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OUTLINE 
 
 EVOLUTION-PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 BT 
 
 De. m. e. gazelles. 
 
 TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH, 
 
 Ret. 0. B. FKOTHINGHAJ 
 
 WITH AN APPESTTTX 
 
 BT 
 
 E. L. YOUMANS, M. D. 
 
 FEW YORK : 
 
 D. APPLETON & COMPANY, 
 
 649 & 651 BROADWAY. 
 
 1875. 
 
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1874, 
 
 By D. APPLETOKT & CO, 
 In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 
 
INTEODU-CTION. 
 
 Ik France, nowadays, few works of dogmatic philoso- 
 phy are produced. 
 
 The writers who belong to the school of Auguste 
 Comte endeavor, by means of useful monography, to 
 spread positive knowledge. By the analytical character 
 of their studies, and by the efforts they make to ayoid the 
 construction of systems on metaphysical ground, they do 
 homage to their master's ideas. 
 
 The school of materialism which still holds to the dog- 
 matic method of metaphysics, bears too plainly the stamp 
 of its origin to possess a developed doctrine. Its adher- 
 ents, graduates mostly from the laboratories of the chemist 
 and the physiologist, are indifferent to departments of 
 knowledge that are inaccessible through these two sci- 
 ences. When they speak of thought and of society, they 
 simply carry over to the facts indicated by these two 
 terms an induction drawn from their own special studies. 
 
 The authors and professors who are concerned with the 
 teaching of ofiScial doctrines mainly devote themselves to 
 the defence of certain authorized credences, and to the 
 
4 INTEODtJCTION. 
 
 demolition of the rival opinions of positivism and material- 
 ism. Their labors are, therefore, almost exclusively critical. 
 
 Among the thinkers who belong to neither of these 
 categories, but who have distinguished themselves by spe- 
 cial works of great philosophic depth and reach, some take 
 pleasure in tracing the outlines of a treatise on the nature 
 of things ; they would, perhaps, undertake such a treatise, 
 if they could detach themselves from researches that pro- 
 foundly interest them, or could be satisfied that they had 
 collected a sufficient number of incontestable data. 
 
 The stage of patient analytical research, at which the 
 French mind of our time is halting, must necessarily be 
 succeeded by an epoch of synthesis, as the period of incu- 
 bation is followed by a period of birth. But, while with 
 us only rough draughts appear, in England a bold scheme 
 of construction is submitted. 
 
 Mr. Herbert Spencer, in a work of great compass, a 
 revised edition of the first volume of which has recently 
 been published, offers to our consideration a synthesis of 
 the universe, as apprehended by an intellect enriched by 
 all the treasures won by science.' The friends of philos- 
 
 ' The name of Herbert Spencer, though unfamiliar to the puhlic, can- 
 not be unknown. His full discussion of objections to Augaste Comte'a 
 classification of the sciences, which may be read in the sixth chapter of 
 a work by M. Littrd {" Auguste Comte and the Positive Philosophy," 
 1863); then an interesting article on the first edition of "First Princi- 
 ples," published by M. Laugel in the Saue des Deux Mondes (February 
 15, 1864); a rapid review of Mr. Spencer's theory of the unknowable, in 
 the preface, by a disciple, which M. Littr^ prefixed to the second edition 
 of the " Cours de Philosophic " of Auguste Comte, must have given us 
 to understand with what a vigorous thinker we have to deal. Since then, 
 divers notices in philosophical writings, too brief and incidental to recall, 
 have kept the name in remembrance: Finally, this very year, a professor 
 
INTEODUCTION. 5 
 
 ophy must devoutly hope that the author's health, already 
 shaken by intellectual toil that ■would try the most robust 
 constitution, may permit the completion cf a work that 
 crowns a life of consecration to lofty studies. 
 
 To pass judgment at present on a work which is to 
 comprise ten volumes, and of which but five have appeared, 
 would be rash. Nevertheless, as Mr. Spencer, before un- 
 dertaking his " System of Philosophy," has submitted his 
 views by fragments, in volumes or in contributions to re- 
 views, we are able to follow the author through the succes- 
 sive passages he traversed before finally arriving at the 
 synthesis we find in the " First Principles." It should not, 
 however, be forgotten that in the previously - published 
 books nothing is conclusively stated ; and that the author, 
 by connecting them with the principle of evolution, pro- 
 poses in the course of his work to complete views which, 
 by his own confession, are but an imperfect expression of 
 his actual thought.' Making this allowance, we shall at- 
 tempt a description of the character of Mr. Herbert Spen- 
 cer's philosophy, and shall indicate the part which, in our 
 judgment, every synthesis of the kind is called, under act- 
 ual circumstances, to fill. 
 
 in the university, M. Th. Eibot, published a carefully-elaborated book on. 
 " Contemporaneous English Psychology." There will be found a clear 
 summary of the " Principles of Psychology " (first edition), and of some 
 essays by Mr. Spencer. We ought also to mention a pamphlet by our 
 friend M. Grotz, pastor, on " The Eeligipus Sentiment." There one may 
 read an admirable exposition of Mr. Spencer's opinions on the function 
 of religion and the significance of the religious sentiment. 
 
 • See the preface to the stereotyped edition of " Social Statics," 1868. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 FAOB 
 ISTKODUCTION .......... 3 
 
 CHAPTER I. 
 The Pboblem of the TJniteese . 9 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 How FAR CAN THE UnITERSE BE EXPLAINED ? . . . . 18 
 
 CHAPTER HI. 
 Outline and Ground of Mr. Spencer's Ststem . . . .26 
 
 CHAPTER TV. 
 The Doctrine of Progress 36 
 
 CHAPTER v. 
 The Law of Eyoluiion . ..... 63 
 
 CHAPTER VL 
 
 POSITITISU ...... . , • • 66 
 
8 CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 PAOH 
 
 Comte's Fundamental Doctbines '?! 
 
 CHAPTER Vni. 
 The Okdek of the Sciences 80 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 Evolution and Government 93 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Herbert Spencer and the Doctrine of Evolution . . . 116 
 Notes = ISt 
 
OUTLINE 
 
 EVOLUTION-PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 CHAPTER L 
 
 THE FBOBLEM OF THE XTNTTEESE, 
 
 The universe, whether regarded as a whole or in the 
 marvellous variety of its details, presents itself before us 
 as an enigma. The mightiest intellects are, by an irresist- 
 ible force, constrained to seek its explanation. In all eras 
 of history, doctrines religious or scientific, initiations into 
 mysteries, or treatises de natura rerum, have been put for- 
 ward as explanations of the phenomena which at the time 
 composed the world of experience. The number of at- 
 tempts ventured thus far, and the attempts that are still 
 continually made, clfearly enough declare that the problem 
 is not solved yet. Can it be solved ? There have not been 
 wanting those who put the question in this formidable 
 shape. The constantly-renewed attempts at explanation, 
 the systems proposed by thinkers who, undaunted by the 
 failure of their predecessors, cherish a firm conviction that 
 they have found the magic word, compel us to believe that 
 these incessantly-renewed endeavors proceed from an un- 
 satisfied craving of our nature. But skeptical doctrines 
 
10 THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 periodically recurring come forward in their turn, and deny 
 the apparently-established results of speculation, sap their 
 foundations, and repress the enthusiastic flights of dogma- 
 tism ; dissipating even the possibility of gaining a knowl- 
 edge of such matters, they haughtily pronounce the search 
 vain. The past is a pledge of the future, say the friends 
 of metaphysics ; the need that has impelled former genera- 
 tions will not allow coming generations repose ; humanity 
 will never be indifferent to these noble and salutary re- 
 searches ; if it ever could be, it would be punished straight- 
 way by an irreparable loss ; such a need could not have 
 been planted like a germ in ox^r nature simply to lead us 
 forever astray. The past is a pledge of the future, say 
 likewise the enemies of metaphysics; vrhere the human 
 mind has always failed, it always will fail. Doubtless, its 
 efforts have not been quite sterile ; if it has not found the 
 truth it looked for, it has often found truths it did not look 
 for. But what might it not have accomplished for the hap- 
 piness of mankind, if its efforts had been brought steadily 
 to bear on problems within reach of its faculties ; if, aban- 
 doning the hope of explaining the universe, it had applied 
 itself solely to the task of exploring the world within v^hich 
 it was confined I An experience, grand though it may have 
 beBn, which thus furnishes an argument to both the philo- 
 sophic parties that contend together, is yet not decisive in 
 the case. The question whether the human mind is to pass 
 forever through these alternations of metaphysical fervor 
 and faintness — is to be condemned to an endless and prfcfit- 
 less toil — ^must be referred, not to beliefs more or less car- 
 dinal w^hich the mind contains, but to the constitution of 
 the mind itself. 
 
 All that we know is the result of experience : this tells 
 us that things change, that is to say, present themselves to 
 us in different successive states. We regard them from a 
 human point of view, according to the idea, correct or othr 
 
CAUSES AND ENDS. 11 
 
 erwise, that we form of our own actions, and attribute to 
 them causes and ends. Whatever meaning the metaphy- 
 sician may attach to these two words, we always mean by 
 " cause " that one thing stands in sequence to another thing 
 to which it is boimd by an invariable relation — a law in 
 accordance with which the first term being given, the sec- 
 ond is immediately conceived of as necessarily following ; 
 by " end " we mean that every thing is represented to us as 
 a middle term — a middle term between an initial term 
 known or supposed, and a final term equally known or sup- 
 posed. We are always led to generalize our experience ; 
 and, as we see things always change, we conclude that all 
 things, considered as a defined whole, though of unknown 
 outhnes, are submitted to a law of change — that there are a 
 cause and an end ; in other words, a first state and a last,- 
 separated by a number of indeterminate states, each one 
 of which is held to be cause and means in regard to the 
 state that follows it, effect and end in regard to the state 
 that precedes. But, although we conceive the world as 
 traversing in its duration an -infinite number of points, all 
 composed of innumerable correlated phenomena, as none 
 of these points are completely known to us, and as all that 
 we can grasp of them is limited to the relations of coexist- 
 (suce between phenomena of the same class, and to the rela- 
 tions of sequence between phenomena which we refer to 
 two consecutive classes, it is only by the boldest anticipa- 
 tions of experience that we assign to the series of groups a 
 law of succession, and. to their mass laws of causality and 
 finality. Three questions are raised, therefore : What is . 
 the primary cause, or what are the primary causes, of the 
 world ? What is the end, the final cause of things, sever- 
 ally and collectively ? What are the means, the secondary 
 causes, of things, separately and collectively; in other 
 words, what is the order after which the successive states 
 are coordinated ? 
 
12 THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 If, leaving out of view the successive stages of the 
 world, we confine our attention to the forces which impel 
 them to succeed one another, we are led to the supposition 
 of a primitive force which precedes and*introduces the first 
 stage. But, is there one only primeval, homogeneous con- 
 dition, or is there, rather, a coordinated system of condi- 
 tions; or, yet again, an indefinite number of independent 
 conditions ? In other words, is there one single primitive 
 force, or are there many primitive forces united by one law; 
 or, again, is there an indefinite number of forces independ- 
 ent of each other, which would make indeterminateness the 
 true law of the world ? If there is but one, how shall it 
 be represented ? Is it associated with a consciousness in 
 which a preestablished purpose and an indefinite series of 
 -means are present at the same instant, or are there differ- 
 ent conscious forces, representing diverse orders of means, 
 and each tending toward different ends ? The derived 
 forces that produtse on our minds the phantasmagoria of 
 successive states which represent things to us, are they por- 
 tions or products of the first -cause ? If portions of it, how 
 and wherefore did they become separated from it ? If prod- 
 ucts, how and wherefore their creation ? These and many 
 other questions have always exercised philosophers. As 
 they have' been put in rapid succession, and, as the greedy 
 mind demanded an instant solution, the solution has been 
 given by generalizing the views of the mind, by condensing 
 abstractions. In the same way the solution is given now. 
 Between the explanations of ancient and those of modem 
 metaphysics the difference is merely in form, not in sub- 
 stance. In the place of facts rudely heaped together, we 
 have now facts well observed, that are adduced to explain 
 what can be called a fact only by a manifest departure from 
 the ordinary sense of the word. The accessories — what we 
 may call the scientific dress of the solution — must not con- 
 ceal from us the true substance of it, namely, the interpre- 
 
THE SOLUTION OF FAITH. 13 
 
 tation. The interpretations are ever the same, and the 
 same things remain to be accounted for. 
 
 It is easy for us to see that no actual advance toward 
 an explanation has been made. Intelligent criticism dis- 
 closes the reason. Every thing known, being known in the 
 consciousness, is composed of actual states of conscious- 
 ness. A primary fact, posited without an antecedent, can- 
 not be represented in consciousness, where all facts are 
 antecedent and subsequent ; it passes its comprehension ; 
 it is inconceivable, unintelligible, unknowable. It is not 
 reason that posits at the head o'f a series a primary fact, it 
 is an act of faith ; it is by an act of faith that we admit a 
 first cause ; by an act of faith just as plausible we might 
 admit several first causes. It is, again, an act of faith that 
 endows them, when posited, with personality, with hiunan 
 attributes, intelligence, feeling, and even with sensible form. 
 Intellect gives place to imagination. But philosophers 
 have always shown great repugnance to confess the insuf- 
 ficiency of reason, to openly avow an act of faith. They 
 will not even acknowledge that they are reduced to that. 
 They rush eagerly off in search of a new basis, leaping 
 from abstraction to abstraction, in hope of discovering be- 
 hind a general name a more solid material. They will bor- 
 row the. materials for a new structure, sometimes from in- 
 tellect, sometimes from sentiment. They bring into service 
 harmony, love, perfection — very intelligible, things in a 
 limited sphere, when considered as laws of a group of con- 
 crete facts ; but, when applied to the whole mass of things, 
 incapable of designating other than an indeterminate order, 
 a pure tendency, an assemblage of contradictions, a con- 
 tinuous being, supporting all modes of existence, himself 
 no mode in particular ; in a word, the Infinite and Abso- 
 lute, who is distinguished only by name from the formless 
 and indefinite substance of the ancients. 
 
 Criticism has, we think, clearly demonstrated the in- 
 
U THE PIIOBLEM OP THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 competency of science to throw light into these regions. 
 All who are acquainted with the atJtual state of philosophy 
 know very well that it is not passing through a crisis from 
 which it may issue with new forces. It is summoned to 
 admit the radical power] essness of the human mind to know 
 the truth on questions in all time regarded as fundamental. 
 It can no longer evade the obligations of resorting, for the 
 satisfaction of the mind, to a greater or less number of acts 
 of faith. 
 
 As soon as this decisive step is taken, we find ourselves 
 on other ground entirely ; we are no longer dealing with 
 science, but with religion. The problems which general 
 science is unable to solve, religion takes up ; she has always 
 had them in charge. To the questions we have raised, as 
 to many others we have left unmentioned, the different 
 forms of religion have offered different replies. If there is 
 no absurdity that has not found a philosopher to defend it, 
 as little is there an absurdity that has not found a place in 
 some dogma of religion. Religion, as well as science, must 
 face criticism. Upon what foundation will it support the 
 truths it announces ? Will it appeal to experiment, and to 
 induction based on experiment ? When the cause of a thing 
 was represented as an animated being, so long as a univer- 
 sal anthropomorphism spread a human vitality over all Na- 
 ture, first causes might be represented with human attri- 
 butes. Being persuaded, moreover, by personal experience 
 or by witnesses deemed worthy of credit, that the gods 
 held palpable relations with created beings, and intervened 
 in the concerns of the lower world, men might believe that 
 supernatural beings had built up the universe, so far as 
 known, by means more marvellous but similar in kind to 
 those that artists employ in the construction of the works 
 of art they fashion with their hands. It was possible to 
 believe, then, that they had a sufficiently good idea of the 
 method as well as of the causes of things, even if they did 
 
FAITH FAILS TO SOLVE IT. 15 
 
 hot comprehend their final object, and felt that the motive 
 was shrouded in mystery. • But since anthropomorphism, 
 though not abolished, has lost credit so far that the super- 
 natural beings no longer manifest themselves directly in 
 material fashion, except it be to the entranced mind of a 
 miraculously-assisted person, here and there ; since the reli- 
 gions of civilized people recognize but one God, whose 
 glory the heavens declare, or who reveals himself to the 
 heart — a God stripped of all the lower attributes of hu- 
 manity, preserving only its intellectual and moral qualities 
 — appeal can no longer be made to experience ; the images 
 which are indispensable as explanatory symbols cannot be 
 supplied. Reason can give none of them except by the 
 help of this or that system of metaphysics, the upshot of 
 which we know too well. The ideas of reason, whatever 
 their origin, are simply the laws of experience, they do not 
 furnish experience ; they give us no help in representing to 
 us what we are to believe. Even if we imagined that we 
 represented well enough the cause of the universe when 
 we posited it by an act of faith, we have no representation 
 of the way in which this Supreme Being communicates 
 with what are called his works ; it must be confessed that 
 nothing is known of the why or the how of the universe, 
 and that neither of them is conceivable. The act of faith 
 does not keep its promise, the temporary device fails to ef- 
 fect a complete illusion. One step beyond, and the Divine 
 Being himself will cease to be conceivable, from the lack 
 of intellectual and moral attributes which imply no contra- 
 diction ; religious minds will then see clearly the truth ap- 
 parent already to not a few. At this point every show of 
 explanation must cease, and it must be admitted that reli- 
 gion is in no better condition than science is, to tell ua 
 what the human mind would give every thing to know. On 
 the one side, scientific generalizations, more and more com- 
 prehensive, result in expressing nothing but the oonnectioa 
 
16 THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 between two terms united by their relative place in time ; 
 by dint of abstracting and classifying, we arrive at an irre- 
 ducible abstraction which cannot be classified. On the 
 other side, the symbols of religion, becoming more and 
 more vague, come at length to signify nothing but pure 
 Being ; by laying stress on mystery, we reach the point of 
 taking as our object a Being who cannot be so much as 
 conceived of. Either way, speculation is in danger of los- 
 ing its object. Religion tends to self-absorption in the con- 
 templation of its mystery, and science confesses her inabil- 
 ity to penetrate it. 
 
 But religious minds, and particularly theologians who 
 speak in their name, are very far from being convinced that 
 their mystery may not be represented in a way to seize 
 powerfully the imagination. Hitherto, their attempts to 
 give some sort of image to that which cannot be faithfully 
 depicted have succeeded for a time, at least with the 
 masses of mankind, in imposing on the craving for knowl- 
 edge, just as in science the attempts at general explanation, 
 however fallacious they may have been, appeared plausible 
 enough at the moment when they were proposed. If men 
 of science, or metaphysicians availing themselves of scien- 
 tific abstractions, still hope to produce satisfactory synthe- 
 ses, why should the theologians, whose success in the past 
 has been far less disputable, all at once abandon the hope 
 of rallying intelligence by their symbols, imperfect as these 
 are in the judgment of the most enlightened among them, 
 idle as they are in the regards of criticism ? The philoso- 
 phers have, therefore, a duty to discharge. It is not for 
 them any more to engage in new metaphysical specula- 
 tions ; but since, in the name of religion, people will pre- 
 tend, for a long time yet, to offer solutions of the problems 
 of a first cause and a motive of the world, they must offer 
 solutions that are credible — in harmony, that is, with the 
 sum of truths that we regard as otherwise established. 
 
RELATION OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION. 17 
 
 Religion, in fact, will do well not to contradict what we 
 know of the series of laws of experience ; in telling us 
 about the wherefore of the universe as a whole, or merely 
 about any one of the entities that compose it, she must not 
 do violence to the order which science has fairly proved. In 
 a word, religion must treat the problem of which it is its 
 duty to furnish the provisory solution, under the fixed con- 
 trol of organized and classified experience. 
 
CHAPTER II. 
 
 HOW FAE CAN THE UjSTITEIBSE BE EXPLAINED? 
 
 The old antagonism, we do not say between religion 
 and science, but between theologians and savants, is not, 
 then, finally healed ; nevertheless, it has changed its charac- 
 ter. Science is no longer a rival of religion, but an inde- 
 pendent power, with another work to do, a special function 
 to perform, the limits whereof must be precisely defined. 
 It is the true function of science to systematize knowledge. 
 To systematize knowledge is to classify it ; it is to link to- 
 gether, according to common principles, all its known or 
 knowable series, and to connect them all with the most 
 general principle ; it is to resolve abstractions into one an- 
 other until, in a final abstraction, a general formula be ar- 
 rived at, a condensed symbol of the immense variety of 
 changes that are revealed to consciousness ; it is the reduc- 
 tion of variety to unity. But, this end attained, we must 
 not think the mystery explained. The highest abstraction 
 that can be found by analysis, and that may afterward 
 serve as basis for a system, represents something which is 
 still unaccounted for. 
 
 Since the success of Newton's marvellous generaliza- 
 tion, which explains the movements of the great celestial 
 bodies as well as of bodies terrestrial, by the laws of gravi- 
 tation, it has been possible to start a scientific theory of 
 the genesis of the solar system, and to extend it, from 
 the farthest planet to other stars, surrounding it with so 
 
DELUSIVE HYPOTHESES. 19 
 
 many guarantees that the later discoveries, as well in as- 
 tronomy as in physics, have but added confirmation to it; 
 so that we are forced to believe that, from the moment 
 ■when the cosmical matter began to collect about a centre, 
 things have gone on as the theory describes. Neverthe- 
 less, two' points remain unexplained : the existence of cos- 
 mical matter and the cause of the concentration. 
 
 When Lamarck derived the two kingdoms, the vegeta- 
 ble and the animal, from brute matter, through the interven- 
 tion of gelatinous substances formed in water-courses, and 
 brought back the animal kingdom, ranged in series, to the 
 primal monad spontaneously engendered, he explained the 
 production and transformation of living beings by a con- 
 currence of external circumstances and of interior move- 
 ments, which were as far from being conceivable as from 
 being proved. The fame that has attached to the ideas of 
 Lamarck, since recent works have made them familiar, and 
 the discoveries of the microscope, which have, so to speak, 
 modified the notion of being into biology, ought not now to 
 delude us. We know that the old adage, " Omne mvtem ex 
 01)0," has given place to a more general axiom, " Every liv- 
 ing creature proceeds from a cell ; " that from a minute cell, 
 an essential part of the egg, have issued all organizations, 
 which, after all, are but groups, more or less considerable, 
 of cells more or less modified. We know that in both the 
 kingdoms of life there are organisms composed of a single 
 minute cell, which live separate and reproduce themselves, 
 as the cellules that make part of more complicated organ- 
 isms do. The formation of the first cellule, and the chain of 
 iitipefceptible movements the succession whereof produces 
 life in this elementary being, always remain unexplained. 
 
 There is a recent theory that is destined to a great dis- 
 tinction. It is the theory known as correlation, equivalence, 
 unity of forces, according as one has a lingering regard for 
 metaphysics, or keeps strictly to the scientific view. Labors 
 
20 CAN THE UNIVERSE BE EXPLAINED? 
 
 which rank among the most admirable of contemporaneous 
 science have spread abroad the idea that the mechanic, elec- 
 tric, magnetic forces, heat, light, chemical processes, vital 
 processes, are, so far as we can see, so many manifestations 
 of one and the same force, which is converted into one or 
 another of these equivalents. We must not in this case, 
 more than in the preceding cases, delude ourselves into the 
 belief that where we see a phenomenon presented in one 
 of the modes of force, followed by another phenomenon 
 presented in another mode of force and equal in quantity, 
 we see a reappearance of the same thing. This theory, ad- 
 mirable for the construction of a good scientific coordina- 
 tion, gives us nothing more than the laws of succession in 
 phenomena, along with a special characteristic which in- 
 creases its certainty — that, namely, of definite quantity. 
 Not only does this theory teach us nothing respecting the 
 pretended sole force which reveals itself to us under these 
 diverse forms ; the very phenomena it unites do not cease 
 to appear diverse 
 
 The idea of law exposes us to a similar peril; Born of 
 a somewhat vague belief, it has become a type of certitude. 
 At first it was but the perception of a relation of sequence, 
 or of coexistence between certain phenomena of known 
 quality, accompanied by a prevision, that is to say, by a be- 
 lief in the future recurrence of the same phenomena under 
 the same conditions. In proportion as the prevision is jus- 
 tified by the event, the confidence in its exactness increases 
 in strength ; the power of foresight gains at once in pre- 
 cision and in scope. The idea of fixedness in the return 
 of phenomena takes root. Feeble at first, and hardly out- 
 weighing in value those probabilities in which the number 
 of unfavorable chances scarcely allows us to reckon on the 
 realization of a favorable chance, the idea of law is forti- 
 fied as much by the frequent recurrence of phenomena re- 
 lated in the manner it describes, as by the indefinitely-re- 
 
UNIVERSALITY OF lAW. 21 
 
 peated coufiiinations of the previsions founded on it. When 
 it has acquired a degree of certainty that warrants a pre- 
 vision in kind, it may serve as a base for scientific theories 
 as yet imperfect, and' incapable of being expressed except 
 in popular speech. But when, in the progress of science, 
 the relation is known with a degree of precision that justi- 
 fies the prophecy of a sure recurrence, definite as to quan- 
 tity in time, space, and degree, the certitude is as great as 
 can be conceived. Then no room is left for unfavorable 
 chances ; the prevision is reckoned complete, and the law is 
 expressed in the terse, unambiguous language of mathe- 
 matics, instead of the popular 'phraseology, which is always 
 tainted by indecision. Thenceforth, the mind of the phi- 
 losopher, made familiar with established relations, and oc- 
 cupied with the discovery of new ones, is so far dominated 
 with the idea of law that he cannot conceive of a phenome- 
 non without a law that accounts for its production. He 
 anticipated the unknown in affirming the universality of a 
 law ; and now, rising to the highest degree of generalization, 
 he proclaims it as " a law, that every thing depends on a 
 law," If the laws that govern any order of events what- 
 ever are unknown to him, he concludes thence that they are 
 yet to be sought ; and, if he fails in his search, he concludes 
 from this, again, that the means employed are not the best, 
 or that our knowledge is not advanced enough to make in- 
 vestigation fruitful. But he never contests the principle. 
 "He refuses to admit that the course of scientific progress 
 is to turn back suddenly on itself; he will acknowledge no 
 other cause of ignoraqce than the insufficiency of our forces, 
 and he does not hesitate to declare that humanity must in 
 the end discover a constant order among phenomena the 
 most complex and the niost obscure." ' Every fact, we are 
 
 ' Herbert Spencer, " Claasification of Sciences," p. 64, edition of 
 1869, in tlie Appendix entitled " Laws in General," which was inserted 
 in the first edition of " First Principles." 
 
22 CAN THE UNIVERSE BE EXPLAINED ? 
 
 told, is explained by its law, and a law is explained by 
 showing that it, too, has a law ; in other words, that it is a 
 particular case under a more general law. The universal 
 explanation, then, would be given in a law under which all 
 other laws should be particular cases, or in a theorem 
 whereof all known relations should be corollaries. In this 
 way the mind of the philosopher, in its more ambitious 
 dreams, may imagine a solution of the problem of Nature. 
 But let us not be beguiled by false appearances. There is 
 no talk, yet, of a true explanation. The mind accustomed 
 to abstractions is the dupe of an illusion when it takes laws 
 for realities. Laws are symbols of order ; they do not ac- 
 count for order. The man of the world does not entertain 
 the same idea that the philosopher does, of the laws of the 
 universe ; falling in with the usages of popular speech, the 
 familiar expression of general beliefs, he sees in a law 
 simply a regulation, like that of the civil code, imposed on 
 the march of events by the arbitrary wUl of a supernatural- 
 legislator, in view of certain mysterious ends which reli- 
 gion reveals or metaphysics conjecture ; and he has, more 
 commonly than most philosophers, a sense of the mystery 
 which we merely displace when we transfer it from an event 
 to a law, and from one law to another more general law. 
 " To explain one law of Nature by another is simply to sub- 
 stitute one mystery for another ; the general course of na- 
 ture is no less mysterious than before, for we can no more 
 assign a reason for the more general laws than for the 
 more partial." ' 
 
 We ought to be thoroughly convinced of the fact that 
 what we have a right to demand of science is not an expla- 
 nation ; it is a coSrdination of the relations which experi- 
 ence shows us as existing among all the orders of phe- 
 nomena in the world ; not with an intent to substitute a 
 ' new dogmatism for an old one, as many believe, but with 
 > J. S. Mill, " System of Lo^c," vol. i., p. 581. 
 
WHAT IS EEQUIRED OF SCIENCE. 23 
 
 a purpose to oppose an insurmountable barrier against 
 the return of aggressive dogmatism in any form. This 
 function, thanks to an authority that, is no longer seri- 
 ously disputed, science is competent to discharge. It is its 
 office to give us a system of truths which minds eager for 
 finished and faultless . constructions can respect; The man 
 of the ■world, who.sees in a law the permanent fiat of a su- 
 pernatural •will, nevertheless believes the world to be gov- 
 erned by laws ; he demands j;o know them, to have the 
 mechanism' of the world disclosed to him, hoping thus to 
 possess one solution, of the triple problem of Nature, the 
 true niethod, the how of things. The philosopher, he at 
 least who has come to doubt the transceiidental reach of 
 human intelligence, completely divests himself of all inter- 
 est in the other phases of the problem, which he makes over 
 to the speculations of metaphysicians and theologians ; but 
 he thinks to penetrate the knowledge of the how when he 
 forges a methodical chain of facts. . The one as much as the 
 other cherishes vitally, the belief that the how can be reached 
 in all the groups of facts, and even in the entire assemblage 
 of groups. This belief in the possibility of a rational syn- 
 thesis of phenomena within the. limits of possible experi- 
 ence is one of the characteristics of the modem mind. It 
 yields to the hope of mounting from law to law till it finds 
 an all-encompassing law, from the concrete facts of experi- 
 ence to an abstract conception which cofnprehends them all, 
 and of rolling back the mystery to the extremest limits at- 
 tainable by om: faculties. It flatters itself that positive 
 science can, in default of an explanation of the universe, 
 organize and institute a doctrine capable of engaging as 
 high a degree of confidence as any system whatever, meta- 
 physical or religious. For this reason, though the hope be 
 abandoned of seeing rise up brie of those grand metaphysi- 
 cal structures by which the potency of a philosophy used 
 to be judged, the idea is not abandoned of a synthesis sci- 
 
24 CAN THE UNIVERSE BE EXPLAINED? 
 
 entilically reduced, a theory of the world with which imagina- 
 tion has nothing to do, and all the parts whereof are rigor- 
 ously demonstrated. This' is the inspiration of many efforts. 
 Will this theory of the world possess the rigorous cer- 
 tainty that will entitle it to fill satisfactorily the part which 
 the modern mind calls on it to play ? If from an embrace 
 ing law already discovered, and not conjectured merely, we 
 could deduce a complete series of laws less and less gen- 
 eral, down to the most el(jmentary, we should possess a 
 basis which, though reached by analysis and deduction, 
 would have the greatest possible certitude. But this is the 
 dream of a perfected science, the full realization of which 
 we are very far from discerning. We only hold the frag- 
 ments of it which each special science furnishes, arid when 
 we attempt to join them together we but form from them a 
 web with enormous rents in it, through which the systems 
 of metaphysics might all introduce themselves with ease. 
 If there existed a single a priori truth to which all these 
 fragments could be attached, if the rents were of a kind to 
 be concealed behind provisory articulations resulting from 
 this a priori truth, positive knowledge would be reduced 
 to unity, we should have a philosophy, and they who think 
 themselves entitled to reason conclusively from actual expe- 
 rience to what transcends possible experience, would have 
 a solid basis for their convictions, and a sure test of their 
 rationality. This would be an ideal science, to use the 
 happy expression of M. Berthelot,' but with a solidity that 
 this thinker refuses to concede to it. In fact, he does not 
 admit that it can be constructed a priori^ that it has a firm 
 central point, a core about which may be disposed, to give 
 them life, these (?/s;ec?a membra which the different sciences 
 present to us. If he is right, if the ideal science is as yet 
 nothing but the fruit of unfettered individual imagination, - 
 which, dissatisfied with positive science, projects its lines 
 
 Revue des Deux Mondes, November IB, 1868. 
 
THE SYNTHETIC PHILOSOPHY. 25 
 
 ■without ability to preserve their original rectitude, then the 
 ideal science is a chimera, and every structure that may be 
 erected on it is condemned in advance. One might con- 
 struct poems on the data of science, but they would not 
 give a fair equivalent to the reader. If, on the other hand, 
 as Mr, Herbert Spencer believes, it is possible to construct 
 a priori a system of knowledge, an abstract expression and 
 .symbol of the synthesis of the world's phenomena, a phi- 
 losophy superior in positiveness to any yet attempted will 
 be instituted amid the applauses of an enlightened public. 
 This work of synthesis Mr. Herbert Spencer has under- 
 taken. Starting from positive science, the difiFerent branches 
 whereof he traces in their concentric progress up to their 
 widest generalizations, he attaches these generalizations to 
 the loftiest abstract conceptions that they all suggest, and 
 brings them back together to the principle which officiates 
 in the double qapacity of supporting all the truths, and ex- 
 pressing an intuition of consciousness. He thus welds the 
 flnost advanced results of experience to the legitimate and 
 inevitable results of a priori speculation. Finally, by way 
 of deduction, he derives from this first principle the laws 
 which sum up the movement of things, and founds, on an 
 undeniable truth, a theory of development which he after- 
 ward verifies by the different- orders of knowledge, and by 
 th& history of the cosmos.. Such is the vast scheme that 
 he proposes, and the arduous task that he undertakes, at an 
 epoch when the path of the systematic thinker is more 
 perilous than it ever could have been before ; when, in face 
 of a criticism alert and fully equipped, it is impossible to 
 foster an illusion by which one may deceive himself. The 
 enterprise is certainly bold ; but it is well calculated to 
 tempt and fascinate one of those rare minds which unite 
 the powerful faculties of the genuine thinker with the im- 
 mense knowledge of the savant who delights in the verifi- 
 cation of the smallest details. 
 2 
 
CHAPTER ni. 
 
 OtmJXE AND GKOUNDS OF SPEITOEb's SYSTEM. 
 
 Me. Hekbeet Spenceb belongs to the class of contem- 
 poraneous philosophers who ground all knowledge on expe- 
 rience. He merits a distinct place, however, in the experi- 
 mental school. He chooses to employ language which 
 might cause him to be taken for an adherent of another 
 school; he speaks of a priori principles, of necessary- 
 truths ; he reproaches the empirics with pretending to ex- 
 plain such of our beliefs as are called necessary, as they 
 explain all others, without assuming the necessity of any 
 beliefs. But we must not deceive ourselves. In the view 
 of Mr. Spencer, even, the difference between himself and 
 other champions of the experimental hypothesis is not fun- 
 damental, but purely formal. If he corrects a mode of 
 speech that seems to him inexact, if he rejects propositions 
 which, taken literally, would leave philosophy without a 
 basis, it is in the faith that thereby he shall serve the same 
 cause. In tracing our most elementary beliefs back to ulti- 
 mate notions, he still explains them by experience. His 
 criticism has no other object than to plant the experimental , 
 theory on an inexpugnable foundation. Empiricism, he de- 
 clares, try as it will, wiU endeavor in vain to escape the ob- 
 ligation to postulate an unquestionable principle. In order 
 that any proposition whatever in his series of reasonings 
 may be proved, it miist be brought back to an order of 
 
FUNDAMENTAL DATA. 21 
 
 propositions already proved, and these again to others, also 
 proved. If this chain of proofs had no end, the whole sys- 
 tem would hang by nothing. It must be attached to some 
 tacitly-admitted principle which cannot be proved, and 
 which cannot be rejected either; in other words, to a neces- 
 sary principle, which must be laid down in advance as 
 certain, and without which, nothing being certain, nothing 
 could be proved. 
 
 We must, therefore, admit data that are not and never 
 will be proved. In science, likewise, we start from par- 
 ticular, concrete facts, and rise to general facts which 
 explain them ; from these to facts yet more general which 
 explain them, by an operation which, however slow and 
 long, cannot be infinite, but which, from one central point 
 to another, brings us toward a final generalization that 
 serves as an explanation of them all — this final generaliza- 
 tion, not being referable to one more general, remains in- 
 explicable. "By strict necessity, explanation brings us 
 face to face with the inexplicable. We have to admit a 
 datum which cannot be explained." ' 
 
 But some means we must have of distinguishing these 
 necessary data from such as are not necessary. A criterion 
 of truth must be fixed upon. We know nothing but what 
 is in our consciousness ; there, and there alone, is the char- 
 acteristic to be sought which shall be acknowledged as cri- 
 terion. Before undertaking a criticism of our judgments, 
 to decide which are true and which are not — before deter- 
 mining, for example, whether we should admit the exist- 
 ence of an external world — all philosophy must make sure 
 that it has a touchstone of truth, and, to discover it, sub- 
 jective elements only can be used. 
 
