CforncU Mnitteraitg ffiihrarg Jltljaca, S^eui ^arh BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME OF THE JACOB H. SCHIFF ENDOWMENT FOR THE PROMOTION OF STUDIES IN HUMAN CIVILIZATION 1918 thi"- V ' Cornell University Library JN276 .B26 1910 Great and Greater Britain olin 3 1924 032 473 435 DATE DUE ^fllNTCO IN U.S.A. ^^^^s^mmm^**^" The original of tiiis book is in tine Cornell University Library. There are no known copyright restrictions in the United States on the use of the text. http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924032473435 GEBAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN WORKS BY J. ELLIS BARKER. Small demy 8to. 10s. 6d. net each. GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN : The Political, Naval, Military, Industrial, Financial, and Social Problems of the Motherland and Empire. Second and ENiiAHGED Edition. Shebwsbdey Ohboniolb.— ' Mr. Ellis Barker haa a clear and masterly compre- hension of the problems he has set himself to place before us. The book Is one the perusal of which cannot fail to inspire deep thoughtfulnesa.' ScoTSMAH.— 'A work so comprehensive must necessarily touch a multitude of points of controversy ; but few persons interested iuSts subject could read it without learning something and having their ideas cleared.' BRITISH SOCIALISM: An Examination of its Doctrines, Policy, Aims, and Practical Purposes. Academy.— 'We advise all who would know something of the real aims land proposals of British Socialists, all who wish to be in a position to difEereutiate true reform and progress from a policy thoroughly dangerous to the State, to read and digest one of the best books of reference on current Socialism which has so far been offered to the public. It has the merit of being eminently practical.' THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE NETHERLANDS. *«* Mr. Barker institutes a comparison between tJie Netherlands and England, and shows that the causes which led to the decadence of the one country are threatening the other, Mr. J. L. Gartin, in the Fortnightly Review, says : 'There is nothing in any language like it, and when all is said it remains one of the most striking additions recently made to the political library. . . . The work is a mine.' National Bevjew. — ' We only wish that every Member of Parliament could be compelled to read it.' MODERN GERMANY: Her Political and Economic Problems, her Policy, her Ambitions, and the Causes of her Success. Third and Enlarged Edition, completely Eevised and brought up-to-date. Mr. Ohablbs Lowe, in the Daily Ohhoniole. — ' This is one of the best books on Germany to which we have been treated for a long time. It should be read by everyone who is interested in the country.' Daily Teliigraph. — * Oannot fail to prove not only informative to the reader on the political and economic problems and foreign and domestic policy of Germany, but indispensable as a convenient reference book.' London : SMITH, ELDEE, & CO., 15 Waterloo Place, S.W. GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN THE PEOBLBMS OP MOTHBELAND AND EMPIEB POLITICAL, NAVAL, MILITABY, INDUSTBIAL FINANCIAL, SOCIAL SECOND AND TEBY GREATLY ENLARGED EDITION, COMPLETELY REVISED AND BROUGHT UP TO AUGUST 1910 BT J. ELLIS ^EKEE AUTHOK OF MODEEN GEKMANY' ' THE BISE AND DECLINE OP THE NETHEBLANDS ' 'BRITISH SOOIAI/ISM' EIO. LONDON SMITH, ELDBE, & CO., 15 WATEELOO PLACE, S.W. 1910 [All rights reserved] A,3?3iol TO The Bight Honourable JOSEPH OHAMBEELAIN, P.O., M.P. THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED PIIEFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION The present edition is ' very greatly enlarged, completely revised, and brought up to date,' as is stated on the title- page. The number of chapters has been increased from fifteen to twenty-three, and more than 200 pages of new matter have been added. In its present shape, ' Great and Greater Britain' may be considered as a new book, and I hope that its second edition will be as favourably received as the first edition has been. The pages added treat as exhaustively as may be, in Chapters XVI-XX, the British land problem in town and country and the re-creation of British agriculture ; the Irish problem is considered in Chapters XXI and XXII ; and the concluding chapter is devoted to the new foreign policy of Great Britain inaugurated by his late Majesty King Edward VII. The five chapters on British Agriculture and on Land Reform contain a mass of information which will not be found elsewhere, and they should be of use to all who are interested in the reform of the British land system — a measure which, politically and socially, must have the most far- reaching consequences. The British land problem is one of the greatest, one of the most urgent, and one of the most difficult problems of our time, and the chapters devoted to this problem not only embrace its various aspects, but also detail the Unionist land pohcy, which viii PREFACE may be summed up in the phrase, ' Every man his own landlord.' For my strenuous advocacy of a policy of national land reform on the basis of small ownership in town and country in the leading monthlies — especially in the Nineteenth Century and After — and in the daily press, I have been attacked by many politicians and journalists belonging to the Liberal Party. Mr. Lloyd-George, for instance, wrote in a signed article in the Nation of October 30, 1909 : ' Mr. Ellis Barker, who supplies the Tariff Reform Party with ideas, has foreseen that the British democracy are profoundly dissatisfied with the conditions Under which land is now owned and managed. He has therefore pressed upon his leaders — and has met with some measure of accept- ance — a scheme of State purchase. But the success of such a scheme must necessarily depend on the price paid for the land. If the extravagant prices which have hitherto accompanied every acquisition of land for public or industrial purposes are to rule in future, the peasant proprietary of Mr. Ellis Barker is doomed to a subsidised insolvency. The new State valuation must be the basis for all plans of com- munal purchase. On this basis, mUnicipahties ought to buy the land which is essential to the development of their towns. And the State could also buy up land necessary to the pohcy of re-creating rural life in Britain.' The last three phrases of Mr. Lloyd- George make clear the difference between his land policy and mine. His scheme of land reform is based on communal and national ownership ; mine is based on universal individual ownership. His scheme is supported by doctrinaires, dreamers, and street orators ; mine by the universal experience of mankind in all ages. Perusal of these pages wiU show that Mr. Lloyd- George and his friends have attacked me unjustly, and that they have misrepresented the policy which I have advocated. It will show that the pohcy ' every man his own landlord ' is a popular, democratic, and— if | Liberalism stands for PEBFACE ix individualism^ progress, and justice — a Liberal policy m the best sense of the word, which should be cordially welcomed by all true Liberals. As a matter of fact, it has been wel- comed by Liberals throughout the country, and I have received highly gratifying support from some of the most prominent members of the Liberal Party. The opponents, in the Liberal camp, to the pohcy of converting the British nation from a nation of tenants and lodgers into a nation of houseowners and landowners, are mostly men who, Hke Mr. Lloyd-rGeorge, desire to abohsh individual property in land and so make ' the community ' the universal landlord by means of confiscatory taxation. They are Liberals in name but Socialists in practice, who find it convenient to sail for the time being under the Liberal flag. Their aim is not reform but confiscation, and the introduction of the most gigantic spoils system, on the lines of Tammany Hall, which the world has seen. On July 3d, 1910, the Nation wrote : ' Nothing could better illustrate the superior electioneering aptitude of the Unionist Party than the way in which, finding that land reform of some sort is popular, they have seized upon the Liberal policy, modified it to suit the needs of the Tariff Keform League and the Property Defence League, and begun to attack its very authors themselves as if they were its enemies. " Land Reform and Tariff Reform " is becoming the party watchword in the country districts. Mr. ElUs Barker in the " Nineteenth Century " supplies the ideas ; Sir Gilbert Parker produces the necessary pamphlet ; Tory members introduce Bills and ask questions in Parliament, and have already begun, in the happy French phrase, /aire chanter Mr. Balfour. " Small holdings ? Of course. The Liberals make you pay for the freehold, and then hand it over to the County Council, leaving you as a mere tenant. We intend to give you the freehold outright. Free Traders rob you of your market ; we will shut out the foreigner and make yoa prosperous. Lloyd- George takes your money X PEEPACE in land taxes ; we will provide you with village banks and cheap loans." There is much to be said against this new Tory pohcy, which at every point bears the marks of its hasty origin. But, as an example of brazen and successful audacity, it would be difficult to find its parallel.' It is, of course, untrue that the Unionist land pohcy is merely an electioneering pohcy. On the other hand, it is true that the Liberal land nationalisers have discovered that whenever the people are asked whether they would hke to have ' the community ' for landlord or whether they would rather be their own landlords, they condemn the former and enthusiastically approve of the latter. That discovery has made the land nationahsers very angry. Some of my reviewers who oppose military training on principle, have found fault with Chapter VIII, ' Our Military Needs — a Plea for a National Army,' and have doubted my competence to deal with that subject. In reply to their criticism, I would say that that chapter is a reprint of a lecture which I delivered on February 27, 1907, to a very distinguished audience at the Royal United Service Institution. Field-Marshal Lord Eoberts was in the chair, and he said at its conclusion : ' I much doubt if any more useful and instructive lecture has ever been delivered in this room. It is rare indeed to find anyoneable to approach a subject of such vast importance with such a store of historical knowledge as the lecturer. To-day we have heard from Mr. ElUs Barker how national armies have been raised and organised in the past. Without a single exception, we find that where armies were truly national, they were raised on the principle of personal service to the country. But wherever and whenever the sordid craving for material prosperity and for selfish enjoyments of an over-civilised society have led to the abandonment of personal service and the adoption of service by proxy, there we may see the decay of the national spirit, which has been the invariable prelude to the national downfall. But Mr. PREFACE xi Ellis Barker has not contented himself with proving to us, by the impregnable testimony of history, the superiority of national over non-national armies, and the downfall which has ever followed the conversion of the former into the latter, he has also shown the reasons of the superiority of national armies. These Ue mainly in the number that a nation can place in the field, and in the moral, mental, and physical qualities which a national army alone can secure. It is no mere academic question, no subject for dilettante discussion, but in very truth the most important matter that can engage the attention of the British people at the present time. For on its solution depends not only the future welfare of the country, physical, material, and industrial, but, as I pro- foundly believe, its very existence as a kingdom. We have heard much recently of the ideal of a nation in arms. But a nation in arms has no meaning unless it is founded on the nation itself, unless all classes are fully represented in it, and unless all are obliged to take their share in the common burden as the first and most sacred duty of citizenship. This, gentlemen, is the true lesson of Mr. Ellis Barker's admirable address. And in emphasising this true lesson, he has subjected the common arguments in favour of the voluntary system of recruitment to an analysis so searching and so destructive that I cannot imagine anyone studying this lecture without being conviaced that, in refusing to adopt the just, modern, and democratic system of personal miUtary training for national defence, the country is adher- ing to methods which are obsolete, to principles that are dis- credited by history and by the practice of all modern nations, and to a hne of action that can only lead to disaster in the first shock of war with a European Power, and thus to the downfall of this great Empire which it is our duty to maintain undiminished and untarnished, as we have received it from our forefathers.' A book entitled ' Great and Greater Britain — The Problems of Motherland and Empire,' cannot treat all CONTENTS CHAP. PAGE Preface ........ vii I. Greatness or Decay? — ^What will be Great Britain's Future? . . . . . 1 — 11. Naval Supremacy — Its Strategical Aspects and ITS Political and Financial Foundations . 24 - III. British Finances and Imperial Responsibilities . 42 IV. The Economy of Empire . . . . .63 V. Will the Colonies secede or become Partners IN THE Empire 1 — Why did England lose her American Colonies ? , . . . .87 VI. British Industry, Labour, Emigration and Poverty 110 VII. Unemployment ...... .135 VIII. Our Military Needs — A Plea for a National Army 159 IX. Physical Degeneration and the Influence of Military Training upon the National Physique 191 X. The Model Army of England .... 20'& XL The Collapse of France in 1870 and its Lesson to England ...... 243 XII. British Foreign Policy and the Balance of Power in Europe. ..... 279 XIII. Sea-Poweb and Continental War . . . 305 — XIV, Education and its Dangers .... 326 XV. Individualism or Patriotism ? — ^Thb Way to a New National Life ...... 347 XVI. British Agriculture — Its Decay and its Re- creation ...,.,. 370 XV xvi CONTENTS CHAT, PAGE XVII. The Rtjbal Land Problem and its Soltttion . 396 XVIII. Rtjkal Land Reform and Urban Congestion . 422 XIX. The Urban Land Problem and its Solution . 446 XX. Democratic or Socialist Land Reform ? . . 475 XXI. Ireland and Home Rule ..... 602 XXII. Ireland's Regeneration and the British Parties 529 XXIII. The New Foreign Policy of Great Britain and King Edward VII .561 Index ........ 575 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN CHAPTER I greatness or decay ? what will be great Britain's future ? All States are in perpetual war with all. For that which we call peace is no more than merely a name, whilst in reality Nature has set all com- munities in an unproclaimed but everlasting war against each other. — Plato, Be Legibus, Book I. It is a law of Nature common to all mankind, which no time shall annul or destroy, that those who have more strength and excellence shall bear rule over those who have less. — Dionysius of Halicaenasstts, i. 5. Many desire one and the same thing at once, which frequently they neither will nor can enjoy in common nor yet divide. Hence it follows that the desired objects must be given to the stronger, and who is the stronger can be known only by fighting. — Thomas Hobbes, De Corpore Politico, i. 5. Experience is the mother of wisdom. History is philo- sophy teaching by example. The laws of history are as immutable as are the laws of nature. If we wish to gauge the future of Great Britain we cannot rely on the theories and views of abstract thinkers, whatever may be their standing, but we must refei? to the past for information, and, guided by historical fact and analogy, we may venture upon a forecast based upon knowledge and experience. Great Britain, with her Colonies, is the greatest commer- cial and maritime State existing. Her greatness is bound up with her commercial and maritime pre-eminence, and dependent upon it. Great Britain, with her Colonies, possesses at present commercial and maritime supremacy, but she has not always possessed that supremacy. Nothing is permanent in this world excepting change. Great 2 GREAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN Britain may lose her power and her wealth. If we wish to understand the problems of Great Britain and to be able to foresee the difficulties and dangers of the future, and perhaps of the immediate future, we must inquire into the history of those States which at one time possessed commercial and maritime supremacy, and study the causes which led to their political and economic decline. Phoenicia is the oldest commercial and maritime State of which we have some knowledge. The Phcenicians were merchants and seafarers of the greatest ability, but they owed their commercial and maritime pre-eminence firstly and principally to the nature and geographical position of their country. Their territory was mountainous and poor, but it abounded in excellent ship timber. Nature had com- pelled the Phcenicians to seek their sustenance on the sea. It is noteworthy that Sidon signifies ' fishery.' The imple- ments used in fishing are said to have been invented in ancient Tyre. The maritime greatness of Phoenicia, as that of Athens, Venice, Genoa, Marseilles, Holland, England, was founded upon the fishing industry. The geographical position of Phoenicia was most favourable. Between the years 1000 and 500 e.g. the greatest civiHsed States were Assyria, Babylonia, Media, Persia, and Egypt. Phoenicia lay in the very centre of the then civilised world. Owing to their favourable geographical position it was natural that the Phoenicians embarked upon international trade, that they exchanged the productions of the countries surrounding them, that they founded trading estabUsh- ments in all the neighbouring States — ^in Nineveh and Memphis vast Phoenician settlements have been unearthed — and that they became exceedingly rich. The demand for men regulates the supply of men. The prosperity of Phoenicia caused a rapid increase of the population; an outlet for the surplus population had to be found, and, whilst extending their trade, the Phoenicians began to establish colonies everywhere on the Mediterranean, and GEEATNESS OR DECAY? 3 on the coasts of Africa and Asia. According to Strabo, they founded three hundred towns on the West African coast alone. Their trade embraced the civilised and the uncivihsed world. They worked silver, gold, and copper mines in Spain, and exploited the tin mines of Cornwall and the Scilly Islands. According to Herodotus, they doubled the Cape of Good Hope two thousand years before Vasco da Gama. Thus the Phoenicians became the pioneers of civilisation. Phoenician culture opened, civilised, and reformed the world. The Phoenicians brought from foreign countries not only their wares, but also their arts and handicrafts, and improved them greatly, so that they became the greatest manu- facturers in the world. Homer shows in his ' Iliad ' and ' Odyssey ' that in his time Phoenicia was the workshop of the world. She was celebrated throughout the universe for her beautiful textiles dyed in marvellous colours, for her wonderful metal and glass ware. Phoenician engineers and workmen built the Temple of Solomon and the Bridge of Xerxes. Phoenician shipping carried on the trade of the world, and the Phoenician navy ruled the sea. The Phoenicians were behoved by the ancients to have invented alphabetical writing and numerals, the arts of shipbuilding and navigation, the use of weights and measures and of money, and to have invented countless industrial arts. The Phoenicians were no doubt the Englishmen of antiquity. In course of time the Phoenician colonies grew up and embarked upon commerce and industry, competing with the mother country. The culture which the Phoenicians had spread led to the rise of new centres of civilisation on the coasts of Greece and of Italy, on the southern coast of Prance and Spain, and on the northern coast of Africa. New commercial and industrial communities arose and opened up the savage hinterland. Carthage, a colony of the Phoenicians, peopled, like the United States, by pohtical refugees, and situated in the centre of the Mediterranean, B 2 4 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN had a more favourable geographical situation for the general Mediterranean trade than had Phoenicia herself, and much Phoenician trade fell to Carthage. In the eastern part of the Mediterranean the towns of Greece, which had founded numerous colonies in Asia Minor, began to oust the Phoenicians from those markets which lay nearest to their own ports, and to monopolise the trade of Persia. According to the text-books of political economy, com- petition is the soul of business. Competition may be very desirable for the idle consumer whose only interest it is to buy cheaply, but the producer and the merchant wish to obtain a substantial profit on their wares. A nation can derive vast prosperity from its international commerce and from its export industries only if it has, through Nature's bounty or some other cause, practically a monopoly of trade. Free national competition leads, as a rule, to some arrange- ment among the competing interests, but free international competition brings profits down to the vanishing point. Therefore all the great commercial and industrial nations of the world could arrive at prosperity resulting from its export industries and international trade only by possessing virtually a monopoly, and the destruction of their trading monopoly meant to them the destruction of their greatness and power. Therefore those nations which depend for their existence on their foreign trade must be able to defend their commercial pre-eminence against all attacks, or they will perish. Carthage being peopled by men of Phoenician blood, Phoenicia could bear her competition with equanimity, but the competition of the Greeks, aliens to them in race and in civilisation, was unbearable. Apparently through the aggressiveness of the Greeks — the Greeks were professional pirates in the time of Homer — Phoenicia came into colUsion with her great rivals. It became a question whether Greeks or Phoenicians should possess supremacy on the sea and the trade and the wealth of the world, and arms only could decide that question. According to Herodotus, the cele- GREATNESS OR DECAY ? 5 brated attack of the Persians upon the Greeks was brought about by the Phoenicians. Phoenicia and Carthage attacked Greece and her colonies simultaneously in the east and in the centre of the Mediterranean. Whilst Greece was being attacked by land and sea by an enormous Perso-Phoenician force, the great Greek colonies in Sicily were attacked by a Phoenico-Carthaginian force commanded by Hamilcar, in which, according to Herodotus, 3,000 ships and 300,000 men were engaged. By a curious coincidence, this enormous force was defeated by Gelon at Himera on the very same day on which the Greeks under Themistocles totally defeated the Perso-Phoenician navy at Salamis. It is worth noting that the Phoenicians furnished the principal naval con- tingent at that great sea-battle. The Greek ships were bat few if compared with those of their enemy, but the Greeks had not yet become effeminate by luxury, self- indulgence, and vice, and superior bravery and seamanship gave them the victory. By war the Greeks acquired com- mercial and maritime supremacy in the eastern half of the Mediterranean, and by war they were to lose it. Through the spreading of civihsation the world had become so much enlarged, and the imperfect construction of ships made the progress of merchantmen so slow, that, after the decline of Phoenicia, the world had room for two great commercial and maritime nations. Carthage, situated in the very centre, between Greece and Spain, between Morocco and Asia Minor, became supreme in the trade of the Western Mediterranean and of the seas beyond ; whilst the Greeks, situated in the middle between the Greek colonies in Asia Minor and the Greek colonies in Italy, became supreme in the eastern half of that sea. The stony soil of Attica could not nourish the Athenians. Necessity made them fishers, seamen, and traders. The victory of Salamis gave them naval supremacy among the Greeks and barbarians, and practically the monopoly of trade in the eastern half of the Mediterranean, They 6 GEEAT AND GEEATBB BEITAIN became immensely wealthy, and Athens became the centre of a large colonial empire. The Greek islands and colonies became tributary to Athens. Athenian fleets and Athenian garrisons protected the Greek islands and colonies against their enemies, and these enriched with their contributions their mighty protectress. The Greeks considered Athens as the centre of the world's trade. Isocrates tells us : ' She made the Pyrseus, as it were, a common mart in the midst of all Greece, where there was such a variety of necessaries and merchandise that what was difficult to be found in small quantities in other places it was easy to find here in the greatest abundance,' According to Xenophon : ' The grandeur of Athens caused the produce of the whole earth to be sent to that town.' The artistic manufacture of Athens became celebrated throughout the antique world. At Athens was the High Court of Justice for the settlement of all legal disputes in the Greek colonies, the money market of the Greek Empire, and the University and Academy of Arts of the whole world. The world's wealth seemed to be centred in Athens. According to Demosthenes, Athens financed the whole Greek Archipelago. Athens began to live largely on foreign labour, on her capital invested abroad, and on the tribute which she received from the islands and colonies in return for protection given. The extreme prosperity of Athens turned the heads of her citizens, who began to beUeve that Athens was destined by Nature to be, and always to remain, the greatest and the richest commercial and in- dustrial State in the world; for the sober Xenophon informs us in all seriousness : ' The Athenians are the only nation among the Greeks and barbarians who can possess wealth ; for if other States are rich in timber for ship- building or in steel or brass or flax, where can they dispose of these unless they sell them to the rulers of the sea ? Our enemies are excluded from the use of the sea, and without labour we enjoy by means of the sea all the earth produces.' GREATNESS OR DECAY? 7 Pampered by fortune and misguided by their politicians, the Athenians became a nation of pleasure-loving idlers. Athens was a democracy, and ambitious politicians en- deavoured to obtain supporters and to rise to power by flattering, amusing, and bribing the masses. Sumptuous pubUc buildings for the entertainment of the masses were erected by the State ; theatrical performances, after having been gratuitous, became a source of income to the citizens, who received a remuneration for the time spent in enjoying themselves. Honorary appointments were converted into salaried ones, and these were so enormously increased that a large portion of the populace received bribes in the form of salaries. Official positions were distributed by lot. Citizens were paid even for attendance at the assembly of the people. According to Aristotle, twenty thousand citizens lived on the contributions paid by the allied and subject States. Gratis distributions of corn and other food for gaining popularity and votes were common. Thus Athens was corrupted, and became filled with idlers whose only aim in life it was to live well without work and to be amused, who did not know the word 'duty,' and who claimed the privilege of idleness and ease as a right, but who objected to work, to paying taxes, and to serving their country in war. Foreigners took the place of Athenians in the army and fleet, and the contributions of the tributaries had to be greatly increased in order to feed and amuse the clamorous idlers of Athens, who subsisted on foreign com, agriculture being neglected. The Crimea supplied Athens with grain, and garrisons at the Dardanelles ensured the regularity of the food supply. According to Demos- thenes, Athens imported more grain than any other nation. Athens was the corn market of the world. Nowhere in the world was bread cheaper than in Athens. Sparta, the great mihtary land Power, became jealous of the wealth of Athens, and began to look with contempt upon the Athenians who refused to fight for their country. 8 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN The Spartans thought that Athens ill deserved her prosperity, and resolved to capture it by war. The terrible Pelopon- nesian war was, according to Thucydides, caused chiefly by Sparta's commercial jealousy. Political intrigues and divisions, the necessity to pursue a popular though unwise policy, the self-indulgence of the citizens, and their reUance rather on tlfeic^ wealth than on their weapons, caused the defeat of Atl>and of emigrants, the^rowing poverty of the classes is appig,rent fromti^ "^t onljS*^® ™ *^® consump- tion of wine and ^(Bf^(|^j^ tjie North S8J° *^^ declining value of house prop>..|^Qj, ^^^^ g^g ^pv.rm^ ^e impoverish- ment of the middle-clwb.^^gg QQj^,een from the constantly growing difficulties of local ^^^ iCHties in collecting the rates. Summonses for failure to pay^he rates are issued by the thousaar 1. In one of the London suburbs alone more than 11,000 of these summonses were recently issued. The impoverishment of Great Britain is great and undoubted. It affects all classes, from the richest to the poorest. It can be seen by all but those who will not see. As Germany is our greatest and our most dangerous industrial and political competitor, it is worth our while to compare British wealth with German wealth. Most Englishmen assume that Great Britain is a much richer 54 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN country than Germany, but I think that that assumption is erroneous. Great Britain was no doubt by far the richer country, but inherited wealth diminishes and disappears gradually, and counts comparatively for little. All solid wealth must be based on production, and man-power is more important than machine-power. It stands to reason that 63,000,000 well-employed Germans produce considerably more wealth than 44,000,000 ill-employed Englishmen. The German Ministry of Finance stated in its investiga- tion of the financial position of various countries of 1908 : ' Those who say that Great Britain and Prance are wealthier countries than Germany consider as still existing a state of affairs which prevailed in the past but which scarcely exists in the present.' Herr Steinmann-Bucher, in his recent book on the national wealth of various countries, wrote : ' Formerly we were taught that Great Britain's national wealth amounted to "£12j500,000,000, and ours to £10,000,000,000. At present Great -Britain's national wealth comes to £15,000,000,000, and oil^s to £17,500,000,000/ There is every reason to believe that Germany is considerablvricher than Great Britain, and Herr Steinmann-Bj;)^^ allow -miniates, in pay 'opinion, the difference in fav .actually deer easing. -r^^. ^^ ^^lat Germany ir^tch^^^ha-n^MaW ^^^I'^g^ fcankiigiy disquieting, for the longest purse can P^^f"^'. ^.«*ngest fleet. During the last fifteen yi^^ Jritish national expenditure has grown very greatly, and Tfe following table shows the direction in which its growth h/s been most pronounced : — Total British On On Expenditure. Army and Navy. OiTil Serrioe. 1893-4 . . £99,220,068 £33,327,475 £25,051,465 1910-11 . . £171,857,000 £68,364,000 £42,686,000 During the last seventeen years our population has increased only by about 10 per cent., but our national expenditure has grown during the same time by more than 70 per cent. IMPEEIAL FINANCES 55 The growth of expenditure was particularly marked on the Army and Navy, which has grown by 105 per cent., and on the Civil Service, which includes part of our expenditure on education, which has grown by 70 per cent. In order to keep abreast of the times we must spend on education much more than we have done hitherto. Our civil servants increase in number with every social ionova- tion, and many of them require an increase in their salaries. We have assumed the burden of old-age pensions, which will require at least £12,000,000 a year. Already demands are heard that the scope of old-age pensions should be greatly enlarged by lowering the age limit to sixty-five or to sixty years, and the pensioners' pay should be in- creased. Proposals are being made to include in the old- age pension scheme all those who are disabled through illness or accident, and who, we are told, are as much entitled to a pension as are people over seventy. Last, but not least, we have to defend an enormous Empire, and our expenditure upon armaments is bound to iacrease very greatly in the immediate future. The Government have told us that we must rebuild our whole Fleet, replacing our present battleships with Dreadnoughts. We have not only to guard ourselves against a German attack in the North Sea, but to watch other Powers in other seas as well, and to defend our Colonies and our commerce. Consequently we must build at least two ships for every single German ship. Under her Navy Bills of 1900-1906 Germany will build thirty-three Dreadnoughts ; but if she should replace the older and smaller ships of her naval programme with Dreadnoughts — and the German Navy League is already advocating that step^she will build fifty-eight Dreadnoughts, We shall have to increase our naval expenditure very greatly in the immediate future. If we lay down two ships for every German ship, and this step is inevitable, we must spend on the Navy at least two sovereigns for every single sovereign 56 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN spent by Germany. As Germany spends £23,000,000 a year on her navy, we must be prepared to spend at least £50,000,000 a year upon ours— £20,000,000 more than we have been spending— because voluntary service is more costly than compulsory service, and because we have to maintain numerous naval stations all over the globe. Some people say that the burden of armaments is ruinous and crushing to Germany ; that Germany will not be able to build her Dreadnoughts; that she is in serious financial difficulties. I think they are mistaken. According to the calculations of the German Ministry of Finance, the warlike expenditure of Great Britain and Germany is as follows : — ExPENDITtTEB OH AbMY AND NaVY PEE HeAD. In Germany Marks 18-95 In Great Britain . . . . . . . . „ 29'23 Our military and naval expenditure is almost 60 per cent, larger than that of Germany. Hence Germany can increase hers very greatly before it will be level with ours. As her mihtary and naval burden is carried by a larger number of people, it is less oppressive than ours. The financial difficulties of Germany have been very much exaggerated. The Germans are able and willing to bear increased tax- ation ; but Germany is not a single State, but a union of independent States, each of which raises its own taxes in its own way. Therefore the difficulty consists, not in obtaining the taxes from the people, but in making all the individual Governments agree on some form of imperial taxation. In 1908 Germany wished to raise an additional £25,000,000 a year in imperial taxation. The vastness of her unexhausted resources may be seen from the fact that, according to Professor Coru-ad, she could raise an additional £50,000,000 per year by increasing only her indirect taxa- tion to our own level, leaving her more direct taxation IMPERIAL FINANCES 57 unchanged. We cannot safely reckon on Germany's financial inability to build her great fleet. The foregoing should suffice to show that the financial position of Great Britain is unfavourable and very serious. Our national wealth is stagnant if not declining. Our taxation is the heaviest in the world, and it is twice as heavy as is that of Germany. Yet we shall have to increase our taxation very greatly in the immediate future. Our national expenditure, which amounted to £99,220,068 in 1893-4, and which amounts to £171,857,000 in 1910-11, according to the forecast of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, will probably exceed £200,000,000 within four or five years. Old-age pensions, our naval requirements, and the automatic growth of our expenditure on education, salaries, &c., should increase next year's Budget again. Where is the money to come from ? The advice of Eadicals and SociaUsts to put taxation on the rich in the form of a super-tax on large incomes or of a land tax of some kind or other is worthless, because taxation, howsoever and upon whomsoever imposed, is bound to fall in the end on the masses of the people. A tax on land values, for instance, will raise the price of land, of houses, and of rents. Therefore any further increase in taxation on the present lines is bound to increase the economic stagnation and decay which is everywhere ap- parent in this country, and to accentuate the prevaihng poverty and unemplojonent. Evidently Great Britain has come to the end of her financial resources. Great Britain is easily able to provide for her purely national requirements, especially when Tariff Reform has strengthened our declining industries and has placed part of our financial burden upon foreign countries, but the country is becoming increasingly unable to provide single- handed for our Imperial liabiUties which it has assumed hitherto. The financial system of this country is antiquated throughout. It urgently requires revision and reform, and 58 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN the Government will be wise to appoint without delay a Commission to inquire into British national and Imperial taxation. Perhaps it will be useful to include representa- tives of the Great Dominions ia that Commission. It will very likely recommend certain important technical reforms in taxation with which I cannot deal in the present chapter, but the most important and the most far-reaching recommendation which such a Commission will probably make wiU be to separate the British National Budget from the British Imperial Budget. That is a tremendous, and I think a most necessary, innovation. In former times our Colonies were an appendage and a convenience to the Motherland. They were considered to exist merely for the purpose of enriching this country, and they were exploited by this cotmtry. We drew a large part of our revenue from the Colonies, and we protected them as a matter of course in our own interests. Times have changed. The ancient Colonial settlements and traders' stations, which were supposed to bring in con- siderably more than the cost of their defence and adminis- tration, have grown up into great Dominions. The helpless infant communities in savage lands across the seas have become wealthy and powerful self-governing States, from which the Motherland derives no revenue. Per head of population the Dominions are much wealthier than is overtaxed Great Britain. Nevertheless we continue to bear proportionately by far the largest part of the charge for their naval defence, because the change in the posi- tion from weakness and poverty to power and opulence has been so gradual that we have scarcely noticed it. The British Budget is stiU called the ' Imperial Budget,' although against our Imperial expenditure there is no longer an Imperial revenue, but merely a British national revenue. In its financial aspect the British Empire is hke an immense pyramid which, instead of resting securely upon its broad basis, balances precariously upon its slender IMPEEIAL FINANCES 59 apex. The 44,000,000 inhabitants of the British Isles cannot afford to defend for all time four continents, count- less islands, and the seas which separate and connect them against all comers. That way lies national bankruptcy, defeat in naval war, the conquest of our Colonies, and the disruption of the Empire. The British Empire has grown out of its old clothes. Forty-three years ago Joseph Howe, the great Canadian Imperialist, wrote in his essay, ' The Organisation of the Empire ' : — ' Security for peace is only to be sought in such an organisation and armament of the whole Empire as will make the certainty of defeat a foregone conclusion to any foreign Power that may attempt to break it. The ques- tion of questions for us all, far transcending in importance any other within the range of domestic or foreign politics, is how the whole Empire can be so organised and strength- ened as to command peace and be impregnable in war.' Being closely in touch with the leading colonial circles, I know that Howe's thought is the thought of many of our most prominent and influential colonial citizens in both hemispheres. Hitherto the Colonies have contributed very little to the British Fleet, not because they are unwilling to pay, but because they have no share in the Fleet. They do not care to provide money over the spending of which they exercise no control. British citizens also would object, and rightly, to send millions of pounds every year to Canada or to Austraha to be spent by their Ministry on their own defence. Besides, people like to have some fun for their money. Our leading colonial citizens have not unnaturally the wish that their friends and relatives should be able to enter our Navy as freely as the sons of Great Britain. It is an honour to serve the Empire, and colonial citizens rightly ask why they should be practically debarred from that honour; why a career in the Imperial Services 60 GEEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN should be the monopoly of the inhabitants of this country. When the recent speeches of Mr. Asquith, Mr. McKenna, and Sir Edward Grey suddenly revealed to us the menace of the German Dreadnought fleet, the Colonies hastened to offer us Dreadnoughts as a present. They did so, not only for sentimental reasons, but also because they felt that the German Dreadnoughts threatened them as much as us ; that Germany required colonies in a temperate zone for her rapidly expanding population ; that an over- whelmingly strong British Fleet is the best guarantee of their peace and security. The Government has wisely not merely pocketed the colonial money contributions for Dread- naughts, but has invited the Dominions to furnish the officers and crews for their ships as well. They are to serve primarily for colonial defence. The creation of British-Colonial naval contingents is a most excellent step. They should form the nucleus of a truly Imperial British Fleet, paid for, manned, and officered by the whole Empire. The Colonies would give money far more freely for an Imperial British Fleet if they could spend it on ships and men of their own than if it would merely be paid into the coffers of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, and be used by him for the upkeep of a British national navy. The generous contributions to our Fleet, which the Dominions have so readily made, are most welcome to us, and they are bound to strengthen the Imperial tie and the Imperial sentiment. But it is vain and foolish to expect that henceforth we shall be able to run the Empire by means of voluntary colonial contributions. The Empire cannot possibly be financed in the same way in which one may perhaps manage a charitable institution. The Empire must be run on business lines. The Colonies must be invited to take their share in the defence of the Empire, and I have every reason to think that they are ready to do so. Great Britain is the armoury, the citadel, and the IMPEEIAL FINANCES 61 naval base of the Empire. The key to the Empire is not Simla or Bombay, Cape Town or Sydney, but London, Our Colonies can be conquered only in London, and the Colonies know it. Besides, Great Britain is, and will continue to be, the sentinel and outpost of the Empire in Europe. Great Britain must guard the Empire against possible aggression on the part of the military States of the Continent. She has shielded them in this way during two centuries, and she will have to continue to do so for a long time. For these reasons our Colonies are just as much interested in the safety of the British Isles as is Great Britain herself. The principle, 'no taxation without representation,' is deeply ingrained in the mind of all EngHsh-speaking citizens. We cannot expect the Colonies to do the taxing and Great Britain to do the spending. If we wish the Empire to defend the Empire we must organise the Empire. We cannot keep for ever our great Dominions in childish leading strings. They caimot be treated for ever like babes and minors. It is very aggravating for the Dominions to have to refer countless trifling matters to the decision of men in London who are thousands of miles away, and who may be ill acquainted with the subject under discussion. We can realise the position of the Dominions best if we imagine that we should have to refer every fishery dispute with Holland to a Government in Melbourne, and if we had to appeal to Melbourne to assist us against the tariff attacks of foreign nations. We must provide a supreme Imperial Goverrmient and an Imperial Parliament which is chosen by the whole Empire, which is representative of the whole Empire, and which therefore is qualified to take in hand the defence of the Empire. As Sir Wilfrid Laurier said, we must call the Dominions to our councils. At present Great Britain has all the honour of defending the Empire, but she has to bear all the burden too. Our honour is a very costly one. 62 GKEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN It is no doubt difficult to organise the Empire and to provide for a common defence to be paid for out of a common purse, but difficulties exist to be overcome. I cannot outline an Imperial organisation in the present pages. That would be outside the scope of this chapter, I would therefore only say that the problem of providing for a common defence, paid for from a common purse, has been successfully solved by other States. The United States are a voluntary union of forty-five self-governing States ; the German Empire is a voluntary union of twenty-five self- governing States, of which three are republics ; Switzerland is a voluntary union of twenty-two self-governing republics. Germany, the United States, and Switzerland have well solved the problem which confronts us now. Why, then, should we be unable to do likewise ? If at the next General Election a Unionist Government should come into power, it will immediately call an Imperial Conference to arrange preferential tariffs throughout the Empire, and will thus lay the foundation of its economic unification. If that conference be called, not only for economic purposes, but also for devising a scheme of Imperial defence, it may lay the foundation of the political unification of the Empire as well. The Dominions are waiting for such a call, and they will answer it with alacrity. The next Unionist Prime Minister will have an op- portunity which occurs scarcely once in a century, an opportunity for which future generations of statesmen will envy him. History may know him as the man who found the Empire in a state of chaos and who placed it upon a secure and enduring basis, as the man who unified and organised it, and who, one might almost say, created it. Let us hope that that statesman will build well, that he will build for ages. After all, our financial difficulties may prove to have been to us a blessing in disguise. CHAPTEE IV THE ECONOMY OF EMPIEB The opinion is very widely held that political economy is a science of yesterday. That opinion is erroneous. Adam Smith is habitually called the Father of Political Economy, but he does not deserve that name. Adam Smith is not even the father of modem Political Economy or of Free Trade. Political economy is after all only current economic policy and thought reduced to a system, and economic poUcy is as old as is civiUsation itself. Although dry and bulky handbooks are of comparatively recent origin — they would not have found a sufficient number of purchasers in former ages — my studies of ancient literature have con- vinced me that since the earliest times statesmen and thinkers have devoted much time and thought to economic science. The ancient Jews were not, like the modern Jews, a race of business men. They were agriculturists and shepherds, whose industries and foreign trade were carried on chiefly by their neighbours, the Phoenicians. Yet many passages occur in the ancient Jewish writings which show that political economy was by no means neglected by them. I would, for instance, draw attention to the fact that in Psalm cv, wealth is beautifully defined as the ' inherited labour of the people,' and that the first statement of the Malthusian doctrine may be found in chapter v. of Ecclesiastes in the words : ' When goods are increased, they are increased that eat them. And what good is there to the owners thereof 63 64 GBEAT AND GBEATEB BRITAIN saving the beholding of them with their eyes ? ' The ancient books of China also furnish much evidence that pohtical economy was studied by the very practical states- men and philosophers of that country. Confucius, Mencius, Laotsze and many others have left on record their economic views which prove that already the ancient Chinese were divided in Free Traders and Protectionists. Confucius recommended benevolent and paternal economic policy : ' To govern means to rectify.' ' There is a great principle for the production of wealth. Let the producers be many and the consumers be few. Let there be activity of produc- tion, and economy in expenditure. Then wealth will always be sufficient.' Laotsze advocated the policy of extreme individualism and laisser faire : ' Let all things take their natural course, and do not interfere. Practice inaction. Concentrate yourself upon doing nothing. If laws and restrictions are increased, the people will grow poorer and poorer. If I do nothing, the people will work out their own salvation.' Mencius condemned laisser faire, and the purely commercial policy of individualism : ' If a ruler makes profit the principle of his conduct, all will find their pleasure in the pursuit of profit. Ministers will serve their rulers for profit, sons will obey their fathers for profit, younger brothers will respect their elder brothers for profit, and, abandoning virtue and righteousness for their guiding stars, rulers and ministers, fathers and sons, elder and younger brothers will act with a view to their personal profit. But never has there been such a state of affairs without ruin being the result.' The Greeks took the keenest interest in political economy. The study of Plato, Aristotle, Thucydides, Xenophon, Demosthenes, and of a host of minor writers, shows that pohtical economy was closely studied by them, and that the statesmen of Greece were guided in their actions by the prevailing economic theories. From the Greek plays, especially from those of Euripides and Aristophanes, it appears that even the masses of the people THE ECONOMY OF EMPIEE 65 took a keen interest in political economy and economic policy. Since the dawn of history, economic policy of nations was based upon certain fundamental theories and principles which professors nowadays would probably call Economic Laws, and these fundamental theories and principles have not unnaturally changed with the changing pohtical and economic conditions of the world. The political economy of antiquity was based on slavery. To the ancients, slavery seemed justified either on religious grounds or sanctioned by the law of Nature. We read in the second Psalm : ' I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the utter- most ends of the earth for thy possession.' Aristotle con- sidered the Greeks entitled to subject and enslave all alien nations. Euripides says, in his ' Iphigenia in Aulis ' : It is meet That Greece should o'er Barbarians bear the sway, Not that Barbarians lord it over Greece ; Nature hath formed them slaves, the Grecians free. It is vain to believe that some economic theory or other may be considered eternally and universally true. Nothing is immutable in this world, in which the only thing abiding is constant change. The economic ideas which our fathers and our grandfathers held, and which are associated with the names of Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Cobden, are losing their hold, and we appear to be embarking upon a new economic policy without knowing whither it will lead us. After the opinion of many people. Great Britain is about to make economically a leap in the dark. Therefore it behoves us to glance at the changes which British economic poUcy has undergone in the past, and then to look at the great tasks which await us, and which call for a new economic policy. At a time when the continent of Europe was inhabited by nations which were eminent in science and art, in 66 GEEAT AND GEEATER BEITAIN manufacturing and trade, Great Britain was inhabited by backward peasants and shepherds who provided the more civilised countries of the Continent with raw produce. Our principal article of exportation was raw wool. It was bought by the merchants of Italy and of the Hanseatic League. It was taken to the Continent in foreign ships, and was turned into manufactures in the large and flourishing towns of Flanders and Brabant. The EngUsh were called on the Continent, 'the shepherds of Flanders.' The 'woolsack' in the House of Lords, the name of our principal coin, pound sterhng, which comes from Easterling, the fact that the three golden balls which are to be found outside our pawnbrokers' shops are the ancient arms of Lombardy, and the name ' Lombard Street,' which is still London's bank- ing centre, as it was in the time of the Medici and Peruzzi, remind us of the time when Great Britain was industrially and commercially a savage country, and when Venice and Genoa, Hamburg and Liibeck, Bruges and Antwerp did the business which is now done by London, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow and Liverpool. Ever since the fourteenth century, the rulers of England strove to increase the wealth of the country by legislative enactments devised to entice the leading wealth-creating industries of foreign countries to our shores. In Anderson's ' Commercial History ' we read under the year 1331 : ' King Edward III, attentively observing the riches and powers of the Provinces of Flanders and Brabant merely proceeding from their vast woollen manufacture, and considering farther that they owed all their said wealth and power entirely to his English wool, it was extremely natural for him to infer that if he could gain the artificers in that manufacture to settle in England, the trade whereof would soon prosper in his kingdom. Seventy families of clothworkers were accordingly induced to settle in England, and in this manner the foundation of our manufacturing industries was laid.' In course of time. THE ECONOMY OF EMPIRE 67 many continental industries were transplanted on English soil, by bounties, immunities, privileges and other forma of encouragement offered by the English Government, and England became largely for business reasons a place of refuge for the persecuted manufacturers, merchants and artisans of the Low Countries, of France, and of other States. The infant industries of England, which our rulers had artificially created, were protected against their mighty foreign competitors by the taxation or by the exclusion of competitive imports, and thus the new industries were able to become aochmatised, to take root in British soil, and to grow great and powerful. Our shipping industry also owes its rise to the initiative of the Government, and to its fostering care. In 1381, in the reign of Richard II, the first English Navigation Act was passed, which provided ' that for increasing the shipping of England, of late much diminished, none of the King's subjects shall hereafter ship any kind of merchan- dise either outward or homeward, but only in ships of the King's subjects on forfeiture of ships and merchandise, in which ships also the greater part of the crews shall be the King's subjects,' This Navigation Act was followed by numerous other enactments devised to encourage and to promote the growth of our merchant marine. Our ship- ping and our shipbuilding industries were estabhshed by prohibitions and lavish bounties, and by attracting Dutch sailors and shipbuilders into the service of England. When America and the sea-passage to India were dis- covered, Venice, which until then had monopolised the trade of the East via the Mediterranean, dechned, and the wealth of the Indies in spices, gold, silver, &c., fell to Spain and Portugal. A race for colonial possessions ensued amongst the Powers of Europe. England, which had been one of the last of European nations to embark in manu- facturing and in foreign trade, was also one of the last in acquiring colonies. "At first she had, hke Germany at the V 2 68 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN present day, to be contented with colonies such as New- foundland, which the great colonial nations of the time considered valueless. However, during the Elizabethan era, at a time when England had as yet no colonies, an insignificant merchant marine, and but a few struggling industries, it became the ideal of our greatest thinkers and statesmen to take advantage of the security which its insular position gave to England, and to convert their poor and backward agricultural country into a wealthy and powerful empire by developing its manufacturing industries and its merchant marine to the utmost, and by acquiring colonies, not for exploitation, but for settlement in all parts of the world. Lord Bacon wrote, in his ' Advice to Sir George Villiers, the Statesman ' : ' Instead of crjdng up all things which are either brought from beyond sea or wrought here by the hands of strangers, let us advance the native com- modities of our kingdom, and employ our countrymen before strangers. Let us turn the wools of the land into cloths and stuffs of our own growth, and the hemp and flax grown here into linen cloth and cordage ; it would set many thousand hands at work, and thereby one shiUingsworth of the materials would, by industry, be multipUed to five, ten, and many times to twenty times the value.' Whilst the Spaniards and Portuguese saw in their colonies merely an opportunity for amassing gold and silver by violence and plunder, Bacon advised us in his celebrated essay ' Of Plantations,' that our surplus popula- tion should be ' dehberately planted ' oversea in industrious agricultural communities. Bacon may perhaps be called the Father of Modern Colonisation and of the British Empire. In his ' History of Henry VII ' Bacon praises that king highly because : ' The King, having care to make his realm potent, as well by sea as by land, for the better maintenance of the navy ordained " That wines and woada from the parts of Gascoign and Languedoc should not be brought but in English bottoms " ; bowing the ancient poUcy THE ECONOMY OP EMPIRE 69 of this Estate, from consideration of plenty to considera- tion of power. For that almost all the ancient statutes incite by all means merchant strangers to bring in aU sorts of commodities, having for end cheapness, and not looking to the point of State concerning the naval power.' It will be noticed that the principle of buying in the cheapest market was not invented by Adam Smith and his followers. In things political and economic. Bacon beheved rather in Governmental action than in the policy of laisser faire, although he did not underrate the vis inertia of custom and indolence. Therefore he concludes his essay, ' Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and Estates,' with the words : • " No man can by care taking (as the Scripture saith), add a cubit to his stature," in this little model of a man's body ; but in the great frame of kingdoms and common- wealths, it is in the power of princes, or Estates, to add amplitude and greatness to their kingdoms ; for by intro- ducing such ordinances, constitutions, and customs, as we have now touched, they may sow greatness to their posterity and succession, but these things are commonly not observed, but left to take their chance.' The economic views of that universal genius. Sir Walter Raleigh, were similar to those of Lord Bacon. Raleigh presented to King James I a weighty memoir in which he proposed : ' To turn the stream of riches raised by your Majesty's native commodities into the natural channel, from which it hath been a long time diverted, may it please your Majesty to consider whether it be not necessary that your native commodities should receive their full manu- factory by your subjects within your dominions.' Raleigh not only advocated the development of our manufacturing industries by Governmental action. In his ' Observations touching Trade and Commerce with the Hollander ' he urged the King that England should deprive the wealthy Dutch, who then were the carriers of the world, of their great fishing and of their carrying trade. In his mind he 70 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN saw England as a great World-Power and the mistress of the sea, and in his ' Discourse of the Invention of Ships ' he left on record the following splendid maxim which, curiously enough, has become one of the mottoes of modern Germany and of her Navy League : ' Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade ; whosoever commands the trade, commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.' The teachings of Bacon and Raleigh and of many other statesmen and thinkers urge England to reserve, by appropriate regulations, the home market to her industries. For a long time she did not succeed in creatiag a great merchant marine, being unable to compete with the Nether- lands. Before 1651 England's foreign trade, and even her colonial trade, was carried on chiefly by Dutch traders and in Dutch ships. Cromwell and many British patriots viewed England's economic dependence on the Dutch with great dissatisfaction, and on October 9, 1651, Cromwell's sweeping Act of Navigation, which superseded all the more or less ineffective Navigation Acts which had preceded it, was passed by the British Parliament. By that Act Cromwell decreed that all goods and commodities whatever, grown, produced or manufactured in Asia, Africa or America, should be imported into Great Britain only in ships belonging to British subjects, of which the master and the greater number of the crew were of British nationahty, and that all goods produced in Europe should be imported into Great Britain only in ships belonging either to Great Britain or to that country in which the goods imported were actually produced. As the Dutch had little native produce to export except butter and cheese, it was clear that Cromwell's Navigation Act was aimed directly at the maritime supremacy of the Dutch, which he intended to transfer to this country. The expulsion of Dutch shipping from the British trade caused at first a great scarcity in British shipping, a rise in THE ECONOMY OF EMPIEE 71 the price of ships, in the wages of EngHsh seamen and in freights, and a diminution of England's foreign trade ; but the monopoly of the maritime trade which Cromwell had secured to Great Britain led very soon to an enormous expansion of England's foreign trade, of her merchant marine, and to a great increase in the maritime skill of the people. Child, Petty and Davenant, the three greatest English economists of the seventeenth century, agree that the commerce and riches of England had never increased faster than between the passing of Cromwell's Navigation Act in 1651 and the Revolution of 1688. Henceforward the shipping of England increased by leaps and bounds, whilst foreign shipping almost disappeared from the British trade, as the following figures show : — Ships Clbaeed Outwaed. British. Foreign. 1663-69 . , . 95,286 tons. 47,634 tons. 1749-51 . ,. 609,798 tons. 51,386 tons. Foreign shipping disappeared from the English trade, and gradually the Enghsh took the place of the Dutch as the carriers of the world. A great merchant marine requires a great carrying trade, and a great carrying trade requires powerful home industries which work for exportation. During the two centuries between Cromwell's Navigation Act and the intro- duction of Free Trade in 1846, Great Britain endeavoured to develop simultaneously her manufacturing industries, her agriculture, her shipping and her foreign trade. During two centuries her economic policy was a strongly Protec- tionist one. Theory and practice went hand in hand. Great Britain's opinion was formed, not by abstract thinkers, men of theory, who were unacquainted with practical business, but by men such as Thomas Munn, Joshua Gee, Josiah Child, Dudley North and other eminent Protectionist writers who were at the same time the leading 72 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN political economists and the leading merchants of the time. During the eighteenth century Great Britain began to extend her trade still further and to strengthen the hold which her industries had acquired on the markets of other nations by concluding with them advantageous commercial treaties and treaties of reciprocity, such as the celebrated Methuen Treaty with Portugal. She entered on a sort of partnership with her most important foreign customers, and secured better terms to her home industries by means of her tariff than other nations could obtain. Furthermore, she strove to regulate the trade of the whole Empire, with a view to reserving as far as possible the trade of the Empire to the citizens of the Empire. That great imperialist statesman Lord Chatham frequently stated his economic views in words such as the following : ' Trade is extended and complicated consideration ; it reaches as far as ships can sail and winds can blow ; it is a great and various machine. To regulate the numberless movements of its several parts, and combine them into effect for the good of the whole, requires the superintending wisdom and energy of the supreme power in the Empire.' It is fashionable nowadays among many political econo- mists, not only to trust entirely to the natural development of things in economic matters, but even to assert that our economic predominance has grovm up naturally and spon- taneously under Free Trade. That is not true. Our manufacturing industries, our foreign trade and our shipping are not plants of natural growth. They are an artificial creation. Under the most comprehensive system of encouragement and protection of all the native industries which the world has seen, the wealth of Great Britain increased to a prodigious extent, to the admiration and envy of all foreign countries. Frederick the Great wrote in his ' History of My Own Time ' : • Among all the nations of Europe, the Enghsh THE ECONOMY OP EMPIEE 73 nation is the wealthiest. Its trade embraces the globe. Its capital is incredibly large. Its resources are almost inexhaustible.' Vattel, the Swiss jurist, wrote in 1758 : ' The State ought to encourage labour, to promote industry, and to increase ability, to grant honours, rewards, privileges, and to take such measures that every citizen may live by his industry. In this respect England deserves to be our model. Her ParUament attends incessantly to these im- portant affairs, and neither labour nor expense is spared in the promotion of industry.' Towards the middle of the eighteenth century England was by far the richest and the most powerful among her national competitors. Unfortunately the English manu- facturers and traders, who were strongly represented in Parliament, followed a very short-sighted and selfish policy. They wished to regulate the trade of the Empire, not for the benefit of the Empire, but for their own benefit. They wished not only to restrict arbitrarily the economic activity of the Colonies, but also to tax them without their consent. The citizens of our old American Colonies were at heart loyal to Great Britain. The study of the American pre- revolutionary literature makes it clear that their ideal, as Lord Chatham's ideal, was a British Empire ruled by an Imperial Government which should be self-supporting and self-sufficing. Our American colonists were quite willing to have their trade and industries regulated in the interests of the Empire, and to have taxation imposed upon them by truly Imperial Parliament, but not by the parochial Parliament of Great Britain in which they were not repre- sented. Twenty-two years before the fatal Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Franklin sent to Governor Shirley a weighty memoir ' On the Subject of Uniting the Colonies more intimately with Great Britain by allowing them Representatives in Parliament,' in which he wrote : ' I should hope that by such a union, the people of Great Britain and the people of the colonies would learn to 74 GBEAT AND GBEATBB BRITAIN consider themselves as not belonging to different com- munities with different interests, but to one community with one interest ; which I imagine would contribute to strengthen the whole and greatly lessen the danger of future separation. ' It is, I suppose, agreed to be the general interest of any State that its people be numerous and rich ; men enough to fight in its defence, and enough money to pay sufficient taxes to defray the charge ; for these circumstances tend to the security of the State and its protection from foreign Powers. . . . The iron manufacture employs and enriches British subjects, but is it of any importance to the State whether the manufacturer Hves at Birmingham or Sheffield, or both, since they are still within its bounds, and their wealth and persons still at its command ? The colonies are all included in the British Empire, and the strength and wealth of the parts is the strength and wealth of the whole. What imports it to the general State whether a merchant, smith or hatter grow rich in Old or New England ? And if there be any difference, those who have most contributed to enlarge Great Britain's Empire and commerce, increase her strength, her wealth and the numbers of her people at the risk of their own Hves and private fortunes in new and strange countries, methinks ought rather to expect some preference. . . .' The views of Franklin were shared by the most prominent Americans, and they were supported in England by the far-seeing Lord Chatham. On the other hand, the narrow-minded merchants, being more concerned about the profits of the present than about the future of the British Empire, did not wish to see their monopoly in the American market impaired, whilst the majority of the poUticians in the English Parliament desired to have the game of poHtics to themselves, and objected to allowing to the American Colonies representatives in Parliament. Thus our merchants and poUticians opposed for selfish reasons the consolidation THE ECONOMY OP EMPIRE 75 of the British Empire. They would not allow it to be placed on a business footing. Lord Chatham's eloquent pleas for fulfilling the reasonable wishes of the colonists and for making them political and economic partners in the Empire, fell on unwilling ears. Adam Smith wrote in his ' Wealth of Nations ' : ' There is not the least probabihty that the British Constitution would be hurt by the union of Great Britain and her colonies. That Constitution, on the contrary, would be completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs of every part of the Empire, in order to be properly informed, ought certainly to have repre- sentatives from every part of it. That this union, how- ever, could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties, and great difficulties, might not occur in the execution, I do not pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear insurmountable. The principal, perhaps, arise, not from the nature of things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the people both on this and on the other side of the Atlantic' Unfortunately for Great Britain and the British Empire, Adam Smith's advice came too late, and illness struck down Lord Chatham at the fatal moment when he alone could have saved the Empire from disruption. Through short-sightedness, selfishness and sheer stupidity, the British Empire was broken up. Has Great Britain learned the terrible lesson of the Anglo-American War, or will the first dismemberment of the Empire be followed by a second and still more disastrous dismemberment ? With the revolt of the American Colonies a series of wars began for Great Britain. The long duration of the Anglo- American War, which lasted from 1775 to 1783, encouraged other nations to attack Great Britain. France and Spain took part in the struggle. The war against the Armed Neutrality League followed, and then came our wars against 76 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN the French Republic, and against Napoleon. During the forty years from 1775 to 1815, Great Britain was almost constantly at war. In our wars against the French Republic and against Napoleon alone. Great Britain expended, according to MacCulloch, far more than £1,000,000,000. At that time a sovereign had about the same purchasing power which two sovereigns have now. Besides, the popu- lation of England was then equal to only about one-quarter of her present population. Therefore our expenditure in the French wars may be compared to an expenditure of £8,000,000,000 at the present day. The Boer War cost £250,000,000. Consequently we may say that more than a century ago Great Britain expended on her wars with France a sum that was practically thirty-two times as large as the sum which we expended in the late Boer War. The fact that Great Britain was not crippled by that enormous expenditure proves that Great Britain was enormously wealthy long before the introduction of Free Trade, railways and the steam-engine ; that her enormous wealth has not been created during the Free Trade era, but during the era of Protection. The end of the Napoleonic wars left the nations of the Continent prostrated. Their wealth had disappeared. Their industries were crippled, and the British industries found a free field throughout the world. Calhng to their aid the steam-engine, the railway, the steamship and the electric telegraph, the British industries increased their productive powers at an unheard-of rate. Trade and com- merce throughout the world became a British monopoly. In the forties of last century Great Britain possessed two- thirds of the world's shipping. She possessed a greater mileage of railways than the whole continent of Europe. She raised about two-thirds of the world's coal, she manu- factured about two-thirds of the world's iron, and she turned about two-thirds of the world's cotton into manu- factures. Great Britain was indeed ' the workshop of the THE ECONOMY OP EMPIRE 77 world,' as Cobden exclaimed, and she was besides the world's banker and engineer. The railways of the United States, of Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, and of many other countries were built by Englishmen with Enghsh money. The industries throughout the world were financed in London. During the time when England had followed the vigorous creative and Protectionist pohcy of Bacon and Cromwell, Prance had followed the equally vigorous policy of RicheUeu and Colbert, who had transplanted the industries of Venice and Holland upon Prench soil. Prance and England had become exceedingly wealthy under a regime of Protection, and other nations had followed their example. A rigidly Protectionist and national policy had been adopted by all the civilised States of Europe, excepting the Netherlands, whose formerly all-powerful manufacturing and shipping industries had decayed under the regime of Pree Trade. Towards the middle of the eighteenth century, some French philosophers began to protest against the spirit of mutual exclusion, and of nationalism, of which the Protec- tionist policy had been a symptom and a part. They wished to escape from this complicated and artificial world to a land of primitive simplicity in which men and women could Hve as shepherds and shepherdesses. They dreamt of replacing the ordered discipline of the State by the gentle brotherhood of man, and the rigidity of the law by the law of nature and the rights of man. They dreamt of making all men happy by making all men equal. Swords were to be beaten into ploughshares. A lofty cosmopoli- tanism was to replace narrow patriotism and nationalism. Freed from all compulsion, the natural goodness of man would bring about universal harmony. In this atmosphere of poetic sentimentalism and cosmopolitanism which was dominated by the impractical ideas of Jean Jacques Rousseau, Adam Smith was born. His work, ' The Wealth of Nations, ' was strongly influenced by the 78 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN prevailing ideas of the French philosophers, and by the physioeratic school of French economists, especially by his friend Quesney. Adam Smith's work, which gives the most powerful expression to the spirit of opposition against Govemmentalism which prevailed in the cultured middle class of France, became soon immensely popular, . and it became a powerful factor in forming economic opinion throughout Great Britain. ' The Wealth of Nations ' possesses the fundamental defect that it is saturated with the poetic and impractical sentimentalism and cosmopohtanism of eighteenth-century France. Its title is a misnomer, for Adam Smith treats practically only of the wealth of individuals, and ignores nations^ and States. His producers and consumers are citizens of the world, according to Rousseau's model, not Englishmen or Frenchmen, He teaches that the interests of the State ought to be subordinated to the interests of the individual, although, in the words of Adam Smith, ' the individual aims only at his private gain,' Nevertheless he thinks that the unchaining of the spirit of private gain will lead to the happiest results because the individual, in working for his private gain, is, according to Smith, led ' by an invisible hand to promote the public good.' Hia faith that un- restrained individual greed of gain will by the action of ' an invisible hand ' promote the pubhc good is perhaps poetry, but it is certainly not common sense. A similar faith in the brotherhood and equality of men and the original goodness of human nature converted France and all Europe into a shambles. Opposing Government restrictions and regulations in the spirit of the philosophic anarchists, Smith advocated replacing the protection and regulation of the national industries in the interests of the nation by the perfect freedom of trade. He wrote in Book IV, chap. v. : ' Were all nations to follow the Liberal system of free exportation and free importation, the different States into which a great THE ECONOMY OF EMPIRE 79 Continent was divided would so far resemble the different provinces of a great Empire.' International Free Trade presupposes, as Adam Smith clearly recognised, the dis- appearance of States and of frontiers, the Brotherhood of Man, Arcadia, the Millennium. The purely speculative and cosmopolitan economic ideas of Smith were further developed by his followers. The British Free Trade school of poUtical economy arose. In the forties of the last century, when Great Britain had reached the zenith of her industrial and commercial eminence, when she had the world's monopoly in industry and trade, Ricardo was considered to be the greatest representative of the Free Trade school. He taught that wages invariably tend towards the irreducible minimum of existence : ' The natural price of labour is the price which is necessary to enable the labourers to subsist and to perpetuate their race without either increase or diminution.' Similar views were held by many of his brother economists of the classical school, such as Senior, James Mill and John Stuart Mill. The doctrine that every cheapening of the means of sub- sistence would inevitably lead to a lowering of wages was generally taught by our economists, and it was credited by many of our manufacturers. Although Great Britain's exports were enormous, com- peting industries began to arise in various countries, and these industries worked with very cheap labour. British wages were then from three to four times as high as German and Swiss wages. Many British manufacturers, among others Cobden, believed that the competition of foreign countries could be met only by ' superior cheapness,' that it could be met only by reducing British wages, and that British wages could be reduced only by reducing the prices of food and of the other necessaries of life. Therefore they agitated for the repeal of the Com Laws, and they contributed enormous sums to the Anti-Corn Law League. Many British Free Traders, viewing business matters from the 80 GREAT AND GEEATEB BRITAIN point of view of the cosmopolitan idealists of pre-revolution- ary France, saw, or pretended to see, in Free Trade a step towards the Brotherhood of Man. Cobden, for instance, said on January 15, 1846 : ' I see in the Free Trade principle that which shall act on the moral world as the principle of gravitation in the universe, drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagon- ism of race and creed and language, and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace. I believe that the desire and the motive for large and mighty empires, for gigantic armies and great navies, for those materials which are used for the destruction of life, and the desolation of the rewards of labour will die away. I believe that such things will cease to be necessary or to be used when man becomes one family and freely exchanges the fruits of his labour with his brother man.' Many of our Free Traders asserted that if England would adopt Free Trade, all other nations would follow our example. Cobden's prophecy, that " there will not be a tariff in Europe that will not be changed in less than five years to follow your example,' may be dismissed as the talk of an irresponsible agitator. However, the then Prime Minister, Sir Robert Peel, himself held, or professed to hold, similar views, for he stated on January 27, 1846, in the House of Commons : ' I have no guarantee to give you that other countries will immediately follow our example. But depend upon it, your example will ultimately prevail.' In common fairness. Protection could not be withdrawn from agriculture alone, and the manufaeturers were quite willing to abolish all protection for the British manufactur- ing industries as well, because these were paramount in the world, and needed then no protection against their feeble foreign competitors. Thus the intoxication of great indus- trial success led, at