 tion to others, and of defending your own rights just so 
 far as to prevent loss.^ A policy in which you could 
 scarcely have succeeded, even had your neighbours re- 
 sembled yourselves in character ; whereas, as indeed we 
 recently showed, your system is old-fashioned in com- 
 parison with theirs; In poUtics, as in art, modern improve- 
 ments of necessity carry the day ; and, though fixed 
 institutions are all very weU for a state at peace with all 
 the world, manifold reforms become essential when many 
 novel exigencies have to be met. Indeed, it is for this 
 reason, owing to her versatile experience, that Athens 
 has far outstripped you in the development of her re- 
 sources. 
 
 ' Literally, • who do only what ia ing yourselyes,' inTolves a gram- 
 reasonable in the matter of arma- matical solecism and a political 
 menta, but show by their temper caricature. Had such been the his- 
 that they will not brook insult.' The torian's meaning, he would have 
 Greek construction will hardly bear written as follows : im T(f ftfirc XvwtXv 
 the adversative sense claimed by dXXovQ, lifin avrol afiwofiivoi pXawTc- 
 Poppo (ed. maj.) for ry TrapauKivf aBai. The words intended to be 
 nor is the sense of the passage at all joined by the conjunctione are /jj) 
 improved by it. He thus explains Xv-jruv on the one hand, and aiiTol 
 the clause : ' Indicare vult homines, afivrnfiivoi on the other. The stu- 
 qui, licet satis magnum apparatum dious use of re and ea/', where there 
 bellicum comparaverint, eo non per- is a negative in both clauses, shows 
 moveantur ad alios laedendos.' This that those conjunctions are not in- 
 version he repeats in the ed. min. tended to apply in both cases to the 
 
 ' Arnold's version, ' nor allowing negative parts of the two clauses, 
 yourselves to be harmed by defend- 
 
24 8PEEGHES FROM THU0YDIDE8. 
 
 Let this point, then, be the limit of your inaction : 
 succour without delay Potidsea and your other allies, as 
 you undertook, by an immediate invasion of Attica, 
 instead of leaving friends and kinsmen a prey to your 
 bitterest foes, and compelling the rest of us to resort in 
 despair to some other ^ alliance. There could be no 
 injustice in our taking such a step, either in the sight of 
 the Gods who witnessed our oaths, or of intelligent men ; 
 for the real violators of treaties are not those whom deser- 
 tion drives to other powers, but those who neglect to aid 
 their sworn confederates. If, however, you resolve to 
 exert yourselves zealously, we wiU stand by you, for we 
 should not be acting rehgiously in shifting sides, nor 
 should we be likely to find so congenial an ally. Weigh 
 the question, then, dehberately and wisely, and exert 
 yourselves to make your leadership of the Peloponnese as 
 glorious as that of your ancestors who bequeathed it to 
 you. 
 
 ' 'This probably refers to the in the Peninsula' (Sheppard and 
 
 Argivea, who were ever ready to Evans, p. 84). The Scholiast, quoted 
 
 take advantage of any opportunity to by Poppo (ed. min.), confirms this 
 
 establish a counter influence to Sparta notion. 
 
TEE ATHENIAN Hm^OYS. 25 
 
 SPEECH OF THE ATHENIAN ENVOYS 
 
 Before the general assembly of Spartan citizens, delivered on the same occasion as the 
 preceding address of the Corinthians, B.C. 432. Bk. I. chs.-6S-79* 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Among the listeners to the previous speech were some Athenian 
 envoys, staying at Sparta on other business. They begged permis- 
 sion to speak, not in answer to the charges advanced by the Corin- 
 thian and other deputies, but on the general question, a compre- 
 hensive view of which would show, as they thought, that it was not 
 a matter to be hastily decided, but one that demanded the fullest 
 consideration. 
 
 Ch. 73. Our embassy was not intended to enter into a 
 controversy with your allies, but to transact the business 
 of our mission. Perceiving, however, that a violent out- 
 cry prevailed against us, we came forward, not to answer 
 the charges of the states opposed to us — for neither our 
 nor their arguments can be addressed to you in the capa- 
 city of judges — but to save you from coming to a wrong 
 decision, through a ready compliance with your allies, 
 upon questions of vast moment ; and at the same time, 
 because we were anxious to prove, in reference to the 
 general charge arrayed against us, that ^ we are not acting 
 unwarrantably in retaining the acquisitions we have made, 
 and that our country deserves high consideration. 
 
 In estabhshing this, we need not ascend to our early 
 national legends, attested as they are rather by tradition 
 than by personal knowledge on the part of my audience. 
 
 1 On the construction of ovtc and clause, see Klotz, Devar., p. 713; 
 
 T€, containing, when there is a verb Eur. Sec. 1 199 ; Xen. Anab. iv. 3, 6 ; 
 
 in both clauses, a negative in the Matthise, Gr. Gram. p. 609. 
 first, an affirmative in the second 
 
26 SPEECHES FROM THUOYDIDES. 
 
 We must, however, refer to the Persian invasion, and the 
 services you yourselves remember, although it is irksome 
 to us to be constantly bringing them forward ; for in those 
 achievements we risked our safety for real public advan- 
 tages, in which you had a substantial share : let us not 
 then lose all the credit, if it is of any service to us. Our 
 aim is not so much to deprecate censure as to offer you a 
 convincing proof of the power of that state with which 
 you will have to contend unless you are wise in your 
 decision. , 
 
 We declare, then, that at Marathon we alone ^ bore the 
 first brunt of the barbarian's attack, and that upon his 
 second invasion, not being sufficiently strong to repel him 
 by land, we embarked in our vessels with our whole 
 population, and fought a naval action at Salamis, which 
 prevented his ravaging Peloponnese by piratical descents 
 upon the several cities — descents he might easily have 
 made, since you would have been unable to protect one 
 another against a large armament. Of this the invader 
 gave a conclusive probf by his own acts ; for when his 
 fleet was defeated, he speedily retired with the greater 
 part of his army, as if aware that his power was no longer 
 what it had been. 
 
 74. Such, then, was the issue of this invasion, in 
 which it was clearly proved that the fortunes of Greece 
 depended on her navy. Towards that issue we con- 
 tributed three elements most conducive to success — the 
 largest contingent of ships, a general of the greatest 
 ability, and an energy that never flagged ; ships, indeed, 
 almost in the proportion of two-thirds to the whole 
 squadron of three hundred, and Themistocles as admiral, 
 to whose influence it was mainly owing that we engaged 
 
 1 The speaker conveniently ignores the aid of Platsea, of whom Hero- 
 dotus (ix. 27) is equally oblivious. 
 
THE ATHENIAN ENVOYS. 27 
 
 the enemy in the straits — a stratagem which obviously- 
 saved our cause, and for which you yourselves, as you 
 know,^ heaped upon him the highest honours ever con- 
 ferred upon a foreigner at Sparta. In daring patriotism, 
 too, we had no rivals. There seemed no prospect^ of 
 anyone coming to our relief by land : the other states up 
 to our frontier had already been enslaved ; yet we had 
 the courage, after abandoning our city and sacrificing our 
 property, not to desert, even in that emergency, the 
 common cause of our surviving confederates, nor to 
 render ourselves useless to them by dispersion, but to 
 embark in our ships, and encounter the foe, instead of 
 quarrelling with you for not having previously sent us 
 aid. We declare, therefore, that we served you quite as 
 effectually as you served us. You had a stake to fight 
 for ; when you marched to our relief, it was from the 
 midst of cities whose homes were still inviolate, and in 
 the hope of enjoying them for the future ; besides, your 
 succour was prompted by alarm for your own rather than 
 our safety ; at any rate, you never came near us while we 
 had anything to lose. We, on the other hand, sallying 
 forth from a city that was such no more, and staking our 
 lives for a country which had but a slender hope of 
 redemption, zealously^ contributed to your deliverance 
 as well as to our own. Now if, on the other hand, we 
 had made terms with the Mede in an earlier stage of the 
 war, in terror, Hke some * states, for our territory ; or if, 
 
 ' A17. Poppo, however (ed. min.), minus hoc antea factum esaet, honor- 
 construes this particle with the de- atum esse virum peregrinum.' 
 monstratiTe rovro. Aid rowro 61) ^ The imperfect e(3oii$tt denotes 
 would then mean 'for this very the repeated frustration of their 
 reason,' 'for this and this only.' hopes. — Bigg. 
 
 Klotz (Devar., vol. ii. p. 402) simi- ' Poppo (ed. min.) explains to 
 
 larly explains it : ' Sid roiro ^17 sic /«pof by ' pro parte virili.' 
 
 dicitur, ut appareat propter earn jam ^ The Scholiast points the allusion 
 
 rem, quum fortaase propter alias res to the Thebans. 
 
28 3PBEGHE8 FROM TEUGYBIBB8. 
 
 at a later period, we had surrendered to despair and 
 lacked courage to embark in our vessels, there would 
 have been no use in your fighting an action at sea, from 
 the want of an adequate ^ fleet ; and the invader's fortunes 
 would have peaceably advanced as he desired. 
 
 75. Do we deserve, then, Lacedgemonians, considering 
 the public spirit and the statesmanship we then displayed, 
 to be objects of such intense jealousy to Greece, if ^ that 
 jealousy is founded on the dominion we hold? remem- 
 bering that we did not gain this very dominion by violence, 
 but because, when you were unwilling to wait ^ during 
 the final operations against the Persian, the confederates 
 repaired to us, and spontaneously requested us to become 
 their leaders. It was thus from the very necessity of the 
 case that we were at first constrained to advance our 
 ascendancy to its present pitch, primarily under the influ- 
 ence of fear, afterwards of ambition also, and, subse- 
 quently, of self-interest ; * and we no longer deemed it 
 prudent, detested as we were by the majority — just after 
 the reduction of several allies who had already revolted 
 — while you, too, were no longer friendly as before, but 
 inspired by jealousy and at variance with us — to hazard 
 a reaction by loosening the reins of power. For, had we 
 done so, deserters from our standards would have joined 
 
 ' At tlie battle of Artemisium the ' Colonel Mure {Literature of 
 
 Lacedaemonians had ten ships (Herod. Greece, vol. v. p. 103) remarks that 
 
 viii. i); at the battle of Salamis, Thucydides (ch. 95, below) gives a 
 
 sixteen (Herod, viii. 43). The Pe- different reason for the secession of 
 
 loponnesians, including the Lace- the Ionian States from the Spartan 
 
 dssmonians, had, at this period, interest, attributing it to their dis- 
 
 eighty-nine ships. gust at the conduct of Pausanias. 
 
 * As Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, Perhaps he places on the lips of the 
 
 it suits the speaker's purpose to Athenian speaker the popular tra- 
 
 confound the iiymovin, which Athens dition prevalent at Athens, 
 had received, with the apxri, to which * That is, when the tribute began 
 
 she had strictly no right, ye em- to flow in from the subject allies, 
 phasises the condition. 
 
THE ATHENIAN ENVOYS. 29 
 
 )urs ; and no man can be blamed for adopting the most 
 )litic course when.threatened by the greatest perils. 
 
 76. But we are not alone in love of power.^ You, 
 icedEemonians, have gained an ascendancy over the 
 jloponnesian states by systematically modelling their con- 
 [tutions ^ to suit your own views ; and, if you, towards 
 e close of the Persian war, had remained at your post 
 roughout the contest, and become, like us, unpopular 
 
 the exercise of your power, we are well assured that 
 )u would not have been less odious to the allies, and that 
 )u would have been compelled either to govern with a 
 jht rein, or to risk the loss of your authority. So that 
 e, too, have not done anything extraordinary or alien 
 om human nature, in at once accepting a proffered 
 ipremacy, and in now declining to surrender it, from the 
 :essure of those overwhelming motives, ambition, fear, 
 id self-interest. Again, we were not the first to set such 
 1 example : it has ever been an established maxim that 
 le weak should be subject to the strong. At the same 
 me, we believed ourselves worthy of power, and were so 
 msidered by you, until the present moment, when, after 
 careful calculation of your own interest, you pretend to 
 ipeal to equity — a plea which no man ever yet put for-i 
 ard, when he had an opportunity of gaining his point) 
 f force, and abstained from taking the advantage. Nay,! 
 raise is due to aU who, while indulging their natural 
 :opensity to rule mankind, have shown more regard for 
 .stice than might have been expected from their power, 
 thers, at any rate, we believe, if they changed places with 
 !, would prove conclusively whether we are moderate 
 
 ' The idea implied in yoSr seems himself (i. 1 9), where he says : ol 
 
 require a little expansion. Aamfmiiovioi oix vttotcKhc ix°vTiQ 
 
 ' By everywhere favouring the ^6pov nic Ju/i/taxowe fiyovvro, kut 
 
 anarchical party. The, key to th^ dXiyapx^t^v Sk (rfhiv avroXg fwvov ^ntTti^ 
 
 ianing is given by Thucydides Siiwg 'ojrug iroXirciauai Otpairtvovrtg. 
 
30 SPUEGHES FROM TEUGYBWES. 
 
 or not. Instead, however, of our enjoying this reputation, 
 we have, in consequence of our very leniency, reaped an 
 unnatural harvest of discredit in place of popularity. 
 
 77. For instance,^ because in our contract^ suits with 
 our allies we do not stand on our prerogative, but decide 
 cases in our own courts according to impartial laws, we 
 are reproached with Utigiousness ; and not a man among 
 our censors reflects why this reproach is not levelled 
 against other states that I could mention,^ holding domi- 
 nion elsewhere, and less equitable than ourselves towards 
 their dependants ; the reason being, that those who are 
 able to appeal to might have no need to appeal to right. 
 Our confederates, on the other hand, having been habitu- 
 ated to associate with us upon equal terms, <if they chance 
 to be ever so slightly prejudiced, contrary to their notions 
 of right, either by judicial decisionSj^^or through the power 
 which flows from our supremacy, feel no gratitude for not 
 being deprived of the larger part of their property, but 
 are more indignant at their trivial loss than if we had 
 from the outset discarded all law and openly sought our 
 own advantage ; though, had we done so,* not even they 
 could have denied that it is a law of nature that the 
 
 • See note ', p. 57, for a similar existing between persons who lie- 
 instance of this use of yap. Oomp. longed to the several states com- 
 Matth. {Gr. Gram. vol. ii. § 615) on prised under the Athenian dominion; 
 the equivalence of this particle to and the necessity of trying them at 
 the Latin nempe. icai, which begins Athens, owing to the expense and 
 the sentence, does not belong to yap, delay thereby incurred, was one of 
 but is used to strengthen the con- the greatest grievances to which her 
 nection between its clause and the allies were subjected. The orator 
 following one, nal Trap' riiui; K.T.\. here tries to gloss it over, by making 
 ' Hie,' says GoUer, ' Kai non jungen- allusion only to such as Athenian 
 dum est cum yap, sed refertur ad citizens were themselves engaged in, 
 ilia, Ka'i ira ' rtn'iv, k.t.X. Particulis Kai — Sheppard and Evans, pp. 88, 89. 
 — Kai hie duse sententiae junguntur, ' nou is often used by Thucydidea 
 quarum altera causam continet al- in this half definite, half indefinite 
 terius.' sense. 
 
 ' These suits, called iiVat Airb ^v/i- * 'EKtivwg. 
 BoKiav, were grounded upon contracts 
 
TRIE ATHENIAN ENVOYS. 31 
 
 laker should yield to the stronger. But injustice/ as it 
 ims, provokes resentment more than violence ; for, in 
 i first case, men feel they are cheated by an equal, in 
 3 other, they think they are constrained by a superior, 
 ineath the Persian sceptre, at any rate, they brooked a 
 xsher rule than ours ; yet our dominion is denounced 
 severe ; and no wonder — for it is the present dominion 
 lich is always bitter to the conquered. One thing is 
 rtain ; if you were to found a supremacy of your own 
 . the ruins of ours, you would soon lose that popularity 
 lich you only gained through the apprehensions felt of 
 , if your system of government should now resemble 
 at of which you gave us a specimen during your brief 
 riod of command against the Persian. The fact is,^ 
 e institutions under which you live at home are not in 
 .rmony with those of other states ; and, moreover, not 
 Spartan general ' on a foreign expedition is true either 
 
 them or to those in fashion with the rest of Greece. 
 78. Take time, then, in coming to a decision, for no 
 ivial interests are at stake ; and do not, under the influ- 
 ice of foreign opinions and imputations, involve your- 
 Ives in trouble; but reflect carefully beforehand how 
 mpletely war cheats all calculation, before you engage 
 
 it ; for, when protracted, it in general comes in the 
 id to depend on chances, from which one of us is no 
 ore exempt than the other, and we must both run the 
 ik in absolute darkness as to the issue. It is a common 
 ror, in going to war, to plunge at once into action, 
 hich ought to be the last resort ; and it is only in the 
 )ur of disaster that men revert to diplomacy. We, 
 
 ' Mr. Crawley, in his version of " Tap. See Donaldson's Greek 
 
 J First Book, cleverly contrasts Grammar, p. 605. 
 
 Kovjuvoi and ' ^laZofitvoi by the ' There is probably a covert allu- 
 
 iglish phrases ' legal wrong ' and sion to Pausanias in elf i^uiv. 
 iolent wrong.' 
 
32. SPEBOEUS FROM THUOYDIDES. 
 
 however, who are not as yet entangled in any such error, 
 and beheve you also to be equally exempt from it, charge 
 you, while true policy is still open to.the choice of both 
 parties, not to infringe the truce, nor to traverse your 
 oaths, but to allow the points in dispute to be settled by 
 arbitration, according to agreement. If you refiise, we 
 will endeavour, summoning as witnesses the Gods who 
 heard the oaths, to avenge ourselves upon you for_giviDg 
 the signal for war, whenever you set us the example. 
 
KING ABOHIDAMUS. 33 
 
 SPEECH OF KING AECHIDAMUS, 
 
 Delivered before the general assembly of Spartan citizens, on the same occasion as the 
 preceding speech of the Athenian Envoys, b.c. 432. Bk. I. cbs. 80-86. 
 
 INTMODUCTION. 
 
 On the conclusion of tte Athenian address, the Spartans, accord- 
 ing to their usual custom, caused the representatives of their allies 
 to withdraw, and submitted to their own assembly the question 
 whether Athens had broken the truce, and war should be declared. 
 Had the Spartan assembly negatived these propositions, the votes 
 of the allies would never have been taken, as they subsequently were. 
 For, although the allies had an equal right of suffrage, Sparta 
 voted alone ; not as a member of the confederacy, but separately 
 and individually as leader ; and the only question ever submitted 
 to the members of her league was, whether they would or would 
 not support the previous decision of the Spartans. — Grote, vol. vi. 
 p. 105. 
 
 Most of the speakers who addressed this assembly clamoured for 
 immediate war ; a decision from which Archidamus endeavours, in 
 the following speech, to dissuade his audience. 
 
 Ch. 80. I have already, Lacedseuionians, been person- 
 ally engaged in several wars, and I know that those of my 
 own age among you are also conversant^ with warfare, 
 so that you are not likely to long for hostilities, like the 
 mass of men, either through inexperience, or from a 
 behef ^ that they are in themselves desirable and safe. 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) and Goller fol- Grammar, § 397, where the con- 
 low the Scholiast in understanding Struction is elucidated. As to the 
 ffiwtipiwc, jroXefiotT after opw. In his sentiment itself, we must remember 
 note Poppo gives an unanswerable that, while an aristocracy is always 
 reason for so doing. fond of war, Sparta was not only 
 
 ' Thus Goller and Poppo take the governed by an aristocracy, hut was 
 
 clause fiiiTi . . . voniaavra, Poppo rather a camp than a city ; her citi- 
 
 (ed. min.) refers to Matthise's Greek zens had scarcely any vocation save 
 
34 SPIEECEES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 You would find, too, that this war, the subject of our 
 present deliberations, is not likely to be one of trifling 
 moment, were any of you dispassionately to weigh the 
 nature of the struggle. Our forces, indeed, when directed 
 against Peloponnesian communities, especially^ those in 
 our neighbourhood, are similar^ to and a match for 
 theirs, and we can attack them rapidly in detail. But — 
 a struggle with men who are rich in foreign dominion, 
 who are thorough masters of the sea, and have long been 
 admirably provided with all the appliances of war, with 
 wealth, both national and private, with ships, with 
 cavalry, with troops, heavy and light,^ i n greater numbers 
 than any which elsewhere exist in any one district of 
 Greece ; and who, besides all this, have a host of confe- 
 derates who pay them tribute — how can it be politic 
 rashly to engage in such a struggle, and in what can we 
 trust when we attack them unprepared? Are we to 
 trust in our fleet ? No ! we are inferior therein, and it 
 will take time to practise and prepare a counter arma- 
 ment. Shall we rely, then, on our wealth? Scarcely! 
 for in this point we are far more deficient still : we have 
 no money in our treasury, nor do we readily contribute 
 from our private resources. 
 
 8 1 . Perhaps, however, some of you may feel sanguine 
 
 that of soldiers. The younger men bourmg Peloponnesian communi- 
 
 ■would, therefore, naturally prefer ties ; ' as xai, without the article, 
 
 war to peace. does not so much introduce a new 
 
 " I have followed Poppo and idea, as it limits and defines the 
 
 GoUer in reading roie naXoTrovvriaiove preceding term, llcXo.roii'ijirtofe. 
 Kal Toiig auTvytiTovas. In this read- " That is, military rather than 
 
 ing, Kal must be explained, with naval: ■wi^oixaxoi yap iravTsg, says 
 
 Poppo (ed. min.), by ' et maxime.' the Scholiast. 
 Poppo thinks the Argives and some ' "O.tXois icai oxXv- Poppo (ed. 
 
 of the Arcadian communities es- maj.) says: '"07r\a quum inter 
 
 pecially pointed at in the epithet equites et turham hominum (ox^v)! 
 
 daTvyEirovag. Dr. Arnold reads icai ad velites conscribendos idoneorum, 
 
 aiTTvynrovag. If the article r:ivg is memorentur, ipsi hoplitte videntur 
 
 drmroed. we must translate ' neish- ease, de quibus eodem loco agihir. 
 
Kma AB0HWAMU8. 3S 
 
 on the ground that we surpass them in our heavy in- 
 fantry, and in the number of our troops/ which would 
 enable us to ravage their land by repeated incursions. 
 But then there are considerable domains, besides ^ Attica, 
 which own their sway, and their command of the sea will 
 enable them to import whatever they require. If, on the 
 other hand, we were to try to seduce their confederates, 
 we must find ships for their special ^ protection, as they 
 are for the most part islanders. What then will be the 
 character of the war we shall be waging? Unless we 
 can either sweep the seas with our fleet, or cut off the 
 supphes that feed the Athenian marine, ours will on the 
 whole be a losing game ; and in such a case we can no 
 longer with honour even negotiate for peace, especially 
 should we^ appear to have provoked the strife. God 
 forbid^ that we should encourage ourselves with the 
 utterly delusive hope that the war will speedily be ter- 
 minated, if we devastate their land ! I rather fear we 
 shall even bequeath it to our children ; so improbable is 
 it that Athenian spirit will chain itself to the soil it 
 tenants, or suffer Athenians, like men who have never 
 been in arms, to quail before the terrors of war. 
 
 82. Not, however, that I advise you tamely to allow 
 
 * See Poppo's note on icXiiSti, ed. vol. i. p. 1 3 3 ; and Jelf s Greek Gram- 
 min. mar, § 897, on the use of those par- 
 
 ' "AXKt). tides in dissuasive wishes, where 
 
 ' This seems to he the force of the they are equivalent to the Latin 
 
 particle ko/, which precedes tovtolc, 'absit ut.' Mi? is used in sensu d- 
 
 and which Kriiger explains, with ir^vKTiKif, as Grammarians say; ynp 
 
 Poppo's assent (ed. min.), as referring in sensu causali, connecting the sen- 
 
 to the whole sentence. Literally it tence, though, less closely than the 
 
 means, ' it will be needful to main- English ' for,' with the preceding 
 
 tain a squadron to protect them, as sentence, which alludes to the subject 
 
 well as for other purposes (icni).' of a termination of the war. Ai) is 
 
 * The forte of fiaXKov va&j per- intensive, and strengthens the two 
 haps be given by italics. preceding particles. 
 
 ° See Klotz, Devar., on f«i) yap Sri, 
 
 D 2 
 
:6 SPEECHES FROM THUCTDIDES. 
 
 hem to injure our allies, and to refrain from exposing 
 heir intrigues. But I do advise you not as jet to draw 
 he sword, but to send an embassy and to expostulate, 
 without either too plainly menacing war, or allowing 
 hem to think we shall be blind to their ambition. In 
 he interval I recommend you to complete our own pre- 
 larations, by the acquisition of allies, both in Greece and 
 broad, in any quarter where we can gain either naval 
 r pecuniary aid ; for men who, like ourselves, are the 
 atended victims of Athenian treachery, cannot be blamed 
 3r consulting their safety by foreign as well as Greek 
 Uiances. Let us, at the same time, develope to the 
 tmost our internal resources : should they then show 
 ny inchnation to listen to our embassies, all the better ; 
 
 * they refuse, after the lapse of two or three years, we 
 hall be better prepared to attack them, should we resolve 
 3 do so. Perhaps, too, by that time, when they observe 
 ur armaments, and the warlike tone of our diplomacy, 
 ley may be more disposed towards concession, while 
 leir territory is still inviolate, and they are able to enjoy, 
 I their full integrity, those great national advantages 
 '^hose fate depends on their dehberations. Indeed, the 
 aly light in which you should regard their domain is 
 lat of a hostage ; a hostage the more precious, the richer 
 s cultivation. It is, therefore, your interest to spare ^ it 
 3 long as possible, instead of rendering its proprietors, 
 y reducing them to desperation, more than ever intrac- 
 ible to terms. If we take the opposite course; if, 
 
 • Compare Livy, v. 42 : ' Ceterum, sessi possent, et non omnia concremari 
 u non omnibus delendse urbis libido tecta, ut, quodcunque superesset urb- 
 atjSeuitaplacueratprincipibusGal- is, id pignus ad flectendos hostium 
 rum, et ostentari qusedam incendia animos haberent ; nequaquam perinde 
 rroria caussft, si compelli ad dedi- atque in captS., urbe primS, die aut 
 mem caritate sedium suarum ob- passim ^ut late vagatus est ignis.' 
 
KING ABCHIDAMUS. 37 
 
 hurried on by the complaints of our confederates, we 
 ravage Attica without adequate supplies, beware that we 
 are not adopting a course httle to the honour of Pelopon- 
 nese, and full of embarrassment. The grievances, indeed, 
 whether of states or of individuals, it is possible to adjust ; 
 but it is not easy for a whole confederacy to termi- 
 nate hostihties on creditable terms, when its members 
 have, each for his own ^ interest, engaged in a war 
 whose issue it is impossible to foresee. 
 
 83. Nor let it be supposed that delay on the part 
 of a numerous confederacy to attack a single state is 
 a mark of pusillanimity. Athens, hke^ ourselves, has 
 allies — alhes as numerous as ours : they pay ^ her tribute, 
 and the contest hinges not so much on arms as on trea- 
 sure, the sinews * of war, especially when, as in the present 
 case, an inland is opposed to a maritime power. Let 
 us first, then, fill our treasury, instead of being carried 
 away by the eloquence of our allies ; let us, who ^ will be 
 mainly responsible for the results, whether fortunate or 
 adverse, leisurely revolve beforehand the chances of suc^ 
 cess or defeat. 
 
 84. I must warn you, too, not to feel ashamed of that 
 slow and dehberate circumspection, which is their prin- 
 cipal reproach against us ; for if you hastily take up arms, 
 it will be all the later before you lay them down,, 
 
 ' Probably the Corinthiana and * Comp. Cic. I%ilipp. v. 2 : ' Nervi 
 
 Megarians are chiefly alluded to. — belli, pecuiiia infinita.' 
 
 Haack. ' The double xal ia used to 
 
 ' Kai. Hoogoveen (On the Par- strengthen the comparison between 
 
 tides) explains this use of xai by an the two clauses. Klotz (JDevar. vol. ii. 
 
 ellipse of oi fiovov ahXa, But see p. 6J5) cites, among other instances 
 
 note ^, p. 7, above. of this usage, Xen. Mem. i. 6, 3 : ei 
 
 ' Bloomfield remarks that the oiv, toinrip Kai twv qAXckv ipyav oi 
 
 comparative ikaaaovQ applies only to SiSaoKaXoirovs liaBriTae luiirirae lavrSiv 
 
 |w/ifiaxoi, since the Lacedaemonian airolcucvvovaWf oiirw xai to, k.t,\, 
 allies paid no tribute. 
 
5 SPEECHES FBOM TSUCYBIBE8. 
 
 jcause you will be entering on the conflict without due 
 "eparation. The wisdom ^ of our cautious policy reflects 
 self in our long career of freedom and glory ; and the 
 jry quality ^ they ridicule in us is only another name 
 T a wise moderation ; a quahty which secures us a 
 ngular exemption from insolent elation in the hour 
 ' triumph, and, compared with others, from despondency 
 L disaster ; from yielding to the fascinations of a gra- 
 fted vanity, when people praise us and cheer us on 
 
 * hazards which our sober judgment disapproves ; or 
 om being piqued into compliance when a Corinthian^ 
 )eaker goads us with invective. Our love of order and 
 iscipline renders us brave soldiers. and wise counsellors ; 
 [•ave soldiers, because sensibility to shame is a powerful 
 ement in the love of order, and a chivalrous spirit in 
 jusibility to shame ; wise counsellors, because we are 
 ained with too httle refinement^ to despise the laws, 
 id with too severe a self-control to disobey them. Nor ^ 
 
 ' In the clause commencing -with the Spartan character are all hrought 
 
 i S.na, K.T.X., a fact is stated in an out: i. A narrow, strictly defined, 
 
 sulated form, -without its true con- and uniform range of ideas. 2. Com- 
 
 iction with the argument, which is pression of all other impulses and 
 
 ft to be inferred. Haack rightly desires, hut an increased sensihi- 
 
 Us it an ' argumentum ah effectu.' lity to their own public opinion; 
 
 ' I agree with Poppo (ed. min.), 3. Great habits of endurance as 
 
 referring tovto to to lipaSi xai well as of submission. The way in 
 
 Wor. which the features of Spartan cha^ 
 
 ' Lit. ' if, as we have seen ' (<!pa). racter are deduced from Spartan in- 
 
 pa points the allusion to the fore- stitutions, as well as the pride which 
 
 )ing Corinthian speech. Its force Archidamus expresses in the igno- 
 
 ay be given in English by sub- ranee and narrow mental range of 
 
 ituting a definite for a general his coimtrymen, are here remarkable, 
 
 rm. A similar championship of ignorance 
 
 * Compare Aristotle, Hhet. i. 1 5 : and nan-owmindedness is not only to 
 i tUv voiiuiv aoipiirepov i^ijTiiv iivai, be found among those who deride 
 VT laTiv iv Toig iTraivovjiimiq the literary and oratorical tastes 
 ifiniQ cnrayopiitTai. of the Athenian democracy (see 
 
 * Mr. Grote (vol. vi. p. T19) re- Aristoph. Ran. 1070; Xen. Mem. i. 
 arks: 'In this part of the speech 2, 9-49), but also in the speech of 
 ■ Archidamus the great points of Cleon (Thucyd. iii. 37).' 
 
KINO AE0SIDAMJJ8. 39 
 
 are we so overskilled in useless accomplislimeiits as 
 to depreciate our enemies' armaments in plausible 
 speeches, without any corresponding energy in action. 
 No ! our education teaches us to believe that, in point of 
 tactics, our neighbours are nearly on a par with our- 
 selves,^ and that the chances incident to war are far 
 beyond the calculations of debate. We arm ^ energetically 
 against the foe on the presumption that his plans will be 
 wisely laid ; for we have no right to build our hopes on 
 the chance of his mistakes, but on the surer ground of 
 our own foresight. We do not believe in any great 
 natural superiority ' in one man over another : that man 
 we hold the most valuable citizen who has been trained 
 in the severest school. 
 
 85. Let us not, then, renounce the principles be- 
 queathed by our fathers to us, and retained by us down 
 to the present moment with uniform advantage ; let us 
 not, in the brief space of an hour, pass a hurried resolu- 
 tion, when the lives of many citizens, the fortunes of many 
 families, the fate of many cities, and our own glory are 
 involved ; let us take time to consider, as our strength 
 permits us to do more easUy than other states. Despatch 
 an embassy to treat on the affairs of Potidasa, and on 
 the alleged wrongs of the allies, especially as Athens 
 is willing to submit the subjects of complaint to arbi- 
 tration ; ^ for public justice forbids your proceeding, 
 
 ' I have followed Poppo's (ed. ing, has heen adopted here. 
 
 min.) construction ; but Gbller's ex- ' The remark is no doubt levelled 
 
 plajiation suits the Greek quite as at the elaborate contrast drawn by 
 
 well. According to him, the passage the Corinthian speaker between the 
 
 must be rendered : 'We are taught intellectual activity ofAthens and the 
 
 to believe that the plans of our intellectual sluggishness of Sparta, 
 
 neighbours are as indefinable by * Poppo (ed. maj.) explains ^iVaj 
 
 calculation as the freaks of chance,' ioSvai by 'rem dijudicandam per- 
 
 Dr. Arnold agrees with Goller. mittere,' 
 
 ' JlapiaKivw^ojuea, Kriiger's read- 
 
40 SPEECHES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 previous to trial, against a party wiUing to accept such a 
 decision, as against an avowed criminal. At the same 
 time make every preparation for war. This will be the 
 safest course you can adopt, and the most hkely to 
 intimidate your foes. 
 
TEE BPHOB STHENELAIDAS. 41 
 
 SPEECH OF THE EPHOR STHENELAIDAS, 
 
 Before the same assembly as that immediately before addressed by Archidamus. 
 Bk. I. ch. 86. 
 
 INTSODUCTION. 
 
 Sthbnelaidas, one of the five Ephors, whose ftinction it was to put 
 the question to the vote, replies, in the following brief address, to 
 the preceding speech ; and, speaking as the organ of the war party 
 at Sparta, closes the debate. 
 
 Ch. 86. I don't understand the long speeches of the 
 Athenians ; they have lavished praises on themselves, but 
 they have never answered our charge — that of wronging 
 our allies and Peloponnese. Besides, if they formerly 
 proved themselves honest men in the struggle with the 
 Medes, and have now proved themselves villains in their 
 conduct towards us, they are deserving of double punish- 
 ment, for having turned rogues in place of honest men. 
 We, on the contrary, are just the same now that we were 
 then ; and, as long as we have a particle of sense, we 
 shall not allow our allies to be oppressed ; nor will 
 we postpone our aid, as they cannot postpone their suf- 
 ferings. Other states may be richer in money, in fleets, 
 in cavalry. We have staunch allies, whom we wiU not 
 abandon to Athens ; nor will we decide our claims either 
 in courts of arbitration or by diplomacy — for it is not by 
 diplomacy that we ^ are being wronged. No ! we will 
 succour them at once, and with all our might. Let no 
 
 ' Kal aiiToiiQ pXavToiikvovc. Kai is p. 636, where he cites Thucyd. ii. 93, 
 
 used to compare the two ideas em- wc Sk tSo^ev auroTe, Kai exi^povi/ cvfvf, 
 
 bodied in the terms Xoyoic liaiepiTea where xai compares the decision with 
 
 and \6y(,> ptXairroiiivovs. The idiom the action taken upon it. 
 is illustrated by Klotz, Demr. vol. ii. 
 
42 8PEWHES FROM THJJGTDIDE8. 
 
 man presume to tell us that we can with honour delibe- 
 rate longer, outraged as we are : protracted deliberations 
 are rather for those who design to outrage others. Vote, 
 then, Lacedsemonians, for war, as befits the dignity of 
 Sparta ; suiFer not Athens to increase her power, nor 
 leave our allies at her mercy ; but march, with the favour 
 of the gods, against the aggressors. 
 
TEE EEPEE8ENTATIVES OF CORINTH. 43 
 
 SPEECH OF THE EEPEESENTATIVES OF COEINTH, 
 
 Delivered at the Second Congresa of the Peloponnesian Confederacy at Sparta, 
 B.C. 432. Bk. I. chs. 120-125. 
 
 IWTHODUCTION. 
 
 On the close of the preceding speech, the Ephor Sthenelaidas took 
 the sense of the Spartan assembly, when a large majority declared 
 the trttce broken, and voted for a declaration of war against Athens. 
 The Spartans then dismissed the representatives of their alHes, 
 consulted the Delphic oracle, and, encouraged by the answer, con- 
 voked a general congress of their confederates, to take their vote on 
 the question of war. The Corinthian Envoys woand up the discus- 
 sion in the following harangue. 
 
 Ch. 1 20. We have no longer,^ confederates, any rea- 
 son to reproach the Lacedgemonians for not having them- 
 selves voted for war, or for omitting to convene us 
 for that purpose, though, had they done so, we should 
 have held them justly censurable ; for ^ it is the duty of 
 the head of a confederacy, while, in private affairs,^ it 
 deals with its allies on terms of equahty, to be foremost 
 in providing for the general welfare, just as upon pubhc 
 occasions it is foremost in the honours conferred. 
 
 Those among us who have been engaged in political 
 transactions with the Athenians, require no warning to 
 
 ' Probably the speaker refers to a De Partic. vol. i. p. 465. 
 
 former complaint on the part of the ' That is, makes no difference be- 
 
 Corinthians, of the obstacles opposed tween Lacedaemonians, on the one 
 
 to the meeting of a congress of allies hand, and Argives or Corinthians, on 
 
 at Sparta. See chap. 69, above. the other. So Classen, quoted by 
 
 * Tap points, as Poppo (ed. min.), Poppo (ed.min.), understands r<ii^ia, 
 GoUer, and Bauer show, to a sup- which he explains to mean 'quum 
 pressed clause, which I have at- ipsorum Lacedaemoniorum, turn sin- 
 tempted to supply. See Hartung, gulorum federatorum res.' 
 
44 SPEHUHES FROM THUGTDIDE8. 
 
 put them on their guard against Athenian ambition ; but 
 it is desirable that those who occupy an inland site, not 
 on the highway of commercial traffic, should be made 
 aware that, if they refuse aid to the maritime cities, they 
 win find it less easy to carry their corn to the coast, and 
 to import the produce which the sea contributes to the 
 mainland. They ought not, therefore, to listen to oiur 
 arguments -with the indifference ^ of unconcerned critics ; 
 remembering that, should they abandon the cities on 
 the coast, the danger will in time reach their own doors, 
 and that their present deliberations affect their own 
 interests fully as much as ours. 
 
 For this very reason they ought not to feel reluctant 
 to exchange peace for war ; for if wise ^ men cherish 
 peace, while they are not wronged, brave men, when 
 they are wronged, abandon peace and resort to war, 
 though disposed to accept honourable terms of accommo- 
 dation ; their eyes being open alike to the foUy of undue 
 elation with mihtary success, and to the danger of sub- 
 mitting to outrage for the sake of the charming tran- 
 quillity of peace. They know that the man whom love 
 of ease seduces from war will, if he clings to a dishonour- 
 able peace, very soon be robbed of the luxurious repose 
 which makes a coward of him ; and that the man who 
 presumes on the victories which have crowned his arms, 
 forgets that there is no sure warrant for the sanguine 
 confidence which intoxicates him. For if ill-concer- 
 ted movements have often succeeded through the de- 
 plorable infatuation of an enemy's tactics, yet more 
 frequently have operations, apparently well-devised, con- 
 
 * KaKoi Kpirai, says Qbller, 'sunt a certain epoch of intellectual cul- 
 indiligentes, soeordes, quia opinantur ture, the maxims it contains may 
 sua nunc non referre, quid judicent.' seem trite ; but they could not have 
 
 * Col. Mure (vol, v. p. 583) cen- been stale in the infancy of Athenian 
 sures this passage as truistical. In political and social experience. 
 
THE BEPBESENTATIVES OF GOBINTE. 45 
 
 trary to all presumption, resulted in defeat. The fact is, 
 men do not carry their schemes into effect in the con- 
 fident spirit ^ which conceives them ; we lay our plans in 
 the midst of security, but diffidence and fear mar their 
 execution. 
 
 121. Thus, in our own case, if we are kindling ^ the 
 flame of war, it is because we have wrongs to resent, and 
 are armed with adequate grounds of complaint ; and, as 
 soon as we have wreaked our vengeance upon Athens, we 
 shall in season sheathe our swords. There is every pre- 
 sumption that we shall be the conquerors ; since, besides 
 having the advantage in numbers and in military skill, 
 we all execute the commands of our ofiicers with the 
 prompt and uniform obedience of a common cause.^ We 
 can build ourselves a fleet— that mainspring of Athenian 
 power — with the resources supplied by the several 
 members of our league, and the treasure * in reserve at 
 Olympia and Delphi ; for, by contracting a loan, we shall 
 be able, the Athenian forces being mercenary rather than 
 national, to seduce their foreign seamen by the offer 
 of more liberal pay — a danger to which we should be 
 less exposed, our military power depending far more on 
 native than on mercenary^ troops. One victory at sea — 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) and Goller read says : ' I conceive that the word 6/joiiug 
 o/ioiif, which gives a hetter sense, and here alludes to the equal interest of 
 relieves the false antithesis which all the confederates in the quarrel, 
 ofiola — Dr. Arnold's reading — would as opposed to the Athenian power, 
 create between niarn and Ipyif. Ac- composed partly of constrained sub- 
 cording to the latter reading, the jects, partly of hired mercenaries ; 
 sense would be : 'it is one thing to to both of which points, as weak- 
 form our expectations, another to nesses in the enemy, the Corinthian 
 give them practical effect.' orator goes on to allude.' 
 
 * ndXt/zoj' £yfipo/^Ei'' a poetical ex- * 'The temples were the banks 
 
 pression, drawn from Homer, ever and capitalists of antiquity.' — Shep- 
 
 on the lips of the Athenians, and pard and Evans, p. 127. 
 
 imitated by later prose writers. ^ The paraphrase of Dukas, quoted 
 
 ' See Grote's note at p. 1 24, vol. vi. by Goller, is my authority for thus 
 
 of his History of Greece, where he rendering x!"'lf""^'i ^ literal version 
 
46 
 
 8PEECEES FROM TRUGYDIDES, 
 
 and, in all probability, all is over with them : should 
 they, however, still hold out, we shall have all the more 
 time to practise naval evolutions ; and when our science 
 rivals theirs, we shall, I presume, be rather more than 
 their rivals in point of courage. No discipline can give 
 them the quahties nature has given us ; and by training 
 we can cancel their superiority in science. The ways and 
 means we shall find by subscription ; for it would be 
 monstrous that, while their alhes are contributing without 
 a murmur towards their own enslavement, we, as seems 
 to be thought,^ should be unable to find funds for the 
 combined objects of vengeance on our foes and salvation 
 for ourselves, as well as to prevent those very funds ^ 
 
 of wMoh makes nonsense. It runs 
 as follows : rj Sk rjntrkpa ek rwv o'tKtiutv 
 cTTpariutTUiv Tuiv kv UtKoTrovvifatp avvi- 
 araiiivti, Kal ovx'i itviKov j^pji/jaffiv 
 btvTjTov, oiiK hv wpaipeQurj vno Tttiv rd 
 ttXciw liSovruav. As Thucydides often 
 puts the effect for the cause, so here, 
 in xpflH-""'! ^^ P'l^ ^^^ cause for the 
 effect, the agent for the patient. 
 In other words, xPHM""^' means, lite- 
 rally, ' money to hire mercenaries ; ' 
 really it means ' mercenaries hired by 
 money.' There is, too, as Poppo (ed. 
 min.) remarks, an equivoque in diva- 
 fiiq • which, applied to the Athenians, 
 means ' forces ' ; applied to the Pelo- 
 ponnesians, ' power.' Previous trans- 
 lators, including even Mr. Crawley, 
 have, by a literal rendering, lost the 
 meaning. He translates as follows : 'A 
 loan from these enables us to seduce 
 their foreign sailors by the offer of 
 higher pay, for the power of Athens is 
 more mercenary than national ; while 
 ours will not be so liable to this, as 
 its strength lies more in men than in 
 money.' But surely this affords no 
 reason for the Peloponnesian force 
 being less open than the Athenian to 
 
 the seductions of higher pay. The 
 contrast lies between national and 
 mercenary troops; the latter being 
 of course more likely than the former 
 to transfer their services to the 
 highest bidder. 
 
 ' "Apa seems to point the allusion 
 to a passage in the preceding speech 
 of Archidamus, ch. 8 o. Poppo, how- 
 ever (ed. min.), takes apa in the 
 sense which it undoubtedly bears in 
 many passages, especially Plato, Apol, 
 p. 34., B, where StaUbaum explains 
 it as giving flagrancy to the contrast 
 between two propositions, and where 
 tyw hi ovSkv dpa rovrmv iroir]<Tut is 
 
 construed by Riddell, 'and then 
 finds that I mean to do nothing of 
 the kind.' 
 
 ' AvTOj before a.(j>aipE9ivT(c, refers 
 to xfhi'-aTa, and is repeated in airole 
 TovToic, as the Scholiast, quoted by 
 Poppo (ed. maj.), shows in the fol- 
 lowing paraphrase : fuSojjKvoi airHv 
 (i.e. Tuiv ^pT^juarwr), ctTroXov^eQa vtt 
 aiiTdv Tovroiv. Sheppard and Evans 
 take the same view of the meaning, 
 objecting to Dr. Arnold's version. 
 
TEE REPBESENTATWES OF COBINTE. 47 
 
 from becoming, through Athenian spoliation, the instru- 
 ments of our ruin. 
 
 122. But we have other means, besides these, of 
 carrying on the war, such as the seduction of their allies 
 — the best mode of cutting off the revenues which are 
 the sinews of Athenian power — and the occupation of a 
 fortified post in Attica ; not to mention other expedients 
 that we cannot at 'this moment foresee. For war is the 
 last thing in the world to turn out according to pro- 
 gramme : ^ it draws chiefly on its own resources for the 
 means of meeting emergencies ; it is a field ^ of action 
 in which the man who mingles in the fray with coolness 
 and presence of mind is likely to succeed, while the man 
 who loses his temper as he fights gets many a faU.^ 
 
 We should also remember that, though our whole 
 confederacy need not have interfered * if we had been 
 individually engaged in mere frontier squabbles with rival 
 states, the case is very difierent now, embarked as we 
 are in a struggle with Athens, who is a match for our 
 whole collective strength, and far more than a match for 
 any single member of our league. So that, unless we 
 
 ' Mr. Bigg, by construing iwi it indeed before, at the end of the 
 ptiraiq, 'by fixed laws,' commits 120th chapter, but here again he 
 Thucydides to a very unphilosophical repeats his protest against the ad- 
 remark, mission of anger into their delibera- 
 
 ^ Sheppard and Evans understand tions: let them not begin the war 
 
 TroXifUfi with iv i(5" but TroKtfiii> would under the influence of passion, but 
 
 then be repeated in avT(^. The Scho- coolly and resolutely ; for they have 
 
 liast explains it as equivalent to Si6- causes of hostility suificient to pre- 
 
 but Poppo (ed. maj.) justly remarks vail on them, even when considered 
 
 that Haack's version, ' qua in re,' is with the coolest temper.' — Vol. i. 
 
 nearer the Greek. p- i4-^- 
 
 ' Dr. Ai'nold remarks : ' The con- ■* OiVro?' av r;i' means literally, 'we 
 
 ueotion of the argument is rather (i. e. the several members of the 
 
 obscure. Perhaps the speaker wishes league) could have taken the burden 
 
 to disclaim being influenced by on our own shoulders,' without in- 
 
 passion in urging war against Athens voking the collective action of the 
 
 so vehemently. He had disclaimed confederacy. 
 
48 SPHEGHES FBOM TEUGYDWBS. 
 
 unanimously assail her witli our united force, with the 
 force of every province and of every city, she will easily 
 conquer us, divided as we shall be. Let every man be 
 well assured that conquest, terrible as it is to hear the 
 truth, imphes nothing short of absolute slavery, the very 
 mention of which as a possibihty is disgraceful to Pelo- 
 ponnese ; and it is disgraceful that so many states should 
 be buUied by a single city. Were such a fate to befall 
 us, we should either seem, to be suflfering only what we 
 deserved, or to brook our degradation through coward- 
 ice, and to declare ourselves unworthy of our fathers, 
 who gave freedom to Greece — freedom which, in our dege- 
 neracy, we are faihng to secure even for our own homes ! 
 since, while we plume ourselves on suppressing despots 
 in single cities, we allow a despot city to rear its head 
 among us. Indeed, we know not upon what grounds 
 your policy can be acquitted of one or another ^ of three 
 most deadly errors, either want of sense, or want of 
 courage, or want of care ; for you need not imagine that 
 you escape them by imputing your disastrous apathy to 
 that most fatal ^ contempt of a foe, which, from the wide- 
 spread ruin it has caused, has been justly described by 
 an epithet similar in sound but opposite in sense — not as 
 contemptuous but contemptible. 
 
 123. However, it is idle to censure the policy of the 
 past, save as a lesson of wisdom for the present. But, 
 for the sake of our future hopes, we must toil with 
 increased zeal in improving present opportunities. Toil, 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) points out that TrXntT,, instead of TrXsiarnvQ ^ij. But, 
 KOI, not ij, would have been used as Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, in is 
 before iiaXuKlag and d/ieXfioc, had it quite in place, intensifying the super- 
 been meant that their policy was lative. Arnold, Gbller, and Poppo 
 chargeable with all the three errors agree as to the meaning of this 
 here mentioned. passage. 
 
 * Kriiger wishes to read vKiiaTovs 
 
TEE EEPBESENTATIVES OF COBINTH. 49 
 
 indeed/ has been to us, from time immemorial, the source 
 of honour ; and we must not abandon a time-honoured 
 principle, merely because we have now, perhaps, a trifling 
 advantage in wealth and political power. For it is not 
 right that the earnings of poverty shcjuld be the waste of 
 affluence. No ! we ought to embark with a well-founded 
 confidence in the war, for such are the commands of the 
 Delphian God, who himself has promised us his aid, and 
 the whole of Greece is about to plunge into the conflict 
 with us, partly from apprehension, partly from policy. 
 Nor will you be the first to infringe the '^ treaty, since the 
 God, by summoning you to go to war, declares it to have 
 been broken by your foes ; you will rather be avenging 
 its violation, for treaties are broken, not by retaliation, 
 but by aggression. 
 
 1 24. Since, then, your political position, from every 
 point of view, and the general ^ sanction of our congress, 
 summon you to arms ; since the * course we advise is 
 firmly guaranteed by its consonance with private as well 
 as national interests, do not hesitate a moment to succour 
 the Dorians of Potidaea, besieged as they are by lonians 
 — a total inversion of the old order of things ! — and to 
 vindicate the freedom of our other allies; for it is no 
 
 • Itisamistake to treat the clause without the article; and JelPs Ch: 
 
 ■n-nrpiov yap, n-.r.X., as a parenthesis. Oram. § 447, Obs., on similar omis- 
 
 The two sentences are logically con- sions of the article. That rrnofSac is 
 
 nected by the unity of ideas ex- used deiinitely here is proved by the 
 
 pressed by ETnTaXimruptlv in the one, relative u'g ye, as well as by the 
 
 and TOKwi' in the other. directness of the allusion to the 
 
 ' Mr. Bigg sagaciously observes Thirty Years' Truce, 
 that •TTToi'^dc cannot mean '<Ae treaty,' ' Kriiger denies that xmry can 
 because the article is not prefixed. mean 'for the common good,' as 
 I recommend him to consult Poppo's some construe it. 
 note (ed. min.) on ch. 67, i, above, * G oiler, who had followed Reiske 
 where that editor shows that a 7ro)/^(ie in preferring ravra, afterwards ad- 
 is used there, and elsewhere, de- mitted raiini to be right. Poppo, 
 finitely of the Thirty Years' Truce, however (ed. min.), reads Tairn, 
 
50 SPEECEES FBOM THU0TDIDE8. 
 
 longer tolerable that some members of our league should 
 be sacrificed on the spot while thej are awaiting md 
 from y_p_u, and that others, if it should be known that we 
 have met in congress and yet dare not avenge their 
 wrongs, should shortly afterwards be involved in the 
 same fate. In the conviction, then, confederates, that the 
 crisis of action has arrived, and that our counsels are 
 your true pohcy, vote for war, undaunted by the imme- 
 diate danger, fascinated by the charm of the more lasting 
 peace that will ensue. For peace ^ is never so stable as 
 when it is the fruit of hostilities, and to flinch from them 
 for the sake of repose is more dangerous than ^ to elicit 
 peace from war. Let us, then, in the belief that the 
 tyrant state which has planted her rule in Greece aims at 
 our common subjugation — some of us, indeed, she already 
 rules, while she threatens others — let us march and pull 
 her down ; and let us live in independence and safety for 
 the future, while we restore to freedom the Grecian com- 
 munities now enslaved.^ 
 
 * Compaxe Cic. Philipp. Tii. 6 : 'On the conclusion of tHs speech, 
 
 ' Si pace frui volumus, bellum ge- the Spartans took the votes of the 
 
 rendum est; si helium omittimus, deputies of all the allied states pre- 
 
 pace nunquam fruemur.' sent, g;reat and small alike, when the 
 
 ' Haack, quoted by Poppo (ed. majority declared for war. This 
 
 min.), translates o/^oiwc 'ac si quis happened at the close of the year 
 
 ex bello pacem pepigerit.' 432 B.C., or early in January b.c, 431. 
 
PEBIOLES. 5 1 
 
 SPEECH OF PEEICLES, 
 
 Addressed to the AtheDian popular assembly, e.g. 431, Bk. I. chs. 140-145, 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 As soon as tte Congress tad broken up, Sparta prepared for war. 
 With, the Yiew, however, of gaining time for effective preparation, 
 and also of establishing a better casus belli, she addressed several 
 vexatious requisitions to Athens, the first of which was aimed 
 directly at Pericles, and was rejected by the Athenians : the second 
 demanded (i) the withdrawal of the force investing Potidaea; (2) 
 the recognition of the independence of ^Slgina ; (3) the repeal of the 
 edict against the Megarians. The chief stress was laid upon the 
 third point, not because it was so important to Sparta as the ter- 
 naination of the blockade of Potidsea, but because it afforded the 
 anti-Periclean and philo-Laconian party at Athens a better chance 
 of defeating the policy of Pericles. The Athenian Assembly, how- 
 ever, refused to revoke the edict, on the ground that the Megarians 
 had been guilty of harbouring their runaway slaves, and of encroach- 
 ments on consecrated ground. Sparta, foiled at all points, at last 
 sent an ultimatum calling on Athens to recognise the independence 
 of all Greece, or, in other words, to break up her empire. This 
 proposal was brought before the Athenian Assembly, which resolved 
 to deliberate tmce for all on all the demands addressed to them, and 
 to give them a peremptory answer. After this assembly had been 
 variously swayed by several speakers of opposite views, Pericles 
 declared his opinion and defended his policy in the following speech, 
 ranked by Dionysius of Halicamassus among the best in Thucy- 
 dides. 
 
 Ch. 140. I still adhere, Athenians, to my former con- 
 viction that we ought to make no concessions to the Pelo- 
 ponnesians, although I am aware that men consent to a 
 declaration of war in one mood, and carry on its opera- 
 tions in another — their views changing with the tide 
 
 s 2 
 
5 2 SPEECHES FROM THUCTDWES. 
 
 of events. Still I feel that I have nearly the same 
 counsel to offer you as before ; and I call upon those 
 among you who follow my advice to support our com- 
 mon resolves, in the event of our meeting with partial 
 reverses ; or — to make no pretensions to sagacity in the 
 event of our success. And we may meet with reverses ; 
 for affairs^ are apt to take a course as eccentric as 
 human counsels ; a truth we acknowledge by familiarly 
 imputing to Fortune whatever contradicts our expec- 
 tations. 
 
