.>.>.WVA/ CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY ^f Cornell University Library The original of this book is in the Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924031248721 (Et)e I3isi)0)] |)abbock Cectntes, 1883 THE FOUNDATIONS Religious Belief THE METHODS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY VINDICATED IgAINST MODERN OBJECTIONS Rev. W. D. WILSON, D. D. PRESBYTER IN THE DIOCESE OF CENTRAL NEW YORK, AND PROFESSOR IN CORNELL UNIVERSITY NEW YORK D. APPLETON AND COMPANY I, 3, AND 5 BOND STREET , 1883 COPYRIGHT BY Rev. W. D. WILSON, D. D. 1883. President White Library THE BISHOP PADDOCK LECTURES. In the summer of the year 1880, George A. Jarvis of Brooklyn, N. Y., moved by his sense of the great good which might thereby accrue to the cause of Christ and to the Church, of which he was an ever grateful member, gave to the General Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church certain securities exceeding in value eleven thousand dollars for the foundation and maintenance of a Lectureship in said Seminary. Out of love to a former Pastor and enduring friend, the Rt. Rev. Benjamin Henry Paddock, D.D., Bishop of Massachusetts, he named his Foundation "The Bishop Paddock Lectureship." The deed of trust declares that : " The subjects of the Lectures shall be such as appertain to the defence of the religion of Jesus Christ, as revealed in the Holy Bible and illustrated in the Book of Common Prayer against the va- rying errors of the day, whether materialistic, rationalistic, or pro- fessedly religious, and also to its defence and confirmation in respect of such central truths as the Trinity, the Atonement, Justification and the Inspiration of the Word of God and of such central facts as the Church's Divine Order and Sacraments, her historical Reforma- tion and her rights and powers as a pure and National Church. And other subjects may be chosen if unanimously approved by the Board of Appointment as being both timely and aJso within the true intent of thw Lectureship." Under the appointment of the Board created by the Trust, viz., the Dean of the General Theological Seminary and the Bishops respectively of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Long Island, the Rev. William D. Wilson, D.D., LL.D., L.H.D., Professor of Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, Cornell University, delivered the Lectures for the year 1883, contained in this volume. PREFACE. The request to deliver these Lectures took me entirely by surprise, and was not accompanied by any intimation of the subject on which it was ex- pected that I would lecture, any farther than as the subject is prescribed in the Deed of Trust which creates the Lectureship. In selecting my specific subject I was guided by a consideration of what my past experience and studies had, in my own judgment, best qualified me to undertake, rather than by any estimate I could have made of what is most needed just now, or what would be likely to produce the most immediate good results. Non omnes omnia possumus. I was confirmed in the selection of the subject which, for these reasons, I had made, by the two fol- lowing considerations : vi Preface. 1. There can be, in my estimation, no satisfac- tory or successful presentation of the Evidences of Christianity that does not assume the truths of Natural Theology and the legitimacy of the Methods by which they are obtained. 2. There is no objection that is urged, or that can be urged, against the doctrines of Natural The- ology, that may not be and is not in fact urged with far greater force and appearance of reason against the doctrines of Christianity as taught by Revelation. In selecting my topics for discussion I have en- deavored to include in my list all those that are current in the popular thought of the day, or are seen in its literature end the predominant tone of conversation ; and to trace them back, if not to their original source, yet at least to some name that has given them prestige and influence. It will be observed that I have given to the sub- ject of Evolution a large share of attention. This could hardly have been otherwise, since that is. Preface. vii in many respects, the great question of the age. It occupies, under one form or another, the largest part of the Second and the Sixth Lectures in this course. And I think that it will be seen that that theory, in any form in which the facts and reason- ing from them justify us in holding it, only makes the argument for the existence and attributes of God stronger and more precise and explicit than it was before. In the pursuit of my subject it has been my good fortune to find no occasion to controvert with any one of the authors from whose general views I dis- sent, dny fact that either he or I can regard as of fundamental or controlling importance, or to assert any conclusion, as derived from these facts, which I have not been able to express in words selected from their own writings. And yet I think that not even the most staunch advocate of Revelation and a Supernatural Religion will find any occasion to complain that I have not maintained all the ground he can ask for his cause so far as it is included in the domain of Natural Theology. viii Preface. It is proper to add that in delivering the Lectures I omitted the Fourth, the last part of the Third and the first of the Fifth, as being so abstruse and tedious to those who are not metaphysically inclined, that I could not have heart to inflict that part of my dis- cussion upon those whose duty it was to attend ; and yet they form such an essential part of the line of argument, that I could not omit them entirely. The reader, if he chooses to do so, can omit these parts of the Lectures as he looks through the vol- ume, now that it is published. Perhaps I ought also to state that in consequence of the length of the Lectures, I was obliged to omit some parts and to condense other parts of the Lect- ures I delivered when I gave them before the students in the General Seminary. W. D. W. Ithaca, June, 1883. CONTENTS. LECTURE I. The Subject Stated and the Two Methods Described. Introduction, Subject Stated 3 Reasons for Choosing it 6 I. The Objective Method 14 Paley's Illustration 18 II. The Subjective Method 20 The Law of Co-ordination 22 Plato's Theory of Ideas 33 Mediaeval Philosophers 38 Descartes' a priori Argument 43 Modem Idealistic Theories 47 LECTURE II. Physical Objections; Theories of Evolution and Causa- tion. The Objections Stated 50 I. The Qaims of Evolution 56 The Idea of Creation 62 1. Evolution implies a Supreme Being 63 2. The Nature of Matter makes a Personal Agent necessary. 65 3. The beginningofLifeimplies something more than Matter 77 11. Theories of Causation 1. The Equivalence of Causes and Effects 86 2. Causation implies a First Cause 92 3. Characteristics of a First Cause 100 Contents. LECTURE III. Metaphysical Objections ; Theories or Knowledge. The Objections to be Considered 107 I. Proof of the Reality of Mind 108 1. Physiological Proof 116 2. Psychological Proof 125 3. What we learn of Mind from Consciousness 133 II. Limits to the Certainty of Knowledge 137 1. The Extent of Knowledge by Sensation 141 2. The Relativity of Knowledge 144 3. The Extent of Certainty 152 LECTURE IV. Logical Objections and Theories of Reasoning. The Influences of Training on Opinion 161 I. Logical Objections 167 1. Objections to the Form of Reasoning 1 70 2. Difficulties that arise from the Use of Words 1 72 II. Kant's Objections 186 I. Bearing of his Theory of Perception 187 ii. His Limitation of Certainty 188 3. His Antinomies igo 4. The General Result 205 LECTURE V. The Attributes and Personality of God. I. The Influence of Language upon Thought 216 Abstractions and Fictions 218 Three Classes of Realities 238 The Existence of God from this Point of View 249 1 1. Objections to the Personality of God 255 The Essence of Personality 259 God a Person 262 All Conceptions of Him inadequate 264 Contents. xi LECTURE VI. Miracles and Inspiration. Revelation Miraculous in its Nature 273 I. The Essential daracter of Miracles 375 1. The Miracle of Creation or Beginning 282 2. Miracle of the Beginning of Life 284 3. Miracle of the Origin of Species 294 41 Miracle at the Origin of Man 310 II. Inspiration; its Nature 320 1. Difficulty of Discriminating 325 2. Time and Results as a Test 329 LECTURE VII. Providence and Moral Government. Moral Government shown chiefly in Human History 334 1. Examples ftom History 337 2. The Objections of Pessimists 344 3. Pain as a Means of Good 350 4. Necessary Laws and Conditions 358 5. Man's Relation to these Laws 365 6. The Use made of Wicked Men 372 7. Suffering as a Means of Holiness 376 8. Christ and Christianity the Solution 381 LECTURE I. THE SUBJECT STATED; REASONS FOR CHOOSING IT; THE TWO METHODS DESCRIBED. Heb. II, 6. — For he that cometh to God must believe that He is and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him. THE METHODS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY VINDICATED. THE METHODS DESCRIBED. Two avenues open out from the human self towards the ultimate and highest Being, Whom we acknowl- edge and worship as God. Both of these are ways of knowledge ; ■ and each of them may be pursued with the strictest conformity to scientific methods and with the most entire certainty in the results. It is my purpose, in these Lectures, to point out and to vindicate, as best I can, these two methods, which, taken together, may be called the Methods of Natural Theology. For my ability to do so, and for my fitness for the office and work to which I have been called, those who appointed me to this Lectureship must be held responsible; for the earnestness and fidelity with which I discharge the duty thus devolved upon me, I alone and by myself am responsible. 4 The Methods of Natural Theology. If we glance backward over the half century that is past we see great changes in the attitude of the world towards the Christian Religion. Then Paley's Natural Theology and Butler's Analogy were in general use, and in the highest esteem. They were considered, each in its place and way, as presenting unanswerable arguments in favor of the propositions which they attempted to prove : the one, the existence of a God of infinite wisdom, power and goodness as manifested in Nature; and the other maintained that the Religion of Christ, as revealed in the Holy Scriptures, and taught in the Christian Church, is in harmony with human reason and the constitution and course of Nature. Before the work of Paley, however, there had ap- peared the work of Dr. Samuel Clarice, which had been delivered as the Boyle Lecture for 1704, on The Being and Attributes of God, differing from those of Paley and Butler, in that it proceeded from a different starting point and pursued a much more metaphysical method. But all these books, and many others like them, have fallen into disrepute and neglect. And there seems to be a growing impression that this line of argumentation is worth but very little, if anything, towards laying a foundation for religious belief and culture. The Methods Described. 5 Since these works were written new facts have been discovered and new theories adopted in science. And it is claimed that metaphysical principles which were then generally held, or allowed to pass unques- tioned, are now no longer held by anybody; and these facts and principles, it is claimed, constituted the very foundation and basis of those arguments — and that, the foundation being removed, the super- structure must fall. Now it is no part of my purpose to enter upon any warfare with modern science. I have no occa- sion to dispute its facts, or to disparage its impor- tance On the other hand, I think that there are but few persons who appreciate these facts and principles more highly than I do. Next to Religion, Science is the greatest benefactor of mankind. And if man has no soul, and is, as many contend, only a being of time — destined to perish with the brutes and like a brute — science is worth more to him than even Religion. And the preference can be given to Christianity, in my estimation, only because the soul can be saved by faith, through Christ, without Sci- ence or much knowledge of the affairs of this world. It is, therefore, my purpose in these Lectures rather to show that whatever may have been taken, by the advance in modern science, from the founda- tion of those old arguments was but hay and stubble The Methods of Natural Theology. and sand, and that it has been replaced by some- thing that is more substantial and enduring — as enduring as eternal truth itself; and that whatever new facts have been discovered in the physical sci- ences, and whatever new truths may have been reached in metaphysics, only tend to make the ar- gument stronger, and to give to the conclusion more of point and precision as well as greater certainty. I have spoken of the general subject of these Lectures as a statement and vindication of the Meth- ods of Natural Theology. In this I assume that Natural Theology is the basis of a Supernatural Theology, and that what we can learn in this way of the character and attributes of God, constitutes a groundwork which we can accept, and on which we can erect, as a superstructure, the doctrines of the Revelation that has been communicated to us in a supernatural way by God Himself And I take up this subject the more gladly be- cause, so far as I know, there is no objection, or ground of objection, to any doctrine of Natural The- ology that may not be, and is not in fact, urged with as great if not with greater force against the doctrines of the Christian Religion. Whatever undermines the basis will in the end subvert the superstructure. If there are objections that are fatal to Natural Theology they will doubtless prove much more fatal The Methods Described. to a reception of the teachings of Revelation. No one, as I believe, can be persuaded to accept Chris- tianity as a Revelation from God, having authority- over conscience and will, who has any serious doubts about any of the doctrines of Natural Theology. There is a passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews that seems to me to inculcate this view of the gen- eral subject. I refer to those earnest and profound words which occur near the beginning of the eleventh chapter. Transposing their order a little, they read as follows : " For he that cometh to God must be- lieve that He is, and that He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him. But without faith it is impossible to please Him." This latter clause of the text needs no comment. Mere outward service cannot be acceptable to God, or in any way pleasing to Him ; for we are abun- dantly assured that if there is any one thing that He hates above all others, it is hypocrisy and mere pre- tense of service when the heart is far from Him. But does the Apostle mean to teach us also that, in order to accept a revelation as a supernatural re- ligion, we must first, and as a prerequisite, believe in the existence of God and of His Moral Govern- ment ? If so, then it must be, of course, on the basis of a natural theology — of some insight of that invisible power and godhead, which, as the Apostle 8 The Methods of Natural Theology. says, is manifest in the phenomena of nature, or what, in another view, we may call an instinct im- planted in our very nature, which must and will, from the very nature of the case, be developed into dogmas and dogmatic form by the operation of the mind in the years of thought and reflection. Now, whether this is precisely what the Apostle intended to say in these words, I shall neither assume nor attempt to prove in this place: But I do most earnestly believe it myself, and shall assume it as one of the starting points in these Lectures. To state my proposition otherwise and more briefly and distinctly, I believe there is in every human soul a natural insight of things divine ; or, in the words of a Greek philosopher, 7 KOivrf rov Qeov yoTjGtS,^ and that this belief can be justified, elaborated and vindicated by most unanswerable arguments, drawn from the facts and phenomena of the external world and from the nature of mind and of knowledge itself* 1 DioG. Laert., e. X. c. I. 5 122. 2 Max MOller says, Science of Language, Second Series, p. 477, " It was one of the first articles in the primitive faith of mankind, that, in one sense or another, they had a father in heaven," for whom, " neither the language of the Vedie Rishis, nor that of any other poets or prophets had yet suggested a fitting name," p. 536. In regard to Egypt, as a sample of the other civilized nations of antiquity, China, India, Mesopotomia, etc., I cite from Rawlinson, The Religions of Ike Ancient World. He says, p. 43, of the better The Methods Described. g For the great mass of mankind, the uneducated and the unsophisticated — " the rank and file of hu- manity " — ^we appeal to this instinct, the feelings and the wants of men, and we show them how Chris- tianity, in its doctrines and its discipline, in its helps and its hopes, meets their wants, satisfies their hearts, and gives them what nothing on- earth, nothing else that comes within the range of their thoughts and conceptions, can give them, or even so much as con- fidently promise them. But there are those who cannot be reached in this way ; they will not be satisfied with this sort of ap- peal. Somehow or another doubts and questionings arise in their minds, and they are disposed to regard minds, that they ' ' understood clearly that the many gods of the popu- lar mythology were mere names, personified attributes of the one true Deity, or parts of the nature which He had created, considered as informed and inspired by Him." And on p. 43 he says, "The better educated Egyptian had a firmer grasp of the truths of natural religion. Below the popular mythology there lay concealed from general view, but open to the educated classes a theological system which was not far removed from pure natural theology." It would be easy to show the same state of things with regard to the Religions of China, India, Persia, and in fact all the earlier na- tions which rose into existence as leaders of civilization in primeval times. And the question arises as both interesting and suggestive — was this the result of an early revelation, the lingering twilight of an earlier and brighter day — or was it the result of discoveries by the methods of Natural Theology ? In either case, it adds interest and strength to our argument. lo The Methods of Natural Theology. these instinctive wants and .feelings as only a weak- ness of their nature, and to look upon the religion which would supply them as merely a delusion — a cunningly devised imposture which women and children may do well to accept, and which unscru- pulous priestcraft may use for its own ends, but from which men of scientific attainments and those with a philosophical turn of mind had better keep them- selves aloof. The position and importance of these men, how- ever, when considered from our point of view, can- not be estimated by their numbers merely. They claim to be the most intellectual men — men who are in advance of all others, in advance of their age ; the men who ought to speak, who ought to be heard ; the men with whom wisdom will die; or if it will not die with them, it has yet made in them an advance beyond which nothing but unimportant details by way of confirmation can be reasonably expected ; the men who now hold what all men will in a few gen- erations come to hold as the truth and the accepted views of all mankind. The claim is indeed a pretentious one, and it is seductive as well. No one in this age likes to be thought deficient. However humble and ignorant he may be, he has a natural ambition to be thought, if not wise himself, yet at least capable of appreciat- The Methods Described. 1 1 ing wisdom, even the highest wisdom he can any- where get a glimpse of. Thousands will follow the leading of one self-confident man without the slight- est appreciation of his fundamental principles, or any foresight of their consequences, if only he can suc- ceed in raising a glamour of applause in his favor. And this is often much helped by the assumption of a confident manner, by a pomposity of style, or by an obscurity — ^a seductive obscurity — of diction that goes far to conceal whatever of real meaning, whether of truth or of falsehood, there may be in what is said. This result is often helped on also, and in many cases it is most effectually helped on, by some pandering to passions that ought to be kept in check, or by some promise of liberty there where what is called liberty can prove to be only licentiousness. When, for example, Sir William Hamilton says, with all the confidence of assured truth, that " all knowledge is only relative," that " we know nothing of things themselves," and that " in any attempt to prove the existence of the Absolute " our " syllogism would collect in the conclusion what is not distribu- ted in the premises," or when Kant says, "there are four pairs of antinomies on which all that we may claim or pretend to know depends, and yet that these antinomies involve irreconcilable contradic- tions," thousands and tens of thousands who have no 1 2 The Methods of Natural Theology. adequate conception of what these profound philoso- phers really meant by these oracular declarations, and who for the most part do not care to know, and are perhaps rather glad, on the whole, that they do not know, take them as a declaration of release from all obligation to know or to believe in anything be- yond the necessities and the pleasures of the passing hour. Or when some disciple of Darwin, out-Dar- wining Darwin himself, proclaims the theory of evolution as explaining all things here below, with- out the intervention or agency of God, or when Huxley declares in magisterial and defiant tones that this doctrine of evolution is as well established as the Copernican theory of the solar system,* mul- titudes who know but little or nothing of science, as they ought to know, take courage, and go on in the ways of irreligion and unbelief, in the ways of sin and transgression, that lead down to eternal death. 1 1 quote from memory from Huxley's Address in America in 1876, as reported at the time in the New York Tribune. He has greatly modified his expressions of confidence in the certainty of evo- lution, as well as in the adequacy of its solution of the problems of the universe since that time. In his Address before the Department of Anthropology in Dub- lin, August, 1878, as published in Appleton's Popular Science Monthly for Oct., 1878, p. 674, he says in regard to this very ques- tion of evolution : " It is a difficult question, and one for which a complete answer may possibly be looked for in the next century. . . In what sense I cannot tell you. I have my own notion about it, but the question for the fiiture is the attainment, by scientific pro- cesses and methods, of a solution of that question." The Methods Described. 1 3 We must, I think, distinctly recognize and admit, moreover, the, fact of "an evil heart of unbelief" in man, which, prevails to some extent in all men in their natural condition, though it is more powerful in some than in others, and which inclines them to accept and urge anything that may be available, as an excuse or pretense for rejecting a religion that imposes restraints upon their liberty of choice and action, even when they know that without such re- straint freedom would result, in the case of the great multitude, in what all men would regard as evil. Were it not for this natural tendency in man to evade restraints which are acknowledged, indeed, to be wholesome, I doubt if many, or indeed any, of the objections I am about to consider would have ever been seriously felt or much urged against Re- ligion, whether Natural or Revealed. It seems to me, therefore, very appropriate, and the best service I can render, under the circumstances, to do what I can to dispel the illusion that these doctrines and theories of metaphysicians and physi- cists have created; And if the subject is, as I suppose it to be, one which, from its very nature, cannot be brought within the comprehension of all, or made attractive to the masses that gather "to hear and read some new thing," I think that I cannot be ac- cused of having judged amiss, when we consider 14 The Methods of Natural Theology. that I am addressing those who are to be themselves the teachers of the masses, and who will encounter in their life-work almost, if not quite, daily, one or more of those whose minds and hearts are affected by the forms of agnosticism and unbelief to which I have alluded. As a preparation for a fuller and more detailed consideration of the objections that have been urged against these methods, I will devote the remainder of this Lecture to a statement and illustration of the two methods. I. We begin our^cquisition of knowledge by the observation of objects and events in the world around us. These objects are, for the most part, visible and tangible. Many of them also move about in space, and others are seen to change in their properties and appearance. To those that move about we ascribe life and spontaneity of action. For those that change, without moving, we soon find an antecedent or cause of the change, in something which is out of them- selves, and which existed before the change began. And thus, early in life and with but little reflec- tion comparatively, " the idea of causation," as it is called, is fixed in our minds as one of its ruling and controlling principles. Naturally enough we accept the axiom that every event or change has had a cause. And for the The Methods Described. 1 5 changes and motions of living beings we are con- tent, for the time, to refer to the self or soul within, as a spontaneously acting agent. But for mere in- organic matter, whether in masses, molecules or atoms, we assume an inertia that compels us to look for something else, something out of themselves, as the cause of their motion and their changes. This line of thought soon leads us back, naturally, and as I think necessarily, to a Beginning and a Beginner ; a first Cause, Who was before all things, is over all things, and in all things, and is Himself uncaused. Further thought leads us to ascribe to this Being personality, with intelligence, moral pur- pose and spontaneity of action. Recent investigations into the early history of mankind have shown that the first inhabitants of our earth were more impressible than we are. They were filled with what Max Miiller has described as a kind of unconscious monotheism.' They saw God, or rather they felt him to be present in all things.* 1 Origin and Growth of Rdigiort, Lect. VI. 8 The recent investigations into the earlier history of mankind and into fheir pre-historic notions and beliefs have been instructive in many ways. They bring to light facts that are inconsistent with, and totally antagonistic to, the modern theory of the evolution of man from the lower animals. Thus Renouf, Religion of Ancient Egypt, says, p. 130: "Totake for granted that what the savages now are, perhaps after milleniums of degradation, all other people most have been, and that modes of 1 6 The Methods of Natural Theology. As yet they had no name for this unseen, every- where present and ever active Agent. They said, as we do, " it dawns," " it rains," " it thunders." But soon came a time when they began to inquire who gives light in the morning? Who is it that sends the rain and speaks in the thunder? Who makes the plants to grow and clothes the earth with verdure ? ^ The pursuit of an answer to these questions, as Max Miiller and others have shown, early led to the conversion of that simple unconscious monotheism — which was a pantheism as well — into a polytheism, with a consequent mythology and idol- worship. These early inquiries and speculations it is likely, as Hearne has well suggested,* were set on foot quite as much, if not indeed much more, and much rather, especially among the Aryans, to satisfy a scientific instinct and want, than to gratify any religious pro- pensity which those unsophisticated children of the thought through which they are now passing have been passed through by others, is a niost unscientific assumption, and you will seldom meet with it in any essay or book without also finding proof that the writer did not know how to deal with historical evidence.'" He says of Egypt, p. 84: "Of a state of barbarism or case of patriarchal life anterior to the monumental period, there is no his- torical vestige." 1 See especially Muller's "Comparative Mythology," Chips from a German Workshop, Vol. II. pp. 1-142. 2 The Aryan Household, p. 286, etc. following. The Methods Described. 17 earth's early day may have had. For no more then than now did men believe, or can they believe, in a mere materialism as explaining all the phenomena of the visible universe. In that day they invented a Zeus, a Ceres, and a Neptune, whom they regarded as the sufficient causes and explanation of the vari- ous phenomena of nature that were observed by them in the earth, the air and the seas, and those who were religiously inclined worshiped these fan- cies of the scientists as gods. In these latter days we shall find, as I think, that men have been doing much the same thing, and find what they are disposed to regard as the ade- quate causes of the phenomena of nature, without, however, the same religious feelings towards them. But to return : the Method of Natural Theology, which was at first scarcely more than an instinct, or, as I shall prefer to call it, an act of unconscious in- sight, has been carefully elaborated into a protracted argumentation in these latter days. Nor is the line of argument exclusively modern. Socrates^ and Plato'' urged it with great force in their day. 1 Xenophon, Memorab., JB. IV., c iii. Here occurs that argu- ment, so often used since, from the eye lashes, and the conformation of the eye brows, the one to protect the eye from dust and the other to protect it &om the violence of blows. 2 Plato, Refuh., B. X., u. i., and De Leg. X. $ 11. In this lat- ter place he assumes as admitted that " the gods " know, see and 1 8 The Methods of Natural Theology. But within the last century the line of argument has been urged by such men as Paley, Chalmers, Whewell, and Lord Brougham, andintheBridgewater Treatises, until all well educated persons are familiar with its general outline and character. We may as well state this method of argument by the use of Paley's illustration. I see a watch before me. By means which I need not now discuss or describe, I know that it has not existed always. Whatever may be said of the particles of the metals used in it, brass and steel and gold, or of the mole- cules in the glass of the crystal, the watch, as the piece of mechanism that it is, has not existed always. Hence it had a maker, and its construction and movements show that the watchmaker was a being of intelligence and purpose, and possessed of power or physical force sufficient to work the raw materi- als of metal and mineral into their present shape. Now note: I here claim that from the watch, considered as an effect, I infer the watchmaker, and I infer not only his existence, the mere fact that he is, but also much of his character, or of w/^at he is. I see that he must have been an intelligent personal agent with something of bodily strength. hear all things," and then proceeds to argue that from their essential activity they can no more be indifferent to or inactive in the affairs of men than from their knowledge they can be ignorant of them. His argument is a good answer to many of the objections we meet with in these days. The Methods Described. 19 But what else do I know of him ? Confining my- self merely to the relation of cause and effect, but little else ; perhaps nothing else. But on inquiry I should find, most likely, that there were several men engaged in the work of making the watch. I might also, if that were important to my purpose, learn much more about them — find their names and ascer- tain much that is interesting of their personal ap- pearance and of their history. By the method of reasoning from effect to cause, however, I could neither ascertain nor find grounds to believe much in answer to such inquiries. I could not, or at least I need not, know that there was more than one such being. But what is more to our purpose, I should not know, and I could not know, by this process, that he was not himself eter- nal, or that he had had a parentage and a line of ancestry reaching far back in the line of cause and effect into the darkness of the irrecoverable past. But availing myself of my general knowledge on the subject I assume that this man had, like all the other men that I have ever known, ancestors reach- ing back in the line of genealogy to the first human pair; and thus I encounter the question of their origin and its Cause. Or, starting from any other objects my eyes can see, or my hand can touch, I might pass along a 20 The Methods of Natural Theology. line of objects in the same method of reasoning from effects to their causes until I should come to the same result. Omnia exeunt in Deum. Everywhere do we find Him as the First Cause, and the only- adequate explanation of the existence of the things we see or know around us. It would be most natural to proceed at once from this point to consider the objections to this method. They fall under two forms of objection wheii con- sidered in reference to their surface appearance, the theory of Evolution and some recent doctrines concerning Causation. But I have decided rather to go on and state and illustrate the other the subjective or the a priori method, before taking up the consid- eration of those objections ; and this, because the two methods are so connected that many of the ob- jections to the one are damaging if not fatal to the other as well, unless they can be successfully an- swered. 11. All reflecting persons begin at an early day in their lives to look within themselves and to see there thoughts and feelings that come and go in a myste- rious manner ; and they naturally think that where there is thought there must be a thinker. Cogito ergo sum is but a natural expression of a natural instinct. The Methods Described. 2 1 This may indeed be but a step in the matter of cause and effect. But there is another phenomenon in our consciousness that brings this idea, or this law, into a greater prominence, and gives to it its posi- tion as the corner-stone and first principle of all knowledge of everything and anything besides mere thought itself. We see the motions of our limbs, our hands and our feet, and we are conscious of the effort we make to move them ; that is, we are conscious of ourselves as causes of their motions. This consciousness be- comes more conspicuous when we have occasion to move something that is heavy, or which, for any cause, resists our effort, We thus learn that there is something that is not ourselves in the world around us which is also an active and an eflScient cause. We soon come to the conclusion that whatever is recognized or in any way known as an effect, must have had a cause, the existence and reality of which is known in and by the very act by which we know the immediate object of our knowledge to be an effect But cause and effect are in a series. Before the effect there must have been the cause ; and this, if not the First Cause, must have been an effect also, and so have had a cause ; and so on, in a retrogres- sion, until we come to a First Cause, which as 22 The Methods of Natural Theology. the First Cause must be the Cause of all things, and so — in the only sense in which we can understand or predicate the word — the Creator of all things. Another line of reflection and argumentatioHj starting still from within and adhering to the inte- rior method, leads to the same result. We soon find that all knowledge is by means of co-ordination. There must be a co-ordination of two objects in all possible acts of cognition that take place in time and are performed by a finite and im- perfect being. In the case of the blind man, all persons are familiar with the fact that he has no idea of light, or of the colors that we discriminate in ordinary day- light. But on a little reflection we find that it is just as certain that he has no idea of darkness either, and can attach no more meaning to that word, although he is immersed in the most profound dark- ness all the while, than he can to the words light, red, blue or white. But open his eyes and enable him to see, and he very soon comes to understand the meaning of both words, darkness and light, and all the varied terms that denote the colors of objects that are seen in the light. But until this experience, and without it, he had no idea of either of the co- ordinates, light and darkness, nor yet of any of the subordinates of either; or of the different colors which objects seen in the light appear to have. The Methods Described. 23 Much the same may be said of the deaf man, with regard to the two co-ordinates silence and sound, and to the co-ordination of the one— silence, with any of the subordinates of the other, as a loud sound, a shrill sound, a whisper, a murmur, a strain of mu- sic or a peal of bells. Now this law and this fact of co-ordination runs through all known human knowledge, and applies to, and controls, every act of cognition that takes place in time. It applies, therefore, to all the words and terms that we may use in any language with which to express our thoughts and beliefs. Hence, all things that are known or thought of go in pairs ; the one implies the other, so that without both, or the thought of both, we could have no idea or knowledge of either. It is said that no savage tribe has ever been found with a name for their social condition — savagery. But people who have become civilized have a name for both conditions — civilization and savagery. Thus, by this law of co-ordination, the cognition or thought of any thing as an effect implies the thought or cognition of something as cause ; and so the very idea of cause implies an effect, just as the word and idea of child implies that of parent. And the two are co-ordinates as objects of cognition and of thought We might know a human being, indeed. 24 The Methods of Natural Theology. without knowing that it was either parent or child. But we could not know it to be either the one or the other without knowing that there are now existing, or have been existing at some time in the past, the two ; and one of them as certainly as the other. The a priori demonstration of this law is very ab- struse and difficult of comprehension, although, as I think, it is irrefragable and overwhelmingly conclu- sive. But I shall not attempt to present it here. I have aimed rather to state the law and to illustrate it with such examples as will make it easily intelli- gible. After having expressed myself so confidently with regard to the universality and the certainty of this law, it is but fair that I should give notice that there are certain cautions to be observed in its application to words that may have been used, which, however, I have not time to discuss in this place. One of these only will I mention. In order to be a basis of proof of the existence of anything the two co-ordi- nates must have some property that is not common to both, otherwise one of them may be merely an other name for the same thing or for some fiction, like that of a centaur, for example, which has no property that is not found in some real object, and hence the idea may be a pure creation of fancy. Now let us apply this law to a few of the ques- tions that are before us. The Methods Described. 25 In every act of perception there are the two, the self that perceives and the object perceived. Whether I see this paper, or hear the voice of a friend, both the paper and the friend must exist, as realities, as truly as myself, or no such act of perception could take place. Hence the co-ordinates of self on the one hand, and the objects in the outward world, the not-me of the philosophers, on the other. So again I am conscious of myself as acting spon- taneously, or, as we often say for brevity's sake, I am conscious of spbntaneity. If this is so, there must be something — and we must have had knowl- edge of it somewhere and somehow — that is not spontaneous, a something that acts under the law of inertia which is the co-ordinate of spontaneity; and this we hold to be the case with all the mere mate- rial objects in the world of inorganic matter. This fact is important in its bearing on the ques- tion of free-will, so often discussed among philoso- phers, and so important in its bearing on many of the subordinate points of Natural Theology. There must be freedom and free-will somewhere or there would be no thought or conception of it, and no question about it in the minds of men ; and no name or word for it in any of the languages that are un- derstood or spoken by any of the inhabitants of the earth. 26 The Methods of Natural Theology. I cite as a further illustration of this law of co- ordination, Herbert Spencer's criticism of the argu- ment which Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel had elaborated and urged to show that, on purely- logical and metaphysical grounds, we have, and can have, no proof of the existence and attributes of God. Sir William Hamilton had maintained that all our knowledge is " relative " ; that we know nothing of things themselves, or " in themselves," as he prefers to express it, and that our idea of God, whether we regard Him as " the Absolute," " the Infinite," or " the Unconditioned," is only " negative," and of such a nature as neither to imply any proof of His existence or afford any knowledge of His attributes. But Spencer replies and insists, with his peculiar clearness of expression and force of reasoning, that the very existence of " the finite " implies the exist- ence of " the Infinite " ; the very existence of any thing " limited " and " conditioned " implies the re- ality of something that is " unconditioned " and " absolute." He admits, indeed, that this Something may not be, and in fact is not, an object of immedi- ate knowledge, whether by consciousness or sense- perception. But he insists upon its existence, and its reality, as implied in the very nature and laws of thought. The Methods Described. 27 Spencer recognizes the fundamental distinction of all things into two classes — phenomena which appear to and are cognizable by the senses and noumena, denoting by this latter word such things as are known to us only by insight and a process of rea- soning, apprehended, as Plato had said, by reason and insight, but not by sight This distinction between phenomena and noume- nia — things seen and things unseen — was sharply drawn by Plato. He speaks of things to which we are led by the insight of reason, and not by the see- ing of the eyes, vojj&eiv, aW ovk opLjJiastv} At a later date St. Paul recognizes the distinction and gives to it the sanction and weight of his great authority when he says,* speaking of God, that " the invisible things of Him, the dopara, things which the eyes of the body cannot see, are nevertheless voovjjisva, " noumena, made apparent, that is phe- nomenal, by the things that are seen by the bodily eyes, even His eternal power and godhead." But Spencer is very emphatic ; and although his language contains words and expressions that I do not altogether like, and $hould not use, yet I cannot 1 Plato, Repuh., B. VII, t. x., xi:, 529 B. And a litde fhrther on he indicates the same contrast in still other words, speaking of things as t? 5j? Aoym xai Siavoia X-^itrd o.^et S> Sv, received or accepted by reason and insight but not by the sight of the eyes. 2 Rom. I., 20. 28 The Methods of Natural Theology. forbear quoting it. After a long review and criti- cism of Sir William's doctrine, and the fuller expo- sition of it given by Dean Mansel in his Limits of Religious Thought, he proceeds to say : ^ " Observe in the first place, that any one of the arguments by which the relativity of our knowledge is demon- strated distinctly postulates the positive existence of something beyond the relative. To say that we cannot know the Absolute [God] is by implication to affirm that there is an Absolute [God]. In the very denial of our power to learn what the Absolute [God] is, there lies hidden the assumption that it [He] is ; and the making of this assumption proves that the Absolute [God] has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something. Simi- larly, with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The Noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis [co-ordinate as I would call it] of the Phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. It is rigorously impos- sible to conceive that our knowledge is a knowledge of Appearances only, without, at the same time, conceiving a Reality of which they are appearances [or manifestations] . . . Strike out from the argument the terms Unconditioned, Infinite, Absolute, with their equivalents, and in place of them write nega- •■ First Principles, Pt. I., $ 26. The Methods Described. 29 tio'n of conceivability or absence of the conditions under which consciousness [cognition] is possible, and you find that the argument becomes nonsense. Truly to realize in thought any one of the proposi- tions of which the argument consists, the Uncondi- tioned [God] must be represented as positive and not negative. How, then, can it be a legitimate conclusion from the argument that our conscious- ness [cognition] of it is negative ? An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term a certain meaning, but which ends in showing that this term has no such meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the very demonstra- tion that a definite consciousness [cognition] of the Absolute [God] is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an indefinite consciousness [cognition] of it" This is strong, and it seems to me unanswerable. I have taken the liberty to bracket in, in several places, words which will explain his meaning in my own terms. In this I do his thought no injustice. If Spencer intended to use the word "phenomena " in the strict Kantian sense, the word "noumena" must be understood to include all substantial reali- ties of whatever kind — everything, in fact, except the thoughts which we have of the things. This, however, is doubtful. But, in any view, his language 30 The Methods of Natural Theology. must be understood to include the existence of God ; and his argument is just or conclusive, and as much to my present purpose as though he had had no other"" object in mind. But be this as it may, the language constantly used by Hamilton and Mansel leave no room to doubt that they did intend to de- note the Supreme Being, the Christian's God, by the words they used in the argument to which Spencer replies. This, however, is not the only way, nor the only instance in which Spencer has recognized and ac- knowledged the existence of God as a First and Uni- versal Cause. He says,^ " We are obliged to regard every phenomena as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon ; phenomena being, so far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent." Again,* " He [the philosopher] like any other man may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom the Unknown cause acts." A more distinct recognition and admission of a First Cause, no w and ever, everywhere and universally acting, not only in the phenomena of nature, but in the thoughts and feelings of our own minds, could hardly be made. '^ First Principles, Pt. I., % 27, p. 99. 2 First Principles, Pt. I., § 34, p. 123. The Methods Described. 3 1 This, however, is not the first or only instance in which Spencer, under the guidance of his clear in- sight and sound logic, marches up squarely to, and sees a truth face to face, acknowledges it, and then turns away, and speaks and acts as though he had never seen it Nay, he even virtually denies that he has seen it, by consigning it and its object to the region of the Unknown and Unknowable. But surely that, or He, of whom so much can be said is not unknowable nor altogether "unknown." It would seem rather that, though incomprehensible. He is about the best known of all things.* It is worthy of note, it seems to me, as a piece of grim irony, this attempt of Spencer to refute such men as Hamilton and Mansel, in a matter of this kind. They were both Christian believers and ear- nest Christian men. He is professedly an agnostic, and has admitted that agnosticism is practically atheism.* " The knowledge that is within as, is the only knowledge that can be of service to us," are his words. And yet we have the strange spectacle of Spencer, the confessed agnostic, trying to convince 1 If Spencer would only change his phraseology and substitute for " unknowable " the good honest English word " incomprehensible," we could readily agree with him, and he would moreover express much more adequately what is really the legitimate conclusion from his premises. 2 $ 25, p. 86. 32 The Methods of Natural Theology. these professing Christians, on purely philosophical grounds, that God is not an abstraction or a mere negation, but is rather a most positive Reality, a reality without which nothing else can be real, and declaring that all their arguments are absurd and "elaborately suicidal." And Kant has argued in one of his world-famous Antinomies, of which I shall have occasion to say something more in a subsequent Lecture, that the existence of God is so involved in the very laws and conditions of thought that it is about the only thing that we cannot deny without involving ourselves in a contradiction of terms. And yet neither of these philosophers — neither Kant nor Spencer — accepted as a part of their philosophy the doctrine which they had so earnestly asserted, and had defended with so much ingenuity. I have already said that this law of co-ordination requires some caution in its application. It applies only to the origination of what we may call simple or elementary ideas. Thus I regard the color red- ness as such an elementary property. Hence I suppose that one who, although he had seen objects of any other color, had seen nothing that is red, could not imagine, or even so much as dream of, one that is red. But suppose he had seen some objects that are red and others that are blue, I presume he The Methods Described. 