ffixMyf'^^ 
 
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 ,7 
 
 Cornell University Law Library. 
 
 THE GIFT OF 
 LILLIAN HUFFCUT 
 
 BINGHAMTON, N. Y. 
 
 NOVEMBER 27, 1915 
 
 9181 
 
Cornell University Library 
 E 183.7.A51 
 
 Fore an policy of the United States: pol 
 
 3 1924 024 896 221 
 
The Foreign Policy 
 
 OF THE 
 
 United States: 
 
 Political and Commercial. 
 
 Addresses and Discussion at the Annual Meeting of the 
 \ America n Academy of Political and Social 
 Science , April 7-8, 1899. 
 
 PHILADELPHIA : 
 
 American Academy op Political and Social Science. 
 
 1899. 
 
The original of this book is in 
 the Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924024896221 
 
v /^ -<^< 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 The Government op Dependencies. 
 Addresses : 
 
 Theodore S. Woolsey, Yale University 3 
 
 E. W. HufFcut, Cornell University 19 
 
 A Lawrence Lowell, Harvard University 46 
 
 W. Alleyne Ireland, London 60 
 
 Discussion : 
 
 Talcott Williams, Philadelphia 65 
 
 Leo S. Rowe, University of Pennsylvania 70 
 
 Militarism and Democracy. 
 
 Address : Carl Schurz 77 
 
 Commercial Relations of the United States with the 
 Far East. 
 Addresses : 
 
 Worthington C. Ford, Boston 107 
 
 Robert T. Hill, Washington 131 
 
 Discussion : 
 
 John Foord, New York 144 
 
 William P. Wilson, Philadelphia 154 
 
 Emory R. Johnson, University of Pennsylvania . . 158 
 The Political Relations op the United States with 
 the Far East. 
 Addresses : 
 
 John Bassett Moore, Columbia University 163 
 
 His Excellency Wu Ting-fang 168 
 
 Discussion : 
 
 Lindley M. Keasbey, Bryn Mawr College 177 
 
 Frederick W. Williams, Yale University 184 
 
 APPENDICES 
 
 I. Report op Annual Meeting 201 
 
 II. Introductory Addresses of the President, Profes- 
 sor Edmund J. James. 
 
 The Academy and its Work 205 
 
 Introducing Hon. Carl Schurz 212 
 
 The East and the West 215, 
 
 (iii) 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 
 
 Addresses and Discussions. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT OF DEPENDENCIES. 
 
 Theodore S. Woolsey, Professor of International Law, 
 Yale University. 
 
 In every state with colonies, its government of them 
 must depend upon two factors: (i) the prevailing theory of 
 the dependent relation; (2) the constitutional limitations, 
 if any, under which it lives. There are two theories to de- 
 fine the relationship between a state and its dependencies. 
 One considers them property from which an income is to be 
 drawn; the other considers them a kind of trust, to be 
 administered for the benefit of their inhabitants. 
 
 A good example of the first is the Dutch rule in Java. 
 The Javanese number approximately twenty-five millions. 
 They are governed by two-fifths of one per cent of their 
 number of Europeans. The island is considered a sort of 
 huge farm by the government of the Netherlands. The 
 method of administration, called the "culture system," is 
 one of forced labor. Introduced in 1830, under the influ- 
 ence of a more enlightened public sentiment it is now dis- 
 appearing. At times it has paid a surplus as high as ten 
 million dollars into the Dutch treasury: but this has given 
 place to a deficit. Under it, the Dutch government dis- 
 couraged European immigration, education and missionary 
 labor. There was no autonomy. Generally speaking there 
 was no private property. And the result was that the 
 natives deteriorated in artistic, industrial and scientific pro- 
 cesses. 
 
 If we look for examples of the other, the trust theory, we 
 shall find a very general opinion that the British system is 
 best worth copying. During the second quarter of the 
 present century, Great Britain finally gave her various de- 
 pendencies self-government, unrestricted trade and reform 
 
 (3) 
 
4 Annai<s of the American Academy. 
 
 administrations, wherever practicable. In those climates 
 where the white man can work and multiply, in Canada, 
 Australia and New Zealand for instance, self-governing 
 colonies have been developed, with large liberty of action, 
 duties to protect domestic manufactures against British 
 competition having even been permitted. In the minor 
 colonies of the temperate zone, and in the tropics, where 
 dependencies have been retained in the hands of the crown, 
 the principle of self-sacrifice has still prevailed, and the 
 results have justified it. For we find, on the whole, pros- 
 perity, contentment and loyalty. A blind attachment to the 
 opposite theory has cost Spain her colonies, and makes those 
 of France, in the opinion of enlightened Frenchmen like 
 M. Hanotaux and M. Eercy-Beaulieu, a failure. Now 
 under the system of Great Britain, she spends and her 
 colonies do not contribute; she protects and they enjoy. 
 A judge of the High Court of Calcutta, Mr. Cunningham, 
 wrote in 1882, "we have definitely abandoned the idea 
 that the political connection of England and India can be a 
 source of direct gain to any public body or to the English 
 nation." 
 
 Where, then, does the profit of a state in the matter of 
 dependencies come in ? It comes from the enlarged oppor- 
 tunity for the energies of its surplus youth, and in that 
 stimulated trade which follows the flag. This is peculiarly 
 true in the case of Great Britain. Her narrow limits at 
 home offer but restricted opportunity for business and agri- 
 cultural activities; while, on the other hand, her long 
 supremacy in manufactures of certain kinds and her con- 
 trol of the carrying trade, enable her to take peculiar 
 advantage of the traffic with her dependencies, by which 
 example other nations like Germany have been tempted, to 
 their hurt. 
 
 When we are forced by circumstances to study a form of 
 government for our own dependencies, we turn naturally, 
 therefore, to those British territories which most resemble 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 5 
 
 them, and seek to learn the secret of their success or the 
 warning in their failure. 
 
 My subject in terms is general, relating to the government 
 of all dependencies. I shall take the liberty of making it 
 more specific, the government of our own. These are of two 
 classes, those which are placed under our sovereignty and 
 those which are placed under our protection. In the latter 
 class is Cuba. By treaty Spain has relinquished her sov- 
 ereignty in Cuba. She does not cede it to us; she simply lets 
 it go, reciting the fact that the island is " to be occupied " by 
 the United States. The result of this must be that the 
 sovereignty remains in abeyance with reversion to the 
 Cubans themselves. Spain recognizes our assumption of 
 responsibility for Cuba's actions, until we are satisfied of its 
 "pacification." To secure this was our avowed object in 
 waging war; everything else which has been won, was an 
 accident. To correspond to this responsibility and to enable 
 us to make it good, we must have a certain power. This 
 in Cuba's foreign relations is exclusive; in her domestic 
 concerns it must be so shared between the Cubans and our- 
 selves as to give them that degree of autonomy which will 
 fit them for eventual independence (either in our Union or 
 separately) , while retaining control enough to be correlative 
 with our liabilities. Our first step very properly consists in 
 military occupation, using our soldiers as a constabulary. 
 This means order and better sanitation and protection to 
 local industries and the revival throughout the length and 
 breadth of the island, of all the arts of peace. To accom- 
 plish the desired end, this must be accompanied by the gradual 
 resumption of civil government in all the municipalities, 
 and by the formation of an island legislature to control 
 internal affairs, subject to the veto of the United States rep- 
 resentative. 
 
 All franchises should be in the hands of the native local 
 authorities; the execution of the laws should be entrusted 
 to native elected officers; the courts to judge causes under 
 
6 Annaw of the American Academy. 
 
 the local law should be Cuban also. We protect Cuba from 
 outside aggression, and by veto from her own inexperience 
 and folly, and prevent acts of hostility to ourselves. But 
 the revenues of the island, after paying for the maintenance 
 of our soldiers so long as they are necessary and of our 
 few necessary officials, must be spent for her own benefit. 
 This is a protectorate. Whether the issue of the protec- 
 torate is independence, or, as many believe, annexation, the 
 process of education, of pacification, is the same. It con- 
 sists, in a word, in granting as much control over internal 
 affairs as the inhabitants are able to bear. And we must so 
 regulate their duties and revenue laws and commercial rights, 
 as to give them a prosperous life, even at our own cost, that 
 is, if we wish the experiment to turn out well. Thus we 
 should open the door to foreign trade on as favorable terms 
 as to our own. Instead of regarding the traffic between 
 Cuba and the states as coasting trade, we should open it to 
 foreign ships. And between Spaniards and Cubans, we 
 should not discriminate. 
 
 All this we can properly and lawfully do, because we have 
 not assumed the Cuban's sovereignty; so far as they are 
 concerned we are not tied down by our constitution. Here 
 we see the difference between protected and ceded territory. 
 In the cases of Porto Rico and the Philippines, we are under 
 constitutional limitations. Here there is no presumption of 
 future independence. They are our spoils of war, to govern 
 as Spain did, or to govern as Great Britain would, so far as 
 our constitution allows. All depends upon the kind of 
 results we desire. Some government we must provide, nor 
 is it clear that this task will be easily shifted to other 
 shoulders. While the ratification of the peace treaty was 
 still an open question, it was urged that this step committed 
 the United States to nothing; that in the Philippines at least, 
 cession would give place in time to a protectorate or a sale 
 or the establishment of a republic. I do not think we should 
 shirk the question of a permanent government for them, 
 
The Government op Dependencies. 7 
 
 under any such illusion. Anything other than permanent 
 possession, however desirable, will be most difficult. My 
 reasons for this view are, first, that future surrender is sure 
 to be construed as a confession of failure, and would hurt 
 the national pride. We need not have assumed the burden, 
 but having done so, it must be patiently and loyally borne. 
 Then, too, it will be much less easy to relinquish sovereignty 
 than it was to refuse it. It implies the favorable conjunction 
 of three bodies, two legislative, one executive, against in the 
 latter case one-third of the Senate. And lastly, the whole 
 spirit and tendency of the European policy which we are 
 following, forbids such surrender. It strengthens the loose 
 tie, rather than loosens the strong one. France in Madagas- 
 car, converting a protectorate into a colony, and England in 
 Egypt, only awaiting the right moment to make her own 
 that territory which she has repeatedly promised to evacu- 
 ate, are examples of this. 
 
 To return from this digression. 
 
 Between Porto Rico and the Philippines, both now 
 equally under the sovereignty of the United States, there is 
 a gulf fixed, climatic, social, racial, as well as geographical. 
 In Porto Rico we find a settled society largely of European 
 stock; law-abiding, fairly prosperous, in a healthful climate 
 where our race can live and work, and whither it is likely 
 to migrate until the opportunities are filled. Here are 
 materials for a state after territorial apprenticeship. Or as 
 an unorganized territory, we may watch it working out its 
 ideas of self-government. For, when Congress sees fit to 
 legislate, the government of Porto Rico should be laid as 
 largely as possible upon the shoulders of its own people. 
 Military rule should not be necessary, and a carpet-bag 
 system would produce results which we can pretty definitely 
 forecast. Native officials, a native legislature, the existing 
 laws and municipal regulations should be the starting point. 
 Upon the present system should gradually be engrafted 
 those changes which reason and experience, theirs and ours, 
 
8 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 may suggest, and which Spain has heretofore prevented. 
 There will be difficulties, there may be failure, but both 
 are a means of education. And education in the art of self- 
 government, is what we aim at giving, unless our policy 
 and our professions are alike disregarded. 
 
 The case of the Philippines stands on a far different 
 footing. Cuba and Porto Rico are near our shores; the 
 Philippines are far away. The first have long been within 
 our sphere of influence; possession of the second, suddenly 
 makes us an Asiatic power, and thrusts us without warning 
 into the political and commercial melting pot of the Orient. 
 The first are in the main civilized; the second on the whole 
 savage. In the first, white men can live and work; 
 in the second they can only make others work. The 
 capacity for self-government may exist in the one, but not 
 so clearly in the other. We may govern the one by reason; 
 for the other we shall need force. Porto Rico will pay its 
 own way. The Philippines are certain to be a heavy burden. 
 These are some of the reasons which made the cession of the 
 Philippines a vulnerable point in the peace treaty. That 
 treaty is now ratified, and we must make the best of it. 
 
 I say nothing about the administration of Hawaii, for that 
 is being laid down by Congress. I assume moreover that 
 the Aguinaldo insurrection will be soon put down and the 
 island of I<uzon pacified. It is the next step, the govern- 
 ment after order is restored, which is the crux of the whole 
 problem. 
 
 And here our minds naturally turn to India. The British 
 rule in India is based upon conquest and maintained by 
 force. By war the limits of dominion are constantly being 
 extended. To iustify the mastery of many millions of peo- 
 ple by a handful of alien conquerors, has required genera- 
 tions of honest administration, giving continuous proof of 
 altruistic effort. The governing class has wisely pursued a 
 policy of indifferentism in the matter of religion, neither dis- 
 criminating between beliefs already embraced, nor seeking 
 
The Government op Dependencies. 9 
 
 to propagate its own. So far as practicable it has sought to 
 administer elementary justice through native officials, whose 
 ability is tested by competitive examination. The covenanted 
 civil service is open to British youth by competition, with ten- 
 ure of office during good behavior, promotion in reserve and 
 a handsome retiring pension in the background. It is a 
 picked class, drawn from the flower of the race, with public 
 school training behind it, and animated by a strong prefer- 
 ence for the administrative, not the commercial career. It 
 makes a study, a science, of the business of governing 
 dependent races, and the result is a commendable esprit de 
 corps. All of this is the consequence of historical develop- 
 ment, nor has this ceased. Thus at present the benevolent 
 despotism of the last generation seems to be giving place to 
 a stricter adherence to legal forms. Complaint is made that 
 promotion goes too much by seniority, taking too little 
 account of proved capacity. The fall in the silver rupee, in 
 which the covenanted receive pay, has made the service less 
 desirable. Some of the commissionerships are too large and 
 unwieldy for one man and should be divided. These are 
 criticisms, but as things are, the competition is still keen 
 and the class secured good. 
 
 At the head of the government stands the Secretary of 
 State for India, guided by a Council and sitting in I/mdon. 
 Next comes the Governor-General, commonly but not 
 officially known as Viceroy, with an Executive Council 
 made up of heads of departments, the Viceroy taking that 
 of foreign affairs. This Council is enlarged into a legisla- 
 tive council by the addition of the Governor of that province 
 in which it is held, of official delegates from Madras and 
 Bombay, and of certain non-official representatives of 
 European and of native communities. Then come the gov- 
 ernors of the two presidencies, also with councils ; the 
 lieutenant-governors of Bengal, the Punjab and the North- 
 western Provinces; the chief commissioners of other prov- 
 inces, together forming a class subordinate to the Viceroy. 
 
IO ANNAI£ OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 
 
 Under these are the 238 districts, grouped into commis- 
 sionerships, their heads being called collector magistrates 
 or deputy-commissioners. These are both fiscal and judicial 
 officers, but concern themselves also with everything under 
 the sun, from police to agriculture, from road-making to the 
 social life of the people. For they are " the representatives 
 of a paternal, not a constitutional government."* 
 
 The districts containing an average of over 800,000 people, 
 are in turn subdivided, this being the final unit of administra- 
 tion. The laws enforced are British acts, Indian Council 
 enactments, native laws and native customs. The judicial 
 jurisdiction corresponds largely to the magisterial and fiscal, 
 and one of the curious features is the frequent union of two 
 out of the three characters in the same person. A soldier 
 also is sometimes made a district officer. 
 
 Each province has its own judicial system, with a chain 
 of authorities ending in the High Court, and to this law, so 
 interpreted, all alike are subject. The characteristics of the 
 whole system appear to be, paternalism, comprehensiveness, 
 justice and order. The great majority of the minor civil 
 offices are filled by natives; the higher judges are mostly 
 European. Indeed the suggestion to place non-official 
 Europeans under the jurisdiction of any natives created a 
 tempest of opposition. 
 
 The results of British administration in India have been 
 splendid. It has kept the peace, preserved order, built 
 roads, railroads and irrigation works, brought justice to the 
 humblest, lessened famine and pestilence, introduced state 
 education, sanitation and dispensaries, freed trade from 
 many burdens, simplified taxation, and has begun to intro- 
 duce local self-government. A single detail further is perti- 
 nent. The imperial revenue is drawn chiefly from salt and 
 opium monopolies and from the land tax; its expenditure, 
 excluding capital or construction account, is about equal to 
 its income. 
 
 *Encyc. Brit., Art. India, p. 769, ninth ed. 
 
The Government op Dependencies. ii 
 
 Now very much of this system, particularly its basic ideas, 
 will repay our study in considering the Philippines. We 
 must practice religious toleration toward Christian and 
 Mohammedan alike, even to the limit of indifferentism, yet 
 not protecting abuses. We must keep a firm hand on the 
 so-called civilized natives, who constitute one-half of the 
 population, and yet educate them to some measure of local 
 administration which they can in time undertake themselves. 
 We must better communications and build public works. 
 We must raise revenue skillfully and spend it more and more 
 on the country. We must get work out of an indolent race, 
 without slavery or its equivalent in contract labor, probably 
 by introducing it to new wants. I<ife is necessarily indolent, 
 where existence is so ridiculously easy. We must guide 
 the savage half with the strength which he will respect and 
 the courage which he will admire. Justice and good faith 
 are essential in dealing with both classes: justice, inexpen- 
 sive, swift and incorruptible, administered by a permanent 
 trained service with higher ideals than personal advantage. 
 All of this is suggested by the British rule in India; it is 
 essential to success; how can it be made practicable ? Here 
 we come in sight of our constitutional limitations, for it is 
 the merest folly to trace out an ideal course and laugh away 
 the obstacles. 
 
 I<et us assume that the United States may acquire ter- 
 ritory, when and how it chooses. Let us grant that there 
 is no obligation, either now or in the remote future, to form 
 this territory into states. Nevertheless the moment Congress 
 begins to legislate for the Philippines and establishes there 
 civil government, whether on the lines above indicated or 
 on any others, that moment the constitutional guarantees 
 begin to work. This was the case in the unorganized ter- 
 ritory of Alaska. In accordance with these guarantees, 
 though a legislative assembly and a delegate to Congress are 
 prohibited, the rights of habeas corpus and of a jury trial are 
 recognized, by statute.* 
 
 * 23 U. S. Stats, pp. 24-27. 
 
12 Annai^s of the American Academy. 
 
 These personal guarantees are contained in the body of 
 the constitution and its amendments. They relate in 
 general to the security of life, liberty and property. They 
 include specifically religious freedom; free speech and a 
 free press; the right of assembling and of petition; the right 
 to bear arms; security from unreasonable search and seizure; 
 freedom from the quartering of troops; the necessity of 
 presentment by a grand jury on a capital charge; the right 
 of compulsory process to secure witnesses; the aid of counsel 
 when accused; above all the right of trial by jury. 
 
 It is to be noted that some of these provisions are by 
 nature or in terms applicable to all the territory of the 
 United States, while others, being civil rather than political 
 rights, may be capable of limitation to the citizens of the 
 states and their grantees under title of the people of the 
 United States. This distinction is by no means certain: it 
 is merely a possible loophole of escape, if the supreme court 
 should be urged to deny the Philippines certain inconvenient 
 rights, that to bear arms, for instance. 
 
 But in order to stand on the safest possible ground let me 
 place together here the guarantees concerning whose exten- 
 sion to all United States terrritory there can be little 
 question. 
 
 First comes the right of trial by jury. 
 
 This is contained in the final clause of Section 2 , Article 
 III, as follows: "The trial of all crimes, except in cases 
 of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be 
 held in the state where the said crimes shall have been com- 
 mitted; but when not committed within any state the trial 
 shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law 
 have directed." This language is pretty clear, but by judi- 
 cial construction it has been made still clearer.* In an illu- 
 minating and most judicial article upon the constitutional 
 questions incident to the acquisition and government of 
 
 *Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S., 540, 550; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S., 343, 346. 
 See also Am. Publ. Co. ». Fisher, 166 U. S., 464, 466. 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 13 
 
 island territory by the United States (Harv. I^aw Rev., 
 XII, No. 6), Judge Baldwin examines the origin of this 
 jury trial provision, its phrasing, and its construction by 
 the supreme court. He expresses the belief that unless 
 the views of that court should be overruled, " they must 
 lead to the conclusion that no conviction for crime could be 
 had in any of our new possessions, after the establishment there 
 of an orderly civil government, except upon a jury trial." 
 
 On the same plane with the right of trial by jury stand 
 those guarantees, contained in the amendments to the con- 
 stitution, which are neither inserted specifically for the bene- 
 fit of the "people" of the United States, nor relate to 
 rights merely political. Those most germane to our topic 
 are here enumerated: 
 
 Slavery is forbidden in the United States ' ' or any place 
 subject to their jurisdiction." 
 
 Religious liberty is provided. 
 
 Indictment by a grand jury is necessary to a trial for an 
 infamous crime. 
 
 No man can be compelled to give testimony against 
 himself. 
 
 No person can be deprived of life, liberty or property 
 without due process of law. 
 
 No cruel or unusual punishment may be inflicted. 
 
 If now these constitutional rights relating to persons and 
 property extend to all the territories of the United States, 
 they must exist in the Philippines, and must be taken 
 account of in the question of governing the Philippines. 
 The inhabitants of these islands are thought to number from 
 eight to ten millions, of eighty distinct tribes which are 
 classified by Professor Worcester as Negritos (the descend- 
 ants of the aborigines), Mohammedan Malays, Pagan 
 Malays, and civilized Malays, the latter being one-half of 
 the whole. These domesticated Malays are described as 
 fairly intelligent, but dishonest, untruthful, and so indolent 
 that crops spoil for lack of laborers. 
 
14 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 Foreman, who had much fuller information than Worces- 
 ter, and is the authority upon whom Worcester -largely 
 relies, gives a curious list of their virtues and vices, and 
 confesses that he cannot understand their character. It is a 
 succession of surprises, he says. They are hospitable, 
 cleanly, sober and patient; they are incapable of grati- 
 tude, profligate, undependable, improvident, cruel, imperti- 
 nent, superstitious, treacherous. The few in the cities 
 imitate European usages; the many regard the European as 
 a demoniacal being, or at least an enemy. All are liars, 
 even in the confessional. ' ' The native is so contumacious 
 to all bidding," writes Foreman, " so averse to social order, 
 that he can only be ruled by coercion, by the demonstration 
 of force." 
 
 There is reason for this judgment. Of sixty-six provinces, 
 nineteen under Spanish rule had a civil governor, forty- 
 seven a military one; yet the civil governor was the head 
 of carbineers and police, of the departments of education, 
 prisons, health, works, forests, mines, agriculture, mails, 
 telegraph; in charge of everything but the public funds, so 
 that he could not have fallen far behind his military col- 
 league as a reservoir of force. 
 
 Such are the domesticated half. The savage half range 
 between docility and ferocity, between innocency and piracy, 
 many tribes having never yielded to the Spaniard. 
 
 Now il we place such people as these in possession of such 
 constitutional rights as those mentioned, we have a reductio 
 ad absutdum. How can we establish over them a civil gov- 
 ernment which would be anything but a mockery, if we 
 must concede indictment by grand jury for some crimes and 
 trial by jury for all? It would mean the breakdown of any 
 criminal system to which it was applied and unchecked 
 crime means administrative failure. And in addition, unless 
 by construction the other guarantees could be put out of 
 reach, like edged tools rescued from children's hands, we 
 might have to concede the right to bear arms to persons 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 15 
 
 intending assassination ; a free press, although teaching 
 open sedition ; the right of assembling when it endangered 
 our sovereignty.* 
 
 As Judge Baldwin well says, to give half-civilized peoples 
 the benefit of immunities framed by a civilized people for 
 itself ' ' would be a serious obstacle to the maintenance there 
 of an efficient government. Every people under a written 
 constitution must experience difficulties of administration 
 that are unknown to nations like Great Britain which are 
 unfettered by legal restraints imposed by former generations. 
 It is part of the price that it pays for liberty, that new con- 
 ditions must be dealt with in fundamentals, under old laws. ' ' 
 
 Nevertheless we need not despair of our ability to frame 
 a suitable government for the Philippines, even if, as I believe, 
 a civil government, under our constitution, is and must 
 be for the indefinite future, inadmissible. We have still 
 the military solution in reserve, and to that we have re- 
 course by process of exclusion. 
 
 Govern we must. Civil government would mean chaos, 
 if the personal guarantees go with it. No government can 
 succeed there which is not based upon force. We need to 
 place a benevolent despot in every district in the Archipelago. 
 Therefore the military government is the only one possible. 
 And this is dependent upon the inaction of Congress. Its 
 constitutional basis lies in the fact that the United States as sov- 
 ereign is responsible for the maintenance of justice and order, 
 for the defence of its territory, for the protection of its subjects' 
 rights. This duty is in the hands of Congress as part of its 
 general rights, and also under the ' ' needful rules and regula- 
 tions' ' clause, regarding territory. Pending action by Con- 
 gress, this duty devolves upon the President, the Executive 
 
 * In Mormon Ch. v. U. S. (136 U. S. 44) Mr. Justice Bradley said for the Court, 
 "Doubtless Congress in legislating for the territories would be subject to those 
 fundamental limitations in favor of personal rights, which are formulated in the 
 Constitution and its amendments ; but these limitations would exist rather by 
 inference and the general spirit of the Constitution from which Congress derives 
 all its powers, than by any express and direct application of its provisions." 
 
16 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 head of the nation and Commander-in-Chief of both army and 
 navy. The law applicable would not be martial law, for 
 that implies war, or insurgency; it would not be military 
 law except as to the discipline of the army itself; it would 
 be simply the will of the President, but expressed so far as 
 practicable in terms of the law already existing, and 
 executed by the President's representatives, the officers of 
 the United States army. This despotic form of administra- 
 tion is not an ideal method; its justification is that no other 
 is practicable. 
 
 In using the army officers for administrative work, we 
 should be doing nothing new. The first act relating to 
 Louisiana, in 1803, empowered the President to appoint all 
 •civil, military and judicial officers of the new territory, 
 define their duties and support them with the army and 
 navy. " It was in effect the establishment of a military 
 despotism over Louisiana, and may suffice as an example of 
 the extent to which the sovereign power of the United 
 States over territories might go, if a wiser policy were not 
 the rule, ' ' writes Alexander Johnston. The untaxed In- 
 dians, who are expressly excluded from the right of repre- 
 sentation, have at times been cared for by our army officers 
 acting as agents, and with a success in agreeable contrast 
 to that of the average Indian agent. 
 
 There are two qualities among many, which the history 
 of the British in India emphasizes as peculiarly desirable in 
 those persons who have to govern dependent peoples. One 
 is physical strength and courage; the other a high sense of 
 honor. Those splendid men who saved India in the Mutiny, 
 men both in the civil and military service, the two Law- 
 rences, Edwards, Neville Chamberlain, Roberts, John 
 Nicholson and many like them, may well serve as examples 
 of the value of these qualities. Their courage and vigor 
 won the native admiration; their honorable dealing won con- 
 fidence and love. The relationship between governor and 
 governed is a fiduciary one, like that between guardian and 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 17 
 
 ward. Its basis must be the sense of honor. Now is it not 
 more likely that we shall find the union of these two qualities 
 in our army officers of West Point training, than amongst 
 any other class of citizens available for such work ? They 
 are taught both to obey and to command. They are picked 
 men, physically. Honor is the basis of the army organi- 
 zation, for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman 
 costs a man his commission. Just so far as the influence 
 of politics and of politicians can be excluded, the regular 
 army is to be trusted. We must use it to obtain order ; I 
 believe that we can and must use it also to maintain order 
 and administer justice. 
 
 There will be difficulties in the way. One will be the 
 status of foreigners in the Philippines. We cannot grant 
 them exterritorial privileges, for that would be inconsistent 
 with our dignity; nor can we deny them civil rights, par- 
 ticularly when specified by treaty with their country; our 
 own citizens would be likewise in a false position. Some 
 makeshift would be required, like a plaster to a sore spot, 
 for instance the application of the laws of Oregon and a 
 Federal Court to others than natives. Another difficulty 
 may arise from the religious orders. These friars serve as 
 parish priests ; they are large holders of property ; this 
 property is secured to them under the terms of the Spanish 
 treaty, preventing sequestration ; the educational system, 
 such as it is, is in their hands. In Spanish times the 
 church constantly intrigued against any governor who pre- 
 ferred the interests of the state to its own, and this same 
 spirit, perhaps stirring up native opposition, we must expect 
 to encounter. 
 
 Then there is the raising of revenue. Under Spanish 
 rule, the larger items of income came from fifteen days' forced 
 labor per head, per annum, or its commutation, five million 
 dollars and over; from customs, two millions; from govern- 
 ment monopolies, stamps, gambling, opium, cock-fighting, 
 and so on, one million ; from lotteries, one-half million. 
 
1 8 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 Much of this is not a proper source of revenue for an 
 enlightened nation. Even with these illegitimate sources 
 of income, Spain made a deficit. "There is no record," 
 writes Foreman, ' ' that the Philippines have ever been in a 
 flourishing financial condition. ' ' 
 
 I^astly, there is always the chance that Congress, in order 
 to embarrass a president of a different political complexion, 
 may decide to embark upon civil government, and take this 
 tremendous, perhaps dangerous, despotic power out of the 
 Executive's hands. 
 
 So that we can hardly expect plain sailing. Our duty is 
 to respect the Constitution, patiently and loyally to do our 
 best under the circumstances, and then to "wish for the 
 day." 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF THE GOVERN- 
 MENT OF DEPENDENCIES. 
 
 E. W. HupfcuT, Professor of Law, Cornell University. 
 
 With the acquisition of Hawaii, Porto Rico and the 
 Philippines, three novel and interesting problems in the 
 government of dependencies confront the United States. 
 First, we are called upon to govern what yesterday was a 
 white man's oligarchy, resting upon the ruins of a semi- 
 savage monarchy, with a basis of native Pacific islanders, a 
 stratum of Japanese and Chinese, another of Portuguese, 
 and an upper crust of domiciled Americans and Englishmen 
 and Germans. Second, we are called upon to govern an 
 ancient Spanish colony, densely populated, with a proud and 
 impatient Latin race as the dominant factor. Third, we are 
 called upon to govern an ancient Spanish satrapy, densely 
 populated with native islanders of varying races, in varying 
 stages of development, and lying in tropical latitudes alleged 
 to be unfit for Caucasian colonization. 
 
 In some respects the problems are totally difFerent from 
 those which have confronted any other government in its 
 dealings with dependencies. Even Hawaii, least difficult 
 of all the problems, presents some novel features, as, for 
 example, the presence of so large a body of subjects of 
 foreign states as to whom our policy has been one of exclu- 
 sion. Porto Rico, on the other hand, presents to us the 
 difficult task of reconciling an influential class of intelligent 
 Europeans to a change of rulers, of educating the Span- 
 iards, bred in the habits of political thought common to the 
 Latin races, to the notions underlying the American form 
 of government, and, at the same time, preserving the dis- 
 tinctions between the independent form of government of 
 our states and organized territories and that necessary for a 
 dependent outlying island possession. I am not sure but 
 this is, after all, our hardest problem. Whether it is or not 
 must depend upon the attitude of the dominant class in the 
 island. As to the Philippines, I content myself with quot- 
 ing from the Hon. James Bryce {Century Magazine, March 
 1899, p. 726): " Probably no task has been presented to 
 the English in India or in any of their colonies during the 
 last fifty years so difficult as that to which Americans will 
 
 (19) 
 
20 ANNAI5 OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 
 
 have to address themselves when they become responsible 
 for these islands, with their area of one hundred and fifteen 
 thousand square miles and their semi-savage and savage 
 population of nearly eight millions. No enterprise of like 
 magnitude or complexity has ever lain before the United 
 States before, for when she purchased Louisiana, and again 
 when she conquered vast territories from Mexico, the area 
 acquired was almost empty, and all of it was a temperate 
 region, fit to be peopled by the overflow of her own popu- 
 lation and to receive her institutions. ' ' 
 
 Face to face with these three problems, the American 
 people have promptly addressed themselves to the analysis 
 of the conditions presented, and to a tentative solution of 
 the difficulties. 
 
 Analyzing the arguments and suggestions concerning the 
 proper means of governing our new dependencies, we find 
 that there are two primary questions upon which expert opin- 
 ion is radically divided: 
 
 First. Does the Constitution of the United States extend 
 of its own force to territories or dependencies governed under 
 laws enacted by the Congress of the United States? 
 
 Second. Can white men live and thrive in the tropics ? 
 
 Our views as to the proper form of government for the 
 dependencies, or at least two of them, must be largely influ- 
 enced or controlled by the answer we return to these two 
 primary questions. If the privileges and immunities 
 accorded to citizens of the states be the constitutional right of 
 citizens of territories, and if the limitations placed upon 
 Congress in legislating for states be equally effective when 
 legislating for territories, then we must pause before 
 attempting to govern the Porto Ricans and the Filipinos 
 under such a system. If it be impracticable to colonize 
 the Philippines, then our form of government, assuming we 
 are free to fix it as we will, must differ materially from that 
 which might be expedient in a territory suitable for coloni- 
 zation by Americans or kindred peoples. 
 
 Upon the first question the experts differ radically. On 
 the one hand Professor I,angdell and Professor Thayer are 
 convinced that the constitutional limitations of the federal 
 constitution do not apply to Congress when legislating for 
 dependencies. The former in an article of extraordinary 
 acuteness and logic has shown that the term ' ' United 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 21 
 
 States" means in the constitution either (1) the collective 
 name of the states which are united together by or under 
 the constitution or (2) the name of the sovereign power 
 resident in the federal union of states, and that in the latter 
 sense it is used to express legal or political relations between 
 the collective states and the particular states, or between 
 the former and foreign states, or between the former and 
 private persons, and that in this sense the term can never 
 properly be used to express extent of territory. Only in 
 popular usage, and not in the constitution, is the third 
 meaning of extent of territory over which sovereignty is 
 exercised, to be found. The three meanings may be con- 
 cisely indicated by the terms Collective or United States, 
 Federal Sovereign, Federal Empire. "The conclusion, 
 therefore, is that, while the term ' United States' has three 
 meanings, only the first and second of these are known to 
 the constitution; and that is equivalent to saying that the 
 Constitution of the United States as such does not extend 
 beyond the limits of the states which are united by and 
 under it." * Professor Thayer gives it as his opinion that, 
 ' ' there is no lack of power in our nation — of legal, consti- 
 tutional power — to govern these islands as colonies, sub- 
 stantially as England might govern them. " f On the other 
 hand Judge Baldwin, in an article referred to by Professor 
 Woolsey in his address opening this discussion, comes to a 
 contrary conclusion and holds that the guaranties of the 
 constitution extend to all territory of the United States sub- 
 jected to civil government.! To the same effect are other 
 recent discussions. § 
 
 Upon the second question experts also differ. It is a 
 debatable question whether white men can live and thrive in 
 the tropics from generation to generation. It is therefore 
 an open question whether the Philippines will lend them- 
 selves to successful colonization. On the one hand we have 
 the conclusion of Mr. Kidd in his suggestive essay on 
 "The Control of the Tropics " (p. 30, see also pp. 48, 53-4) 
 that white men cannot be acclimated in the tropics and that 
 ' ' the unusual triviality of the facts upon the one side, and the 
 
 * 12 Harv. Law Rev. 365 (February, 1899). 
 1 12 Harv. Law Rev. 464, 467 (March, 1899). 
 1 12 Harv. Law Rev. 393, 404-5 (February, 1899). 
 
 g Carmen F. Randolph, 12 Harv. Law Rev. 291 (January, 1899); Professor J. W. 
 Burgess, 14 Pol. Sci. Quar. 1 (March, 1899); Professor Ernst Freund, VS., 19. 
 
22 Annans of the American Academy. 
 
 apparently massive and overwhelming character of the 
 evidence on the other, will probably bring most unbiased 
 minds to feel that it is a matter upon which in the end there 
 can hardly be room for any real or important difference of 
 opinion. ' ' On the other hand, however, we have the testi- 
 mony and the opinion of the venerable Alfred Russel Wal- 
 lace (in The Independent for March 9, 1899, p. 667) that 
 his observation and experience in tropical countries during 
 a period of four years' residence in Brazil and eight in the 
 Malay archipelago lead to the conclusion that white men can 
 live and work and thrive in tropical lands if proper sanitary 
 conditions are observed. Professor Blackman {Independent, 
 March 9, 1899, P- 670) gives many recorded facts to sustain 
 the same conclusion. The experience in Queensland is 
 adduced by both Mr. Wallace and Professor Blackman to 
 add demonstration to the theory otherwise based upon some- 
 what scattered and isolated facts. 
 
 Whatever the truth as to this controversy, it is well for us 
 to take a conservative, if hopeful, view. White men are 
 not likely to flock to the tropics as colonists until it is 
 reasonably certain that they can live there in safety and 
 comfort. Gold fields or diamond fields might entice them, 
 but agriculture and manufacture give too slow a return to 
 encourage the assumption of a large risk. It will be many 
 years before the Philippines will be regarded as a suitable 
 field for any extensive colonization. Moreover we must 
 remember that the islands are already more densely popu- 
 lated than many of the United States and that white men 
 rarely condescend to the harder forms of labor in the 
 presence of large numbers of an inferior race. The Philip- 
 pines, therefore, must be governed under conditions very 
 similar to those which confront the English in India and the 
 Dutch in Java and Sumatra. 
 
 It is, however, not the object of this paper to enlarge upon 
 the second of these questions, or to deal with the form of 
 government best suited to tropical dependencies; but to seek 
 to show that whatever government may be thought best 
 under these conditions, we are free to establish. 
 
 The solutions offered, the form of government proposed 
 for these dependencies, is determined by each writer who has 
 approached the problem, in accordance with his views as to 
 the constitutional powers and limitations of Congress. 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 23 
 
 Those who believe that we are not free to govern as we 
 please, that at every step we shall be beset by constitutional 
 limitations wholly inapplicable to existing conditions, have 
 two possible solutions — a military government or a protec- 
 torate. By either of these methods we should avoid all 
 troublesome constitutional questions. By the first we should 
 leave the power where it now resides, in the executive branch 
 of the government. But there are two very serious objec- 
 tions to this. In the first place nothing seems less desirable 
 for the American Republic than a permanent military 
 government in any place subject to its jurisdiction. It is 
 not only opposed to all our political notions and traditions, 
 but it is a dangerous object lesson for a democracy. In the 
 next place, as Professor Woolsey justly says, we should 
 always in the case of military government, be in fear of 
 congressional action which would plunge us into the very 
 troubles from which military government is intended to save 
 us. Is it not too much to hope for, even if it were well to 
 hope for it, that Congress shall remain inactive where it has 
 a clear right, perhaps a clear duty, to act ? As a temporary 
 expedient military government may tide us over the period 
 of preparation, but in the near future we must squarely face 
 the problem of settled, civil government. 
 
 A protectorate, on the other hand, means an incomplete 
 control, limited and defined by treaty, of a people described 
 by Professor Woolsey' s citations as "incapable of gratitude, 
 profligate, undependable, improvident, cruel, impertinent, 
 superstitious, treacherous," a people "so averse to social 
 order, that they can only be ruled by coercion, by the dem- 
 onstration of force." Under such a treaty we should remain 
 responsible before the world for the good conduct of the 
 islands; we should be held to the protection of foreign inter- 
 ests there and should be responsible for foreign relations; we 
 should be bound by the terms of a convention which could 
 be changed, should experience demonstrate that change is 
 necessary, only by the consent of the other party to it; we 
 should, unless our first arrangement were a miracle of wisdom, 
 be hampered more seriously than by all the provisions of the 
 federal constitution, for that at least we can change without 
 the consent of an Asiatic dependency. 
 
 Those who believe that we are free to govern as we please, 
 as free as England would be under like circumstances, look 
 forward to the establishment of a civil government suited 
 
24 Annai,s of thb American Academy. 
 
 to the needs of the dependency for which it is framed, and 
 backed by such force as is necessary to give it stability and 
 safety. For myself, I believe that such a government is 
 possible and desirable. I believe that the only justifiable 
 form of government for dependencies of the United States 
 is a civil government adapted to the existing conditions and 
 needs of the dependency and administered under the super- 
 vision of Congress. While giving due weight to all that 
 may be said to the contrary, I am convinced that Congress 
 is free to establish such a government untrammeled and 
 unrestricted by any provisions of the federal constitution 
 save only the prohibition against slavery. In the space now 
 allotted to me I shall seek to show the grounds of this belief. 
 
 I«et us examine the provisions of the federal constitution 
 that may touch the matter. Bringing together all the vari- 
 ous provisions of that instrument conferring power upon 
 Congress and restricting the power so conferred, we find 
 the following general scheme : 
 
 First. A specific enumeration of powers, formerly exer- 
 cised by the states, but by this grant conferred upon Con- 
 gress, to be exercised over territory and people formerly 
 within the exclusive jurisdiction of the states.* 
 
 Second. A specific proviso that in the exercise of the 
 powers so conferred, Congress shall not do certain things, f 
 
 Third. A specific statement that certain of these powers 
 shall be exclusive and that as to these the states shall not 
 possess concurrent powers. { 
 
 Fourth. After all these relations between the federal power 
 and the states are disposed of, a specific, unrestricted grant 
 of power in these words: " The Congress shall have power to 
 dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respect- 
 ing the territory or other property belonging to the United 
 States."§ In this there is no hint that such power is to be 
 limited in any way by the provisions previously inserted for 
 the preservation of the rights and liberties of the states or 
 of the people of the states. 
 
 *Art. I, sec. 8; Art. in. 
 
 t Art. I, sec. 9j Art. in, sec. 2, sub. 3. It is significant that the very first of these 
 forbids Congress to prohibit for a certain period " the migration or importation of 
 such persons as any of the stales now existing shall think proper to admit.*' Of the 
 others two specifically mention the states as the territory included in the prohibi- 
 tion.— Art. I, sec. 9, subs. 5 and 6. 
 
 J Art. I, sec. 10. 
 
 j Art. IV, sec. 3, subs. 1. 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 25 
 
 Such are the provisions, plain and unequivocal, of the consti- 
 tution as it was originally adopted. But objection was made 
 that the limitations of Art. I, Sec. 9, and Art. III. Sec. 2, Sub. 
 3 , did not sufficiently safeguard the states , or the people thereof, 
 against the improper exercise of the powers conferred in Art. 
 I, Sec. 8, and in Art. III. Thereupon the first ten amendments 
 were adopted to meet this objection, and it is historically 
 correct to say that these amendments have the same force 
 and effect, and no other, as if they had originally been 
 adopted as a part of the provisos of Art. I, Sec. 9 and Art. 
 III. 
 
 Of the later amendments, the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth, 
 are, with no straining of construction, but naturally and 
 logically, to be regarded as a completion of the same pur- 
 pose. The first section of the Fourteenth determines those 
 who are citizens of the United States and of a state, and is 
 mainly concerned in prohibiting the states from abridging 
 the privileges of such persons. The other sections are 
 plainly aimed at the states. The Fifteenth supplements the 
 Fourteenth by preventing the disfranchisement of the citizens 
 defined in the Fourteenth " on account of race, color or pre- 
 vious condition of servitude." 
 
 The Thirteenth Amendment, on the other hand, is by its 
 terms, made to apply not only to the states but to any place 
 subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. Of all the 
 provisions of the constitution this, therefore, is the only one 
 that in terms, or by fair implication, limits the general grant 
 of power to govern the territories or dependencies of the 
 United States.* 
 
 The conclusion is therefore but natural that Congress has 
 all needful powers over the dependencies except that it can- 
 not authorize or permit slavery to exist there. 
 
 If the question were wholly a new one, to be determined 
 with reference to our new conditions and unembarrassed by 
 previous pronouncements, I venture to think that this con- 
 clusion would easily be reached by the courts. But it is 
 said that the Supreme Court has already decided adversely 
 to this contention, and has expressed a dictum adverse to it 
 
 •With this example and purpose before them the Congress and the States adopted 
 in the Fourteenth Amendment the phrase, " All persons born or naturalized 
 In the United States," without a hint that it was intended to include other places 
 subject to their jurisdiction, and the further phrase " citizens of the United States 
 and of the state wherein they reside," without a suggestion that persons are citi- 
 zens who reside outside the limits of a state. Of course the phrase and subject 
 to their jurisdiction " refers in this amendment to persons and not to places. 
 
26 Annates op the American Academy. 
 
 in numerous cases. After a consideration of the cases cited 
 to these propositions, I am ready to confess that the Supreme 
 Court has, in several cases, given utterance to dicta to the 
 effect that Congress is restricted by the constitutional limi- 
 tations in its dealings with the territories, and has, in one 
 case, actually decided that the constitution guarantees to the 
 people of the District of Columbia a trial by jury in all 
 criminal cases. But beyond this I can find no decision of 
 the Supreme Court to the effect claimed — and, as for the 
 dicta, while they express the opinion of judges from the 
 point of view presented in the cases in which they were 
 uttered, we are all aware that they will not be allowed to 
 control a subsequent decision in which the court may find it 
 possible and proper to take a contrary view. 
 
 In order to understand the precise questions involved in 
 these decisions and dicta, and to appreciate the precise ques- 
 tions that may arise should Congress undertake to establish a 
 civil government for Porto Rico and the Philippines, let us 
 arrange under appropriate heads all the restrictions upon 
 congressional power found in the federal constitution and 
 examine such pronouncements as have been made by the 
 federal courts concerning them. They all fall under the 
 following heads: (a) Citizenship; (£) Justice; (c) Revenue; 
 (d) Bankruptcy; (<?) Military Forces; (/) Titles of Nobility; 
 (g) Freedom of Opinion and Speech; (k) Slavery. 
 
 (a) Citizenship. 
 
 1. The Congress shall have power .... to establish an uniform 
 rule of naturalization .... throughout the United States. — Art. I, 
 sec. 8, sub. 4. 
 
 2. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
 to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
 state wherein they reside. — Amend. XIV, sec. I. 
 
 3. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be 
 denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account 
 of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. — Amend. XV. 
 
 4. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and 
 immunities of citizens in the several states. — Art. IV, sec. 2, sub. 1. 
 
 Under this head the first provision and the last may be 
 passed over. I am sure there will be a general agreement 
 that the last is by its terms a restriction upon the states and 
 not upon the United States, and that as applied to the states 
 it comprehends only those privileges and immunities which 
 are in their nature fundamental, as protection by the gov- 
 ernment, the enjoyment of life and liberty with the right to- 
 
T-he Government of Dependencies. 27 
 
 acquire and enjoy property subject to such restraints as the 
 government may justly prescribe for the public good,* It 
 is now too plain for argument that when the word state is 
 used in the constitution it refers to one of the members of 
 the Union and does not include the District of Columbia or 
 the territories. f Internationally it may be otherwise, and 
 the word state in a treaty may include any political entity 
 whose foreign affairs are conducted by the federal govern- 
 ment. I This distinction between the meaning of phrases as 
 used in the constitution and the same phrases as used in 
 international law is very important, though it has sometimes 
 been overlooked by commentators. 
 
 As to the first of the above provisions, it is proper to 
 make two observations: First, I cannot conceive that we 
 should be at all embarrassed by allowing the same persons 
 to be naturalized in Porto Rico or the Philippines as in 
 Florida or California; second, the remarks which follow as 
 to the second and third provisions above quoted and to the 
 rule requiring taxes to be uniform throughout the United 
 States, are equally applicable to this provision, and, if justi- 
 fied, establish that the phrase United States means the states 
 united by and under the constitution. 
 
 The second and third provisions — the Fourteenth and Fif- 
 teenth Amendments — present a question of the very first 
 importance. Will all persons hereafter born in Porto Rico 
 or the Philippines or Hawaii be citizens of the United States 
 under the definition contained in the Fourteenth Amendment 
 and entitled to the protection of that and the Fifteenth Amend- 
 ment ? I wish to point out that the answer to this question 
 is not dependent, in my judgment, upon the establishment 
 of a civil government in these islands. Under whose juris- 
 diction are the Porto Ricans and the Filipinos and the 
 Hawaiians ? Not Spain's, for hers has been yielded to the 
 United States. Not that of a Porto Rican or Filipino or 
 Hawaiian government for there is none de jure or tie facto. 
 It cannot be that any one of these groups is derelict and 
 without a government to exercise jurisdiction. There 
 remains but one answer. From the moment the treaty of 
 cession is in effect the islands and the inhabitants thereof are 
 
 *Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C C 371; McCready». Virginia, 94 U. S. 391; Geer 
 v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519. 
 
 t Hepburn v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch, 445; New Orleans v. Winter, 1 Wheaton, 91; Bar- 
 ney v. Baltimore, 6 Wallace, 280. 
 
 J Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258. 
 
