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Cornell University Library 
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 The naval battle of Santiago. 
 
 3 1924 020 423 269 
 
The original of tliis book is in 
 tine Cornell University Library. 
 
 There are no known copyright restrictions in 
 the United States on the use of the text. 
 
 http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924020423269 
 
6R0DHLYN 
 
 Position- No. L-The Spanish Ships Comino Out. 
 
 Position No. 1. 
 
 Position No. 8.— After the Sureenher. 
 
 The above is a precise copy of the several charts prepared by 
 Rear Admiral Sampson, and published by him in the Century Maga. 
 zine of April, 1S99, purporting to give the position of the vessels in 
 both squadrons at the diflferent stages of the naval battle of Santiago. 
 It will be seen that Sampson in every chart places other vessels of 
 the fleet in advance of the Brooklyn and nearer to the enemy. 
 
 Position No. 7. 
 
 The above charts are carefully drawn from the official report of 
 the attitude of each vessel engaged in the action at its various stages, 
 as prepared by the unanimous agreement of the navigators of each 
 vessel and published officially by the Navy Department. It will be 
 seen that at every stage of the battle the Brooklyn was in the front 
 and closest to the enemy. 
 
THE NAVAL BATTLE 
 
 OF 
 
 SANTIAGO 
 
 A. K. MoCUURB 
 
A. iivo< 
 
 "PfTTT, ft TMnTtPHTA. 
 
Introduction 
 
 The two articles embraced in this pamphlet were 
 written by A. K. McClure in review of two books 
 recently published purporting to give the history of the 
 naval battle of Santiago. The first article given was 
 published in " The Philadelphia Times " in review of 
 " The Sailor's Log," of which Rear Admiral Robley D. 
 Evans is the author, and the second was published in 
 " The Philadelphia Record" in review of " The History 
 of the United States Navy," by Edgar Stanton Maclay. 
 These articles are presented to correct the sometimes 
 gross and often malicious perversion of the truth of history. 
 
Rear Admiral Evans' Uniquely Embellished 
 Story of Himself and Santiago. 
 
 "A Sailor's Log," a handsomely printed volume of 467 
 pages just issued by D. Appleton & Co., New York, is a 
 breezy, sparkling, rollicking story that will be read and 
 enjoyed by the lovers of mingled history and romance. The 
 greatest inspiration of an author is to be absorbingly inter- 
 ested in his subject, and in this case the author demonstrates 
 on every page his unflagging admiration of his theme. The 
 book is written by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans, and 
 the subject of the book is the life and achievements of Rear 
 Admiral Robley D. Evans. The work is well illustrated, 
 and most of the illustrations exhibit Rear Admiral Robley 
 D. Evans in various phases of his career. We have him in 
 the frontispiece on the bridge of the battleship "Iowa"; 
 again in the first attempt to capture Fort Fisher he is given 
 lying in the sand with numerous bandages well exhibited, 
 persuading with his pistol a soldier armed with a rifle to 
 help Evans to a place of safety; next he appears in a full 
 page on crutches after his recovery from his many wounds in 
 the Fort Fisher battle ; next we have him in contrast as mid- 
 shipman and captain ; next as receiving the German Emperor 
 on the cruiser "New York," and finally he is portrayed as 
 receiving Admiral Cervera on board the "Iowa" after the 
 battle of Santiago. 
 
 (5) 
 
No more interesting story has ever been told than the 
 "Sailor's Log," as told by Rear Admiral Robley D. Evans. 
 It is always fresh, and no incident is ever permitted to have 
 even the semblance of staleness. He possesses what is essen- 
 tial in descriptive authorship — a most brilliant and exhaust- 
 less imagination — and he permits no story to lack in thrilling 
 incident for want of a lavish supply of imagination. This 
 adds immensely to the general interest of the volume, and 
 but for the fact that the same style of narrative is carried 
 into some of the more serious historical features of the book, 
 the beautiful imagery that so often brightens or supplements 
 facts would be entirely pardonable. But discounted by the 
 overshadowing love of the author for his subject that is so 
 profusely exhibited, the book is highly entertaining and 
 instructive. 
 
 „. . The story of Rear Admiral Evans' 
 
 His Childhoods Happy ^^^j^ jj^^ j^ ^^j^ .^^ delightful candor. 
 
 Hour. There is no strained effort to make 
 
 either a perfect character of the lad, or to dignify the litera- 
 ture employed in presenting the book. He was born in 
 Floyd County, Virginia, on the eighteenth of August, 1846, 
 and he grew up with all the pleasures and sorrows of the 
 country boy who seemed to enjoy everything that came 
 along, and took his chances to pay dearly for the fun he was 
 always in search of. His great ambition was to get into the 
 navy, and after having spent some time in Washington when 
 only a lad he managed to win the favor of the Mormon dele- 
 gate in Congress from Utah, Colonel Hooper, who agreed to 
 nominate him for a cadetship at Annapolis, but it was neces- 
 sary for him to go to Utah and obtain a residence there. He 
 had to make his journey to Utah in 1859, when the trans- 
 continental railway was hardly thought of, and he gives a 
 delightful account of his journey, of his many adventures 
 with the Indians, of chasing the buffalo and camping on the 
 plains. With his fertile imagination his report of his west- 
 
ward journey is made intensely fascinating, as is his account 
 
 of his brief stay in Utah to acquire a residence, during which 
 
 time he cultivated the acquaintance of Brigham Young, 
 
 struggled with the prairie storms, and made himself solid 
 
 with the Mormon people. In July, i860, he had acquired 
 
 the necessary residence to warrant his appointment as a cadet 
 
 from that territory, and he tells in his free and easy way of 
 
 the return trip that landed him as a cadet at Annapolis on the 
 
 fifteenth of September. He closes that chapter by saying: 
 
 "I have so far picked the oakum, now let me spin my yarn 
 
 of forty years of naval life." 
 
 „ _ . ,„,,, , His first severe trial came soon 
 
 He Resigns Wiihout ,, , . j ■ • . a i- 
 
 I, . .. after his admission to Annapolis, 
 
 Knowing It ^^^^ ^j^jj ^^^ appalled the country. 
 
 He had to confront a divided family. His next youngest 
 brother enlisted in the Confederate Washington Artillery, 
 and went to the front under Pelham, and his mother severely 
 reproached him for having deserted his State and people, but 
 according to his report he stood by the old flag, even when it 
 cost him scalding tears for a son of Virginia to make war 
 upon his home Commonwealth, the boasted Old Dominion 
 and the Mother of Presidents. 
 
 His resignation was delivered to the Navy Department 
 and formally accepted just when the war was about to 
 begin, but he imputes the forgery of his resignation to his 
 mother, who wrote it without his knowledge, and had it 
 accepted without any notice whatever to himself. Thus, as 
 he presents it, "without previous warning I found myself 
 out of the service despite my determination to stay in." 
 Captain Rodgers came to his aid by telegraphing to Wash- 
 ington explaining that the resignation was a forgery, and 
 he was promptly reappointed, and notice sent to him by 
 telegraph. His first experience in the navy was with the 
 flying squadron that was sent to look after the Confederate 
 privateers in the West Indies. During that voyage he had 
 
to battle with the yellow fever and rebellious sailors, and 
 finally returned without having a chance to test the fighting 
 qualities of the enemy. 
 
 „. p- . p ... . This brings the sailor's yam to the 
 His First Battle at p^^.^ pj^j^^^. campaign, in which, as is 
 Font Fisher. ^^n y.^^^^ to all, Evans made a 
 
 heroic record, and as presented and embellished by himself 
 it makes romance pale before the strange perils and vicis- 
 situdes through which he passed without losing his life. 
 Admiral Porter's fleet that was to move on Fort Fisher was 
 assembled in November, 1864, at Hampton Roads. The 
 destination of the fleet was presumably known only to the 
 Admiral, and the only one in the fleet excepting Admiral 
 Porter who discovered the destination was Acting Ensign 
 Robley D. Evans. He received a letter from his Confederate 
 brother, who was serving as a scout on General Lee's staff, 
 which gave him notice of the movement upon Fort Fisher. 
 In that letter his brother said: "We will give you a warm 
 reception at Fort Fisher when you get there." The fleet 
 under command of Porter and the army under command 
 of General Butler, reached the neighborhood of Fort Fisher 
 on the twenty-third of December, and on the twenty-fourth 
 the memorable powderboat invented by General Butler for 
 the purpose of blowing up Fort Fisher, was run into a 
 proper position, and at two o'clock in the morning the ex- 
 plosion occurred that was expected to be followed by an 
 assault. At daylight it was discovered that the powder 
 boat explosion was a total failure, and that the fort could be 
 taken only by bombardment and assault. 
 
 Acting Ensign Evans was naturally chosen by Commander 
 Schenck to go aloft on his vessel with good glasses and 
 locate if possible some guns that were annoying him. En- 
 sign Evans promptly responded, took his position in the 
 mizzen rigging just below the top, deliberately took a hard- 
 tack from his pocket and placed it.in his mouth to masticate 
 
leisurely while he was adjusting his glasses to locate the 
 guns. He found the guns at once, saw the gunners train 
 them directly upon him and his ship, and in a few seconds a 
 puff of smoke that he described as something like a lamp-post, 
 crossed the field of his glasses, and immediately the rigging 
 was cut four feet below him and he swung down into the 
 mast. Not having breakfasted satisfactorily his first 
 thought, as he tells us, was about his hard-tack, but he 
 records the pathetic story that the hard-tack was gone, as he 
 never found even a crumb of it, and he adds : "I am sure that 
 I swallowed it whole." When he got down on deck to make 
 his report he was amazed to discover that his knees were 
 shaking and he feared the men would see it, but he pulled 
 himself together, finally got them into shape and immedi- 
 ately warmed up to his work. This thrilling experience of 
 Acting Ensign Evans seems to have been the nearest to a 
 disaster that was suffered by the fleet. Careful examination 
 by General Butler resulted in the decision that the fort was 
 too strong to be carried by assault and the expedition was 
 abandoned. 
 
 >• J •■ , ^- I Both General Grant and Admiral 
 
 Second Fort Fisher -r, . j. j. ^ vi. ^u 
 
 Porter were not content with the 
 
 Battle. result of the first movement against 
 
 Fort Fisher. The fleet was ordered to Beaufort, North 
 
 Carolina, well filled up with coal, ammunition and stores, 
 
 and General Alfred Terry, who was placed in command of 
 
 the army, and Admiral Porter then made their second and 
 
 successful attack upon the fort. A naval force was ordered 
 
 to land and assist the army in the assault by attacking the 
 
 sea face of the fort while the army attacked the northwestern 
 
 end of it. Volunteers were called for, and of course as 
 
 Ensign Evans happened to be officer of the deck when the 
 
 order came, he immediately put his name as first in the list 
 
 of volunteers, and there was great rivalry among the navy 
 
 boys for permission to join in the land assault. 
 
lO 
 
 On the thirteenth of January, i865,_ the fleet opened fire 
 on the fort, and Ensign Evans was in charge of the commo- 
 dore's barge that carried thirty-five or forty men who made 
 the first landing of navy forces for the assault. At three 
 o'clock in the afternoon of the fifteenth the order came for 
 the naval force to charge, and it started on its long run of 
 1,200 yards over the loose sand. When it got within 500 
 yards of the fort the column stopped and went down, as the 
 author says, "like a row of falling bricks," leaving every man 
 fiat on his stomach. They were then ordered to make 
 another charge, and after advancing 300 yards they again 
 went down under the terrible fire of rifle and canister. En- 
 sign Evans was then near enough, as he reports, to see and 
 recognize the men on the parapet. He saw Colonel Lamb, 
 the Southern commander, standing on the wall and urging 
 his men to shoot the Yankees. Evans concluded that the 
 best thing for him to do would be to shoot Colonel Lamb, 
 and he drew his revolver and fired a deliberate shot at him, 
 but as he fired, a bullet ripped through the front of his coat 
 across the breast, turning him completely around so that he 
 was not permitted to see the effect of his shot at the Con- 
 federate colonel. He felt a burning sensation over his heart 
 and saw blood coming out of a hole in his coat, but he had 
 not time to bother about it. He concluded that if a bullet 
 had gone into a vital portion of his body he was done for, so 
 he disregarded the wound and went on at the head of his 
 command. 
 
