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THE 
 
 MUNICIPAL COURT ACT, 
 
 WITH NOTES. 
 
 BY 
 
 Hiram T. Gilbert. 
 
 W.r^'^""^ 
 
 chicago, illinois. 
 
 Published by the Author, 
 
 1906. 
 
oopvnicaHT. -isos 
 
 BY 
 HlRAM T- QlLBER-r. 
 
 Press of Babnard & Miller 
 Chicago 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 Shortly after the adoption by the people of the constitu- 
 tional amendnient of 1904, which now constitutes section 
 34 of Article IV of the constitution of 1870, the Chicago 
 New Charter Convention, through its executive committee, 
 selected Messrs. John P. Wilson, Murray F. Tuley, Carter 
 H. Harrison, John S. Miller, Bernard A. Eckhart and Ber- 
 nard E. Sunny as a committee, John P. Wilson being its 
 chairman, to draft a bill to be introduced into the General 
 Assembly for the creation of municipal courts in and for 
 the city of Chicago. This committee employed the writer 
 to assist them. The work was entered upon about De- 
 cember 10, 1904, and was actively participated in by all 
 of the members of the committee. About January 20, 
 1905, the committee, after a number of conferences and 
 discussions, at which the matter was given careful considr 
 eration, agreed upon a bill for an act to be entitled " An Act 
 in relation to municipal courts in the city of Chicago. " 
 
 By this bill there were provided one municipal court 
 designated the common pleas court and five additional 
 municipal courts designated city courts. The common 
 pleas court was to be given jurisdiction in all civil and 
 criminal cases and proceedings of every kind and character 
 other than suits in equity, and of all such suits in equity 
 as might be transferred to it by change of venue or other- 
 wise by the circuit court of Cook county or by the superior 
 court of Cook county for trial and disposition. The city 
 courts were to be given jurisdiction of the class of cases of 
 which justices of the peace now have jurisdiction when the 
 
11 
 
 amount sought to be recovered, whether by way of dam- 
 ages, penalty, fine or otherwise, if the suit or proceeding 
 were brought for the recovery of money only, or the value of 
 the personal property claimed, if the suit or proceeding were 
 brought for the recovery of personal property, did not ex- 
 ceed five hundred dollars, and also of all other suits at law 
 for the recovery of money only when the amount claimed 
 did not exceed five hundred dollars. The provisions reg- 
 ulating the practice in the common pleas court were similar, 
 in their most essential features, to those regulating the 
 practice in cases of the first, second and third classes, and 
 those regulating the practice in the city courts were similar 
 to those regulating the practice in cases of the fourth and 
 fifth classes, in the act finally adopted. 
 
 On January 24, 1905, this bill was introduced into the 
 Senate as Senate Bill No. 45, and into the House as House 
 Bill No. 98. Printed copies of the bill were distributed 
 among the members of the Chicago bar with the result that 
 great interest in the measure was aroused. Its provisions 
 became the subject of extended discussion, and very de- 
 cided opposition to its passage was developed. Shortly 
 thereafter sixty-eight members of the Chicago bar, together 
 with four Cook county judges, having organized for the 
 purpose of studying and, if necessary, drafting amendments 
 to it, prepared an amended bill entitled " A Bill for an act 
 in relation to a municipal court in the city of Chicago," 
 which bill at their request "was introduced into the house on 
 February 17, 1905, as House Bill No. 281. This bill differed 
 from Senate Bill No. 45 and House Bill No. 98 in that it omit- 
 ted all the provisions of the former in relation to the com- 
 mon pleas court, and limited the jurisdiction of the mu- 
 nicipal court, which it provided for and designated the 
 city court, to all those classes of suits and proceedings, 
 
HI 
 
 whether civil or criminal, of which justices of the peace 
 were given jurisdiction by law, when the amount sought 
 to be recovered, whether by way of damages, penalty, fine 
 or otherwise, if the suit or proceeding were for the recovery 
 of money only, or the value of the personal property claimed, 
 if the suit were for the recovery of personal property, did not 
 exceed five hundred dollars, and all criminal actions in 
 which the punishment was by fine, when the fine provided 
 for did not exceed two hundred dollars, or by imprisonment 
 otherwise than in the penitentiary when the imprisonment 
 provided for did not exceed one year, or both. Its pro- 
 visions as to the judges, the clerk, the bailiff and the dep- 
 uties were similar to those contained in Senate Bill No. 45 
 and House Bill No. 98. In respect to its practice pro- 
 visions it was radically different from that bill in that it 
 provided that the methods of procedure of the city court 
 should be the same as those prescribed by law for justices 
 of the peace, and that appeals should lie from its decisions 
 to the circuit, superior, criminal and county courts, the 
 cases appealed to be tried de novo, as is now required with 
 respect to appeals from justices of the peace. A copy of this 
 bill, with a statement prefixed thereto by its authors, will 
 be found in the Appendix hereto commencing at page 
 213. 
 
 There was also introduced in the Senate on February 2 1 , 
 1905, a bill entitled "A Bih for an act in relation to mu- 
 nicipal courts in the city of Chicago, " as Senate Bill No. 207 . 
 It differed from Senate Bill No. 45 and House Bill No. 98 in 
 the following particulars: First, it omitted all the provis- 
 ions of the latter relating to the common pleas court, and 
 provided only for municipal courts with the jurisdiction 
 proposed to be conferred upon the city courts by that act. 
 Second, it fixed the salary of the chief justice at four thou- 
 
sand five hundred dollars per annum, and the salary of an 
 associate judge at four thousand dollars per annum. Third, 
 it fixed the terms of office of the judges at four years and 
 provided for their election on the first Tuesday of April, 
 1904, and every four years thereafter. Fourth, it provided 
 that the clerk and the bailiff should be elective officers, 
 and that their salaries should be four thousand dollars per 
 annum. In all other essential particulars Senate Bill No. 
 207 was substantially like Senate Bill No. 45 and House 
 Bill No. 98. 
 
 The House Committee on Chicago Charter to whom was re- 
 ferred House Bill No. 98, after a careful consideration of its 
 provisions, reported to the House on March 3, 1905, as House 
 Bill No. 422, a committee bill entitled' "A Bill for an act in 
 relation to municipal courts in the city of Chicago." This 
 bill differed from Senate Bill No. 45 and House Bill No. 98 in 
 several particulars. It limited the original criminal jurisdic- 
 tion of the comnion pleas court to misdemeanors. It provided 
 that the judges should be elected on the first Tuesday of 
 April, 1906, the chief justice for six years and the associate 
 judges, one-third for two years, one-third for four years 
 and one-third for six years, and that an election for eight 
 associate judges should be held 'every two years thereafter, 
 and for a chief justice every six years thereafter ; and that 
 the clerk and the bailiff should be elected instead of ap- 
 pointed. It omitted the provision for a grand jury. It also 
 made some changes in the practice provisions. In all of 
 its important features, however, it was essentially the 
 same as the first bill. The House passed House Bill No. 422 
 substantially as it was reported by the committee. 
 
 In the Senate opposition developed to that feature of 
 House Bill No. 422 which provided for a common pleas 
 court. To meet the objections thus raised, the writer, at 
 
the request and under the direction of the members of the 
 Senate Committee on Chicago Charter, prepared a draft of 
 a new bill which omitted the provision for a common pleas 
 court and was, in the main, the bill finally adopted. The 
 purpose of the Senate Committee was to frame a bill which, 
 though different in form from, should preserve the practice 
 provisions of, House Bill No. 422. To avoid the danger of 
 overcrowding the court with business the direct original juris- 
 diction of the court was decreased by omitting therefrom all 
 actions of ejectment, and actions for injuries to the person 
 and qui tarn actions involving over one thousand dollars. 
 To compensate for this, however, the class of cases which 
 were to be tried without pleadings was enlarged so as to 
 include all cases at law where the amount claimed did not 
 exceed one thousand dollars. When House Bill No. 422 
 reached the senate it was amended so as to make its pro- 
 visions conform to those of the new bill thus drafted and was 
 passed as amended. The House voted non-concurrence in 
 the amendments and, the Senate having refused to recede, a 
 conference committee was appointed and its report, which 
 recommended some changes in the Senate amendments, 
 was adopted. 
 
 From the time of its introduction as Senate Bill No. 45 
 and House Bill No. 98 until its final passage upon the report 
 of the conference committee, the municipal court measure 
 was given careful consideration by the members of the Gen- 
 eral Assembly. In the House it was actively supported by 
 Representatives Robert E. Pendarvis, Chester W. Church, 
 Michael J. Daugherty, Cicero J. Lindley, John P. Mc- 
 Goorty, M. L. McKinley, William H. McSurely and John C. 
 Williams, and in the Senate by Senators Joseph F. Hass, 
 O. F. Berry, Daniel A. Campbell, Homer P. Galpin, Corbus 
 P. Gardner, John Humphrey and Michael E. Maher, and its 
 
VI 
 
 final passage was the result, for the most part", of their 
 efforts. Every section of the act was carefully considered 
 and discussed and many valuable suggestions were made 
 by them. 
 
 At the general election held in November, 1905, the act 
 was consented to by a majority of the legal voters of the 
 City of Chicago voting on the question,' the vote being 
 99,092 for and 18,335 against it, and on the isth of Febru- 
 ary, 1906, it was declared constitutional by the Supreme 
 Court in its decision in the case of City of Chicago v. 
 Reeves. 
 
 Inasmuch as the act contains many innovations upon 
 existing methods in the administration of justice, the writer 
 has deemed it proper to prepare and submit, for the con- 
 sideration of the public and the profession, notes explana- 
 tory of the act and expressing, as nearly as is practicable, 
 the views of those participating in its preparation with 
 respect to the purposes of, and the construction to be given 
 to, its various provisions. 
 
 Dated Chicago, Ills., March 12, 1906. 
 
 Hiram T. Gilbert. 
 
TABLE OP CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Title of Municipal Court Act 1 
 
 Section 1 1 
 
 Note to section 1 1-2 
 
 Section 2 3-4 
 
 Note to section 2 4-23 
 
 Description of cases of first class 4-6 
 
 Description of cases of second class 7 
 
 Description of cases of third class 7-10 
 
 Description of cases of foiu-th and fifth classes 10, 11 
 
 History of jurisdictional provisions 12 
 
 Constitutionality of jurisdictional provisions 13-23 
 
 Section 3 24 
 
 Note to section 3 24 
 
 Section 4 25-6 
 
 Note to section 4. 26-S 
 
 Section 5 29 
 
 Note to section 5. 29-31 
 
 Sections 6 and 7 32 
 
 Note to sections 6 and 7 32-4 
 
 Expenditures to be authorized by city council 32-3 
 
 Section 8 35-6 
 
 Note to section 8 37-46 
 
 Circuit, Superior and Criminal Courts 37-9 
 
 Powers of judges 37-8 
 
 Independence of clerks and sheriff 37—8 
 
 Practice and procedure 38 
 
 Expense to tax payers 38-9 
 
 Chief justice of Municipal Court 39 
 
 His powers and duties 39-44 
 
 Associate judges of Municipal Court 44 
 
 Their powers and duties 44^5 
 
 Advantages resulting from these powers 45-6 
 
 Section 9 47-8 
 
 Note to section 9 48-50 
 
 History of section 48-50 
 
 Sections 10, 11 and 12 51-2 
 
 Note to sections 10, 11 and 12 52-4 
 
 History of section 10 52 
 
 Constitutionality of section 10 53-4 
 
 History of section 12 54 
 
 Section 13 55 
 
 Note to section 13 55-6 
 
 vii 
 
Vlll 
 
 'PAGB 
 
 Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17 57-60 
 
 Note to sections 14, IS, 16 and 17 ; • 60-66 
 
 Power of judges over clerk, bailiff and deputies ^ 60-62 
 
 Deputy clerks as shorthand reporters 62-3 
 
 Duties of deputy clerks to assist parties. . 63 
 
 Deputy bailiffs in place of constable 63-4 
 
 Police officers as ex-offlcio deputy iailiffs 65 
 
 Section 18 67 
 
 Note to section 18 67-9 
 
 Sections 19 and 20 70-71 
 
 Note to sections 19 and 20 71-107 
 
 Meaning of "as near as may be" 72 
 
 History of section 20 73-SO 
 
 Construction of section 20 81-84 
 
 Propriety of giving power to Supreme Court 84^6 
 
 Constitutional questions as to practice provisions 86-107 
 
 As to provisions of section 20 87-96 
 
 As to provisions of sections 19, 22, 23 and 31 96-100 
 
 As to provisions of section 20 100-1 
 
 As to provisions of section 23 101-2 
 
 As to provisions of sections 25, 26 and 31 102-3 
 
 As to provisions of sections 30 and 56 103-6 
 
 As to provisions of section 39 106-7 
 
 Section 21 108 
 
 Note to section 21 108-9 
 
 Section 22 110 
 
 Note to section 22 110-111 
 
 Section 23 112-114 
 
 Note to section 23 115-122 
 
 Section 24 123-4 
 
 Note to Section 24 124-9 
 
 Sections 25 and 26 128 
 
 Note to sections 25 and 26 128-132 
 
 Section 27 133 
 
 Note to section 27 134^8 
 
 Constitutional question as to jurisdiction 137-8 
 
 Section 28 139-140 
 
 Note to section 28 141-2 
 
 Section 29 143-4 
 
 Note to section 29 , 144-6 
 
 Section 30. 147 
 
 Note to section 30 147-8 
 
 Section 31 149 
 
 Note to section 31 149-151 
 
 Sections 32, 33 and 34 152 
 
 Note to sections 32, 33 and 34 153-4 
 
 Section 35 165 
 
 Note to section 35 155 
 
 Section 36 156 
 
 Note to section°36 166 
 
IX 
 
 PAQB 
 
 Section 37 157 
 
 Note to section 37 157-160 
 
 Section 38 161 
 
 Note to section 38 161-2 
 
 Section 39 163 
 
 Note to section 39 163-5 
 
 Sections 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47 166-8 
 
 Note to sections 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47 169-172 
 
 Section 48 173 
 
 Note to section 48 173-4 
 
 Section 49 175 
 
 Note to section 49 176 
 
 Section 50 177-8 
 
 Note to section 50 1 78 
 
 Section 51 179 
 
 Note to section 51 179 
 
 Section 52 ISO 
 
 Note to section 52 180 
 
 Section 53 181 
 
 Note to section 53 181 
 
 Section 54 182 
 
 Note to section 54 182-3 
 
 Section 55 184 
 
 Note to section 55 184 
 
 Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59 185-9 
 
 Note to sections 56, 57, 58 and 59 189-196 
 
 Sections 60 and 61 197-8 
 
 Note to sections 60 and 61 198-201 
 
 Section 62 202 
 
 Note to section 62 202-3 
 
 Sections 63 and 64 204-5 
 
 Note to sections 63 and 64 ^ 205-6 
 
 Sections 65 and 66 207 
 
 Note to sections 65 and 66 207-211 
 
 Section 67 212 
 
 Note to section 67 212 
 
 Appendix 213 
 
 Preface to Amended City Court Bill 213-216 
 
 List of Authors of Amended City Court Bill 216-217 
 
 Amended City Court Bill 217-231 
 
THE MUNICIPAL COURT ACT. 
 
 AN ACT IN EELATION TO A MUNICIPAL COUET IN THE CITY 
 
 OF Chicago. Approved May 18, 1905. 
 
 SECTION 1. 
 
 Section 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of 
 Illinois represented in the General Assembly: That 
 there shall be established in and for the city of Chicago 
 a municipal court which shall be styled ' ' The Municipal 
 Court of Chicago, ' ' hereinafter designated and referred 
 to as the municipal court, and the jurisdiction of which 
 shall be exercised in the manner hereinafter prescribed 
 by branch courts, each of which shall exercise all the 
 powers in this act declared to be vested in the municipal 
 court. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 1. 
 
 The constitutional amendment adopted in 1904, which 
 became section 34 of Article TV, contemplated the creation 
 of municipal courts to take the places of justices of the 
 peace, police magistrates and constables, and to perform 
 such additional judicial work as the G-eneral Assembly 
 might see fit to impose upon them. In carrying out this 
 plan the G-eneral Assembly, in the exercise of its dis- 
 cretion, instead of creating a number of distinct and 
 independent municipal courts, determined to create 
 branch municipal courts which collectively should con- 
 stitute one municipal court under the general designation 
 of "The Municipal Court of Chicago." In reality each 
 branch court is of itself a municipal court, just as each 
 branch of the circuit court, or of the superior court, or 
 of the criminal court of Cook County, constitutes in itself 
 
2 Note to Section 1. 
 
 a circuit, superior or criminal court. It was to make 
 this plain that it is declared in section 1 that the jurisdic- 
 tion of the municipal court shall be exercised "by branch 
 courts, each of which shall exercise all the powers in 
 this act declared to be vested in the municipal court," 
 in section 4 that the city shall be divided into districts 
 and that at least one branch court shall be held in each 
 district, in section 8 that each branch court shall be 
 presided over by a single judge, and in sections 15 and 
 17 that at least one deputy clerk and at least one deputy 
 bailiff shall be assigned to duty in each branch court. 
 
Section 2. 3 
 
 SECTION 2. 
 
 Section 2. That said municipal court shall have juris- 
 diction within the city of Chicago, in the following 
 cases : 
 
 First. All actions on contracts, express or implied, when 
 the amount claimed by the plaintiff exceeds one thou- 
 sand dollars ($1,000), and all actions for the recovery 
 of personal property or for the recovery of damages 
 for the conversion of and (or) injury to personal prop- 
 erty, when the value of the property or the amount of 
 damages sought to be recovered, as claimed by the 
 plaintiff, exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000), and 
 which, for convenience, will be hereinafter referred to 
 and designated as cases of the first class. 
 
 Second. All suits of every kind and nature, whether civil 
 or criminal, or whether at law or in equity, which may 
 be transferred to it by change of venue, or otherwise, 
 by the circuit court of Cook county, or by the superior 
 court of Cook county, or by the criminal court of Cook 
 county, for trial and disposition, and which, for con- 
 venience, will be hereinafter designated and referred 
 to as cases of the second class. 
 
 Third. All criminal cases in which the punishment is 
 by fine or imprisonment otherwise than in the peniten- 
 tiary, and which, for convenience, will be hereinafter 
 designated and referred to as cases of the third class. 
 
 Fourth. All those classes of suits and proceedings, 
 whether civil or quasi criminal, of which justices of 
 the peace are now given jurisdiction by law, in all of 
 which classes of suits and proceedings said municipal 
 court shall have jurisdiction when the amount sought 
 to be recovered, whether by way of damages, penalty, 
 orotherwise, if the suit or proceeding be for the recov- 
 ery of money only, or the value of the personal prop- 
 erty claimed, ii the suit or proceeding be brought for 
 the recovery of personal property, does not exceed one 
 thousand dollars ($1,000) ; provided, however, that in 
 any action upon a bond, the amount sought to be recov- 
 ered thereon and not the penalty of the bond shall 
 determine the jurisdiction, and that when payments 
 
4 Note to Section 2. 
 
 are to be made by installments, an action may be 
 brongbt in the municipal court for any installment not 
 exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000) as it becomes 
 due, and which, for convenience, will be hereinafter 
 designated and referred to as cases of the fourth class. 
 Fifth. All other suits at law, for the recovery of money 
 only, when the amount claimed does not exceed one 
 thousand dollars ($1,000), and which, for convenience, 
 will be hereinafter designated and referred to as cases 
 of the fifth class. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 2. 
 
 This section fixes the jurisdiction of the court. For 
 convenience in respect to the framing of subsequent pro- 
 visions of the act the cases of which the court is given 
 jurisdiction are divided into five classes. 
 
 Cases of the Fiest Class. 
 
 Cases of this class, in which the court is given juris- 
 diction withou,t any maximum limit as to the amount 
 involved, are the following: 
 
 1. All actions on contracts, express or implied, when 
 the amount claimed by the plaintiff exceeds one thousand 
 dollars ($1,000). Under this designation are included all 
 forms of the common law actions of account, assumpsit 
 and covenant, and all actions of debt brought on con- 
 tracts, express or implied. 
 
 2. All actions for the recovery of personal property, 
 when the value of the property sought to be recovered, 
 as claimed by the plaintiff, exceeds one thousand dollars 
 ($1,000). Under this designation is included the action 
 of replevin. 
 
 3. All actions for the recovery of damages for the 
 conversion of personal property, when the amount of 
 
Note to Section 2. 5 
 
 damages sought to be recovered, as claimed by the plain- 
 tiff, exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000). Under this 
 designation is included the action of trover. 
 
 4. All actions for the recovery of damages for injury 
 to personal property, when the amount of damages 
 sought to be recovered, as claimed by the plaintiff, ex- 
 ceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000). Under this desig- 
 nation are included the following actions : 
 
 a. Case, when brought against the owner or person 
 conducting a vehicle, car, ship or other conveyance, for 
 negligence resulting in injuries to goods or chattels; 
 against a carrier or an innkeeper for loss of or injury to 
 goods or chattels, or any neglect of duty with respect 
 thereto; against an attorney for negligence in the con- 
 ducting of a cause, or in respect to any other duty to a 
 client; against a sheriff, bailiff or other officer for negli- 
 gence in the execution of process, or for an illegal levy, 
 or other wrongful act connected therewith, or for an 
 escape, or for a false return, or for not taking a bond, 
 or for taking an insufficient bond, or for any other wrong- 
 ful or negligent act with respect to a bond; against a 
 bailee of personal property for negligence or neglect of 
 duty with respect thereto ; against a defendant for deceit 
 connected with the purchase or sale of real or personal 
 property, or for any other deceit resulting in loss to the 
 plaintiff ; against a landlord or other person for an illegal 
 distress, or other wrongful act connected therewith; 
 against a defendant for receiving, or for a pound breach 
 of, cattle taken damage feasant, or for the rescue of a 
 person, arrested on mesne process ; against a defendant 
 for not obeying a subpoena; against a defendant for 
 infringing a copyright ; against a defendant for any other 
 injury known in law as an injury to personal property. 
 
6 Note to Section 2. 
 
 b. Trespass, when brought against a defendant for 
 chasing sheep ; for seizing personal property, or for any 
 direct injury to personal property. 
 
 The term "injury to personal property," as used in 
 this section, has the meaning in which it is employed in 
 judicial decisions and by common law test writers. See 
 Chitty's Pleadings (11th Am. Ed.), Vol. I, pp. 134-139, 
 168-173, and Vol. II, pp. 650a-768 and 858-863, as to cases 
 brought for injuries to personal property. 
 
 The actions of which the court does not have jurisdic- 
 tion when the amount claimed by the plaintiff, in money 
 or property, exceeds one thousand dollars ($1,000) include 
 the following: 
 
 a. Actions of ejectment, of which it has no jurisdic- 
 tion, whatever be the value of the property involved. 
 
 b. Actions for injuries to real property. 
 
 c. Actions for injuries to the person, among which 
 are actions for negligence resulting in personal injuries, 
 assault and battery, libel, slander, false imprisonment 
 and malicious prosecution. 
 
 d. Actions of debt brought for statutory penalties, 
 and qui tarn actions. 
 
 In all of these last mentioned cases excepting eject- 
 ment, however, it has jurisdiction when the amount 
 claimed by the plaintiff, in money or property, does not 
 exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), they being included 
 among cases of the fourth and fifth classes. 
 
 In respect to cases of the first class it will be seen that 
 the amount involved, for the purpose of determining the 
 classification, is the amount claimed by the plaintiff. If 
 this amount exceeds one thousand doUars ($1,000) the 
 
Note to Section 2. 7 
 
 case is one of the first class, although the amount of the 
 recovery is less than one thousand dollars ($1,000). 
 
 Cases of the Second Class. 
 
 Cases of this class embrace all cases of every kind of 
 which the circuit court of Cook county, the superior 
 court of Cook county, or the criminal court of Cook 
 county, has jurisdiction, whether original or appellate, 
 when, by change of venue or otherwise, they are trans- 
 ferred by either of those courts to the municipal court for 
 trial and disposition. By section 24 of the act provision 
 is made for the transfer of civil cases to the municipal 
 court from the circuit or superior court of Cook county 
 when an application for a change of venue is made, or 
 the parties consent to the transfer, and of criminal cases 
 from the criminal court of Cook county upon the request 
 of the state 's attorney or of any defendant. 
 
 Cases oe the Thied Class. 
 
 Cases of the third class embrace all criminal cases, in 
 which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment other- 
 wise than in the penitentiary. These cases are those 
 provided for in the criminal code under the following 
 heads, the numbers in parentheses, excepting as may be 
 otherwise indicated, referring to paragraphs of the crim- 
 inal code as numbered in the second edition of Starr & 
 Curtis 's Annotated Statutes, the references to volumes 
 4 and 5 of Starr & Curtis and to the laws of 1905 being 
 tO' the pages : 
 
Note to Section 2. 
 
 Abandonment, of Wife or Children (2, 3). (5 S. & C, 
 160.) 
 
 Abduction, of Child (6). 
 
 Abortifacient Drugs, Sale of (9). 
 
 Abortifacient Drugs, Advertising for sale (11). 
 
 Adulteration or Frauds as to Foods, &c. (12, 13, 14, 15, 
 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 33, 
 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44) . (4 S. & C, 389-391. ) 
 
 Adultery (45). 
 
 Arson or Burning of Woods, Prairies or other G-rounds 
 (52). 
 
 Assault or Assault and Battery (54, 55, 56). 
 
 Assault with intent to commit bodily injury (59). 
 
 Automobiles, Fast Driving of (5 S. & C, 500). 
 
 Barratry and Maintenance (60, 61). 
 
 Bicycle Racing (4 S. & C, 393). 
 
 Bribery (66, 68). 
 
 Canada Thistles, Allowing to seed, or Failure to de- 
 stroy (74, 75). 
 
 Castor Beans, Failure to protect stock from (76). 
 
 Children, Offences against (77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83). 
 (5 S. & C, 223.) 
 
 Civil Eights (84,85). 
 
 Cocaine (4 S. & C, 395). 
 
 Coloring Grain (88, 89, 90). 
 
 Compounding a Crime (92). 
 
 Concealing Death of Bastard (93). 
 
 Concealing Property (94). 
 
 Conspiracy to Indict (95). 
 
 Conspiracy or Combination under Anti-trust Act (99, 
 100, 101, 102). 
 
 Cruelty to Animals and to Children (122, 123, 124, 131, 
 132, 133, 134, 135, 136). 
 
l^ote to Section 2. 9 
 
 Deadly Weapons, Possessing, Selling or Carrying con- 
 cealed (138, 139, 140, 141, 142). 
 -• Dependent, Neglected or Delinquent Children (L. of 
 1905, p. 189). 
 
 Disorderly Conduct (145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 
 152). 
 
 Drugs, Failing to label (153, 154). 
 
 Drunkenness (155). 
 
 Duelling, Knowledge of and not preventing (163, 164). 
 
 Embezzlement (165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 173, 174, 176). 
 (5 S. & C, 165.) 
 
 Escape (178, 179, 180, 181, 184, 187). 
 
 Explosives, Storing, &c., (192, 193). (5 S. & C, 165-6.) 
 
 Extortion (195). 
 
 False Advertisements (4 S. & C, 402). 
 
 False Imprisonment (197). 
 
 False Pretenses (198, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205). 
 
 Falsely Personating Another (206). 
 
 Fertilizers, Frauds in reference to (208, 209, 210, 211, 
 212). 
 
 Fire-escapes (217, 218, 219, 220). 
 
 Forgery or Counterfeiting Trade-marks (232, 233). 
 
 Frauds (234, 235, 243, 244, 245, 246). (4 S. & C, 407.) 
 (L. of 1905, p. 190.) 
 
 Fraudulent Conveyances (239). 
 
 Fraudulent Wearing of Badge (4 S. & C, 414). 
 
 Gambling (247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 261, 262, 265, 
 255, 267, 268). 
 
 Graves, Graveyards and Cemeteries, Robbing or Injur- 
 ing (270). 
 
 Hazing (4 S. & C, 412). 
 
 Highways, Obstruction of (272). 
 
 Immoral Newspapers, Showing, Selling or Giving away 
 (289, 290, 291). 
 
10 Note to Section 2. 
 
 Intimidation (294, 295, 296, 301, 302). 
 
 Larceny, Petit (305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 312, 313, 314, 
 316, 317, 318, 319). 
 
 Libel (321, 322). 
 
 Lotteries (324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329). 
 
 Malicious Mischief (335, 336, 337, 339, 340, 341, 342, 
 343,344,345,346,348,349). 
 
 Marks and Brands, Altering or Defacing (350). 
 
 Misconduct of Officers (352, 353, 354, 357, 358, 359, 
 361). 
 
 Mob Violence (L. of 1905, p. 190). 
 
 Name, Wrongful Assumption of (368). 
 
 Nuisances (369, 370). 
 
 Obscene Books, Circulating (371, 372). 
 
 Personal Liberty, Eefusal of privilege of seeing coun- 
 sel (377). 
 
 Personating Officers of Fraternal Society (4 S. & C, 
 417-8). 
 
 Policy Playing (L. of 1905, p. 192). 
 
 Prize Fighting (379, 381, 383). 
 
 Public Exhibitions of Criminals and Deformed Per- 
 sons (4S. &C., 418). 
 
 Eeceiving Stolen Property (388, 391). 
 
 Removal of Waste, &c., from Tenders (4 S. & C, 419). 
 
 Resistance of Officers (393, 394, 395, 404). 
 
 Racing, Routs, Riots, Unlawful Assemblies, &c. (414, 
 415, 416, 417, 418,419, 420). 
 
 Saltpeter Caves, Failing to protect stock against (424). 
 
 Seduction (4 S. & C, 420). 
 
 Sheep and other Domestic Animals, Allowing at large 
 (425). 
 
 Sidewalks and Side Paths (4 S. & C, 420). 
 
 Shanty Boats (4 S. & C, 421). 
 
Note to Section 2. 11 
 
 Sunday, Keeping open tippling house, Disturbing 
 
 peace, &c. (426,428,429). 
 Tobacco, Sale of to minors (432, 433). 
 Trespass (437, 438, 439, 440). 
 Yagabonds (441, 449). 
 Witnesses, Causing to abscond, &c. (450)! 
 Water, Injuty to Ice (451). 
 
 All other offences prohibited by statute for which no 
 specific penalty is prescribed (457). 
 
 The method of prosecuting criminal cases of the third 
 class in the municipal court is by information or com- 
 plaint as prescribed by sections 3 and 27. 
 
 Oases op the Foxjkth and Fifth Classes. 
 
 These classes include all suits at law, of a civil nature, 
 when the amount claimed by the plaintiff, in money or 
 personal property, does not exceed one thousand dol- 
 lars ($1000), and all quasi criminal cases, such as prose- 
 cutions under municipal ordinances or penal statutes, 
 when the fine or penalty fixed by the ordinance or stat- 
 ute does not exceed one thousand dollars ($1000). 
 
 Cases of the fifth class embrace actions for injuries to 
 the person, including actions for negligence resulting in 
 personal injuries, assault and battery, libel, slander, false 
 imprisonment and malicious prosecution, and qui tarn 
 actions. Hitherto a person having a just cause of action 
 for a personal injury, however small the amount of dam- 
 ages claimed, could only bring his suit in the 
 circuit or superior court, where, aside from long 
 delay, which of itself would render his claim prac- 
 tically valueless, he was compelled to submit to ruinous 
 expenses attendant upon an extremely technical sys- 
 
12 Note to Section 2. 
 
 tern of practice. All this is changed by the Municipal 
 Court Act. In every such case an expeditious and speedy 
 remedy is provided, by means of which a just claim for 
 not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1000), may be re- 
 duced to judgment within fifteen days after the com- 
 mencement of the suit. 
 
 Thus a party injured by an assault and battery, a libel, 
 or a malicious prosecution, in addition to securing the 
 speedy punishment of the wrongdoer for his violation 
 of the criminal code, may, with equal speed, and by a 
 civil suit, recover the damages to which he is entitled. 
 Indeed, with competent judges, no reason is perceived 
 why any poor person, without means to employ counsel, 
 through the provisions of the act (among them being the 
 last clause of section 15) and by the aid of the court and 
 its officers, may not be awarded his civil remedy when his 
 criminal complaint is heard. Why, let us ask, in the case, 
 for instance, of assault and battery, should it not be 
 within the power of the judge upon finding the defend- 
 ant guilty of the criminal offence, to compel him to pay 
 proper damages to the party injured? Perhaps under 
 the present act two trials will be necessary, but the law 
 should provide that both cases may be tried as one, and 
 it may be that this may be accomplished by means of the 
 rules of court authorized by Section 20, post. 
 
Note to Section 2. 13 
 
 Constitutional Questions as to Jurisdictional Pbo- 
 
 VISIONS. 
 
 By paragraph, sixth of section 28 of the act provision 
 is made that in cases of the first class, where there are 
 several defendants and one of them resides or is found 
 in the city of Chicago, a summons may be issued to the 
 sheriff of Cook county for any defendant residing in said 
 county, but outside the city of Chicago, or to the sheriff 
 of any other county for any defendant residing in such 
 county. This provision, together with paragraph second 
 of section 2, permits the municipal court to entertain ju- 
 risdiction in cases in which the defendants, or some 
 of them, do not reside, and are not found, within the 
 territorial limits of the city in which the court is organ- 
 ized. The question whether these provisions are consti- 
 tutional is involved in considerable doubt and difficulty. 
 
 The word "municipal" is defined in the Century Dic- 
 tionary as "of or pertaining to the local self-government 
 or corporate government of a city or town," and in the 
 same work the term "municipal court" is defined as "a 
 court whose territorial limits of jurisdiction are con- 
 terminous with those of a .municipal corporation, and 
 having civil or criminal jurisdiction, or both." It may, 
 then, be urged, with some force, that the term "municipal 
 courts" as used in the constitutional amendment means 
 courts whose territorial limits of jurisdiction are the ter- 
 ritorial limits of the city, and that, therefore, the legisla- 
 ture cannot confer upon them jurisdiction over persons or 
 property beyond the city limits, though the definition 
 above mentioned may have been adopted because the 
 jurisdiction of municipal courts usually has been, and 
 not because it was essential it should be, limited to the 
 territories of the cities in and for which they were cre- 
 ated. 
 
14 Note to Section 2. 
 
 By section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of 1848 
 it was declared as follows: "The judicial power of this 
 state shall be and is hereby vested in one supreme court, 
 in circuit courts, in county courts, and in justices of the 
 peace : Provided, that inferior local courts, of civil and 
 criminal jurisdiction, may be established by the General 
 Assembly in the cities of this state, but such courts shall 
 have a uniform organization and jurisdiction in such 
 cities." 
 
 This provision has been uniformly construed by the su- 
 preme court as prohibiting the General Assembly from 
 conferring upon city courts power to obtain jurisdiction 
 of a defendant by service of its process of summons upon 
 him beyond the limits of the city. People v. Evcms, 18 HI., 
 362; Covil v. Phy, 26 111., 432; Holmes v. Fihlenherg, 54 
 m., 203 ; Dixon v. Dixon, 61 111., 325 ; People v, Auditor, 
 67 HI., 333; Joslyn v. Dicherson, 71 111., 25. There are, 
 however, other rulings of the court which are important 
 to be considered in this connection. 
 
 In People v. Barr, 22 111., 241, the court held that in a 
 case where a' city court had jurisdiction to render a judg- 
 ment it might issue its writ of execution to enforce it to 
 a foreign county. The court said: "Designed, as these 
 courts are, to settle and dispose of the litigation arising 
 in the cities, they would fall far short of the object, 
 if a successful suitor in that court must stop on the recov- 
 ery of his judgment. We hold, the court having pro- 
 ceeded to judgment in a case properly arising within 
 its jurisdiction, can never be deprived of that jurisdiction. 
 When jurisdiction has once attached, it continues neces- 
 sarily, and all the powers requisite to give it full and 
 complete effect can be exercised, until the end of the 
 law shall be attained." 
 
Note to Section 2. 16 
 
 In Lowry v. Coster, 91 HI., 182, the court held that a 
 cause might be transferred by change of venue from a cir- 
 cuit court to a city court in another county. In East St. 
 Louis C. R. Co. V. Enright, 152 111., 246, it was held that a 
 cause might be transferred by a change of venue from a 
 city court in one city to a city court in another city. In 
 Beid V. Morton, 119 111., 118, it was held that a city court 
 might be given jurisdiction to authorize a guardian's 
 sale of land situated without the city. In Miller v. Peo- 
 ple, 183 111., 423, the court held that a city court could 
 lawfully summon grand jurors from any part of the 
 county in which the court was situated. It was there ar- 
 gued that as a city court could not be authorized to issue 
 a summons to be served upon a defendant beyond the lim- 
 its of the city, the same principle must apply to the sum- 
 moning of grand jurors. But the court said: "But it is 
 said the city court cannot send its process beyond the city 
 limits to be served on a juror. Why not? It may send a 
 subpoena beyond the limits of the city to be served on 
 a witness to compel him to appear and testify. If this 
 may be done, why not send for a juror and require his 
 attendance? The sheriff who attends upon the sessions 
 of the court is authorized to serve proper papers in any 
 part of the county, and where a paper requiring the at- 
 tendance of a juror is given him, we see no reason why 
 he may not serve it beyond the limits of the city. ' ' 
 
 The city court act, adopted in 1874, permitted judges 
 of the city courts and judges of the circuit court to inter- 
 change with and hold court for each other, and this pro- 
 vision has been acted upon for so many years that its 
 validity cannot be doubted. By virtue of it a judge of 
 a city court of any city in the state may hold a branch 
 of the circuit court of Cook coimty and there preside at 
 
16 Note to Section 2. 
 
 the trial of any case of wHch. that court has obtained 
 jurisdiction, whether the process of summons has been 
 served upon the defendant within or beyond the limits of 
 Cook county. 
 
 By section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1870 
 it is declared as follows: "The judicial powers, except 
 as in this article is otherwise provided, shall be vested 
 in one supreme court, circuit courts, county courts, jus- 
 tices of the peace, and in such courts as may be created 
 by law in and for cities and incorporated towns. ' ' There 
 is probably no legal difference, so far as the question of 
 limitation upon territorial jurisdiction is concerned, be- 
 tween the phrase "inferior local courts ... in 
 the cities of this state," and the phrase "such courts as 
 may be created by law in and for cities." Miller v. 
 People, 183 111., 423, supra. Hence the court may be ex- 
 pected to hold that city courts, created by general law, 
 cannot be given power to acquire jurisdiction by the 
 service of summons beyond the limits of their respective 
 cities. 
 
 But the constitutional amendment of 1904 declares 
 that "in case the General Assembly shall create munici- 
 pal courts in the city of Chicago it may abolish the offices 
 of justices of the peace, police magistrates and consta- 
 bles in and for the territory within said city, and may 
 limit the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the ter- 
 ritory of said county of Cook outside of said city to that 
 territory, and in such case the jurisdiction and practice 
 of said municipal courts shall be such as the General 
 Assembly shall prescribe." The question arises whether 
 this last clause does not confer upon the General Assem- 
 bly full power over the question of jurisdiction and per- 
 mit it to confer power upon the municipal courts to send 
 
Note to Section 2. 17 
 
 their processes of summons and cause them to he served 
 heyond the dty limits. Arguments might be presented 
 on both sides of this question. 
 
 In Landers v. Staten Island R. R. Co., 53 N. T., 450, 
 the question arose whether under the constitution of New 
 York the City Court of Brooklyn could be given juris- 
 diction to send its process beyond the limits of the city. 
 The constitution originally provided for the establish- 
 ment of ' ' inferior local courts of civil and criminal juris- 
 diction. ' ' Under this provision the City Court of Brook- 
 lyn had been established and its jurisdiction limited to 
 persons residing or found within the city. By an amend- 
 ment to the constitution the court was continued in ex- 
 istence with the powers and jurisdiction it then had ' ' and 
 such further civil and criminal jurisdiction as may be 
 conferred by law." The legislature subsequently passed 
 an act authorizing the court to send its process into any 
 county of the state. This act the court, Peckham, J., 
 dissenting, held to be unconstitutional. The majority of 
 the court construed "such further civil and criminal 
 jurisdiction as may be conferred by law" to mean such 
 further local jurisdiction, and the argument of the opin- 
 ion is based, to a large extent, upon the inconvenience 
 which might result from a construction which would per- 
 mit "hauling men and women from distant parts of the 
 state, who had never been within the limits of the city, 
 within its power, and subjecting them to its jurisdic- 
 tion." In effect the argument was that the possibility 
 the legislature might abuse the power alleged to have 
 been conferred was conclusive that the people did not in- 
 tend to confer it. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice 
 Peckham is worthy of careful consideration and is en- 
 titled to great weight. 
 
18 Note to Section 2. 
 
 It is difficult to give any good reason why the phrase 
 ' ' in such case the jurisdiction and practice of said munic- 
 ipal courts shall be such as the General Assembly shall 
 prescribe," should not be taken to mean precisely what 
 it says and to authorize the conferring upon the munici- 
 pal courts of jurisdiction to send their processes of sum- 
 mons to be served beyond the limits of the city. Unless 
 this be its meaning, it is clearly surplusage as conferring 
 a power which would have existed without it. 
 
 Comparison of the decisions of the courts of other 
 states with those of this state is quite interesting. Thus, 
 in Jones v. Kent Circuit Judge, 35 Mich., 494, and in 
 Eeath v. Kent Circuit Judge, 37 Mich., 372, the court 
 held that changes of venue, without regard to the resi- 
 dence of the parties, could not be allowed from a munici- 
 pal court to a circuit court, and in Grand U. S N. S L. 
 B. R. Co. V. Gray, 38 Mich., 461, it held that municipal 
 courts are limited in their jurisdiction by the residence 
 of the parties and cannot obtain jurisdiction of an action 
 against a non-resident of the city though he is served 
 with process of summons within the city. These cases 
 are directly contrary to the rulings of the supreme court 
 of Illinois. More striking than this is the history of the 
 rulings of the supreme courts of California and Wis- 
 consin. 
 
 Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1849 of 
 California, provided as follows: "The judicial power 
 of this state shall be vested in a supreme court, in dis- 
 trict courts, in county courts and in justices of the peace. 
 The legislature may also establish municipal and other 
 inferior courts as may be deemed necessary." 
 
 In Meyer v. Kalkma/rm, 6 Cal., 582, the act establish- 
 ing the superior court of the city of San Francisco was 
 
Note to Section 2. 19 
 
 held invalid, so far as it provided that the court might 
 send its writs, processes and orders out of the city of 
 San Francisco in the actions and proceedings of which 
 it had jurisdiction by the act. The court said: "The 
 legislature in creating the superior court of the city of 
 San Francisco acted under power given it in the consti- 
 tution 'to establish such municipal and other inferior 
 courts as may be deemed necessary.' From the expres- 
 sion of this clause, taken together with the constitutional 
 distribution of judicial power, the courts to be created 
 could only be of inferior, limited and special jurisdic- 
 tion. The jurisdiction of a municipal court must neces- 
 sarily be confined to the municipal territory for which it 
 was especially created, and the legislature has no power 
 to extend its jurisdiction so as to let its processes run 
 beyond its territory." 
 
 In Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal., 294, in construing the 
 same constitutional provision, the court held the legisla- 
 ture might authorize the municipal court to issue and send 
 its final process for execution beyond the territorial lipa- 
 its of the city. 
 
 In Chipman v. Bowman, 14 Cal., 157, the same act 
 again came in question upon a bill in equity to set aside 
 a judgment recovered in the superior court of the city 
 of San Francisco in a suit in which the summons had 
 been served upon the defendant in Alameda county, of 
 which he was a resident. The district court held the 
 judgment void upon the authority of Meyer v. KalJc- 
 mamn, supra, but Chief Justice Field, in delivering the 
 opinion of the court, said: "It is true as stated in 
 Meyer v. Kalkmann that the superior court was a munic- 
 ipal court and possessed only an inferior and limited 
 jurisdiction, but the conclusion is not warranted that the 
 
20 Note to Section 2. 
 
 legislature could not authorize its process to run beyond 
 the territorial limits for which the court was especially 
 created. Its character as a municipal and inferior court 
 depended upon the subjects of its jurisdiction and its 
 relation to other tribunals, and not upon the form of its 
 process or the counties to which it might be issued. In 
 HicJcman y. O'Neal, 10 Cal., 294, the question deter- 
 mined related to the authority of the court to issue its 
 final process beyond the city; but the statute makes no 
 distinction between the two kinds of processes, and we 
 are unable to perceive any constitutional inhibition to 
 the granting of the authority in the one case which does 
 not exist equally in the other." Accordingly the court 
 overruled Meyer v. Kalkmcmn, supra, and held the act 
 in question valid. 
 
 Section 2 of Article VII of the Constitution of "Wis- 
 consin, provides as follows: "The legislature may also 
 vest such jurisdiction as shall be deemed necessary in 
 municipal courts, and shall have power to establish in- 
 ferior courts in the several counties with limited civil 
 and criminal jurisdiction, provided that the jurisdiction 
 which may be vested in municipal courts shall not exceed 
 in their respective municipalities that of circuit courts 
 in their respective circuits as prescribed by this consti- 
 tution, and that the legislature shall provide as well for 
 the election of judges of the municipal courts as of the 
 judges of the inferior courts, by the qualified electors 
 of the respective jurisdictions." 
 