 The L'acedsemonians have, on former occasions, but 
 more especially on this, clearly betrayed their hostility to 
 us. Tor though it was stipulated in the Thirty Years' 
 Truce that we should grant and accept an amicable 
 adjustment of our differences,^ and that both parties 
 should retain what they possessed, they have never up to 
 this moment sought a friendly arbitration, and they repu- 
 diate it when offered by us, preferring war to argument 
 ■as a means of settling their grievances; and their ambas- 
 sadors are now here to dictate, and no longer to expos- 
 tulate. For they call on us to raise the siege of Potid^a, 
 lo grant independence to ^gina, and to rescind the 
 Megarian decree; nay, their last embassy, that now 
 before you, publicly summons us to acknowledge the 
 independence of all Greece. I trust none of you will 
 imagine we shall be going to war about a trifle if we 
 refuse to rescind the Megarian decree, the repeal of 
 which they put prominently forward as certain to avert 
 hostilities ; and that you will not allow a particle of self- 
 
 • The Scholiast interprets |i'^- tingencies of events/ an expression 
 
 <popAe by cLTTo^daiiQ, explaining one which betrays the translator, 
 
 difficulty by another. Probably m ^ Compare Livy's ' commercium 
 
 Kvfiiiiopai Twv wpayiidriDv is only a juris praebendi repetendique.' Bk. 
 
 periphrasis for rd Trpayitara. Mr. xli. 29. 
 •Grote construes the phrase ' the con- 
 
FEBICLE8. S3 
 
 reproach to linger in your thoughts, as if you had ap- 
 pealed to war on trivial grounds. For this one point, ^ 
 
 / slight ^ as it seems, comprehends all that can fortify or i. 
 
 I test your resolution.j Surrender it ^ — and some heavier " 
 exaction will shortly be laid upon you, on the assump- 
 tion that even this concession was dictated by fear; sternly ' 
 refuse — and you will give them a significant hint to treat 
 you as equals, and not to command ^ you as subjects. 
 
 141. Make up your minds, then, once for all, either to 
 submit to a state of dependency, before you have suffered 
 from resistance ; or, in the event of our going to war, which 
 / believe will be our best policy, not to yield upon any 
 consideration, whether trivial or important, and to hold 
 with no timorous grasp our present possessions. For any 
 demand, whether small or great, when levied on a foreign 
 state by a rival power, before any decision has been 
 given by a court of arbitration, equally implies subjection. 
 As to the requirements of the war, and the resources 
 of both parties, assure yourselves, by listening to the 
 following statement of details, that the advantage will be 
 on our side. The Peloponnesians farm their own lands, 
 and they have no accumulated wealth, either national or 
 private ; nor are they experienced in protracted and 
 transmarine wars, because their poverty restricts them to 
 short expeditions against each other, and denies them 
 mercenary aid.* Powers of this description cannot often 
 send out well-manned squadrons or expeditions by land; 
 because their subjects would be exiled from their estates, 
 which must, nevertheless, defray ^ their expenses, and also 
 
 ' Compare Livy, bk. xxxv. 17: and is equivalent to roiroif yop. 
 
 ' Initium semper a parvis injuste im- ' See Poppo's note on irpoaipiptaBm, 
 
 perandi fuit.' ed. min. 
 
 ' Literally, ' for, if you give way * This seems to be the meaning of 
 
 to them : ' oIq, as Poppo (ed. min.) airo'i. 
 
 shows, refers to ol rtAtvraioi iJKovTic, ' GdUer remarks that the Athenian 
 
54 SPBEGHES FROM THUGTDIDES. 
 
 because-Zthanks to our maritime supremacy-/-they cannot 
 keep the seas.^ For it is not by forced contributions, 
 but by surplus funds, that war is fed. Men, too, who 
 farm their own lands are more ready to serve in person 
 than in purse, trusting that the former may stiU escape 
 the danger, but feeUng no assurance that the latter wiU 
 survive '^ the war ; especially if, as is likely enough, they 
 should find hostilities outlast their expectations. In a 
 single engagement, indeed, the Peloponnesians and their 
 alUes are capable of resisting all Greece; but they are 
 not capable of carrying on a war against a power con- 
 stitutionally different ^ from their own ; since the want of 
 a single council-chamber disables them from executing 
 their measures with promptitude and despatch ; and, as 
 they aU have equal votes, and are not of the same race,* 
 every man presses his special interest ; and, in effect, 
 helps the rest to do nothing. The anxiety of some is for 
 the utmost vengeance on a foe, the anxiety of others for 
 the utmost saving of expense. On assembling, after many 
 delays, a fraction of their time is given to a little public 
 business, but the greater part of it is devoted to their 
 private affairs. Not a man among them believes that any 
 mischief wiU arise from his own negligence : he thinks 
 
 troops received pay from the time of exhaust the latter before the war is 
 
 Pericles, but not the Lacedsemonian ; over.' 
 
 nor, says Poppo (ed. min.), their ^ Thucydides himself remarks, at 
 
 Peloponnesian allies. He refers espe- a later crisis of the war, that the La- 
 
 cially to Thucyd. ii. lo. cedsemonians, whose national habits 
 
 ' Mr. Crawley translates nlc fn- were so different from those of the 
 
 Maarie ftpyofiivoi, ' having no sea- Athenians, were the most convenient 
 
 . board;' but this can hardly be said foes Athena could have; while the 
 
 of Peloponnese, which was all but Syracusans,on the contrary, so similar 
 
 an island. Poppo (ed. min.) refers in character to their Athenian anta- 
 
 it to their comparative want of man- gonists, managed the war with Athens 
 
 time skill, illustrating the expression capitally. — Bk. viii. 96. 
 from Thucyd. ii. 85, iii. 115, viii. 24.. * See Poppo, ed. min. 
 
 * Literally, 'that they shall not 
 
FTSRIGLES. SS 
 
 some one else will, in his own stead, interest himself for 
 the public welfare ; which is thus imperceptibly but 
 systematically undermined by this very notion, privately 
 cherished alike by every member of the league. 
 
 142. Their chief embarrassment, however, will be the 
 want of money : delays will be caused by their difficulty 
 in raising funds ; and the opportunities of war will wait 
 for no man. Then^as to their plan ^ of establishing a 
 fortified post — neither that nor their navy ought to 
 inspire fear. On the one hand,^ it would be difficult, 
 even in peace, to erect a fortified post in the shape of a 
 town that can rival Athens ; far more difficult in an 
 enemy's territory, when we have fortifications quite as 
 strong to check them. On the other hand, if they were 
 to build a fort, they might injure some portion of our 
 territory by making incursions and inviting deserters ; ' 
 but it would not prevent us from sending a fleet to their 
 shores, from fortifying* ourselves there, and retaliating upon 
 them with owx naval forces, in which we are so strong ;^nd^ 
 we shall find it easy to make descents.\ Our naval skill gives ' 
 us more knowledge of service on land than their miUtary 
 skill gives them of service at sea. And they will find 
 naval tactics no easy acquisition. Even you, though you 
 
 ' See the speech of the Corinthian fication of Deeelea. — Sheppard and 
 
 deputy, ch. 122, ahove. Evans, p. 14.9. 
 
 ' ' Thucydides,' says Arnold, ' is ' See Thucyd. vii. 27. 
 
 here distinguishing hetween two sorts * On the construction, see Poppo,, 
 
 of imrtixiffif, the one by founding a ed. min. He remarks: ' Ejusmodi 
 
 city QiroiKiZdv, vii. 27) in the neigh- ETrirfixiofif in Peloponneso postea 
 
 bourhood of Athens, strong enough Pyhis (iv. 3) et Methone (iv. 45) 
 
 to be a check upon her power (iii. 9), fuerunt.' 
 
 the other by erecting forts in Attica * Tap, in the clause commencing 
 
 as strongholds.' Of the former. Me- ttXeov yip, seems to refer to a sup- 
 
 gara, founded by the Dorians as a pressed idea, a connecting link be- 
 
 check on Athens, is an instance ; as tween the two sentences. See note *, 
 
 al8oisHeracleia(iii. 92). The latter p. 43. 
 scheme was carried out by the forti- 
 
56 SPEEGSES FROM THUCYDWES. 
 
 began practising directly after the Persian invasion, are 
 not adepts even now : how then can a nation of farmers, 
 who are no seamen, and whom your powerful blockading 
 fleets will allow no opportunity of training, how can they 
 achieve anything of consequence? Encouraging their igno- 
 rance by their numbers, they might be tempted to run the 
 gauntlet ^ of a small blockading squadron ; but, if their 
 ports are closed by a strong force, they wiU not move ; 
 and, owing to the want of practice, their skill and courage 
 will alike decline. Seamanship is as much a question of 
 art as anything else ; you cannot treat it as a secondary 
 object, and pick it up on chance opportunities ; on the 
 contrary, it is jealous of anything being even secondary 
 to it. 
 
 143. If, on the other hand, they seize a part of the 
 treasures at Olympia or Delphi, and endeavour, by the 
 offer of higher pay, to seduce our foreign seamen, Ave ^ 
 should still have nothing to fear, unles^ our fleets, when 
 -inanned by a combined force of Athenian citizens and resi- 
 dent aliens, failed to prove a match for them. In point 
 of fact, however, we are a match for them ; and, what is 
 most important, we have citizens for coxswains, and our 
 fleets have better crews than those of any other Grecian 
 power. Besides, none of our foreign seamen, with the 
 danger^ before his eyes, would think, for the sake of a 
 few days' higher wages, of jouiing them in the contest, at 
 the price of expatriation, especially when their prospects 
 of success are less than ours. 
 
 This, I believe is a tolerably fair statement of tlie 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) instances tlie periculum;' or, as he suggests, as 
 
 attempt mentioned by Thucyd. bk.ii. equivalent to ' ut periculum adeat,' 
 
 ch. 83. i.e. 'for pure love of danger.' The 
 
 ^ Poppo (ed. min.) says we may latter sense seems alien from the 
 
 either take kni nli KwStivq), with context, 
 Kriiger, to mean 'ob impendens 
 
PEBIGLE8. 57 
 
 Peloponnesian resources. Our position, on the other 
 hand, is, I think, free from the defects I have pointed out 
 in theirs, while it possesses advantages they do not share. 
 Should their land forces invade our territory, our fleets 
 can retaliate upon their shores ; and the devastation of a 
 part of the Peloponnese will be a greater loss to them 
 than the devastation of all Attica to us. To compensate 
 themselves with other domains, they must fight for them, 
 whereas we have ample territories, both insular and con- 
 tinental; for it is a great thing to command the sea. 
 Consider: suppose, for argument's sake,^ we were is- 
 landers — can you imagine a position more impregnable ? 
 Well, you must act as nearly as possible on that con- 
 ception. Give up all thought of your estates and country- 
 houses ; guard the sea and your capital ; and do not, 
 from vexation at your losses, risk a general action with 
 the Peloponnesians, who greatly outnumber you. A 
 victory could only be followed by another battle with 
 foes as numerous ; a defeat would involve the loss of our 
 allies, the sinews of our power ; they will never remain 
 quiet, if we are unable to march against them. If you 
 mourn, let it be for the loss of feUow-citizens, not for 
 houses and lands : men command them, not they men. 
 Indeed, if I had imagined I could prevail upon you, I 
 would have advised you to sally forth and destroy them 
 with your own hands, and to show the Peloponnesians 
 that regret for them will never induce you to submit. 
 
 144. Many other considerations inspire me with hopes 
 of success, provided you steadily refrain from territorial 
 aggrandisement in the course of the war, and do not 
 court gratuitous perils ; for I am more afraid of our own 
 
 • See Klotz, Devar. vol. ii. p. 235, in a sense equivalent to that of yoCi/, 
 ■where this passage is cited as an to introduce a demonstration or ex- 
 instance of the use of yap, serving, position, or to give an instance. 
 
58 8PEEGEES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 mistakes thaa of our enemies' tactics. These, however, 
 are points which must be reserved for future discussion, 
 in the train of events, as they arise. Let us now dismiss 
 the embassy with the answer, that we will allow the 
 Megarians access to our markets and harbours, if the 
 Lacedsemonians, on their side, forbear to persecute us and 
 our allies with alien acts, there being nothing in the 
 treaty to prevent^ either of tliese concessions ; that we 
 will recognise the independence of our allies, if they were 
 independent when we signed the Thirty Years' Truce; 
 and if Lacedtemon, on her part, vrill grant her confede- 
 rates an independence which satisfies them severally, not 
 an independence convenient only to herself. We must add 
 that we are perfectly ready to submit disputed points to 
 arbitration, according to the treaty ; that we will not 
 commence the war, but will retaliate on those who do 
 commence it. Such a reply will meet the justice of the 
 case, and sustain the dignity of our country. 
 
 One thing, however, must be clearly understood — war 
 is inevitable : its ready acceptance by us will lessen the 
 pressure of our foes ; and it is from the greatest dangers 
 that communities as well as individuals reap their chief 
 glory. It was in this spirit that our forefathers resisted 
 the Mede : they had not our resources to start with ; 
 they even abandoned all they possessed; yet, aided by 
 judgment rather than fortune, armed with courage rather 
 than power, they repulsed the barbarian, and raised our 
 fortunes to their present pitch. We must not allow our- 
 
 1 Dionys. HaL (p. 797, irtpi tUv ports and markets of Attica. Pericles, 
 
 &ovKvSilov iSiM/iaTuiv) notices the use in fact, treats the latter interdict as 
 
 of KuAvu for KioKitrai, The meaning merely the Athenian fonn of Xene- 
 
 of course is, that the Thirty Years' lasy. It closely resembled the cele- 
 
 Truce did not interdict either the brated Berlin decrees of the First 
 
 Spartan Xenelasy or the Athenian Napoleon, levelled against British 
 
 prohibition of Megarian access to the commerce. 
 
PERICLES. 
 
 59 
 
 selves to be eclipsed by them ; every effort must be made 
 to defeat the foe, and to bequeath our power unimpaired 
 to our successors.^ 
 
 * On the termination of this speech, 
 the assembly agreed to give the en- 
 voys the answer recommended by 
 Pericles, on the specific points raised 
 by them. On the general question 
 of peace and war, they declared their 
 
 willingness to submit the complaints 
 which had been made to arbitration, 
 ■according to the articles of the Thirty 
 Years' Truce ; expressing, at the same 
 time, their resolution not to submit 
 to dictation. 
 
6o SPEEGEE8 FROM THUGTDIDES. 
 
 SPEECH OF AECHIDAMUS, 
 
 Addressed to the officers of the Peloponnesian army. Bk. II. ch. ii. 
 
 INTBODUCTION. 
 
 The declaration of war having been sanctioned by the vote of the 
 allies, the Lacedsemonians, upon whom, as the federal chiefs, all 
 executive measures devolved, issued, immediately after the attempted 
 surprise of Platsea, circular orders for the concentration of the 
 various federal contingents at the Isthmus of Corinth, with a view 
 to the invasion of Attica. When they had assembled, Archidamuii 
 addressed the following speech to the commanders and principal 
 officers of the collective force, B.C. 43 1 . 
 
 Ch. 1 1 . Peloponnesians and allies ! Our fathers, it is 
 true, made many expeditions, both within and without the 
 bounds of Peloponnese ; and the elderly men among us 
 have seen something of war ; but we never took the field 
 with a larger armament than this ; and,^ on the present 
 occasion, we have not only a numerous and highly dis- 
 ciphned force, but we are marching against a very 
 powerful state. We are called upon, therefore, to prove 
 ourselves equal to our fathers, and to maintain the lustre 
 of our own renown. All Greece rises in arms in sym- 
 pathy with our movement ; her eyes are fixed upon us, and, 
 inspired by the general hatred of Athens, she heartily 
 wishes our success. 
 
 We must not, however, even if ^ some of us think that 
 
 ' Poppo takes aWa as equivalent ' Surely cl rif icni here is simply 
 
 to at, which, says Professor Key, it Kai tiji. The adversative particles 
 
 signifies addition rather than opposi- are separated, for euphony and em- 
 
 tion ; and the particle athi as equiva- phasis. Mr. Riddell (Apohffy of 
 
 lent to etiaiii. Plato, p. 168) fancifully takes Kai by 
 
ABOmVAMUS. 6 1 
 
 the superior strength of our invading force makes it 
 almost certain that the enemy will shrink from meeting 
 us in the field — we must not, upon that ground, neglect 
 one single precaution on our march. On the contrary, 
 every officer and every soldier in the several contingents 
 ought to be constantly anticipating some danger for his 
 own department. The fact is, the casualties of war 
 beggar all foresight ; and attacks are generally made 
 suddenly and impulsively.^ It often happens, too, that 
 an inferior force, cautious ^ through fear, defeats a force 
 whose superior numbers have inspired a contempt of 
 caution. Indeed, in an enemy's country, while we ought 
 always to march in a spirit of confidence, it is quite 
 as essential to prepare for action in a spirit of cautious 
 apprehension : thus we combine the highest courage in 
 attacking with the greatest safety when attacked. In the 
 present case, especially, every precaution is required : we 
 are marching against a state which, so far from being 
 incapable of defence, as ^ some will tell you, is so richly 
 provided with all the munitions of war, that we must con- 
 fidently expect she will meet us in the field. Perhaps, 
 indeed, the Athenians have already left their gates before 
 our arrival ; at any rate, they will sally out when they 
 see us on their soil, ravaging and laying waste their 
 property. For when men are exposed to any unusual 
 indignity, its actual infliction before their own eyes causes 
 great exasperation ; and, in such cases, the less men 
 think of the consequences, the more passionately they 
 
 itself, and construes the clause as force. 
 
 follows : ' if anyone considers that ' See Poppo (ed. min.) on the 
 
 we are a numerous force, as we are.' sense of (Spy// here. 
 
 The italics are supposed to give the " Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, in 
 
 force of icai. Ei KOI is a favourite reference to the participle SiStoc, ' Ut 
 
 adversative with Thucydides ; and Latino " timidus," simul notio " ca- 
 
 TrAijeof is constantly used by him in vens, sibi prospiciena," coutinetur.' 
 
 the relative sense of superiority of ' OBrw. See Poppo, ed. min. 
 
62 SPEEGHES FROM THU0YDIDE8. 
 
 nish into action. The Athenians, above all men, are 
 likely to act on the impulse of such feelings, as they 
 pride themselves on their imperial I'ule, and boast that it 
 is their province to inflict instead of suifer the havoc of 
 invasion. 
 
 Marching then, as you are, against so powerful a state, 
 and destined, according to the issue, to reflect the highest 
 credit ^ or the deepest shame on your ancestors and your- 
 selves, follow wherever your oflicers lead, prizing dis- 
 cipline and watchfulness above all things, with a quick 
 ear for the word of command ; for it is a point both of 
 honour and safety, to combine unity of discipline with 
 variety of force. 
 
 * ^6^av £7r' dfifoTfpa Kai evjcXcia^ Kai 8vffK\€iag, — Scholiast. 
 
FUBIGLJES. 63 
 
 r 
 
 FUNEEAL OEATION DELIVERED BY PEEICLES, 
 
 In honour of the Athenian citizens who had fallen on the field of battle in the first 
 summer of the war, b.c. 431. Bk. 11. chs. 35-47. 
 
 ' The law of Athens,' says Mr. Gtrote (vol. vi. p. 190), ' not only 
 provided this pp.blic faneral and commemorative discourse, but also 
 assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the 
 slain warriors until they attained mihtary age.' 
 
 Ch. 2S- Most of tlie previous speakers on these occa- 
 sions have commended the statesman who made an oration 
 a part of the funeral ceremony, considering its delivery a 
 fitting tribute to the brave men who have fallen in battle, 
 and are brought here for sepulture.-' In my opinion, 
 however, it would have been well that the honours due to 
 men who have proved their valour by their deeds in arms 
 should be paid ^ in deeds rather than in words ; such, for 
 instance, as the public celebration of this funeral, instead • ■ 
 of staking the reputation of many on one man, so as to 
 make it depend on his speaking well or^ ill. It is* a . 
 hard task to hit the mean, when there is/a special i dif- 
 ficulty in impressing the audience with a conviction of 
 
 ' As Poppo (ed. maj.) remarks, ek perhaps best preserved here by omit- 
 
 Tteii' iroKiiibiv 9airToiihoi(; is a pregnant ting the connecting particle yap, 
 
 construction. which seems to point to something 
 
 * Kai Sr/XovaSai. (see note ', p. 41). understood, a linli between the two 
 Kai' is used to compare the two ideas sentences, e. g. ' And the chances are 
 expressed by ipyij, yEvoiikvuv, k.t.\,, against the speaker.' See note ", 
 and ipyifi St/XnunGai. p. 43, 
 
 ' Authority for this rendering will ' Poppo (ed. min.) says mi may 
 
 (be found in Gbller's note. Both he refer either to sv (f or to ii6\iq. I 
 
 and Poppo (ed. min.) take n and kuI have taken it with the adverb. See 
 
 in_a_diferent_ sense. ~~"' note*, p. 75. 
 
 * The connection of the sense is \j ■ t >•»' Q ft 
 
64 8PEEGHE8 FROM THUOYBIDHS. 
 
 the truth of what is told them. An audience favorably- 
 disposed and familiar with the subject, naturally thinks 
 the picture feebly drawn, compared with its own wishes 
 and convictions ; while persons unacquainted with the 
 facts even suspect exaggeration, their jealousy being 
 aroused, when they hear anything that transcends their 
 own capacity. The fact is, eulogies ^ of other men are 
 tolerable only when ^ the individuals addressed believe 
 themselves able to achieve some of the feats attributed to 
 others ; the moment they are surpassed, they begin to be 
 jealous, and then they disbelieve. However, as this 
 branch of the solemnity has been deliberately approved 
 by our forefathers, I must endeavour, in conforming, hke * 
 my predecessors, to the ordinance, to meet the wishes 
 and sentiments of each of you as nearly as I can. 
 
 36. Our ancestors claim my earliest praise ; for it is 
 only just, and it is quite in harmony with the present 
 occasion, that a tribute of honourable remembrance should 
 be offered them, whose virtues maintained and handed 
 
 • Col. Mure (vol. v. p. 170) thus are placed by their very excellence 
 
 comments on this sentiment : ' Even beyond the reach of envy, few things 
 
 vrere this maxim true, it is one with are more likely to offend a popular 
 
 which an orator of so fine a tact as assembly than the bestowal of undue 
 
 Pericles would surely never have praise on ordinary merit.' Sallust 
 
 insulted the ears of his fellow-citi- does not quite agree with the learned 
 
 zens. When reduced to plain Ian- colonel : he thinks the sentiment 
 
 guage, it amounts to telling them worth reproducing in his Bell. Cat. 
 
 that, so narrow were their minds cap. 3. 
 
 and envious their tempers, as to dis- ' 'Eg '6mv av xai, lit. 'just so far 
 
 qualify them for appreciating virtue as.' Wolf (on Leptin. p. 230) and 
 
 of the highest order. But the doc- Klotz(Deyor.vol.ii.pp.636-37)show 
 
 trine is as untrue as it is invidious, that Kai serves in relative clauses to / 
 
 There may, no doubt, be minds so emphasise the notion and to connect ^ 
 
 morbidly constituted as to be suscep- the ideas more closely. Klotz quotes 
 
 tible of the imputed influence. But Thucyd. iv. i : y ;TS\Xo)\jrai_ imri- (1) 
 
 of the mass of mankind it may con- Qivto, ' and for this very reason they 
 
 fidently be said that the reverse holds were the more determined to attack 
 
 good ; that while the public admira- them.' 
 
 tion for truly great characters is ^ Kai t/«. See note ', p. 7. 
 enhanced by the reflection that they 
 
PEBIGLES. 65 
 
 down to our own days, through a long line of successor?, 
 the purity of their race and the integrity of their freedom. 
 But, worthy of eulogy as they are, our fathers are still 
 more so. Not content with maintaining the territory 
 they inherited, they acquired and bequeathed to us of 
 this generation our existing dominion, the fruit of many 
 struggles. That dominion, however, has been largely "^ 
 aggrandised by our own efforts : by the efforts of the 
 men now before you, still, for the most part, in the prime 
 of life : and our country has been richly endowed with 
 aU the appliances of perfect independence whether for 
 war or peace. The military achievements of these heroes, 
 whereby the several accessions of territory were won, and 
 the threatened invasions, foreign or Greek, which our 
 fathers or ourselves have bravely repulsed from our 
 shores, I wiU not now detail, as I have no desire to be 
 prolix before an audience so famihar with our history. 
 I must, however, dwell for a moment on the training 
 which gained us^ empire, on the form of government,^ the 
 habits and the principles which raised that empire to 
 greatness, before I proceed with my panegyric, believing 
 the topic at once congenial to the occasion, and suited 
 
 • Poppo (ed. min.) construes rd great writer of antiquity, was op- 
 Ik irXiiui ahrfii airnl — litiviliirafisv, posed to pure democratic govem- 
 'magis vero nos earn eveximus.' He ment, yet any charge of partisanship 
 shows that to. ttXiIio in this text, as that mi^t be founded on his expres- 
 in bk. i. 1 3, 5, answers to the Latin sions of favour to the aristocratioal 
 'magis.' See his note (ed. min.) on principle'(alludingtothewell-kuown 
 the apparent contradiction implied passage, bk. viii. 97), 'is effectually 
 by TO. Tr\cio) and om/i' fx"/"" ^PXV''- neutralised by his unqualified admi- 
 
 * Poppo (ed. min.) acknowledges ration for the character and policy 
 ^\eo/[j£v to be the best reading, though of Pericles, the most distinguished 
 he retains ri^Hov in his text. promoter of democratic privileges, 
 
 ' Ool. Mure (Literature of Ancient and by the elaborate panegyric on 
 
 Greece, vol. v. p. 62) remarks that, the Athenian republic which he 
 
 though Thucydides, ' like every other places in the mouth of that orator.' 
 
66 8PEECEES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 to the whole of my audience, whether Athenians or 
 strangers. 
 
 37. The constitution we enjoy is not copied^ from a 
 ibreign code : we are rather a pattern to, than imita- 
 tors of, other states. It goes by the name of a democracy, 
 because it is administered for the benefit of the many, 
 not of the few. It is so constituted, that, if we look to 
 the laws,^ we shall find all Athenians on a footing of 
 perfect equality as to the decision of their private suits ; 
 if we look to the popular estimate of pohtical capacity, 
 distinction in the public service will -be found to depend 
 on merit, weighed by a man's eminence in his own calling, • 
 not ou caste.* Nor again is poverty any exclusion, 
 when a man, however humble his rank, is able to serve 
 his country. A spirit of freedom regulates alike our 
 public and our private life : we tolerate, without a par- 
 ticle of jealousy, varieties in each other's daily pursuits : 
 we are not angry with our neighbour for following the 
 bent of his humour ; nor do our faces wear censorious* 
 looks, harmless, perhaps, but odious. In private society, 
 our poUteness ensures harmony : in public hfe, fear is 
 our principal check on illegal acts : we obey the magis- 
 
 ' 'Pericles tacitly contrasts the position implied, to a great extent, 
 
 Athenian with the Spartan polity, political capacity: and the context 
 
 which had boiTOwed so much from shows that this is what is meant. 
 
 Crete, and perhaps other Dorian ' Sheppard rightly refers d-n-d jii- 
 
 Bources.' — Sheppard and Evans, p. povQ to 'distinctions of hirth, such 
 
 186. as that assigned to the old Dorian or 
 
 * In this passage, the opposition Heracleid blood at Sparta, to which 
 
 lies between vS/iovs and d^iiaaLv, be- belonged the 'Oiioioi or peers.' — Notes 
 
 tween the legal standard, according on Tkueydides, p. 187. 
 
 to which all Athenians were equal ♦ GbUer, followed by Arnold, thus 
 
 before the law, and the social interprets \vTcripaQ ax9riS6vaQ : ' Puto 
 
 standard, which was regulated by intelligendas esse has voces de severSl 
 
 personal excellence, readily admitting Spartanorum inter se censura, quam 
 
 inequalities of rank, when created by preecipue seniores in juniores exerce- 
 
 inequalities of character and capacity, bant, quin etiam inter se seniores.' 
 To an Athenian, of course, social 
 
PERICLES. 67 
 
 trates who are from time to time in autliority, and the 
 laws, especially those enacted to protect the oppressed, 
 and that umvritten code, whose sanction is' a common 
 sense of shame. 
 
 38. Abundant recreation, too, to recruit our spirits, 
 when jaded by the cares of business, is supplied by the 
 very ^ festivals which the Dorians ridicule, and the cus- 
 tomary solemnities of sacrifice throughout^ the year, as 
 well as by the splendour of our private establishments, 
 our daily enjoyment of which scares melancholy away. 
 Owing to the magnitude of our capital, the luxuries of 
 every clime pour themselves into our hands, and it is our 
 good fortune to enjoy the products of other realms as 
 familiarly as the fruits of our own soil. 
 
 39. Another remarkable contrast between ourselves 
 and our rivals lies in the difference of our methods of 
 training for war. The following are the salient points. 
 We throw open our gates to all the world ; no alien acts ^ 
 exclude any of our foes from learning or seeing anything, 
 the revelation * of which may be of any service to them : 
 for we do not trust so much to preconcerted ® stratagems 
 as to that courage in action which springs from our own 
 
 * This allusion is covertly implied this would be ov Kpvipdiy. In ;ij) 
 by yi, which is often the equivalent KfjinijOir, /ur) marks conditionality : as 
 of the ironical scilicet. Reiske, says Poppo (ed. min.) shows, when he 
 Poppo (ed. maj.), is good enough to resolves the two words into the 
 dispense with this particle, so clearly equivalent, ti jit) KpvipOitti. On the 
 relevant'to the sense. feature of the Lacedaemonian policy 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) rejects the here alluded to, see Miiller's Dorians, 
 
 alternative rendering of Sttrriaioir, as vol. ii. p. 240. 
 
 meaning ' anniversary,' on the plea * Though I have not followed 
 
 that such festivals were by no means Mr. Bigg in rendering Trapamtvaii; 
 
 peculiar to Athens. «"' oTrnraif by 'juggling precautions,' 
 
 ' SeeMiiller'sZJorwBS, voLii. p.4, I have treated it as a Hendiadys. 
 
 note ; Herm.'s Pol. Aittiq. of Greece, ' Fraudes bellicae,' says Poppo (ed. 
 
 « jg ,_ min.), 'a Laoedaemoniis maximi ses- 
 
 * Bloomfleld translates 3 jjr) Kpv(ptiiv timabantur.' He refers to Thucy- 
 ' which, as it is never concealed.' But dides (bk. v. 9) in illustration of this. 
 
68 SPEECHES FROM TEUGYDIDES. 
 
 nature. Again, in education, our rivals set out in pursuit 
 of manly qualities by a laborious course of training 
 commenced in childhood : yet we, though living at our 
 ease, are perfectly ready to encounter dangers quite as 
 great as theirs.^ An assertion I can prove by facts ; 
 when the Lacedfemonians invade our realm, it is never 
 with mere detachments,'"^ but at the head of their col- 
 lective force. In our case, when we march against their 
 territory, it is with Athenian troops only, with whom, 
 though struggling on a foreign soil against men who are 
 fighting for their own hearths, we generally gain an easy 
 victory. In fact, not one of our enemies has ever yet 
 encountered our united force, because we have to provide 
 for our navy as well as our army, and are constantly 
 despatching our native troops on so many expeditions by 
 land. If ever they engage a fraction of our troops, and 
 get the better of a few of us, they pretend to have 
 defeated us all : while, if repulsed, they say they have 
 been defeated by all. And yet ^ — to revert to what I 
 was just now saying — if we, who Uve under a luxurious 
 system instead of a toilsome training,* if we, whose 
 courage is the gift of nature, rather than the fruit of dis- 
 cipline, are,^ as I hope, just as ready to brave danger : a 
 
 ' Cicero, perhaps, had this passage elusive. 
 
 in view when he wrote the following: ' The speaker here refers to what 
 
 I ' Neque tamen Lacedsemonii, auctores he had said above. The intermediate 
 
 I islius vitsB atque orationis, qui quo- sentences, commencing with the 
 
 tidianis epulis in rohore accumhunt, words, ' I can prove the truth of 
 
 neque vero Crates, quorum nemo this,' are parenthetical. Quanquam 
 
 igustavit unquam Cubans, melius is used hy Tacitus (Germ. ch. i8), as 
 
 -quam Romani homines, qui tempora kciItui is here, to usher in a reference 
 
 JToluptatis laborisque dispertiunt, res- to a foregoing statement, 
 
 publicassuasretinuerunt.' — ProMur. * G oiler, Arnold, and Sheppard 
 
 ch. 33. see in irorwv fiMry an allusion to the 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) reads snO' severity of the Spartan training. 
 
 tKcuiTovc, but suspects ica0' tavTovi; to ^ Poppo (ed. min.) characteri- es 
 
 be the true reading. Arnold's sup- ieiXoi/usi' as a modest indicative. It 
 
 port of Ka&' UaarovQ seems con- is clear it was the reading of Diony- 
 
PERICLES. 69 
 
 double advantage is gained ; we do not suffer from the 
 anticipation of impending perils : and, when we meet 
 them, we do not yield in courage to the slaves of a life- 
 long drill. 
 
 40. On other grounds, too, I claim admiration for • 
 our country. Our fondness for art is free from extrava- 
 gance, nor do our literary tastes make us effeminate ; ^ 
 wealth we use as an opportunity for action, not for osten- 
 tatious talk : poverty we think it no disgrace to avow, 
 though we do think it a disgrace ^ not to try to avoid it 
 by industry. Among our countrymen political and 
 social duties are combined in the same men : even our 
 labouring classes ^ have a competent knowledge of poli- 
 tics ; indeed, we are the only Greeks who regard a man 
 who takes no interest in public affairs, not as one who 
 only minds his own business,* but as a man unfit for any 
 business at all. If we, the people at large, cannot origi- 
 nate measures of policy, we can, at any rate,^ judge of 
 
 Bius, for he criticises it as an incorrect disparagement at Athens, 
 mood. Dr. Arnold follows Bekker ' Poppo (ed. min.) thinks the 
 
 in reading i0e/\o/j«v, thus cutting a flqrtg, the lowest class of the Athenian 
 
 knot he cannot untie. population, meant. On their poli- 
 
 ' Throughout this chapter there tical influence, see Becker's Charicles, 
 
 runs a thread of covert allusion to p. 155. To the genuine Spartans 
 
 the hahits and institutions of the commerce and mechanical toil, and 
 
 Spartans, who rejected literary and even agriculture,, were interdicted, 
 artistic culture as inconsistent with ^ Pericles, says Kriiger, here refers 
 
 the training of a nation of soldiers. to the stock charge of woXvirpayno- 
 
 For Sparta was a, camp, not a city. avvri brought against the Athenians. 
 See Manso's iS^arte, ii. p. 167. ' Ti, as Dr. Arnold shows, em- 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) points to hk.Tiii. phasises its clause. He compares 
 
 ch. 27, where a similar use of the Aristot. Eth. i. 8 : eV yi n fj rri; vXiiaxa 
 
 comparative alax^p for the English KaropBoiv, 'to be light at any rate on 
 
 positive occurs. He says the old one point, if not on most.' Mr. Grote 
 
 grammarians ranked this use of ai- forgot this, when he translated the 
 
 ox'O" for aiaxpov among the pecu- passage, ' we always hear and pro- 
 
 liarities of Thucydides. Buettn. (in nounce on public matters, when 
 
 his History of the Athenian Clubs, discussed by our leaders — or perhaps 
 
 ' v.Tatpiai, p. 46) does not agree with strike out for ourselves correct rea- 
 
 Thucydides that poverty implied no sonings about theml' 
 
70 8FWEGSES FROM THUOYBIDES. 
 
 tliem when proposad : we do not think discussion' a 
 prejudice to action, but we do think it a prejudice not to 
 be foretaught by discussion, before entering on the field 
 of action. This leads me to mention another character- 
 istic of ours — the combination of chivalrous daring with 
 the most careful calculation of our plans : whereas, with 
 the rest of the world, daring is but the offspring of igno- 
 rance, while reflection leads to hesitation. And surely 
 the palm of magnanimity may well be awarded to those, 
 whom the liveliest appreciation of the hardships of war 
 and the pleasures of peace fails to lure from the perilous 
 path of honour to the charms of ease. Again,_ in point 
 of beneficence and liberality, we act on principles differ- 
 ent from those of the world at large ; we gain our friends 
 not by receiving but by conferring benefits. Now bene- 
 factors are more constant in their friendship than those 
 whom they oblige : they hke to keep the sense of 
 obligation alive by acting kindly to the recipients of 
 their favours ; the friendship of the debtor, on the other 
 hand, is clouded by the remembrance that his acknow- 
 ledgment of the service will be the payment of a debt, 
 not the bestowal of a favour. We, too, are the only 
 people who, without a particle of distrust, aid the 
 distressed, from no sordid calculations of advantage, but 
 in all the confidence of genuine liberality.^ 
 
 41. In one word, I declare that our capital, a t lar ge, 
 is the school of Greece : while, if we look to the citizens, 
 individually, I beheve every man among us could prove 
 himself personally qualified, without aid from others, 
 to meet exigencies the most varied, with a versatility the 
 
 ' See Mill, on Represmtaiive Go- translation ' in the open and confiding 
 
 vernment, ch. 5. ad fin. spirit of conscious freedom,' mars 
 
 ' Sheppard and Evans authorise the antithesis between 'liberality' 
 
 this version of eXwBipiat;. The usual and ' advantage.' See Poppo, ed. min. 
 
PEBIGLE8. 71 
 
 most graceful. That this is no mere rhetorical vaunt of 
 the moment, but the real truth, our political power, the 
 offspring of our national character and the tastes I have 
 described, is itself a sufficient proof. Of aU existing 
 states, Athens alone echpses her prestige, when tested by 
 trial : she alone inspires no mortification in the invading 
 foe, when he thinks by whom he is repulsed : no self- 
 reproach in the subject for submitting to a degrading 
 rule. So far from our supremacy needing attestation, it 
 is written in the clearest characters : it will command the 
 admiration of future ages, as it already does of our own; 
 we want no Homer to sing our praises, nor any other 
 poet whose verse may charm for the moment, while 
 history will mar the conception he raises of our deeds. 
 No ! we shall be admired for having forced every sea and 
 every shore to yield access to our courage, and for the 
 imperishable monuments of the evils heaped on foes and 
 the blessings conferred on friends, which we have, by 
 common effort, reared on every soil. Such, then, is the 
 state for which these men, determined not to be robbed ^ 
 of their country, bravely died on the battle-field : and 
 every one of their survivors will be ready, I am sure, to 
 suffer in the same cause. 
 
 42. I have dwelt at some length on our national 
 advantages, partly from a vsish to convince you that 
 we have a higher stake in the contest than those 
 who cannot rival those advantages, partly to enforce, 
 by the palpable evidence of facts, the justice of the 
 panegyric it is my commission to deliver over our 
 fallen patriots. That commission, indeed, is nearly ful- 
 
 ' Mr. Grote, when he translated nor Arnold notice the difficulty,' 
 
 these words, ' vindicating her just perhaps forgot the ordinary passive 
 
 title to.unimpaired rights,' naively re- construction of verbs which take a 
 
 marking that ' neither Poppo, GoUer, double accusative in the active voice. 
 
72 SPEHGHES FBOM TETJCYDIBE8. 
 
 filled ; for if our country has been the theme of my 
 encomium, it is because she has been graced by the virtues 
 of these heroes and others who resembled them ; nor 
 are there many among the Greeks whose reputation can 
 be shown to be so evenly balanced by their actions. 
 But I may still appeal to the closing scene of their lives, 
 as either oifering the first indication, or giving the 
 crowning proof, of their manly ^ worth. In the former 
 case, men may fairly be allowed to veil their defects 
 beneath the courage they have shown in their country's 
 cause : they cancel evil by good : their public services 
 outweigh the mischief of their private life. Yet among 
 these men there was not one whom the prospect of a 
 prolonged enjoyment of wealth lured to play the coward : 
 not one whom the hope whispered by poverty, the hope 
 of some day exchanging penury for affluence, tempted to 
 quail before the hour of peril. Considering vengeance 
 on their foes more precious than such prospects, the}'' 
 ■willingly, in what they thought the noblest of causes, 
 risked ^ their lives to make sure of their revenge, holding 
 their chances of future enjoyment in reserve. They left 
 hope to provide for the uncertainty of success : but, 
 when engaged in action, face to face with danger, they 
 scorned to trust aught but themselves :^ and, on the field 
 of battle, they chose to fall in resisting the enemy rather 
 than save their lives by surrender. If, indeed, they fled,* 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) remarlis on the ' factis autem confidendum esse oen- 
 
 seeming contradiction between avipoe sentes de eo, quod jam in conspectu 
 
 and rwvSe. He suspects that di'opoe ipsis esset.' 
 
 is a corruption, but it may, he adds, * There seems to be a latent sense 
 
 be taken as equivalent to an epithet in Idvynv, which I have endeavoured 
 
 — an usage chiefly poetical. to bring out. Col. Mure, however, 
 
 ' Mit' aiirov' i.e. Tov Kivfii'oi'. in his version (vol. v. p. 172) has 
 
 ' Xifhiv aiiTols is generally taken taken the clause word for word, 
 
 with iriTroiOivni, as in my version. Surely the passage hardly justifies 
 
 Meyer, however, takes the pronouns hi?, assertion that it represents ' the 
 
 with opbifiivov. He construes thus : chief happiness of an Athenian citi- 
 
PUBIOLES. 73 
 
 it was only from disgrace to tlieir name : far from flying 
 from the battle field, they bore the brunt of the conflict 
 with their bodies, and, in a moment, at the very crisis 
 of victory, were carried away from a scene, not of terror, 
 but of glory. 
 
 43. Such, then, were the principles of these men : 
 principles worthy of their country. You, their surviving 
 countrymen, may perhaps hope that your patriotism^ 
 may be more compatible with personal safety, but you 
 must disdain to harbour a spirit a whit less daring 
 towards our enemies : looking not to the mere policy of 
 so doing, with the eye of a rhetorician ^ haranguing you, 1 
 as famihar with the subject as himself, on thTaHvantages 
 to be reaped by a brave repulse of the foe : but looking 
 to the practical side of the picture, the palpable proofs, 
 daily revealed, of our pohtical greatness — which may 
 well inspire you with a lover's enthusiasm for your coun- 
 try. And when you are impressed with its greatness, 
 remember that it was gained by brave men, by men who 
 were shrewd in counsel, and, in action, sensibly alive to 
 honour: and who, if ever foiled in an attack, never 
 thought of saving themselves, but paid their country the 
 full tribute of their valour,^ nobly lavishing their lives 
 
 zen, instead of being centred, as we tare.' The sense -would be improved 
 
 were j ust before told, in his love and by rendering Siavotav by ' career ' in 
 
 pride of country, as suddenly found the first clause : but this does vio- 
 
 to consist in the possession of riches.' lence to the Greek. 
 
 Bionys. Hal. (irtpi rwv Ho«k-iiri<\ju * This seems to be the latent 
 
 ihwiMiiruiy, § xvi.) complains of the meaning, so imperfectly expressed by 
 
 obscurity arising from the excessive the bald opposition of \oj<i> to Ipyqi 
 
 condensation of this passage. here. Thucydides apparently refers 
 
 ' It is difficult to render in one in the expression Xoyifi to the rhe- 
 
 word the double sense of Stiii'inni; torical commonplaces on courage, 
 
 which Thucydides applies to both patriotism, &c., which so frequently 
 
 clauses to strengthen his antithesis. assailed the Athenian ear. 
 
 Gottl., cited by Poppo (ed. min.), ^ The highly wrought antithetical 
 
 paraphrases the passage thus : ' Eeli- structure of the original renders the 
 
 quos oportet meUorem fortuuani op- meaning somewhat obscure, Lite- 
 
74 
 
 SFEEGHES FROM TUUGYBIBE8. 
 
 as a joint-offering to her. Yes, tliey jointly offered their 
 hves, and were repaid, individually,^ by that glory that 
 can never die, and by the most honourable of tombs, not 
 that wherein they he, but that wherein their fame is trea- 
 sured in everlasting honour, refreshed by every incident, 
 either of action or debate, that stirs its remembrance. 
 For the whole world is the tomb of illustrious men : it 
 is not the mere monumental inscription in their native 
 land that records their valour : no ! even in chmes that 
 knew them not, an unwritten memorial of them finds a 
 home, not in monuments,^ but in the hearts of the brave. 
 Emulate, then, their heroic deeds : and, beheving hap- 
 piness to depend on freedom, and freedom on valour, 
 shrink not, to your own prejudice,^ from the perils of 
 
 rally, the passage would construe: 
 ' whenever they chanced to fail in 
 an attempt upon any position, they 
 thought it no reason for robbing 
 their country of their valour:' ye 
 emphasises TriiAu', and contrasts it 
 with the idea of personal failure. 
 
 ' The metaphor, like that of De- 
 mosthenes {Mddias, § 27), is founded 
 on the friendly societies, ipov u, com- 
 mon at Athens. The members paid 
 their contributions to the general 
 fund : this entitled them to relief in 
 time of poverty : and they repaid the 
 society when they could. Thucy- 
 dides here regards the state as a 
 friendly society on a large scale, in 
 whose favour the fallen patriots had 
 contributed their lives as a joint- 
 offering [tpai/ot'], in common [kuu/^] 
 with those who had not fallen (see 
 Kriiger), though equally exposed to 
 danger. There was, however, a fea- 
 ture of the comparison which sug- 
 gested one of his favourite antiihe^es, 
 that of iS.if, as opposed to mu ij. He 
 remembered that each indi\idual 
 who fell iu battle, had his namy and 
 
 tribe recorded on the column erected 
 in honour of the fallen (see Dr, 
 Arnold's note). This enabled him 
 to describe the offering of their lives 
 as common to those who did not 
 fall, the reward as personal (iSif) to 
 those who did fall. 
 
 * Col. Mure, in his version of this 
 passage (Literature of &reece, vol. v. 
 p. 172), rather conceitedly justifies 
 his omission of rfji^ yvw/iiic; /laKKov rj 
 Tuv ipyui', on the ground that it is only 
 another instance of ' the perpetually 
 recurring contrast between words 
 and deeds.' But surely the contrast 
 lies between the memory of the 
 heart and the memorials of the tomb. 
 He translates it thus : 'For the toinb 
 of illustrious men is the whole earth ; 
 nor is the record of their acts to be 
 sought on the graven monuments of 
 their native soil alone, but in the 
 uninscribed memorials of their fame, 
 spread abroad into distant lands.' 
 
 ^ Kruger extracts this reflexive 
 significance from the middle vepio- 
 
 piindl. 
 
, PJSBIOLES. 75 
 
 war : for it is not men of broken fortunes,^ men hopeless 
 of prosperity, of whom we can so fairly expect a 
 generous prodigahty of hfe, as of those who still risk 
 the change from wealth to poverty, and who have most 
 at stake, in the event of a reverse. For disaster, amid the 
 softness of affluence,^ is infinitely more grievous, at any 
 rate, to a man of high spirit, than the sudden and pain- 
 less death that surprises the soldier in the bloom of his 
 strength and patriotic hope. 
 
 44. For these reasons, I have to offer consolation 
 rather than condolence to those among the parents of 
 the dead, who are now present. They know that their 
 lot from childhood has been chequered with calamity : 
 and that those may be called fortunate, whose fate, 
 whether in affliction, as theirs, or in death, as their rela- 
 tives', has been most brilliant : and whose term of life 
 has not been prolonged beyond the term of their happi- 
 ness.' Still, I feel how difficult it is to console you : for 
 the successes of others — successes in which you, too, 
 used to rejoice — will constantly* remind you of those 
 whom you have lost ; and grief is naturally felt not for 
 blessings of which a man is robbed before he can appre- 
 ciate them,^ but for those which he loses after long habi- 
 
 • The Sclioliast treats this aenti- ' GoUer compares Soph. (Ed. Col. 
 
 meiit as a paradox, citing tlie common 1227, and Herod, i. 30 seqq. More 
 
 opinion which pronounced mrc Triii/- literally, the clause might be ren- 
 
 Tni; icai duMiwi; pi4>"i""<^i>i>uv^. AScho- dered, 'whose life has heen mea- 
 
 liast (on Bur Phcea. 600) agrees with sured out on a scale commensurate 
 
 him in thinking tovq wXuvn'wvQ duXuis only with their happiness.' 
 
 TTpbg dcwnToi'f wt; ^tyaXtov dyaQaiv * Kal TTtiWccKii;. On the use of Kai 
 
 nTipnvfikrovt;. to emphasise adverhs of intensity, 
 
 ' To interpret iioKaatOnrat of see Riddell's ^/)o/o^yo^P?a<o, p. 169, 
 
 cowardice, as Arnold does, is to ^ Poppo (ed. min.) gives a very 
 
 cancel all logical connection between poor reason ior adopting Kruger's 
 
 this and the preceding clause. Hobbes reading, impuaoiitioi, for nupiuja' 
 
 and Bloomf. take the phrase as I have pi i/oc,. 
 done. 
 
76 SPEEGEES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 tuation to them. Those, however, among you, whose 
 age allows them offspring, must comfort themselves with 
 the hope of children yet to come.^ In private life they 
 will lull their parents into forgetfulness of those who are 
 no more, and our country will reap a twofold advantage : 
 she will not suffer from depopulation, and she will be 
 more secure : for it is impossible to expect fair and just 
 legislation from men who do not share tlieir neighbours' 
 risks by having children as well as property ^ at stake. 
 Those, on the other hand, who are past their prime, must 
 consider the longer period of their life during which they 
 have been fortunate, as clear gain : the remainder, they 
 must expect, will be short : and they ought to cheer 
 themselves with the fame of their heroic sons. For the 
 love of honours is the only sentiment that is always 
 young : ^ and, when men are past the age of active service, 
 it is not gain, as cynics say, but rather respect, which 
 pleases them. 
 
 45. As for you, the children or the brothers of the 
 fallen, you will, I am sure, find the task of emulation 
 difficult. Everyone is ready to praise those who are no 
 more : and, even with extraordinary merit, you will 
 find it hard to be pronounced, I will not say equal, but 
 only slightly inferior to them: for envy* will attack a 
 rival's fame, while life remains : and it is only when com- 
 petition is barred by death that affection will applaud 
 
 ' Knc liWwv literally means ' others The qualification ' only ' is of course 
 
 besides those they have had.' See rhetorical : but surely it is true that 
 
 note ', p. 7. generous sentiments, such as ' the 
 
 " HaiTTiildac. Kni tacitly compares love of honour,' opposed as it here is 
 
 TralSae v^ith another term, not ex- to avarice, ever retain their native 
 
 pressed but understood. See the purity and freshness, 
 
 passage quoted from Klotz, note ', * GoUer gives the meaning of this 
 
 p. 7. clause in the following tei-ms: 'in- 
 
 ' Col. Mure (vol. v. p. 585) ceu- vidia est inter vivos erga Eemulos.' 
 Bures this sentiment as ' unmeaning.' 
 
FEBICLES. 77 
 
 without alloy. Perhaps, in deference to those among 
 you who have been plunged into widowhood, I ought 
 to say a word on woman's excellence. A brief recom- 
 mendation will suffice : it is your glory not to overstep 
 ' the modesty of nature,' ^ and to be in the least possible 
 degree the subject of discussion, either for praise or 
 blame, among men. 
 
 46. Honours may be rendered both in words and 
 acts. As to the former, the tribute has been paid in the 
 address which I, like my predecessors,^ have delivered, 
 according to the law, to the best of my ability : as to the 
 latter, this public funeral has tendered to our patriots a 
 portion of the honour due to them, and the rest their 
 country will pay, by rearing their children at the public 
 expense from this day till they are of age : thus pre- 
 senting, in a spirit . of the soundest policy, to our fallen ^ 
 countrymen and their survivors, an honourable reward 
 for their courage on the battle-field. In a spirit of 
 policy,* I say : for the states that institute the highest 
 prizes for valour, have the bravest men for their citizens. 
 And now, having concluded ^ the mourning rites due to 
 your several relations, you may go home. 
 
 ' Dr. Arnold's note might have ' Hal Inn!. Kriiger thinks that kot 
 
 warned Mr. Bigg against construing must be explained in the same way 
 
 this passage — ' great is the glory for as in the phrase teal k/ii iird/iivov 
 
 you not to prove worse than the (ch. 35, ahove). See note ', p. 64. 
 nature of your sex ! ' Too much ' roXirSt, his, i. e. mortuis, roig 
 
 stress has heen laid upon the words Xunottivois, superstitibus. — Dobree. 
 rrjg virapxoinriQ ^iiTEMf, k-.r.X., which '' Compare Li vy (bk. iv. 3 5 ):' Nihil 
 
 no more imply an imputation of non aggressuros homines, si magnis 
 
 unworthiness than the phrase ti'iv conatibus magna praemia proponun- 
 
 TraTfpuiv fli] ^Etpoi'g tpai'flTat (ii. 62) tur.* 
 
 does in relation to the other sex. ^ Such, says Sheppard, is the force 
 
 Still, the following clause is an odd of dTro in composition: as in Herod, 
 
 sentiment on the lips of Pericles, (ii. 4.0), fTriav avoritl/uivTai, 'when 
 
 considering his relation to Aspasia, they have finished beating their 
 
 the character of which is happily breasts.' 
 sketched by Col. Mure, vol. iv. p. 44. 
 
 K 
 
78 SFEEGEES FROM TEU0YDIDE8. 
 
 SPEECH OF PEEICLES, 
 
 Delivered B.C. 430, before the Athenian popular Assembly. Bk. II. clis. 60-6?. 
 
 inteoduction: 
 
 In the interval which elapsed between the delivery of the Funeral 
 Oration and this speech, the Athenians had suffered much, from the 
 havoc wrought by the Peloponnesians in their second invasion of 
 Attica, as well as from the pestilence. They had also been irri- 
 tated by the failure of the expedition under Agnon to reduce 
 Potidaea, and by the rejection of the negotiations for peace which 
 they had opened at Sparta. The philo-Laconian party at Athens 
 had thus been encouraged to denounce the policy of Pericles, who, 
 in the following speech, vindicates his administration of public 
 affairs, and endeavours to reassure the failing resolution of his 
 audience. See Grote, vol. vi. p. 221. 
 
 Ch. 60. I am not at all surprised at the symptoms of 
 anger you have shown towards me, for I am aware of its 
 cause : and it was for that reason that I convened the 
 assembly, to recall some things to your remembrance, 
 and to remonstrate with you, in case, perhaps, there 
 should be no very good reason either for your displeasure 
 with me, or your capitulation to misfortune. Now, it is 
 my belief that the general^ prosperity of a country is 
 more beneficial to individuals than private affluence amid 
 political decline. A man whose personal interests are 
 flourishing, is involved, nevertheless, in the ruin of his 
 country : but a failing member of an opulent community 
 has every chance of re-establishing himself. Since, then, 
 a state can retrieve the disasters of her citizens, while 
 
 ' Compare Livy, xxvi. 36 : 'Res- facile salvas prfehet; publica pro- 
 publica inooliimis et privatas res dendo tua uequicquam serves.' 
 
PEBIGBES. 79 ^ 
 
 those citizens cannot retrieve her fall, how can it fail to 
 be the duty of all to support her, instead of abandoning 
 the care of the public welfare, in the panic of domestic 
 misfortune, as is now the case with you, whose censure of 
 my policy in advising war involves yourselves as consen- 
 tients to it ? You voted for war ; yet you are angry with 
 me, a man who hold myself second to none in judging 
 of the course to be pursued, and in clearly stating, my 
 views : ^ a lover, too, of my country, and proof against 
 corruption. Qualities all indispensable in a statesman : 
 for a man who knows what measures to adopt, but cannot 
 elucidate his policy, is as useless as if he had never con- 
 ceived it : while, if he combines these requisites with 
 disloyalty to his country, the counsel he offers is not 
 likely to be very congenial to her interests. Again, if he 
 is well-affected, but is accessible to bribes, all his other 
 qualifications would be cancelled ^ by this single failing. 
 If, therefore, you agreed to go to war, on the supposition 
 that I had a larger .share of these qualities than other 
 men, though only to a moderate extent, it cannot be fair 
 that I should now be saddled with an imputation — at 
 any rate, not with the imputation of wronging you. 
 
 6 1 . When ^ the option of peace or war is offered to a 
 people, satisfied with their lot in every point but the one 
 at issue, it is, I admit, pure folly to choose war : but, 
 supposing there is no alternative between either giving 
 way at once and submitting to a foreign power, or saving 
 
 ' Thuoydides (viii. 86) attributes for this one consideration.' 
 the sanae combination of wisdom ' 'The connection' [represented 
 
 and eloquence to Antiphon. Poppo by the particles xnt >dp] ' is, I am 
 
 (ed. miu.) cites severdl other passages innocent, for circumstances forced us 
 
 of classic authors, in which the union into war ' (Kriiger). In English, the 
 
 of these qualities is specially eulo- connection may sometimes be best 
 
 gised ; e.g. Xen. il/em. i. 2, 55 ; Horace, expressed by omitting the connecting 
 
 £pist. i. 4-, g;Tiysias, Jilpit. f. 10 s- particle. On this use of ydp, see 
 
 * Literally, -' would be bartered note *, p. 63. 
 