 _ J .. «. As the naval force approached the 
 
 Evans ana the Sharp- . 1 ■> -c- • t? j- j 
 
 '^ stockade Ensign Evans discovered 
 
 shooter. ^^^ ^^^ particular sharpshooter was 
 
 deliberately firing at him at a distance of not over one hun- 
 dred yards, and he struck Evans in the left leg about three 
 inches below the knee. The force of the ball landed him on 
 his face in the sand, but he immediately pulled a silk hand- 
 kerchief out of his pocket, bound up his wound and hastened 
 
to the front. He and seven others of his command made a 
 rush and got into the stockade, when his sharpshooter friend 
 sent another bullet through his right knee, and he realized 
 that with a bullet through both knees he was not in a good 
 condition to make another charge, or even to retreat. He 
 tried standing up, but his legs would not permit it, and he 
 was compelled to rest where he was. 
 
 The naval force was repulsed when, as Ensign Evans 
 states, tvyo minutes more would have given them the parapet 
 in a hand to hand struggle, but the naval men retreated down 
 the beach and were put into trenches to oppose Bragg and 
 there served until the fort was captured. Of the eight who 
 went inside the stockade all were shot down, including 
 Evans. He fortunately had half a dozen silk handkerchiefs 
 along with him, and he managed to bind up his wounds to 
 such an extent as to prevent his death by loss of blood ; but 
 in the meantime his sharpshooter friend would not permit 
 him to have peace. According to the story as given in the 
 log, the sharpshooter was only thirty-five yards away from 
 Evans, and as the experienced sharpshooters of 1865, after 
 four years of training, were among the most expert in the 
 world, there seemed to be but little chance for Evans to 
 escape with his sharpshooter specially gunning after him at 
 easy pistol range. Not only did this sharpshooter amuse 
 himself by shooting at Evans, but addressed him personally 
 in what the story says was "uncomplimentary language." 
 The sharpshooter must have been greatly absorbed and 
 diverted from his purpose by the anathemas he hurled against 
 the wounded and defenseless naval ensign, as it required the 
 fifth shot, according to the memory of the author, to hit 
 Evans again, and then he shot Evans in the foot, taking off 
 one of his toes and the sole of his shoe. Until this time 
 Evans had borne the compliments and balls of the sharp- 
 shooter with reasonable tolerance, but when he had shot at 
 Evans five times and finally was so disrespectful as to cut off 
 
12 
 
 one of Evans' toes. Ensign Evans, as he says without know- 
 ing why, became "unreasonably angry," and he immediately 
 rolled over in the sand so as to look his antagonist in the face 
 and "addressed a few brief remarks to him." While Evans 
 was delivering his oration to the erratic and garrulous sharp- 
 shooter, he saw a freshly loaded rifle handed to the sharp- 
 shooter, and Evans being then "unreasonably angry without 
 knowing just why," fired, aiming at the breast. Of this 
 singularly romantic and tragic event the author says : 
 
 "I knew all the time that I should kill him if I shot at 
 him, but had not intended to do so until he shot me in the 
 toe. My bullet went a little high, striking the poor chap 
 in the throat and passing out at the back of his neck. He 
 staggered around after dropping his gun, and finally pitched 
 over the parapet and rolled down near me, where he lay 
 dead." 
 
 c ' t> LI- This incident sublimely illustrates 
 
 Evans Sub/me ^^^ dominating qualities of Ensign 
 Courage. Evans. He was courageous enough 
 
 to permit a sharpshooter to fire at him five times at short 
 range in the interim of conversations between them, but he 
 states that he did not intend to kill the sharpshooter until his 
 fifth shot at thirty-five yards distance left Evans minus a toe 
 and a shoe sole. His heroism on the occasion was equaled 
 only by his magnanimity to a stranger skilled in sharpshoot- 
 ing, who was firing deliberately at him at short pistol range, 
 but Evans knew that he could "kill the sharpshooter whenever 
 it pleased him to do so, and when he became "unreasonably 
 angry" he was driven to the terrible determination of ending 
 the sharpshooter's life. 
 
 After killing the sharpshooter. Ensign Evans decided to 
 take a rest, as he was greatly enfeebled by his wounds, and 
 he fell asleep. When he awoke it was some time before he 
 could get his bearings, but he finally discovered that he was in 
 some sort of a sand bed, and that the tide was rapidly coming 
 
13 
 
 in upon him. He was helpless to get out, and he expected 
 to be "drowned like a rat." He could not use his legs, but 
 finally, after a great efifort, succeeded in rolling himself side- 
 ways out of the hole. When he got out he saw a marine a 
 short distance from him, well protected by a pile of sand, and 
 firing deliberately at the fort. He called to the marine to 
 pull him in behind his pile of sand, but the marine preferred 
 not to expose himself to the Southern fire. 
 Tha P/otni i^n„^^nt ^^^ marine was playing sharp- 
 ■f f *'^9""«^'>t shooter himself with his rifle, but 
 with the Marine. gj^gj^j^ ^^^^^ decided that the way 
 
 to persuade the marine to come out and expose himself to 
 take Evans under cover was to draw his pistol and propose 
 to kill him if he refused. As Evans was lying in the open 
 with nothing but a revolver, and as the marine was protected 
 behind a sand bank with a rifle, the only possible explanation 
 of the marine's obedience to Evans' order at the point of the 
 pistol, is that he must have known that Evans would kill him 
 some way, no matter how, and he left his cover, exposed 
 himself to the fire of the enemy, and took Evans into safety. 
 The language of the author is : "I persuaded him with my 
 revolver to change his mind, and in two seconds he had me 
 in a place of safety." 
 
 To add to the grotesqueness of the story the pistol of 
 Ensign Evans was soaking wet and could not have been 
 fired, but it answered the purpose, and the protected marine, 
 armed with a rifle, was summoned to offer his life to protect 
 Evans, who was entirely exposed and could have been killed 
 by the marine any moment. Why he should have exposed 
 himself to a hurricane of bullets from the enemy when he 
 was fully armed himself, to escape the impotent pistol of 
 Evans whom he could have killed any time, is one of the 
 strange occurrences that the author does not seem to have 
 thought required logical explanation. Thus having finally, 
 after great forbearance, killed the loquacious sharpshooter 
 
15 
 
 tr i- I Fortunately, Ensign Evans raen- 
 
 Evans Not Entirely ^j^j^^ -^^ ^^ entirely incidental way at 
 Alone in Capturing the ^^^ beginning of his story of the cap- 
 ^ort. ture of port Fisher, that there 
 
 was a fleet there commanded by Admiral Porter and a mili- 
 tary force commanded by General Terry. But for 
 this casual statement any one who reads Evans' story 
 of the capture of Fort Fisher would be ignorant of the 
 presence of any others in that sanguinary conflict than 
 Evans and his little body of naval men, with the Confederate 
 sharpshooter whom he killed, and the marine behind the sand 
 bank whom he threatened to kill with a water-soaked pistol. 
 Of course, the battle was unimportant excepting so far as 
 Evans and his surroundings were concerned, although the 
 naval force under Evans' command made a charge up to the 
 fort, was repulsed, ran away and was finally lodged behind 
 breastworks until the army captured the fort. Had Evans 
 forgotten to tell of the retreat of his entire force, the average 
 reader of his story of the capture of Fort Fisher would logi- 
 cally assume that he did it principally himself. It is obvious 
 that with his innate modesty he chose to prevent the reader 
 from being misled into a belief that Evans had captured the 
 fort himself, by a brief incidental mention of the fact that 
 there was a large army and a large fleet to support Ensign 
 Evans in his great achievement. 
 c a II- L- After the close of the war Ensign 
 
 Evans a Rollicking ^^^^ ^^^^^^ Lieutenant Evans and 
 Reamer. j^g applied for active service, in re- 
 
 sponse to which the Navy Department assigned him to the 
 "Piscataqua"in October, 1867, to accompany Admiral Rowan 
 in a cruise to China. From that time until 1870 he had the 
 usual rollicking time, and gives most delightful stories of his 
 experiences at Cape Town, China, Japan, the Philippines 
 and Oriental affairs generally. In July, 1871, he was as- 
 signed to duty at the Annapolis Naval Academy, and he 
 
i6 
 
 gives a very entertaining story of the admission and treat- 
 ment of the first colored naval cadet. The sable embryo 
 naval officer had a hard time of it, of course, and the dignity 
 of the naval service was maintained by dismissing a New 
 York bootblack cadet and the colored cadet for general mis- 
 conduct and incompetency. After two years at Annapolis 
 he was again ordered to sea as a navigator on the sloop of 
 war "Shenandoah." This cruise took him to England, Mo- 
 rocco, Madeira, Liberia, Africa, Spain, Carthage and other 
 places of interest, and his story of the cruise is embellished 
 up to his best standard of imagery. On his return he was 
 ordered to Baltimore on waiting orders, and was soon there- 
 after placed in command of the gunboat "Yorktown," in 
 which he took a cruise to Chile, where he joined Captain 
 Schley, then in command of the "Baltimore." 
 
 c €. j^i J ^L He was present in Chile at the time 
 
 Evans Sewed the r . , • , , , .^, ^ ^ 
 
 , of the serious trouble with that gov- 
 
 Chi/ean Affair. ernment that brought us to the verge 
 of war, and he gives extensive extracts from his diary telling 
 how Captain Schley in Chile and the government at Wash- 
 ington had very imperfect knowledge of the situation, while 
 he alone seemed to understand it. The whole difficulty arose 
 from a drunken brawl that resulted in the killing of some of 
 Captain Schley's men,, and in a few days it was fanned into 
 a national issue. It has been generally accepted by the gov- 
 ernment that Captain Schley performed his duty with great 
 skill, and opened a way for maintaining peace without any 
 sacrifice of the dignity and honor of the government, but 
 Commander Evans, who remained after Schley and his 
 vessel had been ordered away, seems to have forgotten to 
 mention ii In this difficulty, as in the little difficulty that 
 resulted in the capture of Fort Fisher, Commander Evans 
 seems, according to his story, to have been the hero of the 
 occasion. He was always dying for a fight, but never got it, 
 and, failing to get a fight, he congratulates himself that he 
 
17 
 
 brought the Chileans to an honorable peace. From Chile he 
 sailed to the Bering Sea, where he made the acquaintance of 
 an earthquake,, had a jolly time in the social whirl, was fasci- 
 nated with Arctic scenery, took a whack at a volcano, 
 wrestled with a hurricane, and individually solved the intri- 
 cate seal question that had defied the statesmanship of the 
 country and the diplomacy of nations. 
 p n ji «•■ / In 1894 Captain Evans was as- 
 Evans Opens the K,el ^j^^^^ ^^ ^^^ command of the "New 
 
 ■ York," then the only armored cruiser 
 
 in the navy, and soon thereafter made a short trip to Europe 
 to join the ceremonies at the opening of the Kiel Canal. It 
 is somewhat difficult, in looking over Captain Evans' graphic 
 account of this cruise, to ascertain that Admiral Kirkland 
 was in command of the fleet, and that the "San Francisco," 
 "Marblehead," "Alliance" and "Columbia"belonged to it. The 
 vessels composing the squadron are fotmd only incidentally 
 in the statement that when he reached Southampton the 
 "San Francisco, "Marblehead" and "Alliance" were there, 
 but not the "Columbia," and Admiral Kirkland's presence 
 in the squadron is casually mentioned in the same paragraph 
 in the statement that he would not take the squadron to Kiel, 
 but ordered the "New York" to meet him at Copenhagen, 
 whence they would go to the opening of the canal. Admiral 
 Kirkland transferred his flag to the "New York" and pro- 
 ceeded with Captain Evans to the grand celebration, but 
 from the time the ceremonies began until they were con- 
 cluded Captain Evans was the only naval officer who seems 
 to have been in evidence. 
 
 _ ,- J , . , The Emperor of Germany gave 
 
 Evans Entertains and ^ ^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^^ ^.^^^^ 
 
 Instructs the Emperor. g„^ ^^^^^^ ^^ere Evans was presented 
 to the Emperor, who gave him a "cordial handshake and 
 kept others waiting quite five minutes," while he talked to 
 the American captain. At the reception given on one of 
 
i8 
 
 the German battleships on Sunday Admiral Knorr greeted 
 Captain Evans, telling him: "The Prince says you are a 
 good fellow, and he wants the Emperor to know you." He 
 soon after was introduced to Prince Henry and Princess 
 Irene, and he rounded out the ceremonies grandly by invit- 
 ing Emperor William and Prince Henry and ten admirals to 
 dine with him on board the "New York." Admiral Kirk- 
 land's presence on his own flagship that was commanded 
 by Captain Evans is incidentally mentioned on the occasion 
 of this dinner that Captain Evans was supposed to give to 
 the German Emperor. He mentions the fact that Admiral 
 Kirkland welcomed the Emperor, and that seems to have 
 been the end of the admiral's duty on the occasion. 
 
