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THE WORKS OF XENOPHON 
 
THE 
 
 WORKS OF XENOPHON 
 
 TRANSLATED BY 
 
 H. G. DAKYNS, M.A. 
 
 LATE ASSISTANT MASTER IN CLIFTON COLLEGE 
 
 IN FOUR VOLUMES 
 VOL. II 
 
 HELLENICA— BOOKS III-VII, AGESILAUS, 
 THE POLITIES, AND REVENUES 
 
 ILonlion 
 
 MACMILLAN AND CO. 
 
 AND NEW YORK 
 
 1892 CdhUWAA 
 
 A// rights reserved 
 
A.M-4- CO«f 
 
 UNfVLRraV 
 LIBHARV 
 
PREFACE 
 
 This is the second of four companion volumes, in which 
 I have attempted to translate the works of Xenophon. 
 The iirst, containing Hellenica, Books I. and II. (which 
 practically form the Sequel to Thucydides), together with 
 the Anabasis, was published in 1 890. In the present 
 volume will be found the five remaining books of the 
 Hellenica (which constitute the Hellenic History proper), 
 along with four of the minor works commonly attri- 
 buted to Xenophon : the Agesilaus, the Polity of the 
 Athenians, the Polity of the Lacedaemonians, and the 
 pamphlet on Revenues, otherwise entitled Ways and 
 Means. My next volume should include the Memora- 
 bilia (and the probably spurious Apology'), the Economist, 
 the Symposium, and the Hiero, together with the three 
 remaining minor works, which treat respectively of the 
 Chase, of the duties of a General of Cavalry, and of the 
 Horse and Horsemanship. The final volume will be 
 devoted exclusively to what we may perhaps regard as 
 our author's opus magnum, the Cyropaedia, or Education 
 of Cyrus (the Great). 
 
 In the preface to my former volume I have drawn 
 attention to what, apart from personal deficiencies, 
 would seem to be the main difficulties of representing 
 
vi PREFACE 
 
 the style of Xenophon — that is to say, his thought and 
 diction — in English without travesty or insipidity. 
 
 To those general remarks I have little or nothing 
 to add. I would only ask the reader who, for what- 
 ever reason, may desire to acquaint himself with the 
 subject matter of this volume, not to father upon the 
 ancient historian and essayist shortcomings due to his 
 modern interpreter. 
 
 In the introductory pages preceding the translation 
 I have endeavoured to place the reader in a position to 
 form an independent judgment with regard to the 
 particular problems presented by the historical work 
 rather than to enforce opinions of my own. I have 
 further inserted under the title of Lacunae a list of 
 topics such as might conceivably have been included 
 in a more complete edition of the Hellenica, or in a 
 fuller history of the period by another author. How- 
 ever conjecturally arrived at, such a filling up of 
 apparent gaps could not, I thought, fail to be useful to 
 the student of history. And lastly, I have entered 
 into some discussion concerning each of the minor 
 works in turn, chiefly in connection with the vexed 
 question of their authorship. 
 
 The text which I have followed is, as previously 
 stated, that of the editio stereotypa of Gustav Sauppe. 
 The occasional variations are for the most part noted 
 at the bottom of the page. In one particular case, 
 that of the Polity of the Athenians, I have availed 
 myself largely of emendations due to the scholarly 
 sagacity of A. Kirchhoff. 
 
 I wish here to express my obligations to the many 
 scholars whose editions and notes have been of help 
 to me. In translating the Hellenica I have derived 
 assistance not only from the well-known editions of 
 
PREFACE vu 
 
 Dindorf, of Breitenbach, and of BUchsenschutz, but 
 from the beautiful modern recension of the work by 
 Otto Keller. I wish also to name the serviceable 
 edition of Hell. I.-IV. which Dr. Manatt and his col- 
 laborators have published in Arnerica. Similarly, in 
 reference to the four minor works, I am under obli- 
 gation not only to Sauppe's last volume and to 
 Dindorf's Xenophontis opuscula polttica, but to the 
 separate editions of the Agesilaus by Breitenbach and 
 R. W. Taylor, to the critical school edition of the 
 Polity of the Athenians by Kirchhoff above named, to a 
 commentary on the Polity of the Lacedaemonians by 
 Ernest Naumann, to a commentary on the Revenues, 
 and to the annotated edition of that pamphlet, by 
 • A. Zurborg, and lastly to the two volumes, Analecta 
 Xenophontea and Analecta Xenophontea Nova of J. J. 
 Hartman. I have again to acknowledge my indebted- 
 ness to three historians of Greece: Thirlwall, Grote, 
 and Curtius ; and to other authors named by me in 
 my former Preface. To this list I must now add three 
 works which throw special light on the period of history 
 with which the reader of my present volume will be 
 concerned. I speak of Dr. E. A. Freeman's History 
 of Federal Government, the first volume of Die Lakedai- 
 monier of Georg Busolt, and a Manual of Greek 
 Historical Inscriptions by E. A. Hicks. 
 
 For much direct and indirect help I am again deeply 
 indebted to many personal friends. To the Master of 
 Balliol for his sympathetic encouragement and for 
 actual assistance in revising a portion of the Hellenica ; 
 to Professor Jebb for similar assistance in the Polity 
 of the Lacedaemonians ; to several old friends and 
 former colleagues at Clifton ; to Mr. W. W. Asquith, 
 who carefully read through in proof the five books of 
 
vill PREFACE 
 
 the Helknica ; to Mr. S. T. Irwin, who rendered a like 
 service with regard to the Agesilaus ; to Mr. D. 
 Rintoul, who helped me to a better rendering of various 
 military terms. Lastly, I have availed myself, I trust 
 not too greedily, of the inexhaustible self-sacrificing 
 energy of one of my oldest friends, Mr. J. R. Mozley. 
 Mr. Mozley has, I think, perused every word, whether 
 of translation or of comment, here printed. He has 
 worked in my behalf far harder than many men care 
 to work for themselves. The success, if any, which 
 may be in store for this volume is largely due to him. 
 
 I take this opportunity of thanking those readers 
 not personally known to me who have already been 
 good enough to favour my work with their criticism. 
 I hope to profit still further by their opinions, and per- 
 haps to make the two remaining volumes in some 
 degree more worthy of their commendation. 
 
 Haslemere, September 1892. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 PAGB 
 
 Preface ...... v 
 
 Introduction — 
 
 On the Hellenica — A Further Comment . ■ xi 
 On the Position of Xenophon among the 
 
 Historians of Athens . . . xvii 
 Xenophon and the Ancient Criticism . xxxvi 
 A List of Lacunae . . . . xli 
 In Reference to the Composition of Hell- 
 enica B AND C : A Biographical Note . liv 
 A Conspectus of Party Politics in Athens, 
 
 B.C. 399-35 S • .... liv 
 
 Momenta of the Hellenic History . . Iviii 
 On the Minor Works included in this 
 Volume — 
 
 The Agesilaus . . . Ixi 
 
 The Two Polities .... Ixviii 
 
 The Polity of the Athenians . . Ixx 
 
 The Polity of the Lacedaemonians . Ixxiii 
 
 Ways and Means : A Pamphlet on Revenues Ixxvii 
 
 Map: Greece and the Aegean . . to face xcii 
 
 / 
 
X CONTENTS 
 
 rAGE 
 
 The Hellenica of Xenophon, Book III. . . i 
 
 „ „ Book IV. , . . 40 
 
 „ „ Book V. . .90 
 
 Book VI. . .137 
 
 Book VII. . . 186 
 
 Map : Peloponnese .... to face 234 
 
 Agesilaus: An Encomium . . . -235 
 
 The Polity of the Athenians . . . 273 
 
 The Pouty of the Lacedaemonians . . 293 
 
 Ways and Means: A Pamphlet on Revenues . 325 
 
 INDEX 
 
 3SI 
 
On the " Hellenica " of Xenophon : a further Com- 
 ment, TOGETHER WITH SOME REMARKS ON THE 
 
 Author's Place among the Historians of Athens. 
 
 I have already in my former volume expressed the opinion 
 that the Hellenica of Xenophon, commonly so called, is a 
 composite whole,^ consisting of three main portions (here for 
 
 ' See Note C to Trans, vol. i. p. Iviii. foil. The Hellenica, as we possess 
 it, consists, it will be recollected, of seven books (an arrangement known to 
 Demetrius Magnes, the grammarian friend of Cicero, and dating probably 
 from Alexandrian times). It deals with the contemporary history of Greece 
 during half a century of time from B.C. 411 down to B.C. 362 (or as regards 
 the Pheraean dynasty of Thessaly, to a somewhat later date — 359 or 358 B.C. 
 See Hell. VI. iv. 33-37). The first two books (translated in my former 
 volume) include the Sequel to Thucydides [Hell. I. -II. iii. 10) above men- 
 tioned, down to the end of the Peloponnesian war and the destruction of the 
 Long Walls of Athens), together with a smaller section (Hell. II. iii. 11 to 
 the end of that book), which may be regarded either as an appendix to the 
 Sequel or as introductory to the history of Hellenic affairs (or Hellenic 
 History proper), which the historian set himself to write after his return from 
 Asia in B. c. 394. The portion in question serves to complete the history of 
 Attic affairs from the appointment of the Thirty to the date of the amnesty, 
 B.C. 403. The Anabasis fits in chronologically between Hellenica, Books II. 
 and III. (which is my justification for its position in my former volume). 
 To assist the eye of the reader and make my meaning clearer I repeat the 
 table printed on p. Ix. of vol. i. — 
 
 Hellenica A=Hell. I. and 11. = (i) the Paraleifomena or Sequel to Thucy- 
 (b.c. 411-403.) dides. Hell. I. -II. iii. 10; and (2) the Appendix, Hell. II. 
 iii. II to end of Bk. II., which serves to fill up an im- 
 portant gap between the Paraleipomena and the Hellenic 
 History. 
 
 Hellenica B=Hell. III. (or perhaps more correctly II. iii. ii)-V. i. 36. 
 (b.c. 402 [or 
 more correctly 
 4041-B.C. 387.) 
 
 Hellenica C=Hell. V. ii.-VII. v. 27, and a digression on Thessalian affairs 
 (b.c. 387-362.) to B.C. 359 circa, Hell. VI. iv. 33-37. 
 
xii INTRODUCTION 
 
 the purpose of reference named Hell. A, B, and C), viz. (i) 
 the Sequel lo Thucydides, and (2) the Hellenic History, which 
 itself falls into two parts distinguishable alike by style and date 
 of composition. 
 
 I need not repeat the arguments upon which the above 
 conclusion rests, nor need I emphasise the note of composite- 
 ness further ; it is a fact, the significance of which will be ap- 
 parent when we come to estimate the sort of influence likely to 
 be exercised on the mind of the historian by the political 
 changes which he had set himself to chronicle. 
 
 Meanwhile it is perhaps important to lay stress upon ' the 
 other side of the matter ' — that is to say, the element of unity 
 which underlies the collective work as forming (along with the 
 Anabasis) an orderly series of studies in the contemporary 
 history of half a century. As I before remarked,^ although the 
 Hellenica is not, in the strict sense of the word, a single work, 
 yet, for aught we know to the contrary, the author himself 
 ,(or his earliest editors)^ may have chosen to link the separate 
 parts together so as to form a whole. Indeed, the absence of 
 'proems' at the commencement of the several divisions* 
 (unless it can be otherwise explained) would seem conclusive 
 on that point. Furthermore, it would be a mistake to suppose 
 that the difficulties (or, as most modern critics would plainly 
 call them, the inherent defects) of one portion of the Hellenica 
 differ greatly in kind from those of another. On the contrary, 
 though in the treatment of the several parts I see ample proof 
 of an alteration in the dramatising conception and motif ol the 
 historian, the peculiarities are persistently the same. 
 
 These may be briefly spoken of as a certain unevenness 
 (I will not say disorderliness) in the presentation of the story, 
 whether as regards the chronological sequence of events * or 
 
 1 Vol. i. p. ix. 
 
 ^ In furtherance of his intention or as marking their own view. 
 
 ' Or rather at the beginning of Hell. B and again of Hell. C, since 
 Hell. A would naturally run on in continuation of the story left incomplete 
 by Thucydides without any pause for introduction. The difficulty there is 
 rather that the junctura of the old work and the new is not smoother. For 
 speculations on which matter see vol. i. p. Ixiv. See also Diod. Sic. xiii. 42. 
 
 * E.g. in Hell. A as handed down to us there is no note of time assigned 
 to show where the year 24 of the Peloponnesian war ends and the year 25 
 begins. The modern commentator infers that the spring of B.C. 407 is 
 
HELLENIC HISTORY xiii 
 
 as regards the relative proportion assigned to them in the 
 artistic perspective of the picture. A kindred perplexity is the 
 omission of matters' which, as far as we at this date are 
 competent judges, were not likely to have escaped the em- 
 phatic notice of an historian so painstaking and so honest as 
 Xenophon, but which, for whatever reason, are not found 
 recorded in his narrative as we possess it. 
 
 Of these three ' imperfections in workmanship,' the most 
 puzzling perhaps (since it could so easily have been remedied)^ 
 — and certainly, from the point of view of those critics ^ who 
 
 hidden in the narrative somewhere about Hell. I. v. ii or v. 14. The 
 historian, it would seem, is so taken up with the course of events that he has 
 omitted the date ( " ita ut scriptor propter perpetuitatem rerum anni delapsi 
 notam suo loco addere neglexerit," Haackii Diss. ap. L. Dind. Xen. H. G., 
 Ox. MDCCCLiii., p. xlvii.) In HeU. B {Hell. III. ii. 21) the words toiJtwk hk 
 irpaTTopLivtay iv t^ 'Affiq. ijTb AepKvXida, AaKeSatfidviot /card rbv airbv XP^^^^ 
 TrdXai 6pryi^bii,evoi rois 'HXefois . . . have caused considerable ambiguity as 
 to the date of the Eleian war relatively to the affairs in Asia, In Hell. C the 
 chronology of the Theban invasions is not clear. Indeed, were it not for a 
 passage in Thucydides (v. 20), one might suppose that the chronological con- 
 science had not fully emerged in the middle of the third century B.C. 
 
 In the headline of the page I have inserted the date which, on the whole, 
 I believe to be correct, and in case of grave discrepancies between 'the 
 authorities, ' I have drawn attention to the matter in a footnote. 
 
 I must here apologise to my readers for some unpardonable chronological 
 misprints, for which I am alone responsible, in the headings of Hellenica I. and 
 II, of my former volume. These I hope on an early opportunity to rectify. 
 
 ^ To take three or four typical examples : how easy, as it seems to us 
 now, it would have been to have mentioned the name of Pelopidas as one of 
 the half-dozen patriots who took a leading part in the deliverance of Thebes, 
 B. c. 379. Or again the names of Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and Gorgidas 
 in connection with Leuctra, B.C. 371. The addition of half a sentence 
 would have left no doubt concerning the origin and import of the new naval 
 confederacy of B.C. 378 (see Rev, v. 6 as compared with Hell. V. iv. 34). 
 A single paragraph would have sufficed to explain the founding of Megalo- 
 polis and Messene as direct consequences, the one of Leuctra and the other 
 of the first Theban invasion in the winter of B.C. 370-369. Apparently the 
 historian does not trouble himself about matters which all the world is aware 
 of. That his silence is due to a desire to minimise the fame of political 
 opponents seems to me incredible (and except for the great authority of 
 those who have countenanced that explanation in modem times, I would say 
 ridiculous) considering the notoriety of the circumstances at the time. 
 
 ^ And amongst these some, if not all, of the greatest modern historians of 
 Greece. Grote, indeed, does not question the honesty of Xenophon, but he 
 regards the historian as tongue-tied (or tongue-loosed) by his strong partiality 
 towards Lacedaemon, which in one passage he describes as "glaring" and 
 "discreditable" (H. G. a. 315, note i). Curtius also speaks of intellectual 
 rather than moral disqualifications in his remarks on Rhetoric and History 
 
xiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 suspect the honesty of the historian, the more scandalous — is 
 the omission in places of certain names, now of persons and 
 now of occurrences, which we have come to regard as in the 
 highest sense ' historical.' ^ 
 
 But to others — who admit the puzzle whilst they repudiate 
 the dishonesty — it may well appear that the want of propor- 
 tion which they seem to be aware of in the handling of the 
 topics presents the greater difificulty, since it would seem to 
 imply a serious defect of art in the work of an artist.^ 
 
 Such, on the assumption that the work has been trans- 
 mitted to us in nearly the same condition (apart from the 
 ordinary corruptions to which all ancient texts are liable) as 
 that in which it left the author's hands — such, I say, are the 
 difficulties. How are they to be explained ? Largely perhaps 
 by circumstances over which the historian had little or no con- 
 trol. I refer to such accidents as the time and place at which 
 
 (bk. vii. ch. ii.), as if Xenophon, "in undertaking to continue Thucydides, 
 had assumed a task far beyond his powers. " "At the beginning of the work 
 the influence of his predecessor is still observable as sustaining him ; but this 
 only makes it all the more apparent, in the course of his Hellenic History, 
 how he lacks independence of judgment, freedom of view, and intellectual 
 force" (vol. v. 175, Eng. tr. ). Thirlwall, however (who like Niebuhr regards 
 the historian as 'a bad citizen'), has a poor opinion also of his honesty; 
 see his valedictory note at the end of ch. xl. (v. 152). And this is the 
 verdict also of Professor Freeman ; see his essay, The Historians of Athens, 
 p. 95 and passim. This essay is well worth studying, if only for the delight- 
 ful criticism it contains of Herodotus. In his praise of Thucydides our Sixtuos 
 avyypaipeis seems to me to come much nearer the truth of things than in his 
 dispraise of Xenophon. The latter is too distinctly used as a foil to set off the 
 virtues of the former. Indeed, as far as the inferior historian of the three is 
 concerned, wepl t^s xaxmiBelas toO Sei>o(pu)pros might have been the title of 
 the essay. 
 
 ' See 'Lacunae,' p. xli. foil, below. 
 
 " As arguing either an absolute deficiency of technical skill, or an extraor- 
 dinary want of finish in the work of art ; whereby (if for the profit of others I 
 may venture to analyse my own condition of mind) I find myself in a strange 
 quandary : since clearly to my perception the technical defect is there ; and 
 yet the historian, as I am well aware, was pre-eminently an artistic writer 
 (the testimony of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, as cited in my former vol. p. xxvi. 
 foil, seems to me conclusive on that point). Who then am I that I should 
 criticise this master of style on matters which concern his own department ? 
 How to escape from this dilemma is not clear immediately. As instances of 
 what offends my sense of proportion I would mention (i) the amount of detail 
 bestowed on Asiatic relatively to Home affairs in Hell. B (Bks. III. and IV. 
 throughout) ; (2) the space allotted to ' speechifying ' in the Assembly at 
 Athens during and after the first Theban invasion, as contrasted with the 
 
HELLENIC HISTORY xv 
 
 he collected his materials — and not as concerning the collec- 
 tion merely, but the sorting and sifting of them ; to which 
 must be added the author's whole method of composition, so 
 far as it was influenced by external surroundings ; the manner 
 — not improbably haphazard — in which the writings obtained 
 publication ; and, as affecting each part of the work in turn 
 conceivably, the amount of time and attention allowed him for 
 the final touches. 
 
 Unfortunately (unlike his great predecessor ^ in this as in 
 other more important respects) Xenophon has told us nothing 
 directly as to his motives or his methods. Concerning the 
 surroundings of his life, his opportunities or lack of oppor- 
 tunity, as an exile, to perfect his history, we are left to our 
 own conjectures. We do not know from his own lips 
 what pains he took to make a careful record of personal 
 
 marked silence meanwhile concerning the action military and diplomatic of 
 the invader at the seat of war in Hell. C (in Bks. VI. v. and VII. ) ; (3) the in- 
 sertion (as if it were a special point of duty incumbent on the historian) of 
 the whole episode concerning the little state of Phlius (Bk. VII. ii.), and 
 similarly concerning the Tagoi of Pherae (VI. iv. ), when so much of equal or 
 greater interest concerning other little states and other extra-Peloponnesian 
 affairs is either omitted altogether or hinted at vaguely in a chance paren- 
 thesis. Such a procedure strongly suggests to the reader's mind a method of 
 composition which allowed an alteration of scale in the subjects treated of by 
 the historian, and that too perhaps without his own observation. What this 
 might be (on the supposition that our version of the Helknica is not very dif- 
 ferent from the original work as it left the author's hands in B.C. 355 or 
 thereabouts) will have to be considered. Meanwhile it is not surprising that 
 many modern critics have seen in our version a mere epitome of the original 
 work ; since (if only there were sufficient proof to establish it) such a theory 
 would readily explain the d^'U/xaXIa complained of. 
 
 ^ See the well-known passages in Thucydides, where the historian in the 
 first place explains his motive for writing the history of the war (i. i), and the 
 great pains taken by him to ascertain the truth about events (i. 22), and con- 
 cerning his system of chronology by summers and winters (v. 20), and the 
 autobiographic passage in reference to his exile and the chance so given him 
 "to watch quietly the course of events" and hear both sides (v, 26). The 
 explicitness of Thucydides in these personal matters we may be sure is a 
 sign, not of vanity of any sort, but of conscientiousness ; the reader ought 
 to be furnished with such information that he may know what manner of 
 history he is reading. Xenophon, whose transparency of character reveals 
 itself at every turn, is, as I Iteep on insisting, unduly secretive concerning 
 private matters, partly I think because he fails to put himself at the reader's 
 point of view, but also perhaps in obedience to some theory or instinct of 
 history - writing which would exclude such topics as irrelevant — ^uvavTa 
 avtimSniM would seem, at times, to have been his motto. 
 
XVI INTRODUCTION 
 
 observations,^ or failing these to institute a comparison between 
 the reports of others with a view to eliciting the truth. 
 
 I am far from suggesting that because the historian has 
 taken us so little into his confidence he was therefore 
 careless about the most rudimentary rules of his profession. 
 From what we know of him, we should certainly suspect the 
 opposite. 
 
 His reticence, here and elsewhere, may be allied to 
 shrewdness of mind {ayxi^voia), as if to be more outspoken 
 were unpractical ; or it may argue some lack of sympathy or 
 imagination {dyva/uxrvvq), as if what is clear enough to his 
 simple mind must needs be obvious to the intelligence of others ; 
 or in the case of deeper matters (as I have before suggested ^) it 
 may be the result of some division of the soul {^ixlrvxl^- But 
 whatever the cause was, of this at least we may be certain. 
 This pupil of Socrates, Xenophon, was fully alive to the 
 necessity of careful pains and accuracy (iTri/ieAeta) as a sine 
 qua non of success in every undertaking, so that if he sinned 
 at all in these respects, it was with his eyes open. But that 
 he so sinned at all is just the one explanation which it would 
 be hardest to accept, partly as being opposed to the general 
 impression of good faith which his works produce, and partly 
 because in the opinion of the ancient world his honesty was 
 unimpeachable. 
 
 And so we come to the latter part of this discussion, in 
 which, with a view to stimulate inquiry rather than to state an 
 opinion dogmatically, I have put together some loose remarks 
 
 1 airotl/ia, technically so called. That Xenophon's material was collected 
 atroirnKus to a great extent is obvious (see Sketch). All I mean to say is that 
 he does not make any direct allusion to his methods. 
 
 2 See Sketch of Life, vol. i. p. xcii. : Xenophon "was (to use an epithet 
 of his own) to some extent dipsychio and the cherisher of incompatible 
 desires." I was there speaking'of his personal ambitions ; but in the larger 
 sphere of Politics and History there was, we suspect, in his mind a similar 
 clash of contradictory views and aspirations which kept his judgment in abey- 
 ance and his tongue tied. If he had found voice at all at times, it would have 
 been to exclaim with the poet — 
 
 BoBs /loi M yTidaa'g xparepQ woSl XSf iiri^alvuv 
 fffX^i KunCKKsiv Kolirep iiriaT&ixcvov. — Theog. 815 ; 
 
 for which aphasia see below. For his views as to kTnji&\.ao., see Mem. , Cyrop. , 
 Bcon., passim. 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xvii 
 
 Concerning the Position which Xenophon may claim 
 to hold among the historians of athens ^ 
 
 The first and most obvious point to be noted in any attempt 
 to gauge the merits of the historian is the marked divergence 
 of opinion which would appear to subsist between the ancients 
 and ourselves concerning him. Their estimate, it is scarcely 
 too much to say, is without exception laudatory.^ Ours, if not 
 wholly depreciatory, is qualified with censure and disapproval. 
 The verdict, moreover, of the most famous modern historians 
 of Greece is without exception adverse.^ Xenophon, accord- 
 ing to one of the greatest of these authorities, is not only un- 
 worthy to rank with Herodotus and Thucydides, but is altogether 
 an inferior historian. And that too would seem to be the 
 popular opinion of the moment. It is with diffidence, there- 
 fore, that I venture to restate the matter concerning Xenophon's 
 position as it strikes myself. 
 
 I am well aware of the difficulties which beset the inquiry. 
 The problems already referred to, concerning the composition 
 and publication of the work or works originally, together with 
 the whole subsequent history of the text, are sufficiently in- 
 determinate to warrant a suspense of judgment. That they 
 will one day find their solution in the discovery of some frag- 
 ment of an earlier and fuller Hellenica, is a delightful hope, too 
 
 1 I chose this title out of respect for the name (and now, alas ! I must 
 add, the memory) of the great historian, to whose severe judgment of Xeno- 
 phon I' have already referred — Dr. Edward A. Freeman. 
 
 ^ The criticisms, if unfavourable, concern manner not matter. See, for 
 instance, what Dion. Hal. has to say on the former head {Ep. ad Cn. Pomp. 
 etc. See vol. i. p. xxv. foil.). Another late writer speaks of the laxviit 
 XapaKTiip of Xenophon, which may or may not be a comphment. The re- 
 markable thing is that not a single writer, great or small, finds any sort of 
 fault with Xenophon on the score of partiality or deflection from the strict 
 path of truth and honesty. It seems to be a foregone conclusion that of 
 course he is honest. And yet even so great a writer as Herodotus is attacked 
 on that very ground. See the well-known tract Trepl KaKotiSetas toO 
 'HpoSdrov. 
 
 3 See note 2, above, p. xiii. , for ' the consensus of experts ' : since Niebuhr, 
 the weightiest published opinion is clearly adverse to Xenophon's fame as an 
 absolutely honest historian. On the other hand, I believe it would be im- 
 possible to quote from the ancient world a single adverse criticism of Xenophon 
 gua dUaios avyypa^eis, 
 
 VOL. II ^ 
 
xviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 visionary to rest upon. Meanwhile I am disposed to think 
 that the merits of the work, as we possess it, would suffice in 
 part to explain the admiring attitude of former ages, and that 
 the demerits by the same showing do not suffice to justify the 
 modern depreciation. Has not the Hellenica after all a quality 
 and distinction, not of manner alone or chiefly, but of manner 
 and matter combined, which would seem to justify the old 
 opinion, according to which Xenophon was worthy in some 
 special sense to rank with his two predecessors, and was cer- 
 tainly habitually spoken of in the same breath with them — 
 Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon?^ 
 
 It may be urged that the very collocation of the names is 
 suggestive of greatness on the decline. What is true of the drama 
 (of sculpture and of painting also, doubtless) at that period, 
 and of its evolution as represented by Aeschylus, Sophocles, 
 Euripides, may also be true of history, or history of a certain 
 type, as represented by Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon. 
 In the Hellenica of Xenophon, I admit, what strikes us most is 
 the immense falling-off from Thucydides — a falling-off in dig- 
 nity and depth of art and philosophy, in matter and manner 
 alike. But then Thucydides, like Sophocles or Phidias, stands 
 alone. The comparison is in one sense too severe ; that it 
 was tenable at all, instructive. The ancients in any case, who 
 were in a better position than we to judge, saw no absurdity in 
 drawing it. What they were most aware of was the line of 
 demarcation which separated the three historians from the rest 
 of the world, their contemporaries or successors. So again 
 the evolutional connection between Xenophon and the rhetor- 
 ical school of history, as represented by Ephorus and Theo- 
 pompus, to us is manifest ; indeed, in some ways (though it is 
 hard to judge from fragments and the criticisms of later writers 
 only), Xenophon may seem closer to the Isocratids than to 
 Thucydides. Yet to the earlier critics the other side of the 
 matter was the more striking. And so we come back to what 
 we started from : the opposition between the ancient and 
 the modern estimate of Xenophon. It is a great misfortune 
 on every ground that the works of Xenophon's contempor- 
 
 1 I refer in particular to the two greatest ancient critics, Dionysius of Hali- 
 carnassus and Lucian. 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xix 
 
 aries ^ and immediate successors have not been preselrved. If we 
 had those of Ctesias and Philistus, of Ephorus and Theopompus, 
 of Clidemus and Callisthenes, etc., some or all of whom ob- 
 viously had great merits as historians, we should be in a better 
 position to form a judgment. As it is, we must accept the 
 fact that in the opinion of antiquity, as far as we can discover, 
 none of them possessed that special title to rank with Herodo- 
 tus and Thucydides which was allowed to Xenophon. 
 
 This statement of the case, however, is only broadly correct. 
 It needs qualification in two directions. In the first place, when 
 it is said that Xenophon as an historian was highly thought of by 
 the ancients, it must be recollected that some of them looked 
 upon the Cyropaedia as an ' historical ' work ^ (which probably 
 shows at once a marked distinction between their views of what 
 constitutes history and ours), whereas the modern condemnation 
 is chiefly directed against the defective qualities of the Hellenica. 
 The Cyropaedia no one would think of criticising as a work of 
 history ; and as to the Anabasis, though no doubt it has been, 
 and on quite rational grounds may be, criticised adversely as 
 ' unhistorical,' yet there is no ' consensus of experts ' against 
 it \ but, on the whole, its great qualities, whether as the vera 
 narratio of a particular historical episode, or as a literary 
 composition pure and simple, are probably as highly rated by 
 us as they were by the ancients themselves. 
 
 In the second place, it may be maintained that the criticism 
 of antiquity in general is wont to refer to the style and manner 
 rather than to the substance and matter of any particular writ- 
 ing under consideration, whereas in the case of the Hellenica, 
 
 ' Ctesias (fl. B.C. 401). See Trans, vol. i. p. 108. 
 Philistus (B.C. 406), the Sicilian. See Grote, xi. 139 ; Freeman, Hist, 
 of tci y, . 5^7 . rpjjg j^^ representative pupils of Isocrates. 
 
 Ephorus needed the whip, Theopompus 
 the curb. See Polybius, Hist. iv. 20, 
 vi. 43, ix. I, xii. 15 ; de V. et V. ■xa.fr. 
 ix, X. ; Hist. xvi. 1 1 ; <& V. et V. viii. See 
 Miiller and Donaldson, ch. xliii. ; . Jebb, 
 Att. Or. ii. passim ; Mahaffy, ii. xiv. 
 Clidemus, cot. of Isocrates and Plato, author of an Atihis. See Plut. 
 
 de Glor. Ath. ii. 345. 
 Callisthenes of Stageirus (B.C. 336-323), who accompanied Alexander to 
 the east. See Polybius, Hist. iv. 32, vi. 43, xii. S ; de V. et V. xii. 
 2 See L. Dindorf, Inst. Cyr. p. xiii. (Ox. mdccclvii). 
 
 Ephorus (b. c. 340) of Cyme . 
 Theopompus (B. c. 360) 
 
XX INTRODUCTION 
 
 at any rate, it is distinctly from the point of view of history 
 and not of literature that the modern objections are raised. 
 
 What we are entitled to say is that the favourable opinion of 
 the older critics must, in default of any evidence ^ to the con- 
 trary, be held to have been based on their study of the works as 
 a whole ; but within the range of their consideration were in- 
 cluded, doubtless, the Sequel and the Hellenic History. This 
 in reference to the first point ; and in reference to the second, 
 
 ' The earliest direct reference to the historical' works of Xenophon is, 1 
 think, that of Theopompus, who quotes a passage from Hell. IV. i. 33 (see 
 p. 45, note i).| It is a question whether Ephorus also was acquainted with 
 Xenophon's work. 
 
 The next and a more important witness is Polybius (b. B.C. 207, fl. B.C. 
 160), who was almost certainly well acquainted with the Cyropaedia, and who 
 makes three separate allusions to Xenophon — (i) as to the importance of the 
 march of the Ten. thousand, 7) tujv /ierd ^evo^CivTos 'EXXijywv iK twv &vta 
 aarpairaav iici,voSos, iv 5 iracrav ttJk 'kxrlav Siairopevojj4viiiv airruiv, iroXefilav 
 vn-dpxovaav, oiSeU iT6\fw, fiiveiv Kard, irpdffUTOv tS>v ^ap^dpuv, as the first 
 cause of the conquest of Persia by Alexander, the second being the abortive 
 project of Agesilaus(as described in I/ell. IV.), which Polybius does not 
 indeed actually quote, but probably, I think, refers to : Sevripa Si, AaKedat- 
 liovlav pacri\4a5 'AyriiriKiov, 5«£/3a(ns els t^v 'A.alav, iv § iKeivos oiSiv 
 &^i6xpeuv o6di AvHtoKov eipCiv rais <r<fieT4pai,s im^oXats dirpaKTOs ■^vayKdirBij 
 5ii Tcls /wra(i irepl tV "SlKKASa rapax^s iTanekdeiv. ^| Siy ^LXairos Kara- 
 vo^a-as, k.tX {ffist. iii. 6) ; (2) as a learned historian (in a passage which 
 I shall have occasion to notice in reference to the genuineness of the Pol. Lac. ), 
 irffis oi XoyLiirrwroi tQv ipxaluv ffvyypaipiat' "Eipopo^, Swo^Sy, KaWurdivijs 
 KcU UXdrav . . . (concerning the Cretan constitution), TpSrov fiiv ofwlav 
 dual <j>aai. Kal tV air^ rg AaKeSainovlwv de&repov S' iwaiveTTii/ iiripxovirav 
 &iro(pali'ova-iv {Hist. vi. 43) ; and (3) to the phrase epyaa-Hipiov iroXiftov in 
 Hell. III. iv.p. 29 below, ■' the workshop of war," which Polybius applies 
 himself to Carthago Nova in B.C. 209 {Hist. x. 20). But the value of Poly- 
 bius's testimony, as I hope to show, is weightier than might appear from these 
 passages and others, such as Hist. iv. 33, vi. 41, viii. i, and ix. 8 in reference to 
 Epaminondas, which may or may not imply a thorough acquaintance with the 
 Hellenica. (See below. ) 
 
 We next come to Cicero (55 B.C. ) The great passage is de Or. II. xiv. 53, 
 in which occurs an interesting discussion in answer to the question, "qualis 
 oratoris et quanti horainis in dicendo putas esse historiam scribere?" 
 and a comparison of the Roman and Greek methods, with criticisms 
 of different historians : ' ' Denique etiam a philosophia profectus princeps Xeno- 
 phon Socraticus ille, post ab Aristotele Callistjienes, comes Alexandri, scripsit 
 historiam et hie quidem rhetorico paene more ; ille autem superior leniore 
 quodam sono est usus, et qui ilium impetum oratoris non habeat, vehemens 
 fortasse minus, sed aliquanto tamen est, ut mihi quidem videtur, dulcior " 
 This criticism, doubtless, chiefly concerns manner, but we may be' sure that 
 Cicero had also an eye to matter. 
 
 With it should be compared that of Quintilian, who, in his list of the best 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xxi 
 
 we must say that though the ancients set greater store by style 
 than we do, and were more ready perhaps than we to quarrel 
 with the subject matter of the historian on account of defects 
 of manner, yet there is no reason to suppose that they were 
 likelier than ourselves to overlook the more essential deficien- 
 cies in connection with the treatment of the narrative itself. 
 
 Such is a common-sense conclusion. But we are not left 
 to mere speculation on this point. The fact that three writers 
 
 writers, de Inst. Or. x. 509, on the subject of ' Historians,' names Thucydides, 
 Herodotus, Theopompus, Philistus, Ephorus, Clitarchus, Timagenes, and 
 then, with a sort of apology for having not earlier named him, says : " Xen- 
 ophon non excidit mihi, sed inter philosophos reddendus est." Quintilian's 
 date is 100 A.D., and in order to place him next to Cicero I have omitted 
 Diodorus Sic. (fl. 44 B. c. ). 
 
 What Diodorus says is short, but to the point : 'HpMoros Sk b irohMTrpiriii,wi, 
 et Kal Tis iSXAos, yeyoviis xal iroXX^s laropias ^/iircipos iwiKex^pixe iih> irepl 
 Toiruv (the sources of the Nile) diroSidivai. \byov, ■f/KoXovBriKiiis Sl ivTiXeyofihais 
 inroyoiais ebplaKeTdC ^evo^thv S^ Kal QovkvSIStjSj iTatvoOfieyot Kara 
 T^v &\TiBelay tuv Zitto/jiwc, ivicrxovro t(\4us Karci ,tV ypa^ijp tuv 
 rbtrdiv Tuv xar' XtyvirTov. oi Sk vepl Tiv 'E^opov xal Oediro/iTor /idXiffra 
 irivTinv els raura iimaBivTes iJKUTTa rij! iXriddas iirirvxav. Kal SieiripAlvqaav 
 offrot it&VTei oi Sii, t-Jj)/ d.pii'Ketav dXXi Sii t^v tt\s xiipas IdiSrriTa (i. 37). 
 
 Plutarch (80 a.d.) is a witness whose testimony, like that of Polybius, has 
 a weight beyond that of his actual references, though these are numberless, and 
 not one of them suggests in the slightest degree that Plutarch doubted Xeno- 
 phon's truthfulness. (See below.) 
 
 Of Dio Chrysostom (fl. 100 a.d.) and Arrian (fl. 124 a.d.) I have spoken 
 in my former volume (p. xxvi. foil.). 
 
 Pausanias (138-161 a.d.) testifies to (ffell. C as I call it) the Hellenic 
 History so far as it concerns the struggle for the hegemony, in a passage 
 already referred to : avv^ypa^pav dk &XXot re Kal ^evotpQv rttv Trdvra 7r6Xe/Aoj/, 
 KardXtj^iv re ttjs Ka5/Ae£as (B.C. 383) Kal rd TTOtcrpui AaKedai/Mpiiiiv Tb iv 
 AeiiKTpois (b.C. 371), Kal lbs h Ile\oTrbvvTj(rov iir^^oKov "Boittiral (B.C. 370-369) 
 Kal rijv (Tu/iyiiaxlai' AaKedaiiwvtoi,s Trjv irapb, 'Kdrjvaluv iXBovaav (B.C. 362), 
 
 i- 3- 4- 
 
 The last three witnesses whom I need cite ' flourished ' in the reign of 
 Marcus Antoninus (160 a.d. circa). They are: Lucian, whose essay on the 
 Right Method of the Historian is full of criticism of a high order. He makes 
 pointed allusion to Xenophon and illustrates from his methods, and all with- 
 out a suggestion of fault-finding with him as an offender against the canons 
 which he is engaged in laying down. (See below. ) Polyaenus, the collector 
 of military anecdotes, (!Tpa-n\yi]p.aTa, which he derived from all sorts of 
 sources, Xenophon's Hellenica and Anabasis included. Hermogenes, the 
 celebrated rhetorician, who somewhere draws this comparison : irepl Si 0eo- 
 irbp-Tov KoX 'E04/3OII Kal "EKXavlKov Kal *iXiirTou Kal tSv b/iolaii toiJtois weptrrbv 
 lSo^4 fioi ypd^eiv, Kal Sn fijXou Kal fu/i-/i(reujs rd etSrj tS>v \6ywv airCiv oi 
 irdvv n frnWoj/ Si oiS' Skus baa ye iyd) yiyviisKia ij^luTai irapd tois "EXXijiri 
 KaB&irep rd tup fiXXwi' oTov QovkuSISov, 'SpoSbrov, "EKaratov, SevoipwuTos (ap. 
 Sprengel, ii. 424). 
 
xxii INTRODUCTION 
 
 so different from one another, and yet so able in their several 
 departments — and, I will add, so conscientious and painstaking 
 — as Polybius the historian, Plutarch the biographer and 
 moralist, and Lucian the critic, humorist, and essayist, all 
 concur in speaking well (or by an eloquent silence implying 
 well) of Xenophon's historical writings, seems to me decisive. 
 Whether or not they had the same (or a fuller) text before 
 them may certainly be an open question, but that the judgment 
 of antiquity, finding voice in these three, has declared in favour 
 of Xenophon as an honest and impartial historian, worthy to 
 rank with Herodotus and Thucydides, I consider obvious. 
 
 If this is admitted, it still remains for us to discover some 
 reasonable grounds for their appreciation by a study of the 
 Hellenica itself. Considering the nature of the task which he 
 had undertaken, does it appear that the historian was true to 
 himself and to the standard which the age demanded ? 
 
 The scope of the undertaking might be defined, in the 
 language of Isocrates,^ as " an attempt to compile a history of 
 events exhibited (chiefly) in wars," between B.C. 411 and B.C. 
 362. It might have been entitled a series of studies in con- 
 temporary history. As to the incidents which form its sub- 
 ject matter, they happened, some of them, before the writer's 
 own eyes, and the rest he would either learn from those who 
 had seen them, or else he must make conjecture of them, and 
 reconstruct them according to his idea of probability. He 
 had a plain duty to record them as truthfully and honestly as 
 possible, since, as Polybius puts it, '' neither fear nor favour 
 must tempt him to waver for a moment in his allegiance to 
 truth ; " or as Lucian says, " Impartiality ! that is the one true 
 characteristic of history. He who sets out to write history has 
 but one goddess to whom he must do sacrifice — the goddess 
 Truth. All things and persons else he must disregard." Such, 
 with regard to moral fitness, was the standard required in the 
 ancient world ; and such it remains to-day.^ 
 
 ' T&s TT/jdffis Thx if ToU iroX^/nois, Isocr. Antid. 319. 
 
 2 Only it is to be recollected that many topics which would be appropriate 
 enough and indeed expected in a modem history might fairly well be excluded 
 (and were by Thucydides himself) in a history of events occurring chiefly in wars. 
 The details of the Arcadian confederation as a form of polity which would in- 
 terest us so much would be fairly excluded, but not, I think, certain statements 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xxui 
 
 As regards intellectual fitness, the historian must possess 
 two crowning virtues — the one a gift of nature and the other 
 to be acquired only by long practice : to wit, political intelli- 
 gence, the insight of a statesman, and a capacity for the artistic 
 presentation of the truth.^ And here again I do not know that 
 we can improve on the antique definition of the true historian. 
 
 Does the Helknica satisfy this standard ? That is a ques- 
 tion which every reader must answer for himself. For my own 
 part, I am disposed to believe that the ancients were justified 
 in that high opinion of Xenophon with which I credit them, 
 and which made the collocation of the three names, Herodotus, 
 Thucydides, Xenophon, sound specially suitable to their ears. 
 And with regard to the modern estimate, it presses, as I think, 
 unduly hard on Xenophon for two reasons — partly from his 
 juxtaposition to Thucydides, and partly owing to a misunder- 
 standing as to the nature itself of the Helknica. That, if I am 
 right, is a single work only in the general sense already noted, 
 but, for the purpose of examining into the historian's qualifica- 
 tions, it ought rather to be regarded as a series of separate 
 if closely interconnected studies in contemporary history, the 
 design, method, and manner of each composition varying with 
 the political point of view of the historian at different periods 
 of his long life, but never dishonestly or disingenuously. In 
 what way this may have been the case I will presently explain. 
 
 But as to relative inadequacies : that Xenophon was cer- 
 tainly not a historian of the high Thucydidean type is too obvious 
 to need further comment. He had neither the statesmanlike 
 comprehension nor the interpretative power of Thucydides, 
 neither his faculty for philosophic generalisation nor his spiritual 
 detachment, nor yet again his supreme artistic skill, that power 
 of presentation which (in spite of some obscurity of diction) ^ 
 makes his history of the Peloponnesian war, in a sense deeper 
 than he dreamed of, an eternal possession. But to Xenophon 
 belong great qualities of his own. If he is not a philosopher, he 
 
 of fact (see list of lacunae below), the omission of which at the moment (or 
 altogether) is a great puzzle, but from my point of view a puzzle not explained by 
 'partisanship.' ^ iro\i.Ti,Kij (rivecns and IpfirivevTiK^ dAvafus. 
 
 2 Or perhaps on that very account also, considering the tonic effect pro- 
 duced on the reader "working at his history in the rough-hewn sentences of 
 his own tongue." The words are Dr. Freeman's [Methods, p. 171). 
 
XXIV INTRODUCTION 
 
 is a sensible man with a sober-minded and indeed high-minded 
 theory as to the orderly arrangement of the moral world ; he is 
 aware of the gods at every turn and yet not superstitious ; he 
 is incapable of taking a vulgar or cynical view of the course of 
 events ; he has the gifts of lucidity, transparency, intelligibiUty, 
 and a popular style ; he is shrewd himself, and is apt to expect 
 or assume sharpness of wits on the part of his listeners ; and 
 hence a certain touch of obscurity when he does not trouble, 
 himself to explain what of course every one knows, or with a 
 little reflection might easily arrive at the truth of. And, from 
 another side, it is noticeable that the main thread of his narra- 
 tive is artistically woven. It may be felt that the whole work 
 from beginning to end, or (which I think would be more 
 correct) that certain portions of it, may best be described in 
 Lucian's phrase as troJ/ia aKaWh «Tt koI dSidpOpmrov, a skeleton 
 devoid of beautv as yet and inarticulate ; but if so, there it 
 lies ready to be clothed upon with life by a touch of thei 
 creator's hand.^ To these subjective qualities of the historian 
 must be added an accidental one (though it was no accident 
 indeed which, fortunately, induced him to write his history, 
 whatever we think of it), the objective qualification of being a 
 contemporary witness.^ 
 
 But what are we to say to those omissions and reticences 
 which, under the head of artistic (or inartistic) proportion, I 
 have above referred to and below tabulated ? Three or four 
 possible explanations suggest themselves. 
 
 (i) There is the 'epitome' theory.^ so often spoken of, 
 according to which our Hellenica is not the original work, or 
 rather it is that work in an epitomised form, the mere skele- 
 
 1 See Thirlwall's conspectus of the period [Hell. B and C), analytical and 
 chronological, chaps, xxxv.-xl. of his history. Except for 'flesh and blood' 
 lacunae, the skeleton is all or nearly all there, and on one not extravagant 
 hypothesis the flesh itself was once there. How little do the lacunae even now 
 impair the general aper(u. Indeed it is fair to speak of the work as a living 
 organism ; and if any one chooses to say that it is an organism that has not 
 been fashioned into mature beauty and articulate structure, we might admit 
 this without denying the intrinsically vital touch of the author's hand, i 
 
 ^ See what Grote says so well and kindly on this head, x. 371, note i. 
 
 3 See Trans, vol. i. p. Ixiv. note 3. The only advocate of this theory whose 
 views I am acquainted with at first hand is the Greek scholar A. Kumi- 
 avos, who stated his thesis, thus : Th 'EWriviKb. div elvat a\iyypa,(j>^ toO 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xxv 
 
 ton in part (to use Lucian's simile in an inverted shape) of a 
 far grander work, from which the flesh and blood has been 
 ruthlessly torn by the epitomist and its beauty marred. This 
 theory, though it has the support of able critics, I cannot ac- 
 cept. It is, I think, fatal to it that the epitomist, who must have 
 done his work not earlier probably than the second century of 
 our era, should exhibit so much animus in the application of 
 his scissors. It is also almost incredible that the epitome 
 should have driven the original work out of the field altogether. 
 Theopompus, we know, made an epitome of Herodotus, but the 
 real work has survived whilst the epitome has perished, which 
 is not surprising. But as the theory has gained little acceptance 
 since it was first put forward, I will not discuss it further. 
 
 (2) The second theory is, to my mind, at once more prob- 
 able and less audacious. I wish that it could be proved to 
 be the true one, as might happen, through the discovery of 
 some manuscript. Those who hold it account for the incom- 
 pleteness of 0U7- Hellenica on the supposition that large frag- 
 ments of the original were at some time lost, so that what 
 we now have is not the very image, but a mere stump or 
 torso of the work itself. 
 
 Or again (3), it may be supposed that the work was never 
 finished, and that the text before us is, in part, an outline. This 
 is that theory of the immature and structurally imperfect organ- 
 ism above suggested, and as I hold to it somewhat myself, I will 
 state what I think has happened. If I may make conjecture, 
 the historian's manner of composing was on this wise. He 
 took notes at the time as an eye-witness when he had the 
 chance, or else from hearsay, which notes he from time to 
 
 Seco^ffivTos dXX' iTiTOfiii, yevo/tivri iierli, XpuTrbv Kcd TnSavus iiri XpitTTiavoO. 
 It is not essential to the theory, of course, that the epitomist was a Christian ; 
 but that it was a work done not earlier than the second century of our era, is 
 essential to it, since Plutarch is supposed to have been acquainted with the 
 original,- and we cannot infer from what Diogenes Laertius tells us as to 
 the canon that it existed even then (200 a.d. circa). The same view has been 
 held in a modified form by Dittrich-Fabricius and Grosser. See, for an 
 elaborate criticism of it, a pamphlet, Besitsen wir Xenophon's Hellenische Ge- 
 schichten nur in Auszuge? by J. Haenel, Breslau, 1872; also G. Sauppe, 
 Praef. Hist. Gr. p. xi. ; Roquette, de Xen. Vit. p. 61. Though I do not see my 
 way to accepting Kuprianos's views, I wish to say that the Uttle work in which 
 he published them is full of suggestion and interest. See Karl Schenkl, 
 Chrestomathie aus Xen. , Einleitung, p. xiii. 
 
xxvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 time worked up, some immediately and others after long 
 intervals. In this way a large portion of his history was com- 
 posed currente calamo ; other portions were elaborated with a 
 greater or less prolixity according to some instinct of the artist 
 and historian after mature, or it may be over-mature, reflec- 
 tion;'- others again were put aside, for whatever cause, and 
 never finished. That quality, which I have spoken of above 
 as an unevenness, dvw/mAta, distinguishing each section of his 
 
 1 I here insert — 
 
 A Note on the Historian's Probable Method, etc. 
 
 Hell. ^— The Sequel. 
 
 Design — To finish Thucydides's History of the Peloponnesian war, which 
 Forward-looking-^- he carried out, but through force of circumstances 
 
 Promethean incompletely {see Sketch of Life), 
 
 ' Motif or subject — Given. The final rounds of the Great Duel; and the 
 
 year of ' anarchy.' 
 Materials — (i) Possibly furnished partly by Thucydides's executors (?) ; (2) 
 chiefly obtained at first hand (aiSroTTTi/cws), as he 
 . was an eye-witness of a good deal, we may sup- 
 
 no?vet m 10? 1 pose, but (if he was a captive in Boeotia, accord- 
 
 but fully in 394 )'^°™'°P°'^' ing to an old story, or for whatever reason) not 
 ■^Epimetheafi throughout. Also there is a possible ^oCs iirl 
 
 With a backward gaze. y\ili(T(rri, he is perhaps already somewhat tongue- 
 
 tied. Anyhow the Sequel is incomplete. 
 It led to Hellenica B because the history of the year of ' anarchy ' which 
 completes the Peloponnesian war (flpiyicis dSXioji/ kokSc) is also introductory 
 to the new 
 
 Design ("To-morrow to fresh fields') — To write a history (or current 
 Proraethcan->- notes with a view to a history) of Hellenic Affairs. 
 
 'Motif or theme being — (a) The Pan-Hellenic Anabasis and Conquest of 
 Persia (Agesilaus is the semi-divine leader, the 
 'archie' man). 
 Peacfof An--) ^^P"""'"*" (/3) Thwarted and transmuted into a military 
 talcidas, [■ Promethean-^- '^"'^ diplomatic struggle for the hegemony between 
 B.C. 387 ) Lacedaemon and the Allied Powers, ending tri- 
 
 umphantly for Sparta in the Peace of Antalcidas. 
 Materials — Collected autoptically for (a) entirely almost, and hence [?] ful- 
 ness of detail amounting to prolixity in part, e.g. 
 Asiatic affairs (the scale is not maintained) ; and 
 SS-^ly'developed after ^°' (?) Partly, and partly by hearing the testimony, 
 
 Leuctra, B.c. sfr. possibly one-sided, of people at Olympia, etc., in 
 
 -^Eptmetkean the neighbourhood of Scillus. Hell. B is more 
 complete (see lacunae) than either A ox C (the 
 ^ow iirl y\ib(S(rri is less than anywhere, yet it is 
 there). 
 It led to Hellenica C, the completion of the story, because the Peace of 
 Antalcidas, which marked the zenith of Lacedaemonian domination, is also the 
 birthday [nidus, origin, fostering cause) of Spartan "TjSpis — "since, when desire 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xxvu 
 
 work, might perhaps be accounted for by such a method of 
 composition. 
 
 If it could be proved as an absolute certainty that the 
 Hellenica as we now possess it is not only in the actual con- 
 dition in which it left the author's hands, but as fully finished 
 as he would have wished to make it — and as some portions 
 of it (e.g. the very last chapter) most likely are — I should still 
 maintain that the charge of dishonesty is not proven ; I should 
 
 has established its sway within, then comes excess" (see Plat. Phaedr. 238 A), 
 with its consequent N^/ic<ris — iiripSmoi ve/ieais (see Find. PytA. x. 61), venge- 
 ance extreme to mark what is done amiss ; beginning with the recovery of the 
 Cadmeia (B.C. 379), and then Leuctra(B.c. 371), and the loss of Messenia 
 (B.C. 370-369), shock upon shock. 
 
 'Motifs' or themes being — (o) Spartan "T/9pis . . . divine N^/ieiris, which 
 theme is transmuted into 
 stro^llf mariced. (^) ^he Ufe-and-death struggle of Sparta and 
 
 Thebes. 
 Materials — Collected after 371, chiefly at Corinth. (The historian has inti- 
 mate relations with the Laconising families at Phlius, we suspect. He 
 uses Procles as a persona under which to give out his own political 
 views, much as he uses Callistratus, hence the disproportionate pro- 
 lixity of the speeches to action, B.C. 370-369. The scale again not 
 maintained consistently. ) 
 
 As to the Si^ux'a of Xenophon, the condition of mind may be analysed as 
 a compound of views and emotions, the most pronounced of which are — 
 I. His religious view of the fortunes of men and states. 
 ■.i. His belief in the ' archie ' principle. He is always meditating this ; 
 friends and foes alike are laid under contribution — Cyrus the 
 younger, Agesilaus, Teleutias, Jason, Epaminondas, in turn ; and 
 would fain make discovery of it in (i) Lacedaemon as a state, (2) 
 Agesilaus as a semi-divine man. 
 „. ,. . , _. ,. f philo-Laconian. 
 
 3. His pohtical partisanships | ^j^^.Theban. 
 
 Recognition of the piXnffTOL \ 
 
 Ignoring of the 5^/ios (except that he admires the J- in the states. 
 eira^ta of the Athenian Demos) J 
 
 4. His moral partisanships in favour of those who behave righteously, 
 
 against those who do ip6<na. His disillusionment finds an anodyne 
 in the recognition of the ways and hand of Providence, whose guid- 
 ance he willingly accepts, for that is the deepest thing in him, sub- 
 missiveness to the will of heaven — auKppoirip'ri irepi Toiii Seois. 
 
 iwopla. How did he come to see certain individuals so large and with 
 such detail, and certain others, truly their equals, so dimly, as if 
 through a dwarfing medium — Jason (or Agesilaus) on the one hand, 
 and Epaminondas on the other? or, again, compare his treatment of 
 Teleutias and Pelopidas, whose deaths so markedly resembled each 
 other. 
 
xxviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 fall back upon what at times seems to me a not improbable 
 explanation of more than half the difficulty. This last theory- 
 implies that the historian, however worthy or unworthy to rank 
 with Herodotus and Thucydides, composed his histories under 
 limitations ; some of which he did not even suspect the exist- 
 ence of, whilst others he consciously imposed upon himself 
 with full volition. 
 
 At this point it is only fair to offer an apology not for the 
 historian but for the man. Xenophon the crvyypa^ev^, the 
 compiler of histories, is only a portion of the whole man, who, 
 to use a simile of his own, is a kind of pentathlete ; and the 
 HeUenica, which in some part is ex hypothesi imperfect, is only 
 a portion of his <Tvyypa.fif/.aTa, his compilations. The Anabasis 
 is at least a work of genius, and there are the several partly 
 historical minor works translated in this volume. Besides 
 which, a large portion of the historian's energy was expending 
 itself, even whilst he collected the material and elaborated the 
 notes of his more matter-of-fact histories, upon questions half 
 historical and half speculative concerning the real prince and 
 ideal forms of education and government. Possibly the 
 Cyropaedia, the Hiero, and the Economist each in turn or simul- 
 taneously drew off some of the sap which might have gone to 
 give a greater fulness and vigour of body to the Hellenica. 
 And then there were all the rest of his works. It is a ques- 
 tion, I think, whether even Thucydides himself would have 
 made his work so supremely good had he had, to use a 
 common phrase, so many irons in the fire. It is a further 
 question, what sort of history even Thucydides himself would 
 have made of a period so complex and so devoid of unity as 
 that which it was the lot of Xenophon to chronicle. It may 
 certainly be retorted, " And the moral surely is that a man of 
 Xenophon's mental type should not have undertaken to write 
 the Hellenica at all ! " To which the counter-retort may be 
 given, " And what a loss to the world would that self-abnegation 
 have involved ! " But I have no desire to apologise for the 
 supposed shortcomings of Xenophon further. It is more 
 important to try to analyse his procedure when writing the 
 history of his times. 
 
 As to unconscious limitations : his vision may certainly to 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xxix 
 
 some extent have been troubled (as Schenkl, I think, suggests) 
 by his belief in the greatness of Agesilaus,i a belief genuine 
 and well argued, and all the more blinding therefore ; or again 
 (until he was gradually disenchanted), by the conservative 
 grandeur and stability of Lacedaemon. His philo-laconism is 
 obvious.^ 
 
 If, then, his reverence for Agesilaus or his zeal for Sparta 
 was such that he could not bear to speak of adversaries and 
 the adversities of his party (evdvTioi and cvavTwoTara), he not 
 only was, but should certainly have known that he was, dis- 
 qualified to treat of the period. He must in that case have 
 suffered, I admit, from the cacoethes scribendi, if not from the 
 veritable Kaxo^^eia, of which he has been accused; and de- 
 serves the condemnation pronounced upon the man whose 
 sole title to write history is a fluent pen.s At any rate he had 
 better have held his tongue. But perhaps he argued thus with 
 himself : I know and can make others know the main thread of 
 these occurrences, and in spite of personal feelings will honestly 
 do so. In that case he was Justified in prosecuting the work. 
 
 Again he would be disqualified (but could hardly have dis- 
 covered the fact, or been expected to know it) if his want of 
 detachment from the politics of the time made him colour-blind 
 or purblind. But perhaps he was aware in his own heart of a 
 
 1 That Agesilaus was apprehended by his own generation as the greatest per- 
 sonage, greater, as was commonly supposed, than Epaminondas, may, I think, 
 be considered certain. See Theopompus apud Plut. Ages. lo, koX /i^wrros 
 fjj^v ^v 6fio\oyovfJ.ij/o)Sf Kal twv- rdre ^thvTiav iiri^av^ffTaTos, (is €}!p7jK^ irov koX 
 SeiTTO/tTTOS, though T&re may perhaps refer to the particular date at which he 
 was appointed admiral or general, not to the whole period of his life (see 
 Clough, iv. 12). 
 
 * Though Grote and others have applied the theory, as I think, too rigidly, 
 and to the detriment of Xenophon, whose view is frequently far more detached 
 and impartial than frima facie appears. If it were the right moment, I 
 should like to go through Grote's strictures point by point, and that is a pro- 
 cess which I recommend every youthful student of this period to undertake for 
 himself! He will come, I feel sure, to think not less highly of Grote, but more 
 charitably towards Xenophon. 
 
 ' See Freeman, Methods of Hist. Study, " Matter and Manner," p. 103 : 
 " Here we have perhaps reached the fullest developement of the notion that 
 history is an easy business on both sides, that any man with a fluent pen is 
 qualified to write it, and that any man to whom the work of a fluent pen 
 gives pleasure is qualified to judge of it. " The historian is not, of course, 
 referring to Xenophon. 
 
XXX INTRODUCTION 
 
 certain detachment and independence of view owing to his 
 ' philosophy' — his theory of divine government — his a-uxjjpoarvvri 
 wepl Tois Oeovs.^ I think that he has this detachment — a quite 
 opposite and much less noble, or at any rate grand and useful, 
 detachment than that of Thucydides ; yet valuable in its way 
 and alien* to malignity. 
 
 And with regard to conscious limitations: it is partly, per- 
 haps, for artistic reasons that the historian is sometimes curt 
 or silent when we should have preferred prolixity and distinct- 
 ness of utterance. Let us consider this view of the matter 
 more closely. 
 
 Simplicity of character and transparency of style, these, 
 I imagine, are the two most obvious characteristics of our 
 historian — whether of the man or of the writer. And yet we 
 are perpetually aware (as I have already more than once sug- 
 gested) of a certain something in him which at first sight might 
 seem to contradict those qualities ; but which, as a matter of 
 fact, is compatible with plainness of speech and sincerity of 
 nature, and in Xenophon's case betokens an attitude intel- 
 ligible enough on the part of a simple-minded man confronted 
 with the complexities — moral and political — of life. Such a 
 man does not become soured or cynical ; but he may easily 
 become reticent. 
 
 But not to push our diagnosis further — Xenophon's mind, 
 as I have said above, was shrewd and his imagination (within 
 a certain limit) vivid ; that is, his genuine Attic self. As an 
 educator his tendency was to inculcate ' right ' ideas by sugges- 
 tion viroBuKTiKm's, persuasively TrporpEXTt/caJs (in which he might 
 seem to himself to be imitating his master Socrates, as he 
 understood that master's methods).^ I can quite understand 
 that the same person, when he came to consider the proper 
 artistic handling of the troubled period (the Tapaxn Kal aKpua-la) ^ 
 
 1 See Dion. Hal. Ep. ad Cn. Pomf. iv. 2, for his jjSos $eoa-epis, and Trans, 
 vol. i. pp. xix. xxvii., and //ell. V. iv. c foil., p. iig below ; VI. Iv. 2, tA 
 SiuiibvLov Jryai, p. 158 ; and concerning the death of Jason, VI. iv. 23 foil, 
 pp. 164-167 ; or of Lycomedes, VII. iv. 2, p. 213, etc. 
 
 ^ This whole matter we shall be confronted with immediately in my next 
 volume. 
 
 ' And in particular the period between B.C. 374 and B.C. 362, the latter half 
 oi //ell. C. 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xxxi 
 
 through which the states of Hellas were now passing, might 
 deliberately propose to himself to reduce to the minimum 
 visibile, or even to exclude from the field of observation alto- 
 gether, certain features (names, dates, incidents, isolated or in 
 groups) ; not that the matters were without importance, but that, 
 if important, they were well known to every one and their omis- 
 sion would be easily supplied, whilst their insertion might tend 
 to divert attention from the main line of his argument j or, in the 
 language of art, to destroy the general harmony of the picture. 
 
 As regards the men of his own time he was probably quite 
 correct in his assumption, or again, if his work was intended to 
 catch the popular ear— as a prize essay composition, « to Trapov 
 dydvuTfia ; but as regards later generations and ourselves, if he 
 was proposing to make his work a K-njiJ.a « det, he certainly 
 endangered his object. He expects too much of us,^ and had 
 better have avoided symbols <j>(i>vavTa o-uvetoktu'. 
 
 Again it strikes me that he might have been led to adopt 
 the same method of treatment (I speak of the arbitrary exclu- 
 sion of certain topics), but on less distinctly artistic grounds, by 
 circumstances and through conscientiousness, in this way. He 
 is clearly disposed to treat with greater detail those incidents 
 of which he was an eye-witness, and irrespectively of their 
 essential fitness to hold so conspicuous a place in the picture 
 as a whole.^ The reason is perfectly intelligible. Relying on his 
 own skill as an eye-witness,* he systematically insisted on placing 
 at one time the affairs of Asia, and at another the affairs of 
 Lacedaemon, and at a third time the affairs of Peloponnesus, 
 prominently in the foreground : that done, he might content 
 himself with sketching in the remaining details. Now it is 
 home affairs and now those of the northern powers (of Athens 
 and in particular of Thebes) which appear either in the back- 
 ground or in the comparative paleness of a middle distance. 
 
 Lastly, he was under the control, and consciously, of certain 
 political and ethical ideas, his own and those of the time. I 
 
 1 This is the d.yvoiiJ.o<T6vi) spoken of above. 
 
 2 E.g. in Hell. B, Dercylidas's and Agesilaus's campaigns ; in Hell. C, 
 Phliasian affairs, or, again, Pheraean affairs. He is like a photographer who 
 depends for his illustrations of a voyage on the goodness of his negatives and 
 the opportunities which he had for exercising his art. 
 
 ' In airrofia. See above, p. xvi. note i. 
 
xxxu INTRODUCTION 
 
 do not here speak of political partisanship by any means, but 
 of those dominant notions pervading and leavening the mind 
 of Hellas in the first half of the third century, which a dull 
 man might conceivably have made little of, and a philosopher 
 like Thucydides have taken note of and passed on, but which, 
 in the case of Xenophon, haunted his brain and controlled his 
 composition like the leit-motifs, successive and recurrent, of a 
 dramatic opera shaped by some great musician. 
 
 The chief of these ' leading themes ' after the conclusion of 
 the great war may be named as the Pan-Hellenic march (that 
 grander Anabasis which at a certain moment he thought that 
 he was about to play a part in, and which Polybius refers to 
 as one of the ' causes ' of the conquest of Persia, when at 
 length it was fulfilled in the days of Alexander). Another 
 is the struggle for the hegemony of the states (an ancient 
 idea) ; another the confederation of certain leading states 
 under the /3eX.Tto-Toi (a favourite idea of his own, and perhaps 
 of Socrates) ; ^ another the ethical doctrine which is a leading 
 theme of Herodotus's histories, concerning retributive justice 
 "Y/Jpis — "Arr; — Ne/iEo-ts, whether in men or states ; another 
 the idea, to speak of it by its Aristotelian name, of the Tra/j,- 
 fiacnXevi — in Xenophon's language, of the archie man, the real 
 Prince, and so forth. 
 
 It would, I think, be quite easy to analyse the three divi- 
 sions of the Hellenica in turn in reference to such controlling 
 ideas. We should in that case find that there was a marked 
 correspondence between the historian's arrangement of topics 
 and what I may call the historical momenta of the period.^ A 
 conspectus of that sort would show that the leading themes on 
 the subjective side have their counterpart in the objective 
 momenta. But on this topic I have perhaps already said more 
 than enough. 
 
 Meanwhile I have omitted to make more than a passing 
 reference to that particular quality of these histories which 
 most of all must suffer violence at the hands of a translator, 
 and which I cannot flatter myself has escaped obliteration in 
 the particular renderings of this volume. I need hardly say 
 
 ' See Mem. II. vi. ; also Trans, vol. i. p. Ixxxiv. 
 " See, for an attempt at such analysis, above, p. xxvi. note i ; below, p. Iviii. 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xxxiii 
 
 that I refer to the quality of style and diction. Whether the 
 ancients felt any special charm in the style of the Helknica 
 1 cannot tell ; ^ but to my mind it has, in spite of its dry- 
 ness (the word dulness I repudiate), a marked charm of its 
 own which it is easier to feel than to describe. Of this also 
 I am certain — that it is a book which, like some fragment of 
 ancient sculpture, has something in it most congenial to the 
 soil and climate and physical surroundings of the bright land 
 which gave it birth. I will not attempt to analyse these char- 
 acteristics furth,er, but conclude this part of my subject with two 
 quotations from a former writing.^ The first draws attention 
 to the quality just spoken of; the other to the dramatic con- 
 clusion of the history, in which the historian who was thought by 
 the ancient critics somewhat to sacrifice to KaXov to to i\^v soars 
 for once into the sublime unwontedly and with touching effect. 
 
 (i) As to style and diction. It is well to bear in mind that 
 the title of a Stxatos a-vyypaKJievs — a just historian — has been 
 accorded to Xenophon ; and apart from omissions which sur- 
 prise a modern reader, it is plain that the quality of transparency 
 which belongs to all his writings holds here even in the moral 
 import of the word, so that his demerits, if demerits they be, 
 amount to nothing worse than a species of colour-bhndness. 
 We know, and he does not attempt to conceal, the point of 
 view from which he writes ; moreover, as a philosopher he 
 has a right to his philosophy, however defective it may render 
 him as a philosophic historian ; and he makes no secret of his 
 sympathy with the ideal of Sparta and Lycurgus (his Laconism) 
 or for the 'aristocratic' sections of society. ^ 
 
 But the quality which, like the vigour and the humour 
 and the healthy, joyous youthfulness of the Anabasis, perme- 
 ates this sadder and more sober production, is a certain vivid- 
 ness and brightness of delineation, suited to the clear skies of 
 Hellas and Asia Minor, and the sparkling waves of the Aegean 
 and the Straits. 
 
 1 See Trans, vol. i. p. xix. = See Hellenica Essays, pp. 383, 382. 
 
 s Hellenica C, in particular, miglit appear to have been written somewhat 
 from the point of view of Clarendon, "to vindicate before posterity the 
 conduct and memory of those who have set themselves against this general 
 overthrow." He too sees the finger of God in bringing about the general 
 infatuation, 
 
 VOL. II <^ 
 
xxxiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 What M. Renan has said of the Acts of the Aposties may 
 be ahnost verbatim applied to this work : " Une brise 
 matinale, une odeur de mer, si j'ose le dire, inspirant quelque 
 chose d'allfegre et de fort, pdnbtre tout le livre et en fait uri 
 excellent compagnon de voyage ; le brdviaire exquis de celui 
 qui poursuit des traces antiques sur les mers du midi." ^ 
 
 The Hellenica is not a dull book, and the story with which 
 it is concerned, however sad in part and disheartening, is 
 never tedious. With it in our hands we bound over the 
 glancing waves in rhythmical obedience to our beloved 
 keleustes ; ^ we scale the heights of besieged citadels ; for 
 the moment we are friends with the living personalities of 
 a tumultuous time. We have been Spartans and tramped 
 along by forced marches in the night, after the destruction 
 of a whole army corps by the enemy's forces ; ^ thus we 
 proudly sneaked, for fear not so much of the jeers of luke- 
 warm friends or half-foes as of ourselves and the evil that 
 might come of it. We have crossed the heights at Creusis 
 between Attica and Boeotia, and our shields have been 
 snatched by a violent tornado from us and whirled into the 
 abyss.* We have watched the deadlock at Coronea, and seen 
 the slain with their shields battered, their swords snapt off at 
 the hilt, their daggers still clutched between their fingers.^ 
 And all these things, page after page, hasXenophon by his photo- 
 graphic art and his Euripidean or Zeuxis-like skill wrought for 
 us ; ® so that the feeling left on our minds is one of exhilara- 
 tion and content. Of course, if we had had the making of 
 those days and persons, we should have provided that the hero- 
 friend of Xenophon should be Epaminondas, not Agesilaus ; 
 but the gods, it seems, willed it otherwise, and so this matter, 
 has issued thus.^ 
 
 (2) As to the dramatic conclusion of the work. In the 
 Hellenica, as in the Anabasis, there is a twofold climax 
 
 ' Renan, St. Paul, p. 12 foil. '^ See Xen. Economist, xxi. 3, 4. 
 
 s See Hell. IV. v. 18 (p. 70 below). * See Hell. V. iv. 17 (p. 124 below). 
 
 ^ See Hell. IV. iii. 19 ; Ages. ii. 14 (pp. 56, 249 below). 
 
 ' See the Euripidean touch in the description of the death of Leontiades 
 "reclining in privacy after dinner, his wife seated beside him working wools," 
 Hell. V. iv. 6 (p. 121 below). 
 
 ' TO{ivi' lai^t\ riSe wpay/w.. If only Xenophon could have known 
 
XENOPHON'S POSITION xxxv 
 
 corresponding to the well-known divisions of the work. The 
 first, attained in the reconciliation of the Demos and the 
 supporters of the Thirty, is the finale of the work of Thucy- 
 dides.^ The second and larger volume, constituting the 
 Hellenic history proper in two parts, has sometimes been 
 described as the Epic of Agesilaus, who is certainly to 
 some extent the protagonist ; but the pivot of the piece, the 
 peripety, is the turn of the tide of Sparta's prosperity, 
 consequent, in the eyes of Xenophon, upon the lawless seizure 
 of the Theban citadel by the Spartan general Phoebidas. 
 " Abundant examples might be found alike in Hellenic and in 
 foreign history to prove that the Divine powers mark what is 
 done amiss, winking neither at impiety nor at the commission 
 of unhallowed acts ; but at present I confine myself to the 
 facts before me." ^ When the end draws nigh — not too soon 
 indeed, but with a certain dimly-realised dramatic effect, owing 
 to the long-sustained silence in praise and blame alike, — the 
 fire of the old soldier burns ; and the historian's tongue is 
 loosed in a panegyric of the strategy of Epaminondas ; and 
 the pall descends upon the great Theban, but upon Sparta 
 herself the penumbra of total eclipse. Nor is there wanting a 
 touch of pathos in the half-baffled realisation of the beginning 
 of the end. As to Guicciardini, reviewing the posture of 
 affairs after the peace of Cambray,^ things seem pretty much 
 unaltered ; so to Xenophon, after Mantinea, the old balance is 
 renewed, or rather, in the language of the Greek, " Where it 
 was expected that one or other of these fell combatants would 
 rule an empire, there set in once more confusion worse con- 
 founded (not an apx-q, but worse anarchy)." In one case 
 really the knell of Venice was sounded ; in the other the 
 prestige of humbled Sparta fled with the triumphant spirit of 
 her mighty rival. 
 
 Epaminondas as intimately as he knew Agesilaus, what a splendid portrait 
 might we have had. See Grote x. 483 foil. ' ' Epaminondas, princeps, meo 
 judicio Graeciae I " Cic. Tnsc. I. ii. 4; "Summum virum unum omnis 
 Graeciae," lb. de Or. III. xxxiv. 139. 
 
 ^ Hell. II. iv. 43, on the supposition that the history of the Thirty, etc., is 
 an appendix to Hell. A (though in another sense an introduction to Hell. B). 
 
 2 See Hell. V. iv. i (p. 119 below). 
 
 ' See Symonds's Age of the Despots, p. 232. 
 
xxxvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 Xenophon and the Ancient Criticism 
 
 PoLYBius— HIS General Appreciation 
 
 That Polybius was an admirer of Xenophon and his writings will be ap- 
 parent to any one who studies his biography, and in particular his relationship 
 to the younger Scipio, an intimacy which arose out of reading books together 
 and literary conversation, Ik nvos x/MJo-eus pi.pi\lwv koX t^s Tcpl Toiirmv \aKLas 
 {Bxc. de V. et V. ex Ub. xxxi. ed. Ernesti, Lips. 1764).^ Polybius recounts the 
 origin of this ' notable friendship ' with an echo of Xenophon's own manner : " 
 irpoa/ybvTiav S' aiiruVj 6 HdTrXtos TJffvxji kuI Trpq-us ry (puprj <p6€y^6,fj.epoi 
 Kal Tt^ xP^t^"^^ yevbfievos ivepevBi^Sf H d^ tfyiifflv Si IIoXi//3te, k.t.'K, ; and a little 
 lower down, as to the boy's love of hunting, which the elder man, again 
 after the pattern of Xenophon, fully shared, we are told how PauUus Lucius 
 Aemilius, the boy's real father, after his victory in the war against Perseus, 
 looking upon hunting as the royal road to excellence, like another Xenophon, 
 KaWlffTTjv iTToXafi^Avoiv Kal t^v &ffK7]aiv Kal t^v ^j/vxaytjyylav iirdpx^i-v TOiS 
 v^ois TTiv irepl rd. KVVTjyiffia, k.t.\. (an echo surely of Xen. Cyneg.), "gave 
 the lad the free run of the royal forests of Macedon, and young Scipio was 
 happy as a king, vo/da-as dtov el ^affiKeietv, in his magnificent playground ; " ^ 
 and again . , . Kadtixep eityevovs <rK6\aK0$ ^Trifwvov aitroO ixwi^Tj yev^trffat t^v 
 irepl Tfltff KVVTjyeHas dpfi'/iP (a distinct echo of Cyrop. I. iv, 4). Such passages 
 might be multiplied indefinitely. The last I shall call attention to is Hist. 
 X. 20, in which occurs the quotation of Xenophon's phrase in the Hellenica 
 about Ephesus " the workshop of war." The historian Polybius is recounting 
 the exploits of the elder Scipio before Carthago Nova, and how, after he had 
 taken it, that city became a veritable workshop of war ; and though he does 
 not name them, it is certain to me that the writer has passages of the Cyro- 
 faedia ringing in his ear. Thus the tale of Scipio and the wife of the 
 Spanish chief is copied, so to speak, from the story of Cyrus and Panthea ; 
 Scipio's terms to the captives are parallel to Cyrop. IV. iv. 10 et al. ; the military 
 exercises which he instituted and the sham fight, etc., to Cyrof. II. iii. 17 
 foil., etc. 
 
 My argument is that Polybius was well read in Xenophon, and if he had 
 detected any grave defect in him as a historian, he would certainly not 
 have failed to point it out, since of all historians competent to the task he 
 was at once the readiest to criticise his fellow-workers in the same field and the 
 ablest to lay down rules for the writing of history. See, for instance, on the first 
 head, his criticism (I will not say of Timaeus, on whom, perhaps, he is hard), 
 but of Zeno, his Rhodian friend (xvi. 97). * " What shall we say, then, is the 
 defect of Zeno? That he is anxious, not so much about inquiring into his facts 
 
 1 One of these books, we may be sure, was the Cyropaedia^ since we know from Cicero, 
 Tusc. II. xxvi. 62, that Afi-icanus i^.e. the younger Scipio) used to carry about a copy of 
 it *in his breast pocket ' : "Semper Africanus Socraticum Xenophontem in manibus 
 habebat ; cujus iniprimis_ laudabat illud, quod diceret eosdem labores non esse aeque 
 graves imperatori et militi, quod ipse honor leviorem faceret imperatorium," in reference 
 to Cyrop. I. vi. 25. 
 
 2 A n-aiSifcb? Xoyo?, as Xenophon would have named it {Cyrop, I. iv. 27). See Mr. 
 Strachan Davidson's transl. Hellenica Essays, p. 397. 
 
 3 The words are Mr. Strachan Davidson's. 
 
 * I again take the liberty of quoting Mr. Davidson's rendering. 
 
ANCIENT CRITICISM xxxvii 
 
 and dealing with the subject, as about perfecting his style ; and it is clear from 
 many passages that this is what he prides himself on " ; " but, " adds the critic, 
 "there are other nobler elements of history on which a statesmanlike his- 
 torian would rather pride himself," AXXA ykp &v et-q KaWlu fi^frr) ttjs lirroplas, 
 i(p' ols &v /uSXXo;' ae/Jj/vvBdri iroXiTtKbs Arfip {de V. et V. xvi.). If Polybius 
 had noticed the same defect in Xenophon (and it is one with which Xeno- 
 phon has been charged in modern times), would he not have mentioned it? 
 Or, again, consider his criticism of Ephorus, a writer towards whom he is not 
 unkindly disposed, as touching his ridiculous descriptions of land-battles, 
 Leuctra, Mantinea, and in particular the latter (Exc. Vat. xii. 25, a passage 
 quoted at length below; see 'Lacunae,' p. xlix.). Surely Polybius would 
 have included Xenophon in his condemnation if he had not recognised in his 
 descriptions of land-battles the very quality in which historians as a general rule 
 are wanting. But Polybius not only criticises others : he lays down some of the 
 soundest rules for the writing of history which are to be found in any ancient ■ 
 writer. I will content myself with but one from Hist. i. 14 (see Mr. Strachan 
 Davidson, p. 409 foil.) : " Polybius is thoroughly impressed with the majesty 
 of his subject. Neither fear nor favour, he contends, must tempt the 
 historian to waver for a moment in his allegiance to the truth. In this spirit 
 he criticises the rival histories of Fabius and PhiUnus for their partisan 
 accounts of the first Punic war." Then follows this passage : "Now in most 
 affairs of life, perhaps, a man would do ill to divest himself of such a fellow- 
 feeling. For a good man should be attached to his friend and to iis country, 
 and out of sympathy for these should hate their enemies and love their friends. 
 But when a man assumes the attitude of mind that is proper to history, he is 
 bound to leave out of sight all such considerations, and he must often speak 
 well of his enemies and adorn them with the highest praises when the facts 
 demand this ; and again he must often blame his nearest friends, and bring 
 their faults home to them whenever their conduct requires it. For just as if 
 the eyes of a living animal are put out, the whole creature becomes maimed 
 and helpless, so if you take away the truth out of history, what is left is 
 merely an unprofitable tale." I repeat that if Xenophon had appeared to 
 Polybius (who was a man of much learning, dcTjp TroXu/xaS^s, as Aelian re- 
 marks, and a master of historical methods) so "to take away the truth out of 
 history " (and the modern indictment falls little short of that imputation), 
 we should have heard of it. We should also have heard of it from another 
 ancii^t critic, 
 
 LuciAN, 
 
 whose canons of history - writing, as laid down in the famous essay 
 Trffis Sei l<TTOplav avyypdipciv, show that he too was a master of historical 
 methods.^ "The occasion of the essay is the craze which seized the whole 
 world of Corinth to write histories of the Parthian war(A.D. 162-165): dXX' 
 A<p' oS 3^1 t4 ^i" iroal toOto KeKlv7)Tai, 7r6Xe/ios 6 irpbs toM ^appdpovs 
 Kal ri (v ' Kpiievlq. rpaO/ia Kai al ffwexeis vmai, oidcU SffTis oix laropiav 
 trvyypdipet ;noXXoi' 5^ QovKv5ldai Kal 'H/)45otoi Kal Heyo^fflcres ■^/iic 
 dirai/Tes (everybody must needs be a historian, or rather we are deluged with 
 
 1 The rules are none the less golden because, the essayist has chosen to give them so 
 humorous a setting. Indeed, " the historian Du Thou thought so much of this essay, 
 that he drew the rules for historical writing in the preface to his work principally from 
 it." — Thomas Dyer, article " Lucianus " in the £>ict. 0/ Biography. 
 
xxxviu INTRODUCTION 
 
 Thucydideses, Herodotuses, and Xenophons), Kal (lis iomev, iXijffh S.p' f/f 
 iKeiPo t6 " 7r6Xc/ios 6,v6.vtwv irariip " cl ye Kal avyy pa(l>ia$ Tocroirovs ivitjivaev 
 iirb /uf rg ip/ij (war must indeed be the "father of all things " if at one fell 
 swoop he has given birth to this whole litter of historians). In order not to be 
 the one idle man, Lucian too must roll his tub, like Diogenes on a famous 
 occasion. But as he cannot pretend to write history himself, he will write a 
 little sermon on the art for the benefit of ' ' the historians " if they care to Ksten. 
 That art indeed is not, as some suppose, so simple a business as eating and 
 drinking, which comes naturally to every one, but it needs a good deal of thought 
 if, as says Thucydides, "one's composition is to be a lasting possession." 
 The essayist thereupon proceeds to banter the history-mongers, whose sole 
 idea of history is to laud to the skies the chiefs and generals of their own party 
 and to depreciate the enemy, little recking that a great gulf is fixed between kis- 
 tory and fanegyric, since the genius of history abhors lying, a single crumb of 
 which, to use a medical metaphor, would suffice to choke her windpipe. The 
 canons of poetry are one and of history another. Not that praise is inadmis- 
 sible in history, but it must be applied opportunely and in moderation ; charm 
 of style, t4 rcpirvSv, at best, like the athlete's beauty, can only be a set-off to 
 intrinsic quality, t6' yjpiiiTiiiov. And the historian must recollect that the critics 
 who will sit in judgment on his work will be keen -eyed judges, extreme to 
 mark what is said amiss, eager to distinguish what is counterfeit and what is 
 true coin. (§§ 2-10.) 
 
 Presently (§ 23) he proceeds to give an amusing description of the modem 
 historian, with examples of his manner ; how, for instance, he defends his 
 acephalous composition by remarking that it resembles Xenophon's Anabasis 
 in the want oiafroem. "Darius and Parysatis had two sons," not knowing 
 that two or three words on certain occasions may be a proem in themselves, as 
 the essayist will afterwards explain (§ 52 infra) ; and so on humorously enough 
 (and in various ways suggesting thoughts to any one who is concerned with 
 Xenophon's manner, which I have no space for). 
 
 At § 34 he begins to lay down his rules, the first of which is worth the 
 reader's attention in reference to our special problem. There are two supreme 
 qualifications for history -v^riting, two crowning virtues, which the would-be 
 historian must have, and these are: (i) aiveaii ttoXitiki), political intelli- 
 gence, which is a gift of nature ; and (2) Bivapus ipp.-nvcvri.K'r), a faculty 
 of exposition, which is to be acquired by practice and toil. It is not any- 
 body or everybody whom our essayist will undertake to teach, but prcjvided 
 the pupil has the right equipment, provided he is ^i5i7« <rvv£T6s and ipiara 
 Tpbs \6yovs -ijffKrip^vos, he can perhaps give him some hints to set him 
 on the right road. § 37. His pupil must be some one trvvecval re Kcd elwelv 
 oix iyevvf/s, of apt intelligence and ready speech, keen-eyed, with a. turn 
 for practical affairs (poUtics) if occasion offers, a soldier, statesman, and 
 general in one— if he has chanced to serve in the field so much the better : Kal 
 iv aTpa,ToiriS(f yeyoviSis irove Kal yvfiva^oixivom ^ raTTonivovs aTpaniirai 
 iopaKi>s Kal tirXa elSiis Kal /irfxaviiimTa Ivia, koX H hrl Kipovi Kal rl iirl 
 liCTiiirov, jrfis oi XAxoi, TrSis ol lirTeK Kal TrbBev Kal H i^eXaiivav i) irepieXaiveiv, 
 
 Kal 8Xw! oi T&v KaToiKiSlav ns oiS' dtos iria-Teieiy p.6vov TOis inayyiWomt 
 
 not one of your gentlemen who sit at home at ease and depend on hearsay 
 reports, but a real expert who has seen troops exercising and battalions 
 manoeuvring in the field, and knows all about arms and the engines of war. 
 (It is hard not to believe that Lucian is thinking of Xenophon or Polybius and 
 their special qualifications here.) § 38. But, above all, he must be free, frank. 
 
ANCIENT CRITICISM xxxix 
 
 and fearless, he must be ready to criticise the mistakes and defects of great 
 people. 1 (He illustrates from Callisthenes in reference to Philip and Alexander, 
 Thucydides in reference to Cleon. ) Since pen and ink cannot alter facts, 
 nor Clotho herself unspin the thread of destiny (§ 39), the historian's 
 sole business is to narrate what has happened ; but this he will fail to do if 
 (like Ctesias) he is court physician to Artaxerxes and is looking for some 
 reward of his flattery. TTiat is not what Xenophon will do, the impartial 
 historian, nor yet Thucydides, but the more he hates the greater the necessity 
 laid on him to speak the truth and the truth only, not looking to the audience 
 of the moment, but to that larger audience of all time, those future generations 
 who will consort with his work when the historian himself is in the grave. 
 (These remarkable words, embedded in such a context, dXV oi Sa>o<j)UV airrb 
 iroH^irei, dlxaios <Tvyypa,<f>e{is, ov5i QovKvSiSris, seem to me conclusively to show 
 that Lucian, like Polybius, was not speaking at random, but was well 
 acquainted with Xenophon's historical works, and, however we explain the 
 fact, regarded him as at any rate honest and impartial.) § 41. Fearless, un- 
 corruptible, unfettered, a, friend of truth and plainness of speech, calling figs 
 figs and a spade a spade, as the comic writer says — that is the type of the true 
 historian (and such was Xenophon among the rest). 
 
 At this point (§ 42) Lucian draws an interesting comparison between Thucy- 
 dides and Herodotus, and gives his explanation of what Thucydides meant by a 
 KTrj/iti 4s Ael as opposed to an is rb irapiv dyilivuTixa. (How far Xenophon's 
 work was of the latter class rather than of the former is another question, as 
 to which Lucian says nothing. My suspicion is that Xenophon — always on 
 the supposition that our version of the Hellenica is fairly completes — did fail 
 to picture to himself sufficiently that larger audience of all time, and possibly 
 out of mere modesty wrote rather for the generation in which he lived, but 
 for ourselves, <l>oivavTa (rvvsToiai, as I have before suggested.) 
 
 Thus far concerning the historian's -piwiXT], mental attitude. In § 43 the 
 critic proceeds to offer remarks as to ^oiyr)v Kal r'tf Trjs ipfiTivelas lax'^^t ^'y'^ 
 and expository skill. § 44. As truth and outspokenness are the goal of the 
 historian's intelligence, so clearness and naturalness should be the first and 
 foremost aim of his style, which should be dignified, isxi)fi.ajn KeKOdfi-iiaBtii 
 Aveir&xSeai, but exceptis excipiendis. ^ § 45. His thought should be touched 
 with poetic fire,' especially in narrating battles and sea-fights, but his speech 
 should proceed warily, and so he will avoid losing his head in a fit of poetic 
 rapture. To ride the high horse is suicidal. § 46. He is to avoid the rhythms 
 of verse. § 47. His facts must be carefully collected with much pains by eye- 
 witness, or if not, by the most careful comparison of ear-witnesses ; KivraSBa 
 IjSii KoX (rT0xa<'"nK6j Tis Kal cvvdcTiKis toO nSavaripov IffTU,^ % 48. And 
 when he has collected them all or the greater part, he shall first make a 
 rough draft, a skeleton, which later on he shall clothe upon with the beauty 
 and the order of form and rhythm.^ § 49. Like Homer's Zeus, he is to take 
 a wide impartial survey, " now of the horse-taming Thracians and now of the 
 Mysians ; " and when it comes to setting the battle in array, let him not fix 
 his gaze on one portion nor on a single individual (unless to note the forward 
 dash of Brasidas, or Demosthenes repelling an assault), but on the generals, to 
 
 1 £.g^. as Xenophon criticises Agesilaus, Iphicrates, Epaminondas, etc. 
 
 2 Cf. the rich twelfth-cake style of Gibbon. 
 
 8 Cf. Miciielet, Carlyle, Napier. _ * Like Thucydides or like Grote. _ 
 
 6 The Greek is far prettier : let him first vTrofivrifid rt oT/wy^ati/eTw . . . Kal crSina 
 
xl INTRODUCTION 
 
 catch the word of command and to understand the main idea of attack and 
 defence ; and when the tug of war comes, Koivi} SffTU tj dia, let him watch 
 both sides as an impartial spectator, weighing all the incidents in his balance ; 
 let him pursue with the pursuers, and flee with the fleers. § 50. Kal irHcri 
 Toirms iiirpov liriaTU) — let there be a limit imposed on the whole treatment — 
 lii) h nhpov firiSi iwdpOKiXus /itiSi veapSs — not pushing it to the point of satiety 
 or to offence of good taste, or, in raw schoolboy fashion, overdoing it — iWa 
 padCias Airo\v4a8u—hnt let him shake himself loose with ease and lightly, here 
 pausing and thither hasting as events demand, backwards and forwards and 
 back again, following on the steps of time, and winging his flight from one 
 quarter of the globe to the other in an instant, never failing to mark each 
 crisis of affairs. § 51. For his mind is to be a well-focused mirror, reflecting 
 all things equally and equably. It shall present the very image of reality 
 undistorted in form or colour : oi ykp iiirwep rois pir/ropcri ypiipovai. — since this 
 is no rhetorical history school ; but the words to be spoken exist potentially, 
 they are the double of the facts they represent — the only question is how to 
 order them. The historian is like the sculptor Phidias or Praxiteles : the raw 
 material of the historian consists of facts ; the sculptor's of gold, silver, ivory, 
 wood, supplied to him by the men of Elis, Athens, Argos, which he shall carve 
 and polish and weld together into a shape of beauty ; and so the historian 
 ToiovTO Si] Ti Kal Til ToO (rvyypa<pi<os Ipyov els KoXbv SiaBiaBoj, rb, ireirpay/i.ii'a 
 Kal eh S6va/juv ivapy^ffrUTa iirtdeT^aL airrd — his business is to arrange in lovely 
 order the things that have been done, and to set them forth lit up with the 
 white light and splendour of reality. 
 
 At this point the essayist proceeds to lay down various technical rules, as to 
 'proems,' and the 'narrative that follows' (§ 55).' § 56. Brevity inculcated, 
 especially where there is no dearth of topic. ^ § 57. This (ruippofftjvr] is to be 
 observed especially in descriptions of scenery. He illustrates from Thucydides, 
 vi. 96, loi, on 'Epipolae' or 'the great harbour.' (Xenophon would do 
 equally well to illustrate from. ) § 58. Of speeches (see Thuc. i. 22) appropriate 
 to the character. § 59. Praise and blame to be sparingly apphed, or ' ' you 
 will fall into the error of Theopompus. " § 60. Of the mythical, let it be stated 
 and left to take care of itself. § 61. And generally the precept which he keeps 
 repeating is to be borne in mind : Do not look to the present moment as if 
 courting the suffrages of the men of to-day who pass, but aspire to gain the 
 suffrages of all time — dWA toC ffifiiravTOS altSvos iffroxacrfiivos wpis nis 
 
 IveiTO, fiaWov aiyyptupe Kal irap' iKelvoiv diralrei rbv fu.aBl)v -rijs ypatfirji 
 
 that they may say of you, " See a man who was free and plain of speech, no 
 servile flattery in him, dXV 6,\-fi0eia iirl irSiri." § 62. A pretty simile follows 
 or allegory concerning the Cnidian architect of the beacon tower in Pharos, 
 and how he carved his name within, only to be discovered when the tower 
 crumbled. § 63. So history is to be written aiv rf d\ri0et /jiSWoii irpis Ti)v 
 
 pJWovcrav IXirlda ijirep aiiv KoKaKelq. irpbs rb iiSi tois vSv iiraivovfi4voLS along 
 
 with truth in reference to the hope to be, rather than with flattery with a view 
 to what may tickle the ear of some ephemeral being. OStos a-ol Kaviiv Kal 
 
 TTOietTO OKoXXh eri koL aSiipSfBTOi'- tUaimOeK ■riji' riiiv iirayira to kiiAAos k<ii vpioi-n/'Tia 
 TD Aefti Kai aTfiiiJ.ari.(eTia mi owe^ifera. (Is the HelUnica of Xenophon possiblv in this 
 condition partially, the dead bones not yet clothed upon ?) 
 
 1 With what he says compare Dion. Hal. on Xenophon's skill in marshalline his tonics 
 Trans, vol. i. p. xxvi. ^ *^ ' 
 
 2 The omission of ' the new naval confederacy ' or of ' Megalopolis ' is hardlv so to be 
 ^counted for by us moderns ; was it by Lucian ? 
 
ANCIENT CRITICISM xli 
 
 iTT&ffiai laroplas SiKcdas — Such is the rule and measure of just and impartial 
 history. Whether it will be acceptable or not, the essayist cannot tell, but his 
 tub is rolled on the Craneion. 
 
 Plutarch 
 
 As to Plutarch, who in point of date stands between Polybius and Lucian, 
 and ii great deal closer to Lucian, the argument would be more conclusive 
 supposing that the author of the tract on the spitefulness or malignity of 
 Herodotus (see Mahaffy, Jifisi. Gk. Lit. ii. 38, ist ed.) and Plutarch were one 
 and the same person, since in that case it might be argued : if Plutarch 
 detected so strong an anti-Theban animus in Herodotus, how is it that he 
 does not discover a sign of it in Xenophon, who, according to the modern 
 view, does scant justice, not to say gross injustice, to Thebes ? But aU one 
 is really entitled to say now is that Plutarch, who was thoroughly acquainted 
 with Xenophon's historical and other writings, and has used the former freely 
 (though possibly he had a fuller text than ours) for his lives of Agesilaus, 
 Alcibiades, Marcellus, Lysander, Anthony, Pelopidas, and Artaxerxes (and 
 doubtless also for that of Epaminondas, which is unfortunately lost), evidently 
 relies on him as trusuworthy and honest, and detects in him no KaKcyfi8ei.it. 
 Once indeed he does go so far as to say in his Comparison of Pompey and 
 Agesilaus (see Clough, iv. 154) : "I am persuaded even Xenophon himself 
 would not put the victories of Agesilaus in balance with his (Pompey's), though 
 Xenophon has this privilege allowed him as a sort of special reward for his 
 other excellences, that he may write and spealc in favour of his hero whatever 
 he pleases," which is a very different thing from accusing him of defaming the 
 great Theban. On the other hand, neither the author of that ' smart ' essay 
 which has crept somehow into Plutarch's worlcs nor any other ancient writer 
 has attacked Xenophon for the very malignity which Herodotus is supposed 
 to have exhibited. To Thirlwall and Freeman it is manifest, but to the 
 ancients, for whatever reason, it was not, or else why have they been so charit- 
 able? 
 
 A List of Lacunae 
 
 For the benefit of students I have here drawn up a table 
 of incidents, topics, etc., such as might have been included in 
 a fuller history of the time, but which, for whatever reason, 
 are omitted in the five books of the Hellenica translated in 
 this volume. 
 
 The object of such a table is to enable the reader to dis- 
 cover at a glance the topics, incidents, etc., of chief historical 
 importance, other than those treated of by Xenophon himself 
 in the pages of these parts of his history. 
 
 I have arranged the matter chronologically, and in accord- 
 ance with my belief that the books in question form (roughly 
 
xlii INTRODUCTION 
 
 speaking) the two halves of the Hellenic History proper, as 
 opposed to the Sequel to Thucydides, which I dealt with in 
 Note C of my former volume. -"^ 
 
 I have printed the lacunae occurring in the earlier half 
 (Hellenica B), which contains the history of the years B.C. 400 
 circa to B.C. 387, separately from the lacunae occurring in the 
 latter half {Hellenica C), which contains the history of the 
 years B.C. 387 to B.C. 362. 
 
 The relative increase of lacunae in this second portion 
 may, perhaps, be accounted for by supposing that the historian 
 for some good reason (possibly in obedience to an artistic 
 instinct 2) had resolyed to exclude extra-Peloponnesian topics, 
 in order to concentrate attention on the affairs of southern 
 Hellas^ (as I have elsewhere more elaborately explained). 
 
 In drawing up such a table (chiefly from the pages of 
 Grote), I am well aware that I may be doing the historian 
 Xenophon a grave injustice. In the first place, the incidents 
 which we regard as omissions may, some of them, not be 
 omissions at all. They depend for their very existence on the 
 testimony of orators and later authorities such as Plutarch, 
 Pausanias, Diodorus, etc. In the second place, even where 
 the truth of the occurrences is fully established, their exclusion 
 from the pages of our historian may be natural or excusable. 
 In other words, either it did not enter into his scheme to 
 notice them, and that for some good reason, or through ignor- 
 ance or lack of opportunity he was unable to record them. 
 
 N.B. — Throughout this table the italics signify the particular topic or 
 incident omitted in the Hellenica under the year of its supposed occurrence. 
 The square brackets [ ] signify that the particular lacunae are, according to my 
 notion, natural or pardonable from the point of view of the historian, and 
 considering (i) the design of that portion of his history together with (2) his 
 method of composition. 
 
 ' For like omissions in Hellenica, Bks. I. and II., see Trans, vol. i. p. Ixv. 
 
 ^ He was somewhat under the influence of the rhetorical school of Isocrates : 
 he was writing probably in his study at Corinth or Athens, not at the field of 
 action (see Sketch of Life), itrxo-riyijpws ihv, B.C. 359-358, 
 
 2 And of the party representing the interests of Peloponnese ; see Hell, 
 VII. V. I. 
 
LACUNAE xliii 
 
 Lacunae in "Hellenica B," b.c. 403-387 
 
 B.C. i^oo circa. — Lysander's intrigues. See Aristot. /"a/, v. 15; Eph. ap. 
 Plut. Lys. 25 (Clough, iii. 133) ; Diod. xiv. 13. 
 
 [Grote, ix. 332.] 
 
 B.C. 399 «Vfa. — Heriffidas at Heracleia Trachinia — his exploits — occupa- 
 tion of Pharsalus. Diod. xiv. 38 and 81 ; Polyaen. iv. 27. 
 See below, sub anno 395 B.C. [Grote, ix. 397.] 
 
 B.C. 397-394. — Negotiations between Athens and the court ofSusa, conducted 
 by Conon {at the court of Evagoras) in Cyprus — Pharnalazus 
 and Ctesias. Plut. Artax. ; Ctesiae fr. 29, § 63 (Didot). 
 See Trans, vol. i. p. cv., and in general the doings of Conon 
 and Pharnabazus before the battle of Cnidus. Isocr. Or. 
 via. {de Pace), 82; Or. iv. (Panegyr.), 165; Diod. xiv. 81. 
 
 [Grote, ix. 390.] 
 
 B.C. 395. — (i) The revolt of Rhodes from Sparta, etc., and (2) the effect of 
 the news on the Athenian Assembly {Hell. III. v. 16). 
 
 (1) Diod. xiv. 79 ; cf. Androtion ap. Paus. vi. 7, 2. 
 
 [Grote, ix. 374.] 
 
 (2) Dem. de Cor. 28, p. 258 ; Philipp. i. 7, p. 44 ; Lys. 
 Or. xvi. 15. [Grote, ix. 407.] 
 
 B.C. 395-394. — Successful operations of Ismenias to the north of Boeotia, 
 after Haliartus {Hell. III. v. 25) — capture of Heracleia from 
 Sparta — defeat of the Phocians near the Locrian town of 
 Naryx. Diod. xiv. 38-82 (see Hell. IV. iii. 3 ; Ages. ii. 2). 
 
 [Grote, ix. 420.] 
 
 B.C. 391 (?) (according to Grote, but see Jebb, Att. Or. i. 84). — Alarm 
 at Athens and Thebes consequent on the capture of the long 
 .walls of Corinth — propositions sent to Sparta to solicit peace. 
 The discussions come to no result. Andoc. de Pace, and 
 Philochorus (writing circ. 300-260 B.C.), in the argument of 
 that speech. See Hell. IV. v. 6 (Trans, p. 66) for the desire 
 for peace on the part of Thebes, B.C. 390 {al. B.C. 392); 
 and for the prior disinclination to accept peace on the Spartan 
 terms felt by all sections of the confederates, B.C. 392, Hell. 
 IV. viii. 15 (Trans, p. 82). [Grote, ix. 474.] 
 
 B.C. 387. — \Fincmcial condition of Athens — the The6rikon.'\ See Grote, 
 ix. 525 foil. ; but Xenophon could hardly have been expected 
 to introduce a topic of this kind, though he was interested in 
 questions of economy. Thucydides certainly might have done 
 so in a speech or otherwise ; cf. Thuc. ii. 13. 
 
xliv INTRODUCTION 
 
 Lacunae in "Hellenica C," b.c. 387-362 
 
 B.C. 387-386. — [Remarks touching the import and character of the Peace 
 (^jr' 'Aj/toXk^Sou)], such as Isocrates expresses in his Paneg. 
 passim; or a history of such "applications to the Great 
 King," from the beginning of the Peloponnesian war and 
 throughout on the part of Sparta, and after Aegospotami on 
 the part of Athens (and after the foundation of Messene on 
 the part of Thebes), after the manner of Grote. One certainly 
 seems to miss something in the silence (non- expression of 
 indignation) of the historian. See Plut. Ages. 23 ; Artax. 
 21, 22. Well may Grote exclaim, " Great must have been 
 the change," etc. See Dem. t. Aristocr. 33, p. 666; Isocr. 
 Panath. 167 foil. [Grote, x. I foil.] 
 
 B.C. 387-386. — \The condition of the Asiatic Greeks after being transferred 
 to Persia.^ See Isocr. Paneg. 142, 156, 190. An important 
 result of the diplomatic relations of Sparta and the king. 
 Thucydides would surely have traced the connection, and not 
 have left it to Grote to do so. Cf. Curtius, iv. 274 foil. 
 (Eng. tr. ). The Great King is 'Co.&primum mobile ; the ninth 
 heaven or sphere, the first mover of all the lower spheres, as 
 the saying iv ^aaiXei rh t&v "KKX-itvmv implies. See 
 Aristot. Phys. Ausc. iv. 3, 210 b. [Grote, *. 34 foil.] 
 
 B.C. 386 (?). — The restoration of Plataea by Sparta (and the policy of the 
 act). See Isocr. Plat. 54; Paus. ix. i, 3. 
 
 [Grote, A. 42 foil.] 
 
 B.C. 384-383. — [In detail, the relations of Macedonia and Olynthus and 
 the origin of the Olynthian confederacy (beyond what is given 
 in Cleigenes's speech. Hell. V. ii. 11) with those of Amyntas 
 and Sparta ; and so too concerning the competition of Athens 
 and Sparta for the sea; and the dealings of the latter 
 with the Olynthian confederacy. '[ See Grote's remarks, 
 x. 94 and 191, quite in a Thucydidean manner ; but Thucy- 
 dides would also have brought out Xenophon's point (em- 
 phasised neither by Grote nor Freeman) that the confederacy 
 was regarded by the Peloponnesian allies and Sparta as 
 threatening in conjunction with Thebes and Athens. 
 
 [Grote, x. 92, 94, 191.] 
 
 B. C. 383. — The fine inflicted on Phoebidas, according to Diod. xv. 20 • 
 Plut. Pelop. 6; de Gen. Socr. 576 a; Corn. Nep. Pelop. i. 
 
 [Grote, A. 85.] 
 
LACUNAE xlv 
 
 B.C. 383-379. — Details of oppression and tyrannical government during the 
 Spartan occupation of the Cadmeia (only suggested), so 
 analogous to that of the Thirty during the year of ' anarchy ' 
 which the historian has elaborately treated of in Hell. II. iii. 
 1 1 foil. See Plut. Pelop. 6, and de Gen. Socr. passim j Diod. 
 XV. 25. [Grote, x. log.] 
 
 B.C. 379. — The name of Pelopidas as a prime mover in the liberation (but 
 perhaps Melon was at the time the person most spoken of 
 and the admitted leader). Plut. Pelop-. 7 foil. 
 
 [Grote, X. 112.] 
 
 . . . . — [(Possibly) some of the details given by Plutarch, e.g. the polem- 
 arch's exclamation, " eis oApiov tA, a-irovSaia," "business 
 to-morrow " (cf. the remark of Pitt on being informed of the 
 mutiny of the fleet). Plut. de Gen. Socr. 30, p. 596 F.] 
 
 [Grote, X. Ii6.] 
 
 . . . . — Hell.V.hr. i foil. [The alteration in the balance of power and the 
 tenure of Spartan empire effected by the liberation of Thebes.'\ 
 See Isocr. Plat. 31. Thucydides would have pointed this ; 
 he would have put the topics of the Plataikos into the mouth 
 of one of his dramatis personae. Xenophon's method is 
 different. From his religious point of view it is the peripety 
 of the drama ; and see below. Hell. VI. iv. 3. 
 
 [Grote, X. 127 foil.] 
 
 B.C. 378. — Hell. V. iv. 22-32. [The historian abstains from moral judgment 
 on the exculpation of Sphodrias\ but so would Thucydides 
 qua historian critically, though he would probably have 
 made use 'of the incident dramatically ; it is perhaps not 
 hard to divine how. 
 
 B.C. 378. — '^The new Athenian maritime confederacy (except in briefest 
 allusion (see Hell. V. iv. 34) ; see also Rev. v. 6 ; Pol. Lac. 
 xiv. 6); and all the details about (i) the ffivra^is (not 06pos 
 now) (Harpokration, s.v. ; Isocr. de Pace, 37-46; Plut. 
 Phoc. 7 ; de Portuna Athen. p. 351), and (2) the K\r]povpxlat 
 (Isocr. Plat. 47 ; Diod. xv. 28 foil. ; the inscription, 'Birl 
 NouffiK/fcou dpxovTos, Kbhler, C. I. A. ii. 27 ; Hicks, 81), and 
 (3) the despatch from Athens of Chabrias, Timotheus, and 
 
 ' This is a startling omission. Either (i) Xenophon's conception of history 
 was imperfect from a modern point of view, or (2) his work is unfinished, or (3) 
 has been tampered with in transmission. The allusions in the Revenues (if 
 by Xenophon, as I think) make in favour of (2) perhaps. 
 
xlvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 Callistiatus as commissioners in the first organisation of the 
 confederacy (Diod. xv. 29). [Grote, x. 140.] 
 
 B.C. n%.— IThe doings of Iphicraies; his service in Thrace after the peace of 
 Antalcidas, and marriage with the daughter of Cotys ; and 
 about the seaport village of Drys presented to him by his 
 patron] (cf. Xenophon's own experiences with Seuthes as 
 recounted in the Anabasis, VII. ii. 35. v- 8, etc.), an only 
 natural omission, except that the historian is talkative at 
 times about such matters, and Iphicrates is one of his heroes. 
 See Corn. Nep. Iphicr. 2 ; Chabrias, 2, 3 ; Theopomp. fr. 
 17s (Didot); Dem. c Aristocr. p. 664; Polyaen. iii. 9 
 passim. [Grote, x. 145.] 
 
 _ , . . — (i) The synod of the new confederates assembled at Athens — votes 
 for war on a, large scale. See Diod. xv. 29 ; Polyb. ii. 62. 
 It is true there is a.reference to the enthusiasm of the members 
 in Jiev. V. 6, which proves that the historian was aware of 
 the fact before he died, but does not explain the omission 
 here. See Dem. c. Androt. 21, p. 616 ; c. Timocr. 41, 
 p. 756. 
 (2) {The census of Nausinikus — the new property -tax — the 
 symmories], all which must have been interesting to the 
 historian, but perhaps seemed outside the sphere of history. 
 For authorities, Demosthenes, etc., see Grote, a. 153 foil. 
 
 . . . . — (i) The organisation of the Sacred Band attributed to Gorgidas 
 at Thebes, though he has space for the palisade.^ See Hut. 
 Pelop. 18, 19, b awTaxOels iirb ''Eva/upilivSov lepis X6xos. 
 Hieron. ap. Athen. xiii. p. 602 A ; cf. Diod. xvi. 80. See 
 also Symp. viii. 34. 
 (2) Some notice of the two great Theban statesmen (either now or 
 sub anno 37 1 B. c. at Leuctra), whose names, one would suppose, 
 must have been already on every one's lips, but who do not 
 appear on the scene, as actors definitely named, till the last 
 book — Pelopidas sub anno 368 B.C. {Hell. VII. i. 34 foil.), 
 and Epaminondas next year (ib. ib. 41 foil.). Is this for 
 some 'artistic' purpose? [Grote, x. 171.] 
 
 ^ One would have expected that the historian (i) as a military man would 
 have taken note of the Sacred Band smd the reforms in general of Epaminondas, 
 378-371 B.C. ; and (2) as a philosopher in search of the ' archie' man, might 
 have made a special study of Epaminondas. See Grote's remark (x. 486), 
 with which I fully concur : ' ' Compare Epaminondas with Agesilaus : how 
 great is the superiority of the first, even in the narrative of Xenophon, the 
 earnest panegyrist of the other." 
 
LACUNAE xlvii 
 
 B.C. 378 or 377. — [The obnixo genu scuto incident of the campaign], told 
 by Dem. c. L'ept. p. 479 ; Com. Nep. Chabrias, I ; Diod. 
 XV. 32 ; Polyaenus, ii. I, to the honour of Chabrias, who 
 commanded the Athenian division on the side of Thebes 
 against the Lacedaemonians ; just suited, one would have 
 thought, to Xenophon, if known to him. Gorgidas, the 
 Theban general, deserved mention. [Grote, x. 173.] 
 
 B.C. 376, Sept. — Hell. V. iv. 61. The name Naxos and the interesting 
 details of the victory — its consequences also. See Dem. t. Lept. 
 17, p. 480; Diod. XV. 34, 35. Had the historian forgotten 
 Arginusae ? and why does he omit names ? Has some 
 epitomist done this? or is the passage a mere note incor- 
 porated into the work without further elaboration? That 
 seems to me most probable. [Grote, x. 176.] 
 
 B-C. 375-374.— ^c//. V. iv. 63 ; VL i. 1. Details of Theban political and 
 military achievements in reorganising the Boeotian federation : 
 e.g. " we hear of one victory gained by the Theban cavalry 
 near Plataea, under Charon ; and of another near Tanagra, 
 in which Panthoides, the Lacedaemonian harmost in that 
 town, was slain. But the most important of all their 
 successes was that of Pelopidas near Tegyra." See Plut. 
 Felop. 15-25 ;i Callisth, ft. 3 (Didot), "Battle near Orcho- 
 menus"; Diod. xv. 37. [Grote, x. 182 foil.] 
 
 B.C. 374-373. — Hell. VI. i. 7 ; ii. 10, 12, 13, 39. Details as to the alliances 
 (i) between Athens and Alcetas, cemented by Timotheus 
 (see Diod. xv. 36 ; Corn. Nep. Timoth. 2), and between 
 Athens and Jason (early in 373 B.C. ?), see Dem. c. Timoth. 
 3, p. 1 187 ; (2) the preliminary cruise of Timotheus (April- 
 May 373 B.C.), Dem. ib. p. 1186 ; his trial (Jason and Alcetas 
 come to Athens to support him) and acquittal {tiov. 373 B.C.) 
 [Grote, X. 199, 202, 208 foil.] 
 The question arises, why is the historian so copious con- 
 cerning certain individuals and so silent about others ? 
 
 ^ ' ' But the battle at Tegyrae, which seemed a prelude to Leuctra, won 
 Pelopidas a great reputation ; for none of the other commanders could claim 
 any hand in the design, nor the enemies any show of victory" (Clough, 
 ii. zis). See &\so Ages. (Clough, iv. 33): "Meanwhile the Spartan fortune 
 was but ill : they received many losses both by sea and land, but the greatest 
 was at Tegyrae, where for the first time they were beaten by the Thebans in a 
 set battle." It is easier to stigmatise these sins of omission than to account 
 for them satisfactorily. As the facts were thoroughly well known there was no 
 object to be gained in suppressing them. Nor do I venture to credit Xeno- 
 phon with KaKo-^Oeia. Plutarch does not. 
 
xlviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 li.C. 372.— [About the earthqudkes and destruction of Heliki and Bura in 
 Aciaia.] See Diod. xi. 48, 49 ; Pausan. vii. 25 ; Aelian, 
 ffist. Animal, xi. 19 ; Callisth. fr. 8 (Didot) ; Polyb. Hist. 
 ii. 41. This is perhaps striking, considering the historian's 
 belief in such manifestations of the will of God ; the Lace- 
 daemonian triremes, it is said, were destroyed by the rush of 
 waters. [Grote, x, 212.] • 
 
 B.C. Z12.—Bell. VI. ii.40. (OThePlataeanssecretlytiytopersuadeAthens 
 to annex them (see Diod. xv. 46) ; (2) destruction of Plataea 
 by the Thebans in detail [ib. 47) ; (3) case of Plataea debated 
 in the Athenian Ecclesia and in the general congress of the 
 confederates at Athens, Epaminondas and Callistratus taking 
 opposite sides in the discussion, it is said (ib. 38). See also 
 Isocr. Plat, passim. [Grote, x. 217 foil.] 
 
 B.C. 371, June. — Hell. VI. iii. 19. Epaminondas at the Spartan congress ; 
 his speech, etc. See Plut. Ages. 23 ; ^ also see Paus. xiii. I 
 (who assigns the incidents to 387 B.C., the Peace of Antal- 
 
 ' "All the Greeks were, accordingly, disposed to a general peace, and to 
 that end ambassadors came to Sparta. Among these was Epaminondas, the 
 Theban, famous at that time for his philosophy and learning, but he had not 
 yet given proof of his capacity as a general. , He, seeing all the others crouch 
 to Agesilaus, and court favour with him, alone maintained the dignity of an 
 ambassador, and, with that freedom that became his character, made a speech 
 in behalf not of Thebes only, from whence he came, but of all Greece, 
 remonstrating that Sparta alone grew great by war, to the distress and 
 suffering of all her neighbours. He urged that a peace should be made upon 
 just and equal terms, such as alone would be a lasting one, which could not 
 otherwise be done than by reducing all to equality. Agesilaus, perceiving all 
 the other Greeks to give much attention to this discourse, and to be pleased 
 with it, presently asked him, whether he thought it a part of this justice and 
 equality that the Boeotian towns should enjoy their independence. Epami- 
 nondas instantly and without wavering asked him in return whether he thought 
 it just and equal that the Laconian towns should enjoy theirs. Agesilaus 
 started from his seat and bade him once for all speak out and say whether or 
 not Boeotia should be independent. And when Epaminondas replied once 
 again with the same inquiry, whether Laconia should be so, Agesilaus was so 
 enraged that, availing himself of the pretext, he immediately struck the name 
 of the Thebans out of the League, and declared war against them." I have 
 quoted Plutarch's words at length, because he is the sole authority for the 
 fact' — if a fact, as I presume it was. Unfortunately we do not know from 
 whom he derived the story. Xenophon certainly missed a great opportunity 
 in not working in Epaminondas's speech, which would have brought out the 
 artistic effect of his three Athenian speeches still more clearly. Grote has 
 availed himself of the sentiments of Thuc. iii. 6i and iv. iz6 to produce a very 
 telling Xenophontine account of the matter, but one would like to have had 
 Xenophon's version. Plutarch omits Autocles, etc. 
 
LACUNAE xlix 
 
 cidas); Diod. xv. 38, 51, possibly a confusion of the same 
 story. [Grote, x. 226 and 230 foil.] 
 
 B.C. 371. — Hell. VI. iv. 7 foil. Details of strategic movements and the new 
 order of battle adopted by Epaminondas at Leuctra (the \bi,-i\ 
 (pdXayi). See Diod. xv. 54, 55 (who, it is conjectured, 
 follows Ephorus) ; Paus. ix. 13, 3 foil. ; Plut. I'elop. 20, 21 ; 
 Polyaenus, ii. 3 ; Polyb. ITist. ii. 39 (see also xii. 25 g, 
 Excerpt. Vatican.^. As a military critic, the historian might 
 naturally have drawn attention to these points (cf. his greater 
 detail in the battle of Mantinea).' [Grote, x. 239.] 
 
 . . . .— .STe//. VI. iv. 15 ; v. 21. The results, (i) The disaster to Sparta. 
 Thucydides would in some way or other have anticipated the 
 remark of Aristotle in his Politics, iiiav yi.p 7r\i)7J)i' oix 
 iiH)iieyKei> i] ttAXis dXV dTTiiXero Sick t^v dXiyavBpuTlav {Pol. 
 ii. 9, 16). "The result proves the faulty nature of their laws 
 respecting property ; for the city sank under a single defeat ; 
 the want of men was their ruin" (Jowett). Yet Xenophon's one 
 fact, that one thousand Lacedaemonians and four hundred out 
 of seven hundred Spartans perished, speaks volumes, ipiavavra 
 trvPGTdiffiv. 
 
 ' See RUstow and Kochly, Gesch. des Gr. Kriegswesens, p. 173 ; Curtius, 
 iv. 397 foil. (Eng. tr. ). It must be borne in mind that Polybius (in the 
 Vatican Excerpt) praises Ephorus for his knowledge of maritime warfare, 
 biit adds that he was utterly ignorant of the mode of warfare on land. His 
 accounts of the naval battles of Cyprus and Cnidus are admirable ; those of 
 Leuctra and Mantinea ridiculous. I quote the passage in extenso: iKeivos 
 yhp h TQis iroXefUKOis tQjv \ijkv Kard. 6d\aTTay ^pyiav ^irl Troffhv iThvoiav 
 iffX^K^^^ P'OL doKeL, tS)v S^ Kard. yijv i,ythvuv &Tr€ipos etvcu t€\^ws. Totyapovv 
 brav fxh irphi tAs irepl 'Kiirpov vavfiaxiat koX rds irepl Kvldoy aTevlffrj rts, aXi 
 iXP^iravTO oi ^aaCKiai (rrparriyol irpis Eiaydpav rbv "SiOKaplviov Kal jrdXiv 
 irpbs AaxeSiu/iovlovs, SavpAj^eiv . . . rbv irvyypa<j>4a Kal Karh, rijv Siva/uv Kal 
 KaTci rijv ipLireiplav Kal TroXii ru>v xPV^^f^^'' Airev^yKaffdaL trpbs tols bfioias 
 TrcptffTdtrciS " Hrav 5^ ttiv irepl AevKTpa fJi-ixV^ i^tiy^rat Qrj^alcjv Kal AaKedat- 
 fiovtuv ij rijv iv MavTi-veig. ird'XLV TUJv aiiTuv Toirtav, h § koX fieri^Wa^e rdv 
 ^lov 'ETra/xeiptij'Saj, iv To&rots iav iirl ra /caret /j.ipos itrtaTTuras Tis dewpri rds 
 iKTd^fiS Kal /neTordJcis ras Kar airois Toi>! Kivdivovs, 76X0105 ^alverai Kal 
 iravTeXSs Aircipos Kal diparos tuv roioiruv &v. 6 p^v otv iv Toh AeiKTpots 
 kIvSwos dxXoCs yeyoviiis Kal KaB' iv ti pApoi t^s Svv&pews 01) Xlav iK(pavrj iroiei 
 Trji' ToO iTvyypatpius dirciplav " 6 Si wcpl TTf MavHvetav t^v piv fp^acriv ?%ei 
 •jtoikIKtjv koX ffrpaTTiyiK'^v. ^trrt 5' dvinrSffraTos Kal reXius ddiavSijTOS rip 
 (yvyypa<pei. Tovro 5* iffrai 5t}Xov, idv rts Toirs rbirovs iirodipevos dXT)6tvws 
 iTiperpH rds Kivififfeis ras iir' airov SrjXovpivas, rb 5' airrb avp^alvei Kal 
 Qeoirip,ir<f Kal ndXiffra lip.alip, vcpl oS vOv 6 X670S ' oB p.iv yip ttv {iTip rav 
 TOtoijTU)v KetpaXaiibdrj iroi-^ffiovTat ti}v iiTrbdefftv, StaXavBdvovcrtv, o5 5' &v 
 PovXri$Q<n SiadicBat Kal (rvvvirodei^al ti tUv (card p.ipos, toioOtoi ^atvovrai Kal 
 irdvTut oros 'B0opos (Polyb. Exc. Vat. xii. 25 g). 
 
 VOL. H d 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 (2) The extension of the power of Thehes ; treatment of Orcho- 
 menus and Thespiae ; Epaminondas ' alike distinguished for 
 mild temper and for long-sighted views.' See Diod. xv. 57 ; 
 Paus. ix. 14, I ; A. II, I. [Grote, x. 263 foil.] 
 
 (3) Proceedings in Peloponnesus : ' skytalistn ' in Argos. See 
 Isocr. Or. v. 58. {^Discouragement and helplessness of Sparta ; 
 the accusation preferred in the Aviphiktyonic Assembly by 
 Thebes against Sparta, and the fine imposed, Diod. xvi. 
 23-29; Justin, viii. I (after Theopompus, see fr. 182-184 
 (Didot), as Grote conjectures) ; feeling against Agesilaus at 
 Sparta, Plut. Ages. 30 foil.] [Grote, x. 273 foil.] 
 
 B.C. 371. — \The aspirations of Athens after Leuctra to maritime empire, and 
 to the partial recovery of kleruchies (out-possessions), and to 
 recover Amphipolis, etc.] See authorities in Grote, x. 334 
 foil. 
 
 B.C. 370. — Hell. VI. V. 6 foil. Details as to the formation of the Pan- 
 Arcadian League, see Paus. viii. 27, 3 ; the application of the 
 Arcadians, etc., to Athens for aid refused, Diod. xv. 62; Dem. 
 pro Megalop. 205-207 ; plans of Epaminondas for restoring the 
 Messenians in Peloponnesus {and consolidating the Arcadians 
 against Sparta), Diod. xv. 66 ; Paus. iv. 26, 3. Our historian 
 seems to have missed a great opportunity in neglecting to 
 fiirnish us with these. [Grote, x. 286-294,] 
 
 B.C. 370-369. — Vigilant defence of Sparta (by Agesilaus) ; see Plut. Ages. 
 32 ; Polyaenus, II. i. 14 ; and Aeneas Poliorc. (a contem- 
 porary ?) 1. 2, about the ' barricades ' ; see also Ages. ii. 20. 
 It seems then that the historian does at times omit matters 
 which would redound to the credit of his friends. Perhaps 
 he thought them beneath the dignity of history. See his 
 apologetic introduction of such details in Hell. II. iv. 27 
 (Trans, vol. i. p. 70). 
 
 . . . . — Details as to (l) the building of Megalopolis (Diod. xv. 63, 72 ; 
 Paus. viii. 27 ; 35, 5) and Messene, Paus. iv. 26, 6 ; 27, 3 ; 
 31, 10 ; Strab. viii. 361 ; (2) the abstraction of Western 
 Laconia, no doubt a very sore subject to the Spartans and 
 the philo-Laconian world at the time, and barely recognised 
 as a fait accompli till long afterwards, see Isocr. Archid. 30, 
 lOl foil. ; Polyb. iv. 33 (in reference indeed to a later date, 
 B.C. 362, after Mantinea) ; (3) the loss of the Skiritis (at the 
 time, see Hell. VII. iv. 21) ; (4) the duration of the stay and 
 the concerns meanwhile of Epaminondas and the army before 
 evacuating Peloponnesus, Diod. xv. 67 ; Plut. Ages. 32. 
 
 [Grote, X. 306-320.] 
 
LACUNAE li 
 
 B.C. 369-368. — (l) Athenian affairs outside Peloponnese : Iphicrates's naval 
 operations on the coast of Thrace and Macedonia, B.C. 368- 
 365, and the achievements of Timotheus in those regions, B.C. 
 366-365 ; see authorities in Grote. 
 (2) Theban affairs outside Peloponnese: according to Grote 
 (x. 362), Pelopidas made four expeditions into Thessaly — 
 two before 367 B.C., in B.C. 369 and B.C. 368, and two after, 
 in B.C. 366 and B.C. 364-363; see Diod. xv. 71, 80; Plut. 
 Pelop. 26, 27, 32. [Grote, x. 342-362.] 
 
 . . . . — Hell. VII. i. 27. How Philiscus's mission came about and what it 
 led to. [Grote, x. 351.] 
 
 B.C. 367. — (l) Liberation of Naupactus and Calydon (which were held by 
 Achaean garrisons), and enrolment of, among the allies of 
 Thebes, a result, according to Diod. xv. 75, of Epaminondas's 
 third invasion of Peloponnese. 
 (2) The condition and politics ofSicymt after the trial and acquittal 
 of Euphron's assassin, Hell. VII. iii. 12. 
 
 [Grote, X. 366, 378.] 
 
 B.C. 366. — Affairs of Thebes and Athens in North Greece. Mission (in 
 reference to the Persian rescript) of Pelopidas to Thessaly. 
 He is seized and detained prisoner by Alexander of Pherae ; 
 see Polyb. viii. I. " Greatly impressed with the news, the 
 Athenians looked upon Alexander as a second Jason, likely 
 to arrest the menacing ascendency of their neighbour and 
 rival," Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 660, § 142. " They immediately 
 despatched to his aid thirty triremes and one thousand hoplites 
 under Autokl^s." Despatch of an army from Thebes to 
 rescue Pelopidas ; its defeat and salvation by Epaminondas, 
 then serving as a private. " Epaminondas accepted the duty 
 (of general), marshalled the retreat in consummate order, 
 took on himself the command of the rear-guard, beating off 
 all the attacks of the enemy, and conducted the army back to 
 Thebes," Diod. xv. 71. Triumph of Alexander in Thessaly, 
 and discredit of Thebes. Harsh treatment of Pelopidas ; 
 second Theban army sent into Thessaly, under Epaminondas, 
 for the rescue of Pelopidas, who is at length released by 
 Alexander under a truce. , It is perhaps strange that Xeno- 
 phon, who knew a good deal about the Pheraean dynasty, 
 and describes the death of Alexander, should not mention 
 this matter (see Hell. VI. iv. 35). [Grote, x. 387-392.] 
 
 .... — Hell. VII. iv. I. [Details in connection with the loss of Oropus. 
 It would seem that we are to refer to this loss of Oropus the 
 
lii INTRODUCTION 
 
 trial of Chabrias and Callistratus in Athens, together with the 
 memorable harangue of the latter which Demosthenes heard 
 as a youth • with such strong admiration. See Rehdantr, 
 Vitae Iphicr. Chabr. et Tim, pp. 109-114.] 
 
 [Grote, X. 393.] 
 
 B.C. 366. — \_Epaminondas sent as envoy into Arcadia; he speaks against 
 Callistratus. See Corn. Nep. Epam. 6 ; Plut. Reipub. Ger. 
 Praec. 810 F ; Apophtheg. Reg. 193 D. Grote conjectures 
 that the speech of Callistratus in the Messenian Assembly 
 referred to by Aristotle {Rhet. iii. 17, 14) was delivered now.] 
 
 [Grote, X. 395.] 
 
 . . . . — Hell. VII. iv. 9. The Epidaurians not named along with the 
 Corinthians and Phliasians as obtaining terms, but the 
 historian says " the rest who came " ; probably Epidaurus, 
 Troezen, and Hermione were among the number. 
 
 [Grote, X. 400.] 
 
 . . . . — [The fresh embassy sent by Athens to the Persian king, and the 
 altered rescript from him, pronouncing Amphipolis to be an 
 Athenian possession^ as implied in Dem. F. L. p. 384, § I SO ; 
 p. 420, § 283 ; de Hal. p. 84, § 30. 
 
 . . . . — Timet keus sent with a fleet to Asia, and (only in Ages. ii. 26) 
 coruerning Agesilaus and the revolt of Ariobarzanes ; conquest 
 of Samos by Timotheus, Isocr. Or. xv. 118; Corn. Nep. 
 Timoth. I ; Dem. de Rhod. Lib. p. 193, § 10 ; c. Aristocr. 
 p. 666, § 165 ; p. 687, § 242 ; Polyaenus, vii. 26. Into these 
 diplomatic and military matters the historian was qualified to 
 enter. [Grote, x. 402 foil.] 
 
 B.C. 365. — Partial admission to the Chersonese obtained by Timotheus ; 
 and as to Samos and the Chersonese, a new sphere obtained 
 for kleruchies ; Athenian settlers sent out with proprietary 
 rights; difficulties in the case of the Chersonese, Diod. 
 xviii. 8-18 ; Strab. xiv. 638 ; Dem. de Sym. p. 182, § 19. 
 That the author of the Revenues would take an interest in 
 this question seems obvious. [Grote, x. 405-408.] 
 
 i!.C. 365, Z^^-zd-^.— The progress of{i) Athenian and (2) Theban affairs in 
 the north during the war between Arcadia and Elis, and the 
 discord which broke out within the League itself on its 
 termination, as described in Hell. VII. iv. 12-40. 
 (l) Cotys of Thrace. Timotheus supersedes Ifhicrates, B.c. 365- 
 364, Dem. t. Aristocr. 174, p. 669. He acts with success on 
 
LACUNAE liii 
 
 the coast of Macedonia and ChalcidicS, but fails at Amphi- 
 polis. He acts, B.C. 363, against Cotys and near the Cher- 
 sonese, where a Theban fleet appears (see authorities in 
 Grote). 
 
 (2) Efaminondas exhorts the Thebans to equip a fleet against 
 Athens, Diod. xv. 78 (Aesch. F. L. p. 27S, 32, liis M ri 
 T^s 'AdTjyaiiov &Kpoir6\€Ojs TrpoTr6\tua fiereveyKetv els T^v irpoff- 
 raaiav Trjs KaS/teias, " the propylaea must be brought to the 
 citadel of Cadmus " ) ; discussion between Epaminondas and 
 Menecleidas in the Theban assembly, Diod. xv. 78, 79 ; 
 Corn. Nep. Epam. 5 ; Plut. Pelop. 25 ; de sui Laude, 542 A ; 
 Epaminondas in command of a Theban fleet in the Hellespont 
 and Bosphorus, B.C. 363 (see Isocr. Or. v. 53 ; Diod. xv. 79), 
 whilst Pelopidas at the same time attacks Alexander of 
 Pherae ; Pelopidas slain in the arms of victory ; Alexander 
 of Pherae subjugated, Diod. xv. 80, 81 ; Plut. Pelop. 31 foil. ; 
 Corn. Nep. Pelop. 5. 
 
 (3) B.C. 364-363. Conspiracy of the knights of Orchomenus 
 against Thebes ; destruction of Orchomenus by the Thebans, 
 and probably of Coronea also, see Diod. xv. 79 ; Dem. 
 c. Lept. 121, p. 489; de Pace, p. 62, § 21 ; Philip II. p. 69, 
 § IS ; F. L. 122, p. 375 ; 162, p. 387 ; 373, p. 445. Re- 
 pugnance excited against the Thebans ; regret and displeasure 
 of Epaminondas, Diod. xv. 57; Paus. ix. 15, 2. The historian 
 is at least impartial in his silence. [Grote, a. 409-428. ] 
 
 B.C. 363-362. — Return of Epaminondas from his cruise; renewed complica- 
 tions in Peloponnese, concerning which the historian has 
 informed us well enough. We gather a few isolated facts 
 from other authorities, e.g. the story concerning 
 
 B.C. 362. — Y'the bravery of the Spartan Isidas, son of Phaebidas, who 
 sallied forth naked," etc.], as told in Plut. Ages. 34— one 
 would like to know on whose authority. It is evidently a 
 Spartan story, and not likelier, one would think, to have 
 been known to Ephorus or Callisthenes than to Xenophon. 
 
 [Grote, X. 456.] 
 Grote says (x. 468, note 4), " That the Athenians were on 
 the left in the battle we know from Xenophon, Hell. VII. v. 
 24, though he gives no complete description of the arrange- 
 ment of the allies on either side." " About the practice of 
 the Thebans both at and after Leuctra to make their attack 
 with the left, see Plut. Quaest. Rom. 282 D. The general 
 arrangements of the other contingents we obtain only from 
 
liv INTRODUCTION 
 
 Diodorus, xv. 85," and Diodorus probably follows Ephorus. 
 See my note above, s. anno 371 B.C. One would have liked 
 some such strategical observations from Xenophon as an 
 expert and concerning the order of battle generally. 
 Xenophon's conclusion of the work is, I think, masterly. 
 
 In reference to the Composition of 
 
 Hellenica B and C 
 
 (a eiogkaphicai, note) 
 
 Hdl. B, i.e. the Hellenic History down to the Peace of Antalcidas, B.C. 
 387, was still in process of composition as late as B.C. 384, since Pausanias, 
 whose death is spoken of in III. v. 25, p. 39, was still alive in B.C. 384 
 (V. ii. Si V- 102; see further for this argument vol. i. p. Ixiii.). When 
 Pausanias died is uncertain. But before 'that work was published^I do "not 
 say concluded — and before the idea of continuing it in Hell. C had been fully 
 realised by the historian, another "change," if I may so speak (see vol. i. 
 p. 75, note i), "came o'er the spirit of his dream" during the years 
 B.C. 383-379 ; so that when the historian had fully embarked on the latter 
 volume, his thoughts were strongly coloured by the contemplation of the 
 gradual declension of Sparta as the result of "T^pis visited by Ni/ieais. The 
 following dates are important ; — 
 
 B.C. 383. The seizure of the Cadmeia, "T/3pis. 
 
 B.C. 379. The deliverance of Thebes, Ne/ietris. 
 
 B.C. 378. Strong anti-Laconian feeling in Thebes. 
 In B.C. 374 the reaction had commenced in the ever-growing anti- 
 Theban feeling at Athens, which took practical effect after 
 Leuctra, B.C. 371, and the first Theban invasion of B.C. 
 370-369. 
 
 If this was the feeling at Athens what would Xenophon have felt? 
 According to my theory he was now beginning to collect (or to sift and sort 
 already collected) material for Hell. C ; which work is more and more 
 restricted in its latter part to a presentation of the struggle from a Pelopon- 
 nesian point of view. The point of view is adopted partly from inclination, 
 partly because the materials are readier to hand, and partly on artistic 
 grounds. I will add here 
 
 A brief Conspectus of Party Politics in Athens between B.C. 399 and 355 
 
 (see Curtius, VII. ii., Eng. tr. vol. v. 78-115; Jebb, Att. Or. i. Annals, 
 xlvi.-li. ; Trans, vol. i. p. ciii. foil.). [ ]=Xen. silet ; p. = page of translation. 
 
 B.C. 
 
 400-398. Athens follows the lead of Sparta perforce as her subject ally 
 
 (pp. 2, 17). 
 398-397. Her emancipation secretly maturing ; Pharnabazus and Conon 
 
 (Didot, Ciesiae fr. 29, § 63). 
 397-396. [Lukewarmness re Agesilaus's expedition] [Pans. iii. 9, 2). 
 396. Beginning of irepi 'PASov iriXe/uos ; first campaign of Agesilaus 
 
 (p. 24 foil.). 
 
ATTIC FOREIGN POLITICS, B.C. 399-355 
 
 Iv 
 
 The Boeotian 
 party domi- 
 nant. 
 
 Athens joins 
 the confeder- 
 acy and goes 
 to war with 
 Sparta, etc. 
 
 An attempt of 
 Laconising 
 party to 
 change policy 
 fails. 
 
 ■ 39S- First success of the Boeotian party ; aid to be sent to 
 
 Thebes (pp. 32, 37). 
 394. Athenian contingents at 'Nemea' and 'Coronea'; 
 
 Conon at ' Cnidus. ' 
 393. Athenians, Boeotians, Argives, etc., make Corinth their 
 
 base versus Sicyon (p. 58) ; rebuilding of Long Walls 
 
 by Conon (p. 80). 
 392. Athenian garrison in Corinth ; Iphicrates and his 
 
 peltasts (p. 62 foil. ) ; Antalcidas and the first idea 
 
 of autonomy (p. 82). 
 
 391. [Peace negotiations between Athens and Sparta at 
 Sparta — its terms.] See Curtius (Eng. tr. iv. 259), 
 for position of parties in Hellas. 
 
 Andocides, head of Peace (or aristocratic) Party, ad- 
 vocates separation from the allies, and agreement 
 with Sparta. This is not emphasised by Xenophon, 
 though in favour of Lacedaemon and fro tanto 
 against the ' partisan theory. ' Xenophon refers to 
 something of the sort in his sketch of naval affairs 
 sub an. 390 [al. 392) {Jlell. IV. v. ; see note 5, P- 
 64, and note i, p. 82). 
 
 Partial 
 recovery of 
 her maritime 
 power by 
 Athens. 
 
 390. [Broken off by 0! jSoiaridfoj'Tcs and democrats. 
 Andocides banished.] Athens and Rhodes (p. 83) ; 
 Athens and Evagoras (p. 85); Cyprian war (B.C. 
 390-380 or 379, al. 386-376). 
 
 389. Exploits of Thrasybulus ; renewal of Athenian power 
 in the Hellespont (p. 85 foil. ) ; infl^uence of Argos 
 dominant in Corinth (p. 88). 
 
 388. [Speech of Lysias at Olympia (al. 384) ; Aristoph. 
 Ploutos. ] Athens and Aegina (p. 90) ; Chabrias (p. 
 93) ; surprise of Piraeus (p. 95). 
 
 Her desire for 387, Desire for peace at Athens (p. 97) ; Peace of Antalcidas 
 peace. (see Jebb, ii. 151), (pp. 97-100). This peace 'with- 
 
 out honour ' was all the same ' ' a masterpiece of 
 diplomatic skill " (Curt. iv. 278). 
 
 (End of Hell. B). 
 
 Laconising 386. A blank in Attic history (B.C. 386-383). Sparta versus 
 
 party Thebes and Argos (p. 99). [Persian gains (Curt. iv. 
 
 dominant. 279) ; Plataeae rebuilt by Sparta as a stronghold 
 
 against Thebes.] 
 
Ivi 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 The Boeotian 
 party recovers 
 power. 
 
 The new naval 
 confederacy. 
 
 A reaction. 
 
 The Laconis- 
 ing party re- 
 covers power. 
 
 Athens after 
 Leuctra 
 aspires to 
 hegemony. 
 
 B.C. 
 
 38s- 
 384- 
 383- 
 
 382. 
 381. 
 380. 
 
 379- 
 r378. 
 
 377. 
 
 376- 
 375- 
 374- 
 
 373. 
 
 372. 
 371- 
 
 370- 
 
 369. 
 368. 
 
 of Sparta 
 engenders 'ATH 
 
 and brings 
 
 down the wrath 
 
 of Heaven. 
 
 The 'TBPIS Sparta and Mantinea (p. loi 
 
 foil.). 
 
 (? Lysias at Olympia ; see 
 above, B.C. 388). 
 
 seizure of the Cadmeia ; three 
 hundred Thebans escape to 
 Athens (p. 109) ; Olynthus, 
 Athens.and Boeotia(p. 104). 
 
 Sparta and Olynthus (p. in 
 foil. ) ; [Iphicrates, Cotys]. 
 
 Teleutias slain, ipyurSels (p. 
 
 "3)- . 
 
 Sparta and Phlius, Agesipolis 
 
 (P- "4)- 
 NEMESIS, Liberation of Thebes (p. 121 foil.); 9?;- 
 
 /SaiVcJs Tr6\eii05 begins ( — B.C. 371) ; Phlius and 
 
 Olynthus surrender. 
 "T^pis, Sphodrias's attempt on Piraeus (p. 128). 
 [Athenian finance reform ; establishment of twenty 
 
 avii/ioplai for payment of eltr^opi, (war-tax) collected 
 
 by the state.] New naval confederacy, ffivra^is 
 
 (Rev. V. 6, p. 346). 
 Third invasion of Boeotia by Lac. under Agesilaus 
 (p. 131 foil.). [Thebes begins to reorganise Boeotian 
 confederacy.] 
 A detachment of Thebans and Athenians occupy Cith- 
 
 aeron (p. 134) ; battle of [Naxos] (p. 135). 
 Growth of Theban power (p. 135 ; cf. Sev. v. 7, p. 346) ; 
 
 Timotheus, h\s periflus (p. 135). 
 Jason of Pherae Tagos of Thessaly ; Athens annoyed 
 
 with Thebes in reference to the maintenance of the 
 
 fleet (p. 143 foil.). 
 Peace with Sparta, which does not last. Destruction of 
 
 Plataeae by Thebes (Isocr. Plat. ; Hell. VI. iii. i. 
 
 p. 152). Timotheus at Corcyra, afterwards Iphicrates, 
 
 Chabrias, and CallistratuS. 
 Speeches of Callias, Autocles, and Callistratus (sub Cal- 
 
 hstrati persona loquitur Xenophon?) at Sparta (p. 
 
 I S3 foil.). 
 Peace ' of Callias ' — Leuctra — Spartan cavalry defective 
 
 — Congress at Athens — new Athenian confederacy on 
 
 the basis of autonomy (p. 169) — Athenian hegemony 
 
 party incline to a philo-Laconian foreign policy. 
 Jason assassinated (p. 166) — Mantinea rebuilt (p. 170) 
 
 — Formation of pan- Arcadian League (p. 172) — - 
 
 [Megalopolis] — First Theban invasion, winter B.C. 
 
 370-369 (p. 17s foil.) — [Messene]. 
 Iphicrates at Oneion — Proposal of Cephisodotus that 
 
 Athens and Sparta should exercise command alter- 
 nately — Dionysius I. of Syracuse. 
 (Beginning of the end — SidXwis of the dream of Theban 
 
 d.f)l^^ ending in Ta/)ap(iJ), (p. 192 foil). Lycomedes 
 
ATTIC FOREIGN POLITICS, B.C. 399-355 
 
 Ivii 
 
 Athens makes 
 alliance with 
 the Arcadian 
 League with- 
 out breaking 
 with Sparta. 
 
 Athens 
 
 joins the anti- 
 
 Theban Pelo- 
 
 ponnesian 
 
 party. 
 
 Athenian war 
 party. 
 
 and the Arcadians — Divergence of views concerning 
 the employment of Dionysiiis's second reinforcement 
 on the part of Athens and Sparta (p. 194) — SpUt 
 among the Peloponnesian powers allied to Thebes — 
 Pelopidas, the arch-diplomat (p. 196). 
 367. Conference at Thebes — Autonomy to be applied against 
 Sparta (Hell. VII. i. 36 foil. )— Thebes fails to win 
 support of the states (p. 198). 
 
 366. Loss of Oropus — Athens isolated makes treaty with 
 Arcadian League — Corinth, cold to Athens, — along 
 with Phlius, etc., makes a neutrality -treaty with 
 Thebes (p. 212 foil.). 
 Eleio-Arcadian war. 
 
 365. Eleio-Lacedaemonian alliance versus Arcadians (p. 217 
 foil. ). 
 Maximum of Arcadian, Argive, Messeno-Theban power 
 in Peloponnesus — Cromnus captured. [Timotheus 
 reduces Samos (where (cXijpoBxoi are established), 
 Sestos, and CrithSti.] 
 
 364. Battle at Olympia (p. 221). 
 
 Beginning of the end of pan-Arcadian unity. The 
 split which divides the states, ^kXnaroi versus 
 democrats, is occasioned by the question of pay to 
 the Eparitoi and the use of the Olympian treasure 
 for the purpose. Formation of an anti-Theban 
 Peloponnesian party in which some Arcadian states, 
 e.g. Mantinea, take the lead under their peXnarot 
 versus other states, e.g. Tegea, which under the 
 democrats adhere to Thebes. [Timotheus succeeds 
 to the command of Iphicrates in Thrace : takes 
 Meth6n6, Pydna, Potidaea, Torflnfe.] 
 
 363. 0! KTjSS/ievoi TTJs Ile\oiroiiv^(rov party (ifell. VII. iv. 33, 
 p. 223) — The split between Tegean Democrats and 
 Mantinean Aristocrats — Theban harmost at Tegea. 
 [Campaign of Timotheus against Cotys and Byzan- 
 tium — his return to Athens.] 
 
 362. Epaminondas — Mantinea (Hell. VII. v. 15-17, p. 227). 
 [General peace, excluding Sparta — Athenians at the 
 Hellespont. ] 
 
 {End of Hell. C). 
 
 Appendix. 
 362-361. The first (rvfu/iopla pay down the war-tax irpoa- 
 
 tr<popd, and collect contributions from the inferior sym- 
 
 mories (see B.C. 378). 
 361. Callistratus flies to Thasos — Athenian hegemony and 
 
 war party dominant under Aristophon. [Archidamus 
 
 succeeds Agesilaus {aliter alii, see p. Ixi. ). ] 
 360. Athens supports Orontes against the King Artaxerxes 
 
 Mnemon. 
 
Iviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 3S9. Xenophon finishing Helknica (see Hell. VI. iv. 37). 
 Doath of Artaxerxes Mnemon— Accession of Artaxerxes 
 
 Ochus — ^Accession of Philip— Cotys murdered — His 
 
 son Cersobleptes succeeds. 
 358. Athenians alarm their naval allies by self - regarding 
 
 policy (see Comment on Minor Works — Revenues). 
 357. Chios, Cos, Rhodes, Byzantium revolt — Social war — 
 
 Philip takes Amphipolis — Treaty between Chares and 
 
 Cersobleptes — Thracian Chersonese (except Cardia) 
 
 ceded to Athens — Third form of trierarchy hy sym- 
 
 mories. 
 356. Philip takes Potidaea — Alexander the Great born — 
 
 Delphi occupied by the Phocians — Chares defeats a 
 
 Persian force. 
 Athenian 355. The historian writes his Seventies — End of Social war 
 
 peace party. — Sacred war begun. 
 
 354 (?). The historian dies at Corinth probably — Eubulus 
 
 finance minister — Callistratus returns to Athens. 
 
 Momenta op the Hellenic History (Hell. III. i. i-V. i. 36 ; and Hell. 
 
 VII. I.-VII. V. 3S) DURING THE YEARS B.C. 403-387 AND B.C. 387-362. 
 
 The historian's predominant view of affairs — His guiding political senti- 
 ment a complex of ideas difsychically opposed, or one gradually mer- 
 ging into the other (see note on the Historian's Method). 
 
 In Hellenica B. 
 (1) Conquest of Persia. — A magnificent Anabasis ; everything is ready : 
 Hell. III. i.-IV. i. ^ pan-Hellenic movement under Lacedaemon, the leading 
 pp. 1-47, ' state of Hellas (the Lacedaemonians are the admitted 
 
 An. 403-394 B.C. TrpSffTarat at this date), and the Heracleid Agesilaus. 
 The writer's personal interests are concerned ; his knowledge of the country, 
 cavalry, tribes, serves him as a passport ; his tpCKtmida carries him on ; he 
 writes like a modern war correspondent. 
 
 After the blow of the recall he proceeds with more aloofness (or out of 
 philetairic admiration for Agesilaus). The absorbing interest is now 
 
 (2) The struggle between Lacedaemon and the Coalition 
 
 by land and (vrith less detail) by sea, by war and diplomatic action, which 
 
 struggle ends triumphantly for the leading state of Hellas. 
 
 //>//. IV. ii.-V.i. 36, The historian either ignores' or fails to recognise the 
 
 pp. 47-100, seeds of dissolution in the system, which will afterwards be 
 
 patent enough. To him Sparta reaches the zenith of her 
 
 power at the Peace of Antalcidas, B. c. 387. 
 
 A further contradiction : ' The Persian ' is no longer the enemy of 
 Hellas. He is the friend (or tool) of Lacedaemon. Does the historian feel 
 the shame? If so, he conceals his feelings. Or is it swallowed up and 
 cancelled difsychically, through his counter-desire for Hellenic unity (under 
 
 the hegemony of Sparta, or Sparta and Athens, or rather thit ^eKnaroi of 
 ~or this feeling cf. Lysias, Olymp., B.C. s'iS. 
 
 ' See his own remarks in Pol. Lac. } 
 
MOMENTA OF THE HELLENIC HISTOR Y lix 
 
 In Hdlenica C. 
 
 (i) The N^/te<r4s which (in B.C. 379, 371, and the winter of B.C. 370-369) 
 
 Hell. V. ii. i-VI. iv. 16, /*{' ■uf""' I^cedaemon in consequence of the"'i^f{.% ex- 
 
 pp. 100-163, hibited hy her in the intoxication of unlimited power 
 
 An. 387-371 B.C. {b.c. 387) (pp. 107-110), especially in the case of the 
 
 seizure of the Cadmeia (B.C. 383), which the historian emphatically notes as 
 
 the peripety of the plot (p. 119). 
 
 This "T/3/HS — though the historian does not exactly emphasise the fact, 
 whether as being conscious or unconscious of it, i.e. choosing to ignore it or 
 failing to recognise it, as a matter of art or political bias— is seen worlcing in 
 reference to Mantinea, Phlius, Olynthus, Thebes, from B.C. 387 to B.C. 383 ; 
 and again in B.C. 378, the attempt of Sphodrias ; and again in B.C. 371, the 
 Peace of Callias (a reduplication of the Peace of Antalcidas as concerning 
 Lacedaemon and Thebes). In the case of the seizure of the Cadmeia (b.c. 
 383) he emphatically does note it. 
 
 This N^/*6ffis begins to operate in B.C. 379, the deliverance of Thebes (so 
 the hytristic attempt of Sphodrias, B.C. 378, p. 124, finds its retributive 
 contre-coup in the new naval confederacy and Atheno-Theban alliance), and 
 reaches its full force in B.C. 371, "an unseen power driving them onwards" 
 Hell. VI. iv. 17-VI. V. 52, (P- ^58) to the terrible disaster of Leuctra, B.C. 371, 
 pp. 163-185, followed by the pan-Arcadian movement and the 
 
 An. 370-369 B.C. founding of Megalopolis, the Athenian hegemony 
 
 movement, the first Theban invasion, etc. For the feeling against Sparta, 
 and the idea of a union of states, cf. Isocr. Panegyr. , B. c. 380. 
 
 That is his first motif (absorbing idea, leading theme, or whatever we 
 ought to call it), but it is speedily swallowed up, unless we ought to say gradu- 
 ally transmuted, as the historian becomes absorbed in the topic (quick with 
 interest, partium favor, fautoris studium) : 
 
 (2) The struggle between the Northern aud tlie Southern Powers, engendering 
 rapaxh Kal ixpiala, to the disintegration of &pxfl. These Powers are 
 
 , . . , _ . Hell. VII. i. 1-22, pp. 186-102, 
 
 (o) m the first mstance — b.c. 370-369. 
 
 Thebes^ (Boeotia) with (i) her extra- Peloponnesian northern allies ; 
 
 (z) her Peloponnesian allies (Argos, the old rival 
 against of Sparta, and the now hostile, formerly 
 
 allied, states) 
 Lacedaemon with (i) Athens (after B.C. 369) ; 
 
 (2) three or four faithful states. 
 
 Hell. VII. i. 22-VII. v. 27, pp. 192-233, 
 (/3) eventually — b.c. 369-368— u.c. 362. 
 
 Under the disintegrating forces of ipBbvoi (state-rivalry between the 
 states) (e.g. re Elis and Arcadia) and opposite political theory 
 B'C.3 9-3 • ^Qf (jig ^iXTUTTot versus the democrats within the states com- 
 posing the Arcadian league or other) and the new ' elective affinities ' (see 
 Trans, vol. i.. Sketch, p. cxxxvi. ) 
 
 ^ See p. 196. The problem working in the minds of the Thebans was how to compass 
 the headship of HtUas. 
 
Ix INTRODUCTION 
 
 Thebes (Boeotia) with (i) her northern extra-Peloponnesian allies (Phocis 
 
 less actively, but Thessaly added eventually) ; 
 
 (2) the four democratic states of the Arcadian 
 
 against League headed by Tegea ; the old rival 
 
 of Sparta, Argos j and the new state of 
 
 Messene 
 
 the coalition of the five great Powers, 
 
 The Lacedaemonians, 
 
 The Arcadians {i.e. the jSe'Xno-TOi-led states, Man- 
 tinea and the rest forming the party oi rrjs 
 IlfXoTow^irov K'r]S6ixei'm), 
 The Achaeans, 
 The Eleians, and 
 The Athenians. 
 
 The writer's final mood therefore is at once detached religiously (see above, 
 p. XXX. ) and ' prejudiced ' politically. This anti-Theban feeling is common ; he 
 is not singular in the matter. Cf. Isocr. Plalaikos, B. c. 373. 
 
 There are two passages which show at once his sentiment {animus) and his 
 ffiveffi^ iroXtTiic^. 
 
 u,. The one is about Pelopidas and the failure on the part of Thebes to 
 resuscitate the (Antalcidas) diplomatic instrument in favour of herself 
 as against Lacedaemon, by a turning of the diplomatic tables on her 
 (the principle of autonomy applied to Messene, etc.), B.C. 368, Hell. 
 VII. i. 39, 40. "The striving after empire on the part of Pelopidas 
 and the Thebans was dispelled — SieXiiffi; " p. 198. 
 
 N.B. — This is the minor-peripety of Hell. C, in the case of Thebes ; see 
 above for that of the whole history. Hell. B and C, in the case of Sparta. 
 
 /3. The other, the concluding passage of the work in reference to the ironic 
 working of Providence, the TrapA irpoaSoKtav as regards human inten- 
 tion and divine disposition, instead of an ipx^ renewed ivapxlc, B. c. 
 362, Hell. VII. v. 26, p. 233. 
 
 Note. — As to how the rapaxv arose. The beginning of the end of her 
 dream of empire on the part of Thebes, "the little rift within the lute," is 
 the aspiration after the hegemony of Peloponnese on the part of the Arcadians 
 under the influence of Lycomedes [Hell. VII. i. 23, p. 192), B.C. 398, and the 
 jealousy of the other Peloponnesian Powers, hitherto united among them- 
 selves, and in support of their champion leader Thebes against Lacedaemon. 
 See the historian's remark Apropos of the ' tearless ' victory (p. 196), about 
 the Thebans and the Eleians. 
 
 For a further symptom of rapaxh ^^^ "is cross relations Corinth and 
 Athens ; Athens and the Arcadians, B.C. 366, Hell. VII. iv. 6, p. 214. 
 
 As to (a) the historian's religious detachment, see what he says (definitely 
 states, or hints at silently) about Jason, the Eleians, Euphron, Lycomedes, 
 Philiscus, Pelopidas, Epaminondas, vide Index s. n. 
 
 (/3) As to the historian's partisanship, see what he says about Phlius (a pane- 
 gyric from a Lacedaemonian point of view) ; and note the detail {versus cur- 
 tailment or actual omission of counter-topic) of the long speeches put into the 
 mouth of Procles in two successive debates. 
 