8o SPHECHES FROM TEUGYDIDUS. 
 
 freedom by battle and danger, censure then belongs 
 rather to those who shirk than those who face the 
 danger. Mi/ views are unchanged, and I do not swerve 
 from my opinion ; but yours are changed : for, as it has 
 chanced, you agreed with me when scathless and now 
 repent when damaged : and thus my counsel, owing to 
 your weakness of resolution, fails to approve itself, because 
 present annoyances come home to the feehngs of all of 
 you, while the advantages of my policy are as yet too 
 distant to be realised by any of you. A great reverse, 
 and that on a sudden, has fallen upon you, and your 
 spirits are too depressed to persevere in the course you 
 decreed. Sudden and unlooked-for calamity — every- 
 thing, in fact, that completely defeats expectation — has a 
 tendency to enslave the mind ; and it has been your fate 
 to encounter many such disasters, especially in the case 
 of the pestilence. Still, you are bound in honour, as 
 members of a powerful state, educated in tastes wortliy 
 of her, to make a gaUant stand against even the most 
 trying reverses, instead of suffering your glory to fade : 
 for society claims as good a title to censure the man 
 whom despondency ^ robs of half the credit he has won, 
 as to hate the man whose impudence arrogates a reputa- 
 tion not his own. Yes ! you must cease to mourn for 
 personal losses, and cling to the defence of the common 
 weal. 
 
 62. As to the hardships incidental to the war, I 
 might, to prevent your thinking them likely to prove 
 very severe, and, after all, to lead to no happy issue, 
 simply ^ content myself with the proofs I have on other 
 
 ' MaXaKut can hardly mean ' KaitKiiva. Kai emphasises ktlw, 
 
 ' cowardice ' here : Pericles only re- and calls attention to it, as in the 
 
 proaches his countrymen with yield- passages cited by Klotz, Devar.Yol. ii, 
 
 ing to dejection. pp. 634, 636. 
 
PmRIGLHS. 
 
 8i 
 
 occasions, ere now,' often enough given you, that you 
 have no right to look forward to them with anxious dis- 
 trust. I will, however, mention another point, a power- 
 ful instrument of empire, your possession of which 
 seems never to have crossed your thoughts ; in my 
 previous speeches I never referred to it, nor should I 
 have done so now, as it has rather a pretentious air,^ had 
 I not seen that you were stricken by an mireasonable 
 panic. The fact is,^ you think your empire limited to 
 your allies : but I assure you that, of the two elements * 
 of the world that are open fields for action, land and sea, 
 you are the absolute masters of the whole of one, to the 
 utmost verge of your present dominions, and as far 
 beyond as you choose to sail.^ With your naval arma- 
 ment, no earthly power can check you at sea : neither 
 
 ' Art is often coupled witli ttoX- 
 XoKif, in the sense of ySi], as Klntz 
 (vol. ii. p. 398) sliows; e.g. Xen. 
 {Cyrop. ii. 4, 16), where for jroXXaKit- 
 Blj Muretus wrongly proposes jroX- 
 
 ' A most ridiculous version of this 
 
 expression, KO/ZTrwt'etrrlpav t\ovTi rijv 
 Trpoairolitoii', has been given by Dean 
 Smith in his translation of Thucy- 
 dides. He construes thus : ' Nor 
 should I meddle even now with a 
 point, pompous beyond poetic viiions, 
 did I not see you beyond measure 
 fearful and dejected.' In a note he 
 assures us that his first attempts at 
 rendering this ' stupendous ' phrase 
 'were very faint and imperfect,' as 
 he was convinced by showing them 
 to Lord Chatham, his allusion to 
 whom may perhaps have originated 
 the silly statement in Mr. Rogers' 
 TaUe Talk, that Lord 0. was the 
 writer of the version of the Funeral 
 Speech in Dr. Smith's translation. 
 
 ' Tap. See Dr. Donaldson's Greek 
 Grammar, p. 605. 
 
 * Similarly Virgil calls the sea 
 'pars altera rerum' (^ASn. ix. 131). 
 In the phrase iio fupdv the article 
 rSiv is omitted, because ra Svo /uspj; is 
 used idiomatically in another sense, 
 as equivalent to the English ' two- 
 thirds ' (I'oppo, ed. min.). 
 
 * Miiller (^Literature of Greece, 
 p. 4.84.), speaking of this recom- 
 mendation to the Athenians to rest 
 their liopes on their maritime supre- 
 macy, says: 'This reasoning is ob- 
 viously correct in reference to the 
 policy of a state which, like Athens, 
 was desirous of founding its power- 
 on the sovereignty of the coasts of 
 the Mediterranean ; but states which, 
 likeMacedon and Rome, strengthened- 
 themselves by a conquest of inland; 
 jiations and great masses of the con- 
 tinent befoi-e they proceeded to con- 
 test the sovereignty of the coasts of 
 the Mediterranean, had y!i /cnt awiwra 
 for the basis of their power, and the 
 Xprit^ciTa Kai vavriKotf afterwards ac- 
 crued to them naturally.' 
 
82 SPEECEES FBOM TEUGYDIDES. 
 
 the king of Persia, nor, apart from liim, any nation that 
 exists. Your maritime strength, therefore, is far from 
 being simply on a level with the benefits accruing from 
 house and land, the loss of which you think a great 
 hardsliip, nor is it reasonable that you should mourn 
 for them: you should regard them as mere ornaments 
 and embellishments, the natural appanage of wealth, 
 holding them cheap in comparison with your naval su- 
 premacy. And you may rest assured that, if by vigorous 
 effort we can through all perils save our freedom, she will 
 easily retrieve our losses : but — once bow to foreign dicta- 
 tion, and even our oldest^ possessions will be prone 
 to wane. Prove, then, that you have not degenerated, 
 either in gaining or bequeathing empire, from your 
 fathers, who, instead of inheriting from their ■'ires the 
 dominion which, in its full integrity, they handed down to 
 us, acquired it amid the toils of war ; and remember that 
 it is more disgraceful to lose what one has than to fail in 
 acquisition. We ought at once to close with the enemy 
 in a spirit not merely of pride but of disdain : mere 
 .pride may be found in any coward, when it is simply the 
 offspring of prosperous ignorance : but a dignified disdain 
 belongs to those who rely not merely "^ on fortune but on 
 their intellectual pre-eminence over their foes : a quality 
 you may fairly claim. Enterprise,^ too, when fortune is 
 impartial, gains a surer warrant from the self-confidence 
 of intellect : which, placing little reliance on hope, that 
 crutch of Jielplessness, trusts chiefly to a judgment 
 
 ' Kriiger's ' reading, 7rpo«/cT tmiva, sources of pride, and gives prominence 
 
 affords the best sense. to this one. 
 
 * Koi yviofiy. On icui see note ', ^ Kriiger thus translates this pas- 
 
 p. 7. Kai tacitly refers to another sage : ' Atque aiidatiam in pari for- 
 
 ground of reliance, besides ynofiii, tuna firmiorem reddit prudentia, si 
 
 present to the speaker's mind, but subestelatus animus (i.e. ill", deqiiS 
 
 not expressed. So in nal avo ufi<iSiac, dictum est, hostium contemptio).' 
 above, Kai silently refers to other 
 
PERICLES. 83 
 
 based on the conditions of each case : a faculty which has 
 surer grounds for prescience. 
 
 62- You are called upon to maintain the imperial 
 dignity of your country, in which you all take pride, and 
 to accept the troubles on pain of resigning the glory of 
 dominion. Nor must you think yourselves contending 
 for the single stake of independence instead of vassalage : 
 you have more to apprehend — the loss of your empire, 
 and the dangers arising from the hatred you have pro- 
 voked by your system of government. That empire you 
 have no longer even the option of renouncing : and this 
 I say lest any one,^ in his present alarm, should think to I 
 sit at home and play the honest man by* abdicating our 
 supremacy : for you have long been holding your 
 dominion as an usurpation : a tenure wliich ni:iy shock 
 one's notions of justice, but which it is highly dangerous 
 to resign. Politicians such as I allude to, advocates of 
 peace at any price, whether ^ members of a state where 
 they can influence others, or living independently, as in 
 colonies, under their own auspices, would soon be the 
 ruin of their country. The truth is, men of peace are 
 not safe unless flanked * by men of action : their prin- 
 ciples do not suit imperial states, but only dependencies, 
 where they tend to make subjection safe. * 
 
 64. But I trust you will not be led away by the views 
 of these politicians, nor — especially after willingly second- 
 ing my vote for war— persist * in your anger with me, even 
 
 • Pericles here alludes to the min.), seems far preferable to Goller's 
 
 Philo-Laconian party, opposed to his irifjoui; irori welaavrte, quoted from a 
 
 policy : the representatives of those single MS. 
 
 who wished for peace at any price. * The term riTayfUvov jitra con- 
 
 ' Literally, ' by sucli renuncia- tains a military metaphor. Col. 
 
 tion:' for, as Kriiger shows, rdh, if Mui-e points out the curious use, iu 
 
 genuine, must be a cognate accusa- t6 drpuyiiov and to Spanritpiuv, of the 
 
 tive depending on dvSpayiint,i''f>aj. abstract for the concrete. 
 
 ^ ' BrEpous; rt TTfi'Tai/rff, the common ^ Such, perhaps, is the force of the 
 
 reading, received by Poppo (ed. present ix^irt. 
 
 a 2 
 
5^4 SPEECHES EBOM TBUGTDWES. 
 
 if the enemy's invasion has done all the mischief that was 
 to be expected on your refusal to abate your pretensions : 
 if, too, beyond what we looked for, we have had a crowning 
 disaster in the recent pestilence, literally the only in- 
 cident that has cheated all expectation. It has, I know, 
 essentially^ contributed to increase the disHke fitiU felt 
 for me, and which is not quite just, unless, by way of 
 compensation,^ you agree to give me the credit of any 
 unexpected success. We must bear calamities that come 
 from above with resignation,^ calamities that come from 
 the enemy with courage : and your conduct should form 
 no exception to that enduring fortitude of temper which 
 has ever been a characteristic trait of your countrymen. 
 Be assured that your country enjoys the highest credit 
 throughout the world for the impregnable front she 
 presents to disaster, and for her generous expenditure of 
 life and labour in war ; and that she is the mistress 
 of, 'Confessedly, the greatest empire Greece has yet seen, 
 the memory of which will remain* ao imperishable 
 legacy to our posterity, even should we now at last give 
 w^ay a httle — and, if we do, it is only in Nature's course, 
 wherein all things wane as^ well as flourish. Yes, we 
 shall be remembered as the Greeks who ruled by far the 
 greatest number of Greeks, who in the most important 
 wars held out against the collective force of Greece as 
 well as against her several states, and whose capital was 
 a grand and populous ® city, richly provided with every 
 resource. Distinctions like these, if disparaged by the 
 
 ' Compare the sense of iiipti tlvI, * On this idiomatic use of xai, see 
 
 ' a considerable portion,' in Thucyd. note ', p. 7. 
 
 i. I, s. * Poppo (ed. min.) says, in ex- 
 
 * Kai. planation of luyiartiv- 'Non sohim 
 " Literally, ' as unavoidable.' ad ambitum et domorum multitudi- 
 
 * See Matthise'a Greek Orammar, nem, sed etiam ad incolarum fre- 
 § 498. quentiam respicitur.' 
 
FEBIGLES. 85 
 
 man of peace, will yet^ excite the zealous^ emulation 
 of the man of action, and the envy of communities who 
 have no pretensions to them. Unpopularity and dislike 
 are the proverbial ^ fate, for the time, of all who presume 
 to rule over kindred states; still there is no impohcy 
 in seizing, for the most exalted* objects, that invidious 
 supremacy : for unpopularity is not longhved, while the 
 splendour of actual power, and its legacy of glory are 
 treasured in unfading remembrance. It is for you, by 
 coming to a decision honourable in its future, creditable 
 in its present, issues, to command both these advantages, 
 by prompt and zealous exertion. Make no further over- 
 tures to the Lacedasmonians, and do not let them see 
 that you are weighed down by present afflictions: for, 
 whether in states or among private citizens, power is the 
 heritage of those who confront disaster with the least 
 depression of spiiit, and the most vigorous resistance in 
 action. 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) ingeniously * Dr. Arnold compares the well- 
 remarks that the adversative force known lines of Euripides (Phcen, 
 of /cniroi belongs to the second clause, 524), said to have been ever on the 
 6 Si Sf^v Ti povKofiivoi:, K.',\. lips of the first Csesar : 
 
 ' Airdg. Others explain icai aiirot, 
 
 K,T,\., to mean — ' will emulate them Ein-tp ydp aSiKtXv xpri, rvpawiSbs 
 
 as much as I do.' nipi 
 
 ^ Ail, {iee Maiyig's Greek Syntax, KdWiaTov aSiKtiv, rdWa S" ivnPiXv 
 
 § «34' xpiiiv. 
 
86 SPEECHES FBOM TEUCYVIDES. 
 
 SPEECH ADDRESSED BY THE PELOPONNESIAN 
 ■ COMMANDERS 
 
 To the soldiers and sailors on board the Peloponnesian fleet in the gulf of Corinth, 
 B.C. 429. Bk. II. ch. 87. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 A Peloponnesian fleet, sailing from Corinth to assist the military 
 operations going on in Acarnania, and consisting of forty-seven 
 triremes, with a body of troops on board, and accompanied by store 
 vessels, had been completely defeated by a small Athenian squadron 
 of twenty ships under the command of Phormio, B.C. 429. 
 
 The LacedEemonians, upon this, reinforced their fleet till it 
 amounted to seventy- seven sail ; Phormio, meanwhile, urged the 
 Athenians to increase his force : they despatched twenty ships, 
 which, instead of steering direct for the Corinthian gulf, made an 
 ill-fated diversion against a coast town of Crete, where they were 
 detained by adverse winds, and reached the scene of action too late 
 for the battle. The Lacedaemonian Admiral, Cnemus, manoeuvred 
 to bring on the engagement near the shore (upon which a body of 
 troops had been drawn up to support his operations), with the view 
 of neutralising the advantage which the Athenians derived from 
 their superior nautical skill. Phormio, on the other hand, endea- 
 voured to lure the enemy into tlie open water : and to delay the 
 battle till the arrival of liis reinforcements. The Peloponnesians, 
 however, succeeded in forcing the Athenian fleet to action : when 
 the LacedaBmonian Admiials, conscious that great discouragement 
 prevailed among their men, who were as much afraid of their op- 
 ponents at sea as the Fvench sailors were of the English in the wars 
 of the First Napoleon, hastened to reassure them in the following 
 address, in which they remind their troops and seamen of the great 
 advantage wilh which they are entering upon the action, pointing 
 out that the loss of the late battle had been due solely to mis- 
 management and imprudence not likely to be repeated in the 
 impending conflict. 
 
TEE PEL0P0NNE8IAN COMMANDERS. 87 
 
 Ch. 87. It is possible, Peloponnesians, that the recent 
 naval engagement may lead you to fear the impending 
 action : but it affords no just grounds for real alarm. 
 Our preparations, as you know, were insufficient : and 
 we were sailing to convoy a land force rather than to 
 fight an action at sea. Besides, not a few of the acci- 
 dents of fortune conspired to oppose us : perhaps, too, 
 inexperience contributed a little to mar our first naval 
 battle. It was therefore no cowardice of ours that 
 robbed ^ us of victory : nor is it reasonable that our 
 courage, which has not been crushed by a decisive defeat, 
 but still breathes a tone of defiance,^ should be blunted 
 by the result of a mere^ accident. We should reflect 
 that, though we are all liable to overthrow from casual- , 
 ties, those only whose spir it is e ver the sajne, have a right', 
 to the title of brave men : nor can we believe * that they, ' 
 while their courage remains, will ever make inexperience ' 
 a plausible ^xcuse for misconduct on any occasion. You, 
 however, are not so inferior to the enemy even in ex- 
 perience as you are superior to him in daring. Athenian 
 science, your chief cause of alarm, will, no doubt, if 
 seconded by courage, command the presence of mind 
 needful to accomplish in the midst of danger the ma- 
 noeuvres it has learnt : but, without gallantry,* no degree 
 
 * I have followed GoUer and Arnold and Goller, repeat vofUaai after koI 
 in retaining the old reading, irpoat- jil). 
 
 ykviTo. ' The speaker cunningly assumes 
 
 ' 'AvTiXoyia may be taken in a the absence of courage in the Athe- 
 
 forensie sense : it will then mean nians. Mr. Sheppard remarks : ' This 
 
 ' which has still some plea to offer,' is a sort of fallacy not uncommon in 
 
 j. e. some explanation of the late practice, though not noticed in rhe- 
 
 defeat. So Poppo (ed. min.) takes it. torical treatises, where the speaker 
 
 ' T^f -yt S,vii^upai^ is the reading of covertly implies the incompatibility 
 
 BekkerandPoppo(ed. min.). Goller of two qualities, and aigues from 
 
 omits the significant yt, without the presence of the one the absence 
 
 giving any reason. of the other.' — Notes on Thucydicks, 
 
 * We must, with Popjo (ed. min.) p. 153. 
 
«8 SPEECBES FBOM TEUGYBIDES. 
 
 of skill avails when face to face with peril : for terror 
 scares away presence of mind, and science apart from 
 prowess is useless. Set then your superior daring 
 against their superior skill, and your want of preparation 
 in the recent conflict against the alarm inspired by your 
 defeat. You have the advantage in the greater number 
 of your sliips, and in fighting close to the shore,^ and that 
 a friendly one, with heavy infantry at hand : Victory, 
 too, generally declares for the more numerous and better 
 equipped force. So that there is literally not a single 
 ground upon which we can build the probability of our 
 failure : in fact, the very errors of our recent seafight will 
 add ^ to our stock of experience, and teach us a valuable 
 lesson. Let all of you, then, each in his own sphere, 
 whether steersmen or sailors, obey your admiral, and do 
 not, without ^ orders, leave the posts severally assigned 
 to you. We shall certainly not prepare the attack in 
 a style inferior to that of your late commanders, and we 
 will allow no one any excuse for showing the white 
 feather. If, however, anj' one should choose to do so, 
 he shall be visited with the punishment* he deserves, 
 while the brave shall be honoured with the rewards that 
 are the meed of valour. 
 
 ' This was a great object with the authorise this sense of wpnaytvoiuva. 
 Peloponnesians, owing to their in- ' Such, I suppose, is the force of 
 
 feriority in nautical tactics. In the jt/kI in ^pi^Xd-mwra:. 
 ensuing conflict, we find they ma- ^ Mr. Grote (vol. vi. p. 275) re- 
 
 nceuvred so as to pin Phormio's fleet marlfs that ' this topic was rarely 
 
 as close to the opposite shore as touched upon by ancient generals in 
 
 possible, giving the Athenians no their harangues on the eve of battle, 
 
 room for naval evolutions. and conspicuously demonstrates the 
 
 ' I cannot help thinking that reluctance of many of the Pelopon- 
 
 Trpoayivnfifva would yield a better nesian seamen, who had been brought 
 
 sense, if taken as follows : ' our very to the fight again chiefly by the 
 
 errors, etc., will prove our best ascendancy and strenuous commands 
 
 friends by the lesson they will teach of Sparta.' 
 us.' But none of the commentators 
 
PHOBMIO. 89 
 
 SPEECH OF PHOKMIO, 
 
 The Athenian A dmiral, to his men, delivered on the same occasion as the preceding 
 address. Bk. II. ch. 89. 
 
 Ch. 89. Soldiers ! I called you together because I saw 
 that you were terrified by the superior numbers of the 
 enemy, and I could not brook that you should be scared by 
 imaginary dangers. I say imaginary, because,^ in the first 
 place, if the Peloponnesians, instead of meeting us on equal 
 terms, have provided themselves with a fleet largely out- 
 numbering ours, it is simply owing to the panic of their 
 recent defeat, and to their consciousness of inferior skiU. 
 In the next place, their chief ground of reliance in 
 attacking us — the assumption that courage is their special 
 prerogative — is built solely on the career of success 
 which has rewarded their long experience in land service, 
 which ^ they think will yield them the same fruits in 
 naval warfare as on shore.' Even admitting, however, 
 that they have a better title to expect success on land, 
 we have a better right to expect success at sea : for in 
 natural courage they have certainly no advantage over 
 us : and, whether in their case or ours, daring rises or 
 
 ' Trap refers to a clause conceived min.) leaves the question open. The 
 
 Jn the speaker's mind, intended to next clause, taken literally, would 
 
 be mentally supplied by the quick construe thus : ' But this,' i. e. success, 
 
 apprehension of his audience. See ' will, we have a right to expect, be 
 
 Hartung, Fartic. vol. i. p. 465. more likely to redound to us now,' 
 
 ' I have followed Gail, Sheppard i.e. on our own element, the sea: 'ad- 
 
 and Evans, and others, in making »} raitting that it might be as likely to 
 
 Iv T(f vtKv efiTTfipia the subject of belong to them on land.' MaWov 
 
 TToiliniiv. Arnold and Goller make belongs to both clauses. 
 
 1^ fiaXirtra iriar, Trpotrkpxovraij the ^ Kat, See note ', p. 7. 
 subject of this infinitive, Poppo (ed. 
 
9° SPBEGHES FROM THUGTDIDES. 
 
 falls in proportion to experience. Besides/ they are 
 fighting under compulsion : for most of the allies of 
 whose confederacy LacedEemon is the chief, are dragged 
 into danger by her against their inclination, to maintain '^ 
 her mihtary glory : otherwise they would never have 
 ventured,^ after a crushing defeat, to fight another battle 
 at sea. Fear not, therefore,* any extraordinary valour 
 on their part. You, at this moment, are causing them 
 an infinitely greater and a better-founded alarm, both on 
 the score of your recent victory, and because they do not 
 beheve we should fight them unless determined to achieve 
 something worthy of the signal triumph we lately gained. 
 For, while an enemy,^ when superior in numbers, as the 
 Peloponnesians now are, generally relies more upon his 
 material than his moral resources on going into action ; 
 those, on the other hand, whose forces are numerically 
 very inferior, and who are not fighting under compulsion, 
 must have a very sure pledge in their own courage 
 
 ^ Te ushers in the third reason : matched,' cannot apply to the Pelo- 
 
 the iirst is introduced by iwel, above, ponnesians, who had avast superiority 
 
 " Ait, says Poppo (ed. min.), is of force. It may possibly be said 
 
 equivalent to 'iveica, as in Thucyd. iv. that the sense adopted in this trans- 
 
 102. lation would have required avrliraXnt 
 
 ^ See note *, p. 88. ^ej' yan, 7r.U'"it'j or TrXtiovQ ovTfQ, 
 
 * Ari refers to the three reasons Thucydides, however, is not to be 
 
 previously adduced. See Klotz, Z>e- judged by the canons applicable to 
 
 var. vol. ii. pp. 396-97. the finished Greek of Demosthenes 
 
 ^ Arnold's strange misconstruction or Plato. He began the sentence 
 
 of this passage entirely vitiates the with the word a rriwaKoi, and then 
 
 opposition, which lies between ttXiI- remembered that it required a limit- 
 
 ovQ and U TToWtp inrohinTfpujr, not ing epithet, whereupon he appended 
 
 between avriiraXoi and ik. tt. i'ijt. ol jrAfinwi," 'Adversaries — I mean, 
 
 Poppo (ed. min.) has disproved Kru- when thej' have a numerical supe- 
 
 ger's assertion that diTiTrnXoi never rioiity of force ' (ni ttXcIovc). Mr. 
 
 means ' adversaries ' in Thucydides ; Bigg's translation is a decided im- 
 
 the Scholiast and Hesychius are both provement on Arnold's : but it forces 
 
 in favour of that sense ; and it is us to take uinrtp ovtoi after Trinuvoi, 
 
 astonishing that Dr. Arnold should instead of, in the natural order of the 
 
 not have seen that aiTiVoXoi, in the words, after ol -rXfi'oue. 
 sense he ascribes to it, that of ' fairly 
 
PSOBMIU. 91 
 
 when they dare to encounter the foe. The Peloponne- 
 sians are sensible of this, and are more alarmed by our 
 unexpected audacity than they would have been by an 
 armament proportioned to their own. Eemember, too, 
 that many armies have ere now fallen before inferior 
 forces from ignorance of war, sometimes even from want 
 of courage : defects in which we^ have at present no 
 share. 
 
 If I can help it, I shall not bring on the action inside 
 the Grulf, nor shall I even enter it : being aware that 
 want of sea-room is a disadvantage to a small squadron 
 of fast sailers, manned by able seamen, when they have 
 to contend against a large fleet manned by inexperienced 
 hands. Unless the enemy can be seen some way off, a 
 ship cannot bear down with sufficient impulse for a charge, 
 nor can she so easily retire at the crisis of distress : 
 besides, there is no room to break the enemy's line and 
 wheel back ^ — and these are just the capabilities of the 
 faster sailers. Under such conditions, a naval engage- 
 ment would of necessity degenerate into a land-fight : 
 and then victory would fall to the larger squadron. 
 
 On these points, you may be sure, I wiU take every 
 precaution in my power ; it is for you to await the 
 conflict in perfect order near ^ your ships : listening with 
 quick ears for the word of command, especially as the 
 enemy's post of observation is so near. During the 
 engagement, remember that discipline and silence, points 
 conducive to success in all the operations of war, but 
 
 ' 'HpTc is emphatic; it insinuates break off the oars of the opposing 
 
 against the Peloponnesians the charge vessels. See Thucyd. i. 49 : vii. 36, 
 
 it disclaims for the Athenians. 70. 
 
 ^ The terms SuK-n-Kms and ai'a- ' ' While the ships lay at anchor, 
 
 trrpo.r; describe the manoeuvre com- the greater part of the crews would 
 
 mon to Athenian naval tactics : that be on shore to cook their food, etc' 
 
 of sailing thi-ough the enemy's line, — Bigg, p. 293. 
 and then wheeling back, so as to 
 
91 SPHEGEES FBOM TEUGYBIDES. 
 
 especially in actions at sea— are of the utmost moment : 
 and repel the enemy with a spirit worthy of your former 
 triumphs. The struggle is a critical one for you, as its 
 issue must either ruin all the hopes the Peloponnesians 
 found on their fleet, or bring closer home to the Athe- 
 nians the anxiety they feel for the command of the sea. 
 Again, I remind you, that you have already vanquished 
 most of these men : and I need not tell you that troops 
 who have once been defeated are not hkely ^ to face the 
 same dangers with equal courage. 
 
 ' Col. Mure (IMerature of Greece, limits of familiar usage.' Surely lie 
 
 •vol. V. p. 588) quotes this passage as might have learnt from Poppo's note 
 
 ' a quaint kind of prosopopoeia,' add- that iBk\nvaiv need not be construed 
 
 ing that, ' had Thucydides described ' are wiling,' as he has rendered it; 
 
 " tiie minds of men who have lately that commentator remarks, ' WkXovaw 
 
 suffered defeat as less bold in again valet solent, ut apud alios.' He might 
 
 facing the same danger," his Ian- have compared the parallel use of 
 
 guage would have been within the ' amo ' by Horace. 
 
THE ENVOYS OF MYTILENE. ^2 
 
 SPEECH OF THE ENVOYS OF MYTILENE, 
 
 Addressed to the Spartans, and other members of the Feloponnesian confederacy, at the 
 Olympic festival, in June, B.C. 428. Bk. III. cha. 9-15. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 This speech was delivered on the occasioii of the revolt of Mytilene, 
 one of the most powerful members of the Athenian league, in the 
 summer of the year B.C. 428. She took the opportunity of a period 
 of depression at Athens, to throw off her connection with that city 
 as the head of the confederacy. The Athenians, on receipt of the 
 news, despatched a squadron too small to blockade both the har- 
 bours of Mytilene, which was thus enabled to send an embassy to 
 Sparta to implore aid. The Spartans requested the envoys to 
 attend the Olympic festival, then on the point of celebration, where 
 they would have an opportunity of laying their case before the 
 various members of the Peloponnesian confederacy, whom they 
 addressed in the following speech. 
 
 Ch. 9. Lacedtemonians and allies, we are all familiar 
 with the political feeling prevalent in Greece. States 
 which receive seceders, who, in time of war, desert their 
 former alliance, are kindly disposed towards them in 
 proportion to the advantages they reap, but think less 
 favourably of them if they believe them to be traitors 
 to their former friends. Such an estimate is not unfair, 
 supposing the seceders and those from whom they secede 
 to entertain the same political views,^ to be kindly 
 affected to one another, and fairly matched in material 
 resources and power : supposing, also, that no reasonable 
 ground can be shown for the secession. Such, however, 
 was not the character of our relation to the Athenians. 
 
 ' At this period of the Pelopon- nions was a surer ground of alliance 
 nesian war, identity of political opi- between states than identity of race. 
 
94 SPEECHES FROM TEUGTDIDES. 
 
 And no one should think the worse of us, if, after being 
 treated with honour by them in time of peace, we revolt 
 from them in the hour of danger. 
 
 lo.- We have spoken thus, because it was needful for 
 us, especially as suitors for alliance, to base our argu- 
 ments, on the threshold of our address, on the justice of 
 our cause and the honesty of our intentions : convinced, 
 as we are, that there can be no stability either in private 
 friendships or in international leagues, unless the connec- 
 tion is formed in the belief of mutual honesty of purpose, 
 and is strengthened by a general congeniality of tastes. 
 For differences of action are grounded on differences of 
 opinion. 
 
 The alliance ^ between ourselves and the Athenians 
 was originally formed, when, after the Persian invasion, 
 you retired from the scene, and they stayed with us to 
 carry out the remaining operations of the war. That 
 aUiatice, we must remind you, was not made with a view 
 to the enslavement of Greece by the Athenians,^ but to 
 emancipate her from the Mede. Well : as long as they 
 led the confederacy on terms of equality, we heartily 
 followed them ; but when we perceived that they were 
 relaxing their hostility to the Mede, and urging ^ on the 
 enslavement of their allies, we were no longer free from 
 apprehension. The allies, disabled, by the want of 
 unanimity, from combining together for mutual defence, 
 were reduced to submission, with the exception of our- 
 selves and the Chians ; and we, professedly independent * 
 
 ' See Poppo, ed. min. ' Bekker's conjecture, t;r(iyo^fj/ntic, 
 
 " This construction of 'Aeijvi.mif approved by Poppo (ed. min.), gives 
 
 and "EWtjai suits the sense better a better sense tban irrnyo/iivovc. 
 
 than that adopted by Arnold and 'KirilyoiKn is used transitively by 
 
 Poppo : the latter of whom (ed. min.) Thucydides in the 2nd chapter of 
 
 writes as if unaware that these two this book. 
 
 datives may be dativi commodi after * ' Lesbos, like Chios, was the ally 
 
 KaTaSuv\uiai<; and i\tvOipw(ns. of Athens upon an equal footing, still 
 
THE ENVOYS OF ITYTILENE. 95 
 
 and nominally free, marched under the banner of 
 Athens. Judging, however, by the events going on 
 before our eyes, we no longer 'elt confidence in the 
 Athenians as leaders : for it was not reasonable to expect 
 that, after they had subjugated those whom they had en- 
 rolled as allies with ourselves, they would refrain from 
 applying the same process to their remaining confede- 
 rates, if ever they chanced to have the power to do so. 
 
 II. If, indeed, we were still all of us independent, 
 we should have felt more confidence that they meditated 
 no change towards us ; but now that they hold the 
 majority in subjection, and are on terms of equality with 
 us, it is natural they should feel impatient : especially,'- 
 when they contrast our solitary attitude of equality with 
 the achieved reduction of most of their aUies : and, still 
 more, when they find their own dominion as steadily 
 increasing as our isolation. The truth is, the balance '^ 
 of power is the only thing you can rely upon to maintain 
 a confederacy : for the party who meditates a violation of 
 the covenant, is deterred by his inability to command a 
 vantage ground of attack. 
 
 To resume : we were allowed to remain independent, 
 simply because the Athenian schemes of aggrandisement 
 seemed more likely to be realised by plausible diplomacy, 
 and by the stealthy approaches of policy than by the 
 
 remaining under those conditions that of furnishing a certain (juota of 
 
 which had been at first common to armed ships in case of war. 
 
 all the members of the confederacy ' Poppo (ed. min.) remarks on kuI 
 
 of Delos. Mytilene paid no tribute vpug to, k-.-.X., 'Molestum kciI GoU. 
 
 to Athena; it retained its walls, its interpretaturmsj/pfr; quodreprehen- 
 
 large naval force, and its extensive dens Krohl. (Quffi^.TAwci. p. 3), vult 
 
 landed possessions on the opposite esse adeo, Dobr. expungi j ubet.' The 
 
 Asiatic continent : its government sense assigned by Gbller seems rele- 
 
 was oligarchical, administeiing all vant to the context, 
 
 internal affairs without reference to ' Comp. Tacitus, Germ. cap. i. ; 
 
 Athens.' — Grote, vol. vi. p. 300. He ' Germania a Sarmatis Dacisque mu- 
 
 adds that its chief obligation was tuo metu separatur.' 
 
96 SPEECHES FROM THUCYDIDES. 
 
 open approaches of force. On the one hand,^ our position 
 testified' in their favour, that we, whose votes in federal 
 councils weighed evenly with theirs, would not be likely 
 to join their expeditions against our consent, which we 
 should not give,^ unless the parties they attacked were 
 in the wrong. Policy also taught them to commence 
 operations by gathering under their banners their strong- 
 est ^ confederates, and using them to pull down the weaker 
 ones: with the view of rendering the former, if re- 
 served for their last victims, comparatively helpless, pike, 
 tfees-^ ripped of th ekLJbraBebes^when they came to deal 
 with them. Had they, on the contrary, begun by 
 attacking us, while all the allies still retained their own 
 strength as well as a rallying point, they would not have 
 found it so easy to subdue them. They were also rather 
 alarmed at the prospect of eventual danger to themselves, 
 in the contingency of our fleets either /uniting together, ] 
 or joining your or some other flag. We also partially 
 owed our safety to the court we paid their popular 
 assembly, and the political chiefs of the day. However, 
 judging by their conduct towards the rest of their alUes, 
 we did not believe we could have preserved our indepen- 
 dence, at any rate for any length of time, had not this 
 war broken out. 
 
 1 2. Was this, then, a-friendship,* or an independence, 
 
 • The speaker here proceeds to and compare the similar passage in 
 
 assign four reasons why it was the bk. i. ch. 40, ti (juxppuvovni, ir.r.X. 
 
 policy of Athens to. mask her in- The meaning, of course, is, that the 
 
 tended attack on the independence Athenians tried to derive a moral 
 
 of Mytilene, and to reserve her for a sanction of their encroachments on 
 
 last victim. Poppo(ed.min.) regards their allies from the complicity of 
 
 the -statement that the Mytileneans Mytilene. 
 
 were iVdi/zij^oi, as a rhetoiical hyper- ^ Such as the Chians, Samians, 
 
 bole. See Thucyd. i. 97. and Mytileneans. — Haack. 
 
 ' The sense requires the insertion * I have adopted the version pro- 
 of a clause aft.er dKovrng, as Poppo ferred by Dindorf, Poppo (ed. min.), 
 (ed. min.) shows. See Arnold's note : and Goller — q (jiXla ri iXivCfpia Trwri;. 
 
TEE ENVOYS OF MTTILENE. 97 
 
 on which we could rely ? a state of things in which we 
 were receiv ing each othe r with aflFected regard : in which 
 they, from fear, paid us court in time of war, and we, 
 from fear, paid them court in time of peace : and, while 1 
 in other cases confidence is secured by love, in our case \2 
 confidence was secured by fear. Our alliance, indeed, 
 was cemented by terror rather than by amity : and, 
 whichever party was first encouraged by a sense of se- 
 curity, was also sure to be the first to violate his engage- 
 ments. So that if anyone, on the ground that they only 
 threatened the calamities apprehended by us, thinks us 
 in the wrong for commencing the separation ourselves, 
 instead of waiting to see with our own eyes whether 
 we should actually suffer any of those calamities : be has 
 no just grounds for his censure. For, if we had been as 
 able to wait our time in our plots against them/as they 
 in nursing their designs against usjf how _could. we then ) 
 'f be at their mercy as we are ? And as they had at all i 
 times the option of attacking us, we had a corresponding^ 
 right to forestall their attack. 
 
 13. Such, then, Lacedsemonians and allies, were the 
 grounds and reasons for our revolt : reasons clear enough 
 to satisfy all who hear them that we were justified in 
 seceding : and sufficient to fill us with alarm, and induce 
 us to turn to some alliance for our shelter : a step we 
 were anxious to take long ago, when, still at peace, we 
 sent envoys to sound you on the subject of our defection 
 from Athens, but were checked by your rejection of our 
 overtures. The moment, however, that Bceotia invited 
 our revolt, we at once obeyed : and we thought that in 
 withdraAving our allegiance, we should be withdrawing 
 from two evils :^ from joining Athens in the oppression 
 
 1 Kai. passage would tea mere pun, Bloom- 
 
 " A literal translation of this field translates it ; ' Conceiving that 
 
 H 
 
98 8PBEGHES FROM THUGYDIDHS. 
 
 of Greece, instead of aiding you to emancipate lier ; and 
 from the danger of our being eventually ruined by the 
 Athenians, instead of our ruining them, as we mean to do. 
 However, our revolt was precipitate and unprepared : 
 and for that very reason it is the more incumbent upon 
 you to accept our alliance and speedily send us aid : and 
 you will then stand forth to the world as, in one and the 
 same act, the champions of a righteous cause, and the 
 agents of disaster to your foes. Besides, you never had 
 such an opportunity before. The Athenians have been 
 pulled down by the pestilence, and by heavy expen- 
 diture : their ships are engaged partly in cruising off 
 your coasts, partly in blockading us : it is therefore 
 improbable they will have any naval reserve for defence, 
 if, during this summer, you make a second and simul- 
 taneous attack upon them by sea and land ; on the con- 
 trary, they will either offer no resistance when your fleet 
 approaches, or else they must recall their squadrons from 
 your coasts as well as ours. 
 
 None of you should fancy he will be encountering a 
 home danger for a foreign land ; for if Lesbos strikes 
 anyone as locally remote, the service she can render him, 
 pohtically, will be very near : since the war will not (be 
 decided in Attica,) as some may think, but in the coimtry 
 which supports the strength of Attica. The Athenians 
 derive their revenue from their allies ; large as it is, it 
 will be increased, if they succeed in reducing us : no 
 other confederate will then revolt, and all our resources 
 wiU be added to theirs ; and we shall probably suffer a 
 harder fate than those who were slaves before they ^ 
 
 thereby we made a double secession, from tbe Athenians, so as not to be 
 
 one from the Greeks, not to maltreat ourselves at last destroyed by them, 
 
 them with the Athenians, but to but to be beforehand with them.' 
 
 assist in freeing them; the other ' Because the Mytileneans had 
 
THE ENVOYS OF MYTILENE. 99 
 
 revolted. If, on the other hand, you heartily succour us, 
 you will at once be rewarded by the accession of a state 
 possessed of a powerful navy, your principal want : and 
 you will -find it easier to pull down the Athenians by 
 withdrawing their allies from them : for our example 
 will encourage them all to come over to you, and you 
 will no longer suffer from the imputation of neglecting to 
 aid those who secede. Besides, by standing forth as the 
 champions of Grecian freedom, you will strengthen your 
 vantage ^ ground in the war. 
 
 14. Eespect, then, the hopes that Greece reposes in 
 you, and that Olympian Jupiter, in whose temple we 
 stand in the character of suppliants : grant succour and 
 alliance to the Mytileneans, instead of abandoning us, 
 who, in hazarding our lives, are exposing no one to 
 danger but. ourselves : but to whose resistance, if suc- 
 cessful, all Greece will be indebted : and whose ruin, 
 should it ensue from your rejection of our alliance, will 
 in time involve you all. Prove yourselves then to be the 
 men whom Greece presumes, and our fears wish, you 
 to be. 
 
 less provocation. This is Arnold's the war, had the goodwill of Greece 
 
 interpretation. Poppo (ed. min.) ioi this very leason: r/ Sk tivina vapa 
 
 construes it ' quam qui ante nos ser- iroXi ivoui twv avBpdwuiv paXXov is 
 
 viebant.' Arnold's opinion is de- roiii; AaKtdatfioviovSf dWuig rf koI irpoEi- 
 
 fended by Oleon's demand for the ttovthiv on Trjv 'EKKada l\iv9ipovtnv 
 
 severe punishment of the rebels, on (ii. 8). Poppo, however (ed. maj.), 
 
 the ground of want of provocation construes the passage : ' victoriam in 
 
 on the part of Athens. belle certius sperare poteritis :' ' you 
 
 ' Perhaps Thucydides mentally will have surer grounds for expect- 
 
 refers to his former statement that ing success in the war.' 
 the Lacedaemonians, at the outset of 
 
 U^ 
 
lOO SPHHGHES FROM THUCTDIBES. 
 
 SPEECH OF TEUTIAPLUS, 
 
 An Elean officer in the Feloponnesian fleet, delivered at a council of war held at Em- 
 batum, B.C. 427. Bk. III. ch. 30. 
 
 IWTSODUCTION. 
 
 The Mytileneans were admitted, in compliance -witli the petition 
 urged by them in the preceding speech, into the Lacedsemonian 
 confederacy : but before the Feloponnesian fleet could relieve them, 
 the Athenians enabled Paches, by strong reinforcements, to conyert 
 the siege of Mytilene into a complete blockade by land and sea. 
 At last the commonalty, during the summer of 427 B.C., alaxmed at 
 the prospect of famine, compelled the ruhng oligarchical faction to 
 surrender the town at discretion to the Athenian commander, the 
 only condition being that the fate of the Mytileneans should be re- 
 served for the decision of the Athenian assembly, and that, pending 
 such decision, none of the citizens should be slain, sold, or im- 
 prisoned. Seven days after the fall of the city, the Feloponnesian 
 fleet under the command of Alcidas, reached Embatum, a place on 
 the Asiatic coast, opposite Chios : where the chief oflBcers held a 
 council of war, at which Teutiaplus of Elis recommended in the 
 following speech an attempt to recover Mytilene by a sudden 
 attack. 
 
 Ch. 30. Alcidas, and you, officers of the Peloponnesian 
 fleet, here present! my opinion is that we should sail 
 at once for Mytilene, just as we are, before our approach 
 is discovered. In all probability we shall find a general 
 want of precaution, so natural to men^ who have just 
 taken a city: and no watch at all at sea, an element 
 
 * Poppo (ed. min.) thinks the ge- definitely without the article : and 
 
 nitive di'SpiSi' depends on d^iXaicTor, proposes the following version, which 
 
 because the article is omitted; and, I have followed; 'magnam in cus- 
 
 in this construction, he refers avSpwv todiis negligentiam inveaiemua, qiia- 
 
 definitely to the Athenians. G oiler lis est hominum, qui recens urbem 
 
 doubts whether it can be taken aliquam oocupaverunt.' 
 
TEUTIAPLJJ8. lOl 
 
 whereon the Athenians think no enemy would venture to 
 assail them, and on which our main ^ force happens now 
 to be embarked. It is likely, too, that their soldiery may 
 be scattered about from house to house with the careless 
 confidence of victory. I think, therefore, that a sudden 
 assault by night, seconded by partisans within the city, 
 should it turn out still to contain friends of ours, might 
 make us masters of the situation. The risk we must not 
 shrink from : remembering that an enterprise of this kind 
 is just one of those ' surprises of war,' in which the suc- 
 cessfiil general, watchful to foil a surprise of his own 
 post, seizes the critical moment to steal upon the foe. 
 
 ' See Poppo, ed. min. 
 
I02 SFEEOHES FROM TEUOTDIDHS. 
 
 SPEECH OF CLEON, 
 
 Delivered before the Athenian popular assembly, B.C. 427, against the repeal of tho 
 decree for the massacre of the male population of Mytilene. Bk. III. chs. 37-41. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Alcidas, the Spartan commander, having declined to sanction the 
 attempt to recover Mytilene, recommended by Teutiaplus in the 
 preceding speech, retired with his fleet to the Peloponnese. Paches, 
 who had chased him as far as Patmos, afterwards returned to 
 Lesbos, whence he despatched the Mytileneans m.0Bt concerned in 
 the late revolt, as prisoners to Athens. On their arrival, an as- 
 sembly was held : when Cleon carried a decree for the summary 
 execution, not only of the prisoners, but of the whole male popula- 
 tion of the rebellious city ; and orders were at once despatched to 
 Paches to carry the sentence into effect. On the following day, 
 however, a feeling of remorse ensued: of which the Mends of the 
 condemned capital eagerly availed themselves to persuade the 
 authorities to convoke an assembly for the reconsideration of the 
 question : a proposal strongly opposed .by Cleon in the following 
 speech. 
 
 Ch. 37. For my part, I liave frequently, ere now, and 
 at various times, felt convinced of the incapacity of a 
 popular government to rule dependencies : but never so 
 decidedly as on the present occasion of your change of 
 purpose respecting the Mytileneans. The fact is, the 
 fearless and openhanded sincerity of your daily inter- 
 course with one another, colours your sentiments towards 
 your aUies : and you forget that, in every mistake you 
 make through yielding to their petitions, every time you 
 give way to compassion, you betray a weakness most 
 dangerous to yourselves, and which fails to conciliate their 
 favour. You do not reflect that the dominion you hold 
 
CLE ON. 103 
 
 is a tyrannical usurpation of the rights of men who are in- 
 triguing to overthrow your supremacy, and who reluctantly 
 submit to your rule ; men whose obedience is not due to 
 any kindnesses that, to your own prejudice, you may show 
 them, but to the ascendancy which your strength, rather 
 than their good-will, enables you to maintain. It will, 
 however, be an infinitely greater evil, if none of the 
 measures we have decreed is to stand fast : * if we shut 
 our eyes to the truth that a country ruled by an inferior 
 code, the laws of which are not capriciously changed, is 
 in a better position than a country governed by a well- 
 framed code, when the laws are not steadily enforced : 
 that sober dulness is a better servant than licentious 
 talent : and that, on the whole, mediocrities succeed 
 better as ministers of state than fine intellects. The 
 truth is, clever men want to prove themselves more 
 philosophical than the laws, and to refine ^ upon every 
 measure proposed for the public good, as if they could 
 find no wider field for the display of their abilities : 
 a tendency too often the bane of their country. Ordinary 
 men, on the other hand, distrustful of their own talents, 
 are content with being less enlightened than the laws, 
 and not critical enough to carp at the arguments of 
 able speakers : and, as they play the part of impartial 
 judges rather than of rival debaters, their decisions are 
 
 ^ Poppo (ed. maj.) aptly compares Aristot. N. Ethic, v. 1 o, 6 ; Pol. iv, 
 
 the complaint of Aristophanes (Secies. 4, 2 5 ; Demosth. c. Arisiocr. 649, 2 1 ; 
 
 797) : Schoom. De Com. Athen. p. 248. See 
 
 ,„ ., , . , Dr. Arnold's note. 
 
 EyaSa TOVTOVQ vapoTovovPTag ucv « a u ii i x 
 
 '. =Ar = r 2 Arnold compares the character 
 
 ". ^.'^%, f,« . /, . Tacitus gives to Cornelius Laco, the 
 
 Arr av ok Sot-o. Tavra ttomv apvov- , 0,1-1-... , 
 
 " '^ commander 01 the Praetorian guards 
 
 '^ under Galba : ' Consilii quamvis egre- 
 
 Cleon sophistically confounds vii^oi, gii, quod non ipse adferret, iuimicus, 
 
 the constitutional laws of a state, et adversus peritoa pervicax.' — Sist, 
 
 with ipijifln/jiaTn, the decrees of the i. z6. 
 
 people on particular questions. See 
 
I04 SPEEGEES FROM TEUCYDIDE8. 
 
 generally right. And surely, we politicians ought to 
 follow their example, instead of allowing ourselves, under 
 the influence of eloquent speeches and intellectual rivalry, 
 to recommend to your assembly a policy which our 
 sober judgment disapproves. 
 
 38. My opinion, at any rate, remains the same, and 
 I am surprised at those who have allowed a reconsidera- 
 tion of the Mytilenean question, thereby interposing a 
 delay favourable to the criminals at the expense of their 
 judges, as it blunts the anger with which the sufferer 
 prosecutes the offender: for it is generally when ven- 
 geance treads close upon the heels of wrong that it 
 balances it, and gains thereby full satisfaction. I wonder 
 also who will be the man to gainsay our decree, to dare 
 to assert that the iniquities of the MytUeneans are all for 
 our good : and that our calamities involve losses to our 
 allies. It is clear that he must either rely upon his 
 eloquence, and endeavour to sliow that the resolution 
 so decisively affirmed,^ was not formally sanctioned ; 
 or else, swayed by mercenary motives, he will try to mis- 
 lead you by an elaborate and plausible defence of his 
 clients. In these contests of the champions of debate, 
 equity and custom are reversed : the state, while she 
 awai'ds the prizes to others, has to bear all the risk her- 
 self. An evil for which you are responsible, because you 
 conduct them on a false principle : habituating yourselves 
 to regard political discussions as a theatrical spectacle, 
 and public business as a thing to hsten to : weighing the 
 feasibility of your projects for the future by the state- 
 ments of clever rhetoricians : and, as to transactions 
 already past, testing ^ the credibility of actual facts not 
 
 ' GoUer cleverly remarks on to populus nondum sententiam muta- 
 Travv SoKiivv, ' expectes ro wdw So^ar. verit.' 
 Varum Cleoni ita loqui licuit, quasi " Literally, ' not taking the actual 
 
CLEON. 105 
 
 so much by the reports of eye-witnesses, as by the pungent 
 invectives you hear from pubHc speakers. You are 
 adepts in being gulled by novelties of argument, and in 
 refusing your assent to approved truths : the slaves 
 of every extravagance in turn, scorners of all that is 
 established : all of you anxious, if possible, to be able 
 to make your own speeches, or, failing that, entering into 
 rivalry with your favourite^ orators to avoid the sem- 
 blance of taking their views at secondhand : applauding 
 strokes of wit almost before they are uttered : quick 
 in seizing, before others, the speaker's drift, but slow to 
 foresee the tendency of his measures ; seeking — to speak 
 boldly — a world different from that wherein we live, and 
 without even the common sense to judge of things before 
 your eyes ; in one word, victims of the charms of 
 eloquence, and more like idle gazers at the Sophists than 
 councillors discussing state afifairs. 
 
 ■39. I am anxious to shield you from these mis- 
 chievous fascinations, and I tell you plainly that the 
 Mytileneans have done you the greatest possible injury 
 that one city can inflict. I can, indeed, make allowance 
 for those who revolt from inability to bear our rule, or 
 imder compulsion from your ioe-i. But these men — the 
 inhabitants of an island,^ a fortified island, free from all 
 apprehension of our enemies except at sea— and even on 
 that element protected by a fleet of triremes — living 
 under their own laws, and treated with the greatest con- 
 sideration by us : when men so favoured have acted like 
 
 fact as more credible because it has * As Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, 
 been seen, than that which you have stress is laid upon the word ' island,' 
 heard,' etc. which, for that reason, commences 
 * Toiavra, says Poppo (ed. min.), the sentence. In a war with the 
 is rather obscure : it may mean xaXuir, Peloponnesian league, an insular po- 
 or icmva. The latter seems the more sition was a great security, 
 probable solution. 
 
1j6 8PHE0HE8 FB02I TEUGYDIDES. 
 
 this, are they hot guilty of treason and insurrection rather 
 than defection — ^for surely defection is the act of sufferers 
 from outrage — and of treacherously compassing our ruin 
 in concert with our bitterest foes ? Indeed, their conduct 
 is more monstrous than if they had gone to war with us 
 in the pursuit of an independent dominion. The cala- 
 mities which had overtaken other ^ members of the 
 league, whose previous secession from our flag had been 
 coerced, had no warning voice for them : nor did the 
 happiness they enjoyed indispose them to enter on the 
 path of danger. On the contrary, sanguine in their 
 anticipations for the future, and cherishing hopes, if 
 below their ambition, yet beyond their power, they took 
 up arms, deliberately preferring might to right ; and 
 then, the moment they thought they could get the better 
 of us, they attacked us without the slightest provocation. 
 Wanton insolence is a common trait of communities 
 favoured in the highest degree by very sudden and unex- 
 pected good fortune : men usually have a firmer hold on 
 the prosperity they may reasonably look for, than on that 
 which surpasses all expectation : and, generally, find 
 it easier to repel adversity than to maintain unbroken 
 prosperity. 
 
 The fact is, we ought not, from the very outset of our 
 alliance, to have shown the Mytileneans more considera- 
 tion than the other members of our league; and then 
 their insolence would never have reached its present 
 pitch : for it is a common tendency of our nature to 
 disdain those who pay us court, and to respect those who 
 refuse to stoop. Let them, however, even now receive 
 the punishment their crime deserves : and do not throw 
 the blame on the aristocracy,^ while you acquit the 
 
 ■ See Poppo's note (ed. min., bk. i. Thucydides. 
 32, I ) on the sense of ol TrkXag, in " Mytilene, for some time before 
 
CLE ON. 107 
 
 commons : for all alike attacked us ; even the commons,^ 
 who, had they sided with us, might at this moment have 
 been reinstated in their city. Instead, however, of so 
 doing, they thought it a surer game to join their aris- 
 tocracy in revolting from us. 
 
 Consider, too, whether, if you inflict the same punish- 
 ment on voluntary deserters among your allies as on 
 those whose defection is constrained by your foes, you 
 can expect there will be one who will not secede on any 
 trivial pretext, when independence rewards success, and 
 no ruinous penalty awaits failure ? And all the while our 
 money and our lives will be perilled to the utmost in a 
 contest with their several cities. A contest wherein, if 
 you succeed, you will only recover a state which, ruined 
 by war, will cheat you of its future tribute, the sinews of 
 our strength: if we fail, we shall add fresh enemies to 
 our former foes : and, at the very time when we ought 
 to be making a stand against our declared enemies, we 
 shall be fighting with our own allies. 
 
 40. We must not then hold out a hope, either for 
 eloquence ^ to assure or bribery to purchase, that we can 
 allow them any excuse for having erred through human 
 infirmity. Theirs was no involuntary wrong : their 
 treason was deliberate. Had they acted under constraint, 
 they might have been forgiven. I, for one, then, true to 
 my former conviction, stiU contend that you must not 
 reverse your decree, nor commit a political blunder, 
 by yielding to three influences highly prejudicial to the 
 
 her revolt, had been goyemed by an guendum esse etiam Bloomf. docet, 
 
 oligarchy, which had made secret pronomen relativum pro demonstra- 
 
 overtures to Sparta before the com- tivo et conjunotione aliqu& copula- 
 
 mencement of the Peloponnesian tivS, positum esse addens.' — Poppo. 
 war, with all the privacy which is " Poppo (ed. min.) refers this an- 
 
 one of the natural advantages of that tithesis to the parallel passage in 
 
 form of government. ch. 3?, above: i; n,! Xiyav Tnarivaui; 
 
 ' Olc yf, ' Ante hsec colo distin- — q dpSn iTrfn^in/ifj'ot;. 
 
io8 SPEEOEES FROM TEUGYBIDES. 
 
 naaintenance of power — compassion, the fascinations of 
 eloquence, and clemency. It is right, indeed, to return 
 the compassion of the compassionate, but not to pity 
 those who, far from being likely to reciprocate our pity, 
 are doomed to be our enemies for ever. Then, as to 
 the orators, whose rhetoric charms you, they wiU find 
 subjects of less moment a fitter arena for their displays, 
 than one which, while it rewards their good speeches 
 with pleasant things,^ involves their country in a heavy 
 penalty for the short-lived pleasures of their eloquence. 
 Clemency, again, it is more reasonable to show towards 
 those who are likely to prove tractable allies now ^ and 
 for the future, than towards men whom all your lenity 
 will leave just as inveterate as they were before. 
 
 I will now sum up with one consideration : follow my 
 advice, and you will reconcile justice to the Mytileneans 
 with your own interests : by an opposite decision, you 
 will fail to concihate them : and — you will condemn 
 yourselves. For if they were right in revolting, you 
 cannot be right in ruling. If, however, without any just 
 title, you are still determined to rule, pohcy wUl then 
 compel you to violate equity and punish Mytilene : ^ or 
 — ^you must resign your sceptre, and play the honest man 
 in peace and safety. Make up your minds, then, in chas- 
 tising their revolt, to visit them with the very* penalty 
 they would have inflicted on you, instead of proclaiming 
 yourselves, now that you have ^ escaped, more dead and 
 
 ' TofjTraeeii'' whichisofcoursean ' Poppo (ed. maj. vol. i. Proleg. 
 
 euphemism for the receipt of a bribe, p. 152) refuses to follow GoUer in 
 
 * KairoXoijroj/' lit. 'for the future reading Siaipvyovrti;, because 'parti- 
 as well as now ' («:«;). cipium instar substantivi est. Of. 
 