 There is no report given of what Admiral Kirkland said, 
 but Captain Evans says : "I made him (the Emperor) a short 
 speech, telling him that we had the champion twelve-oared 
 cutter of the American navy, and asked on the part of my 
 crew the honor of naming her for his daughter Victoria 
 Louisa. He was really touched by the compliment, and 
 taking my hand granted my request most graciously." 
 
 Naturally enough Captain Evans regards this dinner as 
 "one of the most delightful I have ever seen, a perfect suc- 
 cess, and George, my steward, who bossed the entire affair, 
 was as proud as a peacock." 
 
 Captain Evans conducted the Emperor over the entire 
 battleship, and received high compliments from the German 
 ruler for the completeness of his vessel. He also instructed 
 the German Emperor as to the necessity of having a strong 
 navy, to which the Emperor "listened very attentively," but 
 when he had finished, the Emperor said : "Captain, unfortu- 
 nately my Parliament does not entertain the same view of 
 the question." Captain Evans, understanding the situation 
 much better than the German Emperor, replied: "If your 
 Majesty will permit me to say so, I think you will eventually 
 bring your Parliament to think as I do." 
 
t9 
 
 .,■,„•,, J , It was certainly considerate and 
 Admiral K,rkland only ^^^^j^^^ ^^ ^^^ p^^^ ^^ ^^p^^j^ 
 
 a Figure-head. g^^^g ^^us to take the entire labor of 
 entertaining the German Emperor oflf the hands of Admiral 
 Kirkland, who is not reported as having had any part what- 
 ever in receiving or amusing the Emperor beyond an address 
 of welcome when the Emperor came on board, which is not 
 deemed of sufficient importance to be reported even in 
 abstract. It is not surprising that after this interesting hos- 
 pitality to the German Emperor, in which the Emperor seems 
 to have recognized Captain Evans as the only officer worthy 
 of notice, he should conclude his views of the German Em- 
 peror in these words : "He was to me the picturesque figure 
 among the ruling heads of Europe." The celebration of the 
 opening of the Kiel Canal appears to have been planned 
 and conducted wholly by Captain Evans, assisted by the 
 Emperor of Germany, while Admiral Kirkland, on whose 
 flagship the Emperor was entertained, had nothing whatever 
 to do beyond enjoying his cigar on deck or in his cabin. 
 
 _ , ^ ^ _,. After the return from the Kiel 
 
 Evans instructs the y u .■ i- ,. • -c j 
 
 celebration Captam Evans was de- 
 
 Government to Prepare ^^ched from the "New York" and 
 for the Late War. assigned to the command of the 
 "Indiana," the first of our battleships, but after a short 
 cruise with her he was again detached and assigned to duty 
 on the Lighthouse Board. This brought him into close rela- 
 tions with Secretary Long and Assistant Secretary Roose- 
 velt, to whom he unfolded a prophetic story of the coming 
 war with Spain. He had the confidence of Roosevelt, and 
 through Roosevelt he made his impress upon the Secretary, 
 as he states that it was through Roosevelt's "earnest recom- 
 mendations to Mr. Long that many most important steps 
 were taken." He was assigned to an inspection tour along 
 the coast and gulf, and about the middle of March he arrived 
 at Key West on his way to Washington. 
 
20 
 
 He saw the weakness of the navy, and says : "I hurried on 
 
 to Washington, determined to give Mr. Long my views on 
 
 the subject," and with the assistance of Assistant Secretary 
 
 Roosevelt he induced the department to order the purchase 
 
 of a number of fast yachts and tugs to be armed with all 
 
 dispatch and hurried off to Key West. He was then ordered 
 
 to relieve Captain Sampson, who was in command of the 
 
 "Iowa," as Sampson was promoted as Acting Rear Admiral 
 
 to command the North Atlantic fleet. He pays high tribute 
 
 to Rear Admiral Sampson, who seems to be the only man in 
 
 the American navy who is a close second to Rear Admiral 
 
 Evans in naval sagacity. He sailed with Rear Admiral 
 
 Sampson to blockade Havana, and he gives an interesting 
 
 description of his first night on blockade duty. All the 
 
 other officers of the navy were very apprehensive of the 
 
 torpedo boat, and, strange as it may seem, Captain Evans 
 
 shared that apprehension. It appears to be about the only 
 
 instance in which he did not understand the situation better 
 
 than anybody else. He was on the watch the first night 
 
 and phantom torpedo boats were around him in countless 
 
 numbers. To use his own language : "I was on the bridge 
 
 during the entire night, and if I saw one torpedo boat I saw 
 
 a thousand. Every breaking sea was to my imagination a 
 
 torpedo boat." An interesting chapter is devoted to the 
 
 movement of the fleet upon San Juan, but as it was without 
 
 special result, there is nothing in it that need be quoted here 
 
 to give completeness to the sailor's yam. 
 
 .- .- ±r , ML ^ We now come to the most inter- 
 
 Eyans Forgetful About ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^ ^^^ ^^^j^^l 
 
 Schley. Evans' story. On the eighteenth of 
 
 May he was signaled by Commander-in-Chief Sampson to 
 proceed to Cienfuegos and report to Commodore Schley, and 
 on Sunday, May 22, he stopped the "Iowa" two hundred 
 yards astern of the "Brooklyn" off Cienfuegos. On the 
 night of May 23, he says, it was reported to him "that there 
 
21 
 
 were three white lights in line on shore, which I knew was 
 a signal from the insurgents that they wished to communi- 
 cate." He adds that he took it for granted that Commodore 
 Schley understood the signal, but he seems to have forgotten 
 to signal Commodore Schley the fact that the lights were 
 discovered and what they meant. He is forgetful also of the 
 fact, well known to him at the time he wrote the chapter, 
 that Admiral Sampson did not give Commodore Schley, 
 the insurgents' signals when Schley was started hur- 
 riedly off to Cienfuegosi, and it was not until Captain 
 McCalla arrived the next day on the "Marblehead" and 
 delivered to Commodore Schley the insurgents' signals that 
 Schley was enabled to ascertain definitely whether the 
 Spanish fleet was in Cienfuegos. 
 
 . - . . n ■ ■ Considering Captain Evans' gen- 
 
 '^ ^ ' eral appreciation of the fact, that 
 
 from his own standpoint he was always better advised than 
 anybody else about him, it is surprising that he did not 
 inform Commodore Schley of a signal that he understood, 
 and was the only man in the fleet who did understand it, 
 assuming that his story is not purely imaginary. He did 
 not communicate the signal to his commander, although 
 nearly a full day elapsed after he knew of it until the signal 
 was recognized, and then only after Captain McCalla had 
 arrived, charged with the duty, among others, of giving it 
 to Schley. Rear Admiral Evans is forgetful also of the fact 
 that a letter written by Rear Admiral Sampson to Commo- 
 dore Schley on the twentieth of May specially charged hith 
 with the duty of ascertaining definitely whether the Spanish 
 squadron was in Cienfuegos, and gave it as his deliberate 
 opinion that it would naturally seek Cienfuegos or Havana 
 to receive and deliver supplies. 
 
 When Commodore Schley ascertained definitely, as he was 
 instructed, that the Spanish fleet was not in Cienfuegos, he 
 immediately sailed for Santiago in obedience to orders. On 
 
22 
 
 the twenty-sixth of May Schley's flying squadron reached 
 Santiago, and the only information Captain Evans has to 
 give is that, so far as he knew, no attempt was made to deter- 
 mine whether the fleet was in the harbor or not. Captain 
 Evans, of course, knew that the Spanish fleet was in San- 
 tiago, and seems to have been the only, man who did know it, 
 but he forgot to mention it to any of his fellow officers or 
 to suggest it to his superior officer. Possessing as he did 
 the exclusive information of the location of the Spanish fleet, 
 he affects great surprise that Commodore Schley left San- 
 tiago, and after proceeding for some distance westward the 
 squadron was stopped for some time, and then had to go 
 back in the direction of Santiago. This is all the informa- 
 tion that Evans gives about the movement of Commodore 
 Schley from Santiago westward, and as he was present and 
 knew the facts, his memory is strangely at fault in not pre- 
 senting at least some measure of the truth. 
 ™, _ , . He knew that Commodore Schley 
 
 ^ ^ left Santiago because he had been 
 for more than twenty-four hours in 
 a heavy gale that made it impossible for him to coal his 
 vessels at sea, and he knew also that the collier, a miserable 
 old hulk that Sampson afterward selected to sink in San- 
 tiago harbor, became disordered in her machinery, and it was 
 most unwise to remain on blockade when the squadron could 
 not be coaled. He knew also that it was a very difficult 
 matter, as the fleet was then provided, to coal a vessel at sea 
 even in a calm, and Rear Admiral Sampson gave his testi- 
 mony to the difficulty of coaling his fleet at sea when he 
 ordered the "Massachusetts," the twin sister of the 
 "Oregon," to leave the line of blockade at two o'clock in the 
 morning of the naval battle to go to Guantanamo to be 
 coaled, thus taking from the battle one of our most powerful 
 battleships. In his description of the movement he has not 
 a kind or even a respectful word for his commander, and 
 
23 
 
 concludes his story by recalling the fate of Admiral Byng, 
 that might have been repeated in the fate of Commodore 
 Schley had Cervera's fleet escaped "while we were tinkering 
 at the machinery of a collier." The suppression of all im- 
 portant facts relating to this movement spoils the beautiful 
 imagery of Rear Admiral Evans, and the chapter is one of 
 the very few stale products of his pen. 
 
 Rear Admiral Evans next reports the discovery of the 
 "Cristobal Colon" in Santiago, and his fertile and latitudin- 
 ous imaginaltion locates the Spanish war vessel outside of the 
 harbor under the protection of the forts with her fires hauled 
 and entirely helpless. In this, as in many other statements 
 made by Rear Admiral Evans, there is a very decided differ- 
 ence of views, he being on one side and pretty much all 
 others who have information on the subject being on the 
 other side. He represents the "Colon" as in front of the 
 Punto Gorda battery, and to use his own language, "she lay 
 helpless and at our mercy." He describes the movement on 
 the thirty-first of May, when the "Massachusetts," "New 
 Orleans" and "Iowa" were ordered to fire upon the "Colon," 
 and complains of the distance Commodore Schley required 
 him to maintain from the Spanish batteries. It may be that 
 Evans had not instructed Secretary Long to give the order 
 to the commanders of our fleets not to expose war vessels to 
 the fire of the Spanish forts. It is the only logical way to 
 account for his failure to give that explanation of the signal 
 "do not go in any closer," when, according to his account, 
 he proposed to rush in with the "Iowa," demolish the Spanish 
 batteries, defy the torpedoes and sink the Spanish fleet him- 
 self. It is evident that Commodore Schley did nothing 
 right, either in the blockade or in the battle of Santiago, but 
 we are left in doubt as to whether Captain Evans gave him 
 the necessary information to make the best use of the squad- 
 ron. When Admiral Sampson came on the first of June 
 everything was lovely. The blockade was immediately made 
 
24 
 
 effective for several reasons, which Evans seems to overlook, 
 among which are a large increase of the fleet and the in- 
 creased facilities for suppUes. 
 
 Evans Refutes Himself . Rear Admiral Ev^s' descrip- 
 , - , tion of the battle of Santiago, in 
 
 as to Commander i • , i ^ i ^- ^ j • 
 
 f PI . which he took an active part during 
 
 ^® ■ the early stages, and in which it is 
 
 not questioned that he behaved heroically, conveys the im- 
 pression to the casual reader that that great battle, the grand- 
 est in the history of naval warfare, was fought chiefly by 
 Capain Evans, whose vessel was distanced when half the 
 Spanish fleet was destroyed, and by Rear Admiral Sampson, 
 who was never near enough to fire a gun even at long range 
 upon the enemy's vessels, and never near enough to one of his 
 own vessels to deliver a signal order to it when actually en- 
 gaged with the enemy. It is generally known that there 
 were others engaged in that battle, but the public must go 
 outside of Evans' story to ascertain the name of any other 
 officer who achieved distinction in that struggle. Early 
 in the morning Commander-in-Chief Sampson left the field 
 with his flagship to meet General Shafter, and he signaled 
 the fleet: "Disregard the movements of the commander-in- 
 chief." Any other officer of the navy than Rear Admiral 
 Evans would say frankly that such a signal from the com- 
 mander-in-chief devolved the positive and responsible com- 
 mand of the squadron upon the next senior officer, but there 
 is not a line or word in Evans' report of the Santiago battle 
 that refers to Schley as in command of the fleet. He quotes 
 the Sampson signal, but says it indicated merely that we 
 were to "close up somewhat so as to cover the interval caused 
 by her (the "New York's") absence, all of which was per- 
 fectly understood by the fleet." 
 