ON THE MINOR WORKS Ixi 
 
 On the Minor Works included in this Volume — 
 A Comment 
 
 To the four compositions before us one general remark 
 applies.i Rightly or wrongly attributed to the pen of Xeno- 
 phon himself, their discussion cannot fail to throw some light 
 on the literary genius of the writer with whose name they have 
 been associated from ancient times; whilst, apart from the 
 question of authorship, each in turn will be found to possess 
 an intrinsic interest, if only as a literary product of the period 
 at which (or close to which) its reputed author lived.^ 
 
 The "Agesilaus" 
 
 Thus it may be considered certain that the encomium ^ 
 was written shortly after the death of Agesilaus (which, 
 according to different computations, occurred between B.C. 
 361 and B.C. 358); and whilst 'the Persian' was still a for- 
 midable power. In point of date, therefore, this work may 
 well have been a product of Xenophon's last years, and, apart 
 from the question who wrote it, is a remarkable piece of 
 
 ' And indeed is applicable to the remaining Xenophontis opuscula (even 
 including the Apologia), which will engage our attention in my third volume. 
 
 ^ Or, considering the dates assigned by one critic or another to the several 
 works, perhaps one ought to say : " of a period not widely separated in spirit, 
 if in date distinct, from that at which its reputed author lived." 
 
 The Polity of the Athenians, not uncommonly regarded "as the earliest 
 specimen of Attic prose and not by Xenophon," is assigned by many modems 
 to B.C. 425-424 circa, by others to a much later date not incompatible with 
 Xenophontine authorship, and by Bernhardy to Macedonian times. 
 
 The Polity of the Lacedaemonians is commonly assigned to B. c. 378 circa. 
 
 The Agesilaus to B.C. 357 cit-ca (i.e. to a date between B.C. 361 or 358 
 circa, the death of Agesilaus, and B.C. 338, Chaeronea, or B.C. 323, the 
 destruction of the Persian empire at latest. See Ages. vii. 7). 
 
 The Revenues to B.C. 355 (or to a date as early as B.C. 422 if we are to 
 believe Schneider, or as late as b. c. 346 according to H. Hagen). 
 
 ' The latest but one of the four, as I believe, in date, but a work so closely 
 connected in several ways with the Hellenica that I have placed it, out of its 
 chronological order, first. 
 
Ixii INTRODUCTION 
 
 writing, which some (of whom Cicero^ is the chief) have 
 extravagantly praised, and others (in modern times) have no 
 less extravagantly blamed. 
 
 To Cicero, who felt in it the touch of a master-hand, 
 " this one little book of Xenophon's " seemed, " for its flatter- 
 ing delineation of the king, its subject, easily to excel all the 
 portrait-pictures and statues that ever were," yet it has come to 
 be regarded in the eyes of many an able critic ^ among ourselves 
 as the sophistical production of a pedant — a student perhaps 
 of rhetoric, whose want of taste can only be forgiven in 
 consideration of his lack of years. 
 
 Here, then, apart from the question of genuineness, is a 
 remarkable divergence of critical opinion. Nor, as far as we 
 can judge, did Cicero stand alone in his appreciation of the 
 literary qualities of the Agesilaus. That all the ancient writers^ 
 who refer to it regarded it with the admiration of Cicero is 
 perhaps too much to assume. What we are warranted to 
 suppose is that from the days of Aristotle down to the sixth 
 
 ^ In the famous "valde bella" epistola (as he names it himself, ad Att. 
 IV. vi.), addressed to the historian Lucceius (in May B.C. 58), urging his 
 friend to make an historical study of his life from the conspiracy of Catiline 
 until his return from exile : ' ' Even though you once wyote in a certain proem 
 that you could be no more affected by favouritism (gratia) than the 
 Xenophontine Hercules by pleasure (in reference to Mem. II. i. 21 foil.), 
 yet, si me (gratia) tibi vehementius commendabit, ne asperneris amorique 
 nostro plusculum etiam quam concedit Veritas, largiere ; " and a little lower 
 down the passage with which we are concerned at present, ' ' Nee m.inus est 
 Spartiates Agesilaus ille perhibendus, qui neque pictam neque iSctam imaginem 
 suam passus est esse" (in reference to Ages. xi. 7; see below, p. 269, 
 ' ' Whilst he would not suffer any image of his bodily form to be set up ... he 
 never ceased elaborating what should prove the monument of his spirit") 
 ' ' quam qui in eo genere elaborarunt. Unus enim Xenophontis lihellus in eo 
 rege laudando facile omnes imagines omnium siatuasque superavit.'* [£p. ad 
 Div. V. xii. 3 and 7). I assume that Cicero's copy of the Agesilaus did not 
 differ greatly from our version. 
 
 * From ^efrigidus Agesilai laudator ei sophista of Valckenaer [ad Herod. 
 iii. 134) down to ihii scriptor in schola quadam Isocratea eruditus puerulus of 
 J. J. Hartman ; see An. Xen. cap. xi. de Agesilao libello (a work to which 
 I owe much, and a chapter well deserving the careful attention of every one 
 interested in the matter). 
 
 ' Apart from a doubtful reference to the work in Isocrates's letter to Archi- 
 damus (Ep. ad Archid. i), the most ancient is that of Dicaearchus, the 
 peripatetic (ob. (?) B.C. 285) (a pupil of Aristotle and friend of Theophrastus), 
 the loss of whose works, and especially of his ^los t^s "BXXdSos, is "one of 
 the most severe in Greek literature." 
 
THE AGESILAUS Ixiii 
 
 century of our era all sorts of authorities ^ were cognisant of 
 its existence, and as a work, we must presume of Xenophon's, 
 which they were free to praise or blame. None of those 
 writers — neither Dicaearchus of Messene as quoted by 
 Plutarch,^ nor Dionysius of Halicarnassus, nor Demetrius 
 Magnes, nor Cornelius Nepos, nor Plutarch himself, nor 
 Athenaeus, nor Themistius, nor Aristides the rhetorician, nor 
 Priscian the grammarian — appears to have detected in it that 
 ' sophistic ' ring which grates so harshly on the modern ear ; 
 nor did any one of them chance to lay his finger on those 
 peculiarities of technique which are a stumbling-block to the 
 modern editor. 
 
 Of these it is time to speak more definitely, and in the 
 first place concerning what may be called the structural 
 peculiarities of the composition ; which, even in a translation, 
 are plainly visible. It will be observed that (i) with the 
 exception of verbal differences and a variation in the rhythm 
 of the sentences (which, however, are by no means unim- 
 portant or uninteresting), the whole of the earlier portion, in 
 which the encomiast recounts the deeds of Agesilaus, consists 
 of a reproduction of passages from the Hellenic History? 
 The question is, would Xenophon have so levied toll upon 
 
 ^ It is a long list, beginning with Dicaearchus or perhaps Isocrates, and I 
 forbear to burthen this note with the references, which are given clearly in 
 another work to which I owe much. See G. Sauppe, vol. v. , Praefatio (to the 
 Agesilaus)t p. 126, dejide ei auctoritaie libri disputaHo, 
 
 * In his life of Agesilaus, in reference to Xen. Ages. viii. 7, d.Kov<TtiTa Sk 
 tijs ^irl ToXtTtKou KavvdBpov Kargei els 'AjUii/cXas i] duydrTjp aiiToO. [The words 
 i] Bvy&Tijp oiJtoO, by the way, were suppUed (by Casaubon) from Plutarch, 
 a fact for the epitomists which Kuprianos did not fail to note. Possibly 
 Plutarch's copy of the Agesilaus was fuller than ours]. " His daughter's 
 canathrum, says Xenophon, was no richer than that of any one else. . . . 
 Xenophon has not left us the name of this daughter of Agesilaus, and 
 Dicaearchus expresses some indignation because we do not know, he says, the 
 name of Agesilaus's daughter nor of Efaminondas' s mother. But in the 
 records of Lacbnia" (these dvaypiiJ,fiaTa, no doubt, were of great use to 
 Plutarch) " we ourselves found his wife's name to have been Cleora, and his 
 two daughters to have been called Eupolia and Prolyta." — Plut. Ages. 19. 
 (Clough, iv. 23). 
 
 * I.e., Ages. i. 6-ii. 31 || Hell. III. iv., and IV. ii, iii. in part. It is 
 commonly assumed that the encomiast borrows from the historian, and not 
 vice versa. It is, however, suggested by the epitomists that both versions 
 are derived from a common source — to wit, the original Hellenica ; and. 
 
Ixiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 himself? (2) A second structural peculiarity is the addition 
 of chapter xi. This chapter is certainly not recapitulatory. 
 It is added, if I take the author's meaning, as a sort of memoria 
 technica} or table of his hero's virtues; and necessitates a 
 second and final peroration. From the point of view of 
 artistic arrangement, is such an appendix defensible? But 
 defects of this sort, it must be admitted, are a proof at worst 
 of incompleteness. The sculptor, if I may once more avail 
 myself of Lucian's metaphor,^ has admitted us into his work- 
 shop. The statue has not yet attained its final beauty ; some 
 limbs are waiting articulation. Who knows but that either 
 through lack of creative power of the highest order, or urjder 
 press of time or other like exigency, the artist Xenophon 
 himself may have failed to give the final touches to his 
 creation ? 
 
 A greater puzzle still to the modern critic than any 
 structural incongruity, is the presence, in the soul and sub- 
 stance of the work, of a quality which, rightly or wrongly, is felt 
 to contradict the plainness and simplicity of Xenophon. What 
 are we to make of that ? 
 
 Though I have so stated the difficulty from the modern 
 point of view, I admit that here I find myself at issue with 
 recent criticism. I do not certainly deny that simplicity 
 
 according to Kuprianos, the Agesilaus\% the nearer of the two to that original. 
 This explanation of the matter must stand or fall with the epitome theory as 
 a whole. 
 
 ^ lis Si' 6 i-Kaivoi eifJUiriiioveffTipus fxv- ^''^ ^^ possibly intend the chapter 
 to be committed to memory with a view to recitation on some state occasion 
 such as that referred to in i. 2 (p. 237 below) ? The Agesilaus, it should be 
 borne in mind, is prose of the "commemoration ode" type. Compare the 
 language of Isocrates, on the Antidosis, 319. I quote from Professor Jebb's 
 paraphrase : ' ' First, it must be remembered that there are as many branches 
 of prose as of poetry. Some prose writers have spent their lives in tracing the 
 genealogies of heroes. Others have been critics of the poets. Others have 
 compiled histories of wars. Others have woven discourses into dialogues. 
 My work has been in yet another field — in the composition of discourses 
 bearing upon the politics of all Hellas, and fitted for recitation at Pan-Hellenic 
 gatherings (irapTiyupiKoM 'Kbr/ovi). Such discourses stand nearer to poetry 
 than to prosaic rhetoric. Their language is more imaginative and more 
 ornate" (Att. Or. ii. p. 137). 
 
 ^ In his essay already quoted above on the right method of writing history, 
 irws Sef, 48 : t6 cru/ia d/caXX^s in Kal ididpSpuiTov. 
 
THE AGESILAUS Ixv 
 
 and a dislike of meretricious ornament are true character- 
 istics of Xenophon's style. But I am perpetually aware of 
 another element of his art which, for want of a better word, I 
 have ventured to call his euphuistic tendency.^ This quality 
 in him has its good and its less good side. At its best it adds 
 a grace like that of poetry to his well-cadenced prose. The 
 magic of his speech at such times is like that of the Elizabeth- 
 ans. Instinct with emotion, it can give a new dignity to the 
 commonplace. Or again, it seeks to impose upon our minds 
 with verbal antitheses and to charm our ears with plays on 
 words and sonorous nothings.^ Here we begin to suspect it. 
 In the last degree it is as if the writer had set himself to 
 caricature his own style. The modern critic naturally 
 exclaims : " This is the work of an imitator !" 
 
 The object of this digression is to point out that many of 
 the things which offend the modern critic in the diction of the 
 Agesilaus find their parallel in the other writings of Xenophon. 
 That, it may be said, is admitted ; only in this particular 
 writing there is so great a multitude of niaiseries. In answer 
 to which I fall back upon the nature of the composition. If 
 a speech attributed to some character in history ^ or the pane- 
 gyric of a small people pronounced by the historian himself 
 suffice to admit them, what scope would not- be given to such 
 a tendency by the very occasion of a panegyric ? * But I 
 do not deny that various particular difficulties exist which I 
 cannot explain. As a matter of convenience, I will speak of 
 
 ^ This manner is visible in very many parts of Xenophon. It is a mark, I 
 think, of his later style. The Cyropaedia is full of it. See Trans, vol. i. 
 p. xli. 
 
 ^ One is occasionally reminded of Shakespeare's manner in Xenophon — 
 Xenophon at his best ; and when Xenophon is at his worst in this matter, we 
 can still draw a parallel from the occasional lapses of the greatest of euphuists, 
 " quandoque bonus dormitat." 
 
 ' See Polydamas's speech. Hell. VI. i. 2 foil. ; and the historian's praise 
 of the Phliasians, Hell. VII. ii. i foil. 
 
 ■* And that the encomium of so great a man, since, in the eyes of more 
 than half of Hellas at the time, the death of Agesilaus was the removal of their 
 greatest national hero ; and whether we share their admiration for the man 
 or not, from that point of view we must needs judge the language of the 
 encomiast, which is not fulsome like that of a flatterer, but effusive with the 
 warmth of a genuine admiration. 'XvcLiiiffrriTos, " without offence committed," 
 he has departed and is truly blest. The epithet has caused offence itself, but it 
 
 VOL. II e 
 
Ixvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 these in the footnote,^ and conclude my remarks with a 
 statement of my own position. 
 
 On the whole, my belief is, that the Agesilaus is genuine. 
 In spite of exaggerated phrase and amorphous structure (two 
 
 is pardonable. Compare the language of our own BpTJvos (not that the Agesi- 
 laus is a $p^vos — a point denied by its author — but the occasion is parallel) : 
 
 " The last great Englishman is low. 
 Mourn, for to us he seems the last, 
 Rememhering all his greatness in the Past." 
 
 ' To name, in the first place, the two passages which are to me the most 
 inexplicable. I cannot understand the words In vios Siv in i. 6. Agesilaus, 
 being over forty (see Plut. Ages. 40 ; Hell. V. iv. 13) when he obtained the 
 kingdom, was scarcely 'still a youth,' unless we are to suppose that v^os = 
 juvenis. But they would be equally puzzling by whomsoever written. Nor, 
 again, can I understand the words rots ^i\ois in ii. 20, a passage parallel to 
 Hell. IV. vi. II. The pass, according to the historian, was stormed distinctly 
 by the first and second ranks of the hoplites. It is odd if, later in life, and 
 with the passage before him, the historian should have pictured that dashing 
 charge as performed by the light troops. It certainly looks as if some one 
 ignorant of military terms had penned the passage thinking that rots ^tXois 
 might be used as the equivalent of heavy infantry without their heavy shields, 
 like the word ev^tiivovs in Anab. VII. iii. 46. I suppose there is no doubt 
 that it cannot. Is it conceivable that Xenophon, writing his encomium ' to 
 order,' as it were, and on the spur of the moment in anticipation of some 
 ceremonial, entrusted the duty of arranging the ' historical ' portion of the 
 encomium, so far as preparing 'slips,' etc., to his amanuensis, just as a great 
 painter might leave it to a pupil to finish some portion of a figure ? But this 
 is a wild theory. In any case these are the only two insuperable difficulties. 
 The rest seem to me explicable either (i) as licenses permitted by the nature 
 of the work, or (2) as little pieces of private knowledge excluded from the 
 history as unworthy of the subject or for want of space, and, lastly (3), on the 
 principle of euphuistic phraseology, to which Xenophon was prone. The 
 passages so arranged are ; 
 
 (i) i. 3, 01) Sevripav wpuneiovatv, k.t.\. The words are not strictly 
 correct in that Lacedaemon lost and never really again recovered her 
 hegemony after Leuctra. But that fact is scarcely realised anno 358 
 B.C. circa. 
 
 ii. 9. ' Coronea,' it is pointed out, was eclipsed by ' Mantinea,' and 
 the words which were natural enough when the historian wrote Hell. B 
 are somewhat out of place now. But it was still true that certain 
 features of ' Coronea ' distinguished it beyond all the other battles of 
 his time. 
 
 ii. 21. Scarcely historical as regards the Thehans at the Peace of 
 Antalcidas. 
 
 ii. 24, d^eo'TTjrfTWi' ttiv tSv So6\av . . . Xairo/iit'ui'. There are 
 two points : (a) as to the revolt of the slaves, the historian himself, in 
 his panegyric of the Phliasians {Hell. VII. ii. 2), tells the same tale, 
 dirotTTdvTOJv 8^ trdvTOjv tuv 'ElWiM'WV, though in VI. v. 8 he minimises 
 
THE AGESILAUS Ixvii 
 
 defects which occur elsewhere in the writings of Xenophon as 
 handed down to us), it is instinct with his spirit. It says 
 concerning his heroic friend almost exactly what I should have 
 expected him to say in a composition of this order. And as 
 
 the danger ; (|3) as to the Spartans slain at Leuctra (cf. Hell. VII. v. 28), 
 the language is strangely ambiguous, unless, indeed, with Breitenbach, 
 we are to understand by XetTro/i^cwv e pugna superstitum. 
 
 (2) i. 10, parallel to Hell. III. iv. 5 (p- 25). "Three months" may well 
 
 be an addition due to personal knowledge. Xenophon was probably 
 with Agesilaus at the time, B.C. 396. 
 
 ii. I, parallel to Hell IV. ii. 8. " In a month," i.e. twelve times as 
 fast as the Persian. 
 
 ii. 10, &v 'HpiTTTrWas i^eviyei., parallel to Hell. IV. iii. 15. See also 
 Hell. III. iv. 20 for the troops taken out by Agesilaus to Asia. Some 
 of these (possibly four thousand out of the original six thousand forming 
 the aivTayna of the allies) were left in Asia on his return. At Coronea, 
 as it appears, Herippidas as ^evaybi (see Thuc. ii. 75, Arnold's note) 
 commanded this moiety + the Cyreians. 
 
 vii. 6, parallel to Hell. IV. v. 3. " Noluit, " says the encomiast ; 
 "non potuit," says the historian (and the encomiast himself, ii. 18), 
 ' Corinthum expugnare ' ; but the story of the exiles and their engines 
 is quite compatible with the historical version. 
 
 (3) Some of these 'euphuisms' are pleasing enough, others sound to me 
 
 artificial ; but in reading the writers of the sixteenth century a similar 
 diflBcuIty arises ; and after all, ' taste ' counts for a great deal, and 
 tastes proverbially differ (e.g. curiously enough, the passage, x. i, 
 p. 267, which Valckenaer (ad Herod, ix. 27) thinks is worthier of a 
 sophist than of Xenophon, is selected by Mr. Mahaify, Hist, of Class. Gk. 
 Lit. vol. ii. p. 270 [ed. 1880], x. 484, as "an elegantly finished 
 period " ). To distinguish between what is good and bad in taste is 
 especially hard, I suppose, in a foreign language. 
 
 iv, 4, o\ irpotKa e5 TreirovBiyre^, Trans, p. 256, ' the recipient of gratui- 
 tous kindness,' is to my ear somewhat of ' a vile phrase.' 
 
 vi. 2. The word-play and jingle of sound between /;[w7/i6ta and 
 (TTjfieia, 1 confess, please me (see Trans, p. 259, ' monuments ' and 
 ' marks' ) ; and so does the phrase /jAxv ivTiTiirif above (cf. Coriolanus, 
 IV. v. 116, " the anvil of my sword"). 
 
 vi. 3. The passage about trophies seems to me a little forced. 
 
 vi. 6. • I rather like the word-play ixvpa, iviix'^pi- 
 
 vi. 7, Trans, p. 260. Mr. Mahaffy criticises the sentence pom'^'d)' . . . 
 dvaeTi^ovXevrdTaTov as "perhaps the worst possible specimen of Gorgian 
 alliteration." I confess I do not like the sound of the sesquipedalia 
 vet-ba ; but what would a modern Greek say ? The sense appears to 
 me better than the sound. 
 
 viii. 7, Seaffdo-ffu, reipdcrdu, ivvtyqairu, iKovtrira. This passage 
 offends my taste in some way. I especially resent Treipiadu. It must, 
 however, be borne in mind that the Spartan kings are demigods, and 
 in imagination we are visiting a semi-sacred spot. 
 
 viii. 8. The last sentence pleases me. 
 
Ixviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 to the 'defects,' I account for them in one or other of two 
 ways. It is to be borne in mind that, if he wrote it at all, he 
 wrote etrxaToyij/atos &v when quite an old man ; and though 
 there is no reason to suppose that old age had in any respect 
 dulled his spirit or warped his reason, he may well have suffered 
 himself for the nonce to indite words which, with the oppor- 
 tunity of a revision, he might well have withdrawn. As I have 
 already noted, the last portion of the Hellenica {Hell. C) seems 
 to furnish evidence of like mannerism and a similar want 
 of finish in parts.^ That is my first explanation, and 
 my second resembles it. We do not know whether the 
 work was published in Xenophon's lifetime or edited 
 posthumously. Perhaps it is not Xenophon himself but 
 his editors who are wholly or in part responsible for these 
 blemishes.^ 
 
 The Tw^o "Polities" 
 
 The Polity of the Athenians and the Polity of the Lacedae- 
 monians, to which we now come, ar'e works of a very different 
 order. The question at once arises, Could the former 
 of the two have been written by Xenophon? and, if not, 
 how did it come to find its way within the canon of his 
 writings? I have no answer to give to either question. 
 All I can do is to state as briefly as possible the reason of my 
 belief as expressed on p. xlix. of my former volume : " I agree 
 
 ix. I. And so does the 'euphuistio' word-play of icdXXos Ki/r/iov : the 
 sentence is a very pretty one, quite spoiled in translation. 
 Two other observations I have to make in conclusion : 
 
 vi. 6 is a reduplication, as it were, of ffetl. VI. i. 5, a passage con- 
 cerning Jason ; but such borrowings from himself are quite in Xeno- 
 phon's manner. The particiJar passage is applicable to the archie 
 man or Real Prince — now Cyrus, now Jason, now Agesilaus. 
 
 vii. 7, concerning the Persian king, to my mind is quite in the 
 manner of Xenophon. Whether it be Darius the Great, or Xerxes, or 
 Artaxerxes Mngmon, or Ochus — no matter — -'the Persian' in the 
 abstract is what he is thinking of, and dreaming the while his old dream 
 of a pan-Hellenic conquest of the arch-enemy's empire. 
 ^ The last chapter itself is highly finished and impressive. See above, 
 p. xxvii. 
 
 2 See Trans, vol. i. p. cxlv. note 3. 
 
THE TWO POLITIES Ixix 
 
 with those critics who accept the Polity of the Lacedaemonians 
 but reject that of the Athenians." 
 
 At the end of the canon preserved by Diogenes Laertius 
 and based, as it would appear, on information derived, in part 
 or altogether, from Demetrius Magnes (the grammarian friend 
 of Cicero), "among the forty books or thereabouts, divided 
 differently by different editors," which were recognised as 
 genuine works of Xenophon, are named " the tract on Revenues, 
 the Hiero or despotic man, the Agesilaus, and (lastly, as if the 
 two were one work) the Polity of the Athenians and Lacedae- 
 monians, which Demetrius Magnes asserts is not by Xenophon." 
 So then it appears that at the time of Cicero some critics, on 
 what grounds we know not, disputed the genuineness of the 
 Polities, one or other, or both. This doubt being so set up in 
 the mind, in the absence, if so it should prove,^ of any strong 
 support from the outside (like that of Dicaearchus and the rest 
 in favour of the Agesilaus), we are thrown back, as it were, 
 entirely upon the internal evidence. As to the weight of this, 
 every reader must judge for himself ; thus much, however, may, 
 I think, be stated without fear of contradiction, that whilst 
 the Polity of the Athenians is altogether unlike in spirit and 
 tone of thought and style to anything else ever attributed to 
 Xenophon, that of the Lacedaemonians, though in certain 
 respects it may be thought unworthy of the subject and of the 
 writer, is at any rate highly Xenophontine in spirit and in 
 
 ^ The only references to the Polity of the Athenians in ancient times, apart 
 from Diogenes Laertius {beginning of third century A. D.), are, I believe, pass- 
 ages in Pollux, the Atticist (end of second century A. D. ) , Stobaeus (beginning of 
 sixth century), and Zonaras (at the beginning of the twelfth). With the Polity 
 of the Lacedaemonians it is different. That work is freely quoted (possibly 
 from a more complete copy than ours) by Plutarch ; and by Polybius, vi. 43 
 foil, (in his discussion and comparison of the Cretan and Lycurgan constitu- 
 tions) ; by Longinus also (see below, p. 303), and by several later writers, 
 including Photius (see G. .Sauppe, Praef. Pol. Lac. p. 156). As to Polybius 
 and his testimony in this matter, there is some reason for thinking that he is 
 confusing Xenophon with Aristotle when he says : 'B7ri hk ttji/ lK.prjTwv fiera- 
 ^dvTes, d^Lov iiriaTTJffaL Kara dtjo rpSirovs, irws ol 'KoyithTO.TOi tuv dpxo.^^v 
 (rvyypa<piav'E(popos, %cvo(j>Sv, 'K.a'K'ki.aBiviii, Kal HXirav irpGirov fih bptolav 
 eXvai (j>a(n Ka.1 rV aM}v Tji AaKeSatfwvioji'' Seirepov i-KaiVET^v virdpxovffav 
 i.Tro<t>alvov(n.v, since Xenophon says nothing (in our Pol. Lac.) about the 
 Cretan constitution, and Aristotle \Pol. ii.) says a good deal. On the other 
 hand, Aristotle himself is thought to have had Xenophon's work before him 
 (see below, p. 307), though possibly, like Plutarch, in a fuller text than ours. 
 
Ixviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 to the ' defects,' I account for them in one or other of two 
 ways. It is to be borne in mind that, if he wrote it at all, he 
 wrote ecrxaToyrjpm S>v when quite an old man ; and though 
 there is no reason to suppose that old age had in any respect 
 dulled his spirit or warped his reason, he may well have suffered 
 himself for the nonce to indite words which, with the oppor- 
 tunity of a revision, he might well have withdrawn. As I have 
 already noted, the last portion of the Hellenica {Hell. C) seems 
 to furnish evidence of like mannerism and a similar want 
 of finish in parts.i That is my first explanation, and 
 my second resembles it. We do not know whether the 
 work was published in Xenophon's lifetime or edited 
 posthumously. Perhaps it is not Xenophon himself but 
 his editors who are wholly or in part responsible for these 
 blemishes.^ 
 
 The Two "Polities" 
 
 The Polity of the Athenians and the Polity of the Lacedae- 
 monians, to which we now come, are works of a very different 
 order. The question at once arises, Could the former 
 of the two have been written by Xenophon? and, if not, 
 how did it come to find its way within the canon of his 
 writings ? I have no answer to give to either question. 
 All I can do is to state as briefly as possible the reason of my 
 belief as expressed on p. xlix. of my former volume : " I agree 
 
 ix. I. And so does the ' euphuistic ' word-play of /niXXos Kbafwv : the 
 sentence is a very pretty one, quite spoiled in translation. 
 Two other observations I have to make in conclusion : 
 
 vi. 6 is a reduplication, as it were, of Hell. VI. i. s. a passage con- 
 cerning Jason ; but such borrowings from himself are quite in Xeno- 
 phon's manner. The particular passage is applicable to the archie 
 man or Real Prince — now Cyrus, now Jason, now Agesilaus. 
 
 vii. 7, concerning the Persian king, to my mind is quite in the 
 manner of Xenophon. Whether it be Darius the Great, or Xerxes, or 
 Artaxerxes MnSmon, or Ochus — no matter — 'the Persian' in the 
 abstract is what he is thinking of, and dreaming the while his old dream 
 of a pan-Hellenic conquest of the arch-enemy's empire. 
 ' The last chapter itself is highly finished and impressive. See above, 
 p. xxvii. 
 
 2 See Trans, vol. i. p. cxlv. note 3. 
 
THE TWO POLITIES Ixix 
 
 with those critics who accept the Polity of the Lacedaemonians 
 but reject that of the Athenians." 
 
 At the end of the canon preserved by Diogenes Laertius 
 and based, as it would appear, on information derived, in part 
 or altogether, from Demetrius Magnes (the grammarian friend 
 of Cicero), " among the forty books or thereabouts, divided 
 differently by different editors," which were recognised as 
 genuine works of Xenophon, are named " the tract on Revenues, 
 the Hiero or despotic man, the Agesilaus, and (lastly, as if the 
 two were one work) the Polity of the Athenians and Lacedae- 
 tnonians, which Demetrius Magnes asserts is not by Xenophon." 
 So then it appears that at the time of Cicero some critics, on 
 what grounds we know not, disputed the genuineness of the 
 Polities, one or other, or both. This doubt being so set up in 
 the mind, in the absence, if so it should prove,^ of any strong 
 support from the outside (like that of Dicaearchus and the rest 
 in favour of the Agesilaus), we are thrown back, as it were, 
 entirely upon the internal evidence. As to the weight of this, 
 every reader must judge for himself; thus much, however, may, 
 I think, be stated without fear of contradiction, that whilst 
 the Polity of the Athenians is altogether unlike in spirit and 
 tone of thought and style to anything else ever attributed to 
 Xenophon, that of the Lacedaemonians, though in certain 
 respects it may be thought unworthy of the subject and of the 
 writer, is at any rate highly Xenophontine in spirit and in 
 
 ' The only references to the Polity of the Athenians in ancient times, apart 
 from Diogenes Laertius (beginning of third century A. D.), are, I believe, pass- 
 ages in Pollux, the Atticist (end of second century A. D. ), Stobaeus (beginning of 
 sixth century), and Zonaras (at the beginning of the twelfth). With the Polity 
 of the Lacedaemonians it is different. That work is freely quoted (possibly 
 from a more complete copy than ours) by Plutarch ; and by Polybius, vi. 43 
 foil, (in his discussion and comparison of the Cretan and Lycurgan constitu- 
 tions) ; by Longinus also (see below, p. 303), and by several later writers, 
 including Photius (see G. Sauppe, Praef. Pol. Lac. p. 156). As to Polybius 
 and his testimony in this matter, there is some reason for thinking that he is 
 confusing Xenophon with Aristotle when he says : 'E7ri ii -riiv KfrriTuv /jLcra- 
 ^dvTCS, &^LOv ^TnarrjtTaL Kara 5{io TpSirovs, ttws ol XoyLibraTOi rdv 6.pxa.iu)v 
 ffvyypa(p4uv"'E^opos, ^evotpuv, KdXXiffd^vTjs, Kal HXdriOj/ Tpuirov fih bfxolav 
 cTvai <pa(n Kal t^jv air^v rri AdKedaLfiovtajv' Se&repov iwatver^v inrdpxovaav 
 d.iro<palvov<nv, since Xenophon says nothing (in our Pol. Lac.) about the 
 Cretan constitution, and Aristotle \Pol. ii.) says a good deal. On the other 
 hand, Aristotle himself is thought to have had Xenophon's work before him 
 (see below, p. 307), though possibly, like Plutarch, in a fuller text than ours. 
 
Ixx INTRODUCTION 
 
 style. I do not say that such a general impression, however 
 correctly formed, is conclusive on the question of genuineness 
 in either case. But for the time being it would seem to 
 justify an attitude which, to speak for myself) I may best 
 describe as a hesitancy to accept the one or to reject the 
 other in the absence of better evidence. 
 
 "The Polity of the Athenians" 
 
 •Terse, pointed, logical, this small treatise, even in the 
 mutilated condition in which it has been handed down to us, 
 rivets the attention. It would indeed be delightful to believe 
 simply, with Grote, or to have it proved to one, that Xenophon 
 at some moment of his long life — perhaps in the heyday of youth 
 and before his mind contracted its peculiar bent — so far in- 
 dulged his native vein of Attic humour as to pen the Polity of 
 the Athenians, perhaps in a letter to a Spartan friend, or as 
 an imaginary debate between an oligarch and a democrat at 
 Athens, or as an essay addressed to a political club ; since, 
 by whomsoever written, this treatise may best be described, I 
 think, as An apology for the democracy, by an oligarch of an 
 impartial turn of mind. ^ 
 
 The question next arises. At what date was the composi- 
 tion penned ? Here, I need hardly say, we must depend 
 entirely upon internal evidence. There is the evidence to be 
 derived from the author's illustrations or his other references 
 to political events past or current, and there is the evidence 
 of diction. 
 
 ^ For the nature of the writing see the views of various critics tabulated 
 in Sauppe's Praef. Resp. Ath. p. 177 foil. ; Roquette, de Xen, Vit. p. 98 
 foil. ; Hartman, An. Xen. Nova, viii. ; Newman, The Politics of Aristotle, i. 
 p. S38. " It is addressed apparently by an Athenian of oligarchical sym- 
 pathies (^TToiiJffa/iei', i. 12) to a friend (/si i/o/i(feis, i. 8), and is intended to 
 correct his impressions that the constitution of Athens and the arrangements 
 of the state generally were a monument of folly. There is much method, it 
 argues, in the supposed madness of the Athenians.'' It is a remarkable fact, 
 and significant of the importance attached to this little work, that it should 
 have become the fruitful parent of so many learned discussions in modern 
 times, and (in support of one plausible theory or another) itself been fathered 
 upon so many illustrious people of old. Besides Xenophon, Thucydides the 
 historian and Thucydides the son of Melesias, Phrynichus, Critias, and 
 Alcibiades have been named as possible authors. 
 
POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS Ixxi 
 
 To speak of the latter first, I have more than once referred 
 to the view of Bergk and others regarding this work as perhaps 
 the earUest extant specimen of Attic prose, as one which com- 
 mends itself to my own perceptiop of Greek prose style. But 
 I am well aware that this is only a persuasion of my mind, 
 based half consciously on the authority of better judges. And 
 I am bound to warn the 'English reader' that the above 
 opinion is stoutly contested by other authorities;^ and that 
 one critic at least, on the strength of a particular passage 
 (ii. 8, p. 284 below) where the author speaks of the mixed 
 character of the Attic dialect, would have us believe that the 
 writing belonged to the Macedonian period. 
 
 As to the incidents implied or referred to directly by the 
 writer in the course of his argument, these indeed may well be 
 expected to throw light on the date of the work, and will, 
 I think, be found to do so. But here again it is necessary to 
 enter a caution. The value of the dates so furnished will, in 
 part at least, depend upon the estimate formed of the writer's 
 point of view and perhaps of his temperament. If he is, to 
 borrow a modern phrase, ' a professional politician,' illustrating 
 from the current events of the day, we may well conclude that 
 in speaking (as he does, ii. 13, p. 285) of the advantage to a 
 naval democracy of "some jutting promontory or adjacent 
 island " on the enemy's coast, he is referring to the incidents 
 connected with Pylos and Sphacteria, which have happened, 
 so to speak, ' the day before yesterday,' and we shall be ready 
 to conclude that our pamphlet was written somewhere about 
 424 B.C. If, on the other hand, we imagine the author to be 
 a political philosopher taking a wide view of history rather 
 than a debater immersed in the politics of the day, we may 
 persuade ourselves that his illustrations are not suggested to 
 him by the striking occurrences of the moment, but rather are 
 generalisations from many instances, though the field of view 
 is still so far limited that the incidents must be typical of 
 
 1 E.g. Hartman, who sees nothing similar to Antiphon or Thucydides (i.e. 
 the earhest Attic prose writing) in the diction (An. Xen. N. p. 299). The 
 critic referred to is Bernhardy, Synt. 10 (ap. G. Sauppe, Praef. R. A. p. 178, 
 but I have not been able to verify the passage). For myself, I can only repeat 
 that it ' feels ' to me to be Attic of an early rather than of late date. The 
 writer's manner is antique and his vocabulary not obviously modern. 
 
Ixxii INTRODUCTION 
 
 the Athenian democracy (for that is the tlieme -of his dis- 
 course). ^ 
 
 Between these two views it is perhaps hard to dfecide fairly, 
 since both, to my mind, are rational. But, as itegards the 
 date of composition arrived at, -a have a strong conviction in 
 favour of B.C. 424 circa rather than of B.C. 371 or any later 
 period suggested ; and if I an:^pressed to give a reason for this 
 conviction, it is that no political philosopher examining the 
 constitution of Athens after 403 B.C. (not Machiavelli _him- 
 self) could, I think, have contwyed to make us live so abso- 
 lutely in the days of the Pelo^onnesian war. Some note of 
 the actual moment at which he wrote under the restored 
 democracy would somewhere have crept in. Sed 'haec 
 hactenus. - ^ 
 
 The last topic of this portion of my comment concerns the 
 subject matter, and may be briefly despatched. The position of 
 the writer is plainly and frankly stated both in the opening sen- 
 tence (i. i) and again at the beginning of the third chapter (iii. i). 
 The type of polity is not to his taste, ' for reasons ' ; but, given 
 that the Athenians have agreed to be democratically governed, 
 they take the right means to preserve the democracy. What 
 these means are I will leave the reader to discover for himself, 
 and, in conclusion, refer him to certain pages of Mr. Newman's 
 work on Aristotle's Politics (already referred to) for an inter- 
 esting discussion of that philosopher's views, as to the means 
 
 ^ To take ii. 13 as an illustration, Sphacteria and Pylos may be matters, 
 comparatively speaking, of ancient history. In what he says about ' ' a pro- 
 montory, islands, straits," etc., the author maybe thinking not especially of 
 Demosthenes's exploit (i.e. B.C. 424), but of incidents as late as the periplus of 
 Iphicrates, as described in Hell. VI. ii. , B.C. 373. It will be apparent to 
 scholars that in drawing the above distinction I am somewhat crudely, though, 
 I trust, not rudely, referring to two divergent principles of criticism represented 
 to me personally by the names of Kirchhoff and Hartman. I take this oppor- 
 tunity of saying that to both these scholars (and indeed to many others) I am 
 deeply indebted. To Kirchhoff in particular I am indebted for his emended 
 edition of the Polity of the Athenians, which I have used for the purpose of 
 my translation. And with regard to the particular question under discussion, 
 though I am one of "those Trepi Kirchhoff," so to speak, as regards the date, I 
 fully admit the force of Hartman's argument, at least up to a certain point, 
 and I agree with him in regarding the author as a prototype in some sort of 
 Machiavelli. I should like to think he had borrowed from Xenophon's 
 Hellenica and Cyropaedia, but of that I am not persuaded. For i. 19, see 
 Hell. VII. i. 2 ; and for i. 14, see Cyrof. VII. v. 36. 
 
POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS Ixxiii 
 
 of preserving constitutions, contrasted with those of the writer 
 of our ' paper.' ^ 
 
 "The Polity of the Lacedaemonians" 
 
 I here return to the Polity of the Lacedaemonians. Of this 
 work — albeit considerably larger than the companion treatise 
 and not less full of interest in a variety of ways — it will not be 
 necessary to speak at proportionate length. I have already 
 partially cleared the ground by pointing out that in spite of the 
 ambiguous verdict of Demetrius Magnes (according to Diogenes 
 Laertius), we are warranted in assuming that the wflrk is 
 genuine, both on account of its Xenophontine spirit and 
 because we have the testimony of Plutarch and the rest in 
 favour of that opinion.^ For myself, I not only regard it as 
 genuine, but as a composition the merits of which, whether 
 from a literary point of view or in reference to the information 
 
 ^ See Newman, op, cit. i. p. 538 foil. After comparing passages in Pol, 
 Ath, and the Politics, Mr. Newman sums up ; "The whole drift of the 
 composition is that a democracy which wishes to be durable must impoverish 
 the rich and diminish their numbers, and see that the demos is as numerous 
 and as well-off as possible. Aristotle recommends democracies to adopt a 
 diametrically opposite course (7 (5) 8, 1309, a 14 si^g.)," etc. 
 
 '^ It is true that the testimony from without might well be stronger. We 
 should like to know whether Plutarch in his quotations or Aristotle for his 
 references had a text before them largely differing from ours. We should like 
 to come to the truth of the matter concerning Polybius's reference to Xenophon 
 as one of four learned historians who had written on the Cretan constitution 
 (see note above), about which not a word is to be found in our version of the 
 Polity (or elsewhere in Xenophon) ; since, unless the historian is confusing 
 Xenophon with Aristotle (which seems extraordinary), his remark implies the 
 loss of at least a sentence and perhaps a whole chapter or more from the work 
 of Xenophon. As to the testimony from within, we should like to be able to 
 lay the ghost of this double of Xenophon — this alter ego, this grandson editor, 
 this plagiarising ludi-magister, this epitomist — which, provided we are in a 
 certain frame of mind, will haunt us, and nowhere more persistently than 
 whilst we peruse the Polity of the Lacedaemonians. We should like, in short, 
 the condition of the text to be such that there should no longer be room for 
 doubt in the mind of any reasonable modern critic whether the work before us 
 deserves to be lauded as an aureolus libellus or stigmatised as pessime 
 mutilatus et corruftus. For views for and against and intermediate, see the 
 list in G. Sauppe's Praef Resp. Lac. p. 155 foil. See also for their own views 
 Roquette, de Xen. Vit. % 21, p. 80 foil. ; Hartman, An, Xen. Nova, vii. ; and, 
 lastly, a work to which I am especially indebted, de Xen. Libro qui AaK, lloX 
 inscriHtur, Ernest Naumann (Berolini, MDCCCLXXVl). 
 
Ixxiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 it contains, far exceed its defects — defects which I ascribe to 
 the thousand and one mischances of publication and editing 
 inevitable in those early days, and in the case of Xenophon 
 enhanced conceivably by the accidents of his life. In spite of 
 everything which has happened to mar the beauty of the 
 original, we may congratulate ourselves that, even so, the 
 occasion, design, and structure of the work are still quite 
 plain. Of these I will now speak in some order. 
 
 The date of the composition is not difficult to arrive at 
 by internal evidence, which shows that the latest portion 
 (chapter xiv.) was penned in B.C. 378, the year of the new 
 confederacy of Delos (or not later than B.C. 375), and the rest 
 of the work at some interval, probably during the nine years 
 preceding {i.e. between B.C. 387 and B.C. 378) ;i or, to put 
 the matter biographically, this work was one of the fruits of 
 that otium cum dignitate which it was Xenophon's fortune to 
 enjoy as a representative of the ruling power (or ought one to 
 say as the head of a small ■KoXirtv^Lo. ?) on his private estate in 
 the Triphylian township of Scillus. 
 
 As to the design of the work, I have little to add to what 
 
 ' The important passage for arriving at this conclusion is that in which the 
 author criticises the brealcdown of the Lycurgean institutions in modern times 
 (xiv. §§ 4-6). Time was when the laws were strictly observed, ' ' whereas now 
 I am well aware that the leading citizens have but one ambition — to live and 
 die as harmosts on a foreign soil" ; but this dereliction on her part has brought 
 upon Lacedaemon its own chastisement : "In old days the states of Hellas 
 sought her leadership against the supposed wrongdoer" (he is thinking 
 apparently of the times of the Peloponnesian war and the old watchword, 
 ^Xeuffepoi/j'Tes tV "EXXdSo, Thuc. iv. 85), but " nam numbers are inviting one 
 another to prevent the Lacedaemonians again recovering their empire," yvv dk 
 ToXKol irapaKoXoOaiv dXX^Xous iirl ri Si.aKu\iei.v Ap^ai irdXiK airois. The 
 harmosts were not removed till the date of Leuctra (see reference in note 6, 
 p. 32"2), and as far as that infirmity in the foreign politics of Lacedaemon 
 goes, the writer's observations would have been true for several years longer ; 
 but the last passage can only refer, I thinlc, to the incidents of the year 378 
 (see Hell. V. iv. 34), or (not to put too fine a point) to the general feeling of 
 irritation against Sparta and desire to prevent that state from resaddling her 
 yoke upon their necks shown by the newly-confederated states between 378 
 B.C. and 37S B.C. , to which Diodorus (xv. 28, 'ABrivaToi Si Trpeff^cit iiiTeii\j/av 
 . . . wapaKaXovnTes) bears witness. See especially the words irpuiTOi di irpbs 
 T^v ^irbaTtiffiv inHjKQvaav Xtot Kcd Bu^d^rtoi, and the text cf a treaty with 
 Chians, Mitylenaeans, and Byzantians discovered by Rangab6, Antiq. Hellin. 
 ii. 40, 373. See too Isocr. Plat. 28 ; Pint. Pel. 15 (ap. Koehler, in Hermes, 
 V. 10). 
 
POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS Ixxv 
 
 I have already stated in my sketch of Xenophon's life.^ I 
 regard the work as a quasi-historical account of Lycurgus's 
 institutions, as seen or pictured in their more or less ideal 
 working, along with a severe criticism (chap, xiv.) on the 
 practical breaking-down of these institutions in modern Sparta. 
 Does it strike any one that there is something paradoxical in 
 the position of a writer thus attempting to expound in laudatory 
 terms the high conception of the lawgiver, whilst in the next 
 breath he is ready to criticise with lamentations the defective 
 working of his ' laws ' ? It is clear that Xenophon felt some 
 sort of difficulty ; and the contrast between the actual and the 
 ideal, of which he was in some degree conscious all the while 
 he wrote, was strongly accentuated before he had ended.^ 
 
 There is no doubt, I imagine (and in dealing with the 
 historical work * I have already pointed out clear indications of 
 the fact), that certain political occurrences, the outcome of 
 Spai;tan liySptSj came as a severe shock to him and to others 
 doubtless, in and out of Lacedaemon itself, who were genuine 
 admirers of that state. Hence the insertion of chapter xiv., 
 which might be spoken of as a sort of palinode, and which in 
 a modern work would have appeared as a footnote or in the 
 appendix. But his admiration for Lycurgus and the marvel 
 of his institutions did not cease to exercise a fascination over 
 him. Of the ideal Lacedaemon he is still as ever enamoured. 
 The essentials of her constitution — that which was its animating 
 force and spirit — might at any moment reappear, and to the 
 great gain of the community and of the whole of Hellas re- 
 assert itself; and what are these essentials? "Silence, 
 obedience, endurance, the suppression of self."* "The true 
 
 ' See Trans, vol. i. p. cxxvii. 
 
 ^ See again a paragraph in Mr. Newman's Aristotle's Politics, vol. i. p. 
 384, entitled The Eulogists and Critics of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian 
 States. Here is a passage in apt illustration of what I wish to indicate : 
 "Even the warmest friends of the Lacedaemonian state at Athens, how- 
 ever, betrayed in their mode of life that they were far from resembling its 
 citizens. Cimon would hardly have been at home at Sparta, and Xenophon 
 must have been conscious that his literary gifts and his interest in philo- 
 sophy drew an impassable barrier between him and the state which he so 
 greatly admired." 
 
 s See Comments on the Hellenica, above, pp. xxvi. xxxii. liv. 
 
 * The words are Mr. Newman's {fb.\ In another passage, p. 209, the 
 same writer points out, from a reference to such passages as 2. 6. 1264 b, 31 
 
Ixxvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 Spartans magnify themselves on their lowHness," on their sub- 
 mission to law and to the magistrates, on the golden principle 
 of life, apxeiv T£ KOI apxeo-6ai. For the sake of his own sons, 
 for the sake of education — bethinking him of his master's 
 teaching, — for the sake of philosophy, he will make a record 
 of what he finds most notable in the system of life encouraged 
 or rather created by the most remarkable of lawgivers. In 
 some parts he is for some reason (or his editors and the copyists 
 have combined to render him) less explicit than we could 
 desire; but in others the writing (or disquisition ought we 
 rather to name it?) flows smoothly on. Now and again some 
 turn of phrase suggests or implies the language of oral delivery.^ 
 It may even serve to throw light on his manner of composition. 
 It is as if he were talking to his family. He is seated or 
 walking up and down, whilst his amanuensis — a favourite slave 
 perhaps — takes down his words. There is a touch of pedantry 
 in the tone of his voice, as if he must needs play the school- 
 master. He allows his egotism to assert itself quite ingenu- 
 ously. When the pages are fairly copied out he will read them 
 to a select audience on a festival day. Friends from the little 
 township or grand visitors making a pilgrimage to Olympia 
 will judge of its merits. He delivers himself therefore at 
 times as if he were making a speech. Perhaps he too readily 
 forgets that, if it is ever published, this document will be 
 studied by a larger and more critical audience than those 
 sympathetic listeners about him to whom he appeals tenderly, 
 but with a quasi-authoritative manner, unaffectedly as is his 
 wont, yet in some sort grandiosely. Perhaps it was not 
 
 s^j. , that according to Aristotle ' ' the constitution also regulates or may regu- 
 late the whole position of the classes concerned with ' necessary functions, ' the 
 position of women, and the educational organisation of the state. It is thus 
 that the little treatise of Xenophon which bears the title AaKeSaifiovluv 
 iroXirela concerns itself as much with the ' pursuits of the Spartans ' (ch. i. init. ), 
 their 'mode of life' {ch. v.), their enforced abstinence from money-making 
 (ch. vii. ) " [and, one might well add, with military rules and tactics, etc.], ' ' as 
 with the political organisation of the state." 
 
 1 This 'oral' mannerism can hardly be represented in a translation, yet it 
 is there strongly, if I mistake not. See ii. 12, iv. 2, xii. i, xiii. i, xv. i. 
 Prose ' essay-writing ' is only emerging as an art out of speaking, and Xeno- 
 phon is perhaps 6i/'i/m3^s, a late learner. At this time, B.C. 378, if we are 
 right in our biographical dates, he would be about fifty-three years of age. I 
 cannot help fancying that it is of himself he is speaking, x. 4, p. 313. 
 
WA YS AND MEANS Ixxvil 
 
 intended for publication. We do not know what ravages time 
 or the hand of man has wrought upon this composition since 
 it was first published. But whatever they are, the subject 
 matter in our version is quite lucidly arranged.^ There is a 
 suitable proem and conclusion between which the several 
 topics lie structurally distinct. But the reader will doubtless 
 prefer to test these matters for himself. 
 
 "Ways and Means" 
 
 It remains to speak of the pamphlet on Revenues, otherwise 
 entitled (and perhaps best known in antiquity as) Ways arid 
 Means?- Four ancient writers refer to the Trdpot as a work of 
 Xenophon.* No further evidence on the part of antiquity for 
 and none at all against its genuineness has hitherto been 
 
 ' Ch. i. Lycurgus : the originality of his ' laws. ' (Some of these are ideal- 
 ised in the Cyropaedia. Did Xenophon see the breakdown of 
 the training as applied to women which was so obvious to 
 Aristotle ? One can hardly suppose that he did. ) 
 Birth and marriage and propagation, 
 ii. Education : children : boys : obedience: boy-loves, 
 iii. Youth : the dangerous age ; modesty. 
 iv. Young manhood : competition in games, hunting. (Idealised in 
 
 the Cyrop.) 
 V. Tke mode of life : public mess, scant fare, gymnastics, 
 vi. Communism ; among peers, 
 vii. Buying and selling, 
 viii. An oligarchy ; the ephors. 
 ix. Glory before life : the coward's death in life. 
 X. The gerousia : reflections of the author. 
 
 xi. Mode of life in warfare, tactics, etc. 
 xii. Encampments and expeditions. 
 
 xiii. Power and privilege of the kings, 
 [xiv. A note by the author, B.C. 378-375; a 'palinode.'] 
 XV. Covenant of kings and state : the kings are ' heroes ' ■ climax. 
 2 The MS. title of the work is Sc^o^wvtos ^^ropos ir&poi. ij irepl irpoab- 
 Sav, with or without the author's name. 
 
 ' They are the author of the Canon (preserved by Diogenes Laertius), 
 which is at least as old as Demetrius Magnes (55 B.C.), and probably much 
 older ; Athenaeus (a.d. 70-100), 4, 272 c ; Menander the rhetorician, of 
 whose date I am ignorant (I think he wrote a criticism on the t^x"") of 
 Hermogenes the celebrated critic (6 fuffriip) in Aurelius's lime (a.d. 161-180), 
 in reference apparently to the passage i. 7 (see Walz, Shet. Graeci, 9, 161) ; 
 and lastly, the author of the Btymol. Magn. (A.D. 976-1025), 644, 4. See 
 G. Sauppe, Praef. Lib. de Vect. p. 194 ; Arm. Zurborg, de Xen. HI. qui 
 Tr6poL insa'ibitur, p. 17. 
 
Ixxviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 discovered. In modern times the point has been much 
 debated, and with an equal weight of authority on either side. 
 To the one set of critics it seems unhke or unworthy of 
 Xenophon that certain topics, such as the advantages of peace, 
 commercial activity, and mining operations, should be so 
 largely insisted on, and others which, according to their view 
 of Xenophon's character, would be more congenial to him, 
 such as agriculture and the occupations of the KaXoC re 
 KayaOob, excluded ; or else it is insisted that the work bears 
 internal evidence of having been written after the conclusion 
 of the Sacred War in b.c. 346, before which date Xenophon, 
 it is all but certain, had long finished his course. On the 
 other side it is urged that the pamphlet in any case would 
 appear to have been written in the midsummer of B.C. 355 
 (a year at least before the probable date of Xenophon's death), 
 that the topics are quite compatible with what we feel to be 
 the idiosyncrasy of Xenophon, and that the style and manner 
 of the composition make it all but certain that the work is his. 
 However much I respect the authority of the former critics, I 
 do not wish to conceal the fact that I agree strongly in opinion 
 with the latter. 
 
 In this httle work we have set before us certain proposals 
 of the author, Xenophon, for promoting the welfare of Attica 
 at a critical moment of Athenian history. In point of auto- 
 biographic interest, this composition, possibly the last which 
 Xenophon ever penned, is second only to the Hipparch (with 
 which we shall be concerned in my next volume). But on 
 this topic I have already spoken at some length in a sketch of 
 Xenophon's life,^ and at present I will confine myself to the 
 subject matter of the scheme itself without immediate reference 
 to the personality of its author.^ 
 
 ^ Vol. i. p. cxlvi. foil. 
 
 ^ To exclude this whole side of the matter, the element of personality, 
 may appear somewhat unscientific on the part of any one who, like myself, 
 regards the whole composition as instinct with the spirit of Xenophon. On 
 the oiher hand, I do not wish to force this idea impertinently upon the reader, 
 who, even through the distorting medium of a translation, will be able, I think, 
 to form an independent view of his own. For myself, suffice it to say that I 
 agree with those who, like Zurborg, are aware of a strong Xenophontine 
 flavour about the work. The vocabulary is his, the diction is his, the turn and 
 type of sentence are his, the tone of thought is his — the whole scheme, as I 
 
fVA YS AND MEANS Ixxix 
 
 As I have already suggested (in the passage just referred 
 to), the pamphlet was perhaps written to be delivered (or as if 
 to be delivered) as an address to the senate of Athens whilst 
 engaged on a financial debate in the midsummer of B.C. 355, 
 just after the conclusion of the Social War.^ Such I take to 
 have been the occasion, actual or ideal, of the writing, and in 
 connection with that view I will now proceed to discus^ the 
 contents of the author's scheme.^ 
 
 A work of this sort gives scope for any length of commen- 
 tary. I propose to pass as rapidly as possible from one point 
 to another of the argument, wherever anything seems to call 
 for further notice than was open to me in the footnote of my 
 translation. 
 
 Chapter i. — The author has his own theory as to the 
 moral 'ups and downs' of commonwealths; 'but, with regard 
 to the current fatalistic doctrine "that, however high the 
 standard of rectitude at Athens, a certain measure of injustice 
 towards the allies is inevitable owing to the pressure of poverty 
 
 say, bears the impress of the very man, but this very man now in his old age, 
 desiring while it is yet to-day to give utterance and perhaps practical effect to 
 more than one project or day-dream of his early manhood : the political 
 rehabilitation of his country ; the development of her revenues, and in par- 
 ticular of her mineral resources ; and, finally, a plan to diminish pauperism, 
 for which see ^(??«. II. vi. , III, vi. (and in particular § 12) ; Anab. III. ii. i (see 
 vol. i. p. 158, note i), etc. 
 
 For a forcible statement of similar views see Hartman, An. Xen. Nov. ix. : 
 ' ' Minime tamen absurdum videtiu- credere Xenophontem spem concepisse 
 sua de patria bene merendi atque eo consilio hunc edidisse libellum, quo 
 doctrinae suae politicae gravissimam partem exponeret " (p. 303) ; and in 
 reference to the astonishment of some that Xenophon (!) should be so 
 enamoured of peace : ' ' Neque hoc neglegendum ab tiomeri inde tempore 
 Graecorum neminem tam belli amantem fuisse quin tamen magis etiam vitae 
 domesticae lautae et quietae teneretur dulcedine. . . . Tacendum erat de 
 bello, tacendum de agricultura, aha erat monstranda ratio emendandae 
 Reipublicae, ' E fodinis reipubhcae salus est petenda ' • haec est scriptoris 
 sententia, hoc consilium" (p. 306). 
 
 1 For the date see iv. 40 below (p. 342), " If, however, you are per- 
 suaded," etc., where the present war would seem to be the Social War just 
 ended (in the feace of B.C. 355, there referred to), yet with a prospect of war 
 soon again breaking out (ib. 43) ; and below, v. 12 (p. 347), where the peace 
 established by sea is the same peace. (See Diod. xvi. 22 ; Grote, H. G. xi. 
 325.) So Cobet, Zurborg, Roquette, etc., atiterH. Hagen, etc. 
 
 '' Besides Boeckh and Grote (see references in footnotes to translation), the 
 treatise is discussed by Col. Mure, I/ist. Gk. Lit. vol. v. ; Sir A. Grant, 
 Xenophon, p. 154 foil. ; Prof. Mahaffy, Hist. Gk. Lit. ch. x. 
 
Ixxx INTRODUCTION 
 
 on the masses at home," he has set himself to face the 
 underlying economic problem : Can the soil of Attica be made 
 to support its own free citizens ? That would be a doubly 
 happy solution ; there would be no further excuse for 
 injustice to the allies on the score of poverty, and there would 
 be no more poverty.^ 
 
 Fortunately, this is found to be the case, thanks partly to 
 the climate of Attica and the natural productivity of the soil 
 (both in fruits of the earth and mineral wealth), partly to the 
 
 ^ For the political background of the moment I must content myself with 
 referring my readers to the pages of the historians. See in particular Grote, 
 H. G. xi. 310-325, Causes of the Social War, etc., B.C. 3S8-3SSi 'o E^i of 
 the Social War — great loss of power to Athens ; also p. 339 foil. , Causes of 
 the Sacred War; Curtius, H. G. bk. vii. ch. ii. (v. 106-115, and in 
 particular p. 122 foil., ioi the condition of the ^nances, Eng. tr.) ; Jebb, Att. 
 Or, ii. ch. xii. pp. 25-30 ; C, R. Kennedy, Appendix I. [the Sacred War) to 
 his translation of The Crown, p. 244 foil. ; Peter, Chron. Tables, sub an. 
 B.C. 355. 
 
 Grote says (p. 310 foil.): "It was shortly after the recent successes in 
 Euboea (against the Thebans, who had been stirring up a revolt) that Chios, 
 Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium revolted from Athens by concert, raising a 
 serious war against her, known by the name of the Social War. Respecting 
 the proximate causes of this outbreak we find unfortunately little information. 
 There was now, and always had been since 378 B.c." (when the new maritime 
 confederacy was formed), "a Synod of deputies from all the confederate cities 
 habitually assembling at Athens, such as had not subsisted under the first 
 Athenian empire in its full maturity. How far the Synod worked efficiently 
 we do not know. . . . But the Athenian confederacy, which had begun 
 in a generous and equal spirit of common maritime defence (Dem. de Rhod. 
 Lib. 194, 17, irapliv airoTs (the Rhodians) "EWijcri xal ^eXHonv airrwv i/uv i^ 
 (trov aviinaxeiv, etc. ), had gradually become perverted, since the humiliation 
 of the great enemy Sparta at Leuktra, towards purposes and interests more 
 exclusively Athenian " — e.g. the conquest of Samos, of Pydna, Potidaea, and 
 Methone, and of the Thracian Chersonese, "all of them acquisitions 
 made for herself alone, without any advantage to the confederate Synod, 
 and made, too, to become the private property of her own citizens as 
 Kleruehs, in direct breach of her public resolution passed in 378 B. c. not to 
 permit any appropriation of lands by Athenian citizens out of Attica. " 
 
 The headings of Grote's paragraphs briefly narrate the melancholy story : 
 ' ' Athens acts more for her own separate interests, and less for that of her allies 
 — her armaments on service — badly-paid mercenaries — their extortions. " (For 
 this difficulty cf. Hell, passim.) "B.C. 358 : the four cities declare themselves 
 independent of Athens — interference of the Karian Mausfllus." (For this 
 prince of Halicarnassus see Curtius, v. 108; Percy Gardner, Types of Greek 
 Coins, pi. X. cl. 39, Nos. 22, 36, MATSSfiAAO ; Index to this volume, s.n.) 
 " Great force of the revolters — armament despatched by Athens against Chios 
 — repulse of the Athenians and death of Chabrias. " "B.C. 357: farther 
 armaments of Athens — Iphikrates, Timotheus, and Chares — unsuccessful 
 
WA YS AND MEANS Ixxxi 
 
 topographical position of the peninsula at the centre of the 
 civilised world. 
 
 Chapter ii. — These natural blessings may be further 
 enhanced by a better treatment of the resident alien popula- 
 tion, ' the metics,' a self-supporting class, who (not being free 
 citizens, but foreigners) do not share in the fiurdhs (payment of 
 members as ecdesiasts, senators, or dicasts, or otherwise), but, 
 on the contrary, pay into the treasury as sojourners' poll-tax 
 twelve drachmae per annum for males and six drachmae for 
 females. In various ways the status of this class may be so 
 improved by exempting them from disagreeable duties (or 
 
 operations in the Hellespont, and quarrel between the generals. '' (See Index 
 to this volume for all four.) B.C. 357-356 (?): " Iphikrates and Timotheus 
 are accused by Chares at Athens." — " Iphikrates is acquitted — Timotheus is 
 fined and retires from Athens." — "Arrogance and unpopularity of Timotheus 
 attested by his friend Isokrates." — "Exile of Timotheus — his death soon 
 afterwards." — " Iphikrates no more employed — great loss to Athens in these 
 two generals." — "B.C. 356: Expedition of Chares— Athens makes peace 
 with her revolted allies, recognising their full autonomy. "^ — "B.C. 355: End 
 of the Social War — great loss of power to Athens." 
 
 ' ' Such was the termination of the Social War, which fatally impaired 
 the power and lowered the dignity of Athens. Imperfectly as we know 
 the events, it seems clear that her efforts to meet this formidable revolt 
 were feeble and inadequate, evincing a sad downfall of energy since 
 the year 412 B.C., when she had contended with transcendent vigour 
 against similar calamities only a year after her irreparable disaster before 
 Syracuse. Inglorious as the result of the Social War was, it had never- 
 theless been costly and left Athens poor. The annual revenues of her 
 confederacy were greatly lessened by the secession of so many important 
 cities, and her public treasury was exhausted. It is just at this time that the 
 activity of Demosthenes as a public adviser begins. In a speech delivered 
 this year (355 B.C.) he notes the poverty of the treasury, and refers back to it 
 in discoiu-ses of after-time as a fact but too notorious" (p. 326). See also 
 Isocr. on the Peace (B.C. 355) ; Dem. in Left. 464, 26, 27, a speech de- 
 livered in the same year ; and de Cor. 305, 29 (B.C. 338). It was just at this 
 time also that the work of Xenophon under consideration was put on paper. 
 
 Grote continues (p. 339) : "But the Social War had not yet terminated 
 when new embarrassments and complications, of a far more formidable nature, 
 sprang up elsewhere, known by the name of the Sacred War, rending the 
 very entrails of the Hellenic world, and profitable only to the indefatigable 
 aggressor in Macedonia." Into these we are not called upon to enter. Con- 
 cerning Philip, Xenophon gives not a hint, unless, as Zurborg (de Xen. Lib. 
 p. s) suggests, he and Cersobleptes are in the writer's mind (iii. 11, p. 333 
 below) among the kings, etc., referred to. To the occupation of Delphi by 
 the Phocians, which in one sense was the fans et origo belli, he distinctly 
 refers in a passage which has caused much discussion (v. 9, p. 347 below). 
 See Trans, vol. i. p. Iviii. 
 
 VOL. II / 
 
Ixxxii INTRODUCTION 
 
 possibly by conferring on select members of the class the fee- 
 simple of building sites within the walls), and by government 
 protection of their interests, that the good-will of this section 
 of the community will be increased, and people without a city 
 of their own will aspire to become ' sojourners ' in Athens, and 
 so further increase the revenues of the city.^ 
 
 Chapter iii. — The author dilates on the advantages of 
 Athens as an emporium and centre of commercial enterprise 
 — her secure harbourage, the opportunity presented to the 
 foreign trader of taking back in lieu of other merchandise that 
 most marketable of commodities, Attic silver. At this point 
 some simple expedients suggest themselves for diminishing the 
 friction incidental to commercial transactions, which being to 
 the relief and honour of the foreign trader, will make him all 
 the more anxious to have dealings with Athens, and with the 
 ultimate result that ' the pot will be kept boiling ' : there 
 will be more imports and exports ; the rent of slaves will go 
 up — a gain to private owners ; and the state exchequer will 
 gain in an expansion of dues and customs. To secure this 
 
 ^ Directly, by increasing the sojourners' tax ; but he means, I think, in- 
 directly also, by bringing their wealth to Athens ; since this class of foreign 
 residents were, like the rest of the citizens, liable to be called upon to contribute 
 to the extraordinary taxes, and in their everyday life, like the rest of the world, 
 would be contributing to the state revenues as ordinary taxpayers. He does 
 not seem to have apprehended any risk of attracting so many foreigners that 
 there would be a chance of their swallowing up the citizens ; but there is one 
 portion of his scheme which is somewhat 'sketchy.' He suggests (p. 329) 
 that the foreign residents should be exempted from hoplite service (which will 
 be good for the citizens proper and pleasant for themselves), and {no doubt 
 again, in exceptional cases) be allowed to serve in the cavalry (a favourite 
 idea, since he advocates it also in the Hifparch) ; but below (p. 342) he notes 
 as one of the advantages of the new state of things to result from liis measure 
 that there will be an increase of troops to serve not only on shipboard, but on 
 land (as infantry, one would suppose), where see Zurborg's note, op, cit. pp. 
 
 43. 44- 
 
 As to the numbers of the raetics, see Boeckh, bk. i. ch. vii. , and in a com- 
 pendious shape, J. Gow, A Companion to School Classics, eh. xiii. According 
 to the census of 309 B. c. , at the time of Demetrius of Phalerum, it is computed 
 that there were in Athens and Attica — slaves, 400,000 ; metics, 10,000 [heads 
 of families, implying 45,000 altogether) ; and citizens, 'ABtivcuoi, 21,000 (again 
 heads of families, implying 94, 500). The /itroLKtop, on the supposition that 
 the whole 45,000 pay poll-tax, infants and adults alike, and that half are 
 females, would apparently yield a little over ;^i5,ooo (^15,187 :ios.) per 
 annum. But to what extent he hoped to increase this item of the revenue does 
 not appear. 
 
WA YS AND MEANS Ixxxiii 
 
 augmentation of the revenue the scheme does not require the 
 outlay of a single penny ; nothing is needed beyond one or 
 two philanthropic measures and certain details of supervision. 
 For the other sources of revenue contemplated an initial 
 outlay is demanded. A capital must in the first instance 
 be subscribed. But there is every reason to hope that 
 the necessary sum will be heartily subscribed; considering 
 the readiness displayed to contribute the necessary funds in 
 order to embark on far less hopeful ventures. The zeal 
 displayed on two notable occasions — to send reinforcements to 
 the Arcadians in B.C. 366 and to the Lacedaemonians in B.C. 
 362, and on various naval expeditions, is encouraging. There 
 was no remuneration to be got of a pecuniary sort by the 
 contributors to those undertakings, whereas the contributor to 
 the fund, contemplated in the scheme, will see from a purely 
 commercial view of the matter that, as the recipient of a daily 
 triobolon, he gets ample interest — as high, in fact, as he would 
 get on bottomry (18 per cent) if his contribution amounts to 
 10 minae, and higher and higher in proportion as his con- 
 tribution drops below that sum (36 per cent for 5 minae and 
 180 per cent for i mina) ; and considering that he does not 
 set foot out of Attica, the investment of money in such a fund 
 is as good and the security as sound as possible. ■*■ 
 
 1 This, however (possibly owing to our ignorance of the details), is the crux 
 of the whole scheme. The question is, what does he mean by the words (i) 
 K.TT\ai.v Si dir oiScvbs &v oflrw KaXiii/ KriiaawTO &ffirep d(p' o5 ft» irftOTeXiffimnv 
 eh TTjV a<popii-/iv ? and below (2), TpuipoXov rrj! ii/i4pas \an^i,vovTi ? I do not 
 think that either Boeckh, whose explanation Grote criticises, or Grote himself 
 quite explains the matter. Still less do I think that what I am about to say 
 will be of much help. 
 
 (i) From the similarity of the terms used, 4 eto^i'c7K6i<, . . . t&v el(reviy- 
 KuaiVi ... Siv hv elffcviyKuni', . . . elffeveyiceiv, in recalling occasions on 
 which the special tax in war time was imposed (by a vote of the Ecclesia), 
 and in discussing his own scheme (iii. 7, 8, 9 ; iv. 40), I conclude that, 
 though it is now a time of peace, he is advocating an enforced extraordinary 
 contribution like the el<T(/>opti. 
 
 As is well known, "the dffcpopd was a kind of income tax" (I quote 
 from Mr. Gow's chapter on Athenian Finance, xviii. § 77 g) "levied 
 according to the Solonian classification in such a manner that the richer 
 citizens paid a higher percentage than the poorer. For the Solonian 
 property classes a new system was introduced B.c. 378-377. in the archonship 
 of Nausinicus. From this time the people were divided, for purposes of elff^opi, 
 into cvp-p-oplai, graded according to their wealth. The first ini/t/topfa " (i.e. 
 the first class of the ffv/i/wplai.) "consisted of the three hundred richest citizens. 
 
 VOL. II / 2 
 
Ixxxiv INTRODUCTION 
 
 Apart from which, the author would hold out moral 
 inducements : he would stimulate the zeal of foreigners — 
 foreign states, kings, tyrants, and satraps — to contribute, by 
 means of stUai on which the names of contributors should be 
 inscribed as benefactors for all time. 
 
 To come to the point : given that the capital is subscribed, 
 how is it to be productively employed? In the following 
 several ways : — 
 
 A. In building State, or Public (i) lodging-houses for ship- 
 masters near the harbours ; 
 
 The tax was at first collected by the state, but after B.C. 362-361 " [al. B.C. 
 378) "these three hundred citizens paid the whole produce of the tax down 
 {irpoeurtfiopi), and collected afterwards the contributions of the inferior sym- 
 mories. The aTparriyol determined the amount of the contribution of each 
 symmpry." See the article "Symmoria" in Vici. of Greek and Roman 
 Antiquities^ last edition. 
 
 That being the nature of the ela-4>opi, I suppose that Xenophon's 
 ' contribution ' is to be enforced on all members of the community, citizens 
 and sojourners alikCj as a graduated income tax by symmories. 
 
 (2) As to the words Tpidi^oKov t^s Tifiipai Xa/ipdvovn, I suppose he means 
 that any citizen who chooses to accept it will be guaranteed three obols a day 
 in return for his subscription, "on the principle of the Thedrikon," as Grote 
 says, or as we might say nowadays, like the remittance of a State Pension. 
 
 In this context it is well to remind the reader that the The6ric Fund, accord- 
 ing to the law of Pericles, who invented it, was originally a payment to help the 
 poorer citizens to keep holiday, being the price of admission to the theatre, the 
 fee of which was two obols. ' ' In process of time this donation was extended to 
 other entertainments besides theatrical ones, the sum of two oboli being given 
 to each citizen who attended ; if the festival lasted two days, four oboli ; and 
 if three, six oboli; but not beyond, Hence all theoric largesses received the 
 name of Sta^eKla" {Diet. Ant.). See Grote, H. G. xi. 465 foil. 484 foil. 492 
 foil. , where the historian speaks of it as " the Church Fund, that upon which 
 were charged all the expenses incurred by the state in the festivals and worship 
 of the gods. The diobely or distribution of two oboli to each citizen was one 
 part of this expenditure. ... To this general religious fund it was provided by 
 law^ that the surplus of ordinary revenue should be paid over, after all the cost 
 of the peace establishment had been defrayed." " The annual surplus might 
 have been accumulated," Grote continues, "as a war fund; but how far 
 Athens is blamable for not having done so " is another question. 
 
 To put my two conclusions briefly : The scheme contemplates (i) an 
 enforced subscription (imposed by the Ecclesia) on the analogy of the elfftpopA, 
 and (2) a permanent first charge on the capital subscribed, to serve as a 
 Pension Fund for the poorer citizens, which we may call the Triobely, 
 
 1 This law was passed within a year of the ideal date of the ■ir6poi. *' During 
 the period 3S4-339 B.c. any surplus of income over expenditure was returned to t^ 
 people as deupiKoi'. At this time, therefore, the treasurer of the theoric fund, o cttI rb 
 BetapiKav, -was the most important of the financial officers." See Gow, op. cit, xiv. 60, 
 p. III. 
 
IVAYS AND MEANS Ixxxv 
 
 (2) meeting-places and exchanges for the same; 
 
 (3) lodging-houses (hdtels) for visitors ; 
 
 (4) dwelling-houses and stores or shops for retail dealers 
 in Piraeus and the city. 
 
 B. In acquiring the germ of a public merchant navy (state 
 merchant vessels), on the analogy of the state war-fleet, which 
 will be let out on the security of guarantors like any other 
 state property ; and, lastly (a new topic) : 
 
 Chapter iv. — C. In establishing the silver mines of 
 Laurium on a new and sounder footing, which the author pro- 
 ceeds to explain at considerable length ; but before stating the 
 actual plan (§ 17, p- 337), he points out, for the benefit of those 
 who may be ignorant, what the capacity of these mines really 
 is. Long ago worked, they are to-day apparently as inexhaustible 
 as ever. The cry is only for more hands. This, in fact, is the 
 one business in which there is no danger of over-production 
 and no dread of over-competition, since depreciation of the 
 product itself is out of the question, silver being apparently 
 in perpetual demand. He gives illustrations from farming and 
 various industries. He discusses the relation of gold to silver. 
 
 The lesson to be learned from the above facts is to pour 
 into the mines human labour in as large doses as possible, and 
 to extend the scale of operations by increase of plant, etc. ; 
 indeed, the state herself suggests the course by the facilities 
 offered to foreigners who desire to undertake mining (the 
 foreigner only pays the same rent [or royalty?] as the free 
 citizen). 
 
 This brings him back to his scheme — a method for working 
 the mines more productively. There is nothing wonderful 
 about it ; the facts are patent to the eyes as recorded in 
 history; the wonderful thing is that the state, with the 
 experience of so many private individuals growing wealthy at 
 her expense, should have failed to imitate them. And now 
 for the scheme itself (§ 17). Why should not the state follow 
 the lead of the private capitalist? The private capitalist 
 (Nicias, the son of Niceratus, or whoever it be) purchases a 
 slave-gang which he lets out to the practical miner for an obol 
 a day per head free of charge. That is what the state ought 
 to do : she should possess herself of a body of slaves (say 
 
Ixxxvi INTRODUCTION 
 
 three to every citizen^ as the total number), and enter into 
 competition with the private capitalist. 
 
 The proposal will be found feasible, in spite of possible 
 objections. As a purchaser and a farmer (or lessor) of slave 
 labour the state can easily hold her own as against the private 
 owner ; her credit being more secure, she will let her slaves 
 to practical miners more easily on the same terms. The risk 
 of losing her slaves (who will bear the state brand) through 
 fraud on the part of the lessee will be less than the risk of 
 losing her moneys through fraud on the part of the tax- 
 farmers^ (reXcovot). But with this increase in the supply of 
 
 ^ Three to every citizen — if we take the number only of adult males 
 (according to the census of b. c. 309 above referred to) — would give 21,000 x 3 
 = 63,000 slaves, who at the lowest computation will Ijring in 63,000 ob. a day 
 (this figure, he says, § 25, is far too low, if any one there present can carry 
 back his memory sixty years to the palmy times of mining 'before Decelea') 
 = 630 tal. per annum (say ;f 150,000 per annum). But there are certain pre- 
 liminary considerations. There is the price of the slaves to be considered, and 
 the possibility of letting them, and finally the question whether the mines can 
 stand such an influx of labour. It will be seen that, for various reasons, he 
 proposes to work each part of the scheme, A, B, C, tentatively and bit by bit ; 
 and as to this part, C, concerning the mines, he only carries us on to a point 
 at which the state has 10,000 [not 63,000) slaves, allowing a profit, or rather 
 yielding a rent, of 100 tal. per annum. As to the price of slaves, see Boeckh, 
 bk. i. ch. xiii. (Eng. tr. p. 67 foil.), for an interesting discussion of the 
 question based on Lucian, Biuz' irpaffts, 27; Dem. c. Pantaen, 967 ; Mem. 
 II. iii. 2, and this passage : ' ' Some slaves are well worth 2 minas ( = £,Z) , others 
 hardly half a mina {£,2) ; many sold for 3 or 10 minas (=;^20 or £40), and 
 Nicias, the son of Niceratus, is stated to have given no less than a talent 
 (;^23S circa) for an overseer of the mines " (Mem. II. iii. 2). In our passage 
 the price is apparently taken at from 125 to 150 drachmae = £/i : 13 : 3 to 
 ;^S : 12 : 6. Taking the lower figure, the initial outlay on the purchase of 
 1200 slaves for mining purposes would be 150,000 drachmae (1500 min. or 
 25 tal.) — nearly ;^6ooo. N.B. — In all these calculations it will be borne in 
 mind that the equivalent English sums are equivalents in weight of silver 
 (based on the best calculations of the actual weights of obols, drachmae, etc. ). 
 As to the purchasing power of the money, that is, of course, another matter. 
 See Gow, op. cit. xi. 47. 
 
 ^ I am not sure that I quite take his meaning about the greater difiiculty of 
 recovering ' moneys ' than slaves lost, stolen, or strayed, since I should 
 have thought that the T^Kwiai. would be held to account by the TrwXTjToi (or 
 irpdKTopes), and the iruXijTai would be accountable to the dirdSeKTCu (receivers- 
 general), and the receivers to the prytany of the Senate, and finally to the 
 Ecclesia when their secretary [dvnypaifieis) made his periodical report. See, 
 for the officers of the treasury, Gow, of. cit. xiv. 60. But in a general sense 
 it is easier to steal 300 drachmae than a couple of slaves. He says nothing 
 about the risks of the slaves absconding or dying in the fetid atmosphere of 
 the mines and of sheer exhaustion. But he is not bound to, since apparently 
 
WA YS AND MEANS Ixxxvii 
 
 slaves, will the contractors go on demanding slave labour? 
 There are various reasons for supposing that there will be no 
 cessation in the demand for slave labour. 
 
 Test the working of the scheme («.«. part C) on paper. 
 Say the state starts with 1200 slaves at first. Out of profits 
 alone (or rather out of income derived from their rent) in five 
 or six years the number may be increased to 6000 ; and (it is 
 only a question of arithmetic) each slave bringing in an obol a 
 day clear of all expenses — that means 60 tal. a year. Lay out 
 20 tal. on more slaves, and you have 40 tal. left for state pur- 
 poses. By the time 10,000 is reached there will be a yearly 
 income of 100 tal. ( = ;£^23,5oo circa). 
 
 These figures are below the mark, as any one who can re- 
 member the state of things sixty years ago, before 413 B.C. (De- 
 celeia), will bear the author witness.^ And the condition of the 
 mines after all these hundreds of years during which they have 
 been worked tells the same tale. They are inexhaustible — 
 there is room for an indefinitely greater number of workers. 
 
 The hesitation at present shown to open up a new area is 
 owing to the risk to the individual, who stakes his all in the 
 venture — ' win or lose ' — and may draw a blank ; in other 
 words, spend his capital on an unproductive cutting. 
 
 But the author has a plan to reduce the risk of opening new 
 cuttings. Why should not the state slaves be worked in 
 divisions of tribes by the ten tribes (one or other of which 
 is sure to hit upon a productive lode for the benefit of 
 all)? 2 
 
 Such a state mining-company [/'.«., as I understand, state- 
 favoured tribal (or state corporation) mining-company] will not 
 
 the lessee has to run the risks of all that, and in spite of the cruel rate of 
 mortality of these poor souls, etc. , will be able to make a profit. See Cornewall 
 Lewis's note to Boeckh's P. E. A. p. 67s, criticising Boeckh's argument (in 
 bk. i. ch. xiii. p. 73, and bk. iv. ch. xvi. p. 606). 
 
 1 Xenophon would, if we are right in our biographical dates, have been 
 nearly eighteen at that date, and doubtless had a vivid recollection of the 
 occurrences. 
 
 ^ I do not quite understand the working of this part of the scheme. Are the 
 slaves to be presented by the state, or loaned by the state, or let by the state 
 to the Ten Tribes ? I suppose that in each of the tribes, as a matter of local 
 business encouraged by the state, a syndicate will be formed and a tribal 
 mining company started who will work the state slaves, paying the usual rent. 
 
Ixxxviii INTRODUCTION 
 
 be a thorn in the side of the private owner (or the private 
 company), nor he (or it) of the state. 
 
 If this scheme (as a whole, A, B, C) works, every Athenian 
 will or may be supplied with ample maintenance at the public 
 expense.^ 
 
 But (exclaims an objector) the capital ! It will need to be 
 enormous, and who is going to subscribe it ? ^ The answer is 
 that it need not be subscribed all at once. The scheme is to 
 be worked in its several parts and tentatively. {A) The public- 
 buildings scheme, {B) the state-merchant-ships scheme, (C) the 
 state-slaves scheme, will each pay its own way and be remuner- 
 ative if they are all three started side by side and bit by bit. 
 That will also give us time to see where to expand and where 
 to draw in. Moreover, the tentative process will spread the 
 expense of the scheme over several years and not let it fall on 
 us entirely. 
 
 So far concerning the enormous capital. To come now to 
 what every one will probably regard as the really grave danger 
 — that of the state getting too many slaves and the works 
 being overstocked. The solution again is : to proceed 
 tentatively ; to pour only small doses of human labour into 
 the mines at a time. 
 
 So far, unless the author is mistaken, the easiest method in 
 every case is the best. But if, owing to the extraordinary 
 ila-(f>opal, property taxes, to which they have been subjected 
 during the war,^ they are not equal to any further subscriptions 
 
 1 Perhaps this passage throws light on Hi. 9 above discussed. He evidently 
 contemplates not a 5iw/3eXia merely, like the ' Church Fund ' for holidays, but 
 a Tpuii§e\la, like the dicasts' fee, only it is to last from year's end to year's 
 end. See Boeckh, P. E. A. p. 605. 
 
 ^ He is again harking back to the same passage, iii. 9, the difBculty of 
 getting his novel ela^oph subscribed (whether it is voted for by the Ecclesia, 
 or, like a modern state loan, only ' advertised for,' so to speak). The el(r(popi, 
 proper was, we know, even in stress of war hard enough to collect ; at present, 
 B.C. 3SS. we are living in what may be called the irpoeiff^opi, era. (See note 
 above. ) I think the author of the scheme despairs in his heart of getting his 
 a,(j>opiiA] subscribed. To work with the financiaJ surplus saved in the expendi- 
 ture of the year [as a matter of history it was next year, b. c. 354, thrown into 
 the Betiiprnhv or ' Church Fund '] is a second string to his bow. For the 
 ordinary and extraordinary sources of incoTne, irpdffoSoi and "KcLTovpyiat, see 
 Gow, op. cit, xviii. 
 
 ^ I.e. the Social War just ended. The importance of the allusions here, 
 as giving the date of the pamphlet, I have already discussed. See above, p. Ixxix. 
 
WA YS AND MEANS Ixxxix 
 
 just yet, he would advise them during the current year (b.c. 355- 
 354) to carry on the administration within the limits of what their 
 taxes (dues) reahsed before the peace {i.e. when things were at 
 their worst), and then to feel at liberty to take any surplus 
 sum, however derived,^ and to invest that so as to bring in the 
 greatest revenue {i.e. according to his view, in mining-slaves, 
 or public-houses, or state-merchant-vessels). 
 
 To the objection that war might upset the working of the 
 whole scheme at any moment, the author demurs. That is 
 an alarmist notion. If there be war, so much the worse 
 for the enemy. Under the condition of things which it is 
 proposed to bring about, there will be an increase of 
 population — more men, and the population itself will be in 
 better heart. "Think of the many ships," he says, "which 
 they will be capable of manning on public service ! Think of 
 the number who will serve on land (as infantry, irefot), and 
 will bear hard upon the enemy ; only we must treat them with 
 courtesy." ^ And as to the mines themselves, they will be safe 
 enough from attack whether from Thebes or Megara (points 
 on which, as a military man who has studied the fortification 
 question, he speaks with some confidence). 
 
 He here reverts to his scheme and its merits. It is not 
 the mines alone which will bring profit to the state, but with 
 
 ■' I.e. due to the peace itself, which will set the wheels of commerce going 
 again, or to his own scheme as far as it involved no outlay (see above), the 
 better treatment of metics, growth of imports and exports with increase of 
 population, augmentation of harbour and market dues. 
 
 " I have already said something (p. Ixxxii. note 1) on the apparent contradic- 
 tion (at first sight) between the passage iv. 42 (p. 343 below) and the two earlier 
 passages ii. 2 and 5 (p. 330 below). It is partly owing to this and to other 
 similar ' contradictions ' that H. Hagen bases his theory that the IIA/joi consists 
 of two separate speeches tacked together — the first contained in i. i-iv. 33, 
 and the other in iv. 34-vi. 3, and both belonging, as he argues, to B.C. 346. 
 But I do not think that the contradiction is formidable, and it is quite like 
 Xenophon to carry two ideas in his head at once in a quasi-illogical manner. 
 He would like to exempt the metics from hoplite service altogether, and draft 
 a few leading metics into the cavalry. (Lysias surely would have made a good 
 cavalry officer if he had the taste for the service, but was, of course, ineligible as 
 a metic.) On the other hand, that reform could not be carried out in a day. 
 The oarsmen of the fleet, vaurai or vav^drac, were, as a rule, obtained from 
 the poorer citizens and metics, though on occasion (Ae richer citizens and 
 knights might handle the oar, or again, as at Arginusae, the slaves be drawn 
 upon. See Hell. I. vi. 24, 25 (Trans, vol.' i. p. 26) ; Hell. V. iv. 61 (below, 
 p. I3S)- 
 
xc INTRODUCTION 
 
 the increase of population there will be new sources of revenue 
 derived from market-dues at Sunium, public buildings in 
 connection with the mines, furnaces, etc., and the rise in 
 the value of land ("the unearned increment"^ which the 
 state directly or indirectly will get a share of). 
 
 If at this point he may assume that his proposals have been 
 carried into effect, he can promise that the city shall not only 
 be relieved from financial strain, but make a great advance in 
 orderliness and tactical organisation ; the whole heart of the 
 community will beat more quickly ; the human war material 
 will be vastly improved ; gymnastic training will no longer be 
 a disagreeable duty to be shirked ; garrison troops, peltasts, 
 and the mounted police (the peripoloi protecting the rural 
 districts and frontier), one and all, will carry out their 
 respective duties more ardently when pay and maintenance 
 are forthcoming.^ 
 
 Chapter v. — Peace is a sine qua non for the full benefits 
 of the scheme ; and for the furtherance of peace he would 
 suggest a new government board (as he has already suggested 
 the institution of /i£ToiKo<^i;AaK£s), a court of arbitration, as it 
 were [such as we are accustomed to in our capital and labour 
 disputes, or like our international arbitration-boards on ques- 
 tions of fishery rights and so forth], who will act as eiprjvo- 
 tfivXaKes, 'guardians of peace.' He points out the desir- 
 ability of such a court, and here he has a word to say to the 
 war party.^ A peace policy, he insists, is best. That is the 
 lesson taught by an impartial survey of history from the 
 Median war to the ' confusion worse confounded ' which was 
 the one dominant result of Mantinea,* and which still reigns, 
 though, thanks to the present peace, their prospects are 
 brightening. This policy implies a readiness for war, com- 
 
 ' He is referring to various Kara/SoXof, rent from state property, steady 
 sources of revenue, such as : tlie iiriin>iop, a duty on all sales ; the SiaTiiXiov, 
 an octroi on all goods brought to market, etc. See Gow, op. cit. xviii. 77. 
 
 ^ The whole of this passage is to ray mind highly characteristic of Xenophon. 
 His mind reverts to old conversations between Socrates and his young friends 
 sixty years ago. 
 
 ' Again thoroughly Xenophontine. 
 
 * As he himself has already pointed out — d/cpiff/a Sk Kal rapaxi) In vKeluv 
 ^cra TT]v fJ.dxV^ iy^vero ^ wpdaSev h Ty 'EXXtifft. Hel/. VII. v. 27 (below, 
 p. 233)- 
 
WA YS AND MEANS xci 
 
 bined with moral influence, as the best weapon for the moment. 
 The Phocians will presently evacuate Delphi, and then "if 
 certain friends of ours yonder or whoever they be " (indicating 
 by a gesture the Thebans) " seek to step into the place so 
 vacated," ^ this moral influence of Athens, exerted by embassies 
 to the different states, will be found effectual enough — a 
 coalition will be formed at once to put physical pressure 
 on the offenders. War is less profitable than peace, but he 
 repudiates the assumption that therefore Athens is to truckle 
 to any foe. No ! certainly not ; but " we should be in a 
 better position to defend ourselves if war comes in proportion 
 as we have done no wrong to any one ourselves. The gods 
 will fight upon our side." 
 
 Chapter vi. — He holds out a fair prospect. Should his 
 proposals appear practicable, he urges upon the senators (or 
 whatever larger audience he is addressing) to consult the will 
 of heaven both at Dodona and Delphi ; and, if so be the 
 divine powers will that the scheme should be carried out, to 
 carry it out at once. The whole of this chapter, with its 
 peroration, is quite in the manner of Xenophon. 
 
 It is pleasant to think that these are probably the last 
 words he ever penned. 
 
 1 I have, as I have so often said, adopted the reading ireipifvTo for the 
 vulgate itrdpuvTO (see vol, i. p. Iviii. note i) ; but even if we were driven to 
 read irelpuvro I should still think that the date of the pamphlet was B. c. 355, 
 and not B.C. 346, and fall back upon Cobet's explanation of a double seizure 
 of Delphi by the Phocians, and an earlier evacuation of the temple (than that 
 which is historically established as taking place in B.C. 346), followed by 
 attempts on the part of the Thebans to seize the temple. The dates of the 
 sacred war are somewhat uncertain. According to Grote and Thirlwall, etc. , 
 it began in B.C. 357 ; according to Curtius, Jebb {Ait. Or., Annals), Abbott 
 {Outlines), Peter {Chron. Tables), etc., it began in B.C.- 355. The authority 
 for either view is Diod. xvi, 14, B.C. 357-356, and xvi. 23, B.C. 355-354 ; 
 Pans. X. 2, 3 giving apparently B.C. 358-357. 
 
THE HELLENICA OF XENOPHON 
 
 BOOK III. I. 1, 2 
 
 I. B.C. 403-402. — Thus the civil strife at Athens had an 
 end. At a subsequent date Cyrus sent messengers to Lace- 
 daemon, claiming requital in kind for the service which he 
 had lately rendered in the war with Athens. ^ The demand 
 seemed to the ephorate just and reasonable. Accordingly 
 they ordered Samius,^ who was admiral at the time, to put 
 himself at the disposition of Cyrus for any service which he 
 might require. Samius himself needed no persuasion to 
 carry out the wishes of Cyrus. With his own fleet, accom- 
 panied by that of Cyrus, he sailed round to Cilicia, and so 
 made it impossible for Syennesis, the ruler of that province, 
 to oppose Cyrus by land in his advance against the king his 
 brother. 
 
 B.C. 401. — The particulars of the expedition are to be 
 found in the pages of the Syracusan Themistogenes,* who 
 
 ' Lit. ■ ' what Cyrus himself had been to the Lacedaemonians let the 
 Lacedaemonians in their turn be to Cyrus." 
 
 " Samius (Diod. Sic. xiv. 19). But see Anai. I. iv. 2 (Trans, vol. i. p. 91), 
 where Pythagoras is named as admiral. Possibly the one officer succeeded 
 the other. 
 
 ' Lit. " as to how then Cyrus collected an army and with it went up 
 against his brother, and how the battle was fought and how he died, and 
 how in the sequel the Hellenes escaped to the sea (all this), is written by (or 
 ' for," or ' in honoiu: of) Themistogenes the Syracusan." See Trans, vol. i. 
 pp. Ixvi. Ixvii. My impression is that Xenophon's Anaiasis, or a portion of 
 the work so named, was edited originally by Themistogenes, See Philol. 
 Museum, vol. i. p. 489 ; L. Dindorf, %ai. BXX., Ox. MDCC'CLIII., notefl</. loc, 
 Beiuarayivei.. Cf. Diod. Sic. xiv. 19-31, 37, after Ephorus and Theopompus 
 probably. 
 
 VOL. II S B 
 
2 HELLENICA— BK. III. {B?"'4;i3J9 
 
 describes the mustering of the armament, and the advance of 
 Cyrus at the head of his troops; and then the battle, and 
 death of Cyrus himself, and the consequent retreat of the 
 Hellenes while effecting their escape to the sea.^ 
 
 B.C. 400. — It was in recognition of the service which he 
 had rendered in this affair, that Tissaphernes was despatched 
 to Lower Asia by the king his master. He came as satrap, 
 not only of his own provinces, but of those which had belonged 
 to Cyrus ; and he at once demanded the absolute submission 
 of the Ionic cities, without exception, to his authority. These 
 communities, partly from a desire to maintain their freedom, 
 and partly from fear of Tissaphernes himself, whom they 
 had rejected in favour of Cyrus during the lifetime of that 
 prince, were loth to admit the satrap within their gates. 
 They thought it better to send an embassy to the Lacedae- 
 monians, calling upon them as representatives and leaders ^ of 
 the Hellenic world to look to the interests of their petitioners, 
 who were Hellenes also, albeit they lived in Asia, and not to 
 suffer their country to be ravaged and themselves enslaved. 
 
 In answer to this appeal, the Lacedaemonians sent out 
 Thibron* as governor, providing him with a body of troops, 
 consisting of one thousand neodamodes* if.e. enfranchised 
 helots) and four thousand Peloponnesians. In addition to 
 these, Thibron himself applied to the Athenians for a detach- 
 ment of three hundred horse, for whose service-money he would 
 hold himself responsible. The Athenians in answer sent him 
 some of the knights who had served under the Thirty,^ thinking 
 that the people of Athens would be well rid of them if they 
 went abroad and perished there. 
 
 B.C. 400-399. — On their arrival in Asia, Thibron further col- 
 lected contingents from the Hellenic cities on the continent ; 
 for at this time the word of a Lacedaemonian was law. He had 
 only to command, and every city must needs obey.* _But 
 although he had this armament, Thibron, when he saw the 
 
 \ At Trapezus, March 10, B.C. 400 (Trans, vol. i. p. 209). 
 " Trpoo'TdTai, " patrons and protectors." 
 ' " Pss harmost." S&& Anai. ad fin. 
 
 * See Hell. I. iii. 15 (Trans, vol. i. p. 13 note) ; Thuc. vii. 58. 
 ' See above, Hell. II. iv. 2 (Trans, vol. i. p. 63) ; and Sketch, pp. Ixxxvi, 
 note, xcvii. ^ See Anai. VI. vi. 12 (Trans, vol. i. p. 269). 
 
b"'. 399^"'} EXPEDITION OF THIBRON 3 
 
 cavalry, had no mind to descend into the plain. If he suc- 
 ceeded in protecting from pillage the particular district in which 
 he chanced to be, he was quite content. It was only when 
 the troops^ who had taken part in the expedition of Cyrus 
 had joined him on their safe return, that he assumed a bolder 
 attitude. He was now ready to confront Tissaphernes, army 
 against army, on the level ground, and won over a number of 
 cities. Pergamum came in of her own accord. So did Teu- 
 thrania and Halisarna. These were under the government of 
 Eurysthenes and Procles,^ the descendants of Demaratus the 
 Lacedaemonian, who in days of old had received this territory 
 as a gift from the Persian monarch in return for his share in 
 the campaign against Hellas. Gorgion and Gongylus, two 
 brothers, also gave in their adhesion ; they were lords, the 
 one of Gambreum and Palae-Gambreum, the other of Myrina 
 and Gryneum, four cities which, like those above named, had 
 originally been gifts from the king to an earlier Gongylus — the 
 sole Eretrian who "joined the Mede," and in consequence 
 was banished. Other cities which were too weak to resist, 
 Thibron took by force of arms. In the case of one he was 
 not so successful. This was the Eg5rptian* Larisa, as it is 
 called, which refused to capitulate, and was forthwith invested 
 and subjected to a regular siege. When all other attempts to 
 take it failed, he set about digging a tank or reservoir, and in 
 connection with the tank an underground channel, by means 
 of which he proposed to draw off the water supply of the 
 inhabitants. In this he was baffled by frequent sallies of the 
 besieged, and a continual discharge of timber and stones into 
 the cutting. He retaliated by the construction of a wooden 
 tortoise which he erected over the tank ; but once more the 
 tortoise was burnt to a cinder in a successful night attack on 
 the part of the men of Larisa. These ineffectual efforts 
 induced the ephors to send a despatch bidding Thibron give 
 up Larisa and march upon Caria. 
 
 He had already reached Ephesus, and was on the point of 
 
 ' March B. C. 399. See the final sentence of the Anabasis (Trans, vol. i. 
 p, 318). '■' See Anab. VII. viii. 8-16 (Trans, vol. i. pp. 316, 317). 
 
 ' Seventy stades S.E. of Cyme in the Aeolid. See Strabo, xiii. 621. For 
 the origin of the name cf. Cyrop. VII. i. 45. 
 
4 HELLENICA — BK. III. {""■ H^;'^ 
 
 marching into Caria, when Dercylidas arrived to take command 
 of his army. The new general was a man whose genius for 
 invention had won him the nickname of Sisyphus. Thus it 
 was that Thibron returned home, where on his arrival he was 
 fined and banished, the allies accusing him of allowing his 
 troops to plunder their friends. 
 
 Dercylidas was not slow to perceive and turn to account 
 the jealousy which subsisted between Tissaphernes and 
 Pharnabazus. Coming to terms with the former, he marched 
 into the territory of the latter, preferring, as he said, to be 
 at war with one of the pair at a time, rather than the two 
 together. His hostility, indeed, to Pharnabazus was an old 
 story, dating back to a period during the naval command ^ 
 of Lysander, when he was himself governor in Abydos; 
 where, thanks to Pharnabazus, he had got into trouble with 
 his superior officer, and had been made to stand " with his 
 shield on his arm " — a stigma on his honour which no true 
 Lacedaemonian would forgive, since this is the punishment of 
 insubordination.^ For this reason, doubtless, Dercylidas had 
 the greater satisfaction in marching against Pharnabazus. 
 From the moment he assumed command there was a marked 
 difference for the better between his methods and those of his 
 predecessor. Thus he contrived to conduct his troops into that 
 portion of the Aeolid which belonged to Pharnabazus, through 
 the heart of a friendly territory without injury to the allies. 
 
 This district of AeoUs belonged to Pharnabazus,^ but had 
 been held as a satrapy under him by a Dardanian named 
 Zenis whilst he was alive ; but when Zenis fell sick and died, 
 Pharnabazus made preparation to give, the satrapy to another. 
 Then Mania the wife of Zenis, herself also a Dardanian, 
 fitted out an expedition, and taking with her gifts wherewith 
 to make a present to Pharnabazus himself, and to gratify his 
 concubines and those whose power was greatest with Pharna- 
 bazus, set forth on her journey. When she had obtained 
 audience of him she spoke as follows : " O Pharnabazus, 
 thou knowest that thy servant my husband was in all 
 
 '■ Technically "navarchy," in B.C. 408-407. ffell. I. v. i (Trans, vol. i. 
 p. 18). 
 
 " See Plut. Aristid. 23 (Clough, ii. p. 309). ' I.e. as suzerain. 
 
CH. I. §11-14. AFFAIRS OF THE AEOLID : MANIA 5 
 
 respects friendly to thee; moreover, he paid my lord the 
 tributes which were thy due, so that thou didst praise 
 and honour him. Now therefore, if I do thee service as 
 faithfully as my husband, why needest thou to appoint 
 another satrap? — nay but, if in any matter I please thee 
 not, is it not in thy power to take from me the government 
 on that day, and to give it to another?" When he had 
 heard her words, Pharnabazus decided that the woman ought 
 to be satrap. She, as soon as she was mistress of the 
 territory, never ceased to render the tribute in due season, 
 even as her husband before her had done. Moreover, when- 
 ever she came to the court of Pharnabazus she brought him 
 gifts continually, and whenever Pharnabazus went down to 
 visit her provinces she welcomed him with all fair and 
 courteous entertainment beyond what his other viceroys were 
 wont to do. The cities also which had been left to her by 
 her husband, she guarded safely for him ; while of those cities 
 that owed her no allegiance, she acquired, on the seaboard, 
 Larisa and Hamaxitus and Colonae — attacking their walls 
 by aid of Hellenic mercenaries, whilst she herself sat in her 
 carriage and watched the spectacle. Nor was she sparing of 
 her gifts to those who won her admiration ; and thus she fur- 
 nished herself with a mercenary force of exceptional splendour. 
 She also went with Pharnabazus on his campaigns, even when, 
 on pretext of some injury done to the king's territory, Mysians 
 or Pisidians were the object of attack. In requital, Pharna- 
 bazus paid her magnificent honour, and at times invited her to 
 assist him with her counsel.^ 
 
 Now when Mania was more than forty years old, the 
 husband of her own daughter, Meidias — flustered by the 
 suggestions of certain people who said that it was monstrous 
 a woman should rule and he remain a private person^ — 
 found his way into her presence, as the story goes, and 
 strangled her. For Mania, albeit she carefully guarded 
 herself against all ordinary comers, as behoved her in the 
 exercise of her "tyranny," trusted in Meidias, and, as a 
 woman might her own son-in-law, was ready to greet him at 
 
 ' Grote, ff. G. ix. 292 ; cf. Herod, viii. 69. 
 " Or, "his brains whimsied with insinuations." 
 
6 HELLENICA BK. III. {""' "Bfc m9 
 
 all times with open arms. He also murdered her son, a youth 
 of marvellous beauty, who was about seventeen years of age. 
 He next seized upon the strong cities of Scepsis and 
 Gergithes, in which lay for the most part the property and 
 wealth of Mania. As for the other cities of the satrapy, they 
 would not receive the usurper, their garrisons keeping them 
 safely for Pharnabazus. Thereupon Meidias sent gifts to 
 Pharnabazus, and claimed to hold the district even as Mania 
 had held it; to whom the other answered, "Keep your 
 gifts and guard them safely till that day when I shall come in 
 person and take both you and them together"; adding, "What 
 care I to live longer if I avenge not myself for the murder of 
 Mania ! " 
 
 Just at the critical moment Dercylidas arrived, and in 
 a single day received the adhesion of the three seaboard 
 cities Larisa, Hamaxitus, and Colonae — which threw open 
 their gates to him. Then he sent messengers to the cities 
 of the Aeolid also, offering them freedom if they would re- 
 ceive him within their walls and become allies. Accordingly 
 the men of Neandria and Ilium and Cocylium lent willing 
 ears ; for since the death of Mania their Hellenic garrisons 
 had been treated but ill. But the commander of the garrison 
 in Cebrenfe, a place of some strength, bethinking him that if he 
 should succeed in guarding that city for Pharnabazus, he would 
 receive honour at his hands, refused to admit Dercylidas. 
 Whereupon the latter, in a rage, prepared to take the place by 
 force; but when he came to sacrifice, on the first day the 
 victims would not yield good omens; on the second, and 
 again upon the third day, it was the same story. Thus for as 
 many as four days he persevered in sacrificing, cherishing wrath 
 the while — for he was in haste to become master of the whole 
 Aeolid before Pharnabazus came to the succour of the 
 district. 
 
 Meanwhile a certain Sicyonian captain, Athenadas by 
 name, said to himself : " Dercylidas does but trifle to waste 
 his time here, whilst I with my own hand can draw off' 
 their water from the men of Cebrenfe " ; wherewith he ran for- 
 ward with his division and essayed to choke up the spring 
 which supplied the city. But the garrison sallied out and 
 
"c/jm'^'"} meidias and DERCYLIDAS 7 
 
 covered the Sicyonian himself with wounds, besides killing two 
 of his men. Indeed, they plied th'eir swords and missiles 
 with such good effect that the whole company was forced to 
 beat a retreat. Dercylidas was not a little annoyed, thinking 
 that now the spirit of the besiegers would certainly die away ; 
 but while he was in this mood, behold ! there arrived from the 
 beleaguered fortress emissaries of the Hellenes, who stated 
 that the action taken by the commandant was not to their 
 taste ; for themselves, they would far rather be joined in bonds 
 of fellowship with Hellenes than with barbarians. While the 
 matter was still under discussion there came a messenger also 
 from the commandant, to say that whatever the former depu- 
 tation had proposed he, on his side, was ready to endorse. 
 Accordingly Dercylidas, who, it so happened, had at length 
 obtained favourable omens on that day, marched his force 
 without more ado up to the gates of the city, which were 
 flung open by those within ; and so he entered.^ Here, then, 
 he was content to appoint a garrison, and without further stay 
 advanced upon Scepsis and Gergithes. 
 
 And now Meidias, partly expecting the hostile advance 
 of Pharnabazus, and partly mistrusting the citizens — for to 
 such a pass things had come — sent to Dercylidas, proposing 
 to meet him in conference provided he might take security 
 of hostages. In answer to this suggestion the other sent 
 him one man from each of the cities of the allies, and bade 
 him take his pick of these, whichsoever and how many 
 soever he chose, as hostages for his own security. Meidias 
 selected ten, and so went out. In conversation with Dercy- 
 lidas, he asked him on what terms he would accept his alliance. 
 The other answered : " The terms are that you grant the 
 citizens freedom and self-government." The words were 
 scarcely out of his mouth before he began marching upon 
 Scepsis. Whereupon Meidias, perceiving it was vain to 
 hinder him in the teeth of the citizens, suffered him to 
 
 ' Grote {I/. G. ix. 294) says : "The reader will remark how Xenophon 
 shapes the narrative in such a manner as to inculcate the pious duty in a 
 general of obeying the warnings furnished by the sacrifice — either for action 
 or for inaction. . . . Such an inference is never (I believe) to be found sug- 
 gested in Thucydides. " See Breitenbach, Xen. Hell, i et 11, prcef. in 
 alteram ed. p. xvii. 
 
8 HELLENICA BK. III. {''"' ''Ic.'s^ 
 
 enter. That done, Dercylidas oifered sacrifice to Athena 
 in the ciudel of the Scepsians, turned out the bodyguards of 
 Meidias, and handed over the city to the citizens. And so, 
 having admonished them to regulate their civic life as Hellenes 
 and free men ought, he left the place and continued his 
 advance against Gergithes. On this last march he was escorted 
 by many of the Scepsians themselves ; such was the honour 
 they paid him and so great their satisfaction at his exploits. 
 Meidias also followed close at his side, petitioning that he 
 would hand over the city of the Gergithians to himself. To 
 whom Dercylidas only made reply, that he should not fail 
 to obtain any of his just rights. And whilst the words 
 were yet upon his lips he was drawing close to the gates, 
 with Meidias at his side. Behind him followed the troops, 
 marching two and two in peaceful fashion. The defenders 
 of Gergithes from their towers — which were extraordinarily 
 high — espied Meidias in company of the Spartan, and ab- 
 stained from shooting. And Dercylidas said : " Bid them 
 open the gates, Meidias, when you shall lead the way, and 
 I will enter the temple along with you and do sacrifice 
 to Athena." And Meidias, though he shrank from opening 
 the gates, yet in terror of finding himself on a sudden seized, 
 reluctantly gave the order to open the gates. As soon as 
 he was entered in, the Spartan, still taking lyieidias with 
 him, marched up to the citadel and there ordered the 
 main body of his soldiers to take up their position round 
 the walls, whilst he with those about him did sacrifice to 
 Athena. When the sacrifice was ended he ordered Meidias's 
 bodyguard to pile arms ^ in the van of his troops. Here for 
 the future they would serve as mercenaries, since Meidias their 
 former master stood no longer in need of their protection. 
 The latter, being at his wits' end what to do, exclaimed : 
 " Look you, I will now leave you ; I go to make preparation 
 for my guest." But the other replied : " Heaven forbid ! Ill 
 were it that I who have offered sacrifice should be treated as 
 a guest by you. I rather should be the entertainer and you 
 the guest. Pray stay with us, and while the supper is 
 
 ^ I.e. take up a position, or " to order arms," whilst he addressed them ; 
 not probably • ' to ground arms, " as if likely to be mutinous. 
 
bx.'mI'"*"^} exploits of DERCYLIDAS 9 
 
 preparing, you and I can consider our obligations, and perform 
 them." 
 
 When they were seated Dercylidas put certain ques- 
 tions : " Tell me, Meidias, did your father leave you heir 
 to his estates?" "Certainly he did," answered the other. 
 "And how many dwelling-houses have you? what landed 
 estates? how much pasturage?" The other began running 
 off an inventory, whilst some of the Scepsians who were 
 present kept interposing, "He is lying to you, Dercylidas." 
 " Nay, you take too minute a view of matters," replied 
 the Spartan. When the inventory of the paternal property 
 was completed, he proceeded : " Tell me, Meidias, to 
 whom did Mania belong?" A chorus of voices rejoined, 
 " To Pharnabazus." " Then must her property have belonged 
 to Pharnabazus too." "Certainly," they answered. "Then 
 it must now be ours," he remarked, "by right of conquest, 
 since Pharnabazus is at war with us. Will some one of 
 you escort me to the place where the property of Mania and 
 Pharnabazus lies ? " So the rest led the way to the dwelling- 
 place of Mania which Meidias had taken from her, and Meidias 
 followed too. When he was entered, Dercylidas summoned 
 the stewards, and bidding his attendants seize them, gave 
 them to understand that, if detected stealing anything which 
 belonged to Mania, they would lose their heads on the 
 spot. The stewards proceeded to point out the treasures, 
 and he, when he had looked through the whole store, bolted 
 and barred the doors, affixing his seal and setting a watch. 
 As he went out he found at the doors certain of the generals ^ 
 and captains, and said to them : " Here, sirs, we have pay 
 ready made for the army — a year's pay nearly for eight 
 thousand men — and if we can win anything besides, there 
 will be so much the more." This he said, knowing that 
 those who heard it would be all the more amenable to dis- 
 cipline, and would yield him a more flattering obedience. 
 Then Meidias asked, " And where am I to live, Dercylidas ? " 
 "Where you have the very best right to live," replied the 
 other, " in your native town of Scepsis, and in your father's 
 house.'' 
 
 1 Lit. ' ' of the taxiarchs and lochagoi. " 
 
lo HELLENICA — BK. III. { b"c. 399-398 
 
 n. — Such were the exploits of Dercylidas : nine cities taken 
 in eight days. Two considerations now began to occupy his 
 mind : how was he to avoid falHng into the fatal error of Thibron 
 and becoming a burthen to his allies, whilst wintering in a 
 friendly country ? how, again, was he to prevent Pharnabazus 
 from overriding the Hellenic states in pure contempt with 
 his cavalry? Accordingly he sent to Pharnabazus and put 
 it to him point-blank : — Which will you have, peace or war ? 
 Whereupon Pharnabazus, who could not but perceive_that the 
 whole Aeolid had now been converted practically into a forti- 
 fied base of operations, which threatened his own homestead 
 of Phrygia, chose peace. 
 
 B.C. 399-398. — This being so, Dercylidas advanced into 
 Bithynian Thrace, and there spent the winter ; nor did Pharna- 
 bazus exhibit a shadow of annoyance, since the Bithynians 
 were perpetually at war with himself. For the most part, 
 Dercylidas continued to harry ^ Bithynia in perfect security, 
 and found provisions without stint. Presently he was joined 
 from the other side of the straits by some Odrysian allies 
 sent by Seuthes ; ^ they numbered two hundred horse and 
 three hundred peltasts. These fellows pitched upon a site 
 a little more than a couple of miles ^ from the Hellenic 
 force, where they entrenched themselves ; then having got 
 from Dercylidas some heavy infantry soldiers to act as 
 guards of their encampment, they devoted themselves to 
 plundering, and succeeded in capturing an ample store of 
 slaves and other wealth. Presently their camp was full of 
 prisoners, when one morning the Bithynians, having ascer- 
 tained the actual numbers of the marauding parties as well 
 as of the Hellenes left as guards behind, collected in large 
 masses of light troops and cavalry, and attacked the garrison, 
 who were not more than two hundred strong. As soon as 
 they came close enough, they began discharging spears and 
 other missiles on the little body, who on their side continued to 
 be wounded and shot down, but were quite unable to retaliate, 
 cooped up as they were within a palisading barely six feet 
 
 ^ ipipav Kal S,y(m>, i.e. " there was plenty of live stock to lift and chattels 
 to make away with." 
 
 2 For Seuthes see Anali. VII. i. J (Trans, vol. i. p. 274) ; and below, IV. 
 viii. 26, p. 85. ' Lit. "twenty stades." 
 
b"c.398^"°} in BITHYNIA ; at LAMPSACUS II 
 
 high, until in desperation they tore down their defences with 
 their own hands, and dashed at the enemy. These had nothing 
 to do but to draw back from the point of egress, and being 
 light troops easily escaped beyond the grasp of heavy-armed 
 men, while ever and again, from one point of vantage or 
 another, they poured their shower of javelins, and at every sally 
 laid many a brave man low, till at length, like sheep penned in 
 a fold, the defenders were shot down almost to a man. A 
 remnant, it is true, did escape, consisting of some fifteen who, 
 seeing the turn affairs were taking, had already made off in 
 the middle of the fighting. Slipping through their assailants' 
 fingers,^ to the small concern of the Bithynians, they reached 
 the main Hellenic camp in safety. The Bithynians, satisfied 
 with their achievement, part of which consisted in cutting 
 down the tent guards of the Odrysian Thracians and 
 recovering all their prisoners, made off without delay; so 
 that by the time the Hellenes got wind of the affair and 
 rallied to the rescue, they found nothing left in the camp 
 ■ save only the stripped corpses of the slain. When the Odrysians 
 themselves returned, they fell to burying their own dead, 
 quaffing copious draughts of wine in their honour and holding 
 horse-races ; but for the future they deemed it advisable to 
 camp along with the Hellenes. Thus they harried and 
 burned Bithynia the winter through. 
 
 B.C. 398. — With the commencement of spring Dercylidas 
 turned his back upon the Bithynians and came to Lampsacus. 
 Whilst at this place envoys reached him from the home author- 
 ities. These were Aracus, Naubates, and Antisthenes. They 
 were sent to inquire generally into the condition of affairs in 
 Asia, and to inform Dercylidas of the extension of his office 
 for another year. They had been further commissioned by 
 the ephors to summon a meeting of the soldiers and inform 
 them that the ephors held them to blame for their former 
 doings, though for their present avoidance of evil conduct 
 they must needs praise them ; and for the future they must 
 understand that while no repetition of misdoing would be 
 tolerated, all just and upright dealing by the allies would 
 
 1 Or, "slipping through the enemy's fingers, who took no heed of them, 
 they," etc. 
 
12 HELLENICA — BK. III. {""■'bJ/s^s 
 
 receive its meed of praise. The soldiers were therefore sum- 
 moned, and the envoys delivered their message, to which the 
 leader of the Cyreians ^ answered : " Nay, men of Lacedae- 
 mon, listen; we are the same to-day as we were last year; 
 only our general of to-day is different from our general in the 
 past. If to-day we have avoided our offence of yesterday, the 
 cause is not far to seek ; you may discover it for yourselves." 
 
 Aracus and the other envoys shared the hospitality of 
 Dercylidas's tent, and one of the party chanced to mention 
 how they had left an embassy from the men of Chersonese in 
 Lacedaemon. According to their statement, he added, it 
 was impossible for them to till their lands nowadays, so per- 
 petually were they robbed and plundered by the Thracians ; 
 whereas the peninsula needed only to be walled across from 
 sea to sea, and there would be abundance of good land to 
 cultivate — enough for themselves and as many others from 
 Lacedaemon as cared to come. " So that it would not surprise 
 us," continued the envoys, "if a Lacedaemonian were actually 
 sent out from Sparta with a force to carry out the pro- 
 ject." Dercylidas kept his ears open but his counsel close, 
 and so sent forward the commissioners to Ephesus.''' It pleased 
 him to picture their progress through the Hellenic cities, and 
 the spectacle of peace and prosperity which would everywhere 
 greet their eyes. When he knew that his stay was to be pro- 
 longed, he sent again to Pharnabazus and offered him once more 
 as an alternative either the prolongation of the winter truce or 
 war. And once again Pharnabazus chose truce. It was thus that 
 Dercylidas was able to leave the cities in the neighbourhood 
 of the satrap ^ in peace and friendship. Crossing the Helles- 
 pont himself he brought his army into Europe, and marching 
 through Thrace, which was also friendly, was entertained by 
 Seuthes,* and so reached the Chersonese. 
 
 This district, he soon discovered, not only contained some- 
 thing like a dozen cities,^ but was singularly fertile. The 
 soil was of the best, but ruined by the ravages of the Thracians, 
 
 ^ Trans, vol. i p. ex. ^ See Grote, H. G. ix. 301. 
 
 ' Or, reading, after Cobet, rets irepl iKeiva vSKeis — "the cities of that 
 neighbourhood." * See Anai. VII. vii. 51 (Trans, vol. i. p. 314). 
 
 ^ Lit. ' ■ eleven or twelve cities. " For the natural productivity, see Anai. 
 V. vi. 25 (Trans, vol. i. p. 232). 
 
b"c. '398-397"} IN THE CHERSONESE ; AT ATARNEUS 13 
 
 precisely as he had been told. Accordingly, having measured 
 and found the breadth of the isthmus barely four miles,i he no 
 longer hesitated. Having offered sacrifice, he commenced his 
 line of wall, distributing the area to the soldiers in detachments, 
 and promising to award them prizes for their industry — a first 
 prize for the section first completed, and to the rest as each 
 detachment of workers might deserve. By this means the 
 whole wall begun in spring was finished before autumn. 
 Within these lines he established eleven cities, with numerous 
 harbours, abundance of good arable land, and plenty of land 
 under plantation, besides magnificent grazing grounds for sheep 
 and cattle of every kind. 
 
 Having finished the work, he crossed back again into Asia, 
 and on a tour of inspection, found the cities for the most 
 part in a thriving condition ; but when he came to Atarneus 
 he discovered that certain exiles from Chios had got possession 
 of the stronghold, which served them as a convenient base for 
 pillaging and plundering Ionia; and this, in fact, was their 
 means of livelihood. Being further informed of the large sup- 
 plies of grain which they had inside, he proceeded to draw 
 entrenchments round the place with a view to a regular 
 investment, and by this means he reduced it in eight months. 
 Then having appointed Draco of Pellene ^ commandant, he 
 stocked the fortress with an abundance of provisions of all 
 sorts, to serve him as a halting-place when he chanced to 
 pass that way, and so withdrew to Ephesus, which is three 
 days' journey from Sardis. 
 
 B.C. 397. — Up to this date peace had been maintained 
 between Tissaphernes and Dercylidas, as also between the 
 Hellenes and barbarians in those parts. But the time came 
 when an embassy arrived at Lacedaemon from the Ionic 
 cities, protesting that Tissaphernes might, if he chose, leave 
 the Hellenic cities independent. "Our idea," they added, 
 " is, that if Caria, the home of Tissaphernes, felt the pinch 
 of war, the satrap would very soon agree to grant us inde- 
 
 1 Lit. " thirty-seven stades." Mod. Gallipoli. See Herod, vi. 36; Plut. 
 P&yicl xix 
 
 2 Cf. Isocr. Panegyr. 70 ; Jebb. Att. Or. ii. p. 161. Of Pellene (or 
 Pellana) in Laconia, not Pellene in Achaia ? though that is the opinion of 
 Grote and Thirlwall. 
 
14 HELLENICA — BK. III. {""' "b^c! '397 
 
 pendence." The ephors, on hearing this, sent a despatch to 
 Dercylidas, and bade him cross the frontier with his army 
 into Caria, whilst Pharax the admiral coasted round with 
 the fleet. These orders were carried out. Meanwhile a 
 visitor had reached Tissaphernes. This was no less a 
 person than Pharnabazus. His coming was partly owing 
 to the fact that Tissaphernes had been appointed general- 
 in-chief, and partly in order to testify his readiness to 
 make common cause with his brother satrap in fighting 
 and expelling the Hellenes from the king's territory; for 
 if his heart was stirred by jealousy on account of the 
 generalship bestowed upon his rival, he was not the less 
 aggrieved at finding himself robbed of the Aeolid. Tissa- 
 phernes, lending willing ears to the proposal, had answered : 
 " First cross over with me into Caria, and then we will take 
 counsel on these matters." But being arrived in Caria, they 
 determined to establish garrisons of some strength in the 
 various fortresses, and so crossed back again into Ionia. 
 
 Hearing that the satraps had recrossed the Maeander, 
 Dercylidas grew apprehensive for the district which lay there 
 unprotected. "If Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus," he said 
 to Pharax, " chose to make a descent, they could harry the 
 country right and left." In this mind he followed suit, and 
 recrossed the frontier too. And now as they marched on, 
 preserving no sort of battle order — on the supposition that the 
 enemy had got far ahead of them into the district of Ephesus 
 — suddenly they caught sight of his scouts perched on some 
 monumental structures facing them. To send up- scouts into 
 similar edifices and towers on their own side was the work of 
 a few moments, and before them lay revealed the long lines 
 of troops drawn up just where their road lay. These were 
 the Carians, with their white shields, and the whole Persian 
 troops there present, with all the Hellenic contingents belong- 
 ing to either satrap. Besides these there was a great cloud of 
 cavalry : on the right wing the squadrons of Tissaphernes, 
 and on the left those of Pharnabazus. 
 
 Seeing how matters lay, Dercylidas ordered the generals of 
 brigade and captains to form into line as quickly as possible, 
 eight deep, placing the light infantry on the fringe of battle, 
 
b!c. 397-396°°} IN CARIA : ARMISTICE 15 
 
 with the cavalry — such cavalry, that is, and of such numerical 
 strength, as he chanced to have. Meanwhile, as general, he 
 sacrificed.^ During this interval the troops from Peloponnese 
 kept quiet in preparation as for battle. Not so the troops from 
 Priene and Achilleum, from the islands and the Ionic cities, 
 some of whom left their arms in the corn, which stood thick 
 and deep in the plain of the Maeander, and took to their heels; 
 while those who remained at their posts gave evident signs that 
 their steadiness would not last. Pharnabazus, it was reported, 
 had given orders to engage ; but Tissaphernes, who recalled 
 his experience of his own military exploits with the Cyreian 
 army, and assumed that all other Hellenes were of similar 
 mettle, had no desire to engage, but sent to Dercylidas saying, 
 he should be glad to meet him in conference. So Dercylidas, 
 attended by the pick of his troops, horse and foot, in personal 
 attendance on himself,^ went forward to meet the envoys. He 
 told them that for his own part he had made his preparations 
 to engage, as they themselves might see, but still, if the satraps 
 were minded to meet him in conference, he had nothing to 
 say against it — " Only, in that case, there must be a mutual 
 exchange of hostages and other pledges." 
 
 When this proposal had been agreed to and carried out, 
 the two armies retired for the night — the Asiatics to Tralles 
 in Caria, the Hellenes to Leucophrys, where was a temple ^ 
 of Artemis of great sanctity, and a sandy-bottomed lake more 
 than a furlong in extent, fed by a spring of ever-flowing water 
 fit for drinking and warm. For the moment so much was 
 effected. On the next day they met at the place appointed, and 
 it was agreed that they should mutually ascertain the terms on 
 which either party was willing to make peace. On his side, 
 Dercylidas insisted that the king should grant independence 
 to the Hellenic cities; while Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus 
 demanded the evacuation of the country by the Hellenic 
 army, and the withdrawal of the Lacedaemonian governors 
 from the cities. After this interchange of ideas a truce was 
 
 ^ I.e. according to custom on the eve of battle. See Pol, Lac. xiii. 8 
 
 (below, p. 321). 
 
 2 Lit. "they were splendid fellows to look at." See^rea*. II. iii. 3 (Trans, 
 vol. i. p. 125). ' Lately unearthed. See Class. Rev. v. 8, p. 391. 
 
1 6 HELLENICA — BK. III. {'"'■ ''■^J°^li 
 
 entered into, so as to allow time for the reports of the pro- 
 ceedings to be sent by Dercylidas to Lacedaemon, and by 
 Tissaphernes to the king. 
 
 B.C. 401 (?).^ — Whilst such was the conduct of affairs in 
 Asia under the guidance of Dercylidas, the Lacedaemonians 
 at home were at the same time no less busily employed with 
 other matters. They cherished a long-standing embitterment 
 against the Eleians, the grounds of which were that the Eleians 
 had once ^ contracted an alliance with the Athenians, Argives, 
 and Mantineansj moreover, on pretence of a sentence registered 
 against the Lacedaemonians, they had excluded them from the 
 horse-race and gymnastic contests. Nor was that the sum of 
 their offending. They had taken and scourged Lichas,^ under 
 the following circumstances : — Being a Spartan, he had formally 
 consigned his chariot to the Thebans, and when the Thebans 
 were proclaimed victors he stepped forward to crown his chariot- 
 eer; whereupon, in spite of his gray hairs, the Eleians put 
 those indignities upon him and expelled him from the festival. 
 Again, at a date subsequent to that occurrence, Agis being sent 
 to offersacrifice to Olympian Zeus in accordance with the bidding 
 of an oracle, the Eleians would not suffer him to offer prayer 
 for victory in war, asserting that the ancient law and custom * 
 forbade Hellenes to consult the god for war with Hellenes ; and 
 Agis was forced to go away without offering the sacrifice. 
 
 In consequence of all these annoyances the ephors and 
 the Assembly determined " to bring the men of Elis to their 
 senses." Thereupon they sent an embassy to that state, 
 announcing that the authorities of Lacedaemon deemed it just 
 and right that they should leave the country^ townships in 
 the territory of Elis free and independent. This the Eleians 
 flatly refused to do. The cities in question were theirs by 
 right of war. Thereupon the ephors called out the ban. The 
 leader of the expedition was Agis. He invaded Elis through 
 Achaia ^ by the Larisus ; but the army had hardly set foot on 
 
 1 For the chronology of the Eleian war, see note 3, p. 18. 
 
 " In 421 B.C. (see Thuc. v. 31); for the second charge, see Thuc. v. 49 foil. 
 
 ' See Mem. I. ii. 61 ; Thuc. v. 50 ; and Jowett, note ad loc. vol. li. 
 p. 314. * See Grote, H. G. ix. 311 ?wte. ' Lit. "perioecid." 
 
 ° From the north. The Larisus is the frontier stream between Achaia 
 and Elis. See Strabo, viii. 387. 
 
Bx."o!.4£''} WAR BETWEEN SPARTA AND ELIS 17 
 
 the enemy's soil and the work of devastation begun, when an 
 earthquake took place, and Agis, taking this as a sign from 
 Heaven, marched back again out of the country and disbanded 
 his army. Thereat the men of Elis were much more em- 
 boldened, and sent embassies to various cities which they 
 knew to be hostile to the Lacedaemonians. 
 
 The year had not completed its revolution ^ ere the ephors 
 again called out the ban against Elis, and the invading host of 
 Agis was this time swelled by the rest of the allies, including 
 the Athenians ; the Boeotians and Corinthians alone excepted. 
 The Spartan king now entered through Aulon,^ and the men 
 of Lepreum ^ at once revolted from the Eleians and gave in 
 their adhesion to the Spartan, and simultaneously with these 
 the Macistians and their next-door neighbours the Epitalians. 
 As he crossed the river further adhesions followed, on the part 
 of the Letrinians, the Amphidolians, and the Marganians. 
 
 B.C. 4oo(?). — Upon this he pushed on into Olympian territory 
 and did sacrifice to Olympian Zeus. There was no attempt to 
 stay his proceedings now. After sacrifice he marched against 
 the capital,* devastating and burning the country as he went. 
 Multitudes of cattle, multitudes of slaves, were the fruits of 
 conquest yielded, insomuch that the fame thereof spread, and 
 many more Arcadians and Achaeans flocked to join the standard 
 of the invader and to share in the plunder. In fact, the expedi- 
 tion became one enormous foray. Here was the chance to fill 
 all the granaries of Peloponnese with corn. When he had 
 reached the capital, the beautiful suburbs and gymnasia became 
 a spoil to the troops ; but the city itself, though it lay open 
 before him a defenceless and unwalled town, he kept aloof from. 
 He would not, rather than could not, take it. Such was the 
 explanation given. Thus the country was a prey to devasta- 
 tion, and the invaders massed round Cyllene. 
 
 Then the friends of a certain Xenias — a man of whom 
 
 ^ Al. "on the coming round of the next year." See Jowett (note to Thuc. 
 i. 31), vol. ii. p. 33. 
 
 ^ On the south. For the history, see Busolt, Vie Laked. pp. 146-200. 
 "The river" is the Alpheus. For the topography of Ehs and the Triphylia, 
 see map. ' See below, VI. v. ii, p. 172 ; Paus. IV. xv. 8. 
 
 * I.e. Elis, of which Cyllene is the port town. For the wealth of the dis- 
 trict, see Polyb. iv. 73 ; and below, VII. iv. 33, p. 222. 
 
 VOL. II C 
 
18 HELLENICA — BIC. III. {"Vit'^-s^ 
 
 it was said that he might measure the silver coin, inherited 
 from his father, by the bushel — wishing to be the leading instru- 
 ments in bringing over the state to Lacedaemon, rushed out 
 of the house, sword in hand, and began a work of butchery. 
 Amongst other victims they killed a man who strongly re- 
 sembled the leader of the democratic party, Thrasydaeus.i 
 Every one believed it was really Thrasydaeus who was slain. 
 The popular party were panic-stricken, and stirred neither hand 
 nor foot. On their side the cut-throats fondly imagined all was 
 over ; and their sympathisers poured their armed bands into the 
 market-place. But Thrasydaeus was laid asleep the while where 
 the fumes of wine had overpowered him. When the people 
 came to discover that their hero was not dead, they crowded 
 round his house this side and that,^ like a swarm of bees clinging 
 to their leader; and as soon as Thrasydaeus had put himself in 
 the van, with the people at his back, a battle was fought, and 
 the people won. And those who had laid their hands to deeds 
 of butchery went as exiles to the Lacedaemonians. 
 
 After a while Agis himself retired, recrossing the Alpheus ; 
 but he was careful to leave a garrison in Epitalium near that 
 river, with Lysippus as governor, and the exiles from Elis 
 along with him. Having so done, he disbanded his army 
 and returned home himself. 
 
 B.C. 400-399 (?).^ — During the rest of the summer and the 
 ensuing winter the territory of the Eleians was ravaged and 
 ransacked by Lysippus and his troops, until Thrasydaeus, the 
 following summer, sent to Lacedaemon and agreed to dismantle 
 the walls of Phea and Cyllene, and to grant autonomy to the 
 Triphylian townships* — together with Phrixa and Epitalium, the 
 Letrinians, Amphidolians, and Marganians ; and besides these 
 
 ^ See PaiK. III. viii. 4. He was a friend of Lysias ( Fit. X. Oral. 835). 
 
 2 The house was filled to overflowing by the clustering close-packed crowd. 
 
 2 Grote {H. G. ix. 316) discusses the date of this war between Elis and 
 Sparta, which, he thinks, reaches over three different years, 402-400 B.C. But 
 Curtius (vol. iv. Eng. tr. p. 196) disagrees : "The Eleian war must have oc- 
 curred in 401-400 B.C., and Grote rightly conjectures that the Eleians were 
 anxious to bring it to a close before the celebration of the festival. But he 
 errs in extending its duration over three years." See Diod. xiv. 17, 34 ; 
 Pans. III. viii. 2 foil. 
 
 * Grote remarks : "There is something perplexing in Xenophon's descrip- 
 tion of the Triphylian townships which the Eleians surrendered " {.ff. G. ix. 
 315). I adopt Grote's emend. Kal ^pl^av. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 176. 
 
riJlirsMVJs} ACCESSION OF AGESILAUS 19 
 
 to the Acroreians and to Lasion, a place claimed by the 
 Arcadians. With regard to Epeium, a town midway between 
 Heraea and Macistus, the Eleians claimed the right to keep it, 
 on the plea that they had purchased the whole district from its 
 then owners, for thirty talents,^ which sum they had actually 
 paid. But the Lacedaemonians, acting on the principle " that a 
 purchase which forcibly deprives the weaker party of his posses- 
 sion is no more justifiable than a seizure by violence," compelled 
 them to emancipate Epeium also. From the presidency of 
 the temple of Olympian Zeus, however, they did not oust them ; 
 not that it belonged to Elis of ancient right, but because the 
 rival claimants,^ it was felt, were "villagers," hardly equal to 
 the exercise of tne presidency. After these concessions, peace 
 and alliance between the Eleians and the Lacedaemonians were 
 established, and the war between Elis and Sparta ceased. 
 
 III. — After this Agis came to Delphi and offered as a sacrifice 
 a tenth of the spoil. On his return journey he fell ill at Heraea — 
 being by this time an old man — and was carried back to Lace- 
 daemon. He survived the journey, but being there arrived, 
 death speedily overtook him. He was buried with a sepulture 
 transcending in solemnity the lot of ordinary mortality.' 
 
 When the holy days of mourning were accomplished, and 
 it was necessary to choose another king, there were rival 
 claimants to the throne. Leotychides claimed it as the son, 
 Agesilaus as the brother, of Agis. Then Leotychides protested : 
 " Yet consider, Agesilaus, the law bids not ' the king's brother,' 
 but ' the king's son ' to be king ; only if there chance to be 
 no son, in that case shall the brother of the king be king." 
 Agesilaus: "Then must I needs be king." Leotychides: 
 "How so, seeing that I am not dead?" Agesilaus: "Be- 
 cause he whom you call your father denied you, saying, 
 ' Leotychides is no son of mine.' " Leotychides : " Nay, but 
 my mother, who would know far better than he, said, and still 
 to-day says, I am." Agesilaus: "Nay, but the god himself, 
 Poteidan, laid his finger on thy falsity when by his earthquake 
 he drove forth thy father from the bridal chamber into the 
 
 ' =;£^73i2 ; los. 
 
 " /.e. the men of the Pisatid. See below, VII. iv. 28, p. 221 ; Busoh. 
 op. cit. p. 156. 
 
 * See below, Ages. xi. 16, p. 272 ; Pol. Lac. xv. 9, p. 324. 
 
20 HELLENICA BK. III. {'b"c."39I-/97 
 
 light of day ; and time, ' that tells no lies,' as the proverb has it, 
 bare witness to the witness of the god ; for just ten months from 
 the moment at which he fled and was no more seen within that 
 chamber, you were born." ^ So they reasoned together. 
 
 Diopeithes,^ a great authority upon oracles, supported 
 Leotychides. There was an oracle of Apollo, he urged, which 
 said, " Beware of the lame reign." But Diopeithes was met 
 by Lysander, who in behalf of Agesilaus demurred to this 
 interpretation put upon the language of the god. If they 
 were to beware of a lame reign, it meant not, beware lest a 
 man stumble and halt, but rather, beware of him in whose 
 veins flows not the blood of Heracles; most assuredly the 
 kingdom would halt, and that would be a lame reign in 
 very deed, whensoever the descendants of Heracles should 
 cease to lead the state. Such were the arguments on either 
 side, after hearing which the city chose Agesilaus to be king. 
 
 Now Agesilaus had not been seated on the throne one 
 year when, as he sacrificed one of the appointed sacrifices in 
 behalf of the city,' the soothsayer warned him, saying : " The 
 gods reveal a conspiracy of the most fearful chsfracter '' ; and 
 when the king sacrificed a second time, he said : " The aspect 
 of the victims is now even yet more terrible " ; but when he 
 had sacrificed for the third time, the soothsayer exclaimed: 
 "O Agesilaus, the sign is given to me, even as though we 
 were in the very midst of the enemy." Thereupon they sacri- 
 ficed to the deities who avert evil and work salvation, and so 
 barely obtained good omens and ceased sacirificing. Nor had 
 five days elapsed after the sacrifices were ended, ere one came 
 bringing information to the ephors of a conspiracy, and named 
 Cinadon as the ringleader ;_a young man robust of body as of 
 soul, but not one of the peers.* Accordingly the ephors ques- 
 
 ^ I have followed Sauppe as usual, but see Hartman (Anal. Xen. p. 327) 
 lor a discussion of the whole passage. He thinks that Xenophon wrote 
 ii o5 y&p Toi ^(pvyep (6 abs Trariip, i.e. adulter) iK tH 6a\dfiai Se/tdrij) /itiiil ri 
 ?0iis. The Doric ^k rffl BaKi/iui was corrupted into i;> Tip OaKifXif and koX 
 iipavTj inserted. This corrupt reading Plutarch had before him, and hence 
 his distorted version of the story. 
 
 ^ See Plut. A^es. ii. 4 ; Lys. xxii. (Clough, iv. 3 ; iii. 129) ; Paus. III. 
 viii. 5. ' Po/. Lac. xv. ^. 
 
 * For the j/xoioi, see Miiller, Dorians, iii. 5, 7 (vol. ii. p. 84) ; Grote, 
 H. G. ix. 34s, note 2. 
 
fl"c. 398-^397''} CONSPIRACY OF CINADON 21 
 
 tioned their informant : " How say you the occurrence is to 
 take place ? " and he who gave the information answered : 
 " Cinadon took me to the limit of the market-place, and bade 
 me count how many Spartans there were in the market-place ; 
 and I counted — ' king, and ephors, and elders, and others — 
 maybe forty; (^ But tell me, Cinadon,' I said to him', 'why 
 have you bidden me count them ? ' and he answered me : 
 ' Those men, I would have you know, are your sworn foes ; 
 and all those others, more than four thousand, congregated 
 there are your natural allies.' Then he took and showed 
 me in the streets, here one and there two of 'our enemies,' 
 as we chanced to come across them, and all the rest 'our 
 natural allies ' ; and so again running through the list of 
 Spartan's to be found in the country districts, he still kept 
 harping on that string : ' Look you, on each estate one 
 foeman — the master^ — and all the rest allies.' " The ephors 
 asked: "How 'many do you reckon are in the secret of this 
 matter?" The informant g.nswered : " On that point also he 
 gave me to understand that there were by no means many in 
 their secret who were prime movers of the affair, but those 
 few to be depended on ; ' and to make up,' said he, ' we 
 ourselves are in i/iet'r secret, all the rest of them — helots, 
 enfranchised, inferiors, provincials, one and all.^ Note their 
 demeanour when Spartans chance to be the topic of their talk. 
 Not one of them can conceal the delight it would give him if 
 he might eat up every Spartan ra^.' " ^ Then, as the inquiry 
 went on, the question came : '' And where did they propose 
 to find arms ? " The answer followed : " He explained that 
 those of us, of course, who are ertroUed in regiments have 
 arms of our own already, and as for the mass — he led the 
 way to the war foundry, and showed me scores and scores of 
 knives, of swords, of spits, hatchets, and axes, and reaping- 
 hooks. 'Anything or everything,' he told me, 'which men 
 use to delve in earth, cut timber, or quarry stone, would serve 
 our purpose ; nay, the instruments used for other arts would 
 in nine cases out of ten furnish weapons enough and to spare, 
 
 ' For the neodamodes, hypomeiones, ferioeci, see Arnold, Thuc. v. 34 ; 
 MUIler, Dorians, ii. 43, 84, 18 ; Busolt, op. cit. p. 16. 
 
 - See Anab. IV. viii. 14 (Trans, vol. i. p. 206, note 3) ; and Horn. //. 
 'V. 34- 
 
22 HELLENICA — BK. III. {"".cI'ms-w" 
 
 especially in dealing with unarmed antagonists.' " Once more 
 being asked what time the affair was to come off, he replied 
 his orders were " not to leave the city." 
 
 As the result of their inquiry the ephors were persuaded 
 that the man's statements were based upon things he had 
 really seen,^ and they were so alarmed that they did not even 
 venture to summon the Little Assembly,^ as it was named ; but 
 holding informal meetings among themselves — a few senators 
 here and a few there — they determined to send Cinadon and 
 others of the young men ' to Aulon, with instructions to 
 apprehend certain of the inhabitants and helots, whose names 
 were written on the scytal^ (or scroll).^ He had further in- 
 structions to capture another resident in Aulon ; this was a 
 woman, the fashionaHe beauty of thd place — supposed to be 
 the arch-corruptress of all Lacedaemonians, young and old, 
 who visited Aulon. It was not the first mission of the 
 sort on which Cinadon had been employed by the ephors. 
 It was natural, therefore, that the ephors should entrust him 
 with the scytalb on which the names of the suspects were 
 inscribed ; and in answer to his inquiry which of the young 
 men he was to take with him, they said : " Go and order 
 the eldest of the H'ippagretae * (or commanders of horse) 
 to let you have six or seven who chance to be there." But 
 they had taken care to let the cbmmander know whom he 
 was to send, and that those §ent should also know that their 
 business was to capture Cinadoii. Further, the authorities 
 instructed Cinadon that they would send three waggons to 
 save bringing back his captives on foot — concealing as deeply 
 as possible the fact that he, and he alone, was the object of 
 the mission. Their reason for not se9uring him in the city was 
 that they did not really know the extent of the mischief; and 
 they wished, in the first instance, to learn from Cinadon who 
 his accomplices were before these latter could discover they 
 were informed against and effect their escape. His captors 
 
 1 ' ' And pointed to a well-concerted plan. '• 
 
 " See Grote, H. G. ix. 348. 
 
 3 See Thuc. i. 131 ; Plut. Zys. 19 (Clough, iii. p. 125). 
 
 * ' ' The Hippagretfe (or commander of the three hundred youthful guards 
 called horsemen, though they were not really mounted)." Grote, ff. G. vol. 
 ix. p. 349 ; see Pol. Lac. iv. 3 (below, p. 303). 
 
Ti-2"'B.c.'^gS-397'} ALARMING NEWS FROM ASIA 23 
 
 were to secure him first, and having learnt from him the 
 names of his confederates, to write them down and send them 
 as quickly as possible to the ephors. The ephors, indeed, 
 were so much concerned about the whole occurrence that 
 they further sent a company of horse to assist their agents at 
 Aulon.^ As soon as the capture was effected, and one of the 
 horsemen was back with the list of names taken down on the 
 information of Cinadon, they lost no time in apprehending the 
 soothsayer Tisamenus and the rest who were the principals in 
 the conspiracy. When Cinadon^ himself was brought back 
 and cross-examined, and had made, a full confession of the 
 whole plot, his plans, and his accomplices, they put to him 
 one- final question: "What was your object in undertaking 
 this business ? " He answered : " I wished to be inferior to 
 no man in Lacedaemon." Let that be as it might, his fate 
 was to be taken out forthwith in irons, just as he was, and to 
 be placed "with his two hands and his neck in the collar, and 
 so under scourge and goad to be driven, himself and his 
 accomplices, round the city. Thus upon the heads of those 
 was visited' the penalty of their offences. 
 
 IV. B.C. 397.^ — It was after the incidents just recorded that 
 a Syracusan named Herodas brought news to Lacedaemon. 
 He had chanced to be in Phoenicia with a certain shipowner, 
 and was struck by the number of Phoenician triremes which 
 he observed, some coming into harbour from other ports, 
 others already there with their ships' companies complete, 
 while others again were still completing their equipments. Nor 
 was it only what he saw, but he had heard say further that there 
 were to be three hundred of these vessels all told ; whereupon 
 he had taken passage home on the first sailing ship bound for 
 Hellas. He was in haste to lay this information before the 
 Lacedaemonians, feeling sure that the king and Tissaphernes 
 were conce:ened in these preparations — though where the fleet 
 was to act, or against whom, he' would not venture to predict. 
 
 These reports threw the Lacedaemonians into a flutter of 
 expectation and anxiety. They summoned a meeting of the 
 
 1 Or, " to those on the way to Aulon." 
 
 2 See for Cinadon's case, Aristot. Pol. v. 7, 3. 
 
 " See Grote, H. G. ix. 353, for chronology, etc. 
 
24 HELLENICA — BK. III. {"c.'Ib'-sgS 
 
 allies, and began to deliberate as to what ought to be done. 
 Lysander, convinced of the enormous superiority of the 
 Hellenic navy, and with regard to land forces drawing an 
 obvious inference from the exploits and final deliverance of 
 the troops with, Cyrus, persuaded Agesilaus t^ undertak e a 
 ca mpaign _j nto Asia, provided the authorities would furnish 
 bihi withliiirty Spartans, two thousand of the enfranchised,^ 
 and contingents of the allies amounting to six thousand 
 men. Apart from these calculations, Lysander had a personal 
 object : he wished to accompany the king himself, and by 
 his aid to re-establish the decarchies originally set up by 
 himself in the different cities, but at a later date expelled 
 through the action of the ephors, who had issued a fiat re- 
 establishing the old order of constitution. 
 
 B.C. 396. — To this offer on the part of Agesilaus to under- 
 take such an expedition the Lacedaemonians responded by 
 presenting him with all he asked for, and six months' provisions 
 besides. When the hour of departure came he offered all such 
 sacrifices as are necessary, and lastly those " before crossing 
 the border," ^ and so set out. This done, he despatched to the 
 several states ^ messengers with directions as to the numbers to 
 be sent from each, and the points of rendezvous ; but for him- 
 self he was minded to go and do sacrifice at Aulis, even as 
 Agamemnon had offered sacrifice in that place ere he set sail 
 for Troy. But when he had reached the place and had begun 
 to sacrifice, the Boeotarchs* being apprised of his design, 
 sent a body of cavalry and bade him desist from further 
 sacrificing ; ^ and lighting upon victims already offered, they 
 hurled them from off the altars, scattering the fragments. 
 Then Agesilaus, calling the gods to witness, got on board his 
 
 ' Technically "neodamodes." ^ Pol. Lac. xiii. 2 foil. (p. 319, below), 
 
 ^ Or, "To the several cities he had already despatched messengers with 
 directions," etc. ; see Pans. III. ix. 1-3 ; see Trans, vol. i. p. civ. 
 
 * See Freeman, Hist, of Federal Government, ch. iv. "Constitution of the 
 Boeotian League," pp. 162, 163. The Boeotarchs, as representatives of the 
 several Boeotian cities, were the supreme military commanders of the League, 
 and, as it would appear, the general administrators of Federal affairs. "The 
 Boeotarchs of course command at DeUon, but they also act as administrative 
 magistrates of the League by hindering Agesilaus from sacrificing at Aulis." 
 
 ^ Plut. Ages. vi. ; Pelop. xxi. See Breitenb. op. cit. Praef. p. xvi. ; and 
 below. III. V. 5, p. 33 ; VI, iv. 23, p. 164. 
 
Bx.sV''"^} AGESILAUS AND LYSANDER 25 
 
 trireme in bitter indignation, and sailed away. Arrived at 
 Geraestus, he there collected as large a portion of his troops 
 as possible, and with the armada made sail for Ephesus. 
 
 When he had reached that city the first move was made 
 by Tissaphernes, who sent asking, " With what purpose he was 
 come thither ? " And the Spartan king made answer : " With 
 the intention that the cities in Asia shall be independent even 
 as are the cities in our quarter of Hellas." In answer to this 
 Tissaphernes said ; " If you on your part choose to make a 
 truce whilst I send ambassadors to the king, I think you may 
 well arrange the matter, and sail back home again, if so you 
 will." "Willing enough should I be," replied Agesilaus, 
 " were I not persuaded that you are cheating me." " Nay, 
 but it is open to you," replied the satrap, " to exact a surety 
 for the execution of the terms . ' Provided always that you, 
 Tissaphernes, carry out what you say without deceit, we on our 
 side will abstain from injuring your dominion in any respect 
 whatever during the truce.' " ^ Accordingly in the presence of 
 three commissioners— Herippidas, Dercylidas, and Megillus — 
 Tissaphernes took an oath in the words prescribed : " Verily 
 and indeed, I will effect peace honestly and without guile." 
 To which the commissioners, on behalf of Agesilaus, swore a 
 counter-oath: "Verily and indeed, provided Tissaphernes so 
 acts, we on our side will observe the truce." 
 
 Tissaphernes at once gave the he to what he had sworn. 
 Instead of adhering to peace he sent up to demand a large 
 army from the king, in addition to that which he already had. 
 But Agesilaus, though he was fully alive to these proceedings, 
 adhered as rigidly as ever to the truce. 
 
 To keep quiet and enjoy leisure was his duty, in the exer- 
 cise of which he wpre away the time at Ephesus. But in 
 reference to the organisation of the several states it was a 
 season of vehement constitutional disturbance in the several 
 cities; that is to say, there were neither democracies as in 
 the old days of the Athenians, nor yet were there decarchies 
 as in the days of Lysander. But here was Lysander back again. 
 Every one recognised him, and flocked to him with petitions 
 
 ' For this corrupt passage, see Hartman, Anal. Xen. p. 332 ; also Otto 
 Keller's critical edition of the Hellenica (Lips, mdccclxxx.). 
 
26 HELLENICA — BK. III. {""' "^X%'^6 
 
 for one favour or another, which he was to obtain for them 
 from Agesilaus. A crowd of suitors danced attendance on his 
 heels, and formed so conspicuous a retinue that Agesilaus, 
 any one would have supposed, was the private person and 
 Lysander the king. All this was maddening to Agesilaus, as 
 was presently plain. As to the rest of the Thirty, jealousy 
 did not suffer them to keep silence, and they put it plainly 
 to Agesilaus that the super-regal splendour in which Lysander 
 lived was a violation of the constitution. So when Lysander 
 took upon himself to introduce some of his petitioners to 
 Agesilaus, the latter turned them a deaf ear. Their being 
 aided and abetted by Lysander was sufficient; he sent them 
 away discomfited. At length, as time after time things turned 
 out contrary to his wishes, Lysander himself perceived the 
 position of affairs. He now no longer suffered that crowd to 
 follow him, and gave those who asked his help in anything 
 plainly to understand they would gain nothing, but rather be 
 losers, by his intervention. But being bitterly annoyed at the 
 degradation put upon him, he came to the king and said to 
 him : " Ah, Agesilaus, how well you know the art of humbling 
 your friends ! " " Ay, indeed," the king replied ; " those of them 
 whose one idea it is to appear greater than myself; if I did 
 not know also how to requite with honour those who work for 
 my good, I should be ashamed." And Lysander said : " Maybe 
 there is more reason in your doings than ever guided my con- 
 duct ; " adding, " Grant me for the rest one favour, so shall I 
 cease to blush at the loss of my influence with you, and you 
 will cease to be embarrassed by my presence. Send me off on 
 a mission somewhere ; wherever I am I will strive to be of 
 service to you." Such was the proposal of Lysander. Agesilaus 
 resolved to act upon it, and despatched Lysander to the Helles- 
 pont. And this is what befell. ^ Lysander, being made aware 
 of a slight which had been put upon Spithridates the Persian by 
 Pharnabazus, got into conversation with the injured man, and 
 so worked upon him that he was persuaded to bring his 
 children and his personal belongings, and with a couple of hun- 
 dred troopers to revolt. The next step was to deposit all the 
 goods safely in Cyzicus, and the last to get on shipboard with 
 
 ' See Affes. iii. 3 ; Anad. VI. v. 7 (Trans, vol. i. p. 264). 
 
b"c'.'3V'°'"} agesilaus and tissaphernes 
 
 27 
 
 Spithridates and his son, and so to present himself with his 
 Persian friends to Agesilaus. Agesilaus, on his side, was 
 delighted at the transaction, and set himself at once to get in- 
 formation about Pharnabazus, his territory and his government. 
 
 Meanwhile Tissaphernes had waxed bolder. A large body 
 of troops had been sent down by the king. On the strength 
 of that he declared war against Agesilaus, if he did not in- 
 stantly withdraw his troops from Asia. The Lacedaemonians 
 there 1 present, no less than the allies,- received the news with 
 profound vexation, persuaded as they were that Agesilaus had 
 no force capable of competing with the king's grand arma- 
 ment. But a smile lit up the face of Agesilaus as he bade the 
 ambassadors return to Tissaphernes and tell him that he was 
 much in his debt for the perjury by which he had won the enmity 
 of Heaven and made the very gods themselves allies of Hellas. 
 He at onte issued a general order to the troops to equip them- 
 selves for a forward movement. He warned the cities through 
 which he must pass in an advance upon Caria, to have markets 
 in readiness, and lastly, he despatched a message to the Ionian, 
 Aeolian, and Hellespontine communities to send their con- 
 tingents to join him at Ephesus. 
 
 Tissaphernes, putting together the facts that Agesilaus had 
 no cavalry and that Caria was a region unadapted to that arm, 
 and persuaded in his own mind also that the Spartan could 
 not but cherish wrath against himself personally for his chican- 
 ery, felt convinced that he was really intending to invade Caria, 
 and that the satrap's palace was his final goal. Accordingly he 
 transferred the whole of his infantry into that province, and pro- 
 ceeded to lead his cavalry round into the plain of the Maeander. 
 Here he conceived himself capable of trampling the Hellenes 
 under foot with his horsemen before they could reach the 
 craggy districts where no cavalry could operate. 
 
 But, instead of marching straight into Caria, Agesilaus 
 turned sharp off in the opposite direction towards ^ Phrygia. 
 Picking up various detachments of troops which met him on 
 his march, he steadily advanced, laying cities prostrate before 
 him, and by the unexpectedness of his attack reaping a golden 
 harvest of spoil. As a rule the march was prosecuted safely; 
 
 ' !.e. at Ephesus. 
 
28 HELLENICA — BK. III. {""B.'c.'lgl'sw 
 
 but not far from Dascyliumi his advanced guard of cavalry 
 were pushing on towards a knoll to take a survey of the state 
 of things in front, when, as chance would have it, a detach- 
 ment of cavalry sent forward by Pharnabazus — the corps, 
 in fact, of Rhathines and his natural brother Bagaeus, — 
 just about equal to the Hellenes in number, also came 
 galloping up towards the very knoll in question. The two 
 bodies found themselves face to face not one hundred and 
 fifty yards ^ apart, and for the first moment or two stood stock 
 still. The Hellenic horse were drawn up like an ordinary 
 phalanx four deep, the barbarians presenting a narrow front 
 of twelve or thereabouts, and a very disproportionate depth. 
 There was a moment's pause, and then the barbarians, taking 
 the initiative, charged. There was a hand-to-hand tussle, 
 in which any Hellene who succeeded in striking his man 
 shivered his lance with the blow, while the Persian troopers, 
 armed with cornel -wood javelins, speedily despatched a 
 dozen men and a couple of horses.^ At this point the 
 Hellenic cavalry turned and fled. But as Agesilaus came up 
 to the rescue with his heavy infantry, the Asiatics were forced 
 in their turn to withdraw, with the loss of one man slain. 
 This cavalry engagement gave them pause. Agesilaus on the 
 day following it offered sacrifice. "Was he to continue his 
 advance ? " But the victims proved hopeless.* There was 
 nothing for it after this manifestation but to turn and march 
 towards the sea. It was clear enough to his mind that without 
 a proper cavalry force it would be impossible to conduct a 
 campaign in the flat country. Cavalry, therefore, he must get, 
 or be driven to a mere guerilla warfare. With this view he 
 drew up a list of all the wealthiest inhabitants belonging to 
 the several cities of those parts. Their duty would be to 
 support a body of cavalry, with the proviso, however, that any 
 one contributing a horse, arms, and rider, up to the standard, 
 would be exempted from personal service. The effect was 
 instantaneous. The zeal with which the recipients of these 
 orders responded could hardly have been greater if they had 
 been seeking substitutes to die for them. 
 
 ^ For Dascylium, see Trans, vol. i. pp. cxiv. cxix. ^ Lit. "four plethra." 
 
 ^ See Xenophon's treatise On Horsemanship, xii. 12 ; Trans, vol. i. p. cxiv. 
 ' Lit. " lobeless," i.e. witli a lobe of the liver wanting — a bad sign. 
 