33 could originate the idea of purple without actual cognition of any purple object This law applies only to the origination of knowl- edge — the original act of cognition, and hence it can have no application to the Divine Mind, as there was no beginning to His knowledge. But let us return to the consideration of the a priori method. It is about as old as the other, although it has not always been presented in quite the same form. It is implied and used by Plato. It was made necessary, in fact, by his theory of ideas as the elementary parts of knowledge. As these ideas do not originate in the human mind, but are retained as the result of a past experience in some former state of existence, they imply both the pre-existence and the future immortality of the souL His doctrine of ideas implied their eternal exist- ence; and also, and of necessity, the eternal existence of the Logos, God Himself, as the ground of their possibility, while they were the patterns or arche- types by which He created all things out of the matter, which, without Him and the ideas, had no properties and no specific forms or modes of exist- ence. As the Platonic theories and speculations so ex- tensively underlie and give explanation to most or 34 The Methods of Natural Theology. all the arguments in the subjective method, I will go a little more fully into a statement of them. The first passage I shall cite is found at the be- ginning of the tenth Book of the Republic. Plato is there giving a very elementary explanation of what he means by ideas. He says of the artisan who is making household furniture, that in order to make tables, bedsteads, etc., he must have in his mind an idea, a pattern, or paradigm of the bed or table to guide him in his works ; otherwise, though he may hew and hack and waste lumber, he will not make any one definite or useful thing. He then proceeds to do what Plato never loses an opportu- nity for doing. He alludes to the creation, and says that in the same way as the human cabinet maker must have an idea of the table, etc., in his mind be- fore he does his work, and while he is doing it, so the great Artificer and Creator of the Universe must have had in His mind ideas or patterns of all the things that are in it before he made this universe. The next passage I shall cite is from the Meno. Plato is here trying to prove that ideas are innate and not acquired from observations and experience. He — or rather Socrates — calls a boy before him and asks him a question with regard to the area of a rectangle. The boy at first answers wrong. Socra- tes proceeds to ask question after question until he The Methods Described. 35 gets the right answer. He then turns to his com- panions and says to them, " You see I have told him nothing and yet he answers right now ; the idea was in his mind and all I had to do was to draw it out." Then follow some remarks with regard to " edu- cation." It consists as Plato teaches in drawing out — not the mind as we say — ^but in drawing out the ideas which are already there — innate in the mind. He then goes on to teach that all ideas are in the Divine mind, constitute its very essence, were always there and were communicated to us — -put into our minds — in some pre-existing state of being, and at the time of our birth we forgot them ; that what we call education should rather be regarded as remin- iscence, recollection, arajxrijeiS. And in the Phado, Plato used the same line of argument to prove the future life and the immortality of the soul. In the Titnceus, chapters xxvii and following, we have an account of the creation. He assumes that there is a certain pre-existing matter, to ov for which Aristotle introduced the word vkt} or matter, vkrf vnoxslfiEvi], underlying matter, and which came at a later day, especially by the Stoics, to be called vXri anoioi, or material substance without properties or specific kinds or character. 36 The Methods of Natural Theology. Now in this we must carefully notice the fact that Plato's theory of ideas makes them to be things in the mind. They are not mere states of the mind, as warmth is a state of the body, but they are things in the mind, as the heart and lungs are in the body, or the blood is in the veins. These ideas Plato re- garded as the proper object of study in order that we may obtain " true knowledge " — sniGtrffjir) — or general principles and absolute truths, as distinct from the mere first impressions — doSa — as he calls them, which the mere unreflecting mind gets from observation of external things. But in his discussion of the relation of these " ideas " to creation, Plato has two points to be con- sidered. The first is that which I have already al- luded to, namely, that they were the patterns, ideals, or paradigms after which, or in accordance with which, the Creator formed all the things that are made. The other point is more obscure. In the Parme- nides^ and again in the Cratylus^ and in the Timcsus,^ as well as other places, Plato discusses the relation of these ideas to external things and to the acts of creation, whereby the primeval, formless matter came to be, by the Divine agency, what we see it to be in the material objects around us. I S lo- 2 5 119- '55 25, 26. The Methods Described. 37 In these discussions Plato assumes, as before, that ideas are things. If we regard them as only in the mind, they are ideas, and ideas only. But if we con- sider them as external to the mind, they are the properties of the objects which we see around us in nature. Thus "whiteness" considered as in the mind is only an idea; considered as an objective reality, it is a property of the objects around us that we call white, the paper, the snow, and whatever else appears to us to be white. So, too, take the word humanity: as a thought within us, it is an idea ; as a property without, it is a characteristic of man — a property that is common to all men. And Plato explains the process of creation in the passages above cited, and speaks of it as imparting^ as the actual tremsference of, these ideas of the Divine mind to mere substantial matter, thus making of it the various objects and the different kinds of matter in the universe. He imparted the idea of whiteness to some, and they became white ; hardness to others, and they became hard; the properties of iron to some, and it became iron ; and so of all the other kinds of matter. He gave animality to some, and 1 This relation or transference of ideas is denoted by snch words as fiEroKa/ifidrsiv, jiBrix^t-y) ftsSs^ti, itapov6ia xoiviavia, etc. I am indebted to a Note in Zeller's Hist. Greek Phil., vol. Plato, p. 335, for this list of words. 3 38 The Methods of Natural Theology. they became animals ; humanity to others, and they became human beings, men and women. And so, too, among the Philosophers of the Middle Ages. Whenever any one of them had occasion to imply or expressly state any of the grounds of be- lieving in the existence of God as a doctrine of Nat- ural Theology, they pursued a line of argument similar to the one we are now considering. I have space and time to mention only a few. Thus John Scott Erigena, born in the beginning of the 9th century, and died 877 A. D. He insists very strenuously that the very name or idea of God implies his existence. In his view God can be no mere phenomenon, not a thing or being that can be seen by the bodily organs. He is nevertheless really noumenon, seen by the insight of reason, and is " manifest " everywhere and in all things ; seen, as Plato had said, vo-ijffetv, a\X ovh o}ifjiaGiv, by the insight of reason and not by the bodily eyes, so that all phenomena or objects are but the manifestation of some noumenal Power whose presence is seen throughout creation. Plato's theory of ideas was, with him, the founda- tion of the argument. In that view God and ideas alone have essential or substantial existence. God is the First Cause of all things, and they are " pri- mordial causes " [causes primordiales] in Him. God The Methods Described. 39 is in His essence incognizable, both for men and for angels. Nevertheless His being and attributes are seen and manifest in visible things. They are His manifestation. His wisdom is seen in their order, and His life in their motion and change. All predi- cates may be affirmed of Him which have not in their nature an opposite such as to imply limitation, and so, imperfection. Hence God may be called truth, goodness, light, justice, and many other things, figuratively, or symbolically. But strictly speaking and literally He can be called Being, es- sentia, oveia, alone. Hence in the view of Erigena, the nature of God is, in fact, superessential, vnspovaia, above the ten categories of Aristotle and cannot be expressed or represented in either of them. God created ideas. They were first in the order of creation. And hence they were called primor- dial causes, or in the terms of Plato paradigms and patterns. These ideas make up the Divine Wisdom. When imparted to matter and made manifest, that is, visible and tangible, they become and constitute the objects which make up the external or material world. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury and a great scholar, was born about two centuries after Erigena, A. D. 1033. He seems to have taken a most com- 40 The Methods of Natural Theology. prehensive view of things. His fundamental axiom that all knowledge exists on faith, credo ut intelli- gam, has a broader application than is generally- conceded to it. By faith in our senses we begin to know and understand the phenomena of the exter- nal world. In like manner by faith in the teachings of the Church, we believe the Creed, and then pro- ceed to consider and understand the articles of the Christian Faith. But, as in the former case, no one feels at liberty or thinks it wise to deny the reality of the external world around us, because he cannot understand and comprehend all its mysteries; so, on the other hand, no one may reject the Christian Faith because he finds many things in its facts and doctrines that are beyond his comprehension, non a fide recedere si intelligere non valet. Anselm thought the observation of external phe- nomena naturally turned the thoughts in upon them- selves, and thus, in his view, we find the thought or idea of a Supreme Being. He then proceeds, by way of analysis, to argue that the very idea of this Being in our minds implies His reality and existence somewhere, out of our minds. " One is convinced, therefore," says he, " that there must be somewhere, either in the mind or out of it, a Being than Whom there can be no greater, because when he hears these words he understands their meaning, and The Methods Deicribed. 41 whatever is understood is in the mind." But cer- tainly that Being than Whom there can be no greater, cannot exist in the mind alone {in intellectu solo). It may add a httle to the right comprehen- sion and the rhetorical effect of this argument to consider that St. Anselm is speaking with reference to " the fool " {insipiens) whom David had repre- sented as saying, " in his heart, there is no God." St. Aquinas, born A. D. 1225, about two hun- dred years after Anselm, and about four hundred after Scott Erigena, was perhaps the grea:test man in all the Middle Ages, taking into account both theological attainment and philosophical acumen. The discussions of the preceding centuries between the Realists and the Nominalists had had their effect on him. He yielded certain points which may be regarded as in some sense concessions to the Nomi- nalists, and he came in consequence much more nearly to a common sense view of things than the earlier Realists had done. He reversed the order of Anselm, and held that knowledge is in fact the basis of faith. He called the beginning of knowl- edge the prceambula fidei, the morning walks of faith. We must know something, in his opinion, before we can begin to exercise faith. I think, however, that in this he meant merely to recognize the obvious fact that we begin to exercise 42 The Methods of Natural Theology. our minds by the observation of the objects in the external world by sense-perception, before we begin to reflect much on their origin and cause, or on the existence of God. In doing this we have faith in our faculties, and in our theological speculations we need do only the same tiling. However, this is not very important for our pres- ent purpose. St. Thomas fully recognized and ap- preciated the external or synthetic method. He believed that from the first step in knowledge, which consists in the act of perceiving objects individually and one by one, and seeing the relation of cause and effect here and there in separate instances, we nat- urally, and by a sort of unreasoning instinct, proceed by generalization and synthesis, until we reach the idea of a First Cause and a summum genus, which includes all being ; or, as I should prefer to say, in deference to modern usages, a genus which includes and in some way comprehends all the individual objects that exist, or can exist anywhere. Thus St. Thomas held that the existence of God cannot be regarded as a self-evident truth, although it is a truth which may be proved ; and the grounds of this demonstration are to be sought in what is more and better known, and very much in accord- ance with the a posteriori methods of more recent times. The Methods Described. 43 This mode of proof consists, in his estimation, of two elements, (i) Assuming, as Aristotle had done, the inertia of all material objects considered 2s mere matter, there must be something that is not inert, a first Mover, whose existence is implied in all mo- tion. And (2) St Thomas held that in any reces- sion cdong the line of effect and cause we must come at last to a First Cause, before Whom there was no other. But when he had arrived, by his exterior or synthetic method, at the idea of God, he adopts the interior and analytic method of developing the idea, with as much confidence, and he develops it with as much energy and clearness, as any of the philoso- phers we know o^ and as confidently, too, as though he knew of no other method. I cannot do justice to this part of my subject although I have already lingered long upon it, with- out mentioning one more great name — a name which is, in some respects, better worth mention than any we have had before us. I mean Rene Descartes. Descartes was bom in A. D. 1596. Inferior to no one of his predecessors in acuteness of penetration, or in logical precision of expression, he surpassed them all in the comprehensive grasp of his subject, and he had the advantage of thena all by the three and a half centuries of controversy upon this and kindred subjects, that had passed away since the time of St. Thomas. 44 The Methods of Natural Theology. He considered all knowledge, all thought in fact, as made up of primary and elementary parts, just as the visible universe is made up of the individual objects which we see and feel, suns and stars, mount- ains and streams, rocks and trees, plants and animals, from the largest cosmic mass to the smallest grain of sand or molecule of water. These parts he called ideas ; and taken together, they make up the sum total of our knowledge. They are our thoughts of objects — all objects, whether seen or unseen, real or imaginary. These ideas he referred to three classes: (i) In- nate, nees avec mot; (2) Adventitious, etrangeres et venir de dehors; (3) Factitious, faites et inventees par moi mime} The " adventitious " ideas he supposed to be made within the mind, either by the mind itself, or by ex- ternal objects acting through the organs of sense ; and hence they represent real but material objects. The " factitious " ideas are, in his estimation, pure creations of fancy ; they may or they may not rep- resent objects that exist in reality. He considered the innate ideas as the result of the action of God within the mind. Hence they were a sort of revelation, or inspiration, and the best proof he could have of the existence of God. 1 Meditation, III., Cousin's edition, Vol. i., p. 368. The Methods Described. 45 Factitious ideas are of necessity complex ideas, and can be made up of only such simple ide£is as are found in one or the other of the other two classes, and they must be either innate or adventitious ideas. In the one case they represent eternal redi- ties ; in the other the properties of material objects ; although the combination may be entirely arbitrary and represent no really existing thing anywhere, as a centaur, and hippogriff, and the thousand and one monsters of heathen mythology, or Christian super- stition. Now among these " innate ideas," as he regards them and calls them, Descartes finds the idea of God, Who appears in this connection as the Perfect and the Infinite one. The points of the argument in Descartes' argu- mentation may be stated as three in number. 1st. The idea of God is a perfect idea, or the idea of perfection ; and he does not appear to make any distinction between a perfect idea and the idea of perfection. But, as he argues, I am imperfect, hence I cannot have originated the idea of God, Who is, from the necessities of His nature, a perfect Being. 2d. The very idea ofjerfection is seen, on analysis, to imply the existence and reality of that which is perfect; as without existence or being the idea would 46 The Methods of Natural Theology. lack at least one element of perfection or complete- ness. What is not and does not exist, cannot be perfect, since an object can be perfect only in the mode of its existence. 3d. In the third place, Descartes presupposes and applies the doctrine of co-ordination, used with so much force, as we have seen, by Herbert Spencer in his answer to Hamilton and Mansel. In this brief historic review it is impossible to do so much as name the many men who have rendered admirable service in this line of argument. Before coming, in conclusion, to one or two that are now living, I must not omit to mention at least the name of one more honored man-^that of Dr. Samuel Clarke. His Boyle Lecture on tJu Being and Attri- butes of God mark an era in this controversy. Con- temporary with Berkeley and Butler, his work was in an important sense a preliminary to Butler's An- alogy, and a correction to Berkeley's excessive ideal- ism — an idealism which amounted well nigh to a form of pantheism. He held, as Descartes had done, that the Perfect Being must be a Reality, since ex- istence is more and better, for anything that is good, than non-existence. Without His existence we must believe in a series either without beginning, which is absurd, or without anything to begin it, which also would be absurd. It would also suppose finite The Methods Described. 47 things without anything infinite ; dependent things without anything to depend upon ; or compel us to believe in an infinite space and time without anything to occupy them — any objects existing in space, or any events that had occurred in time. And he held, as we do, that the attributes of this Being, aside from His necessary and eternal existence, must be inferred from His works. The theories of sense-perception, introduced by Malebranche, Berkeley, and Fichte, have prepared the way for another 'modification of this internal or subjective method. I have not seen this lineof ar- gumentation presented anjnvhere with more clear- ness, force of reasoning, and ingenuity of statement and illustration, than in the recent work on Natural Theology, by Dr. Bascom,^ President of the Univer- sity of Wisconsin. And I quote him the more gladly because I shall have occasion very soon to cite him for another purpose, and in regard to a matter in which I shall have occasion to dissent from his view and criticise his admission. In this view, mind is essentially the creator of matter ; and matter and material things can hardly, if at all, be said to have any existence, substantial or phenomenal, except while, the creative act con- tinues. With Berkeley it was a favorite and a funda- 1 Bascom'S Natural Theology, Chap, iii., { y and following. 48 The Methods of Natural Theology. mental saying, with regard to material things, esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived. In an extreme presentation of this theory, it is held that each human mind, for itself, creates the material objects which it supposes it sees in the world around it. But, in a more moderate form, it holds that this individual energy is insufficient to account for the phenomena which are observed by so many millions of beings, and under such endlessly varied conditions and circumstances. Hence it is held that there must be an eternal Mind, everywhere present, and everywhere active. Whose activity is essentially creative. It is represented to be, in some most important particulars, analogous to the activity of our own minds in producing — creating — our thoughts ; they are while it acts, and they cease to be with the cessation of its activity. One argument for this view is derived from the nature of matter, and the impossibility of supposing it to have any independent substantial existence. Another argument, and one that is presented with great force and ingenuity by President Bascom, is derived from the mind's control over the body and material things. They are inert, but we can move and control them pretty much at will. This influence rises to its highest manifestation in those cases where we become insensible to pain even, in consequence The Methods Described. 49 of the intense occupation and absorption of the mind with matters of its own. In such cases, bones are broken and flesh extensively lacerated, with no con- sciousness of pain; the mind proves itself to be thoroughly master of the body, as much so as though it were its creator, and the body were itself but a " visualized" thought. It would be easy for me to add many more to this list of names in our effort to describe something of this interior, analytic, or a priori method of Natural Theology, but time and space alike forbid. I note in conclusion two things that are specially worthy to be considered and remembered. 1st. The two methods, though starting by differ- ent routes, come together and run into each other before they reach their final result. Or perhaps I had better say that the two, each of them, imply something of the other, and neither of them is quite complete in itself without the other. 2d. The second remark Is that a method that has been so long in use, confided in and depended upon by so many of the profoundest, keenest, and most comprehensive intellects that have blessed humanity with their lives and their thoughts^ may not be lightly regarded or set aside as worthy of no further consideration. I might add to these remarks that this historic so The Methods of Natural Theology. review, brief and imperfect as it has necessarily been, has shown what could have been shown much more fully if that had been my object, namely, that the truths of Natural Theology are really the first in the natural order, the basis on which to erect the super- structure of a supernatural theology, the prceambula, the very " morning walks " of religion, to use again St. Thomas Aquinas's expression. Doubtless mill- ions may believe and be saved without any such knowledge or mental exercise. But for those whom we are educating in our schools and colleges, those whom we are encouraging to enter the paths of sci- ence and of scientific pursuits, those with whom we have to deal as men who have been taught to think for themselves, and even for those who, with no good right to do so, claim to be able " to think for them- selves," and to be free and independent in their thoughts, something more is necessary. They cannot be expected to take, and will not take, opinions and doctrines on mere trust. Least of all will they take the Articles of the Christian Faith, or of any other faith or philosophy that calls for self-denial and submis- sion to the will of another, unless the grounds and first principles of that faith can be cleared from all reasonable doubt, not even though that other be Infinite Goodness itself LECTURE II. PHYSICAL OBJECTIONS; NATURE OF MATTER; THEORIES OF EVOLUTION AND CAUSATION. Rom. I, 20. For the invisible things of Hinij from the creation of the world are manifest . . . even His eternal power and godhead. PHYSICAL OBJECTIONS. In the preceding Lecture I stated the two Meth- ods that are open to the student of Natural Theology, and endeavored to illustrate them so far as may be necessary for a due appreciation of the criticisms I have to make on the objections that are urged against them. These objections are of two kinds: those that refer more especially to the a posteriori^ or object- ive, method, and those that are more particularly aimed at the a priori, or subjective, method. I be- gin with the former class. I. The a posteriori or objective line of argument has been based largely on the principle of causa- tion. But to this it has been objected (i) that we know nothing about the relations of cause and effect ; (2) that the modern doctrine of " the equivalence of ef- fects and their causes" precludes the idea of any personal agency, whether by way of creation or sub- sequent miraculous intervention ; (3) that in the re- 54 The Methods of Natural Theology. cession from observed effects to their causes we nowhere find a veritable First Cause; that, stop wherever we will, we stop arbitrarily, and with as much demand for our supposed, or assumed. First Cause as for any one of the objects or events in the series which we had regarded as an effect. 2. Then, in the second place, much stress has been laid upon the argument from design and the evidences of what we regard as design in nature. But it is objected that what we call design is a mere assumption on our part ; that we have no right to call it design until we have proved that there is a Being capable of designing. The objection may be thus stated: Suppose I am standing on the sea- shore, desirous of a shell of a peculiar kind. If a friend brings it to me, I may reasonably suppose that he has some design to gratify my wants. But if a wave of the sea should cast it up at my feet, I could not suppose that either the wind or the waves had consciousness of my want, or any purpose or design in the matter ; although the shell comes to relieve my want in the one case as in the other. 3. But again. It has been argued that the proba- bilities are untold millions against such an order as we see in nature without a Designing Mind. To this the objector assents. But he adds, it is not a question of probabilities now; it is now an accom- Physical Objections. 55 plished fact Take the case of a dice, and the proba- bility beforehand oi any particular side falling upper- most — say the ace — is one to five against it ; and no prudent man would risk anj'thing needlessly with such an odds against him. But after the dice has been cast the case is altered ; there was no reason why the ace should not have fallen uppermost — no reason against that way of fcdling any more than against any one of the other five faces falling upper- most; and consequently this fall no more proves design than any one of the others would have done. So it is, say the objectors, with the order and course of nature. The present order is one of those that were possible, but having occurred as a past fact, it no more proves design than any other one of the untold millions of ways would have done if it had occurred. 4. Then finally comes the theory of Evolution, which assumes to explain all things in accordance with mere natural laws, and without any recognition of the existence and agency of God. I proceed to consider the first and last named forms of objection — Evolution, and Theories of Causa- tion — in the confident belief that whatever force the other two I have named may have been thought to possess, will disappear as we proceed with our dis- cussion. S6 The Methods of Natural Theology. I. The theory of Evolution, by assuming the eter- nal existence of matter, will leave us no means of proving the act of creation, or the existence of God as a Creator. And, in the estimation of some of its advocates, it goes much further than this, and by accounting for and explaining all the facts and phe- nomena of the universe, precludes us from any means of proving, the existence and agency of God as an Organizer and Moral Governor. It is not my purpose to discuss the theory of Evolution as a whole ; nor yet to deny it altogether. There are certain observed processes in nature which we may call Evolution or not, as. we please. It is merely a question of words, and not worth many words at that. What I aim to show is that Evolu- tion itself implies and proves the existence of God, and makes the argument for His existence stronger and the illustrations of His attributes clearer and more striking than they were before. The term Evolution has gotten such a hold on scientific men, that I presume it will always remain in use, in one sense or another. But the word is only a name for a process ; and the process, by itself and alone, is no adequate explanation of anytliing. Herbert Spencer, if not the most able, is yet in many respects the most noteworthy of all the advo- cates of the doctrine of the evolution and develop- Fhy steal Objections. 57 ment of all things now existing in the universe out of a formless chaos of matter, without Divine agency. And beside this position in relation to the theory, which he unquestionably occupies, he and his works are by far the best known, as well as the most com- plete exposition of the theory in all its bearings and relations that the readers of these Lectures are likely to have known. In citing Herbert Spencer, however, as I shall freely do, I wish to have two things kept constantly in mind. The first is, that I shall cite and criticise — ^though citing from him — only those features or principles that are common to all theories and views of Evolution that do not recognize God as its agent and cause; and the second is, that, in citing from him admissions or concessions, I shall cite none that are not inevitable deductions from principles or as- sumptions that are essential to the theory in any of its atheistic forms or statements, by whomsoever it may have been expounded or advocated. Spencer says : ^ " Respecting the origin of the universe, three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self-existent ; or that it is self-created, or that it is created by exter- nal agency." But without attempting to prove 1 First Principles, Pt. I., % ii. 58 The Methods of Natural Theology. either of these propositions, he rightly, as I think, regards the second — self-created — as absurd, and accepts the first, which means, of course, that mat- ter is uncreated and eternal. If then this visible universe is uncreated and eter- nal, the mere fact of its existence is no proof of the existence of a Creator. And if Evolution by itself explains all that has occurred, or now exists in its diversified forms and objects, or in its changing phe- nomena, no proof can be found in nature of the in- terposition and agency of any Being outside of the universe, or different in character from the objects of which it is made up; and we are precluded from any argument in favor of the existence and attributes of God that might otherwise be drawn from either the objects, or the constitution and course of nature. However, Herbert Spencer is not always quite consistent with himself in his adherence to this theory ; and it is but fair to give him the credit for whatever he may have said that is of an opposite character and tendency. Thus he says ('§ 27) : " We are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a mani- festation of some Power by which we are acted upon ; phenomena being, so far as we can ascertain, unlim- ited in their diffusion, we are obliged to regard this Power as omnipresent ; and criticism teaches us that this Power is wholly incomprehensible." And Physical Objections. 59 again, speaking of the philosopher, our author says (^ 34) • " He must remember that while he is a descendant of the past, he is a parent of the future, and that his thoughts are his children born to him, which he may not carelessly let die. He, like any other man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Un- known Cause." Now, here, in germ and principle, is all that I care to assert or prove in these Lectures. The existettce and omnipresence of God as First Cause are admit- ted, nay, rather, asserted. And we have only to study " the phenomena " of nature in which he works and manifests Himself, to learn all that we can know by the objective method of Natural Theology, of His attributes and character ; of His plans and pur- poses; ofour origin and destiny; of our duties here, and of our hopes for a hereafter. And for anything more than can be obtained by this method by the" careful study of the phenomena of nature and of the human soul and its thoughts, feelings, and aspira- tions, and by legitimate inference from the facts thus observed, we are prepared to look to, expect, accept and depend upon, a Revelation from God Himself. But we have the admission of the existence of a God Whose agency in all things and all phenomena 6o The Methods of Natural Theology. is conceded ; and Whose omnipresence is not only distinctly recognized as obviously and necessarily implied in the phenomena which manifests His ex- istence and presence. This, however, is not the attitude which Spencer is generally understood to hold towards the doctrines of either Natural or Revealed Religion. Few of the scholars who read his books, and still fewer of the thousands who claim to be his disciples, and cite his authority, have ever, apparently, noted these admis- sions of his. And still fewer have comprehended their importance, or given them a place and posi- tion in what they regard as Spencer's philosophy. I return, then, to the consideration of that doc- trine with regard to the origin of matter and the theory of the evolution of all things from it, for which he is mostly known, and for the influence of which upon the minds and the thoughts of men — upon their lives here and their destiny hereafter — ^he is justly held responsible. Now I am not going to dispute or deny Herbert Spencer's doctrine concerning what he calls the "self- existence " of matter, implying its eternal existence, or its existence without beginning or any act of crea- tion. For it is a subject about which, aside from Revelation, I know nothing, and about which it may be a matter of doubt whether philosophy and Physical Objectiotis. 6i Natural Theology can ever prove an3Hhing either way, that will be finally accepted as satisfactory. It is a matter of which, as I am willing to admit, noth- ing can be known, aside from Revelation. And it may be fairly questioned whether what we thus gain from Revelation should not be called faith or belief, rather than knowledge. And as to knowledge, of course we have had no personal observation or experience of any act of creation properly so called. The act itself may be, and, indeed, I think it is, incomprehensible to us in so much that no one can explain it, or tell precisely how it may have occurred. I freely acknowledge, that while I can imagine, while I can and do believe it to have occurred, I can form no such conception of it as would allow me to reason about it, whether to prove it had occurred, or to deny its possibility.^ 1 1 think it worthy of note in this connection that none of the ancient philosophers, none of the heathen philosophers, in &ct, so &T as I can remember, have had any doctrine of a creation of matter. All the old religions had a lingering tradition of some snch act of creation, which had already become a mere travesty before their dogmas were reduced to writing. But in regard to the J'hil- osophies, I cannot now recall one of them that did not assnme the eternal existence and the uncreated nature of matter in some form and under some name or another. Now, while the religions may be regarded as traditional — with an undercurrent of Natural Theology — ^the philosophies were almost, if not quite wholly, intuitional and rational; expressing such views of man and nature as insight and fancy might suggest. But 4 62 The Methods of Natural Theology. For these reasons I shall allow Spencer's assump- tion with regard to the " self- existence " of matter, whatever it may mean, to pass without challenge or contradiction. And yet, in a certain sense, all that is necessary to a belief in the creation of matter out of nothing, occurs and may be seen in any day's experience. When we look into the clear sky of a summer's day, and see a small cloud appear where there was noth- ing visible a moment before, we have for the sight and for imagination all there is in an act of creation. Modern science has taught us, indeed, that here is only a case in which something that was not visible before, has become visible now ; and science cannot explain how the thing happened. That is all. Science has raised a question — a perfectly legiti- mate question, indeed — that did not exist before. And it is a question which even science cannot answer. But this fact by no means proves the crea- tion of something out of nothing, impossible. John Stuart Mill^ has recognized this fact. He says : " All that is necessary for imagining matter an- nihilated is presented in our daily experience. We see apparent annihilation whenever water dries up even so, they were based on observation, and to some extent, at least, under the restraints of reason and common sense. 1 Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, vol. II, pp. 29, 30. Physical Objections. 63 or fuel is consumed without visible residuum. The fact could not offer itself to our immediate percep- tion in a more palpable shape if the annihilation were real." What is thus true of annihilation is just as true of its opposite — creation. The visible appearance of a cloud of steam on a cold morning, just above the safety-valve of a steam-engine, is to our perception and imagination as much a case of " the creation of something out of nothing " as one could have had if he had stood by as an observer at the time of its creation. To the adequacy of Evolution as an explanation of the phenomenon of the universe, I offer the fol- lowing three objections, each of which seems to me to be fatal : I . If the present order of things had no beginning. Evolution must have produced a Supreme Being long before this time. If matter is eternal, and Evolution is the law or mode. Evolution must be as eternal as matter itself. Eternity may, for our purpose, be assumed to be the same as unlimited time ; for so the theory we are discussing assumes it to be, and so its advocates treat it in all their discussions and reasonings. Now, in the infinity of time, and with no over- 64 The Methods of Natural Theology. ruling Power to prevent it, all things that are possi- ble, whether good or bad, and however good or bad, must have become real. Evolution has already, on their theory, produced man. Why not some- thing higher than man ? infinitely higher ? even a Being of infinite power and goodness ? Surely no one will say that such a Being is im- possible. Too many millions of men have believed in Him to allow that objection to have much influ- ence now. Nay, the very name by which we indi- cate His existence, for this purpose, implies His pos- sibility. We ask for what is merely the highest possible Being. Has then Evolution produced such a Being ? It won't do to say " not yet," for in the infinity of time there is all time, and time enough for all things, and for each thing, many times over. Here, then, we have the dilemma. Either Evolu- tion had a beginning, and so a Beginner, in which case we have the existence of God confessed, or it must have produced a Supreme Being long before this time. In the one case we have God as Creator, and in the other as a result. But in each case, and alike, a God over all and through all and in all, " in whom," in the words of the Apostle, " we live and move and have our being." If, the«, there was a beginning to Evolution there Physical Objections. 65 was a Beginner, and His will is its law and limit If there was no beginning it would have produced a Supreme Being long before this time, so long that we may say that He has existed from eternity; and this seems to me to be about the same as God "in the beginning." 2. I come now to my second point The present order of things had a beginning. Evolution is but a process. It has successive stages or steps, and must have had a first stage and a beginning. The universe, in this aspect of it, consists of a series of events or stages. These events constitute a Series; beginning somewhere and tending to something. This is inseparable from the nature of the case. Herbert Spencer speaks (§ 44) of a primary stage — 3. primitive condition — ^in which all matter was in a gaseous state, diffused to a maximum of diffusion, so as, in his own words, " to fill all space." ' " The first advance," says he (§ 44), " towards consolida- tion resulted in a differentiation between the occu- pied space which the nebulous mass still filled and the unoccupied space which it previously filled." With this, as he goes on to state, there came a dif- 1 It seems difficult to understand how anything that is infinite, as Spencer says that space is, can be considered as ,^/ of anything. 66 The Methods of Natural Theology. ference in density among the parts, with also a dif- ference in temperature ; and in due time and order, light, electricity, and all the other " forces," so called, made their appearance and began their career of activity. Now, as the process of condensation goes on it must always tend to, and ultimately reach, the oppo- site extreme, or the minimum of expansion and dif- fusion. This Spencer sees and admits. As there was a time — a stage — in this progress when life be- gan on the earth, so there must and will be a time when " this process must bring Evolution [itself] to a close in Universal Death" (>§ 136). Nor is that all. Even the " forces," light, heat, etc., must be- come extinct, or retired to a state of inaction. But Spencer adds : " When pushing to its extreme the argument that Evolution must come to a close in complete equilibrium or rest, the reader suggests that for aught that appears to the contrary, the Universal Death thus implied will continue indefinitely, it is legitimate to point out how, on carrying the argu- ment still farther, we are led to infer a subsequent universal life." " It would be unwise," however, he admits, " to accept this in any positive sense." Since Spencer has admitted this result — a " uni- versal death " and " a complete equilibrium or rest " — it would seem to spare us the labor and trouble Physical Objections. 6^ of showing its inevitable necessity. This, however, can easily be shown. Spencer holds that these " modes of force," light, heat, etc. (he enumerates seven, light, heat, electricity, magnetism, affinity, and gravity), are all "alike transformable into each other " {% 82). But if they can be transformed into each other, it is a fact which Mr. Spencer knows as well as anybody that they cannot always be got back into their original form. I am not aware that any means has yet been found for converting eitlier gravity into heat or heat into gravity. But with regard to all the rest of them it is conceded, I believe, and proved by experiment, that diey may be transformed or converted into heat But when converted into heat, the heat be- comes diffused by radiation, until all objects coming to be of the same temperature they cease to act on each other at alL The heat cannot be gotten back into its original form, and we have, as Spencer has called it, " a perfect equilibrium or res^" with no force causing further change, and Evolution itself is at cm end.* 1 It is hardly any part of my duty to assist these gentlemen to a more favorable, or at least a less objectionable, statement of their theory. Bat I can see no good reason for speaking of this extreme as an " equilibrinm or rest," when " all force is latent" Accept- ing this theory of "the conservation and correlation of forces," I would sn^^est that they all — the whole seven of them— may have 68 The Methods of Natural Theology. The material forces in nature are of two kinds. The one act by impact, and produce motion in straight lines, with uniform velocity and with no re- currence to the same point or condition of existence. The others act constantly, and when combined with those of the first class, may produce motion in curve lines with recurrence to the same point or condition. As examples, we have the sun in its action on the planets ; the earth on the pendulum that swings back and forth in space; the air that resists whatever would pass through it; the steam that keeps the piston moving back and forth in the cylinder. But in all these cases the force that acts constantly is outside of the moving mass — the sun, the air that resists the bodies that are passing through it, the earth that attracts the swinging pendulum, and the steam that moves the piston-rod. Even in the phenomena of animal life, where we find animal sensibility, the law is the same. The been "converted" into the one, heat, in the state of the greatest diffusion, which may be very intensely active, as repulsion, keep- ing the atoms apart in a gaseous form, and at the other extreme they may all be " converted" into attraction, and so keep the atoms in the closest condensation and unity. They, or it — the forces I mean — may be active as gravity, affinity and cohesion, or these forces may be, as some philosophers maintain that they are, only different forms of one force. But whether as one or as three, there is no reason that I can see why they should not be most intensely active in the state of the greatest condensation of the matter of the uni- verse. Physical Objections. 69 expansion and contraction of the chest in breathing would not occur but for the heart sending the blood to the lungs. Nor would the heart contract but for the constant action of the capillaries in sending the blood to the heart through the veins. The only case in which we know of any recur- rence to the same place or condition, without the action of some such outside force, is found in the actions of man. But here we have a soul, a per- sonal agent or force acting within the man, the mov- ing mass, which is the body itself. The forces of nature can always be represented by a " variable " in an anal3^ic equation, and the rates of motion or change which they produce can be expressed by a coefficient in a differential equa- tion.* In this respect they are unlike the will-power 1 In order that there may be maxima or minima, nodes, cyclic or cycloidal returns to the same place or condition, there must be two variables. These variables represent forces so situated, ontologically, that the one maybe active and producing its results, while the other is inactive, or kept in equilibrium so as to produce no result or change ; for at these points the differential coeificient of one of the variables must become zero, in its passage from a positive to a nega- tive value, or the reverse. Thus in the common cycloid generated by a point in the wheel of a carriage, as it passes along the road, while X, denoting the abscissa, distances in space and time, is con- stantly increasing, y, denoting the ordinaUs, is alternately becom- ing zero or zR, the diameter of the wheel, and at each of these points dy becomes, for the instant zero, or nothing. So with evolution. When dy is nothing or the "forces " spoken of are at their "equi- librium " or " rest," the Force or Power represented by x must be ^o The Methods of Natural Theology. in man, and the emotional power or force in animals. Hence, with regard to the forces that are at work in inanimate nature, we can always, by means of the mathematical formulae, ascertain the bounds and limits to the possibilities of which they are capable. With a constant variable we have only straight lines with no maxima or minima, no return to the same points or over the same track ; while with the varia- ble coefficients which represent the constantly acting forces combined with the constant, we can have such nodes or cyclic recurrences. But for the material universe itself, there can be no such outside mass to carry it through these ex- tremes. The only alternative, therefore, is that there is a Moving Mind in the universe, as in the body of man. He can go back and forth from point to point and state to state at will. So it is with God in this material universe. I do not know that it is necessary to assume or prove that matter has ever actually been in either of these extreme conditions. And yet, without the intervention of some personal Agent to prevent it, I do not see how it could have been otherwise. We do know, however, that for many millions of active in order to carry the mass through its extremes, or maxima and minima points, as truly as the horse that draws the carriage and keeps the wheel taming on its axletree. Physical Objections. 71 years now past it h£is been going and changing from a state of greater heat and diffusion to one of great- er cold and condensation. And this process is still going on, as recent attainments both in geology and astronomy abundantly prove.' At these cosmologicd extremes, therefore, the atoms of matter must either change their nature and become spontaneously active, or there must be the intervention of some Force or Agent of a nature entirely different from theirs. At these points of extreme diffusion and extreme condensation, where there is, as Spencer calls it, a " complete equilibrium or rest," either these atoms must become spontane- 1 The reality of such extremes is not wholly a matter of specula- tion ; nor is the time when they occur wholly beyond computation. Professor Tait, Recent Advances in Physical Science, Lect. VII., gives three Computations. (l) One based on the loss of internal heat as about ten millions of years since the earth was cool enough for plants to grow on its surface. (2) One based on the retarda- tion of the earth's revolutions by^the tidal influences of the moon, which reduces the period to something less than ten millions of years, (3) The length of time that the sun, &om its radiation, can have " kept the earth in a state fit for the habitation of animals and vegetables." This " tends to about the same result." Professor Young, (work on The Sun, p. 276), computing by a somewhat different process, gives us a 4th result, which is about sixteen mill- ions of years. And then Wallace, in his Island Life, Part I., t. X., by a purely geological computation, reaches a result somewhat larger — say about twenty or twenty-five millions of years, giving an average in all, of about fifteen millions of years of time since the earth became sufficiently cooled and consolidated for the beginning of animal and vegetable life. 72 The Methods of Natural Theology. ously active and start into action of themselves — ac- tion both mechanical and chemical — or there must be some spontaneously acting Being or Agent to start them out of their equilibrium of perfect rest and inactivity. It is not a question of moving on through time and space, but it is the question of the beginning of motion and action in time and space, by atoms of matter which nowhere else, and at no other time, have shown themselves capable of origi- nating such kinds of action. Our author thinks that he is provided against this emergency, for he has prepared himself, or rather his theory, with what becomes at this point an " out- side agency," to use his own expression. He has Force, or one force that becomes diversified into the seven already named, light, heat, etc., and they help him, as he thinks, through this "dead point" in nature, to use an expression familiar to engineers and machinists. But do you see where we are ? These modern scientists are in the same difficulty as their early Aryan congeners of whom I have already spoken. Seeing that there must be something beside the visi- ble objects in nature, they invented a Jupiter to "compel" the clouds and send down the rain; a Neptune to control the seas and look after the tides ; an .iEolus to restrain the winds; and a Ceres to cause the earth to bring forth its fruit in due seasoa Physical Objections. yi This view of the matter seems to have occurred to Tylor also, for he says : * " The scientific concep- tions current in my own school-boy days, of heat and electricity as invisible fluids passing in and out of solid bodies, are ideas which reproduce, with ex- treme closeness, the special doctrines of fetichism." If now men may invent causes rather than discover them, no effective argument can be derived from any of the phenomena of nature to prove the existence of God, or any other proposition that the objector does not choose to admit ; for in any case and in reference to any phenomenon or class of phenomena, he has but to invent a cause, call it up from the vast " unknowable " that these men talk so much about, and make it what the case demands; clothe it with all the attributes that may be necessary to make it adequate to the observed effects, and all is done that the demands of science call for. There is no need of a Personal Creator, and it may be triumphantly claimed that there is no proof of His existence or of the manifestation of his attributes anywhere. But never mind. Even so there is a confession of the existence of something besides matter, some- thing that is immaterial in its nature and that can act, and act on matter, too, when matter in all its I Frinritive Culture, vol. i, p. 147. 