28 Annals op the American Academy. 
 
 subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and if the 
 islands are a part of the United States, within the meaning of 
 the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, then every child 
 born in them after the treaty is effective, is a citizen of the 
 United States with all a citizen's privileges and immunities, 
 and the United States cannot deny to such citizen the right to 
 vote on account of race or color. While those provisions of 
 the constitution which are expressly or impliedly an inhibition 
 upon Congress could not be operative in any event, until 
 Congress chose to act, this provision, which simply defines 
 citizenship, does not wait upon any act of Congress, any 
 more than does the provision of the Thirteenth Amendment. 
 The sole question is, whether, like the Thirteenth Amend- 
 ment, it is operative in all places subject to the jurisdiction 
 of the United States. 
 
 But are persons born in these islands born in the United 
 States within the meaning of the constitution ? The answer 
 to this question must depend upon the meaning given to the 
 term "United States." If the contention of Professor 
 I,angdell is correct — and I believe that it is — then the term 
 must be taken, for constitutional and legal purpose, in its 
 natural, primary meaning of the states united or federated 
 under the constitution. A person born in one of these is a 
 citizen of the United States (the federal sovereign), and of 
 the state where he resides; no state shall make any law to 
 abridge his privileges or immunities as such citizen; neither 
 the state nor the United States shall deny to him the suffrage 
 on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. 
 But the status of a person born outside the limits of the 
 states so united or federated is not defined by the constitu- 
 tion made and established for such states, but by the law of 
 nations, the common law, and such statutes as may be 
 enacted by Congress, precisely as the status of persons born 
 in the states was thus defined before these amendments went 
 into effect. Here we come again to the distinction between 
 the constitutional and the international definition or use of 
 terms. A state in the constitution means one of the United 
 States; in international law it means any political entity over 
 which the United States, in external affairs, exercises juris- 
 diction. A citizen in the constitution means a person born 
 or naturalized in one of the United States and subject to 
 their jurisdiction; it means in international law a person born 
 in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 29 
 
 and himself subject to such jurisdiction. That this is the 
 natural meaning to be attached to the term as defined in the 
 constitution will be apparent upon a little consideration. 
 When we reflect that these amendments were aimed at states 
 lately in rebellion, that the restrictions contained in them 
 are mainly in terms restrictions upon the states, that there 
 is a specific statement that the person shall be a citizen ' ' of 
 the United States and of the state," that with the example 
 of the Thirteenth Amendment before them Congress and the 
 states would have used a more comprehensive phrase had 
 they intended to include the territories or other places sub- 
 ject to the jurisdiction of the United States that, finally, 
 there is no reason here or elsewhere, save in the Thirteenth 
 Amendment, to impute any intention to extend the constitu- 
 tional limitations beyond the states framing the constitution, 
 but, on the contrary, there is every reason to suppose that 
 such limitations are imposed for the protection of the states 
 and the people thereof, we are bound, it seems to me, to 
 conclude that, while persons born in the dependencies may 
 be citizens of the United States in the international sense or 
 the sense known to the common law, or may be made citi- 
 zens for specified purposes by statute or treaty, they are not 
 such by force of any constitutional provision and are subject, 
 therefore, in all internal relations, to such laws as Congress 
 in its wisdom may see fit to enact. 
 
 I am not unaware that there are dicta — particularly in the 
 Slaughter- House Cases* — which make against this conclu- 
 sion. But it need hardly be said that dicta uttered by a 
 judge twenty-five years ago in deciding whether an act of 
 the State of Louisiana which created a monopoly in the 
 business of running a slaughter-house was constitutional, 
 would have very little weight before the same court when 
 called upon to decide the constitutional status of the inhabi- 
 tants of the Philippine Archipelago. It has, indeed, been 
 decided that a person, though of Asiatic parentage, born in 
 one of the states, is a citizen of the United States and of 
 the state.f But it has never been decided that a person born 
 in a territory is a citizen of the United States within the 
 meaning of these amendments, while it has been decided 
 that an Indian born a member of an Indian tribe is not a 
 
 * 16 Wallace, 36. 
 
 ■J United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649. 
 
30 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 citizen of the United States although he voluntarily sepa- 
 rates himself from his tribe and takes up his residence among 
 the white citizens of a state.* 
 
 It is probably competent for Congress to enlarge, though 
 not to restrict, the definition of citizenship found in the 
 Fourteenth Amendment. Congress may, therefore, by suit- 
 able legislation determine what inhabitants of territories or 
 what Indians born in tribal relations shall be deemed 
 citizens.f It is also competent for the treaty-making power 
 in acquiring territory to establish by treaty the status as to 
 citizenship of the inhabitants of the territory. This was in 
 fact done in all treaties of cession prior to the one ceding 
 Porto Rico and the Philippines. J But such citizenship, 
 whether established by statute or treaty, is a legislative and 
 not a constitutional citizenship. What the treaty-making 
 power or the legislative power may grant it may withhold. 
 As the treaty ceding Porto Rico and the Philippines is 
 silent on this point, it therefore rests with Congress to grant 
 or withhold citizenship for internal purposes to the inhabi- 
 tants of those dependencies. It is unnecessary now to 
 inquire whether, if once granted, such grant may afterwards 
 be withdrawn. 
 
 (5) Justice. 
 
 1. The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one 
 Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from 
 time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme 
 and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, and 
 shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which 
 shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. The 
 judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising 
 under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties 
 
 made, or which shall be made, under their authority to 
 
 all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, etc. — Art. Ill, sees. 
 I and 2. 
 
 2. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be 
 by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes 
 shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, 
 the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law 
 have directed. — Art. Ill, sec. 2, sub. 3. 
 
 *E)k v. Wilkins, 112 U. S., 94. 
 
 t Indian Land-in-Severalty Act of February 8, 1887. Sec. 6, found in 24 
 Statutes-at-I«arge, p. 388. 
 
 JArt. Ill of the treaty of cession of Louisiana ; Art. VI of treaty of cession of 
 Florida ; Art. IX of treaty of 1848, and Art. V of treaty of 1853, with Mexico ; Art. 
 Ill of treaty of cession of Alaska. Referring to the treaty of cession of Florida, 
 Chief Justice Marshall in American Ius. Co. v. Canter (i Peters 511, 542), says : 
 " This treaty is the law of the land and admits the inhabitants of Florida to the 
 enjoyment of the privileges and immunities of the citizens of the United 
 States." 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 31 
 
 3. No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise 
 infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand 
 jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
 militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor 
 shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
 jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
 case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or 
 property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
 taken for public use without just compensation. — Amend. V. 
 
 4. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to 
 a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district 
 wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
 have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the 
 nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted with the wit- 
 nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses 
 in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. — 
 Amend. VI. 
 
 5. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
 exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, 
 and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court 
 of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
 — Amend. VII. 
 
 6. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
 nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. — Amend. VIII. 
 
 7. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, 
 unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may 
 require it. — Art. I, sec. 9, subs. 2. 
 
 8. No bill of attainder orex post facto law shall be passed. — Art. I, 
 sec. 9, sub. 3. 
 
 9. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
 papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches ana seizures, shall 
 not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
 supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
 place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. — Amend. 
 IV. 
 
 These provisions govern the power of Congress in the 
 establishment of courts and in the enactment of laws for the 
 administration of justice in the courts so established. 
 
 Among the earliest decisions as to the powers of Congress 
 over the territories were those concerning the establishment 
 of courts, and it was distinctly held that these powers are 
 plenary and are unrestricted by the provisions of Article III, 
 Section 1. At the outset of our inquiries into the meaning 
 of the provisions concerning the administration of justice, 
 we find that under the decisions of the Supreme Court, the 
 first provision quoted above, has no reference whatever to 
 the territories, that Congress may establish there such courts 
 as it sees fit, give to them such jurisdiction as it pleases, pro- 
 vide for the appointment of judges whose terms of office 
 
32 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 shall be limited and subject them to removal from office at 
 the pleasure of the appointing power.* The leading case on 
 this is the case of the American Insurance Company v. 
 Canter (i Peters, 511), in which, in the course of his argu- 
 ment, Webster, one of the counsel in the case, used this sig- 
 nificant language: 
 
 " What is Florida ? It is no part of the United States. How can 
 it be ? How is it represented ? Do the laws of the United States 
 reach Florida ? Not unless by particular provisions. The territory 
 and all within it are to be governed by the acquiring power, except 
 where there are reservations by treaty. By the law of England, when 
 possession is taken of territories, the king, Jure Coronae, has the 
 power of legislation until parliament shall interfere. Congress have 
 the /us Coronae in this case, and Florida was to be governed by Con- 
 gress as she thought proper. What has Congress done ? She might 
 have done anything; she might have refused the trial by jury, and re- 
 fused a legislature. She has given a legislature to be exercised at her 
 will; and a government of a mixed nature, in which she has endeav- 
 ored to distinguish between state and the United States jurisdiction, 
 anticipating the future erection of the territory into a state. Does 
 the law establishing the court at Key West come within the restric- 
 tions of the Constitution of the United States? If the constitution 
 does not extend over this territory, the law cannot be inconsistent with 
 the national constitution. ' ' 
 
 Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion in the case, does 
 not go to this length, but he decides for the court in favor of 
 the power of Congress to establish such courts as it pleases 
 in the territories, either directly or through the territorial 
 legislature, and to confer upon them such jurisdiction as it 
 thinks proper. He says: 
 
 "These courts, then, are not constitutional courts, in which the 
 judicial power conferred by the constitution on the general govern- 
 ment, can be deposited. They are incapable of receiving it. They 
 are legislative courts, created in virtue of the general right of sove- 
 reignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause 
 which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, re- 
 specting the territory belonging to the United States. The jurisdic- 
 tion with which they are invested is not a part of that judicial power 
 which is defined in the third article of the constitution, but is con- 
 ferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers which 
 that body possesses over the territories of the United States. Al- 
 though admiralty jurisdiction can be exercised in the states in those 
 courts only, which are established in pursuance of the third article 
 of the constitution, the same limitation does not extend to the terri- 
 tories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined pow- 
 ers of the general, and of a state government." 
 
 • Sere v. Pltot, 6 Cranch, 332; American Insurance Company v. Canter, 1 
 Peters, 511; Bentier v. Porter, 9 Howard, 235; Clinton !/.Engfebrecht, 13 Wal- 
 
 «?'42 4 A ; ,i?* ynold T S , "/^/^l States - 9 8 u - s - '45! The City of Panama, 101 U. S. 
 .453; McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174. 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 33 
 
 In Clinton v. Englebrecht (13 Wallace, 434), Chief Justice - 
 Chase reiterates the same doctrine, in these words: 
 
 "There is no Supreme Court of the United States, nor is there any 
 District Court of the United States, in the sense of the constitution, 
 in the territory of Utah. The judges are not appointed for the same 
 terms, nor is the jurisdiction which they exercise part of the judicial 
 power conferred by the constitution or the general government. The 
 courts are the legislative courts of the territories, created in virtue 
 of the clause which authorizes Congress to make all needful rules 
 and regulations respecting the territories belonging to the United 
 States." 
 
 It is clear then that " the judicial power of the United 
 States " means the judicial power of the federal govern- 
 ment as exercised within the territory comprising the states, 
 and has no reference to the judicial powers exercised in the 
 territories. 
 
 As to the provisions guaranteeing trial by jury, the first is 
 found in Article III, immediately following the provision 
 for the establishment of courts and defining their jurisdic- 
 tion, and is plainly intended to fix the procedure and safe- 
 guards in the courts so established. "We have just seen that 
 that provision for the establishment of courts does not 
 apply to the territories, but that the territorial courts are 
 established under the general unrestricted grant of power 
 "to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the 
 territory . . . belonging to the United States. " Since there- 
 fore the territorial courts do not owe their existence to Article 
 III, is it logical or reasonable to hold that they are restricted 
 by the provisions of Article III ? Since they do owe their 
 existence to the broad legislative grant in Article IV, is it 
 not necessary to conclude that they are restricted in their 
 powers and procedure by the legislation creating them and 
 by that alone ? In other words all constitutional courts — 
 that is, the Supreme Court and the inferior courts created in 
 the United States— are subject to constitutional limitations, 
 but the legislative courts — that is, the territorial courts — 
 are not subject to constitutional but to legislative limitations. 
 
 The provisions in Amendments V, VI and VII, are, 
 historically, to be read as if a part of Article III, and to be 
 construed in the same manner as the provisions just con- 
 sidered. The same is true of the other provisions dealing 
 with judicial writs, procedure and punishment. All of them 
 except two are found in the first ten amendments, and those 
 
34 Annai^s of the American Academy. 
 
 two are in Article I, Section 9 (sub-sections 2 and 3) which, 
 as we have seen, limits logically the powers of Congress 
 conferred in Article I, Section 8, in legislating for the 
 territory or the people of the states united under the con- 
 stitution. 
 
 There is one decision and there are some dicta that stand 
 in the way of so construing these provisions — especially as 
 to the right to trial by jury. The decision is in Callan v. 
 Wilson (127 U. S. 540), where the Supreme Court holds 
 that a citizen of the District of Columbia has a constitutional 
 right to a trial by jury when charged with a crime, and that 
 an act of Congress denying this right is unconstitutional. 
 Upon this case, which must be distinguished or overruled if 
 the construction here contended for is to be established, these 
 observations are proper. First, the grant of legislative 
 power ' ' over such district as may, by cession of particular 
 states and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of 
 government of the United States," is contained in Article I, 
 Section 8, along with the other grants of power conferred by 
 the states and is followed by and may perhaps be regarded 
 as limited by, the same restrictions as the other grants. 
 Second, the grant contemplates the transfer of territory and 
 people then governed by some state to the United States, 
 and it is not unreasonable to think that the states were 
 desirous of securing for this territory and people the same 
 protection as for the states themselves; finally, as observed 
 by Professor Langdell in another connection, ' ' the consti- 
 tution once extended over it, and it may not be easy to show 
 that it has ever ceased to extend over it. * 
 
 In the case of the American Publishing Co. v. Fisher 
 {166 U. S. 464), where an act of the Territory of Utah 
 which provided that ' ' in civil cases a verdict may be ren- 
 dered on the concurrence of nine or more members of the 
 jury," was held invalid as contravening the act under 
 which Utah was admitted as a territory, the court leaves 
 undecided the question whether the Seventh Amendment 
 applies. The state of the decisions on this point is thus 
 concisely summarized by Mr. Justice Brewer: 
 
 "Whether the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the 
 United States, which provides that ' in suits at common law, where 
 the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial 
 by jury shall be preserved,' operates ex proprio vigore to invalidate 
 
 * 12 Harv. Law Rev., p. 382. 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 35 
 
 this statute, may be a matter of dispute. In Webster v. Reid, u 
 How. 437, an act of the legislature of the Territory of Iowa dispensing 
 with a jury in a certain class of common law actions was held void. 
 While in the opinion, on page 460, the Seventh Amendment was 
 quoted, it was also said: ' The organic law of the Territory of Iowa, 
 by express provision and by reference, extended the laws of the 
 United States, including the ordinance of 1787, over the territory, 
 so far as they are applicable;' and the ordinance of 1787, article 2, in 
 terms provided that ' the inhabitants of the said territory shall 
 always be entitled to the benefits of the writ of habeas corpus, and of 
 the trial by jury. " So the invalidity may have been adjudged by 
 reason of the conflict with congressional legislation. In Reynolds 
 v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 154, it was said, in reference to a crimi- 
 nal case coming from the Territory of Utah, that ' by the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States (Amendment VI) the accused was entitled 
 to a trial by an impartial jury.' Both of these cases were quoted in 
 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, as authorities to sustain the ruling 
 that the provisions in the Constitution of the United States relating 
 to trial by jury are in force in the District of Columbia. On the other 
 hand, in Mormon Church v. United States, 136 U. S. 1, 44, it was 
 said by Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court: ' Doubtless Con- 
 gress in legislating for the territories would be subject to those funda- 
 mental limitations in favor of personal rights which are formulated 
 in the constitution and its amendments; but these limitations would 
 exist rather by inference and the general spirit of the constitution 
 from which Congress derives all its powers, than by any express and 
 direct application of its provisions.' And in McAllister v. United 
 States, 141 U. S. 174, it was held that the constitutional provision 
 in respect to the tenure of judicial offices did not apply to territorial 
 judges." 
 
 In the case of Springville v. Thomas (166 U. S. 707), 
 involving the same question, broader language is used by 
 Chief Justice Fuller, but the decision is sufficiently rested 
 upon the ground stated in American Publishing Co. v. 
 Fisher. 
 
 In the later case of Thompson v. Utah (170 U. S. 343), it 
 was decided that the provision of the constitution of the State 
 of Utah that in criminal cases, other than capital, the jury 
 should consist of eight jurors, was unconstitutional as to 
 crimes committed prior to the adoption of the state con- 
 stitution, as contravening the provision of Article I, Section 
 10, Sub. i, of the federal constitution prohibiting any 
 state from passing an ex post facto law. But the court went 
 further and argued that the provisions of the national con- 
 stitution relating to trials by jury apply to the territories. 
 That this was extra judicial may be seen from the following 
 considerations: (1) the law of the territory (independent 
 of the Constitution of the United States) provided that a 
 
36 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 trial jury should consist of twelve persons; (2) the crime 
 was committed while the law was in effect; (3) subsequently 
 the state constitution provided for the trial of this crime by 
 a jury of eight persons; (4) therefore this provision of the 
 state constitution was ex post facto as to this crime. In all 
 this there is no question of Article III, Section 2, or of the 
 Sixth Amendment, but only of Article I, Section 10, 
 Sub. 1, which prohibits a state from passing an ex post 
 facto law. That this is the understanding of the reporter 
 is evident from the head note of the case which simply 
 states, as the holding of the court that, "the provision in 
 the constitution of the State of Utah, providing for the 
 trial of criminal cases, not capital, in courts of general 
 jurisdiction by a jury composed of eight persons, is ex post 
 facto in its application to felonies committed before the terri- 
 tory became a state." Precisely the same decision would 
 be necessary had the first act been passed after Utah was a 
 state, the crime committed while the act was in force, and 
 then the provision of the constitution had altered the prior 
 act by substituting a jury of eight persons for a jury of 
 twelve. The argument, therefore, that the right of the 
 accused rested upon the provisions of the federal constitu- 
 tion guaranteeing trial by jury, was wholly unnecessary to 
 the decision of the case.* 
 
 We may set over against the decision in Callan v. Wilson 
 and the dicta in the other cases the decision in In re Ross 
 (140 U. S. 453), where it was held that a consular court 
 established by Congress in Japan, and consisting of a consul 
 and four associates, could try, convict and sentence to death 
 an American citizen without any jury at all. This is rested 
 upon the ground that the constitution cannot have any effect 
 outside of the territory of the United States and that, there- 
 fore, the accused is not within the protection of the provi- 
 sions relating to jury trial. Such is the contention of this 
 paper. The constitution cannot have any effect outside the 
 states united by and under it, unless by express terms (as in 
 the Thirteenth Amendment) it is extended to places ' ' sub- 
 ject to their jurisdiction." It is, of course, clear that the 
 territory of Japan is not within the United States in any 
 sense. What is here contended for is that the territories, 
 lying outside the limits of the states, are not within the 
 
 * As much so as the argument of the judges in Dred Scott v. Sanford (19 Howard, 
 393), that Congress had not power to prohibit slavery in the territories. 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 37 
 
 United States, in the sense in which that term is used in the 
 constitution, although they are within the United States in 
 the international and popular sense of the term. 
 
 Further light may be had from the consideration of the 
 sovereignty of the United States over the Indian tribes. In 
 the government of them the federal power has never 
 regarded itself as circumscribed or limited by the provisions 
 of the constitution. It is true the policy for a long time was 
 to govern them through treaties, but this policy has lately 
 been abandoned and they are now largely governed under 
 legislation of Congress. The powers of Congress in this 
 matter were considered in United States v. Kagama (118 U. 
 S. 375), and it was there held that an act defining crimes 
 committed by one Indian against another upon an Indian 
 reservation, situated in a state, and conferring jurisdiction 
 over such crimes upon the federal courts, was a constitu- 
 tional exercise of congressional power, and that the state 
 had no jurisdiction over Indians as long as they maintain 
 their tribal relations. "These Indian tribes," it is said, 
 ' ' are the wards of the nation. They are communities 
 dependent upon the United States." Therefore the United 
 States has exclusive jurisdiction over them, as it has over 
 the territories, and there is, it seems, no constitutional 
 restriction upon the exercise of this jurisdiction. 
 
 Congress may therefore establish such courts and provide 
 such procedure as it deems expedient in foreign territory or 
 for Indian tribes, and is not restricted by any provisions of 
 the federal constitution. If the reasoning of this paper be 
 sound, it may in like manner establish such courts and pro- 
 vide such procedure as it deems expedient in any territory 
 not subject to the jurisdiction of a state of the Union. To 
 quote the language of Mr. Justice Brown in the recent case 
 of Holden v. Hardy (169 U. S. 366, 389): 
 
 " In the future growth of the nation, as heretofore, it is not impos- 
 sible that Congress may see fit to annex territories whose jurisprudence 
 is that of the civil law. One of the considerations moving to such 
 annexation might be the very fact that the territory so annexed should 
 enter the Union with its traditions, laws and systems of administra- 
 tion unchanged. It would be a narrow construction of the constitu- 
 tion to require them to abandon these, or to substitute for a system, 
 which represented the growth of generations of inhabitants, a juris- 
 prudence with which they had no previous acquaintance or sym- 
 pathy." 
 
38 Annates of the American Academy. 
 
 This statement, although made in another connection, and 
 in the course of a determination of the powers of a state, is 
 nevertheless significant as indicative of an attitude of mind 
 which would make it possible for the Supreme Court to 
 give effect, under the constitution, to legislation of Congress 
 adapted to dependencies whose jurisprudence is certainly 
 not that of the common law however close or remote may be 
 its relation to the civil law. 
 
 (c) Revenue. 
 
 1. The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, 
 imposts and excises . . . ; but all duties, imposts and excises shall 
 be uniform throughout the United States. — Art. I, Sec. 8, Subs. i. 
 
 2. No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in propor- 
 tion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken. — 
 Art. I, Sec. 9, Subs. 4. 
 
 3. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any state. 
 —Art. I, Sec. 9, Subs. 5. 
 
 4. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or 
 revenue to the ports of one state over those of another; nor shall 
 vessels bound to, or from, one state, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay 
 duties in another. — Art. I, Sec. 9, Subs. 6 
 
 Under the provisions as to means of raising revenue, it 
 may be observed that only the first provision (Art. I, Sec. 
 8, Subs. 1) could possibly present any difficulty to Congress 
 in the governing of dependencies. As to this, what has 
 already been said concerning citizenship applies here muta- 
 tis mutandis. The restriction as to uniformity of duties, 
 imposts and excises throughout the United States would be 
 very embarrassing, if it should be held applicable to terri- 
 tory lying outside the limits of any state. But there is no 
 good reason for thinking that it is applicable to such terri- 
 tory, while many reasons may be assigned for holding the 
 contrary. First it is found in the very first grant of power 
 to Congress by the states, and is clearly intended to restrict 
 Congress in exercising the powers yielded by the states over 
 their own territory and people. Second, the term ' ' United 
 States " as here used clearly means the states uniting in the 
 formation of this instrument and those that should there- 
 after be admitted upon the same terms. Third, the subse- 
 quent grant of full powers over the territory belonging to 
 the federal sovereign contains no hint that these prior 
 restrictions are intended to limit or restrict that power. 
 
 There is, indeed, a dictum in an early case that makes 
 against this construction. In Loughborough v. Blake 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 39 
 
 {5 Wheaton, 317), decided in 1820, Chief Justice Marshall 
 was called upon to decide whether an act of Congress 
 including the District of Columbia in an apportionment of a 
 direct annual tax of $6,000,000 previously laid upon the 
 states, was constitutional. The decision could be rested 
 squarely upon the grant of full legislative power over the 
 District found in Article I, Section 8, subsection 17, but the 
 chief justice indulges in some extra judicial observations 
 as to the meaning of the term ' ' United States ' ' as used in 
 Article I, Section 8, Subsection 1, in the course of which he 
 lays it down that the term includes the states and territories. 
 Yet in the later case of American Insurance Company v. 
 Canter (1 Peters, 511) he rests the decision upon the 
 general grant of powers over the territories as distinguished 
 from the states, while Webster in his argument flatly denies 
 that the restrictions applicable to legislative power over the 
 states have any force in the exercise of legislative power 
 over the territories, and neither the court nor the counsel 
 make any reference to the dictum in this case. The case, 
 moreover, has never since been cited by the court as sus- 
 taining the view taken by the chief justice. Even if we 
 were to give weight to the dictum, we could still distinguish 
 the case on the same ground as the case of Callan v. Wilson 
 {Ante, p. 34), namely, that it is concerned, not with the 
 grant of power over the territories, found in Article IV, but 
 with the special grant of power over the district ceded for 
 the seat of government, found in Article I, Section 8. 
 That this is the correct view seems to be confirmed by the 
 explanation given of I^ougborough v. Blake in Gibbons v. 
 District of Columbia (116 U. S. 404, 407). 
 
 The case of Cross v. Harrison (16 Howard, 164) is also 
 sometimes cited as teaching a doctrine contrary to the posi- 
 tion here taken. But that case simply decided that, after 
 the treaty of cession of California by Mexico, and before 
 Congress had legislated concerning the territory, the Execu- 
 tive Department might lawfully collect an import duty at 
 San Francisco as at other ports of the United States. This 
 is rested upon the argument that, in the absence of a con- 
 trary provision in the treaty, the territory became instantly 
 bound and privileged by the laws Congress had previously 
 passed to raise a revenue on imports and tonnage. Even 
 conceding that this is sound reasoning, it is very far from 
 saying that Congress could not, or the treaty-making power 
 
40 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 could not, have provided a different system for the territory.. 
 A statement that acts of Congress which, when passed, cov- 
 ered states and territories, would extend of their own force 
 to after-acquired territory, unless differently stipulated in 
 the treaty of cession, is no support whatever for the propo- 
 sition that the constitution will extend of its own force to 
 such territory. It seems to me that the case carries a dis- 
 tinct recognition of the right of the treaty-making power or 
 of Congress to provide a different system for the territory, 
 and that the decision is rested upon the omission in the 
 treaty to provide for any different system. I think it proper 
 to add, further, that in my judgment the case could be suf- 
 ficiently rested upon the power of the Executive to admin- 
 ister the territory in the absence of legislation, and that in 
 such administration the Executive might, in his discretion, 
 though he would not be bound so to do, adopt the existing 
 tariff rates of the rest of the country. But however this may 
 be, there is certainly nothing in this case that upholds the 
 contention that Congress is constitutionally bound to pro- 
 vide import duties in the territories uniform with those in 
 the states. 
 
 (d) Bankruptcy Acts. 
 
 The Congress shall have power ... to establish 
 uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United 
 States.— Art. I, Sec. 8, Subs. 4. 
 
 This provision is to be construed in the same manner as 
 the provision as to uniform revenue laws or uniform natural- 
 ization laws. It occurs in the same subsection as the 
 latter, and all that has been said on the other two provisions 
 as to "uniform" laws is applicable to this provision. In 
 any event the provision could hardly be a source of embar- 
 rassment in legislating for the dependencies. 
 
 (e) Military Forces. 
 
 1. A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
 state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be 
 infringed. — Amend. II. 
 
 2. No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house 
 without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner 
 to be prescribed by law. — Amend. III. 
 
 The first of these provisions contains a clear intimation 
 that it is intended for the security of the states. A terri- 
 tory is not a "free state;" it is a dependency to be governed. 
 
The Government oe Dependencies. 41 
 
 as Congress may deem expedient. As it is thus within 
 the power of Congress, there would be an absurdity in hold- 
 ing that it is to be given a right to bear arms in order to 
 resist the exercise of that power. A territorial militia may 
 be authorized or not by Congress, just as a state militia may 
 be authorized or not by a state. While, therefore, some 
 have urged that this provision would entitle the Porto 
 Ricans or the Filipinos to bear arms, and thus prepare for 
 insurrections, it seems almost too clear for argument that 
 no such construction could properly be put upon the pro- 
 vision, even if the contention as to the whole of these 
 amendments, namely, that they are intended only for the 
 protection of states, should be inadmissible. 
 
 The second provision could be no source of embarrass- 
 ment. But, of course, like all the others, it must, on the 
 theory here advanced, be held to be no restriction upon the 
 powers of Congress in dealing with the territories. 
 
 (/) Titles of Nobility. 
 
 No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States. — Art. I, 
 Sec. 9, Subs. 8. 
 
 In its terms this is the broadest of all the provisions found 
 in the constitution as originally passed. While the con- 
 struction contended for in this paper should, of course, 
 extend to this provision also, it could be of no consequence 
 practically whether it were so construed or not. It is very 
 doubtful whether any circumstances could ever arise calling 
 for a construction of it. 
 
 (■£") Freedom of Opinion and Speech. 
 
 Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re- 
 ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free- 
 dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably 
 to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of griev- 
 ances. — Amend. I. 
 
 Of all the amendments this is the broadest in its terms. 
 But it should have no different construction than any of the 
 other of the first ten amendments. Each is intended to secure 
 to the states or the people thereof, an immunity against the 
 aggressions of the federal power. Even if, however, it 
 should be held to protect equally the people of a depend- 
 ency, it is difficult to see how it would interfere with the 
 proper government of such dependency, as it is altogether 
 
42 Annai£ of the American Academy. 
 
 improbable that Congress would think it expedient to ex- 
 ercise any one of the powers prohibited in the amendment. 
 (h) Slavery. 
 
 Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
 for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall 
 exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic- 
 tion. — Amend. XIII. 
 
 This provision is the only one found in the constitution 
 which in terms limits the powers of Congress in dealing 
 with the territories. The latter are subject to the jurisdic- 
 tion of the United States, and therefore within the protection 
 of the amendment prohibiting slavery. It is a very significant 
 fact, throwing light upon the view of Congress and the states- 
 as to the meaning of the other constitutional limitations that 
 the phrase , " or any place subj ect to their j urisdiction , ' ' should 
 have been inserted in this amendment. If, as has been 
 urged by some, all the limitations extend to the states and 
 territories alike, that is to all places subject to the jurisdic- 
 tion of the United States, why should Congress and the 
 states have been anxious to insert here a phrase expressly 
 including the territories? If the phrases, " throughout the 
 United States, " " within the United States, ' ' used elsewhere 
 in the constitution, mean throughout or within all territory 
 over which the federal sovereign has jurisdiction, then 
 the phrase here used is not only useless, but dangerous, 
 for while it adds nothing, it throws a grave doubt at once 
 upon the meaning of the phrases previously used. Is it not 
 obvious that it was inserted because the other phrases were 
 understood to mean throughout or within the territory of 
 the states united under the constitution, while as to this 
 amendment the Congress and the states meant to go further 
 and include that territory and also the territory over which 
 by Article I, Section 8, subsection 17, and Article IV, Section 
 3, subsection 2, Congress has been given plenary power? 
 
 These are all the provisions of the constitution that restrict 
 the powers of Congress. These are all the important deci- 
 sions of the Supreme Court, save one, that directly consider 
 the question whether Congress is subject to any of these 
 restrictions, or to any restrictions, in legislating for the 
 territories. It still remains to consider the case of Dred 
 Scott v. Sanford (19 Howard, 393). Scott claimed his 
 freedom on two grounds: that he had been taken by his 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 43. 
 
 master to the free state of Illinois and had resided there two 
 years; that he had then been taken to the free territory of 
 Upper Louisiana (now Minnesota) where slavery was pro- 
 hibited under an act of Congress (The Missouri Compro- 
 mise) , and had resided there two years. He had then been 
 taken back to the State of Missouri where he had since 
 resided and where he now sued for his freedom. The ques- 
 tion on its merits was whether residence in the free state or 
 the free territory, followed by a return to the slave state, 
 worked an emancipation. The decision on the merits was 
 simply this: residence in a free state or a free territory 
 followed by a return to and residence in a slave state will 
 have such effect, and no other, as the latter state may by the 
 decisions of its highest court give to it; the highest court of 
 Missouri gave no extra-territorial effect to the laws prohibit- 
 ing slavery in the state and territory in which Scott had 
 resided and deemed him on his return to Missouri still a 
 slave; therefore the federal court was bound to follow the 
 same holding. This disposed of the case on its merits, with- 
 out any inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of the 
 law prohibiting slavery in the territory, for admitting it to 
 be valid and constitutional it could have no larger effect in 
 working the emancipation of Scott than the confessedly 
 valid law of Illinois. But a majority of the court went 
 further and in opinions clearly extra-judicial held the act 
 of Congress prohibiting slavery in the territory to be uncon- 
 stitutional. This is put on the singularly narrow ground 
 that the ample grant of power to Congress ' ' to make all 
 needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or 
 other property belonging to the United States " is confined 
 to territory belonging to the United States at the time the 
 constitution was adopted " and cannot, by any just rule of 
 interpretation, be extended to territory which the new 
 government might afterwards obtain from a foreign nation. ' ' 
 The sole right to acquire such territory is found in the pro- 
 vision for the admission of new states. Upon this is built up 
 a novel doctrine as to the limited powers which Congress, as 
 the agent or trustee of the states, may temporarily exercise 
 in governing a territory so acquired while nursing it toward 
 statehood, a doctrine now laid up among the discredited 
 curiosities of the law together with all the rest of the extra- 
 judicial utterances of this celebrated case. I suppose no one 
 would now seriously cite the Dred Scott decision as authority 
 
44 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 for the proposition that Congress has not full power to 
 govern the territories as it may deem most expedient. 
 Certainly that the main premise of the Dred Scott argument 
 is unsound and discredited is shown by the statement in 
 Utter v. Franklin (172 U. S. 416, 423) that, "this court has 
 repeatedly held that Congress has full legislative power over 
 the territories, as full as that which a state legislature has 
 over its municipal corporations. ' ' 
 
 Aside from the Dred Scott case and the others previously 
 cited, the pronouncements of the Supreme Court upon the 
 question of constitutional limitations upon the power defined 
 in Utter v. Franklin have been in terms indicative of a vague 
 constitutional theory rather than of a settled constitutional 
 doctrine. Such is the statement of Mr. Justice Matthews in 
 Murphy v. Ramsey ( 1 14 U. S. 15, 44) that, ' 'the personal and 
 civil rights of the inhabitants of the territories are secured 
 to them, as to other citizens, by the principles of con- 
 stitutional liberty which restrain all the agencies of govern- 
 ment, state or national." Such, also, is the statement of 
 Mr. justice Bradley in Mormon Church v. United States 
 (136 U. S. 1, 44-5), repeated by Mr. Justice Harlan in 
 McAllister v. United States (141 U. S. 174, 188), that, 
 ' ' doubtless Congress in legislating for the territories would 
 be subject to those fundamental limitations in favor of per- 
 sonal rights which are formulated in the constitution and its 
 amendments; but these limitations would exist rather by 
 inference and the general spirit of the constitution, from 
 which Congress derives all its powers, than by any express 
 and direct applications of its provisions." 
 
 We need hardly dwell upon such pronouncement. We may 
 rather recur to the classic statement of Chief Justice Marshall 
 in Cohens v. Virginia (6 Wheaton, 264, 399): " It is a 
 maxim not to be disregarded that general expressions, in 
 every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in 
 which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the 
 case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judg- 
 ment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented 
 for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The 
 question actually before the court is investigated with care, 
 and considered in its full extent. Other principles which 
 may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to 
 the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases 
 is seldom completely investigated. " This maxim we may 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 45 
 
 now invoke. New conditions never contemplated by the 
 judges who voiced these general expressions have suddenly- 
 arisen. Those expressions may be respected as applicable 
 to the cases in which they were used, but they will hardly 
 control the judgment of the judges who shall be called upon 
 to decide the weighty questions involved in the government 
 of remote island dependencies. 
 
 When those questions arise for settlement it will be pos- 
 sible to hold, with entire loyalty to the constitution, and 
 respect for judicial decisions, that all dependencies, except 
 the District of Columbia, are governed under the general 
 power given to Congress ' ' to dispose of and make all need- 
 ful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other 
 property belonging to the United States;" that this power is 
 limited only by the provision prohibiting slavery within the 
 United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction; 
 that no decision of the Supreme Court holds that any other 
 limit is placed upon the powers of Congress over the terri- 
 tories; and that such dicta as may be found to the contrary 
 are either wholly discredited or resolve themselves into a 
 mere statement of constitutional or political theory. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT OF DEPENDENCIES. 
 A. Lawrence LowEU., Esq., Harvard University. 
 
 One whose knowledge of our new possessions is derived 
 entirely from books must speak upon the problem of their 
 government with diffidence. The only thing of which he 
 can be absolutely sure is the defectiveness of his own infor- 
 mation, its insufficiency as a basis for conclusive inductions, 
 and all that he can do is to offer suggestions derived from 
 the experience of other countries under conditions that 
 have at least a considerable similarity with those we are 
 called upon to face. Our policy must at first be tentative, 
 and no doubt we shall make mistakes; but we certainly 
 want to approach the problem with such light as can be 
 drawn from the successes and failures of other nations, and 
 all that the writer ventures to hope is that the few sugges- 
 tions that can be offered in a paper of this length will con- 
 tribute something toward setting forth the questions which 
 our government must solve. 
 
 In this discussion I shall make two assumptions. First, 
 that our primary aim is to be the welfare of the dependen- 
 cies. Such an attitude is alone worthy of an enlightened 
 nation, and the history of colonization shows that it is- 
 almost, if not quite, impossible to make colonies a perma- 
 nent benefit to the dominant country on any other basis. 
 The dependencies ought eventually to be self-supporting, 
 but we have no right to expect them to be a source of 
 public revenue. The second assumption is that the provi- 
 sions of the Constitution of the United States do not apply 
 to our new possessions in such away as to interfere seriously 
 with the establishment of the most desirable form of 
 administration. This assumption is, I believe, well 
 founded, but the subject is a large one, and cannot be 
 treated in the space to which this paper must necessarily 
 be confined. 
 
 Within a year we have acquired three groups of islands, 
 all within the tropic of Cancer, but differing from one 
 another radically in the character of their people and in 
 the nature of the problems they present. In one of them, 
 Hawaii, there is a considerable element of Anglo-Saxon 
 
 (46) 
 
The; Government of Dependencies. 47 
 
 origin, which is, indeed, small as compared with the total 
 population, but is to-day, and is apparently destined to 
 remain, the ruling class in the island. It is not improbable, 
 therefore, that our institutions can be immediately applied 
 to the Sandwich Islands without modification, and such is 
 the recommendation of the commissioners appointed to con- 
 sider the subject. They have reported, in effect, in favor 
 of a territorial government copied from the pattern that has 
 proved successful in the West. 
 
 The other annexations present problems which are not 
 only more difficult, but are as unlike each other as either 
 of them is to that of Hawaii. There is, in fact, a vital 
 difference between Porto Rico and the Philippines. Civili- 
 zation in Porto Rico, as in the United States, is essentially 
 European, and hence our aim must be to develop the people 
 in the lines of our own life. Their condition is not so far 
 from ours, and their climate is not so far tropical, as to set 
 up an impassable barrier; and if it is possible to bring 
 them into accord with our political, social and economic 
 standards, every consideration of their welfare and our own 
 should lead us to do so. 
 
 In the Philippines, on the other hand, which are strictly 
 tropical in climate, the civilization, like that of India, of 
 the Malay Peninsula and of Borneo, is mainly indigenous, 
 and hence we ought to endeavor, as the English have done, 
 to promote social evolution along the natural lines of the 
 race. We should not try to impress our ideas in upon them 
 in a flood, but help them to advance in their own way. In 
 other words, our object must be to make them not Ameri- 
 cans but civilized Malays. 
 
 The two problems are quite distinct, and each presents its 
 peculiar difficulties. One is that of a subtropical island 
 whose inhabitants, although foreigners, are largely of 
 European blood. The other is that of a tropical country, 
 peopled almost entirely by Asiatics. The English have 
 shown in India, and in the still closer parallel of the Malay 
 Peninsula, that the Philippine problem can be solved. They 
 have shown that peoples not unlike the Tagals, the Visayans- 
 and the Moros can be ruled successfully ; and our difficulty 
 lies in the fact that we have yet to learn the art, and must dis- 
 play the self-restraint required to practice it. The difficulty 
 here is not so much to find out how the thing ought to be 
 done, as to do it; while in Porto Rico the opposite is true. 
 
48 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 There historical examples are of negative rather than of 
 positive value. In the cases most nearly analogous there 
 were conditions that simplified matters, and England 
 adopted, as I shall try to show, a solution that is hardly 
 open to us. The Philippinos are utterly incapable of ruling 
 themselves in a civilized way, so that there need be no 
 question about the need of obtaining the consent of the 
 governed, to distract us in the pursuit of their welfare; but 
 in Porto Rico the political aspirations of the people cannot 
 be disregarded, and it will probably not be easy to reconcile 
 these with our views of the best policy for the island. The 
 difference is like that of managing a small child and a half- 
 grown man. A wise parent does what is best for the child, 
 and makes him obey ; but the lad must be allowed a pass-key, 
 and yet is not given control of his property. 
 
 If we are constrained to undertake the management of 
 Cuba, the problem will be like that of Porto Rico and will 
 present similar difficulties. 
 
 The Philippines. 
 
 The task here is that of ruling a tropical colony, where 
 the proportion of white men must always remain insignifi- 
 cant, and where the natives, except in the case of selected 
 individuals, will be incapable of taking part in the govern- 
 ment for an indefinite period. The most important requi- 
 sites for the administration of such a colony are justice, a 
 consistent policy, and a thorough knowledge of the native 
 character. The first of these will probably be best attained 
 by the methods pursued in all English-speaking countries, 
 the methods which the English have generally adopted in 
 ruling Asiatics, that of placing alongside the higher adminis- 
 trative officials independent judicial tribunals. It must inevi- 
 tably happen that local officials are sometimes given judicial 
 powers, but in such cases there ought to be an appeal to the 
 supreme court of the colony, so composed that one or more 
 of the members shall be versed in the common law and 
 others thoroughly familiar with the native customs. Such 
 a court cannot be created in a day, but with care it could 
 be brought to perfection before long. 
 
 Not less indispensable are a consistent policy, and knowl- 
 edge of native character. The need of the last of these is 
 self-evident, and in regard to the former it is clear that 
 nothing will destroy the confidence and respect of the native 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 49 
 
 more quickly than any appearance of vacillation. Now 
 England, the greatest of all colonizing powers, and Holland, 
 the next most successful, have both sought to attain these 
 objects by treating their colonial officials as a distinct per- 
 manent service, and offering an assured career to every 
 man who entered it, and it is hard to see how the result can 
 be reached in any other way. A knowledge of the native 
 character and conditions is not one of those things that 
 comes from Yankee shrewdness, or skill in operating 
 the political machine. It requires long residence on the 
 spot. France has made the mistake of selecting her colonial 
 officials from the home administrative service, and sending 
 them to the colonies as a step in the line of their promo- 
 tion. Iyeroy-Beaulieu, the first of French authorities on 
 colonies, laments this practice of his countrymen, and it has 
 certainly been one of the causes of their lack of success. We 
 must remember, also, that service in the tropics is far from 
 healthy, and if the proper kind of man is to be secured the 
 pay must be liberal, and the incumbent must be able to look 
 forward to a pension that will enable him to spend the rest 
 of his life comfortably at home after devoting his best years 
 to the work of the colony. Entrance into the service ought, 
 of course, to be conditioned upon proof of qualification. 
 The English make their examinations for the Indian civil 
 service of such a nature as to admit only men of liberal 
 education, and encourage the successful candidates to 
 spend their two years of probation at one of the univer- 
 sities. They have felt the great importance of bringing 
 to bear upon colonial administration the highest and 
 broadest culture that the mother country can produce 
 — certainly an excellent method of making European 
 civilization a potent influence in the East. Probably the 
 best way of recruiting our colonial service would be to 
 establish an academy like West Point or Annapolis. The 
 system has proved most admirable for the army and navy, 
 and ought to be equally good for another technical occu- 
 pation. It has shown itself in harmony with our institu- 
 tions. It gives sufficient play to the American love of 
 patronage, by the mode of selecting the candidates for 
 admission, while it produces a service strongly imbued with 
 the best professional traditions. West Point and Annapolis 
 have been both popular and efficient, and good sense would 
 suggest an extension of the principle. 
 
50 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 That the colonial administration ought to be independent 
 of party politics in America, that the governor-general of 
 the Philippines ought not to be a party hack who is not big 
 enough for a position in the Cabinet, needs no demonstra- 
 tion. In fact the success of England as a colonial power 
 dates from the time when the administration of her 
 colonies was divorced from party struggles in Parliament. 
 It is no less evident that the governor-general ought to be 
 advised by a council drawn from the wisest officials 
 in his colony. There is, however, another principle 
 which is less obvious. It is that of avoiding excessive 
 interference from home. Lord Durham in his famous report 
 on the government of Canada in 1839 commented severely 
 upon this evil from which the colonies had suffered long. 
 It is a danger that is much increased by the telegraph, and 
 one to which the United States is peculiarly exposed. Any 
 one familiar with the national administration must be aware 
 how highly centralized, or as the French say concentrated, 
 it is. The postmaster of one of our large cities can hardly 
 get a radiator shifted or a wall painted, until permission 
 has been obtained from Washington. Now such a state of 
 things is utterly inconsistent with good colonial administra- 
 tion, for the home authorities are only dimly informed 
 of colonial conditions, and cannot by means of any amount 
 of dispatches, reports and cable messages be made thor- 
 oughly familiar with them. The governor on the spot must 
 be allowed a large measure of discretion in all matters that 
 do not involve things outside the colony. But it takes a 
 great deal of experience to learn to leave the local officials a 
 free hand, for the home government is easily affected by 
 the representations of interested parties, who are able to 
 display an amount of local knowledge that is quite over- 
 whelming. In England, where the whole system of parlia- 
 mentary government depends upon the observance of con- 
 ventions and upon mutual forbearance, the difficulty is less 
 than in America, where we are more accustomed in politics 
 to exert our legal rights. It would seem wise, therefore, 
 to define the authority of the governor by law, so that 
 only matters of grave concern should be reserved for deci- 
 sion at home. 
 
 The employment of capable, influential natives by the 
 government is a matter of no little consequence. It secures 
 their loyalty, and bridges over the gap between the rulers 
 
The Government op Dependencies. 51 
 
 and the ruled. No doubt the mainstay of the administra- 
 tion in the Philippines must be found in the American offi- 
 cials, but many of the minor posts and magistracies can, as 
 in India, be filled with natives, and a few of the most 
 capable could probably be given seats on the governor's 
 council. Native troops under American officers could also 
 be employed — a proceeding that tends to make good sub- 
 jects of restless spirits, and lessens the number of Ameri- 
 can soldiers that have to be kept in a tropical climate. Our 
 negro troops will save us from maintaining the proportion 
 of white men in the tropics that England is obliged to keep 
 there, but still they might well be supplemented by Phil- 
 ippines. 
 
 This leads naturally to the suggestion, often made of late, 
 of governing through the native chiefs, as Great Britain 
 has done in India and the Malay Peninsula. That such a 
 system is advantageous wherever practicable, English 
 experience amply proves; and indeed, it is now a maxim 
 in India that every native state ought to be preserved with 
 scrupulous care. To what extent the system can be applied 
 in the Archipelago, what islands and districts bear such an 
 allegiance to a native chief that he can maintain authority 
 over them, is a question on which only men with a rare 
 familiarity with the different tribes can venture an opinion. 
 The most promising subject for experiment would seem to 
 be the Sultan of Sulu. In the general form which the system 
 has now reached in India the native princes can hold com- 
 munication with each other, and with foreign powers, only 
 through the Indian government. Their military forces are 
 limited. They cannot take white men into their service 
 without permission. They must allow the British to move 
 troops, place garrisons and camps, and build railways and 
 post roads in their territories. Successions to the throne 
 are not valid until recognized by the viceroy, who can 
 intervene in case of rebellion or gross misrule, and in ex- 
 treme cases can depose the prince and appoint another. 
 More important than all the rest the British resident 
 accredited to the prince, watches his administration, gives 
 him advice, and exerts a constant if unobtrusive pressure 
 in favor of good government. The system has been espe- 
 cially successful where a long minority has given the resi- 
 dent an opportunity to educate the young prince, and 
 administer his estates in his name until he has come of age. 
 
52 Annals of thb American Academy. 
 
 The tendency on the whole has been, while exalting the 
 dignity of the princes, to bring them more and more into 
 harmony with the policy of the empire. The system relieves 
 England of a load of responsibility, and at the same time 
 removes discontent, by giving to a large part of India the 
 satisfaction of native rule, and enabling the Hindoos under 
 direct British government to realize how well they are 
 treated. With the federated Malay states the connection 
 is much closer, for although these states are spoken of as 
 "protected" by England, they are now virtually governed 
 directly by her agents. In the treaty of 1895 the rulers of 
 the Malay states agreed to follow the advice of the British 
 resident-general in all matters of administration, other than 
 those touching the Mohammedan religion, and by this 
 fiction he is enabled to carry on the government in their 
 name. 
 
