'3"'l924 050 187 842 
 
 From the Library of the Late 
 
 • ROBERTS WALKER 
 
 Friend and Partner of ]ustin DuPratt White {Cornell 'go) 
 
 Presented to Cornell University 
 
 In Memorj; of That Relationship 
 
 by . 
 
 MR. WALKER'S FAMILY 
 
(SornpU Slaui ^riyonl Eibraty 
 
ROBERTS WALKER 
 SCARSDALE.KEWYORK 
 
Cornell University 
 Library 
 
 The original of tiiis bool< is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924050187842 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS 
 AND DEBATES OF THE 
 FEDERAL CONVENTION 
 
60th CoNGRBSS\ dyivTATT? /Document 
 
 2d Session i bfcNAlli | No. 728 
 
 SECRET PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES 
 
 OF THE CONVENTION ASSEMBLED AT PHILADELPHIA, IN THE 
 YEAR 1787, FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING 
 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
 
 UNITED STATES OF 
 
 AMERICA 
 
 FROM THE NOTES TAKEN BY THE LATE ROBERT YATES, ESQ. 
 CHIEF JUSTICE OF NEW-YORK, AND COPIED BY JOHN LAN- 
 SING, JUN., ESQ., LATE CHANCELLOR OF THAT 
 STATE, MEMBERS OF THAT CONVENTION 
 
 INCLUDING 
 
 "THE GENUINE INFORMATION" 
 
 LAID BEFORE THE LEGISLATURE OF MARYLAND BY LUTHER 
 
 MARTIN, ESQ., THEN ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF THAT STATE 
 
 AND A MEMBER OF THE SAME CONVENTION 
 
 ALSO 
 
 OTHER HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 
 
 RELATIVE TO THE FEDERAL COMPACT OF 
 THE NORTH AMERICAN UNION 
 
 [Albany — Printed by Webstcrs and Skinners — At llicir 
 
 Bookstore in the White House, corner of 
 
 State and Pearl Streets— 1821] 
 
 FEBRUARY 16, 1909. — Presented by Mr. BAILEY and ordered to be printed 
 
 WASHINGTON 
 
 GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
 
 1909 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The historians of kings, with a rehgious care, collecTlhe first 
 words, the first sentiments, and the first acts of their infancy: in the 
 age of innocence, those great personages, have not yet acquired 
 the art of disguise; and philosophy, more than once, has prognos- 
 ticated, what they would be on the throne, by what they have been 
 in the nursery. 
 
 The historians of free nations, ought not to be less attentive to 
 collect whatever may throw light on the origin of their government, 
 on the principles which have guided their legislators, and on the 
 seeds of disease from which human prudence has never been able 
 to guard entirely human institutions. The exhibition of such facts, 
 impresses the mind with clear and achromatic ideas of the nature, 
 action and power of those poUtical bodies, much better than the 
 most elaborate dissertations. 
 
 It is to increase that source of public instruction that a friend of 
 American history, who long ago had secured in his port folio, the 
 original notes of Mr. Yates of the secret proceedings of the con- 
 vention that framed the present constitution of the United States, 
 has thought that it would be useful to give publicity to those authentic 
 documents. Especially at a period when improvements and alter- 
 ations in the local constitution of one of the main pillars of the 
 north American imion, are about to be undertaken. These docu- 
 ments may serve to show the constitutional lines drawn by the true 
 spirit of 1776, and patriotically defended by the old republicans of 
 1787; and accoimt, in many respects, for a succession of events 
 which are the natural if not the necessary results of a pre-existing 
 order of things. 
 
 Congress have lately caused to be published the journal of the 
 formal proceedings of the federal convention; but, if we are allowed 
 to repeat what has previously been observed on that subject, in the 
 proposals circulated for pubhshing the present collection, that 
 official journal has left history ia the dark as to the views of the 
 legislators and the principles upon which they ig.cted; and it is in 
 reality nothing but a diplomatic skeleton, deprived of its vital parts. 
 Messrs. Hamilton, Jay and Madison, in the numbers so well known 
 under the title of the Federalist, which made their appearance 
 
 5 
 
6 PREFACE. 
 
 previous to the interpolation of the ten declaratory and restrictive 
 amendments, so fortunately insisted on by the states, have, it is true, 
 entered into ample discussions and elaborate comments to assist 
 the public judgment in the investigation of the plan of constitution 
 presented to the consideration of the states. But discussions and 
 comments are not history; and history is never more attractive than 
 when it presents to us on the scene, the actors of great transactions ; 
 opens, as it were, the doors of their most secret councils to the curi- 
 osity of the reader, and procures him, without the compulsion of a 
 literary dictatorat, the pleasing task of judging for himself of public 
 men and public measures. 
 
 It is to be regretted that Mr. Yates left the convention before 
 the draft of the constitution was completed; but he left it after all 
 the basis urged by the promoters of the favored plan had been 
 adopted by a majority of the representatives of the states — and 
 what he did not hear, has not escaped the vigilance of Mr. Lxjther 
 Martin, whose report is inserted before the notes of Mr. Yates, 
 because it embraces a more general view of the subject, and may 
 serve as a key to discriminate the several interlocutors mentioned 
 in the debates. 
 
 We possess no other testimony concerning the secret proceedings 
 of the federal convention. It is said that Mr. Madison has also, 
 during the sittings of that body, made his memorandums of the 
 controversies which have arisen in debating the merits of the con- 
 stitution, and that he intends to publish them. It will be an addi- 
 tional diffusion of radiant matter on a system of government 
 admirably well calculated for the general and local administration of 
 extensive free countries — a system, whose excellence and brilUant 
 success, have rendered it, not only the pattern, but also the centre 
 of gravity and the point of rest of the several confederacies for min g 
 themselves every day on this immense continent, with more rapidity 
 than Herschel has discovered his new constellations. The talents 
 and the veracity of Mr. Madison insure the belief, that his memoires 
 wUl enrich our annals, and that his paternal feelings for the Federalist 
 will not affect the rigidity of his narratives as an historian. 
 
 The Editor. 
 
 Albany, July, 1821. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS 
 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
 
 THE GENUINE INFORMATION 
 
 DELIVERED TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND RELATIVE TO THE 
 
 PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL CONVENTION, HELD AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, BY 
 
 LUTHER MARTIN, ESQUIRE, ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF MARYLAND, AND ONE OF THE 
 
 DELEGATES IN THE SAID CONVENTION. 
 
 To the Hon. Thomas Cockey Dete, 
 
 Speaker of the House of Delegates of Marylaiid. 
 
 Sm, I flatter myself the subject of this letter will be a sufiicient 
 apology for thus publicly addressing it to you, and through you to 
 the other members of the house of delegates. It cannot have 
 escaped your or their recollection, that when called upon as the 
 servant of a free state, to render an account of those transactions 
 in which I had had a share, in consequence of the trust reposed in 
 me by that state, among other things, I informed them, "that some 
 time in July, the honorable Mr. Yates and Mr. Lansing of New- York, 
 left the convention; that they had uniformly opposed the system, 
 and that I believe, despairing of getting a proper one brought for- 
 ward, or of rendering any real service, they returned no more." — 
 You cannot, sir, have forgot, for the incident was too remarkable 
 not to have made some impression, that upon my giving this infor- 
 mation, the zeal of one of my honorable colleagues, in favor of a 
 system which I thought it my duty to oppose, impelled him to 
 interrupt me, and in a manner which I am confident his zeal alone 
 prevented him from being convinced was not the most delicate, to 
 insinuate pretty strongly, that the statement which I had given of 
 the conduct of those gentlemen, and their motives for not returning, 
 were not candid. 
 
 Those honorable members have officially given information on 
 this subject, by a joint letter to. his excellency Governor Clinton — it 
 is published. Indulge me, sir, in giving an extract from it, that it 
 may stand contrasted in the same page with the information I gave, 
 
 7 
 
8 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 and may convict me of the want of candor of which I was charged, 
 if the charge was just — ^if it will not do that, then let it silence my 
 accusers. 
 
 "Thus circumstanced, under these impressions, to have hesitated 
 would have been to be culpable; — we therefore gave the principles 
 of the constitution, which has received the sanction of a majority 
 of the convention, our decided and tmreserved dissent. We were 
 not present at the completion of the new constitution; but before 
 we left the convention, its principles were so well established as to 
 convince us, that no alteration was to be expected to conform it to 
 our ideas of expediency and safety. A persuasion that our further 
 attendance would be fruitless and unavailing rendered us less solic- 
 itous to return.'* 
 
 Theise, sir, are their words; on this I shall make no comment; I 
 wish not to wound the feelings of any person, I only wish to convince. 
 I have the honor to remain, with the utmost respect, 
 Your very obedient servant, 
 
 LuTHEE Martin. 
 
 Baltimore, January 27, 1788. 
 
Mr. Martin, when called upon, addressed the house nearly as 
 follows: 
 
 Since I was notified of the resolve of this honorable house, that we 
 should attend this day, to give information with regard to the pro- 
 ceedings of the late convention, my time has necessarily been taken 
 up with business, and I have also been obliged to make a journey to 
 the Eastern Shore: These circumstances have prevented me from 
 being as well prepared as I could wish, to give the information 
 required — ^However, the few leisure moments I could spare, I have 
 devoted to refreshing my memory, by looking over the papers and 
 notes in my possession; and shall with pleasure, to the best of my 
 abilities, render an account of my conduct. 
 
 It was not in my power to attend the convention immediately 
 on my appointment — I took my seat, I believe, about the 8th or 
 9th of June. I foimd that Governor Randolph, of Virginia, had 
 laid before the convention certain propositions for their considera- 
 tion, which have been read to this house by my honorable colleague, 
 and I believe, he has very faithfully detailed the substance of the 
 speech with which the business of the convention was opened, for 
 though I was not there at the time, I saw notes which had been 
 taken of it. 
 
 The members of the convention from the states, came there under 
 different powers; the greatest number, I believe, under powers 
 nearly the same, as those of the delegates of this state — Some came 
 to the convention under the former appointment, authorising the 
 meeting of delegates merely to regulate trade. Those of Delaware 
 were expressly instructed to agree to no system which sJiouTd take away 
 from the states, that equality of suffrage secured hy the original articles 
 of confederation. Before I arrived, a number of rules had been 
 adopted to regulate the proceedings of the convention, by one of 
 which, seven states might proceed to business, and consequently 
 four states, the majority of that number, might eventually have 
 agreed upon a system which was to affect the whole union. By 
 another, the doors were to be shut, and the whole proceedings were to he 
 Icept secret; and so far did this rule extend, that we were thereby 
 prevented from corresponding with gentlemen in the different states 
 upon the subjects under our discussion — a circumstance, sir, which I 
 confess I greatly regretted — I had no idea, that all the wisdom, 
 
 9 
 
10 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 integrity, and virtue of this state, or of the others, were centered 
 in the convention — I wished to have corresponded freely, and con- 
 fidentially, with eminent political characters in my own, and other 
 states, not implicitly to be dictated to by them, but to give their 
 sentiments due weight and consideration. So extremely solicitcus 
 were they, that their proceedings should not transpire, that the 
 memhers were prohibited even from taking copies of resolutions, on 
 which the convention were deliberating, or extracts of any Jcind from 
 the journals without formally moving for, and obtaining permission, . 
 by a vote of the convention for that purpose. 
 
 You have heard, sir, the resolutions which were brought forward 
 by the honorable member from Virginia ; let me call the attention of 
 this house to the conduct of Virginia, when our confederation was 
 entered into^ — that state then proposed, and obstinately contended, 
 contrary to the sense of, and unsupported by, the other states, for an 
 inequality of suffrage founded on numbers, or some such scale which 
 should give her, and certain other states, influence in the union over 
 the rest; pursuant to that spirit which then characterized her, and 
 uniform in her conduct, the very second resolve, is calculated ex- 
 pressly for that purpose to give her a representation proportioned to 
 her numbers, as if the want of that was the principal defect in our 
 original system, and this alteration the great means of remedying the 
 evils we had experienced imder our present government. 
 
 The object of Virginia, and other large states, to encrease their 
 power and influence over the others, did not escape observation: the 
 subject, however, was discussed with great coolness in the committee 
 of the whole house (for the convention had resolved itself into a 
 committee of the whole to deliberate upon the propositions delivered 
 in by the honorable member from Virginia.) Hopes were formed, 
 that the farther we proceeded in the examination of the resolutions, 
 the better the house might be satisfied of the impropriety of adopting 
 them, and that they would finally be rejected by a majority of 
 the committee; if on the contrary, a majority should report in 
 their favour, it was considered, that it would not preclude the mem- 
 bers from bringing forward and submitting any other system to 
 the consideration of the convention; and accordingly, while those 
 resolves were the subject of discussion in the committee of the whole 
 house, a number of the members who disapproved them, were 
 preparing another system, such as they thought more conducive to the 
 happiness and welfare of the states — The propositions originally 
 submitted to the convention having been debated, and undergone a 
 variety of alterations in the course of our proceedings, the com- 
 mittee of the whole house by a small majority agreed to a report, 
 which I am happy, sir, to have in my power to lay before you; it 
 was as follows: 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 11 
 
 1. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that a national 
 government ought to be estabhshed, consisting of a supreme legis- 
 lative, judiciary and executive. 
 
 2. That the legislative ought to consist of two Iranches. 
 
 3. That the members of the first branch of, the national legislature 
 ought to be elected by the people of the several states, for the term 
 of three years, to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be 
 compensated for the devotion of their time to public service, to be 
 paid out of the national treasury, to be ineligible to any office estab- 
 lished by a particular state, or under the authority of the United 
 States, except those particularly belonging to the functions of the 
 first branch, during the term of service, and under the national 
 government, for the space of one year after its expiration. 
 
 4. That the members of the second branch of the legislature ought 
 to be chosen by the individual legislatures, to be of the age of thirty 
 years at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure 
 their independency, namely, seven years, one third to go out bien- 
 nially, to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated 
 for the devotion of their time to public service, to be paid out of the 
 national treasury, to be ineligible to any office by a particular state, 
 or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly 
 belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term 
 of service, and under the national government, for the space of one 
 year after its expiration. 
 
 5. That each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts. 
 
 6. That the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy 
 the legislative rights vested in congress by the confederation, and 
 moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are incom- 
 petent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be inter- 
 rupted, iy the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all laws 
 passed by the several states, contravening, in the opinion of the 
 legislature of the United States, the articles of union, or any treaties 
 subsisting under the authority of the Union. 
 
 7. That the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national 
 legislature, ought not to le according to the rule established in the articles 
 of confederation, but according to some equitable rate of represen- 
 tation, namely, in proportion to the whole number of white, and other 
 free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex and condition, including 
 those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three-fifths of all other 
 persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except 
 Indians not paying taxes in each state. 
 
 8. That the right of suffrage in the second branch of the national 
 legislature, ought to be according to the rule established in the first. 
 
 9. That a national executive be instituted to consist .of a single 
 person, to be chosen by the national legislature for the term of seven 
 
12 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 years, with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoivi 
 to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, to be ineligible a second 
 time, and to be removeable on impeachment and conviction of mal- 
 practice or neglect of duty, to receive a fixed stipend, by which he 
 may be compensated for the devotion of his time to public service — 
 to be paid out of the national treasury. 
 
 10. That the national executive shall have a right to negative any 
 legislative act which shall not afterwards ie passed, unless hy two third 
 parts of each Iranch of the national legislature. 
 
 11. That a national judiciary be established, to consist of one 
 supreme tribunal, the judges of which, to be appointed by the second 
 branch of the national legislatm-e, to hold their ofiices during good 
 behaviour, and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed com- 
 pensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall 
 be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of 
 such increase or dimiaution. 
 
 12. That the national legislature be empowered to appoint inferior 
 tribunals. 
 
 13. That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to 
 cases which respect the collection of the national revenue; cases 
 arising luider the laws of the United States, impeachments of any 
 national ofl&cer, and questions which involve the national peace and 
 harmony. 
 
 14. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission 
 of states lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, 
 whether from a voluntary j miction of government, territory or 
 otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national 
 legislature less than the whole. 
 
 15. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the continuance 
 of congress, and their authority and privileges, until a given day 
 after the reform of the articles of union shall be adopted, and for the 
 completion of all their engagements. 
 
 16. That a republican constitution and its existing laws ought to 
 be guaranteed to each state by the United States. 
 
 17. That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the 
 articles of union, whensoever it shall seem necessary. 
 
 18. That the legislative, executive and judiciary powers, within 
 the several states, ought to be bound by oath to support the articles 
 of the union. 
 
 19. That the amendments which shall be offered to the confed- 
 eration by this convention, ought, at a proper time or times, after 
 the approbation of congress, to be submitted to an assembly or assem- 
 blies, recommended by the legislatures, to be expressly chosen by 
 the people, to consider and decide thereon. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 13 
 
 These propositions, sir, were acceded to by a majority of the members 
 of the committee — a system by which the large states were to have not 
 only an inequality of suffrage in the first hranch, but also the same 
 inequality in the second hranch, or senate; however, it was not 
 designed the second branch should consist of the same number as the 
 first. It was proposed that the senate should consist of twenty-eight 
 members, formed on the following scale — Virginia, to send five, 
 Pennsylvania and Massachusetts each four, South-Carolina, North- 
 Carolina, Maryland, New- York, and Coimecticut two each, and the 
 states of New-Hampshire, Rhode-Island, Jersey, Delaware, and 
 Georgia each of them one; upon this plan, the three large states, 
 Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, would have thirteen 
 senators out of twenty-eight, almost one half of the whole number — Fif- 
 teen senators were to be a quorum to proceed to business; those 
 three states would, therefore, have thirteen out of that quorum. 
 Having this inequality in each branch of the legislature, it must be 
 evident, sir, that they would make what laws they pleased, however 
 injurious or disagreeable to the other states, and that they would always 
 ■prevent the other states from making any laws, however necessary and 
 proper, if not agreeable to the views of those three states — They were not 
 oidy, sir, by this system, to have such an undue superiority in making 
 laws and regulations for the union, but to have the same superiority 
 in the appointment of the president, the judges, and all other officers 
 of government. Hence, these three states, would in reality have 
 the appointment of the president, judges, and all the other officers. 
 This president, and these judges, so appointed, we may be morally 
 certain, would be citizens of one of those three states; and the 
 president as appointed by them, and a citizen of one of them, would 
 espouse their interests and their views, when they came in competi- 
 tion with the views and interests of the other states. This president, 
 so appointed by the three large states, and so unduly under their 
 influence, was to have a negative upon every law that should be 
 passed, which, if negatived by him, was not to take effect, unless 
 assented to by two thirds of each branch of the legislature, a pro- 
 vision which deprived ten states of even the faintest shadow of 
 liberty; for if they, by a miraculous unanimity, having all their 
 members present, should outvote the other three, and pass a law 
 contrary to their wishes, those three large states need only procure 
 the president to negative it, and thereby prevent a possibility of its 
 ever taking effect, because the representatives of those three states 
 would amount to much more than one third (almost one half) of 
 the representatives in each branch. And, sir, this government, so 
 organized with all this undue superiority in those three large states, 
 was as you see to have a power of negativing the laws passed by 
 
,14 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 every state legislature in the union. Whether, therefore, laws 
 passed by the legislature of Maryland, New-York, Connecticut, 
 Georgia, or of any other of the ten states, for the regulation of their 
 internal police should take effect, and be carried into execution, was 
 to depend on the good pleasure of the representatives of Virginia, 
 Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. 
 
 This system of slavery, which bound hand and foot ten states in 
 the union, and placed them at the mercy of the other three, and 
 under the most abject and servile subjection to them, was approved 
 by a majority of the members of the convention, and reported by 
 the committee. 
 
 On this occasion, the house will recollect, that the convention was 
 resolved into a committee of the whole — of this committee Mr. 
 GoEHAM was chairman — The honorable Mr. Washington was then 
 on the floor, in the same situation with the other members of the 
 convention at large, to oppose any system he thought injurious, or 
 to propose any alterations or amendments he thought beneficial. 
 To these propositions so reported by the committee, no opposition 
 was given by that illustrious personage, or by the president of the 
 state of Pennsylvania. They both appeared cordially to approve 
 them, and to give them their hearty concurrence; yet this system, I 
 am confident, Mr. Speaker, there is not a member in this house 
 would advocate, or who would hesitate one moment in saying it 
 ought to be rejected. I mention this circumstance in compliance 
 with the duty I owe this honorable body, not with a view to lessen 
 those exalted characters, but to show how far the greatest and best 
 . of men may be led to adopt very improper measures, through error 
 in judgment, state influence, or by other causes, and to show that it 
 is our duty not to suffer our eyes to be so far dazzled by the splendor 
 of names, as to run blind-folded into what may be our destruction. 
 
 Mr. Speaker, I revere those illustrious personages as much as any 
 man here. No man has a higher sense of the important services they 
 have rendered this country. No member of the convention went 
 there more disposed to pay a deference to their opinions: but I 
 should little have deserved the trust this state reposed in me, if I 
 could have sacrificed its dearest interests to my complaisance for 
 their sentiments. 
 
 When contrary to our hopes it was found, that a majority of the 
 members of the convention had in the committee agreed to the 
 S3^stem, I have laid before you, we then thought it necessary to 
 bring forward the propositions, which such of us who had disap- 
 proved the plan before had prepared — The members who prepared 
 these resolutions were principally of the Connecticut, New- York, 
 Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland delegations. The honorable Mr. 
 Patterson, of the Jerseys, laid them before the convention; of these 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 15 
 
 propositions I am in possession of a copy, which I shall beg leave to 
 read to you. 
 
 These propositions were referred to a committee of the whole 
 house: imfortunately the New-Hampshire delegation had not yet 
 arrived, and the siclmess of a relation of the honorable Mr. M'Henrt, 
 obliged him still to be absent, a circumstance, sir, which I considered 
 much to be regretted, as Maryland thereby was represented by only 
 two delegates, and they imhappily differed very widely in their 
 sentiments. 
 
 The result of the reference of these last propositions to a committee, 
 was a speedy and hasty determination to reject them — I doubt not, 
 sir, to those who consider them with attention, so sudden a rejection 
 will appear surprising ; but it may be proper to inform you, that on 
 our meeting in convention, it was soon found there was among us 
 three parties of very different sentiments and views. 
 
 One party, whose object and wish it was to abolish and annihilate 
 all state governments, and to bring forward one general government 
 over this extensive continent, of a monarchical nature, under certain 
 restrictions and limitations: Those who openly avowed this senti- 
 ment were, it is true, but few, yet it is equally true, sir, that there 
 was a considerable number who did not openly avow it, who were by 
 myself, and many others of the convention, considered as being in 
 reality favorers of that sentiment, and acting upon those principles, 
 covertly endeavoring to carry into effect what they well knew openly 
 and avowedly could not be accomphshed. 
 
 The second party was not for the aboUtion of the state govern- 
 ments, nor for the introduction of a monarchical government under 
 any form ; but they wished to establish such a system as could give 
 their own states undue power and influence in the government over 
 the other states. 
 
 A third party was what I considered truly federal and repub- 
 Ucan; this party was nearly equal in number with the other two, and 
 were composed of the delegations from Connecticut, New- York, 
 New-Jersey, Delaware, and in part from Maryland; also of seme 
 individuals from other representations. This party, sir, were for 
 proceeding upon terms ot federal equality; they were for taking our 
 present federal system as the basis of their proceedings, and as far as 
 experience had shewn us that there were defects, to remedy those 
 defects; as far as experience had shewn that other powers were 
 necessary to the federal government, to give those powers — They 
 considered this the object for which they were sent by their states, 
 and what their states expected from them; they urged, that if after 
 doing this, experience should shew that there still were defects in 
 the system (as no doubt there would be) the same good sense that 
 induced this convention to be called, would cause the states when 
 
16 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 they found it necessary, to call another; and if that convention 
 should act with the same moderation, the members of it would 
 proceed to correct such errors and defects as experience should have 
 brought to light — That by proceeding in this train, we should have a 
 prospect at length of obtaining as perfect a system of federal govern- 
 ment, as the nature of things would admit. On the other hand, if 
 we, contrary to the purpose for which we were entrusted, considering 
 ourselves as master-builders, too proud to amend our original gov- 
 ernment, should demoUsh it entirely, and erect a new system of our 
 own, a short time might shew the new system as defective as the old, 
 perhaps more so: should a convention be found necessary again, if 
 the members thereof acting upon the same principles, instead of 
 amending and correcting its defects, should demolish that entirely, 
 and bring forward a third system, that also might soon be found no 
 better than either of the former, and thus we might always remain 
 yoimg in government, and always suffering the inconveniencies of 
 an incorrect, imperfect system. 
 
 But, sir, the favourers of monarchy, and those who wished the 
 total abolition of state governments, well knowing that a govern- 
 ment founded on truly federal principles, the basis of which were the 
 thirteen state governments, preserved in full force and energy, would be 
 destructive of their views ; and knowing they were too weak in num- 
 bers, openly to bring forward their system, conscious also that the 
 people of America would reject it if proposed to them, joined their 
 interest with that party, who wished a system, giving particular 
 states the power and influence over the others, procuring in return 
 mutual sacrifices from them, in giving the government great and 
 undefined powers as to its legislative and executive, well knowing that 
 by departing from a federal system,, they paved the way for their 
 favorite object, the destruction of the state governments, and the 
 introduction of monarchy — And hence, Mr. Speaker, I apprehend, 
 in a great measure, arose the objections of those honorable mem- 
 bers, Mr. Mason and Mr. Gerry. In every thing that tended to give 
 thfe large states power over the smaller, the first of those gentlemen 
 could not forget he belonged to the ancient dominion, nor could the 
 latter forget that he represented Old Massachusetts ; that part of the 
 system which tended to give those states power over the others met 
 with their perfect approbation; but when they viewed it charged with 
 such powers as would destroy aU state governments, their ovm as well 
 as the rest — when they saw a president so constituted as to differ 
 from a monarch, scarcely but in name, and having it in his power to 
 become such in reality when he pleased ; they being republicans and 
 federalists, as far as an attachment to their own states would permit 
 them, they warmly and zealously opposed those parts of the system. 
 From these different sentiments, and from this combmation of inter- 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 17 
 
 est, / apprehend, Sir, proceeded the fate of what was called the Jersey- 
 resolutions, and the report made by the cottunitiee of the wholehouse. 
 
 The Jersey propositions being thus rejected, the convention took 
 up those reported by the committee, and proceeded to debate them 
 by paragraphs; it was now that they who disapproved the report 
 found it necessary to make a warm and decided opposition, which 
 took place upon the discussion of the seventh resolution, which 
 related to the inequality of tepresentation in the first branch. Those 
 who advocated this inequality, urged, that when the articles of 
 confederation were formed, it was only from necessity and Expediency 
 that the states were admitted each to have an eqUal vote; but that 
 our situation was now altered, and therefore those states who con- 
 sidered it contrary to their interest, would no longer abide by it. — 
 They said no state ought to wish to have influence in government, 
 except in proportion to what it contributes to it; that if it contributes 
 but little it ought to have but a small vote; that taxation and 
 representation ought always to go together; that if one state had 
 sixteen times a,s many inhabitants as another, or was sixteen times as 
 ivealthy, it ought to have sixteen times ds mxmy votes; that an inhab- 
 itant of Peimsylvania ought to have as much weight and coilsequence 
 as an inhabitant of Jersey or Delaware; that it was contraty to the 
 feelings of the human mind; what the Imge states would rj-euer submit 
 to; that the large states would have great objects in view, in which 
 they would never permit the smaller states to thwart them; that 
 equaling of suffrage was the rotten part of the constitution, and that 
 this was a happy time to get clear of it. In fine, that it was the 
 poison which contaminated our whole system, and the source of all 
 the evils we experienced. 
 
 This, sir, is the substance of the arguments, if arguments they may 
 be called, which were used in favor of inequality of suffrage. Those 
 who advocated the equality of suffrage, took the Uiatter up on the 
 original principles of government; they urged, that all men con- 
 sidered in a state of nature, before any government formed, are 
 equally free and independent, no one having any right or authority 
 to exercise power over another, and this without arty regard to differ- 
 ence in personal strength, understanding or wealth — ^That when such 
 individuals enter into government, they have each a right to an equal 
 voice in its first formation, and afterwards have each a right to aU 
 equal vote in every matter which relates to their govenunent — Th&t 
 if it could be done conveniently, they have a right to exercise it in 
 person — ^Where it cannot be done in person but for convenience, 
 representatives are appointed to act for them, every person has a 
 right to an equal vote, in choosing that representative who is entrusted 
 to do for the whole, that which the whole, if they could assemble, 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 2 
 
as SECRET PROGEEDINaS OF TBE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 might do in person, and in the transacting of which each would have 
 an equal voice — That if we were to admit, because a man was more 
 wise, more strong, or more wealthy, he should be entitled to more 
 votes than another, it would be inconsistent with the freedom and 
 lileriy of that other, and would reduce hrni to slavery. Suppose, for 
 instance, ten individuals in a state of nature, about to enter into 
 goverimient, nine of whom are equally wise, equally strong, and equally 
 wealthy, the tenth is ten times as wise, ten times as strong, or ten times 
 as rich; if for this reason he is to have ten votes for each vote of either 
 of the others, the nine might as well have no vote at all, since though 
 the whole nine might assent to a measure, yet the vote of the tenth 
 would countervail, and set aside all their votes — If this tenth approved 
 of what they wished to adopt, it would be well, but if he disapproved, 
 he could prevent it, and in the same manner he could carry into 
 execution any measure he wished, contrary to the opinion of all the 
 others, he having ten votes, and the other altogether but nine — It is 
 evident that on these principles, the nine would have no wiU nor 
 discretion of their own, but must be totally dependent on the wiU and dis- 
 cretion of the tenth, to him they would be as absolutely slaves as any 
 nsgro is to his master — If he did not attempt to carry into execution 
 any measures injurious to the other nine, it could only be said tha'. 
 they had a good master, they would not be the less slaves, becauge 
 they would be totally dependent on the wiZZ of another, and not on 
 their own will — They might not feel their chains, but they would 
 notwithstanding wear them, and whenever their master pleased he 
 might draw them so tight as to gall them to the bone. Hence it 
 was urged, the ine'>uality of representation, or giving to one man more 
 votes than another on account of his wealth, &c. was altogether 
 inconsistent with the principles of liberty, and in the same proportion 
 as it should be adopted, in favor of one or more, in that proportion are 
 the others enslaved — It was urged, that , though every individual 
 should have an equal voice in the government, yet, even the superior 
 wealth, strength, or understanding, would give great and undue 
 advantages to those who possessed them. That wealth attracts 
 respect and attention; superior strength would cause the weaker and 
 more feeble to be cautious how they offended, and to put up with 
 small injuries rather than to engage in an unequal contest — In like 
 manner superior understanding would give its possessor many oppor- 
 tunities of profiting at the expence of the more ignorant. Having 
 thus established these principles with respect to the rights of indi- 
 viduals in a state of nature, and Vi hat is due' to each on entering into 
 government, principles established by every writer on liberty, they 
 proceeded to show that states when once formed, are considered with 
 respect to each other as individuals in a state of nature ; that like indi- 
 viduals, each state is considered equally free and equally independent, 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 19 
 
 the one having no right to exercise authority over the other, though 
 more strong, more wealthy, or abounding with more inhabitants — That 
 when a number of states unite themselves under a federal government, 
 the same principles' apply to them as when a number of individual 
 men unite themselves imder a state government — That every argu- 
 ment which shews one man ought not to have more votes than another, 
 because he is wiser, stronger or wealthier, proves that one state ought 
 not to have more votes than anpther, because it is stronger, richer, or 
 more populous — And that by giving one state, or one or two states 
 more votes than the others, the others thereby are enslaved to such 
 state or states, having the greater number of votes, in the same manner 
 as in the case before put of individuals when one has more votes than 
 the others. That the reason why each individual man in forming a 
 state government should have an equal vote is, because each indi- 
 vidual before he enters into government is equally free and inde- 
 pendent — So each state, when states enter into a federal government, 
 are entitled to an eqvxil vote, because before they entered into such 
 federal government, each state was equally free and equally inde- 
 pendent — That adequate representation of men formed into a state 
 government, consists in each man having an equal voice, either per- 
 sonally, or if by representatives, that he should have an equal voice 
 in choosing the representatives — So adequate representation of 
 states in a federal government, consists in each state having an equal 
 voice either in person or by its representative in every thing which 
 relates to the federal government — That this adequacy of represen- 
 tation is more important in a federal, than in a state government, 
 because the members of a state government, the district of which is 
 not very large, have generally such a common interest, that laws can 
 scarcely be made by one part oppressive to the others, without their 
 suffering in common; but the different states composing an extensive 
 federal empire, widely distant one from the other, may have interests 
 so totally distinct, that the one part might be greatly benefitted by 
 what would be destructive to the other. 
 
 They were not satisfied by resting it on principles; they also 
 appealed to history — They shewed that in the amphyctionic con- 
 federation of the Grecian cities, each city however different in wealth, 
 strength, and other circumstances, sent the same number of deputies, 
 and had each an equal voice in every thing that related to the common 
 concerns of Greece. It was shewn that in the seven provinces of 
 the United Netherlands, and the confederated cantons of Switzer- 
 land, each canton and each province have an equMl vote, although 
 there are as great distinctions of wealth, strength, population, and 
 extent of territory among those provinces and those cantons, as among 
 these states. It was said, that the maxim that taxation and repre- 
 sentation ought to go together, was true so far that no person ought 
 
20 SECRET PR0GEEDINQ8 00 THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 to be taxed who is not represented, but not ill the extent insisted 
 upon, to wit, that the quantum of tatation and representation ought 
 to be the same; on the contrary, the quantum of teprSseniatiM 
 depends upon the quantiun oi freedom, and therefore aU, whether 
 individual states, or individual men, who are equally free, have a 
 right to equal representation — ^That to those who insist that he who 
 pays the greatest share of taxes, ought to have the greatest number 
 of votes; it is a sufficient answer to say, that fhis rule would be 
 destructive of the liberty of the others, and would render (hem slaves 
 to the more rich and wealthy — That if one man pays mx)re taxes than 
 another, it is because he has more wealth to be protected by govern- 
 ment, and he receives greater benefits from the goverttment — So if 
 one state pays more to the federal government, it is because as a 
 state, she enjoys greater blessings from it; she has more wealth 
 protected by it, or a greater number of inhabitants, whose rights 
 are secured, and who share its advantages. 
 
 It was urged that upon these principles the Pennsylvanian, or 
 inhabitant of a large state, was of as mueh consequence as the inhab- 
 itant of Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, or any other state — That his 
 consequence was to be decided by his situatiofi in his OUm state; that 
 if he was tliere asfree, if he had as great share in the forming of his 
 own government, and in the making and executing its laws, as the inhab- 
 itants of those other states, then was he equally important and of 
 equal consequence — Suppose a confederation of States had never 
 been adopted, but every state had remained absolutely in its inde^ 
 pendent situation, no person could with propriety, say that the 
 citizen of the large state was not as important as the citizen of the 
 smaller, the confederation of the states cannot alter the case. It 
 was said, that in all transactions between state and state, the freedom, 
 independence, importance and consequence, even the individuaUty 
 of each citizen of the different states, might with propriety be said 
 to be swallowed up, or concentrated in the independence, the free- 
 dom and the individuality of the state of which they are citizemg — 
 That the thirteen states are thirteen distinct political individual etist- 
 ences, as to each other; that the federal government is or ought to he 
 a government over these thirteen political individual existences, which 
 form the members of that government; and that as the largest state 
 is only a single individual of this government, it ought to have only 
 one vote; the smallest state also being one individual member of this 
 government, ought also to have one vote — ^Tb those who urged that 
 the. states have equal suffrage, was contrary to the feelings of the 
 human heart, it was answered, that it was admitted to be contrary 
 to the feelings of pride and ambition; but those were feeliags wMch 
 ought not to be gratified at the expence oi freedom. 
 
8E0RET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 21 
 
 It was urged, that the position that great states would have great 
 objects in view, in which they would not suffer the less states to 
 thwart them, was one of the strongest reasons why inequality of 
 representation ought not to be admitted. If those great objects were 
 not inconsistent with the interest of the less states, they would readily 
 concur in them, but if they were inconsistent with the interest of a 
 majority of the states composing the government, in that case two or 
 ^ree states ought not to have it in their power to aggravdize themselves 
 at the expence of all the rest — ^To those who alledged that equaHty of 
 suffrage in our federal government, was the poisonous source from 
 which aU our misfortunes flowed, it was answered, that the allega- 
 tion was not founded in fact — That equality of suffrage had never been 
 com'plained of iy the states as a defect in our federal system — ^That 
 among the eminent writers, foreigners and others, who had treated 
 of the defects of our confederation, and proposed alterations, Twne 
 had proposed an alteration in this part of the system: And members 
 of the convention, both in and out of congress, who advocated the 
 equality of suffrage, called upon their opponents both in and out of 
 congress, and challenged them to produce one single instance where 
 a had m^easure had been adopted, or a good measure had failed of 
 adoption in consequence of the states having an equal vote; on the 
 contrary, they urged, that all our evils flowed from the want of power 
 in the federal head, and that let the right of suffrage in the states be 
 altered in aruy manner whatever, if no greater powers were given to the 
 government, the same inconveniencies would continue. 
 
 It was denied that the equality of suffrage was originally agreed to 
 on principles of necessity or expediency, on the contrary, that it was 
 adopted on the principles of the rights of men and the rights of states, 
 which were then well known, and which then influenced our conduct 
 although nmo they seem to be forgotten — For this the journals of 
 congress were appealed to; it was from them shewn, that when the 
 committee of congress reported to that body the articles of confeder- 
 ation, the very first article which became the subject of discussion, 
 was that respecting equality of suffrage — That Virginia proposed 
 divers modes of suffrage, all on the principle of inequality, which were 
 almost unanimously rejected; that on the question for adopting the 
 article, it passed, Virginia being the only state which voted in the 
 negative — That after the articles of confederation, were submitted to 
 the states by them to be ratified, almost every state proposed certain 
 amendments, which they instructed -their delegates to endeavor to 
 obtain before ratification, and that among all the amendments pro- 
 posed, n,ot one state, not even Virginia, proposed an amendment of 
 that article, securin^g the equality of suffrage — the most convincing 
 proof it was agreed to and adopted, not from necessity, but upon a 
 
22 SECRET I'ROCEEDINdS OF THE FEDERAL COXVEXTIOX 
 
 full conviction, that according to the principles of free government, 
 the states had a right to that equality of suffrage. 
 
 But, sir, it was to no purpose that the futihty of their objections 
 were sheAvn — when driven from the pretence that the equality of 
 suffrage had been originally agreed to on principles of expediency and 
 necessity, the representatives of the large states persisting in a declara- 
 tion, that they would never agree to admit the smaller states to an 
 equality of suffrage — In answer to this, they were informed, and 
 informed in terms the most strong and energetic that could possibly he 
 used, that we never would agree to a system giving them the undue 
 influence and superiority they proposed — That we would risque every 
 possible consequence — That from anarchy and confusion order might 
 arise — That slavery was the worst that could enstie, and we considered 
 the system proposed to be the Tnost complete, most abject system of 
 slavery that the wit of man ever devised, under the pretence of forming 
 a government for free states — That we never would submit tamely 
 and servilely to a present certain evil in dread of a, future, which might 
 be imaginary; that we were sensible the eyes of our country and the 
 world were upon us — That we would not labor under the imputation 
 of being unwilling to form, a strong and energetic federal government; 
 but we would publish the system which we approved, and also that 
 which we opposed, and leave it to our country and the world at large 
 to judge between us, who best understood the rights oi free- men and 
 free states, and who best advocated them; and to the same tribunal we 
 would submit, who ought to be answerable for all the consequences 
 which might arise to the union from the convention breaking up, with- 
 out proposing any system to their constituents. — During this debate 
 we were threatened, that if we did not agree to the system proposed, 
 we never shoiild have an opportunity of meeting in convention to delib- 
 erate on another, and this was frequently urged — In answer, we called 
 upon them to shew what was to prevent it, and from what quarter was 
 our danger to proceed; was it from & foreign enemy? Our distance 
 from Eiu-ope, and the political situation of that country, left us but 
 little to fear : Was there any ambitious state or states, who in violation 
 of every sacred obligation was preparing to enslave the other states, and 
 raise itself to consequence on the ruin of the others? Or was there any 
 such ambitious individual? We did not apprehend it to be the case: 
 but suppose it to be true, it rendered it the more necessary that we 
 should sacredly guard against a system which might enable all those 
 ambitious views to be carried into effect, even under the sanction of the 
 constitution and government: In fine, sir, all these threats were treated 
 with contempt, and they were told that we apprehended but one rea- 
 son to prevent the states meeting again in convention; that when 
 they discovered the ])art this convention had acted, arid how much its 
 members were a,busiw/ the trust reposed in them, the states would 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL GONVI'JNTION: 23 
 
 never trust another convention. At length, sir, after every argu- 
 ment had been exhausted by the advocates of equality of representa- 
 tion, the question was called, when a majority decided in favor of the 
 
 inequaUty Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Vu-ginia, North-Caro- 
 
 Hna, South-Carolina and Georgia voting for it— Connecticut, New- 
 York, New-Jersey, and Delaware against it; Maryland divided. It 
 may be thought surprising, sir, that Georgia, a state now small and 
 comparatively trifling in the union, shoiild advocate this system of 
 unequal representation, giving up her fresent equahty in the federal 
 government, and sinkmg herself almost to total insignificance in the 
 scale; but, sir, it must be considered that Georgia has the most exten- 
 sive territory in the union, being larger than the whole island of Great 
 Britain, and thirty times as large as Connecticut. This system 
 being designed to preserve to the states their whole territory unbroJcen, 
 and to prevent the erection of new states within the territory 
 of any of them: Georgia looked forward when her population being 
 increased in some measure proportioned to her territory, she should 
 rise in the scale and give law to the other states, and hence we 
 found the delegation of Georgia warmly advocating the proposition 
 of giving the states unequal representation. Next day the question 
 came on with respect to the inequality of representation in the second 
 branch, but httle debate took place; the subject had been exhausted 
 on the former question. On the votes being taken, Massachusetts, 
 Pennsylvania, Virginia, North-Carolina, and South-Carohna, voted 
 for the inequality. Connecticut, New- York, New-Jersey, Delaware 
 and Maryland* were in the negative. Georgia had only two repre^ 
 sentatives on the floor, one of whom (not I beheve because he was 
 against the measure, but from a conviction that we would go home, 
 and thereby dissolve the convention before we would give up the ques- 
 tion) voted also in the negative, by which that state was divided. 
 
 Thus, sir, on this great and important part of the system, the con- 
 vention being equally divided, five states for the measure, five 
 against, and one divided, there was a total stand, and we did not 
 seem very likely to proceed any further. At length it was proposed, 
 that a select committee should be ballotted for, composed of a mem- 
 ber from each state, which committee should endeavor to devise 
 some mode of conciliation or compromise; I had the honor to be on 
 that committee; we met and discussed the subject of difference; the 
 one side insisted on the inequality of suffrage in both branches, the other 
 insisted on the equality in both; each party was tenacious of their 
 
 * On this question, Mr. Martin was the only delegate for Maryland present, which circumstance. 
 secured the state a negative. Immediately after the question had been talcen, and the president had 
 declared the votes, Mr. Jenifer cams into the convention, when Mr. King, from Massachusetts, valuing 
 himself on Mr. Jenifer to divide the state of Maryland on this question, as he had on the former, 
 requested of the president that the question might be put again— however, the motion was too extraor^ 
 dinars in its nature to meet with' success. 
 
24 8B1CBET PJiOGEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL (IQJfVENTION. 
 
 seotJjnentg, wjjen it was found that nothing could ipdttce us to yield 
 the inequality in both branches; they at length proposed by way of 
 cpnipromisc, if we would q>pc^fi to their wishes m to tbe^rsif branch, 
 they would agree to the equal representation in the §econd. To this 
 it was answered, that there was no merit in the proposal, it was only 
 consenting, after they had struggled to put ioih thsirfeet on our necks, 
 to take one of them off, provided we would consent to let them Tceep the 
 other on, when they knew at the same time, that they coyM not put 
 one foot on our necks, imless we would consent to it, and that by being 
 permitted to keep on that one foot, they should afterwards be abje to 
 place the other foot on whenever they -pleased. 
 
 They were also called on to inform us what security they could giye 
 us should we agree to this compromise, that they woidd abide by the 
 plan of governinent formed upon it, any longer than it suited their 
 interests, or they found it ey^pedient. — "The states have a right to an 
 equality of representation. This is secured to US by our present arti-. 
 cles of confederation, we are in possession of this right; it is now to be 
 torn from ft'S- What secm-ity can you give us, that, when you get 
 the power the proposed system, will give you, when you have men and 
 Tfio'fiey, that you will not force from the statps that equality of suflFrage 
 in the second branch, which you now deny to be th^jr right, and only 
 give V/f from absolute necessity? Will you tell ns we ought to trust 
 you because you now enter into a solem^n pompact with us? This you 
 have done before, arid now treat with the utmost contempt. Will you 
 now. raake an appeal to the Suprepie Being, and cajl on him to guar- 
 antee your observance of this compact? The same yon haYe formerly 
 done for your observance of the article^ of confederation, which you 
 are now violating in the most wanton manner. 
 
 The same reasons which you now Wge for destrojnng our present 
 federal government, may be urged for abolishirig the system which you 
 npw propose to adopt ; and as the method prescribed by the articles of 
 confederation is now totally disregarded by you, as little regard may be 
 shewn by you to the rules prescribed for the amendment of the new 
 system, whenever haying obtained power by the government, you 
 shall hereafter be pleased either to discard it entirely, or so to alter ii 
 as to give yourselves all that superiority which you have now contended 
 for, and to obtain which you have shewn yourselves disposed to haz- 
 ard the union." — Such, sir, was the language used on that occasion, 
 and they were told that as we could not possibly have a stronger 
 tie on them for their observance of the new system than we had for 
 their observance of the articles of confederation, which had proved 
 totally insufficient, it would be wrong and imprudent to confide in them. 
 It was further observed, that the inequality of the representation 
 woiUd be daily increasing — That many of the states whose territory, 
 was confined, and whose population was at this tinie large in propor- 
 
B:eCRET proceedings op the federal PONVENTWN. 25 
 
 tion to their territory, would probably tweuty, thJl'ty, or forty years 
 hence, have no more representatives than at the introduction of the 
 government, whereas the states having extensive territory, where 
 lands are to be procured cheap, would be daUy encreasing in the num- 
 ber of their inhabitants, not only from propagation, but from the 
 emigration of the inhabitants of the other states, and would have soon 
 double, or perhaps treble the nmnber of representatives that they 
 are to have at first, and thereby enormously increase their influence 
 in the national councils. However, the majority of the select com- 
 mittee at length agreed to a series of propositions by way of compro- 
 mise, part of which related to the representation in the first branch 
 nearly as the system is now pubhshed : and part of them to the second 
 branch, seciu-ing in that equal representation, and reported them as a 
 compromise upon the express terms that they were wholly to be 
 adopted or wholly to be rejected; upon this compromise, a great number 
 of the members so far engaged themselves, that if the system was 
 progressed upon agreeable to the terms of compromise, they woxild 
 lend it their names, by signing it, and would not actively oppose it, if 
 their states should appear inchned to adopt it — Some, however, in 
 which number was myself, who joined in the report, and agreed to 
 proceed upon those principles, and see what Mnd of a system would 
 ultimately be formed upon it, yet reserved to themselves in the most 
 explicit manner the right oi finally giving a solemn dissent to the sys- 
 tem, if it was thought by them inconsistent with thefreedom and happi- 
 ness of their country — This, sir, will account why the members of the 
 convention so generally signed their names to the system; not because 
 they thought it a proper one; not because they thoroughly approved, or 
 were unanimous for it; but because they thpugbt it letter thp,n the sys- 
 tem attempted to be forced upon them. This report of the select 
 committee was after long dissention adopted by a majority of the 
 convention, and the system was proceeded in accordingly — I believe 
 near a fortnight, perhaps more, was spent in the discussion of this 
 business, during which we werts on the verge of dissolution, scarce 
 held together by the strength of an hair, though the pubhc papers 
 were announcing our extreme unanimity. 
 
 Mr. Speaker, I think it my duty to observe, that during this struggle 
 to prevent the large states from having all power in their hands, which 
 had nearly terminated in a dissolution of the convention: it did not 
 appear to me, that either of those illustrious characters, the honorable 
 Mr. Washington, or the president of the state of Pennsylvania, were 
 disposed to favor the claims of the smaller states, against the undue 
 superiority attempted by the Urge states; on the contrary, the hon- 
 orable president of Pennsylvania, was a memier of the committee of 
 compromise, and there advocated the right of the large states to an ine- 
 quality in both branches, and only ultimately conceded it in the second 
 
26 SECRET PROCEEDINOS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 branch on the principle of conciliation, when it was found no other 
 terms would be accepted.— This, sir, I think it my duty to men- 
 tion, for the consideration of those, who endeavor to prop up a danger- 
 ous and defective system by great names; soon after this period, this 
 honorable Mr. Yates and Mr. Lansing of New- York, left us; they had 
 uniformly opposed the system, and I believe, despairing of getting a 
 proper one brought forward, or of rendering any real service, they 
 returned no more. The propositions reported by the committee of 
 the whole house, having been fully discussed by the convention, and 
 with many alterations having been agreed to by a majority, a com- 
 mittee of five, were appointed to detail the system according to the 
 principles contained in what had been agreed to by that majority; 
 this was likely to require some time, and the convention adjourned 
 for eight or ten days. Before the adjournment, I moved for liberty 
 to be given to the different members to take correct copies of the propo- 
 sitions, to which the convention had then agreed, in order that during 
 the recess of the convention, we might have an opportunity of cory- 
 sidering them, and if it should be thought that any alterations or 
 amendments were necessary, that we might be prepared against the 
 convention met to bring them forward for discussion. But, sir, the 
 same spirit which caused our doors to he shut — oiu" proceedings to be 
 Tcept secret — our journals to be loclced up — and every avenue, as far as 
 possible, to be shut to public information, prevailed also in this case, and 
 the proposal so reasonable and necessary was rejected by a majority of 
 the convention; thereby precluding even the members themselves from 
 the necessary means of information, and deliberation on the important 
 business in which they were engaged. 
 
 It has been observed, Mr. Speaker, by my honorable colleagues, 
 that the debate respecting the mode of representation, was produc- 
 tive of considerable warmth — This observation is true. But, sir, 
 it is equally true, that if we could have tamely and servilely consented 
 to be hound in chains, and meanly condescended to assist ia rivetting 
 them fast, we might have avoided all that warmth, and have proceeded 
 with as much calmness and coolness as any stoic could have wished. , 
 Having thus, sir, given the honorable members of this house, a short 
 history of some interesting parts of our proceedings, I shall beg leave 
 to take up the system published by the convention, and shall request 
 your indulgence, whUe I make some observations on different parts 
 of it, and give you such further information as may be in my power. 
 [Here Mr. Martin read the first section of the first article, and then 
 proceeded.] With respect to this part of the system, Mr. Speaker, 
 there was a diversity of sentiment; those who were for two branches 
 in the legislature, a house of representatives and a senate, urged the 
 necessity of a second branch to serve as a check upon the first, and 
 used all those trite and common place arguments which may be proper 
 
SEGBET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 27 
 
 and just, when applied to the formation of a state government over 
 vndividuals variously distinguished in their habits and manners, for- 
 tune and rank; where a body chosen- in a select manner, respectable 
 for their wealth and dignity, may be necessary, frequently to prevent 
 the hasty and rash measures of a representation more popular; but 
 on the other side it was urged, that none of those arguments could 
 with propriety be applied to the formation of & federal government over 
 a number of independent states — that it is the state governments which 
 are to watch over and protect the rights of the individual, whether 
 rich or poor, or of moderate circumstances, and in which the democratic 
 and aristocratic influence or principles are to be so Mended, modified, 
 and checked, as to prevent oppression and injury — That i\xe federal 
 government is to guard and protect the states and their rights, and to 
 regulate their common concerns — That & federal government is formed 
 by the states, as states, that is in their sovereign capacities, in the 
 same manner as treaties and alliances are formed — that a sovereignty 
 considered as such, cannot be said to have jarring interests or princi- 
 ples, the one aristocratic, and the other democratic; but that the 
 principles of a sovereignty considered as a sovereignty, are the same 
 whether that sovereignty is monarchical, aristocratical, democrat- 
 ical, or mixed — that the history of manlcind doth not furnish an 
 instance from its eo.rliest period to the present time, of & federal gov- 
 ernment constituted of two distinct branches — that the memhers of 
 the federal government if appointed by the states in their state capacities, 
 that is by their legislatures, as they ought, would be select in their 
 choice, and coming from different states, having different interests and 
 views; this difference of interests and views, would always be a suffi- 
 cient check over the whole; and it was shewn, that even Adams, who 
 the reviewers have justly observed, appears to be as fond of checks 
 and balances as Lord Chesterfield of the graces, even he declares that 
 a council consisting of one branch has always been found sufficient in 
 & federal government. 
 
 It was urged, that the government we were forming was not in 
 reality & federal but a national government, not founded on the prin- 
 ciples of the preservation, but the abolition or consolidation of all state 
 governments — That we appeared totally to have forgot the business for 
 which we were sent, and the situation of the country for which we 
 were preparing our system — That we had not been sent to form a 
 government over the inJiabitants of America, considered as individuals, 
 that as individuals they were all subject to their respective state 
 governments, which governments would still remain, tho' the federal 
 government should be dissolved — That the system of government we 
 were entrusted to prepare, was a government over these thirteen states; 
 but that in our proceedings, we adopted principles which would be 
 right and proper, only on the supposition that there were no state 
 
28 SECRET PROCEEDJISIOS OP THE FEDERAL GONVmTION. 
 
 governments at all, but that all the inhabitants of this extensive contingent 
 were in their individual capacity, vnthmt government, and in a statfi of 
 nature — That accordingly the system proposes the legislature to con- 
 sist of two tranches, the one to be drawn from the people at large, imme- 
 diately in their individual capacity; the other to be chosen in a more 
 select manner, as a check upon the first — It is in its yery introduction 
 declared to be a compact between the people of the United States as 
 individuals; and it is to be ratified by the people at large in their 
 capacity as individuals; all which it was said, would be quite right 
 and proper, if there were no state governments, if all the people of this 
 continent were in a state of nature, an4 we were forming one vntioncd 
 government /or them as individuals, and is nearly the same as was 
 done in most of the states, when they formed their governments over 
 the people who compose them. 
 
 Whereas it was urged, that the principles on which & federal govern- 
 ment over states ought to be constructed and ratified are the reverse; 
 that instead of the legislature consisting of two branches, one branch 
 was sufficient, whether examined by the dictates of reason, or the 
 experience of ages — That the representation instead of being drawn 
 from the people at large as individuals, ought to be drawn from the 
 states as states in their sovereign capacity — That in a. federal govern- 
 ment, the parties to the compact are not the people as individuals, 
 but the states as states, and that it is by the states as states in their 
 sovereign capacity, that the system of government oiight to be ratified, 
 and not by the people as individuals. 
 
 It was further said, that in & federal government over states equally 
 free, sovereign, and independent, every state ought to have an equal 
 share in making the federal laws or regulations; in deciding upon 
 them, and in carrying them into execution, neither of which was the 
 case in this system, but the reverse, the states jiot having an equal 
 voice in the legislature, nor in the appointment of the executive, the 
 judges, and the other ofiicers of government: it was insisted, that in the 
 whole system there was but one federal feature, the appointment of 
 the senators by the states in their sovereign capacity, that is by 
 their legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but it 
 was said that this feature was oiAj federal in appearance. 
 