 ' Kai Touff^E" lit. 'these men as well ii. a, role ina-yonkvoiQ ovk lirilQovTo, 
 
 as (Kai) others on the same principle.' ii. 5, rrphQ ov iirpaXav ol irpoSiSovriQ, 
 
 * So the Scholiast explains ry avry. Ne commemoremus pevyovTOf, quo 
 But it may mean ' the penalty already nomine ssepissime eos denotari qui 
 decreed.' in exilium ejecti sunt, satis constat.' 
 
CLE ON. 109 
 
 callous to all sense of honour than those who have plotted 
 your ruin : remembering what they would probably have 
 done, had they mastered you, especially as they were the 
 aggressors. Indeed, those who iUtreat others without 
 provocation are always the bitterest persecutors : they 
 are ready to die ^ when they glance at the danger of 
 leaving an enemy at large ; well knowing that any one 
 who has suffered undeservedly,^ proves a more formidable 
 foe after his escape than an enemy who has suffered 
 only as much as he inflicted. Let me implore you, then, 
 not to act as traitors to your own cause : but, recalhng ^ 
 as vividly as possible your first poignant resentment of 
 the wrong, and remembering that you would have given 
 anything to have got these rebels into your power, 
 requite them now, instead of giving way to compassion 
 for the doom that awaits them, or forgetting the peril 
 that so recently hung like a cloud over you. Yes, chas- 
 tise this people as they deserve, and let your other con- 
 federates read in their fate a significant warning that 
 revolt shall in every case be punished with death. Once 
 convince them of this, and you will not so often have 
 to drop your arms against your foes, to take them up 
 against your allies. 
 
 ' Hermann, GoUer, and Poppo (ed. injuria.' 
 
 min. : see, however, the fuller state- ' The Scholiast explains these 
 
 ment in ed. maj.) agree in attaching words by the following paraphrase, 
 
 this sense to SLoWwrai. Arnold tig twoiav IXQqvtsq S}v t/xsAXerf iranxnv 
 
 takes it actively: e.g. 'they hunt im AktIHwv ' realising, in imagina- 
 
 their victims to death, having a keen tion, what you would have suffered 
 
 eye to the danger of leaving an enemy from them.' Poppo (ed. min.) seems 
 
 at large.' to lean to this interpretation : but 
 
 ^ Poppo (ed. min.) adopts Haack's (in ed. maj.) he translates the passage 
 
 explanation of ;iir) ^iv dvayicy, ' prseter much as I have rendered it : ' quam 
 
 necessitatem,' i.e. 'quum nnn laces- maxime animo revocantes sensus 
 
 sierit alterum,' ergo 'immerito atque ejus momenti, quum patiebamini.' 
 
no 8PEE0SES FROM TEUGYDIDES. 
 
 SPEECH ADDRESSED BY DIODOTUS 
 
 To the Athenian popular assembly, on the same occasion as, and in reply to, the pre- 
 ceding oration of Cleon. Bk. III. chs. 42-49.' 
 
 Ch. 42. I neither blame the magistrates who sanc- 
 'tioned a reconsideration of the Mytilenean question, nor 
 agree with those who object to frequent consultations on 
 measures of the greatest moment ; on the contrary, I be- 
 lieve that, if there are two influences especially hostile 
 to good counsel, they are precipitancy and passion : one 
 of which is the wonted companion of folly, the other 
 of vulgarity and narrowness of mind. A man who con- 
 tends that debate"^ is not the expositor of action, is either 
 an idiot, or is self-interested : an idiot, if he thinks he 
 can by any other means throw light on a subject which 
 belongs to the future and has not been cleared up : self- 
 interested, if, when anxious to carry some dishonourable 
 measure, and despairing of speaking effectively in a bad 
 cause, he thinks that by plausible calumnies^ he may 
 take both his opponents and his audience by storm. 
 The most offensive of all, however, are those who accuse 
 others not only of speaking for effect,* but of having 
 
 • See Mr. Grote's remarks on the who denies that words are the ex- 
 line of argument adopted by this positors of deeds.' He forgets, too, 
 speaker (vol. vi. p. 341). There are that the maxim is aimed at Cleon's 
 obvious points of comparison between depreciation of debate (ch. 3 8, above), 
 this harangue, and that ascribed to * A passage of Aristophanes (^jaii. 
 Csesar by Sallust, B.C. $1. 45) illustrates this allusion to Cleon. 
 
 ^ Ool. Mure (vol. v. p. 584) cen- He thus describes the demagogue: 
 
 sures this remark as a mere truism: PvpaoSkil/r)v'na^\ai6vafTlavovp'inraTov 
 
 but his censure is founded upon a /caf Sm^oKmrarov nva. 
 
 mistranslation of the passage, which * He apparently alludes to Cleon's 
 
 he renders thus : ' He is unreasonable, remarks in ch. 3 8, above. 
 
DIOBOTVS. 1 1 1 
 
 pecuniary motives for their rhetorical displays. For if 
 they only imputed want of intelHgence, the advocate who 
 faUed to persuade, would come off with the repute of 
 dulness rather than dishonesty ; whereas, when corrup- 
 tion is the charge, the speaker, if he convinces, becomes 
 an object of suspicion : if he fails, he is thought a fool as 
 well as a knave. The country, certainly, does not gain 
 by these manoeuvres : she is robbed of her counsellors by 
 fear. She might be prosperous enough, if this class ^ of 
 her citizens were destitute of eloquence : for then the 
 pubhc would very seldom be seduced into error. A true 
 statesman ought to prove the wisdom of his policy, not 
 by intimidating opposition, but by meeting it on equal 
 terms : and a well-regulated state ought to be as far from 
 conferring additional^ distinctions on the politician whose 
 counsels are generally sound, (avoiding, of course, any 
 disparagement ' of the credit he has already won) as 
 from discrediting, far less fining, the politician whose 
 measures do not command approval. Were such the 
 case, no hope of enhancing his personal honours would 
 induce the successful speaker to advocate, for the sake of 
 popularity, measures which his conscience disapproved : 
 nor would the unsuccessful speaker try to win public 
 favour by descending, like his rival,* to a similar com- 
 plaisance. 
 
 43. Our conduct, however, reverses this principle : 
 and, moreover, should any statesman, though advocating 
 the most politic measures, incur the faintest suspicion of 
 interested motives, we rob the country of the clear gain 
 
 * Soil : Oi ini xpw'"'^ wpoffKarijyo- passage, which offends the sense as 
 
 povvTig kwiSitKiv • Poppo, ed. min. much as the grammar. 
 
 He refers wsiaSeitiaav to 1} iroXig, a * See Dr. Arnold's note on rfiv li 
 
 collective term. aiixjipova voKiv, 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. maj.) justly protests * Kai amoe. 
 against Bloomfield's version of this 
 
112 SPHEGSES FROM TEUGYBIBE8. 
 
 of his services by yielding to a prejudice founded on a 
 shadowy presumption of venality. The result is, that 
 good counsel straightforwardly tendered is just as much 
 distrusted as bad : and thus the advocate of statesman- 
 like measures lies under the same necessity of employing 
 artifice to gain confidence,^ as the advocate of the most 
 outrageous measures does of resorting to cajolery to 
 win over the multitude. Owing to these hallucinations, 
 Athens is the only state which no one can serve vdth 
 openhanded sincerity, and without humbug ; the frank 
 offer of a public service being always met vsdth the 
 suspicion of some sly prospective gain. Still,^ notwith- 
 standing your estimate of our motives, a regard for our 
 own safety compels us, in dealing with questions of the 
 greatest moment, to base our counsels on a wider forecast 
 than your offhand deliberations allow : because, among 
 other reasons, we are responsible advisers, while you are 
 irresponsible listeners. If, indeed, your counsellors and 
 their political clients were liable to suffer alike, there 
 would be more sobriety in your legislation: but, as 
 things are, whenever you meet with a disaster, you let the 
 penalty fall, in the excitement of the moment,* on the 
 
 ■ Heilmann remarks the oxymoron remarks, it bears in ch. 36, i, above, 
 
 contained in the words ^ivnafuvov The clause, as emended by Kriiger, 
 
 marov ytvioOai' ' to get believed by might then be rendered: 'Still, a 
 
 telling lies.' Thucydides shows, by regard for our own safety compels 
 
 commencing the second clause vpith {xP'd "^j ™ dealing with questions 
 
 Kai, its title to precedence over that of the greatest moment, as on the 
 
 which is introduced hy te. present occasion, to try (dJiuBi') to 
 
 ^ In my version, 1 have followed base our counsels,' etc. In my trans- 
 
 the old reading iv Tif roufSi a^iovvn, lation I have taken koI kv T(f TOL(fSt 
 
 supported by Gbller, Dr. Arnold, a^ioviri in an adversative sense, as 
 
 and others. Poppo, however (ed. the context requires, 
 
 min.), has received into his text ' Some participle must be under- 
 
 Kriiger'smgenious emendation, n^iouv stood after Hixtitc but it seems 
 
 Ti for a^ioCjTi. 'Ev Tip ToufSs will much less harsh to supply liJiuovvTig 
 
 then mean, ' on such an occasion as with Poppo (ed.min.) than afaKivris 
 
 the present,' a sense which, as Poppo with Dr. Arnold. 
 
DI0DUTU8. IIJ 
 
 solitary vote of your counsellor, and not on your own 
 multitudinous suffrages, which were equally in fault. 
 
 44. My object in coming forward was neither to 
 defend the Mytileneans by answering Cleon's speech, 
 nor to impeach them : for, if we are wise, the question 
 for us to consider is not their iniquity but our policy. -"^ 
 If, on the one hand, I could prove them ever so guilty, I 
 would not on that plea recommend you to put them to 
 death, unless it was for our interest : on the other hand, 
 should they seem to have any claim to our forgiveness, 
 I would not advise their pardon, unless it should appear 
 advantageous to the state. But I feel that our delibera- 
 tions concern the future rather than the present. I join 
 issue, then, with Cleon on the very point whereon he 
 lays most stress : that we shall consult our future welfare, 
 with a view to prevent rebellion, by holding out death as 
 its penalty : and, in the interest of our future prosperity, 
 I emphatically assert the contrary : protesting against 
 your rejecting the sound policy of my argument for the 
 mere plausibility of his. His argument, indeed, based 
 rather on what the Mytileneans deserve than on what 
 your interests demand, may very possibly, in^ your 
 present exasperation against them, win your assent. 
 We, however, are not at law^ with them, we are not 
 
 * See Col. Mure's remarks on the vol. iii. p. 69 seqq. The Spanish 
 
 line of ai'gument here adopted. — Lite- Inquisition, however, laboured under 
 
 rature of Greece, vol. v. p. 70. no such embarrassment as to the 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) renders irpbg formalities of their procedure, when, 
 
 by ' propter.' in the days of Philip the Second, 
 
 ' Grote (vol. vi. p. 34.2) cites a they sentenced the whole population 
 
 remarkable parallel from Mr. Burke's of the Netherlands to death for the 
 
 Speech on Conciliation with America, crime of heresy. 'Tantum Religio 
 
 where he disclaims all idea of prose- potuit suadere malorum ! ' The de- 
 
 ciiting the acts of the refractory cree was issued on the i6th of Fe- 
 
 colonies in acriminal court, professing bruary, 1568, and confirmed by the 
 
 that he ' does not know the method king ten days afterwards. See Mot- 
 
 of drawing up an indictment against ley's Dutch Mepiihlic, vol. ii. p. 155. 
 a whole people.' See Burke's Works, 
 
114 SPEBOHES FBOM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 suitors for strict justice ; the question before us, is — how 
 does policy require us to deal with them ? 
 
 45. In ^ the civOised world death is the appointed 
 penalty of many crimes : and, among them, of crimes 
 less heinous than the treason of Mytilene. Nevertheless, 
 men, buoyed up by hope, venture their commission : and 
 perhaps no criminal ever condemned his chance of suc- 
 cess as hopeless, when entering on a dangerous project. 
 Nor did any state, when bent on revolt, ever hazard the 
 enterprise in the belief that her armament — whether a 
 national force, or a force supported by a foreign league — 
 did not warrant the attempt. Besides, all men, in pri- 
 vate and public capacities alike, are naturally prone to 
 err ; no law in existence can restrain them from so doing : 
 at any rate, society ^ has gone through the whole cata- 
 logue of penalties, gradually^ increasing them, in the 
 hope of finding some means of checldng the outrages 
 of wrongdoers. It is probable that, originally, the 
 penalties ordained for the gravest crimes were milder 
 than they are now : and, as they were disregarded, they 
 were generally, as time went on, stretched to capital 
 punishment ; yet even this is shghted. We must, there- 
 fore, either discover some penalty that strikes more terror 
 than death — which is impossible — or admit the failure * 
 
 ' 'Ev iiiv ovv, K.T.\. Ovv is re- quotes the following illustration of 
 aumptive: it marks the commence- this statement from Mitford, the 
 ment of the ensuing general exposi- Tory historian of Greece : ' In early 
 tion as the first stage of the answer times in Greece, as throughout 
 to the question with which the last Western Europe, public justice pro- 
 paragraph concluded. See Klotz, ceeded no further against the most 
 IJerar. vol. ii. p. 718. atrocious criminals, than by the 
 
 * Grote (vol. vi. p. 343) deecribes exaction of a fine. The court of 
 
 this passage as containing ' views Areopagus first adjudged the punish- 
 
 which might have passed as rare ^nd ment of death.' 
 
 profound even down to the last cen- * Tovtov refers to fiavarow, rih to 
 
 tury.' i'toq. Mr. Dale, comiecting both 
 
 ' Bloomfield(2%!/eyrf.vol.ii. p. 78) these demonstratives with the same 
 
DIODOTUS. 1 1 i 
 
 of all punishments to prevent crime ; for poverty,^ 
 lending courage to necessity : wealth and power, inspir- 
 ing wantonness and pride with inordinate desires : and 
 the other conditions of life — each influencing the mind of 
 man — each enslaved by some fatal tyrant passion — all 
 these agencies lure men from the path of safety to the 
 path of danger. Hope, too, and ambition, everywhere 
 dominant, the one leading, the other following — the one 
 devising the enterprise, the other whispering the facility of 
 success — are active agents of ruin : and, though their influ- 
 ence is invisible, it is more than a match for all the terrors ^ 
 of the outward world. Fortune crowns their efibrts by 
 conspiring quite as successfully to urge men on : for 
 at times she comes unexpectedly to their side, and tempts 
 them to run risks with inadequate resources : states, 
 indeed, still more than men, because they play for the 
 highest stakes, such as national freedom, or foreign do- 
 minion : subjects ^ on which each citizen, when backed 
 by his countrymen, is apt to give too free a rein to his 
 imagination. In one word, it is sheer simplicity to believe 
 it possible, when human nature is passionately bent on 
 
 subject, turns the passage into non- following, the one conceiving the 
 sense. He construes thus : ' Either, desig-n, the other suggesting the 
 
 then, some fear more dreadful than facility of success, are the most in- 
 
 this must be discovered, or this, at jurious of all, and being invisible are 
 
 any rate, does not restrain men.' more dangerous than other, visible 
 
 Hobbes and Bloomfield make the evils.' 
 
 same mistake. ^ Poppo (ed. maj.) leaves it an 
 
 ' Ool. Mure (laterature of Greece, open question, whether Stn'(ov means 
 
 vol, V. p. 588) thus renders this 'terrores' or 'pericula.' It would 
 
 passage: 'Poverty, bringing Audacity suit the spirit of the passage to 
 
 to the aid of Necessity, and Power, understand by it, the preventive 
 
 uniting Avarice to Insolence and tei-rors of the law. Neither Poppo 
 
 Arrogance, with the other alfec- nor Gbller mention the possibility of 
 
 tions (?) to which the will of man taking the passage in Col. Mure'a 
 
 is subject, acting on its morbid in- sense, which, though it does not suit 
 
 capacity to resist such influences, the context so well, is surely capable 
 
 seduce into hazardous enterprises; of defence. 
 
 wliile Hope and Desire, everywhere ' Airdv, not airov, is tlie reading 
 
 present, the one leading, the other of the best MSS. 
 
 I 2 
 
Il6 SPEEGSHS FROM THUCYBIDE8. 
 
 accomplishing any purpose, that it can be deterred either 
 by the influence of law, or by any other means of in- 
 timidation. 
 
 46. We must not, therefore, in reliance on any 
 security that capital punishment can afford, come to a 
 decision we may regret ; ^ nor lead seceders to think it 
 hopeless for them to retrace their steps, and on the first 
 opportunity efface their crime. Just consider that, as 
 things now are, if a state which has actually ^ revolted 
 feels that she cannot succeed, she may come to terms 
 while still able to refund all your expenses, and to pay 
 you her future tribute; whereas, if you adopt Cleon's 
 system, what city, do you suppose, will not make more 
 complete preparations for a revolt, and hold out against 
 a siege to the last extremity, if a tardy and a quick sur- 
 render comes to the same thing ? And then — as to us — 
 how can we fail to be damaged by the long and expen- 
 sive blockade which an obstinate defence involves ? by 
 the ruinous condition in which we shall receive a city, 
 when reduced, and by the loss, for the future, of the 
 revenue^ derivable from it? Yet that revenue is the 
 backbone of our strength against our foes. We are not 
 therefore called upon to prejudice ourselves by acting as 
 severe judges of the dehnquents : but rather to ensure, 
 by a mild punishment, that for the time to come our 
 confederate states shall be available for our purposes in a 
 flourishing financial condition : and to guard against 
 their defection, not by measures of excessive rigour, but 
 by the considerate * spirit of our administration. We 
 
 ^ Poppo (ed. maj.) construes xsipov valent to Kaiwep. 
 Pm\aiiran9m by 'pejus consultare.' * GoUer remarks the sarcastic re- 
 He rejects Bloomfield's notion that ference to the corresponding passage 
 ' a harsh decision ' is meant. in Cleon's speech, towards the close 
 
 '^ Poppo (ed.min.) is sm-ely wrong of the 39th chapter, above, 
 
 in making ««/ in Kai airoaraaa equi- * Poppo (ed, min.) refers appro- 
 
DI0D0TU8. iiy 
 
 are, liowever, now acting on an opposite principle : and, 
 if we succeed in subduing a city which, constitutionally 
 iree ' and reluctantly ruled, has naturally enough sought 
 independence by revolt, we fancy that policy requires us 
 to punish her severely. True policy, on the contrary, 
 instead of signally chastising free cities, when they revolt, 
 vigilantly guards them before they revolt, preventing 
 their even thinking of such a step : and, when a defection 
 is quelled, imputes the fault to as few as possible. 
 
 47. Consider, too, how great a mistake you would 
 make, in another point of view, by following Cleon's 
 advice. At present, the commons in all the states are 
 friendly to you, and either refuse to join the aristocratic 
 party in revolting, or, if constrained, instantly declare 
 their hostility to those who forced them to revolt : '^ so 
 that, when you go to war, you are supported by the 
 masses in the various cities of the hostile league. If, 
 however, you exterminate the commonalty at Mytilene, 
 which was not only no party to the revolt, but, as soon as 
 it obtained arms, readily surrendered the city : you will, 
 in the first place, be committing a crime by the slaughter 
 of your benefactors : in the next, you will be realising the 
 fondest wishes of the highest classes. For, when they 
 induce a city to revolt, they will instantly find an ally in 
 the commons, because you will have taught them before- 
 hand that exactly the same penalty awaits the innocent 
 as the guilty. I must add that, even if they ivere guilty, 
 
 vingly to Bloomfield's rendering of Athens professed to recognise in 
 d?r6 Tuiv ipy. t. twi/i,, 'by having a theory at least. Their own spokes- 
 care of our actions.' Bloomfield, in man (iii. 1 1) describes them as auro- 
 a note, explains the pbrase to mean : vofxnt drf vvrfQ Kcti k^tv'^Epot rtp hvn^arif 
 ' by carefully abstaining from such ' professedly independent and nomi- 
 conduct as may provoke revolt.' nally free.' 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. maj.) sees in these ^ Bloomfield, mistaking njrnnrr/- 
 
 words a particular allusion to the nn n for imnaTani, construes ' the 
 
 Mytileneans, wbose independence revolters.' 
 
Il8 SPEEGEES FROM THUCTDIBES. 
 
 it would be good policy not to see it : to prevent the 
 only class still allied to you from becoming hostile to you. 
 I beheve it to be far more conducive to the maintenance 
 of our dominion, that we should voluntarily submit to 
 a wrong, than that we should massacre those whom it is 
 politic to spare, simply because they deserve it. Cleon, 
 indeed, declared that justice and expediency would be 
 combined in the punishment proposed : but we find it 
 impossible to reahse their union by that step.^ 
 
 48. Convinced, then, that mine is the preferable 
 course : and, without allowing too much weight to com- 
 passion or clemency — I, indeed, am as far as Cleon from 
 wishing you to be won over by those influences — but 
 acting on the grounds I have laid before you, bring 
 to a dispassionate trial the Mytileneans whom Paches 
 sent off as criminals, and let the rest enjoy their homes. 
 This course wUl at once conduce to our future good, and 
 spread immediate alarm among our enemies ; for men 
 who take their measures wisely are more formidable to 
 their adversaries,^ than men whose opposition, violent in 
 action, is weak in policy.^ 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.), GBller, and remarks that the proposed masaacrc 
 Arnold connect Evaurij; -with T-i^Mpiaf of the whole male population of 
 the full expression heing h> rif tijuh- Mytilene was only a very rigorous 
 piiadai. Kriiger -wishes to read rtf application of the received laws of 
 avTif, which would improve the war, acted upon, without the slightest 
 sense. abatement, in the Lacedsemonian 
 ^ See Poppo, ed. min. execution of the Platseans shortly 
 ' A small majority of the assembly afterwards. He, however, conve- 
 voted for the repeal of the decree ; niently forgets, in the interest of his 
 but the Mytilenean prisoners, who favourite democracy, a distinguishing 
 Lad been chiefly implicated in the feature in the ease of the Platseans. 
 revolt, and who, to the number of They had been guilty of the cold- 
 more than a thousand, had been sent blooded murder of Theban soldiers 
 to Athens by Paches, were put to while under the protection of a 
 death. Mr. Grote (vol. vi. p. 336) truce. 
 
TME PLAT j!: AN DEPUTIES. 119 
 
 SPEECH OF THE PLAT^AN DEPUTIES, 
 
 Delivered before the five commisaioners despatched from Sparta, to try the Platsean 
 prisoners, after the surrender of their citj', B.C. 427. Bk. III. chs. 53-60. 
 
 jntsoductiojn: 
 
 The Platseans having voluntarily surrendered their city to the 
 Peloponnesian force, and agreed to submit to the decision of Lace- 
 daemonian judges, protected only by a stipulation that no one 
 should be punished unjustly, five commissioners were sent from 
 Sparta to decide their case. These judges, instead of instituting a 
 formal enquiry, merely asked each of the prisoners ' whether he had 
 rendered any service to the Lacedaemonian cause diuing the war ? ' 
 As a categorical reply to this question would have been an act of 
 suicide, the Plataeans, in the teeth of strong opposition from the 
 Thebans, asked and obtained leave to plead their cause at length. 
 
 Ch. 53. When, in full reliance on your good faith, 
 Lacedasmonians, we surrendered our city to you, we did 
 not expect to be subjected to an ordeal of this kind, 
 but to a procedure more conformable to law : we also 
 agreed that we should not, as we now are, be at the 
 mercy of any other judges but yourselves, believing we 
 should then be most likely to obtain justice. As things 
 are, however, we are afraid that we have lost both these 
 securities at once. We have good grounds, on the one 
 hand, to fear that the deadhest issues are involved in the 
 struggle before us, and, on the other, to distrust your 
 impartiality: judging at once, from the fact that no 
 formal charge, for us to answer, has been preferred 
 against us (indeed, we had to ask leave to speak) : and 
 from the narrow scope of the question, a literal reply to 
 which is an adverse verdict, while a false one carries its 
 
I20 STEEGEES FROM THUCTDIDES. 
 
 own refutation. Surrounded, however, as we are, by 
 manifold perplexities, we have no alternative : and it 
 seems the safer course not to risk our lives without a 
 word from our lips ; ^ for, if men in our position left our 
 cause totally unpleaded, we might afterwards think, with 
 self-reproach, that we might have been saved by a 
 defence. In addition, too, to our other disadvantages, 
 we find a peculiar difficulty in convincing you. If we 
 were strangers to each other, our cause might be served 
 by bringing forward evidence in our favour on points 
 unfamiliar to you : but, as it is, the judges whom we 
 address are conversant with all the features of our case : 
 and our fear is, not that you may find a true bill against 
 us through having previously judged our services^ less 
 meritorious than yours, but that, to gratify a neighbour- 
 ing power, we may be standing at a bar where sentence 
 has already been recorded against us. 
 
 54. However, notwithstanding these difficulties, we 
 vsdll recall our public services to your remembrance, and 
 endeavour to bring you over to our views, by laying 
 at once before you the pleas on which we rest our case. 
 Those pleas wiU meet the hostility of Thebes, and will 
 reveal the tenor of our conduct towards you and the 
 rest of Greece.^ We say, then, in answer to your rather 
 curt enquiry, ' whether we have rendered any service to 
 the Lacedsemonians and their allies in the course of the 
 present war,' that, if your question is addressed to us in 
 
 • Poppo (ed. maj.) remarks on commentators, are quite mistaken 
 
 Bloomfleld's Tersion, ' to venture in taking ig i/ids Kai rois dKXovs 
 
 somewhat by thus pleading,' 'non 'EXX^vng with roii' eu SiSpaa/iivuv. 
 
 perpendit tiVwrac non loquentes sig- The use of n and Kai proves that all 
 
 niflcare, sed locwtos.' the words from -n-poQ re to 'EX\jji/of 
 
 ' See GoUer and Dr. Arnold on refer to naptxojitvoi. My version, 
 
 TCLQ apiTciQ. though it alters the machinery of the 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. maj.) shows that sentence, is, I hope, true to the con- 
 
 Bloomfield, Heilmami and other struction. 
 
THE PLAT^AN BUPUTIES. 1 21 
 
 the character of enemies, it was no wrong to you, if you 
 received no benefit at our hands ; while, if you regard 
 us as friends, you yourselves rather than we, were in 
 the wrong in making war upon us. During the peace, 
 as well as in the campaign against the Mede, honesty 
 was the type of our policy ; we were the only ^ Boeotians 
 who joined your attack upon him in the cause of Grecian 
 freedom ; and, on a recent occasion, we were not the 
 first to break the peace. Although an inland people, 
 we took part in the naval action of Artemisium : we 
 stood by you and Pausanias in the battle fought on our 
 own soil : and we overtasked our strength in sharing all 
 the other dangers which at that epoch overshadowed 
 Greece. "We also did you, Lacedasmonians, a special 
 service ; at the very moment when, after the earthquake, 
 Sparta was besieged ^ by the terrible panic caused by 
 the secession of the Helots to Ithome, we despatched two- 
 thirds of our own citizen force to your aid. Claims like 
 these should not be forgotten. 
 
 55. Such then was the part we had the courage to 
 play in former days and at the most critical junctures ; 
 later, indeed, we became your enemies : but that was 
 your own fault. When hard pressed by Thebes, we 
 entreated your alliance : you rejected our suit for selfish 
 reasons,* bidding us apply to Athens, on pretence of her 
 being a neighbouring, while you were a distant, power. 
 However, when we were at war, you neither suffered, nor 
 were destined to suffer, anything foreign to the usages of 
 war at our hands. And, if we refused to separate from 
 
 ' Herodotus, however, pves the Tacitus (Hist. iv. 79): 'Circura- 
 
 Thespians a share in this patriotic steterat Civilem metus.' 
 
 act. Bk. viii. 50. ' The account given of this trans- 
 
 ° Demosthenes (7)e Cor. §195) action hy Herodotus (bk.vi. ch. 108) 
 
 employs the same metaphor : KlvSiwot; suggests this sense of the middle 
 
 Kai (po^og wipuarv) Tt)v jroXtv. Comp. verb nwiwaaaBi, 
 
122 SPEECHES FROM TSUCYDIDES. 
 
 Athens at your summons,, we were not in the wrong : 
 considering that she supported us in opposition to Thebes, 
 when you shrunk from us : after which we could ' not, in 
 honour, abandon her, especially as she had shown us^ 
 much kindness before she received us, on our own petition, 
 into alliance, and had also conferred upon us her muni- 
 cipal franchise.^ On the contrary, it was natural we 
 should heartily obey her injunctions. We must add that, 
 as to the enterprises into which you, the chiefs of the two 
 leagues, lead your allies, it is not your followers who are 
 responsible for any wrong you may commit, but those 
 who implicate them in questionable * acts. 
 
 56. The Thebans have often injured us ere now ; as 
 to their last outrage, the cause, indeed, of our present 
 distress, you need no information from us. When they 
 attempted to seize our city, not only in the midst of peace, 
 but, what is more, on a solemn festival, we were justified 
 in turning our avenging arms upon them by that universally 
 recognised law which allows retahation on an invading 
 foe. It cannot therefore be fair that we should now 
 suffer on their account. For if your own present con- 
 venience and Theban animosity are to be the basis of 
 your decision,^ you will prove yourselves no conscientious 
 judges of right, but rather the courtiers of pohcy. And 
 yet, when we talk of policy, if Thebes seems an useful 
 ally to you now, we and the rest of the Greeks were far 
 more so at the time we referred to, when the perils 
 around you were greater than at present. You are now 
 
 ' That is, when the Lacedse- * Here the speaker replies by an- 
 
 monians called upon Platsea to do so, ticipation to the Theban charge of 
 
 B.C. 429 (Poppo, ed. min.). complicity in Athenian encroach- 
 
 * See Poppo's note on ng as equi- nients on the liberty of Greece, 
 
 valent to r};.<fTc (ed. min.). ^ Poppo (ed. min.) explains r6 
 
 ' The 'iusconnubii et commercii,' ^Ikhlov Xajtjiavnv by the Latin equi- 
 
 lout not the right of voting in the valent, ' decernere de jure.' 
 public assembly or of bearing office. 
 
TUF, PLAT^AN DJEPUTIES. 1I3 
 
 in an attitude of aggression, and you are formidable foes ; 
 but in those days your attitude was one of self-defence : 
 all Greece ^ was threatened with slavery by the Mede : and 
 the Thebans then took part with him. It is only fair to 
 balance the public spirit we then displayed against our 
 present error, if indeed we have committed any: the 
 former, you will find, outweighed the latter: it was 
 shown, too, at a crisis when it was rare indeed for any 
 Grecian power to set sheer courage in array against the 
 might of Xerxes : and therefore public opinion honoured 
 the more those who did hot stand aloof from danger^ 
 and meet the invasion with paltry manoeuvres for their 
 own interests, but who boldly braved the storm, and did 
 what was best for their country. To the latter class we 
 belonged, and highly were we honoured for it : yet now 
 we fear that those very principles,^ which led us to 
 consult right by joining Athens instead of convenience by 
 joining you, may involve our ruin. And yet you ought 
 to show that your estimate of principles* is consistent 
 and impartial : and to see that true policy ^ lies in recon- 
 
 ' 'Idtantum otservandum, scrip- the former act, she could not con- 
 
 torem, quum Laced»momo8 olim in sistently punish the latter, 
 majore periculo constitutos fuisse * To the translator, it makes little 
 
 demonstrare velit, proprie sic de- difference -whether we read Ix"""'' — 
 
 buisse pergere: vm fxiv yap ircpoii; Heilmann's conjecture adopted by 
 
 viiiie tjripxwflf Seivoi, Iv tKiivif Si ti^ Gbller, and approved but not adopted 
 
 naipif iraai BovXitnv iirsfeptv o |8rip- by Poppo — or l\io(ri. I have, how- 
 
 Papog, Kal tote o'iSe /Mr' avrov ijam','— ever, followed GoUer in reading ifiiv 
 
 Poppo, ed. maj. for r'nuv, Poppo, who (ed. min.) 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) explains a<7(pa- retains ruiiv, admits the former pro- 
 
 Xsiif by ' in tuto, i. e. per otium et noun to have the support of the best 
 
 tranquillitatem.' MSS. 'H/ilv, of course, generalises 
 
 ' 'Etti' Toie nirou, 'propter eandem the sentence: ifuv pointedly refers 
 
 agendi rationem.' — Poppo, ed. maj. to the Lacedaemonians. Poppo (ed. 
 
 * They contend that they acted maj.) thus turns the passage, accord- 
 on one and the same principle of ing to Heilmann's reading, and adopt- 
 right in resisting the Mede and in ing in the version, though not in his 
 adhering to their connection with text, viuv instead of 17/1I)', ' Oportet 
 Athens ; and that, as Sparta rewarded utilitatem nihil aliud esse existi- 
 
124 SPHEOEES FROM THU0YDIDE8. 
 
 ciling your own immediate interest on any occasion with 
 a firm and changeless gratitude for the services of your 
 brave allies. 
 
 57. Consider, too, that you are now regarded by 
 most of the Greeks as models of honour and virtue : but, 
 if your decision in our case is otherwise than just (and 
 you cannot hush^ up a sentence pronounced by judges so 
 distinguished on prisoners far from insignificant) beware 
 lest they disapprove of your coming to an unworthy 
 decision on the fate of men inferior only to yourselves : 
 and of your dedicating, in the national temples, spoils 
 torn from us, the benefactors of Greece. It will seem 
 monstrous indeed that LacedEemonians should sack Platsea ! 
 and that, while your fathers inscribed the name of our 
 city on the Delphian tripod in honour of her valour, you 
 should actually blot her out, house and home, from the 
 map of Greece, to gratify Thebans! It is indeed too 
 true that we have reached the very chmax of calamity. 
 Formerly, when the Mede gained the advantage,^ we were 
 on the verge of destruction : while, now, we find ourselves 
 supplanted in your regard, though you were formerly our 
 best friends, by Thebans ; we have also undergone two 
 trials, the most terrible of all : lately, the risk of perishing 
 from famine, had we not surrendered our city : now, of 
 being tried for our lives. Yes, we, Platteans as we are, 
 whose zeal for the freedom of Greece exceeded our 
 strength, have been insultingly pushed aside as outcasts ^ 
 
 mare quam si a voWs flrmam gratiam Xerxes at Thermopylse and Arte- 
 
 vii-tutis bonis sociis habentibua etiam misium. He burnt Platsea in the 
 
 prsesentia ex usu vestro constitu- courseof his marcb through Boeotia: 
 
 antia- i.e. quam si prsesentia ita ex but the Platssans had migrated, 
 
 usu vestro constituatis, ut simul before his approach, into the Pelo- 
 
 bonis sociis gratiam habeatis.' ponnese. 
 
 » Poppo makes atpavij equivalent ' Poppo (ed. mm.) approves Heil- 
 
 to .iVrt d^av^ ili-a.. msam's version of U navra,,; 'ex 
 
 ^ Poppo (ed. min.) refers Kparn- omni societate humana.' 
 ffni-ojr to the advantages gained by 
 
THE PLAT^AN DEPUTIES. i 2 5 
 
 from society, and left destitute of resource and redress ! 
 Not only does everyone of our former confederates refuse 
 us aid, but we even fear lest you, Lacedaemonians, our 
 only hope, may not prove firm friends. 
 
 58. Nevertheless, we earnestly implore you, in the 
 name of the Gods who sanctioned our former alliance, 
 and of our own services to the cause of Greece, to relent, 
 to revoke any promise you may have made to the 
 Thebans, and to ask back again of them the free gift of 
 our hves-^— to save you the shame of a massacre dis- 
 graceful to you, to ensure yourselves an honest gratitude 
 from us, instead of a base gratitude bought by serving 
 Thebes, and to prevent your reaping a harvest of infamy 
 by gratifying the vindictiveness of others. Of infamy — 
 for, though it is easy to take our lives, it will be a difficult 
 task to blot out the dishonour of the deed : since we 
 are not enemies, the natural objects of your vengeance, 
 but well-wishers, involved, by an imperious necessity, 
 in war. By allowing us, therefore, personal security, 
 you will only be deciding justly : considering,^ too, 
 before ' it is too late, that we became your prisoners by 
 free surrender, and in the sacred character of svippliants, 
 whose blood it is against the law of Greece to shed : 
 and, still more, that we have done you good service 
 throughout our career. To assure yourselves of this, 
 only glance at the tombs of your fathers, who fell by the 
 swords of the Medes, and were buried on our soil. Tear 
 by year we have publicly honoured them with robes * 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. maj.) remarks: 'Aw- " ' Kai ei, quod post uiart parti- 
 
 piav ijfi KTtivewvArwca.Yalea.t graiiam, culam positum est, responded' — 
 
 ne ocoidant, ut Goll. et Arnold acce- Poppo, ed. min. 
 
 perunt, an gratiam turn Decidendi, ' This perhaps is the force of the 
 
 seu ne vos coacti sitis necem inferre, preposition in trpopoovvrfg. 
 
 minus certum est ; sed posterius * See Dr. Arnold's note, 
 malim.' 
 
126 SPEECHES FBOM TEUOYBIDES. 
 
 and all the solemnities of mourning, and with lavish 
 offerings of the firstfruits of all the produce which the 
 various seasons elicit from our soil : the tribute of 
 friendly hands from a friendly land, and of allies to their 
 former companions in arms. By a wrongful sentence, 
 you will reverse all this. Just reflect : Pausanias ^ laid 
 your fathers in their graves in the behef that he was con- 
 signing them to a friendly soil, among a people attached 
 to them ; now, if you massacre us, and turn the territory 
 of Plataea into an appanage of Thebes, will you not in 
 effect be abandoning your fathers and kindred in an 
 enemy's land, in the midst of their murderers, no longer 
 honoured by the offerings they now receive? Besides, 
 you will be enslaving the country in which the liberation 
 of the Greeks was achieved : you will ^ be desolating the 
 temples of the Gods to whom they offered their vows 
 on the eve of their defeat of the Mede, and you will be 
 robbing the pious founders of the family sacrifices en- 
 dowed by them. 
 
 59. No, Lacedsemonians ! it is not worthy of your 
 fame to act thus, or to outrage the public opinion of 
 Greece and the memory of your ancestors: nor, un- 
 wronged yourselves, to sacrifice us, your benefactors, to 
 the enmity of a neighbouring state ; no, you should 
 spare us, and receive ^ us with softened hearts and honest 
 compassion, remembering not merely the dreadful fate we 
 shoidd be doomed to suffer, but the character of the 
 sufferers, and how little we can calculate upon whom, 
 however undeserving, calamity may some day fall. We 
 
 * Poppo (ed.maj.) quotes StraWs ed. maj. 
 statement that the graves of those ' Instead of connecting Xapovrat 
 
 who fell at Platsea were shown even with oIkt<ii, as GoUer and Arnold do, 
 
 in his day. Poppo (ed. min.) takes it as equi- 
 
 " ' Inter futura praesena est loco valent to modern reeipienies, 
 futuri.'— Haack, quoted by Poppo, 
 
TEE PLATJUAN DEPUTIES. 1 27 
 
 then, as becomes us, and as this emergency urges, implore 
 you, in the name of the Gods who are worshipped by aJl 
 Greece in common at the same ^ altars, to let our prayer 
 prevail with you : we plead the oaths your sires swoie, 
 and entreat you not to forget them : we appeal as sup- 
 phants to^ the tombs of your fathers, and we solemnly 
 invoke them, now at rest in their graves, not to sur- 
 render us to the mercy of Thebes, nor to suffer their' 
 dearest friends to be handed over to their* bitterest 
 foes. We would remind you, too, of that glorious day, 
 when, side by side with them, we won a brilliant victory, 
 and yet, on this day, are in imminent peril of the most 
 cruel doom. 
 
 In conclusion ^ — and to finish our speech is alike ne- 
 cessary and painful to men in our position, as our lives 
 will be endangered at its close — we repeat that it was 
 not to the Thebans that we surrendered our city— indeed, 
 rather than so degrade ourselves, we would have perished 
 by that most ignoble death, famine — no, it was in re- 
 liance on you that we capitulated. It is therefore only 
 fair, if we fail to persuade you, "that you should restore 
 us to our former position, and allow us to take on our 
 own shoulders all its contingent risk. At the same time 
 we earnestly beseech you that we, Platasans, the most 
 zealous champions of Grecian freedom, may not, suppli- 
 ants as we are, be severed from your custody and the 
 protection of your promise, and given up to the 
 
 ' See Poppo (ed. mm.) and Dr. ' Poppo (ed. min.) understands 
 
 Arnold, on o/io/Ja/ucotif. W'", not Tolg KtKpinKoai, to be the 
 
 * So Poppo, in both editions, takes object of rolf ix^wroiQ. My version 
 
 the phrase : but other commentators leaves the question open, 
 
 construe it : ' we kneel as suppliants ° The construction is, vavonivoi 
 
 before you in the name of the tombs Si, oirip avayxaior, k.t.\. Aayov rt- 
 
 of our fathers.' Xivrfv is epexegetical ; it explains 
 
 ' See Poppo's note (ed. min.) on the relative clause introduced by 
 
 (j,i\TaToi ovri^. oirtp. 
 
128 SPHEOHES FBOM THUOYDWES. 
 
 Thebans, our implacable foes : but that you may prove 
 yourselves om- deliverers, and refrain, whUe restoring 
 freedom to Greece, from staining your hands with our 
 blood. 
 
THE THEBAN8. 1 29 
 
 SPEECH OF THE THEBANS : 
 
 Bk. III. chs. 61-68. 
 
 The Thebans, fearing that tlie above address of tbe Plateeans 
 might make an impression on the Laced8ena.onian judges, request 
 permission to reply at length to it, which they do in the following 
 speech. 
 
 Ch. 61. We should not have asked permission to 
 speak, Lad the Platseans, on their part,-^ tersely answered 
 your question, instead of attacking us with a studied 
 invective, and indulging in a long defence of themselves 
 on points foreign to the issue — whereon, too, they were 
 never impeached — and eulogising deeds which no one 
 censured. As things are, however, we feel called upon 
 to answer their charges against us, and to sift their 
 praises of their own career : to prevent their cause being 
 furthered either by the villany they impute to us, or the 
 glory they claim for themselves : and to place you in 
 possession of the truth on both points, before you decide. 
 
 Our disagreement with them originated thus : after 
 our settlement of the rest of Bceotia, we established 
 Platsea, and, together with her, some other places, which 
 we obtained possession of by driving out a motley popu- 
 lation of various race. The Platteans, however, would 
 not condescend to recognise our supremacy, according to 
 the original agreement : and, breaking away from the 
 common interests of Boeotia, contrary to the institutions 
 of their fathers, went over, the moment we resorted to 
 
 ■• Kai. 
 
I JO SPEECHES FROM THUGYDIBES. 
 
 compulsion, to Athens, in league witli whom they did 
 us much mischief, for which they suffered in return. 
 
 62. Again,^ when the barbarian invaded Greece, they 
 say they were the only Boeotians who did not join him, 
 and it is on this pretended piece of patriotism that they 
 plume themselves and reproach us. We reply that, if 
 they did not join the Mede, it was simply because the 
 Athenians did not either : and they acted on exactly the 
 same principle,^ when Athens subsequently essayed the 
 subjugation of Greece, for then again they were the only 
 Boeotians who Atticised. But first consider, under what 
 form of government we were hving respectively, when 
 we acted thus. On our side, Thebes at that time 
 chanced to be ruled neither by that form of oligarchy 
 wherein all citizens enjoy equal laws in private hfe,^ 
 nor by a popular constitution ; our affairs were controlled 
 by a small clique invested with absolute power — of all 
 systems the one most opposed to the ascendancy of law 
 and to good government, and the closest approach to a 
 despot's * sway. These rulers, naturally supposing that, 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. maj.) says : ' parti- Bimilar (r^ airy ISiif) attack on the 
 
 culam mil nullus interpres praeter freedom of Greece,' etc. 
 
 Hier. Miill. reddidit ; nam depravat ' Dr. Arnold thus explains the 
 
 orationem, quum prius jam de aliis, term oKiyapxiav iaovo/iov ' The term 
 
 qui in Grssciam venerint, actum esse laovofioe relates to the equality of all 
 
 indicare videatur.' But surely Kai the citizens with one another, as far 
 
 simply designates the second apostasy as related to their private disputes 
 
 of the Platseans from Boeotian politics, and private injuries; whereas under 
 
 " So Heilmann and others explain that worst form of oligarchy, which 
 
 iSi<f. But it may be taken, as the was called SwauTiia, those who were 
 
 Scholiast suggests, with iovTuv. possessed of political power were 
 
 Poppo (ed. maj.) leaves the point also above the law in all private 
 
 open : but, in his ed. min., he rules matters, and could oppress their 
 
 in favour of the Scholiast. The fellow-citizens at their pleasure. — 
 
 question is of little consequence ; See Aristotle, Politics, iv. 5.' 
 for, in either construction, ISit/. as- < Poppo (ed.min.)appositelyqu0te8 
 
 Bumes nearly the same sense. If it is the dictum of Tacitus: 'Paucorum 
 
 construed with iovruiv, the passage dominatio regies libidini propior est.' 
 
 maybe rendered: 'and when, at a — Ann. yi. 42. 
 later period, the Athenians made a 
 
TSE THEBAN8. IJI 
 
 if the fortunes of the Mede should prevail, they might 
 strengthen the tenure of their own power, forcibly held 
 down the people, and enticed him on. This indeed was 
 the act of the whole community, but she had no control 
 over her own movements : and it is not fair to reproach ^ 
 her for errors committed when not under constitutional 
 rule. At any rate, you will remember that, after the 
 retreat of the Mede, when we had recovered our con- 
 stitution, and when the Athenians, having commenced their 
 career of aggression,^ were endeavouring to reduce our 
 country — most of which they already held ^ through par- 
 tisans — ^in common with the rest of Greece : you will 
 remember, we say, that the victory we gained over them 
 on the field of Coronea set Boeotia free, and that we are 
 now zealously contributing towards the emancipation of 
 our fellow Greeks, by supplying cavalry and munitions of 
 war on a larger scale than any other member of the 
 league. Such, then, is our defence against the charge of 
 joining the Mede. 
 
 63. We wUl now endeavour to show that you, citizens 
 of Plataea, rather than we, have wronged Greece, and 
 that, instead of meriting forgiveness,* you deserve the 
 severest punishment. You became confederates and 
 fellow-citizens of the Athenians with a view, as you say, 
 
 ' Thucydides characteristically B.C. 44.7. 
 
 places in the mouth of the Theban * Dr. Arnold takes a^iiirepoi to 
 
 orator a more favourable version of mean 'more worthy of all punishment 
 
 the part played by Thebes in the than we, whom you aiTect to call 
 
 great drama of the Persian war, than traitors to all Greece.' To this Bauer, 
 
 was generally current in Greece. See with whom Poppo (ed. min.) and 
 
 the note on bk. i. ch. 75. GoUer agree, objects in the following 
 
 ' The position of n and xat show terms : ' Thebanos cogitare non licet 
 
 that Poppo (ed. min.) is right in se dignos pcena confessos esse. . . . 
 
 placing a comma after iiriovruv, as Solvendusillecomparativusin/i.ifWoi/ 
 
 Dr. Arnold should have done. djioi, ut fiaWov non ad ajiot per- 
 
 * After the battle of CEnophyta, tineat, sed ad totum : d^ni estis posnd 
 
 :b.c.456. The independence of Bceotia ^ofo'ws quam venia aut beneficio.' 
 was regained in the battle of Coronea, 
 
 K 2 
 
132 SPEECBES FROM THUGYDIBES. 
 
 to wreak ^ your vengeance upon us. You ought, there- 
 fore, to have called in their aid only in relation to us, and 
 to have refrained from sharing in their aggressions on 
 other states, in which you certainly were at liberty to 
 refuse to join, if ever Athens drew you on against your 
 will, since that very Lacedaemonian confederacy against 
 the Mede, your cooperation with which is the citadel of 
 your defence, was already on foot. It was strong enough, 
 at any rate, to divert us from attacking you : and — a point 
 of the highest consequence — to allow you to lay your 
 plans in security. Yet you voluntarily, and while ^ you 
 enjoyed perfect freedom of action, espoused the Athenian 
 interest. You plead, indeed, the dishonour of abandoning 
 one's benefactors : but surely dishonour and injustice lie 
 rather in abandoning all the Greeks, whose sworn alhes 
 you were, to ruin,^ than in dissolving your alHance with 
 Athens only, as she was enslaving, and they were eman- 
 cipating, Greece. Besides, you did not repay her kindness 
 by a real equivalent : the return you made was stained 
 with disgrace. For, by your own confession, you sum- 
 moned her aid when you were oppressed : and, instead of 
 helping her when she was oppressed, you became her 
 accomplices in oppressing others. Yet the real dishonour 
 consists in not requiting a favour by an honest equivalent, 
 rather than in failing to acknowledge it by a com- 
 pensation which, if due in justice, can only be paid in 
 infamy.* 
 
 » See Poppo, ed. min. •* Dr. Arnold thus _ explains the 
 
 " Poppo (ed. min.) points the passage: 'The sense is as foUo-ws: 
 
 allusion to the passage (ch. 55) in " When men call ingratitude a crime, 
 
 the speech of the Platseans, where they mean by ingratitude the not 
 
 they describe themselves as, at one returning an honourable kindness 
 
 time hard pressed by Thebes. when it can be done honourably: 
 
 s Poppo (ed. maj . ) endorses Bloom- they do not m ean to blame him -who 
 
 field's notion of the relative force of does not return a kindness, however 
 
 ^p..?ovvat and KaranpcSo-vva,. j ustly due, when he cannot return it 
 
TEE THEBANS. 133 
 
 64. You made it quite clear, too, that even if, at the 
 time of the Persian invasion, you were the only Boeotian 
 state that refrained from joining the Mede, it was not 
 from patriotic motives, but because the Athenians did the 
 same. Yes, you refused to aid the Mede, because you 
 wished to follow the policy of Athens, in opposition to 
 the interests of Greece.^ Yet you now claim the benefit 
 of a patriotism due only to the influence of others. But 
 this is unreasonable : you chose the Athenians : follow, 
 then, their fortunes in the struggle : and do not appeal to 
 the alliance formerly made against the Persians as any 
 title to protection now. You disowned it : you violated 
 it, by promoting instead of actively resisting the enslave- 
 ment of the ^ginetans and some others ^ of your feUow- 
 confederates : and that, when, so far ^ from being under 
 constraint, you were living under the laws which have 
 ruled you to the present hour, and no one had despotic 
 control over you, as our oligarchs had over us. Besides, 
 you persisted in declining* the final proposal which, 
 before commencing the siege, we made to you, engaging 
 to secure you from molestation on condition of your 
 
 ■without a crime.'' So Cicero {De it did not suit his purpose. On this 
 
 Officiis, i. T s) : " Non reddere bene- Poppo remarks: 'At, quanquam 
 
 flcium (jifi avriSiSovai x"!"'") "^^^^ Boeoti prsecipue intelliguntur, tamen, 
 
 bono non licet {alaxpov), modo id ut verba scripta sunt, nihil nisi rolg 
 
 facere possit sine injuriS, (rac o^oi'as "EXXijoi cum Schol. suppleri posse 
 
 xapiToe)." But if it can only be apparet.' 
 
 returned cum injuria (sc n^nciav (iTTo- ' Such as Thasos (bk. i. loi), 
 
 ^iJo/iivos), then the not returning it Samos, Byzantium (i. 117), and 
 
 (jifi dvTiSiSovai) ia allowable in a others. As to.iEgina, see bk. i, 105, 
 
 good man (ouk aiaxpov')J 108. 
 
 * Poppo (ed. min.) rather sum- ^ The use of oSre and re shows 
 
 marily refers rale Ik to "EWriai, on that dKovrie and Exoirtt;, K.r.A., are 
 
 the Scholiast's authority. In his intended to stand in the broadest 
 
 ed. maj. he cites the following com- opposition to each other, 
 mentary of Dukas on relets' 'BoiwroTg * ' Imperfectum iSixiaSt positum 
 
 SriXovoTi' dW airtauivTiai tovto o Tidetur, quoniam ssepius legati ultro 
 
 e)j/3aioe ivTavOa, wg im Kvvayiovilo- citroque missi sunt.' — Poppo, ed. 
 
 fuvov auTif iv Tif Xoyif),' i. e. because min. 
 
''34 SPEEOSES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 strict neutrality. Can any other state, then, rival your 
 pretensions to the hatred of all Greece, since the good 
 qualities you held up to admiration were used only to 
 injure her ? you have publicly proved that you have no 
 longer any title to the virtues which you pretend you 
 once possessed : the aspirations you had always at heart 
 were laid open and proved to conviction, when you 
 joined Athens in her career along the path of iniquity. 
 Such, then, are the remarks we have to offer, touching 
 our involuntary alliance with the Mede and your wilful 
 conspiracy with Athens. 
 
 65. As to the last outrage which you represent your- 
 selves to have suffered in our — as you call it — illegal 
 assault on your city during a truce and on a holyday : we 
 do not consider that even on that occasion we were so 
 much to blame as yourselves.^ No doubt, if we, un- 
 solicited,^ attacked your city in arms, and ravaged your 
 territory as foes, we were ^ in the wrong ; but if, as was 
 the case, the richest and noblest of your citizens, in their 
 anxiety to withdraw you from an alien alliance, and to 
 reunite you to the common confederacy of Boeotia, of 
 their own free wiU invoked our aid — of what crime were 
 we guilty ? To quote * your own words, the real trans- 
 gressors are the instigators, not their followers. In our 
 opinion, however, neither they nor we were in the wrong. 
 They, like you, were citizens of Platsea : only they had a 
 larger stake in the land ; and, in throwing open their 
 gates and admitting us, not as enemies, but as friends, 
 into their city, they aimed at reforming their disaffected ® 
 
 ' ' Minus quam vos, non tarn nos * ' Eespicitur ad Terba cap. 55.' — 
 
 quam vos.' — Poppo, ed. maj. Poppo, ed. min. 
 
 ' AvTni, i.e. 'nostra sponte.' — * The full expression -would be 
 
 Poppo, ed. min. pijicln yeveo9ai X''P»"S l^aXXov tj aya- 
 
 ' ' Perfecti vim habet pr»sens 0(ivg. The 01 x"P<>vs are of course 
 
 ahKovuiv.^ ^Poppo, ed. min. the partisans of the Athenian, the oi . 
 
TSE THSBANS. 135 
 
 fellow-citizens, and rewaxding the well-disposed with the 
 honours they deserved ; acting, in fact, as censors of your 
 political principles, and — without banishing^ members 
 of the opposite party from their native city, trying to 
 bring that city home to the brotherhood of a common 
 race ; besides, they involved you in enmity with none, 
 but left you equally at peace with all. 
 
 66. Indeed, we can prove that we were acting in no 
 hostile spirit: we did not injure a single Plataean, and 
 we called upon all who wished to be governed by the 
 ancestral system of Boeotia, to come over to us. You 
 willingly joined us, and, after coming to an agreement, 
 kept quiet for a time, till you noticed the smaUness of our 
 force : and then — even allowing that we acted rather 
 inconsiderately in entering your city without the consent 
 of your commons — still you did not treat us as we treated 
 you, by refraining from acts of violence, and resorting to 
 expostulation to induce our men to retire. On the con- 
 trary, you attacked them in violation of the agreement : 
 and — though we are not so indignant at the fate of those 
 whom you slew in hot blood, there certainly being some 
 warrant for their treatment — yet how can we acquit you 
 of a fearful crime, when you lawlessly massacred others 
 in the act of stretching forth their suppliant hands, after 
 giving them quarter, and afterwards promising us to 
 spare their lives ? Nevertheless, after consummating three 
 atrocities in a very short interval — in your breach of the 
 agreement, in the subsequent murder of your prisoners, 
 
 ajidvovQ the satellites of the Thehan Conservatives, as opposed to tho 
 
 connection. Similarly, Theognis ' populaies,' the popular party, 
 
 lavishes the epithets xpi'"'''' ^^^ ' ' Sensus est, " ab urhe cives non 
 
 ayaQoi upon the aristocrats, xaKol, abalienantes, sed urbem suorum con- 
 
 K.T.\., on the democrats of his day. sanguineorum foederi adjungentes." ' 
 
 In Cicero's political vocabulary, too, — Goller. Poppo(ed.min.) approves 
 
 the 'boni' are the 'optimates/ or this. 
 
136 8PEEGEE8 FROM THUOYDIDES. 
 
 and in tlie violation of your engagement not to spili their 
 blood, provided we did not injure your property in the 
 country — in the face of all this, you contend that we were 
 the transgressors, and deny your hability to punishment. 
 Not so ! at any rate if the Lacedeemonians here present 
 rightly decide : you shall suffer once for all the penalty 
 due to all these crimes. 
 