 It is, perhaps, needless to emphasize the importance of 
 absolute religious toleration. We believe in it, and prac- 
 tice it, so fully at home that we are not likely to violate it 
 in our dependencies. But there is another question that 
 demands immediate and far-seeing consideration. I refer 
 to the immigration of Chinese. As soon as order has been 
 restored, and a measure of prosperity created, they are likely 
 to come in great numbers ; and they will be heartily wel- 
 comed by the foreign capitalists, because they supply an 
 abundance of industrious and cheap laborers. But their 
 presence will undoubtedly have the same results as in the 
 Straits Settlements and Sarawak, where their superior 
 thrift, industry and commercial aptitude has placed all the 
 smaller trade in their hands, and thus they have prospered 
 at the expense of the Malays, who would, it is said, mas- 
 sacre them all with the greatest satisfaction if the Pax 
 Britannica were removed. The Chinese are utterly imper- 
 vious to European civilization, regarding it simply as a 
 protection under which they can thrive, and whether it is 
 wise, or right toward the natives, to suffer such an element 
 to increase in the Archipelago for the sake of their labor 
 is at least extremely doubtful. Moreover, it will be invidi- 
 ous to forbid the people of our own dependency to come to 
 our shores. The Philippinos are not fond enough of hard 
 work to make their immigration to the United States in 
 considerable numbers anything but a nightmare of the labor 
 unions, but the Chinese will miss no channel for getting 
 
The Government op Dependencies. 53 
 
 here that is left unstopped. We have already prohibited 
 Chinese immigration to Hawaii, and we must consider at 
 once the question whether we will permit it to the Philip- 
 pines. 
 
 Porto Rico. 
 
 Porto Rico presents, as I have said, peculiar difficulties of 
 its own. At first sight the problem appears simple enough. 
 The obvious solution is to establish there a government like 
 that of one of our territories, with a government appointed 
 by the President, and a legislature elected by the people. 
 This system has worked very well here; but we have tried 
 it only as a temporary expedient, a stepping-stone to state- 
 hood. It has lasted only while the population was thinly 
 scattered. When a territory has become settled densely 
 enough to be a real community, with a political life of its 
 own, it has been admitted as a state. Now Porto Rico is 
 almost as densely peopled to-day as any part of the United 
 States, and yet it must be clear that it cannot be admitted 
 as a state until it has been trained in self-government, and 
 has acquired the political, social and industrial habits that 
 prevail in the United States. That this will take a very 
 great length of time every observer of political history will 
 recognize. In short, the period is so long that statehood is 
 too remote to be taken into consideration in determining the 
 immediate administration of the island. 
 
 As a permanent method of colonial government, or one 
 that is intended to last for any great length of time, the 
 system of a governor appointed by the mother country and 
 a legislature elected by the colony is open to grave objec- 
 tions. Continual struggles between these two authorities 
 are almost inevitable, for the legislature naturally wants 
 to have its way, and where it is thwarted by the governor 
 it learns to look upon him as the representative of an alien 
 if not a hostile power; and yet the governor must sometimes 
 check the legislature unless the colony is to be given virtual 
 independence. The system tends, therefore, to promote 
 friction instead of the mutual sympathy that ought to exist 
 between the parent state and the colony. England tried it, 
 and after many bitter experiences, was forced to discard it. 
 She tried it with her North American colonies, and the 
 consequences were constant bickerings, until the Revolution 
 cut the connection altogether. She tried it in Canada with 
 
54 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 similar results, which culminated in the rebellion of 1837. 
 The remedy in this case was found in the granting of 
 responsible government, that is, in placing the governor- 
 general in a position like that of the Queen, and transfer- 
 ring the real exercise of his powers to ministers responsible 
 to the popular chamber of the colony. Except for foreign 
 relations Canada thus became independent in almost every- 
 thing but name. Finally England tried it in the case of 
 Jamaica, and the contests with the legislature that ensued 
 were not terminated until the people of the island, terrified 
 by the insurrection of the negroes in 1865, voluntarily gave 
 up their constitution, and the elected legislature was 
 replaced by one appointed by the Crown. Warned by these 
 experiences, England changed her policy, and granted 
 responsible government as fast as possible to all her 
 colonies where men of English race were numerous. She 
 even pressed it upon Australia and the Cape before they 
 were anxious to receive it. All the North American and 
 Australian colonies and Cape Colony and Natal have now 
 full responsible government; while of the other depen- 
 dencies that have any representative element in their 
 constitution, only three, Bermuda, the Bahamas and Bar- 
 bados, have a purely elective legislative chamber, and 
 these three are small and peculiarly situated. In all the 
 rest (Jamaica, Guiana, the Leeward Islands, Mauritius, 
 Cyprus and Malta) the legislative council is partly elected 
 and partly appointed, usually in such proportions that the 
 appointed members form at least one-half of the body. 
 England has learned not to create an elective legislature 
 unless she is prepared to go farther in a short time and 
 grant to the colony complete control of its affairs, and thus 
 a distinction has arisen, which tends to become sharper 
 and sharper, between Crown colonies and self-governing 
 colonies. 
 
 If this is true of colonies whose people are of English 
 race, emigrants from the United Kingdom, it must be 
 manifestly far more true where the population of the colony 
 differs from the bulk of that of the parent, or rather adopt- 
 ing, state by race, by religion, and by political traditions. 
 Yet that is the case in Porto Rico. The nearest parallel to 
 the condition that confronts us there is to be found in the 
 history of French Canada, and the most valuable study of 
 the problems it presents is the report of Lord Durham, 
 
The; Government of Dependencies. 55 
 
 made after the rebellion of 1837. This document, to which 
 I have already referred, pointed out forcibly the evils that 
 had flowed from placing side by side an elected legislature 
 and a governor with real authority, and it urged the 
 necessity of establishing responsible government in the 
 colony. Although Canada had then been under English 
 rule for about eighty years, and had had an elective assem- 
 bly for nearly half a century, the training of the French 
 Canadians in self-government would hardly have been 
 enough to make the remedy suggested practicable had it 
 not been for the vast tracts of waste land which brought a 
 great influx of English settlers. In fact the province of 
 Upper Canada, which was united with the French province 
 by the act of 1840, was entirely English. Now the people 
 of Porto Rico are not very much less lacking in political 
 experience than the French Canadians were at the capture 
 of Quebec, and there is no vacant territory into which 
 Americans can move in great numbers. Hence respon- 
 sible government in the English sense cannot safely be 
 set up for a long time to come, and the island must first 
 undergo a period of apprenticeship. Moreover, our own 
 people are quite unfamiliar with the conceptions that 
 underlie the principles of responsible government, and 
 they would fail to understand the position of a governor 
 who, on the ground that his legal powers were in the 
 safe keeping of a colonial cabinet, sanctioned unwise and 
 unjust laws, or a hostile tariff, enacted by the colonial 
 legislature. If the governor is to exert no real authority 
 it would probably be wiser to cast the island adrift, 
 providing only that it should hold no communication 
 with the outside world save through the President of the 
 United States. This would, no doubt, involve complica- 
 tions with foreign powers, but at least it would be a system 
 that our people could comprehend. The island would then 
 be a protected state and not a dependency. It would be a 
 Spanish-American republic whose foreign relations alone 
 would be under the guardianship of the United States. 
 Perhaps this would be the most prudent relation for us to 
 hold with the island, and a great deal could be said on both 
 sides of that question. 
 
 Assuming, however, as the title of this discussion indi- 
 cates, that Porto Rico is to remain a dependency of this 
 country, it would seem that an elected assembly with. 
 
56 Annaw oe the American Academy. 
 
 general legislative powers cannot wisely be established. If 
 that is true, two courses are open to us. An elected assem- 
 bly with strictly limited powers may be created, other 
 matters being reserved for the governor and an appointed 
 council; or the English example may be followed of vesting 
 general legislative powers in a body composed partly 
 of appointed and partly of elected members, the latter, 
 say a dozen in number, being perhaps chosen by the 
 seven provinces. The second plan, at least at the outset, 
 would probably be the safer with a people unused to consti- 
 tutional limitations. But in any event the appointed mem- 
 bers of the governor's council ought to be selected from 
 residents, and as far as possible, from natives of the island. 
 By this process, jealousy of foreign rule could be minimized, 
 for the mere fact that the chief officials were appointed 
 ought not to be seriously obnoxious to the inhabitants, who 
 are not accustomed to any other method of selection. 
 
 I am aware that the powers entrusted to the governor and 
 council may be abused, although the danger is surely no 
 greater than in the case of a popular assembly elected by a 
 people unused to self-government. But I do not think we 
 need to fear a repetition of the carpet-bag rule. That was 
 made possible only by the disorganized and distracted state 
 of the south; and by the sudden enfranchisement of an 
 enormous mass of untrained voters, at a time when the 
 North distrusted every Southerner who had the slightest 
 experience of public affairs. It may be observed, also, that 
 where the political conditions are such as to permit the 
 existence of carpet-bag rule, the presence of an elected 
 assembly tends rather to aggravate than to remove the evil ; 
 and further, that if we appoint governors of the carpet-bag 
 type, they will wreck any system of government that can 
 be devised. 
 
 The development of local self-government is a matter of 
 the highest importance, for it is the foundation of true 
 political liberty. Capacity for popular government cannot 
 be created by edict. It must be acquired by slow experi- 
 ence, and efforts to produce it suddenly have usually been 
 disastrous. It requires the gradual training of large num- 
 bers of men to the conduct of public affairs on a small scale; 
 and not less a strong reverence for the authority of law, as 
 distinguished from the commands of men. Hence it must 
 begin with local government administered under strict rules 
 
The Government of Dependencies 57 
 
 of law. I,ord Durham remarked the defective municipal 
 organization of Canada, and laid stress in his report upon 
 the necessity of improving it. We ought to foster by every 
 means in our power the management of local affairs in Porto 
 Rico by the people themselves, and in doing so it would 
 be well to follow as nearly as possible the existing forms 
 and institutions, filling them with a more vigorous spirit. 
 It may be necessary at first to appoint the alcalde, or 
 mayor, but he should be selected from among the leading 
 citizens of the commune, and should be assisted by a coun- 
 cil elected on some qualification based on property or educa- 
 tion, which will insure that the electorate shall not be an 
 ignorant and credulous mass of voters. The franchise 
 could easily be so arranged that it should gradually expand 
 automatically as prosperity and education increased. The 
 general principles of local self-government once fixed, their 
 application will no doubt be tentative for some time to 
 come, and it is certainly presumptuous for anyone unfamil- 
 iar with life on the island to, attempt to talk about details. 
 
 A permanent civil service is essential in Porto Rico as 
 well as in the Philippines, although it would have a some- 
 what different character. In the Philippines we must 
 depend in the main on American officials, while in Porto 
 Rico the service ought, after the first few years, to be 
 recruited almost exclusively from the natives. The reason 
 why the spoils system has not proved even more intolerable 
 in the United States must be sought in the extraordinary 
 versatility of the American, and in the general diffusion of 
 education. But these qualities are wanting in the inhabi- 
 tants of Porto Rico, and therefore if we are to have the 
 support of an efficient administrative force, we must have 
 a permanent and well-trained civil service. The United 
 States cannot afford to throw away any chances in the diffi- 
 cult and untried task before it. 
 
 The judicial system is perhaps the most important point 
 of all. If the people of Porto Rico are to acquire our politi- 
 cal ideas and traditions it must fje»chiefly by means of the 
 courts of law, for the relation of the courts to the adminis- 
 trative officials and to the citizens is the fundamental point 
 of difference between the Anglo-Saxon system of government 
 and that of the Latin races. It is the force that prevents 
 the government from being autocratic, that makes it a gov- 
 ernment of laws and not of men. Porto Rico can never 
 
58 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 obtain our political system unless she first becomes thor- 
 oughly familiar with our judicial conceptions. I do not 
 mean that the substantive law needs to be changed. On 
 the contrary, some branches of the law must obviously be 
 retained, and nothing would be gained by changing most of 
 the others. To change the law of land is oppressive, while 
 commercial law, the law of contracts and so forth, are very 
 much alike over the whole civilized world. England had 
 to decide the same question when she conquered Canada, 
 and after an unfortunate effort to introduce the common 
 law, she determined, in the Quebec Act of 1774, to substitute 
 the English criminal law as being milder than the French 
 at that time, but to leave the Canadian law in other 
 respects untouched. Porto Rico has now the civil law, and 
 it had better not be disturbed except so far as it may be 
 amended in detail from time to time by legislation. There 
 is no difficulty in administering the civil law by means of 
 the American judicial system. The common law has 
 always recognized the binding force of local customs, and 
 there has never been any trouble in the case of Louisiana, 
 which still retains the civil law as the basis of her jurispru- 
 dence. Incidentally the maintenance of the existing law 
 would avoid any question about juries in civil suits, — if the 
 provision about jury trial in the Constitution applies to 
 Porto Rico at all, — because in civil cases the provision ex- 
 tends only to suits at common law. It does not apply to 
 equity causes or to litigation under the civil law. 
 
 The important thing is that the organization and 
 authority of the American courts should be planted in Porto 
 Rico, together with the method of procedure and the rules of 
 evidence. The best judicial organization would probably be 
 that under which the common law was successfully built up ; 
 local courts with a limited jurisdiction, and a central court 
 for the whole island, which should hear appeals in bank, 
 and whose members should go on circuit through the 
 several provinces. They could be assisted in ascertaining 
 the facts in any case by local assessors or the local magis- 
 trates. No system better adapted for maintaining the dig- 
 nity of the courts and the authority of the law has ever been 
 devised. It would appear wise also to allow appeals in 
 certain cases to the Supreme Court at Washington, although 
 such appeals would not be numerous. England has always 
 permitted an appeal from her colonial courts to the Judicial 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 59 
 
 Committee of the Privy Council, which is to-day virtually 
 the same court as the House of Lords, the highest tribunal 
 of the United Kingdom. Such an appeal is useful in many 
 ways. It tends to unify the law, and to preserve the 
 authority of the parent state without the irritation that 
 might be provoked by action of the executive department. 
 Moreover, it acts as a restraint on all public bodies and 
 functionaries in the colony to know that the legality of their 
 acts is liable to be called in question before a paramount 
 power, the greatest tribunal of the parent state. 
 
 A potent force in fostering the affection of the people of 
 Porto Rico for the United States might be found in the 
 army and the navy. Not only might the natives of the 
 island be recruited into the ranks, but a certain number of 
 promising young men might receive Presidential appoint- 
 ments year by year to West Point and Annapolis, just as 
 commissions in the British army are now reserved for young 
 colonials. There is certainly nothing that stimulates loyalty 
 to a flag so much as serving under it. 
 
 The regulation of the grant of concessions or franchises 
 will be a thorny problem in both our dependencies, for the 
 danger of abuse is exceeding great. England encountered 
 the same question in the form of the disposition of crown 
 lands in the colonies ; and we know a little about it our- 
 selves from some trifling experiences at home. The only 
 safeguard we have yet discovered is to provide that such 
 grants shall not be made by special acts, but by general law 
 alone; and although that principle cannot be strictly applied 
 to the gigantic corporations bred by economy of operation 
 in a huge country, it can probably be applied in our new 
 possessions for many years to come. 
 
 One more suggestion before closing, for suggestions are 
 singularly easy to make when one has no responsibility for 
 carrying them out. There would seem to be no motive for 
 haste in creating civil governments either for Porto Rico 
 or the Philippines. The military rule in Porto Rico appears 
 to be proceeding smoothly, and in the Archipelago civil 
 government cannot be established until order is restored. 
 There are certainly cases where it is more important to act 
 right than to act quickly. 
 
THE GOVERNMENT OF TROPICAl, COLONIES. 
 
 W. Aiaeyne Ireland, Esq., London, England. 
 
 It is a curious instance of the mutability of human affairs 
 that three years ago the United States should have practi- 
 cally threatened war against England on account of an 
 alleged attempt on the part of the latter to extend the 
 boundaries of one of her colonies and that to-day the United 
 States should be taking heart of grace in her colonial ventures 
 from England's colonial successes. I mention this merely 
 to show how entirely foreign to the American mind was any 
 idea of territorial expansion a couple of years ago. Perhaps 
 there could be named no subject on which the people at 
 large in this country possess so little information as the gov- 
 ernment of dependencies; nothing could be more natural. 
 It could never have been contemplated that the government 
 of dependencies would ever be a problem which the people 
 of the United States would be called on to face. Since it 
 became evident that the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico 
 would have to be governed by American administration a 
 vast amount of rubbish has appeared in the newspapers of 
 the country in reference to the nature of the problem thus 
 suddenly arising out of the success of American arms. 
 Articles have appeared in even the more respectable journals 
 in reference to the colonial system of England which con- 
 tained inaccuracies which would be severely punished in an 
 English schoolboy of fourteen years of age. It has become 
 common to refer to England's colonial empire as though it 
 consisted of a number of homogeneous parts which in the 
 main present to the sovereign state problems of a similar 
 nature. Nothing could be farther from the facts, and I am 
 inclined to think that before any good work can be done in 
 the direction of educating public sentiment in regard to the 
 government of Porto Rico and the Philippines the fact must 
 be clearly established that the government of tropical de- 
 pendencies is a very different question from the government 
 of states or dependencies outside the tropics. In a tropical 
 climate the conditions of life are so different from any that 
 can be found in northern countries that the experience of 
 home government forms a poor guide for colonial adminis- 
 
 (60) 
 
The Government op Dependencies. 6i 
 
 tration. In Europe and in North America the task of gov- 
 ernment is made comparatively easy from the fact that the 
 general tendency of the majority of the people is in the 
 direction of progress, industry, social improvement, morality 
 and good order; and every act of the government which 
 does not injuriously affect any of these factors meets with 
 the approval and active support of the masses. In tropical 
 climates, on the other hand, the aims of the government 
 find but little encouragement amongst the masses. The 
 population contains but a small element of that material 
 •which is necessary for progressive development, and color 
 prejudice forms an insuperable barrier to the social advance- 
 ment of that small minority of the colored race which suc- 
 ceeds in attaining positions of honorable independence. By 
 far the greater number of individuals in tropical countries 
 are without any ambition to do more than secure the neces- 
 sities of life, and the ease with which this ambition is sat- 
 isfied contributes in no small degree to the idleness and 
 indifference which is the marked characteristic of the popu- 
 lation. A short residence in a tropical colony serves to 
 convince most persons of the governing class of the utter 
 hopelessness of effecting any material change in the natural 
 disposition of the natives, and whether such conviction is 
 based on insufficient grounds or not, the result is the same, 
 and each successive generation of reformers faces the situation 
 with an amazing confidence for a while and then wraps 
 itself up in a garment of indifference, stifling any incon- 
 venient pricks of conscience with the assurance that the 
 time is not yet ripe for the wholesale regeneration of 
 humanity. Thus it happens that the new governor, the 
 new colonial secretary, the new administrator, be he never 
 so bemedaled for worthiness in past service at home, sends 
 to his government the same discouraging tale of a people 
 possessing indeed some virtues of the lesser kind, but lost to 
 all desire for progress and content to live a life in which 
 no disturbing thought of rising above the common level 
 intrudes on the soothing monotony of existence. No one 
 who has spent any considerable time in the tropics can 
 have failed to observe that where any degree of prosperity 
 has been reached, where any approach to sanitary conditions 
 exists, where, in fact, any indication of progress is in evi- 
 dence, these things have been achieved not by means of but 
 in spite of the mass of the people. That in some parts of 
 
62 Annals op theTAmerican Academy. 
 
 the tropics this may be due in some degree to the evil effects 
 of slavery constitutes a satisfactory excuse for those condi- 
 tions, the existence of which is not in any way affected by a 
 consideration of their origin. When measured by the com- 
 mercial standard the difference between tropical and non- 
 tropical colonies becomes most strikingly apparent. Thus 
 taking England's tropical and non-tropical colonies I find 
 that during the past five years the non-tropical colonies, 
 Australia, Canada and Newfoundland, imported British pro- 
 duce to the value of $15.34 P er nead of tneir population, 
 whilst the tropical colonies imported British goods to the 
 value of only fifty-six cents per head. Again, the non- 
 tropical colonies exported to England produce to the value 
 of $22.88 per head and the tropical colonies produce to the 
 value of sixty cents a head. During the past twelve years 
 I have spent most of my time in the British colonies. I was 
 for seven years in the West Indies and visited India and 
 several of the French and Dutch tropical colonies. My 
 observations during the past twelve years have led me to 
 form opinions in regard to the tropics which are likely to be 
 very unpopular in this country. I claim no authority for 
 my opinions. If the conclusions at which I have arrived 
 are wrong I can only say that they are the outcome of careful 
 and unprejudiced investigation. I may say then that I do 
 not believe that the inhabitants of the tropics will ever be 
 capable of self-government in the sense which is usually 
 attached to that expression. Is there at the present day to 
 be found anywhere in the tropics a country which is showing 
 itself capable of self-government ? I might go farther and 
 ask has there ever been any country in the tropics which 
 has shown itself capable of self-government ? It is true that 
 in Peru at the time of the Incas there was a government 
 which maintained discipline and order amongst the people 
 of that country, but the government was autocratic and did 
 not lay with the people, and excellent as the results of the 
 system were in many respects, they have been very generally 
 condemned by writers because they did not proceed from 
 self-government, but from a perfect form of despotism. Now 
 if we glance at India as it is to-day we see a spectacle of 
 three hundred million people governed by thirty thousand 
 British officials. There has been a great clamor in favor 
 of India for the Indians. It is claimed and with great 
 justice that the Hindoos, who have been educated according 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 63 
 
 to western notions, have shown themselves capable of enter- 
 ing all the professions with the greatest credit to themselves 
 in their examinations. I am free to admit that I have never 
 met amongst other races men who have shown such an 
 exquisite subtlety of intellect, such an extraordinary aptitude 
 for learning, as some Hindoos whom I have known, but un- 
 fortunately subtlety of intellect does not help people toward 
 self-government. It is a very common error to suppose that 
 administrative capacity goes hand in hand with intellectual 
 attainment. You may take a native official in India and as 
 long as things run smoothly he will amaze you by the clever- 
 ness and ingenuity of his annual report; compared with it 
 the unvarnished statements of his English brother official 
 will appear as the crude production of a schoolboy. But 
 send a flood, send a famine, devastate his territory with 
 disease and what do you find, an absolute incapacity for 
 action. Then it is that the administrative ability of the 
 Englishman steps in and saves the country from disaster. 
 What is wanted in the government of colonies is extreme 
 energy and determination and these qualities are not found 
 in the make-up of the oriental races. If we turn now to the 
 negro in the tropics we find a still worse condition of affairs. 
 In the British West Indies, where the negro is treated better 
 than in any other part of the world, we find the negro voters 
 sending negroes into the legislative assemblies — in some of 
 these colonies the negro or colored men outnumber the white 
 persons. For more than a year I attended all the meetings 
 of the legislative assembly in such a colony. I listened hour 
 upon hour to the speeches of these negro legislators. I 
 found many of them excellent speakers and keen debaters, 
 but I found also that they were entirely unfit for legislative 
 duties. They seemed to be possessed of no sense of propor- 
 tion, no sense of responsibility ; they were apparently governed 
 almost entirely by their emotions. It would appear as though 
 the British colonial office held similar views to those which I 
 have expressed, for within the past year two islands, Dominica 
 and Tobago, have been deprived of their representative insti- 
 tutions; the former has been converted into a crown colony 
 and the latter has been made a ward of Trinidad. Those 
 who are best informed in the West Indies tell me that it is 
 contemplated to make considerable changes in the near 
 future in the government of the British West Indian 
 colonies. Now it is often urged that the reason why the 
 
64 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 negro in the tropics has not shown himself capable of self- 
 government is because he has not had time. If we take the 
 case of the chief negro republic, Hayti, it would certainly 
 appear that they have not had time, for it is beyond doubt a 
 fact that cannibalism prevails to a considerable extent in the 
 republic. Sir Spencer St. John in his book on Hayti, pub- 
 lished in 1884, places the matter altogether beyond question 
 and during a visit I paid to the island in 1893 I saw sufficient 
 to convince me that the abominable practice still existed, but, 
 as a matter of fact, the negroes have had just as much time 
 to develop a civilization and to evolve a satisfactory form of 
 government as the white man. There were negroes in 
 Africa when Caesar landed on British soil and since that 
 time the people of Britain have made themselves what they 
 are to-day whilst the negro in Africa remains substantially 
 what he was. The reason why the negro has made no prog- 
 ress is that a tropical climate does not place a man under 
 any necessity to exert himself, and there is no reason to 
 suppose that the climatic influence of the tropics will be less 
 powerful in the next thousand years than it has been in the 
 past thousand years. I am inclined to think that so long as 
 theorists will maintain that political and ethical principles 
 have an universal applicability, so long will all attempts at 
 civilizing the tropics end in grievous disappointment. I will 
 not go so far as to say that the faculty of governing the 
 tropics lies wholly with the Anglo-Saxon race but I am 
 firmly of the opinion that without the strong hand of the 
 man of the north to hold things together the tropics will 
 never advance beyond the point which has been reached by 
 the central American republics. James Anthony Froude 
 has, to my mind, expressed the whole question of the gov- 
 ernment of tropical dependencies in the following lines, 
 taken from his " English in the West Indies": " The lead- 
 ing of the wise few, the willing obedience of the many, is 
 the beginning and end of all right action. Secure this, and 
 you secure everything. Fail to secure it, and, be your 
 liberties as wide as you can make them, no success is 
 possible. 
 
DISCUSSION. 
 Dr. Tai,cott Wiulims, Philadelphia. 
 
 The discussion to which we have listened for three hours, has 
 covered all three phases of this subject, constitutional, administrative 
 and industrial, with a complete ability. We may fitly congratulate 
 the Academy upon its series of papers, which face this national issue 
 with confidence, accept its responsibilities without hesitation and see 
 in our laws, our government and our citizenship the material for its 
 successful solution. 
 
 The burden of utterance has been in favor of the constitutional 
 power of the government to discharge all the duties before it in the 
 administration of dependencies. This was also the case in the debate 
 in Congress. While Professor Woolsey and Professor Huffcut confine 
 themselves to this aspect, Professor Lowell has dealt in a strain as 
 encouraging with the administrative necessities of the case, and the 
 solitary doubt as to the future is raised by Mr. Ireland in his assertion, 
 which I will take up later, that contract laws are indispensable in 
 dealing with labor in the tropics. 
 
 The constitutional argument advanced by both Professor Woolsey 
 and Professor Huffcut has become familiar during the last six months. 
 They differ, one in believing that it will be necessary to adjust con- 
 stitutional guarantees in some shape, and the other in asserting that 
 they do not extend over territory newly acquired. I do not propose 
 here and now to review this constitutional discussion, but I desire to 
 draw attention to a phase of this branch of our subject, to which 
 neither has alluded. In guessing on the future decisions of the 
 Supreme Court, it has generally proved wiser to trust to the trend of 
 its past history than to our analysis of its probable reasons for a 
 future decision. For a century, since its early decisions first struck, 
 out the path, the Supreme Court, with the exception of the solitary- 
 decision in the Dred Scott case has never found a national need without 
 discovering a national power. This has been the basis of its steady- 
 extension of the powers of the "federal agency" into the prerogatives-, 
 of a nation possessing all the powers required in the external dis- 
 charge of its duties in the field of international law. In deciding 
 internal questions the pendulum of the Supreme Court has swung from 
 one extreme to the other, but in deciding those questions created by 
 the external relations of the United States, ending in the luminous 
 decisions in Ross' case, quoted by Professor Huffcut (140 U. S. 
 
 (65) 
 
66 Annals op the American Academy. 
 
 453), the Supreme Court has always found whatever power it was 
 necessary for the United States to have to act in its sovereign capacity. 
 I need not review these cases. They have decided the right to ac- 
 quire territory, to determine its government, to govern territory con- 
 quered, but not annexed, to enforce treaties, to exclude aliens in 
 time of peace and to discharge, even to the execution and imprison- 
 ment of American citizens, the civil and criminal jurisdictions of 
 ex-territorial law in Oriental countries. With this clear ascending 
 curve running through a century, it is no great stretch of either im- 
 agination or calculation to assume that the Supreme Court will reach 
 a precisely similiar conclusion when it is called upon to decide 
 whether the nation organized by the constitution can exercise the 
 ordinary national powers of other nations in dealing with annexed 
 territory. 
 
 The precise letter of the constitution of course, blocks the way, as 
 Professor Woolsey has pointed out. Through it, Professor Huffcut has 
 driven his ingenious tunnel, but the provision in regard to jury duty 
 is in the same article with the provision in regard to judges holding 
 for good behavior, and if Congress can establish courts which can 
 legally condemn a man when the judge only holds for a term of 
 years in our territories, it could by parity of reasoning eliminate the 
 jury. Nor is this all. The United States has had three successive 
 classes of territory acquired, first from cession by states to the 
 United States, under conditions which the Supreme Court has recog- 
 nized as limiting congressional action, second by the cession of 
 foreign countries under treaties which stipulated that in the new 
 acquisitions, the citizens of the ceding nation should enjoy the privi- 
 leges of the citizens of the nation accepting the cession, which Justice 
 Marshall held the sole basis of civil rights. Third, our present 
 acquisitions which are ceded without this provision and in which by 
 implication these rights are not conferred by annexation. There is 
 here a steady sequence whose march and progress the Supreme Court 
 sought to interrupt in the Dred Scott decision, but in which the arbit- 
 rament of events proved more powerful than the logic of Taney. 
 The absence of this treaty clause in our last acquisitions under the 
 reasoning of Marshall vitally changes the situation, and while it does 
 not alter the power of Congress to legislate, it changes the environ- 
 ment under which it acts. 
 
 Any confusion on this subject arises from failing to discriminate 
 between the limits of sovereignty and constitutional jurisdiction. 
 The decisions in the California cases to which Professor Huffcut 
 alluded (Cross v. Harrison, 16 Howard, 164) do not base the right to 
 levy taxes on the war power, but the absence of constitutional reason 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 67 
 
 for interference with these taxes on the fact that Congress had not 
 yet legislated so as to extend the jurisdiction of the laws of the 
 United States, its treaties and its constitution. Sovereignty and juris- 
 diction may be coterminous. Either may exist where the other is 
 absent. The sovereignty of the United States sentenced in Japan to 
 death and provided for the imprisonment of Ross for life in Albany, 
 a stronger case than the finding in Japan because the sentence had to be 
 executed within our constitutional limits, but no one will pretend that 
 the constitutional jurisdiction of the United States applied in either 
 case because if it had a jury would have been necessary, and the Supreme 
 Court wisely found the authority for dealing with the life and liberty 
 of an American citizen, not in any special grant of power to Congress, 
 but in the necessity for the exercise of the international powers of an 
 independent sovereignty. A long series of decisions show that the 
 executive sovereignty of the English crown attaches at the instant of 
 conquest, but the judicial jurisdiction of the English crown only 
 begins after an order in council has extended it. The sovereignty of 
 the United States extends over an Indian tribe ; but its members are 
 not within the constitutional jurisdiction of the United States and the 
 right of Congress to regulate the manner in which the local powers of 
 such a tribe shall be exercised does not render such local powers Fed- 
 eral powers, arising from and created by the Constitution of the 
 United States. (Tatton v. Mayer, 163 U. S. 376.) By discovery 
 the sovereignty of the United States extended over the Guano Islands 
 which our citizens occupy, but the jurisdiction of the United States 
 is only established there by act, and if Congress instead of making 
 Navassa a ship as it did by section 5516 R. S. had given its governor 
 power of life and death the grant would have rested on as complete 
 constitutional power in one case as in the other. National sovereignty 
 exists complete, unchallenged and unquestioned over the Philippine 
 Islands and Porto Rico. The authority now exercised there is 
 ordinarily spoken of as the war power of the President, but it is 
 also the necessary exercise, as the Supreme Court pointed out in the 
 case already cited, of that authority which attaches to a sovereignty 
 that acquires territory, an authority which is not provided for in the 
 constitution, but which exists as a logical deduction from the fact 
 that the constitution created a sovereignty with complete national 
 powers for international purposes. 
 
 The constitution created a constitutional jurisdiction within certain 
 definite limits, to wit, the states which formed the union. It also 
 created a nation with the usual international powers needed and 
 demanded by an independent nation, recognized and acting as such 
 under the law of nations. To both of these propositions all agree. 
 
68 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 When this national sovereignty acts within the sphere of constitutional 
 jurdisdiction, it is limited by constitutional provisions. When as a 
 national sovereignty, it acts within the international field, it has what- 
 ever powers are needed for its work as such, a principle established,^ a 
 long series of decisions. (Fong Yue Ting v, U. S. 149, U. S. 712). 
 Sovereignty is exercised over conquered territory under no specific 
 constitutional power, but as part of the rights inherent in the inter- 
 national nation created by the constitution. Legislation, by treaty or 
 statute (American Insurance Co. v. Canter, I Peters, 511), decides 
 when the constitutional jurisdiction shall be coterminous with this 
 national sovereignty, and until some legislation, treaty or statute 
 decides this political question, the judicial power of the United States 
 does not attach (Jecker v. Montgomery, 13 Howard, 498); unless Con- 
 gress legislates otherwise, the "belligerent rights of a conqueror" 
 remaining complete until this time (16 Howard, 164). Sovereignty, 
 in short, moves with the international acts of the nation. 
 Constitutional jurisdiction travels with the municipal law of the 
 United States, and is created by a treaty because it is part of that 
 law. Nor does any decision, not even that cited referring to the Dis- 
 trict of Columbia, traverse this distinction, for the simple reason, if 
 no other, that a treaty annexing territory without conferring civil 
 rights — that is, extending constitutional jurisdiction in greater or less 
 degree — has never yet been before our courts. I submit, therefore, 
 that in dealing with territory thus annexed, there may be found a 
 power wider than that simply ' 'to make all needful rules and regulations 
 respecting territory, and other property," to wit, that broader national 
 power which permits annexation itself, though the constitution makes 
 no provision for the act and under which power a long series of statutes 
 have been passed and even jury less courts created as part of national 
 sovereignty, and not part of our municipal constitutional jurisdiction. 
 In dealing with the administration of dependencies, Professor 
 Lowell has laid stress, as is indeed fit, on the trained and organized 
 character of the English colonial service. But the precise force and 
 efficacy of the English colonial administration is and always has 
 attached to the absence of this requirement in its higher parts. It 
 is the combination of a trained force headed and controlled by men 
 chosen from the general political life of the realm and for political 
 service which gives the English colonial service practical efficiency. 
 A pure bureaucracy, a trained and examined colonial service, exclu- 
 sively applied to colonial administration ends where the German 
 colonial service, which is of this character, has always ended, in the per- 
 petual broils and the perpetual blunders of the ' 'competition wallah, " if 
 he has not some one over him selected by the competition of life and. 
 
The Government op Dependencies. 69 
 
 not of examination. Ultimate power in India rests with the governor- 
 general and governors of the presidencies, men selected from active 
 English political life, and for these posts a Conservative government, 
 selects Conservatives and a Liberal administration, Liberals. Sir Alfred 
 Milner, the ablest figure to-day in English colonial administration, 
 was a dozen years ago a mere journalist and has never gone through 
 the competition mill. Of the seven Australian governors last year 
 only two had ever had political training. The rest had been, one a 
 gentleman in waiting, another groom of the chambers, another " Ver- 
 derer of Epping Forest "—an ancient office doubtless, but whose direct 
 training for colonial administration must be admitted to be slender by 
 the few, even in this audience, who can define its duties. A success- 
 ful explorer, like Thomson, a good regimental officer, some journalist 
 or barrister with a genius for management, a man successful in Eng- 
 lish politics — these have made half the good colonial governors, aided 
 and supported by a trained force selected by competition as their ad- 
 ministrative tools. 
 
 Nor are Anglo-Indian salaries what they were. The very place 
 Macaulay took to accumulate a competence, can to-day be held only by 
 a man with a private fortune to bridge the gap between the salary 
 paid and the level of expenditure demanded by the post. 
 
 Mr. Alleyne Ireland speaks the undoubted conviction of all English- 
 men in deeming contract labor laws necessary in the tropics. I may 
 be pardoned if I remember that every English paper teemed with this 
 advice thirty-three years ago, in behalf of the cotton crop. We were 
 assured — Who does not remember it ? — that without contract laws the 
 negro would not work and the cotton crop cease. Our largest crop 
 then had been 3,000,000 bales. Free labor has quadrupled the yield. 
 There are two ways of making a man work — by pressure from above, 
 disguised slavery — or by stimulus from within, the higher wages of a 
 highly organized, free, industrial system. The last, the tropics have 
 never yet had. Jamaica and the other English tropical West Indian 
 Islands are the dissevered fragments of a continent from whose indus- 
 trial activity they have been separated. Give the stimulus of a 
 market and of high wages and all men will work. Deprive them of 
 either and contract labor laws are needed. The American may yet 
 solve the tropical industrial problem as he has quadrupled the cotton 
 crop in face of all the arguments marshaled by Mr. Ireland, all made 
 thirty-three years ago, not by laws making it harder for a man to be 
 idle but by an industrial system making it more profitable for a man 
 to labor. 
 
70 Annai<s of the American Academy. 
 
 Professor L. S. Rows, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
 It is no small task to add anything to the admirable addresses 
 we have heard this afternoon. In them we find exhausted the pos- 
 sibilities of political organization in the management of dependencies, 
 as well as the constitutional difficulties that we are likely to encounter. 
 Upon these two questions — of political organization and constitutional 
 interpretation — I wish to say a few words. 
 
 I have not the slightest doubt, that so far as the organization of 
 government in our new dependencies is concerned, we shall be able 
 — whether in Cuba, Porto Rico, or the Philippines — to adapt our 
 standards to the needs and possibilities of the inhabitants of the 
 islands. Arguing from precedent, there is reason to believe that our 
 government will be too despotic rather than too free. It is a mistake 
 to suppose that the extension of American rule means equality of 
 political rights. Throughout our history the principle for which we 
 have stood above all others is the maintenance of order and security. 
 To this end we are prepared to subordinate all other political ideals 
 and principles. 
 
 The real difficulties which we will encounter in the government 
 of our new possessions, difficulties which are as yet new to us, 
 lie in the field of the private rather than in that of the public 
 law. In other words, while we shall in all likelihood be able to 
 develop a governmental organization strong enough to meet any 
 emergency, there is grave danger that by suddenly undermining 
 customs, traditions and systems of law which do not conform to the 
 principles of the common law, we shall destroy the fabric of social 
 organization in the new territories. Incomplete and inadequate as 
 such social organization may be, it is the first step in orderly, progres- 
 sive development. To destroy it is to invite disintegration and decay. 
 This danger is evidently very much greater in the Philippines than in 
 either Cuba or Porto Rico. In the latter our first and most important 
 mission is to reorganize the judicial system and the administration of 
 law rather than its form. In certain departments of legal procedure — 
 particularly that of land transfer — glaring abuses must be corrected. 
 The only immediate change necessary in the substantive law however 
 is to make it definite. We cannot afford to permit our Governor- 
 General to indulge in the arbitrary interference with the form of law 
 and administration of justice which characterized the rule of his 
 Spanish predecessor. Under our rule, Cubans and Porto Ricans must 
 be assured of equality before the law not only as between themselves, 
 but also as against the public authorities. This does not mean that 
 we must sweep away all local customary law and establish the code 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 71 
 
 of the civil law throughout the islands, thus sacrificing efficiency to 
 uniformity. If we will but keep in mind how easily the legal fibre of 
 a people is undermined, how gradually permanent changes in legal 
 standards are effected, we shall be spared many humiliating failures. 
 
 Our policy in Cuba and Porto Rico is comparatively simple when 
 compared with the difficulties which we shall encounter in the Philip- 
 pines. We shall there require a combination of firmness and for- 
 bearance which no nation has as yet shown in its dealings with inferior 
 races. For it must be remembered that it was only after a series of 
 bitter lessons that England acquired the first rudimentary notions as 
 to the proper method of dealing with half-civilized peoples. In the 
 Philippines we shall have to deal with almost every conceivable form 
 of primitive institution, from the patriarchal family to the most pro- 
 nounced theocracy. However their system may violate our legal 
 standards, we must remember that it cannot be suddenly changed 
 without setting the population adrift toward anarchy and rebellion. 
 For a long time we may have to tolerate institutions that may seem 
 undesirable, even unjust to our eyes, and yet which are absolutely 
 necessary to maintain the cohesion of the present social system. Law 
 of some kind is better than no law at all. If we endeavor suddenly to 
 inject American ideas into Malay tribal relations, disintegration and 
 disorder are certain to result. The most that we can hope to do at 
 present is to prevent the more violent forms of tribal or individual 
 aggression, to establish an equitable system of taxation and then 
 allow the civilizing influence of industrial reorganization to pave the 
 way for improvement in property and other legal relations. As Mr. 
 Lowell has well said, we shall probably make many blunders, but it is 
 asking too much to expect an easy solution to so complex and delicate 
 a problem. 
 
 A word before closing, on the vexed question of constitutional 
 interpretation. In this respect I am inclined to take quite a different 
 view of the situation from that outlined by Professor Woolsey. If 
 instead of analyzing the letter of constitutional interpretation, we 
 stop to examine its spirit, we find one cardinal principle guiding the 
 court, viz., to avoid as far as possible any interference with the politi- 
 cal organs of the government on broad questions of public policy. 
 In order to carry out this principle we find the court resorting to 
 legal fictions, as for instance in Fleming v. Page, * and Hamilton v. 
 Dillin.t 
 
 I am fully aware that this proposition in the general form may give 
 rise to some misunderstanding. Is it not the function of the judiciary, 
 
 * 9 Howard, 603. 
 1 21 Wallace, 73. 
 
72 Annans op the American Academy 
 
 ary, it -will be asked, to safeguard the constitution and in so doing to 
 check the action of the other organs of government ? An analysis 
 of the decisions of the Supreme Court will show that while this is 
 true, it is subject to certain definite limitations. The court has 
 consistently refused to interfere with what it calls " the political func- 
 tions of the government." 
 
 "While it has given no definite meaning to the term " political func- 
 tions" the end which the court has kept in view seems quite clear, 
 viz., to refrain from interfering with the political organs of the gov- 
 ernment whenever the peace, or safety of the country is endangered 
 or the order and security of any district menaced. It would take us 
 far beyond the limits of this discussion to examine the instances in 
 which this principle has been carried out The most striking cases 
 have arisen in periods of conflict, such as the Civil and Mexican 
 Wars. The Reconstruction Period was particularly fruitful in this 
 respect.* 
 
 This desire to avoid conflict with the political organs of government 
 has demanded a degree of self-restraint on the part of the judiciary 
 which has aroused the admiration of every student of politics. This 
 self-restraint has indirectly increased the authority of the courts, for 
 it has assured to them the respect and support of the people in those 
 cases in which the courts have seen fit to place checks upon executive 
 action. Traditions such as these make it seem tolerably certain that 
 the courts will not force upon the political organs of the government 
 a construction of the constitution which would make good govern- 
 ment in the Philippines impossible. 
 
 But what is the nature of this construction for which Professor Wool- 
 sey contends ? Because, in Callan v. Wilsonf the court held that the 
 framers of the constitution were anxious to secure the benefits of the 
 common law system to the whole people and, by implication, extended 
 the right of trial by jury to the inhabitants of the District of Columbia, 
 therefore, it is argued, this right must be extended to all the territory 
 over which the United States may acquire dominion. This reasoning 
 would apply to the amendments as well as to the body of the consti- 
 tution. In order to avoid giving to the Filipinos the "right to keep 
 and bear arms, "J and to guard against the dangers involved in guar- 
 anteeing to them the common law jury system, it is necessary to 
 resort to a form of casuistry which can only be regarded as a subter- 
 
 * See Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wallace, 475; Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wallace, 50: 
 also Dunning " Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction.'' Macmillan; 1698. 
 1 127 U. S. 540. 
 % Amendments, Article II. 
 
The Government of Dependencies. 73 
 
 fuge. In Cross v. Harrison* the court held that the President 
 as commander-in-chief of the army might govern newly acquired 
 territory and that such territory did not become domesticated 
 until Congress had established a civil government. Arguing from 
 the letter of this decision, it is held that so long as the President 
 governs the Philippines under the provisional form of military admin- 
 istration, the constitutional guarantees will not attach. In other 
 words, if this mode of interpretation be correct we are driven to the 
 conclusion that in order to govern the Philippines efficiently we 
 must establish irresponsible government with its attendant evil — civil 
 government by the military arm. To preserve order and maintain 
 liberty we must create one of the worst forms of despotism. 
 
 I dwell upon this point, for it seems to me to involve a serious 
 menace to the orderly development of our institutions. If we must 
 resort to such devices to "beat " the constitution, it will not be long 
 before its authority will be seriously undermined. Many of those 
 who believe that they are its staunchest supporters are in reality 
 fostering that form of constitutional observance which abides by 
 the letter but violates the spirit. Is it not far better consciously to 
 face the fact that the precedents cited are precedents in form rather 
 than in substance? A precedent is " a decision precisely, exactly 
 or directly, in point,"f or a case, of which the " facts' cannot be dis- 
 tinguished in effect from those of the present case. "J Judged by 
 these standards can the proposition for a moment be seriously enter- 
 tained that real legal precedents exist for the constitutional questions 
 involved in the government of the Philippines; at all events as re- 
 gards the applicability of the constitutional restrictions and the 
 constitutional guarantees ? In every one of the cases cited the ques- 
 tion before the court has been, whether the benefits of the constitutional 
 guarantees, together with the common law system which they include, 
 should be extended to territory contiguous to the territory of the states, 
 settled by a people of essentially the same training and traditions. 
 Is it not natural that with expediency and traditional policy in 
 harmony, the Supreme Court should have followed the line of 
 least resistance ? 
 
 But now the question has arisen under totally different conditions. 
 With a population on a lower plane of civilization, untrained to the 
 common law — in fact, in many cases devoid of any legal system — are 
 we blindly to follow rules of interpretation intended for essentially 
 different application ? The mere statement of the possibility is a 
 
 •76 Howard, 164 (193). 
 
 1 6 Bast, 512, Ram, " On Legal Judgment, "p. 113. 
 
 J 3 Barn, and Aid. 56. 
 
74 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 reflection on our political capacity as a nation. When we bear in 
 mind the splendid traditions of forbearance and self-restraint of the 
 judiciary, the constant desire which it has shown to remove rather 
 than to increase the obstacles to efficient government, there is, it 
 appears to me, but little danger that we will be forced to the unpleas- 
 ant choice between inefficient government and irresponsible rule. 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 
 
 Annual Address. 
 
 (75) 
 
MILITARISM AND DEMOCRACY. 
 The Annual Address, by the Honorable Carl Schurz. 
 
 The subject of "Militarism and Democracy," which has 
 been assigned to me for discussion, is at the present moment 
 of peculiar interest. We are apt to speak boastfully of the 
 progressive civilization characterizing this age. While the 
 very foundation of all civilization consists in the dispensa- 
 tion of justice by peaceable methods between nations as well 
 as individuals, instead of the rule of brute force, it is a sin- 
 gular fact that at the close of this much-vaunted nineteenth 
 century we behold the nations of the world vying with each 
 other in increasing their armaments on land and sea, exhaust- 
 ing all the resources of inventive genius and spending the 
 treasure produced by human labor with unprecedented lav- 
 ishness to develop means of destruction for the defence of 
 their possessions, or the satisfaction of national ambitions, or 
 the settlement of international differences, on a scale never 
 before known. 
 
 Thus the very advances in the sciences and the arts which 
 constitute one part of our modern civilization are pressed 
 into the service of efforts to perfect the engineries of death, 
 devastation and oppression, which are to make brute force in 
 our days more and more terrible and destructive,, and to 
 render the weak more and more helpless as against the 
 strong. It looks as if the most civilized powers, although 
 constantly speaking of peace, were preparing for a gigantic 
 killing-and-demolishing match such as the most barbarous 
 ages have hardly ever witnessed, and this at the expense of 
 incalculable sacrifice to their peoples. 
 
 Nothing could in this respect be more instructive and 
 pathetic than the appeal in behalf of peace and disarma- 
 ment addressed last year by the Czar of Russia to all the 
 powers represented at his court. Of that appeal this is the 
 principal part : 
 
 (77) 
 
78 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 " In the course of the last twenty years the longings for a 
 general appeasement have grown especially pronounced in 
 the consciences of civilized nations. The preservation of 
 peace has been put forward as the object of international 
 policy; it is in its name that great states have concluded 
 between themselves powerful alliances; it is the better to 
 guarantee peace that they have developed in proportions 
 hitherto unprecedented their military forces and still con- 
 tinue to increase them without shrinking from any sacrifice. 
 
 "All these efforts, nevertheless, have not yet been able to 
 bring about the beneficent results of the desired pacification. 
 The financial charges following an upward march strike at 
 the public prosperity at its very source. 
 
 "The intellectual and physical strength of the nations, 
 labor and capital, are for the major part diverted from their 
 natural application, and unproductively consumed. Hun- 
 dreds of millions are devoted to acquiring terrible engines of 
 destruction, which, though to-day regarded as the last word 
 of science, are destined to-morrow to lose all value in con- 
 sequence of some fresh discovery in the same field. 
 