 To prove this, and the senate as constituted could not be a security 
 for the protection and preservation of the state governments, and that 
 the senators could not be justly considered the representatives of the 
 states as states, it was observed, that upon just principles of repre- 
 sentation, the representative ought to speak the sentiments of his co'nr 
 stituents, and ought to vote in the same manner that his constituents 
 would do (as far as he can judge) provided his constituents were act- 
 ing in person, and had the same knowledge and information with 
 himself; and therefore that the representative ought to be dependant 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 29 
 
 on his constitlients, and answerable to theiti; that the connexion 
 between the representative and the represented, ought to be as near 
 and as close as possible; according to these principles, Mr. Speaker, 
 in this state it is provided by its constitution, that the representatives 
 in congress, shall be chosen annually, shall be paid by the state, and 
 shall be subject to recall even within the year; so cautiously has our 
 constitution guarded against an aiuse of the trust reposed in our 
 representatives in the federal government; whereas by the third and 
 sixth section of the first article of this new system, the senators are 
 to be chosen for six years instead of being chosen annually; instead 
 of being paid by their states who send them, they, in conjunction with 
 the other branch, are to pay themselves out of the treasury of the 
 United States; and are not liable to be recalled during the period 
 for which they are chosen: Thus, sir, for six years the senators are 
 rendered totally and absolutely independent of their states, of whom 
 they ought to be the representatives, without any bond or tie between 
 them: During tbat time they may join in measures ruinous and 
 destructive to their states, even such as should totally annihilate their 
 state governments, and their states cannot recall them, nor exercise any 
 coniroul over them. Another consideration, Mr. Speaker, it was thought 
 ought to have great iteight to prove that the smaller states cannot 
 depend on the senate for the preservation of their rights, either against 
 large and ambitious states, or against an ambitious, aspiring president. 
 The senate, sir, is so constituted, that they are not only to compose 
 one branch of the legislature, but by the second section of the sec- 
 ond article, they are to compose a privy council for the president; 
 hence, it will be necessary, that they should be, in a great measure, a 
 permanent body, constantly residing at the seat of government. 
 Seven years is esteemed for the life of a man; it can hardly be sup- 
 posed, that a senator, especially from the states remote from the 
 seat of empire, will accept of an appointment which must estrange 
 him for six years from his state, without giving up to a great degree 
 his prospects in his own state. If he has a family, he wiU take his 
 family with him to the place where the government shall be fixed, 
 that will become his home, and there is every reason to expect, that 
 his future views and prospects wUl centre in the, favouH and emolu- 
 ments of the general government, or of the government of that state 
 where the seat of empire is established: — In either case, he is lost to 
 his own state. If he places his future prospects in the favors and 
 emoluments of the general government, he will become the dependant 
 and creature of the president, as the system enables a senator to be 
 appointed to offices, and without the nomination of the president, no 
 appointment can take place; as such, he will favour the wishes of the 
 president, and concur in his measures, who, if he has no ambitious 
 views of his own to gratify, may be too fa/vorable to the ambitious views 
 
30 SECRET PBOOEEDINOS OF THE FEDERAL -CONVENTION. 
 
 of the large states, who will have an undue sJiare in his original ap- 
 pointment, and on whom he will be m,ore dependant afterwards than 
 on the states which are smaller. If the senator places his futute 
 prospects in that state where the seat of empire is fixed; from that 
 time he will be in every question wherein its particular interest may- 
 be concerned the representative of that state, not of his own. 
 
 But even this provision apparently for the security of the state go'u- 
 emments inadequate as it is, is entirely left at the mercy of .the general 
 government, for by the fourth section of the first article, it is expressly 
 provided, that the congress shall have a power to maJce and alter all 
 regulations concerning the time and manner of holding elections for 
 senators; a provision, expressly looTcing forward to, and / have no douU 
 designed for the utter extinction and abolition of all state governments; 
 nor will this, I believe, be doubted by any person, when I inform 
 you that some of the warm advocates and patrons of the system in 
 convention, strenuously opposed the choice of the senators by the state 
 legislatures, insisting that the state governments ought not to he intro- 
 duced in any manner so as to be component parts of, or instruments for 
 carrying into execution, the general government: Nay, so far were 
 the friends of the system from pretending that they meant it, or con- 
 sidered it as ek federal system, that on the question being proposed, 
 "that a union of the states, merely federal, ought to be the sole 
 object of the exercise of the powers vested in the convention;" it 
 was negatived by a majority of the members, and it was resolved, 
 "that a national government ought to be formed" — afterwards the 
 word '^national" was struck out by them, because they thought 
 the word might tend to alarm: and although now, they who advocate 
 the system, pretend to call themselves federalists, in convention the 
 distinction was quite the reverse; those who opposed the system, 
 were there considered and styled the federal party, those who advo- 
 cated it, the antifederal. 
 
 Viewing it as a national, not a federal government, as calculated 
 and designed not to protect and preserve, but to abolish and annihilate 
 the state governments, it was opposed for the following reasons, it was 
 said, that this continent was much too extensive for one Tiational gov- 
 ernment, which should have sufficient power and energy to pervade 
 and hold in obedience and subjection all its parts, consistent with the 
 enjoyment and preservation of liberty; that the genius and habits of 
 the people of America, were opposed to such a government — That 
 dxu-ing their connexion with Great Britain, they had been accus- 
 tomed to have all their concerns transacted within a narrow circle, 
 their colonial district; they had been accustomed to have their seats 
 of government hear them, to which they might have access, without 
 much inconvenience, when their business should require it — That 
 at this time we find if a county is rather large the people complain of 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINOS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 31 
 
 the inconvenience, and clamor for a division of their county, or for 
 a removal of the place where their courts are held, so as to render it 
 more central and convenient— That in those states, the territory of 
 which is extensive, as soon as the population increases remote from 
 the seat of government, the inhabitants are urgent for a removal 
 of the seat of their government, or to be erected into a new state — 
 As a proof of this, the inhabitants of the western parts of Virginia 
 and North-Carolina, of Vermont and the province of Maine, were 
 instances, even the inhabitants of the western parts of Pennsylvania, 
 who it is said, already seriously look forward to the time when they 
 shall either be erected into a new state, or have their seat of govern- 
 ment removed to the Susquehanna. — If the iahabitants of the 
 different states consider it as a grievance to attend a country court or 
 the seat of their ovm government, when a little inconvenient, can it be 
 supposed they would ever submit to have a national government 
 established, the seat of which would be Tnore than a thousand miles 
 removed from some of them? It was insisted that governments of a 
 republican nature, are those best calculated to preserve the freedom, and 
 happiness of the citizen — That governments of this Icind, are only 
 calculated for a territory but small in its extent ; that the only method 
 by which an extensive continent like America could be connected and 
 united together consistent with the principles of freedom, must be by 
 having a number of strong and energetic state governments for securing 
 and protecting the rights of individuals forming those governments, 
 and for regulating all their concerns; and a strong energetic /ec^eraZ 
 government over those states for the protection and preservation, and 
 for regulating the common concerns of the state. It was further 
 insisted, that even if it was possible to effect a total abolition of the 
 state governments at this time, and to establish one general govern- 
 ment over the people of America, it could not long subsist, but in a 
 little time would again be broken into a variety of governments of a 
 smaller extent, similar in some manner to the present situation of this 
 continent; the principal difference in all probability would be that 
 the governments, so established, being affected by some violent con- 
 vulsion, might not be formed on principles so favorable to liberty as 
 those of our present state governments — That this ought to be an 
 important consideration to such of the states who had excellent gov- 
 ernments, which was the case with Maryland and most others, what- 
 ever it might be to persons who disapproving of their particular state 
 government would be wiUing to hazard every thing to overturn and 
 destroy it. These reasons, sir, influenced me to vote against two 
 branches in the legislature, and against every part, of the system 
 which was repugnant to the principles of a federal government — Nor 
 was there a single argument urged, or reason assigned, which to my 
 mind was satisfactory, to prove that a good government on federal 
 
32 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 principles was unattainable, the whole of their arguments only prov- 
 ing, what none of us controverted, that our federal government aa 
 originally formed, was defective and wanted amendment — However, a 
 majority of the convention hastily and inconsiderately, without con- 
 descending to make a fair trial, in their great wisdom, decided that 
 a kind of government which a Molitesquieu and a Price have declared 
 the best calculated of any to preserve internal liberty, and to enjoy 
 external strength and security, and the only one by which a large 
 continent can be connected and united, consistent with the priiciples 
 of hberty was totally impracticable, and they acted accordiiigly. 
 
 With respect to that fart of the second section of the first article, 
 which relates to the appoHioriment of re'presentati&n and direct taxa- 
 tion, there were considerable objections made to it, besideis the great 
 objection of inequality — It was urged, that no principle coxdd justify 
 taking slaves into computation in apportioning the number of reprt- 
 sentatives a state should have in the gdVfernment — That it involved 
 the absurdity of increasing the power of a state in making laws for 
 free men in proportion as that state violated the rights (ff freedom — 
 That it might be proper to take slaves into cdnsidetation, when taxes 
 were to be apportioned, because it had a tendency to discourage 
 slavery; but to take them into account in giving representation tended 
 to encourage the slave trade, and to make it the interest of the states 
 to continue that infamous traffic — That slaves could not be taken intb 
 account as men, or citizens, because they were not admitted to the 
 rights of citizens, in the states which adopted or continued slavery — ^If 
 they were to be taken into account as property, it was asked, what 
 peculiar circumstance should render this property (of all others the 
 most odious in its nature) entitled to the high privilege of conferring 
 consequence and power in the gov&rlMnent to its possessore, rather than 
 any other property: and why slaves should, as property, be taken 
 into accoimt rather than horses, cattle, mules, or any other species; 
 and it was observed by an honorable member from Massathusetts, 
 that he considered it as dishonorable and humiliating to enter intb 
 compact with the slaves of the southern states, as it would with the 
 horses and mules of the eastern. It was also objected, that the num- 
 iers of representatives appointed by this section to be sent by the 
 particular states to compose the first legislature, were not precisely 
 agreeable to the rule of representation adopted by this system, and 
 that the numbers in this section are artfully lessened for the Urge 
 states, while the smaller states have their /mZZ propottion in order to 
 prevent the undue influence which the large states will have in the 
 government from being too apparent; and I think, Mr. Speaker, that 
 this objection is well founded. I have taken some pains to obtain 
 information of the number of freemen and slaves in the different 
 states, and I -have reason to believe, that if the estimate was nMO 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 33 
 
 taken, which is directed, and one delegate to be sent for every thirty 
 thousand inhabitants, that Virginia would have at least twelve dele- 
 gates, Massachusetts eleven, and Pennsylvania ten, instead of the num- 
 ber stated in this section; whereas the other states, I beheve, would 
 not have more than the number there allowed them, nor would 
 Georgia, most probably at present, send more than two — If I am 
 right, Mr. Speaker, upon the enumeration being made, and the repre- 
 sentation being apportioned according to the rule prescribed, the 
 whole number of delegates would be seventy-one, thirty-six of which 
 would be a quorum to do business; the delegates of Vu-ginia, Massa- 
 chusetts and Pennsylvania, would amount to thirty-three of that 
 quorum — Those three states will, therefore, have much more than 
 equal power and influence in making the laws and regulations, which 
 are to affect this continent, and will have a moral certainty of pre- 
 venting any laws or regidations which they disapprove, although they 
 might be thought ever so necessary by a great majority of the states — 
 It was fiurther objected, that even if the states who had most inhab- 
 itants ought to have a greater number of delegates, yet the number 
 of delegates ought not to be in exact proportion to the number of in- 
 habitants, because the influence and power of those states whose dele- 
 gates are numerous, will be greater when compared to the influence 
 and power of the other states, than the proportion which the num- 
 bers of their delegates bear to each other; as for instance, though 
 Delaware has one delegate, and Virginia but ten, yet Virginia has 
 mxyre than ten times as much power and influence in the government 
 as Delaware; to prove this, it was observed that Virginia would have 
 a much greater chance to carry any measure than any number of states 
 whose delegates were altogether ten (suppose the states of Delaware, 
 Connecticut, Rhode-Island, and New-Hampshire) since the ten dele- 
 gates from Virginia in every thing that related to the interest of that 
 state would act in union, and move one solid and compact body, whereas 
 the delegates of these four states, though collectively equal in number 
 to those from Virginia, coming from different states having different 
 interests, wiU be less likely to harmonize and move in concert. As a 
 further proof, it was said, that Virginia, as the system is now re- 
 ported, by unitiag with her the delegates oi four other states, can 
 carry a question against the sense and interest of the eight states by 
 sixty-four different combinations; the four states voting with Virginia, 
 being every time so far different as not to be composed of the same 
 four; whereas the state of Delaware can only, by uniting four other 
 states with her, carry a measure against the sense of eight states by 
 two different combinations — a mathematical proof that the state of 
 Virginia has thirty-two times greater chance of carrying a measure 
 against the sense of eight states than Delaware, although Virginia 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 3 
 
34 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 has only ten times as many delegates: It was also shewn, that the 
 idea was totally fallacious which was attempted to be maintained, 
 that if a state had one thirteenth part of the numbers composing tht 
 delegation in this system, such state would have as much influence as 
 under the articles of confederation; to prove the fallacy of this idea 
 it was shewn, that under the articles of confederation the state of 
 Maryland had but one vote in thirteen, yet no measure could be car- 
 ried against her interests without seven states, a majority of the whole 
 concurring in it; whereas in this system, though Maryland has six 
 votes, which is m,ore than the proportion of one in thirteen, yet Jive 
 states may, in a variety of confibinations, carry a question against her 
 interest, though seven other states concur with her, and six states by 
 a m,uch greater number of combinations, may carry a measure against 
 Maryland, united with six other states. I shall here, sir, just observe, 
 that as the committee of detail reported the system, the delegates 
 from the different states were to be one for every forty thousand in- 
 habitants; it was afterwards altered to one for every thirty thousand; 
 this alteration was made after I left the convention, at the instance 
 of whom I know not; but it is evident, that the alteration is in favor 
 of the states which have large and extensive territory, to increase 
 their power and influence in the government, and to the injury of 
 the smaller states — Since it is the states of extensive territory, who wUl 
 most speedily increase the number of their inhabitants as before has 
 been observed, and will therefore, most speedily procure an increase 
 to the number of their delegates — By this alteration Virginia, North- 
 Carolina or Georgia, by obtaining one hundred and twenty thousand 
 additional inhabitants, will be entitled to four additional delegates, 
 whereas such state would only have been entitled to three, ii forty 
 thousand had remained the nmnber by which to apportion the dele- 
 gation. As to that part of this section that relates to direct taxa- 
 tion, there was also an objection for the following reasons: it was said 
 that a large sum of money was to be brought into the national treas- 
 ury by the duties on commerce, which would be almost wholly paid by 
 the commercial states; it would be unequal and unjust that the sum 
 which was necessary to be raised by direct taxation should be appor- 
 tioned equally upon aU the states, obliging the commercial states to 
 pay as large a share of the revenue arising therefrom, as the states 
 from whom no revenue had been drawn by imposts; since the wealth 
 and industry of the inhabitants of the commercial states will in the 
 first place be severely taxed through their commerce, and afterwards 
 be equally taxed with the industry and wealth of the inhabitants of 
 the other states, who have paid no part of that revenue, so that by this 
 provision, the inhabitants of the commercial states are in this system 
 obliged to bear an unreasonable and disproportionate share in the 
 expences of the union, and the payment of that foreign and domestic 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 35 
 
 debt, which was incurred not more for the benefit of the commercial 
 than of the other states. 
 
 In the sixth section of the first article, it is provided, that senators 
 and representatives may be appointed to any civil office under the 
 authority of the United States, except such as shall have been created, 
 or the emoluments of which have been increased during the time for 
 which they were elected:, upon this subject, sir, there was a great di- 
 versity of sentiment among the members of the convention — As the 
 propositions were reported by the committee of the whole house, a 
 senator or representative could not be appointed to any office under 
 a particular state, or under the United States, during the tim^ for which 
 they were chosen, nor to any office under the United States until one 
 year after the expiration of that time. — It was said, and in my opinion 
 justly, that no good reason could be assigned why a senator or repre- 
 sentative should be incapacitated to hold an office in his own govern- 
 ment, since it can only bind him more closely to his state, and attach 
 him the more to its interests, which, as its representative, he is bound 
 to consult and sacredly guard, as far as is consistent with the welfare 
 of the union; and therefore, at most, would only add the additional 
 motive of gratitude for discharging his duty; and according to this 
 idea, the clause which prevented senators or delegates from holding 
 offices in their own states, was rejected by a considerable majority; 
 but, sir, we sacredly endeavored to preserve all that part of the resolu- 
 tion which prevented them from being eligible to offices under the 
 United States, as we considered it essentially necessary to preserve the 
 integrity, independence and dignity of the legislature, and to secure 
 its members from corruption. 
 
 I was in the number of those who were extremely solicitous to pre- 
 serve this part of the report; but there was a powerful opposition 
 made by such who wished the members of the legislature to be eligible 
 to offices under the United States — Three different times did they 
 attempt to procure an alteration, and as often failed, a majority firmly 
 adhering to the resolution as reported' by the committee; however, 
 an alteration was at length by dint of perseverance, obtained even 
 within the last twelve days of the convention, for it happened after I 
 left Philadelphia — As to the exception that they cannot be appointed 
 to offices created by themselves, or the emoluments of which are by 
 themselves increased, it is certainly of little consequence, since they 
 may easily evade it by creating new offices, to which may be ap- 
 pointed the persons who fill the offices before created, and thereby 
 vacancies will be made, which may be filled by the members who for 
 that purpose have created the new offices. 
 
 It is true, the acceptance of an office vacates their seat, nor can they 
 be re-elected during their continuance in office; but it was said, that 
 the evil would first take place; that the price for the office would be 
 
36 SECRET PliOCEEDlNG8 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 paid before it was obtained; that vacating the seat of the person who 
 was appointed to office, made way for the admission of a new mem- 
 ber, who would come there as desirous to obtain an office as him 
 whom he succeeded, and as ready to pay the price necessary to obtain 
 it ; in fine, that it would be only driving away the flies who -werefiUed, 
 to make room for those that were hungry — And as the system is now 
 reported, the president having the power to nominate to all offices, 
 it must be evident, that there is no possible security for the integrity 
 and independence of the legislature, but that they are most unduly 
 placed under the influence of the president, and exposed to hribery and 
 corruption. 
 
 The seventh section of this article was also the subject of contest — It 
 was thought by many members of the convention, that it was very 
 wrong to confine the origination of all revenue bills to the house of 
 representatives, since the members of the senate wiU be chosen by the 
 people as well as the members of the house of delegates, if not im- 
 mediately, yet mediately, being chosen by the members of the state 
 legislature, which members are elected by the people, and that it 
 makes no real difl'erence whether we do a thing in person, or by a 
 deputy, or agent appointed by us for that purpose. 
 
 That no argument can be drawn from the house of lords in the 
 British constitution, since they are neither mediately nor immediately 
 the representatives of the people, but are one of the three estates, com- 
 posing that kingdom, having hereditary rights and privileges, distinct 
 from, and independent of, the people. 
 
 That it may and probably will be a future source of dispute and con- 
 troversy between the two branches, what are, or are not revenue bills, 
 and the more so, as they are not defined in the constitution; which 
 controversies may be difficult to settle, and may become serious in 
 their consequences, there being no power in the constitution to decide 
 upon, or authorised in cases of absolute necessity to terminate them 
 by a prorogation or dissolution of either of the branches ; a remedy 
 provided in the British constitution, where the king has that power, 
 which has been found necessary at times to be exercised in case of 
 violent dissentions between the lords and commons on the subject of 
 money bills. 
 
 That every regulation of commerce; every law relative to excises, 
 stamps, the post-office, the imposing of taxes, and their collection; 
 the creation of courts and offices ; in fine, every law for the union, if 
 enforced, by any pecuniary sanctions, as they would tend to bring 
 money into the continental treasury, might and no doubt would be 
 considered a revenue act, that consequently the senate, the members 
 of whom will it may be presumed, be the most select in their choice, 
 and consist of men the most enlightened, and of the greatest abilities, 
 who from the duration of their appointment and the permanency of 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. '37 
 
 their body, will probably be best acquainted with the common con- 
 cerns of the states, and with the means of providing for them, will be 
 rendered ahnost useless as a part of the legislature; and that they will 
 have but little to do in that capacity, except patiently to wait the 
 proceedings of the house of representatives, and afterwards examine 
 and approve, or propose amendments. 
 
 There were also objections to that part of this section which relates 
 to the negative of the president. — There were some who thought no 
 good reason could be assigned for giving the president a negative of 
 any Mnd — ^Upon the principle of a check to the proceedings of the 
 legislature, it was said to be unnecessary; that the two branches hav- 
 ing a controul over each other's proceedings, and the senate being 
 chosen by the state legislatures, and being composed of members from 
 the different states, there would always be a sufficient guard against 
 measures being Tiastily or rashly adopted. 
 
 That the president was not likely to have more wisdom or integrity 
 than the senators, or any of them, or to letter Jcnow or consult the inter- 
 est of the states, than any member of the senate, so as to be entitled to 
 a negative on that principle — And as to the precedent from the British 
 constitution (for we were eternally troubled with arguments and prec- 
 edents from the British government) it was said it would not apply. 
 The king of Great Britain there composed one of the three estates of 
 the kingdom; he was possessed of rights and privileges as such, dis- 
 tinct from the lords and commons ; rights and privileges which de- 
 scended to his heirs, and were inheritable by them; that for the preser- 
 vation of these it was necessary he should have a negative, but that 
 this was not the case with the president of the United States, who was 
 no more than an officer of government, the sovereignty was not in him, 
 but in the legislature: And it was fiu-ther urged, even if he was al- 
 lowed a negative, it ought not to be of so great extent as that given by 
 the system, since his single voice is to countervail the whole of either 
 branch and any number less than two thirds of the other; however a 
 majority of the convention was of a different opinion, and adopted it 
 as it now makes a part of the system. 
 
 By the eighth section of this article, congress is to have power to 
 lay and coUect taxes, duties, imposts and excises. — When we met in con- 
 vention after our adjournment, to receive the report of the committee 
 of detail, the members of that committee were requested to inform us, 
 what powers were meant to be vested in congress by the word duties 
 in this section, since the word imposts extended to duties on goods 
 imported, and by another part of the system no duties on exports were 
 to be laid: In answer to this inquiry we were informed, that it was 
 meant to give the general government the power of laying stamp 
 duties on paper, parchment, and vellum. We then proposed to have 
 the power inserted in express words, least disputes hereafter might 
 
38 • SECRET PBOCEEDIXGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 arise on the subject, and that the meaning might be understood by 
 all who were to be affected by it; but to this it was objected, because 
 it was said that the word stamp would probably sound odiously in the 
 ears of many of the inhabitants, and be a cause of objection. By the 
 power of imposing stamp duties the congress will have a right to declare, 
 that no wills, deeds, or other instruments of writing, shall be good and 
 valid, without being stamped — that without being reduced to writing, 
 and being stamped, no bargain, sale, transfer of property or contract of 
 any kind or nattu-e whatsoever shall be binding; and also that no ex- 
 emplifications of records, depositions, or probates of any kind shall be 
 received in evidence, unless they have the same solemnity — They may 
 likewise oblige all proceedings of a judicial nature to be stamped to 
 give them effect — Those stamp duties may be imposed to any amoimt 
 they please, and under the pretence of securing the^collection of these 
 duties, and to prevent the laws which imposed them from being 
 evaded, the congress may bring the decision of all questions relating to 
 the conveyance, disposition and rights of property, and every question 
 relating to contracts between man and man, into the courts of the gertr- 
 eral government — their inferior courts in the first instance and the 
 superior court by appeal. By the power to lay and collect imposts, 
 they may impose duties on any or every article of commerce imported 
 into these states to what amount they please.. By the power to lay 
 excises, a power very odious in its nature, since it authorises officers to 
 go into your houses, your Tcitchens, your cellars, and to examine into 
 your private concerns, the congress may impose duties on every article 
 of use or consumption, on the food that we eat, on the liquors we drink, 
 on the clothes that we wear, the glass which enlighten our houses, or the 
 hearths necessary for our warmth and comfort. By the power to lay 
 and collect taxes, they may proceed to direct taxation on every indi- 
 vidual, either by a captitation tax on their heads, or an assessment on 
 their property. By this part of the section therefore, the government 
 has power to lay what duties they please on goods imported; to lay 
 what duties they please afterwards on whatever we use or consume; 
 to impose stamp duties to what amount they please, and in whatever 
 case they please: afterwards to impose on the people direct taxes, by 
 capitation tax, or by assessment, to what amount they choose, and 
 thus to sluice them at every vein as long as they have a drop of blood, 
 without any controul, limitation, or restraint • while all the officers for 
 collecting these taxes, stamp duties, imposts, and excises, are to be 
 appointed by the general government, under its directions, not account- 
 able to the states; nor is there even a security that they shall be citizens 
 of the respective states, in which they are to exercise their offices; at 
 the same time the construction of every law imposing any and all these 
 taxes and duties, and directing the collection of them, and every ques- 
 tion arising thereon, and on the conduct of the officers appointed to 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 39 
 
 execute these laws, and to collect these taxes and duties so various in 
 their kinds, are taken away from the courts of justice of the different 
 states, and confined to the covu-ts of the general government, there to be 
 heard and determined by judges holding their offices under the appoint- 
 ment not of the states, but of the general government. 
 
 Many of the members, and myself in the number, thought that the 
 states were much hetter judges of the circumstances of their citizens, 
 and what sum of money could be collected from them by direct taxa- 
 tion, and of the manner in which it could be raised, with the greatest 
 ease and convenience to their citizens, than the general government 
 could be ; and that the general government ought not to have the power 
 of laying direct taxes in any case, but in that of the delinquency of a 
 state. — Agreeable to this sentiment, I brought in a proposition on 
 which a vote of the convention was taken, the proposition was as fol- 
 lows: "And whenever the legislature of the United States shall find 
 it necessary that revenue should be raised by direct taxation, having 
 apportioned the same by the above rule, requisitions shall be made of 
 the respective states to pay into the continental treasury their respec- 
 tive quotas, within a time in the said requisition to be specified, and 
 in case of any of the states failing to comply with such requisition, 
 then and then only, to have power to devise and pass acts directing the 
 mode and authorising the collection of the same." Had this proposi- 
 tion been acceded to, the dangerous and oppressive power in the genr- 
 eral government of imposing direct taxes on the inhabitants, which it 
 now enjoys in all cases, would have been only vested in it, in case of 
 the non-compliance of a state, as a punishment for its delinquency, and 
 would have ceased the moment that the state complied with the requisi- 
 tion — But the proposition was rejected by a majority, consistent with 
 their aim and desire of increasing the power of the general government 
 as far as possible, and destroying the powers and influence of the states. 
 And though there is a provision that aU duties, imposts and excises 
 shall be uniform, that is, to be laid to the same amount on the same 
 articles in each state, yet this will not prevent congress from havmg 
 it in their power to cause them to fall very unequal and much heavier 
 on some states than on others, because these duties may be laid on 
 articles but little or not at all used in some states, and of absolute neces- 
 sity for the use and consumption of others, in which case the first 
 woiild pay little or no part of the revenue arising therefrom, while the 
 whole or nearly the whole of it would be paid by the last, to wit, the 
 states which use and consume the articles on which the imposts and 
 excises are laid. 
 
 By our original articles of confederation, the congress have a power 
 to borrow money and emit bills of credit on the credit of the United 
 States; agreeable to which was the report on this system as made by 
 the committee of detail. When we came to this part of the report, a 
 
40 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 motion was made to strike out the words "to emit bills of credit;" 
 against the motion we urged, that it would be improper to deprive the 
 congress of that power; that it would be a novelty imprecedented to 
 establish a government which should not have such authority — ^That 
 it was impossible to look forward into futurity so far as to decide, that 
 events might not happen that should render the exercise of such a 
 power absolutely necessary — ^And that we doubted, whether if a war 
 should take place it would be possible for this country to defend itself, 
 without having recourse to paper credit, in which case there would be 
 a necessity of becoming a prey to our enemies, or violating the constitu- 
 tion of our government; and that considering the administration of 
 the government would be principally in the hands of the wealthy, 
 there could be little reason to fear an abuse of the power by an unneces- 
 sary or injurious exercise of it — But, sir, a majority of the convention, 
 being wise beyond every event, and being willing to risque any political 
 evil rather than admit the idea of a paper emission, in any possible 
 case, refused to trust this authority to a government, to which they 
 were lavishing the most unlimited powers of taxation, and to the mercy 
 of which they were willing blindly to trust the liberty and property of 
 the citizens of every state in the Tinion; and they erased that clause 
 from the system. Among other powers given to this government 
 in the eighth section, it has that of appointing tribunals inferior to 
 the supreme court; to this power there was an opposition. It was 
 urged, that there was no occasion for inferior courts of the general 
 government to be appointed in the different states, and that such 
 ought not to be admitted — That the different state judiciaries in the 
 respective states would be competent to, and sufficient for, the cogni- 
 zance in the first instance of all cases that should arise under the laws 
 of the general government, which being by this system made the 
 supreme law of the states, would be binding on the different state 
 judiciaries — That by giving an appeal to the supreme court of the 
 United States, the general government would have a sufficient check 
 over their decisions, and security for the enforcing of their laws — ^That 
 to have inferior courts appointed under the authority of congress in 
 the different states, would eventually absorb and swallow up the state 
 judiciaries, by drawing all business from them to the courts of the 
 general government, which the extensive and undefined powers, legis- 
 lative and judicial, of which it is possessed, woTild easily enahle it 
 to do— That it would unduly and dangerously increase the weight 
 and influence of congress in the several states, be productive of a pro- 
 digious number of officers, and be attended with an enormous additional 
 and unnecessary expense — That the judiciaries of the respective states 
 not having power to decide upon the laws of the general government, 
 but the determination of those laws being confined to the judi&iaries 
 appointed under the authority of congress in the first instance, a& 
 
SECRET PROCEEDinaS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 41 
 
 well as on appeal, there Ajrould be a necessity for judges or magistrates 
 of the general government, and those to a considerable nmnber, in 
 each county of every state — That there would be a necessity for courts 
 to be holden by them in each county, and that these courts would 
 stand in need of all the proper officers, such as sheriffs, clerks and 
 others, commissioned imder the authority of the general govern- 
 ment: in fine, that the administration of justice, as it will relate to 
 the laws of the general government, would require in each state all 
 the magistrates, courts, officers and expense, which is now found 
 necessary in the respective states for the administration of justice 
 as it relates to the laws of the state governments. But here again 
 we were overruled by a majority, who assuming it as a principle that 
 the general government and the state governments (as long as they 
 should exist) would be at perpetual variance and enmity, and that their 
 interests wovdd constantly be opposed to each other, insisted for that 
 reason that the state judges being citizens of their respective states, 
 and holding their commissions im.der them, ought not, though acting 
 on oath, to be entrusted in the administration of the laws of the general 
 government. 
 
 By the eighth section of the first article, the congress have also a 
 power given them to raise and support armies without any limitation 
 as to numbers, and without any restriction in time of peace. Thus, sir, 
 this plan of government, instead of guarding against a standing army, 
 that engine of arbitrary power, which has so often and so successfully 
 been used for the subversion ot freedom, has in its formation, given it 
 an express and constitutional sanction, and hath provided for its intro- 
 duction; nor could this be prevented: I took the sense of the con- 
 vention on a proposition, by which the congress should not have 
 power, in time of peace, to keep embodied more than a certain num- 
 ber of regular troops — that number to be ascertained by what should 
 be considered a respectable peace establishment. This proposition was 
 rejected by a majority, it being their determination, that the power 
 of congress to keep up a standing army, even in peace should ovly 
 be restrained by their will and pleasure. 
 
 This section proceeds further to give a power to the congress to 
 provide for the calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the 
 union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions. As to giving such 
 a power there was no objection; but it was thought by some, that 
 this power ought to be given with certain restrictions. It was thought 
 that not more than a certain part of the militia of any one state, 
 ought to be obliged to march out of the same, or be employed out of 
 the same, at any one time, without the consent of the legislature of 
 such state. This amendment I endeavored to obtain; but it met with 
 the same fate, which attended almost every attempt to limit the 
 powers given to the general government, and constitutionally to guard 
 
42 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 against their abuse, it was not adopted. As it now stands, the con- 
 gress will have the power, if they please, to march the whole mihtia 
 of Maryland to the remotest part of the union, and keep .them in 
 service as long as they think proper, without being in any respect 
 dependent upon the goverrwnent of Maryland for this unlimited exer- 
 cise of power over its citizens. All of whom, from the lowest to the 
 greatest, may, during such service, be subjected to military law, and 
 ■tied up and whipped at the haTbert like the meanest of slaves. 
 
 By the next paragraph, congress is to have the power to provide 
 for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for govemiTig 
 such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United 
 States. 
 
 For this extraordinary provision, by which the militia, the only 
 defence and protection which the state can have for the security of 
 their rights against arbitrary encroachments of the general government, 
 is taken entirely out of the power of their respective states, and placed 
 under the power of congress. It was speciously assigned as a reason, 
 that the general government would cause the militia to be better 
 regulated and better disciplined than the state governments, and that 
 it would be proper for the whole militia of the union to have a uni- 
 formity in their arms and exercise. To this it was answered, that the 
 reason however specious, was not just; that it would be absurd the 
 mihtia of the western settlements, who were exposed to an Indian 
 enemy, should either be confined to the same arms or exercise, as the 
 militia of the eastern or middle states; that the same penalties which 
 would be sufficient to enforce an obedience to militia laws in some 
 .states, would be totally disregarded in others — That leaving the 
 power to the several states, they would respectively best know the 
 situation and circumstances of their citizens, and the regulations that 
 VFould be necessary and sufficient to effect a well regulated militia in 
 «ach — That we were satisfied the militia had heretofore been as well 
 disciplined, as if they had been under the regulations of congress; 
 and that the states would now have an additional motive to keep the 
 militia in proper order, and fit for service, as it would be the only 
 chance to preserve their existence against a general government, armed 
 with powers sufficient to destroy them. These observations, sir, pro- 
 cured from some of the members an open avowal of those reasons, by 
 which we believed before that they were actuated. They said, that as 
 the states would be opposed to the general government, and at enmity 
 with it, which, as I have already observed, they assumed as a prin- 
 ciple, if the militia was under the control and the authority of the 
 respective states, it woidd enable them to thwart and oppose the general 
 government: — They said the states ought to be at the mercy of the 
 general government, and, therefore, that the militia ought to be put 
 under its power, and not suffered to remain under the power of the 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 43 
 
 respective states. In answer to these declarations, it was urged, that 
 if after having retained to the general government the great powers 
 already granted, and among those, that of raising and Iceeping up 
 Tegular troops without limitations, the power over the militia should be 
 taken away from the states, and also given to the general government, 
 it ought to be considered as the last coup de grace, to the state govern- 
 ments; that it must be the most convincing proof, the advocates of 
 this system design the destruction of the state governments, and that 
 no professions, to the contrary, ought to be trusted; and that every 
 state in the union ought to reject such a system with indignation, 
 since, if the general government should attempt to oppress and en- 
 slave them, they could not have any possible means of self-defence; 
 because the proposed system, taking away from the states the right 
 of organizing, arming and disciplining of the militia, the first attempt 
 made by a state to put the militia in a situation to counteract the 
 arbitrary measm-es of the general government, would be construed 
 into an act of rebellion, or treason; and congress would instantly murch 
 their troops into the state. It was further observed, that when a 
 government wishes to deprive their citizens of freedom, and reduce 
 them to slavery, it generally makes use of a standing army for that pur- 
 pose, and leaves the militia in a situation as contemptible as possible, 
 least they might oppose its arbitrary designs — That in this system, we 
 give the general government every provision it could wish for, and 
 even invite it to subvert the liberties of the states and their citizens, 
 since we give them the right to increase and keep up a standing army 
 as numerous as it would wish, and by placing the militia under its 
 power, enable it to leave the mihtia totally unorganized, undisciplined, 
 and even to disarm them,; while the citizens, so far from complaining 
 of this neglect, might even esteem it a favor in the general govern- 
 ment, as thereby they would be freed from the burthen of militia 
 duties, and left to their own private occupations or pleasures. How- 
 ever, aU arguments, and every reason that could be urged on this 
 subject, as well as on many others, were obliged to yield to one that 
 was unxinswerable, a majority upon the division. 
 
 By the ninth section of this article, the importation of such persons 
 as<any of the states now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall 
 not be prohibited prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and 
 eight, but a duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding 
 ten dollars for each person. 
 
 The design of this clause is to prevent the general government from 
 prohibiting the importation of slaves, but the same reasons which 
 caused them to strike out the word "national," and not admit the 
 word "stamps," influenced them here to guard against the word 
 "slaves." They anxiously sought to avoid the admission of expres- 
 sions which might be odious in the ears of Americans, although they 
 
44 SECRET PBOCEEDINOS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 were willing to admit into their system those things which the expres- 
 sions signified: And hence it is, that the clause is so worded, as really 
 to authorise the general government to impose a duty of ten dollars 
 on every foreigner who comes into a state to become a citizen, whether 
 he comes absolutely free, or qualijledly so as a servant; although this 
 is contrary to the design of the framers, and the duty was only 
 meant to extend to the importation of slaves. 
 
 This clause was the subject of a great diversity of sentiment in 
 the convention; — as the system was reported by the committee of 
 detail, the provision was general, that such importation should not 
 be prohibited, without confining it to any particular period. This 
 was rejected by eight states— Georgia, South-Carolina, and I think 
 North-Carolina voting for it. 
 
 We were then told by the delegates of the two first of those states, 
 that their states would never agree to a system which put it in the 
 power of the general government to prevent the importation of slaves, 
 and that they, as delegates from those states, must withhold their 
 assent from such a system. 
 
 A committee of one member from each state was chosen by ballot, 
 to take this part of the system under their consideration, and to en- 
 deavour to agree upon some report, which should reconcile those 
 states; to this committee also was referred the following proposition, 
 which had been reported by the committee of detail, to wit: "No 
 navigation act shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of the 
 members present in each house;" a proposition which the staple and 
 commercial states were solicitous to retain, lest their commerce should 
 be placed too much under the power of the eastern states, but which 
 these last states were as anxious to reject. — This committee, of which 
 also I had the honor to be a member, met and took under their con- 
 sideration the subjects committed to them. I found the eastern 
 states, notwithstanding their aversion to slavery, were very wUhng 
 to indulge the southern states, at least with a temporary liberty to 
 prosecute the slave trade, provided the southern states would in their 
 tiu-n gratify them, by laying no restriction on navigation acts; and 
 after a very little time, the committee by a great majority, agreed 
 on a report, by which the general government was to be prohibited 
 from preventing the importation of slaves for a limited time, and the 
 restrictive clause relative to navigation acts was to be omitted. 
 
 This report was adopted by a majority of the convention but not 
 without considerable opposition. — It was said, that we had just as- 
 sumed a place among independent nations, in consequence of our 
 opposition to the attempts of Great Britain to enslave us; that this 
 opposition was grounded upon the preservation of those rights, to which 
 God and nature had entitled us, not in particular, but in common 
 with all the rest of mankind — That we had appealed to the Supreme 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE t'EDERAL CONVENTION. 45 
 
 Being for his assistance, as the Ood of freedom, who could not but, 
 approve our efforts to preserve the rigJbts which he had thus imparted 
 to Ms creatures; that now, when we scarcely had risen from our 
 Jcnees, from supplicating his aid and protection — in forming our govern- 
 ment over a free people, a government formed pretendedly on the 
 principles of liberty and for its preservation — in that government to 
 have a provision not only putting it out of its power to restrain and 
 prevent the slave trade, even encouraging that most infamous traffic, by 
 giving the states power and influence in the union, in proportion as 
 they cruelly and wantonly sport with the rights of their fellow creatures, 
 ought to be considered as a solemn mockery of, and insult to, that God 
 whose protection we had then implored, and could not fail to hold us 
 up in detestation, and render us contemptible to every true friend of 
 liberty in the world. It was said, it ought to be considered that 
 national crimes can only he, a,nd frequently are, punished in this world 
 by national punishments, and that the continuance of the slave trade, 
 and thus giving it a national sanction and encouragement, ought to be 
 considered as justly exposing us to the displeasure and vengeance of 
 him, who is equally Lord of all, and who views with equal eye, the 
 poor African slave and his American master! 
 
 It was urged, that by this system, we were giving the general gov- 
 ernment full and absolute power to regulate commerce, under which 
 general power it woxild have a right to restrain, or totally prohibit the 
 slave trade: it must therefore, appear to the world absurd and dis- 
 graceful to the last degree, that we should except from the exercise of 
 that power, the only branch of commerce which is unjustifiable in its 
 nature, and contrary to the rights of mankind — That on the contrary 
 we ought rather to prohibit expressly in our constitution, the further 
 importation of slcuves; and to authorise the general government from 
 time to time, to make such regulations as should be thought most 
 advantageous for the gradual abolition of slavery, and the emancipor- 
 tion of the slaves which are already in the states. 
 
 That sla/very is inconsistent with the genius of republicanism, and 
 has a tendency to destroy those principles on which it is supported, 
 as it lessens the sense of the equal rights of mankind, and habitu- 
 ates us to tyranny and oppression. It was further urged, that by 
 this system of government, every state is to be protected both 
 from foreign invasion and from domestic insurrections; that from this 
 consideration, it was of the utmost importance it should have a 
 power to restraia the importation of slaves, since in proportion as 
 the number of slaves were increased in any state, in the same pro- 
 portion the state is weakened and exposed to foreign invasion, or 
 \ domestic insurrection, and by so much less will it be able to protect 
 itself against either; and therefore will by so much the more, want 
 aid from, and be a burthen to, the union. It was further said, that 
 
46 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 as in this system we were giving the general government a power 
 under the idea of national character, or national interest, to regulate 
 even our weights and measures, and have prohibited all possibility 
 of emitting paper money, and passing insolvent laws, &c. it must 
 appear still more extraordinary, that we should prohibit the gov- 
 ernment from interfering with the slave trade, than which nothing 
 could so materially affect both our national honor and interest. — ^These 
 reasons influenced me both on the committee and in convention, 
 most decidedly to oppose and vote against the clause, as it now 
 makes a part of the system. 
 
 You will perceive, sir, not only that the general government is 
 prohibited from interfering in the slave trade hefore the year eighteen 
 hundred and eight, but that there is no provision in the constitution 
 that it shall afterwards be prohibited, nor any security that such 
 prohibition will ever take place; and I think there is great reason to 
 believe that if the importation of slaves is permitted until the year 
 eighteen hundred and eight, it will not be prohibited afterwards: At 
 this time we do not generally hold this commerce in so great abhor- 
 rence as we have done — ^When our liberties were at stake, we warmly 
 felt for the common rights of men — The danger being thought to be 
 past, which threatened ourselves, we are daily growing more inseiv- 
 sitle to those rights — In those states who have restrained or pro- 
 hibited the importation of slaves, it is only done by legislative acts 
 which may be repealed — ^When those states find that they must in 
 their national character and connexion suffer in the disgrace, and 
 share in the inconveniencies attendant upon that detestable and 
 iniquitous traffic, they may be desirous also to share in the benefits 
 arising from it, and the odium attending it will be greatly effaced by 
 the sanction which is given to it in the general government. 
 
 By the next paragraph, the general government is to have a 
 power of suspending the habeas corpus act, in cases of rebellion or 
 invasion. 
 
 As the state governments have a power of suspending the habeas 
 corpus act in those cases, it was said, there could be no reason for 
 giving such a power to the general government, since, whenever the 
 state which is invaded, or in which an insurrection takes place, finds 
 its safety requires it, it will make use of that power — And it was 
 urged, that if we gave this power to the general government, it would 
 be an engine of oppression in its hands, since whenever a state should 
 oppose its views, however arbitrary and imconstitutional, and refuse 
 submission to them, the general government may declare it to be an 
 act of rebellion, and suspending the habeas corpus act, may seize upon 
 the persons of those advocates of freedom, who have had virtue and ' 
 resolution enough to excite the opposition, and may imprison them 
 during its pleasure in the remotest part of the imion, so that a citizen 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 47 
 
 of Georgia might be hastiled in the furthest part of New-Hampshire j, 
 or a citizen of New-Hampshire in the furthest extreme to the south, 
 cut off from their family, their friends, and their every connexion — 
 These considerations induced me, sir, to give my negative also to 
 this clause. 
 
 In this same section there is a provision that no preference shall be 
 given to the ports of one state over another, and that vessels bound 
 to or from one state shall not be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties 
 in another. This provision, as well as that which relates to the 
 uniformity of impost duties and excises, was introduced, sir, by the 
 delegation of this state. — Without such a provision, it would have 
 been in the power of the general government to have compelled all 
 ships sailing into, or out of the Chesapeak, to clear and enter at Nor- 
 folk, or some port in Virginia — a regulation which would be extremely 
 injurious to our commerce, but which would if considered merely as 
 to the interest of the union, perhaps not be thought unreasonable, 
 since it would render the collection of the revenue arising from com- 
 merce more certain and less expensive. 
 
 But, sir, as the system is now reported, the general government 
 have a power to establish what forts they please in each state, and to 
 ascertain at what ports in every state ships shall clear and enter in 
 such state; a power which may be so used as to destroy the effect, of 
 that provision, since by it may be established a port in such a place, 
 as shall be so inconvenient to the states, as to render it Tnore eligible 
 for their shipping to clear and enter in another, than in their own 
 states. Suppose, for instance, the general government should deter- 
 mine that all ships which cleared or entered in Maryland, should 
 clear and enter at Georgetown, on Potowmack, it would oblige all the 
 ships which sailed from or were boimd to, any other port of Mary- 
 land, to clear or enter in some port in Virginia. To prevent such a 
 use of the power which the general government now has of limiting 
 the number of ports in a state, smA fixing the place or places where they 
 shall be, we endeavored to obtain a provision, that the general gov- 
 ernment should only, in the first instance, have authority to ascer- 
 tain the number of ports proper to be established in each state, and 
 transmit information thereof to the several states, the legislatures of 
 which, respectively, should have the power to fix the places where 
 those ports should be, according to their idea what would be most 
 advantageous to the commerce of their state, and most for the ease 
 and convenience of their citizens; and that the general government 
 should not interfere in the establishment of the places, unless the 
 legislature of the state should neglect or refuse so to do; but we 
 could not obtain this alteration. 
 
 By the tenth section every state is prohibited from emitting bills of 
 credit — ^As it was reported by the committee of detail, the states were 
 
48 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 only prohibited from emitting them without the consent of congress: 
 but the convention was so smitten with the paper money dread, that 
 they insisted the prohibition should be absolute. It was my opinion, 
 sir, that the states ought not to be totally deprived of the right to emit 
 bills of credit, and that as we had not given an authority to the general 
 government for that purpose, it was the more necessary to retain it in 
 the states. 1 considered that this state, and some others, have for- 
 merly received great benefit from paper emissions, and that if public 
 and private credit should once more be restored, such emissions may 
 hereafter he equally advantageous; and further, that it is impossible to 
 foresee that events may not take place which shall render paper 
 money of absolute necessity; and it was my opinion, if this power was 
 not to be exercised by a state without the permission of the general 
 government, it ought to be satisfactory even to those who were the 
 Tnost haunted by the apprehensions of paper money; I therefore 
 thought it my duty to vote against this part of the system. 
 
 The same section also, puts it out of the power of the states, to 
 make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of 
 debts, or to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 
 
 I considered, sir, that there might be times of such great public 
 calamities and distress, and of such extreme scarcity of specie, as should 
 render it the duty of a government, for the preservation of even the 
 most valuable part of its citizens, in some measure to interfere in their 
 favor, by passing laws totally or partially stopping the courts of 
 justice, or authorising the debtor to pay by instalments, or by deliv- 
 ering up his property to his creditors at a reasonable and honest 
 valuation. The times have been such as to render regulations of 
 this kind necessary in most, or all of the states, to prevent the wealthy 
 creditor and the monied man from totally destroying the poor though 
 even industrious debtor — Such times may again arrive. I therefore 
 voted against depriving the states of this power — a power which I 
 am decided they ought to possess, but which I admit ought only to 
 be exercised on very important and urgent occasions. I appre- 
 hend, sir, the principal cause of complaint among the people at large 
 is, the public and private debt with which they are oppressed, and 
 which, in the present scarcity of cash, threatens them with destruc- 
 tion, unless they can obtain so much indulgence in point of time 
 that by industry and frugality they may extricate themselves. 
 
 This government proposal, I apprehend, so far from removing will 
 greatly increase those complaints, since grasping in its all powerful 
 hand the citizens of the respective states, it will by the imposition 
 of the variety of taxes, imposts, stamps, excises and other duties, squeeze 
 from them the little money they may acquire, the hard earnings of their 
 industry, as you would squeeze the juice from an orange, till not a 
 drop more can be extracted, and then let loose upon them their 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTTON. 49 
 
 private creditors, to whose metcy it consigns them, by whom their 
 property is to be seised upon and sold in this scarcity of specie at a 
 sJieriff's sale, where nothing but ready cash can be received, for a 
 tenth part of its value, and themselves and their /amiZies to be consigned 
 to indigence and distress, without their governments having a pou)er 
 to give them a moment's indulgence, however necessary it might be, 
 and however desirous to grant them aid. 
 
 By this same section, every state is also prohibited from laying 
 any imposts, or duties on imports or exports, without the permission 
 of the general government. It was urged, that as almost all sources 
 of taxation were given to congress, it would be but reasonable to 
 leave the states the power of bringing revenue into their treasuries, 
 by laying a duty on exports, if they should think proper, which 
 might be so light as not to injure or discourage industry, and yet 
 might be productive of considerable revenue — Also that there might 
 be cases in which it would be proper, for the purpose of encouraging 
 manufactures, to lay duties to prohibit the exportation of raw mate- 
 rials, and even in addition to the duties laid by congress on imports 
 for the sake of revenue, to lay a duty to discourage the importation 
 of particular articles into a state, or to enable the manufacturer here 
 to supply us on as good terms as they could be obtained from & foreign 
 mxbrlcet; however, the most we could obtain was that this power 
 might be exercised by the states with, and only with the consent of 
 congress, and subject to its controul — ^And so anxious were they to 
 seize on every shiUing of our money for the general government, that 
 they insisted even the little revenue that might thus arise, should not 
 be appropriated to the use of the respective states where it was 
 collected, but should be paid into the treasury of the United States; 
 and accordingly it is so determined. 
 
 The second article relates to the executive — ^his mode of election — 
 his powers — and the length of time he should continue in office. 
 
 On these subjects there was a great diversity of sentiment; many 
 of the members were desirous that the president should be elected 
 for seven years, and not to be eligible a second time; others proposed 
 that he should not be absolutely ineligible, but that he should not be 
 capable of being chosen a second time, -until the expiration of a 
 certain number of years — The supporters of the above propositions, 
 went upon the idea that the best security for liberty was a limited 
 duration and a rotation of office in the chief executive department. 
 
 There was a party who attempted to have the president appointed 
 during good behaviour, without any limitation as to time, and not 
 being able to succeed in that attempt, they then endeavoured to have 
 hi'm re-eligible without any restraint. It was objected that the 
 choice of a president to continue in office during good behaviour, 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 4 
 
50 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 would be at once rendering our system an elective monarchy; and, 
 that if the president was to be re-eligible without any interval of 
 disqualification, it would amount nearly to the same thing, since 
 with the powers that the president is to enjoy, and the interests 
 and influence with which they will be attended, he will be almost 
 absolutely certain of being re-elected from time to time, as long as 
 he lives: As the propositions were reported by the committee of the 
 whole house, the president was to be chosen for seven years, and not 
 to be eligible at any time after — In the same manner the proposition 
 was agreed to in convention, and so it was reported by the committee 
 of detail, although a variety of attempts were made to alter that part 
 of the system by those who were of a contrary opinion, in which they 
 repeatedly failed; but, sir, by never losing sight of their object, and 
 choosing a proper time for their purpose, they succeeded at length 
 in obtaining the alteration, which was not made until within the last 
 twelve days before the convention adjourned. 
 
 As the propositions were agreed to by the committee of the whole 
 house, the president was to be appointed by the national legislature, 
 and as it was reported by the committee of detail, the choice was to be 
 made by ballot, in such a manner that the states should have an equal 
 voice in the appointment of this officer, as they, of right, ought to 
 have; but those who wished as far as possible to establish a national 
 instead of a, federal government, made repeated attempts to have the 
 president chosen by the people at large; on this the sense of the conven- 
 tion was taken, I think not less than three times while I was there, and 
 as often rejected; but within the last fortnight of their session, they 
 obtained the alteration in the manner it now stands, by which the 
 large states have a very undue influence in the appointment of the 
 president. There is no case where the states will have an equal voice 
 in the appointment of the president, except where two persons shall 
 have an equal number of votes, and those a majority of the whole 
 number of electors, a case very unlikely to happen, or where no person 
 has a majority of the votes; in these instances the house of representa- 
 tives are to choose by ballot, each state having an equal voice; but 
 they are confined in the last instance to the five who have the greatest 
 number of votes, which gives the largest states a very unequal chance 
 of having the president chosen under their nomination. 
 
 As to the vice-president, that great officer of government, who is in 
 case of death, resignation, removal, or inability of the president, to 
 supply his place, and be vested with his powers, and who is officially 
 to be the president of the senate, there is no provision by which a ma- 
 jority of the voices of the electors are necessary for his appointment, 
 but after it is decided who is chosen president, that person who has 
 the next greatest number of votes of the electors, is declared to be 
 legally elected to the vice-presidency, so that by this system it is very 
 
SECRET I'liOCBlEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL fSONVE'XTION. 51 
 
 possible, and not improbable, that he may be ap^dinted t)y the elect- 
 ors of a single large state; and a very undue influence in the senate is 
 given to that state of which the vice-president is a citizen, since in 
 every question where the senate is divided that state will have two 
 votes, the president having on those occasions a casting voice. — Every 
 part of the system which relates to the vice-president, as well as the 
 present mode of electing the president, was introduced and agreed 
 upon after I left Philadelphia. 
 
 Objections were made to that part of this article, by which the 
 president is appointed commander in chief of the army and navy of 
 the United States, and of the militia of the several states, and it was 
 wished to be so far restrained, that he should not command in person; 
 but this could not be obtained. The power given to the president of 
 granting reprieves and pardons, was also thought extremely dan- 
 gerous, and as such opposed — The president thereby has the power of 
 pardoning those who are guilty of treason, as well as of other olBfences; 
 it was said that no treason was so likely to take place as that in which 
 the president himself might be engaged — The attempt to assume to 
 himself powers not given by the constitution, and establish himself in 
 regal authority; in which attempt a provision is m.ade for him to se- 
 cure from punishment the creatures of his ambition, the associates and 
 abettors'of his treasonable practices, by granting them pardons should 
 they be defeated in their attempts to subvert the constitution. 
 
 To that part of this article also, which gives the president a right to 
 nominate, and with the consent of the senate to appoint all the officers, 
 civil and military, of the United States, there were considerable oppo- 
 sition — it was said that the person who nominates, will always in reality 
 appoint, and that this was giving the president a power and influence, 
 which together with the other powers bestowed upon him, would 
 place him above all restraint or control. In fine, it was urged, that 
 the president as here constituted, was a king, in every thing but the 
 name; that though he was to be chosen for a limited time, yet at the 
 expiration of that time, if he is not re-elected, it will depend entirely 
 upon his own moderation whether he will resign that authority with 
 which he has once been invested — that from his having the appoint- 
 ment of all the variety of officers in every part of the civil department 
 for the union, who will be very numerous, in them and their con- 
 nexions, relations, friends and dependents, he will have a formidable 
 host devoted to his interest, and ready to support his ambitious views. 
 That the army and navy, which may be increased without restraint as 
 to numbers, the officers of which, from the highest to the lowest, are 
 all to be appointed by him, and dependent on his will and pleasure, 
 and commanded by him in person, will, of course, be subservient to 
 his wishes, and ready to execute his commands; in addition to which, 
 the militia also are entirely subjected to his orders — That these cii^ 
 
52 SECRhr PliOCEEDINGti OF THE FEDERAL GONVENTION. 
 
 cumstances, combined together, will enable him, when he pleases, to 
 become a king in name, as well as in substance, and establish himself in 
 office not only for his own life, but even if he chooses, to have that 
 authority perpetuated to his family. • 
 
 It was further observed, that the only appearance of responsibility 
 in the president, which the system holds up to our view, is the provi- 
 sion for impeachment; but that when we reflect that he cannot be im- 
 peached but by the house of delegates, and that the members of this 
 house are rendered dependent upon, and unduly under the influence 
 of the president, by being appointable to offices of which he has tha 
 sole nomination, so that without his favor and approbation, they can- 
 not obtain them, there is little reason to believe, that a majority will 
 ever concur in impeaching the president, let his conduct be ever so 
 reprehensible, especially too, as the final event of that impeachment 
 will depend upon a different body, and the members of the house of 
 delegates will be certain, should the decision be ultimately in f avop of 
 the president, to become thereby the objects of his displeasure, and to 
 bar to themselves every avenue to the emoluments of government. 
 