the bidding of a handful of agitators and of economic theorists, to the complete reversal of that creative and imperial economic policy which had become THE ECONOMY OP EMPIEE 81 England's traditional policy, and with which the greatest statesmen of England, from Lord Bacon and Cromwell to Lord Chatham, had identified themselves, and which had created and built up England's industries and trade. When Free Trade had been established, it had to be defended at all costs against the Protectionist reaction. Free Trade chairs of political economy were created ; and Protection was pronounced a heresy, and Free Trade an infallible doctrine, from every chair of political economy. What is the legitimate and logical function of political economy ? Political economy is not a rehgion which must be believed implicitly. It is not a thing by itself, but a means to an end. It exists not merely to enable professors to give lectures on production, distribution and exchange in the abstract, and to write handbooks on economic theory for the use of their students, but to enable a nation to solve its practical, political and economic problems. Does British modem political economy, the individualistic, un- national and cosmopolitan economic policy which we associate with the names of Adam Smith, Mill and Cobden, and which makes for poUtical anarchism, fulfil that task ? I am afraid that in the days of Adam Smith, and still more since the days of Cobden, statesmanship and poUtical economy have drifted far apart. The whole includes the part. The greater includes the lesser. Bacon taught in his ' De Augmentis ' : ' The art of Empire, or Civil Government, includes economics as a state includes a family.' Formerly political economy was a branch of practical statesmanship. Economics were subordinated to national policy. In matters of practical politics, the views of the statesman prevailed over those of the economic philosopher. Our political economists, firmly believing in the inf allibihty of their doctrine, have encroached upon the domain of the statesman. They have declared that the theory of Free Trade, being infallible, must not be disregarded by the statesman, and they have arrogated to 82 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN themselves the right to dictate to the statesman and to direct him, in accordance with the pure theory of individualism and cosmopolitanism, called Abstract Economic Science. Cossa says that ' Statesmanship, the science of good govern- ment, is an auxiliary to political economy.' Our national and imperial needs, and the doctrines of our cosmopolitan political economists who ignore the existence of nation and empire, have become incompatible, and the question has to be put : Shall we any longer subordinate national poUcy to the abstract dicta of pohtical economy ? Shall the statesman or the professor of pohtical economy direct the country and the Empire ? Shall, in questions not of economic theory, but of economic practice and of economic policy, the professor of pohtical economy direct the statesman, or shall the statesman be allowed to disregard the professor ? Great Britain's economic and pohtical position has greatly deteriorated since the time when Free Trade was introduced. Great Britain possesses no longer the industrial and financial predominance which she exercised sixty years ago, and which enabled her to adopt Free Trade. With two or three exceptions, her all-powerful industries have declined. Her agriculture has utterly decayed, and its decay has caused a loss of about £2,000,000,000 of money and of many milhons of our best citizens who have left the country. Great Britain has become dependent for her food on foreign countries which refuse to take her manufactures. Her position is serious, and is becoming grave. The Free Traders of the forties saw in the Colonies an incumbrance to be got rid of, and they deHberately aimed at destrojang the imperial connexion. Sir Howard Douglas, a distinguished colonial administrator, exclaimed on February 13, 1846, in the House of Commons : ' From the moment that the protective principle shall unhappily be extinguished, the colonial system itself will be virtually dissolved. Free Trade, the extinction of the protective principle; the repeal THE ECONOMY OF EMPIRE 83 of the differential duties, would at once convert all our colonies in a commercial sense into so many independent States.' Although the Free Traders, in the pursuit of the policy of profits, succeeded in destroying the creative and imperial economic policy which Great Britain has steadfastly followed since the very dawn of her civiUsation, they did not succeed in eradicating the Imperial idea from the hearts of the people and from the minds of their leaders. The ideals of Bacon and Raleigh, of Cromwell and Chatham were not lost. Disraeli said, in 1872 : ' I cannot conceive how our distant colonies can have their affairs administered except by self- government. But self-government, in my opinion, when it was conceded, ought to have been conceded as part of a great policy of an Imperial Consohdation. It ought to have been accompanied by an imperial tariff, by securities by the people of England, for the enjoyment of the unappropriated lands which belonged to the Sovereign as their trustee and by a mihtary code which should have precisely defined the means and the responsibilities by which the colonies should be defended and by which, if necessary, this country should call for aid from the colonies themselves. It ought further to have been accompanied by the institution of some representative Council in the metropolis, which would have brought the colonies into constant and continuous rela- tions with the Home Government. All this however was omitted because those who advised that pohcy — and I believe their convictions were sincere — looked upon the colonies of England, looked even upon our connexion with India, as a burden upon this country, viewing everything in a financial aspect and totally passing by those moral and pohtical considerations which made nations great and by the influence alone of which men are distinguished from animals.' Lord John Russell wrote in his ' Recollections ' : ' Great changes have been made; great changes are impending; amid a 2 84 GREAT AND GBEATBE BRITAIN these changes there is no greater benefit to mankind that a statesman can propose to himself than the consohdation of the British Empire. ' I am disposed to beheve that if a Congress or Assembly representing Great Britain and her dependencies could be convoked to sit from time to time in the autumn, arrange- ments reciprocally beneficial might be made. In my eyes it would be a sad spectacle, it would be a spectacle for gods and men to weep at, to see this brilliant Empire, the guiding star of freedom, broken up.' Lord Rosebery said : ' The people will in a not too distant time have to make up their mind what footing they wish the colonies to occupy with respect to them or whether they desire their colonies to leave them altogether. It is, I believe, absolutely impossible for you to maintain in the long run your present loose and indefinable relation and preserve these colonies as part of the Empire.' Professor Seeley, the historian of Imperialism, wrote in his ' Expansion of England ' : ' There is only one alternative. If the colonies are not, in the old phrase, possessions of England, then they must be a part of England ; and we must adopt this view in earnest. When we have accus- tomed ourselves to contemplate the whole Empire together and call it all England, we shall see that here too is a United States. Here too is a great homogeneous people, one in blood, language, religion and laws, but dispersed over a boundless space. If we are disposed to doubt whether any system can be devised capable of holding together communi- ties so distant from each other, then is the time to recollect the history of the United States of America. For they have such a system. They have solved this problem. They have shown that in the present age of the world poUtical unions may exist on a vaster scale than was possible in former times. Will the English race, which is divided by so many oceans, making full use of modern scientific inven- tion, devise some organisation hke that under which full THE ECONOMY OP EMPIRE 85 liberty and solid union may be reconciled with unbounded territorial extension ? ' The American federation, like the German federation, was created and cemented by the tariff. The individual States were attracted into the Union by becoming partners in a great and promising concern. They were attracted by the wish of sharing in the vast, reserved, secure and profitable market of a customs union and by the dread of economic isolation if excluded from that union. Both the American and the German federations were created with difficulty. Much educational work is needed to induce a State to merge itself into an Empire. ' We must learn to think con- tinentally,' said Alexander Hamilton, the founder of the American Union ; and ' We must learn to think imperially,' said Mr. Chamberlain. Great Britain stands at the parting of the ways. Our greatly weakened and declining home industries require protection against their mighty industrial rivals more in the interests of the workers than in those of the manu- facturers. Our scattered Colonies and possessions require protection against their mighty poHtical and maritime rivals. We can defend our Empire only as long as our fleet is supreme. The longest purse can build the strongest fleet. We have no monopoly in maritime ability, and we cannot reckon upon having always a Nelson on our side. Our Empire is based upon wealth and defended by wealth in the shape of battleships. England's declining wealth suffices no longer to defend the Empire against all comers. The wealth and strength of the whole Empire must be united for the Empire's defence. To continue the pohcy of Free Trade will mean the utter decline of our industries, the impoverishment of the people, and the final break up and loss of the Empire. PoUtical and economic necessity compel us to return to our historical economic pohcy which we have rashly abandoned. Great Britain stands at the parting of the ways. We must create a mighty united empire, the 86 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN United States of Great Britain, of which Lord Chatham dreamt, and which is desired by many of the leading people belonging to all parties in Great Britain and the Colonies, or the Empire will founder in a sea of blood. As regards our economic policy we can no longer be guided by our professors of poUtical economy. We must disregard their abstract doctrine, the lumber of the age of Rousseau. But we must also not adopt the national systems of List and Carey, which may be good for continental nations such as Germany and the United States. We must follow a purely British economy, an economy which will bind four continents and countless islands together in a firm partnership, and we must again take up -our tra- ditional political economy which we have deserted in a fit of absence of mind and evolve from it a new economic poUcy : The Economy of Empire. CHAPTER V WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE OR BECOME PAETNEES IN THE EMPIRE ? WHY DID ENGLAND LOSE HER AMERICAN COLONIES ? It is very widely believed in Great Britain that England lost her American Colonies through the mischievous activity of George III and of Lord North, and principally through the wrong-headedness and obstinacy of the former. That belief seems at first sight to be justified because the famous American Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, solemnly enumerates twenty or thirty grievances of our colonies each of which begins with words such as He (viz. King George III) has done so and so, whilst the English Parliament is never mentioned by name. Only once is the English Parliament alluded to in the significant words : ' He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our laws — giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation.' Napoleon Vs saying, * History is a fable agreed upon,' is no doubt too sweeping, but to those who are familiar with the realities of American history it is quite clear that that saying may well be applied to the accounts of the loss of America current in Great Britain. George III and Lord North have been unjustly accused of having alienated the Americana from the Motherland. History is apt to repeat itself. Earlier or later we may lose other great Colonies for the same reasons for which we lost our greatest colonial possessions in the eighteenth 87 88 GREAT AND GBEATEB BRITAIN century. Consequently an investigation of the causes which led to the secession of oiu: American Colonies should be of the greatest interest and value to every British statesman and to every British citizen. The following pages are based in the main on the best and most reliable American sources. Therefore they will give a better insight into the motives which prompted our colonists to sever the connexion with the Motherland than do most English histories. I intend firstly to describe the material and moral conditions of our American Colonies during the eighteenth century, and the differences between them and the Motherland which had existed during many years when as yet nobody in America thought of separation, and then to give a brief account of the causes which brought about the crisis and led to the Anglo-American War. During the eighteenth century our American Colonies had been wonderfully prosperous. According to Chalmers and Bancroft the white population had increased from 375,750 in 1714 to 1,192,896 in 1754, and to about 2,000,000 in 1774, the year of the Declaration of Independence, whilst the white and black population had grown from 434,600 in 1714 to 1,425,000 in 1754, and to about 2,600,000 in 1774. America was not only the most important outlet for England's surplus population, but also England's most valuable market, the future potentiahties of which seemed unboimded. We read in Anderson's * History of Commerce,' which was pubUshed in 1764 : ' How happy is the change in our national circumstances since we have had American plantations, the demand from whence of all kinds of merchan- dise having so greatly excited our people at home to the improvement and increase of our old manufactures and to the introduction of new ones. Our American plantations, by the vast increase of their people and of the commodities by them raised for our own use for our manufacture and re-exportation do undoubtedly at present more than ever demand of us the first and highest regard, preferably to any WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE ? 89 other commercial consideration whatever. The commerce we now carry on with our said American plantations is probably already to equal in quantity and to exceed in profit all the other commerce we have with the rest of the world. Every white man in our colonies finds employment for four times as many at home. Near half the shipping of Great Britain is employed in the commerce carried on with her American plantations. A time may come that our colonies may prove so potent and populous as to be able to succour their mother-country both with troops and with shipping in case of an unequal war with her enemies even in Europe itself.' A confirmation of Anderson's statement and forecasts may be found in Burke's speech on Conciliation with America. Prosperity and success beget self-confidence in indi- viduals and in nations. Clear-sighted Americans foretold the future greatness of their country provided that its peaceful development would not be interrupted by a French attack from Canada, which was very much feared. Prance possessed Canada and followed a poUcy of vigorous expan- sion by military means on the American continent. Friction between the French army and the American colonists was frequent, and the danger of French aggression was very real and very great. That danger was constantly in the minds of the colonists. The celebrated John Adams, who later on became President of the United States, wrote on October 12, 1755 : ' All creation is hable to change. Mighty States are not excepted. Soon after the Reforma- tion, a few people came over for Conscience sake. This apparently trivial incident may transfer the great seat of Empire into America. If we can remove the turbulent GalHcs, our people, according to the exactest calculations, will in another century become more numerous than England itself. All Europe will not be able to subdue us.' ' The turbulent Gallics ' held the American Colonies in constant awe and gave much trouble. War broke out 90 GEEAT AND GRBATEE BEITAIN between France and England, and the American Colonies were successfully invaded by French troops. The English troops, blundering about in a strange and wild country and employ- ing English barrack-square tactics against the wily enemy, were frequently defeated. They called for colonial assistance and American volunteers eagerly came to their aid. The colonials, being well acquainted with the peculiarities of their country and with forest warfare, saved the situation more than once, but they bitterly complained that they were treated as inferiors by the regular British officers and by the British Government, that they were rewarded for their services with indignity and contempt. Among the slighted officers who left the English service in disgust was George Washington. These complaints were justified. The attitude of the British Government towards the Americans was dictated by distrust and suspicion. It was thought good policy to let the colonials feel their social and political inferiority and their dependence on the Mother Country. Besides, it was thought to be dangerous to allow them to win victories. Under these circumstances the colonial assemWies were not very wilhng to assist England with money, which was harshly demanded by Downing Street and which was sure to be ill spent. Whilst British and Americans were quarrelling, one British defeat followed the other. It seemed likely that Great Britain would be supplanted on the American con- tinent by France unless the Colonies should support Great Britain with all their might. In 1757 the elder Pitt became Prime Minister. Rejecting the small-minded poUcy of his predecessors, Pitt resolved to rely on the willing patriotism of the colonists. In December 1757 he obtained the King's order that every colonial officer of no higher rank than colonel should have command equal with the British officers. He also abandoned the menace of taxing the Colonies by the English Parliament, and invited the Colonies WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE? 91 of New England, of New York, and of New Jersey, each without limit, to raise as many men as possible, believing them ' well able to furnish at least 20,000,' for the expe- dition against Montreal and Quebec, while Pennsylvania and the southern Colonies were to aid in conquering the west up to the Mississippi. Pitt's policy worked wonders. The American people enthusiastically sprang to arms, the American Assemblies voted the moneys that were required, and the French were soon totally defeated. The Peace of Paris of 1763 gave all Canada to England. The spectre of French invasion was laid for ever. The American colonists could feel secure in their country, and needed no longer the protection of the English army and especially of the English fleet. Fear breeds union, security disunion. Discerning states- men saw that England had made a mistake in freeing her Colonies from the dread of the French invasion. Before the Peace of Paris had been concluded, Choiseul, the Foreign Minister of France, said to Stanley, ' I wonder that your great Pitt should be so attached to the acquisition of Canada. The inferiority of its population will never allow it to be dangerous, and, being in the hands of France, Canada will always be of service to you. It will keep your colonies in that dependence which they will not fail to shake off the moment Canada shall be ceded.' After the cession of Canada had taken place, the French am- bassador, Vergennes, told various people, ' England will before long repent to have removed the only check which could keep her colonies in awe. Now they stand no longer in need of her protection. She will call on them to con- tribute towards supporting the burdens which they have helped to bring on her, and they will answer by shaking off all dependence.' There was indeed much reason for believing that the American Colonies might shake off their dependence, for during many years they had felt that dependence very 92 GEEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN acutely. The majority of Englishmen of the eighteenth century were cold-blooded utiUtarians. In the words of Bancroft, the great American historian, ' they regarded colonies, even when settled by men from their own land, only as sources of emoluments to the mother-country, and colonists as an inferior caste.' The Hon. George Grenville, First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer, cynically proclaimed, " Colonies are only settlements in distant parts of the world for the improvement of trade.' Adam Smith taught about that time, ' If any of the provinces of the British Empire cannot be made to con- tribute towards the support of the whole Empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending those provinces in time of war, and of sup- porting any part of their civil or military establishments in time of peace ! ' Many Englishmen desired to get rid of the American Colonies because they thought such a step would be monetarily profitable. Politically also the majority of Englishmen of the eighteenth century were dissatisfied with the American Colonies, whose claims to be treated not as inferiors, but as equals, to the Mother Country were thought to be im- pertinent. According to Bancroft, ' the idea of equality in political rights between England and the colonies could not be comprehended by the English officials of that day.' The Parhament of England claimed to be an ' Imperial Parliament,' and to be entitled to bind by its decisions not only England but also the Colonies, although these were not represented at Westminster. Therefore the differ- ences between the ' Imperial Parliament ' and the colonial legislatures were frequent, and these differences were apt to be decided in a rather high-handed manner by the EngUsh Parliament, which relied rather on force or on precedent than on common sense and on justice, and which rarely took the trouble to investigate seriously the colonial claims and proposals. WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE? 93 As early as 1640 had Massachusetts petitioned that the Acts of the colonial legislature should not be disallowed by the English Parliament unless such Acts violated the principle of the colonial dependence upon the Mother Country. The Americans frequently claimed that, on general principles, it was as flagrantly wrong for the British ParUa- ment to interfere with the special concerns of an American Colony as it would be for a colonial Parliament to interfere with the affairs of Great Britain. These arguments were quite unanswerable, but they fell on deaf ears. After all, one can convince only the intelligence but not the will. Although the colonists had protested continually against the assump- tion of the English Parliament to call itself an ' Imperial Parliament,' and to legislate for Colonies which were not represented in it and which had not authorised it to legislate on their behalf, it was only natural that the complaints contained in the American Declaration of Inde- pendence were directed not against the English Parliament but against the King. According to the letter of the Constitution the King was the head of the British Empire, and ParUament acted in his name. By complaining against the English Parliament the Americans would have admitted the supremacy of that body over the American legislature — a supremacy which they had strenuously denied. Hence all the complaints contained in the Declaration of Independence were directed against the King. Although the Americans ostensibly protested against the acts of the King, their quarrel was with the EngUsh Pariiament, and they had every reason to dishke that body. Bancroft tells us : ' ParUament esteemed itself the absolute master of America and, recognising no reciprocity of obUgations, it thought nothing so wrong as thwarting the execution of its will. It did not doubt its own superiority of intelligence, and to maintain its authority and reduce every refractory body to obedience, appeared to it the perfection of statesmanship and the true method of colonial reform.' 94 GBEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN The spirit and tone in which Parliament and the official classes in England treated the views of the colonists as expressed by their own elected representatives may be seen from the following characteristic passage : ' Your American AssembUes,' said Earl Granville, the President of the Privy Council, to Benjamin Franklin, ' slight the King's instructions. They are drawn up by grave men learned in the laws and Constitution of the realm ; they are brought into Council, thoroughly weighed, well con- sidered, and amended, if necessary, by the wisdom of that body ; and when received by the Government they are the laws of the land, for the King is the legislator of the colonies,' Long before the differences between America and England had become acute, there was among the Americans much dissatisfaction with England because the American Colonies had ceased to be unimportant settlements in savage lands which could be administered by routine and by order of Downing Street. The British Colonies of America had grown out of their old clothes. The organisa- tion of the British Empire was no longer adequate and required modernisation. Notwithstanding the dissatisfaction with the high-handed proceeding of the EngUsh Parliament and Goverrmient, the American Colonies had little desire to cut themselves adrift from the Motherland. On the contrary they clung to it with tenacious affection. Washington was convinced that ' not one thinking man in all North America desired iadependence,' and Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1768 : ' There is scarce a man, there is not a single native of our country, who is not firmly attached to his king by principle and by affection. But a new kind of loyalty seems to be required of us, a loyalty to Parliament ; a loyalty that is to extend, it is said, to a surrender of all our properties, whenever a House of Commons, in which there is not a single member of our choosing, shall think fit to grant WILL- THE COLONIES SECEDE? 95 them away without our consent. We were separated too far from Britain by the ocean, but we were imited to it by respect and love so that we could at any time freely have spent our lives and little fortunes in its cause ; but this unhappy new system of pohtics tends to dissolve those bands of union and to sever us for ever.' To the American colonists the old colonial system of administration had become distasteful and unbearable. They had come to consider a change in their relations with the Mother Country to be necessary. Hence they saw themselves placed before the alternative either of entering into a closer union with Great Britain or of separating from the Mother Country, and they wished to do the former. The unification of the Empire seemed to them the safest way of abolishing friction between the Colonies and the Mother- land. Therefore they desired that an Imperial ParUament in the true sense of the words, a Parliament representa- tive not only of England but of the whole Empire, should be assembled in London, and the simplest way to create such a Parliament seemed to the colonists that representa- tives chosen by America should be allowed to sit at Westminster. On December 22, 1764, Benjamin Franklin sent a letter to Governor Shirley, in which he wrote : ' Since the conversation your Excellency was pleased to honour me with on the subject of uniting the colonies more intimately with Great Britain by allowing them representatives in Parliament, I have somewhat further considered that matter, and am of opinion that such a union would be very acceptable to the colonies provided they had a reasonable number of representatives allowed them. ' I should hope that by such a union the people of Great Britain and the people of the colonies would learn to consider themselves as not belonging to different com- munities with different interests, but to one community with one interest; which I imagine will contribute to 96 GBEAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN strengthen the whole and greatly lessen the danger of future separation. ' It is, I suppose, agreed to be the general interest of ajoy State that its people be numerous and rich ; men enough to fight in its defence, and money enough to pay sufficient taxes to defray the charge, for these circumstances tend to the security of the State and its protection from foreign Powers, but is it of any importance to the State whether the manufacturer lives at Birmingham or Sheffield, or both places, since they are still within its bounds and their wealth and persons still at its command ? And if there be any difference, those who have most contributed to enlarge Britain's Empire and commerce and to increase her strength, her wealth, and the numbers of her people at the risk of their own lives and private fortunes in new and strange countries ought, methinks, rather to expect some preference.' Such was the attitude and these were the views and wishes of the leading Americans, but, although these wishes were reasonable, they were unfortunately unconditionally rejected by the ruhng politicians of England, who meant to keep their usurped monopoly of political power. Soame Jenyns, a Lord of Trade, published in 1765 a pamphlet rejecting the American proposals on behalf of the Govern- ment, in which the supremacy of the English Parliament throughout the Empire was asserted and in which the Colonies were unconditionally denied a voice in matters political. In that official exposition of the Enghsh views regarding the proposed creation of an Imperial Parliament and Senate representative of Motherland and Colonies we read : ' By their charters the colonies are undoubtedly no more than corporations, and therefore they have no more pretence to plead an exemption from parliamentary authority than any other corporation in England. ' One method indeed has been hinted at, and but one, that might render the exercsie of this power in a British WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE ? 97 Parliament just and legal, which is the introduction of representatives from the several colonies into that body. But I have lately seen so many specimens of the great power of speech of which these American gentlemen are possessed that I should be afraid the sudden importation of so much eloquence at once would endanger the safety and government of this country. In the end it will be much cheaper for us to pay their army than their orators.' With ironical banter the Colonies were told that they ought never to expect to be treated by England as equals, that they would never be allowed to participate in the government of the Empire in which they formed so important a part. Other Englishmen in high positions proclaimed with brutal directness that they would rather lose the Colonies than concede to the colonists a share in the government of the Empire. Charles Townshend, the First Lord of Trade and Plantations, one of the most influential states- men of his time, declared, for instance, in 1765, ' sooner than make of our Colonies our allies, I should wish to see them return to their primitive deserts,' and Lord Chancellor Northington, going a step further, said : ' My lords, the Colonies are become too big to be governed by the laws they at first set out with. If they withdraw allegiance, you must withdraw protection, and then the petty State of Genoa or the little kingdom of Sweden may run away with them.' Notwithstanding these slights, and the bitter provoca- tions by word and deed which they constantly received, the colonists wished to retain the connexion with England, As late as 1774, when the conflict had come to its height and when all hopes of settling peacefully the Anglo-American difficulties seemed to have vanished, the great ^amuel Adams said in his official instructions to Franklin on behalf of Massachusetts : * Colony begins to communicate freely with colonv. There is a common affection among them 98 GREAT AND GEBATER BRITAIN and shortly the whole continent will be as united in senti- ment and in their measure of opposition to tyranny as the inhabitants of this province. Their old good will and affection for the Mother Country are not totally lost ; if she returns to her former moderation and good humour their affections will divide. They wish for nothing more than a permanent union with her upon a condition of equal liberty. This is all they have been contending for, and nothing short of this will, or ought to, satisfy them." Unfortunately the English Goverrmient and Parhament hardened their hearts, and, following a purely selfish policy, they were determined not to conclude with the American Colonies that ' permanent union upon the condition of equal liberty ' which the colonists wished to conclude. All colonial offers made in that direction were haughtily rejected. Now let us cast a glance at the British Parhament and Government of the time who claimed to possess the power to rule America and let us especially examine their constitution, character and spirit. It was a part of the Englishman's creed that the British institutions were the most perfect in the world. Every Englishman esteemed himself his own master. He obeyed no laws but such as he seemed to have assisted in making. Unchecked absolutism in other lands, insular ignorance, and an exaggerated idea of the theoretical perfection of Enghsh representative government had obscured the great practical shortcomings of the British Government and Parliament to most Englishmen. Power was with the few. The people were swallowed up in the Lords and Commons who, though claiming to represent the people and to act on behalf of the majority of the people, were guided chiefly by their own interests. It is true that the House of Commons was composed of men elected by the people, but they were elected by the ignorant. The ' great heart of the people ' is not the best, organ for WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE ? !.»9 solving intricate political problems. Besides, in the eighteenth century the people were as much misrepre- sented in ParHament as they usually are. The ballot box is a most capricious instrument, and it seems to be beyond the wit of man to obtain by election a ParHa- ment truly representative of the nation. Legislators are only human. As self-interest is the strongest human motive, it was not unnatural in the eighteenth century, as in other centuries, that personal interests and Party interests were apt to prevail in Parhament over national interests and imperial interests. Besides, the orating poli- ticians were as vain and ambitious as they are now. In Bancroft's words : ' To promote British interests and command the applause of the British Senate, Enghsh statesmen were ready to infringe on the rights of other countries and even on those of the outlying dominions of the Crown. ' For them the applause at St. Stephen's weighed more than approval of posterity, more than the voice of God in the soul. That hall was the arena of glory, their battle- field for power. They pleaded before that tribunal, and not in the forum of humanity. They studied its majority to know on which side was " the best of the lay " in the contest of factions for office. How to meet Parliament was the minister's chief solicitude ; and sometimes, like the spendthrift at a gaming table he would hazard all his political fortunes on one position.' This being the constitution, character, and spirit of the English Government and Parliament, it was only natural that the American Colonies were treated unfairly, unjustly and unreasonably in London. Governmental and Parhamentary decisions regarding the Colonies did not depend on the merits of the case, but on the party requirements of the moment. The American Colonies became a pawn in the parliamentary game. W. S. Johnson, the colonial agent of Cormecticut, complained T: 2 100 GREAT AND GEEATBR BRITAIN in a letter to Pitkin, the governor of the colony, on February 12, 1767 : ' America was the theme in all companies, yet was discussed according to its bearings on personal ambition. Justice and prudence were lost sight of in imreflecting zeal for momentary victory. Men struggled for present advantage more than for any system of government, and the liberties of two milUons of their countrymen, the unity of the British Empire, were left to be swayed by the accidents of a parliamentary skirmish.' There was some truth in the complaint of the Hon. George Grenville, one of the leading statesmen of the time : ' The seditious spirit of the Colonies owes its birth to the factions of this House.' To make confusion worse, a series of weak and incapable statesmen, of men who owed their position rather to their inoffensive weakness, to their pUabUity and to their know- ledge how to please than to their ability and to their knowledge how to govern, guided the poUcy of Great Britain. At the most critical period of its history the British Empire was practically leaderless. If one compares the activity of Bute, Grenville, Rockingham, Grafton and Townshend, who between 1761 and 1770 directed the policy of Great Britain, it is difficult to decide who of these men was the feeblest, the most incapable and, as a statesman, the most contemptible ; and which of these four administrations was the worst. All was confusion in the English Government, and Choiseul, the implacable enemy of England, exultantly wrote : ' May the anarchy of the British Government last for ages.' Having examined the causes which during a long time had led to severe friction between England and her Colonies and had greatly embittered Anglo-American rela- tions, let us now study the genesis of the crisis in those relations and investigate the causes which eventually brought about the outbreak of the war and America's oecession. WILL, THE COLONIES SECEDE ? 101 With the conclusion of the Peace of Paris in 1763, the whole North American continent seemed secured to England, and a period of happiness and tranquillity seemed to be opening to the British Empire. ' Never,' in the words of the leading American historian, ' was there a moment when the affections of the colonists struggled more strongly towards England, or when it would have been easier for the Mother Country to have secured to herself all the benefits of their trade as well as the goodwill of their people.' Unfortunately the English Government, acting solely in the British interests, was short-sighted enough not to pay any attention to the sentiments and wishes of the Colonies. The great Anglo-French war had cost much money, and the EngUsh Pariiament, starting from the idea that it was supreme throughout the Empire and calling itself an Imperial Parliament, quite logically arrived at the con- clusion that England should recoup herself for her heavy war expenditure by taxing the American Colonies. How- ever, fearing to arouse America's opposition, the English Government abstained from laying heavy taxes upon the American trade and resolved to obtain money from the Americans by taxing not their commodities but their transactions by means of stamps which were henceforth to be attached to every document to make it valid. It was thought that such an indirect taxation would be less obtrusive and could besides less easily be resisted. On March 10, 1764, the Enghsh House of Commons adopted the resolution, 'That towards defraying the expenses of protecting and securing the Colonies, it may be proper to charge certain stamp duties in the Colonies.' The Hon. H. Seymour was the only member who at the time protested against the right of the Enghsh Parliament to tax the Americans. The American Colonies protested vigorously against being taxed without their consent in this artful and underhand 102 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN manner. They appealed to Magna Charta, according to ■which taxation required the consent of the taxed, they pifoved that in the light of Magna Charta this proceeding of the English Parhament was illegal, and they reminded the House of Commons that according to the ruUng of Chief Justice Coke, the father of English jurisprudence, ' An Act of Parliament contrary to Magna Charta is void.' However, the arguments and protests of the Colonies were unavailing. Practically the whole Parhament had resolved to tax the Americans. To answer their objections the Opposition were publicly called upon to deny, if they thought it fitting, the right of the English legislature to impose any tax, internal or ex- ternal, on the Colonies, and not a single person ventured to contradict that right. The English Parliament was determined to rely not on reason or on justice, but on paper rights and on force, in dealing with America. Every- thing was done to intimidate the colonists. They were apprised that not a single member of either House doubted of the right of Parliament to impose the Stamp Duty or any other tax upon the Colonies, and Charles Yorke, the Attorney- General, gave a very long and most elaborate defence of the Stamp Act, resting his argument on the supreme and sovereign authority of Parliament. The Colonies, he insisted with a vast display of legal erudition, were but corporations ; their power of legislation was but the power of making by-laws, subject to Parliamentary control. Their charters could not convey to them the legislative power of Great Britain, because the prerogative could not grant that power. The charters of the Colonial governments were but the King's standing commissions. The people of America could not be taken out of the general and supreme jurisdiction of Parliament. Lord Mansfield, the Lord Chief Justice of England, argued : ' There can be no doubt, my lords, but that the inhab- itants of the Colonies are as much represented in Parliament WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE ? 103 as the greatest part of the people of England are repre- sented. In all questions of property, the Americans have appealed to the Privy Council here, and such causes have been determined not by their law but by the law of Eng- land. The Colonies must remain dependent upon the jurisdiction of the Mother Country, or they must be totally dismembered from it.' The House of Lords accepted the arguments of Lord Mansfield as unanswerable, and it was decided as a question of law that irresponsible tax- ation was not tyranny but a vested right. Unfortunately the English Parliament was judge in its own cause. The opinions given by its legal advisers were bad law and worse justice. John Adams protested against the doctrine of the omnipotence of the English Parliament which presumed to call itself an Imperial Parliament and to act as such, although it represented only England and none of the Colonies. He said : 'If the Parliament of Great Britain had all the natural foimdations of authority, wisdom, goodness, justice, power, would not an unlimited subjection of three millions of people to that Parliament, at three thousand miles distance, be real slavery? The minister and his advocates call resistance to Acts of Par- liament treason and rebellion. But the people are not to be intimidated by hard words ; they know that, in the opinion of all the Colonies, Parliament has no authority over them, except to regulate their trade, and this merely by consent.' In the House of Commons, ' less resistance was made to the Stamp Act than to a common turnpike bill,' and it was passed without a formal division. The Lords passed it without debate, protest, division or amendment, nobody opposing it. Both Houses of Parliament were practically unanimous in their resolution to tax the American Colonies against their will. ' We might,' wrote Franklin, ' as well have hindered the sun's setting.' The King was too ill to ratify the Act in person. The character of his disease was concealed. According to Lord 104 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN Chesterfield the malady was no trifling one ; according to Walpole he was very seriously ill and in great danger. To a few only was the nature of his illness known. At the moment of passing the Stamp Act George III was insane. George III cannot be held responsible for the passing of that iniquitous measure. The Stamp Act aroused the greatest indignation in America. Eiots occurred, the stamps were seized and destroyed by the people, and the stamp ofiflcers had to flee for their lives. The English Parliament repealed the Stamp Act because taxation without representation violated the fundamental principles of the British Constitution and thus admitted the illegality of its action. However, with deplorable lack of logic, the repeal was preceded by an official declaration in which it was affirmed that ' the King in Parliament has power to bind the Colonies and people of America in all cases whatsoever.' Soon another attempt was made to tax the American Colonies without their consent. In 1767 the English Parliament voted taxes on glass, paper, painters' colours, lead and tea imported into America. After the repeal of the Stamp Duty and the acknowledgment of its illegality, the renewed attempts to tax the Colonies without their consent was an outrage. The colonists began to look upon the English Parliament with contempt and hatred. ' Up to this time the colonists had looked to Parliament as the bulwark of their hberties ; henceforward they knew it to be their most dangerous enemy,' wrote Bancroft. The Americans resolved not to drink tea in order to escape being taxed against their will. American tea importers sent back the chests of tea which were landed in the American harbours. ' The duty upon tea, with a great army to collect it, has produced in the southern part of America only £294 14s. ; in the northern part it has produced nothing. For the sake of a paltry revenue,' cried Lord Beauehamp, ' we lose the affections of two millions of people.' WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE ? 105 The English Government was determined not to be foiled by the Americans. In its bhnd obstinacy it resolved to compel America to drink tea. Orders were given to land tea by force, in the expectation that tea-drinkers would soon begin to buy it, but that step had unexpected consequences. Being continually harassed and ill-treated, seeing aU their proposals of an imperial union by an Imperial Parliament rejected, and seeing no hope of receiving justice at the hands of the Motherland by patient representation, the Colonies were at last compelled by the English Parhament to meet force with force. The tea in Boston harbour which was to be poured down the throats of the Americans against their will was thrown into the sea. The Enghsh Parliament retaliated by billeting soldiers in Boston, and by shutting up its port until the tea destroyed was paid for. Bloodshed followed, and at last the outraged Colonies flew to arms to get rid of their tormentors. Thus were the American Colonies driven into rebellion by the action of Parhament. The English Parhament had received many emphatic warnings, but it had refused to heed them. Benjamin Franklin, the greatest well-wisher to England, who acted as America's envoy in London, had in vain warned the Government and Parliament of the inevitable results of their provocative measures. His statements in the House of Commons were not believed. The French envoy reported in August 1768 to Choiseul : ' Frankhn has for years been predicting to the Ministers the necessary consequences of the American measures. He is a man of rare inteUigence and weU-disposed to England, but fortunately he is very httle consulted.' Franklin was treated with contempt by Government and Parliament, and notwithstanding his transparent honesty of purpose his words were not credited. Franklin wrote : ' The British Ministry over-reach them- selves by not believing me. Speaking the truth to them in sincerity was my only finesse.' To the deUght of her enemies England was destroying the Empire, and her 106 GBEAT AND GBEATEE BEITAIN enemies hastened to assist in the process. After a conver- sation of six hours with a person intimately acquainted with America, Choiseul wrote to Du Chatelet in July 1768, ' We must put aside projects and must now act. My idea is to examine the possibility of a treaty of commerce both of importation and exportation between France and America, the obvious advantages of which might draw the Americans towards us. Will it not be possible to give them at the critical moment an inducement powerful enough to detach them at once from the motherland ? ' Encouraged and aided by England's enemies, the Americans began their resistance. Up to that time the thirteen English colonies in America had been by no means united. Governor Shirley of Massachusetts reported in 1755 : ' If it is considered how different the present constitutions of the respective governments are from each other, how much the interests of some of them clash, and how opposed their tempers are, a coalition among the American Colonies will seem highly improbable.' Benjamin Franklin had written to Hume in 1760 : ' That their growth may render them dangerous, I have not the least conception. They have already fourteen separate governments on the maritime coast of the continent, and shall probably have as many more behind them on the inland side. Their jealousy of each other is so great that they have never been able to effect a union among themselves nor even to agree in requesting the mother country to establish it for them. If they eould not agree to unite for their defence against the French and Indians, who were perpetually harassing their people, is there any danger of their uniting against their own nation which they all love much more than they love one another ? ' Such a union is impossible without the most grievous tyranny and oppression. People who have in a country property which they may lose and privileges which they may endanger are generally disposed to be quiet, and even WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE ? 107 to bear much, rather than hazard all. While the government is mild and just, while important civil and religious rights are secure, such subjects will be dutiful and obedient. The waves do not rise but when the winds blow.' The war which began between the American Colonies and the Motherland was in reality a war between the American Colonies and the EngUsh House of Parliament. It was a national war on the part of America, but a parliamentary war on the part of England. The great Burleigh, Lord Sahsbury's ancestor, had said more than three centuries ago : ' England can never be undone unless by its Parliament.' His saying proved true. Parlia- ment ahenated America. It should be mentioned that during the latter part of the Anglo-American conflict, and especially on the out- break of hostihties, George III wished to subdue America by force, and that Lord North, who in 1770 became Prime Minister, supported the King's pohcy. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that Parliament caused the conflict, and was mainly responsible for it. Therefore the great Lord Chatham exclaimed in the House of Lords : ' The people of America look upon Parliament as the authors of their miseries,' and addressing the House of Commons he said : ' Power without right is a thing hateful in itself and ever inchning to its fall. Tyranny is detestable in every shape, but in none so formidable as when it is assumed and exercised by a number of tyrants.' So firmly was Lord Chatham convinced of it that the Enghsh Parhament had driven the Americans into revolt by its injustice that he said, addressing Parhament : ' Resistance to your acts was as necessary as it was just ; and your vain declarations of the omnipotence of Parhament, and the imperious doctrines of the necessity of submission will be found equally im- potent to convince or to enslave your fellow-subjects in America who feel that tyranny whether ambitioned by an individual part of the legislature or the bodies who 108 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN compose it is equally intolerable to British subjects.' Parliament, not the King, who was only partly responsible for his actions, lost the ■ American Colonies to Great Britain. It may be said that from the technical point of view, from the lawyer's point of view, the English ParUament was justified in its uncompromising and overbearing attitude towards the Colonies. It is true that from the days of King William III there was a steady line of precedents of opinion that America, like Ireland, should provide in whole, or at least in part, for the support of its military estabhshment. It is also true that, as we have seen in the foregoing, all the greatest Enghsh lawyers had main- tained England's right to tax the Colonies. However, hving men cannot be ruled by the doctrines, precedents, rules, decisions and views of the dead and buried past. America appealed to England not in order to obtain law but to obtain that justice and fair treatment to which she was entitled as a member of the British Empire. Eeplying to the legal advisers of the Crown and their strictly legal interpretations of the relations between Colonies and Motherland, Lord Chatham indignantly ex- claimed : ' I distrust the refinements of learning which faU to the share of so small a number of men. Providence has taken better care of our happiness, and has given us in the simplicity of common sense a rule for our direction by which we shall never be misled.' It is dangerous for a great nation to rely for guidance in political matters on the abstruse doctrines taught by a few scientists. Had the Enghsh Parhament and Government been guided by practical wisdom, it would have been struck by the curious fact that, whilst all the leading EngUsh lawyers proved the justice of England's poHcy, aU the leading American lawyers proved equally strongly its illegaUty. In practical pohtics, and especially in great national questions, there is a better guide than the WILL THE COLONIES SECEDE? > 109 scientist with his doctrines and laws which the next genera- tion laughs at. Unfortunately Lord Chatham's warnings, his prophecies of disaster and his passionate appeals to unify the Empire before it was too late, fell on deaf ears. In 1775, the year before the American Declaration of Independence, he implored the Government to satisfy the just claims of the colonists, and he said in the course of his speech : ' Such a national and principled union cannot be resisted by the tricks of office or Ministerial manoeuvres. Laying of papers on your table, or counting numbers in a division, will not avert or postpone the hour of danger. It must arise.' Unfortunately English politicians of that time rehed on the ' tricks of office ' instead of relying on justice and fairness, and in short-sighted selfishness they threw away the most valuable possessions of England, The hour of danger arrived, and the British Empire was dismembered. Will the reduced British Empire continue to exist in its present extent, or will a second dismemberment take place ? It is difficult to believe that such a second dismember- ment can be avoided unless the Empire be unified and be directed by an Imperial Parliament and Cabinet representative of the whole Empire. Our Colonies claim, and rightly claim, to be given a voice and a share in the administration of the British Empire. They plead for unity, but their proposals are being ignored. Will the tragedy of Colonial secession be repeated? The times are serious. A few years may decide the fate of the British Empire. Let us hope that the English Parhament will learn in time the lesson of history CHAPTBB VI BRITISH INDUSTRY, LABOUR, EMIGRATION AND POVERTY Free Traders never tire of telling us that the British workers are the happiest and most prosperous workers in the world. They tell us that Free Trade means high wages, that our workers receive the highest wages in Europe, and that these high wages go much further in this country than they would in any other country, because the cost of living is much lower in Great Britain than anywhere else, thanks to Free Trade. These assurances are, as a rule, supported by statistics according to which British workers earn on an average about thirty-five shillings a week, whereas the workers in protected countries, such as Germany and France, earn considerably less. Unfortunately, the statements and statistics which are habitually given by Free Traders in proof of the prosperity of our workers are not in accordance with the facts. The high British wages which are usually quoted are the wages paid to a minority of our workers. They are paid to a relatively small number of Trade Unionists, who occupy an exceptionally favourable position among our workers, and in giving these high wage figures no allowance is ever made for frequent and prolonged spells of unemployment, which reduce the high nominal wages of our Trade tFnionists to a substantially lower level. Great Britain has more than 12,000,000 wage-earners. Of these only about 2,000,000 are Trade Unionists. Let us leave aside the deceptive Trade Union statistics, which 110 INDUSTEY, EMIGEATION AND POVERTY 111 apply only to a favoured section — one-sixth, if not less — of our workers ; let us examine the general national con- dition of labour in Great Britain, and let us then glance at the conditions of labour in other countries. Such an examination will show that our workers are not better off, but are probably much worse off, than are the workers in the great industrial and protectionist countries. Adam Smith taught : ' In a country where the funds destined for the maintenance of labour are sensibly decay- ing, every year the demand for servants and labourers would, in all the different classes of employments, be less than it had been the year before. Many who had been bred in the superior classes, not being able to find employment in their own business, would be glad to seek it in the lowest. The lowest class being not only overstocked with its own workmen, but with the overflowings of all the other classes, the competition for employment would be so great in it as to reduce the wages of labour to the most miserable and scanty subsistence of the labourer. . . . The liberal reward of labour, therefore, as it is the necessary effect, so it is the natural symptom of increasing national wealth. The scanty maintenance of the labouring poor, on the other hand, is the natural symptom that things are at a stand, and their starving conditions that they are going fast backwards.' I am afraid that Adam Smith's description applies to a very large part of our workers. We can easily ascertain whether, as the Free Traders assert, our workers are well employed, well paid, and prosperous, or whether they are not well employed, ill paid, and poor. In a country in which wages are high and prices low there should be little poverty. Nevertheless, the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman told us on June 5, 1903 : • Thanks to the patience and accurate scientific investiga- tions of Mr. Eowntree and Mr. Charles Booth, we know that there are about 30 per cent, of our population under-paid 112 GEEAT AND GEEATBB BRITAIN on the verge of hunger.' Free Traders have tried in vain to explain away that fearfully damaging statement of their leader, which rather understated than overstated the case. In the ninth volume of Mr. Booth's work * Life and Labour of the People ' we read on page 427 : ' The result of all our inquiries makes it reasonably sure that one-third of the population are on or about the line of poverty, or are below it, having at most an income which, one time with another, averages twenty-one shillings or twenty-two shillings for a smaU family^(or up to twenty-five or twenty-six for one of larger size), and in many cases falling much below this level.' I would draw attention to the fact that the average earnings of at most twenty-one shillings to twenty-two shillings apply not to one-third of our wage-earners, but to one-third of our wage-earners' families ; that the scanty income of twenty-one shillings to twenty- two shillings a week which is ' enjoyed ' by one-third of our workers is earned by the united exertions of all the members of the family. On page 21, Volume II, of his work, Mr. Booth gives us the result of his investigations into the labour conditions of London in the following summary : Conditions of Popxtlation op London In lowest poverty Very poor .... Poor ..... Working olaas (comfortable) Middle and upper classes Per cent. 37,610 0-9 316,834 7-5 938,293 22-3 2,166,503 51-5 749,930 17-8 4,209,170 100 Inmates of Institutions (workhouses, hospitals, etc.) 99,830 4,309,000 In explanation of the foregoing table, Mr. Booth writes in Volume I, page 33 : 'By- the word " poor " I mean to INDUSTEY, EMIGEATION AND POVEETY 113 describe those who have a suf&ciently regular, though bare, income, such as eighteen shilhngs to twenty-one sluUings per week for a moderate family ; and by " very poor " those who, from any cause, fall much below this standard. My " poor " may be described as hving under a struggle to obtain the necessaries of hfe and make both ends meet ; while the " very poor " Hve in a state of chronic want.' According to Mr. Booth's investigations no less than 8-4 per cent, of the people of London, or 354,444 men, women, and children, lived in chronic want, subsisting, at the time of Mr. Booth's investigations (between 1887 and 1892), on less than eighteen shillings a week per family, whilst 22-3 per cent, of the people of London, or 938,293 men, women, and children subsisted on less than twenty- one shillings per family. We can gauge the depth of the poverty of these people only if we remember that London is the most expensive town in Great Britain. As the real wages of unskilled labour have scarcely risen during the last fifteen years, I think that poverty has not seriously diminished in London since the time when Mr. Booth made his investigation ; possibly it has increased. In the autumn of 1899, at a time when, as Mr. Eown- tree tells us, trade in York was uiausually prosperous, that gentleman made, by house-to-house visits, a most painstaking investigation into the labour conditions of York — a town which, according to Mr. Eowntree, is ' fairly representative of the conditions existing in many, if not most, of our provincial towns.' He divided the cases of poverty into two classes : primary and secondary poverty. Families living in primary poverty are by his classification those ' whose total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency.' Mr. Eowntree arrived at the conclusion that of the total population of York, 9"91 per cent, were living in primary poverty and that 17"93 per cent, were hving in secondary poverty. 114 GEEAT AND GEEATER BEITAIN Whilst Mr. Booth found that 30-7 per cent, of the people were living in poverty in London, Mr. Eowntree found that 27-84 per cent, of the people were living ia poverty in York, and it seems more than a coincidence that both investi- gators, working on independent and different lines, and in different towns, arrived at so closely similar results. Indeed, Mr. Booth wrote to Mr. Eowntree on July 25, 1901 : ' I have long thought that other cities, if similarly tested, would show a percentage of poverty not differing greatly from that existing in London. Your most valuable inquiry confirms me in this opinion.' It should be borne in mind that both Mr. Booth and Mr. Eowntree exclude from their census of poverty the large army of the poorest of the poor who live in workhouses, lunatic asylums, and other institutions. If these be added, the percentage of people living in poverty would be very materially increased. On page 117, Mr. Eowntree sums up the result of his investigations as follows : ' It was found that families comprising 20,302 persons, equal to 43-4 per cent, of the wage-earning class, and to 27-84 per cent, of the total population of the city, were living in poverty.' If, in autumn 1899, during ' unusually prosperous times,' 27-84 per cent, of the inhabitants, and 43*4 per cent, of the workers, in a representative provincial town were living in poverty, how great, then, must be the prevalence of poverty among our workers at the present moment, when employment is very bad ! Now let us look into British wages. The Labour Department of our Board of Trade might properly be called a Trade Union Labour Department because, in respect of unemployment, wages, &c., it takes into its purview only the two milhon Trade Unionists, and takes practically no notice of the ten millions of unorganised workers. The wages statistics which are regularly issued by the Board of Trade are exclusively Trade Union statistics. However, some official estimates INDUSTEY, EMIGEATION AND POVERTY 115 of general wages are available which show the deplorable and pitiful state of our wage-earners as a whole. On page 10 of the Pinal Report of the Royal Commission on Labour, published in 1894, we read : ' Nearly 24 per cent, of men hi employment receive wages not exceeding twenty shillings a week.' What will be the real average wage of these 24 per cent, of our working men if allowance is made for short time and unemployment ? The very conscientious Mr. Rowntree gives the follow- ing statement regarding labourers' wages in York in 1899, a year of unusual prosperity : ' Allowing for broken time, the average wage for labour in York is from eighteen shillings to twenty-one shillings ; whereas the minimum expenditure necessary to maintain in a state of physical efficiency a family of two adxilts and three children is twenty-one shillings and eightpence, or, if there are four children, the sum required would be twenty-six shillings. It is thus seen that the wages paid for linskilled labour in York are insufficient to provide food, shelter, and clothing adequate to maintain a family of moderate size in a state of bare physical efficiency. The above estimate of necessary mini- mum expenditure (twenty-one shillings and eightpence per week) is based upon the assumption that the diet is even less generous than that allowed to able-bodied paupers in the York workhouse, and that no allowance is made for any expenditure other than that absolutely required for the maintenance of merely physical efficiency.' Messrs. Oadbury and Shann write in their book ' Sweat- ing ' : ' The average wage for an unskilled labourer in this country is from 17s. 6d. to £1 per week, so that even with regular work such a man cannot keep himself and his family above the poverty line. . . . Generally, in the United King- dom an unskilled labourer does not obtain a wage to enable him to keep himself and family in a state of efficiency — that is, he is a sweated worker. ... An unskilled woman's wage is about 10s. per week. . . . The present system tends I 2 116 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN to continually recruit the ranks of the inefficient from the class above them. Their wages being so low leaves them no margin from which to make provision for sickness, unemployment, or old age.' The foregoing statements and figures of Messrs. Booth, Rowntree, and others, which have never seriously been challenged, prove that poverty, appalling in magnitude and in severity, prevails among our workers, who, according to the Free Trade text-books, are the most highly paid and the most prosperous workers in the world, and that this poverty is largely due to the fact that the wages of our unskilled and unorganised workers are quite insufficient to provide the indispensable minimum of food, shelter, and clothing. They prove that millions of our workers can obtain better food, clothes, and shelter in the workhouse than they can provide by the work of their hands. We have a standing army of 1,200,000 paupers, and our permanent and occasional paupers number together at least 3,000,000. Our paupers are maintained at a yearly cost of about £30,000,000 to the community, and were it not for the Draconic administration of our poor- laws all our workhouses would be overcrowded by workers who would gladly exchange freedom and starvation wages for the confinement of the workhouse. No other nation has an army of paupers similar to that of Great Britain. Men who earn a precarious sovereign a week cannot save money for their old age. Hence the workhouse is the refuge of the old and the infirm. According to Mr. Booth's estimate in his work ' The Aged Poor,' ' amongst the working classes and small traders the rate of pauperism for all over fifty-five is not less than 40 to 45 per cent.' Is there any other country in the world where more than 40 per cent, of the workers are underfed, where there are 3,000,000 paupers, and where one-half of the veterans of industry have to Hve on charity ? Can it be beheved that wages are high and prices low in this country, seeing that INDUSTEY, EMIGRATION AND POVERTY 117 more than 40 per cent, of our workers are living in poverty? Can it be believed that more than 40 per cent, of German, French, or American workers are hving in poverty ? The Free Traders know quite well that their statements about the great prosperity of the British workers are contrary to fact. If the British workers enjoyed simultaneously high wages and low prices, if the British working men were those happy, well-fed individuals described by the Free Traders, the Free Traders would not be so foolish as to rely in their opposition to Tariff Reform on the ' big loaf ' argument, a pauper argument which appeals only to men who live on bread and dripping and on an occasional herring or a piece of bacon or of cheese washed down with inferior tea. The prosperous working men would not be frightened by a highly problematical rise of a fraction of a penny in the price of the loaf, but laugh at the ' dear bread ' cry. Now, the question arises : How is it that more than 40 per cent, of our workers live in poverty ? Is their poverty due to their own misconduct or to outer circum- stances ? Mr. Booth analysed with very great care 4076 representative cases of poverty, and the result of his analysis is embodied in the following table : Analysis of 4076 Cases of Povbbty Loafers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Drink 553 Casual, irregular, and low-paid work . . . . . . 2546 Illness, infirmity, large families . . .. .. .. 