 The substance of every proposition is an association 
 of states of consciousness, some representing the subject, 
 others the predicate. In these groups all degrees of cohe- 
 
 ' Herbert Spencer, " Essays : Mill versus Hamilton." 
 
28 OUTLINE AND GROUNDS OF SPENCER'S SYSTEM. 
 
 sion exist. Some are temporarily indissoluble, strong or 
 feeble ; these form the objects given to perception. Some 
 remain indissoluble amid all circumstances. In the former, 
 the associated states of consciousness do not present them- 
 selves always in the same relations. In the latter, the asso- 
 ciated states persist in their relations. In the former, thought 
 can more or less easily separate the subject from the predi- 
 cate ; in the latter, the separation cannot be actually ef- 
 fected. The movement cannot be thought of without a 
 simultaneous thought of something that moves itself. Let 
 one try to separate the two groups of conscious states ; it 
 cannot be done. " The incapacity to conceive the negative 
 of the proposition concurs with the incapacity to separate 
 the states of consciousness which constitute the affirmation. 
 The propositions that resist the effort we make to effect this 
 separation are those we call necessary. Whatever meaning 
 we attach besides to this word, it means essentially the in- 
 dissolubility of a group of states of consciousness. That 
 we bend before, we cannot do otherwise ; whether we will 
 or no, this indissolubility rules thought ; it is a universal 
 law of consciousness, the force whereof is such that no 
 other law is conceivable." ' Does one seek to explain the 
 indissolubility, it cannot be done. Invent any hypothesis 
 for it you please, it will always declare an association of 
 states of consciousness. To judge it, is to test the cohesion 
 of the states of consciousness, that is, to present them be- 
 fore the criterion of indissolubility. After this test, we 
 may consent to accept it, but it will possess no more solid- 
 ity than the criterion itself, consequently it will not explain 
 it. " From this final verdict there is no appeal. The only 
 thing left to do, is to reconcile the different verdicts of 
 consciousness, and to put them in harmony with the final 
 verdict." » 
 
 The character of the truth being found, the point is to 
 ' Herbert Spencer, " Essays : Mill versv^ Hamilton." ' Ibid. 
 
TWOFOLD ORDER OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 20 
 
 discover a truth that serves as a basis for philosophy ; not 
 a, truth of the logical order, but a truth in the order of ex- 
 istence. The reasonings by which people pretend to estab- 
 lish this are usually vitiated by a begging of the question. 
 Mr. Spencer gathers about him all kinds of precautions to 
 avoid this ; he will not leave consciousness, and it is there 
 that he claims to find, without bringing it with him first, 
 the attestation of that real existence which will support his 
 , philosophy. 
 
 Without leaving consciousness, a primary examination, 
 discloses there two classes of states which, in almost all 
 cases, are equally distinguished by marked signs. Every 
 state of consciousness belongs to one of these two classes ; 
 to the class of internal states, ordinarily called the subject, 
 or to the class of external states, ordinarily called the object. 
 We shall show that the states composing both these classes 
 are united by particular bonds ; they correspond with each 
 other, so that the external states, those that are called per- 
 ceptions, appear to excite certain internal states of the sub- 
 jective class. Moreover, the subjective states have the 
 power to excite one another, to form series by a spontane- 
 ously-developed connection which unrolls itself, provided it 
 is not broken by the intervention of a state belonging to 
 the other class, and gives rise to a new one. We are there- 
 fore able to observe and note the conditions under which 
 the subjective states appear. We ascertain, too, that ob- 
 jective states appear to be excited by other objective states, 
 and ranged in series, so that we can also observe and note 
 the conditions of their appearance. Still, there are cases 
 in which these conditions elude us. Some state such as we 
 had seen preceded, appears without any assignable ante- 
 cedent of the same class ; neither has it one in the internal 
 class; it rises spontaneously; and the mind, broken into 
 the habit of affirming an antecedent within the series, find- 
 ing none, affirms one out of the series. It supposes an un- 
 
30 OUTLINE AND GEOUNDS OF SPENCER'S SYSTEM. 
 
 traceable antecedent, as a mode of something that is not 
 revealed in consoiousness. It posits this outside thing as 
 an unknown force, capable of intervening at any moment 
 in the series of objective states, and whose modes are joined 
 to these states by a cohesion which invariable repetition 
 lias rendered indissoluble. What this thing is we cannot 
 say ; we cannot but affirm its reality. That is real which 
 persists ; and this thing absolutely persists, not under this 
 or that form in consciousness, but outside of consciousness, 
 without determinate form, as pure power. 
 
 On this necessary truth it is possible to construct an 
 explanation of knowledge. For this, two hypotheses suf- 
 fice. In supposing that the states of consciousness which 
 form the objective class are manifestations of this unknown 
 power, that the relations more or less close which unite our 
 states of consciousness are engendered by the experience 
 of relations more or less constant in the states of this un- 
 known existence, we comprehend a large part of the facts 
 of consciousness. Another hypothesis helps us to compre- 
 hend the rest. If we suppose that ideas are formed on the 
 model furnished by things, by a constant repetition of the 
 same associations during an incalculable number of genera- 
 tions, and that ideas moulded by experience " are trans- 
 mitted by inheritance under the form of modifications in 
 organic structure," no fact of consciousness eludes longer 
 the explanation of the experimental doctrine. The forms 
 and laws of thought, which have been set up as rules, exist- 
 ing prior to all communication between the me and the not- 
 me, are, according to Mr. Herbert Spencer, but " absolute 
 interior uniformities engendered by a repetition of absolute 
 exterior uniformities," the result of the action which an 
 external world previously posited, exercises on the con- 
 sciousness, the most comprehensive forms of an experience, 
 vague, prolonged for an immense period, during which cor- 
 respondences between groups of states of consciousness and 
 
ANALYSIS OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 31 
 
 groups of external states become organized and gradually 
 fixed, so that they serve as rules for individual experience, 
 the relations invariably presented and represented of states 
 of the world. These universal relations, although empirical 
 in their origin, are of two classes. The first, primitive, in- 
 asmuch as they are given as such in consciousness, are re- 
 lations of succession ; they connect the terms presented in 
 a constant order. The others, secondary, inasmuch as they 
 are primarily given, like the first, in an order of succession, 
 but are distinguished from them by an essential character, 
 the terms they unite presenting themselves indifferently, 
 one before the other ; these are the relations of coexist- 
 ence. 
 
 Considered apart from the states of consciousness, these 
 relations constitute the conceptions of succession and co- 
 existence, time and space, abstracts of the two modes of 
 union in the concrete states of consciousness. 
 
 A criterion of truth, and, by means of this criterion, the 
 assurance of a permanent reality which reveals itself to 
 consciousness through two orders of impression, the me 
 and the not-me, of an unknowable cause, of which we can 
 only say that, beingj so to speak, persistent throughout all 
 the modes of consciousness, it is more real than any of 
 them ; then, of universal forms of cohesion in these states 
 of consciousness, expressions of absolute cohesions be- 
 tween the states' of the unknowable — ^this is what the an- 
 alysis of consciousness gives us. To aflSrm the supreme 
 reality of an unknowable object of thought of which the 
 phenomenal world is but the manifestation in ourselves, is 
 a return to realism. Mr. Herbert Spencer avows it, and 
 considers this return as a logical consequence of the inev 
 itable suicide of skeptical criticism. " Our knowledge of 
 noumenal existence has a certainty which our Ijnowledge 
 of phenomenal existences cannot approach ; in other words, 
 in view of logic as well as of common-sense, realism is the 
 
32 OUTLINE AND GROUNDS OF SPENCER'S SYSTEM. 
 
 only rational thesis ; all the others are doomed to fall." ' 
 It is claiming to know a great deal to affirm that changes 
 occurring in phenomenal existence correspond to parallel 
 changes that occm- in noumenal existence. Still if, follow- 
 ing Mr. Spencer, we keep clear of idealism, as philosophers 
 of the school of Berkeley understood it, we may yet main- 
 tain the principle of the relativity of knowledge, since 
 we profess at the same time to know nothing positive in 
 regard to the nature of the changes that occur in the nou- 
 menon, and recognize the essential inability of the mind 
 to penetrate the mystery of "the unconditioned exist- 
 ence," which remains in our consciousness as a body to 
 which, when we would represent it, we can simply ascribe 
 forms which are our own, without ever being able to de- 
 termine those that really belong to it. 
 
 Neither is any pretence made of knowing in themselves 
 the objects of those notions which, long deemed irreducible 
 to experience, have been considered as supernatural reve- 
 lations of consciousness : space, time, matter, motion, force, 
 personality. Clearly we know these but as forms which 
 the indeterminate substance assumes in consciousness. Re- 
 duce them, as Mr. Herbert Spencer does matter and move- 
 ment, to manifestations of force, time and space to modes 
 of cohesion in the manifestations of force, and every thing 
 will be explained except force. Force remains a primary 
 datum, the nature and modes of action and'variation where- 
 of continue imknown and impenetrable. "We posit it, as 
 the ground for the changes in consciousness, as a persistent 
 cause of fugitive effects, which makes itself manifest in the 
 very fact of the change, and can be seized only in this fact, 
 that is to say, in its relation to us. Finally, consciousness 
 itself, in which we find all these revelations, remains unex- 
 plained. We can conceive neither beginning nor end of 
 the lines of states that compose it. We cannot conceive 
 ' Herbert Spencer, " Principles of Psychology." 
 
PHILOSOPHY THE SCIENCE OF THE RELATIVE. 33 
 
 the succession of these states without interposing, as a 
 "necessary correlative, the action of the absolute realitj' 
 which transcends consciousness, namely, the inexplicable. 
 It can no more be conceived as a being whom another being 
 may affect ; in other words, the personality which seems to 
 be attested by consciousness cannot be explained, since 
 every fact of consciousness is double, and offers to us the 
 antithesis of subject and object, and consequently the in- 
 tuition of self by self would suppose an act of consciousness 
 in which the object should be at the same time subject ; 
 that is to say, an act of consciousness that should not be an 
 act of consciousness. 
 
 The first principles of the subjective order, as well as 
 those of tl*e objective order, are therefore at bottom equally 
 inexplicable. The mind; always thrown back on itself by 
 the impossibility of oveg)assing the limits that enclose it, 
 is condemned to fathom its own nescience, and the only 
 truth it can discern in this abyss of ignorance is the in- 
 tuition of its own feebleuess.^/T'hilosophy, if philosophy 
 be possible, has then another object. Its true aim is not 
 the science of the absolute, but the science of the relative. 
 It must state, as the sum of knowledge, a doctrine which 
 is to this sum what the general doctrine of each science, 
 which is called its philosophy, is to that science ; in other 
 words, it must give to knowledge a unity that compre- 
 hends and consolidates all the fundamental truths of the 
 different sciences, such a unity as transcendental specula- 
 tions have sought in vain — ^in a word, it must institute a 
 general science in the largest acceptation of the term^/ 
 
 The principles which the sciences recognize and do not 
 explain, but by means whereof they explain all the phe- 
 nomena of their province, are, from this fact, laws superior 
 to the different laws that each particular science proposes 
 to discover and unfold. These superior principles are ob- 
 tained by analysis, and they serve to coordinate, to bring 
 
34 OUTLINE AND GEOUNDS OF SPENCEK'S SYSTEM. 
 
 back to unity a complete order of facts. They are philo- 
 sophic principles. If tliey are true of all the sciences of 
 facts, they may be termed universal. If it can be estab- 
 lished that they are consequences of the first incontestable 
 principle, the persistence of force, they are necessary prin- 
 ciples. To discover by analysis the fundamental principles 
 of the sciences, so that they may be connected again by 
 deductive process with the undeniable verity which con- 
 sciousness reveals, is, in the view of Mr. Herbert Spencer, 
 to found philosophy. When it shall be shown that in the 
 world of phenomena nothing is lost, and when, sustained 
 by recent discoveries of the equivalence of forces, it shall 
 be made evident that the infinite variety of phenomena is 
 but a metamorphosis of forces, from the immenge revolu- 
 tions of the celestial orbs to the infinitesimal movements 
 of microscopic animalcula, from the formation of clouds to 
 the birth of an individual sentiment or of a current of opin- 
 ion, from the violent convulsions of the globe to a variation 
 in the public funds ; when it shall be proved that all move- 
 ments, to whatever order belonging, obey in their formation 
 the same laws of equivalence, system, and direction ; when, 
 after this, it shall be shown that this metamorphosis and 
 these laws are corollaries of one and the same principle, 
 the persistency of force, philosophy will have established . 
 its unity. 
 
 But the mission of philosophy, according to Mr. Herbert 
 Spencer, ought not to be limited to this. In summing up, 
 in a final formula, the analytical principles upon which the 
 sciences repose, it gives us but a portion of what we may 
 expect from it. We shall have, indeed, a system of philo- 
 sophical truths, so far as thej* transcend the range of each 
 science, but we shall not have the principle that binds to- 
 gether the phenomena of the universe. We can know, 
 only phenomena, at least one supreme science must em- 
 brace them all, the possible as well as the actual, in a 
 
PHILOSOPHY A HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSE. 35 
 
 comprehensive formula. The history of an object must 
 takq it up at its origin ; that is to say, at the moment Vvhen 
 it begins to fall within the apprehension of consciousness 
 ■with the characteristics that individualize it, and trace it to 
 its end at the moment when it ceases to be perceptible. 
 Philosophy should be the theory of aU these histories. It 
 should show us each state of a thing firmly set between the 
 state that preceded and the state that will follow it, and 
 adjusted, to all the changing things that environ it. It 
 must fix in an abstract formula this immense variety of de- 
 tails. Then it will be a history of the universe in its whole 
 and in its parts, a theory of the progress of things, from 
 which no particle of knowledge is omitted. Besides the 
 systematizing of the axioms of the sciences, philosophy 
 should be a theory of the modification of things. Such is, 
 in its full extent, the object of the " First Principles," 
 
CHAPTER IV. 
 
 THE DOCTKINB OF PBOGKESS. 
 
 Or all the beliefs that the philosophers of the last cen- 
 tury have bequeathed to our age, as if to replace those 
 which they had felt themselves compelled to discard, none 
 has struck such deep root as the belief in the progress of 
 humanitj". It grows every day, and deserves to be con- 
 sidered one of the chief characteristics of thought in the 
 nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the notion of fatality 
 that ordinarily accompanies it shocks many good men. If 
 by progress be understood an absolute direct line toward 
 perfection, the word is unsuited to describe the unbroken 
 march of humanity, in which so many- natural laws, all 
 equally inflexible, cross and recross each other to produce 
 effects which cannot be foreseen with any thing like ex- 
 actness, and still less submitted to calculation. The au- 
 thors who have adhered to the idea of progress toward 
 perfection, stumble at the difficulty of reconciling with a 
 fatal law of evolution toward good the manifest retrogra- 
 dations toward evil. Criticism has made them pay dear 
 for their attachment to a theory which is feeble simply be- 
 cause it is not sufficiently general, and because it assumes 
 final happiness merely as a conjecture obtained by induc- 
 tion, if it be not the result of some disposition to mysticism. 
 They have compromised their doctrine, and would have 
 brought it into complete discredit, perhaps, if it had been 
 
possible to lose sight of the numberless testimonies that 
 science brings in its favor. The thing wanting in the dif- 
 ferent theories of progress is not aij abundance of facts 
 authorizing the induction of a purpose, but a fixed principle, 
 to be, as it were, a guarantee of it — a law from which this 
 conjectured purpose might be deduced. If this principle 
 were seized, the necessity of progress would be demon- 
 strated, and criticism would be reduced to silence. The 
 problem to be solved would merely consist in adjusting to 
 this certitude our belief in responsibility and oiir idea of 
 duty. Humanity will attain the happiness promised to it 
 bj' the defenders of the idea of progress, if happiness be 
 the natural effect of a conditioned development; that is to 
 say, if there be a law whose working out succeeds in effect- 
 ing the full satisfaction of all the needs of every creature 
 endowed with sensibility. 
 
 The opponents of the idea of progress would be right 
 if they confined themselves to a denial of its continuity; 
 that is to say, if they denied that the series of states 
 through which our race passes presents such an arrange- 
 ment that each subsequent stage is better than its antece- 
 dent — an arrange.-aent uninterrupted, unchecked, without 
 reaction. In this setfse nothing in Nature is continuous ; 
 one of the most fixed of the laws of Nature is the law of 
 rhythm. Continuity could exist only in case a single force 
 prevailed; but then no mark of variety would exist, and 
 consequently no progress. With good rfeason, attention is 
 called to facts of retrogression in the history of humanity; 
 melancholy retrogressions that cover periods of many gen- 
 eratioiis, and are, in regard to the intellectual and moral 
 experiences of the race, what disease is to living beings. 
 But these facts are the products of negative factors that 
 preponderate in the composite movement, whereof progress 
 is simply the result ; on this account they are necessary. 
 Should these factors come to prevail for a long time, and in 
 
38 THE DOCTBINE OF PROGRESS. - 
 
 a constant manner, there could be no more question of prog- 
 ress; the march of humanity would take a backward course, 
 and, instead of tending toward perfection, would recede 
 toward barbarism and bestiality. 
 
 Since the reactions and pauses in the march of human- 
 ity are necessary effects, it cannot be said that progress is 
 fatally continuous, that it will go on, whatever happens, for 
 it depends essentially on the persistence of the dynamic fac- 
 tors which favor it. If it is necessary, it is in the sense in 
 which all the results of the natural laws are necessary ; and 
 in this sense the checks, the reactions it experiences, are 
 necessary also.- Whether there be forward or backward mo- 
 tion, there is always development of a series ; the end, the 
 direction is changed, but there is always an end, and a direc- 
 tion. A law that expresses progress only, can be merely a 
 law of movement in one direction, a part only of the law 
 of human advance. The true law, the complete law, must 
 be a law of retrogression as well as a law of progress ; it 
 must express, simultaneously with the general tendency to 
 advance, the partial retrogressions which retard progress 
 without destroying it ; and the partial advancement which 
 cannot arrest the systematic retrogression of a thing that 
 is dissolving. It must present a double current of changes, 
 in opposite directions, so mingled together that one class 
 of changes predominates over the other according to the 
 law of universal rhythm. 
 
 With the great majority of contemporaneous thinkers, 
 Mr. Herbert Spencer believes in necessary progress. Twenty 
 years ago he expressed ibhis belief in a remarkable work — 
 " Social Statics " — devoted to an examination of the con- 
 ditions under which humanity can and must find happiness, 
 and to the search after a natural law that secures the real- 
 ization of these conditions. In various writings published 
 at other dates, and collected under the title of "Essays: 
 Scientific, Political, and Speculative," Mr. Spencer has 
 
PROGRESS BUT A PART OP EVOLUTION. 89 
 
 often, d propos of very different subjects, taken up the idea 
 of evolution, which ia properly the ruling idea of his phi- 
 losophy, the inspiration of his whole work. "With a candor 
 rare in a theorist, Mr. Spencer relates to us the history of 
 his thought, the mental process by which he has brought 
 his primitive ideas to completion, and given to his theory 
 an amplitude and scientific rigor that none of those pro- 
 duced since the end of the last century can claim. In his 
 view, humanity, mighty as it is, is but a feeble part of a 
 system of being much more vast ; it reveals the laws that 
 govern this system ; it shares in its destiny. The prog- 
 ress of humanity is one part of the development of a 
 mass of beings that embrace more than humanity. The 
 appointed end of this progress, happiness, is only a special 
 feature of the more general end appointed to the develop- 
 ment of this more comprehensive whole ; and this whole is 
 itself but a part of a yet vaster whole whose laws it mani- 
 fests. "We shall see how Mr. Herbert Spencer, now. by 
 generalizing his law of development, now by defining it, 
 now again by introducing into it necessary correlatives 
 which allow of a greater comprehension of incidents, has 
 succeeded in tracing the compact and clearly-outlined the- 
 ory which he expounds in the "First Principles," and 
 which he demonstrates or proposes to demonstrate more 
 fully in the volumes that will embrace his entire System 
 OP Philosopht. 
 
 Already, as we have said, in the " Social Statics," Mr. 
 Herbert Spencer sought the natural law whereof the prog- 
 ress of humanity is the manifestation. In what, then, does 
 progress consist ? In general, we see that progress in what- 
 ever contributes to the happiness of man tends directly to 
 augment it, or indirectly to favor it. But the happiness of 
 man, abstractly viewed, consists in" the capacity to satisfy 
 all the classes of his needs ; in other words, in liberty — lib- 
 erty regulated and limited by equality, its necessary cor 
 
40 THE DOCTRINE OP PROGRESS. 
 
 relative, since man exists in a social state ; it is, then, in a 
 more general sense, the complete adaptation of man to 
 social life. " Good, perfect, complete, are words that sig- 
 nify something entirely fitted to its destination ; the word 
 moral signifies the same property in regard to man, . . . 
 to have, in one's self, the ability to do what ought to be 
 done, is to be organically moral. . . . Perfection consists 
 in the possession of faculties exactly calculated for the ful- 
 filment of these conditions ; and the moral law formulates 
 the line of conduct which will fulfil them." ' In a page 
 that recalls the optimism of the proscribed Condorcet, Mr. 
 Spencer affirms his belief in the realization of perfection in 
 humanity. " Progress," he says, " is not an accident, but 
 a necessity. Far from being the product of art, civiliza- 
 tion is a phase of Nature, like the development of an em- 
 bryo, or the opening of a flower. The modifications that 
 humanity has undergone, and those it st;ill undergoes, result 
 from the fundamental law. of organic Nature, and, provided 
 the human race does not perish, and the constitution of 
 things remains the same, these modifications must end in 
 completeness. ... It is certain that what we call evil and 
 immorality will disappear ; it is certain that man wiU be- 
 come perfect." " Mr. Spencer's confidence is in the fact 
 that there is a law of life which is good, not for the human 
 race alone, but for all organic Nature, and that the morality 
 which must insure happiness is but a particular instance of 
 this law. Everywhere life affords to us proof that progress 
 is made when parts at first similar and independent become 
 dissimilar and dependent. When the organism, tends to 
 pass from the state of an assemblage of discrete unities to 
 the integral state of a system of coSrdinated unities, it tends 
 to become a distinct thing, to individualize itself, after 
 Coleridge's definition of life. From those inferior creafc 
 
 ' Herbert Spencer, " Social Statics," p. 27'7. 
 t ' "Social Statics," p. 80 (English edition, p. 65). 
 
THE TENDENCY TO INDIVIDUATION. 41 
 
 ures a species of living jelly, in which no organs, nor even 
 form can be discovered, which feed on the water that soaks 
 them, and which lack unity to the degree that you may 
 cut them, and yet each part will continue to live as the 
 whole mass did at first, to the vertebrates, in which a com- 
 plicated apparatus, fitted for distinct functions imder the 
 impelling force of a nervous system, coordinates actions 
 with a harmony which furnishes us the highest type of 
 unity, and no part of which can be injured without' com- 
 municating to the whole a hurt that may be destructive, 
 there is an immense ladder, every round of which is a de- 
 gree of individuation. "The lower the organism the more 
 completely is it at the mercy of circumstances ; it is always 
 exposed to destruction by the action of elements, want 
 of nourishment, or assaults of enemies, and almost always 
 it perishes. The reason is, its lack of power to preserve its 
 individuality. It loses it either by going back to the in- 
 organic form, or by absorption in another individuality. 
 With the superior animals, on the other hand, which pos- 
 sess force, sagacity, agility, there exists, besides, a power 
 to preserve life, to prevent the easy dissolution of the indi- 
 viduality. In these last the individuation is most complete. 
 The highest illustration of this tendency we see in man. 
 Thanks to the complexity of his structure, his being is the 
 farthest removed from the inorganic world, in which indi- 
 viduality is at the lowest point. His intelligence, and his 
 aptitude in adjusting himself to circumstances, allow him 
 to preserve life to old age, to complete the term of his ex- 
 istence ; in other words, to fill up the measure of the indi- 
 viduality that is bestowed on him. He has consciousness 
 of himself; he recognizes his proper individuality. More- 
 over, the process of change we may observe in human af- 
 fairs is efifeoted in the way of a greater development of 
 individuality — ^we may call it a tendency, to individuation. 
 / " Finally, what we call the moral law, the law of liberty 
 
42 THE DOCTRINE OF PROSRESS. 
 
 in equality, is the law under whicli individuation becomes 
 perfect. The faculty that is even now developing, and is 
 to become the distinctive characteristic of humanity, will 
 be skill in recognizing this law and obeying it. The in- 
 creasingly intense affirmation of individual rights signifies 
 a constantly strengthening purpose to secure respect for 
 the eternal conditions that are indispensable to the de- 
 velopment of individuality. Not only have we now the 
 conception of individuality, and comprehend the means of 
 defending it, but we feel that we can claim a sphere of ac- 
 tion necessary to the full development of individuality, and 
 we wish to obtain it. "Vi^hen the changes that are going 
 on beneath our eyes shall be completed, when each man 
 shall in his heart unite to an active love of liberty, active 
 ' feelings of sympathy with his kind, then the existing limits^ 
 of individuality, the legal obstructions or private violations, 
 will be effaced ; nobody will be hindered any more in his 
 development, for, while maintaining his own rights, each 
 will respect the rights of others. The law wUl impose no 
 more restrictions or burdens ; they will be at once useless 
 and impossible. Then, for the first time in the history of 
 the world, there will be beings whose individuality will be 
 able to reach out in all directions. Moralily, perfect -indi-. 
 viduation, and perfect life, will be realized at once in in- 
 dividualized man." y' 
 
 Society becomes, itself, an individual. With the indi- 
 viduation of the parts goes forward also the reciprocal 
 dependence of the parts. In a superior organism, a true 
 republic of monads, each unit, devoted to special functions 
 which it separately fulfils, is joined to similar units in a 
 common work, by which also the others profit, just as, on ' 
 its part, it profits by the labor of all the others, and becomes 
 ultimately wholly dependent. It is the same in society ; 
 the social units, set apart more and more to special func- 
 
 > "Social Statics," p. 497. 
 
THE TENDENCY TO UNITY. 43 
 
 tions, group themselves with similar units to form distinct 
 classes, which fulfil special functions for the benefit of so- 
 cietj' and of each social unit, and become ultimately alto- 
 gether dependent. In p. civilized society, as in a superior 
 organism, the harmonious unity formed by the subordina- 
 tion of parts is the first condition of existence ; no part can 
 be wounded or destroyed without causing injury to all the 
 rest. Civilization, which is constantly more and more 
 knitting the bonds of this harmony, is but a process of 
 individuation. 
 
 " The union of a great number of men to form a state ; 
 the mutual dependence which is always thus bringing the 
 once independent units nearer together ; the gradual sepa- 
 ration of citizens into distinct groups, engaged in the dis- 
 charge of distinct functions ; the formation of a living being 
 composed of numerous essential parts, all of which feel the 
 injury that has been done to one — all these features enter 
 into the law of individuation. Like the development of 
 man, and of life, the development of society may be defined 
 as a tendency to become one thing. Rightly comprehended, 
 the different forms of the progress that works itself out 
 around us, all express this tendency."' ' 
 
 The history of science shows it to us in a state of prog- 
 ress. Its different sections have incessant intercommunica- 
 tions ; they are united by continued exchange of services. 
 Mr. Spencer makes us recognize in it the same character- 
 istics of development. Science, like man and society, is 
 an organism whose parts, united by a general consensus, 
 serve the development of the whole, as well as that of the 
 other parts. " The observation of a star demands the con- 
 currence of many sciences ; if has need of being digested 
 by the entire organism of science. Each science 'must as? 
 similate to itself the portion that comes within the sphere 
 of its observation, before the essential fact it reveals ao- 
 
 > "Social Statics," p. 481. 
 
44 THE DOCTRINE OF PEOGEESS. 
 
 quires the value that will place it among the contributions 
 to astronomy." ' " A discovery in one science causes in- 
 stantly a corresponding progress in many others ; a gap in 
 one science arrests the development of those that must 
 wait till the gap is filled up. In order to make a good ob- 
 servation in pure natural science, the organized concurrence 
 of a half-dozen societies is necessary." " 
 
 The' example drawn from science proves to us that the 
 principal feature of the progress in organic and in social 
 life recurs as a characteristic of progress in its intellectual 
 manifestations. Tendency to become one thing, to persist, 
 to become organized in a complete system of parts, accord- 
 ing to the laws of the physiological division of labor and 
 of organic harmony, by the gradual substitution of parts 
 specially united by the attraction of one law, for parts 
 loosely joined by juxtaposition — this is movement in the 
 path of progress. This definition well expresses the essen- 
 tial characteristic of progress ; but, in choosing the word 
 individuation to convey it, our author was not happy. 
 His mind, reaching out after vast syntheses, very soon 
 found the idea answering to this word too narrow for his 
 purposes. Besides, the notion of an individual, and the 
 notion of individuation derived from it, suggest, say what 
 we will, the notion of a being who may be and should be 
 considered in himself, and consequently the notion of a 
 suitable end that explains him. At one stroke, undesign- 
 edly by the author, and as by psychological necessity, all 
 the metaphysical and religious speculations he had expelled 
 from the domain of general science, found themselves re- 
 established; the scientific explanation stopped short for 
 lack of power to indicate the natural causes which, in the 
 midst of so many beings that seem to have no purpose of 
 their own, produce beings that seem to have one — individ- 
 uals, in a word; the metaphysical explanation took the 
 
 ' " Genesis of Science." ' " Essays : Genesis of Science." 
 
LANGUAGE AN OBSTACLE TO THOUGHT. 45 
 
 place which science did not occupy, and, instead of engag- 
 ing ia a searcK for causes and natural laws, the mind paused 
 to contemplate the fathomless mystery. Manj^eaders must 
 have been struck by the mystical tone of sentiment, and the 
 suggestion of final causes,. which, without being formulated, 
 seem to pervade the " Social Statics," An imperfect vo- 
 cabulary called up in their minds associations of thought 
 which the author did not contemplate. " Language," Mr. 
 Spencer has said, " is an obstacle to thought." ' It is a 
 hinderance which not only throws the reader off the track, 
 but which compels the thinker himself to go out of the 
 way. We understand why om- author, has taken, in the 
 sequel, so many precautions to place himself beyond the 
 reach of these ugly unforeseen turns of philosophic language, 
 and we cannot help' thinking of all those eminent minds 
 that, since Descartes, have promised to make a rigorous 
 examination of their beliefs. Arrived at the end of their 
 reasonings, they thought they were bending before the 
 unquestionable verdict of logic when, unconsciously, habit 
 alone had spoken, and had insidiously recommitted them 
 to the rdle of beliefs the titles of which they had seriously 
 believed themselves to be challenging. They thought they 
 had in every sense ransacked analytical conceptions, while 
 _ the law of association imposed on their synthetical concep- 
 tions the idols of common-sense. Mr. Spencer had to avoid 
 this danger. At this epoch, already, he yielded to a " de- 
 sire which he did not clearly recognize, but which worked 
 secretly within him." He Avished to find " an interpreta- 
 tion purely physical of phenomena." He sought for some 
 time to connect the fact of individuation with some natural 
 law, and, soon after, succeeded in giving " to one of his 
 corollaries a scientific explanation." " 
 
 ' " Essays : PhUosophy of Style." 
 
 ' " Theory of Population derived from the General Law of Animal Fe- 
 oandity." — Westminster lieviein, April, 1852. 
 
46 THE DOCTRINE OF PEOGEESS. 
 
 "We have seen that with the individuation which forms 
 a whole, composed of harmoniously allied parts, another 
 operation takes place, which distinguishes these parts, and 
 gives a definite character to their respective functions ; this 
 is the specialization of the parts. The two tendencies be- 
 come continually more pronounced as progress goes on ; 
 variety increases with the unity it accomplishes. But it is 
 sometimes the unity that most forcibly attracts attention, 
 and sometimes the variety. These two concomitant facts, 
 which do not explain one another, have not, even in rela- 
 tion to progress, an equal significance. The individuation, 
 which constitutes unity, is the principal characteristic ; the 
 specialization of parts, which constitutes variety, is the sec- 
 ondary characteristic. Nevertheless, the difficulty of as- 
 cending directly from the individuation to the physical law 
 which expresses its cause, by degrees turned Mr. Spencer 
 away from the consideration of the essential characteristic 
 of progress, to direct his attention more specially, and, for 
 a time, exclusively, to the secondary characteristic. In 
 studying a question which lay too close to his most inti- 
 mate thoughts not to exert a preponderating attraction on 
 his mind, the natural evolution of species, and in looking 
 for the geological proofs that support it, Mr. Spencer rec- 
 ognized the fact that " not only the individuals of the 
 vegetable kingdom and of the animal kingdom progress 
 in eccentricity in the course of their evolution, but that, 
 during the geologic epochs, the flora and faiina follow the 
 same order." 
 
 This was a fact that the doctrine of individuation could 
 not express, but which found its general formula in a 
 law already discovered and determined by German think- 
 ers famous in difierent fields — Wolff, Goethe, and Baer. 
 According to the last, " the series of changes effected while 
 a seed transforms itself into a tree, an egg into an animal, 
 is a passage from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous state 
 
TENDENCY TO SPECIALIZATION. 47 
 
 of structure." ' Starting from this point, in possession of a 
 formula that expressed one of the most salient features in 
 the progress of life, Mr. Spencer dropped, little by little, 
 the principle of individuation, and came back to it only 
 when, by new speculations, he could assign to it the pre- 
 eminent place in his work that belongs to it, by giving it 
 an entirely different form, " no longer a metaphysical one, 
 unfit to receive a natural explanation, but a form purely 
 physical, susceptible of a complete explanation." This is 
 the reason that, while during the years subsequent to the 
 publication of "the " Social Statics," we still find in Mr. 
 Spencer's writings the principle of unity under the name 
 of individuation, mutual dependence, consensus; we find 
 there, more and more emphasized, the part which speciali- 
 zation and the increasing heterogeneity of the mass play in 
 the work of progress. 
 
 Already, in an essay entitled " The Philosophy of 
 Style," ' Mr. Spencer presented increase in variety as one 
 of the essential characteristics of progress. According to 
 him, the literary masterpiece of a perfect writer ought to 
 be, "like all the products of Nature and of man, not a 
 series of similar parts simply arranged in line, but a whole, 
 composed of parts mutually dependent." In the " Genesis 
 of Science," also, our author devoted much space to the 
 fact of the specialization of parts. He showed, as in a fine 
 historical study, science receiving birth in vulgar knowl- 
 edge, and progressing by the multiplication of its branches 
 and the specialty of its different objecfts. 
 
 But it is especially in an essay, entitled " Manners and 
 Fashion," published in 1854, that the idea of the special- 
 ization of functions comes clearly out and presents itself in 
 a more • vivid light than the idea of unity. In this paper 
 Mr. Spencer studies a class of manifestations in social life 
 
 ' Herbert Spencer, " Essays : Progress, its Law and Cause." 
 ' Herbert Spencer's " Essays." 
 