 In State v. McArthur, 13 Wis., 428, the court in passing 
 upon the legality of a transfer of an indictment from the 
 municipal court of Milwaukee to the circuit court of Mil- 
 waukee county, among other things, said: "Without 
 determining the question whether or not it would be pos- 
 
Note to Section 2. 21 
 
 sible for the legislature to establish a municipal court 
 without locating it in a city or incorporated village, we 
 are of the opinion that if such court be so located, there 
 is nothing in the language of the constitution prohibiting 
 the legislature from vesting in such court jurisdiction 
 over territory adjacent to the city or village where it 
 may be. The clause does not profess to prescribe any 
 territorial limits to the jurisdiction of such courts. The 
 only ground for implying any prohibition is the use of 
 the words 'municipal' and 'municipality.' But conced- 
 ing that the framers of the constitution contemplated the 
 fact that municipal courts were to be located in cities, 
 the use of these words is explained by the intention 
 merely to describe the kind of court which they wished to 
 authorize, and there is nothing in them which satisfies 
 us that it was the intention to prohibit the legislature 
 from vesting in them any territorial jurisdiction beyond 
 the limits of the cities where they might be. ' ' 
 
 In Lane v. Burdick, 17 Wis., 92, involving the validity of 
 a judgment of the municipal court of the city and town of 
 Eipon, in a case in which neither the plaintiff nor the 
 defendant was at the commencement of the action or 
 ever had been a resident of that town, the court said: 
 "The fact that the jurisdiction of the municipal court 
 must be exercised within the city and town does not 
 affect the question. So must that of the circuit court 
 within the county by the general law. The effect of the 
 statute regulating the commencement of civil actions is 
 to give the circuit court of each county a kind of incipient 
 jurisdiction throughout the state and with the assent of 
 the parties, the power to hear and determine all such 
 actions without regard to the nature of the controversy 
 or the residence of the litigant. The same jurisdiction 
 
22 Note to Section 2. 
 
 and power are extended to the municipal court by the 
 act under consideration. The defendant, having failed, 
 at the time and in the manner prescribed by law, to de- 
 mand that the place of trial be changed, assented to the 
 jurisdiction, and the objectioil by answer came too late 
 and was properly disregarded by the court. The objec- 
 tion that the jurisdiction exceeds that of the circuit court 
 is not true. It may be equal, but does not exceed. And 
 if giving the court an incipient jurisdiction over causes, 
 things or persons residing without the municipality be 
 supposed to conflict with the constitution the objection 
 is answered in State ex rel. Stark v. McCarthy, 13 Wis., 
 383." 
 
 In Brochway v. Carter, 25 Wis., 510, the previous de- 
 cisions of the court were approved and it was held that 
 the municipal court of the city and town of Ripon had 
 jurisdiction of actions to foreclose mortgages of lalnd 
 situate elsewhere in Fond du Lac county. 
 
 But in Atkins v. Fraker, 32 Wis., 510, the court ex- 
 pressly overruled its previous decisions, and held that 
 the jurisdiction of a municipal court could not be ex- 
 tended beyond the limits of the municipality. In speaking 
 of the provisions of a municipal court act by which it 
 was attempted to give a police justice jurisdiction 
 throughout the county, the court said: "The provision 
 is invalid so far as it attempts to confer upon a police 
 justice jurisdiction coextensive with that of justices of 
 the peace throughout the county or elsewhere outside the 
 territorial limits of the village of Omro. As a judge or 
 justice of a municipal court his jurisdiction cannot ex- 
 tend beyond the boundaries of the village within and for 
 which he is elected. This conclusion seems very plain 
 from the language of sec. 2, Art. VII of the constitution, 
 
Note to Section 2. 23 
 
 above quoted. The phraseology is very aptly chosen to 
 indicate such intent on the part of the framers. The 
 words in italics {i. e., 'in their respective municipalities' 
 and 'by the qualified electors of the respective jurisdic- 
 tions') point to a jurisdiction within the municipality, 
 and as so localized and limited as not to be extended 
 beyond its boundaries. In actions local ia their nature, 
 therefore, such as actions for the recovery of the posses- 
 sion of land or affecting its title, or action for injuries 
 to real property, the subject of the action must be within 
 the municipality. In all actions the processes of the 
 court must be served within the same territorial limits 
 and cannot be served beyond. In all transitory actions 
 the voluntary appearance of the defendant, whether he 
 resides within or without the municipality, will give 
 jurisdiction over his person, the same as in any other 
 court. ' ' 
 
 It may, therefore, be regarded as uncertain what the 
 supreme court may finally declare the law to be with 
 respect to the jurisdiction of the municipal courts over 
 defendants who do not reside or are not found within 
 the city limits. The weight of probability would seem to 
 be that it would at least hold the municipal courts may 
 be given jurisdiction of all cases by change of venue, 
 and that, when, in any case where there is more than 
 one defendant, the court has acquired jurisdiction over 
 one defendant by service of process of summons within 
 the city limits, it may complete its jurisdiction by service 
 of process upon the remaining defendants beyond the 
 city limits. If, however, it hold otherwise, the act will 
 still be valid to the extent of the jurisdiction within the 
 city limits. Ueid v. Morton, 119 111., 118, 127. 
 
24 Section 3. 
 
 SECTION 3. 
 
 Section 3. That in all cases of the first class and in all 
 cases of the second class the issues shall he made up 
 in said court by the same forms of pleadings, as near 
 as may he, in use in similar cases in the circuit courts ; 
 that all cases of the third class shall be prosecuted by 
 complaint or by information in accordance with such 
 rules as may be hereinafter prescribed or provided 
 for, or in cases not herein otherwise provided for, by 
 such rules of practice as may be prescribed by law for 
 similar cases in the criminal court of Cook county or 
 before justices of the peace ; and that in all cases of 
 the fourth class and in all cases of the fifth class the 
 issues shall be determined without other forms of 
 written pleadings than those hereinafter expressly 
 prescribed or provided for. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 3. 
 
 This section is a statement of the forms of pleading 
 prescribed by the act for the different classes of cases 
 of which the court is given jurisdiction. It announces 
 a radical change in the existing system of practice, in 
 this, that in the municipal court, in actions at law involv- 
 ing not to exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000) in money 
 or personal property, no other written pleadings shaU 
 be required than a praecipe and a bill of particulars, and 
 in attachment and replevin cases, cases of distress for 
 rent and forcible entry and detainer cases, such affidavits 
 or other papers as are required by statute. The papers 
 required to be filed in those. cases are specified in sections 
 40, 43, 48 and 49. 
 
Section 4. 25 
 
 SECTION 4. 
 
 Section 4. That said court shall be held in districts, 
 which, until otherwise provided, shall be five in number 
 and their territorial limits shall be as follows : 
 
 Of the First District the territorial limits shall be the 
 territory bounded on the east by Lake Michigan, on 
 the north by the city limits, on the west by the center 
 line of Western avenue from the city limits on the 
 north to the center line of Fifty-fifth street, thence on 
 the south by the center line of Fifty-fifth street to the 
 center line of State street, thence on the west by the 
 center line of State street to the center line of Sixty- 
 third street, thence on the south by the center line of 
 Sixty-third street to the center line of Cottage Grove 
 avenue, thence on the west by the center line of Cot- 
 tage Grove avenue to the center line of Seventy-first 
 street, and thence on the south by the center line of 
 Seventy-first street to Lake Michigan, and such terri- 
 tory shall be known as the First District. 
 
 Of the Second District the territorial limits shall be the 
 territory bounded on the south by the city limits, on 
 the east by the city limits and Lake Michigan, on the 
 north by the center line of Seventy-first street, and 
 on the west by the center line of Cottage Grove avenue, 
 and such territory shall be known as the Second Dis- 
 trict. 
 
 Of the Third District the territorial limits shall be the 
 territory bounded on the west and south by the city 
 limits, on the east by the center line of Cottage Grove 
 avenue from the city limits on the south to the center 
 line of Sixty-third street, thence on the north by the 
 center line of Sixty-third street to the center 
 line of State street, thence on the east by the 
 center line of State street to the center line of Fifty- 
 fifth street, thence on the north by the center line of 
 Fifty-fifth street to the city limits on the west, and 
 such territory shall be known as the Third District. 
 
 Of the Fourth District the territorial limits shall be the 
 territory bounded on the south by the center line of 
 Fifty-fifth street, on the east by the center line of 
 
26 Note to Section 4. 
 
 Western avenue, on the north by the center line of 
 Lake street and on the west by the city limits, and such 
 territory shall be known as the Fourth District. 
 
 Of the Fifth District the territorial limits shall be the 
 territory bounded on the south by the center line of 
 Lake street, on the east by the center line of Western 
 avenue, and on the north and west by the city limits, 
 and such territory shall be known as the Fifth District. 
 
 The number and boundaries of the districts may be 
 changed, from time to time, by orders signed by a 
 majority of the judges of the municipal court, and 
 spread upon the records thereof, which orders shall 
 be published for three successive weeks, once in each 
 week, in some newspaper of general circulation in the 
 city of Chicago, and which shall take effect respec- 
 tively within thirty days after the last publication 
 thereof ; provided, however, no such change in the num- 
 ber or boundaries of districts shall become effective 
 unless the order therefor shall have been approved by 
 the city council of the city of Chicago. As many branch 
 courts shall be held in each district as may be deter- 
 mined by the chief justice of said municipal court to be 
 necessary for the prompt and proper disposition of the 
 business of said court; Provided, however, that at 
 least one branch court shall be held in each district. 
 Such branch courts may be given such designation by 
 numbers or otherwise as may be determined by the 
 chief justice. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 4. 
 
 The second, third, fourth and fifth districts are intended 
 to accommodate, in respect to civil and quasi criminal 
 cases when the amount sought to be recovered, in money 
 or property, does not exceed one thousand dollars ($1,000), 
 those inhabitants who would be seriously inconvenienced 
 by being compelled to attend court in the central part 
 of the city. Of the cases within the jurisdiction of the 
 court the following will not, excepting perhaps in rare 
 instances, be disposed of in those districts : 
 
Note to Section 4. 27 
 
 1. Cases of the first class. By section 28 of tlie act 
 these are required to be commenced, prosecuted and dis- 
 posed of in some branch co^rt held in the first district. 
 
 2. Cases of the second class. These cases, being cases 
 coming to the court from the circuit, superior or criminal 
 court of Cook county by change of venue or otherwise, 
 will doubtless be distributed by the chief justice, pur- 
 suant to sections 8 and 36, among the branch courts of 
 the first district where they can be most conveniently 
 disposed of. 
 
 3. Cases in which a jury trial is demanded. By sec- 
 tion 29 all such cases may be transferred to the first 
 district for trial, and doubtless will be so transferred. 
 As jurors are to be furnished by the jury commissioners, 
 of Cook county and will be constantly in attendance in 
 the first district, it will be much easier, taking into ac- 
 count the convenience of all concerned, for the parties 
 and witnesses to attend in the first district, than it will 
 be to transport jurymen to one of the other districts. 
 However, if the demand for jury trials becomes frequent, 
 it may become more convenient and less expensive to 
 have panels of jurors in. each district. 
 
 The criminal and quasi criminal cases may be disposed 
 of at the various police stations, as at present, excepting 
 cases tried by jury as above mentioned. Quasi crim- 
 inal cases, such as cases for violations of municipal ordi- 
 nances, must be brought in the district in which the de- 
 fendant, or, if therfe be more than one defendant, one of 
 the defendants, resides or is found, as provided by section 
 29, but the court issuing a warrant may, in its discretion, 
 direct it to be served at any place within the city limits as 
 provided by section 49. Criminal cases may be com- 
 
28 Note to Section 4. 
 
 menced and prosecuted in any district regardless of where 
 tlie defendant resides or may be found. 
 
 The provision that "as many branch courts shall be 
 held in each district as may be determined by the chief 
 justice to be necessary for the prompt and proper dis- 
 position of the business of the court," is mandatory. If 
 the number of associate judges is insufficient for the 
 purpose, it will be the duty of the chief justice to obtain 
 the requisite number of judges by calling in county 
 judges and judges of other city courts as provided for 
 by section 13. The "prompt and proper disposition of 
 the business of the court" requires that each case shall 
 be set for trial on a particular day and be tried on that 
 day, unless the trial is postponed on account of some 
 cause other than the lack of sufficient judges to take care 
 of the business. With proper facilities for the transac- 
 tion of the business of the court, no reason will exist why 
 litigants cannot secure trials of their causes on the days 
 fixed therefor by the court and without the expense and 
 inconvenience to themselves, their witnesses and their 
 attorneys, resulting from their being compelled to wait 
 from day to day, and perhaps from week to week, until 
 their cases are reached upon the calendar. 
 
 Should the division of the city into districts as made 
 by the act prove to be inconvenient, a change in the num- 
 ber or boundaries of the districts can readily be made 
 by the joint action of a majority of the judges and of the 
 city council. It is probable that it will be found expedient, 
 as a matter of convenience to parties, witnesses and 
 attorneys, soon after the organization of the court, to 
 abolish the fourth and fifth districts and to include their 
 territory within the first district. 
 
Section 5. 29 
 
 SECTION 5. 
 
 Section 5. That said branch courts shall be held at such 
 places in said city of Chicago as may be provided for 
 that purpose by the corporate authorities thereof. If 
 no place be provided by the corporate authorities of 
 said city for the holding of any branch court, or if the 
 place so provided become unfit, said branch court may, 
 by an order signed by the majority of the judges of 
 said municipal court, and entered upon the records of 
 said branch court, adjourn to or convene at a suitable 
 place for holding said branch court, procured for that 
 purpose by said judges, within the district in which 
 the same is located and at such place may hold said 
 branch court, until a suitable place therefor be fur- 
 nished by said corporate authorities. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 5. 
 
 It was the expectation of the framers of the act that 
 the branches of the court for the trial and disposition of 
 criminal and quasi criminal cases would be held, as the 
 police courts now are, at the various police stations 
 throughout the city, excepting that jury trials would be 
 had at some central point in the first district in court rooms 
 provided especially for that purpose. That arrangement 
 would seem most convenient and economical, both for 
 the police department and for the public generally. 
 While the present accommodations for the court at the 
 police stations are inadequate and unsuitable for the 
 purpose, it is hoped that in the near future it will be 
 otherwise. 
 
 The civil business of the court should be disposed of 
 at some central point in each district. One judge in each 
 district, with the assistance, during a portion of the time, 
 of an additional judge, will probably be able to dispose 
 of the business of the second, third, fourth and fifth dis- 
 
30 Note to Section 5. 
 
 tricts, leaving the remaining judges, together with out- 
 side city court judges and county judges, to take care of 
 the business of the first district. 
 
 To accomplish a "prompt and proper disposition of the 
 business of the court" it is essential that there should be 
 provided in the first district, within or near the loop dis- 
 trict, at least thirty court rooms for the trial of civil 
 cases, at least six of which should be large enough for 
 the trial of jury cases, and additional court rooms, say 
 at least four, in some central police station for the trial 
 of criminal and quasi criminal cases with or without a 
 jury. There must also be provided suitable clerk's and 
 bailiff's offices, jury rooms, and other conveniences, 
 including suitable waiting rooms for parties to suits and 
 witnesses. 
 
 It must be borne in mind that the municipal courts will 
 dispose, in all probability, of one hundred and fifty thou- 
 sand cases each year, and will be attended by fully three 
 hundred thousand of the citizens of Chicago annually in 
 the capacity of the parties litigant, witnesses and spec- 
 tators. The impression created upon those people by 
 the municipal court system will not depend entirely upon 
 the quality of justice that will be administered, but will 
 result as well from the appearance of the court rooms 
 and other arrangements and the decorum or lack of 
 decorum which may prevail. Furthermore, judges and 
 officers of court, to accomplish a proper amount and 
 quality of work, must have suitable court rooms, offices 
 and all other modern conveniences. According to esti- 
 mates which may be considered as reasonably reliable, 
 the municipal courts will be self-supporting. Doubtless 
 the city council, notwithstanding the unsatisfactory con- 
 dition of the city finances, will find some way to pro- 
 
Note to Section 5. 31 
 
 vide siicli accommodations for the court as will enable 
 the judges to dispose of its business speedily and eco- 
 nomically, and save to the city the unnecessary expense 
 and waste of money that would inevitably result from 
 the lack of proper facilities for transacting business. 
 
32 Sections 6 and 7. 
 
 SECTIONS 6 AND 7. 
 
 Section 6. That said court shall have seals for each 
 district and may, from time to time, as may be neces- 
 sary, renew the same. The expense of said seals and 
 renewing the same shall be paid by the city of Chicago. 
 
 Sectiok 7. That all blanks, books, papers, stationery and 
 furniture necessary to the keeping of the records of 
 the proceedings of such municipal court, and the trans- 
 action of the business thereof, shall be furnished the 
 officers of such court at the expanse of the city. All 
 other expenditures on account of such court which may 
 be authorized by the city council, and which are not 
 specifically mentioned in this act, shall be paid out of 
 the city treasury. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 6 AND 7. 
 
 These sections are, in substance, copied from section 2 
 of the circuit and superior court act and sections 2 and 4 
 of the city court act of 1874, excepting the last provision 
 in section 7 by which it is intended to confer upon the 
 city council an unlimited discretion as to the expendi- 
 tures which may be made on account of the court in addi- 
 tion to those, such as salaries of judges, clerk, bailiff 
 and deputies and others, specifically mentioned in the 
 act. Among the additional expenditures which may be 
 thus authorized are the following : 
 
 1. Salaries of assistants of judges, in case assistants^ 
 are employed as they are in the county and probate 
 courts. The employment of assistants may enable the 
 judges to devote their entire time to the trial of causes 
 and such other work as must be done by them personally, 
 and thus render necessaiy a less number of judges than 
 would otherwise be needed. 
 
 2. Salaries of private secretaries for the judges, 
 
Note to Sections 6 and 7. 33 
 
 should the business of the court and the finances of the 
 city render the appointment of private secretaries neces- 
 sary or expedient. 
 
 3. Salaries of official reporters, should the appoint- 
 ment of official reporters as such be deemed expedient 
 instead of the appointment of stenographers as deputy 
 clerks as provided by section 15. 
 
 4. Compensation of judges of county courts and of 
 other city courts called in as provided by section 13. 
 
 5. Allowances to the judges, the clerk, the bailiff and 
 the deputies for expenses or for other proper purposes. 
 
 6. Purchase and maintenance of a suitable law library 
 for the general use of the officers of the court and of the 
 bar, and the purchase of necessary law books for the 
 private offices of the judges. 
 
 In the course of the discussion among the members 
 of the General Assembly in reference to the act, it was 
 suggested by some that the entire question of expendi- 
 tures, including the salaries of judges and of the clerk, 
 the bailiff and the deputies, should be left to the city 
 council. By others, who constituted the great majority, 
 it. was contended that no discretion whatever should be 
 vested in the city council. The final result was that by 
 the clause in question the city council was given unlim- 
 ited power in respect to all matters of expenditure on 
 account of the court. This is as it should be. That the 
 discretion thus vested in the city council will be wisely 
 exercised, there is no reason to doubt. It is the legislative 
 body of the city, having charge of its finances. Its mem- 
 bers have much better facilities for judging of the needs 
 of the court than would be possessed by the General 
 Assembly, two-thirds of the members of which are not 
 
34 Note to Sections 6 and 7. 
 
 residents of CMcago, and the power given them will 
 enable them to act promptly in attending to the needs of 
 the court, instead of the court being hampered and its 
 business interfered with by the delay necessary to secure 
 an act of the legislature and the vote of the people ratify- 
 ing it. 
 
Section 8. 35 
 
 SECTION 8. 
 
 Section 8. That said municipal court shall consist of 
 twenty-eight (28) judges, one of whom shall be chief 
 justice and the remaining twenty-seven (27) of whom 
 shall be associate judges. Each branch court shall be 
 presided over by a single judge of the municipal court. 
 The chief justice, in addition to the exercise of all the 
 other powers of a judge of said court, shall have the 
 general superintendence of the business of said court ; 
 he shall preside at all meetings of the judges, and he 
 shall assign the associate judges to duty in the branch 
 courts, from time to time, as he may deem necessary 
 for the prompt disposition of the business thereof, and 
 it shall be the duty of each associate judge to attend 
 and serve at any branch court to which he may be so 
 assigned, but the chief justice shall only assign such 
 number of judges to the trial and disposition of eases 
 of the first class and cases of the second class men- 
 tioned in section two (2) of this act, from time to time, 
 as may not be needed for the prompt disposition of the 
 other business of the court. The chief justice shall 
 also superintend the preparation of the calendars of 
 cases for trial in said court and shall make such classifi- 
 cation and distribution of the same upon different cal- 
 endars as he shall deem proper and expedient. Each 
 associate judge shall at the commencement of each 
 month make to the chief justice, under his official oath, 
 a report in writing of the duties performed by him 
 during the preceding month, which report shall specify 
 the number of days ' attendance in court of such judge 
 during such month, and the branch courts upon which 
 he has attended, and the number of hours per day of 
 such attendance, for which the chief justice shall cause 
 suitable blanks to be prepared and furnished to the 
 associate judges. Each judge shall be entitled to vaca- 
 tions, which shall not exceed thirty-six days in all in 
 any one year and which shall be taken at such times 
 as may be determined by the chief justice. The chief 
 justice must give his attention faithfully to the dis- 
 charge of the duties especially pertaining to his office 
 and to the performance of such additional judicial work 
 
36 Section 8. 
 
 as lie may be able to perform. Eacli associate judge 
 must perform his share of the labors and duties apper- 
 taining to the office. At least one associate judge must 
 be in attendance in one branch court in each district, six 
 hours of each day, except Sunday, a public holida,y, or 
 a day upon which the inhabitants of the city of Chicago 
 generally refrain from business, and each associate 
 judge, while in the court room or in chambers, and 
 not actually engaged in the performance of other offi- 
 cial duties, must act upon any application for his 
 official action, properly made to him. One branch 
 court in the first district shall be kept open, and at 
 least one judge assigned for that purpose by the chief 
 justice, shall be in attendance thereat, each day, except- 
 ing Sunday or a public holiday, from nine o'clock a. m. 
 to ten o'clock p. m., excepting two hours' intermission, 
 for the transaction of such business as may come be- 
 fore it. It shall be the duty of the chief justice and 
 the associate judges to meet together at least once in 
 each month, excepting the month of August, in each 
 year, at such hour and place as may be designated by 
 the chief justice, and at such other times as niay be 
 required by the chief justice, for the consideration of 
 such matters pertaining to the administration of jus- 
 tice in said court as may be brought before them. At 
 such meetings they shall receive and investigate, or 
 cause to be investigated, all complaints presented to 
 them pertaining to the said court, and to the officers 
 thereof, and shall take such steps as they may deem 
 necessary or proper with respect thereto, and they 
 shall have power and it shall be their duty to adopt or 
 cause to be adopted all such rules and rearulations for 
 the proper administration of justice in said court as to 
 them may seem expedient. The salary of the chief jus- 
 tice shall be seven thousand five hundred dollars 
 ($7,500) per annum, and the salary of an associate 
 judge shall be six thousand dollars ($6,000) per an- 
 num, payable in monthly installments out of the city 
 treasury. 
 
Note to Section 8. 37 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 8. 
 
 The circuit court of Cook county consists of fourteen 
 judges and the superior court of Cook county of twelve. 
 Each has a chief justice who is selected for the term of 
 one year by the judges themselves from one of their own 
 number. His powers and duties are limited to presiding 
 at such meetings of the judges as they may see fit to hold 
 and signing his name to such documents as are required 
 by law to be signed by the presiding judge of the court. 
 Each judge is entirely independent of every other judge 
 and has the power to adopt and enforce, in the branch 
 court over which he presides, such rules of practice not 
 inconsistent with law as he may deem proper, regardless 
 of the rules which may be adopted and enforced in other 
 branches of the court. Whatever arrangements are made 
 between the judges respecting uniformity of rules of 
 practice and the division and disposition of the business 
 of the court are purely voluntary. Though one judge 
 may declare a statute or a municipal ordinance constitu- 
 tional or valid, another may declare it unconstitutional or 
 invalid. So, too, one judge may, after due consideration, 
 pronounce a judgment of conviction in a criminal case 
 and thereupon another judge may, upon an application 
 for a writ of habeas corpus, declare such judgment in- 
 valid and discharge the party convicted. 
 
 With respect to the clerk and the sheriff, the power of 
 the circuit and superior court judges, so far as it may be 
 exercised in a summary manner, is limited to an examina- 
 tion of the clerk's office from time to time and the giving 
 of such directions and the making of such orders in re- 
 gard to the keeping of the same and the records and pa- 
 pers thereof, not contrary to law, as they shall deem best, 
 
38 Note to Section 8. 
 
 witli power to compel compliance with any order thus 
 made. They have no power of supervision whatever over 
 the sheriff's office. They have no voice in either the selec- 
 tion or removal of the deputies. The number of deputies 
 is fixed by rule of the circuit court, the compensation is 
 determined by the county board and they are selected by 
 the clerk and the sheriff respectively. The judges may 
 appoint shorthand reporters only when such appointment 
 is authorized by the county board. The salaries and per 
 diem of the reporters thus appointed are fixed by the 
 county board. 
 
 In the matter of practice and procedure, the judges of 
 the circuit and superior courts are subject to numerous 
 rules prescribed by the legislature noncompliance with 
 which renders their judgments subject to reversal by the 
 appellate or supreme court regardless of the propriety 
 or impropriety of the decisions of the cases upon their 
 merits. They are authorized to make rules of practice, 
 but only with respect to matters not covered by the rules 
 prescribed by the legislature. If the statutory rules, of 
 practice prove to be unsatisfactory, the only remedy is an 
 appeal to the legislature for an amendment of the law 
 which it is, in most cases, impossible to obtain because of 
 the constitutional requirement that laws regulating the 
 practice of the courts shall be uniform in their operation 
 throughout the state. 
 
 That the system thus described is unsatisfactory in its 
 results is a matter of common notoriety. Its cost to the 
 tax-payer is whoUy out of proportion to its benefits. The 
 circuit, superior and criminal courts of Cook county cost 
 the tax-payers annually, over and above all receipts, and 
 not including rent, care and custody of court rooms, and 
 not including the salaries of six judges serving in the ap- 
 
Note to Section 8. 39 
 
 pellate court, over six hundred thousand dollars ($600,- 
 000). If to this were added a proper charge as rent of 
 court rooms and clerk's and sheriff's offices, based upon 
 the capital invested in the county and criminal court 
 buildings and grounds, and for care and custody of court 
 rooms and clerk's and sheriff's offices, the total net ex- 
 pense per annum of the three courts mentioned to the tax- 
 payers would amount, in round numbers, to one million 
 dollars ($1,000,000) per annum. An expenditure of this 
 magnitude ought to secure to the people a system of 
 courts by which every person may ' ' obtain, by law, right 
 and justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase 
 it, completely and without denial, promptly and without 
 delay" in accordance with the declaration of the bill of 
 rights. That such is not the result is well understood. 
 
 The municipal court act seeks to eliminate from the 
 new system the defects in the circuit, superior and crim- 
 inal court systems by providing for a chief justice with 
 extensive powers of superintendence and by conferring 
 upon the judges as a body large discretionary powers. 
 
 THE CHIEF JUSTICE. 
 
 The powers and duties of the chief justice are the fol- 
 lowing : 
 
 1. To provide for the holding of as many branch 
 courts in each district as may be necessary for the prompt 
 and proper disposition of the business of the court, the 
 duty of proAdding for such number of branch courts be- 
 ing made mandatory by section 4 of the act. If there are 
 not sufficient municipal court judges to hold the number 
 of branches which may be needed, city court judges and 
 county judges, of whom there are over one hundred in 
 
40 Note to Section 8. 
 
 the state outside of Cook county, may, pursuant to sec- 
 tion 13, be called in for that purpose. The failure of the 
 court to promptly dispose of causes can, therefore, only 
 be excused by the inability of the chief justice to procure 
 the requisite number of judges to hold the branch courts. 
 
 2. To exercise a general superintendence over the busi- 
 ness of tne court, which carries with it all the powers usu- 
 ally vested in a business superintendent. 
 
 3. To preside at all meetings of the judges. 
 
 4. To assign the associate judges to duty in the branch 
 courts, to receive their monthly reports, and to determine 
 the times of their vacations, which are not to exceed thirty- 
 six days each in any one year. The municipal courts 
 must be kept open for business every day in the year, ex- 
 cepting Sundays and legal holidays and there must be no 
 general postponement of the trial of causes for two 
 months in the year while twenty or more judges are ab- 
 sent from the city enjoying vacations, leaving two or 
 three behind to dispose of "emergency" business. Every 
 case in the municipal court should be treated as an "emer- 
 gency case, ' ' and the vacations of the judges must be ar- 
 ranged so that at all times the court can dispose prompt- 
 ly of the cases brought before it. A large mercantile es- 
 tablishment which should permit nine-tenths of its em- 
 ployes to abandon business from the middle of July to 
 the middle of September each year, leaving only a few 
 on guard for "emergency" business, would soon find 
 itself bankrupt. Especially would this be true, if cus- 
 tomers during the vacation period were not to be per- 
 mitted to make purchases without an affidavit or other 
 satisfactory evidence of "emergency." Hence the pro- 
 priety of confiding to the chief justice the power of fixing 
 vacations. 
 
Note to Section 8. 41 
 
 5. To superintend the preparation of the calendars of 
 cases for trial, to make such classification and distribu- 
 tion of the cases upon different calendars as he shall 
 deem proper, and to determine the order in which cases 
 shall be tried. This vests in the chief justice a discre- 
 tion which is necessary to a prompt disposition of eases 
 and the proper distribution of the business among the 
 several judges. It will enable the chief justice to secure 
 the prompt disposition of each day's business by causing 
 the transfer of cases from the calendar of one judge who 
 may not be able to dispose, during the day, of the busi- 
 ness allotted to nim for that day, to the calendar of another 
 judge who may be able not only to complete the work of 
 his own calendar, but to assist in completing that of an- 
 other judge. In this manner, if the court is furnished 
 with suitable accommodations for the convenient trans- 
 action of business, every case can be disposed of, or at 
 least its trial can be entered upon, on the day for which 
 it is set. In distributing the business among the judges 
 the chief justice should, and doubtless will be impartial 
 and under no circumstances exhibit favoritism or per- 
 sonal preference for one judge over another judge. There 
 should be no attempt to treat any case or class of cases as 
 more important than other cases, nor any disposition on 
 the part of the chief justice or of any associate judge to 
 prefer participation in cases which excite unusual public 
 interest. It might be well to assign civil cases in the first 
 district by lot. But above all no opportunity should be 
 given lawyers for scheming to have their cases tried be- 
 fore some judge whom they may select. All judges are 
 elected by the people and the law conclusively presumes 
 they are competent to discharge their judicial duties. If 
 lawyers and litigants are compelled to take their chances 
 
42 Note to Section 8. 
 
 with respect to the judges to whom their cases are as- 
 signed they may be stimulated to strive for the selection 
 of a better class of judges. 
 
 6. To determine the number of petit jurors to be sum- 
 moned from time to time, and to cause them to be inter- 
 rogated and their qualifications to be inquired into. This 
 is a power of especial importance. The act provides 
 (section 25) that jurors for the municipal court shall be 
 selected by the jury commissioners of Cook county in 
 the same manner substantially as jurors are selected for 
 the circuit, superior and criminal courts. The selection 
 thus made by the jury commissioners is to be followed, 
 upon the appearance of the jurors, by a preliminary in- 
 quiry into their qualifications under the direction of the 
 chief justice (section 26), and it is made his duty to re- 
 ject from service as jurors all persons who do not ap- 
 pear to possess the qualifications required by law. The 
 provisions of the law are, that jurors shall be persons 
 "in the possession of their natural faculties and not in- 
 firm or decrepit, free from all legal exceptions, of fair 
 character, of approved integrity, of sound judgment, well 
 informed, and who understand , the English language." 
 These qualifications prescribed by law are such as to in- 
 sure the selection of thoroughly competent and satisfac- 
 tory jurors if the provisions of the law are, as they 
 should be, strictly and faithfully enforced. The munici- 
 pal court act expresses in terms too plain to be misun- 
 derstood its mandate that no juror shall be accepted by 
 the chief justice for service in the municipal court unless 
 he possesses the qualifications required by law. This 
 power will enable the chief justice to have regard for 
 economy in the summoning of jurors. Only so many 
 need be summoned as are actually required to do the 
 
Note to Section 8. 43 
 
 work of trying jury cases, and those summoned can be 
 kept employed. In the circuit, superior and criminal 
 courts twenty-four jurymen are summoned to attend each 
 trial judge. Sometimes the entire twenty-four are idle 
 for one or more days at a time, at an expense to the 
 county of forty-eight dollars a day while the judge is en- 
 gaged in trying some case without a jury, or is sick or 
 absent. This waste of money need not take place in the 
 municipal court. 
 
 7. To prescribe forms of praecipes, summonses, en- 
 tries of appearance, affidavits, bonds, attachment writs, 
 replevin writs, petitions for changes of venue, bills of par- 
 ticulars, and all other papers necessary for the use of 
 parties to suits. One of the purposes of the act is to 
 avoid controversies respecting matters of form. This 
 is especially true with respect to cases involving one 
 thousand dollars ($1,000) or less. In such cases it is in- 
 tended that demurrers and other diliatory motions shall 
 be unknown. To this end the forms of bills of particu- 
 lars are to be prescribed by the chief justice and when 
 the form prescribed is used it is not to be subject to ob- 
 jection. 
 
 8. To supervise the keeping by the clerk and the 
 bailiff, of their accounts. All fees and other money col- 
 lected by the clerk and the bailiff are required to be paid 
 into the county treasury. It is essential that they should 
 keep correct and accurate accounts, and it is made the 
 duty of the chief justice to see to it that their accounts 
 are accurately and properly kept. 
 
 9. To superintend the keeping of the records of the 
 courts and to prescribe abbreviated forms of entries. If 
 the records of the municipal court were to be written up 
 and preserved in the same manner as the records of the 
 
44 Note to Section 8. 
 
 circuit, superior and criminal courts, only a few years 
 would elapse until an enormous expense would be im- 
 posed upon the city for their storage and preservation. 
 There are multitudes of orders occupying half a page of 
 a large sized record book which could be quite as well ex- 
 pressed in an abbreviated form by a single line. Power 
 is properly given to the chief justice to accomplish this 
 reform and thus save the city not only the expense of un- 
 necessary record books and storage room therefor, but 
 the additional clerk hire necessary to the writing up of 
 the records as they are now written in the circuit, su- 
 perior and criminal courts. 
 
 While the powers thus given the chief justice are quite 
 extensive, they are no greater than are necessary to se- 
 cure a business-like management of the administration of 
 justice in the court. 
 
 THE ASSOCIATE JUDGES. 
 
 The- control of the chief justice over the associate 
 judges is limited to assigning them to duty in the branch 
 courts and fixing the dates of their vacations. This 
 power is one which must be lodged somewhere in order 
 that there may be a satisfactory disposition of the busi- 
 ness of the court. It should and doubtless will be exer- 
 cised fairly and impartially. Apart from this power and 
 the administrative functions of the chief justice, all the 
 judges are on an equal footing and, acting as a body, at 
 their meetings to be held monthly or oftener, they possess 
 the following powers : 
 
 1. To receive and investigate, or to cause to be inves- 
 tigated, all complaints presented to them pertaining to 
 the court and to the officers thereof, and to take such steps 
 
Note to Section 8. 45 
 
 as they shall deem necessary with respect thereto. 
 Among the complaints which may be thus investigated 
 are those against the clerk and the bailiff and their dep- 
 uties for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, oppres- 
 sion in the execution of process or other misconduct; 
 those against police officers, who are ex officio deputy 
 bailiffs, for improper conduct towards persons arrested, 
 and those against attorneys for unprofessional or dis- 
 honest conduct in respect to suits pending in the court. 
 
 2. To determine the number of deputy clerks and dep- 
 uty bailiffs to be appointed and to fix their salaries. (See 
 sees. 15 and 17.) 
 
 3. To remove deputy clerks and deputy bailiffs. (See 
 sees. 15 and 17.) 
 
 4. To adopt or cause to be adopted all such rules and 
 regulations for the proper administration of justice in 
 the court as to them may seem expedient. This power 
 authorizes any rule or regulation that is not forbidden 
 by law. 
 
 5. To adopt, with the approval or by the direction of 
 the supreme court, such rules regulating the practice 
 in the court as they, or the supreme court may deem 
 necessary or expedient. (See sees. 19 and 20.) 
 
 These powers, it will be seen, are very extensive and 
 much greater than those possessed by the judges of the 
 circuit and superior courts. Their proper exercise and 
 the proper exercise by the chief justice of the duties es- 
 pecially pertaining to his office ought to and doubtless 
 will result in a satisfactory and efficient administration 
 of justice. The effect of the municipal court act is, 
 shortly stated, to define the cases in which the judges are 
 to exercise jurisdiction, to prescribe a portion of the rules 
 of practice by which they are to be governed, to confer 
 
46 Note to Section 8. 
 
 upon them power to adopt all such further rules as in 
 their judgment are necessary or proper to produce the 
 desired result, and to vest in them practically unlimited 
 power with respect to the inferior officers of the court. 
 
 The frequent meetings of the judges ought to be pro- 
 ductive of much good in the direction of uniformity of de- 
 cision as to matters of jurisdiction, practice, validity of 
 statutes and ordinances, &c., and as to other questions of 
 difficulty. 
 
 But it is not alone in the disposition of the business 
 brought before them that the judges will be able to make 
 themselves useful. They can ascertain the defects in the 
 act creating the court and suggest amendments to cure 
 them. So, also, when they discover defects or omissions 
 in the municipal code, they may report such defects or 
 omissions to the city council with suggestions as to 
 amendments. 
 
 In fact, it is apparent that a competent and industrious 
 body of judges will be able to build up a creditable sys- 
 tem of administering justice in Chicago and will have, 
 as a strong motive for doing so, the certain prospect of 
 well merited censure in case of failure. 
 
Section 9. 47 
 
 SECTION 9. 
 
 Section 9. That the chief justice and the associate 
 judges of the municipal court provided for in the pre- 
 ceding section shall be elected on the first Tuesday 
 after the first Monday of November, A. D. 1906; that 
 the chief justice shall hold his office for the term of 
 six (6) years and until his successor shall be elected 
 and qualified ; that of the said associate judges so to be 
 elected nine (9) shall be elected for the term of two 
 (2) years; nine (9) for the term of four (4) years, and 
 nine (9) for the term of six (6) years and until their 
 respective successors shall be elected and qualified, and 
 on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of Novem- 
 ber, A. D. 1908, and on the first Tuesday after the first 
 Monday of November, every sixth year thereafter, and 
 on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of Novem- 
 ber, A D. 1910, and on the first Tuesday after the first 
 Monday of November every sixth year thereafter 
 there shall be elected nine (9) associate judges of said 
 municipal court and on the first Tuesday after the first 
 Monday of November, A. D. 1912, and every sixth 
 year thereafter there shall be elected a chief justice 
 and nine (9) associate judges of said municipal court 
 as successors in office of the chief justice and associate 
 judges of the municipal court by this act required to 
 be elected, each of whom shall hold his office for the 
 term of six (6) years and until his successor shall be 
 elected and qualified. The judges so required to be 
 elected shall enter upon the discharge of their duties 
 on the first Monday of December following their elec- 
 tion. Vacancies in the office of chief justice or associ- 
 ate judge of the municipal court shall be filled by elec- 
 tion at the regular municipal, judicial or other general 
 election which shall occur next after a period of thirty 
 (30) days from the time such vacancies respectively 
 occur, but where the unexpired term does not exceed 
 one year, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment 
 by the G-overnor. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the 
 office of chief justice, or wheilever the chief justice 
 shall be absent from the city of Chicago, or incapaci- 
 tated from acting, the associate judges shall select one 
 
48 Note to Section 9. 
 
 of their number to act as chief justice until such va- 
 cancy shall be filled by election or appointment, as 
 above provided for, or until the return of the chief 
 justice, or until his incapacity ceases. 
 
 NOTE TO- SECTION 9. 
 
 By section 8 of Senate Bill No. 45 and House Bill 
 No. 98, it was provided that the chief justice and the 
 twenty-four associate judges provided for in the act 
 should be elected on the first Monday of June, 1905, and 
 should hold their offices for the term of three years and 
 until their successors should be elected and qualified, and 
 that on the first Monday of June, 1909, and every six 
 years thereafter, there should be elected a chief justice 
 and such number of associate judges as might, from time 
 to time, constitute the full number of associate judges 
 of the court, who should hold their respective offices for 
 the term of six years and until their respective successors 
 should be elected and qualified. To the members of the 
 committee under whose direction and superintendence 
 the bill was drafted it seemed that the public iiiterests 
 would be best subserved by holding all regular elections 
 of judges at a time when there were no other officers 
 than the judges to be elected. 
 
 By section 8 of House Bill No. 422, as passed by the 
 House, provision was made for the election of the chief 
 justice and twenty-four associate judges on the first 
 Tuesday of April, 1906, the chief justice to hold his 
 office for the term of six years and until his successor 
 should be elected and qualified, and of the associate 
 judges one-third to hold for two years, one-third for four 
 years and one-third for six years, and until their succes- 
 sors should be elected and qualified, with the further 
 provision that on the first Tuesday of April, 1908, and 
 
Note to Section 9. 49 
 
 every two years thereafter, there should be eight associ- 
 ate judges elected to hold their offices for terms of six 
 years and until their successors should be elected and 
 qualified, to succeed the associate judges whose terms 
 should have expired. 
 
 The view taken by the members of the House was that 
 the entire membership of the court ought not to be 
 changed at any one election, but that better results would 
 be obtained if there should be an election every two 
 years for one-third of the associate judges. It was also 
 considered better that the election should be held at the 
 same time as the election for other city officers, other 
 than the mayor, as thereby a larger vote would be as- 
 sured, and the election would be no more political in its 
 character than if held in June. 
 
 The Senate, however, while approving of the division 
 of the judges into three classes, so that there should not 
 be a change in the entire membership of the court at 
 any one election, determined that the regular elections 
 should be held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday 
 of November in 1906 and every two years thereafter, thus 
 making the election partake more of a political character. 
 
 The increase of the number of associate judges to 
 twenty-seven was made by the conference committee. 
 Whether the number will be sufficient to enable the court 
 to dispose promptly of all the business which may be 
 brought before it, is uncertain. The establishment of the 
 court, while certain to cause a decrease of vexatious liti- 
 gation, will, without doubt, induce the prosecution of 
 meritorius causes of action, of which there are several 
 thousand annually upon which suits are not now brought 
 because of the vexatious delays and the ruinous expenses 
 attendant upon prosecuting them by the present methods 
 
50 Note to Section 9. 
 
 of procedure. It is to be hoped, however, that by means 
 of the methods of transacting business prescribed by the 
 act, the business of the court may be promptly disposed 
 of without any considerable increase in the number of 
 judges provided for in section 9. Until the number of 
 judges is increased, the prompt disposition of the busi- 
 ness of the court can be secured by calling in city court 
 judges and county judges. 
 
Sections 10, 11 and 12. 51 
 
 SECTIONS 10, 11 AND 12. 
 
 Section 10. That no person shall be eligible to 
 the office of chief justice or of associate judge of the 
 municipal court unless he shall be at least thirty years 
 of age and a citizen of the United States, nor unless he 
 shall have resided in the county of Cook and been there 
 engaged, either in active practice as an attorney and 
 counsellor at law or in the discharge of the duties of 
 a judicial office, five years next preceding his election, 
 or in one of said occupations during a portion of said 
 time and in the other the remaining portion thereof, 
 and shall, at the time of his election, be a resident 
 of the city of Chicago. 
 
 Section 11. That every chief justice and associate judge 
 of such municipal court, before he enters upon the du- 
 ties of his office, shall take and subscribe the following 
 oath or affirmation: 
 
 I do solemly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) that I 
 will support the Constitution of the United States and 
 the Constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will 
 faithfully discharge the duties of the office of chief jus- 
 tice (or associate judge) of the municipal court of 
 Chicago according to the best of my ability. 
 
 Said oath shall be filed in the office of the Secretary of 
 State. 
 
 Section 12. That whenever two-thirds in number of 
 the judges of the municipal court shall transmit to the 
 city council of the city of Chicago a certificate signed 
 by them that in the opinion of said judges the business 
 of said municipal court is such as to require an increase 
 in the number of the associate judges of said municipal 
 court, said city council may, by ordinance or ordi- 
 nances, provide for an increase of not more than nine 
 in the number of said judges, who shall be elected, 
 one-third for two years, one-third for four years and 
 one-third for six years, at the next ensuing general 
 election. The judges elected in accordance with such 
 ordinance or ordinances shall hold their offices for the 
 said respective periods for which they shall have been 
 elected and until their successors shall be elected and 
 
52 Note to Sections 10, 11 and 12. 
 
 qualified, and every two years thereafter their respec- 
 tive successors shall be elected for the full term of six 
 years. But after the number of associate judges has 
 been increased to thirty-six (36) no subsequent increase 
 thereof shall be made by the city council. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 10, 11 AND 12. 
 
 Section 10, which corresponds with section 9 of the 
 original bill introduced as Senate Bill No. 45 and House 
 Bill No. 98, omits the following provision contained in 
 the latter: 
 
 "Nor shall any person be eligible to the office of chief 
 justice or associate judge . . . who shall have con- 
 tributed or expended, directly or indirectly, or who shall 
 have agreed to contribute or expend, directly or indi- 
 rectly, any money or property whatever for the purpose 
 of furthering either his nomination as a candidate for 
 said office or his election thereto, or the nomination or 
 election of any other candidate for office at such elec- 
 tion." 
 
 It is to be regretted that this provision, which was ap- 
 proved and adopted by the House of Representatives, 
 was not also concurred in by the Senate. The salaries 
 of the judges of the municipal court should be sufficient 
 to justly compensate them for their services and to in- 
 duce competent men to aspire to those offices, and the 
 public treasury should not be made directly or indirectly 
 to contribute to the support of political grafters or to the 
 conducting of political campaigns. The contributions 
 exacted from candidates for judge of the circuit or supe- 
 rior court are usually in the neighborhood of $2,500. In 
 addition to this the candidate is expected to scatter far 
 and wide his cards announcing his candidacy, to adorn 
 
Note to Sections 10, 11 and 12. 53 
 
 public places with his lithographs and to procure the 
 publication of his biography, (or, more exactly putting 
 it, his autobiography), accompanied by his picture, in a 
 large number of newspapers at, say, $25 to $50 each. It 
 is safe to say that the campaign expenses of many candi- 
 dates for judge are fully $5,000. This is certainly a 
 scandalous condition of affairs. It was the hope of the 
 framers of the original bill introduced as Senate Bill No. 
 45 and House Bill No. 98 that the judges of the munici- 
 pal court who were to be content with a salary of $6,000 
 per annum for work far more arduous and requiring far 
 more skill and ability than that performed by circuit and 
 superior court judges, who receive salaries of $10,000 a 
 year, might be relieved from campaign contributions. 
 The politicians, however, decreed otherwise and the situ- 
 ation must be accepted as we find it, leaving to the future 
 the correction of the evU. 
 