917 4076 It will be noticed that the percentage of poverty which is due to drink is small, and it must be questioned whether more often poverty is the result of drink or drink the result of poverty. In the Report on Physical Deteriora- tion we read : ' People who have not enough food turn to drink to satisfy their cravings, and also to support their 118 GREAT AND GEEATBR BRITAIN enfeebled hearts by alcohol. . . . The poor often drink to get the effects of a good meal. They mistake the feeling of stimulation after alcohol for the feeling of nutrition. They turn to it to blunt their sensibility to squalor.' It will be noticed that out of 4076 cases of poverty, 2546, or 62-5 per cent., were due to casual, irregular, and low-paid employment. Mr. Rowntree analysed in York 1465 cases of great poverty, and he arrived at the result that 729 cases, or 57*10 per cent., were due to unemploy- ment, irregular employment, and Hi-paid employment. In winter 1905-6, the Charity Organisation Society investigated 2000 cases of distress in West Ham, and, if we allow for 12-6 per cent, of people who were found to be not in distress, it appears that 55-4 per cent, were in distress owing to ' slackness of trade.' How is it, then, that a considerable part of our workers, the skilled Trade Unionists, receive very good wages whUst the large majority of our workers receive low and very low wages ? I will let Lord Brassey, a very prominent Free Trader and a large employer of labour, furnish a reply. He wrote in his book ' Work and Wages,' on page 155 : ' The rate of wages in England is limited by the necessity of competi- tion with foreign manufacturers. Employers, in England as elsewhere, only employ labour on the assumption that they can realise a profit by their business.' The wages in Great Britain are low in consequence of Free Trade. They are low in those industries in which foreign manufacturers and producers compete freely, and they are high in those industries which are naturally or artificially protected against foreign competition. The wages throughout our coal trade and our building trade are high. Our coal industry is protected against foreign com- petition, by the fact that the coal mines of foreign countries lie so far inland on the continents of Europe and America that the competition of foreign coal in the British market is at present out of the question. The building trade is still INDUSTEY, EMIGRATION AND POVERTY 119 more strongly protected by the fact that though one can import cement, bricks, and timber, one cannot import houses from abroad. On the other hand, in the engineering trade, cotton trade, woollen trade, chemical trade, &c. — trades in which foreign nations freely compete in the British market — general wages are low, ranging from eighteen shillings to twenty-five shillings for the large body of general workers, and they are higher in these trades only among those skilled men who, through the strength of their organisations, have created an artificial scarcity of their labour, and who, by limiting the number of apprentices, &e., have protected their members against that free competition which is the ideal of the Free Traders. It is therefore clear that practically in all cases where British wages are high, they are not high owing to Free Trade, but in spite of Free Trade — that they are high in consequence of Protection given in some form or other. Free Trade, free competition, has not only the effect of levelling down wages to the level of the lowest wages of competing countries, but of converting our highly skilled and highly paid workers into badly paid unskilled labourers. This process was excellently described by one of our Free Traders, Mr. RusseU Rea, M.P., an unwilling witness to the effectiveness of foreign Protection in creating unemployment and ill-paid emplo3rment in Great Britain, in a paper which he read before the recent Free Trade Congress. He stated : ' The nationalistic Protectionist politician decrees that a portion of the capital and labour of his country shall be diverted to particular industries. These industries come into existence. The articles invariably selected for a protec- tive taxation are the particular articles which we English are supplying in the greatest quantities, and apparently with the greatest profit to ourselves. Thus one British manufacturer after another has seen many of his markets restricted, and some lost entirely. He has seen that foreign Protectionist Governments, by the imposition of Protectionist 120 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN tariffs, not only determine the distribution of capital and the emplojTuent of labour in their own country, but in our country too. In their own country they do this in a manner which their fellow-countrymen approve, as apparently to their advantage ; but as regards our country they do it in a manner which is certainly an immediate, and sometimes a permanent, injury to individuals and individual trades ; and their express and avowed object is to injure. . . . The direction of our activities has therefore been in con- siderable part determined by the action of others, and that the deHberately hostile action of Protectionist States.' Foreigners determine, indeed, whether British workers should grow wheat in the sunshine or raise coal in the bowels of the earth, whether they should produce delicate manu- factures and earn thirty-five shillings a week or load and unload goods at the docks and earn starvation wages. Foreign tariffs are graduated in accordance with the labour contained in the various articles imported. For instance, the duties on cotton yarn are low, those on coarse cotton cloth are higher, and those on fine cotton goods are highest. Thus foreign tariffs give a progressive protection not to the capitalist, as we have been told, but to national labour. In consequence of this arrangement of foreign tariffs their effect is to shut out of protected countries our highly finished articles and to let in raw materials and those coarse articles of manufacture which are produced by coarse and ill-paid labour. I will give an example of the effect of foreign tariffs which should interest Free Traders. Jam and pickles are two articles the growing exportation of which has triumphantly been pointed out by our Free Traders as an evidence of the success of Free Trade. Mr. Winston Churchill said in a speech which will be found on page 105 of his book ' For Foreign Trade ' *: ' " Think," Mr. Chamberlain said, " of an Empire founded on jam and pickles." But, gentlemen, I still believe that the country in which the superfine processes INDUSTEY, EMIGRATION AND POVERTY 121 are performed is the country which possesses what may be called commercial leadership.' The superfine process of making jam and pickles is carried on mainly by girls who earn on an average the pitiful wage of from eight shillings to ten shillings per week. If we study the list of our exportations to Germany, it appears that these consist mainly of raw materials and food, such as coal, gold, silver, copper, hides, wool, fish, and of manufactured articles of the coarsest kind, such as cotton and woollen yarn, unbleached cotton cloth, &c. Germany lets into her country chiefly colonial and foreign raw products which come via England and the produce of our unskilled labour, whilst we buy from Germany chiefly fully manufac- tured articles produced by her skilled artisans. Thus the Anglo- German trade has the tendency to raise a large number of highly paid artisans in Germany and to degrade the highly skilled artisans of Great Britain to the ranks of unskilled labour. Foreign tariffs on the higher-grade articles produced by British workers lead in the first place to a restriction in our exports of these high-grade articles to foreign countries. The articles which used to be made in Great Britain for export are, in consequence of the tariff, made by our competitors. These obtain a monopoly in their protected markets, and when their production exceeds the requirements of their home market they invade with their surplus produce in the first place the market of Great Britain, which they can enter free of duty, and there they create additional un- employment among our skilled workers. Thus Free Trade causes more or less severe unemployment among the highly skilled workers of this country. The way in which foreign tariffs cause, firstly, unemploy- ment among our skilled workers, whom they drive into the ranks of unskilled labourers, and then bring about the decline and decay of our industries, is well described on pages xviii and Iv of the ' Report on Depression of Trade,' which 122 GEEAT AND GEEATBR BRITAIN states : ' We are disposed to think that one of the chief agencies which have tended to perpetuate this state of things is the protective pohcy of so many foreign countries. The high prices which Protection secures to the producers within the protected area naturally stimulate production and impel them to engage in competition in foreign markets. The surplus production which cannot find a market at home is sent abroad, and in foreign markets undersells the com- modities produced under less artificial conditions. . . . We think that insufficiency of employment is the most serious feature of the existing depression ; and it is an important, indeed an anxious, question whether, in the face of the ever- increasing invasion of our home markets by foreign pro- ductions admitted duty free, we shall be able to command a sufficiency of employment for our rapidly growing population. The great difficulty consists no longer as of old in the scarcity and dearness of the necessaries and conveniences of life, but in the struggle for an adequate share of that employment which affords to the great bulk of the population their only means of obtaining a title to a sufficiency of those necessaries and conveniences, however plentiful and cheap they may be. The effect upon this country of foreign tariffs and bounties is to narrow the market for our manufactures, and so to cramp the exercise of our industries and to arrest their growth, to render the employment of those engaged in them partial and irregular and very seriously to limit our total production of exchangeable wealth. It is on many accounts impossible for those whose industry is thus checked to turn to the production of " something else " which will be accepted in exchange, but primarily for the simple reason that those tariffs are now appUed to almost every exportable product of British industry. Nor can any efforts of producers, however intelligent or energetic, lessen these difficulties ; for every improvement made by them is at once appropriated by their foreign competitors through the purchase of Enghsh machinery and the engagement for a time of English INDUSTEY, EMIGRATION AND POVERTY 123 superintendents. On the contrary, it is inevitable that any industry which is engaged in a hopeless struggle against insuperable difficulties must sooner or later fall into a condition of languor and of decreasing ability to meet com- petition. Those engaged in it lose heart and hope ; capital and talent are gradually withdrawn from it ; and as it offers reduced remuneration and a diminished prospect of advance- ment to skilled labour, the quality of the labour employed in it tends continually to decUne and its productions deteriorate.' According to the theories of our Free Traders the labour displaced by free imports turns to ' some more profitable employment.' This is a ridiculous misstatement of facts. The floating capital put, let us say, into the woollen industry by way of a loan to a mill may be transferred to some more profitable branch without difficulty and without loss. It may, for instance, be used for financing a woollen mill in France, Germany, or the United States. The fixed capital invested in the buildings and machinery of British mills is largely lost through depreciation or through the closing of mills, and the workers who are dismissed do not turn to a more profitable employment, but drift into the ranks of unskilled and casual labour. After trying in vain to find work at other mills, the dismissed artisans take up any odd job. They become porters, general labourers, dock labourers, carmen, &c. Some sell bootlaces in the street and become loafers. Many of those who are young and strong emigrate. The constant creation of unskilled labour in Great Britain causes a great superfluity of that labour. It causes a constant underbidding of workers and a decline of wages among these workers not merely to the level of competing countries, but to the minimum level of subsistence — to the starvation level. The consequence of this state of affairs is that the wages for unskilled labour are considerably lower in Great Britain than they are in Germany. According to 124 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN the last report of our Consul at Frankfort, the German chemical industries are transferring their works to Great Britain, not only because of the Patent Law but more especially because the chemical manufacturers have dis- covered that general wages are lower in Great Britain than they are in Germany. In its last report the Berhn Chamber of Commerce complained that the ready-made clothes trade was leaving Berlin for London because wages are lower over here than they are in Germany. The Free Traders who, desiring to extol the blessings of Free Trade, tell us that clothes are cheaper in Great Britainthan they are in Germany or the United States, omit to say that these cheap British clothes are only too often made by sweated labour. Wages are lowest and poverty is greatest among our un- skilled workers, who, as dock labourers, porters, carters, &o., live not on production, but on trade, and especially on our foreign trade. Free Trade replaces our home trade by foreign trade ; it converts the regularly employed skilled productive worker into a casually employed and miserably paid trader's help, a two-legged beast of burden ; and it is a poor consolation for us to contemplate and admire the great growth of our foreign trade, a growth which is due to the decay of part of our industries. Our manufacturing industries must have a market somewhere. Before the time when Free Trade had destroyed our agriculture, our manu- factured articles were exchanged for British corn and meat, and our foreign trade was small. Since our agriculture has decayed, British manufactures have to be exchanged for American corn and meat. Through the ruin of our agricul- ture our foreign trade has become large, and ' Look at our prosperity ! ' ' Enormous foreign trade ! ' ' Great Britain is rolling in wealth ! ' cries the Free Trader. It must be doubted whether we were wise in hghtly throwing away the security of our prosperous and expansible home market in order to gain scattered and precarious foreign markets, especially as international crises, which INDUSTEY, EMIGRATION AND POVERTY 125 occur periodically and which seem unavoidable, such as the one through which we have been recently passing, affect far more severely the very sensitive foreign than the sturdy home trade, especially when the home trade is protected by well- devised tariffs. Our exports to protected countries consist of raw materials, such as coal, hides, clay, &c., of coarse, partly manufactured goods, such as yam and unbleached cotton cloth, and of fully manufactured articles. The raw materials and the partly manufactured articles which we export are necessaries to foreign nations, and they are largely bought in good and in bad times, but many of our fully manufactured goods are luxuries to foreigners. For instance, an American who wants a suit of genuine Harris tweed will gladly pay two or three pounds more in times of great prosperity, but he will buy a cheaper American tweed suit in bad times. The same apphes to machinery and many other fully manufactured articles of exportation. In good times, when everyone is making money and cost is not counted, foreigners may cheerfully pay more for British than for domestic productions, and the protective tariff becomes ineffective. But in bad times British exports, and especially exports of fully manufactured articles which are luxuries to protected foreign nations, are cut off as with a knife. Then the protective tariff becomes a prohibitive tariff. In times of international depression our industries can no longer export freely, the British home market becomes over-stocked with goods which cannot be sold abroad, prices fall, and, in addition, foreign surplus manufactures are sold in Great Britain at whatever they will fetch and depress prices still further. And whilst our ' consumers,' the men with money in their pockets, rejoice at the cheapness of things, our producers are thrown out of work by the hundred thousand, and unemployment means distress and starvation for them because the majority of our workers receive such low wages that they cannot save much for a rainy day. They pawn their belongings, break up their 126 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN homes to provide food and fuel, and destitution becomes terribly prevalent. The different standpoints and interests of consumers and producers during times of depression are well described in the ' Report of the Royal Commission on Depression of Trade.' We read on page xi of that report : ' Those who may be said to represent the producer have mainly dwelt upon the restriction, and on the absence of profit, in their respective businesses. It is from this class, and more especially from the employers of labour, that the complaints chiefly proceed. On the other hand, those classes of the population who derive their incomes from foreign investments or from property not directly connected with productive industries, appear to have little ground of complaint ; on the contrary, they have profited by the remarkably low prices of many commodities.' Unfortunately, our Free Traders look at our economic problem chiefly from the point of view of the trader and of the moneyed private purchaser. They take a greater interest in our foreign trade, which is carried on by the few, than in our domestic production, which is carried on by the million. They take a greater interest in the cheapness of ' commodities ' than in the welfare of those men who produce them. Free Traders have the boldness to assert that there is much less unemployment in Great Britain than in protected countries such as the United States and Germany. I shall prove that unemployment has become chronic in Great Britain, in consequence of the policy of Free Trade which places cheapness above happiness, private profit above national power and security, and goods above men ; which sacrifices the producer to the consumer and the health and strength of the nation to the ' profit ' made in foreign trade. I shall prove that in no industrial country in the world is there such widespread and such permanent unemployment as in Great Britain, and that the prevalence of that INDUSTEY, EMIGEATION AND POVERTY 127 widespread unemployment coincides with the rise of Free Trade. Adam Smith wrote in his ' Wealth of Nations ' : ' The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country is the increase of the number of its inhabitants. . . . The value of children is the greatest of all encouragements to marry. . . . The demand for men, Uke that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men ; quickens it when it goes on too slowly, and stops it when it advances too fast.' Translating Adam Smith's epigrams into modern language, I would state : The chief cause of emigration is unemployment and ill-paid employment. Workers migrate from countries where employment is bad to countries where employment is good. Hence the state of employment in a country may best be measured by the emigration and immigration returns. Before the introduction of Free Trade emigration from Great Britain was small. Since the intro- duction of Free Trade about 12,000,000 British people have left this country, and of these about 10,000,000 people have remained in the United States and in our Colonies. Lately emigration from this country has been growing at an alarming rate. Net emigration from Great Britain — that is, emigration minus immigration — amounted in 1900 to 71,188, and, steadily rising every year, it increased to 139,365 in 1905, and to 237,204 in 1907. The significance of these figures can be seen only by comparison. The Boer war, which lasted three years, cost 20,000 lives. One may therefore say that in 1907 Great Britain lost a Boer war every month. Can Free Traders point to any other industrial country where emigration has taken place on a scale similar to that from Great Britain ? Free Trade means cheapness — especially cheap labour, cheap men. Our record emigration has been caused by record unemployment. Most of our 10,000,000 emigrants have passed through the ranks of the unemployed. Free 128 GEEAT AND GEBATEE BEITAIN Trade has meant widespread, acute, and permanent un- employment for our workers. Whilst people emigrate from Great Britain by the hundred thousand, immigration is habitually far greater than emigration not only in the United States, but also in Germany, although the German population increases by more than 900,000 a year, whilst ours increases only by about 400,000 a year. The demand for men regulates the supply of men. Whilst our population leaves this country in rapidly increasing numbers, in a veritable flight as from a stricken land, workers from the neighbouring countries migrate every year by the hundred thousand into Germany, where they find temporary work ; for Germany suffers, as a rule, not from unemployment, but from a scarcity of workers. In 1906, 600,000 foreign workers migrated into Germany, and in 1907 the number was even greater. During the last few years, the United States have found work for more than a million immigrants every year. Nevertheless, our Free Traders have the courage to assert that unemployment is habitually greater in the United States and in Germany than it is in Great Britain. Let us now look at our emigration from the financial point of view. Parents and the community jointly bring up children at very heavy expense, and their emigration at a time when they might repay the cost of their upbringing by useful work means in the first place the loss of the cost of their upbringing to their parents and to the commimity. If we estimate the cost of bringing up a child at £200, it will be seen that Great Britain has, since 1846, lost through emigration £2,000,000,000, and, in 1907 alone, she lost £47,000,000 in that way. We are not man-eating cannibals, still we are paying for our foreign imports with the flesh and blood of our best citizens. The Moloch of Free Trade demands a yearly sacrifice of men. Nations which choose to rely for their food on foreign countries, and which cannot export a sufficient quantity of manufactures to pay for them, INDUSTBY, EMIGRATION AND POVEBTY 129 have to export men. Men are the largest of our ' invisible exports,' but these are never mentioned by our Free Traders when they explain to us how our foreign imports are paid for. Since the introduction of Free Trade we have presented foreign countries and our Colonies with 10,000,000 of our best workers, and. we have saved to them the £2,000,000,000 which otherwise they would have had to spend in bringing them up from babyhood. Free Trade means cheapness. We pay a very high price for the cheapness of ' commodities.' My calculation considers only the cost of bringing up children, and therefore greatly understates the actual loss which this country has suffered by the unnecessary emigration of millions of its inhabitants. The greatest wealth of a country lies not in the possession of coal, gold, a large foreign trade, bank balances, and shares, as the Free Traders try to make us believe, but in the productive labour of numerous well-employed and well-paid workers. Children when grown up become producers of wealth, and become taxpayers as well. Our taxation amounts to about £6 per head of | population. Therefore every million emigrants means an additional taxation of £6,000,000 to the taxpayers who are left behind. Our weakest industries were the first to suffer from the effects of Free Trade. Agriculture, and especially Irish agriculture, became unprofitable. In 1846 Ireland had about 9,000,000 inhabitants. Now it has only about 4,500,000 inhabitants, notwithstanding the rise of great manufacturing industries in Ulster which nourish several hundred thousand people. After rural Ireland came rural Scotland and England. Our agricultural labourers went to America by the hundred thousand. Our agriculture decayed. Mr. Palgrave estimated in 1905 the loss of agricultural capital which this country has suffered at £1,700,000,000, a sum which almost equals the sum total of our foreign investments. Then the canker of Free Trade, attacked our manufacturing industries. Since our rural 130 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN parts have been depopulated, our emigrants consist chiefly of industrial workers from the towns. Rural Ireland, which used to supply the largest quota of our emigrants, suppUes now only a small portion, and the majority of Irish emigrants come now from industrial Ulster. Our emigrants not only weaken our home industry by diminishing the number of skilled workers, but they raise competitors to our home industries in foreign lands. Before the Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade, Mr. Thomas Edward Vickers said : . ' There has been a great emigration from Sheffield to the United States. The emigrants to America remain there. The new steel in- dustries of America will be chiefly estabhshed upon skill imported from Sheffield.' A visit to the great steel-works of America will confirm the foregoing statement. An American author, Mr. Curtiss, wrote on the same subject : ' There cannot be the slightest ,doubt that the chief cause which has driven out of England so many of her skilled artisans, ingenious and enterprising citizens, has been that fiscal poHcy which reduces prices to the lowest level, which destroys profits, and, as profits disappear, drives down wages to starvation point.' Free Trade, the policy of heartless mammonism, does not endeavour to find a remedy for unemployment. The champions of Free Trade and profit comfort our unemployed worker with economic conundrums and feed him with statistics. They bid him behold our magnificent foreign trade and the increase in the income of other people as shown by the income-tax returns, instead of giving him work. ' The only way by which to counteract the misleading teachings of the Tariff Reformers is to give the working man a sohd grounding in the broad principles of pohtical economy,' wrote the 'Free Trader' of April 1908. Classical British political economy is the economy of the trader and of the capitalist. It is not the economy of the worker, the producer. Emigration or the workhouse are the two alternatives INDUSTRY, EMIGRATION AND POVERTY 131 which the Free Traders offer to our displaced workers. But emigration is no remedy for the fearful amount of un- employment and consequent poverty which Free Trade has created. The Royal Commission on Labour reported on this point : ' Depressions of trade produce a relative superfluity of labour for a longer or shorter time. Where an industry is declining without any apparent hope of recovery the temporary condition passes into the permanent. In such an industry the supply of labour may be permanently in excess of the demand, unless it drift away in equal measure elsewhere. . . . Emigration may be a remedy in certain cases, but one serious objection to it from the present point \ of view is that the shiftless and incapable are not fit to emigrate ; and if the emigrants are to be drawn from the better class, this is in effect to remove the more capable in order to lighten the competition of the less capable.' Free Trade, after having created widespread unemploy- ment and poverty in Great Britain, leads to the deterioration of the workers and of the race. Free Trade is converting Great Britain into a country dotted with workhouses and peopled with paupers. Free Trade has had an effect upon our industries similar to that which the expulsion of the Huguenots has had upon the industries of Prance. The former was as criminally foolish as the latter, and the chief difference is that Free Trade was a mistake on an incom- parably larger — indeed, a gigantic scale. Through unemployment and hunger the workers of Great Britain have been compelled to become the champion strike-breakers to all continental countries. Whenever there is a great strike on the Continent, British unemployed workers are successfully called upon to act as blacklegs. On September 9, 1908, at the Trade Union Congress, Mr. J. Sexton pointed out that 'whenever there was a dispute on the Continent, England was made a recruiting ground of blacklegs on behalf of the employers. Thousands of Englishmen had been sent to Germany and Sweden on this K 2 132 GREAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN disgraceful business. Many of them were strong and capable workmen, driven to accept anything in the way of a job by the pangs of hunger. Unemployment, therefore, was the root of the evil, and that problem must be solved.' Mr. J. H. Wilson, M.P., said : ' There was a time when British trade unionists were held in high esteem upon the Continent ; but at Antwerp recently, during a strike, he saw a bill upon the walls which described a worker from this country as a " British louse." When they were described in that way it was time they made some effort to remove the cause of offence. Only this year over two thousand men had been sent from England to the far north of Sweden to take the place of the dock labourers there.' The foregoing extracts are taken from the official report of the Congress. Strike-breaking is apparently becoming an increasingly important British industry. Through per- manent and widespread unemployment the British workers, who used to be the proud aristocrats, are being degraded to the place of pariahs among the workers of Europe, as was pointed out to them at the Socialist Congress at Stuttgart. The tree is known by its fruit, and Free Trade is known by its result. Will fiscal reform, the deliberate protection of British labour, improve employment, raise wages, and better the conditions of our workers ? I have no doubt that it will. The foregoing sketch shows that the condition of our workers, a small minority excluded, is habitually very bad. It can scarcely be worse than it is at present, when unemployment has grown to an unparalleled extent. Besides, the ex- perience of other countries, especially Germany, shows that fiscal rfeform improves employment, and improved employ- ment will mean better wages. Fiscal reform will certainly also mean better profits for our manufacturers, as the Free Traders so often point out ; but as wages are paid out of profits, wages can be large only when profits are large. It is vain to expect large wages in unprofitable, stagnant, or INDUSTRY, EMIGRATION AND POVERTY 133 decaying industries. Many of our manufacturers have lost heart through a long series of losses which free imports have caused to them. The first effect of fiscal reform will be a moral one. It will give new courage to our manufacturers and stimulate enterprise. Free Traders have told us that it is unscientific to protect the British workers by means of a tariff against the fearful sufferings which are being inflicted upon them by foreign tariffs. I am afraid our Free Traders are insufficiently acquainted with their text-books, and I would draw the attention of our Free Trade professors to the following passage, which occurs in Book V. chapter iv. paragraph 6 of John Stuart Mill's ' Political Economy ' : ' A country cannot be expected to renounce the power of taxing foreigners unless foreigners will in return practise towards itself the same forbearance. The only mode in which a country can save itself from being a loser by the revenue duties imposed by other countries on its commodities, is to impose corre- sponding revenue duties on theirs.' During sixty years Great Britain has followed an urmational economic policy — a policy which benefits the consumer, the merchant, and the capitalist. Her stand- point and outlook have been those of a petty and petty- minded tradesman. Her ideal has been the pursuit of ' profit ' in the sense which the tradesman attaches to the word. Her motto has been that unworthy tradesman's motto of Cobden, in which he summed up the essence of Free Trade : ' Buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market.' Only the purchaser, the man with money, was to be considered. Nobody cared what became of the producers, the workers. Nobody cared what became of the nation and the Empire. The dawn of a new era is breaking. Great Britain's economic pohcy of the future will no longer be the poUcy of the narrow-minded shopkeeper. Her economic policy will be gtiided by statesmanlike considerations. It will be a national 134 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN and an Imperial policy. It will protect British workers against unfair foreign competition, and it will endeavour to secure for them regular work with good wages. It will endeavour to re-create the industries which Free Trade has destroyed. It will strive to strengthen the Mother Country, to consolidate the" Empire, and to elevate and unite the race. It will place the welfare of the people above the profit of the moneyed individual, and its watchword will be, 'British work for-British workers.' CHAPTER VII UNEMPLOYMENT At the present moment the question how to help the un- employed is on everybody's lips. It is generally agreed upon that unemployment is a grave social disease, that prevention is better than cure, that temporary assistance to the unemployed, in whatever form it is given, is not a remedy, but at best a very unsatisfactory palUative. If we wish to find a cure for unemployment we must study it in the same manner in which doctors study a disease. Unfortunately, opinions differ as to the prevalence and extent of unemployment in this country. Some say that unemployment is an unavoidable evil, which is common to all industrial nations, and which afflicts Great Britain less than other countries. Others assert that unemployment is more severe and more widespread in Great Britain than in other industrial States. In order to arrive at a correct diag- nosis of British unemployment, we must first of all solve the question whether Great Britain suffers from unemploy- ment in a mild or in a malignant and acute form. Therefore we must compare unemployment in Great Britain with unemployment in Germany and the United States, countries which, by the magnitude and the high development of their industries, can alone be compared with Great Britain. Hitherto most investigators have tried to measure the prevalence of unemployment in various countries by com- paring merely the percentage of workers who are reported as being unemployed by various trade unions. These trade 135 l36 GEEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN union statistics of unemployment are valuable and interest- ing in themselves, but they do not give a faithful and adequate picture of the conditions of the national labour market as a whole. After all, only a small minority of workers, and not a representative minority, both in Great Britain and abroad, are enrolled in trade unions. Besides, the statistics of unemployment published by the trade unions in various countries are not absolutely comparable, for two reasons. In the first place, they are not drawn up in accordance with uniform rules. In the second place, they do not refer to identical occupations. Therefore, the statis- tics of unemployment published by the trade unions in various countries must be used with the utmost caution, and with full knowledge of the different conditions under which they have been drawn up, and these trade union statistics should be supplemented by other statistics of a more comprehensive and more general type. The ebb and flow of the national labour market, as dis- tinguished from the trade union labour market, may be gauged to some extent from the ebb and flow of the people across the frontiers of the State, and from the ebb and flow of the money in its savings banks. Broadly speaking, it may be said that workers emigrate from countries where employment is bad to countries where employment is good. Unemployment and ill-paid employ- ment are no doubt the principal causes of emigration, whilst good employment and well-paid employment are the chief causes of immigration. Therefore, the emigration and immigration statistics give a most valuable indication of the state of the national labour market in its entirety, as com- pared with the purely sectional trade union labour market. Besides, workers who are well employed and well paid are able to save much, whilst workers who are ill employed and ill paid can save but little. Consequently, in countries where workers are well employed and well paid, savings banks deposits should increase rapidly, whilst in countries UNEMPLOYMENT 137 where workers are badly employed and consequently badly paid, savings banks deposits should be stationary or even retrogressive. Hence, the state of employment among the workers of a nation may further be gauged by observing the business transacted by the savings banks. The foregoing shows that unemployment may be measured by three different tests : the trade union un- employment test, the immigration and emigration test, and the savings banks test. Normally, all three should agree, that is, the indications as to the state of employment fur- nished by cne of these tests should be confirmed by the two remaining tests. Now let us, at the hand of these three tests, first compare unemployment in Great Britain and in Germany, and then compare unemployment in Great Britain and the United States. a Q-ermany. In areat Britain. Per cent. Per cent. 2-7 5-1 2-1 6-5 1-6 5-4 1-1 4-1 1-5 4-2 2-9 7-8 2-8 7-7 Pbeobntagb of Unemployment amono Tbade Unionists. Tears. 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 It will be observed that during the period 1903-1908 — the ofi&cial German unemployment statistics were first issued in 1903 — unemployment among trade unionists was, as a rule, from three to four times as large in Great Britain as it was in Germany. However, there is an irreducible mini- mum of unemployment in every country, a minimum which arises from the fact that workers leave one situation on a Wednesday and enter another one on the following Monday or on Monday week, without being in the meantime un- employed in the usual sense of the term, although they may be reported as being unemployed by their trade unions. Besides, voluntary holidays, illnesses, &c., cause absence 138 GBEAT AND GBBATEB BEITAIN from work, but not unemployment strictly so called.^If we allow, let us say, one per cent, for this irreducible mini- mum of purely technical unemployment* it would appear that between 1903 and 1908 unemployment among trade unionists was about four times as great in Great Britain as it was in Germany, that for every unemployed trade unionist in Germany there were, as a rule, no fewer than four unemployed trade unionists in Great Britain. Now let us see whether the emigration and immigration figures and the savings banks statistics confirm or contradict the foregoing statement. Gross Emigra- Net Emigra- tion from tion from Gross Emigration Net Emigration Germany, Germany. from Gt. Britain. from Gt. Britain. 1900 . 22,309 None 168,825 71,188 1901 . 22,073 None 171,715 72,016 1902 . 32,098 None 205,662 101,547 1903 . 36,310 None 259,956 147,036 1904 . 27,984 None 271,435 126,854 1905 . 28,075 None 262,077 139,365 1906 . 31,074 None 325,137 194,671 1907 . 31,696 None 395,680 235,092 1908 . 19,883 None 263,199 91,156 1909 . 24,921 None 288,761 139,693 The foregoing figures show that between 1900 and 1909 gross emigration, that is, emigration which does not allow for immigration, was absolutely from seven to thirteen times as large from Great Britain as it was from Germany. However, it must be borne in miad that the population of Germany is, roughly, 50 per cent, larger than the population of Great Britain. If we allow for that difference in population, it follows that emigration was relatively from ten to twenty times as large from Great Britain as from Germany, that for every German emigrant there were from ten to twenty British emigrants. Consequently, we may say that the pres- sure which causes emigration was from ten to twenty times as great in Great Britain as it was in Germany. 'The foregoing figures show a constant, rapid, and very UNEMPLOYMENT 139 disquieting increase in the outflow of population from this country — an increase which, proportionately, becomes still greater when we look into the figures of British net emigra- tion. These figures show how many British people have left these shores when the number of all British immigrants is deducted. In comparing gross and net emigration from this country, we find that gross emigration from Great Britain increased between 1900 and 1907 by, roughly, 230 per cent., whilst net emigration from Great Britain increased during the same time by 330 per cent. The inclination of our emigrants to return to their old home is apparently grow- ing smaller from year to year, presumably because they find British conditions of employment more and more unsatisfactory. Whilst Great Britain loses every year an enormous number of her people by emigration, a loss compared with which the loss of 20,000 lives in the South African War seems but a trifle, Germany gains every year on balance a considerable number of citizens through immigration. Un- fortunately, I have no figures relating to the immigration of Germans into Germany. If these figures could be given, it would probably appear that the German popu- lation of Germany is rapidly increasing in numbers through the inflow of German Americans, of whom many return to the old country. At all events, it is clear that Germany is gaining on balance in population through the immigration of foreigners. At the census of 1900, 757,151 foreigners were counted in Germany. At the census of 1905, 1,007,179 foreigners were counted in that country. Hence, Germany has gained in foreigners alone 250,028 people between 1900 and 1905, whilst she has lost during the same time only 168,849 of her own people through emigration. A comparison of the British and German emigration and immigration figures seems to indicate that employment is considerably better in Germany than in Great Britain, and 140 GBEAT AND GBEATEB BBITAIN that consequently unemployment is considerably smaller in the former than in the latter country. The objection that it is natural that British emigration is greater than German emigration because Great Britain is more densely populated than Germany, is irrelevant as regards this investigation, which inquires merely into actual conditions, but not into causes. Besides, the fact that the popula- tion is denser in Great Britain than in Germany is not by any means a sufficient explanation for the great and con- i stantly increasing outflow of our people. Great Britain is densely populated only in parts. The country contains large, very thinly, and very inadequately populated districts, which might be filled up if our industries were flourishing. Ireland, for instance, which sixty years ago had about 9,000,000 inhabitants, had at the last census only 4,458,775 inhabitants. Furthermore, the population per square mile is 70 per cent, larger in Belgium than it is in the whole of Great Britain, and it is even 6 per cent, larger in that country than it is in densely-populated England and Wales. Lastly, people emigrate from this . country by the hundred thousand not because there is not enough room, but because there is not enough work, and I do not think that it can be maintained for a moment that there is not enough work in Great Britain because there is not enough room. Great Britain, with her extended coast-line, numerous harbours, and plentiful coal, has probably room enough for factories and work- shops to maintain more than a hundred million people, and she has room for the additional dwelling-houses, &c., which would be required if there be a sufficiency of markets for the wares which these additional factories and workshops might produce. Now let us apply the savings banks test to Great Britain and to Germany. The latest figures available relating to the German savings banks are those for the year 1905, and the savings UNEMPLOYMENT 141 banks deposits in Great Britain and in Germany compare as follows for the period 1900-1905 : — Savenos Banks Deposits. In Germany. In Great Britain. 1900 .. £441,929,000 £187,006,000 1907 . . 694,465,000 209,654,000 Difference +£252,526,000 +£22,648,000 The foregoing table shows that in 1907 the deposits in the German savings banks were three and a half times as large as the deposits in the British savings banks, without allowing for the important fact that in 1907 the German savings banks had accumulated a reserve fund of £39,425,000, which might properly be added to the deposits, whilst the British savings banks have no reserve fund. A comparison of the growth of the savings banks de- posits gives evidently a better insight into the state of employment in the two countries than a comparison of the sums total deposited in the British and German savings banks. The foregoing table shows that between 1900 and 1907 the German savings banks deposits have grown more than eleven times as fast as the British savings banks deposits, and if we allow for the fact that the population of Germany is about 50 per cent, larger than the popu- lation of Great Britain, it appears that the deposits in the German savings banks have grown nearly eight times as fast as the deposits in the British savings banks ; that for every £1 deposited by the British working classes between 1900 and 1905 the German working classes have deported £8. As a matter of fact, the British savings banks deposits have not grown. They have remained scarcely stationary between 1900 and 1907. Their apparent increase is entirely due to the interest added, withdrawals having exceeded 142 GBBAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN deposits by almost £10,000,000. This state of stagnation has lately changed for one of ominous retrogression. During the three years 1905-1908, the British savings banks deposits have grown by only £6,000,000, or by £2,000,000 a year. As the interest paid on our savings banks deposits exceeds £5,000,000 per annum, it follows that during the last three years withdrawals have actually exceeded deposits by more than £3,000,000 a year. Rightly considered, our savings banks deposits have not increased, but have decreased by more than £3,000,000 during every one of the last three years. During the same years, the German savings banks deposits have grown more than twenty-five times as fast as the British savings banks deposits have nominally grown. For every -£1 deposited during the last three years in Great Britain, there have proportionately been deposited £25 in Germany. The growth of the German savings banks deposits is all the more remarkable when we remember that the working masses in Germany have the greatest facilities for acquiring freehold cottages, houses, and agricultural land, that miUions of German peasants are owners of freehold land and houses, and that by far the largest part of the savings of the German masses is invested in fields, and in bricks and mortar. Apart from the enormous savings banks deposits, which now amount to about £750,000,000, the German workers have about £100,000,000 in the Imperial insur- ance societies, to which they contribute at present about £18,000,000 per year, an4 no less than £200,000,000 in prosperous and wealthy co-operativje societies, building societies,,,'^-'"^ ~^^'^^'^'eq:'>^'ieu--)t be doubted that the German vrori'^ets for the wares ^mc^|yjp better off than are the BrSB^ops might pro^^ce ^X In^ii^et us ^PGerman and British savings banks deposits, sofflilM^wance must be made for the fact that many German savings banks accept considerably larger deposits than £200, which is the maximum deposit allowed UNEMPLOYMENT 143 by the British savings banks. However, of these larger sums, a considerable proportion consists of the collective holdings of workers in various forms, and it may be estimated that about 80 per cent, of the German savings banks deposits, or about £600,000,000, come within the British limit of £200. The interest paid by the German savings banks, which is usually about 3J per cent., is certainly considerably higher than the fixed interest of 2| per cent, paid by the British savings banks, but relatively both rates of interest are practically equal. German Government stocks yield about 3| per cent., whilst British Government stocks yield only about 3 per cent., to the investor. Hence, the savings banks pay in both countries about | per cent, less than the rate which is obtainable on Government stocks. Con- sequently, it cannot be said that the German savings banks deposits are more than three times as large, and that they increase from eight to twenty-five times as fast, as the British savings banks deposits, because the interest paid is higher in Germany than in Great Britain. I am also not of opinion that the huge amount and the rapid accumulation of deposits in the German savings banks, as compared with the small amount and the slow growth of deposits in the British savings banks deposits, is chiefly due to the fact that Germans are more thrifty than EngUshmen. The greater thrift of the Germans is largely off-set by other influMices which diminish German, but not British, savings. The German workers have, on an average, a larger number of children, and therefore larger expenses, than have EngUshmen of the same class, and education is not gratuitous in Germany, as it is in this country. Besides, the German children are longer at school than British children, they go to work later in Ufe, and they have there- fore to be maintained during a longer period by their parents than English children. Lastly, military service is com- pulsory and universal in Germany, and the pay of the 144 GBEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN soldier is so low that it is usually supplemented by small sums which the parents send regularly to their sons who are serving. All these circumstances, and various others which I might enumerate, tend to entrench upon German savings. The comparative tables given in the foregoing pages as to unemployment among German and British trade unionists, as to emigration from Germany and Great Britain, and as to British and German savings banks deposits, corroborate and confirm each other. All these tables point unmistak- ably to the fact that employment is, as a rule, very con- siderably better in Germany than in Great Britain, and that, consequently, unemployment is less prevalent in the former than in the latter country. They point to the fact that, in consequence of better employment, the great mass of the working population is considerably better off in Ger- many than in Great Britain. The greater prosperity of the German working masses is eloquently proclaimed by the German savings banks statistics. The fact that the members of certain British trade unions receive higher nominal wages than the members in the corresponding German trade unions does not contradict the foregoing conclusions. In Great Britain the trade unions are almost as old as are the manufacturing industries themselves. In Germany the trade unions are of yesterday. The German trade unions have not yet succeeded in con- quering for themselves a privileged position, and ' standard union wages ' are practically unknown in Germany, Although nominal trade union wages in Great Britain are in many instances higher than are the corresponding trade union wages in Germany, it cannot be concluded therefrom that general wages are higher in Great Britain than in Germany. On the contrary, the general level of wages is probably as high in Germany as in Great Britain, and is very Ukely higher in that country than over here. The migration of German industries to England is not only due to the new UNEMPLOYMENT 145 Patents Act, but also to the fact that German manufacturers have discovered, as the British Consul at Frankfort pointed out in his reports of 1908 and of 1909, that general wages are lower in Great Britain than they are in Germany. The comparisons of picked German and British trade union wages, which have repeatedly been made by the British Board of Trade, are quite unreliable, and if they were correct they would not enable us to compare the wages of non-unionists, who, in both countries, are the large majority of the workers. Whilst in some trades the wages of skilled unionist workers are higher in Great Britain than in Germany, the bulk of wages, and especially among the unskilled workers, is considerably higher in Germany than in Great Britain. The Board of Trade comparisons of German and British wages have therefore been condemned by the German Statistical Office. All the foregoing facts and figures point unmistakably in the same direction. They allow us to conclude that un- employment is usually very small in Germany as compared with this country. That conclusion is amply confirmed by the complaints about scarcity of workers which may be found in numerous reports of the German Chambers of Commerce, and of the German Chambers of Agricul- ture, as well as in the reports of many manufacturing and mining enterprises of Germany. These complaints have found an echo in the reports of many British Consuls, especially of the Consuls in Berlin, Hamburg, Dantzig, and Frankfort. At the time of the General Election in Germany, on January 15, 1907, the Social Democratic Party issued an election manifesto which stated : ' We have in Germany not too large, but too small, a number of workers. This may be seen from the fact that every year foreign workers are imported into Germany by the hundred thousand.' That statement was by no means an exaggerated one. In 1906 Germany imported no fewer than 600,000 workers 146 GEEAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN from abroad, of whom 240,000 were occupied in agriculture, and 360,000 in the manufacturing and mining industries. However, that huge immigration was apparently quite insufficient, for the Chamber of Commerce at Mannheim sent to the Government a petition which prayed that foreign workers should be allowed to be imported into Germany more freely, so as to relieve the great scarcity of labour. That interesting document stated : ' A scarcity of male and female workers has prevailed in our district during some considerable time, as reference to the yearly reports of this Chamber for 1904, 1905, and 1906 shows. Since several years the scarcity of workers is constantly increasing. This scarcity has, in the course of this year, grown to such an extent that various industries have been very seriously hampered in their operations, and have suffered considerable loss and damage. Experience has shown that that scarcity of workers cannot be remedied by offering higher wages. The workers know that labour is scarce. An increase in wages does not increase the output. On the contrary, employers are seriously complaining that their workers produce less and less, knowing that they are the masters of the situation.' The petition from which the foregoing extract is taken — many similar statements are on record — is dated November 13, 1907, a time when employment was very bad in Great Britain, when our trade unions reported that 5 per cent, of their members were unemployed, when the British papers were as full with information about unemployment and consequent distress as they are at present, and when relief works for the unemployed were demanded all over the country. Commenting on the petition of which an extract has been given, the Mannheim Chamber of Com- merce stated in its last report : ' The causes of the permanent scarcity of workers are sufficiently known. The continuous growth of our industries and trade requires a large additional supply of workers, a supply which is UNEMPLOYMENT 147 not forthcoming through the natural increase of our population.' In view of the fact that the natural increase of the German population comes to the enormous figure of 910,000 a year, whilst the British population has a natural increase of' only 380,000 a year, and is nevertheless suffering con- stantly from widespread unemployment, and consequent emigration, the foregoing complaint that the natural increase of the German population is insufficient is very remarkable. The state of employment in Germany may be measured to some extent by the sick fund figures, which are pubhshed every month, and which show how many workers are insured against disease with the State Insurance Societies, By comparing the number of insured workers during the present and the previous year, and by allowing for the natural increase of workers, Richard Calwer, a prominent German statistician, has calculated in the Wirtschaftliche Korrespondenz that in autumn 1908, 380,000 workers, out of a total of about 14,000,000 wage-earners, were unemployed in Germany. If his careful calculations, which have been endorsed by the German Press and the German ParUament, were correct, it would follow that 2-7 per cent, of the German workers were then unemployed. Reference to the foregoing pages shows that unemployment among German trade unionists came also to 2-7 per cent. Apparently, un- employment in Germany is equally great among union and non-union workers. In this country it is usually assumed that the percentage of unemployed among our unorganised workers is considerably higher than it is among our trade unionists, the aristocrats of British labour. However assuming that unemployment among our non-union workers is no higher than among our trade unionists, it would follow that in autumn 1908 unemployment in Germany was trifling if compared with imemployment in Great Britain. Whilst unemployment among our trade unionists came to 8-9 per I. 2 148 GBEAT AND GBEATEB BBITAIN cent, in August, and to 9-4 per cent, in September of 1908, it came to only 2-7 per cent, among all the German workers. Assuming, in opposition to the opinion which is generally held by experts, that unemployment is as a rule no greater among our non-union workers than it is among unionists, it would appear that unemployment in this country compares with unemployment in Germany approximately as thirty-five to ten ; that for every ten unemployed workers iu Germany there are thirty-five unemployed workers in Great Britain. These figures make no allowance for the ' irreducible minimum ' of unemployment already referred to. Everyone acquainted with labour statistics must admit that this estimate is a very moderate one. Let us now compare unemployment in Great Britain with unemployment in the United States. Various Liberal Cabinet Ministers, and among them the Prime Minister himself, have repeatedly asserted in Parlia- ment and elsewhere that unemployment is considerably greater in the United States than in Great Britain, and they have in several instances quoted very high percentages relating to unemployment in America during the year 1908 and during past years. In America no national statistics of unemployment, comparable with those available for Great Britain and Germany, are published, but some of the individual States of the Union, especially New York and Massachusetts, issue regularly statistics of unemploy- ment among the members of certain trade unions within their territories. Acquaintance with the New York State unemployment statistics shows that the ministerial state- ments, according to which unemployment is usually far greater in the United States than in Great Britain, were based upon the very fragmentary statistics of unemployment published by the Department of Labour of the State of New York. Let us now compare the unemployment statistics of New York State UNEMPLOYMENT 149 with the unemployment statistics relating to Great Britain. Unbmploy Unemployment in New York State. MBNT IN Great Britain. Idle continuonaly for 3 ttionths, January, Idle on the last day Average Jfebruaiy, March. Number. Per cent. o£ March. per year. Number. Per cent. Per cent. 1897 . . 35,381 24-8 43,653 30-6 3-5 1898 . . 18,102 10-1 37,857 21-0 3-0 1899 22,658 13-1 31,751 18-3 2-4 1900 . . 22,895 10-1 44,336 20-0 2-9 1901 . . 26,841 11-3 42,244 18-5 3-8 1902 16,776 6-2 36,710 13-6 4-4 1903 19,310 5-5 41,941 12-1 51 1904 56,710 14-6 103,995 27-2 6-5 1905 . . 31,638 8-7 54,916 15-1 5-4 1906 . . 24,746 6-5 37,237 9-9 4-1 1907 . . 65,624 13-8 77,270 19-1 4-2 1908 . . 101,466 26-3 138,131 35-7 7-4 The foregoing table shows that unemployment among trade unionists is habitually from two to six times as large in New York as it is in Great Britain. Now the question arises : Can we conclude from these figures that, as a writer on economic subjects recently put it, ' In America from 10 to 30 per cent, of the workers are habitually unemployed even in the best years ' ? In the United States there are about 20,000,000 wage- earners. The foregoing statistics relate only to from 150,000 to 400,000 workers, or to from 1 to 2 per cent, of the whole wage-earning population. This fact alone shows that the New York statistics of unemployment among trade unionists cannot be safely used as a reliable index to the state of employment in the United States. Besides, the State of New York occupies an altogether exceptional position in the United States. In the first place, about 80 per cent, of the foreign immigrants who go to the United States land in New York harbour, and a large number of these remain in New York State, where they often supplant 150 GEBAT AND GBEATEE BRITAIN native workers. Hence, trade union employment is not very steady in New York. In the words of the British Consul in New York, ' When there is such an immense monthly flow of new men, the unions are to a great extent paralysed.' Thus New York occupies an altogether ex- ceptional position. New York stands approximately in the same relation to the other American States in which the East End of London stands to the rest of Great Britain, and it is as absurd to estimate the number of unemployed in the United States by the percentage of unemployed in New York, as some of our ministers have done, as it would be to estimate the number of Jews in Great Britain by the per- centage of Jews in Mile End, Whitechapel, and Bethnal Green. In the second place, New York is the centre of the seasonal trades of America. The ready-made clothes trade, for instance, is centred in New York for the same reason for which, in Great Britain, it is centred in the East End of London. In both the East End of London and in New York, tailoring is carried on by emigrant Jews from Eastern Europe. Besides, New York has so severe a winter that every year during many months building operations are almost at a standstill. In the words of the Eleventh Special Report, issued by the Commissioner of Labour at Washington, ' Weather conditions interfere with out-of-door work, re- ducing considerably the number of days worked in twelve months. In New York, for instance, it is estimated that bricklayers are able to work during only 150 to 175 days in the year.' It is worth noting that among the trade unionists who report on unemployment to the Labour Department of New York State, the workers engaged in the building trade and the clothing trade — two trades which are essentially seasonal trades — ^form by far the largest contingents. British workers have, on the whole, little cause to pity the American unemployed. Let us take the case of the New York bricklayer, who is occupied during only 150 to 175 UNEMPLOYMENT 151 days in the year. His average wages amount, according to the statistics furnished by the Labour Department in Washington, to 70 cents per hour, and to double that sum per hour for overtime. Hence, a New York bricklayer will earn in a normal eight-hours' day 5 "60 dollars, or £1 3s. If he works nine hours he will earn £1 9s. a day, and if he works ten hours he will earn £1 15s. a day. The report of the Mosely Commission of 1903 contains the following statements by Mr. H. R. Taylor of the Operative Bricklayers' Society and by Mr. M. Deller of the National Association of Opera- tive Plasterers : ' The bricklayer in America receives a wage ranging from two and a quarter to three and a half times the highest wage paid to a bricklayer here, the highest rate in England being 10|d., or 21 cents per hour, whilst the lowest wage paid in any of the towns and cities I have visited was 45 cents, or Is. 10|d. per hour, at Niagara, and as high as 75 cents, or 3s. l^d. per hour, in New York ; whilst for tunnel or sewer work the recognised rate is 75 cents per hour, or 25s. per day in the Niagara and Cleveland districts, and as high as 9 dollars or £1 17s. Qd. per day of eight hours, in New York. The wages paid to plasterers in New York are at the present time 5 dollars (£1 Os. 2d.) per day.' Such are the wages among the men in the building trade of New York, who notoriously suffer most severely from statistical unemployment, as shown in the foregoing table. However, New York bricklayers earn during the six or seven months whilst they are at work more than EngUsh bricklayers can earn in eighteen months. Moreover, during the long spell of winter, when building operations are at a standstill, and when the bricklayers are statistically unemployed, they work, many of them, at another trade. They earn frequently good wages in winter in the gas-works, which then have their busy season. However, that fact does not, of course, pre- vent these men being reported as unemployed at their trade by the secretary of their union. 152 GBEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN The foregoing suffices to show that the statistics of un- employment among trade unionists issued by the Depart- ment of Labour of the State of New York are deceptive, and that it is quite inadmissible to assume that the New York percentage of unemployment may be applied to all workers, organised and unorganised, throughout the United States. It is, perhaps, not unnatural that irresponsible journalists have informed the British public that ' one man out of three is out of work in America,' or ' in Free Trade Great Britain only 8-2 per cent, of the workers are unemployed, whilst in Protectionist America from 10 to 30 per cent, of the workers are habitually unemployed eVen in the best times.' How- ever, it is very much to be regretted that Mr. Asquith and other members of the Cabinet should implicitly and ex- plicitly have endorsed these grossly misleading statements — statements which they ought to have known to be not in accordance with fact. Now let us see whether the two remaining tests of employment and of unemployment, the emigration and immigration tests, and the savings banks test,*'confirm or contradict the very rudimentary trade union unemployment test given in the foregoing. Gross Emigration Net Emigration Immigration to from Great Britain. from Great Britain. the United States 1900 168,825 71,188 448,572 1901 171,715 72,016 487,918 1902 205,662 101,547 648,743 1903 259,956 147,036 857,046 1904 271,435 126,854 812,870 1905 262,077 139,365 1,026,499 1906 325,137 194,671 1,100,735 1907 395,447 237,204 1,285,349 1908 263,199 91,156 782,870 1909 288,761 139,693 ? It will be noticed that between 1900 and 1907 emigration from Great Britain and immigration into the United States have both grown threefold, that the people are fleeing from this country in rapidly increasing numbers as from a UNEMPLOYMENT 153 stricken land, whilst the United States are getting more and more attractive to workers who wish to 'better themselves.' It cannot be argued that the enormous exodus of people from Europe to the United States is due chiefly to the activity of the emigration agents and the shipping com- panies, or that it is a chance movement, a passing craze, or a fashion due to some migratory instinct or to the unjustified hopes of emigrants who are attracted to Americj, by visions of boundless wealth. The American Department of Labour, a department the functions of which are similar to those of our own Board of Trade, has by means of exhaustive inquiries ascertained that the vast majority of immigrants have set out to America because they have been advised to do so by relatives or friends of theirs who have settled in America and who have prospered. In a very large number of cases foreign immigrants have their passage paid for them by their friends and relatives in America. As soon as prosperity diminishes, foreigners settled in America advise their relatives and friends living in Europe not to come over because employment is bad. Hence, the immigration statistics are considered to be an excellent, and almost an infalUble, index to the state of employment in the United States. In view of the foregoing record figures it is quite clear that between 1900 and 1907, when employment grew steadily worse in Great Britain, it became steadily better in the United States. In fact, employment was so good over there during the period 1900-1907 that workers were scarce in America notwithstanding the immigration of millions of willing workers. The reports of the American Chambers of Com- merce, of many American undertakings, and of our own Consuls testify to the fact that the United States suffered up to the summer of 1907, not from a scarcity of work, but from a scarcity of workers. The Consular report for New York, issued in May 1907, speaks, for instance, of ' constant complaints of shortage of labour, notwithstanding an 154 GREAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN immigration exceeding 1,000,000 persons/ Another Con- sular report, relating to the United States, No. 3876, issued in July 1907, states : ' Notwithstanding the fact that con- siderably over 1,000,000 immigrants came into this country, there was in certain industries a serious scarcity of labour.' Consular Report No. 3777, on the trade of Maryland, states : ' Complaints were constantly made by the large wholesale houses that they were unable to get goods from the manu- facturers, and the manufacturers plead that the dearth of workmen prevented them from complying with the demands that were made upon them. Indeed, everywhere, both in the country and in the cities, there was a constant cry for labour, skilled and unskilled.' The immigration and emigration test clearly shows that employment was excellent in America between 1900 and 1907, and that consequently unemployment must have been practically non-existent in that country. The American workers have £800,000,000 in the savings banks, whilst the British workers have only £220,000,000 in the savings banks. However, it would not be fair to apply the savings banks test to the whole of the United States and to Great Britain. In the United States, and especially in the agricultural parts, the workers invest their savings chiefly in land and houses. Similar facilities for investment do not exist in Great Britain. In New York State and Massachusetts, on the other hand, industrial and commercial States in which the vast majority of workers are town dwellers, the workers have compara- tively few opportunities for investing money in real estate, and thus they are compelled to put their savings into the savings banks. In view of the fact that in New York State from 10 per cent, to 30 per cent, of the workers are, according to the trade union statistics, habitually un- employed, it will be particularly interesting to compare the savings banks deposits in Great Britain and in New York State. UNEMPLOYMENT 156 Deposits in the Sayings Banks of Great Britain. £143,181,656 187,005,562 204,834,576 209,005,745 209,694,077 1895 1900 1905 1906 1907 Deposits in the Savings Banks of New Tork State. . £128,774,715 184,416,319 222,179,452 233,629,741 278,859,207 Increase during last twelve years .. +£160,084,492 +£66,512,421 Increase during last three years . . +£56,679,755 +£4,859,601 The foregoing figures are startling indeed. They show that the 8,000,000 inhabitants of New York State have now a considerably larger sum in their savings banks than have the 44,000,000 inhabitants of the whole of Great Britain. If we allow for the difference in population, we find that for every £1 deposited in the savings banks by the average Englishman, the average citizen of New York State has £8 deposited in the savings banks. They show, further, that during the years 1905-1907 the average New Yorker added £7 to his savings banks deposit, whilst during the same time the average Englishman added only two shillings to his savings. In other words, for every £1 put by during the last three years by the average British worker, the average worker in New York State put by £70. The foregoing figures confirm the fact that in the United States employment must have been excellent and unemployment practically nil, and that emplojonent was perhaps best in New York State, notwithstanding the large, but purely nominal, unemploy- ment figures furnished by the trade unions of that State. The emigration and immigration figures and the savings banks statistics incontestably prove that the American workers must have passed through a long period of un- paralleled prosperity. New York State, like Great Britain, is a small and very densely populated State which subsists chiefly on 156 GEE AT AND GREATER BRITAIN trade and industries. Therefore it is worth while to inquire a Httle more closely into the state of employ- ment over there. For this purpose let us look into the censuses of 1900 and 1905 — censuses which did not merely enumerate and classify population, but which were industrial censuses as well. These censuses give the following picture of the state of employment in New York State :— Wages and Salaeies in New Yoek State. Number of Average wages per Average wage-earners. Wages paid, head per year. wages per week. 1900 .. 726,909 $337,323,685 $464=£92 16 £1 15 8 1905 .. 856,947 430,014,851 502=100 8 1 18 6 Increase+ 130,038 +|92,691,266 +|38= £7 12 +£0 2 10 Number of Average salaries salary-earners. Salaries paid. per head per year. per week. 1900 .. 68,030 $76,740,115 $1,113=222 12 £4 5 7 1905 .. 98,012 111,145,175 1,144=228 16 4 8 Increase+ 29,982 -f f;34,405,060 +$31= £6 4 -|-£0 2 5 It will be noticed that between 1900 and 1905 New York State found work for an additional army of 130,038 wage- earners and 29,982 clerks, &c., to whom, roughly speaking, additional wages of 127,096,326 dollars, or £25,419,265, per year were paid. These figures suffice to show that employ- ment has been excellent in New York State. They show a surprising expansion in employment, and they prove that wherever unemployment existed in New York State it could scarcely be due to lack of work. The expansion of business in New York State is further illustrated by the UNEMPLOYMENT 157 increase in the value of real and personal taxable estate, which have increased as follows : — Reai and Peesonai Taxable Estate in New Yobk State. 1895 1900 1905 1907 $4,292,082,167 5,461,302,752 7,738,165,640 8,565,379,394 It will be noticed that during the last twelve years the wealth of New York State, as measured by the value of real and personal taxable estate, has exactly doubled. This enormous increase in wealth has made possible the great increase of employment which is shown by the census figures. Of late we have frequently been told that unemploy- ment and consequent distress are very great in Germany and the United States. It is quite true that the United States and Germany have in 1907 and 1908 passed through an industrial crisis, accompanied by a considerable amount of unemployment. It is true that in these two countries a great reaction has taken place — a reaction which was only to be expected after the prolonged and unpre- cedented boom which preceded it. However, there is a material difference between unemployment in the United States and Germany, and unemployment in Great Britain. In Germany and the United States full employment is the rule ; in Great Britain it is the exception. In the United States and in Germany unemployment is usually unknown ; in Great Britain it is permanent, and it varies only in degree. Pathologically considered, the United States and Germany suffered in 1907-8 from unemployment in an acute form, whilst Great Britain suffers from chronic and malignant unemploy- ment which is constantly increasing, and which has lately become very acute. The fragmentary employment statistics relating to the United States may be said to be not a sufficient criterion to decide whether unemployment is 158 GMAT AND GBEATER BRITAIN greater in America or in Great Britain, but the comprehen- sive emplo3Tiient statistics of Germany su£5ce to show that unemployment in that country is trifling if compared with unemployment in Great Britain, and that it is less severe during times of acute unemployment in Germany than it is in Great Britain during times when employment is considered to be normal. CHAPTEE VIII OUR MILITARY NEEDS — A PLEA FOR A NATIONAL ARMY 1 Among the branches of miUtary science, military policy is, no doubt, the most important, for it provides the subject matter to the military organiser and administrator, and furnishes the sword to the strategist. Every statesman ought to have some considerable knowledge of military matters, because, in the words of a military classic, ' War is merely the continuation of political action by different means,' ^ and he ought, before all, to study military policy, as the military poUcy of the State is directed rather by the civil than by the military power. At the present moment, when the miUtary system of Great Britain is in a state of transition, and when the nation is hesitating in the choice of a miUtary poUcy, it is most important to consider the aspect of the various military systems from the points of view of the strategist, the statesman, the economist, and the citizen, so that we may learn what military policy this country ought to follow. All armies may be divided into two classes : the National and non- National ones. National Armies are com- posed of the voluntarily united citizens of the whole nation ; non-National ones are composed of those citizens who are compelled to enHst against their will, either by force or by poverty, for it seems immaterial whether the fear of imprisonment or the fear of starvation is the compelling ' A paper read on Wednesday, February 27, 1907, at the Eoyal United Service Institution, Field-Marshal the Right Hon. Earl Roberts, V.C, K.G., &o., in the chair. - Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Vol. I. 29. 169 160 GBEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN factor. Compulsory service, when cheerfully accepted by practically the whole nation, creates a National Army. The armies of Germany and France are National Armies, whilst the Russian Army is not a National Army. Voluntary enhstment, which is a misnomer when destitution supplants free will and drives men into the ranks, does not create a National Army. Let us carefully weigh the advantages and disadvantages of National and non- National Armies against each other. The Evidence of History Military science, like every practical science, is based upon experience. As no history of military policy and no satisfactory general history of the art and institutions of war exists — the works of Jahn, Carrion Nisas, Delbriick, Riistow, Gallitzyn, and others are unsatisfactory — I will take a bird's-eye view of the military history of the world, which will make it clear that National Armies are superior to non-National Armies, and that many of the greatest and most prosperous States have perished because they lacked a National Army. Ancient Egypt was a powerful and very wealthy State. Her defence was entrusted to a National Army of 400,000 men who formed one of their great castes similar to the Samurai of Japan. Like the Samurai, the Egyptian warriors were given farms for their subsistence, for according to Diodorus, the Egyptians thought it dangerous to leave the defence of their country to men who had no interest in its preser- vation.i As long as Egypt trusted to a National Army she preserved her wealth and power. However, in the seventh century before Christ, King Psammeticus formed an army of Greek mercenaries from Ionia and Caria, presented them with lands, and ill-treated the Egyptian soldiers. The majority of the Egyptian warriors, 240,000 in number, emigrated to Ethiopia, and Egypt had to rely chiefly on ' Diodorus Siculus, It OUE MILITARY NEEDS 161 foreigners for her defence. The Persians, who were originally a poor and hardy race of mountaineers, attacked Egypt for the sake of plunder with their National Army, and a single battle, that of Pelusium in 525 b,o., destroyed the greatness and power of Egypt, and ever since the country has been ruled by foreigners.^ The Persians, having conquered the rich lands of Asia Minor and Egypt, became exceedingly prosperous. Their ancient discipline was relaxed, their National Army was replaced by soldiers taken from the slums ^ and by levies from the subject nations. When Xerxes attacked Greece no less than fifty-six different nations were represented in his army, in which Persians formed a small minority .3 These vast hordes were easily shattered by the National Armies of Greece. At that time all Greek citizens bore arms. They considered military service to be not a burden but a privilege. All freemen, high and low, rich and poor, fought side by side, and the best citizens were the best soldiers. Practically the whole population, from twenty to sixty years old, was trained for war. Soon after the Persian wars, Persian customs corrupted Greece. Having broken the power of Persia, and believing themselves henceforth secure from all aggression, arms were neglected, and hired troops recruited from the proletariat replaced the citizen armies. The Peloponnesian War, which broke out about fifty years after the battle of Salamis, was, according to Thucydides, fought chiefly by mercenaries. A hundred years after the battle of Salamis, Isocrates complained : ' Formerly mer- cenaries were unknown with us, but now our position is such that it is far easier to raise an army of vagabonds than a citizen army.' * The Greek States relied on their wealth for their defence. Philip II of Macedon attacked Greece 1 Herodotus, II. 152, 154, 164, 168 ; lU. 11, 13. 2 Xenophon, InatituUons of Cyrus, Book VIII. » Herodotus, VII. 59, 100. * Isocrates, Eighth Oration, M 162 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN •with his National Army. The mercenary troops of Greece were routed, and the greatest heroism of the enthusiastic but ill-trained national volunteers — I would instance the total destruction of the sacred hand of Thebes at the battle of Chseronea — could not save the situation. The Greeks, who, as Aristotle had rightly said, were by nature qualified to rule the world,i became, Mke the Egyptians and Persians before them, a subject race, and have since then been ruled and plundered in turn by Macedonians, Romans, Goths, Byzantines, Turks. Phoenicia was the greatest maritime and colonial power of antiquity. Her citizens had, no' doubt, gained their predominant position in the world by their own arms. When Phoenicia was at the summit of her prosperity she relied for her defence on her fleet and on subject races and colonial troops. Persians, Libyans, Lydians, and others garrisoned the great Phoenician towns.® The mighty neigh- bours of Phoenicia despoiled her of wealth and power, and Alexander the Great completed the ruin of the country by the capture and destruction of the island city of Tyre. The desperate resistance of the Phoenician volunteers at the siege of Tyre was useless.^ The rich fled by sea to Carthage, a Phoenician colony, the poor were killed or sold as slaves, and Carthage became the heir of the great Phoenician world- empire in the same way in which, after a crushing defeat of Great Britain, the United States might become the heir of the British Empire. Carthage ruled the sea and was exceedingly wealthy ; Rome was poor. The struggle for existence caused war to break out between these two Powers, and, notwithstanding the genius of Harmibal, Carthage was defeated because, as Polybius, the foremost authority on the Carthagiman wars tells us, 'the Carthaginians employed mercenaries, whilst ' Aristotle, Politics, IV. 7. 2 Ezekiel xxvii. 10, 11. * Arrian, I. ; Diodorua Sioulus, U. OUB MILITABY NEEDS 163 Eome fought mth a national army.' i In the words of a modem historian : ' Eome trusted to itself and its sword ; Carthage to its gold and its hired soldiers. The greatness of Home was founded upon a rock ; that of Carthage upon sand and gold-dust.' ^ The Carthaginians possessed a huge army of native volunteers for home defence, but their heroic resistance could not save Carthage from destruction. After the fall of Carthage Rome became the mistress of the world and exceedingly wealthy. Believiag her position unchallengeable she neglected her army. Vegetius tells us : ■ The security of a long peace altered the dispositions of the Romans, drew them from military to civil vocations, and created among them a love of ease and idleness. MUitary diseiphne, after having been neglected, disappeared entirely.' 3 Universal service fell into abeyance. The Roman soldiers were recruited from the starving proletariat of the over- grown towns, and from allied and foreign nations.* The barbarians invaded Italy, and meeting with feeble resistance, plundered the country. The Roman Emperors removed, for the sake of safety, the centre of the Empire to Constan- tinople, in the same manner in which, after a successful invasion of Great Britain, the Imperial Government and the centre of the British Empire might be removed from London to Montreal. The huge East Roman Empire, with Constantinople as a capital, relied for defence on a Voluntary Army, recruited from the slums and reinforced by foreign mercenaries. Attacked by the National Armies of the Turks, Constantinople and the East Roman Empire fell in the fifteenth century. During the sixteenth century Spain became the greatest and the wealthiest Power in the world. She possessed the strongest navies and armies, and the richest colonies. Her 1 Polybius, I. 6 ; VII. 3. ^ Heeren, Historical Besearchea, Vol. I. chap. viii. ^ Vegetius, De Be Militaire, I. ^ Tacitus, Historice, IV. 14 ; Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus ; Herodiao, H. 6, 7. U 2 164 GBBAT AND GBEATEB BRITAIN wars were fought with mercenaries. The Netherlandish provinces of the Spanish Empire revolted against Philip II ; war ensued, and the military power of Spain was destroyed by the national levies of the Dutch. World-empires usually arise on the ruins of their pre- decessors. The wealth and the colonies of Spain fell into Dutch hands. Pursuing a commercial policy and con- fiding in the impregnable position of their water-girt and strongly fortified provinces, the supremacy of their navy and their glorious military past, the Dutch neglected their land armies. The defence of the country was left to Dutch paupers and foreign mercenaries. The Dutch were attacked by Louis XIV, and the Netherlands, which, when weak and poor, had, with a National Army, resisted Spain during eighty years of war, were overrun by French armies in less than forty days. The Dutch World-Empire crumbled to pieces, England became the heir of the Netherlands, New Amsterdam was re-christened New York. Had the Dutch possessed a national policy and a National Army, the world might have become Dutch instead of Anglo-Saxon. The foregoing sketch history is, of course, very imperfect, for various causes, apart from military ones, contributed to the fall of the great and prosperous States mentioned. At the same time, it cannot be denied that nearly all the world- empires of which we have knowledge succumbed — and usually they succumbed after a single blow — because they had entrusted their defence to non-National Armies instead of relying on their own strength. Let us now leave ancient history and consider the more modern methods of army organisation and warfare in order to understand the conditions and requirements of modern war. Up to the time of the French Revolution war was waged by hired soldiery. In the words of Frederick the Great : ' Armies were composed only of the dregs of the nation, of loafers, drunkards, vagabonds, and other worthless subjects, who shunned work and sought a hfe of licence and OtJfe MlLItCAHY NEEDS 165 adventure.' i Enlistment being largely voluntary, armies were small and costly, and wars were, as a rule, long drawn out. They were rather trials of endurance than trials of strength between nations. A glance at the warfare of Frederick the Great will help us to understand the difference between pre-revolutionary and modem warfare and military policy. Frederick the Great had an excellent standing army of about 200,000 professional soldiers. A large portion of these, from one-third to two-thirds, were foreigners. His troops were exceedingly well trained, discipUne was cruelly severe, the soldier was an instrument, the army was a machine. There was practically no trained reserve. ' One could replace the men lost in battle — supposing that a sufficient number of recruits could be obtained — as regards numbers, but one could not replace the soldiers as regards quaUty.' ^ Frederick the Great had to economise his force to the utmost. Consequently he tried to defeat his opponents rather by manoeuvring than by battle, and fought on an average only one or two battles per year during the Seven Years' War. The change from the cautious, slow, and laboured Prederickian warfare to the lightning-like warfare of Napoleon was due to a change in miUtary policy. Frederick the Great commanded in battle only from thirty to forty thousand men, whilst Napoleon commanded in battle from one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand ihen. Owing to the size of his armies, Napoleon could, after a victorious battle, march straight upon the enemy's capital, detaching half his forces for defending his line of communication. But Frederick the Great could obviously not defend his line of communication with twenty thousand or thirty thousand men, and march with an army of similar strength upon Vienna, although the distance which separated ' Frederick the Great, Anti Machiavel, chap. xii. 2 Frederick the Great, Histoire de la Ouerre de Sept Ans, Intro- duction. 166 GREAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN him from Viemia was trifling. Lacking sufficient men, his battles had to be fought within easy reach of his magazines, exactly as Wellington's battles, also for lack of men, had to be fought within easy reach of the English Fleet. Frederick the Great was situated like a shopkeeper with an insufficient working capital. When the French Revolution broke out practically all Europe made war upon France in the slow Prederickian method. France was, at the same time, invaded from all sides and torn by the great Vendean rising. The number of volunteers was insufficient for the defence of the country. The position of France was desperate. A heroic remedy was applied. By the edicts of August 23 and September 7, 1793, conscription was introduced. All able-bodied Frenchmen were called to arms, and with incredible rapidity fourteen armies and 1,200,000 men were raised. Necessity had created the nation in arms. The enormous armies of France easily scattered the foreign invaders and carried the war into the heart of the enemy's country, and, having an unlimited number of men, the thrifty, pennywise strategy of cautious moves and counter-moves could be thrown aside. Whilst France had created a National Army, Prussia had preserved her non-National one, having religiously adhered to Frederickian traditions and the Frederickian policy. In 1799 Scharnhorst wrote : ' The French have the immense advantage that they can make war with their whole able-bodied population whilst other nations fight with only one-tenth of their able-bodied population.' i Seven years later, on April 12, 1806, Scharnhorst wrote in a memoir : ' Only by arming the whole mass of the people can a small nation obtain some sort of equality of power when defending itself against the attacks of a larger state. In no state can a National Militia be organised more easily than in Prussia. Unfortunately we have come to value more the art and technique of war than military virtues. • Lehmann, Scharnhorst, I. 332. OUB MILITARY NEEDS 167 Through that mistake the great nations of all times have perished. Courage, self-sacrifice, intrepidity are the founda- tion of national independence. Without these we shall be lost, even if we should be victorious in battle.'^ The warnings of Schamhorst, and of other Prussian patriots, that Prussia was no longer abreast of the times, that a thorough reform of her miUtary organisation was required, were not heeded. Six months after the foregoing remarkable phrases were penned war broke out between Prussia and Prance, and on November 5, 1806, at the battle of Jena, Prussia, which had resisted the whole continent of Europe during seven years, succumbed at one blow and was dismembered. After this terrible defeat Prussia recognised the value of Scharnhorst's advice and resolved to create a National Army. On August 31, 1807, Schamhorst drew up a reorganisation scheme. The first article of that interesting document stated : ' All inhabitants of the State are bound to defend it.' The celebrated General Gneisenau added to Scharn- horst's scheme a ' Memoir Regarding the Military Organisa- tion of Schools,' in which he recommended : ' A strict military discipline should be introduced into all schools, every one of which should be supphed with a drill-master. The use of arms should be practised, and companies be formed, scholars should themselves elect their captains, and the principles of discipline should be taught. The bodies of the scholars should be hardened by appropriate gym- nastic exercise preparatory to war.' ^ Prussia introduced the policy lately recommended to Great Britain by Lord Roberts. Wishing to break her fetters, Prussia converted the country into a huge camp, created a National Army, attacked, in 1813, Napoleon, and reconquered her inde- pendence. Having learnt by bitter experience the value of a National Army as a means of defence, she preserved universal compulsory service, which originally had been 1 Lehmaiin, Schamhorst, I. 379. 2 Militdr-Woehenblatt, Beiheft, 1854, 82, 94. 