74 The Methods of Natural Theology. forms, whether mass or molecule, is at rest — " in the perfect equilibrium of rest." I have not taken much notice in this discussion of the theory which is a favorite with many persons just now, which holds that " force," like matter, is eternal, and incapable of either increase or diminu- tion. This is a " good working hypothesis " for most purposes of the physical sciences. But it is not held, and cannot be held, as I understand the matter, ex- cept as we recognize two distinct and opposite con- ditions of force, the " kinetic " and the " latent " or " potential," as they are called. The following has been given as an illustration. If I throw a ball upwards into the air it has a force while moving up which is a product of the weight into the velocity. But at its highest point, its maximum or extreme of elevation, it is at rest for a moment, and has in con- sequence no force, although in the process of de- scending it regains all that it had in starting. But it is held that the force is not lost during its ascent, it only passes over from being kinetic to being latent or only potential. In the case of the ball, it is the attraction of the earth that starts it back again after it had reached its greatest elevation, and awakes the force out of its "latency" and rouses it to a kinetic mood again. But in the case of the material universe there is no Physical Objections. "jt, such outside mass to act upon it. It can be only a Personal Agent, with will-power or psychical force — in short a Spiritual Being — that can start the dead matter into life and action again after its force has become latent and inoperative, and has for all practi- cal purposes ceased to be a force at all. We reach the conclusion, therefore, that mere in- animate matter with such properties and forces as it now has is not adequate to the explanation of the phenomena of the universe by the mode of Evolu- tion or any other mode without the intervention of a personal Cause and Creator. Aristotle* came to the same conclusion from a study of the phenomena of motion. He held that matter vkri is mere capacity, capable of being moved and put into motion. And he argues that it is pos- sible that that which is only moved or capable of being moved has no necessary existence, and may be supposed not to exist But he adds: "It is there- fore necessary that there should be a first Principle or Being Whose very nature is energy, and the cause of motion." The late Professor Benjamin Peirce, of Harvard University, in his great work on Analytic Mechanics, which is doubtless the profoundest mathematical work that has ever been produced in this country, ^Metaphysics, B. xi, c. vi. 76 The Methods of Natural Theology. begins and ends his volume with the declaration that motion in matter implies a Cause and Agent that is immaterial and personal. " Motion is an essential element in all physical phenomena ; and its intro- duction into the universe of matter was necessarily the preliminary act of creation." And in conclud- ing his work he says : " But it is time to return to nature and learn from her actual solutions the recondite analysis of the more obscure problems of celestial and physical mechanics. In these researches there is one lesson which cannot escape the profound observer. Every portion of the material universe is pervaded by the same laws of mechanical action, which are incorporated into the very constitution of the human mind. The solution of the problem of this universal presence of such a spiritual element is obvious and necessary. There is one God and Science is the knowledge of Him." Unless we deny to matter that inertia which is assumed as its fundamental property and character in all our physical sciences, whether chemical or mechanical, and ascribe to it life and the capacity for voluntary action, this conclusion seems to be in- evitable. Here, then, we have what seems to me to be a demonstration of the existence of a being Who acts spontaneously, of His own will and motion, and Physical Objections. yy Whose works must, in the words of St. Paul, show forth the invisible things of Him — even His eternal power and godhead, the attributes that make up the essentials of a personal character. 3. I have one point more for consideration : Evo- lution without God does not account for all the phe- nomena since the beginning. I do not propose, as I have said, to discuss Evo- lution in all its phases and assumptions. It is enough for my purpose to show that it does not destroy or even weaken the force of the argument for the ex- istence of God. It may be a divine method with such limits as scientific investigation has already or may hereafter fix to it as a legitimate part of scien- tific truth. Nor again, do I intend to urge against it in this place,^ the objection, so forcibly urged by Wcil- lace, Mivart, Quatrefages, Virchow, Elam, and many others, that in fact no case of the actual evolution of one species from a stock belonging to another in any proper scientific classification, has ever been seen or actually proved to have taken place. I be- lieve this line of objection is well chosen and fatal to any theory of Evolution, which does not regard it as a part, and only a part, of the divine method, or 1 For this part of the argument see the first part of Lecture VI. 78 The Methods of Natural Theology. that looks to Evolution alone as solving all the phe- nomena of the universe. My line of objection is for the present of a very different character, and, as I believe, it affords a still more insuperable obstacle to the reception of that theory in any form that can operate as an objection to our belief in the existence of God and " in the operations of His hands," which we call Miracles, Inspiration, and Providence. It is as well ascertained as any fact in science can be, that this earth through a long period of its early history was without any living thing, plant or ani- mal, on its surface. At a time life began ; and it is beyond dispute that it began in some of its lowest forms. Whether the first living thing on this earth were a simple cell, without yet a nucleus or cell- wall, or were an animal with an organization of parts and organs, and whethet it belonged to the animal or the vegetable kingdom, is a matter of no importance to our present inquiry. With this first living thing there was a new com- pound of the chemical elements, such as did not in fact exist before, and could not have existed at a much earlier period. It is an exceedingly unstable compound, which ignites and burns at a tempera- ture somewhat above that of boiling water, and always at or below that of red heat. This compound Physical Objections. 79 is such that no chemist has yet been able to produce it in his laboratory. He cannot even tell under what circumstances it would occur or why he can- not produce it himself. Was there then a Divine Agent ? I only ask the question. The chemist will very likely say that there was in that act no violation or contravention of the well known laws of chemistry. Very likely ; but the same may be said of miracles in general. They are not violations of the laws of nature ; not departures from its ordinary courses, except in the one thing, — the intervention of a new Agent — the Miracle Worker Himself. He it is, and not the method or the result in itself considered, that makes the miracle. But this is not all. Here was the beginning of a new process, a new order. We have now life, growth, development of parts and organs, with re- production, decay and death. Nothing like it had occurred or been seen on earth before. No crystal — no mere mineral — undergoes these changes or performs these functions. The crystal had no par- entage, produces no offspring, and will have no line of posterity. What it was, it is, and will be, with none of the phenomena or indications of life, and no life history in the records of its existence. Professor Tyndall has stated the problem here 8o The Methods of Natural Theology. presented very sharply, in his way. " Two views," he says,^ "thus offer themselves to us. Life was present potentially in matter when in the nebulous form, and was unfolded from it by the way of nat- ural development, or it is a principle inserted into matter at a later date." Putting this problem into plain English, without metaphysics or rhetorical embellishment, we have: either there were living beings on the earth at this early stage, or there is such a thing as life which is a substantial entity capable of a separate existence, which came into the CcU^ at a later period, as some meteoric stone, or new chemical element, possibly an invisible gas, might have done. But I can suggest a third alternative : there was a Creator who organized this dust of the earth and made what He had thus produced out of these or- ganic elements, a living being ; and gave to it the power of perpetuating itself and its species through all coming time. Of the three " suppositions " which, in the words of Spencer, are " verbally intelligible," one is not to be held for an instant There were no living things on earth when it was in its incandescent or nebulous condition ; living things did not appear until long after that period had passed away. '^ Fragments of Science, Appleton's Ed., 1872, p. 156. Physical Objections. 8i Only two hypotheses then remain : the one is that there is a living God Who is the Creator of all living things, and Whose presence and agency were mani- fested in this new phenomenon, or there is such a thing as life, which is not a mere mode of existence, but a " substantiated reality " like the gases, oxygen, hydrogen, etc., which at the time came into the world, or which at the least entered at that time, and then for the first time, into new relations and began a new career of existence. But even so, are we not doing as our early Aryan fathers did, creating a new god for our mythology ? Are we not ascribing to " life " something of per- sonality, the power of choice and spontaneity of action ? Anyhow, " life " did not begin without something more, and something besides and different from mere evolution ; for if we accept what Tyndall declares to be the " scientific idea," evolution can be only the way in which molecules act upon each other.* This surely precludes all idea of " forces " to be denoted by such abstract terms as heat, light, etc., or, as Tyndall calls it> " the intervention of slave labor," 1 Fragments of Science, Appleton's edition, 1S72, p. 114, " The scientific idea is that the molecules act upon each other . . . that they attract each other at certain definite poi.nts or poles and in certain definite directions." 82 The Methods of Natural Theology. and reduces us to the dilemma, either the atoms of matter were endowed with intelligence and capable of plan and purpose, or there was a Personal God, Who planned and executed whatever we see, whether we call the phenomena a creation or an evolution. There was also at the introduction of organic life the beginning of another new thing, which Dr. Elam has well and sharply pointed out* " The organic force in vegetable tissue can decompose carbonic acid at ordinary temperatures into carbon and oxy- gen. Now this cannot be effected by the intensifi- cation of any one, or by any combination of the or- dinary forces of the inorganic world." And we may add, no chemist can do it, or knows how it can be done in his laboratory. And yet it takes place daily in the vegetable world and in the growth of every plant in that world. I am aware that there are those who would meet my argument with the claim of what is called " spon- taneous generation," although, as I understand it, they do not claim that living beings have been pro- duced out of inorganic matter by mere chemical processes. And the claim in any form is not allowed by the best authorities on the subject. I know too, that there are chemists who, in the 1 Winds of Doctrine, being an Examination into the modern theo- ries of automatism and evolution, London, 1876, p. 89. Physical Objections. 83 ardor of their enthusiasm for their favorite science, claim that the time will come and is in fact fast ap- proaching — pretty nearly here — ^when the chemist can do all these things in his laboratory — put together in proper proportion, and in the right way, the ele- ments that are essential to organic compounds, and produce the living being in his crucibles and under our very eyes. Well, I do not care to discourage their enthusiastic hopes. He would be a rash man who should venture to set any limits to the progress of discovery and to say what may and what may not be attained in the future. But it is just as much to my purpose, and the purpose of my argument, to say that whatever you may be able to do in the future, there was Some- body, millions of years ago. Who knew how to do these very things then, and did them, too, as the geological records of the past most incontestably prove. He knew how and did then with a certainty and a success that shows no defect or imperfection, no indication of a limit to His knowledge or His power, what you cannot do now, and do not even know why it cannot be done. Did the molecules of matter mcike themselves into living beings? Are they wiser than we are ? Did they know more then than we do now ? or was there a Personal Agent 84 The Methods of Natural Theology. Who showed Himself in this to be a First Cause and Creator ? I have confined myself here to the three objections to the theory of Evolution that are of the most gen- eral character. I shall have occasion to say some- thing more which will be more specific in the sixth Lecture. But I think we have seen enough to justify the proposition with which I started. The word evolu- tion is only a term to denote a process, and the process in itself and alone is no adequate explana- tion of anything. The mere evolutionist seems to me to reason very much as we might expect a very intelligent savage to do who might happen to be visiting, for the first time, a highly civilized country, and seeing all the comforts and conveniencies of life which our modern civilization has accumulated in our modern homes. He would be taken, of course, into our mines, our manufactories, and wherever else our industries are most successfully prosecuted ; and he would see the machinery we use in all its complicated forms and in the performance of all its wonders. He would most likely conclude that it was machinery, and the use of machinery, that has constituted the superiority of our home life, and the splendors of our towns and cities, whatever, in fact, makes our homes superior Physical Objections. 85 to his. He would extol the glories of machinery and machine manufactures as the cause of what he had seen. And he would be right as far as his theory goes. But he would be seen to have overlooked, or failed to discern, the fact that machinery, however perfect and complete in itself, can do nothing without a moving Power. There must be wind or steam or falling water to propel the machinery or it can do nothing. So witii nature. Call its manifold on-going proc- esses evolution or whatever else you will, it is itself but a piece of machinery, and its evolutions and changes are but processes which imply a moving Power or First Cause. But I must hasten to the consideration of the remaining objections that belong to this group — the objections to the a posteriori method. II. The objections that are urged under this head come before us in two forms : the one is based on what is called "the equivalence of effects and their causes," and the other on the ground that there can be no First Cause except as we arbitrarily assume some one to be the first. I. The first of these objections, though very fully elaborated by Sir William Hamilton, is so well stated 86 The Methods of Natural Theology. by President Bascom in the book already referred to,* that I will state it in his words. " This line of argument," he claims, involves " the exact equiva- lence of causes and effects." This law he regards as inexorable ; and, as he says, " it carries with it the uniformity of nature as a congeries of causes. These causes remaining the same, can produce no other effects than those which now belong to them. But causes cannot change themselves within their own circle, for that change would be an effect without a cause. Still further, the notion of causation includes the unbroken continuity of causes and effects in their several series. Hence the correlation of forces — their indestructibility — is a corollary of the law of causation. . . . We are quite certain that no force, either in aid of our purposes or in opposition to them, will ever disappear, no matter how great a variety of forms it may assume With this notion of causation . . . what argument can be constructed for the being of God ? We answer, no argument that pjfifers the least proof. The results reached are quite tlje revgF§e pf those sought for. . . We may affirm that we are thus led up Jo a First Cause. The con- clusion is wholly illegitimate for nj^ny reasons. If for convenience of expression we dividg J:he ascent to a First Cause into distinct steps, the causes in 1 Natural Theology, pp. 40-43. Physical Objections. 87 each step will be the exact equivalents of those which precede it and those which follow it. No move- ment backward or forward alters the causes dealt with, either in quantity or quality. It discloses them as divided and combined in a great variety of ways, as assuming many new and striking appearances, but never as different either in nature or amount from what they have always been. An ascent, therefore, no matter how far, puts no change on the face of the facts, and brings us no nearer their ulti- mate explanation. If we stop at any point we stop arbitrarily. The causes we have chosen stand as causes in no different relations from those already passed over. Equally with them they are intermedi- ates between previous and subsequent causes . . . the energies of the universe, like those of a torrent, come pouring out of the past, and simply spreaid out over the future as an open field." This objection assumes in the first place the eter- nity of matter as self-existing, and does not regard it as a perpetual creation of the Divine Mind, which has already been suggested as the opinion of Dr. Bascom, and which, I will take occasion to add, seems to me the most plausible and the most proba- ble hypothesis that we can entertain on the subject. But of this I have said all that I have time or occa- sion for,^ in the previous Lecture. 88 The Methods of Nattiral Theology. The second assumption made by those who urge this objection, is the eternity and indestructibility of force, or forces, as something distinct from and dual with matter. I have already spoken of this doctrine with regard to " force '' as having its value as a " working hy- pothesis." But in any other view it is liable to very serious objections. And even as a working hypothe- sis it must be taken with the doctrine that " force " has its two forms of existence — kinetic or active on the one .hand, and latent and passive, or at least quiescent, on the other — when, for all practical pur- poses, it becomes no force at all. Hence I think we may safely dismiss that theory without farther con- sideration. The laws of causation and the classes of causes are pretty well understood. Aristotle, with that won- derful sagacity that never forsook him, teaches and repeats in several places, that, to a complete scien- tific comprehension of any subject, there are four causes to be considered : (i) the material cause or the matter out of which anything is made ; (2) the formal cause, which, in our modern sense of words, means the specific character, although in his day a formal cause was always an " idea " in the Platonic sense of the word, or a " form " in the later scholas- tic sense; (3) the efficient cause, or that which Physical Objections. 89 produces the object ; and (4) the final cause. This, in reference to moral agents, is the purpose or aim which the agent had in mind in producing the object. But in a more general sense, and without implying personal agency at all, it would mean the uses of the object or possibly the effects which it, considered as a cause, produces. Bacon ^ recognized these four classes of causes or heads as topics of investigation, and thought that the knowledge of the material and formal causes of things constituted the proper sphere of Natural Philosophy or Physical Science, and that an inquiry into the other two — efficient and final causes — ^be- longed more properly to the department of the Metaphysical Sciences. But with the careful study and use of the Induc- tive Method, and the conditions and laws of scien- tific investigation, it was found that each event had more than one cause acting at the time of its pro- duction, of which notice must be taken, and in like manner no one cause ever acted without contribu- ting to the production of more than one effect. This led to the idea of an equivalence of the sum of the causes and the effects, as a fundamental principle of scientific investigation. This doctrine of the equivalence of causes and ef- 1 Advancement of Learning, B. Ill, c. iv. 90 The Methods of Natural Theology. fects led to a recognition of what is called " residual phenomena," which has been the basis of many of the most important discoveries in modern science. These principles of scientific investigation have been carefully studied and well stated by such men as Whewell,! Si? J. F. W. Herschel,' John Stuart Mill,' and Professor W. Stanley Jevons.* But the law or principle has no application to the question before us. We are not now seeking for the full scientific comprehension of anything ; but we are trying to find whether there was a First Cause of all things or not. The two purposes are totally different, both in their aims and in the principles that should guide the inquiry. Hence mistakes or omissions that would be fatal in the one case, may be only the wise disembarrassment that would relieve us of what would prove only a useless and unnecessary encum- brance in the other. I see an oak growing before me. It is small and has just started out of the ground. If I were intent on the pursuit of scientific knowledge only, I should J Whewell, Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, Pt. II, Book xiii. 2 Sir John F. W. Herschel, Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy. ^ s John Stuart Mill, System of Logic, B. III. * W. Stanley Jevons, The Principles of Science, B. I, c. vii, B. II, c. xi, and B. IV. Physical Objections. 91 begin with considering the conditions of the soil, the climate, and the moisture on which the germination of the acorn and the growth of the shrub had been dependent But my object being quite other than mere natural science, I begin by seeking the cause in another direction, and perhaps in another sense of the word. I start with tlie acorn. I have no doubt it was produced by an oak tree ; and this tree in turn grew from an acorn, and so on, until we come to the time when there was neither oak nor acorn on this earth ; and I ask who or what then existed as the acting, creating Cause ? Or I may begin with the fact of sunlight, and ask about the sun. I know now, as thinkers in the past did not always know, that the sun has not always existed. Whatever may be said about the eternity of matter and the indestructibility and conservation of forces, I know — and nobody denies — that there was a time when there was no such combination of matter and forces as makes up the sun which we now have ; and I ask, naturally and legitimately, what was before the sun ? what was its cause ? who was its creator ? In this line of investigation and inquiry occurs no question of the " equivalence of causes and effects," whatever that may mean. And I have no hesita- tion or difficulty in admitting, if that will at all re- 92 The Methods of Natural Theology. lieve the difficulty, that I might pursue the investi- gation through many lines of causes and of causa- tion, acting in different ways and with different senses for the word cause. But they would all con- verge at last in One, Who is supreme and the sum of all causes and causation, as from another point of view He is the sum and comprehension of all being. From this point of view I can have no hesitation in admitting their doctrine of the " equivalence of causes and effects." It rather helps my argument, for the universe without God is the sum of the effects, and He, as First Cause, is the sum of causes ; and by this law He must be adequate and equal to [the causation of] all the effects. I say equal to the causation of all, for this is obviously the only point of comparison or co-measurement that is possible in the case. And this "equivalence," or adequacy, gives us the attributes of goodness, wisdom and power, just to the extent to which they are manifest- ed in nature — the works of creation around us or in the course of human history. 2. The other form of the objection is of a different character, and much more widely diffused among thinking men. In fact, there are but few, if any, who have not met with it. It is that the argumen- tation from effect to cause to prove a beginning and a First Cause of all things, is ineffectual because Physical Objections. 93 it has no natural or logical stopping place. When we arrive at our so-called First Cause, the question may still be asked, as they allege, and asked as per- tinently, and pursued with as much force, as before, who or what caused this, your so-called first cause ; what was before Him ? This objection may be found in the writings of Sir William Hamilton and John Stuart Mill, to name no others. Dr. Bascom, in the work referred to, as will be seen in the quotation just given, yields to it, apparently, as though he thought it fatal to this line of reasoning. , It is much easier to show the logical fallacy on which this objection is founded than to do away with the evil effects it has produced far and wide upon the minds of men ; the former being, as I think, comparatively easy, while the latter is a work of labor and tact and perseverance, which will often prove ineffectual after we have done all that it is in our power to do. Now, the fundamental mistake of these men who either make, or are troubled by, this objection, is in supposing that we affirm that " every thing had a cause." Even so shrewd a philosopher as Sir Wil- liam Hamilton makes this mistake, and John Stuart Mill, when commenting on Hamilton's words, re- peats it without dissent or apparent consciousness of 94 The Methods of Natural Theology. it. He says " the alleged impossibility of conceiv- ing any phenomena of the universe to be uncaused, applies equally ... to the First Cause itself."* And in his posthumous work' he says : " It would seem, therefore, that our experience instead of furnishing an argument for a First Cause is repugnant to it." But the doctrine is not that every thing\\aA a cause, but that every effect had a cause. Whatever we know to be an effect we know, in the very act of knowing it to be an effect, to have had a cause ; and we believe in the reality and na- ture of the cause just to the extent that we believe in the reality of the effect and know it to be an effect. If, now, there is anything which we know by any means whatever, without knowing it to he an effect, we know it, to that extent, and so long as we know it in that way only, as a first cause. And this is, in substance, my answer to their ob- jection. Effects only have causes, and causes, as such, do not call for or demand belief in their causes. When the French astronomer Leverrier discovered the perturbations of the planet Herschel, he knew them to be an effect, and that there was for them a 1 Examination, etc., Vol. II, p. 37. 2 Three Essays on Religion, p. 142 and following, MiLI, repeats his objection even after he has admitted that there are first causes in the strict and proper sense of the word. Physical Objections. 95 cause, which at the time and for the time was a first cause. He knew it only as producing the observed effect. He supposed it to be a mass of matter as yet undiscovered in the heavens, and the telescope soon made it an object of immediate observation. Then it was classed among the other cosmical masses that are regarded by the common consent of mankind as effects, or created things. Mill, in his Posthumous Essays on Theism (p. 143 and following), has recognized and admitted this doctrine. The example he gives is water. We know this, like every other chemical compound, to be an effect, the result of the union of chemical elements that could not have been so united in the earliest stages of the material universe, or at any rate, at the beginning of the present evolution in mundane affairs. In view of the newly discovered doctrine of the Corelation and Conservation of Force, he sees his way, apparently, to the admission of first causes, without the acknoiwledgment of a Personal First Cause of all things. These elements, as the oxygen and hydrogen of water, he says, are not known to have had any beginning to their existence, and may hence properly be regarded as first causes. Now, in this order of retrogression from any given or assumed effect, we must, of necessity, come some- where at some time to an object which we know 96 The Methods of Natural Theology. only as a cause, and as the cause of the last object, which we have known in any such way, or by any such means, that we know it to be an effect. Hence, at this point and with this object, we may stop and study this, as yet unobserved object which we know only as cause, as the French astronomer did, and learn what we can of the nature and mode of its ex- istence, its modes of action, and its ways of mani- festation. And if there is anywhere a cause that is or was before an effect, then there must be somewhere a Cause before Which there was no cause and no act of causation. Any possible concatenation of cause and effect, and any law of causation or of causal sequence, involves this result as an absolute necessity ; so that if there be no First Cause, there is nothing that can be called an effect anywhere ; no consecution of cause and effect ; no law of causation. Now it is quite true, as Mill claims, that so far as the sixty-four or five chemical elements are concerned, we see nothing in them to imply that they are cre- ated effects — that they are not eternal as God Him- self. But we do know that there was a time in this material universe when they were not united or acting upon each other as they now do in forming and perpetuating the mineralogical compounds of which this earth is made up. Hence, as I have ar- Physical Objections. 97 gued, the necessity of something besides them, some- thing of a nature different, from theirs — something capable of spontaneous activity, and possessed of infi- nite wisdom and power to set them into activity, and begin the present order of things ; thus the existence of God, if not as the Creator of all things visible and invisible, is proved in the capacity of First Cause and Organizer of what we now see in the world or the universe in the process of evolution. The solution of the difficulty, so far as Mill is con- cerned, is in the fact that he uses the word cause in two senses. In the passage just quoted it is evident from the context that he means by causes not the " substantial objects," oxygen, etc., but only the acts of uniting, and in this sense he is doubtless correct ; for we cannot conceive of any union without some "object" or "substantial reality," to use his own words, to be united, and something or somebody acting as cause to unite them. But Mill uses the word " cause " to denote both the act of uniting and the agent that produces the union ; thus perpetrat- ing the fallacy in diction which in logic, we call technically, ambiguous middle. Now this Being is, from the very nature of the case, like the chemical elements in this at least: there is nothing in His nature or in what we know of Him to suggest that He is an effect, or requires a cause for His existence. 98 The Methods of Natural Theology . But unlike them He must, from the nature of the case, be spontaneously active. He can have no periods of " absolute rest," or if He has, He must be able sua sponte, by His own will and from Himself alone, to start into action, to begin anew a state of activity. He must be in this respect, at least, to- tally unlike all material objects, atoms, molecules, or masses, and like nothing that we know of but the human mind itself. These causes and effects constitute a series like the successive stages of evolution. If, however, one objects, as Comte, Lewes and " the positivists " do, that we know nothing of causation, and have no right to affirm it in any case, or speak of anything as a cause, I reply that we have no need to do so for the purposes of our argument. We may treat these phenomena as mere events in the order and sequence of time and the result will be the same. Every series must have five elements : a first term a, a rate of change d, a number of terms n, a last term /, and a sum of all the terms s. Now with any three of these the others may be found. But let the algebraist try and see what he can do with any of the formulae if a, the first term, is thrown out and becomes not the mathematical zero as in the series o, I, 2, 3, 4, but ontologically nothing — so that there is no first term. In that case there can be no sec- Physical Objections. 99 ond term, no succession, and no number of terms, no sums of terms, and in fact no series. The same will be the result if he assumes that the number of terms as well as the last term and the sums of the terms is infinity. He can do nothing with the symbol of infinity in his formulae in place oil or n or s. He can neither add nor substract it. He can neither multiply nor divide by it. It indi- cates to him, in fact, as surely as the absence of a first term, that there is no series. This applies, of course, only to actual ssnes. Se- ries may be theoretically infinite — that is, they may be of such a nature that there was actually and in fact no term before which there might not have been another ; and no one so late that there may not yet be another in the same series, although that other has not yet come into being. But this is not and cannot be the case with any actual series of any ontological facts or events. But as I have said, it is much easier to expose the fallacy logically, than to do away with the injuri- ous impression it has made on the minds of those in whom it has gained a lodgment. Like many another deeply-rooted and long-cherished error, it clings very tightly to its hold upon us. It is like a case of momentum in which we begin to move on in any direction rapidly, and seeing no occasion to loo The Methods of Natural Theology. stop at any particular point, we either keep on at the original pace or we come to a stop with such violence as to cause unpleasant results. We live in the midst of things that are transient and temporary. We are so much accustomed to think of them all as effects — ^that we cannot easily realize, however undeniably we can prove — that there is or can be anything that is cause, without being effect or the product of anytliing. Mill bases our belief in causation and expecta- tion of a cause where we see a result on habit formed by long continued " association of ideas." I base it on insight into the nature of the observed object or event. On his theory when we arrive at the First Cause the force of habit leads us to inquire for its cause, and the inquiry is as pertinent and well grounded as at any previous step. But on my theory, whenever we have reached a conception of that in which we can see no evidence of previous causation — no indications of its being an effect — the mind is satisfied, and will see, on a moment's reflec- tion the unwisdom and the unreasonableness of ask- ing for its cause. If in all our scrutiny into its na- ture as a cause we find nothing to suggest its tran- sitoriness, its production in time, there is nothing in the case to either suggest, or to justify, the question as to its cause. Physical Objections. loi We have seen from another line of argument that we must stop somewhere. I think we see now where we must stop and the reason why we must stop there in our search for a First Cause of all things. The belief in the existence of God is, I have no doubt, with the great majority of mankind a matter of mere instinct, or of sentiment, or it may be the result of early training. But yet we nowhere see Him as we see ourselves in consciousness, or as we see the objects around us, by the organs of sense- perception. Hence the necessity for reasonings like what we have been pursuing. But what we can hope to produce in this way needs to become something more than a matter of intellect. It needs to become a matter of the heart and of the life, as vital and as influential too, in the control of our actions and our thoughts, our plans and our pur- poses, as the consciousness of our own existence or our sense of liability to pains and pleasures, that controls us in the affairs of our daily lives. This I say will be for many the natural, and per- haps for some persons the only possible course. But for the great mass of mankind no questions regard- ing the existence and attributes of God ever arise; the idea, the instinct in their hearts is there, and the earnest appeals of the preacher, the sadder experi- ences of life, call it out and into activity in a way I02 The Methods of Natural Theology. that they know not and for the most part do not care to know. They beheve, and believing, they obey, and following on they are transformed in their lives and in the spirit of their minds, until they come to know, through the enlightening influences of the Holy Spirit, that the things that have been told them are indeed true and of God. Hence I hold as cleared and vindicated from all reasonable objections that the method of reason- ing from effects to cause and to a First Cause, from the things that we see to the unseen God and Crea- tor of all, is perfectly legitimate and irrefragable. The conclusion, therefore, seems inevitable : 1. If there is any relation of cause and effect, or any sequence of causes and effects, there must be a First Cause whose character and attributes are mani- fested in His works. 2. Or, without assuming any relation of cause and effect, if there is so much as a sequence of events one after another in the order of time, there must have been 2. first event. If this event was the act of a spiritual agent then he was a person and acted spontaneously. If it was only a motion or action in mere matter, there must have been, nevertheless, a Personal Agent to cause that action. This the law of inertia necessitates, and in either case God is proved to have existed before all things. Physical Objections. 103 Then to the objections to the method of Natural Theology, which doubters urge on the ground of the theory of Evolution, I answer : 1st. We are in the midst of a process of develop- ment from the lower up towards the higher, and we have not yet (in your view) got beyond or higher than the production of man. But certainly it is pos- sible that there should be many orders of beings higher than man, even a One Who is Supreme, and exclusive of all others of the same order because He is Supreme. These higher orders, even the High- est, being possible, must exist as products of Evo- lution unless there is some One who is above Evo- lution, controlling its productions and guiding its course. 2d. Evolution itself is not and cannot be an eter- nal process without beginning or end. The present evolution, in the midst of which our lot is cast, had a beginning and will come to an end ; and both be- ginning and end are " dead points " through which, and out from which, there is no possible escape with- out the agency of some Being, Who is distinct in His existence, and different in His character, in many important respects, from any of the material sub- stances or forces of which the objects in the visible universe are constituted. 3d. There have been occasions all along in the I04 The Methods of Natural Theology. earth's life-history when something has occurred, which, although not necessarily implying any change in the laws of nature or any violation of them, did, nevertheless, imply, and prove the intervention of an Agent different in kind and in modes of operation, from any and all of the material forces, whether chemical or mechanical, that are known to the phys- ical sciences, or are recognized in our speculations concerning the origin and causes of the phenomena of nature. I claim, therefore, that, so far as Evolution is con- cerned, or the advocates of Evolution can have any- thing to say to the contrary, we have a right, in accordance with our natural instincts, and the com- mon sense and the common sentiments of mankind, to regard these phenomena of nature as manifesta- tions of thought and purpose and as thus proving the existence of Him Whom we, as Christians, ac- knowledge, worship and adore as God, Who is over all blessed forever. LECTURE III. METAPHYSICAL OBJECTIONS; COMTE'S, ANDSPEN. CER'S THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. Matt. VI, 23. If the light that is within you he darkness, how great is that darkness ! METAPHYSICAL OBJECTIONS. In the last Lecture I grouped together and con- sidered the more obvious objections to the objective or a posteriori Method of Natural Theology. But underneath these objections, as the soil on which they grow, and from which they derive their nutriment and support, there are other doctrines of a different character, which we shall now have occa- sion to consider. They lie at the foundation and starting point of the a priorix method indeed ; but they are equally subversive of the objective or a posteriori method, unless they can be shown to be without any sufiScient foundation. The objections which we have to consider under this general division of our subject are four in number. 1st. The first is that there is no soul or immor- tal part in man ; or if there is, we have no means of knowing it, or knowing anything about it. 2d. The second is that all our knowledge is only relativity, and mere personal opinions or impres- sions. io8 The Methods of Natural Theology. 3d. The third is that any Hne or means of argu- ment by which we would seek to prove the existence of God, or attain a knowledge of His attributes, in- volves a fallacy in form which must be fatal to any certainty in the conclusion. 4th. And finally, we have the doctrine that all knowledge, or pretended knowledge, is based on mere assumptions, or at least upon contradictions, which are of such a nature that we may as well and as successfully maintain any one of them as its op- posite, and its opposite as well as itself. Surely here is a good array of challenges, or ob- jections, to any claim that we may make to any knowledge, or even so much as well-founded opinion, on any of the subjects that are the most deeply inter- esting or the most vitally important to man. The first and second I will consider in this Lecture ; the other two will remain to form the subject of the next Lecture in the course. L Natural Theology begins with either assuming as admitted, or claiming to prove as a result, that man is or has a spiritual soul — living in a material body — that the soul has an " inner light," or a " light within," by which it knows something of itself, and its destiny, something of the God Who made it, and to Whom it is subject, both in this life and in the life to come. Metaphysical Objections. 109 Our Lord spoke of "a light within us," and com- pared it to the eye. As by the eye we see and know external things, so by the " light within " we see and know spiritual things. This " light that is within us " we know and call by various names. A slight inversion of the words gives the familiar form of " inner light." It corres- ponds, in many respects, to what Theologians and Christians very generally call " faith," when the word is considered as denoting a subjective act, faculty, or mental process, rather than an objective system of doctrines that are believed and held by an act of faith. But for the purposes of philosophy it is known rather by such words as "reason," "intuition," or "insight" — "the insight of reason." It is some- times called Tioyoi and sometimes vQrjaii by the Greek philosophers. It is thus related to the Nou- mena which. St. Paul, and after him, Herbert Spen- cer, contrast with phenomena,, or things that are seen by the eyes. In its moral relalbns, this " light that is within " us is known as conscience; and the two. Conscience and Reason, in the absence of any special Revela- tion, constitute the best, and, in fact, the only, guide we can have to duty and happiness in this world ; as well as our only encouragement to hope for anything better hereafter. 6 I lO The Methods of Natural Tluology. But there are those who deny this inner light altogether. Thus Comte says:' " It pretends to accomplish the discovery of the laws of the human mind by con- templating it in itself. Such an attempt cannot suc- ceed at this time of day." And again (p. 461): " As for this fundamental principle of interior obser- vation, it would certainly be superfluous to add any- thing to what I have already said about the absurdity of the supposition of a man seeing himself think." This he thinks takes away " the last phase (or ground) of theology" (p. 11). Herbert Spencer adopts the same view, and urges it against Sir William Hamilton and^ Dean Mansel. " The cognition of self, properly so called," he says (§ 20), "is absolutely negatived by the laws of thought ; . . . the mental act in which self is known implies, like every other mental act, a perceiving subject and a perceived object. If, then, the object perceived is self, what is the subject that perceives ? Or if it is the true self that thinks, what other self can it be that is thought of ? ... So that the per- sonality of which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain, is yet a thing which cannot truly be known '^Positive Philosophy, vol. I., p. 11 and p. 461. I quote from Martineau's translation. Metaphysical Objections. 1 1 1 at all; knowledge of it is forbidden by the very- nature of thought." Now, connect with the foregoing that other funda- mental principle of these men, "the knowledge within our reach is the only knowledge that can be of service to us,"^ and we have agnosticism complete and fully justified, so far as any knowledge of self, or of our souls is concerned. This, as you will notice, is beginning early, and laying the foundations broad and deep. If we can- not trust consciousness, and if we know nothing about the self or the soul, except what we can learn by consciousness, we cannot be quite sure whether we have souls or not. Nor can we be any more sure whether there is anything in the mind, or out of it, that manifests to reason the existence and attri- butes of God. The inference which both Comte and Spencer draw from their premises is that we must begin with the study of the body, and especially the brain ; and stop there also, unless we can in some way prove the reality of mind, and justify an appeal to con- sciousness by a purely physical or physiological method, beginning with the body. We do not, however, get the full force of the ob- jection without looking a little further. In August, 1 Spencer's First Principles, } 20. 1 1 2 The Methods of Natural Theology. 1874, was delivered Huxley's famous address, in which he attempted to prove that animals are mere " automata," mere machines, without mind or soul.' In this argument, Huxley, taking advantage of the present attainments of science with regard to what is called " the reflex action " of the nerve cen- tres, claims that we can account for all that animals do in the whole course of their lives, by the reflex action of these three nerve centres — the spinal cord, the sensorium, and the hemispheres of the brain. This reflex action implies neither thought, nor consciousness, nor volition. It is purely physical in its nature. It is, so far as this one point is con- cerned, precisely what we call traction in mechanics. I throw a ball on the floor; the floor reacts and sends the ball back to my hands. In the same way any excitation that is capable of producing a sensa- tion in the nerve centres, is conveyed up the afferent nerves to one or another of these centres, and is re- turned by it along the efferent nerves, and pro- duces a contraction of the muscles, and some motion of body or limb ensues. In this way, as Huxley argues, we can account for all the phenomena of animal instinct and activity. 1 Appleton's Popular Science Monthly, Oct. 1874. The address has since been published, with some changes, in Huxley's later Vol., Science and Culture, p. 206-522. Metaphysical Objections. 113 And he extends his doctrine to man also ; and claims that this theory explains and accounts for all that appears in the life of man that is commonly regarded as implying mind or soul. But we answer to Huxley : Your theory may be true in regard to animals, and probably it is ; cer- tainly we cannot disprove it. But with regard to man it is far otherwise. Besides the reflex actions that you speak of, we know that we have another class of acts, which are of an entirely different char- acter. It'is:quite true that an electric current, for example, will produce a contraction of the muscles of the arm as an excito- motor result; but I can con- tract the muscles and jerk the arm in precisely the same way without any excitation from the electric apparatus. It is true that I draw back my head and close my eyes when I see something approaching that may do me harm, and that I do this involunta- rily, and as a sensori-motor action. But I can jerk my head and close my eyes, in precisely the same way, when there is no such occasion for it. It is quite true that you can make me laugh in spite of myself by your wit and drollery ; but then, I can imitate that laughter, so far as mere outward appear- ance is any indication, when I feel like anything but laughter. And herein I have abundant proof of something in my own experience that is more than 1 14 The Methods of Natural Theology. mere reflex action ; something that implies thought, and consciousness and volition ; something that im- plies a mind that can act originally and spontane- ously ; and not only by way of mere reflex-action or reaction, as do all the masses of mere matter. But how do we know this ? asks Huxley and the agnostics. I answer : I know it by my conscious- ness of what takes place within, and they will ex- press surprise, perhaps, that I am so far "behind the times " as not to know that consciousness is not recognized as a guide, is no authority; that Comte long ago said that it wjis absurd to depend upon consciousness for anything, and that no such "at- tempt can succeed at this time of day." And Her- bert Spencer, he may insist, has even proved it absurd, twenty-five years ago at least. " The cogni- tion of self, properly so called, . . . is absolutely nega- tived by the laws of thought," implies in fact a con- tradiction in terms. The first point presented in the citation from Comte occurs in the midst of an effort to show that, in order to be successful in our inquiries, we must always begin with the study of the body, and of the brain in particular, and that we must confine ourselves to this method at least until we can prove by it that there is something more than brain, something be- sides matter in the general make-up and constitution of man. Metaphysical Objections. 