 It is evident that Evans changed his mind as to the mean- 
 ing of such an order from the commander-in-chief within a 
 very few months. In a previous chapter, telling of the 
 
25 
 
 blockade of Havana, he records the sudden movement of the 
 flagship "New York," to chase a prize ship that was reported 
 flying the signal : "Disregard movements of the commander- 
 in-chief." Evans was then second in rank, and his under- 
 standing of the order at that time is given in his own words : 
 "I, as next in rank to Sampson, hoisted the guide flag, and 
 as senior officer present held the fleet to its course, etc." He 
 claims, and doubtless with justice, that the "Iowa" was the 
 first to detect the coming of the Spanish fleet out of the 
 harbor. The men of his vessel must have been blind if they 
 did not see the movement of the enemy before any other 
 vessel, as the "Iowa" was in the centre of the semicircle of 
 the blockade, and the only vessel that was directly facing 
 the harbor and could see into it farther than any other. 
 P _ , When the Spanish came out it was 
 
 , ; only natural that Captain Evans, of 
 
 Spanish Fleet ^^^ battleship "Iowa," decided to sink 
 the whole fleet himself. His first purpose was to ram or 
 torpedo the Spanish flagship "Maria Teresa," but as his 
 vessel ran only about half as fast as the "Teresa" at the- 
 time, he logically gave up his heroic idea, but he went at her 
 hammer and tongs, swung off to port to give her a starboard 
 broadside, and then swung back quickly to hit across the 
 bows of the second ship, the "Viscaya." He whirled his 
 vessel around, at least in imagination, so that he could bring 
 all his guns to bear now on the "Teresa," again on the 
 "Viscaya," and then on the "Colon," but he found that all 
 passed him, and he then swung to port, gave the flying 
 "Viscaya" a parting broadside, and headed in to tackle the 
 "Oquenda." ■ In reporting his attack on the "Oquenda" after 
 he had practically destroyed all the other cruisers, he remem- 
 bers that the "Oquenda" was under the concentrated fire of 
 several of our ships, and he had very little more to do, as 
 "she rolled and staggered like a drunken thing, and finally 
 seemed to stop her engines." After he had given vital 
 
26 
 
 wounds to four Spanish cruisers he left the other vessels of 
 the fleet to clean up the crippled enemy, and he turned his 
 attention to the two Spanish torpedo boats. He says : "We 
 turned our rapid-fire guns and the after guns of the main bat- 
 tery on them, and at the same time other ships concentrated 
 on the little game cock." In a very few minutes he saw that 
 one of them was blown up, and only a few minutes later the 
 second shared the same fate. 
 
 It is a common belief that Commander Wainwright, of 
 the little steam yacht "Gloucester," destroyed the two Span- 
 ish torpedo boats by one of the most brilliant and heroic 
 movements of the entire battle, but it is quite probable that 
 Captain Evans could not see the little "Gloucester," and sup- 
 posed that he was doing the work that was done chiefly by 
 the "Gloucester," and he has evidently not read much of the 
 history of the battle. After he had thus more or less dis- 
 abled the four Spanish cruisers and destroyed the two Span- 
 ish torpedo boats, the fast vessels having passed beyond him 
 in pursuit of the "Colon," he tells us that "God and the 
 gunners had had their day." It was only natural that he con- 
 cluded that the battle was ended when "he ceased to have any 
 part in it. He says: "At this point the battle of Santiago 
 may be said to have terminated ; at any rate I took no further 
 part in it." 
 
 _ ,._ , ^ While the "Brooklyn" and "Ore- - 
 
 Evans Embarrassment „ • ix. «/- i » 
 
 gon were pursumg the Colon, 
 
 Over Phantom Battles. Captain Evans devoted his attention 
 to rescuing the wounded Spaniards, and he received on the 
 "Iowa" not only Admiral Cervera, but Captain Eulate, of 
 the "Viscaya," and several hundred Spanish unfortunates 
 who had been rescued from the water. He gives a most 
 romantic account of the reception he gave to the Spanish 
 officers, and of their generous appreciation of his courtesy. 
 About the time that he had the Spanish prisoners comfort- 
 ably settled on his ship he gives a highly original story of his 
 
27 
 
 embarrassing condition when felt compelled to start in pur- 
 suit of an enemy's battleship that was reported to be but a 
 little distance in the east. He tells that Captain Eaton; of 
 the "Resolute," passed him and signaled to him: "Enemy's 
 battleship to the eastward." Of course, that was just the 
 medicine for Captain Evans' complaint, but he did not know 
 how to go into action again with several hundred Spanish 
 prisoners on board. He stowed them away as safely as 
 possible, and, according to his own report, he started at full 
 speed to give battle to the new Spanish vessel. True, he 
 saw the "Indiana's" smokestacks as she lay at her station 
 off Santiago quite near to where the new Spanish battleship 
 was reported, but when he reminded Captain Cotton, of the 
 "Harvard," that if there was a Spanish ship there the "In- 
 diana" would certainly know it, he received the answer, as 
 he reports it: "Bob, he has fooled Taylor. Don't let him 
 fool you." 
 
 Of course. Captain Evans could not be fooled into letting 
 the Spanish battleship get away, and he sailed for her, given 
 orders to open fire at S,ooo yards; but just when he was 
 about to train his guns on the vessel, the signal came from 
 her mast that she was an Austrian. Thus Captain Evans 
 was deprived of the opportunity to add another Spanish 
 vessel to what he had already destroyed in a single day. 
 
 When it is remembered that Captain Evans made no men- 
 tion whatever of his chase after the Spanish vessel in his 
 official report of his movements on the third of July, and 
 when in addition it is remembered that Commodore Schley 
 in his report of the same action tells of the order received 
 from Admiral Sampson to take the "Oregon" with the 
 "Brooklyn" and look up this Spaniard, and that he did so, 
 and was about to open fire on her when she signaled that she 
 was an Austrian battleship, it may be accepted as an open 
 question whether Captain Evans did not in some way tangle 
 himself up with Commodore Schley in this chase after the 
 
28 
 
 Spanish man-of-war. As he destroy e_d about all of the 
 other vessels of the Spanish fleet, it is natural that he should 
 feel that he must have had some hand in trying to find an- 
 other one, but the record evidence on one side, and the for- 
 g-etfulness of Captain Evans to make any mention of so im- 
 portant a movement in his official report, would seem to make 
 his story a mere phantom pursuit of what proved to be a 
 phantom Spanish battleship. 
 
 Munchausen only once in his life confessed that he had 
 foimd his superior in his economy of truth, and he com- 
 plained bitterly that his distinction in his vocation had been 
 impaired by the only one in all the world who had ventured 
 to dispute his crown, but Robley D. Evans had not then been 
 born. 
 
Edgar Stanton Maclay's Maliciously 
 Untruthful Story of Santiago. 
 
 The history of the American Navy must ever be quite as 
 inspiring, as instructive to every American citizen interested 
 in the progress of the Republic. Our navy, Uke our army, 
 has attained the highest possible achievements in every con- 
 flict we have ever had with a foreign power, beginning with 
 our feeble, Improvised war vessels during the Revolution. 
 In the second war with England our naval victories made 
 the triumphs of the army pale, and during the civil war, 
 that began with our few ships scattered to the four winds of 
 the earth, a navy was speedily created so formidable as to 
 astonish the world, and the victories of Farragut and Porter 
 and others stand out among the great achievements of naval 
 history. The climax of naval achievement, however, was 
 reserved for the Spanish war, when, in the naval battles of 
 Manila and Santiago every Spanish vessel was destroyed 
 with the loss of but a single life and without serious injury 
 to any of our war ships. Thus in two naval conflicts Spain 
 was effaced from the list of naval powers, and our victories 
 stand out in the annals of history as the most wonderful 
 achievements of the world's naval warfare. 
 
 We have before us the third volume of "The History of 
 the United States Navy from 1775 to 1901," by Edgar Stan- 
 ton Maclay, presented in a new and enlarged edition, hand- 
 
 (29) 
 
30 
 
 somely illustrated and beautifully printed by D. Appleton & 
 Co., New York. It is a very full, and should be a very com- 
 plete, history of the navy in the Spanish war. The author 
 has already published a "History of American Privateers and 
 Reminiscences of the Old Navy," besides editing the 
 "Journal" of Senator William Maclay, of Pennsylvania. He 
 seems to have been a careful student of the old-time history 
 of the navy of the country, that is now presented with the 
 jealousies and passions which so often deform history at the 
 time of great achievements, consigned to oblivion, and his 
 record of our wars with England and of our civil war ap- 
 pears to have been presented entirely without prejudice. 
 But the cloister student is seldom equipped to ascertain the 
 truth of history in the midst of the fierce resentments which 
 achievement ever creates, and when Mr. Maclay came to deal 
 with the recent Spanish war he mingled a most violent 
 partisanship with his lurid rhetoric, and has stamped dis- 
 credit upon his entire work. 
 
 ... L, n lA- Two qualities are indispensable to 
 
 Indispensable Qualities , j , ,,. , . ^ t- -^ ^i 
 t sL u- r • ^ standard public history. First, the 
 
 of the Historian. historian must clearly demonstrate 
 his freedom from prejudice or partisan interest, and his 
 ability to hold the scales of justice in even balance, when 
 confronted by the violent disputes of jostling ambition. 
 Second, he must be scrupulously truthful, and especially 
 must he be truthful when he attempts to crown heroes with 
 laurels or to deprive heroes of claimed triumphs. In both 
 of these essential attributes Mr. Maclay has failed in his 
 presentation of the history of the Spanish war. He does 
 full justice to Admiral Dewey, as none dispute his eminent 
 achievement, but in his story of naval movements in the West 
 Indies, resulting in the destruction of Cervera's fleet, he is 
 not only violently partisan, but goes beyond most of the 
 common defamers of Rear Admiral Schley in his eifort to 
 degrade him and transfer the laurels of Schley to Sampson. 
 
31 
 
 If Mr. Maclay's history of the Spanish war in the West 
 Indies is true Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, who com- 
 manded the Flying Squadron and was in active command 
 of the fleet, by reason of the absence of Rear Admiral Samp- 
 son when the naval battle of Santiago was fought, was an 
 incompetent, a coward and a liar, while Sampson is entitled 
 to be ranked as one of the greatest of American naval heroes. 
 j-L A fL • Let us ask Author Maclay to take 
 
 „ ,. . , „ ,. a deliberate look at his defamatory 
 
 Mahcously Partisan, references to Admiral Schley. In his 
 chapter of contents (page 15) we have the following: 
 "Schley's slow progress toward Santiago; his vacillating 
 course before that port; fictitious lack of coal; a golden 
 opportunity lost." Again (page 16) referring to the San- 
 tiago battle, we have "Schley's humiliating retreat." In 
 his chapter on the preliminary movements of the fleet (page 
 291) he charges Commodore Schley with an indifference to 
 the important duty of ascertaining whether Cervera's fleet 
 was in Cienfuegos, and declares that Schley could easily 
 have reached the shore regardless of the heavy sea if he had 
 been "really anxious" to perform his duty. In the same 
 chapter (page 293) he speaks of the "lack of decision and 
 enterprise which were so apparent in Schley's failure to 
 promptly ascertain whether or not Cervera's squadron was in 
 Cienfuegos." Again (page 296), he declares that Schley 
 "in his report about the coal supply of the vessels under his 
 command exhibited either a timidity amounting to absolute 
 cowardice, or prevarication of facts that were intrinsically 
 falsehoods." Again (page 297), he says: "As to Schley's 
 timidity regarding the possibility of the ships coaling at sea, 
 the facts of the case are that on the two following days the 
 squadron coaled from the "Merrimac," omitting the im- 
 portant fact, testified to by all the officers of the fleet, that a 
 gale of unusual severity had prevailed, but that he was en- 
 abled to coal two days later because the storm had abated. 
 