168 GBEAT AND GREATEB BBITAIN introduced only with the object of throwing off the intoler- able yoke of Prance. The endless wars of Napoleon had created wide-spread dissatisfaction in France. The National and Voluntary Army of the Revolution had, by the weariness of twenty years' warfare, become a compelled and non-National one. The military enthusiasm was gone. Desertion and self- mutilation of recruits were frequent. When Napoleon fell, France cried for relief from conscription, and in 1814 Louis XVIII issued an edict which stated, ' the conscription is abohshed. The Army is recruiting by voluntary enlistment.' That edict was greeted with the greatest enthusiasm. After 1860 the relations between Prussia and J^rance became strained. Prussia, after having conquered for herself the hegemony in Germany, strove to create a united Germany and to acquire the hegemony in Europe, which hitherto had been held by France. A war between Prussia and Prance seemed unavoidable. WhUst Prussia had preserved and improved her National Army, which the disaster of Jena had called into being, France had denationalised hers. France had an excellent intelligence officer in Prussia — Baron Stoffel, who was miHtary attache to the French Embassy. His reports of the Prussian Army are classical. In one of them he shows that ' war. is inevitable between France and Germany,' and under the heading, ' Want of Foresight of Prance — Fatal Consequences,' he writes : ' The North German Confederation will dispose of one million trained, disciplined, and strongly-organised soldiers, while France has barely three hundred thousand to four hundred thousand men. Whilst the German federal army embraces all the manhood, all the intelligence, all the vis viva of the nation full of faith, energy, and patriotism, the French Army is almost entirely composed of the poorest and the most ignorant portion of the people.' After having spoken of the torpor and degeneration of France, he urges the need of systematically regenerating the nation, writing : ' Chief OUR MILITARY NEEDS 160 among the regenerative institutions there are two : compul- sory mihtary service and compulsory education/ However, Baron Stoffel thought the chance of introducing the former very small, for, ' Infatuated with itself and perverted by egotism, the nation will, with difficulty, conform to an institution of which it does not even suspect the strong and fruitful principle, the application of which requires virtues which France does not possess, such as self-denial, self-sacrifice, love of duty. Nations, like individuals, correct nothing in their hves unless taught by bitter experience, and do not reform their institutions unless compelled to do so by disasters — a Jena was necessary to teach Prussia to reform herself.' i Eleven months after these remarkable words were written France experienced her Jena at Sedan. Baron Stoffel was a prophet crying in the wilderness. Misled by the delusive arguments of some eloquent politicians, and preferring ease to duty, the French nation did not Hsten to the voice of the experts. The Franco-German War again proved the superiority of the National over the non-National Army. After her disastrous defeat, France reformed her army and reintroduced universal military service. In the Boer War a National Militia, not a National Army, fought the united forces of the British Empire, and an almost tenfold numerical superiority was required to crush the stubborn farmer-soldiers. Had the Boers possessed a National Army instead of a Mihtia, had their troops possessed a mihtary organisation, disciphne, and cohesion, they would very likely have defeated the British Empire and conquered South Africa. Had the Boers, as they were told, marched straight upon Durban and Cape Town, disregarding Lady- smith, Kimberley, and Mafeking, and had they cleared the country of all rails, and ' salted ' cattle and horses, the reconquest of South Africa might have been impossible for the British Empire. In the Russo-Japanese War, again, > Baron StofEel, Report, August 12, 1869. 170 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN a National Army defeated a non-National Army of the compulsory type. Causes of Supbbioeity of National Armies The foregoing examples seem clearly to prove the superi- ority of National over non-National Armies in ancient history and in modern war. What are the causes of that superiority ? The superiority of National over non-National Armies arises from three causes : — 1. A National Army possesses far more moral value than a non- National Army. 2. A National Army possesses far greater numerical strength than a non-National Army. 3. A National Army possesses far greater intelligence and a far better physique than a non-National Army. Let us consider these three causes one by one. The Moral Factor In the words of Clausewitz : ' The most valuable lesson which the strategist can derive from the study of history is this, that it shows the incredible influence of the moral factor ; that it shows that miUtary virtues are to the soldiers what genius is to their general.' i In the words of the late Colonel Henderson, who might have become another Clausewitz had he lived long enough : ' The first thing is to realise that in war we have to do not so much with numbers, arms, and manoeuvres as. with human nature. Moral force, said Napoleon I, is to physical force as is three to one.' 2 In the words of Brasidas, the great Spartan general : ' Three things are required in a soldier : firmness of will, sense of shame, and obedience to orders.' ^ In the 1 Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, Vol. I. 212, 217. ^ Henderson, Science of War, 174. " Thuoydides, V. OUE MILITAEY NEEDS 171 words of Julius Caesar : ' Modesty and self-restraint are as precious in soldiers as courage and high-mindedness.' i ' An army is an organism, not a machine. In all periods of war, under all conditions of arms, the moral forces which affect armies have been the great determining factors of victories and defeat.' 2 In the words of Prince Bismarck, who possessed military knowledge and intuition to the highest extent : ' In war moral power and discipline is everything.' ^ Historical experience tells us that the moral value of non-National Armies is a very low one. Beholding the ruin of the Roman Empire, which had fallen because it had entrusted its defence to hired soldiers, the father of mihtary science wrote more than fifteen hundred years ago : ' On the careful choice of recruits depends the welfare of the State. The men to whose hands the defence of the Empire and its whole future are committed should be respectable men of high moral standing, for such men will be good soldiers. Their sense of honour will make them high-minded and victorious, but little good can be expected from men of a low type, even if they are well drilled and have been on active service. An army composed of inferior recruits never distinguished itself, and by terrible experience have we learned that there lies the source of our misfortune.' * Seeing Italy overwhelmed by foreign nations, which had easily defeated the non-National Armies of the Italian Republics, Machiavelli wrote, four centuries ago : ' Those soldiers are Uttle to be depended upon who have no other motive for fighting than their pay, for their small pay does not, and cannot, suffice to make them fight bravely and die wilhngly for the country which has hired them. Soldiers who do not fight from love for their country will make but a feeble resistance if vigorously attacked, and as self- sacrifice and heroism cannot be expected in mercenaries, 1 Cjesar, De Bella GalKco, VI. ' General Maurice, in Encyclopoedia Britannica, Vol. IXXIV. 343. 3 Posohinger, Tiaehgesprdche, II. 435. ■* Vegetius, De Re Militaire, I. 172 GBEAT AND GBEATER BRITAIN the rulers of kingdoms and republics ought above all things to create National Armies, as all great nations of the past have done.' i Beholding the decline of England under Charles II and James II, Sir Algernon Sidney wrote, two centuries ago : ' No State can be said to -stand upon a steady foundation except those whose strength is in their own soldiery and the body of their own people. Such as serve for wages often betray their masters in distress, and always want the courage and industry which is found in those who fight for their own interests and are to have a part in the victory. The business of mercenaries is so to perform their duty as to keep their emplojonent, and to draw profit from it, but that is not enough to support the spirit of men in extreme danger. The shepherd who is a hireling flies when the thief comes.' ^ The history of all time proves the moral inferiority of hired soldiery. At the beginning of the war between Parliament and Charles I, 22,000 men were impressed by the former. ' Clergymen, scholars, students at the Inns of Court and Universities, the sons of esquires, persons rated at £5 goods or £3 land, and servants of Members of Parliament, were excepted.' ^ The Parliamentary Army was an armed mob composed of ' decayed serving men and tapsters, and such kind of fellows,' as Cromwell picturesquely put it,* and it was miserably beaten by Charles I. Like every great general, Cromwell attached the highest value to the moral factor in war. Seeing in the spirits of ' these low and mean fellows ' the cause of the numerous defeats of the Parliamentary troops, Cromwell raised a National Army, composed of substantial freeholders, who defended their country, their faith, and, let it not be forgotten, their property, against Charles I, and these men 'made some ' Maohiavelli, Discorsi, Book I. chap, xliii. ^ Sir Algernon Sidney on Government, chap. ii. 21. ■' Firth, GromwelVs Army, 21. * Cromwell's Speech, April 13, 1657. OUR MILITARY NEEDS 173 conscience of what they did and were never beaten.' i In the Franco-German War of 1870-71, the French Army was easily defeated by the German Army, largely in con- sequence of the superior moral force of the latter. Nominally every Frenchman had to serve, but as those who could afford it were allowed to furnish rem/plagants — a substitute could, in 1869, be obtained for 2,400 francs— the soldiers belonged almost exclusively to the poorest, lowest, and least intelligent section of the population.^ The army was a caste in the nation.^ The burden of miUtary service rested upon the poorest, the least instructed, and the least healthy section of the people.* The soldiers were the pariahs of French society, paupers who, according to Bazaine, were generally considered only fit to be food for powder.5 The moral weakness of the French troops con- verted every defeat into a rout, every retirement into a wild flight, every non-success into a disaster, dissolved all bonds of discipline, and converted the regiments into a raving mob, which wreaked its vengeance upon the officers. Zola's ' Debacle ' gives a faithful picture of the frightful moral breakdown of the French Army. Cromwell's soldiers, the Germans when fighting against Napoleon I and Napoleon III, the Boers, and the Japanese, fought for hearth and home ; armed paupers and adventurers, who have no hearth and home, fight merely for their pay. They fight, not for their country, in which they have no stake, but for their more prosperous fellow-citizens, who are unwilling to fight theijaselves. Hence a so-called Voluntary Army is a Pauper Army, which possesses all the pauper characteristics. It is chronically dissatisfied, and is apt to refuse fighting at the moment when its services are most needed. The fall of Carthage was accelerated, if not caused, by the revolt of the 1 Cromwell's Speech, April 13, 1657. ^ Les Causes de nos Disaatrea, 91. 3 Boulanger, L'lnvasion Allemande,^\Z&. ' Lehautoourt, Hiatoire de la Ouerre, II. 56. * Bazajne, Episodes de la Querre, XXV, 174 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN mercenaries described by Polybius.^ In 1797, during the war with France, a strike of the sailors for higher pay twice laid up the British Fleet at a most critical moment. If Great Britain preserves her Voluntary Army, she must be prepared to see history repeating itself when the enemy is imperiously knocking at the gate. A non- National Army possesses little moral value, and is unreliable, especially in adversity. It is true that some non-National Armies, such as those of Hannibal, Marlborough — who was a second Hannibal — and Wellington, have shown the greatest heroism, but these armies fought for exceptional men. The mercenaries who served under generals such as Hannibal, Marlborough, and Welliagton, saw in them their cause and their country. Such leaders arise hardly once in a century, and though they are able to fashion excellent armies out of the worst material they caimot do so quickly. In modern war blows fall with lightning speed. Therefore it is now hardly possible to improvise armies after the outbreak of war. The futile resistance of Gambetta's armies in the Franco-German War has made that point clear. France was not given the time to draw on her latent resources and to ' organise victory,' as in the times of Oamot. Numbers iw War Clausewitz, Jomini, and Hamley teach that the whole art of war consists in striking with greater strength the right point at the right moment. ' Providence,' Napoleon used to say, ' usually fights on the side of the big battalions.' The great numerical superiority of National Armies is certain to give them the victory over non-National ones. Victories such as those of Charles XII of Sweden over the Russians happen nowadays only between white men and savages. The armament and tactics of all European nations are 1 Polybius, I. 3, 5, 6, &o. OUB MILITARY NEEDS 175 practically uniform. Therefore, modern wars between white people are apt to be decided by superior numbers. In 1870 France was swamped by the vast hosts of Germany, which bore all before them. At the beginning of August France had 332 battalions, Germany 474 battalions ; France had 220 squadrons, Germany had 382 squadrons ; France had 780 guns, Germany had 1,584 guns.i In the great numerical superiority of the German Army Napoleon III saw the direct cause of his defeat, for he told us in his ' CEuvres Posthumes ' : ' The troops we might have to face would be either 330,000 men of Prussia alone, without the Southern States, or 430,000 men of united Germany, against which we were able to oppose 400,000, if the calculations of the Minister of War were correct, and if there had been sufficient time to get them together. Thus, although according to official data the number of fighting men was 688,000, there were reckoned only 385,000 for the Army of the Ehine. It seemed, therefore, as if a very large allowance had been made for unfavourable eventualities. What a bitter decep- tion the chief of this Army must have experienced when, at the end of three weeks, the eight army corps sent to the frontier did not furnish more than about 220,000 men ! This inconceivable difference between the number of men present under the colours and those who ought to have been there is a most striking and deplorable example of the vicious character of our miUtary organisation. The transition from a peace establishment to a war estabhshment was far more protracted than was expected, and this was the chief cause of our reverses. ' Instead of having in line, as might have been expected, 385,000 men to oppose the 430,000 of Northern Germany combined with the Southern States, the Army, when the Emperor arrived at Metz on July 25, amounted only to 220,000, and, moreover, not only were the effectives not up ' Oeneralstabswerk, 1*, 30.* 176 GREAT AND GEE ATEE BRITAIN to their full complement, but many indispensable accessories were wanting.' ^ On paper the German and French forces stood approxi- mately in the proportion of two to one. If the moral factor be taken into account, the German and French forces stood in the proportion of three to one. Therefore, the war was lost for France before it was begun. At Weissenburg 60,950 Germans defeated 5,300 Frenchmen, and 144 German guns played upon but 18 French guns ; at Worth 97,650 Germans attacked 48,550 Frenchmen, and 342 German guns easily silenced the 167 French guns opposed to them ; at Spichem (Forbach) 34,600 Germans, with 108 guns, routed 27,600 Frenchmen with 90 guns; at Gravelotte 187,600 Germans with 732 guns defeated 112,800 Frenchmen with 520 guns ; at Sedan 154,850 Germans with 701 guns defeated 90,000 Frenchmen with 408 guns.* Germany's successes in the war were due, perhaps, not so much to superior generalship as to superior numbers and superior morale — factors which her National Army supplied. On August 4 the German attack commenced. On August 6, two days later, when the battles of Weissenburg, WQrth, and Spichem had taken place, the war was, according to a competent French writer, lost for France.^ In two days the mighty French Empire was humbled to the dust. When a National Army meets a non-National one, the first encounter is frequently decisive, as may be seen by the battles of Jena, Eckmiihl, and Koniggratz. Intelligence and Physique National Armies being composed of men of every class, rank, occupation, and profession possess greater intelligence than armies composed of paupers and adventurers. When recruits are drawn almost entirely from the lowest stratum • Napoleon III, (Euwea Posth/umes, IV. V. VT. 2 KriegacMchtUche, Binzelschriften, 1889, Part XII. 837, ^ Lea Causes de nos Diaastrea, 65, OUB MILITAEY NEEDS 177 of the population, every desire of progress and every reform is hampered by fears that it may unfavourably affect recruiting. Therefore, non-National Armies stand still whilst National Armies advance. Whilst non-National Armies are constitutionally conservative, and are mihtary machines directed by routine, National Armies and Mihtiag have brought about nearly every progress in intelligent warfare and nearly every improvement in tactics. The British National Army, which fought at Crecy, Poictiers, and Agincourt; the Hussites, who fought at Deutschbrod, Aussig, and Taus ; and the Swiss National levies, who fought at Morgarten, Sempach, Granson, and Morat, destroyed the power of mailed knighthood and created modern infantry. The revolted Americans and the soldiers of the French Revolution destroyed the linear tactics and created the modern loose formations. The latest revolution in tactics and the latest improvements in field fortifications and permanent fortifications were invented by the Boers. The physique of National Armies is better than that of non-National Armies of the same race, as a comparison of German and English recruits will show. The causes of this difference are obvious. The Germans can pick their recruits from the whole population, whilst the British Army can pick its recruits only from the stunted and underfed youths who voluntarily enlist. Therefore a British Army seems unlikely to be able to compete with a National European Army in marching power and endurance, two most important factors in modern warfare. The foregoing shows that non-National Armies are greatly inferior to National Armies in moral force, that is in courage, fortitude, devotion, and obedience ; in numbers, in intelligence, and in physical strength and endurance ; and it follows that the British Army compares very unfavourably with the armies of other nations, against which it may have to fight. 178 GREAT ANt) GREATER BRITAIN Disadvantages of the British Military System It may be objected : ' It is true that a National Army is, generally speaking, far superior to a non-National Army. Nevertheless, in the case of Great Britain, an army raised by voluntary enlistment is sufficient and, on the whole, preferable to a National Army ' : — 1. Because Great Britain has hitherto done very well without a National Army. 2. Because no nation threatens this country. 3. Because Great Britain rules the sea and can rely on her fleet for her defence. 4. Because this country has alhes who possess powerful armies. 5. Because International Arbitration is Ukely soon to abolish war. Let us examine these arguments one by one. As regards the first objection, I think Great Britain has hitherto not done very well, but has done very badly because she lacked a National Army. Had she possessed a National Army, the American Revolutionary War would probably never have occurred, firstly, because the American Colonies would have been too weak to resist a British National Army ; secondly, and principally, because universal military service is a most powerful argument in favour of peace. An army of mercenaries, a Voluntary Army, can be used for any war, one might almost say for any crime, because such an army obeys blindly, but a National Army can be used only for a National purpose. An unpopular war cannot be carried on by a National Army. The British Parliament would have been juster to the claims of the American colonists had the brothers and sons of Cabinet Ministers, and of Members of both Houses of Parliament, been obliged to shoulder a rifle and fight the Americans. At the time of the American Revolution the British Army was to the men OUR MILITARY NEEDS 179 in Parliament merely the executioner of their will, and they hired Hessians and other German troops to do the fighting for them. Had Great Britain had a National Army she might have preserved her American Colonies, and might have saved to the tax-payers £200,000,000, the cost of the war. We may now trace the loss of our most precious Colonies to the lack of a National Army, and may not similar, and per- haps greater, disasters arise in the future from the same cause ? Owing to our lack of a National Army, Napoleon I was at liberty to devastate the continent of Europe during twenty years. Had Great Britain been able to land 800,000 men at Dieppe, and march with 150,000 men upon Paris — the distance could easily have been covered in less than a week — Napoleon would never have ventured to march upon Berlin, Vienna, Madrid, and Moscow. By a cheap demon- stration, by merely assembling a fleet of transports at Portsmouth, Napoleon's activity might have been stopped and the peace of Europe been maintained. The military weakness of this country let Napoleon loose on Europe. The Napoleonic wars needlessly devoured several million human lives.and cost this country approximately £1,000,000,000. These fearful losses might have been avoided had Great Britain been strong on land. Lastly, owing to the absence of a National Army, the Boer War cost Great Britain 20,000 lives and £250,000,000. Had this country possessed a National Army, the Boers would never have ventured to go to war with Great Britain. It is not true that Great Britain has hitherto done very well without a National Army. As regards the second objection, it must be admitted that no nation threatens Great Britain at present, but we caimot foresee the future. Ten years ago no one would have thought it possible that Great Britain would require 500,000 men to defeat the Boers, or that Japan would defeat Russia, or that France and England would be friends notwithstanding Fashoda, or that Germany would make N 2 180 GBEAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN a determined bid for the rule of the sea. The political situation is apt to alter as suddenly as the weather in April. Therefore, it is as foohsh to ask : ' Against which nation do we require a National Army ? ' as it is to ask : ' Against which burglar do we require a bolt on the front door ? ' It is usually too late to fix a bolt on one's door when one knows against which burglar it is required. Armies are living organisms of very slow growth, and they cannot be improvised when we have the misfortune to know against which Power they are required. As regards the third objection, it is true that Great Britain rules the sea now, but she may not always rule it. Wealthier nations may secure the rule of the sea, and, unless the British Empire be unified, Great Britain alone, with her almost stationary population, may financially be unable to maintain her naval supremacy against the United States or even against Germany. Besides, history teaches us that the foremost naval Powers have been defeated either by coalitions and the defection of allies, as were the Phoenicians and Venetians, or by surprise, as were the Genoese and the Dutch. Forty years ago the Austrians destroyed by surprise the far more powerful ItaHan Fleet at Lissa, and the Japanese, also by surprise, inflicted serious damage on the Russian Fleet at Port Arthur. Naval supremacy may further be lost by new inventions. The corvus of Duilius destroyed the maritime supremacy of Carthage in a few hours, and in the American Civil War a single ship of a new type, the ' Merrimac,' destroyed the weak squadron of old sailing-ships opposed to her. A new electrical invention may conceivably have similar consequences to Great Britain. Lastly, this country may be invaded at a time when the fleet is busy in a distant quarter of the world, for it cannot permanently be kept in home waters. The history of Phoenicia, Carthage, Venice, and the Netherlands, which once ruled the sea, teaches us that it is dangerous for a nation to entrust its fate entirely to its OUE MILITARY NEEDS 181 ships. Let us, therefore, put the utmost trust in the Blue Water School, but let us, at the same time, provide an alternative means of defence. It would be insane to stake the existence of Great Britain on a single card. As regards the fourth objection, it is true that Great Britain has powerful aUies, but let us not forget that no one helps those who do not help themselves. The binding force of treaties is precarious, the reliability of alhes uncertain, and the number of broken treaties beyond counting. A great nation can rely only on its own strength. A nation which is believed to be strong can always get allies. A nation in distress is usually deserted. Foreign nations conclude alUances not with the British nation but with the British Fleet. As regards the fifth objection, let us hope that Compul- sory International Arbitration will cause the wolf to he down beside the lamb, but let us not entrust our national possessions to the benevolence of other nations until Com- pulsory International Arbitration has been actually, and very firmly, established. Until then let us trust in God and keep our powder dry. War is, no doubt, a great evil, but it is apparently a necessary, or at least an unavoidable, evil. Since the time of the Amphictyonic Council, innumer- able attempts have been made to decide differences between nations by arbitration, but hitherto all these attempts have failed because the strongest motive of individuals and of States is self-interest, and because nature is ruled by the law of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest and strongest. Therefore, we can hope for universal peace only if the universal law of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest be abolished. Until then we ought to believe with George Washington : ' If we desire to avoid insult we must be able to repel it. If we desire to secure peace, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war.' ^ ' Washington, Fifth Annual Address, December 3, 1793. 182 GBEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN Supposed Advantages of the British Military System Those who believe that Great Britain ought not to change her military policy, that she ought to preserve her Voluntary Army, may argue : ' It is true that, considered from the historical, political, and military point of view, ia short, from national considerations, the British military system is to be condemned, but, looked at from the economic and social points of view, from the point of view of the individual tax-paying citizens and workers, it possesses great compensating advantages, namely : — 1. Our Voluntary Army is cheaper than would be a National Army, 2. Our Army is a splendid refuge for the unemployed. Let us look into these arguments. It is often stated that a Voluntary Army, such as ours, is much cheaper than a National Army ; that militarism is a'crushing burden and a curse to the nations on the Continent. Let us examine that statement. Germany has not only the strongest army, but also the second strongest, if not the strongest, navy on the Continent. Therefore, we ought to find in Germany unmistakable evidence of the ruinous effect of militarism, especially as her natural resources, such as geographical situation, sea-border, harbours, coal, climate, fruitful soil, &c., are exceedingly poor if compared with the magnificent natural resources of Great Britain. Yet we find that there are in the German savings banks £650,000,000, as compared with but £210,000,000 in Great Britain ; that the German savings banks deposits increased during the last six years by £170,000,000, whilst ours increased by only £17,000,000 ; that only from 20,000 to 30,000 people emigrate yearly from Germany, whilst between 200,000 and 300,000 emigrate yearly from Great Britain ; that in Great Britain the number of unemployed is enormous, whilst Germany has practically none ; that OUB MILITARY NEEDS 183 the national income of Prussia subject to income tax has, between 1892 and 1905, increased by about 75 per cent., whilst it has increased by but 15 per cent, in Great Britain; that apparently Germany is much wealthier than Great Britain. The foregoing figures, which are taken from official statistics, prove that militarism is certainly not a crushing burden to Germany. Measured by the money actually spent, the British Army is apparently a little cheaper than the German Army, but it is in reality far more expensive. Great Britain spends on an inefficient and unready army of a few himdred thousand men about £30,000,000 per annum, whilst Germany spends on an efficient army of several million men £35,000,000 per annum. Per head of popula- tion and per tax-payer the British Army is actually more expensive than the German Army. Whilst Great Britain spends about 15s. per head per year on the army, Germany spends only lis. per head per year on her army. In other words, militarism presses more heavily upon the average British than upon the average German tax-payer, and whilst we receive a very unsatisfactory article, Germany receives an excellent article for the money spent. It is true that, whilst the British Army withdraws only about 200,000 youths, mostly loafers, from the streets, the German Army withdraws about 600,000 youths from active production. However, the marvellous progress of all the German industries indicates that German produc- tion carmot be suffering severely from this withdrawal of 600,000 hands, and I venture to affirm that the German industries are not harmed, but greatly benefited, by the miUtary training received by every worker. The working capacity, and with the working capacity the earning power, of every man depends, in the first place, upon his health and strength, which are his most valuable possessions, and these are greatly increased by two years of strenuous 184 GEEAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN open-air life, free from all anxiety about his daily bread. The two years which every German worker devotes to hard and continued bodily exercise set him up for hfe. They not only improve his health and increase his strength, but inculcate in him habits of discipline, cleanliness, orderliness, thrift, self-reliance, and mutual helpfulness. The German Army is the largest and the best school in Germany. Knowing the German Army from within, and having a considerable knowledge of German industrial and commercial life, I have no hesitation in asserting that Germany's industrial success is due, in the first place, to universal military training. Whilst the British race is undoubtedly physically deteriorating, the physique of the German race is equally undoubtedly improving. A comparison of English crowds with German crowds makes it clear to the most superficial observer that the German race is now by far the sturdier of the two. It is true that, as may be read in old books. Englishmen used to have the finest physique in Europe, but now things have changed. Uni- versal and strenuous bodily trainiog in the one country through three generations, and almost universal bodily neglect in the other country — only an infinitesimal per- centage of Englishmen can afford regular bodily exercise in the open air, and long holidays in the country — ^has wrought this remarkable change. Lastly, it is an illusion that the British Army is a refuge for the unemployed. Although unemployment is fearfully prevalent in this country, and although almost 300,000 British people expatriate themselves every year through lack of work, the army cannot obtain a sufficient number of recruits. Apparently only a very small percentage of the unemployed enters the army, and as those who enter the army must be able-bodied, most of them ought to be able to find work outside the army. Besides, the British Army is primarily not a charitable institution, but an institution for the defence of the country and the Empire. OUR MILITARY NEEDS 185 I think the foregoing proves that from the point of view of economy and hygiene, from the financial and social points of view, from the points of view of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the tax-payer, and the working-man in shop and factory, universal military service is not a curse hut a blessing. An army is an institution which should give the greatest fighting power and the greatest possible security against foreign attack to the nation at the minimum price. The British Army is an institution which gives an insufficient fighting power and insufficient security to the nation at the maximum price. Let us now consider Great Britain's Position in Case of War with a Country possessing a National Army It is evidently not impossible that the British Army may have to fight a National Army. London is the key to the British Empire. Great Britain's insular security rests, in the first place, upon her naval supremacy, and in the second place, upon the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. Phihp II, Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Napoleon I tried to make themselves masters of the Continent and attacked Great Britain. History may repeat itself. Even if Great Britain be not attacked directly by a nation striving to master the Continent, she cannot allow that nation to occupy Belgium and Holland, whence an invasion would be comparatively easy. The Napoleonic wars may have to be fought over again. What will be Great Britain's position in case of such a war, or of any other war with a State possessed of a National Army ? Great Britain, which, in the time of Napoleon I, was a mihtary Power of the second rank, is now only a military Power of the third rank. Her army, though immensely costly, stands on a level with those of Switzerland, Belgium, 186 GBEAT AND GREATBB BRITAIN Holland, and Bulgaria. She has but a small number of soldiers, and these are of inferior morale and inferior physique if compared with those of her possible antagonists. Great Britain cannot safely pit a small number of boy-soldiers against an overwhelming number of men, and as Great Britain has practically no reserve of trained soldiers, a single defeat might wipe out the British Army. A State possessing a National Army may risk losing a battle, but Great Britain dare not incur such a risk, and therefore she would, in such a war, be compelled still to fight in the pre-revolutionary style and to employ the antiquated and inefficient strategy of Frederick II, which Wellington had to use against his will. If such a war be fought on foreign soil, the British commander would have always to keep within easy reach of his ships. He would be able to operate only in a safe corner far away from the vital spot, as did Wellington. However, he may not be able to repeat Wellington's feats in the Peninsula, as railways and telegraphs have abohshed space. Therefore, though he may annoy the enemy at a safe distance, he carmot strike at the seat of power and the centre of national vitality. Great Britain is not an aggressive Power. She requires an army only for defence. But let us not forget that the best defence is the attack. The British Army, as at present constituted, is only an Imperial pohce force, and an instrument for passive defence. It can demonstrate against a National Army, but cannot hit it hard. Therefore, future wars in which this country might be engaged may be almost interminable and exceedingly costly, as were most of our past wars. If Japan had had an army similar in character to our own, if she had been able to land only 100,000 trained soldiers on Asiatic soil, she would have had to fight Russia in far-off corners rather by manoeuvring than by battle, and the Russo-Japanese War would probably still be going on. OUB MILITARY NEEDS 187 Opinions are divided as to whether an invasion of Great Britain is possible, but so much is certain, that such an operation must be most tempting to foreign strategists, who, by risking merely the capture, not the destruction, of a small fraction of their army may gain an unusually tempting prize. At all events, it seems by no means impossible that Great Britain may earlier or later have to fight for her existence with her army, and then she may find her weak military force a reed to lean on. It is true that our army can be reinforced by 300,000 citizen soldiers, but I think it would be murder to send them against a well-trained National Army. It is also true that, in case of need. Great Britain might rise like one man, form an enormous National Militia, and fight as heroically as the Americans did. However, I am afraid Great Britain cannot rely on an untrained militia as do the United States. The position of the two countries is totally dissimilar. In the first place, Great Britain has not the backwoodsmen and countrymen who were the backbone of the American militia in war; and in the second place, she has no continental distances to protect her, and give her time for organising her defence. Besides, according to Moltke, ' Wars fought by Militias have the pecuharity that they last much longer and are for this reason far more costly in money and lives than are other wars.' ^ The American War of Secession cost 800,000 lives, whilst the Franco-German War, which was fought by a number of men more than twice larger, cost only 200,000 lives. Therefore the American Civil War was eight times more deadly than was the Franco-German War. Lastly, militias have been very greatly over-valued. Washington, perhaps the greatest military authority in America, has unconditionally condemned their use. On September 24, 1776, he wrote to the President of Congress : ' Experience, which is the best criterion to work by, so fully, clearly, and decisively reprobates the practice of 1 Moltke, Speech, February 16, 1874. 188 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN trusting to militia, that no man who regards order, regu- larity, and economy, or his own honour, character, or peace of mind will risk them upon this issue. The evils to he apprehended from a standiug army are remote, and, situated as we are, not at all to be dreaded ; but the consequence of wanting one is certain and inevitable ruin. This contest is not hkely to be the work of a day ; and to carry on the war systematically you must estabhsh your army upon a permanent footing.' ^ Colonel Henderson also is very sceptical as to the value of an insufficiently trained militia, for he writes : ' A mob, however patriotic, carrying small- bore rifles is no more likely to hold its own to-day against well-led regulars than did the mob carrying pikes and flint-locks ia the past. Non-professional soldiers are likely to fail in discipline, and it would appear that at the be- giiming of the campaign they are more liable to panic, less resolute iu attack, less enduring under heavy and great hardships, and much slower in manoeuvre than professionals.' ^ I think the foregoing proves that from the points of view of the strategist, the statesman, the economist, and the citizen Great Britain requires a National Army. Therefore two questions arise : — 1. What kind of National Army does Great Britain require ? 2. How can she obtain the required army ? Formerly we were told to copy the German Army, and now we are told to copy the Japanese Army. A National Army is not a dead machine which can be copied, but a liviug organism. To those who say : ' Let us copy the Japanese Army,' I would answer : ' Give me the Japanese history and I will give you the Japanese Army.' Englishmen are neither Germans nor Japanese. A British National Army must before all be National. ' Bancroft, History of the United States, Vol. V. 412. ^ Colonel Henderson in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. XXXIII. 747. OUR MILITABY NEEDS 189 Military service of two or three years is probably unnecessary. In the continental barracks an incredible amount of time is wasted on traditional triviaKties and unnecessary housemaids' work, whilst war training is neglected. Six months' training followed by short man- oeuvres should suffice to make a soldier. The Prussians who defeated Napoleon I under Bliicher had had only six months' training. Since then weapons and tactics have become far more compHcated, but Colonel Pollock has shown that average recruits may be converted into good soldiers in six months. The ideal type of the British Army can be settled only by the careful deUberations of the best military brains, and it seems highly desirable that the Government should appoint a small commission to study this question and to draw up a plan. Three centuries ago. Sir Edward Cecil, then the greatest living English general, wrote in a memoir on the defence of the British coasts against invasion, ' The danger of all is that a people not used to war believeth no enemy dare venture upon them which may make them neglect it the more for that their ignorance doth blinde them.' i This is unfortunately still the attitude of the British nation. Is a Jena or a Sedan required to wake up the people ? Great Britain requires a National Army, or at least a large National Militia, thoroughly trained for war. Every Enghshman should possess the necessary training to enable him to defend his country. The public gives little thought to the army problem because it does not know that a strong British Army is the best guarantee for national and international peace and that universal military training would be a blessing to the people. Therefore it seems to me that the first step towards obtaining a satisfactory mihtary force for the defence of Great Britain and the Empire should consist in informing the people that a National Army is a necessity for Great Britain. Hence the educational 1 Dalton, Echvard Cecil, Vol. II. 402. 190 GEEAT AND GREATEB BEITAIN propaganda of Lord Eoberts seenis to me to be of the very greatest value, and I think that every officer who has the future of the country at heart, and who supports Lord Roberts in his mind, should also support him by deeds to the best of his ability. CHAPTEB IX PHYSICAL DEGENERATION AND THE INFLUENCE OF MILITARY TRAINING UPON THE NATIONAL PHYSIQUE 1 The report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration of 1904 was in many respects a very disappointing document. It supphed a vast quantity of interesting facts regarding the very unsatisfactory state of the health and of the physique of the people, but it left unanswered the question whether the national physique had or had not actually deteriorated. The report declared : — That no sufficient material (statistical or other) was at present available to warrant any definite conclusions on the question of the physique of the people by comparison with data obtained in past times ; that a partial investigation, as for instance into the condition of the classes from which recruits are at present mostly drawn, might be very mis- leading, however carefully conducted, and might give rise to erroneous conclusions on the general question unless checked by expert knowledge. (' Deterioration Report,' Vol. I. p. 1.) Sir William Taylor, the Director-General of the Army Medical Service, confirmed the foregoing statement, for he wrote : — ' I consider that it is impossible to obtain reliable statistical or other data regarding the conditions that have ' A paper read in the Section of Public Health and Forensic Medicine, at the Annual Meeting of the British Medical Association, 1908. 191 192 GEBAT AND GBBATEB BBITAIN existed in the past, and consequently, as no reliable data are obtainable for the purposes of comparison, I do not see how the question can be dealt with from the progressive deterioration point of view.' (' Deterioration Eeport,' Vol. I. p. 100.) The report was an inconclusive one. The Committee returned the verdict ' Not proven.' Although direct evidence showing that the national physique has deteriorated in Great Britain is wanting, circumstantial evidence is at hand which points unmistak- ably to the fact that the change of Great Britain from a principally agricultural to a principally industrial country is responsible for that unsatisfactory state of the physique which we observe in the population of our large towns. As some prominent medical men who gave evidence before the Inter-Departmental Committee tried to prove that the town physique in Great Britain is as good as the country physique, that therefore town life is as healthy as country life, I have to prove my assertion that the transference of the people from the country to the towns has led to the deterioration of the national physique in Great Britain. As British anthropometrioal statistics elucidating the past of the race are not available, I have to rely for proof of my statement upon the German recruiting experience and statistics. If I succeed in showing that the industrial occupations and town life have brought about deterioration of the national physique in Germany, I think we may conclude from that fact that a similar deterioration has most likely, with the rise of the manufacturing industry, taken place in this country as well, for similar causes have', as a rule, similar effects. The Germans have no doubt that the change from agricultural to industrial pursuits, from country life to town hfe, has led to a deterioration of the national physique. The great Gerinan standard work on hygiene says on this point : ' At the beginning of last century the question of • ■ NATIONAL PHYSIQUE 193 bodily degeneration and fitness for military service came to the front. As early as 1828 General von Horn reported to the Prussian Government that the Rhenish province was no longer able to raise its usual quota of soldiers because the population had bodily degenerated through working in the factories. That report has had historical importance, inasmuch as it was the cause of the labour legislation which has taken place in Prussia and in Germany.' (Weyl, 'Handbuch der Hygiene,' Vierter Supplement-Band, p. 746.) Let us now turn from opinions to facts. From the German recruiting statistics we learn that on an average of a number of years in the principal agricultural provinces of East Prussia and of West Prussia about 70 per cent, of the men of military age come up to the standard of fitness for service, whilst in the kingdom of Saxony, where the manufacturing industries prevail and which is the oldest manufacturing district of Germany, only about 50 per cent, of the young men come up to the military standard. In other words, about 30 per cent, of the male population in East Prussia and West Prussia, the pre-eminently agri- cultural parts, are below the military standard, whilst as much as 50 per cent, are below the military standard in the pre-eminently industrial parts of Germany.^ It seems that the miUtarily unfit are about 50 per cent, more numerous in industrial Saxony than in the agricultural provinces of Germany. The contrast between town physique and country physique becomes still more striking if we look into the recruiting statistics of individual towns. Berlin is one of the healthiest towns in Germany. Yet we find that ' In Berlin the percentage of men fit for miUtary service is particularly small. According to Dade, the military fitness of the population of Berlin compares with the population of the largely industrial province of Brandenburg, which ' Statisiiaches Jahrbuoh fiir das D^utiche Eeich. 194 GEBAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN surrounds Berlin, and with that of the chiefly agricultural province of East Prussia as follows : Berlin 34, Brandenburg 57, East Prussia 69. It has to be borne in mind that among the men called up in Berlin at least from 35 to 40 per cent, were born in the country. These are the results for a town which has every reason to be proud of its health and of its sanitary arrangements.' (Weyl, ' Handbuch der Hygiene,' Vierter Supplement-Band, p, 751.) The fact that the physique of the male population, as measured by the military standard, is 70 per cent, better in largely industrial Brandenburg than in Berlin, and 100 per cent, better in agricultural East Prussia than in the German capital, should give us food for thought. Those who maintain that the town physique is as good as the country physique point to the magnificent specimens of manhood among town workers, such as navvies, brewers' men, and other labourers, but they forget that these are picked men, that they are few in number, and that many of them are country-bred. Besides, they do not know that the town-born children of these magnificent specimens of manhood do not always inherit the good physique of their fathers. The progressive deterioration of the town population is, as regards Germany, clearly shown by the following tables, which are taken from the 'Politisch- Anthropologische Eevue ' : — REcjBuiTiifG Statistics RBLATrNo to Beeweks' Men, Butchers, Clbbks, and Artisans. No. of Eeoruits Inspected Per- centage o£Kt Average Girth of Chest Average Height Brewers' men and potmen . . Butohera Cderks and eerrants Tailors 46 68 62 176 462 76-0 69-0 61-6 66-7 47-2 Inches 32-9-36-9 •8-4-36-6 32-0-34-8 31-0-34-0 31-6-34-4 Inchea 66-4 64-3 66-1 64-1 64-9 NATIONAL PHYSIQUE 195 RisoBTJiTiNQ Statistics rblatino to the Sons of Brbwbbs' Men, Butchers, Clerks, akd Artisans. Brewers' men and potmen Butohera Olerfea and servants . . Tailors . . Artisans No. of Becroits Inspected . 60 21 167 163 196 of Kt 43-3 38-1 51-0 47-2 43-9 Average Girth of Oliest Inches 31-6-34-4 31-3-34-1 31-6-34 -4 31-2-34-3 31-6-S4-4 Average Height Inches 64-S 64-0 64-9 64-5 64-8 (Dr. 0. Bose, Beruf und Mllitartaugliohkeit, ' Politisoh-Anthropologiaohe Eevae.' 1906. pp. 146-146.) ' ' A comparison of the first and second of the fore- going tables points to the fact that there is a decided deterioration in the physique among a large part of the men engaged in the industrial occupations which are carried on chiefly in towns. It shows not only a serious numerical falling off in military fitness in the second generation of town workers, but it shows also that the militarily fit of the second generation are on the whole inferior to the militarily fit of the first generation as regards chest measurement and height. If we now turn to the country population, we find a striking contrast with the foregoing figures, for it appears that the second generation among country men is physically as fit as was the first. This may be seen from the following remarkable figures, which also are taken from the ' Politisch-Anthropologische Revue ' : — No. of Eecruita Inspected Per- centage of Fit Average Girth of Chest Average Height Agricultural workers . Sons of such workers . 897 1.128 62-6 62-6 Inches 320-36-I 31-9-36-0 Inches 65-3 65-4 The foregoing shows that agricultural workers and the sons of agricultural workers furnish to the army apparently 2 196 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN the identical percentage of recruits, and that the agri- cultural recruits of the first and of the second generation have practically identical measurements as regards height and size of chest. The following tables will confirm the impression that the country physique is superior to the town physique, and that country-bred men deteriorate when living in town : — Recrttits Called Up in Town. Men Bom in the Country Men Born in Town Halle (town) Hanover (town) Uelzen (town) 4,320 1,056 1,400 2,600 606 Per Cent. 60-2 67-4 No. 1,103 3,181 463 Pit 667 1,940 256 Per Cent. 60-5 61-0 66-3 7,768 4,606 4,747 2,863 60-3 REOEmTs Called T7p m the Country. Men Bom in the Country Men Bom in Town HaUe (country) Hanover (country) Uelien (country) No. 2,886 1,000 1,672 Fit 1,991 646 1,122 Per Cent. 69-0 64-6 67-1 No. 219 114 67 Kt 121 60 37 Per Cent. 65-2 52-6 65-2 5,558 3,759 67-6 400 218 64-5 (Weyl, 'Handbuch der Hygiene,' Vierter Supplement-Band, p. 749.) The foregoing facts and figures should suf&ce to show that a transference of the people from the country to the town leads — ^in Germany, and probably also elsewhere — to a serious deterioration of their physique. After all, that consequence is only to be expected. So strongly are the Germans convinced that town life leads to the deterioration of the race that the handbook of the German Liberal Party says : — NATIONAL PHYSIQUE 197 ' The discussion as to the military fitness of the population in town and country has been finally decided. The country furnishes proportionately more recruits, and these are of a better physique, and where an exception to this rule takes place it is caused by the fact that many workers are emigrants from the country.' ( ' Handbuch der Nationalliberalen Partei,' 1907, 22.) Now, if that deterioration is very marked in Germany, where the manufacturing industries and great towns are of very recent growth, and where at present more than 20,000,000 people live in the country and are mostly engaged in agricultural pursuits, how serious, then, must be the physical deterioration in Great Britain, where the peasant is practically extinct, where agricultural labourers are few, and where huge and ancient manufacturing towns pre- ponderate ? I think there can be no doubt that a very serious physical degeneration has taken place in this country. The question now arises : How can this degeneration be converted into a physical regeneration ? Sir L. H. Ormsby, M.D., in giving evidence before the Committee on Physical Deterioration, described a large section of British town workers as follows : ' In the lower strata of society in large towns I consider their surroundings and domestic home life are in a very depressing condition ; there is a total neglect of every hygienic and sanitary rule of Ufe ; and those conditions, I say, are, perhaps, made up of the insanitary dwellings, the insufficient and improper food, insufficient clothing, and breathing and rebreathing from week's end to week's end the same polluted and contaminated air ; and then they have no means of recreation or athletic exercises to throw off these effects.' (Physical Deterioration Report, Vol. II. p. 462, 12564.) This description is, unfortunately, only too true. Everybody knows that health and strength are promoted by good food, good air, and adequate bodily exercise. The young men who serve in the army get all three in 198 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN plenty. Hence the effect in military training upon the health and strength of the recruits should be very notice- able. It is, of course, foohsh to measure health and strength merely by those popular standards height, weight, and circumference of chest. Organic changes cannot be measured with an inch tape. One might as well try to measure the inteUigence of people by the size of their hats. Unfortunately, the measurements which have been taken in various armies apply mainly to height, weight, and girth of chest. However, let us see what these somewhat elementary measurements will teach us. German Army Dr. Fetzer measured 392 recruits four times. He measured them for the first time shortly after their joining. He measured them a second time when the men had been from three and a half to four months in the army. He took a third measurement when they had been between seven and eight months in the army, and a fourth measure- ment when they had almost been a year in the army. It should be noted that the smaller part of the men came from Stuttgart and its surroundings. The larger part came from the Black Forest, the inhabitants of which are sturdy men with strong bones and muscles. One-half of the men were engaged in agriculture and one-half in industry. I take from his book the following interesting table, which illustrates not the comparatively unimportant size of the outside of the chest, but its inside measurement, the capacity of the lungs. Capacity of Ltjngs ov German Recbttits. Gubic Oentimetres On Joining the Army. After 4 Months After 7i Months After 1 Tear 2,000 to 3,500 3,BD0 to 4,600 4,500 and more Per Cent. 16-6 67-3 16-1 Per Cent. 9-9 70-4 16-8 Per Cent. 8 66-6 26-4 Per Cent. 8-1 68-5 28-4 NATIONAL PHYSIQUE 199 During the year the volume of respiration of the recruits increased on an average by no less than 500 cubic centi- metres. In other words, the capacity of the lungs increased by 13-2 per cent., or by a httle more than an eighth. The increase in lung capacity was most rapid during the first few months of service. Dr. Petzer writes on this point : — ' As the increase of the respiration capacity of the men was particularly great in the course of the first three months, we must assume that the exercises taken during the first three months of mihtary service, such as running, quick marching, gymnastics, fencing, were particularly favourable to the development of the lungs. The increase of the volume • of respiration is proportionate to the increase in the difference between the breathing-in and breathing-out measurements. These also increased most during the first three months of service. The growth of the depth and width of the chest of the man shows clearly that not only the contents but also the framework of the chest has grown in the man examined.' (Fetzer, ' Ueber den Einfluss des Mihtar- dienstes,' 1879, 92-.) French Aemy Measurements similar to those taken by Dr. Fetzer were taken by Dr. Prilley, of the French army. He examined 6,435 men of all arms — infantry, artillery, cavalry, engineers, and army service — on joining and after six months' service, and I extract from his report the following figures : — MBASUEEMBNTS Off rRBNCH RbCRUITS. Height Weight Oiromnferenoe of Ohest When joining, Deo. 188B In July 1886 Inches 64-9 66-0 Iba. 133-66 136-89 Inches 33-9 34-4 DifCerence +0-1 + 3-23 +0-i 200 GEEAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN In 1888 Dr. Prilley examined 5,999 men of all arms on joining and six months later. He obtained similar results to those shown in the foregoing table, and, on examining the changes which had taken place in individual soldiers, he came to the interesting but only natural conclusion — a con- clusion which is confirmed by other investigators — that : — ' The weakest men gained most in weight and in girth of chest.' ( ' Archives de Medecine et de Pharmacie Mihtaires,' Paris, Vol. IX. No. 2, and Vol. XI. No. 2.) Japanese Aemy I would now draw attention to the result of careful measurements of 7,380 soldiers of all arms of the Japanese army, which were taken in 1900 and the three following years. The results of these measurements are briefly summed up in the following table : — MEASTrBBMBNTS OF JAPANESE RbCBUITS. Height Weight Chest Girth Chest Expansion in. lb. in. in. 1901 64-12 126-2 33-13 2-62 1902 64'23 131-3 33-77 2-86 1903 64-34 132-5 34-0 2-88 1904 64-34 131-1 34-0 2-86 ('Journal o£ the Eoyal Army Medical Corps,' April 1905, p. 535.) The German and French armies are fighting machines of the conventional type. The men are trained in the mass. The individual soldier receives comparatively little attention from the instructors in gymnastics. Besides, the French and Germans are not sporting people by instinct. They do not take as eagerly to physical exercise as do Enghshmen or Americans. Hence the German and French recruits do not receive a scientific all-round physical training, designed to develop methodically all the muscles and organs of the men to their utmost extent, but merely a very superficial NATIONAL PHYSIQUE 201 routine training, -which leads only to a rudimentary and partial development of the hody. In the American army physical exercise is, I think, somewhat more energetically cultivated than in the Continental armies, and I would now draw your attention to a table giving some of the results of a training of three and a half months of American recruits at Columbus barracks. Weight Expan- sion of Ohest Size Ohest Inflated Waist Upper Arm Jfatural Upper Arm Musded Average on arrival at depot . . Average at departure from depdt lb. 145-07 147-88 in. 2-804 3-410 in. 36-63 37-18 in. 3018 29-19 in. 10-41 10-85 in. 12-05 12-66 Average gain or logs + 2-81 + 0-606 ■4-0-65 -0-99 + 0-44 +0-61 (Munson, ' Theory and Practice of MiUtary Hygiene,' 1901, p. 42.) The substantial average increases in weight, circum- ference of chest, play of chest, and size of upper arm, accompanied by a substantial reduction in the size of the waist, are very interesting. The Japanese figures given in the foregoing show that the physique of the recruits improves very considerably during the first year of service, and that it remains practically unchanged during the three following years. The German, French, and American figures given in the foregoing show that the greatest improvement in the physique of the men takes place during the first few months of mihtary training, and my own observation of the result of army training shows that the physical improvement among the recruits is most noticeable and more vigorous, not during the first three months, but during the first six or eight weeks of service. I have frequently observed recruits growing out of all their civiUan clothes within two months from their joining, and I know of a few cases where recruits have grown out of their very shirts. This most important point — the fact that mihtary training has its greatest effect on the physique 202 GREAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN during the first two or three months ol service— should be of very considerable interest to those medical men who wish to see some sort of universal military training introduced in this country with a view to improving the physique of the masses, and who fear that six months' training — ^which, I think, is usually recommended — might not be sufficient to affect the deteriorated physique. After all, a cure of three or four weeks often works wonders in patients. Hence a few months of a simple but strenuous life passed in the open air, accompanied by an entire change of scene and of occupa- tion, is bound to have a very far-reaching influence on the millions of townspeople who, stewing in factories, offices, and cramped dwellings, day by day, year in year out, are quite unused to open-air life and exercise — for the townsman takes his holiday loafing. Although the tables given in the foregoing show that military service leads to an unmistakable improvement in the physique of recruits, as measured by height, weight, and circumference of chest, they do not by any means show the all-round influence which national military training has on the national physique, so far as it can be ascertained by the inch-tape. The military authorities in Germany, France, the United States, Japan, and elsewhere do not train soldiers with a view to increasing their height, weight, and girth of chest — a growth which is a purely casual phenomenon —but with a view to making them efficient parts of the national fighting machine. The larger part of the soldier's time is at present, and in all the armies with which I am acquainted, taken up in housemaid's work and valeting in barracks. Of the remaining part of their time only a small fraction is spent in physical exercise. Besides, the physical exercise taken in the various armies is not directed towards the development of height, weight, and chest circumference, for the army trains men, not for wrestling and heavy-weight lifting, but for marching and shooting. In the words of a German text-book on military hygiene : — NATIONAL PHYSIQUE 203 ' The bodily exercises of the soldier aim at the preserva- tion and the greatest possible increase of his physical powers for purposes of war.' (Kirchner, ' Lehrbuch der Militar- Hygiene,' p. 369.) The majority of the soldiers serve on foot. Battles are often won by out-marching the enemy, and as the infantry of various countries carries, whilst marching, from 60 lb. to 66 lb. in arms and accoutrements, the parts most developed by military training are no doubt the legs. Unfortunately, the legs are not measured by the medical men whose figures I have quoted in the foregoing. However, a German army surgeon, Dr. Leitenstorfer, was sensible enough to study the growth of the legs among recruits, and he tells us : — ' The measurements I have undertaken have shown that among recruits the muscles of the leg increase in any case, whilst the muscles of the arm do not always increase. My measurements show that the average growth during the first three months' training of the recruit is 0"5 cm. for the upper arm, that it is 1 cm. for the calf, and that it is 2'5 cm. for the thigh. Increases of the thigh of from 3 cm. to 4 cm. have been observed. The vigorous growth of the legs of recruits which occurs during the first three months of service proves that during these first three months the muscles of the leg grow at the cost of the other muscles of the body. Notwithstanding an average increase of weight of recruits of 3"20 kilos (7 lb.), the chest-measurement in breathing-out shows on an average a decrease of 0-92 cm. However, this decrease has occurred not in the capacity of the lungs, but through the decrease of muscles and fat on the chest. One may therefore say that the growth in the weight of the body by 8-27 kilos, and the decline in the measurement of the chest, have been put into the arms, and especially into the legs, of the recruits.' The result of mihtary training is graphically described by Dr. Leitenstorfer as follows : — ' Men who are too well nourished and who are not used to 204 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN bodily exercise lose weight without exception, and that loss in weight is often very considerable. For instance, I saw a recruit who was a merchant by profession, who was so fat that he was almost unfit for military service. Within four weeks his weight fell from 184 lb. to 155 lb. He lost 29 lb. in twenty-eight days, and his waist shrank from 103 centimetres to 88 centimetres, a decrease of 16 centimetres, or 6 in. Notwithstanding this rapid decrease in weight, the recruit felt in the best of health. He had never before been in so fit a physical condition.' Dr. Leitenstorfer sums up the result of military training upon the national physique as follows : — ' The lasting advantages of a sensible military training are — '(1) Suppleness of joints. ' (2) The growth of muscles in thickness, which lasts for many years, provided very moderate exercise is taken, unless the soldier suffers afterwards from habitual under- feeding. '(3) The increased co-ordination of muscles — that is, a general suppleness for exercise of every kind, and the " training of the memory " of the muscles, so that the movements taught can after many years be performed immediately, or can at least rapidly be learned again. For instance, if swimming has been learnt iu the earhest youth, the complicated movements of swimming will not be forgotten, even if swimming has not been practised during several decades. ' (4) The enlargement of the capacity of the lungs, the increase of the power of the heart, and the facilitation of the flow of blood to and fro in the organs which are stimulated by exercise. In short, a bracing influence upon the development of the whole system, and an increase of its vitality. ' (5) The moral strength which Ues in the knowledge of the individual of being a trained man, and of being able to NATIONAL PHYSIQUE 205 meet heavy duties in after life like an open antagonist, not like an invisible enemy. 'In one word, military service leads to a pronounced increase in the ordinary strength, efficiency, and endurance of the men, quaUties which at will and at any moment can be brought up to their highest and most energetic develop- ment/ (Leitenstorfer, ' Das Militarische Training,' 1897, p. 74, £f.) Military service benefits the national physique not only directly, but also indirectly, by improving not only the bodies but also the habits and mode of life of the recruits. A German text-book on military hygiene tells us : — ' The majority of soldiers come from a class of the population who in their education at home have not been taught sufficiently the necessity of taking care of their bodies, and who, in consequence of their occupation, do not always keep themselves sufficiently clean. Therefore, the recruits must be taught on joining the army not only to clean their arms and accoutrements, but also to cleanse thoroughly their bodies. Every non-commissioned officer must see that his men waish not only face and neck, but their whole body, with soap, and that they clean carefully their nails, their teeth, &c.' (Roth and Lex, ' Handbuch der Militar- Gesundheitspflege,' 1877, p. 216.) National Military Service and National Cleanliness Military service teaches not only cleanliness, but also order, tidiness, self-control, sense of duty, mutual helpfulness. It promotes abstinence from excess iu eating and drinking. It teaches the men the value of fresh air, of a sensible diet, and of common-sense cooking. Hence men who have served in the army wiU insist in their houses of the observance of those rules of sanitation and on that cleanliness, tidiness, and those general rules of housekeeping which they have been taught in the army, and with which their wives are often unacquainted. In the words of a German medical 206 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN man : ' The great national importance of military service lies in this, that the able-bodied of the entire male popu- lation acquire in the army not only health and strength, but also manifold skill and ability and a strong sense of duty. A comparison of the men when joining as recruits and when leaving the army shows most plainly the beneficial effect which military service has had not only upon their body, but also upon their ways and manners. Hence it is only natural that among those who apply for situations the men who have served in the army are favoured. Army service is a twofold recommendation ; it is a guarantee of good health and a guarantee of good behaviour.' i Lately several deputations of British workmen have visited Germany, in order to study economic and social conditions over there. These deputations have practically unanimously spoken very favourably of the physique and the general appearance of the people in Germany, and they have attributed their good physique and bearing, and I think rightly, to the universal military training which they receive. The report of the Birmingham brassworkers, for instance, says of the inhabitants of Berlin : — ' One cannot help being struck with the superior physique and bearing of the soldier, whether in uniform or out of uniform, in observing the populace of Berlin. The effect of the training is seen in the people as distinctly as the effect of the cleaning and washing is noticeable in the streets. There is not the physically deteriorated, untrained, unmended look about the people. Whether one-year or two-year men, they emerge from the army with a stamp upon them that lasts for life. They have to get up early and be out on the exercising grounds between five and six in the morning. The brain is rested, but the physical side of the men is now developed ; good food, plenty of exercise, fresh air, baths and cleanliness, neatness and orderliness, are his daily associates. He learns to hold himself uprightly, to march ' Hiller, Die Qesundheitspfiege des Heeres, 1905, p. 251. NATIONAL PHYSIQUE 207 forward, and to keep his hands out of his pockets ; and if a young man has not already learned deportment and obedi- ence, he does so during his military service.' (' The Brass- workers of Berlin and Birmingham,' 1905, pp. 17 and 18.) I think the foregoing makes two points clear : — (1) That the British population must have physically very seriously deteriorated through Great Britain having become an industrial nation. (2) That if universal and compulsory physical training on a military basis should be introduced, it would very likely lead to a physical regeneration of the people, seeing that at present the majority of our workers receive practically no open-air exercise whatever. In view of the fact that the British nation has physically, in all probabihty very greatly, deteriorated, and that Englishmen possess strong sporting inclinations, I think that the effect of universal and compulsory physical training on a military basis would be more marked in Great Britain than in other countries, where sport is less cultivated, and where the physical deterioration of the race has probably been less serious than over here. My surmise that military training would benefit the British people more than it has benefited those nations which at present have a national army is supported by what, I think, is unmistakable evidence. There cannot be a greater contrast than that afforded by a comparison of our recruits, many of them under-sized, under-developed, and half-starved weaklings, taken from the ranks of the unemployed and born in the slums, and of our Indian battalions and reserve battahons, which are filled with tall, broad-shouldered, muscular men, the very finest specimens of British manhood. If one compares the average recruit at a recruiting depot with the average soldier who takes his discharge, one finds it difficult to believe that the one has grown into the other. Unfortunately, no statistics exist, as far as I know, which summarise the physical changes which are effected among our soldiers whilst 208 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN i ^ serving in the army. Therefore I would strongly urge upon all medical men who wish to promote the improvement and the regeneration of the race, and especially upon our mihtary authorities, medical and non-medical, to take these measure- ments. This can be done with little expense, provided intelligent help is given by some well-organised assistants. The question of physical deterioration is, I think, an urgent one for this country. Unfortimately, it will take many years to trace the progressive physical development of recruits from the time of their joining the army to that of their leaving it. Therefore I would urge that, preliminarily, recruits freshly joining and soldiers of three months', six months', a year's, and several years' service should be simultaneously measured, so that at least a rough compari- son of their average measurements and of their average growth whilst serving may enable us to form some opinion as to the, physical changes which are caused by the present and, I regret to say, somewhat unscientific, bodily training our soldiers receive. I dare say the publication of these figures may prove a revelation to the public, and may incidentally prove a stronger and a more popular argument in favour of universal military training than the invasion argument. CHAPTEE X THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND Among the greatest soldiers of the world, Oliver Cromwell undoubtedly occupies a foremost position, and there is no reason to place him second to any soldier with whose achievements we are familiar, be that soldier Marlborough or Wellington, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon. In fact, if the names of Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Csesar were not surrounded by a halo of glory, which is due, perhaps, more to the traditional admiration of their achievements and to the absence of reliable and exhaustive accounts, than to a critical estimation of their military ability, it might be found that England has produced not only the greatest poet, but also the greatest soldier, known to history. As a strategist and as a tactician, as a cavalry leader and as an organiser, Oliver Cromwell has certainly not had a superior, and perhaps not even an equal. Yet the envy and calumny of his contemporary detractors, the hatred shown to Cromwell, the regicide and usurper, by later writers, the absence of a good account by a first-class military writer, and the apathy and indifference displayed by the public, have so far prevented an adequate appreciation of him in his military capacity, in which his greatness is beyond question. Hcenig, Firth, and Baldock have written interesting but not entirely satisfactory books on Cromwell the soldier, of which the ablest, that by Hcenig, which is unfortunately somewhat dry and bulky, has not yet been translated from the German. The mihtary history of 209 p 210 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN Oliver Cromwell and his time remains still to be written by a soldier- writer, speaking with the authority of a Napoleon, a Jomini, a Clausewitz, or a Mahan. Meanwhile, it would seem interesting and timely to consider, though of necessity but superficially, the achievements of Oliver Cromwell as the organiser of the celebrated New Model Army. Our humiliations in South Africa, resulting from the defects of our army, are still fresh in our memories. If we wish to remedy those defects, and desire some guidance in order to attain that end, we may learn much from Oliver Cromwell, the organiser of England's invincible army, which may, indeed, be held up as a model army for all time. The military forces which existed in England before the outbreak of the Civil War were, as regards their training, armament, tactics, and morale, beneath contempt. Eng- land's strength lay then, as it does now, in her fleet, but even her fleet had been allowed to fall into decay after the victory over the Armada. Owing to the long peace which followed the stirring times of Ehzabeth, the people had been lulled into a feeling of security, the nation had become unaccus- tomed to war, the army was little better than a sham, and England's military records had become extremely humiliat- ing. In 1628, Sir Edward Cecil, who was then considered the greatest military authority in England, said, with much justification : ' Peace hath so besotted us that we think if we have men and ships our Kingdom is safe, as if men were born soldiers.' The state of the armed forces of England before the Civil War was deplorable. The expedition against Cadiz in 1625 became a disgraceful failure, owing to general mismanagement and the complete absence of discipline amongst the soldiers. After much hesitation, the ill-armed troops were landed, at the wrong time and at the wrong place, without any provisions in their knapsacks. At the end of the first day's march they came across a store of wine, plundered it, and became so drunk that, according to THE MODEL AEMY OP ENGLAND 211 Dalton, ' all the chiefs were in hazard to have their throats cut.' With such men warfare was impossible, and the troops were hastily marched hack to the ships, and sent to England. On the way to the ships they encountered some three hundred Spanish musketeers, and, according to contemporary accounts the soldiers ' made few or no shots to any purpose, blew up their powder, and could hardly be persuaded to stand from a shameful flight.' Yet, out of 10,000 men sent on that expedition, 1,000 died from disease. Two years later, 1627, Buckingham undertook an expedition against the Isle of Rhe. Through his incre- dible incapacity and dawdling, an assault by surprise on the commanding fortress of Saint Martin became impossible, and after besieging it in an amateurish way during four months, he withdrew his decimated army, fell into an am- bush of the French, and his force was cut up while it was retiring to the ships. The expedition had been not only fruitless, but also disastrous. Out of 8,000 men landed, only about 3,000 returned to England. In 1628, an Enghsh fleet, under the Earl of Lindsey, was sent to assist La Rochelle against the King of Prance, and that expedition also failed, owing to the incapacity, if not cowardice, of the commander, and the lack of discipline and of soldierly spirit amongst the officers and the men. Again, in 1639, Charles I collected at the Scotch border an army of 15,000 men, consisting mostly of trained bands, of whom Sir Edmund Verney says : ' I dare say there was never so raw, so unskilled, and so unwilling an army brought to fight.' In view of its composition, it was, perhaps, not unnatural that Charles' army ran away from the Scots at Berwick in 1639, and again at Newburn in 1640, before any blood was spilled. Before the Civil War the body of the Enghsh army was not a national force, but an unruly armed mob, without cohesion, discipline, patriotism, or proper mihtary training, in which the crimes of desertion, plunder, and outrage on peaceful inhabitants were common, and even the murder p 2 212 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN of officers not infrequent. The officers of that army belonged to a different world. They were noblemen and courtiers, chivalrous, well-mannered, and full of courage, expert in fencing, in riding, and in single combat, but on the whole quite ignorant of warfare, out of touch with their men, and therefore quite unfit to command. Since Elizabethan times a craze for luxury had grown up in England. At no time did men possess more numerous and more costly dresses, and at no time was society more lascivious and trifling. As regards picturesqueness and gorgeousness of attire, Charles I's officers outshone those of all times. Their chief topics of conversation were dress and women ; the serious business of war hardly entered into their consideration. However, what the officers lacked in military ability they tried to make up for in reckless courage and in heroic devotion to the King. Therefore they and their immediate followers, the feudal part of the army, had some military value, and as the majority of the noblemen, some of whom had gained military experience abroad, took the part of Charles I, the outlook for the Parliamentary forces, which were recruited from the trained bands and volunteers, was not very encouraging. Such was the pitiful state of the armed forces of England before the advent of Cromwell. Yet, in a few years, one might almost say in a few months, he, the inexperienced civilian, who had already arrived at the ripe age of forty- two years, and who had probably never thought of taking part in war, and still less of assuming