115 This idea of considering man as a whole, and studying the brain and its functions as a preparation for the study of the mind, had been begun before the days of Comte,* and has been pursued with results that are quite far beyond anything that he knew, and very unlilce anything that he could have foreseen or expected. It has given us a far more precise idea of what the body is, and what it can do, than we had before or could have had without, and has thus added great force to the proof that over and besides the body there must be a mind or soul in man, which is of an essentially different and en- tirely distinct nature from the body, and may possi- bly exist without it. We accept, therefore, the challenge of Comte in this respect, without, however, entirely conceding its justice, and may well thank God for this new line of proof, which He, in His Providence, has brought to light just now, when apparently we stand in the greatest need of it. Let us then distinctly understand the task that is before us. We have to prove first that there is a soul, an immaterial soul in man ; and secondly, that consciousness, or conscience, is a legitimate means of knowledge concerning it. ^ Gall began to publish his views as early as 1 791, and he and Sfurzheim began to lecture on the subject in the principal cities of Europe in 1805. Comte was not born till 1798. 1 1 6 The Methods of Natural Theology. I. I begin this argument by a line of proof to which these men certainly cannot object, and with the presentation of some facts which I believe are comparatively new to the scientific world. These facts I regard as peculiarly forcible, when addressed to that class of persons whom we have now chiefly in mind. They are the result of a series of experi- ments instituted at Cornell University for another purpose. They were conducted by men who did not believe in the reality of mind as anything else than a modification of matter, or a product of brain activity.^ In order to appreciate the argument, let me re- call to your mind the fact that the " nerves," as they are called, which are distributed throughout the sys- tem, consist of exceedingly small fibres, encased in a white sheath or neurilemma. They are of two kinds : the one afferent, or centripetalj carrying up stimuli to the nerve centres ; and efferent, or centrifugal, car- rying out from those centres the stimuli that produce muscular contraction. It is now well known and admitted by all scien- tific men, that anything which produces pain or other irritation in any of the tissues of the body, produces — acting through the afferent nerves — a reflex emo- 1 A report of some of the experiments was published in the Ameri- can youmal of Science and Arts, for June, 1878, pp. 413-422. Metaphysical Objections. 1 1 7 tion from the gray matter of the spinal cord. This becomes so strong in many cases as to result in in- voluntary or spasmodic contraction of the muscles and a corresponding motion of the limbs. It is also known and admitted, that any object external to the body may act on the encephalic nerve centres, through the organs of special sense, as the eye, the ear, etc., and produce reflex action of what is called the sensori-motor kind. But all these are purely physiological phenomena. We may be conscious of theni when they occur, and are so, for the most part. But they can occur without our consciousness as well. They may occur after the brain proper has been entirely removed, and thus all possibility of consciousness and of voluntary action has been taken away. But the brain, which is the organ of mind, obeys the same law in all of its reflex action, called ideo- motor, as is observed in the lower centres. It is important to notice this fact in connection with our present subject. Let any one of us see or hear something that is exceedingly ludicrous or laughable, and the laugh comes involuntarily and beyond our power of self- restraint, even though — as will sometimes happen — very much out of place and unseemly. Or let one receive a sudden announcement of some sad calamity; 1 1 8 The Methods of Natural Theology. the outcry of grief, and the flow of tears will come unbidden, and persist beyond our powers of control. We cannot put them off — as we sometimes do our repentance — to " a more convenient season," or to some chosen opportunity. We do not and cannot take time to think about the matter, and delay our sadness and our mourning until we choose to give way to them. They come from a necessity over which we have no control. The experiments to which I refer were established to ascertain the rate or velocity at which these stimuli pass along the nerves. Thus, if we apply an electric current to the hand, for example, the current passes up the afferent nerves to the gray matter in the spinal cord between the shoulders, and then passes back by the efferent nerves to the muscles of the lower arm, and a slight jerking motion of the hand and fore-arm ensues. Professor Garver found that the current passes at the rate of about ninety feet per second. But he wished to try the experiment through a longer circuit. He proposed to give the signal by touching the toe of the left foot, and having the patient give the sign, as soon as he felt the touch in his foot, by a motion of the index finger of the right hand. But there is no continuous nerve leading from the foot to the hand ; and he found that there Metaphysical Objections. 119 was no constancy or uniformity in the time that elapsed between the signal and the sign that it was perceived. Here was a new and unexpected phe- nomenon. To understand this, let us suppose a telegraph wire extending from New York to San Francisco, and a person wishing to ascertain, by means of it, the velocity of the electric current. If the wire should coil around an insulator there, and return to the operator in New York, being a continuous wire, the message would go and return in just twice the time that it would take for it to cross the continent. But if there were no continuous wire, so that the message must needs be taken off and re- written at San Francisco, the case would become quite different. Not only would some time be required for the re- writing, but the operator could take his own time for it. He could stop to think, " think twice," perhaps, and he could even refuse or neglect to return the message at all, if he should choose to do so. Or take another case. It is well known that some metals, as copper, for example, will conduct electricity freely, while others, as platinum, will scarcely con- duct it at all. If now a current of electricity passes over a copper wire into a piece of platinum, the platinum becomes very hot, or as we say, " converts the electricity into heat." Now suppose we had 1 20 The Methods of Natural Theology. another wire that would conduct the heat, as the copper wire conducts the electricity. In that case the operator might send the electricity to the non- conducting platinum, and receive it back by the other wire, as heat, in a time exactly proportioned to the length of the two wires. So with the nerve centres. Send up an excita- tion to the gray matter, by the afferent nerves, and it is converted into emotion, and sent back by the efferent nerves, producing muscular contraction, as in the case of the electric shock. But in the case of Professor Garver's experiments, there was no " through line " from the left foot to the right hand, with a nerve centre in its course to convert the sensory excitement into an emotor im- pulse. The message had to be " taken off." He found that there was an "operator" in the case, who received the message and "took time to think," and took his own time to do it in, before giving, by his finger, the sign which would indicate that he felt the signal given to the left foot, as agreed upon. Professor Garver says, in his report referred to, (p. 422) : "It seems that when an individual is ex- perimented upon, as in the given cases, he is con- scious of being surprised by the signal, even when expecting it. And sometimes the surprise is such that he forgets to answer until he is conscious of Metaphysical Objections. 121 considerable time elapsing. At times he has to * think twice ' before he moves his finger or stipulated muscle." Here, then, is proof demonstrative and unanswer- able, that there is something in the brain that acts in a totally, different way and in accordance with a law that is totally dififerent from that in which the nerve centres in the body act. Here is something that is capable of self-control ; that can take time to think, can pause, and think twice before it acts, and then, act or not, as it determines to do ; something that can resist and withstand impulses, and that can act, too, without any impulse that originates from any source except what is within itself It seems to me that we have here a genuine case of the application of the crucial experiment — the experimentum crucis of Bacon. The mind can act when it chooses to act, and take its own time for acting. It can start of itself from inactivity to action and change the intensity of its action at will ; the brain cannot. Like every other piece of matter that we know anything about, it acts, or rather reacts, only when it is acted upon. This is our method in all the physical sciences. The chemist, to suppose a case, has pursued his an- alysis until he has reduced the question of a metal, we will say, to either sodium or potassium. He 1 22 The Methods of Natural Theology. applies the spectroscope and gets the well-known combination of the lines which indicates sodium, and distinguishes that metal from all other known sub- stances. Or he applies some reagent, as chloride of platinum. If the metal is potassium it is precipitated, but if it be sodium no such result follows. Or, in another case, in the examination of some rocky mineral, the chemist comes at last upon some- thing that yields none of the characteristic marks of any one of the " elements " yet known to science, but has a well marked peculiarity of its own. He adopts the conclusion that he has made a discovery and found something new that is not yet described or named in his scientific books. The brain itself, as we have just seen, is, in this respect, and when it is merely a case of brain action, no different from any other mass of matter — even of inorga.nic matter. Here, then, is something that does not act in ac- cordance with inertia, which is a fundamental law and characteristic of matter. This something, there- fore, is not matter, and we call it mind. I regard this as wholly unanswerable from a purely physical point of view. We come here to a limit to the powers and possibilities of mere matter. While pursuing our investigations along a purely physio- logical line, we come upon something that is not Metaphysical Objections. 123 physical in its nature and mode of action, and is not amenable to the laws of matter in any form. Where matter ends there mind begins to manifest itself, and becomes all the more unmistakably noticeable in its manifestations, because we had so carefully watched and studied the phenomena of the bodily or material organs. There are one or two other classes of phenomena that serve to illustrate this argument. After a day of labor, with the body in perfect health, we feel sleepy. Every molecule and tissue of the body is disposed to sleep, and all the physical and physiological co;iditions indicate sleep. But we know that we ought not to go to sleep ; some duty calls for watchfulness, and we keep awake and watch- ful. Now here is the body, every part, particle and tissue of it, inclined in one direction, and this some- thing within that we call ourselves, resists the body and controls the result. The mind is different from the body and controls it. Again, the well-known case of Dr. Tanner. Here was an instance in which, by mere force of will, by mind controlling the body, he fasted and continued without taking food for forty days. Hunger is a physical emotion. Soon after eating the stomach becomes empty, and we are hungry. The unpleas- ant feeling extends until, in the condition of perfect 1 24 The Methods of Natural Theology. health, every part and molecule of the body that is capable of feeling or of emotion at all, sympathizes and suffers with the organs of digestion. There is no part of the body, limb or tissue, to counteract the prevaiUng tendency. And yet for the full forty days he ate not The mind, on the one side and alone, insisted, the body collectively, and all its parts sepa- rately acted together and unanimously on the other. It was body and mind in conflict, a deadly conflict, which if persisted in, as we know it might have been persisted in, would have ended soon in the death of the body. Sometimes when one is on the whole sleepy or hungry, he may be kept from eating or sleeping by the counteracting influence of some organ or tissue that is in pain or diseased, and will not allow the rest to go to sleep. But in these cases there was nothing of the kind. It was the body as a whole, and acting in its entirety, on the one side, urging in one direction ; and the mind, solitary and alone, act- ing against the body in the other ; and the mind triumphed and prevailed.' 1 When these Lectures were delivered, I skipped from this place to the second part of Lecture V, thinking that the second part of this Lecture, Lecture IV, and the first part of Lecture V, would prove too metaphysical for the taste and the patience of most hear- ers. Fearing that the same may be the case with the readers, I give them this timely and — as I think I may call it — friendly w^arn- ing. Metaphysical Objections. 125 2. Having now fully met, as I think and claim, the demands of the materialists, to prove the exist- ence of mind proceeding and arguing from a purely physical or physiological starting point, I proceed to consider the second part of this subject, and vin- dicate my right to use the subjective or psycholog- ical method, in which we can study the nature and phenomena of mind by means of consciousness or that "interior observation " which every one of us has it in his power to use, when it may suit his purposes to do so. What we know of a thing in any case depends upon, the means by which we know anything about it. I see this paper, and by that process I know it to be opaque and white. I feel it, and by the sense- organ of touch I know it to be cold and hard and smooth. By the physiological method alone, pretty much all that we can know of the mind, as we have seen, is that it exists, is a substantial reality — a real cause or agent, and not a mere product of brain activity. We find, also, that it acts spontaneously and under laws of its own, which are in most re- spects totally unlike the laws that obtain in physical nature. May we use consciousness as one of the means of studying further into the nature and modes of activity ? The men who object to this use of it do not object 1 26 The Methods of Natural Theology. altogether and wholly to the testimony of conscious- ness, and to every use we may be disposed to make of it. They object to it only as a means of studying the soul, its nature and possible destiny. While insisting upon consciousness as a means of knowledge for external objects, Comte and Spencer, together with Huxley, Tyndall, and others, who object to our using it, or depending upon it, as a means of knowing ourselves, do use it, and depend upon it as a means of knowledge for other things. And in fact it is a part of the philosophy or the agnosticism with which these names are connected, that what we know and all that we know or can know as absolutely true, is the facts and states of our own consciousness. And they are right, so far at least: for our sense-perception is no means of knowl- edge except as we are conscious of the acts of per- ception which are phenomena or states of our own minds. Spencer admits, indeed, in the very passage I have quoted, that the existence of this self, which consti- tutes the personality in each one of us, is " a fact beyond all others the most certain." I might, in- deed, stop here and take him at his word. But I greatly fear that if I should do so the poison that is in the statement would remain and do its work nevertheless, and notwithstanding the admission. Metaphysical Objections. 127 He, as Comte before him, speaks of the absurdity of any " interior observation " whereby the soul can know or study itself. But Spencer, as usual, is more explicit, and gives us the clue to the true resolution of his difficulty. He accepts his fundamental doctrine of a co-ordi- nation in all acts of cognition, and, with a haste which is rather inconsiderate, he runs to the application of it in this particular case. Says he (§ 20) : " If the self — the mind or the soul — is the perceiving subject, what is the perceived object? a true cognition of self implies a state in which the knowing and the known are one — in which subject and object are identified." If he had said " indentical," the state- ment would have been less liable to misapprehen- sion. It will be observed that the major premise, the principle which Spencer assumes as the ground of his assertion, is that in all cases the " subject " and the "object " must be two distinct substantial reali- ties. But is this really the case ? I say " I strike my- self." Here, manifestly, the " subject " or agent and the " object " are one and the same thing. Again I say "I see myself walking." Here, also, the " subject " or agent and " object " are one and the same thing, unless we assume that the mind is one 128 The Methods of Natural Theology. thing — the "subject" or agent that sees — and the body that is seen is another thing. But in that case we have an admission that mind and body are two different and distinct substances, which can act in- dependently, the one of the other, and upon one an- other ; and also, that we have some means of know- ing each of them separately, and not the one through and by the other exclusively. Let us take good care not to allow these men to ignore the admission which they have thus made. And we may add that in all languages, the fact of a " middle voice " and reflex forms for all transitive verbs, implies and is basedupon the universal con- viction that in some cases, at least, " subject " and "object" may be identical. The Greek middle voice, the Hebrew hithpael, the French se, the German sicH, as well as the English self, that may be used as above after transitive verbs, are all proofs of this fact or law. Hence, in this case, as so often elsewhere, Spencer's great haste in making generalizations has led him into, a mistake, which may be easily pointed out and rendered forever afterwards entirely harmless. The law of co-ordination here assumed by Spencer is undoubtedly fundamental and inexorable. There is, however, one case, or I should rather say, class of cases, in which the co-ordinate objects are not Metaphysical Objections. 129 necessarily ontologically different. We have within the easy reach of all persons an illustration of what I mean. No one can ordinarily see his own eyes. But let him look in a mirror, and the apparent im- possibility is accomplished. He sees his own eyes, or the eye sees itself, and is, in the exact words of Spencer, " both subject and object " — both " seeing and seen " in this intellectual operation. It is quite true that in this case we see the eye by reflected light, by its own reflected image of itself. But it is true also that in consciousness, or that form of self-consciousness in which it is claimed that the soul can see itself and study its own nature and op- efrations, we see it and study it hy reflection, and by reflected light, so to call it. The mind turns its attention in upon itself, as truly as the mirror turns the light that goes out from the eye in upon the eye itself.i And I will take occasion here to point out an- other of Spencer's mistakes. And I do so not be- cause it is his merely, but rather because his is a 1 1 am inclined to think, hpweyer, that "the eye could not see itself" unless it had first seen something else; and that we could not see or think of ourselves in consciousness, unless we had previ- ously cognized and distinctly thought of something that is not our- selves. But the pursuit of this subject would lead into an abstruse discussion which the subject does not call for, and which, as it seems to me, the occasion will not justify. I30 The Methods of Natural Theology. great name with the class of philosophers whom I have chiefly in mind at present, and every statement of his, whether admission or contention, is eagerly caught up and made the ground of confidence and of inference, all of which tend in the same direction as this advance towards utter unbelief and irreligion, which its advocates seem very intent upon accom- plishing. One of the points in Spencer's theory, which is indeed rather implied than expressly stated by him, is that the mind cannot be occupied with two thoughts or engaged in two acts at the same time. The ob- jection may be stated in the form of a question as follows: "If the mind is engaged in any act of thinking, any act of perception, cognition, memory or volition, how can it be engaged also, and at the same time, in the act of perceiving itself, or thinking of itself, and of its own act of thinking of, or per- ceiving, something else ? The case of the eye will furnish an answer, so far at least as the demonstration of the fact is concerned, without perhaps explaining the way in which the apparently impossible act can occur. While looking at my eyes in the glass, I can stand there, if need be, for several minutes, both looking at my eyes, seeing, and being conscious all the while that I am seeing them, and at the same time be Metaphysical Objections. 131 thinking of their structure, their appearance, and being conscious, also and moreover, of the fact that I am thinking of their appearance and structure. Now here is most certainly a case that is within the reach of all that may be disposed to try it, and which, on trial, will be found to demonstrate the fact that somehow or other, explainable or inexplicable, there is a process of " interior observation " in which a man can " see himself think," and the mind be- comes, in the language of Spencer "both subject and object," "the perceiving and the perceived," " the knowing and the known." And in fact what is assumed here to be impossi- ble is occurring all the while, and may be observed at any moment of our conscious wakefulness. We may be looking at and examining some external object, and yet be conscious, all the while, that we are thinking of something else as well, something that we will speak of to no one, and quite possibly something that no one, but ourselves and that God who sees and knows all things, suspects that we are thinking of. I have already endeavored to give to the experi- ments of Professor Garver great prominence as a proof of the reality of a mind or soul in man, not, however, because I think it the- only proof we have, nor yet because I regard it as being intrinsically 132 The Methods of Natural Theology. stronger or more convincing than the other line of argument, which depends exclusively upon con- sciousness, but because I regard it as better adapted to our present purpose. It begins where our agnos- tics and the advocates of physical science claim that we ought to begin ; it pursues the method they point out as the only legitimate one. But it comes to a conclusion which they did not expect nor desire, and one which, as I firmly believe, they cannot repudiate, and from which they can find no way of escape. The other method is no less conclusive, and is in some respects more germane to the subject. It is as old as Descartes, and was first, so far as I know, formulated by him. He began the agnostic, or skeptic process, and rejected all opinions until he might have time to examine into their foundation and see exactly on what they depended. In this process he professed, and aimed, to go back or down until he should come to a proposition that he could not deny, or even so much as doubt. In this way he reached his famous proposition cogito ergo sum. He argues^ that this inference of his existence did not depend on the differentia or peculiarities of the act of thinking, strictly understood ; the conclusion from the act of doubting or denying was as legiti- 1 Discourse on Method, Pt. IV, Cousin's ed., vol. i, p. 156 and following. Metaphysical Objections. 133 mate and as irresistible as that from thinking or affirming. " If I doubt," said lie, " I cannot doubt that I am doubting ; or if I deny, I cannot deay or doubt my act of denying ; but from the one as from the other, and from the one as legitimately and as inevitably as from the other comes the inference of my own substantial existence. And there must be the two, subject and object, the me and the not-me, and the one as real and as substantial as the other." Sense-perception and conscioiisness are alike, also, in this, that they must have an object, and a sub- stantial object as well. We cannot see or hear ex- cept as there is something that is seen or heard. We cannot see walking, for example, but what we see is the man or animal that walks ; walking is the process or mode, and the man or animal is the thing that is seen in that process or mode. As in the ex- ternal world, there is, no whiteness or hardness with- out something that is white and hard, so within, there is no perception, no thinking, feeling, or choosing, without something that perceives, thinks, feels and chooses. We have, then, an "interior observation," by which we know directly and immediately the mind and what it is doing ; an " interior observation " for the acts and phenomena of the mind within, as well as an exterior observation for the objects around us. 7 134 The Methods of Natural Theology. And just as we are liable, in our observation of the outward objects, to false perception and to mistakes with regard to the identity and the qualities of ob- jects, to their nature and character, even when there is no occasion to doubt their reality ; so on the other hand, much occurs within without our notice, we are liable to mistake the facts and acts of our conscious- ness, and are very liable to err in our analysis of them and in our inferences from them. Thus it appears that in fact we have the means of a better and more immediate knowledge of our minds than we have of the objects in the external world. In the words of Huxley : ^ " The most elementary study of sensation justifies Descartes' position that we know more of mind than we do of body; that the immaterial world is a firmer reality than the ma- terial. For sensation is known immediately. So long as it persists it is a part of what we call our thinking selves, and its existence lies beyond the possibility of doubt. The knowledge of an objective or material cause of the sensation, on the other hand, is mediate ; it is a belief, which in any given instance of sensation, may, by possibility, be devoid of foun- 1 Sensation and Sensiferous Organs, in Appleton's Popular Sci- ence Monthly, May, 1879, p. 93. The same essay with modifica- tions, in Science and Culture, p. 253. I quote from the Pop. Sc. Monthly. Metaphysical Objections. 135 dation. It may arise from the occurrence of appro- priate molecular changes in the nerve or in the sen- sorium, by the operation of a cause distinct from the affection of the sense-organ by an external object. Such subjective sensations are as real as any others, and as distinctly suggest an external object, though the belief thus generated is a delusion." But of course the internal staite, and so the mind in which it occurs, is no delusion, or, as Huxley says, " it lies beyond the possibility of doubt" I quote Huxley the more gladly and in preference to other authorities, because he is commonly con- sidered as belonging to the school of philosophers whose views I am criticising, and in most respects he does undoubtedly belong to that school. This advance in Physical Science, from which the materialists expect and claim so much for their cause, helps us in more ways than one. I have referred to it as affording a means of demonstrating the ex- istence of a mind or soul in man, which is a substan- tial reality and a spontaneously acting agent or cause. I turn to some facts that have been established by the line of investigations and experiments for another matter which is of interest to us in our present un- dertaking. The facts and laws with regard to reflex action 136 The Methods of Natural Theology. have enabled us to make a new classification of the motives and to see more clearly some of the laws of their influence upon our acts of choice. We have three classes of motives : (i) the lower or the appetites that arise out of the condition of the body. (2) The affections which originate in some mental act or state. (3) The rational emotions, like those of conscience and religion. The appetites are impulsive in their natures-^they grow more intense, like hunger, until they are gratified, and then cease to exist. No man is hungry after he has eaten all he wants.* The affections, on the other hand, do not become extinct by exercise, they are more likely to become stronger ; this is still more surely the case with the ethic emotions — the impulse to duty. From these facts we derive two very important results. The first is that we are capable of increasing the force or intensity of our effort, at will. Suppose, for example, there is something on the floor that is offensive to me. I stoop down to pick it up and toss it out of the window. This I do with 1 Or possibly some of our philosophers who are so much smitten with the doctrine of "the indestructibility of force" would prefer to say that the hunger has not ceased, it has only become " latent " for the time being. Metaphysical Objections. 137 the impression that it weighs but a few ounces. But I find it weighs several pounds. I " put to the more strength," until I accomplish the object. But, mean- while, the motive occasioned by the offensiveness of the object has not increased or changed at all. The object is no more offensive than it was. Now this increase of force or effort at will is what no mere mass of matter can do. And this is one of the facts of consciousness that serves to distinguish the mind from matter and to prove a:nd illustrate the freedom of will. The next fact is that we do oftSn follow the weaker through the higher motive, acting in a direction con- trary to the stronger, and lower. The appetites, as we have seen, are lower and more in the nature of passions than the affections or the dictates of con- science. But we often follow conscience in disre- gard of the appetites. The case may be illustrated by a phenomenon in physical science. If I strike a ball and send it up- wards, the blow is the greater force for the moment and the ball goes up ; but gravity is stronger in the end, and the ball comes down at last. We, however, unlike the ball, can resist from the first, and go no one step in the direction of the appetite, which is the lower, and for the moment the stronger motive. II. The next point that I have to consider is the 138 The Methods of Natural Theology. doctrine that we know nothing of things in them- selves, and that all knowledge is only relative. Passages from the writings of Sir William Hamil- ton are cited as authority for this doctrine, and in fact he is usually regarded as the originator of this view of the nature and foundations of human knowl- edge. Herbert Spencer, however, adopts it, enlarges upon it, and makes it the subject of one entire chapter in his First Principles (Part I, c. iv). He says : " The reality existing behind all appearances is and ever must be unknown " ; and not only cites Hamilton as saying that " with the exception of a few late Ab- solutists in Germany, this is the truth most harmo- niously held by philosophers of every school," and Spencer himself says : " To this conclusion almost every thinker of note has subscribed." I. The theory of perception and the question how we perceive the objects around us, has indeed occu- pied the attention of thoughtful men and philoso- phers from the times of Plato to our own day. Dur- ing the Middle Ages there had grown up a notion of certain properties or essences of things, which may be considered as distinct from the things themselves. Descartes ' gave this theory a lucid exposition when 1 Meditations : Meditation Second, Cousin's Ed., Vol. I., p. 259- " And yet what do I see of this crowd of men as I look down from Metaphysical Objections. 139 he compared the properties to the clothes one may have on. By this one appears black or white, pos- sibly a nobleman or a peasant. And as he would say, we never can see the man himself, but only the clothes he has on, so we never see the object, the " thing itself," but only the properties that surround it and cover it up so that we see it never, but only them. Locke had said : " If these external objects be not united to our minds . . . and yet we perceive their original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses . . ."it is evident that some singly imper- ceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion which pro- duces those ideas which we have of them in us,"* as the means of perception of external objects. These "imperceptible bodies" or particles — or something analogous to them — Kant regarded as the matter or material out of which our ideas of objects are made. But he also held that while the mind might be thus receiving the matter or " contents" as he calls it, of our ideas of things from the things themselves in the external world in this way, he the window, but the hats and cloaks that might cover artificial ma- chines, which only move themselves by springs ? qui ne se remut- roient que pir ressorts. i Essay on Human Understanding, B. II., c. viii., % 12. I40 The Methods of Natural Theology. held also that the mind itself was the active agent in their formation, and furnished the form ox schema, so that it depends on the mind itself, rather than upon the external objects themselves, what sort of an idea we form of them. The idea thus formed he called the phenomena, the appearance, which the thing has in our minds. These " appearances of things," or our ideas of them, as he held, make up and limit our knowledge; the " thihgs-in-themselves," ding an sich, as he called them, are mere matter of guess and conjecture ; we know nothing about them. But from his psychology there could be in the mind ideas or phenomena — that is, " appearances " — of such things only as we can perceive by the bodily senses, and hence we have in tbis sense of the word ideas of material objects only. I say in this, which is the English sense of the word idea; for Kant would scarcely call these mental acts ideas at all. He pre- fers to use the. word to denote such objects as can have no visible representation, as time, space, etc. It is but due to Kant, however, to add that he included the " things-in-themselves " among the " npumena," or objects of thought. He included the Supreme Being, or God, in the same class of objects. And it- results from his philosophy, and passages can be cited from his writings to prove it, that he regarded the existence of God as being as certain and as rest- Metaphysical Objections. 141 ing on the same kind and means of knowledge as the existence of the external world around us, or of any one of the objects within it. Neither the one nor the other could be regarded, in his opinion, as be- ing immediately known, as phenomena, that is, as appearing to the mind, but only as noumenal — re- alities lying beyond and outside of consciousness. Sir William Hamilton adopted the notion that was prevdent in his time, that in perception we do not see the objects themselves, but only their properties, the color, the form, etc., with which they are clothed and covered up. Hence, he, too, adopted the ex- pression {ding an sich) thing in itself, which Kant^s theory had made necessary and to which it had given a peculiar and very significant meaning. But in the case of Hamilton, I can see no necessity for such an expression. Nor can I see that it makes any differ- ence with our method of argument, whether his theory of perception is true or not. I certainly think that it is not true. But all that we ask, all that we need or assume, as the basis of our argument, is the existence and reality of the objects around us as they are seen by us and as they appear to us. But the very act of perception impliesthe reality of the object perceived. And so Hamilton taught He insisted upon this view with great emphasis.^ In 1 Philosophy of Common Sense, Appleton's Ed. of " The Philoso- 142 The Methods of Natural Theology. this I agree with him, although I should not explain the matter as he does. He makes the perceived object a matter of consciousness. I think it is not. But the act implies the object. We say, " I per- ceive the paper." If, now, the paper does not ex- ist, is nothing, the proposition becomes " I perceive nothing," which is equivalent to " I do not perceive." The act of perception is not performed. In this, perception differs from imagination and memory. In mental acts of these two kinds we think of the object without its presence, and possibly without its reality. But perception is one thing; false-perception, imagination, and memory are oth- ers, and perception differs from them in that it im- plies the reality of its object as they do not. And it results from the law of co-ordination that percep- tion must be as real as an act of the mind, and as a matter of consciousness as either memory or imagi- nation. If there were no real perception we should have no such idea and no such name, any more than the blind would have names for colors, or the deaf words denoting sounds. Theories of perception have been vitiated, from Descartes .down, by a theory of the relation of substance and properties; the theory makes the phy of Sir Waiiam Hamilton," p. 31, also p. 173. Lectures on Metaphysics, Lects. XII., XIII., and XIV. Metaphysical Objections. 143 properties as substantial as the substances them- selves. It supposes that the properties are things that lie upon and cover up the substance, as a man's hat and coat cover his body. Hence the doctrine is expressly declared as a fundamental principle that we do not perceive the objects themselves, but only their properties. But the whiteness and hardness of this paper — though properties of the thing itself — are not things. They are not envelopes or coverings of the real sub- stance. It does not underlie them. What we see is the substantial thing itself It is white and hard ; but the whiteness and the hardness we do not per- ceive, and in supposing that we do so, we make them to be substances and not mere properties, as we had professed to regard them. These truths are so obvious that they need only to be stated to secure the assent of everybody. It is only when the mind is intent on something else, that this old mediaeval error creeps in like a sort of survival and does its work on the course of our specu- lations, and leads us to a result, which is the same as though we had not ever rejected the dogma. We still speak of the sun's rising and setting, as though its motion was the cause of the alternations of night and day, although the scientific world have long since abandoned that view. Nevertheless, we all of us 144 The Methods of Natural Theology. have to unlearn it with the beginning of our educa- tion. 2. The other point, " the relativity of our knowl- edge," is more serious. It seems to me that we have here the old ques- tion of Plato's day revived. He contended some- times that if there is such a thing as insight, voTjfftS, or diavoia there must be iniatrjiJLr} or true knowl- edge; at other times, as in the Timceus {% 25), if there is any true knowledge eniGrrjjxt} as opposed to mere impression and individual beliefs, SoSa, there must be not only vorfffis or. insight as a means of that knowledge, but also both voovfiEva or things that are known by insight, and vor/ra, truths absolutely known concerning them.' Or to put this contrast in its psychological, rather than its logical or ontological point of view, Plato, as we have seen. Lecture I., began by drawing a sharp distinction between the things that we know and are led to contemplate by " the eyes " and " the seeing of the eyes," o/^/zaffiv xai ofsi on the one hand, and by insight and reason, or reaisoning on the other.. And in the Timceus, % IX., XXI., XXV., and others, Plato combines the two, and speaks 1 1 introduce these words in the Greek because they have an etymological connection which gives them an argumentative force that cannot be well retained or exhibited in any mere translation. Metaphysical Objections. 145 of voTjffiS jisrd Xoyov, and then proceeds to say that in consequence there must be realities that are not seen by the eyes, tkvciia^rira, but are known to insight alone, voovfiEvafiqvoy, which are unchange- able in their nature, ocA Kara ravta oV, which are the same always, and for all rational or intelligent beings. I think it is undoubtedly true that we have in what is generally called knowledge the two elements, one of absolute certainty and the other of mere relativity, mere personal opinion or iinpression. But the state- ment' that all knowledge is merely relative, like most of the others which I have had occasion to criticise, has two or more meanings, in one of which at least it is usuaiUy quite true, and in the others it is clealrly false. If by the relativity of knowledge we mean to say or imply that knowledge is only of the relations of things one to another, we should hardly feel inclined to question the doctrine. Even in mathematics the truths that make up our knowledge, express rela- tionsj possible or real, of objects one to another. Every proposition must have a sitbject and a predi- cate. These two terms are, for the most part, ex- pressed or: represented by names which denote the objects we are thinking and speaking about, and between which a relation is affirmed or denied. All 146 The Methods of Natural TJuology. the other words in the proposition, of whatever parts of speech, as verb, adjectives or adverbs, are used merely to denote the relations that exist, or that we wish to assert as existing, between those objects: " the earth moves around the sun," " the table stands on the floor," " the man rides in the carriage," etc. To this extent all knowledge is relative. And if this is what and all that is meant by the relativity of knowledge, nobody can dispute it. But in another sense the statement is intended to assert that nothing is absolutely true ; that all truths are only relative to us, and that any statement can be regarded as true only in relation to us individu- ally. This doctrine results from a too hasty generaliza- tion of some facts that had attracted the attention of some of the great philosophers of our century. I see an object before me ; it is red. But what is redness ? Of course the object may change its color and cease to be red without losing its identity. Moreover, redness may not be precisely the same thing for two persons. But what is more important, there might be a change in my eyes, or in my brain, so that the object would appear to be of a color dif- ferent from that which it now appears to have, with no change in the object itself. Hence redness is said to be relative, and the word to denote only a relation between me and the object. Metaphysical Objections. 147 Or let us take another example: the fluid that feels warm to our hand when it is cold, may feel cold to us when our hand is warm. The water on which the autumn leaf floats before the wind is as solid to the leaf as the rock-quarry on which stands the hut of the hunter, or as the pavement is to our feet as we go about our daily round of business or pleasure. And thus at first sight, and with only a hasty glcUice at a few examples, all knowledge does seem to be only relative, one thing for one person, and in one relation, and quite another for other per- sons and in other relations ; nothing the same to all, or certain for anybody. Now this is true of most of what we know of the properties of external objects, but is not true of all. Take form for example. The objects I see around me are of various forms, round, square, and irregu- lar, and of great varieties of irregularity. But their form is absolute. No change in me, in my eyes or my brain, can cause them to be of a different form. With a change of position or of medium, they may indeed seem to have a form different from that which they now appear to me to have. But they are of the same form still, with no change in the things themselves. Their form is absolute, and the same for all beings that can see them. So with their individuality or separateness. I see 148 The Methods of Natural Theology. two objects. They are distinct and separate. This is no idea that is relative to me. It is true that from defect in our organs of vision we sometimes see things " double " ; but never, that I know of, do we see two things as one when we can see them dis- tinctly at all. But however we may see them they are distinct and separate. Now here we have the basis of most, if not of all of the sciences. In form we have the basis of geome- try ; in individuality, after abstracting the properties, we have the basis of arithmetic and the science of numbers ; and with the properties we have the ground of that classification of objects with which science begins, and on which it ultimately depends. It is especially worthy of note, also, that all the sciences that deal with objects in the concrete, as botany, zoology, mineralogy, geology, astronomy, etc., base their classifications chiefly on the form of objects rather than on any other of their properties, which are only accidental in an ontological point of view, since they may be different for different per- sons, and even for the same person under different circumstances, as in the case of the water just spok- en of. There is still another aspect of this doctrine of " the relativity of all knowledge," which deserves a passing notice. It is claimed that we can know Metaphysical Objections. 149 a thing only as it is in relations with other things, but what it is absolutely or would be if it were in no such relations, we do not know. It is indeed quite true that we know of nothing except as it is in relations. Nor do I think that this can be regarded as a very serious matter. What- ever exists, if indeed there is more than one thing existing, must exist in relations to other things. Some of these relations are accideotal, and others are permanent arid essential ; and permanent be- cause they are essential. This is the case with all the mathematical relations. It is the case also, though to a less extent, with those relations on which the classifications on which all scientific knowledge is based, on the one hand, and those natural classifica- tions, on which all possible use of language depends, on the other. What we want to know, then, is these very rela- tions, and the knowledge of these relations is all the knowledge that can be of any use to us. In the midst of them we live here. Iti the midst of some of them at least, we must live, if we are to live at all, hereafter. Our relations to things of time and sense may indeed pass aWay. But we have rela- tions of a higher kind that are eternal ; as eternal as God and Heaven itself These cannot pass away. But speculations about the way in which things ISO The Methods of Natural Theology. would appear if they were not in relations to one another can have no practical or scientific value. For if the time has ever been, or shall ever come, when anything shall exist that is so absolute as to be in no relations with other things, there will be either nothing to be seen or nobody to see it. I have already spoken of those who would deny or question the reality of the existence of substantial objects around us whose existence is independent of our thought and of our will. The skepticism or agnosticism of these men gives rise to another phase of what is sometimes called " the relativity of knowl- edge." If these objects exist only for us, in relation to us, and as we create them or conceive them to be, they are most surely only relative to us. But by the necessities of co-ordination there must be two objects — the subject and object — the perceiv- ing agent and the perceived object — in every act of perception or cognition. And this object cannot be mere matter in general, nor the outward world as a whole. It must be some one individual object, and the individual objects as they are seen one by one individually. This results from the necessity for co-ordination. But as a matter of psychology, as we have seen, perception is a distinct act, and different in its essen- tial nature from either imagination or memory. It Metaphysical Objections. 151 is an act of which we are conscious. Hence if any- one should deny his consciousness of the act of per- ception, he would be virtually proclaiming himself consciously unconscious]of something that he is con- scious of, or unconsciously conscious of something that he knows nothing about ; and in either case, much like the man that should vociferously proclaim himself speechless. But it is claimed that these laws and conditions of knowledge depend upon classification, and that " the First Cause," " the Absolute," " the Infinite," can- not be in any class, cannot be " conditioned " and " related " to other things so that " the relativity of knowledge " excludes, at all events, the knowledge of God.^ It is indeed perfectly true that whatever we cognize, we must cognize under the law of co- ordination ; and whatever we think or speak about, we must think of and name under the laws of classi- fication, and by referring to some class. Hence we think and speak of God as a Being — one among many — and we call Him, by way of distinction, the Supreme Being ; or if these men prefer it, as the Infinite Being, the Absolute Being. We also think of Him as a cause, and call Him the First Cause. I can therefore see no force in their objection, al- 1 Herbert Sv^nceh's Sirst Principles, }-24, p. 81, aijd follow- ing. I S 2 The Methods of Natural Theology. though Herbert Spencer makes a great account of it in his chapter on the "Relativity of Knowledge." But what is meant by these men when they speak of " the relativity, the absolute relativity of all knowl- edge," is often only the uncertainty of knowledge. This I think is eminently the case with the first part of Spencer's argument just referred to. This is ob- vious on a slight inspection of § 23. Now in all " knowledge " there is undoubtedly an element of uncertainty. Call it by this name and all men will understand what you mean; and all men who have had any cautious experience in deal- ing with human affairs, or in the pursuits of scien- tific truth, will appreciate and admit the truth of what we say. But " relativity " is another kind of a word. It is of vague import and very uncertain application. If, however, we will make another, and, as I think, better analysis of the phenomena tliat Spencer dis- cusses in the Section of his First Principles to which I have just referred, we shall come to a very differ- ent and a much more satisfactory result. Knowledge may be considered as made up of two elements, " facts " and " principles." Facts we may know for a certainty, but we never comprehend any one of them completely and thor- oughly. I know the fact, for instance, that some Metaphysical Objections. 