32 
 
 Again (page 298), Schley "turned in catiff flight from the 
 danger spot toward which duty, honor and the whole Ameri- 
 can people were most earnestly urging him. Viewed in 
 whatever light it may be, the foregoing dispatch cannot be 
 characterized otherwise than as being without exception the 
 most humiliating, cowardly and lamentable report ever 
 penned by an American naval ofificer." Again (page 301), 
 he implies cowardice on the part of Schley because in his first 
 bombardment at Santiago he remained practically out of 
 range of the forts, and instructed Lieutenant Sharp, of the 
 "Vixen" : "Don't expose your vessel ; she is vulnerable, and 
 your guns can do no harm to the enemy at the range we shall 
 use," in which he simply repeated his positive orders from 
 the Navy Department.* Again (page 303), he imputes 
 cowardice to Schley by what he gives as a statement of Rear 
 Admiral Sampson to the author as follows: "We (Samp- 
 son) recognized the 'Colon' at daybreak and immediately 
 started in to investigate the meaning of the remarkable cir- 
 cumstance of an enemy's vessel, practically unsupported, 
 • lying in plain view of an American squadron of superior 
 strength, which was stationed far to the southwestward of 
 the harbor. Before we could get within range the 'Colon' 
 fired a defiance gun and did not appear again until July 3." 
 St ri' ri P i ^^ Rear Admiral Sampson sent 
 
 If f such a statement to the author his 
 
 memory is strangely defective or he 
 has deliberately stated what is untrue. According to his 
 own olficial account he arrived in front pf the "Cristobal 
 Colon," then visible at the mouth of the harbor, at six o'clock 
 in the morning, and the log of the "Colon" shows, as pub- 
 lished by our own Navy Department, that at 10.35 the 
 
 * Do not risk so crippling your vessels against fortifications as to prevent from 
 soon thereafter successfully fighting the Spanish fleet if they shall appear on our 
 side. — Official order from Navy Department. 
 
 The orders of the Department were not to risk needlessly the loss of a vessel 
 until Cervera was disposed of. — Sampson in Century article. 
 
33 
 
 "Colon" "got under way, and under direction of the com- 
 manding officer cast to starboard and under a slow speed 
 passed between Punto Gorda and the bow of the 'Oquendo.' " 
 The bombardment of Schley is described on the same page 
 as follows: "This timid, nervous attack on Cervera's ships 
 was the more disappointing when we remember the elaborate 
 and brave preparations Schley had made to get at the enemy 
 in earnest," and again (page 304), he refers to the blockade 
 as "Schley's farcical blockade," and adds that it cannot be 
 "described otherwise than a wilful disobedience of orders." 
 Again (page 364-65), he imputes to Schley cowardice in 
 turning the "Brooklyn," and a falsehood in explaining it, 
 declaring that Schley's first given excuse, as he presents it, 
 is untrue, and that the "second excuse is even more unmanly 
 than the first." 
 
 We give these statements of the author's studied purpose 
 to defame Commodore Schley in the Santiago action so that 
 the author may see them grouped together in cold type, and 
 study them in connection with the fact that he scrupulously 
 avoids presenting in his history of the -battle that Commo- 
 dore Schley was in actual command of the fleet from start 
 to^'finish of the conflict, and that his flagship, the "Brooklyn," 
 was nearest the enemy when the first gun was fired and until 
 the last Spanish flag was struck. Throughout the whole 
 chapter of Santiago, from the first to the last paragraph, 
 there is not an honest presentation of any creditable act per- 
 formed by Commodore Schley. Every truth, however well 
 known to the government and to the world, that could award 
 honor to Schley is either absolutely omitted or maliciously 
 perverted, and there has not been a defamatory utterance 
 about Schley from the meanest of his persecutors and the 
 most disreputable of his newspaper assailants that the author 
 does not attempt to crystallize into history by accepting it as 
 true. This feature of the work clearly shows that the author 
 was so blinded by prejudice as to niake him wholly incapable 
 
34 
 
 of judging the truth, or that he is for some reason the bitter 
 personal enemy of Schley, and seeks to crucify him by em- 
 balming him in history as an incompetent, a coward and a 
 falsifier. Such prejudice exhibited on every page of the 
 story of Santiago must make every fair-minded citizen reject 
 Mr. Maclay's history of the Spanish war, not only as utterly 
 unworthy of credit, but as worthy only of the contempt and 
 execration of every patriotic citizen. 
 
 Next let us test the truthfulness 
 Recklessly ^^ ^j. Maclay's story of the San- 
 
 Untputhful. ^jagQ ija^^.Ig -phis volume has only 
 
 been issued a few months, and the author had access to all 
 the records of the government, and to the testimony of all 
 who could present the truth in relation to the grandest naval 
 victory of the world. In regard to the search for Cervera's 
 fleet at Cienfuegos it is needless in this review to rehash the 
 many conflicting statements which have been presented. 
 Sampson gave Schley the best reason for believing that the 
 destination of Cervera's fleet would be Cienfuegos or Ha- 
 vana, and Schley was specially charged to be positive as to 
 the presence or absence of the Spanish at Cienfuegos while 
 Sampson guarded Havana. This is shown by Samp- 
 son's letter of May 20 to Schley (suppressed by Samp- 
 son) telling him that while the Navy Department inclined 
 to direct the fleets to Santiago he (Sampson) had decided 
 "to make no change in the present plan — "that is, to make 
 an exhaustive search at Cienfuegos. Referring to Schley's 
 return to Santiago the author says: "He occupied nearly 
 forty-eight hours in the run, which could easily have been 
 accomplished, in spite of rain and rough weather, in half 
 the time," a statement that every naval officer knows to be 
 unwarranted unless Schley had left his fleet and gone alone 
 with the "Brooklyn," as his fleet could not proceed any faster 
 than it did because of the coaling vessel and others of slow 
 speed. His next statement is that when Schley reached San- 
 
35 
 
 tiago he stationed his squadron about twenty-two miles 
 to the southward, and persists in the assertion that the block- 
 ade never was in range of the guns of the enemy in day time, 
 and that it retired twenty-five miles south at night. If this 
 statement is true then the logs of the vessels of Schley's fleet 
 are strangely false. The logs of the "Texas," the "Massa- 
 chusetts," the "Iowa," and' the "Marblehead" all state that 
 the vessels steamed off the harbor from day to day at a dis- 
 tance of from four to six miles, and the log of Captain Evans' 
 vessel, the "Iowa," is more specific than most of the others, 
 telling how his vessel, along with the fleet, was near the har- 
 bor day and night. Taking the author's account of Commo- 
 dore Schley's movements in blockading Santiago, the reader 
 could come to no other conclusion than that Schley was 
 utterly incompetent or utterly cowardly, and that he either 
 had no conception of his duty or had not the courage to per- 
 form it. Fortunately for Schley, the logs of his squadron 
 tell the true story and refute the defamatory statements of 
 the historian. 
 
 There could be no more conclusive evidence that Schley 
 performed his duty in his preliminary movements from Cien- 
 fuegos to Santiago with reasonable fidelity than is furnished 
 in the fact that neither the Navy Department nor Rear 
 Admiral Sampson, Commander-in-Chief, nor the President 
 at the time called him to account to question his courage or 
 capacity. If Schley was guilty of a tithe of what is charged 
 to him by the author of this work, it would have been criminal 
 on the part of the Commander-in-Chief not to remove him 
 from command, and alike criminal for the Navy Department 
 not to summon him to answer for inefficiency or incompe- 
 tency before a Court of Inquiry ; but at the most crucial per- 
 iod of the war Schley was uncensured by either, left as second 
 in command of the fleet, and his record uncriticised by official 
 sources until after he had fought the great battle of the war, 
 destroying the Spanish fleet, and had fairly won the highest 
 
36 
 
 honors that the country could award him. To assume that 
 he was guilty of incompetency, cowardice or falsehood is 
 a direct reflection upon the intelligence or integrity of the 
 President of the United States, of the Secretary of the Navy 
 and of Rear Admiral Sampson for permitting such a man to 
 hold a most important command, and one that, as it hap- 
 pened, made him commander of the fleet when the great 
 battle was fought. 
 
 'MX- We now come to the important 
 
 Sampsons Actions ^^^.^^^ ^^ ^^ Santiago campaign 
 
 Reviewed. ^frhen Rear Admiral Sampson ap- 
 
 peared on the scene with both squadrons under his immediate 
 command, thereby more -than doubling, and probably treb- 
 ling, the power of the Spanish fleet. The author says (page 
 325) : "With the true instincts of the strategist, Sampson 
 realized, as soon as he had secured Cervera in the harbor of 
 Santiago, that a naval engagement of decisive moment must 
 occur off that point before the crucial blow of the war could 
 be given." Sampson arrived at Santiago at six o'clock on 
 the morning of June i, and, according to the author, he 
 was greeted by "a shot from a vessel (the 'Colon') lying in 
 tmdisturbed possession of the harbor entrance." In what . 
 purports to be a statement from Sampson to the author of 
 the work, Sampson states that when he saw the "Colon" 
 at daybreak he "immediately started in to investigate the 
 meaning of the remarkable circumstance of an enemy's ves- 
 sel, practically unsupported, lying in plain view of an Ameri- 
 can squadron of superior strength." The Spanish vessel 
 (the "Colon") that thus fired upon Admiral Sampson at six 
 o'clock in the morning, when he first arrived at Santiago 
 with his squadron, remained just where it was when it fired 
 upon him for four hours and thirty-five minutes after his ar- 
 rival, as it is officially shown that the "Colon" did not move 
 until 10.35 of that morning. What would a commander pos- 
 sessing "the true instincts of a strategist" have done when 
 
37 
 
 fired upon by an "unsupported" vessel of the enemy when he 
 had two squadrons united which could have destroyed the 
 "Colon" in a few minutes ? The general impression would be 
 that Sampson, instead of going to inquire of Schley why he 
 did not destroy the "Colon," would have immediately sum- 
 moned his fleet into action ; but he did not fire a gun, not did 
 he order an attack to be made. All he seems to have done, 
 according to Mr. Maclay's chapter on Santiago, was to run 
 away from a single Spanish vessel to scold Schley for not 
 destroying it. And when Sampson did get his fleet together 
 for a council of war, after he had allowed the "Colon" to go 
 back into the harbor, what did the instincts of the strategist 
 dictate? Did he propose to engage the enemy? On the 
 contrary, his first suggestion and final command was to close 
 the entrance to the harbor so that he could not get in to fight 
 the Spanish fleet, and that the Spanish fleet could not get out 
 to fight him. Sampson alone was responsible for the effort 
 to dose the harbor of Santiago, and thus make a conflict 
 between the two fleets impossible; and it was fortunate for 
 the country, and for the combined squadrons commanded by 
 Sampson that his effort to sink the "Merrimac" in the harbor 
 was a total failure. Up to that point the only success he 
 seems to have achieved was to make a failure in what he re- 
 garded as his most important strategic movement. 
 
 After completing his arrangements for sinking the "Mer- 
 rimac" in the harbor he arbitrarily removed Captain Miller, 
 a gallant officer in the line of command, who made his protest 
 in tears, and when the "Merrimac" was about ready for the 
 movement and sailed out to Sampson's flagship for final 
 orders, Hobson, in his Century article, tells how "the true 
 instincts of the strategist" ' developed in Sampson. Just 
 then a craft was discovered far out in the waters, apparently 
 standing toward the harbor, and the prospect of a prize made 
 the commanding strategist forget the important movement 
 to be made in the harbor, as he hurried off with his flagship 
 
38 
 
 without ceremony to capture the supposed prize. Hobson 
 describes it most eloquently, saying that when he had put the 
 helm to starboard to steer up to the flagship, "Suddenly the 
 'New York' started up, her propeller race began to seethe 
 and she shot by us at full speed. We looked ahead, and on 
 the horizon, to the southeast, discovered a craft standing 
 toward the harbor. The craft stopped, turned about, and 
 took to her heels, and a chase was on. The quarry was fleet, 
 and had ten or twelve miles start. She drew hull down, and 
 then disappeared. The 'New York' stood straight on, 
 and gradually disappeared, and for a long time the two col- 
 umns of smoke told of hot pursuit." This was early in the 
 morning, and Hobson continues: "A scorching sun rose in 
 the cloudless sky; not a breath of air stirred; a blinding 
 glare came out of a glassy sea, and a day of waiting lay be- 
 fore us. We remained there until late in the afternoon." It 
 was not until four o'clock that the commanding strategist 
 got back to his squadron without a prize. 
 
 o I XA u- tri ± We now come to the battle of Tulv 
 
 Sampson Left His Fleet ^ r. , . r i i ■,' 
 
 fi . , . 3- It was a beautiful, clear, calm 
 
 (I c asse . Sunday morning, when any vessel of 
 
 the fleet could have coaled at sea. The first important event 
 of that fateful day was the movement of the "Massachu- 
 setts," the twin battleship of the "Oregon," and one of the two 
 most powerful vessels of the squadron, and the "Suwanee," 
 which shortly before dawn were ordered away to Guanta- 
 namo for coal. Both the Spanish army and the fleet were in 
 a position of extreme peril. It was reasonable for any com- 
 mander to assume that a naval conflict might be precipitated 
 any moment, and yet one of the most powerful vessels of the 
 squadron was sent away to a distant point for coal, when the 
 sea was calm, after Schley had been censured for not coaling 
 at sea in a terrible gale, and was thus lost to our fleet in the 
 struggle. The second important event of that day was the 
 movement of the "New York," at ten minutes before nine 
 
39 
 
 o'clock, when Sampson displayed the signal to the squadron : 
 "Disregard movements of Commander-in-Chief," and sailed 
 away from the blockade line toward Siboney, where he had 
 an appointment for a conference with General Shatter. It 
 was entirely proper for Sampson to go and confer with 
 Shafter, as Shatter was ill and could not come and confer 
 with him, but he committed an unpardonable error in taking 
 his flagship with him. He could have taken a steam launch, 
 or any of the small swifter crafts, and made the journey in 
 half the time, leaving his important ship in battle line. There 
 were but two vessels in the entire joint squadrons which, ac- 
 cording to their registration, were capable of running with 
 the four Spanish cruisers. They were the "New York," 
 Sampson's flagship, and the "Brooklyn," Schley's flagship. 
 Sampson thus took away one of the two vessels of his fleet 
 regarded as capable of making a successful running fight 
 with the Spanish squadron, and actually left his large squad- 
 ron outclassed for a running fight by the absence of the 
 "Massachusetts" and the "New York." The only possible 
 explanation of Sampson taking his flagship away from the 
 fleet, after having sent the "Massachusetts" away earlier in 
 the morning, is in the fact that he deemed it his duty to him- 
 self to sail away in state to meet Shafter, who would have 
 been compelled to journey for the conference in a mud wagon 
 or on a mule. Had Sampson gone in one of the small and 
 swifter vessels, or in a steam launch, he not only would have 
 left his important ship ready for the battle, but he could have 
 returned himself in time to participate in it. But for the fact 
 that the "Oregon" developed unexpected speed, because of 
 the superb management of its machinery and men by Cap- 
 tain Clark in its voyage from San Francisco, the "Colon" 
 would certainly have escaped, and possibly the "Viscaya." 
 