 " National culture, economic progress, and the production 
 of wealth are either paralyzed or checked in their develop- 
 ment. Moreover, in proportion as the armaments of each 
 power increase, so do they less and less fulfill the object 
 which the governments have set before themselves. 
 
 "The economic crises, due in great part to the system of 
 armaments & outrance, and the continual danger which lies in 
 this massing of war material, are transforming the armed 
 peace of our days into a crushing burden, which the peoples 
 have more and more difficulty in bearing. It appears evi- 
 dent, then, that if this state of things were prolonged it 
 would inevitably lead to the very cataclysm which it is 
 desired to avert, and the horrors of which make every think- 
 ing man shudder in advance." 
 
 There has been much discussion as to the motives which 
 may have impelled the Czar to make this appeal. Many of 
 those who consider him sincere, call the manifesto a mere 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 79 
 
 outburst of generous sentimentality which, although laud- 
 able in itself, loses sight of existing conditions and of the 
 practical exigencies of the moment. If it really was mere 
 generous sentimentality, it was sentimentality of that sort 
 which in the history of mankind has not seldom served to 
 give impulse and inspiration to great movements of progress 
 in justice and humanity, overcoming with its optimism that 
 dreary and pusillanimous wisdom which reasons that exist- 
 ing evils cannot be rectified simply because they are strongly 
 intrenched in existing conditions. If it was that sentimen- 
 talism, it did honor to the Czar's heart, and, inasmuch as it 
 attacks a terrible evil which eventually must be remedied, it 
 did no discredit to the Czar's head. 
 
 Others have questioned the Czar's sincerity and good 
 faith, suggesting that the peace manifesto was merely a 
 diplomatic stratagem designed to dupe his competitors for 
 territorial conquest. This is, in view of the solemnity of 
 the Czar's words, so atrocious an imputation that only 
 hardened cynicism will readily accept it. It is, however, 
 all the more to be deplored that the Czar, at the time when 
 the belief of the world in the sincerity of his benevolent 
 purposes is so important, should himself endanger that 
 belief by ruthlessly suppressing the constitutional rights and 
 liberties of the good people of Finland, which he had sol- 
 emnly sworn to maintain, and which his predecessors, even 
 so stern a despot as Nicholas I. had faithfully respected. 
 The performance of two acts so different in character by the 
 same person may be explained on the hypothesis, that in the 
 one case the Czar, being sincerely alarmed by what he him- 
 self experienced of the evils and dangers of excessive arma- 
 ments, could not resist the impulse of attacking them, and 
 did so in good faith, while ordinarily, in doing the business 
 of an autocrat, he may be no better, and in some respects 
 even worse, than others engaged in the same trade. 
 
 But however that may be, and whatever results the peace 
 conference meeting in response to the Czar's appeal may im- 
 mediately bring forth, the most important point is that the 
 
8o Annates of the American Academy. 
 
 statements of fact contained in the Czar's manifesto are true. 
 They are indeed not new. The same things have often been 
 said before. But those who said them were promptly and 
 derisively cried down as visionary dreamers who had no 
 conception of the responsibilities involved in the manage- 
 ment of the great business of the world. Now those things 
 are authoritatively proclaimed by the most absolute monarch 
 commanding the largest army on earth, and holding in his 
 hand the destinies of one of the greatest empires — the man 
 whose immediate responsibilities in the management of the 
 great business of the world are not exceeded by those of any 
 other human being. 
 
 While the so-called practical men of the age never cease 
 to tell us that the greatest possible security of peace depends 
 upon the greatest possible preparation for war, that autocrat 
 and commander of millions of soldiers tells them that the 
 ■nations which are draining their own vitality to preserve 
 peace by their preparations for war, are doing a thing which, 
 if prolonged, ' ' will inevitably lead to the very cataclysm 
 which it is desired to avert, and the horrors of which make 
 every thinking man shudder in advance." Thus it is no 
 longer merely the idle and irresponsible dreamer but the 
 practical potentate charged with the farthest-reaching powers 
 and the highest responsibilities who warns the world that 
 if the policy of increasing armaments, which we call militar- 
 ism, be persisted in, it must produce ruinous mischief, 
 and end in incalculable disaster and calamity. 
 
 The comparative weight with which militarism, that is 
 the system which makes the maintenance of great arma- 
 ments one of the principal objects of the state, burdens 
 different nations, depends upon their respective wealth, the 
 length of the terms of military service, their administrative 
 organization, and the nature of their political institutions. 
 Upon nations which are unable to bear heavy loads of tax- 
 ation, or whose finances are in a precarious state, or which 
 suffer from official incapacity or corruption in their adminis- 
 trative organization, or which withdraw their young men 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 8i 
 
 for long periods of time from productive employments with- 
 out offering through the military service any valuable com- 
 pensation by way of instruction or training, the burden of 
 great standing armaments weighs of course more heavily 
 than upon nations whose material resources are great, or 
 which can easily raise ample revenues, or whose administra- 
 tive machinery is honest and efficient, or whose terms of 
 military service are short, or whose young men receive in 
 that service at least some discipline, instruction and training 
 calculated to increase their working capacity in productive 
 pursuits, and thus to compensate in some measure for their 
 temporary withdrawal from such occupations. 
 
 For the purposes of this discourse the workings of mili- 
 tarism in France are of especial interest, on account of the 
 political institutions of that country. 
 
 In a monarchy a standing armed force is a thing congruous 
 with the nature of the government, and it is the more so, the 
 more the monarchy is of the absolute type. The standing 
 army in such a monarchy may be said to be the enlarged 
 bodyguard of the monarch. The monarch represents an 
 authority not springing from the periodically expressed con- 
 sent of the people, and relying for the maintenance of that 
 authority, if occasion requires, upon the employment of 
 force, even against the popular will. An army is an organi- 
 zation of men subject to the command of a superior will, the 
 origin or the purpose of which it is assumed to have no right 
 to question. The standing army is in this sense, therefore, 
 according to its nature and spirit an essentially monarchical 
 institution. 
 
 But France is a republic. She calls herself a democratic 
 republic. A democratic republic is, or should be, govern- 
 ment by public opinion as expressed in legal form — public 
 opinion, as it issues from discussion in which all the people 
 are free to participate, and the outcome of which they are 
 to determine by their freely given suffrages. The army, 
 inasmuch as it is in all things subject to the will of superior 
 authority without discussion or question, must therefore be 
 
82 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 regarded as an incongruous element in a democracy. The 
 authority to which it is subject, may indeed be a government 
 created by public opinion and supported by it. But as such 
 a government may happen to become faithless to its origin, 
 or fall out of accord with the public opinion of the time, the 
 army, as an organized force subject to its will, may be used 
 by it for ends and purposes adverse to the interests or the 
 will of the people. 
 
 It is for reasons like this that the true democratic spirit has 
 always been jealously opposed to the maintenance of large 
 standing armies. It has always insisted that the organiza- 
 tions of armed forces that may be necessary for the enforce- 
 ment of the laws and the keeping of order at home, or for 
 the defence of the integrity or the honor of the state in 
 foreign warfare, should remain as much as possible identified 
 with the people themselves — should be, in fact, of the 
 people in their origin, their interests, their sympathies, as 
 well as in the character and aspirations of those commanding 
 them; and that, if a standing army as a permanent institu- 
 tion be indeed indispensable for certain necessary objects, it 
 should, in point of numerical strength, be confined to the 
 narrowest practicable limits. 
 
 That democratic spirit has therefore always demanded 
 that the armed force should be composed principally of the 
 militia, the citizen soldiery, — or, in extraordinary emergen- 
 cies, of volunteers called out from the ranks of the people, 
 to serve as soldiers for certain well-defined and stated pur- 
 poses, and then, those stated purposes being accomplished, 
 to return to their civic pursuits. So it has hitherto been 
 with us. In Switzerland, where the democratic spirit is 
 much alive, but where on account of the geographical situa- 
 tion of the country a large and well-drilled force is thought 
 necessary, they have organized the whole male population 
 capable of bearing arms in military bodies, some of which 
 are called out for instruction and drill for a limited period 
 every year, to be restored to civil life after the shortest 
 possible interruption of their ordinary occupations — the only 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 83 
 
 thing resembling a standing army being certain small staff 
 corps which are kept in permanent service. All this rests 
 upon the leading principle that the soldiers of a democracy 
 as well as those commanding them should, while temporarily 
 submitting to military discipline, remain in all essential 
 respects active citizens without any interests, or sympathies, 
 or aspirations in any manner or degree different from those 
 of the general citizenship. 
 
 France furnishes the example of a republic maintaining a 
 large standing force, and the history of that country is 
 peculiarly instructive as to the relations between standing 
 armies and democracies. The first French Republic sprang 
 from the great revolution of 1789. The most famous of 
 French armies were organized under the inspiration of 
 the revolutionary enthusiasms of that period. They were 
 then to a large extent composed of volunteers who had 
 rushed, to arms to defend the territory of the republic, and 
 then went forth to bring "Liberty" to the world outside. 
 Thus they won victory, and glory, and conquest. And then, 
 having gone forth to fight for liberty, they proceeded, 
 intoxicated with glory and conquest, to turn their victories 
 for liberty to the advantage of a personal government 
 animated with insatiable despotic ambitions. I am far from 
 saying that the spirit of the army was the only cause for the 
 downfall of the democratic republic. But it is a matter of 
 history that the army, which had been created for the 
 service of democracy, was, by the glory and the conquests it 
 achieved, transformed into a willing and most effective 
 instrument of usurpation and tyranny at home, and of 
 oppression abroad. And it may be said that the Napoleonic 
 system of government which was thus created, was the 
 beginning of that militarism with which Europe is now 
 afflicted. 
 
 The second French republic sprang from the revolution of 
 1848. It was the prestige of the name of Napoleon, the 
 glamour of the Napoleonic legend of military glory, that 
 made the election of I^ouis Napoleon to the presidency of 
 
84 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 the republic possible. Usurpation followed. I do not pre- 
 tend that the spirit of the standing army alone caused the 
 transformation of the second French republic into the second 
 French empire. But it can certainly not be denied, that the 
 army again lent itself as a willing tool to the schemes of the 
 conspirators who had planned the destruction of the repub- 
 lic, and the erection of a monarchical government upon its 
 ruins. 
 
 After the disastrous collapse of imperial rule in the 
 Franco-German war, the third French republic was pro- 
 claimed in 1870. It has now lasted well-nigh twenty-nine 
 years. But the greatest dangers that have threatened its 
 existence came from the position In it of the standing army. 
 One of its chiefs, MacMahon, while president of the republic, 
 was drawn into the intrigues of the monarchist parties; 
 another, Boulanger, plotted revolution and usurpation, prob- 
 ably for his own benefit; and now, in these latter days, in 
 consequence of the hideous Dreyfus affair, the administra- 
 tion of justice has, in the interest of the chiefs of the army, 
 been subjected to a perversion calculated to undermine the 
 very foundations of legal government, and, it is to be feared, 
 ultimately to effect the total subversion of republican insti- 
 tutions. The domineering spirit of the army is such that it 
 claims to be above discussion and criticism, assumes to dic- 
 tate the decisions of judicial tribunals, and actually seeks to 
 substitute for what in other countries is the crime of lise- 
 majestk, the crime of Itse-armie. At any rate, whatever the 
 future may bring, it is no exaggeration to say, that the atti- 
 tude of the army in France has dealt the reputation of 
 republican government a staggering blow, and that all this 
 may turn out to be only a prelude to new usurpations. 
 
 It is idle to pretend that all the historical facts I have 
 enumerated, were owing only to the proverbial inconstancy 
 of the French temperament; for it should not be forgotten 
 that even in England, when the parliamentary forces during 
 the so-called Great Rebellion of the seventeenth century had 
 assumed the character of a standing army, that army, in 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 85, 
 
 spite of its origin, became in the hands of Oliver Cromwell a 
 ready instrument for the transformation of the republic into 
 a personal government essentially monarchical, and finally, 
 under the leadership of Monk, served to bring about the 
 restoration of the monarchy with all its forms and attributes 
 by the return of the Stuarts. Thus we see that it was not a 
 mere French peculiarity which made a strong standing army 
 a danger to republican institutions in Europe, but that the 
 large standing army has always played the same part in 
 European republics, regardless of race. I need not go into 
 the history of the republics of antiquity, modern instances 
 being sufficiently instructive. 
 
 As I remarked, militarism on a great scale began in 
 Europe with the French revolution and attained a high 
 degree of development under the first Napoleon. It declined 
 somewhat under the influence of the reaction which was 
 caused by the general state of exhaustion after the Napoleonic 
 wars. It revived again after the revolutionary movements 
 of 1848 when the new French Emperor sought to fortify his 
 throne by warlike prestige, when Italy and Germany moved 
 for the accomplishment and maintenance of national unity, 
 when continental powers, following the example of England, 
 became ambitious of colonial expansion, and when new 
 inventions in the appliances of warfare stimulated the 
 powers in a course of nervous rivalry. It is thus that the 
 deplorable conditions came about which are so pointedly set 
 forth in the peace manifesto of the Russian Czar; that 
 millions of young men at the period of their greatest vigor- 
 are withdrawn from productive pursuits; that " the intellec- 
 tual and physical strength of the nations, labor and capital, 
 are largely diverted from their natural application and 
 unproductively employed" in gigantic preparations for 
 possible conflicts of arms, and that the nations are burdened 
 with very onerous taxes for the purpose of providing engines 
 of destruction. 
 
 For the burdens European nations are thus bearing, the 
 advocates or apologists of the system have a ready plea of 
 
86 AnnaivS of the American Academy. 
 
 justification. It is that the nation refusing to bear those 
 burdens would soon be at the mercy of its ambitious and 
 possibly hostile rivals. The Frenchman tells us that, aside 
 from his desire to take revenge for the defeats suffered in the 
 German war, France must strain every nerve in preparation 
 for a possible conflict, to be reasonably secure against Ger- 
 man aggression or British encroachment. The German 
 reasons that, the German Empire being wedged in between 
 France and Russia, whose sentimental alliance may on occa- 
 sion be turned to hostile purposes, the fatherland must be 
 armed to the teeth according to the latest fashion, in order 
 to maintain the integrity of the empire, and that it must also 
 have a strong fleet to hold its own in the race for colonial 
 power. The Russian insists that unless his country be pro- 
 vided with bigger armies and navies, British, and possibly 
 also German jealousy will become dangerous to its vital 
 interests. The Englishman maintains that Britain must 
 have a fleet superior to those of any probable combination 
 against her, and also a strong fighting force on land to pro- 
 tect the safety of her isle and of her widespread" possessions 
 against the ill-will of other nations which would be likely to 
 avail itself of any favorable opportunity to strike at her with 
 effect. 
 
 And thus no sooner has one of those nations taken the 
 slightest step to increase the numerical strength of its arma- 
 ments or their efficiency in killing and destroying; no sooner 
 has it begun to augment its battalions, or squadrons, or bat- 
 teries ; no sooner has it introduced a new model of musket 
 or of cannon ; no sooner has it built a warship upon a new 
 plan promising to do better execution, than all the others 
 with nervous anxiety will follow suit or even try to push a 
 step further ahead. And this process must be gone through 
 again and again, whole armies must be newly armed, and 
 whole fleets must be rebuilt, as the crack ships of yesterday 
 have become little better than old iron to-day. And all this, 
 no matter what burden be put upon the backs of the people, 
 nor how the taxpayer may groan. In fact, those governments 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 87 
 
 claim that they are not permitted under these circum- 
 stances to adapt their policy concerning their armaments to 
 what may be their own wishes, or to what they might con- 
 sider good for the welfare of their people. Their necessities 
 in this respect are determined, not by themselves, but by the 
 performances of their neighbors and rivals. And so the 
 ruinous competition goes on and on without end in sight, 
 the moloch of militarism being insatiable. 
 
 A striking example of this race of competition was re- 
 cently furnished in England by the First Iyord of the Admir- 
 alty, Mr. Goshen, when he asked the House of Commons to 
 appropriate theenormous sum of ^26,554,000 ($132,770,000) 
 for the British navy, saying that so startling an estimate 
 had not originally been contemplated, but that it had been 
 framed after a careful study of the programs of the other 
 powers; that the United States, Russia, France, Japan, 
 Italy and Germany had under construction 685,000 tons of 
 warships, and that England was compelled to shape her 
 action accordingly. He prayed that, "if the Czar's hopes 
 for disarmament were not realized, those who proposed to 
 attack the country's expenditures would not attempt to dis- 
 suade the people from bearing the taxation necessary to carry 
 on the duties of the empire." 
 
 In France the minister of war not long ago dolefully inti- 
 mated that he apprehended France had reached the end of 
 her possibilities, not having men enough to match the in- 
 creases of the much more populous German Empire. As a 
 member of a republican government he might have said 
 more. He might have added that a large standing army 
 makes a monarchy more monarchical, but that it makes 
 a democracy not more, but less democratic; that the 
 more absolute a monarchy is, the more a large standing army 
 will fit it, but that the more democratic a republic is, the less a 
 large standing army will be suitable to it; that to a monarchy 
 it may be a standing support, but that to a democracy it will 
 be a standing danger. 
 So far the American people have been exempt from most 
 
88 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 of the evils springing from this system. From the founda- 
 tion of the government it has been the consistent policy of 
 this republic, following the true democratic instinct, to 
 adapt its armaments to its own needs, without permitting 
 itself to be drawn into the vortex of rivalry with other 
 nations. As to the maintenance of peace and order at home, 
 it has ordinarily depended upon the local police forces and 
 the militia. It kept a small standing army stationed at a 
 few military depots, a few coast defence fortifications, or at 
 posts in the Indian country. It kept a small navy just 
 sufficient for an occasional showing of the flag in foreign 
 waters and for doing its part of the police of the seas. When- 
 ever an extraordinary emergency arose, such as a war with 
 a foreign power, or an insurrection of formidable proportions 
 at home, it organized armed forces on a larger scale by call- 
 ing out volunteers who were enlisted in the service of the 
 republic, not as a regular standing army is, for doing what- 
 ever task might turn up, but for a well-defined, specific pur- 
 pose, to be disbanded again as soon as that specific purpose 
 was accomplished. 
 
 So it was held on the notable occasions of the war of 1812, 
 of our war with Mexico, and of our great civil war. And I 
 venture to say that no nation ever presented to the world a 
 grander, more characteristic and more inspiring spectacle 
 than this republic did when, after the close of the civil war, 
 hundreds of thousands of men who had been organized in 
 great armies, as soon as their task was done, quietly dropped 
 their guns and as good citizens went home to devote them- 
 selves to the productive work of the country — the vast armies 
 disappearing as by magic. It was a grand spectacle, I say, 
 grander in its way than the most splendid victories those 
 armies had achieved. That this republic, against the 
 misgivings entertained abroad even by our friends, proved 
 such a thing to be possible without the slightest difficulty, 
 was one of the finest lessons ever taught by a great democracy 
 to mankind. 
 
 Such was our normal policy during the period between the 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 89 
 
 foundation of the republic and our days. Times of war 
 excepted, the republic was, compared with other nations, 
 substantially unarmed, and, considering the condition of our 
 coast fortifications, substantially defenceless. And yet it 
 cannot be said that, since the war of 181 2, it was, in conse- 
 quence of its unarmed state, at any time in serious danger of 
 foreign aggression or of a serious denial of its rights by any 
 foreign power. Not as if all foreign nations had been our 
 sworn friends, eager to keep us from harm in our innocence 
 — for there were people enough in Europe, and even in 
 America, who disliked us and would not have been sorry to 
 see this republic perish; — nor as if in our intercourse with 
 foreign nations we had been over-anxious to spare other 
 people's feelings — for the tone of our diplomacy was not 
 always a model of politeness. No, it was because in the 
 main we took little interest in matters which did not concern 
 us, and because every foreign power understood that, con- 
 sidering our vast resources, and the compactness and sub- 
 stantial impregnability of our great continental stronghold, 
 a serious conflict with the United States would mean to our 
 antagonist a test of endurance which no European power 
 could undergo without offering seductive opportunities to its 
 rivals or enemies in the old world, and that therefore it was 
 wise to avoid so hazardous an embroilment at almost any 
 cost. This feeling became especially distinct in Europe 
 after the unexpected display of strength the United States 
 made in the civil war, and after the equally unexpected 
 reconciliation between the North and the South so soon after 
 the close of the conflict. 
 
 The American people were therefore perfectly right in 
 their sense of security while in an unarmed condition. 
 There was really no danger to threaten us, unless we our- 
 selves provoked it. Even the warning which we heard now 
 and then among ourselves, that our foreign commerce would 
 not be safe without being protected by a larger war fleet, 
 was groundless. For it is a matter of history that even 
 before those demonstrations of our strength in the civil war, 
 
90 Annai^s of the American Academy. 
 
 when we had with our sailing ships a very large part of the 
 carrying trade of the world, without any navy worth speak- 
 ing of for its protection, our foreign commerce proved as 
 safe as that of any other nation having ever so many guns 
 afloat. In fact, ever since the war of 1812, we have not had 
 a single difference with any European power that could not 
 be settled on fair terms without our having any ready arma- 
 ment to enforce our will. The proof of this is in the histori- 
 cal fact that they were so settled. It is a matter of specula- 
 tion whether they would all have been settled so peaceably 
 if we had possessed an armed force ready and itching for a 
 fray. 
 
 Thus the policy of this republic was in entire harmony 
 with that democratic instinct which abhors large standing 
 armaments, and our position among the nations of the 
 world was singularly favorable to the maintenance of that 
 policy. None of those anxieties arising from the possible 
 hostility of powerful neighbors, which keep European 
 nations in a heavily armed state, existed here. Absolutely 
 nothing to alarm us. Neither was there any reason for 
 apprehending that those happy conditions would change, 
 unless we ourselves desired to change them. There has, 
 indeed, of late been much talk about the necessity of enlarg- 
 ing the field of our foreign commerce, and of increased arma- 
 ments and even of the acquisition of foreign territory to 
 sustain our commercial interests in foreign quarters. But 
 while that talk was going on, our commerce was very 
 extensively enlarging its foreign fields without big fleets 
 and without colonies, by its own peaceful action. We 
 simply produced, in our factories as well as on our farms, more 
 things that other nations wanted, and we could offer them 
 at prices with which other nations could not compete. This 
 golden key of industrial progress and peaceful commercial 
 methods opened to our trade many doors which seemed to 
 be closed against it by all sorts of artificial obstructions; and 
 this peaceful expansion of our foreign commerce went 
 steadily on while other nations that had an overabundance 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 91 
 
 of battalions, batteries and warships, vainly struggled to 
 keep pace witb it. These are facts, undenied and undeni- 
 able. 
 
 But what will happen to us, commercially, if other nations 
 seek by force to monopolize certain fields of trade for them- 
 selves, and in the course of that effort come to blows with 
 one another ? Then a sober and circumspect calculation of 
 the advantages to be gained, and of the price they would 
 cost, will probably lead to the conclusion that in such a case 
 a strong neutral power would enjoy very favorable opportu- 
 nities and in the end have the best of the bargain. And when 
 I speak of a strong neutral power, I do not mean a neutral 
 power so fully armed that it might at once successfully cope 
 with any of the belligerents, but I mean a neutral power 
 strong enough in its resources and in its position to make 
 each belligerent extremely anxious to abstain from anything 
 that might drive it to the other side. Such a neutral power 
 this republic was not in its infant state during the Napoleonic 
 wars preceding our war of 1812, when both belligerents, 
 France as well as England, thought they could kick and 
 cuff this republic with impunity; but such a strong neutral 
 power this republic, with its seventy-five millions of people 
 and its immense wealth, would be now. No belligerent 
 would dare to disregard its neutral rights; and at the end 
 of the fight, the combatants well exhausted, it would prob- 
 ably be in a fair position to exercise a very powerful influence 
 upon the terms of settlement. 
 
 Such a policy, harmonizing with our principles as well as 
 our traditions, safe as well as advantageous, would not 
 oblige us to keep up large and costly armaments; and it 
 would at the same time teach our business men to rely for 
 profit, not upon benefits to be gained for them by force of 
 arms, subject to the fortunes of war, but upon their own 
 sagacity in discovering opportunities, and their own energy 
 in using them — which in the long run will prove to be after 
 all the only sound basis of a nation's commerce under any 
 circumstances. 
 
92 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 There seems to be, then, in all these respects not only no 
 necessity, but no valid reason for our turning away from the 
 old democratic policy and embarking in that course the pur- 
 suit of which costs European nations so dearly, and which 
 they justify only on the ground that the constantly threat- 
 ening dangers of their situation actually force them to follow 
 it. On the contrary there would seem to be overwhelming 
 reason for doing everything to preserve our happy exemption 
 from such dangers and necessities, as a blessing so excep- 
 tionally great that the American people could not be too 
 grateful for it. 
 
 But we are told that there are certain populations in dis- 
 tant lands to whom it is our duty to carry the blessings of lib- 
 erty and civilization, and that this may require larger armies 
 and more warships. However laudable such a purpose may 
 be, if sincere, it behooves us as sensible men soberly to con- 
 sider the consequences of the attempt. I have already 
 spoken of the armies of revolutionary France, that went 
 forth to fight for general liberty, and that conquered for 
 despotism. It cannot be denied that those French armies 
 brought to some of the peoples they overran certain bene- 
 ficial reforms. But with those reforms they brought foreign 
 rule, and most of the " liberated " peoples found foreign rule 
 more hateful than they found the reforms beneficial; and 
 they availed themselves of the first favorable opportunity 
 to throw off the foreign rule of the " liberators " with great 
 slaughter. 
 
 We may flatter ourselves that, as conquerors, we are ani- 
 mated with purposes much more unselfish, and we may 
 wonder why not only in the Philippines, but even among 
 the people of Porto Rico and of Cuba, our benevolent inten- 
 tions should meet with so much sullen disfavor. The reason 
 is simple. We bring to those populations the intended 
 benefits in the shape of foreign rule; and of all inflictions 
 foreign rule is to them the most odious, as under similar cir- 
 stances it would be to us. We have already seen in the 
 Philippines the beginning — for it is a mere beginning— of 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 93 
 
 the resistance to foreign rule by one of our "liberated" 
 peoples — a bloody game far from exhilarating. We may 
 expect by a vigorous application of our superior killing 
 power to beat and disperse Aguinaldo's army; but it is by 
 no means unlikely that more insurrections against foreign 
 rule will follow. They may be suppressed, too, but the 
 surviving spirit of them will oblige us to keep much stronger 
 forces on the ground than we ever anticipated, in constant 
 apprehension of further mischief. Our rule will continue 
 to be foreign rule then with the smell of blood on it. 
 
 Nor is it by any means impossible that the vulnerable spots 
 thus added to our dominions — a point of weakness we so far 
 have never had — may encourage some jealous and unfriendly 
 foreign powers to take advantage of our embarrassments and 
 to involve us in broils which so far we never had any reason 
 to dread. Or the apparent necessity to protect what con- 
 quest we have made, by further conquests, or the ardor of 
 military or naval commanders a little too anxious to serve 
 their country with their guns, may plunge us into the most 
 hazardous complications. Of the chances to which we shall 
 thus be exposed in many places, the utterly absurd Samoan 
 affair furnishes an illustration. We may assume that the 
 greatness of our resources will enable us to issue victorious 
 from such conflicts too. But it will not be denied — in fact, 
 it is already conceded — that persistence in such a course will 
 oblige us very materially to enlarge our standing armaments, 
 and subject us more and more to those burdens which what 
 is called "militarism" is imposing upon the groaning 
 nations of the old world. Patriotism as well as ordinary 
 prudence, demands us to consider what those burdens are 
 likely to be. 
 
 In 1897 our standing army consisted of 27,500 officers and 
 men. The appropriations for the support of that army 
 amounted for that fiscal year, to $23,278,000, which sum did 
 not include expenditures for fortifications. The average 
 cost of each man in the army was therefore about $850. It 
 is generally admitted that if we continue the so-called new 
 
94 Annans op the American Academy. 
 
 policy, we shall need a standing army of certainly not less 
 than 100,000 men — probably more, perhaps a good many 
 more. I do not pretend that the average annual cost of a 
 soldier will under all circumstances rise or fall with the size 
 of the army. But it will not be questioned that such 
 average cost will be much higher when the troops are 
 used in distant places beyond seas, especially in tropical 
 climates, where the soldiers have to endure very unfavorable 
 sanitary conditions. Even if there be little or no active 
 campaigning to be done, it is certainly a moderate assump- 
 tion that the service of a large part of the army beyond seas 
 in tropical regions would raise the average cost of a soldier to 
 $1,000 a year. This would make an army of 100, 000 men cost 
 at least $100,000,000, or over $76,000,000 more than our army 
 cost before the Spanish war. But if active campaigning is to 
 be done, if the "mowing down" of "insurgents," fighting 
 for their freedom and independence, lasts long and has 
 to be carried on during the sickly season, the replenishing 
 of the depleted ranks, the feeding of the troops, the main- 
 tenance of an effective hospital service, the restoration of 
 destroyed war material, the transportation of reinforcements 
 to the theatre of operations, and of the wounded or sick 
 back to the home country, and all the multifarious things 
 incidental to warlike action even on a small scale, would 
 cause expenditures beyond the possibility of accurate 
 computation. 
 
 We are not a very economical people. We are apt to 
 become lavish and wasteful upon the slightest provocation. 
 Even a little war will cost us much. Whether the little war 
 with Spain, which was practically over in three months, has 
 cost us less or more than $500,000,000 may still be a matter 
 of doubt. I speak here only of the cost in money. The 
 cost in blood and misery I leave you to think of. 
 
 That, if the new policy be persisted in, our naval estab- 
 lishment also will have to be much enlarged, is generally 
 admitted. How much — who can tell? Certainly, we can 
 not tell. For it will not depend upon us how many new 
 
MitiTARiSM and Democracy. 95 
 
 battleships, and armored or unarmored cruisers, and light 
 draft vessels, and torpedo boats, and destroyers, we shall 
 want. It will depend upon the naval armaments our rivals 
 and possible enemies have on the field of competition. Until 
 recently, when we were proud, not of possessing large arma- 
 ments, but of not needing any, it has afforded us much 
 occasion for compassionate amusement to observe the almost 
 hysterical nervousnessinto which old world governments were 
 thrown when one of them began the building of new warships 
 by which the proportion of power on the seas might be dis- 
 turbed. Already we begin to feel that nervousness in our 
 bones, and we cannot tell how many and what kind of war- 
 ships we shall be obliged to have in order to maintain what 
 is so vauntingly called our new position among the powers 
 of the world. 
 
 Nor will any amount of new construction set the matter 
 at rest for any certain time. We do not know when we 
 shall have to rebuild the larger part of our fleet; for, as the 
 Czar truthfully says in his manifesto, ' ' the terrible engines 
 of destruction which are to-day regarded as the last word of 
 science, are destined to-morrow to lose all value by some 
 new discovery in the same field. ' ' All forecasts as to the 
 expenditures for naval purposes which the new policy will 
 impose upon us in the course of time, are, therefore, futile. 
 But whatever they may be, the people will have to pay the 
 bills. 
 
 Moreover, we have to bear a burden of which other 
 nations know comparatively little. During the last fiscal year 
 we paid over $140,000,000 in pensions. More than one hun- 
 dred years after the revolutionary war, more than eighty years 
 after the war of 181 2 — for we still have some widows of sol- 
 diers in those wars on our pension rolls — fifty years after the 
 Mexican war, and thirty-three years after the civil war the 
 number of pensioners was about one million. And still 
 they come. It is estimated that the recent Spanish war will 
 add $20,000,000 to our annual pension expenditure. It 
 will probably be much more. The pension attorneys and 
 
g-6 Annaxs of the American Academy. 
 
 members of Congress looking for the soldier-vote will take 
 care of that. But if we continue the military occupation of 
 tropical countries there will be a constant stream of new 
 pensioners owing to tropical diseases; and if we have any- 
 active military operations in those tropical regions, that 
 stream will be heavy beyond calculation. And it will be 
 without any end in sight. We must therefore look for 
 a considerable increase of the pension charge for an 
 incalculable period — the number of new pensioners over- 
 balancing the number of those who in the natural course of 
 things may be expected to drop out — that dropping out 
 being notoriously very slow. Our annual pension expendi- 
 ture now exceeds the whole cost of the great German army 
 on the peace footing, its pension roll included. As our pen- 
 sion charge threatens to become, it may approach for a time 
 the annual cost of the whole peace establishments of the 
 empire of Germany and the kingdom of Italy combined. 
 
 Taking it all in all, assuming our standing army not to 
 exceed 100,000 men, but a large part of it to be engaged in 
 the tropics, and our navy to be gradually enlarged to the 
 strength which it "must have" in order to enable this 
 republic to play the part of a colonial power, we are sure to 
 have, including our pension roll, an annual expenditure for 
 army and navy purposes not only far exceeding that of any 
 European power, but not falling very much short of two- 
 fifths of the expenses for the same purposes of all the six 
 great powers of Europe together — that is not far from $400,- 
 000,000 a year. By honest and strenuous effort we have 
 paid off the bulk of the heavy national debt left by the civil 
 war, and we have been very proud of that achievement. 
 We are now in the way of running up a new national debt, 
 of which, if we go on with the new policy, nobody can fore- 
 tell to what figures it will rise. 
 
 It may be said that the American people, owing to their 
 large and ever increasing numbers and to their extraordin- 
 ary resources will be much more capable than other nations, 
 of bearing such taxation, and therefore feel it less. That is 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 97 
 
 true. But it is also true that it will yet be a painful burden 
 upon the labor of the people, and contribute neither to their 
 well-being nor to their contentment unless the burden, as 
 well as the resulting benefit, be equitably distributed. To 
 justify heavy taxes for military purposes beyond absolute 
 necessity we should, therefore, economically speaking, 
 show two things: (1) that the benefit derived from the 
 employment of the money raised by such taxation will 
 exceed the value of the money thus taken out of the pockets 
 of the people; and (2) that such benefit will accrue to the 
 several taxpayers, or classes of taxpayers, in substantially 
 just proportion to their respective contributions for the pur- 
 pose in view. 
 
 Thus it would in our case be necessary to prove: (1) 
 that if we increase our taxation so many hundred millions 
 a year for the purpose of enlarging our standing armaments 
 to the end of establishing and maintaining our rule in the 
 West Indies and the Philippines, the profits from the expan- 
 sion of our business enterprise accomplished thereby would 
 exceed that amount — a matter about which, to say the least, 
 there is extremely grave doubt; and (2) that such profits 
 from whatever increase of business there may be, will 
 directly or indirectly redound in substantially just propor- 
 tion to the people who pay the taxes — in other words that, 
 while the taxes to sustain our foreign enterprises are levied 
 upon the great mass of the people, the poor as well as the 
 rich, they will redound really to the general benefit of the 
 people, and not merely, or mainly, to the profit of a com- 
 paratively small number of capitalists who are able to take 
 advantage, in a more or less speculative way, of the chances 
 that may offer themselves in those distant regions. About 
 this, too, there is exceeding grave doubt. 
 
 These are points which I have no time to elaborate here in 
 detail; but I commend them for serious consideration to 
 good citizens who are disposed to look before they leap; for 
 they involve not only an economic question, but also one of 
 justice. 
 
98 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 Let me now pass to the institutional aspect of the case as 
 it concerns this republic in particular. I am far from pre- 
 dicting that the organization and maintenance and use of 
 large armaments will speedily bring forth in this country the 
 same consequences which they did produce in England in 
 Cromwell's time, and in France at the periods of the first 
 and the second French republics. With us the "man on 
 horseback " is not in sight. There is no danger of 
 monarchical usurpation by a victorious general — although 
 it is well worthy of remembrance that even here in the 
 United States of America, at the close of the revolutionary 
 war, at the very threshold of our history as a republic, a 
 large part of the revolutionary army, ' ' turned by six years 
 of war from militia into seasoned veterans," and full of that 
 overbearing esprit de corps characteristic of standing armies, 
 urged George Washington to make himself a dictator, a 
 monarch; that, as one of his biographers expresses it, "it 
 was as easy for Washington to have grasped supreme power 
 then, as it would have been for Caesar to have taken the 
 crown from Antony upon the Lupercal;" and that it was 
 only George Washington's patriotic loyalty and magnificent 
 manhood that stamped out the plot. However, usurpation 
 of so gross a character would now be rendered infinitely 
 more difficult, not only by the republican spirit and habits 
 of the people, but also by our federative organization divid- 
 ing so large an expanse of country into a multitude of self- 
 governing states. 
 
 But even in such a country and among such a people it is 
 possible to demoralize the constitutional system and to infuse 
 a dangerous element of arbitrary power into the government 
 without making it a monarchy in form and name. One of 
 the most necessary conservative agencies in a democratic 
 republic is general respect for constitutional principles, and 
 faithful observance of constitutional forms; and nothing is 
 more apt to undermine that respect and to foster disregard 
 of those forms than warlike excitements, which at the same 
 time give to the armed forces an importance and a prestige 
 which they otherwise would not possess. 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 99 
 
 No candid observer of current events will deny that even 
 to-day the spirit of the new policy awakened by the victories 
 and conquests achieved in the Spanish war, and by the 
 occurrences in the Philippines, has moved even otherwise 
 sober-minded persons to speak of the constitutional limita- 
 tions of governmental power with a levity which a year ago 
 would have provoked serious alarm and stern rebuke. We 
 are loudly told by the advocates of the new policy that the 
 constitution no longer fits our present conditions and aspira- 
 tions as a great and active world power, and should not be 
 permitted to stand in our way. Those who say so forget 
 that it is still our constitution; that while it exists, its pro- 
 visions as interpreted by our highest j udicial tribunal are bind- 
 ing upon our actions as well as upon our consciences; that 
 they will be binding and must be observed until they are 
 changed in the manner prescribed by the constitution itself 
 for its amendment; and that if any power not granted by 
 the constitution is exercised by the government or any branch 
 of it, on the ground that the constitution ought to be 
 changed in order to fit new conditions, or on any other 
 ground, usurpation in the line of arbitrary government is 
 already an accomplished fact. And if such usurpations be 
 submitted to by the people, that acquiescence will become 
 an incentive to further usurpations which may end in the 
 complete wreck of constitutional government. 
 
 Such usurpations are most apt to be acquiesced in when, 
 in time of war, they appeal to popular feeling in the name 
 of military necessity, or of the honor of the flag, or of national 
 glory. In a democracy acting through universal suffrage, 
 and being the government of public opinion informed and 
 inspired by discussion, every influence is unhealthy that 
 prevents men from calm reasoning. And nothing is more 
 calculated to do that than martial excitements which stir 
 the blood. We are told that war will lift up people to a 
 higher and nobler patriotic devotion, inspire them with a 
 spirit of heroic self-sacrifice, and bring their finest impulses 
 and qualities into action. This it will, in a large measure, 
 
zoo Annai^ op the American Academy. 
 
 if the people feel that the war is a necessary or a just one. 
 But even then its effects upon the political as well as the 
 moral sense are confusing. When the fortunes of war are 
 unfavorable, almost everything that can restore them will 
 be called legitimate, whether it be in harmony with sound 
 principle or not. When the fortunes of war are favorable, 
 the glory of victory goes far to justify, or at least to excuse, 
 whatever may have been done to achieve that victory, or 
 whatever may be done to secure or increase its fruits. 
 
 History shows that military glory is the most unwhole- 
 some food that democracies can feed upon. War withdraws, 
 more than anything else, the popular attention from those 
 problems and interests which are, in the long run, of the 
 greatest consequence. It produces a strange moral and 
 political color-blindness. It creates false ideals of patriotism 
 and civic virtue. 
 
 Nobody is inclined to underestimate the value of military 
 valor. But compared with military valor, we are apt to 
 underestimate the value of other kinds of valor, which are 
 equally great and no less, sometimes even more, useful to 
 the community. I do not refer only to such heroism as that 
 of the fireman, or the member of the life-saving service on 
 the coast, who rescues human beings from the flames or 
 from the watery grave at the most desperate risk of his own 
 life, and whose deeds are all the more heroic as they are not 
 inspired by the enthusiasm of battle, and pale into insig- 
 nificance by the side of any act of bravery done in killing 
 enemies in the field. I speak also of that moral courage 
 more important in a democracy, which defies the popular 
 outcry in maintaining what it believes right, and in oppos- 
 ing what it thinks wrong. 
 
 Blood spilled for it on the battlefield is often taken to 
 sanctify and to entitle to popular support any cause, however 
 questionable. It is called treason to denounce such a cause, 
 be it ever so bad. It is called patriotism to support it, how- 
 ever strongly conscience may revolt against it. Take for 
 instance the man who honestly believes our war against the 
 
Militarism and Democracy. ioi 
 
 Filipinos to be unjust. If that man, faithfully obeying the 
 voice of his conscience, frankly denounces that war, and 
 thereby risks the public station he may occupy, or the 
 friendship of his neighbors, and resolutely meets the clamor 
 vilifying him as a craven recreant and an enemy to the 
 republic, he is, morally, surely no less a hero than the sol- 
 dier who at the word of command and in the excitement of 
 battle, rushes against a hostile battery. You can no doubt 
 find in our country an abundance of men who would stand 
 bravely under a hailstorm of bullets. But many of them, 
 if their consciences condemned the Filipino war ever so 
 severely, would be loath to face the charge of want of 
 patriotism assailing everybody who opposes it. This is no 
 new story. War makes military heroes, but it makes 
 also civic cowards. No wonder that war has always proved 
 so dangerous to the vitality of democracies; for a 'democracy 
 needs to keep it alive above all things the civic virtues, 
 which war so easily demoralizes. 
 
 You will have observed that I have treated the matter of 
 militarism in the United States in intimate connection with 
 our warlike enterprises, as if they were substantially the 
 same thing. I have done so purposely. As I endeavored to 
 set forth, the development of militarism in European states 
 can be explained on the theory that each power may think 
 the largest possible armaments necessary for the protection 
 of its safety among its neighbors, and for the preservation of 
 peace. With us such a motive cannot exist. Not needing 
 large armaments for our safety — for this republic, if it main- 
 tained its old traditional policy, would be perfectly safe 
 without them — we can need them only in the service of war^ 
 like adventure undertaken at our own pleasure, for whatever 
 purpose. And here I may remark, by the way, that in my 
 opinion, although such a course of warlike adventure may 
 have begun with a desire to liberate and civilize certain 
 foreign populations, it will be likely to develop itself, unless 
 soon checked, into a downright and reckless policy of 
 conquest with all the " criminal aggression" and savagery 
 
io2 Annai^ of the American Academy. 
 
 such a policy implies. At any rate, that policy of warlike 
 adventure and militarism will, with us, go together as 
 essentially identical. Without the policy of warlike adven- 
 ture large standing armaments would, with us, have no 
 excuse and would not be tolerated. If we continue that 
 policy, militarism with its characteristic evils will be in- 
 evitable. If we wish to escape those evils and to protect 
 this democracy against their dangerous effects, the policy of 
 warlike adventure must be given up, for the two things are 
 inseparable. 
 
 I have referred to the current events of the day only by 
 way of illustration, without giving full voice to the feelings 
 which they stir up in my heart, and the utterance of which 
 might be somewhat warmer than what I have said. My 
 theme being the relation of militarism to democracy in 
 general, and to this great American democracy in particular, 
 I may be permitted to express, in conclusion, my views of 
 what our policy as a democracy should be in order to keep 
 the vitality of the democratic republic unimpaired. 
 
 We should, in the first place, restrict our standing arma- 
 ments to the narrowest practicable limits; and those limits 
 will be very narrow, if this democracy does not suffer itself to 
 be carried away by the ambition of doing things which, as 
 history has amply shown, a democracy cannot do without 
 seriously endangering its vital principles and institutions. 
 There is no doubt that a regular standing army is a more 
 efficient fighting machine, especially at the beginning of a war, 
 than citizen soldiery. But our experience has been that, 
 in the peculiar position we occupy among the nations of the 
 world, we need not have any war unless, without any com- 
 pelling necessity, we choose to have it. It would be most 
 unwise to shape our whole policy with a view to the constant 
 imminence of war, there being no such imminence, unless we 
 ourselves choose to create it. We should have as our main 
 armed force, and as the natural armed force of a democratic 
 republic, the citizen soldiery to be called out for specific pur- 
 poses in extraordinary emergencies, the efficiency of that 
 
Militarism and Democracy. 103 
 
 citizen soldiery to be increased by the training of men to 
 serve as officers, and by the organization of staff corps, upon 
 a plan similar to that adopted in Switzerland. We should 
 have a navy strong enough to do our share in the police of 
 the seas, but not a navy rivaling those of the great naval 
 powers, for, as our history has conclusively taught us, we 
 shall not need it if we keep out of quarrels which do not 
 concern us, and cultivate peace and good will with other 
 nations — a disposition which the rest of the world will be 
 glad to reciprocate. In this way we shall avoid the burdens 
 and evil influences of militarism, and give even our pension 
 roll at last a chance to decrease. 
 
 Following a policy essentially different from this we may 
 have our fill of military glory and conquest, but with them, 
 other things which in the course of time will make the 
 American people ruefully remember how free and great and 
 happy they once were with less military glory and with no 
 outlying dominions and subject populations- 
 
The Commercial Relations of the 
 
 United States with the 
 
 Far East. 
 
 Addresses and Discussions. 
 
 (105) 
 
THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
 STATES WITH THE FAR EAST. 
 
 Worthington Chauncey Ford, Ex-Chief Bureau of 
 Statistics U. S. Treasury Department. 
 
 If ' ' prophecy is a gratuitous form of lying, " it is almost 
 inexcusable when undertaken in a period of great change 
 and transition. Two continents are being partitioned among 
 the nations of Europe, a partition that cannot but influence 
 the world's movement for a century to come. In Africa the 
 larger part of the task stands completed. Boundaries and 
 spheres of influence have been fixed so far as they can be by 
 treaties and arrangements based upon a common or mutual 
 interest. There is yet some room for changes, but only at 
 one point — Delagoa Bay — can the result be of great moment. 
 In Asia the work is just beginning, and there is every oppor- 
 tunity for greed, intrigue, moral influence, humanity, every 
 passion that a nation can endure to defend its safety, to 
 accomplish its policy, or to gratify its selfishness. 
 
 Examine the coast of China as it was only a few years 
 ago. France had won Tonking and Indo China. Portugal 
 held Macao, a place of no naval strength, because so over- 
 shadowed by the English island of Hong Kong. Its advan- 
 tage lay in its being near the mouth of one of the great 
 rivers of China, the only river of the south penetrating to 
 the inner provinces. From Hong Kong to Korea no part 
 of the coast was subject to foreign control. In Korea Russia 
 and Japan were about to fight their contest diplomatically, 
 and the Russian eventually to win. The break came with 
 the Sino-Japanese war. Russia obtained the right to bring 
 its great railroad down to Port Arthur, and began to exer- 
 cise a preponderating influence in Chinese councils. 
 
 (107) 
 
108 Annans of the American Academy. 
 
 This menace of Russian control over an empire that had 
 just been shown to be weak beyond description, aroused in 
 other nations a desire to share in the spoils. Germany, 
 under the plea of defending its missionaries and merchants, 
 obtained under threats a lease of the great peninsula of Shan- 
 tung. Great Britain, by diplomacy, and we know what is 
 back of such diplomacy, leased sufficient territory on the 
 mainland above Hong Kong to render that station safe from 
 any land attack. France obtains a lease of Lei-chau on the 
 promontory at the southern end of Kwang-tung. In the 
 next province — Fo-kien — the Japanese are claiming the right 
 rather than the privilege of establishing themselves. Mov- 
 ing northward, we next meet the Italian claims, involving a 
 lease of the bay of San-mun and three islands off the coast. 
 At the next stage occurs the English sphere in the Yang-tze 
 valley, one that will hardly be surrendered, so high are its 
 value and possibilities held. By the side of the Germans in 
 the Shan-tung peninsula are the British at Wei-hai-wei, a 
 great naval base. Belgium comes forward to ask a conces- 
 sion at Han-kau, whereon to construct the I,u-ban railroad. 
 In this way the entire coast of China is held under one form 
 of control or another, by foreign nations, not one of whom 
 has any interest in maintaining the integrity of the empire, 
 unless such maintenance can prevent rivals from securing 
 more than a fair share of the spoil. 
 
 This is certainly a remarkable position for any people to 
 occupy. No charge is made against the Chinese, such as 
 could lie against the followers of the Mahdi, of being a 
 menace to civilization. It can not be said that the Chinese 
 neglect their opportunities as did the Turk, or are hopeless 
 economically, as were the Indians of America, the natives of 
 Africa, or the aborigines of Australia. On the contrary the 
 more that is known of China and the Chinese, the greater 
 is our wonder that in such a mass of population, weighted 
 down by poverty, conservatism and hatred of progress in 
 any form, so much is done, and well done. They have not 
 merited extermination, our brutal exclusion laws to the 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 109 
 
 contrary; and wherever they have gone, and they move freely, 
 the testimony is universal, that as laborers only, they are 
 willing, industrious, patient and efficient. To have their 
 coast occupied by foreign squatters, not one of whom would 
 not resent a similar move on their own territory, and to be 
 bullied and badgered into giving valuable concessions and 
 privileges which have gain for their object, whatever may 
 be the good intentions of the parties — surely this is a sight 
 to awaken a doubt as to the actuating motives. 
 