military leadership, created out of peaceful citizens unused to war the best army in Europe, and raised England's military prestige higher than it has ever been before or since his time. At a time when England's military reputation had sunk to the lowest ebb, Cromwell's genius created, with marvellous celerity, and out of a distinctly unmilitary population, the best soldiers of his time, an achievement which stands un- paralleled in history. THE MODEL AEMY OP ENGLAND 213 At the outbreak of the Civil War, Parliament raised a large force against Charles I, and most of the politicians and not a few professional soldiers were under the delusion that a number of armed men were synonymous with a reliable army. Confident in the number of the armed men fighting for Parhament, and of the weakness of the king in men and war material, all on the side of ParUament thought, as Baxter tells us, that ' one battle would decide the war.' In reality the Parliamentary forces were Httle better than the troops which had disgraced themselves at Cadiz and the Isle of Ehe, at Berwick and at Newburn, as Cromwell had prophesied in Parliament. If the Parliamentary army had been raised on a national basis it might have become a national force, representative of the national spirit in bravery and discipline. However, the narrow-minded class prejudice of the politicians robbed it of that distinction from the outset, and merely substituted for a rabble raised by the King a rabble raised by Parliament. The vicious army system was not reformed. When, by order of Parhament, 22,000 men were impressed in London and in the counties, clergymen, scholars, students at the inns of court and universities, the sons of esquires, persons rated at £5 goods or £3 lands, and even the servants of members of Parliament, were exempted. In the language of Beaumont and Fletcher, the soldiers were considered as ' the scavengers of the realm,' and the Parhamentary army was made representative, not of the nation, but of the proletariat. Owing to its composition, the Parliamentary army greatly resembled the mob army of Cadiz and the Isle of Rh6, of Berwick and Newburn, by being, according to Cromwell, largely recruited from ' decayed serving-men and tapsters, and such kind of fellows,' though its character was somewhat improved by an admixture of enthusiastic volunteers and of Enghsh mercenaries who had seen war on the Continent. Therefore it was but natural that 214 GREAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN part of the Parliamentary army behaved like a frightened mob before the feudal soldiers of Charles I. At Powick Bridge the ParUamentary troops fled in confusion before Prince Rupert's cavalry, with hardly an attempt at resist- ance. At Bdgehill the Parliamentary cavalry turned and fled in a wild panic, without even waiting for Prince Rupert's charge, and only the headlong unending pursuit of the Parliamentary cavalry by the whole of the Royalist horse saved the Parliamentary army from destruction. At the Battle of Stratton, 5,400 Parhamentary soldiers were beaten by 2,400 RoyaUsts, and lost 2,000 in killed and prisoners. Commenting on the hopeless composition of the Parliamentary army, Cromwell said at the beginning of the war to his cousin, Hampden : ' Do you think the spirits of such base mean fellows will ever be able to en- counter gentlemen that have honour and courage and resolution in them ? You must get men of a spirit that is likely to go as far as gentlemen will go, or else you will be beaten still. To cope with men of honour you must have men of rehgion.' Prom the moment when Cromwell began his military career as an independent guerilla chief, and raised, in danuary, 1642, his troop of thirty to forty men for the Jef ence of the counties, the modest nucleus of the celebrated New Model Army, it was clear to him that mere numbers were only a source of weakness, an encumbrance, and an impediment in war, and that impressed half-starved hire- lings, and good-for-nothing volunteers, the outcasts of the population, could not be turned into soldiers by putting uniforms on their backs, arms in their hands, and giving them some military drill. He recognised that a soldier must have a higher motive to fight for than pay or plunder, and that true heroism cannot be expected from military hirelings. Convinced that only men with a soldier's spirit in them, and with a true love of their cause, would fight bravely against a brave enemy, he changed the prevailing THE MODEL AEMY OF ENGLAND 215 system, and began recruiting his men in accordance with his views. Looking back on his miUtary activity, he said, with justifiable pride, on April 13, 1657, ' I raised such men as had the fear of God before them, as made some conscience of what they did, and from that day forward they were never beaten.' Cromwell was convinced that a reliable army can only be formed of men who not only love the soldier's life, and who fight from conviction, but who also possess resolution and intelligence, and strength of body and of mind. There- fore he recruited his men chiefly from farmers and freeholders, healthy, well-fed, substantial countrymen, robust bodily and mentally, who were used to riding and to open- air life, and who became soldiers not from necessity, nor from the lust of adventure or plunder, but from the ardent desire to fight for religious and political Uberty. Conse- quently, his men always ' made some conscience of what they did,' as he expected. In the beginning all his men were Puritans, to whom Charles I and his party were the enemies of their religion. Furthermore, the Court was a horror and an abomination to them on account of its loose morals. Thus Cromwell's men fought not only with the natural skill and resource- fulness of yeomen, but also with the enthusiastic and irresistible determination that is found only in men who fight with the zeal of conviction for a great cause. They were representative of the best elements of the nation, a homo- geneous body with one character, one will, and one mind. Compared with these men, the Royahst troops, excepting the noblemen and their followers, and the large remainder of the Parliamentarian troops, were, on the whole, a mer- cenary rabble induced by sordid motives to bear arms. The commencement of the campaign proved Cromwell's wisdom in the selection of his men. According to Fiennes, Cromwell's soldiers never stirred, and fought to the last moment at Edgehill. Furthermore, his troops kept 216 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN excellent order and discipline, whilst the Royalist and other Parhamentary regiments were unmanageable, mutinous, and plundering. Up to Cromwell's time the officers were aristocrats, the men the pariahs of society. The polished, perfumed officers with long curls, dressed in velvet, frills, and laces, whose dandified appearances Vandyck and Lely have so well portrayed, had nothing in common with the ' scavengers of the realm.' The officers fought for glory and their King, the rank and file for bread or for plunder. Therefore the character of the army was partly royalistic and aristocratic, and partly proletarian, but in neither case truly national. As ready as were the officers to lay down their lives for the King, as ready were the men to run away and save their skins, to kill the officers, or to plunder the well-to-do, were they enemies or friends. Waller wrote, in 1644, ' the men of Essex and Herts attacked their own captain. Such men are only fit for the gallows here and hell hereafter. Above 2,000 Londoners ran away from their colours.' Evidently the army greatly resembled Ealstaffs celebrated company. Owing to tradition, the soldiers were recruited from the dregs of the population, and, also owing to tradition, the armament and tactics of the army were largely out of date. The pike still prevailed, though it had been superseded abroad, and the tactics of infantry and cavalry were of a most elaborate kind, as may be seen from the ancient regulations ; the exigencies of war were sacrificed to appear- ances on the parade-ground, and the drill of the men was rather complicated and showy than practically useful. Here again Cromwell showed his military master-mind. Uninfluenced by the prevailing ideas of armament and tactics, he immediately adopted the armament, uniform, drill, and tactics which he considered most conducive to success in war, and though he profited to some extent from the advice of English officers, such as Colonel Cook, and from the experience gained abroad during the Thirty THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND 217 Years' War, he relied chiefly on hia common sense for guid- ance, and he obtained the best results. The relations between Cromwell and his men were most satisfactory. Whilst other commanders in the Royal and in the Parliamentary army could hardly obtain obedience from their men, the character of his carefully selected men, and his own personality enabled Cromwell to enforce an iron discipline from the beginning, and to exact the utmost services from his men, who did, without grumbling, as they were ordered. His soldiers being of a better stuff than those which were to be found in other regiments, Cromwell could afford to treat them as his equals as men, and as his inferiors only in rank, and his kindness was appreciated, not misunderstood. Like Napoleon and Frederick the Great, he showed the greatest care and consideration for his men, his ear was open to every complaint, he studied their comfort, and saw in them his children. He took the greatest interest in their clothing and boots, and he established an excellent medical and hospital service. His letters to Parliament and to his friends are always full of kindly thought for his ' poor soldiers,' his first thought after the glorious day of Naseby was for his men. Therefore he wrote to the Speaker : ' Sir, they are trusty men ; I beseech you in the name of God not to discourage them.' Whilst in other regiments the soldiers' pay was, as a rule, unsatis- factory and in arrears, Cromwell did his utmost to have his troops well and punctually paid, and did not hesitate to spend freely his own money or money borrowed from friends, in order that his soldiers should not be in want. Naturally, his solicitude and soldierly affection for his ' lovely company,' as he fondly called it, was rewarded with the enthusiastic devotion of his men, who would try the impossible in order to please their beloved commander. Besides having his men well clothed and well paid, Cromwell saw that they had the best arms, beheving, as he wrote in November, 1642, that ' if a man has not good 218 GREAT AND GEBATER BEITAIN weapons, horse, and harness, he is as nought.' Thus, after having obtained for his army the best human material that the country could yield, he provided his men with the best equipment, pay, and arms, which could be procured. His other war material also was of the best description. Though artillery was in its infancy, he introduced most powerful siege guns and mortars, throwing shells up to 12 in. and 14f in. diameter, to the terror of the besieged, and breached, in a few days, walls which, with inferior ordnance, .could have been battered in only after weeks of bombardment. Though Cromwell treated his soldiers as gentlemen, he did not allow the liberty which he conceded to them to degener- ate into hcence, and did not tolerate any breach of discipline. Punishments, unless the offence was dishonourable, were not dishonouring to the offender, and bodily punishment was unknown in his army. Incredible as it may seem, bodily punishment was reintroduced by Cromwell's benighted successors, and was maintained as a means of discipline in the army untU a comparatively recent date. Cromwell's orders show that he knew how to stimulate the sense of honour in his men, and that he relied more upon their sense of honour than their fear of punishment in order to maintain discipline. Therefore, his orders often sound as if they were addressed to soldiers of the present day or of the future, and not to those of the seventeenth cen- tury. In 1643, he wrote to Squire, ' Tell Captain Russell my mind on his men's drinking the poor man's ale and not paying. I will not allow any plunder ; so pay the man and stop their pay to make it up. I will cashier officers and men if such is done in future.' Again he wrote to Squire, in the same year, ' If the men are not of a mind to obey this order I will cashier them, the whole troop. Let them do as ParUament bids them, or else go home.' To this letter Squire put a footnote, ' They obeyed the order.' Under Cromwell's elevating influence the despised soldiery seem to have behaved far more honourably than the cavaliers THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND 219 themselves, and an old newspaper wonderingly relates of CromweU's army : ' Not a man swears but he pays his twelve pence. No plundering, no drinking, no disorder, or impiety is allowed.' It would really seem as if Cromwell's soldiers attained to the ideal set to soldiers by Lord Roberts. Crimes which Cromwell considered dishonourable to a soldier were not treated with similar leniency. Plundering, which was common in the Royal, as well as in the Parlia- mentary, army, and mutiny, were punished by Cromwell with the shameful death on the gallows, in view of the army. However, such rigorous punishment was rarely necessary. In consequence of the careful selection of officers and men, the high moral tone of his army, the justice done to the men, and the certainty of punishment in case of trans- gression, Cromwell's soldiers were as orderly in war as they were in peace, and wherever they went the country folk had confidence in them. With justifiable pride Cromwell wrote, in his Irish Declaration of January, 1650 : ' Give us an instance of one man since my coming to Ireland not in arms massacred, destroyed, or banished, concerning the massacre or destruction of whom, justice has not been done or endeavoured to be done.' This declaration dis- tinctly reminds one of a celebrated proclamation made by Lord Roberts in the South African war. Besides elevating the morale of his soldiers as men, Cromwell knew how to elevate their morale as soldiers to the highest pitch, by his example, his administration, and his Articles of War, which were by no means an empty letter. The following extracts convey a clear picture how by the Articles of War discipline was maintained, how the efficiency of the army, in training, on the march, in quarter, and in battle, was assured, how transgressors were punished, and what influence they must have had upon the spirit of the army : — ' A captain that is careless in the training and governing of his company shall be displaced of his charge. 220 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN ' Drunkenness in an officer shall be punished with loss of place ; in a common soldier with such penalties as a court martial think fit. ' No soldier, either horse or foot, shall presume in march- ing to straggle from his troop or company, or to march out of his rank, upon pain of death. ' None in their march through the countries shall waste, spoil, or extort any victuals, money, or pawn, from any subject, upon any pretence of want whatsoever, upon pain of death. ' None shall presume to let their horses feed in sown grounds whatsoever, or to endamage the husbandman any way, upon severest punishment. ' Whosoever shall in his quarter abuse, beat, fright, his landlord, or any person else in the family, or shall extort money or victuals, by violence from them, shall be proceeded against as a mutineer, and an enemy to discipline. ' No man shall fail wilfully to come to the rendezvous or garrison appointed him by the Lord General, upon pain of death. No officer, of what quality soever, shall go out of the quarter to dinner or supper, or lie out all night, without making his superior officer acquainted, upon pain of cashiering. ' A sentinel or perdue found asleep or drunk, or forsaking their place before they be drawn off shall die for the offence without mercy. ' None shall save a man who has his offensive arms in his hands upon pain of losing his prisoner. ' None shall kill an enemy who yields and throws down his arms. ' If a town, castle, or fort be yielded up without the utmost necessity the governor thereof shall be punished with death. If the officers and soldiers of the garrison constrain the governor to yield it up ... . they shall cast lots for the hanging of the tenth man amongst them.' THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND 221 Burning and sacking without orders, flight, and throwing away of arms or ammunition, were also punished with death. Peculation had been common in the army and in the navy before the Civil War, and had greatly diminished the effi- ciency of both services. To increase the fighting value of his army, and to protect his men against the frauds practised by civihan contractors and by their accomplices in the service, Cromwell applied the following articles against their nefarious activity, which articles might well be revived at the present time : — ' No victuallers shall presume to issue or sell unto any of the army unsound, unsavoury, or unwholesome victuals, upon pain of imprisonment and further arbitrary punish- ment. ' No provider, keeper, or officer of victual or ammunition shall embezzle or spoil any part thereof, or give any false account to the Lord General, upon pain of death.' It would not have been astonishing if, in Cromwell's revolutionary and essentially democratic army, the officers should have been selected either by Cromwell from the rank and file, without any regard to birth and family, as in the army of Napoleon, or that they should have been chosen by the soldiers from amongst themselves, as usually happens in revolutionary armies. However, Cromwell was too wise to make experiments which would no doubt have been popular, but which might have proved dangerous. Though a certain number of his officers were of humble origin, and rose from the ranks by merit alone, Cromwell fully appreciated the additional value which education and good breeding give to an officer, in front of the enemy and with his men. Promotion to the higher commands in the New Model Army went by merit, but was influenced to some extent by the parentage and education of the officer, and by his seniority. In the troop or company a greater influence upon promotion was wisely conceded to seniority. Examinations for officers' positions in topics 222 GEEAT AND/ GREATER BRITAIN unconnected with military service were unknown. For the hook-worm officer Cromwell had no sympathy. On the whole, Cromwell kept the promotion, as well as the nomina- tion of officers, absolutely in his own hands, though he frequently took the advice of his trusted commanders about the officers serving under them, or endorsed their recom- mendations. Being, like most great commanders, an excellent judge of men, he rarely made a mistake in his appointments, but if an officer proved incompetent his career was immediately cut short. Improper influences upon promotion ^seem to have been unknown in the New Model Army. Cromwell's views as to the qualities required in officers and men, and as to the influence exercised by good officers over their men, may be seen from a memorable letter written by him on September 1, 1643, to Sir William Spring and Mr, Maurice Barrow, in which he says : ' I beseech you be careful what captains of horse you choose, what men be mounted ; a few honest men are better than numbers. If you choose godly, honest men to be captains, honest men will follow them, and they will be careful to mount such .... I had rather a plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for and loves what he knows than that which you call " a gentleman," and is nothing else.' These lines might with advantage be written in golden letters upon the walls of every war office in the world. When we remember how carefully Cromwell had selected his officers and men, with an eye to their inborn mihtary spirit, how well they were treated, how perfectly they were trained, armed, and equipped, and how their sense of soldierly honour had been roused, we cannot wonder that his troops performed feats of bravery which filled the whole world with admiration. A few years before the advent of Cromwell, English troops were known to the world as a cowardly armed mob. In 1657, Cromwellian troops, THE MODEL AEMY OF ENGLAND 223 operating in Flanders, proved to the Continent that the reformed English army was an army of heroes. ' 'Tis observable/ said the Duke of York, describing a charge made by his troop of horse on English infantry at the Battle of the Dunes, ' that when had we broken into this battalion, and were got amongst them, not so much as one single man of them asked quarter or threw down his arms, but everyone defended himself to the last/ Similar instances of heroism were by no means rare in Cromwell's soldiers. Before the Battle of Dunbar, 23,000 splendid Scotch troops had surrounded Cromwell and his weary, exhausted force of 11,000 Englishmen, which had been compelled to retreat from the Scotch, and which had been reduced from 14,000 by its terrible privations and the ravages of disease. Nevertheless, the courage of the EngHsh force was unbroken, and it inflicted on the Scotch a smashing defeat, perhaps less owing to the genius of its leader than to the fortitude of the men. Cromwell greatly abbreviated the tedious and circum- stantial business coimected with formal sieges, which he rarely undertook. Disregarding the traditional operations, he preferred to take by assault fortresses, which probably no other troops in the world could have taken in that manner. Thus, nearly all fortresses taken by Cromwell in the campaign of 1646, were taken by storming. By this vigorous, though perhaps ' unscientific,' iimovation he much shortened his campaigns, and struck terror into the heart of the enemy, who, even in the strongest fortresses, felt no longer secure. Therefore many powerful and well-garrisoned strongholds were surrendered to Cromwell without an attempt at defence. If we survey Cromwell's campaigns it would seem that no army has ever performed greater deeds of valour than that of Cromwell, excepting perhaps some armies of remote antiquity, whose feats, such as the battles of Thermopylae, Marathon, &c., create a suspicion that either the antagonists 224 GREAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN were matched like British troops and Soudanese, or that the historians have greatly exaggerated. In training his men, Cromwell strove, before all, to make them self-reliant, and enterprising, resourceful and many- sided. This may be seen from his first warlike enterprise, the raid upon Lowestoft, which was not only a masterpiece of guerilla warfare, and of the greatest credit to Cromwell as a cavalry leader, but was also a splendid proof of his ability as a drill-master of his men, who, in marching power, endurance, scouting, resourcefulness, and versatihty, seem to have equalled, if not surpassed, De Wet's men, though Cromwell's men had been soldiers for only one year. Starting from Cambridge, on March 11, 1643, Cromwell arrived in Norwich on March 13, and, in order to prevent informa- tion reaching Lowestoft, immediately gave orders that nobody should leave the town. He started at five o'clock next morning, and rapidly marched to Lowestoft with his men. Arrived before that town, he took with his dismounted men the guns and barricades which defended the approaches, by a rush, captured a large number of noblemen and cannon, and so well was the raid planned and executed that not one man escaped. If we consider that Cromwell's cavalry covered, in that raid from Cambridge to Lowestoft and back again, no less than 250 miles in nine days, that his men acted as cavalry and as infantry after only one year's training, that he raided Lynn and Thetford in a similar way during the same expedition, and that perfect secrecy was maintained and absolute success achieved, we must agree with Hoenig that this enterprise is tactically exemplary and a model for all time, besides being a proof of the resourcefulness and many-sidedness of Cromwell's cavalry, of which many more examples are on record. At the opening of the campaign of 1645-6, Cromwell undertook a most daring raid in the rear of the Royal army, destroyed the King's three best cavalry regiments at Ishp, THE MODEL ARMY OP ENGLAND 225 drove all the cart horses out of the country, and thereby naade it impossible for the King to advance and to move his baggage. By doing so he disturbed the concentration of the Royal army, and inflicted an irreparable loss on the King, before the campaign had opened. During this raid, which has not been equalled by De Wet, Cromwell's men displayed a wonderful mobiUty, covering on an average thirty miles a day. Later on, when Cromwell had advanced from a leader of cavalry to the command of an army, we find in the infantry under his command the same ability for individual fighting which distinguished his cavalry. Cromwell evidently taught his musketeers to take the greatest advantage of cover, and to fight in a way very similar to that of the Boers, in order to enable them to defeat superior numbers by superior tactics. In 1651, after the Battle of Worcester, Cromwell writes : ' We beat the enemy from hedge to hedge till at last we beat into Worcester.' In 1657, Reynolds, one of Cromwell's officers, offered to Turenne to attack the whole Spanish army with his 6,000 infantry, if they were supported by but 2,000 French cavalry, ' thinking that number of horse sufficient ki that enclosed country, and relying on the bravery of his English foot, who had been accustomed to hedge fighting, to supply their want of numbers.' The excellent scouting and the great mobility to which Cromwell had educated his men in many a small guerilla enterprise, such as those mentioned, were to prove later on of the greatest value in more important engagements. Cromwell anticipated De Wet's tactics by 250 years, with the difference that he did not catch in his traps small isolated parties, but the biggest armies of his time, by com- bining the guerilla's wile with the strategist's wisdom. A classical example of his guerilla strategy, if one may call it so, is furnished by the Battle of Preston. In 1648 the Scotch invaded England with an army of 24,000 men, Q 226 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN to which Cromwell could oppose only 8,600 men. By their vast numerical superiority, the Scotch had already a great advantage over Cromwell, which was stiU further increased by the fact that they marched down the west coast, where the broken country did not lend itself to cavalry tactics. Thus Cromwell saw himself deprived of the use of his best weapon, with which he had gained the victories of Marston Moor and Naseby, and his position seemed extremely serious. But Cromwell was not the man to despair. Whilst the Scotch army, an immense host for the time, was slowly moving southward, Cromwell was lying quietly between Leeds and York, far off their line of march, being apparently not disposed to risk an encounter. However, six regiments of cavalry, under Lambert, had been ordered by Cromwell to watch closely the Scotch army, never showing more than single horsemen to the enemy, and to keep Cromwell constantly posted up as to the movements of the Scotch. Evidently Lambert's cavalry succeeded in surrounding the Scotch army during many days as with a screen, for it marched along without suspicion. Cromwell followed from his camp every movement of the enemy, and at last dashed forward. In a few rapid marches he covered the distance of sixty miles separating him from Preston, and there fell upon the Scotch army at the moment when it was extended on the road to a length of about twenty-five miles, and divided in two by the River Ribble. Taking possession of the bridge, Cromwell could deal separately with the disjointed halves, and he not only defeated, but annihilated, the Scotch army. If we remember that in the seventeenth century roads and means of communication were bad, and that conse- quently a distance of sixty miles was practically very much greater than it appears now, we cannot but marvel at the excellence of Cromwell's information, at the accuracy with which he calculated the movements of the Scotch, at the mathematical precision with which he timed his attack, and THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND 227 at the marching power shown by his troops. If we further remember that the Scotch army remained up to the last moment in profound ignorance of the proximity of Lambert's large body of cavalry, and of Cromwell's approach, we must admire the splendid training of every single officer and scout, whose combined inteUigence and ability kept the Scotch army isolated from the outer world, and enabled Cromwell to reap this splendid victory against overwhelming numbers. However, this and other great successes were not only due to the excellent training in scouting and guerilla warfare which Cromwell gave to his troops, but also to the splendid services of his Intelligence Department, working under a ' Scout-Master-General.' Cromwell seems to have originated this important department, for Sir James Turner says of the Scout-Master- General, in his ' Pallas Armata ' : 'I have known none abroad.' The Scout-Master-General was not only master of the scouts, but he had also to collect military intelligence, and to supply information by spies and otherwise. The Scout-Master-General was often a civilian, who received high pay, and was provided with a large staff. This institu- tion was apparently the seed from which, after more than two centuries, sprang Moltke's Generalstab, of which our own Intelligence Department is a somewhat unsatisfactory copy. Cromwell's intelUgence organisation seems to have splendidly fulfilled the purpose for which it was created, as may be seen from the perfect arrangements which were made beforehand for every expedition, from the smoothness with which enterprises, such as the Battle of Preston, were carried out, and from the absence of ' unfortunate occur- rences,' with which we have been made only too familiar. A brilliant example of the completeness of these preparations is furnished by Cromwell's Irish war of 1649. Before crossing, Cromwell's army was divided in three parts, which were to be transported on different days, so that in 228 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN case of a storm at least two-thirds of his army should arrive safely. Moreover, every ship was provided with so much food for man and horse, hospital appliances, ammunition, &c., that it was practically self-supporting for a long time, and that the expedition could not be en- dangered, or even appreciably weakened, if one or several ships should have been driven out of their course. Bach ship had sealed orders, which were to be opened after its departure, and not one man in the army knew before starting the point of debarkation. Consequently the Irish were easily deceived about the place of landing, and the expedition was a complete success. The circumspection and foresight with which Cromwell's enterprises were undertaken show that the maxim of Frederick the Great, ' Aimez done les details,' and Moltke's principle, ' To work out during peace, in the most minute way, plans for the concentration and the transport of troops, with a view to meet all possible eventuaUties to which war may give rise,' were anticipated and applied by an Englishman long before the time of Frederick the Great and of Moltke. Another innovation, apparently made by Cromwell, was a troop of picked orderlies, mounted on picked horses, of whom a large number was always round the commander. These men were trained to receive and transmit verbal orders according to their meaning, a task which is by no means easy on account of the turmoil of battle, and of the lack of clearness with which such orders are frequently given by an excited and much-occupied commander. The great importance of reliable orderlies was not sufficiently recognised before Cromwell's time, as it is not even now in many armies, including our own. A good orderly should be able, besides reporting correctly, to give an intelligent account of the state of the battle and the condition of the ground. To fulfil those tasks satisfactorily, it is not enough that he is possessed of general intelligence, courage, sense THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND 229 of locality, and good horsemanship ; he should also have a general's grasp of the military situation before him, in order not to mistake the meaning of an order which may have been unclearly expressed, and so describe correctly what he has seen. The lack of rehable orderhes has led to confusion and disaster in many wars, the South African included. Consequently, it is not astonishing that that great commander. General Lee, perhaps the ablest officer who fought in the American War of Secession, recreated an organisation similar to that initiated by Cromwell. Cromwell's arrangements for marching were as perfect as were all other arrangements in his army. According to contemporary witnesses, Cromwell's army marched like one man, and was free from stragglers — a splendid proof of its discipline on the march. Far from the enemy the men were allowed to sing. If the enemy was near, they marched in absolute silence, and the officers gave their orders by signs during the day, and by. whispers at night. No wonder that the awe-stricken country folk, who saw Cromwell's army pass by, likened it to a phantom army. To guard against a surprise, the cavalry used to march far in advance of the army during the day. At night it was placed behind the infantry, in order to prevent confusion in case of a sudden attack. With such a splendid organisation for the supply of information, for scouting, and for the transmission of orders, and with such perfect arrangements for a rapid, safe, and noiseless march, it is not surprising that Cromwell was never defeated or ambushed, and that he could effect more than one surprise attack and destroy thereby the overwhelming numbers of a brave and stubborn enemy. At the beginning of the Civil War we admire Cromwell as a master of partisan warfare, and see him training his soldiers individually, and makmg all-round fighters of them. Hence it came that Charles I rashly assumed that Cromwell was merely a guerilla leader. But he was 280 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN mistaken, for Cromwell clearly recognised that a war can only be rapidly decided by battles, and that battles are not won by guerilla fighting. Therefore he strove to make his men as efficient in battle as they were in guerilla warfare, and accomplished a feat which has hardly ever been achieved before or since his time ; he succeeded in making his men superior to all other troops then existing, both in fighting in masses on the field of battle, and in independent guerilla warfare. As a rule, we find that an army is either an excellent ' fighting machine,' like the German army, which works with precision by the perfect drill of the men, and by their blind obedience to a single will, whereby the individuality of the single fighter is killed, or that it is merely a loose conglomerate or excellent resourceful guerillas, whose very self-reliance and independence incapacitate them from tolerating the irksome restraint of discipline, and from rendering that blind obedience which is required to move a mass of men by a single will towards a purpose which is not always clear to the individual soldier, and which sometimes seems to him utterly wrong. The Boers are an excellent illustration of the latter kind of army ; their very independence and resourcefulness, which made them such splendid fighters in guerilla warfare, caused them to be impatient of discipline, and made it impossible for their generals to perform large strategical or tactical movements, the utility of which was not always clear to the individual Boer. Probably for this reason the Boers did not march on either Cape Town or Durban at the begin- ning of the war, as they had been advised to do by continental strategists, nor did they follow up a reverse inflicted on our troops by an energetic pursuit, which would have turned a defeat into a rout, if not into an annihilation, of our forces. In Cromwell's army the individual enterprise of the men was evidently not killed by the strictness of the discipline. THE MODEL AEMY OP ENGLAND 231 Instead, the mobility, independence, and resourcefulness displayed by the Boers were found in Cromwell's army, side by side with those precise large movements executed by masses of men with startling rapidity, with which the Germans in 1870 won such great successes. The cavalry tactics which prevailed in GromweU's time were somewhat pecuhar. Effective firearms were of com- paratively recent introduction, and, Hke most new arms, were held in exaggerated esteem by those soldiers who constitutionally over- value the importance of the mechanical factor in warfare, as compared with the human factor. For the smashing impact of solid masses of cavalry, com- plicated ' scientific ' tactics, which allowed of a greater use of firearms, were substituted. According to Ward's ' Animadversaries of Warre,' a book which appeared three years before the outbreak of the Civil War, the following manoeuvre was executed : ' We fire upon the enemy by ranks and so fall off into the rear so that all the ranks shall come up and give fire by degrees upon the enemy,' This pretty manoeuvre was no doubt very effective against helpless pikemen, but almost useless against any other foe. When a charge was made, it was made, according to Ward, at a slow pace : ' A cuirassier usually giveth his charge upon the trot, and very seldom upon the gallop.' Even these charges ' upon the trot ' were often interrupted in order to enable the cavalry to use their pistols, and thus the irresistible impetus of the shock at top speed was sacrificed to toying with pistol fire. Cromwell quickly recognised the futility of those artificial tactics, and resolved to use his cavalry in battle like a sledge hammer of irresistible driving power. He therefore relieved his Ironsides of their carbines, and concentrated the training of his cavalry en masse upon the perfect execution of grand and simple shocks, whereby he rolled a series of huge waves of cavalry against the enemy's position, sweeping the opposing forces from the field ' as a little dust,' as he puts it. Thus Cromwell 232 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN inaugurated those cavalry tactics which were, later on, applied with such conspicuous success by the two other great cavalry leaders, Frederick the Great and Napoleon. The application of these splendid shock tactics, which appear so easy to the outsider, and which are so extremely difficult to execute, was only possible owing to the iron discipline which prevailed in Cromwell's army. His cavalry never got out of hand when charging, notwithstanding the difficulty of maintaining a closely knitted line in the attack on the firing enemy, and the strong temptation which every horseman and every horse feels, after a charge has succeeded, to pursue the fleeing, in the wild enjoyment of the chase, until they are run down. By making an absolutely obedient instrument of his cavalry, it became a sledge hammer in Cromwell's hand, with which he could deliver a number of crushing strokes with incredible rapidity and terrible results : a feat which requires the highest training of men and horses, individually, and in masses. Two months after his raid on Lowestoft, in May 1643, Cromwell encountered, at Grantham, a force of Eoyal cavalry double the strength of that under his command, and there he put his shock tactics for the first time to the test. During half an hour desultory firing was main- tained on both sides, and then, as Cromwell puts it, ' They standing firm to receive us, our men charged fiercely upon them, and by God's providence they were immediately routed.' Naturally, when Cromwell came again across Royal cavalry at Gainsborough, two months after the encounter at Grantham, he no longer hesitated before charging, but immediately charged, according to his own account, ' all keepiiig close order, routed this whole body, and our men pursuing them had chase and execution about five or six miles.' From that time the charge by compact masses of cavalry moving at a gallop became a part of Cromwell's tactics, and was constantly used by him, and the importance of his innovation soon became generally THE MODEL ARMY OP ENGLAND 233 recognised in England and abroad. Already, in 1644, Vernon recommended the ' close interlocking ' of the charging men. In 1677 Lord Orrery wrote in his ' Art of War' : ' When the squadrons advance to charge, the troopers' horses and their own knees are as close as they can well endure. The close uniting of the ranks is so necessary to make the charge effectual.' Though in the beginning of the Civil War the Royal cavalry was greatly superior to the Parliamentary cavalry in both horses and men, owing to the presence of a large contingent of noblemen, this initial advantage was soon lost by the absence of that iron discipline which alone can make cavalry a really effective instrument in battle. The very dash of the Royal cavalry caused the loss of the battles of Edgehill, Marston Moor, and Naseby, and thereby the overthrow of the King. The Royal cavalry got out of hand every time their slovenly charge had been successful, and raced after the Parliamentary horse in a wild chase, as the hunt follows the fox. It stopped only when horses and men were utterly exhausted and useless for the day, or when an opportunity for plundering occurred. Clarendon, the contemporary historian, describes clearly the difference between the gallant but undiscipHned Royal cavalry and that of Cromwell : ' Though the king's troops prevailed in the charge, and routed those they charged, they seldom rallied themselves again in order, nor could they be brought to make a second charge the same day, whereas the other troops, if they prevailed, or though they were beaten and routed, presently rallied again and stood in good order till they received new orders.' At Edgehill the ParUamentary cavalry fled before Prince Rupert without waiting for his charge, and overthrew four regiments of ParHamentary infantry in its flight. Whilst the Royalists madly raced after the fleeing horsemen as far as Kineton and started plundering, the wavering Parliamentary infantry braced themselves up, defeated 234 GREAT AND GBEATER BRITAIN the Royal infantry, and the battle ended undecided. There is no doubt that, if Rupert had stopped his men immediately after the charge, and turned them upon the staggering infantry, he might have annihilated the Parliamentary army, and London would have stood open to the King. At Marston Moor the right wing of the Parliamentary army was charged by the Royalist cavalry under Goring, and utterly routed. Fairfax, the commander of the Parlia- mentary right wing, and Skippon, the commander of the centre, were wounded, the Yorkshire infantry in the centre and the Scottish reserve had been overthrown; the outlook for the ParUamentary forces seemed desperate. However, whilst Goring's victorious men galloped after the fugitives as far as their camp, and plundered the baggage, instead of returning to battle, the Royal army, denuded of a large part of its cavalry, was smashed by Cromwell's irresistible, but carefully restrained, charges made with a solid mass of 4,000 horse. Here, as at Edgehill, the King's cavalry failed at the critical moment, not from lack of dash, but from lack of discipUne. The turning-point of the battle, and the miraculous change from apparently inevitable annihilation to victory, is well described in a contemporary ballad, which also shows in what veneration Cromwell was held by his men : — They are here ! they are gone ! we are broken ! we are gone ! Our left is borne before them like stubble on the blast ; Oh Lord, put forth thy might ! Oh Lord, defend the right ! Stand back to back in God's name and fight it to the last. Stout Skippon has a wound, the centre has given ground — Hark ! Hark ! what means the trampling of horsemen on our rear ? Whose banner do I see, boys ? 'tis he, thank God, 'tis he, boys ! Bear up another moment — brave OUver is here. At Naseby the King's infantry had defeated the Parha- mentary infantry, the cavalry on the right wing under Prince Rupert had routed the opposed Parliamentary cavalry under Ireton, and, as usual, intoxicated with their THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND 235 success, the^ Royalist horse pursued as far as the village of Naseby, where they took to plundering the houses and the Parliamentary baggage. Whilst Rupert was far from the field of battle, Cromwell, who commanded the cavalry of the left wing, had smashed the King's cavalry, and the whole of the Royalist infantry, in three consecutive charges. The battle was practically ended, and the RoyaUsts were fleeing, when Rupert returned from his breakneck chase. His horses and men were exhausted, and all his squadrons in hopeless confusion, a mounted crowd, not a body of cavalry, when they were swept out of existence by a fourth charge of Cromwell, who had wisely reserved the strength of men and horses for the supreme moment. Then only, when victory was assured, Cromwell ordered the pursuit, which was mercilessly continued for no less than fourteen miles, until the walls of Leicester put a stop to Cromwell's men. Through the lack of discipline in the cavalry, the King's army was annihilated. Out of 6,000 Royalist horse- men who had ridden into battle, only 200 remained at the end of the day. Cromwell's object in battle was not merely to defeat and to disperse the army of the enemy, but to destroy it as a military force. In order to attain this end, he delivered, with the smallest expenditure of strength possible, a series of rapid blows, which either crushed the enemy, or at least brought disorder into his ranks. Then, when the enemy was either broken up or wavering, he threw his cavalry with full force upon the staggering masses, broke them up, and converted an intended retreat of the enemy into a rout, if not into annihilation. A decisive victory should always be crowned with a destructive pursuit. Cromwell understood this maxim, as is clear from the frequency of his annihilating battles. Apparently he always succeeded in accompUshing his settled purposes to destroy, not merely to defeat, the enemy. 236 GREAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN How well Cromwell knew to reserve the strength of man and horse towards the decisive moment, in order to crush the enemy out of existence, can be seen from a few examples. At Preston, Cromwell pursued the Scotch for thirty miles, in spite of the most fearful weather, which had turned the roads into morasses. He wrote that not one man would have escaped him if he had five hundred men of fresh cavalry and five hundred fresh infantry at his disposal. At that battle, and during the pursuit, Cromwell, with only 8,600 men, killed 2,000 men, and made 10,000 prisoners, out of 24,000 men who had opposed him in battle. At Dunbar, Cromwell pursued the Scotch for eight miles, though his army had been decimated and weakened by disease. Out of 23,000 Scotch, 3,000 were killed, and 10,000 made prisoners, by Cromwell's army of 11,000 men. At Worcester, only 1,000 Scotch escaped out of 16,000 who fought against Cromwell. Evidently Cromwell knew how to gain more than one Sedan. These smashing defeats which Cromwell regularly inflicted prove not only his genius as a soldier, but they prove also the sterling worth of his army, in human material, training, and discipline. When we review, in its entirety, the activity of the ever- victorious New Model Army, in England, Ireland, Scotland, and on the Continent, we cannot help being struck with admiration at its glorious achievements, which appear all the more wonderful if we compare its heroic deeds with the despicable performance of the pre-Cromwellian armies at Cadiz, the Isle of Rhe, Berwick, and Newburn. Our admiration for Cromwell as an organiser must become still greater if we remember that, under his guidance, not only did the English army, within a few years, rise from its deepest disgrace to its greatest glory, but that the neglected fleet also was reorganised, and attained the greatest efficiency, under Cromwell's colonels, Blake, Dean, Popham, and Monck. Owing to its reorganisation by army officers, who had learned the art of organisation THE MODEL ARMY OP ENGLAND 237 and of war from Cromwell, the English navy won the glorious victories over De Ruyter, Van Tromp, and De Witt, and destroyed fleets in fortified harbours, such as Tunis and Santa Cruz, which were considered impregnable — successes which have probably not been surpassed even in Nelson's time. In fact, it seems not unlikely that the victor of Trafalgar and his men would willingly have ceded the laurel to Colonel Blake, the ' general of the navy,' who, when fifty-two years old, went with his musketeers on board ship, and gained with them victory after victory over the greatest Dutch admirals. It is but just to attribute these great successes of the army and navy to Cromwell's genius, but it seems a mistake to believe that only the genius of a Cromwell could have raised the English army and navy from their former degra- dation to such greatness, and that no other general could have done the same. Men of great military ability are probably numerous, but they die often in obscurity. With- out . the Eevolution, Cromwell might never have been more than an honest farmer and brewer ; if he had selected a military career he would probably not have advanced further than to the rank of captain in the infantry, or, at the most, of a colonel, for his original views on military matters, his unpolished manners, and his lack of title, would have cut short his career. Cromwell owes his successes not only to his military genius, but also to the circumstances which gave him the unfettered use of his military genius. Nearly every great event in old and modern history has brought forth a great commander. Consequently, it may be assumed that great soldiers are less rare than is generally supposed, but that they are not always able to prove themselves great commanders from lack of oppor- tunity. England has produced a great number of extremely able soldiers, who performed miracles with ill-armed and ill-trained scratch armies, and some of our generals might 238 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN have outshone Cromwell if they had had similar oppor- tunities : an army of their own organisation, and a free hand. Who knows whether Lord Kitchener or General French might not prove a greater soldier than even Cromwell if he were given a free hand to administer, train, and command our army ? A great soldier can only prove himself a great commander if full power is given him to organise and administer the army according to his own views, but as the civil power is most reluctant to give a free hand to a soldier, however able he may be, great soldiers can hardly ever prove them- selves commanders of the first order, except when they are bom to a throne, like Alexander the Great, Frederick the Great, Gustavus Adolphus, or Charles XII, or when they acquire supreme power in a revolution, as did Csesar, Cromwell, and Napoleon. Let it also be remembered that lack of power was evidently the cause of Hannibal's down- fall, for his military views were constantly overruled by the unmilitary views of the Carthaginian pohticians. If Hannibal had been given full power over his army, he would probably have conquered Rome. A spirited soldier is extremely impatient of civilian interference, especially as civilian politicians have always shown a remarkable lack of understanding of military matters. Civilian meddling with Hannibal's plans, and the niggardly supplies voted for his army by the politicians, destroyed Carthage, and from Hannibal's time onward the politicians' disastrous interference in military matters is constantly met with. During the Civil War, Parhament, in its wisdom, appointed the Earl of Manchester an army commander, not because of his military genius, but because of his great political and social position. As the politicians were aware of Manchester's military incapacity, they gave him their ablest officer, Cromwell, as an adlatus, a kind of unofficial mentor. The result naturally was that Man- chester was offended, and hated Cromwell, that Cromwell's THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND 239 advice was disregarded by the incompetent and stubborn commander, and that both generals were set against one another, to the harm of the Commonwealth. Li a similar way, another army was deprived of its usefulness by placing it under the command of two men, Waller and Essex, on the principle divide et impera. When Cromwell demanded material for the siege of Pontefract in 1648, Parliament voted half the supplies which Cromwell had declared to be necessary. Similar examples of the politicians' clumsy interference and penny wisdom in military matters might be cited from both later, and the latest, military history of this country. A characteristic of most modern armies is that they are conservative, if not reactionary, in spirit, and that the highest commands are filled by men possessed of mediocre ability. The reason for these phenomena is not far to seek. Soldiers of the first rank, such as Cromwell, have trusted remarkably little in detailed regulations for the adminis- tration and training of their armies, because they see in the army a living organism which grows and progresses continually, and believe that resourceful individualism, in officers and men, is more important than the mechanical copying of precedent cases and the imthinking adherence to established rules. The elaborate regulations with which most armies are cursed, and which were devised by dry-as-dust bureaucrats with or without epaulets, but not by soldiers, have substituted the ' fighting machine ' for a living organism, have killed the vitality and initiative of armies, and have, besides, made it easier for men of social position and wealth to attain to the highest commands, by the easy claims of seniority and the passive merits of • correctness,' than for plain men of military genius. Furthermore, the dead-weight of these regulations has made it impossible for a soldier of genius to reform the army when he has at last arrived at the highest command as an old man who has spent his best energy, and who longs for rest. 240 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN Whenever great army reforms have taken place, they have been carried out by a soldier endowed with far- reaching powers, and when civilian politicians or red-tape generals, two classes equally devoid of military under- standing, have not been allowed to molest him in his work. Conspicuously successful army reforms, such as those initiated by Cromwell, Napoleon, Scharnhorst, Moltke, or that of the Egyptian army by Lord Kitchener, were the work of one man, and they were only possible because those commanders had a free hand, ample time, and chose their own methods and their own men. On the other hand; the reform of the French army after 1871 has not been satis- factory, partly because the republican and monarchical politicians who took part in the reorganisation were unable to sink party differences and to regard the organisation of the army merely from a soldier's point of view, partly because ministers of war and commanders-in-chief are appointed in France not solely from military considerations, but largely according to party requirements, and are so frequently changed that the military poUcy of France lacks continuity and her army cohesion. The crying need of reform in the British army has been proved again and again, but nevertheless our pohticians have not given to our most competent soldiers sufficient power to reorganise the army in accordance with their vast experience. Instead, numerous committees, com- posed of well-meaning civilians and decayed generals, have, from time to time, been appointed to inquire into those defects of the army with which all our great soldiers are perfectly famihar, and which only soldiers left to themselves, not politicians and well-meaning amateurs, can thoroughly remedy. Since the time when Cromwell overthrew Parliament, our generals have been deprived of nearly all power over the army, and have been so closely bound and muzzled by the pohticians that our army has virtually become THE MODEL ARMY OF ENGLAND 241 a civilians' army and a politicians' army, and is no more a soldiers' army. Hence its constant unreadiness and inefficiency. The fear of the military usurper, which dictated the policy of withdrawing all power over the army from Cromwell't) successors, was no doubt justified at the time of the Restoration ; the continuance of that policy at the present time is not only unjust towards our generals, but it sacrifices the efficiency of our armed forces, and the safety of the country and of the Empire, to a baseless suspicion. The armies of some of our possible enemies count by milhons, and consequently it has been assumed that, in case of a war with a military Power of the first rank, British armies would henceforth play a merely passive part. As long as we slavishly copy continental organisations, which, as often as not, are unsuitable to British conditions, under the guidance of an amateur soldier at Pall Mall, and learn tactics from the Franco-German War, this assumption is correct. At present our regulars are of about equal quality with the average of continental troops, they receive a similar training, follow nearly identical tactics, and possess almost similar arms and equipment. With all these factors prac- tically alike, it may be concluded that victory will lie in the end with the larger number of soldiers brought in the field. Without national military service we cannot compete with our possible continental enemies in numbers, and consequently we must either consider our army, in case of a great war, as a weapon for passive defence, and must be prepared for all the grave disadvantages, and even dangers, which spring from that passivity, or we must strive to create an army which makes up in quality for what it lacks in numbers. OKver Cromwell has shown us how to reorganise the army, and how to defeat vastly superior numbers of a brave enemy, with a small but highly-trained force, and the late Boer War has confirmed his teaching. If we go on 242 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN copying continental institutions, and do not give sufficient power for reform and administration to our ablest soldiers, our army will continue to be a costly sham and a danger to our national existence ; if we give once more a free hand to an able soldier to recreate a new model army on a national basis, it seems not unlikely that, in case of a war, British military prestige will rise as high as it rose in Cromwell's time, and that the Empire will be as safe from foreign attack as it was then. But whether that consummation will be arrived at seems doubtful. The military views of English pohticians have changed remarkably little during the last three hundred years, and the saying of Sir Edward Cecil seems as true now as it was in 1628 : ' The danger of all is that a people not used to war believeth no enemy dare venture upon them.' CHAPTEE XI THE COLLAPSE OF FRANCE IN 1870 AND ITS LESSON TO ENGLAND On August 1, 1870, the French and German armies stood facing one another on their frontiers. No engagement had yet taken place, and in the great duel that was impending Europe expected the triumph of Prance, who then stood at the zenith of her power and prestige. The French thought their army invincible, as we now think our navy. The arms of France had been victorious in Mexico and in the Crimea, in Italy and in Africa. She was by far the wealthiest, and was generally regarded as being the strongest, Power on the Continent, and all the sovereigns flocked to Paris to pay homage to Napoleon III, whose every pronouncement was a political event of the first magnitude. France was considered to be the arbiter of Europe, and Prussia was held to be a secondary Power, notwithstanding her remarkable successes in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866. On September 1, 200,000 French soldiers were shut up in Metz ; 120,000 men, with the Emperor, were surrounded at Sedan. In one short month France had been defeated in six battles, and the whole of her regular army had been swept from the field. On February 1, 1871, five months later, all was over; 700,000 prisoners, the French capital, the most important fortresses, 7,500 guns, nearly 1,000,000 rifles, the Emperor, and the best French generals, were in German hands. France, utterly vanquished, had to submit to mutilation, 243 B 2 244 GEEAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN and even now, though almost forty years have passed since ' L'Annee Terrible,' she has not regained the place in the world which she used to occupy, and may possibly never regain it. Posterity will perhaps regard her defeat by Germany in 1870 as the turning-point of her history, and as the cause of her decline. It seems desirable to investigate the causes which led to the collapse of the French army, especially as such an investigation will yield us some most valuable lessons. The Erench Army and the Nation The French army was by no means representative of the French nation. According to General Boulanger, ' L'Armee etait une caste dans la nation,' and this spirit of caste was to be found not only amongst the officers, but also amongst the men. The officers were the darlings, and the men the pariahs, of society. Universal compulsory service existed in France only in name, for the State found remplagants for those willing to serve. The Government dealt in remplagants like a merchant, and the price of substitutes fluctuated like that of any commodity. In 1869 a sub- stitute could be obtained for 2,400 francs, and in the yearly levy of that year, comprising 75,000 recruits, no less than 42,000 were reimplagants. It was easy for those who were unwilling to serve and able to pay to shift the duty of defending their country upon the shoulders of poorer men, and the sons of substantial citizens were therefore seldom found in the ranks of the army. The defence of the country was left to the proletariat, and the chief interest taken in the army by taxpayers and voters was a monetary one. Marshal Bazaine tells us in his ' Episodes de la Guerre ' that the expression ' Nous les payons pour qu'ils aillent se faire tuer ' was on everybody's lips, the citizens considering the soldiers as food for powder. General Thoumas wrote in his book ' Les Capitulations': ' War was considered to THE LESSON OP FEANCE'S DOWNFALL 245 be a misfortune in the abstract that did not touch the individual citizen, or as the glorious task of the army which was followed with patriotic pride and admiration. War was regarded as an object for thought only in so far as it gave occasion for praise or blame/ As the chief interest of the citizens in the army was centred in their pockets, the official classes thought it most important to keep the taxpayer in good temper by dazzling his eye with the splendour of costly uniforms and showy reviews, and by exalting his mind with the vision of an invincible army. The latter effect was produced by extravagant official statements which were more elating than the prosaic, and sometimes unpalatable, truth. Patriotic reformers who pointed out the weakness of the army were described as irresponsible croakers and unpa- triotic panic-mongers, and their justified exposures of the unpreparedness of the army were silenced with ridicule and wilfully deceptive statements such as the following, which Marshal Randon, the then Minister of War, made in 1866 : ' What ! Can it be said that a nation like France, who in a few weeks can assemble under the colours 600,000 soldiers, who has in her arsenals 8,000 pieces of field artillery, 1,800,000 muskets, and powder enough for a ten years' war, should not be always ready to maintain by arms her injured honour and her disregarded rights ? Can it be said that the army is not ready to enter upon a campaign when it includes in its ranks the veterans of Africa, Sebastopol, and Solferino ? What army is there in Europe which contains the like elements of experience and energy ? ' A man who continually and emphatically tells the same untruth ends by believing it himself, and the deception continually and dehberately practised upon the public by the French War Office and generals at last engendered in their minds a delusion as to the real state and strength of the French army. Only a state of auto-suggestion can explain the fact that the warnings of prominent soldiers, 246 GBBAT AND GEEATBB BEITAIN such as Generals Bazaine, Trochu, Ducrot, Froissart, and Colonels Stoffel, Lewal, and others, who were amongst the ablest men in the army, were officially pooh-poohed or pigeon-holed, and that General Troohu fell into disgrace through having told, in the most modest language, the truth about the army in his book ' L'Armee Fran^aise,' which was published in 1867. Nothing but the overweening conceit born of ignorance and fortified by continual emphatic boasting can explain the words of the Journal Officiel, which, on August 16, 1869, only ten months before the outbreak of the war, wrote : ' An army of the line of 750,000 men ready for war, in addition nearly 600,000 men of the garde mobile, instruction in all branches carried to an extent hitherto unheard of, 1,200,000 small arms made in eighteen months, fortresses put in preparation, arsenals filled, an immense materiel sufficient for all eventualities — all these are the great results obtained in two years.' Needless to say, there was no foundation for the figures given, not even on paper, and they emanated solely from the official imagination, being produced in order to lull to sleep the just apprehensions of the nation. Napoleon's proclamation to the army on the eve of the war betrayed a similar fatuity. It said : ' The beginning of the war will be long and fatiguing, for it will take place in a country bristling with natural obstacles and fortresses . . . but whichever route we may choose outside our frontiers, evergr- where we shall find glorious reminiscences of our fathers.' The possibihty that the theatre of war might perchance be inside the French frontiers was, apparently, considered to be too remote to be taken into account. Whenever any defect of the army came to Hght it was rather hushed up than reformed, partly because the short- sighted War Office considered the impression made by the army on the taxpayer as all-important, partly because official torpor hated to be disturbed. Official explanations and juggling with facts and figures were easier than reform. THE LESSON OF FEANOB'S DOWNFALL 247 This was inaugurated only at the last moment when it had become quite unavoidable, and was purely symptomatic. Half measures and quarter measures were therefore greatly in favour. Praise without stiat was showered on the army by the Emperor and hig generals, for criticism was, evidently, out of place with an army of which it was continually asserted that everything was in the most perfect order and in the most satisfactory condition. ' Nous sommes toujours pret ' was a catchword amongst the highest commanders, and this catchword was improved by the Minister of War, Le Boeuf, at the outbreak of the war into his celebrated assertion, ' Nous sommes archipret — jusqu'au dernier bouton ! ' The wisdom of the proverb ' Pessimum inimi corum genus laudantes ' and the danger of bestowing upon the army and its officers indiscriminate but undeserved praise was never considered by the military authorities. The Administbation of the Army and the War Office The administration of the French army was self-centred, bureaucratic, over-centrahsed, and completely out of touch with the army. Pierre Lehautcourt, a prominent military writer, from whose admirable book on the Franco- German War much information contained in the following pages is taken, says : ' The Minister of War was principally an administrative official who rather looked after matters connected with the Budget than after the army. Like the Emperor he had no real authority over the army, which was ruled by the fluctuating, uncertain and capricious decisions of various tradition-bound departments and committees and by the shifting influences of certain decorative but nominal commanders. Hence the absence of unity of purpose and of logic in military decisions.' The author of ' Les Causes de nos Desastres ' says : ' Everything ended or began at the War Office, but centralisation stopped at its 248 GREAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN doors, for tke departments acted each on their own account, according to the will of a staff which had elevated routine to a dogma. At the outbreak of war the difficulties increased tenfold. The orders given by the various depart- ments went into the smallest details, and the numerous small mistakes which were made caused endless inquiries requiring equally endless replies. Everything went at cross-purposes and everybody's work was complicated.' A passing comparison with the working of the Prussian War Office is instructive. We read in the ' Denkwiirdig- keiten ' of Count Roon, the then Prussian Minister of War : ' . . . the mobilisation machine worked with such exemplary exactitude, and so completely without friction, that Roon and the War Office had not to reply to one inquiry of the commanding generals or of other commanders. This was the case though the order for mobilisation was given without any previous warning, and though many commanding generals and staff officers were on their summer holiday, and a good number of them were even abroad.' How great was the muddle at the French War Office caused by its over-centralisation and how great the conse- quent chaos at the front, may be seen from the fact that large numbers of the troops arrived at the frontier without cartridges. Others lacked camping materials, baggage train, artificers, bakers, and provisions. No one in the army had a map of Alsace-Lorraine, and the troops lost their way in their. own country, but the officers possessed excellent maps of German territory which were useless to them. According to General Ambert, the last telegram which General Douay sent to the War Office before his death on the battlefield was : ' I have not a single map of the country where I am.' The official account of the war by the French General Staff relates : ' Orders to place the frontier fortresses in a state of defence were not given until the 27th July, twelve days after the outbreak of the war, and as late as the THE LESSON OF PEANCE'S DOWNFALL 249 30th July nothing had been done for the defence of Stras- bourg, which was separated from Germany only by the Ehine. No guns were on the ramparts.' None of the French frontier fortresses had sufficient provisions to withstand a siege ; most of them, including Strasbourg, had been built two centuries ago by Vauban ; they possessed no outlying forts, and the antiquated fortifications had in no way been mod- ernised. IxL spite of the boasts of Marshal Randon and the Journal Offkiel, and of all the official apologists, the shortage of all war material was most deplorable. The fact that at the end of July 1870 the French army could oppose only 768 inferior guns to the 1,410 excellent guns of the German army of invasion, and that of the famous 8,000 guns, of which Marshal Randon boasted, the vast majority were utterly antiquated, some dating as far back as the time of Louis XIV, is characteristic of the quality and the quantity of the entire French war material. The rifles only were good, but even they were quite insufficient in number. General Lewal, the talented soldier who foresaw the fate of France, wrote in ' La Reforme de I'Armee ' : ' Each department of the War Office was a small ministry in itself. Over them all ruled the Minister of War, whose decisions clashed at every moment with those of the departments. Therefore he was powerless. Each department followed the policy that had been established by routine, and gave its orders independently. Consequently the orders given by one department were often found to be contradictory of those given by another. It was a complete system of disorder, and mutual antagonism took the place of united effort. Bach department kept its secrets in order to make itself indispensable and to escape supervision. Everything was organised for peace, nothing for war. In carrying out the smallest movement, enormous difficulties had to be encountered. One department could not give batteries, another could not supply the remounts, and veritable negotiations were necessary to bring the departments into line. 250 GBEAT AND GEBATBE BEITAIN ' The staff of the War Of&ce was largely composed of civUians who had entered it after an examination. They passed their whole lives without acquiring any practical knowledge of military matters, and they knew the army only by correspondence. The chiefs of the departments were aged and had passed the largest part of their lives as clerks. In that occupation they had contracted ideas and hahits of thought from which they could not easily free themselves. Bureaucratic regularity did not take kindly to innovations and change, and tradition and precedent were elevated into a dogma. Things had always been done in a certain manner, therefore they must continue to be so done.' The effect which a War Office so constituted had upon new officials, even if they came fresh from the army and showed the greatest zeal, can only be described as blighting. Says Pierre Lehautcourt : ' After some years' occupation at the War Office, officers became almost civihans, and, living completely outside military life, lost their sense of discipline ; with advancing age they became either professorial or bureaucratic' The French War Office had become a rigid, unthinking machine, and to it not only forethought and energy, but even patriotic duty and honour, were words without meaning. General Lewal says in ' La Reforme de I'Armee ' : ' Ministers often forgot that some officer or the other had clear rights, not merely a claim. Neverthe- less, his rights were trampled under foot.' According to General Wimpffen's account in ' La Bataille de Sedan ' : ' Excessive and exasperating formality was characteristic of the administration, and its unpopularity increased from day to day.' General Lewal, one of the most talented officers in the army, who at the outbreak of the war was chief of one of the departments in the French War Office, was well qualified to criticise the performance of that office and its attitude towards progress and reform. He says : ' Nobody can imagine, unless he has had practical experience, how many obstacles were placed in one's way THE LESSON OP FEANOE'S DOWNFALL 251 if one brought forward a new and sensible idea. The most incredible objections were raised, and officialism went even so far as to treat a man who made a good sugges- tion as a dreamer, a malcontent, or a fool ; for the War Office considered it to be folly to change a bad practice for something better.' Besides being stupid, torpid, and unfair in its ad- ministration, the War Office exercised a tyrannical and pernicious influence over the commanders by its constant meddUng. ' Cavalry colonels,' says General Lewal, ' dared not give sufficient drill to their men for fear of breaking down a few horses and getting into trouble with the War Office.' The officers of the army and the War Office were entirely out of touch, but nevertheless the self-centred, unthinking administrative machine continually encroached upon the province of the executive branch of the service, which became its tool, and was humiliated into a bureaucracy glorified with gold lace. Generals were turned into clerks to the War Office and had to devote their time to endless correspondence on administrative futilities and trifles of account instead of spending their energy in training their troops and themselves for war,,-' General Lewal tells us in ' La Eef orme de 1' Armee ' ; *" The self-centred existence of our army and too much centralisation have caused our generals to get out of touch with military affairs. They knew nothing about the organisation of the army, its administration, the artillery, and other technical matters. They were never consulted by^the War Office, and therefore they took no interest in these matters. Their functions were Umited to transmitting orders and to giving replies regarding the details of the service. .They were allowed neither initiative nor power. It is true that generals were occasionally asked for their opinion, but not much notice was taken of their views. The opinion of a War Office official was always more weighty than the advice of a general.' 