 The question may be raised whether it is competent for 
 the General Assembly to prescribe for judges of the 
 municipal court qualifications in addition to those speci- 
 fied in section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution which 
 declares that "no person shall be eligible to the office of 
 judge of the circuit or any inferior court . . . un- 
 less he shall be at least twenty-five years of age, and a 
 citizen of the United States, nor unless he shall be a resi- 
 dent of the circuit, county, city, cities or incorporated 
 town in which he shall be elected." This does not ex- 
 pressly prohibit the General Assembly from prescribing 
 additional qualifications, and moreover, it is doubtful 
 whether it applies to inferior courts not created by the 
 constitution itself. Besides regard must be had to the 
 sweeping language of the constitutional amendment of 
 1904, which declares that "the General Assembly may 
 
54 Note to Sections 10, 11 and 12. 
 
 pass all laws wMch it may deem requisite to effectually 
 provide a complete system of local municipal government 
 in and for the city of Chicago." 
 
 The oath provided for in section 11 is that prescribed 
 by section 25 of Article V of the Constitution. 
 
 By the original Senate Bill No. 45 and House Bill No. 
 98 provision was made for an increase of not exceeding 
 six in the number of associate judges by the joint action 
 of the city council and two-thirds of the judges of the 
 municipal court, the judges so provided for to be elected 
 at the next ensuing municipal, judicial or general election 
 in the city and to hold their offices until the succeeding 
 regular election of judges, when their successors were to 
 be elected for the full term of six years. The same pro- 
 vision was made by the House in House Bill No. 422, but 
 the bill as finally passed upon the report of the confer- 
 ence committee increased to nine the number of judges 
 which might be added to the court and provided for their 
 election only at the regular elections of judges on the 
 first Tuesday after the first Monday of November in the 
 year in which general elections are held. 
 
Section 13. 55 
 
 SECTION 13. 
 
 Section 13. That the judges of said municipal court 
 may interchange with judges of other city courts, and 
 with county judges, and said respective judges may 
 hold court for each other and perform each other's 
 duties when they find it necessary or convenient. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 13. 
 
 By section 12 of the original bill, introduced as Sen- 
 ate Bill No. 45 and House Bill No. 98, which corresponds 
 with section 13 of the act finally adopted, the municipal 
 court judges were authorized to interchange with judges 
 of the circuit and superior courts and with judges of 
 other city courts. This provision for interchange was 
 vigorously opposed by a considerable number of law- 
 yers, as well as by a number of the judges of the superior 
 court of Cook county, with the result that section 13 of 
 the present law contains simply the provision that the 
 judges "may interchange with judges of other city courts 
 and with county judges, and said respective judges may 
 hold court for each other and perform each other's 
 duties when they find it necessary or convenient." 
 Hence, although the judges of the municipal court may 
 try any case, whether civil or criminal, and whether at 
 law or in equity, which may be sent to that court from 
 the circuit, superior or criminal court of Cook county, 
 although the criminal court of Cook county, upon the 
 application of the state's attorney, may transfer its en- 
 tire docket of cases to the municipal court for trial and 
 disposition, and although the judges of the municipal 
 court may hold any city court in the state and there 
 exercise general jurisdiction of all cases at law and in 
 equity, it was the intention of the members of the legis- 
 
56 Note to Section 13. 
 
 lature, apparently, that the county of Cook and the city 
 of Chicago should not be permitted to save the expense 
 of calling in outside judges by employing judges of the 
 circuit and superior courts of Cook county to hold muni- 
 cipal courts or municipal court judges to hold circuit, 
 superior or criminal courts. 
 
 So far as concerns the omission from the act of a pro- 
 vision for the holding by municipal court judges of a cir- 
 cuit, superior or criminal courts is concerned, it is a mat- 
 ter of comparatively little importance. But it would be 
 advantageous to have circuit judges authorized to hold 
 municipal courts, as in such case there would be a greater 
 number of judges outside of Cook county who, in case of 
 necessity, could be called in to aid in the prompt and 
 proper disposition of the business of the court. 
 
Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17. 57 
 
 SECTIONS 14, 15, 16 AND 17. 
 
 Section 14. That there shall be a clerk of said muni- 
 cipal court, whose term of office shall be six years and 
 until his successor shall be elected and qualified and 
 who shall be elected on the first Tuesday after the first 
 Monday of November, A. D. 1906, and every six years 
 thereafter. He shall perform, with respect to said 
 municipal court, the duties usually performed by 
 clerks of courts of record. He shall give his personal 
 attention to the performance of the duties of his of- 
 fice. He shall maintain an office in each district and 
 each office shall be kept open for the transaction of 
 business from eight o'clock a. m. to six o'clock p. m. 
 of each working day during the year. Until otherwise 
 provided by the rules which may be adopted under 
 the provisions of this act, the powers, duties and lia- 
 bilities, the oath of office and the bond and conditions 
 thereof of such clerk shall be the same, as near as may 
 be, as those prescribed by law for clerks of courts by 
 the act entitled "An act to revise the law in relation 
 to clerks of courts," approved March 25, 1874, and in 
 force July 1, 1874. His salary shall be five thousand 
 dollars ($5,000) per annum, and shall be paid in 
 monthly installments out of the city treasury. He 
 shall be commissioned by the Governor. 
 
 Section 15. That said clerk shall appoint such number 
 of deputies as may be determined, from time to time, 
 by a majority of the judges of the municipal court by 
 orders signed by them and spread upon the records 
 of said court. At least one deputy clerk shall be as- 
 signed to duty in each branch court. The salaries of 
 deputy clerks shall be fixed, from time to time, by 
 orders signed by a majority of the judges of the muni- 
 cipal court and spread upon the records of the court, 
 and shall be payable out of the city treasury in month- 
 ly installments, provided, however, that the salary of 
 the chief deputy clerk shall not exceed two thousand 
 five hundred dollars ($2,500) per annum, and that the 
 salary of no other deputy clerk shall exceed eighteen 
 hundred dollars ($1,800) per annum. Such number of 
 deputy clerks so appointed as the judges may deem 
 
58 Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17. 
 
 necessary shall be competent shorthand reporters, 
 capable of correctly taking down stenographically and 
 transcribing the proceedings of courts, and shall per- 
 form such duties with respect to attending upon and 
 taking down stenographic reports of the proceedings 
 of said court as may be required by the judges, and 
 for making and furnishing transcripts of their 
 steno'graphic reports aforesaid said deputy clerks 
 shall be allowed to make such reasonable charge, 
 not exceeding fifteen cents per one hundred words, 
 to the parties to whom such transcripts are 
 furnished, as may be determined by the judges, 
 and the judges may allow said deputy clerks 
 to retain, as additional compensation for their serv- 
 ices, one-half of the charges so collected, the balance 
 of such charges to be accounted for by such deputy 
 clerks in the same manner as costs collected by them. 
 Such deputy clerks shall take the same oath or affirm- 
 ation required of the clerk of said municipal court and 
 shall give bonds to be approved by the chief justice of 
 said court, conditioned, as near as may be, like the 
 bond required of the clerk. Any deputy clerk shall 
 be subject to removal at any time by an order signed 
 by a majority of the judges of the municipal court 
 and spread upon the records of said court. The num- 
 ber of deputy clerks may be reduced at any time by 
 an order signed by a majority of the judges of said 
 municipal court and spread upon the records of said 
 court. It shall be the duty of deputy clerks to render 
 to parties to suits in cases of the fourth class and in 
 cases of the fifth class mentioned in section two (2) 
 of this act, such assistance and give them such infor- 
 mation as may enable them to properly commence 
 suits or to enter their appearances when sued, which 
 duty shall be regulated and defined by instructions to 
 be prepared by the chief justice. 
 
 Section 16. That there shall be a bailiff of said muni- 
 cipal court whose term of office shall be six years and 
 until his successor shall be elected and qualified and 
 who shall be elected on the first Tuesday after the 
 first Monday of November, A. D. 1906, and every six 
 years thereafter. He shall perform, with respect to 
 
Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17. 59 
 
 said municipal court, the duties usually performed by 
 sheriffs in respect to attendance upon, and service 
 and execution of the process, and obedience of the law- 
 ful orders and directions of, a circuit court. He shall 
 give his .personal attention to the performance of the 
 duties of his office. He shall maintain an office in each 
 district and each office shall be kept open in each dis- 
 trict for the transaction of business from 8 o'clock a. 
 m. ,to 6 'clock p. m. of each working day during the 
 year. Until otherwise provided by the rules which 
 may be adopted under the provisions of this act, the 
 powers, duties and liabilities, the oath of office, and 
 the bond and conditions thereof of such bailiff shall 
 be the same, as near as may be, as those prescribed 
 by law for sheriffs with respect to attendance upon, 
 and service and execution of the process, and obed- 
 ience of the lawful orders and directions of, a circuit 
 court. His salary shall be five thousand dollars 
 ($5,000) per annum and shall be paid in monthly in- 
 stallments out of the city treasury. He shall be com- 
 missioned by the Governor. ^ 
 
 Section 17. That said bailiff shall appoint such number 
 of deputies as may be determined, from time to time, 
 by a majority of judges of the municipal court by or- 
 ders signed by them and spread upon the records of 
 said court. At least one deputy bailiff shall be as- 
 signed to duty in each branch court. The salaries of 
 deputy bailiffs shall be fixed, from time to time, by 
 orders signed by a majority of the judges of the muni- 
 cipal court and spread upon the records of the court 
 and shall be payable out of the city treasury in month- 
 ly installments: Provided, however, that the salary 
 of the chief deputy bailiff shall not exceed two thou- 
 sand five hundred dollars ($2,500) per annum, and that 
 the salary of no other deputy bailiff shall exceed fif- 
 teen hundred dollars ($1,500) per annum. Such dep- 
 uty bailiffs shall take the same oath or affirmation re- 
 quired of the bailiff of said municipal court and shall 
 give bonds to be approved by the chief justice of said 
 court" conditioned, as near as may be, like the bond re- 
 quired of the bailiff. The bailiff and deputy bailiffs 
 of the municipal court shall be ex officio police officers 
 
60 Note to Sections 14, 15, 16 and, 17. 
 
 of tlie city of Chicago. Any deputy bailiff shall be 
 subject to removal at any time by an order signed 
 by a majority of the judges of the municipal court and 
 spread upon the records of said court. The number 
 of deputy bailiffs may be reduced at any time by an 
 order signed by a majority of the judges of said muni- 
 cipal court and spread upon the records of said court. 
 Every police officer of the city of Chicago shall be ex 
 officio a deputy bailiff of the municipal court, and shall 
 perform, from time to time, such duties in respect to 
 criminal and quasi criminal cases, including cases per- 
 taining to alleged violations of city ordinances pend- 
 ing in said court, as may be required of him by said 
 court or any judge thereof. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 14, 15, 16 AND 17. 
 
 In the original bill introduced as Senate BiU No. 45 and 
 House Bill No. 98, it was provided that the clerk and the 
 bailiff should be appointed by and hold their offices dur- 
 ing the pleasure of a majority of the judges. This was 
 deemed essential to the accomplishment of a proper ad- 
 ministration of the clerk's and bailiff's offices and the 
 prevention of many of the evils now prevalent in the 
 sheriff's office and in the offices of the clerks of the cir- 
 cuit, superior and criminal courts. It would have en- 
 abled the judges to select, for the offices of clerk and 
 bailiff, men of ability, capable of rendering material as- 
 sistance to the judges in the performance of their duties. 
 However, notwithstanding the modification of the orig- 
 inal plan resulting in the clerk and bailiff being made 
 elective officers, full control over their official conduct is 
 vested in the judges. The powers, duties and liabilities 
 of the clerk and the bailiff, while temporarily they are 
 to be the same, as near as may be, as those of clerks of 
 courts of record and sheriffs respectively, are entirely 
 
Note to Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17. 61 
 
 subject to regulation by the judges by means of rules and 
 regulations which the act permits them to adopt. 
 
 By section 8, supra, as we have already seen, it is 
 provided that the judges at their meetings "shall re- 
 ceive and investigate, or cause to be investigated, all 
 complaints presented to them pertaining to the said 
 court and to the officers thereof, and shall take such 
 steps as they deem necessary or proper with respect 
 thereto, and they shall have power, and it shall be their 
 duty, to adopt or cause to be adopted all such rules and 
 regulations for the proper administration of justice in 
 said court as to them may seem expedient." This pro- 
 vision, it will be seen, is very broad and comprehensive 
 and confers upon the judges power not only to adopt 
 such rules and regulations as they may deem expedient 
 in the respect to the clerk and bailiff, but also to cause 
 the removal of either of them upon complaint being 
 made against him of misconduct or upon his failing to 
 properly discharge the duties of his office. Though this 
 removal cannot be accomplished directly by an order to 
 that effect, it can be brought about by section 352 of 
 the Criminal Code, by which provision is made that 
 every person holding any public office who shall be 
 guilty of any palpable omission of duty, or of wilful and 
 corrupt oppression, malfeasance or partiality, shall be 
 fined not exceeding $10,000, and may be removed from 
 his office, trust or employment. As the municipal court 
 has jurisdiction in all criminal cases where the punish- 
 ment is by fine or imprisonment otherwise than in the 
 penitentiary, a speedy method is provided for the trial 
 and disposition of any complaint against the clerk or the 
 bailiff, or, indeed, against any public officer. No in- 
 dictment by the grand jury is necessary, as the case can 
 
62 Note to Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17. 
 
 be prosecuted by information. Neither need the ease 
 slumber upon the docket of the criminal court. It, as 
 well as all other criminal cases brought in the munici- 
 pal court, can be tried promptly and without delay. Ee- 
 sponsibility for the continuance of abuses in the clerk's or 
 bailiff's office, should there be abuses, must, therefore, 
 rest upon the judges whose power to bring about a ref- 
 ormation is ample and complete. 
 
 With respect to the deputies the powers of the judges 
 are practically unlimited. Express authority is given 
 them to fix the number and the salaries of the deputies 
 and to remove them at pleasure. While the act of ap- 
 pointment is to be performed by the clerk and the bailiff 
 respectively, it is within the power of the judges to pre- 
 scribe such rules and regulations for its exercise as will 
 insure the appointment of competent and trustworthy 
 persons. Practically the judges can dictate the appoint- 
 ments and therefore must be held responsible for the 
 quality and character of the appointees. They should, 
 and doubtless will, adopt regulations which will secure, 
 as far as it is practicable, proper appointments in the 
 first instance, and the subsequent retention of deputies 
 who have proved themselves efficient and trustworthy. 
 
 The provision for deputy clerks to act as shorthand 
 reporters is an important one. 'The business of the mu- 
 nicipal court, if it is to be conducted successfully, must 
 be conducted in accordance with business principles and 
 modem business methods. All the proceedings of each 
 branch court should be taken down in shorthand and 
 thus preserved for future reference, and this should be 
 done, not at the expense of the individual litigant, for 
 which expense he cannot be reimbursed, though success- 
 ful in his suit, but at the expense of the city and the city 
 
Note to Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17. 63 
 
 should, receive reimbursement out of the costs paid into 
 the city treasury. Not only litigants but the public are 
 interested in this matter. It is probable complaints will 
 be made respecting the conduct of judges in the trial of. 
 causes and the disposition of other business brought be- 
 fore them. A stenographic report of all that is said in 
 court by the judges, the attorneys, the parties and the 
 witnesses, will be the best means of determining the jus- 
 tice of such complaints. Moreover, the fact that all his 
 utterances are to be taken down in shorthand ready to 
 be transcribed in full and given to the public will, with- 
 out doubt, operate as a restraint as well upon the judge 
 upon the bench as upon the lawyer at the bar. Besides, 
 a stenographic report of the proceedings will be of great 
 importance in the correction of erroneous entries which 
 may be made in the record books of the court. 
 
 The requirement in section 15 that deputy clerks ren- 
 der to parties to suits in cases of the fourth and fifth 
 classes such assistance and give them such information 
 as may enable them to properly commence suits or to 
 enter their appearances when sued, is intended mainly 
 for the protection of poor persons who either are unable 
 to employ attorneys to institute suits or who appear in 
 response to a summons in ignorance of what is demanded 
 of them or of the course it is necessary for them to 
 pursue to defend themselves. 
 
 Deputy bailiffs are to take the places of and exercise 
 the functions now performed by constables. The con- 
 stable system has resulted in gross abuses which have 
 grown out of the fact that these officers must rely for 
 their compensation solely upon the fees which they may 
 collect from the litigants and that they can only be re- 
 moved from office by the slow process of indictment and 
 
64 Note to Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17. 
 
 conviction for misdemeanor in office. In order to secure 
 employment they must render themselves useful to their 
 employers, who are usually plaintiffs or judgment cred- 
 .itors, and this they do by collecting claims by sharp 
 practices and oppressive methods. So bold and un- 
 scrupulous have these officers of the law become that they 
 solicit business by circulars addressed to lawyers and 
 others, setting forth that they follow methods of pro- 
 cedure which result in the collection of judgments "which 
 the average constable working in the ordinary manner 
 has been unable to collect." 
 
 Doubtless there are many people in Chicago who do 
 not pay claims which they are able to pay and should 
 pay, but this furnishes no reason why many other people, 
 who, though willing to pay their debts, are unable to do 
 so, should be subjected to oppression or extortion at 
 the hands of officers of the law. By section 32 of the Con- 
 stitution of 1870 the people declared that "the General 
 Assembly shall pass liberal homestead and exemption 
 laws," and this the General Assembly has done. Often- 
 times, however, by their sharp practices and questionable 
 methods, constables subject exempt property to the satis- 
 fa;ction of executions, to the great distress of the judg- 
 ment debtors, and to the injury of the community at 
 large, to whose interest it is that the poor and unfor- 
 tunate should not be deprived of the rights guaranteed 
 them by law. | 
 
 All these abuses w^U disappear with the commence- 
 ment of the operation of the municipal court system. 
 The bailiff and his deputies, being salaried officers, will 
 have no interest in resorting to sharp practices or op- 
 pression for the purpose of earning fees. Their conduct 
 in the execution of process will be regulated by the 
 
Note to Sections 14, 15, 16 and 17. ' 65 
 
 judges and complaints against them for misbehavior, if 
 well founded, will result in their being adequately pun- 
 ished by dismissal or otherwise. 
 
 The provision that "every police officer of the city of 
 Chicago shall be ex oificio a deputy bailiff of the munic- 
 ipal court and shall perform, from time to time, such 
 duties in respect to criminal and quasi criminal cases, 
 including cases pertaining to alleged violations of city 
 ordinances pending in said court, as may be required of 
 him by said court or any judge thereof, " is of very great 
 importance, in that it makes every police officer of the 
 city an officer of the municipal court and as such subject 
 to its orders and to its discipline. The court will have 
 power to regulate the treatment of persons who are ar- 
 rested to be brought before the court and to investigate 
 all complaints respecting the conduct of police officers 
 towards such persons and apply the proper remedy in 
 cases of complaints well founded. On the other hand, 
 by the exercise of its power to investigate and pass upon 
 such complaints, the court will be able to protect police 
 officers against injury from complaints not well founded. 
 
 The number of deputy clerks and deputy bailiffs that 
 will be needed for the municipal court will doubtless be 
 at least 160. By some it is claimed that the power to 
 dictate so large a number of appointments will result 
 in turning the municipal court into a political machine, 
 greatly to the detriment of the public interests. That 
 would doubtless be unfortunate, but if we are to have a 
 machine it is better that it be one in which the bosses are 
 directly responsible to the people for an efficient and 
 economical administration of the department committed 
 to their charge. The people will have the privilege of 
 expressing their opinion of the court every two years. 
 
66 Note to Sections, 14, 15, 16 and 17. 
 
 when they elect one-third of the judges. This alone 
 would operate as a restraint upon the judges, were they 
 otherwise inclined, from political or other improper con- 
 siderations, to abuse their powers in respect to the selec- 
 tion of deputies. 
 
Section 18. 67 
 
 SECTION 18. 
 
 Section 18. That neither the clerk nor the bailiff nor any 
 deputy clerk or deputy bailiff of said municipal court 
 shall receive, aside from the salary and the costs by 
 this act required to be paid, to him in his official capa- 
 city, any money, property, or other valuable thing, as 
 a gratuity or otiherwise, for the performance of any duty 
 imposed upon him by virtue of his office, or for the per- 
 formance of any work of any kind or character in any 
 manner connected therewith. It shall be the duty of 
 the judges of said municipal court to remove from office 
 any deputy clerk or deputy bailiff who shall violate 
 either of the provisions of this section. • No clerk or 
 bailiff, or deputy clerk or deputy bailiff, of the muni- 
 cipal court shall be appointed receiver or guardian ad 
 litem in any suit therein pending. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 18. 
 
 This section contains the same provisions that were 
 contained in section 17 of Senate Bill No. 45 and House 
 Bill No. 98, excepting the following, which was inserted 
 in the latter after the words "in any manner connected 
 therewith : " 
 
 ' ' Nor shall any judge or the clerk or the bailiff or any 
 deputy clerk or deputy bailiff of said court solicit or re- 
 ceive, or cause to be solicited or received, from any rail- 
 road corporation or other common carrier, foV himself or 
 for any other person, any free pass or other gift of 
 value. ' ' 
 
 The House adopted this provision but it was rejected 
 by the Senate. Doubtless the prohibition against the 
 solicitation or acceptance of free passes by the clerk and 
 the bailiff and their deputies is included in that contained 
 in the first sentence of the section. The judges, how- 
 ever, are left at liberty to accept gifts from litigants in 
 
68 Note to Section 18. 
 
 the form of free passes, while having imposed upon them- 
 selves the burden of removing from office any deputy 
 clerk or deputy bailiff who accepts any gratuity in the 
 form of "money, property or other valuable thing." 
 Lord Bacon, the "wisest, brightest, meanest of man- 
 kind, ' ' laid down the following doctrine : 
 
 "The place of justice is an hallowed place, and there- 
 fore not only the bench, but the foot-pace and precincts 
 and purprise thereof, ought to be preserved without scan- 
 dal and corruption. T'or certainly, 'grapes' (as the Scrip- 
 ture saith), 'will not be gathered of thorns and thistles,' 
 neither can justice yield her fruit with sweetness among 
 the briars and brambles of catching and polling clerks 
 and ministers." 
 
 The House apparently endorsed this doctrine entirely, 
 but the Senate amended it by striking out the words "not 
 only the bench, but, ' ' It remains to be seen whether the 
 judges themselves will deem it proper to accept free 
 passes or other gratuities from litigants. 
 
 The municipal court will have to do principally with 
 cases involving small amounts and concerning people of 
 moderate means. It is obvious that the majority of the 
 litigants who may have causes pending before it, will not 
 be financially able to give tips to officers of the court or 
 free transportation or other rewards to the judges. If, 
 then, tipping and free pass giving is permitted to be in- 
 dulged m by the few who may be able to do so, those few 
 will enjoy an unjust and unfair advantage over their less 
 fortunate fellow citizens. 
 
 One benefit both to the public and to the individual liti- 
 gant sought to be accomplished by the municipal court 
 act is the encouragement of the waiver of jury trials. 
 The willingness of litigants to submit their cases for trial 
 
Note to Section 18. 69 
 
 by the court without a jury will, to some extent, at least, 
 be affected by the confidence which they may have in the 
 fairness and impartiality of the judges. Such confidence 
 will not exist to the extent that it otherwise would, if it is 
 understood that the judges accept free passes or any 
 other favors from railroad corporations or other persons 
 who have or expect to have causes pending in the court. 
 
70 Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 SECTIONS 19 AND 20. 
 
 Section 19. That until otherwise determined in the man- 
 ner hereinafter provided, and except as by this act is 
 otherwise prescribed, the practice in the municipal 
 court shall be the same, as near as may be, as that 
 which is now prescribed by law for similar suits or 
 proceedings in circuit courts, excepting that in cases 
 of the fourth class and cases of the fifth class men- 
 tioned in section two (2) of this act the issues shall be 
 determined without other forms of written pleadings 
 than those hereinafter expressly prescribed or pro- 
 vided for. Said municipal court shall be the sole judge 
 of the applicability to the proceedings of said court 
 of the rules of practice prescribed by law for similar 
 cases in the circuit courts and its decisions in respect 
 thereto shall not be subject to review upon appeal or 
 writ of error ; Provided, however, that upon appeal or 
 writ of error the supreme court, or the appellate court, 
 as the case may be, may grant relief from any such 
 decision in any case where, in the opinion of the su- 
 preme court or appellate court, such relief is necessary 
 to prevent a failure of justice. 
 
 Section 20. That the judges of said municipal court shall 
 have power to adopt, in addition to or in lieu of the 
 provisions herein contained prescribing the practice in 
 said municipal court or of any portion or portions of 
 said provisions, such rules regulating the practice in 
 said court ^as they may deem necessary or expedient 
 for the proper administration of justice therein. The 
 adoption of said rules shall be accomplished by an 
 order signed by a majority of said judges, which order, 
 when made, shall be forthwith spread upon the records 
 of the municipal court and shall be printed in pamphlet 
 form at the expense of the city: Provided, however, 
 that no such rule or rules so adopted shall be incon- 
 sistent with those expressly provided for by this act, 
 nor shall they become effective and be in force until 
 after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the approval 
 thereof by the supreme court. Application to the su- 
 preme court for such approval may be made by the 
 chief justice of the municipal court, after notice of 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 71 
 
 STicli application shall have been published once each 
 week, for three consecutive weeks, in some newspaper 
 of general circulation published in the city of Chicago, 
 specifying the time at which such application shall be 
 made. Upon such application the supreme court shall 
 review the said rule or rules so adopted and may either 
 confirm the order adopting the same or may modify or 
 set aside the same, and the supreme court may, in its 
 discretion, substitute for the rule or rules so adopted 
 by said judges of said municipal court or for any por- 
 tion thereof, such other rules as the supreme court may 
 deem proper, and may, in its discretion, of its own mo- 
 tion or otherwise, make any order respecting the rules 
 of said municipal court which it may deem proper. The 
 supreme court and appellate courts in cases brought 
 to them from the municipal court by apiieal or writ of 
 error shall take judicial notice of the rules of practice 
 from time to time in force in said municipal court. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 19 AND 20. 
 
 The substitution of municipal courts, which were to be 
 courts of record, for justices of the peace, was a radical 
 change in the existing order of things. The adoption, 
 therefore, by the General Assembly of a complete and 
 inflexible code of practice might have resulted in great 
 inconvenience and mischief, because of the inability of 
 the General Assembly to foresee precisely what rules 
 Avould operate most beneficially. Accordingly it was de- 
 termined that, at the outset, the new courts should adopt 
 as guides the rules of practice prevailing in the circuit 
 court, excepting in a few specified particulars, and that 
 extensive powers should be given to the judges to change 
 those rules and adopt new rules, from time to time, as 
 that course might seem necessary or expedient. Pro- 
 vision was made, however, that, during the time which 
 might elapse before new rules should be adopted, the 
 
72 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 conformity to the rules of practice in the circuit court 
 should only be " as near as may be. ' ' 
 
 The meaning of this phrase has been judicially deter- 
 mined. By section 914 of the Eevised Statutes of the 
 United States the practice of the circuit and district 
 courts in all civil cases, other than equity and admiralty 
 cases, is required to conform "as near as may be" to 
 the practice in like cases in the courts of the states in 
 which such circuit and district courts are held. In Nudd 
 V. Burrows, 91 U. S., 441, Indianapolis, Sc, B. B. Co. v. 
 Horst, 93 U. S., 291, and Mexican Central BailwoA/ v. 
 Pinkney, 149 U. S., 194, 207, the supreme court of the 
 United States expressed its opinion of the meaning of the 
 phrase referred to in the following language: "The 
 conformity is required to be 'as near as may be' — ^not as 
 near as may be possible, or as near as may be practicable. 
 This indefiniteness may have been suggested by a pur- 
 pose : it devolved upon the judges to be affected the duty 
 of construing and deciding, and gave them power to re- 
 ject, as Congress doubtless expected they would do, any 
 subordinate provision in such state statutes which, in 
 their judgment, would unwisely encumber the adminis- 
 tration of the law, or tend to defeat the ends of justice in 
 their tribunals. ' ' 
 
 That the General Assembly intended this was the con- 
 struction to be given to the phrase "as near as may be" 
 is evidenced by the provision that ' ' said municipal court 
 shall be the sole judge of the applicability to the proceed- 
 ings of said court of the rules of practice prescribed by 
 law for similar cases in the circuit courts ' ' and the further 
 provision that its decisions in respect thereto shall only 
 be reviewed upon appeal or writ of error when such re- 
 view is necessary to prevent a failure of justice. These 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 73 
 
 provisions, together with that in section 8 providing that 
 the judges "shall have power and it shall be their duty 
 to adopt or cause to be adopted all such rules and regula- 
 tions for the proper administration of justice in said 
 court as to them may seem expedient," those in section 
 20 giving the judges of the municipal court and the su- 
 preme court thepowertoadoptrulesof practice, and those 
 in sections 22, 23 and 31 limiting the power of the supreme 
 court and the appellate court to review the decisions of 
 the municipal court as to matters of practice, are all con- 
 firmatory of the conclusion that it was the legislative 
 intention that the judges of the municipal court should 
 have a wide discretion as to how far they should be bound 
 to follow and be governed by the rules of practice pre- 
 scribed by law for similar cases in the circuit courts. 
 
 In determining the construction to be given to section 
 20 it is important that we have before us the history of 
 the provisions therein contained. The original bill, enti- 
 tled "A bill for an Act in relation to municipal courts 
 in the city of Chicago," introduced into the Senate as 
 Senate Bill No. 45, and into the House as House Bill No. 
 98, as already stated, was referred to the House Commit- 
 tee on Chicago Charter, which, after a careful considera- 
 tion of its provisions, framed and reported it with certain 
 additions and changes to the House as House Bill No. 
 422, entitled "A Bill for an Act in relation to municipal 
 courts in the City of Chicago, ' ' and it was subsequently 
 passed by the House with only two modifications so far 
 as sections 18 and 19, corresponding with sections 19 and 
 20 of the act as finally passed, are concerned. One 
 modification was the addition of the proviso mentioned 
 below in reference to the granting of relief by the su- 
 preme court or appellate court as to a question of prac- 
 
74 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 tice for tlie purpose of preventing a failure of justice. 
 The other was the requirement that the supreme court 
 and the appellate courts should take judicial notice of 
 the rules of practice in force, from time to time, in the 
 common pleas court and in the city courts. In the Sen- 
 ate, House Bill No. 422 was amended and passed as 
 amended under the title of "A Bill for an Act in relation 
 to a municipal court in the City of Chicago." By the 
 amendments sections 18 and 19 of the original bill were 
 made sections 19 and 20 and both were substantially mod- 
 ified. The conference committee of the Senate and House 
 further modified section 20 as passed by the Senate and 
 the two houses approved their action, and the act as 
 thus modified became a law by the approval by both 
 houses of the report of the conference committee and the 
 signature of the governor. Sections 18 and 19 of the 
 original bill, the same sections of House Bill No. 422 as 
 passed by the House, and sections 19 and 20 of House 
 Bill No. 422 as amended and passed by the Senate, are 
 as follows: 
 
 Sections 18 and 19 of Senate Bill No 45 and House 
 
 Bill No. 98. 
 
 Sec. 18. That until otherwise determined in the man- 
 ner hereinafter provided, and except as by this act is 
 otherwise prescribed, the practice in the common pleas 
 court shall be the same, as near as may be, as that 
 which is now prescribed by law for similar suits or 
 proceedings in circuit courts, and until otherwise deter- 
 mined in the manner hereinafter provided and except 
 as by this act is otherwise prescribed, the practice in 
 the city courts shall be the same, as near as may be, as 
 that which is now prescribed by law for similar suits 
 and proceedings before justices of the peace and police 
 magistrates, Said common pleas court and said city 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 75 
 
 courts shall be the sole judges of the applicability to 
 the proceedings of said courts of the rules of practice 
 prescribed by law for similar cases in the circuit courts 
 and before justices of the peace and police magistrates, 
 and their decisions in respect thereto shall not be sub- 
 ject to review upon appeal or writ of error. 
 
 Sec. 19. That the judges of said common pleas court 
 shall have power to adopt in addition to or in lieu of 
 the provisions herein contained prescribing the prac- 
 tice in said common pleas court and city courts, or of 
 any portion or portions of said provisions, such rules 
 regulating the practice in said respective courts as they 
 may deem necessary or expedient for the proper ad- 
 ministration of justice therein. The adoption of said 
 rules shall be accomplished by an order signed by a 
 majority of said judges, which order, when made, shall 
 be forthwith spread upon the record of the common 
 pleas court and shall be printed in pamphlet form at 
 the expense of the city and shall go into effect thirty 
 days after being so spread upon said record, and when 
 it shall so go into effect the rules thereby prescribed 
 shall supersede and take the place of all the provisions 
 of this act pertaining to the practice of said courts 
 inconsistent therewith, and said rules so adopted may 
 be amended, rescinded, or added to by a like order 
 signed by a like number of judges of said court, such 
 order to be likewise spread upon the record of said 
 court and printed in pamphlet form, and go into effect 
 thirty days after being spread upon said record; pro- 
 vided, however, that any resident of the city of Chicago 
 shall, upon petition therefor, at any time within sixty 
 days from the entry of any such order, be allowed an 
 appeal from such order to the supreme court. Such 
 appeal shall be allowed without bond, but shall not sus- 
 pend the operation of said order during its pendency. 
 Upon such appeal the supreme court shall review the 
 said order and consider the rules thereby adopted and 
 may either confirm said order or may modify or set 
 aside the same, and the supreme court may, in its dis- 
 cretion, substitute for the rules so adopted by said 
 judges of said common pleas court, or for any portion 
 thereof, such other rules as the supreme court may 
 
76 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 deem proper, and may, in its discretion, of its own mo- 
 tion or otherwise, make any order respecting the rales 
 of said common pleas court and city courts which it 
 may deem proper. 
 
 Sections 19 and 20 of House Bill No. 422, as Passed by 
 
 THE House. 
 
 Sec. 19. That until otherwise determined in the man- 
 ner hereinafter provided, and except as by this act is 
 otherwise prescribed, the practice in the common pleas 
 ■ court shall be the same, as near as may be, as that 
 which is now prescribed by law for similar suits or 
 proceedings in circuit courts, and until otherwise de- 
 termined in the manner hereinafter provided and ex- 
 cept as by this act is otherwise prescribed, the practice 
 in the city courts shall be the same, as near as may be, 
 as that which is now prescribed by law for similar suits 
 and proceedings before justices of the peace and police 
 magistrates. Said common pleas court and said city 
 courts shall be the sole judges of the applicability to 
 the proceedings of said courts of the rules of practice 
 prescribed by law for similar cases in the circuit courts 
 and before justices of the peace and police magistrates, 
 and their decisions in respect thereto shall not be sub- 
 ject to review upon appeal or writ of error ; provided, 
 however, that upon appeal or writ of error, the supreme 
 court or appellate court, as the case may be, may grant 
 relief from any such decision in any case, where, in the 
 opinion of the supreme court or appellate court, such 
 relief is necessary to prevent a failure of justice. 
 
 Sec. 20. That the judges of said common pleas court 
 shall have power to adopt in addition to or in lieu of 
 the provisions herein contained prescribing the prac- 
 tice in said common pleas court and city courts, or 
 of any portion or portions of said provisions, such 
 rules regulating the practice in said respective courts 
 as they may deem necessary or expedient for the 
 proper administration of justice therein. The adop- 
 tion of said rules shall be accomplished by an order 
 signed by a majority of said judges, which order, "when 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 77 
 
 made, shall be forthwith spread upon the record of the 
 common pleas court and shall be printed in pamphlet 
 form at the expense of the city and shall go into effect 
 thirty days after being so spread upon said record, 
 and when it shall so go into effect the rules thereby 
 prescribed shall supersede and take the place of all the 
 provisions of this act pertaining to the practice of said 
 courts inconsistent therewith, and said rules so adopted 
 may be amended rescinded or added to by a like order 
 signed by a like number of judges of said court such 
 order to be likewise spread upon the record of said 
 court and printed in pamphlet form and go into effect 
 thirty days after being spread upon said record; pro- 
 vided, however, that any resident of the city of Chicago 
 shall, upon petition therefor, at any time within sixty 
 days from the entry of any such order be allowed 
 an appeal from such order to the supreme court. 
 Such appeal shall be allowed without bond, but 
 shall not suspend the operation of said order during 
 its pendency. Upon such appeal the supreme court 
 shall review the said order and consider the rules 
 thereby adopted and may either confirm said order or 
 may modify or set aside the same, and the supreme 
 court may, in its discretion, substitute for the rules so 
 adopted by said judges of said common pleas court, or 
 for any portion thereof, such other rules as the supreme 
 court may deem proper, and may, in its discretion, 
 of its own motion or otherwise, make any order respect- 
 ing the rules of said common pleas court and city courts 
 which it may deem proper. The supreme court cmd 
 the appellate courts, in cases brought to them from 
 the common pleas court and the city courts, by appeal 
 or writ of error, shall take judicial notice of the rules 
 of practice from time to time in force in said common 
 pleas court and in said city courts. 
 
 Sections 18 and 19 of House Bill No. 422, as Amended 
 AND Passed by the Senate. 
 
 Section 19. That until otherwise determined in the man- 
 ner hereinafter provided, and except as by this act is 
 otherwise prescribed, the practice in the municipal 
 
7S Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 court shall be the same, as near as may be, as that 
 which is now prescribed by law for similar suits or 
 proceedings in circuit courts, excepting that in cases 
 of the fourth class and cases of the fifth class men- 
 tioned in section two (2) of this act the issues shall be 
 determined without other forms of written pleadings 
 than those hereinafter expressly prescribed or pro- 
 vided for. Said municipal court shall be the sole judge 
 of the applicability to the proceedings of said court 
 of the rules of practice prescribed by law for similar 
 cases in the circuit courts and its decisions in respect 
 thereto shall not be subject to review upon appeal or 
 writ of error: Provided, however, that upon appeal 
 or writ of error the supreme court or the appellate 
 court, as the case may be, may grant relief from any 
 such decision in any case where, in the opinion of the 
 supreme court or the appellate court, such relief is 
 necessary to prevent a failure of justice. 
 
 Section 20. That the judges of said municipal court shall 
 have power to adopt, in addition to or in lieu of the 
 provisions herein contained prescribing the practice in 
 said municipal court or of any portion or portions of 
 said provisions, such rules regulating the practice in 
 said court as they may deem necessary or expedient 
 for the proper administration of justice therein. The 
 adoption of said rules shall be accomplished by an 
 order signed by a majprity of said judges, which order, 
 when made, shall be forthwith spread upon the records 
 of the municipal court and shall be printed in pamphlet 
 form at the expense of the city: Provided, however, 
 
 - that no rule or rules inconsistent with those expressly 
 provided for by this act shall become effective and be 
 in force until after the lapse of thirty (30) days from 
 the approval thereof by the supreme court. Applica- 
 tion to the supreme court for such approval may be 
 made by the chief justice of the municipal court, after 
 notice of such application shall have been published 
 once each week, for three consecutive weeks, in some 
 newspaper of general circulation published in the city 
 of Chicago, specifying the time at which such applica- 
 tion shall be made. Upon such application the supreme 
 
 ■ court shall review the said rule or rules so adopted 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 79 
 
 and may either confirm the order adopting the same or 
 may modify or set aside the same, and the supreme 
 • court may, in its discretion, substitute for the rule or 
 rules so adopted by said judges of said municipal court 
 or for any portion thereof, such other rules as the 
 supteme court may deem proper, and may, in its dis- 
 cretion, of its own motion or otherwise, make any 
 order respecting the rules of said municipal court 
 which it may deem proper. The supreme court and 
 the appellate courts in cases brought to them from the 
 municipal court by appeal or writ of error shall take 
 judicial notice of the rules of practice from time to 
 time in force in said municipal court. 
 
 It will be seen that the only modification made by the 
 House, to section 18 of the original bill was to add to it 
 the following proviso : 
 
 ' ' Provided, however, that upon appeal or writ of error 
 the supreme court or appellate court, as the case may be, 
 may grant relief from any such decision {i. e., any deci- 
 sion upon the applicability to the proceedings of the com- 
 mon pleas court and the city courts of the rules of prac- 
 tice prescribed by law for similar cases in the circuit 
 courts and before justices of the peace and police magis- 
 trates), in any case where, in the opinion of the supreme 
 court or appellate court, such relief is necessary to pre- 
 vent a failure of justice. ' ' 
 
 And the only modification made by the House to Sec- 
 tion 19 of the original bill was to add to it the following : 
 "The supreme court and the appellate courts in cases 
 brought to them from the municipal court by appeal or 
 writ of error shall take judicial notice of the rules of 
 practice from time to time in force in said municipal 
 court. ' ' 
 
 Section 19 of House Bill No. 422 as passed by the Sen- 
 ate, corresponding to section 18 of the original bill, 
 
80 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 changed the latter so as to eliminate the requirement of 
 conformity with the rules of practice before justices of 
 the peace and police magistrates and to require conform- 
 ity of the practice in the municipal court with that pre- 
 scribed by law for similar suits or proceedings in the cir- 
 cuit courts "until otherwise determined in the manner 
 hereinafter provided and except as by this act is other- 
 wise prescribed. ' ' 
 
 Section 20 of House Bill No. 422 as passed by the Sen- 
 ate, corresponding with section 19 of the original bill, so 
 changed the latter as to provide that no rules adopted by 
 the judges of the municipal court inconsistent with those 
 expressly provided for by the act should become effective 
 until after their approval by the supreme court and pro- 
 vided for the method by which the application for such 
 approval should be made. 
 
 When sections 19 and 20 came before the conference 
 committee vigorous opposition was made to the proposi- 
 tion that the judges of the municipal court should have 
 the power to set aside or modify rules of practice ex- 
 pressly prescribed by the General Assembly. The oppo- 
 sition thus made resulted in an amendment of section 20 
 as adopted by the House and amended by the Senate so 
 that the proviso, "Provided, however, fhat no rule or 
 rules inconsistent with those expressly provided for hy 
 this act shall become effective and be in force until after 
 the lapse of thirty days from the approval thereof by the 
 supreme court," was made to read, "provided, however, 
 that no such rule or rules so adopted shall he inconsistent 
 with those expressly provided for hy this act, nor shall 
 they become effective and be in force until after the lapse 
 of thirty days from the approval thereof by the supreme 
 court." 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 81 
 
 The effect of this change in the phraseology of the sec- 
 tion is to create some ambiguity and uncertainty as to 
 the construction to be given to section 20. It renders it 
 necessary to enquire what rules are included within the 
 expression "those expressly provided for by this act"? 
 Are the rules thereby forbidden to be amended those only 
 which are embodied in the succeeding sections 21 to 51, 
 or do they also include the rules of practice "now pre- 
 scribed by law for similar suits or proceedings in circuit 
 courts," made applicable, "as near as may be," by sec- 
 tion 19 ? The ambiguity and uncertainty thus created is, 
 however, more apparent than real. It will be found upon 
 examination that the language used by the legislature in 
 section 20 and in other sections which will be referred to 
 is inconsistent with any other theory than that it was the 
 intention to confer upon the judges of the municipal court 
 the power to adopt, with the approval of the supreme 
 court, any rules of practice not inconsistent with those 
 prescribed in sections 21 to 51, inclusive, although they 
 might be inconsistent with those prescribed by law for 
 similar suits or proceedings in the circuit court. 
 
 1. Effect must be given to the language in section 19, 
 "until otherwise determined in the manner hereinafter 
 provided and except as by this act is otherwise pre- 
 scribed. ' ' This language clearly expresses the intention 
 that the rules of practice prevailing in the circuit courts 
 shall only be applied temporarily in the municipal court 
 "until otherwise determined in the manner hereinafter 
 provided. ' ' There is no manner ' ' hereinafter provided ' ' 
 for changing the rules of practice prevailing in the circuit 
 courts, unless it be that contained in section 20. 
 
 2. Section 20 declares that "the supreme court . . 
 . may, in its discretion, of its own motion or otherwise, 
 
82 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 make any order respecting the rules of said municipal 
 court which it may deem proper.'" Eegardless, there- 
 fore, of what the judges of the municipal court may have 
 power to do, here is a complete grant of power to the 
 supreme court to "make any order respecting the rules 
 of said municipal court which it may deem proper." 
 This provision is broad enough to confer upon the 
 supreme court power, not only to prescribe new rules of 
 practice for the municipal court in lieu of those prevail- 
 ing in similar cases in the circuit courts, but also to mod- 
 ify those expressly prescribed in subsequent sections 21 
 to 51, inclusive. 
 
 3. Again, it is provided in section 22 that "the prac- 
 tice in case of appeals from or writs of error to said 
 municipal court in said cases shall, except as in this act 
 or by rules of said court adopted in pursuance hereof, 
 may be otherwise provided, be the same, as near as may 
 be, as the practice in cases of appeals from and writs of 
 error to circuit courts in similar cases." Here is a plain 
 indication of authority given by this act for the adoption 
 of rules modifying the practice prevailing in the circuit 
 courts in cases of appeals or writs of error. This is con- 
 firmatory of the theory that the legislative intent was 
 that the supreme court should have absolute power to 
 make any and all rules which it might deem proper to 
 make regulating the practice in the municipal court. 
 
 4. In section 28 prescribing the practice in cases of 
 the first class the expression "until otherwise provided 
 by the rules of the municipal court and except as is here- 
 in otherwise prescribed," is a further indication of the 
 legislative intent that even the special provisions in ref- 
 erence to cases of the first class might be modified by 
 means of rules of the municipal court, adopted either by 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 83 
 
 the judges of that court with the approval of the supreme 
 court, or by the supreme court of its own motion. 
 