Bx-'sV '°'°} EPHESUS THE "WORKSHOP OF WAR" 29 
 
 B.C. 395. — After this, at the first faint indication of spring, 
 he collected the whole of his army at Ephesus. But the army 
 needed training. With that object he proposed a series of 
 prizes — prizes to the several heavy infantry regiments, to be 
 won by those who presented their men in the best condition ; 
 prizes" for the cavalry regiments which could ride best ; prizes 
 for those divisions of peltasts and archers which proved most 
 efficient in their respective duties. And now the gymnasiums 
 were a sight to see, thronged as they were, one and all, with war- 
 riors stripped for exercise ; or again, the hippodrome crowded 
 with horses and riders performing their evolutions ; or the 
 javelin men and archers going through their peculiar drill. 
 In fact, the whole city where he lay presented under his hands 
 a spectacle not to be forgotten. The market-place literally 
 teemed with horses, arms, and accoutrements of all sorts for 
 sale. The bronze-worker, the carpenter, the smith, the leather- 
 cutter, the painter and embosser, were all busily engaged in 
 fabricating the implements of war ; so that the city of Ephesus 
 itself was fairly converted into a military workshop.^ It would 
 have done a man's heart good to see those long lines of soldiers 
 with Agesilaus at their head, as they stepped gaily be-garlanded 
 from the gymnasiums to dedicate their wreaths to the goddess 
 Artemis. Nor can I well conceive of elements more fraught 
 with hope than were here combined. Here were reverence and 
 piety towards Heaven ; here practice in war and military train- 
 ing ; here discipline with habitual obedience to authority. But 
 contempt for one's enemy will infuse a kind of strength in 
 battle. So the Spartan leader argued; and with a view to 
 its production he ordered the quartermasters to put up the 
 prisoners who had been captured by his foraging bands for 
 auction, stripped naked ; so that his Hellene soldiery, as they 
 looked at the white skins which had never been bared to sun 
 and wirid, the soft limbs unused to toil through constant 
 riding iti carriages, came, to the conclusion that war with such 
 adversaries would differ little from a fight with women. 
 
 By this datS"^ full year had elapsed since the embarkation 
 of Agesilaus, and the time had come for the Thirty with 
 Lysander to sail back home, and for their successors, with 
 
 1 See Plut^ Marc. (Clough, ii. 262) ; Polyb. Hist. a. zo. 
 
30 HELLENICA BK. III. {""■ "'■b!c!°355 
 
 Herippidas, to arrive. Among these Agesilaus appointed 
 Xenocles and another ^ to the command of the cavalry, 
 Scythes to that of the heavy infantry of the enfranchised,^ 
 Herippidas to that of the Cyreians, and Migdon to that 
 of the contingents from the states. Agesilaus gave them 
 to understand that he intended to lead them forthwith by 
 the most expeditious route against the stronghold of the 
 country,^ so that without further ceremony they might pre- 
 pare their minds and bodies for the tug of battle. Tissa- 
 phernes, however, was firmly persuaded that this was only talk 
 intended to deceive him ; Agesilaus would this time certainly 
 invade Caria. Accordingly he repeated- his former tactics, 
 transporting his infantry bodily into Caria and posting his 
 cavalry in the valley of the Maeander. But Agesilaus was 
 as good as his word, and at once invaded the district of 
 Sardis. A three days' march through a region denuded of 
 the enemy threw large supplies into his hands. On the fourth 
 day the cavalry of the enemy approached. Their general 
 ordered the officer in charge of his baggage-train to cross 
 the Pactolus and encamp, while his troopers, catching sight 
 of stragglers from the Hellenic force scattered in pursuit of 
 booty, put several of them to the sword. Perceiving which, 
 Agesilaus ordered his cavalry to the rescue ; and the Persians 
 on their side, seeing their advance, collected together in battle 
 order to receive them, with dense squadrons of horse, troop 
 upon troop. The Spartan, reflecting that the enemy had as 
 yet no infantry to support him, whilst he had all branches of the 
 service to depend upon, concluded that the critical moment 
 had arrived to risk an engagement. In this mood he sacri- 
 ficed, and began advancing his main line of battle against the 
 serried lines of cavalry in front of him, at the same time order- 
 ing the flower of his heavy infantry — the ten-years-service men * 
 — to close with them at a run, and the peltasts to bring up 
 their supports at the double. The order passed to his cavalry 
 was to charge in confidence that he and the whole body of 
 his troops were close behind them. The cavalry charge was 
 received by the Persians without flinching, but presently find- 
 
 ^ See Trans, vol. i. p. cxv. note 2. " The neodamodes. See above, pp. 21, 24. 
 ' /.e. Lydia. See Pint. A^es. x. (Clough, iv. 11). 
 * See note to Bell. II. iv. 32 (Trans, vol. i. p. 71). 
 
l^c'sgs'*"^} THE PACTOLUS : TITHRAUSTES 31 
 
 ing themselves environed by the full tide of war they swerved. 
 Some found a speedy grave "within the river, but the mass 
 of them gradually made good their escape. The Hellenes 
 followed close on the heels of the flying foe and captured his 
 camp. Here the peltasts not urlnaturally fell to pillaging; 
 whereuf)6n Ag^silaus planted his troops so as to form a 
 cordon' enclosing the property of friends and foes alike. The 
 spoil taken was considerable; it fetched more than seventy 
 talents,^ not to mention the famous camels, subsequently 
 brought over by Agesilaus into Hellas, which were captured 
 here. At the moment of the battle Tissaphernes lay in Sardis. 
 Hence the Persians argued that they had been betrayed by the 
 satrap. And the king of Persia, coming to a like conclusion 
 himself that Tissaphernes was to blame for the evil turn of his 
 affairs, sent down Tithraustes and beheaded him.^ 
 
 This done, Tithraustes sent an embassy to Agesilaus with 
 a message as follows : " The author of all our trouble, yours 
 and ours, Agesilaus, has paid the penalty of his misdoings ; the 
 king therefore asks of you first that you should sail back home 
 in peace ; secondly, that the cities in Asia secured in their 
 autonomy should continue to render him the ancient tribute." 
 To this proposition Agesilaus made answer that " without the 
 authorities at home he could do nothing in the matter." 
 " Then do you, at least," replied Tithraustes, " while awaiting 
 advice from Lacedaemon, withdraw into the territory of 
 Pharnabazus. Have I not avenged you of your enemy?" 
 " While, then, I am on my way thither," rejoined Agesilaus, 
 "will you support my array with provisions?" On this wise 
 Tithraustes handed him thirty talents,^ which the other took, 
 and forthwith began his march into Phrygia (the Phrygia of 
 Pharnabazus). He lay in the plain district above Cyme,* 
 when a message reached him from the home authorities, 
 giving him absolute disposal of the naval forces,^ with the 
 right to appoint the admiral of his choice. This course the 
 Lacedaemonians were led to adopt by the following considera- 
 tions : If, they argued, the same man were in command of 
 both services, the land force would be greatly strengthened 
 
 1 = j^i7,o6z : los. ^ See Diod. xiv. 80. 
 
 3 = ;^73i2 : los. * See Cyrop. VII. i. 45. 
 
 ^ See Grote, //■ G. ix. 327, note 3 ; Arist. Pol. ii. 9, 33. 
 
32 HELLENICA BK. III. {cH.v"§iX;lfc."395 
 
 through the concentration of the double force at any point 
 necessary; and the navy likewise would be far more useful 
 through the immediate presence and co-operation of the land 
 force where needed. Apprised of these measures, Agesilaus 
 in the first instance sent an order to the cities on the islands 
 and the seaboard to fit out as many ships of war as they sever- 
 ally might deem desirable. The result was a new navy, con- 
 sisting of the vessels thus voluntarily furnished by the states, 
 with others presented by private persons out of courtesy to 
 their commander, and amounting in all to a fleet of one 
 hundred and twenty sail. The admiral whom he selected 
 was Peisander, his wife's brother, a man of genuine ambition 
 and of a vigorous spirit, but not sufficiently expert in the 
 details of equipment to achieve a great naval success. Thus 
 whilst Peisander set off to attend to naval matters, Agesilaus 
 continued his march whither he was bound to Phrygia. 
 
 v. — But now Tithraustes seemed to have discovered in 
 Agesilaus a disposition to despise the fortunes of the Persian 
 monarch — he evidently had no intention to withdraw from 
 Asia ; on the contrary, he was cherishing hopes vast enough 
 to include the capture of the king himself. Being at his wits' 
 end how to manage matters, he resolved to send Timocrates 
 the Rhodian to Hellas with a gift of gold worth fifty silver 
 talents, •'• and enjoined upon him to endeavour to exchange 
 solemn pledges with the leading men in the several states, 
 binding them to undertake a war against Lacedaemon. Timo- 
 crates arrived and began to dole out his presents. In Thebes 
 he gave gifts to Androcleidas, Ismenias, and Galaxidorus ; in 
 Corinth to Tiraolaus and Polyanthes ; in Argos to Cylon and 
 his party. The Athenians,^ though they took no share of the 
 gold, were none the less eager for the war, being of opinion 
 that empire was theirs by right.^ The recipients of the 
 moneys forthwith began covertly to attack the Lacedae- 
 monians- in their respective states, and, when they had 
 brought these to a sufficient pitch of hatred, bound together 
 the most important of them in a confederacy. 
 
 ' = ;fi2,i87 : los. " See Paus. III. ix. 8 ; Plut. A^es. xv. 
 
 ' Reading vo^^ovTes airQiv tA dpxci'V with Sauppe ; or if, as Breitenbach 
 suggests, ivdful^oi' Si oix airSiv rb S.pxe(rBat, translate ' ' but thought it was 
 not for them to take the initiative. 
 
Bx-Ms'"'} THEBES AND LACED AEMON 33 
 
 But it was clear to the leaders in Thebes that, unless some 
 one struck the first blow, the Lacedaemonians would never be 
 brought to break the truce with the allies. They therefore 
 persuaded the Opuntian Locrians^ to levy moneys on a 
 debatable district,^ jointly claimed by the Phocians and 
 themselves, when the Phocians would be sure to retaliate by 
 an attack on Locris. These expectations were fulfilled. The 
 Phocians immediately invaded Locris and seized moneys 
 on their side with ample interest. Then Androcleidas and 
 his friends lost no time in persuading the Thebans to 
 assist the Locrians, on the ground that it was no debatable 
 district which had been entered by the Phocians, but the 
 admittedly friendly and alUed territory of Locris itself. The 
 counter-invasion of Phocis and pillage of their country by the 
 Thebans promptly induced the Phocians to send an embassy 
 to Lacedaemon. In claiming assistance they explained that 
 the war was not of their own seeking, but that they had 
 attacked the Locrians in self-defence. On their side the 
 Lacedaemonians were glad enough to seize a pretext for 
 marching upon the Thebans, against whom they cherished a 
 long-standing bitterness. They had not forgotten the claim 
 which the Thebans had set up to a tithe for Apollo in Deceleia,* 
 nor yet their refusal to support Lacedaemon in the attack on 
 Piraeus ; * and they accused them further of having persuaded 
 the Corinthians not to join that expedition. Nor did they 
 fail to call to mind some later proceedings of the Thebans — 
 their refusal to allow Agesilaus to sacrifice in AuUs;^ their 
 snatching the victims already offered and hurling them from 
 the altars; their refusal to join the same general in a cam- 
 paign directed even against Asia." The Lacedaemonians 
 further reasoned that now, if ever, was the favourable moment 
 to conduct an expedition against the Thebans, and once for 
 all to put a stop to their insolent behaviour towards them. 
 Affairs in Asia were prospering under the strong arm of 
 
 1 For an alliance between Athens and the Locrians, B.C. 395, see Hicks, 
 67 ; and below, IV. ii. 17. " Lit. " the." See Paus. IIL ix. g. 
 
 ' See Grote, ff. G. ix. 309, 403 ; viii. 355. 
 * Hell. II. iv. 30 (Trans, vol. i. p. 71). B.C. 403. 
 i> See above, III. iv. 3, p. 24 ; and below, VII. i. 34, p. 196. 
 « See Paus. III. ix. 1-3. 
 VOL. II ° 
 
34 HELLENICA — BK. III. {""'B/cf/gt 
 
 Agesilaus, and in Hellas they had no other war on hand to 
 trammel their movements. Such, therefore, being the general 
 view of the situation adopted at Lacedaemon, the ephors pro- 
 ceeded to call out the ban. Meanwhile they despatched 
 Lysander to Phocis with orders to put himself at the head of 
 the Phocians along with the Oetaeans, Heracleotes, Melians, 
 and Aenianians, and to march upon Haliartus ; before the walls 
 of which place Pausanias, the destined leader of the expedition, 
 undertook to present himself at the head of the Lacedae- 
 monians and other Peloponnesian forces by a specified date. 
 Lysander not only carried out his instructions to the letter, 
 but, going a little beyond them, succeeded in detaching 
 Orchomenus from Thebes.^ Pausanias, on the other hand, 
 after finding the sacrifices for crossing the frontier favourable, 
 sat down at Tegea and set about despatching to and fro the 
 commandants of allied troops whilst contentedly awaiting the 
 soldiers from the provincial ^ districts of Laconia. 
 
 And now that it was fully plain to the Thebans that the 
 Lacedaemonians would invade their territory, they sent am- 
 bassadors to Athens, who spoke as follows : — 
 
 " Men of Athens, it is a mistake on your part to blame us 
 for certain harsh resolutions concerning Athens at the con- 
 clusion of the war.^ That vote was not authorised by the state 
 of Thebes. It was the utterance merely of one man,* who was 
 at that time seated in the congress of the allies. A more im- 
 portant fact is that when the Lacedaemonians summoned us 
 to attack Piraeus^ the collective state of Thebes passed a 
 resolution refusing to join in the campaign. As then you 
 are to a large extent the cause of the resentment which the 
 Lacedaemonians feel towards us, we consider it only fair that 
 
 1 See Freeman, cip. cit. p. 167, "111 feeling between Thebes and other 
 towns." — "Against Thebes, backed by Sparta, resistance was hopeless. It 
 was not till long after that, at last [in 395 B.C.], on a favourable opportunity 
 during the Corinthian war, Orchomenos openly seceded." And for the prior 
 "state of disaffection towards Thebes on the part of the smaller cities," see 
 Mem. III. V. 2, in reference to B.C. 407. ^ Lit. "perioecid." 
 
 3 See Hell. II. ii. 19 (Trans, vol. i. p. 48) ; and below, VI. v. 35, p. 
 180. 
 
 * Plut. Lys. XV. " Erianthus the Theban gave his vote to pull down the 
 city, and turn the country into sheep-pasture. "—,Clough, iii. 121, 
 
 ^ See Hell. II. iv. 30 (Trans, vol. i. p. 71). 
 
arc/agr'"} THEBAN ENVOYS AT ATHENS 35 
 
 you in your turn should render us assistance. Still more do 
 we demand of you, sirs, who were of the city party at that 
 date, to enter heart and soul into war with the Lacedae- 
 monians. For. what were their services to you? They first 
 deliberately converted you into an oligarchy and placed you 
 in hostility to the democracy, and then they came with a great 
 force under guise of being your allies, and delivered you over 
 to the majority, so that, for any service they rendered you, 
 you were all dead men ; and you owe your lives to our friends 
 here, the people of Athens.^ 
 
 " But to pass on — we all know, men of Athens, that you 
 would like to recover the empire which you formerly possessed; 
 and how can you compass your object better than by coming 
 to the aid yourselves of the victims of Lacedaemonian in- 
 justice? Is it their wide empire of which you are afraid? 
 Let not that make cowards of you — much rather let it em- 
 bolden you as you lay to heart and ponder your own case. 
 When your empire was widest then the crop of your enemies 
 was thickest. Only so long as they found no opportunity to 
 revolt did they keep their hatred of you dark ; but no sooner 
 had they found a champion in Lacedaemon than they at once 
 showed what they really felt towards you. So too to-day. Let 
 us show plainly that we mean to stand shoulder to shoulder ^ 
 embattled against the Lacedaemonians ; and haters enough of 
 them — whole armies — never fear, will be forthcoming. To 
 prove the truth of this assertion you need only to count upon 
 your fingers. How many friends have they left to them to- 
 day ? The Argives have been, are, and ever will be, hostile 
 to them. Of course. But the Eleians ? Why, the Eleians have 
 quite lately * been robbed of so much territory and so many 
 cities that their friendship is converted into hatred. And 
 what shall we say of the Corinthians? the Arcadians? the 
 Achaeans ? In the war which Sparta waged against you, there 
 was no toil, no danger, no expense, which those peoples did not 
 share, in obedience to the dulcet coaxings * and persuasions of 
 that poweE. The Lacedaemonians gained what they wanted, 
 
 ' See ffell. II. iv. 38, 40, 41 (Trans, vol. i. p. 74). 
 
 2 Lit. "shield to shield." ' Lit. "to-day," "nowadays." 
 
 * /iAXa 'KiTapoi/iepoi. See Thuc. i. 66 foil. ; vi. 88. 
 
36 HELLENICA — BK. III. {™' ''■b!c! ms 
 
 and then not one fractional portion of empire, honour, or wealth 
 did these faithful followers come in for. That is not all. 
 They have no scruple in appointing their helots ^ as governors, 
 and on the free necks of their allies, in the day of their good 
 fortune, they have planted the tyrant's heel. 
 
 " Take again the case of those whom they have detached 
 from yourselves. In the most patent way they have cajoled 
 and cheated them ; in place of freedom they have presented 
 them with a twofold slavery. The aUies are tyrannised over by 
 the governor and tyrannised over by the ten commissioners set 
 up by Lysander over every subject city.^ And to come lastly 
 to the great king. In spite of all the enormous contributions 
 with which he aided them to gain a mastery over you, is the 
 lord of Asia one whit better off to-day than if he had taken 
 exactly the opposite course and joined you in reducing them ? 
 
 "Is it not clear that you have only to step forward 
 once again as the champions of this crowd of sufferers from 
 injustice, and you will attain to a pinnacle of power quite 
 unprecedented? In the days of your old empire you were 
 leaders of the maritime powers merely — that is clear; but 
 your new empire to-day will be universal. You will have at 
 your backs not only your former subjects, but ourselves, and 
 the Peloponnesians, and the king himself, with all that mighty 
 power which is his. We do not deny that we were serviceable 
 allies enough to Lacedaemon, as you will bear us witness ; but 
 this we say : — If we helped the Lacedaemonians vigorously in 
 the past, everything tends to show that we shall help you still 
 more vigorously to-day ; for our swords will be unsheathed, 
 not in behalf of islanders, or Syracusans, or men of alien stock, 
 as happened in the late war, but of ourselves, suffering under 
 a sense of wrong. And there is another important fact which 
 you ought to realise : this selfish system of organised greed 
 which is Sparta's will fall more readily to pieces than your own 
 
 ^ See Pol. Lac. xiv. {below, p. 322). 
 
 ^ Grote (H. G. ix. 323), referring to this passage, and to Hell. VI. iii. 8-11 
 (below, pi 15s), notes the change in Spartan habits between 405 and 394 B.C. 
 (i.e. between the victory of Aegospotami and the defeat of Cnidos), when 
 Sparta possessed a large public revenue derived from the tribute of the de- 
 pendent cities. For her earlier condition, 432 B.C., cf. Thuc. i. 80. For her 
 subsequent condition, 334 B.C., cf. Aristot. Pol. ii. 6, 23. 
 
CH. V. § 
 B.C. 395 
 
 1S-19J. TREATY BETWEEN THEBES AND ATHENS 37 
 
 late empire. Yours was the proud assertion of naval empire 
 over subjects powerless by sea. Theirs is the selfish sway of 
 a minority asserting dominion over states equally well armed 
 with themselves, and many times more numerous. Here our 
 remarks end. Do not forget, however, men of Athens, that 
 as far as we can understand the matter, the field to which we 
 invite you is destined to prove far richer in blessings to your 
 own state of Athens than to ours, Thebes." 
 
 With these words the speaker ended. Among the Athenians, 
 speaker after speaker spoke in favour of the proposition,'^ and 
 finally a unanimous resolution was passed voting assistance 
 to the Thebans. Thrasybulus, in an answer communicating 
 the resolution, pointed out with pride that in spite of the 
 unfortified condition of Piraeus, Athens would not shrink 
 from repaying her debt of gratitude to Thebes with interest. 
 "You," he added, "refused to join in a campaign against us; 
 we are prepared to fight your batties with you against the 
 enemy, if he attacks you." Thus the Thebans returned home 
 and made preparations to defend themselves, whilst the Athen- 
 ians made ready to assist them. 
 
 And now the Lacedaemonians no longer hesitated. Pau- 
 sanias the king advanced into Boeotia with the home army 
 and the whole of the Peloponnesian contingents, saving only 
 the Corinthians, who declined to serve. Lysander, at the 
 head of the army supplied by the Phocians and Orchomenus 
 and the other strong places in those parts, had already reached 
 Haliartus, in front of Pausanias. Being arrived, he refused to 
 sit down quietly and await the arrival of the army from Lacedae- 
 mon, but at once marched with what troops he had against 
 the walls of Haliartus; and in the first instance he tried 
 to persuade the citizens to detach themselves from Thebes 
 and to assume autonomy, but the intention was cut short 
 by certain Thebans within the fortress. Whereupon Lysander 
 attacked the place. The Thebans were made aware,^ and 
 
 • For the allianca between Boeotia and Athens, B.C. 395, see Kohler, 
 C. I. A. ii. 6 ; Hicks, op. cit. 65 ; Lys. pro Man. § 13 ; Jebb, Att. Or. i. p. 
 247 ; and the two speeches of the same orator Lysias against Alcibiades (son 
 of the famous Alcibiades), on a. Charge of Desertion (Or. xiv.), and on a 
 Charge of Failure to Serve {Or. xv.) — Jebb, <^. cit. 1. p. 256 foil. 
 
 2 See Plut. Lys. xxviii. (Clough, iii. 137). 
 
38 HELLENICA — BK. III. {"'"e'cIms 
 
 hurried to the rescue with heavy infantry and cavalry. Then, 
 whether it was that the army of relief fell upon Lysander 
 unawares, or that with clear knowledge of his approach he 
 preferred to await the enemy, with intent to crush him, is 
 uncertain. This only is clear : a battle was fought beside 
 the walls, and a trophy still exists to mark the victory of the 
 townsfolk before the gates of Haliartus. Lysander was slain, 
 and the rest fled to the mountains, the Thebans hotly pursuing. 
 But when the pursuit had led them to some considerable 
 height, and they were fairly environed and hemmed in by 
 difficult ground and narrow space, then the heavy infantry 
 turned to bay, and greeted them with a shower of darts and 
 missiles. First two or three men dropped who had been fore- 
 most of the pursuers, and then upon the rest they poured 
 volleys of stones down the precipitous incline, and pressed 
 on their late pursuers with much zeal, until the Thebans 
 turned tail and quitted the deadly slope, leaving behind them 
 more than a couple of hundred corpses. 
 
 On this day, therefore, the hearts of the Thebans failed 
 them as they counted their losses and found them equal 
 to their gains ; but the next day they discovered that during 
 the night the Phocians and the rest of them had made off 
 to their several homes, whereupon they fell to pluming them- 
 selves highly on their achievement. But presently Pausanias 
 appeared at the head of the Lacedaemonian army, and once 
 more their dangers seemed to thicken round them. Deep, 
 we are told, was the silence and abasement which reigned in 
 their host. It was not until the third day, when the Athenians 
 arrived, 1 and were duly drawn up beside them, whilst Pausanias 
 neither attacked nor offered battle, that at length the con- 
 fidence of the Thebans took a larger range. Pausanias, on his 
 side, having summoned his generals and commanders of fifties,^ 
 deliberated whether to give battle or to content himself with 
 picking up the bodies of Lysander and of those who fell with 
 him, under cover of a truce. 
 
 The considerations which weighed on the minds of 
 Pausanias and the other high officers of the Lacedaemonians 
 
 ^ See Dem. On the Crown, 258. 
 
 ^ Lit. " polemarchs and pentecontdrs " — " colonels and lieutenants. " See 
 Pol. Lac. xi. (below, p. 315). 
 
b"c.39|°^""^} lysander slain ; pausanias exiled 39 
 
 seem to have been that Lysander was dead and his defeated 
 army in retreat ; while, as far as they themselves were con- 
 cerned, the Corinthian contingent was absolutely wanting, and 
 the zeal of the troops there present at the lowest ebb. They 
 further reasoned that the enemy's cavalry was numerous and 
 theirs the reverse ; whilst, weightiest of all, there lay the dead 
 right under the walls, so that if they had been ever so much 
 stronger it would have been no easy task to pick up the bodies 
 within range of the towers of Haliartus. On all these grounds 
 they determined to ask for a flag of truce, in order to pick up 
 the bodies of the slain. These, however, the Thebans were 
 not disposed to give back unless they agreed to retire from 
 their territory. The terms were gladly accepted by the Lace- 
 daemonians, who at once picked up the corpses of the 
 slain, and prepared to quit the territory of Boeotia. The 
 preliminaries were transacted, and the retreat commenced. 
 Despondent indeed was the demeanour of the Lacedaemon- 
 ians, in contrast with the insolent bearing of the Thebans, 
 who visited the slightest attempt to trespass on their private 
 estates with blows and chased the offenders back on to the 
 high roads unflinchingly. Such was the conclusion of the 
 campaign of the Lacedaemonians. 
 
 As for Pausanias, on his arrival at home he was tried on 
 the capital charge. The heads of indictment set forth that he 
 had failed to reach Haliartus as soon as Lysander, in spite of 
 his undertaking to be there on the same day : that, instead of 
 using any endeavour to pick up the bodies of the slain by 
 force of arms, he had asked for a flag of truce : that at an 
 earlier date, when he had got the popular government of 
 Athens fairly in his grip at Piraeus, he had suffered it to slip 
 through his fingers and escape. Besides this,^he failed to 
 present himself at the trial, and a sentence of death was 
 passed upon him. He escaped to Tegea and there died of 
 an illness whilst still in exile.^ Thus closes the chapter of 
 events enacted on the soil of Hellas. To return to Asia and 
 Agesilaus. 
 
 ^ Or, add, "as a further gravamen." 
 
 " For the bearing of this statement concerning Pausanias on the composi- 
 tion of the Hellenica, see Trans, vol. i. p. Ixiii. 
 
BOOK IV. I. 1-5 
 
 I. B.C. 395. — With the fall of the year Agesilaus reached 
 Phrygia — the Phrygia of Pharnabazus — and proceeded to 
 burn and harry the district City after city was taken, some 
 by force and some by voluntary surrender. To a proposal of 
 Spithridates to lead him into Paphlagonia,^ where he would 
 introduce the king of the country to him in conference and 
 obtain his alliance, he readily acceded. It was a long- 
 cherished ambition of Agesilaus to alienate some one of the 
 subject nations from the Persian monarch, and he pushed for- 
 ward eagerly. 
 
 On his arrival in Paphlagonia, King Otys^ came, and 
 an alliance was made. (The fact was, he had been sum- 
 moned by the king to Susa and had not gone up.) More than 
 that, through the persuasion of Spithridates he left behind as 
 a parting gift to Agesilaus one thousand cavalry and a couple 
 of thousand peltasts. Agesilaus was anxious in some way to 
 show his gratitude to Spithridates for such help, and spoke as 
 follows : — " Tell me," he said to Spithridates, " would you not 
 like to give your daughter to King Otys ? " " Much more 
 would I like to give her," he answered, " than he to take her 
 — I an outcast wanderer, and he lord of a vast territory and 
 forces." Nothing more was said at the time about the 
 marriage ; but when Otys was on the point of departure and 
 came to bid farewell, Agesilaus, having taken care that 
 Spithridates should be out of the way, in the presence of 
 the Thirty broached the subject:^ "Can you tell me, 
 Otys, to what sort of family Spithridates belongs ? " " To one 
 
 1 See Hartman (An. Xen. p. 339), who suggests, 'Otw airtf for aiv airQ. 
 ^ See A^es. iii. 4 (below, p. 255), where he is called Cotys ; also Trans, 
 vol. i. cxix. note 2. 3 /.e, "Spartan counsellors." 
 
b"c.39*^'''} AGESILAUS in PAPHLAGONIA 41 
 
 of the noblest in Persia," replied the king. Agesilaus : 
 "Have you observed how beautiful his son is?" Otys : 
 " To be sure ; last evening I was supping with him." Agesi- 
 laus : "And they tell me that his daughter is yet more 
 beautiful." Otys: "That may well be; beautiful she is." 
 Agesilaus: "For my part, as you have proved so good a 
 friend to us, I should like to advise you to take this girl 
 to wife. Not only is she very beautiful — and what more 
 should a husband ask for ? — but her father is of noble family, 
 and has a force at his back large enough to retaliate on 
 Pharnabazus for an injury. He has made the satrap, as you 
 see, a fugitive and a vagabond in his own vast territory. I 
 need not tell you," he added, "that a man who can so chastise 
 an enemy is well able to benefit a friend; and of this be 
 assured : by such an alliance you will gain not the connection 
 of Spithridates alone, but of myself and the Lacedaemonians, 
 and, as we are the leaders of Hellas, of the rest of Hellas also. 
 And what a wedding yours will be ! Were ever nuptials 
 celebrated on so grand a scale before ? Was ever bride led 
 home by such an escort of cavalry and light-armed troops 
 and heavy infantry, as shall escort your wife home to your 
 palace ? " Otys asked : " Is Spithridates of one mind with you 
 in this proposal ? " and Agesilaus answered : " In good sooth 
 he did not bid me make it for him. And for my own part in 
 the matter, though it is, I admit, a rare pleasure to requite 
 an enemy, yet I had far rather at any time discover some 
 good fortune for my friends." Otys: "Why not ask if 
 your project pleases Spithridates too?" Then Agesilaus, 
 turning to Herippidas and the rest of the Thirty, bade 
 them go to Spithridates; "and give him such good in- 
 struction," he added, "that he shall wish what we wish." 
 The Thirty rose and retired to administer their lesson. 
 But they seemed to tarry a long time, and Agesilaus asked : 
 "What say you. King Otys — shall we summon him hither 
 ourselves ? You, I feel certain, are better able to persuade 
 him than the whole Thirty put together." Thereupon Agesi- 
 laus summoned Spithridates and the others. As they came 
 forward, Herippidas promptly delivered himself thus: "I 
 spare you the details, Agesilaus. To make a long story short, 
 
42 
 
 HELLENICA — BK. IV. {''"' 'bxI^J^ 
 
 Spithridates says, ' He will be glad to do whatever pleases 
 you.'" Then Agesilaus, turning first to one and then to 
 the other ; " What pleases me," said he, " is that you should 
 wed a daughter — and you a wife — so happily.^ But," he 
 added, " I do not see how we can well bring home the 
 bride by land till spring." "No, not by land," the suitor 
 answered, " but you might, if you chose, conduct her home at 
 once by sea." Thereupon they exchanged pledges to ratify 
 the compact ; and so sent Otys rejoicing on his way. 
 
 Agesilaus, who had not failed to note the king's im- 
 patience, at once fitted out a ship of war and gave orders to 
 Callias, a Lacedaemonian, to escort the maiden to her new 
 home ; after which he himself began his march on Dascylium. 
 Here was the palace of Pharnabazus. It lay in the midst of 
 numerous villages, which were large and well stocked with 
 abundant supphes. Here, too, were most fair hunting grounds, 
 offering the hunter choice between enclosed parks^ and a wide 
 expanse of field and fell ; and all around there flowed a river 
 full of fish of every sort; and for the sportsman versed in 
 fowling, winged game in abundance. 
 
 In these quarters the Spartan king passed the winter, col- 
 lecting supplies for the army either on the spot or by a system 
 of forage. On one of these occasions the troops, who had 
 grown reckless and scornful of the enemy through long im- 
 munity from attack, whilst engaged in collecting supplies 
 were scattered over the flat country, when Pharnabazus fell 
 upon them with two scythe- chariots and about four hundred 
 horse. Seeing him thus advancing, the Hellenes ran together, 
 mustering possibly seven hundred men. The Persian did 
 not hesitate, but placing his chariots in front, supported 
 by himself and the cavalry, he gave the command to 
 charge. The scythe-chariots charged and scattered the com- 
 pact mass, and speedily the cavalry had laid low in the dust 
 about a hundred men, while the rest retreated hastily, under 
 cover of Agesilaus and his hoplites, who were fortunately near. 
 
 It was the third or fourth day after this that Spithridates 
 made a discovery : Pharnabazus lay encamped in Caue, a 
 
 ^ Or, "and may the wedding be blest I " 
 ^ Lit. "paradises." See Anai. I. ii. 7; Cyrop. I. iv. 11. 
 
ll'sgs^""^} PHARNABAZUS SURPRISED 43 
 
 large village not more than eighteen miles ^ away. This news 
 he lost no time in reporting to Herippidas. The latter, who 
 was longing for some brilliant exploit, begged Agesilaus to 
 furnish him with two thousand hoplites, an equal number of 
 peltasts, and some cavalry — the latter to consist of the horse- 
 men of Spithridates, the Paphlagonians, and as many Hellene 
 troopers as he might perchance persuade to follow him. 
 Having got the promise of them from Agesilaus, he proceeded 
 to take the auspices. Towards late afternoon he obtained 
 favourable omens and broke off the sacrifice. Thereupon he 
 ordered the troops to get their evening meal, after which they 
 were to present themselves in front of the camp. But by the 
 time darkness had closed in, not one half of them had come 
 out. To abandon the project was to call down the ridicule of 
 the rest of the Thirty. So he set out with the force to hand, 
 and about daylight, falling on the camp of Pharnabazus, put 
 many of his advanced guard of Mysians to the sword. The 
 men themselves made good their escape in different direc- 
 tions, but the camp was taken, and with it divers goblets 
 and other gear such as a man like Pharnabazus would have, 
 not to speak of much baggage and many baggage animals. 
 It was the dread of being surrounded and besieged, if he 
 should establish himself for long at any one spot, which in- 
 duced Pharnabazus to flee in gipsy fashion from point to 
 point over the country, carefully obliterating his encampments. 
 Now as the Paphlagonians and Spithridates brought back 
 the captured property, they were met by Herippidas with his 
 brigadiers and captains, who stopped them and^ relieved them 
 of all they had ; the object being to have as large a list as 
 possible of captures to deliver over to the officers who super- 
 intended the sale of booty.* This treatment the Asiatics 
 found intolerable. They deemed themselves at once injured 
 and insulted, got their kit together in the night, and made 
 off in the direction of Sardis to join Ariaeus without mistrust, 
 seeing that he too had revolted and gone to war with the 
 king. On Agesilaus himself no heavier blow fell during the 
 
 1 Lit. " one hundred and sixty stades.'' 
 
 ■^ Or, " captains posted to intercept them, who relieved ..." See Anai, 
 IV. i. 14 (Trans, vol. i. p. 177). 
 
 3 See Pol. Lac. xiii. 11 (below, p. 322), for these officers. 
 
44 HELLENICA BK. IV. {''"' ' b!c!^315 
 
 whole campaign than the desertion of Spithridates and Mega- 
 bates and the Paphlagonians. 
 
 Now there was a certain man of Cyzicus, Apollophanes 
 by name ; he was an old friend of Pharnabazus, and at this 
 time had become a friend also of Agesilaus.^ This man 
 informed Agesilaus that he thought he could bring about a 
 meeting between him and Pharnabazus, which might tend to 
 friendship ; and having so got ear of him, he obtained pledges 
 of good faith between his two friends, and presented himself 
 with Pharnabazus at the trysting-place, where Agesilaus with 
 the Thirty around him awaited their coming, reclined upon a 
 grassy sward. Pharnabazus presently arrived clad in costliest 
 apparel ; but just as his attendants were about to spread at 
 his feet the carpets on which the Persians delicately seat 
 themselves, he was touched with a sense of shame at his own 
 luxury in sight of the simplicity of Agesilaus, and he also 
 without further ceremony seated himself on the bare ground. 
 And first the two bade one another hail, and then Pharna- 
 bazus stretched out his right hand and Agesilaus his to meet 
 him, and the conversation began. Pharnabazus, as the elder 
 of the two, spoke first; " Agesilaus," he said, " and all you 
 Lacedaemonians here present, while you were at war with the 
 Athenians I was your friend and ally ; it was I who furnished 
 the wealth that made your navy strong on sea ; on land I 
 fought on horseback by your side, and pursued your enemies 
 into the sea.^ As to duplicity like that of Tissaphernes, I 
 challenge you to accuse me of having played you false by 
 word or deed. Such have I ever been ; and in return how 
 am I treated by yourselves to-day? — in such sort that I 
 cannot even sup in m^ own country unless, like the wild 
 animals, I pick up the scraps you chance to leave. The 
 beautiful palaces which my father left me as an heirloom, 
 the parks ^ full of trees and beasts of the chase in which my 
 heart rejoiced, lie before my eyes hacked to pieces, burnt to 
 ashes. Maybe I do not comprehend the first principles of 
 justice and holiness ; do you then explain to me how all this 
 resembles the conduct of men who know how to repay a 
 
 1 Ages. V. 4 I 'Plut. Ages. xi. (Clough, iv. p. 14). 
 ^ See ffell. I. i. 6 (Trans, vol. i. p. 2). ^ Lit. "paradises.'' 
 
B.C. 393 
 
 8 33-37 1 AGESILAUS AND PHARNABAZUS 45 
 
 simple debt of gratitude." He ceased, and the Thirty were 
 ashamed before him and kept silence.^ 
 
 At length, after some pause, Agesilaus spoke. " I think 
 you are aware," he said, " Pharnabazus, that within the states 
 of Hellas the folk of one community contract relations of 
 friendship and hospitality with one another j^ but if these 
 states should go to war, then each man will side with his 
 fatherland, and friend will find himself pitted against friend 
 in the field of battle, and, if it so betide, the one may even 
 deal the other his death-blow. So too we to-day, being at war 
 with your sovereign lord the king, must needs regard as our 
 enemy all that he calls his; not but that with yourself per- 
 sonally we should esteem it our high fortune to be friends. 
 If indeed it were merely an exchange of service, — were you 
 asked to give up your lord the king and to take us as your 
 masters in his stead, I could not so advise you ; but the fact 
 is, by joining with us it is in your power to-day to bow your 
 head to no man, to call no man master, to reap the pro- 
 duce of your own domain in freedom — freedom, which to my 
 mind is more precious than all riches. Not that we bid you 
 to become a beggar for the sake of freedom, but rather to use 
 our friendship to increase not the king's authority, but your 
 own, by subduing those who are your fellow-slaves to-day, and 
 who to-morrow shall be your wiUing subjects. Well, then, 
 freedom given and wealth added — what more would you desire 
 to fill the cup of happiness to overflowing?" Pharnabazus 
 replied: "Shall I tell you plainly what I will do?" "That 
 were but kind and courteous on your part," he answered. 
 "Thus it stands with me, then," said Pharnabazus. "If the 
 king should send another general, and if he should wish to 
 rank me under this new man's orders, I, for my part, am 
 willing to accept your friendship and alliance ; but if he offers 
 me the supreme command — why, then, I plainly tell you, there 
 is a certain something in the very name ambition which whispers 
 
 1 Theopompus of Chios, the historian {I. B.c. 378, Jl. B.C. 333), "in the 
 eleventh book [of his SiJi/Tafis 'EWijKtKuv] borrowed Xenophon's lively 
 account of the interview between Agesilaus and Pharnabazus (Apollonius apud 
 Euseb. B, Praef. Bvang. p. 465)." See Hist. Lit. of Anc. Gr., MUUer and 
 Donaldson, ii. p. 380. 
 
 2 Or, add, " we call them ^erf/Wewi^j. " 
 
46 HELLENICA — BK. IV. {"a'agMw 
 
 me that I shall war against you to the best of my ability." ^ 
 When he heard that, Agesilaus seized the satrap's hand, ex- 
 claiming: "Ah, best of mortals, may the day arrive which 
 sends us such a friend ! Of one thing rest assured. This 
 instant I leave your territory with what haste I may, and for 
 the future — even in case of war — as long as we can find foes 
 elsewhere our hands shall hold aloof from you and yours." 
 
 And with these words he broke up the meeting. Pharna- 
 bazus mounted his horse and rode away, but his son by Para- 
 pita, who was still in the bloom of youth, lingered behind ; 
 then, running up to Agesilaus, he exclaimed : " See, I choose 
 you as my friend." "And I accept you," replied the king. 
 "Remember, then," the lad answered, and with the word 
 presented the beautiful javelin in his hand to Agesilaus, who 
 received it, and unclasping a splendid trapping ^ which his 
 secretary, Idaeus, had round the neck of his charger, he 
 gave it in return to the youth ; whereupon the boy leapt on 
 his horse's back and galloped after his father.^ At a later date, 
 during the absence of Pharnabazus abroad, this same youth, 
 the son of Parapita, was deprived of the government by his 
 brother and driven into exile. Then Agesilaus took great 
 interest in him, and as he had a strong attachment to the son 
 of Eualces, an Athenian, Agesilaus did all he could to have 
 this friend of his, who was the tallest of the boys, admitted 
 to the two hundred yards race at Olympia. 
 
 B.C. 394. — But to return to the actual moment. Agesilaus 
 was as good as his word, and at once marched out of the territory 
 of Pharnabazus. The season verged on spring. Reaching the 
 plain of Thebfe,* he encamped in the neighbourhood of the 
 temple of Artemis of Astyra,® and there employed himself in 
 
 ' Or, "so subtle a force, it seems, is the love of honour that." Grote, 
 H. G. ix. 386 ; cf Herod, iii. 57 for "ambition," ^iXortjufa. 
 
 ^ ^d\apa, bosses of gold, silver, or other metals, cast or chased, with 
 some appropriate device in relief, which were worn as an ornamental trapping 
 for horses, affixed to the head-stall or to a throat-collar, or to a martingale 
 over the chest. — Rich's Companion to Lat. Diet, and Greek Lex. , s. v. 
 
 ' See Grote, ix. 387 ; Plut. Ages. xiv. (Clough, iv. 15) ; Ages. iii. 5 (be- 
 low, p. 255). The incident is idealised in the Cyrop. I. iv. a6 foil. See 
 Lyra Heroica : cxxv. A Ballad of East and West — the incident of the ' ' tur- 
 quoise-studded rein." 
 
 ^ Anat. VII. viii. 7 (Trans, vol. i. p. 315). 
 
 " Vide Strab. xlii. 606, 613. Seventy stades from Theb4. 
 
8"-s;V.cT''394"} RECALL OF AGESILAUS 47 
 
 collecting troops from every side, in addition to those which 
 he already had, so as to form a complete armament. These 
 preparations were pressed forward with a view to penetrating 
 as far as possible into the interior. He was persuaded that 
 every tribe or nation placed in his rear might be considered 
 as alienated from the king. 
 
 II. — Such were the concerns and projects of Agesilaus. 
 Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians at home were quite alive to 
 the fact that moneys had been sent into Hellas, and that the 
 bigger states were leagued together to declare war against 
 them. It was hard to avoid the conclusion that Sparta her- 
 self was in actual danger and that a campaign was inevitable. 
 While busy, therefore, with preparations themselves, they lost 
 no time in despatching Epicydidas to fetch Agesilaus. That 
 offiper, on his arrival, explained the position of affairs, and 
 concluded by delivering a peremptory summons of the state 
 recalling him to the assistance of the fatherland without delay. 
 The announcement could not but come as a grievous blow to 
 Agesilaus, as he reflected on the vanished hopes, and the 
 honours plucked from his grasp. Still, he summoned the 
 allies and announced to them the contents of the despatch 
 from home. "To aid our fatherland," he added, "is an im- 
 perative duty. If, however, matters turn out well on the other 
 side, rely upon it, friends and allies, I will not forget you, but 
 I shall be back anon to Carry out your wishes." When they 
 heard the announcement many wept, and they passed a resolu- 
 tion, one and all, to join Agesilaus in assisting Lacedaemon ; 
 if matters turned out well there, they undertook to take him 
 as their leader and come back again to Asia ; and so they fell 
 to making preparations to follow him. 
 
 Agesilaus, on his side, determined to leave behind him 
 in Asia Euxenus as governor, and with him a garrison number- 
 ing no less than four thousand troops, which would enable 
 him to protect the states in Asia. But for himself, as on 
 the one hand he could see that the majority of the soldiers 
 would far rather stay behind than undertake service against 
 fellow-Hellenes, and on the other hand he wished to take as 
 fine and large an army with him as he could, he offered 
 prizes first to that state or city which should contribute 
 
48 HELLENICA — BK. IV. {""' "b.c. mJ 
 
 the best corps of troops, and secondly to that captain of 
 mercenaries who should join the expedition with the best 
 equipped battalion of heavy infantry, archers, and light 
 infantry. On the same principle he informed the chief 
 cavalry officers that the general who succeeded in presenting 
 the best accoutred and best mounted regiment would receive 
 from himself some victorious distinction. " The final adjudi- 
 cation," he said, " would not be made until they had crossed 
 from Asia into Europe and had reached the Chersonese ; and 
 this with a view to impress upon them that the prizes were 
 not for show but for real campaigners." ^ These consisted for 
 the most part of infantry or cavalry arms and accoutrements 
 tastefully finished, besides which there were chaplets of gold. 
 The whole, useful and ornamental alike, must have cost nearly 
 a thousand pounds,* but as the result of this outlay, no doubt, 
 arms of great value were procured for the expedition.* When 
 the Hellespont was crossed the judges were appointed. The 
 Lacedaemonians were represented by Menascus, Herippidas, 
 and Orsippus, and the allies by one member from each state. 
 As soon as the adjudication was complete, the army com- 
 menced its march with Agesilaus at its head, following the 
 very route taken by the great king when he invaded Hellas. 
 
 Meanwhile the ephors had called out the ban, and as 
 Agesipolis was still a boy, the state called upon Aristodemus, 
 who was of the royal family and guardian of the young 
 king, to lead the expedition ; and now that the Lacedae- 
 monians were ready to take the field and the forces of their 
 opponents were also duly mustered, the latter met* to consider 
 the most advantageous method of doing battle. 
 
 Timolaus of Corinth spoke : " Soldiers of the allied 
 forces," he said, "the growth of Lacedaemon seems to me 
 just like that of some mighty river — at its sources small and 
 easily crossed, but as it farther and farther advances, other 
 
 V ^ Or, ' ' that the perfection of equipment was regarded as anticipative of 
 actual service in the field." Cobet suggests for eixpivetv Stevxptvetv ; cf Oecon. 
 viii. 6. ^ Lit. " at least four talents "= £t)Ti. 
 
 ' Or, ' ' beyond which, the arms and material to equip the expedition were 
 no doubt highly costly. " 
 
 ^ At Corinth. See above. III. iv. ii, p. 27 ; below, V. iv. 6r, p. 135, 
 where the victory of Naxos is described but not localised. 
 
™c'.394 ""'} CONGRESS AT CORINTH 49 
 
 rivers discharge themselves into its channel, and its stream 
 grows ever more formidable. So is it with the Lacedae- 
 monians. Take them at the starting-point and they are but 
 a single community, but as they advance and attach city after 
 city they grow more numerous and more resistless. I observe 
 that when people wish to take wasps' nests — if they try to 
 capture the creatures on the wing, they are liable to be attacked 
 by half the hive ; whereas, if they apply fire to them ere they 
 leave their homes, they will master them without scathe them- 
 selves. On this principle I think it best to bring about the 
 battle within the hive itself, or, short of that, as close to 
 Lacedaemon as possible."^ 
 
 The arguments of the speaker were deemed sound, and a 
 resolution was passed in that sense ; but before it could be 
 carried out there were various arrangements to be made. 
 There was the question of headship. Then, again, what was 
 the proper depth of line to be given to the different army 
 corps? for if any particular state or states gave too great a 
 depth to their battle line they would enable the enemy to 
 turn their flank. Whilst they were debating these points, the 
 Lacedaemonians had incorporated the men of Tegea and the 
 men of Mantinea, and were ready to debouch into the bi- 
 marine region.^ And as the two armies advanced almost at 
 the same time, the Corinthians and the rest reached the 
 Nemea,' and the Lacedaemonians and their allies occupied 
 Sicyon. The Lacedaemonians entered by Epieiceia, and at 
 first were severely handled by the light-armed troops of the 
 enemy, who discharged stones and arrows from the vantage- 
 ground on their right ; but as they dropped down upon the 
 Gulf of Corinth they advanced steadily onwards through the 
 flat country, felling timber and burning the fair land. Their 
 rivals, on their side, after a certain forward movement,* paused 
 
 ' Or, " if not actually at Lacedaemon, then at least as near as possible to 
 the hornets' nest." 
 
 ^ I.e. "the shores of the Corinthian Gulf" Or, "upon the strand or 
 coast road or coast land of Achaia" [aliter tjjc al-iuiKiiv (?) the Strand of the 
 Corinthian Gulf, the old name of this part of Achaia]. 
 
 ' Or, "the district of Nemea. " 
 
 * iirOShvTi^, but see Grote {H. G. ix. 425 note), who prefers d7re\94i'Tes= 
 retreated and encamped. 
 
 VOL. II E 
 
56 HELLENICA — BK. IV. {""' "■b?c!'394 
 
 and encamped, placing the ravine in front of them ; but still 
 the Lacedaemonians advanced, and it was only when they were 
 within ten furlongs ^ of the hostile position that they followed 
 suit and encamped, and then they remained quiet. 
 
 And here I may state the numbers on either side. The 
 Lacedaemonian heavy-armed infantry levies amounted to six 
 thousand men. Of Eleians, Triphylians, Acroreians, and 
 Lasionians, there must have laeen nearly three thousand, with 
 fifteen hundred Sicyonians, while Epidaurus, Troezen, Her- 
 mione, and Halieis ^ contributed at least another three thou- 
 sand. To these heavy infantry troops must be added six hun- 
 dred Lacedaemonian cavalry, a body of Cretan archers about 
 three hundred strong, besides another force of slingers, at least 
 four hundred in all, consisting of Marganians, Letrinians, and 
 Amphidolians. The men of Phlius were not represented. 
 Their plea was they were keeping "holy truce." That was 
 the total of the forces on the Lacedaemonian side. There 
 were collected on the enemy's side six thousand Athenian 
 heavy infantry, with about, as was stated, seven thousand 
 Argives, and in the absence of the men of Orchomenus some- 
 thing like five thousand Boeotians. There were besides three 
 thousand Corinthians, and again from the whole of Euboea 
 at least three thousand. These formed the heavy infantry. 
 Of cavalry the Boeotians, again in the absence of the Orcho- 
 menians, furnished eight hundred, the Athenians ^ six hundred, 
 the Chalcidians of Euboea one hundred, the Opuntian Locrians * 
 fifty. Their light troops, including those of the Corinthians, 
 were more numerous, as the Ozolian Locrians, the Melians, 
 and Acarnanians ^ helped to swell their numbers. 
 
 Such was the strength of the two armies. The Boeotians, 
 as long as they occupied the left wing, showed no anxiety to 
 join battle, but after a rearrangement which gave them the 
 
 1 Lit. ' ' ten stades. " For the numbers below, see Grote, I/. G. ix. 422, 
 note 1. 
 
 " Halieis, a seafaring people (Strabo, viii. 373) and town on the coast 
 of Hermionis; Herod, vii. 137; Thuc. i, 105, ii. 56, iv. 45; Diod. xi. 78; 
 ffell. VI. ii. 3 (below, p. 144). 
 
 ' For a treaty between Athens and Eretria, B. c. 395, see Hicks, 66 ; and 
 below, ffeU. IV. iii. 15 ; Hicks, 68, 69 ; Diod. xiv. 82. 
 
 * See above. Hell. III. v. 3, p. 33, note i. 
 
 " See below, Hell. IV. vi. i ; ii. vii. 1 ; VI. v. 23, p. 176, note 2. 
 
b"c. 394 '^"''} BATTLE OF THE NEMEA 51 
 
 right, placing the Athenians opposite to the Lacedaemonians, 
 and themselves opposite the Achaeans, at once, we are told,i 
 the victims proved favourable, and the order was passed along 
 the lines to prepare for immediate action. The Boeotians, in 
 the first place, abandoning the rule of sixteen deep, chose to 
 give their division the fullest possible depth, and, moreover, 
 kept veering more and more to their right, with the intention 
 of overlapping their opponents' flank. The consequence was 
 that the Athenians, to avoid being absolutely severed, were 
 forced to follow suit, and edged towards the right, though 
 they recognised the risk they ran of having their flank turned. 
 For a while the Lacedaemonians had no idea of the advance 
 of the enemy, owing to the rough nature of the ground,^ but 
 the notes of the paean at length announced to them the fact, 
 and without an instant's delay the answering order " prepare 
 for battle " ran along the different sections of their army. As 
 soon as their troops were drawn up, according to the tactical 
 disposition of the various generals of foreign brigades, the 
 order was passed to " follow the lead," and then the Lacedae- 
 monians on their side also began edging to their right, and 
 eventually stretched out their wing so far that only six out 
 of the ten regimental divisions of the Athenians confronted 
 the Lacedaemonians, the other four finding themselves face to 
 face with the men of Tegea. And now when they were less 
 than a furlong ^ apart, the Lacedaemonians sacrificed in cus- 
 tomary fashion a kid to the huntress goddess,* and advanced 
 upon their opponents, wheeling round their overlapping columns 
 to outflank his left. As the two armies closed, the allies of Lace- 
 daemon were as a rule fairly borne down by their opponents. 
 The men of Pellenfe alone, steadily confronting the Thespiaeans, 
 held their ground, and the dead of either side strewed the 
 position.^ As to the Lacedaemonians themselves : crushing 
 that portion of the Athenian troops which lay immediately in 
 front of them, and at the same time encircling them with 
 their overlapping right, they slew man after man of them ; and, 
 
 1 Or, "then they lost no time in discovering that the victims proved 
 favourable." ' See Grote, If. G. ix. 428; cf. Ijjs. fro Mant. 20. 
 
 ' Lit. "a stade." 
 
 * Lit. " our Lady of the Chase." See Pol. Lac. xiii. 8, p. 321. 
 ' Lit. "men on either side kept dropping at their post." 
 
S2 HELLENICA BK. IV. {cH.iiLs'.-'^'ilc.'sM 
 
 absolutely unscathed themselves, their unbroken columns con- 
 tinued their march, and so passed behind the four remaining 
 divisions ^ of the Athenians before these latter had returned 
 from their own victorious pursuit. Whereby the four divisions 
 in question also emerged from battle intact, except for the 
 casualties inflicted by the Tegeans in the first clash of the 
 engagement. The troops next encountered by the Lacedae- 
 monians were the Argives retiring. These they fell foul, of, 
 and the senior polemarch was just on the point of closing 
 with them "breast to breast" when some one, it is said, 
 shouted, "Let their front ranks pass." This was done, and 
 as the Argives raced past, their enemies thrust at their un- 
 protected ^ sides, and killed many of them. The Corinthians 
 were caught in the same way as they retired, and when their 
 turn had passed, once more the Lacedaemonians Ht upon 
 a portion of the Theban division retiring from the pursuit, 
 and strewed the field with their dead. The end of it all 
 was that the defeated troops in the first instance made for 
 safety to the walls of their city, but the Corinthians within 
 closed the gates, whereupon the troops took up quarters once 
 again in their old encampment. The Lacedaemonians on 
 their side withdrew to the point at which they first closed with 
 the enemy, and there set up a trophy of victory. So the 
 battle ended. 
 
 III. — Meanwhile Agesilaus was rapidly hastening with his 
 reinforcements from Asia. He had reached Amphipolislvhen 
 Dercylidas brought the news of this fresh victory of the 
 Lacedaemonians ; their own loss had been eight men, that 
 of the enemy considerable. It was his business at the same 
 time to explain that not a few of the allies had fallen also. 
 Agesilaus asked, "Would it not be opportune, Dercylidas, if 
 the cities that have furnished us with contingents could hear 
 of this victory as soon as possible ? " And Dercylidas replied : 
 " The news at any rate is likely to put them in better heart" 
 Then said the king : " As you were an eye-witness there could 
 hardly be a better bearer of the news than yourself." To this 
 proposal Dercylidas lent a willing ear — to travel abroad * was 
 
 1 Lit. "tribes." ^ I.e, "right." 
 
 ' See Pol, Lac. xiv. 4 (below, p. 322). 
 
b"c.394^°"^} agesilaus in thessaly 
 
 S3 
 
 his special delight, — and he replied, " Yes, under your orders." 
 " Then you have my orders," the king said. " And you may 
 further inform the states from myself that we have not for- 
 gotten our promise ; if all goes well over here we shall be 
 with them again ere long." So Dercylidas set off on his 
 travels, in the first instance to the Hellespont ;^ while Agesilaus 
 crossed Macedonia and arrived in Thessaly. And now the 
 men of Larissa, Crannon, Scotussa, and Pharsalus, who were 
 allies of the Boeotians — and in fact all the Thessalians except 
 the exiles for the time being — hung on his heels ^ and did him 
 damage. 
 
 For some while he marched his troops in a hollow square,* 
 posting half his cavalry in front and half on his rear ;' but 
 finding that the Thessalians checked his passage by repeated 
 charges from behind, he strengthened his rearguard by sending 
 round the cavalry from his van, with the exception of his own 
 personal escort.* The two armies stood confronted in battle 
 order ; but the Thessalians, not liking the notion of a cavalry 
 engagement with heavy infantry, turned, and step by step re- 
 treated, while the others followed them with considerable 
 caution. Agesilaus, perceiving the error under which both 
 alike laboured, now sent his own personal guard of stalwart 
 troopers with orders that both they and the rest of the horse- 
 men should charge at full gallop,^ and not give the enemy the 
 chance to recoil. The Thessalians were taken aback by this 
 unexpected onslaught, and half of them never thought of 
 wheeling about, whilst those who did essay to do so pre- 
 sented the flanks of their horses to the charge," and were 
 made prisoners. Still Polycharmus of Pharsalus, the general 
 in command of their cavalry, rallied his men for an instant, 
 and fell, sword in hand, with his immediate followers. This was 
 the signal for a flight so precipitate on the part of the Thes- 
 salians, that their dead and dying lined the road, and prisoners 
 were taken ; nor was any halt made until they reached Mount 
 
 1 See below, Hell. IV. viii. 3, p. 77. 
 ^ See Ages. ii. li, p. 246 ; Grote, H. G. ix. 420, note 2. 
 3 See Rilstow and Kochly, § 187 foil. 
 ■• See Thuc. v. 72 ; Herod, vi. 56, viii. 124. 
 
 ^ Lit. ' ' and bids them pass the order to the others and themselves to 
 charge," etc. " See Horsemanship, vii. 16 ; Polyb. iv. 8. 
 
54 HELLENICA — BK. IV. {""■ "b.I.%1\ 
 
 Narthacius. Here, then, midway between Pras and Nartha- 
 cius, Agesilaus set up a trophy, halting for the moment, in 
 unfeigned satisfaction at the exploit. It was from antagonists 
 who prided themselves on their cavalry beyond everything 
 that he had wrested victory, with a body of cavalry of his own 
 mustering. Next day he crossed the mountains of Achaea 
 Phthiotis, and for the future continued his march through 
 friendly territory until he reached the confines of Boeotia. 
 
 Here, at the entrance of that territory, the sun (in 
 partial eclipse) ■■• seemed to appear in a crescent shape, and 
 the news reached him of the defeat of the Lacedae- 
 monians in a naval engagement, and of the death of the 
 admiral Peisander. Details of the disaster were not wanting. 
 The engagement of the hostile fleets took place off Cnidus. 
 Pharnabazus, the Persian admiral, was present with the 
 Phoenician fleet, and in front of him were ranged the ships of 
 the Hellenic squadron under Conon. Peisander had ventured 
 to draw out his squadron to meet the combined fleets, though 
 the numerical inferiority of his fleet to that of the Hellenic 
 navy under Conon was conspicuous, and he had the mortifi- 
 cation of seeing the allies who formed his left wing take to 
 flight immediately. He himself came to close quarters with 
 the enemy, and was driven on shore, on board his trireme, 
 under pressure of the hostile rams. The rest, as many as 
 were driven to shore, deserted their ships and sought safety 
 as best they could in the territory of Cnidus. The admiral 
 alone stuck to his ship, and fell sword in hand. 
 
 It was impossible for Agesilaus not to feel depressed by 
 those tidings at first ; on further reflection, however, it seemed 
 to him that the moral quality of more than half his troops well 
 entitled them to share in the sunshine of success, but in the 
 day of trouble, when things looked black, he was not bound 
 to take them into his confidence. Accordingly he turned 
 round and gave out that he had received news that Peisander 
 was dead, but that he had fallen in the arms of victory in a 
 sea-fight ; and suiting his action to the word, he proceeded to 
 offer sacrifice in return for good tidings,^ distributing portions 
 
 1 B.C. 394, August 14. 
 
 " ' ' Splendide mendax. " For the ethics of the matter, see Mem, IV. ii. 
 17 ; Cyrop. I. vi. 31. 
 
b"c.394^"*"'} battle of coronea 55 
 
 of the victims to a large number of recipients. So it befell 
 that in the first skirmish with the enemy the troops of Agesi- 
 laus gained the upper hand, in consequence of the report that 
 the Lacedaemonians had won a victory by sea. 
 
 To confront Agesilaus stood an army composed of the 
 Boeotians, Athenians, Argives, Corinthians, Aenianians, Eu- 
 boeans, and both divisions of the Locrians. Agesilaus on his 
 side had with him a division ^ of Lacedaemonians, which had 
 crossed from Corinth, also half the division from Orchomenus ; 
 besides which there were the neodamodes ^ from Lacedaemon, 
 on service with him already; and in addition to these the 
 foreign contingent under Herippidas ; * and again the quota 
 furnished by the Hellenic cities in Asia, with others from the 
 cities in Europe which he had brought over during his pro- 
 gress ; and lastly, there were additional levies from the spot — 
 Orchomenian and Phocian heavy infantry. In light-armed 
 troops, it must be admitted, the numbers told heavily in 
 favour of Agesilaus, but the cavalry * on both sides were fairly 
 balanced. 
 
 Such were the forces of either party. I will describe the 
 battle itself, if only on account of certain features which dis- 
 tinguish it from the battles of our time. The two armies met 
 on the plain of Coronea — the troops of Agesilaus advancing 
 from the Cephisus, the Thebans and their allies from the 
 slopes of Helicon. Agesilaus commanded his own right in 
 person, with the men of Orchomenus on his extreme left. 
 The Thebans formed their own right, while the Argives held 
 their left. As they drew together, for a while deep silence 
 reigned on either side ; but when they were not more than a 
 furlong ^ apart, with a loud hurrah « the Thebans, quickening 
 to a run, rushed furiously ' to close quarters ; and now there 
 was barely a hundred yards ^ breadth between the armies, when 
 Herippidas with his foreign brigade, and with them the 
 lonians, Aeolians, and Hellespontines, darted out from the 
 Spartans' battle-lines to greet their onset. One and all of the 
 
 ^ Lit. " a mora" ; for the numbers, see Ages. ii. 6 (below, p. 247) ; Plut. 
 Ages. 17; Grote, H. G. ix. 433. ^ I.e. " enfranchised helots. " 
 
 ^ See Ages. ii. 10, 11 ; and above. Hell. IIL iv. 20. 
 * See Hicks, op. cit. 68. " Lit. "a stade." " Lit. "Alalah." 
 
 7 Like a tornado. ' Lit. " about three plethra. " 
 
S6 HELLENICA BK. IV. {™- '"b^c^'s," 
 
 above played their part in the first rush forward ; in another 
 instant they were^ within spear-thrust of the enemy, and 
 had routed the section immediately before them. As to 
 the Argives, they actually declined to receive the attack of 
 Agesilaus, and betook themselves in flight to Helicon. At 
 this moment some of the foreign division were already in the 
 act of crowning Agesilaus with the wreath of victory, when 
 some one brought him word that the Thebans had cut 
 through the Orchomenians and were in among the baggage 
 train. At this the Spartan ' general immediately turned his 
 army right about and advanced against them. The Thebans, 
 on their side, catching sight of their allies withdrawn in 
 flight to the base of Helicon, and anxious to get across 
 to their own friends, formed in close order and tramped 
 forward stoutly. 
 
 At this point no one will dispute the valour of Agesilaus, 
 but he certainly did not choose the safest course. It was 
 open to him to make way for the enemy to pass, which 
 done, he might have hung upon his heels and mastered his 
 rear. This, however, he refused to do, preferring to crash 
 full front against the Thebans. Thereupon, with close in- 
 terlock of shield wedged in with shield, they shoved, they 
 fought, they dealt death,^ they breathed out life, till at last 
 a portion of the Thebans broke their way through towards 
 Helicon, but paid for that departure by the loss of many 
 lives. And now the victory of Agesilaus was fairly won, and 
 he himself, wounded, had been carried back to the main line, 
 when a party of horse came galloping up to tell him that 
 something like eighty of the enemy, under arms, were shelter- 
 ing under the temple, and they asked what they ought to do. 
 
 ^ Or, "AU these made up the attacking columns . . . and coming 
 within . . . routed ..." 
 
 " Or, ' ' they slew, they were slain. " In illustration of this famous passage, 
 twice again worked up in Ages. ii. 12 (below, p. 249), and Cyrop. VII. i. 38, 
 commented on by Longinus, Trepl ii^ous, 19, and copied by Dio Cassius, 47, 45, 
 I venture to quote a passage from Mr. Rudyard Kipling, With the Main 
 Guard, p. 57, Mulvaney loquitur: "The Tyrone was pushin' an' pushin' in, 
 an' our men was sweerin' at thim, an' Crook was workin' away in front av us 
 all, his sword-arm swingin' like a pump-handle an' his revolver spittin' like a 
 cat. But the strange thing av ut was the quiet that lay upon. 'Twas like 
 a fight in a dhrame — ey.cipt for thim that wus dead." 
 
cH: "iv:s/i'^?0394} AGESILAUS AT DELPHI 57 
 
 Agesilaus, though he was covered with wounds, did not, for 
 all that, forget his duty to God. He gave orders to let them 
 retire unscathed, and would not suffer any injury to be done 
 to them. And now, seeing it was already late, they took 
 their suppers and retired to rest. 
 
 But with the morning Gylis the polemarch received orders 
 to draw up the troops in battle order, and to set up a trophy, 
 every man crowned with a wreath in honour of the god, and 
 all the pipers piping. Thus they busied themselves in the 
 Spartan camp. On their side the Thebans sent heralds asking 
 to bury their dead, under a truce ; and in this wise a truce 
 was made. Agesilaus withdrew to Delphi, where on arrival he 
 offered to the god a tithe of the produce of his spoils — no less 
 than a hundred talents.^ Gylis the polemarch meanwhile with- 
 drew into Phocis at the head of his troops, and from that 
 district made a hostile advance into Locris. Here nearly a 
 whole day was spent by the men in freely helping themselves 
 to goods and chattels out of the villages and pillaging the 
 corn; 2 but as it drew towards evening the troops began to 
 retire, with the Lacedaemonians in the rear. The Locrians 
 hung upon their heels with a heavy pelt of stones and javelins. 
 Thereupon the Lacedaemonians turned short round and gave 
 chase, laying some of their assailants low. Then the Locrians 
 ceased clinging to their rear, but continued their volleys from 
 the vantage-ground above. The Lacedaemonians again made 
 efforts to pursue their persistent foes even up the slope. At 
 last darkness descended on them, and as they retired man 
 after man dropped, succumbing to the sheer difificulty of the 
 ground; some in their inability to see what lay in front, 
 or else shot down by the enemy's missiles. It was then that 
 Gylis the polemarch met his end, as also Pelles, who was 
 on his personal staff, and the whole of the Spartans present 
 without exception — eighteen or thereabouts — perished, either 
 crushed by stones or succumbing to other wounds. Indeed, 
 except for timely aid brought from the camp where the men 
 were supping, the chances are not a man would have escaped 
 to tell the tale. 
 
 IV, This incidentended the campaign. The army as a whole 
 
 1 =^25,000 nearly. * Or, " not to speak of provisions." 
 
58 HELLENICA — BK. IV. {^c.'mI-ssj 
 
 was disbanded, the contingents retiring to their several cities, and 
 Agesilaus home across the Gulf by sea. 
 
 B.C. 393. — Subsequently^ the war between the two parties 
 recommenced. The Athenians, Boeotians, Argives, and the 
 other allies made Corinth the base of their operations j the 
 Lacedaemonians and their allies held Sicyon as theirs. As to 
 the Corinthians, they had to face the fact that, owing to their 
 proximity to the seat of war, it was their territory which was 
 ravaged and their people who perished, while the rest of the 
 aUies abode in peace and reaped the fruits of their lands in 
 due season. Hence the majority of them, including the better 
 class, desired peace, and gathering into knots they indoctrinated 
 one another with these views. 
 
 B.C. 392.^^0n the other hand, it could hardly escape 
 the notice of the allied powers, the Argives, Athenians, and 
 Boeotians, as also those of the Corinthians themselves who 
 had received a share of the king's moneys, or for whatever 
 reason were most directly interested in the war, that if they did 
 not promptly put the peace party out of the way, ten chances 
 to one the old laconising policy would again hold the field. 
 It seemed there was nothing for it bul the remedy of the knife. 
 There was a refinement of wickedness in the plan adopted. 
 With most people the life even of a legally condemned criminal 
 is held sacred during a solemn season, but these men deliber- 
 ately selected the last day of the Eucleia,^ when they might 
 reckon on capturing more victims in the crowded market- 
 place, for their murderous purposes. Their agents were sup- 
 plied with the names of those to be got rid of, the signal was 
 given, and then, drawing their daggers, they fell to work. Here 
 a man was struck down standing in the centre of a group of 
 talkers, and there another seated; a third while peaceably 
 enjoying himself at the play ; a fourth actually whilst officiating 
 as a judge at some dramatic contest.* When what was taking 
 place became known, there was a general flight on the part of 
 the better classes. Some fled to the images of the gods in 
 the market-place, others to the altars ; and here these un- 
 hallowed miscreants, ringleaders and followers alike, utterly 
 
 ^ B.C. 393. See Grote, ix. p. 455, note 2 foil. ; Hell. IV. viii. 7 (below, p. 79). 
 ^ Others assign the incidents of this whole chapter iv. to B.C. 393. 
 * The festival of Artemis Eucleia. * See Diod. xiv. 85. 
 
Bx.aV^'^} PARTY VIOLENCE AT CORINTH 
 
 59 
 
 regardless of duty and law, fell to butchering their victims 
 even within the sacred precincts of the gods; so that even 
 some of those against whom no hand was lifted — honest, law- 
 abiding folk — were filled with sore amazement at sight of 
 such impiety. In this way many of the elder citizens, as 
 mustering more thickly in the market-place, were done to 
 death. The younger men, acting on a suspicion conceived 
 by one of their number, Pasimelus, as to what was going to 
 take place, kept quiet in the Kraneion ; ^ but hearing screams 
 and shouting, and being joined anon by some who had escaped 
 from the affair, they took the hint, and, running up along the 
 slope of the Acrocorinthus, succeeded in repelling an attack 
 of the Argives and the rest. While they were still deliberating 
 what they ought to do, down fell a capital from its column — 
 without assignable cause, whether of earthquake or wind. Also, 
 when they sacrificed, the aspect of the victims was such that 
 the soothsayers said it was better to descend from the position. 
 So they retired, in the first instance prepared to go into 
 exile beyond the territory of Corinth. It was only upon the 
 persuasion of their friends and the earnest entreaties of their 
 mothers and sisters who came out to them, supported by 
 the solemn assurance of. the men in power themselves, who 
 swore to guarantee them against evil consequences, that 
 some of them finally consented to return home. Presented 
 to their eyes was the spectacle of a tyranny in full exercise, 
 and to their minds the consciousness of the obliteration of 
 their city, seeing that boundaries were plucked up and the land 
 of their fathers had come to be re -entitled by the name of 
 Argos instead of Corinth; and furthermore, compulsion was 
 put upon them to share in the constitution m vogue at Argos, 
 for which they had little appetite, while in their own city they 
 wielded less power than the resident aliens. So that a party 
 sprang up among them whose creed was, that life was not 
 worth living on such terms: their endeavour must be to 
 make their fatherland once more the Corinth of old days — to 
 restore freedom to their city, purified from the murderer and 
 his pollution and fairly rooted in good order and legality.^ It 
 
 1 See Paus. II. ii. 4. 
 
 2 eivo/jLla. See Pol. Ath. i. 8 (below, p. 277) ; Aristot. Pol. iv. 8, 6 ; 111. 
 9. 8 ; V. 7, 4. 
 
6o HELLENICA — BK. IV. {""' bxPsqI 
 
 was a design worth the venture : if they succeeded they would 
 become the saviours of their country; if not — why, in the 
 effort to grasp the fairest flower of happiness, they would but 
 overreach, and find instead a glorious termination to existence. 
 
 It was in furtherance of this design that two men — 
 Pasimelus and Alcimenes — undertook to creep through a 
 watercourse and effect a meeting with Praxitas the polem- 
 arch of the Lacedaemonians, who was on garrison duty 
 with his own division in Sicyon. They told him they could 
 give him ingress at a point in the long walls leading to 
 Lechaeum. Praxitas, knowing from previous experience that 
 the two men might be relied upon, believed their statement ; 
 and having arranged for the further detention in Sicyon of 
 the division which was on the point of departure, he busied 
 himself with plans for the enterprise. When the two men, 
 partly by chance and partly by contrivance, came to be on 
 guard at the gate where the trophy now stands, without further 
 ado Praxitas presented himself with his division, taking with 
 him also the men of Sicyon and the whole of the Corinthian 
 exiles.^ Having reached the gate, he had a qualm of mis- 
 giving, and hesitated to step inside until he had first sent in a 
 man on whom he could rely to take- a look at things within. 
 The two Corinthians introduced him, and made so simple and 
 straightforward a representation ^ that the visitor was convinced, 
 and reported everything as free of pitfalls as the two had 
 asserted. Then the polemarch entered, but owing to the 
 wide space between the double walls, as soon as they came to 
 form in line within, the intruders were impressed by the paucity 
 of their numbers. They therefore erected a stockade, and 
 dug as good a trench as they could in front of them, pending 
 the arrival of reinforcements from the allies. In their rear, 
 moreover, lay the guard of the Boeotians in the harbour. 
 Thus they passed the whole day which followed the night of 
 ingress without striking a blow. 
 
 On the next day, however, the Argive troops arrived in all 
 haste, hurrying to the rescue, and found the enemy duly drawn 
 up. The Lacedaemonians were on their own right, the men of 
 
 ^ See Diod. xiv. 86, and below, § 9. 
 " Or, "showed him the place in so straightforward a manner." 
 
b"c.3V'"} battle of the long walls 6i 
 
 Sicyon next, and leaning against the eastern wall the Corinthian 
 exiles, one hundred and fifty strong.^ Their opponents mar- 
 shalled their lines face to face in correspondence : Iphicrates 
 with his mercenaries abutting on the eastern wall ; next to them 
 the Argives, whilst the Corinthians of the city held their left. 
 In the pride inspired by numbers they began advancing at once. 
 They overpowered the Sicyonians, and tearing asunder the 
 stockade, pursued them to the sea and here slew numbers of 
 them. At that instant Pasimachus, the cavalry general, at the 
 head of a handful of troopers, seeing the Sicyonians sore 
 pressed, made fast the horses of his troopers to the trees, 
 and relieving the Sicyonians of their heavy infantry shields, 
 advanced with his volunteers against the Argives. The 
 latter, seeing the Sigmas on the shields and taking them to 
 be "Sicyonians," had not the slightest fear. Whereupon, as 
 the story goes, Pasimachus, exclaiming in his broad Doric, 
 " By the twin gods ! these Sigmas will cheat you, you Argives," 
 came to close quarters, and in that battle of a handful against 
 a host, was slain himself with all his followers. In another 
 quarter of the field, however, the Corinthian exiles had got the 
 better of their opponents and worked their way up, so that they 
 were now touching the city circumvallation wall. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians, on their side, perceiving the dis- 
 comfiture of the Sicyonians, sprang out with timely aid, keep- 
 ing the palisade -work on their left. But the Argives, dis- 
 covering that the Lacedaemonians were behind them, wheeled 
 round and came racing back, pouring out of the palisade 
 at full speed. Their extreme right, with unprotected flanks 
 exposed, fell victims to the Lacedaemonians ; the rest, hugging 
 the wall, made good their retreat in dense masses towards 
 the city. Here they encountered the Corinthian exiles, and 
 discovering that they had fallen upon foes, swerved aside in 
 the reverse direction. In this predicament some mounted 
 by the ladders of the city wall, and, leaping down from its 
 summit, were destroyed ; ^ others yielded up their lives, thrust 
 through, as they jostled at the foot of the steps ; others again 
 were literally trampled under one another's feet and suffocated. 
 
 1 See Grote, ix. p. 333 foil. 
 " Or, " plunged from its summit into perdition." See Thuc. ii. 4. 
 
62 
 
 HELLENICA — BK. IV. {'^"'bIo 39^391 
 
 The Lacedaemonians had no difficulty in the choice of 
 victims; for at that instant a work was assigned to them 
 to do,i such as they could hardly have hoped or prayed for. 
 To find delivered into their hands a mob of helpless enemies, 
 in an ecstasy of terror, presenting their unarmed sides in such 
 sort that none turned to defend himself, but each victim rather 
 seemed to contribute what he could towards his own destruc- 
 tion, — if that was not a divine interposition, I know not what 
 to call it. Miracle or not, in that little space so many fell, 
 and the corpses lay piled so thick, that eyes familiar with the 
 stacking of corn or wood or piles of stones were called upon 
 to gaze at layers of human bodies. Nor did the guard of the 
 Boeotians in the port itself^ escape death ; some were slain 
 upon the ramparts, others on the roofs of the dock-houses, 
 which they had scaled for refuge. Nothing remained but for 
 the Corinthians and Argives to carry away their dead under 
 cover of a truce ; whilst the allies of Lacedaemon poured in 
 their reinforcements. When these were collected, Praxitas 
 decided in the first place to raze enough of the walls to allow 
 a free broadway for an army on march. This done, he put 
 himself at the head of his troops and advanced on the road to 
 Megara, taking by assault, first Sidus and next Crommyon. 
 Leaving garrisons in these two fortresses, he retraced his 
 steps, and finally fortifying Epieiceia as a garrison outpost to 
 protect the territory of the allies, he at once disbanded his 
 troops and himself withdrew to Lacedaemon. 
 
 B.C. 392-391.^ — After this the great armaments of both 
 belligerents had ceased to exist. The states merely furnished 
 garrisons — the one set at Corinth, the other set at Sicyon — 
 and were content to guard the walls. Though even so, a 
 vigorous war was carried on by dint of the mercenary troops 
 with which both sides were furnished. 
 
 A signal incident of the period was the invasion of Phlius 
 by Iphicrates. He laid an ambuscade, and with a small body 
 of troops adopting a system of guerilla war, took occasion of 
 an unguarded sally of the citizens of Phlius to inflict such 
 losses on them, that though they had never previously received 
 
 1 Or, " Heaven assigned to them a work . . ." Lit. "The God. . ." 
 
 2 /.«. " of Lechaeum. " ' So Grote and Curtius ; al. B.C. 393. 
 
"c'sV'^"'} IPHICRATES AND HIS PELTASTS 63 
 
 the Lacedaemonians within their walls, they received them now. 
 They had hitherto feared to do so lest it might lead to the re- 
 storation of the banished members of the community, who gave 
 out that they owed their exile to their Lacedaemonian sym- 
 pathies ;^ but they were now in such abject fear of the Corinthian 
 party that they sent to fetch the Lacedaemonians, and delivered 
 the city and citadel to their safe keeping. These latter, however 
 well disposed to the exiles of Phlius, did not, all the time they 
 held the city, so much as breathe the thought of bringing back 
 the exiles ; on the contrary, as soon as the city seemed to have 
 recovered its confidence, they took their departure, leaving city 
 and laws precisely as they had found them on their entry. 
 
 To return to Iphicrates and his men : they frequently ex- 
 tended their incursions even into Arcadia in many directions,^ 
 following their usual guerilla tactics, but also making assaults 
 on fortified posts. The heavy infantry of the Arcadians posi- 
 tively refused to face them in the field, so profound was the 
 terror in which they held these light troops. In compensation, 
 the light troops themselves entertained a wholesome dread of 
 the Lacedaemonians, and did not venture to approach even 
 within javelin-range of their heavy infantry. They had been 
 taught a lesson when, within that distance, some of the younger 
 hoplites had made a dash at them, catching and putting some 
 of them to the sword. But however profound the contempt of 
 the Lacedaemonians for these light troops, their contempt for 
 their own allies was deeper. (On one occasion ^ a reinforce- 
 ment of Mantineans had sallied from the walls between Corinth 
 and Lechaeum to engage the peltasts, and had no sooner come 
 under attack than they swerved, losing some of their men as 
 they made good their retreat. The Lacedaemonians were un- 
 kind enough to poke fun at these unfortunates. " Our allies,!' 
 they said, " stand in as much awe of these peltasts as children 
 of the bogies and hobgoblins of their nurses." For themselves, 
 starting from Lechaeum, they found no difficulty in marching 
 
 1 Lit. " lacmism.'- * See Thuo. ii. 4. 
 
 ' See Grote, ix. 472 note. Lechaeum was not taken by the Lacedae- 
 monians until the Corinthian long walls had been rebuilt by the Athenians. 
 See next page. Possibly the incidents in this section (§ 17) occurred after the 
 capture of Lechaeum. The historian introduces them parenthetically, as it 
 were, in illustration of his main topic— the success of the peltasts. 
 
64 HELLENICA — BK. IV. (ch.v.I^U^c. mi-39^ 
 
 right round the city of Corinth with a single Lacedaemonian 
 division and the Corinthian exiles.).* 
 
 The Athenians, on their side, who felt the power of the 
 Lacedaemonians to be dangerously close, now that the walls of 
 Corinth had been laid open, and even apprehended a direct 
 attack upon themselves, determined to rebuild the portion of 
 the wall severed by Praxitas. Accordingly they set out with 
 their whole force, including a suite of stonelayers, masons, and 
 carpenters, and within a few days erected a quite splendid wall 
 on the side facing Sicyon towards the west,^ and then proceeded 
 with more leisure to the completion of the eastern portion. 
 
 To turn once more to the other side : the Lacedaemonians, 
 indignant at the notion that the Argives should be gathering 
 the produce of their lands in peace at home, as if war were a 
 pastime, marched against them. Agesilaus commanded the 
 expedition, and after ravaging their territory from one end to 
 the other, crossed their frontier at Tenea * and swooped down 
 upon Corinth, taking the walls which had been lately rebuilt 
 by the Athenians. He was supported on the sea side by his 
 brother Teleutias * with a naval force of about twelve triremes, 
 and the mother of both was able to congratulate herself on 
 the joint success of both her sons ; one having captured the 
 enemy's walls by land and the other his ships and naval 
 arsenal by sea, on the same day. These achievements sufficed 
 Agesilaus for the present ; he disbanded the army of the allies 
 and led the state troops home. 
 
 v. B.C. 390.^ — Subsequently the Lacedaemonians made a 
 second expedition against Corinth. They heard from the 
 exiles that the citizens contrived to preserve all their cattle in 
 Peiraeum; indeed, large numbers derived their subsistence 
 from the place. Agesilaus was again in command of the 
 expedition. In the first instance he advanced upon the 
 
 ^ Or, adopting Schneider's cOnjectxue, inTpaTovcSeiovTO, add "and en- 
 camping." ^ See Thuc. vi. 98. 
 
 ' Reading leviav, Kbppen's emendation for riyeav. In the parallel pass- 
 age (Ages. ii. 17) the text has kotA ri arcvA. See Grote, H. G. ix. 471. 
 
 * See below, IV. viii. 11, p. 81. 
 
 ^ Al. B.C. 392. The historian omits the overtures for peace, B.C. 391 
 (or 391-390), referred to in Andoc. De Pace. See Jebb, Alt. Or. i. 83, 128 ; 
 Grote, H. G. ix. 474 ; Curtius, H. G. Eng. tr. iv. 261 ; below, p. 82, note i. 
 
Bx. M° "■*} CAPTURE OF PEIRAEUM 65 
 
 Isthmus. It was the month of the Isthmian games/ and here 
 he found the Argives engaged in conducting the sacrifice to 
 Poseidon, as if Corinth were Argos. So when they perceived 
 the approach of Agesilaus, the Argives and their friends left 
 the offerings as they lay, including the preparations for the 
 breakfast, and retired with undisguised alarm into the city by 
 the Cenchrean road.^ Agesilaus, though he observed the 
 movement, refrained from giving chase, but taking up his 
 quarters in the temple, there proceeded to offer victims to the 
 god himself, and waited until the Corinthian exiles had cele- 
 brated the sacrifice to Poseidon, along with the games. But 
 no sooner had Agesilaus turned his back and retired, than the 
 Argives returned and celebrated the Isthmian games afresh; 
 so that in this particular year there were cases in which the 
 same competitors were twice defeated in this or that contest, 
 or conversely, the same man was proclaimed victor twice over. 
 On the fourth day Agesilaus led his troops against 
 Peiraeum, but finding it strongly defended, he made a sudden 
 retrograde march after the morning meal in the direction of 
 the capital, as though he calculated on the betrayal of the 
 city. The Corinthians, in apprehension of some such possible 
 catastrophe, sent to summon Iphicrates with the larger portion 
 of his light infantry. These passed by duly in the night, not 
 unobserved, however, by Agesilaus, who at once turned round 
 at break of day and advanced on Peiraeum. He himself kept 
 to the low ground by the hot springs,* sending a division to 
 scale the top of the pass. That night he encamped at the 
 hot springs, while the division bivouacked in the open, in 
 possession of the pass. Here Agesilaus distinguished himself 
 by an invention as seasonable as it was simple. Among those 
 who carried provisions for the division not one had thought 
 of bringing fire. The altitude was considerable; there had 
 been a fall of rain and hail towards evening and the tempera- 
 ture was low ; besides which, the scaling party were clad in 
 thin garments suited to the summer season. There they sat 
 shivering in the dark, with scarcely heart to attack their suppers, 
 
 ' Grote and Curtius believe these to be the Isthmian games of 390 B.C., 
 not of 392 B. C. , as Sauppe and others suppose. See Peter, Chron. Table, p. 
 89, note 183 ; Jowett, Thuc, ii. 468, note on VIII. 9, x. 
 
 - Lit. " road to Cenchreae. " ' Near mod. Lutraki. 
 
 VOL. II F 
 
66 HELLENICA BK. IV. {""' sj t^ 
 
 when Agesilaus sent up to them as many as ten porters carry- 
 ing fire in earthen pots. One found his way up one way, one 
 another, and presently there were many bonfires blazing — 
 magnificently enough, since there was plenty of wood to hand; 
 so that all fell to oiling themselves and many supped over 
 again. The same night the sky was lit up by the blaze of the 
 temple of Poseidon — set on fire no one knows how. 
 
 When the men in Peiraeum perceived that the pass was 
 occupied, they at once abandoned all thought of self-defence 
 and fled for refuge to the Heraion ^ — men and women, slaves 
 and free-born, with the greater part of their flocks and herds. 
 Agesilaus, with the main body, meanwhile pursued his march 
 by the sea-shore, and the division, simultaneously descending 
 from the heights, captured the fortified position of Oenoe, 
 appropriating its contents. Indeed, all the troops on that 
 day reaped a rich harvest in the supplies they brought in from 
 various farmsteads. Presently those who had escaped into the 
 Heraion came out, offering to leave it to Agesilaus to decide 
 what he would do with them. He decided to deliver up to 
 the exiles all those concerned with the late butchery, and that 
 all else should be sold. And so from the Heraion streamed 
 out a long line of prisoners, whilst from other sides embassies 
 arrived in numbers ; and amongst these a deputation from the 
 Boeotians, anxious to learn what they should do to obtain peace. 
 These latter Agesilaus, with a certain loftiness of manner, affected 
 not even to see, although Pharax,^ their proxenus, stood by their 
 side to introduce them. Seated in a circular edifice on the mar- 
 gin of the lake,^ he surveyed the host of captives and valuables 
 as they were brought out. Beside the prisoners, to guard them, 
 stepped the Lacedaemonian warriors from the camp, carrying 
 their spears — and themselvespluckedall gaze their way, so readily 
 will success and the transient fortune of the moment rivet atten- 
 tion. But even while Agesilaus was still thus seated, wearing a 
 look betokening satisfaction at some great achievement, a horse- 
 man came galloping up ; the flanks of his charger streamed with 
 sweat. To the many inquiries what news he brought, the 
 rider responded never a word; but being now close beside 
 
 ^ Or, "Heraeum," i.e. sanctuary of Hera, on a promontory so called. 
 See Leake, Morea, iii. 317 ; and map in Trans, vol. i. to face p. xlii. 
 ^ See Hell. III. ii. 12, if the same. 
 ^ Or, "on the round pavilion by the lake" (mod. Vuliasmeni). 
 
b"c.39^'"'°} haughtiness of AGESILAUS 67 
 
 Agesilaus, he leaped from his horse, and running up to him 
 with lowering visage narrated the disaster of the Spartan 
 division^ at Lechaeum. At these tidings the king sprang 
 instantly from his seat, clutching his spear, and bade his 
 herald summon to a meeting the generals, captains of fifties, 
 and commanders of foreign brigades.^ When these had rapidly 
 assembled he bade them, seeing that the morning meal had not 
 yet been tasted, to swallow hastily what they could, and with all 
 possible speed to overtake him. But for himself, he, with the 
 officers of the royal staff,^ set off at once without breakfast. 
 His bodyguard, with their heavy arms, accompanied him with 
 all speed — himself in advance, the officers following behind. In 
 this fashion he had already passed beyond the warm springs, 
 and was well within the plateau of Lechaeum, when three 
 horsemen rode up with further news : the dead bodies had 
 been picked up. On receipt of these tidings he commanded 
 the troops to order arms, and having rested them a little space, 
 led them back again to the Heraion. The next day he spent 
 in disposing of the captured property.^ 
 
 The ambassadors of the Boeotians were then summoned, 
 and, being asked to explain the object of their coming, made 
 no further mention of the word "peace," but replied that, if 
 there was nothing to hinder it, they wished to have a pass 
 to their own soldiers within the capital. The king answered 
 with a smile : " I know your desire is not so much to see 
 your soldiers as to feast your eyes on the good fortune of your 
 friends, and to measure its magnitude. Wait then, I will 
 conduct you myself; with me you will be better able to 
 discover the true value of what has taken place." And he 
 was as good as his word. Next day he sacrificed, and led his 
 army up to the gates of Corinth. The trophy he respected, 
 but not one tree else did he leave standing — chopping and 
 burning, as proof positive that no one dared to face him in the 
 field. And having so done, he encamped about Lechaeum ; 
 and as to the Theban ambassadors, in lieu of letting them 
 pass into the city, he sent them off by sea across to Creusis. 
 
 But in proportion to the unwontedness of such a calamity 
 
 * Technically mora. ^ Lit. Vae. ■polemanhs, fentecontirs, and xenagoi. 
 
 2 See Pol. Lac. xiii. i (below, p. 319). 
 
 * See Grote, //. G. ix. 480, in reference to Ages. vii. 6. 
 
68 HELLENICA BK. IV. {""' "ic""^ 
 
 befalling Lacedaemonians, a widespread mourning fell upon 
 the whole Laconian army, those alone excepted whose sons 
 or fathers or brothers had died at their post. The bearing 
 of these resembled that of conquerors,^ as with bright faces 
 they moved freely to and fro, glorying in their domestic 
 sorrow. Now the tragic fate which befell the division was on 
 this wise : It was the unvaried custom of the men of Amyclae 
 to return home at the Hyacinthia,^ to join in the sacred paean, 
 a custom not to be interrupted either by active service or 
 absence from home or for any other reason. So, too, on this 
 occasion, Agesilaus had left behind all the Amyclaeans serving 
 in any part of his army at Lechaeum. At the right moment 
 the general in command of the garrison at that place had 
 posted the garrison troops of the allies to guard the walls 
 during his absence, and put himself at the head of his divi- 
 sion of heavy infantry with that of the cavalry,^ and led the 
 Amyclaeans past the walls of Corinth. Arrived at a point 
 within three miles or so * of Sicyon, the polemarch turned back 
 himself in the direction of Lechaeum with his heavy infantry 
 regiment, six hundred strong, giving orders to the cavalry com- 
 mandant to escort the Amyclaeans with his division as far as 
 they required, and then to turn and overtake him. It cannot 
 be said that the Lacedaemonians were ignorant of the. large 
 number of light troops and heavy infantry inside Corinth, but 
 owing to their former successes they arrogantly presumed that no 
 one would attack them. Within the capital of the Corinthians, 
 however, their scant numbers — a thin line of heavy infantry 
 unsupported by light infantry or cavalry-— had been noted ; and 
 Callias, the son of Hipponicus,^ who was in command of the 
 Athenian hoplites, and Iphicrates at the head of his peltasts, saw 
 no risk in attacking with the light brigade. Since if the enemy 
 continued his march by the high road, he would be cut up by 
 showers of javelins on his exposed right flank ; or if he were 
 tempted to take the offensive, they with their peltasts, the nimblest 
 of all light troops, would easily slip out of the grasp of his hoplites. 
 
 ' See Grote, H. G. ix. 488. 
 
 2 Observed on three days of the month Hecatorabaeus (=July). See 
 Miiller's Dorians, ii. 360. For Amyclae, see Leake, Morea, i. ch. iv. p. 145 
 foil. ; Baedeker's Greece, p. 279. 
 
 3 See below. Hell. VI. iv. 12 ; and Pol. Lac. xi. 4, xiil. 4. 
 
 ■i Lit. "twenty or thirty stades," * See Cobet, Prosop. Xen. p. 67 foil. 
 
Bx-sgo'""*} DESTRUCTION OF THE il/Ov?^ 69 
 
 With this clearly-conceived idea they led out their troops ; 
 and while Callias drew up his heavy infantry in line at no 
 great distance from the city, Iphicrates and his peltasts made 
 a dash at the returning division. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians were presently within range of the 
 javelins.1 Here a man was wounded, and there another 
 dropped, not to rise again. Each time orders were given 
 to the attendant shield - bearers ^ to pick up the men and 
 bear them into Lechaeum ; and these indeed were the only 
 members of the mora who were, strictly speaking, saved. Then 
 the polemarch ordered the ten-years-service men ^ to charge and 
 drive off their assailants. Charge, however, as they might, 
 they took nothing by their pains — not a man could they come 
 at within javelin range. Being heavy infantry opposed to light 
 troops, before they could get to close quarters the enemy's 
 word of command sounded " Retire ! " whilst as soon as their 
 own ranks fell back, scattered as they were in consequence 
 of a charge where each man's individual speed had told, 
 Iphicrates and his men turned right about and renewed the 
 javelin attack, while others, running alongside, harassed their 
 exposed flank. • At the very first charge the assailants had 
 shot down nine or ten, and, encouraged by this success, pressed 
 on with increasing audacity. These attacks told so severely 
 that the polemarch a second time gave the order (and this 
 time for the fifteen-years-service men) to charge. The order 
 was promptly obeyed, but on retiring they lost more men than 
 on the first occasion, and it was not until the pick and flower 
 of the division had succumbed that they were joined by their 
 returning cavalry, in whose company they once again attempted 
 a charge. The light infantry gave way, but the attack of the 
 cavalry was feebly enforced. Instead of pressing home the 
 charge until at least they had sabred some of the enemy, 
 they kept their horses abreast of their infantry skirmishers,* 
 charging and wheeling side by side. 
 
 ^ See Grote, H. G. ix. 467, note on the improvements of Iphicrates. 
 
 ^ Grote, H. G. ix. 484 ; cf. Hell. IV. viii. 39, p. 89 ; Anal. IV. ii. 20 
 (Trans, vol. i. p. 182) ; Herod, ix. 10-29. 
 
 ' Youngest rank and file, between eighteen and twenty-eight years of age, 
 who formed the first Une. The Spartan was hable to service at the age of 
 eighteen. From twenty-eight to thirty-three he would belong to the fifteen- 
 years-service division (the second line) ; and so on. See below, IV. vi. 10, p. 73. 
 
 '' See Thuc. iv. 125. 
 
70 
 
 HELLENICA— BK. IV. {"'' ' a^co^ 
 
 Again and again the monotonous tale of doing and suffer- 
 ing repeated itself, except that as their own ranks grew thinner 
 and their courage ebbed, the courage of their assailants grew 
 bolder and their numbers increased. In desperation they 
 massed compactly upon the narrow slope of a hillock, distant 
 a couple of furlongs^ or so from the sea, and a couple of 
 miles ^ perhaps from Lechaeum. Their friends in Lechaeum, 
 perceiving them, embarked in boats and sailed round until 
 they were immediately under the hillock. And now, in the 
 very slough of despair, being so sorely troubled as man after 
 man dropped dead, and unable to strike a blow, to crown 
 their distress they saw the enemy's heavy infantry advancing. 
 Then they took to flight; some of them threw themselves 
 into the sea; others — a mere handful — escaped with the 
 cavalry into Lechaeum. The death-roll, including those who 
 fell in the second fight and the final flight, must have num- 
 bered two hundred En's fifty slain, or thereabouts.* Such is 
 the tale of the destruction of the Lacedaemonian mora. 
 
 Subsequently, with the mutilated fragment of the division, 
 Agesilaus turned his back upon Lechaeum, leaving another 
 division behind to garrison that port. On his passage home- 
 wards, as he wound his way through the various cities, he 
 made a point of arriving at each as late in the day as possible, 
 renewing his march as early as possible next morning. Leaving 
 Orchomenus at the first streak of dawn, he passed Mantinea 
 still under cover of darkness. The spectacle of the Mantineans 
 rejoicing at their misfortune would have been too severe an 
 ordeal for his soldiers. 
 
 But Iphicrates had not yet reached the summit of his good 
 fortune. Success followed upon success. Lacedaemonian 
 garrisons had been placed in Sidus and Crommyon by Prax- 
 itas when he took these fortresses, and again in Oenoe, when 
 Peiraeum was taken quite lately by Agesilaus. One and all 
 of these now fell into the hands of Iphicrates. Lechaeum 
 still held out, garrisoned as it was by the Lacedaemonians and 
 their allies ; while the Corinthian exiles, unable since * the 
 disaster of the mora any longer to pass freely by land from 
 Sicyon, had the sea passage still open to them, and using 
 
 ^ Lit. " two stades." ^ dj " sixteen or seventeen stades. " 
 
 » See Grote, H. G. ix. 486. * Lit. "owing to." 
 
^"c.s'^Vsp*} INVASION OF ACARNANIA 71 
 
 Lechaeum as their base/ kept up a game of mutual annoy- 
 ance with the party in the capital. 
 
 VI. B.C. 390-389.^ — At a later date the Achaeans, being in 
 possession of Calydon, a town from old times belonging to 
 Aetolia, and having further incorporated the Calydonians as 
 citizens,^ were under the necessity of garrisoning their new pos- 
 session. The reason was, that the Acarnanians were threatening 
 the place with an army, and were aided by contingents from 
 Athens and Boeotia, who were anxious to help their allies.* 
 Under the strain of this combined attack the Achaeans 
 despatched ambassadors to Lacedaemon, who on arrival com- 
 plained of the unfair conduct of Lacedaemon towards them- 
 selves. " We, sirs," they said, " are ever ready to serve in your 
 armies, in obedience to whatever orders you choose to issue ; 
 we follow you whithersoever you think fit to lead ; but when 
 it comes to our being beleaguered by the Acarnanians, with 
 their allies the Athenians and Boeotians, you show not the 
 slightest concern. Understand, then, that if things go on thus 
 we cannot hold out ; but either we must give up all part in 
 the war in Peloponnesus and cross over in full force to en- 
 gage the Acarnanians, or we must make peace with them on 
 whatever terms we can." This language was a tacit threat 
 that if they failed to obtain the assistance they felt entitled to 
 from Lacedaemon they would quit the alliance. 
 
 The ephors and the assembly concluded that there was 
 no alternative but to assist the Achaeans in their campaign 
 against the Acarnanians. Accordingly they sent out Agesilaus 
 with two divisions and the proper complement of allies. The 
 Achaeans none the less marched out in full force themselves. 
 No sooner had Agesilaus crossed the gulf than there was a 
 general flight of the population from the country districts 
 into the towns, whilst the flocks and herds were driven into 
 remote districts that they might not be captured by the troops. 
 Being now arrived on the frontier of the enemy's territory, 
 
 1 The illustrative incidents narrated in chapter iv. 17 may belong to this 
 period. See above, p. 63, note 3. 
 
 2 According to others (who suppose that the Isthmia and the events re- 
 corded in chapter v. 1-19 above belong to B.C. 392), we have now reached 
 B.C. 391. 
 
 '^ Or, " having conferred a city organisation on the Calydonians." 
 ■• See Thuc. ii. 68. 
 
72 HELLENICA— BK. IV. {"'c^'J-tH 
 
 Agesilaus sent to the general assembly of the Acarnanians at 
 Stratus,! warning them that unless they chose to give up their 
 alliance with the Boeotians and Athenians, and to take instead 
 themselves and their allies, he would ravage their territory 
 through its length and breadth, and not spare a single thing. 
 When they turned a deaf ear to this summons, the other pro- 
 ceeded to do what he threatened, systematically laying the 
 district waste, felling the timber and cutting down the fruit- 
 trees, while slowly moving on at the rate of ten or twelve 
 furlongs a day. The Acarnanians, owing to the snail-like pro- 
 gress of the enemy, were lulled into a sense of security. They 
 even began bringing down their cattle from their alps, and 
 devoted themselves to the tillage of far the greater portion of 
 their fields. But Agesilaus only waited till their rash con- 
 fidence reached its climax ; then on the fifteenth or sixteenth 
 day after he had first entered the country he sacrificed at 
 early dawn, and before evening had traversed eighteen miles ^ 
 or so of country to the lake^ round which were collected 
 nearly all the flocks and herds of the Acarnanians, and so 
 captured a vast quantity of cattle, horses, and grazing stock 
 of all kinds, besides numerous slaves. 
 
 Having secured this prize, he stayed on the spot the whole 
 of the following day, and devoted himself to disposing of the 
 captured property by public sale. While he was thus engaged, 
 a large body of Acarnanian light infantry appeared, and availing 
 themselves of the position in which Agesilaus was encamped 
 against the mountain side, assailed him with volleys of sling- 
 stones and rocks from the razor-edge of the mountain, without 
 suffering any scathe themselves. By this means they succeeded 
 in dislodging and forcing his troops down into the level plain, 
 and that too at an hour when the whole camp was engaged in 
 preparations for the evening meal. As night drew on, the 
 Acarnanians retired ; sentinels were posted, and the troops 
 slept in peace. 
 
 ' ' ' The Altarnanians had, in early times, occupied the hill of Olpai as a 
 place for judicial proceedings common to the whole nation " (see Thuc. iii. 
 105). ' ' 13ut in Thucydides' own time Stratos had attained its position as the 
 greatest city of Akarnania, and probably the Federal Assemblies were already 
 held there" (Thuc. ii. 80). "In the days of Agfisilaos we find Stratos still 
 more distinctly marked as the place of Federal meeting. " — Freeman, //isi. 
 Fed. Gov. ch. iv. p. 148 foil., " On the constitution of the League." 
 
 ^ Lit. "one hundred and sixty stades." * See Thuc. ii. 80; vi. 106. 
 
"c.39o?389"} SEVERE HILL-FIGHTING 73 
 
 Next day Agesilaus led off his army. The exit from the 
 plain and meadow-land round the lake was a narrow aperture 
 through a close encircling range of hills. In occupation 
 of this mountain barrier the Acarnanians, from the vantage- 
 ground above, poured down a continuous pelt of stones 
 and other missiles, or, creeping down to the fringes, dogged 
 and annoyed them so much that the army was no longer 
 able to proceed. If the heavy infantry or cavalry made sallies 
 from the main line they did no harm to their assailants, 
 for the Acarnanians had only to retire and they had quickly 
 gained their strongholds. It was too severe a task, Agesi- 
 laus thought, to force his way through the narrow pass so 
 sorely beset. He made up his mind, therefore, to charge 
 that portion of the enemy who dogged his left, though these 
 were pretty numerous. The range of hills on this side was 
 more accessible to heavy infantry and horse alike. During 
 the interval needed for the inspection of victims, the Acarnan- 
 ians kept plying them with javelins and bullets, and, coming 
 into close proximity, wounded man after man. But presently 
 came the word of command, " Advance ! " and the iifteen-years- 
 service men of the heavy infantry ^ ran forward, accompanied 
 by the cavalry, at a round pace, the general himself steadily 
 following with the rest of the column. Those of the Acarnan- 
 ians who had crept down the mountain side at that instant 
 in the midst of their sharpshooting turned and fled, and as they 
 climbed the steep, man after man was slain. When, however, 
 the top of the pass was reached, there stood the hoplites of the 
 Acarnanians drawn up in battle line, and supported by the mass 
 of their light infantry. There they steadily waited, keeping up 
 a continuous discharge of missiles the while, or launching their 
 long spears ; whereby they dealt wounds to the cavalry troopers 
 and death in some cases to the horses. But when they were 
 all but within the clutches of the advancing heavy infantry ^ 
 of the Lacedaemonians their firmness forsook them; they 
 swerved and fled, and there died of them on that day about 
 three hundred. So ended the aifair. 
 
 Agesilaus set up a trophy of victory, and afterwards mak- 
 ing a tour of the country, he visited it with fire and sword.* 
 
 ^ I.e. " the first two ranks." See above, IV. v. 14, p. 69. 
 
 3 See Ages. ii. 20 (below, p. 251), for an extmordinary discrepancy. 
 
 ' Or lit. " burning and felling." 
 
74 HELLENICA— BK. IV. {cH.vn.§i%"i B.c.^SgiaSS 
 
 Occasionally, in obedience to pressure put upon him by the 
 Achaeans, he would assault some city, but did not capture a 
 single one. And now, as the season of autumn rapidly 
 approached, he prepared to leave the country; "whereupon 
 the Achaeans, who looked upon his exploits as abortive, 
 seeing that not a single city, willingly or unwillingly, had as 
 yet been detached from their opponents, begged him, as the 
 smallest service he could render them, at any rate to stay long 
 enough in the country to prevent the Acarnanians from sowing 
 their corn. He answered that the course they suggested ran 
 counter to expediency. "You forget," he said, "that I mean 
 to invade your enemies again next summer ; and therefore the 
 larger their sowing now, the stronger will be their appetite 
 for peace hereafter." With this retort he withdrew overland 
 through Aetolia, and by roads, moreover, which no army, 
 small or great, could possibly have traversed without the con- 
 sent of the inhabitants. The Aetolians, however, were only 
 too glad to yield the Spartan king a free passage, cherishing 
 hopes as they did that he would aid them to recover Nau- 
 pactus. On reaching Rhium^ he crossed the gulf at that 
 point and returned homewards, the more direct passage from 
 Calydon to Peloponnesus being effectually barred by an 
 Athenian squadron stationed at Oeniadae. 
 
 VII. B.C. 389-388.2 — On the expiration of winter, and in 
 fulfilment of his promise to the Achaeans, Agesilaus called out 
 the ban once more with early spring to invade the Acarnanians. 
 The latter were apprised of his intention, and, being persuaded 
 that owing to the midland situation of their cities they would 
 just as truly be blockaded by an enemy who chose to destroy 
 their corn as they would be if besieged with entrenchments 
 in regular form, they sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon, 
 and made peace with the Achaeans and alliance with the 
 Lacedaemonians. Thus closes this page of history concern- 
 ing the affairs of Acarnania. 
 
 To turn to the next. There was a feeling on the part of 
 the Lacedaemonians^ that no expedition against Athens or 
 Boeotia would be safe so long as a state so important and so 
 
 ^ Or Antirrhium (as more commonly called). 
 
 " According to others, B.C. 390. See above, p. 71, note 2. 
 
 * Or, " It was agreed by the Lacedaemonians." 
 
Bx/s'ss^ ''"''} INVASION OF ARGOLIS 75 
 
 close to their own frontier as Argos remained in open hostility 
 behind them. Accordingly they called out the ban against 
 Argos. Now when Agesipolis learnt that the duty of leader- 
 ship devolved on him, and, moreover, that the sacrifices be- 
 fore crossing the frontier were favourable, he went to Olympia 
 and consulted the will of the god. " Would it be lawful to 
 him," he inquired, "not to accept the holy truce, on the 
 ground that the Argives made the season for it^ depend not on a 
 fixed date, but on the prospect of a Lacedaemonian invasion ?" 
 The god indicated to the inquirer that he might lawfully repu- 
 diate any holy truce which was fraudulently antedated.^ " Not 
 content with this, the young king, on leaving Olympia, went at 
 once to Delphi, and at that shrine put the same question to 
 Apollo : " Were his views in accord with his Father's as touch- 
 ing the holy truce ? " — to which the son of Zeus made answer : 
 " Yea, altogether in accordance." ^ 
 
 Then, without further hesitation, picking up his army at 
 Phlius (where, during his absence to visit the temples, the 
 troops had been collecting), he advanced by Nemea into the 
 enemy's territory. The Argives, on their side, perceiving that 
 they would be unable to hinder his advance, in accordance with 
 their custom sent a couple of heralds, garlanded, and presented 
 their usual plea of a holy truce. Agesipolis answered them 
 curtly that the gods were not satisfied with the justice of their 
 plea, and, refusing to accept the truce, pushed forward, causing 
 thereby great perplexity and consternation throughout the rural 
 districts and in the capital itself. 
 
 But while he was getting his evening meal that first evening 
 in the Argive territory — just at the moment when the after- 
 dinner libation had been poured out — the god sent an earth- 
 quake ; and with one consent the Lacedaemonians, beginning 
 with the officers of the royal quarters, sang the sacred hymn 
 of Poseidon. The soldiers, in general, expected to retreat, 
 arguing that, on the occurrence of an earthquake once before, 
 Agis had retired from Elis. But Agesipolis held another view : 
 if the god had sent his earthquake at the moment when he was 
 meditating invasion, he should have understood that the god 
 
 1 I.e. "the season of the Carneia." 
 
 '^ Or, " wrongfully put forward." See below, V. i. 29 ; hi. 27 (pp. 98, 119); 
 Paus. III. V. 8 ; Jebb, Att. Or. i. p. 131 ; Grote, H. G. ix. 494 foil. ; Jowett, 
 Thuc. ii. 315 ; note to Thuc. V. liv. 3. ' Grote ; of Aristot. Rhet. ii. 33. 
 
76 HELLENICA — BK. IV. {""' ™.c?388 
 
 forbade his entrance ; but now, when the invasion was a thing 
 effected, he must needs take it as a signal of his approval.^ 
 Accordingly next morning he sacrificed to Poseidon, and 
 advanced a short distance farther into the country. 
 
 The late expedition of Agesilaus into Argos ^ was still fresh 
 in men's minds, and Agesipolis was eager to ascertain from the 
 soldiers how close his predecessor had advanced to the fortifica- 
 tion walls ; or again, how far he had gone in ravaging the open 
 country — not unlike a competitor in the pentathlon,^ eager to 
 cap the performance of his rival in each event. On one occa- 
 sion it was only the discharge of missiles from the towers which 
 forced him to recross the trenches round the walls ; on another, 
 profiting by the absence of the majority of the Argives in 
 Laconian territory, he came so close to the gates that their 
 defenders actually shut out their own Boeotian cavalry on the 
 point of entering, in terror lest the Lacedaemonians might 
 pour into the town in company ; and these Boeotian troopers 
 were forced to cling, like bats to a wall, under each coign of 
 vantage beneath the battlements. Had it not been for the 
 accidental absence of the Cretans,* who had gone off on a 
 raid to Nauplia, without a doubt numbers of men and 
 horses would have been shot down. At a later date, while 
 encamping in the neighbourhood of the Enclosures,^ a thunder- 
 bolt fell into his camp. One or two men were struck, while 
 others died from the effect of the concussion on their brains. 
 At a still later period he was anxious to fortify some sort of 
 garrison outpost in the pass of Celusa,^ but upon offering 
 
 1 Or, " interpret the signal as a summons to advance." 
 
 ^ See above, Hell. IV. iv. 19. 
 
 3 The pentathlon of Olympia and the other great games consisted of five 
 contests, in the following order — (i) leaping, {2) discus-throwing, (3) javelin- 
 tlirowing, {4) running, (5) wrestling. Cf. Simonides, iSX/ia jroSoiKelTjv dlcTKov 
 S.KOVTa iriXriv, where, vietri gratid, the order is inverted. The competitors 
 were drawn in pairs. The odd man who drew a bye in any particular round 
 or heat was called the ephedras. The successful athletes of the pairs, that is, 
 those who had won any three events out of the five, would then again be drawn 
 against each other, and so on until only two were left, between whom the final 
 heat took place. See, for an exhaustive discussion of the subject, Prof. Percy 
 Gardner, "The Pentathlon of the Greeks " [Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. i. 
 9, p. 210 foil. pi. viii. ), from whom this note is taken. ^ See Thuc. vii. 57. 
 
 ^ 7re/)i Th.% elpKTds — what these were no one knows, possibly a stone quarry 
 used as a prison. Cf. Qirop. III. i. 19 ; Mem. II. i. 5 ; see Grote, H. G. ix. 
 497 ; Paus. III. V. 8. ^ Or Celossa. See Strabo, viii. 382. 
 
ri'-sTni'Mr '^"'' } NAVAL AFFAIRS AFTER CNIDUS 77 
 
 sacrifice the victims proved lobeless,^ and he was constrained 
 to lead back and disband his army — not without serious 
 injury inflicted on the Argives, as the result of an invasion 
 which had taken them wholly by surprise. 
 
 VIII. 394 B.C. — Such were the land operations in the war. 
 Meanwhile another series of events was being enacted on the 
 sea and within the seaboard cities ; and these I will now narrate 
 in detail. But I shall confine my pen to the more memorable 
 incidents, and others of less account I shall pass over. 
 
 In the first place, then, Pharnabazus and Conon, after 
 defeating the Lacedaemonians in the naval engagement oiif 
 Cnidus, commenced a tour of inspection round the islands 
 and the maritime states, expelling from them, as they visited 
 them, one after another the Spartan governors.^ Everywhere 
 they gave consolatory assurances to the citizens that they had 
 no intention of establishing fortress citadels within their walls, 
 or in any way interfering with their self-government.^ Such 
 words fell soothingly upon the ears of those to whom they 
 were addressed ; the proposals were courteously accepted ; all 
 were eager to present Pharnabazus with gifts of friendship and 
 hospitality. The satrap, indeed, was only applying the instruc- 
 tions of his master Conon on these matters-rr-who had taught 
 him that if he acted thus all the states would be friendly to 
 him, whereas, if he showed any intention to enslave them, the 
 smallest of them would, as Conon insisted, be capable of causing 
 a world of trouble, and the chances were, if apprehensions 
 were once excited, he would find himself face to face with 
 a coalition of united Hellas. To these admonitions Pharna- 
 bazus lent a willing ear. 
 
 Accordingly, when disembarking at Ephesus, he presented 
 Conon with a fleet of forty sail,* and having further instructed 
 him to meet him at Sestos,^ set off himself by land along the 
 coast to visit his own provinces. For here it should be men- 
 tioned that his old enemy Dercylidas chanced to be in Abydos 
 at the time of the sea-fight;® nor had he at a later date 
 
 1 I.e. "hopeless." See above, III. iv. 15, p. 28. 
 * Lit. " the Laconian harmosts. " 
 
 ' See Hicks, 70, "Honours to Konon," Inscript. found at Erythrae in 
 Ionia. Cf. Diod. xiv. 84. " See Diod. xiv. 83. 
 
 » See above. Hell. II. i. 27 foil. " See above. Hell. IV. iii. 3, p. 53. 
 
78 HELLENICA — BK. IV. {"'■ "'"c I94 
 
 suffered eclipse with the other governors,^ but, on the contrary, 
 had kept tight hold of Abydos and still preserved it in attach- 
 ment to Lacedaemon. The course he had adopted was to 
 summon a meeting of the Abydenians, when he made them a 
 speech as follows: "Sirs, to-day it is possible for you, who 
 have before been friends to my city, to appear as benefactors 
 of the Lacedaemonians. For a man to prove faithful to his 
 friends in the heyday of their good fortune is no great marvel ; 
 but to prove steadfast when his friends are in misfortune — that 
 is a service monumental for all time. But do not mistake me. 
 It does not follow that, because we have been defeated in a 
 great sea-fight, we are therefore annihilated.^ Certainly not. 
 Even in old days, you will admit, when Athens was mistress of 
 the sea, our state was not powerless to benefit friends or chastise 
 enemies. Moreover, in proportion as the rest of the cities 
 have joined hands with fortune to turn their backs upon us, 
 so much the more certainly will the grandeur of your fidelity 
 shine forth. Or, is any one haunted by the fear that we may 
 find ourselves blockaded by land and sea ? — let him consider 
 that at present there is no Hellenic navy whatever on the 
 seas, and if the barbarian attempts to clutch the empire of the 
 sea, Hellas will .not sit by and suffer it ; so that, if only in 
 self-defence, she must inevitably take your side." 
 
 To this the Abydenians lent no deaf ears, but rather 
 responded with willingness approaching enthusiasm — extend- 
 ing the hand of fellowship to the ex-governors, some of whom 
 were already flocking to Abydos as a harbour of refuge, whilst 
 others they sent to summon from a distance. 
 
 So when a number of efficient and serviceable men had 
 been collected, Dercylidas ventured to cross over to Sestos — 
 lying, as it does, not more than a mile * distant, directly facing 
 Abydos. There he not only set about collecting those who 
 held lands in the Chersonese through Lacedaemonian influence, 
 but extended his welcome also to the governors * who had been 
 driven out of European states.^ He insisted that, if they came 
 to think of it, not even was their case desperate, reminding 
 them that even in Asia, which originally belonged to the 
 Persian monarch, places were to be found — such as the little 
 
 ^ Lit. " harmosts, " ^ Or, "we are beaten, ergo, it is all over with us." 
 
 5 Lit. " eight stades. " * Lit. "harmosts." " See Demos, de Cor. q5. 
 
bIc/394-393"^} CONON and PHARNABAZUS 79 
 
 State of Temnos, or Aegae, and others, capable of administer- 
 ing their affairs, unsubjected to the king of Persia. " But," he 
 added, " if you want a strong impregnable position, I cannot 
 conceive what better you can find than Sestos. Why, it would 
 need a combined naval and military force to invest that port." 
 By these and such like arguments he rescued them from the 
 lethargy of despair. 
 
 Now when Pharnabazus found Abydos and Sestos so con- 
 ditioned, he gave them to understand that unless they chose 
 to eject the Lacedaemonians, he would bring war to bear upon 
 them ; and when they refused to obey, having first assigned to 
 Conon as his business to keep the sea closed against them, he 
 proceeded in person to ravage the territory of the men of 
 Abydos. Presently, finding himself no nearer the fulfilment 
 of his object — which was their reduction — he set off home 
 himself and left it to Conon the while so to conciliate the 
 Hellespontine states that as large a naval power as possible 
 might be mustered against the coming spring. In his wrath 
 against the Lacedaemonians, in return for the treatment he 
 had received from them, his paramount object was to invade 
 their territory and exact what vengeance he could. 
 
 B.C. 393. — The winter was thus fully taken up with 
 preparations ; but with the approach of spring, Pharnabazus 
 and Conon, with a large fleet fully manned, and a foreign 
 mercenary brigade to boot, threaded their way through the 
 islands to Melos.^ This island was to serve as a base of 
 operations against Lacedaemon. And in the first instance he 
 sailed down to Pherae^ and ravaged that district, after which 
 he made successive descents at various other points on the 
 seaboard, and did what injury he could. But in apprehension 
 of the harbourless character of the coast, coupled with the 
 enemy's facility of reinforcement and his own scarcity of 
 supplies, he very soon turned back and sailed away, until 
 finally he came to moorings in the harbour of Phoenicus in 
 Cythera. The occupants of the city of the Cytherians, in 
 terror of being taken by storm, evacuated the walls. To 
 
 1 See Lys. :tix. de ion. Arist. 19 foil.; and Hicks, 71, "Honours to 
 Dionysios I. and his court " ; Grote, H. G. ix. 453. 
 ^ Mod. Kalamata. 
 
«o HELLENICA BK. IV. { "bTcI'ms's,! 
 
 dismiss these under a flag of truce across to Laconia was his 
 first. step ; his second was to repair the fortress in question and 
 to leave a garrison in the island under an Athenian governor — 
 Nicophemus. After this he set sail to the Isthmus of Corinth, 
 where he delivered an exhortation to the allies begging them to 
 prosecute the war vigorously, and to show themselves faithful 
 to the Great King ; and so, having left them all the moneys 
 he had with him, set off on his voyage home. 
 
 But Conon had a proposal to make : — If Pharnabazus would 
 allow him to keep the fleet, he would undertake, in the first 
 place, to support it free of expense from the islands ; besides 
 which, he would sail to his own country and help his fellow- 
 citizens the Athenians to rebuild their long walls and the forti- 
 fications round Piraeus. No heavier blow, he insisted, could 
 well be inflicted on Lacedaemon. " In this way, I can assure 
 you," he added, " you will win the eternal gratitude of the Athen- 
 ians and wreak consummate vengeance on the Lacedaemonians, 
 since at one stroke you will render null and void that on which 
 they have bestowed their utmost labour." These arguments so 
 far weighed with Pharnabazus that he despatched Conon to 
 Athens with alacrity, and further supplied him with funds for the 
 restoration of the walls. Thus it was that Conon, on his arrival 
 at Athens, was able to rebuild a large portion of the walls — 
 partly by lending his own crews, and partly by giving pay to 
 carpenters and stone-masons, and meeting all the necessary 
 expenses. There were other portions of the walls which the 
 Athenians and Boeotians and other states raised as a joint 
 voluntary undertaking. 
 
 Nor must it be forgotten that the Corinthians, with the 
 funds left them by Pharnabazus, manned a fleet — the com- 
 mand of which they entrusted to their admiral Agathinus — and 
 so were undisputed masters of the sea within the gulf round 
 Achaia and Lechaeum. 
 
 B.C. 393-391. — The Lacedaemonians, in opposition, fitted 
 out a fleet under the command of Podanemus. That officer, in 
 an attack of no great moment, lost his Ufe, and Pollis,^ his 
 second in command, was presently in his turn obliged to 
 retire, being wounded, whereupon Herippidas took command 
 
 ■' See Hell. I. i. 23 (Trans, vol. i. p. 4, note 2). For these officers, see 
 Index. 
 
r"c/393-39"'"*} the long walls ; ANTALCIDAS 8i 
 
 of the vessels. On the other hand, Proaenus the Corinthian, 
 who had relieved Agathinus, evacuated Rhium, and the Lace- 
 daemonians recovered that post. Subsequently Teleutias suc- 
 ceeded to Herippidas's fleet, and it was then the turn of that 
 admiral to dominate the gulf.^ 
 
 B.C. 392. — The Lacedaemonians were well informed of the 
 proceedings of Conon. They knew that he was not only restor- 
 ing the fortifications of Athens by help of the king's gold, but 
 maintaining a fleet at his expense besides, and conciUating the 
 islands and seaboard cities towards Athens. If, therefore, they 
 could indoctrinate Tiribazus — who was a general of the king 
 — -with their sentiments, they believed they could not fail 
 either to draw him aside to their own interests, or, at any 
 rate, to put a stop to his feeding Conon's navy. With this 
 intention they sent Antalcidas to Tiribazus ; ^ his orders 
 were to carry out this policy and, if possible, to arrange a peace 
 between Lacedaemon and the king. The Athenians, getting 
 wind of this, sent a counter-embassy, consisting of Hermogenes, 
 Dion, Callisthenes, and Callimedon, with Conon himself. They 
 at the same time invited the attendance of ambassadors from 
 the allies, and there were also present representatives of the 
 Boeotians, of Corinth, and of Argos. When they had arrived 
 at their destination, Antalcidas explained to Tiribazus the 
 object of his visit : he wished, if possible, to cement a peace 
 between the state he represented and the king — a peace, more- 
 over, exactly suited to the aspirations of the king himself ; in 
 other words, the Lacedaemonians gave up all claim to the 
 Hellenic cities in Asia as against the king, while for their own 
 part they were content that all the islands and other cities 
 should be independent. " Such being our unbiassed wishes," 
 he continued, " for what earthly reason should [the Hellenes 
 or] the king go to war with us ? or why should he expend his 
 money? The king is guaranteed against attack on the part 
 
 1 According to Grote (H. G. ix. 471, note 2), this section summari.ses the 
 Lacedaemonian maritime operations in the Corinthian Gulf from the late 
 autumn of 393 B.C. till the appointment of Teleutias in the spring or early 
 summer of 391 B.C., the year of the expedition of Agesilaus recounted above, 
 Hell. IV. iv. 19, p. 64. 
 
 - See Plut. Ages, xxiii. (Clough, iv. p. 27) ; and for the date B.C. 392 (al. 
 B.C. 393) see Grote, H. G, ix. 498. 
 
 VOL. U G 
 
82 HELLENICA — EK. IV. {"'' ""b'c! m' 
 
 of Hellas, since the Athenians are powerless apart from our 
 hegemony, and we are powerless so long as the separate states 
 are independent." The proposals of Antalcidas sounded very 
 pleasantly in the ears of Tiribazus, but to the opponents of 
 Sparta they were the merest talk. The Athenians were appre- 
 hensive of an agreement which provided for the independence 
 of the cities in the islands, whereby they might be deprived of 
 Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros. The Thebans, again, were afraid 
 of being compelled to let the Boeotian states go free. The 
 Argives did not see how such treaty contracts and covenants 
 were compatible with the realisation of their own great object 
 — the absorption of Corinth by Argos. And so it came to 
 pass that this peace ^ proved abortive, and the representatives 
 departed each to his own home. 
 
 Tiribazus, on his side, thought it hardly consistent with 
 his own safety to adopt the cause of the Lacedaemonians with- 
 out the concurrence of the king^a scruple which did not pre- 
 vent him from privately presenting Antalcidas with a sum of 
 money, in hopes that when the Athenians and their allies dis- 
 covered that the Lacedaemonians had the wherewithal to furnish 
 a fleet, they might perhaps be more disposed to desire peace. 
 Further, accepting the statements of the Lacedaemonians as 
 true, he took on himself to secure the person of Conon, as 
 guilty of wrongdoing towards the king, and shut him up.^ 
 That done, he set off up country to the king to recount the 
 proposals of Lacedaemon, with his own subsequent capture of 
 Conon as a mischievous man, and to ask for further guidance 
 on all these matters. 
 
 On the arrival of Tiribazus at the palace, the king sent 
 down Struthas to take charge of the seaboard district. The 
 latter, however, was a strong partisan of Athens and her 
 allies, since he found it impossible to forget the long list 
 of evils which the king's country had suffered at the hands 
 of Agesilaus ; so that the Lacedaemonians, contrasting the 
 hostile disposition of the new satrap towards themselves with 
 his friendliness to the Athenians, sent Thibron to deal with 
 him by force of arms. 
 
 1 See Andoc. tie Pace ; Jebb, Attic Or. i. 83, 128 foil. Prof. Jebb assigns 
 this speech to B.c. 390 rather than b.c. 391. See also Grote, H. G. ix. 499 ; 
 Diod. xiv. no ; above, p. 64, notes. ^ SeeDiod. xiv. 85 ; and Com. Nep. 5. 
 
Bx/agJ-slo""'"} CONON SEIZED ; THIBRON SLAIN 83 
 
 B.C. 391.^ — That general crossed over and established 
 his base of operations in Ephesus and the towns in the 
 plain of the Maeander — Priene, Leucophrys, and Achil- 
 leum — and proceeded to harry the king's territory, spar- 
 ing neither live nor dead chattel. But as time went on, 
 Struthas, who could not but note the disorderly, and indeed 
 recklessly scornful manner in which the Lacedaemonian 
 brought up his supports on each occasion, despatched a 
 body of cavalry into the plain. Their orders were to gallop 
 down and scour the plain, making a clean sweep ^ of all they 
 could lay their hands on. Thibron, as it befell, had just 
 finished breakfast, and was returning from the mess with Ther- 
 sander the flute-player. The latter was not only a good flute- 
 player, but, as affecting Lacedaemonian manners, laid claim 
 to personal prowess. Struthas, then, seeing the disorderly 
 advance of the supports and the paucity of the vanguard, 
 appeared suddenly at the head of a large body of cavalry, 
 all in orderly array. 1'hibron and Thersander were the first 
 to be cut down, and when these had fallen the rest of the 
 troops were easily turned. A mere chase ensued, in which 
 man after man was felled to earth, though a remnant contrived 
 to escape into the friendly cities ; still larger numbers owed 
 their safety to their late discovery of the business on hand. 
 Nor, indeed, was this the first time the Spartan commander 
 had rushed to the field, without even issuing a general order. 
 So ends the history of these events. 
 
 B.C. 390.^ — We pass on to the arrival at Lacedaemon of a 
 party of Rhodian exiles expelled by the popular party. They 
 insisted that it was not equitable to allow the Athenians to 
 subjugate Rhodes and thus build up so vast a power. The 
 Lacedaemonians were alive to the fact that the fate of Rhodes 
 depended on which party in the state prevailed : if the demo- 
 cracy were to dominate, the whole island must fall into the 
 hands of Athens ; if the wealthier classes,* into their own. 
 
 1 Al. B.C. 392, al. B.C. 390. 
 
 2 See Hell. VII. i. 40 ; Cyrof. I. iv. 17 ; III. iii. 23 ; Anab. VI. iii. 3. 
 " Grote, H. G. ix. 504 ; al. B.C. 391. 
 
 ' Or, "the Lacedaemonians were not slow to perceive that the whole 
 island ol Rhodes was destined to fall either into the hands of Athens or of 
 themselves, according as the democracy or the wealthier classes respectively- 
 dominated." 
 
84 HELLENICA— BK. IV. {""• ""b^c?°3,'^ 
 
 Accordingly they fitted out for them a fleet of eight vessels, 
 and put Ecdicus in command of it as admiral. 
 
 At the same time they despatched another officer on 
 board these vessels named Diphridas, on a separate mission. 
 His orders were to cross over into Asia and to secure the 
 states which had received Thibron. He was also to pick up 
 the survivors of Thibron's army, and with these troops, aided 
 by a second army which he would collect from any other 
 quarter open to him, he was to prosecute the war against 
 Struthas. Diphridas followed out his instructions, and amongst 
 other achievements was fortunate enough to capture Tigranes,^ 
 the son-in-law of Struthas, with his wife, on their road to 
 Sardis. The sum paid for their ransom was so large that he at 
 once had the wherewithal to pay his mercenaries. Diphridas 
 was no less attractive than his predecessor Thibron ; but he 
 was of a more orderly temperament, steadier, and incomparably 
 more enterprising as a general ; the secret of this superiority 
 being that he was a man over whom the pleasures of the body 
 exercised no sway. He became readily absorbed in the busi- 
 ness before him — whatever he had to do he did it with a will. 
 
 Ecdicus having reached Cnidus, there learned that the 
 democracy in Rhodes were entirely masters of the situation. 
 They were dominant by land and sea ; indeed they possessed 
 a fleet twice the size of his own. He was therefore content 
 to keep quiet in Cnidus until the Lacedaemonians, perceiving 
 that his force was too small to allow him to benefit their 
 friends, determined to relieve him. With this view they 
 ordered Teleutias to take the twelve ships which formed 
 his squadron (at present in the gulf adjoining Achaia and 
 Lechaeum),^ and to feel his way round to Ecdicus : that officer 
 he was to send home. For himself, he was to undertake per- 
 sonally to protect the interests of all who cared to be their 
 friends, whilst injuring the enemy by every possible means. 
 
 So then Teleutias, having reached Samos, where he added 
 some vessels to his fleet, set sail to Cnidus. At this point 
 Ecdicus returned home, and Teleutias, continuing his voyage, 
 reached Rhodes, at the head now of seven-and-twenty vessels. 
 It was during this portion of the voyage that he fell in with 
 
 ' See Anab. VII. viii. 9 (Trans, vol. i. p. 316 foil.) for a similar exploit. 
 ^ See above, IV. viii. 11, p. 81. 
 
"c/jgo-asr"''} EXPLOITS OF TIIRASYBULUS 85 
 
 Philocrates, the son of Ephialtes, who was sailing from Athens 
 to Cyprus with ten triremes, in aid of their ally Evagoras.^ The 
 whole flotilla fell into the Spartan's hands — a curious instance, 
 it may be added, of cross purposes on the part of both belliger- 
 ents. Here were the -Athenians, supposed to be on friendly 
 terms with the king, engaged in sending an allied force to 
 support Evagoras, who was at open war with him ; and here 
 again was Teleutias, the representative of a people at war with 
 Persia, engaged in crippling a fleet which had been despatched 
 on a mission hostile to their adversary. Teleutias put back 
 into Cnidus to dispose of his captives, and so eventually 
 reached Rhodes, where his arrival brought timely aid to the 
 party in favour of Lacedaemon. 
 
 B.C. 389.^- — And now the Athenians, fully impressed with the 
 belief that their rivals were laying the basis of a new naval 
 supremacy, despatched Thrasybulus the Steirian to check them, 
 with a fleet of forty sail. That officer set sail, but abstained from 
 bringing aid to Rhodes, and for good reasons. In Rhodes the 
 Lacedaemonian party had hold of the fortress, and would be 
 out of reach of his attack, especially as Teleutias was close at 
 hand to aid them with his fleet. On the other hand, his own 
 friends ran no danger of succumbing to the enemy, as they 
 held the cities and were numerically much stronger, and they 
 had established their superiority in the field. Consequently 
 he made for the Hellespont, where, in the absence of any 
 rival power, he hoped to achieve some stroke of good fortune 
 for his city. Thus, in the first place, having detected the 
 rivalries existing between Medocus,^ the king of the Odrysians, 
 and Seuthes,* the rival ruler of the seaboard, he reconciled 
 them to each other, arid made them friends and allies of 
 Athens ; in the belief that if he secured their friendship the 
 Hellenic cities on the Thracian coast would show greater pro- 
 clivity to Athens. Such being the happy state of affairs not 
 only in Europe but as regards the states in Asia also, thanks 
 to the friendly attitude of the king to his fellow-citizens, he 
 sailed into Byzantium and sold the tithe-duty levied on vessels 
 
 1 See Diod. xiv. 98 ; Hicks, 72 ; Kohler, C. I. A. ii. p. 397 ; Isoc. Evag. 
 54-57 ; Paus. I. iii. i ; Lys. de ion. Ar. 20 ; Dem. p. 161. 
 
 ■•' Giote, H. G. ix. 507. '^ Al. Amedocus. 
 
 ■* For Seuthes, see above, Hell. III. ii. vi, p. 10, if the same. 
 
86 HELLENICA BK. IV. {""' "'"'B^o'sig 
 
 arriving from the Euxine. By another stroke he converted 
 the oligarchy of Byzantium into a democracy. The result 
 of this was that the Byzantine demos ^ were no longer sorry 
 to see as vast a concourse of Athenians in their city as pos- 
 sible. Having so done, and having further won the friend- 
 ship of the men of Calchedon,^ he set sail south of the 
 Hellespont. Arrived at Lesbos, he found all the cities 
 devoted to Lacedaemon with the exception of Mytilene. He 
 was therefore loth to attack any of the former until he had 
 organised a force within the latter. This force consisted of 
 four hundred hoplites, furnished from his own vessels, and a 
 corps of exiles from the different cities who had sought 
 shelter in Mytilene ; to which he added a stout contingent, 
 the pick of the Mytileneian citizens themselves. He stirred 
 the ardour of the several contingents by suitable appeals : 
 representing to the men of Mytilene that by their capture of 
 the cities they would at once become the chiefs and patrons 
 of Lesbos ; to the exiles he made it appear that if they would 
 but unite to attack each several city in turn, they might all 
 reckon on their particular restoration ; while he needed only 
 to remind his own warriors that the acquisition of Lesbos 
 meant not only the attachment of a friendly city, but the 
 discovery of a mine of wealth. The exhortations ended and 
 the contingents organised, he advanced against Methymna. 
 
 Therimachus, who chanced to be the Lacedaemonian 
 governor at the time, on hearing of the meditated attack of 
 Thrasybulus, had taken a body of marines from his vessels, 
 and, aided by the citizens of Methymna themselves, along 
 with all the Mytileneian exiles to be found in that place, 
 advanced to meet the enemy on their borders. A battle was 
 fought and Therimachus was slain, a fate shared by several of 
 the exiles of his party. 
 
 As a result 8 of his victory the Athenian general suc- 
 
 ^ For the varying fortunes of the democrats at Byzantium in 408 B.C. and 
 405 B.C., see above, Hell. I. iii. 18 ; II. ii. 2 (Trans, vol. 1. pp. 14, 44) ; for 
 the present moment, 390-389 B.C., see Demosth. c. Lept. 475 ; for the i&- 
 mission of Byzantium into the new naval confederacy in 378 B.C., see Hicks, 
 78 ; Kohler, C. I. A. ii. 19 ; and for B.C. 363, Isocr. Phil. 53 ; Died. xv. 79 ; 
 and for its commercial prosperity, Polyb. iv. 38-47. 
 
 ^ For the spelling of the name, see Trans, vol. i. p. 4. 
 
 ' According to some critics, B.C. 389 is only now reached. 
 
nIc.X *^°'"} DEATH OF THRASYBULUS 87 
 
 ceeded in winning the adhesion of some of the states; or, 
 where adhesion was refused, he could at least raise supplies 
 for his soldiers by freebooting expeditions, and so hastened 
 to reach his goal, which was the island of Rhodes. His chief 
 concern was to support as powerful an army as possible in 
 those parts, and with this object he proceeded to levy money 
 aids, visiting various cities, till he finally reached Aspendus, 
 and came to moorings in the river Eurymedon. The money 
 was safely collected from the Aspendians, and the work com- 
 pleted, when, taking occasion of some depredations^ of the 
 soldiers on the farmsteads, the people of the place in a fit 
 of irritation burst into the general's quarters at night and 
 butchered him in his tent. 
 
 So perished Thrasybulus,^ .a good and great man by all 
 admission. In room of him the Athenians chose Agyrrhius,^ 
 who was despatched to take command of the fleet. And now 
 the Lacedaemonians — alive to the fact that the sale of the 
 Euxine tithe-dues had been negotiated in Byzantium by Athens; 
 aware also that as long as the Athenians kept hold on Cal- 
 chedon the loyalty of the other Hellespontine cities was 
 secured to them (at any rate while Pharnabazus remained their 
 friend) — felt that the state of affairs demanded their serious 
 attention. They attached no blame indeed to Dercylidas. 
 Anaxibius,* however, through the friendship of the ephors, 
 contrived to get himself appointed as governor, on a mission 
 to Abydos. With the requisite funds and ships, he promised 
 to exert such hostile pressure upon Athens that at least her 
 prospects in the Hellespont would cease to be so sunny. 
 His friends the ephors granted him in return for these pro- 
 mises three ships of war and funds to support a thousand 
 mercenaries, and so they despatched him on his mission. 
 Reaching Abydos, he set about improving his naval and 
 military position. First he collected a foreign brigade, by 
 
 ' See Diod. xiv. 94. 
 
 ^ " Thus perished the citizen to whom, more than to any one else, Athens 
 owed not only her renovated democracy, but its wise, generous, and harmoni- 
 ous working, after renovation, " — Grote, //. G. ix. 509. 
 
 ^ For this statesman, see Demosth. c. Timocr. 742 ; Andoc. deMyst. 133 ; 
 Aristot. Ath. Pol. 41, and Mr, Kenyon's note ad loc. ; Aristoph. Eccles. 102, 
 and the Schol. ad loc. ; Diod. xiv. 99 ; Curtius, H. G. Eng. tr. iv. 280. 
 
 * For his prior history, see reference. Trans, vol. i, Index s. n. , if the same. 
 
88 HELLENICA— BK. IV. f™' Ilc.'lspjss 
 
 help of which he drew off some of the Aeolid cities from 
 Pharnabazus. Next he set on foot a series of retaliatory ex- 
 peditions against the states which attacked Abydos, marching 
 upon them and ravaging their territories ; and lastly, manning 
 three vessels besides those which he already held in the 
 harbour of Abydos, he intercepted and brought into port all 
 the merchant ships of Athens or of her allies which he could 
 lay hands on. 
 
 Getting wind of these proceedings, the Athenians, fearing 
 lest the fair foundations laid for them by Thrasybulus in the 
 Hellespont should be ruined, sent out Iphicrates with eight 
 vessels and twelve hundred peltasts. The majority of them ^ 
 consisted of troops which he had commanded at Corinth. In 
 explanation it may be stated that the Argives, when once they 
 had appropriated Corinth and incorporated it with Argos, gave 
 out they had no further need of Iphicrates or his troops ; the 
 real fact being that he had put to death some of the partisans 
 of Argos.^ And so it was he turned his back on Corinth and 
 found himself at home in Athens at the present crisis. 
 
 B.C. 389-388. — ^When Iphicrates first reached the Cher- 
 sonese he and Anaxibius carried on war against each other by 
 the despatch of guerilla or piratic bands across the straits. But 
 as time wore on, information reached him of the departure 
 of Anaxibius to Antandrus, accompanied by his mercenaries 
 and his own bodyguard of Laconians and two hundred Aby- 
 denian hoplites. Hearing further that Anaxibius had won 
 the friendly adhesion of Antandrus, Iphicrates conjectured that 
 after establishing a garrison in that place he would make the 
 best of his way back, if only to bring the Abydenians home 
 again. He therefore crossed in the night, selecting a desert 
 point on the Abydene coast, from which he scaled the hills 
 above the town and planted himself in ambuscade within 
 their folds. The triremes which brought him across had 
 orders at break of day to coast up northwards along the Cher- 
 sonese, which would suggest the notion that he was only out on 
 one of his customary voyages to collect money. The sequel 
 
 ^ Or, " The mass of them." 
 
 - See Grote, H. G. ix. p. 491 note. The "Argolising" or philo-Argeian 
 party, as opposed to the philo-Laconian party. .See above, Hell. IV. iv. 6, 
 p. 60. 
 
Bx/388*'*"^'} IPHICRATES AND ANAXIBIUS 89 
 
 more than fulfilled his expectations. Anaxibius began his 
 return march, and if report speaks truly, he did so notwith- 
 standing that the victims were against his marching that day ; 
 contemptuously disregarding the warning, and satisfied that 
 his march lay all along through a friendly country and was 
 directed to a friendly city. Besides which, those whom he 
 met assured him that Iphicrates was off on a voyage to 
 Proconnesus : hence the unusual absence of precaution on 
 the march. On his side Iphicrates saw the chance, but, so 
 long as the troops of Anaxibius lingered on the level bottoms, 
 refused to spring from his lair, waiting for the moment 
 when the Abydenian division in the van was safely landed 
 in the plain of Cremastb, at the point where the gold 
 mines stand ; the main column following on the downward 
 slope, and Anaxibius with his Laconians just beginning 
 the descent. At that instant Iphicrates set his ambuscade 
 in motion, and dashed against the Spartan at full speed. The 
 latter quickly discerned that there was no hope of escape as 
 he scanned the long straggling line of his attenuated column. 
 The troops in advance, he was persuaded, would never be able 
 to come back to his aid up the face of that acclivity ; besides 
 wir>.h, he observed the utter bewilderment of the whole 
 body at sight of the ambuscade. He therefore turned to 
 those next him, and spoke as follows : " Sirs, it is good for 
 me to die on this spot, where honour bids me ; but for you, 
 sirs, yonder your path lies, haste and save yourselves ^ be- 
 fore the enemy can close with us." As the words died on 
 his lips he took from the hands of his attendant shield-bearer 
 his heavy shield, and there, at his post, unflinchingly fought 
 and fell ; not quite alone, for by his side faithfully lingered a 
 favourite youth, and of the Lacedaemonian governors who had 
 rallied to Abydos from their several cities yet other twelve 
 fought and fell beside the pair. The rest fled, dropping 
 down one by one as the army pursued them to the walls of 
 the city. The death-roll amounted to something like fifty 
 hoplites of the Abydenians, and of the rest two hundred. 
 After this exploit Iphicrates returned to the Chersonese.^ 
 
 ' Or, " sauve qui peut." ° See Hicks, 76 ; and below, Hell. V. i. 31, p. 98. 
 
BOOK V. I. 1-3. 
 
 I. B.C. 388. — Such was the state of affairs in the Hellespont, 
 so far at least as Athens and Sparta are concerned. Eteonicus 
 was once more in Aegina; and notwithstanding that the 
 Aeginetans and Athenians had up to this time held com- 
 mercial intercourse, yet now that the war was plainly to be 
 fought out on the sea, that officer, with the concurrence of the 
 ephorate, gave permission to any one who liked to plunder 
 Attica.^ The Athenians retaUated by despatching a body of 
 hoplites under their general Pamphilus, who constructed a 
 fort against the Aeginetans,^ and proceeded to blockade them 
 by land and sea with ten warships. Teleutias, however, 
 while threading his way among the islands in quest of contri- 
 butions, had chanced to reach a point where he received infor- 
 mation of the turn ' in affairs with regard to the construction 
 of the fortress, whereupon he came to the rescue of the 
 beleaguered Aeginetans, and so far succeeded that he drove off 
 the enemy's blockading squadron. But Pamphilus kept a firm 
 hold on the offensive fortress, and was not to be dislodged. 
 
 After this the new admiral Hierax arrived from Lace- 
 daemon. The naval force was transferred into his successor's 
 hands, and under the happiest auspices Teleutias set sail for 
 home. As he descended to the seashore to start on his home- 
 ward voyage there was not one among his soldiers who had 
 not a warm shake of the hand for their old admiral. Here 
 one presented him with a crown, and there another with a 
 
 ^ Or, "determined to let slip the hounds of war; " or, more prosaically, 
 " issued letters of marque. " See Grote, N. G. ix. 517. 
 ^ I.e. in Aegina as an iitndxi.ai'-o^ 
 
ox.'jsl'"'} ATHENS AND AEGINA 
 
 91 
 
 victor's wreath ; and those who arrived too late, still, as the 
 ship weighed anchor, threw garlands into the sea and wafted 
 him many a blessing with prayerful lips. I am well aware 
 that in the above incident I have no memorable story of 
 munificence, peril, or invention to narrate, but in all sincerity 
 I protest that a man may find food for reflection in the in- 
 quiry what Teleutias had done to create such a disposition 
 in his subordinates. Here we are brought face to face with 
 a true man's work more worthy of account than multitudes of 
 riches or adventure.^ 
 
 The new admiral Hierax, taking with him the larger portion 
 of the fleet, set sail once more for Rhodes. He left behind 
 him twelve vessels in Aegina under his vice-admiral Gorgopas, 
 who was now installed as governor of that island. In con- 
 sequence of this change the Athenian troops inside the fortress 
 were more blockaded than the Aeginetans themselves, so much 
 so that a vote was passed by the Athenian assembly, in 
 obedience to which a large fleet was manned, and the garrison, 
 after four months' sojourn in Aegina, were brought back. But 
 this was no sooner done than they began to be harassed by 
 Gorgopas and the privateers again. To pperate against these 
 they fitted out thirteen vessels, choosing Eunomus as admiral 
 in command. Hierax was still at Rhodes when the Lacedae- 
 monians sent out a new admiral, Antalcidas; they believed 
 that they could not find a better mode of gratifying Tiribazus. 
 Accordingly Antalcidas, after visiting Aegina in order to pick 
 up the vessels under Gorgopas, set sail for Ephesus. At this 
 point he sent back Gorgopas with his twelve ships to Aegina, 
 and appointed his vice-admiral Nicolochus to command the 
 remainder of the fleet. 
 
 Nicolochus was to relieve Abydos, and thither set sail ; 
 but in the course of the voyage turned aside to Tenedos, 
 where he ravaged the territory, and, with the money so 
 secured, sailed on to Abydos. The Athenian generals ^ on 
 their side, collecting from Sarhothrace, Thasos, and the fort- 
 
 ' See Grote, H. G. ix. 518 : " The ideal of government as it presented 
 itself to Xenophon was the paternal despotism or something like it," rb 
 iOeKivTOiv iLpxei-v- Cf. Cyrofi. passim, Hiero, and his various other com- 
 positions. 
 
 - And among the rest Iphicrates and Diotimus. See below, § 25, p. 96; 
 nbove, IV. viii. 39, p. 89. 
 
92 HELLENICA BK. V. {""' 'ii/jas 
 
 resses in that quarter, hastened to the relief of Tenedos ; but, 
 finding that Nicolochus had continued his voyage to Abydos, 
 they selected the Chersonese as their base, and proceeded to 
 blockade him and his fleet of five-dnd-twenty vessels with the 
 two-and-thirty vessels under their joint command. 
 
 Meanwhile Gorgopas, returning from Ephesus, fell in 
 with the Athenian admiral Eunomus, and, shunning an 
 encounter at the moment, sought .shelter in Aegina, which 
 he reached a httle before sunset; and at once disembark- 
 ing his men, set them down to their evening meal; whilst 
 Eunomus on his side, after hanging back for a little while, 
 sailed away. Night fell, and the Athenian, showing the 
 customary signal light to prevent his squadron straggling, led 
 the way in the darkness. Gorgopas instantly got his men 
 on board again, and, taking the lantern for his guide, followed 
 the Athenians, craftily lagging behind a little space, so as not 
 to show himself or raise any suspicion of his presence. In 
 place of the usual cry the boatswains timed the rowers by a 
 clink of stones, and silently the oars slid, feathering through 
 the waves^; and just when the squadron of Eunomus was touch- 
 ing the coast, off Cape Zoster ^ in Attica, the Spartan sounded 
 the bugle-note for the charge. Some of Eunomus's vessels 
 were in the act of discharging their crews, others were still 
 getting to their moorings, whilst others were as yet only bearing 
 down to land. The engagement was fought by the light of 
 the moon, and Gorgopas captured four triremes, which he tied 
 astern, and so set sail with his prizes in tow towards Aegina. 
 The rest of the Athenian squadron made their escape into the 
 harbour of Piraeus. 
 
 It was after these events that Chabrias ^ commenced his 
 voyage to Cyprus, bringing relief to Evagoras. His force 
 consisted at first of eight hundred light troops and ten triremes, 
 but was further increased by other vessels from Athens and a 
 body of heavy infantry. Thus reinforced, the admiral chose 
 a night and landed in Aegina; and secreted himself in 
 
 ^ Lit. ' ' the boatswains employing a clink of stones and a sliding motion 
 of the oars." 
 
 ^ I.e. " Cape Girdle," mod. Cape Karvura. See Tozer, Geog: of Greece, 
 pp. 78, 372. 
 
 ^ According to Diod. xiv. 92, Chabrias had been for some time in Corinth. 
 See also above, IV. viii. 24, p. 85, note i. 
 
«"c'.388'°"'} DEATH OF GORGOPAS 93 
 
 ambuscade with his light troops in hollow ground some 
 way beyond the temple of Heracles. At break of day, as 
 prearranged, the Athenian hoplites made their appearance 
 under command of Demaenetus, and began mounting up 
 between two and three miles ^ beyond the Herakleion at 
 Tripurgia, as it is called. The news soon reached Gorgopas, 
 who sallied out to the rescue with the Aeginetans and the 
 marines of his vessels, being further accompanied by eight 
 Spartans who happened to be with him. Not content with 
 these he issued orders inviting any of the ships' crews, who 
 were free men, to join the relief party. A large number of 
 these sailors responded. They armed themselves as best they 
 could, and the advance commenced. When the vanguard 
 were well past the ambuscade, Chabrias and his men sprang 
 up from their hiding-place, and poured a volley of javelins and 
 stones upon the enemy. At the same moment the hoplites, who 
 had disembarked,^ were advancing, so that the Spartan van- 
 guard, in the absence of anything like collective action, were 
 speedily cut down, and among them fell Gorgopas with the 
 Lacedaemonians. At their fall the rest of course turned 
 and fled. One hundred and fifty Aeginetans were numbered 
 among the slain, while the loss incurred by the foreigners, 
 metics, and sailors who had joined the relief party, reached 
 a total of two hundred. After this the Athenians sailed the 
 sea as freely as in the times of actual peace. Nor would 
 anything induce the sailors to row a single stroke for Eteonicus 
 — even under pressure — since he had no pay to give. 
 
 Subsequently the Lacedaemonians despatched Teleutias 
 once again to talce command of the squadron, and when the 
 sailors saw it was he who had come, they were overjoyed. 
 He summoned a meeting and addressed them thus : " Soldiers, 
 I am back again, but I bring with me no money. Yet if 
 God be willing, and your zeal flag not, I will endeavour 
 to supply you with provisions witliout stint. Be well assured, 
 as often as I find myself .in command of you, I have but one 
 prayer — that your lives may be spared no less than mine ; and 
 as for the necessaries of existence, perhaps it would astonish 
 
 1 Lit. " about sixteen stades. " 
 
 ^ Or, reading oi dya/Se^Tj/fires, "who had scaled the height." See 
 Hartman, Anal. Xen. p. 364. 
 
94 HELLENICA BK. V. {"="■ ''^c.^H 
 
 you if I said that I would rather you should have them than I. 
 Yet by the gods I swear I would welcome two days' starvation 
 in order to spare you one. Was not my door open in old 
 days to every comer ? Open again it shall stand now ; and so it 
 shall be : when your own board overflows, you shall look in and 
 mark the luxury of your general ; but if at other times you see 
 him bearing up against cold and heat and sleepless nights, you 
 must apply the lesson to yourselves and study to endure those 
 evils. I do not bid you do aught of this for self-mortification's 
 sake, but that you may derive some after-blessing from it. 
 Soldiers, let Lacedaemon, our own mother-city, be to you 
 an example. Her good fortune is reputed to stand high. 
 That you know ; and you know too, that she purchased her 
 glory and her greatness not by faint-heartedness, but by choos- 
 ing to suffer pain and incur dangers in the day of need. 
 ' Like city,' I say, ' like citizens.' You, too, as I can bear you 
 witness, have been in times past brave ; but to-day must we 
 strive to be better than ourselves. So shall we share our 
 pains without repining, and when fortune smiles, mingle our 
 joys ; for indeed the sweetest thing of all surely is to flatter 
 no man, Hellene or Barbarian, for the sake of hire ; we will 
 suffice to ourselves, and from a source to which honour pre- 
 eminently invites us ; since, I need not remind you, abundance 
 won from the enemy in war furnishes forth not bodily nutri- 
 ment only, but a feast of glory the wide world over." 
 
 So he spoke, and with one voice they all shouted to him 
 to issue what orders he thought fit ; they would not fail him in 
 willing service. The general's sacrifice was just concluded, 
 and he answered : " Good, then, my men ; go now, as doubt- 
 less you were minded, and take your evening meal, and next 
 provide yourselves, please, with one day's food. After that 
 repair to your ships without delay, for we have a voyage on 
 hand, whither God wills, and must arrive in time." So then, 
 when the men returned, he embarked them on their ships, 
 and sailed under cover of night for the great harbour of 
 Piraeus : at one time he gave the rowers rest, passing the 
 order to take a snatch of sleep ; at another he pushed forward 
 towards his goal with rise and fall of oars. If any one supposes 
 that there was a touch of madness in such an expedition — 
 with but twelve triremes to attack an enemy possessed of a 
 
"c.'jsV'"^^} SURPRISE OF PIRAEUS 
 
 95 
 
 large fleet — he should consider the calculations of Teleutias. 
 He was under the firm persuasion- that the Athenians were 
 more careless than ever about their navy in the harbour since 
 the death of Gorgopas ; and in case of finding warships riding 
 at anchor — even so, there was less danger, he conjectured, in 
 attacking twenty ships in the port of Athens than ten else- 
 where ; for, whereas, anywhere outside the harbour the sailors 
 would' certainly be quartered on board, at Athens it was easy 
 to divine that the captains and officers would be sleeping at 
 their homes, and the crews located here and there in different 
 quarters. 
 
 Thus minded he set sail, and when he was five or six 
 furlongs ^ distant from the harbour he lay on his oars and 
 rested. But with the first streak of dawn he led the way, the 
 rest following. The admiral's orders to the crews were ex- 
 plicit. They were on no account to sink any merchant vessel ; 
 they were equally to avoid damaging ^ their own vessels, but if 
 at any point they espied a warship at her moorings they must 
 try and cripple her. The trading vessels, provided they had 
 got their cargoes on board, they must seize and tow out of the 
 harbour ; those of larger tonnage they were to board wherever 
 they could and capture the crews. Some of his men actually 
 jumped on to the Deigma quay,* where they seized hold of 
 various traders and pilots and deposited them bodily on board 
 ship. So the Spartan admiral carried out his programme. 
 