 Should he, contrary to probability, be impeached, he is afterwards 
 to be tried and adjudged by the senate, and without the concurrence 
 of two thirds of the members who shall be present, he cannot be con- 
 victed — This senate being constituted a privy council to the president, 
 it is probable many of its leading and influential members may have 
 advised or concurred in the very measures for which he may be im- 
 peached; the members of the senate also are by the system, placed as 
 unduly under the influence of, and dependent upon, the president, as 
 the members of the other branch, since they also are appointable to 
 offices, and cannot obtain them but through the favor of thepresident — 
 There will be great, important and valuable offices under this govern- 
 ment, should it take place, more than sufficient to enable him to hold 
 out the expectation of one of them to each of the senators — Under 
 these circumstances, will any person conceive it to be difficult for the 
 president always to secure to himself more than one third of that body ? 
 Or, can it reasonably be believed, that a criminal will be convicted, who 
 is constitutionally empowered to bribe his judges, at the head of whom 
 is to preside on those occasions the chief justice, which officer in his 
 original appointment, must be nominated by the president, and will 
 therefore, probably, be appointed not so much for his eminence in 
 legal knowledge and for his integrity, as from favoritism and influence, 
 since the president knowing that in case of impeachment the chief 
 justice is to preside at his trial, will naturally wish to ffil that office 
 witli a person of whose voice and influence he shall consider himself 
 secure. These are reasons to induce a belief, that there will be but 
 little probability of the president ever being either impeached or con- 
 victed; but it was also urged, that vested with the powers which the 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 53 
 
 system gives him, and with the influence attendant upon those pow- 
 ers, to him it would be of little consequence whether he was impeached 
 or convicted, since he will be able to set both at defiance. These con- 
 siderations occasioned a part of the convention to give a negative to 
 this part of the S3^stem establishing the executive as it is now offered 
 for our acceptance. 
 
 By the third article, the judicial power of the United States is vested 
 in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts, as the congress may 
 from time to time ordain and establish: These courts, and these only, 
 will have a right to decide upon the laws of the United States, and all 
 questions arising upon their construction, and in a judicial manner to 
 carry those laws into execution; to which the courts both superior and 
 inferior of the respective states and their judges and other magis- 
 trates are rendered incompetent. To the courts of the general gov- 
 ernment are also confined all cases in law or equity, arising under the 
 proposed constitution, and treaties made under the authority of the 
 United States — all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers 
 and consuls — all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction — all 
 controversies to which the United States are a party — all controver- 
 sies between two or more states — between a state and citizens of an- 
 other state — between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under 
 grants of different states, and between a state or the citizens thereof, 
 and foreign states, citizens, or subjects. Whether therefore, any laws 
 or regulations of the congress, or any acts of its president or other officers 
 are contrary to, or not warranted iy, the constitution, rests only with 
 the judges who are appointed by congress to determine; by whose de- 
 terminations every state must be hound. Should any question arise 
 between a foreign consul and any of the citizens of the United States, 
 however remote from the seat of empire, it is to be heard before the 
 judiciary of the general government, and in the first instance to be 
 heard in the supreme court, however inconvenient to the parties, and 
 however trifling the subject of dispute. 
 
 Should the mariners of an American or foreign vessel, while in any 
 American port, have occasion to sue for their wages, or in any other 
 instance a controversy belonging to the admiralty jurisdiction should 
 take place between them and their masters or owners, it is in the 
 courts of the general government the suit must be instituted; and 
 either party may carry it by appeal to its supreme court: the injury to 
 commerce and the oppression to individuals which may thence arise 
 need not be enlarged upon. Should a citizen of Virginia, Pennsyl- 
 vania, or any other of the United States be indebted to, or have debts 
 due from, a citizen of this state, or any other claim be subsisting on 
 one side or the other, in consequence of commercial or other transac- 
 tions, it is only in the courts of congress that either can apply for 
 redress. The case is the same should any claim subsist between citi- 
 
54 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 zens of this state and foreigners, merchants, mariners, and others, 
 whether of a commercial or of any other nature, they must be prose- 
 cuted in the same courts; and though in the first instance they may be 
 brought in the inferior, yet an appeal may be made to the supreme 
 judiciary, even from the remotest state in the union. 
 
 The inquiry concerning, and trial of every offence against, and 
 breach of the laws of congress, are also confined to its courts; the same 
 courts also have the sole right to inquire concerning and try every 
 offence, from the lowest to the highest, committed by the citizens of 
 any other state, or of a foreign nation, against the laws of this state 
 within its territory — and in all these cases the decision may be ulti- 
 mately brought before the supreme tribunal, since the appellate juris- 
 diction extends to criminal as well as to civil cases. 
 
 And in all those cases where the general government has jurisdiction 
 in civil questions, the proposed constitution not only makes no provi- 
 sion/or the trial iy jury in the^rs^ instance, but by its appellate juris- 
 diction absolutely takes away that inestimable privilege, since it ex- 
 pressly declares the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction 
 both as to law and fact. Should therefore a jury be adopted in the 
 inferior court, it would only be a needless expence, since on an appeal 
 the determination of that jury, even on questions of fact, however honest 
 and upright, is to be of no possible effect — the supreme court is to take 
 up all questions of fact — to examine the evidence relative thereto — to de- 
 cide upon them in the same manner as if they had never been tried by a 
 jury — nor is trial by jury secured in criminal cases. It is true, that in 
 the first instance, in the inferior court, the trial is to be by jury; in this 
 and in this only, is the difference between criminal and civil cases. 
 But, sir, the appellate jurisdiction extends, as I have observed, to cases 
 criminal as well as to civil, and on the appeal the court is to decide not 
 only on the law but on the^c^. If, therefore, even in criminal cases, 
 the general government is not satisfied with the verdict of the jury, 
 its ofl&cer may remove the prosecution to the supreme court, and there 
 the verdict of the jury is to he of no effect, but the judges of this court are 
 to decide upon the fact as well as the law, the same as in civil cases. 
 
 Thus, sir, jury trials, which have ever been the boast of the English 
 constitution, which have been by our several state constitutions so cau- 
 tiously secured to us — jury trials which have so long been considered 
 the surest barrier against arbitrary power, and the palladium of liberty — 
 with the loss of which the loss of out freedom may be dated, are taken 
 away by the proposed form of government, not only in a great variety 
 of questions between individual and individual, but in every case 
 whether civil or criminal arising under the laws of the United States, or 
 the execution of those laws. It is taken away in those very cases where 
 of all others it is most essential for our liberty, to have it sacredly guarded 
 and preserved, in every case, whether civil or criminal, between goverrir 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 55 
 
 ment and its officers on the one part, and the subject or citizen on the 
 other. Nor was this the effect of inattention, nor did it arise from any 
 real difficulty in establishing and securing jury trials by the proposed 
 constitution, if the convention had wished so to do : but the same reason 
 influenced here as in the case of the establishment of inferior courts; as 
 they could not trust state judges, so would they not confide in state 
 juries. They alledged that the general government and the state gov- 
 ernments would always be at variance; that the citizens of the differ- 
 ent states would enter into the views and interests of their respective 
 states, and therefore ought not to be trusted in determining causes in 
 which the general government was any way interested, without giving 
 the general government an opportunity, if it disapproved the verdict 
 of the jury, to appeal, and to have the facts examined into again and 
 decided upon by its own judges, on whom it was thought a reliance 
 might be had by the general government, they being appointed under 
 its authority. 
 
 Thus, sir, in consequence of this appellate jurisdiction and its extevr- 
 sion to facts as well as to law, every arbitrary act of the general gov- 
 ernment, and every oppression of all those variety of officers appointed 
 ■under its authority for the collection of taxes, duties, impost, excise, and 
 other purposes, must be submitted to by the individual, or must be 
 opposed with little prospect of success, and almost a certain prospect of 
 ruin, at least in those cases where the middle and common class of citi- 
 zens are interested : Since to avoid that oppression, or to obtain redress, 
 the application must be made to one of the courts of the United 
 States — by good fortune should this application be in the first instance 
 attended with success, and should damages be recovered equivalent to 
 the inj,ury sustained, an appeal lies to the supreme c urt, in which case 
 the citizen must at once give up his cause, or he must attend to it at 
 the d'stance of perhaps more thn a thousand miles from the place of 
 his residence, and must take measures to procure before that court on 
 the appeal all the evidence necessary to support his action, which even 
 if ultimately prosperous must be attended with a loss of time, a neglect 
 of business, and an expense which will be greater than the original 
 grievance, and to which men in moderate circumstances would be utterly 
 unequal. 
 
 By the third section of this article, it is declared, that treason against 
 the United States, shall consist in levying war against them, or in ad- 
 hering to their enemies, giving them aid or comfort. 
 
 By the principles of the American revolution arbitrary power may 
 and ought to be resisted even by arms if necessary — The time may 
 come when it shall be the duty of a state, in order to preserve itself from 
 the oppression of the general government, to have recourse to the 
 sword — In which case the proposed form of government declares, that 
 the state and every of its citizens who act under its authority, are guilty 
 
56 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 of a direct act of treason; reducing by this provision the different 
 states to this alternative, that they must tamely and passively yieU to 
 despotism, or their citizens must oppose it at the hazard of the halter if 
 unsuccessful — and reducing the citizens of the state which shall take 
 arms, to a situation in which they must be exposed to punishment, let 
 them act as they mil, since if they oiey the authority of their state 
 government, they will be guilty of treason against the United States—^ 
 they join the general government they will be guilty of treason against 
 their own state. 
 
 To save the citizens of ttie respective states' from this disagreeable 
 dilemma, and to secure them from being punishable as traitors to the 
 United States, when acting expressly in obedience to the authority of 
 their own state, I wished to have obtained as an amendment to the 
 third section of this article the following clause: "Provided, that no 
 act or acts done by one or more of the states against the United States, 
 or by any citizen of any one of the United States under the authority of 
 one or more of the said states, shall be deemed treason or punished as 
 such; but in case of war being levied by one or more of the states 
 against the United States, the conduct of each party towards the 
 other, and their adherents respectively, shall be regulated by the laws 
 of war and of nations." 
 
 But this provision was not adopted, being too much opposed to the 
 great object of many of the leading members of the convention, which 
 was by all means to leave the states, at the mercy of the general govervr 
 ment, since they could not succeed in their immediate and entire aboli- 
 tion. 
 
 By the third section of the fourth article, no new state shall be 
 formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state, without 
 the consent of the legislature of such state. 
 
 There are a number of states which are so circumstanced, with 
 respect to themselves and to the other states, that every principle of 
 justice and sound policy require their dismemberment or division into 
 smaller states. — ^Massachusetts is divided into two districts, totally 
 separated from each other by the state of New-Hampshire, on the 
 north-east side of which lies the provinces of Maine and Sagadohock, 
 more extensive in point of territory, but less populous than old Mas- 
 sachusetts, which lies on the other side of New-Hampshire. No per- 
 son can cast his eye on the map of that state but he must in a moment 
 admit, that every argument drawn from convenience, interest, and 
 justice, require that the provinces of Maine and Sagadohock should be 
 erected into a new state, and that they should not be compelled to 
 remain connected with old Massachusetts under all the inconveniences 
 of their situation. 
 
 The state of Georgia is larger in extent than the whole island of 
 Great Britain, extending from its sea coast to the Mississippi, a diS' 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 57 
 
 tance of eight hundred miles or more; its breadth for the most part, 
 about three hundred miles. The states of North Carolina and Vir- 
 ginia in the same manner reach from the sea coast unto the Mississippi. 
 
 The hardship, the inconvenience, and the injustice of compelling the 
 inhabitants of those states who may dwell on the western side of the 
 mountains and along the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to remain con- 
 nected with the inhabitants of those states respectively, on the atlantia 
 side of the mountains, and subject to the same state governments, 
 would be such, as would, in my opinion, justify even recourse to arms, 
 to free themselves from, and to shake off, so ignominious a yoke. 
 
 This representation was made in convention, and it was further 
 urged, that the territory of these states were too large, and that the 
 inhabitants thereof would be too much disconnected for a repuUicctn 
 government to extend to them its benefits, which is only suited to a 
 small and compact territory: That a regard also for the peace and 
 safety of the union, ought to excite a desire that those states should 
 become in time divided into separate states, since when their popula- 
 tion should become proportioned in any degree to their territory, they 
 would from their strength and power become dangerous members of a 
 federal government. It was further said, that if the general govern- 
 ment was not by its constitution to interfere, the inconvenience would 
 soon remedy itself, for that as the population increased in those states, 
 their legislatures would be obliged to consent to the erection of new 
 states to avoid the evils of a civil war; but as by the proposed consti- 
 tution the general government is obliged to protect each state against 
 domestic violence, and consequently will be obliged to assist in sup- 
 pressing such commotions and insurrections as may take place from 
 the struggle to have new states erected, the general government 
 ought to have a power to decide upon the propriety and necessity of 
 establishing or erecting a new state, even without the approbation of 
 the legislature of such states, within whose jurisdiction the new state 
 should be erected, and for this purpose I submitted to the convention 
 the following proposition: "That on the application of the inhabitants 
 of any district of territory within the limits of any of the states, it 
 shall be lawful for the legislature of the United States, if they shall 
 under all circimistances think it reasonable, to erect the same into a 
 new state, and admit it into the union without the consent of the state 
 of which the said district may be a part." And it was said, that we 
 surely might trust the general government with this power with more 
 propriety than with many others with which they were proposed to be 
 entrusted^and that as the general government was bound to suppress 
 all insurrections and commotions which might arise on this subject, it 
 ought to be in the power of the general government to decide upon it, 
 and not in the power of the legislature of a single statej by obstinately 
 and unreasonably opposing the erection of a new state to prevent its. 
 
58 SBGRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL GONVENTION. 
 
 taking effect, and thereby extremely to oppress that part of its citizens 
 which live remote from, and inconvenient to, the seat of its govern- 
 ment and even to involve the union in war to support its injustice and 
 oppression. But, upon the vote being taken, Georgia, South-Caro- 
 lina, North-Carolina, Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, were 
 in the negative. New-Hampshire, Connecticut, Jersey, Delaware and 
 Maryland, were in the affirmative. New- York was absent. 
 
 That it was inconsistent with the rights of free and independent 
 states, to have their territory dismembered without their consent, was 
 the principal argument used by the opponents of this proposition. 
 The truth of the objection we readily admitted, but at the same 
 time insisted that it was not more' inconsistent with the rights of free 
 and independent states than that inequality of suffrage and power which 
 the large states had extorted from the others; and that if the smaller 
 states yielded up their rights in that instance, they were entitled to de- 
 mand from the states of extensive territory a surrender of their rights 
 in this instance; and in a particular manner, as it was equally necessary 
 for the true interest and happiness of the citizens of their own states, as 
 of the union. But, sir, although when the large states demanded 
 undue and improper sacrifices to be made to their pride and ambition, 
 they treated the rights of free states with more contempt than ever a 
 British parliament treated the rights of her colonial establishments, 
 yet when a reasonable and necessary sacrifice was asked/rom them they 
 spurned the idea with ineffable disdain. They then perfectly under- 
 stood the/uS value and the sacred obligation of state rights, and at the 
 least attempt to infringe them where they were concerned, they were 
 tremblingly alive and agonized at every pore. 
 
 When we reflect how obstinately those states contended for that 
 unjust superiority of power in the government, which they have in part 
 obtained, and for the establishment of this superiority by the consti- 
 tution — When we reflect that they appeared willing to hazard the 
 existence of the union rather than not to succeed in their unjust at- 
 tempt — That should their legislatures consent to the erection of new 
 states within their jurisdiction, it would be an immediate sacrifice of 
 that power, to obtain which they appeared disposed to sacrifice every 
 other consideration — When we further reflect that they now have a 
 m,otive for desiring to preserve their territory entire and unbroken, 
 which they never had before — the gratification of their ambition in possess- 
 ing and exercising superior power over their sister states — and that this 
 constitution is to give them the means to effect this desire of which they 
 were formerly destitute — the whole force of the United States pledged to 
 them for restraining intestine commotions, and preserving to them the 
 obedience and subjection of their citizens, even in the extremest part of 
 their territory: — I say, sir, when we consider these things, it would be 
 too absurd and improbable to deserve a serious answer, should any 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS ' OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 59 
 
 person suggest that these states mean ever to give their consent to the 
 erection of new states mthin their territory: Some of them it is true, have 
 been for some time past amusing their inhabitants in those districts 
 that wished to be erected into new states, but should this constitution 
 be adopted, armed with a sword and halter to compel their obedience 
 and subjection, they will no longer act with indecision; and the state 
 of Maryland may, and probably will be called upon to assist with her 
 wealth and her blood in subduing the inhabitants of Franklin, Ken- 
 tucky, Vermont, and the provinces of Maine and Sagadohock, and in 
 compelling them to continue in subjection to the states which respec- 
 tively claim jurisdiction over them, ^ 
 
 Let it not be forgotten at the same time, that a great part of the 
 territory of these large and extensive states, which they now hold in 
 possession, and over which they now claim and exercise jurisdiction, 
 were crown lands, unlocated and unsettled when the American revo- 
 lution took place — ^Lands which were acquired by the common Hood 
 and treasure, and which ought to have been the common stock, and for 
 the comnwn benefit of the union. Let it be remembered that the state 
 of Maryland was so deeply sensible of the injustice that these lands 
 should be held by particular states for their own emolument, even at a 
 time when no superiority of authority or power was annexed to extensive 
 territory, that in the midst of the late war and all the dangers which 
 threatened us, it withheld for a long time its assent to the articles of 
 confederation for that reason, and when it ratified those articles it 
 entered a solemn protest against what it considered so flagrant injus- 
 tice: — But, sir, the question is not now whether those states shall hold 
 that territory unjustly to themselves, but whether by that act of in- 
 justice they shall have superiority of power and influence over the other 
 states, and have a constitutional right to domineer and lord it over them— 
 Nay, more, whether we will agree to a, form of government by which we 
 pledge to those states the whole force of the union to preserve to them 
 their extensive territory entire and unbroJcen, and with our hlood and 
 wealth to assist them, whenever they please to demand it, to preserve the 
 inhabitants thereof under their subjection, for the purpose of encreasing 
 their superiority over us — of gratifying their unjust ambition — in a word, 
 for the purpose of giving ourselves masters, and of rivetting our chains! 
 
 The part of the system, which provides that no religious test shall 
 ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under 
 the United States, was adopted by a great majority of the convention, 
 and without much debate, — however, there were some members so 
 unfashionable as to think that a belief pf the existence of a Deity, and 
 of a state of future rewards and punishments would be some security for 
 the good conduct of our rulers, and that in a christian country it 
 would be at least decent to hold out some distinction between the pro- 
 fessors of Christianity and downright infidehty or paganism. 
 
60 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 The seventh article declares, that the ratification of nine states shall 
 be sufficient for the establishment of this constitution between the 
 states ratifying the same. 
 
 It was attempted to obtain a resolve that if seven states, whose 
 votes in the first branch should amount to a majority of the repre- 
 sentation in that branch, concurred in the adoption of the system, it 
 should be sxifficient, and this attempt was supported on the principle, 
 that a majority ought to govern the minority; — but to this it was 
 objected, that although it was true, after a cojistitution and form of 
 government is agreed on, in every act done under and consistent 
 with that Qpnstitution and form of government, the act of the ma- 
 jority, unless otherwise agreed in the constitution, shoxild bind the 
 minority, yet it was directly the reverse in originally forming a consti- 
 tution, or dissolving it — That in originally forming a constitution, it 
 was necessary that every individual should agree to it to become bound 
 thereby — and that when once adopted it could not be dissolved by con- 
 sent, unless with the consent of every individual who was party to the 
 original agreement — That in forming our original federal government, 
 every member of that government, that is, each state, expressly con- 
 sented to it ; that it is a part of the compact made and entered into in 
 the most solemn manner, that there should be no dissolution or altera- 
 tion of that federal government without the consent of every state, the 
 members of, and parties to, the original compact ; that therefore no 
 alteration could be made by a consent of a part of these states, or by 
 the consent of the inJiabitants of a part of the states, which could either 
 release the states so consenting, from the obligation they are under to 
 the other states, or which could in any manner become obligatory upon 
 those states that should not ratify such alterations. Satisfied of the 
 truth of these positions, and not holding ourselves at liberty to violate 
 the compact, which this state had solemnly entered into with the others, 
 by altering it in a different manner from that which by the same com- 
 pact is provided and stipulated, a number of the members, and among 
 those the delegation of this state, opposed the ratification of this system 
 in any other manner than by the unanimous consent and agreement of 
 all the states. 
 
 By our original articles of confederation any alterations proposed, 
 are in the first place to be approved by congress. — Accordingly as the 
 resolutions were originally adopted by the convention, and as they 
 were reported by the committee of detail, it was proposed that this 
 system should be laid before congress /or their approbation; but, sir, 
 the warm advocates of this system fearing it would not meet with the 
 approbation of congress, and determined, even though congress and 
 the respective state legislatures should disapprove the same, to force 
 it upon them, if possible, through the intervention of the people at 
 large, moved to strike out the words "for their approbation," and 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 61 
 
 succeeded in their motion; to which, it being directly in violation of 
 the mode prescribed by the articles of confederation for the alteration 
 of our federal government, a part of the convention, and myself in the 
 number, thought it a duty to give a decided negative. 
 
 Agreeable to the articles of confederation entered into in the most 
 solemn manner and for the observance of which the states fledged them- 
 selves to each other, and called upon the Supreme Being as a witness 
 and avenger between them, no alterations are to be made in those arti- 
 cles, unless a,fter they are approved by congress, they are agreed to 
 and ratified by the legislature of every state ; but by the resolve of the 
 convention this constitution is not to be ratified by the legislatures of 
 the respective states, but is to be submitted to conventions chosen by 
 the people, and if ratified by them is to be binding. 
 
 This resolve was opposed among others by the delegation of Mary- 
 land; — your delegates were of opinion, that as the form of govern- 
 ment proposed was, if adopted, most essentially to alter the constitu- 
 tion of this state, and as our constitution had pointed out a mode by 
 which, and by which only, alterations were to be made therein, a con- 
 vention of the people could not be called to agree to and ratify the said 
 form of government without a direct violation of our constitution, 
 Avhich it is the duty of every individual in this state to protect and 
 support. In this opinion all your delegates who were attending were 
 unanimous. I, sir, opposed it also upon a more extensive groimd, as 
 being directly contrary to the mode of altering our federal government 
 establisJied in our original compact ; and as such, being a direct violation 
 of the mutual faith plighted by the states to each other, I gave it my 
 negative. 
 
 I also was of opinion, that the states considered as states, in their 
 political capacity, are the members of a federal government; that the 
 states in their political capacity, or as sovereignties, are entitled, and 
 only entitled originally to agree upon the form of, and submit them- 
 selves to, a federal government, and afterwards by mutual consent to 
 dissolve or alter it — That every thiilg which relates to the formation, 
 the dissolution or the alteration of a federal government over states 
 equally free, sovereign and independent, is the peculiar province of the 
 states in their sovereign or political capacity, in the same manner as 
 what relates to forming alliances or treaties of peace, amity or com- 
 merce, and that the people at large in their individual capacity, have 
 no more right to interfere in the one case than in the other : That 
 according to these principles we originally acted in forming our con- 
 federation; it was the states as states, by their representatives in con- 
 gress, that formed the articles of confederation; it was the states as 
 states, by their legislatures, who ratified those articles, and it was 
 there established and provided, that the states as states, that is by 
 their legislatures, should agree to any alterations that should hereafter 
 
62 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF TTIE FEDERAL CONVENTION}. 
 
 be proposed in the federal government, before they should be bind- 
 ing and any alterations agreed to in any other manner cannot release 
 
 the states from the obligation they are under to each other by virtue 
 of the original articles of confederation. The people of the different 
 states never made any objection to the manner the articles of con- 
 federation were formed or ratified, or to the mode by which alterations 
 were to be made in that government — with the rights of their respec- 
 tive states they wished not to interfere — Nor do I believe the people 
 in their individual capacity, would ever have expected or desired to 
 have been appealed to on the present occasion, in violation of the 
 rights of their respective states, if the favorers of the proposed con- 
 stitution, imagining they had a better chance of forcing it to be 
 adopted by a hasty appeal to the people at large, who could not be so 
 good judges of the dangerous consequence, had not insisted upon 
 this mode — Nor do these positions in the least interfere with the prin- 
 ciple, that all power originates from the people, because when once 
 the people have exercised their 'power in establishing a,i\d forming them- 
 selves into a state government, it never devolves iack to them, nor 
 have they a right to resume or again to exercise that power until such 
 events take place as will amount to a dissolution of their state goverrir- 
 ment: — And it is an established principle that a dissolution or altera- 
 tion of a federal government doth not dissolve the state governments 
 which compose it. It was also my opinion, that upon principles of 
 sound policy, the agreement or disagreement to the proposed system 
 ought to have been by the state legislatures, in which case, let the 
 event have been what it would, there would have been but little pros- 
 pect of the public peace being disturbed thereby — Whereas the attempt 
 to force down this system, although congress and the respective state 
 legislatures should disapprove, by appealing to the people, and to 
 procure its establishment in a manner totally unconstitutional, has a 
 tendency to set the state governments and their subjects at variance with 
 each other — to lessen the obligations of government — to weaken the 
 bands of society — to introduce anarchy and confusion — and to light the 
 torch of discord and civil war throughout this continent. All these 
 considerations weighed with me most forcibly against giving my 
 assent to the mode by which it is resolved this system is to be rati- 
 fied, and were urged by me in opposition to the measure. 
 
 1 have now, sir, in discharge of the duty I owe to this house, given 
 such information as hath occurred to me, which I consider most ma- 
 terial for them to know ; and you will easily perceive from this detail 
 that a great portion of that time, which ought to have been devoted 
 calmly and impartially to consider what alterations in our federal 
 government would be most likely to procure and preserve the hap- 
 piness of the union, was employed in a violent struggle on the one side 
 to obtain all power and dominion in their own hands, and on the other 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 63 
 
 to prevent it; and that the aggrandizement of particular states and 
 particular individuals appears to have been much more the object 
 sought after, than the welfare of our country. 
 
 The interest of this state, not confined merely to itself, abstracted 
 from all others, but considered relatively, as far as was consistent with 
 the common interest of the other states, I thought it my duty to pur- 
 sue, according to the best opinion I could form of it. 
 
 When I took my seat in the convention, I found them attempting 
 to bring forward a system, which I was sure never had entered into 
 the contemplation of those I had the honor to represent, and which 
 upon the fullest consideration, I considered not only injurious to the 
 interest and the rights of this state, but also incompatible with the 
 political happiness and freedom of the states in general; from that 
 time until my business compelled me to leave the convention, I gave 
 it every possible opposition in every stage of its progression. I 
 opposed the system there with the same explicit frankness with which 
 I have here given you a history of our proceedings, an account of my 
 own conduct, which in a particular manner I consider you as having^ 
 a right to know — ^While there, I endeavored to act as became a free 
 man, and the delegate of a free state. Should my conduct obtain the 
 approbation of those who appointed me, I will not deny it would 
 afford me satisfaction; but to me that approbation was at most no 
 more than a secondary consideration — mj first was to deserve it; left 
 to myself to act according to the best of my discretion, my conduct 
 should have been the same,, had I been even sure your censure would 
 have been my only reward, since I hold it sacredly my duty to dash 
 the cup of poison, if possible, from the hand of a state, or an individual, 
 however anxious the one or the other might be to swallow it. 
 
 Indulge me, sir, in a single observation further: — There are persons 
 who endeavor to hold up the idea that this system is only opposed 
 by the officers of government. I, sir, am in that predicament. I 
 have the honor to hold an appointment, in this state. Had it been 
 considered any objection, I presume I should not have been appointed 
 to the convention; if it could have had any effect on my mind, it 
 would only be that of warming my heart with gratitude, and render- 
 ing me more anxious to promote the true interest of that state, which 
 has conferred on me the obligation, and to heighten my guilt had I 
 joined in sacrificing its essential rights: But, sir, it would be well to 
 remember, that this system is not calculated to diminish the numher 
 or the value of offices; on the contrary, if adopted, it will be produc- 
 tive of an enormous encrease in their number; many of them will be 
 also of great honor and emoluments. Whether, sir, in this variety of 
 appointments, and in the scramble for them, I might not have as 
 good a prospect to advantage myself as many others, is not for me 
 to say; but this, sir, I can say with truth, that so far was I from being 
 
64 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 influenced in my conduct by interest, or the consideration of office, 
 that I would cheerfully resign the appointment I now hold; I would 
 bind myself never to accept another, either under the general govern- 
 ment or that of my own state: I would do more, sir, so destructive 
 do I consider the present system to the happiness of my country, I 
 would cheerfully sacrifice that share of property with which heaven 
 has blessed a life of industry — I would reduce myself to indigence 
 and poverty, and those who are dearer to me than my own existence 
 I would entrust to the care and protection of that providence who 
 hath so kindly protected myself, if on those terms only I could pro- 
 cure my country to reject those chains which are forged for it. 
 
SECRET DEBATES 
 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
 
 NOTES OF THE SECRET DEBATES OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, TAKE« 
 BY THE LATE HON. ROBERT YATES, CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK, 
 AND ONE OF THE DELEGATES FROM THAT STATE TO THE SAID CONVENTION * 
 
 Friday, Mat 25, 1787. 
 
 Attended the convention of the states, at the state house in Phila- 
 delphia, when the following states were represented: 
 
 New- York: 
 
 Alexander Hamilton, 
 Robert Yates. 
 
 New-Jersey: 
 
 David Brearly, 
 
 WiUiam Churchill Houston, 
 
 William Patterson. 
 
 Pennsylvania: 
 Robert Morris, 
 Thomas Fitzsimons, 
 James Wilson, 
 Gouverneur Morris. 
 
 Delaware : 
 
 George Read, 
 Richard Bassett, 
 Jacob Broom. 
 
 Virginia: 
 
 George Washington, 
 
 Edmund Randolph, 
 
 George Wythe, 
 
 George Mason, 
 
 James Madison, 
 
 John Blair, 
 
 James M'Clurg. 
 North-Carolina : 
 
 Alexander Martin, 
 
 William Richardson Davie, 
 
 Richard Dobbs Spaight, 
 
 Hugh WiUiamson. 
 South-Carolina : 
 
 John Rutledge, 
 
 Charles Cotesworth Pinkney, 
 
 Charles Pinckney, 
 
 Pierce Butler. 
 
 A motion by R. Morris, and seconded, that General Washington 
 take the chair — unanimously agreed to. 
 
 When seated, he (Gen. Washington) declared, that as he never had 
 been in such a situation, he felt himself embarrassed; that he hoped 
 his errors, as they would be unintentional, would be excused. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton, in behalf of the state of New- York, moved that 
 Major Jackson be appointed secretary; the delegates for Pennsyl- 
 vania, moved for Temple Franklin: by a majority Mr. Jackson car- 
 ried it — called in and took his seat. 
 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 5 65 
 
66 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 After which, the respective credentials of the seven states were 
 read. N. B. That of Delaware restrained its delegates from assenting 
 to an abolition of the fifth article of the confederation, by which it 
 is declared that each state shall have one vote. 
 
 Door keeper and messengers being appointed, the house adjourned 
 to Monday the 28th day of May, at ten o'clock. 
 Monday, Mat 28, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjoTirnment. 
 
 A committee of three members, (whose appointment I omitted in 
 the entry of the proceedings of Friday last,) reported a set of rules 
 for the order of the convention; which being considered by articles, 
 were agreed to, and additional ones proposed and referred to the 
 same committee. The representation was this day increased to 
 nine states — ^Massachusetts and Connecticut becoming represented. 
 Adjourned to next day. 
 
 Tuesday, May 29th, 1787. 
 
 The additional rules agreed to. 
 
 His excellency Governor Randolph, a member from Virginia, 
 got up, and in a long and elaborate speech, shewed the defects in the 
 system of the present federal govenmient as totally inadequate to the 
 peace, safety and security of the confederation, and the absolute neces- 
 sity of a more energetic government. 
 
 He closed these remarks with a set of resolutions, fifteen in number, 
 which he proposed to the convention for their adoption, and as lead- 
 ing principles whereon to form a new government— He candidly con- 
 fessed that they were not intended for a federal government — he 
 meant a strong consolidated union, in which the idea of states should 
 be nearly annihilated. [I have taken a copy of these resolutions, 
 which are hereunto annexed.] 
 
 He then moved that they should be taken up in committee of the 
 whole house. 
 
 Mr. C. PiNKNEY, a member from South-Carolina, then added, that 
 he had reduced his ideas of a new government to a system, which he 
 read, and confessed that it was grounded on the same principle as of 
 the above resolutions. 
 
 The house then resolved, that they would the next day form them- 
 selves into a committee of the whole, to take into consideration the 
 state of the union. 
 
 Adjourned to next day. 
 
 Wednesday, May 30th, 1787. 
 
 Convention met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 The convention, pursuant to order, resolved itself into a committee 
 of the whole — Mr. Gobham (a member from Massachusetts) appointed 
 chairman. 
 
SECRET PBOCEEUI.\GS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIOW. 67 
 
 Mr. Randolph then moved his first resolve, to wit : " Resolved, that 
 the articles of the confederation ought to be so corrected and en- 
 larged, as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution, 
 namely, common defence, secm-ity of liberty, and general welfare." 
 
 Mr. G. MoKRis observed, that it was an unnecessary resolution, as 
 the subsequent resolutions would not agree with it. It was then 
 withdrawn by the proposer, and in lieu thereof the following were 
 proposed, to wit : 
 
 1. Resolved, That a union of the states, merely federal, will not 
 accompUsh the objects proposed by the articles of the confederation, 
 namely, common defence, security of liberty, and general welfare. 
 
 2. Resolved, That no treaty or treaties among any of the states as 
 sovereign, will accomplish or secure their common defence, hberty 
 or welfare. 
 
 3. Resolved, That a national government ought to be estabUshed, 
 consisting of a supreme judicial, legislative and executive. 
 
 In considering the question on the first resolve, various modifica- 
 tions were proposed, when Mr. Pinkney observed, at last, that if the 
 convention agreed to it, it appeared to him that their business was 
 at an end; for as the powers of the house in general were to revise 
 the present confederation, and to alter or amend it as the case might 
 require; to determine its insxiflBciency or incapability of amendment 
 or improvement, must end in the dissolution of the powers. 
 
 This remark had its weight, and in consequence of it, the 1st and 
 2d resolve was dropt, and the question agitated on the third. 
 
 This last resolve had also its difficulties; the term supreme required 
 explanation — It was asked whether it was intended to annihilate 
 state governments? It was answered, only so far as the powers in- 
 tended to be granted to the new government should clash with the 
 states, when the latter was to yield. 
 
 For the resolution — Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Vir- 
 ginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina. 
 
 Against it — Connecticut, New- York divided, Jersey and the other 
 states unrepresented. 
 
 The next question was on the following resolve: 
 
 In substance that the mode of the present representation was 
 unjust — the suffrage ought to be in proportion to number or property. 
 
 To this Delaware objected, in consequence of the restrictions in 
 their credentials, and moved to have the consideration thereof post- 
 poned, to which the house agreed. 
 
 Adjourned to to-morrow. 
 
 Thursday, May SIst, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 This day the state of Jersey was represented, so that there were 
 now ten states in convention. 
 
68 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 The house went again into committee of the whole, Mr. Goeham in 
 the chair. 
 
 The 3d resolve, to wit, ' ' That the national legislature ought to 
 consist of two branches," was taken into consideration, and without 
 any debate agreed to. [N. B. As a previous resolution had already 
 been agreed to, to have a supreme legislature, I could not see any 
 objection to its being in two branches.] 
 
 The 4th resolve, ' ' That the members of the first branch of the na- 
 tional legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several 
 states," was opposed; and strange to tell, by Massachusetts and 
 Connecticut, who supposed they ought to be chosen by the legisla- 
 tures; and Virginia supported the resolve, alledging that this ought 
 to be the democratic branch of government, and as such, immediately 
 vested in the people. 
 
 This question was carried, but the remaining part of, the resolve 
 detailing the powers, was postponed. 
 
 The 5th resolve. That the members of the second branch of the 
 national legislature ought to be elected by those of the first out of a 
 proper number of persons nominated by the individual legislatures, 
 and the detail of the mode of election and duration of oflBce, was 
 postponed. 
 
 The 6th resolve is taken in detail: "That each branch ought to 
 possess the right of originating acts." Agreed to. 
 
 " That the national legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy 
 the legislative rights vested in congress by the confederation."— 
 Agreed to. 
 
 "And, moreover, to legislate in all cases to which the separate 
 states are incompetent." — Agreed to. 
 
 Friday, June 1st, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 The 7th resolve, that a national executive be instituted. A^eed to. 
 
 To continue in office for seven years. Agreed to. 
 
 A general authority to execute the laws. Agreed to. 
 
 To appoint all officers not otherwise provided for. Agreed to. 
 
 Adjourned to the next day, 
 
 Saturday, June 2d, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY called for the order of the day. 
 
 The convention went into committee of the whole. 
 
 Mr. Wilson moved that the states should be divided into districts, 
 consisting of one or more states, and each district to elect a number 
 of senators to form the second branch of the national legislature — The 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINOS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 69 
 
 senators to be elected, and a certain proportion to be annually dis- 
 missed — avowedly on the plan of the New-York senate. — Question 
 put — ^rejected. 
 
 In the 7th resolve, the words to he chosen by the national legislature, 
 were agreed to. 
 
 President Franklin moved, that the consideration of that part of 
 the 7th resolve, which had in object the making provision for a com- 
 pensation for the service of the executive, be postponed for the pur- 
 pose of considering a motion, that the executive should receive no salary, 
 stipend or emolument for the devotion of his time to the public services, 
 but that his expenses should be paid. 
 
 Postponed. 
 
 Mr. Dickinson moved that in the seventh resolution, the words, 
 avd removable on impeachment and conviction for mal-conduct or neglect 
 in the execution of his office, should be inserted after the words 
 ineligible a second time. Agreed to. The remainder postponed. 
 
 Mr. Butler moved to fill the number of which the executive 
 should consist. 
 
 Mr. Randolph. — The sentiments of the people ought to be con- 
 sulted — they will not hear of the semblance of monarchy — He pre- 
 ferred three divisions of the states, and an executive to be taken 
 from each. If a single executive, those remote from him would be 
 neglected — ^local views would be attributed to him, frequently weU 
 founded, often without reason. This would excite disaffection. He 
 was therefore for an executive of three. 
 
 Mr. Butler. — Delays, divisions and dissentions arise from an execu- 
 tive consisting of many. Instanced Holland's distracted state, occa- 
 sioned by her many counsellors. Further consideration postponed. 
 
 Mr. C. PiNKNET gave notice for the re-consideration of the mode 
 of electon of the first branch. 
 
 Adjourned till Monday next. 
 
 Monday, June 4th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNET moved that the blank in the 7th resolve consisting of 
 be filled up with an individual. 
 
 Mr. Wilson, in support of the motion, asserted, that it woidd not 
 be obnoxious to the minds of the people, as they in their state gov- 
 ernments were accustomed and reconciled to a single executive. 
 Three executives might divide so that two could not agree in one prop- 
 osition — the consequence would be anarchy and confusion. 
 
 Mr. Sherman thought there ought to be one executive, but that he 
 ought to have a council. Even the king of Great Britain has his 
 privy coiincil. 
 
70 SECRET PR0CEEDIN08 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 Mr. Gerey was for one executive — if otherwise, it would be absurd 
 to have it consist of three. Numbers equally in rank would oddly 
 apply to a general or admiral. 
 
 Question put — 7 states for, and 3 against. New- York against it. 
 
 The 8th resolve. That the executive and a number of the judicial 
 officers ought to compose a council of revision. 
 
 Mr. Gerby objects to the clause — moves its postponement in order 
 to let in a motion — that the right of revision should he in the executive 
 only. 
 
 Mr. Wilson contends that the executive and judicial ought to have 
 a joint and fuU negative — they cannot otherwise preserve their im- 
 portance against the legislature. 
 
 Mr. King was against the interference of the judicial — they may . 
 be biased in the interpretation — He is therefore to 'give the executive 
 a complete negative. 
 
 Carried to be postponed, 6 states against 4 — New- York for it. 
 
 The next question, that the executive have a complete negative; 
 and it was therefore moved to expunge the remaining part of the 
 clause. 
 
 Dr. Franklin against the motion — The power dangerous, and 
 would be abused so as to get money for passing bills. 
 
 Mr. Madison against it — because of the difficulty of an executive 
 venturing on the exercise of this negative, and is therefore of opinion 
 that the revisional authority is better. 
 
 Mr. Bedford is against the whole, either negative or revisional — the 
 two branches are sufficient checks on each other — no danger of sub- 
 verting the executive, because his powers may by the convention be 
 so well defined that the legislature cannot overleap the bounds. 
 
 Mr. Mason against the negative power in the executive, because it 
 will not accord with the genius of the people. 
 
 On this the question was put and carried, nem. con. against expun- 
 ging part of the clause so as to establish a complete negative. 
 
 Mr. Butler then moved that aU acts passed by the legislature be 
 suspended for the space of days by the executive. 
 
 Unanimously in the negative. 
 
 It was resolved and agreed, that the blank be filled up with the 
 words two thirds of the legislature. Agreed to. 
 
 The question was then put on the whole of the resolve as amended 
 and filled up. Carried, 8 states for — 2 against. New- York for it. 
 
 Mr. Wilson then moved for the addition of a convenient number of 
 the national judicial to the executive as a council of revision. Ordered 
 to be taken into consideration to-morrow. 
 
 Adjourned until to-morrow. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 71 
 Tuesday, June 5th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 The 9th resolve. That a national jiidicial he established to consist of 
 one supreme trihunal, and of inferior tribunals, to hold their offices dur- 
 ing good behaviour, and no augmentation or diminution in the stipends 
 during the time of holding their offices. Agreed to. 
 
 Mr. Wilson moved that the judicial be appointed by the executive, 
 instead of the national legislature. 
 
 Mr. Mabison opposed the motion, and inchned to think that the 
 executive ought to by no means to make the appointments, but 
 rather that branch of the legislature called the senatorial; and moves 
 that the words, of the appointment of the legislature, be expunged. 
 
 Carried by 8 states — against it 2. 
 
 The remaining part of the resolve postponed. 
 
 The 10th resolve read and agreed to. 
 
 The 11th resolve agreed to be postponed. 
 
 The 12th resolve agreed to without debate. 
 
 The 13th and 14th resolves postponed. 
 
 The 15th or last resolve, That the amendment which shall be offered 
 io the confederation, ought at a proper time or times after the approba^ 
 Hon of congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of repre- 
 sentatives, recommended by the several legislatures, to be expressly chosen 
 by the people, to consider and decide thereon, was taken into considera- 
 tion. 
 
 Mr. Madison endeavored to enforce the necessity of this resolve — 
 because the new national constitution ought to have the highest 
 source of authority, at least paramount to the powers of the respec- 
 tive constitutions of the states — points out the mischiefs that have 
 arisen in the old confederation, which depends upon no higher 
 authority than the confirmation of an ordinary act of a legislature — 
 Instances the law operation of treaties, when contravened by any 
 antecedent acts of a particular state. 
 
 Mr. King supposes, that as the people have tacitly agreed to a 
 federal government, that therefore the legislature in every state have 
 a right to confirm any alterations or amendments in it — a convention 
 in each state to approve of a new government he supposes however 
 the most ehgible. 
 
 Mr. Wilson is of opinion, that the people by a convention are the 
 only power that can ratify the proposed system of the new govern- 
 ment. 
 
 It is possible that not all the states, nay, that not even a majority, 
 will immediately come into the measure ; but such as do ratify it will 
 be immediately bound by it, and others as they may from time to 
 time accede to it. 
 
72 SECRET PROCEEDINQS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 Question put for postponement of this resolve. 7 states for post- 
 ponement — 3 against it. 
 
 Question on the 9th resolve to strike out the words, and ofinfemr 
 
 tribunals. 
 
 Carried by 5 states against 4 — 2 states divided, of which last num- 
 ber New- York was one. 
 
 Mr. Wilson then moved, that tTie national legislature sJmU have the 
 authority to appoint inferior tribunals, be added to the resolve. 
 
 Carried by 7 states against 3. New- York divided. [N. B. Mr. 
 Lansing from New-York was prevented by sickness from attending 
 this day.] 
 
 Adjourned to to-morrow morning. 
 
 Wednesday, June 6th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY moved (pursuant to a standing order for re-considerar 
 tion) that in the 4th resolve, the words by the people, be expunged, 
 and the words by the legislature, be inserted. 
 
 Mr. Geeky.— If the national legislature are appointed by the state 
 legislatures, demagogues and corrupt members will creep in. 
 
 Mr. Wilson is of opinion that the national legislative powers ought 
 to flow immediately from the people, so as to contain aU their under- 
 standing, and to be an exact transcript of their minds. He observed 
 that the people had already parted with as much of their power as was 
 necessary, to form on its basis a perfect government ; and the particu- 
 lar states must part with such a portion of it as to make the present 
 national government, adequate to their peace and the security of their 
 Uberties. He admitted that the state governments would probably 
 be rivals and opposers of the national government. 
 
 Mr. Mason observed that the national legislature, as to one branch, 
 ought to be elected by the people; because the objects of their legis- 
 lation wiU not be on states, but on individual persons. 
 
 Mr. Dickinson is for combining the state and national legislatures 
 in the same views and measures, and that this object can only be 
 effected by the national legislature flowing from the state legislatures. 
 
 Mr. Read is of opinion, that the state governments must sooner 
 or later be at an end, and that therefore we must make the present 
 national government as perfect as possible. 
 
 Mr. Madison is of opinion, that when we agreed to the first resoh'e 
 of having a national government, consisting of a supreme executive, 
 judicial and legislative power, it was then intended to operate to the 
 exclusion of a federal government, and the more extensive we made 
 the basis, the greater probability of duration, happiness and good 
 order. 
 
 The question for the amendment was negatived, by 8 states against 3. 
 New- York in the majority. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 73 
 
 On the 8th resolve, Mr. Wilson moved (in consequence of a vote to 
 re-consider the question on the revisional powers vested in the execu- 
 tive) that there be added these words, with a convenient mimber of fJie 
 national judicial. 
 
 Upon debate, carried in the negative — 3 states for and 8 against. 
 New- York for the addition. 
 
 Adjourned to to-morrow morning. 
 
 Thltrsday, June 7th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 Mr. RuTLEDGE moved to take into consideration the mode of electing 
 the second branch of the national legislature. 
 
 Mr. Dickinson thereupon moved, tJiat the second branch of the 
 vxitional legislature he chosen by the legislatures of the individual states. 
 He observed, that this mode will more intimately connect the state 
 governments with the national legislature — it will also draw forth the 
 first characters either as to family or talent, and that it ought to con- 
 sist of a considerable number. 
 
 Mr. Wilson against the motion, because the two branches thus 
 constituted, cannot agree, they having different views and different 
 sentiments. 
 
 Mr. Dickinson is of opinion that the mode by him proposed, Uke 
 the British house of lords and commons, whose powers flow from dif- 
 ferent sources, are mutual checks on each other, and will thus pro- 
 mote the real happiness and security of the country — a government 
 thus established wotdd harmonize the whole, and like the planetary 
 system, the national council like the sun, would illuminate the whole — 
 the planets revolving round it in perfect order; or like the union of 
 several small streams, would at last form a respectable river, gently 
 flowing to the sea. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. The state governments ought to be preserved — the 
 freedom of the people and their internal good police depends on their 
 existence in full vigor — but such a government can only answer local 
 purposes — That it is not possible a general government, as despotic 
 as even that of the Roman emperors, could be adequate to the gov- 
 ernment of the whole without this distinction. He hoped that the 
 national government would be independent of state governments, 
 in order to make it vigorous, and therefore moved that the above 
 resolution be postponed, and that the convention in its room adopt 
 the foUowing resolve : That the second branch of the national legisla- 
 ture be chosen by districts, to be formed for that purpose. 
 
 Mr. Sherman supposes the election of the national legislature will 
 be better vested in the state legislatures, than by the people, for by 
 pursuing different objects, persons may be returned who have not 
 one tenth of the votes. 
 
74 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 Mr. Gerky observed, that the great mercantile interest and of stock- 
 holders, is not provided for in any mode of election — they will how- 
 ever be better represented if the state legislatures choose the second 
 branch. 
 
 Question carried against the postponement — 10 states against 1. 
 
 Mr. Mason then spoke to the general question — observing on the 
 propriety, that the second branch of the national legislature should 
 flow from the legislature of each state, to prevent the encroachments 
 on each other and to harmonize the whole. 
 
 The question put on the first motion, and carried unanimously. 
 Adjourned to to-morrow morning. 
 
 Fblday, June 8, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment — 11 states. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY moved, That the national legislature shall have the power 
 ■of negativing all laws to ie passed iy the state legislatures which they may 
 judge improper, in the room of the clause as it stood reported. 
 
 He grounds his motion on the necessity of one supreme controlling 
 power, and he considers this as the comer-stone of the present system; 
 and hence the necessity of retrenching the state authorities in order 
 to preserve the good government of the national council. 
 
 Mr. Williamson against the motion. The national legislature 
 ought to possess the power of negativing such laws only as will en- 
 croach on the national government. 
 
 Mr. Madison wished that the line of jurisprudence could be drawn- 
 he would be for it — but upon reflection he finds it impossible, and 
 therefore he is for the amendment. If the clause remains without 
 the amendment it is inefficient — The judges of the state must give the 
 state laws their operation, although the law abridges the rights of 
 the national government — how is it to be repealed? By the power 
 who made it? How shall you compel them? By force? To pre- 
 vent this disagreeable expedient, the power of negativing is absolutely 
 necessary — this is the only attractive principle which will retain its 
 centrifugal force, and without this the planets will fly from their 
 orbits. 
 
 Mr. Gerky supposes that this power ought to extend to all laws 
 aheady made; but the preferable mode would be to designate the 
 powers of the national legislature, to which the negative ought to 
 apply — he has no objection to restrain the laws which may be made 
 for issuing paper money. Upon the whole he does not choose on this 
 important trust, to take a leap in the dark. 
 
 Mr. Pinkney supposes that the proposed amendment had no retro- 
 spect to the state laws already made. The adoption of the new gov- 
 ernment must operate as a complete repeal of all the constitutions 
 and state laws, as far as they are inconsistent with the new govern- 
 ment. 
 
SECRET I'BOGEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 75 
 
 Mr. Wilson supposes the surrender of the rights of a federal govern- 
 ment to be a surrender of sovereignty. True, we may define some of 
 the rights, but when we come near the hne it cannot be found. One 
 general excepting clause must therefore apply to the whole. In the 
 beginning of our troubles, congress themselves were as one state — dis- 
 sentions or state interests were not known — they gradually crept in 
 after the formation of the constitution, and each took to himself a 
 shce. The original draft of confederation was drawn on the first 
 ideas, and the draft concluded on how different! 
 
 Mr. Bedford was against the motion, and states the proportion of 
 the intended representation of the number 90 : Delaware 1 — Pennsyl- 
 vania and Virginia one third. On this computation where is the 
 weight of the small states when the interest of the one is in com- 
 petition with the other on trade, manufactures and agricultm-e? 
 When he sees this mode of government so strongly advocated by the 
 members of the great states, he must suppose it a question of interest. 
 
 Mr. Madison confesses it is not without its difficulties on many 
 accounts — some may be removed, others modified, and some are un- 
 avoidable. May not this power be vested in the senatorial branch? 
 they will probably be always sitting. Take the question on the other 
 ground, who is to determine the line when drawn in doubtful cases? 
 The state legislatures cannot, for they will be partial in support of 
 their own powers — no tribunal can be found. It is impossible that 
 the articles of confederation can be amended — they are too tottering 
 to be invigorated — nothing but the present system, or something like 
 it, can restore the peace and harmony of the country. 
 
 The question put on Mr. Pinkney's motion — 7 states against 
 it^Delaware divided — Virginia, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts 
 for it. 
 
 Adjourned to to-morrow morning. 
 
 Saturday, June 9th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 Motion by Mr. Gerry to reconsider the appointment of the national 
 executive. 
 
 TJiat (he national executive be appointed by the state executives. 
 
 He supposed that in the national legislature there will be a great 
 number of bad men of various descriptions — these will make a wrong 
 appointment. Besides, an executive thus appointed, will have his 
 partiality in favor of those who appointed him — that this will not be 
 the case by the effect of his motion, and the executive will by this 
 means be independent of the national legislature, but the appointment 
 by the state executives ought to be made by votes in proportion to 
 their weight in the scale of the representation. 
 
 Mr. Kandolph opposes the motion. The power vested by it is 
 dangerous — confidence will be wanting — the large states will be 
 
76 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 masters of the election — an executive ought to have great experience, 
 integrity and activity. The executives of the states cannot know the 
 persons properly qualified as possessing these. An executive thus 
 appointed wiU court the officers of his appointment, and will relax 
 him in the duties of commander of the militia — Your single executive 
 is already invested with negativing laws of the state. Will he duly 
 exercise the power? Is there no danger in the combinations of states 
 to appoint such an executive as may be too favorable to local state 
 govermnents ? Add to this the expense and difficulty of bringing the 
 executives to one place to exercise their powers. Can you suppose 
 they will ever cordially raise the great oak, when they must sit as 
 shrubs under its shade ? 
 
 Carried against the motion, 10 noes, and Delaware divided. 
 
 On motion of Mr. Patteeson, the consideration of the 2d resolve 
 was taken up, which is as follows: Resolved, therefore, that the rights 
 of suffrage in the national legislature ought to be apportioned to ik 
 quotas of contribution, or to the number of inhabitants, as the one or 
 other rule may seem best in different cases. 
 
 Judge Breably. — The present question is an important one. On 
 the principle that each state in the union was sovereign, congress, 
 in the articles of confederation, determined that each state in the pub- 
 lic councils had one vote. If the states still remain sovereign, the 
 form of the present resolve is founded on principles of injustice. He 
 then stated the comparative weight of each state — the number of 
 votes 90. Georgia would be 1, Virginia 16, and so of the rest. This 
 vote must defeat itself, or end in despotism. If we must have a 
 national government, what is the remedy? Lay the map of the con- 
 federation on the table, and extinguish the present boundary lines 
 of the respective state jurisdictions, and make a new division so that 
 each state is equal — then a government on the present system wiE 
 be just. 
 
 Mr. Patterson opposed the resolve. Let us consider with what 
 powers are we sent here ? (moved to have the credentials of Massachu- 
 setts read, which was done.) By this and the other credentials we 
 see, that the basis of our present authority is founded on a revision 
 of the articles of the present confederation, and to alter or amend 
 them in such parts where they may appear defective. Can we on this 
 ground form a national government? I fancy not. — Our commis- 
 sions give a complexion to the business; and can we suppose that 
 when we exceed the bounds of our duty, the people will approve our 
 proceedings ? 
 
 We are met here as the deputies of 13 independent, sovereign states, 
 for federal purposes. Can we consolidate their sovereignty and form 
 one nation, and annihilate the sovereignties of our states who have 
 sent us here for other purposes? 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 77 
 
 What, pray, is intended by a proportional representation? Is 
 property to be considered as part of it? Is a man, for example, pos- 
 sessing a property of £4000 to have 40 votes to one possessing only 
 £100? This has been asserted on a former occasion. If state dis- 
 tinctions are still to be held up, shall I submit the welfare of the state 
 of New-Jersey, with 5 votes in the national council, opposed to Vir- 
 ginia who has 16 votes? Suppose, as it was in agitation before the 
 war, that America had been represented in the British parliament, 
 and had sent 200 members; what would this number avail against 
 600? We would have been as much enslaved in that case as when 
 unrepresented; and what is worse, without the prospect of redress. 
 But it is said that this national government is to act on individuals 
 and not on states; and cannot a federal government be so framed as 
 to operate in the same way? It surely may. I therefore declare, 
 that I win never consent to the present system, and I shall make all 
 the interest against it in the state which I represent that I can. 
 Myself or my state will never submit to tyranny or despotism. 
 