 _ , .. , It is not doubted that Admiral 
 
 Sampson s Moral o ■ r i. 
 
 /^ Sampson is one of our most ac- 
 
 oowaraice. complished naval officers, and had he 
 
 possessed the courage to be entirely just, alike to himself 
 
40 
 
 and to his fellow-officers in the battle of Santiago, he would 
 to-day he one of the most beloved and respected of our heroic 
 men; but he positively effaced himself from the affections 
 and trust of the country and of the world by his moral cow- 
 ardice in two vital matters. He has by every possible method, 
 short of stating the tmtruth in positive terms, sought to con- 
 vey the impression to the public and the world that he was in 
 the action at Santiago. In point of fact the "New York" 
 had disappeared from view of the fleet when the Spanish 
 vessels came out, and while he promptly turned his vessel 
 in obedience to the thunders of the battle, and exhausted 
 her powers to get into the conflict, it is a fact that at no time 
 during the action was he within signal distance of any vessel 
 of his fleet then actually engaged with the enemy. His 
 signal when he departed from the fleet placed Commodore 
 Schley in actual command, and had there been any misdirec- 
 tion of the vessels in action, or a disaster suffered, Commo- 
 dore Schley would have been held responsible, not only ac- 
 cording to the laws regulating the navy, but he would have 
 been held responsible in the considerate judgment of the 
 world. 
 
 If Sampson had exhibited the moral courage and manli- 
 ness of Admiral Sir John Jervis after the battle of St. Vin- 
 cent, who recognized Nelson, a subordinate, as the hero of 
 the battle, and frankly stated that while absent on the line 
 of duty Commodore Schley had fought the Spanish squadron 
 and destroyed it, he would have been honored as the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief, and would be greeted with the huzzahs of 
 the people wherever he appeared. Jervis took Nelson in 
 his arms and welcomed him with tears as the hero of ,St. 
 Vincent, but Sampson has studiedly sought, without direct 
 assertion, to create the impression that he was present in the 
 battle, that it was fought in accordance with his commands, 
 and that he is entitled to the full honor for the victory. His 
 bombastic report of the battle, claiming the credit as entirely 
 
41 
 
 due to himself, stands in our naval records as a blistering re- 
 proach to Rear Admiral Sampson. In one other particular 
 he was guilty of moral cowardice in its most repulsive fea- 
 tures, as it involved an attack upon a brother officer by 
 stealth. Only a week after the battle of Santiago Sampson 
 wrote a confidential letter to the Secretary of the Navy, in 
 which he suggests promotion for the men who had been con- 
 spicuous in the action. There was not only no word of com- 
 mendation for Commodore Schley in that communication, 
 but he refers to Schley's "reprehensible conduct," while con- 
 fessing that he could not separate it "from his subsequent 
 conduct," referring to his action in the battle. At that time 
 and for weeks thereafter Sampson and Schley met with ap- 
 parently the most cordial relations, and not an intimation 
 was given by Sampson that he had by confidential communi- 
 cation, made a grave accusation against the Commodore. It 
 is the law of the navy that any officer making accusations 
 to the department against a fellow-officer must, at the time 
 of transmitting such charges, furnish the accused party with 
 a copy of the complaint made against him ; and certainly the 
 relations which Sampson professed to maintain toward 
 Schley made him bound not only by common courtesy and 
 decency, but by the laws of the navy, to have communicated 
 to Schley the reproach he had cast upon him. 
 i *h ' r I w "^^^ fidelity of the author of this 
 
 ' work to truth in presenting the story 
 of the Battle. ^f ^^^ ^^^^^^ ^f Santiago is very 
 
 clearly illustrated by his reference to the action of the differ- 
 ent vessels. He seems to have adopted the story of Captain 
 Evans' persistent self-glorification. He tells how Evans first 
 saw the enemy coming out of the harbor, forgetting to state 
 that as Evans was stationed in a direct line south of the 
 mouth of the harbor, he was in a position to see any vessel 
 moving in the harbor before it would be visible to any other 
 of our ships ; and then Evans fired the first gun. After firing 
 
42 
 
 the first gun Evans gave battle to the "Teresa," then to the 
 "Oquendo," next to the "Viscaya," and the intelligent reader 
 would naturally assume from the author's story that Evans 
 and the "Iowa" were the chief factors in destroying the 
 Spanish fleet, although it was one of the first of our war 
 vessels that was distanced in the race. We next have a 
 detailed account of the heroic services rendered by the 
 "Texas," and we are also told how the "Indiana" and the 
 "Oregon" were in the hottest of the fight, but the only refer- 
 ence made to the "Brooklyn" is an elaborate attempt to ex- 
 plain why the "Brooklyn" was struck more than all the other 
 ships combined without having been specially exposed in the 
 action. A historian, to give the story of the greatest naval 
 achievement of the world, and give in detail the action of 
 every important vessel but the flagship that was in the front 
 of the battle and closest to the enemy from beginning to end, 
 would generally be held as lacking the ordinary intelligence 
 that would require history to be at least plausible There is 
 not a single creditable reference to Schley or the "Brooklyn" 
 in the whole story of the battle. On the contrary, he is 
 charged with cowardice and incompetency, and lest the au- 
 thor might be misunderstood, he states distinctly that it was 
 the "Oregon" and not the "Brooklyn" that captured the 
 "Colon." It would be worse than grotesque to claim that 
 such a story can be accepted as approximating the truth of 
 history. 
 
 _ „ In the description of the chase after 
 
 - it """P^"" ° the "Colon" (page 369) that was 
 
 ,n the Chase of the ^^^^ ^^j^j^ ^^^^^^^ "Brooklyn" and 
 "Co/on. tjjg "Oregon," the former always be- 
 
 ing closest to the enemy, the author persists in presenting the 
 "Texas" and the "New York" as being in the chase. • He 
 says: "Speeding after her (the 'Colon') were the 'Brook- 
 lyn' and 'Oregon,' while the 'Texas,' with the 'New York' 
 farther behind, was rapidly coming up. These four ships 
 
43 
 
 now settled down to a determined cHase." The point of this 
 false statement is in the effort of the author to connect 
 Sampson and the flagship "New York" with the chase of the 
 "Colon." He again refers to this chase (page 370), saying: 
 "The four American ships presented a magnificent spectacle 
 as they raced through the sea along the coast of Cuba under 
 the cloudless sky." In fact, the flagship "New York" was 
 never in sight of the "Colon" or of the "Brooklyn" during 
 the entire chase. It is possible that the smoke from her 
 stack might have been visible, but the vessel was not, and 
 Admiral Sampson was no more in the chase after the 
 "Colon" than was the "Massachusetts" that was off at Guan- 
 tanamo for coal. It is worthy of note that neither the author 
 in his entire story of Santiago, nor Admiral Sampson in any 
 report or statement he has ever made, gives the time at which 
 the "New York" arrived at the captured "Colon." The last 
 Spanish vessel struck her flag at 1.15 p. m., and precisely 
 one hour and eight minutes later the "New York" arrived. 
 If Captain Chadwick's statement of the speed of seventeen 
 knots is correct, the "New York" was over twenty-two miles 
 distant when the "Colon" was captured. It is evident that 
 Chadwick's statement to prove his efficiency as a captain in 
 handling his vessel is not precisely correct ; but, giving the 
 "New York" a speed of anywhere from thirteen to fifteen 
 knots, she was at a distance that would make her visible only 
 by the smoke from her stacks. Thus, instead of command- 
 ing in the battle, as the story of the author would leave the 
 intelligent reader to infer, the story of Sampson participat- 
 ing in the chase of the "Colon" was simply an awkwardly 
 invented fiction to give Sampson the appearance of having 
 been in actual command of his fleet. 
 
 , But the climax of unpardonable 
 
 Author s Climax jgnorance or of the deliberate per- 
 
 of Ma/ieiotta Falsehood, version of the truth of history is 
 
 given by the author (page 363), in describing the turning 
 
44 
 
 of the "Brooklyn" when it was in danger of being rammed by 
 the "Maria Teresa," and also of blanketing the fire of one or 
 more of the vessels of our own fleet. We quote the full text 
 of this statement as follows : 
 
 Observing that this ship, the "Infante Maria Teresa" was making 
 in his direction, Schley ordered the helm aport, all the other large 
 American vessels having put their helms to starboard. 
 
 "You mean starboard, sir," the navigator of the "Brooklyn" ven- 
 tured to inquire. 
 
 "No, port," was Schle/s rejoinder. 
 
 "But that will carry us into the 'Texas,' " said the oflScer. 
 
 "Let the 'Texas' take care of herself," was the heartless reply, 
 and the shameful spectacle of an American warship supported by a 
 force superior to the enemy's — a warship whose commander had 
 expended such vast quantities of ammunition in target practice in 
 the presence of a fashionable hotel at Hampton Roads, in order to 
 meet a worthy foe — deliberately turning tail and running away 
 was presented. 
 
 There is no excuse for an author, assuming to present 
 the story of the naval battle of Santiago, reprinting and at- 
 tempting to crystallize into history a falsehood that could be 
 corrected by every captain of the fleet engaged at Santiago. 
 The incident of the turning of the "Brooklyn" has many 
 times been published substantially as the author of this work 
 presents it, charging cowardice upon Commodore Schley, but 
 the falsehood has been so clearly answered that for many 
 months past even the most violent defamers of Admiral 
 Schley have refrained from repeating it. They know not 
 only that it is untrue, but that it has been absolutely proved 
 to be untrue, and in the presence of every captain in that en- 
 gagement. If the author, as he states in his introduction, 
 submitted his statements to the naval officers he names, 
 among whom are the captains engaged at Santiago, it is not 
 possible that all of them could have passed over this state- 
 
45 
 
 ment, knowing as they all do that it is a deliberate falsehood, 
 invented in malice to detract from Schley the honors he so 
 nobly won when he was actual commander in the most suc- 
 cessful naval battle of the world's history. 
 
 Commodore Schley gave no order for the turning of the 
 "Brooklyn," and no such conversation was had. The order 
 for the "Brooklyn" to turn was given by Captain Cook, with 
 the knowledge and approval of Commodore Schley. Cook 
 was in the conning tower, where he could instantly handle 
 the vessel, and Schley was on the open bridge from start to 
 finish of the battle. On this point we are not speaking 
 without the most conclusive evidence of the correctness of 
 what we say. For a year or more this alleged order by 
 Commodore Schley and alleged conversation with him on 
 the bridge of the "Brooklyn" have been eliminated from the 
 many malicious scandals which have been invented by less 
 successful naval officers to advance themselves and impair 
 the triumph of Schley, and they were eliminated because 
 the precise truth was finally brought out at a conference be- 
 tween the captains who commanded in that action and Presi- 
 dent McKinley held in the White House. During that con- 
 versation the President inquired of Captain Cook who had 
 given the order for the "Brooklyn" to make the turn, to 
 which Captain Cook promptly responded that he had issued 
 the order, and that he was prepared to submit to. the con- 
 siderate judgment of the naval authorities of the country and 
 the world for its justification. This statement was made in 
 the presence of Captain Evans, the Munchausen of Schley de- 
 famation and Evans glorification, and it was also made in 
 the presence of Captain Chadwick, of Admiral Sampson's 
 flagship, who, according to his own account, was not only 
 in the battle of Santiago, although never in sight of the 
 enemy's ships until they were destroyed, but also directed 
 the movements of the army in effecting the surrender of the 
 Spanish general and his command. 
 