 67. We have entered into this detail, Lacedemonians, 
 both in your and our own behalf, to convince you that 
 you will be acting justly in condemning them, and to 
 assure ourselves that our revenge will be even more 
 righteous than your sentence.^ Eelent not, then, at the 
 recital of their former public services, if indeed they ever 
 rendered any : for, though heroic deeds are the true 
 defence of the oppressed, they entail a double penalty 
 on the authors of a shameful act, because the offence is 
 out of keeping with their character. Nor suffer them to 
 move you to mercy by their piteous lamentations, and 
 appeals to the tombs of your fathers, and their own 
 forlorn desolation. For we can declare, in refutation of 
 their claims, that our youth, massacred, by their hands, 
 suffered a far more cruel fate : our youth, some of whose 
 fathers died on the field of Coronea, struggling to 
 restore Boeotia to your confederacy : while others, left 
 lonely in their old age, amid desolated homes, address to 
 you a far more righteous prayer to avenge them on their 
 murderers. And, surely, if anyone deserves compassion, 
 it is the victims of a flagrant outrage : the victims, on the 
 contrary, of a merited chastisement, like these Platasans, 
 may expect men to smile at their woe. Their present 
 desolation, too, is all their own fault, as it springs from 
 their wilful rejection of better allies. No provocation on 
 
 ' I have followed Poppo (ed. ruin.) in placing a full stop after Teriftrnprf 
 
THE THE BANS. 137 
 
 our part led to their atrocious act : they condemned our 
 men rather from hatred than a sense of justice ; and even 
 now the penalty they have to pay ^ is no equivalent : for 
 they will suffer by judicial sentence — not, as they pre- 
 tend, as prisoners of war suing for mercy, but as men 
 who by formal compact have surrendered themselves to 
 justice. Vindicate, then, Lacedasmonians, the^ law of 
 Greece, violated by these men : and reward us, sufferers 
 from a lawless outrage, by a just return for our zealous 
 support of your interests, instead of allowing us to be 
 pushed aside and supplanted in your favour by their 
 eloquent appeal. Let Greece read in their fate a warn- 
 ing that, when you open the lists, it is not to reward 
 declamation,^ but deeds : a brief relation of which is 
 sufficient, when they are honest : and whose deformity, 
 when they are immoral, the artificial ornaments of rheto- 
 ric only serve to veil. If, however, the representatives 
 of ruling states were to punish criminals by their merits, 
 without * heeding their arguments, as you will be doing 
 now, if you summarily * pronounce sentence on all these 
 men collectively, people would be less disposed to seek fan- 
 words to screen evil deeds. 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) gives a quasi- Thebans were privy to the inten- 
 
 future or anticipatory sense to dvTa- tions of the judges. 
 
 TToSovrig, construing the clause, ' See Poppo's note (ed. min.) ex- 
 
 ' utpote qui non rependerint sequam plaining the iasertion of mi before 
 
 poenam (quum supplicio aflfecti fu- T<f rwr, k.t.x. 
 
 erint).' He shows that Dr. Arnold's ' A satirical allusion to the rhe- 
 
 explanation cannot stand, because, torioal contests so popular at Athens, 
 
 if it is accepted, we must supply the but not equally acceptable at Sparta, 
 
 words — ' in surrendering themselves — Poppo, ed. min. 
 
 to justice : ' the omission of which * Dr. Arnold ingeniously supplies 
 
 would have been a great breach of the omissions, and elucidates the 
 
 clearness on the historian's part. In curious confusion, of this passage, 
 
 the aorist, ai'TajroSovne, Thucydides ^ GoUer regards KnpaXaiMaavnt as 
 
 seems to me to make the Thebau conveying a hint to the Lacedaj- 
 
 orator speak, naturally enough, as if monians to base the issue on a literal 
 
 he had the Lacedaemonian sentence answer to the summary question 
 
 of death in his pocket. For the addressed by them to the Platseans. 
 
138 SPEECHES FROM THUOYBIDES. 
 
 SPEECH OF DEMOSTHENES 
 
 To his soldiers at Pylos. Bk. IV. ch. 10. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Demosthenes, tlie Athenian commander, took advantage of the 
 accidental detention of the Athenian fleet, B.C. 425, in the harbour 
 of Pylos, on the Messenian coast, to construct a fort on the shore 
 by way of occupying a post on the enemy's territory. On receiving 
 intelligence of this descent, the Spartans -withdrew their forces from 
 Attica, and, with the aid of the Peloponnesian fleet of forty-three 
 triremes, which had been recalled from Corcyra, and approached 
 Pylos about the same time as the land forces from Lacedsemon, 
 made an attempt to dislodge the Athenians from their position. 
 Thereupon Demosthenes called upon his men to defend the fort to 
 the last : and to guard the line of the sea-shore, so as to prevent the 
 enemy from landing. 
 
 Ch. 10. Soldiers, my comrades in this adventurous 
 enterprise ! in an emergency like ours, none of you should 
 try to show his ingenuity by computing the degree of 
 danger with which we are threatened ; you should all 
 resolve ^ to charge the enemy home in the reckless spirit 
 of a sanguine confidence, and then you wiU^ probably 
 weather the peril, great as it is. For, when matters have 
 reached a crisis, as in our case, they wiU not brook cal- 
 culation, but demand the earliest venture. And I do 
 believe the odds are on our side, if we resolutely hold 
 
 ' Gbller rightly repeats ^ovXhOu ever Ced. min.), supports Dr. Arnold 
 
 and supplies iKauTog before, ^wp^irat • in assigning to the words a future 
 
 but surely it is not necessary to follow or contingent sense far more relevant 
 
 him, as neither does Poppo(ed. min.), to the context. He explaios the 
 
 in repeating Sokuv also. clause as equivalent to, eirii, el o/ioVe 
 
 " Goller says av vepiyevo/uvog y^Mprjam, xa't Ik tovtidv av iripiyhoiro, 
 ' prseteriti vim habet.' Poppo, how- 
 
DEMOSTHENES. 139 
 
 the position, instead of surrendering the vantage ground 
 we possess to a panic inspired by the enemy's superiority 
 in numbers. On the one hand, I consider the difficulty 
 of landing on this beach in our favour ; for, if we stand 
 fast, it is our ally : whereas, if we once fall back, though 
 the ground is rugged, it will become easy of access, when 
 there is no one to oppose a landing. We should also find 
 the enemy more formidable, because his retreat will not 
 be easily efiected, supposing he should^ be hard pressed 
 by us. And ^ it will be a harder task to repulse him 
 when on shore : for though it is very easy to keep him 
 off while on shipboard, yet the moment he disembarks he 
 win be on the same footing with us. On the other hand, 
 we need not be very much afraid of his superior num- 
 bers : for his troops, though numerous, will have to fight 
 in small detachments, because they have no room to 
 moor their ships in a fine close to the shore ; and we 
 have not got to do with an army on land, exceeding us 
 in numbers, and equal to us in other respects, but with 
 one on board ship : and ships, to act with effect, require 
 the concurrence of many favourable accidents at sea. 
 So that I think our inferiority of force balanced by the 
 difficulties of our foes : and I call upon you, Athenians 
 as you are, who know from experience that a naval 
 
 ' The force of xal, so often used to lowing words : pmZiaBai Sk avrbv Iv 
 
 give emphasis, may perhaps be best 75 x"^"''"'"'/""' £<"■<"! without which 
 
 expressed by italics. Klotz (Devar. the passage is unintelligible. The 
 
 vol. ii. p. 634) gives many such in- difficulty arises from the argumenta- 
 
 stances, and, among them, the fol- tive connection between the clause 
 
 lowing line of Xenophon {Sell, iii, itri yap raii; vavaij r.t.X.j and the 
 
 3, 11): rjpovTo Sc, ri Kal povXofiivoQ first clause of the preceding sentence, 
 
 TttvTa irpaTToi; 'what he meant by which thus requires to be in some 
 
 acting thus.' form repeated. Poppo (ed. min.) 
 
 " Arnold, in explaining this text, connects the two sentences by a 
 
 omits to connect the sense of the link, differing verbally from, but 
 
 clause in-i yap raig vavai, k.t.\., with similar in sense to, that proposed by 
 
 the preceding sentence. GoUer aptly GoUer : ' And he will fight more 
 
 sappliee the missing link by the fol- desperately : ' for though, etc. 
 
14° SPEECHES FROM THUGYVIDES. 
 
 descent ^ on an enemy's coast cannot be effected by force, 
 if the opposing troops stand firm, and do not give way 
 from fear of the breakers, and the imposing approach of 
 the ships as they bear down : I call upon you to support 
 me^ in holding our ground now, and by fighting close to 
 the margin of the surf to save at once yourselves and the 
 fort. 
 
 ^ Poppo (ed. min.) and Giiller ject of pialom. 
 agree with Kriiger's idea of tte con- ' ' Kal avrouc bene Haack : verbis 
 
 struotion of this passage. He regards "ipsos quoque" videtur exprimere, 
 
 vavTisrjv airo^amv as the accusative ut respiciatur ad Demosthenem litus 
 
 by attraction, and maies it the sub- non relicturum.' — Poppo, ed. min. 
 
THE LACHD^MONIAN AMBASSADORS. 1 41 
 
 SPEECH OF THE LACEDAEMONIAN AMBASSADORS 
 
 Before the Athenian popular assembly, b.c. 425. Bk. lY. chs. 17-21. 
 
 IKTMODUCTIOm 
 
 The Lacedsemonians, having been twice defeated at Pylos, purcTiase 
 an armistice by surrendering all their ships to the Athenians, to be 
 restored on the final conclusion or rupture of the negotiations : and 
 allowing them to secure the detention of the Lacedsemonian soldiers 
 cut off in the isle of Sphaoteria. At the same time they despatched 
 an embassy to Athens, to treat for peace : the spokesman of which 
 delivered the following speech.' 
 
 Ch. 17. Laced^mon^ despatched us, Athenians, with 
 ample powers to negotiate, on behalf of our troops on the 
 island, any terms we may show to be advantageous to 
 you, and likely, at the same^ time, so far as circum- 
 stances admit, to prove creditable to us in our present 
 disaster. And, if we now address you at more than 
 ordinary length, it will be no violation of custom : for, 
 though we are not in the habit of using many words 
 when few suffice, we are ready to speak at length, when- 
 ever a detailed exposition of the main points of a case is 
 essential to the fulfilment of our mission. 
 
 Do not suppose for a moment that we are addressing 
 
 ' See Grote, Sist. of Greece, vol. vi. scruple as the Spartan general Mene- 
 
 p. 440. dseus during the preceding year, when 
 
 ^ Grote (vol. vi. p. 444) remarks : he abandoned his Ambraciot con- 
 
 ' On this occasion the Lacedsemonians federates after the battle of Olpse, to 
 
 acted entirely for themselves and conclude a separate capitulation with 
 
 ^om consideration of their own ne- Demosthenes.' 
 
 cessities ; severing themselves from ' ' To aire, idem, i. e. simul.'— 
 
 their allies, and soliciting a special Poppo, ed. min. 
 peace for themselves, with as little 
 
142 8PEE0EES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 you in a spirit of hostility, or as if we were lecturing a 
 half-educated audience in you : look upon us as merely 
 suggesting, to men familiar with poUtical ethics, the 
 principles of an equitable decision. You ^ have now the 
 opportunity of establishing your present prosperity on a 
 firm basis : you may retain^ your existing possessions, and 
 at the same time add to your honour and glory : and 
 you may avoid the fate common to men blessed with 
 unusual good fortune : for hope is ever tempting them 
 to grasp at more, since even their present success exceeds 
 their expectations. Those, on the contrary, who have 
 experienced constant alternations of prosperity and dis- 
 aster, may fairly be expected to have learnt a strong 
 distrust^ of good fortune. A sentiment we may well 
 suppose would be very sensibly felt by your countrymen, 
 owing to their wide experience, as well as by ourselves. 
 
 1 8. A glance at our present disaster will, among 
 other examples,* convince you of the instability of fortune : 
 for we, who had the proudest name in Greece, are now 
 here as your suitors : though, previously, we considered 
 it rather our privilege than yours to grant those favours 
 which we have now repaired to you to entreat. Tet 
 it was neither from a decline of power, nor from arrogance 
 
 ^ Tap is not argumentative here : ' In the expression icai AmaroTaToi, 
 
 it is simply used to introduce the nai is apparently used to compare 
 
 viroiivriaiq mentioned in the preced- the idea of the result with that of 
 
 ing sentence. In such cases, no in- the cause, and to show the closeness 
 
 troductory particle is used by the of the connection between them. 
 
 English idiom: in Latin, as Klotz See the passage cited from Klotz, 
 
 (Devar.) has shown (vol. ii. p. 234), Devar., note ', p. 41. It is possible, 
 
 igitur corresponds to it. however, that it may tacitly compare 
 
 '^ Poppo points out that, when the the idea expressed by oTrio-T-oraroi, 
 
 Lacedaemonians and Athenians came it.t.A., with some other idea latent 
 
 to an understanding, one of the in the writer's mind. The passage 
 
 articles was that they should re- might then be rendered ' may fairly 
 
 spectively retain the places they be expected to have learnt, among 
 
 possessed at the time — kartpous txtw other lessons, a strong distrust,' etc, 
 liirep ixovaiv. — Ch. 1 1 8, below. * Kal. See note ', p. 2. 
 
THE LAGEDJEMONIAN AMBASSADORS. 143 
 
 caused by large accessions to it, that we suffered this ^ 
 calamity : but simply because, while in command ^ of our 
 ordinary resources, our calculations failed us : a con- 
 tingency in which all men are liable to disaster.^ It 
 would therefore be irrational in you to infer, from the 
 present strength of your city and her acquisitions, that 
 fortune must needs* prove your constant ally. Those 
 politicians are wise, who act on the safe principle of 
 regarding prosperity as a prize they may lose : (such 
 men, too, would meet calamity in a more intelhgent 
 spirit than others) and who believe that war wiU not 
 exactly confine itself to the hmited sphere within which 
 they may desire to deal with it, but will foUow its own ^ 
 varying fortunes. Men of this stamp, as they would not 
 be carried away by a blind confidence in military success, 
 would at once be the last to miscarry, and the first to 
 come to terms in their hour of triumph. And this, 
 Athenians, you have now an excellent opportunity of 
 doing : and of avoiding, by a reconcihation with us, aU 
 future imputation — in the very possible contingency of 
 your meeting with a disaster through refusing our over- 
 tures — of owing even your present successes to chance, 
 when you might bequeath to posterity a reputation for 
 power and wisdom, which nothing could endanger. 
 
 19. The Lacedaemonians now invite you to a truce 
 
 ' See note ^, p. 3, on the peculiar tvxvc. It connects together, more 
 
 use of aiiTo for tovto by Thucydides. closely, the two ideas : that of the 
 
 " Poppo (ed. maj.), commenting present strength of Athens, and the 
 
 on the phrase ajrb tUv ad inrap- question of the constancy of fortune. 
 
 XovTuv, says : ' Sententiam his verbis See Wolf, on Leptin. p. 230. Comp. 
 
 recte exprimit Port. ; quum pristmam note ', p. ii 5. 
 
 potentiam ohtineremus. 'Ait hie non, ' ' Pluralis airiiv aut ad avSpac, 
 
 ut ssepe post articulum, est M?iMs^o«< subjectum orationis, aut ad partes 
 
 dlterum, sed perpetuus, constans.' belli, quae insunt in eollectivo oaov 
 
 ' To avTo- lit. 'to the same fate.' av idpog, referri potest.' — Poppo, ed, 
 
 * Such, perhaps, is the force of the min. 
 particle icai which precedes to riji; 
 
144- SPEUGEE8 FBOM THUGTDIDBS. 
 
 and a termination of hostilities, tendering to you peace 
 and alliance, and, besides,^ the reciprocal maintenance of 
 very friendly and intimate relations : soHciting, in return, 
 the liberation of our troops in Sphacteria, and thinking 
 it better for both parties not to prolong the dangers of 
 the situation, for the chance of our men either forcing 
 their way out of the island, should any means of escape 
 offer : or of their being consigned to an even worse fate 
 in the event of their position being stormed. We believe, 
 too, that bitter enmities are most likely to be effectually 
 cancelled, not when a belligerent insists on retaliation, 
 and, because the balance of military success has been on 
 his side, binds his adversary by stringent oaths to un- 
 equal terms of composition: but when, with full power 
 to do all this, he consults equity, vanquishes his antago- 
 nist^ by his generosity, and disappoints his fears by 
 concluding a peace on moderate conditions. For as the 
 adversary has then no debt of retaliation to pay, as if he 
 had been forcibly coerced, but a debt of kindness, he is 
 the more disposed, fi'om a sense of honour, to abide by 
 the terms of the compact. Men, too, are more apt to 
 grant their greatest enemies moderate conditions,^ than 
 those with whom they are at issue on minor points : and 
 it is their nature, when their antagonists voluntarily make 
 concessions, to take a pleasure in meeting them halfway : 
 while they confront overbearing pretensions with a reso- 
 lution to run all risks, even against their better judgment. 
 20. Now, if ever, a fair opportunity of coming to 
 terms presents itself to both of us, before we are over- 
 
 ' 'AWtjv. ' Poppo (ed. maj.) rightly cen- 
 
 " AvTov viKrianQ, a reading not de- sures Gbller for referring tovto Spannv 
 
 void of authority, and preferred by to ?-6 avrniivnaPm. He explains. 
 
 Arnold and Bloomfield, suits' the tovto as equivalent to 7-6 iiiTpms 
 
 sense better than airb vncqnac, which ^iraWoyijvcri. 
 
 Poppo (ed. min.) and GoUer retain. 
 
THE LACEDEMONIAN AMBASSABOBS. 14^ 
 
 taken, meanwhile, by some irreparable disaster, a con- 
 tingency in which we must of necessity cherish an un- 
 dying enmity towards you, on private^ as well as on 
 national grounds : while you will lose the advantages we 
 now proffer to you. Let us, then, while the issue is still 
 pending, while honour and our friendship are flowing in 
 upon you : while we can forestall a disgrace and make a 
 tolerable compromise with our disaster : let us be recon- 
 ciled : let us choose peace instead of war for ourselves, 
 and secure a respite from suffering to the rest of the 
 Greeks, who,^ we must add, will look upon you as the 
 main instruments of their release. For at present they 
 find themselves involved in war without knowing which 
 of the leading states gave the provocation : whereas, if a 
 pacification is effected — a question of which you are now 
 the main arbiters — their gratitude will fall to you. Be- 
 sides, by thus deciding, you may make firm friends of the 
 Lacedasmonians, as you wiU be accepting their own invi- 
 tation to peace, and, instead of extorting a concession, 
 will have- granted' a favour. Finally, consider the 
 many advantages in all probability involved in this 
 course : for, when you and we agree, the rest of Greece 
 will assuredly, from inferiority of power, as you know, 
 pay us the greatest deference.* 
 
 * See Dr. Arnold's explanation, rr/v ilprjv^v, i/tae vofuovaiv aWm- 
 
 It is approved liy Poppo, ed. min. rkpov^. 
 
 " Kai, as Klotz shows (vol. ii. ' Poppo (ed. min.) remarks on the 
 
 p. 636), is often added to relatives participles x''P""'f^i'">'^e and jStaaa- 
 
 merely to emphasise the idea they pivoig, ' aoristi participia vim hahent 
 
 introduce. Thus, Plato (Laches, p. futurorum exactorum.' 
 
 198,9): jyyoi/iEflo S' rifUic Suva, fiiv * Aristophanes holds out the same 
 
 sivat & Kai 6eoq Trapix^i, QappaKia de, inducement to peace between Athens 
 
 d /ii) Jsof vapsx^i. — The Scholiast and Sparta: iKov ttiruaaiiivoit xoivy 
 
 explains the clause by the following Tijg 'EXKaloe apx^iv. — Pac, 104.8, 
 paraphrase : iv rif yeviaBai StiXovon 
 
h6 speboees fbom teuoybides. 
 
 SPEECH OF HEEMOCEATES, 
 
 The representative of Syracuse, at the Congress of SiciKan States held at Gda, B.C. 424. 
 Bk. IV. chs. 59-65. 
 
 INTBOD UCTION. 
 
 At the outbreak of tlie Peloponnesian War, Sparta could count on 
 the sympathy, though not on the active cooperation, of most of the 
 Dorian cities in Sicily — such as Syracuse, Camarina, Gela, Agri- 
 gentum and Selinns, together with the Italian comm.unities of 
 Loori and Tarentiun. Instead, however, of aiding Sparta with the 
 naval armament which, on commencing the war in 431 B.C., she 
 expected from them (Thucyd. ii. 7), they thought it better policy 
 to turn their arms against the Ionic or Chalcidic cities in their own 
 country — viz. Naxos, Catana, and Leontini ; who, hard pressed by 
 their assailants, applied, in the summer of 427 B.C., to Athens for 
 aid ; a petition in which they were joined by the Dorian Camarina, 
 who had much to fear from the ambition of her powerful neighbour, 
 Syracuse, and by the ItaUaji Rhegium. Athens, who had every- 
 thing to gain by checking a 'Dorian supremacy in Sicily, which 
 might have ensured the Lacedaemonians active support, complied 
 with the request, and despatched a squadron of twenty triremes in 
 the year 426 B.C. Their operations, under Laches, met with some 
 success ; afterwards, however, di£B.culties arose : reinforcements were 
 applied for : and a fleet of forty sail left the Piraeus, under the com- 
 mand of Eurymedon and Sophocles. Their presence in the Sicilian 
 waters, combined with the impression produced by the recent de- 
 cisive triumph of the Athenian arms at Sphacteria, intimidated the 
 Sicilian Dorians, and made them eager to forestall Athenian en- 
 croachments by coming to terms with the Chalcidic cities. Ac- 
 cordingly, deputies from the several states were invited to attend a 
 congress at Gela, which met in the spring of the year 424 B.C., when 
 Hermocrates, the representative of Syracuse, the most powerful 
 city in Sicily, delivered the following speech, in which he strongly 
 urges a general pacification as the common interest of aU. 
 
HBBMOGBA TE8. 1 47 
 
 Ch. 59. In the address I am about to deliver, Siceliots, 
 I do not speak as a member either of a weak state, which 
 has most to fear from war, or of one distressed beyond 
 others by recent hostihties ; I speak as the advocate of 
 what seems to me the best policy for the national interest 
 of all Sicily. As to the hardships of war in the abstract, 
 what purpose could I serve by singling out all the horrors 
 it involves, and detailing them at length to an audience 
 familiar with the subject ? Inexperience of those hard- 
 ships has no more power to tempt a man to go to war, 
 than fear has to divert him from it, if he imagines he can 
 gain any advantage by it. The fact is, some ^ men think 
 the prospective gain of war outweighs its risks : others, 
 again, are willing to brave all its dangers rather than 
 brook the slightest immediate loss. If, however, two 
 belligerent powers happen to be exchanging hostilities at 
 a time which suits neither, recommendations to peace are 
 seasonable enough. And, if we believe this to be the 
 case with us'^ at the present time, such advice might 
 prove of the utmost value. It^ was, I presume,* with 
 the view^ of obtaining a satisfactory adjustment of our 
 
 ' I have followed Heilmann and at war with each other at times un- 
 Poppo (ed. min.) and Gbller's second favourable to both.' 
 edition, in taking rolj ^liv and oi Si ^ The connection, marked by yap, 
 as ec[uivalent to the Latin alii — alii : between this sentence and its pre- 
 not, as Gbller did in his first edition, decessor, seems to be this. This is 
 to alteri — alteri. He had formerly the time for such recommendations 
 connected the two clauses of this of peace : for, unless the belligerents 
 sentence, respectively, with the cor- can he persuaded that further con- 
 responding members of the preceding tention will be unseasonable, there 
 one. is much reason to expect a renewal 
 
 ^ Perhaps the force of the particle of hostilities. See note ', p. 1+2. 
 
 ipai, which precedes )7;iili', may be best . ^ Poppo justly rebukes Gottl. for 
 
 given by italicising the English pro- attaching an ironical sense to 5^ 
 
 noun ' us.' If the meaning of Kai is here. 
 
 to be fully expressed, it must be ^ BouXo'/uevoi, a various reading, 
 
 rendered somewhat as follows: 'if yields a fitter sense than iSouXem/iti/oi 
 
 we believed this to he the case with here. 
 US, as well as with other belligerents 
 
 L 2 
 
148 SPEECHES FBOM THVOYDIBES. 
 
 several special interests, that we originally took up arms :- 
 we are now trying to effect a reconciliation with each- 
 other by holding conferences on the questions at issue : but 
 there is every prospect of our resuming hostilities, should 
 the representatives of the several states eventually fail to 
 obtain equitable terms, before they leave Gela. 
 
 60. However, you must remember that the business 
 of this Congress, if we are wise, is not to discuss special 
 interests only, but to consider whether we may still be 
 able to save all Sicily, attacked, I sincerely believe, by 
 the machinations of Athens. The Athenians you may 
 certainly regard as far more cogent mediators in our 
 domestic difficulties than any arguments of mine ; they 
 represent the strongest power in Greece, and are at hand, 
 with a small ^ squadron, watching our mistakes : and, 
 while pretending to act as the rightful allies of Chalcis, 
 are, with a decent regard for appearances, turning their 
 inborn hatred of us to excellent account.^ Now,^ if we 
 go to war with one another, and invite their arbitration 
 — ^ready as they are, unsolicited, to send expeditions even 
 to those who never summoned them — if, I say, we spend 
 our revenues in ruining each other, and at the same time 
 pave the way for their ascendancy : we may fairly expect 
 that, when they see we are worn out by war, they will 
 some day appear again with a larger armament, and 
 endeavour to subject all Sicily to their sway. 
 
 61. If, however, we call in foreign aid at all, and 
 thereby* expose ourselves to danger, it ought surely, if 
 
 ^ See Mr. Grote's note, vol. vii. iroXeutor ad Atheniensium cupidita- 
 
 p. 1 88. tern Sicilise expugnandae refertur.' 
 
 * The Scholiast, quoted by Dr. ' Vap, as Qottl. and Poppo (ed. 
 
 Arnold, wastes "his ingenuity in a min.) remark, refers to SiaXXaKrac, 
 
 prolix paiaphrase of this sentence, not to the concluding clauses of the 
 
 ■which admits of a literal rendering, previous sentence. 
 As Poppo (ed. min.) says, ^ to piirii * Poppo's interpretation (ed. min.) 
 
HERM0GBATE8. 149 
 
 we know our own iaterests, to be with tte view of 
 enriching our several territories by fresh acquisitions, in- 
 stead of damaging our actual possessions. And we may 
 fairly recognise in faction the deadly enemy of our various 
 states and of all Sicily : since it renders the whole po- 
 pulation of the island, while its cities are divided by feuds, 
 the common prey of foreign intrigue. In this conviction, 
 let us aU make peace with each other, citizen with citizen, 
 city with city, and strive by common effort to ensure the 
 safety of all Sicily ; and let no one imagine that, while 
 the Dorians among us are the natural enemies of Athens, 
 the Chalcidic population is protected by its Ionian blood. 
 Athens is attacking us, not because our country is di- 
 vided ^ between two races, one of which she hates, but 
 because she is longing for the good things of Sicily, 
 our common property. Her motives clearly betrayed 
 themselves recently, when the Chalcidic states invited her 
 interference : for she then went further,* in her zeal, than 
 her engagements required, in giving the full benefit of 
 the treaty^ to confederates from whom she never yet 
 received a particle of the aid stipulated by the bond of 
 alhance. 
 
 Now, I can well forgive the Athenians for the ambiti- 
 ous spirit and the political foresight thus displayed ; it is 
 not the lovers of empire that I blame, but those who are 
 
 of trpoaXafi^avtw ttvSvvove Seems the case before ■jrifvKe, 
 
 best : ' pericula, quae cum hac soci- " Portus, quoted by Dr. Arnold, 
 
 Drum invitatione cohaerent, susci- takes nSXKov to mean, ' rather than 
 
 pere.' He thinks irponX, kivS. means demand aid of them.' But it seems 
 
 simply 'suscipere pericula:' not, as better to follow Dobree and Poppo 
 
 Dr. Arnold insists, ' add to existing (ed. min.), and to take fiaXXov aa 
 
 dangers.' governing awQiiKJig. The words, 
 
 ^ I have followed Poppo (ed. min.) fully expressed, would run as follows: 
 
 andGoller, who strike out the comma to SUaiov [r^g ?t/ve»)Kije] iioKXov Tfjq 
 
 before on Uxa tte^uks, and translate KwOriKtig, which is equivalent to 
 
 ' quod Sicilia in duas partes divisa fiaWov if Kara rf/v ivvGi^Kriv. 
 
 est,' making 4 SiteXia the nominative ' See Thucydides, iii. 86. 
 
15° SPEECHES FROM TEUGYDIDES. 
 
 too. ready ^ to submit. For man is naturally prone to 
 domineer over the yielding, but to be shy of meddling 
 with the strong.^ Those among us who know all this, 
 yet fail to take proper precautions : or who have entered 
 this Congress without a conviction that the first care of all 
 of us should be to make a good settlement of a question 
 formidable to all : have made a mistake. A reconcilia- 
 tion with one another would prove our speediest deliver- 
 ance from the danger ; the Athenians would then have 
 nothing to do ; for they are not coming direct from their 
 own country, but from those cities which invited them. 
 If we follow this course, we shall not have one war 
 concluded by another, but domestic differences easily 
 adjusted by peace; and the foreign auxiliaries, who 
 visited our shores with excellent pretexts for doing 
 wrong, will leave them with exceUeut reasons for doing 
 nothing. 
 
 62. So far, then, as the Athenians are concerned, 
 such are found to be the advantages of sound policy on 
 our part. And, as peace is universally held to be the 
 greatest of blessings, why should we not make it among 
 oiu-selves ? ^ Unless, indeed, you really believe that, if 
 one man is enjoying prosperity, and another suffering 
 adversity, tranquillity is not more likely than war to 
 relieve the evil and secure the good : or that the honours 
 and glories incident to peace are not held by a less pre- 
 carious tenure ; to say nothing of its other advantages, in 
 
 ' 'ETotitoHpove is probably a clas- ovtoZq is used to contrast what is 
 
 sical comparative. But it may mean, special with what is general in the 
 
 ' more ready to submit than others terms of the proposition : and to 
 
 to rule,' as Tiberius said of the emphasise the pronoun. See Klotz, 
 
 Romans of his day. J)e»o?*. vol. ii. p. 635. He instances 
 
 " The Scholiast explains to iinbv Soph. (CEd. Col. 53), "O^' olSa Kayia, 
 
 by TO KpiiTTov, the effect being put iravT 'nnaTr\aei, where icai throws the 
 
 for the cause. emphasis on the personal pronoun. 
 
 * The particle kui before iv fijuv 
 
HEBMOGBATES. 
 
 151 
 
 the detail of which one might be as copious as in paint- 
 ing the evils of war.^ Pray consider this, and do not 
 think lightly of my advice : employ it rather as a means 
 of providing ^ for the personal safety of each and all. 
 
 Such,^ indeed, is the uncertainty of fortune, that even 
 if a man feels assured * of success in any project, which 
 he may be compassing either by rightful claim or by 
 open violence, he must not think it hard if he is baffled 
 by an unexpected result. He must be aware that many, 
 ere now, in seeking redress^ for oppression, have lost their 
 lives as well as their revenge : while the efforts of others 
 to achieve aggrandisement by force have resulted in the 
 total loss instead of the enlargement of their posses- 
 sions. For retribution does not succeed, as of right it 
 should, simply because a wrong has been done : nor can 
 we rely on power, merely because it makes us sanguine. 
 
 ' Kriiger, wlien he condemned 
 this last clause, forgot its reference 
 to the similar passage in ch. 59, 
 above. 
 
 ' I have not attempted to echo 
 the tasteless alliteration of i-mpi^nv 
 and irpoiMv, vrhich might he pre- 
 served hy rendering the passage ' do 
 not overlook my advice : look upon 
 it rather as a means of providing for 
 your safety.' 
 
 ' None of the commentators afford 
 us any aid in tracing the connection 
 of thought between this and the 
 preceding paragraph. It seems to 
 he intended as an illustration of the 
 imcertainties of life and the vanity 
 of hope : pointing to the expediency 
 of closing at once with the safest 
 bargain, which peace had just been 
 declared to be. I have ventured the 
 insertion of a few words, intended to 
 serve as a bridge between this and 
 the preceding sentence, 
 
 * Poppo (ed. maj.) endorses, by 
 
 silent quotation, Bloomfield's con- 
 nection of Pifiaiaq with oliTai. The 
 Scholiast supports that view. 
 
 ^ Poppo (ed. maj.) has a right to 
 complain of the position of irtpoi, 
 which should have preceded eXwi- 
 aavTig. But he is surely mistaken 
 in saying that xai before Ti/impimt 
 ' deesse debet : ' it is simply opposed, 
 disjunctively, to the follovraig Kai. 
 Literally the passage might be ren- 
 dered thus : ' he must not think it 
 hard if he is baffled by an unexpected 
 result ; knowing that many, ere now, 
 whether (koi) in quest of vengeance 
 for oppression, or, in other cases 
 (eVtpoi), hoping to aggrandise them- 
 selves by sheer force, have, on the 
 one hand (ol jikv), not only failed of 
 their revenge, but have lost their 
 lives in its pursuit : and, on the other 
 (joiQ Si), instead of gaining more, 
 have chanced to lose into the bargain 
 all they had.' 
 
152 SPEHGEUS FBOM THUOYDIDUS. 
 
 Most^ of our plans are baffled by the uncertainty of the 
 future : an element at once fertile in disaster, and full of 
 advantage : for as it inspires equal distrust in all, it 
 makes us the more cautious in attacking each other. 
 
 63. If, then, that indefinable fear which the unseen 
 future inspires, and the formidable presence of the Athe- 
 nians on the spot, combine to scare us: if we believe 
 that the full ^ realisation of the hopes we had severally 
 formed of great achievements, has been eJfFectually pre- 
 vented by the obstacles I have mentioned : let us dismiss 
 from our country the foes who are hovering over her, 
 and come, if possible, to terms of perpetual amity with 
 each other : or, faiUng this, let us sign a truce for the 
 longest possible period, and adjourn the settlement of our 
 private differences till a future season. In one word, let 
 us only feel assured that, if my counsels are adopted, all 
 our cities will be free : and, as we shall then be absolute 
 masters of ourselves, our moral strength ^ will enable us to 
 reward good and evil deeds as they deserve. If, on the 
 other hand, my advice is rejected, and we listen to foreign 
 mediation, we shall no longer be fighting * for revenge 
 on one another ; or, at the best, if very successful in that 
 
 • Mr. Sellar (in his interesting before eipx9rjvai. Literally, there- 
 essay on the Characteristics of Thucy- fore, the passage would construe 
 dides) observes that there is ' a deep thus : ' if, as regards our imperfect 
 irony ' in the last sentence, suggested, realisation of the hopes we had 
 perhaps, by the signal instances of severally formed of great achieve- 
 triumphant iniquity — that especially ments, we believe ourselves to have 
 of Thebes, never visited for her been effectually debarred by these 
 share in the extinction of Platsea — obstacles.' 
 
 which the history of cotemporary ' Poppo (ed. min.) approves Heil- 
 
 Greece afforded. mann's version of apiry by the Latin 
 
 2 Gbller's interpretation of this equivalent ^er virtutem. 
 
 ■passage seems preferable to Dr. * '0 dyuv larai seems to have been 
 
 Arnold's. He takes to iKKiitIq T-jje suppressed after TifxwpriaaaSm, as Dr. 
 
 •y. li/ii)!,- aa equivalent to ' quod attinet Arnold remarks. In the next clause, 
 
 ad inexpletum et mancum jllorum I have adopted GoUer's reading 
 
 consilioi'um/ and understands i;fia£ yiyi-oi^Eea. 
 
HEBM0CEATE8. 153 
 
 revenge, we shall be forced into friendship with our 
 bitterest foes, and estranged from our natural allies. 
 
 64. For my part, although, as I said on the threshold 
 of my speech, I represent a very powerful city, and am 
 rather in a position to attack others than to defend my- 
 self, I am resolved to anticipate these calamities by 
 coming to terms, instead of continuing hostilities with 
 every prospect of doing myself^ more harm than my 
 enemy. Nor will I allow an infatuated animosity to per- 
 suade me that I am as absolute a master of Fortune, 
 whom I cannot rule, as of my own plans : no ! I would 
 rather make every reasonable concession. And I call 
 upon you, my compatriots, to follow my example, by 
 abating ^ your pretensions of your own accord instead of 
 having them abated by our foes. For there is nothing 
 humiliating, in concessions between kinsmen, between 
 Dorian and Dorian, between Chalcidians and others of 
 Ionian blood : in one word, between men bound to- 
 gether by the common tie of neighbourhood,^ fellow- 
 colonists of one country, and that country girt by the 
 waves,^ and aU known by one name as Siceliots. And, 
 as Siceliots, we shall, I suppose, when Fate decrees, 
 go to war among ourselves, and make peace, too, 
 afterwards, through negotiation and discussion ; but 
 we shall always combine together, if we have a particle 
 of sense, to repel a foreign invasion, inasmuch as, even* 
 
 ' I have followed Poppo(ed.mm.), tlie only argument that was univer- 
 Becker, and GoUer, in reading mi sally applicahle to every part of this 
 
 Tuvg a\\oii(; SiKaiCj Taino fiot TTOlrjanij Case. 
 
 iJ0' v/iCiv avT&v Kai («) inh tSiv ttoXe- ° The epithet probably alludes to 
 
 fiiuiv TovTo TToSth'. tho natioual unity belonging to an 
 
 ^ ' Hermocrates,' says Dr. Arnold, insular position, 
 
 'introduces this clause, hecause he * Kat seems to helong to Ka6' 
 
 was not only urging Dorians to give tKaarovQ rather than to Antp. Einip 
 
 way to Dorians, hut Dorians to Chal- Kai occurs in the Odyssey (ix. 53), but 
 
 cidians, and Chalcidians to Dorians : 'in the sense of ' even if.' 
 so that the local connection aiforded 
 
154 SFUBGEES FBOM TEU0YBIBE8. 
 
 when separately injured, we are nationally endangered. 
 Nor will we ever, for the future, call in confederates or 
 mediators in our quarrels. By adopting this course, we 
 shall, at the present crisis, avoid robbing Sicily of two 
 advantages, riddance of the Athenians and of civil war : 
 while for the future we shall have our country all to 
 ourselves, free and independent, and less exposed to the 
 machinations of foreign intrigue. 
 
BBASIDA8. 155 
 
 SPEECH OF BRASIDAS, 
 
 Addressed to the popular assembly of the city of Acanthns, B.C. 424. Bk. IV. chs. 85-88. 
 
 IJVTMOJDUCTIOJSr. 
 
 Pbediccas, king of Macedonia, and the Chalcidians in Thrace, 
 alarmed by the recent triiunphs of Athens, sent envoys to Sparta to 
 request the despatch of an auxiliary force for their protection. With 
 this petition the Lacedasmonians, anxious to cause Athens embar- 
 rassment in Thrace, instantly complied: and an expedition left 
 Sparta, B.C. 424, under the command of Brasidas. Having reached 
 the Chalcidic by forced marches, he commenced operations by 
 attempting to withdraw Acanthus, a subject ally of Athens, from 
 the Athenian league. A party, within the city, anxious for a revolt, 
 and acting in concert with the Chalcidians, persuaded their country- 
 men to admit the Spartan leader to explain his purposes before the 
 pubUc assembly, whom he addressed in the following speech. ' Its 
 substance,' says Mr. Grote, ' is doubtless genuine : and it is one of 
 the most interesting in Grecian history — partly as a manifesto of 
 professed Lacedasmonian policy — partly because it had a great 
 practical effect in determining, on an occasion of paramount im- 
 portance, a multitude which, though unfavourably inclined to him, 
 was not beyond the reach of argument.' — Vol. vi. p. 547. 
 
 Ch. 85. People of Acanthus ! Lacedasmon, in de- 
 spatching this expedition under my command, intended ^ 
 to prove the sincerity of the motive she professed at the 
 outset of hostihties, when she declared the hberation of 
 Greece to be the object of her war with Athens. And 
 if we have been long in coming to your aid, owing to the 
 failure of the hopes we had founded on our operations 
 nearer home, which we trusted would soon have levelled 
 
 ' Such is the force assigned by Poppo (ed. maj.) to the present participle 
 inaXrjGtvovffa, 
 
156 SPEECHES FBOM THUOYDIBES. 
 
 the Athenian empire with the ground, without endanger- 
 ing you — no blame can be imputed to us. In sending 
 this expedition, we embraced the first opportunity of 
 giving you support ; and, if our eflforts are seconded by 
 you, we will devote ourselves to demolishing Athenian 
 ascendancy. I am, however, surprised to find myself 
 excluded firom your town, instead of being received with 
 a cordial welcome. Tor, when we Lacedeemonians, in 
 the fervour of our zeal for your interests, braved a dan- 
 gerous march of many days through an alien province, 
 it was in the behef that we should find ourselves among 
 men, who, even before our actual arrival, were at any 
 rate at heart our allies, and who would gladly welcome 
 us. And it would be strange indeed, should you have 
 any other views, or object to your own hberation and 
 that of the rest of Greece. It is not as if you only were 
 opposed to me ; every other state to whom I may apply, 
 will be less disposed to join me, because they will think 
 it odd that you, to whom I first repaired, representing, 
 as you do, a considerable city, and supposed to be very 
 inteUigent, did not receive me. Besides, I shall never be 
 able to give them a satisfactory reason for your refusal : 
 they will charge me either with dishonesty in ofiering 
 freedom, or with having brought hither a weak force, 
 powerless to protect you against any attack the Atheni- 
 ans may make. Yet it was with this very force which 
 I now have, that the Athenians, though numerically 
 stronger,^ declined to cope, when I marched to the relief 
 of Nissea ; it is therefore ^ improbable they can now 
 
 ' This, aa Mitford remarks, is un- interpolated ■words rqi iu Nicraip, 
 
 true. Brasidas relied on the igno- forgets that their retention entirely 
 
 ranee of the Acanthians. Comp. vitiates the true inferential sense of 
 
 Thucyd. iv. 7a, 2, with iv. 78, i. uare. Dukas, cited by him (ed.maj.), 
 
 * Poppo (ed. maj. and min.), when sensible of this difficulty, lays violent 
 
 he proposes to retain the evidently hands on the particle, and declares, 
 
BBASJDAS. 157 
 
 despatch against you, as their armament must come by 
 sea,^ a force competent to meet you. Next ^ — as regards 
 my personal intentions — I have come among you with no 
 sinister design, but with a view to the emancipation of 
 Greece, after binding the Lacedaemonian government by 
 the most sacred oaths solemnly to guarantee the indepen- 
 dence of all whom I may induce to enter their league. 
 Nor, again, have we any desire either to force or cajole 
 you into alliance with us : on the contrary, we came here 
 to fight your battles, and to redeem you from slavery 
 to Athens. I think, therefore, that I ought not to be an 
 object of personal distrust, since I give you the surest 
 pledges of my honesty, nor to be regarded as a powerless 
 avenger : and I call upon you to join, my standard with 
 confidence. 
 
 86. Should anyone hesitate to do so, from personal 
 apprehension, perhaps, of some private enemy, in the 
 fancied contingency of my giving up the city to a cabal, 
 let him be the very first to feel assured. For I came not 
 here to support a faction : nor do I intend to ofier you a 
 visionary freedom, as * I should be doing were I to dis- 
 card your * established constitution, and enslave the many 
 
 as Poppo says, ' contra linguae leges,' vi. 37, i, -which illustrates the diffi- 
 
 that it is not avjiiTipaaiiaTiKov, ' in- culty of transporting large arma- 
 
 ferential.' The following version ments hy sea. 
 shows, that if rif iv Niirm'^ is treated * I have followed Dr. Arnold's 
 
 as genuine, uan, in its true sense, arrangement of the paragraph, in 
 
 makes nonsense : ' Yet it was with which Poppo (ed. min.) agrees, al- 
 
 this very force which I now have, though he has adopted the common 
 
 that the Athenians, though supe- division. 
 
 rior in numbers, declined to cope ' Poppo (ed. min.) compares the 
 
 when I marched to the relief of passage in hk. iii. 11, 3, where it is 
 
 Nissea ; it is therefore improbable needful, as here, to understand some- 
 
 they will now despatch against you, thing before the clause commencing 
 
 as their armament must come by sea, with fi. See*, p. 96. 
 a force equal to that which they * Poppo (ed. min.) shows that it 
 
 had at Nissea.' is ridiculous to refer ri narpiov to the 
 
 ' See the passage of Thucydides, Spartan constitution, as Dr. Arnold 
 
158 SPEECHES FROM TRUGTDIDES. 
 
 to the few, or the few to the many. Liberty on such 
 terms would be a greater hardship than foreign subjuga- 
 tion : and we Lacedaemonians, instead of being rewarded 
 with gratitude for our exertions, should meet only with 
 reproach in place of honour and respect : and should be 
 proving our own title to the very imputations with which 
 we are crushing the Athenians, in a form still more 
 odious than in the case of men who never betrayed a 
 glimpse of political honesty. For self-aggrandisement, 
 when wrought by plausible trickery, is more disgraceful,^ 
 at any rate to men of high repute, than when compassed 
 by open violence ; in the one case, the power conferred 
 by Fortune is the plea for encroachments, which, in the 
 other, spring from the treacherous craft of a dishonest 
 policy. 
 
 You may therefore safely trust us : so careful and cir- 
 cumspect are we, when our interests are so vitally con- 
 cerned. Nor could you possibly receive a surer pledge, 
 in addition to the oaths of the Spartan authorities, than 
 our actions, when compared with our professions, afford ; 
 they will irresistibly convince you that it is really our 
 policy to act as I have told you. 
 
 87. If, however, you meet my offers by pleading 
 inability to avail yourselves of them, yet claim, on the 
 strength of friendly intentions, exemption from the penal- 
 ties of refusal, contending that freedom does not seem 
 to you devoid of danger, and that we had better offer it 
 to those only who are able to accept it, forcing it on none 
 against their will ; in that case, I will first call the Gods 
 and the heroes of your country to witness your rejection 
 
 does: for tlie Acanthians could not aut frauds, fiat injuria, fraus quasi 
 
 be ignorant that it was not a popular vulpeculse, yis leonis videtur, utrum- 
 
 government. que liomine alienissimum, sed fraus 
 
 1 Comp. Cicero (De Off. i. 13): odio digna majore.' See also Aristot, 
 
 'Quum duobus modis, id est aut vi HhetA.ti, Xenophon, fieW. iii. 5, ij. 
 
BBA8IDA8. 159 
 
 of my friendly mission : and I will then endeavour, by 
 ravaging your land, to extort your compliance. And in 
 that case I cannot think I am doing wrong : but that I 
 am acting on legitimate grounds, for two most cogent 
 reasons especially. First, in the interest of the Lace- 
 daemonians, to prevent any prejudice accruing to them, 
 in spite of your professed good -will, from the tribute you 
 pay to Athens, should you refuse to join our league : 
 secondly, in the interest of the Greeks, to prevent their 
 deliverance from political vassalage being hindered by 
 you. Apart, indeed, from these considerations, we should 
 certainly not be justified ^ in resorting to compulsion : 
 nor is it our duty, as Lacedaemonians, to emancipate 
 states against their will, save on the plea of some great 
 pubhc advantage. Again, we are not ambitious of do- 
 minion : but, as we are anxious to check the domination 
 of another power, we should be wronging the general 
 welfare, if, when offering independence to all, we allowed 
 you to thwart our designs. 
 
 Weigh, then, the issue well : strive to be foremost in 
 inaugurating a new sera of Grecian freedom : to lay up 
 for yourselves immortal fame : to save your private pro- 
 perty from pillage : and to crown ^ the whole of your 
 community with the brilliant wreath of Honour. 
 
 ■ Dr. Arnold aptly compares the Taciturn aliquoties " circumdare ali- 
 
 arguments used in defence of the cui aliquid " de conciliando dixisse 
 
 expedition against Denmark in 1807. docent interpretes, Agric. c. 20.' — 
 
 * 'Ab omatu translatum est ver- Pdppo. The same figure graces the 
 
 bum ■nepiSi'ivai ad alia, et similiter speech of Alcibiades, tI. 89. 
 
l6o SPEEGBES FBOM THUGYDIDE8. 
 
 SPEECH OF THE THEBAN B(EOTARCH, PAGONDAS, 
 
 To his soldiers, B.C. 424. Bk. lY. ch. 92. 
 
 INTBOBUCTION. 
 
 In the early autumn of 424 B.C., an expedition -was planned by 
 Athens against Boeotia, under the command of Demosthenes and 
 Hippocrates : the former entering the country from the seaport 
 town of Siphse, the latter on the side of Delium, a temple of Apollo, 
 overhanging the sea, a little more than a mile from the Athenian 
 border territory of Oropus. Hippocrates fortified the temple : and 
 the army commenced its return march, halting within the district 
 of Oropus. Meanwhile the Boeotians, who had repulsed Demos- 
 thenes, mustered at Tanagra, under the command of the two Theban 
 BcBotarchs, one of whom, Pagondas, remonstrates, in the following 
 speech, against the unwillingness of the other officers to hazard a 
 battle with an enemy already within the line of his own frontier. 
 
 Ch. 92. My Boeotian comrades ! It ought never even to 
 have entered the heads of any of us, your commanders, that 
 we have no right to force the Athenians to give battle, 
 should it turn out that they are no longer in Boeotia when 
 we overtake them. It is Boeotia, which they entered 
 from a frontier district, on whose soil they have already 
 built a fort, that they intend to lay waste ; besides, they 
 are, I presume, our enemies, independently of the country 
 in which they may be found, or whence they issued to 
 perpetrate acts of hostility. If, however, anyone has ^ 
 
 1 The force of the particle KnI. may ec ti)v iiaxv (when they did join 
 
 he given hy italicising the English battle), upon which he remarks : 
 
 auxiliary verb. Klotz (Deuor. vol. ii. 'idcirco effertur per xai particulam 
 
 p. 637) cites, among many similar verbum awyinav, quia multis verbis 
 
 instances, the following passage from quem ad modum parata acies esset, 
 
 Herod, i. 80) : 'Qq Si xai awytaav descripserat.' 
 
•FAOONBAS. l5l 
 
 fancied it will be safer, just at present, to avoid an action, 
 he had better revise his opinion. For when men are 
 attacked by a foreign invader, and their all is at stake, 
 prudence has not so fair a field for nice calculations, as 
 she has, when men, in full possession of their own terri- 
 tory, invade their neighbours in a spirit of wanton en- 
 croachment. Besides, you have always, as your fathers 
 did before you, repulsed the incursion of foreign armies 
 with equal courage, whether on your own or alien ^ 
 soil. And if there are any towai'ds whom, above all 
 others, it is needful thus to act, it is the Athenians, espe- 
 cially as they are a frontier power. Indeed, in our 
 relations, generally, with neighbouring states, we can 
 only preserve freedom by rivalry of spirit : ^ how much 
 more^ then, when we have to contend with foes like 
 these, whose boundless ambition * aims at enslaving, I say 
 not their neighbours, but even distant countries, is it our 
 duty to fight to the very last ? If we want instances of their 
 encroachments, we have only to glance at the EubcEans 
 across the strait, and at the policy ^ of Athens towards 
 the greater part of Greece. We must remember, too, 
 that, while, in other cases, boundary questions are the 
 subject of the contests between frontier states : in our 
 case, should we be conquered, there will be no such 
 question; one boundary line, no longer to be contro- 
 verted, will be drawn : and the whole of our country will 
 
 * See Poppo's note (ed. min. i. fortiori argument. 
 
 32, i) on oi wkXaQ. * Some sucli idea seems to be 
 
 * To avrivaKov can hardly mean conveyed by tbe particle icai which 
 ' the balance of power ' here. As follows the relative oi'. Poppo (ed. 
 Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, to avr. nrin.) approves Haack's version, ' qui 
 ob superiora non ' ssqualitatem vi- adeo.' 
 
 rium,' sed 'animum ad to avTiira- ^ Poppo (ed. min.) translates we 
 
 Aai'ii/ paratum ' debet designare. avTolg fiaKurat, k. r.\., 'quomodo 
 
 ' Ft S)'i, as Poppo (ed. min.) shows, tractata sit ab illis maxima Grseciae 
 signifies iitique, here, as in ch. 78, 2, pars.' 
 above. It is used to usher in an d 
 
 M 
 
1 62 SPEECHES PBOM THUGYDIDIIS. 
 
 sink into a province of Athens,^ whose troops will forcibly 
 invade and dispossess us. So much more dangerous to 
 us is their neighbourhood, than that of other states. 
 Those, as you know, whom the arrogance of superior 
 strength tempts to encroach upon their neighbours, as 
 the Athenians are now doing, generally march with less 
 hesitation against a foe who stands on the defensive and 
 resists only on his own soil : but they are not so ready 
 to grapple^ with an enemy who forestalls invasion by 
 meeting them beyond his frontier, and, when he has an 
 opportunity, strikes the first blow. We can prove that 
 this is true of the Athenians. Por the victory we 
 gained over them at Coronea, at a time when intestine 
 factions had placed our country in their power, secured 
 Boeotia immunity from alarm to this hour. Young and 
 old, we must ah. cherish the remembrance of this signal 
 triumph : our veterans must rival their former deeds : 
 and our younger soldiers must, as the children of sires 
 whose valour shone on that field, strive to add fresh 
 lustre to the family virtues. Trusting, then, that our 
 cause wiU be favoured by the God, whose temple the 
 Athenians are profanely holding as a fort : relying also 
 on the auspicious omens which reward our sacrifices : 
 we must march at once to meet the foe, and teach him 
 that, though he may get what he covets by attacking 
 unresisting cowards, he shall not retreat without a struggle 
 with men whose sense of national honour leads them 
 always to vindicate in arms the freedom of their country, 
 and never allows them to suUy their hands by the 
 iniquitous enslavement of other states. 
 
 ' Poppo(ed.min.) thus translates: stitnentur, ut tota iUorvun agro 
 ' termini nostraa terrae ab Athenien- contineatur.' 
 BibuB victoribus baud dubie ita con- * See Poppo, ed, min. 
 
HIPPOOBATES. 163 
 
 SPEECH OF HIPPOCEATES, 
 
 Tlie Athenian general, to his troops, delivered on the same occasion as the preceding 
 address. Bk. IV. ch. 95. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Pagondas, finding his address favourably received, conducted his 
 army by a rapid march to a position close to the Athenians. Hip- 
 pocrates, hearing of this movement, joined his army, and addressed 
 the foUoTving brief harangue to his soldiers, who, ' as the battle was 
 just on the Oropian frontier, might fancy that they were not in their 
 own country, and that they were therefore exposed without neces- 
 sity.' — Grote, vol. vi. p. 529. 
 
 Ch. 95. Athenians, I have but little time to address 
 you : but with brave men a short speech is as effectual 
 as a longer one : and my aim is rather to remind you of 
 your former deeds than to stimulate your courage. None 
 of you should for a moment entertain the idea that we 
 are running a great and a thoroughly gratuitous risk 
 by fighting on alien ^ ground : for, if the field of battle 
 is on BcEotian soil, still the struggle is for our own 
 country ; while, if we conquer, the loss of the Boeotian 
 cavalry wiU prevent the Peloponnesians from invading 
 Attica : and, in one action, you will at once gain the ter- 
 ritory on which we stand, and give a surer freedom to 
 your own. Forward, then, to meet them, with a courage 
 
 • It was, really, on a border terri- (ch. 92), to claim it as Boeotian 
 
 tory, which, at the time, belonged soil : but Hippocrates, as Poppo (ed. 
 
 to Athens. It had suited the pur- min.) remarks, is not so dexterous a 
 
 poses of Pagondas, in his speech pleader. 
 
 u 2 
 
t64 8PEE0EB8 FROM THVOYDIDES. 
 
 worthy of that country in whose possession each of you 
 takes pride as the naost illustrious in Greece : and of 
 your sires, whose victory over these men at (Enophyta, 
 under Myronides, gave them the command of Bceotia. 
 