 Into this circle of marauding powers the United States 
 was pitched unexpectedly and without any thought of the 
 consequences. Being in the Philippines, by purchase, and 
 about to occupy them by conquest over the natives, the 
 fact must be accepted. The ruling motive for accepting the 
 responsibility was commercial; given those islands, it was 
 said, our trade with Asia must be large. They can be used 
 as a stepping stone to secure entrance to the continent, and 
 our farmers or manufacturers, or shipping interests and our 
 Congress will feel a quickening influence, and awake to 
 better things. It is the commercial aspect I wish to dwell 
 upon, and this involves our trade with all Asia. 
 
 In 1898 15 per cent of the total imports into the United 
 States was derived from Asia, and 3.63 per cent of the ex- 
 ports were sent to that continent. In 1889 the percentages 
 were 8.55 for imports and 2.48 for exports. In the earlier 
 year the aggregate value of imports was $63,600,391 and 
 in 1898, it was $92,594,593 — an increase of 45.6 per cent. 
 The value of the exports (domestic) rose in the same period 
 from $18,422,922 to $44,642,613 an increase of 142.5 percent. 
 The whole of this increase in exports has occurred since 
 
 1895- 
 
 The distribution of this trade is necessary to a proper 
 understanding of the growth. Imports from China have 
 been stationary, but exports have ranged between wide 
 limits, depending on the movement of cotton cloth: 
 
no Annals oe the American Academy. 
 
 
 
 Domestic 
 
 
 Mineral Oil, 
 
 Year. 
 
 Imports. 
 
 Exports. 
 
 Cotton Cloths. 
 
 Refined. 
 
 1889 . 
 
 $17,028,412 
 
 $2,790,621 
 
 $1,519,265 
 
 $908,500 
 
 1890 . 
 
 16,260,471 
 
 2,943,790 
 
 1,223,965 
 
 1,253,089 
 
 1891 . 
 
 19,321,850 
 
 8,700,318 
 
 5,334,860 
 
 2,591,660 
 
 1892 . 
 
 20,488,291 
 
 5,663,471 
 
 3,887,732 
 
 1,251,025 
 
 1893 . 
 
 20,636,535 
 
 3,900,457 
 
 1,638,657 
 
 1,809,437 
 
 1894 . 
 
 17,135,028 
 
 5,858,488 
 
 2,844,220 
 
 2,438,636 
 
 1895 . 
 
 20,545,829 
 
 3,602,741 
 
 1,703,023 
 
 I,l8l,2IO 
 
 1896 . 
 
 22,023,004 
 
 6,921,136 
 
 3,854,146 
 
 2,166,978 
 
 1897 . 
 
 20,403,862 
 
 11,916,888 
 
 7,438,203 
 
 3,371,973 
 
 1898 . 
 
 20,326,436 
 
 9,992,070 
 
 5,195,845 
 $34,639,9 I 6 
 
 2,839,345 
 
 Total. 
 
 $62,289,980 
 
 $19,811,853 
 
 Second in importance comes Japan, which is even now 
 regarded as the prototype of what China will be when once 
 awakened. Imports from and exports to Japan prove the 
 remarkable activity of that country in building up its foreign 
 
 commerce: 
 
 
 
 Domestic 
 
 
 Mineral Oil, 
 
 Year. 
 
 Imports. 
 
 Exports. 
 
 Raw Cotton. 
 
 Refined. 
 
 1889 . 
 
 $16,687,992 
 
 $4,615,712 
 
 $2,341 
 
 $3,086,978 
 
 1890 . 
 
 21,103,324 
 
 5,227,186 
 
 85,2H 
 
 3,573,798 
 
 1891 . 
 
 19,309, !9 8 
 
 4,800,650 
 
 223,879 
 
 2,894,577 
 
 1892 . 
 
 23,79°> 202 
 
 3,288,282 
 
 132,729 
 
 1,812,414 
 
 1893 • 
 
 27,454,220 
 
 3,189,7" 
 
 68,423 
 
 1,724,972 
 
 1894 . 
 
 19,426,522 
 
 3,981,377 
 
 360,492 
 
 2,226,247 
 
 1895 . 
 
 23,695,957 
 
 4,559,242 
 
 806,058 
 
 1,656,692 
 
 1896 . 
 
 25,537,038 
 
 7,640,250 
 
 1,481,056 
 
 3,149,527 
 
 1897 . 
 
 24,009,756 
 
 I 3,233,97o 
 
 2,345,016 
 
 4,222,383 
 
 1898 . 
 
 25,223,610 
 
 20,354,689 
 
 7,428,226 
 
 3,592,587 
 
 Total. 
 
 $70,891,069 
 
 $13,133,431 
 
 $27,940,175 
 
 The great distributing centre of Asiatic trade, Hong Kong, 
 has not held its own in the commerce of the United States, 
 and has suffered through more direct means of communica- 
 tion. Its share in our trade is so small as to be inappreci- 
 able, though in our trade with Asia it still receives $6,233,607 
 of our exports, and handles $746,517 of merchandise sent to 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far Fast, hi 
 
 this country. In any calculation of the trend of our trade 
 with Asia, Hong Kong may be passed over in the statistics, 
 but examined for its lessons. 
 
 Other than independent (I still apply the adjective to 
 China) countries are counted in the Asiatic returns — the 
 colonial possessions of Great Britain and the Netherlands, 
 and even Aden and Turkey in Asia. But it is to China and 
 Japan that I wish to call particular attention, and if I deal at 
 greater length with China, it is because so much stress is 
 laid upon our future commerce within rather than with that 
 empire. On that future must the prosperity of the Philip- 
 pines rest; and on that future hang our relations to Europe 
 — entangling alliances imposed upon us by commercial ambi- 
 tion. 
 
 Let us measure crudely the export trade of the United 
 States to China. For the ten years, 1889-98, the value 
 of our domestic exports sent to that empire was $62,289,980, 
 of which 87 per cent was made up by two articles of export 
 — cotton cloths and refined mineral oil. In 1889 the pro- 
 portion of the exports for that year given by these articles 
 was 87 per cent; in 1893, ^ ve years later, 88 per cent, and 
 in 1898, another interval of five years, 80 per cent. Up to 
 1898, it was 87 per cent and over, almost without a break. 
 
 Taking the exports to Japan in the same manner, it is 
 found that the total for the ten years was $70,891,069, and 
 of this total raw cotton made $13,133,431, and refined min- 
 eral oil $27,940,175, or the two, 58 per cent of the whole. 
 Of the increase in the exports since 1889 ($15,738,977) ra w 
 cotton gave nearly one-half ($7,425,985). The stationary 
 character of the trade in one country and the elasticity of 
 the demand in the other could hardly be more clearly" or 
 simply demonstrated than by these figures. In 1889 raw 
 cotton did not enter appreciably in the export returns to. 
 Japan; in 1898, it made more than 36 per cent. 
 
 China is poor and not rich. One of the latest and in many- 
 respects most intelligent surveys of China says: " There is; 
 in China a dreadful poverty of the masses due to rapid 
 
ii2 Annai^ of the American Academy. 
 
 increase of population, wherever a district has been spared 
 rebellion and famine for a few tens of years."* The vast 
 population is never far removed from famine, and only by 
 constant industry of the most exacting kind can life be sus- 
 tained. I^arge numbers of Chinese flock to other lands to 
 obtain a living. They have swarmed down the Malay 
 Peninsula, crossed to the Philippines and attempted to gain 
 a foothold in Australia. They are numerous in the Hawaiian 
 Islands, and have secured the hostile notice of both the 
 United States and the Dominion of Canada. The Chinaman 
 is the laborer for the world, and carries his patient and 
 persistent industry wherever permitted, and his frugal habits 
 enable him to save from wages that no other free laborer 
 would accept. The coolie is a privileged worker compared 
 to him. 
 
 Wherever tested and an opportunity given, the Chinaman 
 has proved himself a good worker. The problem then to 
 be settled is how this hive of potential industry can be made 
 to work on the natural resources of China for the benefit of 
 the nations of the West. No one denies the possibilities 
 of Asia; its coal fields, its iron, its tin and its copper de- 
 posits; its wonderful waterways, and its population that 
 always seems to offer a market rich beyond description. 
 Against this rosy picture must be set the poverty of the peo- 
 ple; their conservatism and hatred of the foreigner; and 
 their decay of enterprise, a decay that has persisted in spite 
 of the touch of Western commerce, and the lesson of defeat 
 at the hands of the Japanese. Now Europe steps in to realize 
 the possibilities, and offers to lead and organize the economic 
 forces of China, so that they may become truly productive 
 and yield handsome dividends to these unselfish civilizers 
 and concessionnaires. 
 
 If this development occurs the whole world expects to 
 share in the benefits, and the United States will ask to have 
 its share. But in one direction, more than in another; in 
 imports, rather than exports. In opening new territory by 
 
 * Blackburn Report (Bourne), 10. 
 
Commercial Relations with the Par East. 113 
 
 making it accessible, and thus giving to the population an 
 outlet for their products, the world's supply of certain articles 
 will be that much increased. Tea, silk, raw cotton, wool, 
 hides, mats and straw braids — these are the great articles of 
 China's export trade with occidentals, and in these lines 
 must the first influence of new conditions be felt. Later 
 will come the greater changes which portend almost to 
 revolutionize industry — the opening and working of coal 
 mines, of iron, copper, tin and even gold deposits, mineral 
 resources hardly touched and known to be large. Given an 
 abundance of cheap labor, a certain and cheap transpor- 
 tation to the coast, and the old sources of supply must feel 
 the influence of these new rivals. If the raw materials are 
 worked on the spot or in the coast cities, great industrial 
 enterprises run without regard to the cost of life — the 
 cheapest product in China — it is possible to picture the con- 
 dition apprehended by Pearson, the overrunning of Europe 
 and America with the products of the yellow races. Each 
 nation will strive to secure the utmost gain, for combinations 
 will hardly be possible, and production will attain a great 
 pitch of quantity and of lowness of price. 
 
 In place of hiring and transporting coolies to distant 
 plantations, this labor will be available on the spot; and 
 instead of being an import of value, the very plenty will 
 make it cheap; while care and protection will cause it to 
 increase. Exports will thus be without hindrance. 
 
 How about the imports? In this question the United 
 States has a lasting interest, and a great uncertainty. Of 
 the imports into China, cotton goods hold the first place, 
 opium the second, rice the third, and metal manufactures 
 and mineral oil are of equal importance, as fourth and fifth 
 on the list. In no one item of this enumeration has the 
 United States a natural monopoly; in only one (petroleum) 
 has it a partial monopoly, fast being impaired; and in two 
 (rice and opium) it has and can have no share. Even assum- 
 ing that China remains as she is, and the ports held by 
 Europe, a cordon of duties would check any growth of our 
 
ii4 Annals oe the American Academy. 
 
 exports whether from the United States or the Philippines. 
 The English territory will probably be free, though it is by 
 no means certain that with duties on all sides, her manufac- 
 turers will not demand some assurance of the markets they 
 are taxed to maintain and defend. Elsewhere our products 
 will meet with discriminating tariffs designed to secure the 
 cream of the trade for the mother country. Where will the 
 increase in our export trade be sought ? 
 
 But China will not remain as she is. France, Germany, 
 Italy, England, Russia — these nations have gone to Asia for 
 a purpose . They intend to build railroads, open and develop 
 mines, establish industries, and secure all they can from a 
 -careful attention to encouraging competition on Asiatic con- 
 ditions. In place of wanting cottons, products of iron and 
 Steel, or other metals, or rice, China will utilize her own 
 resources. This may be a work of time, but under the stim- 
 ulus of so many competitors it will not require many years 
 to bring it to pass. Every ton of iron, of copper or of tin 
 wrought into metal ware in China; every pound of wool or 
 of cotton, or of silk made into cloth in the provinces, will 
 reduce the necessity of importing them from other countries. 
 
 A mere comparison of commercial details develops the 
 distinction between Japan and China — a living and pushing 
 people and a decayed and dying empire. In Japan opium 
 does not stand prominent in the import returns, but the 
 leading place is taken by raw cotton. Second in place is 
 sugar, the consumption of which is by some regarded as a 
 gauge of civilization. Textile and metal manufactures form 
 a large item, and the imports of machinery have increased 
 more than sevenfold in ten years. Not raising sufficient 
 food for its people, it is from other countries that the necessary 
 grains must be obtained. The ability to buy of foreign 
 nations has increased from $29,700,000 in 1886 to $94, 800,000 
 In 1896, and the purchases have all been in needed or useful 
 commodities. 
 
 To pay for these imports some domestic products were 
 called for, and herein the organizing ability of the Japanese 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 115 
 
 came into play. Tea and silk were the two important arti- 
 cles of export, the same that China sent into the world's com- 
 merce. The problem then presented was how a larger share in 
 the existing market for these commodities could be obtained, 
 and a share in any increase of market offered. China, by 
 neglect of reasonable precautions, suffered the quality of 
 both her tea and silk to degenerate, and the outside buyers 
 were not slow to determine this fact. The value of teas 
 exported from China has hardly varied in the last thirteen 
 years, nor has raw silk followed another course. Only in 
 silk cocoons and in manufactured piece goods of silk (in- 
 cluding pongees) has there been an increased export. Japan, 
 on the other hand, paid great attention to her products, and 
 has reaped her reward. The exports of silk have doubled 
 since 1885, and those of silk manufactures have risen from 
 less than 270,000 yen in 1885 to 16,232,000 yen in 1895, and 
 have attracted hostile duties in both France and the United 
 States. The movement of tea has not been so progressive, 
 showing only a small increase; but coal has quadrupled 
 (2,004,000 yen in 1885, and 9,018,000 yen in 1896) due to 
 Indian competition; cotton manufactures have gone from 
 181,000 yen in 1885 to 3,378,000 yen in 1896; manufactures 
 of wood, bamboos, etc., from 112,000 yen to 6,129,000 yen; 
 and of copper (raw) from 8,183,000 catties to 11,241,000 
 catties. In the aggregate, the exports have increased from 
 $31,630,000 in 1885 to $61,571,000 in 1896. 
 
 Many have seen in this advance a picture in small of what 
 will occur in China on a grand scale. There are certain 
 differences that may be noted. The character of the two 
 peoples are different, and the Japanese have much higher 
 organizing powers. "The truth is that a man of good 
 physical and intellectual qualities, regarded merely as an 
 economical factor, is turned out cheaper by the Chinese than 
 by any other race; he is deficient in the higher moral quali- 
 ties, individual trustworthiness, public spirit, sense of duty 
 and active courage, a group of qualities perhaps best repre- 
 sented in our language by the word manliness; but in the 
 
n6 Annaw of the American Academy. 
 
 humbler moral qualities of patience, mental and physical, 
 and perseverance in labor, he is unrivaled. . . . 
 
 " European superintendence is essential precisely because 
 of their moral shortcomings above stated. Judged by our 
 standards, we must pronounce all organizations in China 
 (with a few exceptions) above the family and the small 
 business partnership, to be hopeless failure. The upper 
 class seem to lack the moral tone to carry on by enterprises; 
 indeed the laws and the courts of justice are wanting as well 
 as the men."* 
 
 Japan fearlessly went into the money markets and obtained 
 the capital needed for her enterprises. China is held under 
 a crushing weight of custom, of stagnating civilization, and 
 is to be in tutelage for the account and profit of others. No 
 one can doubt for a moment that Europe does not regard the 
 coast provinces as the end of their leases or cessions, or 
 occupations. It is the great interior of China they have in 
 view, and are so anxious to develop. The claim of Italy 
 may be taken as a sample. A lease of the bay, and three 
 islands in it — these matters are first; then the right to build 
 a railroad to Po-yan Lake about one hundred and fifty miles 
 from the sea is claimed, a claim that extends to running the 
 railroad after construction. This is important, as many 
 rivers empty into tnis lake, navigable into the interior of the 
 surrounding country. Finally preferential mining and rail- 
 road rights within a sphere of influence covering two-thirds 
 of the province of Che-kiang — a province containing 
 36,000 square miles (about one-third as much as Italy her- 
 self) and a population estimated at 20,000,000 ( about two- 
 thirds the present population of Italy). So France in 
 Tonking has her eye on Yunnan, and England, at the mouth 
 of the Yang-tze, hungers for the trade of provinces 1,500 
 miles from that mouth, but only to be reached through it at 
 present. Germany and Russia are no more neglectful of the 
 prospective virtues of hinterlands. A map colored to meet 
 the wishes of these land grabbers would resemble that of the 
 
 •Blackburn Report (Bourne), 9. 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 117 
 
 American colonies of England, when charters were granted 
 to extend from the Atlantic Coast to the South Sea. So 
 anxious are they to obtain a part of what is lying waste that 
 combinations are made like the Anglo-German negotiations 
 for a railway from Tien-tsin to Chin-kiang; and the railroad 
 enterprise over which England and Russia have nearly come 
 to blows. 
 
 There are certain obstacles which stand in the path of the 
 commercial development of China, and these obstacles now 
 effect the merchants and products of all nations trading 
 with the Chinese, though not in an equal degree. There is 
 the natural disadvantage of the want of roads and easy 
 access to the interior provinces. There are the rivers, to be 
 sure, and they are great waterways. Apart from them the 
 system of porters is used, a slow, painful and somewhat 
 costly process of transportation. For many commodities it 
 is prohibitive, and it practically confines the export interests 
 of the far western provinces to such products as are of small 
 bulk, and high value — silk and opium. The mountainous 
 regions have mere tracks rather than roads, so narrow that 
 the shoulder poles cannot be used; and a light frame strapped 
 on the back of the coolie takes its place. "The weight 
 which a coolie can carry in this way is perfectly astonishing, 
 and it is a common sight to see him struggling over the most 
 execrable roads having on his back three bundles of Sha-si 
 made cloth, each containing thirty-nine pieces, equal to a 
 load of 220 pounds. Of cotton yarn the load is 160 pounds, 
 and one frequently meets coolies carrying 160 pounds 
 of tin or copper, which has come from the mines in the 
 district of the Tung-chuan."* Pack animals are not gen- 
 erally used, a coolie can carry a larger load, and while he 
 takes a longer time is quite as cheap— 35. 2d. being a charge 
 for 130 miles. 
 
 The first change must be toward constructing better roads 
 where water carriage is not available. Cochin China and 
 Tonking are favored by their many water courses, both 
 
 ♦ Blackburn Report, Neville and Bell, 78. 
 
118 ANNAI5 OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 
 
 rivers and canals. Not only do these favor the cultivation 
 of rice, but permit a ready shipment of the crop, just as 
 Virginia and North Carolina were favored in their rice and 
 tobacco days by the same means of getting direct to the 
 plantations. Annam and Cambodia are wanting in rivers. 
 The West River of China is not available to trade; but the 
 Red River promises a means for the French to reach Yunnan 
 — called ' ' the natural economic complement to Indo-China. ' ' 
 Even the further sections of the Yang-tze offer serious 
 problems to the navigator — rapids and a rise of seventy feet 
 during the freshets. The Yellow River is more uncertain in 
 its course than our Mississippi, and it is a common occur- 
 rence for it to leave its bed, plow a new course through a 
 densely populated country, carrying death and destruction 
 in its new path, and leaving drought and famine in its old. 
 Railroads will supplement river traffic but can never super- 
 sede it; and for some time railroad ventures will be costly, 
 uncertain and experimental. 
 
 Good means of transport and communication will avail 
 little without a thorough revision of the tax question. This 
 means a reform of provincial or local administration. The 
 likin on imports and the duties on exports not only limit the 
 distribution and consumption of foreign products, but place 
 China at a disadvantage with rival peoples. The existence 
 of these taxes is an encouragement to official corruption, and 
 it is estimated that of every three taels collected, only one 
 reaches the imperial treasury. The burdens imposed by a 
 series of likin barriers, each one taking its toll at a rate fixed 
 by the local authority, involve serious loss and discourage- 
 ment to trade. Hong Kong is the natural port for the 
 southern provinces. But the impositions levied on merchan- 
 dise on the West River make it more profitable to take goods 
 intended for Kwang-si to the seaport of Pakhoi, thence 
 partly by boats and partly by porters to the upper waters of 
 the West River, a journey of eight days. One reason for 
 resorting to coolies is the desire to avoid likin stations. 
 
 The likin question has in a measure determined the position 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 119 
 
 of the foreign merchant in China. Generally speaking 
 it has been the treaties with foreign countries that fixed the 
 rights and privileges of the foreigner on Chinese territory. 
 But a subtler and even more powerful influence has neutral- 
 ized the advantages expected to flow from treaty provisions, 
 and a change of some moment has been wrought so quietly 
 and yet with such determination, that the foreigner, as mer- 
 chant, may be said to be out of China. 
 
 What has been the position of a merchant in China until 
 a very recent time ? He possessed a bare right to import 
 and export at certain ports established by treaty. In these 
 ports he occupied a " concession," that is a piece of ground 
 leased by the Chinese Government to his own government, 
 and sublet to the merchant; or a "settlement," an area 
 within which he may lease land directly from the native 
 authorities. He could not manufacture, he could not mine 
 or engage in agriculture. He was a mere commission mer- 
 chant, for outside of these places, the internal trade is in the 
 hands of the Chinese, "excellent peddlers" as they are. 
 Of late some concessions have been made. By treaty privi- 
 lege steamers may be sent up the Yangtze to Ch'ung-king, 
 a distance of 1,400 miles from the sea. Under the treaty of 
 Shimonoseki the right to manufacture has been granted and 
 machinery may be imported. Twenty-one ports are treaty 
 or open ports.* 
 
 It was the purpose of the negotiator of the treaty of 
 Tientsin to lighten some of the burden of these likin or local 
 charges, and the transit pass system was the outcome. On 
 payment of the legal customs duty at the port of entry, and 
 one-half that tariff in addition, goods, whether import or 
 export, should be free to pass between the port of shipment 
 or entry, to or from any part of China, without further 
 charge of toll, octroi, or tax of any description whatsoever, f 
 
 * These are : New Chwang, Tient-sin, Chefoo, on the northern coast ; Chung- 
 king, I-Chang, Shasi, Hankow, Kiu-kiang, Wuhu, Chinkiang, and Shanghai, on 
 the Yang-tze River, Niogpo, Wenchow, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Canton, Hoihow 
 (Kiungchow), and Pakhoi, on the coast south of the Yang-tze ; and Hang-chow 
 and Soo-chow, two cities in the neighborhood of Shanghai. 
 
 t I<ord Elgin, in China No. 4, 1870. 
 
120 Annals op the American Academy. 
 
 In practice the intentions of the pioneers of the system have 
 been neutralized, and in some places to such an extent as 
 to make an "open port" an illusion. 
 
 At Wuchow, for instance, the privilege is evaded by- 
 imposing differential duties on transit pass goods. Or the 
 transit passes are recognized only while the commodities 
 they cover are in foreign hands; as soon as they reach 
 Chinese merchants, the demand for likin is made. Or the 
 pass is accepted and at the end of the journey a ' ' terminal ' ' 
 charge is imposed. Taxation is made the easier because it 
 is imposed on the Chinese merchant. 
 
 One result of this system is to crowd out the foreign mer- 
 chant, in both the import and the export trades. It has 
 been the impression that the opening of a new port in China 
 to commerce involved a concession to foreigners. In practice 
 it has been found it is the native merchant who benefits. 
 The carriage of any article in vessels of a foreign type, or 
 even in native craft in which foreigners may claim to have 
 an interest, at once withdraws those commodities from the 
 control of the native customs with their petty exactions and 
 unscrupulous charges. " At the present day, to open a 
 new port to foreign trade may mean little else than giving to 
 native merchants at that port the blessing of a fixed tariff 
 and an honest customs administration." — Brenan, 54.. 
 
 "The impression which a visit to nearly all the treaty 
 ports of China leaves upon the mind is that the Chinese 
 people are monopolizing in an increasing degree the com- 
 mercial advantages obtained under the several treaties which 
 foreign governments have concluded with China. Foreign 
 powers having prepared the ground for their nationals, the 
 Chinaman is gradually elbowing them out and occupying 
 the position for himself."* Chiefly at Hong Kong and 
 Shanghai is the British merchant found. In most of the 
 ports it is the Chinaman, and he is becoming the more 
 important commercial factor. Not only does he buy of the 
 
 * Report of H. B. M. Consul Byron Brenan, on the State of Trade at the Treaty 
 Ports of China, 1896. 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 121 
 
 agent at Shanghai or Hong Kong, but his orders are given 
 for imports to be made. Of the textiles imported from 
 Europe and the United States, it is estimated that one-half is 
 specially indented for under instructions from Chinese 
 dealers. Cotton and woolen goods apart, seventy-five per 
 cent of the other imports at Shanghai is on Chinese account. 
 The foreign firm, through whom the order has been given 
 has no interest in the goods on arrival, beyond their security 
 for the payment by the Chinese principal. It is a commis- 
 sion transaction, not that of a merchant. 
 
 This situation is not favorable to the expansion of China's 
 commerce. Every advantage secured by foreigners has 
 been obtained by treaty, and often by a treaty extorted under 
 a threat or actual exertion of force. Every privilege secured 
 by treaty is intended to make commercial intercourse more 
 free and more possible. The foreign merchant under cover 
 of the treaty may do many things without interference from 
 the authorities, but the Chinese merchant would be subject 
 to that interference. 
 
 While the foreign merchant may plead treaty rights, and 
 generally secure them, the native merchant is powerless. 
 He has no government to back his complaints, he can hope 
 for no aid from agitation, for the simple reason that he dare 
 not agitate. As soon as he begins to move his goods into 
 the interior he meets the likin, and at many stages of his 
 journey. The officials could wreak a disastrous vengeance 
 upon him should he incur their displeasure, and he has no 
 redress against their extortion. Illegal taxation and vexa- 
 tious detention of goods already exist; they may be so 
 intensified as to throttle trade. Hence the disadvantage of 
 distributing through Chinese merchants. 
 
 Export trade from China is in foreign hands. " A change 
 is noticeable. Where years ago a few large firms with large 
 capital bought China's products and sent them to Europe 
 on their own account, there are now many small firms who 
 receive orders from Europe by telegraph, and who fulfill 
 these for a small commission at no risk to themselves. The 
 
122 Annates of the American Academy. 
 
 telegraph and banking facilities have made it unnecessary 
 to possess capital, and the business of the export merchant 
 in China has in a great measure changed into that of the 
 commission agent. One of the consequences of this is that 
 the commission agent who is buying on a limit, and who 
 receives a commission on the amount of the invoice, buys 
 on the best terms he can at the treaty port, but has no per- 
 sonal interest in the previous treatment which the merchan- 
 dise has experienced at the hands of the tax collector, and 
 does not feel disposed to engage in the interminable disputes 
 which an attempt to profit by the treaty stipulations affect- 
 ing the inland transit of merchandise would land him in. 
 Were he dealing with his own money, and was every dollar 
 saved in taxes a dollar in his own pocket, he probably would 
 try to bring his taxation down to a legal minimum; but in 
 filling an order he now takes what the local market offers, 
 and makes no research into the past." — Brenan, 14., 15. 
 
 Hampered as it is by local dues on both imports and ex- 
 ports, dues which even the ingenuity of native merchants 
 cannot evade, the special products of China are placed at a 
 disadvantage in foreign markets. Silk is taxed in the 
 cocoon, before it can pass into the hands of a foreigner; and 
 tea lands pay a growers' tax that cannot be evaded by transit 
 passes. This disadvantage alone will not explain the fact 
 that the Asiatic trade is more or less confined to Asiatic 
 countries. China's total imports in 1886 were 89,310,000 
 Hk. taels, of which 59,497,000 taels — or two-thirds — were 
 from Asiatic countries. In 1896, the same percentage held, 
 two-thirds of a total of 211,623,000 Hk. taels (140,408,000 
 taels) being of Asiatic origin. But only 41 per cent of 
 China's exports in 1886 were sent to Asiatic countries, and 
 64 per cent in 1896.* Japan's commerce gave almost the 
 same result. In the two years, 1886 and 1896, about 30 per 
 cent of the total imports was Asiatic; but 23 per cent of the 
 exports in 1886 went to Asia, and 32 per cent in 1896, as 
 follows: 
 
 ' * Total export In 1886, 77,207,000 Hk. taels : to Asia, 31,893,000. In 1896, total,. 
 131,081,000 Hk. taels; to Asia, 83,657,000 taels. 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 123 
 
 1886, total import, 37,637,000 yen; from Asia, 11,348,000 
 yen. 
 
 1896, total import, 188,666,000 yen; from Asia, 60,122,000 
 yen. 
 
 1886, total export, 48, 871, 000 yen; to Asia, 11,273,000 yen. 
 
 1896, total export, 129,455,000 yen; to Asia, 41, 954,000 yen. 
 
 The trade of British India is pertinent on this point. The 
 exports of merchandise and treasure by sea were returned at 
 ^90,113,171 in 1887, and ^108,840,187 in 1897 — an increase 
 of 20 per cent. The exports to all Europe rose from 
 ^56,610,000 in 1887 to ^58, 450,000 in 1897 — an increase of 
 only 3 per cent; while those to Asiatic countries were 
 ^24,507,112 in 1887 and ^33,849,257 in 1897 — an increase 
 of nearly 40 per cent. The development of Indian export 
 interests has wholly been toward Asia. In imports the 
 showing is better for Europe, for the trade of that continent 
 to India increased in ten years at nearly the same rate as the 
 trade of Asia to India — 21 per cent for Asia and 22 per cent 
 for Europe. It is with Egypt, Japan and Russia and Asia 
 that the largest returns of increased imports are shown. 
 
 This has been in a measure the experience of Great Britain 
 with British India. In 1897, the year of latest returns, 
 the total exports of India by land and sea were £1 13,400,000, 
 of less than one- third (^34,786,000, or 30 per cent) was 
 Sent to the United Kingdom. Standing between two con- 
 tinents, with such a facility as the Suez canal to favor the 
 trade with Europe, India sells to that continent ^58,405,000 
 or a shade over one-half of its total export movement. This 
 may be taken as an unusually favorable showing for the 
 argument in favor of commercial expansion, but the United 
 States in 1898 sent 80 per cent of its exports to Europe, 
 and counting in what was sent to North American countries, 
 the proportion rises to 90 per cent. Second in impor- 
 tance among the colonies feeding the trade of the United 
 Kingdom is Australasia, with its varied interests and prod- 
 ucts. Excluding gold, the total exports in 1897 were 
 ^65,350,000, of which ^26,000,000— nearly 40 per cent— was 
 
124 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 sent to the United Kingdom. Turning to the English trade 
 returns it is seen that the total imports from Australasia 
 were .£29,352,000, of which ,£16,785,000 — 57 percent — was 
 in wool, a concentration of import interest that is 
 in itself remarkable. If we add a single item from four of 
 these dependencies, butter from Victoria (,£816,400); tallow 
 from New South Wales (,£661,000); fresh beef from Queens- 
 land (,£725,000), and fresh mutton from New Zealand 
 (,£2,077,000), 72 per cent of the entire imports from 
 Australasia into the United Kingdom is accounted for. 
 
 Returning to purely Asiatic colonies of Great Britain the 
 Straits Settlements exports ,£18,000,000 a year, but only 
 one-seventh goes to the United Kingdom, and if all Europe 
 be included, less than one-fourth is sent direct. Mauritius 
 sends only ,£45,000 of a total of ^2,846,000 to the United 
 Kingdom, and the demand of all Europe for its products 
 (of which sugar is the great one) will not double that 
 amount. Ceylon is more devoted to English interests, for 
 two-thirds of its exports are taken by the United Kingdom, 
 due to the peculiar product of tea. If a very few articles 
 are excluded from the export trade of these Eastern posses- 
 sions — tin, tea, jute, hides and skins and wool — what remains 
 has little attractions for Europe, and is Asiatic in avail- 
 ability. 
 
 The Netherlands holds important islands in the East, and 
 their trade is naturally largely with the mother country 
 through fiscal arrangements. It is a trade resting on an 
 artificial basis, but now passing through a transition stage, 
 and a difficult one to foresee in its results. The leading prod- 
 ucts for export are sugar, coffee and tobacco. The sugar 
 crop is experiencing the same pressure as throughout the 
 world ; the cultivation of coffee is passing more and more 
 into the hands of individuals, and the production of tea, tin, 
 cinchona bark, indigo and tobacco points out the future 
 lines of growth for the island 
 
 Being more and more Asiatic in its export character, how 
 can some of the benefits of Asia fall to the United States ? 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 125 
 
 Only in two ways, it is said : by establishing Manila as a 
 free port ; or by manufacturing for Asia on an Asiatic 
 basis. 
 
 Make Manila a free port, it is said, and the United States 
 will be in a position to claim its share in Asia's trade. How 
 can this be ? The example in mind is clearly Hong Kong, 
 but the history of that island shows how it was favored by 
 conditions not likely to be repeated. The striking fact about 
 Hong Kong is that it was not China but the Chinese that made 
 it possible and have made it what it is. For a long time it 
 was a morgue spot: "the White Man's Grave," and an 
 Alsatia, a place of refuge for the lawless or criminal, and its 
 future was in doubt as late as 1848. Then came a series of 
 events: the discovery of gold in Australia and California 
 made the coolie trade profitable; the Taiping rebellion which 
 drove men of property to the island for protection; the Suez 
 canal and its effect on Eastern commerce; and the opportu- 
 nities for work offered in the Malay Peninsula. From a 
 struggling town no better than a mining camp in morals, it 
 has become one of the great shipping centres of the world. 
 " In the colony of Hong Kong," says Colquhoun, " most of 
 the wealth is in the hands of the Chinese, and in all the 
 chief business houses and financial institutions the Chinese 
 hold positions of great responsibility." * For some years 
 the commerce of Europe at Hong Kong has shown a ten- 
 dency to decrease, a fact that can be explained only by the 
 change in the direction of Asiatic commerce, by which the 
 transactions are more and more among the peoples of Asia 
 and less with the countries of Europe and America. Fur- 
 ther, the over-sea commerce tends to become more direct, 
 and the need of a port of deposit or for transshipments is 
 less felt. 
 
 Nor geographically can it be said Manila offers any 
 advantage to Asia's trade. There is already a great shipping 
 station at Singapore, for the Indian commerce, and it is quite 
 as convenient to steam from Singapore to Hong Kong, as it 
 
 * China in Transformation, 316. 
 
126 Annates of the American Academy. 
 
 would be to go to Manila and thence to Hong Kong, or any- 
 port of Asia. If the advantage of a free port is not to be 
 had, the only alternative is to use the Philippines as a 
 manufacturing base, for supplying the continent)with certain 
 manufactures, like low grade cotton cloths. Native labor, 
 if available, and native cotton would be used, after the 
 manner proposed by the French in Tonking. In that event 
 the question of labor would again come to the front. 
 Would an attempt be made to use the natives, or to bring 
 coolies from China? The success of either would be 
 problematical, against the establishment of mills in China 
 itself. 
 
 As an agricultural colony the Philippines have their 
 possibilities, for there is a natural monopoly in Manila hemp, 
 and a capacity for all tropical growths. But the labor for 
 the plantations, where is that to be had ? Spain used the 
 natives, but only under a system that ruined the planter and 
 drove the laborer into rebellion. The methods purported 
 to be in imitation of those adopted by the Dutch in Java. 
 "The [Spanish] law prescribed that every native might 
 plant tobacco, but might only sell it to the government. In 
 the tobacco districts every native had to grow a certain 
 number of plants and devote all his attention to them." 
 Here all similarity ended. The tobacco was sorted by the 
 officials and the unfit burned. ' ' For valuing the tobacco 
 the officials used a scale, according to which the planter 
 received some 20 to 30 per cent of the real value. But he 
 was not paid in cash. He received a certificate, a kind of 
 treasury bond. Had the people had security for the pay- 
 ment of these bonds at an early date, the latter would soon, 
 no doubt, have come into currency as paper money. But, 
 far from this being so, no one would have them, knowing 
 that five or six years might pass before they were redeemed. 
 The tobacco planters lived under more miserable conditions 
 than the worse kept slaves, and were glad if some noble 
 philanthropist would give them half the value of their 
 certificates, for who could say whether the purchaser was 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 127 
 
 not risking his 50 per cent. Frequently the bonds were 
 practically given away."* 
 
 Tobacco, hemp and sugar, these are the three leading prod- 
 ucts of the island, and all paid export duties under the Span- 
 ish rule. The tobacco finds no market in the United States; 
 the sugar will be at a disadvantage with the Cuban and 
 Hawaiian products, and must a find market in China; and 
 hemp can not find an indefinitely increasing demand. 
 There are minerals. The coal is of a quality that unfits it 
 for transportation and must confine it to local use. Gold is 
 reported, and copper is known to exist. Iron ore is abund- 
 ant, but the lignites of the archipelago are said to be 
 unsuitable for blast furnaces, and charcoal pig is the method 
 suggested.! The copper deposits were worked for a time, 
 but were abandoned for want of labor. It is too sanguine a 
 view to accept Mr. Tornow's view: "It is certain that the 
 Philippines, whose future is already assured by their 
 mineral wealth, will play a part in the industry of the coming 
 years equal to, if not surpassing, that of Japan." Even if 
 we accept his view it leads us to the conclusion that the 
 commerce must be for Asia, not for the United States. 
 
 Another straw indicating the direction of trade winds. 
 When Japan obtained possession of Formosa, a tariff of ten 
 per cent ad valorem on imports went into operation. This 
 increase, applying as it did to all imports from foreign 
 countries fell as much on Chinese as on British cottons. 
 Some compensation was expected from the privilege of free 
 circulation of goods throughout the island. In the event 
 Japanese and Chinese cloths have excluded all grades of 
 foreign cloth coming in competition, leaving a much restricted 
 demand for finer grades to be satisfied by Great Britain. 
 
 In Japan there are a million spindles now in operation, pro- 
 ducing, 650,000 bales of cotton yarn of 400 lbs. each, of which 
 more than 200,000 bales will be sent to China. In the needs of 
 no other textile industry in Japan can the United States have 
 
 *Tornow, " The Philippine Islands." 
 
 t George F. Becker of the U. S. Geological Survey. 
 
128 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 a share either in the raw material or manufactured product 
 Silk is out of the question, wool is obtained from Australia 
 and China, while woolens are cheaper in France, Germany 
 or Great Britain than here. Flax and hemp are to be had 
 from the Philippines, China and British India. Is it too 
 much to look for an imitation of Russia's policy, which has 
 sought to make that country independent of our fibre by 
 developing the culture in Asia ? 
 
 Is not this Asiatic commerce beset by a new difficulty 
 offering a new problem of no little moment ? Every port of 
 size on the coast is in the hands or under the control of some 
 European nation. We have set an example by declaring 
 the Philippines open for ten years, and Mr. Reid assures us 
 they will never be closed. What assurance have we that 
 Continental Europe will maintain open ports in Asia? 
 France in Tonking has been exclusive, and her coming 
 policy is foreshadowed by her measures taken in Madagascar 
 within a year. A decree gave a monopoly of the coasting 
 trade to French vessels; it was promptly recalled, only 
 because it was found the vessels flying the French flag were 
 insufficient in number and tonnage for the needs of com- 
 merce. The application of the home tariff to the island, in 
 itself a hardship to foreign merchants, was followed by a 
 commercial campaign on the part of the ' ' General Com- 
 mander-in-Chief of the Corps of Occupation and the 
 Governor-General of Madagascar and dependencies." " I 
 have also to request you to instruct the native authorities," 
 ran his circular, ' ' to exert all their influence in favor of the 
 objects at which we are aiming [to introduce French pro- 
 ducts]. It will be easy for them from the point of view now 
 before us, to represent to persons living under their juris- 
 diction, that tissues of French manufacture are as good 
 as similar articles manufactured abroad; that it is only fit- 
 ting that the Malagasy, who have now become French 
 subjects, should conform to our national customs by using 
 our products; that their clothing thus becomes a distinctive 
 mark of their new position, and that it should be made of 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far Fast. 129 
 
 French tissues. . . But they must bear in mind that no 
 obstacles should be placed in the way of the sale and circu- 
 lation of foreign merchandise. Your part, as well as that 
 of your native subordinates, consists simply in making 
 clear to our new subjects the benefit to be derived by 
 them from the purchase of French products, which will 
 henceforward be more suitable to their habits and wants, 
 which have been modified in the last two years by the intro- 
 duction of French laws and customs. Such a course is abso- 
 lutely within our right, and no one has any right to take 
 exception to it." Further, the columns of the Malagasy 
 journal (the Vaovad) were open to advertisements of French 
 products, free of cost to the advertiser.* This found an 
 echo in the French parliament. Introducing the debate on 
 the colonies, March 6, 1899, M. Ftienne said: "Surely 
 France did not colonize for the benefit of foreign nations." 
 As a result of this policy the exports of French cotton piece 
 goods of all kinds to Madagascar rose from 690,400 francs 
 value in 1897 to 5,512,000 francs in 1898. What reason to 
 expect more liberal ideas in Tonking ? 
 
 Another point must be considered. In order to raise the 
 money necessary to pay the war indemnity to Japan, China 
 mortgaged to the lenders the greater part of the receipts 
 from customs revenue. It is generally known that the 
 financial methods of China are not elastic, and favor a host 
 of officials in the provinces rather than supply the imperial 
 treasury. The land tax, which is the chief item in each 
 provincial budget, is immutably fixed by law, and any 
 attempt to increase it would lead to rebellion. As a monopoly 
 the impost on salt has reached its limit, and it would be 
 dangerous to make it heavier. Trade is, and has been the- 
 most reliable source of income, under the administration of 
 a foreigner; but what is to happen when each port is under 
 a different head, and competing with one another after the- 
 fashion peculiar to five rival governments? The "cohe- 
 sive power of public plunder" makes itself felt under the 
 
 • Circular No. 3+6, printed in the Journal Officiel, twenty-third April, 1898. 
 
130 Annals of the American Academy 
 
 mandarins ; but would be entirely wanting under German, 
 French or British rule. 
 
 Here then is a cordon drawn round China, more obstruc- 
 tive than any Chinese wall, and liable on many accounts to 
 be made effective as a complete prohibition on commerce. 
 It might be assumed the privilege of trade could be assured 
 by treaty, for a longer or shorter period. Where has a 
 treaty been able to stand in the way of interested attack ? 
 The tripartite control of Samoa does not offer as many occa- 
 sions for difference, as would the holding of the Chinese coast 
 for commercial reasons by six great powers, and among the 
 six the United States will not figure. The dual management 
 of Egypt, was child's play compared to the problem of Chinese 
 management. What has occurred in Africa, where the native 
 counts for nothing, is only a pale forecast of what may hap- 
 pen in China with six nations contending for commercial 
 advantage among a people numbering 300,000,000 souls. 
 
 Bearing in mind that the natural resources of the East 
 are to be exploited with all the perfection of modern 
 appliances and cheaper labor than has ever been offered, the 
 following questions suggest themselves: How can cotton 
 goods of the United States find other than a limited market 
 in Asia against the cottons of India, Japan and China ? How 
 can American petroleum, better article as it is, hold more 
 than its own against the Russian oil, supported as it may be 
 by a bounty for political effect ? Then there are the oil fields 
 of Langkat to be counted in as competitors. How can 
 American iron and steel enter markets held to be closed by 
 European countries, each one of which wishes to keep for its 
 own people the construction of the railroads, the building and 
 running steam vessels, and the profits of the custom house ? 
 What better chance will there be for American machinery, 
 the rolling stock of a railroad, the mining machinery and 
 certain textile machines, than now presents itself? Finally, 
 are we looking forward to meeting Asiatic competition with 
 an even higher tariff than is now endured, a tariff bristling 
 -with duties like those on silks in the present law, specially 
 leveled against the imports of light silk goods from Japan ? 
 
THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
 STATES WITH THE FAR EAST. 
 
 Robert T. Hiu,, U. S. Geological Survey. 
 
 The storm centre of world interest undoubtedly now 
 hovers over the far East and it is well that the people of 
 this nation, while not participating in the struggle for terri- 
 tory, should seriously consider their interests in this distant 
 region and how they may be protected in the field in which 
 others are now engaged. 
 
 Mr. Ford in his address has analyzed the elements of the 
 commercial relations of the far East and little remains 
 to be said from the statistical point of view. He has given 
 many of the facts concerning the actual conditions of trade 
 and his paper is so exhaustive that he has left but little 
 room for additional data, other than the indulgence in 
 generalizations and conclusions. 
 
 This Eastern question has but little relation to the recent 
 history-making events in which our nation has been engaged 
 and should not be confused with our problems of territorial 
 expansion. The late expansion of our nation has not been 
 the result of governmental intent, but the culmination of 
 great forces acting through the individual atoms of society 
 which moved irrelevant to any preconceived political plan. 
 Most of this growth, like that of the butterfly, has been 
 within the cocoon, and it is only within the past year that 
 we have emerged from the chrysalis stage into a conspicuous 
 form which attracts the attention of the outer world and 
 astonishes even ourselves with our own magnitude and 
 powers. No one here can predict or judge how or where 
 these newly felt powers will lead us. The dynamic forces 
 of our expansion have been the superior quality of the 
 •citizen which our institutions have created, his desires for 
 
 (131) 
 
132 Annals op the American Academy. 
 
 individual improvement and gain, manifested in mechanical 
 inventions, commerce and trade, and his capacity for initia- 
 tion and administration. The spirit of the United States 
 has been to develop in every citizen the capacity for personal 
 expansion and the growth of the nation is but a natural 
 result of the aggregate uplifting and outspreading capacity 
 of these units. It is the possession of these forces that 
 gives us a feeling that we are competent to compete with 
 the world and to meet any emergency, industrial or political, 
 that may arise. 
 
 There are some Americans who believe that we can con- 
 tinue to exist entirely upon our own adipose, and who do 
 not yet appreciate that we have become a world power, or 
 realize that with our 5,000 miles of coast, our numerous 
 maritime cities and our unlimited capacities for building and 
 manning ships, we own an interest in the ocean as well as in 
 the land. I have seen our nation pass through the most 
 remarkable epoch of its history. My boyhood days were 
 spent in helping reduce the vast unsettled wilderness which 
 this country still possessed twenty-five years ago and which 
 at that time was considered unlimited for settlement and 
 productiveness. I have spent my later years in studying 
 foreign regions where I was constantly impressed with oppor- 
 tunities for the extension of American commerce. These 
 studies enabled me to see the approaching importance of our 
 foreign trade and gave some definite opinions, which when 
 expressed, resulted in securing the appellations which my 
 conservative friends variously applied — a jingo, an expan- 
 sionist and an imperialist. My jingoism, however, has con- 
 sisted of a wish to see American trade stand upon an equal 
 footing with that of all other countries; a desire for the 
 inauguration of good government at home and the suppres- 
 sion of those conditions abroad which tended to prevent the 
 flag which protects our commerce from receiving the universal 
 respect to which it was entitled. It is my privilege to have 
 a wide acquaintance with all classes and kinds of people in 
 this country and I am happy to say that I do not know an 
 American who has in his heart a desire to wrench from any 
 other nation afoot of territory or seize unjustly that which 
 does not belong to us. Hence the term expansionist, in so 
 far as it applies to the principle that we should hold that 
 which has legitimately become ours, may be considered a 
 designation of honor. Neither do I know in this wide 
 
Commercial Relations with the; Far East. 133 
 
 country of ours a single man who desires to upset our 
 democratic institutions or to take from the people and invest 
 in a sovereign a single one of these inestimable rights which 
 it has been their pleasure to enjoy. Hence the term im- 
 perialist is a meaningless misnomer borrowed from English 
 colonial politics, which have no counterpart in this country. 
 Whatever terms may be applied to those who uphold our 
 recent expansion in the Caribbean and the Pacific, I do not 
 believe that any American desires to see this country parti- 
 cipate in the acquirement of Chinese territory. 
 
 For one hundred years our people found an outlet for their 
 energies and expansive forces in developing and conquering 
 their own territory, in opening mines, and establishing 
 systems of internal communication, and above all educating 
 the youth to a degree of general mentality not approached 
 by any other nation in the world. Suddenly we found that 
 the nation no longer possessed undeveloped lands to bestow 
 in exchange for the energy of those who would reclaim 
 them; that the cream of our national resources had been 
 garnered from public to private ownership. But the impulse 
 of enterprise which our educational and political systems had 
 set in action still remained with us as a force of great 
 potentiality which is bound to be felt in foreign fields. 
 