153 years ago an apple seed was planted in a certain place in the soil. I know the fact that it grew to be a tree, blossomed in the spring and bore fruit in the autumn following. Now we may call this one fact or many — ^a series of facts — as we please. We know the facts as certainly as we know our own existence, as certainly as though we were omniscient. But we understand and comprehend it, or them, as we choose to regard them, but very iniperfectly. There is much of uncertainty, something of relativity, and very likely some thing of error and mistake in what we think we know and call our knowledge with re- gard to it. But in regard to principles, strictly so called, there is no such element of error, uncertainty, or relativity. Take as examples for illustration the axioms of geometry. They are said to be self-evident. But at all events we know them for a certainty and we comprehend .^em, too, perfectly^co'mprehend them as well— with profoundest reverence be it said — as Omniscience itself, does or can do. Now such first principles or self-evident axioms underlie all branches of science and scientific knowl- edge, and are either expressly stated or tacitly as- sumed in every book that is written that is intended to teach anything — nay, in every statement that is made with the intention of asserting a truth. The 1 54 The Methods of Natural Theology. physicist assumes that inert matter cannot start from rest to motion, or change its rate of motion, of itself The chemist assumes that elements not in action on each other will not begin to act without something outside of them changing their relations to each other; and that he cannot, in any possible analysis or syn- thesis that he can make, either create or annihilate and destroy one atom of the matter that comes into his crucibles or in any way under the manipulations of his hands. ' Now of these two elements, facts and first princi- ples, all knowledge, properly so called, is made up. In what we call the inductive, or a posteriori sciences, the sciences that depend on observation, the element of facts enters the most largely and forms the largest as well as the most conspicuous part. But in the pure mathematics, the element of fact scarcely enters at all. The truths are obtained by demonstration from (i) the axioms and (2) definitions, exhibiting the nature of the things we reason about, entirely abstracted from their accidents; so that so long as our reasoning is without fault or fallacy, the conclusions are as certain and without intermixture of uncer- tainty or " relativity " as the axioms themselves. We may then grant these agnostics their philoso- phy of " the relativity of knowledge," so far as facts show that it is only relative, and still have enough Metaphysical Objections. 155 left for all the purposes of our argument. We have as much and all that these advocates of the physical or positive sciences have or can have for their own use. If we gain all the certainty they can have, or if they will concede to us as much certainty as they claim for themselves — their facts, their theories, and their speculations in their various stages and degrees — ^it is all we ask for our own purpose and use. All men believe or know that there are the two bodies in space, the sun and the planet Venus. Most men know or feel very sure that there will be another transit of Venus in June, A. D. 2004. Now if they could be made to feel as sure that there is a God Who has created us and. all things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, and if they could be brought to feel as sure that there is a life to come and a day of judgment at the close of this life, as they do of the coming transit of Venus, it would be all that we could hope or desire as a doctrine of mere Natural Theology. It is, in fact, vastly more than we expect to be able to accomplish by our method. . But the facts are as sure, the foundation is as se- cure for us as it is for them. The methods of the sciences are, in their essential elements, one and the same for all. There are four steps or stages ; observation, analysis, classification, 1S6 The Methods of Natural Theology. and inference. And at each of these stages error and mistake are possible. In the first stage we have observation — observation of (i) external objects by sense-perception, and (2) observation of internal phenomena, or the acts and states of the mind, by consciousness. And here, as we have seen and ad- mitted, we are very Uable to mistake — ^both in the mind and in nature — in consciousness and in the perception of the objects we think we see. In the analysis and classification of our facts, the methods are somewhat different, and we are liable to errors of different kinds in the two branches of study, the study of mind and the study of matter. In making our inferences the laws of logic are the same for both departments of knowledge. In the one direction we prove the reality of mind, the ex- istence of God, and the doctrine of His Moral Gov- ernment, by the same methods and with as much certainty in our conclusions, as in the other direc- tion, we prove the existence of the objects in the ■world of matter, the fact of universal gravitation, or the theory of evolution. The methods are in their essential features the same. The certainty is the same in the one case as in the other, so far as the mere grounds of logic and evidence are concerned ; so far as our opinions and inferences are a mere matter of thought and intellect. Metaphysical Objections. 157 But in so far as the results in the two cases are a matter of the heart and of sentiment, they are not the same. We begin with the objective method. We observe external objects almost from the mo- ment of our birth. We are always with them, and they with us. We test our opinions and theories by fact and experience daily. But in the other direc- tion we begin to observe and study the facts of our mental activity only at a later date. We all find, at first at least, a great difficulty in grasping hold of them and keeping them steadily under our gaze, long enough to study them. We can make no dia- gram or model of them j we can have no dried speci- mens, or preserved preparations to aid us in our effort to get a clear conception, and form a careful analysis of the phenomena which we have to study. It is no wonder, therefore, that material objects should seem the most familiar and real to us. Many of us have never heard of the facts and truths of mind. And many more who, in this age of irre- ligion and unbelief, have never been accustomed to hear the truths, or to practice the duties of religion. Hence, while there all seems familiar, here all seems new and strange, and to some extent improbable, if not even impossible. One contrast more. The facts and truths of sci- ence impose no restraint upon our thoughts and 8 IS8 The Methods of Natural Theology. actions — none, that is, except such as we have already- learned to accept without complaint or murmur. But the truths of religion open for us a new world, and put a view and an estimate upon our life, our duties and our relations here that are new and quite unfamiliar to our minds. This new view calls for exertion, for self-denial, for sacrifices here and now, as the means to a glory which eye hath not seen nor ear heard, nor heart of man conceived, which can be fully attained only through the mercy of God and the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, His most Blessed Son and our only Saviour and Re- deemer, in that world to which we are all hastening, and for which this was designed and created chiefly if not only as a means of preparation. LECTURE IV. LOGICAL OBJECTIONS; HAMLITON'S "NO PROOF OF THE INFINITE," KANT'S "ANTINOMIES." Mark XI, 35. Take heed therefore that the light that is within be not dark- LOGICAL OBJECTIONS. I closed the last Lecture without taking advantage of the. opportunity which it afforded me of saying something of the benefits of early ChHstian educa- tion and its relation to the general subject before us. The prophet Jeremiah ' foretold a time when " God would " put his laws into the hearts of the people and write them in their minds, and St. PauP refers to this prediction as about to be fulfilled in the Christian Dispensation. I think this implies something more than the mere hearing and learning so as to remember the words of divine truth. It rather describes that process with what we are now familiar, and by which these truths come to be acquired instincts — a sort of sec- ond nature — as the result of heredity and long use. It is now a fact well known to modern science that, while man has natural instincts like the brutes, a large share of those he now possesses are the re- sult of education. Those which constitute the dif- 1 Jeremiah, xxxi., 33, 34. 2 Hebrews, x., 16. 1 62 The Methods of Natural Theology. ference between the savage man of the woods and forests and the civilized man of the farms and of the cities, are of this kind. Those which constitute the difference between the men and women of these modern Christian communities and the men and women of ancient heathen civilizations, are also of this kind, and have been acquired under the guiding and controlling influence of Christianity. They be- gin in voluntary acts, performed from choice and conviction, and most often, not without self-denial, sacrifice and danger. These acts are repeated by per- severing effort until they become fixed habits, and they are transmitted by the law of heredity to the offspring. In this way the virtues of these early believers have become so much a matter of habit and of course with us, that we forget that men and women have not always been such as we now see them, or that we are indebted to what Christianity has done for us, for this most beneficent change. Virtues which were then scarcely so much as thought of, which people were neither expected to have nor respected for having, have now come into vogue and are regarded as indispensable to respectability in any social community. And vices, of which St. Paul said it was "a shame even to speak,"i ^^^ which he even commanded that they should " not be 1 Ephesians, v., 13, v., and 3. Logical Objections. 163 once named " among Christians, have now no exist- ence and no name among us.^ Nowhere is idolatry- professed and practiced ; and men, even if they are not pure and clean in their lives, find it necessary to pretend and to appear to be so, in order to keep their places in society. Truth and honor, as well as every social virtue, are at a higher standard than they were then. This change hath God wrought for us, and it is the result of religious training under the influence of Christianity and the Christian church. I think I have a right to allude to the facts of hu- man history as furnishing both a proof of the exist- ence of God and an illustration of His attributes. I shall say something more on this subject in the last Lecture. But as germane to the subject just alluded to, called "heredity" by modern scientists, I will take occasion before going any further with my gen- eral subject to say a few words more. This is not the only case in which the attainments of modern science — attainments which have been made for the most part since the days of Paley and 1 This great change in the moral sense and instincts of mankind is what but few persons appreciate. Nor have I ever seen it pre- sented as I think it ought to be, as an argument in fevor of the divine origin and claims of Christianity. See, for an exhibition of heathen sentiment on this subject, Mahaffey, Social Life in Greece front Homer to Menander. It became much worse after Menander. See also Beckek's Charicles. 164 The Methods of Natural Theology. Butler — ^have afforded new and unexpected proofs of the inspiration and divine guidance of the early writers of the Scriptures and of the founders of the Jewish and Christian Dispensations. I refer now to one only. We all readily see and acknowledge the wisdom and necessity of the isolation of the seed of Abra- ham, if there were to be kept in the line of his pos- terity the knowledge and worship of the one true God. But little thought, however, has been given to the opportunity which this isolation and exclu- siveness gave to the law of heredity, just spoken of, to do its appropriate work among them. It did its work and made " a peculiar people " — peculiar in more senses than one — and that peculiarity became, in the generations from Moses to Christ, so thoroughly inwrought into their very natures that it has not de- parted from them yet. Everywhere they are still a peculiar people, isolated and exclusive.^ 1 As showing the effect of the discipline of heredity, I cite the fol- lowing facts, which are found in Jewish history ; The tendency to polytheism and idolatry, hitherto prevalent among all nations, be- came extinct with the Babylonish captivity. They have, and have had for two thousands of years, no drunkards among their men and no wantons among their women. They have no scrofula or leprosy, though leprosy was once not uncommon among them. Cases of insanity and idiocy are exceedingly rare. In all cases of epidemics, as plague, cholera, scarlatina, diphtheria, etc., they are singularly exempt. RICHARDSON, in his Diseases of Modem Life, p. 19, and Logical Objections. 165 The operation of the same law, or rather the in- fluence of Christianity under the same law, in regen- erating* the race and transforming them " into the image of Christ," was as necessary, and apparently as much a part of the divine plan, as the preparation for Christ's " coming " had been under the old Dis- pensation. But geographical or local isolation was here out of the question. The gospel must be preached to all nations, and all, or as many as would listen and should be converted must be gathered into the fold. Hence, in order that "heredity" might have a chance to do its appropriate work, a Spiritual Discipline, not only as a means of enforc- ing the new modes of life and habits of thought within the church, but also as a means of excom- foUowing, gives the following statistics by way of contrast : Deaths under S years, Jews, lo per cent., others, 14. Average age, Jews, 48 years and 9 months, others, 36 and II months. One half the yews reach S3 years and one month, of others, the half reach only 36 years. Of the Jesus, one quarter live to be over 70 years, and of others, not over one quarter live to be 60 years old. Diseases of the lungs, as consumption, are exceedingly rare. These are certainly remarkable results. They show what religion and morality — mor- ality upheld and sustained by religious faith and discipline, can do for man. 1 The word "regeneration," and its equivalent in Greek, itaXty- yevBdia, occurs but twice in the New Testament, and in the first instance, St. Matthew, xix., 28, I think it refers manifestly to a change in humanity collectively and as a whole, rather than to the renewal of persons each in his individual capacity. The other place in which the word occurs is Titus, iii., S- i66 The Methods of Natural Theology. munication and exclusion for those, who after due efforts to retain and guide them, and after all due forbearance and patience with their unavoidable in- firmities and weaknesses, would not live a Christian life. Within the church they would be a means of defeating the operation of this law. Out of it, their influence for evil in this line would be at an end, or work at least among those who, and whose posterity, were to pass away ; and church fellowship and asso- ciation would be among those only in whom the in- fluence of the Holy Ghost and the co-operation of their own wills would be at work in the same direc- tion in this slow but sure and inevitable process of regenerating humanity and transforming the believ- ers into the likenesses of Christ, their Divine Head.* Christians, wTiose eyes and thoughts are turned in that direction, will see in this, perhaps, a reason for the stress that is laid upon church unity and har- mony among its members, and, by way of contrast, the severity of disapprobation with which the " sins of heresy and schism " are spoken of, and the terri- 1 Galton, in his work on Hereditary Genius, p. 357, and follow- ing, contends that/h>w this point of view the institutions of celibacy and monasticism during the Middle Ages was a great disadvantage to Modern Europe. They withdrew the most intellectual, the most gentle, and the most refined of both sexes, as clergy, monks and nuns, from the ordinary sphere of life and oi parentage, so that the race was propagated by the coarsest, least intellectual, and most animal part of the population. Logical Objections. 167 ble effects that are ascribed to excommunication and separation from the communion of the Church. These sins tend to defeat one great object of the Church, the regeneration of humanity as a whole, as effectually as the sins of uncleanness and blasphemy- prevent the sanctification and salvation of the indi- vidual soul of the offender. I. But let us proceed to our main subject, the Logical Objections to the validity of the Methods of Natural Theology, and the importance of the results which may be reached by pursuing them. I have considered the physical objections, and those that have been urged on grounds of psychology and metaphysics. And it is worth noticing that the men who have urged them have evidently done it for a purpose, and that when that purpose is not in view, they speak and act in regard to these very doc- trines as though they held the common views of mankind on the subjects ; common sense triumphs over their philosophy. I. The point which I propose next to consider is one that is purely logical in its character. I will state it in words which I will cite from Sir William Hamilton, although it is but due to him to say that there appears — after a most careful scrutiny — rea- son to doubt whether in using these words he is ex- i68 The Methods of Natural Theology. pressing his own views and is not rather giving an abstract of what he supposes to be the views of Kant His words are as follows -.^ " Things in themselves, — Matter, Mind, God, — all, in short, that is not finite, relative, the phenomenal, ... is beyond the verge of our knowledge. . . A knowledge of the uncondi- tioned is declared impossible ; either immediately, as a notion, or mediately as an inference. A demon- stration of the absolute from the relative is logically absurd, as in such a syllogism, we must collect in the conclusion what is not distributed in the premises." I have said that in using these words Hamilton appears to be giving expression to the views of Kant. And yet Hamilton seems to hold the same view himself, and to accept all of its consequences. Any- how in this matter his professed disciple Mansel has accepted this view and carried it out to the utmost extreme of statement and illustration.* Two things, however, must be observed. {a) While Hamilton says he thinks the reasoning complicated and the reduction incomplete, he says, 1 Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, Appleton's Ed., p. 458. The article was first published in the Edinburgh Review, October, 1829, under the title of Philosophy of the Conditioned, and Refuta- tion of the Various Doctrines of the Unconditioned, especially of Cousin's Doctrines of the Infinito- Absolute. 2 Mansel, Limits of Religious Thought Examined, Bamp;on Lectures, 1858, Lects. II. suid III. Logical Objections. i6g also, that " Kant has clearly shown that the idea of the unconditioned can have no objective reality — that it conveys no knowledge — and that it involves the most insoluble contradictions" (p. 459). (3) In the second place, we must observe that Hamilton's whole line of argument, which is under- stood to be a demonstration of the impossibility of any knowledge of God by the methods of Natural Theology, is based upon, and is an illustration of the doctrine here enunciated with regard to " any syllo- gism " that may be claimed and used as proving His existence or attributes. Mansel so understood the doctrine of Hamilton, and urges it with great force in his well-known work, TAe Limitations of Religious Thought. And Herbert Spencer so understood and applied it in that criticism of his which I have quoted in a preceding Lecture.^ And yet Kant and Hamilton and Mansel were all of them earnest Christian men. One of them, Mansel, was a high dignitary in the English Church. And "the philosophy" of Hamilton has been ex- tensively favored and accepted rather, as I think, however, because he was known to be an earnest Christian believer, than from any appreciation of its intrinsic merits. It is felt and accepted, without question, that the " philosophy of a good Christian 1 First Principles, Ft. I., chap. iv. 1 70 The Methods of Natural Theology. man must be a good Christian philosophy." But I think that the world is beginning to realize the fact that in his concessions, chiefly, as I. think, through the influence of Kant, Hamilton gave away the whole case, as Kant had done, in the hope and belief that he was placing Christianity on impregnable grounds. It is well to note carefully the terms of the state- ment. It does not say in precise terms that any syllogism that should claim to prove " the existence of God" would involve the fallacy in form that is described ; but only that every syllogism that would prove or demonstrate the absolute, would involve such a fallacy. This distinction is practically lost sight of by our modern agnostics, and quite possibly it is of no value in itself Kant and Hamilton are two great names in all matters of logic ; possibly the greatest that the world has seen since the days of Aristotle. One therefore naturally hesitates long, and considers well his ground, before calling in question any dictum of theirs. The words used describe what the logicians call an " illicit process." But as a matter of fact there can be no illicit process of the minor when the sub- ject is an individual term, as any. word used to de- note the Supreme Being must always be. Nor can there be illicit of the major when the conclusion is Logical Objections. 171 afBrmative — ^which must always be the case when we predicate any attribute of God. It is perhaps, therefore, on the whole, most likely that these critics had no definite idea of the fallacy which they intended to ascribe to the reasoning by which we would prove the existence of God. 1st. Let us then observe, in the first place, that Spencer's argument, which I quoted at some length in the first Lecture,, is not based on a syllogism, or any foi-m of syllogistic reasoning. It is what is tech- nically called an " immediate inference " from the co-ordination and contradiction of terms. His argu- ment is, as the idea of silence implies that of sound, and the idea of light implies the idea of darkness and proves its reality as something that has been cognized and experienced in some way, and by some means, so the idea of " the finite," " the relative," " the conditioned," implies the idea of the Infinite, the Absolute, the Unconditioned; the very fact of their being finite phenomena which we can see and handle implies the reality of infinite and absolute noumena, which we can neither see nor handle, or in any way make subjects of immediate observation. Observe, he does not say, or claim, that we can prove, by any form of syllogistic reasoning, their ex- istence. Not at all. He assumes the ground of his argument as implied in the very laws and possibility 172 The Methods of Natural Theology. of thought, as one of those axioms which we must assume in all processes of reasoning, and which, be- cause they are primary and self-evident, there can be no method of proving that will make them more certain than they were before we began our pretended demonstration. But in the next place I wish to emphasize the fact that in the a posteriori, the outward or objective line of argument, by which we prove the existence of God, and of which I spoke more especially in the first and second Lectures, we do not attempt or claim to prove His existence as " the absolute," the " infi- nite," or " the unconditioned," but only as God, the First Cause and Creator of all things. Now it is certainly one thing to prove His exist- ence as First Cause and Creator, and quite another thing to prove Him to be infinite or absolute or un- conditioned. In the first case we are using terms that are technically positive ; terms that indicate His existence, by the very attributes, by the exercise and manifestation of which, we prove that He exists at all. Let us then distinctly notice at the outset, that the expressions "the Infinite," the Absolute," "the Unconditioned," and such like, are not terms that are at all adequate or practicable for the purposes of logic and of reasoning. What we may say of any object, if we speak truly and intelligently, depends Logical Objections. 173 upon what that object is, its essentia, the to xi rjv eivai of Aristotle, which is always indicated by the noun that we use as its name, and never by any adjective, which can at most denote an additional differentia. It is indeed true that the differentia becomes part of the essentia of the more limited subject when the adjective is so joined to the noun that the thought or the description of the object is incomplete with- out it Then, in accordance with Aristotle's dictum, de omni et nullo, whatever may be predicated if the noun without the adjective may be predicated of it also after it is limited by the adjective, and much more may be said after and in consequence of such limitation. Thus, whatever may be said of man may be said oi black men as well, and much besides. But without the noun we have no subject definitely before the mind. If, now, these philosophers, when they speak of "the Infinite," mean that incomprehensible Being whom heaven and earth obey, and Him only, and use this form of expression out of reverence for the sacred Name, we can appreciate their motive and respect them all the more highly for it But we must understand what they mean. As a matter of mere logic it is evident that any adjective may be used to qualify more tlian one noun, 174 The Methods of Natural Theology. and that it may qualify so many nouns, and nouns denoting such different subjects, that no one thing may be predicated of them all except the adjective itself. Thus we may speak of things as infinite until all that can be said of them all is that they are infi- nite, not indeed in number, but that they agree and are alike only in possessing this one property of infinity. If, then, we will speak of " the infinite " as a subject, all that we are authorized to say of it, or them is that they are infinite. We must therefore understand their terms. To assent to their state- ments without doing so would be like giving an un- limited letter of credit to a spendthrift who neither knows the extent of your resources nor cares for your wants and necessities. 2d. The terms " infinite," " absolute," " uncondi- tioned," are certainly negative in form. Let us consider for a moment what these terms mean, and what is the process of thought by which we arrive at them. What I see and handle is finite.. Each object has a limit at which it begins to be, and it extends from that limit to some other point or limit at which it ceases to be at all. Now this is true of all the objects we see. And we generalize our observation, and say that all material objects, all objects that are seen m space must be finite. Logical Objections. 17S What, then, do we mean by saying that anything is infinite ? How shall we find out what is the nipan- ing of the word ? I know of no way better than Plato's, his " accustomed method," ' as he called it. In this way we consider the several objects that are called by any one name and thus find, if we can, what they have in common ; and that will be the true, though the most general meaning of the word. Men speak of space as infinite, and so, likewise, of time and of number as infinite. But I think that the process by which they get at this adjective is essentially the same in all these cases. All visible objects are finite, and could not be seen unless they were so. But we imagine space, which is not visi- ble nor yet tangible. Hence we cannot suppose it to end anywhere ; for, fix any limit as you please, and where you please, and you cannot but suppose that space extends beyond. Hence we say it is in- finite, or has no limits. So with time. Name any date or event and we cannot think that time does not extend beyond it — did not begin before and will not last after it. Hence we say time is infinite. With regard to number, the case is not quite so clear. Cousin has in fact argued that there is an es- sential difierence between what he calls the numer- 1 Republic, B. X., c. i., eieoBvia /teSoSoS. 1/6 The Methods of Natural Theology. ical and the ontological infinite.* The numerical infi- nite should rather, as he thinks, be called " the in- definite." We begin by supposing any sum or number, and then suppose it increased by addition or multiplication until it becomes what we call infi- , nite. What it has become, in fact, is so large or so small that a little more or less will make no practical difference for the matter in hand; or possibly so large or so small that we cannot tell or imagine how large or how small it is. But Cousin fails to tell us what the ontological infinite is, or what we mean by the word. And I doubt very much whether it has any meaning but the one above assigned to it. Now, all these mean- ings of the word are the same in their import, they relate to quantity ; and when we call anything infi- nite we mean to say that it is so large that we do not know how large it is, and cannot imagine or suppose it to be larger. .^. The word " absolute " refers rather, as I think, to quality than to quantity. We may say of water that it is absolutely pure ; we should hardly say it is infinitely pure. We say of space, as above noticed, that it is infinite, or infinitely large, but we should hardly call it absolutely large. 1 Course of the History of Philosophy. Course for 1828-9, 2d se- ries, Vol. II., Lect. XVIII., Chap, iii., in Dr. Henry's translation. Logical Objections. 177 But neither of them are words that are obtained from any act of immediate cognition. What we cognize, immediately, must be finite, limited and conditioned. If it is infinite or absolute it must be proved to be so by reasoning from its nature, and not from any direct observation. We predicate of objects : (i) that which we see them to be, and (2) that which we can prove them to be by reasoning from their nature. I see this paper, as opaque, and because it is opaque and re- flects the light. I feel it because it is hard, and re- sists my hand when I press upon it. It is limited or finite, because both by sight and touch I perceive something besides it, around it and beneath it, which begins to be, where it ends or ceases to be. But I prove that it is divisible-^-divisible infinitely or with- out limit if you please — from its very nature as an object that is extended in space; and I predicate all these properties and say it is opaque, it is hard, it is extended and it is divisible, with equal confidence and certainty. Now we have seen that we prove'the existence of God, as a First Cause, and as such He must be spontaneously active. We see that He must be in- telligent in order that all that he has done shall be in accordance with law and truth. We see that He must be powerful, in order to do all that we find it 178 The Methods of Natural Theology. necessary to ascribe to Him in the construction and course of nature. We have a good illustration of this method of ar- gument in the discovery of the planet Neptune, spoken of in the last Lecture. Now in precisely the same way we find God act- ing spontaneously, with intelligence and power — great power — and some one asks, Is He infinite? We say He is not finite, because we do not and can- not conceive Him to begin to be at any point of either space or time, or to extend as material objects do, and of necessity must from some one point of space to some other point. His omnipresence is not conceived or accounted for in that way. Now, if we choose to denote the not being finite in this sense by the word " infinite," then surely we may say that God is infinite. But the affirmation is based on an immediate inference from the meaning of the word finite, and not on any syllogism that can involve any illicit process, whether of the major or of the minor, or in fact any other fallacy in form. So with the word " absolute." If we generalize our experience of all visible and tangible things, and say they are all effects, dependent on causes that preceded them for their existence, and upon other things still for the continuance of that existence, and then say that God cannot be dependent, like these Logical Objections. 179 objects, on anything else, either for an origin or for the continuance of His existence, and choose to ex- press this thought by the word " absolute " and call Him absolute, there can be no logical impropriety in so doing ; there is nothing absurd or fallacious in the process. With regard to the word unconditioned we must say something a little different. In most respects it means, in this controvei:sy, the same as the word " absolute." And in so far as that meaning is con- cerned, what I halve already said of the word " abso- lute " is fully applicable to the use of this word also. God may be said to be "unconditioned" in the same sense as He may be said to be absolute. And in fact He may be said to be absolute in another and more popular sense of the word. He is absolute in that no one person or thing can resist His will, out- wit Him, if we may so speak, or interpose any obsta- cle that will be felt to be an obstacle to the accom- plishment of His purposes. I have spoken of "absolute '.' as relating rather to the quality than to the quantity of an object. In the discussions to which I am referring, however, the word is used, as I understand, chiefly in reference to freedom from restraint and constraint, or neces- sary conditions and limitations to His wisdom and power, When we call Him absolute, we mean that 1 80 The Methods of Natural Theology. He can do as He pleases, is under no law or limita- tion, as I apprehend, rather than to speak of the quality of His attributes. But in regard to His infinity, we mean to assert, as I conceive, that we know of no limit to the ex- tent of His wisdom and power, or to the presence and reality of His being. But the method of our proof should not be mis- taken. We do not prove, or attempt to prove di- rectly, from the phenomena of nature. His existence as "the Infinite " or "the Absolute." What we prove is His' existence as God- — a Being of wisdom, of power, and of spontaneous activity. Do you ask, Is He infinite and absolute ? I an- swer, This depends very much upon what you mean by the terms. He is both infinite and absolute in the sense in which these attributes can be inferred, from what we know otherwise concerning His nature. And that is all, I apprehend, that we can care to affirm of Him, and in that sense of the words our affirmation cannot be questioned or denied. But "unconditioned " has another element in its meaning, or rather suggests another view of the at- tributes and relations of God. And in this sense it is used as the opposite of the word " relative," as well as the opposite of the word "conditioned." Hence to be " unconditioned " in this sense is to be out of relations to all other things. Logical Objections. i8i We touch here a thought that has occasioned grpat trouble to the metaphysicians from Spinoza, at least, down to our ow^ time. If God be in " conditions " and " relations " with other things, those other things must exist, and, as they argue, they must be, outside of Him, and limit His existence; and so He cannot be infinite. This is a central thought— the germ of Spinoza's pantheism. Now this may involve a mystery which we can neither understand or explain. Certainly I shall attempt no explanation of it here, for it is not my claim that the method of Natural Theology can prove, or claims to prove, that God is infinite, absolute, or unconditioned in any sense of those words which can make their use liable to the objections that Hamilton, Mansel and Spencer have urged against them. I aim to show only that this method of argument proves His existence as First Cause and Creator, a Personal Agent, wise, powerful and good, beyond any limits that we can discover or conceive. But in a certain sense of the word He is not un- conditioned. No object of thought or of reality can be so. He is in the " condition " of being an object that is thought of, and of whom we think, whether we think of Him to affirm or to deny His existence. He exists " in relatio;i " to all created things — the relation of creator to things created. i82 The Methods of Natural Theology. Hp exists in the " relation" to ^phenomena which we have denoted by the word noumenon as that which they make manifest. And if either the doc- trine of the Christian Revelation or those of Natural Theology are true, He exists " in relation to " us as our present Moral Governor and our Final Judge, And on the Christian basis, He exists in many most tender relations to us — in Christ as our Redeemer — in the Holy Ghost as our Sanctifier, to enlighten our minds and guide us in the paths of peace and the ways that lead to Heaven. He exists as all that can excite or inspire noble thoughts, holy aspirations, all that can give courage and hope ; all that can afford strength and give victory at last. And if He exists at all He must be " conditioned " and in some relations to other things. He must be in a "condition'' to be thought of, to be loved and feared, to be the creator of whatever is created, and the coeval of whatever is eternal, if there is anything that is eternal but Himself. If there is more than one thing in the universe they must be in some re- lation to each other and limited in logical— though. not necessarily in ontological — quantity, so that the one is not the other, and they may be two or more and not one only.' 1 It is readily admitted that any two objects that are extended and have the property of imfeneiraUUty which is ascribed to all material Logical Objections. 183 And yet Herbert Spencer, while protesting as we have seen most earnestly, and, as I think, most ef- fectively, against the inference of Hamilton and Mansel, derived both from their psychology and their logic to the non-existence and unreality of what they call " the infinite," was led by his false psychology both unwisely and unnecessarily, as I think, into the worst feature of his agnosticism, the one feature, as I am inclined to regard it, which made of him an agnostic rather than a devout Christian believer. He spoke of God as included in the class of things which he called unknowable and unknown ! But surely He of Whom it may be said that He is " omnipresent," " manifest in every phe- nomenon of nature," " working through its myriad Agencies," and even in the mind of man himself, "producing in him " his highest and holiest " beliefs," ought not to be regarded or spoken of as altogether unknown to men. We have here, not as a confes- substaoces, do limit each other, not only in logical but also in onto- logical quantity, so that neither one of them can be said to be infi- nite in any proper sense of the word. They are not only two objects, but both of them are finite objects. Philosophers, however, hold that space, which has not the material property of impenetrability, is infinite, notwithstanding the existence of material objects. They are thought to exist in space — ^without limiting it ontologically. Much more, therefore, may this be said of mind, and especially of the Divine Mind, to which even the material property of extension is not ascribed. 1 84 The Methods of Natural Theology. sion only, but as a contention rather, all that Natural Theology claims, or that its methods ask, — the existence of God, His agency in nature, His providence over all things, and His inspiration, if not even miracles, in the only sense in which the Bible claims them, or in which theologians have any occa- sion to claim or to assert their occurrence. The case is the same in all its essential features, and in all of the principles of logic that are involved, as what occurs in our daily experience. There is a man before me. I see his body, but of his consciousness, his thoughts, his mind, I know nothing except what is manifested to me by his words and his actions; these are the phenomena which manifest to me what is yet only the noumenon, his self I readily interpret his words and actions to imply certain thoughts, feelings and purposes, and these are the states and acts of his mind or self By them I understand that he is a person and not a mere thing; that he is wise and benevolent, has purposes and aims to accomplish, and some measure at least of power to accomplish them. Of course I may misunderstand him. And it is possible that he may intentionally deceive me. But no one doubts the general result, the inference that he is intelligent, is capable of purpose, and has purposes to accom- plish, arrived at in this way, however I may misun- Logical Objections. 185 derstand them, or he may have deceived me as to the particular thoughts and purposes he may have at the moment. So with Natural Theology. The world and its facts and events are the phenomena that manifest unto us the attributes of God. Their existence proves His creative power. Their intelligibility proves His intelligence. Their harmony and the adaptation of one to another, and of part to part, proves His purpose in their creation, and their ten- dency to produce good results rather than evil and painful ones, proves Him to be good and gracious, as truly and by rules of observation and reasoning which are the same, as those that guide us in the study of the character and purposes of any of our fellow men. But is He then " the infinite," " the absolute," the " unconditioned " ? It depends entirely upon what you mean by these words when you ask the question or raise the objection. In any sense and in all the senses in which the words are positive and have any meaning, He is infinite and absolute. But in so far as they are negative or involve contradictions and absurdities. He is not the one nor the other. He is only good and wise and powerful, just and gracious, full of mercy and compassion, " not willing that any should perish," * but rather that " all men should be 1 2d Peter, Hi., 9. 1 86 The Methods of Natural Theology. saved and come to the knowledge of the truth."* And to this end He not only spoke in times past by the Prophets, but "hath in these latter days sent us His Son Jesus Christ, full of grace and truth, whom He hath appointed heir of all things."^ The question, then, is not whether we can prove the existence of " the Infinite " or " the Absolute " or " the Unconditioned." But it is rather whether we can prove the existence of God — not so much whether He is " infinite," " absolute," and " uncon- ditioned," as whether He is at all or not. And when we cognize or prove His existence, by the very act by which we prove that He is we prove something of what He is. If I know anything directly by sight I know it to be opaque, extended, of a certain color. If I prove that God exists by any process or mode of reasoning, I know Him to be that by which in the process I prove Him to be at all, possibly infinite and absolute, but certainly First Cause, Creator and Personal Agent. II. I pass now to the last part of this branch of my subject : Kant's Antinomies. It is now a little more than a hundred years since Kant published his great work, the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. In this work he first published to the 1 1st Timothy, ii., 4. 2 Hebrews i., 2. Logical Objections. 187 world his now world-famous antinomies. These are contradictions, on which, as he claims, all knowledge and all opinions, of whatever kind, must rest as their basis. In a subsequent work, his Prolegomena, he repeated his antinomies, with some slight modifica- tions of statement, but with the continued claim that they lie at the foundation of all that can be called, or claimed, as knowledge, scientific or otherwise. 1. Before he came to his antinomies Kant had ■w(orked out a theory of perception which left the reality of the objects that are perceived in the ex- ternal world in doubt, and he had taught that, at best, we can have no knowledge of them as they are as things-in-themselves \dinge an sicfi\. He had also limited the application of the principle of Iden- tity and Contradiction to mere definitions, " analytic propositions, a priori" as he called them. And then, as if to complete the work of destruction, he declared the doctrine that all that we call or can claim as knowledge, whether in science or religion, rests at bottom and for its only foundation on one or an- other of these contradictions or " antinomies." 2. The second point in Kant's Philosophy that requires notice, is his rejection of the Principle of Identity and Contradiction for all synthetic judg- ments. I have found no statement of his doctrine on this 1 88 The Methods of Natural Theology. subject, or of his reasons for it except the brief state- ment in his Prolegomena, % 2, and this seems very- inadequate for so important a departure from the preceding doctrine on this subject, which seems to have been universally accepted. Leibnitz had taught that all the propositions we can assert as truth or knowledge — as distinct from matters of faith or mere belief — rest on the two principles (i) Sufficient Cause and (2) Identity and Contradiction. On the first depends all the truths of history and mere science. And we may have the principle under either of the two forms (a) causa essendi or the cause of its existence, and {8) ratio cognoscendi, the grounds on which we believe or acknowledge the proposi- tion. The Principle of Identity and Contradiction is the ground of all absolute truths. It is based on the nature of the subject with regard to which the propo- sition is affirmed and is obtained by the two proc- esses, analysis and demonstration. I make no mention here of the Principle of Ex- cluded Middle, because I regard that as only a part of the means by which we apply the principle of Identity and Contradiction in what we call the indi- rect method of proof or refutation. The Principle of Identity and Contradiction can Logical Objections. 189 be easily illustrated sufEfciently for our present pur- pose. Suppose we have the proposition 2 + 1=3. The terms are not apparently identical. But we can write them thus, i + i + i = i + i + i, in which case the identity is apparent.' Now this is true of every other proposition in mathematics, and in the science of logic. The only question or difficulty arises out of our dexterity or want of dexterity in the manipulation of the forms of expression. There is no difficulty in regard to the principle itself The same law holds also with regard to some of the fundamental ontological questions. I wiU in- stance two, both of which have already occurred to us in the course of these Lectures. The first relates to the reality of the objects that constitute the external or material world. Take any one of and each of theni separately and we may say of it, " I perceive it." But what is it? a reality? If so, very well. If not, it is not-any- thing, not-a- 1 Or if we put the statement into another form, we get a proposi- tion to be tested by the principle of contradiction. Thus if we say 2 -J- 1 = 4, we may write itl + l-|-i = l-|-i + i-fli, in which it is obvious on inspection that the first term or member is not the same as the second ; or, if this is true, three is not there, and it takes three and something else to make three, which is of course absurd and impossible if we use the word " three " in the same sense in both cases. 1 90 The Methods of Natural Theology. thing, no-thing, nothing. Thus we have, " I per- ceive nothing." But that is logically equivalent to "I do not perceive." Hence, if the act of percep- tion takes place, and is not merely false perception, imagination, memory or dreaming, the object per- ceived is a reality. Take, again, the principle of causation. " Every effect has or has had a cause." But the word effect implies that whatever is properly called an effect is a thing produced by some form or act of efficiency, which of course implies an effector (if we may coin a word), or an agent which caused its existence. Hence if there were no such agent, there could have been no such act ; and what we have called an effect was not properly so called — it was not produced as the product of any previous agency, or any previously existing agent. All of Kant's demonstrations rest upon and as- sume this principle ; and it seems to be almost in- credible and not at all well accounted for, that he could have denied and rejected this principle as he did in the passages of hif Prolegomena]ust referred to. 3. The remaining subject is the Antinomies. These Antinomies consist of four pairs of proposi- tions which are apparently contradictory each one to its fellow in the combination, and the relation of the one to the other — the " thesis " to the " antithe- Logical Objections. 191 sis " — is such that while it is impossible for us to believe or even suppose that both of them are true, the one of them can be demonstrated to be abso- lutely true as well as the other, which is its contra- dictory opposite. In fact, it is Kant's claim that both of the propositions in each of the four pairs can be shown to be absolutely true, leading to the inevi- table agnostic consequence that there is and can be no absolute truth anywhere. Kant saw both the wide sweep and the profound depths to which his so-called antinomies extend. He says : " There are four of them and only four, and they are natural and unavoidable. There can be neither more nor less, because there are no more series of synthetic propositions which limit the em- pirical synthesis." "In them we have the whole dialectical play of the cosmological ideas which do not allow that any object that is not in accordance with them shall be given in any possible experience." * This language is a little peculiar, but as nearly as I can construe it to the common sense of mankind, he means to assert that there is no opinion, truth or statement, that can be made by man that does not in some way or another depend upon, and assume, 1 1 quote from statements given in connection with the statement of the Antinomies, and immediately before them as an introduction to them, Vol. II., p. 330, and following, Rosenkrantz's edition. 