 Upon the whole, every sovereign state according to a confederation 
 must have an equal vote, or there is an end to liberty. As long there- 
 fore as state distinctions are held up, this rule must invariably apply; 
 and if a consolidated national government must take place, then 
 state distinctions must cease, or the states must be equalized. 
 
 Mr. Wilson was in favor of the resolve. He observed that a major- 
 ity, nay even a minority, of the states have a right to confederate 
 with each other, and the rest may do as they please. He considered 
 numbers as the best criterion to determine representation. Every 
 citizen of one state possesses the same rights with the citizen of 
 another. Let us see how this rule will apply to the present question. 
 Pennsylvania, from its numbers, has a right to 12 votes, when on 
 the same principle New-Jersey is entitled to 5 votes. Shall New- 
 Jersey have the same right or influence in the councUs of the nation 
 with Pennsylvania ? I say no. It is unjust — I never wiU confederate 
 on this plan. The gentleman from New-Jersey is candid' in declaring 
 his opinion — I commend him for it — I am equally so. I say again 
 I never will confederate on his principles. If no state wiU part with 
 any of its sovereignty, it is in vain to talk of a national government. 
 The state who has five times the number of inhabitants ought, nay 
 must have the same proportion of weight in the representation. If 
 there was a probability of equalizing the states, he would be for it. 
 But we have no such power. If however, we depart from the princi- 
 ple of representation in proportion to numbers, we will lose the object 
 of our meeting. 
 
 The question postponed for farther consideration. 
 
 Adjourned to to-morrow morning. 
 
78 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OV THE FEDERAL CONVBSITION. 
 
 Monday, June 11th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjoummeiit. Present 11 states. 
 
 Mr. Sherman moved that the first hranch of the national legishfwre 
 he chosen in proportion to the number of the whole inhabitants in each 
 state. He observed that as the people ought to have the election of 
 one of the branches of the legislature, the legislature of each state 
 ought to have the election of the second branch, in order to preserve 
 the state sovereignty; and that each state ought in this branch to 
 have one vote. 
 
 Gov. RuTLEDGE Hioved as an amendment of the first proposition, 
 that the proportion of representation ought to be according to and in pro- 
 portion to the contribution of each state. 
 
 Mr. Butler supported the motion, by observing . that money is 
 strength; and every state ought to have its weight in the national 
 council in proportion to the quantity it possesses. He further ob- 
 served, that when a boy he read this as one of the remarks of Julius 
 Caesar, who declared if he had but money he would find soldiers, and 
 every thing necessary to carry on a war. 
 
 Mr. King observed, that it would be better first to establish a prin- 
 ciple (that is to say) whether we will depart from federal grounds in 
 forming a national government; and therefore, to bring this point 
 to view, he moved as a previous question, that the sense of the com- 
 mittee be taken on the following question: 
 
 That the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national legislature, 
 ought not to be according to the rule in the articles of confederation, hut 
 according to some equitable ratio of representation. 
 
 Gov. Franklin's written remarks on this point were read by Mr. 
 Wilson. In these Gov. Franklin observes, that representation 
 ought to be in proportion to the importance of numbers or wealth in 
 each state — that there can be no danger of undue influence of the 
 greater against the lesser states. This was the apprehension of Scot- 
 land when the union with England was proposed, when in parliament 
 they were allowed only 16 peers and 45 commons; yet experience has 
 proved that their liberties and influence were in no danger. 
 
 The question on Mr. King's motion was carried in the aflirmative— 7 
 ayes — 3 noes, and Maryland divided. New-York, New-Jersey and 
 Delaware in the negative. 
 
 Mr. Dickinson moved as an amendment, to add the words, accord- 
 ing to the taxes and contributions of each state actually collected .and paid 
 into the national treasury. 
 
 Mr. Butler was of opinion that the national government will only 
 have the right of making and collecting the taxes, but that the states 
 individually must lay their own taxes. 
 
 Mr. Wilson was of opinion, and therefore moved, that the mode of 
 representation of each of the states ought to be from the number of its 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 79 
 
 free inhabitants, and of every other description three fifths to one free 
 inhabitant. He supposed that the impost will not be the only reve- 
 nue — the post office he supposes would be another substantial source 
 of revenue. He observed further, that this mode had already- 
 received the approbation of eleven states in their acquiescence to 
 the quota made by congress. He admitted that this resolve would 
 reqtiire further restrictions, for where numbers determined the 
 representation a census at different periods of 5, 7 or 10 years, ought 
 to be taken. 
 
 Mr. Gekry. The idea of property ought not to be the rule of repre- 
 sentation. Blacks are property, and are used to the southward as 
 horses and cattle to the northward; and why should their repre- 
 sentation be increased to the southward on account of the number of 
 slaves, than horses or oxen to the north ? 
 
 Mr. Madison was of opinion at present, to fix the standard of repre- 
 sentation, and let the detail be the business of a sub-committee. 
 
 Mr. Rutledge's motion was postponed. 
 
 Mr. Wilson's motion was then put, and carried by 9 states against 
 2. New-York in the majority. 
 
 Mr. Wilson then nioved, as an amendment to Mr. Sherman's 
 motion, That the same proportion be observed in the election of the second 
 branch as the first. 
 
 The question however was first put on Mr. Sherman's motion, and 
 lost — 6 states against, and 5 for it. 
 
 Then Mr. Wilson's motion was put and carried — 6 ayes, 5 noes. 
 
 The eleventh resolve was then taken into consideration. Mr. 
 Madison moved to add after the word junctions, the words, or sepa- 
 ration. 
 
 Mr. Read against the resolve in toto. We must put away state 
 governments, and we will then remove all cause of jealousy. The 
 guarantee will confirm the assumed rights of several states to lands 
 which do belong to the confederation. 
 
 Mr. Madison moved an amendment, to add to or alter the resolution 
 as follows: The republican constitutions and the existing laws of each 
 state, to be guaranteed by the United States. 
 
 Mr. Randolph was for the present amendment, because a repub- 
 hcan government must be the basis of our national union ; and no 
 state in it ought to have it in their power to change its government 
 into a monarchy. — Agreed to. 
 
 13th Resolve — the first part agreed to. 
 
 14th Resolve — taken into consideration. 
 
 Mr. Williamson. This resolve will be unnecessary, as the union 
 will become the law of the land. 
 
 Governor Randolph. He supposes it to be absolutely necessary. 
 Not a state government, but its officers will infringe on the rights of 
 
80 SECRET PROCEEDITfGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 the national government. If the state judges are not sworn to the 
 observance of the new government, will they not judicially determine 
 in favor of their state laws? We are erecting a supreme national 
 government; ought it not to be supported, and can we give it too 
 many sinews? 
 
 Mr. Gerky rather supposes that the national legislators ought to be 
 sworn to preserve the state constitutions, as they will run the greatest 
 risk to be annihilated — and therefore moved it. 
 
 For Mr. Gerry's amendment, 7 ayes, 4 noes. 
 
 Main question then put on the clause or resolve — 6 ayes, 5 noes. 
 New- York in the negative. 
 
 Adjom-ned to to-morrow morning. 
 
 Tuesday, JtrNE 12th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 The 15th or last resolve was taken into consideration. No debate 
 arose on it, and the question was put and carried — 5 states for it, 
 3 against, and 2 divided. New- York in the negative. 
 
 Having thus gone through with the resolves, it was found" necessary 
 to. take up such parts of the preceding resolves as had been postponed, 
 or not agreed to. The remaining part of the 4th resolve was taken 
 into consideration. 
 
 Mr. Sherman moved that the blank of the duration of the first 
 branch of the national legislature, be filled with one year. Mr. Rut- 
 ledge with two years, and Mr. Jenifer with three years. 
 
 Mr. Madison was for the last amendment — ^observing that it will 
 give it stability, and induce gentlemen of the first weight to engage 
 in it. 
 
 Mr. Gerry is afraid the people will be alarmed, as savoring of 
 despotism. 
 
 Mr. Madison. The people's opinions cannot be known, as to the 
 particular modifications which may be necessary in the new govern- 
 ment — In general they believe there is something wrong in the present 
 system that requires amendment; and he could wish to make the 
 republican system the basis of the change^ — because if our amend- 
 ments should fail of securing their happiness, they will despair it can 
 be done in this way, and incline to monarchy. 
 
 Mr. Gerry could not be governed by the prejudices of the people— 
 Their good sense will ever have its weight. Perhaps a limited mon- 
 archy would be the best government, if we could organize it by creat- 
 ing a house of peers ; but that cannot be done. 
 
 The question was put on the three yeai-'s amendment and carried^7 
 ayes — 4 noes. New- York in the affirmative. 
 
 On motion to expunge the clause of the qualification as to age, it 
 was carried, 10 states against one.' 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINaS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 81 
 
 On the questiop. for fixed stipends, without augmentation or dimi- 
 nution, to this branch of the legislature, it was moved that the words, 
 to be pqAd hy the ttatvynal treasury, be added — Carried, 8 states fqf — 3 
 against- New- York in the negative. 
 
 The question was then put on the clause as amended, and carried, 
 8 ayes — 3 noes. New- York in the negative. 
 
 On the clause respecting the ineUgibUity to any other office, it was 
 moved th^t tlje words, hy any f articular state, be expunged- 4 states 
 for — 5 against, and 2 divided. New- York affirmative. 
 
 The question was then put on the whole clause, and carried, 10 
 aves — 1 no. 
 
 The last blank was filled up with one year, and carried — ^8 ayes — 2 
 noes, 1 divided. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY moved to expunge the clause. Agreed to, new,, am. 
 
 The question to fill up the blank with 30 years. Agreed to — 7 
 states for — 4 against. 
 
 It was moved to fiU the blank, as to the duration, with seven years. 
 
 Mr. Pierce moved to have it for three years — instanced the dq,nger 
 of too long a continuance, from the evils arising in the British parlia- 
 ments from their septenual duration, and the clamjors against it in 
 that coimtry by its reg,l Mgnds- 
 
 Mr. Sherman was against the 7 years, bejcq.use if they are bad men 
 it ig too long, and if good they may be again elected. 
 
 Mr. Madison was for 7 years — Gon^ders this branch as * check on 
 the democracy — It cannot therefore be made too strong. 
 
 For the motion, 8 ayes — 1 no — 2 states divided. New-York one 
 of the last. 
 
 Mr. BlTTLER movpd to expunge the clause of the stipend^, "host — 7 
 against — 3 for — 1 divided. 
 
 Agreed that the second branch of the national legislature be paid 
 in the same way as the first branch.* 
 
 Upon the subject of ineligibility, it was agreed that the same rule 
 should apply as to the first branch. 
 
 6th resolve agreed to be postponed, sine die. 
 
 9th resolve taken into consideration, but postponed to to-morrow. 
 Then adjourned to to-morrow morning. 
 
 Wednesday, June 13th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Gov. Randolph observed the difficulty in establishing the powers 
 of the judiciary — ^the object however at present is to establish this 
 principle, to wit, the security of foreigners where treaties are in their 
 favor, and to preserve the harmony of states and that of the citizens 
 thereof. This being once established, it will be the business of a 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 6 
 
82 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 sub-committee to detail it; and therefore moved to obliterate such 
 parts of the resolve so as only to establish the principle, to wit, thaf 
 the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to aU cases of 
 national revenue, impeachment of national officers, and questions 
 which involve the national peace or harmony. Agreed to unanimously. 
 
 It was further agreed, that the judiciary be paid out of the national 
 treasury. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY moved that the judiciary be appointed by the 
 national legislature. 
 
 Mr. Madison is of opinion that the second branch of the legislature 
 ought to appoint the judiciary, which the convention agreed to. 
 
 Mr. Geuey moved that the first branch shall have the only right of 
 originating bills to supply the treasury. 
 
 Mr. Butler against the motion. We are constantly running away 
 with the idea of the excellence of the British parliament, and with 
 or without reason copying from them; when in fact there is no 
 similitude in our situations. With us both houses are appointed by 
 the people, and both ought to be equally trusted. 
 
 Mr. Geeet. If we dislike the British government for the oppressiye 
 measures by them carried on against us, yet he hoped we would not 
 be so far prejudiced as to make ours in every thing opposite to theirs. 
 
 Mr. Madison's question carried. 
 
 The committee having now gone through the whole of the propo- 
 sitions from Virginia — Resolved, That the committee do report to the 
 convention their proceedings — ^This was accordingly done. {See a copy 
 of it hereunto annexed.] 
 
 The house resolved on the report being read, that the cdnsiderar 
 tion thereof be postponed to to-morrow, and that members have 
 leave to take copies thereof. 
 
 Adjourned to to-morrow morning. 
 
 Thuesday, June 14th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Mr. Patteeson moved that the further consideration of the report 
 be postponed until to-morrow, as he intended to give in principles to 
 form a federal system of government materially different from the 
 system now under consideration. Postponement agreed to. 
 
 Adjourned until to-morrow morning. 
 
 Feiday, June 15th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Mr. Patteeson, pursuant to his intentions as mentioned yesterday, 
 read a set of resolves as the basis of amendment to the confederation. 
 [See those resolves annexed.] 
 
iililCRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 83 
 
 He observed that no government could be energetic on paper only, 
 which was no more than straw — that the remark applied to the one 
 as well as to the other system, and is therefore of opinion that there 
 must be a small standing force to give every government weight. 
 
 Mr. Madison moved for the report of the committee, and the 
 question may then come on whether the convention will postpone it 
 in order to take into consideration the system now offered. 
 
 Mr. Lansing is of opinion that the two systems are fairly contrasted. 
 The one now offered is on the basis of amending the federal govern- 
 ment, and the other to be reported as a national government, on 
 propositions which exclude the propriety of amendment. Consid- 
 ering therefore its importance, and that justice may be done to its 
 weighty consideration, he is for postponing it a day. 
 
 Col. Hamilton cannot say he is in sentiment with either plan — 
 supposes both might again be considered as federal plans, and by 
 this means they will be fairly in committee, and be contrasted so as 
 to make a comparative estimate of the two. 
 
 Thereupon it was agreed, that the report be postponed, and that 
 the house will resolve itself into a committee of the whole, to take 
 into consideration both propositions to-morrow. Then the conven- 
 tion adjourned to to-morrow morning. 
 
 Satiirday, June 16, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Mr. Lansing moved to have the first article of the last plan of 
 government read; which being done, he observed, that this system 
 is fairly contrasted with the one ready to be reported — the one 
 federal, and the other national. In the first, the powers are exer- 
 cised as flowing from the respective state governments — The second, 
 deriving its authority from the people of the respective states — which 
 latter must ultimately destroy or annihilate the state governments. 
 To determine the powers on these "grand objects with which we are 
 invested, let us recur to the credentials of the respective states, and 
 see what the views were of those who sent us. The language is there 
 expressive — it is, upon the revision of the present confederation, to 
 alter and amend such parts as may appear defective, so as to give 
 additional strength to the union. And he would venture to assert, 
 that had the legislature of the state of New- York, apprehended that 
 their powers would have been construed to extend to the formation 
 of a national government, to the extinguishment of their independ- 
 ency, no delegates would have here appeared on the part of that 
 state. This sentiment must have had its weight on a former occasion, 
 even in this house; for when the second resolution of Virginia, which 
 declared, in substance, that a federal government could not be 
 
84 SECRET PROCEEDIXOS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 amended for the good of the whole, the Fem^rjk of an honor8,ble 
 member of South-CaroUuft, that by determiniog this question in the 
 affirmative their deliberative powers were at ^n end, induped this 
 house to wave the resolution. It is in vain to adopt a mpde of 
 government, which we have reason to believe the people gave us no 
 power to recommend — m they will consider themselves on this 
 ground authorized to reject it. See the danger of exceeding your 
 powers by the example which the requisition of congress of 1783 
 afforded. They required an impost on all imported articles; to 
 which, on federal grounds, they had no right unless vplijntarily 
 granted. What was the consequence? Some, who had least to 
 give, granted it; and others, under various r,estrictions and modifi- 
 cations, so that it could not be systematized. If we form a govern- 
 ment, let us do it on principles which are likely to meet the appro- 
 bation of the states. Great changes can only be gradually intro- 
 duced. The states will never sacrifice their essential rights to a 
 national government. New plans, annihilating the rights of the 
 states (unless upon evident necessity) can never be approved- I 
 may venture to assert, that the prevalent opinion of America is, 
 that granting additional powers to congress would answar thgir 
 views; and every power.recommended for their approbation exceeding 
 this idea, will be fruitless. 
 
 Mr. Patterson. — As I had the honor of proposing a new system of 
 government for the union, it will be expected that I should explain 
 its principles. 
 
 1st. T^e plan accords with our own powers. 
 
 2d. It accords with the sentiments of the people. 
 
 But if the subsisting confederation is so radically defective as not 
 to admit of amendment, let us say so and report its insufficiency, and 
 wait for enlarged powers. We must, in the present case, pursue our 
 powers, if we expect the approbation of the people. I am not here 
 to pursue my own sentiments of government, but of those who have 
 sent me; and I believe that a little practical virtue is to be preferred 
 to the finest theoretical principles, which caimot be carried into 
 effect. Can we, as representatives of independent states, annihilate 
 the essential powers of independency? Are not the votes of this 
 convention taken on every question under the idea of independency? 
 Let us turn to the 5th article of confederation — in this it is mutually 
 agreed, that each state should have one vote — ^It is a fundamental 
 principle arising from confederated governments. The 13th article 
 provides for amendments ; but they must be agreed to by every 
 state — the dissent of one renders every proposal null. The con- 
 federation is in the nature of a compact ; and can any state, unless by 
 the consent of the whole, either in politics or law, withdraw their 
 powers ? Let it be said by Pennsylvania, and the other large states, 
 
SECBET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENriON. 85 
 
 that they, for the sake of peace, assented to the confederation; can 
 she now resume hex origmal right without the consent of the donee ? 
 
 And although it is now asserted that the larger states reluctantly 
 agreed to that part of the confederation which secures an equal 
 suffrage to each, yet let it be remembered, that the smallra states 
 were the last who approved the confederation. 
 
 On this ground, representation must be drawn from the states to 
 maintain their independency, and tiot from the people composing 
 those states. 
 
 The doctrine advanced by a learned gentleman from PeMisylvania 
 that aU power is derived from the peopte, and that in proportion to 
 their numbers they ought to participate equally in the benefits and 
 rights of government, is right in principle, but unfortunately for him, 
 wrong in the application to the question now in debate. 
 
 When independent societies confederate for mutual defence, they 
 do so in their collective capacity; and then each state for those pur- 
 poses must be considered as one of the contracting parties. Destroy 
 . this balance of equality, and you endanger the rights of the lesser 
 societies by the danger of usurpation in the greater. 
 
 Let us test the government intended to be made by the Virginia 
 plan on these pfMciples. The representatives in the national legis- 
 lature are to be in proportion to the number of inhabitants in each 
 state. So far it is right upon the principles of equahty, when state 
 distinctions are done away; but those to certain purposes stiU exist. 
 WiU the government of Pennsylvania admit a participation of their 
 common stock of land to the citizens of New-Jersey? I fancy not. 
 It therefore follows, that a national government, upon the present 
 plan, is tmjust, and destructive of the common principles of reci- 
 procity. Much has been said that this government is to operate on 
 persons, not on states. This, upon examination, will be found 
 equally fallacious; for the fact is, it will, in the quotas of revenue, 
 be proportioned among the states, as states; and in this business 
 Georgia will have 1 vote, and Virginia 16. The truth is both plans 
 may be considered to compel individuals to a compliance with their 
 requisitions, although the requisition is made on the states. 
 
 Much has been said in commendation of two branches in a legis- 
 lature, and of the advantages resulting from their being checks to 
 each other. This may be true when applied to state governments, 
 but will not equally apply to a national legislature, whose legislative 
 objects are few and simple. 
 
 Whatever may be said of congress, or their conduct on particular 
 occasions, the people in general, are pleased with such a body, and in 
 general wish an increase of their powers, for the good government 
 ot the union. Let us now see the plan of the national government 
 on the score of expense. The least the second branch of the legis- 
 
86 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 lature can consist of is 90 members — The first branch of at least 270. 
 How are they to be paid in our present impoverished situation? 
 Let us therefore fairly try whether the confederation cannot be 
 mended, and if it can, we shall do our duty, and I believe the people 
 will be satisfied. 
 
 Mr. Wilson first' stated the difference between the two plans. 
 
 Virginia plan proposes two branches in the legislature. 
 
 Jersey a single .legislative body. 
 
 Virginia, the legislative powers derived from the people. 
 
 Jersey, from the states. 
 
 Virginia, a single executive. 
 
 Jersey, more than one. 
 
 Virginia, a majority of the legislature can act. 
 
 Jersey, a small minority can control. 
 
 Virginia, the legislature can legislate on aU national concerns. 
 
 Jersey, only on limited objects. 
 
 Virginia, legislature to negative aU state laws. 
 
 Jersey, giving power to the executive tp compel obedience by force. 
 
 Virginia, to remove the executive by impeachment. 
 
 Jersey, on application of a majority of the states. 
 
 Virginia, for the establishment of inferior judiciary tribunals. 
 
 Jersey, no provision. 
 
 It is said and insisted on, that the Jersey plan accords with our 
 powers. As for himself he considers his powers to extend to every 
 thing or nothing; and therefore that he has a right and is at liberty 
 to agree to either plan or none. The people expect relief from their 
 present embarrassed situation, and look up for it to this national 
 convention; and it follows that they expect a national government, 
 and therefore the plan from Virginia has the preference to the other. 
 I would (says he) with a reluctant hand add any powers to congress, 
 because they are not a body chosen by the people, and consist only 
 of one branch, and each state in it has one vote. Inequality in 
 representation poisons every government. The English courts are 
 hitherto pure, just and incorrupt, while their legislature are base and 
 venal. The one arises from unjust representation, the other from 
 their independency of the legislature. Lord Chesterfield remarks, 
 that one of the states of the United Netherlands withheld its assent to 
 a proposition until a major of their state was provided for. He 
 needed not to have added (for the conclusion was self evident) that it 
 was one of the lesser states. I mean no reflection, but I leave it to 
 gentlemen to consider whether this has not also been the case in con- 
 gress? The argument in favor of the Jersey plan goes too far, as it 
 cannot be completed, unless Rhode-Island assents. A single legisla- 
 ture is very dangerous. — Despotism may present itself in various 
 shapes. May there not be legislative despotism if in the exercise of 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 87 
 
 their power they are unchecked or unrestrained by another branch? 
 On the contrary an executive to be restrained must be an individual. 
 The first triumvirate of Rome combined, without law, was fatal to its 
 liberties; and the second, by the usurpation of Augustus, ended in 
 despotism. — The two kings of Sparta and the consuls of Rome, by 
 s^.iiring the executive, distracted their governments. 
 
 Mr. C. C. PiNKNEY supposes that if New Jersey was indulged with 
 one vote out of 13, she would have no objection to a national govem- 
 Hient. He supposes that the convention have already determined, 
 virtualij'^, that the federal government cannot be made efficient. A 
 national government being therefore the object, this plan must be pur- 
 sued — as our business is not to conclude but to recommend. 
 
 Judge Elsworth is of opinion that the first question on the new plan 
 will decide nothing materially on principle, and therefore moved the 
 postponement thereof, in order to bring on the second. 
 
 Gov. Randolph. — The question now is which of the two plans is to 
 be preferred. If the vote on the first resolve will determine it, and it 
 is so generally understood, he has no objection that it be put. The 
 resolutions from Virginia must have been adopted on the supposition 
 that a federal government was impracticable — And it is said that 
 power is wanting to institute such a government. — But when our all 
 is at stake, I will consent to any mode that will preserve us. View our 
 present deplorable situation — France, to whom we are indebted in 
 every motive of gratitude and honor, is left unpaid the large sums she 
 has supplied us with in the day of our necessity — Our officers and sol- 
 diers, who have successfully fought our battles — and the loaners of 
 money to the public, look up to you for relief. 
 
 The bravery of our troops is degraded by the weakness of our gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 It has been contended that the 5th article of the confederation can- 
 not be repealed under the powers to new modify the confederation by 
 the 13th article. This surely is false reasoning, since the whole of the 
 confederation upon revision is subject to amendment and alteration; 
 besides our business consists in recommending a system of govern- 
 ment, not to make it. There are great seasons when persons with 
 limited powers are justified in exceeding them, and a person would be 
 contemptible not to risk it. Originally our confederation was founded 
 on the weakness of each state to repel a foreign enemy; and we have 
 found that the powers granted to congress are insufficient. The body 
 of congress is ineffectual to carry the great objects of safety and pro- 
 tection into execution. What would their powers be over the com- 
 mander of the military, but for the virtue of the commander? As the 
 state assemblies are constantly encroaching on the powers of congress, 
 the Jersey plan would rather encourage such encroachments than bo 
 A check to it; and from the nature of the institution, congress would 
 
88 SECRET PBOCEEDINQS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 ever be governed by cabal and intrigue — They are besides too numer- 
 ous for an executive, nor can any additional powers be sufficient to 
 enable them to protect us against foreign invasion. Amongst other 
 things congress was intended to be a body to preserve peace among the 
 states and in the rebellion of Massachusetts it was found they were 
 not authorized to use the troops of the confederation to quell it. 
 Every one is impressed with the idea of a general regulation of trade 
 and commerce. Can congress do this ? when from the nature of their 
 institution they are so subject to cabal and intrigue ? And would it not 
 be dangerous to entrust such a body with the power, when they are 
 dreaded on these grounds ? I am certain that a national government 
 must be established, and this is the only moment when it can be 
 done — And let me conclude by observing, that the best exercise of 
 power is to exert it for the public good. 
 Then adjourned to Monday morning. 
 
 Monday, June 19th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. — To deliver my sentiments on so important a sub- 
 ject, when the first characters in the union have gone before me, in- 
 spires me with the greatest diffidence, especially when my own ideas 
 are so materially dissimilar to the plans now before the committee — 
 My situation is disagreeable, but it would be criminal not to come for- 
 ward on a question of such magnitude. I have well considered the 
 subject, and am convinced that no amendment of the confederation 
 can answer the purpose of a good government, so long as state sov- 
 ereignties do, in any shape, exist; and I have great doubts whether a 
 national government on the Virginia plan can be made effectual. 
 What is federal ? An association of several independent states into 
 one. How or in what manner this association is formed, is not so 
 clearly distinguishable. We find the diet of Germany has in some 
 instances the power of legislation on individuals. We find the 
 United States of America have it in. an extensive degree in the cases 
 of piracies. 
 
 Let us now review the powers with which we are invested. We are 
 appointed for the sole and express purpose of revising the confedera- 
 tion, and to alter or amend it, so as to render it effectual for the pur- 
 poses of a good government. Those who suppose it must be federal, 
 lay great stress on the terms sole and express, as if these words intended 
 a confinement to a federal government; when the manifest import is 
 no more than that the institution of a good government must be the 
 sole and express object of your deliberations. Nor can we suppose an 
 annihilation of our powers by forming a national government, as many 
 of the states have made in their constitutions no provision for any 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINOS OF THE FEDERAL GONVENTION. S9 
 
 alteration; and thus much I can say for the state I have the honor to 
 represent, that when our credentials were under consideration in the 
 senate, some Members were for inserting a restriction in the powers, 
 to prevent an encroachment on the constitution: it was answered by 
 others, and thereupon the resolve carried on the credentials, that it 
 might abridge some of the constitutional powers of the state, and that 
 possibly in the formation of a new union it would be found fiecesskry. 
 This appears reasonable, and therefore leaves us at liberty to form 
 such a national government as we think best adapted for the good of 
 the whole. I have therefor'e no difficulty as to the extent of our 
 powers, nor do I feel myself restrained in the exercise of my judgment 
 under them. We can only propose and recommend — the power of 
 ratifying or rejecting is still in the states. But on this great question 
 I am still greatly embarrassed. I have before observed my apprehen- 
 sion of the inefficacy of either plan, and I have great doubts whether 
 a more energetic government can perVade this wide and Extensive 
 country. I shall now show that both plans are rttaterially defective. 
 
 1. A good govefnmfent ought to be constant, and ought to contain 
 an active principle. 
 
 2. Utility and necessity. 
 
 3. An habitual sense of obligation. 
 
 4. Force. 
 
 5. Influence. 
 
 I hold it, that different societies have all different views and inter- 
 ests to pursue, and always prefer local to general concerns. For ex- 
 ample: New- York legislature made an external compliance lately to 
 a requisition of congress ; but do they not at the same time counteract 
 their compliance by gratifying the local objects of the state so as to 
 defeat their concession ? And this will ever be the case. Men always 
 love power, and states wUl prefer their particular concerns to the gen- 
 eral welfare; and as the states become large and important, will they 
 not be less attentive to the general government ? • What in process of 
 time will Virginia be ? She contains now half a million of inhabitants — 
 in twenty-five years she wfil double the number. Feeling her own 
 weight and importance, must she not become indifferent to the con- 
 cerns of the union ? And where, in such a situation, will be found 
 national attachment to the general government? 
 
 'Bj force, I mean the coercion of law and the coercion of arms. Will 
 this remark apply to the power intended to be vested in the govern- 
 ment to be instituted by their plan? A delinquent must be com- 
 pelled to obedience by force of arms. How is this to be done? If you 
 are unsuccessful, a dissolution of your government must be the conse- 
 quence; and in that case the individual legislatures will reassume 
 their powers; nay, will not the interest of the states be thtown into 
 the state governments ? 
 
■90 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 By influence, I mean the regular weight and support it will receive 
 from those who will find it their interest to support a government in- 
 tended to preserve the peace and happiness of the community of the 
 Tvhole. The state governments, by either plan, will exert the means 
 to counteract it. They have their state judges and militia all com- 
 bined to support their state interests ; and these wUl be influenced to 
 oppose a national government. Either plan is therefore precarious. 
 The national government cannot long exist when opposed by such a 
 weighty rival. The experience of ancient and modem confederacies 
 evince this point, and throw considerable Ught on the subject. The 
 amphyctionic councU of Greece had a right to require of its members 
 troops, money and the force of the country. Were they obeyed in 
 the exercise of those powers ? Could they preserve the peace of the 
 greater states and republics? or where were they obeyed? History 
 shows that their decrees were disregarded, and that the stronger 
 states, regardless of their power, gave law to the lesser. 
 
 Let us examine the federal institution of Germany. It was insti- 
 tuted upon the laudable principle of securing the independency of the 
 several states of which it was composed, and to protect them against 
 foreign invasion. Has it answered these good intentions ? Do we not 
 see that their councils are weak and distracted, and that it cannot pre- 
 vent the wars and confusions which the respective electors carry on 
 against each other? The Swiss cantons, or the Helvetic union, are 
 equally inefficient. 
 
 Such are the lessons which the experience of others affords us, and 
 from whence results the evident conclusion that all federal govern- 
 ments are weak and distracted. To avoid the evils deducible from 
 these observations, we must estabhsh a general and national govern- 
 ment, completely sovereign, and annihilate the state distinctions and 
 state operations ; and unless we do this, no good purpose can be an- 
 swered. What does the Jersey plan propose ? It surely has not this 
 for its object. By this we grant the regulation of trade and a more 
 effectual collection of the revenue, and some partial duties. These, at 
 five or ten per cent, would only perhaps amount to a fund to discharge 
 the debt of the corporation. 
 
 Ijet us take a review of the variety of important objects, which 
 must necessarily engage the attention of a national government. 
 You have to protect your rights against Canada on the north, Spain 
 on the south, and your western frontier against the savages. You 
 have to adopt necessary plans for the settlement of your frontiers, 
 and to institute the mode in which settlements and good government 
 are to be made. 
 
 How is the expense of supporting and regulating these important 
 matters to be defrayed ? By requisition on the states, according to the 
 Jersey plan? Will this do it? We have already found it ineffectual. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 91 
 
 Let one state prove delinquent, and it will encourage others to folloA\' 
 the example ; and thus the whole will fail. And what is the standard 
 to quota among the states their respective proportions ? Can lands be 
 the standard ? How would that apply between Russia and Holland ? 
 Compare Pennsylvania with North-Carolina, or Connecticut with 
 New- York. Does not commerce or industry in the one or other make 
 a great disparity between these different countries, and may not the 
 comparative value of the states from these circumstances, make an 
 unequal disproportion when the data is numbers ? I therefore con- 
 clude that either system would ultimately destroy the confederation, 
 or any other government which is established on such fallacious prin- 
 ciples. Perhaps imposts, taxes on specific articles, would produce a 
 more equal system of drawing a revenue. 
 
 Another objection against the Jersey plan is, the unequal represen- 
 tation. Can the great states consent to this ? If they did it would 
 eventually work its own destruction. How are forces to be raised by 
 the Jersey plan? By quotas? WiU the states comply with the 
 requisition? As much as they wiU with the taxes. 
 
 Examine the present confederation, and it is evident they can raise 
 no troops nor equip vessels before war is actually declared. They 
 ■caimot therefore take any preparatory measure before an enemy is at 
 your door. How \inwise and inadequate their powers ! and this must 
 «ver be the case when you attempt to define powers. — Something will 
 always be wanting. Congress, by being annually elected, and sub- 
 ject to recall, will ever come with the prejudices of their states rather 
 than the good of the imion. Add therefore additional powers to a 
 body thus organized, and you establish a sovereignty of the worst kind, 
 consisting of a single body. Where are the checks? None. They 
 must either prevail over the state governments, or the prevalence of 
 the state governments must end in their dissolution. This is a con- 
 clusive objection to the Jersey plan. 
 
 Such are the insuperable objections to both plans: and what is to 
 be done on this occasion? I confess I am at a loss. I foresee the dif- 
 ficulty on a consohdated plan of drawing a representation from so ex- 
 tensive a continent to one place. What can be the inducements for 
 gentlemen to come 600 miles to a national legislature? The expense 
 would at least amount to £100,000. This however can be no con- 
 clusive objection if it eventuates in an extinction of state governments. 
 The burthen of the latter would be saved, and the expense then would 
 not be great. State distinctions would be found unnecessary, and 
 yet I confess, to carry government to the extremities, the state govern- 
 ments reduced to corporations, and with very limited powers, might 
 be necessary, and the expense of the national government become less 
 burthensome. 
 
92 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 Yet I confess, I see great difficulty of drawing forth a good repre- 
 sentation. What, for example, will be the iilducelnents for gentle- 
 men of fortune and abilities to leave theit houses aiid business to 
 attend annually and long? It cannot be the wages; for these, I pre- 
 sume, must be small. Will not the power, thei'efore, be thrown into 
 the halids of the demagogue or middling politician, who, for the sake 
 of a small stipend and the hopes of advancement, wiU offet himself as 
 a candidate, and the real men of weight and influence, by remaining 
 at home, add strength to the state governments? I am at a loss to 
 know what must be done — 1 despair that a republican fortn of gov- 
 ernment can remove the difficulties. Whatever may be miy opinion, 
 I would hold it however un'Wise to change that form of government. 
 I believe the British goverimient forms the best model the world ever 
 produced, and such has been its progress in the minds of the many, 
 that this truth gradually gains ground. This government has for its 
 object public strength and indi'uiditaliseetirity. It is said with us to be 
 unattainable. If it was once formed it would maintain itself. All 
 communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first 
 are the rich and well born, the other the mass of the people. The 
 voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God ; and how- 
 ever generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true 
 in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge 
 or detetifline right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct, per- 
 manent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness 
 of the second, and as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, 
 they therefore will ever maintain good government. Can a demo- 
 cratic assembly, who annually revolve in the mass of the people, be 
 supposed steadily to pursue the public good ? Nothing but a perma- 
 nent body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent 
 and uncohtrouling disposition requires checks. The senate of New- 
 York, although chosen for four years, we have found to be inefficient. 
 Will, on the Virginia plan, a continuance of seven years do it ? It is 
 admitted that you cannot have a good executive upon a democtatic 
 plan. See the excellency of the British executive — He is placed above 
 temptation — He can have no distinct interests frorh the public wel- 
 fare. Nothing short of such an executive can be efficient. The weak 
 side of a republican government is the danger of foreign influence. 
 This is unavoidable, utiless it is so constructed as to bring forward its 
 first characters in its support. I am therefore for a general govern- 
 ment, yet would wish to go the full length of republican principles. 
 
 Let one body of the legislature be constituted duritig good behaviour 
 or life. 
 
 Let one executive be appointed who dares execute his powers. 
 
 It may be asked is this a republican system ? It is strictly so, as 
 long as they remain elective. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 93 
 
 And let me ohsprve, that an executive is less dangerous to jthe lib- 
 erties of tke people when in office during life, thaji for spven yeafs. 
 
 It niay be said this constitutes an elective moijarchy ? Pray 'wh^.t 
 is a monarchy? May not the governors of the respective states be 
 considered in that light? But by makiug th$ pxecutive subject to 
 impeachiaeot, the term monarchy cannot apply. These elective moji- 
 archs have produced tumults in Rome, and are equally dangerous to 
 peaice in Pola^ad; but this cannot apply to the mode in which I would 
 propose the election. Let electors b^ appointed iij each of the states 
 to elect the executive — -[Here Mr. H, /produced his flan, a, eopy whereof 
 is hereunto annexed] to consist of two branches — and I would give 
 them the unlimited power of passing all Ioavs without exception. The 
 assembly to he eleicted for three years by the people in districts — ^the 
 senate to be elected by electors to be chosen for that purpose by the 
 people, and to remain in office during life. The executive to het,ve the 
 power of negativing all laws — 'to mak® war or peace — with the advice 
 of the senate — to make treaties with their advice, but to have tlje 
 sole direction of all military operations, and to send ambassadors and 
 appoint all military officers, ftpd to pardon all offenders, treas,on 
 excepted, unless by advice of the senate. On his death or removal, the 
 president of the senate to officiate, with the same powers, until another 
 is elected. Supreme judicial offipers to be appointed by the executive 
 and the senate. The legislature to appoint courts in each state, so as 
 to nxake the state governments imnpcessary to it. 
 
 All state laws to be absolutely void which ©ontravene the general 
 laws. An officer to be appointed jn eaeh state to have a negative on 
 all state laws. AH the mihtia an,d the appointment of officers to be 
 xinder the national goveriunent. 
 
 I confess that this plan and th^t from Virginia are very remote 
 from the idea of the people. Perha^ps the Jersey plan is nearest their 
 expectation. But the people are gradually ripening in their opiniojjs 
 of government — they begin to be tired of an excess of democracy — 
 and what even is the Virginia plan, but porlc ^tiU, with a Utile change 
 of the sauce. 
 
 Then adjourned to to-morrow . 
 
 Tuesday, June 19th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 On the consideration of the first resolve of the Jersey plan. 
 
 Mr. Madison. — This is an important question — Many persons scru- 
 ple the powers of the convention. If this remark had any weight, 
 it is equally applicable to the adoption of either plan. The differ- 
 ence of drawing the powers in the one from the people and in the 
 other from the states, does not affect the powers. There are two 
 
94 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 states in tlie union where the members of congress are chosen by tlie 
 people. A new government must be made. Our all is depending 
 on it; and if we have but a clause that the people will adopt, there 
 is then a chance for our preservation. Although all the states have 
 assented to the confederation, an infraction of any one article by 
 one of the states is a dissolution of the whole. This is the doctrine 
 of the civil law on treaties. 
 
 Jersey pointedly refused complying with a requisition of congress, 
 and was guilty of this infraction, although she afterwards rescinded 
 her non-complying resolve. What is the object of a confederation? 
 It is two-fold — 1st, to maintain the union; 2dly, good government. 
 Will the Jersey plan secure these points ? No ; it is still in the power 
 of the confederated states to violate treaties — Has not Georgia, in 
 direct violation of the confederation made war with the Indians, and 
 concluded treaties? Have not Virginia and Maryland entered into 
 a partial compact ? Have not Pennsylvania and Jersey regulated the 
 bounds of the Delaware? Has not the state of Massachusetts, at 
 this time, a considerable body of troops in pay? Has not congress 
 been obliged to pass a conciliatory act in support of a decision of 
 their federal court, between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, instead 
 of having the power of carrying into effect the judgment of their own 
 court? Nor does the Jersey plan provide for a ratification by the 
 respective states of the powers intended to be vested. It is also 
 defective in the establishment of the judiciary, granting only an 
 appellate jurisdiction, without providing for a second trial; and in case 
 the executive of a state should pardon an offender, how will it effect 
 the definitive judgment on appeal? It is evident, if we do not radi- 
 cally depart from a federal plan, we shall share the fate of ancient and 
 modern confederacies. The amphyctionic council, like the American 
 congress, had the power of judging in the last resort in war and peace — 
 call out forces — send ambassadors. What was its fate or continuance ? 
 Philip of Macedon, with little difficulty, destroyed every appearance 
 of it. The Athenian had nearly the same fate — The Helvetic con- 
 federacy is rather a league — in the German confederacy the parts 
 are too strong for the whole — The Dutch are in a most wretched situa- 
 tion — weak in all its parts, and only supported by surrounding con- 
 tending powers. 
 
 The rights of individuals are infringed by many of the state laws — 
 such as issuing paper money, and instituting a mode to discharge 
 debts differing from the form of the contract. Has the Jersey plan 
 any checks to prevent the mischief? Does it in any instance secure 
 internal tranquility? Right and force, in a system like this, are 
 synonymous terms. When force is employed to support the system, 
 and men obtain military habits, is there no danger they may turn 
 their arms against their employers? Will the Jersey plan prevent 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 95 
 
 foreign influence ? Did not Persia and Macedon distract the councils 
 of Greece by acts of corruption? And is not Jersey and Holland at 
 this day subject to the same distractions? Will not the plan be 
 burthensome to the smaller states, if they have an equal representa- 
 tion? But how is military coercion to enforce government? True, 
 a smaller state may be brought to obedience, or crushed; but what 
 if one of the larger states should prove disobedient, are you sure you 
 can by force effect a submission? Suppose we cannot agree on any 
 plan, what will be the condition of the smaller states ? Will Delaware 
 and Jersey be safe against Pennsylvania, or Rhode-Island against 
 Massachusetts? And how will the smaller states be situated in case 
 of partial confederacies? Will they not be obliged to make larger 
 concessions to the greater states ? The point of representation is the 
 great point of difference, and which the greater states cannot give 
 up; and although there was an equalization of states, state distinc- 
 tions would still exist. But this is totally impracticable; and what 
 would be the effect of the Jersey plan if ten or twelve new states were 
 added? 
 
 Mr. King moved that the committee rise, and report that the Jersey 
 plan is not admissible, and report the first plan. 
 
 Mr. Dickinson supposed that there were good regulations in both. 
 Let us therefore contrast the one with the other, and consolidate such 
 parts of them as the committee approve. 
 
 Mr. King's motion was then put — For it 7 states — 3 against — one 
 divided. New- York in the minority. 
 
 The committee rose and reported again the first plan, and the in- 
 admissibility of the Jersey plan. 
 
 The convention then proceeded to take the first plan into considera- 
 tion. 
 
 The first resolve was read. 
 
 Mr Wilson. I am (to borrow a sea-phrase) for taking a new de- 
 parture, and I wish to consider in what direction we sail, and what 
 may be the end of our voyage. I am for a national government, 
 though the idea of federal is, in my view, the same. With me it is 
 not a desirable' object to annihilate the state governments, and here 
 I differ from the honorable gentleman from New- York. In all 
 extensive empires a subdivision of power is necessary. Persia, Tur- 
 key and Rome, under its emperors, are examples in point. These, 
 although despots, found it necessary. A general government, over a 
 great extent of territory, must in a few years make subordinate juris- 
 dictions. — Alfred the great, that wise legislator, made this gradation, 
 and the last division on his plan amounted only to ten territories. 
 With this explanation, I shall be for the first resolve. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. I agree to the proposition. I did not intend yester- 
 day a total extinguishment of state governments; but my meaning 
 
96 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 was, that a ijational government ought tp be able to support itself 
 without the aid or interference of the state govemmentg, and that 
 therefore it was necessary to have full sovereignty. Evep witb cor- 
 porate rights the states will be dangerous to the national government, 
 and ought to be extinguished, new modified, or reduced to a smaller 
 scale. 
 
 Mr. King. None of the states are now sovereign or independent — 
 Many of these essential rights are vested in congress. Congress, by 
 the confederation, possesses the rights of the United States. This is 
 a union of the men of those states. None of the states, individually 
 or collectively, but in congress, have the rights of peace or war. The 
 magistracy in congress possesses the sovereignty — ^To certaiij points 
 we are now a united people. Consolidation is already established. 
 The confederation contains an article to make alterations — Congress 
 have the right to propose such alterations. The 8th article respecting 
 the quotas of the states, has been' altered, and eleven states have 
 agreed to it. Can it not be altered in other instances'? It can, ex- 
 cepting the guarantee of the states. 
 
 Mr. Martin. When the states threw off their allegiance on Great 
 Britain, they became independent of her and each other. They 
 united and confederated for mutual defence, and this was doije on 
 principles of perfect reciprocity — ^They will now again meet on the 
 same ground. But when a dissolution takes place, our original rights 
 and sovereignties are resumed.— Our a,ccession to the union has been 
 by states. If any other principle is adopted by this conyention, he 
 will give it every opposition. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. The declaration of indeppixdeufie preceded the ^tate 
 constitutions. What does this declare? In the name of the people 
 of these states, we are declared to be free and independent. The 
 power of war, peace, alliances and trade, are declared to be vested in 
 congress. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. I agree to Mr. Wilson's remark. — Establish a weak 
 government and you must at times overleap the bounds. IJ,oiQe was 
 obliged to create dictators. Cannot you make propositions to the 
 people because we before confederated on other principles? — The 
 people can yield to them, if they will. The three great objects of 
 government, agriculture, commerce and revenue, can only be secured 
 by a general government. 
 
 Adjourned to to-morrow morning. 
 
 Wednesday, June 20th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Judge Elswoeth. I propose, and therefore move, to expunge the 
 word national, in the first resolve, and to place in the room of it, 
 government of the United States — which was agreed to, nem. con. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINQS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 97 
 
 Mr. Lansing then moved, that the first resolve be postponed, in 
 order to take into consideration the following: TJiat the powers of 
 legislation ought to he vested in the United States in congress. 
 
 I am clearly of opinion that I am not authorized to accede to a 
 system which will annihilate the state governments, and the Virginia 
 plan is declarative of such extinction. It has been asserted that the 
 public mind is not known. To some points it may be true, but we 
 may collect from the fate of the requisition of the impost, what it 
 may be on the principles of a national government. — ^When many 
 of the states were so tenacious of their rights on this point, can we 
 expect that thirteen states will surrender their governments up to a 
 national plan? Rhode-Island pointedly refused granting it. Cer- 
 tainly she had a federal right so to do; and I hold it as an undoubted 
 truth, as long as state distinctions remain, let the national govern- 
 ment be modified as you please, both branches of your legislature will 
 be impressed with local and state attachments. The Virginia plan 
 proposes a negative on the state laws where, in the opinion of the 
 national legislature, they contravene the national government: and 
 no state laws can pass tmless approved by them. — They will have 
 more than a law in a day to revise ; and are they competent to judge 
 of the wants and necessities of remote states? 
 
 This national government will, from their power, have great influ- 
 ence in the state governments; and the existence of the latter are 
 only saved in appearance. And has it not been asserted that they 
 e:^pect their extinction? If this be the object, let us say so, and 
 extinguish them at once. But remember, if we devise a system of 
 government which will not meet the approbation of our constituents, 
 we are dissolving the imion — but if we act within the limits of our 
 power, it wiH be approved of; and should it upon experiment prove 
 defective, the people will entrust a future convention again to amend 
 it. Fond as many are of a general government, do any of you 
 believe it can pervade the whole continent so effectually as to secure 
 the peace, harmony and happiness of the whole? The excellence of 
 the British model of government has been much insisted on; but we 
 are endeavoring to complicate it with state governments, on prin- 
 ciples which will gradually destroy the one or the other. You are 
 sowing the seeds of rivalship, which must at last end in ruin. 
 
 Mr. Mason. The material difference between the two plans has 
 ah-eady been clearly pointed out. The objection to that of Virginia 
 arises from the want of power to institute it, and the want of prac- 
 ticability to carry it into effect. Will the first objection apply to a 
 power merely recommendatory? In certain seasons of public danger 
 it is commendable to exceed power. The treaty of peace, under which 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 7 
 
98 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 we now enjoy the blessings of freedom, was made by persons who 
 exceeded their powers. It met the approbation of the pubh'c, and 
 thus deserved the praises of those who sent them. The impractica- 
 bility of the plan is still less groiindless. These measures are sup- 
 ported by one who, at his time of life, has little to hope or expect 
 from any government. Let me ask, will the people entrust their 
 dearest rights and liberties to the determination of one body of men, 
 and those not chosen by them, and who are invested both with the 
 sword and purse? They never will — they never can — to a conclave, 
 transacting their business secret from the eye of the public. Do we 
 not discover by their public journals of the years 1778-9, and 1780, 
 that factions and party spirit had guided many of their acts? The 
 people of America, like all other people, are unsettled in their minds, 
 and their principles fixed to no object, except that a republican gov- 
 ernment is the best, and that the legislature ought to consist of two 
 branches. The constitutions of the respective states, made and 
 approved of by them, evince this principle. Congress, however, from 
 other causes, received a different organization. What, would you 
 use military force to compel the observance of a social compact? It 
 is destructive to the rights of the people. Do you expect the militia 
 will do it, or do you mean a standing army? The first will never, 
 on such an occasion, exert any power; and the latter may turn its 
 arms against the government which employs them. I never wiU 
 consent to destroy state governments, and will ever be as careful to 
 preserve the one as the other. If we should, in the formation of the 
 latter, have omitted some necessary regulation, I will trust my pos- 
 terity to amend it. That the one government will be productive 
 of disputes and jealousies against the other, I believe; but it will pro- 
 duce mutual safety. I shall close with observing, that though some 
 gentlemen have expressed much warmth on this and former occasions, 
 I can excuse it, as the result of sudden passion; and hope that 
 although we may difVer in some particular points, if we mean the 
 good of the whole, that our good sense upon reflection, will prevent us 
 from spreading our discontent further. 
 
 Mr. Martin. I know that government must be supported ; and if 
 the one was incompatible with the other, I would support the state 
 government at the expense of the union — for I consider the present 
 system as a system of slavery. Impressed with this idea, I made use, 
 on a former occasion, of expressions perhaps rather harsh. If gentle- 
 men conceive that the legislative branch is dangerous, divide them 
 into two. They are as much the representatives of the states, as the 
 state assemblies are the representatives of the people. Are not the 
 powers which we here exercise given by the legislatiires ? [After giv- 
 ing a detail of the revolution and of state governments, Mr. M.con- 
 
SECRET FROCEEDI\-(tS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEXTION. 99 
 
 tinued.] I confess when the confederation was made, congress ought 
 to have been invested with more extensive powers; but when the 
 states saw that congress indirectly aimed at sovereignty, they were 
 jealous, and therefore refused any farther concessions. The time is 
 now come that we can constitutionally grant them not only new 
 powers, but to modify their government, so that the state govern- 
 ments are not endangered. But whatever we have now in our power 
 to grant, the grant is a state grant, and therefore it must be so 
 organized that the state governments are interested in supporting the 
 union. Thus systematized, there can be no danger if a small force is 
 maintained. 
 
 Mr. Sheeman. We have found during the war that though con- 
 gress consisted of but one branch, it was that body which carried us 
 through the whole war, and we were crowned with success. We closed 
 the war, performing all the functions of a good government, by mak- 
 ing a beneficial peace. But the great difficulty now is, how we shall 
 pay the public debt incurred during that war. The unwillingness of 
 the states to comply with the requisitions of congress, has embarrassed 
 us greatly. — But to amend these defects in government I am not 
 fond of speculation. I would rather proceed on experimental ground. 
 We can so modify the powers of congress, that we will all be mutual 
 supporters of one another. The disparity of the states can be no 
 difficulty. We know this by experience — Virginia and Massachusetts 
 were the first who unanimously ratified the old confederation. They 
 then had no claim to more votes in congress than one. Foreign states 
 have made treaties with us as confederated states, not as a national 
 government. Suppose we put an end to that government under 
 which those treaties were made, will not these treaties be void? 
 
 Mr. Wilson. The question before us may admit of the three follow- 
 ing considerations: 
 
 1. Whether the legislature shall consist of one or two branches. 
 
 2. Whether they are to be elected by the state governments or by 
 the people. 
 
 3. Whether in proportion to state importance, or states individ- 
 ually. 
 
 Confederations are usually of a short date. The amphyctionic 
 council was instituted in the infancy of the Grecian republics — as 
 those grew in strength, the council lost its weight and power. The 
 Achaean league met the same fate — Switzerland and Holland are 
 supported in their confederation, not by its intrinsic merit, but 
 the incmnbent pressure of surrounding bodies. Germany is kept 
 together by the house of Austria. True, congress carried us through 
 the war even against its own weakness. That powers were wanting, 
 you Mr. President, must have felt. To other causes, not to congress, 
 
100 SECRET PB0CEEDINQ8 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 must the success be ascribed. That the great states acceeded to the 
 confederation, and that they in the hour of danger, made a sacrifice 
 of their interests to the lesser states is true. Like the wisdom of 
 Solomon in adjudging the child to its true mother, from tenderness 
 to it, the greater states well knew that the loss of a limb was fatal to 
 the confederation — they too, through tenderness sacrificed their dear- 
 est rights to preserve the whole. But the time is come, when justice 
 will be done to their claims — Situations are altered. 
 
 Congress have frequently made their appeal to the people. I wish 
 they had always done it — the national government would have been 
 sooner extricated. 
 
 Question then put on Mr. Lansing's motion and lost. — 6 states 
 against 4 — one divided. New- York in the minority. 
 
 Adjourned till to-morrow morning. 
 
 Thursday, June 21st, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Dr. Johnson. It appears to me that the Jersey plan has for its prin- 
 cipal object, the preservation of the state governments. So far it is 
 a departure from the plan of Virginia, which although it concentres 
 in a distinct national government, it is not totally independent of 
 that of the states. A gentleman from New- York, with boldness and 
 decision, proposed a system totally different from both; and though 
 he has been praised by every body, he has been supported by none. 
 How can the state governments be secured on the Virginia plan? I 
 could have wished, that the supporters of the Jersey system coidd 
 have satisfied themselves with the principles of the Virginia plan and 
 that the individuality of the states could be supported. It is agreed 
 on all hands that a portion of government is to be left to the states. 
 How can this be done? It can be done by joining the states in their 
 legislative capacity with the right of appointing the second branch of 
 the national legislature, to represent the states individually. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. If security is necessary to preserve the one, it is equally 
 so to preserve the other. How can the national government be 
 secured against the states? Some regulation is necessary. Suppose 
 the national government had a component number in the state legis- 
 lature? But where the one government clashed with the other, the 
 state government ought to yield, as the preservation of the general 
 interest must be preferred to a particular. But let us try to designate 
 the powers of each, and then no danger can be apprehended nor can 
 the general government be possessed of any ambitious views to 
 encroach on the state rights. 
 
 Mr. Madison. I could have wished that the gentleman from Con- 
 necticut had more accurately marked his objections to the Virginia 
 
SECRET PBOCEEDINaS OF THE FEDERAL OONVENTIO]l,_101 
 
 plan. I apprehend the greatest danger is from the e^^^iSjStcBSieht^ 
 the states on the national government — This apprel 
 founded on the experience of ancient confederacies, 
 proof of it. 
 
 The right of negativing in certain instances the sta^ 
 one security to the national government. But is 
 founded? Have any state governments ever encroached on the cor- 
 porate rights of cities ? And if it was the case that the national gov- 
 ernment usurped the state government, if such usurpation was for 
 the good of the whole, no mischief could arise. — To draw the line be- 
 tween the two, is a difficult task. I believe it cannot be done, and 
 therefore I am inclined for a general government. 
 