BBASIDAS. 1 6 
 
 fePEECH OF BEASIDAS 
 
 To his Boldiers, b.c. 4z3. Bk. IV. ch. 126. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Beasidas had accompanied Perdiccas in Ms march into Macedoni 
 against Arrliibseus, who, in an action which ensued, was completel; 
 defeated by their joint forces. After this, however, Perdicca 
 quarrelled with the Spartan general : and the situation becam- 
 complicated by the desertion of a horde of niyiian auxiliaries, who 
 after having accepted the pay of the Macedonian monarch, joine( 
 Arrhibaeus. On receiving this intelligence, the army of Perdiccas 
 seized with sudden panic, broke up, and fled with the utmost pre 
 cipitation, leaving Brasidas to confront the combined forces o 
 Arrhibaeus and his barbarian allies. 
 
 Ch. 126. Had I not suspected, Peloponnesians, tha 
 the desertion . of our allies, and the fact of our beinj 
 attacked by barbarians, and those in numbers, migh 
 have dismayed you : I would not have presumed, as I an 
 about to do, to offer you information as well as en 
 couragement. As things are, however, I will touch upor 
 two points — our abandonment by our allies, and th( 
 superior numbers of the enemy — and endeavour to im 
 press upon you, in a few words of suggestion and counsel 
 some important considerations. I say, then,^ that yoi 
 ought to fight bravely on the field of battle, not in reli 
 ance on the constant presence of allies, but from youj 
 own inborn valour, undismayed by any foreign force 
 
 ' Vap is epexegetlc: it introduces 475 : Tlav trot ippaaa) raX^Oie oiSk xpi' 
 
 the exposition promised in the pre- t^ojiai' ianv yap ovtu>c mainp oiroi 
 
 ceding sentence. Klotz instances a Ivvkna, 
 very similar passage in Soph. Track, 
 
1 66 8PEEGEE8 FROM THUGTDIDE8. 
 
 however multitudinous ; for you do not come from those 
 pohtical communities in which ^ the multitude rules the 
 few, but from states wherein the many are governed by 
 the few, who acquired their power solely by their mili- 
 tary prowess. 
 
 Inexperience leads you to fear the barbarians now 
 before you : and it is needful you should feel convinced, 
 as you well may be, partly from your previous trial of 
 strength with their Macedonian troops, partly from my 
 own assurance, backed by general report, that they will 
 not prove formidable. It is needful,^ I say : for though, 
 when an enemy has genuine military skill, ignorance of 
 its existence may increase the daring of an attack : yet, 
 when his array is strong only in semblance, and weak in 
 reality, an exact knowledge of his capabilities tends to 
 embolden his opponents. And so with yonder host : 
 their impending onset strikes inexperience with terror : 
 their multitude alarms the eye : their loud shouts appal 
 the ear : and the idle vibration ^ of their glittering arms 
 carries a menacing air. But in close conflict with troops 
 who are proof against such terrors, they are not what 
 they seemed ; for as they are not drawn up in regular 
 order, no feeling of shame prevents their abandoning any 
 post under pressure : while it is impossible to put their 
 
 ' I have followed Poppo (ed.min.) discovered a difficulty which they 
 
 in considering ov before voXKoi as have passed over. The particles icai yap 
 
 either an interpolation, or a confusion lefei to iJ.a6Hv xp'f and the opposi- 
 
 on the part of Thucydides. GoUer, tion between fiiv and de answers to 
 
 in his 2nd edition, encloses it in the English opposition of 'though' 
 
 brackets.— The argument itself, to and 'yet.' But, as Mr. Shilleto has 
 
 modern ears, seems curious enough, shown, in his clever essay, entitled, 
 
 especially when addressed to soldiers. Grote or Thucydides f, p. 31, the 
 
 But, in those days, a man's profession clauses require to be reversed, 
 
 as a soldier was more or less merged ^ Livy has unconsciously trans- 
 
 in his character as a citizen. lated this expression by the phrjise 
 
 ' If the commentators had trans- ' armorum agitatio vana.' — Bk. vii. 
 
 lated this passage, they might have 10, 
 
BBA8IBA8. iBj 
 
 courage to the proof, because, with them, flight and 
 attack are equally honourable ; ^ and this independent 
 style of fighting is just the one to give any man a decent 
 excuse for self-preservation. Besides, they think it a 
 safer game to keep out of danger and try to frighten you, 
 than to meet you hand to hand ; otherwise they would 
 have adopted the latter course. 
 
 You now clearly see that aU the danger you antici- 
 pated from them is trivial enough in reality, and has 
 terrors only for the eye and ear. And, if you will firmly 
 withstand it, as it rolls on, like a wave, towards you, and 
 afterwards, at the right moment, fall back in perfect 
 order and discipline, you will reach a safe position aU the 
 sooner : and you wiU. know for the future that barbarous 
 hosts like this, when their first onset is defied, are content 
 to vaunt their courage by threatening demonstrations at 
 a safe distance ; but, if once their foe gives way, are 
 eager enough to display their valour by hanging on his 
 footsteps, when there is no danger. 
 
 * Compare Virgil, G. iii. 31. Horace, Odes, i. 19, u. Tacitus, Hist- 
 ii. IX. 
 
i68 SPEECHES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 SPEECH OF BEASIDAS 
 
 To his soldiers at Ampliipolis, B.C. 422. Bk. Y. ch. 9. 
 
 INTMODUCTION. 
 
 In the year 422 B.C., Cleon was despatohed -with an Athenian arma- 
 ment to reduce Amphipolia, whicL. had joined the Lacedeemonian 
 confederacy. Brasidas held the city with a mixed force of Spartans, 
 Amphipolitans and Chalcidic allies. The Athenian general, urged 
 by the murmurs of his troops, mounted a rising ground on the 
 Eastern side of the town : and, without any expectation of heing 
 attacked, began leisurely to reconnoitre the position. On this Bra- 
 sidas, seeing his advantage, marched his men from the summit of a 
 hill to the West of the city, into Amphipolis : intendiag to sally and 
 surprise the Athenians before they could form their ranks, and offer 
 effectual resistance. After sacrificing at the temple of Athene, he 
 addressed the following speech to his troops, who, had they not 
 known his plan of attack, might have been discouraged by the 
 superior arms and equipment of their Athenian antagonists. 
 
 Ch. 9. A few words, Peloponnesians, will suffice to 
 remind you from what country we have come — a country 
 whose valour has secured her constant independence — 
 and of the character of the impending conflict, between 
 Dorians on your side and lonians on the other, a race 
 you have been wont tp vanquish. I will, however, ex- 
 plain to you the mode in which I intend to make the 
 attack, to prevent your being discouraged by the seeming 
 disadvantage of risking the battle with a detachment 
 instead of our full force. My impression is that it was 
 from contempt of us, and because they could not expect 
 we should sally forth to fight them, that the enemy 
 ascended the hill; they have now, I believe, left their 
 
BBASIBAS. 169 
 
 ranks, and are busy surveying the ground, with little 
 thought of us. Kow the successful general is the man 
 whose eagle 6ye detects at a glance such mistakes on the 
 part of his foe, and who, guiding himself by the force at 
 his disposal, follows up the discovery by a rapid attack, 
 not so much by open assault in battle array, as by suiting 
 his tactics to the exigency of the moment. And those 
 stratagems carry the highest credit, which are most 
 effective at once in cheating one's enemies and serving 
 one's friends. While, therefore, the Athenians are still 
 full of confidence and quite unprepared, and are thinkmg, 
 so far as I can see, rather of quietly withdrawing than oi 
 staying where they are : while their courage is yet un- 
 strung,^ and before they have made up their minds what 
 to do : I will take my own division, and, if possible, 
 surprise them by falling rapidly on the centre of their 
 force. And do you, Clearidas, afterwards, the moment 
 you see me in the act of charging their troops, and. in 
 all probabihty striking terror into them, suddenly open 
 the gates and dash out at the head of your own division, 
 the AmphipoHtans, and the rest of our alhes, making all 
 haste to close at once with the foe. This manoeuvre 
 I think the most likely to scare them: for the force 
 which seconds an attack has more terrors for an enemy 
 than the force which he is fighting at the time. Prove, 
 Clearidas, your own personal courage, a quahty born in 
 your Spartan blood : and do you. Allies, bravely follow 
 him : assured that zeal, sense of honour, and obedience 
 to your officers, are conditions of successful warfare : and 
 that it depends on your bravery this day, whether you 
 
 ' Mr. Grote remarks, on this text, the necessity of the harangue from 
 
 that ' the Grecian hoplites, even the the general -which always preceded 
 
 best of them, required to be pecu- it.' — JTist. of Greece, vol. vi. p. 641. 
 liarly wound up for a battle ; hence 
 
17° BPBEGHm FROM THUGTDIDHS. 
 
 are to maintain your freedom, and the title of confede- 
 rates of Lacedsemon : or to become — supposing you are 
 fortunate enougli to escape slavery or death — the vassals 
 of Athens, on terms far more rigorous than those formerly 
 imposed upon you : besides hindering the liberation of 
 the rest of Greece. But no ! remembering how much is 
 staked on this battle, you must not let your courage 
 droop ; while I, for my part, will show that I am not 
 at all more disposed, to preach valour to my followers 
 than to display it myself on the battle field. 
 
THE ATHENIAN AND MELIAN NEGOTIATORS. 17 1 
 
 THE DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE ATHENIAN AND 
 MELIAN NEGOTIATOES 
 
 On the question of the submission of the island of Melos to the Athenian dominion, 
 B.C. 416. Bk. V. chs. 85-113. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 ' In tte iDegmiiing of the summer of 416 B.C., the Athenians under- 
 took the siege and conquest of the Dorian island of Melos — one of 
 the Cyclades, and the only one, except Thera, ■which was not 
 already included in their empire. Melos and Thera were both 
 ancient colonies of Lacedsemon, with whom they had strong sym- 
 pathies of hneage. They had never joined the confederacy of 
 Delos, nor been in any way connected with Athens : but at the 
 same time, neither had they ever taken part in the recent war 
 against her, nor given her any ground of complaint, until she 
 landed and attacked them in the sixth year of the recent war. She 
 now renewed her attempt : sending against the island a considerable 
 force, under Cleomedes and Tisias. . . . These ofEcers, after disem- 
 barking their forces, and taking position, sent envoys into the city 
 summoning the government to surrender, and to become a subject 
 ally of Athens. 
 
 ' It was a practice, frequent, if not universal, in Greece — even in 
 governments not professedly democratical — ^to discuss propositions 
 for peace or war before the assembly of the people. But on the 
 present occasion the Melian leaders departed &om this practice, and 
 admitted the envoys only to a private conversation with their 
 executive council. Of this conversation Thucydides professes to 
 give a detailed and elaborate account — at stirprising length, con- 
 sidering his general brevity. He sets down thirteen distinct obser- 
 vations, with as many repUes, interchanged bietween the Athenian 
 envoys and the Melians ; no one of them separately long, and some 
 very short — ^but the dialogue carried on is dramatic and very im- 
 pressive. There is indeed every reason for concluding that what 
 we here read in Thucydides is in far larger proportion his own 
 and in smaller proportion authentic report, than any of the other 
 
i?^ 8PEE0SES FROM TSUCTDIDB8. 
 
 speeches which he professes to set down. For this was not a pubKc 
 harangue, in respect to which he might have had the opportanity of 
 consulting the recoUeotion of many different persons : it was a 
 private conversation whereia three or four Athenians, and perhaps 
 ten or a dozen Melians, may have taken part. Now, as all the 
 MeUan population were slain immediately after the capture of the 
 town, there remained only the Athenian envoys through whose 
 report Thucydides could possibly have heard what reaUy passed. 
 That he did hear either from or through them the general character 
 of what passed, I make no doubt : but there is no ground for 
 beHeving that he received from them anything like the consecutive 
 stream of debate, which, together with part of the illustrative rea- 
 soning, we must refer to his dramatic genius and arrangement.' — 
 Girote, vol. vii. pp. 148-49. 
 
 Ch. 85. Athenians. As we are not to address what 
 we have to say to a general assembly of your people — for 
 fear, to be quite candid,^ of their being misled, if they 
 listened ^ to a winning appeal from us, embodied in one 
 continuous speech, and therefore safe from being ques- 
 tioned (oh ! we know well enough what you mean by 
 introducing us to a chamber of oligarchs), we recommend 
 to your conclave a further refinement of caution. Do 
 not confine yourselves, any more than us, to a single, 
 speech : decide each point by itself, interrupting us the 
 moment we broach a proposition that does not suit 
 you. But first let us know whether you accept our 
 ofier. 
 
 86. Melians. We cannot object to your equitable 
 proposal that we should quietly enlighten each other ; 
 but your preparations for war, already made and no 
 
 • ^ri, apparently, is used ironically had been the meaning, Thucydides 
 
 here. would have written ois aKoiaavnc' 
 
 " Bloomfield commits a solecism since the participle, so construed, 
 
 in taking /iti? with cucovaavrig, which would signify a cause or reason, not 
 
 he construes ' by not hearing,' in- a condition or limitation, 
 stead of with avarriSmai. If Such 
 
THE ATHENIAN AND MELIAN NEGOTIATOBS. 173 
 
 longer threatened, seem to clash with it.^ We see that 
 you have come here to be your own judges of the points 
 that may be raised : and that the conference will pro- 
 bably issue in our being involved in war, if we have the 
 best of the argument and on that account refuse to yield : 
 or in the loss of our freedom, should you succeed in con- 
 vincing us. 
 
 87. Athenians. Nay, if your council is sitting to 
 compute the value of your guesses as to the future, or 
 for any purpose beyond that of consulting for the welfare 
 of your country on the basis of the facts before your 
 eyes : we cannot proceed ; if, however, the latter is your 
 object, we are ready to negotiate. 
 
 88. Melians. It is natural, and therefore excusable, 
 for men in our position to exhaust every resource of 
 argument or fancy ; ^ since,' however, the safety of our 
 country is the question which this meeting was called to 
 consider, the discussion may well be conducted, if you 
 desire it, on the basis you suggest. 
 
 89. Athenians. Very well. On our part, we will 
 not offer you a long and readily distrusted argument, 
 plausibly founded either on our right to dominion as 
 a reward for our overthrow of the Mede, or on the sup- 
 position that in coming here, we had wrongs to avenge ; 
 on the other hand, we presume you will not expect 
 to move us by pleading that, though colonists of Sparta, 
 
 * AuKpipovra avrov • airoii 80 clearly and not merely copulative, connec- 
 
 refers to to SiSamiiv, that Col. Mure's tion to the two clauses. Poppo (ed. 
 
 (see his Literature of Greece, vol. v. min.) remarks on the first ku'i, ' par- 
 
 p. 586) endorsement of Dionysius' ticula koi ita colloeata est, ut si in 
 
 censure of this pronoun as a solecism altero membro kqI tov \6yot> .... 
 
 for alirrji, is simply ridiculous. ix^rio yiyvonivov vel similia qussdam 
 
 ' Ao/cowvnf. Upon this term Krii- essent secutura.' See note ', p. 220, 
 
 ger remarks 'minus invidiosa voce and note', p. 238; and Donaldson's 
 
 sententiam exprimunt eandem, quam Gr. Gram. p. 570, on the syllogistic 
 
 Atheuienses verho imovaAv^ force of /cai. 
 
 ' The double kox gives a logical, 
 
174 8FUEGSEB FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 you never marched in her ranks, or that you never 
 injured us ; we presume that you will simply try to 
 obtain the best terms you can get, dealing with the pro- 
 blem on the basis of the real aims and convictions of both 
 parties, each of whom is well aware that, in political dis- 
 cussions, questions of pure right are weighed only when 
 power is equally balanced : ^ and that, otherwise, the 
 stronger exact all they can, and the weak submit, as a 
 matter of course. 
 
 90. Melians. "Well, if it comes to that, we ^ too think 
 it expedient — a line of argument which your open re- 
 pudiation of justice, and adoption of self-interest as your 
 rule, compels us to take — we think it expedient that you 
 should not destroy a principle beneficial to all mankind : 
 but that anyone involved in danger should be allowed to 
 reap some benefit, if he is able to satisfy his audience 
 that his defence is reasonable and just, even should it 
 fall a httle short of strict right. A principle, indeed, 
 even more favourable to you than to us : in proportion 
 to the fearful retribution which, if you deal cruelly with 
 us, will, in your hour of disaster, mark you as an example 
 to mankind. 
 
 91. Athenians. Eeally, we^ are not very anxious 
 about the catastrophe, even if our empire should be over- 
 
 ' Mr. Grote (vol. vii. p. 150) thus approves) in preference to irnaovTa, 
 
 renders this passage : ' Justice in the As to the construction of the clause 
 
 reasoning of mankind is settled ac- commencing with the words aXXii 
 
 cording to equal compulsion on both rif ati, k.t.X., I have adopted the 
 
 sides.' He aptly compares this ad- viewsofDobree, who makes to HKoTa 
 
 mission with the language used by depend on irsiaavra. Poppo (ed. 
 
 the English envoy to the Danish maj.) and Goller are inclined to 
 
 Prince Regent previous to the attack accept this explanation, 
 
 on Copenhagen in 1807. ^ "H/iHj^i — . 'Attoi'tijo'ic roSro rwv 
 
 * I have followed Arnold and 'AOtivatmv wpbe rA ' koI Trpbg vfiSiv ovx 
 
 GoUer in reading 'H/itig Sij, k,t,\., ^aaov rovro,' k.t.\. — Ducas, cited by 
 
 and ndaavra (which Poppo (ed.min.) Poppo, ed. maj. 
 
THE ATHENIAN AND MELIAN NEGOTIATORS. 175 
 
 thrown. It is not imperial states, like ourselves^ and 
 Lacedsemon, whose vengeance is so terrible to the van- 
 quished (with Lacedaemon,^ indeed, at this moment * we 
 are not contending) ; what we have to dread is the 
 vengeance* of our subject allies, should a victory aU their 
 own ever give them the mastery of their rulers. However, 
 it must be left to us to take this risk on our own shoul- 
 ders ; we will now clearly show you, that the support of 
 our dominion is the object of our presence here, and that 
 in this negotiation we have the welfare of your city 
 in view: our only desire being to enjoy an untroubled 
 sovereignty over you, and to ensure your safety on terms 
 compatible with our joint interests. 
 
 92. Melians. Joint interests ! How can it possibly 
 be as ^ advantageous to us to serve as to you to govern ? 
 
 g;}. Athenians. Because, by choosing submission, 
 you wUl escape a terrible fate : and, as you will be our 
 subjects, we shall be gainers by sparing your lives. 
 
 94. Melians. Then you wiU not allow us to remain 
 undisturbed, on terms of friendship instead of enmity 
 with you, and of strict neutrality in the war ? 
 
 g^. Athenians. Ko : for we are not so much preju- 
 
 ' "Qairep Kai • Kai is probably used article prefixed to aymv. 
 
 to compare Lacedaemon with Athens. * Thucydides, when he wrote these 
 
 Elotz {Deoar. vol. ii. p. 635) thus words, must have had the catastrophe 
 
 explains the use of /cai ' " in simplici of the Peloponnesian war in his eye. 
 
 comparatione : " dicitur Kai particula When Athens was compelled to 
 
 uhi ilia res aut persona, propter surrender to Lysander, the repre- 
 
 quam qusepiam res aut persona istS. sentatives of Thebes and Corinth, 
 
 particula effertur, aperte declarata and of several other Grecian states, 
 
 non est.' It may, however, mean at Sparta, urged the Lacedsemonians 
 
 'for instance.' to blot out Athens from the map of 
 
 ' I have followed Poppo (ed.min.) Greece. But this they refused to do. 
 
 in considering this clause parenthe- — ^Xen. Hell. II. ii. 19-21. 
 
 tical. ' "DiTTrtp KaL- Kai points to xpv<'^t""'> 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that which is virtually repeated In the 
 
 the sense of vvv, which some editors second clause, 
 insert, is contained in the definite 
 
i?^ SPEECHES FBOM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 diced by your enmity as we should be by your proffered 
 friendship, in which our subjects would read as clear 
 a revelation of our weakness, as of our ascendancy in 
 your hatred. 
 
 ^6. Melians. Do your subjects, then, entertain such 
 views of equity, as to make no distinction between a 
 people totally unconnected with you, and your depen- 
 dencies ^ — colonists, for the most part, of your own, some 
 of whom have rebelled and have been reduced ? 
 
 97. Athenians. Why, in point of equitable claims 
 to independence they think neither one nor the other 
 wanting ; and that, if any of our subjects maintain their 
 freedom, it is simply owing to their strength : just as, if 
 we refrain from attacking them, it is simply owing to our 
 fears. Tour reduction, therefore, quite ^ independently 
 of the extension of our empire, would contribute to our 
 security : more especially, because you would be an 
 insular^ province of a naval power, and a province — 
 unless,* indeed, you repulse our attack ! — less able to resist 
 us than others of our island subjects. 
 
 98. Melians. But do you not think you would be 
 consulting your own security by allowing us to remain 
 
 * See Bauer's note, cited by Poppo, Melos, Poppo (ed. min.) leans to- 
 ed, min. wards Duker's interpretation, which 
 
 * ' Kni ad f|w videtur referri.' — governs vavKpaTopiav by ■TttpiyivomBf, 
 Poppo, ed. nun. and whose Latin version may be 
 
 ' Athens, as a maritime power, rendered as follows : ' especially 
 
 naturally found insular much easier should you, an insular people, weaker, 
 
 of control than continental depen- too, than other islanders, fail in re- 
 
 dencies. pulsing us, the rulers of- the sea.' 
 
 * I have followed Hofmann, cited To this I object; because it compels 
 by Poppo (ed. min.), in governing us to attach a sense to koI and. ovtu:, 
 I'auKparopwi' by Kareffrprt^/^sroi under- which weakens the spealer's argu- 
 stood, as the only means of eliciting ment. The Athenians could not ex- 
 sense from the last clause, d iir) pect the prestige of their empire to 
 TriptyivoiaSe, which, I imagine, is only be increased by the inability of an 
 a reference, made colloquially, and insular people weaker than their 
 half jocosely, to the possibility of the other island subjects, to defy them, 
 repulse of the Athenian attack on 
 
THE ATHENIAN AND MELIAN NEGOTIATORS. 177 
 
 neutral?' — a questioa we raise, because, at this point 
 again,^ as you debar us from appealing to equity, and 
 invite us to consider your interests only, our best course 
 is to tell you plainly what would suit us, in the hope of 
 winning your assent, should you find that our interests 
 coincide with your own. — We would ask, then,^ how, if 
 you force our alliance, you can possibly avoid making 
 enemies of aU the neutral states, whom a single glance at 
 the part you are playing here, will convince that your 
 attack on them is only a question of time ? And how, if 
 you thus alarm them, can you fail to aggrandise your 
 existing foes, and to invite those who have not a thought 
 of opposing you, to become, against their inclination, 
 your enemies ? 
 
 99. Athenians. The fact is, we do not think the 
 various inland cities, whose independence will render them 
 very slow to take precautions against us, so formidable as 
 the scattered insular communities, some of which, like 
 yourselves, are not subjects of ours, while others have 
 long been exasperated by the severity of our rule ; for 
 these are just the men to throw caution to the winds, and 
 to plunge themselves as well as us into dangers that stare 
 them in the face. 
 
 100. Melians. Surely, then, if you, and the states 
 already subject to you, are ready to brave such desperate 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) and Arnold ' Tip is epexegetic : it connects its 
 
 print the sentence commencing with sentence with the first sentence of 
 
 OH yap and ending with iriiauv, as a the ch. : taking up the thread broken 
 
 parenthesis. 'Ev iKtivif surely refers by the parenthesis. Klotz (vol. ii. 
 
 to what precedes, as G-oUer explains p. 235) compares it, in this sense, to 
 
 it : apparently it points to the en- the Latin igitur : instancing a parallel 
 
 quiry made by the Melians at ch. 94. passage, where it follows a paren- 
 
 Poppo, however (ed. min.), refers it thesis, from Aristoph. (Pint. 78): 
 
 to oaot yofij ff.r.A. But in this sense 'Acovfirov hi] — hCi yap wq fotx lp.1 
 
 ToiiTifi would have been used. \iyuv 8. Kpinrrttv fj ■napmntvaaii.ivoq^ 
 
 * Poppo (ed. min.) refers ai to iyw yap I'tfu nXovrog, 
 ch. 90, above. 
 
178 SPEECHES FROM TEUCYDIDES. 
 
 risks — ^you to avert the fall of your empire, they to throw 
 off the yoke : in us, who are still free, it would be sheer 
 depravity and cowardice not to go through the whole 
 catalogue of hardships rather than surrender. 
 
 loi. Athenians. Not so; at any rate, if you take a 
 sensible view of the case. For you are not engaged in 
 an evenhanded contest on a point of honour, to save 
 yourselves from shameful imputations : the safety of your 
 country is the question before you, and it forbids you to 
 defy a vastly superior force. 
 
 102. Melians. Perhaps so ; but in war,^ fortune, as 
 we all know, sometimes betrays an impartiality^ you 
 could hardly expect from the relative numerical strength 
 of the contending parties : and in our case, while surrender 
 is instant and utter despair, there is still a hope that, by 
 energetic action, we may yet preserve our freedom.^ 
 
 103. Athenians. Hope is, indeed, a solace in danger : 
 nor does she ruin, though she may compromise, those of 
 her votaries who have ample reserves, in. case she fails 
 them ; but when, like reckless gamblers, men stake their 
 whole property on a single throw (and Hope is a lavish 
 passion), her real character is only revealed amid the 
 crash of a ruin so complete as to leave no room to guard 
 against her for the future, when her true attributes are 
 known.* Eefuse, then, weak as you are, with your lives- 
 
 ' T(i tSiv TToK'siiiov is probably here phorical sense by Sophocles, CEd. 
 
 only an amplification of u iroXtfioc. Ji. 50. 
 
 " I have followed Poppo'a reading * I have followed the explanation 
 (ed. min.), Koivoripag. The yaiious, given by the Scholiast, and supported 
 and doubtful, reading Kaivorkpag per- by Kriiger, Portus, and Dr. Arnold, 
 haps improves the sense. Poppo Poppo (ed. min.) and Goller, how- 
 remarks that the Homeric ^moQ ever, apparently on very inconclusive 
 'EvviiXing is the germ of the idea grounds, adopt Scholefield's version : 
 contained in Kotvorkpai. ' neque destituit, quamdiu ab eft 
 
 ' Srijiai 6p9wc means literally cognita cavere poterit aliquis.' They 
 
 'stand upright,' Horace's 'recto stare contend that IWsiVtii/ never bears 
 
 tab.' It is used similarly in a meta- the sense of ' relinquere,' but only 
 
THE ATHENIAN AND MELIAN NEOOTIATOBS. 179 
 
 hanging on a turn of the scale, to be the victims of an 
 influence so disastrous : nor imitate the mass of mankind, 
 who, when they might still save themselves by human 
 means, the moment that rational hopes fail them in the 
 hour of distress, take refuge in the visionary expectations 
 fed by divination and oracles, and similar delusions, which, 
 with the hopes they inspire, are the agents of ruin. 
 
 104. Alelians. We too, you may rest assured, think 
 it an arduous task to struggle against your power, and 
 against fortune, unless she proves impartial.^ Nevertheless, 
 we trust that the divine ^ protection, due to our righteous 
 defence against an iniquitous attack, may secure us a fair 
 share of the favours of fortune : and that our deficiency 
 in material force will be balanced by our ^ alliance with 
 Lacedasmon, who is under a moral obligation to succour 
 us, if for no other reason, still from community of race 
 and a sense of honour. So that our defiance is not so 
 utterly devoid of reasonable grounds. 
 
 105. Athenians. Eeally, as regards the Gods, we do 
 not think ourselves less likely than you to be favoured 
 by their good-will : for there is nothing in our theory or 
 practice foreign to the principles which men suppose to 
 
 tliat of ' deficere : ' the former mean- propoaes to cut tlie knot by reading 
 
 ing, however, is the first assigned to iv ooifi. 
 
 it in Lidd. and Scott's Lexicon, ' Poppo (ed. min.) inclines to 
 
 Poppo's adoption of Soholefield's ren- think these words apply to rixi), not 
 
 dering compels him to lay violent to a.y(tiv'iZ,taQni, 
 
 hands on the particles ufia re Kai, * Prohably this passage escaped 
 
 which,- he admits, generally answer Mr. Sellar's attention, when, in his 
 
 to the Latin ' simul atque ' — the interesting Essay on The Charac- 
 
 sense I have attributed to them — but teristics of Thucydides, he allowed 
 
 which he contends may here stand himself to speak of ' the absence of 
 
 for Ti iiiia Kai. Nor can he find in religious faith in Thucydides' (p. 
 
 Thucydides any similar instance of 307). The same idea recurs below, 
 
 the use of iv oriii to denote time, ch. 112, in the final refusal of the 
 
 though it often signifies instrumen- Melians to submit to Athens, 
 
 tality, the meaning I have given to ' Poppo (ed.min.) joins iiiiiv with 
 
 it. Sensible of this difficulty, he Kvjxnaxiav, 
 
 N 2 
 
i8o SPEE0EE8 FBOM TBUCYBIBES. 
 
 actuate them, and upon which they have chosen to act 
 towards their fellow men. For we believe that the Gods, 
 as far as we can judge, and that men, from what we see, 
 obey an imperious law of Nature by inflexibly maintaining 
 their dominion wherever they have power.^ We did not 
 make this law, nor were we the first to take advantage of 
 its sanction : we found it established, and likely, when we 
 leave it behind us, to continue for ever; and if we now 
 avail ourselves of it, it is in the conviction that you and 
 others, if your power equalled ours, would do so too. So 
 far, then, as the favour of heaven is concerned, we have 
 no reason to dread being eclipsed by you ; while, as to 
 your reliance on the Lacedsemonians — ^your trust that 
 they will aid you, if only, as you say,^ from a sense of 
 honour — we congratulate you on your innocent simplicity, 
 but do not envy your want of sense. The Lacedemonians, 
 indeed, in their relations to each other, in their own social 
 and political life, at home, are honest enough : but, if 
 •anyone wanted to summarise the character of their foreign 
 policy, in illustration of which many stories might be told, 
 he might do so, fairly ^ enough, by describing them as 
 ^evincing their conviction, with a barefaced impudence 
 unknown elsewhere, that honour is a synonym of plea- 
 sure, and right of expediency. And, surely, views like 
 these do not countenance your present ill-founded hopes 
 of succour. 
 
 ' With this assertion we may nantibus serviant: quam tamen in- 
 
 compare the argument of Callicles justitiam nisi sequatur imperiosa 
 
 in the Gorgias of Plato, c. 86-7, civitas, cujus est magna respublica, 
 
 pp. 48 3-4; and the following passage non earn posse provinciis imperare. 
 
 from Cicero : ' Et quoniam cum — Be Rep. iii. 24 : ap. Augustin, Be 
 
 prius agereturpro injustitise partibus Civ. Bei, xix. 21, 
 
 contra justitiam, et diceretur, nisi * In to aiVxpow ^^, 5jj clearly refers 
 
 per injustitiam rempublicam stare to the hope expressed in the last 
 
 aagerique non posse ; hoc veluti rejoinder of the Melians. 
 
 validissimum positum erat, injustum ' MaXcaro. 
 esse, ut homines hominibus domi- 
 
TSE ATHENIAN AND MELIAN NEGOTIATORS. l8l 
 
 1 06. Melians. To borrow your own words, it is just 
 their notion of self-interest on whicli we still ^ chiefly 
 rely ; it wiU disincline them to ruin their credit with their 
 well-wishers in Greece, and to give an advantage to their 
 foes, by abandoning their own colonists in Melos. 
 
 107. Athenians. Then you do not think that expe- 
 diency goes with safety, while works of justice and honour 
 are wrought amid danger ; a risk the Lacedaemonians are 
 in general the last to run ? 
 
 108. Melians. But we do ^ believe they will be more 
 disposed to encounter risk in our defence, and will think 
 it a better investment than if incurred in behalf of others, 
 in proportion to the convenience arising, with a view 
 to the operations of war, from our proximity to the 
 Peloponnesian coast; and because, from community of 
 race, they can place more than ordinary reliance on our 
 loyalty.^ 
 
 109. Athenians. But the loyalty of those who in- 
 voke their aid, is not exactly what men invited to share 
 a conflict regard as a security; they look to the pre- 
 ponderance in material strength of the party they are 
 called upon to aid : a point for which the Lacedaemonians 
 have, if possible, a keener eye than the rest of the world. 
 Thus, when they attack a neighbouring state, they take 
 care ^ to be supported by numerous allies, from distrust 
 of their own resources : so that, while we command the 
 sea, it is not hkely they will cross over to an island. 
 
 no. Melians. But they would still be able to send 
 
 ' For riSri Kriiger conjectures Sij, objects only on the ground that 
 
 which would be quite in its place, iriaroQ is not one of the adjectives 
 
 emphasising tovto. mentioned in Matthise's Qreek Gram- 
 
 ' 'AXXd Kai' Poppo (ed.min.) ran- mar as governing a genitive ! 
 ders Kal by adeo. * Kai emphasises ivft/iaxiov, and 
 
 ' Gbller and Dr. Arnold make points to it as the condition under 
 
 yvwfiijc depend on vnrTOTcpof a con- which such attacks were ventured, 
 struction to which Toppo (ed. min.) 
 
I 82 SPHJUGEES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 federal ^ ti'oops : besides, the Cretan main is wide ; so that 
 the capture of a hostile squadron is a more difficult task 
 for the masters of the sea than the achievement of a safe 
 run for a squadron anxious to elude them. Supposing, 
 too, they should fail to relieve us, they might turn their 
 arms against your territory and that of any of your con- 
 federates whom the expeditions of Brasidas did not reach ; 
 you will then have to fight, not for a countiy that never 
 belonged to you, but for one more nearly related to you, 
 that of an ally,^ or your own soil. 
 
 III. Athenians. You, like others,^ may possibly 
 have some personal experience of such matters : * and then 
 you will learn that the Athenians never yet raised one 
 single siege for fearof any foreign diversion. It strikes 
 us, too, that although you declared the safety of your 
 island should be the subject of your deliberations, 
 throughout this long discussion you have advanced 
 nothing on which men in your position can found a 
 reasonable expectation of saving their country; on the 
 contrary, your chief reliance is on the precarious hopes of 
 the future ; while your present resources, compared with 
 the force at this moment arrayed against you, are too 
 slight to give you a chance of holding out. You will 
 certainly prove yourselves thoroughly wrongheaded, if, 
 after allowing us to retire, you fail to adopt some wiser 
 resolution. For we presume you will not^ take refuge in 
 that misleading influence, the fear of disgrace, which is 
 
 ' "AXXovj" i.e. socios. — Poppo, ed. n Kni K<'Hiiax'iSoQ. In his text, Kai 
 
 min. 7% appears in brackets. 
 
 ** The Scholiast's explanation shows ' Kni wpv significant ' vos qiioque, 
 
 that he did not regard the words siout alii ante vos.' — Poppo, ed. min. 
 
 ^tififiax'Sos TE Kai yijc, which Poppo * See Poppo's note on rovroiv n, 
 
 (ed. min.) has enclosed in brackets, ed. min. 
 
 as an interpolation. Gijlhr, how- ^ Perhaps the force of /e may here 
 
 over, is probably right in believing be given by emphasising the nega- 
 
 the genuine reading to be niicuoTipas tive. 
 
THE ATHENIAN AND MELIAN NEGOTIATOBS. 183 
 
 always involving men in dangers disgraceful^ to them, 
 because foreseen. How often does the dread of what 
 men call ' disgrace,' a word that has the virtue of a spell, 
 entail upon them, in their abject fear of an empty term — 
 though their eyes are open to the perils before them — 
 the penalty of wilful entanglement^ in real and irre- 
 trievable disasters : winning for them, besides, a disgrace 
 the more shameful as the ofiFspring, not of misfortune, but 
 of their own infatuation ! Against such a fate, if your 
 counsels are wise, you will be on your guard : and will 
 not think it undignified to defer to a very powerful state 
 which invites your acceptance of moderate terms, allowing 
 you to retain your territory on condition of becoming her 
 tributary allies ; and, when the option between war and 
 safety is ofiered you, to refrain from obstinately choosing^ 
 the perilous alternative of war. You may then hope for 
 good fortune ; for readiness * to pay due respect to superior 
 power is just as much one of the conditions of a prosperous 
 career, as impatience of submission to an equal, or the 
 considerate treatment of a dependant. Weigh, therefore, 
 the issue well, when we withdraw ; ^ and again and again 
 reflect that the question before you is the safety of your 
 country : your one and only country : whose fate depends 
 on the success or the failure of your final consultation. 
 
 1 The alliteration of ahxpoXe and * I have altered the machinery of 
 
 alaxvv7)v brings out the antithetical this sentence, so aa to give promi- 
 
 contrast between the two terms. nence to the middle term of the 
 
 * Poppo (ed. min.) takes irepi- proposition, which relates to the 
 
 irtffftv and 7rpoa\al3siv as equivalent case in point — the position of Melos 
 
 to substantives : not as final inflni- towards Athens, 
 tives. * Poppo (ed. min.) renders xai 
 
 ' *iAoi'£iKJjiTai per breviloquentiam itiTanravTuv rifiZv, ' etiam semotis 
 
 dictum est pro (pihovuKoiivTaQ i\h6at nobis (non solum prsesentibus).' This 
 
 (GoUer). Poppo (ed. min.) shows may be right, but the use of icrri 
 
 that the same construction occurs in reminds one of the old English 
 
 Plato (iVote^. 360, b)t ^iXo7'eucEiw pi 'even' in such phrases as 'I will 
 
 SoKiig TO Sfii livat tov airoicpivoiiivov, e'en do so.' 
 
i!^4 SPEECHES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 The Melian negotiators, after a brief private conference, apart 
 from tte Athenians, returned with the following ultimatum, which 
 they addressed to the representatives of Athens : 
 
 112. Our view of the case, Athenians, is exactly^ 
 what it was at first ; we will not, at a moment's notice, 
 rob our city, seven hundred years after its foundation, of 
 its independence ; no, we will strain every nerve to save 
 our freedom, putting our trust in that fortune which 
 under Providence has hitherto preserved us, in the sup- 
 port of public opinion, and ^ the active aid of Lacedsemon. 
 We therefore call upon you to allow us to remain friendly 
 to you, without forcing us into hostile relations with 
 either belligerent : and to withdraw from our shores after 
 concluding a treaty on terms acceptable to both parties. 
 
 To this the Athenians, just as they were leaving the council, 
 replied : 
 
 1 13. Well, then, judging by your decision, you seem 
 to us to be the only men who regard future contingencies 
 as more certain than palpable facts, and to look upon 
 events quite out of sight, through the medium of your 
 wishes, as going on before your eyes. You have staked 
 a vital interest on the fraU^ security of Lacedaemon, 
 fortune, and hope; and your trust in them will be 
 rewarded with a very heavy loss. 
 
 ' On this use of kki see Klotz the /cm' before AancSai/ioviiav ' espe- 
 (Devar. vol. ii. p . 6 3 5), where he cites cially : ' he regards it as the counter- 
 Plato (Phcad. 64, 0) : 'Sdipat Sf/, tiiv part of the Latin ' atque,' which, he 
 Spa Kai (Toi Ivv&oK^ Snrtp Kai l/jni, adds, is often equivalent to 'et — 
 "where the rat which precedes kftai is qiiidem.' 
 
 used to strengthen the comparisnn ' The omission ofthe article before 
 
 between that pronoun and <roi. KastlaijiovmiQ and the two following 
 
 2 Poppo (ed. maj.) thinks Bauer words, implies that they are used in 
 
 and Bloomfleld wrong in rendering a characteristic sense. 
 
NIGIA8. 185 
 
 SPEECH OF NICIAS, 
 
 Delivered before the Athenian popular assembly, b.c. 415. Bk. VI. chs. 9-15, 
 
 INTMODUCTION. 
 
 Hermoceates ' having succeeded, B.C. 424, in effecting a general 
 pacification of Sicily, the Athenian squadron returned home. Shortly 
 afterwards, a fresh dispute broke out between Leontini and Syra^' 
 cuse : when the former city, overborne by her powerful rival, ap- 
 pealed to Athens for aid. She, however, embroiled in the turmoil 
 of Peloponnesian politics, was not then, nor for the three years 
 which followed the peace of Mcias, at liberty to interfere. At the 
 end of that period a quarrel broke out between Selinus and Egesta : 
 Syracuse interfered in behalf of the people of Selinus, who, with 
 her aid, reduced Egesta to dependance on foreign succour. The 
 envoys of the distressed city appeared at Athens in the spring ot 
 the year 416 B.C., to sue for Athenian assistance. They rested their 
 appeal chiefly on grounds of policy : representing that ' the Syra- 
 cusans, having already extinguished one ally of Athens (Leontini), 
 were now hard pressing upon a second, and would thus successively 
 subdue them all: as soon as this was completed, there would be 
 nothing left in Sicily except an omnipotent Dorian combination, 
 allied to the Peloponnese both by race and descent, and sure to lend 
 effective aid in putting down Athens herself.' * Alcibiades warmly 
 seconded this petition ; and, on the return of the Commissioners 
 who had been gent to report on the ability of the Egestseans to con- 
 tribute to the expenses of the war, the Athenians determined to 
 despatch an expedition of sixty triremes to Sicily, under three 
 generals, Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus, with the view, in the 
 first place, of relieving Egesta : secondly, of re-establishing the city 
 of Leontini : lastly, of farthering Athenian ascendancy in Sicily. 
 
 Nicias, who had been elected general against his will, and who 
 strongly disapproved the expedition, availed himself of the oppor- 
 tunity offered by a second meeting of the assembly to reopen the 
 whole question, and to reiterate his objections to the measure. 
 
 ' See his Speech, hk. iv. ch. 59, sejy. " Grote, vol. vii. p. 198. 
 
1 86 SPEEGMUS FBOM TEUGYDIVES. 
 
 Ch. 9. I am aware that this assembly was convened 
 to consider the details of our proposed expedition to 
 Sicily; but I think we ought even now to weigh the 
 previous question, the question of the policy of sending 
 the fleet at all, instead of, after so short a consultation on 
 a point of vital consequence, undertaking a war with 
 which we have no business, in obedience to foreign 
 instigation. And when I speak thus, I speak as one who 
 owes his honours to the battle field, and is less anxious 
 than others for his own personal safety — though ^ I do 
 think a man as good a citizen for taking some care of his 
 person and his property as well as of his country : a man 
 of this kind being most likely to be anxious, for his own 
 sake, for the public prosperity as'^ interwoven with his 
 own. Notwithstanding this, I never at any former time 
 courted power by proposing measures that my judgment 
 disapproved ; nor will I now : but I will frankly tell you 
 in what direction I conceive our true course to lie. I 
 know you too well to fancy my arguments would have 
 any effect, were I simply to advocate the conservative 
 policy of keeping what you have, instead of risking your 
 present possessions for the visionary hopes of an unseen 
 future ; I will, however, show you that your ambition is 
 mistimed, and that the project you have at heart is diffi- 
 cult of achievement. 
 
 10. I say, then, that you are acting as if, not content 
 with leaving many enemies at home, you wished to invite 
 others to attack you here, by saiUng there. Perhaps you 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) says, 'hsec /uarof, may of course be taken as 
 
 addit, quod illos seniores ab Alci- simply emphasising irpovoriTaf ' who 
 
 biadis factione timiditatis inousatos does take some care of his person,' 
 
 ipse nequaquam vult reprehendere.' etc., or, as I have rendered it, as 
 
 * Kai TO 7-i(c TToXfwc koi probably cornparing personal with patriotic 
 
 means ' as well as his own.' The cares. See note ', p. 7. 
 former «»/, that which precedes nw- 
 
NIGIAS. 187 
 
 think the treaty concluded with you is something to rely 
 upon : no doubt, while you remain quiet, it will still 
 exist, though only in name (so treacherously was it dealt 
 with by certain personages^ on our as well as on the 
 other side) ; but, the moment any considerable force of 
 ours meets with a check, our enemies will take the first 
 opportunity of attacking us, since, in their case, the con- 
 vention was originally extorted by the pressure of disaster,^ 
 and was less ^ to their credit than to ours ; besides which, 
 the treaty itself leaves many points * of interest to us still 
 at issue. There are also some states, and those not the 
 least powerful, who have not accepted even this arrange- 
 ment:^ on the contrary, some of them are openly" at 
 war, while others, again,'' because Laced^mori has made 
 no move yet, allow themselves to be restrained by a truce 
 terminable every tenth day. And it is very likely that, 
 should they find our forces divided, as we are now so 
 anxious they shovild be, they would eagerly join the 
 Sicilian Greeks, whose alliance they would have valued 
 very highly at an earlier stage of the war, in attacking us. 
 We* certainly ought to weigh these considerations, in- 
 
 ' Alluding to the underliaiid efforts Athenian relation to the Boeotians 
 
 of Cleobulus and Xenares, two of (Thucyd. v. 26) and the Chalcidians 
 
 the Spartan ephors, for the dissolu- (vi. 7). 
 
 tion of the alliance between Athens ' Bloomfield conveniently disposes 
 
 and Lacedsemon, B.C. 4.11 (Thucyd. of the khi which precedes Sid to 
 
 \. 36, Grote, vol. vii. p. 33). By AaiciS<iiiiovwve as an Attic pleonasm. 
 
 ivd'tvSi Alcihiades is meant ; see A critic quoted by Poppo (ed. maj.) 
 
 Thucyd. v. 45, for the trick whereby, thus explains it : ' primum illud ko!, 
 
 420 B.C., he discredited the Lacedse- quod est proxime post ol ^f, hosce ad 
 
 monian embassy at Athens. eos, qui sunt antea dicti, adjimgit, 
 
 ^ See Grote, vol. vii. p. 11. alteram vero mi avrot eosdem illoa 
 
 ' See note", p. 69, on the Thu- Lacedsemoniis opponit.' 
 
 cydidean use oi dinxioi' for aiaxpov. * Goller refers nva to Alcihiades: 
 
 * See Thucyd. v. 35,42. Poppo (ed. min.), more probably, in 
 
 ' See Thucyd. v. 26. consonance with Thucydidean usage, 
 
 ' Corinth is .chiefly alluded to : and in harmony with the context, 
 
 see Thucyd. v. 52, 115. The St-x^i- makes it equivalent to ^/iaf. 
 
 /jEpoi a-Kovdai were the terms of the 
 
r88 SFEEGHE8 FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 stead of presumptuously challenging clanger while the 
 vessel of our country is rocking on the waves, or grasping 
 at a second empire before we have consolidated our 
 existing dominion ; recollecting, too, that the Chalcidians 
 on the Thracian border, after so many years of revolt, are 
 still unsubdued, and that others of our allies on various 
 parts of the mainland ^ are wavering in their allegiance. 
 In the teeth, however, of all tliis, we must, it seems, rush 
 to succour the people of Egesta, our pretended alhes, 
 because they complain of wrongs : while we still adjourn 
 the chastisement of rebels, whose defection, so many 
 years ago, is a standing wrong to ourselves. 
 
 1 1 . And yet the latter, once reduced, might be kept 
 in subjection; whereas, even if we conquered the Sici- 
 lians, we should find it very difficult to govern a depen- 
 dency so distant and so populous. And it is pure folly 
 to invade a country which even conquest cannot firmly 
 hold ; while failure leaves you in a worse position than 
 before you made the attempt. 
 
 Looking to the present condition of the Sicilian Greeks, 
 I should say they were likely to prove decidedly less 
 dangerous to us, if they were subject to Syracuse ; the 
 very contingency with which the envoys of Egesta are 
 trying to frighten us. As things now are, some of the 
 Sicilian states might perhaps be induced to attack us, 
 to obhge Laced^mon ; but, in the former case, it is not 
 likely one imperial city would take up arms against 
 another : there being every probability that, if Syracuse 
 aided the Peloponnesians to despoil our empire, the 
 same process^ would be applied to her own, which 
 
 • Poppo (ed. inin.) thinks Erythrse, are tacitly referred to. 
 
 Miletus and other towns on the coast * The Lacedeemonians always 
 
 of Asia, which revolted on the news pulled down tyrannies and dominant 
 
 of the Athenian disasters in Sicily, states. 
 
NIGIAS. 189 
 
 would in turn be pulled down by those very Pelopon- 
 nesians Besides, the Sicilian Greeks would hold us in 
 far more awe, if we did not go there at all ; and, next ^ 
 to that, if, after making a brief display of our power, 
 we were to retire; for,^ as we all know, reverence is 
 increased by distance,^ and by difficulty in subjecting 
 renown to a crucial test. If, on the other hand, we met 
 with any reverse, it would instantly excite their con- 
 tempt, and they would join our enemies here in assailing 
 us. And this, Athenians, is the feeling you entertain 
 for the Lacedaemonians and their allies ; your triumphs 
 over them, so unexpected, compared with your apprehen- 
 sions at the outset of the war, have taught you to despise 
 them, and to aim forthwith at the conquest of Sicily. 
 Your elation, however, should not be founded on the 
 mere misfortunes of your enemies : you should reserve 
 your self-confidence till you have broken their spirit : * 
 and meanwhile regard the Lacedfemonians as bent solely, 
 owing to the dishonour of their arms, on compassing the 
 means whereby, if possible, they may yet foil us, and 
 creditably close an epoch of disgrace ; a point upon 
 which their anxiety is proportioned to their long and pas- 
 sionate pursuit of military glory. The question, there- 
 fore, now before us, if we are wise, is not the defence 
 
 • "EirciTa Se Kai ti- Kal does not ' Poppo (ed. min.) quotes Tacitus' 
 
 belong to el, but repeats hntirXtjy- maxim ' Major e longinquo reve- 
 
 jiivoi &v [Uv. rentia' (Ann. i. 47). He might have 
 
 ' I have ventured to transpose added Virgil's 'minuit prsesentia 
 
 this and the following sentence ; for, famam.' 
 
 as Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, the * Dr. Arnold aptly compares a fine 
 
 clause commencing oirep vvv, k.t.\., sentence of Livy: 'Habere Samnites 
 
 refers to virtpiSovnc, k.t.X.- and the victoriam, non praeclaram solum, 
 
 intervening clause ra yup f:id rrXdarov, sed etiam perpetuam : cepisse enim 
 
 K.T.X., awkward, as it stands, even eos non Eomam, sicut ante Gallos, 
 
 as a parenthesis, is connected with sed quod multo bellicosius fuerit, 
 
 the previous declaration of the policy Eomanam virtutem ferociamqueJ 
 of keeping aloof from Sicily. 
 
19° SPEECHES FROM TEUOYDIDES. 
 
 of the barbarous population of Egesta, but the means 
 of vigilant precaution against a state which is intriguing 
 against us through the agency of the ohgarchical in- 
 terest. 
 
 12. "We should also remember that it is but lately 
 we have enjoyed a brief respite from the ravages of 
 pestilence and war, enabling us to replenish our exche- 
 quer and recruit our population ; and surely we may 
 fairly be allowed to spend our money for our own pur- 
 poses, at home, rather than in patronising these exiles, 
 just because they beg our aid : men whose purposes it 
 suits to tell plausible falsehoods, and who find it con- 
 venient — while they throw all the risk on their allies, and 
 offer nothing of their own ^ but promises — to make 
 no adequate return if they succeed, or, if they meet with 
 any reverse, to involve their friends in their own ruin. 
 And if a certain personage, all the more delighted with 
 his appointment to a high command, because he is so 
 
 1 very young for its duties,^ urges the expedition, consult- 
 ing only his own desire to win admiration by the beauty 
 of his stud, and at the same time ^ to reimburse his 
 extravagance by means of the appointment : do not, 
 I say, suffer him to display his personal splendour at the 
 hazard of his country, but rest assured that men of his 
 stamp, while ruining their own fortunes with one hand, 
 wrong the public with the other : and that the enter- 
 
 ^ prise itself is a critical affair, and not one for the brief* 
 deliberation and hasty execution of a youngster. 
 
 '■ I have followed Poppo's reading post aipiBiie posita velis : certe cum 
 
 . (ed. min.), avrSiv \6yovQ liovov irapa- verbis TO iavToii, K.r.X., cohsBrere noil 
 
 axoiiivovQ, -which he renders, ' quum de videntui.' 
 
 suis nihil suppeditent prseter verha.' ' Koi lii'ptXridy- KaL refers to Bav- 
 
 ^ Here again, I have been com- iiaaHy, and indicates a second motive, 
 
 pelled to transpose a clause, on the that of ixjilKtia, as operating at the 
 
 authority of Poppo (ed. min.), who same time, 
 
 says, ' heec (u.\/\wf Tf — ap^^ei)') statim ^ BovXtiaaaQm rt /cat 6|£we fiira- 
 
NIGIAS. 19T 
 
 13. I almost tremble when I see the satellites ^ of his 
 policy sitting, by previous concert, in this assembly, close 
 to their leader : and I would make a counter appeal 
 to the more experienced, if any of these partisans try to 
 intimidate them, not to be shamed out of their purpose 
 for fear of being thought cowards, if they do not vote for 
 war: nor to surrender themselves, like these men, to 
 an infatuated passion for acquisitions beyond their reach : 
 recollecting that mere ambition reaps but few successes, 
 a prescient policy many. Yes, I call upon them to 
 oppose the war, in the name of their country, now on 
 the verge of a crisis of unprecedented danger ; and to 
 decide that the Sicilian Greeks shall satisfy themselves 
 with the limits which define their relation to us — ^limits 
 which no one complains of — and which allow them the 
 coast navigation of the Ionian gulf, and the open navi- 
 gation of the Sicilian sea ; and that, as they enjoy their 
 own possessions, so they shall settle, at home, their own 
 differences. The Egestsans, in particular, we must 
 require to dispense with Athenian aid in closing, just as 
 they dispensed with Athenian sanction in commencing, 
 the war with Selinus ; and for the future we must 
 decUne the alHance of states whom we shall have to aid 
 in their hour of misfortune, without the slightest pros- 
 pect of aid from them when we request it. 
 
 14. I call upon you, therefore. President, if you 
 
 Xfipi'ffar the particles rt — icai here in planning, comhined with (rt — tcaf) 
 
 express the close union of the two a promptitude in executing measures, 
 
 verbal notions which they connect : not to be expected in a youngster.' 
 so that the adverb d^siae extends its ' Gbller reads in this passage a 
 
 qualifying influence to jSovKivTanSm significant revelation of the influence 
 
 as well as to /j^raxupiaai' the idea of political clubs at Athens, and 
 
 being that a young man would soon refers to ^sohines (e. Ctes. § i), atd 
 
 get his deliberation over and act at to Thucyd. (viii. 54.), where this 
 
 once. If, however, o^fwf is takeA in machinery is described as in full 
 
 a favoui-able sense, the passage might action during the war. 
 be construed : ' demanding a wisdom 
 
192 SFEEGSES FROM TEUGYDIDES. 
 
 think it becomes you to care for your country, and you 
 wish to prove yourself a patriotic citizen, to put this issue 
 to the vote, and allow the Athenian people a recon- 
 sideration ^ of the question : in the assurance that, if you 
 are alarmed at the repetition of the vote, there can be 
 no responsibility in infringing the law with so many wit- 
 nesses to attest your motives : that you will be proving 
 yourself a skilful physician of the policy^ of the state : 
 and that a good administration consists in conferring 
 every possible service on one's country, or, at any rate, in 
 shielding her from any mischief one can prevent. 
 
 ' Poppo(ed.min.) construes yi'ii/inc admission into his text, on the 
 
 T^poTiGivai by ' aententias dicendi po- ground of its absence from all the 
 
 testatem facere.' MSS. except two ; and Goller re- 
 
 ' The word povKtvaafiivriQ seems marks that Nicias probably avoided 
 
 to require the qualification KaKWQ- it, as likely to affront his audience, 
 but Poppo (ed. min.) refuses it 
 
ALCIBIADES. 1 93 
 
 SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES, 
 
 Before the Athenian popular assembly, in reply to the preceding speech of Nicias. 
 Bk. VI. chs. 1 6-19.1 
 
 Ch. 16. Athenians, I have not only a better title 
 than others to the command — a topic with which, 
 attacked as I have been by Nicias, I am compelled to 
 commence — but I also consider myself personally worthy 
 of it ; since the very qualities for which I am denounced 
 not only reflect honour on myself and my ancestors, but 
 are of positive advantage to my country. In proof of 
 this latter assertion, I need only remind you that the 
 Greeks, who had previously hoped that the resources 
 of our capital had been pulled down by the war, were 
 induced even to overrate them by the magnificent style 
 in which I represented Athens at the Olympic festival, 
 when I sent down seven chariots to the lists — more than 
 any private citizen had ever entered — gaining a first, 
 a second, and a fourth prize : nor did the style of my 
 equipments disparage the lustre of my triumph. Public 
 opinion honours trophies such as these : and the pageantry 
 itself creates an impression of power.^ Again, the dis- 
 tinction with which, within the city, I have served the 
 office of choregus, among other pubhc functions, though 
 it may naturally excite the envy of a fellow-citizen, is,^ to 
 the eye of a foreigner, eloquent of large resources. 
 My wild extravagance, then, as you call it, is not devoid 
 
 » See Grote, toI. vii. p. 207. pression produced by his civic mag- 
 
 " Kai Siva/iiQ' Kai compares SbvajxiQ nificence with that excited hy his 
 with rifiii, above. appearance at the Olympic festival. 
 