192 The Methods of Natural Tlieology. the truth of some one of these eight propositions, which he arranges in the form of four pairs of anti- nomies. After discussing them through some two hundred pages he concludes the discussion with these words :' " We can neither endure the thought nor yet protect ourselves against it, that a Being Whom we represent to ourselves as the Highest among all possible things should say to Himself, ' I am from eternity to eternity; besides Me there is nothing except what exists, is something \etwas ist^ through My Will \durch meinen Willen\' But where then am If Here everything sinks under us and the great- est Perfection as well as the smallest, floats before the Speculative Reason, without support, to which [reason] it costs nothing to allow them, the one as well as the other, to disappear, without the least effort on its part to prevent it."^ 1 Kritik, Works, Vol. II., p. 477. 2 The quotations given above to show Kant's appreciation of the Antithesis, are taken from the larger work, "Die Kritik," I give here, however, » few citations, in the translation from the latter work. "No metaphysical act or subtlety of distinction hinder or avert [ verhiiten] their contradictory opposition, but they compel the phil- osopher to fall back upon the first principles of the pure Reason itself," p. 109. " The Thesis, as well as the Antithesis, can be set forth by equally clear and irresistible proofs,— and I pledge myself for the correct- ness of these proofs — and the Reason sees itself divided against it- self,— a state of things at which the skeptics rejoice— while the crit- Logical Objections. 193 It is but fair towards Kant, however, to pause and say that he gives this only as the outcome of Reason — Par^ Reason — the rtsxAtoi speculative Philosophy. But Kant himself wrote several other works in which he maintained, very strenuously,, that man is natur- ally a religious being, and that, instinctively, he does believe in God and in the reality of the objects in the world around us, and he seems sometimes at least to regard this instinct as being as good a foun- dation for religion and morality as the Pure Reason or Philosophy itself could be. And yet the world knows but little of this part of Kant's philosophy, while everybody knows of his " Antinomies " and his Agnosticism. Kant is a very difficult author to understand or to translate. We can never for many minutes trans- late so as to convey precisely the ambiguities that are in his German, nor always be quite sure that we have given in English that one of the meanings of which his phraseology is susceptible which is the best. But such was to be the sweeping effect of his " Antinomies." And from that day to this no logi- cian has ever been rash enough, so far as I have seen, to undertake to show precisely what and wherein ical philosopher betakes himself to reflection with great uneasiness," p. no. 194 The Methods of Natural Theology. consists the fallacy of his " demonstrations." Even Sir William Hamilton, who was perhaps the keenest man in this respect since Kant's time, admits them to be — in words that I have already quoted—" in- soluble," "the most insoluble contradictions."' These "antinomies" may be stated thus in the best translation that I can make of them : FIRST PAIR. Thesis : " The world had a beginning in time and is limited in space." Antithesis .• "The world, in regard to both time and space, is unlimited " (that is, had no beginning in time and is infinite in extent). SECOND PAIR. Thesis : " Everything in the world is simple." Antithesis : " There is nothing in the world that is simple ; but everything is composite " (made up of parts). THIRD PAIR. Thesis : " In the world there are free and spon- taneously acting causes." Antithesis : " In the world there is no liberty, but all is bound in the necessity of nature." 1 Even Professor Morris, in his little work, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which is an admirable exposition of Kant's doctrines, evades the subject under cover of general statements, as it seems to me, rather gives a clear and precise exposition of the fallacy that lies in them, p. 236. Logical Objections. I9S FOURTH PAIR. Thesis : " In the series of causes in the world there is somewhere a necessary Being." Antithesis: "There is nothing necessary in the world ; but in that series of events that make up the world all is contingent " (accidental or casual).' 1 1 give these Antinomies in the original and in both forms, the earlier form of 1 781 in the Kritik, Rosenkrantz's edition, vol. II, p. 338, etc., and in the form given in 1873 in the Prolegomena, vol. Ill, p. 109. The earlier forms are printed in the left hand column, and the latter opposite to them on the right hand. FIRST PAIR. Thesis, 1 78 1. Thesis, 1783. Die Welt hat einen Anfang in Die Welt hat der Zeit und der Zeit und ist dem Raum nach dem Raum nach einen Anfang auch in Grenzen eingeschlossen. 'Antithesis, Die Welt hat keinen Anfang und keine Grenzen im Raume, sondern ist, sowohl in Ansehung der Zeit als des Raums, unend- lich. SECOND PAIR. Thesis, 178 1. Eine jede zusammengesetzte Substanz in der Welt besteht aus einfachen Theilen, und es existirt iiberall nichts als das Einfache, Oder das, was aus diesem zusam- mengesetzt ist. Antithesis. Kein zusammengesetztes Ding in der Welt besteht aus einfachen Theilen, und es existirt iiberall nichts Einfaches in derselben. (Grenze). Antithesis. Die Welt ist der Zeit una dem Raum nach unendlich. Thesis, 1783. AUes in der Welt besteht aus dem Einfachen. Antithesis. Es ist nichts Einfaches, son- dern AUes ist zusammengesetzt. 196 The Methods of Natural Theology. Now I think I can show, without going into any- great depth of metaphysical profundity, or taxing you with any great effort to follow me and compre- hend what I say, that there are really no " antino- mies" here; no "contradictions," "insoluble" or otherwise ; and that all the appearance of contradic- PAIR. Thesis, 1783. Es giebt in der Welt Ursachen duich Freiheit. THIRD Thesis, 1 78 1. Die Cansalitat nach Gesetzen der Natur ist nicht die einzige, aus welcher die Erscheinungen der Welt insgesammt abgeleitet werden konnen, Es ist noch eine Causalitat durch Freiheit zu Erklarung derselben anzuneh- men nothwendig. Antithesis. Es ist keine Freiheit, sondern AUes in der Welt geschieht le- diglich nach Gesezen der Natur. FOURTH PAIR. Thesis, 1781. Zu der Welt gehort etwas, das, entweder als ihr Theil, oder ihre Ursache, ein schlechthin noth- wendiges Wesen ist. Antithesis. Es existirt iiberall kein schlechthin nothwendiges We- sen, weder in der Welt, noch ausser der Welt, als ihre Ursache. It will be observed that the Antitheses, as stated in the later work, the Prolegomena, 1783, are much more brief and condensed, but substantially the same in their meaning and import. Antithesis. Es ist keine Freiheit, sondern Alles ist Natur. Thesis, 1783. In der Reihe der Weltursachen ist irgend ein nothwendiges Wesen. Antithesis. Es ist in ihr nichts nothwendig, sondern in dieser Reihe ist AUes zufallig. Logical Objections. 197 tion and antinomy there is, depends upon and arises out of a fallacy in diction. Or to be more precise, the whole difficulty arises out of what is called tech- nically an Ambiguous Middle, using the term in its broader signification. I do not offer this solution as a mere conjecture, or as merely something that may be said by way of answer or demurrer to his conclusion. But I ex- amine his illustration and argument, his Beweis and his Anmerkungen, and find that there are the two senses which he attached to the terms, one of them in one proposition and the other sense in the other proposition. Allow me to explain in a few words precisely what I mean by an Ambiguous Middle. We say, " Feathers are light ; light comes from the sun," and the ambiguity of the word " light " is ob- vious. We say, " Money will buy whatever is for sale ; a two shilling piece is money." Here the ambiguity is slightly different in form, but it is equally obvious on a moment's thought of what the premises must mean in order that assent may be given to them at all. Take one more example. We eat what we buy in the market, but we buy raw meat in the market, therefore we eat raw meat, or eat our meat raw. Here, again, the ambiguity is apparent on a little consideration. 198 The Methods of Natural Theology. But in the case of Kant's " antinomies " these am- biguities do not lie on the surface so as to be obvious on a mere inspection. It is quite true, in- deed, that we might conjecture or suspect them, from a mere inspection of the language Kant has used. That, however, could hardly be regarded as any satisfactory exposition. We must inspect the proof which he gives in order to see whether our suspected ambiguity is really involved in and lies at the foundation of his reasoning. And this is what I propose now to do. To take his "antinomies" in order, and consider them one by one in detail. I begin with the thesis of the first pair. It reads, " The world had a begin- ning or has a beginning in tinie and is limited in space" that is, it is not infinite in either respect, but has its limits and bounds. By the words " the world " in this case he means the objects and events that we see, the world-series, weltreihe, as he calls it. He argues, as I have done, that these events, occurring one after another, con- stitute a series, in which there must have been from the very nature of every actual series, a first term — a term before which there was no other. In regard to the objects in the world he holds that as each one of them is limited no one of them can be infinite, nor yet can any addition or multiplication Logical Objections. 199 of them make infinity. Hence the world, in this sense of the word, is limited ; the weltreihe is finite both in time and space. But in the " antithesis " " the world is said to be, in regard to both time and space, infinite." Kant here uses the words " the world " to denote the world-idea, the weltinbegriff, as he calls it. And his argument is that the world as a series of events implies Something Whose existence is not an event in the world (the weltreihe) and Whose presence is not by extension from one limit or point to another, some Being Who is eternal without succession of time — no older than He was — and whose presence is an omnipresence without relations to space or place such as finite or material things have. Now in all this Kant is but presenting the same line of argument as I have been stating and illus- trating in these Lectures. The world considered as what it is is finite, but when considered as including all that it implies — that is, as the universe — it includes something that is infinite, not limited by time and space. In the second pair the " Thesis " is in these words : " In the world everything is simple," but for "antithe- sis " he has, " In the world there is nothing simple, but everything is composite." In discussing this pair I propose to take up and consider the antithesis first. 200 The Methods of Natural Theology. His line of argument and illustration is the one that is usually pursued to prove the " infinite divisi- bility of matter " and of space. Whatever is ex- tended may be divided into two parts ; these parts again into other and smaller parts and so on ad in- finitum. Kant is here obviously speaking of me- chanical or mathematical division. And, in this view, nothing is so small that it may not be con- sidered as made up of parts into which it may be divided, and so it may be said to be theoretically divisible. The word that is common to both propositions, and on which the supposed antinomy depends, is " simple," einfach, in German. We have seen what he meant by it in the " An- tithesis." But when we come to consider his argu- ment and illustration for the " Thesis," we find he means by the term something very different. He is now referring to logical division. The example which Kant cites and dwells upon mostly is the self or the person. " I," he says, " am einfach or simple. I cannot be divided into two persons, nor yet into any two parts of one person." He also cites space as an example. " We cannot," he says, " divide space into parts. We should only make two spaces, which are integral objects and not parts of space [Nun besteht der Raum nicht aus einfachen Theilen, sondern, aus Raumenl. Logical Objections. 201 What he says of self is easily understood and ap- preciated. Space, however, is a less tangible object to deal with. His line of remark and argument in regard to self may be extended to all things considered as indi- viduals in a class. We divide genera into species, and species into individuals. But we can go no farther with our division in this direction, not, how- ever, because the objects have become so small, but because they are individuals; because each of them is one and not two. I can divide this pen mechanic- ally into parts. But I cannot divide it logically into two or more pens — two or more individual objects of the same species ; not because it is so small, but because it is one, and not more, and division would not give us pens, but only parts of a pen. It is re- garded, therefore, simple (einfach) in one sense of the word and not in the other. In considering the third pair, I take up the " an- tithesis " first, also. It is, " In the world there is no hberty, but all is nature." Here the line of argument is such as is usually employed to prove the regularity and uniformity of the phenomena of nature. Whatever comes into being had a cause ; a cause or a combination of them, that were adequate to the effect. These causes act uniformly, as inert matter of necessity must act. No 202 The Methods of Natural Theology. piece or mass is able to originate any action except as it is acted upon ; no one can, of itself, vary the intensity with which it acts. By " the world," there- fore, Kant means in this case the world of inorganic matter exclusive of human beings. But in the Thesis, which is, " In the world there are causes that act through liberty," Kant evidently means the world including human beings. For in the soul of man, as he argues, there is freedom and spontaneity of action. He appeals to his own con- sciousness and says he finds there " a dynamical first beginning of actions, which has no dependence at all upon the causality of any preceding one ; that is, it does not in any way follow from [as having been caused by] it." And this freedom or spon- taneity is opposed to the law of cause and effect which, as he says, " prevails everywhere in nature," meaning by that term the material world. But surely here is no contradiction. There is, however, a manifest ambiguity in the use of the words " the world." In the one case he means the world including man, and in the other the world exclusive of man. In the fourth pair I shall continue my usual method and take up the antithesis first, " There is nothing necessary in the world ; but in the series of events that make up the world all is contingent." In the Logical Objections. 203 earlier work, the Kritik, this was stated somewhat differently. "There exists nowhere, either in the world or out of it, as its cause, anything whose ex- istence is necessary." I think the change in the phraseology is important, as indicating some change in Kant's views. But in any case, his argument must be taken to indicate what he meant by the terms he used in the proposition he was trying to prove. The important word here is that which I have translated " contingent." In the German it is zufdl- lig. It may mean either that which is regarded as having come into existence by chance without any antecedent cause producing it, or that whose exist- ence is of no great importance ; or in the still more strict sense of the word, that the existence of which is not the result of any design and purpose, and so purely accidental. But when reasoning to prove this proposition, Kant takes " in the world " to mean the material world, the world of visible and tangible objects, and he reasons, as any advocate of modern science might do, that every thing had a cause and occurs uni- formly in accordance with law, and every thing has a place and use, and that there is nothing that is not thus produced ; nothing by chance, nothing without a possibility of its explanation by reference to ascer- tained or ascertainable causes and laws. 204 The Methods of Natural Theology. And in this sense of the words " the world " there is no occasion that I know of to dissent from his views. In the thesis, however, which is, " In the series of causes in the world there is somewhere a neces- sary Being," that is, a Being whose existence is neither caused nor yet contingent, Kant takes the words " the world " as he did in the antithesis of his first pair to denote the whole world or universe. And he argues, as I have done, that the very suc- cession of cause and effect and the law of causation imply a First Cause, which is an uncaused cause, whose existence is " necessary " in that It or He cannot be supposed to be non-existent. Whatever is contingent and dependent, implies something that is absolute and necessary on which it can depend and from which it derived its being. Without some- thing absolute and necessary there can be nothing that is contingent and dependent. The very idea is absurd and impossible. Thus taking the second pair, which I will now consider the first in the logical order, we have the commonly accepted doctrine with regard to the ob- jects in nature, namely, that they are individuals, and divisible into parts mechanically and perhaps chemically, and yet they are grouped everywhere into genera and species, each and every one of them be- ing logically and individually simple or einfach. Logical Objections. 205 If we take the other three pairs, the thesis of the first and the third, and the antithesis of the fourth, together, they affirm that the world of visible objects and phenomena is limited in time and space, moves on in accordance with uniform laws, and no one event comes by chance or without its adequate cause and meaning. Taking the other parts we have all the foundation for a Natural Theology that we can reasonably ask, the freedom of the human soul and the existence and attributes of God. There is another solution of Kant's " Antinomies " which I feel obliged to suggest, which, although however commendable on the score of ingenuity and charity, will not, I fear, stand criticism. Kant wrote after Locke's famous doctrine that all ideas are derived from sensation had begun to pro- duce its legitimate effects. He was alarmed, and sought, as Reid had done in Scotland, to arrest the evil consequences that were becoming everywhere apparent. Now we may suppose — and to suppose it is all we can do — ^that what Kant really meant to say was that if, looking at things from Locke's stand- point and the basis of sensationalism, we take the thesis of the first, and the antithesis of the second, third, and fourth pairs, they are undoubtedly and demonstrably true. But if, on the other hand, we look at their opposites, the antithesis of the first 2o6 The Methods of Natural Theology. pair and the thesis of the second, third, and fourth pairs from the standpoint of innate or a priori ideas, or as I should say, from the standpoint of an insight into the nature of things, they also are seen to be absolutely true. Hence as a refutation of Locke and Condillac, they are unanswerable. But Kant apparently never saw, what I have en- deavored to show, that the controlling words in the Antinomies have different meanings in the respective pairs, arising, no doubt, from the different points of view from which the two philosophers regard them.' 1 1 have intimated in the text that it is possible that Kant may have intended these " Antinomies " as a refutation of Locke's theory of the origin and nature of knowledge. He certainly has not made it clear, nor has he hardly left it possible for us to maintain that he so regarded them or that such was in any way a part of his inten- tion in giving them forth to the world. Had that been his object, or had he clearly seen what I have attempted to show, it is impos- sible that he could have given utterance to the thought in the texts of the Lecture, or to that which I have just cited from the Prolego- mena. But in the Prolegomena there appear passages that look as though Kant himself had some glimpse of the solution that may be offered to his difficulties ; thus he says : "Ifwe suppose the necessity, which we everjrwhere find in nature, relates only, to the things as they appear, or their appearance to us, and that freedom belongs to the things themselves [dinge an sich selbst], there arises no contradiction," p. 114. " The necessity which we see in nature must be the condition after which the efficient causes are known to be causes. But liberty, on the other hand, if it is the cause of certain phenomena, must be in respect to them a power which can begin to act of itself, or spon- Logical Objections. 207 I can well imagine that you will be surprised at this result, and ask, " Is this all ? can it be possible that Kant deceived himself and has for these decades of years misled the world in this way, by these, so obvious sophisms ? " And I answer, it is all. It is now more than forty years since I first made my acquaintance with Kant's great work. I have had occasion to recur to it often since, and just now, with reference to this very solution of what Hamilton has pronounced " insoluble contradictions," I have re- read the whole discussion over carefully again, and I have, therefore, Jio hesitation in saying that this is all. And I think that we have here a true and satisfactory solution of what has been quite generally accepted as giving away, in advance, the whole foundation of knowledge. Natural Theology in- cluded. On the other hand, if we eliminate the ambiguities and regard the eight propositions, not as constituting four pairs of antinomies, but rather as eight distinct propositions, asserting, as they certainly do, the most taneously (j;^o»/^)," p. 115. "In the former case the conception of causality is -a. conception of natural necessity ; in the latter, a conception of freedom," p. 116, note. " It can be said without contradiction, that all the acts of rational beings, in so far as they are phenomena or matters of experience, are subject to the same necessity as the phenomena of nature ; but the same acts, when considered in relation to the rational being and his acts, are free," p. 117. 2o8 The Methods of Natural Theology. fundamental principles of all knowledge, we have a broad foundation well laid and established, as it seems to me, beyond further doubt or controversy. I think, therefore, in conclusion, that we may claim that there is no valid objection against the method of Natural Theology, and that the nightmare of ag- nosticism under which philosophic minds have groaned for these many years, has had nothing for its foundation or cause but a few obvious mistakes in psychology or palpable sophistries in logic. We have seen that evolution does not fully ex- plain any of the observed phenomena of nature. It is but a process and not a cause. It needs some- thing to work upon and something besides itself to carry it on. The word may be a good name to de- note the Divine Method in so far as it denotes a method at all, that is, in so far as objects in nature have successive stages and are evolved out of those that precede them. But there are gaps and chasms in the order of nature which no theory of mere evo- lution, without the agency of God, has yet been able to fill or to explain. And thus the phenomena of nature show that this Supreme Being, this First Cause and Creator, must be a Lawgiver. The laws of nature are His modes of operation, and the same phenomena suggest, too, in more ways than one, miracles, so as to make the belief in them easy and Logical Objections. 209 probable on the presentation of a fit occasion and sufficient evidence. And I think we may safely say that we have found nothing in our review of the other class of objections, whether psychological, logical or meta- physical, to interfere with or cause distrust of the inference drawn from the observed constitution and course of nature. And thus whatever we see or our hands can touch in nature, is a manifestation of God, of His nature and attributes, His will and purposes concerning us. And all things which we can see or know we may regard as the work of His hands, or the gifts of His grace ; to be received with gratitude if they are favorable and conducive to our enjoyment, and to be submitted to with resignation and patience if they are sent for our chastisement, or to turn our feet into the ways of righteousness and peace. My convictions in regard to the fundamental principles of Modern Agnosticism took a very earn- est form at an early day of my life, and that earnest- ness has been growing in intensity with at least forty years of study. And if I were called upon to point out the three greatest epochs of evil in human history, the three greatest strategetic devices of the Adver- sary of all good, and the Enemy of the souls of men, I should name as the first that scene in Eden when 2IO The Methods of Natural Theology. he persuaded our first parents that there was no harm in doing wrong ; and as the secotid, that early scene in the history of our race when he persuaded men from their simple monotheism into polytheism, with its many gods, and the doctrine that necessa- rily results from it, that one religion, or form of re- ligion, is as good as another, and that none is as good as the best, if only the devotees like it as well. But the third great movement in the same direc- tion — and it seems to me that it must be the last — was the diffusion among speculative minds of those doctrines in psychology and logic from which the present agnosticism and irreligion has come, as an inevitable result. The first of these great delusions made Bethlehem and Calvary necessary ; the second has cost the race many thousand years of degradation, misery and struggle for recovery, and the third may possibly yet come to be regarded as that fuller manifestation of Antichrist,* which began, indeed, in the Apostles' days, but which is to attain its fullest manifestation and power only in much later times. Time and the future alone can tell what will come of it in the end. But this we know and may feel well assured of, that He Who "bringeth to naught the counsel of princes" 1 2 Thessalonians, ii., 8. Logical Objections. 211 and " maketh the divines mad," will triumph in His own good time. Well may we say in the words of Him Whose right it is to rule and to guide all men : " If the light that is within you be darkness, how great is that darkness ? Take heed, therefore, that the light that is within be not darkness." LECTURE V. THE MISUSE OF ABSTRACTIONS; THE ATTRI- BUTES OF GOD; HIS PERSONALITY. Cor. II, 8. Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the traditions of men. THE PERSONALITY OF GOD. There is a deeper ground for the modern agnos- ticism and the objections to the Methods of Natural Theology than any I have yet reached, a sort of sub-soil, down into which it sends its tap-roots, and from which it may draw nourishment and support when all other means of supply shall have been cut off, or have failed altogether. To this I wish to devote a few words before proceeding with the main topic of this Lecture, which is the Attributes and Personality of God. St. Paul, when writing to his son Timothy, and through him to all subsequent ages, thought he had occasion to speak of the danger that comes from "science falsely so called." He adds, however, the qualification, as it seems to me, as if he was sure that there could be no danger then, now or ever from anything that is science truly so-called. But when he speaks of the danger of being spoiled " through phil- osophy," he adds no such limitation or qualification to his warning. But he adds the words " vain deceit," 2i6 The Methods of Natural Theology. as if he had but little hope of any philosophy that would not partake largely of that character. How- ever, be this as it may, I think that any one, in view of the past, will be disposed to say that the warning was not without sufficient occasion. To prepare the way for what I wish to say on this subject, the final topic of this Lecture, I will turn aside here for a moment and call to mind a few of the results that have been attained by the study of the history and the philosophy of language. It has been found that language is both a product and a producer of thought. It is probably the case that most of the opinions that men hold have been produced in their minds by the language and the form of expressions by which the thoughts of other people have been conveyed to them, not merely by language in general, but by the peculiar forms of expression that were used. We say, for example, " the sun rises " ; and it is quite easy for us who have the use of our eyes to see how that form of expression came into use. But the blind, who have never seen the phenomenon that is indicated by these words, ascribe the motion to the sun none the less on account of the fact that they have never seen the occurrence they speak of. We say the sun gives light to the earth, and imme- diately, though unconsciously, we imagine light as The Personality of God. 217 a substance that can be given or sent forth from one body to another. We say the fire sends forth heat, and straightway we think of heat as some impon- derable, invisible substance that passes through the air and enters whatever becomes warmed by the burning mass which we call the fire. And in this way most of our early opinions are formed. In all the languages of modern times the words and phrases which we use were introduced before we were born. They convey to us, or rather re- produce in us, not only the facts, but the theories and explanations of the facts which were adopted by the men who first observed the facts or formed the theories. These facts and theories remain as our opinions until we begin to observe and think for ourselves. For the most part, and on most subjects, they remain with most men as their opinions through their lives. Let us, therefore, look at the history and develop- ment of language for a moment. The first human vocabulary consisted of very few words, each of which was probably used indifferently as either noun, adjective or verb. In course of time some of these primitive roots become particles, like our conjunctions, prepositions, etc. I have to do now with those only that remained and continued to be used as verbs or nouns. 2 1 8 The Methods of Natural Theology. And first I will speak of the nouns or the words that denote the things that we speak of. All nouns seem to have been at first individual, personal, or proper names. Soon, however, they became general or common, and denoted no longer an individual object, but a class — technically a genus — as man, dog, beast, etc. This was the result of the mental process of generaUzation. But another process began very soon in the course of the reflective mental activity of man. This was the process of abstraction, and it produced from verbs and adjectives, abstract nouns that denote mere modes and properties. Soon these abstractions were objectified and made the objects of thought, as from to live, life ; from white, whiteness, etc. But in the earliest stages of all languages, as Coxe has well re- marked, " men had no abstract terms." "They had formed no notions o{ prudence, of thought and intel- lect, of slavery and freedom. They spoke only of the man who was strong ; who could point out the way to others or choose one thing out of many ; of the man who was bound to another, or who was able to do as he pleased."' The development and formation of abstract terms, however, began very early, and came into extensive use in all the dialects of civilized man. 1 Tales of Greece, Introduction, p. 13. The Personality of God. 219 Abstract terms, in the strict and proper sense of the word, denote only the properties and modes of things which have been made objects of thought, and not things themselves. But in many cases these abstractions are " objectified " and treated as con- crete realities; they thus become fictions, and in this way they have played a most important part in the origin and progress of speculation. I suppose that no one will seriously contend at this day that the "ideas" of Plato ^ were anything but fictions. The same must be said of what is so much talked of in modern times as the " mental faculties." No one supposes or will admit, when we ask him the ques- tion directly, that they sustain any such relation to 1 Reid says, Intellectual Powers, Prelim. Essay, Chap. I, " When in common language we speak of having an idea of any- thing, we mean no more by that expression than thinking of it. " " But philosophers conceive of an idea that is in the mind ; . . . this is the philosophical meaning of the word idea. . . I believe ideas taken in this sense to be a mere fiction of philosophers," Hamilton's Ed., vol. I, pp. 225, 226. In the early part of this century Cousin has expressed (Cours de VHistoire de la Philosophie. Cours de 1829. Lefon 22, vol. II, p. 385. Wright's translation, vol. II, p. 339. Dr. Henry's " Cousin's Psychology," pp. 280, 282, 285) the doctrine of modern philosophy very emphatically. He says, "If by ideas be understood some- thing real, which are intermediate between things and the mind, I say there are absolutely no ideas; there is nothing ri?a/ but things and the mind with its operations." Again, " There are in natffre neither propositions nor ideas." And once more, " There are then indeed no innate ideas really existing, because there are no ideas " in the Platonic sense of the word. 220 The Methods of Natural Theology. the mind as the bodily organs, the heart, lungs, etc., do to the body. And yet all our use of language implies such a relation.^ But in the physical sciences these fictions come to deserve more consideration in view of our present object. From " hot " as an adjective we get " heat " as an abstract term, and thus " heat " the fiction that 1 Locke's foresight and warning on this subject are both interest- ing and instructive {Essay, B. II, c. xxi, J 6). He says, " The ordinary way of speaking is, that the understanding and the will are two faculties of the mind ; a word proper enough if it is used as all words should be, so as not to breed any confusion in men's thoughts, by being supposed (as I suppose it has been) to stand for some real beings in the soul that performs those actions of understanding and volition.'' Again (§ 17) he says, "However the name faculty which men have given to this power called the will ... yet the will, in truth, signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose. If it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as distinct things, that can act (as we do when we say the will orders and the will is free), it is fit that we should make a speaking faculty and a walking faculty and a dancing faculty, by which those actions are produced, which are but several modes of motion ; as well as make the will and understanding to be faculties . . . and we may also as well say that it is the singing faculty that sings and the dancing faculty that dances, as that the will chooses or that the understanding conceives. This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, produced great confusion." The fault has been, as he says, that " the faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many dis- tinct agents." He illustrates the matter still further by supposing one to ask what it is that digests our food, and some one answers, "the digestive faculty," instead of saying the stomach. Or if one asks by what means we move, some one should say by " the motive faculty, which is to say that the ability to digest is the organ of digestion, and the ability to move is the means and instincts of motion." The Personality of God. 221 is spoken of as one of the seven, eight, or ten " forces " with which evolutionists think they can explain all the phenomena of the material universe without "the hypothesis" of a God who shall be regarded as Creator and Superintending Providence, a Worker of miracles, an Inspirer of thought or the Author of a Revelation that can be binding upon the conscience and wills of men. The earliest form of the verb was the active voice. But very soon there came into use reflexive forms as in the Hebrew Hithpael and the Greek Middle Voice, which from its very form indicated and de- clared not only that the act had been performed, but also that it terminated in the agent, as "I strike myself" The next form that was developed was the passive voice, as it is called. Men learned at an early day in their progress, that many events occur and become apparent, the cause of which is not known to the observer. Hence a feeling of the necessity for some form of expression that would assert the observed fact without saying anything about the cause. The vexed and vexatious question, "Who struck Billy Patterson ? " occurred early in the experience of mankind, and developed the feeling of a necessity for some form of the verb that would assert, the fact without incurring the risk or the responsibility of saying who performed the deed. Hence the passive 222 The Methods of Natural Theology. voice, " he was struck." And this became ever after the form of caution and non-committal, and the mid- dle voice gradually went out of use as a distinct form of the verb among all the European nations ; and whenever we have occasion for it, we avail ourselves of a reflexive pronoun, as self'va. English, se in French, and sich in German. These reflex forms are in common use in French and German, and indicate a frame of mind or form of mental activity quite unlike that to which we are accustomed who speak the English language, and many of them seem very odd, and even absurd, to us. Thus in a recent work on physiology, written in the French language, the following examples, beside many others that might be cited, occur within a very few pages : " Ligneous tissues y»r»« themselves" " -wdXex forms itself in the tissues," "carbonic acid gas forms itself in the lungs during respiration," " heat transforms itself into muscular movement;" the " ligneous tissues," "water," and "carbonic acid " are indeed real causes, and are denoted by concrete terms. But assuredly they do not "form" or "make themselves." A German writer settles the much disputed ques- tion of the origin of the soul by saying, " Souls form themselves {sich ausbilden) from the constituents of The Personality of God. 223 the body." This may do for a myth, but it is not science or philosophy. Nor does it seem to me to be very good poetry. I cite but one example more. Montesquieu, in speaking of certain social conditions, says that when these occur among young people " a marriage will make itself" \il se fait un mariage\. Now this may be true in France and of the French. But among English-speaking people marriages are made by the parties to the contract, and there is usually too much that is interesting, if not vexatious and discouraging, to allow them to forget that they were the principal agents in bringing about the happy result. But such forms of expression are of so frequent occurrence in French and German books that they appear to excite no surprise, and they seldom at- tract attention.* 1 1 cite one more, the distinction of nouns in reference to gender. In the old European languages — the Latin and the Greek — besides some regard to the sex of the objects, the distinction was based chiefly on the form and termination of the words. But in the mod- em French there is no neuter gender, and all nouns are either mas- culine or feminine. In German, beyond objects in the animal world, where gender is a reality, the words are also distributed be- tween the three genders, chiefly in reference to their form. In Eng- lish, however, no word is of any one gender on account of its form. The names of inanimate objects are always neuter and others often and to a considerable extent change form to suit the gender, as 224 The Methods of Natural Theology. But I think there can be no doubt that such forms of expression are injurious to the mental culture. They imply, and as I think they tend to promote, a want or clearness of insight into the true causes and the laws of the phenomena they describe. When an object is before us, it exists already in- dependently of any volition or mental action of our own. We see it, if it is visible, and feel it if it is within the reach of our hands. It existed before these acts of ours, and is the cause of those sensa- tions by means of which the acts of perception are performed. Other persons cognize the object as well as ourselves, and it is the same thing to us and to them and for all observers ; and hence the ideas or notions formed of it will be the same, or very nearly the same, for all. But if not, the object is appealed to to verify and to correct those ideas. If we generalize the ideas thus formed, it is done by the omission or elimination of properties that are peculiar to Individual objects and retaining those that are common to all the objects we include in one class and denote by a common name. But the proc- ess is one of exclusion or elimination of properties, and not one of addition or increase. We include in actor, actress, master, mistress, etc. This peculiarity of modern European languages, as well as the orthography of the English, will have to be changed before the millenium is fully realized. The Personality of God. 225 the general term or idea no property that was not obvious in the objects that we thus class together. And all the terms thus obtained are concrete terms, the general no less than the individual or proper nouns. But if we fix our attention upon some one of the properties, modes or actions of the objects thus per- ceived, we objectify it and make it an object of thought. And thus the idea we form of it is denoted by an abstract term, as whiteness, hardness, etc. In this case the mental activity precedes the object of thought, and in fact creates it. The ontological difference between the objects de- noted by abstract and those denoted by concrete terms, is easily pointed out, and when once seen, it is seen to be of the most fundamental importance. Thus take " whiteness." We cannot imagine or suppose it to exist without or apart from some thi^ig that is white. But take any white thing and we can imagine or suppose it to be of some other color, and so on with all the objects in the world until we come to think of a world in which there is nothing that is white and no whiteness. So of life ; we cannot imagine or suppose it to be a reality distinct and apart from some thing that is living or alive. But we can imagine a world or a universe such as this is supposed to have been in its nebulous state, with no living thing in it. 226 Tlie Methods of Natural Theology. Hence we call those objects of thought, properties or modes, which we cannot suppose to exist or think as existing, except as properties or modes of some- thing which we regard a& substantial. And we re- gard those as substances which we can think of as existing, not indeed without properties, modes or relations of some kind, but with properties and rela- tions different from those they now have. Thus if we take all the objects of thought that are denoted by abstract terms, we can apply the test above indicated to them all, one at a time and sepa- rately, and imagine a world in which that one is not present; but we cannot imagine a world in which it could be present without something else, some sub- stantial thing of which it is a mode or property. It will thus be seen that the difference between the two classes of objects of thought is, for all onto- logical purposes, quite fundamental; substantial reali- ties are the things that God has made, while the world of abstractions is purely the creation of man himself So far as the primary and simple properties of objects are concerned there is comparatively little danger of error ; but in regard to the more compli- cated relations of objects the danger becomes very great. It is hardly possible that any two persons will understand such terms alike, and very likely no one will understand them right. The Personality of God. 227 If now we will analyze the sentences where the departures from the literal use of languages which represents objects as they are and events as they occur, or at least appear to be and to occur, we shall find that we have (i) the suggestion of some events that never occurred, and (2) the ascription of others to causes that have no effective existence anywhere. In a very interesting and instructive scientific wprk which I have just read, the author says of the sun, that "it throws up immense quantities of mat- ter in a gaseous form, which passes millions of miles into the open space and then, cooling by tJie radia- tion of its heat, it becomes vapor or dust, and falls back in an intensely luminous condition, constitut- ing, perhaps the photosphere, which is all that we see of the sun." But I ask what becomes of the heat? He answers, "It is radiated into space." But the question arises, is heat a thing that can be radiated ? Is there any act of radiation ? You ac- cept, I suppose, the modern doctrine that heat is only " a mode of motion." How can a " mode of motion " be radiated ? What actually occurs is, the matter becomes cooled. In what way, perhaps you may not be prepared to tell us. But the explanation you give assumes what is confessedly false. You have embarrassed science by the recognition of an event that never occurred and a substance that exists nowhere. 228 The Methods of Natural Theology. But I have been feeling for some time that you will ask, what has this to do with your subject ? I answer, much every way. I have been trying to prepare the way for a satisfactory presentation and a fair appreciation of the criticism I have to make. And with this I will now proceed. I. In the first place, this use of language, or rather the philosophy out of which it grew and which it tends to perpetuate, takes from our argument all foundation, and leaves us nothing to stand upon. I have alluded to this fact before in a preceding Lecture. Suppose we agree with the Evolutionist in accepting his postulate of matter in existence in a gaseous or nebulous state, as he supposes it to have been, and we ask him who or what shall start into condensation this inert mass and begin the process of evolution. He thinks the answer easy enough. It may have been, he says, gravity, or it may have been chemical affinity. Either would bring the other, and with them, revolution on an axis, and with the condensation which the affinity would produce, there would come heat and light and electricity, and we have at once, or at least very soon, all the " forces," so-called, that Spencer asks for as a means of explaining all that has occurred since. But " gravity " and " affinity," what are they for real causes ? The terms are clearly abstract in form The Personality, of God. 229 and appearance. Are they real causes or only modes in which something or Somebody else acts ? If not real entities we have, by referring to them, no ex- planation of the phenomena, no account of what actually occurred ; or rather we have words and a form of expression which suggest what did not oc- cur, and call into existence and activity agents that have no independent effective existence and cannot act at all or anywhere.^ So when the first living thing appeared on the 1 Fotce, as the word is Tiere used, is, in fact, as purely a fiction as any one of the gods of heathen mythology. We use the word as a concrete term when we speak of wind and water as forces used to propel machinery. But in this connection the word is abstracti We speak of " the force with which the earth attracts the moon," but the force is not a thing, a reality distinct from the two — earth and moon. It is not even a property of either of the objects, but only a quality, or quantity rather, of their action, the one upon the other. We might with as much propriety, in a purely philosophical point of view, speak of any other abstraction in the same way. Whiteness, for example. It can neither be increased nor diminished, only when the snow melts the 'whiteness becomes invisible. Or of light. When night comes on there is just as much light as before only it cannot be seen ; it has in fact become darkness. So force that is " latent " or only "potential " is aforce that may be, but is not now ; for aSi practical purposes it is non-existent — purely nothing. In this view, the doctrine of " the indestructibility of force " is about the same as if one should maintain, as a part of his philosophy, the uniformity of the width of that "imaginary line " which we call the Equator; and insist that it neither is, nor can be wider in one place than in another; that it never can have been either broader or narrower than it is now in any period of past geological time. If any one should undertake to maintain such a doctrine I do not think that we should care to dispute him. II 230 The Methods of Natural Theology. earth — (the current philosophy would say when " life first appeared" or " made its appearance ") — we have, indeed, an unusual, and, at that time, an unprecedented combination of the four elements, oxygen and hydrogen, carbon and nitrogen. But how did the new compound become a living being ? If we may speak of " life " as something that was before " latent in matter " or as existing somewhere else, and as then coming into the new chemical com- pound as a fifth element, we do indeed say some- thing that is "verbally intelligible." But is life something that exists independently of any living thing, and can act and vivify what was before and otherwise inert and lifeless ? Or, finally, when man made his appearance, whence and how came the soul or mind ? Does that con- sist of mere abstractions ? Is it only intelligence and memory and will ? or is it a substantial some- thing that understands, and remembers and wills, and which, when it comes into the human body, makes an intelligent human being ? We believe it to be a substantial thing that comes into the body or is created in it and makes of the body a living man. Otherwise it must consist of mere abstractions. And this is what our modern men of science pro- pose to make it. In fact, there has been a growing tendency in this direction since Locke's time. Hume declared it to be " but a bundle or collection of per- The Personality of God. 231 ception or impressions."* Lewis calls it an "ab- straction,"^ Dr. Hammond^ calls it "a force devel- oped by nervous action," like " heat or electricity." John Stuart Mill says, " Mind is nothing but the series of our sensations," * and he adds on a subse- quent page that " this series of feelings " is aware of itself." But yet he adds (p. 256) that "our notion of niind is a notion of a permanent something, con- trasted with the perpetual flux of the sensations," " a something which we figure as remaining the same, while the particular feelings through which it reveals its existence change." Precisely so. And this "something " it was which Professor Garver's experiments disclosed, and which we always find as that which not only " underlies " sensations, but perform the acts of thinking." 1 Hume's Essay on Human Nature, vol. I, p. 233. 2 Lewes, Problems of Life, vol. 1, p. 281. s The Brain not the only organ of the Mind. * Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, vol. I, pp. 253. 