 If we cannot form a general government, and the states become 
 totally independent of each other, it would afford a melancholy 
 prospect. 
 
 The 2d resolve was then put and carried — 7 states for — 3 against — 
 one divided. New- York in the minority. 
 
 The 3d resolve was then taken into consideration by the convention. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNET. I move that the memhers of the first branch ie appointed 
 in such manner as the several state legislatures shall direct, instead of 
 the mode reported. If this motion is not agreed to, the other will 
 operate with great difficulty, if not injustice — If you make district 
 elections and join, as I presume you must, many coimties in one dis- 
 trict, the largest county will carry the election as its imited influence 
 wiU give a decided majority in its favor. 
 
 Mr. Madison. I oppose the motion — there are difficiilties, but they 
 may be obviated in the details connected with the subject. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. It is essential to the democratic rights of the com- 
 munity, that this branch be directly elected by the people. Let us 
 look forward to probable events — There may be a time when state 
 legislatures may cease, and such an event ought not to embarrass 
 the national government. 
 
 Mr. Mason. I am for preserving inviolably the democratic branch 
 of the governmenif — True, we have found inconveniences from pure 
 - democracies ; but if we mean to preserve peace and real freedom, they 
 must necessarily become a component part of a national government. 
 Change this necessary principle, and if the government proceeds to 
 taxation, the states will oppose your powers. 
 
 Mr. Sherman thought that an amendment to the proposed amend- 
 ment is necessary. 
 
 Gov. KuTLEDGE. It is Said that an election by representatives is not 
 an election by the people. This proposition is not correct. What 
 is done by my order is done by myself. I am convinced that the mode 
 of election by legislatures will be more refined, and better men will 
 be sent. 
 
102 SECRET PROCEEDINGS^ OJ' THE FEDERAL COXVBNTIOX. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. The legislature of the states by the proposed motion 
 will have an uncontrolable sway over the general government. Elec- 
 tion is the exercise of original sovereignty in the people — but if by 
 representatives, it is only relative sovereignty. 
 
 Mr. King. The magistrates of the states will ever pursue schemes 
 of their own, and this, on the proposed motion, will pervade the 
 national government — and we know the state governments will be 
 ever hostile to the general government. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNET. All the reasoning of the gentlemen opposed to my 
 motion has not convinced me of its impropriety. There is an esprit 
 de corps which has made heretofore every unfederal member of con- 
 gress, after his election, become stricilj federal, and this I presume 
 will ever be the case in whatever manner they may be elected. 
 
 Question put on Mr. Pinkney's motion and carried by 6 states 
 against 4 — one divided. 
 
 Question then put on the resolve — 9 states for — 1 against — one 
 divided. 
 
 Gov. Randolph. I move that in the resolve for the duration of the 
 first branch of the general legislature, the word three be expunged, 
 and the words two years be inserted. 
 
 Mr. Dickinson. I am against the amendment. I propose that the 
 word three shall remain, but that they shall be removable annually in 
 classes. 
 
 Mr. Sheeman. I am for one year. Our people are accustomed to 
 annual elections. Should the members have a longer duration of 
 service, and remain at the seat of government, they may forget their 
 constituents, and perhaps imbibe the interest of the state in which 
 they reside, or there may be danger of catching the esprit de corps. 
 
 Mr. Mason. I am for two years. One year is too short. — In ex- 
 tensive states four months may elapse before the returns can be 
 known. Hence the danger of their remaining too long unrepresented. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. There is a medium in every thing. I confess three 
 years is not too long — A representative ought to have full freedom 
 of deliberation, and ought to exert an opinion t)f his own. I am 
 convinced that the public mind will adopt a solid plan — The govern- 
 ment of New- York, although higher toned than that of any other 
 state, still we find great listlessness and indifference in the electors; 
 nor do they in general bring forward the first characters to the legis- 
 lature. The public mind is perhaps not now ready to receive the 
 best plan of government, but certain circumstances are now pro- 
 gressing which will give a different complexion to it. 
 
 Two years duration agreed to. 
 
 Adjourned till to-morrow morning. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDIh^GS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 103 
 Friday, June 22d, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 The clause of the 3d resolve, respecting the stipends, taken into 
 consideration. 
 
 Judge Elswoeth. I object to this clause. I think the state legis- 
 latures ought to provide for the members of the general legislature, 
 and as each state will have a proportionate number, it will not be 
 burthensome to the smaller states. I therefore move to strike out 
 the clause. 
 
 Mr. GoRHAM. If we intend to fix the stipend, it may be an objec- 
 tion against the system, as the states would never adopt it. I join 
 in sentiment to strike out the whole. 
 
 Gov. Randolph. I am against the motion. Are the members to 
 be paid 1 Certainly — ^We have no sufficient fortunes to induce gentle- 
 men to attend for nothiag. If the state legislatures pay the mem- 
 bers of the national council, they will controul the members, and 
 compel them to pursue state measures. I confess the payment will 
 not operate impartially, but the members must be paid, and be made 
 easy in their circumstances. Will they attend the service of the 
 public without being paid? 
 
 Mr. Sherman. The states ought to pay their members; and I 
 judge of the approbation of the people on matters of government by 
 what I suppose they will approve. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. I am against going as far as the resolve. If, how- 
 ever, it is intended to throw the national legislature into the hand 
 of "the states, I shall be against it. It is possible the states may 
 become unfederal, and they may then shake the national govern- 
 ment. The members ought to be paid out of the national treasury. 
 
 Mr. Madison. Our attention is too much confined to the present 
 moment, when our regulations are intended to be perpetual. Our 
 national government must operate for the good of the whole, and 
 the people must have a general interest in its support; but if you 
 make its legislators subject to and at the mercy of the state govern- 
 ments, you ruin the fabric — and whatever new states may be added 
 to the general government the expence will be equally borne. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. I do not think the states ought to pay the mem- 
 bers, nor am I for a fixed sum. It is a general remark, that he who 
 pays is the master. If each state pays its own members, the burthen 
 would be disproportionate, according to the distance of the states 
 from the seat of government. If a national government can exist, 
 members will make it a desirable object to attend, without accepting 
 any stipend — and it ought to be so organized as to be efficient. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. I move that the stipend be ascertained by the legislature 
 and paid out of the national treasury. 
 
104 SECRET PB0CEEDIN08 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 Mr. Madison. I oppose this motion. Members are too much 
 interested in the question. Besides, it is indecent that the legisla- 
 ture should put their hands in the public purse to convey it into 
 their own. 
 
 Question put on Mr. Wilson's motion and negatived — 7 states 
 against — 2 for, and 2 divided. 
 
 Mr. Mason moved to change the phraseology of the resolve, that 
 is to say, to receive an adequate compensation for their services, and to 
 be paid out of the treasury. This motion was agreed to. 
 
 Mr. RuTLEDGE. I move that the question be taken on these words, 
 to he paid out of the national treasury. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. It has been often asserted, that the interests of 
 the general and of the state legislatures are precisely the same. 
 This caimot be true. The views of the governed are often materially 
 different from those who govern. The science of policy is the knowl- 
 edge of human nature. A state government will ever be the rival 
 power of the general government. It is therefore highly improper 
 that the state legislatures should be the paymasters of the members 
 of the national government. All political bodies love power, and it 
 will oftetf be improperly attained. 
 
 Judge Elswoeth. If we are so exceedingly jealous of state legis- 
 latures, will they not have reason to be equally jealous of us? If I 
 return to my state and tell them, we made such and such regulations 
 for a general government, because we dared not trust you with any 
 extensive powers, will they be satisfied? nay, will they adopt your 
 government? and let it ever be remembered, that without their 
 approbation your government is nothing more than a rope of sand. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. I am not for submitting the national government to 
 the approbation of the state legislatures. I know that they and the 
 state officers will oppose it. I am for carrying it to the people of 
 each state. 
 
 Mr. Rutledge's motion was then put — 4 states for the clause — 
 5 against — 2 states divided. New- York divided. 
 
 The clause, to be ineligible to any office, &c. came next to be 
 considered. 
 
 Mr. Mason moved that after the words, two years, be added, and 
 to he of the age of 25 years. 
 
 Question put and agreed to — 7 ayes — 3 noes. New- York divided. 
 
 Mr. GoRHAM. I move that after the words, and under the national 
 government for one year after its expiration, be struck out. 
 
 Mr. King for the motion. It is impossible to carry the system of 
 exclusion so far; and in this instance we refine too. much by going 
 to Utopian lengths. It is a mere cobweb. 
 
 Mr. Butler. We have no way of judging of mankind but by expe- 
 rience. Look at the history of the government of Great Britain, 
 
SECRET PBOCEEDINOS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 105 
 
 where there is a very flimsy exclusion — Does it not ruin their govern- 
 ment? A man takes a seat in parliament to get an office for himself 
 or friends, or both; and this is the great source from which flows 
 its great venality and corruption. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. I am for striking out the words moved for. Strong 
 reasons must induce me to disqualify a good man from office. If 
 you do, you give an opportimity to the dependent or avaricious man 
 to fill it up, for to them offices are objects of desire. If we admit 
 there may be cabal and intrigue between the executive and legis- 
 lative bodies, the exclusion of one year will not prevent the effects 
 of it. But we ought to hold forth every honorable inducement for 
 men of abilities to enter the service of the public. — This is truly a 
 republican principle. Shall talents, which entitle a man to public 
 reward, operate as a punishment ? While a member of the legislature, 
 he ought to be excluded from any other office, but no longer. Sup- 
 pose a war breaks out and a number of your best military characters 
 were members; must we lose the benefit of their services? Had 
 this been the case in the beginning of the war, what would have 
 been our situation? — and what has happened may happen again. 
 
 Mr. Madison. Some gentlemen give too much weight and others 
 too little to this subject. If you have no exclusive clause, there may 
 be danger of creating offices or augmenting the stipends of those 
 already created, in order to gratify some members if they were not 
 excluded. Such an instance has fallen within my own observation. 
 I am therefore of opinion, that no office ought to be open to a mem- 
 ber, which may be created or augmented while he is in the legislature. 
 
 Mr. Mason. It seems as if it was taken for granted, that all offices 
 will be filled by the executive, while I think many will remain in 
 the gift of the legislature. In either case, it is necessary to shut the 
 door against corruption. If otherwise, they may make or multiply 
 offices, in order to fill them. Are gentlemen in earnest when they 
 suppose that this exclusion will prevent the first characters from 
 coming forward? Are we not struck at seeing the luxury and venality 
 which has already crept in among us ? If not checked we shall have 
 ambassadors to every petty state in Europe — the little republic of 
 St. Marino not excepted. We must in the present system remove 
 the temptation. I admire many parts of the British constitution 
 and government, but I detest their corruption. — Why has the power 
 of the crown so remarkably increased the last century? A stranger, 
 by reading their laws, would suppose it considerably diminished; 
 and yet, by the sole power of appointing the increased officers of 
 government, corruption pervades every town and village in the king- 
 dom. If such a restriction should abridge the right of election, it is 
 still necessary, as it will prevent the people from ruining themselves; 
 and will not the same causes here produce the same effects? I con- 
 
106 SECRET PROCEEDINGS 01' THE FEDERAL CONVENTIOX. 
 
 sider this clause as the corner-stone on which our hberties depend — 
 and if we strike it out we are erecting a fabric for our destruction. 
 
 • Mr. GoKHAM. The corruption of the Enghsh government cannot be 
 apphed to America. This evil exists there in the venality of their 
 boroughs; but even this corruption has its advantage, as it gives 
 stabihty to their government. We do not know what the effect 
 would be if members of parhament were excluded from offices. The 
 great bulwark of our hberty is the frequency of elections, and their 
 great danger is the septennial parliaments. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. In all general questions which become the subjects 
 of discussion, there are always some truths mixed with falsehoods. 
 I confess there is danger where men are capable of holding two 
 offices. Take mankind in general, they are vicious — their passions 
 may be operated upon. We have been taught to reprobate the 
 danger of influence in the British government, without duly reflecting 
 how far it was necessary to support a good government. We have 
 taken up many ideas upon trust, and at last, pleased with our own 
 opinions, establish them as undoubted truths. Hume's opinion of 
 the British constitution confirms the remark, that there is always a 
 body of firm patriots, who often shake a corrupt administration. 
 Take mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their 
 passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits, 
 who may act from more worthy motives. One great error is that we 
 suppose mankind more honest than they are. Our prevailing pas- 
 sions are ambition and interest; and it will ever be the duty of a 
 wise government to avail itself of those passions, in order to make 
 them subservient to the public good — for these ever induce us to 
 action. Perhaps a few men in a state, may, from patriotic motives, 
 or to display their talents, or to reap the advantage of public applause, 
 step forward; but if we adopt the clause we destroy the motive. 
 I am therefore against all exclusions and refinements, except only 
 in this case; that when a member takes his seat, he should vacate 
 every other office. It is difficult to put any exclusive regulation 
 into effect. We must in some degree submit to the inconvenience. 
 
 The question was then put for striking out — 4 ayes — i noes — 3 
 states divided. New-York of the number. 
 
 Adjourned till to-morrow morning. 
 
 Saturday, June 23d, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Mr. GoEHAM. I move that the question which was yesterday pro- 
 posed on the clause, to he paid out of the national treasury, be now put. 
 
 Question put — 5 ayes — 5 noes — one state divided. So the clause 
 was lost. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDIXOS OF THE FEDERAL CO.\VE\TION. 107 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY moved that that part of the clause which disquaUfies 
 a person from holding an office in the state, be expunged, because 
 the first and best characters in a state may thereby be deprived of a 
 seat in the national council. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. I perceive that some gentlemen are of opinion to give 
 a bias in favor of state governments — This question ought to stand 
 on the same footing. 
 
 Mr. Sherman. By the conduct of some gentlemen, we are erecting 
 a kingdom to act against itself. The legislature ought to be free 
 and unbiassed. 
 
 Question put to strike out the words moved for, and carried — 
 8 ayes, 3 noes. 
 
 Mr. Madison then moved, that after the word established, be added, 
 or the eTnoluments whereof shall have heen augmented hy the legislature 
 of the United States, during the time they were members thereof, and 
 for one year thereafter. 
 
 Mr. BuTLEE. The proposed amendment does not go far enough. 
 How easily may this be evaded. What was the conduct of George 
 the second to support the pragmatic sanction? To some of the 
 opposers he gave pensions — others offices, and some, to put them 
 out of the house of commons, he made lords. The great Montes- 
 quieu says, it is unwise to entrust persons with power, which by being 
 abused operates to the advantage of those entrusted with it. 
 
 Governor Kutledge was against the proposed amendment. No 
 person ought to come to the legislature with an eye to his own emol- 
 ument in any shape. 
 
 Mr. Mason. I differ from my colleague in his proposed amendment. 
 Let me state the practice in the state where we came from. There, 
 all officers are appointed by the legislature. Need I add, that many 
 of their appointments are most shameful. Nor will the check pro- 
 posed by this amendment be sufficient. It will soon cease to be 
 any check at all. It is asserted that it will be very difficult to find 
 men sufficiently qualified as legislators without the inducement of 
 emolument. I do believe that men of genius will be deterred unless 
 possessed of great virtues. We may well dispense with the first 
 characters when destitute of virtue — I should wish them never to 
 come forward — But if we do not provide against corruption, our 
 government wiU soon be at an end: nor would I wish to put a man 
 of virtue in the way of temptation. Evasions, and caballing would 
 evade the amendment. Nor would the danger be less, if the e'xecutive 
 has the appointment of officers. The first three or four years we 
 might go on well enough; but what would be the case afterwards? 
 I will add, that such a government ought to be refused by the people — 
 and it will be refused. 
 
108 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL COWVENTIOW. 
 
 Mr. Madison.' My wish is that the national legislature be as uncor- 
 rupt as possible. I believe all public bodies are inclined, from 
 various motives, to support its members; but it is not always done 
 from the base motives of venality. Friendship, and a knowledge 
 of the abilities of those with whom they associate, may produce it. 
 If you bar the door against such attachments, you deprive the gov- 
 ernment of its greatest strength and support. Can you always rely 
 on the patriotism of the members? If this be the only inducement,, 
 you will find a great indifferency in filling your legislative body. If 
 we expect to call forth useful characters, we must hold out allure- 
 ments ; nor can any great inconveniency arise from such inducements. 
 The legislative body must be the road to public honor; and the advan- 
 tage will be greater to adbpt my motion, than any possible incon- 
 venience. 
 
 Mr. King. The intimate association of ofiices will produce a vig- 
 orous support to your government. To check it would produce no 
 good consequences. Suppose connections are formed? Do they 
 not all tend to strengthen the government under which they are 
 formed? Let therefore preferment be open to all men. We refine 
 otherwise too much — nor is it possible we can eradicate the evil. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. I hope the amendment will be adopted. By the last 
 vote it appears that the convention have no apprehension of danger 
 of state appointments. It is equally imaginary to apprehend any 
 from the national government. That such officers will have influ- 
 ence in the legislature, I readily admit; but I would not therefore 
 exclude them. If any ill effects were to result from it, the bargaia 
 can as well be made with the legislature as with the executive. We 
 ought not to shut the door of promotion against the great characters 
 in the public councils, from being rewarded by being promoted. 
 If otherwise, will not these gentlemen be put in the legislatures to 
 prevent them from holding ofiices, by those who wish to enjoy them 
 themselves ? 
 
 Mr. Sherman. If we agree to this amendment, our good intentions 
 may be prostrated by changing offices to avoid or evade the rule. 
 
 Mr. Gerry. This amendment is of great weight, and its conse- 
 quences ought to be well considered. At the begitming of the war 
 we possessed more than Roman virtue. It appears to me it is now 
 the reverse. We have more land and stock-jobbers than any place 
 on earth. It appears to me, that we have constantly endeavored to 
 keep distinct the three great branches of government; but if we 
 agree to this motion, it must be destroyed by admitting the legis- 
 lators to share in the executive, or to be too much influenced by the 
 executive, in looking up to him for ofiices. 
 
 Mr. Madison. This question is certainly of much moment. There 
 are great advantages in appointing such persons as are known. The 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 109 
 
 choice otherwise will be chance. How will it operate on the mem- 
 bers themselves? Will it not be an objection to become members 
 Avhen they are to be excluded from office? For these reasons I am 
 for the amendment. 
 
 Mr. Butler. These reasons have no force. Characters fit for offices 
 "wiU always be known. 
 
 Mr. Mason. It is said it is necessary to open the door to induce 
 gentlemen to come into the legislature. This door is open, but not 
 immediately. A seat in the house will be the field to exert talents, 
 and when to a good purpose they will in due time be rewarded. 
 
 Mr. Jenifer. Our senators are appointed for 5 years and they can 
 liold no other office. This circumstance gives them the greatest 
 confidence of the people. 
 
 The question was put on Mr. Madison's amendment, and lost — 
 S noes — 2 ayes — one state divided. 
 
 Question on the clause as amended before. Carried— 8 ayes — 2 
 noes — one state divided. 
 
 The question was next on the latter part of the clause. 
 
 Mr. Mason. We must retain this clause, otherwise evasions may 
 be made. The legislature may admit of resignations and thus make 
 members eligible — places may be promised at the close of their 
 ■duration, and that a dependency may be made. 
 
 Mr. Gerry. And this actually has been the case in congress — a 
 member resigned to obtain an appointment, and had it failed he 
 "would have resumed it. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. The clause may be evaded many ways. Offices 
 may be held by proxy — they may be procured by friends, &c. 
 
 Mr. Rtjtledge. I admit, in some cases, it maybe evaded; but this 
 is no argmnent against shutting the door as close as possible. 
 
 The question was then put on this clause, to wit: and for the space 
 ■of one year after its expiration — and negatived. 
 
 Then adjourned to Monday morning. 
 
 Monday, June 25th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Mr. C. PiNKNEY. On the question upon the second branch of 
 the general legislature, as reported by the committee in the fourth 
 resolve, now under consideration, it will be necessary to enquire into 
 the true situation of the people of this country. Without this we 
 can form no adequate idea what kind of government will secure their 
 rights and liberties. There is more equality of rank and fortune in 
 America than in any other country under the sun; and this is likely 
 to continue as long as the unappropriated western lands remain 
 unsettled. They are equal in rights, nor is extreme of poverty to be 
 
110 ;iECliET PROCEEDiyGS OF THE FEDERAL COXVEXTIOX. 
 
 seen in any part of the union. If we are thus singularly situated, 
 both as to fortune and rights, it evidently follows, that we cannot 
 draw any usefvil lessons from the examples of any of the European 
 states or kingdoms ; much less can Great Britain afford us any strik- 
 ing institution, which can be adapted to our own situation — unless 
 we indeed intend to establish an hereditary executive, or one for 
 life. Great Britain drew its first rude institutions from the forests of 
 Germany, and with it that of its nobility. These having originally in 
 their hands the property of the state, the crown of Great Britain 
 was obliged to yield to the claims of power which those large pos- 
 sessions enabled them to assert. The commons were then too con- 
 temptible to form part of the national councils. Many parliaments 
 were held, without their being represented, until in process of time, 
 under the protection of the crown, and forming distinct communi- 
 ties, they obtained some weight in the British government. From 
 such discordant materials brought casually together, those admirable 
 checks and balances, now so much the boast of the British constitu- 
 tion, took their rise. — But will we be able to copy from this original ? 
 I do not suppose that in the confederation, there are one hundred 
 gentlemen of sufficient fortunes to establish a nobility; and the 
 equality of others as to rank would never admit of the distinctions 
 of nobility. I lay it therefore down as a settled principle, that equal- 
 ity of condition is a leading axiom in om- government. It may be 
 said we must necessarily establish checks, lest one rank of people 
 should usurp the rights of another. Commerce can never interfere 
 with the government, nor give a complexion to its councils. Can 
 we copy from Greece or Rome? Have we their nobles or patricians? 
 With them offices were open to few — The different ranks in the 
 community formed opposite interests and produced unceasing 
 struggles and disputes. Can this apply equally to the free yeomanry 
 of America ? We surely differ from the whole. Our situation is unex- 
 ampled, and it is in our power, on different grounds, to secure civil 
 and religious liberty; and when we secure these we secure every 
 thing that is necessary to establish happiness. We cannot pretend 
 to rival the European nations in their grandeur or power; nor is 
 the situation of any two nations so exactly alike as that the one can 
 adopt the regulations or government of the other. If we have any 
 distinctions they may be divided into three classes. 
 
 1. Professional men. 
 
 2. Commercial men. 
 
 3. The landed interest. 
 
 The latter is the governing power of America, and the other two 
 must ever be dependent on them — Will a national government suit 
 them? No. The three orders have necessarily a mixed interest, 
 and in that view, I repeat it again, the United States of America 
 
SECRET PROCEEDmOS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIOX. Ill 
 
 compose in fact but one order. The clergy and nobility of Great 
 Britain can never be adopted by us. Our government must be 
 made suitable to the people, and we are perhaps the only people in 
 the world who ever had sense enough to appoint delegates to estab- 
 lish a general government. I believe that the propositions from 
 Virginia, with some amendments, will satisfy the people. But a 
 general government must not be made dependent on the state 
 governments. 
 
 The United States include a territory of about 1500 miles in 
 length, and in breadth about 400 ; the whole of which is divided into 
 states and districts. While we were dependent on the crown of 
 Great Britain, it was in contemplation to have formed the whole 
 into one — but it was found impracticable. No legislature could 
 make good laws for the whole, nor can it now be done. It would 
 necessarily place the power in the hands of the few, nearest the seat 
 of government. State governments must therefore remain, if you 
 mean to prevent confusion. The general negative powers will sup- 
 port the general government. Upon these considerations 1 am led 
 to form the second branch differently from the report. Their 
 powers are important and the number not too large, upon the prin- 
 ciple of proportion. I have considered the subject with great 
 attention; and I propose this plan (reads it) and if no better plan is 
 proposed, I will then move its adoption. 
 
 Mr. Randolph moved that the 4th resolve be divided, in the same 
 manner as the 3d resolve. 
 
 Mr. GoRHAM moved the question on the first resolve. Sixteen 
 members from one state will certainly have greater weight, than the 
 same number of members from different states. We must therefore 
 depart from this rule of apportionment in some shape or other — 
 perhaps on the plan Mr. Pinkney has suggested. 
 
 Mr. Read. Some gentlemen argue, that the representation must 
 be determined according to the weight of each state — That we have 
 heretofore been partners in trade, in which we all put in our respec- 
 tive proportions of stock — That the articles of our co-partnership 
 were drawn in forming the confederation — And that before we make 
 a new co-partnership, we must first settle the old business. But to 
 drop the allusion — we find that the great states have appropriated to 
 themselves the common lands in their respective states — These lands 
 having been forfeited as heretofore belonging to the king, ought to 
 be applied to the discharge of our public debts. Let this still be 
 done, and then if you please, proportion the representation, and we 
 shall not be jealous of one another — A jealousy, in a great measure, 
 owing to the public property appropriated by individual states — 
 and which, as it has been gained by the united power of the confed- 
 eration, ought to be appropriated to the discharge of the public debts. 
 
112 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTWA. 
 
 Mr. GoRHAM. This motion has been agitated often in congress; 
 and it was owing to the want of power, rather than inclination, that 
 it was not justly settled. Great surrenders have been made by the 
 great states, for the benefit of the confederation. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. The question now before us is, whether the second 
 branch of the general legislature shall or shall not be appointed by 
 the state legislatures. In every point of view it is an important 
 question. The magnitude of the object is indeed embarrassing. 
 The great system of Henry the IVth of France, aided by the greatest 
 statesmen, is small when compared to the fabric we are now about 
 to erect — In laying the stone amiss we may injure the superstructure; 
 and what will be the consequence, if the corner-stone should be 
 loosely placed? It is improper that the state legislatures should 
 have the power contemplated to be given them. A citizen of Amer- 
 ica may be considered in two points of view — as a citizen of the 
 general government, and as a citizen of the particular state, in which 
 he may reside. We ought to consider in what character he acts in 
 forming a general government. I am both a citizen of Permsylvania 
 and of the United States. I must therefore lay aside my state con- 
 nections and act for the general good of the whole. We must forget 
 our local habits and attachments. The general government should 
 not depend on the state governments. This ought to be a leading 
 distinction between the one and the other; nor ought the general 
 government to be composed of an assemblage of different state 
 governments — ^We have unanimously agreed to establish a general 
 government — That the powers of peace, war, treaties, coinage and 
 regulating of commerce, ought to reside in that government. And if 
 we reason in this manner, we shall soon see the impropriety of admit- 
 ting the interference of state governments into the general govern- 
 ment. Equality of representation cannot be established, if the 
 second branch is elected by the state legislatures. When we are lay- 
 ing the foimdation of a building, which is to last for ages, and in 
 which millions are interested, it ought to be well laid. If the national 
 government does not act upon state prejudices, state distinctions 
 will be lost. I therefore move, that the second iranch of the legislature 
 of the national government ie elected iy electors chosen hy the people 
 of the United States. 
 
 Judge Elsworth. I think the second branch of the general legisla- 
 ture ought to be elected agreeable to the report. The other way, it is 
 said, will be more the choice of the people — The one mode is as much 
 so as the other. No doubt every citizen of every state is interested 
 in the state governments; and elect him in whatever manner you 
 please, whenever he takes a seat in the general government, it will 
 prevail in some shape or other. The state legislatures are more 
 
SECRET PR0CEEDI\Q8 OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 113 
 
 competent to make a judicious choice, than the people at large. 
 Instability" pervades their choice. In the second branch of the gen- 
 eral government we want wisdom and firmness. As to balances, 
 where nothing can be balanced, it is a perfect Utopian scheme. But 
 still great advantages will result in having a second branch endowed 
 with the qualifications I have mentioned. Their weight and wisdom 
 may check the inconsiderate and hasty proceedings of the first branch. 
 
 I cannot see the force of the reasoning in attempting to detach 
 the state governments from the general government. In that case, 
 without a standing army, you cannot support the general govern- 
 ment, but on the pillars of the state governments. Are the larger 
 states now more energetic than the smaller? Massachusetts cannot 
 support a government at the distance of one himdred miles from her 
 capital, without an army; and how long Virginia and Pennsylvania 
 will support their governments it is difi&cult to say. Shall we pro- 
 ceed like Tuiskilful workmen, and make use of timber, which is too 
 weak to build a first rate ship? We know that the people of the 
 states are strongly attached to their own constitutions. If you hold 
 up a system of general government, destructive of their constitu- 
 tional rights, they will oppose it. Some are of opinion that if we 
 cannot form a general government so as to destroy state govern- 
 ments, we ought at least to balance the one against the other. On 
 the contrary, the only chance we have to support a general govern- 
 ment is to graft it on the state governments. I want to proceed on 
 this ground, as the safest, and I believe no other plan is practicable. 
 In this way, and in this way only, can we rely on the confidence and 
 support of the people. 
 
 Dr. JoHXsoN. The state governments must be preserved : but this 
 miotion leaves them at the will and pleasure of the general govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Mr. Madison. I find great differences of opinion in this convention 
 on the clause now under consideration. Let us postpone it in order 
 to take up the 8th resolve, that we may previously determine the 
 mode of representation. 
 
 Mr. Mason. All agree that a more efficient government is neces- 
 sary. It is equally necessary to preserve the state governments, as 
 they ought to have the means of self-defence. On the motion of 
 Mr. Wilson, the only means they ought to have would be destroyed. 
 
 The question was put for postponing, in order to take into consid- 
 eration the 8th resolve, and lost — 7 noes — 4 ayes. 
 
 Question on the 1st clause in the 4th resolve — 9 states for — 2 
 against it. 
 
 The age of the senators (30 years) agreed to. 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 8 
 
114 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL COXVENTION. 
 
 Mr. GoRHAM proposed that the senators be classed, and to remain 
 4 years in office; otherwise great inconveniences may arise if a dis- 
 solution should take place at once. 
 
 Gov. Randolph. This body must act with firmness. They may 
 possibly always sit — perhaps to aid the executive. The state gov- 
 ernments win always attempt to counteract the general government. 
 They ought to go out in classes: therefore I move, that they go out 
 of office infixed proportions of time, instead of the words, seven years. 
 
 Mr. Read moved (though not seconded) that they ought to con- 
 tinue in office during good behaviour. 
 
 Mr. Williamson moved that they remain in office for six years. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY. I am for four years. Longer tifne would give them 
 too great attachment to the states^ where the general government 
 may reside. They may be induced, from the proposed length of 
 time, to sell their estates, and become inhabitants near the seat of 
 government. 
 
 Mr. Madison. We are proceeding in the same manner that was 
 done when the confederation was jBrst formed — Its original draft was 
 excellent, but in its progress and completion it became so insufficient 
 as to give rise to the present convention. By the vote already taken, 
 will not the temper of the state legislatures transfuse itself into the 
 senate? Do we create a free government? 
 
 Question on Gov. Randolph's motion — 7 ayes — 3 noes — one 
 divided. 
 
 Motion to fix the term of service at six years — 5 ayes — 5 noes — 
 one divided. 
 
 Do. for 5 years — 5 ayes — 5 noes — one divided. 
 
 The question for 4 years was not put; and the convention ad- 
 journed till to-morrow morning. 
 
 Tuesday, June 26th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Mr. GoRHAM. My motion for 4 years' continuance, was not put 
 yesterday. I am stUl of opinion that classes will be necessary, but 
 I would alter the time. I therefore move that the senators be 
 elected for 6 years, and that the rotation be triennial. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY. I oppose the time, because of too long a continuance. 
 The members will by this means be too. long separated from their 
 constituents, and will imbibe attachments different from that of the 
 state; nor is there any danger that members, by a shorter duration 
 of office, will not support the interest of the imion, or that the states 
 will oppose the general interest. The state of South Carolina was 
 never opposed in principle to congress, nor thwarted their views in 
 any case, except in the requisition of money, and then only for want 
 
SECRET PROCEEDiyQS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEXTION. 115 
 
 of power to comply — for it was found there was not money enough 
 in the state to pay their requisition. 
 
 Mr. Read moved that the term of nine years be inserted, in trien- 
 nial rotation. 
 
 Mr. Madison. We are now to determine whether the republican 
 form shall be the basis of o\ir government — I admit there is weight 
 in the objection of the gentleman from South Carolina; but no plan 
 can steer clear of objections. That great powers are to be given, 
 there is no doubt; and that those powers may be abused is equally 
 true. It is also probable that members may lose their attachments 
 to the states which sent them — Yet the first branch will control 
 them in many of their abuses. But we are now forming a body on 
 whose wisdom we mean to rely, and their permanency in office 
 secures a proper field in which they may exert their firmness and 
 knowledge. Democratic communities may be unsteady, and be 
 led to action by the impulses of the moment. — Like individuals 
 they may be sensible of their own weakness, and may desire the 
 counsels and checks of friends to guard them against the turbu- 
 lency and weakness of unruly passions. Such are the various 
 pursuits of this life, that in aU civilized countries, the interest 
 of a community will be divided. There will be debtors and cred- 
 itors, and an unequal possession of property, and hence arises differ- 
 ent views and different objects in government. This indeed is the 
 ground-work of aristocracy ; and we find it blended in every govern- 
 ment, both ancient and modern. Even where titles have surAdved 
 property, we discover the noble beggar haughty and assuming. 
 
 The man who is possessed of wealth, who lolls on his sofa or roils 
 in his carriage, cannot judge of the wants or feelings of the day 
 laborer. The government we mean to erect is intended to last for 
 ages. The landed interest, at present, is prevalent; but in process 
 of time, when we approximate to the states and kingdoms of Europe; 
 when the number of landholders shall be comparatively small, 
 through the various means of trade and manufactures, will not the 
 landed interest be overbalanced in future elections, and unless wisely 
 provided against, what will become of your government? In Eng- 
 land, at this day, if elections were open to all classes of people, the 
 property of the landed proprietors would be insecure. An agrarian 
 law would soon take place. If these observations be just, our gov- 
 ernment ought to secure the permanent interests of the country 
 against innovation. Landholders ought to have a share in the 
 government, to support these invaluable interests and to balance 
 and check the other. They ought to be so constituted as to protect 
 the minority of the opulent against the majority. The senate, 
 therefore, ought to be this body; and to answer these purposes, they 
 ought to have permanency and stability. Various have been the 
 
116 SECRET PR0CEEDIN08 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 propositions; but my opinion is, tke longer they continue in office, 
 the better mil these views be answered. 
 
 Mr. Sherman. The two objects of this body are permanency and 
 safety to those who are to be governed. A bad government is the 
 worse for being long. Frequent elections give security and even 
 permanency. In Connecticut we have existed 132 years under an 
 annual government; and as long as a man behaves himself weU, he 
 is never turned out of office. Four years to the senate is quite 
 sufficient when you add to it the rotation proposed. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. This question has already been considered in 
 several points of view. We are now forming a repubUcan govern- 
 ment. Real liberty is neither found in despotism or the extremes 
 of democracy, but in moderate governments. 
 
 Those who mean to form a solid republican government, ought to 
 proceed to the confines of another government. As long as offices 
 are open to all men, and no constitutional rank is established, 
 it is pure republicanism. But if we incline too much to democracy, 
 we shall soon shoot into a monarchy. The difference of property 
 is already great amongst us. Commerce and industry will stiU 
 increase the disparity. Your government must meet this state of 
 things, or combinations will in process of time, undermine your 
 system. What was the tribunitial power of Rome ? It was insti- 
 tuted by the plebeans as a guard against the patricians. But was 
 this a sufficient check? No — The only distinction which remained 
 at Rome was, at last, between the rich and poor. The gentleman 
 from Connecticut forgets that the democratic body is already secure 
 in a representation. As to Connecticut, what were the little objects 
 of their government before the revolution? Colonial concerns 
 merely. They ought now to act on a more extended scale, and dare 
 they do this? Dare they collect the taxes and requisitions of con- 
 gress ? Such a government may do well, if they do not tax, and this 
 is precisely their situation. 
 
 Mr. Gerry. It appears to me that the American people have the 
 greatest aversion to monarchy, and the nearer our government 
 approaches to it, the less chance have we for their approbation. Can 
 gentlemen suppose that the reported system can be approved of by 
 them? Demagogues are the great pests of our government, and 
 have occasioned most of our distresses. If four years are insuffi- 
 cient, a future convention may lengthen the time. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. The motion is now for nine years, and a triennial 
 rotation. Every nation attends to its foreign intercourse — to sup- 
 port its commerce — to prevent foreign contempt and to make war 
 and peace. Our senate will be possessed of these powers, and there- 
 fore ought to be dignified and permanent. What is the reason that 
 
SECRET PBOCEEDINOS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 117 
 
 Great Britain does not enter into a commercial treaty with us? 
 Because congress has not the power to enforce its observance. But 
 give them those powers, and give them the stability proposed by the 
 motion, and they will have more permanency than a monarchical 
 government. The great objection of many is, that this duration 
 would give birth to views inconsistent with the interests of the union. 
 This can have no weight, if the triennial rotation is adopted; and 
 this plan may possibly tend to conciliate the minds of the members 
 of the convention on this subject, which have varied more than on 
 any other question. 
 
 The question was then put on Mr. Read's motion, and lost, 8 
 noes — 3 ayes. 
 
 The question on 5 years, and a biennial rotation, was carried — 
 7 ayes — 4 noes. New- York in the minority. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY. I move that the clause for granting stipends be 
 stricken out. 
 
 Question put — 5 ayes — 6 noes. 
 
 On the amendment to the question, to receive a compensation — 10 
 ayes — 1 no. 
 
 Judge Elswokth. I move that the words, outof the national treasury, 
 be stricken out, and the words, the respective state legislatures, be 
 inserted. 
 
 If you ask the states what is reasonable, they wiU comply — ^but 
 if you ask of them more than is necessary to form a good government, 
 they will graat you nothing. 
 
 Capt. Dayton. The members should be paid from the general 
 treasury, to make them independent. 
 
 The question was put on the amendment and lost — 5 ayes — 6 noes. 
 
 Mr. Mason. I make no motion, but throw out for the considera- 
 tion of the convention, whether a person in the second branch ought 
 not to be qualified as to property? 
 
 The questioQ was then put on the clause, and lost — 5 ayes — 6 noes. 
 
 It was moved to strike out the clause, to he ineligible to any state 
 office. 
 
 Mr. Madison. Congress heretofore depended on state interests^- 
 we are now going to pursue the same plan. 
 
 Mr. Welson. Congress has been iU managed, because particiilar 
 states controlled the union. In this convention, if a proposal is 
 made promising independency to the general government, before 
 we have done with it, it is so modified and changed as to amount to 
 nothing. In the present case, the states may say, although I appoint 
 you for six years, yet if you are against the state, your table wiU be 
 unprovided. Is this the way you are to erect an independent gov- 
 ernment ? 
 
118 SECRET PROCEEDIXOS 01' THE FEDERAL GONVEKTIOK. 
 
 Mr. Butler. This second branch I consider as the aristocratic part 
 of our government; and they must be controlled by the states, or 
 they wUI be too independent. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY. The states and general government must stand 
 together. On this plan have I acted throughout the whole of this 
 business. I am therefore for expunging the clause. Suppose a 
 member of this house was qualified to be a state judge, must the 
 state be prevented from making the appointment? 
 
 Question put for striking out — 8 ayes — 3 noes. 
 
 The 5th resolve, that each house have the right of originating Mils, 
 was taken into consideration, and agreed to. 
 
 Adjourned till to-morrow morning. 
 
 Wednesday, June 27th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 The 6th resolve was postponed, in order to take into consideration 
 the 7th and 8th resolves. The first clause of the 7th was proposed 
 for consideration, which respected the suffrage of each state in the 
 first branch of the legislature. 
 
 [Mr. Maktin, the attorney general from Maryland, spoke on this 
 subject upwards of three hours. As his arguments were too difftise, 
 and in many instances desultory, it was not possible to trace him 
 through the whole, or to methodize his ideas into a systematic or 
 argumentative arrangement. I shall therefore only note such points 
 as I conceive inerit most particular notice.] 
 
 The question is important, (said Mr. Maetin,) and I have already 
 expressed my sentiments on the subject. My opinion is, that the 
 general government ought to protect and secure the state govern- 
 ments — others, however, are of a different sentiment, and reverse 
 the principle. 
 
 The present reported system is a perfect medley of confederated 
 and national government, without example and without precedent. 
 Many who wish the general government to protect the state govern- 
 ments, are anxious to have the line of jurisdiction well drawn and 
 defined, so that they may not clash. This suggests the necessity of 
 having this line weU detailed — possibly this may be done. If we do 
 this, the people will be convinced that we meant well to the state 
 governments; and should there be any defects, they will trust a 
 future convention with the power of making further amendments. 
 
 A general government may operate on individuals in cases of 
 general concern, and still be federal. This distinction is with the 
 states, as states, represented by the people of those states. States 
 will take care of their internal police and local concerns. The gen- 
 eral government has no interest, but the protection of the whole. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 119 
 
 Every other government must fail. We are proceeding in forming 
 this government as if there w6re no state governments at all. The 
 states must approve, or you will have none at all. I have never 
 heard of a confederacy having two legislative branches. Evep the 
 celebrated Mr. Adams, who talks so much of checks and balances, 
 does not suppose it necessary in a confederacy. Public and domestic 
 debts are our great distress. The treaty between Virginia and 
 Maryland about the navigation of the Chesapeake and Potomac, is 
 no infraction of the confederacy. The corner-stone of a federal 
 government is equality of votes. States may stirrender this right; 
 but if they do, their liberties are lost. If I err on this point, it is 
 the error of the head, not of the heart.. 
 
 The first principle of government is founded on the nattiral rights 
 of individuals, and in perfect equality. Locke, Vattel, Lord Somers, 
 and Dr. Priestly, all confirm this principle. This principle of equal- 
 ity, when apphed to individuals, is lost in some degree, when he 
 becomes a member of a society, to which it is transferred; and this 
 society, by the name of state or kingdom, is, with respect to others, 
 again on a perfect footing of equality — a right to govern themselves 
 as they please. Nor can any other state, of right, deprive them of 
 this equaUty. If such a state confederates, it is intended for the 
 good of the whole ; and if it again confederate, those rights must be 
 well guarded. Nor can any state demand a surrender of any of 
 those rights; if it can, equality is aheady destroyed. We must 
 treat as free states with each other, upon the same terms of equality 
 that men originally formed themselves into societies. Vattel, Ruther- 
 ford and Locke, are united in support of the position, that states, 
 as to each other, are in a state of nature. 
 
 Thus, says Mr. Martin, have I travelled with the most respectable 
 authorities in support of principles, all tending to prove the equality 
 of independent states. This is equally applicable to the smallest 
 as well as the largest states, on the true principles of reciprocity and 
 poHtical freedom. 
 
 Unequal confederacies can never produce good effects. Apply 
 this to the Virginia plan. Out of the number 90, Virginia has 16 
 votes, Massachusetts 14, Pennsylvania 12 — in all 42. Add to this 
 a state havmg four votes, and it gives a majority in the general legis- 
 lature. Consequently a combination of these states will govern the 
 remaining nine or ten states. Where is the safety and independency 
 of those states? Pursue this subject farther. The executive is to 
 be appointed by the legislature, and becomes the executive in con- 
 sequence of this undue influence. And hence flows the appointment 
 of all your ofiicers, civU, military and judicial. The executive is also 
 to have a negative on all laws. Suppose the possibility of a com- 
 bination of ten states — he negatives a law — it is totally lost, because 
 
120 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAI^ CON VENT I ON. 
 
 those states cannot form two thirds of the legislature. I am willing 
 to give up private interest for the public good — but I must be satisfied 
 first, that it is the pubhc interest — and who can decide this point? 
 A majority only of the union. 
 
 The Lacedemonians insisted, in the amphictionic council to ex- 
 clude some of the smaller states from a right to vote, in order that 
 they might tyrannize over them. If the plan now on the table be 
 adopted three states in the union have the controul, and they may 
 make use of their power when they please. 
 
 If there exists no separate interests, there is no danger of an equal- 
 ity of votes ; and if there be danger, the smaller states caimot yield. 
 If the foundation of the existing confederation is well laid, powers 
 may be added — You may safely add a third story to a house where 
 the foiindation is good. Read then the votes and proceedings of 
 congress on forming the confederation — ^Virginia only was opposed to 
 the principle of equality — The smaller states yielded rights, not the 
 large states — They gave up their claim to the unappropriated lands 
 with the tenderness of the mother recorded by Solomon — they sacri- 
 ficed affection to the preservation of others. — New-Jersey and Mary- 
 land rendered more essential services during the war than many of 
 the larger states. The partial representation in congress is not the 
 cause of its weakness, but the want of power. I would not trust a 
 government organized upon the reported plan, for all the slaves of 
 Carolina or the horses and oxen of Massachusetts. Price says, that 
 laws made by one man or a set of men, and not by common consent, 
 is slavery — And it is so when applied to states, if you give them an 
 unequal representation. What are called human feelings in this 
 instance are only the feelings of ambition and the lust of power. 
 
 Adjourned till to-morrow morning. 
 
 Thursday, June 28th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 
 Mr. Martin in continuation. 
 
 On federal grounds, it is said, that a minority will govern a major- 
 ity — but on the Virginia plan a minority would tax a majority. In 
 a federal government, a majority of states must and ought to tax. In 
 the local government of states, counties may be unequal — still num- 
 bers, not property, govern. What is the government now forming, 
 over states or persons? As to the latter, their rights cannot be the 
 object of a general government — These are already, secured by their 
 guardians, the state governments. The general government is there- 
 fore intended only to protect and guard the rights of the states as 
 states. 
 
 This general government, I believe, is the first upon earth which 
 gives checks against democracies or aristocracies. The only necessary 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 121 
 
 check in a general government ought to be a restraint to prevent 
 its absorbing the powers of the state governments. Representation 
 on federal principles can only flow from state societies. Repre- 
 sentation and taxation are ever inseparable — not according to the 
 quantmn of property, but the quantum of freedom. 
 
 Will the representatives of a state forget state interests ? The mode 
 of election cannot change it. These prejudices cannot be eradicated — 
 Your general government cannot be just or equal upon the Virginia 
 plan, unless you abolish state interests. If this carmot be done, you 
 must go back to principles purely federal. 
 
 On this latter ground, the state legislatures and their constituents 
 will have no interests to pursue different from the general government, 
 and both will be interested to support each other. Under these 
 ideas can it be expected that the people can approve the Virginia 
 plan? But it is said, the people, not the state legislatures, will be 
 called upon for approbation — with an evident design to separate the 
 interest of the governors from the governed. What must be the con- 
 sequence ? Anarchy and confusion. We lose the idea of the powers, 
 with which we are entrusted. The legislatures must approve. By 
 them it must, on your own plan, be laid before the people. How will 
 such a government, over so many great states, operate? Wherever 
 new settlements have been formed in large states, they immediately 
 want to shake off their independency. Why? Because the govern- 
 ment is too remote for their good. The people want it nearer home. 
 
 The basis of all ancient and modern confederacies is the freedom 
 and the independency of the states composing it. The states form- 
 ing the amphictionic council were equal, though Lacedemon, one of 
 the greatest states, attempted the exclusion of three of the lesser states 
 from this right. The plan reported, it is true, only intends to dimin- 
 ish those rights, not to annihilate them — It was the ambition and 
 power of the great Grecian states which at last ruined this respectable 
 coimcil. The states as societies are ever respectful. Has Holland 
 or Switzerland ever complained of the equality of the states which 
 compose their respective confederacies? Bern and Zurich are larger 
 than the remaining eleven cantons — so of many of the states of Ger- 
 many; and yet their governments are not complained of. Bern alone 
 might usurp the whole power of the Helvetic confederacy, but she is 
 contented still with being equal. 
 
 The admission of the larger states into the confederation, on the 
 principles of equality, is dangerous — But on the Virginia system, it 
 is ruinous and destructive. Still it is the true interest of all the states 
 to confederate — It is their joint efforts which must protect and secure 
 us from foreign danger, and give us peace and harmony at home. 
 
 [Here Mr. Martin entered into a detail of the comparative powers 
 of each state, and stated their probable weakness and strength.] 
 
122 SECRET PROCEEDmOH OF THE FEDERAL COXVEXTIOX. 
 
 At the beginning of our troubles with Great Britain, the smaller 
 states were attempted to be cajoled to submit to the views of that 
 nation, lest the larger states should usurp their rights. We then 
 answered them — your present plan is slavery, which, on the remote 
 prospect of a distant evil, we will not submit to. 
 
 I would rather confederate with any single state, than submit to 
 the Virginia plan. But we are already confederat'ed, and no power 
 on earth can dissolve it but by the consent of all the contracting 
 powers — and four states, on this floor, have aheady declared their 
 opposition to annihilate it. Is the old confederation dissolved, be- 
 cause some of the states wish a new confederation ? 
 
 Mr. Lansing. I move that the word not be struck out of the resolve, 
 and then the question wLU stand on its proper ground — and the resolu- 
 tion will read thus: that the representation of the first branch he accord- 
 ing to the articles of the confederation; and the sense of the convention 
 on this point will determine the question of a federal or national 
 government. 
 
 Mr. Madison. I am against the motion. I confess the necessity 
 of harmonizing, and if it could be shown that the system is unjust 
 or unsafe, I would be against it. There has been much fallacy in the 
 arguments advanced by the gentleman from Maryland. He has, 
 without adverting to many manifest distinctions, considered con- 
 federacies and treaties as standing on the same basis. In the one, 
 the powers act collectively, in the other individually. Suppose, for 
 example, that France, Spain and some of the smaller states in Europe, 
 should treat on war or peace, or on any other general concern, it would 
 be done on principles of equality ; but if they were to form a plan of 
 general government, would they give, or are the greater states obliged 
 to give, to the lesser, the same and equal legislative powers ? Stirely 
 not. They might differ on this point, but no one can say that the 
 large states were wrong in refusing this concession. Nor can the 
 gentleman's reasoning apply to the present powers of congress; for 
 they may and do, in some cases, affect property, and in case of war, 
 the lives of the citizens. Can any of the lesser states be endangered 
 by an adequate representation? Where is the probabihty of a com- 
 bination? What the inducements? Where is the similarity of cus- 
 toms, manners or religion? If there possibly can be a diversity of 
 interest, it is the case of the three large states. Their situation is 
 remote, their trade different. The staple of Massachusetts is fish, 
 and the carrying trade — of Pennsylvania, wheat and flour — of Vir- 
 ginia, tobacco. Can states thus situated in trade, ever form such a 
 combination ? Do we find those combinations in the larger counties 
 in the different state governments to produce rivalships? Does not 
 the history of the nations of the earth verify it ? Eome rivalled Carth- 
 age, and could not be satisfied before she was destroyed. The houses 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENriON. 123 
 
 of Austria and Bourbon acted on the same view — and the wars oi 
 France and England have been waged through rivalship ; and let me 
 add, that we, in a great measure, owe our independency to those 
 national contending passions. France, through this motive, joined 
 us. She might, perhaps, with less expense, have induced England 
 to d^de America between them. In Greece the contention was 
 ever between the larger states. Sparta against Athens — and these 
 again, occasionally, against Thebes, were ready to devour each other. 
 Germany presents the same prospect — Prussia against Austria. Do 
 the greater provinces in Holland endanger the liberties of the lesser ? 
 And let me remark, that the weaker you make your confederation, 
 the greater the danger to the lesser states. They can only be pro- 
 tected by a strong federal government. Those gentlemen who 
 oppose the Virginia plan do not sufficiently analyze the subject. 
 Their remarks, in general, are vague and inconclusive. 
 
 Captain Dayton. On the discussion of this question the fate of the 
 state governments depend. 
 
 Mr. Williamson. If any argument will admit of demonstration, it 
 is that which declares, that all men have an equal right in society. 
 Against this position, I have heard, as yet, no argument, and I could 
 wish to hear what could be said against it. What is tyranny? Rep- 
 resentatives of representatives, if you give them the power of taxation. 
 From equals take equals, and the remainder is equal. What process is 
 to annihilate smaller states, I know not. But I know it must be tyr- 
 anny, if the smaller states can tax the greater, in order to ease them- 
 selves. A general government cannot exercise direct taxation. Money 
 must be raised by duties and imposts, &c. and this will operate equally. 
 It is impossible to tax according to numbers. Can a man over the 
 mountains, where produce is a drug, pay equal with one near the 
 shore ? 
 
 Mr. Wilson. I should be glad to hear the gentleman from Mary- 
 land explain himself upon the remark of Old Sarum, when compared 
 with the city of London. This he has allowed to be an unjust pro- 
 portion; as in the one place one man sends two members, and in the 
 other one million are represented by four members. I would be glad 
 to hear how he applies this to the larger and smaller states in America; 
 and whether the borough, as a borough, is represented, or the people 
 of the borough. 
 
 Mr. Martin rose to explain. Individuals, as composing a part of 
 the whole of one consolidated government, are there represented. 
 
 The further consideration of the question was postponed. 
 
 Mr. Sherman. In society, the poor are equal to the rich in voting, 
 although one pays more than the other. This arises from an equal 
 distribution of liberty amongst all ranks; and it is, on the same 
 grounds, secured to the states in the confederation — for this would 
 
124 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 not even trust the important powers to a majority of the states. 
 Congress has too many checks, and their powers are too limited. A 
 gentleman from New- York thinks a limited monarchy the best gov- 
 ernment, and no state distinctions. The plan now before us gives 
 the. power to four states to govern nine states. As they will have 
 the purse, they may raise troops, and can also make a king when they 
 please. 
 
 Mr. Madison. There is danger in the idea of the gentleman 
 from Connecticut. Unjust representation will ever produce it. In 
 the United Netherlands, Holland governs the whole, although she 
 has only one vote. The counties in Virginia are exceedingly dis- 
 proportionate, and yet the smaller has an equal vote with the greater, 
 and no inconvenience arises. 
 
 Governor Franklin read some remarks, acknowledging the diffi- 
 cidties of the present subject. Neither ancient or modern history, 
 (said Gov. Fkanklin,) can give us light. As a sparrow does not fall 
 without Divine permission, can we suppose that governments can 
 be erected without his will? We shall, I am afraid, be disgraced 
 through little party views. I move that we have prayers every morning. 
 
 Adjourned till to-morrow morning. 
 
 Fkiday, June 29th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Dr. Johnson. As the debates have hitherto been managed, they 
 may be spun out to an endless length; and as gentlemen argue on 
 different grounds, they are equally conclusive on the points they 
 advance, but afford no demonstration either way. States are 
 political societies. For whom are we to form a government? for 
 the people of America, or for those societies? Undoubtedly for the 
 latter. They must, therefore, have a voice in the second branch of 
 the general government, if you mean to preserve their existence. 
 The people aheady compose the first branch. This mixtute is proper 
 and necessary. For we cannot form a general government on any 
 other ground. 
 
 Mr. GoRHAM. I perceive no difficulty in supposing a union of 
 interest in the different states. Massachusetts formerly consisted 
 . of three distinct provinces — they have been united into one, and we 
 do not find the least trace of party distinctions arising from their 
 former separation. Thus it is that the interest of the smaller states 
 will unite in a general government. It is thus they wiU be sup- 
 ported. Jersey, in particular, situated between Philadelphia and 
 New- York, can never become a commercial state. It would be her 
 interest to be divided, and part annexed to New-York and part to 
 Pennsylvania — or otherwise the whole to the general government. 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 125 
 
 Massachusetts cannot long remain a large state. The province of 
 Maine must soon become independent of her. PennsjlTania can 
 never become a dangerous state — ^her western country must at some 
 period become separated from her, and consequently her power will 
 be diminished. If some states will not confederate on a new plan, I 
 will remain here, if only one state will consent to confederate with us. 
 
 Judge Elswoeth. I do not despair but that we shall be so fortu- 
 nate as to devise and adopt some good plan of government. 
 
 Judge Read. I would have no objection, if the government was 
 more national — but the proposed plan is so great a mixture of both, 
 that it is best to drop it altogether. A state government is incom- 
 patable with a general government. If it was more national, I 
 would be for a representation proportionate to population. The 
 plan of the gentleman from New- York is certainly the best — but the 
 great evil is the unjust appropriation of the public lands. If there 
 was but one national government, we would be all equally interested. 
 