 The events of the past year, by which our national condi- 
 tions have been bettered, were not a sudden outbreak upon 
 our part, but represented the culmination of a war which 
 has practically continued since the beginning of our national 
 experiences. The second page of Schouler's history 
 describes how Spain in the very first year of our existence 
 was a stealthy foe of the United States. The favorite say- 
 ing of a captain-general of that time was that had he the 
 power he would prevent the birds from flying across the 
 boundary between the United States and Mexico. Since 
 then Spanish sovereignty adjacent to our Southern border 
 has been a source of irritation and annoyance which placed 
 unjust and uncivilized restriction against the natural laws of 
 trade, and prevented our commercial development in that 
 direction. History will look upon the events of the past 
 year merely as the equitable and righteous end of a century of 
 irritation. The Philippine question is an unexpected incident 
 of this war with Spain, which was primarily fought to protect 
 our commercial relations in the Western hemisphere. These 
 islands have come to us as the legitimate prize of a just and 
 
i34 Annai*s of the American Academy. 
 
 civilized war upon our part without preconcerted thought or 
 desire to acquire such distant and extraterritorial domain, 
 although their acquirement at this time gives us a timely 
 and needed vantage which we did not before possess. Then- 
 acquisition is an entirely distinct and separate proposition 
 from the broader Eastern question in which this country has 
 had a deep and vital interest for many years, at least since 
 the Chinese and Japanese ports were first opened to Western 
 trade. 
 
 Broadly stated, the problem of our commercial relations 
 with the far East, including under that term all of Indo- 
 Pacific Asia, is the preservation of the present opportuni- 
 ties and the enlargement of future possibilities in one of the 
 many fields of trade which make up the aggregate of our 
 commerce. This area embraces about 10,500,000 square 
 miles of territory, inhabited by 815,000,000 people — three 
 times the area of the United States and twelve times 
 the population. In its restricted sense the Eastern question 
 applies to China only, and involves the reclamation of the 
 Chinese people from a world retarding and inefficient cul- 
 ture, and their elevation into factors of greater productivity. 
 There are other and perhaps as important fields of trade 
 nearer home which one might well argue are more worthy 
 of our attention, notably the commerce of our South and 
 Central American neighbors. These are dormant fields, 
 however, which are not threatened by cloture and will await 
 our future attention. 
 
 The Eastern Sphere of Trade includes the following 
 countries: 
 
 Area. 
 Country. Square Miles. Population. 
 
 Borneo 290,000 1,750,000 
 
 Celebes 71,000 2,000,000 
 
 Chinese Empire* 4,218,000 400,000,000 
 
 British India 1,560,000 300,000,000 
 
 Indo China 138,000 17,000,000 
 
 Java 51,000 24,000,000 
 
 Japan 148,000 40,090,000 
 
 Korea 82,000 10,000,000 
 
 Siam 300,000 5,000,000 
 
 Sumatra 161,000 3,000,000 
 
 Philippes 114,000 7,000,000 
 
 Oceanica 3,480,000 5,100,000 
 
 10,613,000 814,940,000 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 135 
 
 When it became apparent that the powers of Europe had 
 determined to dismember and seize upon the Empire of 
 China, our people were naturally amazed and alarmed con- 
 cerning the effect of this policy upon our own commercial 
 relations. Sober second thought, however, must lead us to 
 the conclusion that the effects of such a partition instead of 
 being detrimental to our interests, will be to our advantage 
 and prosperity. No great benefit to our trade in the East 
 may be expected should Asia be permitted to remain Asiatic. 
 It is only in the near possibility of its being Europeanized 
 in commerce and government that any future gain for our 
 trade and commerce is to be sought. I maintain that even 
 that portion of the Chinese territory which comes under the 
 control of those nations practicing the " closed door " policy 
 will prove a more fertile field of trade to us than China in its 
 present condition, for "closed doors" can sometimes be 
 opened, while Chinese walls have no doors at all. 
 
 It has already been clearly shown how essential Caucasian 
 superintendence is to the development of China, and no one 
 doubts that under such superintendence the wealth pro- 
 ducing and wealth consuming capacity of that country will 
 be enormously multiplied. Stimulation of commerce is 
 what this country should most desire in China, and it can 
 but reflect great credit upon our trade just as the develop- 
 ment of South Africa has done. The reasons for this belief 
 are as follows: 
 
 1. China will to a degree be Caucasianized inasmuch as 
 large and intelligent European administrative populations 
 will be introduced whose customs and habits will be imi- 
 tated by the natives. Each European wears and uses per- 
 haps ten times as many commodities of trade as an Asiatic. 
 Europeans to-day consume nearly eight times as much of 
 our products as all the races of the world combined. In 
 round numbers Europe takes $805,000,000 of our exports, 
 Asia, $40,000,000; South America, $35,000,000; Oceanica, 
 $20,000,000, and Africa, $15,000,000. The presence of Euro- 
 peans in China will create and enlarge the markets for 
 foreign goods. The effect of Western civilization upon 
 Oriental life can be seen by comparison of Japanese imports 
 with those of China. 
 
136 AnnaIvS of the American Academy. 
 
 Barbaric China Imports. Civilized Japan Imports. 
 
 Cotton goods, Rice, 
 
 Opium, Pulse, 
 
 Metals, Sugar, 
 
 Kerosene, Chemicals, 
 
 Woolen goods, Raw cotton, 
 
 Coal, Cotton yarn, 
 
 Raw cotton, Woolen yarn, 
 
 Fishery products. Flannels, 
 
 Muslins, 
 Cloths, 
 Blankets, 
 Steel rails, 
 Watches, 
 Oil cakes, 
 Spring machinery, 
 Steam vessels, and 
 a hundred other articles aggre- 
 gating in value all the above. 
 
 Within the past ten years our trade with Japan, both im- 
 ports and exports, has increased by annual bounds and jumps, 
 the former having increased 50 per cent and the latter 345 
 per cent. This can be attributed to no other cause than the 
 awakening of Japan through its adoption of Western civiliza- 
 tion. 
 
 Furthermore the foreign trade with civilized Japan with a 
 population of 33,000,000 amounts to $289,517,000, or $9.60 
 per capita, while the total trade of China with twelve times 
 the population amounts to only $34,000,000, or less than 
 nine cents per capita of population. Who can doubt that the 
 introduction of Western civilization into China will develop 
 an enormous foreign trade just as it has done in Japan ? 
 
 We need not look with despair upon the rapid growth of 
 the foreign trade of Japan which has doubled in eleven years. 
 That country has allied itself in civilization and habit with 
 England and ourselves and we should regard its prosperity 
 as a welcome element in the otherwise dark political pano- 
 rama of the East. If she has increased the number of her 
 spindles and competed with our manufacturers of cotton 
 goods it has had no appreciable effect upon that industry 
 in this country, for our cotton mills, notwithstanding this 
 competition, are enjoying the first epoch of undoubted 
 prosperity for many years, and have apparently found 
 market for all they can produce. Furthermore, the develop- 
 ment of cotton manufacture in Japan has been a beneficial 
 factor to the cotton producer of this country and already 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 137 
 
 cargoes of our raw material have found new markets in that 
 country. I have recently heard of several propositions to 
 cultivate cotton by irrigation on the Pacific Coast of North 
 America for the purpose of supplying the Japanese demand. 
 
 I have prepared a table showing our imports and exports 
 with the Eastern Asiatic countries from the year 1886 to 1898, 
 inclusive. (See page 138.) 
 
 The partition of China has been practically going on during 
 the years included in these statistics, especially since the 
 last Japanese war (1895). These figures show that our trade 
 with the Eastern countries has been steadily increasing not- 
 withstanding the constant encroachment of European occu- 
 pation. Our imports from China have remained stationary, 
 while our exports have increased 174 per cent. In all the 
 other countries of the East our trade has in general been 
 normal and has held its own. Furthermore, our trade with 
 the Asiatic Russia, including Korea, has actually grown into 
 measurable proportions from almost nothing ten years ago. 
 The prosperity of this trade has increased proportionately 
 with the pressure of European influence in the far East and 
 has been especially prosperous for the past four years, our 
 exports having increased during that time to China, the 
 Dutch East Indies, the British East Indies, Hong Kong, 
 Japan, Korea, and Asiatic Russia. These figures indicate 
 the beginning of American prosperity in the East rather than 
 the commencement of a dismal epoch of exclusion. 
 
 The stimulation resulting from the introduction of Euro- 
 pean influence into the far East has already been felt by our 
 commerce. Mr. Ford in his statistics has shown us how 
 much the trade of the far East has increased since the par- 
 tition of China practically began with the end of the Jap- 
 anese war in 1895. In 1889, 8.55 per cent of our imports 
 came from Asia; in 1898, 15 per cent. In 1889 only 2.48 
 per cent of our exports went to that country; in 1898 3.63 
 per cent. Of this increase 46 per cent in our imports and 
 76 per cent in our exports took place during a single year 
 of partition, a fact which is indeed most gratifying. This is 
 but a fraction of what the increase will be when the political 
 conditions of China which Mr. Ford so graphically describes, 
 are abolished. Surely if partition has had any influence at 
 all upon this trade it has so far been most quickening. 
 
 2. European occupation of China will abolish the unfor- 
 tunate and incompetent political conditions which have been 
 
138 
 
 Annai£ of the American Academy. 
 
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Commercial Relations with the Far Kast. 139 
 
 such a barrier to the development of the country. All 
 writers and observers agree that the Chinaman as an indi- 
 vidual is competent and industrious, possessing in some 
 respects more sterling qualities of manhood than the 
 Japanese, and that it is only the hopeless political degrada- 
 tion that keeps him reduced to the lowest industrial plane, 
 his opportunities now being restricted to agricultural pur- 
 suits, peddling, and performing the functions of the beast of 
 burden. 
 
 3. The introduction of Western civilization and govern- 
 ment will stimulate mining, manufacturing, mechanical, 
 transportation, and all the modern occupations which 
 increase personal remuneration, add to the volume of circu- 
 lation, and create demand and market for articles of civil- 
 ized commerce now unknown to the people. 
 
 One may pooh-pooh at the quantity of cotton goods and 
 bric-a-brac which constitutes the present commerce of 
 China, but the world knows that the vast area of that 
 decrepit empire is to be net-worked with railroads and 
 telegraph lines opening up the vast mineral resources which 
 are demanded in the world's arts and industries, and in 
 these lines we shall find our opportunities for profit. Eu- 
 ropean control of China means opportunity for the young 
 men we are educating in our technical colleges, market for 
 our iron and machinery, and untold profit for our people. 
 Continued Chinese methods present not one ray of hope for 
 our material profit. 
 
 No one can deny the advantage to our commerce of having 
 Western civilization on the Eastern shore of the Pacific. It 
 will stimulate our merchant marine, upbuild our Pacific 
 Coast, appreciate the importance of our island stations and 
 round out our nationality. What the Atlantic without 
 Europe on the other side would be, the Pacific now is to us 
 with China as it is. 
 
 ' ' Where will the increase in our export trade be sought ? ' ' 
 asks Mr. Ford. This question is as applicable to all the rest 
 of the world as well as for China. Expansion of trade is a 
 matter which concerns the individual merchant. He must 
 seek and procure his own orders. 
 
 The argument that every ton of metal wrought in China 
 will reduce the necessity of importing metal wares from 
 other countries is not essentially correct. The Chinese may 
 make plates and utensils or other crude manufactures of 
 
140 Anna:ls op the American Academy. 
 
 metal, but Americans can make machinery, and in the 
 mechanical education of this country we have a monopoly 
 of capital with which China will not be able to compete for 
 a hundred years even though we made no further progress 
 in that epoch. American mining machinery excels that of 
 any other country and holds its own throughout the world, 
 and the first American spade that enters the undeveloped 
 ore banks of China will stimulate a demand for American 
 mining machinery that will be of multiple effect in increas- 
 ing our trade in that product. Not only this, but American 
 brain and technical skill will predominate in the develop- 
 ment of those mines and American element introduced into 
 China will sympathetically aid trade in other directions. 
 
 The trade of the United States while measured in aggre- 
 gates to be understood must be considered by particles. It 
 is the smallest individual retail purchase that creates the 
 demand for goods. The pending events will undoubtedly 
 better the purchasing power of the Chinese individual, and 
 this is a side of the question which deserves some considera- 
 tion. The future extension of our trade in foreign countries, 
 China included, must depend much more upon individual 
 exertion than upon governmental aid. Our merchants and 
 manufacturers must win patronage by supplying the best 
 quality of goods at the lowest prices. Such articles will win 
 against the most despicable governmental barriers. If we 
 wish to sell agricultural implements to lands where they use 
 the machete instead of the plough, we must make the best 
 machetes possible and they will win for themselves a market. 
 I seriously think that study of the foreign marts and needs 
 by our manufacturers now would be much more profitable 
 than our contemplation of the political horizon of China in 
 which we are not apt to have a part. 
 
 Let us inquire a little further into the so-called open and 
 closed-door policies of the European nations in the far East. 
 These are merely the old questions of protection and free trade. 
 Nations endeavor to expand their territory for the benefit of 
 commerce and national development. When territory comes 
 under the protection of the French, the Italian, the German, 
 or any other flag than the English flag, the protective policy 
 of the respective countries will be put in force. It is 
 alleged that the closed door or protection policy is a sub- 
 terfuge of the weak, a relic of the barbaric days of civiliza- 
 tion. We are told that if the European nations secure 
 
Commercial Relations with the; Far East. 141 
 
 China all of them except England will monopolize it to 
 our exclusion and slam the door of trade in our faces. 
 There is much needless alarm in this subject. There has 
 been much more noise than action and much more fright 
 than fact. It is largely the old cry of wolf ! uttered by a 
 sister nation which is more interested in the question than 
 we and whose interests are more endangered than our own. 
 This is nothing more than the policy which we ourselves have 
 practiced against all other nations for many years. It is 
 true that from a higher theoretical point of view this "closed 
 door" policy is less desirable than that of the open door. 
 It is oftentimes an irritating and from a humanitarian point of 
 view an extremely selfish policy. But we certainly occupy an 
 anomalous position when we stand for the open door abroad 
 and the closed door at home. 
 
 Instead of becoming panic-stricken by the prospect of 
 the trade of China being placed under the protective policy 
 of European nations, we should contemplate more calmly 
 what the effects of such action will be. The nations 
 engaged in this division have been enforcing this same 
 policy against us in Europe for years. In all European 
 countries except Great Britain the doors of trade are as 
 tightly closed against us as they are or will be in China. 
 Yet in some manner our trade has managed to pass their 
 protective barriers and they collectively consume nearly one- 
 half our products. The Germans in Europe consume $124,- 
 000,000 worth, or fifteen times as much as the Chinese; 
 Prance, $56,000,000; Belgium, $32,000,000; Netherlands, 
 $50,000,000; Italy, $21,000,000 and Russia $8,000,000. 
 These are all closed-door countries and yet Italy, our next 
 smallest customer among them, with its population of 
 32,000,000, consumes twice as much of our products as China 
 with its 400,000,000 people. In other words each Italian 
 subject is worth to our trade as much as twelve Chinamen 
 in their present condition. 
 
 "We do not get a dollar's worth of trade from Europe or 
 any other land that prejudice and intention would not 
 prevent if it could. What is true for Europe is true for 
 China. China will never take from us that which we cannot 
 supply better and cheaper than other nations. In her 
 present deplorable state she will never take much more from 
 us than she now takes and our only hope of increased trade 
 with her lies in the betterment of her civilization. 
 
142 AnnaIvS of the American Academy. 
 
 What the future political relations of the United States 
 will be in the affairs of the far East no one can prophesy. 
 Protection of trade and subjects is the duty of the nation. 
 Our commercial interests do not necessarily involve or neces- 
 sitate political complications such as the expansion of our 
 territory beyond what has already been acquired as a re- 
 sult of the war with Spain. Public opinion in this country 
 does not desire that the United States should acquire one 
 foot of Chinese territory. Of necessity our policy must be 
 one of drift and observation. 
 
 For the present we can only jealously guard such rights as 
 we have acquired and be prepared to avail ourselves of all 
 future opportunities, endeavoring through diplomacy to 
 maintain such friendly political relations as will secure 
 equal rights for our goods in competition with those of 
 other nations and the protection of the interests of our 
 citizens who seek investment there. 
 
 This country within the past few years has made some nota- 
 ble commercial conquests without the acquirement of terri- 
 tory or the suggestion thereof. We have commercially invaded 
 Mexico and become supreme in that field of trade, forcing 
 our goods into her markets which were previously hostile 
 and securing business opportunities of incalculable value. 
 In South Africa, a country which a few years ago seemed 
 more hopeless as a field of trade than the far East, we have 
 found a grand market for our food stuffs and our machinery. 
 
 The interests of the United States in the far East will be 
 protected and benefited by the friendly relations which we 
 hold with the two greatest countries now engaged in par- 
 titioning China. Both Russia and England hold us to most 
 cordial relations and neither country would dare to discrimi- 
 nate against us in any unusual or unjust way. Both desire 
 to retain our friendship and under these amicable conditions 
 there is great diplomatic opportunity for us. 
 
 Every foot of the outer world thus far acquired by Eng- 
 land has been to our benefit. Although our chief competitor 
 in the manufacture of textiles, ship- building, etc., this 
 country is nearest to us in blood and ideals and to-day 
 England is one of our chief customers, taking nearly fifty 
 per cent of all that we send abroad. She takes over half of 
 our European exports. Our British neighbors on the north 
 consume twice as much of our products as the rest of North 
 America and more of South America combined. British 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 143 
 
 Oceanica takes nearly as much from us as China and Japan 
 combined, while we send to the British in Africa three times 
 as much as we do to all the other people of the dark con- 
 tinent. It is but natural that our sympathies should lead us 
 to desire that as much of China as possible should fall under 
 English rule. 
 
DISCUSSION. 
 
 John Foord, Esq., New York City, Secretary, American Asiatic 
 
 Association. 
 
 I have been profoundly impressed with the ability and industry dis- 
 played in the preparation of the papers to which we have just listened, 
 and I must pay a special tribute of respect to the earnest intention of 
 their authors to set before you, fairly and impartially, the conditions 
 affecting our commercial relations with the far East. But the fact can 
 hardly have escaped you that the main lines of argument which these 
 papers follow are mutually destructive, and to that extent have relieved 
 me of saying a good deal in reply that might, otherwise, have been 
 necessary. Mr. Ford takes a discouraging view of the future of our 
 trade with China, because he regards the dismemberment of that 
 empire as inevitable, and Mr. Hill takes an optimistic view of it for 
 precisely the same reason. I am in entire agreement with Mr. Ford 
 that our Chinese trade would be a diminishing instead of an increas- 
 ing quantity if China is to be partitioned into spheres of commercial 
 influence, in most of which we should encounter a hostile tariff, and 
 in all of which there would be a pressure, silently but constantly exer- 
 cised, in favor of other merchandise than our own. I disagree abso- 
 lutely with Mr. Hill, and therein I think I voice the sentiments of all 
 Americans who have trade relations with the far East, in assuming 
 that no matter what may be the commercial policy of the powers to 
 whom the control of the Celestial Empire will pass, we should succeed 
 not only in holding our own there, but in greatly increasing our 
 present average of business, simply because of the transformation that 
 the dominance of any form of European civilization would effect in 
 that mass of humanity which we call China. The experience of Mada- 
 gascar is too recent in the business of our manufacturers and exporters 
 of cotton textiles, to admit of any illusions on that point. Here was 
 a trade in which a most promising beginning had been made in 1897, 
 with exports, chiefly in drills and sheetings, of some $550,000, but 
 which one year of French sovereignty, with its accompanying tariff 
 and other methods of exclusion has completely wiped out. I don't 
 think we should have any better chance with the French " sphere " in 
 China, than we have now in Madagascar; I doubt if we should fare 
 much better in the German "sphere," and if we held on to our cotton 
 trade in North China, in spite of the application of a Russian tariff, it 
 would only be till the protected and bounty-fed Moscow manufacturer 
 was able to produce for eleven cents what we are ready to sell for 
 
 (144) 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 145 
 
 seven cents. A differential of 60 per cent is quite too high a burden on 
 trade to give the producer against whom it operated much of an 
 opportunity. 
 
 But I take issue both with Mr. Ford and Mr. Hill in assuming the dis- 
 memberment of China to be inevitable. That seems to me to be tak- 
 ing something for granted which we cannot possibly allow to be taken 
 for granted, in short, it seems like begging the whole question at issue. 
 The partition of China among the great powers of the earth, and the con- 
 sequent girdling of the Chinese coast with a rampart of foreign custom 
 houses, involves certain questions which the people of the United States 
 have not yet passed upon, and which will be answered pretty much as 
 these people may choose to direct. In other words, if the people of this 
 republic make up their minds that the partition of China would be 
 contrary to their interests, the partition of China will not take place. 
 
 Let us clearly understand the situation as it exists to-day: There 
 are two great powers, Russia and France, whose interests impel them 
 to work for the division of China into zones of exclusive commercial 
 influence, if not into zones of actual political and military control. 
 Neither of these nations produces anything which China needs, in 
 great quantity at least, which cannot be more cheaply produced by its 
 rivals. An open market in China, therefore, means for them next to 
 no market at all, and their influence is necessarily thrown on the side 
 of fencing off markets by the aid of a protective wall of customs duties. 
 There is a third great power whose citizens have shown their ability 
 to hold their own in the commercial competition of the world, but 
 whose attitude in China may best be described as that of waiting to 
 see how the cat is going to jump. On what must be called a frivolous 
 pretext, Germany obtained a footing in Shantung, in the shape of a 
 lease of the land around the entrance of Kiaochau Bay — an acquisition 
 which Herr Von Brandt has euphemistically described as a place in 
 the sunshine by the side of others who are basking in it. The same 
 authority — a former German Minister to China — says: " Far from 
 wishing to restrict the area within which foreign trade and industry 
 can and ought to flourish in China, she (Germany ) will ever advocate 
 the maintenance and extension of commercial relations with the Chinese 
 Empire— not to the exclusion of others, but for the general benefit of 
 humanity. And there is no reason why she should not co-operate to 
 that end with any power animated by the same wishes and aspirations. " 
 It must be admitted, however, that Germany stands for equality of 
 commercial opportunity in China with a difference, since she has cau- 
 tiously reserved for her own manufacturers and capitalists the exclu- 
 sive right to construct railroads, work mines, and, generally speaking, 
 develop the resources of a province half the size of Prussia and a third 
 
146 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 more populous. Per contra, Kiaochau has been declared a free 
 port. 
 
 If there be any doubt as to which side the interests of Germany 
 impel her to take in the struggle to keep the door open to commerce 
 in China, there can be none as to the position which traditional policy 
 and present needs alike require England to occupy. It is quite prob- 
 able that there are Englishmen of light and leading, both in the 
 political and commercial world, who regard, like my friend, Mr. Ford, 
 the partition of China as inevitable and who are, therefore, resigned 
 to the necessity of at once marking out the English sphere of influ- 
 ence and making preparations to defend it against all comers. But it 
 remains as true to-day, as it was a year ago, when the Duke of Devon- 
 shire made the declaration in the House of Lords, " that the princi- 
 ple, and the sole principle, which Her Majesty's Government have had 
 in view in their dealings with China — the principle which has actuated 
 both their declarations at home and their communications with foreign 
 powers — has been that China should remain open to commerce as now, 
 that the facilities at present possessed by British subjects for trading 
 in China and for the employment of British capital in China should 
 not be diminished, but should rather be increased, and that no facili- 
 ties, no concessions in these directions, which may be made to other 
 powers, should be denied to British subjects." It maybe, as Mr. 
 Ford says, that not one of the foreign nations who occupy positions 
 around the coast of China has any interest in maintaining the integ- 
 rity of the empire " unless such maintenance can prevent rivals from 
 securing more than a fair share of the spoils." But there is much 
 significance in that " unless," and it would seem to be hardly neces- 
 sary to assume that the desire to secure a fair share of the trade of 
 China must fall under the same ban as a desire to secure this trade 
 plus a slice of territory. The spoil of military aggression is not pre- 
 cisely the same thing as the fruits of open commercial competition, 
 even if the freedom of that competition has to be assured by a dis- 
 play of superior force. 
 
 And here, let me say, that Mr. Hill does not seem correctly to ap- 
 prehend how much freedom commerce enjoys in China to-day. There 
 is no " Chinese Wall," in his sense of the phrase, and one by one the 
 obstacles which have been interposed to trade in the interior of the 
 empire are disappearing. Viewed from one side, there are many and 
 irritating obstructions to anything like free commercial exchange 
 between the foreign merchant and the people of China, but, consid- 
 ering how hard and fast must be the hold of tradition over an em- 
 pire that has long outlived all the ancient civilizations of the world, 
 perhaps the wonder should be, not that the process of change is slow 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 147 
 
 and difficult in China, but that it has gone on of late years with such 
 rapidity. The Chinese tariff is a uniform ad valorem duty of 5 per 
 cent, payable in silver, and that is a very trifling burden on commerce 
 compared with the tariff -which Russia, France or Germany would 
 impose, when the time came to convert a sphere of influence into a. 
 sphere of sovereignty. So far as our treaty rights are concerned, we 
 stand on precisely the same footing as these powers do in China to- 
 day — we enjoy the equality of commercial opportunity known as the 
 " open door," and under such conditions we have no misgivings 
 about the future of our trade. But if there is to be dismemberment, 
 we can have neither part nor lot in it; we have everything to lose and 
 nothing to gain by the division of the empire. We might profit by 
 the liberal policy of Great Britain within what would naturally be 
 her sphere, though that is not where we have had most trade up to 
 the present time; but elsewhere our trade would be at the mercy of 
 whatever discriminating tariff might be declared against it. 
 
 " Is it consistent," asks Mr. Hill, " to stand for the open door 
 abroad while maintaining a closed door at home?" It is a habit of 
 English-speaking people not to trouble themselves much about the 
 logical sequence of any line of public policy. For reasons sufficient 
 to themselves, the people of the United States have adopted a protec- 
 tive tariff for the better development of their domestic industries. 
 When they find sufficient reason to dispense with this tariff, it will go 
 like the scaffolding of a completed building, which has served its pur- 
 pose. There are some of us who think that most of the protective 
 features of the tariff might be dispensed with now, but I take it that our 
 individual views on that subject have nothing to do with the demand 
 that everybody should occupy the same commercial footing in China. 
 That is a matter also which vitally concerns our interests, and while 
 we can have nothing to say about the efforts of Russia, France and 
 Germany to imitate our protective policy at home, we have the clearest 
 possible right to lodge a protest against the application of their 
 domestic tariff to a country in which they have no more rights than 
 are possessed by ourselves. 
 
 I must, therefore, doubly take exception to Mr. Ford's phrase about 
 the United States being pitched unexpectedly into this " circle of 
 marauding powers." I am not concerned with the defence of British 
 policy in China, except in so far as it appears to be the only policy 
 that the United States can support, and it may thus be proper to dis- 
 criminate between a power that takes a naval station in Chinese waters 
 as a base for the dismemberment of the empire, and one that takes a 
 station opposite it for the purpose of preventing that dismemberment. 
 Then, as to the unexpectedness of our position in China; is it not a 
 
148 AnnaIvS of the American Academy. 
 
 fact that we were face to face with precisely the same problems which 
 present themselves to-day, before there was any thought of taking 
 Manila and possessing ourselves of the Philippines ? I admit that had 
 we no interests in China, the possession of the Philippines would be 
 meaningless, but the Chinese question came before the Philippine, not 
 after it, either in time or logical sequence. In December, 1897, it 
 became evident that a situation had been created under which the 
 trade and treaty rights secured by the United States in China might 
 be seriously imperilled. These had already been adversely affected by 
 the agreement made in regard to the Russo-Manchurian Railway, in 
 which it was provided that ' ' goods imported from Russia into China by 
 rail and exported from China to Russia in the same manner shall pay 
 respectively an import or export Chinese duty to the extent of one- 
 third less as compared with the duty imposed at Chinese seaport 
 custom houses. ' ' That must be held to be in clear contravention of the 
 provision of the treaty of 1844 which reads: " Citizens of the United 
 States resorting to China for the purpose of commerce will pay the 
 duties of import and export prescribed in the tariff which is fixed by 
 and made part of this treaty. They shall in no case be subject to 
 other or higher duties than are or shall be required of the people of 
 any other nation whatever, and if additional advantages and privi- 
 leges of whatever description be conceded hereafter by China to any 
 other nation the United States and the citizens thereof shall be entitled 
 thereupon to a complete, equal and impartial participation in the 
 same." 
 
 The existing status had been further threatened by the virtual 
 supremacy of Russia in Manchuria and the I4aotung peninsula and 
 the consequent danger that the treaty port of Newchwang — more than 
 half of whose imports of cotton textiles come from the United States 
 — might at any time be declared a part of the Russian Empire, and 
 therefore subject to its tariff. In short, the beginnings were only toe- 
 obvious of a process of alienation of sovereignty under which the 
 whole of North China might pass under the dominion of the Czar. 
 As it happens that 80 per cent of all the cotton drills, and over 90 per 
 cent of all the sheetings which the United States exports to China, 
 find their way to the three northern treaty ports of Tientsin, Chefoo 
 and Newchwang, this was a process to which the manufacturing 
 interests of our country could hardly be indifferent. The first body 
 to take action in regard to the threatening situation in China was the 
 New York Chamber of Commerce, to which a very largely signed 
 petition had been addressed, calling upon the chamber "to take such 
 immediate action in the premises as may be deemed expedient and 
 proper, to the end that the present situation may be brought to the 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 149 
 
 attention of the Department of State at Washington, and that the 
 important interests of the United States, together with existing treaty 
 rights of its citizens in China, may be duly and promptly further safe- 
 guarded." At its meeting in February, 1898, the New York Chamber 
 of Commerce addressed a memorial to the President of the United 
 States in which it was set forth that the trade of the United States 
 with China is rapidly increasing, and is destined with the further 
 opening of that country to assume large proportions, unless arbitrarily 
 debarred by the action of foreign governments. In view of the 
 changes threatening the future development of this trade, the 
 chamber respectfully and earnestly urged that such proper steps be 
 taken as might commend themselves to the wisdom of the President, 
 " for the prompt and energetic defence of the existing treaty rights of 
 our citizens in China, and for the preservation and protection of their 
 important commercial interests in that empire." Similar action was 
 taken by the Chambers of Commerce of Philadelphia, Boston and San 
 Francisco, and the whole subject of American interests in the far East 
 was fairly lifted into the place of commercial and public importance 
 which it is so fully entitled to occupy. 
 
 That fateful first of May, when Dewey's guns destroyed construc- 
 tions more antique than Spanish men-of-war, did undoubtedly give to 
 the people of the United States a new sense of their nearness to the 
 scene of the strife of international ambitions in the far East, and 
 probably brought home to them a new perception of the impossibility 
 of remaining indifferent to the issue of that struggle. But it did not 
 make manifest, for the first time, the fact that no question of our 
 generation is of such vital moment for the present and future welfare 
 of the American people as this of the preservation of equality of 
 opportunity in a market comprising one-fourth of the entire human 
 race. "We must have a. market or we shall have revolution," is 
 Senator Frye's blunt way of stating that the productive capacity of 
 the country has so far outrun its capacity to consume that a foreign 
 outlet for our surplus products is an absolute necessity to the peace- 
 ful growth of the republic. This brings us to a consideration of 
 what is, perhaps, the main question: What is the value of China as a 
 market ? The experience of the past affords but a slender test of that 
 value. And yet there has been, of late years, a very considerable 
 expansion of our export trade with China. Between 1887 and 1897 
 there was an increase of 121 per cent in the quantity and of 59^ in 
 the value of our cotton fabrics which that market absorbed. In the 
 same period the imports of American kerosene oil into China 
 increased from 13,613,090 gallons to 48,212,505 gallons. In 1887 the im- 
 ports of plain gray and white cotton piece goods from the United States 
 
150 Annai<s of the American Academy. 
 
 into China represented 14% per cent in quantity and 22^ per cent in 
 value of the whole importation of the year; in 1897 the proportion 
 had advanced to 29^ per cent in quantity and 33 per cent in value. 
 That this trade is a steadily increasing one is shown by the reports of 
 the Bureau of Statistics for the first eight months of the current fiscal 
 year, from which it appears that while the export to China for the 
 corresponding period of 1897 was 85,351,867 yards of cotton cloth 
 valued at 14,828,852, it was, from the first of July to the twenty-eighth 
 of February last, 135,604,310 yards, valued at $6,080,355— an increase 
 in two years of 59 per cent in quantity and 27 per cent in value. 
 These figures ought to be a sufficient answer to Mr. Ford's question: 
 ' ' How can cotton goods of the United States make other than a 
 limited market in Asia against the cottons of India, Japan and China ?" 
 As a matter of fact, in cotton drills and sheetings the market of 
 North China is already ours, to have and to hold, without any 
 effective competition whatever. 
 
 But it is the testimony of every one who has studied the question on 
 the spot that only the surface of this market has been scratched. Mr. 
 Ford quotes a statement of the members of the Blackburn Mission as 
 to the poverty of the Chinese, but he does not quote their general con- 
 clusion : "China's trade possibilities are immeasurable. The sparing 
 use and non-presence of foreign commodities are warrant enough of 
 future expansion, if a policy could be adopted which shall open up 
 the entire country to the advantages of unrestricted commercial inter- 
 course." Mr. Ford says that instead of wanting cottons, China will 
 utilize her own resources, but forgets the shrewd comment of the men 
 from Blackburn : " The establishment of permanent industries need 
 not cause us too much alarm. They must be understood as meaning 
 a source of regular income by which the purchasing power of the 
 people is increased, and as powerful factors in that developement by 
 which in the long run we shall most assuredly profit." Mr. Ford 
 quotes Colquhoun to show that the commerce of Hong Kong with 
 Europe exhibits a tendency to decrease, but fails to quote his judg- 
 ment on the whole commercial situation in China : ' ' What the utili-. 
 zation of China would mean can only be realized by a full appreciation 
 of the extraordinary resources of that country judged from various 
 points of view. She has the men to create armies and navies; the 
 materials, especially iron and coal, requisite for the purpose of rail" 
 ways and steam navigation ; all the elements in fact to build up a 
 great living force. One thing alone is wanting — the will, the direct- 
 ing power — which, absent from within, is now being applied from 
 
 without And when it is understood that not merely the soil, 
 
 rich and fertile, but that the mineral resources — the greatest, perhaps, 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 151 
 
 in the world— are as yet practically untouched, the merest surface 
 being scratched; when we consider the extent of China's population; 
 the ability and enterprise, and, above all, the intense vitality of the 
 people, as strong as ever after four millenniums; when we reflect on 
 the general characteristics of the race, is it not clear that the Chinese, 
 under direction, are destined to dominate the whole of Eastern Asia, 
 and maybe to play a leading part in the affairs of the world?" 
 
 To that estimate scores might be added to prove the fallacy of Mr. 
 Ford's idea that China is a "decayed and decaying empire." The 
 phrase might be justly applied to the ruling class of China, though 
 the recent reform movement so abruptly repressed by the Empress 
 Dowager shows that the elements of change are working even in high 
 places. Nor does Mr. Ford correctly apprehend the possibilities of 
 the Chinaman when he speaks of him as hopelessly bigoted and a 
 hater of all progress. All who have studied his character agree with 
 Colquhoun that, though clannish and conservative, the Chinaman is 
 remarkably free from prejudice, religious or political, especially in 
 matters of tangible interest. He has no objection to purchasing the 
 article which he judges to be cheapest and best, wherever it may come 
 from; or, as Bourne remarks, " the Chinaman has everywhere a taste 
 for luxury; he may be trusted to buy luxuries to the full extent of 
 his means. It is this quality which will some day make the foreign 
 trade of China of gigantic dimensions. " 
 
 Here, then, is great empire, awakening from the slumber of centu- 
 ries, and over which the age of steam and electricity has, so far, 
 passed without transforming it, waiting to be equipped with all that 
 constitutes the appliances of modern civilization. It possesses the 
 greatest coal deposits in the world, and yet its transport facilities are 
 so crude that anthracite, which costs thirty-three cents per ton 
 among the hills at the mine at Pingting-chau, costs $17 at the 
 entrance to the plain, after being carried eighty miles on the back 
 of asses— an addition of twenty cents per ton per mile to the original 
 cost. Labor is cheap among these Chinese millions, but the product 
 of labor is dear, because the effectiveness of the man plus the machine 
 has not been developed. Nowhere else in the world is there such a 
 reservoir of untouched wealth as in China, side by side with an indus- 
 trious and docile population ready, under proper direction, to utilize it. 
 The great nations of the world are pressing forward to get their share 
 of the rich returns which will attend the opening up of the resources 
 of China. Here, as elsewhere, there is no longer ' any international 
 politics, in the old sense of the term; the diplomatic questions of the 
 hour relate, simply and solely, to international trade. Mr. Ford asks: 
 " How can American iron and steel enter markets held to be closed by 
 
152 AnnaIvS of the American Academy. 
 
 European countries, each one of which wishes to keep for its own 
 people the construction of the railroads, the building and running of 
 steam vessels and the profits of the custom house I" But suppose that 
 the United States serves a notice on the European countries which would 
 like to divide China between them that it has treaty rights there, any 
 infringement of which would be regarded as much a hostile act as if 
 it were an attack upon its territory ? Do you suppose that with this 
 new and formidable accession to the support of the policy of the open 
 door in China there would be any likelihood of the policy of commer- 
 cial exclusion being pushed to the limit ? 
 
 It is, therefore, somewhat beside the question to inquire what is to 
 happen when each port is under a different head, and competing with 
 one another after the fashion peculiar to five rival governments, 
 because the very essence of the contention is that it rests with the 
 Government of the United States to prevent precisely that eventuality. 
 There are lions in the path, no doubt; there always are in the way of 
 national progress. But if we are to turn aside from the path, plainly 
 marked out for us in the natural line of commercial advance, because 
 of certain traditions of foreign policy, which we are asked to regard as 
 no less sacred than the Constitution of the United States, then we 
 must, perforce, make up our minds to be content with the sphere of 
 national growth for which the purely continental policy was avowedly 
 adopted. At a time when Shanghai is nearer San Francisco than 
 New Orleans used to be to New York, it would seem to be necessary 
 to expand the diplomacy of our grandfathers and frankly to recognize 
 that it is quite as essential to the well-being of the United States of 
 to-day that China should remain an open market, as it was seventy 
 years ago that the colonial system of Europe should not take a new 
 hold on the Republics of Central and South America. 
 
 There is nothing insoluble in what is called the problem of internal 
 taxation in China which so many people find to be an insuperable 
 obstacle to the expansion of international trade. The one valid asset 
 which the Chinese Empire offers to-day to the foreign lender is the 
 income of the imperial martime customs, administered for these 
 many years by an Englishman, Sir Robert Hart, and administered 
 without the slightest taint of " squeeze " or discrimination. The 
 internal transit tax — the likin — has been and is a fruitful source of 
 corruption, but in several provinces its collection has already been 
 transferred to the control of the maritime customs, and the same 
 methods will be applied as hitherto governed the collection of tariff 
 duties. It may be safely asserted that the results will justify, and 
 probably facilitate, the further extension of foreign control over the 
 most important part of the internal tax system of the empire. 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 153 
 
 If we are to deal with China as the ward of civilization, and not as a 
 carcass over which the vultures of military aggression may struggle, 
 a good many difficulties that now appear insuperable will disappear 
 before the united and vigorous action of the Powers enlisted in the 
 cause of peaceful progress. The main question is, shall the United 
 States be a party to this work of progressive civilization in China, or 
 shall it respond to the call for aid with a helpless non possumus, 
 because the fathers were wise enough to construct a formula admir- 
 ably suited to their time, which their sons are not courageous enough 
 to adapt to the larger demands of a different age ? 
 
Dr. W. P. Wii^on, Director of the Commercial Museum, 
 Philadelphia. 
 
 I am going to confine my remarks to just two points, and will be 
 brief, as I can say, with Mr. Foord, that most of the arguments have 
 been presented on both. 
 
 The first point is this: I am going to quote a sentence from Mr. 
 Hill's paper which I believe to be the keynote of the securing of all 
 foreign trade: " Expansion of export trade depends upon individual 
 exertion. ' ' 
 
 Just to give you one or two points on that We know very well the 
 extensive and aggressive line of cotton manufacture that has taken 
 place in England, and, as our manufacturing interests have grown up, 
 it would not naturally be supposed that we would have a great cotton 
 export trade, especially in England or the Continent, so closely situ- 
 ated to the greatest cotton manufacturing country in the world. 
 
 In Philadelphia there exists a. progressive cotton manufacturing 
 plant, which in one particular line has secured an extremely large 
 trade in both London and Paris. 
 
 There has been a great deal said, in the papers at least, and in dis- 
 cussions that have taken place recently in New York and elsewhere, 
 toward stirring up this question of the Oriental trade, with reference 
 to Japan and China, and the danger, as these two countries become 
 more civilized and more active in manufactures, of fulfilling their own 
 needs in their own manufactures. I want to give you just one point 
 with reference to that; I want to say that I feel there is not the 
 slightest danger of that and that the trade we shall secure in the 
 Orient depends upon individual effort. 
 
 In 1889 we exported to England nearly thirty-two million dollars' 
 (|32,ooo,ooo) worth of manufactured goods. In 1898 we exported to 
 England seventy-four millions ($74,000,000) of manufactured goods. 
 Now in all this time England had become more and more active in 
 her own lines of manufacture, and we, as a growing manufacturing 
 nation had more than doubled our export of manufactured goods into 
 England. 
 
 The same with Germany. She has come to an immense period of 
 activity in manufacturing, overtopping England in many markets of 
 the world; taking away from England, in many lines of manufacture, 
 her prestige; and within the last year and a half being the cause of a 
 meeting called by Mr. Chamberlain to examine into the whole ques- 
 tion of why British trade was declining, and why Germany, the United 
 States and other countries were taking her place to a certain extent. 
 
 (154) 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 155 
 
 To Germany in 1878 we exported sixteen and one-half million 
 ($16,500,000) dollars' -worth of manufactured goods and products. In 
 1898 we had doubled that. We sent over to her thirty-two millions 
 seven hundred thousand dollars' ($32,700,000) worth of manufac- 
 tured goods right in the face of her activity. I say that was due 
 almost absolutely to individual effort and individual study of the 
 market of Germany, and the needs there. They manufacture what 
 they need. We manufacture it a little better, a little finer, put little 
 touches here and there which take the market. And that is what we 
 shall have to do all over the world. 
 
 It has been the same with France. In 1889 we sent over a little 
 over five million dollars' worth of manufactured goods and in 1898 
 nearly twenty-four millions right in the face of her activities. One item 
 we sent into Paris was Turkish towels, manufactured in Philadelphia. 
 Why ? Because we manufactured a finer grade than they manufac- 
 ture in any of the mills of England. 
 
 To Belgium in 1889 we sent nearly three millions' worth. In 1898 
 we sent over nine millions (9,000,000). See the progress. 
 
 I simply bring out these points to show that the markets of the 
 Orient are ours if we will study them, and if individual effort is made 
 to capture them. They are not ours unless we go to them. I had 
 prepared a little more in that line, but I am going to let that go. 
 
 One word on the Philippines, and the work of those islands. In 
 the first place I believe these new territorial provinces, that, I do not 
 want to say we are acquiring, but which are under our care at the 
 present time, are doing a great deal of missionary work for us. 
 
 We are all perfectly well aware of the fact that we are not, as for- 
 merly, carrying our own goods abroad. I think we all feel a little 
 ashamed of that. Forty years ago 90 per cent of our manufactures 
 were going abroad in our own bottoms. At the present moment only 
 20 per cent is carried by our own ships. I wonder if any one has 
 stopped to think of the cause of this, or of the revenue paid to Eng- 
 land and Germany for carrying our goods. 
 
 Last year three hundred million dollars were paid to foreign ship- 
 ping interests to carry our exports to Europe and elsewhere. That is 
 nine millions more than the manufactures which we sent over to 
 Europe amounted to. 
 
 We sent abroad, all told, last year twelve hundred and forty-eight 
 million dollars' worth of manufactured and raw products, and out of 
 that we sent over to Europe, about, I believe, two hundred and ninety- 
 one millions, but the cost of our shipping from this country, which was 
 outside of our own shipping, was over three hundred millions. 
 
 Now the point I want to make there is this: We have broadened 
 
156 Annals op the American Academy. 
 
 out wonderfully since we have possessed a little interest in Porto 
 Rico, Cuba and the Philippines. We are actually sending our own 
 transports and ships to the Philippines, and carrying the mail, and are 
 about carrying our goods to the near West India Islands. It is to be 
 hoped that we will develop a habit of doing that, of studying the neces- 
 sities of the trade with different parts of the world, and of building 
 our own ships and doing our own shipping. It is to be hoped we shall 
 remove the obstructive laws that have taken all our shipping off 
 the seas. I think the acquiring of the Philippine Islands and other 
 provinces will be a missionary work in the study of the question. 
 
 Again, did you ever think of the cost to us — what we pay for not 
 having foreign banks in the countries where we do business ? London 
 is the centre of a banking system which has branches in every quarter 
 of the globe, and Great Britain pays tribute to nobody. We pay 
 tribute in doing business with England of about one-half of 1 per cent, 
 and we paid out a great many million dollars last year for the privi- 
 lege of doing our banking business through London. I am in hopes 
 that this acquisition of territory will be a missionary effort in this 
 direction. We will have our own banks in Porto Rico, Cuba and pos- 
 sibly in the Philippines, and this experience may give us a leaning in 
 that direction, for as soon as we begin to study the question practi- 
 cally we will see how much money we are losing. 
 
 I believe the Philippine Islands will be of great advantage to us as 
 a distributing centre for the Eastern trade. With the eight or nine 
 hundred millions of inhabitants that border around the Orient, and the 
 seven hundred and seventy-five millions of export material that goes 
 in there, we furnish only forty millions. It looks as if we were now 
 about to have our opportunity, and if we put individual interest into 
 it, there is no reason why we should not, at least, take our share of it 
 from Great Britain, Germany and Belgium, and have three or four 
 hundred millions instead of forty. 
 
 I believe that the Philippine Islands will take us over and lead us to 
 do that. 
 
 The Philippine Islands themselves I believe to be immensely 
 valuable. There is no richer spot on the face of the globe, covering, 
 as it does, an area equal to New England, New York and Pennsylvania. 
 It is wholly tropical; everything can be cultivated there that can be 
 cultivated in any tropical country. The main products of the islands 
 can be increased a hundredfold with the use of the arts and appliances 
 of civilization. It would be amusing if I should give you some of 
 the methods in which sugar is raised and manufactured in the Philip- 
 pines, and I doubt whether, if the sugar was not entirely changed in 
 the process of refining, you would want to eat any of it. 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 157 
 
 Fifteen or twenty years ago the Philippine Islands raised a great 
 many million dollars' worth of coffee. To-day, or last year, only 
 twenty-four thousand dollars' worth of coffee got outside of the Philip- 
 pines. That is one of the most promising crops that might be raised 
 in those islands. It would be just as valuable as the coffee of Java 
 had the islands been peopled with an intelligent people capable of 
 coping with the disasters which in every country come to crops. The 
 coffee crop of the Philippines was entirely ruined by an insect, and it 
 has been practically given up. The only crop encouraged by the 
 Spaniards was tobacco, out of which they made a great revenue. 
 Cotton-growing would also be extremely profitable. Manila hemp is 
 perhaps .the leading crop at the present moment from which we 
 receive four or five million dollars a year, and which, if properly culti- 
 vated and properly studied, and the quality improved, could be made 
 tenfold more valuable than now. 
 
 I want to state that I believe that the foothold we have obtained in 
 the Orient will lead us to study the whole question. We will intro- 
 duce civilized methods into those islands which will bring out the 
 value — put our own sugar machinery in for that which is one hundred 
 and fifty years old, antiquated and useless, introduce our own economic 
 plans and ideas, and in that way increase the output and quality, and 
 in time make one of the most valuable spots on the face of the globe 
 of the Philippine Islands. At the same time being in the Orient, study- 
 ing the whole question of foreign trade there, which is an individual 
 study, based on individual effort, we will be able to take from other 
 nations, not so active, perhaps, part of their trade, and as China and 
 Japan grow in civilization, and need ten, or a hundred or a thousand 
 fold of the civilized products they now need, we shall be on the ground 
 ready and able to supply those needs. 
 
Professor E. R. Johnson, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
 The purpose of this session of the American Academy is to discuss 
 our commercial prospects in the East and the factors affecting them. 
 The Hawaiian and Philippine Islands are factors that will influence 
 our Pacific trade, but they are only two of many forces and a consid- 
 eration of their influence is incidental rather than fundamental to the 
 discussion in hand. These two groups of newly-acquired island posses- 
 sions are attracting so much attention at the present time that we are 
 in danger of making the double mistake of overestimating the com- 
 mercial importance of the islands and of neglecting to study other 
 and possibly more important factors that are to affect our Pacific 
 trade. 
 