46 
 
 Not one of these captains questioned or criticised the 
 movement of the "Brooklyn" in the presence of the captains 
 and the President, and from that time until now the malicious 
 falsehood about Schley's order and the conversation on the 
 bridge of his ship has not appeared in any reputable news- 
 paper, and we have not seen it in print for many months until 
 it is revamped by the author of this work. , Any naval officer 
 would know that no such conversation could have been had 
 in the heat of action when the commander had given a per- 
 emptory order, and the wisdom of the movement was fully 
 vindicated by the great service the "Brooklyn" rendered in 
 the destruction of the fleet. On a recent social occasion the 
 writer hereof heard one of the captains engaged in that 
 battle, and who rendered heroic service, say that there was 
 one criticism that could be made of Commodore Schley's 
 handling of the "Brooklyn" in that action, and that was 
 that he was not justified in exposing the "Brooklyn" as he did 
 to the broadside fire of the enemy when it was the only vessel 
 in the squadron that could be relied upon in a racing fight 
 with the Spanish ships. If there was any element of doubt 
 from our American standpoint as to the wisdom of turning 
 the "Brooklyn" it is certainly removed by the concurrent 
 testimony of the Spanish officers, including Cervera and his 
 captains, whose reports clearly prove that the aim of the 
 fleet was first to destroy the "Brooklyn" by ramming, if pos- 
 sible, and thus enable the fleet to escape. 
 
 Apart from the question of whether the "Brooklyn" was 
 properly or improperly turned at the time, the importance 
 of criticising this book as a history of our navy is in the fact 
 that the author has given in detail the scandal that had died 
 because abandoned by those who were malicious enough 
 ever to use it, andpresentedit as an historical fact, when every 
 captain of the fleet heard from Captain Cook himself, in the 
 presence of the President, that the order was given by him 
 and not by Commodore Schley, although entirely approved 
 
47 
 
 by Schley and in perfect accord with the purpose they both 
 had in view when they started into the action. This resur- 
 rection of the most malicious and practically abandoned 
 falsehood when the sources for correction were within easy 
 reach of the author stamps his whole work as unrdiable, and 
 must efface it from the standard or even respected histories 
 of the American navy. 
 
 Soon after the Spanish war the writer hereof interrogated 
 Commodore Schley as to the turning of the "Brooklyn," and 
 he promptly answered that he had not given any order at 
 all, although it was what he would have done within a very 
 few moments if Captain Cook had not done it. He issued 
 no order and had no conversation with any of his subalterns 
 relating to it. When asked why he had not stated the facts, 
 his answer was that if he did so it would be claimed by his 
 enemies that he was trying to evade the responsibility of 
 turning the "Brooklyn," and that he could well afford to wait 
 until the truth would come out in some conclusive way. 
 Captain Cook was also silent, for the reason that had he 
 spoken to the public it would have been regarded as an 
 apology for the act and an attempt to relieve Commodore 
 Schley ; but when all the captains were face to face with each 
 other, and with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and 
 Navy, Captain Cook told the truth, and no one then or there- 
 after in Captain Cook's presence dared to dispute it. 
 
 As the author assumes and at- 
 Haml Records tempts to maintain that the turning of 
 
 Vindicate Schley. ^y^^ "Brooklyn" was an act of cow- 
 ardice on the part of Schley — an accusation that has never 
 been made or intimated by any officer of the navy engaged 
 in the action — it is well to turn to the testimony of the enemy. 
 In the "Naval Appendix" (page 558), we find an article 
 from Admiral Cervera, who commanded the Spanish fleet, 
 and who was in the "Maria Teresa" as his flagship 
 and led the Spanish fleet in coming out of the harbor. 
 
48 
 
 He says in his report that is accepted as authentic 
 by our own government: "The 'Maria Teresa' steered 
 toward the 'Brooklyn,' which was at the right of the 
 entrance to the bay, and which was the vessel most 
 dreaded on account of her speed." In his official report 
 of the battle to Captain General Blanco, also published as 
 ofScial by the Navy Department (War Notes No. 7 of Navy 
 Department, page 123) Admiral Cervera says: "As soon as 
 the 'Teresa' went out at 9.35, she opened fire upon the nearest 
 hostile ship, but shaping her course direct for the 'Brook- 
 lyn' ; for it was of the greatest importance to us to place this 
 ship in a condition where she could not make use of her 
 superior speed." In his testimony before the Spanish court- 
 martial Admiral Cervera said : "The only individual and the 
 only ship of which I had the least fear was Admiral Schley 
 and the 'Brooklyn'; but for -his skillful maneuvering my 
 squadron would have escaped." Captain Concas, who com- 
 manded the flagship "Maria Teresa" and was chief of staff to 
 Admiral Cervera, in his account of the battle, also printed by 
 the Navy Department (War Notes No. 8, page 68), says: 
 "Supposing, therefore, that the 'Brooklyn' was at her usual 
 station when we came out, the 'Maria Teresa' was to engage 
 her in battle, endeavoring to ram her, and while the rest of 
 the enemy's squadron were grappling with the flagship the 
 other ships headed by the 'Viscaya,' without delay to 
 succor the 'Teresa,' were to pass in column between her and 
 the coast and endeavor to escape." On page 74 of the same 
 statement Captain Concas says: "In compliance with the 
 order received, I put our bow towards the cruiser 'Brooklyn,' 
 which, putting to starboard, presented her stern to us and 
 fired her two after turret guns, moving to the southward." 
 Such is the testimony of the Spanish officers who came in 
 immediate contact with the "Brooklyn," showing that they 
 started out under orders to destroy the "Brooklyn" and that 
 the destruction of that vessel was averted by the rapid turn 
 
49 
 
 by which she maintained her fire from her after turret guns, 
 
 ji XL a X X J I It is worthy of note also that Mr. 
 
 Author Refuted by -mt , , u- l ■ ^u i i 
 
 /i*A u- * • Maclay s history is the only work 
 
 Other Histories. making any pretence to character or 
 respectability that makes the accusation of cowardice against 
 Commander Schley. There have been many histories of the 
 Santiago battle written, and a number from pens unfriendly 
 to Schley, but not one that we can recall has ventured to 
 reproduce the malicious falsehood about Schley's alleged 
 order and conversation in turning the "Brooklyn," or im- 
 putes cowardice tb him in the remotest degree. In "The 
 Story of the War of 1898," a carefully written and admir- 
 ably illustrated history by W. Nephew King, a lieutenant in 
 the United States Navy, and which has the endorsement of 
 Rear Admiral Evans to the extent of writing the naval 
 preface for the work, the movement of the "Brooklyn" is 
 thus presented : 
 
 At this time the "Brooklyn" was about a mile away from the 
 "Maria Teresa" and heading bows on for her. She was thus exposed 
 to the fire of the "Teresa," "Viscaya," and "Colon," and to avoid plac- 
 ing herself within the ramming circle and exposing her starboard 
 broadside to the enemy, ported her helm and executed a loop, after 
 which she steered a course parallel to that of the Spanish vessels. This 
 maneuver, which in the heat of the action was criticised by some, 
 proved to be a masterly movement. Had she put her helm to 
 starboard and turned to the northward and westward, as was first 
 intended, not only would she have run the risk of being rammed, but 
 of being torpedoed as well, for at that time it was not known where 
 the torpedo boats were, and it was but fair to suppose that they 
 would be found on the unengaged side of the Spanish vessels, where 
 they should have been ready to dash out under cover of the smoke. 
 
 This chapter of Mr. Maclay's elaborate work is in itself 
 sufficient to discredit it as a standard history with every in- 
 telligent and fair-minded citizen, and when the impartial 
 
50 
 
 historian comes to write the story of this greatest achieve- 
 ment in the history of naval warfare, after the mean jeal- 
 ousies and inflamed passions of the present shall have 
 perished, Mr. Maclay's work will be remembered only as 
 one of the most violent of partisan productions evolved 
 from the studied efforts of the Navy Department and of 
 ambitious and dependent naval officers to falsify history by 
 destroying the hero of Santiago and transferring his laurels 
 to one who claims them, without having fired a gun in the 
 action, or given an order to one of his vessels when actually 
 engaged with the enemy. 
 
 Let us contrast the relative atti- 
 Sampson and Schley ^^^^^ ^f Admirals Sampson and 
 Contrasted. S(.j^igy ^g ^^ey appear before the 
 
 country and the world in the controversy that has grown 
 out of the Santiago battle. We have shown that Sampson 
 has yet to give even the semblance of credit to his second 
 officer in command, who, by reason of Sampson's absence, 
 was compelled to assume the responsible command of the 
 fleet in the battle. In Sampson's report to the Govern- 
 ment he makes no reference to Schley, and studiedly con- 
 veys the impression that he (Sampson) was in immediate 
 command. Within a week after the battle Sampson wrote 
 a confidential letter to the Secretary, commending for pro- 
 motion all who had rendered distinguished service, and, 
 instead of naming Schley as among those who were entitled 
 to honors, he charged him in a cowardly and indefinite way 
 with "reprehensible conduct." In all the malignant assaults 
 which have been made upon Admiral Schley not a single 
 word in his defence has come from Admiral Sampson or 
 Captain Chadwick, of the "New York," although none 
 knew better than they that Schley and the "Brooklyn" were 
 first in the fight, and nearest to the enemy at every stage until 
 the last Spanish vessel struck her flag, and that the only 
 man killed in the action stood beside Schley on the bridge 
 
51 
 
 of the "Brooklyn." His attitude toward Schley in public 
 and private was that of malignant enmity, and it is an open 
 secret that when Admiral Sampson was urged to bring the 
 North Atlantic fleet to this city for the Grand Army Na- 
 tional Encampment, the name of Admiral Schley had to be 
 effaced from the list of invited guests, lest such an invita- 
 tion might deprive the occasion of the presence of the fleet. 
 Even in the hour of victory, when the heart of the com- 
 mander of the fleet should have been overflowing with 
 gratitude, and Schley had signaled Sampson as soon as 
 the "New York" arrived within signaling distance, the 
 complete victory, saying that there was glory enough for all, 
 the curt and frigid response of Sampson was: "Report 
 your casualties." 
 
 And how has Admiral Schley borne himself in this ter- 
 rible ordeal of organized defamation, that has been sustained 
 largely by official sanction? He has never yet uttered a 
 single word of criticism or reproach upon any fellow- 
 officer. He has publicly and privately refused to discuss 
 the falsehoods of his malignant accusers, and he has relied 
 upon the truth of history and the intelligent judgment of the 
 American people to do him justice. In his official report of 
 the Santiago battle, made to Sampson three days after the 
 fight, he generously says : "I congratulate you most sincerely 
 on this great victory to the squadron under your command, 
 and I am glad that I had the opportunity to contribute in the 
 least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us." In his 
 letter to the Senate, called out by the official action of that 
 body, Schley said : "As to the battle of Santiago and the de- 
 struction of Cervera's fleet, I have nothing to say here ; the 
 facts of that contest speak for themselves." When the 
 brave men of the "Brooklyn" cheered Schley to the echo, 
 when the capture of the "Colon" was announced, his only 
 response was that the victory was due to the gallant "men 
 behind the guns." Instead of claiming the credit for the 
 
52 
 
 capture of the "Colon," because he was in command of the 
 vessels which captured it, he generously and justly signaled 
 to Captain Clark, who had rendered such potential service : 
 "Well done, 'Oregon' ; thanks for your splendid assistance." 
 In no utterance that he has made in public or private has he 
 ever claimed any special credit for the victory of Santiago, 
 and he has been silent under a floodtide of defamation such 
 as has never surged against any great hero of the past. 
 r-L o LI ni L -^ incident exhibiting this feature 
 
 The Schley-Clark ^^ ^^^^ Admiral Schley's character 
 Incident came tmder the immediate notice of 
 
 the writer of this article. A considerable amount of Spanish 
 coin was taken from the simken "Colon" by the government, 
 and it was purchased by a prominent banker of Washington 
 for the purpose of making it a tribute to Commodore Schley. 
 A few gentlemen in Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore and 
 Washington were advised of the purpose, and promptly con- 
 tributed the money to purchase the silver, and representatives 
 of the contributors met at Washington to confer as to the 
 proper form the tribute should take. Schley was invited to 
 be present, when he was first advised of the purchase of the 
 silver and the purpose to which it was to be applied. He 
 was greatly affected by the generous action of the contribu- 
 tors, but while profoundly grateful to them for their action, 
 he said, substantially : "1 could not in justice to myself and 
 to the navy accept a silver service to be made out of the coin 
 taken from the 'Colon' without having it divided with 
 Captain Clark, of the 'Oregon,' without whose aid the 
 'Colon' would not have been captured." The amount of 
 silver was quite ample to make a double very handsome 
 service of silver, and it was at once decided that Schley's 
 request would be complied with. The writer was charged 
 with communicating the fact to Captain Clark, and on the 
 following day had a conference with Captain Clark on the 
 subject. It is needless for us to give any details of that 
 
53 
 
 conversation, as Captain Qark wrote a letter to Admiral 
 Schley expressing his views on the subject, and permitted 
 the writer to take a copy of it. As it criticises no one we 
 take the Hberty of publishing it in this connection without 
 the knowledge of either Schley or Clark, as follows : 
 
 Navy Yard, League Island, Pa., November 13, 1899. 
 