 Mr. Madison. Some gentlemen are afraid that the plan is not 
 sufficiently national, while others apprehend that it is too much so. 
 If this point of representation was once well fixed, we would come 
 nearer to one another in sentiment. The necessity would then be 
 discovered of circumscribing more effectually the state governments 
 and enlarging the bounds of the general government. Some contend 
 that states are sovereign, when in fact they are only political societies. 
 There is a gradation of power in aU societies, from the lowest corpo- 
 ration to the highest sovereign. The states never possessed the 
 essential rights of sovereignty. These were always vested in con- 
 gress. Their voting, as states, in congress, is no evidence of sov- 
 ereignty. The state of Maryland voted by counties — did this make 
 the counties sovereign? The states, at present, are only great cor- 
 porations, having the power of making by-laws, and these are effectual 
 only if they are not contradictory to the general confederation. The 
 states ought to be placed under the control of the general government— 
 at least as much so as they formerly were under the king and 
 British parliament. The arguments, I observe, have taken a different 
 turn, and I hope may tend to convince all of the necessity of a strong 
 energetic government, which would equally tend to give energy to, 
 and protect the state governments. What was the origin of the 
 mihtary estabUshments of Europe? It was the jealousy which one 
 state or kingdom entertained of another. This jealousy was ever 
 productive of evil. In Rome the patricians were often obliged to 
 excite a foreign war to divert the attention of the plebians from 
 encroaching on the senatorial rights. In England and France, 
 perhaps this jealousy may give energy to their governments, and 
 contribute to their existence. But a state of danger is like a state 
 of war, and it unites the various parts of the government to exertion. 
 
126 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 May not oiir distractions, however, invite danger from abroad? If 
 the power is not immediately derived from the people, in proportion 
 to their numbers, we may make a paper confederacy, but that will 
 be all. We know the effects of the old confederation, and without a 
 general government this will be like the former. 
 
 Mr. Hamilton. The course of my experience in hmnan affairs 
 might perhaps restrain me from saying much on this subject. I 
 shall, however, give birth to some of the observations I have made 
 during the course of this debate. The gentleman from Maryland has 
 been at great pains to establish positions which are not denied. 
 Many of them, as drawn from the best writers on government, are 
 become almost self-evident principles. But I doubt the propriety 
 of his application of those principles in the present discussion. He 
 deduces from them the necessity that states entering into a confed- 
 eracy must retain the equality of votes — this position cannot be 
 correct — Facts plainly contradict it. The parliament of Great 
 Britain asserted a supremacy over the whole empire, and the cele- 
 brated Judge Blackstone labors for the legality of it, although many 
 parts were not represented. This- parliamentary power we opposed 
 as contrary to our colonial rights. With that exception, throughout 
 that whole empire, it is submitted to. May not the smaller and 
 ^eater states so modify their respective rights as to establish the 
 general interest of the whole, without adhering to the right of equal- 
 ity? Strict representation is not observed in any of the state gov- 
 ernments. The senate of New- York are chosen by persons of certain 
 qualifications, to the exclusion of others. The question, after all is, 
 is it our interest in modifying this general government to sacrifice 
 individual rights to the preservation of the rights of an artificial 
 being, called states? There can be no truer principle than this — 
 that every individual of the community at large has an equal right 
 to the protection of government. If therefore three states contain 
 a majority of the inhabitants of America, ought they to be governed 
 by a minority? Would the inhabitants of the great states ever 
 submit to this ? If the smaller states maintain this principle, through 
 a love of power, will not the larger, from the same motives, be equally 
 tenacious to preserve their power? They are to surrender their 
 rights — for what? for the preservation of an artificial being. We 
 propose a free government — Can it be so if partial distinctions are 
 maintained ? I agree with the gentleman from Delaware, that if the 
 state governments are to act in the general government, it affords 
 the strongest reason for exclusion. In the state of New- York, five 
 counties form a majority of representatives, and yet the government 
 is in no danger, because the laws have a general operation. The 
 small states exaggerate their danger, and on this ground contend 
 for an undue proportion of power. But their danger is increased, if 
 
 b 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 127 
 
 the larger states will not submit to it. Where will they form new 
 alliances for their support? Will they do this with foreign powers? 
 Foreigners are jealous of our encreasing greatness, and would rejoice 
 in our distractions. Those who hare had opportunities of conversing 
 with foreigners respecting sovereigns in Europe, have discovered in 
 them an anxiety for the preservation of our democratic governments, 
 probably for no other reason, but to keep us weak. Unless your 
 government is respectable, foreigners will invade your rights; and to 
 maintain tranquility it must be respectable — even to observe neu- 
 trality you must have a strong government. — I confess our present 
 situation is critical. We have just finished a war whictt has estab- 
 lished our independency, and loaded us with a heavy debt. We have 
 still every motive to unite for our common defence — Our people are 
 disposed to have a good government, but this dispositon may not 
 always prevail. It is difficult to amend confederations — it has been 
 attempted in vain, and it is perhaps a miracle that we are now met — 
 We must therefore improve the opportunity, and render the present 
 system as perfect as possible. Their good sense, and above all, the 
 necessity of their affairs, will induce the people to adopt it. 
 
 Mr. PiEKCE. The great difficulty in congress arose from the mode 
 of voting. Members spoke on the floor as state advocates, and were 
 biassed by local advantages. — What is federal? No more than a 
 compact between states; and the one heretofore formed is insufii- 
 cient. We are now met to remedy its defects, and our difficulties 
 are great, but not, I hope, insurmountable. State distinctions must 
 be sacrificed so far as the general government shall render it neces- 
 sary — without, however, destroying them altogether. Although I 
 am here as a representative from a small state, I consider myself 
 as a citizen of the United States, whose general interest I will always 
 support. 
 
 Mr. Gerry. It appears to me that the states never were inde- 
 pendent — they had onlj^ corporate rights. Confederations are a 
 mongrel kind of government, and the world does not afford a prec- 
 edent to go by. Aristocracy is the worst kind of government, and I 
 would sooner submit to a monarchy. We must have a system that 
 will execute itself. 
 
 The question was then put on Mr. Lansing's motion, and lost — 4 
 ayes — 6 noes — one state divided. 
 
 Question on the clause — 6 ayes — 4 noes — and one state divided. 
 
 Judge Els WORTH. I move that the consideration of the 8th 
 resolve be postponed. Carried — 9 ayes — 2 noes. 
 
 I now move the following amendment to the resolve — tMt in the 
 second iran^Ji each state have an equal vote. I confess that the effect 
 of this motion is, to make the general government partly federal and 
 partly natioTml. This will secure tranquility, and still make it effi- 
 
128 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OP THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 cient" and it will meet the objections of the larger states. In taxes 
 they will have a proportional weight in the first branch of the general 
 legislature — If the great states refuse this plan, we will be for ever 
 separated. Even in the executive the larger states have ever had 
 great influence. — The provinces of Holland ever had it. If all the 
 states are to exist they must necessarily have an equal vote in the 
 general government. Small communities when associating with 
 greater, can only be supported by an equality of votes. , I have 
 always found in my reading and experience, that in all societies the 
 governors are ever gradually rising into power. 
 
 The larger states, although they may not have a common interest 
 for combination, yet they may be partially attached to each other 
 for mutual support and advancement. This can be more easily 
 effected than the union of the remaining small states to check it; and 
 ought we not to regard antecedent plighted faith to the confederation 
 already entered into, and by the terms of it declared to be perpetual ? 
 And it is not yet obvious to me that the states will depart from this 
 ground. When in the hour of common danger we united as equals, 
 shall it now be urged by some that we must depart from this prin- 
 ciple when the danger is over? Will the world say that this is just? 
 We then associated as free and independent states, and were well 
 satisfied — To perpetuate that independence) I wish to establish a 
 national legislature, executive and judiciary, for under these we 
 shall I doubt not preserve peace and harmony — nor should I be sur- 
 prised (although we made the general government the most perfect 
 in our opinion,) that it should hereafter require amendment — But 
 at present this is as far as I possibly can go — If this convention only 
 chalk out lines of a good government we shall do well. 
 
 Mr. Baldwin. It appears to be agreed that the government we 
 should adopt ought to be energetic and formidable, yet I would 
 guard against the danger of becoming too formidable. The second 
 branch ought not to be elected as the first. Suppose we take the 
 example of the constitution of Massachusetts, as it is commended 
 for its goodness: There the first branch represents the people, and 
 the second its property. 
 
 Mr. Madtson. I would always exclude inconsistent principles in 
 framing a system of government. The diffiiculty of getting its defects 
 amended are great and sometimes insurmountable. The Virginia 
 state government was the first which was made, and though its 
 defects are evident to every person, we cannot get it amended. The 
 Dutch have made four several attempts to amend their system with- 
 out success. The few alterations made in it were by tumult and 
 faction, and for the worse. If there was real danger, I would give 
 the smaller states the defensive weapons — But there is none from 
 that quarter. The great danger to our general government is the 
 
SECRET PR0CEEDi:X0S OF THE FEDERAL COT^YE^iTIOT^'. 129 
 
 great southern and northern interests of the continent, heing opposed to 
 each other. Loolc to the votes in congress, and most of them stand divided 
 by the geography of the country, not according to the size of the states. 
 
 Suppose the first branch granted money, may not the second 
 branch, from state views, counteract the first? In congress, the 
 single state of Delaware prevented an embargo, at the time that all 
 the other states thought it absolutely necessary for the support of 
 the army. Other powers, and those very essential, besides the legis- 
 lative, will be given to the second branch — such as the negativing all 
 state laws. I would compromise on this question, if I could do it on 
 correct principles, but otherwise not — if the old fabric of the con- 
 federation must be the ground- work of the new, we must fail. 
 
 Adjourned till to-morrow morning. 
 
 Saturday, June 30ti-i, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 Judge Brearsley moved that the president be directed to write to 
 the executive of New-Hampshire, requesting the attendance of its 
 delegates. 
 
 Negatived — 2 ayes — 5 noes — one state divided. 
 
 The discussion of yesterday resumed. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. The question now before us is of so much conse- 
 quence, that I cannot give it a silent vote-^Gentlemen have said, 
 that if this amendment is not agreed to, a separation to the north of 
 Pennsylvania may be the consequence. — This neither staggers me in 
 my sentiments or my duty. If a minority should refuse their assent 
 to the new plan of a general government, and if they will have their 
 own will, and without it, separate the union, let it be done; but we 
 shall stand supported by stronger and better principles. The oppo- 
 sition to this plan is as 22 is to 90, in the general scale — not quite a 
 fourth part of the union — Shall three fourths of the union surrender 
 their rights for the support of that artificial being, called state 
 interest? If we must join issue I am willing. I cannot consent that 
 one fourth shall controul the power of three fourths. 
 
 If the motion is adopted, seven states will controul the whole, and 
 the lesser seven compose 24 out of 90. One third must controul two 
 thirds — 24 overrule 66. For whom do we form a constitution, for 
 men, or for imaginary beings called states, a mere metaphysical 
 distinction? Will a regard to state rights justify the sacrifice of the 
 rights of men? If we proceed on any other foundation than the last, 
 our building will neither be solid nor lasting. Weight and numbers 
 is the only true principle — every other is local, confined or imaginary. 
 Much has been said of the danger of the three larger states combining 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 9 , 
 
130 SECRET PBOCEEDINaS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTIOX. 
 
 together to give rise to monarchy, or an aristocracy. Let the proba 
 bility of this combination be explained, and it will be found that a 
 rivalship rather than a confederacy will exist among them. Is 
 there a single point in which this interest coincides ? Supposing that 
 the executive should be selected from one of the larger states, can the 
 other two be gratified ? Will not this be a source of jealousy amongst 
 them, and will they not separately court, the interest of the smaller 
 states, to counteract the views of a favorite rival? How can an 
 aristocracy arise from this combination more than amongst the 
 smaller states? On the contrary, the present claims of the smaller 
 states lead directly to the estabhshment of an aristocracy, which is 
 the government of the few over the many, and the Connecticut 
 proposal, removes only a small part of the objection. There are 
 only two kinds of bad governments — the one which does too much, 
 and therefore oppressive, and the other which does too little, and 
 therefore weak. — Congress partakes of the latter, and the motion 
 will leave us in the same situation and as much fettered as ever we 
 were. The people see its weakness, and would be mortified in seeing 
 our inability to correct it. 
 
 The gentleman from Georgia has his doubts how to vote on this 
 question, and wishes some qualification of it to be made, — I admit 
 there ought to be some difference as to the numbers in the second 
 branch; and perhaps there are other distinctions which could, with 
 propriety, be introduced — such for example as the qualifications of 
 the elected, &c. However, if there are leading principles in the 
 system which we adopt, much may be done in the detail. We all 
 aim at giving the general government more energy. The state 
 governments are necessary and valuable — No liberty can be obtained 
 without them. On this question depends the essential rights of the 
 general government and of the people. 
 
 Judge Elsworth. I have the greatest respect for the gentleman 
 who spoke last. I respect his abilities, although I differ from him 
 on many points — He asserts that the general government must 
 depend on the equal suffrage of the people. But will not this put 
 it in the power of few states to controul the rest ? It is a novel thing 
 in politics that the few controul the many. In the British govern- 
 ment, the few, as a guard, have an equal share in the government. 
 The house of lords, although few in niunber, and sitting in their own 
 right, have an equal share in their legislature. They cannot give 
 away the property of the community, but they can prevent the 
 commons from being too lavish in their gifts. Where is or was a 
 confederation ever formed, where equality of voices was not a funda- 
 mental principle? Mankind are apt to go from one extreme to 
 another, and because we have found defects in the confederation, 
 jiust we therefore psM 'h>ym the whole fabric, foundation and all, in 
 
SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 131 
 
 order to erect a new building totally different from it, without 
 retaining any of its materials? What are its defects? It is said 
 equality of votes has embarrassed us; but how? Would the real 
 evils of our situation have been cured, had not this been the case? 
 Would the proposed amendment in the Virginia plan, as to repre- 
 sentation, have relieved us? I fancy not. Rhode-Island ^i,s been 
 often quoted as a small state, and by its refusal once deidatf'd the 
 grant of the impost. Whether she was right in so doing is not the 
 question; but was it a federal requisition? And if it was not, she 
 did not, in this instance, defeat a federal measure. 
 
 If the larger states seek security, they have it fully in the first 
 branch of the general government. But can we turn the tables and 
 say that the lesser states are equally secure? In commercial regula- 
 tions they will unite. If policy should require free ports, they would 
 be found at Boston, Philadelphia and Alexandria. In the disposi- 
 tion of lucrative offices they would unite. But I ask no surrender of 
 any of the rights of the great states, nor do I plead duress in the 
 makers of the old confederation, nor suppose they soothed the 
 danger, in order to resume their rights when the danger was over. 
 No; small states must possess the power of self-defence or be ruined. 
 Will any one say there is no diversity of interests in the states ? And 
 if there is, should not those interests be guarded and secured ? But if 
 there is none, then the large states have nothing to apprehend from 
 an equality of rights. And let it be remembered, that these remarks 
 are not the result of partial or local views. The state I represent is 
 respectable, and in importance holds a middle rank. 
 
 Mr. Madison. Notwithstanding the admirable and close reason- 
 ing of the gentleman who spoke last, I am not yet convinced that 
 my former remarks are not well founded. I apprehend he is mistaken 
 as to the fact on which he builds one of his arguments. He supposes 
 that equality of votes is the principle on which all confederacies are 
 formed — that of Lycia, so justly applauded by the celebrated Mon- 
 tesquieu, was different. He also appeals to our good faith for the 
 observance of the confederacy. We know we have found one 
 inadequate to the purposes for which it was made — ^Why then 
 adhere to a system which is proved to be so remarkably defective? 
 I have impeached a number of states for the infraction of the con- 
 federation, and I have not even spared my own state, nor can I 
 justly spare his. Did not Connecticut refuse her compliance to a 
 federal requisition? Has she paid, for the two last years, any money 
 into the continental treasury? And does this look like government, 
 or the observance of a solemn compact ? Experience shows that the 
 confederation is radically defective, and we must in a new national 
 government, guard against those defects. Although the large states 
 in the first branch have a weight proportionate to their population, 
 
132 SECRET PROCEEDmOS OP TTtE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 yet as the smaller states have an equal vote in the second branch, 
 they will be able to controul and leave the larger without any essen- 
 tial benefit. As peculiar powers are intended to be granted to the 
 second branch, such as the negativing state laws, &c. unless the 
 larger states have a proportionate weight in the representation, they 
 cannot be more secure. 
 
 Judge Elsworth. My state has always been strictly federal, and 
 I can with confidence appeal to your excellency [the president] for 
 the truth of it, during the war. The muster-rolls will show that she 
 had more troops in the field than even the state of Virginia. We 
 strained every nerve to raise them ; and we neither spared money or 
 exertions to complete our quotas. This extraordinary exertion has 
 greatly distressed and impoverished us, and it has accumulated our 
 state debts — We feel the effects of it even to this day. But we defy 
 any gentleman to shew that we ever refused a federal requisition. 
 We are constantly exerting ourselves to draw money from the 
 pockets of our citizens, as fast as it comes in; and it is the ardent 
 wish of the state to strengthen the federal government. If she has 
 proved delinquent through inability only, it is not more than others 
 have been, without the same excuse. 
 
 Mr. Sherman. I acknowledge there ha.ve been failures in comply- 
 ing with the federal requisition. Many states have been defective, 
 and the object of our convention is to amend these defects. 
 
 Col. Davie. I have great objection to the Virginia plan as to the 
 manner the second branch is to be formed. It is impracticable. 
 The number may, in time, amount to two or three hundred. This 
 body is too large for the purposes for which we intend to constitute 
 it. I shall vote for the amendment. Some intend a compromise. — 
 This has been hinted by a member from Pennsylvania, but it still 
 has its difficulties. The members will have their local prejudices. 
 The preservation of the state societies must be the object of the 
 general government. It has been asserted that we were one in war, 
 and one in peace. Such we were as states ; but every treaty must be 
 the law of the land as it affects individuals. The formation of the 
 second branch, as it is intended by the motion, is also objectionable. 
 We are going the same round with the old confederation — No plan 
 yet presents sufficient checks to a tumultuary assembly, and there is 
 none therefore which yet satisfies me. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. On the present motion it was not proper to propose 
 another plan. I think the second branch ought not to be numerous. 
 I will propose an expedient — Let there be one member for every 
 100,000 souls, and the smallest states not less than one member each. 
 This would give about twenty-six members. I make this proposal 
 not because I belong to a large state, but in order to pull down a 
 
SECRET PBOCEEDIxas OF THE FEDERAL CONVEyTION. 133 
 
 rotten house, and lay a foundation for a new building. To give 
 additional weight to an old building is to hasten its ruin. 
 
 Governor Feanklix. The smaller states, by this motion, would 
 have the power of giving away the money of the greater states. 
 There ought to be some difference between the first and second 
 branches. Many expedients have been proposed, and I am sorry to 
 remark, without effect. A joiner, when he wants to fit two boards, 
 takes off with his plane the uneven parts from each side, and thus 
 they fit. Let us do the same — we are all naet to do something. 
 
 I shall propose an expedient: Let the senate be elected by the 
 states equally — in all acts of sovereignty and authority, let the votes 
 be equally taken — the same in the appointment of all officers, and 
 salaries; but in passing of laws, each state shall have a right of 
 suffrage in proportion to the sums they respectively contribute. 
 Amongst merchants, where a ship has many owners, her destination 
 is determined in that proportion. I have been one of the ministers 
 to France from this country during the war, and we should have been 
 very glad, if they would have permitted us a vote in the distribution 
 of the money to carry on the war. 
 
 i-lr. Martin. Mr. Wilson's motion or plan would amount to nearly 
 the same kind of inequality. 
 
 Mr. King. The Connecticut motion contains all the vices of the 
 old confederation. It supposes an imaginary evil — the slavery of 
 state governments. And should this convention adopt the motion, 
 our business here is at an end. 
 
 Capt. Dayton. Declamation has been substituted for. argument. 
 Have gentlemen shewn, or must we believe it, because it is said, that 
 one of the evils of the old confederation was unequal representation? 
 We, as distinct societies, entered into the compact. Will you now 
 undermine the thirteen pillars that support it? 
 
 Mr. Martin. If we cannot confederate on just principles, I will 
 never confederate in any other manner. 
 
 Mr. Madison. I will not answer for supporting chimerical objects — 
 but has experience evinced any good in the old confederation? I 
 know it never can answer, and I have therefore made use of bold 
 language against it. I do assert, that a national senate, elected and 
 paid by the people, will have no more efficiency than congress; for 
 the states will usurp the general government. I mean, however to 
 preserve the state rights with the same care, as I would trials by 
 jury; and I am willing to go as far as my honorable colleague. 
 
 Mr. Bedford. That all the states at present are equally sovereign 
 and independent, has been asserted from every quarter of this house. 
 Our deliberations here are a confirmation of the position; and I may 
 add to it, that each of them act from interested, and many from 
 ambitious motives. Look at the votes which have been given on 
 
134 SECRET PROCEEDINGS OF TTfn FEDERAL COiYVENTION. 
 
 t'le floor of this house, and it will be found that their numbers, wealth 
 and local views, ha,ve actuated their determinations; and that the 
 larger states proceed as if our eyes were already perfectly blinded. 
 Impartiality, with them, is already out of the question — the reported 
 plan is their political creed, and they support it, right or wrong. 
 Even the diminutive state of Georgia has an eye t'o her future wealth 
 and greatness — South Carohna, puffed up with the possession of her 
 wealth and negroes, and North Carolina, are all, from different 
 views, united with the great states. And these latter, although it is 
 said they can never, from interested views, form a coalition, we find 
 closely united in one scheme of interest and ambition, notwithstand- 
 ing they endeavor to amuse us with the purity of their principles and 
 the rectitude of their intentions, in asserting that the general govern- 
 ment must be drawn from an equal representation of the people. 
 Pretences to support ambition are never wanting. Their cry is, 
 where is the danger? and they insist that altho' the powers of the 
 general government will be increased, yet it will be for the good of 
 the whole; and although the three great states form nearly a majority 
 of the people of America, they never will hurt or injure the lesser 
 states. I do not, gentlemen, trust you. If you possess the power, the 
 abuse of it could not be checked; and what then would prevent you 
 from exercising it to our destruction ? You gravely aUedge that there 
 is no danger of combination, and trimnphantly ask, how could com- 
 binations be effected? "The larger states," you say, "all differ in 
 productions and commerce; and experience shows that instead of 
 combinations, they would be rivals, and counteract the views of 
 one another." This, I repeat, is language calculated only to amuse 
 us. Yes, sir, the larger states will be rivals, but not against each 
 other — they will be rivals against the rest of the states. But it 
 is urged that such a government would suit the people, and that its 
 principles, are equitable and just. How often has this argument 
 been refuted, when applied to a federal government. The small 
 states never can agree to the Virginia plan; and why then is it still 
 urged? But it is said that it is not expected that the state govern- 
 ments will approve the proposed system, and that this house must 
 directly carry it to the people for their approbation! Is it come 
 to this, then, that the sword must decide this controversy, and that 
 the horrors of war must be added to the rest of our misfortunes? 
 But whathave the people already said? "We find the confederation 
 defective — go, and give additional powers to the confederation — 
 give to it the imposts, regulation of trade, power to collect the 
 taxes, and the means to discharge our foreign and domestic debts." 
 Can we not then, as their delegates, agree upon these points? As 
 their ambassadors, can we not clearly grant those powers? Why 
 then, when we are met, must entire, distinct, and new grounds bt 
 
SECRET PB0CEEDINO8 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 135 
 
 taken, and a government, of which the people had no idea, be insti- 
 tuted? And are we to be told, if we wont agree to it, it is the last 
 momenc of our deliberations ? I say, it is indeed the last moment, if 
 we do agree to this assumption of power. The states will never 
 again be entrapped into a measure like this. The people will say 
 the small states would confederate, and grant further powers to 
 congress; but you, the large states, would not. Then the fault will 
 be yours, and all the nations of the earth will justify us. But what 
 is to become of our public debts if we dissolve the union ? Where is 
 your plighted faith? Will you crush the smaller states, or must they 
 be left unmolested ? Sooner than be ruined, there are foreign powers 
 who will talce us hy the hand. I say not this to threaten or intimidate, 
 but that we should reflect seriously before we act. If we once leave 
 this floor, and solemnly renounce your new project, what will be the 
 consequence? You will annihilate your federal government, and 
 ruin must stare you in the face. Let us then do what is in our 
 power — amend and enlarge the confederation, hut not alter the federal 
 system. The people expect this, and no more. We all agree in the 
 necessity of a more efiicient government — and cannot this be done? 
 Although my state is small, I know and respect its rights, as much, 
 at least, as those who have the honor to represent any of the larger 
 states. 
 
 Judge Elsworth. I am asked by my honorable friend from Massa- 
 chusetts, whether by entering into a national government, I will not 
 equally participate in national security? I confess I should; but I 
 want domestic happiness, as well as general security. A general 
 government will never grant me this, as it cannot know my wants 
 or relieve my distress. My state is only as one out of thirteen. Can 
 they, the general government, gratify my wishes? My happiness 
 depends as much on the existence of my state government, as a 
 new-bom infant depends upon its mother for nourishment. If this 
 is not an answer, I have another to give. 
 
 Mr. King. I am in sentiment with those who wish the preserva- 
 tion of state governments; but the general government may be so 
 constituted as to effect it. Let the constitution we are about forming 
 be considered as a commission under which the general government 
 shall act, and as such it will be the guardian of the state rights. 
 The rights of Scotland are secure from all danger and encroach- 
 ments, although in the parHament she has a small representation. 
 May not this be done in our general government? Since I am up, I 
 am concerned for what fell from the gentleman from Delaware— 
 " Take a foreign power hy the hand"! I am sorry he mentioned it, 
 and I hope he is able to excuse it to himself on the score of passion. 
 Whatever may be my distress, I never will court a foreign power to 
 assist in relieving myself from it. 
 
 Adjourned till Monday next. 
 
136 secret proceedings of the federal convention. 
 Monday, July 2d, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. 
 
 The question was then put on Mr. Elswokth's motion. 5 ayes — 5 
 noes — one state divided. So the question, as to the amendment, was 
 lost. 
 
 Mr. PiNKNEY. As a professional man, I might say, that there is no 
 weight in the argument adduced in favor of the motion on which we 
 were divided; but candor obUges me to own, that equahty of suffrage 
 in the states is wrong. Prejudices will prevail, and they have an 
 equal weight in the larger as in the smaller states. There is a solid 
 distinction as to interest between the southern and northern states — 
 To destroy the ill effects thereof, I renew the motion which I made in 
 the early stage of this business. [See the plan of it iefore mentioned.] 
 
 Gen. PiNKNEY moved for a select committee, to take into consid- 
 reation both branches of the legislature. 
 
 Mr. Martin. It is again attempted to compromise. — You must 
 give each state an equal suffrage, or our business is at an end. 
 
 Mr. Sherman. It seems we have got to a point, that we cannot 
 move one way or the other. Such a committee is necessary to set 
 us right. 
 
 Mr. Morris. The two branches, so equally poised, cannot have 
 their due weight. It is confessed, on all hands, that the second branch 
 ought to be a check on the first — for without its having this effect it 
 is perfectly useless. — The first branch, originating from the people, 
 will ever be subject to precipitancy, changeability, and excess. Ex- 
 perience evinces the truth of this remark without having recourse 
 to reading. This can only be checked by ability and virtue in the 
 second branch. On your present system, can you suppose that one 
 branch will possess it more than the others? The second branch 
 ought to be composed of men of great and established property — an 
 aristocracy. Men, who from pride will support consistency and 
 permanency; and to make them completely independent they must 
 be chosen for life, or they will be a useless body. Such an aristo- 
 cratic body will keep down the turbulency of democracy. But if you 
 elect them for a shorter period, they will be only a name, and we had 
 better be without them. Thus constituted, I hope they will shew us 
 the weight of aristocracy. 
 
 History proves, I admit, that the men of large property will uni- 
 formly endeavor to establish tyranny. How then shall we ward off 
 this evil? Give them the second branch, and you secure their weight 
 for the public good. They become responsible for their conduct, and 
 this lust of power wMl ever be checked by the democratic branch, and 
 thus form a stability in your government. But if we continue 
 changing our measures by the breath of democracy, who will confide 
 
SECRET PBOGEEDiyOS OF THE FEDERAL CO\VEyTTO\. 137 
 
 in our engagements? "WHo will trust us? Ask any person whether 
 he reposes any confidence in the government of congress, or that of 
 the state of Pennsylvania — he will readily answer you, no. Ask him 
 the reason, and he will tell you, it is because he has no confidence in 
 their stability. 
 
 You intend also that the second branch shall be incapable of 
 holding any office in the general government. — It is a dangerous 
 expedient. They ought to have every inducement to be interested 
 in your government. Deprive them of this right, and they mil 
 become inattentive to your welfare. The wealthy will ever exist; 
 and you never can be safe unless you gratify them as a body, in the 
 pursuit of honor and profit. Prevent them by positive institutions, 
 and they will proceed in some left-handed way. A son may want a 
 place — you mean to prevent him from promotion — They are not to be 
 paid for their services — they will in some way pay themselves; nor 
 is it in your power to prevent it. It is good policy that men of 
 property be collected in one body, to give them one common influence 
 in your government. Let vacancies be filled up as they happen, by 
 the executive. Besides it is of little consequence, on this plan, 
 whether the states are equally represented or not. If the state 
 governments have the division of many of the loaves and fishes, and 
 the general government few, it cannot exist. This senate would be 
 one of the baubles of the general government. If you choose them 
 for seven years, whether chosen by the people or the states; whetlier 
 by equal suffrage or in any other proportion, how will they be a 
 check ? They will still have local and state prejudices. — ^A government 
 by compact is no government at all. You may as well go back to 
 your congressional federal government, where, in the character of 
 ambassadors, they may form treaties for each state. 
 
 I avow myself the advocate of a strong government, still I admit that 
 the influence of the rich must be guarded; and a pure democracy is 
 equally oppressive to the lower orders of the community. This 
 remark is founded on the experience of history. We are a commer- 
 cial people, and as such will be obliged to engage in European politics. 
 Local government cannot apply to the general govenmient. These 
 latter remarks I throw out only for the consideration of the com- 
 mittee who are to be appointed. 
 
 Gov. Randolph. I am in favor of appointing a committee; but 
 considering the warmth exhibited in debate on Saturday, I have, I 
 confess, no great hopes that any good will arise from it. Cannot a 
 remedy be devised ? If there is danger to the lesser states, from an 
 unequal representation in the second branch, may not a check be 
 found in the appointment of one executive, by electing him, by an 
 equality of state votes? He must have the right of interposing 
 between the two branches, and this might give a reasonable security 
 
138 SECRET PROCEEDTNGS OF THE FEDERAL COXVENTIOy. 
 
 to the smaller states. — Not one of the lesser states can exist by 
 itself; and a dissolution of the confederation, I confess, would pro- 
 duce conventions, as well in the larger as in the smaller states. The 
 principle of self-preservation induces me to seek for a government that 
 will be stable and secure. 
 
 Mr. Strong moved to refer the 7th resolve to the same committee. 
 
 JsIt. Wilson. I do not approve of the motion for a committee. I 
 also object to the mode of its appointment — a small committee is the 
 best. 
 
 Mr. Lansing. I shall not oppose the appointment, but I expect no 
 good from it. 
 
 Mr. Madison. I have observed that committees only delay business; 
 and if you appoint one from each state, we shall have in it the whole 
 force of state prejudices. The great difficulty is to conquer former 
 opinions. The motion of the gentleman from South Carolina can be 
 as well decided here as in committee. 
 
 Mr. Gerry. The world at large expect something from us. If we 
 do nothing, it appears to me we must have war and confusion — for 
 the old confederation would be at an end. Let us see if no concession 
 can be made. Accommodation is absolutely necessary, and defects 
 may be amended by a future convention. 
 
 The motion was then put to appoint a committee on the 8th resolve, 
 and so much of the 7th as was not agreed to. Carried — 9 states 
 against 2. 
 
 And, hy iallot, the following members were appointed : 
 
 Massachusetts : Maryland : 
 
 Mr. Gerry. Mr. Martin. 
 
 Connecticut : Virginia : 
 
 Mr. Elsworth. Mr. Mason. 
 
 New- York: North Carolina: 
 
 Mr. Yates. Mr. Davie. 
 
 New-Jersey: South Carolina: 
 
 Mr. Patterson. Mr. Eutledge. 
 
 Pennsylvania : Georgia : 
 
 Mr. Franklin. Mr. Baldwin. 
 
 Delaware : 
 
 Mr. Bedford. 
 
 The convention then adjourned to Thursday, the 5th of July. 
 TUESDAY, July 3d, 1787. 
 
 The grand committee met. Mr. Gerey was chosen chairman. 
 
 The committee proceeded to consider in what manner they should 
 discharge the business with which they were entrusted. By the pro- 
 ceedings in the convention they were so equally divided on the 
 important question of representation in the two branches, that the idea 
 
SECRET PROCEEDiyCrS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTWX. 139 
 
 of a conciliatory adjustment must have been in contemplation of 
 the house in the appointment of thi§ committee. But still how to 
 effect this salutary purpose was the question. Many of the mem- 
 bers, impressed with the utility of a general government, connected 
 with it the indispensible necessity of a representation from the states 
 according to their numhers and wealth; while others, equally tenacious 
 of the rights of the states, would admit of no other representation but 
 such as was strictly federal, or in other words, equality of suffrage. 
 This brought on a discussion of the principles on which the house had 
 divided, and a lengthy recapitulation of the arguments advanced in 
 the house in support of these opposite propositions. As I had not 
 openly explained my sentiments on any former occasion on this 
 question, but constantly in giving my vote, showed my attachment 
 to the national government on federal principles, I took this occasion 
 to explain my motives — [See a copy of my speech hereunto annexed.*] 
 
 These remarks gave rise to a motion of Dr. Franklin, which after 
 some modification was agreed to, and made the basis of the following 
 report of the committee. 
 
 The committee to whom was referred the eighth resolution, re- 
 ported from the committee of the whole house, and so much of the 
 seventh as had not been decided on, submit the following report : 
 
 That the subsequent propositions be recommended to the con- 
 vention, on condition that both shall be generally adopted. 
 
 That in the first branch of the legislajiure, each of the states now 
 in the union, be allowed one member for every 40,000 inhabitants, 
 of the description reported in the seventh resolution of the committee 
 of the whole house — That each state, not containing that number, 
 shall be allowed one member. 
 
 That all bills for raising or apportioning money, and for fixing 
 salaries of the officers of government of the United States, shall origi- 
 nate in the first branch of the legislature, and shall not be altered or 
 amended by the second branch; and that no money shall be drawn 
 from the public treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations to be 
 originated in the first branch. 
 
 That in the second branch of the legislature, each state shall have 
 an equal vote. 
 
 THURSDAY, July 5th, 1787. 
 
 Met pursuant to adjournment. 
 The report of the committee was read. 
 
 Mr. GoRHAM. I call for an explanation of the principles on which 
 it is grounded. 
 
 * It is matter of regret that this document cannot be found: the principles it con- 
 tained are perhaps embodied in the letter from Mr. Yates and Mr. Lansing to Gov. 
 George Clinton, on their retiring from the convention. 
 
140 SECRET PB0CEEDINO8 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION. 
 
 Mr. Gekry, the chairman, explained the principles. 
 Mr. Martin. The one representation is proposed as an expedient 
 for the adoption of the other. 
 
 Mr. WiLSOsr. The committee has exceeded their powers. 
 
 Mr. Martin proposed to take the question on the whole of the 
 
 report. 
 
 Mr. Wilson. I do not chuse to take a leap in the dark. I have a 
 right to call for a division of the question on each distinct proposition. 
 
 Mr. Madison. I restrain myself from animadverting on the 
 report, from the respect I bear to the members of the committee. 
 But I must confess I see nothing of concession in it. 
 
 The originating money bills is no concession on the part of the 
 smaller states, for if seven states in the second branch should want 
 such a bill, their interest in the first branch will prevail to bring it 
 forward — it is nothing more than a nominal privilege. 
 
 The second branch, small in number, and well connected, will ever 
 prevail. The power of regulating trade, imposts, treaties, &c. are 
 more essential to the community than raising money, and no pro- 
 vision is made for those in the report — We are driven to an unhapp^^ 
 dilemma. Two thirds of the inhabitants of the union are to please 
 the remaining one third by sacrificing their essential rights. 
 
 When we satisfy the majority of the people in securing their rights, 
 we have nothing to fear; in any other way, every thing. The smaller 
 states, I hope will at last ^ee their true and real interest. — And I 
 hope that the warmth of the gentleman from Delaware will never 
 induce him to yield to his own suggestion of seeking for foreign aid. 
 
 [At this period Messrs. Yates and Lansing left the convention, 
 and the remainder of the session was employed to complete the con- 
 stitution on the principles already adopted. See the revised draft of 
 the constitution and the constitution of the United States, with all 
 the ratified amendments as at present existing, in the appendix.] 
 
 *• ssr sr 
 
 I^"The preceding Notes of the late Chief Justice Yates, con- 
 tained in two hundred and forty-five pages,* of two volumes, were 
 copied by me, literally, from the original manuscript in his hand 
 writing. — The several papers referred to did not accompany his 
 notes. 
 
 John Lansing, Jan. 
 
 * The number of pages in the manuscript. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 DOCUMENTS REFERRED TO IN THE PRECEDING NOTES OF CHIEF JUSTICE YATES. 
 
 RESOLUTIONS OFFERED BY MR. EDMUND RANDOLPH 
 TO THE CONVENTION, MAY 29, 1787. 
 
 1 . Resolved, That the articles of the confederation ought to be so 
 corrected and enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed by 
 their institution, namely, common defence, security of liberty, and 
 general welfare. 
 
 2. Eesolved, therefore, that the right of suffrage, in the national 
 legislature, ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contributioji, 
 or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other may 
 seem best, in different cases. 
 
 3. Resolved, That the national legislature ought to consist of two 
 branches. 
 
 4. Resolved, That the members of the first branch of the national 
 legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several states, 
 every for the term of to be of the age of years 
 at least; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compen- 
 sated for the devotion of their time to public service; to be ineligible 
 to any office established by a particular state, or under the authority 
 of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the func- 
 tions of the first branch) during the term of service and for the space 
 of after its expiration; to be incapable of re-election for the 
 space of after the expiration of their term of service; and to 
 be subject to recall. 
 
 5. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the national 
 
 legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper 
 
 number of persons nominated by the individual legislatures; to be 
 
 of the age of years, at least; to hold their offices for a term 
 
 sufficient to ensure their independency; to receive liberal stipends, 
 
 by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time 
 
 to the public service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a 
 
 particular state, or under the authority of the United States, (except 
 
 those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) 
 
 during the term of service; and for the space of after the 
 
 expiration thereof. 
 
 141 
 
] 42 APPENDIX. 
 
 6. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of 
 originating acts; that the national legislature ought to be empowered 
 to enjoy the legislative right vested in congress, by the confederation; 
 and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are 
 incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be 
 interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative all 
 laws passed by the several states, contravening, in the opinion of the 
 national legislature, the articles of union, or any treaty subsisting 
 under the authority of the union; and to call forth the force of the 
 union against any member of the union failing to fulfil its duty under 
 the articles thereof. 
 
 7. Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to be chosen 
 by the national legislature for the term of years, to receive 
 punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services 
 rendered, in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to 
 affect the magistracy existing at the time of the increase or dimi- 
 nution; to be ineligible a second time; and that, besides a general 
 authority to execute the national laws, it ought to enjoy the executive 
 rights vested in congress by the confederation. 
 
 8. Resolved, That the executive, and a convenient number of the 
 national judiciary, ought to compose a council of revision, with 
 authority to examine every act of the national legislature, before it 
 shall operate, and every act of a particular legislature before a 
 negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said 
 council shall amount to a rejection, unless the act of the national 
 legislature be again passed, or that of a particular legislature be 
 again negatived by of the members of each branch. 
 
 9. Resolved That a national judiciary be established to 
 hold their offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctually, 
 at stated times, fixed compensations for their services, in which no 
 increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the person 
 actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution — That 
 the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals, shall be, to hear and deter- 
 mine, in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and 
 determine, in the dernier resort, all piracies and felonies on the high 
 seas; captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners, or citizens 
 of other states, applying to such jurisdictions, may be interested, or 
 which respect the collection of the national revenue; impeachments 
 of any national ofl&cer; and questions which involve the national 
 peace or harmony. 
 
 10. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the admission 
 of states, lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, 
 whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or 
 otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national 
 legislature less than the whole. 
 
APPENDIX. 143 
 
 1 1 . Resolved, That a republican government, and the territory of 
 each state (except in the instance of a voluntary junction of govern- 
 ment and territory) ought to be guaranteed by the United States to 
 each state. 
 
 12. Resolved, That provisions ought to be made for the continu- 
 ance of a congress, and their authorities and privileges, until a given 
 day, after the reform of the articles of union shall be adopted, and 
 for the completion of all their engagements. 
 
 13. That provision ought to be made for the amendment of the 
 articles of union, whensoever it shall seem necessary; and that the 
 assent of the national legislature ought not to be required thereto. 
 
 14. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary 
 powers within the several states ought to be bound by oath to. sup- 
 port the articles of union. 
 
 15. Resolved, That the amendments, which shall be offered to the 
 confederation by the convention, ought, at a proper time or times, 
 after the approbation of congress, to be submitted to an assembly 
 or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several legis- 
 latures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide 
 thereon. 
 
 Mr HT 9r 
 
 MR. CHARLES PINCKNEY'S DRAFT OF A FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 
 
 We the people of the states of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
 Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New- York, 
 New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
 Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and estab- 
 lish the following constitution for the government of ourselves and 
 posterity. 
 
 Article I. 
 
 The style of this government shall be the United States of America, 
 and the government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive 
 and judicial powers. 
 
 Article II. 
 
 The legislative power shall be vested in a congress, to consist 
 of two separate houses; one to be called the house of delegates, 
 and the other the senate, who shall meet on the day of in 
 
 every year. 
 
 Article III. 
 
 The members of the house of delegates shall be chosen every 
 year by the people of the several states; and the qualification of 
 the electors shall be the same as those of the electors in the several 
 states for their legislature. Each member shall have been a citizen 
 
144 APPENDIX. 
 
 of the United States for years; shall be of years of age, 
 
 and a resident in the state he is chosen for until a census of 
 
 the people shall be taken in the manner hereinafter mentioned. 
 The house of delegates shall consist of to be chosen from the 
 
 different states in the following proportions: for New-Hampshire, 
 for Massachusetts, for Rhode-Island, for Connecticut, 
 
 for New- York, for New-Jersey, for Pennsylvania, 
 
 for Delaware, for Maryland, for Virginia, for North Caro- 
 lina, for South Carolina, for Georgia, and the legislature 
 shall hereafter regulate the number of delegates by the number of 
 inhabitants, according to the provisions hereinafter made, at the 
 rate of one for every thousand. All money bills of every kind 
 shall originate in the house of delegates, and shall not be altered by 
 the senate. The house of delegates, shall exclusively possess the 
 power of impeachment, and shall choose its own officers; and vacan- 
 cies therein shall be supplied by the executive authority of the state 
 in the representation from which they shall happen. 
 
 Aktiole IV. 
 
 The senate shall be elected and chosen by the house of delegates; 
 which house, immediately after their meeting, shall choose by ballot 
 senators from among the citizens and residents of New-Hamp- 
 shire, from among those of Massachusetts, from among those 
 of Rhode-Island, from among those of Connecticut, from 
 among those of New- York, from among those of New-Jersey, 
 from among those of Pennsylvania, from among those of Dela- 
 ware, from among those of Maryland, from among those of 
 Virginia, from among those of North Carolina, from among 
 those of South Carolina, and from among those of Georgia. The 
 senators chosen from New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode-Island, 
 and Connecticut, shall form one class; those from New- York, New- 
 Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, one class; and those from Mary- 
 land, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, one class. 
 The house of delegates shall number these classes one, two, and three; 
 and fix the times of their service by lot. The first class shall serve 
 for years; the second for years; and the third for years. 
 As their times of service expire, the house of delegates shall fill them 
 lip by elections for years; and they shall fill all vacancies that 
 
 arise from death, or resignation, for the time of service remaining of 
 the members so dying or resigning. — Each senator shall be years 
 of age at least; shall have been a citizen of the United States four 
 years before his election; and shall be a resident of the state he is 
 chosen from. The senate shall choose its own officers. 
 
APPENDIX. 145 
 
 Article V. 
 
 Each state shall prescribe the time and manner of holding elec- 
 tions by the people for the house of delegates : and the house of dele- 
 gates shall be the judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications 
 of their members. 
 
 In each house a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business. 
 Freedom of speech and debate in the legislature shall not be im- 
 peached, or questioned, in any place out of it; and the members 
 of both houses shall in all cases, except for treason, felony, or breach 
 of the peace, be free from arrest during their attendance on congress, 
 and in going to and returning from it. Both houses shall keep 
 journals of their proceedings, and publish them, except on secret 
 occasions; and the yeas and nays may be entered thereon at the 
 desire of one of the members present. Neither house, without 
 the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than days, nor 
 to any place but where they are sitting. 
 
 The members of each house shall not be eligible to, or capable of 
 holding any office under the union, during the time for which they 
 have been respectively elected, nor the members of the senate for 
 one year after. The members of each house shall be paid for their 
 services by the states which they represent. Every bill, which shall 
 have passed the legislature, shall be presented to the president of the 
 United States for his revision; if he approves it he shall sign it; but 
 if he does not approve it, he shall return it, with his objections, to 
 the house it originated in; which house, if two-thirds of the members 
 present, notwithstanding the president's objections, agree to pass it, 
 shall send.it to the other house, with the president's objections; 
 where, if two-thirds of the members present also agree to pass it, 
 the same shall become a law; and all bills sent to the president, and 
 not returned by him within days, shall be laws, unless the legis- 
 lature, by their adjournment, prevent their return; in which case 
 they shall not be laws. 
 
 Article VI. 
 
 The legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay 
 and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; 
 
 To regulate commerce with all nations, and among the several 
 states; 
 
 To borrow money and emit bills of credit ; 
 
 To establish post-offices; 
 
 To raise armies; 
 
 To build and equip fleets; 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 10 
 
146 APPENDIX. 
 
 To pass l.aws for arming, organizing, and disciplining the militia 
 of the United States; ' . . 
 
 To subdue a rebellion in any state, on application of its legislature; 
 
 To coin money, and regulate the value of all coins, and fix the 
 standard of weights and measures; 
 
 To provide such dock yards and arsenals, and erect such fortifica- 
 tions as may be necessary for the United States, and to exercise 
 exclusive jurisdiction therein; 
 
 To appoint a. treasurer by ballot; 
 
 To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court; 
 
 To establish post and military roads; 
 
 To establish and provide for a national university at the seat of 
 the government of the United States; 
 
 To establish uniform rules of naturalization; 
 
 To provide for the establishment of a seat of government for the 
 United States, not exceeding. miles square, in which they shall 
 have exclusive jurisdiction; 
 
 To make rules concerning captures from an enemy; 
 
 To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies at sea, 
 and of counterfeitiilg coin, and of all offences against the laws of 
 nations; 
 
 To call forth the aid of the militia, to execute the laws of the 
 union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; 
 
 And to make all laws for carrying the foregoing powers into execu- 
 tion. 
 
 The legislature of the United States shall have the power to 
 declare the punishment of treason, which shall consist only in levying 
 war against the United States or any of them, or in adhering to their 
 enemies. No person shall be convicted of treason but by the testi- 
 mony of two witnesses. 
 
 The proportion of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole 
 number of inhabitants of every description; which number shall, 
 within years after the first meeting of the legislature, and within 
 
 the term of every year after, be taken in the manner to be 
 
 prescribed by the legislature. 
 
 No tax shall be laid on articles exported from the states; nor 
 capitation tax, but in proportion to the census before directed. 
 
 All laws regulating commerce shall require the assent of two 
 thirds of the members present in each house. The United States 
 shall not grant any title of nobility. The legislature of the United 
 States shall pass.no law on the subject of religion; nor touching or 
 abridging the liberty of the press; nor shall the privilege of the writ 
 of habeas corpus ever be suspended, except in case of rebellion or 
 invasion. 
 
APPENDIX. 147 
 
 All acts made by the legislature of the United States, pursuant 
 to this constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of 
 the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and all 
 judges shall be bound to consider them as such in their decisions. 
 
 Article VII. 
 
 The senate shall have the sole and exclusive power to declare war; 
 and to make treaties; and to appoint ambassadors and other min- 
 isters, to foreign nations, and judges of the«supreme court. 
 
 They shall have the exclusive power to regulate the manner of 
 deciding all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or which 
 may arise, between the states, respecting jurisdiction or territory. 
 
 Art]jdle VIII. • 
 
 The executive power of the United States shall be vested in a 
 president of the United States of America, which shall be his style; 
 and his title shall be his excellency. He shall be elected for years; 
 and shall be re-eligible. 
 
 He shall from time to time give information to the legislature, of 
 the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration the 
 measures he may think necessary. He shall take care that the laws 
 of the United States be duly executed. He shall commission all the 
 officers of the United States; and, except as to ambassadors, other 
 ministers, and judges of the supreme court, he shall nominate, and, 
 with the consent of the senate, appoint, all other officers of the 
 United States. He shall receive public ministers from foreign 
 nations; and may correspond with the executive of the different 
 states. He shall have power to grant pardons and reprieves, except 
 in impeachments. He shall be commander in chief of the army and 
 navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states; 
 and shall receive a compensation which shall not be increased or 
 diminished during his continuance in office. At entering on the 
 duties of his office, he shall take an oath faithfully to execute tl^e 
 duties of a president of the United States. He shall be removed 
 from his office on impeachment by the house of delegates, and con- 
 viction in the supreme court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In 
 case of his removal, death, resignation, or disability, the president 
 of the senate shall exercise the duties of his office until another 
 president be chosen. And in case of the death of the president of 
 the senate, the speaker of the house of delegates shall do so. 
 
 Article IX. 
 
 The legislature of the United States shall have the power, and it 
 shall be their duty, to establish such courts of law, 'equity and ad- 
 miralty, as shall be necessary. 
 
148 APPENDIX. 
 
 The judges of the courts shall hold their offices during good be- 
 haviour- and receive a compensation, which shall not be increased 
 or diminished during their continuance in office. One of these courts 
 shall be termed the supreme court, whose jurisdiction shall extend 
 to all cases arising under the laws of the United States, or affecting 
 ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to the trial of 
 impeachment of officers of the United States; to all cases of admi- 
 ralty and maritime jurisdiction. In cases of impeachment affect- 
 ing ambassadors, and otber public ministers, this jurisdiction shall be 
 original; and in all the other cases appellate. 
 
 All criminal officers (except in cases of impeachment) shall be 
 tried in the state where they shall be committed. The trials shall 
 be open and public, and be by jury. 
 
 Article X. 
 
 Immediately after the first census of the people of the United 
 States, the house of delegates shall Apportion the senate by electing 
 for each state, out of the citizens resident therein, one senator for 
 every members such state shall have in the house of delegates. 
 Each state shall be entitled to have at least one member in the senate. 
 
 Article XI. 
 
 No state shall grant letters of marque and reprisal, or enter into 
 treaty, or alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of nobility; 
 nor, without the consent of the legislature of the United States, lay 
 any impost on imports; nor keep troops or ships of war in time of 
 peace; nor enter into any compacts with other states or foreign 
 powers, or emit bills of credit, or make any thing but gold, silver, or 
 copper a tender in payment of debts; nor engage in war, except for 
 self defence when actually invaded, or the danger of invasion is so 
 great as not to admit of a delay until the government of the United 
 States can be informed thereof. And to render these prohibitions 
 effectual, the legislature of the United States shall have the power 
 to revise the laws of the several states that may be supposed to 
 infringe the powers exclusively delegated by this constitution to 
 congress, and to negative and annul such as do. 
 
 Article XII. 
 
 The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges 
 and immunities of citizens in the several states. Any person, 
 charged with crimes in any state, fleeing from justice to another, 
 shall, on demand of the executive of the state from which he fled, 
 be delivered up, and removed to the state having jurisdiction of the 
 offence. 
 
APPENDIX. 149 
 
 Abtiole XIII. 
 
 Full faith shall be given, in each state, to the acts of the legislature 
 and to the records and judicial proceedings of the courts and magis- 
 trates of every state. 
 
 Article XIV. 
 
 The legislature shall have power to admit new states into the 
 union on the same terms with the original states; provided two 
 thirds of the members present in both houses agree. 
 
 Article XV. 
 
 On the application of the legislature of a state, the United States 
 shall protect it against domestic insurrection. 
 
 Article XVI. 
 
 If two thirds of the legislatures of the states apply for the same, 
 the legislature of the United States shall call a convention for the 
 purpose of amending the constitution: or, should congress, with the 
 consent of two thirds of each house, propose to the states amend- 
 ments to the same, the agreement of two thirds of the legislatures 
 of the states shall be sufficient to make the said amendments parts 
 of the constitution. 
 
 The ratification of the conventions of states shall be suffi- 
 cient for organizing this constitution. 
 
 9«r »r str 
 
 PROPOSITIONS OiFFERED TO THE CONVENTION BY THE HONORABLE 
 MR. PATTERSON, JUNE 15, 1787. 
 
 1. Resolved, That the articles of confederation ought to be so 
 revised, corrected, and enlarged, as to render the federal constitution 
 adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of 
 the union. 
 
 2. Resolved, That in addition to the powers vested in the United 
 States in congress, by the present existing articles of confederation, 
 they be authorised to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a 
 duty or duties on all goods and merchandize of foreign growth or 
 manufacture, imported into any part of the United States— by 
 stamps on paper, vellum, or parchment, and by a postage on all 
 letters and packages passing through the general post office — to be 
 applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper and 
 expedient; to make rules and regulations for the collection thereof; 
 and the same from time to time to alter and amend, in such manner 
 as they shall think proper. To pass acts for the regulation of trade 
 
150 APPENDIX. 
 
 and commerce as well with foreign nations as with each other; 
 provided, that all punishments, fines, forfeitures, and penalties, to 
 be incurred for contravening such rules and regulations, shall be 
 adjudged by the common law judiciary of the states in which any 
 offence contrary to 'the true intent and meaning of such rules and 
 regulations shall be committed or perpetrated; with liberty of com- 
 mencing, in the first instance, all suits or prosecutions for that pur- 
 pose, in the superior common law judiciary of such state; subject, 
 nevertheless, to an appeal for the correction of all errors, both in 
 law and fact, in rendering judgment, to the judiciary of the United 
 States. 
 
 3. Resolved, That whenever requisitions shall be necessary, in- 
 stead of the present rule, the United States in congress be authorised 
 to make such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white 
 and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condi- 
 tion, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and 
 three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing 
 description, except Indians not paying taxes; that if such requisitions 
 be not complied with in the time to be specified therein, to direct the 
 collection thereof in the non-complying states; and for that purpose 
 to devise and pass acts directing and authorising the same ; provided, 
 that none of the powers hereby vested in the United States in con- 
 gress, shall be exercised without the consent of at least states; 
 and in that proportion, if the number of confederated states should 
 be hereafter increased or diminished. 
 
 4. Resolved, That the United States in congress be authorised 
 to elect a federal executive to consist of persons, to continue in 
 office for the term of years; to receive punctually, at stated 
 times, a fixed compensation for the services by them rendered, in 
 which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the 
 persons composing the executive at the time of such increase or 
 diminution; to be paid out of the federal treasury; to be incapable 
 of holding any other office or appointment during their time of serv- 
 ice, and for years thereafter; to be ineligible a second time, 
 and removeable on impeachment and conviction for malpractices or 
 neglect of duty, by congress, on application by a majority of the 
 executives of the several states. That the executive, besides a gen- 
 eral authority to execute the federal acts, ought to appoint all federal 
 officers not otherwise provided for, and to direct all military opera- 
 tions; provided, that none of the persons composing the federal 
 executive shall, on any occasion, take command of any troops, so as 
 personally to conduct any military enterprise as general or in any 
 other capacity. 
 