48 THE DOCTRINE OF PROGBESS. 
 
 whose development from their common origin up to a pe- 
 riod when, by the extreme division they undergo, they tend 
 to become effaced, constitutes one of the striking features 
 of the progress of humanity. He treats of the institutions, 
 great and small, which regulate the conduct of men in so- 
 ciety — government, the administration of justice, religion, 
 customs, rules of etiquette, fashions. At an epoch in which 
 ancient documents, myths, poems, monumental ruins, fur- 
 nish us with testimonials that we have only to interpret, 
 and the usages of which, long abolished in our commu- 
 nities, are preserved under analogous forms among the 
 barbarous tribes of Africa, the will of the victorious chief, 
 of the strongest, was the rule of all conduct. When he 
 passed judgment on private quarrels his decisions were the 
 origin of law. The mingled respect and terror inspired by 
 his person, and his peerless qualities, then deemed super- 
 natural by the rude minds that had scarcely an idea of the 
 powers and limits of human nature, were the origin of re- 
 ligion, and his opinions were the first dogmas. The signs 
 of obedience, by which the vanquished whom he spared re- 
 paid his mercy, were the first examples of those marks of 
 respect that are now called good manners and forms of 
 courtesy. The care he took of his person, his vestments, 
 his arras, became models for compulsory imitation; such 
 was the origin of fashion. From this fourfold source are 
 derived all the institutions which have so long flourished 
 among civilized races, and which prevail yet, in spite of 
 their evident decadence and the protests of non-conformists, 
 who, without putting in peril the essential idea that lies at 
 the bottom of them — on the oontrarj', purifying them more 
 and more — menace the long-venerated forms with complete 
 ruin. Everywhere power, originally held in a concentrated 
 form in the hands of the strong man, the king-god, has be- 
 come subdivided in the course of development — ^govern- 
 ment into civil, military, diplomatic functions, etc. , the 
 
SOCIAL HETEROGENEITY. 49 
 
 administration of justice into numerous tribunals, more and 
 more special, to which are attached distinct bodies of mag- 
 istrates, advocates, etc. ; the Church into one institution, 
 where, above the multitude of the faithful, rises a hierarchy 
 of clergy whose functions are more and more distinct and 
 numerous ; customs into diverse observances, which polite- 
 ness imposes toward individuals according to the rank 
 they hold in society ; finally, fashion, at first an imitation 
 of the dress and gestures of the king-god, is subdivided, 
 by the imitation of many other things, so as to become, 
 through the effect of sumptuary regulations imposed by 
 law or opinion, or tacitly accepted, the external character- 
 istic of different classes of society, of administrative, mili- 
 tary, judicial, or religious functions. Everywhere, multi- 
 plication and specialization of functions have marked the 
 development of these institutions. But, in perpetuating 
 themselves, this specialization has profoundly altered their 
 general character. When government tends to be but the 
 federal bond between small independent communities, and 
 the Church to crumble into an incalculable number of sects ; 
 when the marks of class subordination, become simple tokens 
 of respect for the dignity of the human being, are bestowed 
 on all citizens, without regard to rank or function"; finally, 
 when fashions tend to represent merely the aesthetic feeling 
 of each individual, that which strikes us most is not the 
 harmony of the special functions, which nevertheless un- 
 dergo, by reciprocal dependence,'parallel and simultaneous 
 modifications, it is the increasing multiplicity of the sepa- 
 rate parts. 
 
 After having successively tested the fact that the law 
 of Baer was applioable'to organisms considered as individ- 
 uals, to the aggregate of all organisms in the entire course 
 of geologic history, to the masterpieces of literature, to the 
 fundamental institutions of society, as likewise to lan- 
 g-uages, to arts, and to all those products of mental life which 
 3 
 
50 THE DOCTRINE OF PEOGEESS. 
 
 he comprehends under the generic term superorganic, Mr. 
 Spencer found himself placed on an inclination which must 
 naturally bring him to extend this law to the development 
 of the existences that compose the inorganic world. It 
 cannot be doubted that these existences also have an evo- 
 lution. The coordinated changes that constitute the gen- 
 esis of the solar system as a whole, and that of the vast 
 bodies that compose it; the different stages through which 
 the earth has passed, from the epoch at which it was a 
 globe of vapor, until, through periods of incandescence, of 
 hardening at the crust, and of condensation of waters, un- 
 der the combined action of flood and fire it arrived at its 
 present condition — aU these changes attest a gradual devel- 
 opment. In examining all these changes Mr. Spencer ad- 
 mitted the universality of Baer's law; he did more, he 
 proposed to seek the natural cause of it. This search was 
 the origin of the charming essay entitled " Progress : its 
 Law and Cause," which was first to have appeared under 
 thq more significant title, " The Cause of all Progress." ' 
 
 The sidereal world, Mr. Spencer tells us in this essay, 
 if we adopt the nebular hypothesis, has passed from a state 
 almost homogeneous, in which matter was diffused, to its 
 actual state, in obedience to the law of Baer. To a mass, 
 all whose parts were alike in composition, the forces they 
 exerted one on another, the direction of the movement they 
 followed, has succeeded a system of masses distinct and 
 different in volume, in the direction of their movements, the 
 inclination of their axes, the form of the curve they describe 
 in their revolution, etc. In the same way the earth has 
 obeyed this law as it passed from the state of incandescence 
 to the actual state in which a solid and cool crust imprisons 
 a still glowing core, and presents great inequalities of ele- 
 vation, of structure, of exposure to the solar rays, of cli- 
 
 ' " Essays : Progress, its Law and Cause," first published in the West- 
 minster Review, April, 186V. 
 
PROGRESSIVE CHANGE UNIVERSAL. 61 
 
 mates, etc. In the same way, again, living creatures, not 
 only as individuals, but considered in the fauna and flora 
 that have succeeded each other on the surface of the globe ; 
 in the same way, once more, all social manifestations, politi- 
 cal institutions, industries, commerce, sciences, letters, arts. 
 If the mode of development is everywhere the same, we 
 ought, from the uniformity of the law, to infer the uni- 
 formity of the cause. Extensive as this law must be, since 
 it comprehends all the facts of evolution, it is still but a 
 generalization from experience ; it needs to be reduced to 
 a more general law, which renders it rational instead of 
 empirical, and confers on it, as on the progress it formu- 
 lates, the character of necessity. Progress, under what- 
 ever form manifested, is a change ; in a law of change, 
 therefore, is to be sought the rationale of this transforma- 
 tion from homogeneous to heterogeneous. Mr. Spencer 
 finds it in a law demonstrated by experience, and verified 
 in all orders of facts. " In the most stupendous as well 
 as in the most insignificant events" which occur in the 
 sidereal universe, in the solar system, in the history of our 
 planet, in the two animated kingdoms, and in society, we 
 perceive that a single cause produces always more than one 
 efiect. The increasing complexity of things, their passage 
 from a homogeneous to a heterogeneous structure is an 
 inevitable consequence of this. " Should the nebular hy- 
 pothesis ever be established, then it will become manifest 
 that the universe at large, like every organism, was once 
 homogeneous ; that, as a whole, and in every detail, it has 
 unceasingly advanced toward greater heterogeneity, and 
 that its heterogeneousness is still increasing. It will be 
 seen that, as in each event of to-day, so from the beginning, 
 the decomposition of every expended force into several 
 forces had been perpetually producing a higher complica- 
 tion ; that the increase of heterogeneity so brought about 
 is still going on, and must continue to go on ; and, that 
 
52 THE DOCTIIINE OF PKOGHESS. 
 
 thus Progress is not an accident, not a thing within 
 human control, but a beneficent necessity." * 
 
 A little after, Mr. Spencer will indicate another physical 
 cause which, joined to the first, explains the passage from 
 the homogeneous to the heterogeneous ; he will show that 
 the state of homogeneousness is a condition of unstable 
 equilibrium. 
 
 ' " Essays : Progress, its Law and Cause," p. 52, English edition. 
 
CHAPTER V. 
 
 THE LAW 01" EYOLtTTIOH. 
 
 A THEORY of progress thus stated had not the character 
 of mysticism or of finality •which marred the doctrine of 
 individuation : it filled a gap in the scientific mind by sub- 
 stituting for a formula of the metaphysical order a formula 
 more favorable to a natural explanation. At the same 
 time Mr. Spencer felt obliged to give a definition of prog- 
 ress which, leaving out of account our moral or aesthetic 
 sentiments, induced him to abandon the word progress, too 
 much compromised by association with these sentiments, 
 and to adopt the word evolution as more suitable to ex- 
 press the thoroughly scientific nature of his theory. But 
 this formula was very far from being complete and truly 
 scientific. It explained the passage from the homogeneous 
 to the heterogeneous by the law that a single cause pro- 
 duces always manifold efiects relatively to us ; but the fact 
 which this law generalizes remained unexplained, as well 
 as that of the instability of homogeneous existences. Be- 
 sides, is the formula at which we see Mr. Spencer rest really 
 the law of progress ? Does it verify itself in all the changes , 
 to which the name of progress may be given ? and does it 
 verify itself in none of those to which the name may justly 
 be refused ? The law of passage from the homogeneous to 
 the heterogeneous fulfills the first condition, but not the 
 second. As Mr. Spencer himself acknowledges, an injury 
 
54 THE LAW OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 introduces into an organism changes that make it more 
 heterogeneous and more multiform. If this multiplication 
 of effects continues, dissolution ensues. When a revolu- 
 tion breaks out in a state, illegal institutions get estab- 
 lished by the side of legal institutions, and the anarchy 
 that results renders the state more multiform than it had 
 been before : let this anarchy endure and the consequence 
 invariably is the dissolution of the state. These two ex- 
 amples, borrowed from the pathology of organisms and 
 societies, show that changes operated in accordance with 
 the law of passage from the homogeneous to the heteroge- 
 neous, and from the uniform to the multiform, are not facts 
 of progress. Moreover, Mr. Spencer remarks further, a chaos 
 of heterogeneous forms succeeding to a homogeneous mass 
 does not constitute a progress. There is in progress a char- 
 acteristic which the law we have just stated, necessary as 
 it may be, does not embrace ; it is a law of progress, not 
 the law of progress. Another law is required . to limit it, 
 another feature which, added to the first, more distinctly 
 specifies the class of facts we wish to define, a sign by 
 which we may know whether a change from the homoge- 
 neous to the heterogeneous is a link in the chain of prog- 
 ress, or whether it is its terminus, and marks in the history 
 of a thing the line that separates its progressive phase from 
 its dissolution. 
 
 At this point Mr. Spencer had to return to a considera- 
 tion of the principle of unity, which, for a moment and for 
 good reasons, he had neglected. He gradually completed 
 his theory by inserting in his formula the generalizations 
 relating to the formation of observable beings, and to the 
 transformations that constitute their evolution ; and, as his 
 sound habit of mind led him to consider changes of every 
 kind from the physical point of view, and to bring into 
 light their common features, he ended by formulating dif- 
 ferent universal laws upon rhythm and direction of move- 
 
DYNAMIC CONDITIONS OF THE QUESTION. 55 
 
 ment, and all he had "to do was to connect them by inductive 
 process with the first principle, the persistence of force, in 
 order to grasp the truth that all the phenomena of evolu- 
 tion are effects of mechanical laws manifested by the ele- 
 ments that enter into the composition of existences, or, as 
 he phrases it, arrangements on a new plan (redistributions) 
 of matter and movement. Let us rapidly follow the devel- 
 opment of Mr. Spencer's ideas. 
 
 All progress is a kind of change. The law of progress 
 must be a certain law of change. " All change," wrote Mr. 
 Spencer, in the first edition of " First Principles " — " all 
 change in the arrangement of the parts of any mass what- 
 ever, supposes, first, the matter of which the parts con- 
 sists ; next, the movement produced while they arrange 
 themselves on a new plan ; finally, the force that impels 
 them. The problem we have to resolve is a problem of 
 dynamics." For us every change, whatever its apparent 
 complexity, is a modification of matter and a modification 
 of movement. These two aspects of the conception of 
 force are inseparable. Matter is indestructible ; movement 
 is continuous: universal truths these — corollaries of the 
 first principle that consciousness attests — ^the persistence 
 of force. From the various combinations of these two 
 elements result all the phenomena of the cosmos^ Every 
 aggregate of matter has parts, and possesses a certain 
 quantity of sensible movement, as when it occupies suc- 
 cessively different positions, or of insensible movement, 
 as when it affects our senses by its qualities. A change 
 wrought in this aggregate, which is not a simple trans- 
 position of mass, must consist either in an increase or a 
 diminution of the quantity of movement, or in a new ar- 
 rangement of parts, and a different distribution of the 
 quantity of movement. K the quantity of insensible move- 
 ment diminishes, there ensues concentration of the parts, 
 consolidation of the whole mass, integration ; if the insen- 
 
66 THE LAW OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 sible movement increases, there is dispersion of the parti 
 cles, deconsolidatioc of the mass, disintegration. These 
 two types of change — the one of concentration of matter, 
 with dissipation of movement, the other of absorption 
 of movement, with diffusion of matter — comprise all the 
 changes observed in Nature, all the changes in objects, as 
 well as changes in parts of objects. These are the two 
 aspects of the universal metamorphosis always presented, 
 but unequal, so that we always find some tendency to in- 
 tegration or to disintegration, and nowhere repose, equi- 
 Ubrium of the two tendencies. Absolute equilibrium can 
 exist only between dynamic uaits, evenly diffused in an 
 infinite space — a notion that the human intelligence is not 
 made capable of entertaining. The two inverse orders of 
 changes never cease to coexist. They mutually, after an 
 imperfect manner, neutralize each other ; there subsists a 
 differential force, which carries the whole to integration or 
 to disintegration. 
 
 Evolution is integration ; dissolution is disintegration. 
 
 It is only in very simple cases that evolution presents 
 merely a concentration of units around a common centre. 
 More frequently with this general concentration, so to 
 speak, local concentrations of units about various centres 
 are formed, so that evolution is multiplex. The whole is 
 not only more compact, more differentiated from other 
 wholes, it is a compact aggregate of particles themselves 
 concentred, and become differentiated each from the others. 
 On this operation , Mr. Spencer for a time paused. This is ■ 
 what he called^ passage from the homogeneous to the 
 heterogeneous/' In many cases this operation is the most 
 striking — it dompletely masks the operation of concentra- 
 tion of the entire mass, which coordinates all the subordi- 
 nate centres about one common centre, and makes of all 
 the heterogeneous parts an harmonious structure, com- 
 posed of coSperative organs. 
 
THE INTEGRATION OP MOVEMENTS. 51 
 
 What occurs in regard to matter occurs also in regard 
 to movement. In a mass of difiFuse matter, the molecular 
 units are held in the discrete state by a movement peculiar 
 to themselves. As the mass is concentred, the movements 
 of the molecules are integrated, and appear as a movement 
 of the whole mass. Besides this total integration, there 
 are partial and local integrations of the movements of the 
 units into movements of small masses — a complete hierar- 
 chy of coSrdinated movements. The function of the whole 
 combined is an harmonious group of the functions of ele- 
 mentary units. In so far as an assembly of units contains 
 this molecular movement, interior arrangements are pos- 
 sible. In gases, where the molecular movement is exceed- 
 ingly rapid, the relation of the molecules continually 
 changes ; there is no structure. In solids, where it is en- 
 tirely transformed into the movement of masses, or even 
 lost under this form, the molecules cannot change then- 
 position ; the structure is permanent. In bodies of an in- 
 termediate densitj', especially in plastic bodies, the mole- 
 cules have still enough of movement to be able to contract 
 new relations. These bodies are the true field of evolution 
 and of dissolution ; the others have either not commenced 
 evolution or have completed it. The tendency to organ- 
 ization in particles, distinct and cooperative, has not yet 
 disclosed itself, or can do so no longer, owing to the cessa- 
 tion of all action in the relative immobilitj' of the particles. 
 
 To get a clearer apprehension of these abstractions, let 
 us take, once more, the example already presented — so- 
 ciety. The first appearance of wandering families in quest 
 of their meagre subsistence, when no distinct functions ex- 
 ists save that 'of the sexes, illustrates the discrete state of 
 difiuse matter. Later, a certain number of these tribes 
 combine, and already separate functions are established — a 
 rudimentary distinction which divides the social groups 
 into -two classes — the governing and the governed, the 
 
68 THE LAW OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 directing and the laboring. In the first class an integra- 
 tion is e£Fected, the result of which is a hierarchy. The 
 laboring - classes remain in submission to nobles ; these 
 obey feudal lords, who, in turn, have above them the royal 
 power. Mr. Spencer has shown us, in "Manners and 
 Fashion," how, from the royal power, proceeded, by a 
 kind of subdivision, qualities that imply a sovereign nature 
 — functions more and more distinct from government, of 
 church, of judiciary. At the same time, an analogous 
 operation is accomplished in the laboring-class, industry 
 is specialized, by a continually - increasing subdivision. 
 The individuals who are devoted to the same specialty 
 gather in places where their work can be carried on with 
 most facility ; exchanges are effected among the more and 
 more specific commercial agencies ; a strict consensus is 
 established among the producers, the distributors, and the 
 consumers ; it is evolution through the concentration of 
 social units, collected into coordinated groups, accomplish- 
 ing distinct and harmonious functions, which result from 
 the aggregation in convergent and coordinated movements 
 — of movements heretofore independent of the units. 
 
 The thing wanting in the formula, already given by 
 Mr. Spencer in his essay on " Progress," was a declaration 
 that the aggregate, the parts whereof, at first homogene- 
 ous, become heterogeneous, does not lose its unity ; that 
 the differences, constantly becoming sharper, which dis- 
 tinguished these parts, do not therefore dissolve the aggre- 
 gate into more or fewer independent aggregates. In calling 
 evolution a continually-increasing integration of the whole 
 mass, accompanied by an integration, a differentiation, 
 and a mutual, perpetually-increasing dependence of parts 
 as well as of functions, and by a tendency to equilibrium 
 in the functions of the parts integrated, Mr. Spencer com- 
 pleted his formula, and, by substituting for the word indi- 
 viduation the word integration — as he had substituted the 
 
WHAT NECESSITATES EVOLUTION. 59 
 
 word evolution for the word progress — he freed his theory 
 from all metaphysical attachments. 
 
 He has done more than this. It is by the very laws 
 that served to explain to him the increase of variety, that 
 he has explained the increase of imity. In his essay on 
 " Progress " he was content with showing that progress is 
 the necessary result of an empirical law, that a simple force 
 spends itself always in producing many effects. In his 
 essay on " Transcendental Physiology " he had pushed a 
 little further his attempt at explanation, without, however, 
 ceasing to recur to an empirical law, that of the instability 
 of the homogeneous. Now he deprives these laws of their 
 empirical character, by showing that they are consequences 
 of the general principle of the persistence of force. But, 
 as this law is insufficient to explain two of the principal 
 characteristics of progress, the distinction of parts and of 
 functions, and the integration of parts and functions, Mr. 
 Spencer has recourse, in order to explain them, to two laws 
 which are also corollaries of the fundamental principle. 
 He rests the necessity of evolution on three universal laws, 
 and, through them, on the undemonstrable but undeniable 
 principle of the persistence of force. According to the first 
 (the law of the instability of the homogeneous), a homo- 
 geneous body, or, to speak more exa,ctly, a body less hete- 
 rogeneous in composition and structure, for we know noth- 
 ing absolutely homogeneous, becomes more heterogeneous 
 under the action of an incidental force. The law of the 
 multiplication of effects lends to the law of the instability 
 of the homogeneous a vigorous cooperation. A casual 
 force that affects an already heterogeneous composite, af- 
 fects its particles differently ; consequently, by virtue of 
 the principle of reaction, it is differently affected by them ; 
 it ceases to be homogeneous, if it had been so, or becomes 
 more heterogeneous than it was, and acts simply as a bun- 
 dle of dissimilar forces, which, in their turn, exercise actions 
 
60 THE LAW OF EVOLtTTION. 
 
 and undergo reactions more and more dissimilar and numer- 
 ous ; so that the number of effects that may be traced to a 
 single primitive cause goes on increasing in geometrical 
 progression, and the ratio of this progression itself increases 
 according to the degree of heterogeneity of the medium in 
 which the cause operates. Finally, the law of segregation 
 is a necessary consequsnce of the two preceding laws, and, 
 through them, of the principle of the persistence of force. 
 These dissimilar forces, striking a mass, produce in it move- 
 ments in different "ways, which result in the convergence 
 and aggregation of the units that move in the same way, 
 and the separation of units that move in different directions. 
 Supported by the unanimous testimony of the facts of ex- 
 perience, logically deduced from our a priori datum of con- 
 sciousness, and compelled to follow as a result of the me- 
 chanical laws, evolution is for us a necessary fact. 
 
 Will it continue forever ? Does it go on now ? If it 
 has a limit, what is it ? Can a point be assigned beyond 
 which the integration of particles cannot go — at which, all 
 movement of the units being dissipated, no an'angement 
 for evolution is any longer possible ? That evolution has 
 a limit, cannot be doubted. The aggregation of particles 
 does not go on unless they encounter resistance, and, to 
 overcome it, expend a portion of their movement. From 
 concentration to concentration, that is to say, from loss of 
 movement to loss of movement, a degree of concentration 
 must be reached at which the parts have no more move- 
 ment to lose, a state of balanced aggregation, not as re- 
 gards the moving bodies, nor the medium, but as the inte- 
 grating particles. Toward this state the aggregates tend 
 in evolution ; they reach it and persist in it, returning to 
 it when they are displaced from it by a disturbing cause, 
 oscillating veith a slackening rhythm until at length they 
 rest there in repose. Such is the final state appointed to 
 social progress. We advance toward it through terrible 
 
A UMIT TO IIVOLUTION. 61 
 
 fluctuations, through alternations of revolutions and bloody- 
 reactions, wars, and, happily also, through periods of peace, 
 which succeed in slower and slower measure, in which the 
 revolutionary explosions become less violent, and the re- 
 actionary repressions less cruel; we advance toward an 
 epoch of liberty and equality in which the sentiments of 
 men, being adapted to the conditions of human existence, 
 their desires will spontaneously obey the' great economic 
 law of supply and demand which then takes the name of 
 Justice. 
 
 By the side of evolution goes incessantly its inevitable 
 correlative, dissolution. When an aggregate, traversing 
 all the phases of its development, has reached that state 
 of internal equilibrium in which the elementary particles 
 that compose it are no longer susceptible of a new arrange- 
 ment, it is still as much as ever exposed to the action of 
 external forces. In order that it should not be, it would 
 be necessary that it should have disposed of all its force ; 
 in other words, "that it should have attained complete equi- 
 librium. That supposes the neutralization of all possi- 
 bilities by the -realization of all possibiUties, the absolute 
 suppression of movement, universal death ; all which con- 
 ceptions are unthinkable. An exterior force, striking a 
 body in a state of internal equilibrium,- cannot fail to pro- 
 duce in it an arrangement of matter and of motion other 
 than that which existed before, and begin a disintegration 
 the extent whereof depends on the quantity of motion the 
 body absorbs. This event, the prelude of a dissolution, is 
 produced also in aggregates that have not completed their 
 evolution, and with the more facility that the equilibrium 
 of a whole, which has not attained its maximum of hete- 
 rogeneity, is more unstable because it contains still motion 
 of units unintegrated in the functional movement of inte- 
 grated groups. So long as a body is in process of evolution, 
 the proximity of every disposable force is a perpetual peril 
 
62 THE LAW OP EVOLUTION. 
 
 to its progress. In a society in process of evolution, when 
 all its component members are not irrevocably set in the 
 mechanism of a fixed hierarchy, actions from without exert 
 a powerful influence on its structure. The existence, in the 
 neighborhood of such a society, of a centre of unintegrated 
 forces, becomes an obstacle to its progress. Sometimes we 
 have a race arrived at a high degree of civilization ; but, 
 surrounded by yet barbarous nations, it is continually men- 
 aced by a conquest that would make it rapidly retrograde 
 toward the social level of these barbarians, or else it is 
 compelled to keep up military institutions and manners 
 that arrest the development of institutions and sentiments 
 which are more favorable to social progress. Sometimes a 
 society contains in its bosom masses that have no access 
 to the good things of every kind which are the fruit of an 
 advanced social organization, a society wherein no harmony 
 exists between the sentiments of the citizens and the con- 
 stitution of the groups in which they are incorporated for 
 a common end. In these two cases, the societies are in- 
 cessantly beset by the peril of a general dissolution of their 
 institutions, or, at least, they undergo, through unavoid- 
 able and perpetually-renewed struggles, partial dissolutions 
 that retard the general progress. 
 
 When evolution is completed, when the body has ac- 
 quired a fixed structure, equilibrium is more stable, and a 
 greater forc6 is required to dissolve it. The presence of _ 
 such a force in the vicinity of this body inevitably puts its 
 structure in peril. When a society has, through its pro- 
 cess of evolution, attained a stable constitution, in which 
 the sentiments of its members are in harmony with each 
 one's lot, whatever may be the structure of this social 
 body, derangements of its equilibrium are rare and difii- 
 cult. When the social type it presents to us is of an in- 
 ferior order, when the inequality of its members is con- 
 secrated by the most powerful feelings, and especially by 
 
SOCIAL INTEGRATIONS. 63 
 
 the religious sentiment, the evolution has come to the line 
 that closes the path of its advance, but it has not reached 
 the end of its effort after social integration. In such a 
 society the equilibrium •will be maintained for an indefinite 
 time, until some great shock from without — a conquest, for 
 example — temporary or permanent, succeeds, by a salutary 
 catastrophe, in giving to the imperfectly-integrated units 
 proper motion that had been misapplied to the benefit of a 
 bad constitution, and in permitting them at last to recon- 
 struct themselves on a better plan by a radical revolution. 
 Let the question be of the social organism, or of any other 
 aggregate susceptible of evolution, the stability of the 
 temporary equilibrium which mark its stages, or of the 
 more permanent equilibrium which marks its end, cannot 
 be absolute. To break it there are always surplus forces, 
 disengaged by the evolution that has been produced else- 
 where. Force is persistent : this axiom, the basis of phi- 
 losophy, is the guarantee that all force on leaving a body 
 in which matter is aggregated passes elsewhere to effect 
 a dissolution, to be transferred afterward, driven by a new 
 evolution toward another point of the universe, to do there ■ 
 once more its work of disintegration. The partial or total 
 dissolution of an aggregate is an event quite as necessary 
 as its evolution, and depends on the direction of those 
 numberless currents of force which every moment add 
 movement to matter or take it away. Looked at from the 
 highest point, evolution, with its correlative dissolution, 
 represents an immense rhythm of a duration that human 
 imagination cannot grasp. All it can do is to form a sym- 
 bolic representation of the series of waves that carry our 
 world, from a state of extreme diffusion anterior to the for- 
 mation of nebulsB, to the state of equilibrium in the ex- 
 tremest concentration, and then by a gradual disaggrega- 
 tion brings it back to its primitive condition. 
 
 This summary and abstract exposition will serve to 
 
64 THE LAW OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 show us the significance of Mr, Herbert Spencer's syn- 
 thesis. It does not resemble the doctrine which M. Kenan, 
 speaking for the Hegelian thesis, outlined in a brilliant 
 sketch a few years ago,' a theory of steady progress toward 
 the better, to which the name of progress toward the abso- 
 lute fairly belongs. Evolution, with Mr. Spencer, is not a 
 continually accelerating march of all the particles of the 
 universe, which leads them simultaneously, by a path 
 strewed with destruction, but uninterrupted and unpausing, 
 from the material atom to the universal consciousness in 
 which omnipotence and omniscience are realized; in a 
 word, to the full realization of the absolute, of God. The 
 philosophy of Mr. Spencer does not conduct us to specula- 
 tions of this nature. It gives us in an abstract formula the 
 two classes of manifestation of the absolute,' whatever their 
 positions in space and time ; but, at bottom, it gives us 
 only an abstract of what we know of that small number of 
 manifestations which occur in the narrow region of our con- 
 sciousness. We can conclude nothing in regard to such 
 as do not appear to us, except from those that do appear 
 to us. Now these do not present to us a single current 
 bearing men and things toward a predetermined future, 
 but two lines of opposing currents. The force that we 
 know as persistent, but that we do not know in itself, is 
 revealed to us under two antithetic modes, attraction and 
 expansion. In the corner of the universe where we make 
 our effort to conjecture the world's laws, attraction reigns, 
 integration operates, evolution proceeds. We may hope 
 that humanity will realize on earth the conditions of hap- 
 piness, because we have reason to believe that progress 
 will be, for a considerable number of ages, the law of the 
 region whereof we form a part. But we have no reason 
 to believe that, in the whole, the progressive tendency 
 predominates over the retrogressive, and that progress is 
 
 ' Hevue des Deux Mondes, October 15, 1868. 
 
EVOLtJTION AND HUMANITY. 65 
 
 the law of the entire universe. Science may grow by the 
 double process which increases the adjustment of our no- 
 tious to facts, and mates it more firm. The power of man 
 will augment with his knowledge. The life which this 
 power assumes will be better protected and more produc- 
 tive; it will even attain to that point of equilibrium at 
 which knowledge, being the faithful mirror of all the rela- 
 tions that subsist between things and man, will render him 
 the master of his destiny or his planet. But we cannot 
 doubt that if the duration of evolution, to which our prog- 
 ress is due, permits our species to adapt itself perfectly to 
 the conditions imposed on it — which it can comprehend 
 but cannot modify — a time will arrive at last when it wUl 
 not find on the globe the conditions that guarantee the 
 exercise of thought or even of life. Whether humanity, at 
 this epoch, shall or shall not have attained the era of hap- 
 piness and of relatively completed knowledge, such as we 
 have a right to hope for in the generations to come, it will 
 perish, and its work, accomplished or only sketched out, 
 wiU be lost with it — completely lost, unless the existence 
 of the human race and its members persists by the action 
 of some inscrutable law. But such a belief, which finds a 
 place naturally in the philosophy of the illustrious thinker 
 we have just cited, finds none in the system we have been 
 cursorily reviewing ; it has no foundation in it, and cannot 
 figure in it either as deduction or induction. It is a belief 
 that belongs to the province of religion, not to that of 
 philosophy, two things that Mr. Spencer distinguishes and 
 that M. Renan confounds. 
 
CHAPTER VI. 
 
 POSITIVISM. 
 
 Bt discarding from his philosophy every prejudgment 
 that is not scientific, by banishing across the frontiers the 
 problems of substance and cause, which human intelligence 
 is incapable of solving, by basing on experience the whole 
 doctrine of the general science, which unifies the special 
 sciences, and, above all, by coordinating positive knowl- 
 edge, according to a law of evolution, into a series, the 
 gaps whereof are skillfully covered by hypotheses that rea- 
 son may accept and that experience does not contradict ; 
 by all these features, and by the last especially, Mr. Spen- 
 cer presents to us one of the most complete types of the 
 philosophical spirit of the nineteenth century. To authors 
 who maintain this class of doctrines, or at least such of them 
 as are considered fundamental, we have been accustomed 
 for some years in France to give the name " positivists ; " 
 and they have been regarded as disciples of Auguste Comte. 
 The public, from the midst of which this powerful mind 
 had gathered with difficulty a small circle of followers, had 
 allowed him to live, think, and die, without giving to his 
 work the attention it deserved, and without cherishing 
 toward him personally any feelings but those of utter in- 
 difference. 
 
 We shall not forget the profound astonishment with 
 which, a few years after M. Comte's death, we received 
 
THE DOCTRINE OLDER THAN COMTE. 67 
 
 the news — revealed by an economist — that his doctrines 
 seemed likely to replace the old beliefs among some of the 
 working-classes. Afterward, and without very close con- 
 sideration, he received credit for the grand movement of 
 contemporaneous thought which he did not create, and 
 which appeared to pursue another route than that he would 
 have wished it to follow. This term " positivist " is ad- 
 mirable ; it applies well to that general group of thinkers, 
 savants, and even mere amateurs, who base their general 
 ideas on the positive sciences as a whole, and regard as in- 
 soluble the problems that the positive sciences can do noth- 
 ing to explain. Still, it cannot be said that these savants 
 and thinkers belong to Comte's school. A school supposes 
 a master who has founded it, and disciples whose chief care 
 is to reproduce faithfully the master's ideas of processes, 
 allowing themselves more or less liberty in details. Here 
 we have certainly bold lines, fundamental doctrines — but 
 points of divergence cannot be called details. Besides, the 
 grand lines on which there is agreement were traced out 
 already, before Comte. If, then, it was well to give the 
 name of " positivists " to all those who adopt these essen- 
 tial principles, it was wrong to connect them with Comte, 
 as if they were his disciples and he was their master. A 
 confusion would arise from such thoughtlessness that would 
 misrepresent their respective attitudes. They who have 
 already fallen into it profess themselves surprised at a re-- 
 cent controversy, which they have taken to be an intestine 
 quarrel among disciples of the same school, preluding the 
 dissolution of a common doctrine. Not having drawn near 
 enough to the conflicting opinions, they have failed to see 
 the grave differences between them ; not having suflSciently 
 studied the first movement of the current of contemporane- 
 ous philosophy, they do not see the points at which it has 
 parted into several branches. It is no place here to decide 
 the quarrel, or to estimate the comparative value of the 
 
68 POSITIVISM. 
 
 special doctrines of Comte, and of the thinkers who de- 
 cline to be associated with his school, or who have lent 
 him only a partial adherence ; we wish merely to note that, 
 in spite of the resemblances and analogies which the reader 
 may find between the writings of divers contemporary au- 
 thors and the ideas of Comte, those at least that pecul- 
 iarly belong to him form a system so distinct that they 
 who reject them are fairly entitled to claim their inde- 
 pendence ; there is no propriety in calling them disciples 
 of Comte. To those that have no exact knowledge of the 
 doctrines, the polemical documents — among others the 
 writings devoted by Robinet, Bridges, Littr6, J. S. Mill, 
 to the exposition, criticism, defence of Comte's ideas — 
 might have taught that, along with an agreement on essen- 
 tial points, there exists among the several classes of advo- 
 cates of the experimental philosophy a profound disagree- 
 ment on points that are especially characteristic of the 
 philosophy of Comte. 
 
 It is because this disagreement is not well known or 
 appreciated that the greater number of eminent men, who 
 gave in their adhesion to the principles of the experimental 
 philosophy, have been regarded as disciples of Comte, and 
 this philosophy has been confounded with the system called 
 positive. Hence the fairly-warranted protests €hat have 
 appeared from all quarters, especially from Mr. J. S. MiU, 
 who writes with a good-nature growing out of an accept- 
 ance of many of Comte's views ; from Mr. Herbert Spencer, 
 whose impatience is mingled with a profound respect for 
 the illustrious thinker he departs from, and from Mr. Hux- 
 ley, whose assaults go to the extent of injustice. 
 
 In spite of Mr. Spencer's incontestable claims to origi- 
 nality, it is hardly surprising that the confusion we speak 
 of should have been made, especially in France ; but it is 
 more surprising that it should have been persisted in by a 
 distinguished writer whom extensive knowledge, and a 
 
SPENCER'S ESTIMATE OF COMTE. 69- 
 
 familiarity witb Mr. Spencer's-works, ought to have saved 
 from such misunderstanding.* It seems to us -worth while 
 to remove and to destroy it now, when, for the first time, 
 an important work of Mr. Spencer is about appearing in 
 our language. 
 
 " "What Comte meditated,'' says Mr. Spencer, " is a sys- 
 tematic classification of our knowledge, that may serve in 
 the interpretation of classes of phenomena that have not 
 been studied in a scientific manner ; a lofty idea, worthy 
 of encouragement and praise. He has revived the concep- 
 tion of Bacon, already well calculated to astonish us at an 
 epoch when knowledge was so little advanced, as it con- 
 templated nothing less than an organization of the sciences 
 in a vast system, in which social science should appear as a 
 branch of the tree of Nature. In the place of a vague, in- 
 definite conception, Comte has given a. definite, carefully- 
 studied conception of the world-; in his work he has dis- 
 played a reach, a fertility, . and an originality of mind 
 truly great, as weU as a rare power of generalization : set- 
 ting asid6 all q&estion of truth, his system of positive phi- 
 losophy is an immense progress. But, after paying Comte 
 a just tribute of admiration for his ideas, and for the efforts 
 he has made in elaborating them, the question remains as 
 to his success. They who think that he has reorganized 
 method and knowledge, and who accept his reorganization, 
 deserve really the name of his disciples ; but they who do 
 not accept this reorganization ought not to bear it. If one 
 does not admit Comte's peculiar doctrines, he is his adver- 
 sary ; he finds himself in just the situation he would if 
 Comte had never written. They who reject his reorgan- 
 ization of scientific doctrine, and adhere to the doctrine 
 itself as it was before Comte, profess in common with him 
 opinions that the past has bequeathed to the present ; but 
 this adhesion should not be reckoned in favor of the doc- 
 ' M. Langel, Rem^ des Deux Mondes, Febraary 16, 1864. 
 
70 POSITIVISM. 
 
 trines peculiar to Comte. Such is the position of the main 
 body of savants : this is my position." * 
 
 Comte, moreover, did not make the pretensions that 
 certain of his disciples put forward. He acknowledged that 
 the positive method in philosophy had been developing for 
 ages, and was an inheritance common to all men of science. 
 The principles that compose this common heritage, the rela* 
 tivity of knowledge and its corollary, the principle that 
 forbids recourse to metaphysical entities for the explana- 
 tion of phenomena, finally, the fixedness of the laws of 
 Nature, Comte did nothing to add to the weight of these. 
 He availed himself of them, but, simply by interdicting all 
 subjective analysis of thought, he has put himself in oppo- 
 sition to their clear demonstration. We shall not examine 
 all the points of disagreement ; we will merely pause to 
 touch on the three principles — the dynamic law of sociol- 
 ogy, the encyclopedic hierarchy, or classification of the 
 sciences, and the constitution of human society. , 
 
 ' Herbert Spencer, " Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of 
 M. Comte." 
 
CHAPTER VIL 
 
 COMTe's FtrNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES. 
 