 5. In section 50, pertaining to the taking of bail in 
 criminal and quasi-criminal cases, we find the language 
 ' ' the exercise of the power hereby conferred of letting to 
 bail shall be subject to regulation by such rules as may 
 be adopted by a majority of the judges of the municipal 
 court as herein provided. " It is also in that section pre- 
 scribed that "the court may, by rule, provide that any 
 defendant arrested in any criminal case in which the pun- 
 ishment is by fine only, or in any quasi-criminal case, 
 may, in lieu of giving bail for his appearance, deposit with 
 the clerk such sum of money as the court may deem suffi- 
 cient to secure his appearance at the time or times so 
 fixed therefor." This language is also indicative of the 
 intention to vest in the court power to make rules. 
 
 6. In section" 51 the provision empowering any branch 
 court, when the method of procedure in any case is not 
 sufficiently prescribed by the act, or "by any rule of 
 court adopted in pursuance hereof, ' ' to make such provi- 
 sion for disposing of the case as the court may deem 
 proper is indicative of a similar intention. 
 
 7. In section 40, it is provided that "in cases of the 
 fourth class and in cases of the filth class mentioned in 
 section 2 of this act, the municipal court may adopt such 
 rules and regulations as it may deem necessary to enable 
 the parties, in advance of the trial, to ascertain the nature 
 of the plaintiff's claim or claims, or of the defendant's 
 defense or defenses. ' ' This is a recognition of the power 
 of the court to adopt rules. 
 
 8. The rules provided, for in section 20 are to be rules 
 "in lieu of or in addition to" those prescribed by the act. 
 
84 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 This language precludes the idea thai the niles adopted 
 were not to be inconsistent with those prevailing in the 
 circuit courts. 
 
 9. Finally, the fact that by the terms of section 19 the 
 municipal court was to be the sole judge of the appli- 
 cability to its proceedings of the rules prevailing in the 
 circuit court, effectually refutes the claim that the Gen- 
 eral Assembly was unwilling to permit the judges of the 
 municipal court, with the concurrence of the supreme 
 court, to change those rules. 
 
 If these views are sound it follows tha!t the judges of 
 the municipal court, with the approval of the supreme 
 court, have power to adopt new rules inconsistent with 
 those prevailing in the circuit court, provided the rules 
 thus adopted are not inconsistent with those expressed in 
 sections 21 to 51, both inclusive, and that the supreme 
 court has absolute power, of its own motion, to modify or 
 set aside any or all of the rules prescribed by the act and 
 cause to be adopted, in lieu thereof, such rules as it may 
 deem proper. 
 
 Upon the question whether the interests of the adminis- 
 tration of justice will be better subserved by committing 
 to the supreme court the power to make, or to supervise 
 the making of, rules of practice for the municipal court, 
 rather than leaving it to be attended to by the General 
 Assembly, there is but little need of discussion. The 
 supreme court, by virtue of its appellate jurisdiction, ex- 
 ercises supervisory power over inferior courts affirming 
 their judgments and decrees when entered in accordance 
 with the rights of the parties as prescribed by law, and 
 reversing them when erroneous. In exercising its appel- 
 late jurisdiction, its sole function is to see that justice is 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 85 
 
 done between the parties litigant, so far as the law will 
 permit. Why, then, in order to accomplish its purpose 
 should not the supreme court he permitted, in the first 
 instance, to instruct inferior courts how to proceed, rather 
 than be required to confine itself to compelling them to 
 proceed according to methods prescribed by the General 
 Assembly and which, as experience may show, may result 
 in injustice? 
 
 Past experience has demonstrated that the General 
 Assembly is unfitted to properly perform the work of 
 prescribing the practice of the courts. To suppose the 
 non-professional members of that body are capable of 
 framing proper rules of practice is absurd. As for the 
 members who are lawyers, it may be said with truth that 
 nearly every one of them has a grievance, or has heard of 
 some other lawyer's grievance, against some trial judge 
 which induces him either to seek the enactment of some 
 rule curbing the judge's power, or to resist the repeal or 
 modification of one already enacted for that purpose. 
 
 The conferring of this power upon the supreme court, 
 instead of increasing the labors of that tribunal, would 
 greatly diminish them. Eules framed by the supreme 
 court with the aid of the judges of the inferior court 
 would be understood by the latter and properly applied 
 in the trial of causes, and the greater portion of the time 
 which is now devoted not only by the supreme court, but 
 by the inferior courts and the members of the profession, 
 to the investigation, argument and decision of questions 
 of practice might be applied, with greater benefit to all 
 concerned, to the ascertainment of the substantive rights 
 of the parties litigant. 
 
 In the opinion of the writer the two sections now under 
 
86 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 consideration are among the most important of the act, 
 and, if construed as the writer contends they should be 
 and faithfully availed of by the judges of the municipal 
 court and the supreme court, they will be the means of 
 accomplishing much needed reforms in the administra- 
 tion of justice. 
 
 Constitutional Questions as to Peactice Pbovisions. 
 
 The practice provisions, the constitutionality of which 
 have been questioned, are, among others, the following: 
 
 1. Those in section 20 authorizing the judges of the 
 municipal court, with the approval of the supreme court, 
 and authorizing the supreme court upon its own motion, 
 to adopt, in addition to or in lieu of the provisions con- 
 tained in the act, rules regulating the practice in the 
 municipal court. 
 
 2. Those in sections 19, 22, 23 and 31 limitiug the 
 power of the supreme court and the appellate courts to 
 review the decisions of the municipal court upon ques- 
 tions of practice. 
 
 3. Those in section 20 which prescribes that "the su- 
 preme court and the appellate courts, in cases brought to 
 them from the municipal court by appeal or writ of error, 
 shall take judicial notice of the rules of practice from 
 time to time in force in said municipal court. 
 
 4. Those in section 23 limiting to thirty days the time 
 within which writs of error may be sued out to review 
 the judgments of the municipal court in cases of the 
 fourth and fifth classes. 
 
 5. Those in sections 25, 26 and 31 relating to the em- 
 panelling of jurors in the municipal court. 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 87 
 
 6. Those in sections 30 and 56 affecting the right of 
 trial by jury. 
 
 7. Those in section 39 regulating applications for 
 changes of vernie. 
 
 These provisions will be discussed in the order above 
 indicated. 
 
 FiKST. The provisions in section 20 conferring power 
 upon the judges of the municipal court and the Supreme 
 court to make rules. 
 
 During the consideration of the municipal court act by 
 the legislature the objection was made and strenuously 
 insisted upon that the General Assembly could not consti- 
 tutionally confer upon the municipal court or upon the 
 judges thereof, or upon the supreme court, the power of 
 adopting rules of practice inconsistent with those which 
 might be prescribed in the act which the G-eneral Assem- 
 bly might see fit to pass. In support of this objection it 
 was asserted that the establishment of rules and regula- 
 tions prescribing the practice of the courts was a legis- 
 lative function to be performed only by the General 
 Assembly and not to be conferred or imposed upon the 
 judicial department of the government. This position 
 is clearly unsound. 
 
 It is elementary that the General Assembly has the in- 
 herent power to pass any law which is not either ex- 
 pressly or impliedly prohibited by the constitution of this 
 state or by the constitution of the United States and the 
 laws made and treaties entered into in pursuance there- 
 of. In other words, the constitution of this state is not a 
 grant of power to the General Assembly, but is a limita- 
 tion on the power of that department. 
 
 By section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution, it is 
 
88 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 provided, that "the organization, jurisdiction, powers, 
 proceedings and practice of all courts, of the same class 
 or grade, so far as regulated by law, and the force and 
 effect of the process, judgments and decrees of such courts, 
 severally, shall be uniform. ' ' The expression, ' ' so far as 
 regulated by law," is inconsistent with the idea that the 
 practice of the courts is to be entirely regulated by law 
 and indicates clearly that the extent to which matters of 
 practice shall be regulated by law and the extent to which 
 they shall be regulated by the courts, is one committed 
 entirely to the discretion of the General Assembly. Con- 
 sidered by itself alone, the language x>t section 29 could 
 not be construed to prohibit the legislature from commit- 
 ting to the courts the regulation of the entire practice 
 therein in every suit from its commencement to its conclu- 
 sion. If the legislature saw fit to do nothing more than 
 create courts and define their jurisdiction, the courts thus 
 created would have the inherent power to prescribe all 
 such rules and regulations as they might deem necessary 
 for the proper exercise of the jurisdiction thus given 
 them. Finlen v. Eemze, 69 Pac. (Mont.), 828. This is 
 certainly true unless the power to prescribe rules of prac- 
 tice is a purely legislative power which, because of the 
 prohibition contained in Article III of the Constitution, 
 can not be conferred upon the judicial department. 
 
 That the making of rules of practice is a judicial rather 
 than a legislative function is a conclusion which must in- 
 evitably be drawn from a consideration of the history of 
 English and American law. The rules regulating the 
 practice of the courts are for the most part rules which 
 have been made by the courts themselves. The sole func- 
 tion of legislation so far as matters of practice are con- 
 cerned, has been to change court-made rules by substitut- 
 ing in their place rules made by legislative bodies. 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 89 
 
 By the Temporary Process Act of September 9, 1789, 
 1 Stat., 93, enacted by Congress, if not otherwise pro- 
 vided, the forms of writs and executions, (except their 
 style), and modes of process in the circuit and district 
 courts in suits at common law, were directed to be the 
 same as in the supreme courts of the states respectively. 
 By the Permanent Process Act of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat., 
 275, it was enacted that the forms of writs, executions and 
 other processes, and the forms and modes of proceedings 
 in suits at common law, should be the same as directed 
 by the Act of 1789, subject to such alterations and addi- 
 tions as the said courts should deem expedient, or to such 
 regulations as the supreme court of the United States 
 should think proper by rule to prescribe for any circuit 
 or district court. Thus the practice in United States 
 courts under the old statutes in common law cases, was 
 made to conform to the state practice as it was in 1789, 
 subject to alterations by rule of court. In 1828 a law was 
 passed adopting, for the federal courts in the new states 
 admitted since 1789, the forms of process, and forms and 
 modes of proceeding, of the highest courts of those states 
 respectively, as then existing, subject to alteration by the 
 courts themselves or the supreme court of the United 
 States. 4 Stat., 278. By the Act of August 1, 1842, the 
 provisions of the Act of 1828 were extended to states ad- 
 mitted in the intermediate time. Subsequently by the 
 fifth section of the Act of June 1, 1872, Revised Statutes, 
 Sec. 914, it was declared that ' ' the practice, pleadings and 
 forms and modes of proceeding in civil causes, other than 
 equity and admiralty causes, in the circuit and district 
 courts shall conform, as near as may be, to the practice, 
 pleadings and forms and modes of proceeding existing at 
 the time in like causes in the courts of record of the state 
 
90 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 within which such circuit or district courts are held." 
 Amy V. Watertown, 130 U. S., 301. 
 
 In section 913 of the Revised Statutes of the United 
 States it is provided that "the forms of mesne process 
 and the forms and modes of proceeding in suits of equity 
 and of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the cir- 
 cuit and district courts shall be according to the princi- 
 ples, rules, and usages which belong to courts of equity 
 and of admiralty, respectively, except when it is other- 
 wise provided by statute or by the rules of court made 
 ill pursuance thereof; but the same shall be subject to 
 alteration and addition by the said courts, respectively, 
 and to regulation by the supreme court, by rules pre- 
 scribed, from time to time, to any circuit or district court, 
 not inconsistent with the laws of the United States. ' ' In 
 pursuance of this section, which has been in force ever 
 since 1789, the supreme court of the United States has, 
 by the adoption of equity rules and of admiralty rules, 
 regulated the entire system of equity and admiralty prac- 
 tice in the circuit and district courts of the United States 
 from the commencement of suits to their final determina- 
 tion. 
 
 By the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 it is provided that ' ' all 
 necessary rules, forms and orders as to procedure and 
 for carrying this act into force and effect shall be pre- 
 scribed, and may be amended, from time to time, by the 
 supreme court of the United States." In pursuance of 
 this provision the supreme court at its October Term, 
 1898, adopted general orders in bankruptcy regulating 
 the entire system of procedure in bankruptcy cases. 
 
 It will thus be seen that the entire equity, admiralty 
 and bankruptcy practice in the United States courts al- 
 ways has been and still is regulated by rules adopted by 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 91 
 
 the supreme court of the United States and the power of 
 the court to adopt these rules has never been questioned, 
 and that down to 1872 the entire system of practice in the 
 circuit and district courts of the United States in common 
 law cases was subject to regulation by the supreme, cir- 
 cuit and district courts of the United States. 
 
 Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution of Maine 
 provides that "the judicial power of this state shall be 
 vested in a supreme court and such other courts as the 
 legislature shall, from time to time, establish," and by 
 Chapter 79 of the Revised Statutes of that state it is pro- 
 vided that "it {i. e., the supreme judicial court) may 
 establish and cause to be recorded rules, not repugnant 
 t( law, respecting the modes of trial and conduct of busi- 
 ness in suits at law and in equity. ' ' 
 
 By section 2 of Article VI of the Constitution of Minne- 
 sota, it is provided that "the supreme court . . . 
 shall have original jurisdiction in such remedial cases as 
 may be prescribed by law. and appellate jurisdiction in all 
 cases both in law and equity. ' ' By section 5 of the same 
 article it is provided that ' ' the district courts shall have 
 original jurisdiction in all civil cases both in law and 
 equity, where the amount in controversy exceeds $100 
 and in all criminal cases where the punishment shall ex- 
 ceed three months' imprisonment or a fine of more than 
 $100, and shall have such appellate jurisdiction as may be 
 prescribed by law." By section 4886 of the Code of that 
 state it is provided that ' ' the judges of the district courts 
 . . . and of the several courts of common pleas of the 
 state shall on the first Wednesday of July next or on 
 some day prior thereto . . . meet in general session 
 . . . in the city of St. Paul and adopt such general 
 rules of practice in civil actions, not inconsistent with the 
 
92 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 constitution and laws of the state and of the United 
 States as will secure a uniformity of practice throughout 
 the state as may be deemed necessary and just." The 
 code also makes provision for an annual meeting of the 
 judges for the revision of the rules. 
 
 Section 4 of Article V of the Constitution of South 
 Carolina provides that "the supreme court shall have 
 power to issue writs or orders of injunction, mandamus, 
 quo warranto, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and 
 other original and remedial writs. And said court shall 
 have appellate jurisdiction only in cases of chancery . . 
 . and shall constitute a court for the correction of errors 
 at law under such regulations as the General Assembly 
 may by law prescribe." By section 450 of the code of 
 civil procedure of that state, it is provided that ' ' the jus- 
 tices of the supreme court and the judges of the circuit 
 court shall meet in general convention ... at least 
 once in every two years . . . for the purpose of re- 
 vising and amending the rules of the circuit court and 
 establishing such additional rules as may be deemed 
 necessary to regulate the practice in the circuit courts: 
 Provided, such alterations or additions be not inconsist- 
 ent with any of the statutes of this state. ' ' 
 
 By section 88 of Article VI of the Constitution of Vir- 
 ginia, it is provided that "the supreme court of appeals 
 . . . shall have original jurisdiction in cases of 
 habeas corpus, mandamus, and prohibition; but in all 
 other cases, in which it shall have jurisdiction, it shall be 
 appellate jurisdiction only." By section 3112 of the Code 
 of that state, it is provided that "the supreme court of 
 appeals may, from time to time, prescribe the forms of 
 writs and make general regulations for the practice of all 
 the courts ; and may prepare a system of rules of practice 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 93 
 
 and a system of pleadings and the forms of process to be 
 used in all the courts of this state. ' ' 
 
 By section 3 of Article VII of the Constitution of Wis- 
 consin, it is provided that "the supreme court except in 
 cases otherwise provided in this constitution, shall have 
 appellate jurisdiction only, which shall be co-extensive 
 with the state; but in no case removed to the supreme 
 court shall a trial by jury be allowed. The supreme court 
 shall have a general superintending control over all infe- 
 rior courts ; it shall have pbwer to issue writs of habeas 
 corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari 
 and other original and remedial writs and to hear and de- 
 termine the same." By section 2413 of the code of that 
 state it is provided that "the justices of the supreme 
 court shall from time to time as they shall deem necessary 
 make, revise and publish rules of practice in the circuit 
 courts and otner courts having concurrent jurisdiction 
 therewith, in whole or in part, and for regulating the 
 practice in county courts which shall be uniform through- 
 out the state and not inconsistent with the laws thereof, 
 and may repeal, amend and modify the same as they may 
 deem necessary." 
 
 Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution of Michigan 
 provides that ' ' the supreme court shall, by general rules, 
 establish, modify and amend the practice in such court 
 and in the circuit courts and simplify the same. ' ' 
 
 By Section 5232 of the Compiled Laws of the same 
 state it is provided that "the supreme court of this state 
 shall have power from time to time to make uniform rules 
 for regulating the proceedings in all the probate courts of 
 the state, and to alter, amend or modify the same as it 
 may judge necessary in all cases expressly provided by 
 law." Other sections of the Compiled Laws, such as 
 
94 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 4912, 4921, 4927, 4945, 5069, 5088, 5089, 5181, 5591, 5592, 
 5795, 5904, 6059, 6688 and 6692, confer upon the court 
 similar powers with respect to the making of rules for 
 inferior courts. 
 
 In Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheaton, 1, 42, Chief Jus- 
 tice Marshall says : "It will not be contended, that Con- 
 gress can delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunal, 
 powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. 
 But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers 
 which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself. 
 Without going further for example, we will take that, the 
 legality of which the counsel for the defendants admit. 
 The 17th section of the Judiciary Act and the seventh 
 section of the additional act empower the courts respect- 
 ively to regulate their practice. It certainly will not be 
 contended, that this might not be done by Congress. The 
 courts, for example, may make rules directing the return- 
 ing of writs of process, the filing of declarations and 
 other pleadings, and other things of the same description. 
 It will not be contended, that these things might not be 
 done by the legislature, without the intervention of the 
 courts ; yet it is alleged that the power may not be con- 
 .f erred upon the judicial department. The line has not 
 been exactly drawn which separates those important sub- 
 jects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature 
 itself, from those of less interest, in which a general pro- 
 vision may be made, and power given to those who are to 
 act under such general provision to fill up the details. To 
 determine the character of the power given to the courts 
 by the process act, we must inquire into its extent. . . . 
 The difference between the departments undoubtedly is 
 that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the 
 judiciary construes the law; but the makers of the law 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 95 
 
 may commit something to the discretion of the other de- 
 partments, and the precise boundary of this power is a 
 subject of delicate and difficult inquiry into which a court 
 will not enter unnecessarily. ' ' 
 
 Other authorities bearing upon this question are 
 Gamon v. Fitz, 79 Pa. St., 303 ; Texas Land Co. v. Will- 
 iams, 48 Tex., 602; BaTcer v. Blood, 128 Mass., 543; 
 Hughes v. Jackson, 12 Md., 450; Baker v. State, 84 Wis., 
 584 (54 N. W., 1003) ; Detroit, G. R. <& W. R. Co. v. 
 Eaton, 128 Mich., 495 (87 N. W., 641) ; State v. Edwards, 
 110 N. C, 511 (14 S. E., 741) ; Hinckley v. Dean, 104 HI., 
 630; Beveridge v. Hewitt, 8 111. App., 467, 473; Halloway 
 V. Freeman, 22 111'., 197, 201; Prindiville v. People, 42 III, 
 217 ; Fisher v. Nat. Bk. of Commerce, 73 111., 34 ; Boring 
 V. Griffith, 48 Tenn., 456. 
 
 The constitutional amendment declares that the prac- 
 tice of the municipal courts shall be such as the Greneral 
 Assembly shall prescribe. This does not require the Gen- 
 eral Assembly to prescribe all the minute details of a sys- 
 tem of practice. It is sufficient if it lays down a few gen- 
 eral rules leaving it to the court itself to prescribe the 
 details. The General Assembly does in fact prescribe 
 the practice when it enacts that it shall be a practice regu- 
 lated by rules of court. 
 
 Finally, it can be argued with much force that the pro- 
 visions of section 20, as well as all the other practice pro- 
 visions of the act, can be sustained by that clause of sec- 
 tion 34 of Article IV which declares that "the General 
 Assembly may pass all laws which it may deem requisite 
 to effectually provide a complete system of local munici- 
 pal government in and for the city of Chicago." If the 
 General Assembly deems it requisite, in providing a com- 
 plete system of local municipal govermnent in and for 
 
96 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 the city of Chicago, that the rules of practice of the mu- 
 nicipal court shall he prescribed by the judges of that 
 court and by the supreme court, its discretion is not sub- 
 ject to review by the courts. 
 
 Second. The provisions of sections 19, 22, 23 and 31 
 limiting the power of the supreme court and the appel- 
 late courts to review the decisions of the municipal court 
 upon questions of practice. 
 
 What is included within the term practice? This ques- 
 tion is fully answered in Fleischman v. Walker, 91 HI., 
 318. It was there contended that sections 67 and 88 of 
 the Practice Act, in so far as they assumed to increase 
 the jurisdiction of the appellate courts and restrict the 
 jurisdiction of the supreme court, are in violation of 
 section 13 of Article IV of the Constitution, which pro- 
 vides that "no act hereafter passed shall embrace more 
 than one subject and that shall be expressed in the title." 
 But the court said : 
 
 "The several courts of record in this State are either 
 recognized or created by, or are authorized to be created 
 by the constitution. The jurisdiction of some of these 
 courts is fixed by the constitution itself, while the juris- 
 diction of others is left, under certain restrictions, to be 
 determined by the General Assembly. Of this latter class 
 are the appellate courts, and it depended altogether upon 
 the legislative will whether such courts should be created 
 or not, and what appellate jurisdiction they should have 
 if created ; and this legislative will was restricted only in 
 these respects ; that such courts should be of uniform or- 
 ganization and jurisdiction, and that their determinations 
 should not be final in certain specified cases. The Appel- 
 late Court Act created such appellate courts, provided 
 for their organization, and gave them a certain and uni- 
 form jurisdiction. 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 97 
 
 "By sections 67 and 88 of the Practice Act this juris- 
 diction was increased, and we see no valid reason why 
 this could not be so done. The mode and order of pro- 
 cedure in obtaining compensation for an injury by action 
 or suit in the legally established courts, from the incep- 
 tion of such suit until it ends in the final determination 
 of the court of last resort, is all comprehended in the 
 term 'practice.' The relative jurisdictions of the several 
 courts ; the modes by which and the extent to which con- 
 troversies may be transferred, for trial or lor review, 
 from one tribunal to another; and, where several trans- 
 fers are allowed, the order of sequence in such transfers, 
 are all included in what is called the practice of the 
 courts. The word practice is so understood and treated 
 by the text writers, and it is defined by Bouvier to be 
 'the form, manner and order of conducting and carrying 
 on suits or prosecutions in the courts through their vari- 
 ous stages, according to the principles of law, and the 
 rules laid down by the respective courts. ' Said sections 
 legitimately appertain to the course of practice in the 
 courts of record, and are germane to the subject ex- 
 pressed in the title. It was held in Murphy v. Menard, 
 11 Texas, 673, under a similar constitutional requirement, 
 that an act ' to regulate proceedings in the county court, ' 
 properly embraced a provision giving an appeal to the 
 district court, and regulating the proceedings therein on 
 the appeal. See, also, Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind., 
 311. 
 
 "The objection here made would apply with equal or 
 greater force to the matter of the jurisdiction of circuit 
 courts in appeals from justices of the peace. Section 12 
 of Article VI of the constitution provides, that circuit 
 courts shall have such appellate jurisdiction as is or may 
 
98 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 be provided by law, and the several circuit court acts 
 will be searclied in vain for any provision giving them 
 any jurisdiction in the matter of such appeals. The only 
 authority for such appeals, the only jurisdiction in that 
 regard (except in the case of some special statutory pro- 
 ceedings) will be found in chapter 79, Revised Statutes, 
 and tht title to that act in no way purports to confer 
 jurisdiction on the circuit court, unless it be held to be 
 embraced and expressed in the word 'practice' contained 
 in such title. And yet, it will hardly be seriously ques- 
 tioned that circuit courts have such appellate jurisdic- 
 tion." 
 
 The practice provisions of the Municipal Court Act 
 must, therefore, be viewed in the light of this definition 
 of the term ' ' practice ' ' when taken in connection with the 
 provision of section 34 of Article IV, which declares that 
 in case the offices of justices of the peace, police magis- 
 trates and constables within the city are abolished and 
 the jurisdiction of outside justices of the peace is limited 
 to the territory of Cook county outside of the limits of 
 the city, "the jurisdiction and practice of said municipal 
 courts shall be such as the General Assembly shall pre- 
 scribe" and the further provision that "the G-eneral 
 Assembly may pass all laws which it may deem requisite 
 to effectually provide a complete system of local munici- 
 pal government in and for the city of Chicago." What 
 kind of a law is "requisite to effectually provide a com- 
 plete system of local municipal government in and for the 
 city of Chicago," is a matter confidfed exclusively to the 
 judgment of the General Assembly, and its action in re- 
 spect thereto is not subject to judicial review. Sanitary 
 District of Chicago v. Ray, 199 111., 65. 
 
Note to Sections 19 emd 20. 99 
 
 By sections 19, 22 and 23 the power of the supreme and 
 appellate courts to review the decisions of the municipal 
 court upon questions of practice is so limited as to pro- 
 hibit such reviews, excepting in cases where it is neces- 
 sary to' prevent a failure of justice. By section 30 a lim- 
 itation is placed upon the power of the supreme court and 
 the appellate courts to review the rulings of the munici- 
 pal court in matters pertaining to the empanelling of the 
 jury. It has been suggested that these provisions at- 
 tempt to regulate by special legislation, not the practice 
 of the municipal court, but that of the supreme court and 
 of the appellate courts. But the provisions in question 
 are not in fact so much regulations of the practice in the 
 supreme and appellate courts as they are of the practice 
 in the municipal court. It is by means of the provisions 
 regulating the practice in the trial courts that the su- 
 preme court, and the appellate courts obtain their right to 
 review the decisions of the trial courts in respect to mat- 
 ters of practice as well as all those matters directly con- 
 cerning the merits of cases which are presented by bills 
 of ex;ceptions. The principal of these provisions are the 
 following sections of the Practice. Act : 
 
 "Sec. 59.. If, during the progress of any trial in any 
 civil cause, either party shall allege an exception to the 
 opinion of the court, and red'ice the same to writing, it 
 shall be the duty of judge to allow said exception, and 
 sign and seal the same, and the said exception shall there- 
 upon become a part, of the record of such cause. 
 
 "Sec. 60. Exceptions taken to decisions of the court, 
 upon the trial of causes in which the parties agree that 
 both matters of law and fact may be tried by the court, 
 and in appeal cases, tried by the court without the inter- 
 vention of a jury, shall he deemed and held to have been 
 
100 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 properly taken and allowed, and the party excepting may 
 assign for error, before the supreme court, any decision 
 so excepted to, whether such decision relates to receiving 
 improper, or rejecting proper testimony, or to the final 
 judgment of the court upon the law and the evidence. 
 
 "Sec. 61. Exceptions taken to decisions of the court, 
 overruling motions in arrest of judgment, motions for 
 new trials, motions to amend and for continuances of 
 causes, shall be allowed; and the party excepting may 
 assign for error any decision so excepted to." 
 
 So in regulating the practice in the municipal court it 
 was competent for the General Assembly to prescribe 
 what decisions and rulings should be subject to exception 
 and to review in the supreme and appellate courts and 
 the extent of that review. Had it seen fit it might have 
 provided that there should be no exceptions to the deci- 
 sions of the court upon the trial and no review upon ap- 
 peal or writ of error of any questions other than those 
 presented by the record without any bill of exceptions. 
 The provisions in question are, therefore, regulations of 
 the practice in the municipal court and not of that in the 
 supreme court or appellate courts. 
 
 Thied. The provisions in section 20 requiring the su- 
 preme court and the appellate courts to take judicial 
 notice of the rules of practice of the municipal court. 
 
 Section 20 provides that "the supreme court and the 
 appellate courts in cases brought to them from the mu- 
 nicipal court by appeal or writ of error shall take judicial 
 notice of the rules of practice from time to time in force 
 in said municipal court." It is suggested that this also 
 is an attempt, in the Municipal Court Act, to regulate the 
 practice and prescribe the duties of the supreme court 
 
Note to Sections 19 cmd 20. 101 
 
 and of the appellate courts. This contention is no more 
 meritorious than the one last above discussed. The pro- 
 vision in question is in reality merely one regulating, in 
 the municipal court, bills of exceptions and the written 
 statements or stenographic reports provided for in section 
 23. But for this provision, when any question of practice 
 arose upon the determination of which the propriety of 
 a judgment of the municipal court might depend, it would 
 be necessary that the bill of exceptions, statement or 
 stenographic report, should' set forth the rules which 
 the court had adopted. Under this act, instead of em- 
 bodying the rules of the municipal court in every bill of 
 exceptions, statement or stenographic report, the mu- 
 nicipal court will officially inform the appellate courts 
 and the supreme court of its rules of practice by trans- 
 mitting to them certified copies, and those courts will know 
 quite as well what they are as if, at great expense and 
 trouble, they were embodied in every bill of exceptions. 
 
 FouBTH. The provisions in section 23 limiting the time 
 within which writs of error must be sued out. 
 
 Section 23 provides that the final orders and judgments 
 of the municipal court in cases of the fourth and fifth 
 classes shall be reviewed by writ of error only, and that 
 the time within which a writ of error may be sued out in 
 any case shall be limited to thirty days after the entry 
 of the final order or judgment complained of. It has 
 been suggested that this is not a matter of practice in the 
 municipal court, but is a matter proper to be treated only 
 in a statute of limitations. This objection is answered 
 by what has already been said, as well as by the fact 
 that the time within which appeals must be prayed and 
 writs of error sued out has always been fixed by acts regu- 
 lating the practice of the courts whose judgments are 
 
102 Note to Sections 19 and 20, 
 
 sought to be reviewed. Thus the time within which an 
 appeal must be prayed from a judgment rendered by a 
 justice of the peace is fixed by section 1 of Article X of 
 the act entitled "An Act to revise the law in relation to 
 justices of the peace and constables," approved June 26, 
 1895, and the time within which a writ of error may be 
 brought to review a judgment of a court of record is 
 fixed by section 85 of the Practice Act. But it is said 
 that section 23, in fixing the limitation at thirty days, 
 makes no provision for a saving clause in favor of a per- 
 son who is "an infant, non compos mentis, or under 
 duress." By reference to section 19, however, it will 
 be seen that the practice in the circuit courts is to pre- 
 vail, as near as may be, in the municipal court, excepting 
 to the extent that it is changed by the act, or by the rules 
 adopted in pursuance thereof. Consequently the saving 
 clause of section 85 of the Practice Act is applicable to 
 the cases specified in section 23, and the entire section 
 85 is applicable to the cases specified in section 22, which 
 mentions no limitation at all. 
 
 Fifth. Those in sections 25, 26 and 31 relating to the 
 impaneling of jurors in the municipal court. 
 
 Sections 25, 26 and 31 relate to the impaneling of 
 jurors in the municipal court. They provide that the 
 jurors shall be furnished through the jury commissioners 
 of Cook county in the same manner and from the same 
 lists, as near as may be, as petit jurors are provided for 
 the circuit, superior and criminal courts of Cook county; 
 that the number of jurors to be summoned from time to 
 time shall be determined by the chief justice; that it 
 shall be the duty of the chief justice to cause all the petit 
 jurors to be interrogated and their qualifications inquired 
 into, and to cause all persons to be rejected from service 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 103 
 
 who do not appear to possess the qualifications required 
 by law; that it shall be the duty of the judge presiding 
 at the trial to examine the jurors as to their statutory 
 qualifications and permit the parties to interrogate them 
 as to bias and prejudice, and that the only question re- 
 specting the jury which can be raised upon appeal or 
 writ of error is as to whether the court has improperly 
 overruled a challenge of a juror for bias or prejudice. 
 It is suggested that these provisions are invalid because 
 in violation of section 22 of Article IV of the constitution, 
 which declares that the General Assembly shall not pass 
 local or special laws for "summoning and impaneling 
 grand or petit juries." This, however, is merely a gen- 
 eral provision against special legislation, and it is modi- 
 fied and controlled, so far as the municipal court of 
 Chicago is concerned, by the provisions of section 34 of 
 Article IV, which permits special legislation regulating 
 the practice in the municipal court. Furthermore, it is 
 to be observed that the Municipal Court Act does not 
 prescribe for jurors qualifications different from those 
 prescribed for jurors in the circuit courts. It simply 
 provides for a special method of ascertaining the jurors ' 
 qualifications and for a limitation upon the power of the 
 supreme court and the appellate courts to review the 
 rulings of the municipal court so far as those rulings 
 pertain to the impaneling of petit jurors. 
 
 Sixth. The provisions of sections 30 and 56 affecting 
 the exercise of the right of trial by jury. 
 
 By section 30 it is provided that every suit at law in 
 the municipal court, other than a case of the second class 
 or a case of the third class, shall be tried without a jury 
 unless the plaintiff at the time he commences his suit, or 
 the defendant at the time he enters his appearance, shall 
 
104 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 file with the clerk a demand in writing of a trial by jury, 
 and that in' every case of the third class, which class em- 
 braces all criminal cases in which the punishment is by 
 fine or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary, 
 a trial by jury shall be deemed waived unless the defend- 
 ant shall expressly demand such trial. By section 56 the 
 party demanding a trial by jury is required to pay to the 
 clerk the sum of $6 in addition to the sum which he would 
 otherwise be called upon to pay at the time he commences 
 his suit, if he is the plaintiff, or at the time he enters his 
 appearance, if he is the defendant. It has been, suggested 
 that these provisions are in violation of section 5 of Arti- 
 cle II of the constitution, which declares that "the right 
 of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain invio- 
 late. ' ' It will be observed that neither of the provisions 
 in question deprives or attempts to deprive either of the 
 parties of the right of trial by jury. They are merely 
 regulations respecting the exercise of that right and are 
 not at all unreasonable. To require the plaintiff at the 
 time he commences his suit, or the defendant at the time 
 he enters his appearance, when the case is one of the first, 
 fourth or fifth class, to file with the clerk a demand in 
 writing of a trial by jury, is necessary to the economical 
 and prompt disposition of the business of the court. These 
 cases are to be set for trial on particular days. The 
 order setting them for trial is to be entered shortly after 
 the issues are made up by the filing of the defendant's 
 pleas in cases of the first class and by the entry of his 
 appearance in cases of the fourth and fifth classes. Cases 
 to be tried without a jury are to be assigned to judges 
 engaged in the trial of that class of cases, while those 
 to be tried with a jury are to be assigned to other judges 
 who are engaged in conducting jury trials. The number 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 105 
 
 of jurors to be needed will depend upon the number of 
 cases in whicb trials by jury are to be had. Hence, it 
 would seem to be not a debatable question that to require 
 the parties to give the court prompt notification of the 
 character of the trial to be demanded is a very reason- 
 able and businesslike regulation. 
 
 As to the requirement of an additional fee to be paid 
 the clerk when a trial by jury is demanded, it is sufficient 
 to say that that is a matter which is entirely in the dis- 
 cretion of the General Assembly. In all counties except- 
 ing Cook county, larger fees are required in cases tried 
 by jury than in those tried without a jury. It is, of 
 course, not contended that it is unconstitutional to re- 
 quire of a party commencing a suit or entering his ap- 
 pearance to make an advance payment of costs. The 
 costs he thus advances, in case of a successful termina- 
 tion of the suit in his favor, he will obtain judgment for 
 against the opposite party. Nor is there anything unrea- 
 sonable in requiring a party who demands a trial by 
 jury, which requires the city to keep on hand a panel of 
 twenty-four jurymen at $2 a day each, to make a larger 
 advance payment than one who does not insist upon this 
 mode of trial. 
 
 Section 5368 of the Minnesota Statutes provides as fol- 
 lows: "Before a jury is sworn the plaintiff shall pay to 
 the clerk three dollars as a jury fee, which shall be imme- 
 diately paid by the clerk to the treasurer of the county. ' ' 
 In Adams v. Gorriston, 7 Minn., 456, it was held that a 
 provision of this kind was constitutional. 
 
 In Corneau v. Geis, 73 Cal., 176, it was held that a rule 
 of the superior court requiring a party demanding a 
 trial by jury to deposit fees with the clerk in advance 
 of the trial was a reasonable regulation of the mode of 
 
106 Note to Sections 19 and 20. 
 
 enjoyment of the right of trial by jury, and was not a 
 denial or impairment of the right, and that the party 
 demanding a jury trial, upon refusing to comply with 
 the rule, waived his right to a jury. In its opinion the 
 court cited, as supporting its views, Biddle v. Cone, 13 S. 
 & E., 410 ; Keddie v. Moore, 2 Murph., 45 ; Beers v. Beers, 
 4 Conn., 539; Jones v. Bobbins, 8 Gray, 341; Flint River 
 Co. V. Foster, 5 G-a., 195; Marford v. Barnes, 8 Yerg., 
 446; Adams v. Corriston, 7 Minn., 456; People v. Hoff- 
 man, 3 Mich., 248 ; Randall v. Kehlar, 60 Me., 44, 45, and 
 Venine v. Archibald, 3 Colo., 165. 
 
 The following authorities also support the proposition 
 that the legislature may constitutionally require that the 
 party demanding a jury shall advance the expenses of 
 the venire: In re Marron, 60 Vt., 199 ; Conners v. Bur- 
 lington Railroad, 74 Iowa, 383. 
 
 Seventh. The provisions in section 39 regulating ap- 
 plications for changes of venue. 
 
 By section 39 applications for changes of venue in cases 
 of the third, fourth and fifth classes can only specify 
 one judge from whom the change of venue is desired, 
 and the application in civil cases must be filed at or be- 
 fore the entry of the defendant's appearance, if the suit 
 is a civil suit, or at or before the time the defendant is 
 required to plead, if the suit is a criminal suit. It is 
 suggested that this provision violates Section 22 of Ar- 
 ticle IV of the constitution, which declares that the Gen- 
 eral Assembly shall not pass local or special laws "pro- 
 viding for changes of venue in civil and criminal cases. ' ' 
 But as already indicated above. Section 22 of Article 
 IV is controlled by the provisions of Section 34 of Ar- 
 ticle IV, by which full power is given the General Assem- 
 
Note to Sections 19 and 20. 107 
 
 bly to regulate, by special law, the practice of the mu- 
 nicipal court, "practice," of course, including applica- 
 tions for changes of venue, which are parts of ' ' the mode 
 or order of procedure in obtaining compensation for 
 an injury by action or suit in the legally established 
 courts, from the inception of such suit until it ends ia 
 the final determination of the court of last resort." 
 Fleischman v. Walker, 91 111., 318, supra. 
 
 With respect to all of the above mentioned questions 
 of practice it is also to be observed that the prohibition 
 of Section 22 of Article IV of the constitution against 
 special legislation "regulating the practice in courts of 
 justice" does not deprive the General Assembly of the 
 power to prescribe different rules for each class or grade 
 of courts, provided those rules are uniform as to all 
 courts of the same class or grade. "The Municipal 
 Court of Chicago" is in a class or grade by itself, and 
 hence its practice would not be required to be uniform 
 with that of courts of other grades or classes, even were 
 the amendment of 1904 not a part of the constitution. 
 
108 Section 21. 
 
 SECTION 21. 
 
 Section 21. That there shall be no stated terms of the 
 municipal court, but said court shall be always open 
 for the transaction of busiuess. Every judgment, or- 
 der or decree of said court, final in its nature, shall, 
 for the period of thirty days after the entry thereof, 
 be subject to be vacated, set aside or modified, in the 
 same manner and to the same extent as a judgment, 
 decree or order of a circuit court during the term at 
 which the same was rendered in such circuit court. 
 After the lapse of thirty days any such judgment, de- 
 cree or order shall not be vacated, set aside or modi- 
 fied, excepting upon appeal or writ of error, or by bill 
 in equity: Provided, however, that all errors in fact 
 in the proceedings in such case, which could have been 
 corrected at common law by the writ of error coram 
 nobis, may be corrected by motion or the judgment 
 may be set aside, in the manner provided by law for 
 similar cases in the circuit courts. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 21. 
 
 The nature and extent of the business transacted by 
 the municipal court requires that it should be always open. 
 In providing that this should be so, it was necessary to 
 make some provision respecting the finality of judg- 
 ments. In the circuit court a judgment becomes final at 
 the end of the term, whether that occurs on the day the 
 judgment is rendered or several months thereafter. It 
 often happens that an unjust judgment is obtained on 
 the last day of a term against a party without his knowl- 
 edge or without his ascertaining the fact until the follow- 
 ing day or later, when it is too late to obtain relief other 
 than that obtainable in a court of equity, and which can 
 be secured only in rare instances and at great expense. 
 By the municipal court act the party is given thirty days 
 after the entry of the judgment to obtain knowledge of 
 
Note to Section 21. 109 
 
 it and seek relief by having it set aside. He can obtain 
 this knowledge readily, if there is, as there should be, 
 a municipal court law bulletin published, giving daily 
 information of all orders and judgments entered in the 
 municipal court. 
 
 While the letter of the section provides that a judg- 
 ment shall not be set aside after the lapse of thirty days 
 from the date of its rendition, this will doubtless be con- 
 strued to mean that the application to vacate must be 
 made withia the thirty days, and that, the application 
 being made within the time limited, the party will not be 
 prejudiced by the failure of the court to act upon it until 
 after the lapse of the thirty days. 
 
110 Section 22. 
 
 SECTION 22. 
 
 Section 22. That the final orders, judgments and de- 
 crees of the municipal court in cases of the first class, 
 cases of the second class and cases of the third class 
 mentioned in section two (2) of this act, may be re- 
 viewed, upon error or appeal, by the supreme court in 
 all criminal cases above the grade of misdemeanors, 
 cases in which a franchise or freehold, or the validity 
 of a statute or construction of the constitution is in- 
 volved, and in all cases relating to the revenue or in 
 which the state is interested as a -party or otherwise, 
 . and by the appellate court in all other cases. The prac- 
 tice in cases of appeals from or writs of error to said ' 
 municipal court in said cases shall, except as in this 
 act, or by rules of said court adopted in pursuance 
 hereof, may be otherwise provided, be the same, as 
 near as may be, as the practice in cases of appeal from 
 and writs of error to circuit courts in similar cases. 
 But no appeal shall be allowed in any case unless the 
 same be prayed for within twenty days after the entry 
 of the order, judgment or decree appealed from, and 
 no assignment of error in the supreme court or in the 
 appellate court in any such case shall be allowed which 
 shall call in question the decision of the municipal 
 court in respect to any matter pertaining to the prac- 
 tice in said court: Provided, however, that the su- 
 preme court or the appellate court, as the case may 
 be, may grant relief from any error of the municipal 
 court in respect to a matter of practice therein in any 
 case where, in the opinion of the supreme court or ap- 
 pellate court, such relief is necessary to prevent a fail- 
 ure of justice. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 22. 
 
 With respect to cases of the first, second and third 
 classes the practice in cases of appeals and writs of er- 
 ror is to be the same, "as near as may be," as the prac- 
 tice in cases of appeals from and writs of error to circuit 
 courts in similar eases, with such exceptions as may be 
 
Note to Section 22. Ill 
 
 provided by the act and subject to such changes as may 
 be made "by the rules of said court adopted in pursu- 
 ance hereof." The exceptions provided by the act are 
 the following: 
 
 1. The provision in this section that no appeal shall 
 be allowed unless prayed for within twenty days after 
 the entry of the order, judgment or decree appealed 
 from. 
 
 2. The provision in this section that rulings of the 
 municipal court upon questions of practice shall only 
 be subject to review by the supreme court or the appel- 
 late court when such review is necessary to prevent a 
 failure of justice. 
 
 3. The provisions in section 38, that a formal excep- 
 tion shall not be necessary to enable a party prosecuting 
 an appeal or writ of error to obtain a review of an erro- 
 neous ruling duly objected to, and that no bill of excep- 
 tions shall be deemed defective for the want of the seal 
 of the judge thereto. 
 
 The power of the judges of the municipal court, with 
 the approval of the supreme court, and the power of the 
 supreme court upon its own motion, to make changes in 
 the rules of practice is discussed in the note to 'sections 
 19 and 20. 
 
 As to the constitutional questions raised by the pro- 
 visions of this section see the note to sections 19 and 20, 
 supra. 
 
112 Section 23. 
 
 SECTION 23. 
 
 Section 23. That the final orders and judgments of 
 the municipal court in cases of the fourth class and 
 cases of the fifth class mentioned in section two (2) 
 of this act, shall be reviewed bv writ of error only. 
 Such writ of error shall be aued out of the supreme 
 court in all cases in which a franchise, a freehold or 
 the validity of a statute or the construction of the con- 
 stitution is involved, and out of the appellate court in 
 all other cases. The time within which a writ of error 
 may be sued out in any such case shall be limited to 
 thirty days after the entry of the final order or judg- 
 ment complained of. The manner of prosecuting such 
 writ of error shall be as follows : 
 
 First — Any party to any such case against whom there 
 has been rendered any final order or judgment of the 
 municipal court and who shall desire to obtain a re- 
 view of such final order or judgment by appeal or writ 
 of error, may obtain from the municipal court a stay 
 of execution upon such order or judgment for ninety 
 days after the entry thereof by the giving of a bond 
 with a sufficient surety or sureties, to be approved by 
 a judge of the municipal court, conditioned for the 
 performance by such party of, or his compliance with, 
 such order or judgment, or his payment of the money 
 thereby required to be paid and all costs which ma,y be 
 awarded the opposite party in the supreme court or 
 the appellate court, as the case may' be, in case a writ 
 of error to review such order or judgment shall not be 
 sued out within thirty days from the date thereof, or 
 in case, upon the suing out and prosecution of such 
 writ of error, the order or judgment shall be affirmed 
 by the supreme court or the appellate court, as the 
 case may be. 
 