 ' Kai aiirq" Kai compares the im- 
 
 O 
 
194 8PEEGHES FROM THUGYDIDHS. 
 
 of use, when its votary serves the public as well as his 
 personal interests at his own cost. And it certainly is 
 not unfair that a man who is proud of his wealth and 
 station, should repudiate equality with the mass ; society ^ 
 acts on that principle every day : the man of broken 
 fortunes, for instance, finds none to share his calamity. 
 On the contrary, just as people take no notice of us 
 in our hour of adversity, so must they, when their turn of 
 misfortune comes, brook the disdain of prosperity ; they 
 can only expect others to make no difference towards 
 them, when they deal with them on that principle. 
 
 Men of the class I was describing, men of distinction 
 in the various fields of honour, have, I know, during 
 their lifetime, often been unpopular with the world in 
 which they moved, and especially with their equals : but, 
 after their death, posterity often claims a connection with 
 them, even without grounds : and their country takes 
 an exulting pride in them, regarding them not as aliens 
 or offenders, but as her own children and the authors 
 of brilliant achievements. Such is my ambition : and 
 if, in its pursuit, a cry is raised against my private hfe, 
 I will only ask you to consider whether I anj inferior to 
 others in administering public affairs. It was I who 
 united in a league the chief powers of the Peloponnese 
 without any serious risk or expense to you, and forced 
 the Lacedaemonians to put their all to the hazard of a 
 single day's fighting at Mantinea ; a hazard so great, ' 
 that, though victors on the battle field, they have never 
 yet regained a steady confidence in their own strength. 
 
 17. With such results did my extreme youth and, 
 reputedly, portentous folly, confront the Peloponnesian 
 
 1 'ETTti Kai is often used thus, to an 5 /orfjon argument. So in Plato 
 usher in a familiar illustration : espe- (Apol. p. 20, a) : comp. iirci roi Kai, 
 cially when it assumes the form of Hipp. Ma/, p. 288, c. 
 
ALCIBIADE8. 195 
 
 power : ^ and, combining dexterous diplomacy with an 
 earnestness of tone that inspired faith, won assent to my 
 views. Let ^ not then my age alarm you : but, while I 
 am still in the flower of my youth, and Mcias is, appa- 
 rently, a favourite of fortune, make the most of our 
 respective services ; and do not think of countermanding 
 the expedition to Sicily, under the impression that it will 
 have a mighty power to encounter. If her cities are 
 populous, it is only with motley crowds of various race : 
 their constitutions, too, are often in a state of fluctuation, 
 and sometimes of radical change. On this account, the 
 citizens do not provide themselves with arms for their 
 personal protection, or the land with the usual appli- 
 ances of cultivation and defence, as they would do, if 
 they had a country all their own to guard. Everyone's 
 object is to secure for himself out of the common stock, 
 either by eloquence in debate, or by active partisanship, 
 what he thinks will enable him, in the event of a reverse, 
 to settle in a foreign land. And it is not likely that a 
 rabble of this kind will with one heart rally round a 
 statesman, or enter on the field of action with the spirit 
 of a common cause. Every man would act for himself, 
 and quickly side with any proposal that suited his views : 
 especially if, as we hear, the country is at this moment 
 torn by factions. Then, again, as to their heavy infan- 
 try : ^ they do not possess the force they boast of; their 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) justly doubts renders rnirn w/uiXvuE/hsectransegit.' 
 whether rr)v TitKovowrialiiiv Svvaiiw " I have here adopted Bekker's 
 
 can he regarded as equivalent to the conjecture, received into the text of 
 
 preceding expression UiKowovvnaov Arnold and GoUer, and confessed by 
 
 tH SvvarwTaTa, as the Scholiast and Poppo (ed. min.) to he a great im- 
 
 GoUer take it, and renders ig by provement on the old reading, which 
 
 ' contra.' He also objects to Dr. he still allows to disfigure his text. 
 Arnold's explanation of wfiiXriae by ^ ' Hi soli commemorati sunt, quod 
 
 opiAjjiraffa fTTfioSf a uotiou, however, Grseci eos in bellis maximi sestima- 
 
 apparently endorsed by GoUer, who bant.' — Poppo, ed. min. 
 
 o 2 
 
ly6 ' SPJETEOSIIS FBOM THUCYVIDES. 
 
 returns are about as reliable as those of the rest of the 
 Greeks, whose infantry has been transparently proved 
 to be much below the amount at which the several states 
 kept rating it ; Greece, indeed, has grossly exaggerated 
 the muster-roll of her heavy infantry : and, even during 
 the present war, has hardly been adequately armed with 
 troops of this class. 
 
 Such, then, as I have reason to believe from all 
 accounts, will be the state of things there : indeed, our 
 prospects are even more promising; for we shall find 
 many allies among the non-Greek population, whose 
 hatred of Syracuse will dispose them to join us in assail- 
 ing her ; while, if your counsels are wise, no additional ^ 
 difficulty need arise from the -interests we have to defend 
 at home. Our fathers acquired their empire in the teeth 
 of the enmity of those very states — independently of 
 the enmity of the Mede — whose hostility it is now alleged 
 we shall be leaving behind us, when we set sail : and 
 this they achieved simply and solely through the superior 
 strength of their marine. There never was a time when 
 the Peloponnesians were more hopeless of reducing us 
 than they are now ; and, even if they recovered full 
 confidence, though they are strong enough to make 
 incursions into Attica, whether we send the expedition 
 or not, their fleet could not, in either contingency, do us 
 any mischief : for our naval reserves at home are a match 
 for them. 
 
 1 8. What reasonable grounds, then, can we find for 
 shirking the enterprise ourselves ? What excuse can 
 we plead to our Sicilian allies for failing to succour them? 
 We certainly ought to aid them, especially as we have 
 actually sworn to do so, instead of contenting ourselves 
 
 > 'E«K(i)Xi!(T«i" i.e. no difficulty beyond the natural difficulties of tte ex- 
 pedition. 
 
■ALGIBIADES. 197 
 
 with the counterplea that they have never aided us. For, 
 •when we espoused their aUiance, it was not with the 
 view of their returning the favour by coming here to 
 fight for us : we hoped they would keep our Sicilian foes 
 constantly embroiled, and prevent their assaihng us at 
 home. Besides, it was by a policy of intervention that 
 we, in common with aU who ever^ won dominion, ac- 
 quired our empire : it was by heartily assisting com- 
 munities, whether Greek or barbarian, which from time 
 to time invoked our aid. Indeed, if there were no 
 dissensions to interfere in, and if distinctions of race were 
 made in choosing whom to succour, the extension of 
 our empire would be a very slow process ; or, rather, we 
 should run a risk of losing it altogether. For every 
 state is on the watch not only to repel the aggression of 
 a superior power, but to defeat,^ by anticipation, the 
 possibihty of such aggression. And it is out of the 
 question for us to cut and carve at pleasure the area 
 of our rule : we are compelled, by our position as an 
 imperial city, to intriguq systematically for the subjection 
 of one state, while we tighten our rein upon another : 
 threatened as we are with the risk of foreign subjuga- 
 tion,, should we halt in our career of aggrandisement. 
 Situated as you are, you cannot regard political quietism 
 from the same point of view as other communities,^ un- 
 less, at the same time, you choose to recast your national 
 character and pursuits on the model of theirs. 
 
 Concluding, then, that this expedition will probably 
 
 ' "Offoi ii). Klotz (Devar. vol. ii. tural correction of /i^ oirac. 
 
 p. 405) quotes this passage in illus- ' Compare the remark of the 
 
 trating the use of &it, with indefinite Corinthian envoy at Sparta, iiavxa- 
 
 pronouns, when, as he shows, it adds Zo^ffy fiiv ttoXu to. cLKtvrjTa vofit^a 
 
 to their indefiniteness of meaning. apwra, irpog jroXXd Si avayKaiofiivoig 
 
 ' Gbller says /i>) d>e is used for wg uvai iroW^e "al rije liriTCxvriaiidis Sii, 
 
 /iti by Isffius (De ApoU. Hmred. § 27) ; — Bk. i, oh. 71. 
 otherwise, ottuq uri would be a na- 
 
19^ 8PEECSES FROM THUGYDIBES. 
 
 lead to the increase of our existing dominion, let us 
 undertake it at once, and thereby lay low * the arrogant 
 pride of the Peloponnesians, who will see, when we 
 actually sail for Sicily, how little we prize the present 
 interval of peace. Besides,'^ the acquisition of those 
 realms will in all probability enable us to sway the whole 
 of Greece, or, at the least, to ruin Syracuse, to the great 
 advantage of ourselves and our confederates. Our fleet 
 will render it perfectly safe for us either to stay, should 
 any of the Sicilian states come over to us, or to return 
 home ; for we shall be more than a match for the naval 
 forces of Sicily, even if combined. Let not, then, Nicias 
 turn you from your purpose by pleading the policy 
 of non-intervention, and setting the old on one side of 
 the question and the young on the other ; let us follow 
 our traditional custom, the custom of our fathers, who 
 intermingled the young with the old in the councils 
 of the state, and raised our national honour to its present 
 height. Let it be your aim, by similar means, to ad- 
 vance still further the glory of your country, convinced 
 that youth and age are of no avail without each other's 
 aid, and that the true strength of a deliberative council 
 lies in its tempering by fusion the impetuosity^ of the 
 young, the moderation of manhood, and the ripe ex- 
 perience of age : and that our country, if condemned to 
 
 ' See Poppo'a note (ed. maj.) on youth, manhood, and age, as the 
 
 the poetical term lyropkaiofici'. context seems to require, the word 
 
 " I have not ventured to construe fnyXof must be taken as a jocose 
 
 np^o/iiv as a subjunctive, though allusion to the satirical remarks of 
 
 Thucydides must have intended to Nicias on the precipitancy of youth, 
 
 govern the mood by the particle 'Iva, ' His vocabulis,' says Poppo (ed. 
 
 when he placed re after IliKonov- maj.), 'utentem Alcibiadem cavil- 
 
 vriaiiDi', where it answers to Kai in lari apparet.' Portus takes the terms 
 
 the clause commencing Knl I'lpn. as describing the various ranks of 
 
 ' If ibai'Xoi', jiimv, and aKpijUe are society: an explanation at variance 
 
 referred to the various stages of with the context. 
 
ALGIBIADE8. 1 99 
 
 political inaction abroad,^ would follow the general law 
 of nature and wear away her strength in internal 
 agitation, her skill in all its branches growing dull from 
 desuetude : whereas, if her energies are kept in constant 
 play, she will always be adding to her stock of experi- 
 ence, and will be more familiar with the art of self- 
 defence, when, instead of being discussed in debate, it is 
 practised in reality. On the whole, I am of opinion that 
 the change from political enterprise to political inaction 
 would very soon be fatal to a state, and that those com- 
 munities enjoy the safest position, whose political action 
 is most in harmony with the national character and 
 customs, even if they fall materially below the highest 
 standard of excellence. 
 
 > Compare Livy(xxx, 44): 'Nulla si foris hostem non habet, domi in 
 mag-na civitas diu q^uiescere potest: venit,' 
 
20O 8PEE0HES FBOM TEUGTDIBES. 
 
 SPEECH OF NICIAS, 
 
 Delivered on the same occasiou as the two preceding harangues. Bk, VI. chs. 20-24. 
 
 INTSOnUCTION^. 
 
 The impression produced by the speech of Alcibiades, seconded by 
 the entreaties of the envoys from Egesta and Leontini, made Nicias 
 despair of inducing the Athenians to revoke their decree for the 
 expedition. He thereupon changed his tactics : and, in the follow- 
 ing address, tries to dissuade them by representing the magnitude 
 of the force required to ensure success. 
 
 Ch. 20. Athenians, I see that you are fully resolved 
 on this expedition. Trusting that its issue may be such 
 as we desii'e, I will teU you plainly my view of our 
 position. The cities we intend to attack, are, judging 
 from all accounts, powerful, independent of one another, 
 and therefore not in want of a revolution to enable 
 them to make a happy escape from an oppressive 
 servitude to a pleasant change of lot : nor is it likely they 
 will be disposed to accept our rule in preference to 
 freedom ; they are also, to speak of the Greek cities 
 only, numerous for a single island. Apart from Naxos 
 and Catana, whose accession to our cause I expect from 
 their affinity to the people of Leontini, there are other 
 cities, seven in number, provided with all the apphances 
 of defence, in a style similar to that of our own ar- 
 mament; and this is especially the case with Selinus and 
 Syracuse, the chief objects of our expedition. They 
 have a large force of heavy infantry within their walls, 
 of archers and slingers : a considerable fleet, and plenty 
 of hands to man their ships ; they have also ample funds, 
 
NI0IA8. aoi 
 
 partly in private cofiers, partly, as at Selinus, stored in 
 temples.^ Syracuse, too, apart from^ her other sources 
 of revenue, has long been receiving a tribute from some 
 of the non-HeUenic tribes. But their chief advantage 
 over us hes in their abundant stock of horses:^ and 
 in the circumstance that the corn they consume is not 
 imported but of home growth. 
 
 21. To cope with such a power, we want something 
 more than an armament of seamen and marines, which 
 would be inefficient ; a large infantry force must accom- 
 pany the squadron, if we intend to achieve something 
 worthy of our ambition, instead of being debarred from 
 landing by a cloud of cavalry : and it will be the 
 more needful, if terror should lead the cities to combine 
 against us, and we should fail to find friends more able 
 than the Egestseans to supply us with a counter * force of 
 cavalry to repel them. It would be disgraceful to be com- 
 pelled to leave Sicily, or to have to send, subsequently, for 
 reinforcements, owing to our plans having been at the 
 outset inconsiderately laid. No : we must set out from the 
 Pirteus with a competent armament, remembering that 
 we are about to sail to a great distance from our own 
 shores, and that our present expedition does not resemble 
 those we have hitherto undertaken, within the sphere of 
 our dominion in Greece, in the guise ^ of allies, against 
 
 * The temples, as I have before Athens relied on Boeotia and Thes- 
 
 remarked, often served as the banks saly chiefly, for horses ; and on Pontus 
 
 of antiquity. Among other instances, for corn. 
 
 Goller reminds us of the temple of '' Poppo (ed. min.), on the autho- 
 
 Saturn at Kome, and that of PaUas rity of Ducas, gives this force to the 
 
 at Athens. compound preposition in avTi-napa- 
 
 '' This seems to be the meaning of ax""""'- 
 
 Kai, in the words Kai a-nb I3iipi3apwv, * The term p'lii/iaxoc ' expresses 
 
 K-.T.X, See note ', p. 7. In the the -well-known Roman policy, of 
 
 following words, I have adhered to never making war in any country 
 
 Poppo's reading, air' apxvc ipiperai. without having first secured an ally 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that in it, whose quarrel the Romans 
 
202 SPEECHES FROM TRUGYBIDE8. 
 
 various states, wlien it was easy to obtain the needful 
 supplies from a friendly land. On tte contrary, we shaU 
 have removed to an utterly alien realm, from whose 
 shores not even ^ a despatch can reach you during four 
 of the winter months. 
 
 11. I think therefore that we must take a strong 
 infantry force with us, composed both of Athenian and 
 of federal troops, including among the latter those of our 
 own subjects and any Peloponnesian contingents whom 
 we can win by influence ^ or allure by pay : besides a 
 large body of archers and slingers, to enable us to make 
 head against the Sicilian cavalry. We must also secure 
 a very decided superiority in ships, if only ^ to facilitate 
 our importation of supplies. Transports, too, we shall 
 want, to take our home*-corn, consisting of different 
 wheats and parched barley, with an army of bakers from 
 the mills, compelled, in proportion to their numbers at 
 each estabhshment,* to serve for pay : in order, should 
 we chance to be weatherbound, to ensure a supply of 
 provisions for the armament, which will be too large for 
 every city to entertain. With other requisites we must 
 provide ourselves to the utmost of our ability, instead of 
 depending on foreign markets ; but, above all things, we 
 must take from home as large a sum of money as possible. 
 As to the funds which are to come from Egesta, and 
 
 might profess to maintain ' (Arnold), chiefly alluded to by the verb -wiiaai: 
 
 This trait of Boman policy has been the Arcadians by the term iiia9<f, 
 summarised in the maxim, ' Dividere ^ This seems to be the sense of 
 
 et imperare.' Compare the preced- the particle Kai, which precedes r<l 
 
 ing Speech of Alcibiades, ch. i8, iTnrijSna. See note ', p. 7, above, 
 above. * See Poppo's note, ed. min. 
 
 1 ' Ouii insolentius trajectum cum * Poppo (ed. min.) approves Bo- 
 
 vv. ayyt^ov fxfSwv iXHilv jungendum Sckh's interpretation of Trpoe nipog 
 
 eat.' Poppo, ed. min. by 'pro rata portione in singulis pis- 
 
 ^ Ducas, cited by Poppo (ed. min.), trinis.' — Public JEarn. of Athens, \o\.i, 
 
 thinks the Wantineans and Argives p. 308. 
 
NIC IAS. 203 
 
 which are said to be ready there, think of them as 
 hkely enough to be said to be ready, when they are 
 wanted.-' 
 
 23. Ample '^ resources are indeed indispensable ; for, 
 if we were to leave our shores with an armament not 
 merely a match for our foes — except, of course,^ as 
 regards their available force of heavy infantry — but far 
 surpassing them on every point, even in that case we 
 should hardly be able to seize some positions and to hold 
 permanently * others. The fact is, we must look upon 
 ourselves as setting out to found a city amid an alien 
 and hostile population : and a force bound on such ^ an 
 expedition must gain a footing in the country on the 
 very day of its landing, on pain, in case of miscarriage, 
 of finding everyone in arms against it. Fearful of such a 
 catastrophe, conscious that we must owe many successes 
 to our tactics, and still more to good fortune — a trying 
 position for mere men — I am anxious, in setting sail, to 
 place myself as httle as possible in the hands of chance, 
 and to feel, when the voyage is over,'^ that, in point 
 of equipment, I have taken every reasonable precaution 
 against failure. By these means we shall, I think, best 
 
 ' ' Praspositum xai ad superius Xs- disparity of numbers they were fully 
 
 ■y£TairefemexistimatIIaack'(Poppo, able to cope with them.' — Arnold, 
 
 ed. min.). This seems to be correct. * Bloomfield and Dale have copied 
 
 Literally rendered, the clause com- Hobbes' mistranslation of rd Se Knl 
 
 mencing icai Myifi, would mean : Siaaoiaoi. Kai, as Mr. Frost shows, 
 
 ' they will be said to be ready, when repeats Kpareh-- so that the clause, 
 
 wanted, as well as now.' rendered literally, means: 'and to 
 
 " Tap points to a suppressed clause, hold en pei-mnnence, as well as take 
 
 connecting this section with the last, possession of.' 
 
 See note ", p. 43. * Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that 
 
 * ' Because, as on the one hand it otic means ' quales homines.' 
 
 was impossible for the Athenian ^ I have adopted Mr. Shilleto'a 
 
 expedition to match the Syracusan explanation of the force of the oppo- 
 
 infantrv in point of numbers, so on sition between skttXeTi' and iKirXtvaai. 
 
 the other hand they were so superior See his edition of Demosth. F. L. 
 
 in discipline, that even with a great 443. 
 
204 SPEEGEHS FBOM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 secure the interests of tlie country at large, and the 
 welfare of our force about to take the field. If, how- 
 ever, any of my audience is of a different opinion, I am 
 ready to resign my command to him. 
 
HEBM00BATE8. 205 
 
 SPEECH OF HEEMOCRATES, 
 
 Addressed to the popular assembly at Syracuse, B.c. 415. Bk. VI. cha. 3J-3S. 
 
 INTHODUCTION. 
 
 Although intelligence had reached Syracuse of the resolution of 
 Athens to assist Leontini and Egesta, it was not till the muster 
 of the Athenian armament at Corcyra, about July 415 B.C., that 
 the Syracusans became convinced of its approach, and began to 
 suspect the real objects of the expedition. Even then, the magni- 
 tude of the enemy's force was underrated, and the preparations for 
 resistance insufficient. Hermocrates, in the following harangue, 
 endeavours to impress upon his audience the real nature of the im- 
 pending invasion, and the urgent necessity of taking prompt mea- 
 sures to ensure its repulse. 
 
 Ch. 23- Perhaps, when I insist on the reality of the 
 impending descent of the Athenian fleet, I shall share the 
 fate of others, and my assertion will be voted incredible ; 
 nor am I unaware that those who circulate, either on 
 their own or on others' authority, intelligence that pro- 
 vokes incredulity, not only fail to convince, but are 
 regarded as the victims of illusion. No dread, however, 
 of such an - imputation shall close my lips, at a crisis 
 of danger to my country, while I cherish the conviction 
 that I have surer information to give than others possess. 
 The fact is, greatly as it may surprise you, the Athenians 
 have set out to attack us with a vast naval and military 
 force, ostensibly as allies of Egesta, and under colour of 
 re-establishing the Leontine exiles, but in reaUty from a 
 passion for the conquest of Sicily, above all of our own 
 city, whose capture they believe would ensure them 
 an easy command of the whole island. Since, then, 
 
2o6 SPHBGRES FBOM THUCYDIDE8. 
 
 we shall probably speedily see them here, you should 
 weigh the means your resources afford for a glorious 
 repulse of their attack, securing yourselves from being 
 surprised when off your guard through contempt of 
 your foe, and from being led by incredulity to neglect 
 your vital interests. Those, however, who believe 
 my report, must not be dismayed by the enemy's au- 
 dacity and strength. He cannot do us more mischief 
 than we can retaliate : and the very size of the approach- 
 ing armament will prove of some advantage to us : nay, 
 as regards the rest of the Siceliots, it will be far better 
 than a smaller force, since the terror it excites will 
 throw them into our arms as confederates. And, if in 
 the issue we either annihilate our foe, or foil his enter- 
 prise and drive him from our shores — for certainly the 
 consummation of his hopes is the very last ^' thing I fear 
 — in either case it will be a glorious result for us, and 
 one for which I am not unprepared. It is well known 
 that few large armaments,''^ whether Greek or barbarian, 
 have succeeded in operations far from home. In such 
 cases the invading forces are not more numerous than 
 the native population and that of the neighbouring 
 realms — for all instinctively combine through fear — 
 while, if they miscarry from want of supplies in a strange 
 land, they leave a name full of pride for their intended 
 victims, even if they have been the chief authors of their 
 own failure. It was thus, indeed, that these very 
 Athenians, after the unexpected but signal defeat of the 
 Made, grew in celebrity through the prevalent report 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) stows that ye ^ Ducas, cited by Poppo (ed. 
 
 belongs to (pojioviiui, and arranges the min.), thinks the speaker had in his 
 
 words as follows : m ydp Sfi roirS ye eye the Persian invasion of Greece, 
 
 d)oB(ii'fi.ai, K.T.X. TovTo ye answers to and the Athenian expedition to 
 
 the English ' this of all other things.' Egypt. 
 
HEBM0GBATE8. ioy 
 
 that Athens was the aim of his expedition ; and I do not 
 despair of a similar issue in our case. 
 
 34. Let us, then, in a spirit of confidence, set about 
 our preparations at home : and, by opening communica- 
 tions with the Sicels, confirm the loyalty of some and try 
 to conciliate the friendship and alliance of others ; de- 
 spatching, at the same time, envoys to the other Sicilian 
 communities, to convince them that the danger threatens 
 all in common : and to the Italian cities, in the hope of 
 either winning their alliance, or of inducing them to 
 refuse to receive the Athenians. I think, too, that it 
 will be desirable to send to Carthage also. The invasion 
 will not surprise the Carthaginians, who are in constant 
 apprehension of some day seeing the Athenians attack 
 their capital ; it is very possible, therefore, that under an 
 apprehension of being themselves involved in trouble, if 
 they resign us to our fate, they may be disposed, if 
 not openly, at any rate secretly, or by some means 
 or other, to assist us. And, if inclined, they can give 
 more effective aid than any other power : possessing, as 
 they do, an ample supply of the precious metals, those 
 sinews of military success as of general prosperity. 
 Let us also send to the Lacedsemonians and the Corin- 
 thians, imploring them to come speedily to our aid, and 
 to distract the enemy by rekindling the war at home. 
 
 There is an expedient which I think would exactly 
 meet the crisis, but to which, with your characteristic 
 love of ease, you will be the last men to yield a quick 
 assent. I will, however, explain my plan. It is this.^ 
 If we Sicehots, all in one body, if possible : if not, as 
 many as will join us, would make up our minds to 
 launch our whole existing fleet, with two months' pro- 
 
 ' On thia introductoiy use of yap, see note ', p. 165. 
 
2C8 SF-tlSUEJES FBOM TEUGTDIDE8. 
 
 visions,, and go to meet the Athenians off Tarentum 
 or the lapygian foreland, thus showing them they will 
 have to fight for a passage across the Ionian gulf before 
 they fight for Sicily: we should probably completely 
 scare them, and make them reflect that, in defending our 
 country,^ we have a friendly shore to sally from, the 
 shelter of Tarentum being open to us, and that they will 
 have a wide expanse of sea to cross with their whole 
 armament, which can hardly keep in line throughout so 
 long a passage, and will be easily assailable, because it 
 will come up slowly, and can only close with us in small 
 divisions. If, on the other hand, they were to lighten^ 
 their ships, and attack us with a compact squadron of 
 fast sailers, we might, if they took to their oars, fall 
 on them when fatigued ; and, if this did not suit us, 
 we could still retire to the harbour of Tarentum. In 
 that case the enemy, who, with a naval action in view, 
 would have crossed the gulf with a small stock of pro- 
 visions, would suffer from scarcity on a desolate shore, 
 with the prospect, if they lingered, of being blockaded by 
 us : or, if they tried to run down the coast, of leaving the 
 rest of the armament behind: disheartened, too, in all 
 probability, by their uncertainty as to the willingness of 
 the Italian cities to receive them. For my part, therefore, 
 I believe that, debarred by these considerations, they wiU 
 not even lift their anchors in the harbour of Corcyra : 
 but that they will either, after weighing various ^ plans, 
 and reconnoitring oiir numbers and position, be precluded 
 from action by the lateness of the season till winter over- 
 
 ' Dale copies Bloomfield's mistake ' By removing the heaTy-armed 
 
 in connecting ipiXaiag with Italy, troops. See the Scholiast's explana- 
 
 The Scholiast, cited by Dr. Arnold, tion of the words — rale vavirl Koufaie. 
 
 appends to (piXaxie the following — Oh. 37, below, 
 
 comment: Afi-n-ii rijs liKiXiag. See " See Mr. Frost's Thucydides, 
 
 Poppo, ed. min. p. zog. 
 
EEBMOGBATES. 209 
 
 takes them : or else, panicstricken by the unexpected 
 turn of events, they will break up the expedition : and 
 this is the more likely, as the ablest of their generals — so 
 I hear — took the command against his will, and would 
 gladly seize an excuse to return, if he saw that an effective 
 resistance would be offered by us. Their scouts would, I 
 am sure, exaggerate our numbers ; men's resolutions 
 veef ^ about with every breeze of rumour : and they 
 stand in greater awe of those who strike before they are 
 struck, or at any rate give their assailants the clearest^ 
 assurance of a resolute defence, because they consider 
 them equal to the danger. 
 
 And this is likely to be the case with the Athenians 
 now. They are advancing against us in the belief that 
 we shall make no defence, justly despising us, because 
 we did not second the Lacedsemonian effort to demolish 
 their power. Should they, on the contrary, find us 
 cheating their calculations by a daring manoeuvre, they 
 would be more dismayed by the surprise than by any 
 force we can bring into the field. Follow, then, my 
 advice : if it is not too much to hope, by the bold move 
 I suggest ; if you will not do this, lose not an hour in 
 completing ^ the rest of your preparations for the cam- 
 paign : and let every man feel that it is very well to show 
 contempt of an assailant by courage on the battle field, 
 but that, at this crisis, our best chance of a favourable 
 
 ' Al yvuiiai 'iirravrai. According feelings.' See note ^ p. 41, above, 
 
 to Poppo, the metaphor is drawn ' If the preposition irpo in -irpoir]- 
 
 from the action of the wind on a \ovvTaq is taken in a temporal sense, 
 
 sail. Bauer, whose explanation he the participle must be construed 
 
 endorses, says : ' a vento ductum, ' who show, before the struggle 
 
 ad quern vela conversa consistant.' commences.' 
 
 Mr. Frost explains the particle ical, ' The dependance of hoinaZtiv and 
 
 preceding ai yvSiiiai., as used to com- TrapaaTiivat on irtiSiaOt is so awkward, 
 
 pare the idea contained in those that a translator finds a relief in 
 
 words with rd 'Kiyojiiva- e.g. 'as Bauer's suggestion, that these inflni- 
 
 the reports are, so also are men's tives may be imperatives in disguise. 
 
21 8PBECBES FROM TETJGTDIBES. 
 
 result is to make up our minds that it will be safest 
 to let a sentiment of fear dictate our preparations, and to 
 act as in the presence of danger. For that the expedi- 
 tion is really descending upon us, I am absolutely sure : 
 it is actually on its way : indeed, it is aU but within 
 sight. 
 
ATHENAQOBAS. . 2" 
 
 SPEECH OF ATHENAGOEAS, 
 
 Delivered before the Syracusan assembly on the same occasion as the preceding address 
 of Hermocrates. Bk. VI. chs. 36-41. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Heemoceates, who belonged to the ohgarchical party, ' was so far,' 
 says Dr. Thirlwall (vol. iii. p. 380), 'from being able to carry the 
 vigorous measure which he recommended, that a large part of the 
 assembly persisted in treating the rumour as incredible ; some made 
 a jest of it ; others, supposing it well founded, could see no danger ; 
 a very small number adopted his views. A popular orator, named 
 Athenagoras, who seems to have been invested with a kind of tri- 
 bunician character as the o£S.cial advocate of the commonalty, not 
 only rejected the report, but inveighed severely against its authors.' 
 Mr. Grote (vol. vii. p. 257) remarks that Athenagoras represented 
 the popular jealousy of the richer classes and the magistrates, whose 
 proceedings were liable to the scrutiny and the censure of the public 
 assembly. The doubts expressed by Athenagoras as to the reahty 
 of the impending invasion, were unreasonable enough ; but he had 
 grounds for imputing to the oligarchical party an interest in spread- 
 ing public alarm and in promoting military organisation. Very 
 recently, ' the democracy of Argos, contemplating a more warlike 
 and aggressive policy, had been persuaded to organise and train the 
 select regiment of One Thousand Hophtes, chosen from the ohgar- 
 chical youth : within three years, this regiment subverted the 
 democratical constitution. Now the persons respecting whose de- 
 signs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly 
 the class at Syracuse corresponding to the select Thousand at 
 Argos.' — Grote, p. 258. 
 
 Aristocratic influence naturally rises in war ; and we find that, as 
 danger thickened around Syracuse, the tribune was thrown into 
 the shade ; indeed, the present is his last as well as his first appear- 
 ance on the pohtical arena. Hermocrates, on the other hand, be- 
 comes a more and more prominent figure. 
 
 p 2 
 
212 8PEEGEES FROM TWdOYBIBES. 
 
 Ch. 36. As to the Athenians, anyone who does not 
 wish they may be so ill-advised as ^ to place themselves 
 in our power by coming here, must either be a coward, 
 or a traitor to his country : as to the men who circulate 
 intelligence of this kind, and try to excite consternation 
 among you, though not surprised at their audacity, I 
 wonder at their simplicity, if they fancy their motives 
 are not transparent. The fact is, those who have any 
 private grounds for alarm, want to throw the city into a 
 violent panic, in the hope of their personal fears being 
 ecHpsed by the general terror. Such, indeed, is the true 
 value of these announcements : they are not idle rumours, 
 but are concocted by the very party which is always 
 agitating here. You, however, if wise counsellors, will 
 not, in trying to ascertain the truth, construe probabili- 
 ties by the bulletins of these professional alarmists ; you 
 will be guided by what men of talent and of great expe- 
 rience, qualities I claim for the Athenians, would be 
 likely to do. Surely it is improbable that they will 
 leave the Peloponnesians in their rear, and, before they 
 have satisfactorily concluded the war in that part of the 
 world, plunge gratuitously into another war of equal 
 magnitude ; nay, I imagine they are thankful enough 
 that we, who represent cities so populous and so power- 
 ful, are not on our march to attack them. 
 
 37. If, however, the report should be verified by 
 their actually coming, I believe that Sicily is less likely 
 to be exhausted by hostilities than Peloponnese, in pro- 
 portion as she is better provided with all the appliances 
 of war : and that our city, by her own unaided strength, 
 would prove far more than a match for the armament 
 they describe as now on its way to assail us, even were 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) endorses Bauer's remark that rai is used for the mora 
 usual uVrc after ovria. 
 
ATEENAG0BA8. 2 1 J 
 
 its force doubled. I am sure that the fleet will have rto 
 horses on board, and that they cannot be procured here, 
 save in small numbers from Egesta : nor will their heavy 
 mfantry numerically equal ours, since they can only come 
 by sea.' It would, indeed, be difficult even for the ships 
 themselves, unencumbered by troops, to accomphsh the 
 long voyage to our shores : it would be difficult, too, to 
 provide stores, on the vast scale required, for an attack 
 upon a city of such magnitude as ours. I am so far, 
 therefore, from agreeing with Hermocrates, that I think 
 that, even supposing they possessed, on their arrival, a 
 city rivaUing Syracuse in size, and made war upon us 
 from a safe position on our borders, they could hardly 
 escape annihilation : much less,^ then, when all Sicily is 
 against them — for the whole country will combine: 
 when their troops must hurriedly encamp the moment 
 they leave their ships, and will be cooped up by our 
 cavalry within a short distance from their miserable tents 
 and beggarly .commissariat. On the whole, however, I 
 do not believe they could even effect a landing : so 
 decided in my opinion is our preponderance of force. 
 
 38. But — we have nothing to fear! The Athenians,^ 
 as I teU you, are well aware of all this, and, I feel sure, 
 are taking care of their own interests: while, here, 
 oligarchical agents are manufacturing events that never 
 happened and never could have happened. It is not 
 the first time they have played this trick ; it has, I know, 
 been the constant aim of this party, if not by overt acts, 
 at any rate by fictions of this kind, and others still more 
 mischievous, to spread terror among our commonalty, and 
 make themselves the rulers of our capital. And I really 
 fear lest their repeated efforts may at last be crowned 
 
 ' See note ', p. 1 5 7. ' See Mr, Grote's remarks, vol. Tii. 
 
 ' See DonalcUon's Ch; Gram. p. 569. p. 258. 
 
214 SPEECHES FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 with success ; while we, alas ! are not disposed to pro- 
 tect ourselvesj before we are actually sufferers, by vigi- 
 lant precautions, and to pounce upon the traitors at the 
 moment of detection. Such are the agencies which so 
 habitually rob our city of repose ; she is constantly 
 plunging into party feuds, into civic conflicts as frequently 
 as foreign wars : sinking, at one time, beneath a despot's 
 sword, at another, beneath the sway of a tyrannical 
 cabal. Only resolve to support me, and I wiU exert 
 myself to prevent any of these calamities happening in 
 our time, if, by commanding the confidence of the 
 popular party among you, I am enabled to chastise the 
 authors of these treacherous manoeuvres, I do not say ^ 
 on detection only — it is hard to surprise an overt act — 
 but when they show the will and want but the power. 
 For we ought to foil by anticipation the meditated as well 
 as the actual thrust of an enemy : the last to parry being 
 the first to suffer. As to the oligarchical party, I shall 
 meet them by exposing their plots, watching their move- 
 ments, and denouncing their principles : a mode of 
 treatment likely, I think, to turn them aside from their 
 profligate designs. 
 
 3 9. And you, young men, I would ask ^ of you, what 
 is ^ your aim ? a question I have often pondered. Is it 
 instant elevation to power? But the law* forbids it. 
 And the law was passed in consequence of your incapa- 
 city for ofiice at so early an age, rather than from any 
 
 ' Dale and Bloomfield construe /ir) passage is cited from Xenophon, in 
 
 finvov avTo^ojpovg aa if the words were which the particle Kai is similarly 
 
 ov fiovov avr, used to emphasise the verb PoiXo/iai. 
 
 ' See Klotz (Devar. vol.ii. p. 437) * There was a limitation of age as 
 
 on the use of 5 ^'■a in expostulations a qualification for office, at Syi-acuse, 
 
 and appeals. as in moat other states. See Poppo'a 
 
 ' Seenote', p. i39;Whereaparallel note on Thucyd. v. 43, ed. min. 
 
ATMENAGOBAS. 
 
 215 
 
 intention ^ of slighting your pretensions, when capable of 
 holding it. Is it then ^ to avoid an equaUty of privilege 
 with the people at large ? If so, is it fair that citizens 
 of the same capital should be held unworthy of the same 
 rights ? I may be told that democracy is an institution 
 neither intelligent nor just : and that ownership of pro- 
 perty is, by a logical necessity,^ the best qualification for 
 good government. To this I reply that the term ' de- 
 mocracy ' means government by the whole community,* 
 ' oligarchy ' government by a section of it only : and, 
 admitting that the rich are the natural guardians of pro- 
 perty, I contend that men of talent are likely to prove 
 the best statesmen, and that the whole body of the 
 people, after hearing measures discussed, are the most 
 competent to decide ;* and that all these classes,® whether 
 in their several spheres, or in their collective capacity as 
 
 ^ 'Inflnitivus an/ial^iiv, ex IriBri 
 pendens, consilium significat.' — Pop- 
 po, ed. min. 
 
 ' "AXXd dfi is similarly used in 
 Plato's Apol. p. 37, to usher in the 
 last of a series of suppositions, where 
 Socrates asks, aWd Ji) ^vyrjg rifiriaui- 
 Hai; 
 
 ' A similar use of Kai will be found 
 ahove (hk. iv. 18 ; see note *, p. 143). 
 It represents one clause as the logical 
 counterpart of the other. 
 
 * Mr. Frost (Thucydides, p. 214) 
 thus elucidates the argument : ' The 
 true meaning of democracy is a 
 government embracing the whole 
 state, and not a portion only : demo- 
 cracy therefore, in its proper accepta- 
 tion, as embracing the wealthy and 
 noble as portions of itself, could not 
 be opposed, in contra-distinction to 
 their government, as the rule of one 
 part distinguished from the rule of 
 . another, but as the rule of the whole, 
 opposed to the rule of a part only. In 
 
 a true democracy, all, rich, noble, 
 as well as others, had their proper 
 sphere, whereas in an oligarchy all 
 but the rich and noble were excluded 
 from power. So Burke, " a true 
 natural aristocracy is not a separate 
 interest in the state, or separable 
 from it. When great multitudes 
 act together, under that discipline of 
 nature, I recognise the people." ' 
 
 * Compare the statement of Peri- 
 cles (bk. ii. 41), that, if the people 
 at large could not originate mea- 
 sures, they were at any rate compe- 
 tent judges of them. Dr. Arnold 
 quotes a striking parallel firom 
 Aristotle's PolUics, iii. 7 : roig y&p 
 
 TToXKoVSj &V iKaOTOQ SffTlV ov trTTOvSdioQ 
 
 dvrjpj oftwQ ^vSsx^Tai avveKBovrag. eivat 
 ^eXrlovQ eKclviaVf ov\ mg 'dKuaroVy dW 
 we avfiiravTag^ 
 
 ° TaiiTa de hominibus dixit etiam 
 Demosth. (Philipp, i. 8). Poppo, ed^ 
 
2l6 STBEGHE8 FROM THUGYDIDES. 
 
 members of the commonwealth, enjoy, under a demo- 
 cracy, a vntual equality of privilege. Oligarchy, on the 
 other hand, while it gives the masses a liberal share of 
 public danger, not only grasps an exorbitant share of 
 public advantages, but monopolises them to the utter 
 exclusion of the people. Such is the ambition of the 
 powerful and the young among you : an ambition which, 
 in so large a city as ours, it is impossible to gratify. 
 
 40. Even ^ now, however, it is not too late for you, 
 though your infatuation is without a parallel — for, if you 
 are not sensible of the iniquity of your aims, you are the 
 most wrongheaded of the Greeks I ever met with : or 
 the most unprincipled, if you dare to persist in conscious 
 wrong — even now, I say, it is not too late for you, if not 
 by learning wisdom, at any rate by discarding an iniqui- 
 tous ambition, to devote yourselves to advancing the 
 prosperity of your country, in which all unite a common 
 interest. Eest assured that you patricians ^ will enjoy 
 an equal, if not a larger,- share of that prosperity than 
 the mass of your fellow-citizens ; but that, should you 
 choose to take another course, you run the risk of losing 
 aU. Let us have no more, too, of these false reports, 
 addressed to men who see through your motives, and 
 
 • It is alffloat impossible to make the connection between aXV fn icai 
 
 sense of this obviously corrupt pas- vvv and rb kowov av^iri, clearly 
 
 sage, as it stands: but I have not denoted by the repetition of aWu, 
 
 ventured to deviate from the received which marks the resumption of the 
 
 text, though Poppo's rearrangement direct construction of the sentence, 
 
 of the sentence (ed.min.) would clear which had been broken by the 
 
 the meaning. He thus restores the parenthesis. 
 
 passage : 'AW' tn xai vvv, !> ttAvtuv " Oi dyaOoi iterura optimates sunt 
 
 d^vveTMTaroif ei firi fiavBaven kuko, (GoUer). Ot ciyaQoi vfiutv of course 
 
 a-n-ivSovTEi;, uv iyu> olSa 'EXXr/vwi-, i) means lit. 'the patricians among 
 
 aSiKdiTarat, el dSone ToXjiaTe. He you:' but, as Poppo (ed. min.) ob- 
 
 thinks the words fi afiaBiaTaroi tare serves, the nominative, riyaPoi, shows 
 
 were inserted by some copyist, to that they are directly addressed by 
 
 balance, antithetically, the words ^ the speaker. 1 have therefore ren- 
 
 dStKiiraToi, the interpolator not seeing dered the words, ' you patricians,' 
 
ATHENAGOBAS. 21; 
 
 will not tolerate the fraud. For our capital, supposing 
 the Athenians are really coming, will beat them off in 
 a style worthy of her fame, and we have generals to look 
 after these matters ; while, if there is no truth in the 
 report, as I believe, she will not be so appalled by your 
 intelligence as to choose you for her rulers, and to rivet 
 on her own neck the chains of a self-imposed subjection. 
 No! she will ascertain the truth without^ your aid, 
 believing that, if you are capable of circulating trea- 
 cherous reports, you are capable of treachery in the 
 conduct of affairs ; ^ and, instead of being beguiled by 
 your bulletins of the freedom she enjoys, she will struggle 
 to preserve it by taking active precautions to prevent * its 
 violation. 
 
 At the conclusion of this harangue, one of the generals — ^perhaps 
 a partisan of Hermocrates — interposed, stopped the debate, and, 
 after addressing his fellow-citizens in the foUo-wing terms, dissolved 
 the assembly. 
 
 41. It is a breach of propriety for members of this 
 assembly to interchange personal imputations, or for 
 their audience to listen to them ; our duty is, looking to 
 the prevailing reports, to take care that we citizens and 
 our capital at large are effectively armed for the repulse 
 of the invaders. Should it turn out that we have no 
 need to fight, still there can be no harm in providing the 
 public service with cavalry, heavy infantry,* and all the 
 other resources which are the pride and ornament of war. 
 It is our province to superintend these arrangements, and 
 
 ' '£^' uvtT)q est ' per se sola.' — 'So Poppo (ed. min.) and Arnold 
 
 Poppo, ed. min. take iTriTpiiruv. GoUer, however, 
 
 ^ Gbller thus explains tovc \6yovQ understands tt)v apxhv- 
 — KpivCi- 'judicabit, vos, qui infidi * See Poppo's note (ed. min.) on 
 
 et falsi estis in renunciando, item the similar idiom of oirXoii (bk. i. 
 
 infidos fore in ductu ciTitatis.' 80-3). 
 
2l8 8PEEGHE8 FROM TEUGYBIBE8. 
 
 to test their efficiency : as well as to despatch embassies 
 to the various cities, to watch their movements, and to 
 serve any other useful purpose. A part of our task we 
 have already discharged ; and, whatever we discover, we 
 wiU report to you. 
 
NI0U8. 219 
 
 SPEECH ADDEESSED BY NICIAS, 
 
 The Athenian commander, to his troops, on the eve of their first serious conflict with 
 the forces of Syracuse, about the middle of October, 415 b.o. Bk. VI. oh. 68. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The Attenian armament, instead of attacking ' Syracuse on its first 
 arrival in the Sicilian waters, in July — when tte city would pro- 
 bably have fallen an easy prey— ^lounged away three months in a 
 calamitous inaction hardly redeemed by the acquisition of Catana 
 and Naxos as allies, since their adhesion to the Athenian cause 
 might have been presumed from the circumstance of their Ohalcidic 
 origin. At last Nioias — who, since the recall of Aloibiades, had 
 shared the command with Lamachus — stung by the insults of the 
 Syracusans, sailed by night from Catana into the great harbour of 
 Syracuse : and, after landing his men, drew them up, next morn- 
 ing, in order of battle. The Syracusan greatly outnumbered the 
 Athenian infantry : it was, however, the imperfectly disciplined 
 fruit of a hasty levy en masse : whUe the enemy's force represented 
 the flower of the Athenian, Argive and Mantinean troops. But 
 Nicias had no cavalry to oppose to the squadron of horse, 1 420 in 
 number, which flanked the right wing of the Syracusan army. 
 
 Ch. 68. Soldiers! I need not address you at any length, 
 as we are all about to fight in a common cause. Indeed, the 
 very sight of our troops, in battle array, is in my opinion 
 far more likely to inspire confidence than the most 
 eloquent appeals, with a weak force to support them. 
 On a field where Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and 
 
 ' Lamachus, the third commander, opportunity. It appears from Livy 
 recommended this course : but his that, when the battle had been won, 
 counsels were overruled by Nicias a Carthaginian officer, after urging 
 and Aloibiades. Harmibal's omission in vain an immediate advance on the 
 to crown the victory of Cannae by a Italian capital, thus addressed his 
 sudden assault on Rome, wiU occur chief, ' Vincere scis, Hannibal : vie- 
 to every student of ancient history toria uti nescis.' Livy's opinion of 
 as a similar contempt of a golden the probable success of a rapid attack 
 
220 8PEBGHES FROM TEUOYDIDES. 
 
 the flower of the insular cities, are drawn up, can any 
 soldier, backed by allies so staunch and so numerous, fail 
 to cherish the most sanguine hopes of victory ? consider- 
 ing, too, that the enemy is defending himself with levies 
 en massed instead of picked troops — as ours emphatically^ 
 are — and those levies composed of Sicilian Greeks, who 
 will find it easier to despise than to withstand us, their 
 skill not being quite a match for their presumption. Let 
 us all remember, too, that we are not only a long way 
 from our own shores, but have no friendly country at 
 hand, unless indeed your own swords acquire one for 
 you. So that,^ in giving you a hint, I shall exactly 
 reverse the argument with which the enemy, I know, is 
 raising the courage of his men; they are being told 
 that they are about to fight for their country : I remind 
 you that the battle field is not your country, but * ground 
 wherefrom, if you do not conquer, your retreat wiU be 
 difficult : for a cloud of cavalry will press upon you. 
 Mindful, then, of the high character you bear, charge 
 your adversaries gallantly, in the assurance that there 
 are more terrors in the constraint of our position, and 
 the absence of any feasible alternative, than in the enemy. 
 
 may 1)6 gathered as clearly from his far when he thus explains iravStiiici- 
 remark, ' Mora ejus diei satis creditur ' vis tov TrnvSruiei non est " in uni- 
 saluti fuisse urbi atque imperio,' as versis," quod augendae sit formidini, 
 Mr. Kinglake's conviction of the fatal sed in " colluvie promisouft," " in- 
 effects of the omission to attack the conditS multitudine " [an undisci- 
 northern side of Sebastopol imme- plined rabble].' 
 diately after the battle of Alma, may ' "iltrnsp xai ^fiag' Kai seems here 
 be gleaned from the concluding words rather to emphasise than to compare, 
 of his second volume ; ' It (the battle ' Kai seems here to mean ' there- 
 of Alma) established the allies as fore : ' as Donaldson (6r. Oram. 
 invadei's.in a province of Russia. It p. 570) shows that it does in ch. 89, 
 did more : upon condition that they below. 
 
 would lay instant hands upon the * Ois iv varpiSt may be taken for 
 
 prize, it gave them Sebastopol.' iv ov irarpiSi, with Dobree, Bauer, 
 
 ' Bauer, whose comment is cited and Arnold : or aXKi supplied, with 
 
 by Poppo (ed. min.), surely goes too GoUer, before eS ^j. 
 
WEEM00BATE8. - 0.11 
 
 SPEECH OF HEKMOCEATES, 
 
 Addressed to the public assembly at Camarina, in the wintenof the year 415-414. B.c. 
 Bk. VI. chs. 76-81. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 Aftee the battle which forms the subject of the preceding speech, 
 and in which the Athenians gained the advantage, Nicias, instead 
 of pushing his victory, returned to Gatana, where he spent "the 
 winter. During that season of the year, an effort was made to gain 
 the alliance of Camarina, hitherto not openly committed to either 
 of the contending parties ; ' and the Athenian envoy Euphemus was 
 sent thither to propose a renewal of the alliance between that city 
 and Athens, which had been concluded ten years before. Hermo- 
 crates the Syracusan went to coionteract his object ; and both of 
 them, according to Grecian custom, were admitted to address the 
 pubHc assembly.' — Grote, vol. vii. p. 311. 
 
 Ch. 76. People of Camarina — our embassy was not 
 despatched from any apprehension of your being dis- 
 mayed by the force the Athenians have at command : 
 but rather from a fear of your being won over by the 
 representations which their envoys are about to address 
 to you, before hearing a word from us in reply. You are 
 familiar with the pretexts, and we all suspect the motives, 
 which have brought them to Sicily ; indeed, in my 
 opinion, their intention is not to restore the Leontines 
 to their homes, but to turn us out of ours. For it would 
 surely be very inconsistent in them, after depopulating 
 cities in Greece, to set about re-estabhshing them here : 
 and to feign the solicitude of kinsmen for the Chalcidic 
 blood of the people of Leontini, after keeping the Chalci- 
 
212 SPEECHES FROM TEUGYBIDE8. 
 
 dians ^ of Euboea, whose colonists the Leontines are, in a 
 state of pohtical vassalage. The fact, however, is, that 
 they are compassing dominion here by the same method 
 which achieved it there. It was this;^ having been 
 elected chiefs of the confederacy by the free choice of 
 the lonians, and of all their own colonists ^ included in 
 the league, for the avowed purpose of chastising the 
 Mede, they reduced their allies to subjection on various 
 pretexts, charging some with shirking military service, 
 others with making war on members of the confederacy, 
 and impeaching the rest on any colourable ground which 
 the several cases afforded. So that, as it turned * out, 
 it was not to vindicate freedom that the Mede was 
 resisted : Athens did not fight for the liberty of the 
 Greeks, nor they for their own ; her object was to transfer 
 their allegiance from the Mede to herself : to them, the 
 result was a change from one master to another, more 
 inteUigent,® indeed, but more hkely to turn intelligence to 
 evil. 
 
 77. But ^ I will not pursue this topic ; for we did not 
 come here to expose the numerous wrongs of which, as 
 
 • After the Persian war, Chalcis, strues the expression hy ' sponte : ' 
 with the rest of Euboea, became a it will then mean, ' all who volun- 
 tributary of Athena. In the year tarily joined the league.' 
 
 B.C. 445, she joined her fellow- *^&&MsAy\g'sCfreek Syntax, ^z$i, 
 
 countrymen in a revolt : but the on the particle dpa. 
 
 whole island was speedily recon- ^ See Poppo, ed. min. He ex- 
 
 quered by Pericles, who changed the plains ois diui/trwrlpou by the figure 
 
 government of Chalcis. Mr. Grote litotes. 
 
 (vol. vii. p. 312) construes SovXwaa- * 'AXAa yap- aWa here points to 
 
 fikvovQ 1%"*') ' lield in slavery.' But an elliptical clause, the reason of 
 
 this is much too strong a term. which is given by yap. Hoogoveen, 
 
 ^ See a similar use of yap, in On the. Particles (aWd yap, § iii.), 
 
 ch. 34, above. illustrates this use of aWd from 
 
 * This is Poppo's (ed. min.) ver- Plato (Mep. ii. p. 366) : a\Xd yap kv 
 sion of airb a(pCiv " it is accepted by fdov SiKr/v lioaofiev aiv &.V h'Balt aSuci]- 
 Arnold, and supported by the Scho- awiuv- where, between aWa and 
 liast, who explains it by the words yap, we must understand ovk dl^rifum 
 oaoi aTTor 01 ijtyav aiiTwv. Gbllercon- dTToXXd^o/ui'. 
 
EEBMOCBATHS. 223 
 
 you all know, the Athenian government, so open to 
 censure, has been guilty : but rather to reproach our- 
 selves, because, though we had warnings ^ before our 
 eyes in the loss of independence which had overtaken the 
 Greeks in that part of the world from their failing to 
 succour one another : '^ though we now find the same 
 artifices levelled at ourselves, in the shape of pretended 
 resettlements of kinsmen at Leontini, and expeditions in 
 aid of allies at Egesta — notwithstanding this, we still 
 want the courage to combine together and resolutely 
 show them that our countrymen are no lonians,^ nor 
 settlers on the Hellespont nor colonists of the -lEgean 
 islets, whose passive submission * to the loss of freedom is 
 varied only by occasional changes from the Persian to 
 some other tyrant : no ! we are freeborn Dorians, who 
 came direct from the Peloponnese, that home of iadepen- 
 dence, to colonise Sicily. Are we, then, to wait * till, one 
 after another, city by city, we fall a prey — conscious as 
 we are that it is only by this means, through our dis- 
 union, we can be conquered — seeing, as we do, that the 
 Athenians are trying this very method of attack, that of 
 setting some of us at variance by diplomacy,, of inciting 
 others with hopes of alliance to make war on one 
 another, and, in other cases, availing® themselves of any 
 
 > Goller remarks that Poppo and * AovXorvrm verteris ' patiuntur se 
 
 Arnold rightly consider the particle in servitutem ledigi.' — Poppo, ed. 
 
 7-f, which follows riiv, out of its min. 
 
 place, as it should follow irapaSiiy- ^ Poppo (ed. min.) refers to Matth. 
 
 Iiara. It is omitted altogether by (Gr. Gram. § 516, 2) for instances of 
 
 Dionys. Hal., who quotes this pas- this use of the indicative for the 
 
 sage (p. 932). conjunctive. 
 
 ' :S(pimv airroif pro dXXr/Xoii,-. — ^ Poppo (ed. min.) and Arnold 
 
 Poppo, ed. min. nearly agree as to the order of the 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) quotes Thucyd. words in this passage. Portus thus 
 
 (i. 1Z4: V. 9: vii. 5: viii. 25) to illus- arranges them: toIs Si XkyovTie n 
 
 trate the contempt in which Dorians irpoartvk, we haarotg \iytiv Sivavrm, 
 
 habitually held lonians. Kuicovpydv, 
 
224 SPEECHES FROM TEUGTDWES. 
 
 opportunities of conference to pretend to meet men's 
 views, and then using their confidence to sap their 
 freedom? Do we suppose, too, that, when our distant 
 fellow-countryman falls a sacrifice before us, the danger 
 will fail to come home to every one of us as well : but 
 that, instead of this, the first sufferers will keep their 
 calamity all to themselves ? 
 
 78. If, however, it happens to have struck any of 
 you that, though the Syracusan^ is the Athenian's foe, 
 he himself is not : and that it is hard for him to be 
 imperilled in defending my ^ capital ; he should remember 
 that, when he is fighting within my territory, it wOl be 
 full as much in defence of his own city as of mine, and, 
 besides, with comparative safety, since ^ he will be enter- 
 ing the field before the resources of Syracuse have been 
 exhausted : and, instead of standing alone,* will find an 
 ally in us. He should also refiect that the object of the 
 Athenians is not to chastise the enmity of Syracuse, but 
 to avail * themselves of our unpopularity as a means of 
 
 * Dionysiiis Hal. (p. 936) com- serves to impersonate the represen- 
 
 plains, witli some justice, of the tation of Syracuse by Hermocrates, 
 
 constant substitution of the singular who, says Ducas, avuiripiXaiipavei 
 
 for the plural number in this pas- iavrif vai'Tag roig avfiiroXhac. 
 
 sage. So far, however, as his censure ' The force of ye may be given by 
 
 applies to the terms Svpusoaio^ and emphasising the possessive pronoun. 
 