 The variations of human opinion, says Comte, can 
 never have been purely arbitrary. They obey a law that 
 causes every theoretical conception to pass through three 
 successive stages : the first, by a pure mental fiction, gives 
 to the absolute cause of events concrete forms — this is the 
 theological stage ; the second gives to the same absolute 
 cause an abstract and purely ideal form — ^this is the meta- 
 physical stage; finally, the third abandons "the search 
 after the origin and destiny of the universe," the knowl- 
 edge of the " interior causes of phenomena," and devotes 
 itself merely to discovery of " their efiective laws, that is 
 to say, their relations of succession and similitude " — this 
 is the positive or real stage. The stage adopted at first 
 in the general system of explanation, has gone on from 
 concentration to concentration, and has reached "the 
 highest perfection it is susceptible of when it has substi- 
 tuted the providential action of a single being for the 
 varied play of the numerous independent divinities that 
 had been imagined in primitive times." The second stage, 
 the metaphysical, which closely follows the first, substi- 
 tuting for a deity a creation of reason, pursues in its turn 
 the same path toward unity, and arrives at perfection when 
 all the unities are combined in one unity. Nature, a grand 
 
12 COMTE'S FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES. 
 
 entity, " regarded as the only source of all phenomena." 
 The third stage, the positive, in which the mind confines 
 its search to the marks of relations, traces facts to more 
 general facts, whereof they are but particular.cases, these 
 to others more general still, so that " its perfection, toward 
 which it tends incessantly, although quite probably it will 
 never reach it, would consist in the power to represent 
 the diflferent observable phenomena as particular cases 
 under a single general fact, like that of gravitation, for 
 example." 
 
 Such is the law of the three stages destined to play in 
 the system of Comte a part of the first order, since, by as- 
 signing a definite limit to the progress of human thought, 
 it lays a basis for the practical construction of ultimate 
 society. This law determines the principle of the classi- 
 fication of sciences, which furnishes a career for education, 
 in which " what has hitherto been accomplished blindly 
 will be done henceforth scientifically." Although Oomte 
 shows us the application of the three methods in philoso- 
 phy, the characteristics whereof are, he says, essentially 
 different and even radically opposite, he sees, at bottom, 
 in the metaphysical method nothing more than a gen- 
 eral modification of the theological method, very suitable 
 as an intermediate step between the two extreme stages, 
 and as conducting, " by insensible degrees, to the positive 
 philosophy, ... a powerful instrument for breaking up 
 theological conceptions, a clever device for concealing 
 their absence a while by vague, illusory conceptions, but 
 incapable of organizing the domain of metaphysics, or of 
 stemming the tide of the positive philosophy." There are, 
 then, but two methods fundamentally and essentially op- 
 posed — the theological and the positive ; the human mind 
 passes from the first to the second, whatever accidents may 
 befall on the passage ; it must begin with the first and end 
 with the second, abandoning the first as radically incapable 
 
DEFECTIVE INDUCTION. 73 
 
 »f bestowing on man the power of modifying the environ- 
 ment in which he is .placed. 
 
 Of all the contributions that Comte has made from his 
 private store to the common fund, none has called forth 
 more lively protests than the dynamic law of social organ- 
 ization, as well from theologians and pure metaphysicians 
 as from the representativiss of a school in other respects 
 closely allied to positivism — the critical school, namely — 
 aU of whom refuse to allow the march of humanity, which 
 they think indeterminate, to be compressed within the 
 lines of any strict law whatever. • Comte was well aware 
 that this law needed explanation ; that it would never ac- 
 quire the scientific authority he wished to give it so long 
 as it expressed only a simple general fact. He perceived 
 the necessity of characteriidng the different general motives 
 taken up in the exact knowledge of human nature, which 
 have made, now inevitable, now indispensable, that neces- 
 sary succession of social phenomena, regarded in the direct 
 light of intellectual evolution, which essentially controls 
 their principal march. The different scientific processes, 
 that serve definitely to confirm an empirical truth, were too 
 well known to the man who had traced the philosophy of 
 the positive sciences to justify him in thinking he had done 
 enough in announcing a simple historical generalization. 
 This sort of induction, he knew and said, needed, in order 
 to become unexceptionable, the control of the " eminent 
 faculty," by which we conceive, " a priori, all the funda- 
 mental relations of phenomena, independently of their 
 direct investigation, according to indispensa,ble bases fur- 
 nished in advance by the biological theory of man. Inde- 
 pendently of secondary causes, the movement that proceeds 
 in accordance with the dynamic law, recognizes two uni- 
 versal causes, " the natural conditions of the human organ- 
 ization, and those of the medium wherein it has its devel- 
 opment." But these two causes are ever at work, and, if 
 4 
 
74 COMTE'S FUNDAMENTAL DOCTEINES. 
 
 it can always be maintained with confidence that they de- 
 termine evolution and its rapidity, we can never tell what 
 part each takes in this common work, or show what laws 
 of circumstance, what laws of human organization, are 
 verified in this or that manifestation of social dynamics. 
 In presence of this difficulty, which he was unable wholly 
 to surmount, Comte, for the verification of his law, was 
 compelled to resort to all the means of investigation at his 
 command, to observation direct and indirect, " to the num- 
 berless forms of the comparative method," and, above all, 
 to logical reasoning. In spite of these resources, the dy- 
 namic law, with no bond of deduction to connect it with a 
 more comprehensive law, remains a pure empirical general- 
 ization ; the adherence of " all advanced minds " cannot 
 shield it against the " irrational evolution " of those less 
 advanced minds whom Comte so loftily waved off, making 
 himself judge of the competency of his antagonists. 
 
 Man, he tells us, has never been able to comprehend 
 the events that surround him, except by endowing each 
 permanent group of phenomena with consciousness and 
 will. He has thought he could know himself, and he has 
 supposed he found in himself a type of unity ; this he has 
 transferred " to other subjects that attracted his nascent 
 attention." He ended, of course, in a universal anthro- 
 pomorphism. This is quite possible. We see aroimd us 
 still many instances of this quite childish method of ex- 
 planation ; we still hear the assertion that what man knows 
 best is himself, made often enough to comprehend that one 
 of the first offices of reason, on coming out from this long 
 period during which, impressions not being coordinate, no 
 knowledge could take form, is to personify. But this 
 wholly metaphysical induction, so like those which have 
 often led astray thinkers who tried to bend facts to mental 
 theories^ cannot dispense with the support of a complete 
 historical verification. It is very true that, at the birth of 
 
DEFECTIVE -VERIFICATION. 75 
 
 al] societies, theological conceptions prevail ; but there are 
 cases wherein the first theological notions that history pre- 
 sents to us have not the stamp of fetichism. The rational 
 induction of Comte has not, therefore, the rigorous verifica- 
 tion it requires. 
 
 The difficulty that presents itself in the way of passing 
 from the theological to the positive stage is very much 
 greater even than this. Comte attributes it, peremptorily, 
 to "the predilection of intelligence for positive concep- 
 tions ; especially on account of their practical superiority, 
 which they owe entirely to the fact that they are better 
 adapted to the provisions exacted by our activity." This 
 reason, true in itself, does not seem to us to contain all 
 that Comte would draw from it. It answers admirably 
 weU to account for changes, constantly increasing in the 
 conception of Deity, which, up to that point, has domi- 
 nated our understanding ; but, does it go the length of 
 annihilating it ? Persuaded henceforth of the practical 
 superiority of positive conceptions, man will demand his 
 happiness, and the security of his future, of positive sci- 
 ence ; he will no longer endeavor, by " plausible solicita- 
 tions," to secure the arbitrary intervention of ideal powers. 
 He will try to get at the secret of Nature by all the 
 methods of scientific investigation ; and, to make sure of 
 his own destiny, he wiU set himself to the task of modify- 
 ing, with the whole force of his knowledge, the naturally 
 independent conditions that determine it. He will no 
 longer pray ; but, will he give over his belief in the exist- 
 ence and presence of Deity ? It is a common notion that 
 a god who confers no favors, who does not lay his finger 
 on each event, is not God ; this is the opinion of the ad- 
 herents of Christian churches, as of the greater number of 
 those who rfeject their symbols — ^it certainly was the opin- 
 ion of Comte himself. He did not, therefore, think it ne- 
 cessary to demonstrate that the full advent of the positive 
 
76 COMTE'S FUNDAMENTAL DOOTEINES. 
 
 system would efikoe the last vestiges of theological con- 
 ception. In the absence of the special experience that the 
 future holds in reserve, which may or may not verify the 
 positivist affirmation, sectional motives alone can give it 
 the provisional authority of an accepted belief, forbid con- 
 tradiction, and render impossible or improbable every other 
 theory of mental evolution. 
 
 General conceptions, Mr. Spencer declares, do not pass 
 through three different and opposite stages, nor even 
 through two ; they remain always the same ; the compre- 
 hension of them alone varies, and, with their comprehen- 
 sion, but in an inverted way, their compactness. 
 
 The human mind has never ceased to agitate the ques- 
 tion of cause ; it has . tried two methods of solution — the 
 religious and the scientific — hence the illusion of two ob- 
 jects of research, hence the apparent antagonism between 
 two processes, which hides the deep sense of their common 
 tendency. The friends of religion, and the defenders of 
 science, have ceaselessly fought together, and still they 
 have not ceased doing a common work, profitable as well 
 to religion as to science. In this conflict, old as civiliza- 
 tion, beset with so many vicissitudes, there has been neither 
 victor nor vanquished. 
 
 " All religion is an a priori theory of the universe." 
 All religions undertake to explain the world by a causing 
 power ; all affirm that something must be explained by a 
 cause, and all propose a conception of this cause. " In the 
 grossest fetichism, which supposes a distinct personality 
 behind each phenomenon," that is to say, which represents 
 the directing force of the world under manifold forms, 
 " strictly outlined and homely," and assimilates them with 
 visible powers, human and bestial ; in polytheism, where 
 these personalities begin to undergo generalization, and are 
 more and more peremptorily remanded to distinct regions, 
 whence they influence the order of things by means that 
 
EELIGIOK GANNOT BE OUTGROWN. 77 
 
 dude man's apprehension ; in monotheism, where the gen- 
 eralization becomes complete, where the divine person 
 loses, little by little, all his anthropomorphic attributes and 
 becomes, through lack of possible qualification, "the un- 
 known god ; " finally, in this latter period, when religion 
 is distinctly aware of the impossibility of endowing the 
 object of its worship with any attribute whatever, in other 
 words, of conceiving it, when religious thinkers repeat, 
 with Hamilton, " a god comprehended would be no God ; " 
 in all these forms so various, under symbols so dififerent, 
 religion has done nothing but affirm more and more ear- 
 nestly the transcendency of the cause of the universe ; and 
 its development consists precisely in its shedding of the 
 symbols that disguise the fathomless mystery of this cause ; 
 this the most enlightened theologians of our time admit. 
 According to them, the struggle and the reverses have been 
 a discipline from which religion has come out purer every 
 time. 
 
 .And science? That, too, is a theory of the universe. 
 Science represents the sum of " positive and definite knowl- 
 edge in regard to the order which reigns among the phe- 
 nomena that environ us." For the indeterminate order, 
 expressed by theological conceptions, it has gradtially sub- 
 stituted a determinate order ; but it has advanced only by 
 affirming powers radically diflferent in kind from those of 
 the religious dogmas, entities, spirits, forces, conceptions, 
 more and more abstract, by means whereof it claimed to 
 represent what it did not and could not know. Not till 
 nowj by the method of' the most advanced savants, has it 
 perceived that the ultimate forces on which its universal . 
 explanation rests, are not distinct forces at all, but modes 
 of manifestation of a single universal force hitherto recog- 
 nized as incomprehensible. Science, like religion, has ad- 
 vanced by laying down superficial explanations, which it 
 took up little by little int-o explanations more profound and 
 
78 OOMTE'S FUNDAMENTAL DOCTEINES. 
 
 more general, and it ends at last, after a struggle in which 
 victory seems to hav^e never deserted it, by acknowledging 
 the same mysterj' before which religion bends; a trans- 
 cendent, that is to say, an inconceivable cause of the uni- 
 verse. 
 
 If the mind, in its evolution, follows not three distinct 
 processes but only one, it oomes to one only result, and not 
 to three. The one God, who, in religion, absorbs all the 
 other gods ; Nature, the single entity that in metaphysics 
 absorbs all the other entities ; the general fact to which all 
 facts may be referred as particular cases, are not three dif- 
 ferent conceptions, but one single conception. "When 
 the theological idea of the providential action of an indi- 
 vidual being has reached the last form of its development, 
 by absorbing all secondary independent powers, it becomes 
 the conception of a being inlminent in all phenomena, 
 which explains the disappearance of all the anthropomor- 
 phic attributes that once characterized them. The last 
 term of the metaphysical system, Nature, is a conception 
 identical with the preceding ; it is the notion of a single 
 source, which, as soon as it is regarded as universal, ceases 
 to be conceivable, and dififers in name only from the con- 
 ception of a being who manifests himself in all phenomena. 
 In the same way the final stage of science, the reduction 
 of all observable phenomena to particular illustrations of 
 one general unique fact, implies the postulate of an ulti- 
 mate existence to which this fact may be referred ; a pos- 
 tulate that cannot be distinguished from the two identical 
 conceptions of theology and metaphysics." ' The conflict, 
 thus far permanent, between religion and science, can be 
 terminated only by a full adherence of these two powers 
 to the principle of the transcendence of the cause of the 
 world; it cannot end in the suppression of either one; 
 
 • Herbert Spencer, " Reasons for dissenting from M. Comte's Phi- 
 losophy.'" 
 
HARMONY OF EELIGIOK AND SCIENCE. 79 
 
 tLey are destined to live as long as consciousness. In 
 vain will Science flatter herself that her explanations have 
 touched the unknown; her conquests, immense as they may 
 be reckoned, will always leave the eternal problem un- 
 solved. The religious sentiment will not perish for want 
 of nourishment ; intrenched, as it is now, in a region where 
 science cannot reach it, it sees its domain extend in equal 
 measure with that of its rival. " If we consider science as 
 a gradually increasing sphere, we may say that every ad- 
 dition to its surface enlargement does but multiply its 
 points of contact with surrounding nescience." ' The ob- 
 ject of the religious sentiment wiU continue to be what it 
 has always been, the unknown source of things. The 
 forms under which men conceive the unknown som-ce of 
 things may be effaced ; the absolute Being, the substance 
 of consciousness, is permanent. The religious sentiment 
 began by representing the universal cause under the form 
 of imperfectly known agents, then under the form of agents 
 less known and less kncwable, arriving at last at the con- 
 ception of it as a cause wholly unsearchable ; but, if for 
 the moment it has ceased making it the object of its specu- 
 lations, it has come' back to it again with new fervor : it 
 will busy itself thus always. Now that, in magnifying its 
 object, it has come to contemplate it as the unknowable in- 
 finite, it is at the highest limit of its evolution ; no finite 
 being will satisfy it, not more the object which Comte pro- 
 poses for the veneration of his disciples — the grand being, 
 humanity — than any other finite conception within the com- 
 pass of knowledge.' 
 
 ' Herbert Spencer, " First Principles," p. 16. 
 
 ' " Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte." 
 
CHAPTER Vm. 
 
 THE OEDBE OF THE SCIEITCES. ' 
 
 EvEET dogmatic or critical philosoplier is under ne- 
 cessity to deal with the question of the order of our ideas. 
 The founder of positivism could the less decline this task, 
 as he believed the epoch of criticism to be finally closed, 
 and the hour for positive constructions come. In spite of 
 hie denials, often made in a peremptory tone, Comte ad- 
 mitted that, by placing one's self at a favorable point of 
 view, and with sufficient knowledge, one could reproduce 
 the connection of the more general scientific ideas ; that is 
 to say, could conceive that inquiry, as to broad outlines, 
 was closed ; he believed that what remained of truths in 
 detail to be explored, although of great extent and great 
 practical importance, could exert no influence on the work- 
 ing of the speculative system. For this reason he preferred 
 the dogmatical to the historical method in giving his ex- 
 position of the hierarchy of the sciences. He knew per- 
 fectly weU that these two methods do not concur, that the 
 development of the sciences has been simultaneous, and 
 has gone on by reciprocal exchange of services. Never- 
 theless, he chose to regard the older as the more advanced, 
 thus subordinating an irreproachable witness to a principle 
 of classification that he has borrowed from the relations of 
 things ; he determines the order and rank of the sciences, 
 according to the relation of the facts with which they deal. 
 
COMTE'S ARRANGEMENT. 81 
 
 Another cardinal point in the doctrine of Comte is the 
 division of the sciences into the abstract and the concrete, 
 the former being systems of laws that govern elementary 
 facts, or events, as they exist or present themselves to ob- 
 servation, but in scope more comprehensive than real exist- 
 ence ; the latter, co5rdinations, which are only layers of facts 
 or events, combinations disclosed by experience. These 
 occurrences present mutual relations which admit of classi- 
 fication in " natural categories so disposed that the rational 
 study of each category rests on the principal laws of the 
 category preceding it, and becomes the foundation of the 
 study of that which follows." ' Each category depends on 
 that which goes before it, and, in its turn, serves as an 
 introduction to that which comes after; it is a scale in 
 which each category of facts represented by the corre- 
 sponding laws systematized in abstract sciences, is more 
 general and more simple than that which immediately fol- 
 lows. This order of decreasing generality correlative with 
 an increasing complexity constitutes the unity of philo- 
 sophic doctrine, and gives to the classification of the sci- 
 ences a homogeneity such as.no other essay has presented. 
 Beings in Nature present two grand divisions. All pos- 
 sess properties of gravity, heat, etc., of combination and 
 decomposition, but only one ' of the two groups presents 
 phenomena of increase and reproduction. The first, pos- 
 sessing properties common to both divisions, the most gen- 
 eral, in other Tvords, are the simplest; they form the class 
 of brute bodies. The second, haying, in addition to these 
 common properties, certain special ones, are less general 
 and more complex ; they form the class of organized bodies. 
 The first division is again subdivided, by virtue of the same 
 principle of decreasing generality, into three groups, to 
 which respond three sciences : astronomy, for the more 
 general and more simple phenomena, " subjected to laws 
 
 ' Auguste Comte, " Cours de Fhilosophie Positive," i., p. 68. 
 
82 THE ORDER OP THE SCIENCES. 
 
 that bear on all the rest, of which they themselves are how- 
 ever independent ; " physics, in which bodies are consid- 
 ered from the more general and simple point of view of 
 mechanism ; chemistry, which studies the laws that govern 
 the combinations of bodies. The second class, in its turn, 
 may be divided into two distinct groups according as we 
 consider the physiological laws of the individual, or those 
 less general laws which, becoming auxiliary to the first, 
 condition the social evolution. These two groups corre- 
 spond to the sciences called biology and social physics. 
 
 If, now, a group be made of the mathematical sciences 
 which shall comprise all the phenomena under the catego- 
 ries of number, space, and force, we shall have a science 
 the laws whereof are the most general and the simplest of 
 all, thus giving it the first rank in the hierarchy of the 
 sciences. " The science of mathematics is less a constituent 
 part of natural philosophy properly so called, than, since 
 Descartes and Newton, the true basis of that philosophy, 
 . . . the most powerful instrument the human mind can em- 
 ploy in the investigation of natural phenomena." ' " To 
 sum up finally, mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, 
 physiology, social physics,' this is the encyclopedic formula, 
 which, among a great number of classifications that the six 
 fundamental sciences afford, is alone logically conformable 
 to the natural arid invariable hierarchy of phenomena. " ' 
 The same principle of decreasing generality presides over 
 the development of the secondary sciences, the subdivisions 
 of the six fundamental sciences. Independently of the 
 great advantage of combining in a methodical system all 
 the truths that make up knowledge, the encyclopedic scale 
 possesses one eminent property — it furnishes a rational 
 basis for a system of education which, henceforth, will lead 
 the coming generations systematically over the road that 
 humanity has pursued without deliberate purpose.- 
 
 > Comte, "Coura de Philosophie Positive," i., p. 86. ' Ibid., p. IIB. 
 
 ■i 5 
 
THEY PROGRESS TOGETHER. 83 
 
 Mr. Spencer does not admit the possibility of arranging 
 the sciences in a serial order that will express either their 
 logical dependence or their historical development. Were 
 such an order possible, the classification he would adopt 
 would be that of Comte. But whj' that order? Is it be- 
 cause our thought is so constituted that we can only repre- 
 sent things in series? This purely metaphysical reason, 
 which rests the foundation of things upon logical forms, 
 can have no force with the positive mind of Comte. None 
 but a German, capable of conceiving Nature as petrified in- 
 telligence, could lean on that. Besides, Comte, by claim- 
 ing that the sciences are branches of a single trunk, de- 
 prived himself of the right to arrange them in series. He 
 perceived the truth, but not the whole truth. The sci- 
 ences are not merely branches from a common trunk, they 
 are mutually sustaining, assisting, inosculating, as an anat- 
 omist expressed it ; they do not only follow a movement 
 from simplicity to complexity, from greater generality to 
 less, they follow also the inverse course. Historj-, and the 
 special tendencies that now prevail, show us that the de- 
 velopment of the sciences takes place after the manner of 
 a continually augmenting generalization, that general sci- 
 ence is constantly becoming more independent of special 
 knowledge. Comte, in his system, has embodied but half 
 of tbe truth. Progress is at once analytical and syntheti- 
 cal ; the profounder analysis prepares the way for the com- 
 pleter synthesis ; the completer synthesis enables us to 
 conceive and to effect a still more profound analysis. Sci- 
 ence, as we have seen, is an organism. In proportion as it 
 grows, it creates departments with special functions. But 
 each department lends to all the rest, and receives from all 
 the rest. They are all united bj' an intimate consensus, 
 the effect of which is that one science progresses only as 
 the others progress also. The evolution of the sciences 
 does not therefore take place in the serial order indicated 
 
84 THE ORDER QE THE SCIENCES. 
 
 by Comte, nor in any other; properly speaking, there is 
 no filiation of the sciences. From the beginning, the ab- 
 stract sciences, the concrete sciences, and an intermediate 
 order that unites these extreme characteristics — ^the ab- 
 stract-concrete — ^have advanced together. The first have 
 made no progress, except by solving the problems pre- 
 sented by the second and the third ; the third, in like man- 
 ner, have progressed no otherwise than by solving the 
 problems raised by the second. There has always been 
 between these three great orders of the sciences an ex- 
 change of services, a constant action and reaction. From 
 concrete facts we have passed to abstract, and these have 
 afterward been applied to the analysis of new orders of 
 concrete. This order Comte has remarked on. He per- 
 ceived that the development of the sciences leads first to 
 the knowledge of events, which serve to make up the ab- 
 stract sciences, and that afterward the concrete sciences 
 are completed under the direction of the abstract sciences, 
 and finish the coordination of the combinations of events. 
 But he did not attach sufficient importance to this observa- 
 tion ; he forgot it as the principle of simultaneous and solid 
 development. 
 
 The other basis of Comte's theory — the order of devel- 
 opment in the parts of a science according to the principle 
 of decreasing generalization — is equally wanting in truth. 
 The mathematics will give ua proof of this. For the rest, 
 one has only to go to Comte himself to find the objections 
 that may be made to his theory : he has admitted them all. 
 By his own confession, " mathematical analysis seems to 
 have had its birth in the contemplation of geometrical and 
 mechanical facts ; " that is, the most general science was 
 bom after the less general, and incidentally to it. From 
 that time we have seen algebra, an abstract science, remain 
 unformed until after geometry' had received a high degree 
 of development; algebra itself is posterior to arithmetic. 
 
THE PROGRESS OP MATHEMATICS. 85 
 
 which it includes, and the transcendental analysis, more 
 general than algebra, is a quite recent science. The mathe- 
 maticians are even obliged to invent still broader gener- 
 alizations. So much for the science of calculation. In 
 geometry there is the same progress toward the more gen- 
 eral : the ancients occupied themselves solely with bodies ; 
 the moderns rise to higher abstractions ; they concern them- 
 selv^es with all questions that relate to figures. In mechan- 
 ics, the same ; the most general science, statics, moves only 
 after the less general dynamics, which, by the principle of 
 virtual forces, supplies to it an abstract theory of equilib- 
 rium susceptible of application alike to fluids and solids. 
 
 The principle of decreasing generality does not, then, 
 express the order of development in the constituent parts 
 of a science } no more does it express the order of develop- 
 ment in the fundamental sciences. . Astronomy — which 
 Comte places after mathematics and physics, and which 
 represents the application of the geometrical and mechan- 
 ical laws to the heavenly bodies — together with the laws 
 of celestial physics, made no progress until after geometry, 
 mechanics, and terrestrial physics, had advanced on their 
 side. " Before scientifically coordinating a class of celes- 
 tial phenomena, a commencement was made by coordinat- 
 ing a corresponding class of terrestrial phenomena." 
 
 " Mr. Herbert Spencer's objections are weighty," says 
 M. Iittr6, " but they have failed to convince me." ' Comte's 
 principle of classification is true; the inverse principle, 
 which Mr. Spencer makes the basis of his criticism, is also 
 true. The contradiction must therefore be apparent, not 
 real, and Mr. Spencer must have deceived himself; By a 
 decreasing generality, Comte meant a generality given in 
 the object. Philosophy at first knows nothing but groups 
 — grand totals ; on these grand totals it begins to specu- 
 late ; at first it studies bodies in the mass, then it passes to 
 
 • Littr^, " Augnate Comte and the Positive Philosophy," chap. vi. 
 
36 THE ORDER OP THE SCIENCES. 
 
 the examination of organs, next to tissues, finally to ana- 
 tomical elements. Here you see the type of the history of 
 science : the advance is from the whole to the parts ; the 
 generality that is followed is decreasing, it is an objective 
 generality. In Mr. Spencer's view, science, passing from 
 body considered in the mass to the organ, thence to the 
 tissue, thence to the anatomical element, has ascended to 
 doctrines more and -more general; but here the question is 
 of a generality in doctrine, that is to say, a subjective gen- 
 erality. The difference in the points of view is obvious. 
 What Comte has in consideration is the object, not the 
 doctrines based on the object. Set aside the mathematics, 
 the place whereof is incontestably at the head of the series, 
 and astronomy, which must come down from the lofty rank 
 of a fundamental science to the more humble place of a 
 secondary science belonging to the group of physics, that 
 we may, by " an indispensable sacrifice," serve the sub- 
 stance of the doctrine here justly attacked by Mr. Spencer. 
 What does the object show to us ? Three groups of prop- 
 erties — the physical, the chemical, the vital — ranged ac- 
 cording to the principle of decreasing generality. From 
 the physical group, as being the most general, the mind, 
 duly prepared by the knowledge of mathematics, must take 
 its departure in its encyclopedic study, thence it must con- 
 tinue through the chemical group and end wdth the vital, 
 under pain of arrest, since the mind is constrained to 
 " travel at the same pace " with the natural arrangement 
 of the object. 
 
 What meaning does M. Littr6 attach to the words " ob- 
 jectively more general ? " By this phrase he indicates (pp. 
 289, 290) properties that are manifested in many instances. 
 Applying this meaning to what he has said of tissues, and 
 of anatomical elements, Mr. Spencer would then be justified 
 in saying that the properties of the tissue are objectively 
 more general than those of the organ, and those of the 
 
M. LITTRE'S DIFFICULTY. 81 
 
 anatomical element objectively more general than those of 
 the tissue, since the properties of the tissue present them- 
 selves in more instances than those of the organ, and the 
 properties of the element in more instances than those of 
 the tissue.' This superior generality does not exist in the 
 mental view, it is at the point of the scalpel, and under the 
 lens of the microscope that we find it. Mr. Spencer con- 
 fesses that he does not comprehend M. Littr6's objection ; 
 but he tries to throw light upon it. " There is," he says, 
 " and here M. Littr6 is right, a decreasing generality, which 
 is objective. With the exception of the phenomena of dis- 
 solution, which are changes froin the special to the general, 
 all the changes undergone by matter are from the general 
 to the special ; these are changes in which there is "a de- 
 creasing- generality in the groups of attributes ; this is the 
 progress of things. The progress of notions is made not 
 in the same direction alone, it is made also in the opposite 
 direction. The investigation of Nature reveals to us con- 
 tinually- more, particulars; but, at the same time, it reveals 
 to us continually more generals in which the particulars 
 are contained. To take an example : Zoology, in multiply- 
 ing the number of the species it describes, and in studying 
 them more thoroughly, pursues a decreasing generality; but, 
 at the same time, in disclosing the common characteristics 
 that unite the species in larger groups, it pursues an in- 
 creasing generality. ' These two operations are subjective, 
 and in this case the two orders of acquired truths are con- 
 crete — ^they express phenomena actually inanifested." ' 
 
 If, then, a decreasing generality is claimed in the ar- 
 rangement of the sciences, it can be only subjective. The 
 misconception attributed to Mr. Spencer by M. Littr6 does 
 not exist. But, according to him, Mr. Spencer has com- 
 mitted the fault of " confounding the series of the sciences 
 with their evolution, and, in the evolution itself, the epoch 
 
 ' Spencer; " Classification of the Sciences," p. 10. ' Ibid., p. 10, note. 
 
88 THE ORDER 0¥ THE SCIENCES. 
 
 in whicli they are not yet constituted with the epoch in 
 which they are so." 
 
 The series, M. Littr6 says, should be such that each 
 science shall depend on that which precedes it, and shall 
 hold in dependence that which follows it. The, series in- 
 stituted by Comte satisfies this condition ; it satisfies a yet 
 more important condition, without which the whole work, 
 being arbitrary, would have to be abandoned : it conforms 
 to the series of the object, which is " naturally hierarchized, 
 a circumstance that furnishes an excellent a priori reason 
 in favor of Comte's series, supported besides on an a pos- 
 teriori verification drawn from the impossibility of know- 
 ing the object, except by traversing the series of the 
 sciences according to the order of decreasing generality." 
 
 The evolution of the sciences which leads knowledge 
 on to truths more and more general and abstract, takes 
 place, in Comte's view, according to the serial order; in 
 Spencer's view, simultaneously for all the sciences, which 
 lend each other a mutual assistance. Here again M. Littr6 
 thinks to explain the disagreement between Comte and 
 Mr. Spencer, by a confusion on the part of the latter. He 
 grants that Mr. Spencer is right as to the evolution of 
 the sciences, but not as to the constitution of the sci- 
 ences, which Comte's hierarchy alone correctly expresses. 
 A science is constituted when it takes account of " some 
 one of the fundamental properties of matter, and, on 
 that property, establishes an abstract doctrine suscepti- 
 ble of evolution." For example, biology had no possible 
 doctrine prior to the time when it recognized the vital 
 properties inherent in tissues, and in the morphological 
 elements. Previous to this epoch, it could have none that 
 did not proceed from doctrines of the physical and chemical 
 sciences, or that did not rest on some metaphysical con- 
 ception of finality. Henceforth it is on the recognition 
 of the properties of tissues that the hypotheses yrill rest 
 
SPENCEB'S CLASSIFICATION. 89 
 
 that should indicate the path of evolution, which goes on, 
 it is true, by the mutual concurrence of the sciences. In 
 this way, M. Littr6 proposes to reconcile these two oppo- 
 site points of view. 
 
 Nothing will give a better idea of the opposition, after 
 what we have already said on the evolution of the sciences, 
 than an exposition of Mr. Herbert Spencer's classification. 
 In conformity with the logical principle which groups to- 
 gether in one and the same class the things that resemble 
 one another more than they resemble things outside, Mr. 
 Spencer begins by forming two grand groups of sciences. 
 In the first he puts the sciences that treat of " the abstract 
 relations under which phenomena present themselves to 
 us," that is, the relations of space and time ; this is the 
 group of forms, comprehending th£ abstract sciences, logic, 
 the mathematics, sciences that differ from others more than 
 others differ among themselves. In the second group he 
 puts the sciences that treat of the existences represented 
 under the relations of time and space. This group sub- 
 divides itseK into two classes, which differ greatly. " Every 
 phenomenon is more or less composite ; that is to say, it 
 is a manifestation of force under several distinct modes ; 
 thence two objects of study." A first class studies the 
 component modes separately, and gives their laws, making 
 abstraction of the particular cases ; this is the class of foo- 
 ters. The abstract-concrete sciences that compose it are 
 abstract in the classification of Comte ; they doubtless are 
 so since their theorems express laws of force whereof no 
 fact is a pure expression, but they are also concrete because 
 these modes of force express real relations. Just as the 
 abstract sciences are ideal relatively to the rest, the ab- 
 stract-concrete sciences are ideal relatively to the concrete 
 sciences. Just as logic and the mathematics have for their 
 object to generalize the laws of relations, qualitative and 
 quantitative, abstracting the things that limit them, so 
 
90 THE ORDEE OP THE SCIENCES. 
 
 mechanics, physics, chemistry, have for their object to 
 generalize the laws of relation which the different modes 
 of matter and movement obey when they are disengaged 
 from those actual phenomena in which they undergo modi- 
 fications. In mechanics are expressed " the laws of move- 
 ment, no account being made of friction and resistance of 
 medium. The theorems do not tell us what movement is, 
 but what it would be if there were no retarding force ; or, 
 rather, what should be the effect of such retarding force, 
 other retarding forces being eliminated." In physics, the 
 laws of ladiation are laid down without taking account of 
 the media that disturb its effect, and, when the action of 
 these media is investigated, " they are considered as homo- 
 geneous, which they never are ; " and, even when changes 
 of density are reckoned — in the atmosphere, for example — 
 when the matter treated of is light, we are not concerned 
 with the currents that traverse it, and would derange again 
 the effect announced in the theorem. Finally, in chem- 
 istry, there is never taken " a substance just as it is in 
 Nature. . . . The problem of chemistry is to confirm the 
 laws of molecular combination, not as they are actually 
 operative, but as they would appear in the absence of 
 those minute- interventions that can never be completely 
 put aside. . . . All the abstract-concrete sciences have arir 
 alytical interpretation as their object." ' 
 
 The second class studies these component modes of 
 force in their relations, in their cooperation for the produc- 
 tion of phenomena of particular cases. The sciences that 
 compose it are concrete, in that they deal with things as 
 they are met in Nature, " with the real as opposed to the 
 wholly or partially ideal. Their object is synthetical in- 
 terpretation. . . . The construction of phenomena that 
 result from factors under the different conditions offered 
 by the universe." This is the class oi products ; it cdm- 
 1 Spencer, " Claasification of'tbe Sciences," p. 16. 
 
SPENCER'S FUNDAMENTAL. PRINCIPLES. 91 
 
 prises astronomy, geology, biology, psychology, sociol- 
 ogy. With Cotnte . geology is, indeed, a concrete science, 
 but psychology has no independent existence, and is but a 
 department of biology, an abstract science like astronomy 
 and sociology. 
 
 The differences on which Mr. Herbert Spencer rests his 
 divisions bear simply on the degree of abstractness ; the 
 degree of generalness in the laws with which the sciences 
 are concerned is a secondary principle which serves to sub- 
 divide the three main groups. Thus, in each group of 
 sciences, the more as well as the less general, there are 
 those which deal with relations that extend to all, or to 
 the greater number of facts, and those which deal with 
 relations that extend to a smaller number of facts. "We 
 need not enter into the details of the classification, nor 
 follow its secondary, tertiary, or other subdivisions. We 
 need only give enough of them to explain their charac- 
 teristics. 
 
 Nothing better conveys the extent to which the dif- 
 erences they repose on " are fundamental," than the func- 
 tions that they fulfill. The class of abstract-concrete sci- 
 ences, and those of the concrete sciences, supply materials 
 to the class of the abstract sciences, the class of the con- 
 crete supplies materials to the class of the abstract-con- 
 crete; the first two classes act as an instrument for the 
 third, the first for the second, but " no theorem of the 
 second and third will serve as a key to resolve the prob- 
 lems of the first, any more than a theorem of the t^jird will 
 serve as a key to resolve the problems of the second. 
 There are constant relations between the three classes, 
 direct and indirect, but these relations find no expression 
 in a linear series ; an arrangement of three dimensions 
 would alone properly express them, and obliterate what- 
 ever of crudeness there may be in a sketch which claims to 
 represent a classification, and which performs its office by 
 
92 THE ORDER OF THE SCIENCES. 
 
 mutilating the object it sought to image." ' It has been 
 affirmed, but without proof, that Mr. Spencer's attempt 
 has failed, and that, in its turn, it may serve to show the 
 difficulty of making an unexceptionable classification.' We 
 have presented it in its broad lines, in order to show how 
 much it differs from that of Comte, and wherein the two 
 points of view are irreconcilable. 
 