 As to the Athenians, meanwhile, some of them who got 
 wind of what was happening rushed from indoors outside to 
 see what the commotion meant, others from the streets home 
 to get their arms, and others again were off to the city with 
 the news. The whole of Athens rallied to the rescue at that 
 instant, heavy infantry and cavalry alike, the apprehension 
 being that Piraeus was taken. But the Spartan sent off the 
 captured vessels to Aegina, telhng off three or four of his 
 triremes to convoy them thither; with the rest he followed 
 along the coast of Attica, and emerging in seemingly inno- 
 cent fashion from the harbour, captured a number of fishing 
 
 1 Lit. " five or six stades." 
 
 2 See Hartman, Anal. Xen. pp. 365, 366. 
 
 3 See Map, Trans, vol. i. p. 76 ; Grote {H. G. ix. 523) : cf. Thuc. ii. 94, 
 the attempt of Brasidas on the port of Megara. For the wealth of Piraeus, 
 Grote, H. G. ix.ssi. See below, Pol. Ath. i. 17; Rev. iii. 13 (pp. 281, 334). 
 
96 HELLENICA— BK. V. I "b.c'.' Iss'jl' 
 
 smacks, and passage boats laden with passengers crossing to 
 Piraeus from the islands ; and finally, on reaching Sunium he 
 captured some merchantmen laden with corn or other mer- 
 chandise. After these performances he sailed back to Aegina, 
 where he sold his prizes, and with the proceeds was able to 
 provide his troops with a month's pay, and for the future was 
 free to cruise about and make what reprisals chance cast in 
 his way. By such procedure he was able to support a full 
 quota of mariners on board his squadron, and procured to 
 himself the prompt and enthusiastic service of his troops. 
 
 B.C. 388-387. — Antalcidas had now returned from the Per- 
 sian court with Tiribazus. The negotiations had been success- 
 ful. He had secured the alliance of the Persian king and his mili- 
 tary co-operation in case the Athenians and their allies refused 
 to abide by the peace which the king dictated. But learning 
 that his second in command, Nicolochus, was being blockaded 
 with his fleet by Iphicrates and Diotimus ^ in Abydos, he set 
 off at once by land for that city. Being come thither he 
 took the fleet one night and put out to sea, having first spread 
 a story that he had invitations from a party in Calchedon ; but 
 as a matter of fact he came to anchorage in Percotfe and there- 
 kept quiet. Meanwhile the Athenian forces under Demaenetus 
 and Dionysius and Leontichus and Phanias had got wind of 
 his movement, and were in hot pursuit towards Proconnesus. 
 As soon as they were well past, the Spartan veered round and 
 returned to Abydos, trusting to information brought him of 
 the approach of Polyxenus with the Syracusan ^ and Italian 
 squadron of twenty ships, which he wished to pick up and 
 incorporate with his own. 
 
 A little later the Athenian Thrasybulus ^ (of CoUytus) was 
 making his way up with eight ships from Thrace, his object 
 being to effect a junction with the main Athenian squadron. 
 The scouts signalled the approach of eight triremes, where- 
 upon Antalcidas, embarking his marines on board twelve 
 of the fastest sailers of his fleet, ordered them to make up 
 their full complements, where defective, from the remaining 
 
 ' See above, p. 91 ; Lysias, de ion. Arist. (Jebb, Att. Or. i. p. 237). 
 
 '■^ See below, VI. ii. 4 foil., p. 144 ; Hicks, 71, 84, 88, 
 
 ^ His name occurs on the famous stele of the new Athenian confederacy, 
 
 B.C. 378. See Hicks, 81 ; Kohler, C. I. A. ii. 17 ; Demos, de Cor. p. 301 ; 
 
 Arist. Shet. ii. 23 ; Demos, t. Timocr. 742. 
 
n"c. ssl^''^'} DESIRE FOR PEACE AT ATHENS 97 
 
 vessels; and so lay to, skulking in his lair with all possible 
 secrecy. As soon as the enemy's vessels came saihng past he 
 gave chase; and they catching sight of him took to flight. 
 With his swiftest sailers he speedily overhauled their laggards, 
 and ordering his vanguard to let these alone, he followed hard on 
 those ahead. But when the foremost had fallen into his clutches, 
 the enemy's hinder vessels, seeing their leaders taken one by 
 one, out of sheer despondency fell an easy prey to the slower 
 sailers of the foe, so that not one of the eight vessels escaped. 
 
 Presently the Syracusan squadron of twenty vessels joined 
 him, and again another squadron from Ionia, or rather so much 
 of that district as lay under the control of Tiribazus.' The 
 full quota of the contingent was further made up from the terri- 
 tory of Ariobarzanes (with whom Antalcidas kept up a friendship 
 of long standing), in the absence of Pharnabazus, who by this 
 date had already been summoned up country on the occasion 
 of his marriage with the king's daughter. With this fleet, which, 
 from whatever sources derived, amounted to more than eighty 
 sail, Antalcidas ruled the seas, and was in a position not only 
 to cut off the passage of vessels bound to Athens from the 
 Euxine, but to convoy them into the harbours of Sparta's allies. 
 
 The Athenians could not but watch with alarm the 
 growth of the enemy's fleet, and began to fear a repeti- 
 tion of their former discomfiture. To be trampled under 
 foot by the hostile power ■ seemed indeed no remote pos-. 
 sibility, now that the Lacedaemonians had procured an ally 
 in the person of the Persian monarch, and they were in 
 little less than a state of siege themselves, pestered as they 
 were by privateers from Aegina. Ofl all these grounds the 
 Athenians became passionately desirous of peace.i The Lace- 
 daemonians were equally out of humour with the war for 
 various reasons — what with their garrison duties, one mora at 
 Lechaeum and another at Orchomenus, and the necessity of 
 keeping watch and ward on the states, if loyal not to lose 
 them, if disaffected to prevent their revolt ; not to mention 
 that reciprocity of annoyance ^ of which Corinth was the centre. 
 So again the Argives had a strong appetite for peace ; they 
 
 ' See, at this point, Grote on the financial condition of Athens and the 
 TheSrikon, H. G. ix. 525. ^ Or, "that give-and-take of hard knocks." 
 
 VOL. II H 
 
98 HELLENICA — BK. V. {™' "'d'c^sI? 
 
 knew that the ban had been called out against them, and, it 
 was plain, that no fictitious alteration of the calendar would 
 any longer stand them in good stead. Hence, when Tiri- 
 bazus issued a summons calling on all who were willing to 
 listen to the terms of peace sent down by the king ^ to pre- 
 sent themselves, the invitation was promptly accepted. At 
 the opening of the conclave ^ Tiribazus pointed to the king's 
 seal attached to the document, and proceeded to read the 
 contents, which ran as follows : 
 
 "The king, Artaxerxes, deems it just that the cities in 
 Asia, with the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, should be- 
 long to himself J the rest of the Hellenic cities he thinks it 
 just to leave independent, both small and great, with the ex- 
 ception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which three are to 
 belong to Athens as of yore. Should any of the parties con- 
 cerned not accept this peace, I, Artaxerxes, will war against 
 him or them with those who share my views. This will I do 
 by land and by sea, with ships and with money." 
 
 After listening to the above declaration the ambassadors, 
 from the several states proceeded to report the same to their 
 respective governments. One and all of these took the oaths * 
 to ratify and confirm the terms unreservedly, with the excep- 
 tion of the Thebans, who claimed to take the oaths in behalf 
 of all Boeotians. This claim Agesilaus repudiated : unless 
 they chose to take the oaths in precise conforrhity with the 
 words of the king's edict, which insisted on " the future 
 autonomy of each state, small or great," he would not admit 
 them. To this the Theban ambassadors made no other, 
 reply, except that the instructions they had received were 
 different. " Pray go, then," Agesilaus retorted, " and ask the 
 question ; and you may inform your countrymen that if they 
 will not comply, they will be excluded from the treaty.-" The 
 Theban ambassadors departed, but Agesilaus, out of hatred 
 to the Thebans, took active measures at once. Having got 
 the consent of the ephors he forthwith offered sacrifice. The 
 offerings for crossing the frontier were propitious, and he 
 pushed on to Tegea. From Tegea he despatched some of 
 the knights right and left to visit the—perioeci and hasten 
 
 * See Hicks, 76. ^ At Sardis, doubtless. f At Sparta, doubtless. 
 
Bx-aS^z^"*} THE PEACE "OF" ANTALCIDAS 
 
 99 
 
 their mobilisation, and at the same time sent commanders of 
 foreign brigades to the allied cities on a similar errand. But 
 before he had started from Tegea the answer from Thebes 
 arrived ; the point was yielded, they would suffer the states to 
 be independent. Under these circumstances the Lacedae- 
 monians returned home, and the Thebans were forced to 
 accept the truce unconditionally, and to recognise the auto- 
 nomy of the Boeotian cities.^ But now the Corinthians were 
 by no means disposed to part with the garrison of the Argives. 
 Accordingly Agesilaus had a word of warning for both. To 
 the former he said, "if they did not forthwith dismiss the 
 Argives," and to the latter, "if they did not instantly quit 
 Corinth," he would march an army into their territories. The 
 terror of both was so great that the Argives marched out of 
 Corinth, and Corinth was once again left to herself;^ where- 
 upon the "butchers"* and their accomplices in the deed of 
 blood determined to retire from Corinth, and the rest of the 
 citizens welcomed back their late exiles voluntarily. 
 
 Now that the transactions were complete,' and the states 
 were bound by their oaths to abide by the peace sent down to 
 them by the king, the immediate result was a general dis- 
 armament, military and naval forces being alike disbanded ; 
 and so it was that the Lacedaemonians and Athenians, with 
 their allies, found themselves in the enjoyment of peace for 
 the first time since the period of hostilities subsequent to the 
 demolition of the walls of Athens. From a condition which, 
 during the war, can only be described as a sort of even 
 balance with their antagonists, the Lacedaemonians now 
 emerged ; and reached a pinnacle of glory consequent upon 
 the Peace of Antalcidas,* so called. As guarantors of the 
 peace presented to Hellas by the king, and as administrators 
 personally of the autonomy of the states, they had added 
 Corinth to their alliance ; they had obtained the independence 
 
 * See Freeman, of. cit. pp. i68, 169. 
 
 ^ See Ages. ii. 21, p. 251 ; Grote, H. G. ix, 537. 
 
 ' oi (T<t>ayeh, a party catchword (in reference to the incidents narrated above, 
 Hell. IV. iv. 2). See below, t&v fiapioiv Sr)iuiywyQ>v, Hell. V. ii. 7 ; ol 
 KriSbtievoi. rfi^ IleXoTrovVT^ffov, Hell. VII. v. i, pp. 102, 225 ; above, ol ff^ayeij, 
 Hell. III. ii. 27, p. 18, of the philo-Laconian olig£u:chs in Elis. See Dem. 
 c. Lept. 473. , 
 
 * Or, more correctly, the peace "under," or " at the date of," iir' 'AitoX- 
 kISov. See Grote, H. G. x. i, note i. 
 
loo HELLENICA BK. V. {''"§ lif^os'se 
 
 of the states of Boeotia at the expense of Thebes,i which meant 
 the gratification of an old ambition ; and lastly, by calling out 
 the ban in case the Argivesv refused to evacuate Corinth, they 
 had put a stop to the appropriation of that city by the Argives. 
 
 II. B.C. 386. — Indeed the late events had so entirely shaped 
 themselves in conformity with the wishes of the Lacedaemon- 
 ians, that they determined to go a step farther and chastise 
 those of their allies who either had borne hard on them during 
 the war, or otherwise had shown themselves less favourable to 
 Lacedaemon than to her enemies.^ Chastisement was not all ; 
 they must lay down such secure foundations for the future as 
 should render the like disloyalty impossible again.^ As the first 
 step towards this policy they sent a dictatorial message to the 
 Mantineans, and bade them raze their fortifications, on the sole 
 ground that they could not otherwise trust them not to side with 
 their enemies. Many things in their conduct, they alleged, 
 from time to time, had not escaped their notice : their frequent 
 despatches of corn to the Argives while at war with Lacedae- 
 mon ; at other times their refusal to furnish contingents during 
 a campaign, on the pretext of some holy truce or other ;* or if 
 they did reluctantly take the field — the miserable inefficiency 
 of their service. " But, more than that," they added, " we note 
 the jealousy with which you eye any good fortune which may 
 betide our state ; the extravagant pleasure ^ you exhibit at the 
 sudden descent of some disaster." 
 
 This very year, moreover, it was commonly said,^ saw 
 
 •^ Or, "they had made the states of Boeotia independent of Thebes." 
 See Grote, H. G. a. 44. 
 
 ^ See Hartman, An. Xen. p. 367 foil. ; Busolt, Die Lak. p. 129 foU. 
 
 * Or, ' ' they determined to chastise . . . and reduce to such order that 
 disloyalty should be impossible." 
 
 ^ See above, Hell. IV. ii. 16, p. so- ^ -W. IV. v. 18, p. 70. 
 
 * As to this point, see Curtius, H. G., V. v. (iv. 305 note, Eng. trans.). 
 There appears to be some confusion. According to Thuc. v. 81, "When 
 the Argives deserted the alliance [with Mantinea, Athens, and Elis, making 
 a new treaty of alliance with Lacedaemon for fifty years] the Manti- 
 neans held out for a time, but without the Argives they were helpless, and 
 so they came to terms with the Lacedaemonians, and gave up their claims 
 to supremacy over the cities in Arcadia, which had been subject to them. 
 . . . These changes were effected at the close of winter [418 B.C.] towards 
 the approach of spring [417 B.C.], and so ended the fourteenth year of the 
 war." — Jowett. According to Diod. xv. 5, the Lacedaemonians attacked 
 Mantinea within two years after the Peace of Antalcidas, apparently in 386 B.C. 
 
d"c. "sL/ss } REDUCTION OF MANTINEA loi 
 
 the expiration, as far as the Mantineans were concerned, of 
 the thirty years' truce, consequent upon the battle of Mantinea. 
 On their refusal, therefore, to raze their fortification walls the 
 ban was called out against them. Agesilaus begged the state 
 to absolve him from the conduct of this war on the plea that 
 the city of Mantinea had done frequent service to his father ^ 
 in his Messenian wars. Accordingly Agesipolis led the ex- 
 pedition — in spite of the cordial relations of his father 
 Pausanias ^ with the leaders of the popular party in Mantinea. 
 
 B.C. 385. — The first move of the invader was to subject 
 the enemy's territory to devastation ; but failing by such means 
 to induce them, to raze their walls, he proceeded to draw ' 
 lines, of circumvallation round the city, keeping half his troops 
 under arms to screen the entrenching parties whilst the other 
 half pushed on the work with the spade. As soon as the 
 trench was completed, he experienced no further difficulty in 
 building a wall round the city. Aware, however, of the 
 existence of a large supply of corn inside the town, the 
 result of the bountiful harvest of the preceding year, and 
 averse to the notion of wearing out the city of Lacedaemon and 
 her allies by tedious campaigning, he hit upon the expedient 
 of damming up the river which flowed through the town. 
 
 It was a stream of no inconsiderable size.^ By erecting a 
 barrier at its exit from the town he caused the water to rise 
 above the basements of the private dwellings and the founda- 
 tions of the fortification walls. Then, as the lower layers of 
 bricks became saturated and refused their support to the 
 rows above, the wall began to crack and soon to totter 
 to its fall. The citizens for some time tried to prop it with 
 pieces of timber, and used other devices to avert the im- 
 minent ri^in of their tower; but finding themselves over- 
 matched by the water, and in dread lest the fall at some point 
 or other of the circular wall * might deliver them captive to the 
 
 According to Thuc. v. 82, and C. I. A. 50, in B.C. 417 Argos had reverted 
 to her aUiance with Athens, and an attempt to connect the city with the sea by- 
 long walls was made, ' ' certain other states in Peloponnese being privy to the 
 project" (Thuc. v. 83) — an attempt frustrated by Lacedaemon early in B.C. 
 416. Is it possible that a treaty of alliance between Mantinea and Lacedae- 
 mon for thirty years was formally signed in B.C. 416? 
 
 ^ I.e. Archidamus. ^ See above. Hell. III. v. 25, p. 39. 
 
 ' I.e. the Ophis. See Leake, Morea, III. xxiv. p. 71 ; Pausan. Arcad. 8 ; 
 Grote, H. G. x. 48, note 2. * Or " in the circuit of the wall." 
 
I02 HELLENICA — BK. V. { b". 'ssl-lst 
 
 spear of the enemy, they signified their consent to raze their 
 walls. But the Lacedaemonians now steadily refused any 
 form of truce, except on the further condition that the Manti- 
 neans would suffer themselves tp be broken up and distributed 
 into villages. They, looking the necessity in the face, con- 
 sented to do even that. The sympathisers with Argos among 
 them, and the leaders of their democracy, thought that their 
 fate was sealed. Then the father treated with the son, Pausanias 
 with Agesipolis, in their behalf, and obtained immunity for them 
 — sixty in number — on condition that they should quit the city. 
 The Lacedaemonian troops stood lining the road on both sides, 
 beginning from the -gates, and watched the outgoers; and 
 with their spears in their hands, in spite of bitter hatred, kept 
 aloof from them with less difficulty than the Mantineans of the 
 better classes themselves — a weighty testimony to the power 
 of Spartan discipline, be it said. In conclusion, the wall was 
 razed, and Mantinea split up into four parts,^ assuming once 
 again its primitive condition as regards inhabitants. The first 
 feeling was one of annoyance at the necessity of pulling down 
 their present houses and building others, yet when the owners ^ 
 found themselves located so much nearer their estates round 
 about the villages, in the full enjoyment of aristocracy, and rid 
 for ever of "those troublesome demagogues," they were de- 
 lighted with the turn which affairs had taken. It became the 
 custom for Sparta to send them, not one commander of con- 
 tingents,' but four, one for each village; and the zeal dis- 
 played, now that the quotas feu: military service were furnished 
 from the several village centres, 'was far greater than it had 
 been under the democratic system. So the transactions in 
 connection with Mantinea were brought to a conclusibn, and 
 thereby one lesson of wisdom was taught mankind — not to 
 conduct a river though a fortress town. 
 
 B.C. 384-383. — ^To pass on. The party in exUe from Phlius, 
 
 1 See Diod. xv. 5 ; Strab. viii. 337 ; Ephor. fr. 138, ed. Did.; and Grote, 
 H. G. X. SI. 
 
 ^ Or, " holders of properties. " The historian is referring not to the popu- 
 lation at large, I think, but to the rich landowners, i.e. the BAtiittoi, and is not 
 so partial as Grote supposes \H. G. x. 51 foil.). 
 
 ^ Technically ^aiayol, Lacedaemonian officers who commanded the con- 
 tingents of the several allies. See above, Hell. III. v. 7, p. 34 ; Thuc. ii. 76 ; 
 and Arnold's note ad loc. ; also C. R. Kennedy, ap. Diet, of Greek and Roman 
 Antiquities, s.v.; Muller, Dorians, ii. 250, Eng. tr. ; Busolt, Die Lak. p. 123. 
 
B"c.3i4-|8"} SPARTA AND PHLIUS 103 
 
 seeing the severe scrutiny to which the behaviour of the allies 
 of Lacedaemon during the late war was being subjected, felt 
 that their opportunity had come. They repaired to Lace- 
 daemon, and laid great emphasis on the fact that, so long as 
 they had been in power themselves at home, " their city used 
 to welcome Lacedaemonians within her walls, and her citizens 
 flocked to the campaign under their leadership ; but no sooner 
 had they been driven into exile than a change had come. 
 The men of Phlius now flatly refused to follow Lacedaemon 
 anywhere J the Lacedaemonians, alone of all men living, 
 must not be admitted within their gates." After listen- 
 ing to their story the ephors agreed that the matter de- 
 manded attention. Then they sent to the state of Phlius 
 a message to this effect : the Phliasian exiles were friends 
 of Lacedaemon; nor did it appear that they owed their 
 exile to any misdoing. Under the circumstances, Lacedaemon 
 claimed their recall from banishment, not by force, but as a 
 concession voluntarily granted. When the matter was thus 
 stated, the Phliasians were not without alarm that an army 
 might march upon Phlius, and a party inside the town might 
 admit the enemy within the walls; for within the walls of 
 Phlius were to be found many who, either as blood relations 
 or for other reasons, were partisans of the exiles, and as so 
 often happens, at any rate in the majority of states, there was 
 a revolutionary party who, in their ardour for reform, would 
 welcome gladly their restoration. Owing to fears of this 
 character, a formal decree was passed : to welcome home the 
 exiles, and to restore to them all undisputed property, the 
 purchasers of the same being indemnified from the treasury 
 of the state ; and in the event of any ambiguity or question 
 arising between the parties, the same to be determined before 
 a court of justice. Such was the position of affairs in con- 
 nection with the Phliasian exiles at the date in question. 
 *" B.C. 383.^ — And now from yet another quarter ambassadors 
 arrived at Lacedaemon : that is to say, from Acanthus and Apol- 
 lonia, the two largest and most important states' of the Olynthian 
 confederacy. The ephorate, after learning from them the object 
 of theirvisit, presented them to the assembly and-the allies, in pre- 
 sence of whom Cleigenes ofAcanthus madea speech to thiseffect: 
 
 ^ Ai. B.C. 382. 
 
104 HELLENICA — BK. V. {""■ "'ii^'^H 
 
 " Men of Lacedaemon and of the allied states," he said, 
 " are you aware of a silent but portentous growth within the 
 bosom of Hellas ? ^ Few here need to be told that for size 
 and importance Olynthus now stands at the head of the 
 Thracian cities. But are you aware that the citizens of 
 Olynthus have already brought over several states by the 
 bribe of joint citizenship and common laws ; that they have 
 forcibly annexed some of the larger states ; and that, so en- 
 couraged, they have taken in hand further to free the cities 
 of Macedonia from Amyntas the king of the Macedonians; 
 that, as soon as their immediate neighbours had shown com- 
 pliance, they at once proceeded to attack larger and more dis- 
 tant communities ; so much so, that when we started to come 
 hither, we left them masters not only of many other places, 
 but of Pella itself, the capital of Macedonia. Amyntas,^ we 
 saw plainly, must ere long withdraw from his cities, and was in 
 fact already all but in name an outcast from Macedonia. 
 
 " The Olynthians have actually sent to ourselves and to 
 the men of ApoUonia a joint embassy, warning us of their 
 intention to attack us if we refuse to present ourselves at 
 Olynthus with a military contingent. Now, for our parts, 
 men of Lacedaemon, we desire nothing better than to abide by 
 our ancestral laws and institutions, to be free and independent 
 citizens ; but if aid from without is going to fail us, we too 
 must follow the rest and coalesce with the Olynthians. Why, 
 even now they muster no less than eight hundred^ heavy infantry 
 and a considerably larger body of hght infantry, while their 
 cavalry, when we have joined them, will exceed one thousand 
 men. At the date of our departure we left embassies from 
 Athens and Boeotia in Olynthus, and we were told that the 
 Olynthians themselves had passed a formal resolution to return 
 the compliment. They were to send an embassy on their side 
 to the aforesaid states to treat of an alliance. And yet, if the 
 power of the Athenians and the Thebans is to be further in- 
 creased by such an accession of strength, look to it," the 
 
 ' Or, " are you aware of a new power growing up in Hellas ? " 
 ^ For Amyntas's reign, see Diod. xiv. 89, 92 ; xv. 19 ; Isocr. Panegyr, 126, 
 Archid. 46 ; note below, p. 105. 
 
 ' See Grote, H. G. x. 72 ; Thirlwall, H. G. v. 12 (ch. xxxvii.). 
 
b"c."8|'^"''} ACANTHIAN envoys at SPARTA 105 
 
 speaker added, " whether hereafter you will find things so 
 easy to manage in that quarter. 
 
 " They hold Potidaea, the key to the isthmus of Pallene, 
 and therefore, you can well believe, they can command the 
 states within that peninsula. If you want any further proof 
 of the abject terror of those states, you have it in the fact that 
 notwithstanding the bitter hatred which they bear to Olynthus, 
 not one of them has dared to send ambassadors along with us 
 to apprise you of these matters. 
 
 " Reflect, how you can reconcile your anxiety to prevent the 
 unification of Boeotia with your neglect to hinder the solidify- 
 ing of a far larger power — a power destined, moreover, to 
 become formidable not on land only, but by sea ? For what is 
 to stop it, when the soil itself supplies timber for shipbuilding,^ 
 and there are rich revenues derived from numerous harbours 
 and commercial centres ? — it cannot but be that abundance of 
 food and abundance of population will go hand in hand. Nor 
 have we yet reached the limits of Olynthian expansion ; there 
 are their neighbours to be thought of — the kingless or inde- 
 pendent Thracians. These are already to-day the devoted 
 servants of Olynthus, and when it comes to their being 
 actually under her, that means at once another vast accession 
 of strength to her. With the Thracians in her train, the gold 
 mines of Pangaeus will stretch out to her the hand of welcome. 
 
 " In making these assertions, we are but uttering remarks 
 ten thousand times repeated in the democracy of Olynthus. 
 And as to their confident spirit, who shall attempt to de- 
 scribe it? It is God, for aught I know, who, with the 
 growth of a new capacity, gives increase also to the proud 
 thoughts and vast designs of humanity. For ourselves, men 
 of Lacedaembn and of the allied states, our task is com- 
 pleted. We have played our parts in announcing to you how 
 things stand there. To you it is left to determine whether 
 
 1 See Hicks, 74, for a treaty between Am)mtas and the Chalcidians, B.C. 
 390-389 : "The article of the treaty between Amyntas III., father of Philip, 
 and the Chalcidians, about timber, etc., reminds us that South Macedonia, 
 the Chalcidio peninsula, and Amphipolis were the chief sources whence Athens 
 derived timber for her dockyards." Thuc. iv. 108 ; Diod. xx. 46 ; Boeckh, 
 P. E. A. p. 250 ; and for a treaty between Athens and Amyntas, B.C. 382, 
 see Hicks, 77 ; Kohler, C. I. A. ii. 397, 423. 
 
io6 HELLENICA — BK. V. {""' "b^c^^sSs 
 
 what we have described is worthy of your concern. One 
 only thing further you ought to recognise : the power we 
 have spoken of as greaj is not as yet invincible, for those 
 states which are involuntary participators in the citizenship 
 of Olynthus will, in prospect of any rival power appearing in 
 the field, speedily fall away. On the contrary, let them be 
 once closely knit and welded together by the privileges of 
 intermarriage and reciprocal rights of holding property in land 
 - — which have already become enactments ; let them discover 
 that it is a gain to them to follow in the wake of conquerors 
 (just as the Arcadians,^ for instance, find it profitable to march 
 in your ranks, whereby they save their own property and pil- 
 lage their neighbours') j let these things come to pass, and 
 perhaps you may find the knot no longer so easy to unloose." 
 At the conclusion of this address, the Lacedaemonians 
 requested the allies to speak, bidding them give their joint 
 advice as to the best course to be pursued in the interests 
 of Peloponnese and the allies. Thereupon many members, 
 and especially those who wished to gratify the Lacedae- 
 monians, agreed in counselling active measures ; and it was 
 resolved that the states should severally send contingents to 
 form a total of ten thousand men. Proposals were also 
 made to allow any state, so wishing, to give money instead of 
 men, at the rate of three Aeginetan obols ^ a day per man ; or 
 where the contingent consisted of cavalry, the pay given for 
 one horseman was to be equivalent to that of four hoplites ; 
 while, in the event of any state defaulting in service, the 
 Lacedaemonians should be allowed to mulct the said state of 
 a stater per man per diem. These resolutions were passed, 
 and the deputies from Acanthus rose again. They argued that, 
 though excellent, these resolutions were not of a nature to be 
 rapidly carried into effect Would it not be better, they asked, 
 
 ' For the point of the comparison, see Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. ch. jv. 
 " Real nature of the Olynthian scheme," pp. 190 foil, and note z, p. 197 ; 
 also Grote, H. G. x. 67 foE, 278 foil. 
 
 ^ /.e. "rather more than sixpence a day for a hoplite, and two shilhngs 
 for a horseman." "The Aeginetan stater weighed about 196 grains, rather 
 more than two of our shillings, and was divided into two drachms of 98 grains, 
 each of which contained six obols of about 16 grains each. " See Percy Gardner, 
 "Types of Greek Coins," ffisf. Int. p. 8; Jowett, note to Thuo. III. Ixx. 
 4, vol. ii. pp. 201, 202. 
 
l^i'ist'^''^} WAR DECLARED AGAINST OLYNTHUS 107 
 
 pending the mobilisation of the troops, to despatch an officer 
 at once in command of a force from Lacedaemon and the other 
 states, not too large to start, immediately. The effect would 
 be instantaneous, for the states which had not yet given in 
 their adhesion to Olynthus would be brought to a standstill, 
 and those already forcibly enrolled would be shaken in their 
 alliance. These further resolutions being also passed, the 
 Lacedaemonians despatched Eudamidas, accompanied by a 
 body of neodamodes, xtith perioeci and Sciritae,^ to the num- 
 ber of two thousand odd. Eudamidas lost no time in setting 
 out, having obtained leave from the ephors for his brother 
 Phoebidas to /oUow later with the remainder of the troops 
 assigned to him. Pushing on himself to the Thracian 
 territory, he set about despatching garrisons to various 
 cities at their request. He also secured the voluntary 
 adhesion of Potidaea, although already a member of the 
 Olynthian alliance ; and this town now served as his base of 
 operations for carrying on war on a scale adapted to his 
 somewhat limited armament. 
 
 Phoebidas, when the remaining portion of his brother's 
 forces was duly mustered, put himself at their head and com- 
 menced his march. On reaching Thebes the troops en- 
 camped outside the city, round the gymnasium. Faction was 
 rife within the city. The two polemarths in office, Ismenias 
 and Leontiades, were diametrically opposed,? being the respect- 
 ive heads of antagonistic political clubs. Hence it was that, 
 while Ismenias, ever inspired by hatred to the Lacedaemonians, 
 would not come anywhere near the Spartan general, Leontiades, 
 on the other hand, was assiduous in courting him ; and 
 when a sufficient intimacy was established between them, he 
 made a proposal as follow^; "You have it in your power," he 
 said, addressing Phoebidas, " this very d^y to confer supreme 
 benefit on your country. Follow me with your hoplites, and 
 I will introduce you into the citadel. That done, you may 
 rest assured Thebes will be completely under the thumb of 
 
 ^ Or, "new citizens, provincials, and Sciritae. " 
 
 2 See Grote, ff. G. vol. x. p. 80: "We have little or no information 
 respecting the government of Thebes," etc. The /ocus classicus seems to be 
 Plut. de Genio Socraiis. See Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. § 2, "Of the Boeotian 
 League," pp. 154-184 ; and, in reference to the seizure of the Kadmeia, p. 170. 
 
lo8 HELLENICA— BK. V. {""■ "■ic^;r, 
 
 Lacedaemon and of us, your friends. At present, as you see, 
 there is a proclamation forbidding any Theban to take service 
 with you against Olynthus, but we will change all that. You 
 have only to act with us as we suggest, and we shall at once 
 be able to furnish you with large supplies of infantry and 
 cavalry, so that you will join your brother with a magni- 
 ficent reinforcement, and pending his proposed reduction of 
 Olynthus, you will have accomplished the reduction of a far 
 larger state than that — to wit, this city of Thebes." 
 
 The imagination of Phoebidas was kindled as he listened 
 to the tempting proposal. To do a brilliant deed was far 
 dearer to him than life ; ^ on the other hand, he had no 
 reasoning capacity, and would seem to have been deficient 
 altogether in sound sense. The consent of the Spartan 
 secured, Leontiade's bade him set his troops in motion, as if 
 everything were ready for his departure. " And anon, when 
 the hour is come," added the Theban, " I will be with you, 
 and show you the way myself." 
 
 The senate was seated in the arcade or stoa in the 
 market-place, since the Cadmeia was in possession of the 
 women who were celebrating the Thesmophoria.^ It was 
 noon of a hot summer's day ; scarcely a soul was stirring 
 in the streets. This was the moment for Leontiades. He 
 mounted on horseback and galloped off to overtake Phoebidas. 
 He turned him back, and led him without further delay into 
 the acropolis. Having posted Phoebidas and his soldiers 
 inside, he handed him the key of the gates, and warning him 
 not to suffer any one to enter into the citadel without a pass 
 from himself, he straightway betook himself to the senate. 
 Arrived there, he delivered himself thus : " Sirsf the 'L^oe- 
 daemonians are in possession of the citadel ; but that is no 
 cause for despondency, since, as they assure us, they have 
 no hostile intention, except, indeed, towards any one who 
 has an appetite for war. For myself, and acting, in obedience 
 to the law, which empowers the polemarch to apprehend all 
 
 ^ Or, " Renown was his mistress." See Grote, If. G. x. 84. 
 
 - An ancient festival held by women in honour of Demeter and Persephone 
 {tu> Qe<TiM<j>6pu)), who gave the first impulse to civil society, lawful marriage, 
 etc. See Herod, ii. 171 ; Diod. v. 5. 
 
b"c'.38|^°'^^} seizure of the CADMEIA 109 
 
 persons suspected of capital crimes, I hereby seize the person 
 of Israenias as an arch-fomenter of war. I call upon you, sirs, 
 who are captains of companies, and you who are ranked with 
 them, to do your duty. Arise and secure the prisoner, and 
 lead him away to the place appointed." 
 
 Those who were privy to the affair, it will be understood, 
 presented themselves, and the orders were promptly carried 
 out. Of i:hose not in the secret, but opposed to the party of 
 Leontiade^, some sought refuge at once outside the city in 
 terror for their lives; whilst the rest, albeit they retired to 
 their hous'es at first, yet when they found that Ismenias was 
 imprisoned in the Cadmeia, and further delay seemed danger- 
 ous, retreated to Athens. These were the men who shared 
 the views of Androcleidas and Ismenias, and they must 
 have numbered about three hundred. 
 
 - Now that the transactions were concluded, another polem- 
 arch was chosen in place of Ismenias, and Leontiades at 
 once set out to Lacedaemon. There he found the ephors and 
 the mass of the community highly incensed against Phoebidas, 
 " who had failed to execute the orders assigned him by the 
 state." Against this general indignation, however, Agesilaus pro- 
 tested.^ If mischief had been wrought to Lacedaemon by this 
 deed, it was just that the doer of it should be punished ; but, 
 if good, it was a time-honoured custom to allow full scope for 
 impromptu acts of this character. " The sole point you have~ 
 to look to," he urged, "is whether what has been done is good 
 or evil." After this, however, Leontiades presented himself to 
 the assembly^ and addressed the members as follows : " Sirs, 
 Lacedaemonians, \he hostile attitude of Thebes towards you, 
 before the occurrence of late events, was a topic constantly on 
 your lips, since time upon time your eyes were called upon 
 to witness her friendly bearing to your^ foes in contrast 
 with her hatred of your friends. Can it be denied that Thebes 
 refused to take part with you in the campaign against your 
 direst enemy, the democracy in Piraeus; and balanced that 
 lukewarmness by an onslaught on the Phocians, whose sole 
 
 ' See Ages. vii. 
 
 2 "Select Committee.'' See ffell II. iv. 38 (Trans, vol. i. p. 73); and 
 below, VI. iii. 3, p. 153. 
 
no HELLENICA BK. V. {''"' "'ic^afs 
 
 crime was cordiality to yourselves ? ^ Nor is that all. In full 
 knowledge that you were hkely to be engaged in war with 
 Olynthus, she proceeded at once to make an alliance with that 
 city. So that up to the last moment you were in constant 
 expectation of hearing some day that the whole of Boeotia was 
 laid at the feet of Thebes. With the late incidents all is" 
 changed. You need fear Thebes no longer. One brief de- 
 spatch 2 in cipher will suffice to procure a dutiful subservience 
 to your every wish in that quarter, provided only you will take 
 as kindly an interest in us as we in you." 
 
 This appeal told upon the meeting, and the Lacedae- 
 monians ^ resolved formally, now that the citadel had been 
 taken, to keep it, and to put Ismenias on his trial. In con- 
 sequence of this resolution a body of commissioiiers * was 
 despatched, three Lacedaemonians and one for each of the 
 allied states, great and small alike. The court of inquiry thus 
 constituted, the sittings commenced, and an indictment was pre- 
 ferred against Ismenias. He was accused of playing into the 
 hands of the barbarian ; of seeking amity with the Persian to 
 the detriment of Hellas ; of accepting sums of money as bribes 
 from the king ; and, finally, of being, along with Androcleidas, 
 the prime cause of the whole intestine trouble to which Hellas 
 was a prey. Each of these charges was met by the defendant, 
 but to no purpose, since he failed to disabuse the court of 
 their conviction that the grandeur of his designs was only 
 equalled by their wickedness.^ The verdict was given against 
 him, and he was put to death. The party of Leontiades thus 
 possessed the cityj and Went beyond the injunctions given 
 them in the eager performance of their services. x 
 
 B.C. 382. — As a result of these transactions the Lacedae- 
 monians pressed on the combined campaign against Olynthus 
 
 ' See vol. i. p. 71 ; and above, JleU. III. v. 4, p. 33. 
 
 ^ Lit. "scytalfe." See note, p. 22, above. 
 
 ' See Grote, If. G. vol. x. p. 85 ; Diod. xv. 20 ; Plut. Pelop. vi.; ib. de 
 Genio Socratis, V. vii. 6 A ; Cor. Nep, Pelop. i. 
 
 * Lit. "Dicasts." 
 
 ^ Or, " that he was a magnificent malefactor." See Grote, H. G. vol. ix. 
 p. 420, "the great wicked man" (Clarendon's epithets for Cromwell) ; Plato, 
 Mono, go B; Republic, 336 A, "a rich and mighty man." See also Plut. 
 Ages, xxxii. 2, Agesilaus's exclamation at sight of Epaminondas, Si tov /jxfaKo- 
 irpiyiiovos dvOpdiwov, 
 
l"c."3sl""*°} TELEUTIAS BEFORE OLYNTHUS in 
 
 with still greater enthusiasm. They not only sent out Teleutias 
 as governor, but by their united efforts furnished him with 
 an aggregate army of ten thousand men.^ They also sent 
 despatches to the allied states, calling upon them to sup- 
 port Teleutias in accordance with the resolution of the allies. 
 All the states were ready to display devotion to Teleutias, 
 and to do him service, sinee--he__was a man who never 
 forgot a service rendered him. Not* was Thebes an ex- 
 ception ; for was not the governor a brother of Agesilaus ? 
 Thebes, therefore, was enthusiastic in sending her contribution 
 of heavy infantry and cavalry. The Spartan conducted his 
 march slowly and surely, taking the utmost pains to avoid 
 injuring his friends, and to collect as large a force as 
 possible. He also sent a message in advance to Amyntas, 
 begging him, if he were truly desirous of recovering his empire, 
 to raise a body of mercenaries, and to distribute sums of 
 money among the neighbouring kings with a view to their 
 alliance. Nor was that all. He sent also to Derdas, the ruler 
 of Elimia, pointing out to him that the Olynthians, having laid 
 at their feet the great power of Macedonia, would certainly not 
 suffer his lesser power to escape unless they were stayed by 
 force of arms in their career of insolence. Proceeding . thus, 
 by the time he had reached the territory of the allied powers, 
 he was at the head of a very considerable army. At Potidaea 
 he halted to make the necessary disposition of his troops, and 
 thence advanced into the territory of the enemy. As he ap- 
 proached the hostile city, he abstained from felling and firing 
 alike, being persuaded that to do so was ofily to create difficul- 
 ties in his own path, whether advancing or retreating ; it would 
 be time enough, when he retired from Olynthus, to fell the trees 
 and lay them as a barrier in the path of any assailant in the rear. 
 Being now within a mile or so ^ of the city he came to 
 a halt. The left division was under his personal command, 
 for it suited him to advance in a line opposite the gate from 
 which the enemy sallied; the other division of the allies 
 stretched away to the right. The cavalry were thus dis- 
 tributed : the Laconians, Thebans, and all the Macedonians 
 
 ' Lit. ' ' sent out along with him the combined force of ten thousand men, '' 
 inref. to § 20 above, p. 106. ^ Lit, "tenstades." 
 
"2 HELLENICA— BK. V. {''"■ '\\t%'!i:lt-% 
 
 present were posted on the right. With his own division he 
 kept Derdas and his troopers, four hundred strong. This he 
 did partly out of genuine admiration for this body of horse, 
 and partly as a mark of courtesy to Derdas, which should make 
 him not regret his coming. 
 
 Presently the enemy issued forth and formed in line 
 opposite, under cover of their walls. Then their cavalry formed 
 in close order and commenced the attack. Dashing down 
 upon the Laconians and Boeotians they dismounted Polychar- 
 mus, the Lacedaemonian cavalry general, inflicting a hundred 
 wounds on him as he lay on the ground, and cut down 
 others, and finally put to flight the cavalry on the right 
 wing. The flight of these troopers infected the infantry in 
 close proximity to them, who in turn swerved ; and it looked 
 as if the whole army was aBout to be worsted, when Derdas 
 at the head of his cavalry dashed straight at the gates of 
 Olynthus, Teleutias supporting him with the troops of his 
 division. The Olynthian cavalry, seeing how matters were 
 going, and in dread of finding the gates closed upon them, 
 wheeled round and retired with alacrity. Thus it was that 
 Derdas had his chance to cut down man after man as their 
 cavalry ran the gauntlet past him. In the same way, too, the 
 infantry of the Olynthians retreated within their city, though, 
 owing to the closeness of the walls in their case, their loss was 
 trifling. Teleutias claimed the victory, and a trophy was 
 duly erected, after which he turned his back on Olynthus and 
 devoted himself to felling the fruit-trees. This was the cam- 
 paign of the summer. He now dismissed both the Macedonian 
 army and the cavalry force of Derdas. Incursions, however, 
 on the part of the Olynthians themselves against the states 
 allied to Lacedaemon were frequent ; lands were pillaged, and 
 people put to the sword. 
 
 III. B.C. 381. — ^With the first symptoms of approaching 
 spring the Olynthian cavalry, six hundred strong, had swooped 
 into the territory of ApoUonia — about the middle of the day — 
 and dispersing over the district, were employed in pillaging; but 
 as luck would have it, Derdas had arrived that day with his 
 troopers, and was breakfasting in Apollonia. He noted the 
 enemy's incursion, but kept quiet, biding his time ; his horses 
 
»!c. 381* '"' } DEATH OF TELEUTIAS 
 
 "3 
 
 were ready saddled, and his troopers armed cap-A-j>kd. As the 
 Olynthians came galloping up contemptuously, not only into 
 the suburbs, but to the very gates of the city, he seized his 
 opportunity, and with his compact and well-ordered squadron 
 dashed out ; whereupon the invaders took to flight. Having 
 once turned them, Derdas gave them no respite, pursuing and 
 slaughtering them for ten miles or more,^ until he had driven 
 them for shelter within the very ramparts of Olynthus. Report 
 said that Derdas slew something like eighty men in this affair. 
 After this the Olynthians were more disposed to keep to their 
 walls, contenting themselves with tilling the merest corner of 
 their territory. 
 
 Time advanced, and Teleutias was in conduct of another 
 expedition against the city of Olynthus. His object was to 
 destroy any timber '^ still left standing, or fields still cultivated 
 in the hostile territory. This brought out the Olynthian cavalry, 
 who, stealthily advancing, crossed tlie river which washes the 
 walls of the town, and again continued their silent march right up 
 to the adversary's camp. At sight of an audacity which nettled 
 him, Teleutias at once ordered Tlemonidas, the officer com- 
 manding his light infantry division, to charge the assailants at 
 the run. On their side the men of Olynthus, seeing the rapid 
 approach of the light infantry, wheeled and quietly retired 
 until they had recrossed the river, drawing the enemy on, who 
 followed with conspicuous hardihood. Arrogating to them- 
 selves the position of pursuers towards fugitives, they did not 
 hesitate to cross the river which stood between them and their 
 prey. Then the Olynthian cavalry, choosing a favourable 
 moment, when those who had crossed seemed easy to deal 
 with, wheeled and attacked them, putting Tlemonidas himself 
 to the sword with more than a hundred others of his company. 
 Teleutias, when he saw what was happening, snatched up his 
 arms in a fit of anger and began leading his hoplites swiftly 
 forward, ordering at the same time his peltasts and cavalry to 
 give chase and not to slacken. Their fate was the fate of 
 many before and since, who, in the ardour of pursuit, have 
 come too close to the enemy's walls and found it hard to get 
 back again. Under a hail of missiles from the walls they 
 
 1 Lit. " ninety stades. " " I.e. fruit-trees. 
 
 VOL. II . \ 
 
114 HELLENICA BK. V. {""' 'B.cfls? 
 
 were forced to retire in disorder and with the necessity of 
 guarding themselves against the missiles. At this juncture the 
 Olynthians sent out their cavalry at full gallop, backed by 
 supports of light infantry; and finally their heavy infantry 
 reserves poured out and fell upon the enemy's Unes, now in 
 thorough confusion. Here Teleutias fell fighting, and when 
 that happened, without further pause the troops immediately 
 about him swerved. Not one soul longer cared to make a 
 stand, but the flight became general, some fleeing towards 
 Spartolus, others in the direction of Acanthus, a third set 
 seeking refuge within the walls of ApoUonia, and the majority 
 within those of Potidaea. As the tide of fugitives broke into 
 several streams, so also the pursuers divided the work between 
 them ; this way and that they poured, dealing death wholesale. 
 So perished the pith and kernel of the armament. 
 
 Such calamities are not indeed without a moral. The lesson 
 they are meant to teach mankind, I think, is plain. If in a 
 general sense one ought not to punish any one, even one's own 
 slave, in anger, — since the master in his wrath may easily incur 
 worse evil himself than he inflicts, — so, in the case of antagonists 
 in war, to attack an enemy under the influence of passion rather 
 than of judgment is an absolute error. For wrath is but a blind 
 impulse devoid of foresight, whereas to the penetrating eye of 
 reason a blow parried may be better than a wound inflicted.^ 
 
 When the news of what had happened reached Lace- 
 daemon it was agreed, after due deliberation, that a force 
 should be sent, and of no trifling description, if only to quench 
 the victors' pride, and to prevent their own achievements from 
 becoming null and void. In this determination they sent out 
 King Agesipolis as general, attended, like Agesilaus ^ on his 
 Asiatic campaign, by thirty Spartans.^ Volunteers flocked to 
 his standard. They were partly the pick and flower of the 
 provincials,* partly foreigners of the class called Trophimoi,^ 
 or lastly, bastard sons of Spartans, comely and beautiful of 
 
 ' See, for the same sentiment, Horsemanship, vi. 13. See also Plut. Pel, 
 and Marc. (Clough, ii. p. 278). ^ See above, Hell. III. iv. 2, p. 24. 
 
 ' Lit. " Spartiates. " Tlie new' army was sent out B.C. 380, according to ] 
 Grote. * Lit. "beautiful and brave of the Perioeci." 
 
 " Xenophon's own sons educated at Sparta would belong to this class. 
 See Sketch of Life, vol. i. p. cxxviii. ; Grote, H. G. x. 91, 
 
bIc.Tsi'^''^ AGESIPOLIS; PHLIUS 115 
 
 limb, and well versed in the lore of Spartan chivalry. The 
 ranks of this invading force were further swelled by volunteers 
 from the allied states, the Thessalians notably contributing a 
 corps of cavalry. All were animated by the desire of becoming 
 known to Agesipolis, so that even Amyntas and Derdas in zeal 
 of service outdid themselves. With this promise of success 
 Agesipolis marched forward against Olynthus. 
 
 Meanwhile the state of Phlius, complimented by Agesipolis 
 on the amount of the funds contributed by them to his expedi- 
 tion and the celerity with which the money had been raised, 
 and in full belief that while the one king was in the field 
 they were secure against the hostile attack of the other (since 
 it was hardly to be expected that both kings should be absent 
 from Sparta at one moment), boldly desisted from doing justice 
 by her lately . reinstated citizens. On the one hand, these 
 exiles claimed that points in dispute should be determined 
 before an impartial court of justice ; the citizens, on the other, 
 insisted on the claimants submitting the cases for trial in the 
 city itself. And when the latter demurred to that solution, 
 asking "What sort of trial that would be where the offenders 
 were also the judges ? " they appealed, to deaf ears. Conse- 
 quently the restored party appeared at Sparta, to prefer a 
 complaint against their city. They were accompanied by other 
 members of the community, who stated that many of the Phli- 
 asians themselves besides the appellants recognised the injustice 
 of their treatment. The state of Phlius was indignant at 
 this manoeuvre, and retaliated by imposing a fine on all who 
 had betaken themselves to Lacedaemon without a mandate 
 from the state. Those who incurred the fine hesitated to 
 return home ; they preferred to stay where they were and 
 enforce their views : " It is quite plain now who were the 
 perpetrators of all the violence — the very people who originally 
 drove us into exile, and shut their gates upon Lacedaemon ; the 
 confiscators of our property one day, the ruthless opponents 
 of its restoration the next. Who else but they have now brought 
 it about that we should be fined for appearing at Lacedaemon ? 
 and for what purpose but to deter any one else for the future 
 from venturing to expose the proceedings at Phlius ? " Thus 
 far the appellants. And in good sooth the conduct of the men 
 
ii6 HELLENICA — BK. V. { '^"' "'■^cl^ssj 
 
 of Phlius did seem to savour of insolence ; so much so that 
 the ephors called out the ban against them. 
 
 B.C. 380. — Nor was Agesilaus otherwise than well satisfied 
 with this decision, not only on the ground of old relations of 
 friendly hospitality between his father Archidamus and the party 
 of Podanemus, who were numbered among the restored exiles 
 at this time, but because personally he was bound by similar 
 ties himself towards the adherents of Procles, son of Hip- 
 ponicus. The border sacrifices proving favourable, the march 
 commenced at once. As he advanced, embassy after embassy 
 met him, and would fain by presents of money avert invasion. 
 But the king answered that the object of his march was not to 
 commit wrongdoing, but to protect the victims of injustice. 
 Then the petitioners offered to do anything, only they begged 
 him to forgo invasion. Again he replied — How could he 
 trust to their words when they had lied to him already ? He 
 must have the warrant of acts, not promises. And being 
 asked, "What act (would satisfy him)?" he answered once 
 more, saying, "The same which you performed aforetime, 
 and suffered no wrong at our hands" — in other words, the 
 surrender of the acropolis.^ But to this they could not bring 
 themselves. Whereupon he invaded the territory of Phlius, 
 and promptly drawing lines of circumvallation, commenced 
 the siege. Many of the Lacedaemonians objected, for the 
 sake of a mere handful of wretched people, so to embroil 
 themselves with a state of over five thousand men.^ For, 
 indeed, to leave no doubt on this score, the men of Phlius 
 met regularly in assembly in full view of those outside. But 
 Agesilaus was not to be beaten by this move. Whenever 
 any of the townsmen came out, drawn by friendship or kin- 
 ship with the exiles, in every case the king's instructions were 
 to place the public messes* at the service of the visitors, 
 and, if they were willing to go through the course of gymnastic 
 training, to give them enough to procure necessaries. All 
 members of these classes were, by the general's strict injunctions, 
 further to be provided with arms, and loans were to be raised 
 
 ^ See above, IV. iv. 15, p. 63. 
 * See Grote, Jf. G. x. 45, note 4 ; and below, V. iv. 13, p. 123. 
 * See below, Pol. Lac. v. p. 305. 
 
B"c.38o?37r'} DEATH OF AGESIPOLIS 117 
 
 for the purpose without delay. Presently the superintendents 
 of this branch of the service were able to turn out a detach- 
 ment of over a thousand men, in the prime of bodily perfec- 
 tion, well disciplined and splendidly armed, so that in the end 
 the Lacedaemonians affirmed : " Fellow-soldiers of this stamp 
 are too good to lose." Such were the concerns of Agesilaus. 
 
 Meanwhile Agesipolis on leaving Macedonia advanced 
 straight upon Olynthus and took up a strategical position in 
 front of the town. Finding that no one came out to op- 
 pose him, he occupied himself for the present with pillaging 
 any remnant of the district still intact, and with marching 
 into the territory allied with the enemy, where he destroyed 
 the corn. The town of Torone he attacked and took by 
 storm. But while he was so engaged, in the height of mid- 
 summer he was attacked by a burning fever. In this condition 
 his mind reverted to a scene once visited, the temple of 
 Dionysus at Aphytis, and a longing for its cool and sparkling 
 waters and embowered shades^ seized him. To this spot 
 accordingly he was carried, still living, but only to breathe his 
 last outside the sacred shrine, within a week of the day on 
 which he sickened. His body was laid in honey and con- 
 veyed home to Sparta, where he obtained royal sepulture. 
 
 When the news reached Agesilaus he displayed none of the 
 satisfaction which might possibly have been expected at the 
 removal of an antagonist. On the contrary, he wept and pined 
 for the companionship so severed, it being the fashion at Sparta 
 for the kings when at home to mess together and to share the 
 same quarters. Moreover, Agesipolis was admirably suited to 
 Agesilaus, sharing with the merriment of youth in tales of the 
 chase and horsemanship and boyish loves ; ^ while, to crown all, 
 the touch of reverence due from younger to elder was not want- 
 ing in their common life. In place of Agesipolis, the Lace- 
 daemonians despatched Polybiades as governor to Olynthus. 
 
 B.C. 379. — Agesilaus had already exceeded the time during 
 which the supplies of food in Phlius were expected to last. 
 The difference, in fact, between self-command and mere appetite 
 is so great that the men of Phlius had only to pass a resolu- 
 tion to cut down the food expenditure by one half, and by 
 doing so were able to prolong the siege for twice the calcu- 
 
 1 Lit. "shady tabernacles." ^ See Ages. viii. 2, p. 263. 
 
u8 HELLENICA— BK. V. {""'"' bJ'j^I 
 
 lated period. But if the contrast between self-restraint and 
 appetite is so great, no less startling is that between boldness 
 and faint-heartedness. A Phliasian named Delphion, a real 
 hero, it would seem, took to himself three hundred Phliasians, 
 and not only succeeded in preventing the peace-party from 
 carrying out their wishes, but was equal to the task of incar- 
 cerating and keeping safely under lock and key those whom 
 he mistrusted. Nor did his ability end here. He succeeded 
 in forcing the mob of citizens to perform garrison duty, and 
 by vigorous patrolling kept them constant to the work. Over 
 and over again, accompanied by his personal attendants, he 
 would dash out of the walls and drive in the enemy's outposts, 
 first at one point and then at another of the beleaguering 
 circle. But the time eventually came when, search as they 
 might by every means, these picked defenders^ could find 
 no further store of food within the walls, and they were 
 forced to send to Agesilaus, requesting a truce for an em- 
 bassy to visit Sparta, adding that they were resolved to leave 
 it to the discretion of the authorities at Lacedaemon to do 
 with their city what they liked. Agesilaus granted a pass 
 to the embassy, but, at the same time, he was so angry 
 at their setting his personal authority aside, that he sent 
 to his friends at home and arranged that the fate of Phlius 
 should be left to his discretion. Meanwhile he proceeded 
 to tighten the cordon of investment, so as to render it im- 
 possible that a single soul inside the city should escape. 
 In spite of this, however, Delphion, with one comrade, a 
 branded dare-devil, who had shown great dexterity in relieving 
 the besieging parties of their arms, escaped by night. Pre- 
 sently the deputation returned with the answer from Lace- 
 daemon that the state left it entirely to the discretion of 
 Agesilaus to decide the fate of Phlius as seemed to him-best. 
 Then Agesilaus pronounced his> verdict. A board of one 
 hundred — fifty taken from the restored exiles, fifty from 
 those within the city — were in the first place to make inquisi- 
 tion as to who deserved to live and who to die, after which 
 they were to lay down laws as the basis of a new constitution. 
 Pending the carrying out of these transactions, he left a 
 
 ^ See below, IfeU. VII. i. 19, p. 191. 
 
cS:.v!'/i?bT379} PHLIUS and OLYNTHUS surrender 119 
 
 detachment of troops to garrison the place for six months, 
 with pay for that period. After this he dismissed the allied 
 forces, and led the state ^ division home. Thus the transactions 
 concerning Phlius were brought to a conclusion, having occu- 
 pied altogether one year and eight months. 
 
 Meanwhile Polybiades had reduced the citizens of Olynthus 
 to the last stage of misery through famine. Unable to supply 
 themselves with corn from their own land, or to import it by 
 sea, they were forced to send an embassy to Lacedaemon to 
 sue for peace. The plenipotentiaries on their arrival accepted 
 articles of agreement by which they bound themselves to have 
 the same friends and the same foes as Lacedaemon, to follow 
 her lead, and to be enrolled among her allies ; and sg, having 
 taken an oath to abide by these terms, they returned home. 
 
 On every side the affairs of Lacedaemon had signally 
 prospered : — Thebes and the rest of the Boeotian states lay 
 absolutely at her feet ; Corinth had, become her most faithful 
 ally; Argos, unable longer to avail herself of the subterfuge 
 of a movable calendar, was humbled to the dust ; Athens was 
 isolated ; and, lastly, those of her own allies who displayed a 
 hostile feeling towards her had been punished ; so that, to all 
 outward appearance, the foundations of her empire were at 
 length absolutely well and firmly laid. 
 
 IV. — Abundant examples might be found, alike in Hellenic 
 and in foreign history, to prove that the Divine powers mark 
 what is done amiss, winking neither at impiety nor at the com- 
 mission of unhallowed acts ; but at present I -confine myself to 
 the facts before me.^ The Lacedaemonians, who had pledged 
 themselves by oath to leave the states independent; had laid 
 violent hands on the acropolis of Thebes, and were eventually 
 punished by the victims of that iniquity single-handed, — the 
 Lacedaemonians, be it noted, who had never before been 
 mastered by living man ; and not they alone, but those citizens 
 
 ^ ri troKiTi.Kbv , the citizen army. See above, IV. iv. 19, p. 64 ; below, 
 Pol. Lac. xi. p. 314. 
 
 2 Or, " it is of my own subject that I must now spealc." For 'Cae.ferifety, 
 or sudilen reversal of circumstances, on which the plot of the Helknica hinges, 
 see Grote, H. G. x. ioo-io3. Cf Soph. Oed. Tyr. 450 ; Antig. 1066 ; Thuc. 
 V. 116 ; also some remarks in Trans, vol. i. pp. Ixii. Ixiii. ; Helknica Essays, 
 " Xenophon," p. 382 foil. This passage is perhaps the key to the historian's 
 position. 
 
120 HELLENICA BK. V. {""' 'bJ. 1,1 
 
 of Thebes who introduced them into their acropolis, and who 
 wished to enslave their city to Lacedaemon, that they might 
 play the tyrant themselves — how fared it with them ? A bare 
 score of the fugitives were sufficient to destroy their govern- 
 ment. How this happened I will now narrate in detai^ 
 
 There was a man named Phyllidas — he was secretary to 
 Archias, that is, to the polemarchs.^ Beyond his official duties, 
 he had rendered his chief other services, and all apparently 
 in an exemplary fashion. A visit to Athens in pursuance 
 of some business brought this man into contact with a former 
 acquaintance of his own, Melon, one of the exiles who had 
 fled for safety to Athens. Melonhad various questions to 
 ask touching the sort ' of tyranny practised by Archias in the 
 exercise of the polemarcliy, and by Philip. He soon dis- 
 covered that affairs at home were still more detestatjle to 
 Phyllidas than to himself. It only remained to exchange 
 pledges, and to arrange the details of what was to be done. 
 After a certain interval Melon, accompanied by six of the 
 trustiest comrades he could find among his fellow-exiles, set 
 off for Thebes. They were armed with nothing but daggers, 
 and first of all crept into the neighbourhood under cover of 
 night. The whole of the next day they lay concealed in a 
 desert place, and drew near to the city gates in the guise 
 of labourers returning home with the latest comers from the 
 fields. Having got safely within the city, they spent the 
 whole of that night at the house of a man named Charon,' 
 and again the next day in the same fashion. Phyllidas mean- 
 while was busily taken up with the concerns of the polemarchs, 
 who were to celebrate a feast of Aphroditb on going out of 
 office. Amongst other things, the secretary was to take this 
 opportunity of fulfilling an old undertaking, which was the 
 introduction of certain women to the polemarchs. They 
 were to be the most majestic and the most beautiful to be 
 found in Thebes. The polemarchs, on their side (and the 
 character of the men is sufficiently marked), were looking for- 
 ward to the pleasures of the night with joyful anticipation. 
 
 ■^ Lit. " to Archias and his (polemarchs) " ; but the Greek phrase does not, 
 as the English would, imply that there were actually more than two polem- 
 archs, viz. Archias and Philippus. Hypates and Leontiades belonged to 
 the faction, but were neither of them polemarchs. 
 
bIc.sV'^} deliverance of THEBES l2t 
 
 Supper was over, and, thanks to the zeal with which the 
 master of the ceremonies responded to their mood, they were 
 speedily intoxicated. To their oft-repeated orders to introduce 
 their mistresses, he went out and fetched Melon and the rest, 
 three of them dressed up as ladies and the rest as their 
 attendant maidens. Having brought them into the treasury 
 of the polemarchs' residence,^ he returned himself and 
 announced to Archias and his friends that the women would 
 not present themselves as long as any of the attendants 
 remained in the room ; whereupon they promptly bade all 
 withdraw, and Phyllidas, furnishing the servants with a stoup 
 of wine, sent them off to the house of one of them. And 
 iiow at last he introduced the mistresses, and led them to 
 their seats beside their respective lords. It was preconcerted 
 that as soon as they were seated they were to throw aside 
 their veils and strike home. That is one version of the death 
 of the polemarchs.^ According to another. Melon and his 
 friends came in as revellers, and so despatched their victims. 
 
 That over, Phyllidas, with three of the band, set off to the 
 house of Leontiades. Arrived there, he knocked at the door, 
 and sent in word that he had a message from the polemarchs. 
 Leontiades, as chance befell, was still reclining in privacy 
 after dinner, and his wife was seated beside him working 
 wools. The fidelity of Phyllidas was well known to him, and 
 he gave orders to admit him at once. They entered, slew 
 Leontiades, and with threats silenced his wife. As they 
 went out they ordered the door to be shut, threatening that 
 if they found it open they would kill every one in the house. 
 And now that this deed was done, Phyllidas, with two of the 
 band, presented himself at the prison, telling the gaoler he had 
 brought a man from the polemarchs to be locked up. The 
 gaoler opened the door, and was at once despatched, and the 
 prisoners were released. , These they speedily supplied with 
 arms taken from the armoury in the stoa, and then led them 
 to the Ampheion,^ and bade them take up a position there, 
 after which they at once made a proclamation calling on all 
 
 ' Lit. " Polemarcheion. " 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' and so, according to the prevalent version of the matter, the polem- 
 archs virere slain. But some say that . . ." 
 
 ' See plan of Thebes, Did. Geog. ; Arrian, Anab. i. 8 ; Aesch. Sept. c. 
 Thch. 528. 
 
122 HELLENICA — BIC V. {""'"iVsn 
 
 Thebans to come out, horse and foot, seeing that the tyrants 
 were dead. The citizens, indeed, as long as it was night, not 
 knowing whom or what to trust, kept quiet, but when day 
 dawned and revealed what had occurred, the summons was • 
 responded to with alacrity, heavy infantry and cavalry under 
 arms alike sallying forth. Horsemen were also despatched by 
 the now restored exiles to the two Athenian generals on the 
 frontier ; and they, being aware of the object of the message 
 [promptly responded].^ 
 
 On the other hand, the Lacedaemonian governor in the 
 citadel, as soon as that night's proclamation reached his ears, 
 was not slow to send to Plataeae ^ and Thespiae for reinforce- 
 ments. The approach of the Plataeans was perceived by 
 the Theban cavalry, who met them and killed a score of 
 them and more, and after that achievement returned to the ^ 
 city, to find the Athenians from the frontier already arrived. 
 Then they assaulted the acropolis. The troops within recog- 
 nised the paucity of their own numbers, whilst the zeal of 
 their opponents (one and all advancing to the attack) was 
 plainly visible, and loud were the proclamations, promising 
 rewards to those who should be first to scale the walls. All 
 this so worked upon their fears that they agreed to evacuate 
 the place if the citizens would allow them a safe-conduct to 
 retire with their arms. To this request the others gladly 
 yielded, and they made a truce. Oaths were taken on the 
 terms aforesaid, and the citizens dismissed their adversaries. 
 For all that, as the garrison retired, those of them who were 
 recognised as personal foes were seized and put to death. 
 Some were rescued through the good offices of the Athenian 
 reinforcements from the frontier, who smuggled them across 
 and saved them. The Thebans were not content with putting 
 the men to death ; if any of them had children, these also 
 were sacrificed to their vengeance. 
 
 B.C. 378. — When the news of these proceedings reached 
 Sparta the first thing the Lacedaemonians did was to put to 
 
 ' Supply iire^o^Sow. There is a lacuna in the MSS. at thus point. 
 
 ^ This city had been refouuded in B.C. 386 (Isocr. Plat. 20, 21). See 
 Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. p. 170 : "Its restoration implied not only a loss of 
 Theban supremacy, but the actual loss of that portion of the existing Theban 
 territory which had formerly formed the Plataian district." 
 
Bx-aV^"'*} EXPEDITION OF CLEOMBROTUS 123 
 
 death the governor, who had abandoned the Cadmeia instead 
 of awaiting reinforcements, and the next was to call out the 
 ban against Thebes. Agesilaus had little taste to head the 
 expedition ; he pointed out that he had seen more than forty 
 years' service,^ and that the exemption from foreign duty 
 applicable to others at that age was applicable on the same 
 principle to the king. Such were the ostensible grounds on 
 which he excused himself from the present expedition, but 
 his real objections lay deeper. He felt certain that if he 
 led the expedition his fellow-citizens would say : " Agesilaus 
 caused all this trouble to the state in order to aid and abet 
 tyrants." Therefore he preferred to leave his countrymen 
 to settle the matter themselves as they liked. Accordingly 
 the ephors, instructed by the Theban exiles who had escaped 
 the late massacres, despatched Cleombrotus. He had not 
 commanded before, and it was the depth of winter. 
 
 Now while Chabrias, with a body of Athenian peltasts, kept 
 watch and ward over the road through Eleutherae, Cleombrotus 
 made his way up by the direct route to Plataeae. His column 
 of light infantry, pushing forward in advance, fell iipoh the 
 men who had been released from the Theban prison, guarding 
 the summit, to the number of about one hundred and fifty. 
 These, with the exception of one or two who escaped, were 
 cut down by the peltasts, and Cleombrotus descended in 
 person upon Plataeae, which was still friendly to Sparta. 
 Presently he reached Thespiae, and that was the base for an 
 advance upon Cynoscephalae, where he encamped on Theban 
 territory. Here he halted sixteen days, and then again fell 
 back upon Thespiae. At this latter place he now left 
 Sphodrias as governor, with a third portion of each of the 
 contingents of the allies, handing over to him all the moneys 
 he had brought with him from home, with directions to 
 supplement his force with a contingent of mercenaries. 
 
 Whilst Sphodrias was so employed, Cleombrotus himself 
 commenced his homeward march, following the road through 
 treusis at the head of his own moiety of the troops, who indeed 
 were in considerable perplexity to discover whether they were at 
 war with the Thebans or at jieace, seeing that the general had 
 
 ' And was therefore more than fifty-eig|>t years old at this date. See 
 below, Ages. i. 6, p. 238. 
 
124 HELLENICA BK. V. {"'• "'■b'c7378 
 
 led his army into Theban territory, had inflicted the minimurt) 
 of mischief, and again retired. No sooner, however, was his 
 back turned than a violent wind storm assailed him in his 
 rear, which some construed as an omen clearly significant of 
 what was about to take place. Many a blow this assailant 
 dealt them, and as the general and his army, crossing from 
 Creusis, scaled that face of the mountain ^ which stretches sea- 
 ward, the blast hurled headlong from the precipices a string 
 of asses, baggage and all : countless arms were wrested from 
 the bearers' grasp and wHirled into the sea j finally, numbers' 
 of the men, unable to march with their arm^s, deposited them 
 at different points of the pass, first filling the hollow of their 
 shields with stones. For the moment, then, they halted at 
 Aegosthena, on Megarian soil, and supped as best they could. 
 Next day they returned and recovered their arms. After this 
 adventure the contingents lost no time in returning to their 
 several homes, as Cleombrotus disbanded them. 
 
 Meanwhile at Athens and Thebes alike fear reigned. To 
 the Athenians the strength of the Lacedaemonians was un- 
 mistakable : the war was plainly no longer confined to 
 Corinth ; on the contrary, the Lacedaemonians had ventured 
 to skirt Athenian territory and to invade Thebes. They were 
 so worked upon by their alarm that the two generals who had 
 been privy to the insurrection of Melon against Leontiades ■ 
 and his party had to suffer : the one was formally tried and put 
 to death; the other, refusing to abide his trial, was banished. 
 
 The apprehensions of the Thebans were of a different sort : 
 their fear was rather lest they should' find themselves in single- 
 handed war with Lacedaemon. To prevent' this they hit upon 
 the following expedient. They worked upon Sphodrias,^ the 
 Spartan governor left in Thespiae, by offering him; as at least 
 was suspected, a substantial sum, in return for which he was 
 to make an incursion into Attica; their great object being 
 to involve Athens and Lacedaemon in hostilities. Sphodrias 
 lent a willing ear, and, pretending that he could easily capture 
 Piraeus in its present gateless condition, gave his troops an 
 early evening meal and marched out of Thespiae, saying that 
 he would reach Piraeus before daybreak. As a matter of fact 
 
 ' I.e. " Cithaeron." For the position of Creusis, Aegosthena, Thria,.etc., 
 see map, p. xlii. Trans, vol. i. ^ See Plut. Pel. xiv. (Clough, ii. p. 214). 
 
B^c.sV""'*} ATTEMPT OF SPHODRIAS 125 
 
 day overtook him at Thria, nor did he take any pains even to 
 draw a veil over his intentions ; on the contrary, being forced 
 to turn aside, he amused himself by recklessly lifting cattle and 
 sacking houses. Meanwhile some who chanced upon him in 
 the night had fled to the city and brought news to the men of 
 Athens that a large body of troops was approaching. It needs 
 no saying with what speed the cavalry and heavy infantry 
 armed themselves and stood on guard to protect the city. 
 As chance befell, there were some Lacedaemonian ambassadors 
 in Athens at the moment, at the house of Callias their 
 proxenos ; their names were Etymocles, Aristolochus, and 
 Ocyllus. Immediately on receipt of the news the Athenians 
 seized these three and imprisoned them, as not improbably 
 concerned in the plot. Utterly taken aback by the affair 
 themselves, the ambassadors pleaded that, had they been 
 aware of an attempt to seize Piraeus, they would hardly have 
 been so foolish as to put themselves into the power of 
 the Athenians, or have selected the house of their proxenos 
 for protection, where they were so easily to be found. It 
 would, they further urged, soon be plain to the Athenians 
 themselves that the state of Lacedaemon was quite as little 
 cognisant of these proceedings as they. " You will hear before 
 long " — such was their confident prediction — " that Sphodrias 
 has paid for his behaviour by his life." On this wise the 
 ambassadors were acquitted of all concern in the matter and 
 dismissed. Sphodrias himself was recalled and indicted by 
 the ephors on the capital charge, and, in spite of his refusal to 
 face the trial, he was acquitted. This miscarriage of justice, 
 as it seemed to many, who described it as unprecedented in 
 Lacedaemon, has an explanation. 
 
 Sphodrias had a son named Cleonymus. He was just at 
 the age when youth emerges from boyhood, very handsome 
 and of high repute among his fellows. To this youth 
 Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, was passionately attached. 
 Now the friends of Cleombrotus, as comrades of Sphodrias, 
 were disposed to acquit him ; but they feared Agesilaus tod 
 his friends, not to mention the intermediate party, for the 
 enormity of his proceeding was clear. So then Sphodrias 
 addressed his son Cleonymus : " You have it in your power, 
 
126 HELLENICA BK. V. {""■ "'b^co^s 
 
 my son, to save your father, if you will, by begging Archi- 
 damus to dispose Agesilaus favourably to me at my trial." 
 Thus instructed, the youth did not shrink from visiting Archi- 
 damus, and implored him for his sake to save his father. 
 Now when Archidamus saw how Cleonymus wept, he too was 
 melted to tears as he stood beside him, but to his petition he 
 made answer thus : " Nay, Cleonymus, it is the bare truth I 
 tell you, I cannot so much as look my father in the face;^ 
 if I wished anything transacted for me in the city I would 
 beg assistance from the whole world sooner than from my 
 father. Still, since it is you who bid me, rest assured I will 
 do my best to bring this about for you as you desire." He 
 then left the common hall ^ and retired home to rest, but with 
 dawn he arose and kept watch that his father might not go out 
 without his knowledge. Presently, when he saw him ready to 
 go forth, first some citizen was present, and then another and 
 another ; and in each case he stepped aside, while they held 
 his father in conversation. / By and by a stranger would come, 
 and then another; and so it went on until he even found 
 himself making way for a string of petitioning attendants. 
 At last, when his father had turned his back on the Eurotas, 
 and was entering his house again, he was fain to turn his 
 back also and be gone without so much as accosting him. 
 The next day he fared no better : all happened as on the 
 previous day. Now Agesilaus, although he had his suspicions 
 why his son went to and fro in this way, asked no questions, 
 but left him to take his own course. Archidamus, on his 
 side, was longing, as was natural, to see his friend Cleonymus ; 
 but how he was to visit him, without having held the desired 
 conversation with his father, he knew not. The friends of 
 Sphodrias, observing that he who was once so frequent a 
 visitor had ceased coming, were in agony ; he must surely 
 have been deterred by the reproaches of his father. At 
 last, however, Archidamus dared to go to his father, and 
 said, " Father, Cleonymus bids me ask you to save his father ; 
 grant me this boon, if possible, I beg you." He answered : 
 " For yourself, my son, I can make excuse, but how shall 
 my city make excuse for me if I fail to condemn that man 
 
 ^ See Cyrop. I. iv. 12. 
 ^ Lit. " %hQ Pkilition." See below, Pol, Lac. iii. 6, p. 303. 
 
b"c.3V^°'^*} acquittal of SPHODRIAS 127 
 
 who, for his own base purpose, traffics to the injury of the 
 state?" For the moment the other made no reply, but re- 
 tired crestfallen before the verdict of justice. Afterwards, 
 whether the thought was his own or that he was prompted 
 by some other, he came and said, " Father, if Sphodrias 
 had done no wrong you would have released him, that I 
 know; but now, if he has done something wrong, may he 
 not be excused by you for our sakes?" And the father 
 answered : " If it can be done without loss of honour on 
 our parts, so shall it be." At that word the young man, in 
 deep despondency, turned and went. Now one of the friends 
 of Sphodrias, conversing with Etymocles, remarked to him : 
 " You are all bent on putting Sphodrias to death, I take it, you 
 friends of Agesilaus ? " And Etymocles replied : " If that be 
 so, we all are bent upon one thing, and Agesilaus on another, 
 since in all his conversations he still harps upon one string : 
 that Sphodrias has done a wrong there is no denying, yet 
 Sphodrias is a man who, from boyhood to ripe manhood,'^ was 
 ever constant to the call of honour. To put such a man as 
 that to death is hard ; nay, Sparta needs such soldiers.'^V^he 
 other accordingly went off and reported what he had just heard 
 to Cleonymus ; and he in the joy of his heart went straightway 
 to Archidamus and said : " Now we know that you care for 
 us ; rest assured, Archidamus, that we in turn will take great 
 pains that you shall never have cause to blush for our friend- 
 ship." Nor did his acts belie his words; but so long as he 
 lived he was ever faithful to the code of Spartan chivalry; 
 and at Leuctra, fighting in front of the king side by side with 
 Deinon the polemarch, thrice fell or ever he yielded up his 
 breath — foremost of the citizens amidst the foe. And so, 
 albeit he caused his friend the bitterest sorrow, yet to that 
 which he had promised he was faithful, seeing he wrought 
 Archidamus no shame, but contrariwise shed lustre on him.^ 
 In this way Sphodrias obtained liis acquittal. 
 
 At Athens the friends of Boeotia were not slow to in- 
 struct the people that his countrymen, so far from punishing 
 Sphodrias, had even applauded him for his designs on Athens ; 
 
 1 Lit. "who, whether as child, boy, or young man"; and for the three 
 stages of growth, see Pol. Lac. ii. iii. iv. ^ I.e. both in life and in death. 
 
128 HELLENICA— BK. V. {""■ "'J'.aV;^ 
 
 and in consequence of this the Athenians not only furnished 
 Piraeus with gates, but set to work to build a fleet, and dis- 
 played great zeal in sending aid to the Boeotians.^ The 
 Lacedaemonians, on their side, called out the ban against the 
 Thebans ; and being persuaded that in Agesilaus they would 
 find a more prudent general than Cleombrotus had proved, 
 they begged the former to undertake the expedition. ^ He, 
 replying that the wish of the state was for him law, began 
 making preparations to take the field. 
 
 Now he had come to the conclusion that without the 
 occupation of Mount Cithaeron any attack on Thebes would 
 be difficult. Learning then that the men of Cleitor were 
 just now at war with the men of Orchomenus,^ and were main- 
 taining a foreign brigade, he came to an understanding with 
 the Cleitorians that in the event of his needing it, this force 
 would be at his service j and as soon as the sacrifices for 
 crossing the frontier proved favourable, he sent to the com- 
 mander of the Cleitorian mercenaries, and handing him a 
 month's pay, ordered him to occupy Cithaeron with his men. 
 This was before he himself reached Tegea. Meanwhile he 
 sent a message to the men of Orchomenus that so long as 
 the campaign lasted they must cease from war. If any city 
 during his campaign abroad took on itself to march against 
 another city, his first duty, he declared, would be to march 
 against such offending city in accordance with a decree of 
 the allies. 
 
 Thus crossing Cithaeron he reached Thespiae,* and from 
 that base made the territory of Thebes his objective. Finding 
 the great plain fenced round with ditch and palisade, as also 
 the most valuable portions of the country, he adopted the 
 plan of shifting his encampment from one place to another. 
 Regularly each day, after the morning meal, he marched 
 out his troops and ravaged the territory, confining himself to 
 his own side of the palisadings and trench. The appearance 
 
 1 For the new Athenian confederacy of Delos of this year, B. c. 378, see 
 below, Po/. Lac. xiv. 6 ; Rev. -i. 6 (pp. 323, 346) ; Diod. xv. 28-30 ; Plut. 
 Pelop. XV. ; Hiclcs, 78, 81 ; and for an alliance between Athens and Chalds 
 in Euboea, see Hicks, 79 ; and for a treaty with Chios, Hicks, 80. 
 
 ^ See below. Ages. ii. 22, p. 251. 
 
 ' In Arcadia. See Busolt, Die Lab. 120 foil, 
 
 * By Cynoscephalae. See Ages. ii. 22. 
 
"c'aV^^"*'} AGESILAUS IN BOEOTIA 129 
 
 of Agesilaus at any point whatever was a signal to the enemy, 
 who within the circuit of his entrenchment kept moving in 
 parallel line to the invader, and was ever ready to defend the 
 threatened point. On one occasion, the Spartan king having 
 retired and being well on the road back to camp, the Theban 
 cavalry, hitherto invisible, suddenly dashed out, following one 
 of the regularly constructed roads out of the entrenchment. 
 Taking advantage of the enemy's position — his light troops 
 breaking off to supper or busily preparing the meal, and 
 the cavalry, some of them on their legs just^ dismounted, 
 and others in the act of mounting, — on they rode, pressing the 
 charge home. Man after man of the light troops was cut down ; 
 and three cavalry troopers besides — two Spartans, Cleas and 
 Epicydidas by name, and the third a provincial^ named 
 Eudicus, who had not had time to mount their horses, and 
 whose fate was shared by some Theban^ exiles. But presently 
 Agesilaus wheeled about and advanced with his heavy infantry 
 to the succour ; his cavalry dashed at the enemy's cavalry, 
 and the flower of the heavy infantry, the ten-years-service men, 
 charged by their side. The Theban cavalry at that instant 
 looked like men who had been imbibing too freely in the 
 noontide heat — that is to say, they awaited the charge long 
 enough to hurl their spears ; but the volley sped without effect, 
 and wheeling about within that distance they left twelve of 
 their number dead upon the field. 
 
 Agesilaus had not failed to note with what regularity the 
 enemy presented himself a!fter the morning meal. Turning 
 the observation to account, he offered sacrifice with day's 
 dawn, and marched with all possible speed, and so crossed 
 within the palisadings, through what might have been a desert, 
 as far as defence or sign of living being went. Once well in- 
 side, he proceeded to cut down and set on fire everything up 
 to the city gates. After this exploit he beat a retreat, retiring 
 into Thespiae, where he fortified their citadel for them. Here 
 he left Phoebidas as governor, while he himself crossed the 
 
 ' Read, after Courier, tfpri for the vulg. Iri. ; or, better still, adopt Hart- 
 man's emendation (op. cit. p. 379), tOiv iUv ^5^ KaTa^e^Kbrav twp Si 
 KaTapawivTUv, and translate "some — already dismounted, and others dis- 
 nioanting." ^ Lit. " one of the perioeci." 
 
 ' Reading Gj/iSoW after Dind. for 'A9r).va((i)y. 
 
 VOL. n K 
 
•30 HELLENICA BK. V. {""• "'icVijl 
 
 passes back into Megara. Arrived here he disbanded the 
 allies, and led the city troops homewards. 
 
 After the departure of Agesilaup, Phoebidas devoted himself 
 to harrying the Thebans by sending out robber bands, and 
 laid waste their land by a system of regular incursions. The 
 Thebans, on their side, desiring to retaliate, marched out with 
 their whole force into the territory of'Thespiae. But once 
 well inside the district they found themselves closely beset 
 by Phoebidas and his light troops, who would not give them 
 the slightest chance to scatter from their main body, so that 
 the Thebans, heartily vexed at the turn their foray had taken, 
 beat a retreat quicker than they had come. The muleteers 
 threw away with their own handsahaiiwits they had cajptured, 
 in their anxiety to get home as quickly as possible ; so dire a 
 dread had fallen upon the invading army. This was the - 
 chance for the Spartan to press home his attack boldly, keep- 
 ing his light division in close attendance on himself, and 
 leaving the heavy infantry under orders to follow him in battle 
 ■ order. He was in hopes even that he might put the enemy 
 to complete rout, so valiantly did he lead the" advance, en- 
 couraging the light troops 'to ".come to a close grip with the 
 invaders," or summoning the heavy infantry of the Thespiaeans 
 to " bring up their supports." Presently the Theban cavalry 
 as they retired found thfemselves face to face with an im- 
 passable glen or ravine, where in the first instance they 
 collected in a mob, and next wheeled right-about-face in sheer 
 resourcelessness where to cross. The handful of light troops 
 who formedrthe Spartan vanguard took fright at the Thebans 
 and fled, and the Theban horsemen seeing this put in practice 
 the lesson of attack which the fugitives taught them. As for 
 Phoebidas himself, he and two or three with him fell sword in 
 hand, whereupon his mercenary troops all took to their heels. 
 When the stream of fugitives reached the Thespiaean 
 heavy infantry reserves, they too, in spite of much boasting 
 beforehand that they would never yield to Thebans, took 
 to flight, though there was absolutely no pursuit whatever, 
 for it was now late. The number slain was not large, but, for 
 all that, the men of Thespiae did not come to a standstill 
 until they found themselves safe inside their walls. As a 
 
b"c. '378-377^'} SECOND EXPEDITION 131 
 
 sequel, the hopes and spirit of the Thebans were again kindled 
 into new life, and they made campaigns against Thespiae and 
 the other provincial cities of B6eotia.^ It must be admitted 
 that in each case the democratical party retired from these 
 cities to Thebes ; since absolute governments had been estab- 
 lished in all of them on the pattern previously adopted at 
 Thebes ; and the result was that the friends of Lacedaemon 
 in these cities also needed her assistance.^ After the death of 
 Phoebidas the Lacedaemonians despatched a polemarch with 
 a division by sea to form the garrison of Thespiae. 
 
 B.C. 377. — With the advent of spring^ the ephors again 
 called out the ban against Thebes, and requested Agesilaus 
 to lead the expedition, as on the former campaign. He, hold- 
 ing to his former theory with regard to the invasion, even 
 before sacrificing the customary frontier sacrifice, sent a de- 
 spatch to the polemarch at Thespiae, with orders to seize the 
 pass which commands the road over Cithaeron, and to guard 
 it against his arrival. Then, having once more crossed the pass 
 and reached Plataeae, he again made a feint of marching first 
 into Thespiae, and so sent a despatch ordering supplies to be 
 in readiness, and all embassies to be waiting his arrival there ; 
 so that the Thebans concentrated their attention on the 
 approaches from Thespiae, which they strongly guarded. 
 Next morning, however, Agesilaus sacrificed at daybreak and 
 set out on the road to Erythrae,* and completing in one day 
 what was a good two days' march for an army, gave the 
 Thebans the slip, and crossed their palisade-work at Scolus 
 before the enemy had arrived from the closely-guarded point 
 at which he had eifected his entrance formerly. This done 
 he proceeded to ravage the eastward -facing districts of the 
 city of Thebes as far as the territory of Tanagra, for at that 
 
 1 Lit. " their other perioecid cities." For the significance of this title as 
 applied by the Thebans (and perhaps commonly) to the other cities of Boeotia, 
 see Freeman, op. cit. ch. iv. pp. 157, 173 foil. 
 
 2 See Grote, H. G. x. 174 ; Freeman, op. cit. iv. 171, 172. 
 
 ' See for affairs of Delos, never actually named by Xenophon, between B. c. 
 377 and 374, the Sandwich Marble in Trinity College, Cambridge; Boeckh, 
 C. I. G. 158, and P. E. A. ii. p. 78 foil. ; Hicks, 82. 
 
 * Erythrae (Redlands) stands between Hysiae and Scolus, east of KatEi'ila. 
 — Lealce, jV. Gr. ii. 329. See Herod, ix. 15, 25 ; Thuc. iii. 24 ; Paus. IX. 
 ii. I ; Strab. IX. ii. 
 
132 
 
 HELLENICA BK. V. {""' "'B.c^jjt 
 
 date Tanagra was still in the hands of Hypatodorus and his 
 party, who were friends of the Lacedaemonians. After that 
 he turned to retire, keeping the walls of Thebes on his left. 
 But the Thebans, who had stolen, as it were, upon the scene, 
 drew up at the spot called " The Old Wife's Breast," ^ keeping 
 the trench and palisading in their rear : they were persuaded 
 that here, if anywhere, lay their chance ,to risk a decisive 
 engagement, the ground at this point being somewhat narrow 
 and difficult to traverse. Agesilaus, however, in view of the 
 situation, refused to accept the challenge. Instead of march- 
 ing upon them he turned sharp off in the direction of the city ; 
 and the Thebans, in alarm for the city in its undefended state, 
 abandoned the favourable ground on which they were drawn 
 up in battle line and retired at the double towards the city 
 along the road to Potniae, which seemed the safer route. This 
 last move of Agesilaus may be described as a stroke of genius : ^ 
 while it allowed him to retire to a distance, it forced the enemy 
 themselves to retreat at the double. In spite of this, however, 
 one or two of the polemarchs, with their divisions, charged 
 the foe as he raced past But again the Thebans, from the 
 vantage-ground of their heights, sent volleys of spears upon 
 the assailants, which cost one of the polemarchs, Alyp^tus, his 
 life. He fell pierced by a spear. But again from this particular 
 crest the Thebans on their side were forced to turn in flight,; 
 so much so that the Sciritae, with some of the cavalry, scaled 
 up and speedily cut down the rearmost ranks of the Thebans 
 as they galloped past into the city. When, however, they 
 were close under cover of their walls the Thebans turned, 
 and the Sciritae seeing them retreated at more than a steady 
 walking pace. No one, it is true, was slain ; but the Thebans 
 all the same set up a trophy in record of the incident at the 
 point where the scaling party had been forced to retreat. 
 
 And now, since the hour was come, Agesilaus fell back and 
 encamped on the very site on which he had seen the enemy 
 drawn up in battle array. Next day he retired by the road to 
 Thespiae. The light troops, who formed a free corps in the 
 pay of the Thebans, hung audaciously on his heels. Their 
 
 1 Lit. "Graos Stethos." 
 ^ Or, "and this move of Agesilaus was regarded as a very pretty one." 
 
CH. .v.^1 54-57 I HOW LACEDAEMON LOST OREUS 133 
 
 shouts could be heard caUing out to Chabrias ^ for not bring- 
 ing up his supports; when the cavalry of the Olynthians 
 (who now contributed a contingent in accordance with their 
 oaths)* wheeled round on them, caught the pursuers in the 
 heat of their pursuit, and drove them uphill, putting large 
 numbers of them to the sword, — so quickly are infantry over- 
 hauled by cavalry on steep ground which can be ridden 
 over. Being arrived within the walls of Thespiae, Agesilaus 
 found the citizens in a state of party feud, the men of Lacedae- _ 
 monian proclivities desiring to put their political opponents, one ' 
 of whom was Menon, to death ^ — a proceeding which Agesilaus . 
 would not sanction. After having healed their differences and 
 bound them over by solemn oath to keep the peace with 
 one another, he at once retired, taking his old route across 
 Cithaeron to Megara. Here once more he disbanded the 
 allies, and at the head of the city troops himself marched 
 back to Sparta. 
 
 The Thebans had not gathered in the fruits of their soil 
 for two years now, and began to be sorely pinched for want 
 of corn ; they therefore sent a body of men on board a couple 
 of triremes to Pagasae, with ten talents * in hand for the pur- 
 chase of corn. But while these commissioners were engaged in 
 effecting their purchases, Alcetas, the Lacedaemonian who was 
 garrisoning Oreus,^ fitted out three triremes, taking precautions 
 that no rumour of his proceedings should leak out. As soon as 
 the corn was shipped and the vessels under weigh, he captured 
 not only the corn but the triremes, escort and all, numbering 
 no less than three hundred men. This done he locked up ■ 
 his prisoners in the citadel, where he himself was also quartered. 
 Now there was a youth, the son of a native of Oreus, fair of 
 
 ' For the exploits of Chabrias, who commanded a division of mixed 
 Athenians and mercenaiies (see above, § 14), see Dem. c. Lept. 479 ; Polyaen. 
 ii. JL, 2 ; Diod. xv. 32, 33, who gives interesting details ; Grote, H. G, a. 
 172 foil. ^ See above, Ifell. V. iii. 26. 
 
 ' Or, "under the pretext of furthering Laconian interests there was a 
 desire to put political opponents to death." For "Menon," Dind. corj. 
 "Melon." * = ;^2437 : los. 
 
 " Oreus, formerly called Histiaea, in the north of Euboea. See Thuc. vii. 
 57, viii. 95 ; Diod. xv. 30 ; Grote, //. G. ix. 263. For Pagasae at the 
 north extremity of the Pagasaean Gulf, "the cradle of Greek navigation," 
 see Tozer, Geog. Gr. vi. p. 124 ; Strab. IX. v. 15. 
 
134 HELLENICA BK. V. { ""bIc.' ot-s^ 
 
 mien and of gentle breeding,^ who danced attendance on the 
 commandant : and the latter must needs leave the citadel and 
 go down to busy himself with this youth. This was a piece 
 of carelessness which the prisoners did not fail to observe, 
 and turned to good account by seizing the citadel, whereupon 
 the town revolted, and the Thebans experienced no further 
 difficulty in obtaining corn supplies. 
 
 B.C. 376. — At the return of spring Agesilaus lay sick — a 
 bedridden invalid. The history of the case is this : During 
 the withdrawal of his army from Thebes the year before, when 
 at Megara, while mounting from the Aphrodision^ to the 
 Government house he ruptured a vein or other vessel of 
 the body. This was followed by a rush of blood to his sound 
 leg. The knee was much swelled, and the pain intolerable, 
 until a Syracusan surgeon made an incision in the vein near 
 the ankle. The blood thus let flowed night and day; do 
 what they could to stop the discharge, all failed, till the patient 
 fainted away ; then it ceased. In this plight Agesilaus was 
 conveyed home on a litter to Lacedaemon, and remained an 
 invalid the rest of that summer and throughout the winter. 
 
 But to resume : at the first burst of spring the Lacedae- 
 monians again called out the ban, and gave orders to Cleoni- 
 brotus to lead the expedition. The king found himself 
 presently with his troops at the foot of Cithaeron, and his 
 light infantry advanced to occupy the pass which commands 
 the road. But here they found a detachment of Thebans and 
 Athenians already in occupation of the desired height, who for 
 a while suffered them to approach ; but when they were close 
 upon them, sprang from their position and charged, putting 
 about forty to the sword. This incident was sufiScient to 
 convince Cleombrotus that to invade Thebes by this mountain 
 passage was out of the question, and in this faith he led back 
 and disbanded his troops. 
 
 The allies met in Lacedaemon, and arguments were 
 adduced on the part of the allies to show that faintheartedness 
 would very soon lead to their being absolutely worn out by 
 the war. They had got it in their power, it was urged, to fit 
 
 ' Or, " beautiful and brave if ever youth was. " 
 
 ^ Pausanius (I. xi. 6) mentions a temple of Aphroditi 'EvKTrpotpia (Verli- 
 cordia), on the way up to the Carian Acropolis of Megara. 
 
""■."sVaTs"*^} NAXOS ; VQYAGE OF TIMOTIIEUS 135 
 
 out a fleet far outnumbering that of Athens, and to reduce 
 that city by starvation ; it was open to them, in the self-same 
 ships, to carry an army across into Theban territory, and 
 they had a choice of routes — the road into Phocis, or, if they 
 preferred, by Creusis. After thus carefully considering the 
 matter they manned a fleet of sixty triremes, and Pollis was 
 appointed admiral in command. Nor indeed were their ex- 
 pectations altogether belied. The Athenians were soon so 
 closely blockaded that their corn vessels could get no farther 
 than Geraestus ; 1 there was no inducing them to coast down 
 farther south, with a Lacedaemonian navy hovering about 
 jEgina and Ceos and Andros. The Athenians, making a 
 virtue of necessity, manned their ships in person, gave battle 
 to Pollis under the leadership of Chabrias, and came out of 
 the sea-fight ^ victorious. 
 
 B.C. 375. — Then the corn supplies flowed freely into 
 Athens. The Lacedaemonians, on their side, were preparing 
 to transport an army across the water into Boeotia, when the 
 Thebans sent a request to the Athenians urging them to 
 despatch an armament round Peloponnesus, under the per- 
 suasion that if this were done the Lacedaemonians would find 
 it impossible at once to guard their own or the allied territory 
 in that part of the world, and at the same time to convey an 
 army of any size to operate 'against Thebes. The proposals 
 fell in with the present temper of the Athenians, irritated 
 with Lacedaemon on account of the exploit of Sphodrias. 
 Accordingly they eagerly manned a fleet of sixty vessels, ap- 
 pointing Timotheus as admiral in command, and despatched 
 it on a cruise round Peloponnesus. 
 
 The Thebans, seeing that there had been no hostile 
 invasion of their territory for so long (neither during the 
 campaign of Cleombrotus nor now,* whilst Timotheus prose- 
 
 ^ The promontory at the southern extremity of Euboea. 
 
 ^ Battle of Naxos, B.C. 376. For interesting details, see Diod. xv. 34, 35. 
 
 2 Lit. "nor at the date of Tiraotheas' s fieri^lus." To the historian writ- 
 ing of the events of this period several years later, the coasting voyage of 
 Timotheus is a single incident {irepicTrXewe), and as Grote {//. G. x. 185, 
 note 3) observes, the words may ' ' include not simply the time which Timotheus 
 took in actually circmnnavigating Peloponnesos, but the year which he spent 
 afterwards in the Ionian sea, and the time which he occupied in performing 
 his exploits near Korkyra, Leukas, and the neighbourhood generally." For 
 
f CH. TV. 6 6^-66 
 136 HELLENICA — BK. V. {'^ b.c. 375-374 
 
 cuted his coasting voyage), felt emboldened to carry out a 
 campaign on their own account against the provincial cities ; ^ 
 and one by one they again recovered them. 
 
 Timotheus in his cruise reached Corcyra, and reduced it at 
 a blow. That done, he neither enslaved the inhabitants nor 
 drove them into exile, nor changed their laws. And of this 
 conduct he reaped the benefit in the increased cordiality ^ of 
 all the cities of those parts. The Lacedaemonians thereupon 
 fitted out and despatched a counter fleet, with Nicolochus in 
 command, an officer of consummate boldness. This admiral 
 no sooner caught sight of Tiraotheus's fleet than without 
 hesitation, and in spite of the absence of six Ambraciot vessels 
 which formed part of his squadron, he gave battle, with fifty- 
 five ships to the enemy's sixty. The result was a defeat at 
 the moment, and Timotheus set up a trophy at Alyzia. But 
 as soon as the six missing Ambraciot vessels had reinforced 
 him — the ships of Timotheus meanwhile being docked and 
 undergoing repairs — he bore down upon Alyzia in search of 
 the Athenian, and as Timotheus refused to put out to meet 
 him, the Lacedaemonian in his turn set up a trophy on the 
 nearest group of islands. 
 
 B.C. 374. — Timotheus, after repairing his original squadron 
 and manning more vessels from Corcyra, found himself at 
 the head of more than seventy ships. His naval superiority 
 was undisputed, but he was forced to send to Athens for 
 moneys, seeing his fleet was large and his wants not trifling. 
 
 the character and exploits of Timotheus, son of Conon, see Isocr. Or. xv. 
 "On the Antidosis, " §§ 101-139 ; Jebb. Atf. Or. ii. p. 140 foil. ; Rehdantz, 
 Vit. Ifhicr. Chahr. Timoth. Atheniensium. 
 
 1 Or, " the cities round about their territory, " lit. ' ' the perioecid cities. " 
 For the import of the epithet, see note to V. iv. 46 (above, p. 131) ; Freeman, 
 op. cit. iv. 173, note i, in reference to Grote, H. G. x. 183, note 4. For the 
 battle of Tegyra see Grote, ib. 182 ; Plut. Pelof. 17; Diod. xv. 57 ("evi- 
 dently this battle," Grote); Callisthenes, fr. 3, ed. Did. Cf. Steph. Byz., 
 Teyipa. 
 
 ^ The Corcyraeans, Acarnanians, and Cephallenians join the alliance B.C. 
 375 ; see Hicks, 83. " This decree dates from the autumn of B.C. 375, 
 immediately after Timotheos's visit to Korkyra (Xen. Hell. V. iv. 64). The 
 result was that the names of Korkyra, Kephallenia, and Akarnania were in- 
 scribed upon the hst (No. 81), and an alliance was made with them." See 
 C. I. A. ii. p. 399 foil. ; Hicks, loc. cit. \ see below, p. 176 (Hell. VI. v. 
 23) ; C. I. A. ii. 14. The tablet is in the Asclepeian collection at the entrance 
 of the Acropolis at Athens. See Milchofer, Die Museen Athens, 1881, p. 45. 
 
BOOK VI. I. 1-3 
 
 1. B.C. 374. — The Athenians and Lacedaemonians were thus 
 engaged. But to return to the Thebans. After the sub- 
 jugation of the cities in Boeotia, they extended the area of 
 / aggression and marched into Phocis. The Phocians, on their 
 ' / side, sent an embassy to Lacedaemon, ^and pleaded that with- 
 out assistance from that power they must inevitably yield to 
 Thebes. The Lacedaemonians in response conveyed by sea 
 into the territory of Phocis their king Cleonibrotus, at the head 
 of four regiments and the contingents of tfte allies. 
 
 About the same time Polydamas of Piiarsalus arrived from 
 Thessaly to address the general assembly^ of Lacedaemon. 
 He was a man of high repute throughout the whole of 
 Thessaly, while in his native city he was regarded as so true 
 a gentleman that the faction-ridden Pharsalians were content to 
 entrust the citadel to his keeping, and to allow their revenues to 
 pass through his hands. It was his privilege to disburse the 
 money needed for sacred rites or other expenditure, within the 
 limits of their written law and constitution. Out of these 
 moneys this faithful steward of the state was able to garrison 
 and guard in safety for the citizens their capital. Every year 
 he rendered an account of his administration in general. If 
 there was a deficit he made it up out of his own pocket, and 
 when the revenues expanded he paid himself back. For the 
 rest, his hospitality to foreigners and his magnificence were on 
 a true Thessalian scale. Such was the style and character* 
 
 -^ 
 
 ' irpbs rb kolv6v, " h.e. vel ad senatum vel ad cphoros vel ad concionem." — 
 Sturz, Lex. Ken, s.v. 
 
138 HELLENICA BK. VI. {'^"'bIc^IjI 
 
 of the man who now arrived in Lacedaemon and spoke as 
 follows : 
 
 " Men of Lacedaemon, it is in my capacity as ' proxenos ' 
 and 'benefactor' (titles borne by my ancestry from time 
 immemorial) that I claim, or rather am bound, in case of 
 any difficulty to come to you, and, in case of any com- 
 plication dangerous to your interests in Thessaly, to give you 
 warning. The name of Jason, I feel sure, is not unknown to 
 Lacedaemonian ears. His power as a prince is sufficiently 
 large, and his fame widespread. It is of Jason I have to speak. 
 Under cover of a treaty of peace he has lately conferred with 
 me, and this is the substance of what he urged : ' Polydamas,' 
 he said, 'if I chose I could lay your city at my feet, even 
 against its will, as the following considerations will prove to 
 you. See,' he went on, ' the majority and the most important 
 of the states of Thessaly are my allies. I subdued them in 
 campaigns in which you took their side in opposition to 
 myself Again, you do not need to be told that I have six 
 thousand mercenaries who are a match in themselves, I take 
 it, for any single state. It is not the mere numbers on which 
 I insist. No doubt as large an army could be raised in other 
 quarters ; but these citizen armies have this defect — they in- 
 clude men who are already advanced in years, with others whose 
 beards are scarcely grown. Again, it is only a fraction of the 
 citizens who attend to bodily training in a state, whereas with 
 me no one takes mercenary service who is not as capable of 
 endurance as myself.' 
 
 " And here, Lacedaemonians, I must tell you what is the 
 bare truth. This Jason is a man stout of limb and robust of 
 body, with an insatiable appetite for toil. Equally true is it 
 that he tests the mettle of those with him day by day. He is 
 always at their head, whether on a field-day under arms, or in 
 the gymnasium, or on some military expedition. The weak 
 members of the corps he weeds out, but those whom he sees 
 bear themselves stout-heartedly in the face of war, like true 
 lovers of danger and of toil, he honours with double, treble, 
 and quadruple pay, or with other gifts. On the bed of sick- 
 ness they will not lack attendance, nor honour in their graves. 
 Thus every foreigner in his service knows that his valour in 
 
""■.374"} POLYDAMAS OF PHARSALUS 
 
 139 
 
 war may obtain for him a livelihood — a life replete at once 
 with honour and abundance.^ 
 
 " Then with some parade he pointed out to me what I 
 knew before, that the Maracians, and the Dolopians, and 
 Alcetas the hyparch^ in Epirus, were already subject to his 
 sway; 'so that I may fairly ask you, Polydamas,' he pro- 
 ceeded, 'what I have to apprehend that I should not look 
 on your future subjugation as mere child's play. Perhaps 
 some one who did not know me, and what manner of man 
 I am, might put it to me: "Well! Jason, if all you say be 
 true, why do you hesitate? why do you not march at once 
 against Pharsalia ? " For the good reason, I reply, that it suits 
 me better to win you voluntarily than to annex you against 
 your wills. Since, if you are forced, you will always be plan- 
 ning all the mischief you can against me, and I on my side 
 shall be striving to diminish your power ; whereas if you throw 
 in your lot with mine trustfully and willingly, it is certain we 
 shall do what we can to help each other. I see and know, 
 Polydamas, that your country fixes her eyes on one man only, 
 and that is yourself: what I guarantee you, therefore, is that, 
 if you will dispose her lovingly to myself, I on my side will 
 raise you up to be the greatest man in Hellas next to me. 
 Listen, while I tell you what it is in which I offer you the 
 second prize. Listen, and accept nothing which does not 
 approve itself as true to your own reasoning. First, is it not 
 plain to us both, that with the adhesion of Pharsalus and the 
 swarm of pettier states dependent on yourselves, I shall with 
 infinite ease become Tagos ^ of all the Thessalians ; and then 
 
 1 Or, " a life satisfying at once to soul and body. " 
 
 2 Or, "his underlord in Epirus." By hyparch, I suppose, is implied that 
 Alcetas regarded Jason as his suzerain. Diodorus (xv. 13, 36) spealts of him 
 as king of the Molossians. 
 
 ^ Or, " Prince," and below, " Thessaly so converted into a Principality." 
 " The Tagos of Thessaly was not a King, because his office was not hereditary 
 or even permanent ; neither was he exactly a Tyrant, because his office had 
 some sort of legal sanction. But he came much nearer to the character either 
 of a King or of a Tyrant than to that of a Federal President like the General 
 of the Achaians. . . . Jasdn of Pherai acts throughout like a King, and his 
 will seems at least as uncontrolled as that of his brother sovereign beyond the 
 Kambunian hills. Even Jason seems to have been looked upon as a Tyrant 
 (see below. Hell. VI. iv. 32) ; possibly, like the Athenian Demos, he himself 
 did not refuse the name" (cf. Arist. Pol. iii. 4, 9). — Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. 
 "No True Federation in Thessaly," iv. pp. 152 foil. 
 
I40 HELLENICA — BK. VI. I*^"' 'b.I^jH 
 
 the corollary — Thessaly so united — sixteen thousand cavalry 
 and more than ten thousand heavy infantry leap into life. 
 Indeed, when I contemplate the physique and proud carriage 
 of these men, I cannot but persuade myself that, with proper 
 handling, there is not a nation or tribe of men to which 
 Thessalians would deign to yield submission. Look at the 
 broad expanse of Thessaly and consider : when once a Tagos is 
 established here, all the tribes in a circle round will lie stilled 
 in subjection; and almost every member of each of these 
 tribes is an archer born, so that in the light infantry division of 
 the service our power must needs excel. Furthermore, the 
 Boeotians and all the rest of the world in arms against Lace- 
 daemon are my allies ; they clamour to follow my banner, if only 
 I will free them from Sparta's yoke. So again the Athenians, 
 I make sure, will do all they can to gain our alliance ; but with 
 them I do not think we will make friends, for my persuasion is 
 that empire by sea will be even easier to acquire than empire 
 by land ; and to show you the justice of this reasoning I would 
 have you weigh the following considerations. With Macedonia, 
 which is the timber-yard ^ of the Athenian navy, in our hands 
 we shall be able to construct a far larger fleet than theirs. 
 That stands to reason. And as to men, which will be the 
 better able to man vessels, think you — Athens, or ourselves 
 with our stalwart and numerous Penestae ? ^ Which will better 
 support mariners — a nation which, like our own, out of her 
 abundance exports her corn to foreign parts, or Athens, 
 which, but for foreign purchases, has not enough to support 
 herself? And so as to wealth in general it is only natural, is 
 it not, that we, who . do not look to a string of little islands 
 for supplies, but gather the fruits of continental peoples, should 
 find our resources more copious ? As soon as the scattered 
 powers of Thessaly are gathered into a principality, all the 
 tribes around, I repeat, will become our tributaries. I need 
 not tell you that the king of Persia reaps the fruits, not of 
 islands, but of a continent, and he is the wealthiest of men ! 
 But the reduction of Persia will be still more practicable, I 
 
 1 See above, p. 105 ; and Hicks, 74. 
 
 ^ Or, "peasantry." See Trans, vol. i. p. 57, note 2, as to the villeins of 
 Thessaly. 
 
CH. I. § 12- 
 B.c. 374 
 
 '■•} CONCERNING JASON OF PHERAE 141 
 
 imagine, than that of Hellas, for there the men, save one, 
 are better versed in slavery than in prowess. Nor have I 
 forgotten, during the advance of Cyrus,i and afterwards under 
 Agesilaus, how scant the force was before which the Persian 
 quailed.' 
 
 "Such, Lacedaemonians, were the glowing arguments of 
 Jason. In answer I told him that what he urged was well 
 worth weighing, but that we, the friends of Lacedaemon, should 
 so, without a quarrel, desert her and rush into the arms of her 
 opponents, seemed to me sheer madness. Whereat he praised 
 me, and said that now must he needs cling all the closer to 
 me if that were my disposition, and so charged me to come 
 to you and tell you the plain truth, which is, that he is minded 
 to march against Pharsalus if we will not hearken to him. 
 Accordingly he bade me demand assistance from you ; ' and if 
 they suffer you,' ^ he added, ' so to work upon them that they 
 will send you a force sufJScient to do battle with me, it is well : 
 we will abide by war's arbitrament, nor quarrel with the con- 
 sequence ; but if in your eyes that aid is insufficient, look to 
 yourself. How shall you longer be held blameless before 
 that fatherland which honours you and in which you fare so 
 well?'* 
 
 "These are the matters," Polydamas continued, "which 
 have brought me to Lacedaemon. I have told you the whole 
 story ; it is based partly on what I see to be the case, and 
 partly on what I have heard from yonder man. My firm 
 belief is, men of Lacedaemon, that if you are likely to de- 
 spatch a force sufficient, not in my eyes only, but in the 
 eyes of all the rest of Thessaly, to cope with Jason in war, 
 the states will revolt from hira, for they are all in alarm as 
 to the future development of the man's power; but if you 
 
 1 See Trans, vol. i. p. cxxii. 
 
 2 Or, reading 0eoi, after Cobet ; translate "if providentially they should 
 send you." 
 
 ' Reading xal J a-i irpdrTett, after Cobet. The chief MSS. give o6k 
 ^Sri iii^yKXriTos &v SiKoltas efo)S h rxi irarplSi ij ffe nw «"' """^ TrpirTOis to 
 KpdTiara, virhich might be rendered eii/ier, "and how be doing best for your- 
 self? " [lit. ' ' and you would not be doing best for yourself," oix Sji carried on 
 from previous clause], or (taking irpdrrois as pure optative), "may you be 
 guided to adopt the course best for yourself ! " "may the best fortune attend 
 you 1 Farewell." See Otto Keller, op, cit. ad loc. for various emendations. 
 
142 HELLENICA BK. VI. I""' '■b!c'''374 
 
 think a company of newly-enfranchised slaves and any amateur 
 general will suffice, I advise you to rest in peace. You 
 may take my word for it, you will have a great power to contend 
 against, and a man who is so prudent a general that, in V 
 all he essays to do, be it an affair of secrecy, or speed, or force, 
 he is wont to hit the mark of his endeavours : one who is skilled,^ 
 should occasion serve, to make the night of equal service to 
 him with the day;^ or, if speed be needful, will labour on 
 while breakfasting or taking an evening meal. And as for 
 repose, he thinks that the time for it has come when the goal 
 is reached or the business on hand accomplished. And to 
 this same practice he has habituated those about him. Right 
 well he knows how to reward the expectations of his soldiers, 
 when by the extra toil which makes the difference they have 
 achieved success ; so that in his school all have laid to heart 
 that maxim, ' Pain first and pleasure after.' ^ And in regard 
 to pleasure of the senses, of all the men I know, he is the 
 most continent ; so that these also are powerless to make 
 him idle at the expense of duty. You must consider the 
 matter then and tell me, as befits you, what you can and 
 will do." 
 
 Such were the representations of Polydamas. The Lace- 
 daemonians, for the time being, deferred their answer; but 
 after calculating the next day and the day following how many 
 divisions * they had on foreign service, and how many ships on 
 the coast of Laconia to deal with the foreign squadron of the 
 Athenians, and taking also into account the war with their 
 neighbours, they gave their answer to Polydamas : " For the 
 present they would not be able to send him a sufficient aid : 
 under the circumstances they advised him to go back and 
 make the best settlement he could of his own affairs and those 
 of his city." He, thanking the Lacedaemonians for their 
 straightforwardness, withdrew. 
 
 The citadel of Pharsalus he begged Jason not to force 
 him to give up : his desire was to preserve it for those who 
 had entrusted it to his safe keeping; his own sons Jason 
 
 1 See Cyrop. III. i. 19. 
 
 * For this sentiment, see Mem. II. i. 20 et passim. 
 
 ^ Lit. "morai." 
 
ch! n.Vi^;''B:c. 374} JASON APPOINTED TAGOS 143 
 
 was free to take as hostages, and he would do his best to 
 procure for him the voluntary adhesion of his city by per- 
 suasion, and in every way to further his appointment as 
 Tagos of Thessaly. Accordingly, after interchange of solemn 
 assurances between the pair, the Pharsalians were let alone 
 in peace, and ere long Jason was, by general consent, ap- 
 pointed Tagos of all the Thessalians. Once fairly vested 
 with that authority, he drew up a list of the cavalry and 
 heavy infantry which the several states were capable of fur- 
 nishing as their quota, with the result that his cavalry, in- 
 clusive of allies, numbered more than eight thousand, while 
 his infantry force was computed at not less than twenty 
 thousand ; and his light troops would have been a match for 
 those of the whole world — the mere enumeration of their 
 cities would be a labour in itself.^ His next act was a 
 summons to all the dwellers round ^ to pay as tribute exactly 
 the amount imposed in the days of Scopas.^ And here in this 
 state of accomplishment we may leave these matters. I return 
 to the point reached when this digression into the affairs of 
 Jason began. 
 
 II. B.C. 374. — The Lacedaemonians and their allies were 
 collecting in Phocis, and the Thebans, after retreating into 
 their own territory, were guarding the approaches. At this 
 juncture the Athenians, seeing the Thebans growing strong 
 at their expense without contributing a single penny to the 
 maintenance of the fleet, while they themselves, what with 
 money contributions, and piratical attacks from Aegina, and 
 the garrisoning of their territory, were being pared to the bone, 
 
 ' See Cyrop. I. i. S' ° Lit. perioeci. 
 
 ' It is conjectured that the Scopadae ruled at Pherae and Cranusa in the 
 earher half of the fifth century B. c. ; see, for a change of dynasty, what is said 
 of Lycophron of Pherae in Hell, II. iii. 4 (Trans, vol. i. p. 49). There was 
 a famous Scopas, son of Creon, to whom Simonides addressed his poem — 
 
 "Avdp' ayaOiv fnh d\aOiuis yeviaSai 
 
 XctXeirii' x^P^^^ "^^ ^^^ Troffi koX vbi^ rerpdyuvov, &vev ^6yov TervyfjUfov, 
 a sentiment criticised by Plato, Protag. 339 A. "Now Simonides says to 
 Scopas, the son of Creon, the Thessalian : 
 
 ' Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good ; built four-square in hands 
 and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.' 
 
 Do you know the poem?" — Jowett, Plat. i. 153. But whether this Scopas is 
 the Scopas of our text and a hero of Jason's is not clear. 
 
144 HELLENICA BK. VI. {^€."374-373 
 
 conceived a desire to cease from war. In this mood they 
 sent an embassy to Lacedaemon and concluded peace.^ 
 
 B.C. 374-373. — This done, two of the ambassadors, in obe- 
 dience to a decree of the state, set sail at once from Laconian 
 territory, bearing orders to Timotheus to sail home, since peace 
 was established. That ofi&cer, while obeying his orders, availed 
 himself of the homeward voyage to land certain Zacynthian 
 exiles^ on their native soil, whereupon the Zacynthian city 
 party sent to Lacedaemon and complained of the treatment 
 they had received from Timotheus ; and the Lacedaemonians, 
 without further consideration, decided that the Athenians were 
 in the wrong, and proceeded to equip another navy, and at 
 length collected from Laconia itself, from Corinth, Leucas,^ 
 Ambracia, Elis, Zacynthus, Achaia, Epidaurus, Troezen, Her- 
 mione, and Halieis, a force amounting to sixty sail. In com- 
 mand of this squadron they appointed Mnasippus admiral, 
 with orders to attack Corcyra, and in general to look after 
 their interests in those seas. They, moreover, sent an em- 
 bassy to Dionysius, instructing him that his interests would be 
 advanced by the withdrawal of Corcyra from Athenian hands. 
 
 B.C. 373. — Accordingly Mnasippus set sail, as soon as his 
 squadron was ready, direct to Corcjrra ; he took with him, 
 besides his troops from Lacedaemon, a body of mercenaries, 
 making a total in all of no less than fifteen hundred men. 
 He disembarked, and soon became master of the island, the 
 country district falling a prey to the spoiler. It was in a high 
 state of cultivation, and rich with fruit-trees, not to speak of 
 magnificent dweUing-houses and wine-cellars fitted up on the 
 farms : so that, it was said, the soldiers reached such a pitch 
 of luxury that they refused to drink wine which had not a fine 
 bouquet. A crowd of slaves, too, and fat beasts were captured' 
 on the estates. 
 
 The general's next move was to encamp with his land 
 forces about three-quarters of a mile * from the city, on rising 
 ground, • .which commanded the rural district, so that any 
 Corcyraean who attempted to leave the city to go into the 
 
 ' See Curtius, //. G. vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. trans.). 
 
 ^ See Hicks, 81, p. 142. ' Jbid. 81, 86. 
 
 ■* Lit. ' ' five stades. " 
 
cH.iK|M2J THE ATHENIANS RELIEVE CORCYRA 145 
 
 country would be certainly cut off on that side. The fleet he 
 stationed on the other side of the city, at a point where he 
 calculated on detecting and preventing the approach of con- 
 voys. Besides which he established a blockade in front of the 
 harbour when the weather permitted. In this way the city was 
 completely invested. 
 
 The Corcyraeans, on their side, were in the sorest straits. 
 They could get nothing from their soil owing to the vice in 
 which they were gripped by land, whilst owing to the pre- 
 dominance of the enemy at sea nothing could be imported. 
 Accordingly they sent to the Athenians and begged for their 
 assistance. They urged upon them that it would be a great 
 mistake if they suffered themselves to be robbed of Corcyra. 
 If they did so, they would not only throw away a great 
 advantage to themselves, but add a considerable strength to 
 their enemy ; since, with the exception of Athens, no state was 
 capable of furnishing a larger fleet or revenue. Moreover, 
 Corcyra lay favourably^ for commanding the Corinthian gulf 
 and the cities which line its shores ; it was splendidly situated 
 for injuring the rural districts of Laconia, and still more 
 splendidly in relation to the opposite shores of the con- 
 tinent of Epirus, and the passage between Peloponnesus and 
 Sicily. 
 
 This appeal did not fall on deaf ears. The Athenians 
 were persuaded that the matter demanded their most serious 
 attention, and they at once despatched Stesicles as general,^ 
 with about six hundred peltasts. They also requested Alcetas 
 to help them in getting their troops across. Thus under cover 
 of night the whole body were conveyed across to a point in 
 the open country, and found their way into the city. Nor 
 was that all. The Athenians passed a decree to man sixty 
 ships of war, and elected^ Timotheus admiral. The latter, 
 being unable to man the fleet on the spot, set sail on a 
 cruise to the islands and tried to make up the complements 
 of his crews from those quarters. He evidently looked upon 
 
 1 See Thuc. i. 36. 
 
 ^ The name of the general was Ctesicles, according to Diod. xv. 47. Read 
 arparriyiiv for Tay6p, with Breitenbach, Cobet, etc. For Alcetas, see above, 
 Hell. VI. i. 7, p. 139. ^ I.e. by show of hands, ix^iporbvovv. 
 
 VOL. II L 
 
146 
 
 HELLENICA — BK. VI. {""' "'l"'^l 
 
 it as no light matter to sail round Peloponnesus as if on a 
 voyage of pleasure, and to attack a fleet in the perfection of 
 training.^ To the Athenians, however, it seemed that he was 
 wasting the precious time seasonable for the coasting voyage, 
 and they were not disposed to condone such an error, but 
 deposed him, appointing Iphicrates in his stead. The new 
 general was no sooner appointed than he set about getting 
 his vessels manned with the utmost activity, putting pressure 
 on the trierarchs. He further procured from the Athenians for 
 his use not only any vessels cruising on the coast of Attica, 
 but the Paralus and Salaminia^ also, remarking that, if things 
 turned out well yonder, he would soon send them back plenty 
 of ships. Thus his numbers grew to something like seventy 
 sail. 
 
 Meanwhile the Corcyraeans were sore beset with famine : 
 desertion became every day more frequent, so much so that 
 Mnasippus caused proclamation to be made by herald that 
 all deserters would be sold there and then j^ and when that 
 had no effect in lessening the stream of runaways, he ended 
 by driving them back with the lash. Those within the walls, 
 however, were not disposed to receive these miserable slaves 
 within the lines, and numbers died outside. Mnasippus, not 
 blind to what was happening, soon persuaded himself that 
 he had as good as got the city into his possession : and he 
 began to try experiments on his mercenaries. Some of them 
 he had already paid off;* others still in his service had as 
 much as two months' pay owing to them by the general, who, 
 if report spoke true, had no lack of money, since the majority 
 of the states, not caring for a campaign across the seas, sent 
 him hard cash instead of men. But now the beleaguered 
 citizens, who could espy from their towers that the outposts 
 were less carefully guarded than formerly, and the men 
 scattered about the rural districts, made a sortie, capturing 
 some and cutting down others. Mnasippus, perceiving the 
 attack, donned his armour, and, with all the heavy troops 
 
 1 See Jowett, note to Thuc. VIII. xcv. 2, ii. p. 525. 
 ^ The two sacred galleys. See Trans, vol. i. p. 41 ; Thuc. iii. rir, ■ Aristoph. 
 Birds, 147 foil. 
 
 ' Or, "he would knock them all down to the hammer." 
 ^ Or, " cut off from their pay. " 
 
b"c.'ot'^"*} MNASIPPUS in CORCYRA 147 
 
 he had, rushed to the rescue, giving orders to the captains 
 and brigadiers^ to lead out the mercenaries. Some of the 
 captains answered that it was not so easy to command 
 obedience when the necessaries of life were lacking ; whereat 
 the Spartan struck one man with his staff, and another with 
 the butt of his spear. Without spirit and full of resent- 
 ment against their general, the men mustered — a condition 
 very unfavourable to success in battle. Having drawn up the 
 troops, the general in person repulsed the division of the enemy 
 which was opposite the gates, and pursued them closely ; but 
 these, rallying close under their walls, turned right about, and 
 from under cover of the tombs kept up a continuous discharge 
 of darts and other missiles ; other detachments, dashing out at 
 other gates, meanwhile fell heavily on the flanks of the enemy. 
 The Lacedaemonians, being drawn up eight deep, and thinking 
 that the wing of their phalanx was of inadequate strength, 
 essayed to wheel round; but as soon as they began the 
 movement the Corcyraeans attacked them as if they were 
 fleeing, and they were then unable to recover themselves,^ 
 while the troops next in position abandoned themselves to 
 flight. Mnasippus, unable to succour those who were being 
 pressed owing to the attack of the enemy immediately in 
 front, found himself left from moment to moment with de- 
 creasing numbers. At last the Corcyraeans collected, and 
 with one united effort made a final rush upon Mnasippus and 
 his men, whose numbers were now considerably reduced. 
 At the same instant the townsmen,^ eagerly noticing the posture 
 of affairs, rushed out to play their part. First Mnasippus was 
 slain, and then the pursuit became general; nor could the 
 pursuers well have failed to capture the camp, barricade and 
 all, had they not caught sight of the mob of traffickers with a 
 long array of attendants and slaves, and thinking that here 
 was a prize indeed, desisted from further chase. 
 
 The Corcyraeans were well content for the moment to set 
 up a trophy and to give back the enemy's dead under a flag 
 
 ' Lit. ' ' lochagoi and taxiarchs. " 
 
 2 Or, " to retaliate " ; or, " to complete the movement. " 
 
 3 Reading, after Dindorf, oi ttoXitoi, or, if with the MSS. , ol iTXlrai; 
 translate "the heavy-armed among the assailants saw their advantage and 
 pressed on." 
 
148 HELLENICA — BK. VI. {''"" "■b!c!''373 
 
 of truce ; but the after-consequences were even more im- 
 portant to them in the revival of strength and spirits which 
 the citizens experienced, in proportion as the foreign invaders 
 were sunk in despondency. The rumour spread that Iphi- 
 crates would soon be there — he was even at the doors ; and 
 in fact the Corcyraeans themselves were manning a fleet. So 
 Hypermenes, who was second in command to Mnasippus and 
 the bearer of his despatches,^ manned every vessel of the fleet 
 as full as it would hold, and then sailing round to the en- 
 trenched camp, filled all the transports with prisoners and 
 valuables and other stock, and sent them off. He himself, 
 with his marines and the survivors of the troops, kept watch 
 over the entrenchments ; but at last even this remnant in the 
 excess of panic and confusion got on board the men-of-war 
 and sailed off, leaving behind them vast quantities of corn and 
 wine, with numerous prisoners and invalided soldiers. The 
 fact was, they were sorely afraid of being caught by the 
 Athenians in the island, and so they made safely off to Leucas. 
 Meanwhile Iphicrates had commenced his voyage of cir- 
 cumnavigation, partly voyaging and partly making every 
 preparation for ' an engagement. He at once left his 
 large sails behind him, as the voyage was only to be the 
 prelude of a battle ; his flying jibs, even if there was a good 
 breeze, were but little used, since by making his progress de- 
 pend on sheer rowing he hoped at once to improve the 
 physique of his men and the speed of his attack. Often 
 when the squadron was about to put into shore for the pur- 
 pose of breakfast or supper, he would seize the moment, and 
 draw back the leading wing of the column from the land off 
 the point in question ; and then facing round again with the 
 triremes posted well in line, prow for prow, at a given signal 
 let loose the whole fleet in a stoutly contested race for the 
 shore. Great was the triumph in being the first to take 
 in water or whatever else they might need, or the first to 
 breakfast ; just as it was a heavy penalty on the last-comers, 
 not only to come short in all these objects of desire, but 
 to , have to put out to sea with the rest as soon as the 
 
 ' For the import of the official title iwi(rTo\ia<popos in reference to the 
 composition of the Hellenica, see Trans, vol. i, p. Ixiii. 
 
CH. 1^28-31 J. VOYAGE OF H'HICRATES 149 
 
 signal was given ; since the first -comers had altogether a 
 quiet time of it, whilst the hindmost must get through the 
 whole business in hot haste. So again, in the matter of 
 outposts, if he chanced to be getting the morning meal on 
 hostile territory, pickets would be posted, as was right and 
 proper, on the land ; but, apart from these, he would raise 
 his masts and keep look-out men on the maintops. These 
 commanded of course a far wider prospect from their lofty 
 perches than the outposts on the level ground. So too, when 
 he dined or slept he had no fires burning in the camp at 
 night, but only a beacon kindled in front of the encampment 
 to prevent any unseen approach ; and frequently in fine 
 weather he put out to sea immediately after the evening meal, 
 when, if the breeze favoured, they ran along and took their rest 
 simultaneously, or if they depended on oars he gave his 
 mariners repose by turns. During the voyage in daytime he 
 would at one time signal to " sail in column," and at another 
 signal "abreast in line." So that whilst they prosecuted the 
 voyage they at the same time became (both as to theory and 
 practice) well versed in all the details of an engagement before 
 they reached the open sea — a sea, as they imagined, occupied 
 by their foes. For the most part they breakfasted and dined 
 on hostile territory ; but as he confined himself to bare neces- 
 saries he was always too quick for the enemy. Before the 
 hostile reinforcement would come up he had finished his 
 business and was out to sea again. 
 
 At the date of Mnasippus's death he chanced to be off 
 Sphagiae in Laconian territory. Reaching Elis, and coasting 
 past the mouth of the Alpheus, he came to moorings under 
 Cape Ichthus,^ as it is called. The next day he put out from 
 that port for Cephallenia, so drawing up his line and conduct- 
 ing the voyage that he might be prepared in every detail to 
 engage if necessary. The tale about Mnasippus and his demise 
 had reached him, but he had not heard it from an eye-witness, 
 and suspected that it might have been invented to deceive 
 him and throw him off his guard. He was therefore on the 
 look-out. It was, in fact, only on arrival in Cephallenia that 
 
 ' Cape Fish, mod. Cape Kat^olon, protecting harbour of Pyrgos in Elis. 
 See map to face p. 218 of Trans, vol. i. 
 
ISO 
 
 HELLENICA — BK. VI. { ""b.c/ l/l'jj* 
 
 he learned the news in an explicit form, and gave his troops 
 rest. 
 
 I am well aware that all these details of practice and 
 manoeuvring are customary in anticipation of a sea-fight, but 
 what I single out for praise in the case before us is the skill 
 with which the Athenian admiral attained a twofold object 
 Bearing in mind that it was his duty to reach a certain point at 
 which he expected to fight a naval battle without delay, it was 
 a happy discovery on his part not to allow tactical skill, on 
 the one hand, to be sacrificed to the pace of sailing,^ nor, on the 
 other, the need of training to interfere with the date of arrival. 
 
 After reducing the towns of Cephallenia, Iphicrates sailed 
 to Corcyra. There the first news he heard was that the 
 triremes sent by Dionysius were expected to relieve the Lace- 
 daemonians. On receipt of this information he set off in 
 person and surveyed the country, in order to find a spot from 
 which it would be possible to see the vessels approaching and 
 to signal to the city. Here he stationed his look-out men. 
 A code of signals was agreed upon to signify " vessels in sight," 
 " mooring," etc. ; which done he gave his orders to twenty of 
 his captains of men-of-war who were to follow him at a given 
 word of command. Any one who failed to follow him must 
 not grumble at the penalty ; that he warned them. Presently 
 the vessels were signalled approaching ; the word of command 
 was given, and then the enthusiasm was a sight to see — every 
 man of the crews told off for the expedition racing to join his 
 ship and embark. Sailing to the point where the enemy's 
 vessels lay, he had no difficulty in capturing the crews, who 
 had disembarked from all the ships with one exception. The 
 exception was that of Melanippus the Rhodian, who had ad- 
 vised the other captains not to stop at this point, and had then 
 manned his own vessel and sailed oif. Thus he encountered the 
 ships of Iphicrates, but contrived to slip through his fingers, while 
 . the whole of the Syracusan vessels were captured, crews and all. 
 
 Having cut the beaks oif the prows, Iphicrates bore down 
 into the harbour of Corcyra with the captured triremes in 
 tow. With the captive crews themselves he came to an 
 agreement that each should pay a fixed sum as ransom, with 
 
 ' Lit. " the voyage. " 
 
"c.372^*"^'} HIS STRATEGY AND SUCCESSES 151 
 
 one exception, that of Crinippus, their commander. Him he 
 kept under guard, with the intention apparently of exacting 
 a handsome sum in his case or else of selling him. The 
 prisoner, however, from vexation of spirit, put an end to 
 his own life. The rest were sent about their business by 
 Iphicrates, who accepted the Corcyraeans as sureties for the 
 money. His own sailors he supported for the most part as 
 labourers on the lands of the Corcyraeans, while at the head 
 of his light infantry and the hoplites of the contingent he 
 crossed over into Acarnania, and there lent his aid to any 
 friendly state that needed his services ; besides which he went 
 to war with the Thyrians,^ a sturdy race of warriors in posses- 
 sion of a strong fortress. 
 
 B.C. 372. — Having attached to his squadron the navy also 
 of Corcyra, with a fleet numbering now about ninety ships he 
 set sail, in the first instance to Cephallenia, where he ex- 
 acted money-ywhich was in some cases voluntarily paid, in 
 others forcibly extorted. In the next place he began making 
 preparations partly to harass the territory of the Lacedae- 
 monians, and partly to win over voluntarily the other states in 
 that quarter which were hostile to Athens ; or in case of re- 
 fusal to go to war with them. 
 
 The whole conduct of the campaign reflects, I think, the 
 highest credit on Iphicrates. If his strategy was admirable, 
 so too was the instinct which led him to advise the associa- 
 tion with himself of two such colleagues as Callistratus and 
 Chabrias, — the former a popular orator but no great friend of 
 himself politically,^ the other a man of high military reputa- 
 
 ' Thyreum (or Thyrium), in Acarnania, a chief city at the time of the 
 Roman wars in Greece ; and according to Polybius (xxxviii. 5), a meeting-place 
 of the League on one occasion. See Diet. And. Geog. s.v. ; Freeman, of. cit. 
 iv. 148 ; cf. Pans. IV. xxvi. 3, in reference to the Messenians and Naupactus ; 
 Grote, H. G. x. 212. 
 
 2 Reading, with the MSS. , oi iiAXa tiriT^Seioc ivra. See Grote, H. G. 
 X. 206. Boeckh (P. S. A. , trans. Cornewall Lewis, p. 419) wished to read e5 
 ix.d\a for oi iid\a k.t.X, in which case translate "the former a popular 
 orator, and a man of singular capacity " ; and for itriT'fiSeiov in that sense, 
 see Hipparch. i. 8 ; for e5 /idXa, see Hipparch. i. 25. For details concerning 
 Callistratus, see Dindorf, op. cit. note ad loc. ; Curtius, H. G. iv. 367, 381 
 foil. , 1. 90. For Chabrias, Rehdantz, cp. cit. In the next sentence I have 
 again adhered to the reading of the MSS. , but the passage is commonly re- 
 garded as corrupt ; see Otto Keller, op. cit. p. 215 for various emendations. 
 
IS2 HELLENICA — BK. VI. { Ti-'s i o-cr^^-a"; 
 
 tion. Either he looked upon them as men of unusual 
 sagacity, and wished to profit by their advice, in which case 
 I commend the good sense of the arrangement, or they were, 
 in his belief, antagonists, in which case the determination to 
 approve himself a consummate general, neither indolent nor 
 incautious, was bold, I admit, but indicative of a laudable 
 self-confidence. Here, however, we must part with Iphicrates 
 and his achievements, to return to Athens. 
 
 III. — The Athenians, forced to witness the expatriation from 
 Boeotia of their friends the Plataeans (who had sought an 
 asylum with themselves), forced also to listen to the supplica- 
 tions of the Thespiaeans (who begged them not to suffer them 
 to be robbed of their city), could no longer regard the Thebans 
 with favour ; ^ though, when it came to a direct declaration of 
 war, they were checked in part by a feeling of shame, and partly 
 by considerations of expediency. Still, to go hand in hand 
 with them, to be a party to their proceedings, this they abso- 
 lutely refused, now that they saw, them marching against 
 time-honoured friends of the city like the Phocians, and 
 blotting out states whose loyalty in the great Persian war was 
 conspicuous no less than their friendship to Athens. Accord- 
 ingly the People passed a decree to make peace ; but in the first 
 instance they sent an embassy to Thebes, inviting that state 
 to join them if it pleased them on an embassy which they pro- 
 posed to send to Lacedaemon to treat of peace. In the next 
 place they despatched such an embassy on their own account. 
 Among the commissioners appointed were Callias the son of 
 Hipponicus, Autocles the son of Strombichides, Demostratus 
 the son of Aristophon, Aristocles, Cephisodotus,^ Melanopus, 
 and Lycaethus. 
 
 B.C. 371. — [These were formally introduced to the Deputies 
 of the Lacedaemonians and the allies.^] Nor ought the name 
 of Callistratus to be omitted. That statesman and orator was 
 present. He had obtained furlough from Iphicrates on an 
 undertaking either to send money for the fleet or to arrange a^ 
 peace. Hence his arrival in Athens and transactions in behalf 
 
 1 Plataeae destroyed in B.C. 373. See Jowett, TA?ic. ii. 3^7. 
 ^ See below, HeU. VII. i. 12, p. 188 ; Hicks, 87. 
 
 ' Tlie bracketed words read like an annotator's comment, or possibly they 
 are a note by the author. 
 
b!c.37i*^'*} peace congress at SPARTA 153 
 
 of peace. After being introduced to the assembly ^ of the 
 Lacedaemonians and to the allies, Callias,^ who was the dadou- 
 chos (or torch-holder) in the mysteries, made the first speech. 
 He was a man just as well pleased to praise himself as to 
 hear himself praised by others. He opened the proceedings 
 as follows : 
 
 " Lacedaemonians, the duty of representing you as 
 proxenos at Athens is a privilege which I am not the first 
 member of my family to enjoy; my father's father held it 
 as an heirloom of our family and handed it down as a 
 heritage to his descendants. If you will permit me, I should 
 like to show you the disposition of my fatherland towards 
 yourselves. If in times of war she chooses us as her generals, 
 so when her heart is set upon quiet she sends us out as 
 her messengers of peace. I myself have twice already* 
 stood here to treat for the conclusion of war, and on 
 both embassies succeeded in arranging a mutually agreeable 
 peace. Now for the third time I am come, and I flatter 
 myself that to-day again I shall obtain a reconciliation, and on 
 grounds exceptionally just. My eyes bear witness that our 
 hearts are in accord ; you and we alike are pained at the 
 efifacement of Plataeae and Thespiae. Is it not then reason- 
 able that out of agreement should spring concord rather than 
 discord ? It is never the part, I take it, of wise men to raise 
 the standard of war for the sake of petty differences ; but where 
 there is nothing but unanimity they must be rnarvellous folk 
 who refuse the bond of peace. But I go further. It were 
 just and right on our parts even to refuse to bear arms 
 against each other ; since, as the story runs, the first strangers 
 to whom our forefather Triptolemus showed the unspeakable 
 mystic rites of Demeter and Cor^, the mother and the maiden, 
 were your ancestors ; — I speak of Heracles, the first founder 
 of your state, and of your two citizens, the great twin sons 
 of Zeus — and to Peloponnesus first he gave as a gift the 
 seed of Demeter's corn-fruits. How, then, can it be just or 
 
 ^ See above, Hell. II. iv. 38 (vol. i. p. 73). 
 
 2 See above, Hell. IV. v. 13 ; Cobet, Prosop. Xen. p. 67 foil. ; Xen. 
 Symp. \ Plat. Protag. ; Andoc. de Myst. If this is one and the same person 
 he must have been an elderly man at this date, 371 B.C. 
 
 ^ B.C. 387 and 374 ; see Curtius, H. G. vol. iv. p. 376 (Eng. ed. ). 
 
154 HELLENICA BK. VI. {''"' "'.'cf I7? 
 
 right either that you should come and ravage the corn crops 
 of those from whom you got the sacred seed of corn, or that 
 we should not desire that they to whom the gift was given 
 should share abundantly of this boon ? But if, as it would 
 seem, it is a fixed decree of heaven that war shall, never 
 cease among men, yet ought we — your people and our people 
 — to be as slow as possible to begin it, and being in it, as 
 swift as possible to bring it to an end." 
 
 After him Autocles ^ spoke : he was of repute as a versatile 
 lawyer and orator, and addressed the meeting as follows ; 
 " Lacedaemonians, I do not conceal from myself that what 
 I am about to say is not calculated to please you, but it 
 seems to me that, if you wish the friendship which we are 
 cementing to last as long as possible, we are wise to show 
 each other the underlying causes of our wars. Now, you are 
 perpetually saying that the states ought to be independent; 
 but it is you yourselves who most of all stand in the way of 
 independence, — your first and last stipulation with the allied 
 states being that they should follow you whithersoever you 
 choose to lead ; and yet what has this principle of follow-my- 
 leader got to do with independent action ? ^ Again, you pick 
 quarrels without consulting your allies, and lead them against 
 those whom you account enemies ; so that in many cases, 
 with all their vaunted independence, they are forced to march 
 against their greatest friends ; and, what is still more opposed 
 to independence than all else, you are for ever setting up here 
 your decarchies and there your thirty commissioners, and your 
 chief aim in appointing these officers and governors seems to 
 be, not that they should fulfil their office and govern legally, 
 but that they should be able to keep the cities under their 
 heels by sheer force. So that it looks as if you delighted in 
 despotisms rather than free constitutions. Let us go back to 
 the date ^ at which the Persian king enjoined the independence 
 of the states. At that time you made no secret of your con- 
 viction that the Thebans, if they did not suffer each state to 
 
 1 For the political views of Autocles, see Curtius, H. G. iv. 387, v. 94 
 (Eng. tr.) ; see also Grote, ff. G. x. 225. 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' what consistency is there between these precepts of yours and 
 political independence?" 
 
 ^ Sixteen years before — B.C. 387. See below, Pal. Lac. xiv. 5, p. 322. 
 
S!c.37i*''^} SPEECHES OF THE ATHENIAN ENVOYS 155 
 
 govern itself and to use the laws of its own choice, would be 
 failing to act in the spirit of the king's rescript. But no sooner 
 had you got hold of the Cadmeia than you would not suffer 
 the Thebans themselves to be independent. Now, if the 
 maintenance of friendship be an object, it is no use for people 
 to claim justice from others while they themselves are doing 
 all they can to prove the selfishness of their aims." 
 
 These remarks were received in absolute silence, yet in 
 the hearts of those who were annoyed with Lacedaemon they 
 stirred pleasure. After Autocles spoke Callistratus : " Tres- 
 passes, men of Lacedaemon, have been committed on both 
 sides, yours and ours, I am free to confess ; but still it is not 
 my view that because a man has done wrong we can never 
 again have dealings with him. Experience tells me that no man 
 can go very far without a slip, and it seems to me that some- 
 times the transgressor by reason of his transgression becomes 
 more tractable, especially if he be chastened through, the error 
 he has committed, as has been the case with us. And so in 
 your own case I see that ungenerous acts have sometimes 
 reaped their own proper reward : blow has been met by 
 counter-blow ; and as a specimen I take the seizure of the 
 Cadmeia in Thebes. To-day, at any rate, the very cities 
 whose independence you strove for have, since your unright- 
 eous treatment of Thebes, fallen one and all of them again 
 into her power.^ We are schooled now, both of us, to know 
 that grasping brings not gain. We are prepared, I hope, to 
 be once more moderate under the influence of a mutual 
 friendship. Some, I know, in their desire to render our peace ^ 
 abortive accuse us falsely, as though we were come hither, not 
 seeking friendship, but because we dread the arrival of some ^ 
 Antalcidas with moneys from the king. But consider, what 
 arrant nonsense they talk ! Was it not, pray, the great king 
 who demanded that all the states in Hellas should be inde- 
 pendent ? and what have we Athenians, who are in full agree- 
 
 1 Reading, with Breitenbach and Hartman, as instead of lij iinroidairaTe 
 K.T.X. ^ Or, more lit. ' ' to avert the peace " as an ill-omened thing. 
 
 3 Without inserting ris, as Hartman proposes {An. Xen. p. 387), that, I 
 think, is the sense. Antalcidas is the arch-diplomat — a name to conjure with, 
 like that of Bismarck in modern European poUtics. But see Grote, H. G. x. 
 213, note 2. 
 
IS6 HELLENICA BK. VI. {""' "''u.c.%n 
 
 ment with the king, both in word and deed, to fear from 
 him ? Or is it conceivable that he prefers spending money in 
 making others great to finding his favourite projects realised 
 without expense ? 
 
 " Well ! what is it really that has brought us here ? No 
 especial need or difficulty in our affairs. That you may 
 discover by a glance at our maritime condition, or, if 
 you prefer, at the present posture of our affairs on land. 
 Well, then, how does the matter stand ? It is obvious that 
 some of our allies please us no better than they please you ; ^ 
 and, possibly, in return for your former preservation of us, we 
 may be credited with a desire to point out to you the sound- 
 ness of our policy. 
 
 " But, to revert once more to the topic of expediency and 
 common interests. It is admitted, I presume, that, looking at 
 the states collectively, half support your views, half ours ; and 
 in every single state one party is for Sparta and another for 
 Athens. Suppose, then, we were to shake hands, from what 
 quarter can we reasonably anticipate danger and trouble ? To 
 put the case in so many words, so long as you are our friends 
 no one can vex us by land ; no one, whilst we are your sup- 
 porters, can injure you by sea. Wars hke tempests gather and 
 grow to a head from time to time, and again they are dis- 
 pelled. That we all know. Some future day, if not to-day, 
 we shall crave, both of us, for peace. Why, then, need we 
 wait for that moment, holding on until we expire under the 
 multitude of our ills, rather than take time by the forelock 
 and, before some irremediable mischief betide, make peace ? 
 I cannot admire the man who, because he has entered the 
 lists and has scored many a victory and obtained to himself 
 renown, is so eaten up with the spirit of rivalry that he must 
 needs go on until he is beaten and all his training is made 
 futile. Nor again do I praise the gambler who, if he makes 
 one good stroke of luck, insists on doubling the stakes. Such 
 
 ' See, for this corrupt passage, Otto Keller, oji, cii. p. 219 ; Hartman, op. 
 cit. p. 387 ; and Breitenbach, n. ad loc. In the next sentence I should like 
 to adopt Hartman's emendation {it.') &v SpSws lyvare for the MSS. 5, 6p6as 
 lyru/iev, and translate " we may lilie to prove to you the soundness of your 
 policy-at the time." For the "preservation " referred to, see below, VI. v. 35, 
 p. 180 ; and Hell. 11. ii. 20 (Trans, vol. i. p. 48). 
 
cH:.'v.'/,f 0X371} TREATY OF PEACE ; THEBES EXCLUDED 157 
 
 conduct in the majority of cases must end in absolute collapse. 
 Let us lay the lesson of these to heart, and forbear to enter 
 into any such lists as theirs for life or death ; but, while we 
 are yet in the heyday of our strength and fortune, shake hands 
 in mutual amity. So assuredly shall we through you and 
 you through us attain to an unprecedented pinnacle of glory 
 throughout Hellas." 
 
 The arguments of the speakers were approved, and the 
 Lacedaemonians passed a resolution to accept peace on a 
 threefold basis : the withdrawal of the governors from the 
 cities,^ the disbanding of armaments naval and military, and 
 the guarantee of independence to the states. " If a!ny state 
 transgressed these stipulations, it lay at the option of any 
 power whatsoever to aid the states so injured, while, conversely, 
 to bring such aid was not compulsory on any power against 
 its will." On these terms the oaths were administered and 
 accepted by the Lacedaemonians on behalf of themselves and 
 their allies, and by the Athenians and their allies separately 
 state by state. The Thebans had entered their individual name 
 among the states which accepted the oaths, but their ambas- 
 sadors came the next day with instructions to alter the name 
 of the signatories, substituting for Thebans Boeotians.^ But 
 Agesilaus answered to this demand that he would alter nothing 
 of what they had in the first instance sworn to and sub- 
 scribed. If they did not wish to be included in the treaty, he 
 was willing to erase their name at their bidding. So it came 
 to pass that the rest of the world made peace, the sole point 
 of dispute being confined to the Thebans ; and the Athenians 
 came to the conclusion that there was a fair prospect of the 
 Thebans being now literally decimated.^ As to the Thebans 
 themselves, they retired from Sparta in utter despondency. 
 
 IV. — In consequence of the peace the Athenians proceeded 
 to withdraw their garrisons from the different states, and sent to 
 
 ^ Grote {H. G, a. 236) thinks that Diod. xv. 38 (i^aria-^m) belongs to 
 this time, not to the peace between Athens and Sparta in 374 B.C. 
 
 " See, for a clear explanation of the matter. Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. iv. 
 p. 17s, note 3, in reference to Grote, ib. x. 231 note, and Pans. IX. xiii. 2 ; 
 Plut. Ages. 28 ; Thirlwall, H. G. v. p. 69 note. 
 
 ^ Or, "as the saying is, taken and tithed. " See below, VI. v. 35, p. 180, 
 and for the origin of the saying, Herod, vii. 132. 
 
158 HELLENICA BK. VI. {""■ 'e/cf 3^? 
 
 recall Iphicrates with his fleet ; besides which they forced him 
 to restore everything captured subsequently to the late solemn 
 undertaking at Lacedaemon. The Lacedaemonians acted 
 differently. Although they withdrew their governors and 
 garrisons from the other states, in Phocis they did not do 
 so. Here Cleombrotus was quartered with his army, and 
 had sent to ask directions from the home authorities. A 
 speaker, Prothous, maintained that their business was to 
 disband the army in accordance with their oaths, and then 
 to send round invitations to the states to contribute what 
 each felt individually disposed, and lay such sum in the 
 temple of Apollo ; after which, if any attempt to hinder the 
 independence of the states on any side were manifested, 
 it would be time enough then again to invite all who cared 
 to protect the principle of autonomy to march against its 
 opponents. "In this way," he added, "I think the good- 
 will of heaven will be secured, and the states will suffer 
 least annoyance." But the Assembly, on hearing these views, 
 agreed that this man was talking nonsense. Puppets in the 
 hand of fate ! ^ An unseen power, as it would seem, was 
 already driving them onwards ; so they sent instructions to 
 Cleombrotus not to disband the army, but to march straight 
 against the Thebans if they refused to recognise the autonomy 
 of the states. [Cleombrotus, it is understood, had, on hearing 
 the news of the estp-blishment of peace, sent to the ephorate 
 to ask for guidance ; and then they sent him the above in- 
 structions, bidding him under the circumstances named to 
 march upon Thebes.^] 
 
 The Spartan king soon perceived that, so far from leaving 
 the Boeotian states their autonomy, the Thebans were not 
 even preparing to disband their army, clearly in view of a 
 general engagement ; he therefore felt justified in march- 
 ing his troops into Boeotia. The point of ingress which 
 he adopted was not that which the Thebans anticipated from 
 Phocis, and where they were keeping guard at a defile ; 
 
 ' See Grote, J/. G. x. 237 : ' ' The miso-Theban impulse now drove them 
 on with a fury which overcame all other thoughts ... a misguiding inspira- 
 tion sent by the gods — like that of the Homeric At^. " 
 
 ^ This passage reads like an earlier version for which the above was 
 substituted by the author. 
 
Tc.'ij'^^'^} CLEOMBROTUS AT LEUCTRA 159 
 
 but, marching through Thisbae by a mountainous and un- 
 suspected route, he arrived before Creusis, taking that for- 
 tress and capturing twelve Theban war-vessels besides. After 
 this achievement he advanced from the seaboard and en- 
 camped in Leuctra on Thespian territory. The Thebans en- 
 camped on a rising ground immediately opposite at no great 
 distance, and were supported by no allies except the Boeotians. 
 
 At this juncture the friends of Cleombrotus came to him 
 and urged upon him strong reasons for delivering battle. 
 " If you let the Thebans escape without a battle," they said, 
 " you will run great risks of suffering the extreme penalty at 
 the hands of the state. People will call to mind against 
 you the time when you reached Cynoscephalae and did not 
 ravage a square foot of Theban territory ; and again, a sub- 
 sequent expedition when you were driven back foiled in your 
 attempt to make an entry into the enemy's country — while 
 Agesilaus on each occasion found his entry by Mount 
 Cithaeron. If then you have any care for yourself, or any 
 attachment to your fatherland, march you must against the 
 enemy." That was what his friends urged. As to his 
 opponents, what they said was, "Now our fine friend will 
 show whether he really is so concerned on behalf of the 
 Thebans as he is said to be." 
 
 Cleombrotus, with these words ringing in his ears, felt 
 driven ^ to join battle. On their side the leaders of Thebes 
 calculated that, if they did not fight, their provincial -cities ^ 
 would hold aloof from them and Thebes itself would be 
 besieged; while, if the commonalty of Thebes failed to get 
 supplies, there was every prospect that the city itself would 
 turn against them ; and, seeing that many of them had already 
 tasted the bitterness of exile, they came to the conclusion that 
 it was better for them to die on the field of battle than to 
 renew that experience. Besides this they were somewhat 
 encouraged by the recital of an oracle which predicted that 
 the Lacedaemonians would be defeated on the spot where the 
 monument of the maidens stood, who, as the story goes, being 
 
 ' Or, " was provoked. " 
 
 ^ Lit. "perioecid." See Thuc. iv. 76, Arnold's note, and ffell. V. iv. 
 46, 63 (above, pp. 13T, 136). 
 
i6o HELLENICA BK. VI. { ]u\y67i>^c.''3]° 
 
 violated by certain Lacedaemonians, had slain themselves. ^ 
 This sepulchral monument the Thebans decked with orna- 
 ments before the battle. Furthermore, tidings were brought 
 them from the city that all the temples had opened of their 
 own accord ; and the priestesses assented that the gods revealed 
 victory. Again, from the Heracleion men said that the arms 
 had disappeared, as though Heracles himself had sallied forth 
 to battle. It is true that another interpretation^ of these 
 marvels made them out to be one and all the artifices of the 
 leaders of Thebes. However this may be, everything in the 
 battle turned out adverse to the Lacedaemonians ; while fortune 
 herself lent aid to the Thebans and crowned their efforts with 
 success. Cleombrotus held his last council " whether to fight 
 or not," after the morning meal. In the heat of noon a little 
 wine goes a long way ; and people said that it took a somewhat 
 provocative effect on their spirits.* 
 
 Both sides were now arming, and there were the unmistak- 
 able signs of approaching battle, when, as the first incident, 
 there issued from the Boeotian lines a long train bent on 
 departure^these were the furnishers of the market, a detach- 
 ment of baggage bearers, and in general such people as had 
 no inclination to join in the fight. These were met on 
 their retreat and attacked by the mercenary troops under 
 Hiero, who got round them by a circular movement.* The 
 mercenaries were supported by the Phocian light infantry 
 and some squadrons of Heracleot and Phliasian cavalry, 
 who fell upon the retiring train and turned them back, pur- 
 suing them and driving them into the camp of the Boeotians. 
 The immediate effect was to make the Boeotian portion of the 
 army more numerous and closer packed than before. The 
 next feature of the combat was that in consequence of the 
 flat space of plain ^ between the opposing armies, the Lace- 
 daemonians posted their cavalry in front of their squares 
 of infantry, and the Thebans followed sui^. Only there was 
 this difference, — the Theban cavalry Was m a high state of 
 training and efficiency, owing to their war with the Orcho- 
 
 ^ See Diod. xv. 54 ; Paus. IX. xiii. 3 ; Plut. Pelop. xx. 
 
 ^ Or, "it is true that some people made out these marvels." 
 
 " Or, " they were somewhat excited by it. " 
 
 ■" Or, "surrounded them." ° See RUstow and Kochly, ofi. cit. p. 173. 
 
CH. iv.^g io..4| DEFEAT OF THE SPARTANS i6i 
 
 menians and again their war with Thespiae, whilst the cavalry 
 of the Lacedaemonians was at its worst at this period.^ The 
 horses were reared and kept by the wealthiest members of 
 the state ; but whenever the ban was called out, an appointed 
 trooper appeared who took the horse with any sort of arms 
 which might be presented to him, and set off on the expe- 
 dition at a moment's notice. Moreover, these troopers were 
 the least able-bodied of the men : raw recruits set simply 
 astride their horses, and devoid of soldierly ambition. Such 
 was the cavalry of either antagonist. 
 
 The heavy infantry of the Lacedaemonians, it is said, 
 advanced by sections three files abreast,^ allowing a total 
 depth to the whole line of not more than twelve. The 
 Thebans were formed in close order of not less than fifty 
 shields deep, calculating that victory gained over the king's 
 division of the army implied the easy conquest of the rest. 
 
 Cleombrotus had hardly begun to lead his division against 
 the foe when, before in fact the troops with him were aware 
 of his advance, the cavalry had already come into, col- 
 lision, and that of the Lacedaemonians was speedily worsted. 
 In their flight they became involved with their own heavy 
 infantry ; and to make matters •worse, the Theban regiments 
 were already attacking vigorously. Still strong evidence 
 exists for supposing that Cleombrotus and his division were, 
 in the first instance, victorious in the battle, if we consider the 
 fact that they could never have picked him up and brought 
 him back alive unless his vanguard had been masters of the 
 situation for the moment. 
 
 When, however, Deinon the polemarch and Sphodrias, a 
 member of the king's council, with his son Cleonymus,^ had 
 fallen, then it wa^ that the cavalry and the polemarch's adju- 
 tants,* as they are called, with the rest, under pressure of 
 the mass against them, began retreating ; and the left wing of 
 the Lacedaemonians, seeing the right borne down in this way, 
 
 1 See Hipparch, ix. 4 ; also Cyrop. VIII. viii. 
 
 '^ It would appear that the "enomoty " (section) numbered thirty-six files. 
 See Pol. Lac. xi. 4 ; xiii. 4. For further details as to the tactical order of the 
 Thebans, see Diod. xv. 55 ; Plut. Pelop. xxiii. 
 
 ' See above, V. iv. 33, p. 127. 
 
 * <rviii<j>opeis. For the readings of this corrupt passage see Otto Keller. 
 