 5. Resolved, That a federal judiciary be established, to consist of a 
 supreme tribunal, the judges of which to be appointed by the execu- 
 
APPENDIX. 151 
 
 tive, and to hold their offices during good behaviour; to receive 
 punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, 
 in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect 
 the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminu- 
 tion. That the judiciary, so established, shall have authority to 
 hear and determine, in the first instance, on all impeachments of 
 federal officers; and by way of appeal, in the dernier resort, in all 
 cases touching the rights and privileges of ambassadors; in all cases 
 of captures from an enemy; in all cases of piracies and felonies on 
 the high seas; in all cases in which foreigners may be interested, in 
 the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any 
 act or ordinance of congress for the regulation of trade, or the collec- 
 tion of the federal revenue. That none of the judiciary officers shall, 
 during the time they remain in office, be capable of receiving or 
 holding any other office or appointment during their term of service, 
 or for thereafter. 
 
 6. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers 
 within the several states, ought to be bound, by oath, to support 
 the articles of union. 
 
 7. Resolved, That all acts of the United States in congress assem- 
 bled, made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers hereby vested 
 in them, and by the articles of the confederation, and all treaties 
 made and ratffied under the authority of the United States, shall be 
 the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts or 
 treaties shall relate to the sg,id states, or their citizens; and that 
 the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound thereby in their 
 decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual states 
 to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 And if any state, or. any body of men in any state, shall oppose 
 or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the 
 federal executive shall be authorised to call forth the powers of the 
 confederated states, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to 
 enforce and compel an obedience to such acts, or an observance of 
 such treaties. 
 
 8. Resolved, That provision ought to be' made for the admission 
 of new states into the union. 
 
 9. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for hearing and 
 deciding upon all disputes arising between the United States and 
 an individual state, respecting territory. 
 
 .10. Resolved, That the rule for naturalization ought to be the 
 same in every state. 
 
 n. Resolved, That a citizen of one state, committing an offence 
 in another state, shall be deemed guilty of the same offence as if 
 it had heen committed by a citizen of the state in which the offence 
 was committed. 
 
152 APPENDIX. 
 
 COL. HAMILTON'S PLAN OF GOVERNMENT. 
 
 THE FOLLOWING PAPER WAS READ BY COL. HAMILTOW, AS CONTAINING HIS IDEAS OF A 
 SUITABLE PLAN OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 1. The supreme legislative pov^er of the United States of America 
 to be vested in two distinct bodies of men, the one to be called the 
 assembly, the other the senate, who, together, shall form the legis- 
 lature of the United States, with power to pass all laws whatsoever, 
 subject to the negative hereafter mentioned. 
 
 2. The assembly to consist of persons elected by the people, to 
 serve for three years. 
 
 3. The senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good 
 behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for that 
 purpose by t^e people. In order to this, the states to be divided 
 into election districts. On the death, removal, or resignation of any 
 senator, his place to be filled out of the district from which he came. 
 
 4. The supreme executive authority of the United States to be 
 vested in a governor, to be elected to serve during good behaviour. 
 His election to be made by electors, chosen by electors, chosen by 
 the people, in the election districts aforesaid. His authorities and 
 functions to be as follows : — 
 
 To have a negative upon all laws about to be passed, and the 
 execution of all laws passed; to have the entire direction of war, 
 when authorised, or begun; to have, with the advice and approba- 
 tion of the senate, the power of making all treaties; to have the 
 sole appointment of the heads or chief 'officers of the departments of 
 finance, war, and foreign affairs ; to have the nomination of all other 
 officers, (ambassadors to foreign nations included) subject to the 
 approbation or rejection of the senate; to have the power of pardon- 
 ing all offences, except treason, which he shall not pardon, without 
 the approbation of the senate. 
 
 5. On the death, resignation, or removal of the governor, his 
 authorities to be exercised by the president of the senate, until a 
 successor be appointed. 
 
 6. The senate to have the sole power of declaring war; the power 
 of advising and approving all treaties; the power of approving or 
 rejecting all appointments of officers, except the heads or chiefs of 
 the departments of finance, war and foreign affairs. 
 
 7. The supreme judicial authority of the United States to be 
 vested in judges, to hold their offices during good behaviour, 
 with adequate and permanent salaries. This court to have original 
 jurisdiction in all causes of capture; and an appellative jurisdiction 
 in all causes, in. which the revenues of the general government, or 
 the citizens of foreign nations, are concerned. 
 
APPENDIX. 153 
 
 S. The legislature of the United States to have power to institute 
 courts in each state, for the determination of all matters of general 
 concern. 
 
 9. The governors, senators, and all officers of the United States 
 to be liable to impeachment for mal and corrupt conduct; and, 
 upon conviction, to be removed from office, and disqualified for 
 holding any place of trust, or profit. All impeachments to be tried 
 by a court to consist of the chief, or senior judge of the superior 
 court of law in each state; provided, that such judge hold his place 
 during good behaviour, and have a permanent salary. 
 
 10. All laws of the particular states, contrary to the constitution 
 or laws of the United States, to be utterly void. And the better to 
 prevent such laws being passed, the governor or president of each 
 state shall be appointed by the general government, and shall have 
 a negative upon the laws about to be passed in the state of which 
 
 • he is governor, or president. 
 
 11. No state to have any forces, land or naval; and the militia 
 of all the states to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the 
 United States; the officers of which to be appointed and commis- 
 sioned by them. 
 
 sr sr »r 
 
 STATE OF RESOLUTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE CONSIDERATION OF THE 
 
 HOUSE BY THE HONORABLE MR. RANDOLPH, AS ALTERED, AMENDED AND 
 
 AGREED TO IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE HOUSE. 
 
 1. Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee that a 
 national government ought to be established, consisting of a supreme 
 legislative, judiciary and executive. 
 
 2. Resolved, That the national legislature ought to consist of t-wo 
 branches. 
 
 3. Resolved, That the members of the first branch of the national 
 legislature ought to be elected by the people of the. several states 
 
 ' for the term of three years; to receive fixed stipends, by which they 
 may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service, 
 to be paid out of the national treasury; to be ineligible to any office 
 established by a particular state, or under the authority of the 
 United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions 
 of the first branch) during the term of service, and under the national 
 government, for the space of one year after its expiration. 
 
 4. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the 
 national legislature ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures ; 
 to be of the age of thirty years at least; to hold their offices for a 
 term sufficient to insure their independency, namely, seven years; 
 to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated- for the 
 devotion of their time to public service, to be paid out of the national 
 
154 APPENDIX. 
 
 treasury; to be ineligible to any office, established by a particular 
 state, or under the authority of the United States, (except those 
 peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during 
 the term of service, and under the national government, for the 
 space of one year after its expiration. 
 
 5. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of 
 originating acts. 
 
 6. Resolved, That the national legislature ought to be empowered 
 to enjoy the legislative rights vested in congress by the confederation; 
 and moreover, to legislate in all cases to which the separate states 
 are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may 
 he interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation; to negative 
 all laws passed by the several states contravening, in the opinion 
 of the national legislature, the articles of union, or any treaties sub- 
 sisting under the authority of the union. 
 
 7. Resolved, That the right of suffrage in the first Ijxanch of the 
 national legislature ought not to be according to the rule established 
 in the articles of confederation, but according to some equitable 
 ratio of representation, namely, in proportion to the whole number 
 of white and other free citizens, and inhabitants of every age, sex 
 and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term ot 
 years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the 
 foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes in each state. 
 
 8. Resolved, That the rights of suffrage in the second branch of 
 the national legislature ought to be according to the rule established 
 for the first. 
 
 9. Resolved, That a national executive be instituted to consist of a 
 single person; to be chosen by the national legislature, for the term 
 of seven years; with power to carry into execution the national 
 laws; to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for; to 
 be ineligible the second time; and to be removable on impeachment, 
 and conviction of mal-practice, or neglect of duty; to receive a 
 fixed stipend, by. which he may be compensated for the devotion of 
 his .time to public service, to be paid out of the national treasury. 
 
 10. Resolved, That the national executive shall have a right to 
 negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed, 
 unless by two third parts of each branch of the national legislattixe. 
 
 1 1 . Resolved, That a national judiciary be established to consist 
 of one supreme tribunal; the judges of which to be appointed by 
 the second branch of the national legislature; to hold their offices 
 during good behaviour; to receive punctually, at stated times, a 
 fiK:ed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminu- 
 tion shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the 
 time of such increase or diminution. 
 
 12. Resolved, That the national legislature be empowered to 
 appoint inferior tribunals. 
 
APPENDIX. 155 
 
 13. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall 
 extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue; 
 impeachment of any national officer; and questions which involve the 
 national peace and harmony. 
 
 14. Resolved, That prpvision ought to be made for the admission 
 of states, lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, 
 whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or. 
 otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national 
 legislature less than the whole. 
 
 15. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the continuance 
 of congress and their author' ties, until a given day after the reform 
 of the articles of union shall be adopted; and for the completion of 
 all their engagements. 
 
 16. Resolved, That a republican constitution, and its existing laws, 
 ought to be guaranteed to each state by the United States. 
 
 17. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the amend- 
 ment of the articles of union, whensoever it shall seem necessary. 
 
 18. Resolved, That the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, 
 within the several states, ought to be bound, by oath, to support the 
 articles of union. 
 
 19. Resolved, That the amendments which shall be offered to the 
 confederation by the convention, ought, at a proper time or times, 
 after the approbation of congress, to be submitted to an assembly 
 or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several legis- 
 latures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide 
 
 thereon. 
 
 if «r nr 
 
 RESOLUTIONS OF THE CONVENTION REFERRED, ON THE TWENTY-THIRD 
 AND TWENTY-SIXTH OF JULY, 1787, TO A COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, (MESSRS. 
 RUTLED6E, RANDOLPH, GORHAM, ELSWORTH, AND WILSON) FOR THE PUR- 
 POSE OF REPORTING A CONSTITUTION. 
 
 1. Resolved, That the government of the United States ought to 
 consist of a supreme legislative, judiciary, and executive. 
 
 2. Resolved, That the legislature, consist of two branches. 
 
 3. Resolved, That the members of the first branch of fhe legislature 
 ought to be elected by the people of the several states, for the term 
 of two years; to be paid out of the public treasury; to receive an 
 adequate compensation for their services ; to be of the age of twenty- 
 five years at least; to be ineligible and incapable of holding any 
 office under the authority of the United States (except those pecu- 
 Harly belonging to the function's of the first branch) during the term 
 of service of the first branch. , 
 
 4. Resolved, That the members of the second branch of the legis- 
 lature of the United States ought to be chosen by the individual leg- 
 islatures; to be of the age of thirty years at least; to hold their 
 
156 APPENDIX. 
 
 offices for six years, one third to go out biennially; to receive a com- 
 pensation for the devotion of their time to the public service; to be 
 ineligible to and incapable of holding any office, under the authority 
 of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the func- 
 tions of the second branch) during the term for which they are 
 elected, and for one year thereafter. 
 
 , 5. Resolved, That each branch ought to possess the right of orig- 
 inating acts. 
 
 6. Resolved, That the national legislature ought to possess the 
 legislative rights vested in congress by the confederation; and more- 
 over, to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the union, 
 and also in those to which the states are separately incompetent, or 
 in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by 
 the exercise of individual legislation. 
 
 7. Resolved, That the legislative acts of the United States, made 
 by virtue and in pursuance of the articles of union, and all treaties 
 made and ra^tified under the authority of the United States, shall be 
 the supreme law of the respective states, as far as those acts or 
 treaties shall relate to the said states, or their citizens and inhabit- 
 ants; and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be bound 
 thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the 
 individual states to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 8. Resolved, That in the original formation of the legislature of 
 the United States, the first branch thereof shall consist of sixty-five 
 members ; of which number 
 
 New-Hampshire shall send 3 ; Massachusetts, 8 ; Rhode-Island, 1 ; 
 Connecticut, 5; New- York,. 6; New-Jersey, 4;' Pennsylvania, 8; 
 Delaware, 1; Maryland, 6; Virginia, 10; North Carolina, 5; South 
 Carolina, 5; Georgia, 3. But as the present situation of the states 
 may probably alter in the number of their inhabitants, the legislature 
 of the United States shall be authorised, from time to time, to appor- 
 tion the number of representatives; and in case any of the states 
 shall hereafter be divided, or enlarged, by addition of territory, or 
 any two or inore states united, or any new statfes created within the 
 Hmits of the United States, the legislature of the United States shall 
 possess authority to regulate the number of representatives, in any 
 of the foregoing cases, upon the principle of their number of inhabit- 
 ants according to the provision hereafter mentioned, namely — Pro- 
 vided always, that representation ought to be proportioned according 
 to direct taxation. And in order to ascertain the alteration in the 
 direct taxation which may be required from time to time by the 
 changes in the relative circumstances of the states — 
 
 9. Resolved, That a census be taken within six years from the 
 first meeting of the legislature of the United States, and once within 
 the term of every ten years afterwards, of all the inhabitants of 
 
APPENDIX. ' 157 
 
 United States, in the manner and according to the ratio recommemded 
 by congress in their resokition of April 18, 1783; and that the legis- 
 lature of the United States shall proportion the direct taxation 
 accordingly. 
 
 10. Resolved, That all bills for raising or appropriating money, and 
 for fixing the salaries of the officers of the government of the United 
 States, shall originate in the first branch of the legislature of the 
 United States, and shall not be altered or amended by the second 
 branch; and that no money shall be drawn from the pubhc treasury, 
 but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated by the first branch. 
 
 11. Resolved, That in the second branch of the legislature of the 
 United States, each state shall have an equal vote. 
 
 12. Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to consist 
 of a single person; ^to be chosen by the national legislature for the 
 term of seven years; to be ineligible a second time; with power to 
 cany into execution the national laws; to appoint to offices in cases 
 not otherwise provided for; to be removable on impeachment, and 
 conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty; to receive a fixed com- 
 pensation for the devotion of his time to public service; to be paid 
 out of the pubhc treasury. 
 
 13. Resolved, That the national executive shall have a right to 
 negative any legislative act, which shall not be afterwards passed, 
 unless by two third parts of each branch of the national legislature. 
 
 14. Resolved, That a national judiciary be established, to consist 
 of one supreme tribunal, the judges of which shall be appointed by 
 the second branch of the national legislature; to hold their offices 
 during good behaviour; to receive , punctually, at stated times, a 
 fixed compensation for their services, in which no diminution shall 
 be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of 
 such diminution. 
 
 15. Resolved, That the national legislature be empowered to 
 appoint inferior tribunals. 
 
 16. Resolved, That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall 
 extend to cases arising under laws passed by the general legislature; 
 and to such other questions as involve the national peace and har- 
 mony. 
 
 17. Resolved, That provision ought to be made-for the admission 
 of states lawfully arising within the hmits of the United States, 
 whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or 
 otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national 
 legislature less than the whole. 
 
 18. Resolved, That a republican form of government shall be 
 o-uaranteed to each state; and that each state shall be protected 
 against foreign and domestic violence. 
 
158 APPENDIX. 
 
 19. Resolved, That provision ought to be made for the amendment 
 of the articles of union, whensoever it shall seem necessary. 
 
 20. Eesolved, That the legislative, executive and judiciary powers, 
 within the several states, and of the national government, ought to 
 be bound, by oath, to support the articles of union. 
 
 21. Resolved, That the amendments which shall be offered to the 
 confederation by the convention ought, at a proper time or times 
 after the approbation of congress, to be submitted to an assembly 
 or assembhes of representatives recommended by the several legisla- 
 tures, to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide 
 thereon. 
 
 22. Resolved, That the representation in the second branch of 
 the legislature of the United States consist of two "members from 
 each state, who shall vote per capita. 
 
 23. Resolved, That it be an instruction to the committee, to whom 
 were referred the proceedings of the convention for the establishment 
 of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring 
 certain qualifications of property and citizenship, in the United States, 
 for the executive, the judiciary, and the members of both branches 
 of the legislature of the United States. 
 
 »r sr sr 
 
 DRAFT OF A CONSTITUTION, REPORTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE 
 
 AUGUST 6, 1787. 
 
 We the people of the states of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, 
 Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New- York, 
 New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North 
 Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, do ordain, declare and estab- 
 lish the following constitution for the government of ourselves and 
 our posterity. 
 
 Article I. 
 
 The style of this government shall be, "The United States of 
 America." 
 
 Article II. 
 
 The government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive, 
 and judicial powers. 
 
 Article III. 
 
 The legislative power shall be vested m a congress, to consist or 
 two separate and distinct bodies of men, a house of representatives 
 and a senate; each of which shall, in all cases, have a negative on 
 the other. The le,g;islature shall meet on the first Monday in Decem- 
 ber in every year. 
 
APPENDIX. 159 
 
 Article IV. 
 
 Sect. 1. The members of the house of representatives shall be 
 chosen every .second year, by the people of the several states com- 
 prehended within this union. The qualifications of the electors shall 
 be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the several 
 states of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures. 
 
 Sect. 2. Every member of the house of representatives shall be of 
 the age of twenty-five years at least ; shall have been a citizen in the 
 United States for at least three years before his election; and shall 
 be at the time of his election, a resident of the state in. which he shall 
 be chosen. 
 
 Sect. 3. The house of representatives, shall, at its first formation, 
 and until the number of citizens and inhabitants shall be taken in 
 the manner hereinafter described, consist of sixty-five members; of 
 whom three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts 
 one in Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut , 
 six in New- York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania, one in 
 Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in North Carolina, 
 five in South Carolina, and three in Georgia. 
 
 Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in the different states wilj 
 alter from time to time; as some of the states may hereafter b^ 
 divided; as others may be enlarged by addition of territory; as two 
 or more states may be united; as new states will be erected within the 
 limits of the United States, the legislature shall, in each of these cases, 
 regulate the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, 
 according to the provisions hereinafter made, at the rate of » one for 
 every forty thousand. 
 
 Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fix- 
 ing the salaries of the officers of government, shall originate in the 
 house of representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the 
 senate. No money shall be drawn from the public treasury, but in 
 pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the house of 
 represent atives . 
 
 Sect. 6. The house of representatives shall have the sole power of 
 impeachment. It shall choose its speaker and other officers. 
 
 Sect. 7. Vacancies in the house of representatives shall besypplied 
 by writs of election from the executive authority of the state, in the 
 representation from which they shall happen. 
 
 Article V. 
 
 Sect. 1. The senate of the United States shall be chosen by the 
 legislatures of the several states. Each legislature shall choose two 
 members. Vacancies may be supplied by the executive until the 
 next meeting of the legislature. Each member shall have one vote. 
 
160 APPENDIX. 
 
 Sect. 2 . The senators shall be chosen for six years ; but, immediately 
 after the first election, they shall be divided, by lot, into three classes, 
 as nearly as may be, numbered one, two and three. The seats of 
 the members of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of 
 the second year; of the second class at the expiration of the fourth 
 year; of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year; so that 
 a third part of the members may be chosen every Second year. 
 
 Sect. 3. Every member of the senate shall be of the age of thirty 
 years at least ; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at 
 least four years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his 
 election, a resident of the state for which he shall be chosen. 
 
 Sect. 4. The senate shall choose its own president and other officers. 
 
 Article VI. 
 
 Sect. 1. The times, and places and the manner of holding the 
 elections of the members of each house, shall be prescribed by the 
 legislature of each state; but their provisions concerning them may, 
 at any time, be altered by the legislature of the United States. 
 
 Sect. 2. The legislature of the United States shall have author- 
 ity to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each 
 house with regard to property, as to the said legislature shall seem 
 expedient. 
 
 Sect. 3. In eacli house a majority of the members shall constitute 
 a quorum to do business; but a smaller number ma}^ adjourn from 
 day to day. 
 
 Sect. 4. Each house shall be the, judge of the elections, returns, 
 and qualifications of its own members. 
 
 Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the legislature shall not 
 be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of the legisla- 
 ture: and the members of each house shall, in all cases, except trea- 
 son, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during 
 their attendance at congress, and in going to and returning from it. 
 
 Sect. 6. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings; 
 may punish its members for disorderly behaviour; and may expel 
 a member. 
 
 Sect. 7. The house of representatives, and the senate, when it 
 shall be acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a journal of their 
 proceedings; and shall, from time to time, publish them: and the 
 yeas and nays of the members of each house, on any question, shall, 
 at the desire of one-fifth part of the members present, be entered on 
 the journal. 
 
 Sect. 8. Neither house, without the consent of the other, shall 
 adjourn for more than three^ays, nor to any other place than that 
 at which the two houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not 
 
APPENDIX. 161 
 
 extend to the senate, when it shall exercise the powers mentioned 
 in the article. 
 
 Sect. 9. The members of each house shall be ineligible to, and 
 incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United 
 States, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected; 
 and the members of the senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable 
 of holding any such office for one year afterwards. 
 
 Sect. 10. The members of each house shall receive a compensation 
 for their services, to be ascertained and paid by the state in which 
 they shall be chosen. 
 
 Sect. 1 1 . The enacting style of the laws of the United States shall 
 be, "Be it enacted, and it is hereby enacted by the house of repre- 
 sentatives, and by the senate of the United States, in congress 
 assembled." 
 
 Sect. 12. Each house shall possess the right of originating bills, 
 except in the cases before mentioned. 
 
 Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the house of repre- 
 sentatives and the senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented 
 to the president of the United States, for his revision. If, upon such 
 revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation by sign- 
 ing it; but if upon such revision, it shall appear to him improper 
 for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together with his 
 objections against it, to that house in which it shall have originated, 
 who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed 
 to reconsider the bill; but if, after such reconsideration, two thirds 
 of that house shall, notwithstanding the objections of the president, 
 agree to pass it, it shall, together with his objections, be sent to the 
 e^her house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; and if ap- 
 proved by two thirds of the other house also, it shall become a law. 
 But, in all such cases, the votes of both houses shall be determined 
 by yeas and nays; and the names of the persons voting for or against 
 the bill shall be entered in the journal of each house respectively. 
 If any bill shall not be returned by the president within seven days 
 after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law, unless 
 the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent its return; in which 
 case it shall not be a law. 
 
 Article VII. 
 
 Sect. 1. The legislature of the United States shall have the power 
 to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises; 
 
 To regulate coijMaeroe with foreign nations, and among the several 
 states; 
 
 To establish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the 
 United States; 
 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 11 
 
162 APPENDIX. 
 
 To coin money; 
 
 To regulate the value of foreign coin; 
 
 To fix the standard of weights and measures; 
 
 To establish post-offices; 
 
 To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of the United 
 States; 
 
 To appoint a treasurer by ballot; 
 
 To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court; 
 
 To make rules concerning captures on land and water; 
 
 To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies com- 
 mitted on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the 
 coin of the United States, and of offences against the law of nations; 
 
 To subdue a rebellion in any state, on the application of its legis- 
 lature; 
 
 To make war; 
 
 To raise armies; 
 
 To build and equip fleets; 
 
 To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws 
 of the union; enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel inva- 
 sions; and, 
 
 To make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
 into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, 
 by this constitution, in the government of the United States, or in 
 any department or officer thereof. 
 
 Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall consist only in 
 levying war against the United States, or any of them; and in ad- 
 hering to the enemies of the United States, or any of them. The 
 legislature of the United States shall have power to declare the pun- 
 ishment of treason. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless 
 on the testimony of two witnesses. No attainder of treason shall 
 work corruption of blood, nor forfeiture, except during the life of 
 the person attainted. 
 
 Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated by 
 the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants, 
 of every age, sex, and condition, including those bound to servitude 
 for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not com- 
 prehended in the foregoing description, (except Indians not paying 
 taxes;) which number shall within six years after the first meeting 
 of the legislature, and within the term of every ten years afterwards, 
 be taken in such manner as the said legislature shall direct. 
 
 Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the legislature on articles 
 exported from any state; nor on the migration or importation of 
 such persons as the several states shall think proper to admit; nor 
 shall such migration or importation be prohibited. 
 
APPENDIX. 163 
 
 Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the 
 census herein before directed to be taken. 
 
 Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without the assent of 
 two thirds of the members present in each house. 
 
 Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any title of nobility. 
 
 Article VIII. 
 
 The acts of the legislature of the United States made in pursuance 
 of this constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the 
 United States, shall be the supreme law of the several states, and 
 of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several states 
 shall be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the constitu- 
 tion or laws of the several states to the contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 Article IX. 
 
 Sect. 1 . The senate of the United States shall have power to make 
 treaties, and to appoint ambassadors, and judges of the supreme 
 court. 
 
 Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or that 
 may hereafter subsist, between two or more states, respecting juris- 
 diction or territory, the Senate shall possess the following powers: 
 Whenever the legislature, or the executive authority, or the lawful 
 agent of any state in controversy with another, shall by memorial 
 to the senate, state the matter in question, and apply for a hearing, 
 notice of such memorial and application shall be given, by order 
 of the senate, to the legislature or the executive authority of the 
 other state in controversy. The senate shall also assign a day for 
 the appearance of the parties, by their agents, before that house. 
 The agents shall be directed to appoint by joint consent, commis- 
 sioners or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining 
 the matter in question. But if the agents cannot agree, the senate 
 shall name three persons out of each of the several states; and from 
 the list of such persons each party shall, alternately, strike out one, 
 until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that num- 
 ber not less than seven nor more than nine names, as the senate shall 
 direct, shall in their presence, be drawn out by lot; and the persons 
 whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be com- 
 missioners or judges to hear and finally determine the controversy; 
 provided a majority of the judges, who shall hear the cause, agree in 
 the determination. If either party shall neglect to attend at any 
 day assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons for not attending, 
 or, being present, shall refuse to strike, the senate shall proceed to 
 nominate three persons out of each state, and the clerk of the senate 
 shall strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing. If any of 
 
164 APPENDIX. 
 
 the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or 
 shall not appear to prosecute or defend their claim or cause, the 
 court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce judgment. The judg- 
 ment shall be final and conclusive. The proceedings shall be trans- 
 mitted to the president of the senate, and shall be lodged among the 
 public records for the security of the parties concerned. Every com- 
 missioner shall, before he sit in judgment, take an oath, to be ad- 
 ministered by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of 
 the state where the cause shall be tried, "well and tru?y to hear and 
 determine the matter in question, according to the best of his 
 judgment, without favor, afllection, or hope of reward." 
 
 Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed under different 
 grants of two or more states, whose jurisdiction as they respect such 
 lands, shall have been decided or adjusted subsequent to such grants, 
 or any of them, shall, on appHcation to the senate, be finally deter- 
 mined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed 
 for deciding controversies between different states. 
 
 Article X. 
 
 Sect. 1 . The executive power of the United States shall be vested 
 in a single person. His style shall be, "The president of the United 
 States of America;" and his title shall be, "his excellency." He 
 shall be elected by ballot by the legislature. He shall hold his office 
 during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second 
 time. 
 
 Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information to the legis- 
 lature of the state of the union. He may recommend to their con- 
 sideration such measures as he «hall judge necessary and expedient. 
 He may convene them on extraordinary occasions. In case of dis- 
 agFeement between the two houses, with regard to the time of ad- 
 journment, he may adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper. 
 He shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly and 
 faithfully executed. He shall commission all the oflSxjers of the United 
 States; and shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided 
 for by this constitution. He shall receive ambassadors, and may 
 correspond with the supreme executives of the several states. He 
 shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall 
 not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment. He shall be commander 
 in chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the imilitia 
 of the several states. He shall, at stated times, receive for his serv- 
 ices a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished 
 during his continuance in office. Before he shall enter on the duties 
 of his department, he shall take the following oath or affirmation: 
 "I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute 
 
APPENDIX. 165 
 
 the office of president of the United States of America." He shall 
 be removed from his office on impeachment by the house of repte- 
 sentatives, and conviction in the supreme court, of treason, bribery, 
 or corruption. In case of his removal as aforesaid, death, resigna- 
 tion, or disability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, 
 the president of the senate shall exercise those powers and dutips 
 until another president of the United States be chosen, or until the 
 disabiUty of the president be removed. 
 
 Article XI. 
 
 Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested 
 in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as shall, when neces- 
 sary, from time to time, be constituted by the legislature of the 
 United States. 
 
 Sect. 2. The judges of the supreme court, and of the inferior 
 courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, 
 at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall 
 not be diminished during their continuance in office. 
 
 Sect. 3. The jurisdiction of the supreme court shall extend to all 
 cases arising under laws passed by the legislature of the United States; 
 to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; 
 to the trial of impeachments of officers of the United States; to all 
 cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies be- 
 tween two or more states (except such as shall regard territory or 
 jurisdiction;) between a state and citizens of another state; between 
 citizens of different states; and between a state or the citizens thereof, 
 and foreign states, citizens- and subjects. In cases of impeachment, 
 cases affecting ambassadors, other pubHc ministers and consuls, and 
 those in which a state shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. 
 In all the other cases before mentioned, it shall be appellate, with 
 such exceptions and under such regulations as the legislature shall 
 make. The legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction above 
 mentioned (except the trial of the president of the United States) 
 in the manner, and under the limitations, which it shall think proper, 
 to such inferior courts as it shall constitute from time to time. 
 
 Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of im- 
 peachments) shall be in the state where they shall be committed; 
 and shall be by jury. 
 
 Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend 
 farther than to removal from office, and disquaMcation to hold 
 and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United 
 States. But the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and 
 subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according 
 to law. 
 
166 APPENDIX. 
 
 Article XII. 
 
 No state shall coin money; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal: 
 nor enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any 
 title of nobiHty. 
 
 Article XIII. 
 
 No state, without the consent of the legislature of the United 
 States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a tender 
 in payment of debts : lay impost or duties on imports : nor keep troops 
 or ships of war in time of peace: nor enter into any agreement or 
 compact with another state, or with any foreign power: nor engage 
 in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the 
 danger of invasion be so imminent as not to admit of a delay until 
 the legislature of the United States can be consulted. 
 
 Article XIV. 
 
 The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and 
 immunities of citizens in the several states. 
 
 Article XV. 
 
 Any person charged with treason, felony, or high misdemeanor, 
 in any state, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in any 
 other state, shall, on demand of the executive power of the state 
 from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the state having 
 jurisdiction of the offence. 
 
 Article XVI. " 
 
 Full faith shall be given in each state to the acts of the legislatures, 
 and to the records and judicial proceedings of the courts and magis- 
 trates of every other state. 
 
 Article XVII. 
 
 New states, lawfully constituted or established within the limits, 
 of the United States, may be admitted by the legislature into this 
 government; but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the 
 members present in each house shall be necessary. If a new state 
 shall arise within the limits of any of the present states, the consent 
 of the legislatures of such states shall be also necessary to its admis- 
 sion. If the admission be consented to, the new states shall be ad- 
 mitted on the same terms with the original states. But the legisla- 
 ture may make conditions with the new states concerning the public 
 debt, which shall be then subsisting. 
 
167 
 
 Akticle XVIII. 
 
 The United States shall guarantee to each state a republican form 
 of government; and shall protect each state against foreign inva- 
 sions; and, on the application of its legislature, against domestic 
 violence. 
 
 Article XIX. 
 
 On the appHcation of the legislatures of two thirds of the states 
 in the union for an amendment of this constitution, the legislature 
 of the United States shall call a convention for that purpose. 
 
 Article XX. 
 
 The members of the legislatures, and the executive and judicial 
 officers of the United States, and of the several states, shall be bound 
 by oath to support this constitution. 
 
 Article XXI. 
 
 The ratification of the conventions of states shall be suf- 
 
 ficient for organizing this constitution. 
 
 Article XXII. 
 
 This constitution shall be laid before the United States in congress 
 assembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this con- 
 vention that it should be afterwards submitted to a convention 
 chosen in each state, under the recommendation of its legislature, 
 in order to receive the ratification of such convention. 
 
 Article XXIII. 
 
 To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this convention, 
 that each assenting convention should notify its assent and ratifica- 
 tion to the United States in congress assembled; that congress, after 
 receiving the assent and ratifications of the conventions of 
 states, should appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and 
 appoint a place for commencing proceedings under this constitution; 
 that after such pubHcation, the legislatures of the several states 
 should elect members of the senate, and direct the election of mem- 
 bers of the house of representatives; and that the members of the 
 legislature should meet at the time and place assigned by congress, 
 and should, as soon as may be, after their meeting, choose the presi- 
 dent of the United States, and proceed to execute this constitution. 
 
CONSTITUTION 
 OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 AS AMENDED AND ADOPTED IN 
 CONVENTION, SEPTEMBER 17, 1787. 
 
 We the people of the United States, in order to form a more per- 
 fect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquihty, provide 
 for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the 
 blessings of Uberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and 
 establish this constitution for the United States of America. 
 
 Article I. 
 
 Sect. 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in 
 a congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and 
 house of representatives. 
 
 Sect. 2. The house of representatives shall be composed of mem- 
 bers chosen every second year by the people of the several states, 
 and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite 
 for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. 
 
 No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained 
 to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of 
 the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant 
 of that state in which he shall be chosen. 
 
 Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the 
 several states which may be included within this union, according 
 to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding 
 to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to servi- 
 tude for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three 
 fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made 
 within three years after the first meeting of the fcongress of the United 
 States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such man- 
 ner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall 
 not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each state shall have 
 at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be 
 made, the state of New-Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, 
 Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, 
 168 
 
APPENDIX. 169 
 
 Connecticut five, New- York six, New-Jersey four, Pennsylvania 
 eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten. North Carolina five, 
 South Carolina five, and Georgia three. 
 
 When vacancies happen in the representation from any state, the 
 executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such 
 vacancies. 
 
 The house of representatives shall choose their speaker and other 
 ofl&cers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment. 
 
 Sect. 3. The senate of the United States shall be composed of two 
 senators from each state, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six 
 years; and each senator shall have one vote. 
 
 Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the 
 first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three 
 classes. The seats of the senators of the first class shall be vacated 
 at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expira- 
 tion of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of 
 the sixth year; so that one third may be chosen every second year. 
 And if vacancies happen by resignation, or otherwise, during the 
 recess of the legislature of any state, the executive thereof may make 
 temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, 
 which shall then fill such vacancies. 
 
 No person shall be a senator who shall not have attained to the 
 age of thirty years, and been nins years a citizen of the United States, 
 and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state, for 
 which he shall be chosen. 
 
 The vice president of the United States, shall be president of the 
 senate, but shall have no vote, unless they be equally divided. 
 
 The senate shall choose their other officers, and also a president 
 pro tempore, in the absence of the vice president, or when he shall 
 exercise the office of president of the United States. 
 
 The senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. 
 When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. 
 When the president of the United States is tried, the chief justice 
 shall preside; and no person shall be convicted without the concur- 
 rence of two thirds of the members present. 
 
 Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than 
 to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any 
 office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party 
 convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, 
 trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law. 
 
 Sect. 4. The times, places and manner of holding elections for 
 senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by 
 the legislature thereof; but the congress may at any time by law 
 make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing 
 senators. 
 
170 APPENDIX. 
 
 The congress shall assemble at least once in every year; and such 
 meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall 
 by law appoint a different day. 
 
 Sect. 5. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns 
 and qualifications of its own members; and a majority of each shall 
 constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may ad- 
 journ from day to day, and may be authorised to compel the attend- 
 ance of absent members, in such manner, and under such penalties 
 as each house may provide. 
 
 Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings ; punish its 
 members for disorderly behaviour, and, with the concurrence of 
 two thirds, expel a member. 
 
 Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and. from time 
 to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judg- 
 ment require secrecy ; and the yeas and nays of the members of either 
 house on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, 
 be entered on the journals. 
 
 Neither house, during the session of congress, shall, without the 
 consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any 
 other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. 
 
 Sect. 6. The senators and representatives shall receive a compensa- 
 tion for their services to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the 
 treasury of the United States. They shall in all cases, except treason, 
 felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their 
 attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to, 
 and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either 
 house, they shall not be questioned in any other place. 
 
 No senator or representative shall, during the time for which he 
 was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of 
 the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments 
 whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no person 
 holding any office under the United States, shall be a member of 
 either house during his continuance in office. 
 
 Sect. 7. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the house of 
 representatives; but the senate may propose or concur with amend- 
 ments as on other bills. 
 
 Every bill which shall have passed the house of representatives 
 and the senate shall, before it become a law, be presented to the 
 president of the United States. If he approve he shall sign it; but 
 if not he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which 
 it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on 
 their journal, and proceed to re-consider it. If, after such re-consider- 
 ation, two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be 
 sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it 
 shall likewise be re-considered, and if approved by two thirds of that 
 
APPENDIX. 171 
 
 house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both 
 houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of the 
 persons voting for and against the bill, shall be entered on the journal 
 of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the 
 president within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have 
 been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if 
 he had signed it, unless the congress by their adjournment, prevent 
 its return, in which case it shall not be a law. 
 
 Every order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of the 
 senate and house of representatives may be necessary (except on a 
 question of adjournment) shall be presented to the president of the 
 United States ; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved 
 by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be re-passed by two 
 thirds of the senate and house of representatives according to the 
 rules of limitations prescribed in the case of a bill. 
 
 Sect. 8. The congress shall have power — 
 
 To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the 
 debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the 
 United States; but all duties, imposts and excises, shall be uniform 
 throughout the United States. 
 
 To borrow money on the credit of the United States: 
 
 To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several 
 states, and with the Indian tribes: 
 
 To establish an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws 
 on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States: 
 
 To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, 
 and fix the standard of weights and measures : 
 
 To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and 
 current coin of the United States: 
 
 To establish post-offices and post-roads: 
 
 To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing, for 
 limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their 
 respective writings and discoveries: 
 
 To constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court: 
 
 To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high 
 seas, and offences against the law of nations: 
 
 To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make 
 rules concerning captures on land or water: 
 
 To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to 
 that use shall be for a longer term than two years: 
 
 To provide and maintain a navy: 
 
 To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and 
 naval forces : 
 
 To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
 union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions: 
 
172 APPENDIX. 
 
 To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and 
 for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service 
 of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the ap- 
 pointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia 
 according to the discipline prescribed by congress: 
 
 To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such 
 district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of par- 
 ticular states, and the acceptance of congress, become the seat of 
 the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority 
 over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the 
 state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, 
 arsenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings ; — And 
 
 To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
 into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by 
 this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any 
 department or office thereof. 
 
 Sec. 9. The migration or importation of such persons as any of 
 the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be pro- 
 hibited by the congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred 
 and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation, 
 not exceeding ten dollars for each person. 
 
 The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, 
 unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may 
 require it. 
 
 No bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. 
 
 Xo capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion 
 to the census or enumeration herein before directed to be taken. 
 
 No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state. 
 No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or reve- 
 nue to the ports of one state over those of another; nor shall vessels 
 bound to or from one state, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties 
 in another. 
 
 No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence 
 of appropriations made by law ; and a regular statement and account 
 of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be pubhshed 
 from time to time. 
 
 No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States: and 
 no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, 
 without the consent of the congress, accept of any present, emolu- 
 ment, office or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince or 
 foreign state. 
 
 Sect. 10. No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance or con- 
 federation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit 
 bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in 
 
APPENDIX. 173 
 
 payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex fost facto law, or law 
 impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. 
 No state shall without the consent of the congress, lay any imposts 
 or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely neces- 
 sary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all 
 duties and imposts, laid by any state on imports or exports, shall be 
 for the use of the treasm-y of the United States; and all such laws 
 shall be subject to the revision and controul of the congress. No 
 state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any duty of tonnage, 
 keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement 
 or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in 
 war, imless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not 
 admit of delay. 
 
 Aeticle II. 
 
 Sect. 1. The executive power shall be vested in a president of the 
 United States of America. He shall hold his ofEce dmring the term 
 of four years, and together with the vice-president, chosen for the 
 same term, be elected as follows: 
 
 Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislatiire thereof 
 may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of sena- 
 tors and representatives to which the state may be entitled in the 
 congress ; but no senator or representative or person holding an office 
 of triist or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector. 
 
 The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by bal- 
 lot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant 
 of the same state with themselves. And they shall make a list of 
 all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which 
 list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the 
 government of the United States, dirfected to the president of the 
 senate. The president of the senate shall, in the presence of the 
 senate and house of representatives, open all the certificates, and the 
 votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest num- 
 ber of votes shall be the president, if such number be a majority of 
 the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than 
 one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, 
 then the house of representatives shall immediately ickoese by ballot 
 one of them for president ; and if no person have a majority, then from 
 the five higiiest on the list, the said house shall, in like manner, 
 choose the president. But in choosing the president, the votes shall 
 be taken by states, the representation from each state having one 
 vote: a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or mem- 
 ber's &om two-thirds of the states, tmd a majority of all the states 
 shall be necessary to a choice. In every case, after the choice of the 
 president, the person having the greatest number of votes of the 
 
174 APPENDIX. 
 
 electors, shall be the vice-president. But if there should remain two 
 or more who have equal votes, the senate shall choose from them by 
 ballot, the vice-president. 
 
 The congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, 
 and the day in which they shall give their votes; which day shall be 
 the same throughout the United States. 
 
 No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United 
 States at the time of the adoption of this constitution, shall be eligible 
 to the office of president : neither shall any person be eligible to that 
 office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and 
 been fourteen years a resident within the United States. 
 
 In case of the removal of the president from office, or of his death, 
 resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said 
 office, the same shall devolve on the vice president; and the congress 
 may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or 
 inability, both of the" president and vice president, declaring what 
 officer shall then act as president; and such officer shall act accord- 
 ingly, until the disability be removed, or a president shall be elected. 
 
 The president shall at stated times, receive for his services a com- 
 pensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during 
 the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not re- 
 ceive within that period any other emolument from the United States, 
 or any of them. 
 
 Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take the 
 following oath or affirmation: 
 
 " I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the 
 office of president of the United States, and will, to the best of my 
 ability, preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the United 
 States." 
 
 Sect. 2. The president shall be the commander in chief of the army 
 and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, 
 when called into the actual service of the United States. He may 
 require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officers in each of 
 the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties 
 of the respective offices. And he shall have power to grant reprieves 
 and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases 
 of impeachment. 
 
 He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the 
 senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators present 
 concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the advice and con- 
 sent of the senate, shall appoint, ambassadors, other public ministers 
 and consuls, judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of 
 the United States, whose appointments are not herein otherwise pro- 
 vided for, and which shall be established by law. But the congress 
 may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers a they 
 
APPENDIX. 175 
 
 think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the 
 heads of departments. 
 
 The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may 
 happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions, 
 which shall expire at the end of their next session. 
 
 Sect. 3. He shall from time to time give to the congress informa- 
 tion of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration 
 such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. He may, 
 on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them; 
 and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time 
 of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think 
 proper. He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers. 
 He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and shall 
 commission all the officers of the United States. 
 
 Sect. 4. The president, vice president, and all civil officers of the 
 United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and 
 conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. 
 
 Akticle III. 
 
 Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested 
 in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the congress may 
 from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the 
 supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good be- 
 haviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a com- 
 pensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance 
 in office. 
 
 Sect. 2. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and 
 equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, 
 and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; 
 to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and con- 
 suls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to con- 
 troversies to which the United States shall be a party; to contro- 
 versies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of 
 another state; between citizens of different states; between citizens 
 of the same state claiming lands under grants of different states, and 
 between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, 
 or subjects. 
 
 In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers or con- 
 suls, and those in which a state shall be party, the supreme court 
 shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before men- 
 tioned, the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as 
 to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations 
 as the congress shall make. 
 
 The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be 
 by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said 
 
176 APPENDIX. 
 
 crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within 
 any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the congress 
 may by law have directed. 
 
 Sect. 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only isn 
 levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving 
 them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, 
 unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or 
 on the confession in open court. 
 
 The congress shall have- power to declare the punishment of trea- 
 son; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or 
 forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted. 
 
 Article IV. 
 
 Sect. 1 . Full faith and credit shall be given in each state, to the 
 public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. 
 And the congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which 
 such acts, records, and proceedings, shall be proved, and the effect 
 thereof. 
 
 Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges 
 and immunities of citizens in the several states. 
 
 A person charged in any state with treason, felony, or other crime, 
 who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall, on 
 dejnand of the executive authority of the state from which he flfid, 
 be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the 
 crime. 
 
 No person held to service or labor in one state, under the laws 
 thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or 
 r^ulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but 
 shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or 
 labor may be due. 
 
 Sect. 3. New states may be admitted by the congress into this 
 union; but no new state shall be formed or erected within the juris- 
 diction of any other state; nor any state be form,ed by the junction 
 of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the 
 legislature of the states concerned, as well as of the congisess. 
 
 The congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful 
 rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property be- 
 longing to the United States; and nothing in this Gonstitiitio.n shall 
 be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or 
 of any particular state. 
 
 Sect. 4. The United States shall guarantee to every state in this 
 union, a republican form of government, and shall protect eaeh of 
 them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of 
 the executive (when the legislature cannot be convenpd) agpinst 
 domestic violence. 
 
APPENDIX. 177 
 
 Article V. 
 
 The congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it 
 necessary, shall propose amendments to this constitution, or, on the 
 application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several states, 
 shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either 
 case, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this con- 
 stitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the 
 several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one 
 or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the congress; 
 provided, that no amendment which may be made prior to the year 
 one thousand eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the 
 first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and 
 that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal 
 suffrage in the senate. 
 
 Article VI. 
 
 All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the 
 adoption of this constitution, shall be as valid against the United 
 States under this constitution, as under the confederation. 
 
 This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall 
 be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall 
 be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the su- 
 preme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound 
 thereby; any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the 
 contrary notwithstanding. 
 
 The senators and representatives before mentioned, and the mem- 
 bers of the several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial 
 officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be 
 bound by oath or affirmation, to support this constitution; but no 
 religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office of 
 pubUc trust under the United States. 
 
 Article VII. 
 
 The ratification of the conventions of nine states, shall be sufficient 
 for the establishment of this constitution between the states so 
 ratifying the same. 
 
 Done in convention, by the unanimous consent of the states pres- 
 ent, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one 
 thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the independence 
 of the United States of America, the twelfth. In witness whereof, 
 we have herexmto subscribed our names. 
 
 Geo: Washington, 
 President, and deputy from Virginia. 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 12 
 
178 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 New-Hampshiee : 
 
 John Langdon, 
 
 Nicholas Gilman. 
 Massachusetts : 
 
 Nathaniel Gorham, 
 
 Rufus King. 
 Connecticut: 
 
 William Samuel Johnson, 
 
 Roger Sherman. 
 New- York: 
 
 Alexander Hamilton. 
 New-Jersey: 
 
 William Livingston, 
 
 David Brearley, 
 
 William Patterson, 
 
 Jonathan Dayton. 
 Pennsylvania : 
 
 Benjamin Franklin, 
 
 Thomas Mifflin, 
 
 Robert Morris, 
 
 George Clymer, 
 
 Thomas Fitzsimons, 
 
 Jared IngersoU, 
 
 James Wilson, 
 
 Gouverneur Morris. 
 , Attest, 
 
 Delaware: 
 
 George Read, 
 
 Gunning Bedford, jun. 
 
 John Dickinson, 
 
 Richard Bassett, 
 
 Jacob Broom. 
 Maryland: 
 
 James M'Henry, 
 
 Daniel of St. Tho. Jenifer, 
 
 Daniel Carroll. 
 Virginia : 
 
 John Blair, 
 
 James Madison, jun. 
 North Carolina: 
 
 William Blount, 
 
 Richard Dobbs Spaight, 
 
 Hugh Williamson. 
 South Carolina: 
 
 John Rutledge, 
 
 Charles C. Pinkney, 
 
 Charles Pinckney, 
 
 Pierce Butler. 
 Georgia : 
 
 William Few, 
 
 Abraham Baldwin. 
 
 William Jackson, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 sr 9r Mr 
 
 In Convention, 
 
 Monday, September 17th, 1787. 
 
 Present, The states of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecti- 
 cut, Mr. Hamilton from New- York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, 
 Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
 Georgia: 
 
 Resolved, That the preceding constitution be laid before the United 
 States in congress assembled, and that it is the opinion of this con- 
 vention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a convention of 
 delegates chosen in each state by the people thereof, under the recom- 
 mendation of its legislature, for their assent and ratification; and 
 that each convention assenting to, and ratifying the same, should 
 give notice thereof to the United States in congress assembled. 
 
 Resolved, That it is the opinion of this convention, that as soon 
 as the conventions of nine states shall have ratified this constitution, 
 the United States in congress assembled, should fix a day on which 
 
APPENDIX. 179 
 
 electors should be appointed by the states which shall have ratified 
 the same, and a day on which the electors should assemble to vote 
 for the president, and the time and place for commencing proceedings 
 under this constitution. That after such publication, the electors 
 should be appointed, and the senators and representatives elected. 
 That the electors should meet on the day fixed for the election of 
 the president, and should transmit their votes, certified, signed, 
 sealed, and directed, as the constitution requires, to the secretary 
 of the United States, in congress assembled; that the senators and 
 representatives shoidd convene at the time and place assigned; that 
 the senators should appoint a president of the senate, for the sole 
 purpose of receiving, opening, and counting the votes for president; 
 and, that after he shall be chosen, the congress, together with the 
 president, should, without delay, proceed to execute this constitu- 
 tion. 
 
 By the unanimous order of the convention, 
 
 Go: Washington, 
 
 President. 
 William Jackson, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 iv w Mr 
 
 In Convention, 
 
 September 17 th, 1787. 
 
 Sm, We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of 
 the United States in congress assembled, that constitution which 
 has appeared to us the most advisable. 
 
 The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the 
 power of making war, peace and treaties; that of levying money and 
 regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial 
 authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the general gov- 
 ernment of the union; but the impropriety of delegating such exten- 
 sive trusts to one body of men is evident. Hence results the neces- 
 sity of a different organization. 
 
 It is obviously impracticable, in the federal government of these 
 states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and 
 yet provide for the interest and safety of all; individuals entering 
 into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The 
 magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and cir- 
 cumstance as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult 
 to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be 
 surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the present 
 occasion this difficulty was increased by a difference among the 
 several states as to their situation, extent, habits and particular 
 interests. 
 
180 APPENDIX. 
 
 In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, 
 that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, 
 the consolidation of otir union, in which is involved our prosperity, 
 felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important con- 
 sideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each state 
 in the convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitutle, 
 than might have been otherwise expected; and thus the constitu- 
 tion, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity^ and of 
 that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our 
 political situation rendered indispensable. 
 
 That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state is 
 not perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless consider, that 
 had her interests alone been consulted, the consequences might have 
 been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is liable 
 to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we 
 hope and believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that 
 country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is 
 our most ardent wish. With great respect, we have the honor to be, 
 sir, your excellency's most obedient and humble servants. 
 
 Go : Washington, 
 
 President. 
 By unanimous order of the convention. 
 
 His excellency the President of Congress. 
 
 *■ sr sr 
 
 The United States, In Congress Assembled, 
 
 Friday, Sept. 28th, 1787. 
 Present — New-Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New- York, 
 New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, 
 South Carolina, and Georgia; and from Maryland, Mr. Ross. 
 
 Congress having received the report of the convention lately assem- 
 bled in Philadelphia; 
 
 Resolved unanimously. That the said report, with the resolutions 
 and letter accompanying the same, be transmitted to the several 
 legislatures, in order to submit to a convention of delegates, chosen 
 in each state by the people thereof, in conformity to the resolves of 
 the convention, made and provided in that case. 
 
 Charles Thompson, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
APPENDIX. 181 
 
 AMENDMENTS 
 
 TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 Article I. 
 
 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
 or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
 speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
 and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. 
 
 Article II. 
 
 A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free 
 state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be 
 infringed. 
 
 Article III. 
 
 No soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any house, with- 
 out the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to 
 be prescribed by law. 
 
 Article IV, 
 
 The right of the people to be secured in their persons, houses, 
 papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
 not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
 cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
 the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
 
 Article V. 
 
 No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise in- 
 famous crime, vmless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, 
 except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, 
 when in actual service, in time of war, or public danger: Nor shall 
 any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeop- 
 ardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to 
 be witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
 without due process of law: Nor shall private property be taken for 
 public use, without just compensation. 
 
 Article VI. 
 
 In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
 speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district 
 wherein the crime shall have been committed; which district shall 
 have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
 nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit- 
 nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining wit- 
 
182 APPENDIX. 
 
 nesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his 
 defence. 
 
 Article VII. 
 
 In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
 exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved: 
 And no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any 
 court of the United States, than according to the rules of the com- 
 mon law. 
 
 Article VIII. 
 
 Excessive bail shall not be required; nor excessive fines imposed; 
 nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
 
 Article IX. 
 
 The enumeration, in the constitution, of certain rights shall not 
 be construed to deny or disparage others, retained by the people. 
 
 Article X. 
 
 The powers not delegated to the United States by the constitu- 
 tion, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states 
 respectively, or to the people. 
 
 Article XI. 
 
 The judicial power of the United States shall not be -construed to 
 extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against 
 one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens 
 or subjects of any foreign state. 
 
 Article XII. 
 
 The electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by 
 ballot for president and vice-president, one of whom at least shall 
 not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall 
 name in their ballots the person voted for as president, and in dis- 
 tinct ballots the person voted for as vice-president, and they shall 
 make distinct lists of all persons voted for as president, and of all 
 persons voted for as vice-president, and of the number of votes for 
 each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to 
 the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the 
 president of the senate; the president of the senate shall, in the 
 presence of the senate and house of representatives, open all the 
 certificates and the votes shall then be counted: The person having 
 the greatest number of votes for president, shall be the president, if 
 such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; 
 and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having 
 
APPENDIX. 183 
 
 the highest numbers not exceeding three on the Ust of those voted 
 for as president, the house of representatives shall choose imme- 
 diately, by ballot, the president. But in choosing the president, the 
 votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state 
 havmg one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member 
 or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the 
 states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the house of represent- 
 atives shall not choose a president whenever the right of choice 
 shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next fol- 
 lowing, then the vice-president shall act as president, as in case of 
 the death or other constitutional disability of the president. 
 
 The person having the greatest number of votes as vice-president, 
 shall be the vice-president, if such number be a majority of the whole 
 number of electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then 
 from the two highest numbers on the list, the senate shall choose the 
 vice-president; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds 
 of the whole number of senators, and a majority of the whole num- 
 ber shall be necessary to a choice. 
 
 But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of president 
 shall be eligible to that of vice president. 
 
 «r *■ sr 
 ADVERTISEMENT, 
 
 Published by tbe Department ol State as an introduction to the Journal of the Conrention assembled 
 at Philadelphia, Monday, May 12, and dissolved Monday, September 17, 1787. 
 
 The first volume of the late edition of the laws of the United States, 
 compiled under the direction of the late secretary of state and 
 attorney general, contains a succinct historical review of the suc- 
 cessive public measures, which led to the present organization of the 
 North American Union, from the assembling of the congress of the 
 colonies on the 5th of September, 1774, to the adoption of the con- 
 stitution of the United States, and of the subsequent amendments 
 to it, now in force. 
 
 The following resolution of the old congress, adopted on the 21st 
 of February, 1787, contains the authority by which the convention 
 which formed the constitution, was convoked: 
 
 "Whereas there is provision in the articles of confederation and 
 perpetual union, for making alterations therein, by the assent of a 
 congress of the United States, and of the legislatures of the several 
 states; and whereas experience hath evinced, that there are defects 
 in the present confederation, as a mean to remedy which, several of 
 the states, and particularly the state of New- York, by express 
 instructions to their delegates in congress, have suggested a conven- 
 
184 APPENDIX. 
 
 tion for the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such 
 convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing 
 in these states a firm national government — 
 
 "Eesolved, That in the opinion of congress, it is expedient, that on 
 the second Monday in May next, a convention of delegates, who shall 
 have been appointed by the several states, be held at Philadelphia, 
 for the sole and express purpose of revising the articles on confedera- 
 tion, and reporting to congress and the several legislatures, such 
 alterations and provisions therein, as shall, when agreed to in con- 
 gress, and confirmed by the states, render the federal constitution 
 adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preservation of 
 the union." 
 
 The day appointed by this resolution for the meeting of the con- 
 vention was the second Monday in May; but the 25th of that month 
 was the first day upon which a sufficient number of members appeared 
 to constitute a representation of a majority of the states. They then 
 elected George Washington their president, and proceeded to busi- 
 ness. 
 