 Second — No other or further stay of proceedings or 
 execution in any such case shall be allowed by the mu- 
 nicipal court, but the supreme court or the appellate 
 court, or any judge thereof, may allow a supersedeas 
 as in other cases, but upon the allowance of any su- 
 persedeas, when any bond has been given as above 
 
Section 23. 113 
 
 provided, no additional bond shall be required, and 
 such supersedeas shall be operative until the final de- 
 termination of such writ of error. 
 
 TMrdb — If, upon application to the supreme court or ap- 
 pellate court, or to any judge thereof, for a superse- 
 deas the same shall be denied, such order or judgment 
 shall stand affirmed, and no further proceedings shall 
 be had in said supreme court or appellate court with 
 respect thereo, unless the supreme court or appellate 
 court, or the judge denying such supersedeas shall 
 otherwise order. 
 
 Fourth — The party in whose favor any final order or 
 judgment has been entered shall be entitled to sue out 
 a writ of error from the supreme court or the appel- 
 late court, as the case may be, by depositing with the 
 clerk of the court from which said writ of error is sued 
 out the sum of twenty dollars ($20) as security to the 
 opposite party for such costs as may be awarded such 
 opposite party by the supreme court or the appellate 
 court, as the case may be, upon the final determination 
 of such writ of error. 
 
 Fiffh — The party suing out any writ of error shall not 
 be required to serve upon the opposite party any scire 
 facias to hear errors, but in lieu thereof shall, within 
 five days after the issuance of the writ of error, file 
 the same with the clerk of the said municipal court, 
 and make to the supreme court or the appellate court, 
 as the case may be, proof of such filing, and such writ 
 of error so filed shall be notice to the opposite party 
 of the suing out and prosecution of such writ of error. 
 
 Sixth — Upon application made at any time within sixty 
 days after the entry of any final order or judgment, 
 it shall be the duty of the judge by whom such final 
 order or judgment was entered to sign and place on 
 file in the case in which the same was entered, if so 
 requested by either of the parties to the suit, either 
 a correct statement, to be prepared by the party re- 
 questing the signing of the same, of the facts appear- 
 ing upon the trial thereof, and of all questions of law 
 involved in such case, and the decisions of the court 
 upon said questions of law, or a correct stenographic 
 
114 Section 23. 
 
 report, the expense of procuring which shall be paid 
 by the party requesting the signing of the same, of 
 the proceedings at the trial, as such party may elect, 
 the original of which statement or stenographic re- 
 port, together with a certified transcript of the judg-' 
 ment, shall be certified to the supreme court or appel- 
 late court, as the case may be, as the record to be con- 
 sidered upon the review of such order or judgment by 
 writ of error. 
 Seventh — No order or judgment so sought to be reviewed 
 shall be reversed unless the supreme court or appel- 
 late court, as the case may be, shall be satisfied from 
 said statement or stenographic report signed by said 
 judge that such order or judgment is contrary to the 
 law and the evidence, or that such order or judgment 
 resulted from substantial errors of said municipal 
 court directly affecting the matters at issue between 
 the parties, in which last mentioned case the supreme 
 court or appellate court, as the case may be, may enter 
 such order or judgment as, in its opinion, the munici- 
 pal court ought to have entered, or it may reverse the 
 said order or judgment and remand the case to the 
 municipal court for further proceedinffs- 
 
 Eighth — No assignment of error in the supreme court 
 or in the appellate court in any such case shall be al- 
 lowed which shall call in question the decision of such 
 municipal court in respect to any matter pertaining to 
 the practice in such court, nor shall any exceptions to 
 the rulings and decisions of the municipal court upon 
 the trial be necessary to the right of either party to 
 a review of such rulings and decisions in the supreme 
 court or appellate court upon their merits, but it shall 
 be the duty of the supreme court or the appellate 
 court, as the case may be, to decide such case upon its 
 merits as they may appear from such statement or 
 stenographic report signed by the judge: Provided, 
 however, that the supreme court or appellate court, as 
 the case may be, may grant relief from any error of 
 the municipal court in respect to a matter of practice 
 therein in any case where, in the opinion of the su- 
 preme court or the appellate court, such relief is nec- 
 essary to prevent a failure of justice. 
 
Note to Section 23. 115 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 23. 
 
 By Section 19 of Article II of the Constitution it is 
 declared that "every person ought to find a certain rem- 
 edy in the laws for all injuries and wrongs which he 
 may receive in his person, property or reputation; he 
 ought to obtain, by law, right and justice freely, and 
 without being obliged to purchase it, completely and 
 without denial, promptly and without delay." To give 
 effect to these constitutional provisions in every suit at 
 law, when the amount sought to be recovered, either in 
 money or property, does not exceed $1,000 is the pur- 
 pose of the fourth and fifth clauses of section 2 confer- 
 ring jurisdiction upon the municipal court in that class 
 of cases, and sections 23 and 40 to 45, both inclusive, 
 prescribing the rules of practice by which they are to be 
 disposed of. Sections 40 to 45, both inclusive, provide 
 for a speedy trial in the municipal court, while section 
 23 seeks to accomplish a speedy final determination of 
 appellate proceedings in the supreme and appellate 
 courts. To attain this end, so far as appellate proceed- 
 ings are concerned, a review by writ of error only is 
 provided for and the election to sue out the writ of error 
 is required to be made within thirty days after the entry 
 of the final order or judgment complained of. The meth- 
 ods of procedure in the prosecution of the writ of error 
 are in substance as follows : 
 
 First. A stay of proceedings for ninety days after 
 the rendition of a judgment is demandable by the com- 
 plaining party as a matter of right, and may be had upon 
 the execution of a bond, conditioned as prescribed in 
 clause first, and its approval by a judge of the court. 
 But the giving of a bond is not essential to the prosecu- 
 
116 Note to Section 23. 
 
 tion of a writ of error, which may be prosecuted without 
 the giving of a bond, just as a writ of error may be pros- 
 ecuted in a like case to review a judgment of the circuit 
 court. Under the existing law regulating suits before 
 justices of the peace a party unable to give an appeal 
 bond in double the amount of the judgment rendered 
 against him, whether it be in a civil or a criminal case, 
 can have no relief in a reviewing court, however unjust 
 the judgment may be. This defect is remedied in the mu- 
 nicipal court act, and by its provisions any person may 
 prosecute a writ of error and thus secure a reversal of 
 an unjust judgment, though not able to give a bond to 
 secure its payment. In such case, however, the prosecu- 
 tion of the writ of error does not stay the execution of 
 the judgment. The stay of proceedings obtained by the 
 giving of a bond in the municipal court is only intended 
 to accomplish the purpose of giving the complaining 
 party the necessary time to secure his record and pre- 
 sent it to the supreme court or the appellate court, aa 
 the case may be. It does not, as does the perfecting of 
 an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court, stay the 
 execution of the judgment, whether meritorious or un- 
 meritorious, until the final determination of the case by 
 the appellate court, which oftentimes does not occur un- 
 til the lapse of eighteen months. This provision, it is 
 apparent, will tend to discourage the prosecution of 
 writs of error for mere purposes of delay. 
 
 Second. A stay of proceedings beyond the ninety days 
 can only be secured by means of a supersedeas, to be 
 allowed by the supreme court or the appellate court, or 
 some judge thereof. Such supersedeas may be allowed 
 without any previous stay of proceedings having been 
 granted by the municipal court, in which case a super- 
 
Note to Section 23. 117 
 
 sedeas bond must be given; but when such stay of pro- 
 ceedings has been granted and a bond has already been 
 given, no additional supersedeas bond need be given. 
 The supersedeas may, of course, be allowed at any time. 
 It need not be applied for within the ninety days allowed 
 for obtaining a stay of proceedings from the municipal 
 court. 
 
 Third. The provision that the denial of a supersedeas 
 shall amount to an affirmance of the judgment, unless the 
 supreme court or the appellate court, or the judge deny- 
 ing the supersedeas, shall otherwise order, is intended 
 to accomplish two purposes : first, to enable the supreme 
 court or the appellate court to dispose of writs of error 
 which have no merit speedily and without the waste of 
 time attendant upon final hearings, and the preparation 
 and filing of written opinions; and, second, to save to 
 the party in whose favor the judgment has been ren- 
 dered the expense attendant upon the preparation and 
 filing of a printed argument, supplemented, perhaps, 
 also by an oral argument. 
 
 Fourth. A party in whose favor a judgment has been 
 rendered and who is dissatisfied with the amount there- 
 of is authorized to sue out a writ of error only upon de- 
 positing with the clerk of the court from which the writ 
 of error is sued out the sum of $20 to secure the opposite 
 party for such costs as may be awarded the latter upon 
 the final determination of the writ of error. This de- 
 posit is in lieu of a bond which it would be competent 
 for the General Assembly to require, and the provision 
 for the deposit obviates the necessity of a suit by the 
 opposite party upon a bond to enable him to collect his 
 costs, in case of an affirmance of the judgment. 
 
118 Note to Section 23. 
 
 Fifth. The provision dispensing with the service of 
 the scire facias and substituting in lieu thereof the filing 
 of the writ of error with the clerk of the municipal 
 court is for the purpose of saving expense to the party 
 suing out the writ and of giving speedy notice to the 
 opposite party. As the writ of error must be sued out 
 within thirty days and must be filed in the municipal 
 court within five days thereafter, the party who has ob- 
 tained a judgment, at the end of thirty-five days, upon 
 inspection of the files of the municipal court, obtains full 
 information as to whether his judgment is a finality or 
 whether it is to be reviewed by the supreme or appellate 
 court. 
 
 Sixth. Two methods are prescribed for presenting to 
 the appellate court the merits of a case which has been 
 decided by the municipal court. One is, a correct state- 
 ment of the facts appearing upon the trial and of the 
 questions of law involved, and the decisions of the court 
 upon said questions, signed by the judge, and the other 
 is, a correct stenographic report of the proceedings at 
 the trial, which is also to be signed by the judge. Each 
 party may elect whether he will secure a statement or 
 a stenographic report, and the statement or stenograph- 
 ic report, together with a certified transcript of the judg- 
 ment, is to be certified to the supreme court, or to the 
 appellate court, as the record to be considered upon the 
 review of the order or judgment complained of. By the 
 terms of this provision one party to the suit might re- 
 quest and secure the signing of a statement and the other 
 might request and secure the signing of a correct steno- 
 graphic report, but in practice it would be extremely 
 rare that the party satisfied with the judgment would 
 secure either one. If both should be secured, both would 
 
Note to Section 23. 119 
 
 be certified to the supreme court or appellate court as a 
 part of the record, in which case, doubtless, the steno- 
 graphic report would be regarded as of controlling im- 
 portance. 
 
 Seventh. It was regarded as highly important that 
 the review of cases of the fourth class and fiith class by 
 the supreme court and appellate court should be upon the 
 merits and as free as possible from technicality Ac- 
 cordingly, there are only two grounds upon which an 
 order or judgment of the municipal court, in a case of the 
 fourth class or a case of the fifth class, can be reversed. 
 The first ground is that the order or the judgment is con- 
 trary to the law and the evidence. This involves a con- 
 sideration of the merits of the case as disclosed by the 
 evidence. The question for the appellate court is whether 
 the municipal court reached a correct conclusion as to the 
 right of the case, and before a reversal is permitted, the 
 appellate court must be satisfied the conclusion reached is 
 wrong. This amounts to a rule that the judgment shall 
 not be reversed unless the appellate court can say that 
 the evidence is insufficient to support it. 
 
 If the appellate court is not satisfied that the order or 
 judgment is contrary to the law and the evi- 
 dence, it remains for that court to consider 
 whether the order or judgment resulted from substantial 
 errors of the municipal court directly affecting the mat- 
 ters at issue between the parties. Examples of such er- 
 rors are errors in the admission or rejection of evidence, 
 or in giving or refusing to give instructions to the jury. 
 It is not enough that there be erroneous rulings respecting 
 the admission or rejection of evidence or in respect to the 
 instructions, but such erroneous rulings must be of such 
 a character that the appellate court is satisfied they l%ave 
 
120 Note to Section 23. 
 
 produced a judgment which otherwise would not have 
 been rendered. The fact that an erroneous charge to the 
 jury or an erroneous ruling respecting the admission or 
 rejection of evidence may have affected the result is not 
 sufficient. The entire Municipal Court Act evidences the 
 intention that the administration of justice in the munici- 
 pal court shall be practical. It makes an allowance for 
 weak human nature, recognizes the fact that even the 
 most skillful judges will occasionally err, and provides 
 that the supreme court and appellate court shall not de- 
 termine mere moot questions and shall not reverse judg- 
 ments because of mere imperfections in the proceedings 
 leading to the result, but shall only reverse when, upon a 
 consideration of the whole case, it satisfactorily appears, 
 not that injustice may have been done, but that it Itias been 
 done. 
 
 Whether this rule should be applied in all cases 
 reviewed by the supreme court or appellate court, re- 
 gardless of tli§ amounts involved, it is not now necessary 
 to consider. It is believed, however, that every right think- 
 ing man will concede that it is far better that a slight de- 
 gree of injustice should occasionally result from the affirm- 
 ance of a judgment arrived at, in part, by erroneous 
 rulings, rather than that many just judgments should be 
 reversed, and great expense imposed upon both parties to 
 the litigation, as well as upon the public, merely 
 on the ground that some of the erroneous rul- 
 ings of the trial court may have affected the re- 
 sults. The judgments of the municipal court will, for the 
 most part, be small in amount. Probably the average of 
 judgments appealed from will not exceed $200, an amount 
 insufficient in most cases to reimburse the successful 
 party for his outlays. No matter what errors may have 
 
Note to Section 23. 121 
 
 been committed, the successful party is not to blame. 
 His cause has been submitted to' a judge selected by the 
 vote of the people, and has been conducted by an attor- 
 ney at law stamped by public authority as competent. To 
 reverse his judgment, mulct him in costs, compel him to 
 go through another trial only to reach the same result by 
 slightly better methods, after the trial judge and his at- 
 torney have been educated at his expense, is nothing if 
 not gross injustice. 
 
 Eighth. The provision that the decisions of the munici- 
 pal court ta respect to matters of practice shall not be 
 reviewed, excepting where such review is necessary to 
 prevent a failure of justice, corresponds with similar pro- 
 visions in sections 19 and 22. It serves to emphasize the 
 intention of the legislature that the real question for con- 
 sideration, in a review by the supreme court or appellate 
 court, shall be whether the result arrived at is correct, or 
 rather, whether it is clearly incorrect, and not whether 
 all the steps leading up to that result have been strictly 
 regular and in accordance with correct rules of practice. 
 It is only when the disregard of a rule of practice, if not 
 corrected, will result in a failure of justice, that the su- 
 preme court or appellate court can make the correction. 
 The provision dispensing with the necessity of exceptions 
 to the rulings and decisions of the court upon the trial is 
 to secure a decision in the reviewing court upon the mer- 
 its, and not permit the reviewing court to sustain an un- 
 just judgment simply because there is not in the rec- 
 ord a formal exception to a ruling which has produced 
 that injustice. 
 
 In Horton v. Critchfield, 18 111., 133, the court, through 
 Chief Justice Scates, describe trials on appeals from jus- 
 tices of the peace as proceedings "in which parties pro- 
 
122 Note to Section 23. 
 
 ceed on the merits, without pleadings, but according to 
 the proofs, and very right," and say: "Where a techni- 
 cality presents no vital and meritorious claim for the dis- 
 covery of truth, and the furtherance of right and justice, 
 it can have no enlargement of its sphere of action from 
 us." Such is the result sought to be accomplished in. 
 cases in the municipal court involving $1,000 or less, in 
 money or property, by this section regulating appellate 
 proceedings, and sections 40 to 45, both inclusive, regu- 
 lating the practice in such cases in the municipal court. 
 
 As to the constitutional questions raised by the provi- 
 sions of this section see the note to sections 19 and 20, 
 supra. 
 
Section 24. 123 
 
 SECTION 24. 
 
 Section 24. That in any case transferred to said munici- 
 pal court by the circuit or superior court of Cook county 
 for ti;ial and disposition, said municipal court shall ex- 
 ercise the same powers as the court from which said 
 case has been transferred might have exercised had 
 said case not been so transferred. The circuit court of 
 Cook county, or the superior court of Cook county, 
 may, upon the application of either party for a change 
 of venue, and shall upon the request of both, parties to 
 any suit at law or in equity pending therein, transfer 
 said suit to the municipal court for trial and disposi- 
 tion. The criminal court of Cook county may, in its 
 discretion, upon the request of the state's attorney or 
 of any defendant, transfer to the municipal court for 
 trial and disposition any case therein pending and shall 
 have power to make all orders which it may deem 
 necessary to accomplish such transfer and secure the 
 attendance of the parties and witnesses upon said mu- 
 nicipal court until the final disposition of the case, and 
 said municipal court, when any criminal case shall have 
 been so transferred to it, shall exercise all the powers 
 with respect to the trial and disposition of said case 
 which the said criminal court of Cook county might 
 have exercised had said case not been so transferred. 
 All judgments of conviction in criminal cases in said 
 municipal court where the punishment inflicted is death, 
 or imprisonment, shall be carried into execution in the ~ 
 same manner as is provided by law for similar cases 
 in said criminal court of Cook county. The prosecu- 
 tion of all criminal cases in the municipal court shall 
 be conducted by or under the supervision of the state 's 
 attorney of Cook county^ but in any case in which the 
 state's attorney is disqualified from acting, or is un- 
 able to act, the court inay appoint some attorney at 
 law of Cook county to act as prosecuting attorney in 
 such case. In all cases transferred as aforesaid to saia 
 municipal court, the practice in respect to the trial and 
 disposition thereof shall be the same as that prevailing 
 in the respective courts from which the same have been 
 
124 Note to Section 24. 
 
 transferred, unless the parties shall consent that the 
 trial and disposition thereof shall be governed by the 
 rules of practice prevailing in said municipal court in 
 cases commenced therein. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 24. 
 
 By this section provision is made whereby the munici- 
 pal court, by change of venue or otherwise, may be given 
 jurisdiction of any case at law or in equity pending in the 
 circuit court of Cook county, the superior court of Cook 
 county or the criminal court of Cook county. In civil 
 cases the circuit and superior courts are authorized to 
 direct a transfer of a case to the municipal court upon the 
 application of either party for a change of venue, and 
 are directed to order such transfer when requested so to 
 do by both parties. In criminal cases the power of trans- 
 fer is entirely discretionary with the court, but the dis- 
 cretion to direct a transfer can only be exercised in any 
 case upon the request of the state's attorney or of any 
 defendant. The meaning of the provisions of this sec- 
 tion is too plain to need discussion, with the exception of 
 the last clause, which reads as follows : 
 
 "In aU cases transferred as aforesaid to said munici- 
 pal court the practice in respect to the trial and disposi- 
 tion thereof shall be the same as that prevailing in the 
 respective courts from which the same have been trans- 
 ferred, unless the parties shall consent that the trial and 
 disposition thereof shall be governed by the rules of prac- 
 tice prevailing in said municipal court in cases com- 
 menced therein." 
 
 This provision was adopted by the Senate at the de- 
 mand of those who were opposed to any radical change 
 in the practice of the circuit, superior and criminal courts. 
 
Note to Section 24. 125 
 
 and with the view, doubtless, of requiring the municipal 
 court, in all cases of which it acquired jurisdiction by- 
 transfer, to proceed in all respects in accordance with the 
 rules of practice prevailing in the circuit, superior or 
 criminal court. If this be the construction to be given to 
 the clause in question, the following provisions of the act 
 will be inapplicable in cases of which the municipal court' 
 acquires jurisdiction by transfer : 
 
 1. The provisions of section 31 with respect to the im- 
 paneling of jurors for the trial of cases. 
 
 2. The provisions of section 32 in reference to the fil- 
 ing of interrogatories before the trial or hearing. 
 
 3. The provisions of section 33 for the cross-examina- 
 tion of an adverse party. 
 
 4. The provisions of section 34 for the hearing of 
 oral evidence in open court in support of or in opposi- 
 tion to any interlocutory or other motion or application. 
 
 5. The provisions in section 35 in reference to the 
 power of the judge of the municipal court to sign or make 
 orders at any place within the city limits. 
 
 6. The provisions in section 37 authorizing the court 
 to charge the jury orally. 
 
 But the expression in section 31 is "that in all cases 
 tried by jury in a municipal court, ' ' etc. ; that in section 
 32 is "that the municipal court in any civil suit pending 
 therein, ' ' etc. ; that in section 33 is " that upon the trial 
 or hearing of any suit in the municipal court, ' ' etc. ; that 
 in section 34 is " that whenever in any suit pending in the 
 municipal court evidence shall be necessary," etc.; that 
 in section 35 is that ' ' in any suit pending in the municipal 
 court," etc., while that in section 37 is "that in jury trials 
 in the municipal court; the court shall charge the jury," 
 
126 Note to Section 24. 
 
 etc. Hence the provisions in these sections apply to all 
 cases in the municipal court regardless of whether they 
 were commenced in that court or came there by transfer 
 from the circuit, superior or criminal courts. There are 
 certain rules prescribed especially for cases commenced 
 in the municipal court. Thus sections 28 and 30 pre- 
 scribe certain rules of practice for cases of the first class, 
 and sections 29, 30, 39 and 40 to 50, both inclusive, pre- 
 scribe certain rules for cases of the fourth and fifth 
 classes, and it might well be argued that it was these rules 
 the General Assembly intended should not be applied in 
 cases of the second class, being cases transferred, except- 
 ing with the consent of the parties, and not the rules pre- 
 scribed in sections 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 37. 
 
 If the view prevails that by the terms of section 20 the 
 supreme court is given complete discretion with respect 
 to the rules of practice in the municipal court, the last 
 clause of section 24 will doubtless not be permitted to cre- 
 ate much trouble or difficulty. Moreover, the provision 
 of section 22 that decisions of the municipal court upon 
 questions of practice shall not be reviewed by the su- 
 preme court or the appellate court, unless such review is 
 necessary to prevent a failure of justice, will practically 
 make final the construction which the judges of the mu- 
 nicipal court may put upon the concluding provision of 
 section 24. The proper construction to give this clause, 
 taken in connection with the other provisions of the act, 
 would seem to the writer to be to make applicable, in the 
 trial and disposition of the cases transferred, the provi- 
 sions of sections 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37, and to make 
 inapplicable all provisions which by their terms are ex- 
 pressly declared to be applicable only to cases commenced 
 in the municipal court, to wit: cases of the first, third, 
 fourth and fifth classes. 
 
Note to Section 24. 127 
 
 If it be claimed that tlie provision authorizing the 
 transfer of cases from the circuit, superior and criminal 
 courts of Cook county is unconstitutional, as being special 
 legislation in reference to the last mentioned courts, an 
 answer will be found in the note to section 20, supra, and 
 the case of Fleischman v. Wdllier, 91 111., 318. 
 
 That the municipal court may, by transfer or change 
 of venue, obtain jurisdiction of cases which could not be 
 brought there originally, would seem to be settled by the 
 decisions of the court in Lowry v. Coster, 91 111., 182, and 
 East St. Louis C. R. Co. v. EnrigU, 156 111., 246, which 
 are commented on in the note to Section 2, ante. 
 
128 Sections 25 and 26. 
 
 SECTIONS 25 AND 26. 
 
 Section 25. That the petit jurors for the trial of cases 
 in said municipal courts shall be .provided by the jury 
 commissioners of the county of Cook in the same man- 
 ner and from the same lists, as near as may be, as petit 
 jurors are provided for the circuit, superior and crim- 
 inal courts of Cook county. The names of the neces- 
 sary number of petit jurors required from time to time 
 in said municipal court shall be furnished by said jury 
 commissioners upon demand to the clerk of the munici- 
 pal court and the venires for such jurors shall be di- 
 rected to and served by the sheriff of Cook county at 
 the expense of said county, and the fees of the said 
 jurors shall be paid out of the city treasury. The 
 number of petit jurors to be summoned from time to 
 time shall be determined by the chief justice. 
 
 Section 26. That it shall be the duty of the chief jus- 
 tice of the municipal court to cause to be interrogated 
 all petit jurors summoned for service in the municipal 
 court, and to cause to be enquired into the qualifica- 
 tions of said jurors, and to reject from service as jur- 
 ors all persons who do not appear to possess the quali- 
 fications required by law, and to cause the summoning 
 of persons competent to serve as jurors. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 25 AND 26. 
 
 The purpose of these sections is to secure for the muni- 
 cipal court a high class of petit jurors. To accomplish 
 this it is provided, in the first place, that the petit jurors 
 shall be furnished by the jury commissioners of Cook 
 county in the same manner and from the same lists, as 
 near as may be, as petit jurors are provided for the cir- 
 cuit, superior and criminal courts of Cook county, and at 
 such times and in such numbers as may be determined by 
 the chief justice. The numbers to be summoned from 
 time to time and the periods for which they shall serve 
 
Note to Sections 25 and 26. 129 
 
 will depend upon the number of cases in which jury trials 
 are demanded. The chief justice, having full control of 
 the making up of the calendars and of the order in which 
 cases shall be tried, will be enabled to avoid the summon- 
 ing of a larger number than is needed and the consequent 
 keeping of a number of jurymen idle at the expense of 
 the city. Economy in the matter of expense of the jury 
 system is an important item. 
 
 The provision that the fees of the jurors shall be paid 
 out of the city treasury was inserted at the request of the 
 representatives of Cook county residing beyond the city 
 limits. The city court act, under which all the other 
 city courts of the state are organized, requires that the 
 fees of jurors for the city courts shall be paid out of the 
 county treasury. This is, doubtless, upon the theory that 
 the cases tried m the city courts by jury, if not tried in 
 those courts, would be tried in the circuit courts and the 
 county would thus be compelled to pay the fees of the 
 jurors. It is, however, a matter of comparatively little 
 importance whether the fees of the jurors in the munici- 
 pal court of Chicago be paid out of the city treasury or 
 out of the county treasury, for the city, so far as prop- 
 erty subject to assessment for taxation purposes is con- 
 cerned, represents about ninety-three per cent, of the 
 county. 
 
 The duty imposed upon the chief justice to cause to be 
 interrogated all petit jurors and to cause their qualifica- 
 tions to be inquired into, and to reject from service all 
 who do not appear to possess the qualifications required 
 by law, is an exceedingly important one. In the circuit 
 court jurors who are summoned for service are presumed, 
 in the first instance, to possess the qualifications required 
 by law. Upon the first day of their appearance they are 
 
130 Note to Sections 25 and 26. 
 
 usually examined by the presiding judge for the purpose 
 of ascertaining whether they have any valid excuses to 
 offer why they should not be required to serve as jurors. 
 Those who do not have such excuses are retained for 
 service, regardless of their qualifications. Occasionally 
 a juryman, for the purpose of being excused from service, 
 calls the court's attention to his lack of proper qualifica- 
 tions ; as, for instance, that he is not able to read, write or 
 understand English sufficiently well to properly discharge 
 his duty. Such instances, however, are rare. The re- 
 sult of this method is that in each and every case in which 
 a juryman on the regular panel is called for service he 
 is examined by counsel on both sides with respect to his 
 statutory qualifications. 
 
 By the terms oi section 17 of article VI of the constitu- 
 tion, any person can be a circuit judge, or the judge of 
 any inferior court, if he is twenty-five years of age, a citi- 
 zen of the United States, has resided in this state five 
 years next preceding his election, and is a resident of the 
 circuit, county, city, cities or incorporated town in which 
 he has been elected, but much higher qualifications are 
 required of jurymen. The statute prescribing the quali- 
 fications of petit jurors declares that they shall be per- 
 sons "in the possession of their natural faculties and not 
 infirm or decrepit, free from all legal exceptions, of fair 
 character, of approved integrity, of sound judgment, well 
 informed and who understand the English language. ' ' It 
 is a matter of common notoriety that the majority of the 
 jurors furnished by the jury commissioners to the cir- 
 cuit, superior and criminal courts do not possess all of 
 these statutory qualifications. An investigation would 
 reveal the fact that only a small percentage of them: were 
 persons "of fair character, of approved integrity, of 
 
Note to Sections 25 and 26. 131 
 
 sound judgment, well informed and who understand tue 
 English language." Yet notwithstanding their lack of 
 qualifications they are retained for jury service and are 
 permitted by the court, in the absence of objection by the 
 parties, to participate in the trial of causes. Doubtless 
 an examination of the jurors would show that the major- 
 ity of those who sit in the trial of causes would not be 
 able to give any intelligent explanation of the written in- 
 structions which are delivered to them by the court re- 
 specting the law of the case on trial and which they take 
 with them in their retirement. Yet in the appellate and 
 supreme courts they are not only presumed to understand 
 these written instructions, but are supposed to inspect 
 them so carefully and consider them so thoroughly as to 
 observe and be misled by erroneous statements as to the 
 law the inaccuracy of which has escaped the attention 
 not only of the learned judge presiding at the trial, but 
 also of the learned counsel by whom the instructions have 
 been prepared. 
 
 It is the clear intention and positive direction of the 
 Municipal Court Act that the statutory qualifications of 
 the jurors shall not be a matter left entirely for the in- 
 vestigation of the attorneys at the time jurors are being 
 impaneled in cases, but that the chief justice in the first 
 instance shall see to it that there are no jurors called into 
 the jury box who do not possess the statutory qualifica- 
 tions. Thus, if the law is obeyed, as it is presumed it 
 will be, a panel of .one hundred jurors accepted for serv- 
 ice in the municipal court will be one hundred men, every 
 one of whom possesses all the qualifications required by 
 law, excepting, however, those falling under the designa- 
 tion "free from all legal exceptions," as it would hardly 
 be practicable to inquire in advance into all such excep- 
 
132 Note to Sections 25 and 26. 
 
 tions. To do so would require an inquiry as to whether 
 any juryman was of kin to any person who might be a 
 party to any suit which might be called for trial while he 
 was serving as a juryman, and also an ascertainment of 
 whether any juryman was biased or prejudiced in any 
 cause which might possibly come before him for trial. 
 However, as respects the question of bias or prejudice, it 
 would be practicable for the chief justice to eliminate 
 from the list of jurors any who would be biased or preju- 
 diced in such cases then pending for trial as, because 
 of their public notoriety, might have come to the knowl- 
 edge of the jurymen. 
 
 The method of securing jurors thus prescribed by these 
 sections is to be considered in connection with subsequent 
 section 31, which is fully explained in the note thereto. 
 
 As to the constitutional questions raised by the provi- 
 sions of this section see the note to sections 19 and 20, 
 supra. 
 
Section 27. 133 
 
 SECTION 27. 
 
 Section 27. That all criminal cases in the municipal 
 court in which the punishment is by fine or imprison- 
 ment otherwise than in the penitentiary, may be prose- 
 cuted by information of the attorney general or state's 
 attorney, or some other person, and when an informa- 
 tion is presented by any person other than the attorney 
 general or state's attorney, it shall be verified by affi- 
 davit of such person that the same is true, or that the 
 same is true as he is informed and believes. Before an 
 information is filed by any person other than the at- 
 torney general or state 's attorney, one of the judges of 
 the municipal court shall examine the information and 
 may examine the person presenting the same and re- 
 quire other evidence and satisfy himself that there is 
 probable cause for filing the same and so endorse the 
 same. Every information shall set forth the offense 
 with reasonable certainty, substantially as required in 
 an indictment, and the proceedings thereon shall be the 
 same, as near as may be, as upon indictment in the 
 criminal court of Cook county, excepting as is by this 
 act otherwise provided. But criminal cases in which 
 the punishment is by fine only not exceeding five hun- 
 dred dollars ($500) may, in the discretion of the court, 
 be prosecuted by complaint as is provided by law for 
 the prosecution of criminal cases before justices of the 
 peace. Any person committed for a criminal or sup- 
 posed criminal offense and not admitted to bail and not 
 tried within four months after the date of arrest shall 
 be set at liberty by the court, unless the delay shall 
 happen on the application of the prisoner or unless the 
 court is satisfied that due exertion has been made to 
 procure the evidence on the part of the people and that 
 there is reasonable grounds to believe that such evi- 
 dence may be procured within the next sixty days, in 
 which case the court may continue the case for such 
 time as the court may deem necessary, not exceeding 
 said sixty days : Provided, however, that if said person 
 be not tried within said sixty days no further continu- 
 ance shall be granted and said person shall be set at 
 liberty by the court. 
 
134 Note to Section 27. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 27. 
 
 The provision for prosecuting by information in the 
 municipal court criminal cases in which the punishment 
 is by fine or imprisonment otherwise than in the peniten- 
 tiary, is the same as that contained in section 117 of the 
 County Court Act of 1874 (1 Starr & Curtiss, 2d Ed., 
 p. 1188). The provision for the discharge of a defendant 
 for want of prosecution is the same as that contained in 
 the Criminal Code, division 13, section 18 (1 Starr & Cur- 
 tiss, 2d Ed., 1406), with the change made necessary by the 
 fact that there are in the municipal court no terms. 
 
 The original criminal jurisdiction of the municipal 
 court is of great importance and if properly exercised will 
 bring about a great improvement in the administration 
 of the criminal law in Chicago. Under the existing law 
 justices of the peace have no jurisdiction of criminal 
 cases excepting those in which the punishment is by fine 
 only and the fine does not exceed two hundred dollars. If 
 a case of misdemeanor punishable by a fine exceeding two 
 hundred dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail, is 
 brought before a justice of the peace, his power, in case 
 the evidence satisfies him of the defendant's guilt, is lim- 
 ited to binding the defendant pver to the grand jury. The 
 witnesses who have testified before the justice are then 
 required to appear before the grand jury in order that an 
 indictment may be secured and, if an indictment is se- 
 cured and the defendant does not plead guilty, they are 
 obliged to again attend before the criminal court to tes- 
 tify at the trial and such attendance may require the loss 
 by each of them of several days' time. The trial of the 
 case is by a jury with all the delay and waste of time at- 
 tendant upon the method in vogue of trying criminal 
 
Note to Section 27. 135 
 
 cases in the criminal court. The witnesses, if called by 
 the state, unless nonresidents of the county, receive no 
 compensation for thfeir services, except in the rare in- 
 stances in which the costs may be collected from the de- 
 fendant. It often happens, and perhaps it is true in most 
 of such cases, that the witnesses are poor people who can 
 ill afford the loss of time made necessary by their attend- 
 ance once before the justice of the peace on the prelim- 
 inary examination, once before the grand jury and again 
 before the criminal court at the trial. Besides, the county 
 is put to the expense of the service of subpoenas to se- 
 cure the attendance of the witnesses not only at the pre- 
 liminary examination but also before the grand jury and 
 at the trial of the cause and the time which elapses be- 
 tween the commission of an offense and the trial in the 
 criminal court often results in the death or removal of 
 witnesses or in their being so tampered with as to prevent 
 the conviction of the defendant. Then, too, it is a matter 
 of common notoriety that thousands of petty 
 criminal offenses annually are ignored by the parties 
 especially aggrieved thereby because of the annoyances 
 and expenses to which those who must furnish evidence 
 are subjected under the existing methods of procedure. 
 The system is manifestly one that is very unsatisfactory 
 and very inefficient. 
 
 The Municipal Court Act is designed to work a radical 
 reform in the method of disposing of criminal cases of 
 tne grade of misdemeanors. The arrest of any person 
 for a misdemeanor may be founded in the first instance 
 on an information which answers all the purposes of an 
 indictment, or the information may follow the arrest and 
 instead o± a preliminary examination followed by a bind- 
 ing over to the grand jury, the subsequent appearance by 
 
136 Note to Section 27. 
 
 the witnesses before the grand jury, and an indictment 
 and a trial at which the witnesses must again attend, the 
 first step in the municipal court which may render neces- 
 sary the attendance of the witnesses will be the trial. 
 This trial will be at the police station to which the defend- 
 ant may be brought when arrested, without a jury, unless 
 the defendant requests a jury trial, in which latter case 
 the trial will be at such place as may be provided for 
 jury trials. As there will always be petit jurymen in at- 
 tendance upon the municipal court ready for the trial of 
 causes, any defendant arrested in pursuance of an in- 
 formation filed or otherwise, may be placed upon trial 
 immediately, if he shall so demand, or within such period 
 after his arrest as may be consistent with securing to him 
 the right to a sufficient preparation for his trial and de- 
 fense. By this system a defendant who is unjustly ac- 
 cused and arrested may secure a speedy restoration to 
 liberty, and a defendant who is guilty may be as speedily 
 dealt with as a just and proper regard for his legal 
 rights, including his right to a lair and impartial trial, 
 will permit. 
 
 Jury trials in such cases will be freed from some of 
 the most glaring defects attendant upon jury trials in 
 the criminal court. Of these defects there may be men- 
 tioned those pertaining to the impaneling of jurors 
 which are pointed out ia the notes to sections 25, 26 and 
 31. Mention may also be made of the method which will 
 prevail in the municipal court in the charging of the 
 jury, which is sufficiently commented on' in the note to 
 section 37. 
 
 It will thus be seen that the importance of the criminal 
 jurisdiction of the municipal court is very great. Prop- 
 erly and intelligently exercised, it will secure the speedy 
 
Note to Section 27. 137 
 
 trial of all persons charged with misdemeanors, the 
 speedy release from imprisonment of those who are 
 found not guilty and the speedy punishment of those who 
 are found guilty. The spectacle of a prompt and effi- 
 cient administration of the criminal law, even in cases 
 of misdemeanors, cannot but have a beneficial effect 
 upon the community at large in the way of discouraging 
 the commission of criminal offenses. 
 
 It is true the division of the criminal business into two 
 parts, one composed of felonies to be handled and dis- 
 posed of in the criminal court, and the other composed 
 of misdemeanors to be handled and disposed of in the 
 municipal court, may possibly impose some inconveni- 
 ence and additional labor upon the state's attorney, but 
 that inconvenience will be one personal to that officer 
 and his assistants and as a matter of fact will be a dis- 
 advantage more apparent than real. Moreover, it will 
 be overbalanced and compensated for by the benefit 
 which will result to the community at large. 
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION AS TO JURISDIC- 
 TION IN CRIMINAL CASES. 
 
 Section 26 of article VI of the constitution of 1870 de- 
 clares that all recognizances and appeals taken in Cook 
 county in criminal and quasi-criminal cases shall be re- 
 turnable and taken to the criminal court of said county. 
 It is suggested that this would prevent the municipal 
 court, in any criminal case pending before it, from tak- 
 ing any recognizance other than one for the appearance 
 of the defendant before the criminal court, and would 
 require the allowance of appeals to the criminal court 
 
138 Note to Section 27. 
 
 from the municipal court in all criminal cases. But this 
 suggestion is without merit. The jurisdiction of the 
 criminal court is not exclusive, but is only concurrent 
 with that of the circuit court in criminal and quasi-crim- 
 inal cases. Berkowits v. Lester, 121 111., 99. As the con- 
 stitutional amendment declares that the jurisdiction and 
 practice of the municipal courts may be such as the Gen- 
 eral Assembly may prescribe, the General Assembly is 
 authorized to make the jurisdiction of the municipal 
 courts concurrent with that of the criminal court in all 
 criminal and quasi-criminal cases. 
 
Section 28. 139 
 
 SECTION 28. 
 
 Section 28. That, until otherwise provided hy the rules 
 of the municipal court, and except as is herein other- 
 wise prescribed, cases of the first class mentioned in 
 section two (2) of this act shall be commenced and 
 prosecuted in said municipal court in the same manner 
 in which similar suits and proceedings are required to 
 be commenced and prosecuted in the circuit courts, and 
 excepting also in the following particulars : 
 
 First — The summons, when the first process is a sum- 
 mons, or the writ, when the first process is a writ, shall 
 be directed to the bailiff to execute and shall be re- 
 turnable upon some Monday at least ten days, and not 
 more than thirty days, after the date thereof. 
 
 Second — Service of such summons or writ shall be made 
 by delivering a copy thereof to the defendant, if an in- 
 dividual, ai^d informing htm of the contents thereof, 
 but if any defendant be a corporation, the service shall 
 be made in the manner provided by law for similar 
 cases in the circuit courts. 
 
 Third — Notice to the defendant by publication may be 
 given under like circumstances and in the same man- 
 ner as is provided by law for similar cases in the cir- 
 cuit courts, but the notice published, in lieu of stating 
 the time of the return of the summons or writ, shall 
 state the date on or before which the defendant is re- 
 quired to appear, which date shall be some Monday not 
 less than forty nor more than sixty days after the date 
 of the first publication of notice, as the plaintiff may 
 require. 
 
 Fourth — No such suit shall be commenced in the munici- 
 pal court unless the defendant, if there be but one de- 
 fendant, resides or is found within the city of Chicago, 
 or if the defendant be a corporation, unless its princi- 
 pal office is within said city ; but if the defendant be a 
 corporation not having a principal office in the city of 
 Chicago, such suit may be brought in the municipal 
 court wherever service of process may be had within 
 the city upon any officer, agent or employe of such cor- 
 poration upon whom service of process might be had 
 if issued in a suit commenced in the circuit court. 
 
140 Section 28. 
 
 Fifth — The provisions of paragraph, fourth above shall 
 not apply to attachment suits brought against non- 
 residents of this state, which suits may be brought in 
 the municipal court when any property of the defend- 
 ant is levied upon, or any garnishee resides or is found 
 within the city of Chicago. 
 
 Sixth — When there are several defendants, one of whom 
 resides or is found in the city of Chicago, a summons 
 or writ may be issued to the sheriff of Cook county 
 for any defendant residing in said coimty, but outside 
 of the city of Chicago, or to the sheriff of any other 
 county for any defendant residing in such county, and 
 service of any summons or writ so issued shall be 
 made in the same manner as herein required in the 
 case of a summons or writ directed to the bailiff : Pro- 
 vided, however, that no judgment shall, in any such 
 case, be rendered against any defendant served with 
 process outside of the city of Chicago unless judgment 
 be also rendered against a defendant served within said 
 city of Chicago. 
 
 Seventh — The plaintiff shall file his declaration withia 
 five days after the commencement of the suit, in de- 
 fault whereof the suit shall be dismissed unless the 
 court by an order entered in said suit shall extend the 
 time for filing such declaration. 
 
 Eighth — The defendant shall, in case he shall have been 
 served with process of summons, or with the writ, five 
 days or more prior to the return day thereof, demur 
 or plead to the declaration or the complaint on or be- 
 fore the Monday succeeding such return day; but in 
 case the summons or writ shall have been served less 
 than five days prior to the return day the defendant 
 shall not be required to plead to the declaration or 
 complaint until on or before the second Monday after 
 such return day. In case the time for filing the decla- 
 ration or complaint shall be extended by the court, the 
 time for the defendant to demur or plead to the same 
 shall be extended until the second Monday succeeding 
 the expiration of such extension of time. The time 
 within which the defendant is required to demur or 
 plead may be extended by the court in its discretion. 
 But all cases provided for in this section shall be 
 commenced, prosecuted and disposed of in some branch 
 court held in the first district. 
 
Note to Section 28. 141 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 28. 
 
 The difference between the methods of procedure in 
 the municipal court in cases of the first class and those 
 in the circuit court in similar cases are mainly those ren- 
 dered necessary by the circumstance that there are to be 
 in the municipal court no stated terijas, the court being 
 always open for the transaction of business. A few of 
 these differences may be specially pointed out. 
 
 Service of summons upon individual defendants is to 
 be made by the delivery of a copy, instead of by reading 
 as in the circuit court. 
 
 The provision that if one defendant, in a case where 
 there are several defendants, resides or is found within 
 the city of Chicago, a summons may be issued to the sher- 
 iff of Cook county for any defendant residing in said 
 county but outside of the city, or to the sheriff of any 
 other county for any defendant residing in such county, 
 has already been commented upon in that part of the 
 note to sections 19 and 20, entitled Constitutional Ques- 
 tions as to Jurisdictional Provisions. 
 
 In the circuit court the plaintiff is required to file his 
 declaration ten days prior to the first day of the term of 
 court at which his summons is returnable, in default of 
 which the defendant is not required to plead to the decla- 
 ration until the succeeding term. If the plaintiff fails to 
 file his declaration ten days prior to the term succeeding 
 that at which the summons is made returnable, his suit 
 is to be dismissed for want of prosecution. In the muni- 
 cipal court the plaintiff is required to file his declaration 
 within five days after he commences his suit. Unless he 
 does so his suit will be dismissed unless the court shall 
 extend the time for filing the declaration. It will be 
 
142 Note te Section 28. 
 
 noted that the language of this provision is not "unless 
 the court . . . shall have extended the time," but 
 it is "unless the court . . . shall extend." Hence 
 the extension of time for the filing of a declaration may 
 be granted by the court as well after as before the plain- 
 tiff is in default. 
 
 In the circuit court the defendant is not required to 
 plead unless the summons has been served and the decla- 
 ration filed ten days prior to the term at which the sum- 
 mons is made returnable. In the municipal court the 
 defendant is required to plead on or before the Monday 
 succeeding the return day of the summons in case it has 
 been served five days or more before the return day or in 
 case it has been served less than five days prior to the 
 return day he is required to plead on or before the second 
 Monday after the return day. An extension of the time 
 for filing the declaration operates as an extension of the 
 time to plead until the second Monday succeeding the ex- 
 piration of the extended time. 
 
 Cases of this class are to be commenced, prosecuted 
 and disposed of in some branch court held in the first dis- 
 trict. This is for convenience in handling and disposing 
 of the business. 
 
Section 29. 143 
 
 SECTION 29. 
 