 ' Spencer, " Classification of Science." 
 ' Lewes, " History of Philosophy," vol. ii. 
 
CHAPTER IX. 
 
 EVOLUnOK AKD GOTEENMENT. 
 
 Grave as are the two questions on which we have just 
 seen Comte and Mr. Herbert Spencer, in complete disagree- 
 ment, that which is yet to be examined is graver still. 
 
 At the beginning of this century, after an unexampled 
 revolution, which had presented the spectacle of a people 
 overthrowing all their institutions and trying to build up 
 others, with no instruments but those furnished by a crude 
 science and theories — ^rational, so called — on the nature of 
 man, there remained. in the mind of the French an idea that 
 this construction was not made on a sound plan ; that it 
 was necessary to begin again on a basis and with materials 
 of scientific validity. A number of theorizers hereupon 
 came forward with systems of social organization that 
 claimed to be an infallible means of arriving promptly at 
 general happiness — too often, however, at the expense of 
 liberty. Comte, a pupil of St. Simon, received from his 
 master the notion that society must be, and could be, 
 manufactured. The present time was, in his judgment, a 
 period of untimely criticism and anarchy, with which we 
 must have done as speedily as possible, in order to save 
 progress. He pieced up a system in which liie minute de- 
 tails of life were made subject to regulations, and which 
 extended a jealous supervision over thoughts as well as 
 actions. A society in which each individual should act 
 
94 EVOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 under a common inspiration, as at the fine era of the Cath- 
 olic rule, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, would be 
 the form most conducive to the advancement of humanity. 
 This miracle of revealed faith, demonstrated faith, was to 
 be repeated under the direction of a clergy of sava9its, com- 
 posed of men most capable through their cyclopedic knowl- 
 edge of knowing the desirable end to reach, and invested 
 with a moral authority suflBcient to rally in phalanx, and 
 direct in action, the scattered faculties. 
 
 By its proper constitution the human race is called to 
 action. But, as in the Christian religion, the faithful re- 
 ceive from a competent and recognized authority the dog- 
 mas they must believe, and the commandments they must 
 obey ; so, in the society conceived by Comte, the man who, 
 either from mental' incapacity or because his activity is 
 better employed otherwise, cannot discover and verify the 
 principles that serve as a basis for practice, will accept 
 them from a superior authority. The authority of the 
 savant, in matters belonging to his special department, 
 nobody disputes ; the same should be the case with the 
 savant who has penetrated the laws of the social sciences. 
 To obtain a clear notion of man's relations with the rest 
 of the universe, that the problems which daily rise in prac- 
 tice may be scientifically solved, is the aim of the highest 
 human activity. This work is evidently beyond the ca- 
 pacity of the great majority of mankind. It is well, then, to 
 institute an order of speculative minds devoted to the solu- 
 tion of these difiBcult problems, commissioned to discover 
 the thing to be done, to formulate rules of action, and to 
 interpret them when necessary, by throwing light on such 
 obscure points as may arise in the minds of those who have 
 to follow them. If men are too often incompetent to dis- 
 cover the principles of their actions, they show their radi- 
 cal incompetence above all in morals. Not only have they 
 great trouble in discerning nicely the true moral principles 
 
COMTE'S THEORY OF PUBLIC RULE. 95 
 
 that should guide them, but they have small inclination to 
 follow them unless they, are laid under some restraint — 
 either a physical restraint, represented by that necessary 
 evil called government, the application whereof is to out- 
 ward actions alone, which interest immediately the mem- 
 bers of society, or a restraint of a different kind, namely, 
 moral influence. These two orders of constraint are, so to 
 speak, complementary each of the other ; where the moral 
 is feeble or unheeded, recourse must be had to force, to the 
 detriment of humanity— for there is always something in 
 force that degrades the dignity of man. Still, the monarch- 
 ical opinions of the savants of the present day, and notably 
 . those of the men -who maintain the cause of progress against 
 the defenders of Catholic authority, tend to nothing less 
 than the propagation in society of ills so intolerable that 
 the despotism, of brute force may alone avail to save it. 
 One remedy exists : a strong constitution of the spiritual 
 power, based on the positive philosophy, which shall in- 
 cessantly appeal to the sentiments of men, assume their 
 direction, and compel all thoughts and actions to converge 
 toward a common end, the welfare of humanity. The moral 
 power will have to prevent social^ miseries of two kinds : 
 among men in general the preponderance of egoistical in- 
 stincts, which, when gratified, diminish the sum of well- 
 being and of power, whence progress results, and, when 
 repressed, inflict a cruel injury on the happiness of the 
 individual ; among savants in particular, the taste for use- 
 less studies, an excess of the disintegrating specialism 
 which leads away from contemplation of the grand sub- 
 jective unity, and from the ends of humanity. The first 
 aim will be reached by an education that subordinates the 
 egoistical sentiments to the disinterested, and realizes, so 
 far as our nature permits, the ideal of the unity in which 
 our personal existence in its greatest activity harmonizes 
 with society and cooperates with it for a common object. 
 
96 EVOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 The second aim -will be reached by that systematizing of 
 scientific research which will cause to converge toward a 
 common object of recognized utility, under the direction of 
 the highest theoretical knowledge, all the activity that for 
 want of a preconceived plan is scattered and lost in vain 
 speculations on insoluble and idle problems, such as the 
 origin of species, or the objective synthesis of the universe. 
 If the ideas of Comte were applied they would submit the 
 whole man to oiEoial regulation ; an unimpeachable author- 
 ity would rule every thing ; the Catholic ideal of the sup- 
 pression of the liberty to err would be realized, and human- 
 ity, as the price of the absolute submission of the individual 
 to society, would have no fruits to gather but those of a 
 progress conceived in its plan and its methods by the specu- 
 lative class. Decided as Comte was to commit the exercise 
 of physical constraint, and the direction of industry, to an 
 oligarchy of the rich, the exercise of moral restraint and 
 the direction of science to an oligarchy of the learned, it is 
 not surprising that he should have felt an utter contempt 
 for representative government, and that he should have 
 seen, at first in the revolution of February, 1848, later, in 
 the despotic revolution of December, 1851, felicitous events 
 calculated to suppress miserable and degrading factions,- 
 and favorable occasions for putting in practice a social sys- 
 tem which the pedantic twaddle of orators in the elective 
 assemblies could no longer obstruct. 
 
 There is certainly an advantage in committing the moral 
 authority to a body composed of truly wise men, making 
 recommendations in the name of indisputable science, in- 
 stead of priests, who give orders in the name of transcen- 
 dental conceptions. The institution of a sacerdotal theo- 
 logical power has helped progress wonderfully, by giving 
 to the ill-defined knowledge of mankind a synthesis that 
 might serve as a basis for morality. The institution of a 
 scientific sacerdotal power would serve a better purpose 
 
THE EMBODIMENT OF AUTHORITY. 07 
 
 still, by ruling out contradictions in ethical precept. But, 
 to say nothing of the intervention, always powerful, of the 
 passions, which have, corrupted the theological institution, 
 and have made it for the last three centuries the greatest 
 obstacle to progress in the West, and which would not fail 
 to corrupt as well the scientific institution, an argument of 
 great weight presses against the organization which Comte 
 proposed for the coming society. At the bottom of Comte's 
 doctrine is the belief that man is always the same, that he 
 has always needed guidance in the past, and will always 
 need guidance in the future, the idea that the principle 
 of authority must forever be incorporated in some visible 
 form. Neither history, which furnishes our inductions, nor 
 the theory of evolution, which extends and confirms them, 
 warrants this belief. History shows a gradual decay of the 
 diflferent governmental institutions, in civilized communi- 
 ties ; the theory of evolution shows how, for the influence 
 of visible authority, which is decreasing, is substituted the 
 influence of an invisible authority of much greater efficacy. 
 From the fact that the action of a temporal government, 
 and of a spiritual government, has been necessary and 
 legitimate, it is not fair to conclude that it always will be. 
 This error proceeds from the false idea men form of the 
 social function of government under one or another shape. 
 It is assumed that government is called to direct citizens 
 in their action. According to Mr. Spencer, nothing is less 
 true. For the origin of this error we must go back to the 
 old anthropomorphic conception which has hitherto shaped 
 all our explanations of things, and which still, in our own 
 time, holds so wide an empire. The man who believed 
 that the sun and the moon had been launched into space 
 by an almighty hand, that man had been modeled in clay 
 by an artist of supernatural skill, believed according to the 
 same way of thinking that the society to which he belonged 
 had been fashioned and regulated, either directly Ijy Provi- 
 
98 EVOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 dence, or indirectly by the supreme wisdom which inspired 
 an all-powerful legislator. This way of thinking stiU re- 
 curs in our own time. People are still inclined. to ascribe 
 to the institutions of the past an august character that ex- 
 alts them above our criticisms. " It is the wisdom of the 
 sovereign, it is the wisdom of our fathers," say they, " that 
 has created this or that institution." There are some who 
 think that a social state is the work of governors, tlie happy 
 result of the thoughts of the men of genius whom the na- 
 tions have been fortunate enough to possess, or the corrupt 
 product of the vices and evil -passions of those who have 
 governed them. It is a mistake. A society, like every con- 
 crete existence, is the product of a development under, fixed 
 laws. The institutions that constitute the essence of it 
 existed first in the germ ; afterward, by a slow and insen- 
 sible development, under the pressure of necessity, and, 
 through the activity of interested individuals, it has at- 
 tracted the notice of contemporaries, who consecrated it by 
 an act of legislative power ; but nobody designed or estab- 
 lished it all at once. The most considerable social facts 
 attest this, and the less important facts as well. The le- 
 gislative changes,. which succeed in overturning a secular 
 institution, seem to contradict this opinion. A law is 
 passed, functionaries are appointed to carry it into execu- 
 tion ; here, it seems, is the beginning of a series. This, 
 again, is an error ; the innovation has a deeper root than 
 the wiU of legislators. These, whether they suspect it or 
 misunderstand it, are the mouth-pieces of the national will, 
 the resultant of the sentiments that prevail in the coimtry. 
 " Law is not a creation, it is a natural product of the char- 
 acter of the people." ' That explains why the aristocratic 
 and reactionary constitution of Sylla, the essentiiEiUy wise 
 and useful reforms of Cromwell, the democratic institutions 
 founded by the authors of the French Revolution, so soon 
 
 ' Spencer, " Essays : The Social Organism." 
 
INFLUENCE OP THE SOCIAL CONDITION. J|9 
 
 perished. Men of genius may ." derange,' retard, or help 
 the close work that goes on naturally in .society, they have 
 no p'owBr to determine its course, . . . great men are the 
 products of the society in which they appear. But for 
 certain antecedents, a certain .level of national 'character, 
 they could not have been born, they would not have re- 
 ceived the cultme that formed them. If* there is truth in 
 laying that society owes to theni in. some degree its form, 
 it is truer yet that they owe to' it their fprjn: they have 
 received from their ancestors the traits that distinguish 
 thenif a kind of congenital bent, their beliefs, their knowl- 
 edge, their aspirations." .' • , 
 
 These cohsiderations determine. the idea- that shptild be 
 formed of the 'province of government; it is npt, and it 
 Ought not tO'be, an imitator. It has been said that gov^ 
 ernment is a necessary evil, and that natiotis ever have the 
 government they deseirve. These' projiositions are essen- 
 tially true. Government is. the whole body of institutions, 
 of constraining apparatus that give ch6ck to the antisocial 
 tendencies, .and maintain the equilibrium between the con- 
 ditions of social life at a given moment and the traditional 
 dispositions, the vestiges of an anterior, social state: gov- 
 ernment is a function c.orrespondir(g to the immorality of 
 Society. A bad government corresponds to a bad social 
 state, that is, to a combination of social ' phenomena pro- 
 duced by bad passions and beliefs. " The social state, of 
 whatever epoch, is the resultant of all the ambitions, of all 
 the personal interests, bf the sentiments .of fear, respect, 
 indignation, sympathy, as they exist among the citizens of 
 that epoch, or as they isxist'ed among their ancestors in 
 previous epochs." * From the time when the human race, 
 multiplying, covered the globe so that the individuals com- 
 posing it find themselves in presence of one another, and 
 
 ' Spencer, " Easays : The Social Organism.'' 
 
 ' Sgencer, " Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte." 
 
100 EVOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 can satisfy their desires only by struggling for its posses- 
 sion, till our era, social forms have always shown this 
 correlation between preponderating sentiments and the 
 rigor of authority. The development of the moral sense 
 gradually brings on the fall of coercive institutions. Re- 
 spect for authority declines in proportion as respect for the 
 right of the individuals increases. But it is too evident 
 that we are far from this adjustment of man to the social 
 state. To say nothing of treasons, knaveries, robberies of 
 all sorts, violences, intrigues, and corruptions, which the 
 penal law does not touch, the infractions of sacred rights 
 and the crimes that it tries to punish, attest that we still 
 bear in our hearts remains of the old predatory manners 
 of primitive cannibalism. There are still reasons for the 
 existence of government, that is to say, there is room yet 
 for a protective institution. 
 
 The true function of government, says Mr. Spencer, is 
 the protection of the governed. This definition was always 
 good ; but, the notion men form of the protection which 
 the governed may claim, and which is his due, has not al- 
 ways been understood in the same sense. To establish 
 justice, although the sole title to existence of its authority, 
 has not always been its sole occupation. At the epoch 
 when it was surrounded with the most respect, it was called 
 on to regulate the conduct of individuals, their costumes, 
 their credences, their private undertakings ; not to see that 
 this or that piece of injustice was not done, but that this 
 thing prejudged good, was. The law of specialization of 
 functions, of which physiology and political economy offer 
 us so many examples, wills that, in becoming more skillful 
 to perform one function, an organ shall become less' skill- 
 ful to perform others. The best form of government then 
 will be that which best fulfills the true end of authority, 
 even thotigh it give but moderate results in respect to the 
 other attributes ascribed to it, or still arrogated by it. If 
 
THE ESSENTIAL OFFICE OF GOVEENMENT. 101 
 
 it shows incapacity there, it is because it works outside of 
 its sphere. It ought to contract itself. " In different lands, 
 and at various times, the state has performed a hundred 
 different offices. Perhaps no two governments have re- 
 sembled "each other in the number and nature of the duties 
 they thought themselves obliged to discharge; but one 
 duty has never been entirely neglected by any — the duty 
 of protection ; which proves that to be its essential fune- • 
 tion. . . . The duty of the state is to protect, to maintain 
 the rights of men, in other words, to administer justice." ' 
 Representative government, so defective when it comes to 
 massing the wills and forces of a country for practical con- 
 currence toward an end judged useful, that it has been 
 accused of retarding with us the development of industry, 
 is well fitted to perform the true office of government, the 
 protection of rights. To it nations have recourse when 
 they would bridle oppression, check injustice, stop the de- 
 moralizations of the heads of the state, abolish the abuses 
 of privilege, and the rights of castes founded on inequality. 
 The sentiment of equity, which is never quite absent from 
 the mind of the least cultivated members of society, suf- 
 fices to discover and to perfect the means of abolishing un- 
 just practices, and experience has proved that the vitality 
 of this sentiment may be relied on, that it knows how to 
 assert itself in spite of aH the imperfections, whether specu- 
 lative or practical, which characterize what has been called 
 the political incapacity of the conunon people and the 
 laboring classes. " Parliamentary government is the best 
 of all for the work a government ought to do ; it is the 
 worst of all for the work a government ought not to do." ' 
 It is the office of a government to secure the inviolability 
 of the law of equality in liberty; it is not its business to 
 seek means by which the citizens may obtain happiness, 
 
 ' Spencer, "Social Statics," p. 280. 
 
 » Spencer, " Essays : Kepreseatative GoTemment." 
 
102 EVOLUTION AND GOVEKNMENT. 
 
 nor to conduct them to it. For the rest, parliamentary 
 government, as it exists at present in countries where it is 
 best established, and where it produces its finest fruits, is 
 still but a transitory form of government ; it is best adapted 
 to a society wherein the violent and predatory manners 
 that characterized the past ages have not yet given place 
 to manners founded on justice. It is a form in which the 
 two legitimate forces that by their balance secure the regu- 
 lar march of social progress — the conservative spirit and 
 the spirit of radical reform — may best assert themselves ; 
 the first, affirming the necessity of still imposing on the 
 governed the constraint of institutions which the state of 
 human immorality and savagery once made necessary ; the 
 second, dreaming of the realization of an ideal social state, 
 which will never come until man shall have reached the 
 stature of a perfectly moral being. The force of conserva- 
 tive sentiments, and the force of reformatory sentiments, 
 express by their strife and by the resultant of their ten- 
 dencies, the degree of morality in a community. The tri- 
 umph of the former indicates a predominance of violent 
 habitudes, the victory of the latter proves that the moral 
 habitudes of respect for rights preponderate. A society 
 may be judged by the proportion of constraint employed 
 on its citizens in the name of human law, and the propor- 
 tion of voluntary obedience to the moral law of equality in 
 liberty. Where the one fails the other comes in. If the 
 moral law has insufficient power over hearts, constraint 
 must supply the deficiency; But, on the other hand, 
 when the moral law is strong enough, constraint must dis- 
 appear. ' 
 
 Then all government becomes uselesSj nay, mischievous, 
 a;nd men feel such an aversion toward the restrja.ints of au- 
 thority, they " show themselves so jealous of their rights, 
 that government of every kind becomes impossible. Ad- 
 mirable illustration of the simplicity, of Nature : the same 
 
THE TENDENCY OF SOCIAL PEOGEESS. 103 
 
 sentiment that makes us fit for freedom makes us freci" ' 
 Between the absolute monarchy of the Eastern despots, 
 the tyrants of antiquity, and of Italy in the middle ages, 
 who knew no other restraint than the fear of revolt and 
 assassination; between this political r^^ime, adapted to a 
 state of very inferior morality, wherein unrestrained vices 
 rendered energetic restraint necessary, and the final de- 
 mocracy, in which the nation will be the true deliberative 
 body, and will cause its wishes to be executed by dele- 
 gates charged with imperative mandates,, a society whose 
 members will no more eijcroach on the rights of their 
 neighbors, there are forms that look paradoxical because 
 they allow room for- two opposite sentiments. The rep- 
 resentative government, monarchical or republican, which 
 all civilized nations at present adopt, may appear absurd 
 to thinkers who look at it from the absolute point of view ; 
 it is rational in the eyes of those who see in a government 
 the expressed sentiments of the people who sustain it. 
 "Here," adds Mr. Spencer, "we have a fine example in 
 support of the law that opinion is ultimately determined 
 by sentiment, and not, as Comte claimed, by intelligence." ' 
 In place, then, of a social form in which the greater part 
 of the nation is excluded from political rights, in which the 
 function of civil government belongs to the body that pos- 
 sesses fortune, and the function of moral and intellectual 
 government is in the hajids of the body that possesses knowl- 
 edge, " we advance toward a form in whicli authority will 
 be reduced to a miniinum, and liberty carried to the maxi- 
 mum. Human nature will be so well moulded by social 
 discipline, so fitted for sociar life, that it will no longer 
 have need of external constraint, and will restrain , itself. 
 The citizen wiir tolerate no encroachment on his liberty, 
 other than that which assures to all an equal liberty. The 
 
 ' Speiicer, "Social Statics,". p. 467; 
 
 ' Spencer, " Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of Oomte." 
 
104 EVOLUTION AND GOVEENMENT. 
 
 supreme authority will have no other office than to secure 
 the conditions under -which individuals can, by free asso- 
 ciations, develop industry and acquit themselves of all 
 other social duties. , Finally, the life of the individual will 
 be elevated to the highest degree compatible with the 
 social life, and this will have but one aim, to guard against 
 all infringement the sphere of individual existence." ' Far 
 from subordinating the individual more and more to a su- 
 perior authority, social progress will more and more eman- 
 cipate him. If, ultimately, he is more dependent on his 
 kind, it is for the satisfaction of his different needs by the 
 same title that others depend on him : the dependence is 
 reciprocal, and one that may exist under a rkgime in which 
 equality reigns simultaneously with liberty. Not only does 
 social progress, reached under the law of the instability of 
 the homogeneous, tend to dissolve the political bodies ap- 
 pointed by the community to discharge the different func- 
 tions of government, it dissolves also the aggregates formed 
 by the voluntary union of the members of society, the par- 
 ties, the churches, the sects, in which they combine their 
 sentiments and forces with a view to common action. The 
 parties, breaking into smaller . and smaller fractions, must 
 perish through the multiplicity of their divisions. The in- 
 creasing attenuation of the distinctive characteristics of 
 these groups will slowly lead to universal nonconformity, 
 to the suppression of all common regulation, even of such 
 as has been submitted to with free consent, to the com- 
 plete independence of the individual. "In place of an 
 artificial uniformity, according to a prescribed pattern, 
 humanity will present^ as Nature does, a general resem- 
 blance, varied by infinitesimal differences," ' 
 
 In this progressive march toward the independence of 
 the individual, when imposed authority and accepted au> 
 
 ' Spencer, " Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of Comte." 
 'Spencer, " Social Statics," p. 476. 
 
BXTEENAL MORAL AUTHOBITT. 105 
 
 thorities are abolished alike, the moral power must yield 
 to the same fate. Humanity is not forever condemned to 
 choose between a brutal submission to force, or a no less 
 humiliating submission of the mind to the decisions of an 
 outward tribunal. There is an illusion in this matter. The 
 decrease of the empire of force is due to the fact that men 
 are become more moral, more capable of respecting one 
 another. The power of moral ideas need not be incar- 
 nated in a body organized to rule conduct and opinion, 
 and armed with the power to censure and excommunicate. 
 The force of free opinion, uno£5cial, is enough. In propor- 
 tion as the opinion shall become more moral, it will be 
 more powerful to repress infractions of the law of human 
 respect. At this point the powerful apparatus of moral 
 constraint represented by the Church, theological or posi- 
 tivist, will have no longer a ground of existence ; it should 
 not and cannot outlast humanity's need of its services. In- 
 stitutions civil and religious, the power of force and the 
 moral power of religion, are protecting envelopes which 
 aid wonderfully the development of society. But when 
 the forms they haye shielded during the period of their 
 growth have attained their full development, they are 
 simply obstacles which the social being puts off, sheds, 
 as it were, keeping all the while the good acquired 
 under their protection. " From age to age tyrannical laws 
 hav« been abolished, and the administration of justice, so 
 far from being injured by it, has, on the contrary, been 
 purified. The dead and buried beliefs have not carried 
 away with them the foundation of morality which they em- 
 bodied ; that exists still, but purged of the taint of super- 
 stition." ' 
 
 We are far from claiming that these pages give a com- 
 plete idea of Mr. Herbert Spencer's work. Our purpose 
 has been to indicate the place that, in our view, Mr. Spen- 
 ' Herbert Spencer, " Essays : Manners and Fashion." 
 
106 EVOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 oer occupies among contemporaneous thinkers, not to pass 
 under review all the elements of his philosophy, nor to fol- 
 low him into all the questions he has seen fit to treat. We 
 have been content; to explain his method, and to trace the 
 march of his thought from the moment of his conception- 
 6f the idea of progress as the guarantee of future happiness 
 for humanity, to the quite recent period when he has fixed 
 in a final formula the natural law of advance which ex- 
 plains and secures the realization of the progress of the 
 race. Fina,lly, we had to note the "differences that sepa- 
 rate the doctrines of Mr. Spencer (romjihe French posi- 
 tivism, the only concisely formulated ' doctrine that rep- 
 resents the experimental philosophy among ourselves. 
 This suffices for au appreciation of the general char- 
 acter of Mr.; Spencer's doctrine, and for a recognition of 
 its originality: - 
 
 The philosophy of Mr. Spencer resolves for the first 
 time the difficult problem raised by .the ancient conflict be- 
 tween religion and science, here represented by philosophy, 
 which is its highest expression. It has been maintained 
 that this conflict must end-in the complete overthrow of 
 one of the two adversaries, either the subjugation of science 
 by religion, or the entire suppression of teligion. The suc- 
 cessive defeats inflicted by criticism on theology seemed 
 to justify the belief that of the two combatants it is religion 
 that must go down. Mr. Spencer's philpsophy gives proof 
 of great originality by its interpretation - of this struggle, 
 hitherto incessant) and, by showing how it may and must 
 at last cease, it demonstrates the legitimacy of religion, 
 while at the same time it secures the independence of 
 science by exactly defining its sphere. If religion be the 
 expression of an indestructible sentiment, because it has 
 for its object a positive transcendent existence attested 
 by consciousness — an existence that criticism leaves un 
 touched, and that science cannot help assuming-+-religion 
 
RELIGION PEBMANENT AND PROGRESSIVE. 107 
 
 is indestructible; the' hiunan mind will not ce.ase to specu- 
 late on this transcendent existence, and to ascribe to it 
 forms that make it conceivable. The theological concep- 
 tions: and the practical institutions /which spring from 
 religion will pass away, but religion will not pass away. 
 In the future, as in the pasf^ it will save :the' mind ^om 
 the danger o£ becoming absorbed in ithe exelusire con- 
 sideration ;of relative existence,: and, though powerless 
 to raise it. to inowledge, lif the absohilej- wiU raise it 
 so far above- the "plane of simple concrete xelationa that 
 it can better feel the immensity -of 'that /unconditioned 
 being which none of our conoeptidnsj: however vast and 
 bold they may be, are adequate to r^resent. / /^ 
 • StUl, in its: attempts lat representatioH,. the 'mind, is 
 obliged to borrow images from the order of phenomena; 
 the religious sentiment: builds up its transcendent beliefs 
 with materials f famished by science;. its conceptions are 
 submitted to the law of evolution.^ It must not fashion 
 them arbitrarily, nor draw from the conceptions of igno- 
 rant ages elements that are in contradiction with the posi- 
 tive notions of more enlightened periods. It must remem-r 
 ber that the conception it adojpts being inadequate, a pure 
 symbol, its value must whoUy depend on its conformity 
 with the highest conceptions of science. Far froin im- 
 posing on speculation, as applied to the phenomenal world, 
 the' bridle of a pregstablished religious dogma, religion 
 ought to renew its symT3ols in accordance with the develop^ 
 ments of science. J£, as it has done in the past and still 
 tries to do; religidfi were to succeed in thus bridling sci- 
 encej it might arrest its natural movement, bntj by a just 
 and inevitable reaction, it "would ■ cease to find there the 
 elements of criticism and renovation whic^ -its beliefs re- 
 quire for theit- development^ and for their contribution to 
 the moral progress df humanity. On its part science, ap- 
 prehendiiig only the manifestatioas of the absolute being 
 
lOS EVOLUTION AND GOVERNMENT. 
 
 that are relative to us, and reducing them all to manifesta- 
 tions of force, cannot, by its most comprehensive theories, 
 prejudge the essence of tlie absolute Being. The genuine 
 characteristic of scientific theories, and especially of the 
 one that brings them back to unity, is not that they be 
 spiritualistic or materialistic, religious or anti-religious, but 
 that they be true ; and the decision must be made not in 
 the interest of a religious dogma, any more than in the in- 
 terest of a favorable metaphysical belief, but in the interest 
 of the principle which serves as a criterion of truth, the 
 indissolubility of the association of the states of conscious- 
 ness which these theories express. 
 
 Religion, then, is legitimate, and science is indispensa- 
 ble. This Mr. Spencer declares in a system of philosophy 
 free as well from the religious as from the anti-religious 
 prejudices, which, for a generation, have been blindly at 
 war. More than this, religion has need of science not 
 only by what, she lends it, but by the help she receives 
 from it. 
 
 " Doubtless science is the enemy of the superstitions that 
 cloak themselves with the name of religion, but it is not 
 the enemy of the essential religion which the superstitions 
 darken. Doubtless in the science of to-day there reigns an 
 irreligious spirit, but not in the true science, which, not 
 stopping at the surface, penetrates to the depths of Na- 
 ture. . . . With regard to human traditions, and the au- 
 thority that consecrates them, true science maintains a lofty 
 attitude ; but, before the impenetrable veil that hides the 
 absolute, it humbles itself; it is at once truly proud and 
 truly humble. The sincere philosopher alone (and by these 
 words we mean not the astronomer, who computes dis- 
 tances, nor the naturalist, who defines species, but he who, 
 through the. lower seeks the higher, to stop only at the 
 highest), the sincere philosopher alone can know how high 
 — we say not above human knowledge, but above human 
 
HARMONY or RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 109 
 
 conception — is the universal power, whereof Nature, life, 
 thought, are manifestations." ' 
 
 It is already a high tribute to the originality of a phi- 
 losophy, that it lays down the preliminaries of a treaty of 
 perpetual peace between religion and science. The phi- 
 losophy of Mr. Spencer enjoys above all others a privilege 
 no less dignified than this. While some confine themselves 
 to speculation on the data of science, without concerning 
 themselves with action, and others build up theories of ac- 
 tion on insufficient or disputable data, the philosophy of 
 Mr. Herbert Spencer is able to deduce from the loftiest of 
 his speculations ends of action for men in society. In 
 showing us in the evolution of humanity the efiect of a law 
 guaranteed and explained by the universal laws that flow 
 from the first principle, the persistence of force, it teaches 
 us that the progress of society consists of a series of states 
 of unstable equilibrium, covering, relatively to us, vast pe- 
 riods, and alwaj's liable to be overturned by the shock of 
 outward circumstances, to reconstitute themselves after- 
 ward, sometimes on an inferior model in the rank of prog- 
 ress, sometimes on a superior model, according to the ac- 
 tion of these game circumstances, and the condition of the 
 social unities disengaged from their former aggregations. 
 It shows us, moreover, the strict solidarity that unites man- 
 hind in the nation, and even in the race ; it explains the 
 important part that human actions play in preparing the 
 social arrangements that constitute the temporarily per- 
 manent conditions of equilibrium, and in originating the 
 causes that later bring on social perturbations ; it makes 
 us feel the mutual dependence which diffuses fKroughout 
 the social body the good as well as the evil that a single 
 individual can do, the reaction which visits on the indi- 
 vidual or the nation the evil and the good that individual 
 or nation may perform ; finally, propagation, which causes 
 
 ' Herbert Spencer, "Education." 
 
110 ETOLUTION AND GOVEKNMENT. 
 
 to echo in a country the violent transgressions of the moral 
 law that are perpetrated in a distant land. ; By this teach- 
 ing, so fruitful in social applications, the philosophy of Mr. 
 Spencer seems to us especially^ calculated to give encour- 
 agement to action. So long as his sentiment of duty is 
 unenUghtened, man remains in ignorance of Tvhat he ought 
 to do; he hesitates and is liable to go astray : instructed in 
 the conditions under. which the law of s-ocial progress is 
 fulfilled, he knows what direction he should take ; he pei> 
 ceives at what point the intelligent forces, united for a 
 common purpose, the advancement of human happiness, 
 should apply their irresistible lever. He knows, too, that 
 the force he expends on this labor will-have its effect, that 
 his indifference or ill-will must inevitably produce disas: 
 trous effects. He sees " clearly, in the natural constitution 
 of thingSj" recompenses and penalties certain in quite 
 another fashion from those tha,t " the traditional beliefs 
 announce." This certainty sustains and animates him, 
 because he perceives " that the natural laws he obeys are 
 at once inexorable and beneficent. . He sees that, by con- 
 formity with them, people march toward a higher degr€e 
 of perfection, and reach a higher degree of happiness. F'or 
 this reason he urges their observance, for this reason he is 
 indignant at their misapprehension. • Jt is in affirming the 
 eternal principles of liings, and the necessity of obeying 
 them, that he. shows himself essentially religious." ' 
 
 In this way Mr. ifierbert Spencer gives the liand ^p re- 
 ligion, under the elevated form it i§ coming, to assume in 
 our day,; and, at the same time, sidheres to the doctrines of 
 the positive thinkers. He recognizes the nov/menon be- 
 neath the phenomenon, lie- feels the eternal behind: the 
 transitory, he ^shows happiness to , be the result of obedi- 
 ence io a divine law -of equality joined with liberty, which 
 will be attained by the observance of justice, and of, that 
 * Herbert Spencer, " Education." 
 
THE HIGHEST DEGREE Of LIBERTY. m 
 
 otter virtue which consists in abstinence from a right that 
 may injure another, and in doing cheerfully what con- 
 tributes to another's happiness, a virtue which he calls 
 beneficence, and whichj in Christian speech, goes by the 
 name of charity. Finally, with the positivists, he admits 
 the necessity of knowing the law in order to obey it ; if, 
 to use the language of one of these, he seeks nobleness of 
 life in liberty, he finds the highest degree of liberty in 
 obedience to the eternal law. 
 
 Septbhbeb, 187^• 
 
APPEIJfDIX, 
 
 HEKBEET SPEJ^CEE A^D THE DOOTEmE 
 OF EVOLUTION: 
 
 DELIVEEED BEFOEE THE NEW YOKE LIBEKAL CLXJB, 
 JUNE 5, 1874,. 
 
 By E. L. T0TJMA¥S. 
 
HERBEET SPENCEE 
 
 DOCTEINE OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 The change that has taken plaice in the world of 
 thought within our own time, regarding the doctrine of 
 Evolution, is something quite unprecedented in the history 
 of progressive ideas. Twenty years ago that doctrine was 
 almost universally scouted as a groundless and absurd 
 speculation ; now, it is admitted as an established principle 
 by many of the ablest men of science;, and is almost univer- 
 sally conceded to have a basis of truth, whatever form it 
 may ultimately take. It is, moreover, beginning to exert 
 a powerful influence in the investigation and mode of con- 
 sidering many subjects ; while those who avow their belief 
 in it are no longer pointed at as graceless reprobates or in- 
 corrigible fools. 
 
 With this general reversal of judgment regarding the 
 doctrine, and from th6 prominence it has assumed as a 
 matter of public criticism and discussion, there is naturally 
 an increasing interest in the question of its origin and 
 authorship ; and also, as we might expect, a good deal of 
 misapprehensidn about it. The name of Herbert Spencer 
 has been long associa,ted, in the public mind, with the idea 
 of Evolution. And, while ihat idea was passing thtough 
 what may be called its stage of execration, there was no 
 hesitancy in according to him all tie infainy of' its pater- 
 
116 HEBBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 nity ; but, when the infamy is to be changed to honor, by 
 a kind of perverse consistency of injustice there turns out 
 to be a good deal less alacrity in making the revised award. 
 That the system of doctrine put forth by Mr. Spencer would 
 meet with strong opposition was inevitable. Representing 
 the most advanced opinions, and disturbing widely-cher- 
 ished beliefs at many points, it was natural that it should 
 be strenuously resisted and unsparingly criticised. Nor 
 is this to be regretted, as it is by conflict that truth is- 
 elicited ; and those who, after candid examination, hold 
 his teachings to be erroneous and injurious, are certainly 
 justified in condemning them. With such, at the present 
 time, I have no controversy, but propose to deal with quite 
 another class of critics. There are men of eminence, lead- 
 ers of opinion, who neither know nor care much for what 
 Mr. Spencer thinks or has done, but are quite ready with 
 their verdicts about him ; and, so long as it is not gener- 
 ally known to what an extent we are indebted to him for 
 having originated and elaborated the greatest doctrine of 
 the age, these superficial and careless deliverances from 
 conspicuous men become very misleading and injurious. 
 By many he is regarded as only a clever and versatile 
 essayist, ambitious of writing upon every thing, and who 
 has done something to popularize the views of Mr. Dar- 
 win and other scientists. For example, M. Taine, in a 
 late Paris journal, says : " Mr. Spencer possesses the rare 
 merit of having extended to the sum of phenomena — to 
 the whole history of Nature and of mind — ^the two master- 
 thoughts which, for the past thirty years, have been giv- 
 ing new form to the positive sciences; the one being Mayer 
 and Joule's Conservation of Energy, the other Darwin's 
 Natural Selection." Colonel Higginson says' : " Mr. Spen- 
 cer has what Talleyrand caUs the weakness of omniscience, 
 and must write not alone on astronomy, metaphysics, and 
 banking, but also on music, on dancing, on style." And 
 ' Estimating Spencer, in tSe Friend o/2'rogress, 1864. 
 
THE DOCTEINE OF EVOLUTION. 117 
 
 again: "It seems rather absurd to attribute to him, as a 
 scientific achievement, any vast enlargement or further 
 generalization of the modern scientific doctrine of evolu- 
 tion." To the same effect, Mr. Emerson, -when recently- 
 called upon by a newspaper interviewer to furnish his 
 opinions of great men, declared Mr. Spencer to be noth- 
 ing better than a " stock-writer, who writes equally well 
 upon all subjects." 
 