 In criticism of Mr. Ford'spaperl wouldsay that I sympathize with the 
 general spirit and method of his study. There are so many loose and 
 exaggerated statements current regarding the prospective expansion 
 of our Pacific trade and the quickening influences that our new pos- 
 sessions are to exert that we need to have our assertions subjected to 
 critical analysis, and Mr. Ford is a master of that art. However the 
 man who loves analysis strongly may neglect synthesis; and I think 
 Mr. Ford's study does not construct so many castles of hope as the 
 facts warrant us in building. I shall endeavor to illustrate this by 
 criticising one point in the paper. 
 
 From his survey of the industrial and commercial conditions, present 
 and probable, of China, Mr. Ford concludes that China will increase 
 her exports largely, but that she will not have occasion to import 
 much, and of what she does import we shall have but a small share. 
 Ashe says "Of the imports into China, cotton goods hold the first 
 place, opium the second, rice the third and metal manufactures and 
 mineral oils are of equal importance, as fourth and fifth on the list. 
 In no one item of this enumeration has the United States a natural 
 monopoly; and in only one ( petroleum) has it a partial monopoly, 
 fast being impaired; and in two (rice and petroleum) it has and can 
 have no share.'' These statements are true, and they seem to predict 
 a sorry place for us in Chinese markets, but possibly they do not 
 present the whole of the case. I think there is probably a stronger 
 prospect than this picture indicates that American manufacturers 
 will be able for some time to come to sell cottons and metal wares 
 in China in competition with rival producers; of that however I will 
 not speak; but will consider the probability of our being able to find 
 larger markets for our food products in China. Is there reason to 
 
 (158) 
 
Commercial Relations with the Far East. 159 
 
 expect that Japan, China and Eastern Asia will furnish a considerable 
 market for American cereals? 
 
 The answer to this question must depend in part upon whether 
 China is or is not going to pass through an industrial revolution. I 
 agree with Mr. Ford that there is every indication that " China will 
 not remain as she is. France, Germany, Italy, England, Russia — 
 these nations have gone to Asia for a purpose. They intend to build 
 railroads, open and develop mines, establish industries, and secure all 
 they can from a careful attention to encouraging competition on 
 Asiatic conditions." 
 
 Mr. Ford also expects that China will manufacture largely and 
 import but small quantities. He says: "In place of wanting 
 cottons, products of iron and steel, or other metals, or rice, China 
 will utilize her own resources. This may be a work of time, but 
 under the stimulus of so many competitors it will not require many 
 years to bring it to pass. Every ton of iron, of copper or of tin 
 wrought into metal ware in China; every pound of wool or of cotton, 
 or of silk made into cloth in the provinces, will reduce the necessity 
 of importing them from other countries." 
 
 As regards one thing all observers of what is going on in the East 
 are agreed; China is going to be controlled by occidental nations, and 
 her natural resources of great value and variety are to be exploited. 
 Concerning the development of textile manufacturing industries in 
 China the future is not quite so certain; but the present indications 
 are, as Mr. Ford suggests, that there are to be many cotton mills es- 
 tablished in China. If the coal and iron and other mineral resources 
 of China are exploited — of course it will be by native labor — 
 and if a considerable portion of the population becomes engaged in 
 manufacturing, certain results are certain to follow; population will 
 increase in numbers, the percentage of the population devoted to the 
 production of foods will decrease, and the necessity for importing 
 food will increase. China is now a large importer of food — rice being 
 third in the list of imports; in the future she will be obliged to import 
 more largely. China is now such a thickly settled country that these 
 industrial changes must place her in the list of nations that depend 
 upon foreign countries for a considerable portion of their food supply. 
 
 Is this imported food going to consist exclusively or mainly of rice ? 
 If so, then we shall not share in China's food imports very largely, at 
 least in the proximate future. So far as I know the Oriental has no 
 antipathy to wheat and other cereals of the temperate zone. He eats 
 rice because it is his natural domestic crop. During the past five 
 years our sales of wheat flour have doubled in Hong Kong, have more 
 than doubled on the continent of Asia and have nearly quadrupled in 
 
160 Annai,s of the American Academy. 
 
 Japan. May not these facts be accepted as a portent of much larger 
 sales in the future when the economic progress of the Orient is once 
 well under way ? The economic and social changes of the people of 
 the East will be accompanied by modifications and greater variety in 
 their wants and their general standards of living. Furthermore, the 
 fact that the industrial and social changes are to come about under 
 European and occidental leadership will tend to enlarge the demand 
 for the food products of the temperate zone. 
 
 I think Mr. Ford underestimates the dynamic qualities "of the indi- 
 vidual Chinaman. He says, in contrasting the Chinese and Japanese: 
 " A mere comparison of commercial details develops the distinction 
 between Japan and China — a living and pushing people, and a decayed 
 and dying empire." And he also says in another connection: "The 
 character of the two peoples is different, and the Japanese have much 
 higher organizing powers." 
 
 The Chinaman and the Chinese Empire have very different charac- 
 teristics. The political institutions of the country are crumbling 
 from the dry rot of ultra-conservatism and official corruption. The 
 government seems practically incapable of change for the better; but 
 not so the individual Chinaman. He travels freely, he is a willing 
 and industrious artisan, and possesses to a considerable degree the power 
 to avail himself of economic opportunities. It is true that the Japan- 
 ese possess higher organizing powers; but in the economic and social 
 changes to transpire in China the Occident is to supply the organizing 
 needs of the Chinese. There are, in my opinion, good reasons for 
 expecting the Chinaman to vary his wants and become an important 
 importer. I have attempted to show one of the ways in which we 
 are likely to participate in supplying his wants. 
 
The Political Relations of the 
 
 United States with the 
 
 Far East. 
 
 Addresses. 
 
 (161) 
 
INTRODUCTORY ADDRESS. 
 
 A REVIEW OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 
 FAR EAST. 
 
 By the Honorable John Bassett Moore, Columbia 
 University. 
 
 From the foundation of our government the energy and 
 enterprise that distinguish the American character have 
 impelled our merchants, in spite of unrivaled opportunities 
 at home, to seek in the markets of the world an extension 
 of their commerce. ' ' Before the war of independence, ' ' 
 said Mr. Jefferson, in a report made by him as secretary of 
 state, "about one-sixth of the wheat and flour exported 
 from the United States, and about one-fourth in value of 
 their dried and pickled fish, and some rice, found their best 
 markets in the Mediterranean; " and among the earliest 
 negotiations undertaken after our independence was estab- 
 lished were those for commercial treaties with the countries 
 bordering on that sea. When, in 1821, the Emperor of 
 Russia issued a ukase by which it was proposed to inhibit 
 the right of navigation and of fishing along a vast extent 
 of coast bordering on the Pacific Ocean, John Quincy 
 Adams, as secretary of state, replied: "The United States 
 can admit no part of these claims. Their right of navigation 
 and of fishing is perfect, and has been in constant exercise 
 from the earliest times, after the peace of 1783." And 
 when, in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine was announced, one of 
 its declared objects was to prevent the extension in any part 
 of the American continents of the colonial system under 
 which foreign commerce was restricted and excluded. Such 
 was the policy of the United States. It sought in the com- 
 merce of the world an equality of opportunity. Its object, 
 as tersely expressed in the recent negotiations at Paris with 
 
 (163) 
 
1 64 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 reference to the Philippines, was ' ' to maintain an open door 
 to the world's commerce." 
 
 But while our commerce with Europe and Africa, and 
 along the shores of America, north and south, was fostered 
 and protected, our intercourse with the East was not 
 neglected. In the early part of this century, after the revolt 
 of the Spanish colonies in America against the rule of 
 Spain, a trade was carried on by American merchants 
 between those countries and Asia, in addition to that which 
 was conducted directly between the United States and the 
 East. "With its growth, our trade with Oriental countries 
 attracted more and more the attention and solicitude of our 
 government. In 1832 Edmund Roberts, a sea captain of 
 Portsmouth, N. H., was chosen by President Jackson as an 
 ' ' agent for the purpose of examining in the Indian Ocean 
 the means of extending the commerce of the United States 
 by commercial arrangements with the powers whose domin- 
 ions border on those seas; ' ' and he was empowered to nego- 
 tiate for*the extension of the commerce of the United States 
 in the Pacific. In March, 1833, he concluded a treaty of 
 amity and commerce with Siam. 
 
 Roberts was followed by other agents of our government, 
 who were sent on similar missions. Expeditions were dis- 
 patched for purposes of exploration and negotiation. A 
 determined effort was made to break down the seclusion of 
 the East, and a show of force was not deemed an inappro- 
 priate mode of disclosing the design. 
 
 An important step forward was taken when, on March 3, 
 1843, an act was approved by which Congress placed forty 
 thousand dollars " at the disposal of the President . . . 
 to enable him to establish the future commercial relations 
 between the United States and the Chinese Empire on terms 
 of national equal reciprocity." In the following May 
 Caleb Cushing, one of the ablest and most accomplished 
 diplomatists whom our country has produced, was appointed 
 envoy extraordinary, minister plenipotentiary and commis- 
 
Political Relations with thb Par East. 165 
 
 sioner to China, for the purpose of carrying this act into 
 effect. On July 3, 1844, he concluded with that empire a 
 general convention of peace, amity and commerce, by which 
 the intercourse between the two countries was regulated and 
 placed on a certain foundation. 
 
 By this treaty it was stipulated that citizens of the United 
 States, resorting to China for the purposes of commerce, 
 should pay the duties of import and export prescribed in a 
 tariff thereto annexed, and that they should in no case be 
 subject to other or higher duties than should be required of 
 the people of any other nation. Five ports were opened, 
 not only to the trade, but also to the residence of American 
 citizens. Provision was made for the appointment of 
 consuls. 
 
 In 1858 other treaties were concluded, the negotiator on 
 the part of the United States being William B. Reed, a 
 citizen of Philadelphia. 
 
 In June, 1861, Anson Burlingame, whose name is also 
 memorably associated with the history of our relations with 
 China, was sent as envoy extraordinary and minister 
 plenipotentiary to that country. The ancient empire was 
 then passing through a period of civil commotions which 
 seemed to threaten its permanence. In these critical times 
 Burlingame played a prominent and benevolent part. In a 
 dispatch written to Mr. Seward in June, 1863, he said: "In 
 my dispatch No. 18, of June 2, 1862, I had the honor to 
 write, if the treaty powers could agree among themselves on 
 the neutrality of China, and together secure order in the 
 treaty ports, and give their moral support to that party in 
 China in favor of order, the interests of humanity would be 
 subserved. Upon my arrival at Peking I at once elaborated 
 my views, and found, upon comparing them with those held 
 by the representatives of England and Russia, that they 
 were in accord with theirs." In June, 1864, Burlingame, 
 acting in the spirit of his dispatch to Mr. Seward, gave 
 instructions to the consul-general of the United States at 
 
1 66 Annai<s op the American Academy. 
 
 Shanghai as to the "extent of the rights and duties of 
 American citizens under the treaty. ' ' These instructions he 
 submitted to the British, French and Russian ministers, who 
 authorized him to state that they met with their approval, 
 both as to general views and as to policy. The policy of the 
 instructions, as expressed by Burlingame himself, was " an 
 effort to substitute fair diplomatic action in China for force." 
 Of this policy Mr. Seward declared: "It is approved with 
 much commendation." 
 
 In 1868 Burlingame, who had then resigned from the 
 service of the United States, came to this country, in associa- 
 tion with two Chinese officials of high rank, as the repre- 
 sentative of the government to which he had lately been 
 accredited. Though it is not usual for governments to 
 receive as diplomatic agents their own citizens, he was cor- 
 dially welcomed; and on July 28, 1868, he concluded the 
 well-known treaty which has always borne his name. 
 
 Since the days of Burlingame, new questions between the 
 two countries have from time to time arisen, as the result of 
 conditions the full development and varying aspects of which 
 could not be foreseen. But, in respect of China, as well as 
 of other countries in the East, it may be said that the 
 Government of the United States has adhered to the policy 
 of endeavoring by "fair diplomatic action" to adjust all 
 differences in conformity with international rights and 
 interests. 
 
 But, in the consideration of the situation in the East, it is 
 impossible to concentrate our vision exclusively upon the 
 relations of the United States with the particular govern- 
 ments with which we have contracted treaties in that quarter 
 of the globe. There has existed in respect of the Orient a 
 concert of powers in which, as has been intimated, we have 
 borne an important part, when its object was to maintain the 
 independence and "neutrality" of governments, and by 
 that means to assure equal rights to all the powers concerned. 
 For the disappearance of that concert, if it should disappear, 
 
Political Relations with the Far East. 167 
 
 it is obvious that the United States would not be responsible; 
 but its disappearance would throw upon our government the 
 necessity of considering the means by which the extensive 
 interests that have grown up between our country and the 
 East may be protected, preserved and extended. Our 
 relation to this subject has been rendered more immediate 
 than ever before by events growing out of the war with Spain 
 — events so recent as to require no recapitulation or ex- 
 planation. 
 
 We have with us this evening a distinguished diplomatic 
 representative, who, though a native of the East, may, by 
 reason of his experience, his studies, and his attainments be 
 said to be at home also in the West. It was my pleasure 
 not long ago to hold relations with him in his official charac- 
 ter as Minister of China; and it is proper for me to confess 
 that his excellent knowledge of English, while it greatly 
 facilitated our intercourse, rendered me incapable of showing 
 all the reciprocal courtesies which I should have been glad 
 to bestow. An accomplished student of the laws and 
 customs of nations, he is peculiarly well qualified to speak 
 upon the subject on which he is to address us. 
 
CHINA'S RELATION WITH THE WEST. 
 
 Address of the Chinese Minister, His Excellency Wu TiNG- 
 
 Eang. 
 
 We have all read about the dispute between two ancient 
 knights over a shield, one claiming it to be gold and the 
 other claiming it to be silver. The story is an old one, but 
 the lesson it teaches is worth remembering. It is the failure 
 to look at the other side of the shield that has given rise to 
 all the misunderstanding in the intercourse between the 
 East and the West. The different nations in the West 
 have, within the present century, advanced so much in 
 science, knowledge and wealth that it has become the 
 fashion to speak of them as the most civilized nations on the 
 face of the earth and to consider the nations in the East as 
 much below them in civilization — in fact, as barbarous or 
 semi-civilized. It has been too much the habit to ignore 
 the good points the Eastern nations possess, and to leave 
 out of account what they have done. This is hardly just. 
 The East also has a civilization of its own. Of that civili- 
 zation, China is the chief exponent. Among its achieve- 
 ments may be mentioned the invention of the mariners' 
 compass, gunpowder and printing. It is not a civilization 
 of mushroom growth. There is not a nation standing 
 to-day that can trace its history as far back as China. She 
 has witnessed the rise and fall of the ancient Egyptian 
 Dynasties; the expansion of the Persian Empire; the con- 
 quests of Alexander; the irresistible advance of the Roman 
 legion; the deluge of Teutonic hordes from the North; the 
 dissolution of the Empire of Charlemagne; and the birth of 
 all the modern nations of Europe. During the forty cen- 
 turies of her existence there have gradually grown up insti- 
 tutions and laws adapted to the needs and character of 
 the people; a literature as extensive and varied as that of 
 ancient and modern Europe; a system of morality that can 
 
 (168) . 
 
Political Relations with thu Far East. 169 
 
 challenge comparison with any other the world has ever 
 produced; and those useful arts that have never ceased to 
 excite the wonder and admiration of the world. You may- 
 ask why Egypt, Persia, Greece, and even mighty Rome 
 have successively succumbed to the ravages of time, while 
 China alone has survived. The answer is not far to seek. 
 It is the survival of the fittest. The working of this inexor- 
 able law of nature constantly weeds out those nations that 
 cannot adapt themselves to the ever-changing conditions of 
 life, and the fact that China is standing to-day shows con- 
 clusively that she has not outlived her usefulness to the cause 
 of civilization. 
 
 Thus Chinese civilization has been weighed in the bal- 
 ance of time and not found wanting. But the conditions 
 that have fostered that civilization have in recent years been 
 greatly modified by steam and electricity. With the Hima- 
 layas on the west, vast deserts on the north, and large 
 bodies of water on the east and south, China was a country 
 extremely difficult to approach from all sides in days not 
 very long ago. There she was left for centuries to work out 
 her destiny practically free from outside influence and 
 foreign molestation. But the steamboat and telegraph have 
 changed the whole situation of things, and rendered it im- 
 possible for her to lead such a national life as she could be- 
 fore. It has taken her some time to awake to this fact. On 
 this account, she has been called an unprogressive nation. 
 This sentiment is voiced by Tennyson when he says,- 
 " Better fifty years of Europe than a cycle of Cathay." 
 
 But it is a mistake to think that China has been station- 
 ary. Compare China of the present day with China of fifty 
 years ago, and the progress she has made will be at once 
 apparent. There is a well-known law in physics that when 
 a body is at rest or in motion, it will remain at rest or con- 
 tinue to move in a straight line unless acted upon by some 
 outside force. This law holds good in the political as well 
 as in the physical world. It is unreasonable to expect 
 
170 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 China to break away from the long-established sway of cus- 
 tom in a moment. The inertia of centuries must be first over- 
 come. The meeting of the Chinese and Western civilizations 
 is a meeting of two social forces. We must look for the result 
 not in the complete neutralization of one force by the other, 
 but in the union of the two forces. It is the recovery from 
 the shock of the collision that requires time. After the 
 union of the forces is effected, movement in the resultant 
 direction may be expected to be rapid. 
 
 Mechanics also teaches us that if the same force acts for 
 the same period of time upon bodies of different masses, the 
 velocity generated is inversely proportional to their masses. 
 According to this law, when two balls, one weighing twice 
 as much as the other, are thrown from the hand, the heavier 
 one will go only half as far as the other. Now the popula- 
 tion of the United States is estimated at 76,000,000, and the 
 population of China is estimated at from 350,000,000 to 
 400,000,000, or about five times as large. We should ex- 
 pect, therefore, that a social or political movement, which 
 would stir up the whole people of the United States, would, 
 other conditions being equal, produce only one-fifth as much 
 effect upon the people of China. But in order to obtain the 
 same effect in China as in the United States, the force must 
 be five times as great; or, if the force be the same, the time 
 it is allowed to act must be five times as long. Thus for the 
 apparently slow progress of the Chinese nation, we have a 
 scientific explanation. 
 
 Though China may not have made very rapid progress 
 from a Western point of view in times past, there are signs 
 everywhere at the present day indicative of a general awak- 
 ening among the people. We have already established a 
 system of telegraphs which is now in operation in every 
 province of China, and a message can be sent from one thou- 
 sand miles in the interior to the furthest seaport in a few 
 hours. With regard to the railroad, it was introduced in 
 the north of China fourteen years ago, and I had the honor 
 
Pouticai, Relations with the Far East. 171 
 
 of being one of the promoters and directors that organized 
 the first company. Since then it has been extended in dif- 
 ferent directions. A journey from Tientsin to Peking, 
 which by boat would have taken three or four days a few 
 years ago, can be accomplished now in a few hours. The 
 grand trunk line from north to south is now being rapidly 
 pushed forward, and in the near future a traveler from the 
 extreme south of China will be able to go up by the ' ' iron 
 horse" to Peking in forty -eight hours. Such is also the case 
 with water communication. We have steamers plying along 
 the coast of China, and steamboats of light draught are seen 
 on most of the navigable rivers. 
 
 It will be tedious to enumerate all the improvements 
 that have been introduced within the last twenty or thirty 
 years, but from what I have above indicated it is sufficient 
 to show that China has not been napping. I do not say 
 that all necessary reforms have been made, and I frankly 
 admit that something more will have to be done. Our 
 government and people are aware of this, and they are tak- 
 ing steps in that direction. But it should be remembered that 
 it is not necessary to import by wholesale the Western civil- 
 ization into China. What is suited to one country may hot 
 be suited to another. Wise statesmen do not rush forward 
 to introduce new measures without serious considera- 
 tion lest their introduction may cause disruption and 
 harm not counterpoised by the good produced. 
 
 You have so many conflicting stories about China and the 
 Chinese nowadays, that I must admit it is a difficult matter 
 for anybody to distinguish what is true from what is false. 
 Every globe-trotter, upon his returning home, generally has 
 something to say about China, and is ever ready to give his 
 impressions of the country and its people. A rocky hill may 
 have the appearance of a sand dune on the outside. A 
 passing observer is apt to mistake the one for the other. In 
 order to find out the true character of the elevation, we 
 must go below the surface. The same may be said of 
 
172 Annaw oe the American Academy. 
 
 China. The words of the globe-trotter must be taken cum 
 grano salts with reference to all things Chinese. 
 
 The most important questions with which the Chi- 
 nese Government has to deal arise from the spirit 
 of commercialism and the spirit of proselytism. In 
 all the treaties which China has concluded with Western 
 Powers, there is an article generally known as the 
 "Toleration Clause." This article provides in effect 
 that Christianity inculcates the practice of virtue, 
 and that those professing or teaching it should not be 
 harassed or persecuted. This apparently innocent provision 
 has not, however, helped to further the cause of Christianity 
 in China. It must be borne in mind that this official recog- 
 nition of Christianity was first obtained from her after a dis- 
 astrous war. The clause was no doubt inserted with the 
 best of intentions. But it had the apparent effect of exciting 
 in the native mind the unfounded suspicion that a deep- 
 laid political object was intended under the cover of religion. 
 The provision itself was hardly necessary as the subjects of 
 every Treaty Power are all protected under the general pro- 
 visions which apply equally to missionaries. Unfortunately 
 most of the troubles occurring in China have arisen from 
 riots against missionaries. Hence it has been said by some 
 foreigners in China that, without missionaries, China would 
 have no foreign complications. I am not in a position to 
 affirm or deny this. 
 
 But let us put the shoe on the other foot, and suppose 
 that Confucian missionaries were sent by the Chinese to 
 foreign lands with the avowed purpose of gaining proselytes, 
 and that these missionaries established themselves in New 
 York, Philadelphia, San Francisco and other cities, and that 
 they built temples, held public meetings, and opened schools. 
 It would not be strange if they should gather around them a 
 crowd of men, women and children of all classes and conditions. 
 If they were to begin their work by making vehement attacks 
 on the doctrines of Christianity, denouncing the cherished 
 
Political Relations with thb Far East. 173 
 
 institutions of the country, or going out of their way to 
 ridicule the fashions of the day, and perhaps giving a learned 
 discourse on the evil effects of corsets upon the general 
 health of American women, it is most likely that they would 
 be pelted with stones, dirt and rotten eggs for their pains. 
 
 What would be the consequence if, instead of taking 
 hostile demonstrations of this character philosophically, 
 they should lose their temper, call in the aid of the police, 
 and report the case to the government at Washington for 
 official interference ? I verily believe that such action would 
 render the missionaries so obnoxious to the American people 
 as to put an end to their usefulness, and that the American 
 government would cause a law to be enacted against them 
 as public nuisances. Can it be wondered at then that now 
 and then we hear of riots occurring against missionaries in 
 China, notwithstanding the precautionary measures taken 
 by the local authorities to protect them ? It must not be 
 understood that I wish to justify or extenuate the lawless 
 acts committed by ignorant mobs, nor do I underestimate the 
 noble and unselfish efforts of Christian missionaries in gen- 
 eral who spend the best part of their lives in China. What 
 I desire to point out is that the preaching of the Gospel of 
 Christ in the interior of China (except with great tact and 
 discretion) will, in the nature of things, now and then run 
 counter to popular prejudice and lead to some disturbance. 
 
 The spirit of commercialism has lately risen to a dangerous 
 pitch. As a market for the world's goods, China indisputably 
 holds the first place, for the wants of 350, 000, 000 to 400,000,- 
 000 people have to be supplied in some way. It has been said 
 that, as a market, one province of China is worth more than 
 the whole continent of Africa. It has always been the 
 policy of China to treat all foreign nations alike. They are 
 all most favored nations in a literal sense. The maintenance 
 of an "Open Door" is exactly in the line of her policy. 
 But unhappuy human nature is never contented. When a 
 man gets an inch, he wants an ell. It is now the turn of 
 
174 Annai,s of the American Academy. 
 
 missionaries to tell us that if there were no foreign adven- 
 turers in China there would be no foreign complications. 
 Twenty-five centuries ago, our Sage Confucius, the greatest 
 philosopher that ever flourished in China, said, " Wealth 
 gotten by improper ways will take its departure by the 
 same." This is equivalent to your proverb, "Goods ill- 
 gotten go ill-spent." Nations as well as individuals should 
 not forget this, as the maxim of Confucius as well as 
 your proverb will always come true if any nation or 
 individual should unjustly obtain possession of any property. 
 Some people call themselves highly civilized, and stigmatize 
 others as uncivilized. What is civilization ? Does it mean 
 solely the possession of superior force and ample supply of 
 offensive and defensive weapons ? I take it to mean some- 
 thing more. I understand that a civilized nation should 
 respect the rights of another nation, just the same as in 
 society a man is bound to respect the rights of his neighbor. 
 Civilization, as I understand it, does not teach people to 
 ignore the rights of others, nor does it approve the seizure 
 of another's property against his will. It would be a sorry 
 spectacle if such a glaring breach of the fundamental rights 
 of man could be committed with impunity at the end of this 
 nineteenth century. What would the future historian say 
 when he should come to write about the events of this cen- 
 tury ? Is it not time that we should at least recognize the 
 principle of righteousness, justice and fair play ? 
 
 Mencius, a great philosopher of China, twenty-three 
 centuries ago said: "I like life, and I also like righteous- 
 ness; but if I cannot keep the two together, I will let life 
 go and choose righteousness. ' ' Now, if people professing 
 Christianity and priding themselves on being highly civil- 
 ized, should still so far misconduct themselves as to disregard 
 the rights of the weak and inexcusably take what does 
 not belong to them, then it would be better not to become 
 so civilized. It would be better to live amongst the people 
 who practice the tenets of Confucius and Mencius than 
 
Political Relations with the Far East. 175 
 
 amongst a people who profess to believe in the highest 
 standard of morality but do not practice what they believe. 
 The aphorism of Tennyson should then be changed so as to 
 read: " Better fifty years in Cathay than a cycle in Europe." 
 But I do not believe such practice of ignoring other 
 people's rights is generally resorted to, and I am persuaded 
 there are many people who denounce it. China welcomes 
 to her shores the people of all nations. Her ports are open 
 to all, and she treats all alike without distinction of race, 
 color, nationality, or creed. Her people trade with all 
 foreigners. In return, she wishes only to be treated in the 
 same way. She wants peace, — to be let alone, and not to be 
 molested with unreasonable demands. Is this unfair ? She 
 asks you to treat her in the same wa3 r as you would like to 
 be treated. Surely this reasonable request cannot be refused. 
 We are about to enter into the twentieth century, and are 
 we to go back to the Middle Ages and witness again the 
 scenes enacted in that period ? I cannot bring myself to 
 think that the world is deteriorating. I believe that 
 in every country there are men and women of noble 
 character — and I know in this country there are many 
 such — whose principle is to be fair and just to all, 
 especially to the weak, and that they would not themselves; 
 nor allow their respective governments to commit acts of 
 oppression and tyranny. It is such men and women that 
 shed lustre on their respective countries. It is due to the 
 noble and unselfish efforts of such good people that the 
 scheme of a tribunal for the settlement of international dis- 
 putes has been brought prominently before the world. May 
 their grand scheme be soon carried into effect ! The good 
 such an institution will produce to the world will be mani- 
 fold. All international disputes will then be settled in an 
 amicable way without resort to arms and without bloodshed. 
 There will be practically no more war. The blessings of 
 peace will be permanent. Commerce and trade will be 
 more steady and prosperous, and merchants will have more 
 
176 Annai^ of the American Academy. 
 
 confidence in each other. All men will follow their respective 
 avocations uninterruptedly. Nations will be brought into 
 closer touch with each other, and their friendly relations 
 will be more cordial. 
 
 These and many other beneficial results will, in my 
 humble opinion, naturally follow from the establishment of 
 an international court of arbitration. It is gratifying to 
 hear that the project of a general disarmament, so nobly 
 proposed by His Majesty the Czar of Russia and so readily 
 seconded by the leading nations of the world, will soon lead 
 to a conference. May it bear good fruit! May it be the 
 precursor of an international court of arbitration! This is 
 my earnest wish, and I am sure it is your wish and the wish 
 of every man and woman who has the peace and well-being 
 of the world at heart. 
 
THE POLITICAL RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
 
 STATES WITH THE EUROPEAN POWERS 
 
 IN THE FAR EAST. 
 
 Iandley Miller Keasbey, Bryn Mawr College. 
 
 His Excellency the Chinese Minister touches our tender 
 points. The missionary, the tourist and the trader must 
 certainly strike the conservative celestial as strange examples 
 of Western civilization, and rather difficult to rate under his 
 "Rules of Propriety." According to Mencius, the way to 
 reach the hearts of the Chinese people is ' ' simply to collect 
 for them what they like and not to lay on them what they 
 dislike." But this is not the way of the West ; we propose 
 to collect for them what we think they should like and lay 
 on them what we like ourselves. A peculiar program per- 
 haps, but in pursuance of such a plan the missionary, the 
 tourist and the trader has each served his turn with some 
 success. 
 
 True, Chinese civilization is very much older than ours, 
 but we must not forget that in our youth we cherished the 
 same childlike ideals. In the words of Jarric, the Jesuit 
 historian: "If Plato were to rise from Hades, he would 
 declare that his imagined Republic was realized in China." 
 But against the advice of Aristotle, the Greeks themselves 
 took to ' ' retail trade ' ' and in the brief course of our subse- 
 quent civilization, capitalism has all but encircled the globe. 
 China is still uncontaminated, to be sure, but missionaries, 
 tourists and traders have already inoculated her inert body — 
 politic with the germs of Western commercialism, and let us 
 hope rejuvenation will result. 
 
 There is a story of Chuang-tze, the Chinese Diogenes. He 
 was fishing one day when two high officials approached him 
 with the request that he undertake the administration of the 
 state. Without turning his head Chuang-tze answered the 
 envoys : " I have heard that in Ch'u there is a sacred tortoise 
 which has been dead now some three thousand years, and 
 that the prince keeps this tortoise carefully enclosed in a 
 chest on the altar of his ancestral temple. Now would this 
 tortoise rather be dead and have its remains venerated, or 
 
 (i77) 
 
178 ANNAtS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 
 
 be alive and wagging its tail in the mud?" "It would 
 rather be alive" replied the envoys, "and wagging its tail 
 in the mud." " Begone," cried the philosopher, "I too 
 will wag my tail in the mud." So China has been dead now 
 some three thousand years and is weary of being venerated 
 for her remains. She wants to wag her tail again, even 
 though it be in the mud of Western civilization. 
 
 But knowing nothing of the incipient tail-waggings of the 
 Chinese tortoise except from the reports of missionaries, 
 tourists and traders, I will leave the discussion of this 
 interesting problem to those who are better versed in the 
 social anatomy of the celestials. We shall meet with others 
 in the far East beside the Asiatics and the question arises : 
 What effect will our present policy of expansion have upon 
 our long-standing attitude toward the European powers ? 
 
 We Americans are coming at the eleventh hour into the 
 vineyard of Eastern politics. The earlier comers are mur- 
 muring somewhat against our sudden intrusion, it is true, 
 but there is really no ground for complaint. We have cer- 
 tainly not been standing idle in the market-place, and if we 
 are late in arriving, it is because we have had work to do_in 
 our own fields and a longer road to travel to the vineyard. 
 And at all events — by analogy at least — we are entitled to 
 the same reward as our European fellows who have borne 
 the burden and heat of the day. We must not allow our 
 equanimity to be in the slightest degree disturbed therefore 
 by any lack in the cordiality of our reception. 
 
 Our own unpreparedness is a matter much more ,to the 
 point. Coming by the unfrequented road from the West, 
 we have had but little opportunity of learning the traditions 
 of the place beforehand, and judged from the standpoint of 
 our own experience the situation seems somewhat distorted. 
 If of the many already called we hope to be of the chosen 
 few, it will be well, therefore, before taking up our own 
 burden to look about us a bit, lest we commit some silly 
 blunder at the start difficult to retrieve. 
 
 Taken in its broader sweep, Western civilization is fur- 
 rowed with the vicissitudes of conquest, but as far as our 
 own experience goes, progress toward the West has been 
 practically along an unimpeded path. This is due to the 
 fact that inter-European competition was reduced to an 
 earlier issue on this side of the globe, leaving independent 
 republics, under the hegemony of the United States, in 
 
Pouticai, Relations with the Far Bast. 179 
 
 practical possession of the field. England has thus far been the 
 only European power in any political position to dispute our 
 exclusive claim to the New World, and under such extended 
 territorial conditions contact might generate some friction, 
 perhaps, but scarcely lead to controversy. The continent 
 thus lay open to economic exploitation directly from the 
 Atlantic, and, save for some trifling opposition on the part 
 of the aborigines, American enterprise has consequently 
 been afforded a fair field to run its full course to the Pacific. 
 To us, therefore, expansion has merely meant a peaceful 
 overland advance. But this is purely fortuitous, and it 
 would not be the part of prudence to prognosticate the future 
 from the precedents of so brief a past. 
 
 If our domestic traditions are then too limited to deter- 
 mine our present course, we may learn, perhaps, from the 
 more extended experience of our foreign competitors. But 
 in shaping our policy upon international analogy we must 
 bear in mind that Europe and the United States are approach- 
 ing the Asiatic problem from opposite points of departure — 
 Europe from the East and the United States from the West 
 — and each is accordingly inspired by a different set of ideals. 
 European conclusions must consequently be applied with 
 some reserve to the American side of the case; but if taken 
 with proper precaution the analogy is sufficiently apposite. 
 
 The European current of commerce and colonization set- 
 ting in toward the Pacific, differs from the corresponding 
 course of Western civilization primarily in this : progress 
 toward the East was originally confronted by compact native 
 populations which caused the main stream to bifurcate, one 
 branch proceeding across the northern plains of Siberia, the 
 other reaching the South Sea by skirting the southern shores 
 of the continent. Expansion across the desolate steppes in 
 the North was unopposed save by unorganized aborigines, 
 but the rich peninsulas and fertile islands of the South served 
 each in turn as successive causes of international contention. 
 European colonization in the East thus serves us with two 
 sets of traditions, one evolved from a peaceful overland 
 advance, the other proceeding from colonial controversy by 
 sea. Russia's present political program is the outcome of 
 the former, British imperialism is the result of the latter. 
 
 Our own progress across the plains and prairies of North 
 America finds its closest European parallel in Russia's cor- 
 responding conquest of Siberia. Before both countries lay 
 
180 Annals op the American Academy. 
 
 an immense extent of untitled territory, and the problem 
 confronting each government has been to connect a far-lying 
 frontier with a distant political base. Having succeeded in 
 establishing our own transcontinental lines we can better 
 estimate the importance of the Siberian railway and appre- 
 ciate Russia's present endeavor to control an ice-free port on 
 the Pacific. Russia's possessions in the far East constitute 
 an integral part of her domain, just as the Pacific slope is 
 included within our own body-politic. Russia's attitude 
 toward China and Korea may, therefore, very properly be 
 compared with our own rather ill-defined relations toward 
 the Spanish- American states. In both cases it is a matter 
 of border diplomacy rather than a question of colonial 
 politics. In marking out a sphere of influence toward the 
 south and in claiming certain exclusive privileges, Russia is 
 accordingly following in our own footsteps and taking the same 
 position in northern Asia that we have long since assumed 
 in America. We should be careful, therefore, not to regard 
 Russia's Eastern policy from the prejudiced standpoint of 
 Europe. Her territorial position on the Pacific is entirely dif- 
 ferent from that of the other maritime powers, and much more 
 closely akin to our own. We have always resented European 
 interference in American affairs and Russia has consistently 
 supported our claims. A sense of justice, — and to a certain 
 extent also a feeling of gratitude, — should therefore, restrain 
 us from joining in the indiscriminate European outcry 
 against Russian aggression in Asia. So long as we believe 
 in the protection of our own borders and jealously encourage 
 reciprocity arrangements with our southern neighbors, we 
 cannot consistently expect Russia to let down the bars and 
 open her Pacific ports to the world. It is enough if she 
 admit her friends, and if we continue to deport ourselves 
 properly, we may doubtless always count upon a warm 
 welcome within her gates. 
 
 Without prejudice to our cause we may, therefore, recog- 
 nize the Russian ideal, and reckon upon at least one 
 legitimate sphere of influence in northern Asia. Having 
 definitely abandoned her earlier American enterprise, there 
 is nothing, however, to attract Russia beyond her Pacific 
 border. Herein we differ from our Slavic contemporary, for 
 our missionaries long since led us to Hawaii and Dewey has 
 recently established us in the Philippines. In thus tran- 
 scending the limits of our continent, the Russian analogy 
 
Political Relations with the Far East. 181 
 
 fails; and among the islands of the South Sea we have 
 recently come into contact with the other current of Euro- 
 pean colonization setting in along the southern littoral of 
 Asia. We are here confronted with much more complex 
 conditions, and it will be correspondingly difficult to dis- 
 cover the European counterpart of our policy. Fortunately 
 for our purpose, however, international contest along this 
 line has already resulted in a partial process of elimination, 
 leaving England, the dominant naval power, in practical 
 control. It is to Great Britain we may, therefore, look for 
 further precedents in our present policy of over-sea expan- 
 sion, as she is the only country which has successfully solved 
 the problem of maritime colonization. 
 
 The influence of sea-power is a lesson we have already 
 learned from English history. Eet us hope, then, in apply- 
 ing our conclusions to the Pacific that we will at last realize 
 the strategic importance of controlling the westerly trade- 
 routes to the Indies, even as England has seen fit to 
 . place herself in possession of the easterly lines. Great 
 Britain also affords us an admirable example of colonial 
 administration, and sets us a civil service standard which we 
 would certainly do well to emulate both at home and abroad. 
 Up to the present, however, England being an industrial 
 and the United States an agricultural country, the commer- 
 cial cases of the two governments have not been at all analo- 
 gous. Desiring to develop our manufacturing interests and 
 subsist at the same time by exporting our raw materials, we 
 have been unable to appreciate the universal advantages of 
 the free-trade policy so ardently advocated by our leading 
 competitor in the industrial field. And even now, when our 
 infant industries are approaching maturity and need no 
 further protection, we are still inclined to believe reciprocity 
 will prove the better trade policy for us to pursue — at least 
 with European and American countries. In Asia, perhaps, 
 where the industrialists of Europe and America are meeting 
 on common ground, the case may be somewhat different, but 
 even here it would be a pity to become dogmatic and blindly 
 follow any commercial creed until we are thoroughly 
 cognizant of the situation. 
 
 Eord Beresford's pet policy of the "open door" will at 
 best appeal to those established in the islands and along the 
 southeastern littoral of the Asiatic mainland, whose primary 
 aim is the economic exploitation of the continent. Germany 
 
1 82 ANNAI.S OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 
 
 and Japan should accordingly be in sympathy with the 
 cause, and if properly persuaded, both powers may probably 
 be induced to lend the doctrine their support. But French 
 politics are proverbially problematic. To hazard a general 
 proposition: extent of territory is usually more in keeping 
 with France's conception of colonial success than the mere 
 amount of revenue to be derived. Her domain being con- 
 tiguous upon southern China, it is, therefore, very doubtful 
 whether she will agree to abandon her present policy of 
 encroachment for the doubtful benefits of the open door. 
 And as for Russia, her case as we have already seen does not 
 come within the category at all. 
 
 Thus upon our arrival in the far East we shall be met by 
 at least two proposals; the sphere of influence and the open 
 door. If importuned to make an immediate choice, we may 
 best avoid the issue with the boy, who, when asked which 
 hand he would have, laconically answered both! What we 
 should object to is the alternative nature of the proposition; 
 this endeavor on the part of the Europeans to draw us into 
 their controversies and commit us to a particular cause. 
 From our present position in the Philippines our immediate 
 interests coincide, it is true, with the policy of the open door. 
 The dismemberment of the Asiatic empire is not in other 
 words to our advantage, and if we are wise we will continue 
 to cultivate friendly relations with the Chinese with a view 
 to encouraging reciprocal trade. We may well afford, there- 
 fore, to keep open house in our East Indian islands and vie 
 with our neighbors in the measure of our hospitality. But 
 our action in this particular case should not be supposed to 
 commit us to the universal principles of free-trade. In 
 Europe and America we must feel free to fall back upon 
 reciprocity arrangements. Our relations with the Russians 
 in northern Asia may likewise have to be regulated with 
 similar formality, and it would be folly to antagonize our 
 Slavic friends merely to inculcate an abstract doctrine, 
 when equally good results are to be obtained by more politic 
 means. 
 
 In short neither the "open door" nor the "sphere of 
 influence " quite covers our commercial case. And yet our 
 proclivities are sufficiently concordant with either policy to 
 allow us to combine the benefits of both. We should 
 recognize that the two doctrines are due to different sets*of 
 traditions and adapt ourselves accordingly to the divergent 
 
Political Relations with the Far East. 183 
 
 principles involved. If the Eastern camp is divided, it 
 merely means that we shall have to treat with both parties. 
 Coming alone from the West we are not diplomatically con- 
 cerned with these time-worn controversies of the East, and 
 we should find it comparatively easy, therefore, to preserve 
 our traditional attitude of independence. We shall only 
 have to insist upon regarding these questions of commercial 
 policy from the relative point of view. If accused of incon- 
 sistency, we can then claim the privileges of an eclectic. To 
 put it bluntly: our present part is to pacify Asiatics and not 
 to contend with Europeans. Until we have adjusted our 
 new burden, therefore, we had best adopt a policy of 
 beneficent neutrality toward our foreign competitors. The 
 Asiatic future is replete with economic opportunities which 
 it were a pity to cloud with diplomatic complexities. I,et 
 us take Washington again as our guide : ' ' The great 
 rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is 
 in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as 
 little political connection as possible. " Or to paraphrase the 
 words of Jefferson, let this be our motto in the far East. 
 Commercial rivalry with all nations, political alliance with 
 none. 
 
THE REAL MENACE OF RUSSIAN AGGRESSION. 
 Frederick Wells Williams, Yale University. 
 
 What we call the Far-Eastern Problem to-day is only an 
 acute phase of the problem of the civilized races of mankind 
 as it has been developed during many centuries. It is the 
 eternal struggle of Turanian and Aryan, of East and West. 
 In its larger meaning it is a contest between the exponents 
 of autocracy and democracy, between absolutist and repre- 
 sentative systems of rule ; the conception of government 
 under ancient tyrannies as opposed to modern individualism. 
 In its especial relation to our own times it is the question as 
 to which of these tenets of sovereignty is to be applied to the 
 reconstruction of the effete empires of Asia, to the eventual 
 control of civilized mankind. If, as Mr. Brooks Adams 
 suggests, the velocity of the social movement of any com- 
 munity is proportionate to its energy and mass, and its 
 centralization is proportionate to its velocity, the settlement 
 of this problem of the ages may be near at hand. The time 
 has already come when every live nation is necessarily con- 
 cerned in its solution. 
 
 The evolution of modern Europe has involved the gradual 
 elimination of small governments. Beginning with the 
 absorption of feudal fiefs and the suppression of private war 
 and brigandage, a process of concentration at natural centres 
 presently developed a number of national groups which con- 
 tinued to incorporate and ingraft their weaker neighbors 
 until only those remained who were allowed their autonomy 
 because of the convenience or the jealousies of the great 
 powers. The movement from a condition of physical 
 dispersion to one of concentration has been going on from 
 the break-up of the Roman Empire to the recent formation 
 of a united Italy and a united Germany, nor is it possible to 
 say that it has yet reached its limit. 
 
 This proceeding has assumed of late an aspect altogether 
 at variance with its former manifestation, since the larger 
 states have sought not only to add to their possessions in 
 Europe but have reached out for colonies to exploit and to 
 supply homes for their surplus populations. The process 
 has in its recent phase been rendered feasible by two material 
 agencies which have risen to predominant importance only 
 
 (184) 
 
Pouticai, Relations with the Far East. 185 
 
 within the century in which we live: these are modern 
 fighting machinery and modern transporting machinery. 
 The size and cost of military and naval armaments to-day 
 place the means alike of attack and defence completely be- 
 yond the resources of smaller states; in precisely the same 
 manner the introduction of artillery at the close of the Mid- 
 dle Ages, made the continuance of private warfare altogether 
 too dangerous and costly a business for individuals and com- 
 pelled the sovereign at once to police and protect his domain. 
 The convenience and economy of this evolution are the best 
 guarantees of its continuance until only those nations shall 
 survive which are best fitted to administer the affairs and 
 preserve the peace of the world. Have we any assurance 
 that we have reached the end of a readjustment that has 
 eliminated the names of Burgundy, of Savoy, and of Poland 
 from the map of Europe, or that such existing survivals as 
 Belgium, or Denmark, or Bulgaria are not destined sooner 
 or later to follow in their train ? The second agency, that 
 of rapid travel and the transmission of information, renders 
 it possible to administer territories which in the old days 
 would have fallen apart from mere size and weight ; also to 
 convey orders and, if necessary, the troops to enforce them, 
 over lands and seas which have heretofore offered insuperable 
 obstacles to even the highest military and administra- 
 tive genius. It is not easy to appreciate in a moment 
 the enormous significance of a change in the conditions of 
 life itself which removes us further from the time of Napo- 
 leon than he was — so far as means of transport and control 
 of territory were concerned — removed from Alexander or 
 Asshurbanipal. They had roads for the movement of armies 
 by land and sailing vessels for their transport by sea; so had 
 he, nor was his equipment for either element much more 
 swift or certain than theirs. But within the past two 
 generations an alteration in the mere mechanics of fighting 
 and of government has carried us into a new world — a world 
 differing effectually not alone in habits and ideals but in the 
 foundations and instruments of its efficiency from those 
 ancient and mediaeval states which history offers as models. 
 These conditions are necessarily as yet so novel as_ to 
 engender some vagueness of interpretation by philosophical 
 speculators, some indefiniteness of purpose on the part of 
 politicians. The main issues of this transition era with its 
 measureless possibilities for the future are nevertheless at 
 
1 86 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 length grasped by the dominant statesmen of Europe. They 
 begin now to understand that, given the control of sufficient 
 resources, it is simply a matter of calculation how far the 
 power of a single government may be extended over the 
 peoples of the earth. Under present terms, moreover, those 
 disabilities have substantially disappeared which formerly 
 rendered the education and amalgamation of alien races 
 brought under a common rule a hard and hazardous matter. 
 Complete isolation and removal from prevailing influences 
 are no longer practicable under normal conditions without 
 artificial compulsion. The interchange of ideas proceeds 
 inevitably and by itself throughout communities whatever 
 their size and number. And as a corollary to this trans- 
 fusion of intellectual life comes the inevitable employment 
 for general purposes of the language in which instruction and 
 information are disseminated. A secondary result, therefore, 
 of prevalent tendencies is the spread of a few languages 
 over the greater part of the world as the legal and literary 
 media of the future, and the relegation of other tongues to 
 the subordinate position of dialects which survive only as 
 the vernacular of restricted districts. 
 
 Under widely varying circumstances and with numerous 
 differences of detail Europe appears at the opening of the 
 twentieth century to be entering upon a phase of its career 
 somewhat similar to that which was marked by the estab- 
 lishment of imperial Rome nearly nineteen centuries ago. 
 The machinery of the new centralization is certain to be more 
 elastic as it will be more complex, the control will be less 
 obvious and direct; but co-ordination of hitherto heterogene- 
 ous elements under some predominant power is apparently 
 as inevitable and necessary now as it was then. In compari- 
 son with the vast extent of the new system the domain of 
 ancient Rome shrinks to almost insignificant dimensions. 
 The command of the habitable globe is for the first time in 
 history possible to that power in whose hands are placed 
 the resources that insure obedience, whose capital is the 
 centre of exchanges. The area of its activities will embrace 
 not Europe and the Mediterranean basin alone but the six 
 continents and their outlying islands ; its mastership must 
 be exercised alike in all countries. 
 
 When we seek for the nation under whose aegis the rote 
 and rule of old Rome may be resuscitated in the near future, 
 only two appear as possible competitors for the great prize, 
 
Powticai, Relations with the Far East. 187 
 
 the Slav and the Anglo-Saxon. These are the only races 
 whose territories, and consequently whose potential strength 
 in population and material resources, are adequate to the 
 stupendous task, whose subjects are colonizers in the true 
 sense that comprises both the peopling of waste spaces and 
 the assimilation and subjection of foreigners to their insti- 
 tutions. These great rivals have been already long at work, 
 each in characteristic fashion, fulfilling what we call, some- 
 what lightly perhaps, their manifest destiny, each a participat- 
 or in the conquest of Asia. The solution of the problem seems 
 to lie in their hands, and behind one or the other must 
 sooner or later be ranged all the political forces of the world. 
 