 Section 29. That cases of the fourth class and cases of 
 the fifth class mentioned in section two (2) of this act 
 shall be brought and prosecuted in the district in which 
 the defendant, if there be but one defendant, or one of 
 the defendants, if there be more than one defendant, 
 resides or is found, or, if the defendant be a corpora- 
 tion having its principal office in the city of Chicago, 
 in the district in which its principal office is located; 
 but if the defendant be a corporation not having a prin^ 
 cipal office in the city of Chicago, suit may be brought 
 in any district within which service of process may be 
 had upon any officer, agent or employe of such corpora- 
 tion, upon whom service of process might be had if is- 
 sued in a suit commenced in the circuit court. If, in 
 any such case, there is more than one defendant and 
 one defendant resides or is found within the district in 
 which such suit is brought or is properly served with 
 process therein, the process of such municipal court 
 may be served upon the remaining defendant or de- 
 fendants at any place within said city of Chicago. But 
 no suit shall be brought against the city of Chicago or 
 any other municipal corporation in any other than the 
 first district. If, in any case where there is more than 
 one defendant, process is duly served upon one or more 
 defendants and returned not served as to another de- 
 fendant or other defendants, the suit shall proceed as 
 in like cases in the circuit court. But the requirement 
 that the defendant, if there.be but one defendant, or 
 one of the defendants, if there be more than one de- 
 fendant, must reside or be found within the district in 
 which such suit is brought shall not apply to attach- 
 ment suits brought against non-residents of this state, 
 which suits may be brought in any district when any 
 property of the defendant is levied upon within such 
 district or any garnishee resides or is found in such 
 district, nor shall it apply to forcible entry and de- 
 tainer suits in which the defendants do not reside or 
 cannot be found within the city of Chicago, which suits 
 may be brought in any district in which the property, 
 the possession of which is sought to be recovered, is 
 
144 Note to Section 29. 
 
 situated, and service of summons may be had by no- 
 tice by publication in the manner required by law in 
 cases of attachments in courts of record. "When, upon 
 the complaint of any defendant, it shall be made to ap- 
 pear to the municipal court in any district that the suit 
 has been improperly brought therein, the court shall 
 not be required on that account to dismiss the suit, if 
 the municipal court in any district could properly have 
 jurisdiction thereof, but in such case the court may 
 cause such suit to be transferred to the proper district 
 and the court in the district to which the same is trans- 
 ferred shall proceed therewith as if the same had been 
 originally commenced in said district : Provided, how- 
 ever, that the court may, in its discretion, require the 
 plaintiff to pay the costs of the defendant paid by him 
 prior to such transfer:. And, provided further, that 
 whenever a trial by jury is demanded in any case, 
 whether civil, criminal or quasi criminal, the court may, 
 in its discretion, direct the trial of said case to be had 
 in the first district, and for that purpose may cause said 
 case to be transferred to the first district, to be there 
 tried and disposed of. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 29. 
 
 One of the complaints against the system of justices' 
 courts is the annoyance and injustice which result from 
 the bringing of suits before justices whose oflSces are 
 in parts of the county long distances from the residences 
 of the defendants or garnishees. To correct this evil, 
 the Municipal Court Act requires suits of the fourth and 
 fifth classes to be brought and prosecuted in the district 
 in which the defendant, if there be but one defendant, 
 or one of the defendants, if there be more than one de- 
 fendant, resides or is found, or if the defendant be a 
 corporation having its principal office in the city of Chi- 
 cago, in the district in which its principal ofl&ce is lo- 
 cated. Process in any such case cannot be served beyond 
 the city limits, but attachment suits may be brought 
 
Note to Section 29. 145 
 
 against non-residents where any property belonging to 
 tliem may be levied upon or any garnishee resides or is 
 found in the district. The summoning of defendants and 
 garnishees residing in the city before justices whose 
 offices are beyond the city limits is entirely prohibited 
 excepting in cases where such defendants and garnishees 
 are served with summons without the city limits. 
 
 Corporations, or at least domestic corporations, ob- 
 tain one great benefit by the act, in that garnishee pro- 
 ceedings, in cases against non-residents, as well as all 
 original suits of the fourth and fifth classes, must be 
 brought against them in the districts in which their prin- 
 cipal offices are located. As the principal offices of most 
 domestic corporations are located in the first district, all 
 such suits and proceedings must be brought against them 
 in that district. Doubtless the chief justice, in the man- 
 agement of the business in the first district, will arrange 
 that all such suits and proceedings will be so disposed 
 of on the calendars as to expedite the trials and at the 
 same time to relieve the defendants and garnishees from 
 unnecessary inconvenience. Instead of being compelled 
 to attend upon from fifty to seventy-five courts in dif- 
 ferent parts of the county, as now, they will rarely be 
 compelled to attend upon more than one. The same ben- 
 efit will also result to other litigants against whom simi- 
 lar proceedings are brought. Corporations are referred 
 to especially because of the well known fact that they 
 are compelled to attend to a vast number of garnishee 
 proceedings. 
 
 The requirement that a defendant or, if there are sev- 
 eral defendants, one or more of the defendants, shall re- 
 side or be found in the district is not jurisdictional. The 
 defendant wrongfully sued out of his district may com- 
 
146 Note to Section 29. 
 
 plain of it if lie sees fit. If lie does complain the suit 
 will not be dismissed, but will be transferred to the prop- 
 er district. 
 
 The provision authorizing cases in which a trial by 
 jury is demanded to be transferred to the first district 
 is in the interest of convenience and economy in the man- 
 agement of the jury trials of the court. To require con- 
 stantly twenty-four jurymen to be kept on hand ready 
 to serve in each of the other four districts might result 
 in great and unnecessary expense to the city. But 
 should it appear that justice to the parties litigant 
 required that jury trials should be had as well in the 
 other districts as in the first, provision can be made there- 
 for. The discretion vested in the judges should be exer- 
 cised with proper regard for the interests of all con- 
 cerned. 
 
Section 30. 147 
 
 SECTION 30. 
 
 Section 30. That every suit at law in the municipal 
 court, other than a case of the second class or a case 
 of the third class mentioned in section two (2) of this 
 act, shall be tried by the court without a jury unless 
 the plaintiff, at the time he commences his suit, or the 
 defendant, at the time he enters his appearance, shall 
 file with the clerk a demand in writing of a trial by 
 jury, which demand, however, may be withdrawn by 
 the party filing the same at any time before the trial, 
 and in every case of the third class mentioned in sec- 
 tion two of this act a trial by jury shall be deemed 
 waived unless the defendant shall expressly demand 
 such trial. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 30. 
 
 By the requirement that in cases of the first, fourth 
 and fifth classes jury trials shall only be allowed where 
 the plaintiff, at the time he commences his suit, or the 
 defendant, at the time he enters his appearance, files 
 with the clerk a demand in writing of a trial by jury, the 
 court is enabled, immediately upon the entry of the de- 
 fendant's appearance, to ascertain whether a jury trial 
 will be demanded, and with that information in all cases 
 will be enabled to so arrange the calendars that cases 
 for trial by jury will not be intermingled with or put on 
 the same calendars as cases of trials without a jury, and 
 hence a much better calculation can be made as to the 
 number of cases which should be placed upon each day's 
 calendar. 
 
 In criminal cases the defendant is not to be required 
 to file any written demand for a trial by jury. He may 
 demand it orally. But unless he does demand it before 
 the trial is entered upon it is deemed to be waived, and 
 hence the record need not show any express waiver, for, 
 
148 Note to Section 30. 
 
 in the absence of the recital upon the record of a demand 
 a waiver will be presumed. 
 
 This section in no manner infringes upon the right of 
 trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution. It is mere- 
 ly a regulation in the interest of an orderly and con- 
 venient disposition of the business of the court. Its con- 
 stitutionality is discussed in the note to sections 19 and 
 20, supra. 
 
Section 31. 149 
 
 SECTION 31. 
 
 Section 31. That in all cases tried by jury in a munici- 
 pal court each party shall be entitled to a challenge 
 of the same number of jurors without showing cause 
 for such challenge as are allowed in similar cases in 
 the circuit courts and in the criminal court of Cook 
 county, and challenges for statutory and other causes 
 shall be allowed as in similar cases in the circuit court 
 and in said criminal court of Cook county. It shall be 
 the duty of the judge presiding at the trial to examine 
 or cause to be examined all jurors called into the jury 
 box in any case with respect to their statutory quali- 
 fications to serve as petit jurors in such case, and to 
 
 . permit the plaintiff, or the people, and the defendant 
 to propound to the jurors such pertinent questions as 
 may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining 
 whether the jurors are biased or prejudiced. But upon 
 appeal or writ of error to review any judgment of said 
 municipal court in any case tried therein by jury no 
 assignment of error shall be allowed which shall call 
 in question any ruling of the court pertaining to or 
 connected with the impaneling of the jury, other than 
 one improperly restricting the right of the defendant 
 to examine the jurors as to bias or prejudice, or im- 
 properly overruling a challenge by the defendant of a 
 juror for bias or prejudice. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 31. 
 
 As we have already seen by sections 25 and 26, ante, 
 a method is prescribed by which it will be practicable 
 to insure the acceptance for service as petit jurors of 
 only such persons as possess the qualifications required 
 by statute. After the jurors summoned have been thor- 
 oughly examined by the chief justice, and that examina- 
 tion has been supplemented by an examination by the 
 judge presiding at the trial, no good purpose could pos- 
 sibly be subserved by allowing the attorneys in each 
 
150 Note to Section 31. 
 
 case as it was called to examine and re-examine the ju- 
 rors as to their statutory qualifications other than that 
 of being unbiased or unprejudiced. Their possession of 
 those qualifications should be set at rest forever by the 
 examination by the chief justice and by the presiding 
 judge. By reserving to the parties the right to examine 
 the jurors upon the question of bias or prejudice and by 
 permitting a review by the supreme court or appellate 
 court of the question whether any juror accepted was 
 biased or prejudiced, all necessary safeguards are given 
 to the parties litigant. 
 
 It is believed that the provisions of sections 25, 26 
 and 31 will result, not only in the securing of first class 
 jurymen for service in the municipal court, but also in 
 saving the immense amount of time and money that is 
 wasted in the circuit, superior and criminal courts in 
 tlie securing of competent jurymen. It is difficult to un- 
 derstand how in the impaneling of any petit jury in any 
 case, civil or criminal, where there are not more than 
 three defendants, it would be possible to exhaust a panel 
 of one hundred jurymen accepted for service before a 
 proper jury for the trial of the cause could be obtained. 
 
 While economy in respect to time and money is of 
 great importance in this matter, it is much less so than a 
 strict adherence to and observance of the requirements 
 of the law. Even if it were true that the qualifications 
 fixed by the statute were unnecessarily high that would 
 be no justification for a disregard of its provisions. But 
 the qualifications are not higher than they should be, 
 for certainly no man is fit to decide causes between liti- 
 gants who is not a person "of fair character, of ap- 
 proved integrity, of sound judgment, well informed, and 
 who understands the English language." 
 
Note to Section 31. 151 
 
 It must not, however, be assumed by those who are 
 called upon to give effect to this provision of the statute 
 that the test to be applied in determining whether a 
 proposed juryman is a man "of sound judgment, well 
 informed, and who understands the English language," 
 is his ability, when suddenly called into court before a 
 learned judge and a number of astute lawyers, to define 
 ponderous words with Websterian accuracy. 
 
 The constitutionality of this section is discussed in the 
 note to sections 19 and 20, supra. 
 
152 Sections 32, 33 and 34. 
 
 SECTIONS 32, 33 AND 34. 
 
 Section 32. That the municipal court in any civil suit 
 pending therein, at any time before the trial or final 
 hearing thereof, may permit the filing therein of inter- 
 rogatories to be answered by any party to such suit or 
 any person for whose immediate benefit such suit is 
 prosecuted or defended, or by the directors, officers, 
 superintendent or managing agents of any corpora- 
 tion which is a party to the record in such suit, at the 
 instance of the adverse party or parties or any of 
 them, and to require an answer under oath to all such 
 interrogatories as the party to be interrogated might 
 be required to answer, if called as a witness upon the 
 trial or hearing of such suit, but the party filing such 
 interrogatories shall not be concluded by the answers 
 thereto, if he shall elect to introduce the same or any 
 or either of them upon the trial or final hearing. 
 
 Section 33. Tha,t upon the trial or hearing of any suit 
 in the municipal court any party thereto, or any per- 
 son for whose immediate benefit such suit is prose- 
 cuted or defended, or the directors, officers, superin- 
 tendent or managing agents of any corporation which 
 is a party to the record in such suit, may be examined 
 upon the trial thereof as if under cross-examination 
 at the instance of the adverse party or parties or any 
 of them, and for that purpose may be compelled, in 
 the same manner and subject to the same rules for ex- 
 amination as any other witness, to testify, but the par- 
 ty calling for such examination shall not be concluded 
 thereby, but may rebut the testimony thus given by 
 counter testimony. 
 
 Section 34. That whenever in any suit pending in the 
 municipal court, evidence shall be necessary concern- 
 ing any fact in support of or in opposition to any in- 
 terlocutory or other motion or application, other than 
 an application for a change of venue, the court may, 
 in its discretion, require such evidence to be presented 
 by the oral examination of witnesses in open court or 
 otherwise, and may make all necessary orders for such 
 oral examination. 
 
Note to Sections 32, 33 and 34. 153 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 32, 33 AND 34. 
 
 These sections are innovations, so far as the practice 
 in this state is concerned, though their provisions have 
 long been in force in other states. The method of pro- 
 cedure under them will doubtless be regulated by rules to 
 be adopted in pursuance of section 20. The following 
 suggestions in reference to them are here offered: 
 
 First. "With respect to interrogatories under section 
 30 the practice in other states is concisely stated in 14 
 Cyc, 352-362. Doubtless the practice in the municipal 
 court will be greatly simplified. In cases of the fourth 
 and fifth classes the application to file interrogatories 
 should ordinarily be required to be maae at ^UB time of 
 the commencement of the suit, if made by the plaintiff, 
 or at the time of the entry of appearance, if made by 
 the defendant, and should be accompanied by an affi- 
 davit by the plaintiff setting forth facts showing that he 
 has a good cause of action, or by the defendant setting 
 forth facts showing that he has a good defense. The 
 interrogatories should be limited in number and directed 
 towards the vital questions in the case. By means of 
 these interrogatories the questions of fact in issue be- 
 tween the parties may be greatly reduced, thus render- 
 ing necessary the attendance of a less number of wit- 
 nesses and shortening the length of the trial, if not in 
 many cases rendering a trial entirely unnecessary. 
 
 Second. The provision in section 33 is substantially 
 a copy of section 5659 of the Minnesota Code. The ex- 
 amination, being in open court, is under the control of 
 the presiding judge, and is governed, for the most part, 
 by the same rules which govern other cross-examina- 
 tions. No re-examination by the attorney of the party 
 
154 Note to Sections 32, 33 and 34. 
 
 called as a witness is permissible. If sucli examination 
 is desired the party must be called as a witness in his 
 own behalf. The advantage to be derived from this 
 practice is the elimination of uncontro verted matters by 
 the proof, through the admissions of the opposite party, 
 of facts which otherwise might require the production of 
 many witnesses. The section is construed in In re Brown, 
 38 Minn., 112 (35 N. W. 726) ; Waif or d v. Farnham, 4A 
 Minn., 159 (46 N. W., 295); Schmidt v. Schmidt, 47 
 Minn., 451 (50 N. W., 589) ; Schmidt v. Durnham, 50 
 Minn., 96 (52 N. W., 277) ; State v. Thaden, 43 Minn., 
 325 (45 N. W., 614) ; Wheaton v. Berg, 50 Minn., 525 
 (52 N. W., 926). 
 
 Third. Under the present practice the only evidence 
 which can be used in support of or in opposition to in- 
 terlocutory motions are the voluntary affidavits of wit- 
 nesses, or records, or other documents or writings. As 
 a consequence it often happens that the decision of a 
 motion may depend upon the skill and industry of the re- 
 spective attorneys in drawing affidavits. Oftentimes 
 facts are sworn to in affidavits which would not be sworn 
 to were the party making the affidavit testifying as a 
 witness in open court. Moreover, though a person may 
 be an important witness as to a fact in issue upon a mo- 
 tion, his evidence cannot now be obtained unless he vol- 
 unteers to make an affidavit. These defects in the sys- 
 tem of practice will be remedied by the provision allow- 
 ing the calling of witnesses upon such motions. 
 
Section 35. 155 
 
 SECTION 35. 
 
 Section 35. That any judge of the nmnicipal court shall 
 upon the application of either party and upon reason- 
 able notice to the opposite party, have power to sign 
 or otherwise make any order in any suit pending in the 
 municipal court at any place within the city of Chi- 
 cago, whenever in the opinion of such judge the grant- 
 ing of such order at such place is in furtherance of 
 justice, and such order shall be as effective as if made 
 in any court room of said court or in the chambers of 
 said judge. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 35. 
 
 In U. 8. Life Ins. Co. v. Shattuck, 159 111., 610, it was 
 held that a judge of the superior court while presiding 
 in the criminal court of Cook county could not make a 
 valid order for an extension of the time for filing a bill 
 of exceptions in a case tried before him in the superior 
 court. It is the intention of the Municipal Court Act 
 that the technical rule announced in that decision shall 
 not apply in the case of orders entered by judges of the 
 municipal court upon reasonable notice to the parties. 
 
156 Section 36. 
 
 SECTION 36. 
 
 Section 36. That cases in the municipal court shall be 
 tried in such order and the calendars of cases shall be 
 so arranged as may be determined by the chief justice 
 or by rules of the court adopted as herein provided. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 36. 
 
 By this section and by section 8 the chief justice is 
 given full control of the order in which cases shall be 
 tried and of the manner in which they shall be classified 
 and distributed upon the different calendars. There will 
 not be, as in the circuit and superior courts, long calen- 
 dars of cases to be disposed of in their order and requir- 
 ing long periods of time for that purpose. Every case 
 in the municipal court will be set for trial on a partic- 
 ular day, and the business of each day will be distrib- 
 uted among the judges for disposition, with the power on 
 the part of the chief justice to transfer cases from the 
 calendar of one judge to that of another when that course 
 may be necessary to accomplish the disposition of each 
 day's business upon that day. Thus, if on a particular 
 day there are fifty cases for trial, of which five are as- 
 signed to each of ten judges, a judge who disposes in two 
 hours of the cases assigned to him may be called upon 
 to assist in disposing of the cases upon the calendar of 
 another judge, who, without such assistance, might not 
 be able to complete the work assigned to him for the day. 
 
Section 37. 157 
 
 SECTION 37. 
 
 Section 37. That in trials by jury in the municipal 
 court, the court shall charge the jury as to the law 
 only, and the charge may, in the discretion of the 
 court, be given orally or in writing, but, when given 
 orally, it shall be taken down in shorthand, and at the 
 request of either party a transcript thereof shall be 
 made and filed in the cause in which such charge is 
 given, and shall be made a part of the record in such 
 case. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 37. 
 
 By the provisions of this section the practice now pre- 
 vailing in the circuit, superior and criminal courts will 
 be varied from in the municipal court in the following 
 particulars : 
 
 1. The charge of the court will be given orally in- 
 stead of in writing. 
 
 2. The parties will be permitted to present to the 
 judge, either orally or in writing, requests to charge, 
 which will be duly considered and passed upon by him. 
 
 3. The jury will take with them in their retirement 
 only their recollections of the rules of law announced in 
 the charge, instead of a number of written propositions 
 each having the word "given" written upon its margin, 
 and a portion purporting to be "instructions for the 
 plaintiff" and the remaining portions "instructions for 
 the defendant." 
 
 4. In order that errors may be pointed out and cor- 
 rections made before the verdict the court will require 
 errors and inaccuracies in the charge to be pointed out 
 and exceptions to be taken before the jury retire, instead 
 of allowing them after the verdict, as is the practice in 
 
158 Note to Section 37. 
 
 the circuit court. Exceptions to the charge, moreover, 
 will not he permitted to he a mere formality, hut the 
 attorneys of the respective parties will he required in 
 good faith to point out specifically and intelligihly the 
 corrections w;hich they wish to have made. 
 
 In Senate Bill No. 45 and House Bill No. 98 there were 
 two provisions relating to the charging of the jury, 
 which were as follows : 
 
 "Sec. 37. That in trials hy jury in the common pleas 
 court the court may charge the jury orally or in writ- 
 ing. ' ' 
 
 "Sec. 49. That in all trials hy jury in the city courts 
 the court may charge the jury orally or in writing as to 
 the law and the facts." 
 
 The proposition to permit the court to charge the jury 
 orally in cases in the municipal court met with serious 
 opposition in the General Assembly and among the mem- 
 bers of the bar. In House Bill No. 422, which was 
 adopted by the house as a substitute law for Senate Bill 
 No. 45 and House Bill No. 98, the provisions on that 
 subject were the following: 
 
 "Sec. 37. That in trials by jury in the common pleas 
 court the court shall charge the jury as to the law only, 
 and such charge may in the discretion of the court he 
 given orally or in writing." 
 
 "Sec. 39. That in all trials by jury in the city courts 
 the court shall not charge the jury as to the facts, hut 
 may state the testimony and the law, and the charge may, 
 in the discretion of the court, be given orally or in writ- 
 ing." 
 
 When House Bill No. 422 reached the senate it was 
 amended in many particulars, and its provisions respect- 
 
Note to Section 37. 159 
 
 ing the charging of the jury were changed to the fol- 
 lowing : 
 
 "Sec. 37. That in trials by jury in the municipal 
 court the court shall not charge the jury as to the facts, 
 but may state the testimony and the law, and the charge 
 may, in the discretion of the court, be given orally or in 
 writing. ' ' 
 
 These provisions applied to all cases, whether civil 
 or criminal, tried by jury. In the conference committee 
 opposition again manifested itself and the result was the 
 compromise which is contained in section 37 of the act 
 as finally passed. 
 
 The practice under this section will be such that when 
 the charge is completed it will be for the parties to then 
 and there and before the jury retire make known their 
 complaints with respect to the real or supposed inaccu- 
 racies in the language used by the judge. This will en- 
 able the judge to correct any inaccuracy in the form or 
 any error in the substance of an instruction, and, in the 
 end, in nearly all cases, the charge can be made satis- 
 factory to both parties. It is extremely rare, in a case 
 of trial by jury, that there is any substantial difference 
 between the attorneys of the respective parties as to the 
 rules of law applicable to the case. In fact, in the great 
 majority of cases the lawyers in their arguments to the 
 jury state the law with reasonable accuracy. There can, 
 then, be no difficulty ordinarily in securing a correct 
 charge, if complaint be made at the proper time. If no 
 complaint be made before the jury retire, no complaint 
 can be made after the verdict, either in the municipal 
 court or in the appellate tribunal. 
 
 But this is not all. By paragraph seventh of section 
 23 of the act, as we have already seen, an error in re- 
 
160 Note to Section 37. 
 
 spect to the charge to the jury, in order to furnish a 
 ground for the reversal of a judgment in a case of the 
 fourth or fifth class, must be one which not merely might 
 have affected the result, but one which the supreme court 
 or appellate court is satisfied did affect it. The practice 
 in this class of cases contemplates that not only, the trial 
 judge, but the attorneys of the respective parties, shall 
 be bound at the trial to use their best endeavors to avoid 
 the commission of errors, and that, when they have so 
 used their best endeavors, the defeated party must be 
 satisfied with the result, unless he can demonstrate to 
 the satisfaction of the appellate tribunal that against his 
 objection and notwithstanding his endeavor to the con- 
 trary, an error was committed which produced a result 
 which but for that error would not have been produced. 
 
 Is not this an infinitely better method for the trial and 
 disposition of the cases of poor people, or of people in 
 moderate circumstances, than the vicious and dishonest 
 system of practice now prevailing in the circuit court, 
 which denies a poor man justice and imposes upon him 
 burdensome and oppressive expenses merely that law- 
 yers may exhibit their acuteness in discovering and 
 exposing, after the verdict, inconsequential defects in 
 written instructions? 
 
Section 38. 161 
 
 SECTION 38. 
 
 Section 38. That whenever it appears in any bill of 
 exceptions signed in any case of the first class or any 
 case of the second class or any case of the third class, 
 mentioned in section two (2) of this act, tried and de- 
 termined in the municipal court, that any erroneous 
 ruling was made by said municipal court against the 
 objection of the party complaining thereof, but that no 
 formal exception was taken by such party thereto, 
 such erroneous ruling shall be subject to review upon 
 appeal or writ of error to the same extent and in like 
 manner as if it appeared that a formal exception had 
 been taken thereto by the party complaining, and no 
 bill of exceptions shall be held defective for the want 
 of the seal of the judge thereto. Upon the prosecution 
 of an appeal or writ of error to review any judgment 
 of the municipal court, in any such case, the original 
 bill of exceptions, in lieu of a certified copy thereof, 
 shall be inserted in the transcript of the record to be 
 filed in the supreme court or appellate court upon 
 such appeal or writ of error, unless the municipal 
 court shall otherwise direct, and upon the final deter- 
 mination of such appeal or writ of error such original 
 bill of exceptions shall be remitted to the municipal 
 court. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 38. 
 
 Two purposes are sought to be accomplished by this 
 section. One is to prevent the refusal of an inquiry by 
 the supreme court or the appellate court into the merits 
 of an appeal or writ of error because of a failure of the 
 bill of exceptions to show, with respect to a ruling com- 
 plained of, that the party appealing or prosecuting the 
 writ of error "then and there excepted," or because the 
 judge, although he signed the bill of exceptions, failed 
 to make a scrawl at the end of his signature and desig- 
 nate it a seal. It imposes upon the supreme court or the 
 appellate court the duty of reviewing every erroneous 
 
162 Note to Section 38. 
 
 ruling that appears to have been made by the municipal 
 court against the objection of the party appealing or 
 prosecuting the writ of error, and it declares that a bill 
 of exceptions shall be valid though it does not contain 
 the seal of the judge. The other purpose is to entitle 
 the party prosecuting an appeal or writ of error to de- 
 mand as a matter of right the insertion of the original 
 bill of exceptions into the transcript of the record, un- 
 less the municipal court shall otherwise direct. As the law 
 now is respecting bills of exceptions in the circuit and 
 superior courts, the consent of both parties to the suit is 
 required to secure the use of the original bill of excep- 
 tions in the transcript in lieu of a copy, and such consent 
 is often refused, with the result that unnecessary ex- 
 pense and trouble is thereby caused. As a further means 
 of saving unnecessary expense to the parties, provision 
 is made that upon the determination of the appeal or 
 writ of error the original bill of exceptions shall be re- 
 mitted to the municipal court, so that it may be availed 
 of in case of a new trial or other proceeding without 
 there being imposed upoji the parties the expense of pro- 
 curing from the clerk of the supreme court or of the 
 appellate court a certified copy thereof. 
 
Section 39. 163 
 
 SECTION 39. 
 
 Section 39. That no application for a change of venue 
 in any case of the fourth class or in any case of the 
 fifth class mentioned in section two (2) of this act, or 
 in any criminal case punishable by fine or imprison- 
 ment otherwise than in the penitentiary, on account 
 of the prejudice of the judge shall be allowed by the 
 municipal court when the applicant names in his ap- 
 plication more than one judge from whom such change 
 of venue is desired, nor unless such application for a 
 change of venue is made by petition as in like cases 
 in the circuit courts, and such petition is filed at or 
 before the time of the filing or entering by the defend- 
 ant of his appearance in the suit in which such change 
 of venue is asked for, if such suit is a civil suit, or at 
 or before the time the defendant is required to plead 
 if such suit is a criminal suit, and in no case shall the 
 granting of any change of venue delay the trial of the 
 suit, but such suit shall be tried and disposed of at 
 the time set for the trial thereof of or at the tinie 
 to which the trial thereof may be postponed, before 
 some other judge of the court than the one from whom 
 the change of venue has been granted, or in any other 
 district in which the same may be ordered to be tried, 
 and all orders necessary for the setting of such case 
 for trial and for the securing of a speedy trial thereof 
 may be made by the judge from whom said change of 
 venue has been obtained. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 39. 
 
 The judges of the municipal court being salaried offi- 
 cers, there will be less justification than there is in suits 
 before justices of the peace for applications for changes 
 of venue and less occasion for their use. To permit a 
 change of venue to be taken on the day fixed for the 
 trial of a cause from the judge on whose calendar it 
 may be placed, as is now permissible in the circuit and 
 superior courts, would lead to great inconvenience in dis- 
 
164 Note to Section 39. 
 
 arranging the calendars and in putting the opposite 
 party to unnecessary trouble and compelling him to sub- 
 mit to unnecessary delay. On the other hand to wholly 
 deny the right to a change of venue would be too rad- 
 ical a departure from the existing method of procedure. 
 The act, therefore, allows to each party a change of 
 venue from one judge, on condition that it is applied for 
 at or before the time the defendant enters his appear- 
 ance, if the suit is a civil suit, or at or before the time 
 the defendant is required to plead, if the suit is a crim- 
 inal suit. Quasi-criminal cases are not provided for in 
 express terms, but they also are included under the des- 
 ignation "civil suits," unless some express provision is 
 made to the contrary. 
 
 The provision respecting the time when the petition 
 for a change of venue is to be filed is designed to pre- 
 vent applications being made because, on account of 
 some remark or ruling of the judge, one of the parties 
 becomes dissatisfied with the judge's views, real or sup- 
 posed, respecting the law or the facts of the case, and 
 therefore prefers to take his chances before some other 
 judge. This is quite frequently the motive of such appli- 
 cations, though often they are caused by some miscon- 
 duct of the judge justly tending to cause the parties to be 
 apprehensive of injustice. 
 
 Another motive which oftentimes induces an applica- 
 tion for a change of venue is the gaining of delay. In 
 the circuit court it frequently happens that a defendant, 
 when the case is about to be called for trial, suddenly 
 discovers that the judge is prejudiced against him and 
 he takes a change of venue in order to secure a postpone- 
 ment of the trial which is always the result of the' grant- 
 ing of the application. The plaintiff in such case finds 
 
Note to Section 39. 165 
 
 either that his case is deprived of its place upon the cal- 
 endar or that he is put to serious trouble and inconven- 
 ience in securing a trial before another judge. This mo- 
 tive for a change of venue the Municipal Court Act seeks 
 to destroy by providing that the granting of a change 
 of venue shall not postpone the trial. 
 
166 Sections 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47. 
 
 SECTIONS 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47. 
 
 Section 40. That every case of the fourth class and 
 every case of the fifth class mentioned in said section 
 two (2) of this act, excepting attachment suits, reple- 
 vin suits, cases of distress for rent, and forcible entry 
 and detainer suits, and also quasi-criminal cases 
 brought in the municipal court, shall be commenced by 
 the filing by the plaintiff with the clerk of a praecipe 
 for a summons, specifying the names of the parties to 
 the suit, the amount of the plaintiff's claim and the 
 day at which the summons shall be made returnable, 
 which day shall not be less than five (5) nor more than 
 fifteen (15) days from the filing of the praecipe, and 
 a bill of particulars of the plaintiff's claim, which bill 
 of particulars, if the suit be upon a contract, express 
 or implied, shall consist of a statement of the account 
 or of the nature of the demand, or, if the suit be for a, 
 tort, it shall consist of a brief statement of the nature 
 of the tort and such further information as will rea- 
 sonably inform the defendant of the nature of the case 
 he is called upon to defend, but nothing herein con- 
 tained shall be construed to require the bill of particu- 
 lars in any action for a tort to set forth the cause of 
 action with the particularity required in a declaration 
 at common law. In cases of the fourth class and in 
 cases of the fifth class mentioned in said section two 
 (2) of this act, the municipal court may adopt such 
 rules and regulations as it may deem necessary to en- 
 able the parties, in advance of the trial, to ascertain 
 the nature of the plaintiff's claim or claims, or of the 
 defendant's defense or defenses. 
 
 Section 41. That upon the filing of such praecipe and 
 bill of particulars the clerk of the municipal court shall 
 issue a summons to the defendant directed to the bailiff 
 to execute and returnable at ten o'clock a. m. sharp of 
 the day for such return specified in the praecipe, 
 which summons shall state the amount of the plaintiff's 
 claim and shall be attested in like manner as a sum- 
 mons issued out of a court of record. Upon every such 
 summons there shall be printed in plain type the pro- 
 visions of this act pertaining to defaults in case of the 
 
Sections 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47. 167 
 
 non-appearance of the defendant, and setting of the 
 case for trial in case of appearance, and such further 
 information as may be prescribed by the chief justice. 
 
 Section 42. That every such summons issued out 
 of the municipal court shall be served, if the defendant 
 be an individual, by delivering to him a copy thereof 
 and informing him of its contents, or, if the defendant 
 be a corporation, service shall be made upon such cor- 
 poration in the same maimer as is now or hereafter 
 may be provided by law for the service of process 
 upon such corporation in a suit at law when issued out 
 of a circuit court. In case said summons shall not be 
 served upon, the defendant three days or more prior to 
 the return day thereof an alias summons may be is- 
 sued and a subsequent pluries summons may be issued 
 in any case when a previous alias or pluries summons 
 shall not have been served upon the defendant three 
 days or more prior to the return day fixed in the pre- 
 vious summons. Service of such alias or pluries sum- 
 mons shall be made in the same manner as that above 
 provided for the service of the original summons. 
 
 Section 43. That upon the return of any such summons 
 duly served upon the defendant, the plaintiff shall be 
 entitled to judgment as in case of default, unless the 
 defendant shall either appear in person at the time 
 specified in such summons, or shall, at or before the 
 time fixed in such summons for his appearance, file 
 his appearance in writing in said municipal court. 
 Upon such default the court shall assess the damages 
 after hearing such evidence as the court may deem 
 sufficient for that purpose. In case the defendant shall 
 desire upon the trial to present any set-off or counter 
 claim, he shall file a bill of particulars thereof with 
 his appearance; provided, however, the court may, in 
 its discretion, extend the time for the filing of such bill 
 of particulars. It shall be the duty of the court at ten 
 o'clock A. M. sharp of each day upon which the court 
 is open for business, or as soon thereafter as is prac- 
 ticable, to call the cases in which the summonses are 
 then returnable for the purpose of ascertaining 
 whether the defendants therein have appeared in per- 
 son or have entered their appearances in writing, and 
 
168 Sections 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47. 
 
 to give such directions with respect to such appear- 
 ances as the court may find necessary or proper for 
 the information of the parties. 
 
 Section 44. That the clerk of the municipal court shall 
 keep on hand and furnish to suitors and attorneys on 
 application printed blank forms of praecipes, sum- 
 monses, entries of appearance, affidavits, bonds, at- 
 tachment writs, replevin writs, petitions for changes 
 of venue, and all other papers necessary for the use 
 of the parties to suits in such court. Forms for such 
 papers shall be prescribed by the chief justice of the 
 municipal court, who shall also from time to time pre- 
 scribe and cause to be printed forms of bills of par- 
 ticulars to be used in said court. 
 
 Section 45. That if in any case of the fourth class or in 
 any case of the fifth class mentioned in said section 
 two (2) of this act, brought in the municipal court, 
 the defendant shall appear at the time specified in the 
 summons or shall have entered his appearance in writ- 
 ing at or before the time so specified, the court shall, 
 at such time, or as soon thereafter as practicable, fix 
 a time for the trial thereof and such case shall be tried 
 at the time so fixed or as soon thereafter as the other 
 business of the court will permit. 
 
 Section 46. That amendments to bills of particulars, 
 praecipes, summons and other papers filed by either 
 party may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed 
 at any time. 
 
 Section 47. That the court may in any case of the fourth 
 class or any case of the fifth class mentioned in section 
 two (2) of this act, grant such postponements of the 
 trial, and may make such other orders in respect there- 
 to as the court may deem proper and necessary for 
 the protection of the rights of the parties, and the 
 failure of the court to try any such case at the time 
 to which the trial has been postponed shall not operate 
 as a discontinuance, but the same shall remain under 
 the control of the court until the final disposition 
 thereof. 
 
Note to Sections 40-47. 169 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 
 
 AND 47. 
 
 The purpose of these sections is to prescribe for civil 
 suits at law where the amount claimed by the plaintiff 
 in any case, in money or property, does not exceed 
 $1,000, a method of procedure which is simple, free from 
 technicalities and expeditious. Attachment suits, re- 
 plevin suits, cases of distress for rent, forcible entry and 
 detainer suits, and quasi-criminal cases, though excepted 
 in section 40, are provided for in sections 48 and 49, by 
 the terms of which the proceedings in such cases are re- 
 quired to be the same as in other cases of the fourth and 
 fifth classes, excepting in certain particulars rendered 
 necessary by their peculiar nature. Of the provisions of 
 sections 40 to 47, inclusive, the following may be spe- 
 cially mentioned: 
 
 1. The summons is issued upon the filing of a prae- 
 cipe specifying the names of the parties to the suit, the 
 amount of the plaintiff's claim and the day at which the 
 summons shall be made returnable, which day shall not 
 be less than five nor more than fifteen days from the 
 filing of the praecipe. The summons is to be made re- 
 turnable at 10 o'clock A. M., sharp, of the day for the 
 return specified in the praecipe, and it must state the 
 amount of the plaintiff's claim and must also have 
 printed upon it section 43 pertaining to defaults and the 
 setting of the case for trial in case of appearance, and 
 such further information as may be prescribed by the 
 chief justice. It is to be served upon the defendant by 
 delivering him a copy and informing him of its contents. 
 If not served three days or more prior to the return day, 
 an alias may be issued and, in default of that being 
 
170 Note to Sections 40-47. 
 
 served three days or more prior to the return day, a 
 ' pluries may issue. 
 
 2. In Heu of the declaration filed in a similar case in 
 the circuit court the plaintiff at the time of filing his 
 praecipe must file with it a bill of particulars, which is 
 to be a brief statement of the nature of his demand, if 
 the suit is upon a contract, express or implied, or a brief 
 statement of the nature of the tort, if the suit is for a 
 tort. By section 44 it is made the duty of the chief jus- 
 tice to prescribe forms of bills of particulars, so that a 
 party commencing a suit may either find a form already 
 prescribed which he may use or, upon application to the 
 chief justice, may cause a form to be prescribed to meet a 
 new case not covered by any of the forms thus far pre- 
 scribed. One purpose to be accomplished by this is the 
 avoidance of motions or applications for more specific 
 bills of particulars. Motions of this kind are, in the vast 
 majority of cases, made not for securing to the defend- 
 ant necessary knowledge as to the nature of the plain- 
 tiff's claim, but for the purpose of testing the skill of 
 the plaintiff's attorney in drawing a bill of particulars, 
 which upon the trial will conform to the proofs. One 
 great inconvenience in the practice in the circuit' and 
 superior courts is the vast number of frivolous and un- 
 necessary motions which the judges are called upon to 
 hear and determine. It is one of the purposes of the 
 Municipal Court Act to prevent an unnecessary waste 
 of time respecting matters of form, and likewise to pre- 
 vent the matters of form being made use of to defeat a 
 trial upon the merits. 
 
 3. By the concluding clause of section 40 the munic- 
 ipal court is given power to adopt all rules and regula- 
 tions necessary to enable the parties, in advance of the 
 
Note to Sections 40-47. 171 
 
 trial, to ascertain the nature of the plaintiff's claim or 
 claims, or the defendant's defense or defenses. Under 
 this provision, it would be permissible, for example, to 
 require a defendant who. intended to rely upon the stat- 
 ute of limitations, the statute of frauds, or other similar 
 defense, to file a statement to that effect at the time of 
 the filing of his appearance. 
 
 4. A default may be taken in any case unless the defend- 
 ant either appears in person at the time specified or, 
 at or before that time, files his appearance in writing, 
 and upon default the court is to assess the damages after 
 hearing such evidence as may be deemed sufficient for that 
 purpose. In the work of attending to default cases the 
 judges will doubtless avail themselves of the aid of com- 
 petent deputy clerks or other assistants of the court, 
 and will thereby be enabled to devote substantially their 
 entire time and attention to the trial and disposition of 
 contested cases. 
 
 5. The provision for the calling of cases at 10 o'clock 
 A. M., sharp, of each day upon which the court is open 
 for business, or as soon thereafter as is practicable, is 
 one inserted for 'the purpose of avoiding the entry of 
 defaults against persons who have been duly summoned 
 and who have appeared in person without having em- 
 ployed attorneys, and who, through ignorance or other 
 circumstances, may need information from the court re- 
 specting their rights, and the steps necessary to be taken 
 to make defenses. Thus, for instance, defendants who 
 do not speak or understand the English language and 
 who, upon being summoned, personally appear, may be 
 informed of their rights and protected against judg- 
 ments by default when, in fact, they have good defenses 
 to the claims sued upon. 
 
172 Note to Sections 40-47. 
 
 6. The appearance of a defendant in a case is a join- 
 ing of issue with the plaintiff and necessitates a trial. 
 The court therefore is required to fix a time for the trial 
 and provision is made that the case shall be tried at the 
 time so fixed or as soon thereafter as the other business 
 of the court will permit. The practice in the circuit and 
 superior courts by which long calendars of cases are 
 made up and parties are compelled to attend with their 
 witnesses day after day awaiting their trials is not to 
 prevail in the municipal court. Doubtless it will some- 
 times happen that a case cannot be tried on the day 
 set for trial, but in the vast majority of cases it will 
 be otherwise. 
 
Section 48. 173 
 
 SECTION 48. 
 
 Section 48. That the practice and proceedings in the 
 municipal court, other than the mode of trial and the 
 proceedings subsequent to the trial, in cases of attach- 
 ment, replevin, distress for rent and forcible entry and 
 detainer included within the cases of the fourth class 
 and within the cases of the fifth class mentioned in 
 section two (2) of this act, shall be the same, as near as 
 may be, as that which is now prescribed by law for 
 sinular cases in courts of record, with the following 
 exceptions : 
 
 First — There shall be no written pleadings, excepting 
 such as are required by law in similar cases before 'jus- 
 tices of the peace, other than the affidavits in attach- 
 ment and replevin, copies of the distress warrants in 
 cases of distress for rent, and the complaint in for- 
 cible entry and detainer, and the writs shall be made 
 returnable in like manner as the summons in other 
 cases of such classes in the municipal court. 
 
 Second — In attachment cases the plaintiff at the time 
 of the commencement of his suit and the defendant at 
 the time of his appearing in person or of his entering 
 his appearance in writing, if he shall desire upon the 
 trial to present any set-off or counter-claim, shall file 
 a bill of particulars thereof. 
 
 Third — In forcible entry and detainer cases the plaintiff 
 may unite with his claim for possession of the property . 
 any claim for rent or damages for withholding posses- 
 sion of the same, providing such claim does not exceed 
 one thousand dollars ($1000). 
 
 Fourth — The mode of trial and all proceedings subse- 
 quent to the trial shall be the same, as near as may be, 
 as in other cases of the fourth class and cases of the 
 fifth class, mentioned in section two (2) of this act. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 48. 
 
 In cases of attachment, replevin, distress for rent and 
 forcible entry and detainer, the plaintiff at the time he 
 
174 Note to Section 48. 
 
 commences his suit is not required to file a praecipe .or a 
 bill of particulars, those papers being rendered unnec- 
 essary by the filing of the affidavits in attachment and 
 replevin, copies of the distress warrants in case of dis- 
 tress for rent, and the complaint in forcible entry and de- 
 tainer. In forcible entry and detainer cases the plaintifP 
 is permitted to unite with his claim for possession of the 
 property, any claim for rent or damages for withholding 
 the same, providing the claim does not exceed $1,000. In 
 all other respects cases of attachment, replevin, distress 
 for rent and forcible entry and detainer are governed by 
 the same rules of practice as other civil cases of the 
 fourth and fifth classes. 
 
Section 49. 175 
 
 SECTION 49. 
 
 Section 49. That the practice in the mimicipal court in 
 qnasi criminal cases shall be the same as herein pre- 
 scribed for civil cases of the fourth class mentioned in 
 section two (2) of this act, in said court, excepting as 
 follows : 
 
 First — The first process in any suit for the violation of any 
 municipal ordinance shall, except as hereinafter pro- 
 vided, be a summons. If the defendant, after being 
 duly served with summons, fails to appear personally, 
 at the time specified in the summons, or to enter his 
 appearance at or before such time, the court may 
 proceed, as in case of default, or may issue a warrant 
 for the arrest of the defendant. 
 
 Second — When the offense complained of is also a violation 
 of any provision of the criminal code, the court may 
 issue a warrant in the first instance for the violation 
 of the ordinance under like circumstances under which 
 a warrant might issue for a violation of the criminal 
 code, and such warrant may be served at any place 
 within the city of Chicago if the court in its discretion 
 shall so direct. 
 
 Third — A warrant may issue in the first instance upon 
 the affidavit of any person that an ordinance has been 
 violated and that the person making the complaint has 
 reasonable grounds to believe the party charged is 
 guilty thereof and will escape unless arrested, and stat- 
 ing the facts upon which such belief is based, provided 
 the judge to whom application is made for such war- 
 rant shall be satisfied, after examining under oath the 
 party making the affidavit, that such arrest should be 
 made, and any person arrested upon any warrant 
 herein provided for shall, without unnecessary delay, 
 be taken before the branch court to which such 
 warrant is returnable and tried for the alleged offense, 
 and such warrant may be served at any place within 
 the city of Chicago, if the court in its discretion shall 
 so direct. 
 
176 Note to Section 49. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 49. 
 
 Under the law as it now is (E. S. 1874, Ch. 24, Art. V, 
 Sec. 7) any person is subject to be arrested under a war- 
 rant for the violation of any ordinance, if an affidavit be 
 filed charging that the ordinance has been violated and 
 that the party making the affidavit has reasonable 
 grounds to believe the party charged is guilty. The Mu- 
 nicipal Court Act changes this so as to provide that when 
 the violation of the ordinance is not also a violation of 
 the Criminal Code, a warrant can only issue upon an affi- 
 davit stating that the person making the complaint has 
 reasonable grounds to believe the party charged is guilty 
 thereof and will escape unless arrested and stating the 
 facts upon which such belief is based, in which case the 
 judge to whom application is made for the warrant is 
 required before issuing the warrant, to examine under 
 oath the party making the affidavit and satisfy himself 
 that the arrest ought to be made. This will tend to 
 greatly lessen the number of vexatious prosecutions 
 for violations of ordinances and protect citizens from 
 unnecessary preliminary arrests in such cases. 
 
Section 50. 177 
 
 SECTION 50. 
 