 VOL. II \ M 
 
i62 HELLENICA — BK. VI. {''"' "'■b'c'''37i 
 
 also swerved. Still, in spite of the numbers slain, and broken 
 as they were, as soon as they had crossed the trench which 
 protected their camp in front, they grounded arms on the 
 spot^ whence they had rushed to battle. This camp, it 
 must be borne in mind, did not lie at all on the level, but 
 was pitched on a somewhat steep incline. At this juncture 
 there were some of the Lacedaemonians who, looking upon such 
 a disaster as intolerable, maintained that they ought to prevent 
 the enemy from erecting a trophy, and try to recover the 
 dead not under a iiag of truce but by another battle. The 
 polemarchs, however, seeing that nearly a thousand men of 
 the total Lacedaemonian troops were slain; seeing also that of 
 the seven hundred Spartans themselves who were on the field 
 something like four hundred lay dead ; ^ aware, further, of 
 the despondency which reigned among the allies, and the 
 general disinclination on their parts to fight longer (a 
 frame of mind not far removed in some instances from 
 positive satisfaction at what had taken place) — under the cir- 
 cumstances, I say, the polemarchs called a council of the ablest 
 representatives of the shattered army ^ and deliberated as to 
 what should be done. Finally the unanimous opinion was to 
 pick up the dead under a flag of truce, and they sent a herald 
 to treat for terms. The Thebans after that set up a trophy 
 and gave back the bodies under a truce. 
 
 After these events, a messenger was despatched to Lace- 
 daemon with news of the calamity. He reached his destina- 
 tion on the last day of the gymnopaediae,* just when the 
 chorus of grown men had entered the theatre. The ephors 
 heard the mournful tidings i^ot without grief and pain, as 
 needs they must, I take it ; bpt for all that they did not dis- 
 miss the chorus, but allowed the contest to run out its 
 natural course. What they did was to deliver the names of 
 those who had fallen to thfeir friends and families, with a 
 word of warning to the wome^ not to make any loud lamenta- 
 
 ' Or, "in orderly way." See Curt. H. G. iv. 400. ^ See Ages. ii. 24. 
 
 ' Tois liriKtupioirdTovs. See above, III. iii. 10, p. 23 ; Cyrof. VII. iv. 4; 
 VIII. iv. 32, vi. 2. 
 
 * The festival was celebrated annually about midsummer. See Herod, vi. 
 67; Thuc. V. 82, and Arnold's note; Pollux, iv. 105; y*then. xiv. 30, xv. 
 22 ; Miiller, Dorians, ii. 389. 
 
Bx.'J?!*'*"'} EFFECT OF THE NEWS AT SPARTA 163 
 
 tion but to bear their sorrow in silence ; and the next day 
 it was a striking spectacle to see those who had relations 
 among the slain moving to and fro in public with bright and 
 radiant looks, whilst of those whose friends were reported to 
 be living barely a man was to be seen, and these flitted by 
 with lowered heads and scowling brows, as if in humiliation. 
 
 After this the ephors proceeded to call out the ban, includ- 
 ing the forty-years -service men of the two remaining regi- 
 ments ; ^ and they proceeded further to despatch the reserves 
 of the same age belonging to the six regiments already on 
 foreign service. Hitherto the Phocian campaign had only drawn 
 upon the thirty-five-years-service list. Besides these they 
 now ordered out on active, service the troops retained at the 
 beginning of the campaign in attendance on the magistrates at 
 the government offices. Agesilaus being still disabled by his 
 infirmity, the city imposed the duty of command upon his son 
 Archidamus. The new general found eager co-operators in the 
 men of Tegea. The friends of Stasippus at this date were still 
 living,^ and they were stanch in their Lacedaemonian proclivi- 
 ties, and wielded considerable power in their state. Not less 
 stoutly did the Mantineans from their villages under their 
 aristocratic form of government flock to the Spartan standard. 
 Besides Tegea and Mantinea, the Corinthians and Sicyonians, 
 the Phliasians and Achaeans were equally enthusiastic in join- 
 ing, the campaign, whilst other states sent out soldiers. Then 
 came the fitting out and manning of ships of war on the part 
 of the Lacedaemonians themselves and of the Corinthians, 
 whilst the Sicyonians were requested to furnish a supply of 
 vessels on board of which it was proposed to transport the 
 army across the gulf And so, finally, Archidamus was able 
 to offer the sacrifices usual at the moment of crossing the 
 frontier. But to return to Thebes. 
 
 Immediately after the battle the Thebans sent a messenger 
 to Athens wearing a chaplet. Whilst insisting on the magni- 
 tude of the victory they at the same time called upon the 
 Athenians to send them aid, for now the opportunity had 
 come to wreak vengeance on the Lacedaemonians for all the 
 
 ^ I.e. every one up to fifty-eight years of age. See above, p. 69. 
 '^ See below, VI. v. 9, p. 171. 
 
i64 HELLENICA BK. VI. {""' '\^c'°'3n 
 
 evil they had done to Athens. As it chanced, the senate of 
 the Athenians was holding a session on the Acropolis. As 
 soon as the news was reported, the annoyance caused by its 
 announcement was unmistakable. They neither invited the 
 herald to accept of hospitality nor sent back one word in 
 reply to the request for assistance. And so the herald turned 
 his back on Athens and departed. 
 
 But there was Jason still to look to, and he was their ally. 
 To him then the Thebans sent, and earnestly besought his aid, 
 their thoughts running on the possible turn which events might 
 take. Jason on his side at once proceeded to man a fleet, 
 with the apparent intention of sending assistance by sea, 
 besides which he got together his foreign brigade and his own 
 cavalry ; and although the Phocians and he were implacable 
 enemies,^ he marched through their territory to Boeotia. 
 Appearing like a vision to many of the states before his ap- 
 proach was even announced — ^at any rate before levies could be 
 mustered from a dozen different points — he had stolen a march 
 upon them and was a long way ahead, giving proof that expedi- 
 tion is sometimes a better tool to work with than sheer force. 
 
 When he arrived in Boeotia the Thebans urged upon 
 him that now was the right moment to attack the Lacedae- 
 monians : he with his foreign brigade from the upper ground, 
 they face to face in front ; but Jason dissuaded them from 
 their intention. He reminded them that after a noble 
 achievement won it was not worth their while to play for so 
 high a stake, involving a still higher achievement or else the 
 loss of victory already gained. " Do you not see," he urged, 
 " that your success followed close on the heels of necessity ? 
 You ought then to reflect that the Lacedaemonians in their 
 distress, with a choice between life and death, will fight it out 
 with reckless desperation. Providence, as it seems, ofttimes 
 delights to make the little ones great and the great ones 
 small." 2 
 
 By such arguments he diverted the Thebans from the 
 desperate adventure. But for the Lacedaemonians also he 
 had words of advice, insisting on the difiference between an 
 
 ' Or, "though the Phocians maintained a war d outrance with him." 
 ^ Cf. Anab. III. ii. lo (Trans, vol. i. p. 154). 
 
™c"n '*"''') JASON'S MEDIATION 165 
 
 army defeated and an army flushed with victory. " If you 
 are minded," he said, "to forget this disaster, my advice 
 to you is to take time to recover breath and recruit your 
 energies. When you have grown stronger then give battle 
 to these unconquered veterans.^ At present," he continued, 
 "you know without my telling you that among your own 
 allies there are some who are already discussing terms of 
 friendship with your foes. My advice is : by all means en- 
 deavour to obtain a truce. This," he added, "is my own 
 ambition : I want to save you, on the ground of my father's 
 friendship with yourselves, and as being myself your repre- 
 sentative." ^ Such was the tenor of his speech, but the secret 
 of action was perhaps to be found in a desire to make these 
 mutual antagonists put their dependence on himself alone. 
 Whatever his motive, the Lacedaemonians took his advice, 
 and commissioned him to procure a truce. 
 
 As soon as the news arrived that the terms were arranged, 
 the polemarchs passed an order round : the troops were to take 
 their evening meal, get their kit together, and be ready to set 
 off that night, so as to scale the passes of Cithaeron by next 
 morning. After supper, before the hour of sleep, the order 
 to march was given, and with the generals at their head the 
 troops advanced as the shades of evening fell, along the road 
 to Creusis, trusting rather to the chance of their escaping notice, 
 than to the truce itself. It was weary marching in the dead of 
 night, making their retreat in fear, and along a difficult road, until 
 at length they reached Aegosthena in the Megaris. Here they 
 fell in with Archidamus's army of relief At this point, then, 
 Archidamus waited till all the allies had arrived, and so led the 
 whole of the united armies back to Corinth, from which point 
 he dismissed the allies and led his fellow-citizens home. 
 
 Jason took his departure from Boeotia through Phocis, 
 where he captured the suburbs of Hyampolis^ and ravaged 
 the country districts, putting many to the sword. Content 
 with this, he traversed the rest of Phocis without meddling or 
 
 1 Or, " the invincibles. " " Lit. " your proxenos. " 
 
 ^ An ancient town of Phocis {see Horn. //. ii. 521) on the road leading 
 from Orchomenus to Opus, and commanding a pass from Locris into Phocis 
 and Boeotia. See Herod, viii. 28 ; Paus. ix. 35, § S ; Strab. ix. 424 ; £>ic/. 
 0/ Geoff, s.v. 
 
l66 HELLENICA BK. VI. { ^b.'c.' I;!-"" 
 
 making. Arrived at Heraclea,i he knocked down the fortress 
 of the Heracleots, showing that he was not troubled by any 
 apprehension lest when the pass was thrown open somebody 
 or other might march against his own power at some future 
 date. Rather was he haunted by the notion that some one 
 or other might one day seize Heraclea, which commanded the 
 pass, and bar his passage into Hellas — should Hellas ever be 
 his goal. 2 At the moment of his return to Thessaly he had 
 reached the zenith of his greatness. He was the lawfully 
 constituted Prince^ of Thessaly, and he had under him a 
 large mercenary force of infantry and cavalry, and all in the 
 highest perfection of training. For this twofold reason he 
 might claim the title great. But he was still greater as the 
 head of a vast alliance. Those who were prepared to fight 
 his battles were numerous, and he might still count upon 
 the help of many more eager to do so ; but I call Jason 
 greatest among his contemporaries, because not one among 
 them could afford to look down upon him.* 
 
 B.C. 370. — The Pythian games were now approaching, and 
 an order went round the cities from Jason to make preparation 
 for the solemn sacrifice of oxen, sheep and goats, and swine. 
 It was reported that although the requisitions upon the several 
 cities were moderate, the number of beeves did not fall short 
 of a thousand, while the rest of the sacrificial beasts exceeded 
 ten times that number. He issued a proclamation also to this 
 effect : a golden wreath of victory should be given to which- 
 ever city could produce the best-bred bull to head the pro- 
 cession in honour of the god. And lastly there was an order 
 issued to all the Thessalians to be ready for a campaign at the 
 date of the Pythian games. His intention, as people said, was 
 to act as manager of the solemn assembly and games in person. 
 What the thought was that passed through his mind with 
 
 ^ Or, " Heracleia Trachinia," a fortress city founded (as a colony) by the 
 Lacedaemonians in B. c. 426, to command the approach to Thermopylae from 
 Thessaly, and to protect the Trachinians and the neighbouring Dorians from 
 the Oetean mountaineers. See Diet, of Geog. "Trachis"; Thuc. iii. 92, 93, 
 V. 51. 52; Diod. xii. S9- 
 
 ^ B.C. 370.— The following sections 28-37 form an episode concerning 
 Thessalian affairs between B.C. 370 and B.c. 359. See Trans, vol. i. p. Ixiii. 
 
 ' Lit. "Tagos." 
 
 * For a similar verbal climax see below, VI. v. 47, p. 183. 
 
b!c.'J7<?'°'^'} his power, ambition, death 167 
 
 reference to the sacred money, remains to this day uncer- 
 tain ; only, a tale is rife to the effect that in answer to an 
 inquiry of the Delphians, " What ought we to do, if he takes 
 any of the treasures of the god ? " the god made answer, " He 
 would see to that himself." This great man, his brain teeming 
 with vast designs of this high sort, came now to his end. 
 He had ordered a military inspection. The cavalry of the 
 Pheraeans were to pass muster before him. He was already 
 seated, delivering answers to all petitioners, when seven 
 striplings approached, quarrelling, as it seemed, about some 
 matter. Suddenly by these seven the Prince was despatched ; 
 his throat gashed, his body gored with wounds. Stoutly the 
 guard rushed to the rescue with their long spears, and one 
 of the seven, while still in the act of aiming a blow at Jason, 
 was thrust through with a lance and died ; a second, in the 
 act of mounting his horse, was caught, and dropped dead, the 
 recipient of many wounds. The rest leaped on the horses 
 which they had ready waiting and escaped. To whatever city 
 of Hellas they came honours were almost universally accorded 
 them. The whole incident proves clearly that the Hellenes 
 stood in much alarm of Jason. They looked upon him as a 
 tyrant in embryo. 
 
 So Jason was dead ; and his brothers Polydorus and 
 Polyphron were appointed princes^ in his place. But of 
 these twain, as they journeyed together to Larissa, Poly- 
 dorus was slain in the night, as he slept, by his brother 
 Polyphron, it was thought; since a death so sudden, with- 
 out obvious cause, could hardly be otherwise accounted 
 for. 
 
 Polyphron governed for a year, and by the year's end 
 he had refashioned his princedom into the likeness of a 
 tyranny. In Pharsalus he put to death Polydamas^ and 
 eight other of the best citizens ; and from Larissa he drove 
 many into exile. But while he was thus employed, he, in 
 his turn, was done to death by Alexander, who slew him 
 to avenge Polydorus and to destroy the tyranny. This man 
 now assumed the reins of office, and had no sooner done so 
 than he showed himself a harsh prince to the Thessalians : 
 
 ' Lit. "Tagoi." ^ See above, VI. i. 2 foil. p. 137 foil. 
 
i68 HELLENICA — BK. VI. {c„. v. s^.Tb^.'sPIIs 
 
 harsh too and hostile to the Thebans and Athenians,^ and 
 an unprincipled freebooter everywhere by land and by sea. 
 But if that was his character, he too was doomed to perish 
 shortly. The perpetrators of the deed were his wife's 
 brothers.^ The counsellor of it and the inspiring soul was 
 the wife herself She it was who reported to them that 
 Alexander had designs against them; who hid them within 
 the house a whole day; who welcomed home her husband 
 deep in his cups and laid him to rest, and then while the 
 lamp still burned brought out the prince's sword. It was she 
 also who, perceiving that her brothers shrank back, fearing 
 to go in and attack Alexander, said to them, "If you do 
 not be quick and do the deed, I will wake him up ! " After 
 they had gone in, she, too, it was who caught and pulled to 
 the door, clinging fast to the knocker till the breath was out 
 of her husband's body.^ Her fierce hatred against the man 
 is variously explained. By some it was said to date from the 
 day when Alexander, having imprisoned his own favourite — 
 who was a fair young stripling — when his wife supplicated him 
 to release the boy, brought him forth and stabbed him in the 
 throat. Others say it originated through his sending to Thebes 
 and seeking the hand of the wife of Jason in marriage, because 
 his own wife bore him no children. These are the various 
 causes assigned to explain the treason of his wife against him. 
 Of the brothers who executed it, the eldest, Tisiphonus, in 
 virtue of his seniority accepted, and up to the date of this 
 history * succeeded in holding, the government. 
 
 V. — ^The above is a sketch of Thessalian affairs, including 
 the incidents connected with Jason, and those subsequent to 
 his death, down to the government of Tisiphonus. I now 
 return to the point at which we digressed. 
 
 B.C. 371. — Archidamus, after the relief of the army de- 
 feated at Leuctra, had led back the united forces. When 
 he was gone, the Athenians, impressed by the fact that the 
 
 ' See Dem. e.. Aristocr. 120 ; Diod. xv. 60 foil. '^ B.C. 359 or 358. 
 
 ' The woman's name was Thebfe. See Diod. xvi. 14 ; Cicero, de Inven. 
 II. xlix. 144; de Div. I. xxv. 52 ; de Off. II. vii. 25 ; Ovid, IHs, iii. 21 foil. 
 
 * Or, "portion of my work;" lit. "argument," Xrf^os. See KuTrpfovos, 
 Ilepi tGsv 'EXX : p. iii. For the importance of this remark in reference to 
 the composition of the Hellenica, see Trans, vol. i. pp. Ivii. Ixii. Ixiii, 
 
b"c/37'-37o } N^^ ATHENIAN CONFEDERACY 169 
 
 Peloponnesians still felt under an obligation to follow the 
 Lacedaemonians to the field, whilst Sparta herself was by 
 no means as yet reduced to a condition resembling that to 
 which she had reduced Athens, sent invitations to those 
 states which cared to participate in the peace authorised 
 by the great king.^ A congress met, and they passed a 
 resolution in conjunction with those who wished to make 
 common cause with them to bind themselves by oath as follows : 
 " I will abide by the treaty terms as conveyed in the king's 
 rescript, as also by the decrees of the Athenians and the 
 allies. If any one marches against any city among those which 
 have accepted this oath, I will render assistance to that city 
 with all my strength." The oath gave general satisfaction, 
 the Eleians alone gainsaying its terms and protesting that it 
 was not right to make either the Marganians or the Scilluntians 
 or the Triphylians independent, since these cities belonged to 
 them, and were a part of Elis.^ The Athenians, however, and 
 the others passed the decree in the precise language of the 
 king's rescript : that all states — great and small alike — were to 
 be independent ; and they sent out administrators of the oath, 
 and enjoined upon them to administer it to the highest author- 
 ities in each state. This oath they all, with the exception of 
 the Eleians, swore to. 
 
 B.C. 371-370. — As an immediate consequence of this agree- 
 ment, the Mantineans, on the assumption that they were now 
 absolutely independent, met in a body and passed a decree to 
 make Mantinea into a single state and to fortify the town.^ The 
 proceeding was not overlooked by the Lacedaemonians, who 
 thought it would be hard if this were done without their con- 
 sent. Accordingly they despatched Agesilaus as ambassador 
 to the Mantineans, choosing him as the recognised ancestral 
 friend of that people. When the ambassador arrived, however, 
 the chief magistrates had no inclination to summon a meeting 
 of the commons to listen to him, but urged him to make g 
 statement of his wishes to themselves. He, on his side, was 
 ready to undertake for himself and in their interests that, if 
 
 ' I.e. in B.C. 387, the peace "of" Antalcidas. See Grote, H. G. x. 274. 
 2 See Busolt, op. cit. p. 186. 
 
 = For the restoration of Mantinea, see Freeman, Fed. Gov. iv. p. 198 ; 
 Grote, H. G. x. 283 foil. 
 
I70 HELLENICA BK. VI. {"''I'c^sjl 
 
 they would at present desist from their fortification work, he 
 would bring it about that the defensive walls should be built 
 with the sanction of Lacedaemon and without cost. Their 
 answer was, that it was impossible to hold back, since a decree 
 had been passed by the whole state of Mantinea to build at 
 once. Whereupon Agesilaus went off in high dudgeon ; though 
 as to sending troops to stop them,^ the idea seemed impracti- 
 cable, as the peace was based upon the principle of autonomy. 
 Meanwhile the Mantineans received help from several of the 
 Arcadian states in the building of their walls ; and the Eleians 
 contributed actually three talents^ of silver to cover the 
 expense of their construction. And here leaving the Manti- 
 neans thus engaged, we will turn to the men of Tegea. 
 
 There were in Tegea two political parties. The one was 
 the party of Callibius and Proxenus, who were for drawing 
 together the whole Arcadian population in a confederacy,* in 
 which all measures carried in the common assembly should be 
 held valid for the individual component states. The programme 
 of the other (Stasippus's) party was to leave Tegea undisturbed 
 and in the enjoyment of the old national laws. Perpetually 
 defeated in the Sacred College,* the party of Callibius and 
 Proxenus were persuaded that if only the commons met they 
 would gain an easy victory by an appeal to the multitude; 
 and in this faith they proceeded to march out the citizen 
 soldiers.^ At sight of this Stasippus and his friends on 
 their side armed in opposition, and proved not inferior in 
 numbers. The result was a collision and battle, in which 
 Proxenus and some few others with him were slain and the 
 
 ^ See above, V. ii. a, sui anno B. c. 386. 
 
 '' = ;f 731 : 5s. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 199. 
 
 ' Although the historian does not recount the foundation of Megalopolis 
 {see Pausanias and Diodorus), the mention of the common assembly of 
 the League (h tQ koivi^') in this passage and, still more, of the Ten 
 Thousand (below, Hell. VII, i. 38), Implies it. See Freeman, op. cit. iv. 197 
 foil. ; Grote, H. G. x. 306 foil. , ii. 599 ; Did. of Geog. ' ' Megalopolis. " As 
 to the date of its foundation Pausanias (VIII. xxvii. 8) says ' ' a few months 
 after the battle of Leuctra, " before midsummer B. c. 370 ; Diodorus (xv. 72)says 
 B. c. 368. The great city was not built in a day. Messene, according to Paus. 
 IV. xxvii. 5, was founded between the midsummers of B.C. 370 and B.C. 369. 
 
 * Lit. "in the TAedroi." For the TheAri, see Thuc. v. 47, Arnold's note; 
 and C. I. G. 1756 foil. ; and for the revolution at Tegea here recounted, see 
 Grote, N. G. x. 285 foil. ^ Or, "they mustered under arms." 
 
b^c/jVo' "°} °^ MANTINEA AND TEGEA 171 
 
 rest put to flight; though the conquerors did not pursue, 
 for Stasippus was a man who did not care to stain his 
 hands with the blood of his fellow-citizens.^ 
 
 Callibius and his friends had retired under the fortification 
 walls and gates facing Mantinea ; but, as their opponents made 
 no further attempts against them, they here collected together 
 and remained quiet. Some while ago they had sent messages 
 to the Mantineans demanding assistance, but now they were 
 ready to discuss terms of reconciliation with the party of 
 Stasippus. Presently they saw the Mantineans advancing; 
 whereupon some of them sprang to the walls, and began call- 
 ing to them to bring succour with all speed. With shouts they 
 urged upon them to make haste, whilst others threw open wide 
 the gates to them. Stasippus and his party, perceiving what 
 was happening, poured out by the gates leading to Pallantium,^ 
 and, outspeeding their pursuers, succeeded in reaching the 
 temple of Artemis, where they found shelter, and, shutting to 
 the doors, kept quiet. Following close upon their heels, how- 
 ever, their foes scaled the temple, tore off the roof, and began 
 striking them down with the tiles. They, recognising that there 
 was no choice, called upon their assailants to desist, and under- 
 took to come forth. Then their opponents, capturing them 
 like birds in a fowler's hand, bound them with chains, threw 
 them on to the prisoners' van,* and led them off to Tegea. 
 Here with the Mantineans they sentenced and put them to death. 
 The outcome of these proceedings was the banishment to 
 Lacedaemon of the Tegeans who formed the party of Stasip- 
 pus, numbering eight hundred ; but as a sequel to what had 
 taken place, the Lacedaemonians determined that they were 
 bound by their oaths to aid the banished Tegeans and to 
 avenge the slain. With this purpose they marched against 
 the Mantineans, on the ground that they had violated their 
 
 ^ Or, " opposed to a wholesale slaughter of the citizens. " 
 3 Pallantium, one of the most ancient towns of Arcadia, in the Maenalia 
 (Paus. VIII. xliv. 5 ; Livy, i. s). situated somewhat south of the modern 
 Tripolitza (see Diet, of Anc, Geog. ) ; like Asea and Eutaea it helped to found 
 Megalopolis (Paus. VIII. xxvii. 3, where, for 'laffaia read 'Ao-^a) ; below, 
 VII. V. 5, p. 227 ; Busolt, op. cit. p. 125. 
 
 » For the sequel of the matter, see above. Hell. VI. iv. 18, p. 163 ; 
 Busolt, op. cit. p. 134. 
 
172 HELLENICA — BK. VI. {''"' ''■bx!°37o 
 
 oaths in marching against Tegea with an armed force. The 
 ephors called out the ban and the state commanded Agesilaus 
 to head the expedition. 
 
 Meanwhile most of the Arcadian contingents were muster- 
 ing at Asea.i The Orchomenians not only refused to take 
 part in the Arcadian league, on account of their personal 
 hatred to Mantinea, but had actually welcomed within their 
 city a mercenary force under Polytropus, which had been 
 collected at Corinth. The Mantineans themselves were 
 forced to stay at home to keep an eye on these. The men 
 of Heraea and Lepreum made common cause with the Lace- 
 daemonians in a campaign against Mantinea. 
 
 Finding the frontier sacrifices favourable, Agesilaus began 
 his march at once upon Arcadia. He began by occupying the 
 border city of Eutaea, where he found the old men, women, 
 and children dwelling in their houses, while the rest of the 
 population of a military age were off to join the Arcadian 
 league. In spite of this he did not stir a finger unjustly 
 against the city, but suffered the inhabitants to continue in 
 their homes undisturbed. The troops took all they needed, 
 and paid for it in return ; if any pillage had occurred on his 
 first entrance into the town, the property was hunted up and 
 restored by the Spartan king. Whilst awaiting the arrival of 
 Polytropus's mercenaries, he amused himself by repairing such 
 portions of their walls as necessity demanded. 
 
 Meanwhile the Mantineans had taken the field against 
 Orchomenus ; but from the walls of that city the invaders had 
 some difficulty in retiring, and lost some of their men. On 
 their retreat they found themselves in Elymia;^ here the 
 
 1 Asea is placed by Leake ( Travels in Morea, i. 84 ; iii. 34) near Frangdvrysl, 
 a little south of Pallantium. 
 
 Heraea, the most important town of Arcadia in the Cynuria, near Elis, 
 on the high road to Olympia, and commanding other main roads. See Leake, 
 Peloponnesiaca, p. i foil. ; Morea, ii. 91. 
 
 Lepreum, chief town of the Triphylia (Herod, iv. 148, ix. 28 ; Thuc. v. 31 ; 
 above, IIL ii. 25, p. 17 ; Paus. V. v. 3 ; Polyb. iv. 77 foU. ; Strab. viii. 345), 
 near modern Strovitzi ; Leake, Morea, i. 56 ; Dodwell, Tour, ii. 347. 
 
 Eutaea is placed by Leake between Asea and Pallantium at Barbitza 
 I^Morea, iii. 31); but see Grote, H. G. x. 288. 
 
 ^ Blymia, mentioned only by Xenophon, must have been on the confines of 
 the Mantinici and Orchomenus, probably at Levidhi. . — Leake, Morea, iii. 75 ; 
 Peloponn. p. 229. 
 
Bx.srJ'^'"} THE ARCADIAN LEAGUE 173 
 
 heavy infantry of the Orchomenians ceased to follow them ; 
 but Polytropus and his troops continued to assail their rear 
 with much audacity. At this conjuncture, seeing at a glance 
 that either they must beat back the foe or suffer their own 
 men to be shot down, the Mantineans turned right about and 
 met the assailant in a hand-to-hand encounter. Polytropus 
 fell fighting on that battlefield ; and of the rest who took 
 to flight, many would have shared his fate, but for the 
 opportune arrival of the Phliasian cavalry, who swooped 
 round to the conqueror's rear and checked him in his 
 pursuit.^ 
 
 Content with this achievement, the Mantineans retired 
 homewards ; while Agesilaus, to whom the news was brought, 
 no longer expecting that the Orchomenian mercenaries could 
 effect a junction with himself, determined to advance without 
 further delay. ^ On the first day he encamped for the even- 
 ing meal in the open country of Tegea, and the day following 
 crossed into Mantinean territory. Here he encamped under 
 the westward-facing^ mountains of Mantinea, and employed 
 himself in ravaging the country district and sacking the 
 farmsteads ; while the troops of the Arcadians who were 
 mustered in Asea stole by night into Tegea. The next day 
 Agesilaus shifted his position, encamping about two miles'* 
 distance from Mantinea ; and the Arcadians, issuing from 
 Tegea and clinging to the mountains between Mantinea and 
 that city, appeared with large bodies of heavy infantry, wishing 
 to effect a junction with the Mantineans. The Argives, it is 
 true, supported them, but they were not in full force. And 
 here counsellors were to be found who urged on Agesilaus 
 to attack these troops separately ; but fearing lest, in propor- 
 tion as he pressed on to engage them, the Mantineans might 
 issue from the city behind and attack him on flank and rear, 
 he decided it was best to let the two bodies coalesce, and 
 then, if they would accept battle, to engage them on an open 
 and fair field. 
 
 And so ere long the Arcadians had effected their object 
 and were united with the Mantineans. The next incident was 
 
 ^ See Cyrop. VII. i. 36. ^ See below, Ages. ii. 23, p. 232. 
 
 » See Leake, Morea, iii. 73. ■* Lit. " twenty stades. " 
 
174 HELLENICA BK. VI. {''"' %!c!''37o 
 
 the sudden apparition at break of day, as Agesilaus was 
 sacrificing in front of the camp, of a body of troops. These 
 proved to be the Ught infantry from Orchomenus, who in 
 company with the Phliasian cavalry had during the night 
 made their way across past the town of Mantinea; and so 
 caused the mass of the army to rush to their ranks, and 
 Agesilaus himself to retire within the lines. Presently, how- 
 ever, the newcomers were recognised as friends ; and as the 
 sacrifices were favourable, Agesilaus led his army forward a 
 stage farther after breakfast. As the shades of evening de- 
 scended he encamped unobserved within the fold of the 
 hills behind the Mantinean territory, with mountains in close 
 proximity all round.'- 
 
 On the next morning, as day broke, he sacrificed in front 
 of the army ; and observing a mustering of men from the 
 city of Mantinea on the hills which overhung the rear of his 
 army, he decided that he must lead his troops out of the 
 hollow by the quickest route. But he feared lest, if he himself 
 led off, the enemy might fall upon his rear. In this dilemma 
 he kept quiet ; presenting a hostile front to the enemy, he 
 sent orders to his rear to face about to the right,^ and so 
 getting into line behind his main body, to move forward upon 
 him ; and in this way he at once extricated his troops from 
 their cramped position and kept continually adding to the 
 weight and solidity of his line. As soon as the phalanx was 
 doubled in depth he emerged upon the level ground, with 
 his heavy infantry battalions in this order, and then again 
 extended his line till the troops were once more nine or ten 
 shields deep. But the Mantineans were no longer so ready 
 to come out. The arguments of the Eleians who had lent 
 them their co-operation had prevailed : that it was better not 
 to engage until the arrival of the Thebans. The Thebans, 
 
 ^ Lit. "within the hindmost bosom of the Mantinicfe." In reference to 
 the position, Leake (Morea, iii. 75) says : "The northern bay [of the Mantinic 
 plain between Mantinea and the Argon] corresponds better by its proximity 
 to Mantinea ; by Mount Alesium it was equally hidden from the city, while 
 its small dimensions, and the nearness of the incumbent mountains, rendered 
 it a more hazardous position to an army under the circumstances of that of 
 Agesilaus " [than had he encamped in the Argon itself]. For the Argon (or 
 Inert Plain), see Leake, ib. 54 foil. 
 
 ^ See Anah. IV. iii. 29 (Trans, vol. i. p. 187); Pol. Lacxi, 10, p. 317. 
 
CH, 
 B.C. 
 
 :• ^370-3^9'^} AGESILAUS IN ARCADIA 175 
 
 it was certain, would soon be with them ; for had they not 
 borrowed ten talents ^ from Elis in order to be able to 
 send aid ? The Arcadians with this information before them 
 kept quiet inside Mantinea. On his side Agesilaus was 
 anxious to lead off his troops, seeing it was midwinter; 
 but, to avoid seeming to hurry his departure out of fear, 
 he preferred to remain three days longer at no great dis- 
 tance from Mantinea. On the fourth day, after an early 
 morning meal, the retreat commenced. His intention was 
 to encamp on the same ground which he had made his 
 starting-point on leaving Eutaea. But as none of the 
 Arcadians appeared, he marched with all speed and reached 
 Eutaea itself, although very late, that day; being anxious 
 to lead off his heavy troops without catching a glimpse 
 of the enemy's watch-iires, so as to silence the tongues 
 of any one pretending that he withdrew in flight. His 
 main object was in fact achieved. To some extent he 
 had recovered the state from its late despondency, since he 
 had invaded Arcadia and ravaged the country without any 
 one caring to offer him battle. But, once arrived on Laconian 
 soil, he dismissed the Spartan troops to their homes and 
 disbanded the provincials ^ to their several cities. 
 
 B.C. 370-369. — The Arcadians, now that Agesilaus had 
 retired, realising that he had disbanded his troops, while they 
 themselves were fully mustered, marched upon Heraea, the 
 citizens of which town had not only refused to join the 
 Arcadian league, but had joined the Lacedaemonians in 
 their invasion of Arcadia. For this reason they entered the 
 country, burning the homesteads and cutting down the fruit- 
 trees. 
 
 Meanwhile news came of the arrival of the Theban rein- 
 forcements at Mantinea, on the strength of which they left 
 Heraea and hastened to fraternise ^ with their Theban friends, 
 When they were met together, the Thebans, on their siJie, were 
 well content with the posture of affairs : they had duly brought 
 their succour, and no enemy was any longer to be discovered 
 
 ' ;f2437 ; los. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 199. 
 "^ Lit. "perioeci"; and below, §§ zS' S^- 
 ' Or, "effect a junction with." 
 
176 HELLENICA BK. VI. {""B.c.'lyo^jCg 
 
 in the country; so they made preparations to return home. 
 But the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians were eager in urging 
 them to lead the united forces forthwith into Lacor^ia : they 
 dwelt proudly on their own numbers, extolling above measure 
 the armament of Thebes. And, indeed, the Boeotians one and 
 all were resolute in their military mancEuvres and devotion to 
 arms,i exulting in the victory of Leuctra. In the wake of 
 Thebes followed the Phocians, who were now their subjects, 
 Euboeans from all the townships of the island, both sections 
 of the Locrians, the Acamanians,^ and the men of Heraclea 
 and of Melis ; while their force was further swelled by Thes- 
 salian cavalry and light infantry. With the full consciousness 
 of facts like these, and further justifying their appeal by dwell- 
 ing on the desolate condition of Lacedaemon, deserted by her 
 troops, they entreated them not to turn back without invading 
 the territory of Laconia. But the Thebans, albeit they listened 
 to their prayers, urged arguments on the other side. In the 
 first place, Laconia was by all accounts most difficult to in- 
 vade ; and their belief was that garrisons were posted at all 
 the points most easily approached. (As a matter of fact, 
 Ischolaus was posted at Oeum in the Sciritid, with a garrison 
 of neodamodes and about four hundred of the youngest of 
 the Tegean exiles ; and there was a second outpost on Leuc- 
 trum above the Maleatid.^) Again it occurred to. the Thebans 
 
 1 Or, " in practising gymnastics about the place of arms. " See Pol. Lac. 
 xii. 5, p. 318. 
 
 ^ See Hell. IV. vii. i ; Ages. ii. 20. For a sketch of the relations of 
 Acarnania to Athens and Sparta, see Hicks, No. 83, p. 150 ; and above, Hell. 
 V. iv. 64 (p. 136). 
 
 ' Leuctrum, a fortress of the district Aegytis on the confines of Arcadia 
 and Laconia ("in the direction of Mount Lycaeum," Thuc. v. 54). See 
 Leake, Morea, ii. 322 ; also Peloponn. p. 248, in which place he corrects his 
 former view as to the situation of Leuctrum and the Maleatid. 
 
 Oeum or Inm, the chief town of the Sciritis, probably stood in the KUsiira 
 or series of narrow passes through the watershed of the mountains forming the 
 natural boundary between Laconia and Arcadia (in the direct line north from 
 Sparta to Tegea), Diet, of Anc. Geog. s.v. Leake says [Morea, iii. 19, 30 
 foil.) near the modem village of Kdlina ; Baedeker (Greece, p. 269) says per- 
 haps at Palaeogoulds. 
 
 Caryae. This frontier town was apparently (near Ardchova) on the road 
 from Thyrea (in the direption of the Argolid) to Sparta (Thuc. v. 55 I Paus. 
 III. X. 7 ; Livy, xxxiv. 26, but see Leake, Morea, iii. 30 ; Peloponn. p. 342). 
 
 Sellasia, probably rightly placed "half an hour above Vourlia " (Baedeker, 
 
b!c. 370-169°'} THE THEBANS INVADE LACONIA 177 
 
 that the Lacedaemonian forces, though disbanded, would not 
 take long to muster, and once collected they would fight nowhere 
 better than on their own native soil. Putting all these con- 
 siderations together, they were not by any means impatient to 
 march upon Lacedaemon. A strong counter-impulse, however, 
 was presently given by the arrival of messengers from Caryae, 
 giving positive information as to the defenceless condition of 
 the country, and offering to act as guides themselves ; they 
 were ready to lose their lives if they were convicted of perfidy. 
 A further impulse in the same direction was given by the 
 presence of some of the provincials,^ with invitations and pro- 
 mises of revolt, if only they would appear in the country. 
 These people further stated that even at the present moment, 
 on a summons of the Spartans proper, the provincials did not 
 care to render them assistance. With all these arguments 
 and persuasions echoing from all sides, the Thebans at last 
 yielded, and invaded. They chose the Caryan route them- 
 selves, while the Arcadians entered by Oeum in the Sciritid.^ 
 
 By all accounts Ischolaus made a mistake in not advancing 
 to meet them on the difficult ground above Oeum. Had he 
 done so, not a man, it is believed, would have scaled the 
 passes there. But for the present, wishing to turn the help of 
 the men of Oeum to good account, he waited down in the village ; 
 and so the invading Arcadians scaled the heights in a body. 
 At this crisis Ischolaus and his men, as long as they fought 
 face to face with their foes, held the superiority ; but, pre- 
 sently, when the enemy, from rear and flank, and even from 
 the dwelling-houses up which they scaled, rained blows and 
 missiles upon them, then and there Ischolaus met his end, 
 and every man besides, save only one or two who, failing to 
 be recognised, effected their escape. 
 
 After these achievements the Arcadians marched to join 
 
 Greece, p. 269). The famous battle of Sellasia, in the spring of B.C. 221 (see 
 Trans, vol. i. p. 46, note 4), in which the united Macedonians under Anti- 
 gonus and the Achaeans finally broke the power of Sparta, was fought in the 
 little valley where the stream Gorgylus joins the river Oenus and the Khan of 
 Krevat^ now stands. For a plan, see Diet, of Anc. Geog. s.v. 
 
 ' "Perioeci." 
 
 ' Diodorus (xv. 64) gives more details ; he makes the invaders converge 
 upon Sellasia by four separate routes. See Leake, Morea, iii. 29 foil. 
 
 VOL. II N 
 
178 HELLENICA — BK. VI. {'^"'.olyS'slg 
 
 the Thebans at Caryae, and the Thebans, hearing what wonders 
 the Arcadians had performed, commenced their descent with 
 far greater confidence. Their first exploit was to burn and 
 ravage the district of Sellasia, but finding themselves ere long 
 in the flat land within the sacred enclosure of Apollo, they 
 encamped for the night, and the next day continued their 
 march along the Eurotas. When they came to the bridge 
 they made no attempt to cross it to attack the city, for they 
 caught sight of the heavy infantry in the temple of Alea^ ready 
 to meet them. So, keeping the Eurotas on their right, they 
 tramped along, burning and pillaging homesteads stocked 
 with numerous stores. The feelings of the citizens may 
 well be imagined. The women who had never set eyes 
 upon a foe^ could scarcely contain themselves as they 
 beheld the cloud of smoke. The Spartan warriors, inhab- 
 iting a city without fortifications, posted at intervals, here 
 one and there another, were in truth what they appeared to 
 be — the veriest handful. And these kept watch and ward. 
 The authorities passed a resolution to announce to the helots 
 that whosoever among them chose to take arms and join a 
 regiment should have his freedom guaranteed to him by solemn 
 pledges in return for assistance in the common war.* More 
 than six thousand helots, it is said, enrolled themselves, so 
 that a new terror was excited by the very incorporation of these 
 men, whose numbers seemed to be excessive. But when it 
 was found that the mercenaries from Orchomenus remained 
 faithful, and reinforcements came to Lacedaemon from Phlius, 
 Corinth, Epidaurus, and Pellene, and some other states, the 
 dread of these new levies was speedily diminished. 
 
 The enemy in his advance came to Amyclae.* Here he 
 crossed the Eurotas. The Thebans wherever they encamped 
 at once formed a stockade of the fruit-trees they had felled, 
 as thickly piled as possible, and so kept ever on their 
 guard. The Arcadians did nothing of the sort. They 
 
 ' See Pausanias, III. xix. 7. 
 
 ^ See Plutarch, Ages.iaaa. 3 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 38); Aristot. Pol. ii. 9-10. 
 
 ' See below, VII. ii. 2, p. 201. 
 
 * For this ancient (Achaean) town, see Paus. III. ii. 6 ; Polyb. v. 19 ; 
 and for its site the references given above, note i, p. 68, Hell. IV. v. 11. 
 It lay only twenty stades (a little more than two miles) from the city of Sparta. 
 
b"c737o-369"} '^^^ ^^'^^ O^ SPARTA ESCAPES 179 
 
 left their camping - ground and took themselves off to 
 attack the homesteads and loot. On the third or fourth 
 day after their arrival the cavalry advanced, squadron by 
 squadron, as far as the racecourse, '^ within the sacred en- 
 closure of Gaiaochos. These consisted of the entire Theban 
 cavalry and the Eleia'ns, with as many of the Phocian or 
 Thessalian or Locrian cavalry as were present. The cavalry 
 of the Lacedaemonians, looking a mere handful, were drawn 
 up to meet them. They had posted an ambuscade chosen 
 from their heavy infantry, the younger men, about three 
 hundred in number, in the house of the Tyndarids^; and 
 while the cavalry charged, out rushed the three hundred at 
 the same instant at full pace. The enemy did not wait to 
 receive the double charge, but swerved, and at sight of that 
 many also of the infantry took to headlong flight. But the 
 pursuers presently paused ; the Theban army remained motion- 
 less ; and both parties returned to their camps. And now the 
 hope, the confidence strengthened that an attack upon the 
 city itself would never come ; nor did it The invading army 
 broke up from their ground, and marched ofif on the road to 
 Helos and Gytheum.* The unwalled cities were consigned to 
 the flames, but Gytheum, where the Lacedaemonians had their 
 naval arsenal, was subjected to assault for three days. Certain 
 of the provincials * also joined in this attack, and shared the 
 campaign with the Thebans and their friends. 
 
 The news of these proceedings set the Athenians deeply 
 pondering what they ought to do concerning the Lacedae- 
 monians, and they held an assembly in accordance with a 
 resolution of the senate. It chanced that the ambassadors 
 of the Lacedaemonians and the allies still faithful to Lacedae- 
 mon were present. The Lacedaemonian ambassadors were 
 Aracus, Ocyllus, Pharax, Etymocles, and Olontheus, and from 
 the nature of the case they all used, roughly speaking, similar 
 
 1 Or, "hippodrome." See Paus. III. ii. 6. ' Paus. III. xvi. 2. 
 
 ' See Trans, vol. i. p. 16 ; Baedeker's Greece, p. 279. Was Gytheum 
 taken? see Grote, H. G. x. 305 ; Curt. H. G. Eng. trans, iv. 431 ; below, 
 VII. i. 18, p. 190, note 3. 
 
 * "Perioeci." See above. III. iii. 6; VI. v. 25; below, VII. ii. 2; 
 Grote, H. G. x. 301. It is a pity that the historian should hiu'ry us off to 
 Athens just at this point. The style here is suggestive of notes {iiroiuiiiixaTa) 
 unexpanded. 
 
i8o HELLENICA BK. VI. {^B.olyo^sig 
 
 arguments. They reminded the Athenians how they had often 
 in old days stood happily together, shoulder to shoulder, in 
 more than one great crisis. They (the Lacedaemonians), on 
 their side, had helped to expel the tyrant from Athens, and 
 the Athenians, when Lacedaemon was besieged by the Messen- 
 ians, had heartily lent her a helping hand.^ Then they 
 fell to enumerating all the blessings that marked the season 
 when the two states shared a common policy, hinting how 
 in common they had warred against the barbarians, and more 
 boldly recalling how the Athenians with the full consent and 
 advice of the Lacedaemonians were chosen by united Hellas 
 leaders of the common navy ^ and guardians of the common 
 treasure, while they themselves were selected by all the Hellenes 
 as confessedly the rightful leaders on land ; and this also not 
 without the full consent and concurrence of the Athenians. 
 
 One of the speakers ventured on a remark somewhat in 
 this strain : " If you and we, sirs, can only agree, there is hope 
 to-day that the old saying may be fulfilled, and Thebes be 
 ' taken and tithed.' " * The Athenians, however, were not in 
 the humour to listen to that style of argumei?t. A sort of 
 suppressed murmur ran through the assembly ,'i)zhich seemed 
 to say, "That language may be well enougbltow'p'iyut when 
 they were well off they pressed hard enougli on us.". But 
 of all the pleas put forward by the Lacedaemonians, the 
 weightiest appeared to be this : that when they had reduced 
 the Athenians by war, and the Thebans wished to wipe Athens 
 off the face of the earth, they (the Lacedaemonians) them- 
 selves had opposed the measure.* If that was the argument 
 of most weight, the reasoning which was most commonly 
 urged was to the effect that " the solemn oaths necessitated 
 the aid demanded. Sparta had done no wrong to justify this 
 invasion on the part of the Arcadians and their allies. All 
 she had done was to assist the men of Tegea when^ the Man- 
 
 ' In reference (i) to the expulsion of the Peisistratidae (Herod, v. 64) ; 
 (2) the "third " Messenian war (Thuc. i. 102). 
 
 ^ See below, Revenues, -f. 6, p. 346. 
 
 ' Or, "the Thebans be decimated " ; for the phrase see above, Hell. VI. 
 iii. 20 (p. 157). 
 
 * See ffell. II. ii. ig (Trans, vol. i. p. 48) ; and Hell. III. v. 8, p. 34. 
 
"c. 370-369^'} SPARTAN ENVOYS AT ATHENS 181 
 
 tineans had marched against that township contrary to their 
 solemn oaths." Again, for the second time, at these expres- 
 sions a confused din ran through the assembly, half the 
 audience maintaining that the Mantineans were justified in 
 supporting Proxenus and his friends, who were put to death 
 by the party with Stasippus ; the other half that they were 
 wrong in bringing an armed force against the men of Tegea. 
 
 Whilst these distinctions were being drawn by the assembly 
 itself, Cleiteles the Corinthian got up and spoke as follows : 
 " I daresay, men of Athens, there is a double answer to the 
 question. Who began the wrongdoing? But take the case 
 of ourselves. Since peace began, no one can accuse us either 
 of wantonly attacking any city, or of seizing the wealth of any, 
 or of ravaging a foreign territory. In spite of which the 
 Thebans have come into our country and cut down our fruit- 
 trees, burnt to the ground our houses, filched and torn to 
 pieces our cattle and our goods. How then, I put it to you, 
 will you not be acting contrary to your solemn oaths if you 
 refuse your aid to us, who are so manifestly the victims of 
 wrongdoing ? \ Yes ; and when I say solemn oaths, I speak of 
 oaths and undertakings which you yourselves took great pains 
 to exact from all of us." At that point a murmur of applause 
 greeted Cleiteles, the Athenians feeling the truth and justice 
 of the speaker's language. 
 
 He sat down, and then Procles of Phlius got up and 
 spoke as follows : " What would happen, men of Athens, 
 if the Lacedaemonians were well out of the way? The 
 answer to that question is obvious. You would be the 
 first object of Theban invasion. Clearly; for they must 
 feel that you and you alone stand in the path between them 
 and empire over Hellas. If this be so, I do not consider 
 that you are more supporting Lacedaemon by a campaign 
 in her behalf than you are helping yourselves. For imagine 
 the Thebans, your own sworn foes and next-door neighbours, 
 masters of Hellas ! You will find it a painful and onerous 
 exchange indeed for the distant antagonism of Sparta. As a 
 mere matter of self-interest, now is the time to help your- 
 selves, while you may still reckon upon allies, instead of 
 waiting until they are lost, and you are forced to fight a life- 
 
i82 HELLENICA BK. VI. {'""'.c-'lyo^sl, 
 
 and-death battle with the Thebans single-handed. But the 
 fear suggests itself, that should the Lacedaemonians escape 
 now, they will live to cause you trouble at some future date. 
 Lay this maxim to heart, then, that it is not the potential 
 greatness of those we benefit, but of those we injure, which 
 causes apprehension. And this other also, that it behoves 
 individuals and states alike so to better their position ^ while 
 yet in the zenith of their strength that, in the day of weakness, 
 when it comes, they may find some succour and support in 
 what their former labours have achieved.^ To you now, at 
 this time, a heaven-sent opportunity is presented. In return 
 for assistance to the Lacedaemonians in their need, you may 
 win their sincere, unhesitating friendship for all time. Yes, 
 I say it deliberately, for the acceptance of these benefits at 
 your hands will not be in the presence of one or two chance 
 witnesses. The all-seeing gods, in whose sight to-morrow is 
 even as to-day, will be cognisant of these things. The know- 
 ledge of them will be jointly attested by allies and enemies ; 
 nay, by Hellenes and barbarians alike, since to not one of 
 them is what we are doing a matter of unconcern. If, then, 
 in the presence of these witnesses, the Lacedaemonians should 
 prove base towards you, no one will ever again be eager in 
 their cause. But our hope, our expectation should rather 
 be that they will prove themselves good men and not base ; 
 since they beyond all others would seem persistently to have 
 cherished a high endeavour, reaching forth after true praise, 
 and holding aloof from ugly deeds. 
 
 " But there are further considerations which it were well 
 you should lay to heart. If danger were ever again to visit 
 Hellas from the barbarian world outside, in whom would 
 you place your confidence if not in the Lacedaemonians? 
 Whom would you choose to stand at your right hand in battle 
 if not these, whose soldiers at Thermopylae to a man preferred 
 to fall at their posts rather than save their lives by giving the 
 barbarian free passage into Hellas? Is it not right, then, 
 considering for what thing's sake they displayed that bravery 
 in your companionship, considering also the good hope there 
 is that they will prove the like again — is it not just that you 
 
 ■* Lit. "to acquire some good." * Or, "for wliat," etc. 
 
l^c^jjitig*^} SPEECH OF PROCLES OF PHLIUS 183 
 
 and we should lend them all countenance and goodwill? 
 Nay, even for us their allies' sake, who are present, it would 
 be worth your while to manifest this goodwill. Need you be 
 assured that precisely those who continue faithful to them in 
 their misfortunes would in like manner be ashamed not to 
 requite you with gratitude ? And if we seem to be but small 
 states, who are willing to share their dangers with them, lay 
 to heart that there is a speedy cure for this defect : with 
 the accession of your city the reproach that, in spite of all our 
 assistance, we are but small cities, will cease to be. 
 
 " For my part, men of Athens, I have hitherto on hearsay 
 admired and envied this great state, whither, I was told, every 
 one who was wronged or stood in terror of aught needed only 
 to betake himself and he would obtain assistance. To-day I 
 no longer hear, I am present myself and see these famous 
 citizens of Lacedaemon here, and by their side their trustiest 
 friends, who have come to you, and ask you in their day of 
 need to give them help. I see Thebans also, the same who 
 in days bygone failed to persuade the Lacedaemonians to 
 reduce you to absolute slavery,^ to-day asking you to suffer 
 those who saved you to be destroyed. 
 
 " That was a great deed and of fair renown, attributed in 
 old story to your ancestors, that they did not suffer those 
 Argives who died on the Cadmeia ^ to lie unburied ; but a 
 fairer wreath of glory would you weave for your own brows 
 if you suffer not these still living Lacedaemonians to be 
 trampled under the heel of insolence and destroyed. Fair, 
 also, was that achievement when you stayed the insolence of 
 Eurystheus and saved the sons of Heracles ; * but fairer still 
 than that will your deed be if you rescue from destruction, 
 not the primal authors * merely, but the whole city which they 
 
 I See ffell. II. ii. 19 ; III. ^. 8, in reference to B.C. 405. 
 
 " In reference to the Seven against Thebes, see Herod. IX, xxvii. 4 ; Isoc. 
 Paneg. SS- 
 
 " Herod. IX. xxvii. 3 ; see Isoc. Paneg. ^6. " The greatness of Sparta was 
 founded by the succour which Athens lent to theHeraldid invaders of the Pelo- 
 ponnese — a recollection which ought to restrain Sparta from injuring or claim- 
 ing to rule Athens. Argos, Thebes, Sparta were in early times, as they are 
 now, the foremost cities of Hellas ; but Athens was greater than them all — the 
 avenger of Argos, the chastiser of Thebes, the patron of those who founded 
 Sparta." — Jebb, Ati. Or. ii. 154. ■* Hut. Lye. vi. 
 
i84 HELLENICA BK. VI. {"B.c.'fjo^jig 
 
 -founded; fairest of all, if because yesterday the Lacedae- 
 monians won you your preservation by a vote which cost them 
 nothing, you to-day shall bring them help with arms, and at 
 the price of peril. It is a proud day for some of us to stand 
 here and give what aid we can in pleading for assistance to 
 brave men. What, then, must you feel, who in very deed are 
 able to render that assistance ! How generous on your parts, 
 who have been so often the friends and foes of Lacedaemon, 
 to forget the injury and remember only the good they have 
 done ! How noble of you to repay, not for yourselves only, 
 but for the sake of Hellas, the debt due to those who proved 
 themselves good men and true in her behalf!" 
 
 After these speeches the Athenians deliberated, and though 
 there was opposition, the arguments of gainsayers ^ fell upon 
 deaf ears. The assembly finally passed a decree to send 
 assistance to Lacedaemon in force, and they chose Iphicrates 
 general. Then followed the preliminary sacrifices, and then 
 the general's order to his troops to take the evening meal in 
 the grove of the Academy.^ But the general himself, it is 
 said, was in no hurry to leave the city ; many were found at 
 their posts before him. Presently, however, he put himself 
 at the head of his troops, and the men followed cheerily, in 
 firm persuasion that he was about to lead them to some noble 
 exploit. On arrival at Corinth he frittered away some days, 
 and there was a momentary outburst of discontent at so much 
 waste of precious time ; but as soon as he led the troops out 
 of Corinth there was an obvious rebound. The men responded 
 to all orders with enthusiasm, heartily following their general's 
 lead, and attacking whatever fortified place he might confront 
 them with. 
 
 And now reverting to the hostile forces on Laconian 
 territory, we find that the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians had 
 retired in large numbers. They had every inducement so to 
 do since their homes bordered on Laconia ; and off they went, 
 driving or carrying whatever they had looted. The Thebans 
 and the rest were no less anxious to get out of the country, 
 
 ' As to the anti-Laconian or Boeotian party at Athens, see Curtius, H. G. 
 vol. V. ch. ii. (Eng. tr. ). 
 
 - See Trans, vol. i. note i, p. 46 ; Baedeker, Greece, p. 103. 
 
b"c.369'°'^''} aid voted; iphicrates 185 
 
 though for other reasons, partly because the army was melting 
 away under their eyes day by day, partly because the necessaries 
 of life were growing daily scantier, so much had been either 
 fairly eaten up and pillaged or else recklessly squandered and 
 reduced to ashes. Besides this, it was winter ; so that on 
 every ground there was a general desire by this time to get 
 away home. 
 
 As soon as the enemy began his retreat from Laconian soil, 
 Iphicrates imitated his movement, and began leading back his 
 troops out of Arcadia into Corinthia. Iphicrates exhibited 
 much good generalship, no doubt, with which I have no sort 
 of fault to find. But it is not so with that final feature of the 
 campaign to which we are now come. Here I find his strategy 
 either meaningless in intent or inadequate in execution. He 
 made an attempt to keep guard at Oneion, in order to pre- 
 vent the Boeotians making their way out homewards ; but 
 left meanwhile far the best passage through Cenchreae un- 
 guarded. Again, when he wished to discover whether or not 
 the Thebans had passed Oneion, he sent out on a recon- 
 naissance the whole of the Athenian and Corinthian cavalry ; 
 whereas, for the object in view, the eyes of a small detach- 
 ment would have been as useful as a whole regiment ;^ and 
 when it came to falling back, clearly the smaller number had 
 a better chance of hitting on a traversable road, and so effect- 
 ing the desired movement quietly. But the height of folly 
 seems to have been reached when he threw into the path 
 of the enemy a large body of troops which were still too 
 weak to cope with him. As a matter of fact, this body of 
 cavalry, owing to their very numbers, could not help covering 
 a large space of ground ; and when it became necessary to 
 retire, had to cling to a series of difficult positions in suc- 
 cession, so that they lost not fewer than twenty horsemen. ^ It 
 was thus the Thebans effected their object and retired from 
 Peloponnese. 
 
 ' See Hipparch. viii. lo foil., and Sketch of Life (Trans, vol. i. p. cxxxix). 
 ^ See Died. xv. 63 ; Plut. Pelop. 24. 
 
BOOK VII. I. t-3 
 
 I. B.C. 369. — In the following year^ plenipotentiary am- 
 bassadors ^ from the Lacedaemonians and the allies arrived 
 at Athens to consider and take dounsel in what way the alliance 
 between Athens and Lacedaemon might be best cemented. 
 It was urged by many speakers, foreigners and Athenians also, 
 that the alliance ought to be based on the principle of absolute 
 equality,^ " share and share alike," when Procles of Phlius put 
 forward the following argument : 
 
 " Since you have decided, men of Athens, that it is good 
 to secure the friendship of Lacedaemon, the point, as it 
 appears to me, which you ought now to consider is, by 
 what means this friendship may be made to last as long as 
 possible. The probability is, that we shall hold together best 
 by making a treaty which shall suit the best interests of 
 both parties. On most points we have, I believe, a toler- 
 able unanimity, but there remains the question of leader- 
 ship. The preliminary decree of your senate anticipates 
 a division of the hegemony, crediting you with the chief 
 maritime power, Lacedaemon with the chief power on land ; 
 and to me, personally, I confess, that seems a division not 
 more established by human invention than preordained by some 
 divine naturalness or happy fortune. For, in the first place, 
 you have a geographical position pre-eminently adapted 
 for naval supremacy ; most of the states to whom the sea 
 is important are massed round your own, and all of these 
 are inferior to you in strength. Besides, you have harbours 
 
 ^ I.e. the official year from spring to spring. See Peter. Chron. Table 95, 
 note 215 ; see Grote, H. G. x. 346, note i. ^ See Hicks, 89. 
 
 * For the phrase iirl tois tirois koX o/iolois, implying "share and share 
 alike," see Thuc. i. 145, etc. 
 
Spring'B.c.369} CONGRESS AT ATHENS 187 
 
 and roadsteads, without which it is not possible to turn 
 a naval power to account. Again, you have many ships 
 of war. To extend your naval empire is a traditional poUcy ; 
 all the arts and sciences connected with these matters you 
 possess as home products, and, what is more, in skill and 
 experience of nautical affairs you are far ahead of the rest of 
 the world. The majority of you derive your livelihood from 
 the sea, or things connected with it ; so that in the very act 
 of minding your own affairs you are training yourselves to 
 enter the Usts of naval combat.^ Again, no other power 
 in the world can send out a larger collective fleet, and 
 that is no insignificant point in reference to the question of 
 leadership. The nucleus of strength first gained becomes a 
 rallying-point, round which the rest of the world will gladly 
 congregate. Furthermore, your good fortune in this depart- 
 ment must be looked upon as a definite gift of God : for, 
 consider among the numberless great sea-fights which you 
 have fought how few you have lost, how many you have won. 
 It is only rational, then, that your allies should much prefer 
 to share this particular risk with you. Indeed, to show you 
 how natural and vital to you is this maritime study, the 
 following reflection may serve. For several years the Lacedae- 
 monians, when at war with you in old days, dominated 
 your territory, but they made no progress towards destroying 
 you. At last God granted them one day to push forward 
 their dominion on the sea, and then in an instant you com- 
 pletely succumbed to them.^ Is it not self-evident that your 
 safety altogether depends upon the sea? The sea is your 
 natural element — your birthright ; it would be base indeed to 
 entrust the hegemony of it to the Lacedaemonians, and the 
 more so, since, as they themselves admit, they are far less 
 acquainted with this business than yourselves ; and, secondly, 
 your risk in naval battles would not be for equal stakes — theirs 
 involving only the loss of the men on board their ships, but 
 yours, that of your children and your wives and the entire state. 
 "And if this is a fair statement of your position, turn, 
 now, and consider that of the Lacedaemonians. The first 
 
 1 See below, Pol. Ath. i. ig foil. p. 282. 
 
 2 See Hell. II. i. (Trans, vol. i. p. 40 foil.). 
 
i88 HELLENICA BK. VII. {""" 'iLc.'sel 
 
 point to notice is, that they are an inland power; as 
 long as they are dominant on land it does not matter how 
 much they are cut off from the sea — they can carry on 
 existence happily enough. This they so fully recognise, 
 that from boyhood they devote themselves to training for 
 a soldier's life. The keystone of this training is obedience 
 to command,^ and in this they hold the same pre-eminence 
 on land which you hold on the sea. Just as you with your 
 fleets, so they on land can, at a moment's notice, put the 
 largest army in the field ; and with the like consequence, 
 that their allies, as is only rational, attach themselves to 
 them with undying courage.^ Further, God has granted them 
 to enjoy on land a like good fortune to that vouchsafed to 
 you on sea. Among all the many contests they have entered 
 into, it is surprising in how few they have failed, in how many 
 they have been successful. The same unflagging attention 
 which you pay to maritime affairs is required from them on land, 
 and, as the facts of history reveal, it is no less indispensable 
 to them. Thus, although you were at war with them for several 
 years and gained many a naval victory over them, you never 
 advanced a step nearer reducing them. But once worsted on 
 land, in an instant they were confronted with a danger affect- 
 ing the very lives of child and wife, and vital to the interests of 
 the entire state. We may very well understand, then, the 
 strangeness, not to say monstrosity, in their eyes, of surrender- 
 ing to others the military leadership on land, in matters which 
 they have made their special study for so long and with such 
 eminent success. I end where I began. I agree absolutely 
 with the preliminary decree of your own senate, which I 
 consider the solution most advantageous to both parties. My 
 prayer* is that you may be guided in your deliberations to 
 that conclusion which is best for each and all of us." 
 
 Such were the words of the orator, and the sentiments of 
 his speech were vehemently applauded by the Athenians no 
 less than by the Lacedaemonians who were present. Then 
 
 ^ Or, "the spirit of discipline.'' See Mem. III. v. i6 ; IV. iv. 15; 
 Thuc. ii. 39; Pol, Lac. viii. ^ Or, " with unlimited confidence. " 
 
 ^ See above. Hell. VI. i. 13, xal ai Tpdrrois ri, Kp&nara, "and so may 
 the best fortune attend you ! " — if that reading and rendering be adopted. 
 
b"c. 369" "'} TERMS OF ALLIANCE 189 
 
 Cephisodotus 1 stepped forward and addressed the assembly. 
 He said : " Men of Athens, do you not see how you are 
 being deluded? Lend me your ears, and I will prove it 
 to you in a moment. There is no doubt about your leader- 
 ship by sea : it is already secured. But suppose the 
 Lacedaemonians in alliance with you : it is plain they will 
 send you admirals and captains, and possibly marines, of 
 Laconian breed ; but who will the sailors be ? Helots 
 obviously, or mercenaries of some sort. These are the folk 
 over whom you will exercise your leadership. Reverse the 
 case. The Lacedaemonians have issued a general order 
 summoning you to join them in the field ; it is plain again, 
 you will be sending your heavy infantry and your cavalry. 
 You see what follows. You have invented a pretty machine, 
 by which they become leaders of your very selves, and 
 you become the leaders either of their slaves or of the dregs 
 of their state. I should like to put a question to the Lace- 
 daemonian Timocrates seated yonder. Did you not say just 
 now, Sir, that you came to make an alliance on terms of 
 absolute equality, 'share and share alike'? Answer me." 
 " I did say so." "^Well, then, here is a plan by which you 
 get the perfection of equality. I cannot conceive anything more 
 fair and impartial than that ' turn and turn about ' each of us 
 should command the navy, each the army ; whereby whatever 
 advantage there may be in maritime or military command we 
 may each of us share." 
 
 These arguments were successful. The Athenians were 
 converted, and passed a decree vesting the command in either 
 state ^ for periods of five days alternately. 
 
 B.C. 369.^ — The campaign was commenced by both Athen- 
 ians and Lacedaemonians with their allies, marching upon 
 Corinth, where it was resolved to keep watch and ward over 
 Oneion jointly. On the advance of the Thebans and their allies 
 the troops were drawn out to defend the pass. They were posted 
 in detachments at different points, the most assailable of which 
 was assigned to the Lacedaemonians and the men of Pellene.* 
 
 1 See above, Hell. VI. iii. a, p. 152 ; Hicks, 87. 
 
 2 See below. Revenues, v. 7, p. 346. 
 
 ' See Grote, H. G. a. 349 foil. ; al. B. C. 368. 
 
 * "During the wars of Epamein6ndas PellfinS adhered firmly to her 
 
190 HELLENICA — BK. VII. {""• 'ao'369 
 
 The Thebans and their aUies, finding themselves within 
 three or four miles 1 of the troops guarding the pass, en- 
 camped on the flat ground below; but presently, after a 
 careful calculation of the time it would take to start and 
 reach the goal in the gloaming, they advanced against the 
 Lacedaemonian outposts. In spite of the difSculty they 
 timed their movements to a nicety, and fell upon the Lace- 
 daemonians and Pellenians just at the interval when the night 
 pickets were turning in and the men were leaving their shake- 
 downs and retiring for necessary purposes.^ This was the 
 instant for the Thebans to fling themselves upon them ; they 
 plied their weapons with good effect, blow upon blow. Order 
 was pitted against disorder, preparation against disarray. 
 When, however, those who escaped from the thick of the 
 business had retired to the nearest rising ground, the Lace- 
 daemonian polemarch, who might have taken as many heavy, 
 or light, infantry of the allies as he wanted, and thus have held 
 the position (no bad one, since it enabled him to get his 
 supplies safely enough from Cenchreae), failed to do so. On 
 the contrary, and in spite of the great perplexity of the 
 Thebans as to how they were to get down from the high 
 level facing Sicyon or else retire the way they came, the 
 Spartan general made a truce, which, in the opinion of the 
 majority, seemed more in favour of the Thebans than himself, 
 and so he withdrew his division and fell back. 
 
 The Thebans were now free to descend without hindrance, 
 which they did ; and, effecting a junction with their allies the 
 Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians, at once attacked^ Sicyon 
 and Pellene, and, marching on Epidaurus, laid waste the 
 whole territory of that people. Returning from that exploit 
 with a consummate disdain for all their opponents, when they 
 found themselves near the city of Corinth they advanced at 
 the double against the gate facing towards Phlius ; intending 
 if they found it open to rush in. However, a body of light 
 
 Spartan policy, at a time when the other cities were, to say the least, less 
 strenuous in the Spartan cause." — Freeman, Ifist. Fed. Gov. p. 241. After- 
 wards Pellene is found temporarily on the Theban side {Hell. VII. ii. 11). 
 
 ^ Lit. "thirty stades." 
 
 " Or, "intent on their personal concerns.'' See Hell. II. iv. 6 (Trans. 
 vol. i. p. 64) ; Hiffarch. vii. 12. 
 
 ' And took (apparently) ; see below, p. 192 ; Diod. xv. 69. 
 
b"c'.34'''"} second THEBAN invasion 191 
 
 troops sallied out of the city to the rescue, and met the ad- 
 vance of the Theban picked corps ^ not one hundred and fifty 
 yards 2 from the walls. Mounting on the monuments and 
 commanding eminences, with volleys of sling stones and 
 arrows they laid low a pretty large number in the van of the 
 attack, and routing them, gave chase for three or four furlongs' * 
 distance. After this incident the Corinthians dragged the 
 corpses of the slain to the wall, and finally gave them up 
 under a flag of truce, erecting a trophy to record the victory. 
 As a result of this occurrence the allies of the Lacedaemonians 
 took fresh heart. 
 
 At the date of the above transactions the Lacedaemonians 
 were cheered by the arrival of a naval reinforcement from 
 Dionysius, consisting of more than twenty warships, which 
 conveyed a body of Celts and Iberians and about fifty 
 cavalry. The day following, the Thebans and the rest of the 
 aUies, posted, at intervals, in battle order, and completely fill- 
 ing the flat land down to the sea on one side, and up to the 
 knolls on the other which form the buttresses of the city, 
 proceeded to destroy everything precious they could lay their 
 hands on in the plain. The Athenian and Corinthian cavalry, 
 eyeing the strength, physical and numerical, of their antagonists, 
 kept at a safe distance from their armament. But the little 
 body of cavalry lately arrived from Dionysius spread out in a 
 long thin line, and one at one point and one at another 
 galloped along the front, discharging their missiles as they 
 dashed forward, and when the enemy rushed against them, 
 retired, and again wheeling about, showered another volley. 
 Even while so engaged they would dismount from their horses 
 and take breath ; and if their foemen galloped up while they 
 were so dismounted, in an instant they had leapt on their 
 horses' backs and were in full retreat. Or if, again, a party 
 pursued them some distance from the main body, as soon as 
 they turned to retire, they would press upon them, and dis- 
 charging volleys of missiles, made terrible work, forcing the 
 whole army to advance and retire, merely to keep pace with 
 the movements of fifty horsemen. 
 
 ' See Anai. III. iv. 43 (Trans, vol. i. p, 170) ; and above, Hell. V. 
 iii. 23, p. 118. ^ Lit. " four plethra." ^ Lit. " three or four stades." 
 
192 HELLENICA BK. VII. {"Ic. f^^ls 
 
 B.C. 369-368. — After this the Thebans remained only a 
 few more days and then turned back homewards ; and the rest 
 likewise to their several homes. Thereupon the troops sent 
 by Dionysius attacked Sicyon. Engaging the Sicyonians in 
 the flat country,, they defeated them, killing about seventy 
 men and capturing by assault the fortress of Derae.^ After 
 these achievements this first reinforcement from Dionysius 
 re-embarked and set sail for Syracuse. 
 
 Up to this time the Thebans and all the states which had 
 revolted from Lacedaemon had acted together in perfect 
 harmony, and were content to campaign under the leadership 
 of Thebes ; but now a certain Lycomedes,^ a Mantinean, broke 
 the spell. Inferior in birth and position to none, while in 
 wealth superior, he was for the rest a man of high ambition. 
 This man was able to inspire the Arcadians with high thoughts 
 by reminding them that to Arcadians alone the Peloponnese 
 was in a literal sense a fatherland ; since they and they alone 
 were the indigenous inhabitants of its sacred soil, and the 
 Arcadian stock the largest among the Hellenic tribes — a good 
 stock, moreover, and of incomparable physique. And then 
 he set himself to panegyrise them as the bravest of the brave, 
 adducing as evidence, if evidence were needed, the patent 
 fact, that every one in need of help invariably turned to 
 the Arcadians.* Never in old days had the Lacedaemonians 
 yet invaded Athens without their help ; nor could the Thebans 
 nowadays approach Lacedaemon without the Arcadians. " If 
 then," he added, "you are wise, you will be somewhat chary 
 of following at the beck and call of anybody, or it will be the 
 old story again. As when you marched in the train of Sparta 
 you only enhanced her power, so to-day, if you follow Theban 
 guidance without thought or purpose instead of claiming a 
 
 ' "East of Sicyon was Epieiceia (see above, Hell. IV. ii. 14, iv. 13)011 
 the river Neraea. In the same direction ^s the fortress Derae " {Dici. Ami. 
 Geog. " Topography of Sicyonia"), a/.^Gerae. So Leal^e {Morea, iii. 376), 
 who conjectures that this fortress was in the maritime plain. 
 
 ^ For the plan of an Arcadian Federation and the part played by Lyoomedes, 
 its true author, ' ' who certainly merits thereby a high place among the statesmen 
 of Greece," see Freeman, Hist. Fed, Gov. ch. jv. p. 199 foil. 
 
 * F6r this claim on the part of the Arcadians,- see Anah. VI. ii. 10 foil. 
 (Trans, vol. i. p. 253). 
 
B^c. '368 "'*"'*} LYCOMEDES AND THE ARCADIANS 193 
 
 division of the headship, you will speedily find, perhaps, in 
 her only a second edition of Lacedaemon." ^ 
 
 These words, uttered in the ears of the Arcadians, were 
 sufficient to puff them up with pride. They were lavish in 
 their love of Lycomedes, and thought there was no one his 
 equal. He became their hero ; he had only to give his 
 orders, and they appointed their magistrates ^ at his bidding. 
 But, indeed, a series of brilliant exploits entitled the Arcadians 
 to magnify themselves. The first of these arose out of an 
 invasion of Epidaurus by the Argives, which seemed likely to 
 end in their finding their escape barred by Chabrias and his 
 foreign brigade with the Athenians and Corinthians. Only, 
 at the critical moment the Arcadians came to the rescue and 
 extricated the Argives, who were closely besieged, and this 
 in spite not only of the enemy, but of the savage nature of 
 the ground itself. Again, they marched on Asinb ^ in Laconian 
 territory, and defeated the Lacedaemonian garrison, putting 
 the polemarch Geranor, who was a Spartan, to the sword, 
 and sacking the suburbs of the town. Indeed, whenever or 
 wherever they had a mind to send an invading force, neither 
 night nor wintry weather, nor length of road nor mountain 
 barrier could stay their march. So that at this date they 
 regarded their prowess as invincible.* The Thebans, it will 
 be understood, could not but feel a touch of jealousy at these 
 pretensions, and their former friendship to the Arcadians 
 had lost its ardour. With the Eleians, indeed, matters were 
 worse. The revelation came to them when they demanded 
 back from the Arcadians certain cities ^ of which the Lacedae- 
 monians had deprived them. They discovered that their views 
 were held of no account, but that the Triphylians and the 
 rest who had revolted from them were to be made much of, 
 because they claimed to be Arcadians.^ Hence, as contrasted 
 
 ^ Or, " Lacedaemonians under another name." 
 
 ^ ApXcvras, see below, ffeil. VII. iv. 33. The formal title of these Federal 
 magistrates may or may not have been S,pxovres ; Freeman, //. P. G, 203, note 6. 
 
 3 See Grote, H. G. x. 356. 
 
 * Or, "regarded themselves as the very perfection of soldiery." 
 
 i> In reference to Hell. III. ii. 23 foil. (p. 17 above), see Freeman, op. 
 cit. p. 201, and below, Hell. VII. iv. 12 (B.C. 365); Busolt, op. cU. p. 186 
 foil., in reference to Lasion. * Busolt, p. 150. 
 
 VOL. II O 
 
194 
 
 HELLENICA BK. VII. {"' "■b!c!''368 
 
 with the Thebans, the Eleians cherished feelings towards their 
 late friends which were positively hostile. 
 
 B.C. 368. — Self-esteem amounting to arrogance — such was 
 the spirit which animated each section of the allies, when a new 
 phase was introduced by the arrival of Philiscus ^ of Abydos 
 on an embassy from Ariobarzanes ^ with large sums of money. 
 This agent's first step was to assemble a congress of Thebans, 
 allies, and Lacedaemonians at Delphi to treat of peace. On 
 their arrival, without attempting to communicate or take counsel 
 with the god as to how peace might be re-estabUshed, they 
 fell to deliberating unassisted ; and when the Thebans refused 
 to acquiesce in the dependency of Messene ^ upon Lacedaemon, 
 Philiscus set about collecting a large foreign brigade to side 
 with Lacedaemon and to prosecute the war. 
 
 Whilst these matters were still pending, the second 
 reinforcement from Dionysius * arrived. There was a differ- 
 ence of opinion as to where the troops should be em- 
 ployed, the Athenians insisting that they ought to march 
 into Thessaly to oppose the Thebans, the Lacedaemonians 
 being in favour of Laconia ; and among the allies this latter 
 opinion carried the day. The reinforcement from Dionysius 
 accordingly sailed round to Laconia, where Archidamus in- 
 corporated them with the state troops and opened the cam- 
 paign. Caryae he took by storiri, and put every one cap- 
 tured to the sword, and from this point marching straight 
 upon the Parrhasians of Arcadia, he set about ravaging the 
 country along with his Syracusan supporters. 
 
 Presently, when the Arcadians and Argives arrived with 
 succours, he retreated, and encamped on the knolls above 
 Medea." While he was here, Cissidas, the officer in charge of 
 the reinforcement from Dionysius, made the announcement 
 
 1 See Hicks, 84, p. 152 ; Kohler, C. I. A. ii. 51 ; Grote, H. G. x, 357 ; 
 Curtius, H. G. (Eng. tr. ) iv. 458 ; Diod. xv. 90. 
 
 ^ See above, V. i. 28 ; Ages. ii. 26. ^ See Hicks, 86. 
 
 * See above, §§ 20, 22, p. 191 foil. The date is B.C. 368 according to 
 Grote, H. G. x. 362 foil. ; al. B.C. 367. 
 
 ° Or, "Melea" or "Malea." E. Curtius conjectures MTjX^as for MijS^os 
 of the MSS. , and probably the place referred to is the township of Malea in the 
 Aegytis (Pausan. VIII. xxvii. 4) ; see above. Hell. VI. v. 24, "the Maleatid." 
 See Dind. Hist. Gr., Ox. MDCCCLiii., note ad loc. ; Curtius, H. G. iv. 459; 
 Grote, H. G. x. 362. 
 
b"c.'36V^"^°} the tearless victory I9S 
 
 that the period for his stay abroad had elapsed; and the 
 words were no sooner out of his lips than off he set on the 
 road to Sparta. The march itself, however, was not effected 
 without delays, for he was met and cut off by a body of 
 Messenians at a narrow pass, and was forced in these straits 
 to send to Archidamus and beg for assistance, which the 
 latter tendered. When they had got as far as the bend ^ on 
 the road to Eutresia, there were the Arcadians and Argives 
 advancing upon Laconia and apparently intending, like the 
 Messenians, to shut the Spartan off from the homeward road. 
 
 Archidamus, debouching upon a flat space of ground where 
 the roads to Eutresia and Medea converge, drew up his troops 
 and offered battle. What happened then is thus told : — He 
 passed in front of the regiments and addressed them in terms 
 of encouragement thus : " Fellow-citizens, the day has come 
 which calls upon us to prove ourselves brave men and look 
 the world in the face with level eyes.^ Now are we to deliver 
 to those who come after us our fatherland intact as we received 
 it from our fathers ; now will we cease hanging our heads in 
 shame before our children and wives, our old men and our 
 foreign friends, in sight of whom in days of old we shone 
 forth conspicuous beyond all other Hellenes." 
 
 The words were scarcely uttered (so runs the tale), when 
 out of the clear sky came lightnings and thunderings,^ with 
 propitious manifestation to him ; and it so happened that on 
 his right wing there stood a sacred enclosure and a statue of 
 Heracles, his great ancestor. As the result of all these things, 
 so deep a strength and courage came into the hearts of his 
 soldiers, as they tell, that the generals had hard work to re- 
 strain their men as they pushed forward to the front. Presently, 
 when Archidamus led the advance, a few only of the enemy 
 cared to await them at the spear's point, and were slain ; 
 the mass of them fled, and fleeing fell. Many were cut down 
 by the cavalry, many by the Celts. When the battle ceased 
 and a trophy had been erected, the Spartan at once despatched 
 
 ' Or, "the resting-place"; cf. mod. "Khan." L. and S. cf. Arist. 
 Frogs, 113. Medea, below, is probably Malea (see last note). 
 - See Plut. Ages. S3 (Clough, vol. iv. p. 41). 
 " See Xen. Afolog. 12 ; Homer, //. ii. 353; Od. xx. 113 foil. 
 
196 HELLENICA — BIC VII. {""' ''B^fai 
 
 home Demoteles, the herald, with the news. He had to 
 announce not only the greatness of the victory, but the 
 startling fact that, while the enemy's dead were numerous, not 
 one single Lacedaemonian had been slain. ^ Those in Sparta 
 to whom the news was brought, as says the story, when they 
 heard it, one and all, beginning with Agesilaus, and, after 
 him, the elders and the ephors, wept for joy — so close akin 
 are tears to joy and pain alike. There were others hardly 
 less pleased than the Lacedaemonians themselves at the mis- 
 fortune which had overtaken the Arcadians : these were the 
 Thebans and Eleians — so offensive to them had the boastful 
 behaviour of these men become. 
 
 The problem perpetually working in the minds of the 
 Thebans was how they were to compass the headship of 
 Hellas ; and they persuaded themselves that, if they sent an 
 embassy to the King of Persia, they could not but gain some 
 advantage by his help. Accordingly they did not delay, but 
 called together the allies, on the plea that Euthycles the Lace- 
 daemonian was already at the Persian court. The commis- 
 sioners sent up were, on the part of the Thebans, Pelopidas ; ^ 
 on the part of the Arcadians, Antiochus, the pancratiast ; and 
 on that of the Eleians, Archidamus. There was also an Argive 
 in attendance. The Athenians on their side, getting wind of 
 the matter, sent up two commissioners, Timagoras and Leon. 
 
 When they arrived at the Persian court the influence of 
 Pelopidas was preponderant with the Persian. He could point 
 out that, besides the fact that the Thebans alone among all the 
 Hellenes had fought on the king's side at Plataeae,^ they had 
 never subsequently engaged in military service against the 
 Persians ; nay, the very ground of Lacedaemonian hostility to 
 them was that they had refused to march against the Persian 
 king with Agesilaus,* and would not even suffer him to sacrifice 
 to Artemis at Aulis (where Agamemnon sacrificed before he 
 set sail for Asia and captured Troy). In addition, there 
 were two things which contributed to raise the prestige of 
 
 * According to Died. xv. 72, ten thousand of the enemy fell. 
 
 2 See Plut. Pelop. 30 (Clough, vol. ii. p. 230). For the date see Grote, 
 H. G. X. 36s, 379 ; Curtius, ff. G. iv. 460. ' See Thuc. iii. 58, 59, 60. 
 
 * See above, Hell. III. iv. 3 ; Lincke, Zur Xen. Krit. p. 315. 
 
b"c.367466°} PELOPIDAS 195. 
 
 Thebes, and redounded to the honour of Pelopidas. These 
 were the victory of the Thebans at Leuctra, and the indisputable 
 fact that they had invaded and laid waste the territory of 
 Laconia. Pelopidas went on to point out that the Argives 
 and Arcadians had lately been defeated in battle by the 
 Lacedaemonians, when his own countrymen were not there 
 to assist. The Athenian Timagoras supported all these state- 
 ments of the Theban by independent testimony, and stood 
 second in honour after Pelopidas. 
 
 At this point of the proceedings Pelopidas was asked by 
 the king, what special clause he desired inserted in the royal 
 rescript. He replied as follows : " Mes_senfe to be independent 
 of Lacedaemon, and the Athenians to lay up their ships of 
 war. Should either power refuse compliance in these respects, 
 such refusal to be a casus belli ; and any state refusing to take 
 part in the military proceedings consequent, to be herself the 
 first object of attack." These clauses were drawn up and read 
 to the ambassadors, when Leon, in the hearing of the king, 
 exclaimed : " Upon my word ! Athenians, it strikes me it is, 
 high time you looked for some other friend than the great 
 king." The secretary reported the comment of the Athenian 
 envoy, and produced presently an altered copy of the document, 
 with a clause inserted : " If the Athenians have any better and 
 juster views to propound, let them come to the Persian court 
 and explain them."^ 
 
 Thus the ambassadors returned each to his own home and 
 were variously received. Timagoras, on the indictment of 
 Leon, who proved that his fellow-commissioner not only re- 
 fused to lodge with him at the king's court, but in every way 
 played into the hands of Pelopidas, was put to death. Of the 
 other joint commissioners, the Eleian, Archidamus, was loud 
 in his praises of the king and his policy, because he had shown 
 a preference to Elis over the Arcadians ; while for a converse 
 reason, because the Arcadian league was slighted, Antiochus 
 not only refused to accept any gift, but brought back as his 
 report to the general assembly of the Ten Thousand,^ that 
 
 1 See Grote, H. G. x. 402 ; and below, A^es. viii. 3, p. 263. 
 
 2 See above, VI. v. 6 ; Freeman, ffisi. Fed. Gov. 202 ; Demosth. F. L. 
 220, etc. 
 
igS HELLENICA BK. VII. {"""'0*0^367 
 
 the king appeared to have a large army of confectioners 
 and pastry-cooks, butlers and doorkeepers; but as for 
 men capable of doing battle with Hellenes, he had looked 
 carefully, and could not discover any. Besides all which, even 
 the report of his wealth seemed to him, he said, bombastic 
 nonsense. " Why, the golden plane-tree that is so belauded is 
 not big enough to furnish shade to a single grasshopper. "^ 
 
 At Thebes a conference of the states had been convened 
 to listen to the great king's letter. The Persian who bore the 
 missive merely pointed to the royal seal, and read the docu- 
 ment ; whereupon the Thebans invited all, who wished to be 
 their friends, to take an oath to what they had just, heard, 
 as binding on the king and on themselves. To which the 
 ambassadors from the states replied that they had been sent to 
 listen to a report, not to take oaths ; if oaths were wanted, 
 they recommended the Thebans to send ambassadors to the 
 several states. The Arcadian Lycomedes, moreover, added 
 that the congress ought not to be held at Thebes at all, but at 
 the seat of war, wherever that might be. This remark brought 
 down the wrath of the Thebans on the speaker ; they exclaimed 
 that he was bent on breaking up the alliance. Whereupon the 
 Arcadian refused to take a seat in the congress at all, and got 
 up and betook himself off there and then, accompanied by all 
 the Arcadian envoys. Since, therefore, the assembled represent- 
 atives refused to take the oath at Thebes, the Thebans sent to 
 the different states, one by one in turn, urging each to under- 
 take solemnly to act in accordance with the great king's rescript. 
 They were persuaded that no individual state would venture 
 to quarrel with themselves and the Persian monarch at once. 
 As a matter of fact, however, when they arrived at Corinth — 
 which was the first state visited — the Corinthians stood out 
 and gave as their answer, that they had no desire for any 
 common oath or undertaking with the king. The rest of the 
 states followed suit, giving answers of a similar tenor, so that 
 this striving after empire on the part of Pelopidas and the 
 Thebans melted like a cloud-castle into air. 
 
 B.C. 367.^ — But Epaminondas was bent on one more effort. 
 
 ' Or, "the golden plane-tree they romance about would not suffice to," 
 etc. ^ B.C. 367, according to Grote, H. G. a. 365, note i ; al. B.C. 366. 
 
B^'.'je'"'"*^} EPAMINONDAS IN ACHAEA 
 
 199 
 
 With a view to forcing the Arcadians and the rest of the allies to ' 
 pay better heed to Thebes, he desired first to secure the 
 adhesion of the Achaeans, and decided to march an army into 
 Achaea. Accordingly, he persuaded the Argive Peisias, who 
 was at the head of military affairs in Argos, to seize and occupy 
 Oneion in advance. Peisias, having ascertained that only a 
 sorry guard was maintained over Oneion by Naucles, the general 
 commanding the Lacedaemonian foreign brigade, and by Timo- 
 machus the Athenian, under cover of night seized and occu- 
 pied with two thousand heavy infantry the rising ground above 
 Cenchreae, taking with him provisions for seven days. Within 
 the interval the Thebans arrived and surmounted the pass of 
 Oneion ; whereupon the allied troops, with Epaminondas at 
 their head, advanced into Achaea. The result of the cam- 
 paign was that the better classes of Achaea gave in their 
 adhesion to him ; and on his personal authority Epaminondas 
 insisted that there should be no driving of the aristocrats into 
 exile, nor any modification of the constitution. He was con- 
 tent to take a pledge of fealty from the Achaeans to this 
 effect : " Verily and indeed we will be your allies, and follow 
 whithersoever the Thebans lead." ^ 
 
 So he departed home. The Arcadians, however, and 
 the partisans of the opposite faction in Thebes were ready 
 with an indictment against him : " Epaminondas," they said, 
 "had merely swept and garnished Achaea for the Lace- 
 daemonians, and then gone off." The Thebans accordingly 
 resolved to send governors ^ into the states of Achaea ; and 
 those officers on arrival joined with the commonalty and drove 
 out the better folk, and set up democracies throughout Achaea. 
 On their side, these exiles coalesced, and, marching upon each 
 separate state in turn, for they were pretty numerous, speedily 
 won their restoration and dominated the states. As the 
 party thus reinstated no longer steered a middle course, but 
 
 1 See Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. p. 241 : "We read of local oligarchies 
 (in the several cities of Achaia) which Epameinflndas found and left in posses- 
 sion, but which the home government of Thebes thought good to expel, and 
 to substitute democracies under the protection of Theban harmosts. This 
 policy did not answer, as the large bodies of exiles thus formed contrived to 
 recover the cities, and to bring them to a far more decided Spartan partisan- 
 ship than before, " '' Lit. "harmosts." 
 
200 HELLENICA BK. VII. { ''b.c.' |67?366 
 
 went heart and soul into an alliance with Lacedaemon, the 
 Arcadians found themselves between the upper and the nether 
 millstone — that is to say, the Lacedaemonians and the 
 Achaeans. 
 
 At Sicyon, hitherto/ the constitution was based on the 
 ancient laws; but at this date Euphron (who during the 
 Lacedaemonian days had been the greatest man in Sicyon, 
 and whose ambition it was to hold a like pre-eminence under 
 their opponents) addressed himself to the Argives and Arcadians 
 as follows : " If the wealthiest classes should ever come into 
 power in Sicyon, without a doubt the city would take the first 
 opportunity of readopting a Laconian policy; whereas, if a 
 democracy be set up,'' he added, "you may rest assured 
 Sicyon will hold fast by you. All I ask you is to stand by 
 me ; I wUl do the rest. It is I who will call a meeting of the 
 people ; and by that selfsame act I shall give you a pledge 
 of my good faith and present you with a state firm in its 
 alliance. All this, be assured," he added, "I do because, 
 like yourselves, I have long ill brooked the pride of Lace- 
 daemon, and shall be glad to escape the yoke of bondage." 
 
 These proposals found favour with the Arcadians and the 
 Argives, who gladly gave the assistance demanded. Euphron 
 straightway, in the market-place, in the presence of the two 
 powers concerned,^ proceeded to convene the Demos, as if 
 there were to be a new constitution, based on the principle 
 of equality.* When the convention met, he bade them appoint 
 generals : they might choose whom they liked. Whereupon 
 they elected Euphron himself, Hippodamus, Cleander, Acrisius, 
 and Lysander. When these matters were arranged he appointed 
 Adeas, his own son, over the foreign brigade, in place of the 
 former commander, Lysimenes, whom he removed. His next 
 step was promptly to secure the fidelity of the foreign mer- 
 cenaries by various acts of kindness, and to attach others ; 
 and he spared neither the public nor the sacred moneys for 
 this object. He had, to aid him, further, the property of all 
 the citizens whom he exiled on the ground of Laconism, and 
 
 1 See Grote, H. G. x. 379. 
 
 ^ Lit. " the Argives and the Arcadians." 
 
 ^ Lit. "on fair and equal terms." See Thuc. v. 79. 
 
§"i-3Vb^I."366"'} EUPHRON, tyrant of SICYON 201 
 
 of this without scruple he in every case availed himself. As 
 for his colleagues in office, some he treacherously put to death, 
 others he exiled, by which means he got everything under his 
 own power, and was now a tyrant without disguise. The 
 method by which he got the allies to connive at his doings 
 was twofold. Partly he worked on them by pecuniary aid, 
 partly by the readiness with which he lent the support of his 
 foreign troops on any campaign to which they might invite him. 
 
 II. B.C. 366. — Matters had so far progressed that the 
 Argives had already fortified the Trikaranon above the Heraion 
 as an outpost to threaten Phlius, while the Sicyonians were 
 engaged in fortifying Thyamia^ on their frontier; and 
 between the two the Phliasians were severely pinched. They 
 began to suffer from dearth of necessaries ; but, in spite of all, 
 remained unshaken in their alliance. It is the habit of 
 historians, I know, to record with admiration each noble 
 achievement of the larger powers, but to me it seems a still 
 more worthy task to bring to light the great exploits of even 
 a little state found faithful in the performance of fair deeds. 
 
 B.C. 370-369. — Now these Phliasians were friends of Lace- 
 daemon while at the zenith of her power. After her disaster 
 on the field of Leuctra, when many of the Perioeci, and the 
 helots to a man, revolted; when, more than that, the allies, save 
 only quite a few, forsook her ;^ and when united Hellas, so to 
 speak, was marching on her, — these Phliasians remained stanch 
 in their allegiance ; and, in spite of the hostility of the most 
 powerful states of Peloponnese, to wit the Arcadians and the 
 Argives, they insisted on coming to her aid. It fell to their 
 lot to cross into Prasiae as the rearguard of the reinforce- 
 ments, which consisted of the men of Corinth, of Epidaurus 
 and of Troezen, of Hermionfe, Halieis, and Sicyon and 
 Pellenfe, in the days before any of these had revolted.^ 
 Not even when the commander of the foreign brigade, 
 picking up the divisions already across, left them behind 
 and was gone — not even so did they flinch or turn back, 
 
 ' ' ' Thyamia is placed by Ross on the lofty hill of Spirii, the northern pro- 
 longation of Tricaranum, between the villages Stimdnga and Skrapini. " — Diet. 
 And. Geog. "Phlius." " See above, VI. v. 29, p. 178. 
 
 s See Hell. VII. i. 18 (above, p. 190). 
 
202 HELLENICA — BK. VII. {b". "yo-sM 
 
 but hired a guide from Prasiae, and though the enemy was 
 massed round Amyclae, slipped through his ranks, as best 
 they could, and so reached Sparta. It was then that the 
 Lacedaemonians, besides other honours conferred upon them, 
 sent them an ox as a gift of hospitality. 
 
 B.C. 369. — Later on, when the enemy had retired from La- 
 conia, the Argives, ill brooking so much zeal for Lacedaemon 
 on the part of Phlius, marched in full force against the little 
 state, and fell to ravaging their territory. Even then they 
 remained undaunted ; and when the enemy turned to retire, 
 destroying all that he could lay hands upon, out dashed the 
 cavalry of the Phliasians and dogged his retreat. And notwith- 
 standing that the Argive's rear consisted of the whole of his 
 cavalry, with some companies of infantry to support them, they 
 attacked^ him, sixty in number, and routed his whole rear- 
 guard. They slew, indeed, but a few of them ; but, having so 
 slain that handful, they paused and erected a trophy in full 
 sight of the Argive army with as little concern as if they had 
 cut down their enemies to a man. 
 
 Once again the Lacedaemonians and their allies were guard- 
 ing Oneion,! and the Thebans were threatening to scale the pass. 
 The Arcadians and Eleians^ were moving forwards through 
 Nemea to effect a junction with the Thebans, when a hint was 
 conveyed to them by some Phliasian exiles, " Only show your- 
 selves before Phlius and the town is yours." An agreement was 
 made, and in the dead of night a party consisting of the exiles 
 themselves and others with them, about six hundred in number, 
 planted themselves close under the walls with scaling-ladders. 
 Presently the scouts from the Trikaranon signalled to the city 
 that the enemy was advancing. The citizens were all attention ; 
 their eyes were fixed upon their scouts. Meanwhile the traitors 
 within were likewise signalling to those seated under lee of 
 the walls " to scale " ; and these, scaling up, seized the arms 
 of the guards, which they found abandoned, and fell to pur- 
 suing the day sentinels, ten in number (one out of each squad 
 of five being always left on day duty).* One of these was put 
 
 * B.C. 369? al. B.C. 368. See above, Hell. VII. i. 15 (p. 189) ; Grote, 
 H. G. X. 346. 2 See above, ffell. VII. i. 18, and below, §8. 
 
 ' Or, " one member of both the squads of five was left behind " — i.e. two 
 
IVljlil} GALLANTRY OF THE PHLIASIANS 203 
 
 to the sword as he lay asleep, and a second as he was escaping 
 to the Heraion ; but the other eight day-pickets leapt down 
 the wall on the side towards the city, one after another. The 
 scaling party now found themselves in undisputed possession 
 of the citadel. But the shouting had reached the city below : 
 the citizens rallied to the rescue; and the enemy began by 
 sallying forth from the citadel, and did battle in the forefront 
 of the gate leading down to the city. By and by, being 
 strongly beleaguered by the ever-increasing reinforcements of 
 the citizens, they retired, falling back upon the citadel ; and 
 the citizens along with the enemy forced their way in. The 
 centre of the citadel was speedily deserted ; for the enemy 
 scaled the walls and towers, and showered blows and missiles 
 upon the citizens below. These defended themselves from 
 the ground, or pressed the encounter home by climbing the 
 ladders which led to the walls. Once masters of certain 
 towers on this side and the other of the invaders, the citizens 
 came to close quarters with them with reckless desperation. 
 The invaders, pushed and pommelled by dint of such audacity 
 and hard hitting, were cooped up like sheep into narrower and 
 narrower space. But at that critical moment the Arcadians 
 and the Argives were circling round the city, and had begun 
 to dig through the walls of the citadel from its upper side."^ 
 Of the citizens inside some were beating down their assailants 
 on the wall ; ^ others, those of them who were climbing up 
 from outside and were still on the scaling-ladders ; whilst a 
 third set were delivering battle against those who had mounted 
 the towers. These last had found fire in the men's quarters, 
 and were engaged in setting the towers and all ablaze, bringing 
 lip sheaves of corn and grass — an ample harvesting, as luck 
 would have it, garnered off the citadel itself. Thereupon the 
 occupants of the towers, in terror of the flames, leapt down 
 one by one, while those on the walls, under the blows of 
 the defenders, tumbled off with similar expedition ; and as 
 soon as they had once begun to yield, the whole citadel, in 
 
 out of the ten could not keep up with the rest in their flight, and were taken 
 and Icilled ; one indeed had not started, but was killed in sleep. 
 
 1 Or, "downwards" (L. and S.) ; or, "in front," "von vorn" (Buchs). 
 
 ^ Reading, rolls ^Tri to5 relxovs. See Otto Keller for various emendations 
 of the passage. 
 
204 HELLENICA BK. VII. {""'."slgT^l] 
 
 almost less time than it takes to tell, was cleared of the enemy. 
 In an instant out dashed the cavalry, and the enemy, seeing 
 them, beat a hasty retreat, leaving behind scaling-ladders and 
 dead, besides some comrades hopelessly maimed. In fact, the 
 enemy, what between those who were slain inside and those who 
 leapt from the walls, lost not less than eighty men. And now 
 it was a goodly sight to see the brave men grasp one another 
 by the hand and pledge each other on their preservation, whilst 
 the women brought them drink and cried for joy. Not one 
 there present but in very sooth was overcome by laughter 
 mixed with tears.^ 
 
 Next year also ^ Phlius was invaded by the Argives and all 
 the Arcadians. The reason of this perpetually-renewed attack 
 on Phlius is not far to seek : partly it was the result of spleen, 
 partly the little township stood midway between them, and 
 they cherished the hope that through want of the necessaries 
 of life they would bring it over. During this invasion the 
 cavalry and the picked troop of the Phliasians, assisted by 
 some Athenian knights, made another famous charge at the 
 crossing of the river.^ They made it so hot for the enemy 
 that for the rest of that day he was forced to retire under 
 the mountain ridges, and to hold aloof as if afraid to 
 trample down the corn-crops of a friendly people on the 
 flat below. 
 
 Again another time* the Theban commander in Sicyon 
 marched out against Phlius, takirig with him the garrison 
 under his personal command, with the Sicyonians and 
 Pellenians (for at the date of the incident these states 
 followed in the wake of Thebes). Euphron was there 
 also with his mercenaries, about two thousand in number, 
 to share the fortunes of the field. The mass of the troops 
 began their descent on the Heraion by the Trikaranon, 
 intending to ravage the flat bottom below. At the gate 
 leading to Corinth the Theban general left his Sicyonians and 
 Pellenians on the height, to prevent the Phliasians getting 
 
 ^ In true Homeric fashion, as Pollux (ii. 64) observes. See Homer, //. 
 vi. 484. See above, VH. i. 32 (p. 196) ; Cyrap. VII. v. 32 ; Hiero, iii. 5 ; 
 Sym. ii. 24 ; Antony and Cleopatra^ IH. ii, 43. ^ B.C. 368 (or 367). 
 
 * The Asopus. * B.C. 367 (or 366). 
 
DX.367""'} THEIR LOYALTY TO SPARTA 205 
 
 behind him at this point and so over the heads of his troops 
 as they lay at the Heraion beneath.^ As soon as the citizens 
 of PhUus found that hostile troops were advancing on their 
 corn-land, out dashed the cavalry with the chosen band of 
 the Phliasians and gave battle, not suffering the enemy to 
 penetrate into the plain. The best part of the day was spent 
 in taking long shots at one another on that field ; Euphron 
 pushing his attack down to the point where cavalry could 
 operate, the citizens retaliating as far as the Heraion. 
 Presently the time to withdraw had come, and the enemy 
 began to retire, following the circle of the Trikaranon ; the 
 short cut to reach the Pellenians being barred by the ravine 
 which runs in front of the walls. The Phliasians escorted 
 their retreating foes a little way up the steep, and then turning 
 off dashed along the road beside the walls, making for the 
 Pellenians and those with them ; whereupon the Theban, per- 
 ceiving the haste of the Phliasians, began racing with his 
 infantry to outspeed them and bring succour to the Pellenians. 
 The cavalry, however, arrived first and fell to attacking the 
 Pellenians, who received and withstood the shock, and the 
 cavalry drew back. A second time they charged, and were 
 supported by some infantry detachments which had now 
 come up. It ended in a hand-to-hand fight ; and eventually 
 the enemy gave way. On the field lay dead some Sicyonians, 
 and of the Pellenians many a good man. In record of the feat 
 the Phliasians began to raise a trophy, as well they might ; 
 and loud and clear the paean rang. As to the Theban and 
 Euphron, they and all their men stood by and stared at the 
 proceedings, like men who had raced to see a sight. After 
 all was over the one party retired to Sicyon and the other 
 withdrew into their city. 
 
 That too was another noble exploit of the Phliasians, when 
 they took the Pellenian Proxenus prisoner and, although suffer- 
 ing from scarcity at the time, sent him back without a ransom. 
 "As generous as brave," such is their well-earned title who 
 were capable of such performance. 
 
 The heroic resolution with which these men maintained 
 their loyalty to their friends is manifest. When excluded from 
 
 ^ Lit. "above the Heraion" (where his main body lay). 
 
2o6 HELLENICA BK. VII. {""' "'IcJiT, 
 
 the fruits of their own soil, they contrived to live, partly 
 by helping themselves from the enemy's territory, partly by 
 purchasing from Corinth, though to reach that market they 
 must run the gauntlet of a hundred risks ; and having reached 
 it their troubles began afresh. There were diificulties in pro- 
 viding the requisite sum, diificulties in arranging with the 
 purveyors, and it was barely possible to find sureties for the 
 very beasts which should carry home their marketing. They 
 had reached the depth of despair, and were absolutely at a loss 
 what to do, when they arranged with Chares to escort their 
 convoy. Once safe inside Phlius, they begged him to help 
 them to convey their useless and sick folk to Pellene.^ These 
 they left at that place ; and after making purchases and pack- 
 ing as many beasts of burthen as they could, they set off to 
 return in the night, not in ignorance that they would be laid 
 in wait for by the enemy, but persuaded that the want of 
 provisions was a worse evil than mere fighting. 
 
 The men of Phlius pushed forward with Chares ; presently 
 they stumbled on the enemy and at once grappled to their 
 work. Pressing hard on the foe, they called cheerily to one 
 another, and shouted at the same time to Chares to bring up 
 his aid. In short, the victory was theirs ; and the enemy was 
 driven off the road ; and so they got themselves and their 
 supplies safely home. The long night-watching superinduced 
 sleep which lasted well into the next day. But Chares was 
 no sooner out of bed than he was accosted by the cavalry 
 and the pick of the heavy infantry with the following appeal : 
 "Chares, to-day you have it in your power to perform the 
 noblest deed of arms. The Sicyonians are fortifying an out- 
 post on our borders, they have plenty of stone-masons but a 
 mere handful of hoplites. We the knights of Phlius and we 
 the flower of our infantry force will lead the way; and you 
 shall follow after with your mercenaries. Perhaps when you 
 appear on the scene you will find the whole thing finished, or 
 perhaps your coming will send the enemy flying, as happened 
 at Pellene. If you do not like the sound of these proposals, 
 sacrifice and take counsel of the gods. Our belief is that the 
 
 ^ What is the date of this incident? See above, Hell. VII. ii. 3, p. 201 ; 
 below, VII, iv. 17, p. 217. 
 
b"c.3S7'°"°'} chares and the PHLIASIANS 207 
 
 gods will bid you yet more emphatically than we to take this 
 step. Only this, Chares, you must well consider, that if you 
 do take it you will have established an outpost on the enemy's 
 frontier; you will have saved from perdition a friendly city; 
 you will win eternal glory in your own fatherland ; and among 
 friends and foes alike no name will be heralded with louder 
 praise than that of Chares." 
 
 Chares was persuaded, and proceeded to offer sacrifice. 
 Meanwhile the Phliasian cavalry were donning their breastplates 
 and bridling their horses, and the heavy infantry made every 
 preparation for the march. Then they took their arms, fell 
 into line, and tramped off to the place of sacrifice. Chares 
 with the soothsayer stepped forward to meet them, announcing 
 that the victims were favourable. "Only wait for us," they 
 exclaimed ; " we will sally forth with you at once." The 
 heralds' cry " To arms ! " was sounded, and with a zeal which 
 was almost miraculous the mercenaries themselves rushed 
 out. As soon as Chares began the march, the Phliasian 
 cavalry and infantry got in front of him. At first they led 
 off at a smart pace ; presently they began to bowl ^ along more 
 quickly, and finally the cavalry were tearing over the ground 
 might and main, whilst the infantry, at the greatest pace 
 compatible with keeping their ranks, tore after them; and 
 behind them, again, came Chares zealously following up in 
 their rear. There only remained a brief interval of daylight 
 before the sun went down, and they came upon the enemy 
 in the fortress, some washing, some cooking a savoury meal, 
 others kneading their bread, others making their beds. These, 
 when they saw the vehemence of the attack, at once, in utter 
 panic, took to flight, leaving behind all their provisions for the 
 brave fellows who took their place. They, as their reward, 
 made a fine supper off these stores and others which had 
 come from home, pouring out libations for their good fortune 
 and chanting the battle-hymn ; after which they posted pickets 
 for the night and slumbered well. The messenger with the 
 news of their success at Thyamia arrived at Corinth in the 
 night. The citizens of that state with hearty friendship at 
 once ordered out by herald all the oxen and beasts of burthen, 
 
 ' See Anab. VII. iii. 46 (Trans, vol. i. p. 293). 
 
2o8 HELLENICA BK. VII {Ti-sJ^Bxrs";."^ 
 
 which they loaded with food and brought to PhUus ; and all 
 the while the fortress was building day by day these convoys 
 of food were duly despatched. 
 
 III. — But on this topic enough, perhaps, has been said to 
 demonstrate the loyalty of the men of Phlius to their friends, 
 their bravery in war, and, lastly, their steadfastness in maintain- 
 ing their alliance in spite of famine. 
 
 B.C. 367-366. — It seems to have been somewhere about this 
 date that Aeneas the Stymphalian,i who had become general of 
 the Arcadians, finding that the state of affairs in Sicyon was 
 intolerable, marched up with his army into the acropolis. 
 Here he summoned a meeting of the Sicyonian aristocrats 
 already within the walls, and sent to fetch those others who 
 had been banished without a decree of the people.^ Euphron, 
 taking fright at these proceedings, fled for safety to the harbour- 
 town of Sicyon. Hither he summoned Pasimelus from Corinth, 
 and by his instrumentality handed over the harbour to the 
 Lacedaemonians. Once more reappearing in his old character, 
 he began to pose as an ally of Sparta. He asserted that his 
 fidelity to Lacedaemon had never been interrupted ; for when 
 the votes were given in the city whether Sicyon should give up 
 her allegiance to Lacedaemon, "I, with one or two others," 
 said he, " voted against the measure ; but afterwards these 
 people betrayed me, and in my desire to avenge myself on 
 them I set up a democracy. At present all traitors to your- 
 selves are banished — I have seen to that. If only I could get 
 the power into my own hands, I would go over to you, city 
 and all, at once. All that I can do at present, I have done ; 
 I have surrendered to you this harbour." That was what 
 Euphron said to his audience there, but of the many who 
 heard his words, how many really believed him is by no means 
 
 ^ Is this man the famous writer 6 tciktikSs, a portion of whose works, 
 the Treatise on Siege Operations, has been preserved [recently re-edited by 
 Arnold Hug — Commentarius PoUorceticus, Lips. Trubner, 1884]? So 
 Casaubon supposed. Cf Com. Pol. 27, where the writer mentions irdveia 
 as the Arcadian term for "panics." Readers of the Anabasis will recollect 
 the tragic end of another Aeneas, also of Stymphalus, an Arcadian officer 
 (see Trans, vol i. p. 202). On the official title aTparrrybs (general), Freeman 
 (ffist. Fed. Gov. 204) notes that "at the head of the whole League there 
 seems to have been, as in so many other cases, a single Federal general.'' 
 Cf. Diod. XV. 6a. 2 ggg above, VII. i. 46, p. 200. 
 
e"c."6j\t6} EUPHRON ASSASSINATED 209 
 
 evident. However, since I have begun the story of Euphron, 
 I desire to bring it to its close. 
 
 Faction and party strife ran high in Sicyon between the 
 better classes and the people, when Euphron, getting a 
 body of foreign troops from Athens, once more obtained his 
 restoration. The city, with the help of the commons, he 
 was master of, but the Theban governor held the citadel. 
 Euphron, perceiving that he would never be able to dominate 
 the state whilst the Thebans held the acropolis, collected 
 money and set off to Thebes, intending to persuade the 
 Thebans to expel the aristocrats and once again to hand over 
 the city to himself. But the former exiles, having got wind of 
 this journey of his, and of the whole intrigue, set off themselves 
 to Thebes in front of him.^ When, however, they saw the terms 
 of intimacy on which he associated with the Theban authorities, 
 in terror of his succeeding in his mission some of them staked 
 their lives on the attempt and stabbed Euphron in the Cadmeia, 
 where the magistrates and senate were seated. The magis- 
 trates, indeed, could not but indict the perpetrators of the 
 deed before the senate, and spoke as follows : 
 
 " Fellow-citizens, it is our duty to arraign these murderers 
 of Euphron, the men before you, on the capital charge. 
 Mankind may be said to fall into two classes : there are 
 the wise and temperate,^ who are incapable of any wrong 
 and unhallowed deed; and there are the base, the bad, 
 who do indeed such things, but try to escape the notice of 
 their fellows. The men before you are exceptional. They 
 have so far exceeded all the rest of men in audacity and 
 foul villainy that, in the very presence of the magistrates and 
 of yourselves, who alone have power of life and death, they 
 have taken the law into their own hands,* and have slain 
 this man. But they stand now before the bar of justice, and 
 they must needs pay the extreme penalty ; for, if you spare 
 them, what visitor will have courage to approach the city? 
 Nay, what will become of the city itself, if license is to be 
 given to any one who chooses to murder those who come here, 
 before they have even explained the object of their visit ? It is 
 
 ' Or, "on an opposition journey." ^ Lit. " the sound of soul. " 
 
 ' Or, ' ' they have been judge and jury both, and executioners to boot." 
 
 VOL. II P 
 
210 HELLENICA— BK. VII. {™"'b.c?|66 
 
 our part, then, to prosecute these men as arch-villains and mis- 
 creants, whose contempt for law and justice is only matched by 
 the supreme indifference with which they treat this city. It is 
 your part, now that you have heard the charges, to impose upon 
 them that penalty which seems to be the measure of their guilt." 
 
 Such were the words of the magistrates. Among the men 
 thus accused, all save one denied immediate participation 
 in the act. It was not their hands had dealt the blow. This 
 one not only confessed the deed, but made a defence in words 
 somewhat as follows : 
 
 " As to treating you with indifference, men of Thebes, that 
 is not possible for a man who knows that with you lies the 
 power to deal with him as you list. Ask rather on what I 
 based my confidence when I slew the man ; and be well 
 assured that, in the first place, I based it on the conviction 
 that I was doing right ; next, that your verdict also will be right 
 and just. I knew assuredly how you dealt with Archias ^ and 
 Hypates and that company whom you detected in conduct' 
 similar to that of Euphron : you did not stay for formal voting, 
 but at the first opportunity within your reach you guided the 
 sword of vengeance, believing that by the verdict of mankind a 
 sentence of death has already been passed against the conspicu- 
 ously profane person, the manifest traitor, and him who lays to 
 his hand to become a tyrant. See, then, what follows. Euphron 
 was liable on each of these several counts : he was a con- 
 spicuously profane person, who took into his keeping temples 
 rich in votive offerings of gold and silver, and swept them 
 bare of their sacred treasures ; he was an arrant traitor — ^for 
 what treason could be more manifest than Euphron's ? First 
 he was the bosom friend of Lacedaemon, but presently «hose 
 you in their stead; and, after exchange of solemn pledges 
 between yourselves and him, once more turned round and 
 played the traitor to you, and delivered up the harbour to 
 your enemies. Lastly, he was most undisguisedly a tyrant, 
 who made not free men only, but free fellow- citizens his 
 slaves ; who put to death, or drove into exile, or robbed of 
 their wealth and property, not malefactors, note you, but the 
 mere victims of his whim and fancy ; and these were ever the 
 
 ' See above, V. iv. ij, p. 120. 
 
BX.366*'""} THE DEFENCE 211 
 
 better folk. Once again restored by the help of your sworn 
 foes and antagonists, the Athenians, to his native town of 
 Sicyon, the first thing he did was to take up arms against the 
 governor from Thebes ; but, finding himself powerless to drive 
 him from the acropolis, he collected money and betook him- 
 self hither. Now, if it were proved that he had mustered 
 armed bands to attack you, I venture to say, you would have 
 thanked me that I slew him. What then, when he came 
 furnished with vile moneys, to corrupt you therewith, to bribe 
 you to make him once more lord and master of the state? 
 How shall I, who dealt justice upon him, justly suffer death at 
 your hands? For to be worsted in arms implies injury 
 certainly, but of the body only : the defeated man is not 
 proved to be dishonest by his loss of victory. But he who is 
 corrupted by filthy lucre, contrary to the standard of what is 
 best,^ is at once injured and involved in shame. 
 
 " Now if he had been your friend, however much he was 
 my national foe, I do confess it had been scarce honourable 
 of me to have stabbed him to death in your presence : but 
 why, I should like to ask, should the man who betrayed you 
 be less your enemy than mine ? ' Ah, but,' I hear some one 
 retort, ' he came of his own accord.' I presume, sir, you mean 
 that had he chanced to be slain by somebody at a distance 
 from your state, that somebody would have won your praise ; 
 but now, on the ground that he came back here to work 
 mischief on the top of mischief, ' he had the right to live ' ! ^ 
 In what part of Hellas, tell me, sir, do Hellenes keep a truce 
 with traitors, double-dyed deserters, and tyrants ? Moreover, 
 I must remind you that you passed a resolution — if I mistake 
 not>iit stands recorded in your parliamentary minutes — that 
 ' renegades are liable to be apprehended ^ in any of the allied 
 cities.' Now, here is a renegade restoring himself without any 
 common decree of the allied states : will any one tell me on 
 what ground this person did not deserve to die? What I 
 maintain, sirs, is that if you put me to death, by so doing 
 you will be aiding and abetting your bitterest foe ; while, by a 
 
 1 Or, as we should say, "in violation of conscience." 
 
 ^ Or, " he was wrongfully slain. " 
 
 ' For this right of extradition see Plut. Lys. xxvii. 
 
212 HELLENICA — BK. VII. {c„. ,v.Ti-"'; b.cI'sM 
 
 verdict sanctioning the justice of my conduct, you will prove 
 your willingness to protect the interests not of yourselves only, 
 but of the whole body of your allies." 
 
 The Thebans on hearing these pleadings decided that 
 Euphron had only suffered the fate which he deserved. His 
 own countrymen, however, conveyed away the body with the 
 honours due to a brave and good man, and buried him in the 
 market-place, where they still pay pious reverence to his 
 memory as "a founder of the state." So strictly, it would 
 seem, do the mass of mankind confine the term brave and 
 good to those who are the benefactors of themselves. 
 
 IV. B.C. 366. — And so ends the history of Euphron. I return 
 to the point reached at the commencement of this digression.^ 
 The Phliasians were still fortifying Thyamia, and Chares was 
 still with them, when Oropus^ was seized by the banished 
 citizens of that place. The Athenians in consequence de- 
 spatched an expedition in full force to the point of danger, 
 and recalled Chares from Thyamia; whereupon the Sicyonians 
 and the Arcadians seized the opportunity to recapture the 
 harbour of Sicyon. Meanwhile the Athenians, forced to act 
 single-handed, with none of their allies to assist them, retired 
 from Oropus, leaving that town in the hands of the Thebans as 
 a deposit till the case at issue could be formally adjudicated. 
 
 Now Lycomedes ^ had discovered that the Athenians were 
 harbouring a grievance against their allies, as follows : — They 
 felt it hard that, while Athens was put to vast trouble on their 
 account, yet in her need not a man among them stepped 
 forward to render help. Accordingly he persuaded the 
 assembly of Ten Thousand to open negotiations with Athens 
 for the purpose of forming an alliance.* At first some of the 
 Athenians were vexed that they, being friends of Lacedaemon, 
 
 1 See above, VII. ii. 23 ; iii. 3, p. 208 ; Diod. xv. 76. 
 
 2 See Thuc. viii. 60 ; Trans, vol. i. p. cxlii. note 2. 
 ^ See above, VII. i. 23. 
 
 * This proves that ' ' the Ten Thousand made war and peace in the name 
 of all Arkadia"; cf. //ell. VII. i. 38 ; Diod. xv. 59. "They received and 
 listened to the ambassadors of other Greek states " ; Demosth. F. L. 220. 
 "They regulated and paid the standing army of the Federation " ; //ell. VII. 
 iv. 22, 23; Diod. XV. 62. "They sat in judgment on political offenders 
 against the collective majority of the Arkadian League " ; Hell. VII. iv. 33 ; 
 Freeman, //ist. Fed, Gov. 203, note 1. 
 
l^c'sie^'^} DEATH OF LYCOMEDES 213 
 
 should become allied to her opponents ; but on further reflec- 
 tion they discovered it was no less desirable for the Lacedae- 
 monians than for themselves that the Arcadians should become 
 independent of Thebes. That being so, they were quite ready 
 to accept an Arcadian alliance. Lycomedes himself was still 
 engaged on this transaction when, taking his departure from 
 Athens, he died, in a manner which looked like a divine 
 intervention. 
 
 Out of the many vessels at his service he had chosen the 
 one he liked best, and by the terms of contract was entitled 
 to land at any point he might desire ; but, for some reason, 
 selected the exact spot where a body of Mantinean exiles lay. 
 Thus he died ; but the alliance on which he had set his heart 
 was already consummated. 
 
 Now an argument was advanced by Demotion ^ in the 
 Assembly of Athens, approving highly of the friendship with 
 the Arcadians, which to his mind was an excellent thing, 
 but arguing that the generals should be instructed to see 
 that Corinth was kept safe for the Athenian people. The 
 Corinthians, hearing this, lost no time in despatching garrisons 
 of their own large enough to take the place of the Athenian 
 garrisons at any point where they might have them, with 
 orders to these latter to retire : " We have no further need of 
 foreign garrisons," they said. The garrisons did as they were 
 bid. 
 
 As soon as the Athenian garrison troops were met together 
 in the city of Corinth, the Corinthian authorities caused pro- 
 clamation to be made inviting all Athenians who felt them- 
 selves wronged to enter their names and cases upon a list, and 
 they would recover their dues. While things were in this state. 
 Chares arrived at Cenchreae with a fleet. Learning what had 
 been done, he told them that he had heard there were designs 
 against the state of Corinth, and had come to render assistance. 
 The authorities, while thanking him politely for his zeal, were 
 not any the more ready to admit the vessels into the harbour, 
 
 1 Of Demotion nothing more, I think, is linown. Grote {H. G. x. 397) 
 says : ' ' The public debates of the Athenian assembly were not favourable to 
 the success of a scheme like that proposed by Demotion, to which secrecy was 
 indispensable. Compare another scheme " (the attempted surprise of Mitylene, 
 B.C. 428), "divulged in like manner, in Thuc. iii. 3." 
 
214 HELLENICA BK. VII. { "''■ b.c?|^ 
 
 but bade him sail away; and after rendering justice to the 
 infantry troops, they sent them away likewise. Thus the 
 Athenians were quit of Corinth. To the Arcadians, to be 
 sure, they were forced by the terms of their alliance to send 
 an auxiliary force of cavalry, " in case of any foreign attack 
 upon Arcadia." At the same time they were careful not to 
 set foot on Laconian soil for the purposes of war. 
 
 The Corinthians had begun to realise on how slender a 
 thread their political existence hung. They were overmastered 
 by land still as ever, with the further difficulty of Athenian 
 hostility, or quasi -hostility, now added. They resolved to 
 collect bodies of mercenary troops, both infantry and horse. 
 At the head of these they were able at once to guard their 
 state and to inflict much injury on their neighbouring foes. 
 To Thebes, indeed, they sent ambassadors to ascertain 
 whether they would have any prospect of peace if they came 
 to seek it. The Thebans bade them come : " Peace they 
 should have." Whereupon the Corinthians asked that they 
 might be allowed to visit their allies ; in making peace they 
 would like to share it with those who cared for it, and would 
 leave those who preferred war to war. This course also the 
 Thebans sanctioned ; and so the Corinthians came to Lace- 
 daemon and said : 
 
 " Men of Lacedaemon, we, your friends, are here to present 
 a petition, and on this wise. If you can discover any safety 
 for us whilst we persist in warlike courses, we beg that you will 
 show it us ; but if you recognise the hopelessness of our affairs, 
 we would, in that case, proffer this alternative : if peace is alike 
 conducive to your interests, we beg that you would join us in 
 making peace, since there is no one with whom we would more 
 gladly share our safety than with you ; if, on the other hand, 
 you are persuaded that war is more to your interest, permit 
 us at any rate to make peace for ourselves. So saved to-day, 
 perhaps we may live to help you in days to come ; whereas, if 
 to-day we be destroyed, plainly we shall never at any time be 
 serviceable again." 
 
 The Lacedaemonians, on hearing these proposals, coun- 
 selled the Corinthians to arrange a peace on their own 
 account ; and as for the rest of their allies, they permitted 
 
b"c.3«-315^} CORINTH OBTAINS PEACE 215 
 
 any who did not care to continue the war along with them to 
 take a respite and recruit themselves. "As for ourselves," 
 they said, " we will go on fighting and accept whatever Heaven 
 has in store for us," — adding, "never will we submit to be 
 deprived of the territory of Messene, which we received as an 
 heirloom from our fathers." ^ 
 
 Satisfied with this answer, the Corinthians set off to Thebes 
 in quest of peace. The Thebans, indeed, asked them to agree 
 on oath, not to peace only but an alliance ; to which they 
 answered : " An alliance meant, not peace, but merely an 
 exchange of war. If they liked, they were ready there and 
 then," they repeated, " to establish a just and equitable peace." 
 And the Thebans, admiring the manner in which, albeit in 
 danger, they refused to undertake war against their benefactors, 
 conceded to them and the Phliasians and the rest who came 
 with them to Thebes, peace on the principle that each should 
 hold their own territory. On these terms the oaths were 
 taken. 
 
 Thereupon the Phliasians, in obedience to the compact, at 
 once retired from Thyamia ; but the Argives, who had taken 
 the oath of peace on precisely the same terms, finding that 
 they were unable to procure the continuance of the Phliasian 
 exiles in the Trikaranon as a point held within the limits of 
 Argos,^ took over and garrisoned the place, asserting now that 
 this land was theirs — land which only a little while before they 
 were ravaging as hostile territory. Further, they refused to 
 submit the case to arbitration in answer to the challenge of 
 the Phliasians. 
 
 It was nearly at the same date that the son of Dionysius* 
 (his father, Dionysius the first, being already dead) sent a 
 reinforcement to Lacedaemon of twelve triremes under Timo- 
 crates, who on his arrival helped the Lacedaemonians to 
 recover Sellasia, and after that exploit sailed away home. 
 
 B.C. 366-365. — Not long after this the Eleians seized Lasion,* 
 
 1 See Isocr. Or. vi. " Archidamos, " § 70 ; Jebb, Attic Or. ii. 193 ; Trans, 
 vol. i. p. cxliii. 
 
 'i Or, "as a post held by them within the territory of the state." The 
 passage is perhaps corrupt. 
 
 2 Concerning Dionysius the first, see above, VII. i. 20 foil. 28. 
 *' See above, VII. i. 26 ; Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. p. 201. 
 
2i6 HELLENICA — BK. VII. { """kc." lel^jes 
 
 a place which in old days was theirs, but at present was 
 attached to the Arcadian league. The Arcadians did not 
 make light of the matter, but immediately summoned their 
 troops and rallied to the rescue. Counter-reliefs came also on 
 the side of Elis — their Three Hundred, and again their Four 
 Hundred.^ The Eleians lay encamped during the day face to 
 face with the invader, but on a somewhat more level position. 
 The Arcadians were thereby induced under cover of night to 
 mount on to the summit of the hill overhanging the Eleians, 
 and at day-dawn they began their descent upon the enemy. 
 The Eleians soon caught sight of the enemy advancing from 
 the vantage-ground above them, many times their number ; 
 but a sense of shame forbade retreat at such a distance. 
 Presently they came to close quarters ; there was a hand-to- 
 hand encounter ; the Eleians turned and fled ; and in re- 
 tiring down the difficult ground lost many men and many 
 arms. 
 
 Flushed with this achievement the Arcadians began march- 
 ing on the cities of the Acroreia,^ which, with the exception of 
 Thraustus, they captured, and so reached Olympia. There 
 they made an entrenched camp on the hill of Kronos, estab- 
 lished a garrison, and held control over the Olympian hill- 
 country. Margana also, by help of a party inside who gave it 
 up, next fell into their hands. 
 
 These successive advantages gained by their opponents 
 reacted on the Eleians, and threw them altogether into despair. 
 Meanwhile the Arcadians were steadily advancing upon their 
 capital.^ At length they arrived, and penetrated into the 
 market-place. Here, however, the cavalry and the rest of the 
 Eleians made a stand, drove the enemy out with some loss, 
 and set up a trophy. 
 
 It should be mentioned that the city of Elis had pre- 
 
 ' From the sequel it would appear that the former were a picked corps of 
 infantry and the latter of cavalry. See Thuc. ii. 25 ; Busolt, op. cit. p. 175 foil. 
 
 ^ The mountainous district of Elis on the borders of Arcadia, in which the 
 rivers Peneius and Ladon take their rise ; see Diet, of And. Geog. s.v. ; 
 above, III. ii. 30, IV. ii. 16 (pp. 18, 50). Thraustus was one of the four 
 chief townships of the district. For the topography of Olympia, see map, 
 Trans, vol. i. For Margana, see above. III. ii. 25, 30, IV. ii. 16, VI. v. 
 2 (pp. 17, 18, 50, 169). ' I.e. Elis. 
 
B."c.3M-36r°} WAR BETWEEN ARCADIA AND ELIS ±^1 
 
 viously been in a state of disruption. The party of Charo- 
 pus, Thrasonidas, and Argeius were for converting the state 
 into a democracy ; the party of Eualcas, Hippias, and Stratolas ^ 
 were for oligarchy. When the Arcadians, backed by a large 
 force, appeared as allies of those who favoured a democratic 
 constitution, the party of Charopus were at once emboldened ; 
 and, having obtained the promise of assistance from the 
 Arcadians, they seized the acropolis. The Knights and the 
 Three Hundred did not hesitate, but at once marched up and 
 dislodged them; with the result that about four hundred 
 citizens, with Argeius and Charopus, were banished. Not 
 long afterwards these exiles, with the help of some Arcadians, 
 seized and occupied Pylus;^ where many of the commons 
 withdrew from the capital to join them, attracted not only 
 by the beauty of the position, but by the great power of the 
 Arcadians, in alliance with them. 
 
 There was subsequently another invasion of the territory of 
 the Eleians on the part of the Arcadians, who were influenced 
 by the representations of the exiles that the city would come over 
 to them. But the attempt proved abortive. The Achaeans, 
 who had now become friends with the Eleians, kept firm 
 guard on the capital, so that the Arcadians had to retire without 
 further exploit than that of ravaging the country. Immedi- 
 ately, however, on marching out of Eleian territory they were 
 informed that the men of Pellene were in Elis ; whereupon they 
 executed a marvellously long night march and seized the Pellenian 
 township of Olurus^ (the Pellenians at the date in question 
 having already reverted to their old alliance with Lacedaemon). 
 And now the men of Pellene, in their turn getting wind of what 
 had happened at Olurus, made their way round as best they 
 could, and got into their own city of Pellene ; after which there 
 
 ' See below, VII. iv. 31, p. 222 ; Busolt, op. cit. p. 175. 
 
 ^ Pylus, a town in "hollow" Elis, upon the mountain road from Elis to 
 Olympia, at the place where the Ladon flows into the Peneius (Paus. VI. 
 xxii. 5), near the modern village of Agrdpidokhdri. — Baedeker, Greece, p. 320. 
 See Busolt, p. 179. 
 
 ' This fortress (placed by Leake at modern Xylokastro) lay at the entrance 
 of the gorge of the Sys, leading from the Aigialos or coast-land into the 
 territory of Pellene, which itself lay about sixty stades from the sea at modern 
 Zougra. For the part played by Pellene as one of the twelve Achaean states 
 at this period, see above, p. 189, note 4, and p. 201, note 3. 
 
2i8 HELLENICA BK. VII. {""' "'b.c^^I 
 
 was nothing for it but to carry on war with the Arcadians in 
 Olurus and the whole body of their own commons ; and in 
 spite of their small numbers they did not cease till they had 
 reduced Olurus by siege. 
 
 B.C. 365.^ — The Arcadians were presently engaged on 
 another campaign against Elis. While they were encamped 
 between Cyllene ^ and the capital the Eleians attacked them, 
 but the Arcadians made a stand and won the battle. Andro- 
 machus, the Eleian cavalry general, who was regarded as re- 
 sponsible for the engagement, made an end of himself; and 
 the rest withdrew into the city. This battle cost the life also 
 of another there present — the Spartan Socleides ; since, it 
 will be understood, the Lacedaemonians had by this time 
 become allies of the Eleians. Consequently the Eleians, 
 being sore pressed on their own territory, sent an embassy 
 and begged the Lacedaemonians to organise an expedition 
 against the Arcadians. They were persuaded that in this 
 way they would best arrest the progress of the Arcadians, 
 who would thus be placed between two foes. In accord- 
 ance with the suggestion Archidamus marched out with a 
 body of the city troops and seized Cromnus.^ Here he left 
 a garrison — three out of the twelve regiments * — and so with- 
 drew homewards. The Arcadians had just ended their Eleian 
 campaign, and, without disbanding their levies, hastened to the 
 rescue, surrounded Cromnus with a double line of trenches, 
 and haying so secured their position, proceeded to lay siege to 
 those inside the place. The city of Lacedaemon, annoyed at 
 the siege of their citizens, sent out an army, again under the 
 command of Archidamus, who, when he had come, set about 
 ravaging Arcadia to the best of his power, as also the Sciritid, 
 and did all he could to draw off, if possible, the besieging 
 army. The Arcadians, for all that, were not one whit the more 
 to be stirred : they seemed callous to all his proceedings. 
 
 Presently espying a certain rising ground, across which 
 the Arcadians had drawn their outer line of circumvallation, 
 
 ' See Grote, I/. G. x. 429 foil. ; al. B. c. 364. 
 ^ The port town of Elis. See above, p. 18. 
 
 ' Cromnus, a township near Megalopolis. See Callisthenes, ap. Athen. 
 10, p. 452 A. See Schneider's note ad loc. 
 
 * Lit. " lochi." See Arnold's note to Thuc. v. 68 ; below, VII. v. 10. 
 
bIc-jV'""'} siege of CROMNUS 219 
 
 Archidamus proposed to himself to take it. If he were once 
 in command of that knoll, the besiegers at its foot would be 
 forced to retire. Accordingly he set about leading a body of 
 troops round to the point in question, and during this move- 
 ment the light infantry in advance of Archidamus, advanc- 
 ing at the double, caught sight of the Arcadian Eparitoi^ 
 outside the stockade and attacked them, while the cavalry 
 made an attempt to enforce their attack simultaneously. The • 
 Arcadians did not swerve : in compact order they waited impass- 
 ively. The Lacedaemonians charged a second time : a second 
 time they swerved not, but on the contrary began advancing. 
 Then, as the hoarse roar and shouting deepened, Archidamus 
 himself advanced in support of his troops. To do so he 
 turned aside along the carriage-road leading to Cromnus, and 
 moved onward in column two abreast,^ which was his natural 
 order. When they came into close proximity to one another 
 — Archidamus's troops in column, seeing they were marching 
 along a road; the Arcadians in compact order with shields 
 interlinked — at this conjuncture the Lacedaemonians were not 
 able to hold out for any length of time against the numbers 
 of the Arcadians. Before long Archidamus had received a 
 wound which pierced through his thigh, whilst death was busy 
 with those who fought in front of him, Polyaenidas and 
 Chilon, who was wedded to the sister of Archidamus, in- 
 cluded. The whole of these, numbering no less than thirty, 
 perished in this action. Presently, falling back along the 
 road, they emerged into the open ground, and now with a 
 sense of relief the Lacedaemonians got themselves into battle 
 order, facing the foe. The Arcadians, without altering their 
 position, stood in compact line, and though falling short in 
 actual numbers, were in far better heart — the moral result of 
 an attack on a retreating enemy and the severe loss inflicted 
 on him. The Lacedaemonians, on the other hand, were sorely 
 down-hearted : Archidamus lay wounded before their eyes ; 
 in their ears rang the names of those who had died, the 
 fallen being not only brave men, but, one may say, the 
 
 1 So the troops of the Arcadian Federation were named. Diodorus (xv. 62) 
 calls them "the select troops," Toii KoKov/i^fovs iirMKTOVs. 
 " See above, III. i. 22. 
 
220 MELLENICA — BK. VII. {''"' "'■^c!'365 
 
 flower of Spartan chivalry. The two armies were now close 
 together, when one of the elder men lifted up his voice and 
 cried : " Why need we fight, sirs ? Why not rather make 
 truce and part friends ? " Joyously the words fell on the ears 
 of either host, and they made a truce. The Lacedaemonians 
 picked up their dead and retired ; the Arcadians withdrew to 
 the point where their advance originally began, and set up a 
 trophy of victory. 
 
 Now, as the Arcadians lay at Cromnus, the Eleians from 
 the capital, advancing in the first instance upon Pylus, fell in 
 with the men of that place, who had been beaten back from 
 Thalamae.^ Galloping along the road, the cavalry of the 
 Eleians, when they caught sight of them, did not hesitate, but 
 dashed at them at once, and put some to the sword, while 
 others of them fled for safety to a rising knoll. Ere long 
 the Eleian infantry arrived, and succeeded in dislodging 
 this remnant on the hillock also ; some they slew, and others, 
 nearly two hundred in number, they took alive, all of whom 
 were either sold, if foreigners, or, if Eleian exiles, put to death. 
 After this the Eleians captured the men of Pylus and the 
 place itself, as no one came to their rescue, and recovered the 
 Marganians. 
 
 The Lacedaemonians presently made a second attempt upon 
 Cromnus by a night attack, got possession of the part of the 
 palisading facing the Argives, and at once began summoning 
 their besieged fellow-citizens to" come out. Out accordingly 
 came all who happened to be within easy distance, and 
 who took time by the forelock. The rest were not quick 
 enough; a strong Arcadian reiriforcement cut them off, and 
 they remained shut up inside, and were eventually taken 
 prisoners and distributed. One portion of them fell to the lot of 
 the Argives, one to the Thebans,^ one to the Arcadians, and one 
 to the Messenians. The whole number taken, whether true-born 
 Spartans or Perioeci, amounted to more than one hundred. 
 
 ^ A strong fortress in an unfrequented situation, defended by narrow 
 passes (Lealce, Morea, ii. 204) ; it lay probably in the rocky recesses of Mount 
 ScoUis (modem Santam^ri), on the frontier of Achaia, near the modern village 
 of Santam6ri. See Polyb. iv. 75. See Busolt, op. cit. p. 179. 
 
 " "The Thebans must have been soldiers in garrison at Tegea, Megalo- 
 polis, or Messene." — Grote, H. G. x. 433. 
 
B"c.764!july'} BATTLE AT OLYMPIA 
 
 B.C. 364. — And nowthat the Arcadians had leisureon the side 
 of Cromnus, they were again able to occupy themselves with the 
 Eleians, and to keep Olympia still more strongly garrisoned. In 
 anticipation of the approaching Olympic year/ they began pre- 
 parations to celebrate the Olympian games in conjunction with 
 the men of Pisa, who claim to be the original presidents of the 
 Temple.2 Now, when the month of the Olympic Festival — and 
 not the month only, but the very days, during which the 
 solemn assembly is wont to meet, were come, the Eleians, in 
 pursuance of preparations and invitations to the Achaeans, of 
 which they made no secret, at length proceeded to march 
 along the road to Olympia. The Arcadians had never 
 imagined that they would really attack them ; and they were 
 themselves just now engaged with the men of Pisa in carrying 
 out the details of the solemn assembly. They had already 
 completed the chariot -race, and the foot-race of the pent- 
 athlon.^ The competitors entitled to enter for the wrestling 
 match had left the racecourse, and were getting through their 
 bouts in the space between the racecourse and the great altar. 
 
 It must be understood that the Eleians under arms were 
 already close at hand within the sacred enclosure.* The 
 Arcadians, without advancing farther to meet them, drew up 
 their troops on the river Cladaus, which flows past the Altis 
 and discharges itself into the Alpheus. Their allies, consisting 
 of two hundred Argive hoplites and about four hundred 
 Athenian'cavalry, were there to support them. Presently the 
 
 1 I.e. "OI. 104. i" (July B.C. 364). 
 
 2 For this claim on the part of the Pisatans (as the old inhabitants), see 
 above, III. ii. 31 ; Pans. VI. xxii. 2 ; Diod. xv. 78 ; Busolt, op. cit. p. 154. 
 
 » As to \.he fentathlon, see above, IV. vii. 5 (p. 76, note 3). Whether the 
 preceding iTTToSpo/da was, at this date, a horse or chariot race, or both, I am 
 unable to say. 
 
 ■* " The riiixvos must here be distinguished from the Altis, as meaning the 
 entire breadth of consecrated ground at Olympia, of which the Altis formed a 
 smaller interior portion enclosed with a wall. The Eleians entered into the 
 riixevos before they crossed the river Kladeus, which flowed through the 
 rifienos, but alongside the Altis. The tomb of Oenomaus, which was doubt- 
 less included in the ri/ievos, was on the right bank of the Kladeus (Pans. VI. 
 xxi. 3) ; while the Altis was on the left bank of the river." — Grote, If. G. x. 
 438, note I. For the position of the Altis (Paus. V. x. i) and several of the 
 buildings here mentioned, and the topography of Olympia in general, see 
 Baedeker's Greece, p. 322/011. ; and Dorpfeld's Plan ("Olympia und Umge- 
 gend," Berlin, 1B82), there reproduced. 
 
223 HELLENICA — BK. VII. {""e'c/lefsia 
 
 Eleians formed into line on the opposite side of the stream, 
 and, having sacrificed, at once began advancing. Though 
 heretofore in matters of war despised by Arcadians and Argives, 
 by Achaeans and Athenians aUke, still on this day they led the 
 van of the allied force like the bravest of the brave. Coming 
 into collision with the Arcadians first, they at once put them 
 to flight, and next receiving the attack of the Argive supports, 
 mastered these also. Then having pursued them into the 
 space between the senate-house, the temple of Hestia, and the 
 theatre thereto adjoining, they still kept up the fighting as 
 fiercely as ever, pushing the retreating foe towards the great 
 altar. But now being exposed to missiles from the porticoes 
 and the senate-house and the great temple,^ while battling with 
 their opponents on the level, some of the Eleians were slain, 
 and amongst others the commander of the Three Hundred him- 
 self, Stratolas. At this stage of the proceedings they retired 
 to their camp. 
 
 The Arcadians and those with them were so terrified at the 
 thought of the coming day that they gave themselves neither 
 respite nor repose that night, but fell to chopping up the 
 carefully -compacted booths and constructing them into pali- 
 sades ; so that when the Eleians did again advance the 
 next day and saw the strength of the barriers and the number 
 mounted on the temples, they withdrew to their city. They 
 had proved themselves to be warriors of such mettle as a 
 god indeed by the breath of his spirit may raise up and 
 bring to perfection in a single day, but into which it were im- 
 possible for mortal men to convert a coward even in a lifetime. 
 
 B.C. 363. — The employment of the sacred treasures of the 
 temple by the Arcadian magistrates ^ as a means of maintaining 
 the Eparitoi ^ aroused protest. The Mantineans were the first 
 to pass a resolution forbidding such use of the sacred property. 
 They set the example themselves of providing the necessary 
 quota for the Troop in question from their state exchequer, 
 and this sum they sent to the federal government. The latter, 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' from the porticoes of the senate-house and the great temple. " 
 ^ See above, VII. i. 24 (p. 193, note 2). "Were these magistrates, or 
 merely popular leaders?" — Freeman, Hist. Fed. Gov. p. 203, note 3. 
 ^ Or, "Select Troop." See above, VII. iv. 22, p. 219, note i. 
 
b"'.3V"''^|- discord among the arcadians 223 
 
 affirming that the Mantineans were undermining the Arcadian 
 league, retaliated by citing their leading statesmen to appear 
 before the assembly of Ten Thousand ; and on their refusal 
 to obey the summons, passed sentence upon them, and sent 
 the Eparitoi to apprehend them as convicted persons. The 
 Mantineans, however, closed their gates, and would not admit 
 the Troop within their walls. Their example was speedily 
 followed : others among the Ten Thousand began to protest 
 against the enormity of so applying the sacred treasures ; it 
 was doubly wrong to leave as a perpetual heirloom to their 
 children the imputation of a crime so heinous against the gods. 
 But no sooner was a resolution passed in the general assembly ^ 
 forbidding the use of the sacred moneys for profane purposes 
 than those (members of the league) who could not have afforded 
 to serve as Eparitoi without pay laegan speedily to melt away ; 
 while those of more independent means, with mutual en- 
 couragement, began to enrol themselves in the ranks of the 
 Eparitoi — the feeling being that they ought not to be a mere 
 tool in the hands of the corps, but rather that the corps itself 
 should be their instrument. Those members of the govern- 
 ment who had manipulated the sacred money soon saw that 
 when they came to render an account of their stewardship, in 
 all likelihood they would lose their heads. They therefore 
 sent an embassy to Thebes, with instructions to the Theban 
 authorities warning them that, if they did not open a campaign, 
 the Arcadians would in all probability again veer round to 
 I^cedaemon. 
 
 The Thebans, therefore, began making preparations for 
 opening a campaign, but the party who consulted the best 
 interests of Peloponnese^ persuaded the general assembly 
 of the Arcadians to send an embassy and tell the Thebans 
 not to advance with an army into Arcadia, unless they 
 sent for them ; and whilst this was the language they addressed 
 to Thebes, they reasoned among themselves that they could 
 dispense with war altogether. The presidency over the temple 
 
 1 ' ' The common formula for a Greek confederation, t6 Koivbv twv 
 'ApicASav, is used as an equivalent of 0! nipi.01." (here and below, §§ 35, 38). — 
 Freeman, op. cit. 202, note 4. 
 
 ^ See below, VII. v. i, ol Ki)56uepoi Tri^ JleKoirovviiaov. I regard these 
 phrases as self-laudatory political catchwords. 
 
224 HELLENICA BK. VII. { ""b.c.' le^al' 
 
 of Zeus, they were persuaded, they might easily dispense with ; 
 indeed, it would at once be a more upright and a holier pro- 
 ceeding on their parts to give it back, and with such conduct 
 the god, they thought, would be better pleased. As these were 
 also the views and wishes of the Eleians, both parties agreed 
 to make peace, and a truce was established. 
 
 B.C. 362. — The oaths were ratified ; and amongst those who 
 swore to them were included not only the parties immediately 
 concerned, but the men of Tegea, and the Theban general him- 
 self, who was inside Tegea with three hundred heavy infantry 
 of the Boeotians. Under these circumstances the Arcadians in 
 Tegea remained behind feasting and keeping holy day, with 
 outpouring of libations and songs of victory, to celebrate the 
 establishment of peace. Here was an opportunity for the 
 Theban and those of the government who regarded the forth- 
 coming inquiry with apprehension. Aided by the Boeotians 
 and those of the Eparitoi who shared their sentiments, they first 
 closed the gates of the fortress of Tegea, and then set about 
 sending to the various quarters to apprehend those of the 
 better class. But, inasmuch as there were Arcadians present 
 from all the cities, and there was a general desire for peace, 
 those apprehended must needs be many. So much so, that 
 the prison-house was presently full to overflowing, and the 
 town-hall was full also. Besides the number lodged in prison, 
 a number had escaped by leaping down the walls, and there 
 were others who were suffered to pass through the gates (a 
 laxity easily explained, since no one, excepting those who 
 were anticipating their own downfall, cherished any wrathful 
 feeling against anybody). But what was a source of still 
 graver perplexity to the Theban commander and those acting 
 with him, — of the Mantineans, the very people whom they had 
 set their hearts on catching, they had got but very few. 
 Nearly all of them, owing to the proximity of their city, had, 
 in fact, betaken themselves home. Now, when day came and 
 the Mantineans learned what had happened, they immediately 
 sent and forewarned the other Arcadian states to be ready in 
 arms, and to guard the passes ; and they set the example 
 themselves by so doing. They sent at the same time to 
 
 ' Or, "government house." 
 
cH.l'^'iVj^B^rseJ THE THEBAN HARMOST AT TEGEA 225 
 
 Tegea and demanded the release of all Mantineans there 
 detained. With regard to the rest of the Arcadians they 
 further claimed that no one should be imprisoned or put to 
 death without trial. If any one had any accusation to bring 
 against any, then by the mouth of their messengers there 
 present they gave notice that the state of Mantinea was ready 
 to offer bail, "Verily and indeed to produce before the 
 general assembly of the Arcadians all who might be summoned 
 into court." The Theban accordingly, on hearing this, was at 
 a loss what to make of the affair, and released his prisoners. 
 Next day, summoning a congress of all the Arcadians who 
 chose to come, he explained, with some show of apology, that 
 he had been altogether deceived ; he had heard, he said, that 
 "the Lacedaemonians were under arms on the frontier, and that 
 some of the Arcadians were about to betray Tegea into their 
 hands." His auditors acquitted him for the moment, albeit 
 they knew that as touching themselves he was lying. They 
 sent, however, an embassy to Thebes and there accused him 
 • as deserving of death. Epaminondas (who was at that time 
 the general at the head of the war department) is reported to 
 have maintained that the Theban commander had acted far 
 more rightly when he seized than when he let go the prisoners. 
 " Thanks to you," he argued, " we have been brought into a 
 state of war, and then you, without our advice or opinion asked, 
 make peace on your own account ; would it not be reasonable 
 to retort upon you the charge of treason in such conduct? 
 Anyhow, be assured," he added, "we shall bring an army 
 into Arcadia, and along with those who share our views carry 
 on the war which we have undertaken." 
 
 v. B.C. 362. — This answer was duly reported to the general 
 assembly of the Arcadians, and throughout the several states of 
 the league. Consequently the Mantineans, along with those 
 of the Arcadians who had the interests of Peloponnesus at 
 heart,^ as also the Eleians and the Achaeans, came to the 
 conclusion that the poHcy of the Thebans was plain. They 
 wished Peloponnesus to be reduced to such an extremity of 
 weakness that it might fall an easy prey into their hands who 
 were minded to enslave it. " Why else," they asked, " should 
 
 1 See note above, VII. iv. 35, p. 223. 
 VOL. II Q 
 
226 HELLENICA BK. VII. {"'ex. til 
 
 they wish us to fight, except that we may tear each other to 
 pieces, and both sides be driven to look to them for support ? 
 or why, when we tell them that we have no need of them at 
 present, do they insist on preparing for a foreign campaign ? 
 Is it not plain that these preparations are for an expedition 
 which will do us some mischief?" 
 
 In this mood they sent to Athens,^ calling on the Athenians 
 for military aid. Ambassadors went also to Lacedaemon on 
 behalf of the Eparitoi, summoning the Lacedaemonians, if 
 they wished to give a helping hand, to put a stop to the pro- 
 ceedings of any power approaching to enslave Peloponnesus. 
 As regards the headship, they came to an arrangement at 
 once, on the principle that each of the allied states should 
 exercise the generalship within its own territory. 
 
 While these matters were in progress, Epaminondas was 
 prosecuting his march at the head of all the Boeotians, with 
 the Euboeans, and a large body of Thessalians, furnished 
 both by Alexander^ and by his opponents. The Phocians 
 were not represented. Their special agreement only required 
 them to render assistance in case of an attack on Thebes ; to 
 assist in a hostile expedition against others was not in the 
 bond. Epaminondas, however, reflected that inside Pelopon- 
 nesus itself they might count upon the Argives and the 
 
 ^ For a treaty of alliance between Athens, the Arkadians, Achaeans, 
 Eleians, and Phliasians, immediately before Mantinea, B.C. 362, M M6\un>os 
 dpXovTOi, see Hicks, 94 ; Kbhler, C. I. A. ii. p. 405. It is preserved on a 
 steli ( ' ' broken at bottom ; but the top is surmounted by a relief representing 
 Zeus enthroned, with thunderbolt ; a female figure [ = the Su/i/taxfa ?] ap- 
 proaches lifting her veil, while Athena stands by") now standing among the 
 sculptures from the Asklepieion on the Acropolis at Athens. See Milchhofer, 
 p. 47, no. 7, Die Museen, Athens, 1881. For the date, seeDemosth. c. Polycl. 
 1207. 
 
 2 For Alexander of Pherae, see above, VI. iv. 34 (p. 168). In B.C. 363 the 
 Thebans had sent an army under Pelopidas into Thessaly to assist their allies 
 among the Thessalians with the Phthiot Achaeans and the Magnetes against 
 Alexander. At Kynos Kephalae Alexander was defeated, but Pelopidas was 
 slain (see Grote, H. G. x. 420 foil. ). ' ' His death, as it brought grief, so like- 
 wise it produced advantage to the allies ; for the Thebans, as soon as they 
 heard of his fall, delayed not their revenge, but presently sent seven thousand 
 foot and seven hundred horse, under the command of Malcitas and Diogiton. 
 And they, finding Alexander weak and without forces, compelled him to restore 
 the cities he had taken, to withdraw his garrisons from the Magnesians and 
 Achaeans of Phthiotis and swear to assist the Thebans against whatsoever 
 enemies they should require." — Plut. Pelop. 35 (Clough, ii. 236). 
 
BX.36I'''} EPAMINONDAS IN PELOPONNESE 227 
 
 Messenians, with that section of the Arcadians which shared 
 their views. These latter were the men of Tegea and Megal- 
 opolis, of Asea and Pallantium, with any townships which 
 owing to their small size or their position in the midst of 
 these larger cities were forced to follow their lead. 
 
 Epaminondas advanced with rapid strides ; but on reaching 
 Nemea he slackened speed, hoping to catch the Athenians as they 
 passed, and reflecting on the magnitude of such an achieve- 
 ment, whether in stimulating the courage of his own allies, or 
 in plunging his foes into despondency; since, to state the matter 
 concisely, any blow to Athens would be a gain to Thebes. But 
 during his pause at Nemea those who shared the opposite 
 policy had time to converge on Mantinea. Presently the news 
 reached Epaminondas that the Athenians had abandoned the 
 idea of marching by land, and were preparing to bring their 
 supports to Arcadia by sea through Lacedaemon. This being 
 so, he abandoned his base of Nemea and pushed on to Tegea. 
 
 That the strategy of the Theban general was fortunate I 
 will not pretend to assert, but in the particular combination of 
 prudence and daring which stamps these exploits, I look upon 
 him as consummate. In the first place, I cannot but admire 
 the sagacity which led him to form his camp within the walls 
 of Tegea, where he was in greater security than he would have 
 been if entrenched outside, and where his future movements were 
 more completely concealed from the enemy. Again, the means 
 to collect material and furnish himself with othei: necessaries 
 were readier to his hand inside the city; while, thirdly, he 
 was able to keep an eye on the movements of his opponents 
 marching outside, and to watch their successful dispositions 
 as well as their mistakes. More than this : in spite of his 
 sense of superiority to his antagonists, over and over again, 
 when he saw them gaining some advantage in position, he 
 refused to be drawn out to attack them. It was only when he 
 saw plainly that no city was going to give him its adhesion, 
 and that time was slipping by, that he made up his mind that 
 a blow must be struck, failing which, he had nothing to expect 
 save a vast ingloriousness, in place of his former fame.^ He 
 had ascertained that his antagonists held a strong position 
 ' Or, " dull obscurity in place of renown. " 
 
228 HELLENICA — BK. VII. {''"'^b.1.%61 
 
 round Mantinea, and that they had sent to fetch Agesilaus 
 and the whole Lacedaemonian army. He was further aware 
 that Agesilaus had commenced his advance and was already at 
 Pellene.^ Accordingly he passed the word of command ^ to his 
 troops to take their evening meal, put himself at their head 
 and advanced straight upon Sparta. Had it not been for the 
 arrival (by some providential chance) of a Cretan, who brought 
 the news to Agesilaus of the enemy's advance, he would have 
 captured the city of Sparta like a nest of young birds abso- 
 lutely bereft of its natural defenders. As it was, Agesilaus, 
 being forewarned, had time to return to the city before the 
 Thebans came, and here the Spartans made distribution of 
 their scanty force and maintained watch and ward, albeit 
 few enough in numbers, since the whole of their cavalry were 
 away in Arcadia, and so was their foreign brigade, and so were 
 three out of their twelve regiments.* 
 
 Arrived within the city of Sparta,* Epaminondas abstained 
 from gaining an entry at a point where his troops would have to 
 fight on level ground and under attack from the houses above ; 
 where also their large numbers would give them no superiority 
 over the small numbers of the foemen. But, singling out a 
 positioij which he conceived would give him the advantage, he 
 occupied it and began his advance against the city upon a 
 downward instead of an upward incline. 
 
 With regard to what subsequently took place, two possible 
 explanations suggest themselves : either it was miraculous, or 
 it may be maintained that there is no resisting the fury of 
 desperation. Archidamus, advancing at the head of but a hun- 
 dred men, and crossing the one thing which might have been 
 expected to form an obstacle to the enemy,^ began marching 
 
 ' Pellene (or Pellana), a town of Laconia on the Eurotas, and on the road 
 from Sparta to Arcadia ; in fact the frontier fortress on the Eurotas, as Sellasia 
 on the Oenus ; Vict, of And. Geog. s.v. ; see Paus. iii. 20, § 2 ; Strab. viii. 
 386 ; Polyb. iv. 81, xvi, 37 ; Plut. Agis, 8 ; Leake, Morea, iii. 14 foil. 
 
 2 Cf. Hifparch. iv. 9. 
 
 ' Lit. "lochi." See above, VII. iv. 20 (p. ai8) ; Pol. Lac. xi. 4 ; below, 
 
 P- 315- 
 
 * Grote (H. G. x. 455) says : "Though he crossed the Eurotas and actually 
 entered into the city of Sparta," as the words iirel Si iyhcro hi tji ifbXei tuv 
 STraprtarwi' certainly seem to me to imply. Others interpret ' ' in the close 
 neighbourhood of." 
 
 " Or, "to serve as his defence" ; or, " the one obstacle to his progress," 
 
Bx/36^ ""' } ATTEMPT TO SURPRISE SPARTA 229 
 
 uphill against his antagonists. At this crisis these fire-breath- 
 ing warriors, these ' victorious heroes of Leuctra,^ with their 
 superiority at every point, aided, moreover, by the advantage 
 of their position, did not withstand the attack of Archidamus 
 and those with him, but swerved in flight. 
 
 The vanguard of Epaminondas's troops was cut down; 
 when, however, flushed with the glory of their victory, the 
 citizens followed up their pursuit beyond the right point, they 
 in turn were cut down, — so plainly was the demarking line of 
 victory drawn by the finger of God. So then Archidamus set 
 up a trophy to note the limit of his success, and gave back 
 those who had there fallen of the enemy under a truce. 
 Epaminondas, on his side, reflecting that the Arcadians must 
 already be hastening to the relief of Lacedaemon, and being 
 unwilling to engage them in conjunction with the whole of 
 the Lacedaemonian force, especially now that the star of 
 Sparta's fortune shone, whilst theirs had suifered some eclipse, 
 turned and marched back the way he came with all speed 
 possible into Tegea. There he gave his heavy infantry pause 
 and refreshment, but his cavalry he sent on to Mantinea ; he 
 begged them to " have courage and hold on," instructing them 
 that in all likelihood they would find the flocks and herds of 
 the Mantineans and the entire population itself outside their 
 walls, especially as it was the moment for carrying the corn. 
 So they set off. 
 