252 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN The Oeganisation op the Abmy and its Preparation FOR War General Ducrot wrote a memoir dated January 23, 1868, which was submitted to the Emperor, in which he stated : ' The only thing for which I envy the Prussian army and which gives it its strength is its excellent organisation, which makes its mobilisation so easy and so rapid that Prussia can in forty-eight hours concentrate 120,000 men in Mayence and Coblence. As things are at present we should require several weeks in order to obtain a similar result.' His warnings, like those of many other generals, were considered troublesome, being likely to disturb official indolence and to expose official nonchalance and ignorance and its unwarranted optimism. At the Emperor's table Ducrot was mercilessly mocked by his brother generals who were acquainted with his pessimistic views, and he was treated as a " malcontent.' It was so much easier to silence the general, who was by nature somewhat awkward, than to tell the truth and to institute reforms ! The attitude of the people towards the army and the spirit which prevailed at the War; Office were jointly responsible for the bad organisation of the firmy and its lack of prepara- tion for war. Napoleon himsdlf describes the organisation of his army in the following way : ' Our war organisation is like a complicated machine, of which all working parts are skilfully separated, and are kept stored at various workshops. If it becomes necessary to put it in motion, the work of getting it ready is slow and troublesome, for all the single wheels and cranks have to be found and connected. In fact the whole machine has to be put together, from the simple nut to the most complicated part.' His opinion is borne out by General Lewal in his book ' La Eeforme de I'Armee,' which significantly begins with the phrase : ' The vice of a double organisation, one for peace and the other for war, is too THE LESSON OF PBANGE'S DOWNFALL 258 evident to require demonstration. Only one organisation is needed, namely, that for war.' The ill-starred General Wimpffen in ' La Bataille de Sedan ' sums up the causes of the French disasters in one sentence : ' Whilst in France everything was left to chance, in Prussia everything was regulated by calculation, intelligence, and science.' Napoleon III gays in his ' (Euvres Posthumes ' : ' This inconceivable difference between the number of men present under the colours and those who ought to have been there is the most striking and deplorable example of the vicious character of our mihtary organisation. . . . The transition from a peace establishment to a war establishment was far more protracted than was expected, and this was the chief cause of our reverses. ' Instead of having in line, as might have been expected, 385,000 men to oppose the 430,000 of Northern Germany combined with the Southern States, the army, when the Emperor arrived at Metz on the 25th July, amounted only to 220,000 men, and moreover, not only were the effectives not up to their full complement, but many indispensable accessories were wanting.' General Lebrun describes in his ' Souvenirs Militaires ' the practical working of the two independent army organisa- tions, one for peace and one for war, and the cumbrous and laborious conversion of the unprepared army from the peace footing to the war footing : ' The lengthy and complicated labour which devolved upon the War Office, owing to the neglect of preparations and the numerous difficulties to which that neglect gave rise, might have been avoided if, in time of peace, army corps had been organised possessed of a composition identical to that which they would have in war, but, unfortunately, the War Office had had the unhappy idea to change in the last minute the whole organisaition of the army when there was no longer any time for re- organisation. If everything had been prepared, generals and troops would at least have known one another, the 254 GREAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN commanders of brigades and divisions woiild have seen that each corps was completely supplied with necessaries of war before moving them out of their garrisons, and they would have assured themselves that everything had been prepared to receive the reservists.' The Due d'Audiffret Pasquier expressed a similar opinion before the Committee of the National Assembly : ' Among the causes of defeat were the improper distribution of the contingents and their want of instruction, the slowness of the reserves in joining the corps, the improvised formation of corps d'armee in time of war ; the system which took a divisional officer at Lille, a brigadier at Perpignan, and an intendant in Algeria, placed these officers, called from the four points of the compass, in common combined action, without any indication of their character, their reciprocal aptitude, and without a chance of duties performed in conjunction having given them that confidence in each other which is necessary to enable them to share their common responsibilities ; and this when, in a few days, they must be in front of the enemy.' His opinion is borne out by -the astonishing experiences of Colonel Patry, described in his book ' La Guerre telle quelle est ' : 'I had never seen the face of our brigade general ; I knew my division commander by sight because I had happened to meet him in Sierck, but I had neither seen him on the march nor in camp. As regards the commander of the corps, no one even knew his name.' The experience of Colonel Patry was typical, and the weighty corroborative evidence cited can leave no doubt as to the viciousness and danger entailed by a double organisa- tion, one for peace and one for war. The organisation of the French army was essentially a peace organisation, ill adapted for rapid mobilisation. Its conversion to a war footing caused the greatest disorder, and, owing to its unpreparedness, the army was bound to find itself at a grave, and almost irreparable, disadvantage in any serious war. THE LESSON OP PEANCE'S DOWNPALL 255 It is a well-known fact that Prance would not have stood alone against Germany had she not succumbed at the first blow, owing to her unreadiness. Marshal Bazaine, the commander-in-chief of the Prench army, in his book ' Episodes de la Guerre,' makes the following interesting and painful statement : ' I wish to state in the most emphatic manner that the first and greatest advantage of Germany has been the promptitude of her mobilisation, whereby she was able to take the offensive against us. If we had been allowed a fortnight more time we could have collected everything that was indispensable for our armies, and our troops would have been well fed and enabled to march and fight. In that case the chances of war would have been changed and any reverse which we might have experienced would not have had the most serious conse- quences. With a better military organisation our country would have been saved.' The Prench War Office had been forewarned by some of its own members, but their warnings were not heeded. The official account of the war by the Prench General Staff tells us that General Lewal, who was then a colonel in the War Office, had in his official capacity reported that the maximum time required for the mobiHsation of Prussia would be twenty-two days, and, indeed, twenty-two days after the declaration of war the German troops crossed the frontier. No notice had been taken of Lewal's report. The Staff of the French Army In Prance the intellectual guidance of the army and the supplying of military intelligence was not in the hands of a powerful organisation, but was left to chance and circum- stance. No department existed whose duty it was to collect systematically all the facts of interest to Prance regarding foreign countries and foreign armies, to watch their progress, 256 GEEAT AND GBEATBE BBITAIN to prepare detailed plans of campaign in time of peace, to solve the many strategical, mechanical, and administrative problems which require solution, and to educate the ofi&cers in the art of war. There was no thinking department, and important problems were either shelved (which was the favourite method), or dealt with in a haphazard fashion by the overworked and insufficiently informed War Office, which was quite incompetent to decide whether the pessi- mistic forecasts of Colonels Stoffel and Lewal or the opti- mistic views of Marshals Eandon and Le Boeuf, which were supported in their writings by numerous ' dashing ' young officers, such as Lafouge, Smeth, Costa de Serda, Loizillon, Bourelly, Mequillet, Derrecagaix, and Pay, were correct. Not unnaturally it decided that the opinion of the highest dignitaries was bound to be right, and dis- regarded the views of Stoffel and Lewal, who received no thanks for their pains. A department called General Staff certainly existed in France, but its functions were chiefly mechanical and bureaucratic, and it fulfilled in no way the purposes which it should have served. It is useful to recall Moltke's words regarding some of the duties of a general staff in making those preparations for war which were utterly neglected in France : ' One of the principal duties of the General Staff is to work out during peace in the most minute way plans for the concentration and the transport of troops, witlt a view to meet all possible eventuaUties to which war may give rise. ' When an army first takes the field the most multifarious considerations — political, geographical, as well as military — have to be borne in mind. Mistakes in the original con- centration of armies can hardly ever be made good in the whole course of a campaign. All these arrangements can be considered a long time beforehand, and — assuming the troops are ready for war and the transport service properly organised — ^must lead to the exact result which has been contemplated.' THE LESSON OP PEANCE'S DOWNFALL 257 The routine of the War Office had also infected the French General Staff, and staff officers, who should represent the highest intelligence in the army and whose occupation should be entirely intellectual, were made the bureaucratic drudges of the officers in command. General Lewal states in ' La R^forme de I'Arm^e ' : ' Staff officers became clerks, and copied orders, letters and circulars. Their clerical position humiliated them and disgusted them with their career. Besides, they learned to see too clearly the incapacity of the commanders to whom they were attached, and became sceptical of the advantage gained by knowledge and exertion.' Pierre Lehautcourt tells us : ' Staff officers outside the War Office found no better occupation for their abihties than to devote their official existences to signing receipts, writing letters, and transmitting orders.' The staff of the French army was an elaborate sham, and most generals had only a hazy idea of the value of a staff, and they would not have known how to make use of a good staff had it existed. No special aptitude was required in staff officers, for they were only clerks and supernumer- aries. Besides, the staff officers did not possess any special qualifications for their duties. In consequence of its composition and of its bureaucratic intellect - killing occupation, the General Staff, as well as the army corps staffs, proved almost valueless in war. General Wimpffen complains in ' La Bataille de Sedan ' : ' The officers of the numerous staffs did not know the language of the enemy. We had no maps, though the War Office was full of maps.' If a great soldier had been placed at the head of the General Staff and had been given ample powers, he might have created an active brain to the army that would have rejuvenated the War Office and the whole service, and pre- pared the army in all respects for war. But staff officers' positions were filled from a narrow circle of mediocrities 258 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN instead of being thrown open to the free competition of all the best brains in the army. In this connexion Marshal Bazaine's words regarding the selection of staff officers are well worth quoting : ' Taking in a position at a glance is not an art which can be taught. It is a natural gift which can be perfected by experience. Hence, officers, who have to fulfil the important duty of directing the movements of troops and choosing positions favourable to each arm, of studying those parts of countries which may become the theatre of war, must have a complete grasp of all the require- ments of an army, and must possess an activity of mind and body that is proof against fatigue. Those officers carmot therefore be selected from among the pupils of a school, but must be chosen from the most capable officers of the whole army who possess the greatest natural talent for those duties.' After the war had broken out the War Office woke up from its torpor and began to work in feverish haste, vainly attempting, at the eleventh hour, to improvise organisations which, with reasonable forethought, would have been created in peace time. According to the official account of the war by the French General Staff, the Minister of War directed, on July 17, two days after the outbreak of war, ' that it is necessary to organise immediately an intelligence service in order to supply continually information regarding the enemy and the country in which we shall have to operate.' Naturally enough it was impossible either to organise at the last moment an adequate intelhgence depart- ment, or to obtain much valuable intelligence through the scratch staff that was organised, or to turn to good account the scraps of intelhgence which were received. Similarly, on July 23, eight days after the declaration of war. Napoleon sent a lengthy memoir to the Minister of War in which he recommended a large number of elaborate reforms and new organisations, as if it were possible to improvise at the last moment organisations which it required years to create and to set working. The Emperor might just as THE LESSON OP FEANOE'S DOWNFALL 259 well have tried to save a drowning man by recommending him to take swimming lessons. It can hardly be doubted that if a powerful inteUigence organisation had existed in Prance, the war would either not have broken out, or it would have found Prance prepared. At any rate it is impossible to improvise at the outbreak of war an intelligence department, the usefulness of which can only consist in knowledge and information acquired during years of patient labour. The Commander-in-Chief Napoleon III, who acted as commander-in-chief of the French army in peace and war, was little qualified for that position. His ignorance of warfare and of all connected with it was as notorious as was his rashness. We have it from Marshal Castellane that, during the Crimean War, the Emperor was about to send an expedition to the Baltic in order to take Cronstadt, not knowing that Cronstadt Hes on an island, and a map had to be fetched to convince him. Moreover, the Emperor was too much occupied with other matters which diverted his attention from military affairs, too good-natured and too weak, and his weakness was con- tiriually exploited by courtiers, generals, and especially by certain ladies who exercised considerable influence in the army. The Army Commanders and the Generals Kleber has said that a good general in command of a mediocre army is better than a mediocre general in com- mand of a good army, and that saying has been true ever since the time of Hannibal and Caesar. Consequently it might have been expected that the nephew of the great Napoleon and the historian of Julius Caesar would have exercised some care in the selection of his generals. How- ever, this was not the case. Generals did not always owe s 2 260 GREAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN their position to their conspicuous ability, and the unjustifiable appointments which were made gravely com- promised the efi&ciency of the army and undermined its discipline. Intrigue was often a better aid to obtaining a command than conspicuous merit. Pierre Lehautcourt writes : ' Of&cers amongst themselves laughed about appointments which placed at the head of the cavalry an officer who could not ride, or at the head of an army corps a clever engineer officer who, during his whole life, had never commanded a division, a brigade, a regiment, or even a battalion.' Prom General Lewal we learn : ' Officers approached the Emperor and did not blush to ask for promotion. Each high official and officer had his friend at Court. The first thought of officers was to please, and everyone in the army knew the influences which had been instrumental in causing this or that promotion.' The vicious and dangerous practice of giving high com- mands to personal favourites without sufficient regard to their miUtary capacity prevailed not only in peace but unfortunately also in war. General Lewal states in ' La Eeforme de I'Armee : ' At the outbreak of a war commands were given not to those who were considered most capable but to those to whom a promise of command had been made beforehand.' When in 1870 eight army corps were formed on the frontier, the commands of the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Corps, and that of the Guards, were given to five personal aides-de-camp of the Emperor, men who were more distinguished as courtiers than as generals. On the other hand, we learn from General Lewal that 'General Pellissier, renowned through the Crimean War, in which he had been commander-in-chief, received no command after his return ; General Montauban, who had made his mark ■in China, and who was supposed to be the ablest general, received no command in 1870. Therefore it was said in mihtary circles that the Emperor was jealous of superior merit, and that his sympathies were with mediocrities.' THE LESSON OF PEANCE'S DOWNFALL 261 General Wimpffen says : ' Base rivalry and childish jealousy influenced the distribution of high commands.' To be ' un bel homme,' ' un homme spirituel,' ' un danseur indefatigable,' was a great recommendation for military employment, as papers found at the Tuileries have proved. The Emperor was aware of these abuses and the dangers springing from them, yet he dehberately closed his eyes to them, for favouritism had become an established custom difficult to uproot. The Emperor was a weak man, and Society had become stronger than he, the War Office, and the executive combined. The most trivial pretexts were considered sufficiently strong to demand a favour from him. General Ambert mentions in ' Sedan ' that a colonel asked the Emperor to be changed into another corps. ' Why ? ' asked the Emperor. ' Because my regiment is bad,' answered the colonel. ' Monsieur,' answered Napoleon, ' I have no bad regiments, only bad colonels.' The Emperor's favour was, however, not sufficient to secure the promotion of a favourite officer, as elaborate counter-intrigues were set on foot by highly placed per- sonages in the interests of their own proUgis, and their objections were of the most trifling kind. General Ambert teUs us in his book ' L'Invasion ' : ' I could name two French marshals who opposed the admission of a colonel to the Imperial Guard because he was considered to be too strict a disciplinarian. Personal and financial relations, relatives in high places, and flighty Parisian manners were great aids to promotion, and often sufficed where ability was lacking.' Courtiers, flatterers, and their hangers-on, and the froUgis of society ladies pushed themselves by sheer insolence into high military positions, and whilst those sycophants had their sway and succeeded in hiding their incapacity with brazen assurances of the excellence of the army, no minister had the courage to tell the Emperor that, as General Lewal says, ' the efficiency of an army is 262 GREAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN impossible when it is more in the interest of every officer to make himself agreeable to his superior than to do his duty.' Many meritorious officers who disdained to clamour for promotion, or to fawn on their superiors, and those were often the best men, were neglected and passed over in promotion, and they finally left the service full of bitterness. There were, however, other influences unfavourable to the efficiency of the generals quite apart from the fact that they were not selected solely by merit. General Ponchalon states in his ' Souvenirs de la Guerre ' : ' Our army com- manders were paralysed by a higher power, and their liberty of action was circumscribed by requirements of policy.' Marshal Marmont's saying, ' A general should rather resign his command if no liberty of action is given to him than submit to the direct interference of the Government,' may have been remembered by some of the generals, but resignation offers little inducement to a general if he knows that he wiQ be quickly replaced by a man of inferior ability, that he will harm only himself, and that there is no hope that his action wiU lead to reform in the service. Resigna- tion under such circumstances would mean only useless self-sacrifice. In consequence of this state of affairs it is not astonish- ing to hear from the author of ' Les Causes de nos Desastres ' : ' What strikes the observer at once is that the generals were not familiar with the functions which they were supposed to exercise, being ignorant alike of their duties and of the powers given to them. Most of them were in reality no better than colonels.' Indeed, where could they have learned to handle troops ? War was an exception, and manoeuvres consisted only of parade evolutions. The commanders of divisions came into contact with their troops only during reviews, and had never cause to study maps and the ground. Hence a general inexperience was to be found among the higher THE LESSON OP FEANCE'S DOWNFALL 263 officers, who were incapable of executing the smallest operation without orders. They possessed no initiative and were afraid of responsibiUty. The French generals were hampered not only by the disorganisation of the army, by their insufficient ability, and by the constant interference of the War Office, but also by the jealousies engendered in the numerous intrigues in which they were engaged and to which they largely owed their positions. We read in General Derrecagaix's book ' La Guerre Modeme ' : ' At the commencement of operations in 1870 the rivalry of our commanders more than once contributed to our reverses.' General Lewal confirms the opinion of this distinguished military scientist, stating : ' Often enough an officer, instead of helping a comrade who was hard pressed, said, " Let him help himself if he is so clever." ' At the outbreak of the Franco-German War Napoleon III was very ill, suffering excruciating pain through stone in the bladder, from which he finally died. Nevertheless, he took the field with his generals, chiefly in order to preserve some union amongst them, as he had in former campaigns received unmistakable proofs of their dangerous rivaby, which had gone to the duelhng point. Fearing their jealousies, he did not group his army corps into armies, but left them isolated, thereby gravely hampering combined action. Only on August 5, after the serious defeat of Worth, when incalculable harm had already been done, were the scattered army corps under his nominal command hurriedly grouped into three armies. Here again we see the fatal instability of purpose and vacillation which we meet everjrwhere in the French army. The state of the intrigue and bureaucracy ridden army, its helplessness and its hopelessness in face of the enemy, is clear from General Wimpffen's description : ' All the corps were isolated, and without cohesion or sohdarity. There was no possibility of mutual assistance and they 264 GEEAli AND GEEATER BEITAIN were not united by any tie except by their common head- quarters, which was far away, badly informed, and incapable not only of giving orders but even of supplying useful informa- tion. In reality, under the deceptive outward appearance of unity, anarchy of command reigned supreme.' The Officers ' Soldiering was first a profession, then it became an art, now it is a positive science. In order to succeed in war thorough knowledge is required.' This maxim, given here in the words of General Lewal, had already been frequently expressed by Frederick the Great and Napoleon I, and it was well known, though little heeded, ia the French army. ' Our young officers,' says the same general, in ' La Eeforme de I'Armee,' ' had plenty of personal courage, but not that professional keenness in the service which counts for so much. On every occasion they hastened to take off their uniform, and considered an officer's position mainly as a desirable complement of a brilliant marriage.' The vanity and luxury of the officers was very great. General Ambert complains : ' The luxury of baggage passed all bounds, and made our army resemble that of Darius.' The military schools, which should have supplied a good military education and training and fostered the military spirit, were utterly worthless. General Wimpffen tells us : ' The spirit which ruled at Saint Cyr was that of a badly managed private school, not of a military establish- ment. Discipline was maintained with difficulty and revolts were frequent. The staff college was a college only in name. The studies were puerile, and the choice of pro- fessors, the way of tuition, and the programme proved that no importance was attached to it.' The pupils of the miHtary schools were young gentle- men, not officers. They evinced a profound contempt for knowledge, remained ignorant, and made the lives of the THE LESSON OP FEANCE'S DOWNFALL 265 studious a burden to them. No wonder tliat according to General Wimpffen : ' Able young men who had entered the army in the hope of finding an honourable career ia it were soon discouraged and tried by all means to re-enter a civil occupation.' Coming from such schools and having imbibed a profound contempt of studies, officers had come to acclaim ignorance of military science and disdain of all iatellectual occupations a military virtue. General Ambert said in his book ' Sedan ' : ' The French army did not even read what was published in Germany on its work and progress. Some few staff officers wrote short papers, which were treated with contempt by the chiefs of the army. The army did no intellectual work because knowledge did not lead to promotion.' Easy victories over savage enemies were to a great extent responsible for the superficiality of French officers, and for the contempt in which not only military science but all serious occupation with military matters was held. As Pierre Lehautcourt tells us : ' The African school enjoyed the greatest prestige and ruled everywhere. Its contempt of studies was shared by the highest in command ; a new word was coined by that school and became its motto, " On se debrouillera." ' This phrase translated into EngUsh means ' We '11 muddle through somehow.' The easy successes obtained over a brave but savage African enemy were a bad preparation for European war. According to General Lewal, ' the attack with cold steel was considered the last word in military matters. Scouting, the movement of troops over difficult ground and outpost duty were not considered subjects worthy of attention.' Promotion went by seniority, and, consequently, there was little inducement for the officers to excel. All they could do in order to get on was to play a waiting game and behave ' correctly ' towards officers of a higher grade, or to ingratiate themselves with personages who possessed influence at Court or at the War Office. General Lewal 266 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN states : ' Owing to the promotion by seniority pure and simple a premium was offered to laziness and incapacity,' and General Derrecagaix even asserts : ' Merit had become an obstacle to advancement, and the excessive centralisation left no other outlet to the professional zeal of officers than office work.' The encroaching spirit of the bureaucratic War Office had introduced into the French army a centraHs- ation which is illogical, and which is opposed to, and altogether incompatible with, mihtary efficiency. The exaggerated centralisation and the constant refer- ence to the War Office which was required before the smallest step could be taken, together with the absence of individual responsibihty, had killed the in- itiative of officers, and converted them into helpless automatons who were afraid to act for themselves, and who ever waited for the War Office or somebody in authority to pull the string. Many of the most talented officers wasted their years in barren office work, as did General Lewal. Constantly bent over their books, accounts, and letters, with their attention fixed on the countless minute rules and regulations of the War Office, the inteUigence of these men, their ambition, and their very soldierly instincts, were killed by the intolerable petty tyranny of imnecessary formalism. Marshal Bazaine tells us in his ' Episodes de la Guerre ' : ' Many officers who had lived away from active service had lost the necessary ability and activity,' and General Trochu says in his ' (Euvres Posthumes ' : ' Officers were employed for duties of detail which, at the best, should have been entrusted to sergeants.' Thus occupied and leading the lives of clerks, officers grew old in purely mechanical employment, ignorant of their pro- fession, dissatisfied with their career, indifferent to their duties, and callous as to the welfare of the army. General Montaudon says in his ' Souvenirs Militaires ' : ' In 1867 I THE LESSON OP FEANCE'S DOWNFALL 267 found that in the troops of my brigade the average age of captains was forty-five years, and that of Ueutenants thirty-seven years. Some officers were rather slow in their ways and possessed no initiative, evincing a kind of moral apathy resulting from the monotony of the daily service which was alternated only by the amusements of the town.' Advancement outside the usual rotation and apart from favouritism was granted for acts of conspicuous bravery, but such promotion is distinctly dangerous. Its dangers are weU described by General Lewal in ' La Eeforme de I'Armee ' : 'An act of brilHant courage or daring which has occurred in war and which has had happy results should not by itself be a sufficient claim to promotion. It is no doubt a recommendation for an officer, but such a success does not guarantee his real capacity as a leader. Experience as well as reflection prove that. The disregard of this fact has brought into the forefront of our army mediocrities, and the results were worst where the rank was highest. Energy and bravery suffice as qualifications up to a certain point for officers of the lower grade, but when it is a question of operations on a greater scale capacity becomes indispensable and must be proved.' Unfortunately some of the high commanders in the French army had arrived at their position by acts which were described as conspicuous bravery in fighting against a very inferior enemy — acts which would have been more correctly described as wanton foolhardiness, had it not been for the fortuitous incident of that incalculable factor — good luck. But recklessness avails httle against a European army. Misapplying their elan against well- armed and well-prepared troops, the same officers who had been so conspicuously successful in Africa only succeeded by their dash in uselessly sacrificing thousands of lives in the war against Germany. 268 GREAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN The Rank and Pile The rank and file of the army was largely recruited from the lowest strata of society, owing to the vicious system before described, which enabled not only sons of the well-to-do, but also the sons of prosperous peasants and working men to purchase freedom from military service for a moderate sum. Being largely composed of the idle, thriftless scum of the city slums, it was only natural that the bearing of the army was in accordance with its composition. Furthermore, garrison life was extremely monotonous and unmilitary, as the chief occupation of the soldier consisted chiefly in constantly cleaning his uniforms and barracks — work which is hateful to every soldier. Their activity with the scrubbing brush was varied with aimless and mechanical drills and parades, and tedious sentry duties. Purely military training, which would have ele- vated the spirit of the soldiers, was greatly neglected, and the shooting in the French army was deplorably bad. The officers led a life apart from that of the men, and their lack of education and the spirit of vanity and flighti- ness which animated them, which was their only bond of union, and which took the place of a true esprit de corps, was instrumental in depriving them of aU influence and authority over their men. Therefore, the moral tone of the army was not improved by the officers, but remained low, and the discipline was extremely bad. An insufficient meal or any slight grievance sufficed to provoke a riot. Discomfort on the march quickly caused the men to throw away their rifles, cartridges, and knapsacks, and slight fatigue made them fall out of the ranks in large numbers. During the Franco- German War the route of march of the French army was always littered with arms and accoutre- ments which had been wantonly thrown away, and the roads swarmed with stragglers. THE LESSON OF PEANCE'S DOWNFALL 269 The uneducated, dandified, and incapable officers were neither feared nor respected by their men. They were made fun of in their absence and often in their presence, military disobedience was common, and the transgressions of the men had frequently to be overlooked because they became too frequent to allow of punishment. Cowed by the unruhness of their men, depressed by the attitude of the War Office, which gave them neither a suitable occupa- tion nor authority, nor full responsibility for their command, nor promoted them by merit, the officers tried to humour the men in order to maintain some semblance of order. It was almost impossible to execute any movement in the field at an early hour or to secure efficient scouting, owing to the unwillingness and passive resistance of the men, and many surprises by the German troops and consequent disasters are directly traceable to the imchecked self- indulgence and lack of discipline of the French soldiers. The Tactics of the Army It was only natural that in an army which was ruled by a chance combination of party influences, society influences, favouritism, and an ossified bureaucracy, in which responsi- bility was ill defined or was non-existent, in which no real discipline was observed, and in which the vital problems of war received neither serious thought nor study, tactics also were neglected, and were quite out of date. Military disasters are frequently attributed by the personages responsible for them to some extraneous influence, and so it was explained that the new arms had revolutionised warfare. Since the time of the Greeks and Romans the implements of war have been improved from year to year, and when an army ruled by conservatism was beaten by a progressive army which had adapted its tactics to its new arms, the unfortunate commander has frequently tried to exonerate himself by blaming for his defeats not himself, but 270 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN the revolution in warfare, which he certainly did not foresee, but which was foreseen by his more progressive oppo- nent. Napoleon I had already said in his ' Pensees sur la Guerre ' : ' II faut changer la tactique de la guerre tous les dix ans si on veut conserver quelque superiorite.' Never- theless the French army had not allowed ten years but fifty years to pass by without any adequate modification in their antiquated tactics. It is true that Marshal Niel had written some valuable tactical handbooks, but they were not read, tllan and arme Uanche were the catchwords of the army, but its heroic attempts to overthrow the enemy by hurling itself against the German troops resulted only in its unnecessary self-destruction. In fact, the French tactics were those of which Napoleon I had already said, ' C'est magnifique — mais ce n'est pas la guerre.' Not only were the tactics of the French army of the crudest, but furthermore the bureaucratic influences which encroached everywhere upon the executive of the army had effectually drilled the natural common sense and self- reliance out of the officers, and had converted them into helpless, timid nonentities, military bureaucrats, who always waited for instructions, who always were surprised by the enemy, and who always stmnbled into traps, the existence of which had not been notified in advance in their instruc- tions. The army had indeed been turned into a fighting machine, and fought with the intelUgence of a machine, but without its precision. Officers sent out five miles to reconnoitre would rather return without any information than go a mUe further when they would have seen the enemy ; regiments were decimated without returning fire because they had no orders to shoot ; mechanical obedience had everywhere been substituted for self-reliance and intelligent discretion. Pierre Lehautcourt says : ' The tendency to centralise everything and to kill all initiative is found in the orders for march or battle. By presuming to foresee everything, the worst results were obtained.' THE LESSON OP FEANOE'S DOWNFALL 271 The movement of the 2nd Corps against Saarbriick on August 2, ordered by General Eailly, is classical in this respect. The order covers eight pages, and goes into the smallest details. But whilst matters of detail, which might have been safely left to the individual commander, were carefully regulated in advance by the general, who, from his desk, tried to play the part of Providence in the miUtary scheme, the essential points were often overlooked. The official account of the war by the French General Staff says with regard to the order previously mentioned : ' The order gives no information regarding the whereabouts of the enemy, it gives no instructions for the cavalry division, no advance guard is formed, the whole army corps deploys against some outposts. Nobody knows where the com- mander is to be found in action. On the other hand, the order gives many details which should be left to subordinate officers. Everything is regulated in advance as if the troops were about to make an evolution on the parade ground.' General Wimpffen writes in his book ' La Bataille de Sedan ' : ' At Sedan the whole staff of the army, excepting two captains, returned to town when Marshal MacMahon was wounded, leaving his successor alone on the battle- field.' Evidently the French officers were utterly helpless when left to themselves. From the foregoing it is clear that simple tactical evolu- tions which were decided upon in many cases did not succeed owing to the defective tactical training of the officers, whereby intelligent co-operation had been made impossible. Officers of all grades considered it their duty rather to stand by idly when their assistance was of vital importance than to take a necessary and logical step which any private would have taken if left to himself without precise instruc- tions. Colonel Patry reports in his book ' La Guerre telle quelle est ' : ' The enemy fled at the gallop. "Why did we not at least speed him with a good volley ? No doubt everybody was waiting for somebody else to give the order 272 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN to shoot. We were so accustomed to do nothing without precise orders that the men would have waited for an order to draw their swords if attacked with cold steel.' Colonel Pinget tells of similar experiences in his ' Feuilles de Garnet ' : ' The troops struck camp, carried everything a few hundred yards away, put their tents up again, prepared their cooking, and before their soup was ready moved on again without knowing why. Suddenly they are deployed for battle without any consideration of the formation of the ground, but the lines are as rigidly enforced as if the men were on the drUl ground.' The same indolence of thought and aimlessness of pur- pose, the same confusion in action, and the same blind reliance on written orders, behind which shelter could be taken, and respect for which was habitual, that were so much in evidence at the War Office, were also to be found on the march and on the battlefield. Consequently nearly every mistake that could be made was made by the French army. ■ The Diplomatic Peepabations for War It' was one of the duties of French diplomacy to know the strength of Prance and of her possible enemies, and to prepare against an attack by a stronger Power by an alliance, the conclusion of which would have offered little difficulty before the war. Denmark smarted under her defeat by Prussia in 1864, Austria thirsted for revenge after her defeat by Prussia in 1866, and Italy owed a debt of gratitude to France for her regeneration. The possibility of a quad- ruple alliance against Prussia was contemplated and often dwelt on by Napoleon, and it would have been easy for French diplomacy to delay the outbreak of the war by negotiations until binding arrangements with other States had been concluded. There was solid ground for the beUef that such a quad- ruple alhance lay within the sphere of practical politics. We THE LESSON OP FEANCE'S DOWNFALL 273 read in the official account of the war by the French General Staff : ' In March 1870, Archduke Albert of Austria, the hero of Custozza, who was considered one of the fore- most soldiers in Europe, travelled through France and thoroughly studied her resources, arsenals, fortresses, &c., and at the end of April Napoleon III told General Le Brun that the Archduke and himself had drawn up a common plan of campaign. Shortly after General Le Brun was sent by Napoleon to Vienna in order to arrange with the Austrian mihtary authorities for their co-operation, and on June 23 he returned to Paris to submit Austria's definite plan of campaign to Napoleon. Before it could be adopted the war broke out.' French diplomacy was evidently as unready, as amateur- ish, as ignorant, and as frivolous, as was the French army, and it is characteristic that the declaration of the Minister of War, General Le Bceuf's ' Nous sommes archipret,' was paralleled by the pronouncement of the Prime Minister, Emile Ollivier, before the Chamber, that he went into the war ' le cceur leger.' Olhvier was a politician, but not a statesman. He had made his mark as a brilhant lawyer, eloquent writer, and able journahst, and evidently thought a command of the phrase a sufficient qualification for conducting the policy of a great State. Granmont, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, brought no capacity to his office, and Bismarck remarked that he could hardly conceive how Napoleon came to select him. Pohticians occupied positions which ought to have been held by statesmen. Napoleon III and his diplomatic advisers showed the same insouciance and the same supreme trust in the good luck of France that was to be found in his generals. Whilst Bismarck was developing his pohtical ideas to Napoleon at Biarritz the Emperor said in an undertone to Prosper Merimee, on whose arm he was leaning, ' C'est un fou,' and when Bismarck took leave of Napoleon, the Emperor 274 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN remarked to his cousin, ' Cast un brave homme. Seulement il ne connait pas rAUemagne.' We read in Trochu's ' (Euvres Posthumes ' : ' On July 18, three days after the declaration of war, Napoleon III asked Trochu for his opinion on an expedition to Denmark, for which neither an expeditionary corps nor the navy had been prepared, nor even diplomatic steps been taken in view of such a contingency. At that time French diplomacy was considering the conclusion of a Danish- French defensive and offensive alliance.' French statesmen evidently hoped to improvise alliances at the last moment in the same way in which they counted upon improvising armies, generals, staffs, and everything else required for war, and the Emperor continued negotiations for an alliance after he had joined his army. His first defeat naturally shattered all hope of foreign assistance or inter- ference and sealed the fate of Prance. The Lessons of the Franco-German War When we look impartially at the Franco-German War we cannot help being struck with the utter hopelessness of the French cause. The armies of France had not only to contend with overwhelming numbers. The German armies were better armed, better equipped, better trained, better officered, animated by a more mihtary spirit, and able to fall on the French before they were ready. Therefore it would seem that though the German army was, no doubt, excellent, its victory was due, perhaps, less to its excellence than to the inferiority of the French army. The state of the French army before the war of 1870 has, so far, received comparatively Uttle attention at the hands of military students, but it would seem that its study should be at least as profitable as that of the achievements of the German army, for it teaches many valuable lessons. Before 1870 France was much richer than Germany, and THE LESSON OP FRANCE'S DOWNFALL 275 possessed of almost inexhaustible latent military and financial resources. This was proved by the levde en masse and by the ease with which she bore the tremendous expenses of the war. However, latent resources of wealth and patriotism, though they are very fine on paper and in the mouths of orators, are often as useless to a nation for defence against a ready enemy as is a hypothetical revolver against an actual and determined burglar. War is a trial of strength, not as a rule of latent strength, but of readily available strength, and no amount of casuistry by the advocates of peace and unpreparedness will alter that fact. The British Empire has been victorious in the late South African War, perhaps less owing to the latent resources p-'iJ to the patriotism of the Motherland and the Colonies than to the lack of strategical understanding on the part of the Boers, through which we were allowed the necessary time to convert our latent resources into armies. If the Boers had marched straight upon Cape Town and Durban, as they were advised to do by continental strategists, and had driven the live-stock into the interior and demoUshed the railways, instead of sitting aimlessly round Kimberley, Ladysmith, and Mafeking, it would have been impossible for us to save those garrisons. The Dutch m Cape Colony would have risen, and an army even of 500,000 men might have been unable to reconquer South Africa. Li South Africa our latent resources have stood us in good stead because we were mercifully given time to create armies, but a wise and energetic enemy, an enemy who is better prepared for war than were the Boers, will certainly give us as Httle chance to draw on our latent resources as did the Germans to the French in the Franco-German War. We must, therefore, be ready for war, for preparedness for war is the best security for peace. The defeat of France is attributable to a number of causes, among which is foremost the lack of seriousness which pervaded the whole official and pohtical life of the country, T 2 276 GEEAT AND GEBATEE BEITAIN and indeed the entire upper classes. We find the same levity in the Emperor, the Prime Minister, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Minister of War, and in most of the generals, who behaved more like ignorant, reckless gamblers than like conscientious and capable statesmen and com- manders. The leading military and civil officials were ap- parently not even capable of overlooking the vast machinery which they were called upon to direct. They were hardly able to master the routine work and still less to administer control and reform the service. Society influences had a decisive influence on the most important appointments, which were considered sinecures, and which were demanded as a right by men who politically and socially had, perhaps, some claim to recognition, but who had not the slightest claim to offices which they were in no way fitted to occupy. As soon as a man had succeeded in obtaining an office which he coveted, he considered himself ' un homme arrive,' applied the minimum of exertion to his work, and confined himself to doing exactly as his predecessors had done. To increase the ease of office, responsibihties were shirked or formally abolished. The arts of evasion, misrepresentation, and deceit were used to meet justified criticism and to avoid inaugurating necessary, but troublesome, reforms ; and no powerful directing influence was felt anywhere in the departments of State. The departments, more and more left to themselves, at last freed themselves from all control, and the chiefs of the departments became mere figureheads. Lawlessness was universal. Officials in high places, who admittedly had proved their incompetence, were not called to account if they had powerful protectors. Capacity, the sense of justice, of true patriotism and of duty had disappeared from high office, and had given place to incom- petence, fawning, idling, shirking, and trifling, covered over with a mantle of systematic deception. The administration of the country had become an elaborate and expensive sham and a fraud upon the taxpayer. No effective supervision THE LESSON OP PRANCE'S DOWNPALL 277 was exercised over the various departments by the Emperor, the Prime Minister, or by public opiaion. Ministers, marshals and ambassadors even abused their positions, and their knowledge of State secrets, for financial gain at the Stock Exchange. Matters of State of the greatest impor- tance were treated in camera with the greatest levity, scandals were hushed up, and inquiries were stifled. The public services of Great Britain are better and far more honestly administered than were those under the Second Empire. Nevertheless, the system which places at the head of a great pubhc department a man who is absolutely ignorant of the working of that department and often quite unfit for the duties which he is supposed to fulfil, a man who owes his administrative position not to administrative ability but to rhetorical skill or to fortuitous circumstances, to social or pohtical influence, position or personal connexions, is dangerous to the State, unless reliable safeguards exist which ensure the competent administration of the departments notwithstanding the frequent incompetence of their amateur chiefs, and which make it dangerous to delude the nation with deceptive statements. Such safeguards can be found and must be found, for it cannot be doubted that incapacity or indolence in a minister whose actions are not supervised, whose responsibility is purely nominal, and who is able to deceive the nation by muzzling the experts and by making misleading statements in the House of Commons, may even be more harmful to the State than gross dishonesty and corruption. Napoleon I used to say that even the most difficult problems can easily be solved if one goes down to, and tackles, the main cause. Many excellent suggestions have been put forward for the reform of our army, but the chief cause of its unsatisfactory condition has so far not been pointed out with sufficient emphasis. The Secretary of State for War with his civihan staff and the military commanders have to co-operate, although 278 GBEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN they are about the most ill-adapted sets of persons which can be chosen for co-operation. This strange and unnatural partnership is probably the main cause of the defects of our army, for it renders it impossible both for the administration and for the executive to fulfil their allotted tasks, and has created a dualism throughout the army, and a friction which is fatal to co-operation, efficiency, and economy. The military commanders, the great military experts, reign but do not govern ; the Secretary of State for War, who is an amateur, governs but does not reign. Hence arises constant friction, dissatisfaction, misunderstandings, explanations, delays, reproaches, and stagnation. After much interference, correspondence, and squabbling, a truce is often established by the exhaustion and collapse of all parties. Departments remain without control, and become dilatory and obstructive, and in the stress of the daily routine the most important questions of military policy, reorganisation and methodical preparation for all the contingencies of war, are apt to remain unattended to or are forgotten. A system which subordinates the whole military organisa- tion to a civihan who is unacquainted with war, a system which enables the civilian to overrule the competent soldier, to encroach upon his department, to do things which the soldier thinks bad for the army, and to leave things undone which the soldier declares to be absolutely necessary, is illogical and vicious. It is doubly vicious when the com- plaints and the wishes of the soldier are only heard in camera by a party pohtician, when his representations and state- ments are suppressed, coloured, or distorted in ParUament and in the Press, when inquiries are held in private, when the soldier is muzzled and cannot defend himself, and is blamed for the mistakes made by his poUtical chief, and is Hable to be made responsible even for the blunders of his poHtical chief which he tried in vain to oppose. CHAPTEE XII BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE In the year 1511 — ^when the Spaniards and Portuguese were discovering and conquering the New World, and were build- ing up vast colonial empires in both Indias, in North and South America, and in all parts of Africa ; when the names and the deeds of Columbus, Cortez, Pizarro, Prince John of Portugal, Balboa, Magellan, Amerigo Vespucci, Vasco da Gama, Diego Velasquez, Bartolomeo Diaz, Albuquerque, and of Giovanni Cabotto, the Genoese, who is better known under the name of John Cabot, of Bristol, were on every- body's lips ; and when the division of the New World between the Spaniards and the Portuguese by the celebrated bull of Alexander VI was still discussed by all European diplomats — Henry VIII joined the Holy League against Prance, and prepared for war against that country. According to Lord Herbert of Cherbury, his advisers then urged the King : ' Let us, in God's name ' [they said] ' leave off our attempts against the terra firma, as the natural situ- ation of these islands seems not to suit with conquest of that kind. . . . The Indias are discovered, and vast treasure wrought thence every day. Let us, therefore, bend our endeavours thitherwards ; and if the Spaniards and Portu- guese suffer us not to join with them, there will yet be region enough for all to enjoy.' The councillors who, four hundred years ago, told Henry VIII that England's greatest interest lay outside of Europe 279 280 GREAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN have proved seers and prophets, and from 1511 to the present day British statesmen and countless leaders of public opinion in this country have held that Great Britain has no poHtical interest on the continent of Europe. Conse- quently, a large section of the public in this country has always condemned, and condemns still now, all interference on our part in the politics of the Continent. Even when, a century ago. Great Britain fought against Napoleon I for her national existence, there was a very powerful party in this country which strenuously opposed that war, con- demning it as wanton interference. Unfortunately, we are not in the happy position in which are the United States. Although our most valuable posses- sions he far away from the continent of Europe, the ' silver streak ' is so narrow that it gives us only some protection, but not complete security, against the attacks of continental nations and against possible invasion. Our possessions in far-away India and elsewhere may easiest be attacked in the Enghsh Channel, and our geographical position requires us to keep constantly an eye on those nations which, with unsleeping vigilance, are watching us across the narrow waters, biding their opportunities. Whether the balance of power in Europe, which has been maintained, at the cost of countless wars, for many centuries, is a blessing to the continental nations, may well be doubted. They would probably be happier if some strong nation either ruled the whole of the Continent, or if it possessed at least an absolute and unchallangeable supremacy among conti- nental States. If the Continent had but one master, the nations of Europe might be able to disarm, and only rare civil wars could be expected to occur on the so often battle- stricken mainland of Europe. The rise of an absolutely supreme Power on the Continent, which, considered in the abstract, may appear highly desirable from the continental point of view, would be the reverse of desirable for this country. A nation which had THE BALANCE OP POWER IN EUROPE 281 the mastery of the Continent could hardly allow a strong Great Britain to maintain an independent existence. Owing to our strong strategical position on the flank of Europe, the lord of the Continent would consider this country a permanent menace to his continental supremacy. He would exclaim with Napoleon I : ' Let us destroy England and then Europe wiU be at my feet.' Therefore it cannot be doubted that a Power which had acquired the supremacy on the Continent would eventually attack this coimtry in order to consoHdate and to secure its possessions, even if it should not covet our Colonies. Hence it is clear that a Power which aspires to become supreme on the Continent indirectly threatens the national existence of Great Britain, although it need have no hankering after our wealth, our trade, and our Colonies and possessions. Our position in Europe is secure, and will remain secure, only as long as the various Powers or groups of Powers in Europe are so nearly equal in strength that no Power or group of Powers is able to obtain that supremacy which, earlier or later, would cause it to attack Great Britain. For these reasons it has, since time immemorial, been the object of British diplomacy to maintain what is known as ' The Balance of Power in Europe.' When practically the whole Continent was ruled by one Power, Great Britain lost her Hberty. Rome's supremacy on the mainland of Europe inevitably led to the invasion of this country on Caesar's plea that the Britons had assisted the Gauls against Rome, and to centuries of national servitude. The lesson of the Roman conquest and occupation has never been forgotten. Therefore, when Spain, France, and Russia in turn tried to obtain the supremacy in Europe by land, and when HoUand tried to obtain the supremacy in Europe on the sea, each of these nations came into colhsion with this country, and each was prevented by Great Britain from attaining that supremacy which would, undoubtedly, have endangered our national existence. 282 GREAT AND GRBATEE BRITAIN The preservation of the balance of power, or rather of the balance of Powers, in Europe is, and will continue to be, the first condition of our national independence and safety. Therefore the preservation of the balance of power in Europe is, and wUl always remain, the vital interest of this country. Great Britain has fought all her great wars for the preserva- tion of the balance of power on the Continent, and she may soon again have to fight, at least diplomatically, in defence of her traditional policy. Divide et impera was the maxim of Imperial Rome. Divide ut facem habeas would be Rome's advice to Great Britain. However, although we are interested in the preser- vation of the balance of power, we need not, and we should not, go so far as to sow dissensions among the States of Europe, for the balance of power is not by any means an artificial creation, as has so often been asserted by would-be conquerors. Through the differences in language, religion, race, character, and aims, the co-existence of a number of inde- pendent, approximately equally strong, and mutually divided and opposed nations, is the natural condition of Continental Europe. This natural condition of division, of conflicting interests and ambitions and of permanent tension between the nations of Europe is the best guarantee of our safety. The duty of self-preservation, which is the first law of Nature, not jealousy, absolutely compels us to preserve and to per- petuate these natural divisions and dissensions in Europe, and thus to maintain the balance of power. Hence, the often-heard accusation that perfidious Albion has always endeavoured to make mischief between the European Powers and to set them against one another in order to benefit from their quarrels, is an audacious and malicious invention and a dehberate perversion of historic truth, for which those are responsible whose ambitious plans of universal dominion have been foiled by this country. Prom the foregoing it is clear that the preservation of THE BALANCE OP POWER IN EUROPE 283 the balance of power in Europe is most important to this country. It is certainly more important to Great Britain than is the Monroe Doctrine to the United States. Of late years we have heard surprisingly Httle of the balance of power in Europe ; but the fact that many British politicians and pubhcists have, for some considerable time, been anxiously discussing the possibiUty of an invasion of this country, and that some of our leading statesmen and military experts are seriously considering the necessity of introducing imiversal compulsory military service in some form or other in these islands, is sufficient to show that the position of Great Britain towards the military Powers of Europe is not satisfactory, and that that balance of power on the Continent, which hitherto has been considered indis- pensable for our national security, fails to give us the wanted protection ; that, in fact, the balance of power has been disturbed. Prevention is better than cure both in medicine and in politics. If we wait till an ambitious Power, or group of Powers, has actually become paramount on the Continent, a great, dangerous, and costly war between Great Britain and that Power will, sooner or later, become inevitable. In a war between ourselves, who wish merely to preserve our property and our liberty, and an ambitious continental Power, which strives to acquire our property and to destroy our liberty, we should be at a great disadvantage, because the risks run would be totally different and out of all pro- portion. The continental aggressor would merely risk defeat, whilst we should risk national annihilation ; our continental opponent would hope to make enormous territorial acquisi- tions at our cost, a price which would make the risk run seem insignificant ; whilst we, if we should be victorious, could not hope to indemnify ourselves either by seizing territory on the Continent or by exacting an adequate monetary com- pensation. Our struggle for liberty against Napoleon I cost this country more than a thousand million pounds. 284 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN A repetition of that struggle would cost several thousand million pounds. Evidently, everything that can be done should be done in order to prevent the occurrence of such a war. History teaches us how to avert this danger. In the year 1739, a few months before he came to the throne, Frederick the Great wrote a most interesting book, the ' Anti-Machiavel,' in which he summed up his views on statecraft, and in which he also gave a programme of his pohcy. In the last chapter of that remarkable treatise the following passage occurs, which is in so far most noteworthy as it contains not only the crowning thought of the book, but also that principle of political conduct by which Prussia has constantly been guided since 1740, when she was a third-rate Power with barely three million inhabitants, down to the present day, when she is at the head of the strongest nation in Europe. Frederick the Great was as prominent as a diplomat as he was as a soldier. Hence his advice, which contains the essence of Prusso- German diplomacy, is well worth heeding. He says : ' When the excessive aggrandisement of one Power threatens to break all bounds and to overwhelm all others, it is wise to oppose barriers to its encroachments as long as there is time to stay its progress and as long as it is manageable. When clouds are seen to gather, and lightning announces the approaching storm, the sovereign who is unable to contend against it alone will, if he is wise, unite himself with all those who are menaced by the same common danger, for their interests are identical. If Egypt, Syria, and Macedonia had combined against the Roman power, they would not have been overthrown. A wisely-framed alliance and an energetic war would have preserved the ancient world from the chains of a universal despotism.' The counsel of Frederick the Great, which is the counsel of common sense, ought constantly to be kept in mind by British statesmen. It should be the unalterable policy of this country never to support the strongest and most ambitious Power on the Continent, but always to take sides THE BALANCE OP POWEB IN EUBOPE 285 with the natural opponents of that Power. If we aUy our- selves with the strongest and most ambitious Power, our position may appear for the moment absolutely secure ; but we foolishly assist at the same time in making that Power overwhelmingly strong, to our danger. On the other hand, if we ally ourselves with the opponents of the strongest Power, we take its preponderance away from it, and check it in its otherwise irresistible progress. Our safety lies with the weaker Powers of Europe, and if the maxim ' Always support the weaker Power or Powers of Europe against the stronger ' should constantly be adhered to, those ambitious and powerful States which strive to obtain the mastery of the Continent will find their pro- gress automatically arrested. They wiU not be able to grow all-powerful, and many great wars which otherwise might devastate the continent of Europe will remain unfought, to the advantage of the Continent and of ourselves. Thus the restraint exercised by the balance of power would prove a blessing to humanity. On the other hand, if we assist the strongest Power to become supreme, fancying that to be allied with the strongest Power in Europe means safety, and putting our trust either in paper promises, or in the uncertain tie of dynastic or racial relationship, we help to strengthen the wolf which some day wiU devour us. Before the outbreak of the Eusso-Japanese War, the balance of power in Europe was absolutely perfect. The Triple Alliance, the countries of which approximately cover the enormous Empire of Charlemagne after the separation of Gaul, and the Dual Alliance by which it is flanked, were considered to possess mihtarily almost equal weight and value. The number of soldiers of Prance and Russia combined was about equal to the armed forces of Germany, Austria- Hungary, and Italy. Owing to the greater concentration of forces, and to various other favourable circumstances which it would lead too far to enumerate, the Triple 286 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN Alliance was probably the stronger of the two combinations. Still, the difference was considered to be so small that a war between the two groups of nations offered quite incalculable risks to either. On the sea, likewise, France and Eussia on the one hand, and the Powers of the Triple Alhance on the other hand, possessed almost equal strength. In fact, the two national combinations balanced one another to a nicety, and this exact balancing, one might almost say this equipoise of Powers, acted as a deterrent to all the allied Powers, and was, therefore, the strongest guarantee of peace in Europe, and at the same time the best safeguard of our national security. Hence peace reigned in Europe for an unusually long period, and Great Britain found herself in the enviable position that she could act as the balance-holder, being able, if she was so minded, to direct and to control the pohcy of Europe by throwing, or by threatening to throw, her weight and iafluence sometimes into the one and sometimes into the other scale. If Great Britain did not sufficiently utilise this most favoured position for her own ends as she ought to have done, it was due to lack of grasp or lack of enter- prise on the part of her statesmen. Owing to this exact balancing of Powers, the various attempts which were made to raise a coaUtion against this country at the time of the Fashoda crisis, the Jameson Eaid and the South African War, were bound to prove abortive. Not the peaceful or friendly disposition of one or the other monarch or statesman, nor the skill of British diplomacy, but the balance of military and naval power in Europe, preserved Great Britain thrice within a decade from the calamity of a great war. The exact balancing of military and naval power, which ensured peace in Europe for such a long time, was impatiently borne by those nations whose impulse of expansion is stronger than their instinct of preservation. Hence, unceas- ing attempts were made by various diplomats to give to their combination a distinct preponderance over the rival group of Powers in order to obtain a free hand for action. To THE BALANCE OE POWEB IN EUEOPE 287 attain this end, attempts to induce Great Britain or the United States to take sides -with one of the allied groups were constantly made by diplomats and monarchs, and diplomatic manoeuvres which aimed at weakening the opposing combination either by sowing distrust between its members or by involving one of its members in war were constantly noticeable. That the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 was caused by Bismarck has been proved by German writers and historians, and it is not astonishing that it has been asserted that the Russo-Japanese War also was caused, or at least brought about, by the action of a third and so-caUed 'friendly' Power. German publicists have accused Great Britain of having brought on the war with British gold, and British pubUcists have retaliated by accusing Germany of having incited Russia to attack Japan. As yet, nothing positive is known on this most interesting subject, and history will perhaps never lift the veil which covers the causa causans of the Russo-Japanese War ; but so much is sure, that British diplomacy would have acted with perfectly incredible stupidity if it should have incited Russia or Japan to enter upon a war which was certain either to greatly strengthen Russia, to the danger of our Indian possessions, or to greatly weaken Russia, whereby the balance of power in Europe would be destroyed, to the danger of Great Britain. Under these circumstances it seems quite im- possible to beheve that British diplomacy tried to bring about a war which it was bound to discountenance in its own interest, and which it was bound to oppose with every means in its power. The course of the Russo-Japanese War has profoundly affected the balance of power in Europe, and the peace of Europe and of this country may consequently be endangered in the near future. Although Russia has fought bravely, the signs of her exhaustion are unmistakable. The pres- tige and confidence of her hitherto unvanquished army 288 GEEAT AND GEEATER BEITAIN have been destroyed, her fleet has been shattered, her financial position is seriously compromised, her people are impoverished and dissatisfied, and have become less manage- able. For many years to come Eussia may be reduced to playing a passive part in European politics and that country may be unable to conduct a war outside her own frontiers. For many years to come Eussia may, therefore, be con- sidered as a quantite negligeable by her neighbours in the West. For many years to come the Triple Alliance may rule the Continent. Possibly, Eussia may disappear from the concert of Europe for a much longer time than ten years. The fer- ment, the dissatisfaction, and the revolutionary movement among the masses in Eussia, which is unprecedented in that country, may profoundly, and possibly permanently, alter Eussia's character as a nation. Since the time of Peter the Great, Eussia has essentially been a conquering and aggres- sive military Power. Her failure against Japan, and the impoverishment, dissatisfaction, and latent rebelliousness of her population so greatly endanger the very foundations of the State and the very existence of the autocracy that Eussia may resolve to confine her attention exclusively to domestic affairs. She is so immensely strong for defence that she requires no large army, especially as no nation covets Eussian territory. Consequently Eussia may, and possibly will, at some time or other, reduce her army very consider- ably, cut down her navy, and break off her engagements with foreign Powers which may oblige her to engage in wars which she will avoid at all costs. She may, therefore, resolutely shut herself up in her frontiers, stay at home, and devote all her energies to her internal development, disregarding all events outside her own frontiers. Through Eussia's misfortunes, the balance of power in Europe has at least temporarily, but possibly permanently, been destroyed. For all practical poUtical purposes Eussia counts now very little. The Dual Alliance is a source of THE BALANCE OP POWER IN EUEOPE 289 anxiety, but not of strength, to France, for Russia would not be able to fulfil her treaty obligations to her ally, even if she wished to do so. Besides, ultra fosse nemo ohligatur is a guiding principle of every Government. No nation can be expected to commit political suicide for the sake of its ally. France will, therefore, stand for a time, but may soon stand permanently, isolated on the continent of Europe, and one cannot help remembering Bismarck's prophecy that the next great European war may mean the wiping out of Prance from the map of Europe. Owing to the temporary disappearance of Russia from the political stage, the Triple Alliance is absolutely supreme on the Continent. It was a defensive alliance against the attacks of Prance and Russia combined, but it has, through the collapse of the Colossus of the North, lost its raison d'etre. The nations of the Triple AUiance may therefore, singly or combined, embark upon a more active and more adventurous foreign policy, if they feel incHned to do so. This has already been shown in the Austro-German action regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina and other actions may follow. The restraining influence of the sense of common danger and of mutual responsibility has Ukewise disappeared. No longer will warnings be addressed by one Power of the Triple AUiance to one of its partners not to compromise its ally by some dangerous enterprise. Hence, Germany, Austria- Hungary, and Italy find themselves in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility. Through the breakdown of the balance of power, the States of the Triple Alliance have obtained a greater Uberty of action in Europe than they have enjoyed for a very long time, and they may be expected to use the fleeting opportun- ities of the present to their best advantage. Consequently, it seems likely that the prolonged period of European peace through which we have been passing has come to an end, and that we may stand at the opening of a period of poHtical unrest which may convulse Europe, 290 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN The collapse of Eussia, which has made the Triple Alliance all-powerful and which has set its forces free, is a matter of more serious concern to Prance than it is to this country, which is, to some extent, protected by its insular position. Consequently, Prance may have to bear the brunt in the pohtical developments which may possibly soon take place. Her position is not a comfortable one, for Prance can, without an ally, hardly be expected to hold her own against Germany. In fact. Prance is becoming weaker from day to day, if compared with Germany, because her population remains stationary, whilst that of Germany is rapidly increasing. How seriously Prance has been losing ground, and what her position in the future wiU be, may be seen when we compare the growth of the population in Prance and in Germany since the Pranco-German War. The following table shows the relative positions of Prance and Germany at a glance : — Population of France Population of Germany Excess of German Population 1872 36,103,000 41,230,000 + 5,127,000 1876 36,906,000 43,059,000 + 6,153,000 1881 37,672,000 45,428,000 + 7,756,000 18S6 38,219,000 47,134,000 + 8,915,000 1891 . 38,343,000 49,762,000 + 11,419,000 1896 38,618,000 52,753,000 + 14,235,000 1901 38,962,000 66,862,000 + 17,900,000 1906 39,252,245 60,641,278 + 21,389,033 1910 (estimated) 39,650,000 (estimated) 64,200,000 + 24,860,000 Prom the foregoing figures it appears that the population of France was almost equal to that of Germany after the Pranco-German War. At present the population of Germany is considerably more than fifty per cent, greater than is that of Prance, and in twenty years it should be twice as large as that of Prance. In Germany more than 2,000,000 children, but in Prance less than 800,000 children, are bom every year. Moltke spoke truly when he said : ' The Prench lose every day a battle,' for every day 3,300 fewer children are bom in Prance than are born in Germany. If we further THE BALANCE OP POWEE IN EUROPE 291 remember that the proportion of men able to bear arms in Germany is probably greater than in France, that the Germans are supposed to make better soldiers than the French, and that Germany has, through her powerful wealth and arms-creating industries, an enormous advantage over chiefly rural France, it is clear that the present position of France is very precarious, and that it becomes more precarious from year to year. The sense of her growing weakness has completely altered the character of the French nation. Her rulers and the people think less of glory than they used to. France is no longer a military nation. She no longer aspires to rule the / Continent. She has become a peaceful and conservative nation which wiU do everything she can do to avoid war. Thoughtful Frenchmen cannot help considering the downfall of Russia and the consequent isolation of France with grave concern, and they cannot help feehng that France must have a strong and reUable ally in Europe. Without a strong and reliable ally, France would be con- demned to a purely passive policy. Enormous changes of the map of Europe may soon take place, which would still further compromise the position of France, and which, eventually, would threaten the independence of this country. France might with open eyes watch the development of events which would reduce her to a second-class Power, and yet she would be unable to hft her hand. She would be condemned to remain a spectator when standing alone. In future she might have no more influence upon European politics than has Belgium or Holland. France might be imable to do more than defend her own frontiers against attack. Under these circumstances, it is natural that France has turned towards this country, and that her people instinctively feel that their safety lies in a close understand- ing with Great Britain. The entente cordiale comes, as far as the French nation is concerned, from the heart. u 2 292 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN For preserving the status quo in Europe and for preserv- ing peace, an Anglo-French understanding is good, but an Anglo-French alliance would be better. If British statesmen are of opinion that a strong France is necessary in Europe, that France is the natural defender of the independence of Belgium and Holland, that France is a continental bulwark and a tete-de-pont to this country, it clearly follows that Great Britain cannot, under any circumstances, allow France to be, either directly or indirectly, further weakened. If it is the view of the British statesmen that a strong France is indispensable for preserving the status quo in Europe, it would seem advisable and, indeed, necessary that an Anglo- French alhance should be substituted for a vague Anglo- French understanding, which does not give a sufficient guarantee of mutual assistance and of national security either to Great Britain or to France. An open alhance between Great Britain and France, such as the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Triple Alliance, has a great advantage over a vague understanding or a secret alliance. A public alliance is a serious and solid fact, which is taken seriously by all whom it may concern. It cannot be explained away by either contracting party, and it is an unmistakable warning to all would-be trespassers not to trespass. On the other hand, a vague understanding leaves much room for involuntary or deliberate misunder- standings. A vague understanding, backed with most excellent intentions on the part of our present statesmen, will allow weak statesmen who may guide British policy later on, and will even allow the same statesmen who at one time possessed such excellent intentions, to explain away their obhgations at a critical moment. Therefore the uncertainty of the binding force of an understanding or a verbal agreement will enable third parties to speculate upon the weakness or foolishness of one of the contracting parties, and will leave room for ceaseless and most dangerous intrigues. For these reasons the Anglo-French understanding. THE BALANCE OF POWEB IN EUKOPE 293 although it may have been reinforced by excellent verbal undertakings, seems hardly a sufficient guarantee of the European status quo. A formal written treaty between Great Britain and France, which is confirmed by the Parha- ments of the two countries, seems absolutely necessary for the safety of the two countries. Recent history supplies a warning against vague under- standings and furnishes an example which should be borne in mind by British and French statesmen. In 1859 Napoleon III had fought for Italy, and had procured for that country its liberty and independence. In 1864 Denmark was crushed by Prussia, and in 1866 Austria-Hungary was humbled and defeated by the same country. Italy owed, therefore, a heavy debt of gratitude to France, whilst the feelings of Austria-Hungary and of Denmark against Prussia were naturally those of hatred and revenge. Napoleon III, who was, of course, well aware of the sentiments which animated Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark with regard to France and to Germany, thought these three countries so firmly tied to him by their senti- ments, and he felt so certain of their support against Germany, that he thought that no written treaty with these countries was necessary. In the mind of Napoleon III Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark figured as his faithful retainers in war against Germany, who were ready to put on their armour as soon as called upon. In 1870, only four years after the Austro-Prussian War, war broke out between Prance and Germany. Napoleon III, who previously might easily have concluded an alUance with those Powers which were hostile to Germany, and who had offers of alliance absolutely thrust upon him by those Powers, fancied that he had an understanding with Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark, but he was deserted by these Powers at the critical moment. Although the sympathies of Austria- Hungary, Italy, and Denmark were undoubtedly with France, these Powers did not even try to save France from the 294 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BBITAIN greatest disaster in her history. The understanding which Napoleon III imagined he possessed with these Powers proved, owing to Bismarck's action, a delusion and a snare. Before the Franco-German War broke out, Bismarck had taken the precaution to find out whether a secret alliance existed between France and those countries which might be expected to stand on the side of France, and it cannot be doubted that he decided on war only when he felt assured that France possessed no formal alliance with Austria- Hungary, Italy, and Denmark, her natural allies. Many of Napoleon's advisers, who foresaw the Franco- German War, had, since 1866, urged the Emperor to conclude a quadruple alliance against Germany, with Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Denmark, and preparatory steps for concluding such an' alliance were actually taken by the Emperor. However, Napoleon III was a dreamer. He could not make up his mind to sign a formal treaty. He was vaguely afraid of sharply-defined engagements, seeing in a formal alliance the source of uncertain entangle- ments. Therefore he refused the formal alliances which were offered to him, and when, in the hour of trial, he anxiously sought for help in every quarter, relying merely on sympathy for support, he received sympathy everywhere, but nowhere assistance. The lack of support on the part of those nations which Napoleon rightly considered to be the natural allies of France, which were the natural alhes of France, and which were anxious to conclude an alUance with France and to help her against Germany, led to France's downfall. If a defensive alliance had existed between France and some of Germany's natural opponents, the Franco-German War of 1870-71 would probably never have been fought. Various objections may be raised against formal alliances in general, and against a formal alliance between Great Britain and France in particular, and it is worth while to consider the principal objections which may be brought forward. THE BALANCE OF POWEB IN EUBOPE 295 Those politicians and political writers who are better acquainted with Parliamentary politics than with foreign pohcy, and who judge of every measure by the standard of its popularity, are apt to think with a vague dread of ' entangle- ments ' as soon as they hear the word ' alliance.' Alhances and entanglements are synonyms to them, and the risk of signing an alliance is to their minds similar to the risks of taking a lottery ticket. To these people an alKance seems a vague and dangerous speculation with unlimited risks, but not a sober and well-defined business proposition. Happily, the demand of those who see in an alliance the fruitful source of uncertain and dangerous entanglements, and who judge of poMtical measures by their popularity, can easily be satisfied, for the political instinct of nations is so fine that a good alliance is always popular, whilst a bad alli- ance is always unpopular. The Venezuela affair and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are cases in point, and it cannot be doubted that an Anglo-French AlUance would be as popular as is the Anglo- Japanese Alliance. An unpopular alliance is nowadays unthinkable in any country, least of all in a democracy, and an alliance which may be able to engulf a nation in unforeseen pitfalls and dangers is equally unthinkable. The following definition of the Triple Alhance, which Prince Bismarck gave on February 6, 1888, before the German Parliament, is worth recalUng, inasmuch as it gives the characteristics, the aim, and the scope of a good alliance, and as it defines the nature of the engagements entered into in the fewest words. He said : — ' We are bound to our ally Austria-Hungary not only in the love of peace and by the bond of sentiment and of friendship, but also by the most urgent interests, for preserving the balance of power in Europe and for safeguarding our own future. ' I think it was absolutely necessary to have concluded that alliance. If we had not yet done so we should have to conclude it to-day. 296 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN ' Our alliance possesses the most distinguished feature of an international treaty, which is that it is the expression of the common and permanent interests both of Austria- Hungary and of Germany. ' No great Power can, for any length of time, be tied by the wording of a treaty which is opposed to the interests of the people, and if it has done so it will eventually be compelled openly to declare, " The times have altered. I cannot do it," and it must justify its action before the people and before its ally as best it can. But to ruin its own people by fulfilling one's treaty duties to the letter, that is an action which no great Power can assent to. However, this is by no means demanded in any treaty. . . . ' Treaties are only the expression of a community of aims and of risks run by the treaty-concluding Powers.' Evidently concluding a treaty cannot well be compared with taking a lottery ticket, as is so often done in this country. A good treaty cannot possibly lead to unforeseen entangle- ments, nor can an ally trap and trick his partner under the text of a treaty, as is so often believed. Those who do not wish for an Anglo-French alhance, and who would like to see Great Britain and France keeping apart, have frequently declared that France can never be England's ally, that France will never forget that England deprived her of her colonies, and they will remind her of Canada, of Egypt, and of Fashoda. No doubt this country has done much harm to France by conquering her colonies through the accident of war, but France has done even more injury to this country in our own colonies. We have conquered colonies which at the time were of Uttle value to France, but France has deprived us of our most valuable possessions. Had it not been for the action of France, the United States would never have made themselves inde- pendent, and, by a strange coincidence, the first shot against the French in North America was in May 1754 fired by the same George Washington who. twenty-two years later, THE BALANCE OP POWER IN EUROPE 297 signed the Declaration of Independence. Although Prance has suffered much at our hands, we have suffered more at hers. We have deprived her of colonies, but she has deprived us of an empire. Surely the two nations can afford to cry quits. Pifty years ago Prance and Great Britain fought side by side in the Crimea, and forty-five years ago the troops of both countries fought together in China. But since then the two countries have often quarrelled with one another. Misunderstandings and mutual jealousies over trifles were responsible for part of our recent differences with Prance, but the strongest cause of friction between the two countries lay probably in Bismarck's action. It was Bismarck's deliberate pohcy to sow dissensions between Prance and her possible allies, a policy which was clearly expressed in his dispatch of December 20, 1872, to Count Harry von Arnim, who, at the time, was Ambassador in Paris. In that dis- patch the German Chancellor wrote : ' We want Prance to leave us in peace, and we have to prevent Prance finding an ally if she does not want to keep peace. As long as France has no alhes,. she is not dangerous to Germany.' Bismarck's special aim was to keep Great Britain and Prance asunder by encouraging Prance to extend her colonial empire in those parts where she was likely to come into collision with this country, and he succeeded admirably in accomplishing his purpose. To Busch, Bismarck said quite openly : ' It is in our interest that the Prench quarrel with the English, and when they have trouble in Tunis they forget the Rhine.' It seems idle to speculate about what has happened in the past between Great Britain and Prance. Such investi- gations belong more to the province of the historian than to that of the statesman, who has to consider the problems of the present and of the future. Besides, alliances, Hke other business agreements, are arranged on grounds of practical utility, not on grounds of historical differences or 298 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN of personal predilections. Hence, mutual recrimination about the past is vain and foolish if two States wish to transact business. For these reasons the attempt of those who, for reasons of their own, wish to weaken Great Britain and Prance, or at least to keep them asunder, by appealing to their history or to their prejudices, should prove unavaiUng. Thanks to the far-seeing action of King Edward VII, who has opened a new era in British foreign policy, the relations between France and Great Britain greatly improved immediately on his accession, and they have now become most cordial. The time when Douglas Jerrold could coin the then much-applauded witticism, ' The best thing which I know between France and England is the sea,' is past. Both nations have happily lost many of their ancient pre- judices, and have learned to esteem one another. The ancient argument that French and British are totally incompatible, mutually antipathetic, and that they can never agree is no longer true. Another objection against an Anglo-French alliance will probably be raised by those people who for a long time have been advocating an Anglo-Eussian alliance. That Russia seemed a desirable ally to those British statesmen who considered her invincible, such as Sir Charles Dilke, is natural, but the present moment seems hardly appropriate for advocating the Anglo-Eussian alliance. An Anglo- Eussian alliance appears to be out of the question for many reasons which it would lead too far to discuss in this place, but it might be mentioned that alliances cannot be picked up like blackberries, and it is difficult to discover the common interest which an Anglo-Eussian alliance could defend. Above all, there seems no wish in Eussia to conclude such an alliance. Therefore the advocates of an Anglo-Eussian alUance are preaching to deaf ears. Great Britain need have no alliance, but she may weU continue her good understanding, with Eussia, by frankly supporting her in her European policy where she comes THE BALANCE OP POWER IN EUROPE 299 into collision with the Powers of Central Europe, and by delimiting the British and the Russian spheres of interest in Asia. For decades our policy towards Russia, both in Europe and in Asia, has been fitful, capricious, inconsequent, incalculable, and incomprehensible. Therefore it cannot be wondered at that Russia has hitherto looked upon this country with distrust as well as with dislike. Great Britain is a World-Power, and the safety of our scattered Colonies and possessions requires that the balance of power be preserved not only in Europe, but all the world over. Our interests in Asia are sufficiently safeguarded by the Anglo- Japanese AlUance. In Austraha and in Africa we have little to fear, but in North America the British Empire is exceedingly vulnerable. The relations between the United States and Great Britain are, happUy, of the very best, and it is sincerely to be hoped that Anglo-Ameri- can relations will remain unclouded. Nevertheless, Great Britain cannot afford to consider the United States as a potential ally and treat that country as a quantiU nigligeable in her political calculations. Germany and the United States are rapidly building enormous navies, which are, at present, intended to be secondary only to the navy of Great Britain. In a very short time the fleets of the United States, Germany, and Prance will be equally strong, and British diplomacy must reckon with the possibiUty that some naval alliance may be formed against this country with the object of wresting from it the rule of the seas and despoiling it of its Colonies. There are many historical precedents ior such a united attack. Venice, the England of the sixteenth century, was attacked in 1509 by Prance, SpaiQ, Germany, and the Pope. The Netherlands,, the England of the seventeenth century, were unprovokedly attacked in 1672 by England, Prance, and some minor German potentates. In both attacks the motive was envy, the object plunder, and Great Britain may be exposed to concerted attack on similar grounds. 