 Section 50. That upon the arrest of any person for any 
 criminal or quasi criminal offense within the juris- 
 diction of the municipal court, any judge of the munici- 
 pal court, or any judge of the circuit or superior court 
 of Cook county shall have power to let such person 
 to bail and in case of the arrest of any person for any 
 quasi criminal offense or for any offense when the pun- 
 ishment is by fine or imprisonment otherwise than in 
 the penitentiary, the chief of police or any captain, 
 lieutenant or sergeant of police of the city of Chicago 
 shall have power to let such person to bail. The bail 
 bond in any such case shall be conditioned for the appear- 
 ance of the person arrested before some branch court 
 at a time feed in such bond for such appearance, 
 which time shall be not later than two days after the 
 date of the bond. Any bond so taken shall be signed 
 by one or more sureties to be approved by such judge 
 or officer, who shall be authorized and required to ad- 
 minister oaths for the purpose of ascertaining the suffi- 
 ciency of the sureties. All bonds so taken shall be filed 
 with the clerk of the municipal court at the branch 
 court at which the person so arrested is required to 
 appear. The exercise of the power hereby conferred 
 of letting to bail shall be subject to regulation by such 
 rules as may be adopted by a majority of the judges 
 of the municipal court as herein provided. But any 
 person so arrested shall have the right to be brought 
 immediately before the municipal court in the district 
 in which he is arrested, or, if there be no judge then in 
 attendance upon such court, to the mimicipal court 
 in any other district at which there may be a judge 
 then in attendance, to be dealt with by such court 
 according to law. The court may, by rule, provide 
 that any defendant arrested in any criminal case in 
 which the punishment is by fine only, or in any quasi 
 criminal case, may, in lieu of giving bail for his ap- 
 pearance, deposit with the clerk such sum of money 
 as the court may deem sufficient to secure his appear- 
 ance at the time or times so fixed therefor. Such sum 
 to be forfeited and paid into the city treasury in case 
 
178 Note to Section 50. 
 
 such defendant shall fail to appear at the time or times 
 so fixed. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 50. 
 
 This section is designed to render it more convenient 
 for persons arrested for criminal offenses or for viola- 
 tions of city ordinances to give bail and thus relieve 
 them of the .oftentimes unnecessary humiliation of being 
 committed to jail solely because of difficulty in securing 
 the attention of an official authorized to take bail. 
 
 It also emphasizes the right of a person arrested to be 
 brought immediately before the court instead of being 
 locked up for an indefinite period in jail or in a police 
 station. By section 17 of the act every police officer of 
 the city of Chicago is ex officio a deputy bailiff of the 
 municipal court and as such is subject to discipline re- 
 specting any misconduct connected with his duties in 
 criminal and quasi criminal cases. Hence the court can 
 deal in a summary manner with any misconduct of any 
 such officer in violation of the rights of persons arrested 
 as defined in section 50. 
 
 Allowing, in certain cases punishable by fine only, a 
 cash deposit to be made in lieu of the giving of a bond 
 is a convenience which saves the arrested person the 
 trouble of securing a bondsman and saves the city the 
 trouble of enforcing the forfeited bond, as well as les- 
 sens the profits of the professional bondsman. 
 
 Another, reform worked by this section, in connection 
 with sections 57 and 58 as to costs is, that defendants in 
 criminal and quasi criminal cases are not compelled 
 to pay fees for giving bonds with no right to recover 
 them, if finally discharged or acquitted. The only de- 
 fendants in such eases who pay any costs are those who 
 are convicted and have judgments rendered against them. 
 
Section 51. 179 
 
 SECTION 51. 
 
 Section 51. That if the method of procedure in any case 
 "within the jurisdiction of the municipal court is not 
 sufBciently prescribed by this act, or by any rule of 
 court adopted in pursuance hereof, the branch court 
 in which the same is brought or proposed to be 
 brought, may make such provision for the conducting 
 and disposing of the same as may appear to the court 
 proper for the just determination of the rights of the 
 parties. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 51. 
 
 This section merely expresses the rule that when a 
 court is organized and given jurisdiction to determine 
 controversies, it has the inherent power to adopt all rules 
 not inconsistent with law which it may deem neces- 
 sary to exercise effectually the jurisdiction thus given. 
 It supplements sections 19 and 20 and other sections per- 
 taining to the practice by providing for every case which 
 possibly may not be covered by the other provisions of 
 the act or by the rules of practice adopted in pursuance 
 thereof. By section 19 the practice prevailing in the cir- 
 cuit court is to govern, except as is otherwise prescribed, 
 until otherwise determined in the manner provided by 
 section 20. The conformity to the practice of the cir- 
 cuit court is to be " as near as may be, ' ' and the munici' 
 pal court is to be the sole judge as to the extent to which 
 conformity is practicable. If, therefore, in any case con- 
 formity to the practice in the circuit court appears im- 
 practicable to the presiding judge, and the matter is not 
 regulated by the provisions of the act or by the rules 
 adopted by the judges, the judge before whom the case 
 is brought may make such provision as in his judgment 
 will secure a just result. In other words, there is not to 
 be a failure of justice in any case because of omissions or 
 deficiencies in the rules of procedure prescribed by the 
 act 
 
180 Section 52. 
 
 SECTION 52. 
 
 Section 52. That botli in direct and in collateral pro- 
 ceedings tlie same presumptions shall be indulged with 
 respect to the jurisdiction of the municipal court over 
 the subject matter of suits and over the parties thereto, 
 as are indulged with respect to the jurisdiction of cir- 
 cuit courts in like cases. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 52. 
 
 With respect to the proceedings of courts of general 
 jurisdiction, the rule is jurisdiction of the subject mat- 
 ter and of the parties is presumed unless the contrary 
 affirmatively appears from the record; but with respect 
 to courts of limited or inferior jurisdiction, the pre- 
 sumption is that neither jurisdiction of the subject mat- 
 ter nor of the persons of the parties exists unless it so 
 affirmatively appears from the record. While the munic- 
 ipal court is a court of limited jurisdiction, it cannot 
 well be characterized as an inferior court, inasmuch as 
 it may have jurisdiction in all causes at law and in 
 equity. Possibly without section 52 the same rule with 
 respect to the jurisdiction of the court would be applied 
 as is applied to the jurisdiction of the circuit court, 
 but it was deemed prudent, by expressly providing that 
 the same presinnption should apply to the proceedings 
 of both- courts, to leave no occasion for discussion. 
 
Section 53. 181 
 
 SECTION 53. 
 
 Section 53. That any money judgment rendered by the 
 municipal court, when no execution issued thereon is 
 outstanding, may be satisfied by the payment by the 
 party against whom the same has been rendered of the 
 amount thereof to the clerk of said court, who, upon 
 payment being made, shall enter satisfaction thereof 
 and shall, upon demand, pay over the money received 
 by him to the person appearing of record to be entitled 
 thereto. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 53. 
 
 Under the law as it now exists, a defendant in a judg- 
 ment who wishes to make payment thereof and secure the 
 entry of its satisfaction upon the record, can only do so 
 by means of a tender to the party in whose favor it is ren- 
 dered, and, upon such tender being either accepted or 
 refused, an application to the court for the entry of sat- 
 isfaction. This application can only be made upon the 
 giving of due notice to the judgment creditor and the giv- 
 ing of notice may b© difficult. By the terms of section 
 53 this trouble is avoided by permitting payment to be 
 made to the clerk and making it the duty of the latter, 
 upon such payment, to enter satisfaction and to pay over 
 the money to the party entitled thereto. 
 
182 Section 54. 
 
 SECTION 54. 
 
 Section 54. That the iminicipal court shall take judicial 
 notice of all matters of which courts of general juris- 
 diction of this state are required to take judicial notice, 
 and also of the following : 
 
 1. All general ordinances of the city of Chicago and all 
 general ordinances of every municipal corporation sit- 
 uated in whole or in part within the limits of the city 
 of Chicago. 
 
 2. All laws of a public nature enacted by any state or 
 territory of the IJnited States. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 54. 
 
 In cases brought in the circuit, superior or criminal 
 court, an ordinance of the city of Chicago or other munici- 
 pal corporation, or a statute of a state, other than Illi- 
 nois, or of a territory, if material to the issues, must be 
 brought to the attention of the court by evidence, and, in 
 case of the prosecution of an appeal or writ of error, such 
 evidence must be incorporated into the bill of exceptions. 
 In many cases, also, it must be alleged in the pleading of 
 the party who relies upon it to support his action or his 
 defense. 
 
 In respect to ordinances the provision of this section 
 obviates the necessity of their introduction in evidence 
 before the same judges day after day, and hour after 
 hour, in the fifty thousand or more quasi-criminal cases 
 brought for the violation of the various provisions of the 
 municipal codes. 
 
 In respect to the statutes of other states and of the ter- 
 ritories, the provision simply asserts the rule which gov- 
 erns the courts of the United States, all of which courts 
 take judicial notice of the laws of each of the states and 
 
Note to Section 54. 183 
 
 territories. As these laws, when needed as evidence, are 
 proven by the printed statutes of the state by which they 
 have been enacted, to copy them into every record in 
 which they are introduced, would only result in useless 
 expense, and this expense is saved by requiring the court 
 to take judicial notice of them. 
 
 As the municipal court is to take judicial notice of the 
 ordinances and laws mentioned in this section, it will be 
 unnecessary to plead them in any case pending in that 
 court, and, of course, the supreme court and the appellate 
 courts will take judicial notice of them upon appeal or 
 writ of error. 
 
184 Section £5. 
 
 SECTION 55. 
 
 Section 55. That the masters in chancery of the circuit 
 and superior courts of Cook county shall be ex officio 
 masters in chancery of the municipal court. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 55. 
 
 The municipal court will have no original jurisdiction 
 in chancery cases, its sole means of obtaining jurisdiction 
 being by transfers made from the circuit court of Cook 
 county or the superior court of Cook county, as provided 
 by section 24. Hence no provision is made for the ap- 
 pointment of masters in chancery as masters in chancery 
 of the municipal court. 
 
Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 185 
 
 SECTIONS 56, 57, 58 AND 59. 
 
 Section 56. That the costs in civil cases in the municipal 
 court shall be as follows : 
 
 First — ^In a case of the first class mentioned in section two 
 (2) of this act the plaintiff at the time of commencing 
 his suit shall pay to the clerk in full for all services to 
 he rendered by said clerk for the plaintiff in said suit 
 other than the making or furnishing of transcripts of 
 the record, the sum of eight dollars ($8.00), and if he 
 at the same time files with the clerk a demand in writ- 
 ing of a trial by jury he shall pay to the clerk the fur- 
 ther sum of six dollars ($6.00) to be applied towards 
 the payment of the fees of jurors, in said court. 
 
 Second — In a case of the second class mentioned in sec- 
 tion two (2) of this act the plaintiff, at the time of the 
 bringing of the transcript of the record to the munici- 
 pal court, shall pay to the clerk in full for all services 
 to be rendered by said clerk for the plaintiff in said 
 suit other than the making or furnishing of transcripts 
 of the record, the sum of eight dollars ($8.00), and if 
 he at the same time files with the clerk a demand in 
 writing of a trial by jury, he shall pay to the clerk the 
 further sum of six dollars ($6.00) to be applied towards 
 the payment of the fees of the jurors in said court. 
 
 Third — In any case of the first class or of the second 
 class mentioned in section two (2) of this act the defend- 
 ant at the time of filing his appearance, and before he 
 shall be permitted to make any defense, shall pay to the 
 clerk in full for all services to be rendered by said clerk 
 for the defendant in said suit, other than the making 
 or furnishing of transcripts of the record, the sum of 
 three dollars ($3.00), and if he shall at the same time 
 file with the clerk a demand in writing of a trial by 
 jury, he shall pay to the clerk the further sum of six 
 dollars ($6.00) to be applied towards the payment of 
 the fees of the jurors in said court. 
 
 Fourth— In any case of the fourth class or of the fifth 
 class mentioned in section two (2) of this act, the plain- 
 tiff, at the time of commencing his suit shall pay to the 
 clerk in full for all services to be rendered by said 
 
186 Sections 56, 57, 58 and, 59. 
 
 clerk, if such, case be other than an action of forcible 
 entry and detainer, the sum of two dollars ($2.00) 
 when the amount claimed by him in money or property 
 does not exceed two hundred dollars ($200), the sum of 
 five dollars ($5.00) when the amount claimed by him 
 exceeds two hundred dollars ($200) but does not exceed 
 one thousand dollars ($1,000), and the sum of two dol- 
 lars ($2.00) in a case of forcible entry and detainer, 
 and if the plaintiff at the time he commences his suit 
 files with the clerk a demand in writing of a trial by 
 jury, he shall pay to the clerk the further sum of six 
 dollars ($6.00) to be applied towards the payment of 
 the fees of jurors in said court. 
 
 Fifth — In any case of the fourth class or of the fifth class 
 mentioned in section two (2) of this act the defendant, at 
 the time of his appearance, shall pay to the clerk in full 
 for services to be rendered by said clerk, if the suit be 
 other than an action of forcible entry and detainer and 
 the amount claimed by the plaintiff in money or property 
 exceeds two hundred dollars ($200) the sum of two dol- 
 lars ($2.00), and if thfe defendant shall at the same time 
 file with the clerk a demand in writing of a trial by 
 jury he shall pay to the clerk the further sum of six 
 dollars ($6.00) to be applied towards the payment of 
 the fees of jurors in said court. 
 
 Sixth — The costs to be paid for the services of the bailiff 
 and of sheriffs and other costs not included in the above 
 in cases of the first class and in cases of the second 
 class mentioned in section two (2) of this act shall be 
 the same as those required by law from time to time to 
 be paid for similar services in cases in the circuit court 
 of Cook county. 
 
 Seventh — In any case of the fourth class or of the fifth 
 class mentioned in section two (2) of this act the party 
 delivering to the bailiff any summons, writ of attach- 
 ment, writ of replevin, subpoena, writ of execution or 
 other process shall at the time of making such delivery 
 pay to the bailiff the sum of one dollar ($1.00) for each 
 defendant named in such process upon whom service 
 thereof is to be made, and in cases of writs of attach- 
 ment, repleivin or execution, he shall pay to the bailiff 
 the further sum of one dollar ^$1.00) when any levy 
 
Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 187 
 
 upon or seizure of property is to be made thereunder, 
 and shall also pay to the bailiff the actual expense of 
 seizing or caring for any property levied upon or 
 seized thereunder. 
 
 Eighth — In any case of the fourth class or of the fifth 
 class mentioned in section two (2) of this act, the party 
 procuring any certified copy of the record or of any 
 l)ortion thereof in any case shall pay to the clerk the 
 same fees required by law from time to time to be 
 paid to the clerk of tlie circuit court of Cook county 
 for similar services. 
 
 Ninth — In any ease of the fourth class or of the fifth class 
 mentioned in section two (2) of this act the bailiff, as 
 commissions on moneys realized by execution, shall col- 
 lect from the defendant in the execution five (5) per 
 cent, upon the amount realized if it do not exceed one 
 hundred dollars ($100), but if the amount realized ex- 
 ceeds one hundred dollars ($100) the bailiff shall col- 
 lect five (5) per cent, on the first one hundred dollars 
 ($100) and three (3) per cent, upon the excess over one 
 hundred dollars ($100). 
 
 The amounts hereby required to be advanced when a de- 
 mand in writing of a trial by jury is filed to be applied 
 towards the payment of the fees of jurors in said court 
 shall be paid by the clerk into the city treasury. 
 
 In any case included within the terms of this section the 
 court may, in its discretion, order that an advance 
 payment of costs may be waived in favor of any poor 
 person whose financial circumstances, as made to ap- 
 pear to the court, are such that such advance payment 
 would be unduly burdensome or oppressive. 
 
 Section 57. That the costs in criminal and in quasi crim- 
 inal cases and proceedings in the municipal court, insti- 
 tuted in the name or by the authority of the people or 
 in the name of any state or county officer in his official 
 capacity, shall be as follows : 
 
 First— The clerk's fees in full for all services rendered 
 by him shall be the sum of six dollars ($6). 
 
 Second^The bailiff's fees shall be the same as those 
 which may now or hereafter be fixed by law for the 
 sheriff in counties of the third class for similar services. 
 
188 Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 
 
 All moneys collected upon judgments of the municipal 
 court in sucli cases shall be paid to the clerk, who shall, 
 at the end of every three months, apply the same, or 
 so much thereof as may be necessary, to the payment 
 of the uncollected costs in criminal and quasi criminal 
 cases instituted in the municipal court in the name of 
 the people, or in the name of any- state or county officer 
 in his official capacity, and pay over the balance, if any, 
 to the officer entitled hj law to receive the same. 
 
 Section 58. That the costs in cases in the municipal 
 court instituted in the name of the city of Chicago or 
 in the name of any officer thereof in his official capacity, 
 shall be as follows : 
 
 First — The clerk's fees in full for all services rendered 
 by him shall be the sum of six dollars ($6). 
 
 Second — The bailiff's fees shall be the same as those 
 which may now or hereafter be fixed by law for the 
 sheriff in counties of the third class for similar services. 
 
 All moneys collected upon judgments of the municipal 
 court in cases for the violation of the ordinances of the 
 city of Chicago shall be paid to the clerk, who shall 
 pay over the same to the city of Chicago, within one 
 week after receiving the same. 
 
 Section 59. That the clerk and each deputy clerk shall 
 collect for the acknowledgment and entering of memo- 
 randa of chattel mortgages and for the acknowledg- 
 ment of other written instruments the same fees al- 
 lowed by law to justices of the peace for similar serv- 
 ices and the fees so collected and all costs collected 
 in each week by the clerk and bailiff shall be paid over 
 by them respectively to the city of Chicago on the Mon- 
 day of the succeeding week, and the clerk and bailiff 
 shall be held personally responsible for all costs re- 
 quired to be paid to them in advance as hereinbefore 
 provided, and the clerk shall be personally responsible 
 for all fees required as aforesaid to be collected by him 
 and by each deputy clerk. The clerk and the bailiff 
 shall be required to keep complete and accurate ac- 
 counts of all moneys collected by them and by their 
 respective deputies, and such accounts shall, under the 
 direction of the chief justice of said municipal court, 
 
Note to Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 189 
 
 be examined and audited monthly, tlie expense thereof 
 to be paid by the city. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 56, 57, 58 AND 59. 
 
 The judges, the clerk, the bailiff and the deputies are 
 all salaried officers and are to receive no compensation 
 for their services other than their salaries and such 
 other allowances as may be made to them, all of which 
 are to be paid by the city. All fees collected are to be 
 paid into the city treasury and a system of accounting 
 is provided for to the end that the city may receive all 
 that it is entitled to. Among the provisions of these sec- 
 tions the following may be especially referred to : 
 
 1. The party demanding a trial by jury is required, 
 in a civil suit, to pay as advance costs $6 more than he 
 would be required to pay if he waived a jury trial. Dur- 
 ing the consideration of the act by the General Assembly 
 this provision was the subject of much criticism as re- 
 quiring the imposition of an unjust burden upon litigants 
 and as a measure to deprive them of, or at least embar- 
 rass them in exercising, their constitutional right of trial 
 by jury. But this criticism was, for the following, among 
 other, reasons, without good foundation : 
 
 a. The costs in every case are finally imposed upon 
 the party against whom judgment is rendered and who 
 consequently, as is to be conclusively presumed, is in the 
 wrong and, because in the wrong, ought to be compelled 
 to make a reasonable pajmient for the expense which he 
 has unjustly occasioned. A party who refuses to pay a 
 just demand, or wrongfully insists upon contesting in 
 court the right of his opponent to a judgment when the 
 latter is entitled to one, is not in a position to justly com- 
 plain at being compelled to pay $6 to the city for a trial 
 
190 Note to Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 
 
 by jury which costs the city several times that amount. 
 Neither is a plaintiff who wrongfully commences a suit 
 in a position to justly complain at being compelled to pay 
 a portion of the expense he has thereby imposed upon 
 the city. 
 
 b. Parties who demand a trial by jury involving a 
 greater consumption of time by the court and its officers 
 than is consumed in one tried without a jury, as well as 
 the attendance of a panel of twenty-four jurymen, involv- 
 ing an expense to the city of $48 per day, have no just 
 ground to complain at being required to make an advance 
 payment of a larger sum by way of costs than one who 
 is willing to dispense with the services of the jury, but 
 the latter could, with perfect justice, complain at being 
 compelled to pay in advance as much as the former. 
 
 c. In all the counties of the state, excepting only Cook 
 county, the taxable costs which the parties are required 
 to pay are uniformly higher in cases tried by jury than 
 in those tried by the court without a jury. The extra 
 costs in cases tried by jury are taxed for a variety of 
 services, such as the filing of papers, as for instance 
 instructions, the verdict and other papers peculiar to 
 jury trials, swearing juries, swearing officers to attend 
 juries, furnishing lists of jurors, entering verdicts, mo- 
 tions for new trials and various other motions which are 
 common in jury trials, and these extra costs may amount 
 to as much or more than $3 in each case. It is only in Cook 
 county that the absurd practice prevails of demanding 
 from the parties the same fees in a case where there is 
 a judgment by default, or where there is a trial by the 
 court, as in a case tried by jury which may consume 
 many days, or, indeed, many weeks, and cost the county 
 several hundred dollars, or even several thousand dol- 
 
Note to Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 191 
 
 lars, in jurors' fees and other expenses which would not 
 be incurred were the case not tried by jury. 
 
 d. No complaint is ever heard of the provision of the 
 law by which a party demanding a jury trial before a 
 justice of the peace must pay in advance $3 for a jury of 
 six, or $6 for a jury of twelve, together with other costs 
 for serving the venire, swearing the jury, entering the 
 verdict and other services which may amount to $2 or $3 
 more. Why, then, should there be any complaint that 
 the Municipal Court Act provides for a charge of $6 for 
 a jury of twelve, furnished through the jury commis- 
 sioners and found by the chief justice of the court to be 
 thoroughly qualified for jury service? 
 
 e. A party commencing a suit in the circuit court to 
 recover for a personal injury, although his damages do 
 not exceed $200, is compelled to pay an advance clerk's 
 fee of $10, whereas in the municipal court he need only 
 pay $2 if he waives a jury, or only $8 if he demands a 
 jury. So. too, if his damages exceed $200 and do not 
 exceed $1,000, he is only required in the municipal court 
 to pay an advance clerk's fee of $5 if he waives a jury, 
 instead of $10, as in the circuit court, or $11 if he demands 
 a jury, instead of $10, as in the circuit court. The pro- 
 vision for the payment of $6 in case a jury trial is de- 
 manded does not result in any case in any substantial 
 increase in the amount of advance costs demanded from 
 the plaintiff over and above the costs now required to be 
 paid in the circuit court. In many cases the act lessens 
 the amount he is required to pay in that court, even if he 
 demands a trial by jury, and it reduces by $8 in some 
 cases, and by $5 in others, the amount he is required to 
 there pay, if he is content to waive a jury. 
 
192 Note to Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 
 
 f. The city of Chicago ought not to be held bound to 
 maintain, at great expense to the tax payers, a system 
 of courts in which litigants may prosecute the kind of 
 suits which may be and now are prosecuted in the circuit 
 court and in the superior court at the expense of the 
 county. Plaintiffs who prefer the circuit and superior 
 court system are at liberty to use it, as the commence- 
 ment of suits in the municipal court is not compulsory. 
 
 g. This provision will operate as an encouragement to 
 the waiver of jury trials, just as the extra charge of $3 
 for a jury has reduced the number of jury trials before 
 justices of the peace so that in those courts jury trials 
 have become extremely rare. This is as it should be. In 
 chancery cases questions of fact are tried by judges with 
 quite as satisfactory results to litigants and to members 
 of the bar as those obtained in cases tried by jury. "While 
 these questions of fact in chancery cases pertain largely 
 to contracts, they include questions of fraud, forgery, 
 negligence and almost all possible questions which arise 
 in jury trials. Should lawyers once get accustomed to 
 trials by the court, trials by jury would become extremely 
 rare, unless judges by their conduct rendered a resort 
 to them necessary. The right to such trials would be 
 reserved to be availed of only whenever it became evi- 
 dent the judges were subject to improper influences, or 
 were partial in their conduct of trials, or for other rea- 
 sons created distrust. 
 
 2. The provision authorizing the court to waive an 
 advance payment of costs in favor of any poor person, 
 whose financial circumstances are such that such advance 
 payment would be unduly burdensome, vests in the court 
 a large discretion and assures to every deserving litigant 
 that he will not be turned out of court because of inability 
 
Note to Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 193 
 
 to pay costs. This discretion, however, will hardly be 
 exercised to the extent of granting, without advance pay- 
 ment of costs, a trial by jnry. A case to be such as to 
 justify a waiver of costs should be one which will com- 
 mend itself to any judge when he has heard the evidence, 
 and hence it ought to be required of a litigant, who wishes 
 to be relieved of the payment of costs in advance, to sub- 
 mit to a trial by the court without a jury. 
 
 3. In criminal cases and in quasi criminal cases and 
 proceedings instituted in the name or by the authority of 
 the people, or in the name of any state or county ofScer 
 in his official capacity, the clerk's costs are fixed at $6 in 
 each case, regardless of its character, and the bailiff's 
 fees are to be the same as those allowed the sheriff of 
 Cook county for similar services. The costs in those 
 cases, including the costs of subpoenaing the witnesses, 
 will amount, on an average, to at least $8. Inasmuch as 
 the Municipal Court Act imposes upon the city of Chi- 
 cago the expense of trying a large number of criminal 
 cases which would otherwise be disposed of in the crim- 
 inal court, at the expense of the county, the General As- 
 sembly very properly provided that the city should reim- 
 burse itself for that expense, so far as it might be able to, 
 out of the fees and fines which might be collected in such 
 cases. Hence the provision that all money collected on 
 judgments in such cases shall be paid to the clerk, who 
 shall, at the end of every three months, apply the same, 
 or so much thereof as may be necessary, to the payment 
 of the uncollected costs in those cases, and pay over the 
 balance, if any, to the officer entitled by law to receive the 
 same. A defendant in a criminal case will not be re- 
 quired, as he is now in cases in the police courts or before 
 justices of the peace, to make any advance payment of 
 
194 Note to Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 
 
 costs. He will only pay costs when a judgment of con- 
 viction is entered against him. 
 
 4. In cases instituted in the name of the city, or in the 
 name of any officer thereof in his official capacity, the 
 costs, including the costs of subpoenaing witnesses, will 
 amount, on an average, to at least $8 a case. The city 
 itself will be relieved of all costs in such cases, excepting 
 costs which may be awarded against it in cases in which 
 the defendants are successful, which costs can only be on 
 account of witness fees, for all other fees, if any, paid 
 by defendants will have been paid into the city treasury 
 and the city, if such costs be awarded against it, will only 
 be returning to the defendants the money which it has al- 
 ready received from them. The costs collected by the 
 city in the cases specified in section 58, together with all 
 fines collected upon judgments in cases for the violation 
 of city ordinances, are to be paid into the city treasury 
 to go towards maintaining the court. As in criminal 
 cases, so in quasi criminal cases, defendants will only be 
 compelled to pay costs when judgments are rendered 
 against them. 
 
 5. The abolition of the offices of justices of the peace 
 and police magistrates within the city rendered neces- 
 sary some provision for the acknowledgment of chattel 
 mortgages after the municipal court system should be put 
 into operation. Accordingly the General Assembly 
 amended sections 2 and 3 of the Mortgage Act so as to 
 provide for the acknowledgment of chattel mortgages 
 before the clerk or any deputy clerk of the municipal 
 court in the district in which the mortgagor resides. The 
 fees for acknowledging and entering chattel mortgages 
 will average about fifty cents for each instrument. 
 
Note to Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 195 
 
 It will thus be seen that the sources of income to the 
 city from the municipal court system will be the follow- 
 ing: 
 
 First. Cases of the first class, being cases in which the 
 amount claimed by the plaintiff exceeds $1,000, and be- 
 ing actions on contracts, express or implied, actions of 
 replevin and trover, and actions for injuries to personal 
 property. The average costs in these cases will be about 
 $12 a case, payable in advance. 
 
 Second. Cases of the fourth and fifth classes in which 
 the amount claimed exceeds $200 and does not exceed 
 $1,000, in which the average costs will be about $8 a 
 case, payable in advance. 
 
 Third. Cases of the fourth and fifth classes in which 
 the amount claimed does not exceed $200 in which the 
 average costs will be about $3.50 a case, payable in ad- 
 vance. 
 
 Fourth. Criminal cases and quasi-criminal cases in- 
 stituted in the name or by the authority of the people, or 
 in the name of any state or county officer in his official 
 capacity. The average costs in these cases will be about 
 $8 a case. The costs not collected from defendants will 
 be received by the city from such fines as may be collected 
 in criminal cases, to the extent that such fines may be 
 sufficient for that purpose. 
 
 Fifth. Cases instituted in the name of the city or in 
 the name of any officer thereof in his official capacity. 
 The average costs in these cases will be about $8 a case, 
 and all such costs collected, together with all fines col- 
 lected in cases brought for violations of city ordinances, 
 will be paid into the city treasury. 
 
 Sixth. Fees for the acknowledgment of chattel mort- 
 gages and other instruments. 
 
196 Note to Sections 56, 57, 58 and 59. 
 
 Seventh. Miscellaneous fees, such as fees for tran- 
 scripts of judgments, transcripts of the proceedings at 
 trials, etc. 
 
 It is much to be regretted that the General Assembly 
 did not adopt the provision contained in section 65 of 
 Senate Bill No. 45 and House Bill No. 98, permitting the 
 judges of the municipal court, with the consent of the 
 city council, to change, from time to time, the provisions 
 of the act as to costs. To judge accurately in advance of 
 the inauguration of the municipal court system what 
 should be the costs charged against litigants, in justice 
 to them as well as to the public, is impossible. The end 
 which it is desirable should be attained is to make the 
 municipal court system self-sustaining, or as nearly so as 
 may be, without imposing unreasonable burdens upon 
 litigants. The best judges of a proper scale of costs, it 
 would seem to be evident, are those charged with the car- 
 rying on of the business of the courts and of the city, 
 and it is certainly not justifiable to presume that a scale 
 of costs unjust either to the tax payers or to the city 
 would meet with the approval of both the judges and the 
 city council. By the action of the General Assembly, 
 whatever may be the result of the provisions of the act 
 regulating the costs, no change can be made until the sub- 
 sequent session of the General Assembly and the vote of 
 the people approving any amendatory act. 
 
Sections 60 and 61. 197 
 
 SECTIONS 60 AND 61. 
 
 Section 60. That the offices of justices of the peace, po- 
 lice magistrates and constables in and for the territory 
 within the city of Chicago be and they are hereby abol- 
 ished, and that the jurisdiction of justices of the peace 
 in the territory of the county of Cook outside of the 
 city of Chicago he and it is hereby limited to the ter- 
 ritory of said county outside of said city, but this sec- 
 tion of this act shall not become operative until the first 
 Monday of December, A. D. 1906, and on and after said 
 date the jurisdiction hereby conferred upon the munici- 
 pal court shall exclude the exercise of any portion of 
 such jurisdiction by all other courts excepting courts 
 of record, and on and after said first Monday of De- 
 cember, A. D. 1906, no other court than a court of rec- 
 ord shall exercise jurisdiction in any case in which said 
 municipal court is given jurisdiction by this act. 
 
 Section 61. That when the offices of justices of the peace 
 within the city of Chicago shall be abolished the docket 
 of each justice of the peace whose office is thus abol- 
 ished and all papers in his possession pertaining to 
 proceedings had before him shall be forthwith deliv- 
 ered up to the clerk of the municipal court, who shall 
 preserve the same in his office kept in the first district 
 and who shall have full power and authority to certify 
 to transcripts of such proceedings as such justice of 
 the peace would have had, had the office not been abol- 
 ished. Executions may be issued by the clerk of said 
 court upon any unsatisfied judgments rendered by such 
 justice of the peace in all cases in which the same might 
 have been issued had such office of justice of the peace 
 not been abolished, and said municipal court shall al- 
 low an appeal to the circuit or superior court of Cook 
 county from any judgment rendered by any justice of 
 the peace within twenty (20) days prior to the first 
 Monday of December, A. D. 1906, upon the giving by 
 the appellant of an appeal bond with security as now 
 required by law in cases of appeals from justices of the 
 peace, provided such appeal is prayed at any time 
 within twenty (20) days after the first Monday of De- 
 
198 Note to Sections 60 and 61. 
 
 cumber, A. D. 1906. In all cases not determined or 
 finally disposed of by such justice of the peace at the 
 time his ofSce is abolished, such proceedings shall be had 
 in said municipal court as might be had were such suits 
 originally brought in said court, but no trial of any 
 such case shall be had in said court without such notice 
 to the parties thereto as the court may deem necessary. 
 All writs issued by justices of the peace withiu the city 
 of Chicago and which shall not have been returned on 
 the first Monday of December, A. D. 1906, shall be 
 forthwith returned to the municipal court, and said mu- 
 nicipal court shall have full power to make such pro- 
 vision for the execution or other, disposition of all such 
 writs as said court may deem proper for the protec- 
 tion of the rights of the respective parties to the suits 
 in which such writs have been issued. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 60 AND 61. 
 
 The constitutional amendment adopted in 1904 declares 
 that "in case the General Assembly shall create munici- 
 pal courts in the city of Chicago, it may abolish the offices 
 of justices of the peace, police magistrates and constables 
 in and for the territory within said city and may limit 
 the jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the territory of 
 said county of Cook outside of said city to that territory, 
 and in such case the jurisdiction and practice of said mu- 
 nicipal courts shall be such as the General Assembly 
 shall prescribe. ' ' 
 
 The power being thus given to abolish the offices of jus- 
 tices of the peace, police magistrates and constables in 
 and for the territory within the city, and to limit the 
 jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the territory of 
 Cook county outside of Chicago, the question may be 
 mooted whether the making of this provision in the act 
 creating municipal courts conflicts with the constitutional 
 provision that "no act hereafter passed shall embrace 
 
Note to Sections 60 and 61. 199 
 
 more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the 
 title." 
 
 With respect to this question there can be no room for 
 reasonable doubt. By the terms of the constitutional 
 amendment the jurisdiction and practice of the munici- 
 pal courts are inseparably connected with the question 
 whether the offices of justices of the peace, police magis- 
 trates and constables in and for the territory within said 
 city are to be abolished and the jurisdiction of justices of 
 the peace in the territory of Cook county outside of the 
 city is to be limited to that territory. Hence that ques- 
 tion is one that may properly be disposed of and should 
 be disposed of by the provisions of an act, the purpose 
 of which is to create municipal courts in the city of Chi- 
 cago and provide for their jurisdiction and practice. 
 O'Leary v. County of Cook, 28 111., 534; Neifing v. Pon- 
 tiac, 56 111., 172; Town of Ahington v. Caheen, 106 111., 
 200; Potwin v. Johnson, 108 111., 70; Lamed v. Tiernan, 
 110 111., 173; People v. Nelson, 133 111., 565; Ritchie v. 
 People, 155 111., 98; Hudnall v. Hamm, 172 111., 76; Man- 
 chester V. People, 178 111., 285; Davis & Bro. v. Wool- 
 nough, 9 Iowa, 104 ; People v. Hurst, 41 Mich., 328. 
 
 In Davis & Bro. v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 104, it was held 
 that a provision for the establishment of a city court was 
 properly embraced in an act whose title was "An Act for 
 revising and consolidating the laws incorporating the 
 city of Dubuque and to establish a city court therein," 
 and that the act did not embrace more than one subject. 
 In People v. Hurst, 41 Mich., 328, it was held that a pro- 
 vision establishing and regulating the jurisdiction of the 
 Recorder's Court was properly contained in an act en- 
 titled "An Act to revise the charter of the City of De- 
 troit." The Charter of Greater New York passed in 
 
200 Note to Sections 60 and 61. 
 
 1897 is entitled "An Act to unite in one municipality un- 
 der the corporate name of the city of New York, the va- 
 rious communities lying in and about New York harbor, 
 including the city and county of New York, the city of 
 Brooklyn and the county of Kings, the county of Eich- 
 mond, and part of the county of Queens and to provide 
 for the government thereof. ' ' By chapter 20 of this char- 
 ter the municipal court of New York and the inferior 
 courts of criminal jurisdiction are established and their 
 jurisdiction and practice regulated. Should the General 
 Assembly pass and the people of the city of Chicago con- 
 sent to an act entitled "An Act in relation to the munici- 
 pal government of the city of Chicago," a provision 
 therein establishing municipal courts, prescribing their 
 jurisdiction and practice and abolishing justices of the 
 peace, police magistrates and constables in the city and 
 limiting the jurisdiction of outside justices would not be 
 obnoxious to the constitutional provision that "no act 
 hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, 
 and that shall be expressed in the title. ' ' Much less, then, 
 should the Municipal Court Act be invalid because of the 
 provisions therein respecting justices of the peace, police 
 magistrates and constables. 
 
 The provisions of section 61 are intended to preserve 
 the rights of all parties who have either obtained judg- 
 ments before justices of the peace in the city of Chicago 
 or who have suits pending there at the time the offices 
 of such justices of the peace are abolished. They may 
 be summed up as follows: 
 
 1. The justices of the peace on the first Monday of 
 December, 1906, are to deliver up to the clerk of the 
 municipal couri, their dockets and all papers in their pos- 
 session pertaining to proceedings before them. 
 
Note to Sections 60 and 61. 201 
 
 2. The clerk of the municipal court is to have power 
 to issue executions on unsatisfied judgments and to cer- 
 tify to transcripts. 
 
 3. In case of judgments rendered not more than 
 twenty days prior to the first Monday of December, 1906, 
 the municipal court it to allow appeals to the circuit or 
 superior court, if prayed for within twenty days after 
 that date. 
 
 4. Oases not finally determined on the first Monday of 
 December, 1906, are to be heard and determined by the 
 municipal court. 
 
 5. Writs in the hands of constables on the first Mon- 
 day of December, 1906, are to be forthwith returned to 
 the municipal court, which is given full power with re- 
 spect to their execution or other disposition. 
 
202 Section 62. 
 
 SECTION 62. 
 
 Section 62. That it shall be the duty of the chief justice 
 of the municipal court to superintend the keeping of 
 the records of said court and to prescribe abbreviated 
 forms of entries of orders therein, which abbreviated 
 forms so prescribed shall have the same force and ef- 
 fect as if said orders were entered in full in the records 
 of said court. When any certified transcript of the rec- 
 ord, or of any portion thereof, of any suit or proceed- 
 , ing in said court is required, the same shall be written 
 out in full from such abbreviated forms and duly au- 
 thenticated according to law. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 62. 
 
 The purpose of this section is to save to the city a 
 portion of the expense which would be incurred, if all 
 the records of the municipal court were written out in 
 full as they now are in the circuit, superior and criminal 
 courts. The items of saving thus provided for are tlitr 
 following : 
 
 1. The expense of purchasing the large number of 
 record books which would be needed were the records 
 written out in fuU. 
 
 2. The additional clerk hire needed for writing up the 
 records in full. 
 
 3. The time which would be unnecessarily spent by 
 clerks, attorneys and parties in examining the records of 
 cases scattered through a large number of record books, 
 when the entire record of each case might be made upon 
 a single page of one book. 
 
 While the duty of superintending the keeping of the 
 records and prescribing abbreviated forms of entries is 
 imposed upon the chief justice, it is of course permissible 
 
Note to Section 62. 203 
 
 for him to avail himself of the services of experts in the 
 endeavor to secure the adoption of the most convenient 
 and economical system. Should the system thus to be 
 inaugurated in the municipal court prove successful, the 
 inevitable result will be its acceptance and adoption by 
 the General Assembly for the circuit, superior, criminal, 
 county and probate courts and a consequent large saving 
 to the county. 
 
204 Sections 63 and 64. 
 
 SECTIONS 63 AND 64. 
 
 Section 63. That the orders, judgments, and decrees of 
 the municipal court in cases of the first class and cases 
 ot the second class shall have the same force, be of the 
 same effect, be liens upon real estate in the city of Chi- 
 cago to the same extent and under the same circimi- 
 stances, and be executed and enforced m tne same man- 
 ner as the judgments, orders and decrees of the circuic 
 court of Cook county, and such judgments and decrees 
 shall also be liens upon real estate in the county of 
 Cook outside of the city of Chicago after certified 
 transcripts of the same shall have been filed in the 
 office of the recorder of Cook county, which transcripts 
 shall contain the names of the parties to the suits, 
 the kinds of actions, the amounts of the judgments 
 or the general nature and effect of the decrees as the 
 case may be, and the dates on which the judgments and 
 decrees were rendered; provided, however, that no such 
 orders, judgments or decrees shall be liens upon or 
 affect registered land or any estate or interest therein 
 until a certificate under the hand and official seal of 
 the clerk of the municipal court, stating the date and 
 purport of the judgment, decree or order, is filed in the 
 office ot the register of titles of said Cook county, and 
 a memorial of the same is entered, upon the register 
 of the last certificate of title to be affected. 
 
 Section 64. That all other judgments of the municipal 
 court shall have the same force, be of the same effect 
 and be executed and enforced in the same manner as 
 the judgments of the circuit court of Cook county. But 
 no such judgment shall be a lien upon the real estate 
 of the person against whom it is obtained, excepting 
 from the time of the filing of a certified transcript 
 thereof in the office of the recorder of Cook county, 
 which transcript shall contain the names of the parties 
 to the suit, the kind of action, the amount of tne judg- 
 ment and the date upon which the same was rendered, 
 provided, however, that no such judgment shall be a 
 lien upon or affect registered land or any estate_ or in- 
 terest therein until a certified transcript thereof is filed 
 
Note to Sections 63 amd 64. 205 
 
 in the office of the register of titles of Cook county and 
 a memorial of the same is entered upon the register 
 of the last certificate of title to be affected. The re- 
 corder of Cook county shall provide and keep in his of- 
 fice for said municipal court well bound books for en- 
 tering therein an. alphabetical docket of all judgments 
 and decrees rendered in said municipal court as is now 
 required by law for docketing judgments and decrees 
 rendered in circuit courts, and shall forthwith, after 
 the filing of any transcript herein provided for, enter 
 the same, together with the hour, day. month and year 
 of the filing of such certified transcript and the general 
 number thereof. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 63 AND 64. 
 
 By virtue of section 63 the orders, judgments and de- 
 crees of the municipal court in cases of the first class, 
 and cases of the second class become liens upon real es- 
 tate within the city limits from the time they are entered 
 and upon real estate in Cook County outside of the city 
 limits from the time of the filing of certified transcripts 
 thereof in the recorder's office, excepting real estate reg- 
 istered under the Torrens Act, as to which real estate 
 they only become liens when compliance is had with the 
 terms of that act. As all cases of the first and second 
 classes will be disposed of in the first district, exam- 
 iners of titles to real estate within the -city limits will 
 only need to inspect the judgment indexes in the clerk's 
 office in that district. 
 
 By the terms of Section 64 the judgments of 
 the municipal court in cases of the third class, 
 cases of the fourth class and cases of the fifth class 
 only become liens upon the filing of certified transcripts 
 thereof in the office of the recorder of Cook county. This 
 distinction between orders, judgments and decrees in 
 
206 Note to Sections 63 cmd 64. 
 
 cases of the first class and cases of the second class and 
 judgments in cases of the third class, cases of the fourth 
 class and cases of the fifth class was deemed expedient to 
 avoid needlessly encumhering or clouding titles to real 
 estate within the city limits and thereby imposing addi- 
 tional expense and other annoyances respecting abstracts 
 of title. Under the law applicable to judgments of jus- 
 tices of the peace, those judgments are only liens upon 
 real estate from the time of filing transcripts. As jus- 
 tices of the peace have jurisdiction to the extent of only 
 $200, and as the municipal court has jurisdiction in all 
 criminal cases in which the punishment is by fine or im- 
 prisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary and which 
 are cases of the third class, and in all civil and quasi- 
 criminal cases where the amount sought to be recovered 
 does not exceed $1,000, and which are described as cases 
 of the fourth class and cases of the fifth class, it is ap- 
 parent that titles to real estate under the provisions of 
 the new act, will be relieved of numerous liens which oth- 
 erwise would be imposed upon them had the act not 
 been adopted. "Whether judgments in such cases will be 
 liens will depend upon the willingness or unwillingness 
 of judgment creditors to pay the costs of procuring 
 transcripts and filing them in the recorder's office. 
 
Sections 65 and 66. 207 
 
 SECTIONS 65 AND 66. 
 
 Section 65. That in case it shall be hereafter deter- 
 mined that so much of sections nine (9) and twelve 
 (12) hereof as fixes the terms of office of the chief jus- 
 tice and associate judges of the municpal court is in- 
 valid, this act shall not on that account be adjudged 
 wholly invalid, but the terms of office of the chief jus- 
 tice and associate judges of said municipal court shall 
 in such case be four (4) years, and they shall hold 
 their offices until their successors shall be elected and 
 qualified, and on the first Tuesday after the first Mon- 
 day of November, A. D. 1910, and on the first Tuesday 
 after the first Monday of November of every fourth 
 year thereafter there shall be elected a chief justice 
 and twenty-seven (27) associate judges of said muni- 
 cipal court as successors in office of the judges hereby 
 required to be elected on the first Tuesday after the 
 first Monday of November, A. D. 1906, and the terms 
 of offices of the associate judges which may be added 
 to said municpal court in pursuance of section twelve 
 (12) hereof shall be four (4) years. 
 
 Seotiow 66. That the invalidity of any portion of this 
 act shall not affect the validity of any other portion 
 thereof, which can be given effect without such invalid 
 part. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTIONS 65 AND 66. 
 
 There being some doubt expressed as to the constitu- 
 tionality of certain provisions of the act, it was deemed 
 advisable to guard against the entire act being declared 
 invalid because of the invalidity of some one or more of 
 its provisions. By section 32 of Article VI of the Con- 
 stitution, it is prescribed with respect to the officers in 
 that article provided for that "the terms of office of all 
 such officers, when not otherwise prescribed in this arti- 
 cle, shall be four years." It was thought that judges of 
 the municipal court were not officers provided for in that 
 
208 Note to Sections 65 and 66. 
 
 article and that hence their terms of office need not be 
 limited to four years. Lest, however, should the question 
 be presented, the Supreme Court might hold otherwise, 
 it was deemed prudent to make the provision contained 
 in section 65 and thereby avoid the annulment of the en- 
 tire act which, without that provision, would necessarily 
 result from such holding by the supreme court. 
 