 The Athenian cavalry, starting from Eleusis, had made their 
 evening meal at the Isthmus, and passing through Cleonae, as 
 chance befell, had arrived at Mantinea and had encamped 
 within the walls in the houses. As soon as the enemy were 
 seen galloping on with evidently hostile intent, the Mantineans 
 fell to praying the Athenian knights to lend them all the 
 succour they could, and they showed them all their cattle 
 outside, and all their labourers, and among them were many 
 children and graybeards who were free-born citizens. The 
 Athenians were touched by this appeal, and, though they had 
 not yet broken fast, neither the men themselves nor their 
 
 i.e. Archidamus's. It was a miraculous, thing that the Thebans did not stop 
 him. 
 
 1 See Mahaffy, Hist. Gk. Lit. vol. ii. p. 268, ist ed. See above, Hell. VI. 
 iv. 24 ; Diod. xv. 39, 56. 
 
230 HELLENICA BK. VII. {'^"^ "''^J.^ll 
 
 horses, went out eagerly to the rescue. And here we must 
 needs pause to admire the valour of these men also. The 
 enemy whom they had to cope with far outnumbered them, as 
 was plain to see, and the former misadventure of the cavalry 
 in Corinth was not forgotten. ^ But none of these things 
 entered into their calculations now — nor yet the fact that 
 they were on the point of engaging Thebans and Thessalians, 
 the finest cavalry in the world by all repute. The only thing 
 they thought of was the shame and the dishonour, if, being 
 there, they did not lend a helping hand to their allies. In 
 this mood, so soon as they caught sight of the enemy, they 
 fell with a crash upon him in passionate longing to recover the 
 old ancestral glory. Nor did they fight in vain — the blows 
 they struck enabled the Mantineans to recover all their property 
 outside, but among those who dealt them died some brave 
 heroes ;^ brave heroes also, it is evident, were those whom 
 they slew, since on either side the weapons wielded were not 
 so short but that they could lunge at one another with effect. 
 The dead bodies of their own men they refused to abandon ; 
 and there were some of the enemy's slain whom they restored 
 to him under a flag of truce. 
 
 The thoughts now working in the mind of Epaminondas 
 were such as these : that within a few days he would be forced 
 to retire, as the period of the campaign was drawing to a close ; 
 if it ended in his leaving in the lurch those allies whom he 
 came out to assist, they would be besieged by their antagonists. 
 What a blow would that be to his own fair fame, already some- 
 what tarnished ! Had he not been defeated in Lacedaemon, 
 with a large body of heavy infantry, by a handful of men? 
 defeated again at Mantinea, in the cavalry engagement, and 
 himself the main cause finally of a coalition between five great 
 powers — that is to say, the Lacedaemonians, the Arcadians, 
 the Achaeans, the Eleians, and the Athenians ? On all grounds 
 it seemed to him impossible to steal past without a battle. 
 And the more so as he computed the alternatives of victory or 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' and in Corinth an untoward incident had been experienced by the 
 cavahy." See Grote, ff. G. x. 458, note 2. Possibly in reference to Hell. VI. 
 V. SI. S2. 
 
 ^ Probably Xenophon's own son Gryllus was among them ; see Trans, 
 vol. i. p. cxliii. 
 
Bx.362'^'"} BATTLE OF MANTINEA 231 
 
 death. If the former were his fortune, it would resolve all his 
 perplexities ; if death, his end would be noble. How glorious 
 a thing to die in the endeavour to leave behind him, as his 
 last legacy to his fatherland, the empire of Peloponnesus ! 
 That such thoughts should pass through his brain strikes me 
 as by no means wonderful, since these are thoughts distinctive 
 of all men of high ambition. Far more wonderful to my mind 
 was the pitch of perfection to which he had brought his army. 
 There was no labour which his troops would shrink from, either 
 by night or by day ; there was no danger they would flinch 
 from ; and, with the scantiest provisions, their discipline never 
 failed them. 
 
 And so, when he gave his last orders to them to prepare 
 for impending battle, they obeyed with alacrity. He gave the 
 word ; the cavalry fell to whitening their helmets, the heavy 
 infantry of the Arcadians began inscribing clubs as the crest 
 on their shields,^ as though they were Thebans, and all were 
 engaged in sharpening their lances and swords and polishing 
 their heavy shields. When the preparations were complete 
 and he had led them out, his next movement is worthy of 
 attention. First, as was natural, he paid heed to their forma- 
 tion, and in so doing seemed to give clear evidence that he 
 intended battle ; but no sooner was the army drawn up in the 
 formation which he preferred, than he advanced, not by the 
 shortest refute to meet the enemy, but towards the westward- 
 lying mountains which face Tegea, and by this movement 
 created in the enemy an expectation that he would not do 
 battle on that day. In keeping with this expectation, as soon 
 as he arrived at the mountain-region, he extended his phalanx 
 in long line and piled arms under the high cliffs ; and to 
 all appearance he was there encamping. The effect of this 
 manoeuvre on the enemy in general was to relax the prepared 
 bent of their souls for battle, and to weaken their tactical 
 arrangements. Presently, however, wheeling his regiments 
 (which were marching in column) to the front, with the effect 
 of strengthening the beak-like ^ attack which he proposed to 
 
 ^ Grote (H. G. x. 463) has another interpretation. 
 
 2 Or, " the wedge-like attack of his own division " ; see Grote, H. G. x. 
 469 foil. I do not, however, think that the attacking column was actually 
 wedge-shaped like the acies cuneata of the Romans. It was the unusual depth 
 
232 HELLENICA BK. VII. {""' ^'IZ^lt 
 
 lead himselfi at the same instant he gave the order, " Shoulder 
 arms, forward," and led the way, the troops following. 
 
 When the enemy saw them so unexpectedly approaching, not 
 one of them was able to maintain tranquillity : some began 
 running to their divisions, some fell into line, some might be 
 seen bitting and bridling their horses, some donning their 
 cuirasses, and one and all were like men about to receive 
 rather than to inflict a blow. He, the while, with steady impetus 
 pushed forward his armament, like a ship-of-war prow forward. 
 Wherever he brought his solid wedge to bear, he meant to 
 cleave through the opposing mass, and crumble his adversary's 
 host to pieces. With this design he prepared to throw the 
 brunt of the fighting on the strongest half of his army, while 
 he kept the weaker portion of it in the background, knowing 
 certainly that if worsted it would only cause discouragement 
 to his own division and add force to the foe. The cavalry on 
 the side of his opponents were disposed like an ordinary 
 phalanx of heavy infantry, regular in depth and unsupported 
 by foot-soldiers interspersed among the horses.-' Epaminondas 
 again differed in strengthening the attacking point of his cavalry, 
 besides which he interspersed footmen between their lines in 
 the belief that, when he had once cut through the cavalry, 
 he would have wrested victory from the antagonist along his 
 whole line ; so hard is it to find troops who will care to keep 
 their ground when once they see any of their own side flying. 
 Lastly, to prevent any attempt on the part of the Athenians, 
 who were on the enemy's left wing, to bring up their reliefs in 
 support of the portion next them, he posted bodies of cavalry 
 and heavy infantry on certain hillocks in front of them, intend- 
 ing to create in their minds an apprehension that, in case they 
 offered such assistance, they would be attacked on their own 
 rear by these detachments. Such was the plan of encounter 
 which he formed and executed ; nor was he cheated in his hopes. 
 He had so much the mastery at his point of attack that he 
 caused the whole of the enemy's troops to take to flight. 
 
 of the column which gave it the force of an ironclad's ram. Cf. Cyrop. 11. iv. 
 for eis ^Tiairov. 
 
 ' See Rustow and Kochly, p. 176 ; and for the &iuinroi. Harpocration, s.v. ; 
 Pollux, i. 131 ; Hipparch. v. 13 ; Thuc. v. 58 ; Herod, vii. 158 ; Caes. B. G. 
 i. 48 ; B. Civ. iii. 84. 
 
Bx/362 '''"' } DEATH OF EPAMINONDAS 233 
 
 But after he himself had fallen, the rest of the Thebans 
 were not able any longer to turn their victory rightly to account. 
 Though the main battle line of their opponents had given way, 
 not a single man afterwards did the victorious hoplites slay, 
 not an inch forward did they advance from the ground on 
 which the collision took place. Though the cavalry had fled 
 before them, there was no pursuit ; not a man, horseman or 
 hoplite, did the conquering cavalry cut down ; but, like men 
 who have suffered a defeat, as if panic-stricken^ they slipped 
 back through the ranks of the fleeing foemen. Only the foot- 
 men fighting amongst the cavalry and the light infantry, who 
 had together shared in the victory of the cavalry, found their 
 way round to the left wing as masters of the field, but it cost 
 them dear ; here they encountered the Athenians, and most of 
 them were cut down. 
 
 The effective result of these achievements was the very 
 opposite of that which the world at large anticipated. Here, 
 where well-nigh the whole of Hellas was met together in one 
 field, and the combatants stood rank against rank confronted, 
 there was no one who doubted that, in the event of battle, 
 the conquerors this day would rule ; and that those who lost 
 would be their subjects. But God so ordered it that both 
 belligerents alike set up trophies as claiming victory, and 
 neither interfered with the other in the act. Both parties 
 alike gave back their enemy's dead under a truce, and in 
 right of victory; both alike, in symbol of defeat, under a 
 truce took back their dead. And though both claimed to 
 have won the day,- neither could show that he had thereby 
 gained any accession of territory, or state, or empire, or was 
 better situated than before the battle. Uncertainty and con- 
 fusion, indeed, had gained ground, being tenfold greater 
 throughout the length and breadth of Hellas after the battle 
 than before. 
 
 At this point I lay aside my pen : the sequel of the story 
 may haply commend itself^ to another. 
 
 ^ Or, " they timorously slipped back." 
 2 Or, " win the attention of some other writer. " 
 
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AGESILAUS: 
 
 AN ENCOMIUM 
 
AGESILAUS: 
 
 AN ENCOMIUM 
 
 I. 1-4 
 
 To write the praises of Agesilaus in language equalling his 
 virtue and renown is, I know, no easy task ; yet must it be 
 essayed ; since it were but an ill requital of pre-eminence, that, 
 on the ground of his perfection, a good man should forfeit the 
 tribute even of imperfect praise. 
 
 As touching, therefore, the excellency of his birth, what 
 weightier, what nobler testimony can be adduced than this one 
 fact ? To the commemorative list of famous ancestry is added 
 to-day the name ^ Agesilaus as holding this or that numerical 
 descent from Heracles, and these ancestors no private persons, 
 but kings sprung from the loins of kings. Nor is it open to 
 the gainsayer to contend that they were kings indeed but of 
 some chance city. Not so, but even as their family holds 
 highest honour in their fatherland, so too is their city the most 
 glorious in Hellas, whereby they hold, not primacy over the 
 second best, but among leaders they have leadership. 
 
 And herein it is open to us to praise both his fatherland 
 and his family. It is notable that never throughout these 
 ages has Lacedaemon, out of envy of the privilege accorded to 
 her kings, tried to dissolve their rule ; nor ever yet throughout 
 these ages have her kings strained after greater powers than 
 
 1 Or, "even to-day, in the proud bead-roll of his ancestry he stands 
 commemorated, in numerical descent from Heracles." 
 
238 _ AGESILAUS ch. 1.84-8 
 
 those which limited their heritage of kingship from the first. 
 Wherefore, while all other forms of government, democracies 
 and oligarchies, tyrannies and monarchies, alike have failed to 
 maintain their continuity unbroken, here, as the sole excep- 
 tion, endures indissolubly their kingship.^ 
 
 And next in token of an aptitude for kingship seen in 
 Agesilaus, before even he entered upon ofiSce, I note these 
 signs. On the death of Agis, king of Lacedaemon, there 
 were rival claimants to the throne. Leotychides claimed the 
 succession as being the son of Agis, and Agesilaus as the 
 son of Archidamus. But the verdict of Lacedaemon favoured 
 Agesilaus as being in point of family and virtue unim- 
 peachable,^ and so they set him on the throne. And yet, 
 in this princeliest of cities so to be . selected by the noblest 
 citizens as worthy of highest privilege, argues, methinks con- 
 clusively, an excellence forerunning exercise of rule.' 
 
 And so I pass on at once to narrate the chief achievements 
 of his reign, since by the light of deeds the character of him 
 who wrought them will, if I mistake not, best shine forth. 
 
 Agesilaus was still a youth * when he obtained the kingdom, 
 and he was still but a novice in his office when the news came 
 that the king of Persia was collecting a mighty armament by 
 sea and land for the invasion of Hellas. The Lacedaemonians 
 and their allies sat debating these matters, when Agesilaus 
 undertook to cross over into Asia. He only asked for thirty 
 Spartans and two thousand New Citizens,^ besides a con- 
 tingent of the allies six thousand strong ; with these he would 
 cross over into Asia and endeavour to effect a peace ; or, if 
 the barbarian preferred war, he would leave him little leisure 
 to invade Hellas. 
 
 The proposal was welcomed with enthusiasm on the part 
 
 •* See Cyrop. I. i. i. 
 
 * For this matter see above, Hell. III. iii. 1-6 ; V, iv. 13 (pp. 19, 123) ; 
 Plut. Ages. iii. 3 (Clough, iv. 3 foil. ) ; Paus. iii. 3. 
 
 ' See Aristides (Rhet. 776), who quotes the passage for its measured 
 cadence. 
 
 * B.C. 399 ; according to Plut. [Ages, ad fin.) he was forty-three, and there- 
 fore still "not old." See Hell. III. iv. i for the startling news, B.C. 396. 
 
 " For the class of Neodamodes, see Arnold's note to Thuc. v. 34 (Jowett, 
 Thuc. ii. 307) ; also Thuc. vii. 58 ; Hell. I. iii. 15 (Trans, vol. i. p. 13) ; 
 and above, p. 21. 
 
CH. .. ! 8-13 HIS EXPLOITS IN ASIA 239 
 
 of many. They could not but admire the eagerness of their 
 king to retaliate upon the Persian for his former invasions of 
 Hellas by counter-invasion on his own soil. They liked the 
 preference also which he showed for attacking rather than 
 awaiting his enemy's attack, and his intention to carry on the 
 war at the expense of Persia rather than that of Hellas ; but 
 it was the perfection of pohcy, they felt, so to change the 
 arena of battle, with Asia as the prize of victory instead of 
 Hellas. If we pass on to the moment when he had received 
 his army and set sail, I can conceive no clearer exposition of 
 his generalship than the bare narration of his exploits. 
 
 The scene is Asia, and this his first achievement. Tissa- 
 phernes had sworn an oath to Agesilaus on this wise : if 
 Agesilaus would grant him an armistice until the return of 
 certain ambassadors whom he would send to the king, he 
 (Tissaphernes) would do his utmost to procure the independence 
 of the Hellenic cities in Asia. And Agesilaus took a counter 
 oath : without fraud or covin to observe the armistice during 
 the three months ^ necessary to that transaction. But the 
 compact was scarcely made when Tissaphernes gave the lie to 
 the solemn undertaking he had sworn to. So far from effecting 
 peace, he begged the King to send him a large armament in 
 addition to that which he already had. As to Agesilaus, 
 though he was well aware of these proceedings, he adhered 
 loyally to the armistice. 
 
 And for myself, I look upon this as the first glorious 
 achievement of the Spartan. By displaying the perjury of 
 Tissaphernes he robbed him of his credit with all the world ; 
 by the exhibition of himself in contrast as a man who ratified 
 his oath and would not gainsay an article of his agreement, he 
 gave all men, Hellenes and barbarians alike, encouragement to 
 make covenant with him to the full extent of his desire. 
 
 When Tissaphernes, priding himself on the strength of 
 that army which had come down to aid him, bade Agesilaus 
 to be gone from Asia or to prepare for war,^ deep was the 
 vexation depicted on the faces of the Lacedaemonians there 
 
 1 See Grote, If. G. *. 359 ; ffell. III. iv. 5 (above, p. 25). 
 " Lit. ' ' When Tissaphernes, priding himself . . . bade Agesilaus be 
 gone . . . deep was the annoyance felt. " 
 
240 AGESILAUS ch. ,. g 13-18 
 
 present and their allies, as they realised that the scanty force of 
 Agesilaus was all too small to cope with the armaments of 
 Persia. But the brow of their general was lit with joy as gaily 
 he bade the ambassadors take back this answer to Tissaphernes : 
 " I hold myself indebted to your master for the perjury whereby 
 he has obtained to himself the hostility of heaven, and made 
 the gods themselves allies of Hellas." And so without further 
 pause he published a general order to his soldiers to pack their 
 baggage and prepare for active service ; and to the several cities 
 which lay on the line of march to Caria, the order sped to 
 have their markets in readiness ; while to the men of Ionia and 
 the Aeolid and the Hellespont he sent despatches bidding them 
 send their contingents to Ephesus to join in the campaign. 
 
 Tissaphernes meanwhile was influenced by the fact that 
 Agesilaus had no cavalry, and that Caria was a hilly district 
 unsuited for that arm. Moreover, as he further bethought him, 
 Agesilaus must needs be wroth with him for his deceit. What 
 could be clearer, therefore, than that he was about to make a 
 dash at the satrap's home in Caria? Accordingly he trans- 
 ported the whole of his infantry into Caria and marched his 
 cavalry round the while into the plain of the Maeander, per- 
 suaded that he would trample the Hellenes under the hoofs of 
 his horses long before they reached the district where no 
 cavalry could operate. 
 
 But Agesilaus, instead of advancing upon Caria, turned right 
 about and marched in the direction of Phrygia. Picking up 
 the various forces that met him on his . progress, he passed 
 onwards, laying city after city at his feet, and by the sudden- 
 ness of his incursion capturing enormous wealth. 
 
 Here was an achievement which showed the genius of a 
 general, as all agreed. When once war was declared, and 
 the arts of circumvention and deceit were thereby justified, 
 he had proved Tissaphernes to be a very babe in subtilty ; ^ 
 and with what sagacity again did he turn the circumstances 
 to account for the enrichment of his friends. Owing to the 
 quantity of wealth captured, precious things were selling for 
 a mere song. Thereupon he gave his friends warning to 
 
 1 See below, xi. 4 ; Mem. III. i. 6 ; IV. ii, 15 ; Cyrop. I. vi. 31 ; 
 Plut. Ages. xi. (Clough, iv. 10). 
 
CH. .. § 18.23 HIS SAGACITY AND HUMANITY 241 
 
 make their purchases, adding that he should at once march 
 down to the sea-coast at the head of his troops. The 
 quartermasters meanwhile received orders to make a note of 
 the purchasers with the prices of the articles, and to consign 
 the goods. The result was that, without prior disbursement 
 on their part, or detriment to the public- treasury, his friends 
 reaped an enormous harvest. Moreover, when deserters came 
 with offers to disclose hidden treasures, and naturally enough 
 laid their proposal before the king himself, he took care to 
 have the capture of these treasures effected by his friends, 
 which would enable them to do a stroke of business, and at 
 the same time redound to their prestige. For this reason he 
 was not long in discovering many an eager aspirant to his 
 friendship. 
 
 But a country pillaged and denuded of inhabitants would 
 not long support an army. That he felt. A more perennial 
 source of supply was surely to be found in waving cornfields 
 and thickly clustering homesteads. So with infinite pains he 
 set himself not merely to crush his foes by force, but also to 
 win them to his side by gentleness. In this spirit he often 
 enjoined upon his soldiers to guard their captives as fellow- 
 men rather than take vengeance on them as evildoers ; ^ or, 
 on a change of quarters, if aware of little children left behind 
 by the dealers (since the men often sold them in the belief 
 that it would be impossible to carry them away and rear them), 
 he would show concern in behalf of these poor waifs and have 
 them conveyed to some place of safety ; or he would entrust 
 them to the care of fellow-prisoners also left behind on account 
 of old age ; in no case must they be left to ravening dogs and 
 wolves. In this way he won the goodwill not only of those 
 who heard tell of these doings but of the prisoners them- 
 selves. And whenever he brought over a city to his side, he 
 set the citizens free from the harsher service of a bondsman 
 to his lord, imposing the gentler obedience of a freeman to his 
 ruler. Indeed, there were fortresses impregnable to assault 
 which he brought under his power by the subtler force of 
 human kindness. 
 
 But when, in Phrygia even, the freedom of his march along the 
 
 ^ See Grote, vol. ix. pp. 365 foil. 
 VOL. II R 
 
242 AGESILAUS <:«• '• 8 =3-27 
 
 flats was hampered by the cavalry of Pharnabazus, he saw that 
 if he wished to avoid a skulking warfare under cover, a force of 
 cavalry was indispensable. Accordinglyhe enlisted thewealthiest 
 members of every city in those parts to breed and furnish 
 horses ; with this saving clause, however : that the individual 
 who furnished a horse and arms with a good rider should be 
 exempt from service himself. By this means he engendered 
 an eagerness to discharge the obligation, not unlike that of the 
 condemned man, casting about to discover some one to die in 
 his place.i He further ordered some of the states themselves 
 to furnish contingents of mounted troopers, and this in the 
 conviction that from such training-centres he would presently 
 get a pick of cavaliers proud of their horsemanship. And thus 
 once more he won golden opinions by the skill with which he 
 provided himself with a body of cavalry in the plenitude of 
 strength and ripe for active service. 
 
 On the approach of early spring ^ he collected his whole 
 armament at Ephesus, and set himself to the work of training 
 it. With that object he proposed a series of prizes : one set 
 for the cavalry squadron which rode best, another for the heavy 
 infantry divisions which presented the best physique, another 
 again for various light troops, peltasts, and bowmen, which 
 showed themselves most efficient in their respective duties. 
 
 Thereupon it was a sight to see the gymnasiunis thronged 
 with warriors going through their exercises, the racecourses 
 crowded with troopers on prancing steeds, the archers and 
 the javelin men shooting at the butts. Nay, the whole city in 
 which he lay was transformed into a spectacle itself, so filled 
 to overflowing was the market-place with arms and armour of 
 every sort, and horses, all for sale. Here were coppersmiths 
 and carpenters, ironfounders and cobblers, painters and 
 decorators — one and all busily engaged in fabricating the 
 implements of war ; so that an onlooker might have thought 
 the city of Ephesus itself a gigantic arsenal. It would have 
 kindled courage in the breast of a coward to see the long 
 
 ^ Instead of the plain fip-ofij of the parallel passage (Hell. III. iv. 15) the 
 encomiast prefers the poetical yiiao-reiJoi. 
 
 '^ B.C. 395 ; see Hell III. iv. 16 (above, p. 29) ; Plut. Marcel. (Clough, 
 ii. 262) ; Polyb. xii. 20, 7. 
 
CH. .. § 27-31 HIS ADVANCE AGAINST THE PERSIAN 243 
 
 lines of soldiers, with Agesilaus at their head, all garlanded as 
 they marched in proud procession from the gymnasiums and 
 dedicated their wreaths to our Lady Artemis. Since, where 
 these three elements exist — reverence towards heaven, practice 
 in military affairs, and obedience to command — all else must 
 needs be full of happy promise. 
 
 But seeing that contempt for the foe is calculated to infuse 
 a certain strength in face of battle, he ordered his criers to 
 strip naked the barbarians captured by his foraging parties, 
 and so to sell them. The soldiers who saw the white skins of 
 these folk, unused to strip for toil, soft and sleek and lazy- 
 looking, as of people who could only stir abroad in carriages, 
 concluded that a war with women would scarcely be more for- 
 midable. Then he published a further order to the soldiers : 
 " I shall lead you at once by the shortest route to the strong- 
 hold 1 of the enemy's territory. Your general asks you to keep 
 yourselves on the alert in mind and body, as men about to 
 enter the lists of battle on the instant." 
 
 But Tissaphernes was persuaded that this was all talk on 
 his part for the purpose of outwitting him a second time : 
 now certainly Agesilaus would make an incursion into Caria. 
 So once again the satrap transported his infantry over into 
 that country just as he had done before, and as before he 
 posted his cavalry in the plain of the Maeander. 
 
 This time, however, Agesilaus was true to his word. In 
 accordance with his published order he advanced straight upon 
 the region of Sardis, and, during a three days' march through 
 a country where not an enemy was to be seen, provided his 
 army with abundant supplies. On the fourth day the enemy's 
 cavalry came up. The Persian general ordered the com- 
 mandant of his baggage train to cross the Pactolus and en- 
 camp, whilst his troopers, who had caught sight of the camp 
 followers of the Hellenes scattered in search of booty, put 
 many of them to the sword. Agesilaus, aware how matters were 
 going, ordered his cavalry to the rescue, and the Persians on 
 their side, seeing the enemy's supports approaching, collected 
 and formed up in line to receive them with the serried 
 squadrons of their cavalry. And now Agesilaus, conscious that 
 
 1 Or, "the richest parts of the country," viz. Lydia ; Plut. Ages. x. 
 
244 
 
 AGESILAUS <:«• '■ § 3--34 
 
 his enemy's infantry had not as yet arrived, whilst on his own 
 side no element in his preparation was lacking, felt that the 
 moment was come to join battle if he could. Accordingly 
 he sacrificed and advanced against the opposing lines of cavalry. 
 A detachment of heavy infantry, the ten -years -service men, 
 had orders to close with them at the run, while the light 
 infantry division were told to show them the way at a swinging 
 pace. At the same time he passed the order along the hne of 
 his cavalry to charge in reliance on the support of himself and 
 the main body in their rear. Charge they did, these troopers, 
 and the pick of Persian cavalry received them bravely, but in 
 face of the conjoint horror of the attack they swerved, and 
 some were cut down at once in the river-bed, while others 
 sought safety in flight. The Hellenes followed close on the 
 heels of the flying foe and captured his camp. Here the 
 peltasts, not unnaturally, fell to pillaging, whereupon Agesilaus 
 formed a cordon of troops, round the property of friends and 
 foes alike, and so encamped. 
 
 Presently hearing that the enemy were in a state of disorder, 
 the result of every one holding his fellow responsible for what 
 had happened, he advanced without further stay on Sardis. 
 Having arrived, he fell to burning and ravaging the suburbs, 
 while at the same time he did not fail to make it known by 
 proclamation that those who asked for freedom should join 
 his standard; or if there were any who claimed a right of 
 property in Asia he challenged them to come out and meet 
 her liberators in fair fight and let the sword decide between 
 them. Finding that no one ventured to come out to meet 
 him, his march became for the future a peaceful progress. All 
 around him he beheld Hellenes who formerly were forced to 
 bow the knee to brutal governors now honoured by their former 
 tyrants, while those who had claimed to enjoy divine honours 
 were so humbled by him that they scarce dared to look a 
 Hellene in the face. Ever5rwhere he saved the territory of his 
 friends from devastation, and reaped the fruit of the enemy's 
 soil to such good effect that within two years he was able to 
 dedicate as a tithe to the god at Delphi more than one hundred 
 talents.^ 
 
 * = £zS'°°° nearly. 
 
CH. .. § 35-38 HIS SUCCESSES AND RECALL 245 
 
 It was then that the Persian king, believing that Tissa- 
 phernes was to blame for the ill success of his affairs, sent 
 down Tithraustes and cut off the satrap's head. After this 
 the fortunes of the barbarians grew still more desperate, whilst 
 those of Agesilaus assumed a bolder front. On all sides 
 embassies from the surrounding nations came to make terms 
 of friendship, and numbers even came over to him, stretching 
 out eager arms to grasp at freedom. So that Agesilaus was 
 now no longer the chosen captain of the Hellenes only, but of 
 many Asiatics. 
 
 And here we may pause and consider what a weight of 
 admiration is due to one who, being now ruler over countless 
 cities of the continent, and islands also (since the state had 
 further entrusted her navy to his hands), just when he had 
 reached this pinnacle of renown and power, and might look 
 to turn to account his thronging fortunes; when, too, which 
 overtops all else, he was cherishing fond hopes to dissolve 
 that empire which in former days had dared to march on 
 Hellas ; — at such a moment suffered himself not to be 
 overmastered by these promptings, but on receipt of a sum- 
 mons of the home authorities to come to the assistance of 
 the fatherland, obeyed the mandate of his state as readily '^ 
 as though he had stood confronted face to face with the Five 
 in the hall of ephors ; and thus gave clear proof that he would 
 not accept the whole earth in exchange for the land of his 
 fathers, nor newly-acquired in place of ancient friends, nor 
 base gains ingloriously purchased rather than the perilous 
 pursuit of honour and uprightness.^ 
 
 And, indeed, glancing back at the whole period during 
 which he remained in the exercise of his authority, no act of 
 deeper significance in proof of his kingly qualities need be 
 named than this. He found the cities which he was sent out 
 to govern each and all a prey to factions, the result of con- 
 stitutional disturbances consequent on the cessation of the 
 Athenian empire, and without resort to exile or sanguinary 
 measures he so disposed them by his healing presence that 
 civil concord and material prosperity were permanently main- 
 tained. Therefore it was that the Hellenes in Asia deplored 
 
 1 Cf. Hor. Od. III. V. 50. 2 See Pindar, Ofym^. vi. 14. 
 
246 AGESILAUS {ch.u.I'i'j 
 
 his departure ^ as though they had lost, not simply a ruler, but 
 a father or bosom friend, and in the end they showed that 
 their friendship was of no fictitious character. At any rate, 
 they voluntarily helped him to succour Lacedaemon, though 
 it involved, as they knew, the need of doing battle with com- 
 batants of equal prowess with themselves. So the tale of his 
 achievements in Asia has an end. 
 
 He crossed the Hellespont and made his way through the 
 very tribes traversed by the Persian^ with his multitudinous 
 equipment in former days, and the march which cost the 
 barbarian a year was accomplished by Agesilaus in less than 
 a single month. He did not want to arrive a day too late to 
 serve his fatherland. And so passing through Macedonia he 
 arrived in Thessaly, and here the men of Larissa, Crannon, 
 Scotussa, and Pharsalus, who were allies of the Boeotians, 
 and indeed all the Thessalians, with the exception of those 
 who were in exile at the time, combined to dog his steps and 
 do him damage. For a while he led his troops in a hollow 
 square, posting one half of his cavalry in the van and the other 
 half on his rear, but finding his march hindered by frequent 
 attacks of the Thessalians on his hindmost divisions, he sent 
 round the mass of his cavalry from the vanguard to support 
 his rear, reserving only his personal escort.^ And now in 
 battle order the rival squadrons faced each other ; when the 
 Thessalians, not liking a cavalry engagement in face of 
 heavy infantry, wheeled and step by step retreated ; their 
 opponents with much demureness following. Then Agesilaus, 
 detecting the common error under which both parties laboured, 
 sent round his own bodyguard of stalwart troopers with orders 
 to their predecessors (an order they would act upon themselves) 
 to charge the enemy at full gallop and not give him a chance 
 to rally. The Thessalians, in face of this unexpected charge, 
 either could not so much as rally, or in the attempt to do so 
 were caught with their horses' flanks exposed to the enemy's 
 
 ' See Plut. Ages. xv. ' / g "Xerxes." 
 
 ' /.e. "the Three hundred." See Thuc. v. 72 ; Pol. Lac. xiii. 6. 
 
CH. ■■. ; 4-8 HIS HOMEWARD MARCH 247 
 
 attack. Polycharmus, the Pharsalian, a commandant of cavalry, 
 did indeed succeed in wheeling, but was cut down with those 
 about him sword in hand. This was the signal for a flight so 
 extraordinary that dead and dying lined the road, and the 
 living were captured wholesale, nor was- a halt made until the 
 pursuers reached Mount Narthacius. Here, midway between 
 Pras and Narthacius, Agesilaus erected a trophy, and here for 
 the moment he halted in unfeigned satisfaction at his exploit, 
 since it was from an antagonist boasting the finest cavalry in 
 the world that he had wrested victory with a body of cavalry 
 organised by himself. 
 
 Next day, crossing the mountain barrier of Achaea 
 Phthiotis, his march lay through friendly territory for the rest 
 of the way as far as the frontiers of Boeotia. Here he found 
 the confederates drawn up in battle line. They consisted of 
 the Thebans, the Athenians, the Argives, the Corinthians, the 
 Aenianians, the Euboeans, and both divisions of the Locrians.^ 
 He did not hesitate, but openly before their eyes drew out his 
 lines to give them battle. He had with him a division ^ and 
 a half of Lacedaemonians, and from the seat of war itself the 
 allied troops of the Phocians and the men of Orchomenus 
 only, besides the armament which he had brought with him 
 from Asia. 
 
 I am not going to maintain that he ventured on the 
 engagement in spite of having far fewer and inferior forces. 
 Such an assertion would only reveal the senselessness of the 
 general^ and the folly of the writer who should select as 
 praiseworthy the reckless imperilling of mighty interests. On 
 the contrary, what I admire is the fact that he had taken care 
 to provide himself with an army not inferior to that of his 
 enemy, and had so equipped them that his cohorts literally 
 gleamed with purple and bronze.* He had taken pains to 
 enable his soldiers to undergo the fatigue of war, he had filled 
 their breasts with a proud consciousness that they were equal 
 to do battle with any combatants in the world, and what was 
 more, he had infused a wholesome rivalry in those about him 
 to prove themselves each better than the rest. He had filled 
 
 1 See Hell. IV. ii. 7. ^ Lit. "mora." 
 
 ' Lit. "Agesilaus." * See Cyrop, VI. iv. 1. 
 
248 AGESILAUS ="• "• S s-n 
 
 all hearts with sanguine expectation of great blessings to 
 descend on all, if they proved themselves good men. Such 
 incentives, he thought, were best calculated to arouse en- 
 thusiasm in men's souls to engage in battle with the enemy. 
 And in this expectation he was not deceived. 
 
 I proceed to describe the battle, for in certain distinctive 
 features it differed from all the battles of our day. The con- 
 tending forces met on the plain of Coronea, Agesilaus and 
 his troops approaching from the Cephisus, the Thebans and 
 their allies from the slopes of Helicon. These masses of 
 infantry, as any eye might see, were of duly balanced strength, 
 while as near as could be the cavalry on either side was 
 numerically the same. Agesilaus held the right of his own 
 army, and on his extreme left lay the men of Orchomenus. 
 On the opposite side the Thebans themselves formed their 
 own right and the Argives held their left. While the two 
 armies approached a deep silence prevailed on either side, 
 but when they were now a single furlong's ^ space apart the 
 Thebans quickened to a run, and, with a loud hurrah, dashed 
 forward to close quarters. And now there was barely a 
 hundred yards ^ between them, when Herippidas, with his 
 foreign brigade, rushed forward from the Spartan's battle lines 
 to meet them. This brigade consisted partly of troops which 
 had served with Agesilaus ever since he left home, with a 
 portion of the Cyreians, besides lonians, Aeolians, and their 
 neighbours on the Hellespont. All these took part in the 
 forward rush of the attack just mentioned, and coming within 
 spear-thrust they routed that portion of the enemy in front of 
 them. The Argives did not even wait for Agesilaus and his 
 division, but fled towards Helicon, and at that moment some of 
 his foreign friends were on the point of crowning Agesilaus with 
 the wreath of victory, when some one brought him word that 
 the Thebans had cut through the division from Orchomenus 
 and were busy with the baggage- train. Accordingly he at 
 once deployed his division and advanced by counter- march 
 against them. The Thebans on their side, seeing that their 
 allies had scattered on Helicon, and eager to make their way 
 back to join their friends, began advancing sturdily. 
 
 1 Lit. "astade." " Lit. " three plethra. " 
 
CH. II. S 12-15 ON THE FIELD OF CORONEA 249 
 
 To assert that Agesilaus at this crisis displayed real valour 
 is to assert a thing indisputable, but for all that the course he 
 adopted was not the safest. It was open to him to let the 
 enemy pass in their effort to rejoin their friends, and that done 
 to have hung upon their heels and overmastered their rear ranks, 
 but he did nothing of the sort : what he did was, to crash 
 front to front against the Thebans. And so with shields inter- 
 locked they shoved and fought and fought and shoved, dealing 
 death and yielding life. There was no shouting, nor yet was 
 there even silence, but a strange and smothered utterance, 
 such as rage and battle vent.^ At last a portion of the 
 Thebans forced their way through towards Helicon, but many 
 were slain in that departure. 
 
 Victory remained with Agesilaus. Wounded himself, they 
 bore him back to his own lines, when some of his troopers 
 came galloping up to tell him that eighty of the enemy had 
 taken refuge with their arms^ under cover of the Temple,* 
 and they asked what they ought to do. He, albeit he had 
 received wounds all over him, having been the mark of divers 
 weapons, did not even so forget his duty to God, and gave 
 orders to let them go whithersoever they chose, nor suffered 
 them to be ill-treated, but ordered his bodyguard of cavalry to 
 escort them out of reach of danger. 
 
 And now that the battle had ceased, it was a sight to see 
 where the encounter took place, the earth bedabbled with 
 gore, the dead lying cheek by jowl, friend and foe together, 
 and the great shields hacked and broken to pieces, and the 
 spears snapped asunder, the daggers lying bare of sheaths, 
 some on the ground, some buried in the bodies, some still 
 clutched in the dead men's hands. For the moment then, 
 seeing that it was already late in the day, they dragged 
 together the corpses of their slain apart from those of the 
 enemy * and laid them within the lines, and took their evening 
 meal and slept; but early next morning Agesilaus ordered 
 Gylis, the polemarch, to marshal the troops in battle order and 
 
 ' Or, " as the rage and fury of battle may give vent to. " See Cyrop. VII. 
 i. 38-40. A graphic touch omitted in Hell. IV. iii. 19. 
 
 2 I.e. ' ' they had kept their arms. " 
 
 3 See Plut. A^es. xix. ; Paus. ix. 34. 
 
 ■• Reading, 7-oi>s (k t&v TroKe/ituv vixpovs, after Weislce. 
 
250 AGESILAUS ch. n. § rs-zo 
 
 to set up a trophy, while each man donned a wreath in honour 
 of the god, and the pipers piped. So they busied themselves, 
 but the Thebans sent a herald asking leave to bury their dead 
 under cover of a truce. And so it came to pass that a truce 
 was made, and Agesilaus departed homewards, having chosen, 
 in lieu of supreme greatness in Asia, to rule, and to be ruled, 
 in obedience to the laws at home. 
 
 It was after this ^ that his attention was drawn to the men 
 of Argos. They had appropriated Corinth, and were reaping 
 the fruits of their fields at home. The war to them was a 
 merry jest. Accordingly he marched against them ; and having 
 ravaged their territory throughout, he crossed over by the pass ^ 
 down upon Corinth and captured the long walls leading to 
 Lechaeum. And so having thrown open the gates of Pelo- 
 ponnese he returned home in time for the Hyacinthia,* where, 
 in the post assigned him by the master of the chorus, he 
 shared in the performance of the paean in honour of the god. 
 
 Later on, it being brought to his notice that the Corinth- 
 ians were keeping all their cattle safely housed in the Peiraeum, 
 sowing the whole of that district, and gathering in their crops ; 
 and, which was a matter of the greatest moment, that the 
 Boeotians, with Creusis as their base of operations, could 
 pour their succours into Corinth by this route, — he marched 
 against Peiraeum. Finding it strongly guarded, he made as if 
 the city of Corinth were about to capitulate, and immediately 
 after the morning meal shifted his ground and encamped 
 against the capital. Under cover of night there was a rush 
 from Peiraeum to protect the city, which he was well aware 
 of, and with break of day he turned right about and took 
 Peiraeum, defenceless as it lay, capturing all that it contained, 
 with the various fortresses within ; and having so done retired 
 homewards. 
 
 After these exploits* the Achaeans were urgent for an 
 alliance, and begged him to join them in an expedition against 
 Acarnania. In the course of this the Acarnanians attacked 
 
 1 B.C. 393. 
 
 ^ Kard, ri, arevi,. See Hell, IV. iv. 19. Kwrh leviav, according to 
 Koppen's emendation. 
 
 ^ See Grote, H. G. v. 208 ; Herod, ix. 7 ; Hell. IV. v. lo (above, p. 63). 
 
 * B.C. 390-389? 
 
CH. II. §20-23 HIS FURTHER EXPLOITS 251 
 
 him in a deiile. Storming the heights above his head with his 
 hght troops,^ he gave them battle, and slew many of them, and 
 set up a trophy, nor stayed his hand until he had united the 
 Acarnanians, the Aetolians, and the Argives,^ in friendship 
 with the Achaeans and alliance with himself. 
 
 When the enemy, being desirous of peace, sent an embassy, 
 it was Agesilaus who spoke against the peace,^ until he had 
 forced the states of Corinth and of Thebes to welcome back 
 those of them who, for Lacedaemon's sake, had suffered 
 banishment. 
 
 And still later,* again, he restored the exiles of the 
 Phliasians, who had suffered in the same cause, and with that 
 object marched in person against Phlius, a proceeding which, 
 however hable to censure on other grounds, showed unmis- 
 takable attachment to his party.* 
 
 Thus, when the adverse faction had put to death those of 
 the Lacedaemonians then in Thebes, he brought succour to 
 his friends, and marched upon Thebes.^ Finding the entire 
 country fenced with ditch and paUsading, he crossed Cynos- 
 cephalae ^ and ravaged the district right up to the city itself, 
 giving the Thebans an opportunity of engaging him in the 
 plain or upon the hills, as they preferred. And once more, in 
 the ensuing year,^ he marched against Thebes, and now sur- 
 mounting these paUsades and entrenchments at Scolus,* he 
 ravaged the remainder of Boeotia. 
 
 Hitherto fortune had smiled in common upon the king 
 himself and upon his city. And as for the disasters which 
 presently befell, no one can maintain that they were brought 
 about under the leadership of Agesilaus. But the day came 
 when, after the disaster which had occurred at Leuctra, the 
 rival powers in conjunction with the Mantinaeans fell to 
 massacring his friends and adherents i" in Tegea (the con- 
 
 1 See Hell. IV. vi. 9-11, where it is expressly stated that the action was 
 won by the Spartan hoplites. See Hartman, An. Xen. (cap. xi. De Agesilao 
 libello), p. 263, for other discrepancies between the historian and the en- 
 comiast. ^ See perhaps Hell. IV. iv. 19 ; vii. 2 foil. 
 
 3 I.e. "o/"Antalcidas, B.C. 387." See Hell. V. i. 36; Grote, H. G. ix. 
 537 note. * B.C. 383 and 380 ; see Hell. V. ii. 10 ; iii. 10. 
 
 6 See Hell. V. iii. 16. ° B.C. 378. 
 
 ' See Hell. V. iv. 34 foil. ; for the site see Breitenbach, ad loc. 
 
 8 B.C. 377. ° See Hell. V. iv. 47. i" Or intimates. 
 
252 AGESILAUS <:«• "• S "3-^6 
 
 federacy between all the states of Boeotia, the Arcadians, and 
 the Eleians being already an accomplished fact). Thereupon, 
 with the forces of Lacedaemon alone,^ he took the field, and 
 thus belied the current opinion that it would be a long while 
 before the Lacedaemonians ventured to leave their own 
 territory again. Having ravaged the country of those who 
 had done his friends to death, he was content, and returned 
 home. 
 
 After this Lacedaemon was invaded by the united Arca- 
 dians, Argives, Eleians, and Boeotians, who were assisted by 
 the Phocians, both sections of the Locrians, the Thessalians, 
 Aenianians, Acamanians, and Euboeans ; moreover, the slaves 
 had revolted and several of the provincial cities ; ^ while of the 
 Spartans themselves as many had fallen on the field of Leuctra 
 as survived. But in spite of all, he safely guarded the city, 
 and that too a city without walls and bulwarks. Forbearing 
 to engage in the open field, where the gain would lie wholly 
 with the enemy, he lay stoutly embattled on ground where the 
 citizens must reap advantage; since, as he doggedly per- 
 sisted, to march out meant to be surrounded on every side ; 
 whereas to stand at bay where every defile gave a coign of 
 vantage, would give him mastery complete.* 
 
 After the invading army had retired, no one will gainsay 
 the sound sense of his behaviour. Old age debarred him 
 from active service on foot or horse, and what the city chiefly 
 needed now, he saw, was money, if she looked to gain allies. 
 To the task therefore of providing that he set himself. Every- 
 thing that could be done by stopping at home he deftly turned 
 his hand to ; or when the call arose and he could better help 
 his country by departure he had no false pride ; he set off on 
 foreign service, not as general, but as ambassador. Yet on 
 such embassy he achieved acts worthy of the greatest general. 
 
 ^ B.C. 370. See ffell. VI. v. 21, p. 173. 
 
 '■' Lit. "perioecid"; see Plut. Ages, xxxii. (Clough, iv. 39); //ell. VI. 
 V. 32. 
 
 ^ Is this parallel to I/ell. VII. v. 10, or //ell. VI. v. 28 ? According to 
 the historian, Agesilaus adopted similar tactics on both occasions (in B.C. 369 
 and B.C. 362 alilce). The encomiast after his manner appears to treat them 
 as one. Once and again his hero cunctando resHtuit rem, but it was by the 
 same strategy. 
 
CH. II. § 26-30 THE SAVIOUR OF SPARTA 253 
 
 Autophradates 1 was besieging Ariobarzanes,^ who was an 
 ally of Sparta, in Assos ; but before the face of Agesilaus he 
 fled in terror and was gone. Cotys,^ besieging Sestos, which 
 still adhered to Ariobarzanes, broke up the siege and departed 
 crestfallen. Well might the ambassador have set up a trophy 
 in commemoration of two bloodless victories. Once more, 
 Mausolus * was besieging both the above-named places with a 
 squadron of one hundred sail. He too, like, and yet unlike, 
 the former two, yielded not to terror but to persuasion, and 
 withdrew his fleet. These, then, were surely admirable achieve- 
 ments, since those who looked upon him as a benefactor and 
 those who fled from before him both alike made him the richer 
 by their gifts. 
 
 Tachos,^ indeed, and Mausolus gave him a magnificent 
 escort ; and, for the sake of his former friendship with 
 Agesilaus, the latter contributed also money for the state of 
 Lacedaemon ; and so they sped him home. 
 
 And now the weight of, may be, fourscore years was laid 
 upon him,® when it came under his observation that the king 
 of Egjrpt,'' with his hosts of foot and horse and stores of 
 wealth, had set his heart upon a war with Persia. Jo37fully he 
 learned that he himself was summoned by King Tachos, and 
 that the command-in-chief of all the forces was promised to 
 him. By this one venture he would achieve three objects, 
 which were to requite the Egj^tian for the benefits conferred 
 on Lacedaemon; to liberate the Hellenes in Asia once 
 again ; and to inflict on the Persian a just recompense, 
 not only for the old offences, but for this which was of 
 to-day; seeing that, while boasting alliance with Sparta, 
 he had dictatorially enjoined the emancipation of Messene.* 
 But when the man who had summoned him refused to 
 confer the proffered generalship, Agesilaus, like one on 
 whom a flagrant deception has been practised, began to 
 
 ' Satrap of Lydia. ^ Satrap of Propontis or HeUespontine Phrygia. 
 
 See Grote, H. G. x. 404, 408. 
 
 ' Satrap of Paphlagonia, king of Thrace. Iphicrates married his 
 daughter. See Grote, ff. C. x. 410. 
 
 * Satrap of Caria. " King of Egypt._ 
 
 " Or, ' ' But to pass on, he was akeady, may be, eighty years of age, when 
 it came under his observation. . . ." 
 
 7 This same Tachos. ^ See Hell. VII. i. 36 ; iv. 9. 
 
254 AGESILAUS {""iHl'mT.-^ 
 
 consider the part he had to play. Meanwhile a separate 
 division ^ of the Egyptian armies held aloof from their king. 
 Then, the disaffection spreading, all the rest of his troops 
 deserted him ; whereat the monarch took flight and retired in 
 exile to Sidon in Phoenicia, leaving the Egyptians, split in 
 faction, to choose to themselves a pair of kings.^. Thereupon 
 Agesilaus took his decision. If he helped neither, it meant 
 that neither would pay the service-money due to his Hellenes, 
 that neither would provide a market, and that, whichever of the 
 two conquered in the end, Sparta would be equally detested. 
 But if he threw in his lot with one of them, that one would 
 in all likelihood in return for the kindness prove a friend. 
 Accordingly he chose between the two that one who seemed 
 to be the truer partisan of Hellas, and with him marched 
 against the enemy of Hellas and conquered him in a battle, 
 crushing him. His rival he helped to establish on the throne, 
 and having made him a friend to Lacedaemon, and having 
 acquired vast sums besides, he turned and set sail homewards, 
 even in mid -winter, hastening so that Sparta might not lie 
 inactive, but against the coming summer be on the alert to 
 confront the foe. 
 
 Ill 
 
 Such, then, is the chronicle of this man's achievements, or 
 of such of them as were wrought in the presence of a thousand 
 witnesses. Being of this sort they have no need of further 
 testimony ; the mere recital of them is sufificient, and they at 
 once win credence. But now I will endeavour to reveal the 
 excellence indwelling in his soul, the motive power of his acts, 
 in virtue of which he clung to all things honourable and thrust 
 aside all baseness. 
 
 Agesilaus showed such reverence for things divine that 
 even his enemies regarded his oaths and solemn treaties as 
 more to be relied on than the tie of friendship amongst them- 
 selves. These same men, who would shrink from too close 
 intercourse with one another, delivered themselves into the 
 
 ' I.e. "the army under Nectanebos." See Diod. xv. 92; Plut. Ages. 
 xxxvii. (Clough, iv. 44 foil. ). 
 
 ''■ I.e. " Nectanebos and a certain Mendesian." 
 
cSilv.'lr^'} HIS PIETY AND JUSTICE 255 
 
 hands of Agesilaus without fear. And lest the assertion should 
 excite discredit, I may name some illustrious examples. Such 
 was Spithridates the Persian, who knew that Pharnabazus,^ 
 whilst negotiating to marry the daughter of the great king, was 
 minded to seize his own daughter unwedded. Resenting such 
 brutality, Spithridates delivered up himself, his wife, his children, 
 and his whole power, into the hands of Agesilaus. Cotys ^ also, 
 the ruler of Paphlagonia, had refused to obey a summons from 
 the king, although he sent him the warrant of his right hand ; ^ 
 then fear came upon him lest he should be seized, and either 
 be heavily fined or die the death ; yet he too, simply trusting 
 to an armistice, came to the camp of Agesilaus and made 
 alliance, and of his own accord chose to take the field with 
 Agesilaus, bringing a thousand horsemen and two thousand 
 targeteers. Lastly, Pharnabazus* himself came and held 
 colloquy with Agesilaus, and openly agreed that if he were 
 not himself appointed general-in-chief of the royal forces he 
 would revolt from the king. " Whereas, if I do become general," 
 he added, " I mean to make war upon you, Agesilaus, might 
 and main," thus revealing his confidence that, say what he 
 might, nothing would befall him contrary to the terms of truce. 
 Of so intrinsic a value to all, and not least to a general in the 
 field, is the proud possession of an honest and God-fearing 
 character, known and recognised. Thus far, as touching the 
 quality of piety. 
 
 IV 
 
 To speak next of his justice ^ in afifairs of money. As to 
 this, what testimony can be more conclusive than the following ? 
 During the whole of his career no charge of fraudulent dealing 
 was ever lodged against Agesilaus ; against which set the many- 
 voiced acknowledgment of countless benefits received from 
 him. A man who found pleasure in giving away his own 
 for the benefit of others was not the man to rob another 
 of his goods at the price of infamy. Had he suffered from 
 
 1 See Hell. III. iv. lo (above, p. 26) ; Plut. Ages. xi. (Clough, iv. 9). 
 i" See Hell. IV. i. 3 (above, p. 40) ; Plut. Ages. xi. (Clough, iv. 13). 
 3 Died. xvi. 34. * See Hell. IV. i. 37 (above, p. 45). 
 
 6 See MuUer and Donaldson, Hist. Gk. Lit. ii. 196, note 2. 
 
256 AGESILAUS ch. iv. § i-6 
 
 this thirst for riches it would have been easier to ding to what 
 belonged to him than to take that to which he had no just 
 title. This man, who was so careful to repay debts of gratitude, 
 where ^ the law knows no remedy against defaulters, was not 
 likely to commit acts of robbery which the law regards as 
 criminal. And as a matter of fact Agesilaus judged it not 
 only wrong to forgo repayment of a deed of kindness, but, 
 where the means were ample, wrong also not to repay such 
 debts with ample interest. 
 
 The charge of embezzlement, could it be alleged, would 
 no less outrage all reason in the case of one who made over 
 to his country the benefit in full of grateful offerings owed 
 solely to himself Indeed the very fact that, when he wished 
 to help the city or his friends with money, he might have done 
 so by the aid of others, goes a long way to prove his indifference 
 to the lure of riches ; since, had he been in the habit of selling 
 his favour, or of playing the part of benefactor for pay, there 
 had been no room for a sense of indebtedness.^ It is only the 
 recipient of gratuitous kindness who is ever ready to minister 
 to his benefactor, both in return for the kindness itself and 
 for the confidence implied in his selection as the fitting 
 guardian of a good deed on deposit.' 
 
 Again, who more likely to put a gulf impassable be- 
 tween himself and sordid love of gain* than he, who 
 nobly preferred to be stinted of his dues^ rather than 
 snatch at the lion's share unjustly ? It is a case in point that, 
 being pronounced by the state to be the rightful heir to his 
 brother's^ wealth, he made over one half to his maternal 
 relatives because he saw that they were in need ; and to the 
 truth of this assertion all Lacedaemon is witness. What, too, 
 was his answer to Tithraustes when the satrap offered him 
 countless gifts if he would but quit the country ? " Tithraustes, 
 
 ^ Or, "a state of indebtedness beyond the reach of a tribunal." See 
 Cyrop. I. ii. 7. 
 
 ' Or, " no one would have felt to owe him anjrtbing." 
 
 ' See Cyrop. VI. i. 35 ; Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. 312. 
 
 * Or, "base covetousness." 
 
 •^ Or reading, aim a<rrif rif yevvalif (with Breitenbach), " in obedience to 
 pure generosity." See Cyrop. VIII. iii. 38. 
 
 ^ I.e. Agis. See Plut. Ages. iv. 
 
cS; ":%!%} HIS SELF-CONTROL 257 
 
 with us it is deemed nobler for a ruler to enrich his army 
 
 than himself ; it is expected of him to wrest spoils from the 
 enemy rather than take gifts." 
 
 Or again, reviewing the divers pleasures which master 
 human beings, I defy. any one to name a single one to which 
 Agesilaus was enslaved : Agesilaus, who regarded drunkenness 
 as a thing to hold aloof from like madness, and immoderate 
 eating like the snare of indolence. Even the double por- 
 tion ^ allotted to him at the banquet was not spent on his own 
 appetite ; rather would he make distribution of the whole, re- 
 taining neither portion for himself. In his view of the matter 
 this doubling of the king's share was not for the sake of sur- 
 feiting, but that the king might have wherewithal to honour 
 whom he wished. And so, too, sleep ^ he treated not as a 
 master, but as a slave, subservient to higher concerns. The 
 very couch he lay upon must be sorrier than that of any 
 of his company or he would have blushed for shame, since 
 in his opinion it was the duty of a leader to excel all ordinary 
 mortals in hardihood, not in effeminacy. Yet there were things 
 in which he was not ashamed to take the lion's share, as, for 
 example, the sun's heat in summer, or winter's cold. Did 
 occasion ever demand of his army moil and toU, he laboured 
 beyond all others as a thing of course, believing that such 
 ensamples are a consolation to the rank and file. Or, to put 
 the matter compendiously, Agesilaus exulted in hard work : 
 indolence he utterly repudiated. 
 
 And, as touching the things of Aphrodite, if for nothing 
 else, at any rate for the marvel of it, the self-restraint of the 
 man deserves to be put on record. It is easy to say that to 
 abstain from that which excites no desire is but human ; yet 
 in the case of Megabates, the son of Spithridates, he was 
 moved by as genuine a love as any passionate soul may feel 
 for what is lovely. Now, it being a national custom among 
 
 ' See Fol. Lac. xv. 4. See J. J. Hartman, An. Xen. 257. 
 ' See Horn. //. ii. 24, oi xp^ vavvixiov eSSeiv Povkt)(j)bpov ILvSpa, "to 
 sleep all night through beseemeth not one that is a counsellor." — W. Leaf. 
 
 VOL. II S 
 
2s8 AGESILAOS =«■ v- 8 4-7 
 
 the Persians to salute those whom they honour with a kiss, 
 Megabates endeavoured so to salute Agesilaus, but the latter, 
 with much show of battle, resisted — " No kiss might he accept."^ 
 I ask whether such an incident does not reveal on the face of 
 it the self-respect of the man, and that of no vulgar order.^ 
 Megabates, who looked upon himself as in some sense dis- 
 honoured, for the future endeavoured not to offend in like 
 sort again.* Whereupon Agesilaus appealed to one who was 
 his comrade to persuade Megabates again to honour him with 
 his regard ; and the comrade, so appealed to, demanding, " If 
 I persuade him, will you bestow on him a kiss?" Agesilaus 
 fell into a silence, but presently exclaimed : " No, by the Twins, 
 not if I might this very instant become the swiftest -footed, 
 strongest, and handsomest of men.* And as to that battle I 
 swear by all the gods I would far rather fight it over again than 
 that everything on which I set my eyes might turn to gold." ^ 
 What construction some will put upon the story I am 
 well aware, but for myself I am persuaded that many more 
 people can master their enemies than the foes we speak of ^ 
 Doubtless such incidents when known to but few may well be 
 discredited by many, but here we are in the region of estab- 
 lished facts, seeing that the more illustrious a man is the less 
 can his every 'act escape notice. As to Agesilaus no eye- 
 witness has ever reported any unworthy behaviour, nor, had he 
 invented it, would his tale have found credence, since it was 
 not the habit of the king, when abroad, to lodge apart in 
 private houses. He always lay in some sacred place, where 
 behaviour of the sort was out of question, or else in public, 
 with the eyes of all men liable to be called as witnesses to his 
 sobriety. For myself, if I make these statements falsely against 
 the knowledge of Hellas, this were not in any sense to praise 
 my hero, but to dispraise myself 
 
 1 See Plut. Ages. (Clough, iv. p. 13 foil.). 
 
 ^ Reading, koX "hiav yevviKbv ; or, " a refinement of self-respect, " " a self- 
 respect perhaps even over-sensitive." 
 
 5 Lit. " made no further attempt to offer kisses." 
 
 « See Plut. Ages. ii. (Clough, iv. p. 2) : "He is said to have been a little 
 man of a contemptible presence." 
 
 ° See Plut. Ages. xi. (Clough, iv. p. 14) ; Parall. Min. v ; Ovid. Met. xi. 
 102 foil. ^ Or, "than the seductions in question." 
 
CH. VI. § j-4 HIS COURAGE AND WISDOM 259 
 
 VI 
 
 Nor, in my opinion, were those obscure proofs of courage 
 and true manliness which he furnished by his readiness ever 
 to wage war against the strongest enemies, whether of Sparta 
 or of Hellas, placing himself in the forefront of the contests 
 decided on. If the enemy cared to join issue in fair field 
 he would not chance upon a victory won by panic, but in 
 stubborn battle, blow for blow, he mastered him ; and set up 
 trophies worthy the name, seeing that he left behind him 
 imperishable monuments of prowess, and bore away on his 
 own body indelible marks of the fury with which he fought ; ^ 
 so that, apart from hearsay, by the evidence of men's eyes his 
 valour stood approved. 
 
 And amongst these we must not deem them trophies alone 
 which he actually set up, but reckon the many campaigns which 
 he undertook, since they were victories truly, even when the 
 enemy refused to encounter him, victories devoid of danger, 
 yet fraught with even more solid advantage to the state of 
 Sparta and her fellow-combatants ; just as in our games we 
 crown as victor him who walks over the field ^ no less than 
 him who conquers by dint of battle.' 
 
 And to speak next of his wisdom,^ I suppose there is not 
 one of all his doings but must illustrate it ; — this man whose 
 bearing towards his fatherland was such that by dint of im- 
 plicit obedience [he grew to so great a height of power],* 
 whose zeal in the service of his comrades won for him the 
 unhesitating attachment of his friends, who infused into the 
 hearts of his soldiers a spirit, not of discipline only, but of 
 self-devotion to their chief. And yet surely that is the 
 
 ^ Or, "visible signs of the spirit," etc. See Plut. Ages, xxxvi. 
 
 ^ Or, "without striking a blow." Lit. "without the dust of the arena, 
 sine pulvere." See Thuc. iv. 73, &kovitI. 
 
 ° Or, "his sagacity. "• 
 
 ^ The words irXetffTOP fcrxwe are supplied from Plutarch (Ages. iv. ), who 
 quotes the passage, ' ' What Xenophon teUs us of him, that by complying with, 
 and, as it were, being ruled by his country, he grew into such great power with 
 them, that he could do what he pleased, is meant," etc. (Clough, iv. p. 4). 
 The lacuna in the MS. was first noted, I believe, by Weiske. See Brei- 
 tenbach's note ad loc. 
 
26o AGESILAUS { ''"ch"™.''!^ 
 
 Strongest of all battle - lines ^ in which obedience creates 
 tactical efficiency, and alacrity in the field springs out of loyal 
 affection for the general. 
 
 Enemies he had to cope with, who had little excuse to 
 disparage, however much they might be compelled to hate 
 their opponent, seeing that he was for ever contriving to 
 give his allies some advantage over them, — by sheer decep- 
 tion, if occasion offered ; now anticipating them if speed were 
 requisite ; now skulking in corners if concealment served ; in 
 all points observing one rule of behaviour to his friends and 
 another towards his foes. By turning night into day and day 
 into night^ he drew so close a veil of mystery over his movements 
 that frequently there was no saying where he was, or whither he 
 would go, or what he might do next. The fastnesses of the 
 enemy he transformed into so many weaknesses,^ passing this 
 one by, and scaling that, and stealing like a thief into a third. 
 
 When he was on the march, and was well aware that an 
 enemy might, if he chose, deliver battle, his habit was to lead 
 his troops in compact order ready to confront emergencies, 
 with soft, slow step, advancing, as it were, with maidenly 
 demureness,* for in such procedure, as he believed, lay the 
 secret of true calm, engendering a dauntless self-assurance, 
 imperturbable, unerring, impervious to treacherous assault. 
 Therefore by such behaviour he was a terror to the enemy, 
 whilst he infused courage and strength in the hearts of his 
 friends, so that throughout his life he continued to be a 
 man whom his foes dared not despise, whom his fellow-citizens 
 cared not to arraign, within the circle of his friends held 
 blameless, the idol and the admiration of the outer world.^ 
 
 VII 
 
 To describe his patriotism ® point by point in detail were a 
 tedious story, since, as I suppose, there is not one of his 
 
 ' See Cyrop. VII. i. 30 ; Econ. xxi. 7. 
 
 ^ See Hell. VI. i. 15 (above, p. 142) ; Pol Lac. v. 7 ; Cyrop. I. v. 12. 
 ^ Or, " the strongholds of the enemy might to all intents and purposes 
 have been open places. " < See above, ii. 3 ; Pol. Lac. iii. 5. 
 
 ' Cf. Tacitus's phrase concerning Titus, " deliciae humani generis." 
 * Lit. "love for his own city." 
 
CH. VII. §1-4 HIS PATRIOTISM 261 
 
 several achievements but must finally resolve itself into that. 
 For, to put it briefly, we all know well that where Agesilaus 
 expected in any way to benefit his country there was no toil 
 he shrank from, no danger he avoided, no money he stinted, 
 no excuse whether of age or body he admitted, but deemed it 
 ever the true function of a good king ^ to shower blessings to 
 the utmost on the subjects of his rule. 
 
 And for my part I hold it as chief among the magnificent 
 benefits so conferred by him upon his country that, being the 
 most powerful member of the state, he made no secret of his 
 absolute submission to the laws,^ since what lesser man, see- 
 ing the king's obedience, would take ^ on himself to disobey ? 
 Who, in discontentment at his own poor lot, would venture 
 on revolution, knowing that the king himself could condescend 
 to constitutional control? And that, too, a king who bore 
 himself towards political opponents with a paternal mildness.* 
 If he rebuked them sharply for their misdemeanours, he none 
 the less honoured their high endeavours, and proved himself a 
 present help to them in time of trouble.^ No citizen could 
 be his personal foe ; of that he was assured. His desire was 
 to commend them one and all alike, counting the common 
 salvation of all a gain, and reckoning it as a loss if even a 
 mean man perished. For thus he reasoned, nor made a secret 
 of the conclusion he had come to : so long as her citizens con- 
 tinued tranquilly adherent to the laws the happiness of Sparta 
 was secure.® And for the rest Sparta would once again be 
 strong on that day when the states of Hellas should learn 
 wisdom. 
 
 And if, by admission, it is noble for every Hellene to be 
 a lover of his fellow- Hellenes, yet we must fare far afield 
 
 ^ Or, "regarded it as the cardinal virtue of a real prince." See Mem. 
 III. ii. 3. 
 
 2 Or, "he was at the same time the most obvious in his allegiance to the 
 laws." 
 
 ' Lit. "would have talcen on himself . . . would have ventured on 
 revolution." 
 
 * Lit. "as a father to his children." 
 
 ° Or, ' ' and was ready to stand by their side in time of trouble. " 
 
 " Or, ' ' For this was the clear tenor of his thought, that by tranquil con- 
 tinuance within the laws the citizens of Sparta might secure her happiness. 
 And as to power, Sparta, etc." See Afem. II. vi. 27. 
 
262 AGESILAUS ch. vii. § 4-7 
 
 to find another instance of a general who, expecting to sack 
 some city, would have refused to seize the prize; or who 
 regarded victory in a war waged against fellow -Hellenes as 
 a species of calamity. Yet this man when a message was 
 brought him concerning the battle at Corinth,^ in which but 
 eight Lacedaemonians had fallen, but of their opponents ten 
 thousand nearly, showed no sign of exultation, but sighed, say- 
 ing, " Alas for Hellas ! since those who now lie in their graves 
 were able, had they lived, to conquer in battle the hosts of 
 Asia." ^ Again, when some Corinthian exiles informed him 
 that their city was ripe for surrender, and showed him the 
 engines by which they were confident they would take the 
 walls, he refused to make the assault, saying that Hellene 
 cities ought not to be reduced to slavery, but brought back to 
 a better mind,* and added, " For if we lop off our offending 
 members, haply we may deprive ourselves of the means to 
 master the barbarian." 
 
 Again, if it is a sacred duty to hate the Persian, who of old 
 set out on a campaign to enslave Hellas ; the Persian, who 
 to-day makes alliance with these (no matter to him which the 
 party, provided it will help him to work the greater mischief*) ; 
 or gives presents to those (who will take them and do the 
 greatest harm to his foes the Hellenes) ; or else concocts a 
 peace that shall presently involve us in internecine war, as he 
 anticipates: — but why dwell on facts so patent? — I ask, did 
 ever Hellene before Agesilaus so enter heart and soul upon 
 his duty ; whether it were to help some tribe to throw off the 
 Persian yoke, or to save from destruction a revolted district, 
 or if nothing else, at any rate to saddle the Persian with such 
 troubles of his own that he should cease to trouble Hellas ? 
 An ardent hater of Persia surely was he, who, when his own 
 country was at war with Hellenes, did not neglect the common 
 good of Hellas, but set sail to wreak what harm he might 
 upon the barbarian.^ 
 
 ' B. c. 394. See Hell. IV. ii. 9-23 ; Diod. xiv. 83 ; Grote, H. G. ix. 429. 
 
 ^ Lit. " all the barbarians. " ' See Econ. i. 23. 
 
 * Or, "the worse the mischief he can work, the better the side." 
 
 ^ See Isocr. JSf. ix. To Archidamus, § 1114. 
 
cH.vm. §1-4 HIS GRACE AND LOFTY SENTIMENT 263 
 
 VIII 
 
 To turn to another side, that grace of manner which was 
 his, claims more than passing recognition. Here was a man 
 to whom honour was vouchsafed and power present, and who, 
 to crown all else, held in his hands the sceptre of sovereignty 
 — a kingship not plotted against, but respected and beloved. 
 Yet there was no trace of arrogance to be seen in him, but of 
 tender affection and courteous service to his friends proof in 
 abundance without seeking. Witness the zest with which he 
 shared in the round of lovers' talk ; ^ the zeal with which he 
 threw himself into the serious concerns ^ of friends. By dint 
 of a hopeful and cheery disposition and unflagging gaiety of 
 heart he attracted to his side a throng of visitors, who came, 
 not simply for the transaction of some private interest, but 
 rather to pass away the day in pleasant sort. Though little 
 apt himself to use high-swelling words, it did not annoy him 
 to hear others sounding their own praises, which he regarded 
 as a harmless weakness, the pledge at least of high endeavour ^ 
 in the future. 
 
 But that he was capable of lofty sentiment and at the right 
 season must not be overlooked. Thus when a letter reached 
 him from the king (I speak of that which was brought by the 
 Persian agent in company with Calleas * of Lacedaemon, pro- 
 posing terms of hospitality and friendship with the Persian 
 monarch), he disdained to accept it, telling the bearer to take 
 back to the king this answer : " He need not be at pains to 
 send him letters in private, but if he could prove himself a 
 friend to Lacedaemon and the well-wisher of Hellas he should 
 have no cause to blame the ardour of his friendship," but 
 added, " if your king be detected plotting, let him not think 
 to find a friend in me. No, not if he sends me a thousand 
 letters." For my part, then, I hold it praiseworthy that, by 
 comparison with pleasing his fellow-Hellenes, Agesilaus scorned 
 
 1 See Hell. V. iii. 20 ; Cyrop. I. iv. 27 ; Econ. ii. 7 j Plut. Ages. ii. ; xx. ; 
 Lye. XX. 
 
 2 Or, " he would discuss graver matters, according to the humour of his 
 friends." 
 
 ^ Or, " of courageous conduct," "noble manhood." 
 
 * See Hell IV. i. 15 ; Plut. Apophlh. Lac. p. 777 ; Grote, H. G. x. 402. 
 
264 AGESILAUS ch. viii. 1 4-8 
 
 such friendship. And this, too, among his tenets I find admir- 
 able : the truer title to self-congratulation belonged not to the 
 millionaire, the master of many legions, but to him rather, who, 
 being himself a better man, commanded the allegiance of 
 better followers. 
 
 And this, in proof of mental forecast, I must needs praise 
 in him. Holding to the belief that the more satraps there 
 were who revolted from the king the surer the gain to Hellas, 
 he did not suffer himself to be seduced, either by gifts or by 
 the mightiness of his power, to be drawn into bonds of friend- 
 ship with the king, but took precaution rather not to abuse 
 their confidence who were willing to revolt. 
 
 And lastly, as beyond all controversy admirable, note this 
 contrast : First, the Persian, who, believing that in the multi- 
 tude of his riches he had power to lay all things under his 
 feet, would fain have swept into his coiiFers all the gold and 
 all the silver of mankind : for him, and him alone, the costliest 
 and most precious things of earth. And then this other, who 
 contrariwise so furnished his establishment as to be totally 
 independent of every adventitious aid.^ And if any one 
 doubts the statement, let him look and see with what manner 
 of dwelling-place he was contented ; let him view the palace 
 doors : these are the selfsame doors, he might well imagine, 
 which Aristodemus,^ the great-great-grandson of Heracles, took 
 and set up in the days of the return. Let him endeavour to 
 view the furniture inside ; there he will perceive how the king 
 feasted on high holy days ; and he will hear how the king's 
 own daughter was wont to drive to Amyclae in a public 
 basket-carriage.^ Thus it was that by the adjustment of ex-" 
 penditure to income he was never driven to the commission of 
 any unjust deed for money's sake. And yet if it be a fine 
 thing to hold a fortress impregnable to attack, I count it a 
 greater glory that a man should hold the fortress of his soul 
 inviolable against the assaults of riches, pleasures, fears. 
 
 ' Or, "of all such external needs." ^ See Herod, vi. 52. 
 
 3 .See Plut. Ages. xix. (Clough, iv. p. 23) ; the words ^ Svydrrip airroS were 
 supplied from tills passage by Casaubon. 
 
CH. IX. § 1-4 HIS SPARTAN SIMPLICITY 265 
 
 I will here state to what extent the style of living which he 
 presented stands out in striking contrast to the ostentatious 
 manner of the Persian.^ In the first place, if the latter made 
 a solemn affectation of being but seldom seen, Agesilaus 
 delighted to live in the eye of day, believing that seclusion 
 might accord well enough as a screen for shameless conduct, 
 but to a life of nobleness and beauty ^ heaven's light added 
 new ornament.* And next, if the one prided himself on 
 being unapproachable, the other rejoiced in being accessible 
 to all the world J the one, with his airs and graces, was 
 pleased to transact business slowly, the other was never so 
 happy as when he could satisfy the demands of a petitioner 
 without waste of time.* 
 
 Again, it is worthy of observation how much easier and 
 simpler to satisfy was the standard of comfort which the 
 Spartan aimed at* For the Persian, men must compass sea 
 and land to discover some beverage which he will care to 
 drink ; he needs ten thousand pastrycooks to supply the kick- 
 shaws he will deign to eat ; and to procure him the blessing 
 of sleep no tongue can describe what a world of trouble must 
 be taken. But Agesilaus was a lover of toil, and therefore 
 not so dainty ; the meanest beverage was sweet to his lips, 
 and pleasant enough to his taste was the chance fare of the 
 moment ; and for . the purpose of refreshing slumber every 
 place alike conducive. It was not merely that to fare thus 
 gave him pure pleasure, but in the sense of contrast lay a 
 double satisfaction. Here was he roaming earth freely in the 
 midst of a world of delight," and there lay the Persian, under 
 his eyes, who to escape a life of pain must drag together from 
 the uttermost parts of earth the separate ingredients for his 
 
 ' Or, ' ' how he presented his own manner in antithesis to the false pre- 
 tences of the Persian." For &\ai;oi>eta see Mem. I. vii. i ; Aristot. N. £. iv. 7 ; 
 Theophr. CAar. vi. 
 
 2 Lit. "a life striving towards beauteousness." 
 
 ' Or, " added but greater lustre." 
 
 * Lit. "could satisfy and dismiss his petitioners without delay." 
 
 " See Herod, i. 13S, for the luxury of the Persians and for the refinements 
 of civilisation. See Mem. II. i. 10 ; Cyrop. VIII. i. 40. 
 
 « Or, "in a round of festivity." See Anai. (Trans, vol. i. p. cxx.). 
 
266 AGESILAUS {'"''■Ih.LYi 
 
 pleasure. It was another source of joy that to himself it was 
 given to confront the appointed order of the universe ^ without 
 pain ; while through weakness of soul his rival, it was plain to 
 see, was driven to flee away from heat and cold, and to shape 
 his life, not by the pattern of brave men, but of some mean 
 and defenceless animal.^ 
 
 And what a fine trait was this in him, and betokening how 
 lofty a sentiment, that, being content to adorn his own house 
 with works and possessions suited to a man, and being 
 devoted to the breeding of dogs and horses in large numbers 
 for the chase and warfare, he persuaded his sister Cynisca to 
 rear chariot horses,^ and thus by her victory * showed that to 
 keep a stud of that sort, however much it might be a mark of 
 wealth, was hardly a proof of manly virtue. And surely in 
 the following opinion we may discern plainly the generosity 
 of him who entertained it. To win victories over private 
 persons in a chariot race does not add one tittle to a man's 
 renown. He, rather, who holds his city dear beyond all 
 things else, who has himself sunk deep into the heart of her 
 affections, who has obtained to himself all over the world 
 a host of friends and those the noblest, who can outdo his 
 country and comrades alike in the race of kindliness, and his 
 antagonists in vengeance — such a man may, in a true sense, 
 be said to bear away the palm of victory in conquests noble 
 and magnificent; living and in death to him belongs tran- 
 scendent fame. 
 
 It is as possessing qualities such as these that I praise 
 Agesilaus. And in these matters he was not like a man who 
 chances upon a treasure and thereby becomes wealthier, 
 
 1 See Plut. Ages. xiv. (Clough, iv. p. 17) ; Apophth, Lac, p. 102 ; Kur. 
 Supp. 214, 215, 
 
 Sp' 01! rpv^wiuv, 0eoO KaroffKeviiv ^lif 
 SbvTos Toiairriv, olaiv oiK ipKet riSe ; 
 
 " Or, "the most defenceless of God's creatures." Lit. " the weakest of 
 animals." * I.e. " for the games. " 
 
 * /.e. "atOlympia." Cynisca, according to Pausanias (iii. 8), was the first 
 woman who won a prize at Olympia. See also Plut. Ages. xx. (Clough, iy. 
 P- 23). 
 
CH. X. §1-4 A PATTERN AND EXAMPLE 267 
 
 albeit none the more skilful in economy ; nor yet like him 
 who, when a plague has fallen upon an enemy, wrests a 
 victory, whereby he may add to his reputation for success, 
 but not for strategy. Rather was his example that of one 
 who in each emergency will take the lead; at a crisis 
 where toil is needful, by endurance ; or in the battle-hsts of 
 bravery by prowess ; or when the function of the counsellor is 
 uppermost, by the soundness of his judgment. Of such a man I 
 say, he has obtained by warrant indefeasible the title peerless. 
 
 And if, as a means towards good workmanship, we count 
 among the noble inventions of mankind the rule and the 
 plummet,! no less happily shall we, who desire to attain to 
 manly excellence, find in the virtue of Agesilaus a pat- 
 tern and example. He was God-fearing, he was just in all 
 his dealings, sound of soul and self- controlled. How then 
 shall we who imitate him become his opposite, unholy, unjust, 
 tyrannical, licentious? And, truth to say, this man prided 
 himself not so much on being a king over others as on ruling 
 himself,^ not so much on leading his citizens to attack the 
 enemy as on guiding them to embrace all virtue. 
 
 Yet let it not be supposed, because he whom we praise has 
 finished life, that our discourse must therefore be regarded 
 as a funeral hymn.* Far rather let it be named a hymn of 
 praise, since in the first place it is only the repetition, now 
 that he is dead, of a tale familiar to his ears when living. 
 And in the next place, what is more remote from dirge and 
 lamentation than a life of glory crowned by seasonable death ? 
 What more deserving of song and eulogy than resplendent 
 victories and deeds of highest note? Surely if one man 
 rather than another may be accounted truly blest, it is he who, 
 from his boyhood upwards, thirsted for glory, and beyond all 
 contemporary names won what he desired ; who, being gifted 
 with a nature most emulous of honour, remained from the 
 moment he was king unconquered ; who attained the fullest 
 term of mortal life and died without offence* committed, 
 
 ' See Aeschin. c. Cfes. p. 52, 25 ; Plat. Pkileb. 56 B. 
 ' See Plut. Apofhth. Lac. p. 104. 
 8 See Symonds' Greek Poets, ch. v, 
 
 * As to the word dra/idpTriTos so translated, see Breitenbacb, Exc. ad x. 4 
 of his edition. 
 
268 AGESILAUS { cH."xl!/i^i 
 
 whether as concerning those at whose head he marched, or as 
 towards those others against whom he fought in war. 
 
 XI 
 
 It only remains for me, under the form of headings,^ to 
 review the topic of this great man's virtue, in hopes that thus 
 his eulogy may cling to the memory more lastingly. 
 
 Agesilaus reverenced the shrines and sacred places even of 
 the enemy. We ought, he said, to make the gods our allies 
 on hostile no less than on friendly soil. 
 
 He would do no violence to a suppliant, no, not even if 
 he were his own foe; since how irrational must it be to 
 stigmatise robbers of temples as sacrilegious and yet to regard 
 him who tears the suppliant from the altar as a pious person. 
 
 One tenet he never wearied of repeating : the gods, he 
 said, are not less pleased with holy deeds than with pure 
 victims. 
 
 In the day of his prosperity his thoughts were not raised 
 higher than befits a man ; he gave thanks to the gods ; and 
 offered more victims when he had nothing to fear than he 
 registered vows in time of apprehension. 
 
 He was accustomed in the midst of anxiety to wear an 
 aspect of gaiety, but, when the victory was won, of gentleness. 
 
 Amongst friends his warmest greeting was reserved, not for 
 the most powerful, but for the most ardent ; and if he hated, 
 it was not him who, being evil entreated, retaliated, but one 
 who, having had kindness done to him, seemed incapable of 
 gratitude. 
 
 He rejoiced when sordid greed was rewarded with 
 poverty; and still more if he might himself enrich a 
 righteous man, since his wish was to render uprightness 
 more profitable than iniquity. 
 
 He made it a practice to associate with all kinds of 
 people, but to be intimate only with the best. 
 
 As he listened to the praise of this man, or the censure of 
 another, he felt that he learnt quite as much about the char- 
 
 ^ Or, as others think, "in a summary." I have stated my own views 
 about this chapter above. 
 
CH. XI. § 4-8 A MEMORIA TECHNICA 269 
 
 acter of the speakers themselves as of those whom they 
 discussed. 
 
 To be cheated by a friend was scarcely censurable, but he 
 could find no condemnation strong enough for him who was 
 outwitted by a foe. Or again, to dupe the incredulous might 
 argue wit, but to take in the unsuspecting was veritably a 
 crime. 
 
 The praise of a critic who had courage to point out his 
 defects pleased him ; and plainness of speech excited in him 
 no hostility. It was against the cunning rather of the 
 secretive person that he guarded himself, as against a hidden 
 snare. 
 
 The calumniator he detested more than the robber or the 
 thief, in proportion as the loss of friends is greater than the 
 loss of money.^ 
 
 The errors of private persons he bore with gently, but 
 those of rulers he looked upon as grave ; since the mischief 
 wrought in the one case was so small, and so large in the 
 other. The proper attribute of royalty was, he maintained, 
 not an avoidance of responsibility, but a constant striving after 
 nobleness. 2 
 
 Whilst he would not suffer any image ^ of his bodily form 
 to be set up (though many wished to present him with a 
 statue), he never ceased elaborating what should prove the 
 monument of his spirit, holding that the former is the business 
 of a statuary, the latter of one's self. Wealth might procure 
 the one, he said, but only a good man could produce the 
 other. 
 
 As for riches, he employed them not with justice merely, 
 but with liberality, holding that for a just man it is sufficient 
 if he let alone the things of others, but of a liberal man it is 
 
 1 Mr. R. W. Taylor aptly quotes Othello, III. iii. 157 — 
 
 " Who steals my purse steals trash ; 'tis something, nothing ; 
 'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands ; 
 But he that filches from me my good name 
 Robs me of that which not enriches him 
 And malces me poor indeed." 
 
 2 On the word KaXoKciyadla so translated, see Demosth. 777, S- 
 
 3 See Plut. Ages. ii. (Clough, iv. p. 2) ; also Plut. AJi. Lac. p. 115 ; ib. 
 p. 103 ; Cic, ad Div. V. xii. 7. 
 
270 AGESILAUS ch. xi. | 8-i, 
 
 required that he should take of his own and give to supply 
 another's needs. 
 
 He was ever subject to religious fear,i believing that no 
 man during his lifetime, however well he lives, can be counted 
 happy ; it is only he who has ended his days with glory of 
 whom it can be said that he has attained at last to blessed- 
 ness.^ 
 
 In his judgment it was a greater misfortune to neglect 
 things good and virtuous, knowing them to be so, than in 
 ignorance. Nor was he enamoured of any reputation, the 
 essentials of which he had not laboriously achieved.^ 
 
 He was one of the small band, as it seemed to me, who 
 regard virtue, not as a thing to be patiently endured,* but as a 
 supreme enjoyment. At any rate, to win the praise of mant 
 kind gave him a deeper pleasure than the acquisition of 
 wealth ; and he preferred to display courage far rather in con- 
 junction with prudence than with unnecessary risks, and to 
 cultivate wisdom in action more than by verbal discussion. 
 
 Very gentle to his friends, to his enemies he was most 
 terrible. Whilst he could hold out against toil and trouble 
 with the best, nothing pleased him better than yielding to 
 his comrades. But passion was kindled in him by beauty of 
 deed rather than of person.^ 
 
 Skilled to the exercise of self-command in the midst of 
 external welfare, he could be stout of heart enough in stress of 
 danger. 
 
 Urbanity he practised, not with jest and witticism, but by 
 the courtesy of his demeanour. 
 
 In spite of a certain haughtiness, he was never overbear- 
 ing, but rich in saving common sense. At any rate, while 
 pouring contempt upon arrogance, he bore himself more 
 humbly than the most ordinary man. In fact, what he truly 
 
 ^ See Cyr, III. iii. 58, and for the word haaiZaiimv, see Jebb, Theophr. 
 Char. p. 263 foil. ; Mr. Ruskin, Preface to BiH. Past. vol. i. p. xxv. 
 
 ' See Herod. 1. 34 ; Soph. Oed. Tyr. 1529 ; and Prof. Jebb's note ad he. 
 
 ^ Or, "for which he did not qualify himself by the appropriate labour." 
 
 ' Or, "as a system of stoical endurance," " a kind of stoicism. " But we 
 must not let Xenophon, who is a Socratic, talk of the Stoa. If we knew cer- 
 tainly that the chapter was a much later production, the language would be 
 appropriate enough. 
 
 ^ Or, " beauteous deeds rather than bodily splendour." 
 
CH. XI. Sii-t5 OF HIS VIRTUES 271 
 
 took a pride in was the simplicity of his own attire, in contrast 
 with the splendid adornment of his troops ; or, again, in the 
 paucity of his own wants, combined with a bountiful liber- 
 ality towards his friends. 
 
 Besides all this, as an antagonist he could hit hard 
 enough, but no one ever bore a lighter hand when the victory 
 was won.^ 
 
 The same man, whom an enemy would have found it hard 
 to deceive, was pliability itself in the concerns of his friends. 
 Whilst for ever occupied in laying these on a secure founda- 
 tion, he made it a ceaseless task to baffle the projects of the 
 national foe. 
 
 The epithets applied to him are significant. His relatives 
 found in him a kinsman who was more than kind. To his 
 intimates he appeared as the friend in need who is a friend 
 indeed. To the man who had done him some service, of 
 tenacious memory. To the victim of injustice, a knight- 
 errant. And to those who had incurred danger by his side, a 
 saviour second only to the gods. 
 
 It was given to this man, as it appears to me, to prove 
 exceptionally that though strength of body may wax old the 
 vigour of a man's soul is exempt from eld. Of him, at any 
 rate, it is true that he never shrank from the pursuit of great 
 and noble objects, so long as ^ his body was able to support 
 the vigour of his soul. Therefore his old age appeared 
 mightier than the youth of other people. It would be hard to 
 discover, I imagine, any one who in the prime of manhood 
 was as formidable to his foes as Agesilaus when he had 
 reached the limit of mortal life. Never, I suppose, was there 
 a foeman whose removal came with a greater sense of relief to 
 the enemy than that of Agesilaus, though a veteran when he 
 died. Never was there a leader who inspired stouter courage 
 in the hearts of fellow- combatants than this man with one 
 foot planted in the grave. Never was a young man snatched 
 from a circle of loving friends with tenderer regret than this 
 old graybeard. 
 
 ' Lit. "he was the heaviest of antagonists and the lightest of conquerors." 
 " Reading, fKyaXwv koX koKwv i<l>tiii,a>os, lias /tol rd irwiM, k.t.X. See 
 Breitenbach. 
 
272 AGESILAUS ch. xi. § ,6 
 
 The benefactor of his fatherland, absolutely to the very 
 end ; with bounteous hand, even in the arms of death, dealing 
 out largesse ^ to the city which he loved. And so they bore 
 him home to his eternal resting-place ; ^ this hero, who, having 
 raised to himself many a monument of his valour over the 
 broad earth, came back to find in the land of his fathers a 
 sepulture worthy of a king.^ 
 
 1 See above, ii. 31. '^ See for this remarkable phrase, Diod. i. 51. 
 
 * See Pol. Lac. xv. 9. 
 
 The date of Agesilaus's death is uncertain — 360 B.C. (Grote, H. G. ix. 
 336) ; 358 B.C. (Curt. iv. 196, Eng. tr.). 
 
THE 
 
 POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS 
 
THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS 
 
 Now, as concerning the Polity of the Athenians,^ and the 
 type or manner of constitution which they have chosen,^ I 
 praise it not, in so far as the very choice involves the welfare 
 of the baser folk as opposed to that of the better class. 
 I repeat, I withhold my praise so far; but, given the fact 
 that this is the type agreed upon, I propose to show that 
 they set about its preservation in the right way; and that 
 those other transactions in connection with it, which are looked 
 upon as blunders by the rest of the Hellenic world, are the 
 reverse. 
 
 In the first place, I maintain, it is only just that the poorer 
 classes ^ and the People of Athens should be better off than 
 the men of birth and wealth, seeing that it is the people who 
 man the fleet,* and put round the city her girdle of power. 
 The steersman,^ the boatswain, the lieutenant,* the look-out-man 
 at the prow, the shipwright — these are the people who engird the 
 city with power far rather than her heavy infantry ' and men 
 of birth and quality. This being the case, it seems only just 
 
 1 See Grote, H. G. vi. p. 47 foil. ; Thuc. i. 76, 77 ; viii. 48 ; Boeckh, P.B.A. 
 passim ; Hartman, An. Xen. N. cap. viii. ; Roquette, Xen. Vit. § 26 ; Newman, 
 Pol. Arist. i. 538 ; and Xenophontis quifertur libellus de Refuilica Athenien- 
 sium, ed. A. Kirchhoff (mdccclxxiv), whose text I have chiefly followed. 
 
 2 Lit. " I do not praise their choice of the (particular) type, in so far as . . . ' ' 
 2 Cf Mem. I. ii. 58 foil. * Lit. "ply the oar and propel the galleys. " 
 See Econ. viii. 14 ; Pollux, i. 96 ; Arist. Knights, 543 foil. ; Plat. Laws, 
 
 V. 707 A ; Jowett, P/a(. v. 278 foil. ; Boeckh, P. B. A. bk. ii. ch. xxi. 
 " Lit. " pentecontarch ; " see Dem. In Pol. 1212. 
 ' Aristot. Pol. vi. 7 ; Jowett, The Politics of Aristotle, vol. i. p. 109. 
 
276. THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS ch. i. § 2-5 
 
 that offices of state should be thrown open to every one both 
 in the ballot ^ and the show of hands, and that the right of 
 speech should belong to any one who likes, without restriction. 
 For, observe,^ there are many of these ofifices which, according 
 as they are in good or in bad hands, are a source of safety or 
 of danger to the People, and in these the People prudently 
 abstains from sharing ; as, for instance, it does not think it 
 incumbent on itself to share in the functions of the general 
 or of the commander of cavalry.^ The sovereign People 
 recognises the fact that in forgoing the personal exercise of 
 these offices, and leaving them to the control of the more 
 powerful * citizens, it secures the balance of advantage to itself 
 I t is only those departments of government which bring 
 emolument" and assist the private estate ~ that the~Feople 
 cares To "Eeep^nTiEs" own "hands. ~ ~ ~ 
 
 In the next place, ^h regard to what some people are 
 puzzled to explain — the fact that ever)rvsrhere greater considera- 
 tion is shown to the base, to poor people and to common folk, 
 than to persons of good quality,— so far from being a matter of 
 surprise, this, as can be shown, is the keystone of the preserva- 
 tion of the democracy. It is these poor people, this common 
 folk, this riff-raff,* whose prosperity, combined with the growth 
 of their numbers, enhances the democracy. Whereas, a shift- 
 ing of fortune to the advantage of the wealthy and the better 
 classes implies the establishment on the part of the commonalty 
 of a strong power in opposition to itself. In fact, all the world 
 over, the cream of society is in opposition to the democracy. 
 Naturally, since the smallest amount of intemperance and in- 
 justice, together with the highest scrupulousness in the pursuit 
 of excellence, is to be found in the ranks of the better class, 
 while within the ranks of the People will be found the greatest 
 amount of ignorance, disorderliness, rascality, — poverty acting 
 as a stronger incentive to base conduct, not to speak of lack 
 of education and ignorance, traceable to the lack of means 
 which afflicts the average of mankind.^ 
 
 ^ KkitpuTol, alperot. 
 
 ^ Reading with Kirclihoff, ciret Toi, or if ^ireira, "in the next place." 
 
 '■' Hipparch. * Cf. Hipparch. 1. 9 ; Econ. ii. 8. ' E.g. the hiKa<XTi\fiti. 
 
 " Or, "these inferiors," "these good-for-nothings." 
 
 ' Or, " some of these follt." The passage is corrupt. 
 
CH. 1. § 6-IO NOT IDEAL BUT CONSISTENT 277 
 
 The objection may be raised that it was a mistake to allow 
 the universal right of speech ^ and a seat in council. These 
 should have been reserved for the cleverest, the flower of the 
 community. But here, again, it will be found that they are 
 acting with wise deliberation in granting to ^ even the baser sort 
 the right of speech, for supposing only the better people might 
 speak, or sit in council, blessings would fall to the lot of those 
 like themselves, but to the commonalty the reverse of blessings. 
 Whereas now, any one who likes, any base fellow, may get up \ 
 and discover something to the advantage of himself and his \ 
 equals. It may be retorted : " And what sort of advantage \ 
 either for himself or for the People can such a fellow be ex- 
 pected to hit upon ? " The answer to which is, that in their 
 judgment the ignorance and the baseness of this fellow, to- 
 gether with his goodwill, are worth a great deal more to them I 
 than your superior person's virtue and wisdom, coupled with 
 animosity. What it comes to, therefore, is that a state founded 
 upon such institutions will not be the best state ; ^ but, given 
 a democracy, these are the right means to secure its preserva- 
 tion. The People, it must be borne in mind, does not demand 
 that the city should be well governed and itself a slave. It 
 desires to bk free and to be master.* As to bad legislation it 
 does not conctern itself about that.^ In fact, what you believe ] 
 to be bad legisMion is the very source of the People's strength I 
 and freedom. But if you seek for good legislation, in the first | 
 place you will see the cleverest members of the community 
 laying down the laws for the rest. And in the next place, the 
 better class will curb and chastise the lower orders ; the better 
 class will deliberate in behalf of the state, and not suffer crack- 
 brained fellows to sit in council, or to speak or vote in Parlia- 
 ment.* No doubt ; but under the weight of such blessings 
 the People will in a very short time be reduced to slavery. 
 
 Another point is the extraordinary amount of license' 
 
 1 Lit. "everybody to speak in turn." 
 
 "■' Or, " it is a counsel of perfection on their part to grant to," etc. 
 
 " Or, "the ideal state," 
 
 * Or, ' ' and to govern and hold office. " 
 
 "Or, " it will take the risk of that." 
 
 See Grote, H. G. v. p. 510 note. 
 
 7 See Aristot. Pol. v. 11 and vi. 4 ; Jowett, op. cit. vol. i. pp. 179, 196 ; 
 
278 THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS ch. i. § jo-12 
 
 granted to slaves and resident aliens at Athens, where a blow- 
 is illegal, and a slave will not step aside to let you pass him 
 in the street. I will explain the reason of this peculiar 
 custom. Supposing it were legal for a slave to be beaten by 
 a free citizen, or for a resident alien or freedman to be beaten 
 by a citizen, it would frequently happen that an Athenian 
 might be mistaken for a slave or an alien and receive a beating ; 
 since the Athenian People is not better clothed than the slave 
 or alien, nor in personal appearance is there any superiority. 
 Or if the fact itself that slaves in Athens are allowed to indulge 
 in luxury, and indeed in some cases to live magnificently, be 
 found astonishing, this too, it can be shown, is done of set 
 purpose. Where you have a naval power ^ dependent upon 
 wealth ^ we must perforce be slaves to our slaves, in order 
 that we may get in our slave-rents,^ and let the real slave go 
 free. Where you have wealthy slaves it ceases to be advan- 
 tageous that my slave should stand in awe of you. In 
 Lacedaemon my slave stands in awe of you.* But if your 
 slave is in awe of me there will be a risk of his giving away 
 his own moneys to avoid running a risk in his own person. , 
 It is for this reason then that we have established an equality 
 between our slaves and free men ; and again between our 
 resident aliens and full citizens,^ because the city stands in 
 
 Welldon, The Politics of Aristotle, pp. 394, 323 ; Dem. Phil. III. iii. 10 ; 
 Plaut. Stich. III. i. 37. ^ See Diod. xi. 43. 
 
 2 Reading, &,Trb xPVf^^'^^^> ^I'dyKTj, or {reading, dirb x/"?/*<iTW dvdyKT]) 
 ' ' considerations of money force us to be slaves. " 
 
 ^ See Boeckh, P. £. A. I. xiii. (Eng. trans, p. 72). "The rights of pro- 
 perty with regard to slaves in no way differed from any other chattel ; they 
 could be given or taken as pledges. They laboured either on their master's 
 account or their own, in consideration of a certain sum to be paid to the 
 master, or they were let out on hire either for the mines or any other kind of 
 labour, and even for other persons' workshops, or as hired servants for wages 
 (aTo^opi.) : a similar payment was also exacted by the masters for their slaves 
 serving in the fleet." It. " Dissertation on the Silver Mines of Laurion," p. 659 
 (Eng. trans.). 
 
 ^ See Pol. Lac. vi. 3 {below, p. 307). 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' we have given to our slaves the right to talk hke equals with free 
 men, just as to resident aliens the right of so talking with citizens." See Jebb, 
 Theophr. Char. xiv. 4, note, p. 221. See Demosth. against Midias, 529, 
 where the law is cited. " If any one commit a personal outrage upon man, 
 woman, or child, whether free-born or slave, or commit any illegal act against 
 any such person, let any Athenian that chooses" {not being under disability) 
 
§'i'2-';4 } SELF-PRESERVATIVE INSTINCT OF THE PEOPLE 279 
 
 need of her resident aliens to meet the requirements of such 
 a multiplicity of arts and for the purposes of her navy. That 
 is, I repeat, the justification of the equality conferred upon 
 our resident aliens. 
 
 Citizens devoting their time to gymnastics and to the 
 cultivation of music are not to be found in Athens j^ the 
 sovereign People has disestablished them,^ not from any 
 disbelief in the beauty and honour of such training, but 
 recognising the fact that these are things the cultivation of 
 which is beyond its power. On the same principle, in the 
 case of the choregia,* the gymnasiarchy, and the trierarchy, 
 the fact is recognised that it is the rich man who trains the 
 chorus, and the People for whom the chorus is trained ; it is 
 the rich man who is trierarch or gymnasiarch, and the People 
 that profits by their labours.* In fact, what the People looks 
 upon as its right is to pocket the money.^ To sing and run 
 and dance and man the vessels is well enough, but only in 
 order that the People may be the gainer, while the rich are 
 made poorer. And so in the courts of justice,® justice is not 
 more an object of concern to the jurymen than what touches 
 personal advantage. 
 
 To speak next of the allies, and in reference to the point 
 that emissaries^ from Athens come out, and, according to 
 common opinion, calumniate and vent their hatred * upon the 
 
 ' ' indict him before the judges, " etc. ; and the orator exclaims : ' ' You know, O 
 Athenians, the humanity of the law, which allows not even slaves to be insulted 
 in their persons. " — C. R. Kennedy. 
 
 ^ For nov<rtK'/i and yviwcurTiKi), see Becker's Charicles, Exc. "Education." 
 
 ° See Revenues, iv. 52 (below, p. 345) ; Arist. Frogs, 1069, ^ '^enhwcrev 
 rds re iraXaiffTpas, "and the places of exercise vacant and bare." — Frere. 
 
 ^ ' * The duties of the choregia consisted in finding maintenance and in- 
 struction for the chorus " (in tragedy, usually of fifteen persons) " as long as 
 they were in training ; and in providing the dresses and equipments for the 
 performance.'' — ^Jebb, Theophr. Char. xxm. 3. For those of the gymnasiarchy, 
 see Diet, of Antiq. "Gymnasium." For that of the trierarchy, see Jebb, op. 
 cit. XXV. 9 ; xxix. 16 ; Boeckh, P. E. A. IV. xi. 
 
 * See Econ. ii. 6 ; Thuc. vi. 31. 
 
 " See Boeckh, P. E. A. II. xvi. p. 241. 
 
 ^ For the system of judicature, the diKaffr^pta, and the boards of jurymen 
 or judges, see Aristot. Constitution of Athens, ch. Ixiii. ; Diet, of Antiq. s.v. ; 
 Trans, vol. i. p. 30, note i. 
 
 ' For ol eKirKiovm, see Grote, H. G. vi. p. 41. 
 
 ^ Reading fuaov<rt ; or, if with Kirchhoff, fxeiovai, "in every way humiliate. " 
 
28o THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS ch. i. § 14-16 
 
 better sort of people, this is done^ on the principle that the 
 ruler cannot help being hated by those whom he rules ; but that 
 if wealth and respectability are to wield power in the subject 
 cities the empire of the Athenian People has but a short lease 
 of existence. This explains why the better people are punished 
 with infamy,^ robbed of their money, driven from their homes, 
 and put to death, while the baser sort are promoted to honour. 
 On the other hand, the better Athenians throw their aegis over 
 the better class in the aUied cities.^ And why ? Because they 
 recognise that it is to the interest of their own class at all 
 times to protect the best element in the cities. It may be 
 urged * jthat if it rom es to st rength and power the rear strength 
 of Athens lies in the capacity of her ^lies to contribute their 
 money quota. ^ But to the democratic mind^ it appears a 
 higher advantage still for the individual Athenian to get hold 
 of the wealth of the allies, leaving them only enough to live 
 upon and to cultivate their estates, but powerless to harbour 
 treacherous designs. 
 
 Again,^ it is looked upon as a mistaken policy on the part 
 of the Athenian democracy to compel her allies to voyage to 
 Athens in order to have their cases tried.^ On the other hand, 
 it is easy to reckon up what a number of advantages the 
 Athenian People derives from the practice impugned. In 
 the first place, there is the steady receipt of salaries throughout 
 the year * derived from the court fees.^ Next, it enables them 
 
 ' Or, " [they do so] as recognising the fact." 
 
 2 dri/da = the loss of civil rights, either total or partial. See C. R. 
 Kennedy, Select Speectus of Demosthenes, Note 13, Disfranchisement. 
 
 3 See Thuc. viii. 48. 
 
 * See Grote, H. G. vi. S3. ° Or, "to a thorough democrat." 
 
 ^ Grote, H. G. vi. 61. ' See Isocr. Panath. 245 D. 
 
 ^ See Arist. Clouds, 1196 ; Demosth. c. Timoc. 730. 
 
 " For the "Prytaneia," see Aristot. Pol. ii. 12, 4. " Ephialtes and Pericles 
 curtailed the privileges of the Areopagus, Pericles converted the Courts of 
 Law into salaried bodies, and so each succeeding demagogue outdid his pre- 
 decessor in the privileges he conferred upon the commons, until the present 
 democracy was the result" (Welldon). "The writer of this passage clearly 
 intended to class Pericles among the demagogues. He judges him in the 
 same depreciatory spirit as Plato in the Gorgias, pp. 515, 516." — ^Jowett, Pol. 
 of Aristot. vol. ii. p. loi. But see Aristot. Constitution of Athens, ch. xxv., a 
 portion of the newly -discovered treatise, which throws light on an obscure 
 period in the history of Athens ; and Mr. Kenyon's note ad loc. ; and Mr. 
 Macan's criticism. Journal of Hellenic Studies, vol. xii. No. 1. 
 
CH. 1. § I6.J9 IN DEALING WITH THE SUBJECT ALLIES 281 
 
 to manage the affairs of the allied states while seated at home 
 without the expense of naval expeditions. Thirdly, they thus 
 preserve the partisans of the democracy, and ruin her opponents 
 in the law courts. Whereas, supposing the several allied states 
 tried their cases at home, being inspired by hostility to Athens, 
 they would destroy those of their own citizens whose friendship 
 to the Athenian People was most marked. But besides all 
 this the democracy derives the following advantages from 
 hearing the cases of her allies in Athens. In the first place, 
 the one per cent ^ levied in Piraeus is increased to the profit 
 of the state ; again, the owner of a lodging-house ^ does better, 
 and so, too, the owner of a pair of beasts, or of slaves to be 
 let out on hire ; ^ again, heralds and criers * are a class of people 
 who fare better owing to the sojourn of foreigners at Athens. 
 Further still, supposing the allies had not to resort to Athens 
 for the hearing of cases, only the official representative of the 
 imperial state would be held in honour, such as the general, 
 or trierarch, or ambassador. Whereas now every single in- 
 dividual among the allies is forced to pay flattery to the 
 People of Athens because he knows that he must betake 
 himself to Athens and win or lose ^ his case at the bar, not 
 of any stray set of judges, but of the sovereign People itself, 
 such being the law and custom at Athens. He is compelled 
 to behave as a suppliant* in the courts of justice, and when 
 some juryman comes into court, to grasp his hand. For this 
 reason, therefore, the allies find themselves more and more in 
 the position of slaves to the people of Athens. 
 
 Furthermore, owing to the possession of property beyond 
 the limits of Attica,'' and the exercise of magistracies which 
 take them into regions beyond the frontier, they and their 
 attendants have insensibly acquired the art of navigation.^ 
 A man who is perpetually voyaging is forced to handle the 
 
 1 For the iKaTOffrii, see Thuc. vii. 28, in reference to the yearB.c. 416; 
 Arist. Wasps, 658 ; Frogs, 363. 
 
 2 See Boeckh, P. E. A. I. xii. p. 65 (Eng. trans.) ; I. xxiv. p. 141. . 
 
 s See note 3, above, p. 278 ; Revenues, iv. 20, p. 338 ; Jebb, Theofhr. 
 Char. xxvi. 16. ^ For these functionaries, see Jebb, of. cit. xvi. 10. 
 
 ° Lit. " pay or get justice. " 
 " See Arist. Wasfs, 548 foil. ; Grote, H. G. v. 520 note ; Newman, of: cit. 
 
 i. 383. 
 
 ' See Mem. II. viii. 1. ^ See Hell. VII. i. 4 (above, p. 187). 
 
282 THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS { ''"ci. n!§i'^ 
 
 oar, he and his domestic alike, and to learn the terms familiar 
 in seamanship. Hence a stock of skilful mariners is produced, 
 bred upon a wide experience of voyaging and practice. They 
 have learnt their business, some in piloting a small crafl, others 
 a merchant vessel, whilst others have been drafted off from 
 these for service on a ship-of-war. So that the majority of 
 them are able to row the moment they set foot on board a 
 vessel, having been in a state of preliminary practice all their 
 lives. 
 
 II 
 
 As to the heavy infantry, an arm the deficiency of which 
 at Afhens is well recognised, this is how the matter stands. 
 They recognise the fact that, in reference to the hostile power, 
 they are themselves inferior, and must be, even if their heavy 
 infantry were more numerous.^ But relatively to the allies, who 
 bring in the tribute, their strength even on land is enormous. 
 And they are persuaded that their heavy infantry is sufficient 
 for all purposes, provided they retain this superiority.^ Apart 
 from all else, to a certain extent fortune must be held re- 
 sponsible for the actual condition. The subjects of a power 
 which is dominant by land have it open to them to form con- 
 tingents from several small states and to muster in force for 
 battle. But with the subjects of a naval power it is different. 
 As far as they are groups of islanders it is impossible for their 
 states to meet together for united action, for the sea lies 
 between them, and the dominant power is master of the sea. 
 And even if it were possible for them to assemble in some 
 single island unobserved, they would only do so to perish by 
 famine. And as to the states subject to Athens which are 
 not islanders, but situated on the continent, the larger are held 
 in check by need^ and the small ones absolutely by fear, 
 since there is no state in existence which does not depend 
 upon imports and exports, and these she will forfeit if she 
 does not lend a willing ear to those who are masters by sea. In 
 
 ^ Reading after Kirchhoff, i^TTovs ye . . . k&v el /teifop ^v, rwv did k. t. X. 
 See Thuc. i. 143 ; Isocr. ile Pace, 169 A ; Plut. Them. 4 (Clough, i. 235). 
 ^ Lit. "they are superior to their allies." 
 ' Reading with Kirchhoff, 5ia xpelai> ... Sid dios. 
 
CH. II. § 4-8 AS RULERS OF THE SEA 283 
 
 the next place, a power dominant by sea can do certain things 
 which a land power is debarred from doing ; as, for instance, 
 ravage the territory of a superior, since it is always possible to 
 coast along to some point, where either there is no hostile 
 force to deal with or merely a small body ; and in case of an 
 advance in force on the part of the enemy they can take to 
 their ships and sail away. Such a performance is attended with 
 less difficulty than that experienced by the relieving force on 
 land.'- Again, it is open to a power so dominating by sea to 
 leave its own territory and sail off on as long a voyage as you 
 please. Whereas the land power cannot place more than a 
 few days' Journey between itself and its own territory, for 
 marches are slow affairs ; and it is not possible for an army 
 on the march to have food supplies to last for any great length 
 of time. Such an army must either march through friendly 
 territory or it must force a way by victory in battle. The 
 voyager meanwhile has it in his power to disembark at any 
 point where he finds himself in superior force, or, at the worst, 
 to coast by until he reaches either a friendly district or an 
 enemy too weak to resist. Again, those diseases to which the 
 fruits of the earth are liable as visitations from heaven fall 
 severely on a land power, but are scarcely felt by the naval 
 power, for such sicknesses do not visit the whole earth every- 
 where at once. So that the ruler of the sea can get in supplies 
 from a thriving district. And if one may descend to more 
 trifling particulars, it is to this same lordsMp of the sea that 
 the Athenians owe the discovery, in the first place, of many of 
 the luxuries of life through intercourse with other countries. 
 So that the choice things of Sicily and Italy, of Cyprus 
 and Egypt and Lydia, of Pontus or Peloponnese, or whereso- 
 ever else it be, are all swept, as it were, into one centre, and 
 all owing, as I say, to their maritime empire. And again, in 
 process of listening to every form of speech,^ they have selected 
 this from one place and that from another — for themselves. 
 So much so that while the rest of the Hellenes employ ^ each 
 pretty much their own peculiar mode of speech, habit of life, 
 
 'Or, " the army marching along the seaboard to the rescue." 
 
 ^ Or, " a variety of dialects. " 
 
 8 Or, " maintain somewhat more. " 
 
284 THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS ch. 11. 88-11 
 
 and style of dress, the Athenians have adopted a composite 
 type,i to which all sections of Hellas, and the foreigner alike, 
 have contributed. 
 
 As regards sacrifices and temples and festivals and sacred 
 enclosures, the People sees that it is not possible for every 
 poor citizen to do sacrifice and hold festival, or to set up^ 
 temples and to inhabit a large and beautiful city. But it has 
 hit upon a means of meeting the difficulty. They sacrifice — 
 that is, the whole state sacrifices — at the public cost a large 
 number of victims ; but it is the People that keeps holiday 
 and distributes the victims by lot amongst its members. Rich 
 men have in some cases private gymnasia and baths with 
 dressing-rooms,* but the People takes care to have built at 
 the public cost* a number of palaestras, dressing-rooms, and 
 bathing establishments for its own special use, and the mob 
 gets the benefit of the majority of these, rather than the select 
 few or the well-to-do. 
 
 As to wealth, the Athenians are exceptionally placed with 
 regard to Hellenic and foreign communities alike,^ in their 
 ability to hold it. For, given that some state or other is rich 
 in timber for shipbuilding, where is it to find a market® for 
 the product except by persuading the ruler of the sea ? Or, 
 suppose the wealth of some state or other to consist of iron, 
 or may be of bronze,^ or of linen yarn, where will it find a 
 market except by permission of the supreme maritime power ? 
 Yet these are the very things, you see, which I need for my 
 ships. Timber I must have from one, and from another iron, 
 from a third bronze, from a fourth linen yarn, from a fifth wax, 
 
 ' Or, "have contracted a mixed style, bearing traces of Hellenic and 
 foreign influence alike." See Mahaffy, Hist, of Greek Lit. vol. ii. ch. ». p. 
 257 (ist ed. ) ; cf. Walt Whitman, Preface to original edition of Leaves of 
 Grass, p. 29 — "The English language befriends the grand American expres- 
 sion : it is brawny enough and limber and full enough, on the tough stock of 
 a race, who through all change of circumstances was never without the idea of 
 political liberty, which is the animus of all liberty ; it has attracted the terms 
 of daintier and gayer and subtler and more elegant tongues." 
 
 ^ Reading with Kirchhoff, XaTaaBai. 
 
 ' See Jebb, Theophr. Char, vii, 18, p. 202. 
 
 * Reading with Kirchhoff, diifi.o(Tiif. 
 
 ^ Or, " they have a practical monopoly. '' 
 
 "Or, " how is it to dispose of the product ? " 
 
 ' Or, " coppert. " - 
 
CM. II. § ii-xs BUT A Peninsular power 285 
 
 etc. Besides which they will not suffer their antagonists in 
 those parts ^ to carry these products elsewhither, or they will 
 cease to use the sea. Accordingly I, without one stroke of 
 labour, extract from the land and possess all these good things, 
 thanks to my supremacy on the sea ; whilst not a single other 
 state possesses the two of them. Not timber, for instance, and 
 yarn together, the same city. But where yarn is abundant, 
 the soil will be light and devoid of timber. .And in the same 
 way bronze and iron will not be products of the same city. 
 And so for the rest, never two, or at best three, in one state, 
 but one thing here and another thing there. Moreover, above 
 and beyond what has been said, the coast-line of every main- 
 land presents, either some jutting promontory, or adjacent 
 island, or narrow strait of some sort, so that those who are 
 masters of the sea can come to moorings at one of these points 
 and wreak vengeance ^ on the inhabitants of the mainland. 
 
 There is just one thing which the Athenians lack. Sup- 
 posing they were the inhabitants of an island,' and were still, 
 as now, rulers of the sea, they would have had it in their power 
 to work whatever mischief they liked, and to suffer no evil in 
 return (as long as they kept command of the sea), neither the 
 ravaging of their territory nor the expectation of an enemy's 
 approach. Whereas at present the farming portion of the 
 community and the wealthy landowners are ready * to cringe 
 before the enemy overmuch, whilst the People, knowing full 
 well that, come what may, not one stock or stone of their 
 property will suffer, nothing will be cut down, nothing burnt, 
 lives in freedom from alarm, without fawning at the enemy's 
 approach. Besides this, there is another fear from which they 
 
 ' Reading e/cei. For this corrupt passage see L. Dindorf, ad loc. ; also 
 Boeckh, P. E. A. I. ix. p. SS- Perhaps (as my friend Mr. J. R. Mozley 
 suggests) the simplest supposition is to suppose that there is an ellipsis before. 
 if oil xP^ffovTM T% BaMTTji: thus, " Besides which they will not suffer their 
 antagonists to transport goods to countries outside Attica ; they must yield, 
 or they shall not have the use of the sea. " 
 
 2 Xu/3ao-9ai. This ' poetical ' word comes to mean " harry, " " pillage, "in 
 the common dialect. 
 
 3 See Thuc. i. 143. Pericles says; "Reflect, if we were islanders, who 
 would be more invulnerable? Let us imagine that we are." 
 
 * Or, "are the more ready to cringe." See, for the word vTipxovrai, 
 Pol. Lac. viii. 2 ; Plat. Crit. 53 e; Rutherford, New Phrynichus, p. no. 
 
286 THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS ch. n. § 15-18 
 
 would have been exempt in an island home — the apprehension 
 of the city being at any time betrayed by their oligarchs ^ and 
 the gates thrown open, and an enemy bursting suddenly in. 
 How could incidents like these have taken place if an island 
 had been their home ? Again, had they inhabited an island 
 there would have been no stirring of sedition against the people ; 
 whereas at present, in the event of faction, those who set it on 
 foot base their hopes of success on the introduction of an 
 enemy by land. But a people inhabiting an island would be 
 free from all anxiety on that score. Since, however, they did 
 not chance to inhabit an island from the first, what they now 
 do is this — they deposit their property in the islands,^ trusting 
 to their command of the sea, and they suffer the soil of Attica 
 to be ravaged without a sigh. To expend pity on that, they 
 know, would be to deprive themselves of other blessings still 
 more precious.* 
 
 Further, states oligarchically governed are forced to ratify 
 their alliances and solemn oaths, and if they fail to abide by 
 their contracts, the offence, by whomsoever committed,* lies 
 nominally at the door of the oligarchs who entered upon the 
 contract. But in the case of engagements entered into by a 
 (democracy it is open to the People to throw the blame on the 
 single individual who spoke in favour of some measure, or put 
 it to the vote, and to maintain to the rest of the world, " I was 
 Jnot present, nor do I approve of the terms of the agreement." 
 Inquiries are made in a full meeting of the People, and should 
 any of these things be disapproved of, it can at once discover 
 ten thousand excuses to avoid doing whatever they do not wish. 
 And if any mischief should spring out of any resolutions which 
 the People has passed in council, the People can readily shift 
 the blame from its own shoulders. " A handful of oligarchs ^ 
 acting against the interests of the People have ruined us." 
 
 ^ Or, " by the minority " ; or, " by a handful of people." 
 
 ^ As they did during the Peloponnesian war ; and earlier still, before the 
 Imttle of Salamis, in the case of that one island. 
 
 * Or, ' ' but mean the forfeiture of others. " 
 
 ■• Reading ir0' orovoiiy dSoceirai 6vbiw,n iirb twv SKlyav, which I suggest 
 as a less violent emendation of this corrupt . passage than any I have seen ; 
 or, reading with Sauppe, i<f 6tov ddiKei Avo/ietTai dirb twv SKlyav, " the 
 illegality lies at the door of," 
 
 ^ Or, "a few insignificant fellows." 
 
CM, ii.8i8-2o NATURAL SYMPATHIES OF THE PEOPLE 287 
 
 But if any good result ensue, they, the People, at once take the 
 credit of that to themselves. 
 
 In the same spirit it is not allowed to caricature on the 
 comic stage ^ or otherwise libel the People, because ^ they do 
 not care to hear themselves ill spoken of. But if any one has 
 a desire to satirise his neighbour he has full leave to do so. 
 And this because they are well aware that, as a general rule, 
 the person caricatured * does not belong to the People, or the 
 masses. He is more likely to be some wealthy or well-born 
 person, or man of means and influence. In fact, but few poor 
 people and of the popular stamp incur the comic lash, or if 
 they do they have brought it on themselves by excessive love 
 of meddling or some covetous self-seeking at the expense of the 
 People, so that no particular annoyance is felt at seeing such 
 folk satirised. 
 
 What, then, I venture to assert is, that the People of Athens 
 has no difficulty in recognising which of its citizens are of the 
 better sort and which the opposite.* And so recognising 
 those who are serviceable and advantageous ^ to itself, even 
 though they be base, the People loves them ; but the good 
 folk they are disposed the rather to hate. This virtue of theirs, 
 the People holds, is not engrained in their nature for any 
 good to itself, but rather for its injury. In direct opposition 
 to this, there are some persons who, being* born of the 
 People, are yet by natural instinct not commoners. For my 
 part I pardon the People its_own democracy, as, indeed, it is 
 pardonable in anx_one to do good to_hmself.^_ T3ut the man 
 who, not being himself one of the People, prefers to live in a 
 state democratically governed rather than in an oligarchical 
 state may be said to smooth his own path towards iniquity. 
 He knows that a bad man has a better chance of slipping 
 
 1 See Grote, H. G. viii. 446, especially p. 449, " growth and development 
 of comedy at Athens " ; Curtius, H. G. iii. pp. 242, 243 ; Thirlwall, H. C. 
 ch. xviii. vol. iii. p. 42. 
 
 '^ Or, more lit. " it would not do for the People to hear, " etc. 
 
 3 Or, " the butt of comedy. " * Or, " and which are good for nothing." , 
 
 B Or, " its own friends and supporters." 
 
 8 Reading Svres, or {ii yvbvTeij, ' ' who, recognising the nature of the People, 
 have no popular leaning." Gutschmidt conj. hmi lyyvoi Sktcs, i.e. Pericles. 
 
 7 On the principle that ' ' the knee is nearer than the shin-bone, " ySvv 
 /o-ij/i))!, or, as we say, " charity begins at home." 
 
288 THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS ch. m. § 1-3 
 
 through the fingers of justice in a democratic than in an 
 oligarchical state. 
 
 Ill 
 
 I repeat that my position concerning the polity of the Athen- 
 ians is this : the type^ of polity is not to my taste, but given that 
 a democratic form of government has been agreed uponj_they 
 do seern_tgjne-to~g0-tlie_right^ way to_ preserve the_deinoQracy 
 by the adoption of thejparticular type ^_ which I JbayC- set, forth. 
 But there are other objections brought, as I am aware, 
 against the Athenians, by certain people, and to this effect. 
 It not seldom happens, they tell us, that a man is unable to 
 transact a piece of business with the senate or the People, 
 even if he sit waiting a whole year. Now tTiis does happen at 
 Athens, and for no other reason save that, owing to the 
 immense mass of affairs they are unable to work off all the 
 business on hand and dismiss the applicants. And how in the 
 world should they be able, considering in the first place, 
 that they, the Athenians, have more festivals ^ to celebrate than 
 any other state throughout the length and breadth of Hellas ? 
 [During these festivals, of course, the transaction of any sort 
 of affairs of state is still more out of the question.] * In the 
 next place, only consider the number of cases they have to 
 decide, — ^what with private suits and public causes and 
 scrutinies of accounts, etc., more than the whole of the rest of 
 mankind put together ; while the senate has multifarious 
 points to advise upon concerning peace and war,^ concerning 
 ways and means, concerning the framing and passing of laws,* 
 and concerning the thousand and one matters affecting the 
 state perpetually occurring, and endless questions touching the 
 allies ; besides the receipt of the tribute, the superintendence 
 of dockyards and temples, etc. Can, I ask again, any one 
 find it at all surprising that, with all these affairs on their 
 hands, they are unequal to doing business with all the world ? 
 
 But some people tell us that if the applicant will only 
 address himself to the senate ijr.- the P6dpl& with a JieeJaJlis 
 
 ' Or, "manner." ^ Or, "manner." ' See Arist. IVasps, 661. 
 
 * This sentence is perhaps a gloss. 
 
 '' Or, "about the war," irepl toO woXi/wv. 
 
 ^ See Thirlwall, ch. xxxii. vol. iv. p. 221, note 3. 
 
cH.in.§3-s MULTIPLICITY OF AFFAIRS 289 
 
 hand he will do a good stroke of^uwgess. And for my part 
 I am free to confess to these gainsayers that a good many 
 things may be done at Athens by dint of money ; and I will 
 add, that a good many more still might be done, if the money 
 flowed still more freely and from more pockets. One thing, 
 however, I know full well, that as to transacting with every 
 one of these applicants all he wants, the state could not do it, 
 not even if all the gold and silver in the world were the 
 inducement offered. 
 
 Here are some of the cases which have to be decided on. 
 Some one fails to fit out a ship : judgment must be given. 
 Another puts up a building on a piece of public land : again 
 judgment must be given. Or, to take another class of cases : 
 adjudication has to be made between the choragi for the 
 Dionysia, the Thargelia, the Panathenaea, year after year. 
 [ ^ And again in behalf of the gymnasiarchs a similar adjudica- 
 tion for the Panathenaea, the Prometheia, and the Hephaestia, 
 also year after year.] Also as between the trierarchs, four 
 hundred of whom are appointed each year, of these, too, any 
 who choose must have their cases adjudicated on, year after 
 year. But that is not all. There are various magistrates to 
 examine and approve ^ and decide between ; there are orphans ^ 
 whose status must be examined ; and guardians of prisoners 
 to appoint. These, be it borne in mind, are all matters of 
 yearly occurrence ; while at intervals there are exemptions and 
 abstentions from military service * which call for adjudication, 
 or in connection with some other extraordinary misdemeanour, 
 some case of outrage and violence of an exceptional character, 
 or some charge of impiety. A whole string of others I simply 
 omit ; I am content to have named the most important part 
 with the exception of the assessments of tribute which occur, 
 as a rule, at intervals of five years.^ 
 
 ^ Adopting the emendation of Kirchhoff, who inserts the sentence in 
 brackets. For the festivals in question, see Diet, of Antij. " Lampade- 
 phoria " ; C. R. Kennedy, Demosth. against Lepiines, etc. , App. vi. 
 
 ^ For the institution called the SoKiitaala, see Aristot. Constitution of Athens, 
 ch. Iv. 
 
 8 See Dem. against Midias, 565, 17; against Afhobus (i) , 814, 20. 
 
 * See Lys. Or. xiv. and xv. 
 
 " See Grote, H. G. vi. p. 48 ; Thuc. vii. 78 ; i. 96 ; Arist. Wasp, 707 ; 
 Aristot. Pol. V. 8. 
 
 VOL. II V 
 
ago THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS ch. hi. § 5.9 
 
 1 put it to you, then : can any one suppose that all, or any, 
 of these may dispense with adjudication?^ If so, will any 
 one say which ought, and which ought not, to be adjudicated 
 on, there and then ? If, on the other hand, we are forced to 
 admit that these are all fair cases for adjudication, it follows 
 of necessity that they should be decided during the twelve- 
 month; since even now the boards of judges sitting right 
 through the year are powerless to stay the tide of evildoing by 
 reason of the multitude of the people. 
 
 So far so good.^ " But," some one will say, " try the cases 
 you certainly must, but lessen the number of the judges." 
 But if so, it follows of necessity that unless the number of 
 courts themselves are diminished in number there will only be 
 a few judges sitting in each court,^ with the further consequence 
 that in dealing with so small a body of judges it will be easier 
 for a litigant to present an invulnerable front ^ to the court, 
 and to bribe ^ the whole body, to the great detriment of 
 justice.* 
 
 But besides this we cannot escape the conclusion that the 
 Athenians have their festivals to keep, during which the courts 
 cannot sit.' As a matter of fact these festivals are twice as 
 numerous as those of any other people. But I will reckon 
 them as merely equal to those of the state which has the 
 fewest. 
 
 This being so, I maintain that it is not possible for business 
 affairs at Athens to stand on any very different footing from 
 the present, except to some slight extent, by adding here and 
 deducting there. Any large modification is out of the 
 question, short of damaging the democracy itself. No doubt 
 
 ' Reading with Kirchhoff. Cf. for oie<r6at xpi). ffeli, VI. iv. 23 ; Cyr. 
 IV. ii. 28. 
 
 2 See Grote, i/. G. v. 514, 520 ; Machiavelli, Disc, s, Livio, i. 7. 
 
 ' Reading with Sauppe, i.v&yK'g toIvw, khv fii] [for the vulgate iliv /iiv 
 dXlya K.T.X.] S\lya wouavTCU SMaarripia, Sfdyoi iv iK&arif iaovTOX rifi 
 SiKaiirripl(f. Or, adopting Weiske's emendation, ii,v iiiv iroWa ttoiuvtoi 
 SiKaffTiipM K.T.'K. Translate : ' ' Then, if by so doing they manage to multiply 
 the law courts, there will be only a few judges sitting," etc. 
 * Or, as Liddell and Scott, "to prepare all his tricks." 
 ^ awSeK&tTai, ' ' to bribe in the lump." This is Schneider's happy emenda- 
 tion of the MS. ffmSiKiiffai ; see Demosthenes, 1137, 1. 
 
 ° Reading fiffTe, lit. " so as to get a far less just judgment. " 
 
 ' Lit, " it is not possible to give judgment " ; or, " for juries to sit. " 
 
cii. in. § 9-13 STRENGTH OF THE DEMOCRACY 291 
 
 many expedients might be discovered for improving the con- 
 stitution, but if the problem be to discover some adequate 
 means of improving the constitution, while at the same time 
 the democracy is to remain intact, I say it is not easy to do 
 this, except, as I have just stated, to the extent of some trifling 
 addition here or deduction there. 
 
 There is another point in which it is sometimes felt that 
 the Athenians are ill advised, in their adoption, namely, of the 
 less respectable party, in a state divided by faction. But if 
 so, they do it advisedly. If they chose the more respect- 
 able, they would be adopting those whose views and interests 
 differ from their own, for there is no state in which the best 
 element is friendly to the people. It is the worst element 
 which in every state favours the democracy — on the principle 
 that like favours like.^ It is simple enough then. The 
 Athenians choose what is most akin to themselves. Also on 
 every occasion on which they have attempted to side with 
 the better classes, it has not fared well with them, but within 
 a short interval the democratic party has been enslaved, as 
 for instance in Boeotia ; ^ or, as when they chose the aristo- 
 crats of the Milesians, and within a short time these revolted 
 and cut the people to pieces ; or, as when they chose the 
 Lacedaemonians as against the Messenians, and within a short 
 time the Lacedaemonians subjugated the Messenians and went 
 to war against Athens. 
 
 I seem to overhear a retort, " No one, of course, is deprived 
 of his_cLvil rights, at Athens- unjustly." My answer is, that 
 there are some who are unjustly deprived of their civil rights, 
 though the cases are certainly rare. But it will take more 
 than a few to attack the democracy at Athens, since you 
 may take it as an established fact, it is not the man who has 
 lost his civil rights justly that takes the matter to heart, but 
 the victims, if any, of injustice. But how in the world can 
 any one imagine that many are in a state of civil disability at 
 Athens, where the People and the holders of office are one and 
 
 1 I.e. "birds of a feather." 
 
 2 The references are perhaps (i) to the events of the year 447 B.C., see 
 Thuo. i. 113 ; cf. Aristot. Pol. v. 3, s ; (2) to 440 b.c., Thuc. i. 115 ; Diod. 
 xii. 27, 28 ; Pint. Pericl. c. 24 ; (3) to those of 464 B.C., followed by 457 B.C., 
 Thuc. i. 102 ; Plut. Cimon. c. 16 ; and Thuc. i. 108. 
 
292 THE POLITY OF THE ATHENIANS ch. 111.I13 
 
 the same ? It is from iniquitous exercise of office, from iniquity 
 exhibited either in speech or action, and the like circumstances, 
 that citizens are punished with deprivation of civil rights in 
 Athens. Due reflection on these matters will serve to dispel 
 the notion that there is any danger at Athens from persons 
 visited with disfranchisement. 
 
THE POLITY 
 OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS 
 
THE 
 POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS 
 
 I- 1-3 
 
 I RECALL the astonishment with which I ^ first noted the unique 
 position ^ of Sparta amongst the states of Hellas, the relatively 
 sparse population,* and at the same time the extraordinary 
 power and prestige of the community. I was puzzled to 
 account for the fact. It was only when I came to consider 
 the peculiar institutions of the Spartans that my wonderment 
 ceased. Or rather, it is transferred to the legislator who gave 
 them those laws, obedience to which has been the secret of 
 their prosperity. This legislator, Lycurgus, I must needs 
 admire, and hold him to have been one of the wisest of 
 mankind. Certainly he was no servile imitator of other states. ■ 
 It was by a stroke of invention rather, and on a pattern much 
 in opposition to the commonly-accepted one, that he brought 
 his fatherland to this pinnacle of prosperity. 
 
 Take for example — and it is well to begin at the beginning * 
 -i— tfie whole topic of the begetting and rearing of children, 
 throughout the rest of the world the young girl, who will one 
 day become a mother (and I speak of those who may be held 
 
 ^ See the opening words of the Cyrop. and of the Symp. 
 
 ^ Or, ■ ' the phenomenal character. " See Grote, H. G. ix. 320 foil. ; 
 Newman, Pol. Arist. i. 202. «- 
 
 ' See Herod, vii. 234 ; Aristot. Pol. ii. 9, 14 foil. ; Muller, Dorians, ili. 10 
 (vol. ii. p. 203, Eng. tr. ). 
 
 * Cf. a fragment of Critias cited by Clement, Stromata, vi. p. 741, 6 ; 
 Athen. x. 432, 433 ; see A Fragment of Xenophon (?), ap. Stob. Flor, 88, 14, 
 translated by J. Hookham Frere, Theognis Restitutus, vol. i. 333 ; G, Sauppe, 
 Append, de Frag. Xen. p. 293 ; probably by Antisthenes (Bergk. ii. 497). 
 
296 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS ch. i. § 3-6 
 
 to be well brought up), is nurtured on the plainest food attain- 
 able, with the scantiest addition of meat or other condiments ; 
 whilst as to wine they train them either to total abstinence or 
 to tal^ it highly diluted with water. And in imitation, as it 
 were, of the handicraft type, since the majority of artificers are 
 sedentary,^ we, the rest of the Hellenes, are content that our 
 girls should sit quietly and work wools. That is all we demand 
 of them. But how are we to expect that women nurtured in 
 this fashion should produce a splendid offspring ? 
 
 Lycurgus pursued a different path. Clothes were things, 
 he held, the furnishing of which might well enough be left to 
 female slaves. And, believing that the highest function of a 
 free woman was the bearing ok children, in the first place he 
 insisted on the training of the body as incumbent no less on 
 the female than the male ; and in pursuit of the same idea 
 instituted rival contests in running and feats of strength for 
 women as for men. His belief was that where both parents 
 were strong their progeny would be found to be more vigorous. 
 
 And so again after marriage. In view of the fact that 
 immoderate intercourse is elsewhere permitted during the 
 earher period of matrimony, he adopted a principle directly 
 opposite. He laid it down as an ordinance that a man should 
 be ashamed to be seen visiting the chamber of his wife, whether 
 going in or coming out. When they did meet under such 
 restraint the mutual longing of these lovers could not but be 
 increased, and the fruit which might spring from such inter- 
 course would tend to be more robust than theirs whose affec- 
 tions are cloyed by satiety. By a farther step in the same 
 direction he refused to allow marriages to be contracted ^ at 
 any period of life according to the fancy of the parties con- 
 cerned. Marriage, as he Ordained it, must only take place in 
 the prime of bodily vigour,^ this too being, as he believed, a 
 condition conducive to the production of healthy offspring. 
 
 ^ Or, " such technical work is for the most part sedentary." 
 
 8 ' ' The bride to be wooed and won. " The phrase iyetrOai perhaps points 
 
 to some primitive custom of capturing and carrying off the bride, but it had 
 
 probably become conventional. 
 
 ^ Cf. Plut. Lycurg. 15 (Clough, i. loi). " In their marriages the husband 
 
 carried off his bride by a sort of force ; nor were their brides ever small and 
 
 of tender years, but in their full bloom and ripeness. " 
 
cHili.Vr""} ORIGINALITY OF LYCURGUS'S LAWS 297 
 
 Or again, to meet the case which might occur of an old man ^ 
 wedded to a young wife. Considering the jealous watch which 
 such husbands are apt to keep over their wives, he introduced 
 a directly opposite custom; that is to say, he made it in- 
 cumbent pn the aged husband to introduce some one whose 
 qualities, physical and moral, he admired, to play the husband's 
 part and to beget him children. Or again, in the case of a 
 man who might not desire to live with a wife permanently, 
 but yet might still be anxious to have children of his own 
 worthy the name, the lawgiver laid down a law ^ in his behalf 
 Such an one might select some woman, the wife of some man, 
 well born herself and blest with fair offspring, and, the sanction 
 and consent of heir husband first obtained, raise up children 
 for himself through her. 
 .-^ These and many other adaptations of a like sort the law- 
 giver sanctioned. As, for instance, at Sparta a wife will not 
 object to bear the burden of a double establishment,* or a 
 husband tO adopt sons as foster-brothers' of his own children, 
 with a full share in his family and position, but possessing no 
 claim to his wealth and property. 
 
 So opposed to those of the rest of the world are the 
 principles which Lycurgus devised in reference to the produc- 
 tion of children. Whether they enabled him to provide Sparta 
 with a race of men superior to all in size and strength I leave 
 to the judgment of whomsoever it may concern. 
 
 With this exposition of the customs in connection with 
 the birth of children, I wish now to explain the systems of 
 education in fashion here and elsewhere. Throughout the 
 rest of Hellas the custom on the part of those who claim to 
 educate their sons in the best way is as follows. As soon as 
 the children are of an age to understand what is said to them 
 they are immediately placed under the charge of Paidagogoi * 
 
 1 Cf. Plut. Lycurg. 15 (Clough, i. 103). 
 
 2 Or, "established a custom to suit the case." 
 
 ' Cf. Plut. Comf. of Numa with Lycurgus, 4 ; Cato mi. 25 (Clough, i. 
 163 ; iv. 39s). 
 
 * =" boy-leaders." Cf. St. Paul, Ep. Gal. m. 24: The Law was our 
 schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ. 
 
298 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS en. n. § i-s 
 
 (or tutors), who are also attendants, and sent off to the school 
 of some teacher to be taught " grammar," " music," and the 
 concerns of the palestra.^ Besides this they are given shoes ^ 
 to wear which tend to make their feet tender, and their bodies 
 are enervated by various changes of clothing. And as for 
 food, the only measure recognised is that which is fixed by 
 appetite. 
 
 But when we turn to Lycurgus, instead of leaving it to 
 each member of the state privately to appoint a slave to be 
 his son's tutor, he set over the young Spartans a public 
 guardian, the Paidonomos^ or "pastor," to give him his 
 proper title,* with complete authority over them. This 
 guardian was selected from those who filled the highest 
 magistracies. He had authority to hold musters of the boys,^ 
 and as their overseer, in case of any misbehaviour, to chastise 
 severely. The legislator further provided the pastor with a 
 body of youths in the prime of life, and bearing whips,® to 
 inflict punishment when necessary, with this happy result that 
 in Sparta modesty and obedience ever go hand in hand, nor 
 is there lack of either. 
 
 Instead of softening their feet with shoe or sandal, his rule 
 was to make them hardy through going barefoot.'^ This 
 habit, if practised, would, as he believed, enable them to scale 
 heights more easily and clamber down precipices with less 
 danger. In fact, with his feet so trained the young Spartan 
 would leap and spring and run faster unshod than another 
 shod in the ordinary way. 
 
 Instead of making them effeminate with a variety of clothes, 
 his rule was to habituate them to a single garment the whole 
 year through, thinking that so they would be better prepared 
 to withstand the variations of heat and cold. 
 
 Again, as regards food, according to his regulation the 
 Eiren,^ or head of the flock, must see that his messmates 
 
 ' Cf, Plato, Ale. maj. 106 E ; Theages, 122 E ; Aristot. Pol. viii. 3. 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' sandals. " 3 _ ■ > boyherd. " 
 
 ' Cf. Plut. Lycurg. 17 (Clough, i. 107) ; Aristot. Pol. iv. 15, 13 ; vii. 17, 5. 
 
 ' Or, "assemble the boys in flocks." 
 
 ^ fia.ffTiyo(l>tipoi = ' ' flagellants. " 
 
 ' Cf. Plut. Lycurg. 16 (Clough, i. 106). 
 
 8 For the Eiren, see Plut. Lycurg. (Clough, i. 107). 
 
CH. ,1. § 5-7 TRAINING OF BOYHOOD 
 
 299 
 
 gathered to the club meal,^ with such moderate food as to 
 avoid that heaviness ^ which is engendered by repletion, and 
 yet not to remain altogether unacquainted with the pains of 
 penurious living. His belief was that by such training in boy- 
 hood they would be better able when occasion demanded to 
 continue toiling on an empty stomach. They would be all 
 the fitter, if the word of command were given, to remain on 
 the stretch for a long time without extra dieting. The craving 
 for luxuries ^ would be less, the readiness to take any victual 
 set before them greater, and, in general, the regime would be 
 found more healthy.* Under it he thought the lads would 
 increase in stature and shape into finer men, since, as he 
 maintained, a dietary which gave suppleness to the limbs 
 must be more conducive to both ends than one which added 
 thickness to the bodily parts by feeding.^ 
 
 On the other hand, in order to guard against a too great 
 pinch of starvation, though he did not actually allow the 
 boys to help themselves without further trouble to what they 
 needed more, he did give them permission to steal ^ this 
 thing or that in the effort to alleviate their hunger. It was 
 not of course from any real difficulty how else to supply 
 them with nutriment that he left it to them to provide them- 
 selves by this crafty method. Nor can I conceive that any 
 one will so misinterpret the custom. Clearly its explanation 
 lies in the fact that he who would live the life of a robber 
 must forgo sleep by night, and in the daytime he must em- 
 ploy shifts and lie in ambuscade ; he must prepare and make 
 
 1 Reading cvupoXeieiv (for the vulg. av/ipovXeiav). The emendation is 
 now commonly adopted. For the word itself, see L. Dindorf, ». ad loc. , and 
 Schneider. ai\t,^oKav — Ipapos or club meal. Perhaps we ought to read 
 ixovras instead of ^xocT-a. 
 
 ^ See Plut. Lycurg. 17 (Clough, i. 108). 
 
 3 Lit. "condiments," such as "meat," "fish," etc. ^& Cyrop. I. ii. 8. 
 
 'Or, " and in general they would live more healthily and increase in 
 stature." 
 
 " See L. Dindorf 's emendation of this corrupt passage, ». ad loc. (based 
 upon Plut. Lycurg. 17 and Ps. Plut. Moral. 237), /coi e& pJr^KOi S' &r ai^dveff- 
 ffai (fiero Kal eieiSeiXTipovs vel xoXXious ylyveaffai, irpbs diiiplrrepa t^v jiaSaib, 
 tA o-iijuora Toiomav Tpo^ijv /iSXXoy o'l/XXo/iijSdi'eo' ■nyijiri.iievos t) rip Sia- 
 wXariJi'ovffai'. Otherwise I would suggest to read Kal els /aJKos &v ai^iveaBac 
 Tr)!' [yap'] jiaStvi, . . . iiy^ffaro k. t. X. , which is closer to the vulgate, and gives 
 nearly the same sense. ' See Anat. IV. vi. 14 (Trans, vol, i. p. 198)! 
 
300 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS ch.u.|7-ii 
 
 ready his scouts, and so forth, if he is to succeed in captur- 
 ing the quarry.^ 
 
 It is obvious, I say, that the whole of this education 
 tended, and was intended, to make the boys craftier and more 
 inventive in getting in supplies, whilst at the same time it 
 cultivated their . warlike instincts. An objector may retort : 
 " But if he thought it so fine a feat to steal, why did he inflict 
 all those blows on the unfortunate who was caught?" My 
 answer is : for the self-same reason which induces people, in 
 other matters which are taught, to punish the mal-performance 
 of a service. So they, the Lacedaemonians, visit penalties on 
 the boy who is detected thieving as being but a sorry bungler 
 in the art. So to steal as many cheeses as possible [off the 
 shrine of Orthia ^J was a feat to be encouraged ; but, at the 
 same moment, others were enjoined to scourge the thief, which 
 would point a moral not obscurely, that by pain endured for 
 a brief season a man may earn the joyous reward of lasting 
 glory.8 Herein, too, it is plainly shown that where speed is 
 requisite the sluggard will win for himself much trouble and 
 scant good. 
 
 Furthermore, and in order that the boys should not want 
 a ruler, even in case the pastor* himself were absent, he 
 gave to any citizen who chanced to be present authority to 
 lay upon them injunctions for their good, and to chastise 
 them for any trespass committed. By so doing he created in 
 the boys of Sparta a most rare modesty and reverence. And 
 indeed there is nothing which, whether as boys or men, they 
 respect more highly than the ruler. Lastly, and with the same 
 intention, that the boys must never be reft of a ruler, even if 
 by chance there were no grown man present, he laid down the 
 rule that in such a case the most active of the Leaders or 
 Prefects ^ was to become ruler for the nonce, each of his own 
 
 ^ For the institution named the Kpxnrrela, see Plut. Lycurg. 28 (Clough, i. 
 120) ; Plato, Laws, i. 633 B ; for the iCKairela, ib. vii. 823 E ; Isocr. Panathen. 
 277 B. 
 
 ^ I.e. "Artemis of the Steep " — a title connecting the goddess with Mount 
 Orthion or Orthosion. See Pausan. VIII. xxiii. i ; and for the custom, see 
 Themistius, Or. 21, p. 250 A. The words have perhaps got out of their 
 right place. See Schneider's Index, s.v. 
 
 ' See Plut. Lycurg. 18 ; Morals, 239 c ; ArisHd. 17 ; Cic. Tusc. ii. 14. 
 
 * Lit. " Paidonomos. " ^ Lit. "Eirens. " 
 
CH. ... § 11-14 IN CONTRAST WITH OTHER STATES 301 
 
 division. The conclusion being that under no circumstances 
 whatever are the boys of Sparta destitute of one to rule them. 
 
 I ought, as it seems to me, not to omit some remark on 
 the subject of boy attachments,^ it being a topic in close con- 
 nection with that of boyhood and the training of boys. 
 
 We know that the rest of the Hellenes deal with this 
 relationship in different ways, either after the manner of the 
 Boeotians,^ where man and boy are intimately united by a bond 
 like that of wedlock, or after the manner of the Eleians, where 
 the fruition of beauty is an act of grace j whilst there are 
 others who would absolutely debar the lover from all conversa- 
 tion ^ and discourse with the beloved. 
 
 Lycurgus adopted a system opposed to all of these alike, 
 Given that soihe one, himself being all that a man ought to be, 
 should in admiration of a boy's soul * endeavour to discover 
 in him a true friend without reproach, and to consort with 
 him — this was a relationship which Lycurgus commended, and 
 indeed regarded as the noblest type of bringing up. But if, 
 as was evident, it was not an attachment to the soul, but a 
 yearning merely to'A'ards the body, he stamped"^ this thing as 
 foul and horrible ; and with this result, to the credit of Lycurgus 
 be it said, that in Lacedaemon the relationship of lover and 
 beloved is like that of parent and child or brother and brother 
 where carnal appetite is in abeyance. 
 
 That this, however, which is the fact, should be scarcely 
 credited in some quarters does not surprise me, seeing that in 
 many states the laws -^ do not oppose the desires in question. 
 
 I have now described' the two chief methods of education 
 in vogue; that is to say, the Lacedaemonian as contrasted 
 with that of the rest of Hellas, and I leave it to the judgment 
 of him whom it may concern, which of the two has produced 
 the finer type of men. And by finer I mean the better dis- 
 ciphned, the more modest and reverential, and, in matters 
 where self-restraint is a virtue, the more continent. 
 
 ' See Plut. Lycurg. 17 (Clough, i. 109). 
 
 2 See Xen. Symp. viii. 34 ; Plato, Symp. 182 B (Jowett, 11. p. 33). 
 ' 8ioX^7e(r9ni came to mean philosophic discussion and debate. Is the 
 author thinking of Socrates ? See Mem. I. ii. 35; IV. v. 12. 
 * See Xen. Symp. viii. 35 ; Plut. Lycurg. 18. 
 s I.e. "law and custom." 
 
302 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS ch. m. 8 i-s 
 
 Coming to the critical period at which a boy ceases to be 
 a boy and becomes a youth,^ we find that it is just then that 
 the rest of the world proceed to emancipate their children 
 from the private tutor and the schoolmaster, and, without 
 substituting any further ruler, are content to launch them into 
 absolute independence. 
 
 Here, again, Lycurgus took an entirely opposite view of 
 the matter. This, if observation might be trusted, was the 
 season when the tide of animal spirits flows fast, and the froth 
 of insolence rises to the surface ; when, too, the most violent 
 appetites for divers pleasures, in serried ranks, invade^ the 
 mind. This, then, was the right moment at which to impose 
 tenfold labours upon the growing youth, and to devise for him 
 a subtle system of absorbing occupation. And by a crowning 
 enactment, which said that "he who shrank from the duties 
 imposed on him would forfeit henceforth all claim to the 
 glorious honours of the state," he caused, not only the public 
 authorities, but those personally interested^ in the several 
 companies of youths to take serious pains so that no single 
 individual of them should by an act of craven cowardice find 
 himself utterly rejected and reprobate within the body politic. 
 
 Furthermore, in his desire firmly to implant in their youth- 
 ful souls a root of modesty he imposed upon these bigger boys 
 a special rule. In the very streets they were to keep their two 
 hands * within the folds of the cloak ; they were to walk in 
 silence and without turning their heads to gaze, now here, now 
 there, but rather to keep their eyes fixed upon the ground 
 before them. And hereby it would seem to be proved con- 
 clusively that, even in the matter of quiet bearing and sobriety,^ 
 the masculine type may claim greater strength than that which 
 
 ^ els rb /leipaKiovadai, "with reference to hobbledehoy-hood." Cobet 
 erases the phrase as post-Xenophontine. 
 
 ^ Lit. "range themselves." For the idea, see Mem. I. ii. 23 ; Swinburne, 
 Sengs before Sunrise : Prelude, " Past youth where shoreward shallows are." 
 
 ' Or, " the friends and connections. " 
 
 * See Cic. pro Coelio, 5. 
 
 ^ See Plat. Charmid. 159 B ; Jowett, Plato, I. 15, 
 
cHilv'; 1,^-3^} OF YOUTH AND EARLY MANHOOD 303 
 
 we attribute to the nature of women. At any rate, you might 
 sooner expect a stone image to find voice than one of those 
 Spartan youths ; to divert the eyes of some bronze statue were 
 less difficult. And as to quiet bearing, no bride ever stepped 
 in bridal bower ^ with more natural modesty. Note them 
 when they have reached the public table.^ The plainest 
 answer to the question asked, — that is all you need expect 
 to hear from their lips. 
 
 IV 
 
 But if he was thus careful in the education of the stripling,^ 
 the Spartan lawgiver showed a still greater anxiety in dealing 
 with those who had reached the prime of opening manhood ; 
 considering their immense importance to the city in the scale 
 of good, if only they proved themselves the men they should be. 
 He had only to look around to see that wherever the spirit of 
 emulation * is most deeply seated, there, too, their choruses and 
 gymnastic contests will present alike a far higher charm to eye 
 and ear. And on the same principle he persuaded himself that 
 he needed only to confront ^ his youthful warriors in the strife of 
 valour, and with like result. They also, in their degree, might 
 be expected to attain to some unknown height of manly virtue. 
 
 What method he adopted to engage these combatants I 
 will now explain. It is on this wise. Their ephors select 
 three men out of the whole body of the citizens in the prime 
 of life. These three are named Hippagretai, or masters of 
 the horse. Each of these selects one hundred others, being 
 
 ^ Longinus, irepl Sij/, iv. 4, reading 6(p$a\iJ.ois for BoKd/iois, says : ' ' Yet why 
 speak of Timaeus, when even men like Xenophon and Plato, the very demigods 
 of literature, though they had sat at the feet of Socrates, sometimes forget them- 
 selves in the pursuit of such pretty conceits ? The former in his account of the 
 Spartan Polity has these words : ' Their voice you would no more hear, than 
 if they were of marble, their gaze is as immovable as if they were cast in 
 bronze. You would deem them more modest than the very maidens in their 
 eyes." To speak of the pupils of the eye as modest maidens was a piece of 
 absurdity becoming Amphicrates rather than Xenophon ; and then what a 
 strange notion to suppose that modesty is always without exception expressed 
 in the eye I "— H. L. Howell, Longinus, p. 8. See Spectator, No. 354. 
 
 ^ See Paus. VII. i. 8, the 4>idlnov or ipMnov ; above. Hell. V. iv. 28, p. i?6. 
 
 s See Hell. V. iv. 32 (above, p. 127). 
 
 * Cf. Cyrop. II. i. 22. ' Or, "pit face to face." 
 
304 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS cH.1v.l3-7 
 
 bound to explain for what reason he prefers in honour these 
 and disapproves of those. The result is that those who fail 
 to obtain the distinction are now at open war, not only 
 with those who rejected them, but with those who were 
 chosen in their stead ; and they keep ever a jealous eye on 
 one another to detect some slip of conduct contrary to the 
 high code of honour there held customary. And so is set on 
 foot that strife, in truest sense acceptable to heaven, and for 
 the purposes of state most politic. It is a strife in which not 
 only is the pattern of a brave man's conduct fully set forth, 
 but where, too, each against other and in separate camps, the 
 rival parties train for victory. One day the superiority "Shall 
 be theirs ; or, in the day of need, one and all to the last man, 
 they will be ready to aid the fatherland with all their strength. 
 
 Necessity, moreover, is laid upon them to study a good 
 habit of the body, coming as they do to blows with their fists 
 for very strife's sake wherever they meet. Albeit, any one 
 present has a right to separate the combatants, and, if obe- 
 dience is not shown to the peacemaker, the Pastor of youth ^ 
 hales the delinquent before the ephors, and the ephors inflict 
 heavy damages, since they will have it plainly understood that 
 rage must never override obedience to law. 
 
 With regard to those who have already passed ^ the vigour 
 of early manhood, and on whom the highest magistracies 
 henceforth devolve, there is a like contrast. In Hellas gener- 
 ally we find that at this age the need of further attention to 
 physical strength is removed, although the imposition of mili- 
 tary service continues. But Lycurgus made it customary for 
 that section of his citizens to regard hunting as the highest 
 honour suited to their age ; albeit, not to the exclusion of any 
 public duty.^ And his aim was that they might be equally 
 able to undergo the fatigues of war with those in the prime 
 of early manhood. 
 
 1 Lit. "the Paidonomos." 
 
 2 Probably the dyaSoepyol, technically so called. See Herod, i. 67 ; 
 Schneider, ap. Dindorf. 
 
 ' Lit. "save only if some public duty intervened." See Qim/i. I. ii. 
 
cH.v.§i-5 STYLE OF LIVING : PUBLIC MEALS 305 
 
 The above is a fairly exhaustive statement of the institu- 
 tions traceable to the legislation of Lycurgus in connection 
 with the successive stages ^ of a citizen's life. It remains that 
 I should endeavour to describe "the style of living which he 
 established for the whole body, irrespectively of age. It will 
 be understood that, when Lycurgus first came to deal with the 
 question, the Spartans, like the rest of the Hellenes, used to 
 mess privately at home. Tracing more than half the current 
 misdemeanours to this custom,^ he was determined to drag 
 his people out of holes and corners in|:q^ the broad day- 
 light, and so he invented the public mess-rOoms. Whereby 
 he expected at any rate to minimise the transgression of 
 orders. 
 
 As to food,^ his ordinance allowed them so much as, 
 while not inducing repletion, should guard them from actual 
 want. And, in fact, there are many exceptional * dishes in the 
 shape of game supplied from the hunting field. Or, as a 
 substitute for these, rich men will occasionally garnish the 
 feast with wheaten loaves. So that from beginning to end, 
 till the mess breaks up, the common board is never stinted 
 for viands, nor yet extravagantly furnished. 
 
 So also in the matter of drink. Whilst putting a stop to 
 all unnecessary potations, detrimental alike to a firm brain 
 and a steady gait,^ he left them free to quench thirst when 
 nature dictated ^ ; a method which would at once add to the 
 pleasure whilst it diminished the danger of drinking. And 
 indeed one may fairly ask how, on such a system of common 
 meals, it would be possible for any one to ruin either himself 
 or his family through either gluttony or wine-bibbing. 
 
 This too must be borne in mind, that in other states equals 
 
 1 Lit. "with each age"; see Plut. Lycurg. 25; Hesychius, s.v. Iptpes ; 
 Hell. VI. iv. 17 ; V. iv. 13 (above, pp. 123, 163). 
 
 ^ Reading after Cobet, h Toirif. 
 
 s See Plut. Lycurg. 12 (Clough, i. 97). 
 
 * irapdXova, i.e. unexpected dishes, technically named iiraiiCKa (hors 
 d'asuvres), as we learn from Athenaeus, iv. 140, 141. 
 
 " Or, ' ' apt to render brain and body alike unsteady. " 
 
 " See Agesilaus (above, p. 265) ; also Mem. and Cyrop. 
 
 VOL. II X 
 
3o6 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS ch. v. § 5.9 
 
 in age,^ for the most part, associate together, and such an 
 atmpsphere js little conducive to modesty.^ Whereas in Sparta 
 Lycurgus was careful so to blend the ages ^ that the younger 
 men must benefit largely by the experience of the elder — an 
 education in itself, and the more so since by custom of the 
 country conversation at the common meal has reference to 
 the honourable acts which this man or that man may have 
 performed in relation to the state. The scene, in fact, but little 
 lends itself to the intrusion of violence or drunken riot ; ugly 
 speech and ugly deeds alike are out of place. Amongst other 
 good results obtained through this out-door system of meals 
 may be mentiohed these : There is the necessity of walking 
 home when thfe meal is over, and a consequent anxiety not 
 to be caught tripping under the influence of wine, since 
 they all know of course that the supper-table must be presently 
 abandoned,* and that they must move as freely in the dark as 
 in the day, even the help of a torch ^ to guide the steps being 
 forbidden to all on active service. 
 
 In connection with this matter, Lycurgus had not failed 
 to observe the effect of equal amounts of food on different 
 persons. The hardworking man has a good complexion, 
 his muscles are well fed, he is robust and strong. The man 
 who abstains from work, on the other hand, may be detected 
 by his- miserable appearance; he is blotched and puffy, 
 and devoid of strength. ' This observation, I say, was not 
 wasted on him. On the contrary, turning it over in his mind 
 that any one who chooses, as a matter of private judgment, to 
 devote himself to toil may hope to present a very creditable 
 appearance physically, he enjoined upon the eldest for the 
 time being in every gymnasium to see to it that the labours of 
 the class were proportional to the meats.^ And to my mind 
 
 1 Cf. Plat. Phaedr. 240 C ; ^XiJ ^Xtfco ripiret, "Equals delight in equals." 
 
 2 Or, " these gatherings for the most part consist of equals in age (young 
 fellows), in whose society the virtue of modesty is least likely to display 
 itself." 
 