 On the 29th of May, Mr. Edmund Randolph presented to the con- 
 vention fifteen resolutions, and Mr. C. Pinckney laid before them the 
 draft of a federal government, which were referred to a committee 
 of the whole; which debated the resolutions, from day to day, until 
 the 13th of June, when the committee of the whole reported to the 
 convention a series of nineteen resolutions, founded upon those which 
 had been proposed by Mr. Randolph. 
 
 On the 15th of June, Mr. Patterson submitted to the convention 
 his resolutions, which were referred to a committee of the whole, to 
 whom were also re-committed the resolutions reported by them on 
 the 13th. 
 
 On the 19th of June, the committee of the whole reported, that 
 they did not agree to Mr. Patterson's propositions, but reported 
 again the resolutions which had been reported before. 
 
 The convention never afterwards went into committee of the 
 whole; but from the 19th of June till the 23d of July were employed 
 in debating the nineteen resolutions reported by the committee of 
 the whole on the 13th of June; some of which were occasionally 
 referred to grand committees, of one member from each state, or to 
 select committees' of five members. 
 
 After passing upon the nineteen resolutions, it was on the 23d of 
 July resolved, "That the proceedings of the convention for the 
 establishment of a national government, except what respects the 
 supreme executive, be referred to a committee for the purpose of 
 reporting a constitution conformably to the proceedings aforesaid." 
 
 This committee, consisting of five members, and called in the 
 journal "the committee of detail," was appointed on the 24th of 
 
APPENDIX. 185 
 
 July, and with the proceedings of the convention, the propositions 
 submitted to the convention, by Mr. Charles Pinckney, on the 29th 
 of May, and by Mr. Patterson on the 15th of June, were referred to 
 them. 
 
 On the 26th of July, a resolution respecting the executive and two 
 others, offered for the consideration of the convention, were referred 
 to the committee of detail; and the convention adjourned till Mon- 
 day, the 6th of August, when the committee reported a constitution 
 for the establishment of a national government. This draft formed 
 the general text of debate, from that time till the 8th of September; 
 many additional resolutions, being in the course of the deliberations, 
 proposed, and referred to and reported upon by the same committee 
 of detail, or other committees of eleven, (a member from each state) 
 or of five. 
 
 On the 8th of September a committee of five was appointed "to 
 revise the style of and arrange the articles agreed to by the house." 
 
 On the 12th of September, this committee reported the constitu- 
 tion as revised and arranged, and the draft of a letter to congress. It 
 was ordered that printed copies of the reported constitution should 
 be furnished to the members, and they were brought in the next day. 
 
 On the seventeenth day of September, 1787, the convention dis- 
 solved itself, by an adjournment without day, after transmitting the 
 plan of constitution which they had prepared to congress, to be laid 
 before conventions, delegated by the people of the several states, for 
 their assent and ratification. 
 
 The last act of the convention, was a resolution that their journal 
 and other papers should be deposited with their president, to be 
 retained by him subject to the order of the congress, if ever formed 
 under the constitution. 
 
 On the 19th of March, 1796, president Washington deposited in 
 the department of state three manuscript volumes; one containing in 
 153 pages, the journal of the federal convention of 1787; one the 
 journal of the proceedings of the same convention, while in com- 
 mittee of the whole, in 28 pages; and one, three pages of lists of yeas 
 and nays, on various questions debated in the convention; and after 
 an interval of eight blank pages, five other pages of like yeas and 
 nays. There were also two loose sheets, and one half sheet of similar 
 yeas and nays; a printed draft of the constitution as reported on the 
 6th of August, 1787, "with erasures and written interlineations of 
 amendments afterwards adopted; two sheets containing copies of 
 the series of resolutions offered to the convention by Mr. Edmund 
 Randolph, in different stages of amendnnent, as reported by the 
 committee of the whole; and seven other papers of no importance in 
 relation to the proceedings of the convention. 
 
186 APPENDIX. 
 
 The volume containing the journal of the convention was in an 
 incomplete state. The journal of Friday, September 14, and a com- 
 mencement of that of Saturday, September 15, filled three fourths 
 of the 153d page; then terminated abruptly, and were, with the 
 exception of five lines, crossed out with a pen. President Madison, 
 to whom application for that purpose was made, has furnished, from 
 his own minutes, the means of completing the journal, as now pub- 
 Hshed. 
 
 The yeas and nays were not inserted in the journals, but were 
 entered partly in a separate volume, and partly on loose sheets of 
 paper. They were taken, not individually, but by states. Instead 
 of publishing them, as they appear in the manuscript, they are now 
 given immediately after each question upon which they were taken. 
 
 Gen. Joseph Bloomfield, executor of David Brearley, one of the 
 members of the convention, transmitted to the department of state 
 several additional papers, which are included in. this pubhcation. 
 
 The paper, purporting to be Col. Hamilton's plan of a constitu- 
 tion, is not noticed in the journals. It was not offered by him for 
 discussion, but was read by him, as part of a speech, observing that 
 he did not mean it as a proposition, but only to give a more correct 
 view of his ideas. 
 
 The return of the members in the several states, appears to have 
 been an estimate used for the piu-pose of apportioning the number of 
 members to be admitted from each of the states to the house of 
 representatives. 
 
 In order to follow with clear understanding, the course of proceed- 
 ings of the convention, particular attention is required to the follow- 
 ing papers, which, except the third, successively formed the general 
 text of their debates. 
 
 1. May 29, 1787. The fifteen resolutions offered by Mr. Edmund 
 Randolph to the convention,^ and by them referred to a committee of 
 the whole. 
 
 2. June 13. Nineteen resolutions reported by this committee of 
 the whole, on the 13th, and again on the 19th of June, to the con- 
 vention. 
 
 3. July 26. Twenty-three resolutions, adopted and elaborated by 
 the convention, in debate upon the above nineteen reported from 
 the committee of the whole; and on the 23d and 26th of July, re- 
 ferred, together with the plan of Mr. C. Pinkney, and the propositions 
 of Mr. Patterson, to a committee of five, to report a draft of a con- 
 stitution. 
 
 4. August 6. The draft of a plan of constitution reported by this 
 committee to the convention; and debated from that time till the 
 12th of September. 
 
APPENDIX. 187 
 
 5. September 13. Plan of constitution, brought in by a committee 
 of revision, appointed on the 8th of September, consisting of five 
 members, to revise the style and arrange the articles agreed to by 
 the convention. 
 
 The second and fourth of these papers, are among those deposited 
 by president "Washington, at the department of state. 
 
 The first, fourth and fifth, are among those transmitted by general 
 Bloomfield. 
 
 The third is collected from the proceedings of the convention, as 
 they are spread over the journal from June 19th to July 26th. 
 
 This paper, together with the plan of Mr. C. Pinkney, a copy of 
 which has been furnished by him, and the propositions of Mr. Patter- 
 son, included among the papers forwarded by general Bloomfield, 
 comprise the materials, upon which the first draft was made of the 
 constitution, as reported by the committee of detail, on the 6th of 
 August. 
 
 To the journal, acts and proceedings of the convention, are added 
 in this pubhcation, the subsequent proceedings of the congress of 
 the confederation, upon the constitution, reported as the result of 
 their labors; and the acts of ratification by the conventions of the 
 several states of union, by virtue of which it became the supreme 
 law of the land; and also the amendments to it, which have been 
 since adopted and form a part of the constitution. It was thought 
 that this supplement would be, if not essential, at least well adapted 
 to carry into full effect the intentions of congress in directing the 
 publication; by presenting at one view the rise, progress, and present 
 condition of the constitution of the United States. 
 
 Department of State, October, 1819. 
 
LIST OF THE MEMBERS 
 
 OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION WHICH FORMED 
 THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 From- 
 
 N e w-Hampshire . 
 
 Massachusetts. 
 
 Rhode Island 
 Connecticut- - 
 
 New- York 
 
 New-Jersey. . 
 
 Pennsylvania . 
 
 Delaware. 
 
 188 
 
 1. John Langdon July 23, 1787 
 
 John Pickering, 
 
 2. Nicholas Oilman July 23, 1787 
 
 Benjamin West. 
 
 Francis Dana, 
 
 Elbridge Gerry May 29,1787 
 
 3. Nathaniel Gorham May 28,1787 
 
 4. RufusKing May 25,1787 
 
 CalebStrong May 28,1787 
 
 [No appointment.] 
 
 5. Wm. Sam. Johnson June 2,1787 
 
 6. Roger Sherman May 30, 1787 
 
 Oliver Elsworth May 29,1787 
 
 Robert Yates May 25, 1787 
 
 7. Alexander Hamilton May 25, 1787 
 
 John Lansing June 2,1787 
 
 8. Wm. Livingston June 5,1787 
 
 9. David Brearley May 25, 1787 
 
 William C. Houston May 25,1787 
 
 10. William Patterson May 25,1787 
 
 John Nielson, 
 
 Abraham Clarh, 
 
 n. Jonathan Dayton June 21, 1787 
 
 12. Benjamin Franklin May 28,1787 
 
 13. Thomas Mifflin... May 28,1787 
 
 14. RobertMorris i May 25,1787 
 
 15. George Clymer j May 28, 1787 
 
 16. Thos. Fitzsimons May 25,1787 
 
 17. Jared Ingersoll May 28, 1787 
 
 18. James Wilson May 25,'l787 
 
 19. Gouvemeur Morris May 25,1787 
 
 20. George Read May 25, 1787 
 
 21. Gunning Bedford, jr May 28, 1787 
 
 22. John Dickinson May 28, 1787 
 
 23. Richard Bassett May 25,1787 
 
 24. Jacob Broom May 25,1787 
 
 Attended. 
 
From- 
 
 Maryland. 
 
 Virginia. 
 
 North Carolina. 
 
 South Carolina. 
 
 Georgia. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 List of the Members — Continued. 
 
 189 
 
 25. James M'Henry 
 
 26. Danielof St. Thomas Jenifer 
 
 27. Daniel Carroll 
 
 John Francis Mercer 
 
 Luther Martin 
 
 28. George Washington , 
 
 Patrick Henry 
 
 Edmund Randolph 
 
 29. John Blair , 
 
 30. James Madison, jr 
 
 George Mason 
 
 George Wythe 
 
 James M'Clurg, (in the room of 
 
 P. Henry.) 
 
 Richard Caswell 
 
 Alexander Martin 
 
 William R. Davie 
 
 31. William Blount, (in the room of 
 
 R. Caswell.) 
 Willie Jones 
 
 32. Richard D. Spaight 
 
 33. Hugh Williamson, (in the room of 
 
 W. Jones.) 
 
 34. John Rutledge 
 
 35. Charles C. Pinkney 
 
 36. Charles Pinckney 
 
 37. Pierce Butler 
 
 38. William Pew 
 
 39. Abraham Baldwin 
 
 William Pierce 
 
 George Walton, 
 
 William Houston 
 
 Natharml Pendleton. 
 
 Attended. 
 
 May 29,1787 
 June . 2, 1787 
 July 9, 1787 
 August 6, 1787 
 June 9, 1787 
 May 25,1787 
 (Declined.) 
 May 25,1787 
 25, 1787 
 25, 1787 
 25,1787 
 25, 1787 
 25, 1787 
 
 May 
 May 
 May 
 May 
 May 
 
 (Resigned.) 
 May 25,1787 
 May 25,1787 
 June 20,1787 
 
 (Declined.) 
 May 25,1787 
 May 25,1787 
 
 May 
 May 
 May 
 May 
 May 
 June 
 May 
 
 25, 1787 
 25, 1787 
 25, 1787 
 25, 1787 
 25, 1787 
 11, 1787 
 31, 1787 
 
 June 1, 1787 
 
 Those with numbers before their names, signed the constitution 39 
 
 Those in italics, never attended 10 
 
 Members who attended, but did not sign the constitution 16 
 
 65 
 
LETTER FROM THE HONORABLE ROBERT YATES, AND THE HON- 
 ORABLE JOHN LANSING, JUN. ESQUIRES, TO THE GOVERNOR OF 
 NEW-YORK, CONTAINING THEIR REASONS FOR NOT SUBSCRIBING 
 TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
 
 SlE, 
 
 We do ourselves the honor to advise your excellency, that in 
 pursuance of concurrent resolutions of the honorable senate and 
 assembly, we have, together with Mr. Hamilton, attended the con- 
 vention, appointed for revising the articles of confederation, and 
 reporting amendments to the same. 
 
 It is with the sincerest concern we observe, that, in the prosecu- 
 tion of the important objects of our mission, we have been reduced 
 to the disagreeable alternative, of either exceeding the powers dele- 
 gated to us, and giving our assent to measures which we conceive 
 destructive to the political happiness of the citizens of the United 
 States, or opposing our opinions to that of a body of respectable 
 men, to whom those citizens had given the most unequivocal proofs 
 of confidence. — Thus circumstanced, under these impressions, to 
 have hesitated, would have been to be culpable; we, therefore, gave 
 the principles of the constitution, which has received the sanction of 
 a majority of the convention, our decided and unreserved dissent; 
 but we must candidly confess, that we should have been equally 
 opposed to any system, however modified, which had in object the 
 consolidation of the United States into one government. 
 
 We beg leave, briefly, to state some cogent reasons, which, among 
 others, influenced us to decide against a consolidation of the states. 
 These are reducible into two heads. 
 
 1st. The limited and well-defined powers under which we acted, 
 and which could not, on any possible construction, embrace an idea 
 of such magnitude, as to assent to a general co.nstitution, in sub- 
 version of that of the state. 
 
 2d. A conviction of the impracticability of establishing a general 
 government, pervading every part of the United States, and extend- 
 ing essential benefits to all. 
 
 Our powers were explicit, and confined to the sole and express 
 purpose of revising the articles of confederation, and reporting such 
 190 
 
APPENDIX. 191 
 
 alterations and provisions therein, as should render the federal con- 
 stitution adequate to the exigencies of government, and the preserva- 
 tion of the union. 
 
 From these expressions, we were led to believe, that a system of 
 consolidated government could not in the remotest degree, have been 
 in contemplation of the legislature of this state ? for that so important 
 a trust, as the adopting measures which tended to deprive the state 
 government of its most essential rights of sovereignty, and to place 
 it in a dependent situation, could not have been confided by implica- 
 tion; and the circumstance, that the acts of the convention were to 
 receive a state approbation in the last resort, forcibly corroborated 
 the opinion, that our powers could not involve the subversion of a 
 constitution, which being immediately derived from the people, could 
 only be abolished by their express consent, and not by a legislature, 
 possessing authority vested in them for its preservation. Nor could 
 we suppose, that if it had been the intention of the legislature, to 
 abrogate the existing confederation, they would, in such pointed 
 terms, have directed the attention of their delegates to the revision 
 and amendment of it, in total exclusion of every other idea. 
 
 Reasoning in this manner, we were of opinion, that the leading 
 feature of every amendment, ought to be the preservation of the 
 individual states, in their uncontrouled constitutional rights, and 
 that in reserving these, a mode might have been devised of granting 
 to the confederacy, the monies arising from a general system of 
 revenue; the power of regulating commerce, and enforcing the 
 observance of foreign treaties, and other necessary matters of less 
 moment. 
 
 Exclusive of our objections originating from the want of power, 
 we entertained an opinion, that a general government, however 
 guarded by declarations of rights, or cautionary provisions, must 
 unavoidably, in a short time, be productive of the destruction of 
 the civil liberty of such citizens who could be effectually coerced by 
 it: by reason of the extensive territory of the United States, the 
 dispersed situation of its inhabitants, and the insuperable difficulty 
 of controuling or counteracting the views of a set of men (however 
 unconstitutional and oppressive their acts might be) possessed of all 
 the powers of government ; and who from their remoteness from their 
 constituents and necessary permanency of office, could not be sup- 
 posed to be uniformly actuated by an attention to their welfare and 
 happiness; that however wise and energetic the principles of the 
 general government might be, the extremities of the United States 
 could not be kept 'in due submission and obedience to its laws, at 
 the distance of many hundred miles from the seat of government; 
 that if the general legislature was composed of so numerous a body 
 of men, as to represent the interests of all the inhabitants of the 
 
192 APPENDIX. 
 
 United States, in the usual and true ideas of representation, the 
 expence of supporting it would become intolerably burdensome; and 
 that if a few only were vested with a power of legislation, the interests 
 of a great majority of the inhabitants of the United States, must 
 necessarily be unknowri; or if known, even in the first stages of the 
 operations of the new government, unattended to. 
 
 These reasons were, in our opinion, conclusive against any system 
 of consolidated government: to that recommended by the conven- 
 tion, we suppose most of them very forcibly apply. 
 
 It is not our intention to pursue this subject farther, than merely 
 to explain our conduct in the discharge of the trust which the honor- 
 able the legislature reposed in us. — Interested, however, as we are, 
 in common with our feUow citizens, in the resvdt, we cannot forbear 
 to declare, that we have the strongest apprehensions, that a govern- 
 ment so organized, as that recommended by the convention, cannot 
 afford that security to equal and permanent liberty, which we wished 
 to make an invariable object of our pursuit. 
 
 We were not present at the completion of the new constitution; 
 but before we left the convention, its principles were so well estab- 
 lished, as to convince us, that no alteration was to be expected to 
 conform it to our ideas of expediency and safety. A persuasion, that 
 our further attendance would be fruitless and unavailing, rendered 
 us less soUcitous to return. 
 
 We have thus explained our motives for opposing the adoption of 
 the national constitution, which we conceived it our duty to com- 
 municate to your excellency, to be submitted to the consideration of 
 the honorable legislature. 
 
 We have the honor to be, with the greatest respect, 
 
 Your excellency's most obedient, and very humble servants, 
 
 Robert Yates, 
 John Lansing, Jun. 
 
 His Excellency Governor Clinton. 
 
A LETTER OF HIS EXCELLENCY EDMUND RANDOLPH, ESQ. ON 
 
 THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, ADDRESSED TO THE HONORABLE 
 
 THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, VIRGINIA. 
 
 Richmond, Oct. 10, 1787. 
 Sir, 
 
 The constitution, which I enclosed to the general assembly in a 
 late official letter, appears without my signature. This circumstance, 
 although trivial in its own nature, has been rendered rather important, 
 to myself at least, by being misunderstood by some, and misrepre- 
 sented by others. — As I disdain to conceal the reasons for withhold- 
 ing my subscription, I have always been, still am, and ever shall be, 
 ready to proclaim them to the world. To the legislature, therefore, 
 by whom I was deputed to the federal convention, I beg leave now 
 to address them: affecting no indifference to public opinion, but 
 resolved not to court it by an unmanly sacrifice of my own judgment. 
 
 As this explanation will involve a summary, but general review of 
 our federal situation, you will pardon me, I trust, although I should 
 transgress the usual bounds of a letter. 
 
 Before my departure for the convention, I beheved, that the con- 
 federation was not so eminently defective, as it had been supposed. 
 But after I had entered into a free communication with those who 
 were best informed of the condition and interest of each state; after 
 I had compared the intelligence derived from them, with the prop- 
 erties which ought to characterise the government of our union, I 
 became persuaded, that the confederation was destitute of every 
 energy, which a constitution of the United States ought to possess. 
 
 For the objects proposed by its institution were, that it shyuld be 
 a shield against foreign hostility, and a firm resort against domestic 
 commotion: that it should cherish trade, and promote the prosperity 
 of the states under its care. 
 
 But these are not among the attributes of our present tmion. 
 Severe experience under the pressure of war — a ruinous weakness 
 manifested since the return of peace; and the contemplation of 
 those dangers, which darken the future prospect, have condemned 
 the hope of grandeur and of safety under the auspices of the con- 
 federation. 
 
 S. Doc. 728, 60-2 13 193 
 
194 APPENDIX. 
 
 In the exigencies of war, indeed, the history of its effects is but 
 short ; the final ratification haviag been delayed until the beginning 
 of the year 1781. ' But however short, this period is distinguished by 
 melancholy testimonies of its inability to maintain in harmony, the 
 social intercourse of the states, to defend congress against encroach- 
 ments on their rights, and to obtain by requisitions, supphes to the 
 federal treasury, or recruits to the federal armies. I shall not attempt 
 an enumeration of the particular instances; but leave to your own 
 remembrance and the records of congress, the support of the as- 
 sertions. 
 
 In the season of peace too, not many years have elapsed; and yet 
 each of them has produced fatal examples of delinquency, and some- 
 times of pointed opposition to federal duties. To the various re- 
 monstrances of congress, I appeal, for a gloomy, but unexaggerated 
 narrative of the injiu-ies which our faith, honor and happiness, have 
 sustained by the failure of the states. 
 
 But these evils are past; and some may be led by an honest zeal 
 to conclude that they cannot be repeated. Yes, sir, they will be 
 repeated as long as the confederation exists, and will bring with them 
 other mischiefs springing from the same source, which cannot be yet 
 foreseen in their full array of terror. 
 
 If we examine the constitution and laws of the several states, it is 
 immediately discovered that the law of nations is unprovided with 
 sanctions in many cases, which deeply affect public dignity and public 
 justice. The letter however of the confederation does not permit con- 
 gress to remedy these defects, and such an authority, although evi- 
 dently deducible from its spirit, cannot without violation of the 
 second article, be assumed. Is it not a political phenomenon, that 
 the head of the confederacy should be doomed to be plunged into 
 war, from its wretched impotency to check offences against this law; 
 and sentenced to witness in unavailing anguish the infraction of their 
 engagements to foreign sovereigns ? 
 
 And yet this is not the only grievous point of weakness. After a 
 war shall be inevitable, the requisitions of congress for quotas of 
 men or money, will again prove unproductive, and fallacious. Two 
 causes will always conspire to this baneful consequence. 
 
 1. No government can be stable, which hangs on human inclina- 
 tion alone, unbiassed by the coercion; and 2, from the very connec- 
 tion between states bound to proportionate contributions, jealousies 
 and suspicions naturally arise, which at least chill the ardor, if they 
 do not excite the murmm-s of the whole. I do not forget indeed, 
 that by one sudden impulse our part of the American continent has 
 been thrown into a military posture, and that in the earlier annals of 
 the war, our armies marched to the field on the mere recommendations 
 of congress. But ought we to argue from a contest, thus signalized 
 
APPENDIX. 195 
 
 by the magnitude of its stake, that as often as a flame shall be here- 
 after kindled, the same enthusiasm will fill our legions, or renew 
 them, as they may be filled by losses? 
 
 If not, where shall we find protection? Impressions, like those, 
 which prevent a comphance with requisitions of regular forces, will 
 deprive the American republic of the services of militia. But let us 
 suppose that they are attainable, and acknowledge, as I always shall, 
 that they are the natural support of a free government. When it 
 is remembered, that in their absence agriculture must languish; that 
 they are not habituated to military exposures and the rigour of mili- 
 taiy discipline, and that the necessity of holding in readiness succes- 
 sive detachments, carries the expence far beyond that of enlistments — 
 This resource ought to be adopted with caution. 
 
 As strongly too am I persuaded, that the requisitions for money 
 wiU not be more cordially received. For besides the distrust, which 
 would prevail with respect to them also; besides the opinion, enter- 
 tained by each state of its own liberality and unsatisfied demands 
 against the United States, there is another consideration not less 
 worthy of attention — the first rule for determining each quota of 
 the value of all lands granted or surveyed, and of the buildings and 
 improvements thereon. It is no longer doubted, that an equitable, 
 uniform mode of estimating that value, is impracticable; and there- 
 fore twelve states have substituted the number of inhabitants under 
 certain limitations, as the standard according to which money is to 
 be furnished. But under the subsisting articles of the union, the 
 assent of the thirteenth state is necessary, and has not yet been 
 given. This does of itself lessen the hope of procuring a revenue for 
 federal uses; and the miscarriage of the impost almost rivets our 
 despondency. 
 
 Amidst these disappointments, it would afford some consolation, 
 if when rebellion shall threaten any state, an ultimate asylum could 
 be found under the wing of congress. But it is at least equivocal 
 whether they can intrude forces into a state, rent asunder by civil 
 discord, even with the purest solicitude for our federal welfare, and 
 on the most urgent entreaties of the state itself. Nay the very allow- 
 ance of this power would be pageantry alone, from the want of money 
 and of men. 
 
 To these defects of congressional power, the history of man has sub- 
 joined others, not less alarming. I earnestly pray, that the recollec- 
 tion of common sufferings, which terminated in common glory, may 
 check the sallies of violence, and perpetuate mutual friendship be- 
 tween the states. But I cannot presume, that we are superior to 
 those unsocial passions, which under like circumstances have infested 
 more ancient nations. I cannot presume, that through all time, in 
 the daily mixture of American citizens with each other, in the con- 
 
196 APPENDIX. 
 
 flicts for commercial advantages, in the discontents which the neigh- 
 borhood of territory has been seen to engender in other quarters of 
 the globe, and in the efforts of faction and intrigue — thirteen dis- 
 tinct communities under no effective superintending control (as the 
 United States confessedly now are, notwithstanding the bold terms 
 of the confederation) will avoid a hatred to each other deep and 
 deadly. 
 
 In the prosecution of this enquiry, we shall find the general pros- 
 perity to decline under a system thus unnerved. No sooner is the 
 merchant prepared for foreign ports, with the treasures which this 
 new world kindly offers to his acceptance, than it is announced to 
 him, that they are shut against American shipping, or opened under 
 oppressive regulations. He urges congress to a counter-policy, and 
 is answered only by a condolence on the general misfortune. He is 
 immediately struck with the conviction, that until exclusion shall 
 be opposed to exclusion, and restriction to restriction, the American 
 flag will be disgraced. For who can conceive, that thirteen legisla- 
 tures, viewing commerce under different regulations, and fancying 
 themselves discharged from every obligation to concede the smallest 
 of their commercial advantages for the benefit of the whole, will be 
 wrought into a concert of action and defiance of every prejudice? 
 Nor is this all: Let the great improvements be recounted, which 
 have enriched and illustrated Europe: Let it be noted, how few 
 those are, which will be absolutely denied to the United States, com- 
 prehending within their boundaries, the choicest blessings of climate, 
 soil, and navigable waters; then let the most sanguine patriot 
 banish, if he can, the mortifying belief, that all these must sleep, 
 until they shall be roused by the vigor of a national government. 
 
 I have not exemplified the preceding remarks by minute details; 
 because they are evidently fortified by truth, and the consciousness 
 of the United States of America. I shall, therefore, no longer deplore 
 the unfitness of the confederation to secure our peace; but proceed, 
 with a truly unaffected distrust of my own opinions, to examine 
 what order of powers the government of the United States ought to 
 enjoy? How they ought to be defended against encroachments? 
 Whether they can be interwoven in the confederation, without an 
 alteration of its very essence, or must be lodged in new hands? 
 Shewing at the same time the convulsions, which seem to await us, 
 from a dissolution of the union or partial confederacies. 
 
 To mark the kind and degree of authority, which ought to be 
 confided to the government of the United States, is no more than 
 to reverse the description which I have already given, of the defects 
 of the confederation. 
 
 From thence it will follow, that the operations of peace and war 
 will be clogged without regiilar advances of money, and that these 
 
APPENDIX. 197 
 
 will be slow indeed, if dependent on supplication alone. For what 
 better name do requisitions deserve, which, may be evaded or opposed 
 without the fear of coercion? But although coercion is an indis- 
 pensable ingredient, it ought not to be directed against a state, as 
 a state; it being impossible to attempt it except by blockading the 
 trade of the delinquent, or carrying war into its bowels. Even if 
 these violent schemes were eligible, in other respects, both of them 
 might perhaps be defeated by the scantiness of the public chest; 
 would be tardy in their complete effect, as the expence of the land 
 and naval equipments must be first reimbursed; and might drive 
 the proscribed state into the desperate resolve of inviting foreign 
 alliances. Against each of them lie separate unconquerable objec- 
 tions. A blockade is not equally applicable to all the states, they 
 being differently circumstanced in commerce and in ports; nay, an 
 excommunication from the privilege of the union would be vain, 
 because every regulation or prohibition may be easily eluded under 
 the rights of American citizenship, or of foreign nations. But how 
 shall we speak of the intrusion of troops? Shall we arm citizens 
 against citizens, and habituate them to shed kindred blood? Shall 
 we risque the inflicting of wounds which will generate a rancour 
 never to be subdued? Would there be no room to fear, that an 
 army accustomed to fight for the establishment of authority, would 
 salute an emperor of their OAvn ? Let us not bring these things into 
 jeopardy. Let us rather substitute the same process by which 
 individuals are compelled to contribute to the government of their 
 own states. Instead of making requisitions to the legislatures, it 
 would appear more proper, that taxes should be imposed by the 
 federal head, under due modifications and guards; that the collectors 
 should demand from the citizens their respective quotas, and be 
 supported as in the collection of ordinary taxes. 
 
 It foUows too, that, as the general government will be responsible 
 to foreign nations, it ought to be able to annul any offensive measure, 
 or enforce any public right. Perhaps among the topics on which 
 they may be aggrieved or complain, the commercial intercourse, and 
 .the manner in which contracts are discharged, may constitute the 
 principal articles of clamor. 
 
 It follows too, that the general government ought to be the supreme 
 arbiter, for adjusting every contention among the states. In all 
 their connections, therefore, with each other, and particularly in 
 commerce, which will probably create the greatest discord, it ought 
 to hold the reins. 
 
 It follows too, that the general government ought. to protect each 
 state against domestic as well as external violence. 
 
198 APPENDIX. 
 
 And lastly, it follows, that through the general government alone, 
 can we ever assume the rank to which we are entitled by our resources 
 and situation. 
 
 Should the people of America surrender these powers, they can be 
 paramount to the constitutions and ordinary acts of legislation, only 
 by being delegated by them. I do not pretend to affirm, but I ven- 
 ture to believe, that if the confederation had been solemnly ques- 
 tioned in opposition to our constituion, or even to one of our laws, 
 posterior to it, it must have given way. For never did it obtain a 
 higher ratification, than a resolution of assembly in the daily form. 
 
 This will be one security against encroachment. But another not 
 less effectual is, to exclude the individual states from any agency in 
 the national government, as far as it may be safe, and their inter- 
 position may not be absolutely necessary. 
 
 But now, sir, permit me to declare, that in my humble judgment, 
 the powers by which alone the blessings of a general government can 
 be accomplished, cannot be interwoven in the confederation, without 
 a change in its very essence, or, in other words, that the confedera- 
 tion must be thrown aside. This is almost demonstrable, from the 
 inefficacy of requisitions,' and from the necessity of converting them 
 * into acts of authority. My suffrage, as a citizen, is also for additional 
 powers. But to whom shall we commit these acts of authority, 
 these additional powers ? To congress ? When I formerly lamented 
 the defects in the jurisdiction of congress, I had no view to indicate 
 any other opinion, than that the federal head ought not to be so 
 circumscribed. For free as I am at all times to profess my reverence 
 for that body, and the individuals who compose it, I am yet equally 
 free to make known my aversion to repose such a trust in a tribunal 
 so constituted. My objections are not the visions of theory, but the 
 result of my own observations in America, and of the experience of 
 others abroad. 1. The legislative and executive are concentred in 
 the same persons. This, where real power exists, must eventuate 
 in tyranny. 2. The representation of the states bears no proportion 
 to their importance. This is an unreasonable subjection of the will 
 of the majority to that of the minority. 3. The mode of election, 
 and the liability of being recalled, may too often render the delegates 
 rather partizans of their own states than representatives of the union. 
 4. Cabal and intrigue must consequently gain an ascendency in a 
 course of years. 5. A single house of legislation will sometimes be 
 precipitate, perhaps passionate. 6. As long as seven states are 
 required for the smallest, and nine for the greatest votes, may not 
 foreign influence at some future day insinuate itself, so as to interrupt 
 every active exertion? 7. To crown the whole, it is scarce within 
 the verge of possibility, that so numerous an assembly should acquire 
 
APPENDIX. 199 
 
 that secrecy, dispatch, and vigour which are the test of excellence 
 in the executive department. 
 
 My inference from these facts and principles, is, that the new 
 powers must be deposited in a new body, growing out of a consoli- 
 dation of the union, as far as the circumstances of the states will 
 allow. Perhaps, however, some may mediate its dissolution, and 
 others, partial confederacies. 
 
 The first is an idea awful indeed, and irreconcileable with a, very 
 early, and hitherto uniform conviction, that without union, we 
 must be undone. For, before the voice of war was heard, the pulse 
 of the then colonies was tried, and found to beat in unison. The 
 unremitted labor of our enemies was to divide, and the policy of 
 every congress, to bind us together. But in no example was this 
 truth more clearly displayed, than in the prudence with which inde- 
 pendence was unfolded to the sight, and in the forbearance to declare 
 it, until America almost unanimously called for it. After we had 
 thus launched into troubles, never before explored, and in the hour 
 of heavy distress, the remembrance of our social strength, not only 
 forbade despair, but drew from congress the most illustrious repeti- 
 tion of their settled purpose to despise all terms, short of independ- 
 ence. 
 
 Behold, then, how successful and glorious we have been, while we 
 acted in fraternal concord. But let us discard the illusion, that by 
 this success, and this glory, the crest of danger has irrecoverably 
 fallen. Our governments are yet too youthful to have acquired 
 stability from habit. Our very quiet depends upon the duration of 
 the union. Among the upright and intelligent, few can read without 
 emotion the future fate of the states, if severed from each other. 
 Then shall we learn the full weight of foreign intrigue. Then shall 
 we hear of partitions of our country. If a prince, inflamed by the 
 lust of conquest, should use one state as the instrument of enslaving 
 others — if every state is to be wearied by perpetual alarms, and com- 
 pelled to maintain large military establishments — if all questions are 
 to be. decided by an appeal to arms, where a difference of opinion 
 cannot be removed by negociation — in a word, if all the direful mis- 
 fortunes which haunt the peace of rival nations, are to triumph over 
 the land, for what have we to contend ? why have we exhausted our 
 wealth? why have we basely betrayed the heroic martyrs of the 
 federal cause ? 
 
 But dreadful as the total dissolution of the union is to my mind, 
 I entertain no less horror at the thought of partial confederacies. 
 I have not the least ground for supposing, that an overture of this 
 kind would be listened to by a single state, and the presumption is, 
 that the politics of the greater part of the states, flow from the 
 warmest attachment to an union of the whole. If, however a lesser 
 
200 APPENDIX. 
 
 confederacy could be obtained by Virginia, let me conjure my 
 countrymen, well to weigh the probable consequences, before they 
 attempt to form it. 
 
 On such an event, the strength of the union would be divided in 
 two, or perhaps three parts. Has it so increased since the war as 
 to be divisible — and yet remain sufficient for our happiness ? 
 
 The utmost limit of any partial confederacy, which Virginia could 
 expect to form, would comprehend the three southern states, and 
 her nearest northern neighbour. But they, like ourselves, are 
 diminished in their real force, by the mixture of an unhappy species 
 of population. 
 
 Again may I ask, whether the opulence of the United States has 
 been augmented since the war? This is answered in the negative, 
 by a load of debt, and the declension of trade. 
 
 At all times must a southern confederacy support ships of war, 
 and soldiery? As soon would a navy move from the forest, and an 
 army spring from the earth, as such a confederacy, indebted, im- 
 poverished in its commerce, and destitute of men, could, for some 
 years at least, provide an ample defence for itself. 
 
 Let it not be forgotten, that nations, which can enforce their 
 rights, have large claims against the United States, and that the 
 creditor may insist on payment from any of them. Which of them 
 would probably be the victim? the most productive, and the most 
 exposed. When vexed by reprisals or war, the southern states will 
 sue for alliance on this continent or beyond sea. If for the former, 
 the necessity of an union of the whole is decided; if for the latter, 
 America will, I fear, re-act the scenes of confusion and bloodshed, 
 exhibited among most of those nations, which have, too late, re- 
 pented the folly of relying on auxiliaries. 
 
 Two or more confederacies cannot but be competitors for power. 
 The ancient friendship between the citizens of America, being thus 
 cut off, bitterness and hostility will succeed in its place; in order to 
 prepare against surrounding danger, we shall be compelled to vest 
 some where or other power approaching near to military government. 
 
 The annals of the world have abounded so much with instances of 
 a divided people being a prey to foreign influence, that I shall not 
 restrain my apprehensions of it, should our union be torn asunder. 
 The opportunity of insinuating it, will be multiplied in proportion 
 to the parts into which we may be broken. 
 
 In short, sir, I am fatigued with summoning up to my imagination 
 the miseries which will harrass the United States, if torn from each 
 other, and which will not end until they are superseded by fresh 
 mischiefs under the yoke of a tyrant. 
 
 I come, therefore to the last, and perhaps only refuge in our diffi- 
 culties, a consolidation of the union, as far as circumstances will 
 
APPENDIX. 201 
 
 permit. To fulfil this desirable object, the constitution was framed 
 by the federal convention. A quorum of eleven states, and the 
 only member from a twelfth have subscribed it; Mr. Mason of Vir- 
 ginia, Mr. Gerry of Massachusetts, and myself having refused to 
 subscribe. 
 
 Why I refused, will, I hope, be solved to the satisfaction of those 
 who know me, by saying, that a sense of duty commanded me thus 
 to act. It commanded me, sir, for believe me, that no event of 
 my life ever occupied more of my reflection. To subscribe, seemed 
 to offer no inconsiderable gratification, since it would have presented 
 me to the world as a fellow laborer with the learned and zealous states- 
 men of America. 
 
 But it was far more interesting to my feelings, that I was about to 
 differ from three of my colleagues, one of whom is, to the honor of 
 the country which he has saved, embosomed in their affections, and 
 can receive no praise from the highest lustre of language ; the other 
 two of whom have been long enrolled among the wisest and best 
 lovers of the commonwealth; and the unshaken and intimate friend- 
 ship of all of whom I have ever prized, and still do prize, as among 
 the happiest of all acquisitions. I was no stranger to the reigning 
 partiality for the members who composed the convention, and had 
 not the smallest doubt, that from this cause, and from the ardor 
 for a reform of government, the first applauses at least would be 
 loud and profuse. 1 suspected, too, that there was something in 
 the human breast which for a time would be apt to construe a tem- 
 perateness in politics, into an enmity to the union. Nay, I plainly 
 foresaw, that in the dissentions of parties, a middle line would prob- 
 ably be interpreted into a want of enterprize and decision. But 
 these considerations, how seducing soever, were feeble opponents 
 to the -suggestions of my conscience. I was sent to exercise my judg- 
 ment, and to exercise it was my fixed determination; being instructed 
 by even an imperfect acquaintance with mankind, that self approba- 
 tion is the only true reward which a political career can bestow, and 
 that popularity would have been but another name for perfidy, if 
 to secure it, I had given up the freedom of thinking for myself. 
 
 It would have been a peculiar pleasure to me to have ascertained 
 before I left Virginia, the temper and genius of my fellow citizens, 
 considered relatively to a government, so substantially differing from 
 the confederation as that which is now submitted. But this was, 
 for many obvious reasons, impossible; and I was thereby deprived 
 of what I thought the necessary guides. 
 
 I saw, however, that the coiifederation was tottering from its own 
 weakness, and that the sitting of the convention was a signal of its 
 total insufficiency. I was therefore ready to assent to a scheme 
 of government, which was proposed, and which went beyond the 
 
202 APPENDIX. 
 
 limits of the confederation, believing, that without being too exten- 
 sive it would have preserved our tranquility, until that temper and 
 that genius should be collected. 
 
 But when the plan which is now before the general assembly, was 
 on its passage through the convention, I moved, that the state 
 conventions should be at liberty to amend, and that a second general 
 convention should be holden, to discuss the amendments, which 
 should be suggested by them. This motion was in some measure 
 justified by the manner in which the confederation was forwarded 
 originally, by congress to the state legislatures, in many of which 
 amendments were proposed, and those amendments were afterwards 
 examined in congress. Such a motion was doubly expedient here, 
 as the delegation of so much more power was sought for. But it was 
 negatived. I then expressed my unwillingness to sign. My reasons 
 were the following: 
 
 1. It is said in the resolutions which accompany the constitution, 
 that it is to be submitted to a convention of delegates chosen in 
 each state by the people thereof, for their assent and ratification. 
 The meaning of these terms is allowed universally to be, that the 
 convention must either adopt the constitution in the whole, or reject 
 it in the whole, and is positively forbidden to amend. If therefore, 
 I had signed, I should have felt myself bound to be silent as to 
 amendments, and to endeavor to support the constitution without 
 the correction of a letter. With this consequence before my eyes, 
 and with a determination to attempt an amendment, I was taught 
 by a regard for consistency, not to sign. 
 
 2. My opinion always was, and still is, that every citizen of America, 
 let the crisis be what it may, ought to have a full opportunity to pro- 
 pose,- through his representatives, any amendment which in his appre- 
 hension, tends to the public welfare. By signing, I should have con- 
 tradicted this sentiment. 
 
 3. A constitution ought to have the hearts of the people on its 
 side. But if at a future day it should be burthensome after having 
 been adopted in the whole, and they should insinuate that it was in 
 some measure forced upon them, by being confined to the single 
 alternative of taking or rejecting it altogether, under my impressions, 
 and with my opinions, I should not be able to justify myself had I 
 signed. 
 
 4. I was always satisfied, as I have now experienced, that this 
 great subject would be placed in new lights and attitudes by the 
 criticism of the world, and that no man can assure himself how a 
 constitution will work for a course of years, until at least he shall 
 have heard the observations of the people at large. I also fear more 
 from inaccuracies in a constitution, than from gross errors in any 
 other composition; because our dearest interests are to be regulated 
 
APPENDIX. 203 
 
 by it ; and power, if loosely given, especially where it will be inter- 
 preted with great latitude, may bring sorrow in its execution. Had 
 I signed with these ideas, I should have virtually shut my ears against 
 the information which I ardently desired. 
 
 5. I was afraid, that if the constitution was to be submitted to the 
 people, to be wholly adopted or wholly rejected by them, they would 
 not only reject it, but bid a lasting farewell to the union. This 
 formidable event I wished to avert, by keeping myself free to pro- 
 pose amendments, and thus, if possible, to remove the obstacles to 
 an effectual government. But it will be asked, whether all these 
 arguments were not well weighed in convention. They were, sir, 
 with great candor. Nay, when I called to mind the respectability of 
 those, with whom I was associated, I almost lost confidence in these 
 principles. On other occasions,'! should cheerfully have yielded to 
 a majority; on this, the fate of thousands, yet unborn, enjoined me 
 not to yield until I was convinced. 
 
 Again, may I be asked, why the mode pointed out in the constitu- 
 tion for its amendment, may not be a sufficient security against its 
 imperfections, without now arresting it in its progress ? My answers 
 are — 1. That it is better to amend, while we have the constitution in 
 our power, while the passions of designing men are not yet enlisted, 
 and while a bare majority of the states may amend than to wait 
 for the uncertain assent or three fourths of the states. 2. That a 
 bad feature in government, becomes more and more fixed every day. 
 3. That frequent changes of a constitution, even if practicable, ought 
 not to be wished, but avoided as much as possible. And 4. That in 
 the present case, it may be questionable, whether, after the particular 
 advantages of its operation shall' be discerned, three fourths of the 
 states can be induced to amend. 
 
 I confess, that it is no easy task, to devise a scheme which shall 
 be suitable to the views of all. Many expedients have occurred to 
 me, but none of them appear less exceptionable than this ; that if our 
 convention should choose to amend, another federal convention 
 be recommended: that in that federal convention the amendments 
 proposed by this or any other state be discussed ; and if incorporated 
 in the constitution or rejected, or if a proper number of the other 
 states should be unwilling to accede to a second convention, the 
 constitution be again laid before the same state conventions, which 
 shall again assemble on the summons of the executives, and it shall 
 be either wholly adopted, or wholly rejected, without a further power 
 of amendment. I count such a delay as nothing, in comparison with 
 so grand an object; especially too as the privilege of amending must 
 terminate after the use of it once. 
 
 I should now conclude this letter, which is already too long, were 
 it not incumbent on me, from having contended for amendments, to 
 
204 APPENDIX. 
 
 set forth the particulars, which I conceive to require correction. I 
 undertake this with reluctance: because it is remote from my inten- 
 tions to catch the prejudices or prepossessions of any man. But as 
 I mean only to manifest that I have not been actuated by caprice, 
 and now to explain every objection at full length would be an im- 
 mense labour, I shall content myself with enumerating certain heads, 
 in which the constitution is most repugnant to my wishes. 
 
 The two first points and the equality of suffrage in the senate, 
 and the submission of commerce to a mere majority in the legisla- 
 ture, with no other check than the revision of the president. I con- 
 jecture that neither of these things can be corrected; and particu- 
 larly the former, without which we must have risen perhaps in dis- 
 order. 
 
 But I am sanguine in hoping that in every other justly obnoxious 
 cause, Virginia will be seconded by a majority of the states. I hope 
 that she will be seconded. 1. In causing all ambiguities of expres- 
 sion to be precisely explained. 2. In rendering the president ineli- 
 gible after a given number of years. 3. In taking from him the 
 power of nominating to the judiciary offices, or of filhng up vacancies 
 which may there happen during the recess of the senate, by granting 
 commissions which shall expire at the end of their next sessions. 
 4. In taking from him the power of pardoning for treason at least 
 before conviction. 5. In drawing a line between the powers of con- 
 gress and individual states; and in defining the former, so as to 
 leave no clashing of jurisdictions nor dangerous disputes; and to 
 prevent the one from being swallowed up by the other, under cover 
 of general words, and implication. 6. In abridging the power of the 
 senate to make treaties supreme laws of the land. 7. In incapaci- 
 tating the congress to determine their own salaries. And 8. In 
 limiting and defining the judicial power. 
 
 The proper remedy must be consigned to the wisdom of the con- 
 vention; and the final step which Virginia shall pursue, if her over- 
 tures shall be discarded, must also rest with them. 
 
 You will excuse me, sir, for having been thus tedious. My feelings 
 and duty demanded this exposition; for through no other channel 
 could I rescue my omission to sign from misrepresentation, and no 
 more effectual way could I exhibit to the general assembly an un- 
 reserved history of my conduct. 
 
 I have the honor, sir, to be with great respect, your most obedient 
 servant, 
 
 Edmund Randolph. 
 
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 
 
 Chief Justice Yates, the subject of the following memoir, was born 
 on the 27th day of January, 1738, in the city of Schenectady, in this 
 state. At the age of sixteen he was sent by his parents to the city 
 of New- York, where he received a classical education, and afterwards 
 studied the law with WiUiam Livingston, Esq. a celebrated barrister 
 in that metropolis, and father of Brockholst Livingston, Esq. one 
 of the judges of the supreme coiirt of the United States. On the com- 
 pletion of his studies he was admitted to the bar, and soon after fixed 
 his residence in the city of Albany, where in due time he received 
 the degrees of soUcitor and counsellor in the court of chancery — 
 He soon became eminent in his profession, and on account of his 
 incorruptible integrity was known by the appellation of the honest 
 Lawyer — At the age of twenty-seven he married Miss Jane Van Ness, 
 of Columbia county. On the prospect of a rupture, between this 
 country and Great Britain, his open and avowed principles as a wldg 
 brought him into pohtical notice, and several well written essays, 
 which were the productions of his pen, contributed in no small degree 
 to establish his reputation as a writer in defence of the rights and 
 Uberties of his country. He had already held a seat as a member of 
 the corporation of the city of Albany and as attorney and counsel 
 to that board; and he was soon after appointed a member of the 
 committee of public safety, a body of men who were invested with 
 almost inquisitorial powers, and who had justly become the dread 
 and scourge of that class of men called tones. — By the exertions of 
 Chief Justice Yates, the proceedings of that tribunal were tempered 
 with moderation, and the patriotic zeal of the community confined 
 within its proper and legitimate sphere of action. We find him not 
 long afterwards holding a seat in the provincial congress of his own 
 state, and, during the recess of that body, performing the compli- 
 cated and arduous duties of chairman of a committee for the organi- 
 zation and direction of military operations against the common 
 enemy. In the year 1777, the constitution of this state was adopted, 
 and Chief Justice Yates was an active and distinguished member of 
 the convention that framed that instrument — During the same year 
 he received without solicitation the appointment of a judge of the 
 supreme court, at a time when an extensive and lucrative practice 
 as a lawyer held out to him strong inducements to decline its ac- 
 ceptance — ^Regardless however of private interest, he entered upon 
 the duties of that office rendered at the time peculiarly delicate and 
 dangerous. He sat upon the bench, as a writer has expressed it, 
 "with a halter about his neck," exposed to punishment as a rebel, 
 
 205 
 
206 APPENDIX. 
 
 had our efforts for emancipation proved abortive — nor were these 
 the least of his dangers. For in counties ravaged or possessed by 
 the enemy, or by secret domestic foes watching every opportunity 
 to ruin or betray their country, he was sometimes obliged to hold 
 his courts — ^But no dangers could appal nor fears deter him from a 
 faithful and honest performance of the functions of his office — 
 He was particularly distinguished for his impartiality, in the trials of 
 state criminals, and he was not unfrequently obliged to abate the 
 intemperate zeal or ill-judged patriotism of the juries who were to 
 decide upon the fate of unfortunate prisoners — On one occasion he 
 sent a jury from the bar four times successively to reconsider a ver- 
 dict of conviction which they had pronounced most unwarrantably 
 against the accused, merely because they suspected he was a tory, 
 though without any proof that could authorize the verdict — ^As the 
 accused had become very obnoxious to the great body of the whigs, 
 the legislature were inflamed and seriously contemplated calling 
 Chief Justice Yates before them to answer for his conduct — But he 
 was ahke indifferent to censure or applause in the faithful and inde- 
 pendent exercise of his judicial duties, and the legislature at length 
 prudently dropped the affair. His salary during the war was very 
 small, and hardly sufficient for the support of himself and family — 
 Indeed before the scale of depreciation -of continental money had 
 been settled, he received one year's salary in that money at its 
 iwminal value, the whole of which was just sufficient (as he humor- 
 ously observed) "to purchase a pound of green tea for his wife." — 
 He was often urged to imite with some of his friends in speculating 
 on forfeited estates during the war, by which he naight easily have 
 enriched himself and his connexions without censure or suspicion — 
 and although such speculations were common, yet he would not con- 
 sent to become wealthy upon the ruin of others. "No," said he, 
 "I will sooner die a beggar than own a foot of land acquired by such 
 means." In Septeraber 1776, George Clinton afterwards executive 
 of this state, anxious to receive the co-operation of Chief Justice 
 Yates in certain measures then deemed important and necessary, 
 addressed him a letter of which the following is an extract : "We have 
 at last, arrived at a most important crisis, which will either secure 
 the independence of our country or determine that she shall still 
 remain in a state of vassalage to Great Britain. I know your senti- 
 ments on this subject, and I am extremely happy to find that they 
 agree so exactly with mine — But as we are called upon to act as 
 well as to think, your talents and exertions in the common cause 
 cannot be spared." With such men as John Jay, Dr. Franklin, 
 Chancellor Livingston, Gen. Philip Schuyler, and Alexander Ham- 
 ilton, he was in habits of intimacy and friendship. — ^And to his rela- 
 tives and more particular friends, Abraham Yates, Jun. former 
 mayor of Albany, and Col. Christopher Yates, the father of Joseph 
 
APPENDIX. 207 
 
 C. Yates, Esq. the present judge of the supreme court, he was en- 
 deared by every tye of affection and esteem. — These two last named 
 gentlemen, were well known for their exertions in defence of their 
 country, during the revolutionary war — The former more particularly 
 as the writer of certain spirited publications under the signatures 
 of Sidney and Roughhewer. 
 
 After the conclusion of the revolutionary war, he was chosen together 
 with General Hamilton and Chancellor Lansing, to represent his native 
 state in the convention that formed the constitution of the United 
 States; and to his labors in that convention we are indebted for the 
 preservation of some of the most important debates that ever dis- 
 tinguished any age or country* — He was also a member of the con- 
 vention subsequently held in this state, to whom that constitution 
 was submitted for adoption and ratification — His political opinions 
 were open and imreserved — He was opposed to a consolidated na- 
 tional government, and friendly to a confederation of the states pre- 
 serving their integrity and equality as such. Although the form 
 of government eventually adopted, was not, in all its parts, agreeable 
 to his views and wishes, still in all his discussions, and especially in 
 his judicial capacity, he deemed it a sacred duty to inculcate entire 
 submission to, and reverence for, that constitution — In the first 
 charge which he deUvered to a grand jury, immediately after its 
 adoption, he used the following language: "the proposed form of 
 government for the union has at length received the sanction of so 
 many of the states as to make it the supreme law of the land, and 
 it is not therefore any longer a question whether or not its pro- 
 visions are such as they ought to be in all their different branches. — 
 We, as good citizens, are bound implicity to obey them, for the 
 united wisdom of America has sanctioned and confirmed the act, 
 and it would be little short of treason against the republic to hesi- 
 tate in our obedience and respect to the constitution of the United 
 States of America. Let me therefore exhort you, gentlemen, not 
 only in your capacity as grand jurots, but in your more durable 
 and equally respectable character as citizens, to preserve inviolate 
 this charter of our national rights and safety, a charter second only 
 in dignity and importance to the declaration of our independence. 
 We have escaped, it is true, by the blessing of Divine Providence, 
 from the tyranny of a foreign foe, but let us now be equally watch- 
 ful in guarding against worse and far more dangerous enemies — 
 domestic broils and intestine divisions." Soon after this period he 
 
 *Cliief Justice Yates, though often solicited, refused during his life, to permit his 
 notes of those debates to be published, not only because they were originally not 
 written for the public eye, but because he conceived himself under honorable obliga- 
 tions to withhold their publication — These notes after his death fell into the hands of 
 his widow, who disposed of them, and they are thus become public. 
 
208 APPENDIX. 
 
 filled the important trust of commissioner to treat with the states of 
 Massachusetts and Connecticut, on the subject of territory, and to 
 settle certain claims of his native state against the state of Vermont. 
 In 1790, he received the appointment of chief justice of the state of 
 New- York, and was twice supported for the office of governor, to 
 which latter office he was on one occasion elected by a majonty of 
 votes; but on account of some real or supposed inaccuracy in some 
 of the returns, he did not receive the certificate of his election. 
 
 In January, 1798, having completed his sixtieth year, and with it, 
 the constitutional term of his office, he retired from the bench of 
 which for twenty-one years he had been its ornament and pride; 
 and resumed the practice of the law — So highly did the legislature 
 estimate his former services and usefulness, that it was proposed in 
 that body to fix an aimual allowance or stipend on him for life, and 
 the proposition actually passed the senate, but was laid aside in the 
 assembly as being supposed to savor too much of the monarchical 
 regulation called pensions. Determined however to provide for an 
 old and faithful public servant, who had worn out his better days 
 for the good of his country, the legislature appointed him a commis- 
 sioner to settle disputed titles to lands in the military tract, and this 
 appointment he held till nearly the close of his life, when the law 
 creating it, ceased by its own limitation. On the 9th day of Septem- 
 ber, 1801, he finished his mortal career, "full of honors and full of 
 years," placing a firm reliance on the merits of an atoning Saviour, 
 and the goodness of a merciful God. — He left a widow and four chil- 
 dren, two of whom only are now living, a son and daughter, the 
 former of whom is the present secretary of this state. 
 
 Chief Justice Yates died poor. — He had always been indifferent 
 to his own private interest, for his benevolent and patriotic feelings 
 could not be regulated nor restrained by the cold calculations of 
 avarice or gain. No man in this state was more esteemed than him- 
 self — He never had, it is believed, in the whole course of his life, a 
 personal enemy, and the tears of the widow, the orphan, the destitute 
 and oppressed, followed him to his grave: — He was emphatically the 
 honest man and the upright judge. — His talents were of the higher 
 order, and his manners were plain, attractive and unassuming — His 
 opinions at nisi prius were seldom found to be incorrect, and on the 
 bench of the supreme court he was distinguished for a clear, dis- 
 criminating mind, that readily arrived at the true merits of the case 
 before him. It may be safely affirmed, that no single individual ever 
 filled so many high and responsible stations with greater credit to 
 himself, and honor to the state. — His memory will be cherished as 
 long as virtue is esteemed and talents respected, and his epitaph is 
 written in the hearts of his fellow citizens, and in the history of his 
 country.