258- 5 A third view makes mind mere "force." Thus Dr. Hammond in The Brain not the Sole Organ of the Mind," says, p. J. " By the term mind, I understand a force developed by nervous action. It bears the same relation to the gray nerve tissue that heat, or elec- tricity, or light does to chemical or mechanical action." " Why mind should result from the functionation of the gray nerve tissue," etc., etc. This, as I have said, may be conceived and understood — though it can be regarded as true only in a modified sense — of thought. 232 The Methods of Natural Theology. For all these acts of perceiving, thinking of, which these philosophers admit that we are conscious, and which they claim to regard as the immediate objects of consciousness are — like evolution itself, of which we have had so much to say — only processes, only and merely processes. They are not causes, forces, or agents ; they are not substances that can exist by themselves. There can no more be thinking with- out a something that thinks, than there can be evo- But it cannot be understood of mind. The one is an agent, the other a product or mode. The one is denoted by an abstract term, the other by a concrete term. Replace the word "I," or ego, by what is here taken for its synonymn, and the absurdity becomes apparent at once. We have for "I think," "thought thinks," for "I choose," "choice chooses." Thought without a thinker is as impossible as creation without a creator, writing without a writer. And I do not think that Dr. Hammond really believed his own definition. He certainly did not, if he understood its meaning. The title of his address is. The Brain not the Sole Organ of the Mind. Now if he had been treating of heat and of the sun, he cer- tainly would not have said the Sun not the Sole Organ of the Heat. But rather, as I suppose, " the Sun not the only, or sole source of heat." And yet Dr. Hammond professes to regard mind and heat as be- longing to the same kind of entities— both to be denoted by abstract terms, although he uses the one, " mind," as concrete. Nor is it true that thought and volition are produced by " nerve activity " alone, and without something besides, as the cases cited in the first part of the third Lecture pro ve. There is " a something else " that sometimes excites and controls nerve action, and is sometimes controlled by it. And the two, although for the most part in harmony, are sometimes antagonistic to each other. The Personality of God. 233 lution without something that causes and produces the evolution as well as a subject matter that is evolved. These men use the word mind as though it were the logical equivalent of the word thought. Nor do the substantial objects of the material world fare any better. " Matter," says Stuart Mill,^ " may be defined a permanent possibility of sensa- tion," and this definition he repeats in several places as though it were the result of niuch deliberate con- sideration. But the " possibility of sensations " must be in us, where the sensations are produced, and where only they can be real. And if that is all that there is of " matter " and material objects in his philosophy, we cannot wonder that he finds nowhere any satisfactory proof of the existence and attributes of God.* Herbert Spencer, to escape the argument from the nature of matter to the existence of God, says,' " Our conception of matter reduced to its simplest shape is that of co-existent positions that offer re- sistance." But positions ! what are they for causes ? 1 Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, vol. I, pp. 243, 264, and elsewhere. 2 Mill, however, speaks of matter in one place (p. 271) as the "permanent cause of sensations." But he does this apparently without any consciousness of the incompatibility of the two state- ments. 3 First Principles, Pt. 1, J 63. 234 I^J^ Methods of Natural Theology. Does he mean things in position, or atoms in rela- tion to and acting upon one another? If so his pretended definition is but a subterfuge, or way of an attempted escape from the deistic argument. If not, he means nothing, and his pretended philoso- phy evanishes into nothing and mere senselessness. John Stuart Mill gives us another illustration. Besides the definition of matter already given he says,' " When a physical phenomenon is traced to its cause, that cause, when analyzed, is found to be a certain quantum of force combined with certain collocations." But Mill's "collocations" are no better than Spencer's " positions," and no worse. They are out of the possibility of argument. Does he then mean atoms that are collocated and acting on each other with force more or less ? If so, we have all that we ask ; if not, his words are senseless. Herbert Spencer asks, as all that he needs to ex- plain the universe, these five elements or postulates, Matter, Motion, Time, Space and Force. But mo- tion is only a mode and no " substantial reality." Time and space, if anything more than mere " fic- tions," are only conditions. But force, what is that ? the word is ambiguous, and in this ambiguity lies its power for use (shall I say mischief?) in this connec- tion. We speak of wind and water and steam as 1 Theism, p. 144. The Personality of God. 235 forces that propel machinery, and we speak of them as the forces of nature, or natural forces. In this way we are accustomed to the word as a concrete term, and are not, therefore, shocked or surprised at its use. And if Spencer means to use the word in this way, what he means by force and what his philosophy demands is, and can be, nothing less than God Himself, the God in whom we as Christians believe. But the word has another logical quality, and in this lurks the mischief. We say the earth attracts the moon, and attracts it with a certain force. We call that force gravity, and in fact Spencer has left us no escape from this meaning, for he says that this force exists and acts in seven different forms and under as many different names. Heat, Light, Electrici- ty, Magnetism, Cohesion, Affinity, and Gravity. All of these are abstract terms, and they denote either " mental abstractions " or fictions, such fictions as are needful in science, although no " substantial re- alities " of which I will say a few words more soon. Hence force, if it is not God, is either a fiction or an abstraction, a mere mode or degree of the motion, and the motion itself is only a mode of the matter, so that all that Spencer's postulates amount to, when reduced to their substantial value, is matter in mo- tion or moving with a certain force. And of course 236 The Methods of Natural Theology. if it moves or is in motion at all, it moves with a force greater or less according to the rate of motion. But Who or What put it in motion ? Surely not the motion itself. Nor yet force in his sense of the word; for so understood it is but the mode or degree of the motion, the force of the motion, or better still, the force of the moving matter. And thus we have for Spencer's system of the universe one reality, matter, and four abstractions or fictions to one reality. And perhaps this is about the portion of truth to fancy, of worth to worthless- ness, that future generations will be willing to ac- cord to his speculations. Now it is obvious that this use of abstract terms leads us at once into a region of fancy and of mysti- cism, where anything can be affirmed and nothing can be successfully denied or contradicted ; since the " philosopher can retire into a nebulosity of words and phrases, where no logic can follow him and no sagacity can detect him." Every philosopher with whose works I am ac- quainted makes complaint and enters his protest in one form or another against the use or abuse of ab- stract terms. To cite only one, a notable case on more accounts than one, I will refer to John Stuart Mill. He says,' " All experience attests the strength 1 Examination, etc., vol. I, p. 247. The Personality of God. 237 of the tendency to mistake mental abstractions, even negative ones, for substantive realities." And yet this same philosopher resolves both matter and mind into mere abstractions, as we have just seen, defin- ing the one " as nothing but the series of our sensa- tions,"- and the other as " a series of feelings which is aware of itself." But surely "sensation" and '^feeling" are abstract terms- — "?«^«to/ abstractions," therefore, I suppose, as I know of no other kind. We sometimes meet with a man whose use of language very soon satisfies us that he is color blind. It is said — I do not know how true it is — but it is said that persons with a good ear for music often be- come unable to distinguish between harmony and melody on the one hand, and discord on the other, by having their organs of hearing habitually and for a long time accustomed to hear discordant sounds. We know something like this to be the case with the moral sensibility. He that carefully studies the right arid wrong of acts and sacredly and eairnestly regards and obeys the dictates of conscience, becomes not only strong to do, but quick and clear-sighted to see, what is right and becoming for him to do. On the other hand, he that neither tries to see, nor makes any effort to do, what is right soon loses, to a great extent, if not wholly, the power to distin- guish right from wrong, as well as the sensibility to 238 The Methods of Natural Theology. feel and appreciate the difference between them and the importance of doing right when it has been pointed out to him. These facts indicate and illustrate a law of human nature. And it is applicable in the case before us. The habitual use of language, such as I have de- scribed, tends to confuse that insight into the nature and relations of things upon which all science that is not " falsely so called," and all philosophy which is not mere " vain deceit," must depend. It fills the pathway of the earnest thinker with obstacles. It raises questions and problems where there need be none. It makes atheism easy. It enables men to hold and to defend themselves in holding any opin- ion that caprice, constitutional idiosyncracy, personal ambition or self-interest may incline them to adopt and proclaim as their own. All the nouns that may be used to denote the things of which we speak may be referred to five classes: (i) those that denote material objects or matter ; (2) those that denote souls or personal be- ings or mind; (3) those that denote afoifrat^/i tradition of this cold period ? If so, it would carry back the date of their existence to something like ten or twelve thousand years. And this is the earliest point to which any known date would seem to carry it. See, in reference to this tradition, Rawlinson's Ancient Monarchies, Vol. II, p. 43Z. Since the foregoing note was written 1 have received, what I be- lieve to be, the latest work by Principal Dawson, who is certainly the best authority on this subject in America, and as good as any in the world. The title of the book is Fossil Men and their Modem Representatives. He reiterates his statements of the high character of the earliest men that we know anything about as having lived on the earth. And in regard to the antiquity of their origin he says, p. 246, " What evidence the future may bring forth I do not know, but that available at present points to the appearance of man, with all his powers and properties, in the Fost-glacial age of Geology, and not more than firom 6,000 to 8,000 years ago.'' 3i6 The Methods of Natural Theology. Early man was, as Huxley says, " In all essential respects " like the men of our age, equal to the av- erage of civilized men in all that indicates eleva- tion in the scale of being and mental capacity; they were far above the lowest of the savages that we now meet with in some parts of the world. We have thus Huxley's admission rather reluc- tantly made. Dawson' says, " With such views the skeletons of the most ancient known men fully ac- cord. They indicate a people of great stature, of powerful muscular development, especially in the lower limbs ; of large brain, indicating great capacity and resources." (The italics are mine). Nicholson says,^ " As to the physical peculiarities of the ancient races . . . little is known. . . Such information as we have, however, . . . would lead to the conclusion that Post- Pliocene man was in no re- spect [the italics are mine] inferior in his organiza- tion to or less highly developed than many existing races. All the known skulls of this period, with the single exception of the Neanderthal cranium [which is now acknowledged to have been abnormal and idiotic] are in all respects average and normal in their characters." 1 Chain of Life, p. 241. See also Mitchell's Past in the Pres- ent, everywhere. And still better, Dawson's Fossil Men, which has been received since the above was written. 2 Ancient Life-History of the Earth, p. 364. Miracles and Inspiration. 3 1 7 I cite but one more authority on this point, and that is one which will command very considerate attention, Herbert Spencer, and I quote at some length. He says* that "Evolution is commonly considered to imply that in every thing there is an intrinsic tendency to become something higher, but this is an erroneous conception of it. . . If environ- ing circumstances change, the species changes [in general traits] until it re-equilibrates itself with them. . . Only now and then does the environing change initiate in the organism a new complication and so produce a somewhat higher type [species]. . . When the habitat entails modes of life that are infe- rior some degeneration results. . . Direct evidence forces this conclusion upon us. Lapse from higher civilization to lower civilization made familiar during school-boy days is further exemplified as our knowl- edge increases ; . . . many large and highly evolved societies have either disappeared or have dwindled to barbarous hordes or have been long passing through slow decay; , . . thus then the tribes now known as lowest [note the word, as " lowest "], must exhibit some social phenomena which are due . . . to causes that operated during past social states higher than the present" In connection with this, I note the fact that so far 1 Principles of Sociology, Part II, Chap, viii, % 50. 3 1 8 The Methods of Natural Theology. as we know, so far as any discoveries or researches have brought any facts in the case to light, there were none of the quadrumanous animals in existence at the time when man appeared, from which man could have been derived, that were of a higher grade or order than those that are in existence now. To suppose, therefore, that the first human beings — our ancestors — were born of quadrumanous pa- rentage, is to suppose what is as improbable, what is in fact as absurd, and from a scientific point of view, as impossible as that a human child had been produced and nursed up to maturity by parents be- longing to any order of the present quadrumana, the gorillas, chimpanzes, or orang outangs, of to-day, or by any of the monkeys, apes, or baboons of the Asiatic or African forests, the swamps of South America, or the Islands of the Pacific Ocean. Nor does there seem to be the slightest prospect or promise that further discoveries will bring to light anything to diminish the chasm that now exists between man and any of the species or orders of the animal world below man ; the tendency and the pros- pects are all in the other direction. Hence as the matter stands now the descent of man by way of evolution from any of the species of animals that now exist, or that are known to have existed in the past, would be no less a miracle than his immediate Miracles and Inspiration. 319 creation out of the dust of the earth, as most Christ- ians believe that he was created. We have seen that Dawson says, and no well in- formed man will contradict him, I think, that there is no necessity or reason for supposing man to have been on the earth more than the eight or ten thou- sand years that have elapsed since the close of the Glacial Period, except what arises out of the neces- sity for supporting " the hypothesis of evolution." And I think we may now add that there is neither necessity nor reason for believing him to have come into existence by any natural descent from any pa- rents of a lower species of animals except what arises from a disposition to maintain that " hypothe- sis." And I think we may add that there is no disposition tomatHt-ain: thathypothesis in its extreme or atheistic form, except what comes from an un- willingness, whether conscious or unconscious I can- not say, but an unwillingness to acknowledge the personality of God and the reality of His moral government of the universe. I have no theory to offer on the subject. My present purpose does not require that I should ex- plain the mode of man's origin. My object has been rather to show that no explanation has been offered which proposes to dispense with creation and miraculous interposition that is at all satisfactory and consistent with the facts that are known in the case. 320 The Methods of Natural Theology. And if one should claim that the peculiar charac- teristics of humanity came into existence as a con- genital abnormity or monstrosity, like the quills of the porcupine man or the limbs of the Ancon sheep, the phenomena would not be explained thereby. We know no better how such traits are produced than we do how the first protoplasm became a living ani- mal, or how to make a man out of the dust that is beneath our feet. II. I come now to another branch of the subject of this Lecture — Inspiration. I shall treat it very briefly and say the less of it because the topic be- longs more properly to a Treatise on Revealed Religion. I have said that Inspiration, in the sense in which I am now using the word, must be of the nature of a miracle as I have defined the term miracle. I think that a strong presumption arises in favor of a belief in inspiration, both general and special, from what we have proved with regard to the nature and attributes of God. We have seen that the ma- terial universe can be but a realization of His thoughts and purposes. He has acted on matter, even if He did not create it, moved and moulded it to His will. Inert as it is it does not appear to have any power either of resistance or impenetrability as against Miracles and Inspiration. 321 Him. It is as plastic and as yielding as if it were only His thoughts or volitions,, as some pTiilosophers have claimed, and He works in it and upon it. He has shown His presence and power, His agency and intervention in physical nature, whenever it was necessary to produce some new thing, the proto- plasm of which all animal tissue is made, or the first pairs of all permanent species. And He made man; "In His own image created He him." Shall we hold that He works in nature and in accordance with the physical laws, or rather in those laws in the inorganic world and not in the mind of man ? He manifests His purposes, and works to do His will, in the instincts of animals ; does He not work also in the reason and conscience of man, the only ra- tional being that He has created that is within the sphere of our observation ? In human history, also, God has manifestly a plan and a purpose, and for the execution of this purpose His influence on the hearts and wills of men is as necessary as it was to start the primordial chaos of nebulous matter into the manifold operations, chem- ical, mechanical and biological, which were neces- sary that, in the process of evolution and develop- ment, we might have the state of things in the midst of which we live. I like to quote Herbert Spencer when he says 21 322 The Methods of Natural Theology. anything that is to my purpose, as he often does. He says,' " He [the philosopher], like every other man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause ; and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief, he is thereby authorized to act out that belief. . . Not as adventitious, therefore, will the wise man regard the faith which is in him. The highest truth he sees he will fearlessly utter, know- ing that, let what may come of it, he is thus playing his right part in the world, knowing that if he can effect the change he aims at — well ; if not — ^well also; though not so well." Could the fact of inspiration and an overruling Providence be more fully declared ? " The thought and behef that is in him " is the product of the Un- known Cause — of God — and let him act accordingly, and let what may come of it, the outcome is the re- sult of an overruling Power " that is not ourselves working for righteousness." He will overrule and graciously forgive our mistakes also, if only we will be faithful to our convictions. Really, I can hardly see how a Christian man could have said this better. Here is Inspiration and an overruling Providence fully confessed. I believe there is no man who has lived, or tried 1 First Principles, Part I, § 34. Miracles and Inspiration. 323 to live, a religious life, who has not had a faith in such divine guidance and overruling Providence, a faith which, whatever it may have rested upon at first, became so confirmed by experience that no argument, or line of argument, could shake it. It had become part of his experience, part of his innermost consciousness, a part of his identity, as completely in, and as inseparable from it, as any fact or recollection of his past history. I remember an instance that stands out among the most distinct recollections of my early life, which is quite in point. It was a bitter cold afternoon of a December day. The steamer Lexington was lying at the wharf ready to start for New York. One of the greatest men that our country has produced had occasion to be in Washington early the following week. He was on his way to the landing with his satchel in hand, ready to take the boat. But on a sudden the thought came upon him, " I won't go to-night, after all." He turned on the sidewalk, though in sight of the boat, and went back to his home. He could give no reason for his thought, or for the consequent change of purpose that ensued. He went home and slept soundly for the night:- But in the night, at sea, when off the coast of Rhode Island, the Lexington took fire, burned to the water's edge, and finally went down in fifty fathoms of water. 324 The Methods of Natural Theology. All on board, save two or three, perished in the flames or were whelmed in the freezing waters, and our friend could not have been one of the few that escaped had he been on board. Now I suppose that in the present state of our means of psychological analysis, nobody can prove to the satisfaction of one that is skeptically inclined that here was a special interposition of God. And perhaps it is best that we cannot. There must be left a place and a work for faith, if man is to attain the highest of which his nature is capable. What is the relation of the Divine Efficiency to the present and ordinary phenomena of nature must ever remain, as I think, a matter of speculation and mere opinion. Two theories only, as I think, are possible: the one holds, with Tyndall, that the atoms and masses of matter " act directly on one another," and the other holds that God is the One force and Agent; so that in the strictest expression of the truth, we should say that He acts in all action, and the several forces, heat, light, and such like, .are but names for different modes or forms of His activity. Substi tuting for the word God, the term " the Unknowa- ble," which seems to be a favorite expression with this class of philosophers, this last view would seem to be the one that is preferred by them and for which many very explicit passages could be cited. Miracles and Inspiration. 325 But when we come to consider the relation of God to the minds of men, the matter becomes still more difficult. There are two fundamental differences, each pre- senting a class of difficulties of its own, which I see no way at present of overcoming. isL The first is, we have no certainty that the atoms or particles of matter have any independent existence so as to be able to "act on eack other" in any proper sense of the words instead of being mere modes of God's action. But with the minds of men the case is otherwise. Although created and de- pendent for the origin of their being, they have now a certain independence of existence, and act, to some extent, as " first causes." This we know of them by the very means by which we know that they exist at all, just as I know that this paper is white by the means by which I know it exists as anything external. Hence, in knowing that minds exist I know that they exist with the power of independent spontaneous activity. 2d. In the second place, mind and matter are different in kind and are distinguished and corordi- nated by the two properties, spontaneity and inertia. We can therefore reason easily from matter as inert to many things that mere matter, whether as atoms, molecules, or masses, cannot do ; and hence we have 15 326 The Methods of Natural Theology. in certain cases, by one of the surest and best known canons of induction, very certain proof of the inter- vention of an agent that is different in kind from matter. But as between the mind of man and God, the difference, so far as our present inquiry is concerned, is only one of degree. Both are intelligent, and both act with spontaneity. It is true that one is finite and the other infinite. But " finite " and " in- finite " do not co-ordinate them as objects in onto- logical reality. Terms to be co-ordinate must be of the same logical quality ; if one is concrete the oth- ers must be concrete also ; if one is positive the other cannot be negative. But the terms "finite" and " infinite " do sustain precisely this latter relation to each other ; the one is positive and the other is nega- tive, in form at least. And in so far as we can at- tach any clear and comprehensible meaning to the two terms, they denote difference in degree only, and not difference in kind as co-ordinates, whether logical or ontological, must always do. Hence to find cases of inspiration, and proof that they are really cases of inspiration, we are not to seek for or find something different in kind from what the mind of man ordinarily does. On the con- trary, acts of divine influence must be the same in kind, and differ only in degree from what ordinarily Miracles and Inspiration. 327 occurs in human consciousness. If man knows without inspiration, inspiration can only increase his knowledge. If without the direct agency of God, man knows and can know something of the nature and attributes of God, even " His unseen, or eternal power and godhead," by way of Natural Theology, then by the aid of inspiration he can see and know more of the attributes and purposes of God, even to the tri-unity of His nature, including the personality of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. If man has something of foresight, inspiration can make him a prophet, and enable him to foretell the doom of Babylon and Tyre or to predict the birth of the Son of Mary in Bethlehem of Judea.* The question then arises, precisely what can the unaided mind of man do in these directions, and what is the Umit, if indeed there is any, beyond which it cannot go ? Fix this limit, settle upon it 1 It is very possible; that this and other statements in this connec- tion may be thought to imply a theory of Inspiration which I do not intend either to teach or to deny in this connection. I am not writing as from the facts and phenomena presented in the Holy Scriptures, or to explain them. I am writing rather from the Nat- ural Theology point of view. If, therefore, the Scriptures present instances of inspiration in which the prophet had visions and uttered words which he himself did not understand, there is nothing in my statements, nor do I intend to say anything, that is inconsistent with such facts. And I think that what I have occasion to say will serve as a basis on which to erect any higher view of inspiration, that may be found necessary. 328 The Methods of Natural Theology. so that all men will be agreed in accepting your de- termination, or so that you can defend it against all adversaries, and we can prove miracles of inspira- tion, acts of direct and immediate divine influence upon the mind of man or within his mind, as clearly and as unanswerably as we prove acts of supernat- ural intervention in the realm of nature, and upon mere inert, inanimate matter. But this will be difficult, perhaps impossible. At any rate I shall not attempt it ; arguing, as I now do, from a purely Natural The- ology point of view. With a revelation as a proved or as an accepted fact, the case would be quite dif- ferent. All that we can say now is, therefore, that inspi- ration as a special divine influence, acting upon the mind of man, frequently or otherwise, as the case may be, is shown to be a possibility, nay a proba- bility rather, and a thing to be expected, looked for and welcomed, whenever a special emergency or occasion for it shall occur. But the fact of inspi- ration in any particular case must be left, I fear, as a matter of faith and opinion, of probability and moral suasion, rather than demonstrated as a matter of scientific or absolute certainty. And to me, the fact so well known, thanks to some of the more recent investigations in this line, that all men and all nations of men, if we except perhaps a Miracles and Inspiration. 329 few of the least unsophisticated philosophers of the more civilized races, have always believed in such communications and influences, is a strong proof — strong enough to overcome, and more than over- come — all the doubt and distrust on this point, that has been raised, cultivated and inculcated by mod- ern skepticism. All nations and all people have had their prophets. All believe in prophecy, all believe in God, and none of them believe that He has left Himself without witness. All gladly acknowledge that their highest wisdom, their best thoughts, and their holiest aspirations are from Him who is the Father of Spirits and the Source of life and of light to all His creatures. But predsely where is the distinction and what marks off as a boundary line the thoughts and feel- ings that are of God from the freaks and fancies of our own minds, no one perhaps can certainly tell in all cases, so long as they are mere matters of his own consciousness. But undoubtedly experience and the developments of history will, in time, discriminate between the two — false-perception, hallucination and the crea- tions of fancy on the one hand — all of which repre- sent error and delusion — from the results of true and genuine cognition and insight on the other. True predictions will come true, and be verified by 330 The Methods of Natural Theology. subsequent events. True insight, and its discoveries and revelations, will exert an elevating influence on mankind, and form an epoch in the history of men, from which all events, that are legitimately influenced by them, will move on a higher plane. And that Some- thing has been at work in this way in human history from its very beginning is so plain that I cannot see how any one can read that history attentively with- out admitting the fact. With these facts in view we may say with a thoughtful sage of old, " Surely there is a spirit in man and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth him understanding." LECTURE VII. PROVIDENCE AND MORAL GOVERNMENT; INCOM- PLETE WITHOUT CHRIST AND CHRISTIANITY. FSAUts LXXIIT, 15, 16. Then thought I to understand this, but it was too hard for me until I went into the sanctuary of God. PROVIDENCE AND MORAL GOVERN- MENT. I think it a fair inference from what we may consider as capable of proof by the Methods of Nat- ural Theology, as exhibited in these Lectures, that there must be, in this world at least, a Providence and a Moral Government. And to these topics I invite your attention in this, which is the last Lecture in my course. And here, as elsewhere in these Lectures, I have aimed not so much to set forth and prove the doc- trines of Natural Theology as to vindicate its Foun- dation and Methods. I have assumed that you know already pretty much what has been said and taught by the great divines, the noble line of wit- nesses all along in the Christian Church ; and I have aimed at limiting myself, pretty closely, to the task I had undertaken, namely, the vindication of the Methods of Natural Theology rather than its truths. During these Lectures I have said but little of the proof and illustrations of what are sometimes called 334 ^he Methods of Natural Theology. the Moral Attributes of God, or His goodness and benevolence. I have directed attention chiefly to the two of His attributes which are of a different order, namely, His Wisdom and His Power, and to the spon- taneity of His action ; these are manifested in those phenomena of nature which inert matter cannot pro- duce, such as the beginning of the present evolution, the origin of living protoplasm, the beginning of new species in the vegetable and animal world and such like, which man, the only spiritual or spontaneously acting being whose acts fall under our observation, was not then in existence to produce. But the goodness of God must be chiefly if not exclusively manifested in the life and history of man. Here, however, we encounter the difficulty spoken of in the last Lecture. We deal here with acts which are certainly similar if not the same in kind as man can perform and is to some extent constantly per- forming, as the result of human choice and sponta- neity of action. Human history is indeed a part of the general process which we call Evolution. But it can hardly be regarded as presenting us with a proof of a Cre- ator like what we derive from a consideration of the material universe. But with this exception, I think that human history and human life and experience is the field to which we must look for our fullest and Providence and Moral Government. 335 best proofs and illustrations of the Moral Attributes of God. Ascribe what you will to the influence of " envi- ronment" and physical conditions, etc., — and their influence has certainly been very great — and ascribe all that you can or may to the voluntary selection, and choice and conscious purpose of the people, individually and personally, or to their rulers and guides, and yet there remains a large residuum of influence that can be ascribed to God only, and ac- counted for only on the supposition that there is an overruling Providence that " shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will." Thus in regard to the influence of physical envi- ronment, I think it perfectly certain that no such environment or influence could, by any possibility, have produced either (i) the religious instinct in man or (2) given him his first idea of God. But nothing is more manifest in history than the fact that such influences have been very powerful in giv- ing form to man's theism and his mode of worship. It led from unconscious monotheism to /a^theism and to /o/j'theism in theology, and to idolatry and fetichism in worship. It gives to one's religion a gloomy and sombre tone in some countries and cli- mates, and a cheerful, hilarious tone in others. But'sucb influences cannot have given origin to the 336 T}ie Methods of Natural Theology. instinct and the idea on which all religion and the- ology are based or out of which they have grown. History is to be studied as a whole, a grand drama, whose parts are consecutive and well planned. Or, to change the figure, as in the study of some great cathedral or other structure of man's skill and device we find much indeed that is determined and con- trolled by the climate and by the condition and laws of nature, in regard to the materials to be used, the size and proportions, etc., of the building, beyond any power of choice or selection by the architect or the workmen. Set aside what we will and ascribe it to these causes. Then again, each workman has some power of choice and comprehension of the work he is doing ; and this adds something to the appearance and detail of the finished work. But in all, above all and over all, there is the thought and the will of the architect, which may be seen more conspicuously, perhaps, than anything else by any one who looks at the structure with anything of the eye of an architect. And so in history. In the history of any nation that has risen to civilization and influence, and still more so in any comprehensive view of the history of man taken as a whole, the most important influ- ences that have been at work, the most efficient causes, or cause, in producing the great and final Providence and Moral Government. 337 results, cannot be found in "environment" and " physical conditions," nor yet in the foresight and choice of man. Everywhere there are signs and proofs of an intelligence far above that of man ; of a will and purpose more persistent and unchanging than his, and of a force to overcome obstacles and to shape the course of events that shows a deter- mined earnestness in carrying out a preconceived plan and reaching results that were ordained before the foundation of the world. I have no time to illustrate this principle fully by examples. I cannot, however, resist the temptation to refer to two or three facts or laws, as suggesting most important influences. 1st. At our earliest glimpse of history outside of the Bible, man was already very far gone from a righteousness which, if it was not " original," was at least ideal — a righteousness of which we all have some conception. We find many — not all — ^tribes without the arts of civilized life, even the art of agri- culture, living in geographical centres where the sup- ply of food such as was available for them had become insufficient. A crisis came; a turning-point had been reached. All had sagacity enough to see the importance of labor, of industry, of frugality and economy. Would the stronger exercise the self- denial and make the exertions which labor and fore- 338 The Methods of Natural Theology. sight demanded ? or would they indulge their own appetites, eat their fill, and leave the weaker, their wives and children, their parents and disabled broth- ers and sisters to suffer privation and starve ? If the latter, savagery, with all its beastliness and cru- elties, would ensue and remain their condition. But if love for kindred and compassion for the needy was strong enough to induce them to impose upon them- selves the toil of labor, the self-restraints of absti- nence, the thoughtfulness of frugality, foresight and economy, for the love of wives and children, the weak and the infirm, there was a step in advance, a beginning of civilization, and a higher life. But it was the necessity for labor that brought it about. It did not come from choice or as a pursuit of pleasure, nor yet from any choice voluntarily made in view of the great benefits to mankind that might ensue from labor and frugality. And yet the necessity for labor, as it was at the beginning, has done more than any one thing else to promote that civilization and moral elevation among men which we enjoy to-day. It has wrought under the law of heredity a change in man's nature, so that he is now constitutionally and instinctively an industri- ous and working being. That is, he will work — all that are good for anything, the "fittest," — will work voluntarily in view of the enjoyment which the products of his labor will bring to him and his. Providence and Moral Government. 339 2d. Another point of suggestive inquiry and con- sideration is found in the origin and nature of gov- ernment. As man is not naturally, especially in his savage state, inclined to toil and industry, so he is not in- clined to submit to the will of another, for the good of the whole, or even for his own good. The wisdom and necessity of submission to authority, is a lesson which he has learned by long experience. We cannot doubt but that at first ambition, the lust of power, the disposition to tyrannize over others, was more prominent in the hearts of those who assumed control, than any more impersonal or unselfish con- sideration for the good of others. But the mass submitted of necessity and because they could not help themselves. And in this way they learned submission through the ages past. They have come to see that loyalty, which was at first indeed adregem, and has only in these last years become ad legem, is one of the first of virtues, one of the most indispensa- ble of mental habits. They who appreciate it and will reverence and obey \a.vi for the sake of the law, may be for a time under a government where all are politically equal before the law, and the greatest amount of civil liberty may be enjoyed. But for all others some form of despotism and tyrannical con- trol is still a necessity. 340 The Methods of Natural Theology. But men in the beginning did not choose the submission to which they were subjected. Some of them may have seen its necessity, but most of them did not, nor could any form of government or administration which they would have chosen from any appreciation they may have had of its effects on them and their posterity, ever have accomplished the result that has now been obtained. 3d. I refer for the last instance to what is more germane to my general subject in these Lectures. Man is essentially and ever3rwhere a religious be- ing. The religious instincts are the strongest and most ineradicable of any in his nature.^ In quiet times men may be governed and guided by self- interest alone. But for men, as for nations and countries, and for nations and countries as for men, there come times of passion and excitement, when the plainest and most obvious dictates of self-inter- est and common sense are disregarded — passion rules for the hour. But above all other passions, and as able to subdue and control them all, arises the religious instinct whenever it has been roused to a pitch of intensity which we call enthusiasm, or 1 Even Tyndall says in words that are more energetic than grace- ful, "The world will have a reli^on of some kind, even though it should fly to the intellectual whoredom of spiritualism." Frag- ments, Ed. 1878, p. 355. Providence and Moral Government. 341 rather, fanaticism. Then is not only self-interest forgotten, but all the angry passions are put into abeyance; ambition, pride, and even resentment or revenge are laid aside, and men sacrifice all but themselves, and even themselves, so far as this world is concerned, to the one absorbing object of their fanatic zeal. Now this peculiarity of man's nature has been used with tremendous power in the past ages of the history of our race. Men have claimed to come from God, or to rule and guide with a divine mis- sion or sanction. And not one of the governments of the past has arisen or stood and endured with- out allying itself with the religious sentiment of the people. This sentiment has doubtless given power and influence for evil to despots and impostors. But it has been one of the most efficient and most indis- pensable means of maintaining even the best gov- ernments and of bringing about that change in the constitution of man and the instincts of humanity which distinguish the civilized from the savage man. It has enabled the great rulers and leaders to bring to bear upon the minds and hearts of men a power that is vastly superior to any of the threats and tor- ments they could inflict. And this, too, has been a means of elevating 342 The Methods of Natural Tiuology. man. It taught him to look to something higher than this world affords, did much to prepare for that " fullness of time " when his thoughts and faith, his fears and his aspirations should be directed to Him who is a Spirit and who would be worshiped in spirit and in truth, when bloody sacrifices should no more be needed, and the priesthood should be chiefly instructors and guides in matters of conscience, and every one a " priest and a king " for himself to God in a certain sense, and that, too, the most important sense* of the words. And here again, that which has been the most influential, and the most influential because "the most needful for the time," when it was in vogue, was never an invention of the men of the age. It was never wholly or to any great extent a matter of choice with the masses except as that choice was the result of a conviction or of a fanaticism that had been enkindled for a purpose, and that, too, often by a designing impostor. No system that ever ac- complished much good for man was chosen, kept up and continued by a popular choice, the majority de- termining whether they would have this man or this religion " to rule over them " or not. Now in all these cases it is obvious that that which has been the most needed and has proved the most useful and efficient in bringing man from the degra- Providence and Moral Government. 343 dation of his early, not to say his first, for I do not believe it was his first, condition, has been some- thing that has kept him in subjection, compelled him to do and to submit to that which he would not have done or submitted to from mere foresight and choice without such necessity or compulsion. The invol- untary and unwilling submission, however, produced its effect in the altered habits of the individuals who were then forced to practice these virtues ; and they have been transmitted by tlie law of heredity, spoken of in an earlier Lecture, to us and the men of these latter days. And thus we see that our modern civilization de- pends not only on the intellectual advance of the race in what is apparent in our arts and sciences, but there has been going on, underneath all the more obvious facts and events of history, a gradual change in the nature of man himself. This change has been indeed twofold or in two opposite directions, one downwards towards savagery and beastliness, and the other in all the civilized races, upwards towards civilization and a higher plane of life. These changes, those of them that are for the bet- ter at least, have been going on very much in ac- cordance with the laws which the evolutionists advocate. There has been a Power or an Influence at work in them, that has gradually wrought a 344 The Methods of Natural Theology. change in human nature so as to render much pos- sible now, in science and religion, in politics and in morals, that could not have been introduced with any prospect of success, at any earlier stage of human history. Has there not been a providence in all this? But it is time to go on with our main subject. Providence and Moral Government and the objec- tions to them. The main points of the objections that are chiefly urged are two, namely: (i) to a Personal Provi- dence, and (2) to the fact of a Moral Government that is exercised on the principles of righteousness and justice and in the spirit of good will or benevo- lence. Such objections discourage prayer and worship, instill into the minds of all a distrust of moral prin- ciples and of any rewards, either here or hereafter, for righteous deeds, except such as are seen to be manifest in prospect and which, as is often supposed, can, for the most part, be secured better by prudent foresight and expediency, with possible trickery, deception, pusillanimous submission to those in power and such like means, than by the nobler means of a higher morality. Of these Pessimists, the two names that are just Providence and Moral Government. 345 now the most conspicuous, perhaps, are Schopen- hauer and John Stuart Mill. The pessimism of Schopenhauer evidently began in personal feeling, and led to, a theory, such as only a German could form, from which his system results as an inference. He was unhappy, unsuccessful. Things did not go at all to suit him ; and so he in- vented a theory of his own. Starting from Hegel's point of view that all reality is included in the about- to-be {das Werdend), Schopenhauer thought to im- prove upon it by adopting the notion that Will is all. " Matter is nothing but Force ; Force is noth- ing but Will " — ^Will become apparent as presenta- tion or Vorstellung, or phenomena in the mind of the thinker. For the das, Werdend of Hegel he would substitute das Wollend, mere will-power, or activity. Thus far his philosophy is not so bad as many other systems that we could name. But when he comes to practical views, he over- looks the fact that the one creative Will is guided by wisdom or acts from a sense of justice and love. In his view, whatever is, is a manifestation of will or willfulness, and of course anything and everything that has a will of its own is to be regarded only as seeking its own — its own ends and pleasures. Hence for the weaker there can be nothing but misery and defeat. 346 The Methods of Natural Theology. Schopenhauer is, however, but little known among English-speaking people. The best known repre- sentative of pessimism among the English is John Stuart Mill. I shall therefore refer to him chiefly, not only because he is the best representative, but also because he presents in his writings all the ob- jections of this kind that have been presented at all and in fact all, so far as I can see, that the case admits of The objection is easily stated : there is pain and suffering in this world. If God could prevent it and would not, there is an end to all idea of goodness and justice. If He would prevent it and make all creatures perfectly happy and cannot, there is an end to all idea of His infinite power or omnipotence. " If," says he,' " the Maker of the world can do all that He wills, he wills misery, and there is no escape from the conclusion. If He willed that all men should be virtuous. His designs have been com- pletely baffled." Again, p. 38, "Not even on the most distorted and contracted theory of good which man ever framed by religious or philosophical fanat- icism, can the government of nature be made to re- semble the work of a being at once good and om- nipotent." 1 Nature in posthumous works, p. 37. Providence and Moral Government. 347 Again, in a later part of the volume, p. 112, he says, " It is impossible that any one who habitually thinks, and who is unable to blunt his inquiring in- tellect by sophistry, should be able, without misgiv- ing, to go on ascribing absolute perfection to the author and ruler of so clumsily made and capriciously governed a creation as this planet and the life of its inhabitants." " The Author of the Sermon on the Mount is assuredly a far more benignant Being than the Author of Nature." ' I presume it will hardly be considered as coming within the fair range of argument to allude to the 1 Mill, in his less "atra bilious" moments, thinks that among the attributes of God, as manifest in nature and human experience, goodness or benevolence is on the whole predominant over other motives of a different kind. The pleasures and the pains have a conservative tendency, the pleasures being so disposed as to attach to the things which maintain individual and collective existence, the pains so as to deter from such as would destroy it," Theism, p. 190. "Yet endeavoring to look at the question without partiality or prejudice and without allowing wishes to have any influence over judgment, it does appear [the italics are mine] that granting the existence of design, there is a preponderance of evidence that the Creator desired the pleasure of His creatures, . , Even in cases where the pain results, like pleasure, from the machinery itself, the appearances do not indicate that contrivance was brought into play purposely to produce pain ; . . there is, therefore, much appearance that pleasure is agreeable to the Creator, while there is very little if any appearance that pain is so, and there is a certain amount of justification for inferring, on the ground of Natural Theology alone, that benevolence is one of the attributes of the Creator," p. 192. 