 ' See Plut. Lycurg. 12 (Clough, i. 98). 
 
 ' Or, "that they are not going to stay aJl night where they have supped." 
 
 ^ See Plut. Lycurg. 12 (Clough, i. 99). 
 
 " I.e. "not inferior in excellence to the diet which they enjoyed." The 
 reading here adopted I owe to Dr. Arnold Hug, lis /u^j irivovs airuv i\dTTOVs 
 Twv triTluv ylyveaStu. 
 
cH.vi.^'T-s} COMMUNISTIC PRINCIPLES 307 
 
 he was not out of his reckoning in this matter more than else- 
 where. At any rate, it would be hard to discover a healthier 
 or more completely developed human being, physically speak- 
 ing, than the Spartan. Their gymnastic training, in fact, makes 
 demands alike on the legs and arms and neck,^ etc., simul- 
 taneously. 
 
 VI 
 
 There are other points in which this legislator's views run 
 counter to those commonly accepted. Thus : in other states the 
 individual citizen is master over his own children, domestics,^ 
 goods and chattels, and belongings generally; but Lycurgus, 
 whose aim was to secure to all the citizens a considerable share 
 in one another's goods without mutual injury, enacted that 
 each one should have an equal power over his neighbour's 
 children as over his own.^ The principle is this. When a 
 man knows that this, that, and the other person are fathers of 
 children subject to his own authority, he must perforce deal 
 by them even as he desires his own children to be dealt by. 
 And, if a boy chance to have received a whipping, not from 
 his own father but some other, and goes and complains to his 
 own father, it would be thought wrong on the part of that 
 father if he did not inflict a second whipping on his son. A 
 striking proof, in its way, how completely they trust each other 
 not to impose dishonourable commands upon their children.* 
 
 In the same way he empowered them to use their neigh- 
 bour's^ domestics in case of need. This communism he 
 applied also to dogs used for the chase ; in so far that a party in 
 need of dogs will invite the owner to the chase, and if he is 
 not at leisure to attend himself, at any rate he is happy to let 
 his dogs go. The same applies to the use of horses. Some 
 one has fallen sick perhaps, or is in want of a carqage,^ or is 
 anxious to reach some point or other quickly — in any case he 
 
 • See Plat. Laws, vii. 796 A ; Jowett, Plato, v. p. 365 ; Xen. Symf. ii. 7 ; 
 Plut. Lycurg. 19. 
 
 '^ Or rather, " members of his household. " 
 
 3 See Plut. Lycurg. 15 (Clough, i. 104). ' See Plut. Moral. 237 D. 
 
 " See Aristot. Pol. ii. s (Jowett, i. pp. xxxi. and 34 ; ii. p. S3) ; Plat- 
 Laws, viii. 845 A ; Newman, Pol. Aristot. ii. 249 foil. 
 
 ^ " Has not a carriage of his own." 
 
3o8 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS { ch. v'l'ifi'i'ts 
 
 has a right, if he sees a horse anywhere, to take and use it, and 
 restores it safe and sound when he has done with it. 
 
 And here is another institution attributed to Lycurgus 
 which scarcely coincides with the customs elsewhere in vogue. 
 A hunting party returns from the chase, belated. They 
 want provisions — they have nothing prepared themselves. 
 To meet this contingency he made it a rule that owners^ 
 are to leave behind the food that has been dressed ; and the 
 party in need will open the seals, take out what they want, 
 seal up the remainder, and leave it. Accordingly, by his 
 system of give-and-take even those with next to nothing ^ have 
 a share in all that the country can supply, if ever they stand 
 in need of anything. 
 
 VII 
 
 There are yet other customs in Sparta which Lycurgus 
 instituted in opposition to those of the rest of Hellas, and the 
 following among them. We all know that in the generality 
 of states every one devotes his full energy to the business 
 of making money : one man as a tiller of the soil, another 
 as a mariner, a third as a merchant,^ whilst others depend 
 on various arts to earn a living. But at Sparta Lycurgus 
 forbade his freeborn citizens to have anything whatsoever 
 to do with the concerns of money -making. As freemen, 
 he enjoined upon them to regard as their concern exclusively 
 those activities upon which the foundations of civic liberty are 
 based. 
 
 And indeed, one may well ask, for what reason should 
 wealth be regarded as a matter for serious pursuit* in a 
 community where, partly by a system of equal contributions 
 to the necessaries of life, and partly by the maintenance of 
 a common standard of living, the lawgiver placed so 
 effectual a check upon the desire for riches for the sake of 
 
 1 Reading ireirafiivovs, or if weirairiihovs, "who have ahready finished 
 their I'epasts. " 
 
 ^ See Aristot. Pol. ii. 9 (Jowett, i. pp. xlii. and 52) ; MuUer, Dorians, iii. 
 ID, I (vol. ii. 197, Eng. tr.). 
 
 ' See Plut. Lycurg. 10 (Clough, i. 96). 
 
cllivm.Vi^} AS TO MONEY-MAKING ; THE EPHORS 309 
 
 luxury? What inducement, for instance, would there be to 
 make money, even for the sake of wearing apparel, in a state 
 where personal adornment is held to lie not in the costliness 
 of the clothes they wear, but in the healthy condition of the 
 body to be clothed ? Nor again could there be much induce- 
 ment to amass wealth, in order to be able to expend it on the 
 members of a common mess, where the legislator had made it 
 seem far more glorious that a man should help his fellows by 
 the labour of his body than by costly outlay. The latter being, 
 as he finely phrased it, the function of wealth, the former an 
 activity of the soul. 
 
 He went a step farther, and set up a strong barrier (even 
 in a society such as I have described) against the pursuance 
 of money-making by wrongful means. ^ In the first place, he 
 established a coinage ^ of so extraordinary a sort, that even a 
 single sum of ten minas ^ could not come into a house without 
 attracting the notice, either of the master himself, or of some 
 member of his household. In fact, it would occupy a con- 
 siderable space, and need a waggon to carry it. Gold and 
 silver themselves, moreover, are liable to search,* and in case 
 of detection, the possessor subjected to a penalty. In fact, 
 to repeat the question asked above, for what reason should 
 money-making become an earnest pursuit in a community 
 where the possession of wealth entails more pain than its 
 employment brings satisfaction ? 
 
 But to proceed. We are all aware that there is no'state^ 
 in the world in which greater obedience is shown to magis- 
 trates, and to the laws themselves, than Sparta. But, for 
 my part, I am disposed to think that Lycurgus could never 
 have attempted to establish this healthy condition,® until he 
 
 ^ Or, "against illegitimate commerce.'' 
 
 2 See Plut. Lycurg. 9 (Clougli, i. 94). ' =;^40. circa. 
 
 * See Grote, H. G. ix, 320 ; Aristot. Pol, ii. 9, 37. 
 ^ See Grote, H. G. v. 516 ; Mem. III. v. 18. 
 
 " Or, reading after L. Dindorf, eiTa^iav, "this world - renowned 
 orderliness." 
 
310 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS ch.viii.§i-5 
 
 had first secured the unanimity of the most powerful members 
 of the state. I infer this for the following reasons.^ In other 
 states the leaders in rank and influence do not even desire to 
 be thought to fear the magistrates. Such a thing they would 
 regard as in itself a symbol of servility. In Sparta, on the 
 contrary, the stronger a man is the more readily does he bow 
 before constituted authority. And indeed, they magnify them- 
 selves on their humility,^ and on a prompt obedience, running, 
 or at any rate not crawling with laggard step, at the word of 
 command. Such an example of eager discipline, they are 
 persuaded, set by themselves, will not fail to be followed by 
 the rest. And this is precisely what has taken place. It ^ is 
 reasonable to suppose that it was these same noblest members 
 of the state who combined* to lay the foundation of the 
 ephorate, after they had come to the conclusion themselves, 
 that of all the blessings which a state, or an army, or a house- 
 hold can enjoy, obedience is the greatest. Since, as they 
 could not but reason, the greater the power with which men 
 fence about authority, the greater the fascination it will 
 exercise upon the mind of the citizen, to the enforcement of 
 obedience. 
 
 Accordingly the ephors are competent to punish whom- 
 soever they choose J they have power to exact fines on "the 
 spur of the moment ; they have power to depose magistrates 
 in mid career,^ — nay, actually to imprison and bring them to 
 trial on the capital charge. Entrusted with these vast powers, 
 they do not, as do the rest of states, allow the magistrates 
 elected to exercise authority as they like, right through the 
 year of office ; but, in the style rather of despotic monarchs, 
 or presidents of the games, at the first symptom of an offence 
 against the law they inflict chastisement without warning and 
 without hesitation. 
 
 But of all the many beautiful contrivances invented by 
 
 ' Or, "from these facts." ' See Trans, vol. i. p. cxxvii. 
 
 ' Or, " It was only natural that these same ..." 
 
 * Or, "helped." See Aristot. Pol. v. ii, 3 ; ii. g, i (Jowett, ii. 224); 
 Plut. Lycurg, 7, 29 ; Herod, i. 65 ; Muller, Dorians, iii. 7, 5 (vol. ii. p. 125, 
 Eng. tr.). 
 
 ^ Or, "before the expiration of their term of office." See Plut. Agis, 18 
 (Clough, iv. 464) ; Cic. de Leg. iii. 7 ; de Rep. ii. 33. 
 
chIkI'iU'} obedience to authority 311 
 
 Lycurgus to kindle a willing obedience to the laws in the 
 hearts of the citizens, none, to my mind, was happier or more 
 excellent than his unwillingness to deliver his code to the 
 people at large, until, attended by the most powerful members 
 of the state, he had betaken himself to Delphi,^ and there 
 made inquiry of the god whether it were better for Sparta, 
 and conducive to her interests, to obey the laws which he had 
 framed. And not until the divine answer came : " Better will 
 it be in every way," did he deliver them, laying it down as a 
 last ordinance that to refuse obedience to a code which had 
 the sanction of the Pythian god himself^ was a thing not 
 illegal only, but profane. 
 
 IX 
 
 The following too may well excite our admiration for 
 Lycurgus. I speak of the consummate skill with which he 
 induced the whole state of Sparta to regard an honourable death 
 as preferable to an ignoble life. And indeed if any one will 
 investigate the matter, he will find that by comparison with 
 those who make it a principle to retreat in face of danger, 
 actually fewer of these Spartans die in battle, since, to speak 
 truth, salvation, it would seem, attends on virtue far more 
 frequently than on cowardice — virtue, which is at once easier 
 and sweeter, richer in resource and stronger of arm,^ than her 
 opposite. And that virtue has another familiar attendant — to 
 wit, glory — needs no showing, since the whole world would fain 
 ally themselves after some sort in battle with the good. 
 
 Yet the actual means by which he gave currency to these 
 principles is a point which it were well not to overlook. It 
 is clear that the lawgiver set himself deliberately to provide all 
 the blessings of heaven for the good man, and a sorry and ill- 
 starred existence for the coward. 
 
 In other states the man who shows himself base and 
 cowardly wins to himself an evil reputation and the nickname 
 of a coward, but that is all. For the rest he buys and sells in 
 
 1 See Plut. Lycurg. 5, 6, 29 (Clough, i. 8g, 122) ; Polyb. x. 2, 9. 
 
 2 Or, " a code delivered in Pytho, spoken by the god himself." 
 
 3 See Homer, //. v. 532 ; Tyrtaeusi 11, 14, Tpe(T(T6,vTii3v 5' dvdpwv Tratr* 
 
312 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS {"'■cH:t.''§^ 
 
 the same market-place with the good man ; he sits beside him 
 at the play ; he exercises with him in the same gymnasium, 
 and all as suits his humour. But at Lacedaemon there is not 
 one man who would not feel ashamed to welcome the coward 
 at the common mess-table, or to try conclusions with such an 
 antagonist in a wresthng bout. Consider the day's round of 
 his existence. The sides are being picked up in a football 
 match,^ but he is left out as the odd man : there is no place 
 for him. During the choric dance ^ he is driven away into 
 ignominious quarters. Nay, in the very streets it is he who 
 must step aside for others to pass, or, being seated, he must 
 rise and make room, even for a younger man. At home he 
 will have his maiden relatives to support in their isolation (and 
 they will hold him to blame for their unwedded lives).® A 
 hearth with no wife to bless it — that is a condition he must 
 face,* and yet he will have to pay damages to the last farthing 
 for incurring it. Let him not roam abroad with a smooth and 
 smiling countenance ; ^ let him not imitate men whose fame is 
 irreproachable, or he shall feel on his back the blows of his 
 superiors. Such being the weight of infamy which is laid upon 
 all cowards, I, for my part, am not surprised if in Sparta they 
 deem death preferable to a life so steeped in dishonour and 
 reproach. 
 
 That too was a happy enactment, in my opinion, by which 
 Lycurgus provided for the continual cultivation of virtue, even 
 to old age. By fixing ® the election to the council of elders ' 
 as a last ordeal at the goal of life, he made it impossible for a 
 
 ^ See Lucian, Anacharsis, 38 ; Miiller, Dorians (vol. ii. 309, Eng. tr.). 
 
 " The xopo'i «■(?• of ttifi Gymnopaedia, See Miiller, op. cit, iv. 6, 4 (vol. 
 "• 334. Eng. tr.). 
 
 ^ rrii AvavSplas, cf. Plut. Ages. 30 ; or, ttjs ivewdpelai, ' ' they must bear 
 the reproach of his cowardice." 
 
 * Omitting oi, or translate, "that is an evil not to be disregarded." See 
 Dindorf, ad loc. ; Sturz, Lex. Xen, 'EffHa. 
 
 ^ See Plut. Ages. 30 (Clough, iv. 36) ; ffell. VI. iv. 16 (above, p. 163). 
 
 ° Reading vpoSels. See Plut. Lycurg. 26 (Clough. i. 118) ; Aristot. Pol. 
 ii. 9, 25. 
 
 ' Or "seniory," or "senate," or "board of elders" ; lit. "the Gerontia." 
 
cH.x.§..6 THE GERONTIA; VIRTUE A PUBLIC DUTY 313 
 
 high standard of virtuous living to be disregarded even in old 
 age. (So, too, it is worthy of admiration in him that he lent his 
 helping hand to virtuous old age.^ Thus, by making the elders 
 sole arbiters in the trial for life, he contrived to charge old age 
 with a greater weight of honour than that which is accorded to 
 the strength of mature manhood.) And assuredly such a contest 
 as this must appeal to the zeal of mortal man beyond all others 
 in a supreme degree. Fair, doubtless, are contests of gymnastic 
 skill, yet are they but trials of bodily excellence, but this 
 contest for the seniory is of a higher sort — it is an ordeal of the 
 soul itself. In proportion, therefore, as the soul is worthier 
 than the body, so must these contests of the soul appeal to a 
 stronger enthusiasm than their bodily antitypes. 
 
 And yet another point may well excite our admiration 
 for Lycurgus largely. It had not escaped his observation that 
 communities exist where those who are willing to make virtue 
 their study and delight fail somehow in ability to add to the 
 glory of their fatherland.^ That lesson the legislator laid to 
 heart, and in Sparta he enforced, as a matter of public duty, 
 the practice of every virtue by every citizen. And so it is that, 
 just as man differs from man in some excellence, according as 
 he cultivates or neglects to cultivate it, this city of Sparta, with 
 good reason, outshines all other states in virtue ; since she, 
 and she alone, has made the attainment of a high standard of 
 noble living a pubUc duty. 
 
 And was not this a noble enactment, that whereas other 
 states are content to inflict punishment only in cases where a 
 man does wrong against his neighbour, Lycurgus imposed 
 penalties no less severe on him who openly neglected to make 
 himself as good as possible ? For this, it seems, was his prin- 
 ciple : in the one case, where a man is robbed, or defrauded, 
 or kidnapped, and made a slave of, the injury of the misdeed, 
 whatever it be, is personal to the individual so maltreated ; 
 but in the other case whole communities suffer foul treason at 
 the hands of the base man and the coward. So that it was 
 only reasonable, in my opinion, that he should visit the heaviest 
 penalty upon these latter. 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' the old age of the good. Yet this he did when he made . . . since 
 he contrived," etc. ^ Is this an autobiographic touch? 
 
314 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS | cH.xi.Vit 
 
 Moreover, he laid upon them, like some irresistible neces- 
 sity, the obligation to cultivate the whole virtue of a citizen. 
 Provided they duly performed the injunctions of the law, the 
 city belonged to them, each and all, in absolute possession 
 and on an equal footing. Weakness of limb or want of wealth ^ 
 was no drawback in his eyes. But as for him who, out of 
 the cowardice of his heart, shrank from the painful performance 
 of the law's injunction, the finger of the legislator pointed him 
 out as there and then disqualified to be regarded longer as a 
 member of the brotherhood of peers.^ 
 
 It may be added, that there is no doubt as to the great 
 antiquity of this code of laws. The point is clear so far, that 
 Lycurgus himself is said to have lived in the days of the 
 Heracleidae.^ But being of so long standing, these laws, even 
 at this day, still are stamped in the eyes of other men with all 
 the novelty of youth. And the most marvellous thing of all is 
 that, while everybody is agreed to praise these remarkable 
 institutions, there is not a single state which cares to imitate 
 them. 
 
 XI 
 
 The above form a common stock of blessings, open to 
 every Spartan to enjoy, alike in peace and in war. But if 
 any one desires to be informed in what way the legislator 
 improved upon the ordinary machinery of warfare and in 
 reference to an army in the field, it is easy to satisfy his 
 curiosity. 
 
 In the first instance, the ephors announce by proclamation 
 the limit of age to which the service applies * for cavalry and 
 heavy infantry ; and in the next place, for the various handi- 
 craftsmen. So that, even on active service, the Lacedae- 
 monians are well supplied with all the conveniences enjoyed 
 by people living as citizens at home.* All implements and 
 
 ^ But see Aristot. Pol. ii. g, 32. 
 
 2 Grote, H. G. viii. 81 ; Hell. III. iii. 5 (above, p. 20 foil. ). 
 ' See Plut. Lycurg. i. 
 
 ^ I.e. "in the particular case." See Hell. VI. iv. 17 (above, p. 163); 
 MuUer, Dorians, iii. 12 (vol. ii. 242 foil. , Eng. tr. ). 
 " Or, ' ' the conveniences of civil life at home. " 
 
CH. XI. 1 2-6 MILITARY SYSTEM 315 
 
 instruments whatsoever, which an army may need in common, 
 are ordered to be in readiness,^ some on waggons and others 
 on baggage animals. In this way anything omitted can hardly 
 escape detection. 
 
 For the actual encounter under arms, the following inven- 
 tions are attributed to him. The soldier has a crimson- 
 coloured uniform and a heavy shield of bronze ; his theory 
 being that such an equipment has no sort of feminine associa- 
 tion, and is altogether most warrior-like.^ It is most quickly 
 burnished ; it is least readily soiled.* 
 
 He further permitted those who were above the age of 
 early manhood to wear their hair long.* For so, he con- 
 ceived, they would appear of larger stature, more free and 
 indomitable, and of a more terrible aspect. 
 
 So furnished and accoutred, he divided his citizen soldiers 
 into six morai^ (or regimental divisions) of cavalry® and 
 heavy infantry. Each of these citizen regiments (political 
 divisions) has one polemarch '' (or colonel), four lochagoi (or 
 captains of companies), eight penteconters (or lieutenants, each 
 in command of a half company), and sixteen enomotarchs (or 
 commanders of sections). At the word of command any such 
 regimental division can be formed readily either into enomoties 
 (i.e. single file) or into threes (i.e. three files abreast), or into 
 sixes (i.e. six files abreast).^ 
 
 As to the idea, commonly entertained, that the tactical 
 arrangement of the Laconian heavy infantry is highly compli- 
 cated, no conception could be more opposed to fact. For in 
 the Laconian order the front rank men are all leaders,^ so that 
 each file has everything necessary to play its part efficiently. 
 In fact, this disposition is so easy to understand that no one 
 
 ^ Reading irapixdv, or if TrapAyetv, "to be conveyed." Cf. Pausan. I. 
 xix. I. See Cyrop. VI. ii. 34. 
 
 " Cf. Aristoph. Acham. 320, and the note of the scholiast. 
 
 8 See Ps. Plut. Moral. 238 P. 
 
 * See Plut. Lycurg. 22 (Clough, i. 114). 
 
 " The iihpa,. Jowett, Thuc. ii. 320, note to Thuc. v. 68, 3. 
 
 « See Plut. Lycurg. 23 (Clough, i. 115) ; Hell. VI. iv. 11 (above, p. 161) ; 
 Thuc. V. 67 ; Paus. IV. viii. 12. ' See Thuc. v. 66, 71. 
 
 8 See Thuc. v. 68, and Arnold's note ad loc. ; Hell. VI. iv. 12 (above, p. 
 161) ; Anat. II. iv. 26 (Trans, vol. i. p.~ 132) ; Rustow and Kbchly, op. cit. 
 p. 117. " See Anab. IV. iii. 26 ; Cyrop. III. iii. 59 ; VI. iii. 22. 
 
3i6 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS ch. xi. % 6.9 
 
 who can distinguish one human being from another could fail to 
 follow it. One set have the privilege of leaders, the other the 
 duty of followers. The evolutional orders, ^ by which greater 
 depth or shallowness is given to the battle line, are given by 
 word of mouth by the enomotarch (or commander of the 
 section), who plays the part of the herald, and they cannot be 
 mistaken. None of these manoeuvres presents any difficulty 
 whatsoever to the understanding. 
 
 But when it comes to their ability to do battle equally 
 well in spite of some confusion which has been set up, and 
 whatever the chapter of accidents may confront them with,^ I 
 admit that the tactics here are not so easy to understand, 
 except for people trained under the laws of Lycurgus. Even 
 movements which an instructor in heavy-armed warfare ^ might 
 look upon as difficult are performed by the Lacedaemonians 
 with the utmost ease.* Thus, the troops, we will suppose, are 
 marching in column ; one section of a company is of course 
 stepping up behind another from the rear.^ Now, if at such a 
 moment a hostile force appears in front in battle order, the word 
 is passed down to the commander of each section, " Deploy 
 (into line) to the left." And so throughout the whole length 
 of the column, until the line is formed facing the enemy. Or 
 supposing while in this position an enemy appears in the 
 rear. Each file performs a counter-march * with the effect of 
 bringing the best men face to face with the enemy all along 
 the line.^ As to the point that the leader previously on the 
 right finds himself now on the left,* they do not consider that 
 they are necessarily losers thereby, but, as it may turn out, 
 even gainers. If, for instance, the enemy attempted to turn 
 their flank, he would find himself wrapping round, not their 
 exposed, but their shielded flank.^ Or if, for any reason, it 
 
 ^ I.e. "for doubling depth"; e.^. anglic^, "form two deep, " etc. , when 
 marching to a flank. Grote, If. G, vii. 108 ; Thuc. v. 66 ; also Riistow 
 and Kochly, op. cit. p. iii, § 8, note 19 ; p. 121, § 17, note 41. 
 
 ^ Or, "alongside of any comrade who may have fallen in their way." 
 See Plut. Pelop. 23 (Clough, ii. 222) ; Thuc. v. 72. 
 
 ^ Or, " drill sergeant. " ^ See Jebb, note to Theophr. viii. 3. 
 
 ° Or, " marching in rear of another. " 
 
 " See RUstow and Kochly, p. 127. ' Or, "every time." 
 
 ^ See Thuc. v. 67, 71. " See Riistow and Kochly, p. 127. 
 
c":xl;.Vi-2°"} evolutions; encampments 317 
 
 be thought advisable for the general to keep the right wing, 
 they turn the corps about/ and counter-march by ranks, until 
 the leader is on the right, and the rear rank on the left. Or 
 again, supposing a division of the enemy appears on the right 
 whilst they are marching in column, they have nothing further 
 to do but to wheel each company to the right, like a trireme, 
 prow forwards,^ to meet the enemy, and thus the rear company 
 again finds itself on the right. If, however, the enemy should 
 attack on the left, either they will not allow of that and push 
 him aside,® or else they wheel their companies to the left to 
 face the antagonist, and thus the rear company once more falls 
 into position on the left. 
 
 xn 
 
 I will now speak of the mode of encampment sanctioned 
 by the regulation of Lycurgus. To avoid the waste inci- 
 dental to the angles of a square,* the encampment, according 
 to him, should be circular, except where there was the 
 security of a hill,^ or fortification, or where they had a river in 
 their rear. He had sentinels posted during the day along the 
 place of arms and facing inwards ;* since they are appointed 
 not so much for the sake of the enemy as to keep an eye 
 on friends. The enemy is sufficiently watched by mounted 
 
 ' For these movements, see Did. of Antiq. "Exercitus"; Grate, H, G, 
 vii. III. 
 
 2 See Hell. VII. v. 23 (above, p. 232). 
 
 ' I am indebted to Professor Jebb for the following suggestions with regard 
 to this passage : ' ' The words oiSk toOto i&ny, dXV diruffoOnv fj, etc. , contain 
 some corruption. The sense ought clearly to be roughly parallel with that of 
 the phrase used a little before, oidiv &Wo irpay/MTeiovTai % etc. Perhaps 
 &irii>dov<nv is a corruption of dTo9ev oSirw, and this corruption occasioned the 
 insertion of fl. Probably Xenophon wrote oiSi touto euaiv, dXX' &vodev 
 otinv &vmr6.\ovi, etc. : ' while the enemy is still some way off, they turn their 
 companies so as to face him. ' The words &iroBev oSaiv indirectly suggest the 
 celerity of the Spartan movement. " 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' Regarding the angles of a square as a useless inconvenience, he 
 arranged that an encampment should be circular," etc. See Polyb. vi. 31, 42. 
 
 ^ Cf. Ifell. VI. iv. 14 (above, p. 162) ; Polyaen. II. iii. 11, ap. Schneider. 
 
 •^ Lit. ' ' these, " Tcts fliv. Or, ' ' He had lines of sentinels posted throughout 
 the day ; one line facing inwards towards the place of arms (and these were 
 appointed, etc. ) ; while observation of the enemy was secured by mounted 
 troopers," etc. 
 
3i8 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS ch. xn. § 2-6 
 
 troopers perched on various points commanding the widest 
 prospect. 
 
 To guard against hostile approach by night, sentinel duty 
 according to the ordinance was performed by the Sciritae^ 
 outside the main body. At the present time the rule is 
 so far modified that the duty is entrusted" to foreigners,^ if 
 there be a foreign contingent present, with a leaven of Spartans 
 themselves to keep them company.' 
 
 The custom of always taking their spears * with them when 
 they go their rounds must certainly be attributed to the same 
 cause which makes them exclude their slaves from the place 
 of arms. Nor need we be surprised if, when retiring for 
 necessary purposes, they only withdraw just far enough from 
 one another, or from the place of arms itself, not to create 
 annoyance. The need of precaution is the whole explanation. 
 
 The frequency with which they change their encampments 
 is another point. It is done quite as much for the sake of 
 benefiting their friends as of annoying their enemies. 
 
 Further, the law enjoins upon all Lacedaemonians, during 
 the whole period of an expedition, the constant practice of 
 gymnastic^ exercises, whereby their pride ^ in themselves is 
 increased, and they appear freer and of a more liberal aspect 
 than the rest of the world.'' The walk and the running ground 
 must not exceed in length * the space covered by a regimental 
 division,® so that no one may find himself far from his own 
 stand of arms. After the gymnastic exercises the senior polem- 
 arch gives the order (by herald) to be seated. This serves 
 all the purposes of an inspection. After this the order is given 
 
 ^ See MilUer's Dorians, ii. 253 ; Hell. VI. v. 24 (above, p. 176) ; Cyrop. 
 IV. ii. I ; TIiuc. v. 67, 71 ; Grote, H. G. vii. no. ^ See Hipparch. ix. 4. 
 
 2 Reading aMav Si. The passage is probably corrupt. See L. Dindorf 
 ad loc. 
 
 * See Critias, ap. Schneider ad loc. 
 
 ^ Cf. Herod, vii. 208 ; Plut. Lycurg. 22 (Clough, i. 113 foil.). 
 
 * Reading iKyaKotppovearipovs (L. Dindorf's emendation) for the vulg. 
 neyaXovpeveoripovs. Xen. Opusc. polit. Ox. mdccclvi. 
 
 'Or, " the proud' self-consciousness of their own splendour is increased, 
 and by comparison with others they bear more notably the impress of free- 
 men." 
 
 ^ The word yiidffffft) is 'poetical' (old Attic?). See Cyrop. II. iv. 27, and 
 L. Dindorf ad loc. 
 
 " A single mora, or an army corps. 
 
CH. xl'ii.Vi'J } '^^^ PRIVILEGE OF THE KING 319 
 
 "to get breakfast," and for "the outposts^ to be relieved." 
 After this, again, come pastimes and relaxations before the 
 evening exercises, after which the herald's cry is heard "to 
 take the evening meal." When they have sung a hymn to the 
 gods to whom the offerings of happy omen have been per- 
 formed, the final order, " Retire to rest at the place of arms," ^ 
 is given. 
 
 If the story is a little long the reader must not be surprised, 
 since it would be difficult to find any point in military matters 
 omitted by the Lacedaemonians which seems to demand 
 attention. 
 
 XIII 
 
 I will now give a detailed account of the power and 
 privilege assigned by Lycurgus to the king during a campaign. 
 To begin with, so long as he is on active service, the state 
 maintains the king and those with him.^ The polemarchs 
 mess with him and share his quarters, so that by dint of 
 constant intercourse they may be all the better able to consult 
 in common in case of need. Besides the polemarch three 
 other members of the peers* share the royal quarters, mess, 
 etc. The duty of these is to attend to all matters of com- 
 missariat,^ in order that the king and the rest may have 
 unbroken leisure to attend to affairs of actual warfare. 
 
 But I will resume at a somewhat higher point and describe 
 the manner in which the king sets out on an expedition. As 
 a^ preliminary step, before leaving home he offers sacrifice 
 (in company with^ his staff) to Zeus Agetor (the Leader), 
 and if the victims prove favourable then and there the priest,^ 
 who bears the sacred fire, takes thereof from off the altar and 
 leads the way to the boundaries of the land. Here for the 
 
 1 Or, "vedettes," irplxTKOiroi/. See Cyrop. V. ii. 6. 
 
 '' ? Or, "on your arms." See Sturz, Lex. Xen. s.v. 
 
 3 I.e. "the Thirty." See Ages. i. 7; Hell. III. iv. 2 (above, pp. 238, 
 24) ; Plut. Ages. 6 (Clough, iv. 6) ; Aristot. Pol. ii. 9, 29. 
 
 * For these oi i\ui\.oi, see Cyrop. I. v. 5 ; and above. Hell. III. iii. 5, p. 20. 
 
 " Lit. "supplies and necessaries." 
 
 " Lit. reading /col oi abv airr^, after L. Dindorf, ' ' he and those with him. '• 
 
 'Lit. "the Purphoros." See Nic. Damasc. ap. Stob. Fl. 44, 41; 
 Hesych. ap. Schneider, n. ad he. 
 
320 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS ch.xmi.§=-7 
 
 second time the king does sacrifice^ to Zeus and Athena; 
 and as soon as the offerings are accepted by those two 
 divinities he steps across the boundaries of the land. And 
 all the while the fire from those sacrifices leads the way, and 
 is never suffered to go out. Behind follow beasts for sacrifice 
 of every sort. 
 
 Invariably when he offers sacrifice the king begins the 
 work in the gloaming ere the day has broken, being minded 
 to anticipate the goodwill of the god. And round about the 
 place of sacrifice are present the polemarchs and captains, 
 the lieutenants and sub-lieutenants, with the commandants of 
 the baggage train, and any general of the states ^ who may 
 care to assist. There, too, are to be seen two of the ephors, 
 who neither meddle nor make, save only at the summons of 
 the king, yet have they their eyes fixed on the proceedings 
 of each one there and keep all in order,^ as may well be 
 guessed. When the sacrifices are accomplished the king 
 summons all and issues his orders * as to what has to be done. 
 And all with such method that, to witness the proceedings, 
 you might fairly suppose the rest of the world to be but 
 bungling experimenters,^ and the Lacedaemonians alone true 
 handicraftsmen in the art of soldiering. 
 
 Anon the king puts himself at the head of the troops, 
 and if no enemy appears he heads the line of march, no one 
 preceding him except the Sciritae, and the mounted troopers 
 exploring in front.* If, however, there is any reason to antici- 
 pate a battle, the king takes the leading column of the first 
 army corps' and wheels to the right until he has got into 
 position with two army corps and two generals of division on 
 either flank. The disposition of the supports is assigned to 
 the eldest of the royal council® (or staff corps) acting as 
 brigadier, — the staff consisting of all peers who share the 
 
 ^ These are the SiapaHipia, so often mentioned in the Hellenica. See 
 above, pp. 24, 34, 75, 166. 
 
 ^ I.e. " allied " ? or " perioecid ' ' ? 
 
 ' awippovl^ovnv , "keep every one in his sober senses." 
 
 * See Thuc. v. 66. 
 
 ^ airroffxeStaffra^, Texvtrai. See Jebb, Theophr. x. 3. 
 
 " Or, "who are on scouting duty. If, however, they expect a battle," etc. 
 
 ^ Technically *' mora." 
 
 8 tQiv TTfpl Safioalav. See HeN. IV. v. 8 ; vii. 4 (above, pp. 67, 75). 
 
CH. XIII. § 7-II THE SACRIFICE; AND BATTLE 321 
 
 royal mess and quarters, with the soothsayers, surgeons,'- and 
 pipers, whose place is in the front of the troops,^ with, finally, 
 any volunteers who happen to be present. So that there is no 
 check or hesitation in anything to be done ; every contingency 
 is provided for. 
 
 The following details also seem to me of high utility among 
 the inventions of Lycurgus with a view to the final arbitrament 
 of battle. Whensoever, the enemy being now close enough 
 to watch the proceedings,* the goat is sacrificed; then, says 
 the law, let all the pipers, in their places, play upon the pipes, 
 and let every Lacedaemonian don a wreath. Then, too, so 
 runs the order, let the shields be brightly pohshed. The 
 privilege is accorded to the young man to enter battle with 
 his long locks combed.* To be of a cheery countenance — that, 
 too, is of good repute. Onwards they pass the word of com- 
 mand to the subaltern^ in command of his section, since it 
 is impossible to hear along the whole of each section from the 
 particular subaltern posted on the outside. It devolves, finally, 
 on the polemarch to see that all goes well. 
 
 When the right moment for encamping has come, the king 
 is responsible for that, and has to point out the proper place. 
 The despatch of embassies, however, whether to friends or to 
 foes, is [not] * the king's affair. Petitioners in general wishing 
 to transact anything treat, in the first instance, with the king. 
 If the case concerns some point of justice, the king despatches 
 the petitioner to the Hellanodikai (who form the court-martial) ; 
 
 ' See Anab. III. iv. 30 (Trans, vol. i. p. 168) ; Cyrop. I. vi. 15 ; L. 
 Diadorf, n. ad loc. 
 
 ^ Schneider refers to Polyaenus, i. 10. 
 
 3 See Plut. Lycurg. 22 (Clough, i. 114) ; and for the goat sacrificed to 
 Artemis Agrotera, see Hell. IV. ii. 20 (above, p. 51) ; Pans. IX. xiii. 4 ; 
 Plut. Marcell. 22 (Clough, ii. 264). 
 
 * See Plut. Lycurg. 22 (Clough, i. 114). The passage is corrupt, and 
 possibly out of its place. I cite the words as they run in the MS. with various 
 proposed emendations. See Schneider, n. ad loc. iifiari. dk rf viifl Kal 
 KeKpL/iihi^ ds li^xt" (TWiivai xal (jiaiSpbv eXvai Kal eidi/ci/iov. Kal TrapaKe\e6ovTai 
 8i K.T-.X. Zeune, Kexpiii-ivif Khfaiv, after Plut. Lycurg. 22. Weiske, Kal K6/ajv 
 SiaKexpi.iiii'ifi. Cobet, (^ean dk tQ viif XiTrdpip Kal rfts /c6/ias SiaKeKpiiiivtf eis 
 liixiiv livai.. " Lit "to the enomotarch." 
 
 ' The MSS. give a5, "is again," but the word /tA-TOi, "however," and 
 certain passages in Nell. II. ii. 12, 13 ; II. iv. 38 (Trans; vol. i. pp. 46, 47, 
 73) suggest the negative 01) in place of a5. If aJ) be right, then we should 
 read eip6p<i>v in place of ^affMas, "belongs to the ephors." 
 
 VOL. II Y 
 
322 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS •{''c"h.''xIv.|V-5 
 
 if of money, to the paymasters.^ If the petitioner brings booty, 
 he is sent off to the Laphuropolai (or sellers of spoil). This 
 being the mode of procedure, no other duty is left to the king, 
 whilst he is on active service, except to play the part of priest 
 in matters concerning the gods and of commander-in-chief in 
 his relationship to men.^ 
 
 Now, if the question be put to me, Do you maintain that 
 the laws of Lycurgus remain still to this day unchanged? 
 that indeed is an assertion which I should no longer venture 
 to maintain ; knowing, as I do, that in former times the Lace- 
 daemonians preferred to live at home on moderate means, 
 content to associate exclusively with themselves rather than to 
 play the part of governor-general * in foreign states and to be 
 corrupted by flattery ; knowing further, as I do, that formerly 
 they dreaded to be detected in the possession of gold, whereas 
 nowadays there are not a few who make it their glory and 
 their boast to be possessed of it. I am very well aware that 
 in former days alien acts ^ were put in force for this very object. 
 To live abroad was not allowed. And why? Simply in 
 order that the citizens of Sparta might not take the infection 
 of dishonesty and light-living from foreigners ; whereas now I 
 am very well aware that those who are reputed to be leading 
 citizens have but one ambition, and that is to live to the end 
 of their days as governors-general on a foreign soil.^ The days 
 were when their sole anxiety was to fit themselves to lead 
 the rest of Hellas. But nowadays they concern themselves 
 
 ^ Technically the raidai. ^ See Aristot, Pol. iii. 14. 
 
 ^ For the relation of this chapter to the rest of the treatise, see Grote, ix. 
 325 ; Ern. Naumann, de Xen. liiro qui AAK. IIOAITBIA inscribitur, p. 
 18 foil. ; Newman, Pol. Aristot, ii. 326. * Harmosts. 
 
 ^ "Xenelasies," Jeyj^Xao-Jai technically called. See Plut. iycOTy. 27 ; Agis, 
 10 ; Thuo. ii. 39, where Pericles contrasts the liberal spirit of the democracy 
 with Spartan exclusiveness : " Our city is thrown open to the world, and we 
 never expel a foreigner or prevent him from seeing or learning anything of 
 which the secret, if revealed to an enemy, might profit him." — Jowett, i. 118. 
 
 ® Lit. ' ' harmosts " ; and for the taste for living abroad, see what is said of 
 Dercylidas, Hell. IV. iii. 2 (above, p. 52). The harmosts were not removed 
 till just before Leuctra (371 B.C.), Hell. VI. iv. i (above, p. 158), and after, 
 see Paus. VIII. Iii. 4 ; IX. Ixiv. 
 
Sxv'ii"'} degeneracy; king and state 
 
 323 
 
 much more to wield command than to be fit themselves to rule. 
 And so it has come to pass that whereas in old days the states 
 of Hellas flocked to Lacedaemon seeking her leadership'^ 
 against the supposed wrongdoer, now numbers are inviting one 
 another to prevent the Lacedaemonians again recovering their 
 empire.^ Yet, if they have incurred all these reproaches, we 
 need not wonder, seeing that they are so plainly disobedient 
 to the god himself and to the laws of their own lawgiver 
 Lycurgus. 
 
 XV 
 
 I wish to explain with sufficient detail the nature of the 
 covenant between king and state as instituted by Lycurgus ; 
 for this, I take it, is the sole type of rule ^ which still preserves 
 the original form in which it was first established; whereas 
 other constitutions will be found either to have been already 
 modified or else to be still undergoing modifications at this 
 moment. 
 
 Lycurgus laid it down as law that the king shall offer in 
 behalf of the state all public sacrifices, as being himself of 
 divine descent,* and whithersoever the state shall despatch 
 her armies the king shall take the lead. He granted him to 
 receive honorary gifts of the things offered in sacrifice, and he 
 appointed him choice land in many of the provincial cities, 
 enough to satisfy moderate needs without excess of wealth. 
 And in order that the kings also might camp and mess in 
 public he appointed them public quarters ; and he honoured 
 them with a double portion ^ each at the evening meal, not in 
 order that they might actually eat twice as much as others, but 
 
 ' See Plut. Lycurg. 30 (Clough, i. 124). 
 
 ^ This passage would seem to fix the date of the chapter xiv. as about the 
 time of the Athenian confederacy of 378 B. c. ; Hell. V. iv. 34 ; Rev. v. 6. 
 See also Isocr. Panegyr, 380 B. c. ; Grote, H. G. ix. 323. See the text of a 
 treaty between Athens, Chios, Mytilene, and Byzantium ; Kbhler, Herm. v. 
 10 ; Rangab6, Antiq. Hellin. ii. 40, 373 ; Naumann, op. cit, 26. 
 
 'Or, " magistracy " ; the word opxi) at once signifies rule and govern- 
 mental office. 
 
 * I.e. a Heracleid, in whichever line descended, and, through Heracles, 
 from Zeus himself. The kings are therefore "heroes," i.e. demigods. See 
 below ; and for their privileges, see Herod, vi. 56, 57. 
 
 " See Ages. v. i (above, p. 257). 
 
324 THE POLITY OF THE LACEDAEMONIANS ch.xv.§4-9 
 
 that the king might have wherewithal to honour whomsoever 
 he desired. He also granted as a gift to each of the two kings 
 to choose two mess -fellows, which same are called Puthioi. 
 He also granted them to receive out of every litter of swine 
 one pig, so that the king might never be at a loss for victims 
 if in aught he wished to consult the gods. 
 
 Close by the palace a lake affords an unrestricted supply of 
 water ; and how useful that is for various purposes they best 
 can tell who lack the luxury.^ Moreover, all rise from their 
 seats to give place to the king, save only that the ephcTrs rise 
 not from their thrones of office. Monthly they exchange 
 oaths, the ephors in behalf of the state, the king himself in 
 his own behalf And this is the oath on the king's part : " I 
 will exercise my kingship in accordance with the established 
 laws of the state." And on the part of the state the oath runs : 
 " So long as he ^ (who exercises kingship) shall abide by his 
 oath we will not suffer his kingdom to be shaken." ^ 
 
 These then are the honours bestowed upon the king 
 during his lifetime [at home],* — honours by no means much 
 exceeding those of private citizens, since the lawgiver was 
 minded neither to suggest to the kings the pride of the 
 despotic monarch,^ nor, on the other hand, to engender in the 
 heart of the citizen envy of their power. As to those other 
 honours which are given to the king at his death,® the laws of 
 Lycurgus would seem plainly to signify hereby that these kings 
 of Lacedaemon are not mere mortals but heroic beings, and • 
 that is why they are preferred in honour.' 
 
 ^ See Hartman, An. Xen. N. p. 274 ; but cf. Cyneget. v. 34 ; Anai. V. 
 iii. 8. ^ Lit. "he yonder." 
 
 ^ Lit. ' ' we will keep it for him unshaken. " See L. Dindorf, n. ad Im. 
 Q.n6. praef. p. 14 D. 
 
 * The words ' ' at home " look like an insertion. 
 
 ^ Lit. ' ' the tyrant's pride. " 
 
 ° See Hell. III. iii. i (above, p. 19) ; Ages. xi. 16 ; Herod, vi. 58. 
 
 ^ Intentionally or not on the part of the writer, the concluding words, in 
 which the intention of the Laws is conveyed, assume a metrical form : 
 
 oi5x ^^ avdpdjTTovs aXV cJjs ijpojas 
 Toiis KaKeSaLHOvlav /3acri\c(S Tporenii-^KOffa', 
 
 See Em. Naumann, 0/. cil. p. 18. 
 
WAYS AND MEANS: 
 
 A PAMPHLET ON REVENUES 
 
WAYS AND MEANS: 
 
 A PAMPHLET ON REVENUES 
 
 '• 1-3 
 
 For myself I hold to the opinion that the qualities of the 
 leading statesmen in a state, whatever they be, are repro- 
 duced in the character of the constitution itself.^ 
 
 As, however, it has been maintained by certain leading 
 statesmen in Athens that the recognised standard of right and 
 wrong is as high at Athens as elsewhere, but that, owing to the 
 pressure of poverty on the masses, a certain measure of injustice 
 in their dealing with the allied states ^ could not be avoided ; I 
 set myself to discover whether by any manner of means it were 
 possible for the citizens of Athens to be supported solely from 
 the soil of Attica itself, which was obviously the most equitable 
 solution. For if so, herein lay, as I believed, the antidote at 
 once to their own poverty and to the feeling of suspicion with 
 which they are regarded by the rest of Hellas. 
 
 I had no sooner begun my investigation than one fact 
 presented itself clearly to my mind, which is that the country 
 itself is made by nature to provide the amplest resources. 
 And with a view to establishing the truth of this initial pro- 
 position I will describe the physical features of Attica. 
 
 In the first place, the extraordinary mildness of the climate 
 is proved by the actual products of the soil. Numerous 
 
 1 " Like minister, lilce government." For the same idea more fully ex- 
 pressed, see Cyrop. VIII. i. 8 ; viii. s- 
 
 ^ Lit. " the cities," i.e. of the alliance, tos ffvii/uixtSa!. 
 
328 WAYS AND MEANS CH.1.S3-7 
 
 plants which in many parts of the world appear as stunted 
 leafless growths are here fruit-bearing. And as with the soil 
 so with the sea indenting our coasts, the varied productivity 
 of which is exceptionally great. Again with regard to those 
 kindly fruits of earth ^ which Providence bestows on man 
 season by season, one and all they commence earlier and end 
 later in this land. Nor is the supremacy of Attica shown 
 only in those products which year after year flourish and grow 
 old, but the land contains treasures of a more perennial kind. 
 Within its folds lies imbedded by nature an unstinted store of 
 marble, out of which are chiselled^ temples and altaj-s of 
 rarest beauty and the glittering splendour of images sacred to 
 the gods. This marble, moreover, is an object of desire to 
 many foreigners, Hellenes and barbarians alike. Then there 
 is land which, although it yields no fruit to the sower, needs 
 only to be quarried in order to feed many times more mouths 
 than it could as corn-land. Doubtless we owe it to a divine 
 dispensation that our land is veined with silver ; if we consider 
 how many neighbouring states lie round us by land and sea 
 and yet into none of them does a single thinnest vein of silver 
 penetrate. 
 
 Indeed it would be scarcely irrational to maintain that the 
 city of Athens lies at the navel, not of Hellas merely, but of 
 the habitable world. So true is it, that the farther we remove 
 from Athens the greater the extreme of heat or cold to be 
 encountered ; or to use another illustration, the traveller who 
 desires to traverse the confines of Hellas from end to end will 
 find that, whether he voyages by sea or by land, he is describ- 
 ing a circle, the centre of which is Athens.^ 
 
 Once more, this land though not literally sea-girt has all the 
 advantages of an island, being accessible to every wind that 
 blows, and can invite to its bosom or waft from its shore all 
 
 1 Lit. " those good things which the gods afford in their seasons." 
 
 ^ Or, "arise," or " are fashioned. " 
 
 ^ See Geog. of Brit. Isles, J. R. and A. S. Green, eh. i. p. 7 : " London, 
 in fact, is placed at what is very nearly the geometrical centre of those masses 
 of land which make up the earth surface of the globe, and is thus more than 
 any city of the world the natural point of convergence for its different lines of 
 navigation," etc. The natural advantages of Boeotia are similarly set forth by 
 Ephorus. Cf. Strab. ix. 2, p. 400. 
 
cninVi-t} NATURAL PRODUCTIVITY OF ATTICA 329 
 
 products, since it is peninsular; whilst by land it is the 
 emporium of many markets, as being a portion of the 
 continent. 
 
 Lastly, whilst the majority of states have barbarian neigh- 
 bours, the source of many troubles, Athens has as her next-door 
 neighbours civilised states which are themselves far remote 
 from the barbarians. 
 
 All these advantages, to repeat what I have said, may, I 
 believe, be traced primarily to the soil and position of Attica 
 itself But these natural blessings may be added to : in the 
 first place, by a careful handling of our resident alien ^ popula- 
 tion. And, for my part, I can hardly conceive of a more 
 splendid source of revenue than lies open in this direction. 
 Here you have a self-supporting class of residents conferring 
 large benefits upon the state, and instead of receiving pay- 
 ment ^ themselves, contributing on the contrary to the gain of 
 the exchequer by the sojourners' tax.^ Nor, under the term 
 careful handling, do I demand more than the removal of 
 obligations . which, whilst they confer no benefit on the state, 
 ""h9,ve an air of inflicting various disabilities on the resident 
 alietis.* And I would further relieve them from the obligation 
 of |is(Ting as hoplites side by side with the citizen proper ; 
 since, beside the personal risk, which is great, the trouble of 
 quitting trades and homesteads is no trifle.^ Incidentally the 
 
 ^ Lit. "raetics" or " metoecs." 
 
 ^ lu<T06s, e.g. o/t&e assemtly, the senate, and the dicasts, 
 
 ' The neroUiov. See Plat. Laws, 850 B ; according to Isaeus, ap. 
 Harpocr. s.v., it was 12 drachmae per annum for a male and 6 drachmae for 
 a female. 
 
 * Or, "the class in question." According to Schneider (who cites the 
 dT//iH)Tos lieTavdiTTris of Homer, //. ix. 648), the reference is not to disabilities 
 in the technical sense, but to humiliating duties, such as the aKa<jyri<popla im- 
 posed on the men, or the iSpta^opla and aKiaSriipopla imposed on their wives 
 and daughters in attendance on the Kavri<t>bpot, at the Panathenaic and other 
 festival processions. See Arist. Becks. 730 foil. ; Boeckh, P. E. A. IV. x. 
 (Eng. tr. , G. Cornewall Lewis, p. 538). 
 
 ^ Or, reading )t.iyax fiMv ykp 6 &yiiv, pAya di xal t& AttJ rfic rexvUv kdX 
 tCov otKelan iwUvai, after Zurborg [Xen. de Sediiibus Libellus, Berolini, 
 MDCCCLXXVI. ), transl. " since it is severe enough to enter the arena of war, 
 but all the worse when that implies the abandonment of your trade and your 
 domestic concerns." 
 
330 WAYS AND MEANS ch. n. § 3-7 
 
 State itself would be benefited by this exemption, if the 
 citizens were more in the habit of campaigning with one 
 another, rather than ^ shoulder to shoulder with Lydians, 
 Phrygians, Syrians, and barbarians from all quarters of the 
 world, who form the staple of our resident alien class. Besides 
 the advantage [of so weeding the ranks],^ it would add a 
 positive lustre to our city, were it admitted that the men of 
 Athens, her sons, have reliance on themselves rather than on 
 foreigners to fight her battles. And further, supposing we offered 
 our resident aliens a share in various other honourable duties, 
 including the cavalry service,^ I shall be surprised if we do not 
 increase the goodwill of the aliens themselves, whilst at the same 
 time we add distinctly to the strength and grandeur of our city. 
 
 In the next place, seeing that there are at present numerous 
 building sites within the city walls as yet devoid of houses, 
 supposing the state were to make free grants of such land * to 
 foreigners for building purposes in cases where there could be 
 no doubt as to the respectability of the applicant, if I am not 
 mistaken, the result of such a measure will be that a larger 
 number of persons, and of a better class, will be attracted to 
 Athens as a place of residence. 
 
 Lastly, if we could bring ourselves to appoint, as a new 
 government office, a board of guardians of foreign residents 
 like our Guardians of Orphans,^ with special privileges assigned 
 to those guardians who should show on their books the greatest 
 number of resident aliens, — such a measure would tend to 
 improve the goodwill of the class in question, and in all prob- 
 ability all people without a city of their own would aspire to 
 the status of foreign residents in Athens, and so further increase 
 the revenues of the city.^ 
 
 1 Or, ' ■ instead of finding themselves brigaded as nowadays with a motley 
 crew of Lydians," etc. 
 
 ^ Zurborg, after Cobet, omits the words so rendered. 
 
 ' See Hipfarch. ix. 3, where Xenophon in almost identical words recom- 
 mends that reform. 
 
 * Or, "offer the fee simple of such property to." 
 
 '> ' ' The Archon was the legal protector of all orphans. It was his duty to 
 appoint guardians, if none were named in the father's will." — C. R. Kennedy, 
 Note to Select Speeches of Demosthenes. The orphans of those who had fallen 
 in the war (Thuc. ii. 46) were specially cared for. 
 
 * Or, " help to swell the state exchequer." 
 
CH. in. 8 1-4 ATHENS A COMMERCIAL CENTRE 331 
 
 III 
 
 At this point I propose to offer some remarks in proof of 
 the attractions and advantages of Athens as a centre of com- 
 mercial enterprise. In the first place, it will hardly be denied 
 that we possess the finest and safest harbourage for shipping, 
 where vessels of all sorts can come to moorings and be laid up 
 in absolute security ^ as far as stress of weather is concerned. 
 But further than that, in most states the trader is under the 
 necessity of lading his vessel with some merchandise ^ or other 
 in exchange for his cargo, since the current coin ^ has no 
 circulation beyond the frontier. But at Athens he has a choice : 
 he can either in return for his wares export a variety of goods, 
 such as human beings seek after, or, if he does not desire to 
 take goods in exchange for goods, he has simply to export 
 silver, and he cannot have a more excellent freight to export, 
 since wherever he likes to sell it he may look to realise a large 
 percentage on his capital.* 
 
 Or again, supposing prizes ^ were offered to the magistrates 
 in charge of the market ^ for equitable and speedy settlements 
 of points in dispute ^ to enable any one so wishing to proceed 
 on his voyage without hindrance, the result would be that far 
 more traders would trade with us and with greater satisfaction. 
 
 It would indeed be a good and noble institution to pay 
 special marks of honour, such as the privilege of the front 
 seat, to merchants and shipowners, and on occasion to invite 
 to hospitable entertainment those who, through something 
 notable in the quality of ship or merchandise, may claim to 
 have done the state a service. The recipients of these honours 
 
 ' Reading dScffis after Cobet, or if ijSius, transl. ' ' in perfect comfort. " 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' of exchanging cargo for cargo to the exclusion of specie. " 
 
 ' /.«. of the particular locality. See TAe Types of Greek Coins, Percy 
 Gardner, ch. ii. " International Currencies among the Greeks." 
 
 ^ Or, " on the original outlay." 
 
 ^ Cf. Hiero, ix. 6, 7, ii ; Hifparch. i. 26. 
 
 * T^ ToC i/iwoplov dpxv- Probably he is referring to the eTi/icKrjTal 
 i/iTToplav (overseers of the market). See Harpocr. t v. ; Aristot. Athenian 
 Polity, 51. 
 
 ' For the sort of case, see Demosth. (or Deinarch.) t.. Theocr. 1324; 
 ZuTborg ad loc, ; Boeckh, I. ix. xv. (pp. 48, 81, Eng. tr.). 
 
332 WAYS AND MEANS ™- '"■ 8 4-9 
 
 will rush into our arms as friends, not only under the incentive 
 of gain, but of distinction also. 
 
 Now the greater the number of people attracted to Athens 
 either as visitors or as residents, clearly the greater the 
 development of imports and exports. More goods will be sent 
 out of the country,^ there will be more buying and selling, with 
 a consequent influx of money in the shape of rents to indi- 
 viduals and dues and customs to the state exchequer. And 
 to secure this augmentation of the revenues, mark you, not the 
 outlay of one single penny ; nothing needed beyond one or 
 two philanthropic measures and certain details of supervision.^ 
 
 With regard to the other sources of revenue which I contem- 
 plate, I admit, it is different. For these I recognise the 
 necessity of a capital ^ to begin with. I am not, however, 
 without good hope that the citizens of this state will contribute 
 heartily to such an object, when I reflect on the large sums 
 subscribed by the state on various late occasions, as, for 
 instance, when reinforcements were sent to the Arcadians 
 under the command of Lysistratus,* and again at the date of 
 the generalship of Hegesileos.^ I am well aware that ships of 
 war are frequently despatched and that too ® although it is 
 uncertain whether the venture will be for the better or for the 
 worse, and the only certainty is that the contributor will not 
 recover the sum subscribed nor have any further share in the 
 object for which he gave his contribution.^ 
 
 But for a sound investment * I know of nothing compar- 
 able with the initial outlay to form this fund.® Any one 
 
 ^ See Zurborg, Comm. p. 24. ^ See Aristot. Pol. iv. 15, 3. 
 
 ^ " A starting-point." 
 
 * B.C. 366 ; cf. Hell. VII. iv. 3 (above, p. 213). 
 
 ° B.C. 362 ; cf. Hell. VII. v. 15 (above, p. 230). See Grate, H. G. x. 
 459 ; Ephor. ap. Diog. Laert. ii. 54 ; Diod. Sic. xv. 84 ; Boeckh, ap. L. 
 Dindorf. Xenophon's son Gryllus served under liira and was slain (see Trans, 
 vol. i. p. clxiii.). 
 
 ' Reading koJ ravra roirov ii,h AS^Xou frros, after Zurborg. 
 
 ' Reading \{nrkp\ Sn> &p eUreviyKuxri with Zurborg. See his note, Comm. 
 p. 25. ' "A good substantial property." 
 
 * Or, ' ' on the other hand, I affirm that the outlay necessary to form the 
 capital for my present project will be more remunerative than any other that 
 can be named." As to the scheme itself see Grote, Plato, III. ch. xxxix. ; 
 Boeckh, of. cit. (pp. 4, 37, 136, 600 seq. Eng. tr. ). Cf. Demosth. de Sym. for 
 another scheme, 354 B.C., which shows the "sound administrative and 
 
CH. III. § 9-12 SCHEME TO RAISE A STATE CAPITAL 333 
 
 whose contribution amounts to ten minae^ may look for- 
 ward to a return as high as he would get on bottomry, of 
 nearly one-fifth,^ as the recipient of three obols a day. The 
 contributor of five minae^ will on the same principle get 
 more than a third,* while the majority of Athenians will get 
 more than cent per cent on their contribution. That is to 
 say, a subscription of one mina^ will put the subscriber in 
 possession of nearly double that sum,^ and that, moreover, 
 without setting foot outside Athens, which, as far as human 
 affairs go, is as sound and durable a security as possible. 
 
 Moreover, I am of opinion that if the names of con- 
 tributors were to be inscribed as benefactors for all time, 
 many foreigners would be induced to contribute, and possibly 
 not a few states, in their desire to obtain the right of inscrip- 
 tion ; indeed I anticipate that some kings,' tyrants,^ and satraps 
 will display a keen desire to share in such a favour. 
 
 To come to the point. Were such a capital once furnished, 
 it would be a magnificent plan to build lodging-houses for the 
 
 practical judgment" of the youthful orator as compared with "the benevolent 
 dreams and ample public largess in which Xenophon here indulges." — Grote, 
 op. cit. p. 601. 
 
 ' £i^a : 12 : 4 = 1000 drachmae. 
 
 2 I.e. exactly 18 or nearly 20 per cent. The following table will make the 
 arithmetic clear : — 
 
 6 ob. = I drachma 10 minae = 6000 ob. 
 
 100 dr. = I mina = 1000 dr. 
 
 600 ob. =1 mina 1000 dr. : 180 dr. : : 100 : 18 .'. nearly \ 
 
 3 ob. (a day) x 360 = 1080 ob. p. a. = nearly 20 per cent. 
 
 = 180 dr. p.a. 
 
 As to the 3 obols a day ( = 180 dr. p.a.) which as an Athenian citizen 
 he is entitled to, see Grote, op. cit. p. 597= "There will be a regular dis- 
 tribution among all citizens, per head and equally. Three oboh, or half a 
 drachma, will be allotted daily to each, to poor and rich alike " [on the prin- 
 ciple of the Thedrikon]. ' ' For the poor citizens this will provide a comfortable 
 subsistence, without any contribution on their part ; the poverty now prevailing 
 will thus be alleviated. The rich, like the poor, receive the daily triobolon as 
 a free gift ; but if they compute it as interest for their investments, they will 
 find that the rate of interest is full and satisfactory, like the rate on bottomry." 
 Zurborg, Comm. p. 25 ; Boeckh, op. cit. IV. xxi. (p. 606, Eng. tr. ) ; and 
 Grote's note, op. cit. p. 598- ° =£'^° : 6 : 3 = 500 drachmae. 
 
 * I.e. 36 per cent. " =i'4 = i : 3 = 1°° drachmae. 
 
 * I.e. 180 per cent, 
 
 ' Zurborg suggests (p. S) "Philip or Cersobleptes." Cf. Isocr. On. the 
 Peace, § 23. ' !•'• despotic monaichs. 
 
334 WAYS AND MEANS {'"'ch: fv^sTj 
 
 benefit of shipmasters in the neighbourhood of the harbours, 
 in addition to those which exist ; and again, on the same 
 principle, suitable places of meeting for merchants, for the 
 purposes^ of buying and selling; and thirdly, public lodg- 
 ing-houses for persons visiting the city. Again, supposing 
 dwelling-houses and stores for vending goods were fitted up 
 for retail dealers in Piraeus and the city, they would at once 
 be an ornament to the state and a fertile source of revenue. 
 Also it seems to me it would be a good thing to try to see 
 if, on the principle on which at present the state possesses 
 public warships, it would not be possible to secure public 
 merchant vessels, to be let out on the security of guarantors 
 just like any other public property. If the plan were found 
 feasible this public merchant navy would be a large source of 
 extra revenue. 
 
 I come to a new topic. I am persuaded that the estab- 
 lishment of the silver mines on a proper footing ^ would be 
 followed by a large increase of wealth apart from the other 
 sources of revenue. And I would like, for the benefit of 
 those who may be ignorant, to point out what the capacity 
 of these mines really is. You will then be in a position to 
 decide how to turn them to better account. It is clear, I 
 presume, to every one that these mines have for a very long 
 time been in active operation ; at any rate no one will venture 
 to fix the date at which they first began to be worked.^ Now 
 in spite of the fact that the silver ore has been dug and 
 carried out for so long a time, I would ask you to note that 
 the mounds of rubbish so shovelled out are but a fractional 
 portion of the series of hillocks containing veins of silver, and 
 as yet unquarried. Nor is the silver-bearing region gradually 
 becoming circumscribed. On the contrary it is evidently 
 extending in wider area from year to year. That is to say, 
 during the period in which thousands of workers * have been 
 employed within the mines no hand was ever stopped for 
 
 ' Reading, with Zurborg, ^Tri dip^ re. 
 
 ^ Or, " on a sound basis. " s "Exploited." 
 
 * Or, "at the date when the maximum of hands was employed." 
 
CH. IV. § 3.7 THE SILVER MINES OF LAURIUM 335 
 
 want of work to do. Rather, at any given moment, the work 
 to be done was more than enough for the hands employed. 
 And so it is to-day with the owners of slaves working in the 
 mines; no one dreams of reducing the number of his hands. 
 On the contrary, the object is perpetually to acquire as many 
 additional hands as the owner possibly can. The fact is that 
 with few hands to dig and search, the find of treasure will be 
 small, but with an increase of labour the discovery of the ore 
 itself is more than proportionally increased. So much so, 
 that of all operations with which I am acquainted, this is the 
 only one in which no sort of jealousy is felt at a further 
 development of the industry. ^ I may go a step farther; every 
 proprietor of a farm will be able to tell you exactly how many 
 yoke of oxen are sufficient for the estate, and how many farm 
 hands. To send into the field more than the exact number 
 requisite every farmer would consider a dead loss.^ But in 
 silver mining [operations] the universal complaint is the want 
 of hands. Indeed there is no analogy between this and other 
 industries. With an increase in the number of bronze-workers 
 articles of bronze may become so cheap that the bronze-worker 
 has to retire from the field. And so again with ironfounders. 
 Or again, in a plethoric condition of the corn and wine market 
 these fruits of the soil will be so depreciated in value that the 
 particular husbandries cease to be remunerative, and many a 
 farmer will give up his tillage of the soil and betake himself to 
 the business of a merchant, or of a shopkeeper, to banking or 
 money-lending. But the converse is the case in the working 
 of silver ; there the larger the quantity of ore discovered and 
 the greater the amount of silver extracted, the greater the 
 number of persons ready to engage in the operation. One 
 more illustration : take the case of movable property. No 
 one when he has got sufficient furniture for his house dreams 
 of making further purchases on this head, but of silver no one 
 ever yet possessed so much that he was forced to cry " enough." 
 On the contrary, if ever anybody does become possessed of 
 an immoderate amount he finds as much pleasure in digging 
 a hole in the ground and hoarding it as in the actual employ- 
 
 1 Reading imKaTaa-Kevai^o/i^voi,!, or, if imaKeval^dnevoi, transl. "at tlie 
 rehabilitation of old works." * Cf. Oecon. xvii. 12. 
 
336 WAYS AND MEANS ch.iv.§7-i3 
 
 ment of it. And from a wider point of view : when a state is 
 prosperous there is nothing which people so much desire as 
 silver. The men want money to expend on beautiful armour 
 and fine horses, and houses, and sumptuous paraphernalia^ of 
 all sorts. The women betake themselves to expensive apparel 
 and ornaments of gold. Or when states are sick,^ either through 
 barrenness of corn and other fruits, or through war, the demand 
 for current coin is even more imperative (whilst the ground 
 lies unproductive), to pay for necessaries or military aid. 
 
 And if it be asserted that gold is after all just as useful as 
 silver, without gainsaying the proposition I may note this 
 fact ^ about gold, that, with a sudden influx of this metal, it is 
 the gold itself which is depreciated whilst causing at the same 
 time a rise in the value of silver. 
 
 The above facts are, I think, conclusive. They encourage 
 us not only to introduce as much human labour as possible 
 into the mines, but to extend the scale of operations within, 
 by increase of plant, etc., in full assurance that there is no 
 danger either of the ore itself being exhausted or of silver 
 becoming depreciated. And in advancing these views I am 
 merely following a precedent set me by the state herself. So 
 it seems to me, since the state permits any foreigner who de- 
 sires it to undertake mining operations on a footing of equality * 
 with her own citizens. 
 
 But, to make my meaning clearer on the question of 
 maintenance, I will at this point explain in detail how the 
 silver mines may be furnished and extended so as to render 
 them much more useful to the state. Only I would premise 
 that I claim no sort of admiration for anything which I am 
 about to say, as though I had hit upon some recondite dis- 
 covery. Since half of what I have to say is at the present 
 moment still patent to the eyes of all of us, and as to what 
 belongs to past history, if we are to believe the testimony of 
 our fathers,^ things were then much of a piece with what is 
 
 ^ "The thousand and one embellishments of civil life." 
 ^ "When a state is struck down with barrenness," etc. See Mem. II. vii. 
 ' Lit. "I know, however." 
 
 ^ Or, " at an equal rent with that which she imposes on her own citizens. " 
 See Boeckh, P. E. A. IV. x. (p. 540, Eng. tr.). 
 
 ^ Reading impk ruiv iraT^piiiv , with Zurborg, after Wilamowitz-Mollendorf. 
 
CH. IV. § 13-18 PROFIT DERIVABLE FROM THE MINES 337 
 
 going on now. No, what is really marvellous is that the 
 state, with the fact of so many private persons growing wealthy 
 at her expense, and under her very eyes, should have failed to 
 imitate them. It is an old story, trite enough to those of us 
 who have cared to attend to it, how once on a time Nicias, 
 the son of Niceratus, owned a thousand men in the silver 
 mines,! whom he let out to Sosias, a Thracian, on the follow- 
 ing terms. Sosias was to pay him a net obol a day, without 
 charge or deduction, for every slave of the thousand, and be ^ 
 responsible for keeping up the number perpetually at that 
 figure. So again Hipponicus ^ had six hundred slaves let out 
 on the same principle, which brought him in a net mina * a 
 day without charge or deduction. Then there was Phile- 
 monides, with three hundred, bringing him in half a mina, 
 and others, I make no doubt there were, making profits in 
 proportion to their respective resources and capital.^ But 
 there is no need to revert to ancient history. At the present 
 moment there are hundreds of human beings in the mines let 
 out on the same principle.* And given that my proposal 
 were carried into effect, the only novelty in it is that, just as 
 the individual in acquiring the ownership of a gang of slaves 
 finds himself at once provided with a permanent source of 
 income, so the state, in like fashion, should possess herself of 
 a body of public slaves, to the number, say, of three for every 
 Athenian citizen.' As to the feasibility of our proposals, I 
 challenge any one whom it may concern to test the scheme 
 point by point, and to give his \erdict. 
 
 With regard to the price then of the men themselves, it is 
 
 ^ See Mem. II. v. 2 ; Plut. Nicias, 4 ; Athen. vi. 272. See an important 
 criticism of Boeckti's view by Cornewall Lewis, translation of P. £.A.p. 675 foil. 
 
 ^ Reading irap^x^iv, or if irapeix^v, transl. ' ' whilst he himself kept up 
 the number." See H. Hagen in foum. Philol. x. 19, pp. 34-36 ; also 
 Zurborg, Comm. p. 28. ' Son of Callias. * =£4:1 13 = 600 ob. 
 
 ■i Or, "whose incomes would vary in proportion to their working capital." 
 
 " See Jebb, Theophr. xxvi. 21. 
 
 ' According to the ancient authorities the citizens of Athens numbered 
 about 21,000 at this date, which would give about 63,000 as the number of 
 state-slaves contemplated for the purposes of the scheme. See Zurborg, Comm. 
 p. 29. "At a census taken in B.C. 309 the number of slaves was returned at 
 400,000, and it does not seem likely that there were fewer at any time during 
 the classical period." — A Companion to School Classics (James Gow), p. lor. 
 xiii. "Population of Attica." 
 
 VOL. II Z 
 
338 WAYS AND MEANS ="■ '^- ^ ^^-'^ 
 
 obvious that the public treasury is in a better position to 
 provide funds than any private individuals. What can be 
 easier than for the Council ^ to invite by public proclamation 
 all whom it may concern to bring their slaves, and to buy up 
 those produced ? Assuming the purchase to be effected, is it 
 credible that people will hesitate to hire from the state rather 
 than from the private owner, and actually on the same terms ? 
 People have at all events no hesitation at present in hiring 
 consecrated grounds, sacred victims,^ houses, etc., or in pur- 
 chasing the right of farming taxes from the state. To ensure 
 the preservation of the purchased property, the treasury can 
 take the same securities precisely from the lessee as it does 
 from those who purchase the right of farming its taxes. 
 Indeed, fraudulent dealing is easier on the part of the man 
 who has purchased such a right than of the man who hires 
 slaves. Since it is not easy to see how the exportation * of 
 public money is to be detected, when it differs in no way 
 from private money. Whereas it will take a clever thief to 
 make off with these slaves, marked as they will be with the 
 public stamp, and in face of a heavy penalty attached at once 
 to the sale and exportation of them. Up to this point then 
 it would appear feasible enough for the state to acquire pro- 
 perty in men and to keep a safe watch over them.* 
 
 But with reference to an opposite objection which may 
 present itself to the mind of some one : what guarantee is 
 there that, along with the increase in the supply of labourers, 
 there will be a corresponding demand for their services on the 
 part of contractors ? ^ It may be reassuring to note, first of all, 
 that many of those who have already embarked on mining 
 operations ^ will be anxious to increase their staff of labourers 
 by hiring some of these public slaves (remember, they have a 
 
 ^ Or, "senate." See Aristot. Athen. Pol. for the functions of the BouU. 
 
 ^ So Zurborg. See Demosth. in Mid. S7o ; Boeckh, P. E. A, II. xii. 
 (p. 212, Eng. tr. ). See Arnold's note to T/iuc, iii. 50, 7. 
 
 ^ Or, "diversion," "defalcation." 
 
 * Or, "as far as that goes, then, there is nothing apparently to prevent 
 the state from acquiring property in slaves, and safeguarding the property so 
 acquired." 
 
 ^ Or, "with this influx (multiplying) of labourers there will be a corre- 
 sponding increase in the demand for labour on the part of the lessees. " 
 
 '' Or, "got their mining establishments started." 
 
CH. IV. §22-25 EMPLOYMENT OF PUBLIC SLAVES 339 
 
 large capital at stake ; ^ and again, many of the actual labourers 
 now engaged are growing old) ; and secondly, there are many 
 others, Athenians and foreigners alike, who, though unwilling 
 and indeed incapable of working physically in the mines, will 
 be glad enough to earn a livelihood by their wits as super- 
 intendents.^ 
 
 Let it be granted, however, that at first a nucleus of twelve 
 hundred slaves is formed. It is hardly too sanguine a supposi- 
 tion that out of the profits alone,^ within five or six years this 
 number may be increased to at least six thousand. Again, 
 out of that number of six thousand — supposing each slave to 
 bring in an obol a day clear of all expenses — we get a revenue 
 of sixty talents a year. And supposing twenty talents out of 
 this sum laid out on the purchase of more slaves, there will be 
 forty talents left for the state to apply to any other purpose it 
 may find advisable. By the time the round number * of ten 
 thousand >is reached the yearly income will amount to a 
 hundred talents. 
 
 As a matter of fact, the state will receive much more than 
 these figures represent,^ as any one here will bear me witness 
 who can remember what the dues ^ derived from slaves realise(J 
 before the troubles at Decelea.' Testimony to the same effect 
 is borne by the fact, that in spite of the countless number of 
 human beings employed in the silver mines within the whole 
 period,^ the mines present exactly the same appearance to-day 
 as they did within the recollection of our forefathers.® And 
 
 1 Or, ' ' of course they will, considering the amount of fixed capital at 
 stalce," or, " since they have large resources at their back." I have adopted 
 Zurborg's stopping of this sentence. 
 
 ^ See Mem. II. viii. 1, for an illustrative case. 
 
 3 " Out of the income SO' derived. " * Or, " full complement. " 
 
 ■* Or, "a very much larger sum than we have calculated on." Lit. 
 " many times over that sum." 
 
 " Or, " tax." See below, § 49; for the whole matter see Thuc. vii. 
 27, vi. 91 ; Xen. Mem. III. vi. 12, in reference to B.c. 413, when Decelea 
 had been fortified. As to the wholesale desertion of slaves, " more than twenty 
 thousand slaves had deserted, many of them artisans," according to Thucy- 
 dides. 
 
 ' Or, "the days of Decelea." Lit. " the incidents of Decelea. " 
 
 ^ I.e. " of their working since mining began. " 
 
 ^ Lit. ' ' are just the same to-day as our forefathers recollected them to be 
 in their time." 
 
340 WAYS AND MEANS <:h. iv. § 26-32 
 
 once more everything that is taking place to-day tends to 
 prove that, whatever the number of slaves employed, you will 
 never have more than the works can easily absorb. The 
 miners find no limit of depth in sinking shafts or laterally in 
 piercing galleries. To open cuttings in new directions to-day 
 is just as possible as it was in former times. In fact no one 
 can take on himself to say whether there is more ore in the 
 regions already cut into, or in those where the pick has not 
 yet struck.^ Well then, it may be asked, why is it that there 
 is not the same rush to make new cuttings now as in former 
 times? The answer is, because the people concerned with 
 the mines are poorer nowadays. The attempt to restart opera- 
 tions, renew plant, etc., is of recent date, and any one who 
 ventures to open up a new area runs a considerable risk. 
 Supposing he hits upon a productive field, he becomes a rich 
 man, but supposing he draws a blank, he loses the whole of 
 his outlay ; and that is a danger which people of the present 
 time are shy of facing. 
 
 It is a difficulty, but it is one on which, I believe, I 
 can offer some practical advice. I have a plan to suggest 
 which will reduce the risk of opening up new cuttings to a 
 minimum.^ 
 
 The citizens of Athens are divided, as we all know, into 
 ten tribes. Let the state then assign to each of these ten 
 tribes an equal number of slaves, and let the tribes agree to 
 associate their fortunes and proceed to open new cuttings. 
 What will happen ? Any single tribe hitting upon a product- 
 ive lode will be the means of discovering what is advantageous 
 to all. Or, supposing two or three, or possibly the half of 
 them, hit upon a lode, clearly these several operations will 
 proportionally be more remunerative stilL That the whole 
 ten will fail is not at all in accordance with what we should 
 expect from the history of the past. It is possible, of course, 
 for private persons to combine in the same way,^ and share 
 their fortunes and minimise their risks. Nor need you appre- 
 
 ^ Or, " whether the tracts already explored or those not yet opened are 
 the more prolific." 
 
 ^ Or, ' ■ I have a plan to make the opening of new cuttings as safe as 
 possible." ' " To form similar joint-stock companies. " 
 
CH. IV. 1 32-38 TENTATIVE PROCEDURE REQUISITE 341 
 
 hend, sirs, that a state mining company, established on this 
 principle, will prove a thorn in the side ^ of the private owner, 
 or the private owner prove injurious to the state. But rather 
 like allies who render each other stronger the more they 
 combine,^ so in these silver mines, the greater number of 
 companies at work^ the larger the riches they will discover 
 and disinter.* 
 
 This then is a statement, as far as I can make it clear, of 
 the method by which, with the proper state organisation, every 
 Athenian may be supplied with ample maintenance at the 
 public expense. Possibly some of you may be calculating that 
 the capital ^ requisite will be enormous. They may doubt if 
 a sufficient sum will ever be subscribed to meet all the needs. 
 All I can say is, even so, do not despond. It is not as if it 
 were necessary that every feature of the scheme should be 
 carried out at once, or else there is to be no advantage in it 
 at all. On the contrary, whatever number of houses are 
 erected, or ships built, or slaves purchased, etc., these portions 
 will begin to pay at once. In fact, the bit-by-bit method of 
 proceeding will be more advantageous than a simultaneous 
 carrying into effect of the whole plan, to this extent : if we set 
 about erecting buildings wholesale* we shall make a more 
 expensive and worse job of it than if we finish them off gradu- 
 ally. Again, if we set about bidding for hundreds of slaves at 
 once we shall be forced to purchase an inferior type at a higher 
 cost. Whereas, if we proceed tentatively, as we find ourselves 
 able,' we can complete any well-devised attempt at our leisure,* 
 and, in case of any obvious failure, take warning and not 
 repeat it. Again, if everything were to be carried out at once, 
 it is we, sirs, who must make the whole provision at our 
 
 ' See Cyneg. v. 5. ^ Or, " deriving strength from combination." 
 
 ' Co-operators. * Reading iK(pof>^(rovn, after Cobet. 
 
 " Or, " sinking fund. " 
 
 " &8p6oi — "in a body." It is a military phrase, I think. In close 
 order, as it were, not in detachments. 
 
 ' ' ' According to our abiUty , " a favourite Socratic phrase. See Trans, 
 vol. i. pp. Ixxix. 154. 
 
 8 aSffis. See for this corrupt passage Zurborg, Comm. p. 31. He would 
 insert, "and a Httle delay will not be prejudicial to our interests, but rather 
 the contrary," or to that effect, thus : Kal aiOis hv [iviToifieV oi yip TOiairf) 
 TXi dvaPoXy pXaprjv yeviadat. ftx] iiiuv oU/ieSa "vel simile aliquld." 
 
342 WAYS AND MEANS ch.iv.I 38-41 
 
 expense.^ Whereas, if part were proceeded with and part 
 stood over, the portion of revenue in hand will help to furnish 
 what is necessary to go on with. But to come now to what 
 every one probably will regard as a really grave danger, lest the 
 state may become possessed of an over large number of slaves, 
 with the result that the works will be overstocked. That 
 again is an apprehension which we may escape if we are careful 
 not to put into the works more hands from year to year than 
 the works themselves demand. Thus ^ I am persuaded that 
 the easiest method of carrying out this scheme, as a whole, is 
 also the best. If, however, you are persuaded that, owing to 
 the extraordinary property taxes ^ to which you have been 
 subjected during the present war, you will not be equal to any 
 further contributions at present,* what you should do is 
 this : ^ during the current year resolve to carry on the financial 
 administration of the state within the limits of a sum equivalent 
 to that which your dues® realised before the peace. That 
 done, you are at liberty to take any surplus sum, whether 
 directly traceable to the peace itself, or to the more courteous 
 treatment of our resident aliens and traders, or to the growth 
 of the imports and exports, coincident with the collecting 
 together of larger masses of human beings, or to an augmenta- 
 tion of harbour ^ and market dues ; this surplus, I say, how- 
 ever derived, you should take and invest ^ so as to bring in 
 the greatest revenue." 
 
 Again, if there is an apprehension on the part of any that 
 the whole scheme ^^ will crumble into nothing on the first out- 
 break of war, I would only beg these alarmists to note that, 
 
 ^ Or, " it is we who must bear the whole burthen of the outlay. " 
 
 ^ oifrws, "so far, unless I am mistaken, the easiest method is the best." 
 
 * Or, "heavy contributions, subscriptions incidental to," but the word 
 el<r<popli,s is technical. For the exhaustion of the treasury see Dam. Lejii, 464 ; 
 Grote, If. G. xi. 326. 
 
 * Or, ' ' you will not be able to subscribe a single penny more. " 
 
 ' ifieis Si, you are masters of the situation. It lies with you to carry on, 
 etc.; SioiKene is oi coxixse imferalive. ' Or, "taxes." 
 
 ' Reading, after Zurborg, Sih. rk iWijjAvia. Or, if the vulg. Sik rb iv Xinhi, 
 transl. "an augmentation of market dues at Piraeus." 
 
 8 I.e. as fixed capital, or, "you should expend on plant." 
 
 * Or, adopting Zurborg's emend. So-' ftp TrXuirra iyylyvriTai, transl. "for 
 the purposes of the present scheme as far as it may be available. " 
 
 ■"' Or, " the proposed organisation. " 
 
cn.iv.§4J-47 SECURITY OF THE MINES IN WAR 343 
 
 under the condition of things which we propose to bring about, 
 war will have more terrors for the attacking party than for this 
 state. Since what possession I should like to know can be 
 more serviceable for war than that of men? Think of the 
 many ships which they will be capable of manning on public 
 service. Think of the number who will serve on land as 
 infantry [in the public service] and will bear hard upon the 
 enemy. Only we must treat them with courtesy.^ For myself, 
 my calculation is, that even in the event of war we shall be 
 quite able to keep a firm hold of the silver mines. I may 
 take it, we have in the neighbourhood of the mines certain 
 fortresses — one on the southern slope in Anaphlystus ; ^ and 
 we have another on the northern side in Thoricus, the two 
 being about seven and a half miles ^ apart. Suppose then a 
 third breastwork were to be placed between these, on the 
 highest point of Besa, that would enable the operatives to 
 collect into one out of all the fortresses, and at the first per- 
 ception of a hostile movement it would only be a short distance 
 for each to retire into safety.* In the event of an enemy 
 advancing in large numbers they might certainly make off 
 with whatever corn or wine or cattle they found outside. But 
 even if they did get hold of the silver ore, it would be little 
 better to them than a heap of stones.* But how is an enemy 
 ever to march upon the mines in force ? The nearest state, 
 Megara, is distant, I take it, a good deal over sixty miles ; ® 
 and the next closest, Thebes, a good deal nearer seventy.' 
 Supposing then an enemy to advance from some such point 
 to attack the mines, he cannot avoid passing Athens ; and pre- 
 suming his force to be small, we may expect him to be annihi- 
 
 ' See ch. ii. above. 
 
 " Or, reading h tJ TrpJs iieo"riiJ,Pplav SaXArTri, ' ' on the southern Sea. " 
 For Anaphlystus see ffe/l. I. ii. i ; Mem. III. v. 25. It was Eubulus's deme, 
 the leading statesman at this date. For topography see map to face p. xli. of 
 Trans, vol. i. ^ Lit. " 60 stades." 
 
 * The passage (tuj'tJkoi t &p tA. ipya, etc. , is probably corrupt. TA ^pya 
 seems to mean ' ' the operatives ; " cf. Latin operae. Others taie it of " the 
 works themselves. " Possibly it may refer to military works connecting the 
 three fortresses named. ' ' There might be a system of converging (works or) 
 lines drawn to a single point from all the fortresses, and at the first sign of 
 any thing hostile," etc. 
 
 ° I.e. " they might as well try to carry off so many tons of stone. " 
 
 ° Lit. " 500 stades." ' Lit. " more than 600 stades. " 
 
344 WAYS AND MEANS ch. iv. § 47-52 
 
 lated by our cavalry and frontier police.^ I say, presuming 
 his force to be small, since to march with anything like a large 
 force, and thereby leave his own territory denuded of troops, 
 would be a startling achievement. Why, the fortified city of 
 Athens will be much closer the states of the attacking parties 
 than they themselves will be by the time they have got to the 
 mines. But, for the sake of argument, let us suppose an 
 enemy to have arrived in the neighbourhood of Laurium ; 
 how is he going to stop there without provisions? To go 
 out in search of supplies with a detachment of his force 
 would imply risk, both for the foraging party and for those 
 who have to do the fighting;^ whilst, if they are driven 
 to do so in force each time, they may call themselves 
 besiegers, but they will be practically in a state of siege 
 themselves. 
 
 But it is not the income ^ derived from the slaves alone to 
 which we look to help the state towards the effective mainten- 
 ance of her citizens, but with the growth and concentration of 
 a thick population in the mining district various sources of 
 revenue will accrue, whether from the market at Sunium, or 
 from the various state buildings in connection with the silver 
 mines, from furnaces and all the rest. Since we must expect 
 a thickly populated city to spring up here, if organised in the 
 way proposed, and plots of land will become as valuable to 
 owners otit there as they are to those who possess them in the 
 neighbourhood of the capital. 
 
 If, at this point, I may assume my proposals to have been 
 carried into effect, I think I can promise, not only that our 
 city shall be relieved from a financial strain, but that she shall 
 make a great stride in orderliness and in tactical organisation, 
 she shall grow in martial spirit and readiness for war. I 
 anticipate that those who are under orders to go through 
 
 ^ The irepliroKoi, or horse patrol to guard the frontier. See Thuc. iv. 57, 
 viii. 92 ; Arist. Birds, ii. 76. Young Athenians between eighteen and 
 twenty were eligible for the service. 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' for the very object of the contest. " The construction is in any case 
 unusual, irepl av i,y(avl^oi>Tai = irepl Toirwv ot. Zurborg suggests irepl riiii 
 dycovi^of/^vuv. 
 
 ' I adopt Zurborg's correction, nrpoaipopA for el(T^opd, as obviously right. 
 See above, iv. 23, p. 339. 
 
cH.v"^/,'! } ADVANTAGES OF PEACE 345 
 
 gymnastic training will devote themselves with a new zeal to 
 the details of the training school, now that they will receive a 
 larger maintenance whilst ^ under the orders of the trainer in 
 the torch race. So again those on garrison duty in the various 
 fortresses, those enrolled as peltasts, or again as frontier police 
 to protect the rural districts, one and all will carry out their 
 respective duties more ardently when the maintenance 2 appro- 
 priate to these several functions is duly forthcoming. 
 
 But now, if it is evident that; in order to get the full 
 benefit of all these sources of revenue,^ peace is an indispensable 
 condition, — if that is plain, I say, the question suggests itself, 
 would it not be worth while to appoint a board to act as 
 guardians of peace ? Since no doubt the election of such a 
 magistracy would enhance the charm of this city in the eyes 
 of the whole world, and add largely to the number of our 
 visitors. But if any one is disposed to take the view, that by 
 adopting a persistent peace policy,* this city will be shorn of 
 her power, that her glory will dwindle and her good name be 
 forgotten throughout the length and breadth of Hellas, the 
 view so taken by our friends here ® is in my poor judgment 
 somewhat unreasonable. For they are surely the happy states, 
 they, in popular language, are most fortune-favoured, which 
 endure in peace the longest season. And of all states Athens 
 is pre-eminently adapted by nature to flourish and wax strong 
 in peace. The while she abides in peace she cannot fail to 
 exercise an attractive force on all. From the mariner and the 
 merchant upwards, all seek her, flocking they come; the 
 
 ^ I follow Zurborg in omitting fj. If fj is to stand, transl. " iAan they get 
 whilst supplied by the gymnasiarch in the torch race," or "whilst exercising 
 the ofBce of gymna?iarchs themselves." See Pol. Ath. i. 13 (above, p. 279). 
 
 2 "State aid." 
 
 ' Or, " to set these several sources of revenue flowing in full stream." 
 
 * Cf. "a policy of peace at any price," or, " by persisting for any length 
 of time in the enjoyment of peace." 
 
 ' Kol oBroi ye. The speaker waves his hand to the quarter of the house 
 where the anti-peace party is seated. 
 
346 WAYS AND MEANS ch.v.§3-7 
 
 wealthy dealers in corn and wine ^ and oil, the owner of many 
 cattle. And not these only, but the man who depends upon 
 his wits, whose skill is to do business and make gain out of 
 money ^ and its employment. And here another crowd, 
 artificers of all sorts, artists and artisans, professors of wisdom,' 
 philosophers, and poets, with those who exhibit and popular- 
 ise their works.* And next a new train of pleasure-seekers, 
 eager to feast on everything sacred or secular,^ which may 
 captivate and charm eye and ear. Or once again, where are 
 all those who seek to effect a rapid sale or purchase of 
 a thousand commodities, to find what they want, if not at 
 Athens ? 
 
 But if there is no desire to gainsay these views — only that 
 certain people, in their wish to recover that headship ** which 
 was once the pride of our city, are persuaded that the accom- 
 plishment of their hopes is to be found, not in peace but in 
 war, I beg them to reflect on some matters of history, and to 
 begin at the beginning,' the Median war. Was it by high- 
 handed violence, or as benefactors of Hellenes, that we 
 obtained the headship of the naval forces, and the trusteeship 
 of the treasury of Hellas?* Again, when through the too 
 cruel exercise of her presidency, as men thought, Athens was 
 deprived of her empire, is it not the case that even in those 
 days,^ as soon as we held aloof from injustice we were once 
 more reinstated by the islanders, of their own free will, as 
 presidents of the naval force ? Nay, did riot the very Thebans, 
 in return for certain benefits, grant to us Athenians to exercise 
 leadership over them ? ''■" And at another date the Lacedae- 
 monians suffered us Athenians to arrange the terms of 
 hegemony^i at our discretion, not as driven to such submission, 
 
 ^ After Zurborg, I omit oix o! TiSiowoi. 
 
 ^ Reading koI &ir' dpyvplov, with Zurborg. 
 
 ' Lit. "Sophists." See Grote, If. G. viii. btvii. note, p. 497. 
 
 ^ E.g. chorus-trainers, musicians, grammarians, rhapsodists, and actors. 
 
 ^ Or, ' ' sacred and profane. " 
 
 * Lit. "her hegemony for the city," B.C. 476. 
 
 ' "And first of all." 8 gee Thuc. i. 96. 
 
 ' B.C. 378. Second confederacy of Delos. See Grote, H. G. x. 152. 
 ^^ B.C. 375. Cf. Hell. V. iv. 62 (above, p. 135) ; Grote, H. G. x. 139 ; 
 Isocr. Or. xiv. 20 ; Diod. Sic. xv. 29, 
 
 " B.C. 369 (al. B.c. 368). Cf. Hell. Vn. i. 14 (above, p. 189). 
 
cH.v.§7-i2 THE RENOVATION OF ATHENS 347 
 
 but in requital of kindly treatment. And to-day, owing to 
 the chaos ^ which reigns in Hellas, if I mistake not, an oppor- 
 tunity has fallen to this city of winning back our fellow- 
 Hellenes without pain or peril or expense of any sort. It is 
 given to us to try to harmonise states which are at war with 
 one another : it is given to us to reconcile the differences of 
 rival factions within those states themselves, wherever existing. 
 
 Ma,ke it but evident that we are minded to preserve the 
 independence ^ of the Delphic shrine in its primitive integrity, 
 not by joining in any war but by the moral force of embassies 
 throughout the length and breadth of Hellas, — and I for one 
 shall not be astonished if you find our brother Hellenes of one 
 sentiment and eager under seal of solemn oaths ^ to proceed 
 against those, whoever they may be, who shall seek * to step 
 into the place vacated by the Phocians and to occupy the 
 sacred shrine. Make it but evident that you intend to 
 establish a general peace by land and sea, and, if I mistake 
 not, your efforts will find a response in the hearts of all. There 
 is no man but will pray for the salvation of Athens next to 
 that of his own fatherland. 
 
 Again, is any one persuaded that, looking solely to riches 
 and money-making, the state may find war more profitable 
 than peace? If so, I cannot conceive a better method to 
 decide that question than to allow the mind to revert* 
 to the past history of the statte and to note well the sequence 
 of events. He will discover that in times long gone by 
 during a period of peace vast wealth was stored up in the 
 acropolis, -the whole of which was lavishly expended during a 
 subsequent period of war. He will perceive, if he examines 
 closely, that even at the present time we are suffering from its 
 ill effects. Countless sources of revenues have failed, or if 
 they have still flowed in, been lavishly expended on a multi- 
 plicity of things. Whereas," now that peace is established by 
 sea, our revenues have expanded and the citizens of Athens 
 
 1 See Hell. VII. v. 27 (above, p. 233). ^ " Autonomy." 
 
 8 See Thuc. v. 18, clause 2 of the Treaty of Peace, B.C. 422-421. 
 
 * Reading, with Zurborg, irup^vro. Or, if the vulgate iireipUvTo, transl. 
 "against those who sought to step." For the date of the pamphlet itself see 
 on the minor works. Trans, vol. i. p. Iviii. note i. ^ Reading iiravaffKoiroltj. 
 
 ^ Or, " But the moment peace has been restored." 
 
348 WAYS AND MEANS | ""ch. ?i! § '^3 
 
 have it in their power to turn these to account as they like 
 best. 
 
 But if you turn on me with the question, " Do you really 
 mean that even in the event of unjust attacks upon our city 
 on the part of any, we are still resolutely to observe peace 
 towards that offender ? " I answer distinctly, No ! But, on 
 the contrary, I maintain that we shall all the more promptly 
 retaliate on such aggression in proportion as we have done no 
 wrong to any one ourselves. Since that will be to rob the 
 aggressor of his allies.^ 
 
 VI 
 
 But now if none of these proposals be impracticable or 
 even difiScult of execution ; if rather by giving them effect we 
 may conciliate further the friendship of Hellas, whilst we 
 strengthen our own administration and increase our fame ; if 
 by the same means the people shall be provided with the 
 necessaries of life, and our rich men be relieved of expenditure 
 on war ; if with the large surplus to be counted on, we are in 
 a position to conduct our festivals on an even grander scale 
 than heretofore, to restore our temples, to rebuild our forts 
 and docks, and to reinstate in their ancient privileges our 
 priests, our senators, our magistrates, and our knights — surely 
 it were but reasonable to enter 'upon this project speedily, so 
 that we too, even in our own day, may witness the unclouded 
 dawn of prosperity in store for our city. 
 
 But if you are agreed to carry out this plan, there is one 
 further counsel which I would urge upon you. Send to 
 Dodona and to Delphi, I would beg you, and consult the will 
 of Heaven whether such provision and such a policy on our 
 part be truly to the interest of Athens both for the present and 
 for the time to come. If the consent of Heaven be thus 
 obtained, we ought then, I say, to put a further question : 
 whose special favour among the gods shall we seek to secure 
 with a view to the happier execution of these measures ? 
 
 ^ Reading, after Cobet, el firjS^va {nrdpxotfiev iSiKovvres. Or, if thevulgate 
 el ii,r)Siva trapexoiliev iSiKovvra, tran^l. " if we can show complete innocence on 
 our own side." 
 
CH. VI. § 3 BY THE WILL OF GOD 349 
 
 And in accordance with that answer, let us offer a sacrifice 
 of happy omen to the deities so named, and commence 
 the work ; since if these transactions be so carried out with 
 the will of God, have we not the right to prognosticate some 
 further advance in the path of political progress for this whole 
 state ? ^ 
 
 ' See Trans, vol. i. p. cxlvii, for some remarks on this writing in reference 
 to Xenophon's biography. 
 
INDEX 
 
 *,* The Roman numerals, etc., refer to the " Hellenica" when 
 the title of the work is not given. 
 
 Abydos, a town on the Asiatic coast of 
 the Hellespont, III. i. g, p. 4 ; IV. 
 viii. 3, p. 78 ; ib. 32, p. 87 ; V. i. 
 6, p. 91 ; ii. 25, p. 96 ; the coast 
 of, IV. viii. 35, p. 88 ; the inhabit- 
 ants of, IV. viii. 3, p. 78 ; ib. 6, 
 p. 79 ; ib. 3S, p. 88 ; Philiscus of, 
 VII. i. 27, p. 194 ; gold mines in 
 the neighbourhood of, IV. viii. 37, 
 p. 89. 
 
 Academy, the, VI. v. 49, p. 184. 
 
 Acanthus, a town in the Chalcidicfe, 
 V. ii. II, p. 103 ; ii. iii. 6, p. 114 ; 
 deputies from, V. ii. 23, p. 106. 
 
 Acarnania, VI. ii. 37, p. 151 ; Ages. 
 ii. 20, p. 250. 
 
 Acarnanians, the, IV. ii. 17, p. 50 ; 
 ii. vi. I foil., p. 71 foil. ; ii. vii. 
 I, p. 74 ; VI. V. 23, p. 176 ; Ages. 
 ii. 20, p. 250. 
 
 Achaeans, the Arcadians and, join in 
 the invasion of Elis (B.C. 401?), 
 III. ii. 26, p. 17 ; at "the Nemea" 
 (B.C. 394), IV. ii. 18, p. SI ; occupy 
 Calydon (B.C. 390), IV. vi. i, p. 71 ; 
 their campaign against the Acar- 
 nanians, IV. vi. 3, ib. ; allied with 
 Lacedaemon (B.C. 371), IV. iv. 18, 
 p. 163 ; Epaminondas secures ad- 
 hesion of (B.C. 367), VII. i. 41, p. 
 199; in alliance with Eleians (B.C. 
 36s), ii. iv. 17, p. 217 ; atOlympia 
 
 (B.C. 364), ib. 28, p. 221 ; join the 
 
 anti-Theban league (B.C. 362), z'^. 
 
 v. I, p. 225 ; ii. 18, p. 230 ; their 
 
 Acarnanian campaign. Ages. ii. 20, 
 
 p. 250. 
 Achaea Phthiotis, mountains of, IV. 
 
 iii. 9, p. S4- 
 Achaia, III. ii. 23, p. 16 ; IV. viii. 
 
 10, p. 80 ; ib. 23, p. 84 ; VI. ii. n, 
 
 p. 144 ; VII. i. 41, p. 199. 
 Achilleum, in the Troad, III. ii. 17, 
 
 p. 15; in the plain of the Maeander, 
 
 IV. viii. 17, p. 83. 
 Acrisius of Sicyon, VII. i. 45, p. 200. 
 Acrocorinthus, the, IV. iv. 4, p. 59. 
 Acroreia, the cities of the, VII. iv. 14, 
 
 p. 216. 
 Acroreians, the. III. ii. 30, p. 18 ; 
 
 IV. ii. 16, p. so. 
 Adeas of Sicyon, VII. i. 4s, p. 200. 
 Aegae, a town in Aeolis, IV. viii. j, 
 
 P- 79- 
 Aegina, the island of, V. i. 2, p. 90 ; 
 
 ib. iv. 61, p. 13s ; VI. ii. i, p. 
 
 143- 
 Aeginetan obols, V. ii. 21, p. 106. 
 Aeginetans, the, and Athenians (B.C. 
 
 388), V. i. 2, p. 90. 
 Aegosthena, town in Megaris, V. iv. 
 
 18, p. 124 ; VI. iv. 26, p. 165. 
 Aeneas of Stymphalus, VII. iii. i, p. 
 
 208. 
 
352 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Aenianians, the, III. v. 6, p. 34 ; IV. 
 
 iii. IS, p. SS- 
 Aeolid, the, III. i. 10, p. 4 ; ii. 16 
 
 foil., p. 6 ; a. ii. I, p. 10 ; ii, 13, 
 
 p. 14 ; IV. viii. 33, p. 87. 
 AeoUans, the, III. iv. 11, p. 27 ; IV. 
 
 iii. 17, p. SS ; Ages. i. 14, p. 240 ; 
 
 ii. II, p. 248. 
 Aetolia, IV. vi. i, p. 71. 
 Aetolians, the, IV. vi. 14, p. 74 ; 
 
 Ages. ii. zo, p. 251. 
 Agamemnon, III. iv. 3, p. 24 ; VII. 
 
 i. 34, p. 196. 
 Agathinus, a Corinthian admiral, IV. 
 
 viii. 10, p. 80. 
 Agesilaus, son of Archidamus, V. iii. 
 
 13, p. 116 ; brother of Agis, III. iii. 
 
 1 , p. 19 ; though lame is chosen king, 
 ii. 4, p. 20 ; undertakes a cam- 
 paign into Asia, id. iv. 2, p. 23 ; 
 and the Boeotarchs at Aulis, ii. 3, 
 p. 24 ; Tissaphernes makes truce 
 with, ii. s foil., p. 25 ; his dealings 
 vifith Lysander, ii. 7 foil., p. 25 
 foil. ; his first campaign in Asia 
 (B.C. 396), ii. 2-is, pp. 24-28; 
 second (B.C. 39S)i ii- 16-29, pp. 
 28-32; in Phrygia and Paphla- 
 gonia, IV. i. 1-41, pp. 40-47; recall 
 and departure of (B.C. 394), ii. ii. 
 
 2, p. 47 ; his rapid march through 
 Thrace and Thessaly to Boeotia, ii. 
 iii. 1-9, pp. 52-54 ; his behaviour on 
 hearing of the defeat at Cnidus, ii. 
 10 foil. , p. 54 ; at the battle of 
 Coronea, ii. 15-21, pp. SS-S7 '• *t 
 Delphi ; returns home, ii. iv. i 
 foil., p. 57 foil. ; his campaign 
 against Argos, and capture of the 
 long walls (and naval arsenal) of 
 Corinth (B.C. 391?), ii. 191 p. 64; 
 his campaign against Corinth and 
 capture of Peiraeum ; haughtiness ; 
 behaviour on hearing of destruction 
 of the mora ; and homeward march 
 (B.C. 390?), ii. V. 1-18, pp. 64-70; 
 his campaign in Acarnania (B.C. 
 390?), ii. vi. 3-14, pp. 71-74; insists 
 on the principle of autonomy in 
 reference to the Boeotian states at 
 the peace of Antalcidas (b.c. 387), 
 V. i. 32 foil. , p. 98 ; forcibly severs 
 
 the political connection of Corinth 
 and Argos, ii. 34 foil., p. 99 foil. ; 
 begs to be absolved from conduct- 
 ing the war against Man tinea (B.C. 
 386), ii. ii. 3, p. loi ; his opinion 
 as to the conduct of Phoebidas at 
 the seizure of the Cadmeia(B.c. 383), 
 ii. 32, p. 109 ; willingly undertakes 
 the campaign against Phlius in be- 
 half of the restored Phhasian exiles, 
 and reduces Phlius after a long 
 siege (B.C. 380-379), ii. iii. 13-25, 
 pp. 116-119 ; his relations to Agesi- 
 polis and sorrow at his death, ii. 
 20, p. 117; excuses himself from 
 the expedition against Thebes (B.C. 
 378), ii. iv. 13, p. 123 ; his be- 
 haviour in the case of Sphodrias, 
 ib. z6 foil., p. 125 foil. ; under- 
 takes the renewed expedition against 
 Thebes (b.c. 378), ii. 35-41, pp. 
 128, 129 ; and again the next year 
 (B.C. 377), it. 47-55, pp. 131-133 ; 
 his illness (b.c. 376) (see below, 
 VI. iv. 17, p. 163), ii. 58, p. 154 ; 
 his behaviour towards the Theban 
 ambassadors at the congress of 
 Sparta (b.c. 371), VI. i. 19 foil., 
 p. 157 ; as ambassador endeavours 
 to stop the rebuilding of the walls 
 of Mantinea (B.C. 371-370), ib. iv. 
 4 foil., p. 169 foil. ; commanded to 
 head the expedition against Man- 
 tinea (B.C. 370), ib. V. 10-12, p. 
 172 ; his conduct of the campaign 
 till midwinter (B.C. 370-369), ib, 
 15-21, pp. 173-17S [for his defence 
 of Sparta on the occasion of the 
 first Theban invasion, see Agesilaus, 
 ii. 24, p. 252] ; in command of the 
 Laconian army against Epamin- 
 ondas (B.C. 362), VII. v. 9, p. 228 ; 
 prevents Epaminondas capturing 
 Sparta by surprise, ib. 10, p. 228 ; 
 — Encomium of, Agesilaus, pp. 237- 
 272 ; his age, i. 6, p. 238 ; ii. 28, 
 p. 253 ; daughter, viii. 7, p. 264 ; 
 sister, ix. 6, p. 266 ; his title to 
 fame, noble birth, etc. , aptitude for 
 rule, i. i-S, pp. Z37. 238 ; exploits 
 in Asia, and in Hellas proper, i. 6- 
 ii. 22, pp. 238-251 ; his sagacity and 
 
INDEX 
 
 353 
 
 clemency, i, 17-23, pp. 240, 241 ; 
 his valour at Coronea, ii. 12 foil., 
 p. 249 ; his attachment to his party, 
 ib. 21, p. 251 ; as the saviour of 
 Sparta, ib. 23 foil., p. 251 foil. ; 
 his diplomatic services, re Auto- 
 phradates, in behalf of Ariobar- 
 zanes, an ally of Sparta (B.C. 366- 
 365), Cotys, Mausolus, Tachos, ii. 
 25-27, pp. 252, 253 ; his last cam- 
 paign in Egypt (b.c. 361), ii. 28-31, 
 'PP- 253. 254 ; Ws piety, iii. pp. 254, 
 25s ; his integrity, iv. pp. 255-257 : 
 his self-control, v. pp. 257, 258 ; 
 his courage, wisdom, generalship, 
 vi. pp. 259, 260 ; his patriotism, 
 vii. pp. 260-262 ; his grace of 
 manner and lofty sentiment, viii. 
 pp. 263, 264 ; his simplicity of life, 
 ix. pp. 265, 266 ; a pattern and 
 ensample of virtue, x. pp. 266-268 ; 
 his virtues under headings, xi. p. 
 268 foil. ; his death and burial, xi. 
 16, p. 272. 
 
 Agesipolis, son of Pausanias, king of 
 Sparta, under the guardianship of 
 Aristodemus (B.C. 394), IV. ii. 9, 
 p. 48 ; his campaign against Argos 
 (B.C. 389-388), ib. vii. 2-7, p. 75 
 foil. ; against Mantinea (B.C. 385), 
 V. ii. 3-6, p. loi foil. : against 
 Olynthus (B.C. 381), ib. iii. 8-18, 
 p. 114 foil. ; f^s ill and dies at 
 Aphytis, ib. 19, p. 117. 
 
 Agis, king of Sparta, prevented by the 
 Eleians from offering a sacrifice at 
 Olympia, III. ii. 22-29, p. 16 foil. ; 
 his campaign against Elis (b.c. 402- 
 400?), ib. 23 foil., p. 16 foil. ; at 
 Delphi ; his death at Lacedaemon 
 (B.C. 399?), ib. iii. 1, p. 19; Ages. 
 i. 5, p. 238. 
 
 Agyrrhius, an Athenian statesman, 
 commands the fleet, IV. viii. 31, 
 p. 87. 
 
 Alcetas, a Lacedaemonian, loses 
 Oreus, V. iv. 56 foil., p. 133. 
 
 Alcetas, hipparch in Epirus, under 
 Jason, VI. i. 7, p. 139 ; the Athe- 
 nians and, ib. ii. 10, p. 145. 
 
 Alcimenes, a Corinthian, IV. iv. 7, 
 p. 60. 
 VOL. 11 
 
 Alea, temple of Athena Alea, VI. v. 
 
 27, p. 178. 
 Alexander, Tyrant of Thessaly, mur- 
 dered by his wife (b.c. 358), VI. iv. 
 
 33 foil., p. 167 foil. ; furnishes a 
 
 contingent to the "ITiebans (b.c. 
 
 362), VII. v, 4, p. 226. 
 Alpheus, the river, III. ii. 29, p. 18 ; 
 
 VI. ii. 31, p. 150 ; VII. iv. 29, p. 
 
 221. 
 Altis, the, at Olympia, VII. iv. 29, 
 
 p. 221. 
 AlypStus, a Lacedaemonian polem- 
 
 arch, V. iv. 52, p. 132. 
 Alyzia, a town on the west coast of 
 
 Acarnania, V. iv. 65, p. 136. 
 Amphidolians, the, inhabitants of Am- 
 
 phidoli in the Pisatis of Elis, III. ii. 
 
 25, p. 17 ; ib. 29, p. 18 ; IV. ii. 
 
 16, p. 50. 
 Ampheion, a division of the city of 
 
 Thebes, V. iv. 8, p. 121. 
 Amphipolis, IV. iii. i, p. 52. 
 Amyclae, a town about two miles from 
 
 Sparta, VI. v. 30, p. 178 ; VII. ii. 
 
 3, p. 202 ; Ages. viii. 7, p. 264. 
 Amyclaeans, the, IV. v. 11, p. 68. 
 Amjmtas, king of Macedonia, helps 
 
 Sparta against Olynthus, V. ii. 12, 
 
 p. 104; ib. 38, p. Ill ; ib. iii. 9, 
 
 P- IIS- ; 
 
 Anaphlystus, a deme of Attica, Rev. 
 
 iv. 43, p. 343. 
 Anaxibius, the Lacedaemonian, sent 
 
 as harmost to Abydos (b.c. 389), 
 
 IV. viii. 32 foil., p. 87 foil. ; and 
 Iphicrates, ib. 35 foil., p. 88; his 
 death, ib. 38 foil. , p. 89. 
 
 Androcleidas of Thebes, III. v. i, p. 
 32; escapes to Athens (b.c. 383), 
 
 V. ii. 31, p. 109. 
 Andromachus of Elis, VII. iv. 19, p. 
 
 218. 
 
 Antalcidas, the Lacedaemonian, IV. 
 viii. 12, p. 81 ; confers with Tiri- 
 bazus (B.C. 392), ib. 14-16, p. 81 
 foil. ; appointed navarch (B.C. 388), 
 V. i. 6, p. 91 ; the peace of (b.c. 
 ■^87), V. i. 31, p. 98 ; ib. 36, p. 
 99 ; VI. iii. 12, p. 155. 
 
 Antandrus, a. city of the Troad, IV. 
 viii. 35, p. 88. 
 
354 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Antiochus, an Arcadian, VII. i. 33- 
 
 38, p. 196. 
 Antisthenes, a Lacedaemonian, III. 
 
 ii. 6, p. II. 
 Aphrodision, the, temple of Aphrodite 
 
 at Megara, V. iv. 58, p. 134. 
 Aphrodite, a feast of, at Thebes, V. 
 
 iv. 4, p. 120. 
 Aphytis, a town of Pallene in Mace- 
 donia, V. iii. 19, p. 117. 
 Apollo, oracle of. III. iii. 3, p. 20 ; 
 
 ih. V. 5, p. 33 ; IV. vii. 2, p. 75 ; 
 
 the temple of, VI. iv. m, p. 158 ; 
 
 ib. 30, p. 167 ; ih. v. 27, p. 178. 
 ApoUonia, the diief town of Chalcidicfe, 
 
 V. ii. II, p. 103 ; ib. iii. i foil., p. 
 
 112. 
 ApoUophanes of Cyzicns, IV. i. 29, 
 
 p. 44. 
 Aracus, a Lacedaemonian, III. ii. 6 
 
 foil., p. II foil. ; VI. V. 33, p. 179. 
 Arcadia, IV. iv. 16, p. 63 ; VI. v. 12, 
 
 p. 172 ; ib. SI, p. 185 ; VII. iv. 10, 
 
 p. 214 ; ib. 3S, p. 223 ; ib. v. 10, 
 
 p. 228 ; the Parrhasians of, VII. i. 
 
 28, p. 194 ; ib. 40, p. 225. 
 Arcadians, the, join in the invasion of 
 
 Elis (b.c. 401?), III. ii. 26, p. 17; 
 
 claim of, to Lasion (see below), ib. 
 
 30, p. 18 ; ib. V. 12, p. 35 ; and 
 
 Iphicrates's peltasts, IV. iv. 16, p. 
 
 63 ; character of, V. ii. 19, p. 106 ; 
 
 of Orchomenus and Cleitor at war, 
 
 V. iv. 36 foil., p. 128 ; impulse of, 
 towards Pan-Arcadian union and 
 common assembly of (b.c. 370), 
 
 VI. V. 6, p. 170 ; contingents of, 
 muster at Asea, VI. v. 11, p. 172 ; 
 and unite with the Mantineans, ib. 
 I Si P' 173 ; wise discretion of, 
 ib. 19 foil., p. 17s; march upon 
 Heraea {winter of B. c. 370-369) 
 and coalesce with the Thebans 
 at Mantinea, ib. 22 foil. , p. 175 ; 
 eagerness of, to invade Laconia, ib. 
 23, p. 176 ; Ages. ii. 23, p. 251 ; 
 enter by Oeum in the Sciritid, ib. 
 25, p. 177 ; coalesce with the 
 Thebans at Caryae, ib. 27, p. 177 j 
 unguarded behaviour of, before 
 Sparta, ib. 30, p. 178 ; was the 
 invasion of Laconia by the, and 
 
 their allies justifiable? ib. 36, p. 
 180; retire from Laconia, ib. 50, p. 
 184 ; the Thebans effect a junction 
 with the, Argives, and Eleians (second 
 invasion, B.C. 369), VII. 1. 18, p. 
 190 ; Lycomedes inspires the, with 
 high thoughts, ib. 23, p. 192 ; 
 brilliant exploits of, ib, 24, p. 193 ; 
 growing lukewarmness of the The- 
 bans and hostility of the Eleians 
 towards, ib. 26, p. 193 ; and 
 Argives encounter Archidamus and 
 are defeated in the ' * tearless " 
 battle (B.C. 368), ib. 28 foil., p. 
 194 foil. ; Antiochus commissioner 
 of, at the court of Persia (B.C. 367), 
 ii- 33i P- ^9^ ; '''s report to the 
 general assembly of (the Ten Thou- 
 sand), ib. 38, p. i97folL; dissension 
 between the envoys of, and the 
 Thebans at the congress of Thebes 
 (B.C. 366), ih. 39, p. 198; Epami- 
 nondas and the (n.c. 367), ib. 41- 
 43, pp. 198, 199 ; stress of, between 
 the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians, 
 ib. 43, p. 199 foil. ; successful over- 
 tures of Euphron to Argives and, 
 ih. 43 foil., p. 200 foil. ; relations 
 of Phlius to, and Argives (b. c. 370 
 foil. ), ib. ii. 2, p. 201 ; some Phli- 
 asian exiles and, it. 5 foil., p. 202 
 foil. ; an attack on Phlius by the 
 Argives and, ib. 10, p. 205 ; Aeneas 
 of St3miphalus, general of, ih. iii. i , 
 p. 208 ; the Sicyonians and, re- 
 capture the harbour of Sicyon (b. c. 
 366), ih. iv. I, p. 212 I Lycomedes 
 cements an alliance between Athens 
 and, ib. 2 foil. , p. 212 foil. ; quarrel 
 of, with the Eleians re Lasion, ih. 
 12 foil., p. 215 foil. ; achievements 
 of, against Elis, ih. 15, p. 216 ; 
 subsequent campaign of, in Elis and 
 at Oliurus, ib. 16 foil., p. 217 foil. ; 
 on another campaign (B.C. 365?) 
 near Cyllene and at the siege of 
 Cromnus, ib. 18 foil. , p. 218 foil. ; 
 the select troops of (Eparitoi), ih. 
 22, p. 219 ; ib. 33 foil. , p. 222 
 foil. ; share the I^acedaemonian 
 prisoners taken at Cromnus, ib. 27, 
 p. 220; at Olympia (B.C. 364), ib. 
 
INDEX 
 
 355 
 
 28 foil. , p. 220 foil. ; discord among 
 (B.C. 363), ii. 33 foil., p. 222 foil. ; 
 the general assembly of, ib. 35, p. 
 223 ; the Theban harmost and, in 
 Tegea (b. c. 362) ib. 36, p. 224 ; 
 send an embassy to Thebes accusing 
 the Theban harmost, ib. 39 foil. , p. 
 225 ; Epaminondas's answer to the 
 general assembly of, ib. v. i, p. 
 362 ; those of, championing the 
 interests of Peloponnese, determine 
 to resist the Thebans, and call on 
 the Athenians for military aid, apply- 
 ing at the same time to Lacedaemon, 
 ib. 2 foil. , p. 226 ; the heavy in- 
 fantry of, on the side of Epami- 
 nondas inscribe clubs as the crest on 
 their shields, as though they were 
 Thebans, ib. 20, p. 231 ; reinforce- 
 ments sent to, by the Athenians 
 under Lysistratus (b.c. 366), and 
 again when Hegesileos was general 
 (b.c 362), I^ev. iii. 7. 
 
 Archias, the Theban polemarch (b.c. 
 379)1 V. iv. 2, p. 120 ; VII. iii. 7, 
 p. 210. 
 
 Archidamus, father of Agesilaus, V. 
 iii. 13, p. 116 ; ./4^es. i. 5, p. 238. 
 
 Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, V. iv. 
 25 foil. , p. 125 ; commands the 
 army of relief after Leuctra, VI. iv. 
 18 foil. , p. 163 ; ib. 26, p. 165 ; 
 ii. V. I, p. 168 ; recaptures Caryae, 
 and wins a victory over the Arcad- 
 ians, VII. i. 28 foil. , p. 194 foil. ; 
 marches to assist the Eleians against 
 the Arcadians, seizes Croranus (b.c. 
 365), is wounded in battle, ib. iv. 
 20-24, p. 218 foil. ; defends Sparta 
 against Epaminondas, ib. v. 12 foil., 
 p. 228 foil. 
 
 Archidamus, commissioner of the 
 Eleians at the court of Persia (b.c. 
 367), VII. i. 33, p. 196 ; his praise 
 of the king and his policy, ib. 38, 
 p. 197. 
 
 Argeius, an Eleian of the democratic 
 party, VII. iv. 15 foil., p. 217. 
 
 Argives, the, a former alliance of the 
 Eleians with (b.c. 421), III. ii. 21, 
 p. 16 ; hostile to Lacedaemon of 
 old, ib. V. II, p. 35 ; seven thou- 
 
 sand, at "the Nemea" (b.c. 394), 
 IV. ii. 17 foil., p. so foil. ; hold the 
 left at Coronea, ib. iii. 15 foU., p. 
 55 ; with the Athenians, Boeotians, 
 and the other allies, carry on the 
 war against Lacedaemon, making 
 Corinth their base (b.c. 393), ib. iv. 
 I foil., p. 58 foil. ; at the battle 
 within the long walls (b.o. 392), 
 ib. 9 foil., p. 61 foil. ; Lacedae- 
 monians march against (b.c. 391), 
 under Agesilaus, ibi 19, p. 64; 
 conduct "the Isthmia" (cf. B.c. 
 390) "as if Argos were Corinth," 
 ib. v. I foil., p. 64 foil. ; fictitious 
 extension of the lepon'qvla by (B.C. 
 388), and invasion of, by Agesipolis, 
 ib. vii. 2 foil., p. 74 foU. ; resent 
 the principle of autonomy, wish- 
 ing to absorb Corinth (b.c. 392), 
 ib. viii. 15, p. 82 ; and Iphicrates 
 in Corinth (b.C. 389), ib. 34, p. 88 ; 
 have a strong desire for peace (b. c. 
 387), V. i. 29, p. 98 ; Agesilaus 
 severs the connection of, and Corinth 
 by force, ib. 34 foil., p. 99 foil. ; 
 the Mantineans and, ib. ii. 2, p. 
 100 ; treatment of, by Athens in the 
 old story (/.^e Seven against Thebes). 
 VI. V. 46, p. 183 ; retire from 
 Laconia (winter of B.C. 370-369), 
 ii. 50, p. 184 ; the Thebans effect a 
 junction with, and their other allies 
 (second invasion, B.C. 369), VII. i. 
 18, p. 190 ; saved by the Arcadians 
 (b. C. 368), ib. 25, p. 193; defeated 
 along with the Arcadians by Archi- 
 damus in the ' ' tearless " battle, ib, 
 28 foil., p. 194 foil. ; a commis- 
 sioner representing, at the court of 
 Persia (B.C. 368), ib. 33, p. 196; 
 Peisias, general of, occupies Oneion 
 for Epaminondas (b.c. 367), ib. 41, 
 p. 199; and Arcadians and Euphron 
 of Sicyon, ib. 44 foil. , p. 200 ; fortify 
 the Trikaranon threatening Phlius, 
 ib. ii. I, p. 201 ; relations of Phlius 
 to the Arcadians and (e.c. 370-369 
 foil.), ib. 4, p. 201 ; the Arcadians 
 and, assault Phlius, ib. 8, p. 203 ; 
 Phlius invaded by, and the Arcadians 
 (b.c. 368), ib. 10. p. 204 ; takeover 
 
356 
 
 INDEX 
 
 and garrison Trikaranon contrary to 
 the terms of peace (b.c. 366), ib. iv. 
 II, p. 215; at the siege of Cromnus, 
 ib. 27, p. 220 ; one portion of the 
 Lacedaemonian prisoners falls to 
 the lot of, ib. p. 220 ; at Olympia 
 (b.c. 364), ib. 29 foil., p. 221 foil. ; 
 Epaminondas (b.C. 362) counts 
 upon, and the Messenians with a 
 section of the Arcadians, ib, v. 5, 
 p. 227. 
 
 Argos, Timocrates as agent of Tith- 
 raustes gives money to Cylon in 
 (B.C. 39S), III. V. I, p. 32; threat- 
 ened absorption of Corinth by (B.C. 
 392), IV. iv. s foil., p. S9 ; "the 
 Isthmia" of B.C. 390 conducted 
 "as if, were Corinth," ib. v. i, p. 
 64 ; danger to Lacedaemon on the 
 side of (B.C. 388), ib. vii. 2 foil, p. 
 74 foil. ; representatives of, at the 
 Asiatic congress (b.c. 392), ib. viii. 
 13, p. 81 ; how the principle of 
 autonomy would affect, ib. 15, p. 
 82 ; Iphicrates and the partisans of, 
 in Corinth (b.c. 389), ib. 34, p. 
 88 ; and the subterfuge of a mov- 
 able calendar, V, iii. 27, p. 119 ; 
 Peisias head of military affairs in 
 (b.c. 367), VII. i. 41, p. igg. 
 
 Ariaeus (see Trans, vol. i. s.n.) and 
 the Paphlagonians, IV. i. 27, p. 44. 
 
 Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, and 
 Antalcidas, V. i. 28, p. 97 ; mission 
 of Phihscus in behalf of (b.c. 368), 
 VII. i. 27, p. 194 ; saved by Agesi- 
 laus. Ages, ii. 26, p. 253. 
 
 Aristocles, an Athenian, VI. iii. z, p. 
 152. 
 
 Aristodemus, guardian of Agesipolis, 
 commands the expedition (b.c. 394), 
 IV. ii. 9, p. 48. 
 
 Aristodemus, the great-great-grandson 
 of Heracles, Ages. viii. 7, p. 264. 
 
 Aristolochus, a Lacedaemonian, V. iv. 
 22, p. 125. 
 
 Aristophon, Demostratus, son of, an 
 Athenian, VI. iii. 2, p. 152. 
 
 Artaxerxes, king of Persia, V. i. 30 
 foil., p. 98. 
 
 Artemis of Astyra, her temple in the 
 plain of Thebe, IV. i. 41, p. 47; 
 
 at Leucophrys, III. ii. 19, p. ij ; 
 
 of Ephesus, III. iv. 18, p. 29 ; 
 
 Ages, i. 27, p. 243 ; her temple 
 
 near Tegea, VI. v. 9, p. 171 ; at 
 
 Aulis, VII. i. 34, p. 196. 
 Asea, a town in the Maenalia of 
 
 Arcadia, VI. v. 11, p. 172 ; ib, 15, 
 
 p. 173 ; the men of, VII. v. 5. p. 
 
 227. 
 Asia, i,e, (as a rule) Asia Minor, III. 
 
 i. 3 foil., p. 2 ; ib. ii. 6 foil., p. 11 
 
 foil. ; ib, iv. 2 foil., p. 23 foil. ; ib. 
 
 V. i. foil., p. 32 foil. ; IV. ii. 6, p. 
 
 48 ; ib, iii. i, p. 52; ib, viii. 5, p. 
 
 78; V. iii. 8, p. 114; VII. i. 34, 
 
 p. ig6 ; the states (or Hellenic 
 
 cities) of, IV. ii. 4 foil. , p. 47 foil. ; 
 
 ib. iii. 15, p. SS ; V. i. 31, p. 98 ; 
 
 the lord of. III. v. 13, p. 36 ; Ages. 
 
 i. 7, p. 238. 
 Asinfe, a town in Laconia, VII. i. 25, 
 
 P- 193- 
 Aspendians, the, IV. viii. 30, p. 87. 
 Aspendus, a town in PamphyHa, IV. 
 
 viii. 30, p. 87. 
 Assus, a town of Troas, Ages. ii. 26, 
 
 P- 2S3- 
 Astyra, Artemis of, IV. i. 41, p. 47. 
 Atameus, a town in Aeolis, III. ii. ir, 
 
 p. 13- 
 Athena, III. i. 21, p. 8 ; Lacedae- 
 monian king sacrifices to Zeus and, 
 on the boundaries, Pol. Lac, xiii. a, 
 
 p. 320- 
 
 Athenadas, a Sicyonian captain, III. 
 i. 18, p. 6. 
 
 Athenians, the, send a detachment of 
 horse to serve under Thibron (b.c. 
 400), III. i. 4, p. 2 ; a former 
 alliance of the Eleians with (b.c. 
 421), ib, ii. 21, p. 16 ; join in the 
 invasion of Elis by Agis, ib, 25, p. 
 17 ; the states of Asia under, ib, iv. 
 7, p. 25 ; eager for war and the re- 
 covery of empire (b.c. 395), ib. v. 
 2, p. 32 ; Theban envoys address, 
 ib, 8 foil., p. 34 foil. ; treaty be- 
 tween, and the Thebans, ib, 17 foil. , 
 p. 37 ; send troops to Haliartus, ib. 
 22 foil. , p. 38 ; the war between the 
 Lacedaemonians and, IV. i. 32, p. 
 44 ; six hundred cavalry and six thou- 
 
INDEX 
 
 357 
 
 sand hoplites of, at ' ' the Nemea " 
 (B.C. 394), position of, in the 
 battle, U. ii. 17 foil., p. 51 foil. ; at 
 Coronea, si. 15, p. 55; make Corinth 
 their base (B.C. 393), ii. iv. i 
 foil. , p. 58 ; and the coup d'iiat 
 (of B.C. 392), ib. 8, p. 58 foil. ; 
 rebuild the Corinthian long walls 
 (b.c, 391), ib. 19, p. 64; hoplites 
 of, under Callias at Corinth (B.C. 
 390), ib. V. 13, p. 68; assist their allies 
 the Acarnanians re Calydon (b. c. 
 390?), ib, vi. I foil., p. 71 ; occupy 
 Cythera (b.c. 393), ib. viii. 8 ; and 
 rebuild their own long walls, ib, 9 
 foil, p. 80 foil. ; Conon in part 
 recovers the naval empire of (b.c. 
 392), ib. 12, p. 81 ; adverse to the 
 principle of auionomy, fearing to be 
 deprived of Lemnos, Naxos, and 
 Scyros, ib. 14 foil. , p. 82 ; Tiri- 
 bazus and, Struthas and, ib, 15 foil, 
 p. 82 ; the Rhodian exiles and (b.c. 
 390), ib, 20, p. 83 ; aid their ally 
 Evagoras (b.c. 390), ib. 24, p. 85 ; 
 despatch Thrasybulus to check the 
 Lacedaemonians (B.C. 389), ib. 25 
 foil , p. 85 foil ; on his death choose 
 Agyrrhius to command their fleet, 
 and maintain their hold of Calche- 
 don and later on send out Iphicrates 
 to the Hellespont, ib. 31 foil., p. 87 
 foil ; the Aeginetans and (b.c. 388), 
 V. i. I foil, p. 90 foil ; and Gor- 
 gopas, ib. 7 foil., p. 91 foil ; ex- 
 ploits of, under Chabrias, ib. 10 foil. , 
 p. 93 foil ; through carelessness of, 
 Teleutias surprises Piraeus, ib, 19 
 foil p. 9S ; ill success of (B.C. 387), 
 become passionately desirous of 
 peace, ib. 25 foil., p. 96 foil. ; 
 subscribe to the Peace of Antal- 
 cidas, ib. 33, p. 99 ; Cleigenes of 
 Acanthus on the danger to Lace- 
 daemon of an alliance between, and 
 Olynthus (B.C. 383), ib. ii. 15, p. 
 104 ; assist the Theban patriots 
 (b.c. 379), ib. iv. 10, p. 122; 
 nervous apprehensions of (b.c. 378), 
 ib. 19, p. 124 ; and the attempt of 
 Sphodrias, ib. 21 foil, p. 125; in 
 consequence fortify Piraeus, build a 
 
 fleet (new confederacy of Delos), and 
 display zeal in aiding the Boeotians, 
 ib. 34, p. 128 ; a detachment of 
 Thebans and, occupy the pass on 
 Cithaeron(Cleombrotus'sexpedition, 
 B.C. 376), ib. sgfoll, p. 134; win 
 the battle of Naxos, ib. 61, p. 135 ; 
 despatch Timotheus on his "peri- 
 plus" (B.C. 375), ib. 62, p. 135 
 foil. ; and the Lacedaemonians (b.c. 
 374), VL i. I, p. 137 ; Macedonia 
 the timber yard of their navy, ib. 
 10, p. 140 ; annoyed witli the 
 Thebans (B.C. 374) in reference to 
 the maintenance of the fleet, con- 
 clude peace with Lacedaemon, ib. ii. 
 I foil , p. 143 foil. ; but hostilities 
 speedily recommence re the Zacyn- 
 thian exiles restored by Timotheus 
 their general, ib. 4, p. 144 ; send 
 aid to the Corcyraeans (b.c. 373), 
 ib. 9 foil, p. 14s foil. ; depose 
 Timotheus, appointing Iphicrates in 
 his place, ib. 13 foil , p. 146 ; the 
 Lacedaemonian troops evacuate 
 Corcyra in fear of, ib. 26, p. 148 ; 
 alienated from Thebes re Plataeae 
 and Thespiae, pass a decree to treat 
 with Lacedaemon (b.c. 371), ib. iii. 
 I foil., p. 152 foil ; treaty of peace 
 between, and the Lacedaemonians, 
 the Thebans being excluded, ib. 19, 
 p. 157 ; conscientiously carry out 
 its terms, not so the Lacedae- 
 monians, ib. iv. I, p. 157 ; feelings 
 of, on receipt of the news of Leuctra, 
 ib. 20, p. 163 foil ; hostility of Alex- 
 ander of Pherae to the Thebans and, 
 ib. 35, p. 168 ; organise a new con- 
 federacy on the basis of the King's 
 rescript {i.e. the terms of the peace 
 of Antalcidas), the Eleians alone 
 dissenting to the principle of auto- 
 nomy (B.C. 371-370), ib. v. I foil, 
 p. 169 ; and the Lacedaemonian 
 envoys in reference to the first 
 Theban invasion (b.c. 370-369)1 *'*• 
 33 foil , p. 179 foil. ; after debate the 
 assembly of, decreies to send assist- 
 ance to Lacedaemon, ib. 49 foil , p. 
 184 ; Iphicrates commands, ib. sr 
 foil. , p. i8s ; an alliance between, 
 
358 
 
 INDEX 
 
 and the Lacedaemonians (spring, 
 B.C. 369), VII. i. I foil., p. 186 
 foil. ; decree passed by, vesting the 
 command in either state alternately, 
 ib. 12, p. 189 ; campaign com- 
 menced by, and Lacedaemonians, 
 a. 14, p. 1B9 ; send two commis- 
 sioners to the court of Persia (B.C. 
 368), a. 33 foil. , p. 196 foil. ; pro- 
 posed (by Pelopidas) that " Messene 
 be independent, and, lay up their 
 ships of war," ib. 37, p. 197 ; 
 Timomachus general of (b.c. 367, 
 third Theban invasion), ib. 41, p. 
 199 ; Phliasians assisted by some 
 cavalry of (B.C. 368), ib. ii. 10, p. 
 204 ; Euphron restored to Sicyon 
 (b.c. 367) by, ib. iii. 9, p. 211; 
 forced to act single-handed re 
 Oropus, are persuaded by Lyco- 
 medes to make a cross alliance with 
 the Arcadians (b.c. 366), ib. iv. 
 I foil., p. 212 foil. ; proposal of 
 Demotion to, concerning Corinth, 
 ib. 4, p. 213 ; the Corinthians and, 
 ib. s foil. p. 213 foil. ; four hundred 
 cavalry of, with the Arcadians at 
 Olympia (July, B.C. 364), ib. 29 
 foil., p. 221 foil. ; the Mantineans, 
 etc., call on, for military aid to 
 resist the Thebans (b. c. 362), ib. 
 V. 3 foil. , p. 226 ; Eparainondas 
 hopes to intercept, at Nemea, ib. 6, 
 p. 227 ; cavalry of, at Mantinea, 
 behave gallantly, ib. 15 foil., p. 229 
 foil. ; position and exploits of, in 
 the battle of Mantinea, ib. 24 foil. , 
 pp. 232, 233. See Polity of the 
 Athenians, passim, pp. 275 - 292 ; 
 Ways a?id Means: a Pamphlet on 
 Revenues, passim, pp. 327-349. 
 Athens, end of civil strife at (b. c. 403- 
 402), III. i. I, p. I ; Thebans send 
 ambassadors to, ib. v. 7, p. 34 ; 
 popular government of, and Pau- 
 sanias, ib. 28, p. 39 ; a squadron 
 from, at the Oeniadae (b. c. 390-389), 
 IV. vi. 14, p. 74 ; Conon rebuilds 
 a portion of the long walls of, ib. viii. 
 9, p. 80 ; Philocrates sailing from, 
 to Cyprus encounters Teleutias (b. c. 
 390), ib. 24, p. 84 ; Chabrias 
 
 voyaging from, to Cyprus stops at 
 Aegina (B.C. 388), V. i. 10, p. 92; 
 rush from, to Piraeus on the occa- 
 sion of Teleutias's surprise, ib. 20, 
 p. 9S ; in B.C. 387 (Peace of An- 
 talcidas), ib. 35, p. 99 ; Thebans 
 escape to (b.c. 383), on the occa- 
 sion of the seizure of the Cadmeia, 
 ib. ii. 31, p. 109; isolated (b.c. 
 379), ib. iii. 27, p. 119 ; Phyllidas 
 visits Melon at (b.c. 379), ib. iv. 2 
 foil. p. 120 ; Lacedaemonian am- 
 bassadors at {b.c. 378), on the 
 occasion of the attempt of Sphod- 
 rias, ib. 22, p. 125 ; Timotheus 
 has to send to, for moneys (b.c. 
 374), ib. 66, p. 136 ; Corcyra 
 second only to, as a naval power 
 (B.C. 373), VI. ii. 9, p. 14s ; a 
 party for Lacedaemon and a party 
 for, in every state, ib. iii. 14, 
 p. 156; Callistratus in (b.c. 371), 
 advocating peace, ib. iii. 3, p. 152 ; 
 the Theban messenger appears chap- 
 leted at, with news of Leuctra, ib. 
 iv. 19, p. 163 ; "how the Lacedae- 
 monians had helped to expel the 
 tyrant from, and how the Thebans 
 had wished to wipe, off the face of 
 the earth," ib. v. 33, 35, pp. 179, 
 180 ; plenipotentiaries from Lace- 
 daemon, etc., arrive at (spring, B.C. 
 369), VII. i. I, p. 186 ; Euphron 
 of Sicyon gets a foreign force from 
 (b.c. 367), ib. iii. 4, p. 209 ; 
 the city of, at the centre, not of 
 Hellas merely, but of the habitable 
 world, Rev. i. 6, p. 328 ; license 
 granted to slaves and resident aliens 
 at, Pol. Ath. i. 10, p. 278 ; citizens 
 of, divided into ten tribes. Rev. iv. 
 30, p. 340. 
 Attica, Eteonicus issues letters of 
 marque, encouraging the Aeginetans 
 to plunder, V. i. i foil. , p. 90 ; 
 Cape Zoster in, ib. g, p. 92 ; Teleu- 
 tias coasts along, from Piraeus to 
 Sunium, ib. 22 foil. , p. 95 ; incur- 
 sion of Sphodrias into, ib. iv. ig, 
 p. 124 ; Iphicrates obtains the use 
 of vessels cruising on the coast 
 of, VII. ii. 14, p. 146 ; physical 
 
INDEX 
 
 359 
 
 resources of, Rev. i. 3 foil., p. 327 
 foil. 
 
 Aulis, a town of Boeotia on the 
 Euripos, III. iv. 3, p. 24 ; ib. v. 5, 
 p. 33 ; VII. i. 34, p. 196. 
 
 Aulon, a town on the borders of 
 Messenia and Elis, III. ii. 25, p. 17 ; 
 ih. ill. 8, p. 22. 
 
 Autocles, one of the Athenian com- 
 missioners at Sparta (b.c. 371), his 
 speech, VI. iii. 2 foil., p. 152 foil. 
 
 Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, Ages. 
 ii. 26, p. 253. 
 
 Bagaeus, a Persian, III. iv. 13, p. 
 
 28. 
 Besa, a derae in Attica, Rev. iv. 44, 
 
 P- 343- 
 
 Bithynia, III. ii. 2, p. 10. 
 
 Bithynians, the, III. ii. 2 foil., p. 10 
 foil. 
 
 Boeotarchs, the. III., iv. 4, p. 24. 
 
 Boeotia, two Lacedaemonian armies 
 in (B.C. 395), III. v. 17, p. 37; 
 after their defeat at Haliartus the 
 Lacedaemonians quit the territory 
 of, ib. 24, p. 39 ; Agesilaus reaches 
 the confines of (b.c. 394), IV. iii. 9, 
 p. S4 ; to attack Athens or, unsafe 
 for the Lacedaemonians with Argos 
 hostile in their rear (b.c. 389-38S), 
 ib. vii. 2, p. 74 ; Thebans and the 
 states of (b.c. 392), ib. viii. 15, p. 
 82 ; the Thebans forced to recognise 
 the "autonomy" of the cities of 
 (b.c. 387, peace of Antalcidas), 
 V. i. 33, 36, p. 99 : embassies from 
 Athens and, at Olynthus (b.c. 383), 
 ib. ii. 15, p. 104 ; the solidifying of 
 the power of Olynthus more danger- 
 ous to Lacedaemon than the uni- 
 fication 6f, ib. 16, p. 105 ; the 
 prostration of, to Thebes no longer 
 possible (after the seizure of the 
 Cadmeia, B.C. 383), according to 
 Leontiades, ib. 34, p. iro ; the 
 friends of, at Athens (b.c. 378), ib. 
 iv. 34, p. 127 ; the expatriation of 
 the Plataeans from (B.C. 373), VI. 
 iii. I, p. 152 ; Cleombrotus feels 
 justified in marching into (uc. 371), 
 ib. iv. 3, p. 158 ; Jason marches 
 
 through Phoois into (after Leuctra), 
 ib. 21 foil. , p. 164 ; Pol. Aih. iii. 
 
 11, p. 291. 
 
 Boeotians, the, and Corinthians will 
 not join in the invasion of Elis 
 (B.C. 401?), III. ii. 25, p. 17; 
 five thousand heavy infantry and 
 eight hundred cavalry of, at "the 
 Nemea" (B.C. 394), IV. ii. 17, 
 p. 50 ; " tactical disposition of, in 
 the battle, ib. 18 foil, p. 51 ; 
 Thessalian allies of, hang on the 
 heels of Agesilaus, ib. iii. 3, p. 53 ; 
 (see Ages. ii. 2, p. 246) ; at Coronea, 
 ib. 15, p. 55 ; theAthenians, Argives 
 and the other allies make Corinth 
 their base (B.C. 393), ib. iv. i foil., 
 p. 58 ; in the harbour (of Corinth, 
 i.e. Lechaeum) lay the guard of 
 (b.c. 392, battle within the long 
 walls), p. 60, and were cut up, ib. 
 
 12, p. 62 ; a deputation from, to 
 Agesilaus (b.c. 390), anxious to 
 obtain peace, ib. v. 6, p. 66 ; Agesi- 
 laus and the ambassadors of, ii. 9, 
 p. 67 ; the Athenians and, allied 
 with the Acarnanians (b.c. 390), ib. 
 vi. I foil., p. 71 ; cavalry of, in 
 Argos (B.C. 389-388, the campaign 
 of Agesipolis), ib. vii. 6, p. 76 ; help 
 the Athenians to rebuild their long 
 walls (b.C. 393), ib. viii. 10, p. 80 ; 
 representatives of, on the embassy 
 to Tiribazus (b.c. 392), ib. 13, p. 
 81 ; the Thebans claim to take the 
 oaths on behalf of all (b.c. 387, 
 congress at Sparta re the peace 
 of Antalcidas), V. i. 32, p. 98 ; 
 the Olynthian cavalry put to flight 
 the cavalry of the Lacedaemonians 
 and (B.C. 382), ib. ii. 41, p. 112; 
 Thebes and the rest of, prostrate 
 before Lacedaemon (B.C. 379), ib. 
 iii. 27, p. 119; the Athenians dis- 
 play zeal in sending aid to (e.g. 
 378, new confederacy of Delos), ib. 
 iv. 34, p. 128 ; and all the rest of 
 the world in arms against Lacedae- 
 mon are Jason's allies (B.C. 374), 
 VI. i. 10, p. 140 ; Thebans, wishing 
 to substitute the, for Thebans, are ex- 
 cluded from the treaty of B.C. 371, 
 
36o 
 
 INDEX 
 
 ib. iii. ig, p. 157 ; Thebans at 
 Leuctra supported by no allies but, 
 ib. iv. 9, p. 159 ; resolute in practis- 
 ing gymnastics about the place of 
 arms (winter, B.C. 370-369), ib. v. 
 23, p. 176 ; Iphicrates fails to pre- 
 vent, making their way out home- 
 wards, ib. 51, p. 185 ; aided by, 
 and those of the Eparitoi who 
 shared their sentiments, the Tegea- 
 tans attempt forcible measures (b.c. 
 362), VII. iv. 36, -p. 224 ; Epamin- 
 ondas at the head of all, with the 
 Euboeans and a large body of 
 Thessalians, invades Peloponnese 
 for the last time, ib. v. 4, p. 226 ; 
 manner of, in reference to boy attach- 
 ments, Pol. Lac. ii. 13, p. 301. 
 Byzantium, affairs of (B.C. 389), IV. 
 viii. 27 foil, , p. 8s foil. 
 
 Cadmeia (or Kadmeia), the, of 
 Thebes, V. ii. 29, p. 108 ; VI. iii. 
 9, p. 15s ; ii. V. 46, p. 183. 
 
 Calchedon, city of Bithynia opposite 
 Byzantium, IV. viii. 28, p. 86 ; ib. 
 31, p. 87 ; V. i. 25, p. 96. 
 
 Calleas, a Lacedaemonian, Ages. viii. 
 3. P- 263. 
 
 Callias, son of Hipponicus, an Athen- 
 ian, in command of Athenian hop- 
 lites at Corinth (b.c. 390), IV. v. 
 13, p. 68 ; proxenos of the Lacedae- 
 monians, V. iv. 22, p. 125 ; com- 
 missioner at Sparta (b.c. 371), his 
 speech, VI. iii. 2 foil., p. 152. 
 
 Callias, a Lacedaemonian, IV. i. 15, 
 p. 42. 
 
 Callibius of Tegea, a leader of the 
 Pan-Arcadian movement (b. c. 370), 
 VI. V. 6 foil., p. 170 foil. 
 
 Callimedon, an Athenian, IV. viii. 13, 
 p. 81. 
 
 Callisthenes, an Athenian, IV. viii. 13, 
 p. 81. 
 
 Callistratus, the Athenian orator, col- 
 league of Iphicrates (b.c. 372), VI. 
 ii. 39, p. 151 ; his speech at Sparta 
 (B.c.,371), ib. iii. 3 foil., p. 152 
 foil. 
 
 Calydon, a city of Aetolia, source of 
 weir between the Achaeans and 
 
 Acarnanians (b.c. 390), IV. vi. x, 
 p. 71 ; ib. 14, p. 74. 
 Caria, south-western district of Asia 
 Minor, III. ii. 12 foil., p. 13 foil. ; 
 home of the satrap Tissaphernes, 
 Ages. i. 14 foil. , p. 240; ib. 29, p. 
 
 243- 
 Carians, the. III. ii. 15, p. 14. 
 Caryae, frontier town of Laconia, 
 
 occupied by the Thebans (b. c. 370- 
 
 369), VI. V. 25, p. 177 ; recovered 
 
 by Archidamus (B.C. 368), VII. i. 
 
 28, p. 194. 
 Caue, a large village in Phrygia ad. H. , 
 
 IV. i. 20, p. 42. 
 Cebren, in the Troad, III. i. 17, p. 6. 
 Celts and Iberians sent by Dionysius 
 
 to assist Sparta (B.C. 369), VII. i. 
 
 20, p. 191 ; and again (B.C. 368), 
 
 ib. 31, p. 195. 
 Celusa, the pass of Mount, in Argolis, 
 
 IV. vii. 7, p. 76. 
 Cenchreae, the eastern port of Corinth, 
 
 IV. V. I, p. 6s ; VI. v. s, P- 185 ; 
 
 VII. iv. Si p. 213. 
 Ceos, the island of, V. iv. 61, p. 13 s. 
 Cephalleiiia, the island of, VI. ii. 31, 
 
 33. P- 149- 
 
 Cephisodotus, an Athenian, VI. iii. 2, 
 p. 152 ; his speech to the Assembly 
 at Athens (B.C. 369), VII. i. 12, p. 
 1S8. 
 
 Cephisus, a river in Boeotia, IV. iii. 
 i6, p. SS ; -^ges. ii. 9, p. 248. 
 
 Chabrias, the Athenian general, his 
 exploits in Aegina, V. i. 10 foil.; p. 
 92 foil. ; at Eleutherae, ib. iv. 14, 
 p. 123 ; assists the Thebans (b.c. 
 377). ib. S4. P- 133 ; wins the 
 battle of Naxos (b.c. 376), ib. 6r, 
 p. 13s ; colleague of Iphicrates 
 (B.C. 372), VI. ii. 39, p.' isi ; with 
 his foreign brigade blockades the 
 Argives near Epidaurus (b,c. 368), 
 VII. i. 25, p. 193. 
 
 Chares, the Athenian general, and the 
 Phliasians (b.c. 367), VII. ii. 18 
 foil. , p. 206 foil. ; recalled from 
 Thyamia (b.c. 366), ib. iv. i foil, 
 p. 212 foil. ; at Cenchreae, ib. 5, 
 p. 213. 
 
 Charon, the Theban, V. iv. 3, p. 120. 
 
INDEX 
 
 361 
 
 Charopus, an Eleian, of the demo- 
 cratic party, VII. iv. 15, p. 217. 
 
 Chersonese, the Thracian, III. ii. 8- 
 10, p. 12; IV. ii. 6, p. 48; IV. 
 viii. 35 foil. , p. 88 foil. 
 
 Chilon, a Lacedaemonian, VII. iv. 23, 
 p. 219. 
 
 Cilicia, III, i. x, p. ±. 
 
 Cinadon, a Lacedaemonian, not of the 
 peers, his conspiracy. III. iii. 4 foil. , 
 p. 20 foil. 
 
 Cissidas, in command of troops from 
 Dionysius, VII. i. 28, p. 194. 
 
 Cithaeron, a mountain range separat- 
 ing Boeotia from Megaris and 
 Attica, V. iv. 37 foil., p. 128; ii. 
 47, p. 131 ; ii. 55, p. 133 ; ii. 59, 
 p. 134 ; VI. iv. s. p. IS9- 
 
 Cladaus, the river, VII. iv. 29, p. 
 221. 
 
 Clazomenae, islands of, and Cyprus 
 belong to the king (peace of 
 Antalcidas, B.C. 387), V. i. 31, p. 98. 
 
 Cleander of Sicyon, VII. i. 45, p. 
 200. 
 
 Cleas, a Spartan, V, iv. 39, p. 129. 
 
 Cleigenes of Acanthus, his speech at 
 Lacedaemon (b.c. 383), V. ii. 11, 
 p. 103. 
 
 Cleiteles, the Corinthian, his speech at 
 Athens (B.C. 370-369), VI. y. 37, 
 p. 181. 
 
 Cleitor in Arcadia, at war with Orcho- 
 menus, V. iv. 36, p. 128. 
 
 Cleitorians, the, V. iv. 36 foil. p. 128. 
 
 Cleombrotus, King of Sparta, expedi- 
 tions of (B.C. 378), V. iv. 14 foil., 
 p. 123 foil.; (B.C. 376), ii. S9i P- 
 134; in Phocis (b.c. 374), VI. i. 
 I, p. 187 ; (b.c. 371), ii. iv. 3 foil., 
 p. 158 foil. ; mortally wounded on 
 the field of Leuctra, ii. 13, p. i6i. 
 
 Cleonae, a town in Argolis, VII. v. ij, 
 p. 229. 
 
 Cleonymus, pon of Sphodrias the Lace- 
 daemonian, V. iv. 25 foil., p. 125 
 foil.; VI. iv. 14, p. 161. 
 
 Cnidus, town in Caria, battle of, IV. 
 iii. 1 1 foil. , p. 54 ; ii. viii. 22 foil. , 
 p. 84 foil. 
 
 Cocylium, in Mysia, the men of, III. 
 i. 16, p. 6. 
 
 Colonae, a seaboard city in Troas, III. 
 i. 13, p. 5 ; ii. 16, p. 6. 
 
 Conon, the Athenian, defeats the 
 Spartans at Cnidus (B.C. 394), IV. 
 iii. II, p. 54; expels the Spartan 
 governors from the islands and mari- 
 time cities, IV. viii. i foil. , p. 77 ; 
 ravages the coast of Laconia, ii. 7, 
 p. 79 ; rebuilds the walls of Athens 
 (B.C. 393), ii. 9 foil. , p. 80; sent 
 by the Athenians on an embassy to 
 Tiribazus (B.C. 392), ii. 13, p. 81 ; 
 captured and shut up by Tiribazus 
 (B.C. 391), ii. 16, p. 82. 
 
 Corcyra, the island of, Timotheus 
 reduces (b.c. 375), V. iv. 64, p. 
 136 ; Mnasippus tries to wrest, from 
 the Athenians (B.C. 373), VI. ii. 4 
 foil., p. 144 foil; favourable posi- 
 tion of, ii. 9, p. 145 ; Iphicrates 
 sails to (b.c. 373), ii. 33, p. 150; 
 and attaches the navy of, to his 
 squadron (b.c. 372), ii. 38, p. 151. 
 
 Corcyraeans, the, invested by Mnasip- 
 pus, ask aid from Athens, VI. ii. 7 
 foil. , p. 14s ; defeat Mnasippus, ii, 
 15, p. 147 ; man a fleet, ii. 24, p. 
 148 ; and Iphicrates, ii. 36 foil. , p. 
 
 151- 
 
 Corfe, Demeter and, VI. iii. 6, p. 153. 
 
 Corinth, III. v. 1, p. 32; IV. iii. 15, 
 P- 55 i speech of Timolaus of, IV. 
 ii. II, p. 48 ; the base of opera- 
 tions of the allies (b.c. 393), ii. 
 iv. I foil., p. 58 foil.; political 
 absorption of, by Argos, ii, 6, p. 
 59 ; battle within the long walls of 
 (b.c. 392), ii, 9, p. 60; ii. 14, p. 
 62 ; (see below, p. 82) ; rival garri- 
 sons at, and Sicyon (b.c. 391), i^.14, 
 p. 62 ; the long walls of, laid open, 
 ii. 19, p. 64 ; Lacedaemonians march 
 against (b.c. 390), ii. v. i, p. 64 ; 
 Callias and Iphicrates inside, ii. 12, 
 p. 68 ; representatives of, in Asia 
 (b.c. 392), ii. viii. 13, p. 81 ; 
 Iphicrates leaves, ii. 34, p. 88 ; V. 
 i. 29, p. 97 ; the Argives evacuate 
 (b. c. 387), ii. 34, p. 99 ; Lacedae- 
 monians collect ships from (b. c. 
 374), VI. ii. 3, p. 144 ; Archidamus 
 disbands his troops at (b.c. 371), 
 
362 
 
 INDEX 
 
 it. iv. 26, p. 165 ; mercenary force 
 collected by Polytropus at, ib. v. 
 n, p. 172 ; Iphicrates halts at (b.c. 
 370-369), ib. 49 foil., p. 184 foil.; 
 the Athenians and Lacedaemonians 
 concentrate at (b.c. 369), VII. i. 
 IS, p. 189 ; the Theban picked 
 corps routed near, ib. 19, p. 190 
 foU. ; Theban ambassadors visit, with- 
 out result (b.C. 367), ib. 40, p. 198 ; 
 ib. ii. II, p. 204; the Phliasians 
 make purchases from, ib. 17, p. 
 206 ; Euphron of Sicyon fetches 
 Pasimelus from, ib. iii. 2, p. 208 ; 
 Demotion's proposition concerning, 
 ib. iv. 4 foil., p. 213 foil.; mis- 
 adventure of Athenian cavalry in, 
 ib. V. 16, p. 230; Ages. ii. 16 foil., 
 p. 250 foil. ; Gulf of, IV. ii. 15, p. 
 49 ; VI. ii. 9, p. 145. 
 Corinthians, the, Boeotians and, hold 
 aloof from the Eleian war (b.c. 
 401?), III. ii. 25, p. 17; ib. V. s, 
 P- 33 ; feeling of, to Lacedaemon, 
 ib. II foil., p. 35 foil.; decline to 
 send troops against Locris (b.c. 
 39S), ib. 17, p. 37 ; ib. 23, p. 39 ; 
 and the allies reach the Nemea (b.c. 
 394), IV. ii. 14 foil., p. 49; three 
 thousand heavy infantry and light 
 troops of, at "theNeraea," ib. i7foll. , 
 p. 50 foil. ; shut the gates on the 
 defeated troops, ib. 22 foU. , p. 52 ; 
 at Coronea, ib. iii. 15, p. 55 ; one 
 party of, desires peace (b.c. 393- 
 392), ib. iv. I, p. 58 ; the other 
 with the allies resort to the knife, ib. 
 3 foil. , p. 59 foil. : some of, betray 
 the long walls to the Lacedae- 
 monians and the exiles, ib. 8 foil., 
 p. 60 ; the exiles v. the city party 
 of, at the battle within the long 
 walls, ib. 9 foil., p. 61 ; and Argives 
 carry away their dead under truce, 
 ib. 13, p. 62 ; the Isthmia of B. c. 
 390 celebrated a second time by 
 the exiled, ib. v. 2 foil. , p. 65 ; fear- 
 ing the betrayal of the city, summon 
 Iphicrates, ib. 3 foil. , p. 65 ; man a 
 fleet under Agathinus, and dominate 
 the gulf (B.C. 393), ib. viii. 11, p. 
 80 ; forced to dismiss theii' Argive 
 
 garrison, at the peace of Antalcidas 
 (b.c. 387), V. i. 34, p. 99 ; allied 
 with Lacedaemon (B.C. 379), ib. iii. 
 27, p. 119 ; rally to support Sparta 
 (b.c. 371), after Leuctra, VI. iv. 18, 
 p. 163 ; with reinforcements reach 
 Lacedaemon just in time (winter of 
 B.c. 370-369), ib. V. 29, p. 178; 
 cavalry of, under Iphicrates, ib. 52, 
 p. 185 ; rout the Theban picked 
 corps (B.C. 369), VII. i. 18 foil., p. 
 190 ; under Chabrias blockade the 
 Argives near Epidaurus (B.C. 368), 
 ib. 25, p. 193 ; have no desire to 
 join a Theban confederacy (B.C. 
 367), ib. 40, p. 198 ; celebrate the 
 capture of Thyamia by Chares and 
 the Phliasians, ib. ii. 23, p. 207 ; 
 get rid of the Athenian garrison 
 troops (b. C. 366), and refuse to 
 admit their fleet under Chares, at 
 Cenchreae, ib. iv. 4 foil., p. 213 
 folL ; with the consent of Lace- 
 daemon arrange a peace with Thebes 
 on their own account, ib. 6 foil., 
 p. 214 foil. 
 