 These are not the circumspect and instructive utter- 
 ances which we should look for from men of authority 
 whose opinions are sought and are valued by the public ; 
 they are gross and inexcusable misrepresentations, and ex- 
 emplify a style of criticism that is now so freely indulged 
 in that it requires to be met, in the common interest of jus- 
 tice and truth. By theii> estimates of Mr. Spencer, the 
 gentlemen quot(3d have raised the question of his position 
 as a thinker, and the character and claims of his intellect- 
 ual work, I follow their lead, and propose, on the pres- 
 ent occasion, to bring forward some considerations which 
 may help to a more trustworthy judgment upon the sub- 
 ject. Assuming the foregoing statements to be representa- 
 tive, it will be worth while to see what becomes of them 
 under examination. My object wiU. be, less to expound or 
 to defend Mr. Spencer's views, than to trace his mental 
 history, and the quality and extent of his labors, as dis- 
 closed by an analysis and review of his published writings. 
 
 And, first, let us glance at the general condition of 
 thought in relation to the origination of things when he 
 began its investigation. Character is tested by emergen- 
 cies, as well in the world of ideas as in the world of action; 
 and it is by his bearing in one of the great crises of our 
 progressive knowledge of Nature, that Mr. Spencer is to be 
 measured. 
 
 Down to the early part of the present century it had 
 generally been believed that this world, with all that it 
 
118 HEKBEET SPENCER AND. : 
 
 contains, was "suddenly called, into existence but a few 
 thbusand years ago in much the same oonditibh as we now 
 see it. Throughout Christendom it was held with the 
 earnestness of religious conviction, that the universe was 
 a Divine manufacture, made out of nothing in a week, 
 and set at once to running: in .all. its present' perfection. 
 This doctrine was something more than a mere item of 
 faith ; it was a complete theory of the method of origin of 
 natural things, and it' gave shape to a whole body of sci- 
 ence, philosophy, and common opinion, which was inter- 
 preted in accordance with this theory. The problem of 
 origins was thus authoritatively solved, and life, mind, 
 man, and all Nature, were studied under the hypothesis of 
 •their late and sudden production. 
 
 But it vcas difficult to inquire into the existing order of 
 Nature without tracing it backward. Modern science was 
 long restrained frorn this procedure by the power of tradi- 
 tional belief s, but the force of facts arid reasoning at length 
 proved too strong for these beliefs, and it was demon- 
 strated that the prevailing notion concerning the recent ori- 
 gin of the world was not true. Dverwhelming evidence was 
 found that the uiiiverse did not come into existence in the 
 condition in which we now see it, nor in any thing Kke that 
 condition ; but that the present order of things is the out- 
 come of a vast series of changes running back to an indefinite 
 and incalculable antiquity. It was proved that the present 
 forms and distributions of mountains, valleys, continents, 
 and oceans, are but the final terms of a 'stupendous course 
 of transformations to which the crust of the earth has been 
 subjected. It was also established, that life has stretched 
 back for untold millions, of years ; that multitudes of its 
 forms arose and perished in a determinate succession, while 
 the last appearing are highest in grade, as if by some prin- 
 ciple of order and progression. 
 
 It is obvious that one of the great epochs of thought 
 
THE DOCTRINE OP EYOLUTION. 119 
 
 had now been reached ;■ for the point of view from which 
 natural things are to be regarded, was fundamentally and 
 forever altered. But, as it is impossible to escape at once 
 and c(»npletely from the dominion / of: old ideas, the full 
 import of the position was far from bpilig recognized, 
 and different. classes. of the thinking, world, were naturally 
 very differently- .affected ;hy the .new discoveries.. To the 
 mass of people' who inherit itheir' opinions and rarely Tin- 
 quire into the grounds upon ;which they rest, the changed 
 view was of no moment ; noB had. the geological revelations 
 much interest to the Ktefary classes, beyond, that of bare 
 oimosity about strange and. remote speculations. To the 
 theologians, howeverj ithe- step. that had been taken was of 
 grave concern. They: were the proprietors of the old. view ; 
 they claimed for it supernatural authority,, and strenuously 
 maintained that its subversion .would be the subversion of 
 religion, itself. . They maintained, moreover, that the con- 
 troversy i involved the very existence of God-^ The ;most 
 famili&r. concejption of the Deity was that of a Creator, 
 and creation was held' to 'mean the grand six-day drama 
 of calling the universe into .existence ; whUe this transcen- 
 dent display of power had always^ been devoutly held as 
 alike the exemplification and the proof of the Divine attri- 
 butes. How deep and tenacious was the old error is shown 
 by the fact that, although it has been completely exploded ; 
 although the immeasurable antiquity of the earth and the 
 progressive order of its life have been demonstrated and 
 admitted by all intelligent people, yet the piulpit still clings 
 to the old conceptions, and the traditional view is that 
 which generally prevails among the multitude.' 
 
 To men of .science the new position was, of course, id 
 the highest degree, important.. It was stated by Pi-of. 
 Sedgwick, in' an anniversary address to the Geological So- 
 ciety of London inl831, as follows : "We have a series ol 
 
 ' Bee Note A, p. 1B9. 
 
120 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 proofs the most emphatic and convincing that the approach 
 to the present system of things has been gradual, and that 
 there has been a progressive development of organic struct- 
 ure subservient to the purposes of life." The traditional 
 explanation of the origin of the vforld, and all that be- 
 longs to it, being thus discredited, it only remained to seek 
 another explanation: if it has not been done oneway, how 
 has it been done ? was the inevitable question. One might 
 suppose that the effect of the utter break-down of the old 
 hypothesis would have been to relegate the whole question 
 to the sphere of science, but this was far from being done. 
 The preternatural solution had failed, but its only logical 
 alternative, a natural solution, or the thorough investi- 
 gation of the subject on principles of causation, was not 
 adopted or urged. The geologists occupied themselves in 
 extending observations and accumulating facts rather than 
 in working out any comprehensive scientific or philosoph- 
 ical principles from the new point of view. The result 
 was a kind of tacit compromise betwe'en the contending 
 parties — ^the theologians conceding the vast antiquity of 
 the earth, and the geologists conceding preternatural in- 
 tervention in the regular on-working of the scheme ; so 
 that in place of one mighty miracle of creation occurring 
 a few thousand years ago, there was substituted the 
 idea of hundreds of thousands 6t separate miracles of 
 special creation scattered all along the geological ages, to 
 account for the phenomena of terrestrial life. Two sys- 
 tems of agencies — natural and supernatural — ^were thus 
 ' invoked to explain the production of effects. What it 
 now concerns us to note is, that the subject had not yet 
 been brought into the domain of science. One portion 
 of it was stUl held to be above Nature, and therefore inac- 
 cessible to rational inquiry.; while that part of the problem 
 which was withheld from science was really the key to the 
 whole situation. Under the new view the question of the 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 131 
 
 origin of living forms, or of the action of natural agencies 
 in their production, was as completely barred to science as 
 it had formerly been under the literal Mosaic interpreta- 
 tion ; and, as questions of origin were thus virtually inter- 
 dicted, the old traditional opinions regarding the genesis of 
 the present constitution of things remained in full force. 
 
 It is in relation to this great crisis in the course of ad- 
 vancing thought that Herbert Spencer is to be regarded. 
 Like many others, he assumed, at the outset, that the study 
 of the whole phenomenal sphere of Nature belongs to sci- 
 ence ; but he may claim the honor of being the first to 
 discern the full significance of the new intellectual posi- 
 tion. It had been proved that a vast course of orderly 
 changes in the past has led up to the present, and is lead- 
 ing on to the future : Mr. Spencer saw that it was of 
 transcendent moment that the laws of these changes be 
 determined. If natural agencies have been at work in 
 vast periods of time to bring about the present condi- 
 tion of things, he perceived that a new set of problems 
 of immense range and importance is opened to inqmry, 
 the efEect of which must be to work an extensive revolu- 
 tion of ideas. It was apparent to him that the hitherto 
 forbidden question as to how things have originated had 
 at length come to be the supreme question. When the 
 cpnception that the present order had been called into 
 being at once and in all its completeness was found to be 
 no longer defensible, it was claimed that it makes no dif- 
 ference how it originated — -that the existing system is the 
 same whatever may have been its source. Mr. Spencer 
 saw, on the contrary, that the question how things have 
 been caused is fundamental ; and that we can have no real 
 understanding of what they are, without first knowing how 
 they came to be what they are. Starting from the point 
 of view made probable by the astronomers, and demon- 
 strated by the geologists, that, in the mighty past, Nature 
 6 
 
122 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 has conformed to one system of laws ; and assuming that 
 the existing order, at anytime, is to be regarded as growing 
 out of a preexisting order, Mr. Spencer saw that nothing 
 remained for science but to consider all the contents of 
 Nature from the same point of view. It was, therefore, 
 apparent that life, mind, man, science, art, language, mo- 
 rality, society, government, and institutions, are things 
 that have undergone a gradual and continuous unfolding, 
 and can be explained in no other way than by a theory of 
 growth and derivation. It is not claimed that Mr. Spencer 
 was the first to adopt this mode of inquiry in relation to 
 special subjects, but that he was the first to grasp it as a 
 general method, the first to see that it must give us a new 
 view of human nature, a new science of mind, a new theory 
 of society — all as parts of one coherent body of thought, 
 and that he was the first to work out a comprehensive philo- 
 sophical system from this point of inquiry, or on the basis of 
 the principle of Evolution. In a word, I maintain Spencer's 
 position as a thinker to be this : taking a view of Nature 
 that was not only generally discredited, but was virtually 
 foreclosed to research, he has done more than any other man 
 to make it the starting-point of a new era of knowledge. 
 
 For the proof of this I now appeal to his works. Let us 
 trace the rise and development of the conception of Evolu- 
 tion in his own mind, observe how he was led to it, and how 
 he pursued it, and see how completely it pervades and unifies 
 his entire intellectual career. Various explanatory details 
 that follow, I have obtained from conversations with Mr. 
 Spencer himself ; but the essential facts of the statement 
 are derived from his works, and may be easily verified by 
 any who choose to take the trouble of doing so. 
 
 Mr. Spencer is not a scholar in the current acceptation 
 of the term ; that is, he has not mastered the curriculum 
 of any university. Unbiased by the traditions of culture, 
 his early studies were in the sciences. Born in a sphere of 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 123 
 
 life which made a vocation necessary, he was educated as a 
 civil-engineer, ' and up to 1843, when he was twenty-two 
 years of age, he had written nothing but professional papers 
 published in the Civil Engineer and Architects' Journal. 
 But he had always been keenly interested in political and so- 
 cial questions, which he had almost daily heard discussed by 
 his father and uncles. In the summer of 1843 he began to 
 contribute a series of letters to a weekly newspaper, the 
 Nonconformist, under the title of " The Proper Sphere of 
 Government." It was the main object of these letters to 
 show that the functions of government should be limited 
 to the protection of life, property, and social order, leaving 
 all other social ends to be achieved by individual activities. 
 But, beyond this main conception, it was implied through- 
 out that there are such things as laws of social develop- 
 ment, natural processes of rectification in society, and an 
 adaptation of man to the conditions of social life. The 
 scientific point of view was thus early assumed, and society 
 was regarded not as a manufacture but as a growth. These 
 letters were revised and published in a pamphlet in 1843. 
 
 The argument, however, was unsatisfactory from its want 
 of depth and scientific precision, and Mr. Spencer decided in 
 1846 to write a work in which "t^e leading doctrine of his 
 pamphlet should be affiliated upon general moral principles. 
 By reading various books upon moral philosophy he had 
 become dissatisfied with the basis of morality which they 
 adopt; and it became clear to him that the question of the 
 proper sphere of government could be dealt with only by 
 tracing ethical principles to their roots. The plan of this 
 work was formed whUe Mr. Spencer was still a civil-engi- 
 neer ; and it was commenced in 1848, before he abandoned 
 engineering and accepted the position of sub-editor of the 
 Economist. It was issued, under the title of " Social Stat- 
 ics," at the close of 1850. In this work various develop- 
 
 • See Note B. 
 
124 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 ments of the ideas contained in the pamphlet above named 
 are noticeable. It will be seen that the conception that 
 there is an adaptation going on between human nature and 
 the social state has become dominant. There is the idea 
 that all social evils result from the want of this adaptation, 
 and are in process of disappearance as the adaptation pro- 
 gresses. There is the notion that all morality consists in 
 conformity to such principles of conduct as allow of the 
 life of each individual being fulfilled, to the uttermost, 
 consistently with the fulfillment of the lives of other indi- 
 vidaals ; and that the vital activities of the social human 
 being are gradually being moulded into such form that 
 they may be realized to the uttermost without mutual hin- 
 drance. Social progress is in fact viewed as a natural evolu- 
 tion, in which human beings are moulded into fitness for the 
 social state, and society adjusted into fitness for the natures 
 of men — ^the units and the aggregate perpetually acting 
 and reacting, until equilibrium is reached. There is recog- 
 nized not only, the process of continual direct adaptation 
 of men to their circumstances by the inherited modifications 
 of habit ; but there is also recognized the process of the 
 dying out of the unfit and the survival of the fit. And 
 these changes are regarded as parts of a process of general 
 evolution, tacitly affirmed as running through all animate 
 Nature, tending ever to produce a more complete and self- 
 sufficing individuality, and ending in the highest type of 
 man as the most complete individual. 
 
 After finishing " Social Statics " Mr. Spencer's thoughts 
 were more strongly attracted in the directions of biology 
 and psychology — sciences which he saw were most inti- 
 mately related with the progress of social questions ; and 
 one result reached at this time was significant. As he 
 states in the essay on the " Laws of Organic Form," pub- 
 lished in 1859 in the Medico- Chirurgical Heview, it was 
 in the autumn of 1851, during a country ramble with Mr. 
 
Lnm uvuxxiiaja vn' javuLiUTiUJN. 125 
 
 George Henry Lewes, that the germinal idea of that essay 
 was reached. This idea, that the forms of organisms, in 
 respect of the different kinds of their symmetry and asym- 
 metry, are caused by their different relations to surround- 
 ing incident forces, implies a general recognition of the 
 doctrine of Evolution, a further extension of the doctrine 
 of adaptation, and a foreshadowing of the theory of life 
 as a correspondence between inner and outer actions. 
 
 In 1853 Mr. Spencer published in the Westminster 
 Meview the " Theory of Population deduced from the Gen- 
 eral Law of Animal Fertility," setting forth an important 
 principle which he says that he had entertained as far back 
 as 1847. Here also the general belief ia. Evolution was 
 tacitly expressed ; the theory being that/"! proportion as 
 the power of maintaining individual life is small, the power 
 of multiplication is great ; that along with inci;eased evolu- 
 tion of the individual there goes decreased power of repro- 
 duction ;. that|.the one change is the cause of the other ; 
 that in man ^ in all other creatures the advance toward a 
 higher type will be accompanied by a decrease of fertility ; 
 and that there will be eventually reached an approxi- 
 mate equilibrium between the rate of mortality and the 
 rate of multiplication. Toward the close of this argument 
 there is. a clear recognition bf the important fact that ex- 
 cessive multiplifetion and the consequent struggle for ex- 
 istence cause this advance to a higher type. It is there 
 argued that " only those who do advance under it event- 
 ually survive," and that these " must be the select of their 
 generation." That which, as he subseijuently stated in the' 
 " Principles of Biology," Mr. Spencer failed to recognize at 
 this time (1853) was the effect of these influences in pro- 
 ducing the diversities of living forms ; that is, he did not then 
 perceive the cooperation of these actions of the struggle 
 for existence and the survival of the fittest, with the ten- 
 dency to variation which organisms exhibit. He saw only 
 
126 HEEBEET SPENCEB AND 
 
 the power of these processes to produce a higher form of 
 the same type, and did not recognize how they niay give 
 rise to divergencies and consequent differentiations of 
 species, and eventually of genera, orders, and classes/^ 
 
 Early in 1853 Mr. Spencer also printed a brief essay 
 in the Leader, on "The Development Hypothesis," in 
 which some of the new current reasons for believing in 
 the gradual evolution of. all organisms, including man, are 
 indicated. To this paper Mr, Darwin refers in the intro- 
 ductory sketch of the previous course of research on the 
 subject of development, which he prefixed to the " Origin 
 of Species." In this essay, however, direct adaptation to 
 the conditions of existence is the only process recognized. 
 
 In October of the same year (1853), Mr. Spencer pub- 
 lished an essay in the 'Westminster Review, on the " Phi- 
 losophy of Style," in which, though the subject appears so 
 remote, there are traceable some of the cardinal ideas now 
 indicated, and others that were afterward developed. The 
 subject was treated from a dynamical point of view, and, 
 as Mr. Lewes remarks in his essays on the " Principles of 
 Success in Literature," it offers the only scientific exposi- 
 tion of the problem of style that we have. The general 
 theory set forth is, that effectiveness of style depends on a 
 choice of words and forms of sentence offering the least 
 resistance to thought in the mind of the reader or hearer — 
 a foreshadowing of the general law of the " line of least 
 resistance" as applied to the interpretation of psychologi- 
 cal phenomena, as well as phenomena in general. More- 
 over, at the close of the essay, there is a reference to the 
 law of Evolution in its application to speech — ^there is a 
 recognition of the fact that "increasing heterogeneity" 
 has been the characteristic of advance in this as in other 
 things, and that a highly-evolved style wiU " answer to the 
 description of all highly-organized products, both of man 
 and of Nature ; it will be, not a series of like parts simply 
 
THE DOCTRINE OP EVOLUTION. 127 
 
 plaoed in juxtaposition, but one whole made up of unlike 
 parts that are mutually dependent." Here, as early as 
 1852, there is recognized in one of the highest spheres 
 both the process of differentiation and the process of inte- 
 gration — ^the two radical conceptions of Evolution. 
 
 In July of the next year (1853) Mr. Spencer's con- 
 tinued interest in the question of the functions of the 
 state, led him to write the essay on " Over-Legislation" in 
 the Westminster Review ; and here, as in^ " Social" Statics," . 
 the conception of society as a growth, under the operation 
 of natural laws, is predominant. 
 
 The critical perusal of Mr. Spencer's works shows that 
 this was a very important period in the development of his 
 views. The reading of Mr. Mill's "Logic" along with 
 some other philosophical works had led him to the elabora- 
 tion of certain opinions at variance with those of Mr. Mill 
 on the question of our ultimate beliefs, and those he pub- 
 lished in the Westminster Heview, under the title of "The 
 Universal Postulate" (1853). The inquiries thus com- 
 menced, together with those respecting the nature of the 
 moral feelings, and those concerning life and development, 
 bodily and mental, into which he had been led both by 
 " Social Statics " and the " Theory of Population," prepared 
 the way for the "Principles of Psychology." Some of 
 the fundamental conceptions contained in this remarkable 
 work now began to take shape in his mind. Other ideas 
 connected with the subject began also to form in his 
 mind, an example of which is furnished by the essay 
 on "Manners and Fashion," published in the Westmin- 
 ster JRevieio (April, 1854). Various traits of the general 
 doctrine of Evolution are here clearly marked out in their 
 relations to social progress. It is shown that the various 
 forms of restraint exercised over men in society — political, 
 ecclesiastical, and ceremonial — are all divergent unfoldings 
 of one original form, and that the development of social 
 
128 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 structure, in these as in other directions, takes place by 
 gradual and continuous differentiations, "in conformity 
 with the laws of Evolution of all organized bodies." 
 
 Mr. Spencer was at the same time engaged in working 
 out his view in a different sphere; the essay on the "Gen- 
 esis of Science " being contributed to the JBritish Quar- 
 terly Review in July, 1854. This was primarily called forth 
 by Miss Martineau's " Abridgment of Comte," then just 
 issued, arid was in part devoted to the refutation of the 
 French philosopher's views respecting the classification of 
 the sciences. But it became the occasion for a further 
 development of the doctrine of Evolution in its relation to 
 intellectual progress. The whole genesis of science is 
 there traced out historically under the aspect of a body of 
 truths, which, while they became differentiated into dif- 
 ferent sciences, became at the same time more and more 
 integrated, or mutually dependent, so as eventually to form 
 " an organism of the sciences." There is besides a recog- 
 nition of the gradual increase in definiteness that accom- 
 panies this increase in heterogeneity and in coherence. 
 
 It was at this time that Mr. Spencer's views on psy- 
 chology began to assume the character of a system — ^the 
 conception of intellectual progress now reached being com- 
 bined with the ideas of life previously arrived at, in the 
 development of a psychological theory. The essay on the 
 "Art of Education,'" published in the North British He- 
 view (May, 1854), assisted in the further development of 
 these ideas. In that essay the conception of the progress 
 of the mind during education, is treated in harmony with 
 the conception of mental Evolution at large. Methods are 
 considered in relation to the law of development of the fac- 
 ulties, as it takes place naturally. Education is regarded 
 as rightly carried on only when it aids the process of self- 
 
 ' Republished in his little work on "Education," under the title of 
 " Intellectual Education.'' 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 129 
 
 development; and it ia urged that tHe course in all cases 
 followed should be from the simple to the complex, from 
 the indefinite to the definite, from the concrete to the 
 abstract, and from the empirical to the rational. 
 
 Having reached this stage in the unfolding of his ideas, 
 Mr. Spencer began the writing of the "Principles of 
 Psychology" in August, 1854 This is a work of great 
 originality, and is important as marking the advance of 
 Mr. Spencer's phUosophioal views at the time of its prepara- 
 tion. The whole subject of mind is dealt with from the 
 Evolution point of view. The idea which runs through 
 " Social Statics," that there is ever going on an adaptation 
 between living beings and their circumstances, now took on 
 a profounder significance. The relation between the or- 
 ganism and its environing conditions was fpund to be 
 involved in the ivery nature of hf e.; and the idea of adapta- 
 tion was developed into the conception that life itself " is 
 the definite combination of heterogeneous changes both 
 simultaneous and successive in correspondence with exter- 
 nal coexistences and sequences." It is argued that the 
 degree of life varies with the degree of correspondence, 
 and that all mental phenomena ought to be interpreted in 
 terms of this correspondence. Commencing with the 
 lowest types of life, Mr. Spencer, in successive chapters, 
 traces up this relation of correspondence as extending in 
 space and time, as increasing in specialty, in generality, and 
 in complexity. It is also shown that the correspondence pro- 
 gresses from a more homogeneous to a more heterogeneous 
 form, and that it becomes gradually more integrated-^the 
 terms here employed in respect to the .Evolution of mind 
 being the terms subsequently used in treating of Evolution 
 in general. In the fourth part of the work, under the title 
 of "Special Synthesis," the Evolution is traced out under 
 its concrete form from reflex action iip through instinct, 
 meimorj-, reason, feelings, and the will. Mr. Spencer here 
 
130 HEEBEIIT SPENCER AKD 
 
 distinctly avowed his belief that " Life in its multitudinoua 
 and infinitely varied embodiments has arisen out of the 
 lowest and simplest beginnings, by steps as gradual as 
 those which evolve a homogeneous microscopic germ into 
 a complex organism" — dissent being at the same time 
 expressed from that version of the doctrine put forth 
 by the author of the "Vestiges of the Natural His- 
 tory of Creation." It was, moreover, shown by subjective 
 analysis how intelligence may be resolved, step by step, 
 from its most complex into its simplest elements, and it 
 was also proved that there is "unity of composition" 
 throughout, and that thus mental structure, contemplated 
 internally, harmonizes with the doctrine of Evolution. 
 
 It was at this time (1854), as I have been informed by 
 Mr. Spencer, when he had been at work upon the " Princi- 
 ples of Psychology" not more than two months, that the 
 general conception of Evolution in its causes and extent, 
 as well as its processes, was arrived at. He had somewhat 
 earlier conceived of it as universally a transformation from 
 the homogeneous into the heterogeneous. This kind of 
 change, which Von Baer had shown to take place in every 
 individual organism, as it develops, Mr. Spencer had already 
 traced out as taking place in the progress of social arrange- 
 ments, in the development of the sciences, and now in the 
 Evolution of mind in general from the lower forms to the 
 higher. And the generalization soon extended itseK so as 
 to embrace the transformations undergone by all things 
 inanimate as well as animate. This universal extension of 
 the idea led rapidly to the conception of a universal cause 
 necessitating it. .In the autumn of 1854, Mr. Spencer 
 proposed to the editor of the Westminster JReview to write 
 an article upon the subject under the title of " The Cause 
 of aU Progress," which was objected to as being too as- 
 suming. The article was, however, at that time agreed 
 upon, with the understanding that it should be written as 
 
iJlJi JJUUlKlJMJii UJb' JKlVUiiU'i'lUJN. 131 
 
 soon as the " Principles of Psychology" was finished. The 
 agreement was doomed to be defeated, however, so far as 
 the date was concerned, for, along with the completion of 
 the "Psychology," in July, 1855,' there came a nervous 
 breakdown, which incapacitated Mr. Spencer for labor dur- 
 ing a period of eighteen manths — ^the whole work having 
 been written in less than a year. 
 
 We may here note Mr. SpMjoer's advanced position- 
 in dealing with this subject. /'WhUe yet the notion of 
 Evolution as a process of Nature was as vague and 
 speculative as it had been in the time of Anaximander 
 and Democritusi he had grasped the problem in its uni- 
 versality and its causes, and had successfully applied it 
 to one of the most difficult and important of the sci- 
 ences. He had traced the operation of the law in the 
 sphere of mind, and placed that study upon a new basis. 
 The conviction is now entertained by many that the 
 "Principles. of Psychology," by Spencer, in 1855, is one of 
 the most original, and masterly scientific , treatises of the 
 present century ; if, indeed, it be not the most fruitful 
 contribution to scientific thought that has appeared since 
 the " Principia " of Newton.' For thousands of years, from 
 
 ' This association of the name of Spencer with Newton, let it be re- 
 membered, does not rest upon the authority of the present writer ; recent ' 
 discussions of the subject in the highest quarters are full of it. The 8at- 
 wday Review says, " Since Ifewton there has not in England been a philoso- 
 pher of more remarkable speculative and systematizing talent than (spite 
 of some errors and some narrowness) Mr. Herbert Spencer." An able 
 writer in the Quarterly Reoieio, in treating of Mr. Spencer's remarkable 
 power of binding together different and distant subjects of thought by 
 the principle of Evolution, remarks : " The two deepest scientific princi- 
 ples now known of all those relating to material things are the Law o% 
 Gravitation and the Law of Evolution." The eminent Professor of Logic 
 in Owen's College, Manchester, Mr. W. Stanley Jevons, in his recent 
 treatise entitled " The Principles of Science, a. Treatise on Logic and ^ 
 Scientific Method," says, " I question whether any scientific works which 
 have appeared, since the 'Principia' of Newton, are comparable in iiu- 
 
132 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 Plato to Hamilton, the world's ablest thinkers had been 
 engaged in the efEort to elucidate the phenomena of mind; 
 Herbert Spencer took up the question by a method first 
 rendered possible by modern science, and made a new 
 epoch in its progress. From this time forward, mental 
 philosophy, so called, could not confine itself simply to 
 introspection of the adult human consciousness. The 
 philosophy of mind must deal with the whole range of 
 psychical phenomena, must deal with them as manifesta- 
 tions of organic life, must deal with them genetically, and 
 show how mind is constituted in connection with the expe- 
 rience of the past. In short, as it now begins to be widely 
 recognized, Mr. Spencer has placed the science of mind 
 firmly upon the ground of Evolution. Like aU productions 
 that are at the same time new and profound, and go 
 athwart the course of long tradition, there were but few 
 that appreciated his book, a single small edition more than 
 sufficing to meet the wants of the public for a dozen 
 years.' But it began at once to tell upon advanced think- 
 ers, and its influence was soon widely discerned in the 
 best literature of the subject. The man who stood, per- 
 haps, highest in England as a psychologist, Mr. John Stu- 
 art MUl, remarked in one of his books, that it is " one of 
 • the finest examples we possess of the psychological method 
 in its full power ; " and, as I am aware, after carefully re- 
 reading it some years later, he declared that his already high 
 I opinion of the work had been raised still more — whiqh he 
 recognized as due to the progress of his own mind.V^ 
 
 The article " Progress, its Law and Cause," projected, 
 as we have seen, in 1854, was written early in 1857. In 
 the first half of it the transformation of the homoge- 
 neous into the heterogeneous is traced throughout all 
 
 portance with those of Darwin and Spencer, revolutionizing as they do 
 all our views of the origin of bodily, mental, moral, and social phenomena." 
 ■ See Note C. ' See Note D. 
 
THE DOCTKINE OP EVOLUTION. 133 , 
 
 orders of phenomena ; in the second half- the principle of 
 transformation is deduced from the law of the multiplica- 
 tion of effects. In this essay, moreover, there is indicated 
 the application of the general law of Evolution to the pro- 
 duction of species. It is shown that there " would not be 
 a substitution of a thousand more or less modified species, 
 for the thousand original species ; but, in place of the thou- 
 sand modified species, there would arise several thousand 
 species or varieties or changed forms ; " and that " each 
 original race of organisms would become the root from 
 which diverged several races differing more or less from it 
 and from each other." It is further argued that the new 
 relations in which animals would be placed toward one 
 another woidd initiate further differences of habit and con- 
 sequent modifications, and that "there must arise, not 
 simply a tendency toward the differentiations of each race 
 of organisms into several races, but also a tendency to the 
 occasional production of a somewhat higher organism." 
 The case of the divergent varieties of man, some of them 
 higher than others, caused in this same manner, is given in 
 illustration. Throughout the argument there is a tacit im- 
 plication that, as a consequence of the cause of Evolution, 
 the production of species will go on, not in ascending' 
 linear series, but by perpetual divergence and rediver- 
 gence — branching and again branching. The general con- 
 ception, however, differs from that of Mr. Darwin in this 
 — that adaptation and readaptation to continually-changing 
 conditions is the only process recognized — ^there is no rec- 
 ognition of " spontaneous variations," and the natural se- 
 lection of those that are favorable. 
 
 During the summer of 1857 Mr. Spencer wrote the 
 "Origin and Function of Music," published in Fraser's 
 Magazine for October. Like nearly all of his other writ- 
 ings, this interesting article is dominated by the idea- of 
 Evolution. The general law of nervo-motor action in all 
 
134 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 ammals is shown, to fiimish an explanation of the tones 
 and cadences of emotional speech ; and it is pointed out 
 that from these music is evolved by simple exaltation of 
 all the distinctive traits, and carrying them out into ideal 
 combination. A further step was taken, the same year, in 
 the development of the doctrine of Evolution, which is in- 
 dicated in the article entitled " Transcendental Physiology." 
 It was there explained that the multiplication of effects 
 was not the only cause of the universal change from homo- 
 geneity to heterogeneity, but that there was an antecedent 
 principle to be recognized, viz., the Instability of the 
 Somogeneous. The physiological illustrations of the law 
 are mainly dwelt upon, though its other applications are 
 indicated. 
 
 In October of the same year, the essay on " Represent- 
 ative Government — what is it good for ? " appeared in the 
 Westminster JBeview. The law of progress is here applied 
 to the interpretation of state functions, and it is stated 
 that the specialization of offices, " as exhibited in the Evo- 
 lution of living creatures, and as exhibited in the Evolu- 
 tion of societies," holds throughout ; that " the govern- 
 mental part of the body politic exemplifies this truth 
 equally with its other parts." In January, 1858, the essay 
 on " State Tamperings with Money and Banks " appeared 
 in the same periodical. The general doctrine of the limita- 
 tions of state functions is there reaffirmed, with further 
 illustration of the mischiefs that arise fifom traversing the 
 normal laws of life ; and it is contended that " the ulti- 
 mate result of shielding men from the effects of foUy is to 
 fin the world with fools " — an indirect way of asserting the 
 beneficial effects of the survival of the fittest. 
 
 In April, 1858, Mr. Spencer published an essay on 
 " Moral Education," in the British Quarterly Review, and 
 throughout the argument every thing is again regarded 
 from the Evolution point of view. The general truth in- 
 
THE J)OCTEINE OF EVOLUTION 135 
 
 sisted upon is, that the natural rewards and restraints of 
 conduct are those which are most appropriate and. effectual 
 in modifying character. The principle contended for is, 
 that the moral education of every chUd should be regarded 
 as an adaptation of its nature to the circumstances of Kfe ; 
 and that to become adapted to these circumstances it must 
 be allowed to come in contact with them ; must be allowed 
 to suffer the pains and obtain the pleasures which do in the 
 order of Nature follow certain kinds of action. There is 
 here, in fact, applied to actual life, the general conception 
 of the nature of .life, previously inculcated in the " Prin- 
 ciples of Psychology " — a correspondence between the 
 inner and the outer actions that becomes great in propor- 
 tion as the converse with outer actions through experience 
 becomes ■ extended. 
 
 The essay on the " Nebular Hypothesis " was published 
 in the Westminster Seview for July, 1858. The opinion 
 was then almost universally held that the nebular hypothe- 
 sis had been exploded, and the obvious bearing of the ques- 
 tion upon the theory of Evolution induced Mr. Spencer to 
 take it up. The conclusions that had been drawn from 
 observations with Lord Rosse's telescope, that the nebular 
 hypothesis had been invalidated, were shown to be _ erro- 
 neous ; and the position taken that the nebulae could not 
 be (as they were then supposed to be) remote sidereal sys- 
 tems, has been since verified. Spectrum analysis has, in 
 fact, proved what Mr. Spencer then maintained, that there 
 are many nebulae composed of gaseous matter. To the 
 various indications of the nebular origin of our own solar 
 system commonly given, others were added -which had not 
 been previously recognized, while the view that Mr. Spen- 
 cer took of the constitution of the solar atmosphere has 
 since been also verified by spectrum analysis. 
 
 In October, 1858, he published in the Medico- Chirur- 
 gical Review a criticism on Prof. Owen's " Archetype and 
 
136 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton," which was writ- 
 ten in furtherance of the doctrine of Evolution, and to 
 show that the structural peculiarities which are not ac 
 counted for on the theory of an archetypal vertebra, 
 are accounted for on the hypothesis of development. In 
 January of the next year there appeared in the same re- 
 view a paper on " The Laws of Organic Form," already 
 referred to (the germ of which dated back to 1851), and 
 which was a further elucidation of the doctrine of Evolu- 
 tion, by showing the direct action of incident forces in 
 modifying the j^rms of organisms and their parts. In 
 April, 1859, appeared in the British Quarterly Meview an 
 article on " Physical Education," in which the bearing of 
 biological principles upon the management of children in 
 respect to their bodily development is considered. It in- 
 sists upon the normal course of unfolding, versus those 
 hindrances to it which ordinary school regulations impose ; 
 it asserts the worth of the bodUy appetites and impulses 
 in children, which are commonly so much thwarted ; and 
 contends that during this earlier portion of life, in which 
 the main thing to be done is to grow and develop, our edu- 
 cational system is too exacting — -."it makes the juvenile 
 life f9.r more like the adult life than it should be." The 
 essay " What Knowledge is of most Worth " was printed 
 in the Westminster Meview for July, 1859. This argu- 
 ment is familiar to the public, as it has been many times 
 republished ; but what is here most worthy of note is that, 
 in criticising the current study of history, it defines with 
 great distinctness the plan of the " Descriptive Sociology " 
 (the first divisions of which are now just published), and 
 which wiU give the comprehensive and systematic data 
 upon which the Principles of Sociology are to be based. 
 
 An argument on " Illogical Geology " was contributed 
 in July, 1859, to the Universal Meview, which, although 
 nominally a criticism of Hugh Miller, was really an attack 
 
THE DOCTEINK OF EVOLUTION. 137 
 
 upon the prevalent geological doctrine -which asserted si- 
 multaneity in the systems of strata in different parts of the 
 earth. His view, which was at that time heresy, is now 
 coming into general recognition. In the Medico- Chirur- 
 gical Review for January, 1860, Mr. Spencer published a 
 criticism on Prof. Bain's work, "The Emotions and the 
 Will," designed to show th%t the emotions cannot be 
 properly understood and classified without studying them 
 from the point of view of Evolution, and tracing them up 
 through their increasing complications from lower types of 
 animals to higher. The essay on the " Social Organism " 
 appeared at the same time in the Westminster Review, in 
 which it was maintained that society, consisting of an 
 organized aggregate, follows the same course of Evolution 
 with all other organized aggregates — ^increasing in mass 
 and showing a higher integration not only in this respect 
 but also in its growing solidarity ; becoming more and 
 more heterogeneous in all its structures, and more and 
 more definite in all its differentiations. The " Physiology 
 of Laughter," which appeared the same year ia Maomil- 
 lan's Magazine, was a contribution to nervous dynamics 
 from the point of view that had been taken in the " Prin- 
 ciples of Psychology." Even in Mr. Spencer's discussion 
 of " Parliamentary Reforms, their Dangers and Safe- 
 guards " ( Westminster Review, 1860), the question is dealt 
 with on scientific grounds ultimately referring to the doc- 
 trine of Evolution. It was its general purpose to sho^v 
 that the basis of political power can be safely extended 
 only in proportion as political function is more and more 
 restricted. It wag maintained in an earlier essay that rep- 
 resentative government is the best possible for that which 
 is the essential office of a government — ^the maintenance of 
 those social conditions under which every citizen can carry 
 on securely and without hindrance the pursuits of life ; 
 and that it is the worst possible for other purposes. And 
 ■ in continuation of this argument it was here contended 
 
13S HEEBEET SPENCEE AND 
 
 that further extension of popular power should be accom- 
 panied by a further restriction of state duty — a further 
 specialization of state function. In the essay on " Prison 
 Ethics," contributed to the Jiritish Quarterly Jteview in 
 July, 1860, a special question is very ably dealt with in the 
 light of those biological, psychological, and sociological 
 principles which belong to the Evolution philosophy. The 
 principle of moral Evolution is asserted, and the concomi- 
 tant unfolding of higher and better modes of dealing with 
 criminals. 
 