348 The Methods of Natural Theology. personal character and habits of these pessimists. But yet I think that some notice should be taken of it, for wherever there is complaint there is surely something wrong ; so that if the thing complained of is not at fault the complainant himself is certainly so, so far at least as the act of making of the com- plaint is concerned. Now I do not know that any one of these complainants has ever been distinguished for the highest moral or spiritual excellence, or has even secured any considerable number of followers who would willingly trust the affairs of the universe in his hands, with any expectation that they would be on the whole any better managed than they are now. Pessimism has existed as a sentiment in sporadic cases, in all ages of the world. Always there have been men and women who have felt and thought that their trials and sufferings were more than they could bear. With us, and in all the higher races, this view of life reaches, in isolated cases, its proper issue in sui- cide, when the victims of misfortune come to the conclusion that not to be at all is better than to be as they are, or in any condition they can hope to realize. And we regard all such cases as bordering upon, if not already entered into, that state of mental disease which we call and treat as insanity. Providence and Moral Government. 349 Often does it happen that their suflferings and mis- fortunes have come from no fault of their own, no events or acts over which they had or could have had any power of control. Such cases appeal to our tenderest sympathy and make us hesitate in our speculations and theories. And to my mind, one of the saddest things in all human history is the fact that the hundreds of mill- ions in Asia who are called Buddhists could have ever taken such pessimistic views of this life and the best that it can offer, as to accept their mysterious Nirvana* as a boon. Whether we regard it as total annihilation or the extinction of all conscious indi- viduality or not, the result is the same ; the case is one of unspeakable sadness. 1 It has been suggested and, as I think, satisfactorily proved that Nirvana did not mean originally, and was never intended to mean, entire annihilation. The founder of the religibn had in view a two- fold nature, of man like what the. Christians have in mind when they speak of '■■ the spirit " and "the flesh " and t|ie contrariety between them, and by Nirvana the Buddha meant only the extinction or annihi- lation of " the lusts of the flesh," the carnai nature of-man. Hence it is only by a later perversion that the word has come to mean entire annihilation of the conscious bein£. At first it meant resig- nation. "When a man can bear everything without a word of com- plaint," says Buddha, " he has attained Nirvana . . . thus is Nirvana the greatest happiness." See Max Muller, Science of Religion, p, 142. And yet I suppose there can be no doubt that the great mass of the Buddhists, the ignorant, degraded ^d. miserable por- tion of them do regard Nirvana as an utter extinction of their con- scious being. 16 3 so The Methods of Natural Theology. Now I have no skill at making evil appear to be good, and no ambition for distinction in that direc- tion. Nevertheless, something may be said in favor of pain. It has its place and function in the world. I think it may be safely said that pain is always a sign of something wrong, besides itself. It shows that something has been done that calls for amend- ment and remedy, or that something is being done, or is about to be done, that calls for foresight, cir- cumspection and efforts at avoidance. In the lower and purely physical sphere, pain is proof of something wrong, some disease or injury to the tissues that calls for attention. And even when remedies are painful it is only because they are in themselves considered a violation of the laws and conditions of well-being, the use and application of which can be justified only on the ground that they are remedies and means for curing or removing an evil that is greater than that which already exists. Hence the surgeon's knife is as painful when it re- moves a diseased limb or opens an abscess as if it were used needlessly and for the mere purpose of torture. The law is general, and were this not so there could be no general law. But it is asked why should there be pain in the animal world ? If there were no pains of hunger and of dying there would be no effort to secure food Provideitce and Moral Government. 351 and to avoid danger ; and the species would speedily come to an end. If, on the other hand, food were so abundant that life could be prolonged without effort, or if the animal were to be spared the pains of death and allowed to live forever, the world would soon become so full of the one species that there would be no room for another and for a succession of the higher orders, as we see that they came into existence in the course of geological time: there could have been no evolution. If now we raise our view to the next higher plane, the moral and intellectual, we find that the painful, or malevolent passions have their place. When one is angry, for example, there is something wrong. Either an injury has been done, which, in the interest of righteousness and general well-being, call for in- dignation and resentment, or we ourselves are in the wrong, angry without sufficient cause. And in this latter case there is something wrong in ourselves, our own conduct, something that calls for a remedy as much as in the former case, although the remedy will be of a totally different kind and in a very dif- ferent scene of action. Something the same may be said of all the varied forms of the evil or malevolent passions — of envy, of hate, of revenge, of jealousy, and of even spite itself They come of wrong, indicate and prove the 352 The Methods of Natural Theology. existence of wrong, and call for a remedy even if they do not always clearly point out the proper remedy. We may " be angry and sin not," although we may be angry and commit a great sin. But the anger is always proof of something wrong, and, by consequence of, something requiring to be changed for the better. But does one ask why there should be wrong doing or the possibility of it ? I answer as the ques- tion has been answered so many times already, that without the possibility of wrong doing there could be no liberty for right doing, no moral freedom, none in fact of that acquired character and those higher, nobler virtues which we all recognize and admit to be the chief glory and distinction of the higher order of beings. Nobody doubts that purity and temperance and generosity and fidelity and courage and magnanimity, are better and higher and more desirable than their opposites. Or if there is anybody that doubts it, he is hardly a person to be reasoned with on such a subject as this. In the ex- ercise of common reason and right judgment we all see that these virtues are the conditions of happiness in social life, as truly as the laws of gravity, of chem- ical and mechanical action are the necessary condi- tions of the orderly system and harmonious ongo- ings of the material world. Without them there Providence and Moral Government. 353 would be no proof of the existence and agency of a wise, benevolent and all-powerful Being, whom we may worship and adore as God over all blessed forever.^ And not only pain, but even wicked men, have a work to do in a world where wickedness and wrong exist, which no other class of persons can so fitly do. Although not intending it and not conscious of the feet, they are doing God's will and are in some cases the very "fittest" instruments for doing it under the circumstances.* 1 There is another thought connected with this subject that I think I ought to present for the consideration of the reader, and this I do without attempting to determine how far it is true, although beyond doubt there is some truth in it. Happiness implies the possibility of its opposite, unhappiness or misery, and the converse, misery or suffering, implies the possi- bility of happiness; that is, they both imply a sensitive nature. We do not speak of inanimate objects as happy, nor yet are they mis- erable, they are simply insensible. Nor, as I think, do we speak of one as happy who is not con- scious of his happiness. We may regard Barnes fortunate and even speak of such an one as happy, but when we come to look into the matter carefully I think we shall admit that no one is happy who is not consdous of being so. Now much that I have ssud in the first Lecture of co-ordination in cognition applies here. We can have no consciousness or thought of happiness except as it is co-ordinated with its ojpposite, pain or misery. 2 The old Prophet Isaiah had a very clear conception of this law of Providence, chap, x, 5-8 : " O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger and the staff in their hand is mine indignation. I will send him against an hypocritical nation, and against the people of my wrath 354 The Methods of Natural Theology. It would seem, therefore, that what men so often and so loudly complain of is but a necessary part of a system, with which, perhaps, they are not alto- gether in harmony, and which, at any rate, they do not fully understand and appreciate. Any attempt to judge of this world, in reference to the matter before us, must assume that it is a means to some end, and judge of it with reference to that end. If God had intended it as a place for mere animal enjoyment, or for the success of schemes of worldly ambition, I have no doubt He could have made it better than it now is ; most any of us could have done so. At least such is the prevalent opin- ion. Men who take this view of life can see no reason why pain and ill health should have been made to follow upon excessive indulgence, or why all the hopes, " reasonable hopes " they will call them, of ambitious and aspiring men should not be re- alized. We can clearly see, however, that if man is des- tined to another and a higher state of existence, and that if the moral and spiritual life is higher than the mere animal and worldly life, a world in which men that are, and intend to be, devoted to animal enjoy- will I give him a charge, to take the spoil and to take the prey and to tread them down like the mire of the streets. Howbeit he mean eth not so neither doeth his heart think so ; but it w in his heart k destroy and cut off nations not a few." Providence and Moral Government. 355 ments and the pursuits of mere worldly ambition, would find themselves best provided for and things most to their liking would not be very well adapted to those who might have the higher aims of life chiefly in view. A world that would make the drunkard and debauchee happy and entirely satis- fied in their line of enjoyment could hardly be adapted to the promotion of virtue and the higher objects and aims in life. Now I am willing to admit that I do not see how from the mere facts of nature, without taking into account human experience, the incarnation, Christ and Christianity and all that precede it to prepare the way for it, with all that has followed it and is yet to come as its work, its work here and the re- sults of that work hereafter, we can prove that God is infinitely good or altogether benevolent. We need some way to turn seeming evil into real good, and a world best adapted for spiritual purposes could not be satisfactory to those who are otherwise disposed. I cannot, therefore, dismiss this part of my argu- ment without intimating very strongly that our esti- mate of this world depends much, very much, upon the use we propose to make of it and the kind of life we intend to live in it while we remain a portion of its inhabitants. 356 The Methods of Natural Theology. The heathen religions of the world may teach us an important lesson on this subject. The heathen nations all believed in a god, and for the most part in " gods many." They never ascribed to them a very high degree of moral excellence. They never thought them altogether benevolent in their feelings and designs towards man. And not only their opinions and religious rites were influenced by this view of the character of their so-called gods, but their whole life was tinged by it. For the most part their religion afforded no encouragement to a high standard of morals, and little or no hope for a future life that could be in any important particular better than this.' I One of Mill's arguments against the goodness of God, as a proof of a want of either goodness or power to do what, in Mr. Mill's es- timation, would have been a far better thing to do than has been done, is derived from the low state of civilization, the savagery and ignorance that prevailed so long in the early ages of mankind and still prevails among such savage tribes as the Bushmen and the Andaman Islanders. Mill sees no reason why they might not have been made at once equal in civilization and all the attainments of modern science, political economy included, to modern Englishmen, or possibly a little better than some of them. But there is a point of view from which even the Bushman and the Andaman Islander, if they live up to such light as God has been pleased to give them, are to be preferred, in their lowly and misera- ble condition, if happiness alone is to be regarded as "our being's end andaim," to the most advanced Englishman, with his agnosti- cism and blasphemy. They are happier now and here, and have a much better chance, as I think, for the " hereafter." Providence and Moral Government. 357 The Jews are said to have been the only people that had any idea of sin and ill desert so that, in the light of this consciousness, they could see and ac- knowledge that God is just and righteous in all His ways, and good in all His dealings with men.* But even they did not, and could not, see and realize this truth as we can, who live in later times and who now see in His Son Jesus Christ the fuller manifes- tation of His goodness and love. In this comple- ment of the revelations and manifestations of His plans and purposes we see the" full exhibition of His attributes, so that there is no longer any occasion, or any disposition, to doubt among those who have experienced the grace which He brought to light in the Gospel. The Christian view of life, when once thoroughly adopted, changes the whole aspect of the case. It cures all pessimism and takes away all disposition to complain. Amidst the sadness and the sorrow, the disap- pointments and the discouragements that come to I The Patriarch Job speaks of the pessimists of his day as con derailing God that they may "appear to be righteous themselves," Job, xl, 8. Nor did the Psalmist become a pessimist on account of his mis fortunes and sufferings.' He Could rather say, " O my God I cry in the day-time, but Thou hearest not and in the night season I take no rest. And Thou continuest holy O Thou Worship of Israel." 358 The Methods of Natural Theology. all thoughtful people, there is nothing like the con- templation of the life and death of Christ, the Divine Son of Man, what He did and suffered for us. The one thought takes all bitterness out of the heart. No event on earth has exhibited such a depth of tragic pathos, none has had such power to touch the heart with infinite tenderness. And all subsequent history, the experience of believers, the conversion of the heathen, the success of missions, now, to-day and everywhere, justify the divine foresight of Him Who said, signifying what death He should die, " And I if I be lifted from the earth will draw all men unto Me." The laws under which we live may be referred to several groups, systems or codes, each of them hav- ing some peculiarity of its own. 1st. All the laws of number and quantity are ab- solute : two and two will make four, and will not, and cannot, make five, however much we may wish it, pray for it, or suffer if it be not so done. Three straight lines meeting will make a triangle, and one of the sides will be shorter than the sum of the other two. 2d. Some years ago Whewell made an argument' to show that in any possible universe, where there 1 Astronomy, (Biidgewater Treatise), especially B. II. Providence and Moral Government. 359 should be more than one object, and it would not be a universe without a good many more than one, these objects must attract each other in a formula or law which we may express by the words " in proportion to their quantity of matter and inversely as the square of their distances." I regarded his argument as a success at the time and have seen no reason to change my view since. 3d. It is pretty well settled now, that if there are to be more than one material object, the objects must be in motion, and all the laws of motion can be determined a priori and are in accordance with the formulae of analytical geometry and the calculus. This results from their nature as inert masses. They must also all revolve around one another and around a common centre, or be kept in motion by some in- telligent Power, such as God alone can exert. 4th. The laws of chemical combination, if they are not fixed and determined a priori as the laws of motion are, as there seems some reason for suppos- ing them to be, are nevertheless fixed; and so in har- mony with the other laws, even the laws of mathe- matics, that it would, seem that there can be but very little that is in any sense of the word arbitrary or that could have been otherwise than it is, or har- monize with another system even if such a thing had been desirable. 360 The Methods of Natural Theology. Now these four systems of laws make up mogt of the system of nature in which we have our earthly existence. Could they have been other than they are ? Would it have been better if they had been different ? Is there anything in these laws that mili- tates against the doctrines of a Providence and a thoroughly righteous Moral Government of the world ? If a man conforms to them he is happy and prosperous, so far as their influence can make or mar his happiness or his prosperity. > And if he is not in conformity with them whose fault is it, his or theirs ? When, however, we come to consider man we enter a new realm. We have now to deal with spontaneity and to consider actions that cannot be reduced to, or expressed in, the formulae of mathemat- ics, kinds and modes of action that cannot be fore- seen or cialculated a priori. Let us now look at this system in which man is placed and of which he is a part, from man himself, as our point of observation and see how he stands related to the other things that with him make up the system of which he is part. Man's body is made of the same chemical elements as the other masses of matter around him and is obedient to the same laws. It is by his mind or soul alone that he differs from them. But by this Providence and Moral Government. 361 alone he can understand them, and understanding them and knowing the laws by which they act, he can control them to a great extent ; so far, indeed, that the whole face and surface of nature and the course of its events, become changed and totally diflfereat in consequence of his presence and agency from what it would be if he were not there. This chapel, these seats, and the waves of air by which I arrest your attention and make you partakers of my thoughts, are all the results of man's presence, and would not be at all but for him. 1st. In the first place, let us remember that man is an intelligent hemgi he can understand the nature of the things around him and the laws by which they act. He can in consequence (i) adapt himself to them or (2), what is perhaps far more important, he can control their operations to a large extent. He cannot, indeed, arrest or suspend the law of gravity, but he can protect himself against a fall. He can- not change the laws of heat and cold, but he can build a fire that will keep him from freezing. He cannot change the laws of chemical combination and analysis ; but he can so Select and combine the arti- cles of food that he takes into his system that they will digest and be assimilated, instead of producing indigestion, disease and death. In this way he can exert a " providence " over 362 The Met/tods of Natural Theology. affairs, and for his own good, which is analogous to that which God Himself exercises for us, and which is about as far above what the lowest animals can do, as it is necessary that that which He exercises over us should be, in order that it may accomplish all that is claimed for it by Natural Theology. I wish to emphasize this point somewhat, because I am here speaking not of supernatural interven- tions by way of miracles. I have said all that I propose to say on this occasion on that subject in a preceding Lecture. * What I am speaking of here is the ordinary Providence of God in the affairs of Life. This has two branches, (i) the internal, in which He influences the thoughts and wills of men, as in the example of the passenger saved from a steamboat calamity, cited in the last Lecture, and (2) the other in the outward world, exercising there, as I have said, an influence which is analogous in kind, though far above in degree, to that which man is constantly exercising. On this point I propose to confirm what I have said by citations from two or three authorities, each of which will be recognized as foremost in his kind. Thus Tyndall, speaking for the men of physical science, says, Fragments, p. 468, "The theory that the system of natur? is unc^er the control of a Being who changes phenomena in compliance with the Providence and Moral Government. 363 prayers of men is, in my opinion, a perfectly legiti- mate one. It may of course be rendered futile by being associated with conceptions that contradict it ; but such conceptions form no necessary part of the theory." Then, as representing the metaphysicians and logicians, I quote John Stuart Mill, Theism, p. 136: " Science contains nothing repugnant to the suppo- sition that every event which takes place results from a specific [note the word ' specific '] volition of the presiding Power, provided that this Power adheres in its particular volitions to general laws laid down by itself" Here is all that my argument calls for, and all that we can ask. Herbert Spencer, as we have seen several times, admits all this, and more than this. " We are obliged" he says (§ 27), " to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some Power by which we are acted upon." And again ('§ 34), " Every man may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause, and when the Unknown Cause produces in him a certain belief," etc. Here the Divine influence in external nature is spoken of as that which we are " obliged to admit," and the action in and upon the mind as what we may "properly believe" and act upon. 364 The Methods of Natural Theology. If Spencer would change his phraseology and call Him the Incomprehensible instead of the Unknown and the Unknowable, we could agree with most of what he says of God, and he would, moreover, be calling Him by a name that indicates all that his premises call for or justify. For surely, as has been well said. He of whom so much may be said cannot be regarded as unknowable or as altogether un- known. 2d. In the next place, man can greatly change himself by his own acts. There is hardly anything by way of virtue, moral excellence or good habits, that one may not acquire and make of it a sort of second nature to himself, by the power of will and self-control which he possesses. In this he is totally unlike the masses and molecules of inanimate mat- ter. Nothing that they can devise or do will change their nature or properties, make them better or more adapted to things that surround them in their envi- ronments. What they were made to be that they must remain and continue to be to the end. 3d. Then again, man can suffer. And here we reach the central point of our subject. A thing falls and breaks, but does not suffer or feel pain. A man falls, breaks a limb, and is in pain and suffers disa- bility for a long time. This is a controlling fact, and gives significance to the other three facts in Providence and Moral Government. 365 man's constitution and nature just named, (i) He can understand the laws of nature and conform his acts to them. (2) He can control the operation of other things to some extent so as to bring events much more nearly into accordance with his will and judgment as to what is right, than they would oth- erwise be, and (3) he can so mould and change him- self as to bring his own nature, his " second nature," to a large extent, into harmony with whatever there is in " the constitution and course of nature " that he cannot change ; and he may thus grow in strength and righteousness of character, to an extent to which we know no limit and to which probably no limit can be prescribed. Man's relations to these things and his experience with them is under three codes of laws. 1st. In the lower tihere is no such thing as pardon, favor, or consideration of persons, their character, their worth or worthlessness, their aims whether good or bad, their ignorance of the law, or their knowledge of it, their mistakes or their misfortunes. We say " the burnt child dreads the fire." By that bit of experience he has learned one fact and a law of nature; he has made a beginning of scientific at- tainment. By a repetition of such experinients he soon learns that the recurrence of the phenomena under the same circumstances is uniform, and that the operation of the laws of nature is inexorable. 366 The Methods of Natural Theology. But he has acquired a new instinct also. He now dreads, and shrinks from, the burning taper. He generalizes and applies his conclusion and extends his instinct to the burning coals, the heated iron, and whatever else has the appearance of a burning heat. Now in this we have the philosophy of a large share of man's education. He studies into and learns the laws of nature and becomes a man of sci- entific attainments. He learns also to respect and obey those laws as something that are immeasurably his superior, something to which he must submit and conform, or be crushed and killed by tliem. They will not respect him, and he learns to respect them. But does he suffer the consequences every time he transgresses nature's laws? This is the law. The mere inanimate objects of nature can make no exceptions, show no favor, exercise no mercy or forbearance. They are not intelligent moral agents ; they have no power of choice, no spontaneity of action. And yet I think it manifest that, for some reason or another, we do not suffer the consequence for "one in a thousand" of our faults of this kind. Hundreds go to sea in ships that are unseaworthy and escape, arriving safely to the haven where they 368 The Methods of Natural Theology. This form of objection is very old, as old as St. Augustine at least. He said in view of it that there are some things which God cannot do because He is omnipotent. Qumdam non potest quia omnipotens est. They are not questions of power, whether of ciw^ipotence or ?w«potence, but only of the feasibility of the things themselves. A space enclosed be- tween two straight lines is no space. The intersec- tion of two parallel lines and such like fictions are no questions or tests of wisdom or of power. They are not merely inconceivable; they are simply nothings. And this is in accordance with the common sense of mankind. We speak of things as easy or as diffi- cult. But when we so speak of them we do it un- der the idea that they are in themselves feasible, possible or practicable. Hence we speak of those who can do only the easy things as weak, whether in body or in mind, and of those that can do the more difficult as strong, comparatively, and of Him that can do all things that are in themselves feasible or conceivable, we say that He is omnipotent, able to do all things. And it is only when the thing is confessedly possible, and sustains some relation to power, that we so speak of it or of him that can do it. But to make two straight lines enclose a space is no more within the reach of the strongest, whether Providence and Moral Government. 369 in mind or in body, than of him who is the weakest or has no power and even no existence.' We have seen that man can intervene and change to some extent the course of events. The forces of nature are indeed wild horses, but man can tame them and make them subservient to his purposes, as well as destructive of his life and happiness. He can guide the fire so that it will burn the gas that lightens his study, or the coal that warms his dwell- ing, so that it will consume the noisome nuisance of decaying matter or become the conflagration of the city that destroys the homes and lives of thou., sands of human beings. But he cannot make it consume the granite mountain or burn all the waters of the ocean. And assuredly God can do more than man in 1 There is much in Mill's line of argament that reminds me of the question said to have been proposed by the bewildered Sunday school boy to his teacher : " Please, sir, can God make a stone so big that He can't lift it " ? I do not know what answer was given to the poor boy's question, but I presume it was answered in some way to save the " infinite power " of God. I have often heard, however, among the unsophisticated country people, with their strong, practical common sense, the remark that " God cannot make two mountains without a valley between them." The remark, however, was never regarded by them as any impeach- ment of His attributes, whether His goodness or His power, but it was intended rather as a rebuke to those who were expecting un- reasonable thiuF^s. 370 The Methods of Natural Theology. controlling and guiding the forces of nature in the production of events. He can "intervene" without " interfering " — in the offensive sense of the word — to show mercy and exercise loving kindness. He can send the rain in time of need, or avert the com- ing pestilence, if to Him it seems good to do so. It is idle and vain to say that we know the laws of nature well enough to deny His Providence in such matters. To say that He cannot intervene is imper- tinent and blasphemous. To say that He does not is mere assumption. Nothing short of omniscience can assert a universal negative of that kind. It is well for scientific men to assume, and for the purposes of mere science they must assume, that everything in nature occurs regularly and as though there were nothing concerned in its production but the forces and laws of nature — the forces that we can see and handle and the laws that we can learn by observation and generalization. But then we must admit, also, that there is no one fact or event in nature that man knows so well and understands so thoroughly that he can say that God was not con- cerned as an Agent in its production ; that God was not " acting " in it, to use Spencer's expression ; that it was not the result of a " specific volition " on His part, to use Mill's expression ; or, to use the still stronger one of Tyndall,that it was not a phenomenon Providence and Moral Government. 371 that had been " changed " by Him " in compliance with the prayers of men." In this way, and to this extent, we may all very properly confess to an agnosticism. It is much more probable, therefore, in view of what we do know that He overrules and guides all things, leaving us to suffer only when, or as, it is for our own good that we should do so. For man will not learn without suffering. It is only the " burnt " child that dreads the fire. And I think we are fast approaching the conviction that throughout the whole realm of nature, man suffers in this way no more than is good for, perhaps no more than is indispensable to, his progress in knowl- edge and virtue. 2d. I now reach the second code of laws under which man lives. And here I can be much more brief In this domain he is to be considered as in relation to his fellow-men. Here we soon learn that certain courses of action produce good-will, and a disposition to respect and favor us ; while actions of an opposite character produce quite different results, such as loss of character, of the respect and good- will, and even of the charity and forbearance of oth- ers. We see, also, that these courses of action have a relation to moral laws, and that by these laws cer- tain kinds of actions are seen to be right as well as pleasing to others. 372 The Methods of Natural Theology. But the main feature of the case, now to be con- sidered, is the fact that these agents are not like the mere inert masses around us. They are intelligent moral beings. They can consider our case, make excuses where excuses are deserved. They can show favor and make exceptions to the enforcement of general rules. They can exercise forgiveness and forbearance where none are deserved. With them ignorance of a law is often an excuse— rgood inten- tions are accepted for right performances. Mistakes are often corrected so that we get credit for the good which we intended, instead of suffering for the evil we actually, though unintentionally, wrought for fellow- men. Here we experience the interfer- ence and exercise of a moral government by our fellow- men, tempered and softened, though not always so by compassion, by sympathy and ten- derest love. 3d. But we rise to a higher region than this ; to a purely spiritual experience, a world of supernatural life, in which a different law prevails and religion forms the controlling element. And as I wish to connect with the discussion of it, another principle of a more general character and application, I will turn aside for a few moments to consider it. It is the use which God in His Providence makes of wicked men and their wicked deeds. Providence and Moral Government. 373 Why sin is in the world I do not know and shall make no attempt to explain. I shall not even offer a conjecture. But it is here ; and we can see much good that is accomplished by it, which, so far as we can see, could no more have been accomplished without sin and suffering than man could have been made to study into, learn, respect and use those laws of nature which make up our science and make us masters of the world, subjecting all things in it to our use, without the pain that follows upon the vio- lation. And I put the two together. I think we are fast approaching the conclusion, even if we have not yet already reached it, that there is no suffering in this world without some previous transgression of some one or more of the laws, moral or physical, of nature or of grace, under which we live. Hence suffering, though it does not always fall upon the offender himself, is nevertheless always a sign and a reminder of a law that has been broken and vio- lated, though quite possibly not yet fully known. It is a hint and a stimulus to inquiry and discovery. It is also a spur and an incitement towards the formation of a new habit, the acquiring of a new element in our second nature, and thus bringing us into a nearer conformity to a higher state of law and of life. We grow by means of it, both in knowledge 17 374 The Methods of Natural Theology. and in grace, in strength of character and in nearness to our ideal standard of perfection. Now the way in which, both in history and in individual life, God brings good out of evil and makes even " the wrath of man to praise him," is to me one of the most striking proofs of Providence, working for a purpose in history and in the exer- cise of Moral Government. Take a case in history for illustration, the cruci- fixion of our Lord. And in discussing it I assume nothing as to its dogmatic character or theological bearing. I look at it only as a matter of history. He was a just and holy man, in whom there was no guile, no cause or justification for His death. Yet His enemies hated Him most bitterly, and put Him to death. One of His own disciples and trusted friends betrayed him. Of course the fault, the mis- take, the crime and the guilt, were all their own. But we risk nothing in saying that if He had not been put to death in some such manner, His religion would never have taken root in the world; and the greatest step in the advancement of humanity to a higher level and a cleaner and holier mode of life, would have proved a failure from the outset. Who then should put Him to death ? Who de- liver Him up to be crucified ? Surely no friend could do it ; no loving disciple could be guilty of Providence and Moral Government. 375 such a thing. No one that feared God and loved righteousness above all things else, could have thought of it. No devotee of the doctrine of expe- diency could ever have persuaded himself that, in this case, the end would justify the means. And yet, betrayers and murderers were found, men who had no conscientious scruples at the time, whatever may have been the case with some of them, as Judas for example, afterwards. God used theiti for the ac- complishment of his purposes. He made them no worse than they were, and if we may presume to judge in such a case, He showed them no mercy on account of the most blessed results, that He, by His providence and grace, brought but of their act. And the case gains unspeakably in breadth of sig- nificance and in the depth of its pathos when we view it in the light of the Christian doctrine of the Atonement and the Redemption of mankind. Now history is full of such examples, although, of course, on a vastly smaller scale:. In fact, it seems sometimes almost as if God could not well get along, govern this world, and work out what are manifestly His purposes in history, without His enemies and the use He makes of them to do His work, His strange work ; just as it has been said of the Queen of England, that she could scarcely get along and administer the affairs of her Empire without what 376 The Methods of Natural Theology. has been facetiously called " her majesty's opposi- tion," as well as the assistance and co-operation of her friends and loyal subjects. But I must hasten to my closing thought, which is, to my mind, the crowning glory of the whole subject. It may be stated as the doctrine, that there is no pain or suffering in this world that we may not, by such means and aids as are always at our command, turn to our own good. I am willing to admit that this doctrine cannot be fully made out without the recognition of a future life into which the results of discipline, if not the economy of rewards and punishments, must enter, and in which growth in knowledge and in grace are possible. And although I have not made any effort in these Lectures to prove the future life of rewards and punishments, as one of the doctrines of Natural Theology, I think, that in view of what has been said by others in the pursuit of the methods I have been vindicating, I have a right to assume that doc- trine, so far at least as my present object requires that it should be regarded as a doctrine of Natural Theology. I think, indeed, that the argument for a future life which may be derived from the facts and laws I have been considering, is overwhelmingly strong. Providence and Moral Government. 377 If we regard this world and this life as a scene for the highest and the greatest amount of mere animal enjoyment for such a being as man, it may indeed well be considered, as Mill has called it, an " igno- minious failure."* But is it not wiser, more logical and scientific, as well as a safer and more prudent way, to infer from all we know of God and of nature, that this is not the last or the highest state of exist- ence for man ? Does not everything, in fact, tend to show that this world and this life for man is only a part of a far more comprehensive plan ? a some- thing hereafter that gives a new meaning and im- portance to all there is here ? And in this connection I am willing, and more than willing, to forego and repudiate what is some- times offered by way of answer to the objection to the doctrine of a Moral Government growing out of the fact of suffering, namely,* the consideration of the insignificance of the individual- man, the unspeakable nothingness of his significance and worth in com- parison with the general good of the whole. I am quite willing to admit that, in this respect, each man is to himself infinitely valuable. What good to him if the universe flourishes and prospers and he himself is annihilated and become extinct ? What to him the happiness of millions, if he is consigned 1 Theism, p. 192. 378 The Methods of Natural Theology. to everlasting woe ? to the regions of the lost and the despised and damned ? Their happiness is noth- ing to him. The only thought there can be which, so far as I can imagine, can be of any comfort or alleviation to him, is the thought that he has de- served his doom; that God is just and holy and merciful, though he suffers what no tongue can tell, no heart but that of him who has endured it can conceive. And the being that can entertain such a thought under such circumstances is not far from the kingdom of heaven; and from all the ideas and thoughts that Natural Theology can suggest, it is evident he will soon be there, in the midst of its glories and enjoyments. I cannot tell, or pretend to, why children die. In some cases we see that from circumstances of dis- ease or deformity life to them could be no scene of happiness if it should be prolonged. In others, we see that they are takeh away from the evil to come, and in all, we may hope that they only go before us, and earlier than we do, to that world where we must all be gathered at last. But to the kindred question, why do the righteous suffer ? we can offer a very different answer. This question presents a problem of an entirely different kind. It is a doctrine now well understood that there is Providence and Moral Government. 379 no coming to a right mind, no growth in grace, no attainment in the higher qualities of intelligence and moral excellence, without a good deal of pain and suffering. This is a doctrine which, although Christ may have first taught it to the world, has now be- come confirmed by the experience and the philosophy of the last eighteen centuries. This is true in intellectual growth. The child gets its first lesson in thermotics by the pain in the burnt finger. As we grow old we grow cautious. We learn to regard very slight indications and to take many gentle hints. But the terrible rod of chas- tisement is always there for the heedless and the careless, for the presumptuous adventurer and the trifler. And in this sphere there is seldom any amends that can be made, or any escape from the penalty once inflicted. The palsied limb, the broken constitution, remain as both proofs and penalties of the transgression. In ihe moral sphere we meet with the first in- stances of the higher administration of a moral gov- ernment. Here repentance, if it is genuine and sin- cere, is always respected; amends for the evil done are always accepted ; and the offender may be re- stored to the place in private affection or in public confidence, which, by his fall, he had lost. And here, too, it sometimes happens that one becomes 380 The Methods of Natural Theology. stronger, both in character and in public confidence, after his transgression, by the intensity of his peni- tence. The thoroughness of his reform and the in- creased comprehension of, and faith in, the great moral principles that are alike the foundation of character and the source of strength and stability to all that is good and trustworthy in human life, often afford ground for a confidence that would not be otherwise felt. But in the spiritual sphere we, for the first time, find the possibility of repentance, and amendment with complete recuperation, and full forgiveness. We find more. We find gain. We find the possibility of turning all evil into good, and out of any adver- sity, misfortune or suffering, that can possibly come upon us, whether it come from our own transgres- sion or from the faults and wickedness of others, we may educe the pure gold, the sparkling gem, the pearl of great price and of priceless value, spiritual worth; though we lose the world, we gain our own souls. There can be no need of an induction of exam- ples to establish this truth. Enough is to be seen in the experience of every thoughtful person, enough in the life of every holy man or woman, every lofty and noble character that we have known, to suggest and illustrate the doctrine and to satisfy us of its truth. Providence and Moral Government. 381 But here as everywhere, as in each of the other spheres, the conditions are the same : faith and sub- mission to the authority of Him who ordained the laws and still rules to enforce them. With this experience comes deeper humiliation, more entire self-renunciation, with stronger faith, more earnestness of effort, and somehow, nobody perhaps can tell how, but there comes somehow a strength and a bounding upwards from earth and earthly things towards heaven and the highest and the holiest that we conceive of The very things that these pessimists complain of come to be the very opportunity and means that are given us to become spiritually great and strong. They make what the world most honors. No man, after such an experience, doubts the goodness of God or the righteousness of His Moral Government. No one doubts His providence over all His works or His presence wherever a humble, penitent, believing soul needs his presence and help.^ 1 Mill rests his argument chiefly upon the amount of pain and suffering there is in the world. But I doubt very much whether the greatest sufferers are the "greatest complainers. Those whom we most respect for their noble qualities, seldom complain or even so much as think that they have had anything to complain of. Nay, we have read of, if we have not seen, more than one who could "glory"' in his infirmities and "rejoice" in his "tribulations," knowing that their "afflictions " worked for them a far more ex- ceeding and eternal weight of glory. 382 The Methods of Natural Theology. It is hard to discover, and still more painful and humiliating to confess, that the remedy and the cure for all the ills of this life is in ourselves or within our reach. True, indeed, this fact does not become entirely clear and satisfactorily demonstrated until we can contemplate it as Christians and from the point of view of that reconcihation with God which He has wrought through Christ. In Him is our strength, our help, and our salvation. But at any rate we can see enough by the light of nature alone, to justify us in the assertion that if we will but make the right use of it, nothing can occur to us that we cannot turn to our spiritual gain and come out the better for it in the end. Of course this solution will hot suit immoral men, worldly minded men and agnostics, who do not want to be anything but immoral or worldly minded. But I know of no way of making the world suit them without first making of them something quite differ- ent from what they now are, or intend to become. Evidently this world was not made for such as they wish to be, nor was the universe, of which we all are parts, arranged for such a life as they propose to lead, or for such an end of life as is the most and the best they hope for. But for those who will ac- cept it, God has ordained and provided something better by way of remedy in this world and of re- ward in the next. Pnovidence and Moral Government. 383 There was a Christian hero once of old who said, " I can do all things through Christ Who strength- eneth me." He, as he assures us, could rejoice even in tribulations. I think that with the same help we can do as much. He knew, and nobody had tested the matter more thoroughly, that " all things work to- gether for the good of them that love God." There is a way by which we can all become " the children of God and heirs of the Kingdom of Heaven," mak- ing all the pains and sufferings of this life work out for us an exceeding and eternal weight of glory.^ 1 Mill is sometimes inclined to take rather a philanthropic view of the existence of evil and suffering. He says. Theism,-^. 185: "The imperfections in the attainment of the purposes which the appearances indicate, have not the air of having been designed. They are like the unintended results of accidents insufficiently guarded against." Again, p. 193, " If man had not the power by the exercise of his own energies for the improvement both of himself and of his out- ward circumstances, to do for himself and other creatures, vastly more thsm God had in the first instance done, the Being who called him into existence would deserve something very different from thanks at his hands." And this idea of working with" Giod and helping Him to overcome the evils and difficulties that were too much for Him at the time of the creation, seems to be rather a favorite thought with Mr. Mill. But oh, how different the spirit from that of St. Paul, "We, then, as workers together with Him, beseech you that ye receive not the grace of God in vain." With Mill, it is "help Him because He needs help"j with St. Paul, "help Him because He has helped us, and given His only begotten Son for us that we, through Him, need not perish, but might have everlasting life." 384 The Methods of Natural Theology. But the evil complained of is one for which I know no other remedy and for which I seem to see that there is a good reason why there should be no other. In this case Evolution cannot help us. Ag- nosticism is of no avail ; for whatever else we may know or not know, there are evils in this life against which we are weak, helpless and hopeless, except as our help and our strength come from Christ through faith in Him and the ministrations of His Gospel. The terms may not suit our pride of in- tellect or our pride of heart. The reward that is promised may not be just such as we would choose if we were sure of getting what we choose. But there is a Wisdom and a Power that is above us, that has been at work in the past history of our race and in ten thousand instances in our own lives, " bringing us by ways that we knew not and leading us by paths that we had not known," to results that were far above, and far better than, any that we should have chosen if the choice had been left to ourselves. Cannot we trust Him ? And now, in conclusion, I think I have consid- ered and disposed of all the objections that have been raised in these modern times or that can well be raised against the Methods and the Truths of Natural Theology, whether physical or metaphysical. Providence and Moral Government. 385 logical or ontological. These truths, however, are at best of but very little value to us or to mankind at large, if we stop with them. I confess, however, that I have a, much higher estimate of them and of their value to mankind than I should have had, had it not been for the testimony which St. Paul has borne in their favor. After speaking of the great truths of Natural Theology that are "manifest" in the works of creation, even " the eternal power and godhead or divinity of God," which makes those that reject Revelation " without excuse," he goes on to speak of the Gentiles who had had no means of knowing the gospel as " doing by nature the things that are written in the law," and says of them, if I understand him rightly, that they also, following this light of nature, will be saved, in the day of their final account, both theirs and ours alike, through the merits of Christ's atoning blood. If, then, these truths may be a guide to salvation for those who have had no opportunity to learn more of the Divine Will and of the way of salvation than these Methods can teach, they certainly deserve a higher estimate than we should otherwise be inclined to put upon them. 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