300 GEEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN Whether the financial resources of Great Britain alone will suffice to guarantee our continued superiority against any possible combination of naval Powers must be doubted, and we must constantly be on guard against the conclusion of a naval alliance which could be directed only against Great Britain, and have the spolia- tion of our Colonies for an object. Happily our relations with France and the United States are the best. Never- theless, the two-Power standard carmot be abandoned, for no understanding and no alhance can be expected to last for ever. The fact that Germany has, for some time, assiduously made advances to France and the United States, the strong- est naval Powers after Great Britain, should give food for thought. In this connexion it might be mentioned that Dr. Guttmann, a prominent German journalist, pubhshed in 1905, immediately after having had an interview with Prince Biilow, an article in Das Freie Wort, in which he recommended a Franco-German alliance as the best security for preserving peace. As Germany is not threatened by any powerful and aggressive neighbour, such an aUiance could hardly bear a defensive character, and one is inclined to inquire what the aims of such an alliance could possibly be, and why the desire for such an alliance should be found, in Germany. At present the likelihood of a Franco-German alliance appears somewhat remote, but as this country could not look with equanimity upon such an alliance, the development of Franco- German relations should be closely watched. Since the time when Dr. Guttmaim recommended the conclusion of a Franco - German aUiance, the Morocco incident has occurred. Germany has deHberately and determinedly crossed the path of France in Morocco, and is opposing France's legitimate ambitions in that country with considerable vigour. Therefore people have been wondering what was Germany's aim. Some writers have THE BALANCE OE POWEB IN EUROPE 301 conjectured that Germany wished to test the solidity of the Anglo-Erench understanding, whilst others have drawn ominous comparisons between the Morocco incident and the well-known episode of the HohenzoUem candidature to the throne of Spain which brought about the Franco- German War of 1870-71. However, both explanations seem erroneous and far-fetched. It appears unlikely that German diplomacy wished to test the true inwardness of the Anglo-French relations by challenging France somewhat brusquely over Morocco, a proceeding which might be hkened to that of testing the tone of a piano with a sledge hammer. It seems still more unhkely that the German Government was frivolous enough to think of making the Morocco question the pretext of a European war. Therefore it can only be assumed that Germany wished to impress upon France in the most unmis- takable manner the value of Germany's good wiU, the danger of Germany's opposition, and the great advantage for France of a close understanding with Germany, with the object of detaching France from Great Britain and attaching her to Germany as an ally. This assumption was strengthened by the attitude of the German semi-official Press, which, with surprising unanimity, chided France, ' more in sorrow than in anger,' whilst, according to the Times of April 5, 1905, a friend and confidant of Count von Biilow declared to a French joumaUst : ' Here we have considerable doubt as to the sincerity of England, who takes your part against us. I am afraid that, according to a popular French ex- pression, you wiU sit between two stools if you put too much confidence in England. The British sailors will fraternise with yours, but that is all you wiU get, and it would be much better for you to come to terms with us.' If it was the object of Germany's action in Morocco to drive a wedge between Great Britain and Prance, and to prepare the way for an eventual Franco- German alliance, she has not succeeded in her attempt. Instead, Germany's 302 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN policy has caused people on both sides of the Channel to ask themselves : Why does Germany try to disturb the good relations between Great Britain and Prance, two peaceful and conservative countries which only wish to defend what they own and which do not threaten anyone ? Why does Germany wish to force Prance against her will into an alli- ance with her ? What would be the object of a Pranco- German alliance, and against which nation would such an alliance be directed ? Under these circumstances it is only natural that Germany's unexpected and rather abrupt, if not startling, proceeding in Morocco has filled many serious and peaceful people both in Prance and in Great Britain with concern, if not with alarm, as to Germany's ultimate aims, and that in consequence the feeling in favour of an Anglo-Prench alUance has been considerably strength- ened. The meeting between King Edward and President Loubet during the Morocco crisis was probably not merely a friendly meetiag, but a political event of the very greatest international importance. Some time ago various writers eloquently recom- mended that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be renewed in the form of an unrestricted and long-termed offensive and defensive alliance, which, especially if the United States should join in, would prove an irresistible combination. The idea of an offensive and defensive Anglo-Japanese or of an offensive and defensive Anglo- American-Japanese alliance strongly appeals to a lively imagination, but it is to be feared that it will remain a picturesque, but very unpractical, idea. The United States are so strong for their defence, and they need so little fear attack, that they require no alliance whatever. Consequently the United States would hardly be prepared to conclude an alliance either with Great Britain or with Great Britain and Japan combined, as they could not see the advantage of such an alliance. The United States are the only nation in the world which can afford THE BALANCE OP POWEB IN EUROPE 303 to live in splendid isolation, and they have no reason to tie themselves to any Power or combination of Powers and thus hamper their freedom of action. An mirestricted and long-termed Anglo- Japanese offensive and defensive alliance would unfortunately prove unpractical. Such an alliance would no longer be a limited and clearly defined partnership for the settlement of some definite business, but it would be an unlimited one. It would make both Great Britain and Japan mutually responsible for every action of the other. If Japan should be involved in war with France, we should, under the terms of an unrestricted offensive and defensive alliance, have to attack France ; if Japan should faU out with the United States, we should have to fight the United States for the sake of Japan. Are those who so strenuously recommend an unrestricted Anglo-Japanese offensive and defensive alliance prepared to fight at the side of Japan all comers, inclusive of France and the United States, or will they guar- antee that a war between Japan and France, or between Japan and the United States, will not occur during the term of the unrestricted Anglo-Japanese offensive and defensive alliance which they recommend ? If an offensive and defensive Anglo-Japanese alUance was concluded. Great Britain would be compelled to support Japan everywhere in the East, and Japan would be obliged to identify herself with all British interests in all parts of the world. Hence she would have to support us not only in Asia, but in Europe and America as well. Do those who so earnestly plead for an Anglo-Japanese offensive and defensive alliance seriously expect that Japan is willing to send her army and navy against a great Power on the European continent, say Germany, with which we may be at war, or against the United States ? If a con- bination of the greatest naval Powers should suddenly attack England in the same manner in which Venice and the Netherlands were attacked in former centuries, or if a 304 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN powerful enemy should succeed in effecting the landing upon our shores, the assistance of the Japanese army and navy, under the terms of an offensive and defensive alliance, wovdd, of course, be invaluable to us ; but, owing to the long distance which separates England from Japan, that invaluable help would, at the critical moment, unfortunately prove unavailable. The war would probably be decided by the time when our Japanese allies could bring us succour. An unrestricted and long-termed Anglo-Japanese offen- sive and defensive alliance is, no doubt, a chimera. Such an alliance is not possible between two nations which have to grapple with totally different problems and which live at the opposite ends of the earth. However, a defensive alliance, and perhaps a defensive and offensive alliance, although hardly an unrestricted one, is possible, and appears necessary between two nations such as Great Britain and France, who are neighbours, who have identical interests, who are both peacefully inclined, who run the same risks, and who share the same dangers. For these reasons Great Britain and France could be, should be, and, I think, even- tually will be, alUes. The downfall of Eussia is for both Great Britain and France an unfortunate event, and it may conceivably be- come a calamity to France, or even to both nations. The consequences of Eussia's disappearance from the pohtical stage, even if that disappearance be but temporary, are incalculable, and Europe may soon be convulsed by the action of the more ambitious nations on the Continent which are no longer restrained by the balance of power. The statesmen of Great Britain and France are able to avert what may possibly be a disaster of the greatest magnitude by timely action, and it is to be hoped that they will be alive to the requirements of the time. King Edward has, with marvellous pohtical sagacity and skill, shown them the way, and has made their task easy by preparing their path. May they follow his lead ! CHAPTEB XIII SEA-POWER AND CONTINENTAL WAR The Franco-German War of 1870-71 brought to a close a lengthy period of great and purely contmental wars. These wars were fought for a great purpose. They effected the unity of Germany and also of Italy, the relations existing between the continental Great Powers were completely rearranged, and the chief consequence of that rearrange- ment was that the leading position among the continental Powers had to be ceded by Prance to Germany. During the thirty-five years following the great Franco-German struggle, the Great Powers of Europe have kept peace among themselves. The Eusso-Turkish War of 1877, the Servo-Bulgarian War of 1885, and the Turco-Greek War of 1897 hardly affected the relations between the continental Great Powers. These wars, although they were fought on European soil, were for all practical purposes as much colonial and extra-European wars as were the Spanish- American War of 1898, our own South African War of 1900, and the recent Eusso-Japanese War. The rearrangement of the national forces on the Continent, ending with the Franco-German War, seemed to have brought an element of permanence and stability, almost finality, into the formerly unstable political situation on the Continent. Since 1871 the centre of political nterest and of political danger was situated no longer in Europe, but sometimes in America, sometimes in Asia, sometimes in Africa. Continental politics were frankly tedious, 305 X 306 GEEAT AND GEEATER BEITAIN and the peaceful development of this country was almost permanently threatened through the extra-European ambi- tions of the various continental Powers which found no scope for expansion in Europe. The late Eusso- Japanese War would appear to have ended the chapter of colonial wars and continental peace. Apparently, we stand before a period during which the relations between the great continental Powers may again be considerably modified, and perhaps completely recast, During the next few years the map of Europe may undergo considerable alteration through one or several great con- tinental wars. A great continental struggle appears, no doubt, to be of considerable advantage to this country from the point of view of the shopkeeper and of the superficial politician who speculates from day to day, but whether such a struggle and the rearrangement following it will ultimately be of benefit or of incalculable disadvantage to Great Britain and the Empire will probably depend on the armed power of this country, and upon the wisdom and energy with which that power is wielded by our statesmen. The present political position on the Continent is exceedingly grave and disquieting, and in the following an attempt will be made at analysing it, at making a forecast of the conse- quences to which it may give rise, at showing that this country at the present moment holds the future of the Continent in its hands, and at sketching out the duties which Great Britain owes to herself and to other nations with regard to continental affairs. The Franco-German War of 1870-71 created a power- ful and united Germany in the centre of Europe, and Bismarck's skill, aided by the natural course and drift of political events, caused Austria-Hungary and Italy to gravitate towards Germany. Austria-Hungary felt threatened by Eussia, Italy felt threatened by Prance. Both Powers turned to Germany for protection, and both SEA-POWEE AND CONTINENTAL WAE 307 became the supporters, one raight say almost the satellites, of Germany. Russia, on the other hand, had supported Prussia in her struggle with Austria-Hungary and France, rather in the hope of seeing her -western neighbour weakened than unduly strengthened. Therefore, she observed with disUke and distrust the rapid and marvellous increase of Germany's power, and logically she became the defender of Prance in order to prevent Germany from becoming all- powerful on the Continent. The Dual Alliance was the natural consequence of the Triple Alliance, but even before the Dual Alliance was formally concluded, Russia was determined, as Germany found out in 1875, not to allow Prance to be further weakened. That determination con- stituted one of the chief elements of the safety of Prance. Ever since 1871, but especially since 1875, when Russia prevented a German attack upon Prance, Bismarck had reckoned with the possibility that Germany might have to fight Prance and Russia simultaneously. Thus, siace 1871, Europe became divided into two vast military camps. The two groups of Powers opposed to one another had almost the same number of soldiers and of guns, almost the same arms and tactics, and almost equal wealth and naval strength. Therefore, the States of both groups considered the risk of a coUision between them so great that both were unwiUing to break the peace. The German camp and the Pranco-Russian camp being considered by many to be about equally strong, an almost perfect balance of power was estabUshed on the Continent, and owing to this almost perfect balance of power, a European war among the Great Powers had become almost impossible, and their armaments seemed ridiculous and unnecessary. In consequence of this balancing of the military forces maintained on the continent of Europe, the diplomats of the two groups alternately tried to draw Great Britain into their combination in order to use her as an ausdliary, and thus to secure the superiority over the rival X 2 308 GREAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN combination ; they gave scope to their ambitions outside of Europe in countless colonial enterprises, and they occupied themselves in endeavouring to weaken the rival group by sowing discord among its members, and especially by trying to bring them into collision with third Powers. The greater skill and the greater activity, or perhaps the greater unscrupulousness, in these attempts at causing mischief, were evinced by the diplomats of the Triple Alliance, and especially by the diplomats of Germany. Prance and Great Britain were alienated from one another, and were repeatedly pushed to the brink of war over some suitable colonial object of contention which had been baited by what is technically called a ' friendly ' Power. Russia and Great Britain were cleverly set against one another over India or China, and numerous ' irrecon- cilable differences ' were skilfully created between them. By sap and mine, Bismarck and his successors endeavoured to weaken and to destroy the purely defensive position occupied by Russia and France, and to cause the downfall of these countries. Since 1871 it was Bismarck's dehberate and confessed aim to isolate France, and to weaken all those Powers which possibly might support France against Germany. Among these Powers Russia stood foremost, and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 was Russia's reward for her services to France in 1875, for it can be proved that the Eusso-Turkish War was brought about by Bismarck. The Anglo-French estrangements over various colonial questions and the Anglo-Russian troubles in Central Asia also were largely brought about by Bismarck's hand. After all, it was only natural that Bismarck endeavoured to maintain the great and at first, perhaps, somewhat precarious position which he had conquered for Germany by weakening all possible future enemies of his country. That policy was particularly necessary during the time when Germany was financially exhausted through her wars, and when SEA-POWEE AND CONTINENTAL WAB 809 the unity of the Empire was of too recent a date to appear quite assured. However, the soUdification of the Imperial iastitutions of Germany, the creation of the Triple Alliance, Germany's rapid advance in prosperity, the rapid increase of the German population and the still more rapid increase of the German army, soon gave to Germany such an enormous mihtary preponderance on the continent of Europe that she no longer had to fear an attack from any quarter, for during the last ten or fifteen years the balance of power had turned very distinctly in Germany's favour. Therefore, some years ago, the late Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee, who was designed to be the commander-in-chief of the armies of Germany in case of a war, declared at a mihtary club, before a number of officers, that Germany was strong enough single-handed to hold her own against France and Russia combined. That opinion was shared at the time by many German generals. The boundless confidence which Germany had in her military strength may be seen from the detailed plans which were drafted by the German General Staff for a possible war with Russia. According to rehable informa- tion, the German army was not merely to occupy some fruitful districts in Western Russia and gradually to weaken that country, as Great Britain and France had done in the Crimean War, but the German forces were to advance directly upon St. Petersburg. This daring plan was drawn up, although German diplomacy considered it a certainty that in case of a Russo-German war France would come to Russia's assistance. From the strong defensive positions which have been prepared everywhere in Alsace-Lorraine, which have converted that coimtry into a huge prepared battlefield, and from the powerful fortifications along the whole of the Rhine, from Wesel on the Dutch frontier down to a spot opposite Basle on the Swiss frontier, it appears that, in case of a war with France and Russia, Germany contemplates acting at first towards France on the defensive 310 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN and attacking Russia, and that she means, after having crushed Russia, to throw herself upon Prance. Notwithstanding the fact that Germany considered herself miUtarily strong enough in case of need single-handed to meet France and Russia combined, and notwithstanding the fact that she could, in case of a war against Prance and Russia, under the terms of the Triple Alhance, reckon upon the unconditional support of Austria-Hungary and Italy, Germany has ever since 1871, but especially during the last twenty years, persistently endeavoured to weaken Prance and Russia, although these Powers did not threaten Germany, and were considered by Germany as Powers little to be feared. In spite of the eccentricities of William II, Germany has pursued on the whole a sober national policy. Therefore, we carmot possibly assume that Germany endeavoured to bring Prance and Russia into collision with third Powers and to cause the downfall of these countries merely for the pleasure of watching a big fight. Hence, we must necessarily conclude that Germany, in endeavouring to weaken Prance and Russia, whom she thought her inferiors in strength, pursued some definite and important political aim. What is that aim ? If Germany had been satisfied with the status quo which the war of 1870-71 had created, she would have welcomed the establishment of that balance of power on the Continent which came into being soon after the war, for that balance of power was the best possible guarantee against the outbreak of another European war. If she had been bent on peace, and on the preservation of the position which she had gained in the world, she would have seen in the counterpoise of the Franco-Russian Alliance a most desirable means of curbing the ambitions of her own military men and of her militant statesmen. The fact that Germany, ever since the war of 1871, constantly endeavoured to cause the downfall of France and Russia, and to destroy that balance SEA-POWEE AND CONTINENTAL WAE 811 of power whicli ensured peace on the Continent, in order to give to the Triple AlUance, and especially to herself, a decided military superiority in Europe, shows that Germany was not satisfied with her great position, that she found the restraining influence of the balance of power irksome, that she wished to have her elbows free. Yet she did not fear the two Powers which were distinctly inferior to the Triple Alliance, and the fact that Germany has for many years worked and plotted to destroy the strength of Eussia and Prance, two countries which Germany considered she could easily defeat with the help of her allies, and possibly even without their help, proves — unless we believe that Germany has, since 1871, pursued a policy of wanton and criminal intrigue — that Germany's political aims are such as to cause her to believe that, in the pursuit of her ambitions, she would meet with the opposition not only of Prance and Russia, but even with that of her allies. Germany's constant attempts to involve Prance and Russia in war with third parties prove that Germany's policy is a policy of conquest, not a policy of preservation. Modern Germany, Prusso-Germany, has become great by conquest. The Hohenzollerns, who originally ruled a small Slavonic country outside the borders of Germany proper, gradually forced their way into Germany ; they subjected, one by one, German States and provinces to themselves, and they have at last become the recognised champions of Germanism, not only among the Germans in Germany, but among the Germans in Austria-Hungary as well. Many years ago, when Germany was merely a geographical expression, when there existed only a chaotic and incoherent mass of German-speaking States, but no German State and no German nation, the poet Arndt, in his celebrated song, said that all those countries belonged to Germany where German was spoken. This ancient song is now the most popular song in Germany, and it has become the battle-song of Pan-Germanism. It is daily 312 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN sung all over the country, and it has completely ousted the ' Watch on the Rhine ' and the Prussian anthem, which are no longer considered to be up to date. The great German public, not unnaturally, considers that the Germans who live outside Germany ought, by rights, to be joined to Prusso- Germany ; that it is an anomaly that millions of Germans should Uve imder what all Germans consider to be alien rule in Austria-Hungary and in Switzerland. Besides, it has not been forgotten, and it is taught in all the schools, that Switzerland and Holland were, at one time, German countries which cut themselves adrift from ancient Germany. Therefore, Germany has, no doubt, an excellent sentimental and historic, though a bad legal, claim to the possession of both Holland and Switzerland. However, Germany is guided in her foreign policy not by sentimental and historic considerations, but by reasons of practical advantage. She wishes to expand, as all vigorous and growing nations do, not so much for the sake of glory as in order to secure outlets for her abundant population and in order to add to her strength and to increase her wealth. At the same time, she cannot altogether disregard German national sentiment in the pursuit of a foreign policy which may lead to war, for her army is a national army. Bearing in mind these considerations, which guide Germany in her foreign policy, it is perfectly clear that Russia and France possess little that Germany has reason to covet. A war- with Prance for the possession of the French colonies, or for the possession of the Meuse, would be un- profitable, and would be distinctly unpopular in Germany. It is true that Toul and Verdun were at one time in German bands, but the population of that district is thoroughly French. Such a war would not raise the popular enthusiasm in Germany which at once arose when Germany went to war with France in 1870 with the intention of reconquering SEA-POWER AND CONTINENTAL WAR 313 German Strassburg and regaining a large German population in Alsace-Lorraine. A great war waged with the object of conquering the Baltic provinces of Russia, or of taking another slice of Poland, would be still more unprofitable and still more unpopular. The Baltic provinces, although there is a sprinkling of Germans to be found in them, have httle value, and Germany has already more Poles than she wishes for. On the other hand, a war for breaking the power of Great Britain and taking her commerce and her Colonies, or for conquering Holland or Switzerland, or for joining the German parts of Austria-Hungary to Germany, would powerfully appeal to the imagination of the masses, and such a war would not only be immensely popular all over Germany, but it would, if successful, be exceedingly profit- able to that country. As the German fleet is not yet strong enough to challenge the British Navy, and as France is not prepared to place her fleet at Germany's disposal, it is evident that Germany's expansionist ambitions should logically be directed, at least at present, towards Holland, Switzerland, and Austria-Hungary. The possession of Holland would give to Germany 5,500,000 industrious and wealthy citizens, some valuable colonies and coaling stations, the mouth of the Rhine, the control of the port of Antwerp by the possession of the mouths of the Scheldt, which at present belong to Holland. Last, but not least, the possession of Holland would give to Germany a number of excellent harbours, of which she stands greatly in need, both for her navy and for her merchant marine, and she would, at the same time, obtain a most valuable strategical position which would be of the greatest service if ever she should wish to strike at this country. If Germany could place her fleet into the Dutch harbours, only six hours of sailing would separate the German army from our shores. The possession of Switzerland would profit Germany but 314 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN little from the economic point of view. On the other hand, it should be remembered that Switzerland is an important strategical centre both for the defence of Germany and for an attack upon Prance and Italy. Switzerland is Hke a powerful fortress, able to dominate the South of France and the North of Italy. Lastly, the possession of the chiefly German part of Austria-Hungary would give to Germany 20,000,000 new citizens and some excellent harbours on the Mediterranean, and in the possession of these Germany might be in a position to acquire Constantinople. If Germany and Austria should be joined together, and no doubt they could be united, owing to the powerful Germanic element, and the strong Philo- German movement, in Austria — the Austrian Germans sing ' The Watch on the Ehine ' and ' Deutschland, Deutschland iiber Alias ' as loudly, and perhaps even more loudly, than do even the Germans themselves — the Greater German Empire would rival the Empire of Charlemagne, and might soon exceed it. A German Empire stretching across Europe from Hamburg to Trieste wotdd dominate not Only the continent of Europe, but Asia Minor as well. Such an empire would be able to threaten Constantinople, Egypt, and India, and it might legitimately aspire to the domination of the Mediterranean, of Asia Minor, and of North Africa. Those who have followed the pohcy of Germany, not the policy of the Pan-Germanic League, cannot have the slightest doubt that Germany is seriously bent on the acquisition of Holland. Whilst the Emperor, William II, has made the warmest advances to the present Queen of Holland, and has done everything to ingratiate himself with the leading Dutch people, his Government has, at the expense of many millions, built the Dortmund-Ems Canal; with the avowed object of diverting the Ehine traffic from the Dutch harbours to Emden, a town which lies close to the Dutch frontier. The harbour of Emden, which was opened only in 1901, has proved SEA-POWER AND CONTINENTAL WAR 315 so prosperous and so effective in drawing the stream of trafi&c away from Holland that it is to be immensely enlarged, and it is evidently to be turned into a serious competitor to Antwerp and Rotterdam. By the construction of the Rhine-Ems Canal, by preferential railway rates, and, if needs be, by still more drastic measures, Germany intends to damage the very valuable through trafi&c of Holland, which contributes greatly to the wealth of that country, to such an extent as to force Holland into a customs union with Germany, which would be the first step towards an organic union with that country. Those who doubt that this is Germany's plan will find an ample confirmation of these views in the official arguments which were raised when the construction of the Dortmund-Ems Canal was decided upon, and in the numerous inspired utterances of the leading semi-official papers, such as Die Grenzboten, which, from time to time, have appeared. Holland is a pear which may gradually ripen and then fall into Germany's lap without much exertion. Germany need therefore be in no hurry if she wishes to acquire Holland, especially as it will be wiser to gain her by gradual economic pressure than by the violence of war. Besides, the posses- sion of Holland will not help Germany much in acquiring the Austrian domain. On the contrary, the precipitate acquisition of Holland would not only cause lasting dis- satisfaction with German rule in the Netherlands, but such a step might also bring Germany into collision with Great Britain, and such a coUision might prove absolutely disas- trous for Germany's commerce and industries. On the other hand, if Germany should succeed in joining Austria to herself in some form or other, and if she should also succeed in placing a Prussian prince on the Hungarian throne — this is said to be a favourite plan of the Emperor William, who would Hke to see one ^of his sons become the ruler of Hungary — Germany would become so immensely powerful and acquire so great a prestige on the Continent 816 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN that she might occupy Holland without causing much commotion in the world. At present Germany has 64,000,000 inhabitants, whilst Prance, which is considered to be the second strongest military Power in Europe, has 40,000,000 inhabitants. If, through the acquisition of the larger part of Austria, the population of Germany should increase to 84,000,000, France would miUtarily, and probably economically as weU, sink to the rank of a second- or third-class Power as compared with Germany. She would become another Belgium, and would no longer be an effective counterpoise against Germany ; and if Germany, after having strengthened herself by the absorption of Austria, should proceed to the acquisi- tion of Holland and perhaps of Belgium as well, France, single-handed, would be powerless to resist, and she could do no more than raise a feeble and ineffectual protest against Germany's encroachments. To avoid any com- motion, Germany might agree with Prance upon a division of Belgium and Holland between the two countries — a division which, in reality, would only mean that Germany would ' lend ' Belgium to Prance until the latter would receive Germany's notice to quit. Prom the foregoing short sketch it appears that Germany has practically no inducement whatever for attacking either Prance or Russia, because neither Power possesses anything which makes such an attack worth Germany's while. It further appears that Germany never had any serious apprehension of a Franco-Russian attack, seeing that the forces of the Triple AUiance were stronger than those of the Dual Alliance before Russia was crippled in Asia. Lastly, it appears that Germany's true interests lie, at least for the present, perhaps not so much in gaining the command of the sea and acquiring by force Great Britain's commerce and Colonies, as in making her position on the Continent all-powerful and therefore absolutely secure. She can do so by greatly increasing her population, and, with her SEA-POWEE AND CONTINENTAL WAB 317 population, her armed strength. Backed by a greatly in- creased army, she can easily acquire the harbours which she lacks, for her present harbours have not sufficient space to accommodate the enormous fleet which she is building. When Germany once has from 80,000,000 to 100,000,000 inhabitants, a standing army of 1,000,000, and a war army of 6,000,000 men, and a large number of excellent harbours, in short, when her position on the Continent is absolutely secure against her neighbours, she can with her flourishing industries soon build a fleet sufficiently strong to defeat the British Navy. An industrial population of 100,000,000 Germans must necessarily have a larger purse than an iadustrial population of 45,000,000 Englishmen. Imperial federation and the drawing together of Great Britain and the United States, which seems likely to take place, and which probably would follow the creation of a Greater Germany dominating the continent of Europe, may frustrate Germany's maritime ambitions. If Germany should become the ruler of the continent of Europe, Great Britain would become the outpost and the sentinel of Anglo-Saxondom. She would have to be in constant readiness for war, watching with sleepless vigilance a gigantic and aggressive military and naval Power, ruling the continent of Europe, and she would have to be ever prepared to bear the brunt of a formidable and sudden German attack. Great Britain's post would be a post of honour, but her position, though exceedingly honourable, would be very far from being either profitable or comfortable. In fact. Great Britain would have to face a situation similar to that which prevailed a hundred years ago ; but a German Emperor ruUng the Continent would be a far more firmly established sovereign and a far more dangerous antagonist than was Napoleon I, for the German Emperor's power would be more solid. Besides, there would be this great difference, that Great Britain was able to capture the trade of the world during the Napoleonic wars. If a 318 GREAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN repetition of the Napoleonic wars should be enacted, the trade of the world would be captured not by Great Britain, but by the United States. Not the peacefulness of WiUiam I, or of William II, or of Prince Bismarck, or of Prince von Biilow, or of the German nation, but the automatic action of the balance of military power in Europe, has preserved peace in Europe since 1871, but now the balance of power, which is the best, or rather the only, safeguard of peace on the Continent, has been destroyed by the downfall of Eussia. For many years to come Eussia will be unable actively to intervene in the affairs of the Continent, for her army hardly suffices to keep order in the ruined, rebellious, and distracted country, and she has neither the strength nor the means for conducting a great war. Besides, her mechanical outfit for war is very defective. More than a hundred and fifty years ago Frederick the Great, the prince of diplomats, wrote in his 'Anti- Machiavel ' : * The tranquilhty of Europe rests principally upon the wise maintenance of a balance of power by which the superior strength of one State is made harmless by the countervailing weight of several united States. In case this equilibrium should disappear, it is to be feared that a universal revolution will be the result, and that an enormous new monarchy will be established upon the ruins of those countries which were too weak for in- dividual resistance, and which lacked the. necessary spirit to unite in time.' Since the remotest ages it has been a matter of common occurrence that a European nation which through warlike successes had become more powerful than its neighbours, has endeavoured to dominate or to rule the whole continent of Europe. Eome at one time succeeded in ruling the Continent, and the Eoman mastery of the continent of Europe naturally led to an attack upon Great Britain, whose independent position seemed to endanger Eoman rule in SEA-POWER AND CONTINENTAL WAR 319 Gallia, the present Prance, as we may read in CaBsar's ' Bellum GaUicmn.' The destruction of the balance of power by Rome inevitably led to the invasion and conquest of Great Britain, and brought with it several centuries of Roman rule in this country, and history wUl probably repeat itself, if Europe, or at least the larger part of Central Europe, should again be subjected to one master. An independent and powerful Great Britain is, and must always be, a danger to a Power which rules the larger part of the Continent, or which aspires to ruling it. Hence, when Spain under Philip II, and Prance under Louis XIV and Napoleon I, strove to destroy the balance of power on the Continent, and to establish a world-empire, they felt threatened, or at least impeded, in their freedom of action, by the existence of this country and by its independence. Therefore, they attacked it, and if we study our history we shall find that our greatest wars during the last three centuries had to be fought for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. If Germany should rule the Continent, or aspire to ruling the Continent, the war against Napoleon I may have to be fought over again, and we may have to call in the United States to redress the balance of power in Europe. William II is said to be ambitious, and to be exceedingly anxious to be an ' augmenter of the country,' as were all the HohenzoUerns. His restless activity seems to confirm the estimate of him which is generally held. However, even if Germany had a most unambitious ruler, she might, and very possibly would, endeavour to utiUse the great opportunities which have been created by the breakdown of the balance of power. After all, history is made not so much by great and ambitious men as by average men who use great opportunities, or rather, history is made by great opportunities and by those irresistible currents which are created by these opportunities, and which are apt to sweep rulers and ruled off their feet. 320 GEEAT AND GBEATER BBITAIN The existence of exceedingly strong and exceedingly aggressive expansionist tendencies among the leading men and among the broad masses of Germany cannot be denied. The fact that the rulers of Germany have for many years past deliberately worked for a reunion with Auatria and for the acquisition of HoUand cannot be doubted, and it is probable that Germany's rulers may consider that the best way to the acquisition of maritime preponder- ance Hes via Holland, and that the best way to Holland goes via Vienna. Therefore, we must be prepared to see Germany move towards Vienna. But at the same time we must remember that political ambitions can rarely be realised in accordance with a programme previously drawn up, although it may have been drawn up with the very greatest care. Diplomacy, though pursuing certain aims in a certain sequence and in accordance with a certain plan, has to deal with problems which are totally different from an algebraic problem. It must largely be guided by momentary constellations and opportunities which, as a rule, are brought about by chance. However, we must also remember that opportunities can frequently be created, and a skilful diplomat ought always to be able to produce a plausible and useful casus belli at very short notice. The ever- present Balkan question, or some other unimportant dormant matter, may suitably be worked up in a short time, and a situation may quickly be created which will afford to the German Government that pretext for action in one direction or another, which political decency and diplomatic custom rather than pohtical morality requires. If the will to act is there, Gennany will easily find a pretext in order to be able to make use of the present opportunity which Germany has striven for decades to bring about. The mastery of Europe is a stake worth pla3dng for, and Germany s chances, if she wishes to effect a great coup, appear not unfavourable. Austria-Hungary is weak because it is racially a disunited SEA-POWEE AND CONTINENTAL WAR 321 State. The people are poor and heavily taxed, and the Austro-Hungarian army is supposed to be very inferior to the German army. Many Austrian Germans would welcome a war with Germany, or any other event which would be likely to lead to the establishment of German supremacy in Austria-Hungary. For these reasons, Austria-Himgary would not be able to offer a serious resistance to Germany. A German army could rapidly reach Vienna, which lies only a hundred miles from the German frontier, and no great fortress would stop Germany's progress, for Austria has fortified all her frontiers with the exception of the German one. Besides, the Austro-Hungarian army is not sufficiently prepared for war, whilst the German army is ready for imme- diate action. For these reasons, an Austro-German war may be a walk-over, and may be ended in a few days, and the German Emperor might be acclaimed -with rapture in Vienna by the populace before the other Powers have come to an agreement as to the action to be taken. Italy would certainly not hke to see the Germans estab- lished in Trieste, but her acquiescence might probably be bought either by liberal ' assurances ' or by a territorial quid fro quo, especially as Italy is too poor to stand the financial strain of a great war, notwithstanding the recent improvement of her finances. Besides, Italy's army is small and weak compared with that of Germany. Russia is at present no more dangerous to Germany than is Holland. Therefore, Europe, apart from Germany, is for all practical political purposes composed of but two Powers — France and Great Britain. From the diplomat's point of view. Prance and Great Britain constitute at the present moment the non-German part of Europe. Prance alone would hardly oppose Germany unaided. A Franco-German war would, according to careful estimates made by undoubted authorities, actually cost the two nations about £1,000,000,000, and the defeated State would have to pay this huge sum, and perhaps more — if possible. 322 GEEAT AND GEBATEB BRITAIN Very likely the vanquished Power would become bankrupt. If France should be defeated it would mean Finis Gallice, and the French statesmen are scarcely prepared to stake their all, the very existence of their country, upon the preservation of Austria-Hungary.- Even if Germany, in- stead of attacking Austria-Hungary, should more directly threaten and damage France by taking Belgium and Holland, France would hardly move against Germany if she was alone, but she might oppose Germany in order to redress the balance of power in Europe, if she had Great Britain's unconditional support, if she were sure that Great Britain would aid her with all her might. In these circumstances it appears that Great Britain has the destiny of Europe in her hands, and the question arises : What should Great Britain do if Germany should strive to use her opportunities by an attack on Austria- Hungary or on Holland, and endeavour to become all-powerful in Europe ? Let us hear the advice of two of our greatest and most experienced statesmen. The great Earl of Chatham said, on December 1, 1743 : ' I must lay this down as a maxim which this nation ought always to observe, that, though it be our interest to preserve a balance of power in Europe, yet, as we are the most remote from danger we ought always to be the least susceptible of jealousy, and the last to take the alarm.' Similar views were occasionally expressed by Lord Palmerston. For instance, he said in May 1860 : ' The policy of Great Britain, subject to exception in special cases, is to keep free from prospective engagements, and to deal with events when they happen, according to the circum- stances of the moment.' These are wise and weighty words, but can we apply these two pronouncements, which embody our traditional policy, to the present political situation on the continent of Europe ? During every period of her history there has been an active and aggressive State in Europe, which has grown SEA-POWEB AND CONTINENTAL WAR 323 exceedingly powerful through its mihtary successes and which has striven to grow still more powerful at the expense of the peace-loving and conservative nations surrounding it. From the time of Eicheheu to that of Napoleon III, France was the chief factor of restlessness in Europe, hut now Germany has taken the place of France. However, in former times, when a situation similar to the present situation arose on the Continent, there was always some kind of a balance of power in existence, and there were always some Powers which were willing to step into the breach and to offer an effective resistance to a Louis XIV, to a Louis XV, and to a Napoleon I. Great Britain was, therefore, able to keep in the background, waiting to see whether her assistance would be required. Therefore, she could at the psychological moment, when her help became indispensable for preventing Europe from falling under one master, step forth and throw her weight into the balance. Thus Great Britain has more than once saved Europe from tyranny. Now matters are different. Through the complete collapse of Russia the balance of power on the continent of Europe has been absolutely destroyed, and Germany's advance in one direction or another might encounter no more formidable opposition than a few cautiously worded diplomatic protests. We might find the Powers of Europe acquiesce as easily in the fait accompli of an enormous German expansion as they did in Russia's declaration of 1871 that she would no longer be bound by the chief stipula- tion of the Treaty of Paris. Therefore we cannot afford to wait for the fait accompli, but must in this instance deviate from our traditional policy of conservatism and caution, and we must decide how to act before the event which is to be dreaded has actually taken place. However, we cannot weU act alone, but should act in concert with France. We can really not be expected to save Europe against her will. Therefore we must agree with Prance on a plan of action, in case of certain clearly determinable contingencies. T 2 324 GBBAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN Some distinguished Britisli and German, and a few French, politicians and statesmen are of opinion that France is too weak to oppose Germany, even if she had the support of this country. But those who have an intimate knowledge of the French and the German armies do not take such a hopeless view of the mihtary strength of France. In fact, it may he asserted that the French army is at present approximately equal to the German army in numbers, in the equipment of men and horses, and in its tactics. It should also not be forgotten that the very restricted territory between the frontier fortifications where the decisive battles will probably be fought is not favourable to the employment of very large masses. It is quite true that the German General Staff feels perfectly confident that the German army can defeat the French forces, and it is also true that many distinguished Frenchmen are sceptical as to the help which Great Britain could offer to Prance on land. But, at the same time, it must be borne in mind, assuming that Germany should defeat France on land, that such a defeat would not end the war, for she could not at present defeat Great Britain on the sea. A war with France on land may last three months or a year, and it may conceivably be ended by the victory of Germany ; but a war with Great Britain on the sea would last until Germany made peace on Great Britain's terms. Such a war may last interminably. A lengthy blockade of the German coasts would lead to the collapse of the industries of Germany and to a terrible impoverishment of the whole country ; it would lead to the dissatisfaction, the disheartening, and perhaps the mutiny, of the army, and it would at last lead to the creation of a continental coalition against Germany, for Germany's weak neighbours would regain courage should Germany be greatly enfeebled. The story of our war with Napoleon I might repeat itself, and Germany is hardly prepared to incur such a risk. SEA-POWEE AND CONTINENTAL WAR 325 Let us remember these few facts, which caimot be gain- said, and let us also remember the following words of the Earl of Chatham, which he pronounced in 1770 : — ' Preventive policy, my Lords, which obviates or avoids the injury, is far preferable to that vindictive pohcy which aims at reparation, or has no object but revenge. The precaution that meets the disorder is cheap and easy ; the remedy which follows it bloody and expensive.' The German camp, with its 4,000,000 well-drilled, well- armed, and perfectly organised soldiers, may overwhelm the continent of Europe, or it may abstain from aggression. Whether it will do the one or the other will depend chiefly, if not entirely, upon the determination of British statesmen and the use which they are prepared to make of the British fleet. ^ ^ OHAPTEB XIV EDUCATION AND ITS DANGERS Education, after having been more or less neglected for a long time in Great Britain, has now become an all-powerful panacea in the eyes of the British public and of the British pohtician. As the alchemists of the dark ages expected to be able to turn any base metal into gold with the help of the philosopher's stone, even so the pohticians of the present day expect education to work wonders in Great Britain and to benefit the nation most marvellously in every direction. And, as in the Middle Ages unenlightened princes often subjected their entire States to the fantastic experiments of astrologers and alchemists, half-crack- brained mystics not entirely innocent of fraud, half-nebulous scientists full of extravagant superstitions, in the hope of benefiting their people thereby, even so the patient British nation is to be experimented upon by the schoolmaster at the bidding of the politician, and education is to work wonders in every way. The stagnation of British commerce is to be converted into commercial triumphs by commercial education. Our former industrial supremacy is to return at the hand of technical education, improved military education is to endow us with capable officers — in fact, the whole nation will have to put its nose in a book. But may not the nation become shortsighted, in the literal and in. the metaphorical sense, from too much study, and may not the promised blessings of the schoolmaster's activity prove largely an illusion? At present it seems as if we 326 EDUCATION AND ITS DANGEBS 327 were going to fall from the Scylla of under-educalion into the perhaps more dangerous Charybdis of over-education. Whilst educational enthusiasts ia and out of politics are strenuously advocating the ' trainjng ' of leaders of men in every field of human activity, it is useful to consider occasionally the limitations of education, and to remember how few of the leaders of men have been ' trained ' to their leadership by third parties either in schools or otherwise. It is an old experience that the most prominent men in nearly every province of human activity have been amateurs, and that is one of the reasons why amateurs, and not pro- fessionals, are selected to rule our great public departments. Our great administrators have nearly all been amateurs and autodidacts. To take a few of the best-known examples : Cromwell was a farmer, Warren Hastings and Clive were clerks, Mr. Chamberlain was brought up for trade. Lord Goschen for commerce, and Lord Cromer for the army. Other countries have had the same experience with self- taught amateurs. Prince Bismarck was brought up for law, failed twice to pass his examination, became a country squire, and drifted without any training into the Prussian diplomatic service and the Cabinet, and founded the German Empire. George Washington was a surveyor, Benjamin Franklin a printer, Abraham Lincoln a lumberman, M. de Witte a railway official. In a less exalted sphere we meet with the same pheno- menon. Sir William Herschel was a musician, Faraday a bookbinder, Scott a lawyer's clerk, Murat a student of theology, Ney a notary's clerk, Arkwright, the inventor of the spinning machine and the first cotton manufacturer, a barber, Spinoza a glass-blower, Adam Smith a clergyman. Lord Armstrong an attorney, Herbert Spencer an engineer, Pasteur, the father of modern medicine and surgery, a chemist, Edison a newsvendor ; George Stephenson and most of the great inventors and creators of industry of his time were ordinary working men. 328 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN When we look round we find not only that many leaders of men were devoid of a highly speciahsed training in that particular branch of human activity in which they excel, that they were self-taught amateurs, but that many of the ablest politicians and of the most successful business men have not even had the advantage of a fair general education. Abraham Lincoln had learned at school only the three R's, and those very incompletely, President Garfield worked with a boatman when only ten years old, President Jackson was a saddler and never spelled correctly. President Benjamin Harrison started Ufe as a farmer, and President Andrew Johnson, a former tailor, visited no school, and learned reading only from his wife. George Peabody started work when only eleven years old, the late Sir Edward Harland was apprenticed at the age of fifteen years, Andrew Carnegie began his commercial career when twelve years old as a factory hand, Charles Schwab, the late president of the United States Steel Corporation, drove a coach as a boy, and then became a stake-driver at an iron-works. Josiah Wedgwood started work when only eleven years old, Arkwright, the father of our cotton industry, was never at school, Edison was engaged in selling papers when twelve years of age, and Sir Hiram Maxim was with a carriage builder when he was fourteen. ' Commodore ' Cornelius Vanderbilt, the railway king, who left more than a hundred million dollars, started as a ferry- man at a tender age ; the founder of the wealth of the Astors was a butcher's boy, Baron Meyer Amschel von Rothschild a pedlar, Alfred Krupp a smith. Rockefeller, the head of the Standard Oil Trust, a clerk. All these most successful men were autodidacts. People well acquainted with the City can name a goodly number of milHonaires who occa- sionally drop an ' h,' the only evidence left of an arduous career from the bottom rung of the ladder. Why have so few eminently successful men been school- trained ? Because the acceptance of ready-made opinions EDUCATION AND ITS DANGEES 329 kills the original thinking power and unbiassed resource- fulness of the mind, and paramount success cannot be achieved by docile scholars and imitators, but only by pioneers. Besides, the independent spirits who are pre- destined for future greatness are usually impatient of the restraint of schools, and of their formal and largely un- practical tuition, and wish to be free to follow their own instincts towards success. In view of these numerous well-known instances of greatness achieved by men unaided, but also unspoiled by education, who taught themselves what they found necessary to learn, which instances might be multiplied ad infinitum, it is only natural to find a strong opposition to education among the unlearned men whose native shrewd common sense has not been affected by the reading of books. But even the learned begin to waver and to ask themselves whether the much-vaunted benefits of learning have not been largely over-estimated, and whether the undoubted advantages of education are not more than counterbalanced by corresponding disadvantages. The doubts as to the advantages of education have been considerably strengthened by our experiences in the South African War. Many observers have been struck by the curious phenomenon that our most highly educated officers had on the whole so little success against the Boer officers, who were not only quite unlearned in the science of war, but also mostly uneducated, and sometimes grossly ignorant in elementary knowledge, peasants who had perhaps not even heard the names of Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Moltke, whose every battle our erudite officers had at their fingers' ends. The highest military school in Great Britain is the Staff College. The officers who have succeeded in passing through that institution are considered to be the most intellectual, and are marked out for future employment in the most responsible positions. They are our most scientific soldiers 330 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN and represent the flower of learning in the army. Con- sequently it might be expected that our most distinguished generals should be Staff College men. However, if we look through the Army List, it appears that our most successful of&cers in the Boer War— Lord Roberts, Lord Kitchener, Sir John French, Sir George White, Sir Archibald Hunter, Sir Ian Hamilton, Lord Dundonald, Sir Hector Macdonald, and General Baden-Powell — ^have not passed the Staff College. On the other hand, we find that the late General CoUey, who lost Majuba, was a prominent military scientist and Staff College professor, and that General Gatacre, who was defeated at Stormberg, and Generals Kelly-Kenny, Hildyard, Hart, and Barton, who also took part in the South African War, though not with conspicuous success, have the much-coveted P.S.C. (passed Staff College) printed after their names. Li the South African War it came to pass, as some crusty old colonels had prophesied, that the of&cers who were brimful of scien- tific military knowledge, and who could talk so learnedly on strategy and tactics, achieved nothing on the field of battle. Those who achieved something had not been ' trained ' to generalship in the Staff College, and had not had their natural thinking power, their common sense, crowded out of existence by the absorption of a huge store of book- learning. After some of our initial defeats a distinguished general was sent out, and it was reported that wherever he went a large Ubrary of military works, strategical, tactical, and historical, went with him. He and his hbrary went to Africa to save the situation, but not many months after that distinguished scientific general returned in disgrace to England, together with his hbrary. His imposing book knowledge, with which he could talk down any mere fighting officer, had availed him nothing in the field. Our ' highly trained ' professional intelligence of&cers proved also of very little value until they had unlearned EDUCATION AND ITS DANGERS 331 in Africa what they had been taught at home, whilst quite unlearned Transvaal peasants made splendid intelligence officers. On the other hand, ' Colonel ' Wools- Sampson, by far our best intelligence officer, was a civilian. Our politicians have unfortunately not yet learned the lessons of the South African War. Instead of investigating why the unlearned peasant officers defeated so often the flower of our military scientists, who were fortified with the most profound military education, and who had a most extensive knowledge of the battles, the strategy and tactics of all periods, from the time of Hannibal onwards, a com- mittee of gentlemen innocent of war was deputed to inquire into the education of our officers. Naturally enough their verdict was condemnatory of the present system, and various suggestions were made by it how to improve the education of our officers. Lord Kitchener, General French, Christian de Wet, and Louis Botha, fighting officers who are no doubt the most competent judges of the qualifications required in an officer for war, were, unfortunately, not asked for their opinion on such a vital matter. It would have been interesting to learn how much or how Uttle weight practical authorities of unrivalled weight, such as these, attach to school education of officers as practised in Great Britain, and what, according to their opinion, the effect of that school education is upon their common sense. In view of these few examples, which are universally known, and many more which are less famihar, it is not to be wondered at that thoughtful men begin to question the efficacy of education altogether. Hence the danger seems impending that after a spell of over-education the swing of the pendulum should bring us back again to under- education. Consequently it seems opportune to consider what the object of education should be, what the advantages and the disadvantages of education are, how the disad- vantages of education are caused, and how they may be 332 GEEAT AND GREATEB BEITAIN obviated, so that only the advantages of education should remain. The object of education has been laid down by the great thinkers of all times. King Solomon recommends education in order ' to give subtilty to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion ' (Prov. i. 4), and though he frequently recommends knowledge, he considers it as subsidiary to understanding, and wisely emphasises ' Wisdom is the principal thing ; therefore get wisdom : and with all thy getting get understanding ' (Prov. iv. 7). The advantages of a proper education are too generally known to be enlarged upon, consequently we may turn at once to the disadvantages inherent to education. No great thinker believed in the indiscriminate and uncritical acquisition, the mere storage of dead book- knowledge, to the confusion of the intellect — a result which is usually arrived at by the cramming in preparation for examinations, as practised by our present-day education. Learning by rote was probably in former ages as popular among schoolmasters as it is now, because it shows quickest some tangible results of education. Aware of this danger, Solomon urges again and again in his proverbs, ' Get wisdom,' ' Get understanding,' ' Get discretion.' He evidently thought an actively working and intelligent brain more valuable than one filled with knowledge. No doubt the object of education should be to enlighten the understanding, cultivate the taste, correct the temper, form the manners and habits of youth, and especially to fit them for usefulness in their future stations by preparing them for the battle of hfe. Is this object attained to any degree by our present education, or does it chiefly endow us with a show of motley knowledge, mostly useless in after Hfe, to the detriment of our natural thinking powers and of our common sense ? The danger inherent to the possession of a store of undigested knowledge is that it shackles, stifles, and often EDUCATION AND ITS DANGEES 333 kills the free working of the brain. That great danger of education has been clear to many great men, from Solomon onwards, who have given the matter a thought. Of the numerous epigrams which have been coined to warn against the danger of substituting a dead weight of undigested and therefore useless knowledge for an active unprejudiced and clear brain, endowed with common sense, I should Uke to mention only two : Goethe's ' The greater the knowledge the greater the doubt,' and Hazlitt's ' The most learned are often the most narrow-minded men.' The truth of these sayings is absolutely clear to everyone ; only this truth, though instinctively felt, has not sufficiently been taken to heart by those who direct the education of the nation. It has been truly said, ' Knowledge is power ' ; but know- ledge in itself is not power, only applied knowledge is power. Knowledge is like money, not valuable in itself, but only valuable for what it will buy. Knowledge is Uke b, strong weapon, but the best weapon is useless to a man who does not know how to wield it. Knowledge is an elementary power, but the power of the Niagara, or of steam, or of electricity, would be useless to mankind unless intelh- gence directs that power to some practical purpose. The Chinese knew magnetic iron long before the Europeans knew it. To them it was a piece of iron and nothing more. Handled by European intelhgence, magnetic iron became a useful power in the compass, which gave Europe the rule of the seas. The Chinese knew also gunpowder before the Europeans knew it, but to them it was only a plaything used in fireworks. A man who has read endless treatises on boxing, and who has studied the fights of all great boxers, gets knocked out whilst he is reflecting how Jackson or Pitzsimmons would have behaved. The officer whose mind is soaked in military literature and who can tell why Napoleon won the battle of Austerlitz and why Frederick the Great lost the battle of Hochkirch has lost in nine cases out of ten his common sense, the buoyancy, resourcefulness, 334 GREAT AND GBEATEB BBITAIN and impartiality of mind with which a less erudite officer would tackle a difficult question. A learned officer whose intelligence has been swallowed up by his military studies will not immediately fit his tactics to the case in point, as his free common sense would suggest, but tries often to make the case in point fit the theories which he has imbibed, or the historical precedents and parallels which his memory, not his judgment, suggests to him. An example : On December 15, 1899, General BuUer telegraphed to Lord Lansdowne from Ohievely Camp : ' . . . My view is that I ought to let Ladysmith go and keep good position for the defence of South Natal, and let time help us. . . . The best thing I can suggest is that I should keep defensive position and fight it out in a country better suited to our tactics.' Instead of looking at the position of the enemy and his tactics with an unbiassed mind, and fitting his tactics to the ground and circumstances. General Buller evidently wished to fit the ground and circumstances to his unsuitable book tactics, and proposed to retire to South Natal in the vain hope that the enemy would oblige him by following after, and thus enable him to fight there according to the book. Other generals complained that the Boers ' bolted ' before an attack with the bayonet could be ' brought home.' They seemed to consider that the Boers did not play the game squarely in deviating from the tactics taught in the text-books. Amongst statesmen also we find that, on the whole, the comparatively unlearned have a great advantage over the very learned and bookish. Our two most capable living statesmen. Lord Cromer and Mr. Chamberlain, were brought up for the army and for business respectively. They are hard workers and practical men, singularly free from useless book learning, and have never been known to rely for an argument on a text-book or a professorial dictum. Their learning has been chiefly derived from intelligent EDUCATION AND ITS DANGERS 335 observation in practical life, and they have fortunately not had time for lengthy theoretical studies. Mr. Gladstone, on the other hand, was a great scholar. Bjs mind was a perfect encyclopaedia of classical and other knowledge. He could look at every question from so many sides and could enlarge on its countless minor aspects and possibilities with such a wonderful brilUancy and intellectual subtlety that, after considering all the arguments which might be raised for or against, he did at the end often no longer know himself what side to take. He illustrated Bacon's saying, that it is not so important to know what might be said as what ought to be done. Mr. Gladstone's unwieldy store of book knowledge was a millstone round his neck, and disqualified him from being a statesman of the first rank. Instead of looking at essentials, his kaleidoscopic mind became involved and entangled by, the spinning out of his topic, and after straying through a confusing maze of arguments, he was apt to let slip the thread and to lose himself in trifles. Of English statesmen of the second rank, few are more thoroughly forgotten than those of the greatest and most subtle intellect and of nearly unequalled learning, such as Edward Gibbon, Macaulay, Sir George Comewall Lewis, Eobert Lowe, and the late Duke of Argyll. They are hardly remembered as statesmen. Compared with the men named above, the two greatest statesmen of modern times, Bismarck and Abraham Lincoln, might be called uncultured. Bismarck was comparatively unlearned and certainly not bookish. In fact, he expressed more than once his contempt of political and of economical theorists, and relied solely on his broad untrammelled common sense, taking no notice of professorial theories and protestations. Unhampered by the superfluous knowledge and the aesthetic feelings of a Gladstone, and quite free from the theories of political scientists and political economists, he brushed the hair-splitting arguments of over-culture 336 GEEAT AND GBEATEB BEITAIN aside, kept his eyes steadfastly on the main issue, and rapidly led his country from triumph to triumph, to greatness, unity, and wealth. Again, that great statesman Abraham Lincoln, the former lumberman, brought the sturdy, practical; sober common sense and the fearless determination, which he had acquired in his intercourse with Naturej from the backwoods into office, and saved America from disruption. No bookish men of science would have been able to replace either Bismarck or Lincoln. Of our rulers, unpoUshed Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth, and Cromwell are among the greatest. On the other hand, of our polished rulers, James I, ' the wisest fool in Christendom,' and Charles II, ' who never said a foolish thing, and never did a wise one,' confirm that people who have filled themselves with undigested learning can talk most wisely in drawing upon their store, but cannot act wisely in applying their accumulated knowledge to practical issues, because with them knowledge has taken the place of common sense. What appUes to military matters and to business of State applies with equal force to trade and commerce. None of our successful generals in the South African wars have passed through the Staff College, and no business man of the first rank in Great Britain, America, or Germany has, as far as is known, come from commercial high schools. On the contrary, it seems that Mr. Carnegie's advice 'to start young and broom in hand ' is most excellent counsel. While great fortunes and great industries have almost invariably been created by uneducated men, parvenus unembarrassed with learning, who taught themselves what they found necessary to know, we find on the other hand that those men who have made commercial science, political economy, their study, have not shown any success in business and have remained theorists. Most pohtical economists have had to live on their pen. Mr. Cobden went bankrupt in business. It is true that Bicardo was well off, but he EDUCATION AND ITS DANGERS 337 was a, stockbroker by trade, and with him political economy was only a hobby, not a serious pursuit. It is strange how few business men of the first rank have a good word to say of poUtical economy. If we look at the masses of the people we find that, owing to education, nearly everybody can read, and does read, copiously. Every labourer and his wife read regularly their paper, free public libraries are to be found everywhere, the best books can be bought at sixpence or less a volume, and there is hardly a family, howsoever poor it may be, without a library of much-read books. It might be assumed that with the opening of the intellectual world of books, the intellect of the people would also have been opened correspondingly, and that the people should be more enlightened. However, it seems very doubtful whether that is the case. Perhaps at no time have uncritical credulous- ness and crass superstition been greater. Perhaps at no time have swindlers, quacks, and charlatans of aU kinds found a larger and more gulHble clienUle. Cheiromancy and clairvoyance flourish everywhere and find countless patrons, from titled ladies to mill hands. The behef in ghosts is strong and spirituaUsm is fashionable. MiUions beheve in the faith cure and similar extraordinary gospels. The wildest schemes floated on the Stock Exchange find the millions of the public ready, and the thousands are raked in by missing-word competitions, bucket-shops, and other transparent frauds. Throughout the country we have large parties of convinced vaccinationists and anti-vaccina- tionists, of Imperiahsts and of Little Englanders, of Free- traders and of Protectionists, &c. However, if the average much-reading voter is asked why he is a convinced supporter of one or the other movement, he wiU not be able to adduce any intelligent reasons for his ' convinced ' attitude from his enhghtened common sense, notwithstanding his copious readings. As a matter of fact, he has had his belief drummed into his brain, which has been duUed by over-reading. 