 Other sections, respecting the constitutionality of 
 which it was thought question might be raised, are sec- 
 tion 10, fixing the qualifications of judges (see section 17 
 of Article VI of the Constitution), sections 19 and 20, 
 and other sections, conferring upon the supreme court 
 and the judges of the municipal court power to establish 
 rules of practice, sections 25, 26, 30 and 31, pertaining to 
 jurors and trials by jury, section 31, relating to changes 
 of venue, section 28, permitting the summons or writ in 
 cases of the first class to be served beyond the limits of 
 the city of Chicago and some others. The provisions of 
 all of these sections were believed by the framers of the 
 act, to be constitutional and valid, but lest the supreme 
 court shold hold otherwise, it was provided by section 
 66 that "the invalidity of any portion of this act shall 
 not affect the validity of any other portion thereof which 
 can be given effect without such invalid part. ' ' 
 
 It has been asserted that section 66 merely states the 
 rule of law which would be given effect without the en- 
 actment of that section, and that the courts aways sus- 
 tain the valid provisions of an act, though other provi- 
 sions of it may be held invalid. This, however, is not an 
 accurate statement of the law. 
 
 In People v. Cooper, 83 111., 585, 595, the court adopt 
 the rule laid down by Cooley in his work on Constitu- 
 
Note to Sections 65 and 66. 209 
 
 tional Limitations as follows: "If a statute attempts to 
 accomplish two or more objects, and is void as to one, 
 it may still be in every respect complete and valid as to 
 the other ; but if its purpose is to accomplish a single ob- 
 ject only, and some of its provisions are void, the whole 
 must fail, unless sufficient remains to effect the object 
 without the aid of the invalid portion ; and if they are so 
 mutually connected with and dependent on each other, as 
 to warrant the belief that the legislature intended them 
 as a whole, and if all could not be carried into effect the 
 legislature would not pass the residue independently, 
 then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the provi- 
 sions which are thus dependent, conditional or connected, 
 must fail with them." 
 
 In 23 Am. & Eng. Ency. (1st Ed.), 225, the law on this 
 subject is stated as follows: "Part of a statute may 
 be unconstitutional and void, and the residue constitu- 
 tional and valid. The test is not whether the void and 
 valid parts are contained in the same section, for the 
 distribution into sections is purely artificial ; but rather, 
 whether they are essentially and inseparably connected; 
 as it would be inconsistent with all just principles of 
 constitutional law to adjudge enactments not obnoxious 
 to any just constitutional exceptions void, because they 
 are associated in the same act, but not connected with or 
 dependent on, others which are unconstitutional. The 
 rule is that where the provisions are so interdependent 
 that one may not operate without the other, or so re- 
 lated in substance and object that it is impossible to sup- 
 pose that the legislature would have passed the one with- 
 out the other, the whole must fail; but if, when the un- 
 constitutional portion is stricken out, that which remains 
 is complete in itself and capable of being executed in 
 
210 Note to Sections 65 and 66. 
 
 accordance witli the apparent legislative intent, it must 
 be sustained." 
 
 The purpose of section 66 was to express in clear and 
 unmistakable terms the intention of the law-making 
 body, that the supreme court, in passing upon the valid- 
 ity of the act, or of any of its provisions, should not in- 
 dulge in the belief that the legislature intended to adopt 
 the provisions of the act as a whole, and that it 
 would not have passed any portion of the act had 
 it supposed it could not be carried into effect in its 
 entirety. On the contrary, the language of the section 
 is an express direction to the court to sustain each and 
 every valid provision of the act to which effect may be 
 given when the invalid portions are stricken out. The 
 effect of this may be illustrated. Thus, if the provi- 
 sions as to the making of additional rules of practice 
 or as to the special rules or any of them contained in 
 the act are held invalid the act can stiU be given effect 
 by holding the practice of the circuit courts to be the 
 practice as prescribed by section 19. Indeed, if those 
 provisions of the act prescribing the organization of 
 the court and its jurisdiction are held valid they must 
 be given effect and the court must be organized and set 
 in motion, although every other provision of the act may 
 be declared unconstitutional. In such case the absence 
 of valid provisions as to methods of procedure would, 
 of necessity, result in conferring upon the court the 
 power to adopt such methods as would enable it to prop- 
 erly and effectively exercise the jurisdiction conferred 
 upon it by the act. Waymcm v. Southard, 10 Wheat., 1, 
 42; Finlen v. Hemze, 69 Pac., 829; Boring v. Grifflth, 48 
 Tenn., 456. 
 
 The power exercised by courts of deciding in case of 
 
Note to Sections 65 and 66. 211 
 
 legislative acts invalid in part, that tlie legislature would 
 not have enacted the valid portions without the others, is 
 one which gives the courts a vast and uncontrollable dis- 
 cretion and is extremely dangerous. In the case of the 
 municipal court act it does not exist. 
 
212 Section 67. 
 
 SECTION 67. 
 
 Section 67. That this act shall be submitted to a vote 
 of the legal voters of the city of Chicago at the gen- 
 eral election to be held on the first Tuesday after the 
 first Monday of November, A. D. 1905. The ballots 
 to be used at said election in voting upon this act 
 shall be in substantially the following form: 
 
 For consenting to the act entitled "An 
 act in relation to a Municipal Court in the 
 city of Chicago." 
 
 Against consenting to the act entitled 
 "An act in relation to a Municipal Court in 
 the city of Chicago." 
 
 If a majority of the legal voters of said city voting 
 on the question at such election shall vote in favor of 
 consenting to this act, the same shall immediately there- 
 upon take effect and become operative. 
 
 NOTE TO SECTION 67. 
 
 This section is in conformity with the following pro- 
 vision of the constitutional amendment: 
 
 "No law based upon this amendment to the constitu- 
 tion affecting the municipal government of the city of 
 Chicago, shall take effect until such law shall be consented 
 to by a majority of the legal voters of said city voting 
 on the question at any election, general, municipal or 
 special." 
 
Appendix. 213 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 HOUSE BILL NO. 281. 
 
 This bill was prepared under the circumstances and for the 
 purpose indicated in an address to the Hon. Joseph F. Haas and 
 Hon. Robert E. Pendarvis, which was prefixed to it, and printed 
 with it. The address is as follows : 
 
 Honorable Joseph F. Haas, Chairman of the Senate Committee, 
 and Honorable Robert E. Pendarvis, Chairman of the House 
 Committee on Charter Legislation for Chicago, and to the 
 Members of the Committees: 
 
 The undersigned, organized for the purpose of studying and 
 if necessary drafting amendments to the bill for "An Act in 
 relation to Municipal Courts in the City of Chicago," now pend- 
 ing in both branches of the General Assembly, having formu- 
 lated certain amendments, consider it best, in order that they 
 may be in a concrete form, to submit the same in the form of 
 a draft of an amended bill, copies of which are herewith pre- 
 sented. 
 
 The amended bill adopts the entire frame of the original bill 
 pertaining to City Courts, with a few amendments — eliminating 
 everything relating to the Common Pleas Court. If it is desired 
 to have another court of general jurisdiction within this county, 
 we shall offer no serious objection. It would seem to us that 
 this can be better accomplished, however, by an amendment of 
 the City Court Act with a referendum provision, making it apply 
 to such cities as adopt it, with perhaps less uncertainty as to its 
 constitutionality. 
 
 Those who are in a position to know best, state that it will 
 require from twenty to twenty-five judges in the City Court to 
 do the work now done by the justices of the peace and police 
 magistrates in the City of Chicago with their present jurisdic- 
 tion. If we increase this jurisdiction, as suggested in the orig- 
 inal bill, all of the twenty-five judges provided for in that bill 
 will be needed to do the work of that court and will have no 
 time for the work of the Common Pleas Court. It is self-evi- 
 
214 Appendix. 
 
 dent that the judges of the City Court will do better work if 
 their entire thought is given to the duties of that court. 
 
 Radical legislation requiring radical changes of procedure, 
 -either by courts or municipal bodies, is sure to cause much liti- 
 gation in construing the new laws. The wise course to follow 
 for the new court that is to take the place of our present justice 
 of the peace system is to provide for this court salaried officials, 
 and then make as few changes in justice of the peace procedure 
 as possible, so that the great body of decisions and law that 
 has been in force for generations in this state will still apply 
 and control litigation in the new courts. 
 
 A fundamental objection to the original bill is that the judges 
 are given widely different jurisdictions. It is founded upon ac- 
 knowledged characteristics in human nature. The principle in- 
 volved has been shortly stated — no person can serve two mas- 
 ters. The original bill provides for judges who will have prac- 
 tically unlimited jurisdiction, but shall perform the duties now 
 performed by justices of the peace and police magistrates. Men 
 who seek these positions will necessarily be men of ability and 
 ambitious to succeed. This we understand to be the thought of 
 those who strongly support this proposed feature of the original 
 bill. These judges will be men also who desire to make a rec- 
 ord, not in the comparatively limited field of the police magis- 
 trates or justices of the peace, but in what they will consider the 
 higher field with the more extended jurisdiction. As soon as 
 elected, and even before, there will be a campaign on the part 
 of these officers, not for the opportunity to serve the public in 
 deciding the cases of the poor people, but to be excused from 
 so doing, and to be permitted to exercise power in the court 
 with larger jurisdiction. The result will be that most of the 
 judges who are hearing the cases of the poor people will do so, 
 much of the time, against their hope and contrary to their de- 
 sire. We can not expect them to make a success of work which 
 they do unwillingly. 
 
 It is urged in support of the original bill that it is necessary 
 to provide a Common Pleas jurisdiction. in order to attract men 
 of a high class. If so, it must be self-evident that these men 
 would be dissatisfied unless assigned to duty in the Common 
 Pleas Court, and we would then have a City Court made up of 
 discontented judges. 
 
 Under the original bill, it is left to the chief justice to deter- 
 mine how many judges shall sit in the City Court. With the 
 pressure brought to bear upon him by the other judges for more 
 
Appendix. 215 
 
 congenial work, it would be strange if he were not influenced 
 thereby to assign to the City Court fewer judges than it would 
 in fact need. Should this condition arise, there could be no 
 immediate relief. The poor people would not be able to make 
 their grievances understood, and lawyers would not feel free to 
 protest. At all events, the disposition of the business in the 
 City Court would rest entirely upon the judgment, or even upon 
 the caprice, of one man, obliged to act in this regard under a 
 constant adverse , influence. If the chief justice proved to be 
 an unsympathetic or poor executive officer, this popular court 
 might greatly suffer. 
 
 We believe the plan of relieving the congested condition of 
 our upper courts and of providing at the same time for the sum- 
 mary disposition of the causes of the poor is impracticable. The 
 constitutional amendment, so far as it applies to our courts, was 
 passed chiefly, if not solely, for the purpose of doing away with 
 the evils of the fee system in the justice court and constable 
 practice in Cook County. The idea that this amendment was 
 designed to affect the practice of the upper courts is purely an 
 after-thought. For these reasons and others the amended bill 
 omits the radical innovation of a Common Pleas Court. Such 
 court, of superior jurisdiction, is the ' distinctive feature of the 
 original bill. 
 
 We have made a number of other changes, and while most 
 of them are important, some of them are not fundamental. We 
 request that an opportunity be given us to explain our views 
 before the Committees of the Senate and House, where the whole 
 matter will be presented. We request also that the amended bill 
 be introduced in each House of the General Assembly and re- 
 ferred to the Charter Committee and there considered with the 
 original bill. 
 
 As to the constitutionality of this proposed measure, we need 
 only say that if the original bill is constitutional it would seem 
 that the amended bill would certainly be. 
 
 Substantially all the evils of the justice of the peace practice 
 in this city have been attributable either to the fee system or 
 the institution of suits in remote parts of the county. Both 
 these evils will be corrected without the establishment of a Com- 
 mon Pleas Court, and the correction of both is provided for in 
 the amended bill. 
 
 In conclusion, let us specially urge upon your attention that 
 most of the population of the City of Chicago is poor or in very 
 
216 
 
 Appendix. 
 
 moderate circumstances, and that about three-fourths of it is of 
 foreign extraction. These are the people who must have litiga- 
 tion in the City Court. Our best information is that about one 
 hundred and fifty thousand cases, civil and criminal, are brought 
 yearly before the justices of the peace and police magistrates in 
 Chicago. The disposition of this vast business, so intimately 
 concerning the life of the people of this city, is and must be a 
 specialty. It ought not to be complicated by any other problem 
 or any other court. In the proposed new City Court we believe 
 the requisite dignity will be obtained and the requisite talent and 
 honesty secured by the abandonment of the fee system and the 
 payment of the salaries provided for in the bill. The Municipal 
 or City Court must be a separate court, easy of access from all 
 sections of the city, and fitted for the disposition of all business 
 speedily and without formality. 
 
 [Alphabetical List of Signers.] 
 Frank Ashbury Johnson, 
 
 Charles P. Abbey, 
 Sylvester G. Abbott, 
 Keene H. Addington, 
 Samuel Alschuler, 
 James J. Barbour, 
 Judge Albert C. Barnes, 
 William Brace, 
 Almon W. Bulkley, 
 J. M. H. Burgett, 
 George A. Carpenter, 
 Edmund S. Carr, 
 Judge Orrin N. Carter, 
 Frank L. Childs, 
 William E. Church, 
 M. Lester Coffeen, 
 William N. Cottrell, 
 Josiah Cratty, 
 Frank Crowe, 
 A. L. Currey, 
 Judge Charles S. Cutting, 
 Joseph H. Defrees, 
 Franklin A. Denison, 
 Edward A. Dicker, 
 Eli B. Felsenthal, 
 
 George A. Follansbee, 
 Mitchell D. Follansbee, 
 
 GWYNN GaRNETT, 
 
 David S. Geer, 
 Edward E. Gray, 
 Frank R. Grover, 
 John J. Healy, 
 Edwin Hedrick, 
 Judge Jesse Holdom, 
 Robert S. Iles, 
 William B. Jarvis, 
 Chancellor L. Jenks, Jr., 
 Harry A. Lewis, 
 E. C. Lindley, 
 Edward J. McArdle, 
 Robert McMurdy, 
 Robert D. Martin, 
 Chauncey W. Martyn, 
 George A. Mason, 
 David F. Matchett, 
 George P. Merrick, 
 Amos C. Miller, 
 Frank I. Moulton, 
 Harrison Musgrave, 
 
Appendix. 217 
 
 Frederic F. Norcross, G. Fred Rush, 
 
 John V. Norcross, Frank H. Scott, 
 
 John E. Northup, Andrew R. Sheriff, 
 
 Harry Olson, Frank L. Shepard, 
 
 Abram M. Pence, F. D. Silber, 
 
 Merritt W. Pinckney, Julius Stern, 
 
 Millard R. Powers, Horace Kent Tenney, 
 
 Henry W. Price, Oscar M. Torrison, 
 
 A. A. Rolf, N. E. Utt, 
 
 Julius Rosenthal, W. H. Utt, 
 
 Lessing Rosenthal, Charles R. Webster, 
 
 William W. Wheelock. 
 
 The bill was introduced into the House February 17, 1905, 
 and is as follows: 
 
 A BILL FOR 
 
 AN ACT IN RELATION TO A MUNICIPAL COURT IN 
 
 THE CITY OF CHICAGO. 
 
 Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented 
 in the General Assembly: 
 
 Section i. There shall be established in and for the City 
 of Chicago a municipal court, which shall be styled "The City 
 Court of Chicago." 
 
 Section 2. The court shall have jurisdiction, within the City 
 of Chicago, in the following cases: 
 
 First. All those classes of suits and proceedings, whether 
 civil or criminal, of which justices of the peace are given juris- 
 diction by law, in all of which classes of suits and proceedings 
 said court shall have jurisdiction, excepting when the amount 
 sought to be recovered, whether by way of damages, penalty, 
 fine or otherwise, if the suit or proceeding be for the recovery 
 of money only, or the value of the personal property claimed, 
 if the suit or proceeding be brought for the recovery of personal 
 property, exceeds Five Hundred Dollars ($500) : provided, how- 
 ever, that in any action upon a bond the amount sought to be 
 recovered thereon and not the penalty of the bond shall deter- 
 mine the jurisdiction; and that when payments are to be made 
 by installments, an action may be brought in the court for each 
 
218 Appendix. 
 
 installment not exceeding Five Hundred Dollars ($500) as it 
 becomes due. 
 
 Second. All criminal actions in which the punishment is by 
 fine, where the fine provided for does not exceed Two Hundred 
 Dollars ($200), or by imprisonment otherwise than in the peni- 
 tentiary, where the imprisonment provided for does not exceed 
 one year, or both. 
 
 Section 3. Branches of the court shall be held at such place 
 or places as may be provided by the corporate authorities of said 
 city, at the expense of the city, within the respective territorial 
 limits within which they are to be located and exercise their 
 jurisdiction, which territorial limits shall be fixed and ordered 
 by a majority of the judges of said court. If no place shall be 
 provided by the corporate authorities of said city for the holding 
 of a branch of said court, or if the place provided therefor be- 
 comes unfit, said court may by an order signed by a majority 
 of the judges of said court adjourn to or convene 'at a suitable 
 place for holding the branch of the court procured for that 
 purpose by said judges, within the district in which it is located, 
 and at such place may hold said court until a suitable place 
 therefor be furnished by such corporate authorities. The ex- 
 pense of procuring such place to which said branch is adjourned 
 or at which it is convened shall be paid by the city. The num- 
 ber of the branch courts shall be fixed, and the boundaries of 
 the districts shall be established and may be changed from time 
 to time, by orders signed by a majority of the judges of the 
 court and spread upon the records thereof, which orders shall 
 be published for three successive weeks, once in each wetek, in 
 some newspaper of general circulation in the City of Chicago, 
 and shall take efifect respectively within thirty days after the 
 last publication thereof : provided, however, the order therefor 
 shall have been approved by the City Council of the City of 
 Chicago. 
 
 Section 4. No person shall practice for compensation before 
 said court, or hold himself out to the public as being entitled to 
 practice in said court, without having the license prescribed by 
 law to practice in the courts of this state, and a violation of the 
 foregoing provisions shall constitute a misdemeanor, punishable 
 by fine not exceeding Two Hundred Dollars ($200), or impris- 
 onment in the county jail not exceeding one year: provided, 
 however, that any plaintiff or defendant may prosecute or defend 
 any suit or proceeding in said court in his own proper person. 
 
Appendix. 219 
 
 Section 5. All blanks, printed forms, books, papers, station- 
 ery and furniture necessary to the keeping of the records of the 
 proceedings of said court, and the transaction of the business 
 thereof, shall, at the expense of the city, be furnished to the 
 officers thereof, who shall furnish to suitors and attorneys on 
 application the blanks used in the procedure in said court. 
 
 Section 6. Said court shall consist of twenty-five (25) 
 judges one of whom shall be chief justice and the remaining 
 twenty-four (24) of whom shall be associate judges. Said court 
 may be divided, from time to time, into as many branches as 
 may be deemed necessary for the prompt and proper disposition 
 of the business of said respective branches, and as may be de- 
 termined by the chief justice. The chief justice, in addition to 
 all the other powers of a judge of said court, shall have the 
 general superintendence of the business of said court; he shall 
 prepare a set of forms and blanks for use in said court; he 
 shall preside at all meetings of the judges, and he shall assign 
 the associate judges to duty in the branches of said court, from 
 time to time, as he may deem necessary for the prompt disposi- 
 tion of the business thereof, and it shall be the duty of each 
 associate judge to attend and serve at any branch of said court 
 to which he may be so assigned. The chief justice shall also 
 superintend the preparation of the calendars of cases for trial 
 in the respective branches, and shall make such classification 
 and distribution of the same upon different calendars as he shall 
 deem proper and expedient. Each associate judge shall, at the 
 commencement of each month, make to the chief justice, under 
 his official oath, a report in writing of the duties performed by 
 him during, the preceding month, which report shall specify the 
 number of days' attendance in court of such judge during such 
 month, and the branch upon which he has attended, and the 
 number of hours per day of such attendance, for which the chief 
 justice shall cause suitable blanks to be prepared and furnished 
 to the associate judges. The chief justice must give his attention 
 faithfully to the discharge of the duties especially pertaining to 
 his office and to the performance of such additional judicial 
 work as he may be able to. perform. Each associate judge must 
 perform his share of the labors and duties appertaining to the 
 office. At least one associate judge must be in attendance in 
 each branch six hours of each day, except Sunday, a public holi- 
 day, or a day upon which the inhabitants of the City of Chicago 
 generally refrain from business, and such other days for vaca- 
 tions, not exceeding thirty-six (36) in number to any judge in 
 
220 Appendix. 
 
 any year, as may be fixed and specified by rule of court or by 
 the chief justice; and each associate judge, while in the court- 
 room or in chambers, and not actually engaged in the perform- 
 ance of other official duties, must act upon any application for 
 his official action properly made to him. One branch of the 
 court shall be kept open, and at least one judge, assigned for 
 that purpose by the chief justice, shall be in attendance thereat, 
 each day, excepting Sunday or a public hofiday, from nine 
 o'clock A. M. until ten o'clock p. m.^ excepting two hours' inter- 
 mission, for the transaction of such business as may come before 
 it: provided, however, that on Sundays and public holidays at 
 least one branch court shall hold morning sessions for the hear- 
 ing of criminal and quasi criminal cases. It shall be the duty 
 of the chief justice and the associate judges to meet together at 
 least once in each month, excepting the month of August, in 
 each year, at such hour and place as may be designated by the 
 chief justice, and at such other times as may be required by the 
 chief justice, for the consideration of such matters pertaining to 
 the administration of justice in said court as may be brought 
 before them. At such meetings they shall receive and investi- 
 gate, or cause to be investigated, all complaints presented to them 
 pertaining to the said court or to the officers thereof, and shall 
 take such steps as they may deem necessary or proper with re- 
 spect thereto, and they shall have power, and it shall be their 
 duty, to adopt or cause to be adopted all such rules and regula- 
 tions for the proper conduct of said court as to them may seem 
 expedient. The salary of each judge shall be Six Thousand 
 Dollars ($6,000) per annum, payable in monthly installments out 
 of the city treasury. 
 
 Section 7. The judges of the court shall be elected on the 
 first Monday of June, A. D. igo6. They shall enter upon the 
 discharge of their duties on May i, A. D. 1907. Upon the elec- 
 tion of the judges they shall by lot divide themselves into three 
 classes, the first and second of eight each, and the third of nine 
 judges. The first class shall hold their offices until the city elec- 
 tion for aldermen in the City of Chicago in April, A. D. 1908; 
 and the second and third until such election in the years A. D. 
 1910 and A. D. 19 12, respectively; and at such elections judges 
 shall be elected to fill the vacancies caused by the expiration of 
 the terms of said judges, and the judges so elected shall hold 
 their offices for the terms of six years, and until their successors 
 are elected and qualified. Vacancies in the office of judge of the 
 court shall be filled by election at the city election for aldermen 
 
Appendix. 221 
 
 in the City of Chicago, which shall occur next after a period 
 of thirty (30) days from the time such vacancies respectively 
 occur; but where the unexpired term does not exceed one year, 
 the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the Governor. The 
 judges shall annually select one of their number to act as chief 
 justice for the ensuing year. Whenever a vacancy occurs in the 
 office of chief justice, or whenever the chief justice shall be ab- 
 sent from the City of Chicago, or incapacitated from acting, the 
 associate judges shall select one of their number to act as chief 
 justice until such vacancy shall be filled by selection, as above 
 provided for, or until the return of the chief justice, or until his 
 incapacity ceases. 
 
 Section 8. No person shall be eligible to the office of judge 
 of the court unless he shall be at least thirty years of age, and 
 a citizen of the United States, nor unless he shall have resided 
 in the City of Chicago, and been there engaged either in active 
 practice as an attorney and counsellor at law, or in the discharge 
 of the duties of a judicial office five years next preceding his 
 election or appointment, or in one of said occupations during a 
 portion of said time, and in the other, the remaining portion 
 thereof, and shall, at the time of his election or appointment, 
 be a resident of the City of Chicago. Nor shall any person be 
 eligible to the office of judge of the court who shall have con- 
 tributed or expended, directly or indirectly, or who shall have 
 agreed to contribute or expend, directly or indirectly, any money 
 or property whatever for the purpose of furthering either his 
 nomination as a candidate for said office, or his election thereto, 
 or the nomination or election of any other candidate for office 
 at such election. 
 
 Section 9. Every judge of said court, before he enters upon 
 the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe the following 
 oath or affirmation: 
 
 "I do solemnly swear (or affirm, as the case may be) 
 that I will support the Constitution of the United States 
 and the Constitution of the State of Illinois, and that I will 
 faithfully discharge the duties of the office of judge of the 
 City Court of Chicago, according to the best of my ability." 
 
 Said oath shall be filed in the office of the City Clerk of the 
 City of Chicago. 
 
 Section 10. Whenever two-thirds in number of the judges 
 of the court shall transmit to the City Council of the City of 
 Chicago a certificate signed by them, that in the opinion of said 
 
222 . Appendix. 
 
 judges the business of said court is such as to require an in- 
 crease in the number of the judges of said court, said Council 
 may, by ordinance, provide for an increase of either three or six 
 in the number of said judges, who shall be elected at the next 
 ensuing city election for aldermen in said city in an even num- 
 bered year. The judges elected in accordance with such ordi- 
 nance shall by lot divide themselves into three classes. The 
 first class shall hold office until the first, the second class until 
 the second, and the third class until the third city election there- 
 after for aldermen in said City of Chicago in an even numbered 
 year, and until their successors shall be elected and qualified. 
 The vacancies occasioned by the expiration of the terms of such 
 judges shall be filled in accordance with the provisions of this. 
 Act made for filling the vacancies in the terms of the judges in 
 this Act originally provided for. In case only three judges are 
 provided for by ordinance, the said City Council may again 
 provide in the same way and with the same effect for three more 
 in number of said judges. After an increase in the number of 
 judges to six is made by ordinance, no subsequent increase there- 
 of shall be made by said City Council. 
 
 Section ii. There shall be a clerk of said court, who shall 
 be appointed by and hold his office during the pleasure of a ma- 
 jority of the judges of said court. He shall perform with respect 
 to said court and the respective branches thereof the duties 
 usually performed by clerks of courts of record. He shall give 
 his personal attention to the performance of the duties of his 
 office. The clerk's office of the court shall be kept open for the 
 transaction of business from eight o'clock a. m. to six o'clock 
 p. M. of each working day during the year. Until otherwise 
 provided by the rules which may be adopted under the pro- 
 visions of this Act, the powers, duties and liabilities, the oath of 
 office and the bond and condition thereof of such clerk shall be 
 the same, as near as may be, as those prescribed by law for 
 clerks of courts by the Act entitled "An Act to revise the law 
 in relation to clerks tof courts," approved March 25, 1874, and 
 in force July i, 1874. His salary shall be Three Thousand 
 Dollars ($3,000) per annum, and shall be paid in monthly in- 
 stallments out of the city treasury. 
 
 Said clerk shall appoint such number of deputies as may be 
 determined, from time to time, by a majority of the judges of 
 the court by orders signed by them and spread upon the records 
 of said court. The salaries of deputy clerks shall be fixed, from 
 time to time, by orders signed by a majority of the judges of 
 
Appendix. 223 
 
 the court and spread upon the records of the court, and shall 
 be payable out of the city treasury in monthly installments: 
 provided, however, that the salary of no deputy clerk shall ex- 
 ceed Fifteen Hundred Dollars ($1,500) per annum. Such dep- 
 uty clerks shall take the same ' oath or affirmation required by 
 the clerk of said court and shall give bonds, to be approved by 
 the chief justice of said court, conditioned, as near as may be, 
 like the bond required of the clerk. Any deputy clerk shall be 
 subject to removal at any time by an order signed by a ma- 
 jority of the judges and spread upon the records of said court. 
 The number of deputy clerks may be reduced at any time by 
 an order signed by a majority of the judges of said court and 
 spread upon the records of said, court. It shall be the duty of 
 the deputy clerks to render to parties to suits such assistance and 
 give them such information as may enable them to properly 
 commence suits, which duty shall be regulated and defined by 
 instructions to be prepared by the chief justice. The selection 
 of deputy clerks shall be made in accordance with the provisions 
 of the Act entitled "An Act to regulate the civil service of cities," 
 approved March 20, 1895. 
 
 Section 12. There shall be a bailiff of said court, who shall 
 be appointed and hold his office during the pleasure of a major- 
 ity of the judges of said court. He shall perform with respect 
 to said court and the respective branches thereof the duties 
 usually performed by sheriffs in respect to attendance upon, and 
 service and execution of process, and obedience to the lawful 
 orders and directions of a Circuit Court. He shall give his per- 
 sonal attention to the performance of the duties of his office. 
 The bailiff's office shall be kept open for the transaction of busi- 
 ness from eight o'clock a. m. to six o'clock p. m. of each working 
 day during the year. The powers, duties and liabilities, the oath 
 of office, and the bond and condition thereof of such bailiff shall 
 be the same, as near as may be, as those prescribed by law for 
 sheriffs with respect to attendance upon, and service and execu- 
 tion of process, and obedience to the lawful orders and directions 
 of a Circuit Court. His salary shall be three thousand dollars 
 ($3,000) per annum, and shall be paid in monthly installments 
 out of the city treasury. 
 
 Section 13. Such bailiff shall appoint such number of depu- 
 ties as may be determined, from time to time, by a majority of 
 the judges of the court by orders signed by them and spread 
 upon the records of said court. The salaries of deputy bailiffs 
 shall be fixed, from time to time, by orders signed by a majority 
 
224 Appendix. 
 
 of the judges of the court and spread upon the records of the 
 court, and shall be payable out of the city treasury in monthly 
 installments: provided, however, that the salary of no deputy 
 bailiff shall exceed twelve hundred dollars ($1,200) per annum. 
 Such deputy bailiffs shall take the same oath or affirmation re- 
 quired of the bailiff of said court, and shall give bonds, to be 
 approved by the chief justice of said court, conditioned, as near 
 as may be, like the bond required of the bailiff. The bailiff and 
 deputy bailiffs of the court shall be ex officio police officers of 
 the City of Chicago. Any deputy bailiff shall be subject to 
 removal at any time by an order signed by a majority of the 
 judges and spread upon the rfecords of said court. The number 
 of deputy bailiffs may be reduced at any time by an order signed 
 by a majority of the judges of said court and spread upon the 
 records of said court. Every police officer of the City of Chicago 
 shall be ex officio a deputy bailiff of the court and shall perform, 
 from time to time, such duties in respect to criminal and quasi 
 criminal cases, including cases pertaining to alleged violations 
 of city ordinances pending in said court, as may be required of 
 him by the court or branch thereof or any judge thereof. All 
 selections of deputy bailiffs shall be made in accordance with 
 the provisions of the act entitled "An Act to regulate the civil 
 service of cities," approved March 20, 1895. 
 
 Section 14. Neither the clerk nor the bailiff nor any deputy 
 clerk or deputy bailiff of said court shall receive, aside from 
 his salary and the costs by this Act required to be paid to him 
 in his official capacity, any money, property or other valuable 
 thing, as a gratuity or otherwise, for the performance of any 
 duty imposed upon him by virtue of his office, or for the per- 
 formance of any work of any kind or character in any manner 
 connected therewith; nor shall the chief justice or any judge, 
 or the clerk or the bailiff or any deputy clerk or deputy bailiff 
 of said court solicit or receive, or cause to be solicited or re- 
 ceived, from any railroad corporation or other common carrier, 
 for himself or for any other person, any free pass or other gift 
 of value. It shall be the duty of the judges of said court to 
 remove from office any clerk, deputy clerk, bailiff or deputy 
 bailiff who shall violate any provision of this section. The pow- 
 ers, duties and liabilities of such deputy bailiffs shall be the 
 same, as near as may be, as those prescribed by law for con- 
 stables with respect to attendance upon, and service and exe- 
 cution of process, and obedience to the lawful orders and direc- 
 tions of said court. 
 
Appendix. 225 
 
 Section 15. The practice and procedure in said court shall 
 be the same, as near as may be, as that prescribed by law for 
 similar suits and proceedings before justices of the peace and 
 police magistrates. 
 
 The provisions of all laws relating to justices of the peace 
 and police magistrates, which concern the practice and procedure 
 before them, transcripts, all proceedings by appeal or otherwise 
 to review their judgments, and the acknowledgment of chattel 
 mortgages and conveyances between husband and wife sha^l, as 
 near as may be, except as otherwise provided in this act, apply 
 to said City Court and the practice and procedure therein. 
 
 Section 16. Service of summons or writ shall be made by 
 delivering a copy thereof to the defendant, if an individual ; but 
 if any defendant be a corporation, the service shall be made in 
 the manner provided by law for similar cases at law in the Cir- 
 cuit Court. 
 
 Section 17. The court shall not exercise jurisdiction in any 
 suit brought therein, unless the defendant, if there be one de- 
 fendant, or one of the defendants, if there be more than one de- 
 fendant, resides or is found within the district in which the 
 branch of said court is located, or if the defendant be a cor- 
 poration having its principal office in the City of Chicago, unless 
 its principal office is within such district; but if the defendant 
 be a corporation not having its principal office in the City of 
 Chicago, suit may be brought in any branch of the court within 
 whose district service of process may be had upon any officer, 
 agent or employe of such corporation upon whom service of 
 process might be had if issued in a suit commenced in the Cir- 
 cuit Court. If, in any case, there is more than one defendant 
 and one defendant resides or is found within said district, or is 
 properly served with process therein, the process of said court 
 may be served upon the remaining defendant or defendants at 
 any place within said City of Chicago; but should such suit be 
 dismissed as to the defendant residing or found within said dis- 
 trict, then such suit shall, upon the trial, be dismissed by the 
 court as to all defendants, unless all the other defendants con- 
 sent that the court may retain jurisdiction. Provided, that no 
 suit shall be brought against the City of Chicago or any other 
 municipal corporation in said court other than in the district 
 in which the City Hall is located. This section shall not apply 
 to attachment suits brought against non-residents of this state, 
 which suits may be brought in any branch of the court within 
 
226" Appendix. 
 
 the district in which any property of the defendant is levied 
 upon, or within which any garnishee resides or is found. When, 
 upon the complaint of any defendant, it shall be made to appear 
 to any branch of the court that a suit has been improperly 
 brought therein, the court shall not be required on that account 
 to dismiss the suit, if any branch of the court could properly 
 have jurisdiction thereof; but in such case the court may cause 
 such suit to be transferred to the proper branch of the court, 
 and the branch to which the same is transferred shall proceed 
 therewith, as if the same had been originally commenced in the 
 district in which such branch is located : provided, however, that 
 the court may, in its discretion, require the plaintiff to pay the 
 costs of the defendant paid by him prior t6 such transfer. 
 
 Section i8. Previous to the commencement of any trial 
 before any judge of said court the defendant, or his agent or 
 attorney, may make oath that it is the belief of such deponent 
 that the defendant cannot have an impartial trial before such 
 judge. Whereupon, it shall be the duty of the judge to grant 
 a change of venue to a judge who is not of kin to either party, 
 or interested in the event of the suit. In no case shall the grant- 
 ing of any change of venue delay the trial of the suit, but such 
 suit shall be tried and disposed of at the 'time set for the trial 
 thereof, or at the time to which the trial thereof may be post- 
 poned, before some other judge of the court in the same, or in 
 any other district in which the suit may be ordered to be tried, 
 and all orders necessary for the setting of such suit for trial, 
 and for the securing of a speedy trial thereof may be made by 
 the judge from whom said change of venue has been ob- 
 tained. 
 
 Section 19. Upon the filing of any praecipe which shall not 
 have attached thereto an affidavit of amount due, the court or 
 the clerk thereof shall examine the plaintiff as to the amount 
 claimed, and shall endorse thereon the amount of such claim. 
 Upon each summons there shall be endorsed the amount shown 
 to be due by the affidavit or by the endorsement upon the prae- 
 cipe, and the defendant may pay such sum and costs to the dep- 
 uty bailiff who serves such summons. Upon such payment the 
 officer shall immediately give a receipt to the defendant for 
 such sum and costs, and shall make a return of that fact upon 
 the summons, and thereupon a judgment shall be entered for the 
 sum so claimed and costs, and immediately marked satisfied by 
 payment. Upon every summons there shall be printed in plain 
 type the location of the branch of the court to which the same 
 
Appendix. 227 
 
 is returnable, information prescribed by the chief justice con- 
 cerning defaults in cases of non-appearance of the defendant, 
 and such further information as may be prescribed by the chief 
 justice. 
 
 Section 20. The process in any suit for the violation of any 
 municipal ordinance shall, except as hereinafter provided, be a 
 summons. If the defendant, after being duly served with sum- 
 mons, fails to appear personally at the time specified in the sum- 
 mons, the court may proceed with the trial or may issue a war- 
 rant for the arrest of the defendant. 
 
 When the offense complained of is also a violation of any 
 provision of the criminal code the court may issue a warrant in 
 the first instance for the violation of the ordinance under the 
 like circumstances under which a warrant might issue for a 
 violation of the criminal code. 
 
 A warrant may issue in the first instance upon the affidavit 
 of any person that an ordinance has been violated, and that the 
 person making the complaint has reasonable grounds to believe 
 the party charged is guilty thereof and will escape unless 
 arrested, and stating the facts upon which such belief is based, 
 provided the judge to whom application is made for such war- 
 rant shall be satisfied, after examining under oath the party 
 making the affidavit that such arrest should be made; and any 
 person arrested upon any warrant herein provided for shall, 
 without unnecessary delay, be taken before the branch of the 
 court to which such warrant is returnable and tried for the 
 alleged offense. 
 
 Section 21. Upon the arrest of any person for any criminal 
 or quasi criminal offense within the jurisdiction of the court the 
 chief of police or any captain, lieutenant or sergeant of police 
 of the City of Chicago shall have power to let such person to 
 bail. The bail bond in any such case shall be conditioned for 
 the appearance of the person arrested before some branch of the 
 court, at a time fixed in such bond for such appearance, which 
 time shall be not later than two days after the date of the bond. 
 Any bond so taken shall be signed by one or more sureties, to be 
 approved by such officer, who is hereby authorized and requireed 
 to administer oaths for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency 
 of the sureties. All bonds so taken shall be filed with the clerk 
 of the branch at which the person arrested is required to ap- 
 pear. The exercise of the power hereby conferred of letting to 
 bail shall be subject to regulation by such rules as may be 
 
228 Appendix. 
 
 adopted by a majority of the judges of the court, as herein pro- 
 vided. But any person so arrested shall have the right to be 
 brought immediately before the branch of the court in the dis- 
 trict in which he is arrested, or, if there be no judge then in 
 attendance upon such branch, to any other branch at which there 
 may be a judge then in attendance, to be dealt with according to 
 law. 
 
 Section 22. Both in direct and in collateral proceedings the 
 same presumptions shall be indulged with respect to the juris- 
 diction of the court over the subject-matter of suits, and over 
 the parties thereto as are indulged with respect to the jurisdic- 
 tion of Circuit' Courts in like cases. 
 
 Section 23. Any money judgment rendered in the court, 
 when no execution issued thereon is outstanding, may be satis- 
 fied by the payment by the party against whom the same has 
 been rendered of the amount thereof and the costs to the clerk 
 of the court, who, upon payment being made, shall enter satis- 
 faction thereof, and shall, upon demand, pay over the money 
 received by him to the person appearing of record to be entitled 
 thereto. 
 
 Section 24. The court shall take judicial notice of all mat- 
 ters of which courts of general jurisdiction in this state are 
 required to take judicial notice, and also of the following: 
 
 All general ordinances of the City of Chicago. 
 
 Section 25. The costs in civil cases in the court shall be as 
 follows : 
 
 First. The plaintiff at the time of commencing his suit shall 
 pay to the clerk in full for all services to be rendered by said 
 clerk Two Dollars ($2), when the amount claimed by him in 
 money or property does not exceed One Hundred Dollars ($100) 
 and five dollars ($5) in all other cases, including all forcible en- 
 try and detainer cases. 
 
 Second. The party delivering to the bailiff any summons, 
 writ of attachment, writ of replevin, subpoena, writ of execution 
 or other process, shall, at the time of making such delivery, pay 
 to the bailiff the sum of One Dollar ($1) for each defendant 
 named in such process upon whom service thereof is to be made ; 
 and in case of writs of attachment, replevin or execution, he shall 
 pay to the bailiff the further sum of One Dollar ($1) when any 
 levy upon or seizure of property is to be made thereunder, and 
 shall also pay to the bailiff the actual expense of seizing and 
 caring for any property levied upon or' seized thereunder. 
 
Appendix. 229 
 
 Third. As commissions on moneys realized by execution, the 
 bailiff shall collect from the defendant in the execution five per 
 cent, upon the amount realized, if it do not exceed One Hun- 
 dred Dollars ($ioo), but if the amount realized exceeds One 
 Hundred Dollars ($ioo) the bailiff shall collect five per cent, on 
 the first One Hundred Dollars ($ioo) and three per cent, upon 
 the excess over One Hundred Dollars ($ioo). 
 
 Section 26. In criminal and quasi criminal cases and pro- 
 ceedings in the court instituted in the name or by the authority 
 of the people, or in the name of any state or county officer in 
 his official capacity, no fee or costs shall be asked or received in 
 advance. 
 
 All moneys collected upon judgments of the court in cases 
 for the violation of the ordinances of the City of Chicago shall 
 be paid to the clerk, who shall pay over the same to the City of 
 Chicago within one week after receiving the same. 
 
 Section 27. All costs collected in each week by the clerk 
 and bailiff shall be paid over by them respectively to the City 
 of Chicago on the Monday of the succeeding week, and the 
 clerk and bailiff shall be held personally responsible for all costs 
 required to be paid to them in advance as hereinbefore provided, 
 less such sums as shall have been paid out as jurors' fees where 
 the jury shall have been summoned in a cause wherein the de- 
 fendant is not required by law to advance the same. They shall 
 be required to keep complete and accurate accounts of all moneys 
 collected by them, and such accounts shall, under the direction 
 of the chief justice of said court, be examined and audited 
 monthly, the expense thereof to be paid by the city. 
 
 Section 28. The offices of justices of the peace, police magis- 
 trates and constables in and for the territory within the City of 
 Chicago are hereby abolished, and the jurisdiction of justices of 
 the peace in the territory in the County of Cook outside of the 
 City of Chicago is hereby limited to the territory outside of said 
 city ; but this section of this Act shall nAt become operative until 
 May I, A. D. 1907, and on and after said date the jurisdiction 
 hereby conferred upon the court shall exclude the exercise of any 
 portion of such jurisdiction by all other courts excepting courts 
 of record, and on and after said date, no other court than a 
 court of recdrd shall exercise jurisdiction in any case of which 
 said court is given jurisdiction by this Act. 
 
 Section 29. When the offices of justices of the peace within 
 the City of Chicago shall be abolished, the docket of each jus- 
 
230 Appendix. 
 
 tice of the peace whose office is thus abolished shall be forthwith 
 delivered up to the clerk of said court. Executions may be is- 
 sued by the clerk of said court upon any unsatisfied judgments 
 rendered by such justice of the peace in all cases in which the 
 same might have been issued had such office of justice of the 
 peace not been abolished, and an appeal shall lie to the Circuit 
 Court, Superior Court or County Court of Cook County from 
 any judgment rendered by any justice of the peace within twen- 
 ty days prior to May i, A. D. 1907, upon the giving by the ap- 
 pellant of an appeal bond, with security, as now required by law 
 in cases of appeals from justices of the peace: provided, the 
 appeal bond is filed at any time within twenty days after said 
 date. In all cases not determined or finally disposed of by any 
 such justice of the peace at the time his office is abolished, such 
 proceedings shall be had in said court as might be had were 
 such suits originally brought in said court, but no trial of any 
 such case shall be had in said court without such notice to the 
 parties thereto as the court may deem necessary. All writs is- 
 sued by justices of the peace within the City of Chicago and 
 which shall not have been returned on or before May i, A. D. 
 1907, shall be forthwith returned to the court, and said court 
 shall have full power to make such provision for the execution 
 or other disposition of all such writs as said court may deem 
 proper for the protection of the rights of the respective parties 
 to the suits in which such writs shall have been issued. 
 
 Section 30. It shall be the duty of the chief justice of the 
 court to superintend the keeping of the records of said court and 
 to prescribe abbreviated forms of entries of orders therein in 
 civil cases, which abbreviated forms so prescribed shall have the 
 same force and effect as if said orders were entered in full in 
 the records of said court. When any certified transcript of the 
 record, or of any portion thereof, of any suit or proceeding in 
 said court is required, the same shall be written out in full from 
 such abbreviated forms and duly authenticated according to law. 
 
 Section 31. In case it shall be hereafter determined that so 
 much of Sections seven (7) and ten (10) hereof as fixes the 
 terms of office of the judges of the court is invalid, this Act 
 shall not on that account be adjudged wholly invalid, but the 
 terms of office of the judges of said court shall, in such case, 
 be four years, and they shall hold their offices until their suc- 
 cessors shall be elected and qualified, and on the first Monday 
 of June, A. D. 1910, and on the first Monday of June of every 
 
Appendix. 231 
 
 fourth year thereafter, there shall be elected twenty-five (25) 
 judges of said court as successors in office of the judges hereby 
 required to be elected on the first Monday of June, A. D. 1906, 
 and the terms of office of the judges added to said court in pur- 
 suance of Section ten (10) hereof shall be four years. 
 
 Section 32. The invalidity of any portion of this Act shall 
 not affect the validity of any other portion thereof which can be 
 given effect without such invalid part. 
 
 Section 33. This Act shall be submitted to a vote of the 
 legal voters of the City of Chicago at the general election to be 
 held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, 
 A. D. 1905, and if a majority of the legal voters of said city 
 voting on the question at such election shall consent to this Act, 
 the same shall thereupon immediately take effect and become 
 operative.