 We have now passed in rapid review the intellectual 
 work of Mr. Spencer for nearly twenty years, and have 
 shown that, though apparently miscellaneous, it was, in 
 reality, of a highly-methodical character. Though treating 
 of many subjects, he was steadily engaged with an exten- 
 sive problem which was resolved, step by step, through the 
 successive discovery of those processes and principles of 
 Nature which constitute the general law of Evolution. 
 Beginning in 1843 with the vague conception of a social 
 progress, he subjected this idea to systematic scientific 
 analysis, gave it gradually a more definite and comprehen- 
 sive form, propounded the principles of heredity and adap- 
 tation in their social applications, recognized the working 
 of the principle of selection in the case of human beings^ 
 arid affiliated the conception of social progress upon the 
 more general principle of Evolution governing all animate 
 Nature. Seizing the idea of increasing heterogeneity in 
 organic growth, he gradually extended it in various direc- 
 tions. When the great conception thus pursued had grown 
 into a clear, coherent, and well-defined doctrine, he took up 
 the subject of psychology, and, combining the principle of 
 differentiation with that of integration, he placed the in- 
 terpretation of mental phenomena upon the basis of Evo- 
 lution. We have seen that two years after the publica- 
 tion of the "Psychology," or in 1857, Mr. Spencer had ar- 
 
THE DOCTEINE OP EVOLUTION. 139 
 
 rived at the law of Evolution as a universal principle of 
 Nature, and worked it out both inductively as a process of 
 increasing heterogeneity, and deductively from the princi- 
 ples of the instability of the homogeneous and the multi- 
 plication of effects. How far Mr. Spencer was here in ad- 
 vance of all other workers in this field, will appear when 
 we consider that the doctrine of Evolution, as it now 
 stands, was thtis, in its universality, and in its chief out- 
 lines, announced by him two years before the appearance 
 of Mr. Darwin's " Origin of Species." 
 
 A principle of natural changes more universal than any 
 other known, applicable to all orders of phenomena, and so 
 deep as to involve the very origin of things, having thus 
 been established, the final step remained to be taken, which 
 was to give it the same ruling place in the world of thought 
 and of knowledge that it has in the world of fact and of 
 Nature. A principle running through all spheres of phe- 
 nomena must have !the highest value for determining scien- 
 tific relations ; and a genetic law of natural things must 
 necessarily form the deepest root of the philosophy of nat- 
 ural things. It was in 1858, as Mr. Spencer informs me, 
 whUe writing the article on the " Nebular Hypothesis," 
 that the doctrine of Evolution presented itself as the basis 
 of a general system under which all orders of concrete phe- 
 nomena should be generalized. Already the conception 
 had been traced out in its applications to astronomy, geol- 
 ogy, biology, psychology, as well as all the various super- 
 organic products of social activity ; and it began to ap- 
 pear both possible and necessary that all these various con- 
 crete sciences should be dealt with in detaU from the Evo- 
 lution point of view. By such treatment, and by that only, 
 did it appear practicable to bring them into relation so as 
 to fprm a coherent body of scientific truth — a System of 
 Philosophy. 
 
 It is proper to state in this place that, in contemplating 
 the execution of so comprehensive a woik, the first diifi- 
 
140 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 culty that arose was a pecuniary one. Mr. Spencer had 
 frittered away the greater part of what little he possessed 
 in writing and publishing books that did not pay their ex- 
 penses, and a period of eighteen months of ill health and 
 enforced idleness consequent on the writing of one of 
 them had further diminished his resources. His state of 
 health was still such that he could work, at the outside, 
 but three hours a day, and very frequently not that, so 
 that what little he could do in the shape of writing for peri- 
 odicals, even though tolerably paid for it, did not suffice 
 to meet the expenses of a very economical bachelor-life. 
 How, then, could he reasonably hope to prosecute a scheme 
 elaborating the doctrine of Evolution throughout all its de- 
 partments in the way contemplated — a scheme that would 
 involve an enormous amount of thought, labor, and inquiry, 
 and which seemed very unlikely to bring any pecuniary re- 
 turn, even if it paid its expenses ? Unable to see any so- 
 lution of the difficulty, Mr. Spencer wrote, in July, 1858, 
 to Mr. John Stuart Mill, explaining his project, and asking 
 whether he thought that in the administration for India, in 
 which Mr. Mill held office, there was likely to be any post, 
 rather of trust than of much work, which would leave him 
 leisure enough for the execution of his scheme. Mr. Mill 
 replied sympathetically, but nothing turned out to be 
 available. In despair of any other possibility, Mr. Spen- 
 cer afterward extended his application to the Government, 
 being regnforced by the influence of various leading scien- 
 tific men, who expressed themselves strongly respecting 
 the importance of giving him the opportunity he wished.* 
 A peculiar difficulty, however, here arose. Mr. Spencer is 
 a very impracticable man — ^that is, he undertakes to con- 
 form his conduct to right principles, and his decided views 
 as to the proper functions of government put an interdict 
 upon the far greater number of posts that might otherwise 
 be fit. Among the few that he could accept, the greater 
 
 ' See Note K 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 141 
 
 part were not available because they did not offer the 
 requisite leisure. One position became vacant which he 
 might have accepted, that of Inspector of Prisons, I think ; 
 but, though effort in his behalf was made by Lord Stanley 
 (now Lord Derby, who was familiar with Mr. Spencer's 
 works and entertained the matter kindly), the claims of 
 party were too strong, and no arrangement was made. 
 
 Other plans failing, Mr. Spencer decided to adopt that 
 of subscription, and to issue his " System of Philosophy " 
 in a serial form. A prospectus of that system was issued 
 in March, 1860, which outlined the contents of the succes- 
 sive parts. The first installment of the work was issued in 
 October, 1860, and the commencing volume, " First Princi- 
 ples," was published in June, 1862. 
 
 In this work the general doctrine of Evolution is pre- 
 sented in a greatly developed form ; and the author's for- 
 mer views are not only combined but extended. The law 
 of Von Baer, which formulates organic development as a 
 transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous, 
 Mr. Spencer had previously shown to hold of all aggre- 
 gates whatever — of the universe as a whole, and of all its 
 component parts. But, in " First Principles," it was shown 
 that this universal transformation is a change from in- 
 dejlnite homogeneity to d^nite heterogeneity ; and it is 
 pointed out that only when the increasing multiformity is 
 joined with increasing definiteness, does it constitute Evo- 
 lution as distinguished from other changes that are like it 
 in respect of increasing heterogeneity. There is, however, 
 a much more important development of the principle. 
 This change from the indefinite to the definite is shown to 
 be the accompaniment of a more essential change from the 
 incoherent to the coherent. Throughout all aggregates of 
 all orders it is proved that there goes on a process of inte- 
 gration. This process is shown to hold alike in the growth 
 and consolidation of each aggregate as weU as in the growth 
 and consolidation of its differentiated parts. The law of 
 
142 ■ HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 the instability of the homogeneous is also more elaborately 
 traced out. Under the head of the principle of segrega- 
 tion it is, moreover, shown that the universal process by 
 which, in aggregates of mixed units, the units of like kinds 
 tend to gather together, and the units of unlike kinds 
 to separate, everywhere cooperates in aiding Evolution. 
 Yet a further universal law is recognized and developed 
 — the law of equilibration. The question is asked, " Can 
 these changes which constitute Evolution continue with- 
 out limit?" and the answer given. is that they cannot; 
 but that they universally tend in each aggregate toward 
 a final state of quiescence, in which aU the forces at work 
 have reached a state of balance. Like the other univer- 
 sal process, that of equilibration is traced out in all divis- 
 ions of phenomena. But the most important development 
 given to the . doctrine of Evolution in this volume was its 
 aiBliation upon the ultimate principle underlying aU science 
 — the persistence of force. It was shown that from this 
 ultimate law there result certain universal derivative laws, 
 which, are dealt with in chapters on "The Correlation and. 
 Equivalence of Forces," "The Direction of Motion," and 
 " The Ehythm of Motion," and it was demonstrated that 
 these derivative laws hold throughout all changes, from the 
 astronomical to the psychical and social. It is then shown 
 that "the Instability of the Homogeneous," "The Multi- 
 plication of Effects," " Segregation " and " Equilibration," 
 are also deducible from this ultimate principle of the per- 
 sistence of force. So that Evolution, having been first es- 
 tablished inductively as universal, is further shown to be 
 universal by establishing it deductively as a result of the 
 deepest of all knowable truths. 
 
 The first edition of " First Principles " was published, 
 but another important step in elucidating the philosophy 
 of Evolution required to be taken. In dealing with <he 
 classification of the sciences, from the point of view to 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 143 
 
 which his philosophy has brought him, Mr. Spencer had 
 occasion to seek for that aspect of all physical phenomena 
 ■which forms the most general division of physical sci- 
 ence. He found that what he sought must be some gen- 
 eral fact respecting the redistribution of matter and mo- 
 tion. The law was soon arrived at, that integration of 
 matter results from decrease of the contained motion, 
 while disintegration of matter results from increase of the 
 contained motion. It is at once manifest that the law thus 
 reached was deeper than the principle of Evolution, for 
 it is conformed to by mineral bodies, which do not exhibit 
 the phenomena of Evolution as Mr. Spencer had inter- 
 preted them. In short, it became clear that a law had 
 been- reached holding of all material things whatever, 
 whether they are those which do or those which do not 
 increase in heterogeneity. It was now first possible to 
 judge of the relative value and importance of the several 
 factors of the evolutionary process. In Von Baer's con- 
 ception of organic development, it is made to consist 
 essentially and solely in the change of increasing hetero- 
 geneity in the evolving body. But Mr. Spencer had 
 shown that evolution is a double process^a tendency to 
 unity as well as to diversity, an integration as well as a 
 differentiation. It was now found that the process of in- 
 tegration, as it applies to all things, whether evolving or 
 not, is a deeper principle, and is, in fact, ^& primary pro- 
 cess in evolution, while the increase of heterogeneity is the 
 secondary process. At the same time, this hew view of the 
 matter made it -obvious that Dissolution is everywhere the 
 correlative of Evolution, and that, before the generaliza- 
 tion is complete, Dissolution must be recognized as xaa,- 
 versally tending to undo what Evolution does. 
 
 In a new edition of " First Principles," this idea was 
 embodied, and the work recast in conformity with it. 
 The doctrine of Evolution thus attained a higher develop- 
 
144 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 ment. The fundamental antagonism between Evolution 
 and Dissolution comes into tlie foreground as the cardinal 
 conception. It is shown that every aggregate, simple or 
 compound, is, from the beginning to the end of its exist- 
 ence, subject to these opposing processes of change; that, 
 according as its quantity of contained motion is becoming 
 greater or less, it is tending to integrate or disintegrate — 
 evolve or dissolve; that from moment to moment through- 
 out its whole existence it is simultaneously exposed to 
 both these processes, and that the average transformation 
 it is undergoing expresses the predominance of the one pro- 
 cess over the other. This being the universal law to which 
 all material things at all times are subject, there come 
 to be recognized certain derivative laws that are not uni- 
 versal although highly general. Evolution is distinguished 
 into simple and compound: simple Evolution being that in 
 which the character of the matter and the rate of its inte- 
 gration are such that this primary process of change from 
 a diffused state to a concentrated state is uncomplicated 
 by secondary changes — compound Evolution being that in 
 which, along with the general integrations, there go on 
 more or less marked difEerentiations and local integrations. 
 Thus the changes which were originally conceived to con- 
 stitute Evolution itself, came to be recognized as, in order 
 of time and importance, subordinate; integration may go 
 on without differentiation, as in crystals; but differentia- 
 tion is made possible only by antecedent integration.' 
 
 The doctrine of Evolution, as a theory of the genesis 
 and dissolution of things "in the onward course of Nature, 
 was elaborately presented in " First Principles," and might 
 have been there left to take its place, and its chance 
 among philosophical theories. But it had not been ex- 
 ploited by Mr. Spencer in the way of mental gymnastics, as 
 a piece of novel and ingenious speculation. He believed 
 ' See Note F. 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 145 
 
 it to embody a living and applicable principle of the great- 
 est moment. If the law of Evolution be true, it is a truth 
 of transcendent import, no less in the sphere of practical 
 life than in the world of thought, and it was important that 
 it should be carried out in the various fields of its applica- 
 tion. Moreover, Mr. Spencer had been drawn to the inves- 
 tigation by his interest in the study of human affairs, and 
 his task was but fairly begun with the establishment of the 
 principle by which they arc to be interpreted. In the strict 
 logical order the next step would have been to trace the 
 operation of the law in the inorganic or preorganic world, 
 but the vastness of the subject forbade this, and Mr. Spen- 
 cer found it necessary to enter at once upon the organic 
 division of his scheme. In the " Principles of Biology " the 
 subject of life was accordingly comprehensively dealt with 
 from the Evolution point of view. He then passed to the 
 phenomena of mind, and recast and amplified the " Principles 
 of Psychology " in accordance with his more matured opin- 
 ions, placing it upon the ampler basis afforded by " First 
 Principles " and the " Principles of Biology." These three 
 works, forming five volumes of the System of Philosophy,- 
 are now published, and they carry him half through the 
 undertaking--the " Principles of Sociology,"* in three vol- 
 umes, and the " Principles of Morality," in two volumes, 
 remaining yet to be vmtten. Mr. Spencer allowed twenty 
 years for the whole enterprise ; Dl health and unforeseen 
 interruptions have occasioned considerable delay, and it 
 was half accomplished in twelve years. 
 
 A further illustration of the comprehensive and thor- 
 oughly systematic character of Mr. Spencer's work is 
 afforded by his preparation for the treatment of the sub- 
 ject of Sociology. In dealing with Biology and Psychol- 
 ogy, the data for reasoning were readily accessible ; but in 
 entering upon the scientific study of so vast and varied a 
 subject as human society a most formidable difficulty ap- 
 7 
 
146 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 peared at the threshold of the inquiry, in the absence of 
 facts to form the broad basis of sociological reasoning. So 
 deficient and scattered and contradictory were such data that 
 the possibility of any valid social science has been generally 
 regarded with distrust, or unhesitatingly denied. But the 
 phenomena of society are not chaotic ; they coexist and 
 succeed each other in an orderly way. The natural laws 
 of the social state are undoubtedly determinable, but 
 such determination is primarily a question of the col- 
 lection of materials suitable for wide and safe inductions. 
 Mr. Spencer foresaw this several years ago, and began the 
 collection and methodical arrangement of all those numer- 
 ous classes of facts pertaining to the various forms and 
 states of society which are needed to work out the "Princi- 
 ples of Sociology." This alone was an immense undertak- 
 ing. The races of mankind were divided into three groups, 
 illustrating existing civilizations, extinct or decayed civili- 
 zations, and the savage state. Three corresponding series 
 of works were projected, a tabular method for the classifi- 
 cation and arrangement of facts was devisedj and three 
 gentlemen were employed to carry out the work of collecr 
 tion and digestion of materials under Mr. Spencer's super- 
 vision. The first installments of each of these divisions 
 are now completed, and published. This important work, 
 which is subsidiary to his main enterprise, is the first of 
 the kind ever attempted, and when finished and issued will 
 form a complete .Cyclopaedia of the multifarious data neces- 
 sary for the scientific investigation of social questions. Its 
 continued publication will depend upon public support ; 
 but the collection has been made by Mr. Spencer for his 
 own use, and it will form the groundwork of the " Prin- 
 ciples of Sociology " upon which he has now entered, and 
 the first part of which is issued. 
 
 Let us now recapitulate his labors in the order pf their 
 accomplishment, so as to bring them into one view : 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 
 
 147 
 
 Letters on the Proper Sphere of Grovemment, 
 
 (Occupied several years as a Bailroad Engineer.) 
 Planned Social Statics, .... 
 Social Statics published, .... 
 
 Theory of Population, 
 
 The Development Hypothesis, | 
 
 Philosophy of Style, 
 
 Over-Le^slation, ) 
 
 The Universal Postulate, J 
 
 Manners and Fashion, ') 
 
 The Genesis of Science, I 
 
 The Art of Education, I ' ' 
 
 JEvolution first conceived as Universal, J 
 
 Principles of Psychology, 
 
 (Breakdown of eighteen montlis ) 
 
 Progress, its Law and Cause, 1 
 
 Origin and Function of Music, I 
 
 Transcendental Physiology, | .... 
 
 Kepresentative Government, J 
 
 State Tamperings with Money and Banks, 
 Moral Education, 
 The Nebular Hypothesis, 
 
 Archetype and Homologies of the Vertebrate Skeleton, 
 JEvolution first conceived as the basis of a system of 
 Philosaphy, , 
 
 The Laws of Organic Form, 
 
 Physical Education, 
 
 What Knowledge is of most Worth, 
 
 Illogical Geology, 
 
 ProBpedus of the System of Philosophy drawn up, _ 
 
 The Emotions and the Will, 
 
 The Social Organism, 
 
 The Physiology of Laughter, 
 
 Parliamentary Reform, 
 
 Prison Ethics, 
 
 Prospectus of the Philosophical System published, 
 
 First Principles, 
 
 Classification of the Sciences, .... 
 
 Principles of Biology, 
 
 Principles of Psychology, 
 
 The Study of Sociology, ) 
 
 Descriptive Sociology, ) .... 
 
 Principles of Sociology, Part I., . . . . 
 
 1842 
 
 1846 
 18B0 
 
 1852 
 1863 
 
 1864 
 1866 
 
 1867 
 1858 
 
 1859 
 
 1860 
 
 1862 
 1864 
 1867 
 1872 
 
 1873 
 
 1874 
 
148 • HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 The facts now presented, I submit, entirely sustain the 
 view with which we set out, in regard to the character 
 of Mr. Spencer's work, and his position in the world of 
 thought. It has been shown that he took up the idea of 
 Progress while it was only a vague speculation, and had 
 not yet become a subject of serious scientific study. We 
 have seen that he verified its reality by gradually tracing 
 its operation step by step, in widely different fields of phe- 
 nomena ; that he analyzed its conditions and causes, and 
 at length formulated it as a universal principle, to which 
 the course of all things conforms. That view of the uni- 
 verse which the science of the world now accepts, it has 
 been shown that Mr. Spencer adopted a generation ago, 
 and entered upon its elucidation as a systematic life-work. 
 We have traced the course of its unfolding, and I appeal 
 to the record of labors here delineated as furnishing an ex- 
 ample of original, continuous, and concentrated thinking, 
 which it will be difficult to parallel in the history of intel- 
 lectual achievement. In newness of conception, unity of 
 purpose, subtUty of analyses, comprehensive grasp, thor- 
 oughness of method, and sustained force of execution, this 
 series of labors, I believe, may challeiige comparison with 
 the highest mental work of any age. 
 
 As to the character of the system of thought which 
 Mr. Spencer has elaborated, we have shown that it is such 
 as to form an important epoch in the advance of knowl- 
 edge. He took up an idea not yet investigated nor enter- 
 tained by his predecessors or contemporaries, and has made 
 it the comer-stone of a philosophy. If, by pljilosophy, we 
 understand the deepest explanation of things that is pos- 
 sible to the human mind, the principle of genesis or Evolu- 
 tion certainly answers preeminently to this character ; for 
 what explanation can go deeper than that which accounts for 
 the origin, continuance, and disappearance of the changing 
 objects around us ? It is the newest solution of the old- 
 
THE DOOTEINE OF EVOLUTION. 149 
 
 est problem ; a solution based alike upon the most extended 
 knowledge, and upon a reverent recognition that all human 
 investigation, however extensive, must have its inexorable 
 bounds. The philosophy of Evolution is truly a philosophy 
 of creation, carried as far as the human mind can penetrate. 
 If man is finite, the infinite is beyond him ; if finite, he is 
 limited, and his knowledge, and all the philosophy that 
 rests upon knowledge, must be also limited. Philosophy is 
 a system of truth pertaining to the order of Nature, and 
 coextensive with it ; and, as the various sciences are but 
 the knowledge of the different parts of Nature, Mr. Spen- 
 cer bases philosophy upon science, and makes it what may 
 be called a science of the sciences. Resting, moreover, 
 upon a universal law, which governs the course and changes 
 of all phenomena, this philosophy becomes powerful to 
 unify and harmonize the hitherto separate and fragmen- 
 tary systems of truth ; and, as this is the predominant 
 trait of Mr. Spencer's system of thought, he very properly 
 denominates it the ^nthetio Philosophy. 
 
 In estimating the character of Mr. Spencer's Philo- 
 sophical System it is needful to remember that it differs in 
 various fundamental respects from any that has before 
 been offered to the world. It is more logically complete 
 than any other system, because its truths are first derived 
 from facts and phenomena by the method of induction, 
 and then systematically verified by deduction from prin- 
 ciples already established. It is more practical than any 
 other, because it bears inimediately upon common experi- 
 ence, takes hold of the living questions of the time, throws 
 light upon the course of human affairs, and gives knowl- 
 edge that may serve both for public and individual guid- 
 ance. Viewed as an intellectual achievement, his under- 
 taking is neither to be measured by the time consumed in 
 its execution nor by the amount of labor involved, but by 
 the nature and quality of the work itself. It was original 
 
150 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 throughout, was based upon the most comprehensive re- 
 sults of modern science, and was elaborated under the in- 
 exorable conditions of logical method. The development 
 of a system of philosophy now is a very different thing 
 from what it was in the earlier times. Plato spun a sys- 
 tem of thought before speculation was yet curbed by the 
 knowledge of Nature ; Spencer has constructed a phi- 
 losophy out of the inflexible materials furnished in all the 
 fields of modern investigation. His system is not a digest, 
 but an organon ; not merely an analytic dissection, but a 
 grand synthetic construction ; not a science, but a coordi- 
 nation of the sciences ; not a metaphysical elaboration, but 
 a positive body of doctrine conforming to verifiable facts, 
 and based upon the most comprehensive principle of Na- 
 ture yet arrived at by the human mind. 
 
 But no recognition of the greatness of Mr. Spencer's in- 
 tellectual work will do him justice. There is a moral sublim- 
 ity in his self-sacrificing career which is not to be neglected 
 in making up the estimate of his charaq^er. As remarked by 
 M. Laugel : " If Mr. Spencer, with his talents, his fertility of 
 genius, and the almost encyclopedic variety of knowledge, of 
 which his writings furnish the proof, had chosen to follow 
 the beaten path, nothing would have been more easy than 
 for him to secure all those honors of which English Society 
 is so prodigal to those who serve her as she wishes to be 
 served. He preferred, however, with a noble and touching 
 self-denial, to put up with poverty, and, what is stiU more 
 difficult, with obscurity." In advance of his generation 
 and working against the powerful current of its preju- 
 dices, with broken health, without pecuniary resources, 
 and depending upon promises of support that were but 
 very partially redeemed, with an intrepidity that was not 
 wanting in heroism he entered upon the most formidable 
 intellectual project that was ever undertaken by any single 
 mind. One would think that it should have commanded 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. ' 151 
 
 the sympathy of the generous and the cordial approvaj if 
 not the kindly coSperation of all who appreciate coura- 
 geous and noble endeavor; but, unhappUy, a discriminating" 
 appreciation of genuine work is not over-abundant in these 
 times; and, in the accomplishment of a task which I be- 
 lieve future generations will regard as the most memorable 
 achievement of this fruitful age, Mr. Spencer has had but 
 stinted encouragement and a very shabby support. In an- 
 swer to the question, why his contemporaries have been so 
 unappreciative, much might be said, but I will here confine 
 myself to one or two suggestions. 
 
 In the first place, Mr. Spencer's work has been done 
 under circumstances peculiarly unfavorable to the recogni- 
 tion of his rights as an original and independent thinker. 
 Of the twenty-five articles prepared in the most active 
 period of his hfe, and published between 1853 and 1860, 
 which, as I have shown, are important contributions toward 
 the development of the doctrine of Evolution in its various 
 phases, most, if not all, appeared anonymously. They were 
 printed in the different leading reviews, and many of them 
 attracted marked attention at the time ; but their author 
 was unknown, and, of course, lost the advantage of having 
 his ideas accredited to him. Up to the time when he had 
 matured his system of thought, and was ready to enter 
 upon its formal publication, he had been giving it out in 
 fragments, as its several aspects had taken shape in his 
 own mind. His articles, many of which were republished 
 in this country, thus went far toward familiarizing the pub- 
 lic mind with the general conception of Evolution, so that 
 he was actually preparing his readers to discredit his subse- 
 ' quftit claims to his own views, whichjbeing reproduced and 
 further diffused by others, were regarded as belonging to 
 the common stock of current ideas. So far did this go, that 
 he was ultimately exposed to the imputation of plagiarism 
 for the restatement of opinions that he had first put forth, 
 
152 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 but which other men had appropriated and sent out ■ as 
 their own. Nor was the case much helped when he began 
 to publish his system of philosophy to subscribers, for so 
 limited was its distribution that it might almost have been 
 said that it was " printed for private circulation." More- 
 over, being the owner of his own works, the interests of 
 publishers were not enlisted in their diffusion ; while the 
 assaults of the press were so malignant, and their repre- 
 sentations so false, that for years he was constrained to 
 withhold his series from the periodicals. AU this was 
 favorable to misconception, and left Mr. Spencer much 
 at the mercy of dishonest authorship and unscrupulous 
 criticism. 
 
 Again, it must be recognized that there were difficulties 
 in appreciating his work which arose from its nature and 
 extent. While a scientific discovery, or a single definite 
 doctrine, is readily apprehended because the impression it 
 makes is narrow and sharp, an extensive system of prin- 
 ciples, which it requires power to grasp and time to master, 
 can only be imperfectly received by the general mind. The 
 very greatness of Mr. Spencer's work was thus an impedi- 
 ment to its recognition, and this, too, it must be acknowl- 
 edged, on the part even of men of science. In the scien- 
 tific world, the accumulation of facts has outstripped the 
 work of valid generalization. For, while men of moderate 
 ability can observe, experiment, and multiply details in 
 special departments, it requires men of breadth to arrange 
 them into groups, to educe principles and arrive at com- 
 prehensive laws. The great mass of scientific specialists, 
 confined to their departments, and little trained to the 
 work of generalization, are apt to regard lightly the l(%i- 
 cal processes of science, and to decry mere theorizing and 
 speculation. They forget that facts of themselves are not 
 science, and only become so by being placed in true rela- 
 tions, and that the function of the thinker is therefore su- 
 
THE DOCTRINE OP EVOLUTION. 153 
 
 preme ; while' the work of organizing facts and estab- 
 lishing general truths is, after all, Just as much a specialty 
 as that of observation or experiment- in any branches of 
 , inquiry. The prevalence of these narrow views has been 
 unfavorable to the recognition of Mr. Spencer's work by a 
 targe class of the cultivators of science ; and the more so, 
 as he has been mainly occupied in the highest spheres of 
 generalization. For this reason it is only by the compara- 
 tively small number of scientific men, who possess marked 
 philosophic power, that his labors have been justly appre- 
 ciated. 
 
 But, while considerations of this kind are not to be 
 overlooked in assigning the responsibilities of criticism, 
 neither are they to be construed into excuses for preju- 
 diced opinions, or "crude and hasty judgments. It is the 
 business of critics to inform themselves on important mat- 
 ters of which they speak, or to hold their peace. Andj 
 where there is peculiar difficulty or liability to error, 
 they are all the more bound to caution, and to refrain 
 from injurious interpretations. Reverting, now, to the 
 criticisms cited at the outset of this discussion as typical 
 of a class, we are prepared to rate them at what they are 
 worth. 
 
 From what has been stated, I think it will be suiBcient- 
 ly evident that Mr. Spencer is no follower of Comte, Dar- 
 win, or any other man, and that he has pursued hia own 
 independent course in his own way. As to M. Taine's 
 statement that " Mr. Spencer has the merit of extending 
 to the phenomena of Nature and of mind" Mr. Darwin's 
 principle of Natural Selection, the facts given show how 
 mistaken was his view of the case. Strange to say, M. 
 Taine, who claims to be a psychologist, puts forth this idea 
 in a review of Mr. Spencer's " Principles of Psychology," 
 a work which treated the subject of mind throughout, and 
 for the first time from the point of view of Evolution, and 
 
154 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 this years before Mr. Darwin had published a word upon 
 the subject. 
 
 As this error of M. Taine is frequently repeated,' and 
 indicates a total misapprehension of the facts, it is de- 
 sirable to add a word or two regarding Mr. Darwin's re- 
 lation to the question. WhUe this illustrious naturalist 
 has contributed immensely toward the .extension and es- 
 tablishment of a theory of organic development, he has 
 made no attempt to elucidate the general law of Evolu- 
 tion. His works do not treat of this broad problem ; 
 and nothing has tended more to the popular confusion of 
 the subject than the notion that " Darwinism " and Evolu- 
 tion are the same thing. Mr. Darwin's fame rests chiefly 
 upon the skill and perseverance with which he has worked 
 out a single principle in its bearing upon the progressive 
 diversity of organic Ufe. The competitions of Nature 
 leading to a struggle for existence, and that consequent 
 winnowing which Mr. Darwin calls " Natural Selection," 
 and Mr. Spencer calls " Survival of the Fittest," were rec- 
 ognized before Mr. Darwin's time : what he did, as I have 
 already explained, was to show how this principle may aid 
 in giving rise to new species from preexisting species. 
 The principle is a part of the great theory of Evolution, 
 and has a philosophic importance exactly in proportion 
 to the validity of that larger system of doctrine to which it 
 is tributary as an element. Not only has Mr. Darwin never 
 taken up the general question of Evolution, but it was 
 not his aim to explain even the evolution of species in 
 terms of ultimate principles — ^that is, in terms of the re- 
 distribution of matter and motion. Yet it is in this way 
 
 ' The Saturday Review, for example, in commenting upon Prof. Tyn- 
 dall's late address, remarks : " What Darwin has done for physiology, 
 Spencer would do for psychology by applying to the nervous system par- 
 ticularly the principles which his teacher (!) has abeady enunciated for 
 the physical system generally." 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 155 
 
 that all proximate principles, including Natural Selection, 
 have to be expressed before the final interpretation is 
 reached. This mode of dealing with the subject — the anal- 
 ysis of it' into those primary principles from which all 
 the proximate principles are derived, and the reduction of 
 the various phases of transformation to a single law, which 
 is the only thoroughly scientific method of its treatment, 
 belongs to Mr. Spencer alone. As to his following Mr. 
 Darwin, we have already seen that, long before the " Origin 
 of Species " was published, Mr. Spencer had reached the 
 proof of Evolution as a universal law ; had traced its de- 
 pendence upon the principle of the persistence of force ; 
 had resolved it into its ultimate dynamical factors ; had 
 worked out many of its important applications ; had made 
 it the basis of a system of Philosophy; and had shown that 
 it furnishes a new starting-point for the scientific interpre- 
 tation of human affairs. And for this vast constructive 
 work Mr. Spencer was indebted solely to his own genius. 
 Referring to the subject of Evolution, in a lecture before 
 the Royal Institution, Professor Huxley said : " The only 
 complete and systematic statement of the doctrine vdth 
 which I am acquainted is that contained in Mr. Herbert 
 Spencer's ' System of Philosophy ; '" of this doctrine, I have 
 given the proof that Mr. Spencer is the chief originator, 
 as well as the only expositor. The same ethical canons 
 of research, I therefore maintain, which gave to Coper- 
 nicus the glory of the heliocentric astronomy ; to New- 
 ton that of the law of gravitation ; to Harvey that of the 
 circulation of the blood ; to Priestley that of the discovery 
 of oxygen ; to Dr. Young that of tha undulatory theory of 
 light ; and, to Darwin, that of natural selection, wiU also 
 give to Herbert Spencer the honor of having first eluci- 
 dated and established the law of Universal Evolution. 
 
 Colonel Higginson imputes to Mr, Spencer, as a weak- 
 ness, the propensity to write on a great number of sub- 
 
156 HERBERT SPENCER AND 
 
 jeots ; I have shown, on the contrary, that he has been 
 compelled to write upon many subjects from logical neces- 
 sity, and has done so in unswerving devotion to the devel- 
 opment of one class of ideas. It will be seen that he is 
 now upon the same identical track of thought which he 
 opened in his youth, to which he has consecrated his Ufe, 
 and which he has made his own. Thirty-two years ago 
 he began to study the social condition and relations of 
 men from the scientific point of view, and to treat of hu- 
 man society as a sphere of natural law. After eight years 
 he published a treatise upon the question, which, although 
 in advance of the times, only served to convince its author 
 that the investigation was barely begun, and that, before 
 any adequate social science was possible, the whole subject 
 required to be more deeply grounded in the knowledge of 
 Nature. Upon that deeper study of Nature he then en- 
 tered, and, after twenty-four years of steady and system- 
 atic preparation, the problems of Social Statics are re- 
 sumed in the " Principles of Sociology." If so prolonged 
 and inflexible a course of original inquiry, yielding results 
 which are felt in the highest spheres of thought, are sug- 
 gestive of " a weakness," we should be glad to be furnished 
 with the examples which embody Colonel Higginson's con- 
 ception of strength in mental character. As to the decla- 
 ration that it seems absurd to attribute to Mr. Spencer any 
 vast enlargement or further generalization of the modern 
 doctrine of Evolution, we leave its author to reconcile his 
 opinion with the fact that the System of Psychology, 
 which first extended the principle of Evolution to the 
 sphere of mind, had been nine years before the world, the 
 conception of universal Evolutiftn had been formulated 
 and promulgated four years, and " First Principles " had 
 been for some time published, when this statement was 
 made. 
 
 Mr. Emerson's criticism of Spencer is summary and de- 
 
THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION. 157 
 
 oisive, as becomes a man who has gone to the bottom of a 
 subject. Reticent and mystical no longer, he plumps out 
 his opinion, when interviewed, with all the confidence of 
 one who knows what he is talking about. Into the pan- 
 theon of immortals, arranged for the reporter of Frank Les- 
 lie's newspaper, none may enter but star-writers, and Mr. 
 Spencer is only a "stock-writer." "We may, however, 
 presume that Mr. Emerson has here followed his trans- 
 cendental lights, as there are many who will insist that he 
 is not for a moment to be suspected of having ever read 
 Mr. Spencer's books — though it will still remain a mys- 
 tery how he has so skillfully contrived to make his state- 
 ment as exactly wrong as it could be made. It will, prob- 
 ably, matter little to Mr. Spencer what Mr. Emerson 
 thinks of his position, as it may matter nothing to Mr. 
 Emerson what we think of his judgment ; but it should 
 matter a good deal to him that he do not lend the influ- 
 ence of his eminent name to the perpetration of injustice. 
 Speaking in the light of the facts here sketched, we say 
 that Mr. Emerson will search the annals of authorship in 
 vain to find an instance in which his epithet would be 
 more grossly misapplied. And we will do him the justice 
 to say that in other days he has taught us a more generous 
 lesson in regard to what is due from the manly and liberal- 
 minded to the heroic endeavors of noble and unrecognized 
 men. Many of his admirers will recall with pleasure the 
 following admirable passage : " What is the scholar, what 
 is the man for, but for hospitality to every new thought 
 of £is time ? Have you leisure, power, property, friends ? 
 you shall be the asylum of every new thought, every un- 
 proved opinion, every untried project, which proceeds out 
 of good-wiU and honest seeking. AH the newspapers, all 
 the tongues of to-day, will, of course, at first defame what 
 is noble ; but you, who hold not of to-day, not of the times, 
 but of the everlasting, are to stand for it ; and the highest 
 
158 HERBERT SPENCER, ETC. 
 
 compliment man ever receives from Heaven is the sending 
 to him its disguised and discredited angels." This is a 
 grand exhortation, and has no doubt thrilled, many a reader 
 vi^ith enthusiasm for the rising thoughts of his time. But 
 the difficulty still remains, how to identify the celestial 
 messengers ! Such are the eccentricities of human judg- 
 ment, that the sympathj' which Mr. Emerson invokes is as 
 likely to be given to the worthless as to the worthy. And 
 what shall we say about the duty of common mortals re- 
 specting the " disguised and discredited angels," when the 
 Seer himself snubs the author of First Principles as a 
 " stock-writer," and says to the author of that unclean im- 
 posture, "Leaves of Grass," " I greet you at the beginning 
 of a great career ? " 
 
NOTES, 
 
 Note A. — Page 119. 
 