 Rear Admiral Winfield S. Schley, U. S. N., 
 
 Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 
 
 My Dear Admiral: — ^Last night I was shown an artide in The 
 Philadelphia Times, in which it is stated that you suggested that 
 I should be honored in the same way that you will be by the con- 
 tributors who wish to present you with a set of silver made from the 
 Spanish coins found on board the "Cristobal Colon." 
 
 I am not surprised that the first thought of the man who said 
 "there is glory enough for all" should have been "there is enough for 
 two," especially as you knew that the glorious four hours of the 
 third of July were only the nearest and best of those that make up 
 the many years of our friendship. But as the contribution was made 
 solely for you, and as no thought of me entered into the minds of 
 any of the contributors, I cannot permit your suggestion to be carried 
 out, although I understand it was unanimously accepted and heartily 
 applauded by those who heard it. Please express to them the grati- 
 tude I feel, for I am truly appreciative of the honor they would 
 confer; indeed, they have greatly honored me already, and I could 
 not accept anything more. I know I am imposing a hard duty upon 
 you, but the contributors should, of course, be informed as soon as 
 possible, and I have to depend upon you to reach them and to explain 
 to them why I could not avail myself of their generous intention and 
 desire. 
 
 But it will be easier for you to do that than for me to thank yon 
 for your more than considerate act. I am deeply affected by it, for 
 it calls to mind the signals "Well done, 'Oregon,' thanks for your 
 splendid assistance," and "Welcome back, irave 'Oregon,' " made by 
 the man who led the stormers over the Southern rampart at 
 
54 
 
 Chemulpo,* where victory alone could save from death and perhaps 
 torture. With kindest regards, I am, dear Admiral, 
 
 Sincerely your friend, 
 
 C. E. Clark. 
 
 On the very same day that Admiral Sampson sent his 
 cowardly letter to the department, charging Schley with 
 "reprehensible conduct," Commodore Schley, without the 
 knowledge of Sampson, cabled to the Navy Department: 
 "Feel some mortification that the newspaper accounts of 
 July 6 have attributed victory on July 3 almost entirely to 
 me. Victory was secured by the force under Commander- 
 in-Chief of North Atlantic Squadron, and to him the honor 
 is due. ... I do not doubt for a moment that full 
 and proper credit will be given all persons and all ships in 
 the official report of the combat." Again, on the twenty- 
 third of July, in a letter addressed to Lieutenaiit-Com- 
 mander Parker, speaking of Sampson, he said : "The victory 
 was so unique in completeness, so marvelous in its glory as 
 to be large enough for all to participate. I feel no wish 
 to exclude any one, and if I had announced the victory I 
 should carefully have noted all whose prominence of action 
 had helped it. I think that omission was a mistake. It has 
 caused some thoughtless expression, and I hope no friend 
 of mine will keep this matter alive while the facts, coldly 
 recited, are sufficient." 
 
 _ , , , ., , It is a painful duty to declare 
 
 Rebuke from the Army . 4.1, iJ -i t,i 
 
 ■'to the world upon unassailable evi- 
 and Navy Organ. ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^ pretentious history of the 
 
 United States Navy is not only utterly unworthy of credit, 
 but deserves the severest criticism as a violently partisan, 
 defamatory and untruthful presentation of one of the most 
 important victories of the American navy. If we stood alone 
 
 * Chemulpo was where Schley led the charge in capturingthe Korean forts on 
 the Salee River, afte;- two days fighting, in June, 1871. 
 
55 
 
 in thus condemning this work as false and malicious there 
 might be some question as to the justice of our criticism; 
 but when it is remembered that this work stands single and 
 alone among the reputable histories of the war in charging 
 Admiral Schley with incompetency, cowardice or false- 
 hood, and that The Army and Navy Journal, the recognized 
 organ of both army and navy, whose columns have uniformly 
 exhibited the warmest friendship for Admiral Sampson, de- 
 nounced Mr. Maclay's third volume as unworthy of respect 
 and unfitted to occupy a position in the library of the Naval 
 Academy, the author can hardly fail to appreciate the fact 
 that he has committed a blunder that is worse than a crime. 
 The Army and Navy Journal, of July 13, 1901, has a leading 
 editorial on Mr. Maclay's third volume of the "History of 
 the Navy," from which we quote the following : 
 
 We believe that the two early volumes of Maclay's history have 
 been adopted for the instruction of the cadets at the Naval Academy. 
 If this third is added at Annapolis with the sanction of the Navy 
 Departmeiit, will not the cadets when they read it ask themselves 
 what punishment was bestowed upon this naval officer who will thus 
 be charged by the department, by indirection at least, with being a 
 coward and a liar, and with turning his back upon the enemy in the 
 crisis of a great naval battle? 
 
 Turning to the records of the Navy Department, they wjll find 
 that not one word of official censure was bestowed upon this recreant 
 officer; that on the contrary he received the same recognition and 
 reward as those concerning whose conduct no question has been 
 raised — ^that is, commendation in orders and promotion by numbers. 
 
 As for Mr. Maclay, his volume is so infused with the spirit of 
 bitter prejudice and partisanship as to be totally unworthy of the 
 name of history. In the account of the operations at Santiago more 
 space is devoted to Schley than to any other commander, but it is ir 
 an attempt to make out a case against him in such a spirit of disin- 
 genuous unfairness as to disgust the fair-minded reader; as, for 
 instance, when the Spanish reports are quoted and the fact is sup- 
 pressed that they show how the attack of the Spanish squadron was 
 
56 
 
 so concentrated on the armorless "Brooklyn" as to necessitate a line 
 of action on the part of her commander differing from that of the 
 other captains. The reports of Cervera and his captains make it 
 perfectly apparent that Schley at least thwarted the main purpose of 
 their attack, which was to disable the "Brooklyn," so that they could 
 escape. 
 
 We are in no sense partisans of Admiral Schley, but we are in this, 
 as in all other matters, the friends of fair play and honest dealing, 
 and this civilian critic, in his zeal to serve his cause, has gone beyond 
 every fair judgment upon Schley, however severe that may be, and 
 incidentally has presented the severest possible arraignment of a 
 Navy Department which could permit honors to be bestowed upon 
 such an obvious liar and coward, as Maclay declares Schley to be. 
 
 Tk o I M I- Another very important fact that 
 
 T/ie People Make ^^ intelligent and impartial historian 
 History as to Heroes. ^^^^^ ^^^^ overlooked, and that 
 speaks trumpet tongued against the criticism of Schley 
 by Mr. Maclay, is the pronounced action taken on the 
 issue by a Republican Senate and a Republican House 
 during the last two Congresses. Both Houses of each 
 Congress were in political accord with the Administra- 
 tion, and the power of the Administration was exhausted 
 to assure the promotion of Sampson over Schley, but 
 neither Senate nor House would permit it to be accom- 
 plished. When the nominations of Sampson and Schley 
 were first before the Senate for promotion that made Samp- 
 son the senior, the Senate not only refused to give the con- 
 firmation, but demanded of the Secretary of the Navy a 
 statement from Schley that had been suppressed (also sup- 
 pressed by the author), and after its presentation to the 
 Senate and the public the Senate was nearly or quite two to 
 one against Sampson and against the policy of the Adminis- 
 tration. The fact that the Republican Senate and the Re- 
 publican House of two Congresses defiantly maintained the 
 position that Sampson did not merit, and could not be 
 
57 
 
 given, promotion over Schley is one of which an honest his- 
 torian would not only take note, but which should make him 
 take pause in assailing the judgment of the leading statesmen 
 of the country, who have the best opportunity of knowing 
 the truth, and who had every political persuasion to support 
 Sampson. And another unmistakable judgment on the issue 
 is that of the American people. They cannot be deceived as 
 to a hero. They may be deceived by demagogues in politics, 
 but the man who fights the battle is always known to them, 
 and the man who does not fight the battle, but claims 
 credit for what others have done, is ever despised by them. 
 Wherever Schley has gone since the battle of Santiago the 
 hearts of the people have leaped up in spontaneous and most 
 enthusiastic welcome, while Sampson can appear on any 
 public occasion without commanding a cheer from the hearts 
 of the people. 
 
 It is plainly the duty of the Navy Department to forbid the 
 official recognition to Maclay's third volume, giving the 
 history of the Spanish war, that has been already and per- 
 haps justly awarded to his earlier volumes, when he was 
 not called upon to deal with the disputed problems of the 
 day. It is not a history; it is simply a compilation of 
 defamation that reflects with equal injustice upon the hero 
 of the great naval battle of Santiago, and upon every officer 
 of the general government responsibly connected with the 
 movements of our fleets. 
 
ADBMNDA. 
 
 Since the foregoing articles were published. Rear Admiral 
 Schley has written the Navy Department asking for a court 
 of inquiry. It was promptly granted, and Admiral Dewey 
 and Rear Admirals Benham and Howison, both retired 
 before the Spanish war, have been assigned as the court with 
 the Judge Advocate of the Navy assigned to direct the trial. 
 An attempt was made by the malignant naval coterie of 
 Washington to have a Judge Advocate assigned to conduct 
 the trial who was with Sampson at Santiago and is now 
 serving with Sampson at the Boston Navy Yard, but public 
 sentiment promptly forced a change in the programme. The 
 court as organized has every appearance of fairness to all 
 parties. 
 
 Several startling facts have been developed since the gen- 
 eral criticism of Mr. Maclay's third volume of his naval his- 
 tory. He first announced to the public, in justification of 
 his book, that proof sheets had been read and approved by 
 Secretary Long, Admiral Sampson and many other naval 
 officers. Secretary Long promptly contradicted the state- 
 ment of the author, and said that he had received the proofs 
 only of the chapters relating to the organization of the navy 
 and preliminary naval movements in the Spanish war. He 
 has also excluded the volume from the list of naval text- 
 books. Admiral Sampson was forced to confess that he had 
 read the proofs commending himself and criticising Schley 
 and returned them to the author with his approval, thus 
 making Rear Admiral Sampson as much responsible to the 
 public as Mr. Maclay himself for the malignant and false 
 criticism of Schley, 
 
 (59) 
 
6o 
 
 Another important developement appears in the fact that 
 Mr. Maclay has been inspired by high officials of the Navy 
 Department to write this false and malicious story of the 
 Santiago campaign, with the view of having it accepted at 
 the Naval School as a text-book of naval history. In fur- 
 therance of this purpose Mr. Maclay has been carried on the 
 pay roll of the Navy Department, at times as connected with 
 a lighthouse, and is now carried on the pay roll as a common 
 laborer, as some measure of compensation for the infamous 
 duty he accepted. He could not be appointed to any official 
 subordinate position in the navy, as that would make him 
 answerable to the navy authorities for his appearance on the 
 pay roll and drawing money for services he had not per- 
 formed. 
 
 Rear Admiral Schley has maintained his usual discretion 
 and refused to talk, but decided to act. It is intimated that 
 the scope of inquiry will not be restricted, and that a full 
 and complete presentation of the inner machinations of the 
 navy will be unfolded to the world. If the court shall fail 
 in that, it will become the duty of Congress to appoint a 
 committee to make a complete and fearless investigation of 
 the malignant despotism that has ruled the navy bureaus 
 for some years past, extending to a measure of terrorism 
 that has practically forbidden even social civilities to those 
 who are not in favor with the navy authorities. 
 

 
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