 Coronea, battle of, IV. iii. 16, p. 55 ; 
 Ages. ii. 9, p. 248. 
 
 Craneium (or Kraneion), the, of Cor- 
 inth, IV. iv. 4, p. 59. 
 
 Crannon, the men of, IV. iii. 3, p. 53 ; 
 annoy Agesilaus, Ages. ii. ^, p. 
 246. 
 
 Cremaste, plain of, in the Troad, IV. 
 viii. 37, p. 89. 
 
 Cretan, archers, at "the Nemea," IV. 
 ii. 16, p. 50 ; in the Argolid, ib. vii. 
 6, p. 76 ; a, brings news of the 
 enemy's advance (B.C. 362), VII. v. 
 10, p. 228. 
 
 Creusis, in Boeotia, IV. v. 10, p. 67 ; 
 
 V. iv. 16, p. 123 ; ib. 60, p. 135 ; 
 
 VI. iv. 3, p. IS9 ; Ages. ii. 18, p. 
 250. 
 
 Crinippus, in command qf the Syra- 
 
 cusan vessels captured by Iphicrates, 
 
 VI. ii. 36, p. 151. 
 Crommyon, in the Megarid, IV. iv. 
 
 13, p. 62 ; ib. V. 19, p. 70. 
 Cromnus, in Arcadia, the siege of 
 
 (B.C. 365), Vn. iv. 20 foil., p. 218 
 
 foil. 
 
INDEX 
 
 363 
 
 Cyllene, the port of Elis, III. ii. 27, 
 
 p. 17 ; U. 30, p. 18 ; Vll. iv. 19, 
 
 p. 218. 
 Cylon, the Argive, and Timocrates, 
 
 the Rhodian, III. v. i, p. 32. 
 Cyme, in the Aeolid, III. iv. 27, p. 
 
 31- 
 Cynisca, sister of Agesilaus, Ages. ix. 
 
 6, p. 266. 
 
 Cynoscephalae, in Boeotia, V. iv. 15, 
 p. 123 ; VI. iv. 5, p. 159 ; Ages. 
 ii. 22, p. 251. 
 
 Cyprus, IV. viii. 24, p. 84 ; V. i. 10, 
 p. 92 ; ill. 31, p. 98 ; Pol. Ath. ii. 
 
 7, p. 283. 
 
 Cyreians, the, leader of, withThibron, 
 
 III. ii. 7, p. 12 ; Tissaphemes and 
 the, ih. iv. 18, p. 15 ; Herippidas 
 commands, ib. iv. 20, p. 30 ; Ages. 
 ii. II, p. 248. 
 
 Cyrus, the younger, III. i. i foil, p. 
 
 I ; Jason's reference to the advance 
 
 of, VI. i. 12, p. 144. 
 Cythera, Conon occupies (B.C. 393), 
 
 IV. viii. 8, p. 79. 
 
 Cyzicus, in Mysia, III. iv. 10, p. 26 ; 
 Apollophanes of, IV. i. 29, p. 44. 
 
 Daedanian, Zenis a. Mania his wife 
 
 also a. III. i. 10, p. 4. 
 Dascylium, in Bithynia, III. iv. 13, p. 
 
 27 ; IV. i. 15, p. 42. 
 Oecelea, slaves of the Athenians at, 
 
 Rev. iv. 25, p. 339. 
 Deigma quay, in the Piraeus, V. i. 
 
 21. P- 9S- 
 Deinon, a Lacedaemonian polemarch, 
 
 V. iv. 33, p. 127 ; slain at Leuctra, 
 
 VI. iv. 14, p. 161. 
 
 Delphi, Agis at (B.C. 399?), III. iii. i, 
 
 p. 19 ; Agesilaus at (B.C. 394), IV. 
 
 iii. 21, p. 57; Agesipolis at (B.C. 
 
 389-388 ?), IV. vii. 2, p. 75 ; Philis- 
 
 cus of Abydos at (B.C. 368), VII. 
 
 i. 27, p. 194 ; Ages. i. 34, p. 244 ; 
 
 Lycurgus at, Pol, Lac. viii. 5, p. 
 
 311 ; Rev. vi. 2, p. 348. 
 Delphians and Jason, VI. iv. 30, p. 67. 
 Delphion of Phlius, V. iii. 22 foil. , p. 
 
 118 foil. 
 Demaenetus, an Athenian general, V. 
 
 i. 10, p. 93 : ib. 26, p. 96. 
 
 Demaratus, King of Sparta, III. i. 6, 
 P- 3- 
 
 Demeter, VI. iii. 6, p. 133. 
 
 Demostratus, an Athenian, VI. iii. 2, 
 p. 152. 
 
 Deraoteles, a Lacedaemonian, a 
 herald, VII. i. 32, p. 195. 
 
 Demotion, an Athenian, his motion in 
 the Assembly (B.C. 366), VII. iv. 4, 
 p. 213. 
 
 Derae, or Gerae, a Sicyonian fortress, 
 VII. i. 22, p. 192. 
 
 DercyUdas, the Lacedaemonian, super- 
 sedes Thibron (B. c. 399) ; his nick- 
 name "Sisyphus"; turns to nc- 
 count the jealousy between the two 
 Persian satraps ; his hostility to 
 Pharnabazus owing to an incident 
 when governor of Abydos ; marches 
 into the Aeolid of Pharnabazus, 
 III. i. 8 foil. p. 4 foil. ; his per- 
 sistence in sacrificing ; dealings 
 with Meidias and exploits in the 
 Aeolid, ib. 16-28, pp. 6-10 ; having 
 forced Pharnabazus to make truce, 
 winters in Bithynia; his further 
 exploits (B.C. 399-398), ib. ii. i-J, 
 p. 10 foil. : meets the Lacedae- 
 monian envoys at Lampsacus 
 (spring, B.C. 398) ; his yearof oiKce 
 extended ; fortifies the Chersonese ; 
 crossing back to Asia takes Atar- 
 neus ; at Ephesus, ib, 6-11, p. 12 
 foil. (b.C. 397) ; ordered into Caria, 
 to put pressure on Tissaphernes, 
 in behalf of the Ionic cities ; sup- 
 ported by Pharax, brings the two 
 satraps to a conference ; insists on 
 the independence of the cities in re- 
 turn for the withdrawal of the 
 Lacedaemonian harmosts and the 
 evacuation of the country by his 
 troops ; reports progress to Lace- 
 daemon, ib, 12-21, pp. 13-16 ;-com- 
 missioner on iDehalf of Agesilaus 
 (B.C. 396), in the exchange of oaths 
 with Tissaphemes, ib. iv. 6, p. 25 ; 
 meets Agesilaus at Aniphipolis (B.C. 
 394) with news of the Lacedae- 
 monian victory at ' ' the Nemca " ; his 
 fondness for travel ; is sent on to 
 Asia, visiting first the Hellespont, 
 
364 
 
 INDEX 
 
 IV. iii. I foU. , p. 52 foil. ; at Abydos 
 at the date of the battle of Cnidus ; 
 as governor, preserves it in attach- 
 ment to Lacedaemon, and as a 
 harbour of refuge for the ex-gover- 
 nors, and secures Sestos for the same 
 object, it. viii. 3 foil. p. 78 foil. ; 
 is eventually (B.C. 389) superseded 
 by Anaxibius as governor of Aby- 
 dos, ib. 32, p. 87. 
 
 Derdas, the ruler of Elimia, assists the 
 Lacedaemonians against Olynthus 
 (b.c. 382), V. ii. 38 foil., p. Ill ; 
 ib. iii. 1 foil., p. 112 ; ii. 9, p. 115. 
 
 Dion, an Athenian, IV. viii. 13, p. 81. 
 
 Dionysius, the elder, son of Hermo- 
 crates, Tyrant of Syracuse, embassy 
 of Lacedaemonians to (b.c. 374), 
 VI. ii. 4, p. 144 ; triremes sent by, 
 to relieve the Lacedaemonians cap- 
 tured by Iphicrates in Corcyra 
 (B.C. 373), ii. 33, p. 150 ; a naval 
 reinforcement from (B.C. 369, of 
 twenty ships with a body of Celts 
 and Iberians and fifty cavalry) ; 
 exploits of his cavalry, VII. i. 20 
 foil, p. 191 ; second reinforcement 
 from (b. c. 368), and exploits of, ii. 
 28 foil., p. 194. 
 
 Dionysius, the younger, son of the 
 above, VII. iv. 12, p. 215. 
 
 Dionysius, an Athenian general (B.C. 
 387), V. i. 26, p. 96. 
 
 Dionysus, temple of, at Aphytis, V. 
 iii. 19, p. 117 ; the festival of (the 
 Dionysia), Pol. Ath. Iii. 4, p. 289. 
 
 Diopeithes, a Lacedaemonian, an 
 authority upon oracles, supports 
 I,eotychides, III. iii. 3, p. 20. 
 
 Dioscuri, the, the twin sons of Zeus, 
 VI. iii. 6, p. 153. 
 
 Diotimus, an Athenian general (b.c. 
 387), V. i. 25, p. 96. 
 
 Diphridas, a Lacedaemonian, suc- 
 cessor to Thibron in Asia (b. c. 390), 
 IV. viii. 21, p. 84. 
 
 Dodona, Rev. vi. 2, p. 348. 
 
 Dolopians, the, a tribe in Epirus, 
 subject to Jason, VI. i. 7, p. 139. 
 
 Draco, of Pellene, appointed com- 
 mandant of Atameus by Dercylidas, 
 III. ii. II, p. 13. 
 
 ECDicu's, a Lacedaemonian admiral, 
 sent ou^ to Rhodes (b.c. 390), IV, 
 viii. 20 foil., p. 83 foil. 
 
 Eiren, Pol. Lac. ii. 11, p, 300. 
 
 Eleians, long-standing embitterment 
 of the Lacedaemonians against the, 
 and the grounds of it, III. ii. 21 
 foil. , p. 16 ; refuse to leave their 
 country townships free at the bidding 
 of the Lacedaemonians (b. c. 402 ? 
 circa), ii. 23, p. 16 ; the men of 
 Lepreum revolt from (b.c. 401?), 
 ii. 25, p. 17 ; territory of, ravaged 
 by I^ysippus, the Lacedaemonian 
 governor left in Epitalium (b.c. 
 401-400?), ii. 29 foil. , p. 18 ; claim 
 of, to Epeium, ii. 30, p. i8 ; peace 
 between, and the Lacedaemonians 
 (B.C. 400?), it. 31, p. 19 ; disposi- 
 tion of, to Lacedaemon (b.c 39s), 
 ih. v. 12, p. 3S ; contingents of, 
 at " the Nemea," IV. v. 16, p. 50 ; 
 protest against the principle of au- 
 tonomy in the case of Margana, • 
 Scillus, and theTriphylia(B.c. 371, 
 congress at Athens, after Leuctra), 
 
 VI. v. 2 foil., p. 169; contribute 
 three talents towards the rebuilding 
 of the walls of Mantinea (B.C. 370), 
 ii. s, p. 170 ; advise the Mantineans 
 to await the arrival of the Thebans 
 before engaging, ib. 19, p. 174 ; 
 the Arcadians, Argives, and, urge 
 the Thebans to invade Laconia, ii. 
 23, p. 176 ; cavalry of, in the plain 
 of the Eurotas near Amyclae (winter 
 of B.C. 370-369), ib. 30, p. 179 ; 
 Arcadians, Argives, and, retire from 
 Laconia, ib. 50, p. 184 ; the Theb- 
 ans force Oneion and effect junction 
 with the Arcadians, Argives, and 
 (b.c 369, second Theban invasion), 
 
 VII. i. 18, p. 190 ; cherish hostile 
 feelings towards their late friends, 
 the Arcadians (b,c. 368), ib. 26, 
 p. 193 ; the Thebans and, pleased 
 at the discomfiture of the Thebans 
 by Archidamus in the ' ' tearless " 
 battle, ii. 32, p. 196 ; the commis- 
 sioner of, at the court of Persia 
 (b.c 368-367), and his praise of 
 the king and his policy, ib. 33, 38, 
 
INDEX 
 
 365 
 
 pp. 196, 197 ; the Arcadians and, 
 concert an attack on Phlius with 
 some Phliasian exiles (B.C. 369?), 
 ii. il. Si P- 202 ; seize Lasion (B.C. 
 366-365), ib. iv. 12, p. 215 ; war 
 between, and the Arcadians ; reverses 
 and successes of, ib. 13 foil., p. 216 
 foil. ; the Achaeans and, allied 
 (B.C. 36s) withstand the Arcadians, 
 ib. 116, p. 217 ; third campaign of 
 the Arcadians against, who are now 
 allied with Lacedaemon, ib. 19 foil. , 
 p. ai8 ; exploits of, against their 
 own exiles, capturing Pylos and 
 recovering Margana, ib. 26, p. 220 ; 
 advance against 01ympia(B.c. 364), 
 which is held by the Arcadians, ib. 
 28 foil., p. 221 ; exploits of, in the 
 battle of Olympia, ib. 30 foil., p. 
 222 ; the general assembly of the 
 Arcadians makes peace with, sur- 
 rendering the presidency of Olym- 
 pian Zeus, ib. 3S, p. 224 ; the Man- 
 tineans and other sections of the 
 Arcadians with, and the Achaeans, 
 agree to exclude the Thebans from 
 Peloponnese (B.C. 362), ib. v. i, 
 p. 225 ; coalition between the five 
 great powers, i.e. the Lacedae- 
 monians, Arcadians, Achaeans, 
 Athenians and, against Epamin- 
 ondas, ib. 18, p. 230; the con- 
 federacy between the states of 
 Boeotia, the Arcadians and, A^es. 
 ii. 23, p. 252 ; manner of, as to boy 
 attachments, Pol. Lac. ii. 13, p. 301. 
 Elis, invaded by Agis through Achaia 
 via the Larisus, III. ii. 23, p. 16 ; 
 and later through Aulon, ib. 25, p. 
 17 ; the presidency of the temple of 
 Olympian Zeus conceded to, rather 
 than to the ' ' villagers " of Pisa, ib. 
 ii. I foil, p. 19 ; Agis and the earth- 
 quake in, IV. vii. 4, p. 75 ; naval 
 contingent from, levied by Lacedae- 
 mon (b.c. 374), VI. ii. 3, p. 144; 
 Iphicrates comes to moorings under 
 Cape Ichthus in, ib. 31, p. 149 ; 
 the city of, a prey to party strife : 
 democrats and oligarchs, VII. iv. 
 15, p. 217 ; Pylos, a town in 
 "hollow," ib. 16, p. 217. 
 
 Eleusis, VII. v. 15, p. 229. 
 
 Eleutherae, a mountain fortress of 
 Attica on the southern slope of 
 Cithaeron, gtiarding the pass into 
 Boeotia, V. iv. 14, p. 123. 
 
 Elimia, in Macedonia, V. ii. 38, p. in. 
 
 Elymia, between Mantinea and Orcho- 
 menus, VI. v. 13, p. 172. 
 
 Epaminondas, the Theban, his object 
 (the third Theban invasion, B.C. 
 367), to make the Arcadians, 
 etc., pay better heed to Thebes 
 by securing the adhesion of the 
 Achaeans, which he does ; on his 
 personal authority insists that there 
 shall be no driving of the aristocrats 
 into exile, nor any modifications of 
 the constitutions, and so, taking a 
 pledge of fealty from the Achaeans, 
 departs home ; indictment of, by 
 the opposite party in Thebes and 
 the Arcadians ; his policy reversed, 
 with evil consequences, VII. i. 41 
 foil., p. 198 foil. ; as head of the 
 war department, his opinion, as to 
 the conduct of the Theban com- 
 mander at Tegea (b.c. 362), and 
 his answer to the general assembly 
 of the Arcadians, promising to bring 
 an army into Arcadia and, along 
 with those who share Theban views, 
 to cany on the war already under- 
 taken, ib. iv. 40, p. 22s ; prosecutes 
 his march (final invasion, B.C. 362) 
 at the head of all the Boeotians, etc. ; 
 his calculations as to the amount of 
 CO - operation to be reckoned on 
 within Peloponnesus ; advances with 
 rapid strides, but at Nemea slackens 
 speed, hoping to intercept the 
 Athenian contingent ; his reflec- 
 tions on the importance of such 
 an exploit ; on receipt of certain 
 news abandons his base at Nemea, 
 and pushes on to Tegea, ib. v. 4 foil. , 
 p. 226 foil. ; the historian's com- 
 ments on the strategy of — " in a par- 
 ticular combination of prudence and 
 daring he was consummate," ib. 8, 
 p. 227 ; for certain reasons advances 
 straight upon Sparta, and all but 
 captures the city ; cautious tactics 
 
366 
 
 INDEX 
 
 and misadventure of, within the city 
 of Sparta ; his reason for return- 
 ing with all speed into Arcadia ; 
 reaches Tegea ; sends on his cavalry 
 post - haste to Mantinea ; limited 
 success of his cavalry before Man- 
 tinea, ib. g-1.7, pp. 227-230 ; the 
 thoughts now working in the mind 
 of (according to the historian), which 
 determined him to deliver battle ; 
 the wonderful perfection to which he 
 had brought his army ; the alacrity 
 with which his final orders were 
 obeyed ; his manoeuvres misleading 
 to the enemy ; his tactical formation 
 in strengthening the attacking point 
 of his infantry and cavalry ; the 
 complete success of his encounter, 
 ib. 18-25, PP- 230-232 ; the strange 
 paralysis which seized his victorious 
 army after he himself had fallen, ib. 
 
 25. P- 233- 
 Eparitoi, the (select troops or militia 
 of the Arcadian League), successful 
 engagement of, with the Lacedae- 
 monians under Archidamus before 
 Cromnus (b.c. 365), VII. iv. 22 
 foil. , p. 219 ; the sacred treasures 
 of the temple of Zeus at Olympia 
 employed by the Arcadian League 
 to maintain the (b.c. 363), ib, 33, 
 p. 222 ; the payment of, becomes 
 a burning question leading to a 
 division in the League itself; the 
 state of Mantinea passes a resolution 
 forbidding the use of the sacred 
 money as pay for the, and votes a 
 sum from their state exchequer for 
 the purpose ; some of their leading 
 statesmen being cited to appear 
 before the Ten Thousand (i.e. the 
 General Assembly), refuse to obey 
 and shut the gates on the, sent to 
 apprehend them ; other states of the 
 League following the example of 
 Mantinea, the Ten Thousand forbid 
 the use of sacred money for profane 
 purposes, with the result that the 
 poorer, cease to serve, and wealthier 
 people stepping into their place, the 
 corps tends to become an instrument 
 in the hands of the better classes. 
 
 ib. 34 foil. , p. 223 ; ambassadors 
 sent to Lacedaemon on behalf of 
 the (now oligarchical), summoning 
 the Lacedaemonians to stop the 
 enslavement of Peloponnese by the 
 Thebans, ib. v. 3, p. 226. 
 
 Epeium, a town midway between 
 Heraea and Macistus, especially 
 claimed by the Eleians (b.c. 400), 
 III. ii. 30, p. 18. 
 
 Ephesus, a city in Lydia ( ' ' one of the 
 twelve Ionian cities," Herod, i. 
 142), III. i. 8, p. 4 ; ib. ii. g, p. 
 12; three days' journey from Sardis, 
 ib. II, p. 13 i district of, ib. 14, p. 
 14 ; ib. iv. 4, p. 24 ; ib. 7, p. 25 ; 
 ib. II, p. 27; ib. 16, p. 28; "the 
 workshop of war" (b.C. 39s), ib. 
 17, p. 29 ; IV. viii. 3, p. 77 ; ib. 
 17, p. 82 ; V. i. 6 foil. , p. 91 foil. ; 
 Ages. i. 14, p. 240 ; ib. 25, p. 242. 
 
 Epicydidas, a Spartan, IV. ii. 2, p. 
 47 ; V. iv. 39, p. 129. 
 
 Epidaurus, a contingcr.t from, with the 
 Lacedaemonians at the Nemea, IV. 
 ii. 16, p. 50 ; ships from, under 
 Mnasipptis (e.g. 374), VI. ii. 2 
 p. 144 ; the Thebans and their 
 allies march on (B.C. 369, second 
 Theban invasion), VII. i. 18, p. 
 190 ; invaded by the Argives (b.c. 
 368), ib. 25, p. 193. 
 
 Epieiceia, a fortress of Sicyon on the 
 river Nemea, IV. ii. 14, p. 49 ; ib, 
 iv. 13, p. 62. 
 
 Epirus, VI. i. 7, p. 139 ; ib. ii. 9, 
 
 p. 14s. 
 Epitalians, the, revolt from Elis, III. 
 
 ii. 25, p. 17. 
 Epitalium, south of the Alpheus, gar- 
 risoned by Agis, III. ii. 29, p. 18 ; 
 
 ib. 30, p. 18. 
 Ephialtes, an Athenian, IV. viii. 24, 
 
 p. 84. 
 Eretrian, Gongylus, the. III. i. 6, p. 3. 
 Erythrae, in Boeotia, V. iv. 49, p. 131. 
 Eteonicus, a Lacedaemonian (see 
 
 Trans., vol. i. Index), V. i. l, p. 
 
 90 ; ib. 13, p. 90. 
 Etymocles, a Lacedaemonian, V. iv. 
 
 22, p. 125 ; ib. 32, p. 127 ; VI. v 
 
 33. p. 179. 
 
INDEX 
 
 367 
 
 Eualcas {al. Stalcas) of Elis, an oli- 
 garch, VII. iv. 15, p. 217. 
 
 Eualces, an Athenian, IV. 1. 40, p. 
 46. 
 
 Euboea, contingents from, with the 
 Lacedaemonians at the Nemea, IV. 
 ii. 17, p. 50. 
 
 Euboeans, the, with the allies at 
 Coronea, IV. iii. ij, p. 55 ; with 
 the Thebans (first invasion), VI. v. 
 23, p. 176 ; (final invasion), VII. 
 V. 4, p. 226 ; Ages. ii. 6. p. 247 ; 
 ii. 24, p. 252. 
 
 Eucleia, festival of Artemis, at Corinth, 
 
 IV. iv. 2, p. 58. 
 
 Eudamidas, a Lacedaemonian general, 
 brother of Phoebidas, V. ii. 24, p. 
 107. 
 
 Eudicus, a Lacedaemonian perioecid, 
 
 V. iv. 39, p. 129. 
 
 Eunomus, an Athenian admiral, V. i. 
 S foil., p. 91 foil. 
 
 Euphron of Sicyon, formerly an aristo- 
 crat, by help of the Argives and 
 Arcadians (B. C. 366) becomes 
 "tyrant," VII. i. 44 foil., p. 200 
 foil. ; with his mercenaries serves 
 under the Theban commander in 
 Sicyon against Phlius, ii. ii. 11 
 foil., p. 204 foil. ; is driven from 
 Sicyon by Aeneas (the general of 
 the Arcadian League), and takes 
 refuge in the port town ; where, 
 posing once more as an ally of 
 Sparta, he surrenders the port town 
 to that power, ii. iii. 2 foil, p. 
 208 ; by help of foreign troops from 
 Athens, obtains his restoration to 
 Sicyon (the citadel of which is still 
 held by a Theban governor) ; sets 
 off in the democratic interest to 
 Thebes to persuade the government 
 to expel the aristocrats, and to hand 
 over the city to himself ; is stabbed 
 by some of the former exiles in the 
 Cadmeia, ii. 4 foil. , p. 209 ; the 
 murderers of, arraigned by the 
 magistrates before the senate of 
 Thebes, and their defence, ii. 6-11, 
 pp. 209-212 ; the Thebans decide 
 that, suffered the fate which he 
 deserved, but the Sicyonians rever- 
 
 ence his memory as "a founder of 
 
 the state," ii. 12, p. 212. 
 Europe, III. ii. 9, p, 12 ; IV. ii. 6, 
 
 p. 48 ; ii. iii. 15, p. 55 ; ii. viii. 5, 
 
 p. 78. 
 Eurotas, the river, V. iv. 28, p. 126 ; 
 
 VI. V. 27, 30, p. 178. 
 Eurymedon, the river, in Pamphylia, 
 
 IV. viii. 30, p. 87. 
 Eurysthenes and Procles, descendants 
 
 of Demaratus, the Lacedaemonian, 
 III. i. 6, p. 3. 
 
 Eurystheus, ' ' son of the Perseid 
 Sthenelos" (//. xix. 123); the Athen- 
 ians stayed the insolence of, and 
 saved the sons of Heracles, who had 
 found refuge in Attica, VI. v. 47, 
 p. 183. 
 
 Eutaea, in Arcadia, VI. v. 12, p. 172 ; 
 ii. 20, p. 175. 
 
 Euthycles, a Lacedaemonian, VII. i. 
 
 33. P- 196- 
 Eutresia, a district of Arcadia, VI. i. 
 
 29. P- 19S- 
 Euxenus, a Lacedaemonian, left as 
 
 harmost in Asia by Agesilaus (b.c. 
 . 394), IV. ii. s, p. 47. 
 Evagoras of Cyprus, ally of Athens, 
 
 at war with the King, IV. viii. 24, 
 
 p. 85 ; V. i. 10, p. 92. 
 
 Gaiaochus, i.e. Poseidon, VI. v. 30, 
 
 p. 179. 
 Galaxidorus, a Theban, III. v. i. p. 32. 
 Gambreum, in Mysia, III. i. 6, p. 3. 
 Geraestus, or Gerastus, in Euboea, III. 
 
 iv. 3, p. 24 ; V. iv. 61, p. 135. 
 Geranor, a Spartan polemarch, VII. 
 
 i. 25, p. 193. 
 Gergitha, or Gergithes, in the Troad, 
 
 IIL i. IS foil., p. 6 foil. 
 Gongylus, a descendant of the famous 
 
 Eretrian, III. i. 6, p. 3. 
 Gorgion, brother of Gongylus, III. i. 
 
 6, p. 3- 
 Gorgopas, a Lacedaemonian, harmost 
 
 in Aegina (b.c. 388) and admiral, 
 
 V. i. 5 foil., p. 91 ; his death, ii. 
 
 12, p. 93 ; '*• 20. P- 95- 
 Graos St^thos (the old wife's breast), 
 near Tanagra in Boeotia, V. iv. 50, 
 p. 132. 
 
368 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Gryneum, in the Aeolid, III. i. 6, 
 
 P- 3- 
 Gylis, the Lacedaemonian polemarch, 
 
 killed in Locris, IV. iii. 21, p. 57 ; 
 
 U. 23, p. S7 ; -^.f"- "■ iS> P- 249- 
 Gytheum, the naval arsenal of Lacedae- 
 
 mon, VI. V. 32, p. 179. 
 
 Haliartus, in Boeotia, Lysander to 
 march upon(B.c. 395), III. v. 6, p. 
 34 ; Lysander slain before, ib. 17 
 folL, p. 37 foil. ; ib. 23 foil., p. 
 
 39- 
 
 Halieis, in the Hermionid of Argolis, 
 troops from, with the Lacedae- 
 monians at "theNemea," IV. ii. 16, 
 p. so ; ships from, in the Lacedae- 
 monian fleet (B.C. 374), VI. ii. 3, 
 p. 144 ; reinforcements from, after 
 Leuctra, VII. ii. 2, p. 201. 
 
 Halisarna, in Mysia, III. i. 6, p. 3. 
 
 Hamaxitus, in the Troad, III. i. 13, 
 p. S ; i. 16, p. 6. 
 
 Hegesileos, an Athenian general of 
 cavalry (b.c. 362), Rev. iii. 7, p. 
 
 33a- 
 Helicon, Mount, in Boeotia, IV. iii.. 
 
 16 foil., p. 55 foil. ; Ages. ii. 9, p. 
 
 24S. 
 Hellas, III. i. 6, p. 3 ; ib. iv. i, p. 
 
 23 ; ib. 5, p. 25 ; camels brought 
 
 by Agesilaus into, ib. 24, p. 31 ; 
 
 ib. V. I, p. 32 ; ib. 5, p. 33 ; ib. 
 
 2S> P- 39 ; 'li6 Lacedaemonians 
 
 leaders of, IV. i. 8, p. 41 ; ib. 34, 
 
 p. 45 ; ib. ii. 1, p. 47 ; ib. 8, p. 
 
 48 ; ib. viii. a, p. 77 ; ib. 4, p. 78 ; 
 
 V. ii. T2, p. 104 ; ii. 35, p. no ; 
 
 VI. i. 8, p. 139 ; ib. 12, p. 141 ; 
 ib. iii. 12, p. 155 ; ib. 17, p. 157 ; 
 ib. iv. 27, p. 166 ; ib. v. 43, p. 
 182 ; ib. 48, p. 184 ; VII. ii. 2, p. 
 201 : ib. V. 26 foil., p. 233; Ages. 
 vii. 5, p. 262. 
 
 Hellene or Hellenes, III. i. 2 foil., p. 
 2 ; ib. 18 folL, p. 7 ; ib. ii. 3 foil., 
 p. 10 foil. ; ib. 12 foil. , p. 13 foil. ; 
 an ancient law forbade, to consult 
 the god (at Olympia) for war with, 
 ib. 23, p. 16; ib. iv. II foil., p. 
 a7j ib. 24, p. 31 ; IV. i. 18, p. 42 ; 
 ib.' 21 foil., p. 42 foil.; ib. ii. t;, p. 
 
 47 ; V. i. 17, p. 94 ; VI. iv. 32. p. 
 167 ; ib. V. 41, p. 182 ; VII. i. 30, 
 p. 195 ; ib. 34, p. 196 ; »■*■ 38. P- 
 197 ; i*. iii. 10, p. 211; Ages. ii. 
 29, p. 253 ; customs of Sparta 
 compared with those of the other, 
 Pol. Lac. i. 3, p. 296; ii. i, p. 
 297, tcoA. passim. 
 
 Hellenic, cities, III. i. 5, p. 2 ; garri- 
 sons in Asia, ib. 16, p. 6 ; ib, ii. i 
 foil., p. 10 foil.; ib. 12, p. 13; 
 navy, ib. iv. 2, p. 23 ; cavalry, ib. 
 14 foil., p. 28 ; ib. 22, p. 30 ; IV. 
 iii. II foil., p. 54; ib. 15, p. 55; 
 ib. viii. 4, p. 78 ; ib. 14, p. 81 ; 
 cities on the Thracian coast, ib. 26, 
 p. 85 ; V. i. 31, p. 98 ; VII. i. 23, 
 p. 192. 
 
 Hellespont, the, III. ii, 9, p. 12 ; ib. iv. 
 10 foil., p. 26 ; IV. ii. 8, p. 48 ; ib. 
 iii. 3, p. 53 ; Thrasybulus at (B.C. 
 389), ib. viii. 26 foil., p. 85 foU. ; 
 Anaxibius at, ib. 32 foil. , p. 87 ; 
 
 V. i. i., p. 90 ; Ages. i. 14, p. 240 ; 
 ii. I, p. 246 ; ib. ii. p. 248. 
 
 HeUespontine, III. iv. 11, p. 27 ; IV. 
 iii. 17, p. 55 ; Conon conciliates the, 
 states, ib, viii. 6, p. 79. 
 
 Helos, in Laconia, VI. v. 32, p. 179. 
 
 Helots, III. iii. 6 foil., p. 21 ; as har- 
 mosts (see Pol. Lac, xiv. p. 322), 
 ib. V. 12, p. 36 ; six thousand, ac- 
 cept enfranchisement (b.c. 370-369), 
 
 VI. v. 28, p. 178 ; VII. i. 12, p. 
 189 ; revolt of, after "Leuctra," ib. 
 ii. 2, p. 201. 
 
 HeracleaTrachinia, in Mails, a fortress 
 colony of the Lacedaemonians, VI. 
 iv. 27, p. 166 ; the men of, with 
 the Thebans, ib. v. 23, p. 176. 
 
 Heracleots, the, III. v. 6, p. 34 ; VI. 
 iv. 9, p. 160 ; Jason destroys fort- 
 ress of the (B.C. 371), ib. 27, p. 
 166. 
 
 Heracleldae, Pol. Lac. x. 8, p. 314. 
 
 Heracleion, temple of Heracles, in 
 Aegina, V. i. 10, p. 93 ; at Thebes, 
 VI. iv. 7, p. 160. 
 
 Heraea, in Arcadia, III. ii. 30, p. 18; 
 ib. iii. I, p. 19 ; the men of, make 
 common cause with the Lacedae- 
 monians against Mantinea(B.c. 370), 
 
INDEX 
 
 369 
 
 VI. V. II, p. 172 ; the Arcadians 
 march upon, ii. 22, p. 175. 
 
 Heraion or Heraeuni, the, in Peir- 
 aeum, IV. v. 5 foil., p. 66 ; at 
 Phlius, VII. ii. I foil., p. 201 foil. 
 
 Heracles, III. iii. 3 foil., p. 20; the 
 founder of Sparta, VI. iii. 6, p. 
 IS3 ; ib. iv. 7, p. i6o ; the sons of, 
 ii. V. 47, p. 183 ; VII. i. 31, p. 
 igS ; descendants of, Kings of 
 Sparta, Ages. i. 2, p. 237. 
 
 Herippidas, a Lacedaemonian, III. 
 iv. 6, p. 25 ; ib. 20, p. 29 ; IV. i. 
 II foil., p. 42 ; ib. ii. 8, p. 48 ; in 
 command of the foreign contingent 
 at Coronea, U. iii. 15, 18, p. 55 
 (see Ages. ii. 10, p. 248) ; ib. viii. 
 II, p. 80. 
 
 HermionA, in Argolis, contingent from, 
 at " the Nemea," IV. ii. 16, p. 50 ; 
 ships from (B.C. 374), VI. ii. 3, p. 
 144 ; reinforcements from, after 
 "Leuctra," VII. ii. 2, p. 201. 
 
 Hermogenes, an Athenian, IV. viii. 
 13, p. 81. 
 
 Herodas, the Syracusan, III. iv. i, p. 
 
 23- 
 Hephaestia, the, Pol. Lac. iii. 4, p. 
 
 289. 
 Hestia, the temple of, at Olympia, 
 
 VII. iv. 31, p. 222. 
 
 Hierax, a Lacedaemonian admiral, V. 
 
 i. 3 foil., p. 91 foil, 
 hiero, a Lacedaemonian, in command 
 
 of mercenaries at Leuctra, VI. iv. 
 
 9, p. 160. 
 Hippias of Elis, an oligarch, VII. iv. 
 
 IS. p. 217- 
 Hippodamus of Sicyon, VII. i. 45. 
 
 p. 200. 
 Hipponicus, an Athenian, his wealth, 
 
 Reu. iv. 15, p. 337. 
 Hipponicus, an Athenian, VI. iii. n, 
 
 p. 152. 
 Hipponicus, the Phliasian, Procles, 
 
 son of, V. iii. 13, p. 116. 
 Hyacinthia, the, festival at Sparta, 
 
 Ages. ii. 17, p. 250. 
 Hyampolis, in Phocis, VI. iv. 27, p. 
 
 165. 
 Hypates, the Theban, VII. ni. 7, p. 
 
 210. 
 VOL. II 
 
 Hypatodorus, a Boeotian, of Tanagra, 
 V. iv. 49, p. 132. 
 
 Hypermenes, a Lacedaemonian, eva- 
 cuates Corcyra (B.C. 373), VI. ii. 
 25, p. 148 
 
 Iberians, Celts and, with Dionysius's 
 reinforcement (e.g. 369), VII. i. 
 20, p. 191. 
 
 Ichthus, promontory of, VI, ii. 31, p. 
 149. 
 
 Idaeus, a Lacedaemonian, IV. i. 39, 
 p. 46. 
 
 Ilium, the men of. III. i. 16, p. 6. 
 
 Imbros, island of, IV. viii. 13, p. 82 ; 
 V. i. 31, p. 98. 
 
 Ionia, III. ii. 11, p. 13; ib. 14, p. 
 14 ; V. i. 28, p. 97. 
 
 lonians, the, III. iv. 11, p. 27 ; IV. 
 iii. 17, p. ss ; Ages. i. 14, p. 240 ; 
 ii. II, p. 248. 
 
 Ionic cities. III. i. 3, p. 2 ; ib. ii. 12, 
 p. 13 ; ib. 17, p. 13. 
 
 Iphicrates, the Athenian, with his mer- 
 cenaries in the battle between the 
 long walls of Corinth, IV. iv. 9, p. 
 61 ; invasion of Phlius by, ii. 15, p. 
 62 ; incursions of his peltasts into 
 Arcadia, ib. i6, p. 63 ; in Corinth 
 (B.C. 390), ib. v. 3, p. 6s ; his ex- 
 ploit against the Laconian mora, ib. 
 13 foil., p. 68 foil. ; recaptures 
 Sidus, etc., ib. 19, p. 70 ; sent out 
 to the Hellespont (b.c. 389-388) ; 
 success of, against Anaxibius, ib. 
 viii. 34 foil., p. 88 foU. ; off Abydos 
 (B.C. 387), V. i. 25, p. 96 ; suc- 
 ceeds Timotheus as admiral (b.c. 
 373), VI. ii. 13 foil., p. 146 ; ex- 
 pected at Corcyra, ib. 24, p. 148 ; 
 how he conducted the voyage, ib. 
 27 foil., p. 148 foil. ; at Corcyra, 
 intercepts Dionysius's relief fleet, ib. 
 35 foil., p. 150; the historian's 
 encomium of, ib. 39, p. 151 ; and 
 Cephisodotus, ib. iii. 3, p. 152 ; 
 recalled after the peace (b.c. 371), 
 ib. iv. I, p. 138 ; chosen general of 
 an aid in force against the victorious 
 Thebans (winter, B.C. 370-369), 
 ib. V. 49, p. 184 ; the historian's 
 strictures on his handling of 
 2 B 
 
370 
 
 INDEX 
 
 cavalry, etc., at Oneion, ii. Si, p. 
 
 i8s. 
 Ischolaus, a Lacedaemonian general 
 
 slain at Oeum, VI. v. 24 foil., p. 
 
 176. 
 Ismenias, the Theban statesman, and 
 
 Timocrates, III. v. i, p. 32; as 
 
 polemarch opposed to Leontiades 
 
 (B.C. 383), V. ii. 25, p. 107 ; seized 
 
 by Leontiades and imprisoned in 
 
 the Cadmeia, ib. 30 folL , p. 109 ; 
 
 his trial before the Commission, 
 
 his defence, and condemnation, ib. 
 
 3S, p. no. 
 Isthmian games, celebrated twice (B.C. 
 
 390), IV. V. I, p. 64. 
 Isthmus of the Thracian Chei-sonese, 
 
 III. ii. 10, p. 13 ; of Corinth, IV. v. 
 
 I, p. 64; ib. viii. 8, p. 80; VII. v. 
 
 15, p. 229 ; of Pallene, V. ii. iS. 
 
 p. 105. 
 Italian squadron, V. i. 26, p. 96. 
 Italy, Pol. Aih. ii. 7, p. 283. 
 
 Jason of Phekae, Polydamas of 
 Pharsalus warns the Lacedae- 
 monians concerning ; his physical 
 and moral qualities, his ambition, 
 VI. i. 4 foil., p. 138 foil. ; ap- 
 pointed Tagos of Thessaly, ib. 18 
 foil., p. 143 ; his response to the 
 summons of Thebes after ' ' Leuctra ' ' ; 
 his advice to the Thebans and 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. iv. 20 foil., 
 p. 164 ; exploits of, in Phocis ; 
 destroys the fortress of Heraclea 
 Trachinia, wishing to keep Thermo- 
 pylae open, it. 27 foil., p. 165 
 foil. ; assassinated at the Pythia 
 (B.C. 370), ib. 32 foil., p. 166 foil. ; 
 the widow of, at Thebes, ib, 37, 
 p. 168. 
 
 Lacedaemon, Cyrus sends mes- 
 sengers to (b.c. 403-402), III. i. 1, 
 p. I ; the leader of the Cyreians 
 addresses certain envoys from, ib. 
 ii. 8, p. 12 ; an embassy from the 
 Chersonese at (B.C. 398), ib. ; an 
 embassy from the Ionic cities at 
 (b.c. 398-397), ib. 12, p. 13 ; 
 Dercylidas reports progress to, ib. 
 
 20, p. IS J Thrasydaeus sends to, 
 and agrees to dismantle Phea and 
 Cyllene, etc. (conclusion of the 
 Eleian war, B. C. 400 ?), ib. 30, p, 
 18 ; Agis carried to, Ul, ib. iii. i, 
 p. 19 ; Cinadon wished to be in- 
 ferior to no man in, ib. 11, p. 23 ; 
 Phocian ambassadors at, claim 
 assistance against the Thebans (B. c. 
 39S), ib. V. 4, p. 33; Lysander, 
 witihout awaiting the army from, 
 marches with his own troops against 
 Haliartus, ib. 18, p. 37 ; the allies 
 in Asia resolve to aid Agesilaus in 
 assisting (b.c. 394), IV. ii. 4, p. 
 47 ; Timolaus of Corinth urges 
 upon the aUies in congress to deliver 
 battle as close as possible to, ib. 
 12, p. 49 ; the neodamodes from, 
 already on service with Agesilaus, 
 ib. iii. 15, p. 55 ; Praxitas after the 
 campaign of 392 B.C. withdraws 
 to, ib. iv. 13, p. 63 ; the Achaeans 
 send ambassadors to, in reference 
 to Calydon, ib. vi. i, p. 71 ; next 
 spring the Acarnanians send am- 
 bassadors to, and make peace with 
 the Achaeans and alliance with the 
 Lacedaemonians, ib. vii, i, p. 74 ; 
 Pharnabazus and Conon (B.C. 393) 
 make Melos a base of operations 
 against, ib. viii. 7, p. 79 ; Rhodian 
 exiles at (b. c. 390), ib. 20, p. 83 ; 
 proposal to chastise those of the 
 allies who have shown disloyalty to 
 (B.C. 386), V. i. I, p. 100 ; Phli- 
 asian exiles at (B.C. 384), ib. 8, p. 
 103 ; ambassadors from Acanthus 
 and ApoUonia at (b.c. 383), ib. n, 
 ib. ; the deputies from Acanthus 
 urge the immediate despatch of a 
 force from, against Olynthus, ib. 
 23, p. 107 ; Leontiades sets out 
 for, ib. 32, p. 109 ; the Phliasians 
 fine those citizens who have betaken 
 themselves to, without a mandate 
 from the state, ib. iii. 11, p. 115 ; 
 the Phliasians willing to sun-ender 
 (B.C. 379) to the authorities of, at 
 discretion, ib. 23, p. 118; the 
 deputation returns from, ib. 29, p. 
 118 ; the Olynthians send an em- 
 
INDEX 
 
 371 
 
 bassy to, to sue for peace, ib, 26, 
 p. 119; "the state of, was quite as 
 little cognisant of the attempt of 
 Sphodrias as they themselves," the 
 ambassadors protested (B.C. 378), 
 ib. iv. 24, p. 125 ; Agesilaus con- 
 veyed home on a litter to (b.c. 376), 
 ib. 58, p. 134 ; the allies meet in, 
 ib. 60, p. 125 ; the Phocians send 
 an embassy to, and Polydamas of 
 Pharsalus arrives to address the 
 general assembly of (B.C. 375-374). 
 VT, i. I foil., p. 137 ; the Athenians 
 send to, and conclude a peace (b. c. 
 374), ib. ii. I, p. 144 ; Mnasippus 
 taltes troops from, and other forces 
 (B.C. 373), and sails for Corcyra, 
 ib. s, p. 144 ; embassy from Athens 
 to conclude peace at (b.c. 372), ib. 
 iii. 2, p. 152 ; the Athenians rigidly 
 carry out the terms of the solemn 
 undertaking at (B.C. 371), ib. iv. 
 i, p. 158 ; a messenger with news 
 of the disaster at Leuctra reaches, 
 on the last day of the gymno- 
 paediae, ib. 16, p. 162 ; Agesilaus 
 undertakes that the walls of Man- 
 tinea shall be rebuilt with the 
 sanction of, and without cost, ib. 
 V. 4, p. 170 ; the party of Stasippus 
 in Tegea banished to (b. c. 370), ib. 
 10, p. 171 ; the desolate condition 
 of, deserted by her troops (winter 
 of B.C. 370-369), ib. 23, p. 176 ; 
 the Thebans not eager to march 
 upon, ib, 24, p. 177 ; the assembly 
 at Athens decrees to send aid to, in 
 force, ib. 49, p. 184 ; the Thebans 
 dependent on the Arcadians for the 
 invasion of (see speech of Ly- 
 comedes), VII. i. 23, p. 192 ; if 
 the Arcadians follow Thebes blindly 
 they may find in her only a second 
 edition of, ib. 24, p. 193 ; the 
 Argives ill brook the zeal of Phlius 
 for (b.c. 369), ib. ii. 4, p. 202 ; 
 the Corinthians at, on the matter of 
 peace (b.c. 366), ib. iv. 7, p. 214 ; 
 ambassadors at, on behalf of the 
 Eparitoi (b.c. 362), ib. v. 3, p. 
 226 ; Epaminondas hears that the 
 Athenians will bring their supports 
 
 to Arcadia by sea through, ib. 7, 
 p. 227 ; Epaminondas reflecting 
 that the Arcadians must already be 
 hastening to the relief of, falls back 
 upon Tegea, ib. 14, p. 229 ; Epami- 
 nondas reflects on his misadventtu-e 
 in, ib. 18, p. 230 ; on the death of 
 Agis, king of, rival claimants to 
 the throne, but the verdict of, 
 favoured Agesilaus, Ages. i. 5, p. 
 238 ; those who for the sake of, 
 had suffered banishment, ib. ii. 
 21, p. 251 ; invaded by the united 
 powers (after "Leuctra"), ib. 24, p. 
 252 ; Matjsolus aids, with money, 
 Tachos morally, ib. 27, p. 253 ; 
 Agesilaus makes Nectanebos a 
 friend to, ib. 31, p. 254 ; all, a 
 witness to the generosity of Agesi- 
 laus, ib. iv. 6, p. 256 ; status of 
 slaves in, Pol. Ath. i. 12, p. 278. 
 See Pol. Lac. passim. 
 Lacedaemonian, at this date (B.C. 
 400-399) the word of a, was law, 
 III. i. s, p. 2 ; the descendants of 
 Demaratus the, ib. 6, p. 3 ; " to 
 stand with the shield on the arm " 
 a stigma on the honour of a true, 
 ib. 9, p. 4 ; a, to be sent to the 
 Chersonese (b.c. 398), ib. ii. 8, p. 
 12 ; Persian satraps demand the 
 withdrawal of the, governors from 
 the Asiatic cities (B.C. 397)1 »*• 2°. 
 p. IS ; "victims of, injustice" (see 
 speech of Theban envoys at Athens, 
 B.C. 395), ib. v. 10, p. 35; Pau- 
 sanias at the head of a, army in 
 Boeotia (B.C. 39s), ib. 21, p. 38 ; 
 Callias a, with Agesilaus in Paphla- 
 gonia, IV. i. 15, p. 42 ; the, heavy 
 infantry at "theNemea" amounted 
 to six thousand men, to which must 
 be added six hundred, cavalry ; the 
 total of the forces on the, side, ib. 
 ii. 16, p. 50 ; Phliasians owing 
 their exile to their, sympathies, as 
 they gave out (b.c. 391), ib. iv. 15, 
 p. 63 ; Iphicrates'speltasts taught a 
 lesson by some of the younger, 
 troopers, ib. 16, ib. ; the, warriors 
 (at the Heraeum, B.C. 390) the 
 cynosure of all beholders, ib. v. 6, 
 
372 
 
 INDEX 
 
 p. 66 ; the destruction of the, mora, 
 it. i8, p. 70 ; garrisons placed by 
 Praxitas in Sidus and Crommyon, 
 U>. 19, p. 70 ; the, party in Rhodes, 
 ib. viii. 25, p. 85 ; twelve of the, 
 governors who had rallied to 
 Abydos (after Cnidos) slain along 
 vrith Anaxibius (B.C. 388), ii. 39, 
 p. 89 ; the, troops lining the road 
 after the reduction of Mantinea (B.C. 
 384) exhibit proofs of discipline, 
 V. ii. 6, p. loa ; the, cavalry at 
 Olynthus under Polycharmus (B.C. 
 382), ib. 41, p. 112 ; some, am- 
 bassadors chance to be in Athens 
 at the date of Sphodrias's attempt 
 (b.c. 378), ii. iv. 22, p. 123 ; the 
 men of, procUvities in Thespiae, and 
 their opponents (b.c. 377) re- 
 strained by Agesilaus, ib. iv. 55, p. 
 133 ; a, navy moving about Aegina, 
 Ceos, and Andros blockades Athens, 
 ib. 61, p. 135 ; the, admiral and 
 Timotheus off Alyzia (b.c. 37s), ib. 
 65, p. 136 ; nearly a thousand 
 men of the total, force slain at 
 Leuctra (b.c. 371), VI. iv. 15, p. 
 162 ; the men of Tegea, led by Sta- 
 sippus and others, staunch in their, 
 procUvities, stand by Lacedaemon 
 after "Leuctra," ib. 18, p. 163 ; it 
 occurred to the Thebans (winter of 
 B.C. 370-369)thatthe, forces, though 
 disbanded, would not take long to 
 muster, etc., ib. v. 24, p. 177; the, 
 ambassadors at Athens during the 
 first Theban invasion, ib. 33, p. 
 179 ; the Thebans surprise the, out- 
 posts on Oneion (B.C. 369, second 
 Theban invasion), VII. i. 15, p. 
 190 ; the, garrison in Asinfe of 
 Laconia defeated by the Arcadians 
 (B.C. 368), ib. 25, p. 193; not a 
 single, slain in the ' ' tearless battle," 
 ib. 32, p. 196 ; Euthycles the, at 
 the Persian court, ib. 33, ib. ; the 
 ground of, hostility to Thebes (see 
 Pelopidas's speech at the Persian 
 court, ib. 34, ib. ; sorry guard kept 
 over Oneion by Naucles, the general 
 commanding the, foreign brigade 
 {B.C. 367, third Theban invasion). 
 
 ib. 41, p. 199 ; during the, days 
 Euphron had been the greatest man 
 in Sicyon, ib. 44, p. 200 ; the 
 Pellenians (in B.C. 365) had reverted 
 to their old, alliance, ib. iv. 17, p. 
 217 ; Agesilaus and the whole, 
 army expected to unite with the 
 Peloponnesian forces at Mantinea 
 (b.c. 362), ib. v. 9, p. 228 ; Epami- 
 nondas, unwilling to engage the 
 Arcadian forces united with the 
 whole, force in the proximity of 
 Sparta, falls back on Mantinea, ib. 
 14, p. 229. 
 Lacedaemonians, the, in answer to the 
 appeal of the ' ' Hellenes in Asia " 
 send out Thibron as governor, 
 III. i. 4, p. 2 ; during the Asiatic 
 campaigns the, at home were no 
 less busily employed with other 
 matters («'. e. the Eleian war), ib. ii. 
 21, p. 16 ; the Eleians on plea of 
 a sentence registered against the, 
 had excluded them from the Olym- 
 pian games (some years ago), ib. ; 
 emboldened by the first abortive 
 attempt of Agis to invade them, the 
 men of EUs send embassies to states 
 known to be hostile to the, ib. 24, 
 p. 16 foil. ; treatment of the Eleians 
 by, re Epeium and the presidency 
 of the temple of Zeus at Olympia ; 
 peace and alliance between the 
 Eleians and, ib. 30, p. 18 foil. ; the 
 arch-corruptress of all, young and 
 old, at Aulon, ib. iii. 8, p. 22 ; 
 Herodas lays certain information 
 before the (b.c. 397) ; his reports 
 throw the, into a flutter of expecta- 
 tion and anxiety, ib. iv. i foil., p. 
 23 ; the, agree to Agesilaus's pro- 
 posal and give him troops, etc. , for 
 the Asiatic campaign (b. c. 396), 
 ib. 3, p. 24 ; vexation of the army 
 at Ephesus, including the, there 
 present,atTissaphernes's declaration 
 of war (B.C. 39S), ib. 11, p. 27 
 (see Ages. i. 7, 13, p. 238 foil. ) ; 
 the reasons which led the, to give 
 Agesilaus absolute control over the 
 naval (as well as the land) forces, 
 ib. 27, p. 31 ; it was clear to the 
 
INDEX 
 
 373 
 
 leaders in Thebes that unless some 
 one struck the first blow the, would 
 never be brought to break the truce 
 with the allies ; on their side the, 
 were ready to seize any pretext for 
 marching upon Thebes, ii. v. 3 
 foil. , p. 33 ; Pausanias at the head 
 of the, and other Peloponnesian 
 troops is to effect junction with 
 Lysander in Boeotia by a certain 
 date, ii. 6, p. 34; the Thebans, 
 about to be invaded by the, send 
 ambassadors to Athens to ask for 
 assistance, their indictment against 
 the, ib. 7-15, pp. 34-37 ; and now 
 the, no longer hesitated, ii. 17, p. 37; 
 the considerations which weighed 
 with Pausanias and the other 
 high officers of the, in acknow- 
 ledging defeat before Haliartus, 
 ii. 23, p. 38 ; the terms of the 
 Thebans gladly accepted by the ; 
 demeanour of, in retiring ; sorry 
 conclusion of the campaign of the, 
 ii. 24 foil., p. 39; the, "leaders 
 of Hellas " (see conversation be- 
 tween Agesilaus and Otys, king 
 of Paphlagonia), IV. i. 8, p. 41 ; 
 Pharnabazus addresses Agesilaus 
 and the, there present, at an inter- 
 view, ii. 32, p. 44 ; the, at home, 
 in prospect of war with the allied 
 powers, send for Agesilaus (b.c. 
 394), ii. ii. I, p. 47 ; the, repre- 
 sented by three judges (or umpires) 
 in the competition decided at the 
 Hellespont, ii. 8, p. 48 ; the, are 
 ready to take the field under Aristo- 
 demus, the guardian of Agesipolis, 
 who is still a minor, ii. 10, ii. ; 
 the, ought to be captured like wasps 
 in their nest, according to Timolaus 
 of Corinth (at the congress of allies), 
 ii. II, p. 49 ; before the congress 
 is concluded the, advance, incor- 
 porating the men of Tegea and 
 the men of Mantinea, and are ready 
 to debouch into the coast land 
 of Achaea ; occupy Sicyon whilst 
 the allies reach "the Nemea" ; their 
 attack is by Epieiceia, ii. 13 foil. , 
 ii, ■ the, advance within ten fur- 
 
 longs of the enemy's position at 
 the ravine of the Nemea and en- 
 camp, ii. 15, p. so ; position, 
 tactics, exploits, and victory of the, 
 in the battle of the Nemea, ii. ii. 
 18-23, P- 50 foil- (see Ages. vii. 4, 
 p. 262) ; the news of this victory of 
 the, reaches Agesilaus at Amphi- 
 polls, ii. iii. i, p. 52 ; the news of 
 the defeat of the, at Cnidus reaches 
 him (on 14th August) on the con- 
 fines of Boeotia, ii. 9, p. 54 ; re- 
 inforcements of, join Agesilaus at 
 Coronea, ii. 15, p. 55 (see Ages. 
 ii. 6, p. 247) ; misadventure of the, 
 with Gylis the poleraarch next day 
 in Locris, ii. 21-23, P- S7 \ "sxt 
 year (b.c. 393) the allies have 
 Corinth as their base, the, Sicyon, 
 ii. iv. I, p. 58 ; Pasimelus and 
 Alcimenes, two laconising Corinth- 
 ians, effect a meeting with Praxitas 
 the polemarch of the, on garrison 
 duty at Sicyon, and betray the 
 long walls, ii. 7 foil., p. 60; 
 position, tactics, exploits, and vic- 
 tory of the, in the battle which 
 ensued, ib. 9 - 13, p. 60 foil. ; 
 the men of Phlius, in fear of Iphi- 
 crates (b.c. 391 ?), receive the, within 
 their walls, and are well treated by 
 them, ii. 15, p. 62 foil. ; thepeltasts 
 of Iphicrates afraid of the, but a 
 bugbear to the Arcadians ; the, un- 
 kindly banter their allies on the 
 subject, a. 16 foil., p. 63; the 
 Athenians, feeling the power of the, 
 to be dangerously close to Athens, 
 repair the breach in the Corinthian 
 long walls, ii. 18, p. 64 ; the, send 
 Agesilaus against the Argives and 
 swoop down upon Corinth and capture 
 Lechaeum, ii. 19, ii. ; subsequently 
 (b. c. 390) the, make a second ex- 
 pedition against Corinth and capture 
 Peiraeum, ib, v. i foil., it. foil. ; 
 the unwonted calamity which befell 
 the, (in the destruction of the mora) 
 ii. 10, p. 67 ; the, not ignorant of 
 the number of troops inside Corinth, 
 but arrogant, ii. 12, p. 68 ; the, 
 presently within javelin range, ii. 14, 
 
374 
 
 INDEX 
 
 p. 69 ; Lechaeum, garrisoned by 
 the, and their allies, holds out against 
 Iphicrates, ib. 19, p. 70 ; the heavy 
 infantry of the, defeat the Acarnan- 
 ians at a mountain pass (of. Ages. 
 ii. 20, p. 251), il>- vi. II, p. 73; 
 the Acamanians make peace with 
 the Achaeans and alliance with the, 
 ib. vii. 1, p. 74 ; feeling on the 
 part of the, that no expedition 
 against Athens or Boeotia can be 
 safe until Argos is disarmed (B.C. 
 389-388), ib. 2, ib. ; with one con- 
 sent the, beginning with the officers 
 of the royal quarter, sing the sacred 
 hymn to Poseidon, ib. 4, p. 75 ; 
 proceedings of Pharnabazus and 
 Conon after defeating the, at Cnidus 
 (B.C. 394), ib. viii. I, p. 77 ; Der- 
 cylidas appeals to the Abydenians 
 to appear as benefactors of the, ib. 
 3, p. 78 ; Pharnabazus (with Conon) 
 endeavours to force the men of 
 Abydos and Sestos to eject the ; 
 his wrath against the (see above, 
 IV. i. 37, p. 46), ib. 6, p. 79 ; 
 how the satrap may win eternal 
 gratitude from the Athenians, whilst 
 glutting his vengeance on the, 
 (by rebuilding the long walls, etc. ) 
 ib. 9, p. 80 ; fleets and admirals of 
 the, and recovery of Rhium by the 
 (B.C. 393-391), ib. II foil., ib. foil. ; 
 the, try to neutralise the power of 
 Conon and Pharnabazus by working 
 on Tiribazus through Antalcidas ; 
 offer to give up all claim to the 
 Hellenic cities as against the king, 
 etc. (B.C. 392), ib. 12 foil., p. 81 ; 
 Tiribazus cannot directly adopt the 
 cause of the, without the king's con- 
 currence, but presents Antalcidas 
 with money, and accepting the 
 statement of the, as true, seizes and 
 imprisons Conon, ib. 16 foil., p. 82 ; 
 the, send Thibron to deal with the 
 new satrap Struthas, a partisan of 
 Athens (B.C. 391), ib. 17, ib. \ the, 
 lend a willing ear to the appeal of 
 the Rhodian exiles (of the wealthier 
 class) (B.C. 390), ib. 20, p. 83 ; the, 
 send out Ecdicus with too small a 
 
 force and presently relieve him, ib. 
 23, p. 84; the, (B.C. 389) try to 
 neutralise the influence of the Athen- 
 ians in the Hellespont and Bos- 
 phorus, ib. 31, p. 87 ; the, send 
 out a new admiral (B.c. 388), 
 Antalcidas, to Ephesus, V. i. 6, p. 
 91 ; Gorgopas with the, of his 
 force falls into the trap laid by 
 Chabrias and is slain in Aegina, ib. 
 12, p. 93 ; subsequently the, send 
 out Teleutias to take command of 
 their squadron in the Saronic Gulf 
 once more, ib. 13, ib. ; now that 
 the, had procured an aUy in the 
 person of the great king, the 
 Athenians are desirous of peace ; the, 
 were equally out of humour with the 
 war for various reasons (b.c. 387), 
 ib. 29, p. 97 ; the, having by threat 
 of war forced the Thebans to re- 
 cognise the autonomy of the Boeotian 
 cities, return home, ib. 33, p. 99 ; 
 the, and Athenians with their allies 
 find themselves in the enjoyment of 
 peace for the first time since the 
 period of hostilities subsequent to 
 the demolition of the walls of Athens ; 
 and the, now reach a pinnacle of 
 glory consequent upon the peace of 
 Antalcidas, so called, ib. 35 foil, 
 ib. ; indeed late events have so ac- 
 corded with the wishes of the, that 
 they determine to go farther and 
 dominate recalcitrant states (b.c. 
 386), ib. ii. 1, p. 100 ; the, insist 
 on the dismemberment of Mantinea 
 (b.c. 38s), ib. s, p. 102; the 
 Phliasian exiles work on the feelings 
 of the, ib. 8, p. 103 ; the, in an- 
 swer to the deputies from Acanthus 
 and Apollonia, request the allies to 
 advise whether or not active measures 
 should be taken against Olynthus ; 
 resolutions empowering the, so to 
 do (B.C. 383), ib. 20 foil., p. 106; 
 the, despatch Eudamidas at once 
 with a portion of the troops, ib. 24, 
 p. 107 ; the hatred of Ismenias (the 
 one polemarch at Thebes) against 
 the, and the assiduous courtship of 
 Phoebidas by Leontiades (the other 
 
INDEX 
 
 37S 
 
 polemarch), ib. 25, ib. ; Leontiades 
 (after the seizure of the Cadmeia) 
 addresses the assembly (or select 
 committee) at Lacedaemon in de- 
 fence of the act, ib. 32, p. 109 ; 
 the, resolve to keep the citadel and 
 to put Ismenias on his trial ; con- 
 stitution of the covurt ; as the result 
 of the whole business the, press on 
 the combined campaign against 
 Olynthus, ib. 35 foil. , p. no foil. ; 
 disposition of the, and other troops 
 in the first engagement (chiefly of 
 cavalry) before the gates of Olynthus, 
 ib. ii. 40 foil. , p. Ill foil. ; many of 
 the, object for the sake of a hand- 
 ful of people (the Phliasian exiles) 
 so to embroil themselves with that 
 state (b.c. 380), ib. iii. 16, p. 116; 
 but in the end the, come round to 
 the opinions of Agesilaus, ib. 17, p. 
 117 ; on the death of Agesipolis the, 
 despatch Polybiades as governor to 
 Olynthus, ib. 20, ib. ; the nemesis 
 which fell upon the (in B.C. 379), 
 when the acropolis of Thebes, wrong- 
 fully seized by them, was snatched 
 from their hands by a handful of 
 pa.tnots{theperipeiyoftheffellenica), 
 ib. iv. 1, p. 119 ; the, put to death 
 the governor, who had abandoned 
 the Cadmeia instead of awaiting re- 
 inforcements, and call out the ban 
 against Thebes, ib. 13, p. 122 foil. ; 
 fear of the, on the part of the 
 Athenians (B.C. 378), ib. 19, p. 
 124, merged into hatred when the, 
 connive at the attempt of Sphodrias, 
 ib. 34, p. 127 (see fol. Lac. xiv. 6, 
 p. 323) ; the, again call out the ban 
 against Thebes after Cleombrotus's 
 abortive invasion, and entrust the 
 expedition toAgesilaus,;^. 35, P- 128; 
 during the next campaign (b. c. 377), 
 Agesilaus ravages Theban territory 
 on the east as far as Tanagra, which 
 at that date is in the hands of a 
 party friendly to the, ib. 49, p. 132 ; 
 the, again (for the fourth time, B.C. 
 376) call out the ban against 
 Thebes, Cleombrotus leading the 
 expedition, ib. 59, p. 134 ; the, 
 
 (b.c. 375) are about to transport 
 an army across the water into 
 Boeotia, when the Thebans urge 
 the Athenians to despatch an arma- 
 ment round Peloponnesus which 
 should keep the, occupied at home 
 (Tiraotheus's feriflus], ib. 62, p. 
 135; the, fit out and despatch a 
 counter fleet under Nicolochus to 
 Corcyra, ib. 65, p. 136 ; the 
 Athenians and the, being thus en- 
 gaged (B.C. 374)1 the Thebans 
 meanwhile march' against Phocis and 
 the Phocians obtain assistance from 
 the, VI. i. t, p. 137 ; Polydamas 
 of Pharsalus addresses the, con- 
 cerning Jason and the growth of 
 his power in Thessaly, ib. 3 foil., 
 p. 138 ; the, after deliberation find 
 it impossible to give him aid, and 
 he thanking the, for their straight- 
 forwardness withdraws, ib. 17, p. 
 142 ; (To revert) the, were collect- 
 ing in Phocis, and the Thebans 
 after retreating into their own terri- 
 tory guarding the approaches, ib. 
 19, p. 143 ; the Athenians having 
 concluded peace with the, send to 
 recall Timotheus, who is accused 
 by the city party of Zacynthus of 
 landing certain exiles after the peace ; 
 the, without further consideration 
 decide that the Athenians are in the 
 wrong, and go to war again with a 
 view to wrest Corcyra from Athens, 
 ib. ii. 3, p. 144 ; the, under Mnasip- 
 pus defeated by the Corcyraeans 
 (B.C. 373), ib. 21, p. 147; Iphi- 
 crates at Corcyra intercepts the re- 
 inforcements sent by Dionysius to 
 the, ib. 33, p. 150 ; and with a 
 large fleet prepares to harass the 
 territory of the, (b.c 372) ib. 38, 
 p. 151 ; Callias and the other com- 
 missioners from Athens introduced 
 to the deputies of the, and the 
 allies (B.C. 371), ib. iii. 3, p. 152 ; 
 speeches of Callias, etc., to the 
 assembly of the, and to the allies, 
 ib. 3-17, pp. 153-157 ; 'he, pass a 
 resolution to accept peace on a 
 threefold basis : the withdrawal of 
 
376 
 
 INDEX 
 
 the barmosts from the cities (see 
 Pol. Lac. xiv, 3, p. 322), the dis- 
 banding of armaments, naval and 
 military, and the guarantee of 
 autonomy to the states ; the, under- 
 take on behalf of themselves and 
 their allies, the Athenians and their 
 allies separately state by state ; the 
 Thebans are eventually excluded, 
 it. 18 foil., p. 157 ; the Athenians 
 carry out the terms literally, the, 
 act differently, ib. iv. i, p. 158 ; 
 the oracle predicting the defeat of 
 the, on certain ill-omened ground 
 (near Ijeuctra), ib. 7, p. 159 foil. ; 
 everything in the battle turned out 
 adverse to the ; position and ill 
 condition of the cavalry of the, as 
 compared with that of the Thebans, 
 in the battle ; and the contrasted 
 handling of the heavy infantry ; 
 first the right and then the left 
 wing of the, completely driven off 
 the field ; desire of some of the, 
 to attempt to retrieve their mis- 
 fortune, ib. 8-15, pp. 160-162 ; 
 ships of war fitted out by the, and 
 the Corinthians to convoy the 
 Sicyonian transports with an army 
 of relief after " Leuctra," ib. 18, p. 
 163 ; the Thebans appeal to (i) the 
 Athenians, and (2) to Jason to com- 
 plete the ruin of the ; Jason medi- 
 ates between the Thebans and the, 
 ib. 20-26, pp. 163-165 ; the Athen- 
 ians, comparing the condition of 
 the, after "Leuctra" (shorn of power 
 but still exercising hegemony 
 within Peloponnese), and their own 
 after the demolition of the long 
 walls (in B. c. 405), organise a con- 
 federacy on the basis of autonomy ; 
 whereupon the Mantineans, to the 
 chagrin of the, proceed to rebuild 
 their walls, and resume political 
 existence, ib. v. 1-5, p. 169 ; the, 
 decide that they are bound by their 
 oaths to aid the banished Tegeans 
 (the party of Stasippus, B.C. 370), 
 ib. 10, p. 171 : the men of Heraea 
 and Lepreum make common cause 
 with the, in a campaign against 
 
 Mantinea, ib. 11, p. 172 (see W^j. 
 ii. 23, p. 252) ; the, forces, though 
 disbanded (winter of 370-369 B. c. ) 
 afterAgesilaus'scampaign in Arcadia, 
 will not take long to muster, and 
 will fight nowhere better than on 
 their native soil ; hence a certain 
 reluctance on the part of the Thebans 
 to invade Laconia, ib. 24, p. 177 ; 
 the cavalry of the, a mere handful, 
 drawn up to meet the enemy's 
 squadrons at Sparta ; the naval 
 arsenal of the, defies him, ib. 30 
 foil. , p. 179 ; at news of the suc- 
 cesses of the Thebans and their 
 friends, the Athenians hold an 
 assembly to consider what they 
 ought to do concerning the ; it 
 chances that ambassadors of the, 
 and of the allies still faithful to 
 Lacedaemon are in Athens, who 
 put forward all possible pleas in 
 favour of the, the weightiest of 
 which was ' ' that when the Thebans 
 had (405 B. c. ) wished to wipe Athens 
 off the face of the earth, they (the, ) 
 themselves had opposed the mea- 
 sure," ib. 33-36, p. 179 foil. ; the 
 speech of Procles of Phlius on be- 
 half of the, arguing that the destruc- 
 tion of the, would be to the detri- 
 ment of Athens (the hegemony of 
 Thebes a worse evil than the dis- 
 tant antagonism of Sparta) ; the 
 salvation of the, to her gain through 
 the permanent friendship of the, so 
 secured to her, ib. 38-48, pp. 181- 
 184 ; in the following year (the 
 spring of B.C. 369, apparently) 
 plenipotentiary ambassadors from 
 the, and allies arrive at Athens to 
 consider how an alliance between 
 the, and Athenians may best be 
 cemented, VII. i. i, p. 186 ; Procles 
 argues then that if the leadership on 
 sea belongs to the Athenians as 
 against the, the leadership on land 
 belongs to the, by natural right ; 
 his views applauded by the Athen- 
 ians and the, who were present, ib. 
 2-12, pp. 186-188 ; Cephlsodotus 
 however argues that such an arrange- 
 
INDEX 
 
 377 
 
 ment gives an unfair advantage to 
 the, and that the command, whether 
 maritime or military, should be held 
 turn and turn about ; the assembly 
 passes a decree to that effect, ii. 
 12-14, P- 189 (see Rev. v. 8, p. 
 346); the campaign (summer? 
 369 B.C. ) commenced by both 
 Athenians and the, with their allies 
 converging on Corinth and guard- 
 ing Oneion (see below, VII. ii. 5, 
 p. 202), one half on one side of the 
 pass, the other on the other, the 
 more assailable being assigned to 
 the, and the men of Pellene, ib. 15, 
 p. 189 ; the, and Pellenians are sur- 
 prised by the Thebans, who breeik 
 through the pass, ib. 15, p. 190 ; 
 a victory won in the suburbs of 
 Corinth over the Thebans gives the 
 allies of the, fresh heart ; and the, 
 are further cheered by the arrival of 
 a reinforcement from Dionysius, ib. 
 19 foil., p. 191 ; the dependence of 
 the, on the Arcadians in old days 
 CLycoraedes loquitur, B.C. 369-368); 
 the Eleians demand back from the 
 Arcadians certain cities of which the, 
 had deprived them (in the Eleian 
 campaigns of Agis), ib. 26, p. 193 ; 
 Philiscus assembles a congress of 
 Thebans, allies, and, at Delphi to 
 treat of peace ; meanwhile a second 
 reinforcement from Dionysius arrives, 
 and the question is where the troops 
 shall be employed ; the Athenians 
 are in favour of Thessaly, the, in 
 favour of Laconia, ib. 27 foil., p. 
 194 ; others hardly less pleased 
 than the, themselves at the misfor- 
 tune of the Arcadians (the " tearless 
 battle"), ib. 32, p. 196; Pelopidas 
 points out (at the Persian court) 
 that the Argives and Arcadians had 
 been lately defeated in battle by the, 
 when the Thebans were not there to 
 assist, ib. 35, p. 197 ; owing to the 
 reversal of Epaminondas's policy in 
 Achaea (B.C. 367), the Arcadians 
 find themselves between the upper 
 and nether millstone, i.e. the, and 
 the Achaeans, ib. 43, p. 200 ; the, 
 
 confer special honours on the Phlias- 
 ians in recognition of their bravery, 
 ib. ii. 3, p. 202 ; the Athenians 
 reflect that it is no less desirable 
 for the, than for themselves that the 
 Arcadians should become inde- 
 pendent of Thebes, ib. iv. 2, p. 213 ; 
 the, counsel the Corinthians to 
 arrange a peace with Thebes on 
 their own account (b.c. 366), ib. 9, 
 p. 214 ; a reinforcement sent by 
 Dionysius (the younger) enables the, 
 to recover Sellasia, ib. 12, p. 215 ; 
 the, allied with the Eleians (b.c. 
 36s), organise an expedition against 
 the Arcadians, ib. 19 foil., p. 218 ; 
 ill successes and final discomfiture 
 of the, at Cromnus, ib. 22-25, ?• 
 219 ; after a second attempt on the 
 part of the, to relieve Cromnus their 
 garrison is captured, ib. 27, p. 220 ; 
 plea of the Theban commander at 
 Tegea, he had heard that the, were 
 under arms on the frontier, etc. , ib. 
 39, p. 225 ; appeal to the, on behalf 
 of the Eparitoi (or picked corps of 
 militia in the pay of the Arcadian 
 League) for aid against a foreign 
 invader of Peloponnese, ib. v. 3, 
 p. 226 ; Epaminondas himself the 
 main cause of a coalition between 
 five great powers : that is to say, the. 
 Arcadians, Achaeans, Eleians, and 
 Athenians, ib. 18, p. 230; to aid the, 
 against the Messenians (B.C. 464, 
 revolt of the Helots) a false policy 
 on the part of the Democracy, 
 Pol. Ath. iii. II, p. 291. For the 
 institutions of the, see Polity of 
 the Lacedaemonians, pp. 295-324, 
 fassim, 
 Laconia, the rural (lit. perioecid) 
 districts of. III. v. 7, p. 34 ; the 
 coast of, VI. i. 17, p. 142 i «'*• "■ 
 3, p. 144 ; ib. 9, p. 145 ; «^' V. 23, 
 foil., p. 176; ib. 50 foil., p. 184 
 folL ; VII. i. 28 foil., p. 194 foil. ; 
 ib. 35, p. 197 ; il>- i'. 3> P- 2°2. 
 Laconian, the whole, army affected by 
 the calamity of the mora, IV. v. 10, 
 p. 67 ; ib. vii. 6, p. 76 ; ib. viii. 8, 
 p. 80 ; Sphagiae (or Sphacteria) in, 
 
378 
 
 INDEX 
 
 territory, VI. ii. 31, p. 149 ; ib. v. 
 
 21, p. 175 ; VII. i. 12, p. 189 ; 
 
 Asini in, territory, ih. 29, p. 195 ; 
 
 j'i. iv. 5, p. 214. 
 Laconians, IV. viii. 37, p. 89 ; V. ii. 
 
 40 foil. , p. Ill foil. 
 Laconism, IV. iv. 15, p. 63 ; VII. i. 
 
 46, p. 200. 
 Lampsaeus, in the Troad, III. ii. 6, 
 
 p. 11. 
 Larisa, "the Egyptian" {fll. " Phri- 
 
 conis"), in the Aeolid, III. i. 7, p. 
 
 3 ; ib. 16, p. 6. 
 Larissa, in Thessaly, VI. iv. 33, p. 
 
 167 ; the men of, IV. iii. 3, p. 53 ; 
 
 Ages. ii. 2, p. 346. 
 Larisus, a river of Achaea, III. ii. 23, 
 
 p. 16. 
 Lasion, a city in eastern Elis claimed by 
 
 the Arcadians, III. ii, 30, p. 18 ; the 
 
 Eleians seize (B.C. 366-365), VII. 
 
 iv. 12, p. 215. 
 Lasionians, the, a contingent of, at 
 
 "theNemea," IV. ii. 16, p. 50. 
 Lechaeum, harbour of Corinth, IV. 
 
 iv. 7, p. 60 ; ib. 17, p. 63 ; ib. v. 
 
 7 foil. , p. 66 foil. ; ib. viii. 10, p. 
 
 80 ; ib. 23, p. 84 ; V. i. 29, p. 97; 
 
 Ages. ii. 17, p. 250. 
 Lemnos, the island of, IV. viii. 15, p. 
 
 82 ; V. i. 31, p. 98. 
 Leon, an Athenian ambassador at the 
 
 court of Persia (B.C. 367), VII. i. 
 
 33 foil. , p. 196 foil. 
 Leontiades, the Theban polemarch 
 
 (B.C. 383), introduces the Lacedae- 
 monians under Phoebidas into the 
 
 Cadmeia, etc., V. ii. 25 foil., p. 107 
 
 foil. ; at Sparta addresses the 
 
 assembly, justifying the act, ib. 32 
 
 foil. , p. 109 ; slain by Phyllidas, 
 
 (B.C. 379), ib. iv. 7 foil., p. 121 ; 
 
 re the insurrection of Melon against, 
 
 ib. 19, p. 124. 
 Leontichus, an Athenian general, V. 
 
 i. 26, p. 96. 
 Leotychides, a Spartan, son of Agis, 
 
 his claim to the throne. III. iii. i 
 
 foil., p. 19 foU. ; Ages. i. 5, p. 
 
 238. 
 Lepreum, in Elis, the men of, revolt 
 
 to Sparta (B.C. 401), III. ii. 25, 
 
 p. 17 ; with the Lacedaemonians 
 against Mantinea (B.C. 370), VI. v. 
 II, p. 172. 
 
 Lesbos, the island of, IV. viii. 28, p. 
 86. 
 
 Letrinians, the, join the Lacedae- 
 monians (B.C. 401), III. ii. 25, p. 
 
 17 ; granted autonomy, ib. 30, p. 
 
 18 ; at "the Nemea," IV. ii. 16, p. 
 SO- 
 
 Leucas, the island of, the Lacedae- 
 monians collect ships from (B.C. 
 374), VI. ii. 3, p. 144 ; ib. 26, p. 
 148. 
 
 Leucophrys, a town in Caria, III. ii. 
 19, p. 14 ; IV. viii. 17, p. 83. 
 
 Leuctra, in Boeotia, battle of (B.C. 
 371), V. iv. 33, p. 127 ; Cleom- 
 brotus encamps in, VI. iv. 4 foil., 
 p. 159 foil. ; ib. V. 1, p. 168 ; 
 effect of victory of, on Boeotians, 
 ib. 23, p. 176 ; Pelopidas refers to, 
 VII. i. 35, p. 196 J disaster of 
 Lacedaemonians at, ib. ii. 2, p. 
 201 ; Ages. ii. 22, 23, p. 251 foil. 
 
 Leuctrum, a Spartan frontier fortress 
 in the Aegytis of Arcadia, VI. v. 
 24, p. 176. 
 
 Lichas, the Spartan, case of, III. ii. 
 21, p. 16. 
 
 Locrians, the Opuntian, origin of the 
 quarrel between, and the Phocians 
 (B.C. 395), in. V. 3 foil., p. 33; 
 cavalry of, with the allies at " the 
 Nemea," IV. ii. 17, p. 50 ; — the 
 Ozolian, with the allies at the 
 Nemea, IV. ii. 17, p. 50 ; — both 
 divisions of, at Coronea, ib. iii. 15, 
 p. 55 ; attacked by Gylis, ib. 22, p. 
 57 ; both sections of, with the 
 Thebans (first invasion), VI. v. 23, 
 p. 176 ; cavalry of, ib. 30, p. 179 ; 
 Ages. ii. 6, p. 247. 
 
 Locris, III. V. 3, p. 33 i IV. iii. 21, 
 
 P- 57- 
 
 Lyoaethus, an Athenian, VI. iii. z, p. 
 152. 
 
 Lycomedes, the famous statesman of 
 Mantinea, and organiser of the 
 Arcadian League (B.C. 368), VII. i. 
 23 foil., p. 192 foil. ; his quarrel 
 with the Thebans at the congress. 
 
INDEX 
 
 379 
 
 ii- 39 1 P- 198 ; cements an alliance 
 between Athens and the Arcadian 
 League, ib. iv. 2, p. 212 : his ill- 
 starred death, U. 3, p. 213. 
 Lycurgus, Institutions of the lawgiver, 
 
 Pol. Lac. passim. 
 Lysander, his navarchy (B.C. 407), 
 III. i. 9, p. 4 ; how he Interpreted 
 the ' ' lame reign, " ii. iii. 3, p. 20 ; 
 his object in urging Agesilaus to 
 conduct an Asiatic campaign (B.C. 
 396), viz. to re - establish his 
 decarchies, it. iv. n, p. 24 ; see 
 below, ib. v. 13, p. 36 ; trying to 
 outshine the king, is set down j 
 renders service in the Hellespont, 
 ii. 7 foil. , p. 25 foil. ; at the year's 
 end (b.C. 39S) returns home with 
 the Thirty, it. 20, p. 29 ; sent to 
 Phocis with orders to march on 
 Haliartus, it. v. 6, p. 34 ; is there 
 slain, it. 17 foil., p. 37 foil. 
 
 Lysander of Sicyon, VII. i. 45, p. 
 200. 
 
 Lysiraenes, at Sicyon in command of 
 a foreign brigade, superseded by 
 Euphron, VII. i. 45, p. zoo. 
 
 Lysippus, a Lacedaemonian, harmost 
 in Epitalium (B.C. 401-400), ravages 
 Elis, III. ii. 29 foil., p. 18. 
 
 Lysistratus, an Athenian in command 
 of reinforcements sent to the Ar- 
 cadians (B.C. 366), Rev. iii. 7, p. 
 332- 
 
 Macedonia, IV. iii. 3, p. 53 (see 
 Ages. ii. 2, p. 246) ; policy of 
 Olynthus to free the cities of, from 
 Amyntas (B.C. 383), V. ii. 12 foil., 
 p. 104; it. 38, p. Ill ; the timber 
 yard of Athens, VI. i. 11, p. 140. 
 
 Macedonians, the, Amyntas, king of, 
 V. ii. 12, p. 104 ; cavalry of, with 
 Teleutias at Olynthus (B.C. 382), 
 it. 40 f9ll., p. Ill ; army of, dis 
 banded, it. 43, p. iii. 
 
 Macistians, the, revolt from Elis to 
 
 . Sparta (B.C. 401), III. ii. 25, p. 
 
 17- 
 Macistus, in the Triphylia, III. ii. 30, 
 
 p. 18. 
 
 Maeander, the river, III. ii. 14, p. 14 ; 
 
 plain of, it. 17, p. 15 ; ib. iv. 12, p. 
 27 ; the valley of, it. 21, p. 30 ; 
 towns in the plain of, IV. viii. 17, 
 p. 83 ; Ages. i. 15, p. 240 ; it. 29, 
 
 P- 243- 
 
 Malea, see Medea. 
 
 Maleatid, the, a district in southern 
 Arcadia bordering on Laconia, VI. 
 v. 24, p. 176. 
 
 Mania, a Dardanian, holds satrapy of 
 the Aeolis on her husband's death ; 
 her relations to Pharnabazus ; Hel- 
 lenic mercenaries ; murder. III. i. 
 10-14, P- 4 lol'- 
 
 Mantinea, in Arcadia, Agesilaus with 
 the remnant of the mora passes, in 
 the dark, IV. v. 18, p. 70 ; the 
 battle of (B.C. 418), V. ii. 2, p. 
 100 ; Pausanias, the exiled king of 
 Sparta, father of Agesipolis, friendly 
 with the popular party in, it. 3, p. 
 loi ; split up into four villages 
 (B.C. 385), it. 7 foil., p. 102 ; re- 
 united into a single state (b.c. 371- 
 370), VI. V. 3 foil., p. 169 foil. ; 
 the Tegean party under Callibius 
 (in favour of the pan - Arcadian 
 League) seek refuge under the walls 
 and gates facing, (b.c. 370) it. 8, p. 
 171; a threatened engagement near, 
 ib. 16 foil., p. 173 foil. ; the Pelo- 
 ponnesian allies converge on, (b.c. 
 362) VII. v. 7 foil. , p. 227 ; the 
 Athenian cavalry encounter Epami- 
 nondas's cavalry before, it. 16, p. 
 229 : battle of, it. 20 foil., p. 231 
 foil. ; the Mantinicfe, or territory of, 
 VL v. IS foil, p. 173. 
 Mantineans, the, a former alliance of 
 the Eleians with the Athenians, 
 Argives and the (b.c. 421), III. ii. 
 21, p. 16 ; incorporated with the 
 Lacedaemonian army (b.c. 394), 
 IV. ii. 14, p. 49 ; " stand in as 
 much awe of Iphicrates's peltasts as 
 children of hobgoblins," it. iv. 17, 
 p. 63 ; and the remnant of the mora 
 (B.C. 390), it. V. 18, p. 70 ; the 
 Lacedaemonians proceed to chastise 
 the (B.C. 386), for lukewarmness or 
 disloyalty, V. ii. 2 foil., p. 100 
 foil. ; attitude of the, (of the better 
 
38o 
 
 INDEX 
 
 classes) towards sixty fellow-citizens 
 (of the argolising or democratic 
 party) banished on the capitulation 
 of the city to Agesipolis, ib. 6, p. 
 I02 ; the feeling of the wealthy 
 landowners among, with regard to 
 the disruption of the vb'Kii, ib. ; the, 
 from their villages flock to the Spar- 
 tan standard after "Leuctra" (B.C. 
 371), VI. iv. 18, p. 163 ; but on 
 the revival of autonomy (by the con- 
 federacy organised at Athens) the, 
 decree to make Mantinea a single 
 state and to fortify the town, ib. v. 
 3 foil., p. i6g foU. ; the, receive 
 help on all sides in the building of 
 the walls (the Eleians contributing 
 actually three talents), ib, g, p. 170; 
 the, side with the party in Tegea in 
 favour of a pan-Arcadian League, 
 and march against Tegea in their 
 behalf, ib. 8 foil., p. 171 (see Ages. 
 ii. 251) ; the Ephors send an army 
 under Agesilaus against the, on the 
 ground that they have violated their 
 oaths in marching on Tegea, ib. 10, 
 p. 172 ; the, march against Orcho- 
 menus (the chief anti - Arcadian 
 League state, and an old rival of 
 Mantinea), ib. 13 foil., p. 172 foil.; 
 coalition of the several Arcadian 
 contingents mustered in Asea with 
 the, supported by Argives, in face of 
 Agesilaus, ib. 17, p. 173 ; the, in- 
 fluenced by the Eleians, decide to 
 await the arrival of the Thebans 
 before risking a battle, ib. 19, p. 
 174 ; in reference to the employ- 
 ment of the sacred treasures (of 
 Olympia) by the officers (or leaders) 
 of the Arcadian League (b. c. 363) 
 as a means of maintaining the 
 Bfaritoi (militia of the League), 
 the, first pass a resolution (in their 
 own state) forbidding such use of 
 the sacred property, VII. iv. 33, p. 
 
 222 ; the, are accused by the federal 
 government of undermining the 
 League, and close their gates against 
 the Eparitoi, etc., ib. foil., p. 
 
 223 ; the policy of the, (re the sacred 
 money) prevails, with various conse- 
 
 quences, ib. 34, ib. ; attempt against 
 the, in Tegea on the part of the 
 Theban commandant and certain 
 members of the Arcadian govern- 
 ment, ib. iv. 37 foil., p. 224 foil.; 
 the, along with the anti -Theban 
 states of the League and other 
 Peloponnesian states, decide to resist 
 foreign invasion, ib. v. 1, p. 225 ; 
 the, pray the Athenian knights to 
 succour them, and, thanks to their 
 good offices, recover their property 
 outside, ib. 14 foil., p. 229 foil. 
 
 Maracians, the, subjected by Jason of 
 Thessaly, VI. i. 7, p. 139. 
 
 Margana, a town in the Pisatis of 
 Elis, falls into the hands of the 
 Arcadian League (B.C. 366), VII. 
 iv. 14, p. 216. 
 
 Marganians, the, give in their adhesion 
 to Sparta (B.C. 401), III. ii. 25, p. 
 17; granted autonsmy, ib. 30, p. 18 ; 
 at "theNemea," IV. ii. 16, p. 50; 
 the Eleians protest against recognis- 
 ing autonomy of (B.C. 371, congress 
 at Athens), VI. v. 2, p. 169 ; the 
 Eleians recover (B.C. 365), VII. iv. 
 26, p. 220. 
 
 Mausolus, satrap of Caria, and Agesi- 
 laus, Ages. ii. 26, p. 253. 
 
 Medea, should be probably Melea, or 
 Malea, a township in the Aegytis 
 (see Maleatid), VII. i. 28 foil., p. 
 194. 
 
 Median war {i.e. Persian), Rev. <. 5, 
 
 P- 346. 
 Medocus, or Amedocus, king of the 
 
 Odrysians, IV. viii. 26, p. 85. 
 Megabates, son of Spithridates, IV. 
 
 i. 28, p. 44 ; Ages. v. 4, p. 257. 
 Megalopolis, the great city of the 
 
 Arcadian League founded soon 
 
 after "Leuctra" (see note 3, p. 
 
 170), the men of, share the Theban 
 
 policy (B.C. 362), VII. V. 5, p. 227, 
 Megara, IV. iv. 13, p. 62 ; V. iv. 41, 
 
 p. 130 ; ib. SS. p. 133 ; ii- S8, p. 
 
 134 ; Rev. iv. 46, p. 343. 
 Megaris, Aegosthena in the, IV. iv. 
 
 18, p. 124 ; VI. iv. 26, p. 165. 
 Megillus, a Lacedaemonian, III. iv, 
 
 6, p. 25. 
 
INDEX 
 
 381 
 
 Meidias, son-in-law and murderer of 
 Mania, outwitted by Dercylidas, 
 III. i. 14-28, p. 5 foil. 
 
 Mdanippus, a Rhodian captain, 
 
 1; escapes Iphicrates, VI. ii. 35, p. 
 ■ ISO. 
 
 Melanopus, an Athenian, VI. iii. 2, 
 p. 152- 
 
 Melians, the, or Malians, with Lysander 
 in Boeotia (b.c. 395), III. v. 6, p. 
 34 ; with the allies at "the Nemea ' ' 
 (B.C. 394), IV. ii. 17, p. 50; with 
 the Thebans (B.C. 370), VI. v. 23, 
 p. 176. 
 
 Melon, the Theban, and six com- 
 rades deliver Thebes (b. c. 379), V. 
 iv. 2 foil., p. 120; ii. 19, p. 124. 
 
 Melos, the island of, IV. viii. 7, p. 
 
 79- 
 Menascus, a Lacedaemonian, IV. ii. 
 
 3. P- 48. 
 
 Menon, al. Melon, a Boeotian of 
 Thespiae, V. iv. 55, p. 133. 
 
 Messene, Lacedaemon refuses to re- 
 cognise autonomy of (B.C. 368), 
 VII. i. 27, p. 194 ; Pelopidas in- 
 sists on autonomy of, ii. 36, p. 
 197 ; Lacedaemonians will not be 
 deprived of the territory of, VII. 
 iv. 9, p. 215 ; Ages. ii. 29, p. 253. 
 
 Messenian, the, war, V. ii. 3, p. loi. 
 
 Messenians, the, VI. v. 33, p. 180 ; 
 Cissidas cut off by a body qf (b. c. 
 368), VII. i. 29, p. 19s; portion 
 of Lacedaemonian captives at Crom- 
 nus allotted to the (B.C. 365), ii. 
 iv. 27, p. 220 ; share the Theban 
 policy (B.C. 362), ii. v. s. P- 227 ; 
 Pol. A/A. iii. II, p. 291. 
 
 Methymna, in Lesbos, IV. viii. 28, 
 p. 86 ; defeat of the people of, by 
 Thrasybulus, ii. 29, p. 86. 
 
 Migdon, or Mygdon, a Lacedae- 
 monian, III. iv. 20, p. 30. 
 
 Milesians, the, Pol Ath. iii. 11, p. 
 291. 
 
 Mnasippus, a Lacedaemonian, admiral, 
 his exploits and death in Corcyra, 
 with consequences, VI. ii. 4-32, p. 
 144 foil. 
 
 Myrina, a town in Aeolis, III. i. 6, 
 
 P- 3- 
 
 Mysians, the. III. i. 13, p. 5 ; IV. i. 
 
 24, p. 43. 
 Mytilene, town in Lesbos, IV. viii. 
 
 28, p. 86. 
 Mytilenians, the, Thrasybulus kindles 
 
 the ardour of (B.C. 389), IV. viii. 
 
 28, p. 86 ; their exiles with the 
 
 Methymnians defeated, it. p. 86. 
 
 Narthacius, Mount, in Thessaly, IV. 
 
 iii. 8, p. S3 ; Ages. ii. 5. p. 247. 
 Naubates, a Lacedaemonian, III. ii. 
 
 6, p. II. 
 Naucles, a Lacedaemonian general, 
 
 VII. i. 41, p. 199. 
 Naupactus (mod. Lepanto), a town of 
 
 the Locri Ozolae, IV. vi. 14, p. 
 
 74- 
 Nauplia, port town of Argos, IV. vii. 
 
 6, p. 76. 
 Neandria, in the Troad, the men of, 
 
 III. i. i6, p. 6. 
 Nemea, the stream of, between Corinth 
 
 and Sicyon, site of battle, IV. ii. 
 
 14, p. 49 ; township of Argolis, it. 
 
 vii. 3, p. 7S ; VII. ii. 5, p. 202 ; 
 
 ii. v. 6, p. 227. 
 Neodamodes, i.e. enfranchised helots, 
 
 III. i. 4, p. 2 ; ib. iii. 6, p. 21 ; ii. 
 
 iv. 2, p. 24 ; ii. 20, p. 30 ; IV. iii. 
 
 iSi P- SS ; V. ii. 24, p. 107 ; VI. 
 
 i. 14, p. 142 ; ii. V. 24, p. 176 ; 
 
 Ages. i. 7, p. 238. 
 Niceratus, father of Nicias, Rev. iv. 14, 
 
 P- 337- 
 Nicias, Rev. iv. 14, p. 337. 
 Nicolochus, a Lacedaemonian, V. i. 
 
 6 foil., p. 91 foil. ; ii. 25, p. 96 ; 
 
 ii. iv. 65, p. 136. 
 Nicophemus, an Athenian, IV. viii. 3, 
 
 p. 80. 
 
 OcYLLUS, a Lacedaemonian, V. iv. 
 
 22, p. 125 ; VI. V. 33, p. 179. 
 Odrysians, the. III. ii. 2, p. 10 ; ii. 
 
 S, p. II ; IV. viii. 26, p. 85. 
 Oeniadae, in Acarnania, IV. vi. 14, 
 
 p. 74- 
 Oenoe, a fortress in the Peiraeum of 
 
 Corinth, IV. v. 5, p. 66 ; ii. 19, p. 
 
 70. 
 Oetaeans, the. III. v. 6, p. 34. 
 
382 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Oeum, or lum, in the Sciritid, VI. v. 
 
 24 foil. , p. 177 ; the men of, ib, 
 
 26, p. 177. 
 Olontheus, a Lacedaemonian, VI. v. 
 
 33. P- 179- 
 Olurus, -a. fortress dependent upon 
 
 Pellene in Achaea, VII. iv. 17 foil., 
 
 p. 217 foil. 
 Olympia, III. ii. 26, p. 17 ; IV. i. 
 
 40, p. 46 ; ib. vii. 2, p. 75 ; VII. 
 
 iv. 14, p. 2i6 ; ib. 28, p. 221. 
 Olympian games, VII. iv. 28, p. 221. 
 Olympian Zeus, III. il. 22, p. 16 ; ii. 
 
 26, p. 17 ; ib. 31, p. 19. 
 Olympic year, the, VII. iv. 28, p. 
 
 221. 
 Olynthians, the, V. ii. 13 foil., p. 104 
 
 foil.; ib. 38, p. in; ib. 42 foil., 
 
 p. 112 foil. ; ib. iii. i foil., p. 112 
 
 foil. ; ib. iv. S4. P' I33- 
 Olynthus, V. ii. 12 foil., p. 104 foil. ; 
 
 ib. 27, p. 108 ; ib. 37, p. no ; 
 
 ib. iii. 9, p. 115 ; ib. 20, p. 117. 
 Oneion, or Oneium, VI. v. 51, p. 
 
 i8s ; VII. i. IS, p. 189 ; ib. 41 
 
 foil., p. 199 foil. ; ib. ii. 5, p. 
 
 202. 
 
 Opuntian Locrians, the, see Locrians. 
 Orchomenians, the Boeotian, III. v, 
 
 6, p. 34 ; IV. ii. 17, p. 50 ; ib. iii. 
 
 15 foil., p. 55 foil. ; VI. iv. 10, p. 
 
 160 ; Ages. ii. 6, p. 247, 
 Orchomenians, the Arcadian, V. iv. 
 
 36, p. 128; VI. V. II, 13, p. 172 
 
 foil. 
 Orchomenus, in Arcadia, IV. v. 18, 
 
 p. 70 ; VI. V. 13, p. 172 ; ib. 17, 
 
 p. 174 ; ib. 29, p. 178. 
 Orchomenus, in Boeotia, III. v. 6, 
 
 p. 34 ; ib. 17, p. 37 ; IV. ii. 17, 
 
 p. so ; ii. iii. is, p. SS I V. i. 29, 
 
 P- 97. 
 Oreus, in Euboea, V. iv. 56 foil., p. 
 
 133 foil. 
 Oropus, town on the borders of Attica 
 
 and Boeotia, VII. iv. i, p. 212. 
 Orsippus, a Lacedaemonian, IV. ii. 8, 
 
 p. 48. 
 Orthia, Artemis, Pol. Lac. ii. 9, p. 
 
 300. 
 Otys, king of Paphlagonia, IV. i. 3 
 
 foil., p. 40 foil. 
 
 Pactolus, the river, in Lydia, III. 
 
 iv. 22, p. 30 ; Ages. i. 30, p. 243. 
 Pagasae, port town in Thessaly, V. 
 
 iv. s6, p. 133. 
 Palae-Gambreum, town in Aeolis, III. 
 
 i. 6, p. 3. 
 Pallantium, town in Arcadia, VI. v. 
 
 9, p. 171, and note 3 ; the men of, 
 
 VII. V, s, p. 227. 
 Pallene, the isthmus of, V. ii. 15, p. 
 
 105. 
 Pamphilus, an Athenian general, V. i. 
 
 2, p. 90. 
 Panathenaea, the, Pol. Ath. iii. 4, 
 
 p. 289. 
 Pangaeus, a mountain in Thrace, V. 
 
 ii. 17, p. 105. 
 Paphlagonia, IV. i. 2 foil. , p. 40 ; 
 
 Ages. iii. 4, p. 255. 
 Paphlagonians, the, IV. ii. 21, p. 
 
 43. 
 Parapita, wife of Pharnabazus, IV. i. 
 
 39, p. 46. 
 Parrhasians, the, VII. i. 28, p. 194. 
 Pasimachus, a Lacedaemonian general, 
 
 IV. iv. 10, p. 61. 
 Pasimelus, a Corinthian, IV. iv. 4, p. 
 
 59 ; ib. 7, p. 60 ; VII. iii. 2, p. 
 
 208. 
 Pausanias, king of Sparta, III. v. 6 
 
 foil. , p. 34 foil. ; V. ii. 3, p. loi. 
 Peiraeum, IV. v. i foil. , p. 64 ; Ages. 
 
 ii. 18, p. 250. 
 Peisander, a Lacedaemonian, brother- 
 in-law of Agesilaus, III. iv. 29, p. 
 
 32 ; IV. iii. 10 foil., p. 54. 
 Peisias, of Argos, VII. i. 41, p. 199. 
 Pella, the capital of Macedonia, V. ii. 
 
 13, p. 104. 
 Pellene, in Achaea, VII. i. 18, p. 
 
 190 ; ib. ii. 18 foil., p. 206 ; ib. iv. 
 
 18, p. 217 ; or Pellana, in Laconia, 
 
 ib. V. 9, p. 228 note. 
 Pellene, Draco of. III. ii. 11, p. 13. 
 Pellenians, the Achaean, IV. ii. 20, 
 
 p. 51 ; VI. v. 29, p. 178 ; VII. i. 
 
 15, p. 190 ; ii. ii. 2, p. 201 ; ib. 11 
 
 foil., p. 204 foil. ; ib. iv. 17, p. 
 
 217. 
 Pelles, a Lacedaemonian, IV. iii. 23, 
 
 p. S7. 
 Pelopidas, the Theban, as commis- 
 
INDEX 
 
 383 
 
 sioner representing Thebes at the 
 court of Persia (b.c. 367-366?), 
 his influence preponderant, VII. i. 
 33 foil., p. 196 ; supported by the 
 Athenian Tiraagoras ; his reply, 
 when asked what special clause he 
 would have inserted in the royal 
 rescript, ib. 35 foil., p. 197 ; his 
 dream of empire dispelled, ih. 40, 
 p. 198. 
 
 Peloponnese, behaviour of the troops 
 from, compared with those from the 
 islands and Ionic cities (B.C. 397), 
 III. ii. 17, p. IS ; a harvesting for, 
 in Elis (B.C. 401?), ib. 26, p. 17; 
 the Achaeans and the war in, IV. ii. 
 2, p. 71 ; ib. 14, p. 74 ; what 
 course in the interest of, ought to 
 be taken re Olynthus (B.C. 383), V. 
 ii. 20, p. 106 ; Timotheus's cruise 
 round, ib. 62, p. 135 ; favourable 
 position of Corcyra between, and 
 Sicily, VI. ii. 9, p. 145 ; the gift of 
 Triptolemus to, ib. iii. 6, p. 153 ; 
 in a literal sense the fatherland of 
 the Arcadians, VII. i. 23, p. 192 ; 
 ib. ii. 2, p. 201 ; the party "repre- 
 senting the interests of," ib. iv. 35, 
 p. 223 ; ib. V. I, p. 225 ; the en- 
 slavers of, to be resisted, ib. 3, 
 p. 226 ; the empire of, Epaminon- 
 das would fain leave as his legacy to 
 Thebes, ib. 18, p. 231; the gates 
 of, Ages. ii. 17, p. 250 ; Pol. Ath. 
 ii. 7, p. 283. 
 
 Peloponnesian troops vrith Pausanias 
 (B.C. 395) in Boeotia, III. v. 6, p. 
 
 34- 
 Peloponnesians, four thousand, with 
 
 Thibron (B.C. 400), III. i. 4, p. 2 ; 
 
 will follow Athens, ib. v. 14, p. 36 ; 
 
 still feel bound to follow Lacedae- 
 
 mon after "Leuctra" (B.C. 371), 
 
 VI. V. 1, p. 169. 
 Percoti, town in Troas, V. i. 23, p. 
 
 96. 
 Pergamum, town in Aeolis, III. i. 6, 
 
 P- 3' 
 Perioeci, the, or provincials, III. iii. 6, 
 
 p. 21 ; V. i. 33, p. 99 ; i'>- "■ ^f« 
 p. 107; ib. iii. 9, p. 114; ^i- i^- 
 39, p. 129 ; of Pherae. VI. i. 19, 
 
 p. 143 ; ib. v. 21, p. 17S ; ib. 25, 
 p. 177 ; ib. 32, p. 179 ; VII. ii. 2, 
 p. 291 ; ib. iv. 27, p. 220. 
 Perioecid cities, i.e. country town- 
 ships, III. ii. 23, p. 16 ; rural 
 districts, ib. v. 7, p. 34 ; of Boeotia, 
 
 V. Iv. 46, p. 131 ; ib. 63, p. 136 ; 
 
 VI. iv. 6, p. 159. 
 
 Persia, the king of. III. iv. 25, p. 31 ; 
 
 IV. i. 6, p. 41 ; VI. i. 12, p. 140 ; 
 
 VII. i. 33, p. 196 ; Ages. i. 6, p. 
 238 saA passim. 
 
 Persian, the, III. ii. 15, p. 14 ; 
 
 troopers, ib. iv. 14, p. 28 ; V. ii. 
 
 3S, p. no ; VII. i. 34, p. 196 ; 
 
 Ages, ii. 1, p. 246 ; ib. 29, p. 253 
 
 and passim. 
 Persians, the. III. iv. 22 foil., p. 30 
 
 foil.; IV. i. 30, p. 44. 
 Phanias, an Athenian, V. i. 26, p. 
 
 96. 
 Pharax, a Lacedaemonian admiral, 
 
 III. ii. 12-14, P- 14 ; proxenus of 
 
 the Boeotians, IV. v. 6, p. 66 ; VI. 
 
 V. 33. P- 179- 
 
 Pharnabazus, the Persian satrap, and 
 Tissaphernes (b.c. 399), III. i. 9 
 foil., p. 4 foil. ; and Mania, ib. 11 
 foil. , p. 4 ; and Dercylidas (b. c. 
 399-398), ib. ii. I foil., p. 10 foil. ; 
 visits Tissaphernes (b.c. 397), ib. 
 13, p. 14 ; his willingness to engage 
 Dercylidas, ib. 18, p. 15 ; Tissa- 
 phernes and, make truce with 
 Dercylidas, ib. 20, p. 15 ; Ly- 
 sander turns to account a slight put 
 upon Spithridates by, ib. iv. 10, p. 
 26 (see Ages. iii. 3, p. 255) ; Hel- 
 lenic cavalry defeated by cavalry of, 
 (B.C. 396) ib. 13, p. 28 (see Ages. 
 i. 23, p. 242) ; the Phrygia of, ib. 
 26, p. 31 ; attacked by Agesilaus 
 (B.C. 395), IV. i. I, p. 40; his palace 
 at Dascylium, ib. 15, p. 42 ; sur- 
 prised in Caue, ib. 20 foil. , p. 43 ; 
 interview between Agesilaus and, 
 ib. 28 foil. , p. 44 foil, (see Ages. 
 iii. Si P' 2SS) ; the son of, and 
 Agesilaus, ib. 39, p. 46 ; Ages- 
 ilaus evacuates the territory of 
 (B.C. 394, spring), ib. 41, p. 46; 
 at the battle of Cnidus, ib. iii. 11, 
 
384 
 
 INDEX 
 
 p. S4 i ^nd Conon expel the 
 Laconian harmosts, ii. viii. i foil., 
 p. 77 ; ravages the territory of 
 Abydos, ii. 6, p. 79 ; naval opera- 
 tions of, and Conon against Lace- 
 daemon {B.C. 393), ih. 8, p. 79 ; 
 helps Conon to restore the walls of 
 Athens, and the Corinthians to man 
 a fleet, ib. 10, p. 80 j marriage of, 
 with the king's daughter, V. 1. 28, 
 
 . P- 97- 
 
 Pharsalia, VI. i. 7, p. 139, See Phar- 
 salus. 
 
 Pharsalians, the, VI. i. z, p. 137 ; ii. 
 18, p. 143. 
 
 Pharsalus, the men of, IV. iii. 3, p. 
 53 ; Ages. ii. 2, p. 246 ; Polychar- 
 mus of, IV. iii. 8, p. 53; Ages. ii. 4, 
 p. 247 ; speech of Polydamas of, a 
 Lacedaemon (B.C. 374), VI. i. 2 
 foil., p. 137 foil. ; the citadel of, 
 not surrendered to Jason, ii. 18, p. 
 142 ; Polydamas put to death in, 
 ii. iv. 33, p. 167. 
 
 Phea, town in Elis, III. ii. 30, p. 18. 
 
 Pherae, in Thessaly, IV. viii. 7, p. 
 
 79- 
 
 Pheraeans, the, VI. iv. 31, p. 167. 
 
 Philemonides, Rev, iv. ij, p. 337. 
 
 Philip, a Theban, V. iv. 2, p. 120. 
 
 Philiscus, of Abydos, VII. i. 27, p. 
 194. 
 
 Philocrates, an Athenian, IV. viii. 24, 
 p. 84. 
 
 Phlius {men of, and Phliasian), the 
 men of, keep holy truce (B.C. 394), 
 IV. ii. 16, p. 50 ; attacked by 
 Iphicrates, introduce Lacedaemon- 
 ians within their walls (b.c. 391 ?), 
 ii. iv. IS, p. 62 ; Agesipolis's troops 
 collect at (B.C. 384), ii. vii. 3, p. 
 75 ; the party in exile from, make 
 overtures to Lacedaemon (B.C. 384- 
 383), V. ii. 8, p. 102 ; the men of, 
 under pressure of Lacedaemon make 
 terms with their exiles, ii. 9 foil., 
 p. 103 ; the quarrel between the 
 men of, and their exiles ripens (B.C. 
 3817-380), ii. iii. 10 foil., p. lis; 
 the Lacedaemonians declare war 
 against, in support of the exiles, ii. 
 13, p. IIS ; siege of, by Agesilaus ; 
 
 reduction of, after one year and 
 eight months ; and fate of (b.c. 
 379), (see Ages, ii. 21, p. 251), ii. 
 16-25, P- "6 foil. ; exploits of 
 Delphion, a citizen of, during the 
 siege, ii. 22, p. iiB ; cavalry of, 
 at Leuctra (b.c. 371), VI. iv. 9, p. 
 160 ; enthusiasm of, in behalf of 
 Sparta, ii. 18, p. 163 ; cavalry of, 
 at Elymia (b.c. 370), ii. v. 14, p. 
 173; cavalry of, effect junction with 
 Agesilaus before Mantinea, ii. 17, 
 p. 174 ; reinforcements from, rally 
 to rescue of Sparta (b.c. 370-369), 
 ii. 29, p. 178 ; speech of Procles 
 of, VII. i. I, p. 186 ; battle at the 
 gate of Corinth leading to (b.c. 
 369), ii. 18, p. 190 ; stress of, 
 between the Argives at Trikaranon, 
 and the Sicyonians at Thyamia, ib. 
 ii. 1, p. 201 ; fidelity of, to Lace- 
 daemon (b.c. 371-366), ii. 2 foil., 
 p. 201 ; doughty deeds of the men 
 of (b.c. 370-369), ib. 3; in B.C. 
 369, ii. 4, s ; in B.C. 368, ii. 10 ; 
 in B.C. 367, ii. II foil., 16, 17 
 foil, , pp. 202-208 ; historian's en- 
 comium of the men of, ii. iii. i , p. 
 208 ; men of, fortify Thyamia (b.c. 
 366), ii. iv. I, p. 212 ; theThebans 
 grant peace to, and Corinth, etc., 
 ii. 10, p. 215 ; men of, give up 
 Thyamia, but fail to recover Trikar- 
 anon, ii. II, p. 215. 
 Phocians, the, quarrel between, and 
 the Opuntian Locrians (B.C. 395), 
 III. V. 3 foil., p. 33 foil. ; obtain 
 aid from Lacedaemon, ii. 6, p. 34 ; 
 make off after " Haliartus," ib. 21, 
 p. 138 ; at Coronea with Agesilaus 
 (E.C. 394), IV. iii. IS, p. SS (see 
 Ages. ii. 6, p. 247) ; attacked by 
 Thebes as philo-Laconian, V. ii. 
 33, p. 109 ; ask help from Lace- 
 daemon against Thebes (B.C. 374), 
 VI. i. I, p. 137 ; conduct of Thebes 
 towards, disliked by Athens (B.C. 
 373), ii. iii. I, p. 152 ; light in- 
 fantry of, at Leuctra (B.C. 371), ib. 
 iv. 9, p. 160 ; enmity between 
 Jason and, ib. 21, p. 164; in the 
 wake of Thebes, as subjects (B.C. 
 
INDEX 
 
 38s 
 
 370-369), ii. V. 23, p. 176 ; cavalry 
 of, before Sparta (B.C. 370-369), 
 ti. V. 30, p. 179 ; not with Epa- 
 rainondas (b.c. 362), VII. v. 4, p. 
 226 ; in occupation of sacred land 
 belonging to temple of Delphi (B.C. 
 3SS?), Jlev. V. 9, p. 347. 
 
 Phocis, III. V. 4, p. 33 ; IV. iii. 21, 
 p. 57 ; V. iv. 60, p. 13s ; VI. i. 1, 
 p. 137 ; i*. ii. I, p. 143 ; U. iv. 3, 
 p. 158 ; ii. 27, p. 165. 
 
 Phoebidsis, the Lacedaemonian, march- 
 ing on Olynthus, stops at Thebes 
 and seizes the Cadmeia (b.c. 383?), 
 V. ii. 24 foil., p. 107 foil. ; left as 
 harmost at Thespiae (b.c. 378), ii. 
 iv. 41, p. 129 ; is slain in battle by 
 the Thebans, ii. 45, p. 131. 
 
 Phoenicia, III. iv. i, p. 23 ; Ages. ii. 
 30, p. 254. 
 
 Phoenician triremes, fitting out (b.c. 
 397), III. iv. I, p. 23 ; under 
 Pharnabazus at Cnidus (b.c. 394)7 
 IV. iii. II, p. 54. 
 
 Phoenicus, in Cythera, IV. viii. 7, p. 
 
 79- 
 Phrixa, in Elis, granted autonomy, 
 
 III. ii. 30, p. 18. 
 Phrygia Minor, III. ii. i, p. 10 ; ii. 
 
 iv. 12, p. 27 ; ii. 26, p. 31 ; ii. 
 
 28, p. 32 ; IV. i. I, p. 40 ; A^es. 
 
 i. 16, p. 240. 
 Phrygians, the, Jiev. ii. 3, p. 330. 
 Phthiotis, Achaea, IV. iii. 9, p. S4 ; 
 
 Ages. ii. s. P- 247- 
 Phyllidas, or Phillidas, the Theban, 
 
 secretary to the polemarchs (b.c. 
 
 379), organises the deliverance of 
 
 Thebes, V. iv. 2 foil., p. 120 foil. 
 Piraeus, III. v. s. P- 33 ; '*■ 8, p. 
 
 34 ; ii. 16, p. 37 ; ii. 25, p. 39 ; 
 
 walls of, rebuilt (B.C. 393), IV. viii. 
 
 9, p. 80 ; V. i. 9, p. 92 ; Teleutias 
 
 surprises (B.C. 388), ii. 22, p. 94; 
 
 ii. ii. 33, p. 109 ; attempt of 
 
 Sphodrias on (B.C. 378), ii. iv. 20 
 
 foil., p. 124 foil. ; furnished with 
 
 gates (B.C. 378), ii. 34, p. 128. 
 Pisa, the men of, or the' Pisatid, 
 
 claim to be the original presidents 
 
 of the temple at Olympia, VII. iv. 
 
 28, p. 221. 
 VOL. II 
 
 Plataeae, V. iv. 10, p. 122; id. 14, 
 p. 123 ; ii. 48, p. 131 ; VI. iii. 5, 
 p. 153 ; battle of, VII. i. 34, p. 
 196. 
 
 Plataeans, the, attempt of, to assist 
 the Lacedaemonians (b.c. 379), V. 
 iv. lo, p. 122 ; expatriation oJE, by 
 the Thebans (b.c. 372), VT. iii. i, 
 p. 152- 
 
 Podanemus,aLacedaemonian admiral, 
 IV. viii. II, p. 'So. 
 
 Podanemus of Phlius, V. iii. 13, p. 116. 
 
 PolUs, a Lacedaemonian admiral, IV. 
 viii. II, p. 80; defeated in the 
 battle of Naxos (b.c. 376), V. iv. 
 61, p. I3S- 
 
 Polyaenidas, a Lacedaemonian, VII. 
 iv. 23, p. 219. 
 
 Polyanthes, a Corinthian, III. v. 1, 
 
 P- 32- 
 Polybiades, a. Lacedaemonian, V. iii. 
 
 20, p. 117; ii. 26, p. 119. 
 Polychirmus of Pharsalus, IV. iii. 8, 
 
 p. 53 ; see Ages. ii. 4, p. 247. 
 Polycharmus, a Lacedaemonian, V. ii. 
 
 41, p. 112. 
 Polydamas of Pharsalus, addresses 
 
 the Assembly at Lacedaemon (b.c. 
 
 374), VI. i. 2 foil., p. 137 foil. ; 
 
 answer of the Lacedaemonians to, 
 
 ii. 17, p. 142 ; and Jason, ii. 18, 
 
 p. 142 foil. ; put to death by Poly- 
 
 phron, ii. iv. 33, p. 167. 
 Polydorus of Thessaly, slain by Poly- 
 
 phron, his brother, VI. iv. 33, p. 
 
 167. 
 Polyphron of Thessaly, slain by 
 
 Alexander, VI. iv. 33, p. 167. 
 Polytropus, commander of mercen- 
 aries for the Orchomenians (b. c. 
 
 370), VI. V. II, p. 172 ; slain at 
 
 Elymia, ii. 14, p. 173. 
 Polyxenus, in command of a Syracusan 
 
 and Italian squadron (b.c. 387), V. 
 
 i. 26, p. 96. 
 Pontus or Euxine, IV. viii. 27, p. 85 ; 
 
 ii. 31, p. 87; V. i. 28, p. 97; Pol. 
 
 Alh. ii. 7, p. 283. 
 Poseidon, sacrifice to, at the Isthmia, 
 
 IV. v. I, p. 65 ; temple of, ablaze, 
 
 ii. 4, p. 66 ; hymn to, ii. vii. 4, 
 
 p. 7S ; «'*• S. P- 76- 
 
 2 C 
 
386 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Poteidan {(&nV= Poseidon), III. iii. -a, 
 p. 19. 
 
 Potidaea, key to Pallene, V. ii. 15, p. 
 105 ; base of operations against 
 Olynthus (B.C. 383) ; ib. 24, p. 
 107 ; Teleutias at (B.C. 382), ih. 
 39, p. Ill ; ib. iii. 6, p. 114. 
 
 Potniae, in Boeotia, V. iv. 51, p. 
 132. 
 
 Pras, in Thessaly, IV. iii. 9, p. 53 ; 
 Age's, ii. 5, p. 247. 
 
 Prasiae, in Laconia, VII. ii. z, p. 
 201. 
 
 Praxitas, the Lacedaemonian polem- 
 arch, at Sicyon (B.C. 392), ad- 
 mitted within the long walls of 
 Corinth, IV. iv. 7foll., p. 60 foil. ; 
 exploits of, ib. 13 foil., p. 62 foil. ; 
 Iphicrates undoes the work of (b. c. 
 390?), ib. V. 19, p. 70. 
 
 Priene, in Ionia, III. ii. 17, p. 15 ; 
 
 IV. viii. 17, p. 83. 
 
 Proaenus, a Corinthian, IV. viii. 11, 
 
 p. 81. 
 Procles, Eurysthenes and, descendants 
 
 of Demaratus, the Lacedaemonian, 
 
 III. i. 6, p. 3. 
 Procles of Phlius, son of Hipponicus, 
 
 V. iii. 13, p. 116 ; his speech at 
 Athens in behalf of Lacedaemon 
 (B.C. 370-369), VI. V. 38 foil., p. 
 181 foil. ; his second speech (B.C. 
 369), VII. i. I foil., p. 186 foil. 
 
 Proconnesus, island and town, in the 
 Propontis, IV. viii. 36, p. 89 ; V. 
 i. 26, p. 95. 
 
 Prometheia, the, Pol. Ath. iii. 4, p. 
 289. 
 
 Prothbus, a Lacedaemonian, outvoted 
 in the Assembly at Lacedaemon 
 (B.C. 371), VI. iv. :i, p. 158. 
 
 Proxenus of Tegea favours Pan- 
 Arcadian confederacy (B.C. 370), 
 
 VI. v. 6 foil. , p. 170 ; is slain in 
 battle by the rival party, ib. 7, p. 
 171 ; were the Mantineans justi- 
 fied in supporting his party ? ib. 36, 
 p. 180. 
 
 Proxenus, the Pellenian, VII. ii. 16, 
 
 p. 205. 
 Pylus, a town in "hollow" Ehs, 
 
 occupied by the Eleian exiles (B.C. 
 
 366-365), VII. iv. 16, p. 217 ; 
 recovered by the Eleians, ib. 26, p. 
 220. 
 Pythian games (B.C. 370), VI. iv. 29 
 foil., p. 166. 
 
 Rhathines, a Persian, III. iv. 13, 
 p. 28. 
 
 Rhium (and Antirrhium), the two pro- 
 montories at the entrance of the 
 Gulf of Corinth, IV. vi. 13, p. 74 ; 
 IV. viii. II, p. 81. 
 
 Rhodes, the island of, Lacedae- 
 monians seek to hold (b.c. 390), 
 IV. viii. 20, p. 83 ; the strength of 
 the democracy in, ib. 22, p. 84 ; 
 Teleutias reaches, ib. 25, p. 85 ; 
 Thrasybulus and (B.C. 389), ib. 30, 
 p. 86 ; Hierax at, V. i. s, p. 91. 
 
 Rhodian, Timocrates the, agent of 
 Tithraustes, III. v. i, p. 32 ; 
 exiles at Lacedaemon, IV. viii. 20, 
 p. 83 ; Melanippus the, VI. ii. 35, 
 p. ISO. 
 
 Salaminia, the sacred galley of the 
 Athenians, VI. ii. 14, p. 146. 
 
 Samius, the Lacedaemonian admiral, 
 III. i. I, p. i. 
 
 Samos, the island of, JV, viii. 23, p. 
 84. 
 
 Samothrace, the island of, V. 1. 7, p. 
 92. 
 
 Sardis, capital of Lydia, III. ii. 11, 
 p. 13 ; ib. iv. 25, p. 31 ; IV. i. 27, 
 p. 44 ; ib. viii. 21, p. 84 ; the dis- 
 trict of. III. iv. 21, p. 30 ; Ages. 
 i. 29, p. 243. 
 
 Scepsis, in the Troad, III. i. 15 foil., 
 p. 6 foil. 
 
 Scepsians, the. III. i. 21 foil., p. 8. 
 
 Scilluntians, the, claims of Elis to 
 (B.C. 371), VI. V. 2, p. 169. 
 
 Sciritae, the, V. ii. 24, p. 107 ; ib. iv. 
 52, p. 132 ; Pol. Lac. xii. 3, p. 
 318 ; ib. xiii. 6, p. 320. 
 
 Sciritid, the, of Laconia, Ischolaus 
 posted at Oeum in (B.C. 370-369), 
 
 VI. v. 24, p. 176 ; the Arcadians 
 enter by Oeum in, ib. 25, p. 177 ; 
 Archidaraus ravages (B.C. 365), 
 
 VII. iv. 21, p. 218. 
 
INDEX 
 
 387 
 
 Scolus, in Boeotia, V. iv. 49, p. 131 ; 
 Ages. ii. 22, p. 251. 
 
 Scopeis, the Thessalian, VI. i. ig, p. 
 143- 
 
 Scmussa, in Thessaly, the men of, IV. 
 i'i- 3. P- S3 ; -^ges. ii. 2, p. 246. 
 
 Scyros, the island of, feelings of the 
 Athenians concerning (b.c. 392), 
 IV. viii. IS, p. 82 ; exempted from 
 autonomy, V. i. 31, p. g8. 
 
 Scythes, a Lacedaemonian general, 
 
 III. iv, 20, p. 30. 
 
 Sellasia, in Laconia, ravaged (B.C. 
 370-369), VI. V. 27, p. 178 ; the 
 Lacedaemonians recover, VII. iv. 
 12, p. 215 (B.C. 366). 
 
 Sestos, in the Thracian Chersonese, 
 
 IV. viii. 3 foil., p. 78 foil. ; Ages. 
 ii. 26, p. 253. 
 
 Seuthes, the Thracian, sehds Odi-ysians 
 to Dei-oylidas (B.C. 399-398), III. 
 ii. :^, p. 10 ; Dercylidas entertained 
 by, it. 9, p. 12 ; Thrasybulus 're- 
 conciles Medocus and, in alliance 
 with Athens (B.C. 389), IV. viii. 26, 
 p. 85. 
 
 Sicily, VI. ii. 9, p. 145. 
 
 Sicyon, the Lacedaemonians, etc., 
 occupy (B.C. 394), IV. ii. 14, p. 
 49 ; base of operations versus men 
 of Corinth (B.C. 393), ii. iv. i, p. 
 58 ; Lacedaemonian mora in (B.C. 
 392), ib. 7, p. 60 ; men of, atthe 
 battle within the long walls of 
 Corinth, ib. 8 foil. , p. 60 foil. ; rival 
 garrisons in Corinth and (B.C. 391), 
 ib. 14, p. 62 ; the westward long 
 wall of Corinth facing, rebuilt by 
 the Athenians, ib. 18, p. 64; de- 
 struction of the mora between, and 
 Lechaeum (B.C. 390), ib, v. 12, p. 
 68 ; land passage between, and 
 Lechaeum stopped, ib. 19, p. 70 ; 
 the men of, assist Lacedaemon 
 (B.C. 370-369), ib. ii. 2, p. 201; 
 attacked and taken by the Thebans 
 and their allies (B.C. 369), VII. i. 
 18 foil., p. 190 ; attacked by 
 Dionysius's reinforcements, ib. 22, 
 p. 192 ; how Euphron by help 
 of the Argives and Arcadians 
 became tyrant of, (B.C. 367) 
 
 ib, 44, p. 200 ; the Theban com- 
 mander in, attacks Phlius, ib. ii. 
 1 1 foil. , p. 204 foil. ; Aeneas, gen- 
 eral of the Arcadians, occupies the 
 Acropolis of, (b. C. 367-366) ; Eu- 
 phron flees to harbour of, and 
 hands it over to Lacedaemonians, 
 ib. iii. I foil. , p. 208 ; party strife 
 in, ib. 4, p. 209 ; , harbour of, 
 recaptured, ib. iv.'i, p. 212. 
 
 Sicyonian, Athenadas, a. III. i. 18, 
 p. 6. 
 
 Sicyonians, the, fifteen hundred of, at 
 "the Nemea," IV. ii. 16, p. 50 ; rally 
 to help L^edaemon after ' ' Leuc- 
 tra, " VI. iv. i8, p. 163; engagement 
 between, and the troops of Diony- 
 sius, VII. i. 22, p. 192 ; fortify 
 Thyamia against Phlius, ib. ii. i, 
 p. 201 ; and Pellenians march 
 against Phlius, ib. 11 foil., p. 204 
 foil. ; the Phliasians capture Thyamia 
 from, ib. 20, p. 206 ; Aeneas and 
 the, aristocrats, ib. iii. 1, p. 208,; 
 the, with the Arcadians recapture 
 their harbour (B.C. 366), ib. iv. i, 
 p. 212. 
 
 Sidon, in Phoenicia, Ages, ii, 30, p. 
 
 254- 
 
 Sidus, in Corinthia, taken by Praxitas 
 (b,c, 392), IV. iv. 13, p. 62 ; re- 
 taken by Iphicrates (B.C, 390), ib. 
 V. 19, p. 70. 
 
 Sisyphus, nickname of Dercylidas, III. 
 i. 8, p. 4. 
 
 Socleides, the Spartan, slain, VII. iv. 
 19, p. 218. 
 
 Sosias, a Thracian, Rev. iv. 14, p. 
 
 337- 
 
 Sparta, both kings should not be 
 absent from, at one moment, V. iii. 
 10, p. IIS ; needs such soldiers as 
 Sphodrias, ib. iv. 32 foil., p. 127; 
 the road to, VII. i. 28, p. 195 ; ib. 
 ii. 3, p. 203 ; ib. v. 9, p. 228. See 
 Pol. Lac. i. I, p, 29s a.nd. passim. 
 
 Spartan, the, troops with Agesilaus in 
 his Arcadian campaign (b.c. 370- 
 369), VI. V. 21, p. 17s ; the, war- 
 riors defend the city, ib. 28, p. 178 ; 
 Geranor the polemarch, a, slain at 
 Asinfe of Laconia (b.c. 368), VII. 
 
388 
 
 INDEX 
 
 i. 25, p. 193 ; the, Socleides with 
 the Eleians (b.c. 365), VII. iv. 19, 
 p. 218. 
 Spartans, conspiracy of Cinadon 
 against the, III. iii. 5 foil., p. 20 
 foil. ; thirty, with Agesilaus for the 
 Asiatic campaign, ii. iv. 2, p. 23 ; 
 Ages. i. 8, p. 238 ; eighteen, slain 
 in Locris with Gylis and Pelles (b. c. 
 394), IV. iii. 23, p. 57 ; eight, with 
 Gorgopas fall into the ambuscade 
 of Chabrias in Aegina (b.c. 388), 
 
 V. i. II, p. 93 ; thirty, with Agesi- 
 polis against Olynthus, ib. iii. 
 9, p. 114 ; bastard sons of, ib, ; two, 
 killed in a cavalry surprise by 
 the Thebans (b.c. 378), ib. iv. 39, 
 p. 129 ; of the seven hundred, at 
 ' ' Leuctra" (b. c. 371 ), something like 
 four hundred lay dead, VI. iv. 15, 
 p. 162 (see Ages. ii. 24, p. 252) ; 
 the perioeci lend a deaf ear to the 
 summons of the (B.C. 370-369, 
 winter), ib. v. 25, p. 177 ; more 
 than one hundred, or perioeci cap- 
 tured by the Arcadians and their 
 allies in Cromnus (b.c. 364), VH. 
 iv. 27, p. 221 ; the, keep guard 
 over the city (b.c. 362), a scanty 
 force, ib. v. 10 foil., p. 228, 
 
 Spartolus, in the Chalcidicfe, V. iii. 6, 
 
 p. 114. 
 Sphagiae (or Sphacteria), in Messenia, 
 
 VI. ii. 31, p. 149. 
 
 Sphodrias, the Lacedaemonian, left as 
 harmost at Thespiae (b.c. 378), V. 
 iv. IS foil., p. 123 foil. ; attempts 
 to seize Piraeus, ib. 20 foil., p. 124 
 foil. ; recalled, indicted by the 
 ephors, and acquitted, ib. 23 foil., 
 p. 125 ; and his son Cleonymus, 
 ib. 25 foil., p. 125 foil. ; irritation 
 of the Athenians against (b.c. 375), 
 ib. 63, p. 13s ; falls at " Leuctra," 
 VI. iv. 14, p. 161. 
 
 Spithridates, the Persian, and Lysan- 
 der. III. iv. 10, p. 26 ; Agesilaus 
 and, IV. i. n foil. , p. 40 foil. ; the 
 Paphlagonians and, make off, ib. 
 20 foil., p. 43 ; Ages. iii. 3, p. 255. 
 
 Stalcas (see Eualcas), the Eleian, VII. 
 iv. IS, p. 217. 
 
 Stasippus of Tegea, his party philo- 
 Lacofcan, VI. iv. 18, p. 163 ; strife 
 between, and the rival political 
 party in Tegea (b.c. 370), ib. v. 6 
 foil., p. 170 ; is put to death, ib. 9, 
 p. 171 ; were the Mantineans justi- 
 fied in giving armed help to the 
 party of Proxenus against? ib. 36, 
 p. 181. 
 
 Steirian, Thrasybulus the, i.e. of the 
 deme Steiria, IV. viii. 25, p. 85. 
 
 Stesicles (or probably Ctesicles), an 
 Athenian general, VI. ii. 10, p. 145. 
 
 Stratolas, an Eleian, in favour of 
 oligarchy (B.C. 365), VII. iv. 15, p. 
 217 ; in command of the Three 
 hundred slain, ib. 31, p. 222. 
 
 Stratus, in Acarnania, IV. vi. 4, p. 
 
 71- 
 Strorabichides, an Athenian, VI. iii. 
 
 ■2, p. 152. 
 Struthas, a Persian satrap (b.c 392), 
 
 defeats and slays Thibron, IV. viii. 
 
 17 foU., p. 83 foil. 
 Stymphalian, Aeneas the, i.e. of Stym- 
 
 phalus in Arcadia, VII. iii. i, p. 
 
 208. 
 Syennesis, the ruler of Cilicia, III. i. 
 
 i, p. i. 
 Syracusan, Themistogenes the. III. i. 
 
 I, p. I ; Herodas the, ib. iv. i, p. 23 ; 
 
 squadron, V. i. 26 foil. , p. 96 foil. ; 
 
 a, surgeon attends Agesilaus, ib. iv. 
 
 S8, p. 134; vessels captured by Iphi- 
 
 crates, VI. ii. 35, p. 150. 
 Syracusans, the. III. v. 14, p. 36. 
 Syracuse, VII. i. 22, p. 192. 
 Syrians, the. Rev. ii. 3, p. 330. 
 
 Tachos, king of Egypt, Ages. ii. 27 
 foil., p. 253. 
 
 Tanagra, in Boeotia, still in the hands 
 of the philo-Laconian party (b.c. 
 377), V. iv. 49, p. 131 foil. 
 
 Tegea, in Arcadia, Pausanias at '(B.C. 
 39S), III. V. 7, p. 34 ; Pausanias 
 dies in exile at, ib. 25, p. 39 ; 
 Agesilaus at (b.c. 387), V. i. 33, 
 p. 98 ; ditto (b.c. 378), ib. iv. 37, p. 
 128 ; political parties in (B.C. 370), 
 VI. V. 6 foil., p. i7|ffell. ; Agesi- 
 laus assists his frflK^n, (b.c. 
 
INDEX 
 
 389 
 
 370) Ages. ii. 23, p. 251 ; the 
 Mantineans before, ib. g, p. 171 ; 
 the territory of, ib. 15, p. 173 ; the 
 Arcadians in, ib. 16, p. 173 ; the 
 case between Mantinea and Sparta 
 re, ib. 36, p. i8i ; doings at, under 
 the Theban general (B.C. 362), VII. 
 iv. 36, p. 224 ; and Mantinea, ib. 
 38 foil., p. 225 ; Epaminondas at, 
 ii. V. 7, p. 227 ; Epaminondas 
 returns to, ib. 14, p. 229. 
 
 Tegeans, the (or men of Tegea), in- 
 corporated with the Lacedaemonian 
 forces (B.C. 394), IV. ii. 13, p. 49 ; 
 position of, at the Nemea facing 
 the Athenians, ib. 19 foil., p. 51 
 foil. ; eager co-operation of, with 
 the Lacedaemonians after Leuctra, 
 VI. iv. 18, p. 163 ; split into two 
 parties (Pan-Arcadian and Conserva- 
 tive), ib. V. s foil- 1 P- 170 ; eight 
 hundred, Stasippus's party, banished 
 to Lacedaemon, ib. 10, p. 171 ; 
 four hundred (exiles), with Ischokus 
 at Oeum (B.C. 370-369), ib. 24, p. 
 176 ; the Theban general and, VII. 
 iv. 36, p. 224 ; Epaminondas may 
 count on the, etc., ib. v. 8, p. 227. 
 
 Teleutias, the Spartan, assists his 
 brother, Agesilaus, in capturing 
 Lechaeum (B.C. 391?), IV. iv. 19, 
 p. 64 ; as navarch, dominates the 
 gulf of Corinth, ib. viii. 11, p. 81 ; 
 despatched to Rhodes, exploits of 
 (B.C. 390), ib. 23 foil., p. 84 foil. ; 
 relieves the Aeginetans (B.C. 388), 
 V. i. 2 foil. , p. 90 foil. ; superseded, 
 his popularity, ib. 3, p. 91 ; sent 
 again to Aegina, conciliates the 
 troops ; his calculations and success 
 in surprising Piraeus, ib. 13-24, p. 
 93 foil. ; sent out as governor to 
 Olynthus (B.C. 382), ib. ii. 37. 
 p. Ill ; success before Olynthus, 
 ib. 41, p. 112 ; in another expe- 
 dition (B.C. 381) against Olynthus, 
 is slain, ib. iii. 3, p. 113 ; the moral 
 to be drawn from the circumstances 
 of his death, ib. 6, p. 114. 
 
 Temnos, in Aeolis, IV. viii. 5, p. 79. 
 
 Tenea, on tlje frontier of Corinth (cf. 
 Ages. ii. 17), IV. iv. 19, p. 64. 
 
 Tenedos, the island of, V. i. 6 foil., 
 p. 91 foil. 
 
 Ten Thousand, the (lit. ol ULiiptoi,), i.e. 
 Pan-Arcadian Assembly, Antiochus's 
 report to, concerning Persia, VII. i. 
 38, p. 197 ; Lycomedes persuades, 
 to open alliance negotiations with 
 Athens (B.C. 366), ib. iv. 2, p. 212 ; 
 leading Mantineans cited by the 
 Federal Government to appear be- 
 fore, as undermining the Arcadian 
 League (B.C. 363), ib. 34, p. 223 ; 
 others among the, follow the lead 
 of Mantinea on the question of the 
 day, ib. 34, p. 223. 
 
 Teuthrania, in Mysia, comes over to 
 Thibron, III. i. 6, p. 3. 
 
 Thalamae, a fortress in Elis, VII. iv. 
 26, p. 220. 
 
 Thasos, the island of, V. i. 7, p. 92. 
 
 Thebes, Timocrates the Rhodian 
 gave gifts to Androcleidas, etc., 
 leaders in (B.C. 395), VI. v. i 
 foil., p. 32 foil. ; Lysander de- 
 taches Orchomenus from, ib. 6, 
 p. 34 ; overtures of Leontiades to 
 Phoebidas in (b.c. 383), V. ii. 25 
 foil., p. 107 foil.; and the rest of 
 the Boeotian states at the feet of 
 Lacedaemon (b.c. 379), ib. iv. 1, 
 p. 119 ; expedition of Cleombrotus 
 into territory of (b.c. 378), ib. 14, 
 p. 123 ; state of alarm in Athens 
 and, ib. 19, p. 124 ; expedition of 
 Agesilaus against, ib. 36, p. 128 
 (see Ages. ii. 22, p. 251) ; 
 second expedition of Agesilaus 
 against (b.c. 377), ib. 46 foil., p. 
 131 ; expedition of Cleombrotus 
 against (B.C. 376), ib. 58, p. 134 ; 
 exempt firom hostile invasion during 
 Timoiheus' s periplus (B.C. 375), ib. 
 63, p. 13s ; the Athenians send 
 an embassy to, before treating for 
 peace with Lacedaemon (b.c. 371), 
 VI. iii. 2 foil., p. 152 ; "the seizure 
 of the Cadraeia in, has borne evil 
 fruit' ' ( Callistratus's speech, B. c. 37 1 , 
 congress at Sparta), ib. 11, p. 155; 
 the widow of Jason in, ib. iv. 37, 
 p. 168 ; conference of the states 
 convened at, to listen to the king's 
 
39° 
 
 INDEX 
 
 letter (B.C. 367), VII. 1. 39 foil., p. 
 198 ; Euphron of Sicyon and his 
 opponents at, ii, iii. 5, p. 209 ; 
 Corinthian embassy at (B.C. 366), 
 ib. iv. 6 foil., p. 214 foil. ; a section 
 of the Arcadian government sends 
 an embassy to (B.C. 363), suggest- 
 ing military aid, ib. 34, p. 223 ; 
 the other section sends an embassy 
 to, with a capital indictment against 
 the Theban harmost in Tegea, ib. 
 39, p. 225 ; the special agreement 
 between the Phocians and (B.C. 
 362), ib. V. 4, p. 226 ; nearly 
 seventy miles from Laurium, Rev. 
 iv. 46, p. 343. 
 
 Theban, Lichas the Lacedaemonian 
 at Olympia competes under a, 
 name, III. ii. 21, p. 16 ; speech of 
 the, envoys at Athens (B.C. 395), 
 setting forth the case against 
 Sparta, as it then stood, ib. v. 8-15, 
 pp. 34-37; the Lacedaemonians 
 and the, division at the Nemea(B.c. 
 394), IV. ii. 22, p. 52; ambas- 
 sadors and Agesilaus (B.C. 390), 
 ib. V. 10, p. 67 ; the, ambassadors 
 at Sparta (b.c. 3B7), V. i. 33, p. 
 98 ; " there is a proclamation 
 forbidding any, to take service with 
 Lacedaemon against Olynthus, but 
 we will changeall that" (Leontiades's 
 overtures to Phoebidas in reference 
 to the seizure of the Cadmeia, B.C. 
 383), ib. ii. 25, p. 108 ; the, 
 cavalry and the reinforcements from 
 Plataeae, ib. iv. 10, p. 122 ; the, 
 exiles apply to Sparta for aid, ib. 
 IS, p. 123 ; the, cavalry, ib. 38, p. 
 129 ; picked corps {or sacred band), 
 VII. i. 19, p. 191 ; commander in 
 Sicyon marches against Phlius, ib. 
 ii. II, p. 204. 
 
 Thebans, the, assist the Locrians 
 against the Phocians, and the 
 Lacedaemonians seize the pretext 
 for marching against (B.C. 395), 
 III. v. 4 foil., p. 34; send 
 envoys to Athens asking for assist- 
 ance against Lacedaemon, which is 
 unanimously voted, ib. 8 foil., p. 
 34 foil. ; defeat and slay Lysander 
 
 before Haliartus ; hopes and fears 
 of, ib. 19 foil., p. 38 ; assisted by ■ 
 the Athenians, confront Pausanias, 
 ib. 22, p. 38 ; insolent bearing 
 of, towards the retiring Lace- 
 daemonians, ib. 24, p. 39 ; at 
 Coronea (B.C. 394), position and 
 furious courage of, IV. iii. 16 
 foil., p. SS f°U. (see Ages. ii. 6, 
 p. 247) ; depart from the principle 
 of autonomy (B.C. 392), for fear of 
 being compelled to let the Boeotian 
 states go free, ib. viii. 15, p. 82 ; 
 re the king's rescript (B.C. 387, 
 peace of Antalcidas), claim to take 
 the oaths in behalf of all the 
 Boeotians, V. i. 32 foil. , p. 98 ; 
 out of hatred to, Agesilaus takes 
 active measures and forces them to 
 accept the truce unconditionally, and 
 to recognise the autonomy of the 
 Boeotian cities, ib. 33, p. 99 ; "if 
 the power of the Athenians and, is 
 to be further increased by that of 
 Olynthus," the interests of Lace- 
 daemon will suffer (Cleigenes's 
 speech, B.C. 383), ib. ii. 15, p. 104 ; 
 hostile attitude of, towards Lace- 
 daemon (according to Leontiades 
 in a speech to the Spartan Assem- 
 bly justifying the seizure of the 
 Cadmeia), ib. ii. 33 foil. , p. 109 ; 
 send contingents of heavy infantry 
 and cavalry under Teleutias against 
 Olynthus (B.C. 382), ib. 37, p. iii 
 foil. ; Melon, one of, in exile at 
 Athens, concerts with Phyllidas to 
 deliver Thebes (b.c. 379), ib. iv. 2 
 foil., p. 120 ; a proclamation, call- 
 ing on all, to come out, horse and 
 foot, seeing that ' ' the tyrants were 
 dead," ib. 8, p. 121 foil. ; and their 
 adversaries, ib. 12, p. 122 ; and 
 Sphodrias (B.C. 378), ib. 20, p. 
 124 ; and Phoebidas the Lacedae- 
 mon harmost in Thespiae, ib. 42, 
 p. 130 ; campaigns of, against 
 Thespiae and the other ferioecid 
 cities of Boeotia, ib. 45, p. 131 ; 
 exploits of, against Agesilaus (B.C. 
 377), ib. 48 foil., p. 131 foil. ; and 
 Alcetas the Lacedaemonian com- 
 
INDEX 
 
 391 
 
 mandant in Oreus, ii. 56, p. 133 
 foil. ; a detachment of, and 
 Athenians occupy the pass in 
 Mount Cithaeron (b.c. 376), and 
 prevent Cleombrotus from invading, 
 »*• S9i P- 134 ; request the 
 Athenians to despatch an armament 
 round Peloponnesus (periplus of 
 Timotheus, B.C. 375), ib. 62, p. 
 13s ; and escaping hostile invasion 
 for so long a time, devote themselves 
 to the recovery of their ferioecid 
 cities, ih. 63, pp. 135, 136 ; after the 
 subjugation of the cities in Boeotia, 
 extend the area of aggression and 
 march into Phocis (a. c. 374), VI. i. i , 
 p. 137 ; condition of the Athenians 
 in contrast with that of, at this date, 
 ib. ii. L, p. 143 ; the Athenians, 
 considering the treatment of Plataeae 
 and Thespiae, begin to regard, with 
 disfavour, ib. iii. i, p. 152 ; how 
 the Lacedaemonians construed the 
 principle of autonomy in reference 
 to, and themselves (Autocles'sspeech, 
 atSparta, B.C. 371, after "Leuctra"), 
 ib. 9, p. 154 ; ambassadors of, at 
 the congress of Sparta (b.c. 371), 
 having signed the treaty in the name 
 of, wish next day to substitute for, 
 Boeotians, ib. 19, p. 157; Agesilaus 
 and ; a fair prospect of, being now 
 literally decimated (see below, p. 
 180) ; despondency of, ib. 20, ib. ; 
 Cleombrotus and, ib. iv. 3, p. 158 ; 
 he feels driven to join battle with, 
 at Leuctra, ib. 4 foil., p. 159 ; be- 
 haviour of, on the eve of battle, ib. 
 7, p. 160; tactical disposition of, and 
 of the Lacedaemonians respectively, 
 ib. 12 foil., p. 161 ; victory of, ib. 
 IS, p. 162; and Jason, ib. 19 foil., 
 p. 164 ; are diverted from a des- 
 perate adventure, ib. 24, ib. ; Alex- 
 ander of Pherae hostile to, and 
 Athenians, ib. 33, p. 168 ; reach 
 iVIantinea (midwinter B.C. 370-3S9' 
 first Theban invasion), ih. v. 19, p. 
 176 ; hesitate to invade Laconia, ib, 
 24, p. 176 ; invade by Caryae, 
 ib. 25, p. 177 ; with the Arcadians 
 ravage Sellasia and descend into 
 
 the valley of the Eurotas, ib. 27, p. 
 178 ; caution and orderliness of, 
 by contrast with the Arcadians in 
 the vicinity of Sparta, ib. 30 foil. , 
 p. 178 ; pass on to Helos and 
 Gytheum, but fail to take the naval 
 arsenal ; some of the ferioeci share 
 in the campaign with, and their 
 friends, ib. 31, 32, p. 179 ; ' ' the, 
 wished (b.c. 40s) to wipe Athens 
 off the face of the earth " (see speech 
 of the Lacedaemonian envoys at 
 Athens), ib. 35, p. 180 (see below, 
 p. 183); "imagine, masters of 
 Hellas ! " (see the speech of Procles 
 of Phlius to the assembly at Athens), 
 if>- 37. P- 181 ; anxious to get out 
 of Laconia, ib. 50, p. 184 ; in 
 spite of Iphicrates, effect their object 
 and retire from Peloponnese (spring 
 of 369 B.C.), ib. 52, p. 185; and 
 their allies force the passage of 
 Oneion (b.c. 369, second Theban 
 invasion), VII. i. 15 foil., p. 189 
 foil. ; effect junction with their allies 
 the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleians, 
 and attack Sicyon and Pellene, an^i 
 invade Epidaurus, ib. 18, p. igo ; 
 and the rest harassed by Dionysius's 
 cavalry, ib. 20, p. 191 ; turn back 
 homewards, ib. 22, p. 192 ; the 
 harmony hitherto (b.c. 368) Obtain- 
 ing between, and all the states 
 which had revolted from Lacedaemon 
 is impaired with the growth of a 
 national spirit among the Arcadians 
 led by Lycomedes, ib. 22 foil., ib. ; 
 feel a touch of jealousy at the pre- 
 tensions of the Arcadians, ib. 26, 
 p. 193 ; Philiscus assembles a con- 
 gress of, allies, and Lacedaemonians 
 at Delphi to treat of peace ; but, 
 refusing to admit the dependency 
 of Messeneon Lacedaemon, he takes 
 the side of Lacedaemon and helps 
 her to carry on the war, ib. 27, p. 
 194 ; the Athenians wish to employ 
 Dionysius's second reinforcement 
 against, in Thessaly, ib. 28, ib. \ 
 and Eleians not sorry to hear of 
 the defeat of the Arcadians in the 
 "tearless" battle, ib. 32, p. 196; 
 
394 
 
 INDEX 
 
 from (B.C. 366), ii. iv. i, p. 212 ; 
 the Phliasians retire from, ii. 11, 
 
 p. 215- 
 Thyrians, the, of Thyreum in 
 
 Acamania, VI. ii. 37, p. 151. 
 Tigranes, the Persian, IV. viii. 21, 
 
 p. 84. 
 Timagoras, an Athenian commissioner 
 
 at the Persian court, plays into the 
 
 hands of Pelopidas, VII. i. 33, p. 
 
 196 ; put to death, i6. 38, p. 197. 
 Timocrates, the Lacedaemonian, his 
 
 proposal to the congress at Athens 
 
 (B.C. 369), VII. i. 13, p. i8g. > 
 Timocrates, the Rhodian, agent of 
 
 Tithraustes, III. y. 1, p. 32. 
 Timocrates, the Syracusan, aids 
 
 Lacedaemon to recover Sellasia, 
 
 VII. iv. 12, p. 215. 
 Tiraolaus, the Corinthian, III. v. 1, 
 
 p. 32 ; addresses the congress of 
 
 allies (B.C. 394), IV. ii. 11, p. 48. 
 Timomachus, the Athenian, in 
 
 command at Oneion (b. c. 367), VII. 
 
 i. 42, p. 199. 
 Timotheus, the Athenian, appointed 
 
 admiral ; his periplus (b.c. 375- 
 
 374), V. iv. 63, p. 135; his victory 
 
 at Alyzia ; reduction of Corcyra ; 
 
 need of money, ib. 64 foil., p. 
 
 136 ; recalled ; restores Zacynthian 
 
 exiles, VI. ii. 2 foil., p. 144 ; 
 
 appointed admiral (b.c. 363), ib. 
 
 II, p. 14s ; deposed, it. 13, p. 
 
 145- 
 
 Tiribazus, the Persian satrap in 
 Ionia, the Lacedaemonians wish- 
 ing to indoctrinate, send Antalcidas 
 (B.C. 392) : Athenian counter 
 embassy to, IV. viii. 12 foil., p. 
 81 ; lends a willing ear to Antal- 
 cidas ; seizes Conon ; sets off up 
 country to the king ; is replaced by 
 Struthas, ib. 14 foil., p. 82 ; 
 Antalcidas sent out as admiral to 
 gratify (B.C. 388), V. i. 6, p. 91; 
 Antalcidas retiu'ns with, from Susa 
 (B.C. 387), ib. 28, p. 97 ; produces 
 and reads the king's rescript, 
 "Peace of Antalcidas," ib. 30, p. 
 98. 
 
 Tisamenus, a Lacedaemonian sooth- 
 
 sayer, a principal in the conspiracy 
 of Cinadon, III. iii. 11, p. 23. 
 
 Tisiphonus, ruler of Thessaly ( " at 
 the date of this history," B.C. 
 358?), VI. iv. 37 foil, p. 168. 
 
 Tissaphemes, the Persian , despatched 
 to Lower Asia by the king as satrap 
 not only of his own provinces, but 
 those of Cyrus (B.C. 401-400) ; 
 and the Ionic cities, III. i. 3 foil., 
 p. 2 ; Thibron with the Cyreians 
 ready to confront, ib. 6, p. 3 ; jeal- 
 ousy between, and Pharnabazus, ib. 
 9, p. 4 ; the Lacedaemonians at 
 the instance of the Ionic cities 
 order Dercylidas to invade Caria, 
 the home province of, (B.C. 397) ; 
 Pharnabazus visits and makes 
 friends with, ib. ii. 12 foil., p. 
 13 foil. ; shrinks from engaging 
 Hellenes, ib. 14 foil., p. 14 foil. ; 
 the terms of peace agreed to by, 
 Pharnabazus, and Dercylidas (B.C. 
 397-396), ib. 20, p. 15 ; a fleet 
 being fitted out by the king 
 and, probably, ib. iv. i foil., p. 
 23 ; Agesilaus and, (b.c. 396) 
 ib. s foil. , p. 24 ; declares war 
 against Agesilaus ; is outwitted, ib. 
 II foil., p. 27; cf. Ages. i. 11-18, 
 p. 239 foil. ; is again outwitted 
 (B.C. 39S), ib. 21, p. 30 ; cf. Ages. 
 i. 29, p. 243 ; in Sardis during the 
 battle of the Pactolus, is thought to 
 have betrayed the Persians ; super- 
 seded by Tithraustes and beheaded, 
 ib. 25, p. 31 ; cf. Ages. i. 35, p. 245. 
 
 Tithraustes, the Persian, supersedes 
 Tissaphemes as satrap (cf. Ages. 
 i. 35, p. 24s) ; persuades Agesilaus 
 to quit his province. III. iv. 25 
 foil. , p. 31 (cf. Ages. iv. 6, p. 256) ; 
 through Timagoras assists the con- 
 federate states to undertake war 
 with Lacedaemon, ib. v. ±, p. 32. 
 
 Tlemonidas, a Lacedaemonian, in 
 command of light troops under 
 Teleutias, is slain by Olynthian 
 cavalry, V. iii. 3 foil. , p. 113. 
 
 Torone, in the Chalcidice, taken by 
 Agesipolis (b.c 380), V. iii. 18, p. 
 117. 
 
INDEX 
 
 395 
 
 Tralles, in Caria, III. ii. 19, p. ij. 
 
 Trikaranon (a mountain with three 
 summits bounding Phliasia to the 
 north-east), a. point of, fortified by 
 the Argives against Phlius, VII. 
 ii. i, p. 201 I signalling from, ib. 
 Si p. 202 ; Sicyonians and Pel- 
 lenians worsted by the Phliasians 
 under, ib. 1 1 foil. , p. 204 ; the 
 Argives claim and occupy (B.C. 
 366), ib. iv. II, p. 215. 
 
 Triphylian, the, townships, granted 
 autonomy (B.C. 400?), III. ii. 30, 
 p. 18. 
 
 Triphylians, the, on the side of Lace- 
 daemon at the Nemea, IV. ii. 16, 
 p. so ; Eleians protest against 
 autonomy applying to (B.C. 371- 
 370), VI. V. 2, p. 169 ; claim to be 
 Arcadians (b.c. 368), VII. i. 26, 
 
 P- 193- 
 Triptolemus, VI. iii. 6, p. iS3. 
 Tripurgia, in Aegina, V. i. 10, p. 93. 
 Troezen, in southern Argolis, with 
 
 Epidaurus, Hermione, and Halieis, 
 
 contributes troops to Lacedaemon 
 
 at the Nemea (B.C. 394), IV. ii. 
 
 16, p. 50; furnishes ships (B.C. 
 
 374), VI. ii. 3, p. 144 i still faithful 
 
 to Lacedaemon (b. c. 370 - 369), 
 
 VII. ii. 2, p. 201. 
 "Trophimoi" at Sparta, V. iii 
 
 114. 
 Troy, III. iv. 3, p. 24; VII. 
 
 p. 196. 
 Tyndarids, the, the house of, 
 
 Sparta, VI. v. 31, p. 179. 
 
 9. P- 
 
 >. 34. 
 
 Xenagos, an officer in command of 
 foreign troops [i.e. of the allies) at 
 Lacedaemon ; III. v. 7, p. 34 ; 
 IV. ii. 19, p. 51; ib. iii. is foil. , 
 p. ^i foil. ; see A^es. ii. 10, p. 
 248 ; ib. \. 7, p. 67 ; V. i. 33, p. 
 99 : ib. ii. 7, p. 102 (and note i) ; 
 VII. ii. 3, p. 201. 
 
 Xenelasy, at Sparta, Fol, Lac. xiv. 4, 
 p. 322. 
 
 Xenias, an Eleian, wealthy, philo- 
 Laconian, his attempt to bring over 
 the state of Lacedaemon, III. ii. 
 27, p. 17. 
 
 Xenocles, a Lacedaemonian, with 
 another appointed to command the 
 cavalry of Agesilaus (B.C. 395), 
 III. ii. 20, p. 29. 
 
 Zacynthus, exiles of, restored by 
 Timotheus (B.C. 374) ; men of, 
 complain to Lacedaemon ; contri- 
 butes ships to Lacedaemon, VI. ii. 
 2 foil., p. 144. 
 
 Zenis, the Dardanian, III. i. 10, p. 4. 
 
 Zeus, Olympian, III. ii. 22, p. 16, 
 ib. 26, p. 17 ; the presidency of 
 the temple of, claimed by the men 
 of the Pisatid versus the Eleians, 
 ib. 31, p. 19 ; IV. vii. 2, p. 75 ; 
 the general assembly of the Arcad- 
 ians agree to restore the presidency 
 of the temple of, to Elis (B.C. 363), 
 VII. iv. 3S, p. 224 ; — Agltor (the 
 leader), Pol. Lac. xiii. 2, p. 319 
 foil. 
 
 Zoster, cape in Attica, V. i. 9, p. 92. 
 
 END OF VOL. II 
 
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