 'j\e/))'aiof, numerous precedents will ' "Oiry, says Bauer, is equivalent to 
 
 be found both in Thucydides and on. 
 
 Herodotus. Thus, Herod, (viii. 136), ■* Goller and Arnold show con- 
 
 we find Tov 'A97]va7ov' (ix. 12) rbv clusively that €prjfiot:f not sprjfioff is 
 
 STrapTLvtTriv Thucyd. (vi. 84), o the true reading. 
 
 Xn\KiStve. It is a common idiom of ^ Poppo (ed. min.) suggests /Sia- 
 
 Livy : and is defended by the autho- nnaBaiioT: jSifiaiMnaaBai' but, asGoller 
 
 rity of Quintilian. ' Maxime,' says remarks, the received reading is not 
 
 that rhetorician, 'in orando valebit devoid of sense. He renders the 
 
 numerorum ilia libertas. Nam et passage thus : ' Meum odium prss- 
 
 Liviusssepesicdicit: JRomanM«^?'<E& texens illius (i. e. aliorum Siceliota- 
 
 victor, quum Romanes vicisse signi- rum, qui Syracusanos oderunt) ami- 
 
 ficat' (viii. 6,21). If the subsequent citiam maxima flrmare Atheniensis 
 
 use of '/fijf, iiiov, BfiF, K.T-.X., carries studet.' 
 the idiom to a fanciful length, it 
 
HEBMOORATES. 225 
 
 strengthening to the utmost the bonds of amity between 
 themselves and the other SiceHot cities. Now, if any of 
 you entertain feeUngs of jealousy or even apprehension 
 of us — and both these passions find a home in powerful 
 states — and if, thus influenced, you long to see the pride 
 of Syracuse humbled by a heavy, yet not, for the sake 
 of your own security, a fatal, blow : such hopes and 
 wishes are more than man can expect to realise. For 
 it is impossible for anyone to make the fortune of war 
 square exactly with his own wishes. And should for- 
 tune, in this instance, foil your calculations,^ the day may 
 chance to come, when, lamenting your own calamities, 
 you may wish you had once more even our prosperity 
 to envy. But this can never be, if you abandon us, and 
 dechne to share our perils in defending interests which, 
 though not nominally, are really your own : for though, 
 in name, you would be propping our power, you would, 
 in effect, be securing your own safety. 
 
 It might have been expected that you, citizens of 
 Camarina, above all others, living on our frontier, and 
 the first to be endangered by our fall, would, for your 
 own sakes, have foreseen all this : and, instead of giving 
 us, as you are now doing, a fainthearted support, would 
 rather have been the first to repair to Syracuse, and to 
 have openly encouraged us not to yield an inch, in the 
 very words and with all the earnestness of the imploring 
 appeal you would have made to us, had the territory 
 of Camarina been the first object of Athenian attack. 
 Neither you, however, at any rate as yet, nor others, 
 have shown any such intention. 
 
 79. Perhaps, however, cowardice will lead you to 
 consult your notions of duty, in your relation to the 
 
 ' That is — as Ducas explains — ^if destroying the independence of Syra- 
 the Athenians should succeed in cuae. 
 
 Q 
 
226 SPEEGEm FROM THWYBIDES. 
 
 Athenians as well as to ourselves : and you will point to 
 the alhance you contracted with them. That alliance, 
 however, was not formed to prejudice your friends, but to 
 meet the contingency of an attack by your foes : and 
 it bound you to aid the Athenians only ^ when wronged 
 by other powers — not, as in the present case, when they 
 are the trespassers. If ^ you doubt it, look at the people 
 of Ehegium : they went further : they actually refused, 
 though of Chalcidic race, to join in resettling the Leon- 
 tine exiles, Chalcidians as they were. And it would 
 be monstrous, if, while that people, divining the real 
 meaning of the specious plea^ set up by the invaders, 
 discard logic* and obey pohcy, you should be led, by 
 your fine logical principles, to support your natural 
 enemies, and to join their bitterest foes in destroying 
 those whom nature has made your kinsmen by a double * 
 tie. But no ! this is not your duty : it binds you to suc- 
 cour your kinsmen, instead of cowering before the Athe- 
 nian armament. That armament has terrors only, if, 
 as these envoys are so anxious we should, we stand aloof 
 
 ' Tf seems here to emphasise the translates a\6yi>ig auippoviiv by ' caute 
 
 limitation. agere, ita tamen ut rationem tuam 
 
 * The particles lirti oiide usher in an non defendere possis ' (' play a pru- 
 a fortiori ^rooi: the Rhegians being dent part, without being able to give 
 regarded as having less reason to a very good reason for your con- 
 refuse the Leontines than the Cama- duct '). Poppo thinks that (v\6y(f> 
 rineans had to refuse the Athenians : vpopaan cannot signify ' quum ba- 
 the resettlement of the former being beatis probabilem excusationem,' 
 vyrongful only in its tendency to ' when you have a fair pretext for 
 favour Athenian ambition : vrhereas refusing Athens,' without the pre-r 
 the compliance of the people of position iv. I have therefore referred 
 Camarina with the request of the the term to the plea on which Her- 
 Athenians would have involved them uiocrates fears the people of Camarina 
 in a direct attack on Syracuse. may decline alliance with Syracuse — 
 
 = See Poppo, ed. min. the plea of their previous treaty with 
 
 " Poppo (ed. min.) says : ' Videtur Athena. 
 d\6ywc, ad Tulgi judicia et speciem ^ As Dorians and Sicilians. — Pop- 
 
 rei referendum esse.' A far better po, ed. min. 
 version than that of Goller: who 
 
KEBM0CBATE8. 227 
 
 from one another : if, on the contrary, we stand firm . 
 together, it has none ; for, even when the Athenians 
 attacked us singly, although they gained the advantage 
 in the battle, their main object miscarried,^ and they 
 speedily retired. 
 
 80. So long, therefore, as we are united, there is 
 no ground for despondency : but there is every reason 
 for our entering heartily into alliance, especially as suc- 
 cours wiU shortly arrive from the Peloponnese, whose 
 troops are superior to the Athenians in every branch of 
 military art. Nor should anyone regard that politic 
 device — ^your professed^ inability to aid either party, 
 owing to your being allies of both — as fair to us and safe 
 for you ; it is not quite so fair in reality, as in semblance.^ 
 For if, through your refusal to join our standard, the 
 beleaguered city falls and her powerful foe triumphs, will 
 you not, by one and the same act of neutrality, have 
 failed to aid* in the rescue of the one party, and to 
 hinder the other from violating right? Yet it would 
 surely be more honourable to throw your weight on the 
 side of those who have a double claim as your kinsmen 
 and as sufferers from outrage, and thus at once secure the 
 national welfare of all Sicily, and save the Athenians, 
 those excellent friends of yours, from an act of iniquity. 
 
 And now we, the representatives of Syracuse, must 
 briefly conclude our address : for it would be useless to 
 enlighten you or the other Sicehots, familiar as you are 
 with the state of affairs, by laying everything before you 
 in detail. But we do implore your aid, and at the same 
 time we call you to witness that, if you reject our suit, 
 
 ' Alluding to the recent engage- 01/raf, is clearly ironical, 
 ment, tlie Athenian success in which ' AucaiM/iaTi- 'specie juris' isPop- 
 
 was not crowned by the capture of po's rendering (ed. min.). 
 Syractise. * See Poppo's note (ed. min.) on 
 
 ' All, here, and below, in ^IXove Stj the two aorists, 
 
 q2 
 
228 SFEECBUS FROM THUGTDIDES. 
 
 we, besieged by the plots of lonians, our constant foes, 
 though Dorians ourselves, find Dorians to desert us in 
 you. If the Athenians succeed in our reduction, they 
 will owe their triumph, indeed, to your counsels, but all 
 its honours will grace their own name, and the prize 
 of their victory will be the very state which allowed them 
 to win it If, on the other hand, we gain the day, 
 you will stUl have to suffer from our vengeance as re- 
 sponsible for our perils. Weigh, then, the alternatives 
 before you : embrace at once subjection with its tem- 
 porary immunity from danger, or take the chance ^ of 
 avoiding a disgraceful submission to Athenian rule by 
 aiding us to defeat the invaders, and of escaping an 
 enmity on our part, the duration of which it might be 
 difficult to limit. 
 
 ' Dr. Arnold, after ascertaining takes it, in his version, with jrtpiytvo- 
 from Poppo and GoUer that k&p fievot. 
 should be construed with Xo/Stli', 
 
EUPREMUS. 229 
 
 SPEECH OF EUPHEMUS, 
 
 The Athenian envoy, addressed to the publio assemblv at Camarina, in reply to the 
 preceding speech of Hermocrates. Bk. Yl. chs. 82>88. 
 
 Ch. 8 a. Although the renewal of the previously sub- 
 sisting alliance was the object of our mission, the invective 
 dehvered by the ambassador of Syracuse compels us 
 to touch on the subject of our dominion, and to show 
 that we have reasonable grounds for its retention. Now 
 his own assertion of the immemorial enmity prevaiUng 
 between the Ionian and the Doric race, is a very strong 
 proof of this. But ^ it also admits of the following vin- 
 dication. The fact is,^ we lonians had to consider the 
 best means of maintaining our independence against the . 
 Dorians of the Peloponnese, who, besides outnumbering 
 us, lived on our frontier. Accordingly, after the Persian 
 war, we availed ourselves of the naval force we had 
 acquired, to shake off the dominion and even the political 
 ascendancy of Laced^mon, who had no better title to 
 dictate to us than we had to dictate to her, unless it, was 
 derived from a temporary^ preponderance of power. 
 The states previously subject to the king elected us 
 their political chiefs, and we retain the supremacy, thus 
 conferred, thinking it our best protection against the risk 
 of subjection to the Peloponnesians, as it provides us 
 
 ' See Mr. Frost's note, p. 241. tranatum prseparant.' 
 
 Haack, quoted by Poppo (ed. maj.), * See Donaldson's Greek Gram, 
 
 takes tlie same view: 'Hsec verba p. 605. 
 
 (t^ii — o'iTiao) non tam ea, quae ante- ^ At the epoch of the Persian in- 
 
 cesserunt, vera esse denotant, quam vasion, Lacedsemon vras a far more 
 
 adsequentempotiusdemonstrationem powerful state than Athens. 
 
23Q SPEECHES FROM TKUGYBIBES. 
 
 with the means of self-defence : besides — to speak the 
 hteral truth — there was not a particle of injustice in our 
 subjugation of the lonians and the insular states, in 
 reducing whom, the Syracusans say we have enslaved our 
 own kinsmen. For they joined the march of the Mede 
 against their mother country, against ourselves : they had 
 not the courage to revolt and sacrifice their property, 
 as we did, when we abandoned our capital ; not content, 
 too, with choosing servitude for themselves, they wanted 
 to impose it upon us. 
 
 83. Such, then, was the origin of the dominion we 
 consider ourselves entitled^ to hold, not only from our 
 having contributed to the Grecian cause the largest fleet 
 and the most uncompromising patriotism, but because 
 the lonians, by volunteering these services to the Mede, 
 were injuring us ; besides,^ we needed the ^ material 
 force our dominion supplied, to confront the Pelopon- 
 nesian power. 
 
 We discard all affectation of higher than ordinary 
 motives : we will not ground our right to rule either on 
 our single-handed * demolition of the barbarian, or on the 
 fact that, when we first® braved the Persian, we had 
 the freedom of the lonians more at heart than our own 
 hberty and that of our common country. No one, how- 
 
 ' As Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, ' Tijj inxuoi ■ ' articulo,' says Poppo 
 
 the clause commencing with afia B (ed. min.), ' signiflcatur ea potentia, 
 
 answers to the words djioi re ■ the qufi, opus est.' 
 
 two intermediate clauses belong to ^ Poppo (ed. min.) thinks that the 
 
 afioi Tt apxnv, for which, i. e. their speaker, in using this expression, had 
 
 title to empire, they assign two the battle of Marathon in view, 
 
 grounds. = Haack is doubtless right in re- 
 
 * Kai SioTi Kal- Bauer explains the ferring this allusion to the aid given 
 
 second Kai by ' adeo : ' ' Persis adeo, by Athens, and refused by Sparta, to 
 
 Grsecise hostibus.' But it is more the revolt of the Ionian cities on the 
 
 probable that the words simply mean, coast of Asia Minor from the Persian 
 
 as Poppo (ed. min.) suggests, ' and king, b.c. 500. See Herod, v. 99. 
 also because.' 
 
EUPHEMUS. 23 1 
 
 ever, will question the right of every state to work out 
 the conditions of its own security. It was this considera- 
 tion — regard for our own safety — that, on this occasion, 
 brought us here ; and we feel convinced that our pre- 
 sence ^ is conducive to your interests as ^ well as to our 
 own. In proving this, we can well afford to join issue 
 with the very calumnies^ launched by the Syracusan 
 envoys against us — calumnies invested with additional 
 terrors by your suspicions ; for we are well aware that 
 though, when alarm and distrust are excited, men niay 
 be beguiled for the moment by arguments congenial to 
 those feelings, yet, in the later stage of action, they will 
 follow their real interests. We have already told you 
 that fear * is our motive for retaining our dominion in 
 Greece : we now assure you that the same * motive has 
 brought us to your shores to place affairs here on a safe 
 footing in concert with our friends : and that, so far 
 from our having any intention of enslaving you, we are 
 anxious to shield you from that fate. 
 
 84. No one should suppose that we are affecting 
 a concern for you which our mutual relation does not 
 warrant, when he reflects that, if your freedom is pre- 
 served, and you are in a position to offer a strong resist- 
 ance to Syracuse, we should be less Hkely to suffer, 
 should that city despatch a force to aid the Peloponne- 
 
 ' Poppo (ed. min.) and Arnold contends that the policy of Athena 
 
 read ravra- Gbller raird. I have required the freedom of her allies in 
 
 followed Poppo, who explains Tavra Sicily. 
 
 as equivalent to rb r;^.ie -irapilvm. * Compare the very similar lan- 
 
 ' Kai vfiiv • See note ', p. 7. guage of the Athenian speaker at 
 
 ' Alluding, chiefly, to the asser- Lacedssmon, bk. i. 75; 3- 
 tion of Hermocrates that Athens was ' Their apprehension that Syracuse, 
 
 guided by policy and self-interest if she became the dominant power 
 
 alone, and was playing the same in Sicily, would aid the Peloponr 
 
 game in Sicily as she had already nesians to pull down the Athenian 
 
 played in Greece. Euphemus accepts empire, 
 the first part of the charge: but 
 
232 SPEECHES FROM TEU0YDIDE8. 
 
 sians. And surely this consideration alone ^ brings you 
 into the closest relation ^ to us. For this reason, too, we 
 are only acting as you might expect, in reinstating the 
 Leontines, whom we are resetthng not, indeed, in the 
 character of subjects, like their kinsmen in Euboea, but 
 armed with all possible power, so as to enable them to 
 aid us by harassing Syracuse with sallies from their 
 frontier soil. In Greece, we are strong enough, by our- 
 selves alone,^ to cope with our foes: and it suits us best 
 to keep the Chalcidians * — whom Hermocrates says it is 
 inconsistent in us to enslave in Euboea and liberate here 
 — unprepared for war, their quota being paid in money 
 instead of ships ; in Sicily, on the contrary, our policy 
 requires that both the Leontines and the rest of our 
 friends should enjoy the utmost independence. 
 
 85. Despotism,^ whether embodied in one absolute 
 ruler, or represented by an imperial city, thinks nothing 
 inconsistent that is politic, and recognises no relationship*" 
 where no confidence is felt : its enmity or its friendship 
 towards other '' states can only be a question of passing 
 
 ' "HSi] perhaps niBans literally * We must remember that despotic 
 
 'without going further.' Madvig authority, withinthelimitsofGrreece, 
 
 (Gr. Syntax, p. 219) cites a similar generally meant usurped authority, 
 
 use of the particle from Xen. (^Hell. This idea underlies the passage. The 
 
 vii. I, 12) : TTOH/iae St tovto, to. aWa Athenian empire is often treated, by 
 
 ijSri ^px""" lu>ticih>, ' without more its professed advocates in Thucy- 
 
 ado.' dides, as an usurpation : requiring, 
 
 " There is, as Poppo (ed. min.) for its maintenance, a mixed system 
 
 says, a play on the double sense of of policy and force. 
 Trpoaijsov and TrpoariKiTi, the latter ° The speaker, as Bloomfield shows, 
 
 inflection being used in a more per- is thinking of the Chalcidians of 
 
 sonal sense, the speaker trying to Euboea, who, though of the same 
 
 shut his eyes to the difierence of race as the Athenians, were dis- 
 
 race, and to argue a community of trusted by them, 
 political interest from a community ' Hpog UanTa, i.e. irpoQ iKUTrnve, 
 
 of political danger. Poppo (ed. min.); lit. 'towards the 
 
 ' Bauer makes icai equivalent here several states with which itis brought 
 
 to the Latin ' vel.' into contact.' 
 
 t 
 
 Of Euboea. 
 
EUPHEMUS. 233 
 
 convenience. This rule applies to us : but we should 
 not be serving our interests here, were we to pull down 
 our friends : it is our policy to strengthen them to such a 
 degree as to paralyse our foes. 
 
 Can you doubt it ? Look at the principle on which 
 we govern our confederates in Greece : we treat them 
 according to their relative utility to us. Thus we leave 
 the people of Chios and Methymna independent, subject 
 only to the contribution of ships : the majority, however, 
 are more strictly ruled and pay their tribute in money : 
 while others,^ though islanders and easy of reduction, 
 are our allies on terms of perfect freedom, because they 
 hold convenient positions around the Peloponnese. You 
 may therefore reasonably conclude that our own in- 
 terests, and those apprehensions of Syracuse on which 
 we touched, will be the key of our policy towards the 
 Sicilian states. Dominion over you is her ambition : she 
 is anxious to avail herself of the prevalent distrust of our 
 designs, in order to combine your forces with her own 
 against us : and either by violence, or through your 
 isolation, should we retire without success, to become the 
 absolute mistress of Sicily. And this she must effect, 
 if you join her standard. Eor it will no longer be easy 
 for us to deal with so large a force when united : nor will 
 you find a weak antagonist in Syracuse, if we retire from 
 the scene. 
 
 86. An opposite opinion, if entertained by any of 
 you, is amply refuted by the fact that, when, some years ^ 
 ago, you invoked our aid, the very weapon of alarm with 
 which you tried to influence us, was the prospect of 
 eventual danger to ourselves,^ if we connived at your 
 
 ' Haack thinks the islanders of ' See Thucyd. iii. 86. 
 Zacynthus and Cephallene chiefly al- ' On aai aini and nal riiidg, see 
 
 luded to. Compare Thujyd. vii. 57. Mr. Frost's note, p 243. 
 
234 SPEECHES FROM TEUGYDIDE8. 
 
 subjugation by Syracuse. And now it is hardly fair to 
 distrust the very argument which you thought good 
 enough to persuade us, or to suspect our motives because 
 we have brought a larger armament than before to ' 
 oppose the power of Syracuse ; . surely, it is Syracuse you 
 should distrust. Why — we'^ cannot possibly hold our 
 ground in Sicily without your aid : and, even supposing 
 we were to turn villains and reduce you, it would be just 
 as impossible for us to retain our conquests, owing to the 
 length of the voyage, and the difficulty of guarding cities 
 of great size, and which, though insular, are armed with 
 the resources of continental ^ states. The Syracusans, on 
 the other hand, with their base of operations close * to 
 your doors, not in the shape of a camp, as in our ® case, 
 but of a city more powerful than the force we have at 
 command, are always intriguing against you, and never 
 let sHp a single opportunity of assailing any of you : a 
 disposition they have shown in many cases ere now, 
 especially in that of Leontini. And now they are actually 
 impudent enough to invite you, as if you were senseless 
 idiots, to aid them against those who up to the present 
 day have always checked their aggression, and saved 
 Sicily from sinking beneath the waves ^ of their dominion. 
 How much more real, at any rate, is the safety to which 
 we invite you, when we implore you not to throw away 
 
 * Bauer, quoted in Poppo's ed. navy, 
 
 maj., leaves ns at liberty to take * Poppo (ed. maj.) distinguishes 
 
 irpoE, K.T.X., in a comparative sense, bttoikovvtic, ' living in hostile proxi- 
 
 or as I have construed it. But the mity to,' from vapoucovvTCQ. 
 
 former construction seems at variance ' Oi arpnTomSif • siout Athenienses 
 
 with ttoXei fiil^ovi TiJQ riiieTspae ira- HTpaTomSif rt Ik viuiv iSpvSivTt, K.r.X., 
 
 povaiag, below. c. 37. — Poppo, ed. maj. 
 
 " Tf emphasises ijftftf, and contrasts * 'Avixovras' Tropic6 dictum in- 
 
 it with o'iSi Si, below. terpretatur Abr., a navi ductum, 
 
 ' That is (as the Scholiast explains quod appareat ex loco Aristidis : T(f 
 
 it), they had plenty of cavalry and niyisTtji twv K:vliepi'riT(uv,dsTov!;\6yovg 
 
 infantry : and did not rely on their dviixf /»>/ KaraSivcu. — Bauer. 
 
EUPEEMUS. 235 
 
 the protection we are mutually ensuring one another, 
 and to remember that, while their numbers will always 
 open for them, even without alhes, an easy path of 
 attack on you, you will not often have the chance of 
 defending yourselves with so strong an auxiliary force. 
 And if, through jealousy, you allow us to retire, after 
 the miscarriage, perhaps even the defeat, of that force, 
 you will some day long for the sight of even the smallest 
 fraction of it, when it can no longer serve you by coming 
 to your aid. 
 
 87. But — no ! neither you, citizens of Camarina, nor 
 your compatriots, will be misled by the calumnies of the 
 Syracusans. We have given you, without reserve, full 
 explanations on the points which have caused suspicion 
 of our designs : and we will hope that a brief recapitula- 
 tion will serve to remind you, and win your assent. 
 We say, then, in answer to the charge of inconsistency, 
 that, while in Greece it is our policy to maintain our 
 dominion over our allies, in order to prevent our sub- 
 jugation by another power : here it is our policy to keep 
 them free, to prevent our being compromised by their 
 incorporation with a hostile league ; in answer to the 
 charge of meddling, we reply, that the numerous dangers^ 
 against which we have to guard, compel us to embark 
 in a great variety of enterprises : and that, in coming 
 on this as on former occasions to rescue some of your 
 cities from oppression, we did not come without an 
 invitation, but in answer to your own appeal. It is not, 
 however, for you to sit in judgment on our proceedings, 
 or to assume the censorship of our political career, and 
 try to divert us from our scheme — that would be difficult 
 now ! What you have to do, is this : take just as much 
 
 * Aton Kai • see note ', p. 41, above. 
 
236 8PEEGHE8 FROM TEUGYBIDE8. 
 
 of our — so-called — meddlesome policy and restless am- 
 bition as may chance to suit your ^ views, and turn it to 
 your own account : in the assurance that those quaUties 
 of ours, so far from being uniformly mischievous, are 
 actually beneficial to the great majority of the Greeks. 
 For as in every country, even where we are not at hand 
 to interfere, all those, who either dread or meditate 
 encroachment, have in the background a clear prospect, 
 in the one case, of obtaining redress ^ through om* inter- 
 position, in the other, of our being likely to cause them 
 some alarm, should we appear on the scene of their in- 
 tended aggression : both these parties, I say, are obliged, 
 the one to forbear against their will, the other to accept 
 our protection and save themselves trouble. Eeject not, 
 then, that protection, open impartially to every suitor, 
 and now at your command ; but act as others act : and, 
 instead of having constantly to stand on your guard 
 against the Syracusans, take part at last with us in com- 
 passing their fall as ' they have compassed yours. 
 
 • To aiiTo' ut Latine idem est simul spectare ad injuiiam adversarii com- 
 (Poppo, ed. min.). Literally, it pensandam auxilio Atheniensium.' — 
 would mean ' your -news as well as Poppo, ed. min. 
 
 ours : ' but perhaps the effect may he ' 'Ek roS buoiov • ' pari mode atque 
 
 better given by emphasising ' your.' illi vobis insidias tendunt.' — Poppo, 
 
 * 'AvTirvxiiv 'dwriHaackexplicat ed. min. 
 
ALOIBIABES. 237 
 
 SPEECH OF ALCIBIADES, 
 
 Delivered before the Congress at Sparta, b.c. 415. Bk. VI. chs. 89-93. 
 
 INTMODUCTION. 
 
 Alcibiades, having escaped from the escort which was accompanying 
 him to Athens, crossed from Thurii to Cyllene in the Peloponnese, 
 and shortly afterwards appeared at Sparta on special invitation- from 
 the Lacedaemonians, whom he addressed in the following harangue, 
 at a Congress summoned to consider a petition for aid presented by 
 envoys from Syracuse, and seconded by deputies from Corinth. 
 
 Ch. 89. I must commence my address with a few 
 remarks on the imputations current against myself, lest a 
 feeling of distrust should induce you to listen to my 
 statements on public affairs with prejudiced ears. 
 
 You will remember that my ancestors, upon some 
 ground of complaint, renounced^ the representation of 
 your interests at Athens. I wished to resume that func- 
 tion in my own person, and did my best to promote your 
 interests in several ways, especially on the occasion of 
 your disaster at Pylos. But, though my zeal for your 
 service never slackened, nevertheless, when you were 
 making peace with Athens, you carried on negotiations 
 through my enemies,^ thus rewarding them with power, 
 and me with discredit. The damage, therefore, which 
 you sustained, when I fell back on the alHance of Argos 
 and Mantinea, and the general opposition you encoun- 
 tered from me, were well deserved. By this time, how- 
 ever, a candid examination of the case ought to disarm 
 
 ' See Thucyd. v. 43. 
 
 * Nicias and Laches are apparently meant. See Thucyd. v. 43. 
 
'13^ SPEECEES FBOM TSTTCTDIDES. 
 
 the not very reasonable anger which, at the moment of 
 suJQTering, any of you may have felt. And if anyone 
 thought the worse of me on another ^ ground, from the 
 favour I showed the popular party, he ought to be con- 
 vinced that even from this point of view he has no right 
 to feel aggrieved. Hostility to despotism has been an 
 immemorial trait of my family : and, in common lan- 
 guage, popular government is habitually opposed to 
 despotic ^' government. It was thus •'' — hatred of the one 
 engendering partiality for the other — that we continued 
 the persevering champions of popular power. Besides, 
 as v/e were living under a democratic regime, we had no 
 choice, in most cases, but to acquiesce in existing arrange- 
 ments. StiU. we did our best to signalise our public 
 policy by a moderation strikingly contrasted with the 
 reigning license. It was not, indeed, by my kinsmen, 
 but by other * politicians, that the mob, in earher times 
 as well as in our own day, was led on to its worst acts ; 
 it was, in fact, by the very men who exiled me. My 
 family supported the cause of popular government, from 
 
 ' Aton icai' Poppo (ed. min.) ex- despots; while he excuses his pa- 
 plains Kai by the following para- tronage of popular rights as a natural 
 phrase : Swtl ov fiovov rivavnov^riv reaction from his hatred of tyrants. 
 vn'iv, a\\a Kai. ' Dr.Donaldson (Gr. Gram.-p. 570) 
 
 ' Mr. Grote translates this sen- instances this use of icai, in the words 
 
 tence : ' My family were always op- kuI air Uiivov, as an example of the 
 
 posed to the Pisistratid despots ; and syllogistic force of rai. 
 
 as aU opposition to a reigning dynasty * Poppo (ed. min.) quotes with 
 
 takes the name of The People, so from approval Bp. Thirlwall's {Sist. of 
 
 that time forward we continued to Greece, iii. p. 405) comment on Dr. 
 
 act as leaders of the people.' But Arnold's exposition of this passage : 
 
 the clause underlined is surely un- 'Dr. Arnold's opinion that these 
 
 true, as the Grecian despots were words refer to the high aristocratic 
 
 often upset by oligarchical partisans, party, seems extremely improbable. 
 
 Sparta herself, whenever she upset The natural interpretation is to be 
 
 a despot, replaced him by an oli- sought in Thucydides(viii. 65), where 
 
 garchy. Alcibiades covertly recom- the demagogueAndrocles is described 
 
 mends himself to Spartan sympathies as the man omnp Kai tov 'AXKtPidSijv 
 
 on the ground of his hostility to ovx f/Kiirra i^ljXaaep' 
 
AWIBIABES. 239 
 
 a feeling that it was right to aid in maintaining a con- 
 stitution which we had inherited, and under which our 
 country was enjoying a degree of power and freedom 
 she had never known before. Otherwise, we, in common 
 with all men of any sense, were no strangers to the true 
 character of democracy ; perhaps, indeed, it was better 
 known to me than anyone, as I have had more reason 
 than others to complain of it. However, nothing new 
 can be said of a form of government acknowledged to be 
 a type of insanity.^ I should add that we did not think 
 it safe to change ^ the constitution, while you were en- 
 camped, as enemies, at our gates. 
 
 90. Such, then, is the history of the prejudice felt 
 against me. I must now lay before you the business of 
 this meeting : and, in so doing, can perhaps give you 
 information which will be new to you. The first object 
 of our expedition was the subjugation, if possible, of the 
 Sicilian, and, in the sequel, of the ItaUan Greeks : to be 
 followed by an attempt on the dependencies of Carthage 
 and on that capital herself. Should these schemes be 
 crowned with complete or even general success, we in- 
 tended, in the next place, to attack the Peloponnese, with 
 an armament composed of the united force of the Greeks 
 who had joined us in Sicily, taking a strong corps of 
 barbarians into pay, drawn from Spain, and such other 
 uncivilised regions in that part of the world as are reputed, 
 at the present day, to produce the best soldiers ; building, 
 too, a numerous fleet of triremes in addition to our own, 
 from the abundant timber which Italy supplies. By thus 
 
 ' Herodotus places a similar sen ti- ttoXithuiv, 
 
 ment on the lips of Megabyzus ; ' ' All political change is fatal in 
 
 ifiiXov ovHv iariv alvvirCiTepov. Di- the presence of a foreigner invading 
 
 ony^. Hal. {Ant. p. 1179) is not far the soil of a fatherland.' — History 
 
 behind, when he denounces demo- of Julius Ctssar, by the Emperor 
 
 cracy as a/iaflterTarij tCiv iv avOpi!nrois Napoleon HI., vol. i. p. 224. 
 
240 SPEECHES FROM THUCYBIDES. 
 
 blockading the whole coast of Peloponnese, and simulta- 
 neously attacking her with our soldiery on the land side, 
 we expected, after storming some cities and walling in 
 others, the easy reduction of the whole peninsula, and the 
 eventual establishment of our rule over the rest of Greece. 
 And there was every prospect that our new acquisitions in 
 Sicily would alone contribute money and provisions to 
 facilitate these operations in ample sufficiency, without 
 drawing on our home revenue. 
 
 91. Such, then, were the objects of the expedition 
 which has akeady sailed, as you have now heard from 
 one who knows exactly what we intended ; and the 
 remaining generals, if they are able, will carry on hos- 
 tilities on the same plan. I have now to prove that the 
 Sicilian cities cannot hold out without succour from you. 
 The Siceliots, indeed, though half trained, might possibly, 
 by rallying in one united body, even now defeat the in- 
 vaders. But the Syracusans, standing alone — vanquished 
 as they have akeady been in a general action, hemmed 
 in as they are by sea — will find it impossible to resist 
 the armament the Athenians have at this moment on 
 the spot. And, if their capital is taken, that moment 
 all Sicily, and, presently afterwards, Italy also, falls into 
 the invaders' grasp : nor would it be long before the 
 danger which I just now predicted from that quarter, would 
 overtake you. None of you therefore should regard 
 Sicily as the only subject of your deliberations : the 
 safety of the Peloponnese is at stake, unless yon speedily 
 adopt the following measures. Embark and despatch 
 to Sicily a force capable of working their own passage, 
 and of acting as heavy infantry ^ on their arrival ; and — 
 a point I consider still more important than an army — a 
 
 ' Kai birXiTevaovaiv ' Kai, as Poppo (ed. min.) remarks, signifies ' etiam,' 
 ' as well.' 
 
ALGIBIADJE8. 1^1 
 
 Spartan commander to drill and discipline^ the troops 
 already enrolled, and to impress unwilling recruits. 
 Such a course will inspire fresh confidence in states 
 dready friendly to you, and will embolden waverers to 
 joia your league. It will be needftil at the same time to 
 prosecute the war more openly and vigorously in this 
 part of the world, so as at once to encourage Syracuse to 
 resist, when she finds you interested in her cause, and to 
 indispose the Athenians to send fresh reinforcements to 
 their own army. You must also build a permanent fort at 
 Decelea in Attica : the very expedient Athens has always 
 most dreaded, and beheves to be the only calamity in- 
 cident to this war, that she has not sufiered. Indeed, the 
 surest way of damaging an enemy lies in ascertaining 
 what is the blow he most fears, and then inflicting it ; 
 for men may well be supposed to know best, for them- 
 selves, in each case, their own dangers, and to regulate 
 their fears accordingly. 
 
 As to the advantages that wiU reward you, and the 
 embarrassments that will cripple the enemy, from your 
 occupation of the fort, I will briefly state, among many, 
 the sahent points. It wiU throw into your hands the 
 greater part of the material stock of the country, in many 
 instances from seizure, and, in the case of slaves,^ from 
 voluntary desertion : it will involve the immediate loss of 
 the proceeds of the silver mines at Laurium^ together 
 with the income accruing from land and the courts of 
 law ;^ but the greatest damage will be the irregular pay- 
 ment of the revenue due from their allies, who, finding 
 
 • See chapters 69 and 72, for com- meaning being restricted to the live- 
 plainta of the imperfect discipline of stock of the country. 
 
 the Syracuaan troops. ' The fees and fines arising from 
 
 * See Poppo's note (ed. min.). It the adjudication of cases brought 
 is difficult to see how avro/ioj-a can before the Athenian courts by the 
 apply to anything but slaTes, the allied states. 
 
242 8P:EEGHE8 FBOM TEUGYBIDE8. 
 
 you now determined on a vigorous prosecution of the 
 war, will slight their claims. The reaUsation of these 
 advantages depends, Lacedaemonians, on your promptitude 
 and zeal ; for, as to the feasibility of the scheme, I feel 
 the utmost confidence : and I believe the issue will prove 
 the truth of my opinion. 
 
 92. Nor do I think that the vigorous attack which I, 
 who had formerly the character of a patriot, am now 
 organising against my country, in concert with her 
 declared enemies, ought to lower me in your opinion: 
 or that my overtures ought to be distrusted as simply 
 betraying the busy zeal of an exile. An exile, indeed, I 
 am from the villany of those who banished me, but not 
 from the power of aiding you, if you hsten to my counsels ; 
 nor are you, who in open war perhaps have injured me, 
 my ^ worst enemies : but rather those, who forced a friend 
 to become a foe. Love of my country was a passion with 
 me, when my political rights were secure : I cherish it no 
 longer, now that I am wronged. Nor do I conceive that 
 the land I am assaihng, is stDI my country ; I look upon 
 myself as trying to win back a country that is such for me 
 no more. The true patriot is not he, who scruples to 
 invade his native land, when iniquitously robbed of it : it 
 is the man whose passion for his country exhausts every 
 effort to regain her. 
 
 On these grounds I call upon you, Lacedasmonians, 
 fearlessly to employ me in every service of danger or of 
 hardship : admitting the cogency of the plea advanced 
 
 ^ Mr. Grote (vol. vii, p. 325) con- iroXi/iiovc, o)g'A9rivaiove. Alcibiades 
 
 strues this passage, ' The worst is contending that it is natural for 
 
 enemies of Athens are not those who him to take up arms against the 
 
 make open war like you,' etc. But country which had banished him : 
 
 surely the commentators are right for she, while under the influence of 
 
 in following the Scholiast, who para- his foes, was a worse enemy to him 
 
 phrases xal voXsiiuIiTaToi, k.t-.X., by than the Spartans, who had only 
 
 the words, ovx ovTutg vjiaq riyovum opposed him in open warfare. 
 
ALCIBIABES. 243 
 
 by all in my position — the plea, that if I did you great 
 mischief as a foe, I could serve you effectively as a friend ; 
 and the more, as I know the secret of the Athenian plans, 
 while I could only conjecture yours. I conjure you, 
 then, remembering the vast interests involved in your 
 present deliberations, to carry your arms, without hesita- 
 tion, into Sicily as well as Attica : enterprises which, if 
 combined, give you every hope of maintaining your 
 Sicilian connections on an influential footing,^ by suc- 
 couring them with a- fraction of your forces : and, nearer 
 home, of pulling down, for the future as well as the 
 present, Athenian ascendancy ; with the prospect, in the 
 sequel, of permanent security at home, and of supremacy, 
 abroad, over the willing submission of all Greece — a 
 submission not yielded to coercion, but flowing from 
 good-will. 
 
 * Poppo (ed. min.) remarks that the positioii of fieyaXa makes it a pre- 
 dicate. 
 
 R 2 
 
244 SPEEOEHS FROM THUCYDIDHS. 
 
 SPEECH OF NICIAS, 
 
 Addressed to the Athenian and auxiliary forces about to engage in the great naval 
 
 action in the harbour of Syracuse, fought in the month of September, 413 B.C. 
 
 Bk. VII. chs. 61-65. 
 
 INTJRODUCTIOJY. 
 
 Demosthenes and Eurymedon, the colleagues of Nicias in the com- 
 mand of the Athenian armament, had, several weeks previously, 
 urged Nicias to withdraw the fleet from the harbour of Syracuse, 
 the limited circumference of which, not exceeding five English 
 miles, combined with the increased nautical skiU of the Syracusans, 
 and the large force at their disposal, placed it in imminent peril. 
 Nicias at last assented to the step : when, on the night of the 27th 
 of August, an eclipse of the moon, exciting the superstitious terrors 
 of the troops and, above all, of their infatuated chief, interposed a 
 farther and a most disastrous delay. In the interval, the Syracusans 
 not only defeated the Athenian fleet, but actually blocked up the 
 mouth of the harbour, about an English mile in breadth. Finding 
 their retreat thus intercepted, Nicias and his colleagues resolved on 
 a desperate attempt to force their way into the open sea ; an enter- 
 prise in which, but for the presence of malignant conditions,' they 
 would have had every chance of success, their fleet opposing a hun- 
 dred and ten triremes to seventy-six on the side of their foes. As 
 the troops and crews, on the eve of embarkation, mustered on the 
 shore, Nicias tried to raise their evidently drooping spirits and to 
 revive their shaken confidence, by the following harangue. 
 
 Ch. 6 1 . Soldiers of Athens and her allies ! ^ We have 
 all alike a common interest in the approaching struggle, 
 every man's safety and that of his country being at stake 
 
 ' Admirably summed up by Mr. allies.' As if the Athenians were 
 
 Grote (vol. vii. p. 451). mere auxiliaries! As Goller points 
 
 " Mr. Dale translates : ' Soldiers out, the full phrase would be kuI 
 
 of the Athenians, and of the oth^ ■rCiv oKKiov ivnnaxuv tivruv. 
 
NICIA8. 245 
 
 with us, as with our foes ; for it is only by gaining a naval 
 victory now, that we can hope to look upon our various 
 homes again. We must not, however, despond, nor act 
 Uke raw recruits, whose failure in their first battles clouds 
 their after anticipations with constant fear, and colours 
 them with the hues of disaster. On the contrary, all 
 who are here in arms — you, Athenians, the veterans of 
 many former wars : and you, confederates, the constant 
 comrades of our campaigns — remember, all of you, how 
 often war cheats expectation, and nerve yourselves for 
 the fight, in the hope that Fortune may once more 
 prove our ally, and that ^ this engagement may retrieve 
 our defeat in a style worthy of the imposing force of 
 your fellow-countrymen, which you see arrayed before 
 you. 
 
 62. Looking to the probability of the ships being 
 crowded together, owing ^ to the narrowness of the har- 
 bour, and to the annoyance we might sufier, as we did in 
 the last engagement,^ from the .troops on the enemy's 
 decks : we have, after consulting the steersmen, adopted 
 every expedient of which our resources admit, to meet 
 these contingencies.* With this view, we shall embark a 
 strong force of archers and darters, and a number of men 
 whom, we should not have wanted if about to engage in 
 
 ^ Kai as avaiinxoijiivor Fo^Tpo{ei. every trireme:' as if each trireme 
 
 maj.) suspects that Kal has been in- differed specifically from every other. 
 
 terpolated; butKriiger,whomIhave A curious contradiction should be 
 
 followed, takes it with IX TTiVairfs, as noted at p. 365, of the same vol. 
 
 equivalent to Kai Trpoff^oBuvrjc Avafia- Here we are told that Gylippus 
 
 XticSai. reached Himera ' without either 
 
 ^ See Poppo's note (ed. min.). troops or arms :' an assertion rebuked 
 
 ' See Thucyd. vii. 40. by the statement at p. 362, that he 
 
 ■* Mr. Grote (vol. vii. p. 440) ex- left Himera ' at the head of 700 
 
 tracts from this passage the aatoimd- hoplites from his ovm vesseh ! ' the 
 
 ing intelligence that 'the best consul- vessels with which he had set sail 
 
 tation was held with the steersmen from Leucas for Sicily. 
 
 as to arrangement and manoeuvres of 
 
246 SPEEGHjES from THUCTDIDE8. 
 
 the open sea, because, by overloading the ships, they 
 might cripple our manoeuvres : but who, forced as we 
 now are to fight a land battle afloat, wUl be very useful. 
 All the appliances, too, of the counter-armament our 
 ships should carry, have been provided : among others, 
 grappling-irons, to prevent our suiFering, as we recently 
 did so severely, from the thick-ribbed prows of the 
 enemy's vessels : for these engines wiU disable a trireme 
 which has once charged us, from backing water to repeat 
 her attack, if the rest of the work is well done by the 
 marines. The fact is, we are actually driven to fight a 
 land battle on board ship ; and it is apparently our poHcy 
 neither to back ^ water ourselves, nor to let the enemy do 
 so ; especially as the shore, except where held by our 
 infantry, is thronged with our foes. 
 
 63. Bear this in mind, and fight to the last, as long 
 as your strength endures, taking care not to be driven 
 ashore, and, when one ship closes with another, not to 
 think of loosing the grappling-irons till you have swept 
 the troops ofi" her deck. An injunction I address to the 
 soldiery full as much as to the sailors, because this par- 
 ticular service devolves chiefly upon those on deck ; and, 
 fortunately for us, we have still, at least at this moment, a 
 decided advantage in point of troops. As to you, sailors, I 
 . recommend, and, while I recommend, I entreat you, not to 
 be unduly disheartened by our previous defeats, considering 
 the increased efficiency of our armament on deck, and the 
 reinforcement of our fleet, I beseech you, too, to reflect 
 that there is one gratifying privilege, which may well be 
 thought worth preserving by those among you, who have 
 hitherto commanded respect throughout Greece, because, 
 from your knowledge of our dialect and imitation of our 
 
 ' See Poppo's note (ed. min.) on the term avdicpovatc, ch. 36, 5, above. 
 
NIGIAS. 247 
 
 habits, you have been taken for Athenians, though not 
 really such : enjoying, all the while, an equal share of the 
 material benefits of our dominion, and more^ than an 
 equal share in the awe it inspires in subject states, and 
 the protection it gives from outrage. Since, then, you 
 alone are partners, on independent terms, in the advan- 
 tages of our empire, do not surrender it now : it would 
 be iniquitous ; but beat the Corinthians ofi" with all the 
 scorn engendered by repeated triumphs over them, and 
 the Siceliots, not one of whom dared even meet us at sea, 
 while our marine was in its prime : and prove your 
 nautical skill, even amid the clouds of sickness and 
 disaster, to be more than a match for alien strength with 
 fortune at its side. 
 
 64. And you, citizens of Athens ! I wish once more 
 to remind you that you left in the docks at home no 
 reserves of ships equal to these, nor youths to recruit 
 your infantiy : and that, should any result but victory 
 await you, your enemies here will instantly set sail for 
 Attica, where our remaining fellow-countrymen will find 
 it impossible to repel at once the foes already on the 
 spot, and the fresh assailants who will join them. Your 
 forces here would then fall into the hands of the Syra- 
 cusans — and you well know with what intentions you 
 attacked them — while our friends at home would lie at 
 the mercy of Lacedeemon. Committed, therefore, as you 
 are, to this one decisive struggle to avert both these 
 calamities, stand firm now, if ever, reflecting, each and 
 all, that those among you on the eve of embarking, are 
 the sole stay of Athens — her soldiery, her fleet, all that 
 is left ^ of her capital, and her heroic name : in whose 
 
 1 See Dr. Arnold's note. sentiment attributed to Nicias, ch. 77, 
 
 * The significance of the phrase /; below — avSpis r"P ■^"^'■t, Kai oii mxi. 
 iTTciXoiffos TToXic, is illustrated by the 
 
248 SPEEGHUS FBOM TEUGYDIDHS. 
 
 defence, sliould any man surpass anotlier in skill or 
 courage, he cannot hope for a finer opportunity of pro- 
 moting, by the display of those qualities, his personal 
 interests, and of ensuring the safety of his country. 
 
GYLIPPU8. 249 
 
 SPEECH ADDEESSED BY GYLIPPUS, 
 
 As the spokeaman • of the Syracusan generals, to the soldiers and sailors about to embark 
 on board the Syracusan and allied fleet, on the same occasion as that which forms 
 the subject of the preceding speech. Bk. VII. chs. 66-69. 
 
 Ch. 66. Syracusans and allies! although most of you 
 seem to us to be sensible of the splendour of our past 
 achievements, and of the glorious future involved in the 
 impending battle — otherwise, indeed, you would not have 
 shown such devotion to the cause — still, as some of you 
 may not fully appreciate the issues now at stake, we will 
 endeavour to impress upon you their vital consequence. 
 
 When the Athenians, possessing, already, a wider do- 
 minion than any former or cotemporary Hellenic state, 
 first invaded this realm, with a view to the subjugation of 
 Sicily, and afterwards, if they succeeded, of the Pelopon- 
 nese and the rest of Greece, you were the first to with- 
 stand their navy, the instrument^ of all their sway, and 
 you defeated them in several engagements : a triumph 
 you will in all probabihty repeat now. For when men's 
 pretensions are cut down at the very point of their fancied 
 excellence, all their remaining pride sinks to a lower ebb 
 than if they had never dreamt of eclipsing others : and, 
 losing ground from mortified ambition,^ they fall back 
 
 ' Thucydides (vii. 65) says: /cai " Dr. Arnold, mistaHng xarkaxov 
 
 ETTtiJr) jravra irdifia fiv, wapiicsKivaavTo for tlie imperfect tense, construes 
 
 tKeivoie o( T£ (TTparriyol xal riXiTrwoc if^^P "'ai'ra Karsaxov, 'with which 
 
 Kal IXe^av roidSf. Poppo (ed. min.) they were overhearing everything.' 
 explains the words o'l n nrp., k.t.>.., ' I have made auxmarog depend 
 
 hy the Latin equivalent ' quum re- on T<f -rap iXwiSa, as GbUer suggests, 
 
 liqui duces, turn maxime vel nomi- Poppo (ed. min.) rather summarily 
 
 natim Gylippus.' decides that np Trap' iXiriSa does not 
 
250 SPEECHES FBOM TEUGYDIDES. 
 
 further than their real strength warrants. Such, probably, 
 is now the case with the Athenians. 
 
 67. On our side, on the other hand, the courage^ we 
 derive from nature, which made us venturous and bold 
 even when little versed in seamanship, has been braced 
 and strengthened by experience : and each of us, rein- 
 forced by the conviction that our defeat of the strongest 
 power afloat, proves us to be the strongest, finds his hopes 
 of victory doubled. And, in general, the more sanguine 
 men's hopes, the more daring the gallantry of their enter- 
 prise. Besides, the contrivances they have devised in 
 imitation of our armament, are very well suited to our 
 mode of fighting, and there is not one of them that we 
 are not prepared to foil.^ But the enemy — his decks 
 crowded with heavy infantry, contrary to his custom, and 
 obliged to embark a multitude of javelin-men, mere 
 landsmen,^ for the most * part, from Acarnania and else- 
 where, who, with no room ^ to move about, will be quite 
 at a loss how to discharge their weapons — ^how, I say, 
 can his ships fail to be imperilled, and his troops thrown 
 into general confusion, when tossed about in a style so 
 novel to them? Why — even the numerical superiority 
 of their fleet will do thern no good — a point I mention in 
 case any of you should be alarmed by the prospect of 
 
 admit of this construction, and takes off without acquiring any hold.' — 
 
 avxfiiiaros with o0n\Xo/ifvoi. The Grote, vol. vii. p. 445. 
 
 clause may then he rendered, 'their ' Poppo(ed.niaj.) compares Livy's 
 
 pride being mortified by disappoint- epithet, mediterraneus, as applied to 
 
 ment.' Philopoemen (bk. xxxv. 26), with 
 
 ' ' To virdpxov ■Trporcpov ' i. 6. insita x^P'^'^os here. 
 
 Boriensium virtus.' — Poppo, ed. min. * Bauer shows that o>e dirilv must 
 
 ' The Syracusans ' had been ap- signify maximam partem,, not vi ita 
 
 prised of the grappling-irons now dicam, here. 
 
 about to be employed by the Athe- * Poppo (ed. min.) takes KaPifv- 
 
 nians, and had guarded against them /icvove in its literal sense : GoUer 
 
 by stretching hides along their bows, thinks it means ' with just room to 
 
 80 that the " iron-hand " might slip stand,' but none to move about. 
 
OYLIPPUS. ■251 
 
 engaging a larger squadron than his own ; for a numerous 
 fleet in a narrow harbour will be slow to execute the 
 desired mancEuvres, and very easily damaged by the 
 engines of attack devised by us. 
 
 There is one fact of which you may rest assured, for 
 we have certain information of its truth. It is only 
 because their miseries exceed enduirance — because they 
 are constrained by positive distress — that they have 
 resorted to the desperate expedient of fighting a decisive 
 action ; ^ not that they rely on their resources : they are 
 simply resolved, in the conviction that they cannot be 
 worse oflf than they are, to risk a daring throw in any 
 way they can, in the hope of either getting to sea by 
 forcing the blockade : or, faihng this, of attempting their 
 retreat by land. 
 
 68. Let us, then, now^ that our deadly enemies are 
 thus in disarray, and fortune, once their ally, offers us 
 her aid, let us close with them in a spirit of resentful 
 passion, convinced that, in dealing with our foes, we are 
 thoroughly justified in thinking^ ourselves at liberty, 
 when avenging acts of aggression, to satiate the animosity 
 of our hearts : remembering, too, that, in wreaking ven- 
 geance on our enemies, we shall taste what is proverbially 
 the sweetest of all earthly pleasures. That they are 
 enemies, ay, and deadly enemies, you want no assurance ; 
 they came to our land to make us slaves, and, if they had 
 succeeded, they would have brought upon our men a 
 miserable fate, on our children and wives the most 
 
 ' Goller, after noticing the doubts ara^ia?', k.t-.X., witli irpoanii.iajxiv but 
 
 as to the genuineness of airoKii'Sv- Bauer, whom I have followed, denies 
 
 vtvati, remarks : ' si reputas, in iq that the preposition depends on the 
 
 airovoLav KaQiariiKaaiv non alium sen- verb, asking ' Quippe adversus for- 
 
 sum esse, nisi deceriare volunt pugnd tunam — semet ^jr«ieM<em — quomodo 
 
 decretorid, vulgatam fortasse se recta pugnarent?' 
 
 habere existimabis.' ' See Poppo's note, ed. min. 
 
 ^ Poppo (ed. min.) takes irpbs 
 
252 SPjEEGEES from THU0YDIDE8. 
 
 shocking indignities, and upon our country a most 
 shameful reproach. Eemembering this, none of us ought 
 to relent, or think it all the better for us, if they depart, 
 and save us further risk ; depart they will, just the same, 
 even should victory crown their efforts. No : we have a 
 glorious prize to struggle for: for if, as we may fairly 
 hope, we accomplish what we wish, not only will these 
 invaders be chastised, but we shall bestow on all Sicily, 
 blessed with freedom heretofore, a freedom yet more sure. 
 And it is very seldom that in venturing to brave a danger, 
 we find that failure works so little mischief, and such 
 vast advantages reward success. 
 
NIOIAS. 253 
 
 SPEECH OF NICIAS 
 
 To his soldiers, on commencing their retreat from Syracuse. Bk. VII. ch. 77. 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 The Athenians, defeated in tteir attempt to break the blockade of 
 the harbour of Syracuse, commenced, after a delay of two days, 
 their retreat by land. Although they amounted to forty thousand 
 men in all, their miserable condition led them to despair of forcing 
 their way into the interior of the island ; and Mcias — worn down 
 himself by an incurable complaint — found it needful to urge them 
 in the strongest accents to exertion. 
 
 Ch. 77. Dangerous as oiir position is, Athenians and 
 allies, we must still cherish hope : ere ^ now men have 
 been saved from perils yet more terrible than this : nor 
 should you allow either past disasters, or the undeserved 
 hardships you are now suffering, to plunge you into 
 excessive self-abasement.^ Even I, who am very far from 
 being one of the strongest among you — in fact, you can 
 see for yourselves how illness has pulled me down — I, 
 who am supposed to be second to none in the favours 
 showered by fortune on my private life and public career, 
 have to share at this crisis all the dangers and anxieties 
 of the humblest soldier. Yet religious observances have 
 ever been habitual with me, and I have acted, on the 
 whole, justly and irreproachably towards my fellow men. 
 This leads me still to entertain sanguine hopes of a 
 favourable issue, though I am alarmed by disasters con- 
 fessedly unmerited. But calamity, perhaps, may yet 
 
 ' ' Asyndeton incitatione oratioDis * See Poppo's note on naTajitnipie 
 defenditur.' — Poppo, ed. tnin. (ed, min.), ch. 75, ahoye, 
 
254 SPEECHES FROM THU0TDIDE8. 
 
 abate ; for our enemies have already been sufficiently 
 fortunate : ^ and if our enterprise offended any of the 
 Gods, we have paid our penalty in full. Other powers, 
 before us, have, I imagine, invaded foreign realms, and, 
 as they have only done what it is man's nature to do, so 
 they have only suffered what man can bear. We have 
 therefore reason to hope for some mitigation of the dis- 
 pleasure of the Gods — at this moment, indeed, we are 
 objects of their pity rather than their jealousy : while, if 
 you look at your own ranks, and observe the experience, 
 the number, and the compact order of the troops on their 
 march, you should not be too much cast down; you 
 should reflect that, wherever you encamp, you form to 
 all intents and purposes a city : and that no Sicihan town, . 
 Syracuse excepted, could easily dispute your entrance, or 
 dislodge you from any position you might seize. Be on 
 the watch yourselves to secure the safety and good order 
 of our march: and let every man remember that the 
 ground he is forced to contest, will, if he maintain it, 
 prove his country and his fortress. We must, however, 
 hiu-ry on our journey, alike by night and by day : for we 
 are short of provisions ; and, if we can but reach some 
 friendly village of the Sicels, whose terror of Syracuse 
 keeps them true to us, you may consider yourselves, from 
 that hour, perfectly safe. We have already sent messages 
 to them, enjoining them to meet us on our march with 
 fresh supplies of provisions. 
 
 In one word, soldiers, recollect that the last necessity 
 enjoins you to be resolutely brave, if only because there 
 is not a position in the neighbourhood that can protect 
 you, should you give way ; while, if you now escape your 
 
 ' Would Nicias, a stately and dig- Grote's version : ' our enemies have 
 nified Athenian, have thougtt this had their full swing of good for- 
 sentence adequately ectoed bv Mr. tunep' 
 
NI0IA8. 255 
 
 foes, you, our allies, will yet be restored to the homes 
 you doubtless long to see again : and you, Athenians, will 
 live to reconstitute the mighty, though fallen, power of 
 our country ; for it is men, not walls, nor ships without 
 men, that make a country. 
 
 LONDOlf : PHINTBD BT 
 
 SPOTTISWOODH AND CO., NEW-BTitEET SQUA«H 
 
 AND PABLIAMENT STBBBT