 PutPiT exposition, in this case, is to be talcen as representing the force 
 of tradition, the persistence of habit, and the adherence to stereotyped 
 ideas and forms of expression, wMcli have been so long used in sacred 
 relations that they have become sacred — rather than the actual and living 
 belief. There has come to be a great discrepancy iv, this matter between 
 pulpit presentations and the private opinions of clergymen. An example 
 of this occurred when Prof. Huxley was iuvited to address the clerical 
 body of Sion College, and took up, as the subject of his discourse, " The 
 Antiquity of the Earth, of Man, and of Civilization." His address 
 was followed by discussion, in accordance with custom, when several 
 clergymen took occasion to express their surprise that Prof. Huxley 
 should have chosen such a subject for such an audience ; that his facts 
 were very elementary, and his views long established and quite common- 
 place, and that the speaker greatly underrated the inteUigence of clergy- 
 men if he supposed they needed primary lessons on that subject. To 
 this Prof. Huxley replied : " Wh'g, then, do you not teach these things to 
 your eoTigregations ? " But there are plenty of clergymen still who incul- 
 cate the old views by no means as a matter of routine. They maintain 
 them with vigor, and still denounce the modem doctrines with fiery vehe- 
 mence. An illustration of this is afforded by a sermon lately preached 
 in New York by Kev. George B. Cheever, on Evolution, of which the fol- 
 lowing passages are samples from the Tribime report.- Mr. Darwin hav- 
 ing referred to the notion of the special creation of man as a miserable 
 hypothesis, Dr. Cheever remarks : " Observe this language, the miserable 
 assumption of a special creation, spoken or written in the full knowledge 
 that, instead of being an assumption at all, it is the very first truth taught 
 in the Bible, as clearly as the being of a God, and no more to be dis. 
 
160 NOTES. 
 
 puted by a Christian than that, but plainly rerealed as the foundation of 
 all the obligations and duties of religion, and the corner-stone on which 
 the whole scheme of Christianity rests, . . . 
 
 '■ If you demand positive and actual chronology for these postu- 
 lated, illimitable ages, the archaeological and geological scientists hare 
 an almanac of Greek scientific terminologies, under the cloak of ■which 
 both absence and assumption of knowledge without facts they may hide 
 themselves — Eocene, Miocene, Pliocene, and Pleistocene — ^ingenious com- 
 pounds of two Greek words ; the dawn of recent time, the less recent, 
 the more recent, the most recent. The use of these forms of scientific 
 learniBg being established, when you ask the age of any given develop- 
 ment or stratum, you are answered, it was Pliocene, or Post-Pliocene, or 
 Eocene, or Miocene. You must be content, for these are but parts of 
 the grammar of endless genealogies, which you must accept for certain- 
 ties, and any further questioning can only show your ignorance of what 
 be the very first principles of the knowledge of earth and time in the 
 processes of evolution. The first postulate of this philosophy is that of 
 countless millions of years to work in, with no creator, and no authority 
 that can bring it to book. Such being the basis of scientific evolution, 
 what can be the God, or the natural principle, at work for such results 
 through illimitable ages ? Is it any gain to such a system, or does it ob- 
 viate, or soften, or neutralize its irreligion, its atheistic tendency, its 
 monstrosity and cruelty, to suppose a God, or what is called God,, hiding 
 himself behind all these millions of ages, and setting all this in motion 
 by inexorable law that evolves its products by natural selection, but' gives 
 neither idea, nor knowledge, nor revelation of God, but, on the contrary, 
 makes it impossible that God should be a father or should ever interpose 
 for the guidance or benefit of his creatures, or indeed should ever have 
 acted with personal will and purpose, benevolence, and power, as their 
 Creator ? . . . . 
 
 " By their scheme, there never was, and never could have been, a 
 deity interposing to instruct Adam, to educate Abraham, to inspire Jo- 
 seph, to put down oppressing Pharaoh, to change the rod of Moses into 
 a serpent, to create an additional frog, louse, or mosquito, in Egypt ; to 
 call for the waters of a deluge, to spread abroad a rainbow, to speak to 
 the rain to fall on one piece of ground and not on another ; to commission 
 a famine, or a pestilence, or a fiash of lightning ; every drop of rain, and 
 every shower, and every ray of light, and every blade of grass, having 
 been so unalterably woven out of the original supply of force in the 
 web of order, continuous and unbroken forever, as not to admit of a 
 possibility of interference or alteration." 
 
NOTES. 161 
 
 Note B. — Page 123. 
 
 In regard to Mr. Spencer's education, a few words may be added. As 
 a child he had a delicate constitution, and his father, feeling the danger 
 of exposing him to the usual course of education, kept him from school, 
 and attended to his early instruction himself. In this respect his case 
 was like that of Mr. MiU, but the plan pursued was very different. For, 
 while young Mill's mind was forced out by a stern coercive discipline, 
 that of Spencer was led out by awakening an interest in knowledge, and 
 guiding and encouraging the; spontaneous tendencies of his mind. His 
 father was a professed mathematical teacher, and the son's mathematical 
 studies began early, and were continued systematically with a view to his 
 prospective vocation as a civil^^ngineer. This course was chosen because 
 Herbert early exhibited a marked aptitude for mechanics, mathematics, 
 and scientific studies, and because the occupation of engineering would 
 combine useful employment with out-door activity, which was favorable 
 to health, and was demanded by his slender constitution. Mr. Mill's 
 early education was purely one of books, and in his autobiography he 
 expresses regret that he never had the discipline of trying experiments in 
 science, or even the advantage of seeing them. Young Spencer, on the 
 other hand, went early into the practical work of science. He cultivated 
 natural history, collected an herbarium, and experimented in physics and 
 chemistry. The bent of his nund, moreover, early attracted him to origi- 
 nal investigation, and it is known that, before the age of seventeen, he 
 had discovered and worked out the electrotype process independently. 
 He had also solved certain difficult original problems relating to his 
 chosen profession, and devised a new and ingenious theorem in descrip- 
 tive geometry, which were afterward published in The Civil Eivgineer and 
 Architects Journal. He completed his mathematical studies with his 
 uncle the Kev. Thomas Spencer, a cultivated scholar, who graduated with 
 honors at Cambridge. He was also a man of great liberality, advanced 
 in his political views, and the first clergyman of the Established Church 
 to take a public and prominent pu't in the movement for the repeal of the 
 Corn-Laws ; having written and published extensively upon the subject. 
 At seventeen young Spencer commenced life as a civil-en^neer, being 
 first engaged under Mr. Charles Fox, afterward Sir Charles Fox, who had 
 been a pupil of his father, and afterward built the great Exhibition build- 
 ing of 1850. Some eight years were spent in this profession, when the 
 reaction from the railway mania of 1845 led to such a depression in the 
 en^eering business that he abandoned it, and gave himself up to system- 
 alio study and a career of authorship. 
 
162 NOTES. 
 
 ■ Note C.—Page 132. 
 
 The following passage is from an able article republished in The 
 Popular Science Monthly, from the Westminster Heview, on the " Develop- 
 ment of Psychology : " 
 
 " If Mr. Herbert Spencer had no other title to fame, he would still be 
 the greatest of psychologists. The vast construction of his ' First Prin- 
 ciples ' will ever be a monument of his extraordinary powers of general- 
 ization. His designed organization of the Social Science opens up the 
 prospect of intellectual acquisitions in the future, to which the past may 
 furnish few parallels. But the 'Principles of Psychology' will still 
 remain, in its symmetrical completeness and perfect adequacy to the sub- 
 ject, at once the most remarkable of his achievements, and the most 
 scientific treatise on the Mind which has yet seen the light. Its publica- 
 tion in 185S did not make a sensation. The persistent efforts of Mill had 
 not yet succeeded in stemming the muddy tide of the prevailing scholas- 
 ticism. The bastard Eantismof Hamilton did duty for Metaphysics, and 
 the Common-Sense Philosophy of Reid, with the common-sense left out, 
 usurped the place of experimental psychology. Experimental Psychology 
 was as usual busy with analysis, and had no eye for an imposing synthet- 
 ical effort. Mr. Spencer's work had, accordingly, a chill reception. 
 Greeted by the aristocratic metaphysicians with only a few words of 
 courtly complimetit, but treated practically with supercilious disregard, 
 it was received by psychologists of the Association school with hardly 
 more favor than the snarling approval with which a constitutional Whig 
 views the entry into the cabinet of a Birmingham Radical. Mr. Spencer 
 was ahead of his generation, and paid the penalty of his prescience in 
 twenty years of neglect. But now the wheel is coming round. The 
 bovine British public, constitutionally disposed, indeed, to apathy, but 
 drugged into a leaden slumber by its medicine-men, is at last awakening 
 to the fact that the peer of Bacon and Newton is here. Writers of all 
 schools are hastening to define their position with reference to the Syn- 
 thetic Philosophy. , . . Whatever part •f this philosophy may be transi- 
 tory, Mr. Spencer's present influence is indisputable ; and, since the la- 
 mented death of Mill, no one can now contest his claims to the pMlosophio 
 supremacy in these islands. That supremacy rests mainly on his Psy- 
 chology. . . . Mr. Spencer's numerous psychological advances may be 
 grouped in two divisions : the application to mind of the theory of devel- 
 opment, and the connection of psychological evolution with evolution in 
 general. The last edition of his work also incorporates Mr. Darwin's law 
 of natural selection in the explanation of the emotions, but this may be 
 
NOTES. 163 
 
 regarded as simply an' extension of the development theory. In the work- 
 ing out of both principles, Mr. Spencer has followed the lead of the physi- 
 cal sciences. ... With a prescient insight into the future of science 
 which has probably few parallels, Mr. Spencer founded his Psychology on 
 the hypothesis of development. To all but a few deep-thinking observers 
 there can have seemed few signs in 1855 that that hotly-disputed theory 
 was ever likely to be in the ascendant. The exposition of none of the 
 organic sciences, that we know of, had yet been based on it, and its ap- 
 plication to mind was undreamt of. But, with a confidence in the intui- 
 tions of reason, which is one of the clearest attributes of speculative 
 genius, and which may have its analogue in the statesman, in the nerve 
 to take the vessel of the stats' over a bar, Mr. Spencer assumed the pro- 
 visional truth of the theory, and it might be difficult to exaggerate the 
 extent to which his exhibition of it in Psychology has contributed to 
 its establishment." 
 
 Note J).— Page 132. 
 
 High as was Mr. Mill's estimate of the " Principles of Psychology," we 
 believe he never grew to a full appreciation of it. He was an ardent par- 
 tisan of the experiential psychology as opposed to the intuitional, and his 
 bias prevented him from discerning the immense step that Mr. Spencer had 
 taken in harmonizing the fundamental disagreements of the two schools. 
 His position, as defined in the " Autobiography," is, that " there is not any 
 idea, feeling, or power, in the human mind, which, in order to account for 
 it, requires that its origin should be referred to any other source than ex- 
 perience," and by this he means the experience of the individual. How 
 strong his feeling was against the a priori view is illustrated by a further 
 passage in the " Autobiography." He says : " Whatever may be the practi- 
 cal value of a true philosophy of these matters, it is hardly possible to ex- 
 aggerate the mischiefs of a false one. The notion that truths external to 
 the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, independently of 
 observation and experience, is, I am persuaded, in these times the great 
 intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid 
 of this theory, every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of which 
 the origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense with the obligation 
 of justifying itself by reason, and is erected into its own all-sufficient 
 voucher and justification. There never was such an instrument devised 
 for consecrating aU deep-seated prejudices." Mr. Spencer, on the con- 
 trary, held that the intuitionalists are right in this, that the ideas, feel- 
 ings, and powers of the mind, cannot be explained as originating in the 
 experience of the individual, but that thereare intuitions or capacities of 
 
164 NOTES. 
 
 knowing born with us. But, instead of merely assuming these with the 
 intuitionalists as ultimate principles beyond explication, he maintains 
 that they originate in the experiences of the race which have been accu- 
 mulated and transmitted to the individual in his organization. Intuitions 
 are thus aflSrmed, but their basis is laid in hereditary life, and the law of 
 Evolution thus becomes the key to the deepest inferpretation of mental 
 phenomena. 
 
 In his recent able work, entitled " Principles of Mental Physiology," 
 Dr. Carpenter remarks : " No physiologist can deem it improbable that 
 the intuitions which we recognize in our own mental constitution have 
 been acquired by a process of gradual development in the race corre- 
 sponding to that which we trace by observation in the individual. . . . 
 The doctrine that the intellectual and moral intuitions of any one genera- 
 tion are the embodiments in its mental constitution of the experiences of 
 the race was first explicitly put forth by Mr. Herbert Spencer, in whose 
 philosophical treatises it will be found most ably developed." Dr. Car- 
 penter furthermore says that " the great master of the experiential school, 
 Mr. J. S. Mill, was latterly tending toward the acceptance of this view," 
 the evidence of which is given in the following quotation from a letter of 
 Mr. Mill upon the subject to Dr. Carpenter : " There is also considerable 
 evidence that such acquired facilities of passing into certain modes of 
 cerebral action can in many cases be transmitted, more or less completely, 
 by inheritance. The limits of this transmission, and the conditions on 
 which it depends, are a subject now fairly before the scientific world ; 
 and we shall, doubtless, in time know much more about them than we do 
 now. But, so far as my imperfect knowledge of the subject extends, I 
 take much the same view of it that you do, at least in principle." We 
 thus see how profoundly the foremost psychologist of his time was ulti- 
 mately influenced in his most radical philosophical views by the doctrines 
 of Mr. Spencer ; and, when we remember how completely Mr. Spencer 
 had already reconstructed the new psychology upon the basis of the prin- 
 ciple thus lately and partially recognized by Mr. Mill, we are enabled to 
 see how far he was in advance of his age in dealing with this great sub- 
 ject. 
 
 Note 'E.—Page 140. 
 
 Interested in all that relates to the history of Mr. Spencer's enter- 
 prise, and the conditions under which it was launched, when I learned 
 about his being sustained by eminent men, in his application to govern- 
 ment, I sought to know what kind of action they took, and found that 
 their influence was ^ven in the shape of letters to Mr. Spencer, to be 
 
NOTES. 165 
 
 used with the government authorities. They were written by Mr. J. S. 
 Mill, George Grote, and Professors Huxley, Fraser, Hooker, Tyndall, and 
 Latham, in 1859, fifteen years ago, and were, of course, responsible esti- 
 mates of Mr. Spencer as a thinker by some of the most distinguished of 
 his contemporaries. At my request, Mr. Spencer favored me with the 
 reading of these letters, and the effect of their perusal was to produce 
 a feeling of profound regret that they had never been given to the pub- 
 lic ; for this would certainly have made an important difference in the re- 
 ception accorded to his philosophical project. The writers recognized 
 that Mr. Spencer was eminently the man to do a great and special work 
 for the advancement and organization of knowledge in this age — a work 
 which the British Government would honor itself by promoting ; and they 
 predicted the utmost that time has fulfilled in regard to the undertaking. 
 But Mr. Spencer regarded the letters as written for a special purpose, and 
 therefore not to be appropriated to any other. They, however, belonged 
 to the initial stage of his enterprise, were designed to aid it, and should, 
 I think, have been used for that object. I refer to this circumstance be- 
 cause it is an interesting fact ; and I have the less concern in speaking 
 about it, as the author of one of the letters assured me that the writers 
 •designed them for publication. 
 
 Note V.—Fage 143. 
 
 The following summary of the essential doctrines of Mr. Spencer's 
 system is taken from the article " Evolution " in the revised edition of 
 the American Cyclopedia : 
 
 1. Throughout the universe in general, and in detail, there is an un- 
 ceasing redistribution of matter and motion. 
 
 2. This redistribution constitutes evolution where there is a pre- 
 dominant integration of matter and dissipation of motion, and consti- 
 tutes dissolution where there is a predominant absorption of motion and 
 disintegration of matter. 
 
 3. Evolution is simple when the process of integration, or the forma- 
 tion of a coherent aggregate, proceeds uncomplicated by other processes. 
 
 4. Evolution is compound when along with this primary change from 
 an incoherent to a coherent state there go on secondary changes due to 
 differences in the circumstances of the different parts of the aggregate. 
 
 5. These secondary changes constitute a transformation of the homo- 
 geneous into the heterogeneous — a transformation which, like the first, is 
 exhibited in the universe as a whole and in all (or nearly all) its details — ^iu 
 the aggregate of stars and nebulae ; in the planetary system ; in the earth 
 
166 NOTES. 
 
 as an inorganic mass ; in each organism, vegetal or animal (Von Baer'a 
 Law) ; in the aggregate of organisms throughout geologic time ; in the 
 mind ; in society ; in all products of social activity. 
 
 6. The process of integration, acting locally as well as generally, 
 combines with the process of differentiation to render this change not 
 simply from homogeneity to heterogeneity, but from an indefinite homo- 
 geneity to a definite heterogeneity ; and this trait of increasing definite- 
 ness, which accompanies the trait of increasing heterogeneity, is, like it, 
 exhibited in the totality of things, and in all its divisions and subdivisions 
 down to the minutest. 
 
 I. Along with this redistribution of the matter composing any evolv- 
 ing aggregate, there goes on a redistribution of the retained motion of 
 its components in relation to one another ; this also becomes, step by 
 step, more definitely heterogeneous. 
 
 8. In the absence of a homogeneity that is infinite and absolute, this 
 redistribution, of which evolution is one phase, is inevitable. The causes 
 which necessitate it are : 
 
 9. The instability of the homogeneous, which is consequent upon the 
 different exposures of the different parts of any limited aggregate to in- 
 cident forces. The transformations hence resulting are complicated by — 
 
 10. The multiplication of effects : every mass and part of a mass on 
 which a force falls subdivides and differentiates that force, which there- 
 upon proceeds to work a variety of changes ; and each of these becomes 
 the parent of similarly multiplying changes : the multiplication of these 
 becoming greater in proportion as the aggregate becomes more heteroge- 
 neous. And these two causes of increasing differentiations are furthered 
 by- 
 
 II. Segregation, which is a process tending ever to separate unlike 
 units, and to bring together like units, so serving continually to sharpen, 
 or make definite, differentiations otherwise caused. 
 
 12. Equilibration is the final result of these transformations which 
 an evolving aggregate undergoes. The changes go on until there is 
 reached an equilibrium between the forces which all parts of the aggre- 
 gate are exposed to, and the forces these parts oppose to them. Equili- 
 bration may pass through a transition stage of balanced motions (as in a 
 planetary system), or of balanced functions (as in a living body), on the 
 way to ultimate equihbrium ; but the state of rest in inorganic bodies, or 
 death in organic bodies, is the necessary limit of the changes constituting 
 evolution. 
 
 13. Dissolution is the counter-charge which sooner or later every 
 evolved aggregate undergoes. Remaining exposed to surrounding forces 
 
NOTES. 167 
 
 that are unequUibrated, each aggregate is ever liable to be dissipated bj 
 the increase, gradual or sudden, of its contained motion ; and its dissipa- 
 tion, quickly undergone by bodies lately animate, and slowly undergone 
 by inanimate masses, remains to be undergone at an indefinitely remote 
 period by each planetary and stellar mass, which, since an indefinitely 
 remote period in the past, has been slowly evolving: the cycle of its 
 transformations being thus completed. 
 
 14. This rhythm of evolution and dissolution, completing itself dm'ing 
 short periods in small aggregates, and in the vast aggregates distributed 
 through space completing itself in periods which are immeasurable by 
 human thought, is, so far as we can see, universal and eternal : each alter- 
 nating phase of the process predominating now in this region of space, 
 and now in that, as local conditions determine. 
 
 15. All these phenomena, from their great features down to their 
 minutest details, are necessary results of the persistence of force under 
 its forms of matter and motion. Given these in their known distribu- 
 tions through space, and, their quantities being unchangeable, either by 
 increase or decrease, there inevitably result the continuous redistributions 
 distinguishable as evolution and dissolution, as well as all those special 
 traits above enumerated. 
 
 16. That which persists unchanging in quantity but ever-changing in 
 form, under these sensible appearances which the universe presents to us, 
 transcends human knowledge and conception ; is an unknown and un- 
 knowable power, which we are obliged to recognize as without limit in 
 space, and without beginning or end in time. 
 
 THE END. 
 
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 conscious of having given but a sorry account of it in these brief paragraphs. But wo 
 hope we have said enough to commend it to the attention of the thoughtful leader."—' 
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 which entitle any arrangement and connection of facts and deductions to be called a 
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 VII. 
 
 The Conservation of Energy. 
 
 By BALFOUR STEWART, LL. D., F. R. S. 
 
 IViik an Ajipendix treaUng of the Vital and Menial Applications of the Doctrine. 
 I vol., i2rao. Cloth. Price, $1.50. 
 
 " The author has succeeded in presenting the facts in a clear and satisfactory manner, 
 using simple language and copious illustration in the presentation of facts and prin- 
 ciples, confining himself, however, to the physical aspect of the siibject. In the Ap- 
 pendix the operation of the principles in the spheres of hfe and mind is supplied by 
 the essays of Professors Le Conte and Bain." — Ohio Farmer. 
 
 " Prof. Stewart is one of the best known teachers in Owens College in Manchester. 
 
 " The volume of The International Scientific Series now before us is an ex- 
 cellent illustration of the true method of teaching, and will well compare with Prof. 
 Tyndall's charming little book in the same series on ' Forms of Water," with illustra- 
 tions enough to make clear, but not to conceal his thoughts, in a style simple and 
 brief." — Christian Register^ Boston. 
 
 " The writer has wonderful ability to compress much information into a few words. 
 It is a rich tj-eat to read such a book as this, when there is so much beauty and force 
 combined with such simplicity. — Easterjt Press. 
 
 VIII. 
 
 Animal Locomotion; 
 
 Or, WALKING, SWIMMING, AND FLYING. 
 
 Wiih a Dissertation on Aeronautics. 
 
 By J. BELL PETTIGREW, M. D., F. R. S., F, R. S. E., 
 F. R.C. P.E. 
 
 I vol., i2mo.' Price, $1.75. 
 
 "This work is more than a contribution to the stock of enterfaining knowledge, 
 though, if it only pleased, that would be sufficient excuse for its publication. But Dr. 
 Pettigrew has given his time to these investigations with the ultimate purpose of solv- 
 ing the difficult problem of Aeronautics. To this he devotes the last fifty pages of his 
 book. Dr. Pettigrew is confident that man will yet conquer the domain'of the air." — 
 N. Y. yournal 0/ Cojnmerce. 
 
 _ " Most persons claim to know how to walk, but few could explain the mechanical 
 principles involved in this most ordinary transaction, and will be surprised that the 
 movements of bipeds and quadrupeds, the darling and rushing motion of fish, and th^ 
 erratic flight of the denizens of the air, are not only anologous, but can be reduced to 
 similar formula. The work is profusely illustrated, and, without reference to the theory 
 it is designed to expound, will be regarded as a valuable addition to natural history." 
 —Omaha Republic. 
 
 D. APPLETON & CO., Publishers, 549 & 551 Broadway, N. Y, 
 
opinions of the Press on the "International Scientific Series.'' 
 
 IX. 
 
 Responsibility in Mental Disease. 
 
 By HENRY MAUDSLEY, M. D., 
 
 Fellow of the Royal College of Physicians; Professor of Medical Jurisprudence 
 in University College, London. 
 
 I vol., i2mo. Cloth. . . Price, $1.50. 
 
 " Having lectured in a medical college on Mental Disease, this book has been a 
 feast to us. It handles a great sul;yect in a masterly manner, and,. in our judgment, the 
 positions taken by the aumor are correct and well sustained. — Pastor and People, 
 
 " The author is at home in his subject, and presents his views in an almost singu- 
 larly clear and satisfactory manner. . . . The volume is a valuable contribution to one 
 of the most difficult, and at the same time one of the most important subjects of inves- 
 tigation at the present day." — N, y. Observer, 
 
 " It is a work profound and searching, and abounds in wisdom." — Pittshurg Com- 
 mercial, 
 
 "Handles the important topic with masterly power, and its suggesdons are prac- 
 tical and of great value." — Providence Press. 
 
 X. 
 
 The Science of Law. 
 
 By SHELDON AMOS, M. A., 
 
 Professor of Jurisprudence in University College, London; author of ".A Systematic 
 
 View of the Science of Jurisprudence," " An English Code, its Difficulties 
 
 and tlie Modes of overcoming them," etc., etc. 
 
 I vol., i2ino. Cloth Price, $1.75. 
 
 '* The valuable series of ' International Scientific ' works, prepared by eminent spe- 
 cialists, with the intention of popularizing^ information in their several branches of 
 knowledge, has received a good accession in this compact and thoughtful volume. . It 
 is a difficult task to give the oudines of a complete theory of law in a portable volume, 
 which he who runs may read, and probably Professor Amos himself .would be the last 
 to claim that he has peifectly succeeded in doinjg this. But he has certainly done much 
 to clear the science of law from the technical obscurities which darken it to minds which 
 have had no legal training, and to make clear to his May' readers in how true and high a 
 sense it can assert its right to be considered a science, and not a mere practice." — The 
 Christian Register, 
 
 ''The works of Sentham and Austin are abstruse and philosophical, and Maine's 
 require hard study and a certain amount of special training. The writers also pursue 
 different lines of investigation, and can only be regarded as comprehensive in the de- 
 partments they confined themselves to. It was left to Amos to gather up the result 
 and present the science in its fullness. The unquestionable merits of this, his lastbook, 
 are, that it contains a complete treatment of a subject which has hitherto been handled 
 by specialists, and it opens up that subject to every inquiring mind. . . . To do justice 
 to * The Science of Law' would require a longer review, than we have space for. We 
 have read no more interesting and instructive book for some time. , Its themes concern 
 every one who renders obedience to laws, and who would have those laws the best 
 possible. The tide of legal reform which set in fifty years ago has to sweep yet higher 
 if the flaws in our jurisprudence are to be removed. The process of change cannot be 
 better ^ided than by a well-informed public mind, and Prof. Amos has done great 
 service in materially helping to promote this q'oA,''* —Buffalo Courier. 
 
 D. APP'LETON & CO., Publishers, 549 & 551 Broadway, N. Y. 
 
opinions of the Press on the ^^International Scientific Series.'" 
 
 XI. 
 
 Animal Mechanism, 
 
 A Treatise on Terrestrial and Aerial Locomotion, 
 
 By E. J. MAREY, 
 
 Professor at the College of France, and Member of the Academy of Medicine. 
 
 With 117 Illustrations, drawn and engraved under the direction of the author. 
 
 X vol., i2mo. Cloth Price, $1.75 
 
 " We hope that, in the short glance which we have taken of some of the most im- 
 portant points discussed in the work before us, we have succeeded in interesting our 
 readers sufficiently in its contents to make them curious to learn more of its subject- 
 matter. We cordially recommend it to their attention, . 
 
 " The author of the present work, it is well known, stands at the head of those 
 physiologists who have investigated the'mechanism of animal dynamics — indeed, we 
 may almost say that he has made the subject his own. By the originality of his con- 
 ceptions, the ingenuity of his constructions, the skill of his analysis, and the persever- 
 ance of his investigations, he ^has surpassed all others in the power of unveiling the 
 complex and intricate movements of animated beings." — Popular Science Monthly. 
 
 XII, 
 
 History of the Conflict between 
 Religion and Science. 
 
 By JOHN WILLIAM DRAPER, M. D., LL. D., 
 
 Author of " The Intellectual Development of Europe." 
 X vol., i2mo. Price, $1.75. 
 
 *'This Tittle ' History' would have been a valuable contribution to literature at any 
 <ime, and is, in fact, an admirable text-book upon a subject that is at present engross- 
 ing the attention of a large number of the most serious-minded people, and it is no 
 small compliment to the sagacity of its distinguished author that he has so well gauged 
 the requirements of the times, and so adequately met them by the preparation of this 
 volume. It remains to be added that, while the writer has flinched from no responsi- 
 bility in his statements, and has written with entire fidelity to the demands of. truth 
 and justice, there is not a word in his book that can give offense to candid and fair- 
 minded readers." — N. Y. Evening Post. 
 
 " The key-note to this volume is found in the antagonism between the progressive 
 tendencies of the human mind and the pretensions of ecclesiastical authority, as devel- 
 oped in the history of modem science. No previous writer has treated the subject 
 from this point of view, and the present monograph will be found to possess no less 
 originality of conception than vigor of reasoning and wealth of erudition. . . . The 
 method of Dr. Draper, in his treatment of the various questions that come up for dis- 
 cussion, is marked by singular impartiality as well as consummate ability. Through- 
 out his work he maintains the position of an historian, not of an advocate. His tone is 
 tranquil and serene, as becomes the search after truth, with no trace of the impassioned 
 ardor of controversy. He endeavors so far to identify himself with the contending 
 parties as to gain a clear comprehension of their motives, but, at the same time, he 
 Bubmits their actions to the tests of a'cool and impartial examination/'— JV. V. Tribune. 
 
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 A BE.IEP HISTORY OF CTJLTTTE.E. 
 
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 ** He writes in a popular style for popular use. He takes ground which has never 
 been fully occupied before, although the general subject has been treated more or less 
 distinctly by several writers. , , . Mr. Hittell's method is compact, embracing a wide 
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 the reader; but, aldiotigh his book cannot be commended as a model of literary art, it 
 may be consulted to great advantage by every lover of free thought and novel sugges- 
 tions." — iV, K. Tribune, 
 
 THE HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RE- 
 LIGION AND SCIENCE. 
 
 By John W. Draper, M. D., author of "The Intellectual Develop- 
 ment of Europe." I vol., i2mo. Cloth. Price, $1.75. 
 
 " The conflict of which he treats has been a mighty tragedy of humanity that has 
 dragged nations into its vortex and involved the fate of empires. The work, though 
 small, is full of instruction regarding the rise of the great ideas of science and philos- 
 ophy ; and he describes in an impressive manner and with dramatic effect the way re- 
 ligious authority has employed the secular power to obstruct the progress of knowledge 
 and crush out die spirit of investigation. While there is not in his book a word of dis- 
 respect for things sacred, he writes with a directness of speech, and a vividness of char- 
 acterization and an unflinching fidelity to the facts, which show him to be in thorough 
 earnest with his work. -The * History of the Conflict between Religion and Science' 
 is a fitting sequel to the ' History of the Intellectual Development of Europe,' and will 
 add to its author's already high reputation as a philosophic historian. "—iV. Y, Tribujie, 
 
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 ■ " " " » .• 1 ■ m. It is as uioroughly practical as is a book of 
 
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 Ecient'fic research to a remarkable degree. The author recounts a story that is more romantic than nine 
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 pages each, with 105 Illustrations. Cloth, $22.00 ; sheep, $27.00. Each vol- 
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 volume has just been issued. • 
 
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 invaluable as a work of reference for those who wish to study the snbiect of physiology exhaustively. As 
 a complete treatise on a subject of such interest. It should be in the libraries of literary and scientific men, 
 OS well as in the hands of practitioners and students of medicine. Illustrations are introduced wherever 
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THE GREVILLE MEMOIRS. 
 
 COMPLETE IN TWO VOLS. 
 
 A JOURNAL OF THE REIGNS OF 
 
 King G-eorge IV. & King William lY. 
 
 By the Late CHAS. C. F. GREVILLE, Esq., 
 *- Clerk of the Council to those Sovereigns. 
 
 Edited by Henry Reeve, Registrar of the Privy Council. 
 
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 temporaneous." — The' Academy. 
 
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 his observations." — Buffalo Courier. 
 
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 ment, and the price, which is nine dbllars across the water, here is only four. It 
 is not too much to say that this work, though not so ambitious in its style as Horace 
 Walpole's well-known 'Correspondence,' is much more interesting. In a word, these 
 Greville Memoirs supply valuable mateiials not alone for political, but also for social 
 history during the time they cover. They are addil ionally attractive from the large 
 quantity of racy anecdotes which they contain." — Philadelphia Press. 
 
 '* These are a few among many illustrations of the pleasant, gossipy information con- 
 veyed in these Memoirs, whose great charm is the free and straightforward manner in 
 which the writer chronicles his impressions of men and ^ycrvXs" —Boston Daily Globe. 
 
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 instruction and amusement." — Boston Saturday Evening Gazette. 
 
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 may almost say, a terrible light on the conduct and character of the public men in Eng- 
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 HEALTH AND EDUCATION, 
 
 By the Rev. CHARLES KINGSLEY, F. L. S., F. G. S., 
 
 CANON OF WESTMINSTER, 
 
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 Kingsley, and he has shown himself such In every thing he has written, from 'Alton 
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 and style, and some of them blending most valuable instruction with entertainment, 
 as few living writers can." — Hartford Post 
 
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 History, or the Education of Women. The lecture on Thrift, which was intended for 
 the women of England, may be read with profit and pleasure by the women of 
 everywhere." — St Louis Democrat 
 
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 " For the style alone, and for the vivid pictures fi-equently presented, this latest 
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 Whether discussing the abstract science of health, the subject of ventilation, the 
 education of the different classes that form English society, natural history, geology, 
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THE GREAT ICE AGE, 
 
 AND ITS RELATIONS TO THE ANTIQUITY OF MAN. 
 
 By JAMES GEIKIE, F. R. S. E. 
 
 With Maps, Chapts,"an<i numerous Illustrations. 
 
 I vol., thick l2mo. . . . Price, $2.50. 
 
 OPINIONS OF THE PRESS. 
 
 '* Intelligent general readers, as well as students of geology, will find more infor- 
 mation and reasonable speculation concerning the great glacial epoch of our globe in 
 this volume than can be gathered from a score of other sources. The author writes 
 not only for the benefit of his ' fellow-hammerers/ but also for non-specialists, and 
 any one gifted with curiosity in respect to the natural history of the earth will be de- 
 lighted with the clear statements and ample illustrations of Mr. Geikie's ' Great Ice 
 Age.' " — Episcopal Register, 
 
 " * The Great Ice Age * is a work of extraordinary interest and value. The subject 
 is peculiarly attractive in the immensity of its scope, atid.exercises a fascination over -the 
 imagination so absorbing that it can scarcely find expression in words. It has all the 
 charms of wonder-tales, and excites scientific and unscientific minds alike." — Boston 
 Gazette. 
 
 " Mr. Geikie has succeeded in writing one of the most charming volumes in the 
 library of popularized science." — Utica Herald. ' 
 
 " We cannot too heartily commend the style of this book, which is scientific andyet 
 popular, and yet not sb popular as to dispense with the necessity of the reader's putting 
 his mind to work in order to follow out the author in his forcible yet lucid arguments. 
 Nor can the attentive reader fail to leave the work with the same enthusiasm over the 
 subject as is shown in every page by the talented a.-a.iaar."— Portland Press. 
 
 "Although Mr. Geikie's position in the scientific world is such as to indicate that 
 he is a pretty safe teacher, some of his views are decidedly original, and he does not 
 make a point of sticking to the beaten ^•^."—Springfield Union. 
 
 "Prof. Geikie's book is one that may well engage thoughtful students other than 
 geologists, bearing as it does on the absorbing question of the unwritten history of our 
 race. The closing chapter of his work, in which, reviewing his analytical method, he 
 constructs the story of the checkered past of the last 200,000 years, can scarcely fail to 
 give food for thought even to the indifferent."— .S!<^/o Courier. 
 
 " Every step in the process is traced with admirable perspicuity and fullness by 
 Mr. Geikie." — London Saturday Review, 
 
 " It offers to the student of geology by far the completest account of the period yet 
 published, and is characterized throughout by refreshing vigor of diction and originality 
 of thought." — Glasgow Herald. 
 
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A New Magazine for Students and Cultivated Readers. 
 
 POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY, 
 
 CONDUCTED BY 
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 The growing importance of scientific knowledge to all classes of the - 
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