 Superficially both of these colossal empires appear to 
 denote the spirit of the West and all that this implies in the 
 eternal opposition of Orient and Occident, to which allusion 
 has been made. But the accidents of a capital located in 
 Europe and an ancestry traced to a common Aryan origin 
 must not mislead our conclusions. In temperament and 
 propensity these two nations embody the same antagonism 
 that has in times past ranged the civilized world in two 
 hostile camps. Their pretensions are as diverse as those of 
 Persia and Hellendom twenty-two centuries ago — when, too, 
 Aryan chiefs focused and guided the ambitions of East as 
 well as West to different ends. Russia, though arrayed in 
 the panoply of Christendom and bearing the outward sym- 
 bols of Western culture, is the embodiment and expression 
 of Oriental absolutism, the synonym of obedience to a single 
 will. Great Britain, the present leader of the Anglo-Saxon 
 hosts, is the protagonist of Western conceptions of liberty 
 and self-government. She stands for the freedom of subject 
 as well of sovereign, which, being interpreted in terms 
 made clear by generations of conflict between her own 
 children, means the sovereignty of the subject, of the people. 
 The principles upon which her constitution reposes are the 
 result of centuries of education and evolution in which the 
 races of the East have taken no part. 
 
 The past careers of these two aspirants for world-direction 
 furnish a clue to what may logically be expected from them 
 in the future. In the dawn of Slavonic history we find the 
 ancestors of the Russians to be a wayward group of tribes 
 unable to coalesce in effective federation until conquered and 
 given the initiative by an alien power. What the Tartar 
 Bulgars did for some of these clans in the lower Danube 
 
1 88 Annals of the American Acadbmy. 
 
 valley the Northmen of Scandinavia and the Mongols 
 effected at different times upon other members of the race in 
 Russia. The unity to which the Slavs could never of them- 
 selves attain was forced upon them from without; but they 
 had their revenge in the end by absorbing their conquerors 
 and reducing their organization to its simplest elements. 
 From this the inference may not unreasonably be made that 
 the Slavic type, though enduring, displays little administra- 
 tive ability and yields inevitably to the higher political 
 genius of others. It carries its arms far to-day, but its 
 soldiers and colonists bear no new message to the Asiatics 
 with whom they commingle. They overrun their waste 
 places and change their manners and perhaps their language, 
 but for government only offer a Western autocrat in place 
 of an Oriental monarch. It is Asiatic absolutism again 
 incarnate in an Aryan family, as in the days of the Medo- 
 Persian dominion. 
 
 The Anglo-Saxon presents a striking contrast in every 
 phase of this comparison. He compels submission not 
 through mere numerical superiority or the primitive process 
 of force majeur, but by reason of the inventive and organiz- 
 ing talent of the race. Never content with the experience 
 and example of others, he has worked out his problems to 
 his own satisfaction and impressed his conclusions as a logi- 
 cal necessity upon all with whom he associates. In the 
 light of his past performances it is impossible to imagine 
 that he can ever abandon his ideals or revert to the primitive 
 principles of patriarchal rule. The inevitable outcome of 
 the predominance of one of these two races in Asia is sub- 
 mission to the old-world dogma of divinely inspired sove- 
 reignty, of the other an attempt — it may be altogether in 
 vain — to teach the subject the high doctrine of self-rule. 
 
 To these politico-historic considerations must be added the 
 politico-economic aspects of the Eastern Question which are 
 rapidly driving on toward a crisis. For the century that 
 has so radically altered the national relationships in the civ- 
 ilized world has in equal degree revolutionized the economic 
 situation. Mechanical appliances have increased production 
 and facilitated the exchange of raw and manufactured 
 materials out of all proportion to the increase in consumption 
 and demand. A significant result of this transformation of 
 the productive plant in the Western world has been the 
 accumulation of enormous reserves of capital in the hands 
 
Political Relations with thb Far East. 189 
 
 of the ablest members of civilized society. The demand of 
 this capital for larger employment and the extension of its 
 field of activity exerts a pressure upon the statesmen and 
 legislators of Western nations absolutely irresistible in its 
 effect. Within a score of years it has compelled them to 
 explore and partition Africa and lay claim to even the 
 minutest islands of the sea. But its grandest ambition must 
 inevitably be devoted to enlightening the unregenerate popu- 
 lations of Asia and developing both the natural resources 
 of their territories and the artificial appetites which will 
 turn them into profitable consumers. 
 
 It is idle in face of a factor which is founded upon one of 
 the strongest of human passions to argue the morality of 
 this desire. Greed and fear have ever been, in one form or 
 another, the two most powerful motives in history, and this 
 predicament of modern times involves them both. For the 
 stake is life or death; the nation that does not succeed in 
 gaining at least a small share in this competition for new 
 markets must succumb to a pressure that will surely anni- 
 hilate. Yet the issue may none the less bring infinite possi- 
 bilities for good to a vast aggregation of human beings who 
 now lie fallow and inept to every quickening impulse. Evi- 
 dently the happiness of many millions is to depend upon the 
 outcome of a conflict which is both racial and industrial. 
 
 Applying these economic postulates to the two rivals which 
 we necessarily keep in view, it remains to consider their 
 relation to the problem before us. It is evident from what 
 has already been adduced that political concentration is the 
 order of the day, and that electricity, steam and steel are 
 practical agents of the highest importance in the further 
 prosecution of the struggle between East and West, because 
 they make it physically possible for a single nation to conquer 
 and rule the inhabited globe. This has never been the case 
 before. In the past the contest between these diverse and 
 dissenting parties has been unremitting; neither has been 
 completely successful, and there has always been room for 
 them both. The war was long and often fierce, but it could 
 not be a war of extermination, for the defeated side could 
 always flee to the barbarians beyond its remoter borders. 
 Moreover, the unparalleled industrial evolution of the closing 
 century has added a new element of gravity to the issue. If 
 mechanical advantages render the extension of the struggle 
 possible, this necessitates its spread; the first may be a 
 
i go Annaw of the American Academy. 
 
 matter of preference and policy, this is relentless natural 
 law. The ancient ambitions of martial kings subside into 
 insignificance when compared with the terrible earnestness 
 of modern competition for industrial supremacy. This is 
 the monstrous test of Nature herself to determine the fittest, 
 one of those titanic cosmical throes wherein the individual 
 and his desires disappear altogether in the immensity of the 
 operation. Under antique influences, when even the small- 
 est communities could subsist contentedly upon their own 
 resources, it was feasible and sometimes profitable for nations 
 to shut themselves within their own borders and stagnate 
 behind the protection of fortified frontiers. To-day the 
 action of commercial intercourse renders the policy of hermit 
 nations odious alike to those without and to those within 
 their boundaries. The industrial and trading portion of 
 mankind insists upon adding to the area of its operations 
 until every avenue to profit is opened and every people 
 civilized. The strength and headway of this combination is 
 such now that only a military colossus supported by sufficient 
 troops and territories to sustain its own weight can presume 
 to resist its continued expansion. 
 
 But what if such a colossus arise? What if the future 
 unlike the past allow no space for two equally matched 
 empires to contend without conclusion, if it provide no 
 barbarian fastness as asylum for the defeated ? Both contin- 
 gencies may occur. The Colossus of the North, Antaeus- 
 like, is increasing his strength with each fresh contact with 
 the soil; and already the exploitation of remote lands is 
 leaving no territory untouched by the influence of economic 
 laws that constitute producers of the same commodity, 
 members of the same gild, wherever found. 
 
 Evidently the rivals approach the same goal from opposite 
 directions and impelled by different forces. The manufac- 
 turing and trading nations advance upon hitherto unknown 
 lands, moved by the silent action of a primary passion that 
 transforms every qualified trader into the captain of a 
 conquering host. It is not incredible indeed that the 
 government which orders the foremost group of these com- 
 mercial armies to-day may succumb to the lust of military 
 power in the event of succeeding too rapidly. With the 
 prize well in view England's temptation is perhaps the 
 strongest and most subtle ever set before a nation, and her 
 people and rulers are but human. But England herself is 
 
Political Relations with the Far East. 191 
 
 great only so long as as she leads her mighty offspring and 
 expresses the racial idea. It is the natural tendency of her 
 empire to fall away as its dependencies mature; the only real 
 tie that binds the aggregation together is that of self-interest. 
 The moment she goes counter, therefore, to this great aim of 
 her coadjutors, the moment a scramble for spoils begins, her 
 leadership is lost, the body and limbs separate. It has been 
 her fate rather than her desire to add to her possessions 
 great patches of barbarism in order to defend the preserves 
 where civilization has already begun to replace ignorance and 
 misrule. Her true course, however, is not annexation, but 
 instruction; the operations of trade bring her victories more 
 lasting than those won by Maxim guns; she has no need of 
 a better ally. 
 
 Russia's objective, on the other hand, is international 
 monopoly. Her tendency is toward increased centralization 
 of authority and the concentration of aggressive power 
 whose appetite for territorial extension becomes in the end 
 a mania. There is no place in her schemes for countries 
 that her garrisons do not occupy. To subvert in unending 
 succession, to tax and oppress her subjects for the mainten- 
 ance of the huge military machine — these are her aims, pre- 
 cisely as they were those of Darius long ago. They involve 
 the suppression of the individual everywhere for the benefit 
 of the ruler, the abasement of the subject, and the inevit- 
 able reduction of civilization to a level with the condition of 
 purely military despotisms of the past. She cannot cease 
 aggressions against her neighbors because she is powerless 
 to change her ways and compete with those mercantile 
 nations whose effective conquests are those of peace and the 
 increase of plenty. She frankly and even cynically acknowl- 
 edges her intention of pushing her acquisitions to the 
 extreme limits of the continent upon which she has entered. 
 She must do so: both to exercise those armies that may, if 
 thwarted, turn and rend her, and to exclude forcibly from 
 those vast spaces the agents of her insatiable commercial 
 adversaries. The occupation of Manchuria by her troops 
 and workmen under a contract with China which secures its 
 complete segregation from the competition of outsiders is 
 only the most recent instance of a policy she has applied 
 wherever practicable. This last step, which excites con- 
 siderable apprehension at the moment because her desire to 
 cancel the Niuchwang railway contract might, if persisted 
 
192 Annaj^s of the American Academy. 
 
 in, threaten war with Great Britain, is especially interesting 
 as demonstrating the inability of any Czar by himself 
 to modify the national and dynastic program. Personally 
 the present emperor is credited with a strong desire for 
 peace; but it is impossible for |him, however friendly his 
 inclinations, to expose this natural outlet of his Siberian 
 possessions to the free action of foreign business concerns 
 before whose superior commercial ability Russian interests 
 would inevitably decay. For Russian plans to succeed 
 there must be monopoly and undisputed sway; the presence 
 of a single interloper endangers the whole system. The 
 Czar must, then, fulfil the family traditions and protect his 
 children where they are confessedly incompetent to defend 
 themselves, or forfeit the respect and endorsement of the 
 army which is the foundation of his throne. 
 
 A melancholy reflection suggested by this incident is the 
 fact that the greatest Russian sovereigns have always been 
 the wickedest. A ruler there need only be callous enough 
 to suffering and to breaches of the moral law to count to the 
 uttermost upon the support of his fighting machine. The 
 emperor who prefers the ways of peace, on the other hand, 
 must defend his predilection against a hostile group of 
 officers' who, if they are convinced that rectitude is likely to 
 be pushed far, can always replace him upon the throne with 
 a more complacent instrument of their ambitions. The rift 
 in the armor of Russia is the necessity, common to every 
 despotism, of implicit reliance upon those to whom delicate 
 and dangerous tasks are entrusted. Agents who are trained 
 to the sort of business required by irresponsible monarchs 
 will accept the death penalty for failure, they will not tolerate 
 close scrutiny of their accounts. For this reason a habit of 
 corruption has been fostered which the most strenuous abso- 
 lutism in the world is powerless to keep in check. The 
 vices of bribery and peculation are so generally recognized 
 as prevailing everywhere in the Eastern world that we have 
 come to attribute them, rather loosely and almost uncon- 
 sciously, to climatic or geographical influences; yet the 
 example of New Japan shows that they are not concomi- 
 tants to life in the Orient, but are only inevitable to the 
 Oriental system of rule. How deeply this disease of 
 immorality has permeated their society may be inferred 
 from the significant though horrible Russian adage that 
 "Lord Christ himself would steal if his hands were not 
 nailed fast to the cross." 
 
Political Relations with the Far East. 193 
 
 Against these weaknesses in the body politic of Russia, 
 however, may be balanced the vacillation inseparable to 
 party government in Anglo-Saxon states, where waves of 
 prejudice or sentiment not infrequently overwhelm and ruin 
 the wisest plans of far-sighted statesmen. Though the 
 Eastern power be less delicately adjusted for the great work 
 of governing men it is less apt to be subjected to those 
 strains which come from too strenuous a passion for right- 
 eousness. Nor, in this category of disabilities common to 
 our race should we neglect those traits of timidity and sel- 
 fishness which become the bane of purely commercial com- 
 munities and finally sap their strength and invalidate their 
 influence. Against this vital danger we of the West have 
 ever need to be on our guard. 
 
 Such being the attitude and ability of these natural 
 opponents it remains to consider their position upon the con- 
 tinent which is the arena of their struggle. Great Britain, 
 with her present reserve of capital at home and her command 
 of the sea, has the advantage of being able to strike where- 
 ever she chooses and strike with swift and terrible strength. 
 But Russia, like the leviathan, having no vitals cannot be 
 mortally wounded however severe the blow may be. With 
 limitless numbers intrenched in her remote and unassailable 
 strongholds she can neither be ousted from her possessions 
 nor prevented from advancing. Though for the time being 
 there is little advertisement of Western Asia in the news- 
 papers it is not likely that she has abandoned her earlier 
 intention of securing Turkey. Even Persia and India re- 
 main well within the horizon of her ambition. It is enough, 
 she thinks, that the greater prize of China when won will 
 secure the less. Meantime the Ottoman Empire, if shrewdly 
 guarded against invigoration through European reforms, 
 will ripen and then rot in iniquity so as to fall, helpless and 
 inane, of itself into her lap. And the same is palpably true 
 of Persia; while in India much more may be expected from 
 the fermentation engendered by British philanthropy than 
 could ever be won by Russian attacks. There are signs in 
 that mysterious land of South Asia which seem to intimate 
 that England's work instead of stimulating its inhabitants 
 to learn the difficult lesson of self-control is exciting them to 
 madness and revolt. It is only necessary, Russia concludes, 
 to locate her frontier fortresses conveniently near and wait. 
 The end, therefore, is not yet. Much remains to be 
 
i94 Annals op the American Academy. 
 
 achieved in order to perfect the instruments by which her 
 plans are to be fulfilled, while the great distances which 
 -separate the different parts of the Russian Empire are cov- 
 ered with a network of railways, and its vacant spaces 
 turned into breeding-places of armed men. Above all, it is 
 essential to the completion of her purpose to secure that 
 richest and most populous realm on earth which has hitherto 
 •escaped the hand of the despoiler. Russia's need of China 
 does not at all imply a necessity for increased markets to 
 satisfy the desires of an overflowing industrial population. 
 It means the direct increase of her fighting force by the ac- 
 quisition of millions of hardy peasants who can, under 
 European training, be turned into admirable soldiers; it 
 represents the addition to her already magnificent resources 
 of the richest mineral deposits to be found anywhere in the 
 world; it signifies to her manufacturing rival that these sup- 
 plies of men and material are to be henceforth as in the past 
 withdrawn from the general service of mankind and re- 
 served for her exclusive benefit. With the immoderate 
 power involved in the mastery of these possessions, extend- 
 ing over a wide and continuous domain, impenetrable from 
 without, but made articulate within by methods which 
 modern science provides, Russia will have only to issue 
 commands while the inhabitants of the earth tremble and 
 obey. For it must not be forgotten that her peculiar 
 strength depends upon position as well as upon size. With 
 her back to the frozen ocean and her feet planted firmly upon 
 two continents, she occupies a strategic front that can be 
 maintained against any assault. Add to this the natural 
 wealth from the mines and fields and manual labor of Asia, 
 and the result is a combination of potency and energy that 
 not only defies attack, but eventually threatens destruction 
 to every other existing political power. Upon the high- 
 lands of Central Asia have been bred in the past the races 
 which overran and dominated the civilized West, and where 
 these swarms were once raised other millions may spring 
 up in the future to obey the call of the conqueror and 
 spread devastation among those more cultured but less 
 lusty peoples who represent our race. It might indeed be 
 an interesting speculation to calculate the chances of 
 Africa, Australia and the two Americas if pitted against 
 a united Russian-Asia, in some supreme encounter a 
 century or two hence. In actual fighting strength the 
 
Political Relations with the Far East. 195 
 
 sides might not be very uneven. But the result of such an 
 estimate would be valueless, because no combination that 
 could be imagined would bring all those diverse and unre- 
 lated continents together, while a true comprehension of 
 every part and people of Asia under Russian leadership, as 
 representative of her Zeitgeist, looms large from the ob- 
 scurity that veils the coming age. 
 
 The future, then, admits a return to the conception of 
 hermit nation only upon the condition that the hermit, like 
 that great Assassin, Sheikh al-Jebal or the Old Man of the 
 Mountain, be feared sufficiently to command implicit obedi- 
 ence from his instruments and inspire terror far and near 
 among the nations. Only by sheer might and multitude of 
 resources can he defeat the operations of those natural econo- 
 mic processes which diffuse prosperity and knowledge equally 
 throughout the world. It appears to be not only evident but 
 inevitable that Russia proposes to fill this fearful r61e of 
 great reactionist. The strength and occasion for its exer- 
 cise being granted, Russia with the confidence of a youthful 
 and courageous savage intends to pursue her passion for 
 omnipotence to the very end. A less rudimentary racial 
 type would long since have been diverted from this artless 
 ambition by the complex distractions of an inventing and 
 speculative age; an older people would not have dared. In 
 her indifference to the risk incurred, in the crudity of her 
 ideals, in her deliberate preference for the ruthless way of 
 the Ancient East, lie the menace of her pretensions. The 
 conclusion to the contest already begun between Asia and 
 Europe under Slav and Saxon leadership allows no alter- 
 native between victory on the one side and destruction on 
 the other. Much is said at present of Russian alliances in 
 Europe. It is eminently politic for her to secure as many of 
 these as she may, provided they are to be had, as is usually 
 the case, for the asking. The national bigotry and narrow- 
 ness of decadent France seem to find in such a co-partner- 
 ship some assuagement for recent mortifications; but Russia 
 is of necessity equally opposed to all Western European 
 states alike so long as they produce salable commodities and 
 desire trade. Her friendships with some of them are only 
 phases of a transition period while her plans await accom- 
 plishment, or are undertaken to divide the ranks of her 
 enemies the more easily to overwhelm them. Permanent 
 community of interests between such natural antagonists is 
 
196 Annai£ op the American Academy. 
 
 as unlikely as was any lasting fellowship between the Roman 
 Empire and its occasional barbarian allies. When she has 
 won the prize set before her there will be no room left in the 
 political firmament for luminaries of the second magnitude, 
 no uncivilized regions, as of old, for the vanquished party to 
 invade and settle, no long tension of inconclusive wars that 
 retard growth indeed but leave the body of the nation free 
 to pursue its accustomed vocations. Her victory will mean 
 the sort of depressing monopoly which Napoleon sought to 
 establish, but extended this time over a vastly wider sphere. 
 I<et us face the alternatives offered by this tremendous 
 combat : they are either a crushing absolutism which must 
 involve us all, or an era of prosperity brought about by a 
 universalization of commerce unequaled hitherto in the 
 world's history. 
 
 It is imperative to comprehend fully the purport of this 
 great question and discern the abyss that yawns beyond. 
 Nor is it necessary to defame the Russian character in order 
 to strengthen the protest against their assumptions. It is in 
 the race tendency rather than in the people themselves that 
 the danger lies. They have often and beneficially played 
 the r&le of civilizers in darkest Asia, enforcing peace and 
 good order where none had been known for centuries. Their 
 work in reducing the khanates of Turkestan and compel- 
 ling the desert slavers there to forego their favorite activities 
 of kidnapping and robbery, compares favorably with any- 
 thing that England has done of the same sort. In dealing 
 with the ruder Asiatic they undoubtedly succeed better 
 than their less pliant rivals, the English; and by reason of 
 the personal popularity of their administrators, as well as 
 because of the prestige of their unbroken successes, they 
 enjoy a fairer prospect of securing the guidance of militant 
 Asia by choice of the fighting class than any other foreign 
 folk. Yet it is this very simpatica with a grosser civilization 
 than befits their Aryan descent that constitutes the gravity 
 of the impending crisis. It shows that half-measures and a 
 merely superficial modification of barbaric society satisfy the 
 Russian conscience. It proves again, if additional proof be 
 needed, that the Slav is ready in all that touches and inspires 
 the soul of a nation to sink to the low level of Asiatic ideals, to 
 surrender what he has learned from liberal Europe and 
 relapse into the animalism and inertness of Oriental life. 
 And when the mark of his European culture, brandished a 
 
Political Relations with the Far East. 197 
 
 little contemptuously now before our eyes, is at length thrown 
 aside, we shall find ourselves, while opposed to this Caliban 
 of to-day confronted with the old, unchanging issue of 
 Eastern tyranny and retrogression versus Western freedom 
 and progress. 
 
 To keep this protoype of brute force from pervading and 
 controlling the whole world, the nations that still cherish 
 lofty hopes for humanity must forget their sectionalism and 
 stand together in battle. It is madness to abate one particle 
 of the issue and declare that something ought to be conceded 
 for the cause of peace, to pretend, as do some Englishmen 
 already weary of the strain, that Russia if given Northern 
 China, or Constantinople, or a port on the Persian Gulf, 
 will be content. She is not striving for portions, but for the 
 whole of Asia; when she has gained this she knows, and we 
 must eventually agree, that nothing human can resist her. 
 Fortunately for the cause of freedom America has just dis- 
 covered that she is necessarily involved in the affairs of 
 Eastern Asia; that she has a stake in common there with 
 others whom she can already undersell in distant as well 
 as in domestic markets; that her business compels her to 
 join in the work of reducing barbarians to order and educat- 
 ing them; finally, and perhaps most fortunately of all for 
 the present crisis, that there is no real antagonism between 
 the mother-country and her once rebellious colony, but that 
 friendly co-operation has only to be proffered to be eagerly 
 accepted. When we realize that the menace of Russian 
 aggression affects not only the political supremacy of Great 
 Britain in Asia but the free exercise of those high aspira- 
 tions which are vital to the existence of every regenerate 
 people, we will cease to imagine vain fears of imperialism 
 and assemble the utmost strength of the enlightened West 
 against that portentous imperialism embodied in the spirit 
 of a devouring and devastating East. Finally, when we 
 appreciate the fact that to secure China is the sine qua non 
 of Russian designs for the establishment of a universal 
 empire, that without her wealth and willing hands the 
 Muscovite can never become master of a double continent and 
 so of the world, we will listen before it is too late to the 
 Macedonian cry of that misgoverned nation to go over and 
 help them. 
 
Appendices. 
 
 (199) 
 
I. THIRD ANNUAL MEETING 
 
 OF THE 
 
 American Academy of Political and 
 Social Science. 
 
 "THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED 
 
 STATES: COMMERCIAL AND 
 
 POLITICAL." 
 
 Report of the Committee on Meetings. 
 
 Two years ago when the Academy decided to inaugurate 
 a series of annual meetings it was felt by your Committee 
 that the value of papers discussed at such meetings would be 
 greatly increased if grouped about one subject. In this way 
 the best thought and experience of the country could be 
 concentrated upon definite public questions. Each year 
 would thus mark an important contribution to the literature 
 of political and social science. 
 
 The success of the Third Annual Meeting has fully justi- 
 fied the expectations of the Committee. The concentration 
 of public attention upon the questions connected with our 
 foreign policy together with the high authority of those who 
 took part in the discussions, placed the meetings promi- 
 nently before the eyes of the public. The information 
 accessible to the general public on the great public questions 
 confronting the country was to be found, in the main, in the 
 newspaper press. Colored as this information was by parti- 
 sanship, all thoughtful citizens were anxious to obtain trust- 
 worthy information and to receive the benefit of unprejudiced 
 opinion. 
 
 (201) 
 
202 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 In planning a thoroughly scientific examination of our 
 commercial and political policy, the Committee feels that 
 the Academy has rendered a real service, not merely to its 
 members but to the country at large. 
 
 The plan for the annual meeting included four scientific 
 sessions, held on the afternoon and evening of Friday and 
 Saturday, April 7 and 8, together with a visit to the Com- 
 mercial Museums Saturday morning, April 8. The after- 
 noon sessions were held in the Assembly Room of the Manu- 
 facturers' Club and were largely attended. 
 
 The session of Friday afternoon, April 7, which was 
 devoted to a discussion of the ' ' Government of Dependen- 
 cies," was presided over by Professor Samuel McCune 
 I^ndsay, of the University of Pennsylvania. In introduc- 
 ing the speakers Professor I^indsay emphasized the fact that 
 the committee in charge of the meeting had but one end in 
 view— namely, the impartial discussion of greet public 
 questions. The diversity of opinion evoked by the discus- 
 sions fully corroborated the statement of the presiding 
 officer. 
 
 On Friday evening, April 7, the Honorable Carl Schurz 
 delivered the annual address on " Militarism and Democ- 
 racy." Professor E. J. James, of the University of Chi- 
 cago, and president of the Academy, presided, and in his 
 opening remarks commented on the work of the Academy, 
 past and present, and mapped out its future field of useful- 
 ness. The remarks of the president are printed in full in 
 another portion of this volume. 
 
 On Saturday morning, April 8, the members of the 
 Academy were invited to visit the Commercial Museums, 
 where Dr. W. P. Wilson had arranged a special exhibit of 
 products of the far East. This visit proved one of the most 
 interesting events in connection with the annual meeting. 
 The care and skill with which the exhibit was arranged gave 
 to the members the possibility of acquainting themselves at 
 first hand with the economic resources of the East. In a. 
 
Third Annual Meeting. 203 
 
 few well chosen remarks Dr. Wilson pointed out the possi- 
 bilities of trade and commerce and explained to the members 
 the organization and work of the museum. 
 
 The session of Saturday afternoon, April 8, was devoted 
 to a discussion of ' ' Our Commercial Relations with the far 
 East," Professor Roland P. Falkner, of the University of 
 PennS3'lvania, in the chair. Both Mr. Ford's and Mr. 
 Hill's papers presented a wealth of material on this impor- 
 tant question. 
 
 The discussion of Saturday evening on ' ' Our Political 
 Relations with the far East, ' ' proved one of the niost inter- 
 esting of the series. The presence of four distinguished 
 speakers attracted one of the largest audiences in the 
 history of the Academy. The addresses of all the speakers, 
 particularly that of his excellency, the Chinese minister, 
 Wu Ting-fang, were received with great interest. 
 
 That the discussions of the annual meeting attracted 
 wide-spread attention was attested by the great number of 
 editorial comments in newspapers of all sections of the 
 country. The early publication of the proceedings will 
 give to the members of the Academy who were not able to 
 attend the meeting the opportunity of profiting by the 
 material presented. 
 
 Your committee arranged for a number of social events 
 in connection with the annual meeting. On Friday even- 
 ing, April 7, a reception was tendered by the Academy to 
 the Honorable Carl Schurz, which gave to our members the 
 opportunity of meeting the distinguished guest of the 
 Academy. On Saturday afternoon, April 8, Mrs. Talcott 
 Williams entertained the members at her home and gave 
 them an opportunity to meet his excellency, the Chinese 
 minister. On Saturday evening, April 8, the University 
 Club tendered a reception to the Chinese minister, the Hon- 
 orable John Bassett Moore and the other speakers at the 
 annual meeting. 
 
 The committee on meetings takes this opportunity to 
 
ao4 Annai<s op the American Academy. 
 
 express to the president and directors of the Manufacturers' 
 Club, the president and board of governors of the University- 
 Club and to the director of the Commercial Museums, Dr. 
 W. P. Wilson, their appreciation of the courtesy of these 
 organizations in co-operating with the committee in the 
 arrangements for the meeting. 
 
 The expenses of the meeting, which would have proved a 
 very serious financial burden to the Academy, were defrayed 
 by a special committee of fifteen members, each of whom 
 contributed fifty dollars to the special fund. The members 
 of the committee were: George Burnham, George Burn- 
 ham, Jr., Andrew Carnegie, John H. Converse, Edwin S. 
 Cramp, Samuel Dickson, W. W. Frazier, Charles C. Har- 
 rison, Samuel F. Houston, Theodore Marburg, John D. 
 Rockefeller, J. G. Rosengarten, Charles A. Schieren, Isaac 
 N. Seligman, John Wanamaker. This fund was supple- 
 mented by a number of subscriptions from ten to twenty- 
 five dollars, contributed by the following gentlemen: Oliver 
 H. P. Belmont, Charles J. Bonaparte, Henry E. Busch, 
 Clarence H. Clark, Dr. J. M. DaCosta, Hon. George F. 
 Edmunds, Theodore M. Etting, Abram S. Hewitt, Thomas 
 McKean, Jr., Robert C. Ogden, Charles E. Pugh, Charles 
 Richardson, Gustav H. Schwab, M. Hampton Todd, Harry 
 F. West, George Wood. 
 
 To the members of the special committee, as well as to 
 the subscribers, your committee on meetings desires to 
 extend its sincere thanks. 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 I<. S. RowE, 
 
 Chairman. 
 Roland P. Falkner, 
 Samuel McCune Lindsay, 
 E. R. Johnson, 
 I*. S. Rowe, 
 
 Committee on Meetings. 
 
II. 
 
 INTRODUCTORY ADDRESSES OF THE PRESI- 
 DENT OF THE ACADEMY, PROFESSOR 
 EDMUND J. JAMES, OF THE UNI- 
 VERSITY OF CHICAGO. 
 
 The American Academy and Its Work. 
 
 Remarks at the Evening Session of the Annual Meeting, 
 Friday, April y, 1879. 
 
 Members and guests of the Academy: Before the time set 
 for another annual meeting comes around, our association 
 will have completed its first decade. On the fourteenth of 
 next December the Academy will have been in existence 
 ten full years. It would seem to be appropriate, therefore, 
 on an occasion like this to cast a brief glance back over the 
 history of our organization and possibly cast a brief horo- 
 scope of its future. 
 
 One element of success in the work of the Academy is to 
 be found in the comparative permanence which has been 
 secured in the general management of affairs and in the issue 
 of our publications. Our present Advisory Committee, 
 which has been a great help to us in our work still contains 
 the names of many members who were on the committee 
 when it was first organized. The losses from this committee 
 have been few though serious. The distinguished economist, 
 Francis A. Walker, the distinguished constitutional authori- 
 ties, Judge J. A. Jameson, and the Honorable Thomas M. 
 Cooley were lost to the Academy by death. The addition of 
 such men as the Rt. Hon. I,ord Herschell, whose sudden 
 death, however, deprived us so soon of his assistance, and 
 the Rt. Hon. Arthur J. Balfour, the very Reverend John J. 
 
 (205) 
 
206 Annai,s of the American Academy. 
 
 Keane, D. D., and other eminent men, have brought to our 
 councils, added wisdom and strength. 
 
 The present Editor in Chief of the publications of the 
 Academy, Professor Roland P. Falkner, of the University of 
 Pennsylvania, was one of the associate editors when our 
 work was first inaugurated, and has furnished, therefore, 
 the continuous element in this important branch of our work. 
 
 I see around me still nearly all the men who were active 
 in the original planning of the Academy with the exception 
 of the lamented Brinton Coxe. I am especially pleased to 
 see here to-night — I know that you will pardon me this 
 personal allusion — and I trust that he will also, my friend 
 Mr. J. G. Rosengarten, a man to whom this Academy owes 
 very much, as do indeed, so many other of the successful 
 organizations for public work in this city. It was Mr. 
 Rosengarten who brought to the aid of the Academy in the 
 very first instance. the name and the prestige of the old 
 Philadelphia Science Association, an organization which had 
 done a useful and honorable service in this community. With- 
 out the assistance of Mr. Rosengarten at this juncture it is a 
 serious question whether the Academy could have been 
 organized on the liberal scale which was actually adopted. 
 He has been ever since one of the quiet, unostentatious, 
 most important elements in our work. 
 
 Dr. I^indsay will, in a few moments give you some detailed 
 account of the actual work of the Academy during the last 
 year. 
 
 To the larger aspects of our work as seen from the point 
 which enables us to look back over a full decennium, I 
 would briefly call your attention. When the Academy was 
 organized we set before ourselves a number of tasks. We 
 undertook to initiate and carry out various lines of scientific 
 and practical activity. We proposed to secure, if possibld 
 a large membership, believing that in this way we should 
 secure for our publications a wider and more extensive 
 influence. We undertook to hold regular meetings of the 
 
Third Annual Meeting. 207 
 
 Academy for the reading of scientific papers and for the dis- 
 cussion of scientific matters. We held out the prospect that 
 these papers and such other material as we might find 
 valuable, should be published in the form of a regular serial. 
 We expressed the hope that we should be able to collect a 
 library, and that we might be enabled, as the years went on, 
 to undertake special investigations under the immediate 
 auspices of the Academy itself, which might in this way 
 assist in the development of certain work, which would not 
 otherwise be feasible. 
 
 It is, of course, too much to expect that in a large plan of 
 this sort we should be able within the short period of a single 
 decade to even initiate all these various departments of 
 work, to say nothing of carrying to complete development 
 any one of them . But a glance at our history certainly shows 
 that we have at least made a beginning in nearly all of these 
 directions, and in some of them have carried out very fully, 
 as fully as might be reasonably expected under the circum- 
 stances, the program which we announced. 
 
 We have to-day, as you learn from our printed announce- 
 ments, a membership including subscribing members, of 
 nearly two thousand. This is surely a satisfactory fulfill- 
 ment of our undertaking to secure a large membership. No 
 other body similar to ours working in these fields has any- 
 thing like the same number of members. And while a 
 large membership is not by any means the only test of the 
 value of such an organization, it is at any rate a proof that 
 the work it is doing commands a certain general sympathy 
 and support among thoughtful people here and elsewhere. 
 It is interesting to know that the membership is not limited 
 to citizens of Philadelphia, or of Pennsylvania, or even of 
 the United States, but that a very large proportion, some- 
 thing like 10 per cent, are to be found in foreign countries. 
 Great Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, 
 Italy, Spain, Russia, South and Central America, China, 
 India and Japan have representatives in our body. 
 
208 Annaw op the American Academy. 
 
 We have held regular meetings, either monthly or quar- 
 terly, since the organization of the Academy, and during the 
 last three years we have inaugurated a special annual meet- 
 ing similar to the one which we open to-night for the pur- 
 pose of discussing more in detail, than would otherwise be 
 possible, some question of important theoretical or practi- 
 cal bearing. "We are now publishing the thirteenth volume 
 of our proceedings, and I think no one can examine these 
 publications without being convinced that they form a 
 substantial contribution to the development in theoretical 
 and practical directions of the political and social sciences. 
 We have collected a few books which may form the 
 nucleus of a library, and we stand ready to inaugurate the 
 work of special investigation as soon, and carry it as 
 far, as any special funds given to the Academy for that pur- 
 pose may justify. 
 
 The outlook, therefore, is extremely promising for the 
 work of the next decade, and I should like simply to pre- 
 sent one thought for your consideration on this occasion, and 
 that is the desirability of securing as soon as may be con- 
 venient a suitable building, properly equipped and prepared 
 for the special work of the Academy. We have thus far 
 been compelled to utilize for our work such quarters as we 
 might be able to obtain from time to time, hiring usually 
 special rooms for our public meetings. 
 
 I think it is due to express in a public way the apprecia- 
 tion of the Academy for the courtesy which the University 
 of Pennsylvania has shown to this organization from its 
 beginning in practically putting at its disposal, free of 
 charge, a room in the University building for the conducting 
 of certain portions of its work. It is not easy to see how in 
 early days we could have inaugurated our work at all had it 
 not been for the generous attitude of the University toward 
 our society. 
 
 When the Academy was organized in the first instance I 
 maintained that the headquarters should be located perma- 
 
Third Annual Meeting. 209 
 
 nently in the city of Philadelphia. It was natural that some 
 persons should have thought that my argument found its 
 chief support in the fact that I was then living in the city 
 of Philadelphia and connected with the University of Penn- 
 sylvania. But my experience in the work of the Academy 
 during the ten years since its organization has amply borne 
 out my views at that time. And now that I can look at the 
 work from a view-point a thousand miles away, I am still 
 more fully convinced that the city of Philadelphia was the 
 only city in the United States in which the work could have 
 been begun as it was, and could have reached its present 
 proportions within such a brief period. 
 
 Philadelphia is par excellence the home of the learned 
 society. You have the American Philosophical Society, the 
 oldest and still the most respectable of these organizations. 
 Founded by Benjamin Franklin, the father of so many 
 excellent things in this city and country, it has done a wide 
 and useful work, and Philadelphia and the whole country 
 may be proud of its career. 
 
 In the Academy of Natural Sciences you have another 
 organization whose work is known wherever scientific men 
 are prying into the mysteries of the universe. 
 
 In the Franklin Institute there is still another organiza- 
 tion of the same kind, which has done in the department 
 of engineering a work very similar to that accomplished 
 by the Academy of Natural Sciences in its own proper 
 field. 
 
 In the Pennsylvania Historical Society you have an 
 organization and an equipment, which in its publications 
 and series of contributions to American History is certainly 
 not surpassed by any other similar organization in the 
 United States, and equaled by few. 
 
 Surely all these things point to the fact that here was the 
 proper place for such an organization, and the experience 
 of the last ten years, though brief and partial, has amply 
 sustained this view. 
 
210 Annals of the American Academy. 
 
 There is another favoring circumstance here, in the exist- 
 ence of the University of Pennsylvania, and its past close 
 relations to the work of such an organization as this. To 
 the work of an academy of political and social sciences 
 which is to be fruitful, permanent and far reaching the aid of 
 a great institution of learning in which due attention is given 
 to the cultivation of this field, is almost absolutely necessary. 
 The University of Pennsylvania has made wonderful strides 
 in the last few years toward a leading position among the 
 great American universities, and in no department has it 
 done more or achieved a greater success than in that of the 
 political and social sciences. I say it after a due delibera- 
 tion and with a pretty full knowledge of existing facilities 
 for the study of these subjects in the United States, that 
 nowhere is to-day a better opportunity offered for the 
 advanced student to get the kind of help which he needs in 
 the prosecution of his studies in the field of the political and 
 social sciences than in the University of Pennsylvania. 
 Such a department is of enormous aid in the proper develop- 
 ment and management of the work of a society like our 
 own. 
 
 Here then the conditions are favorable for our work as 
 shown by the best of all tests, the success which has 
 attended it. 
 
 We are now about to enter upon the second decade, and 
 I believe that the next great step for us to take is in the 
 direction of securing an adequately equipped building which 
 may serve as the headquarters of the work of the Academy, 
 where its administrative work may be done with suitable 
 accommodations for its library, which will enable us to make 
 it more useful to the members and to the general public as 
 well, and with suitable halls for its meetings, and with the 
 opportunities for special investigation and research which 
 the advanced student or college or university professor 
 needs. The existence of such a building as this, would, I 
 am sure, mark a new era in the history of the Academy 
 
Third Annual Meeting. 211 
 
 and render permanent the achievements which have been 
 thus far effected, opening the way for new advances in 
 many different directions, now only slightly appreciated, 
 and perhaps not even yet dreamed of. 
 
 To the fullest and most complete working of human forces 
 there belongs not merely a soul, but a body. We have been 
 evolving a soul — if you may permit us to use such an 
 expression — during the first ten years of the existence of the 
 Academy. The time has come to clothe that soul with a 
 body. A sound mind in a sound body, a beautiful soul in 
 a beautiful body. This is our desire and expectation. 
 
 It is permitted to young men to dream dreams and old 
 men to prophesy. As I stand half way between youth and 
 old age I may be permitted to take advantage of the privi- 
 leges of both, and dream a dream and prophesy a prophecy. 
 
 I dream of the time when the Academy will be properly 
 housed here in this city in such a building as I have indi- 
 cated, equipped with special funds for carrying on special 
 investigations similar to those which enable the Academy of 
 Natural Sciences to organize its expeditions; the Franklin 
 Institute to organize its expositions, and the Historical 
 Society and the Philosophical Society to do their appropriate 
 work. A building which will enable us to accumulate a 
 special library along lines not cared for by existing institu- 
 tions, and which will enable us to offer these facilities in the 
 freest and fullest way to the public is a necessity. 
 
 I prophesy that long before we shall have completed the 
 second decade of our existence such a building will be con- 
 structed and in use. I bespeak for this project your hearty 
 sympathy and interest, and your co-operation in exciting 
 and developing such an interest among the public spirited 
 citizens of Philadelphia as will enable us to carry out this 
 project in the fullest and most satisfactory manner. 
 
2i2 Annai£ of the American Academy. 
 
 INTRODUCING HONORABLE CARL SCHURZ. 
 
 Members and Guests of the Academy: — It is par 
 excellence the function of a society like ours to bring to the 
 discussion and consideration of every public question that 
 patient and open mind which is characteristic of the true 
 scientific man. It is our duty to see that, so far as possible, 
 all sides of important public questions shall receive due 
 attention and thought. Our attitude toward all questions, 
 no matter how practical they become, is that of the scientific 
 mind, pure and simple. The Academy, as such, can take no 
 side upon any concrete public question. It can, as such, 
 espouse the cause of no party; its sole purpose is to elicit 
 truth upon all questions falling within the general field to the 
 cultivation of which it is devoted. I may be mistaken, of 
 course, but I think that just at this juncture in our country 
 we need especially to develop this attitude of mind; that 
 just at this time we ought to apply the cold and impartial 
 test of scientific reasoning, so far as possible, to the impor- 
 tant concrete questions which are attracting so powerfully 
 our attention. 
 
 Our newspapers, as a rule, even when they have upon 
 their staffs men properly qualified to discuss these questions, 
 do not allow them an opportunity to express their free and 
 unbiased opinion. But having taken sides upon a public 
 question; having determined that they will espouse the 
 policy of one party or another; that they will espouse or 
 oppose the President or other political party leader, every 
 man in such an office is compelled to prostitute his talents in 
 order to advance and represent the views of his paper, no 
 matter how much they may be opposed to his own personal 
 views. Whatever may be said of the legitimacy of such a 
 system it is certainly not calculated to give an opportunity 
 for the free and uninterrupted play of individual opinion. 
 And as our newspapers are nearly all under the power of 
 one or another illegitimate influence, looking at them from 
 
Third Annual Meeting. 213 
 
 the standpoint of public interest, we have almost ceased to 
 have the kind of free and impartial discussion of public 
 questions which it lies in the interest of the democracy to 
 promote. 
 
 Under these conditions the average citizen is oftentimes at 
 a serious loss to know exactly what the facts are in regard 
 to any particular subject — still more at loss to know upon 
 whose honest and independent judgment he may, to some 
 extent, rely. We have had no better illustration of this 
 than the attitude of the newspapers toward the Spanish war, 
 and toward the Philippine embroglio which has grown out 
 of that. If a newspaper has made up its mind to support 
 the policy of the government, whatever that policy might 
 turn out to be, it has had only foul epithets, or at least the 
 most evil and unfair criticism for any one who was inclined 
 to raise the question, whether this subject ought to be more 
 fully discussed before it was settled, or whether we ought to 
 consider the question at least in all of its aspects and try and 
 settle it in the thoughtful way rather than by mere hap- 
 hazard. 
 
 As said before, the Academy takes no attitude upon these 
 and similar questions. It is neither for nor against the 
 policy of the United States in the Spanish war. It is 
 neither for nor against the policy of the President in the 
 Philippine matter, but it is profoundly interested in securing 
 a fair and full discussion of these questions in all their 
 various ramifications. 
 
 We are fortunate to-night in having with us a gentleman 
 who has distinguished himself throughout his career for inde- 
 pendence of judgment and plain speaking. He has spoken 
 the truth as God has given him to see the truth, without fear 
 or favor. He has had experience in almost every line of pub- 
 lic service in the United States. He has seen our politics and 
 our administrative system from every point of view. His 
 opinions, therefore, whether in our opinion sound or not, have 
 the advantage of being based upon a long experience and an 
 
214 Annai^ op the American Academy. 
 
 extensive knowledge of men and things. He has filled 
 many positions of public trust, and has graced them all. 
 He has discussed many subjects of public policy, and has 
 illuminated them all. We are glad that in the presentation 
 of one aspect of this important question before the American 
 public, we have a man of such ability and of such straight- 
 forward honesty to present, what it is true, may be only his 
 own views, and with which we may not agree, but which 
 will have the great advantage of being the honest and 
 outspoken and the uninfluenced views of an experienced 
 public man. 
 
 I cannot drop this subject without making one more point 
 which we Americans are sometimes apt to lose sight of. 
 We are aware, of course, of the great influence of the foreign 
 element in our midst We know what opportunities we have 
 offered to the foreigner. We realize to some extent what 
 he has done for us. The immigrant of the last two gen- 
 erations has built our railways, has dug our canals, and 
 has settled up our unoccupied territory, and has helped 
 us fight through one of the great civil struggles of our 
 history. 
 
 All this we recognize, all this we appreciate, but I am 
 afraid we do not always recognize so fully what contributions 
 the same class of people have made to the ideal sides of our 
 life. And in the career of the gentleman who is to address 
 us this evening we have a striking illustration of the service 
 which the educated, thoughtful foreigner may do for the 
 higher sides of American life. Mr. Schurz has stood from 
 the beginning of his career for the best things, and for the 
 emphasis of the best things in American politics. He comes 
 from a country with whose form of government and political 
 institutions Americans have as a rule very little sympathy, 
 but he has demonstrated in his own career how a man may 
 be thoroughly devoted and patriotic to the best interests 
 of the German people, and at the same time one of the 
 most devoted and patriotic of American citizens. We may 
 
Third Annual Meeting. 215 
 
 well be proud of the fact that such a career as that of Mr. 
 Schurz's is possible in the United States, and be grateful 
 that men have been found strong enough to run it. 
 
 I take great pleasure in introducing to you the Honorable 
 Carl Schurz who will address you on the subject of ' ' Mili- 
 tarism and Democracy." 
 
 THE EAST AND THE WEST. 
 
 Introductory Remarks on the Political Relations of the United 
 
 States with the Far East, at the Evening Session, 
 
 Saturday, April 8, 18pp. 
 
 Professor James: — Members and guests of the Academy: 
 Dr. Charles C. Harrison, provost of the University, who 
 had kindly consented to preside this evening, begs to be 
 excused on account of a severe cold, which has deprived 
 him temporarily of the use of his voice. 
 
 I think those of us who have lived during the last decade 
 of this century must congratulate ourselves that we have 
 been living in one of the most interesting periods, not only 
 of the last hundred, but of the last three hundred, or even 
 of the last five hundred years. We can take up no news- 
 paper in these days without finding something which 
 reminds us that we are a part of the great world which 
 has its limits no longer in the civilized life of Europe and 
 the nations which were the outgrowth of that, but which 
 extends to the uttermost confines of the globe and includes 
 practically to-day, as never before in the history of the 
 world, the whole human race. The astonishing develop- 
 ments in all parts of the earth, which owing, among other 
 things to the steam-engine and the telegraph, have become a 
 part of our daily information and our daily interest, have 
 brought us together and made us feel the solidarity of the 
 whole human kind in a way quite unparalleled at any pre- 
 vious time. 
 
216 Annais of the American Academy. 
 
 I am inclined to think that when the historian of this 
 century comes to describe the great events which have taken 
 place within it he will find nothing more significant and more 
 important in the great events which will follow in the next 
 and in the succeeding centuries — nothing which will be, in 
 his opinion, more remarkable than the new contact of the 
 Orient and the Occident. There is nothing of deeper signifi- 
 cance in the Napoleonic campaigns, or in the struggle for the 
 reconstruction of Europe beginning in 1848 and ending in 
 1871, or in our own great struggle for national unity, or in 
 the brief conflict which marked the passing of Spain as a 
 great colonial power, — I say in none of these events is there 
 a more important significant prophetic element than in the 
 awakening of Japan and China and of the ever hastening 
 process of union between the East and the West. 
 
 We are fortunate in having with us for the discussion of 
 the question which the Academy has selected for this 
 evening's session, namely, " The Relations of the East and 
 the West ' ' a group of men who are competent to speak on 
 this topic, as perhaps no other equal group of men to be 
 found in this country. 
 
 In the first speaker we have a distinguished member of 
 the Academy who is known by reputation to the entire 
 country, and whose career has been an honor to the profes- 
 sion to which he belongs. He has in his own work afforded 
 us a striking example of the all-compelling power of expert 
 knowledge and ability even over political partisanship and 
 political influences which would gladly have managed things 
 alone if they could have done so. 
 
 The political authority of the country in our last crisis 
 was compelled at more than one time to call upon the patient 
 and thorough knowledge of the scholar, and in no case was 
 this policy more profoundly vindicated than that of the 
 Honorable John Bassett Moore, of Columbia University, who 
 will open this discussion. 
 
E 163.7 A51 
 
 American academy of political 
 and social science, Philadelphia 
 
 The foreign policy of the 
 US; political and comercial 
 
 DATE 
 
 ISSUED TO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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