338 GEfiAT AND GEEATEB feEITAlN His common sense and his intellect have been smothered in paper and printer's ink. He does not reason, but believes and follows blindly. The average man reads not for information, but for amusement. Divorces, murders, cricket, betting, &c., are the most popular items, as a glance at the evening papers, or a visit to the public Hbraries, will show, and popular magazines and books are filled with extravagant stories of the love and murder type, which only serve to distort the people's ideas of life, and may incidentally also be responsible for the creation of the hooligan. Even the short story begins to tire the flaccid brain and the staled palate of the multitude. Its place is rapidly being taken by papers of the Scraps, Bits, and Chips style. In spite of the universal education of the people, the stage is steadily degenerating. The masses are no longer able to follow a drama, notwithstanding universal education, and can only concentrate their minds sufficiently to follow performances of the Scraps style, composed of comic songs, ballets, acrobatic feats, and buffoonery. The brain of the people has evidently not been sharpened, but been dulled and softened, by too much reading. Public opinion is ready made by the newspapers, and is assimilated without criticism by their readers. Common sense is getting more and more uncommon, and is being rapidly replaced by a useless store of miscellaneous odds and ends of information. In fact, the mind of the multitude is beginning to resemble the contents of a number of Tit-Bits, with its scrappy, heterogeneous and incoherent information. In consequence of this passive state of the public brain, any movement which is undertaken by people disposing of a sufficient store of money has a good chance of success. Whatever the gospel may be, if there is money enough to drum it loudly and continuously into the public ear, the public is sure to adopt it. For a nation whose policy is based upon the will of the masses, and for a Government EDUCATION AND ITS DANGEBS 339 which often waits for a lead from the electorate before acting, a state of affairs which supplants the native common sense and the judgment of the people by a confused mass of useless, unassimilated knowledge seems distinctly dangerous. It might be objected that common sense is not a subject that can be taught in schools, like writing or languages. That is true to some extent, but common sense can either be developed and strengthened in schools, or can be neglected and stifled. The tendency of schools constantly to provide for the scholar authoritative ready-made opinions which he has to learn by heart, and which he need not trouble to question or investigate, is no doubt fatal to his common sense. Instead of exercising and stimulating the power of judgment and criticism in the tender brain, and encouraging it to work independently, schools work almost exclusively upon the memory, which has to assimilate a bewildering, heterogeneous mass of chiefly ornamental facts and data, which more often than not prove utterly useless in after-hfe. Instead of filling the pupil's head with knowledge regardless of his judgment, schools should, before all, awaken the mental initiative and invigorate the indepen- dent thinking power of their pupils, and encourage them to use their common sense, in order to give ' subtUty to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion.' However, instead of thus equipping their pupils for Ufe, they cram the youthful brains so chokeful with chiefly orna- mental, and therefore futile, knowledge that their common sense becomes stunted. Of what use is a smattering of history, botany, and a few words of French to a workman's daughter who, from lack of common sense, cannot cook or cannot keep house for a future husband, or bring up her children sensibly? Of what use are the vague, hazy memories of science, which he has been taught, to a working- man who ruins his trade and loses his employment because he believes in the ' scientific ' restriction of labour, who goes idly on strike on the advice of a loud-mouthed agitator, z 2 340 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN or who thoughtlessly gambles his money away, owing to the lack of that common sense which has been stifled at school, and which has been replaced by a smattering of vain book knowledge ? Again, of what use are the higher studies of the merchant, the doctor, the soUcitor, the engineer, &c., if, owing to stifled common sense, they can make as httle use of their learning as did our highly trained officers in South Africa ? As the possession of knowledge without understanding is not only useless, but as its acquisition also deprives the learners of much valuable time which might more advan- tageously have been employed in a different way, it is quite clear that the schools should first of all try to develop the native intelligence, the common sense, of their pupils, instead of ignoring its presence and weakening its force. Furthermore, schoolmasters should constantly bear in mind that knowledge can only be usefully acquired in proportion to the common sense possessed by the learner, that learning must be subordinate to understanding, and that, though common sense can make excellent use of knowledge, know- ledge can never replace common sense. Tuition should, therefore, always look to the intellectual power of the scholar, as the engineer looks to the pressure gauge, and regulate accordingly the rate of progress in learning, instead of mechanically filling the learner's brain to the full capacity of the memory, and thereby crowding out the common sense. A thorough investigation of the art of teaching is needed, and such an investigation may show the necessity of aban- doning altogether competitive examinations of the present type, which rather go to show the strength of the pupil's memory than the far more important soundness of his judgment. However, more will be required than strengthening the judgment of the pupil and regulating the quantity of learning to be taught by the assimilative, not the retentive power EDUCATION AND ITS DANGERS 341 of the individual. It will be the duty of our statesmen to discover whether the present practice of education and the topics taught are most conducive to fit the youth of the nation for their future stations in practical hfe. To the solution of that most important question every true patriot, and especially every practical man, can materially contribute, for it is essentially a practical man's question, and not an educationalist's, as has hitherto been usually assumed. That our present education, primary, secondary, and tertiary, is on the whole so httle practical that it treats the critical faculties of the pupil with sublime disregard, that it consequently tends to deprive the nation of its common sense, and thereby not fits but unfits the youth of the nation for practical life, cannot be wondered at. The reason is that our whole educational system is unfortunately schoolmaster- made. No doubt the fittest educators for any walk of hfe are those men who have achieved conspicuous success in it. Lord Kitchener would probably be able to train officers of distinction. Sir Edward Clarke would probably be able to educate lawyers of prominence, and Mr. Carnegie would very likely raise successful business men. Not schools but great men have always been the trainers of great men, whenever great men have not trained themselves unaided. In proof of this I would cite the pupils of Plato, the schools of the great Italian painters during the Renaissance, the excellent officers trained by Frederick the Great, Napoleon, and Nelson. Successful men are most competent to teach others how to attain success. Schoolmasters are most competent to train schoolmasters. Therefore, unless a wholesome influence from outside supplies the leaven and brings on practical reforms, primary education will remain what it is, classical education will continue to be forced on young men to whom it is absolutely useless in after-hfe, and tertiary education will not be brought up to the practical requirements of the nation. 342 GREAT AND GRBATEE BEITAIN It is unlikely that the services of Mr. Carnegie will be secured by a commercial academy, or those of Lord Kitchener by the Staff College, and it is equally unlikely that able soldiers, chemists, engineers, business men, &c., will throw away their unlimited chances in exchange for a tedious professorship that gives them a precarious, or at the best a moderate, income, and a mediocre position. But, even assumiiig that first-class practical men could be secured for teaching practical matters, they would be too much wrapped up in teaching to keep up to date in practice, and they would soon fall behind in their teaching. Besides, a practical man rapidly becomes professorial when he is put in the lecturer's chair. A Virchow, a Treves, or a Marconi could probably teach a few intelligent, self-chosen assistants more in the laboratory during a month, without taking any trouble, and without interrupting his work, than he could teach an audience in two years by carefully prepared lectures. The triumphs of German science and industry are unjustly attributed to the numerous universities and technical and other schools which exist in Germany. Those institutions have been instrumental in turning out an immense host of professors, medical men, lawyers, &c., of medium ability, of whom the vast majority is only partly occupied or unoccupied. Men of great ability are raised not by the superficial education of the many, but by the intensive culture of the few, and Germany's successes in science and industry are traceable to the intensive, not the extensive tuition, that has been provided by her. The ability of the best German scientists, engineers, soldiers, &c., has wisely been utilised towards intensive education. Moltke was at the same time the commander of the army and the chief of the staff, and in his latter quality he trained the staff officers in the art of organisation and of war, especially those who showed most talent, such as his successor. Von Waldersee, who acted for a long time as his EDUCATION AND ITS DANGERS 343 assistant. Germany's successes in chemistry are directly traceable to Justus von Liebig and his assistants in the laboratory, her electrical paramountcy was created by W. von Siemens and his pupils. In fact, most of the leading men of science and industry in Germany were trained by a few very able men of the type of Moltke, Liebig, and Siemens, whose assistants they have been. Schoolmasters are too far removed from the turmoil of the world to be able to train young men and fit them for the battle of life if left to themselves. The training of the young cannot safely be left to the unguided schoolmaster. To improve education the practical men of the nation, the men who do things and who can take a comprehensive view of the requirements of education, manufacturers, merchants, bankers, lawyers, doctors, officers, &c., must take an active part, not only a sympathetic interest, in education and assist in the mapping out of an up-to-date educational programme of real practical utility. The shortcomings of the schools are not of modern date. As long as human records exist schools have had a distinctly conservative strain in their character. The schools of Judeea and Egypt were ecclesiastical — that is to say, conservative — and the earliest and medieval Christian schools were monastic. From medieval monastic times the present schools have faithfully preserved their classic programme and their exaggerated veneration of the studia humaniora. They have preserved their somewhat monastic character and programme, partly owing to the dead weight of tradition, which has ever been very powerful in schools, partly owing to the influence of clergymen upon education. No doubt the blending of ecclesiastical and scholastic influences has greatly improved the morals of the nation, and has made it high-minded ; but these influences, which have been excellent for the ideal equipment of Great Britain, have not worked as satisfactorily for the practical and scientific advancement of the country. Generally speaking, clergymen 344 GREAT AND GEEATEB BRITAIN cannot be considered to be the fittest exponents of science. With few exceptions schoolmasters of every type form an extremely conservative, self-centred and somewhat self- important body. Speaking always with the voice of authority to their classes, they tend to become autocratic in their views, and, having themselves studied the classics, they believe the study of the classics to be the best prepara- tion for any and every career. Abeunt studia in mores. New ideas have hardly ever come from schools. On the contrary, schools have ever proved reactionary and inimical to new ideas. Great minds have ever been persecuted owing to the narrow-mindedness and the jealousy of the schools from Socrates onwards. Galileo, Columbus, and many other great discoverers were imprisoned and treated like criminals with the approval, and largely at the instigation, of schools of science because their discoveries threatened the tenets of accepted learning. Even the heavy artillery of theology has been advanced by the universities of the^Middle Ages, and also of later days, against geological and astronomical discoveries. Newton and Darwin were laughed at by the faculties, and in Roman CathoHc universities Darwin is still ostracised, according to report. Kant became a pro- fessor only when he was forty-six years old, after fifteen years' lecturing ; Schopenhauer never became a professor, owing to the jealousy of the universities. Liebig and Pasteur were jeered at by the profession ; vaccination and homoeopathy had to fight for decades against the envy of the medical schools. David Strauss and Renan were com- pelled to leave their universities ; Beethoven and Wagner were persecuted by the schools of music, and were treated like madmen because they did not conform with musical traditions. Millet was neglected by the Salon in Paris, and Whistler snubbed by the Royal Academy in London. The inventions of Edison, Marconi, Rontgen, Koch, could not be explained away by modern science schools, but their EDUCATION AND ITS DANGERS 345 discoveries have been greeted by the universities with per- sonal attacks full of animosity, and these men have been pictured as the commercially successful exploiters of other people's ideas. Wherever we look we find the schools somewhat inclined towards reaction. That being their character, not only in Great Britain, but everywhere, it seems clear that it would be unreasonable to expect that the schools should reform themselves. Therefore reforms must come from outside unless education is to remain what it is — an elaborate sham, with science in its mouth, but in reahty a course of cramming, destructive of common sense. To improve education, education may have to be in- dividualised ; that is to say, the present uniformity of the schools may have to give way to schools catering directly for the practical needs of the various classes of the popula- tion. Why should a number of pupils who wish to follow different occupations, which require the most diversified qualifications of mind and body, and of knowledge, and therefore also a diversified course of preparatory study, all be classed together, treated alike, and be compelled to learn the same subjects ? Already pupils are enabled to some extent to choose subjects for instruction, but speciahsa- tion has not by any means been earried far enough. In future we shall very likely not so much require schools which exclusively aim at mechanically cramming their pupils for certain examinations, which are for show but otherwise of doubtful value, but we shall require intelligently designed institutions which cater directly for boys who intend to become lawyers, or doctors, or business men, &c. The various classes of the community are bound to feel, in course of time, the absolute necessity of a more practical and more directly useful tuition for their children. They are bound to recognise the absolute futility of measuring ability by examinations, which show only the retentive, not the in- tellectual, capacity of the brain, and the commercial instinct 346 GREAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN of schoolmasters will supply the demand for individualised schools of a more practical type adapted to give a thorough businesshke preparation to their pupils. Why should a boy, who is interested in a certain science or pursuit, be forced to waste a number of precious years in studying various subjects which are distinctly unsympathetic to him, and to receive at the same time during all these years but a scant and superficial tuition in the one subject which he ardently wishes to study, and to which he would like to devote his Ufe ? A modest beginning to provide competent and ef&cient tuition in special subjects is already being made by practical men in a tentative way. Certain trades — as, for instance, the gunmakers in Sheffield — ^have established technical schools of their own, which are doing excellent work, and which, on the whole, should prove more competent and more businesslike than technical schools established by outside agencies, such as the Government, corporations, or universities. Let us hope that the spirit of combination which seems to be growing, though somewhat slowly, within the community, will in due course dot the whole country with technical schools founded and supervised by the various industries themselves, and planted under the very eye of these industries in their business centre. The application of science to industry will then become a very powerful factor and an established fact where it is now only a pious wish. Let us hope, besides, that the direct active interest in education, which practical men are begimiing to take, will cause in course of time the mapping out of specialised school programmes by competent experts for all schools, from elementary schools to universities throughout the country ; for, after all, practical men, not tradition-bound schoolmasters and well-meaning clergymen, can determine the practical requirements of education. CHAPTER XV INDIVIDUALISM OR PATRIOTISM ? THE WAY TO A NEW NATIONAL LIFE Whether the British Empire wUl stand or fall depends most of all on the spirit and the will of the people. We must organise the Empire. We must reform many of our institutions, but before all we must reform ourselves. We must find the way to a new national life, and Japan furnishes us with an example which must fill us with confidence and hope. ' It is a well-known characteristic of mankind to despise what they do not know. For this reason the Japanese, until quite recently, looked down upon foreigners as bar- barians. But the foreigners display the same mental attitude which formerly distinguished the Japanese. They do not know what to them is a foreign country — Japan.' It is a good many years ago since Fukuzawa Yukichi, perhaps the foremost Japanese educationahst of modern times, wrote these words, and since then the world has learned to respect and to admire Japan for her splendid achievements in every province of human activity. But the world still believes that the reform of Japan is a thing of yesterday, a mushroom growth which has sprung up over- night, and which, as we are told, may disappear as suddenly as it came when ' the Asiatic ' reasserts himself, tears up his European clothes, hke the monkey in the fable, and returns to his native ways. In reality, the foundation on which the magnificent 347 348 GREAT AND GEEATEE BRITAIN edifice of modern Japan has been erected with marvellous skill and unparalleled rapidity was laid at a time when Europe was still in swaddling clothes, and successive genera- tions have added stone by stone to the building, which, with the adaptation of European civiUsation, received its natural completion. The rise of modern Japan may seem hke a fairy tale to the superficial observer in Europe or America, but to the Japanese themselves the reform of their country appears natural in view of its history, character, and traditions. If we wish to understand how and why Japan succeeded in carrying out perhaps the most marvellous reformation which any empire has ever effected, in order to gauge what are her aims and what her future wiU be, we must study her progress and her reformation from Japanese sources. Such study will reveal the fact that Europe and America can now learn quite as much from Japan as she has learned from them in the past. Twenty years ago, when Japan seemed, in European eyes, no greater than Siam or Liberia, Pukuzawa Yukichi said : ' Though we learned the art of navigation during the last twenty years, it is neither within the last twenty years, nor within the last 200 years, that we cultivated and trained our intellect so as to enable us to learn that art. That con- tinued training is characteristic of Japanese civilisation, and can be traced back hundreds and thousands of years, and for that continuity of effort we ought to be thankful to our ancestors. ' We have never been backward or lacking in civilisation and progress. What we wanted was only to adapt the out- ward manifestations of our civihsation to the requirements of the time. Therefore, let us study not only navigation, but every other branch of European knowledge and civihsa- tion, however trifling it may be, and adopt what is useful, leaving alone what is useless. Thus shall we fortify our national power and well-being. INDIVIDUALISM OE PATEIOTISM ? 349 ' On the great stage of the world, where aU men can see, we mean to show what we can do, and vie with other nations in all arts and sciences. Thus shall we make our country- great and independent. This is my passionate desire.' Fukuzawa Yukichi and the other great reformers of his time have now succeeded in carrying out their ardent ambition, and have raised their coimtry to the eminent position in the world which is its due. Now let us take a rapid glance at old Japan, and then watch its transformation and modernisation. The early history of Japan is wrapped in obscurity, but from the fact that the present Emperor comes from a dynasty which, in unbroken succession, has governed the country for more than 2,500 years, we may assume that the Japanese were a politically highly organised, well-ordered, and therefore a highly cultured people centuries before the time of Alexander the Great. Seven centuries before Christ, Japan was already a seafaring nation, for Japanese ships went over to Corea. In the year 86 b.c. the Emperor Sujin had the first census of the population taken, and in 645 the Emperor Kotoku ordered that regular census registers should be compiled every six years. In Great Britain we find that only in 1801, and after much obstruction and opposition, was the first census taken. Japan's first regular postal service was established in the year 202, and was perfected in later centuries. The great renaissance of Japan took place in the seventh and eighth centuries, or several hundred years before Wilham the Conqueror. Prince Shotoku initiated that period of splendid and universal progress. He organised the ad- ministrative system of the country, and he created that spirit of Japan which combines absolute fearlessness, patriotism, and the keenest sense of personal honour with un- selfishness, unfaihng courtesy, gentleness, and obedience to authority. The following rules of political conduct laid down by the Prince during a time of disorder have been, and 350 GREAT AND GREATBB BRITAIN still are, the Ten Commandments of the Japanese, and were spoken of as The Constitution : ' . . . Concord and harmony are priceless ; obedience to estabUshed principles is the first duty of man. But in our country each section of people has its own views, and few possess the light. Dis- loyalty to Sovereign and parents, disputes among neighbours, are the results. That the upper classes should be in unity among themselves, and intimate with the lower, and that all matters in dispute should be submitted to arbitration — that is the way to place Society on a basis of strict justice. ' Imperial edicts must be respected. The Sovereign is to be regarded as the heaven, his subjects as the earth . . . so the Sovereign shows the way, the subject follows it. In- difference to the Imperial edicts signifies national ruin. ' Courtesy must be the rule of conduct for all ministers and officials of the Government. Social order and due distinctions between the classes can only be preserved by strict conformity with etiquette. ' To punish the evil and reward the good is humanity's best law. A good deed should never be left um:ewarded or an evil unrebuked. Sycophancy and dishonesty are the most potent factors for subverting the State and destroying the people. ' To be just, one must have faith. Every affair demands a certain measure of faith on the part of those who deal with it. Every question, whatever its nature or tendency, requires for its settlement an exercise of faith and authority. Mutual confidence among officials renders all things possible of accomplishment ; want of confidence between sovereign and subject makes failure inevitable. ' Anger should be curbed and wrath cast away. The faults of another should not cause our resentment. ' To chide a fault does not prevent its repetition, nor can the censor himself be secure from error. The sure road to success is that trodden by the people in unison. ' Those in authority should never harbour hatred or INDIVIDUALISM OB PATRIOTISM ? 351 jealousy of one another. Hate begets hate and jealousy is Wind. ' The imperative duty of man in his capacity of a subject is to sacrifice his private interest to the pubUc good. Egoism forbids co-operation, and without co-operation there cannot be any great achievement.' These lines, which were written about 600 a.d., or thirteen hundred years ago, and which have the subHme ring of inspiration about them, explain the mystery of the Japanese character better than a lengthy account of Japan's history, philosophy, and customs. When we remember that these principles have continuously been taught in Japan during more than forty generations, we can under- stand the character and spirit of the country, to which it owes its magnificent successes. When we read these lines we can realise that Fukuzawa Yukichi's claim to an old civihsation was not a hollow boast, and we can comprehend why the passionate ambition to elevate their country animates every thinking Japanese, from the prince to the peasant. These guiding principles show us the moral and mental foundation of Japan, and enable us to understand why the Japanese officials are the flower of the nation, why class jealousy is absent in Japan, and why Japan is the only country in the world where, regardless of birth, weaK^, and connexions, all careers and the very highest offices in the land are open to all comers. These principles of political conduct, which might have been drawn up by a Lycurgus or a Solon, explain the wonder- ful unity of purpose, courage, self-reliance, self-discipline, homogeneity, and patriotism of the Japanese nation which at present astonish the world ; and it seems that Japan owes her greatness and success less to the superior will- power and to the inborn genius of the individual Japanese than to the traditional education of the character of the nation, in which the educational ideas of Athens and Sparta are harmoniously blended. British education rightly 352 GBEAT AND GRBATEE BEITAIN attaches great weight to the formation of character, but it would seem that British educationahsts, in the highest sense of the word, can learn more from Japan than from the United States and Germany, where education is prin- cipally directed towards the advancement of learning and the somewhat indiscriminate distribution of knowledge. In olden times, when communications were exceedingly bad, the various centres of original culture existing in the world were separated from one another by such vast dis- tances that each highly cultured country naturally thought itself the foremost country of the universe, considered the inhabitants of other nations as barbarians, refused to learn from them, became self-concentrated, rigidly conservative, and at last retrogressive. We find this narrow-minded, though explicable, attitude of haughty contempt for all foreign culture, which finally results in the inability to adopt a superior civilisation and organisation, in Egypt, Babylonia, Persia, Palestine, Greece, China, and many other ancient countries. To the ever-victorious men of old Japan, also, their country was naturally the centre of the universe ; it was created by the gods themselves, and their Emperor was the Son of Heaven, being a direct descendant of the great Sun- goddess. But national self-consciousness and self-admira- tion never became so overwhelmingly strong as to obscure Japan's open mind. On the contrary, the Japanese were always ready to learn from other countries, and to graft foreign culture on to their own. Prom conquered Corea Japan introduced Buddhism, and from the Chinese she learned much in hterature, philosophy, and art. In the year 195 the Chinese species of silkworm was brought into the country, and later on silk-weavers from various districts of China were introduced and distributed all over Japan to teach the inhabitants the art of silk-weaving. In 805 Denkyo Daishi introduced tea plants in a similar manner. Evidently Japan was .ever ready and anxious to learn from • '' INDIVIDUALISM OE PATEIOTISM ? 353 the foreigner all that could be learned, and to adapt, but not to slavishly copy, all that could benefit and elevate the nation. Up to a few hundred years ago European civilisation was unknown in Eastern Asia. Largely owing to the influence of Buddhism, Japan had been permeated with Chinese Uterature and Chinese ideas, and had come to con- sider Chinese culture in many respects superior to her own. Therefore it was not unnatural that, in the sixteenth century, when Portuguese missionaries caused a widespread revolt, Japan resolved to close, more sinico, the country against all foreign intercourse. From 1638 to 1853, or for more than two hundred years, Japan led a self-centred existence far away from the outer world, like the sleeping beauty of the fairy tale ; but in the latter year she was waked out of her self-chosen seclusion by the arrival of Commodore Perry and his squadron, who, to the amazement of Japan, had come to wring a commercial treaty from the country, and to open it, if necessary by force, to the hated foreigners, Japan had considered herself safe from the contact of foreigners, and inviolable. The intrusion of Commodore Perry was, in the eyes of all Japan, a crime and almost a sacrilege. The sanctity of the country had been defiled, its laws had been set at defiance, and the Government had no power to resist the Commodore, who used veiled threats of employing force. The feeling of national honour, which is stronger in Japan than in any other country, was deeply outraged, and the passionately patriotic nation was shaken to its base with violent indignation. Nothing can give a better idea of the indescribable excite- ment and turmoil which was caused by Commodore Perry's intrusion than the vivid account of Genjo Yume Monogatari, a contemporaneous writer. He says : ' It was in the summer of 1853 that an individual named Perry, who called himself the envoy of the United States of America, suddenly arrived at Uraga, in the province of Sagami, with four ships of war, ^ 2 a 354 GEEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN declaring that he brought a letter from his country to Japan and that he wished to deliver it to the Sovereign, The Governor of the place, Toda Idzu No Kami, much alarmed by this extraordinary event, hastened to the spot to inform himself of its meaning. The envoy stated, in reply to questions, that he desired to see a chief minister in order to explain the object of his visit, and to hand over to him the letter with which he was charged. The Governor then dispatched a messenger on horseback with all haste to carry this information to the Castle of Yedo, where a great scene of confusion ensued on his arrival. Fresh messengers followed, and the Shogun lyeyoshi, on receiving them, was exceeding troubled, and summoned all the officials to a council. ' At first the fear seemed so sudden and so formidable that they were too alarmed to open their mouths, but in the end orders were issued to the great clans to keep strict watch at various points on the shore, as it was possible that the "barbarian" vessels might proceed to commit acts of violence. ' Presently a learned Chinese scholar was sent to Uraga, had an interview with the American envoy, and returned with the letter, which expressed the desire of the United States to estabhsh friendship and intercourse with Japan, and said, according to this account, that if they met with a refusal they should commence hostilities. ' Thereupon the Shogun was greatly distressed, and again summoned a council. He also asked the opinion of the Daimios. The assembled officials were exceedingly dis- turbed, and nearly broke their hearts over consultations which lasted all day and all night. ' The nobles and retired nobles in Yedo were informed that they were at liberty to state any ideas they might have on the subject, and, although they all gave their opinions, the diversity of propositions was so great that no decision was arrived at. INDIVIDUALISM OB PATRIOTISM ? 355 ' The military class had, during a long peace, neglected military arts ; they had given themselves up to pleasure and luxury, and there were very few who had put on armour for many years, so that they were greatly alarmed at the prospect that war might break out at a moment's notice, and began to run hither and thither in search of arms. The city of Yedo and the surrounding villages were in a great tumult. And there was such a state of confusion among all classes that the Governors of the city were compelled to issue a notification to the people, and this in the end had the effect of quieting the general anxiety. But in the Castle never was a decision further from being arrived at, and, whilst time was thus idly wasted, the envoy was con- stantly demanding an answer.' Commodore Perry happened to arrive at a most critical period in the history of Japan. Since 1192 the formerly subordinate military class had held the reins of government, and the Shogun, who was supposed to be only the generalis- simo of Japan, and who was appointed by the Mikado, had possessed himself of all political power. The Mikado was the nominal ruler of the country, but, though he was treated with the greatest respect, was in reality a prisoner in his palace at Kyoto. The country was divided into numerous principalities, which were more or less independent. Japan was an empire in name, but no longer an empire in fact. Thus the land was ruled by a number of great feudal chiefs, who were supported by their armed retainers, the Samurai, the soldier caste of Japan. The autonomous territories of the great nobles were ruled on different principles — ^they possessed their own laws, finances, and regulations. There was consequently, perhaps, less unity in Japan then than there is at present in China. In the absence of a powerful centralising influence, the country had become divided against itself : the formerly unquestioned authority of the Shogun had been shaken and gravely compromised, the nobles wer6 intriguing for power, '' 2 A 2 356 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN the people were arbitrarily and harshly treated, feudalism felt the ground heave and give way under its feet. The numerous Daimios, the great feudal lords of old Japan, were generous patrons of literature and art, and strove to make their residences not only seats of power, but also centres of learning. From these learned circles the ultimate revolt against the Shogun's usurpation took its beginning. In 1715 the Prince of Mito finished, with the assistance of a host of scholars, his great work, ' Dia Nihon Shi,' or history of Japan. This classical work was copied by hand by industrious students and eager patriots, and was circulated throughout the Empire, being printed only in 1851. It is characteristic of the spirit of intense and reflective patriotism of Japan that this celebrated compila- tion, which gave an account of the decay of the Mikado's power and of the usurpation by the Shoguns, became the strongest factor in the eventual overthrow of the Shogunate, in the re-estabUshment of the Mikado's power, and in the unification of the Empire. The history by the Prince of Mito was followed by a history of the usurpation period by the celebrated scholar, poet, and historian, Rai Sanyo, who attacked with historic proof, unanswerable logic, and patriotic fervour the Shogun's usurpation of the Imperial power. He traced the history of Japan and the Imperial House, and mourned the disap- pearance of the true Imperial power. The influence of his writings was enormous, and not a few-Of his disciples bBcacae men of action, who carried out their master's ideas. Thus the Mikado's party found a strong and growing support among the intellectual classes. The body of malcontent ideaHsts and students was reinforced by the large body of devout Shintoists, who see in the Mikado their god, and the fountain of all virtue, honour and authority. Shintoism, which had been lying dormant for a longtime, experienced a wonderful revival, and became again a living faith. Consequently it was only natural that iKDlVIDtALlSM OH PATRIOTISM ? 357 the adherents to Japan's native religion were outraged when they were told that the Mikado had been ousted from power and was practically a prisoner. Thus disorder within the country was added to the danger threatening from without. While the conscience of the people was awaking to the ancient wrong done to the Mikado and clamouring for its redress by reinstating him in power, Japanese patriotism instinctively felt the need of uniting the nation against the insolent foreigner, and added force to the growing movement towards national unity and towards the reinstallation of the legitimate ruler. Under these circumstances it was only natural that the ferment of the nation was greatly increased by the behaviour of the insolent foreigners, and by their — to Japanese minds — outrageous demands, and the national feeling rose to fever heat when it was discovered that the Shogun had, in spite of the remonstrance of the Mikado, concluded the treaty of 1854, whereby the country was opened to foreign trade, merely in order to get rid of the troublesome and dreaded foreigners at any price. From 1854 onward the problem whether the foreigners should be exterminated or tolerated was uppermost in men's minds, and, as the majority of the nation was in favour of expelling the barbarians, the position of the unfortunate Shogun, who had concluded the treaty without the Mikado's consent, became one of very great difficulty. During this period of national agitation and perturbation the Mikado issued a rescript, in which he said : ' Amity and commerce with foreigners brought disgrace on the country in the past. It is desirable that Kyoto and Yedo should join their strengths and plan the welfare of the Empire.' This idea rapidly became universal, and led to the rallying cry of the people, which rang from one end of the Empire to the other : ' Destroy the Shogunate and raise the Mikado to his proper throne.' The hatred towards the foreign intruders became more 358 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN and more accentuated as time passed on. Europeans were murdered without provocation, and the guns on the coast opened fire on foreign ships, regardless of their nationality, when they passed by. These attacks led to the bombardment of Kagoshima on August 11, 1863, and to that of Shimonoseki on September 5, 1864. Though the Japanese on land bravely tried to defend themselves, they found their weapons unavailing against the superior armaments of the foreign ships. The effect of the two bombardments on the mind of Japan may best be gathered from the following memorandum of a native chronicler : ' The eyes of the Prince were opened through the fight of Kagoshima, and affairs appeared to him in a new light ; he changed in favour of foreigners, and thought now of making his country powerful and of completing his armaments.' The Emperor also wrote in a rather pathetic tone to the Shogun : ' I held a council the other day with my military nobility, but, unfortunately, inured to the habits of peace which for more than 200 years has existed in our country, we are unable to exclude and subdue our foreign enemies by the forcible means of war. ... If we compare our Japanese ships of war and cannon with those of the barbarians, we feel certain that they are not sufficient to inflict terror upon the foreign barbarians and are also insufficient to make the splendour of Japan shine in foreign countries. I should think that we only would make ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the barbarians.' The damage done by the bombardments was, after all, insignificant, and if Japan had possessed the spirit of China, the officials might easily have explained away these attacks as being unimportant and purely local affairs. However, the proud mind of Japan required no further humiliation to drive home the lesson, but immediately realised that the time of seclusion, conservatism, and feudalism was past, and that the nation's salvation could only henceforward be found INDIVIDUALISM OB PATEIOTISM ? 359 in progress and unity. As Professor Toyokichi lyenaga put it : ' Those bombardments showed the necessity of national union. Whether she would repel or receive the foreigner, Japan must present a united front. To this end a great change in the internal constitution of the Empire was needed. The internal resources of the nation had to be gathered into a common treasure, the police and the taxes had to be recognised as national, not as belonging to petty local chieftains, the power of the feudal lords had to be broken in order to reconstitute Japan as a single strong State under a single head. These are the ideas which led the way to the Restoration of 1868. Thus the bombardments of Kago- shima and Shimonoseki may be said to have helped indirectly in the Restoration. . . . ' When a country is threatened with foreign invasion, when the corporate action of its citizens against the enemy is needed, it becomes an imperative necessity to consult public opinion. In such a time centralisation is needed. Hence the first move of Japan after the advent of foreigners was to bring the scattered parts of the country together and unite them under one head. Japan had hitherto no formidable foreign enemy on her shores, so her governmental system, the regulating system of the social organism, received no impetus for self-development ; but as soon as a formidable people, either as allies or foes, appeared on the scene in 1853, we immediately see the remarkable change in the State system in Japan. It became necessary to consult public opinion. Councils of Kuges (nobles belonging to the Court of the Mikado) and Daimios (independent nobles) and meetings of Samurai sprang forth spontaneously.' Recognising that the reconstitution of the country, its reunion, and the re-establishment of the rule of the Mikado were absolute necessities for the continued independent ex- istence of Japan, the Shogun, the virtual ruler of the country, whose predecessors had governed Japan for hundreds of years, took a step which is almost unprecedented in history. 360 GBEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN Placing the welfare of his country high above the glorious traditions of his House, and waiving the historical claims to his exalted position which he possessed, the Shogun resigned his office on November 19, 1867, in a document which should for ever and to all nations be a monument of sublime patriotism. In this document he said : ' A retro- spect of the various changes through which the Empire has passed shows us that after the decadence of the monarchical authority power passed into the hands of the Minister of State ; that by the wars of 1156 to 1159 the governmental power came into the hands of the military class. ' My ancestor received greater marks of confidence than any before him, and his descendants have succeeded him for more than 200 years. Though I performed the same duties, the objects of government have not been attained and the penal laws have not been carried out ; and it is with a feeling of the greatest humiliation that I find myself obhged to acknowledge my own want of virtue as the cause of the present state of things. Moreover, our intercourse with foreign Powers becomes daily more extensive, and our foreign policy cannot be pursued unless directed by the whole power of the country. ' If, therefore, the old regime be changed and the govern- mental authority be restored to the Imperial Court ; if the councils of the whole Empire be collected and their wise decisions received, and if we are united with all our heart and all our strength to protect and maintain the Empire, it will be able to range itself with the nations of the earth. This comprises our whole duty towards our country.' This simple declaration is as manly, straightforward, and wholly admirable as the following verbal explanation of his step which the Shogun gave to Sir Harry Parkes and the French Minister. He said : ' I became convinced last autumn that the country would no longer be successfully governed while the power was divided between the Emperor and myself. ... I therefore, for the good of my country, INDIVIDUALISM OR PATRIOTISM ? 361 informed the Emperor that I resigned the governing power with the understanding that an assembly of Daimios shall be convened for the purpose of deciding in what maimer and by whom the government should be carried on in the future. ' In acting thus I sank my own interests and abandoned the power handed down to me by my ancestors in the more important interests of the country. ... In pursuance of this object I have retired from the scene of dispute instead of opposing force by force. ... As to who is the Sovereign of Japan, this is a question on which no one in Japan can entertain a doubt. The Emperor is the Sovereign. ' My object has been from the first to obey the will of the nation as to the future government. If the nation should decide that I ought to resign my powers, I am pre- pared to resign them for the good of the country. ... I had no other motive than the following : With an honest love for my country and people, I resigned the governing power which I inherited from my ancestors with the under- standing that I should assemble all the nobles of the Empire to discuss the question disinterestedly, and, adopting the opinion of the majority, which decided upon the reformation of the national constitution, I left the matter in the hands of the Imperial Court.' Thus the question whether the Mikado or the Shogun should be supreme was not decided by civil war, as might have been expected, but by the self-sacrifice of patriotism. The Mikado accepted the resignation of the Shogun, and with the disappearance of the latter from power the chief obstacle to Japan's unification and modernisation was re- moved. A Government was formed by the Mikado, and its first active step was a memorial to the Throne, which is so remarkable for its enlightenment and which is so important for the whole development of Japan that it seems necessary to quote a part of it. That interesting manifesto, which most clearly illustrates the mind of Japan and which brings the fundamental differences between that country and 362 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BRITAIN China into the strongest relief, says : '. . . It causes us some anxiety to feel that we may perhaps be following the bad example of the Chinese, who, fancying themselves alone great and worthy of respect and despising foreigners as little better than beasts, have come to suffer defeats at their hands and to have it lorded over themselves by those foreigners. ' It appears to us, therefore, after mature reflection, that the most important duty we have at present to perform is for high and low to unite harmoniously in understanding the conditions of the age, in effecting a national reformation, and commencing a great work : and that for this reason it is of the greatest necessity that we determine upon the attitude to be observed towards this question. ' Hitherto the Empire has held itself aloof from other countries and is ignorant of the force of the world ; the only object set has been to give ourselves the least trouble, and by daily retrogression we are in danger of falling under a foreign rule. ' By travelling to foreign countries and observing what good there is in them, by comparing their daily progress, the universality of intelligent government, of a sufficiency of mihtary defences and of abundant food for the people among them, with our present condition, the causes of prosperity and degeneracy may plainly be traced. . . . ' In order to restore the fallen fortunes of the Emperor and to make the Imperial dignity respected abroad, it is necessary to make a firm resolution and to get rid of t^e narrow-minded notions which have prevailed hitherto. ' We pray that the important personages of the Court will open their eyes and unite with those below them in establishing relations of amity in a single-minded maimer, and that, our deficiencies being supplied with what foreigners are superior in, an enduring government be established for future ages. Assist the Emperor in forming his decision wisely and in understanding the condition of the Empire ; let the foolish argument which has hitherto styled foreigners INDIVIDUALISM OB PATEIOTISM ? 363 dogs and goats and barbarians be abandoned ; let the Court ceremonies, hitherto imitated from the Chinese, be reformed, and the foreign representatives be bidden to Court in the manner prescribed in the rules current amongst all nations ; and let this be publicly notified throughout the country, so that the ignorant people may be taught in what light they are to regard this subject. This is our most earnest prayer, presented with all reverence and humility.' Happily, the Mikado himself saw the necessity for reform and progress. Had he been a man of ordinary ability, had he not been aided by a group of enlightened and far-seeing statesmen, he might have rested satisfied with regaining, by the force of circumstances, the power which his ancestors had lost centuries ago. He would have continued a rule of absolutism, and he would merely have tried to raise the defensive power of the country sufficiently to allow Japan to return to the seclusion to which the people had become accustomed. But, happily, Mutsu Hito was thoroughly in sympathy with the reformers, and on April 17, 1869, betook before the Court and the Assembly of Daimios the charter oath of five articles, which in substance were as follows : 1. A deliberative assembly shall be formed, and all measures shall be decided by public opinion. 2. The principles of social and political science shall be constantly studied by both the higher and lower classes of the people. 3. Everyone in the community shall be assisted in obtaining liberty of action for all good and lawful purposes. 4. All the old, absurd usages of former times shall be abolished and the impartiality and justice which are displayed in the working of Nature shall be adopted as the fundamental basis of the State. 5. Wisdom and knowledge shall be sought after in all quarters of the civilised world, for the purpose of firmly estabhshing the foundations of Empire. 364 GBEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN Thus the Mikado identified himself with the cause of reform, pledged the nation to progress, and made the success of the movement towards the modernisation of Japan a certainty. Henceforth the whole of the nation strove for progress and enlightenment with that passionate will-power and singleness of purpose which is not found outside Japan. By the voluntary surrender of power on the part of the Shogun, the Mikado had been installed, and he had pledged himself to progress ; but the formidable difficulties remained how to unify and modernise a nation which for centuries had been governed by a large number of independent princes whose power rested on an immense army of Samurai. The problem of abolishing feudalism and militarism, which, so far, had formed the groundwork of all government, was one of enormous difficulty, for the feudal lords and their Samurai considered themselves, naturally, as ' the government ' by tradition as well as by right. This apparently formidable question was, however, easily settled by the marvellous patriotism of those who held power in the land. Daimio Akidzuki, President of the Kogisho (the deliberat- ing council representing the clans), addressed the following memorial to the Throne : ' . . . The various Princes have used their lands and their people for their own purposes ; different laws have obtained in different places; the civil and criminal codes have been different in the various provinces. ' The clans have been called the screen of the country, but in reality they have caused its division. Internal relations having been confused, the strength of the country has been disunited and diminished. How can our small country of Japan enter into fellowship with the countries beyond the sea ? How can she hold up an example of a flourishing country ? ' Let those who wish to show their faith and loyalty act in the following manner, that they may firmly establish the foundations of Imperial government : INDIVIDUALISM OR PATRIOTISM ? 365 ' (1) Let them restore the territories which they have received from the Emperor and return to a constitutional and undivided country. ' (2) Let them abandon their titles, and under the name of Kuazoko (persons of honour) receive such small properties as may suffice for their wants. * (3) Let officers of the clans abandon that title, call themselves officers of the Emperor, receiving the property equal to that which they have held hitherto. ' Let these three important measures be adopted forth- with, that the Empire may be raised on a basis imperishable for ages. . . .' This declaration, which was inspired by the great states- men of the three leading clans, and which breathes a spirit of unselfish patriotism that seems almost incredible to the more stolid and the more selfish nations of the West, met with universal approval, and the great Daimios emulated one another in offering up to the Mikado their titles, their position, their lands, and their wealth. The Daimios of the west, for instance, said in their memorial : ' Now, when men are seeking for a new government, the great body and the great strength must neither be lent nor borrowed. . . . We therefore reverently offer up the list of our possessions and men. . . . Let Imperial orders be issued for eCltering and remodelling the territories of the various clans. Let all affairs of State, great and small, be directed by the Emperor,' On April 14, 1869, 118 Daimios, having a revenue of 12,000,000 kokus of rice, or about £24,000,000, had agreed to the proposed radical restoration. A few months later 241 out of 258 of these nobles had resigned their power, and the remaining seventeen, who were the only dissentients, soon followed suit. Thus feudahsm, which had existed in Japan for over eight centuries, voluntarily extinguished itself, and patriotism triumphed over selfish interests and the love of power. 366 GREAT AND GEEATEB BRITAIN The fall of feudalism was marked by the laconic Imperial decree of August 29, 1871, which simply announced : ' The clans are aboUshed and prefectures are estabhshed in their place.' As great an event in history has probably never been proclaimed by as short a decree. The new era of Japan, which is truly called the ' Meiji Era,' the era of enlightemnent, thus began with acts of noble self- sacrifice by the greatest in the land, and the patriotic example of the nobility stirred up the country from shore to shore. A feverish desire to sacrifice themselves for their country, a desire which is deeply implanted in all Japanese, took hold of the whole population, and when it was recognised that the enormous caste of Samurai, the warriors, who cost the country about £2,000,000 per annum, had no room in the modern State, patriotism again found the remedy. The army of professional soldiers, who had been taught that the sword was their sole and their only means of earning a living, and who disdained to earn their bread by industry or trade, quietly effaced themselves, surrendered the larger part of their income, and, without a murmur, accepted inglorious poverty in the shape of pensions which amounted to but a few pence per day, and which barely kept the men from starvation. The compensation paid to the nobles for surrendering their lands and, with the lands, their incomes to the State, the pensioning of the Samurai, and the rearrangement of finances from their local basis to an Imperial basis, was an enormous financial transaction of stupendous difficulty. The loans raised in connexion with this vast national reorganisation amounted to no less than 225,514,800 yen, or to the truly enormous sum of about £40,000,000. It speaks volumes for the financial strength of the country and for the consummate ability of the Japanese financiers that this enormous operation was satisfactorily carried out, and that by 1903 all but the trifling amount of 23,800,111 yen had been redeemed. INDIVIDUALISM OR PATRIOTISM ? 367 Many eulightened Japanese shared the opinion of the great educationaUst, Fukuzawa Yukichi, who fearlessly declared : ' The Government exists for the people, and not the people for the Government ; the Government officials are the servants of the people, and the people are their employers.' Hence the desire for representative govern- ment arose in Japan soon after the reformation, though the Japanese had hitherto only known government by despotism. Though the Japanese people had had no experience whatever of popular government, the Mikado and his advisers had so much confidence in the good sense and the patriotism of the nation that they decided upon giving the people a share in the government of the country. On October 12, 1881, the Mikado issued the famous declaration, in which he said : ' We have long intended to estabUsh gradually a constitutional form of government. ... It was with this object in view that we established the Senate in 1875, and authorised the formation of local assemblies in 1878. . . . We therefore hereby declare that we shall establish a Parliament in 1890, in order to carry into full effect the determination which we have announced ; and we charge our faithful subjects bearing our commissions to make in the meantime all necessary preparations to that end.' With the deliberate cautiousness and foresight which is characteristic of all Japanese action, the people were, step by step, introduced and accustomed to self-government. When the Senate had settled down, local assembUes were created, and when the local assemblies had proved their worth, it was announced that ten years hence a Parliament should be elected. Thus the leaders of public opinion had ample time to prepare the nation for the coming change, and were enabled to educate the electorate for their future duties. In consequence of this careful preparation and this wise delay the Japanese Parliament has proved a great success. The elections cause no excitement, the people record their 368 GREAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN votes with the full knowledge of their responsihility, and Parhament works with ability and decorum. Lengthy speeches are unknown in that assembly, and the House gets through an immense amount of work in an incredibly short time. Parliamentary peroration and obstruction are practically unknown in Japan, though there have been not a few pohtical struggles and dissolutions. However, party struggles are confined to domestic politics. The reconstitution of the body politic of Japan was crowned on April 1, 1890, when the Mikado solemnly promulgated a Constitution for Japan. Whilst in all other monarchical countries the Constitution had to be wrested from an unwilling sovereign by the force, and not infre- quently by the violence, of the people, Japan is the only country in the world which can boast of a monarch who has voluntarily divested himself of a part of his rights, and who has by his own free will granted a participation in the government to his subjects. This short sketch of one of the most remarkable chapters in the history of the world clearly proves that Japan's marvellous progress and her astonishing change from medieval Orientalism to modern Western culture is in no way a fact that can cause surprise. Though the Japanese are an extremely gifted people, they are, individually, probably no more talented than are the inhabitants of many other countries. Japan's progress has no doubt been meteoric, and her complete adoption of Western culture has certainly been startling. But her progress and her transformation appear only natural if we remember that Japan is a nation in which everybody, from the highest to the lowest, in all circumstances, un- flinchingly obeys the rule : * The imperative duty of man in his capacity of a subject is to sacrifice his private interests to the public good. Egoism forbids co-operation, and without co-operation there caimot be any great achievement.' The individualistic nations of the West in which the INDIVIDUALISM OB PATEIOTISM? 869 interests of the nation are only too often sacrificed to the selfish interests of the individual, where party loyalty is apt to take precedence over patriotism, where ministers, generals, and admirals are rarely appointed by merit only, where jobbery occurs even in time of war, and where everything is considered to be permitted that is not actually punished by law, will do well to learn from Japan's example, for it caimot be doubted that the cause of Japan's greatness and of Japan's success can be summed up ia the one word — patriotism. 2 B CHAPTEE XVI BEITISH AGEICULTURE — ITS DECAY AND ITS EB-CBBATION From both the national and the imperial point of \dew the British land problem is of the very greatest importance. It is undoubtedly as important as is the problem of safe- guarding our manufacturing industries and of binding together the motherland and the colonies in an indissoluble and indestructible union for mutual defence. As a matter of fact, the settlement of the British land problem is a necessary part of that great constructive national and imperial policy which Mr. Chamberlain has initiated, and with which Mr. Chamberlain's name wiU be cormected for all time. Mr. Chamberlain's policy was enthusiastically taken up by the Unionist party. Every Unionist became a missionary of empire. Unfortunately, but inevitably, Unionists were so absorbed by their mission, they were so absorbed in explaining their great pohcy of national and imperial organisation and reform, and especially the Tariff Reform part of that pohcy, to the people, and they were so absorbed in defending their pohcy against the attacks of their opponents, that the consideration of the great land problem had necessarily to be relegated to the background, and was in danger of being overlooked. Happily that danger is passed, and Unionists are under a twofold obligation to Mr. Lloyd George : Firstly, for having raised the land problem by means of his Budget of 1909, and for thus having given Unionists an opportunity of 370 BEITISH AGEICULTUBE 371 showing that Tariff Reform and land reform are parts of the same policy and must go hand in hand ; secondly, for having treated our great land problem in such a manner that the Unionist solution of that problem will certainly be far more acceptable to the nation than the fantastic and mischievous proposals of Mr. Lloyd George and his friends. Mr. Lloyd George said in his Budget speech of 1909 : ' Any man who has crossed and recrossed this country from North to South and East to West must have been perplexed at finding that there was so much waste and wilderness possible in such a crowded Uttle island. There are mUHons of acres in this country which are more stripped and sterile than they were, and providing a hving for fewer people than they did, even a thousand years ago. We are not getting out of the land anything hke what it is capable of endowing us with. Of the enormous quantity of agri- cultural, dairy produce and fruit, and of the timber which is imported into this country, a considerable portion could be raised on our own land. We have drawn upon the robust vitality of the rural areas of Great Britain, and especially of Ireland, and spent its energies recklessly in the devitalising atmosphere of urban factories and workshops as if the supply were inexhaustible. We are now beginning to realise that we have been spending our capital, and at a disastrous rate, and it is time we should make a real concerted national effort to replenish it. ' Every acre of land brought into cultivation, every acre of cultivated land brought into a higher state of culti- vation, means more labour of a healthy and productive character ; it means more abundant food — cheaper and better food — for the people.' Li the foregoing words Mr. Lloyd George did well sum up our agricultural problem ; but how did he propose to solve it? 2 B 2 372 GREAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN Mr. Lloyd George proposed to put heavy additional taxes on the landowners, and especially upon the large landowners, by means of heavy additions to the death duties, heavy additions to the income tax, and various heavy taxes on land. Most of our landowners work with a very small profit, some make no profit, some make a loss. Landowners have no unlimited liquid funds at their disposal wherewith they can pay heavy additional taxes. Therefore they can find the money for paying the heavy new imposts only by raising the rent of the farmers and by reducing their expenditure. The function of our landowners is not only to collect the rent and spend it on their own amusements, as Radical and SociaUst agitators seem to imagine. It is their function to finance agriculture by draining the land, erecting farmhouses and buildings, and keeping them in repair, providing seed and manure, and improving the land in every way, and many millions of pounds are spent by them in this manner in every year, to the great benefit of agriculture. The majority of our landowners live thriftily, and they cannot greatly reduce their personal expenditure. Therefore they will be able to pay the new taxes only by reducing their expenditure on the land. Hence Mr. Lloyd George's new taxes will inevitably lead to the raising of agricultural rents on the one hand, and to the starvation and exhaustion of the soil on the other. The profits of our farmers are very small. The prices for their agricultural produce are limited by the free com- petition of foreign agricultural produce. Hence they can pay increased rents only by making economies, by dismissing part of their labourers, by converting com lands and vegetable fields, which require much labour, into grazing fields, which require very Uttle labour. Mr. Lloyd George's new taxes will not re-create our rural industries, but they will accelerate the decline of our agriculture and the exodus of our rural population from the land. BRITISH AGEICULTURE 373 We have become to such an extent a nation of town dwellers, and we have become to such a degree estranged from the land, that very few of us are aware how great and how unnecessary has been the decline and decay of our agriculture. Many people argue complacently : Great Britain is a small and densely populated industrial country ; the great development of our manufacturing industries made the decline of our agriculture inevitable ; the decline of our agriculture, and the exodus of the rural population, is a natural phenomenon in a country such as ours. These often-heard arguments are fallacious. Like causes have like effects. Great Britain is not the only industrial country in Europe. If the development of the manufacturing industries was bound to lead to the decline of British agriculture, it should have led to a far greater decline of German agriculture, because Germany is agri- culturally in a much less favourable position than is Great Britain. Germany's soil is much poorer than ours. Her territory east of the Elbe is a huge sandy plain. Great ranges of lofty and sterile mountains occur in the south and west. Her climate has extremes of cold and heat unknown to Great Britain. The air is dry. Owing to these unfavourable conditions Germany can grow wheat only in a few favoured spots, and she has to rely for bread principally on rye. Besides, Germany is an inland country. Hence the transport of agricultural produce from the purely agricultural east to the densely populated industrial west is exceedingly costly. Great Britain, on the other hand, has a naturally rich soil, few mountains except in the north, a mild and equable climate, thanks to the Gulf Stream, and a very humid air helpful to vegetation. Our great centres of population, the natural markets of our agriculturists, are to be found in every part of the country in easy reach of our fields. Besides, our agricultural interior is everywhere in easy reach of the sea and of cheap 374 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN coastwise transport to our great towns which He on or near the sea border. Nature has given to German agriculture great disadvantages which are unknown to our farmers. During the last thirty years the progress of the German manufacturing industries has been probably far more rapid than the progress of our manufacturing industries has been at any time in our history. Nevertheless her so unfavour- ably situated agriculture has not decayed through the rise of her manufacturing industries, but has mightily grown. If we wish to treat a disease successfully, we must first of all ascertain its nature and extent and then diagnose its causes. A comparison of our agriculture with that of Germany will show how great and terrible has been the decline of our agriculture, and how inadequate is the way in which our great agricultural resources are utiUsed. Such a comparison will clearly prove that the vigorous develop- ment of the manufacturing industries need not by any means lead to the neglect and the decay of a nation's agriculture ; that the manufacturing industries and the rural industries may flourish side by side. It will besides help us to ascertain the causes which have led to the decay of our agriculture and indicate to us the remedies. The Royal Commission on Agriculture estimated in 1894 that the loss of agricultural capital, which we have suffered owing to the decay of our agriculture since 1874, amounted to £1,000,000,000. That loss has constantly grown since then. In 1905 Sir Robert Palgrave, the well-known statis- tician, estimated that loss at £1,700,000,000, and it may amount now to £2,000,000,000, a sum three times as large as our huge National Debt. How has that enormous loss arisen ? It is generally known that wheat has gone out of cultivation in this country, but it is not generally known BEITISH AGEICULTURE 375 that our dependence on foreign wheat has increased as follows : AvEEAaE Number ov British People fed on British Wheat : In 1841-45 In 1901-5 24,000,000 people out of a population of 26,800,000 4,500,000 „ „ „ 42,000,000 Sixty years ago British people lived practically entirely on British wheat. Now we grow scarcely enough wheat to keep us during five weeks in every year. However, not only has wheat gone out of cultivation, but the acreage of all our principal crops has shrunk during thirty-five years as follows : Acres imder - Wheat Barley Oats Beans Feas Potatoes Turnips and Swedes Permanent Pastures 1873 1908 3,670,259 1,664,860 2,674,529 1,824,410 4,198,495 4,189,378 698,131 296,918 321,007 164,183 1,425,720 1,161,122 2,479,847 1,837,997 23,363,990 27,623,562 Increase or decrease -2,005,399 -760,119 - 9,117 -401,203 - 156,824 -264,628 -641,890 +4,159,672 Decrease in acreage of principal corn and vegetable crops Increase in acreage of permanent pasture -4,229,110 acres +4,159,572 „ It will be noticed that the decay of our agriculture is not restricted to wheat, which, it is true, suffers from the competition of the boundless plains of America, but that our agricultural decay is universal, that practically all our food crops have shrunk in the most serious manner. Between 1873 and 1908 more than 4,000,000 acres of food-producing land have gone out of cultivation and have been abandoned by the ploughman. Stubbly uncultivated grass and weeds, officially called ' permanent pasture,' grow wildly on the fields on which hundreds of thousands of British husbandmen grew corn and vegetables for the people, and the busy villages where they lived have decayed. The effect of the dechne and decay of our agriculture 876 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN upon our rural population is well illustrated by the following figures : Persons occupied in Agriculture in England Agricultural Population o£ and Wales Xiabourers in Ireland Ireland 1841 (MoCulloch's estimate) 2,300,000 9 8,175,124 1851 (Census figures) , 1,904,687 850,100 6,515,794 1861 1,803,049 602,200 5,764,543 1871 „ „ . . 1,423,854 509,700 5,402,759 1881 1,199,827 293,300 5,159,839 1891 „ „ . . 1,099,572 251,700 4,706,162 1901 „ „ . . 988,340 212,200 4,458,775 The foregoing figures show a terrible decline. The number of persons occupied in agriculture in England and Wales has shrunk to less than one-half the former number. The number of agricultural labourers in Ireland has shrunk to one-fourth. Since 1846, when Ireland had 9,000,000 inhabitants, she has lost more than one-half of her population. During the last sixty years the United Kingdom has lost by emigration more than 10,000,000 people, a number con- siderably greater than the present population of Scotland and Ireland combined. By far the larger part of our emi- grants came from the country. They were the best and strongest of the race. Their loss has undoubtedly led to a great deterioration of the national physique, as I have shown in a lecture delivered before the British Medical Association. Compared with the enormous national loss in population and in man-power, the financial loss of £2,000,000,000, alluded to above, huge as it is, seems but a trifle. Why has our agriculture decayed in this terrible manner ? The first half of the nineteenth century was filled with an incessant struggle between the Conservative and Liberal Parties, which was fought out in Parhament by Conservative landowners on the one side and by Radical manufacturers, BEITISH AGEICULTUEE 877 traders and politicians on the other. The Radical politicians were victorious. The Liberal Party became supreme in Parliament, and it used its supremacy for making war upon the landowners. The definite triumph of the Liberal Party was marked by the abolition of the Com Laws in 1846, and ever since 1846 war upon the landowners has been a standing item in the Liberal programme. Hatred of the landowners has inspired and directed Liberal poUcy during more than half a century. The desire to cripple and to ruin the land- owners has been one of the principal aims of Liberal pohcy from the abohtion of the Corn Laws in 1846 to Mr. Lloyd George's Budget in 1909. The study of the literature of the Anti-Corn Law League, issued in and before 1846, and of the speeches of Cobden and of his supporters, proves that the Free Trade agitation was animated quite as much by the desire of Radical politicians to ruin the landowners as by their desire to benefit the manufacturers and traders. The desire to ruin the landowners has been equally ap- parent in some of the recent speeches of leading Liberal pohticians. Liberal politicians not only deliberately exposed our agriculture to ruinous foreign competition, but they equally dehberately overburdened that stricken industry with taxes, believing, or pretending to believe, that the special burdens which they put on the land would fall on the wealthy land- owners. Every attempt of the Conservative Party to assist agriculture was denounced by Radical orators as doles to the wealthy landowners wrung from the bread of the poorest. Whilst other European nations, anxious to preserve their rural industries, have taxed agriculture more Hghtly than their manufacturing industries. Great Britain has, through the action of the Liberal Party, overtaxed her agriculture to such an extent that British agriculture is the most highly taxed industry in the world. In Great Britain land is the most heavily taxed form of capital. Ever since their triumph of 1846, the Liberals have 878 GREAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN pursued agriculture with hostile legislation. They have tried to ruin the landowners from political mahce, and they have succeeded in a number of cases, but incidentally they have ruined our agriculture as well. Since 1846 the agricul- tural population of the United Kingdom has shrunk by more than one-half. The victory of the Liberal over the Conser- vative Party was bought at the price of £2,000,000,000 and of 10,000,000 of the best British citizens. Between 1846 and 1909, whilst the British country popu- lation has shrunk to less than half its former number, the country population of Germany has greatly increased, and it has not appreciably decreased even during the last two or three decades, when the marvellous expansion of her manu- facturing industries drew milUons of peasant lads to the factories of the towns, and when at the same time labour- saving machinery was generally introduced into German agriculture. The labour-displacing effect of agricultural machinery was fully counteracted by a great expansion in Germany's agricultural production. The expansion of Germany's agriculture since 1879, the year when she intro- duced Protection, has been very great. According to her somewhat unsatisfactory harvest statistics, Germany's production of corn and potatoes has increased since 1879 by more than 100 per cent. Germany's agriculture has vigorously grown during the very time when our agri- cultural production has shrunk to insignificance, and her Kve stock has, since the live-stock census of 1883, increased as follows : Live Stock of Germany - Horses Cattle Sheep Pigs 1883 . 1907 . 3,522,525 4,337,263 15,786,764 20,589,856 19,189,715 7,681,072 9,206,195 22,080,008 Increase or decrease + 814,738 +4,803,092 -11,508,643 + 12,873,813 BEITISH AGBICULTUEE 379 Germany's sheep have decreased considerably because she has converted her grazing lands into cornfields. Her sheep and their grass lands had to give way to intensive cultivation. The decrease in her sheep is a sign of the increase in the prosperity of her agriculture. In Germany a pig is three times as valuable as a sheep. Hence the loss of 11,500,000 sheep is trifling as compared with the gain of 800,000 horses, 5,000,000 cattle, and almost 13,000,000 pigs. Let us compare the increase of Germany's live stock between 1883 and 1907 with the increase of our own live stock during the same years : Live Stock or Great Bbitain - Horses Cattle Sheep Figs 1883 1907 1,898,745 2,089,027 10,097,943 11,630,142 28,347,560 30,011,833 3,986,427 3,967,163 Increase or decrease + 190,282 + 1,532,199 + 1,664,273 - 19,264 During the period under consideration Germany has added four horses for every single one added by Great Britain ; Germany has added three head of cattle for every single one added by Great Britain ; Germany has added almost 13,000,000 pigs, whilst Great Britain has lost 20,000. During these twenty-four years, when our Uve stock has remained practically stationary, that of Germany has in- creased enormously, and the result is that Germany has now about twice as many head of cattle and five times as many pigs as has Great Britain. Hence the Germans live practically exclusively on home-grown meat, which in Great Britain is only within the means of the well-to-do. Foreign frozen and chilled meat, and Chicago dehcacies imported in 380 GREAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN tins, are unknown in Germany. Great Britain and Germany- compare as follows as regards the importation of dead meat : Dead meat imported into Great Britain in 1907 „ „ „ Germany in 1907 £ 43,614,573 1,230,000 For every pound's worth of dead meat imported into Germany we import nearly £40 worth every year. We are in danger of becoming as dependent on foreign meat as we are already on foreign wheat, and the danger is all the greater as it is very difficult to discover disease in frozen carcases. Whilst our population has greatly increased, our cattle has remained practically stationary. Hence milk has become scarce and dear. It is dearer in Great Britain than in any other country in Europe, and poor people are beginning to bring up their babies on preserved milk, of which more than £1,500,000 worth is imported every year. Can we hope to grow a strong race on artificial food? The following tables give a bird's-eye view of German and British agriculture, and they will enable us to compare at a glance the different ways in which the soil of the two countries was utilised in 1903, the last year for which, com- parable figures are available : Utilisation oi' the Ageicdltueal Soil in 1903 - In Germany In Great Britain Under all com crops .... (Under wheat and rye .... Under potatoes ..... Under clover and graas for hay Under permanent pa&ture not for hay . Acres 38,050,196 20,056,711 7,996,768 14,631,924 6,685,574 Acres 8,393,000 1,690,216) 1,195,877 3,053,638 22,187,124 Total cultivated area . 65,189,532 47,708,033 BBITISH AGEICULTUEE 881 It will be noticed that for every acre under bread- corn in Great Britain there are no less than twelve in Germany. Expressed in percentages the utilisation of the agricultural soil of the two countries compares as follows : Pbkobntaqes OF AOEIOULTITBAl SOIL - In Germany In Great Britain Under corn crops Under vegetables Under fodder Under grass and fallow Orchards and gardens . Per cent, 61-1 18-2 101 8-7 1-9 Per cent. 18-2 9-4 6-9 66-5 100 1000 When one travels by railway through Great Britain the eye meets chiefly grassfields. It will be seen from the fore- going table that the proportion of land under grass in Great Britain is practically identical with the proportion of land under corn crops in Germany. Three-fifths of Great Britain is under grass, while three-fifths of Germany is under com. Therefore one can easily realise the agricultural aspect of Germany by imagining all British grass land converted into cornfields. The foregoing tables show at a glance how greatly our agricultural resources are at present being wasted and abused. With our superior soil and cUmate, and with the greater accessibility of our interior, we can grow not only as much, but proportionately to the size of our country far more, corn and vegetables than can Germany, and we can, besides, put our agricultural produce far more easily on the market. The cry ' Back to the land ' is heard on all sides, and it has been taken up by the nation. Let us therefore inquire whether a more intensive form of agriculture, such as that 382 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN prevailing in Germany, may be expected to cause the people to settle on the land in increasing numbers. The following table answers this question : PBBS0N3 OCCUPIED IN AGRICULTUBE AND FiSHING In Germany in 1907 (62 million inhabitants) . . . 9,883,257 In the United Kingdom in 1901 (39 million inhabitants) . 2,265,868 In Great Britain in 1901 (30,500,000 inhabitants) . . 1,389,806 The foregoing figures show that in Germany one-sixth of the entire population are actively occupied in agriculture, whilst in the United Kingdom only one-seventeenth, and in Great Britain alone one-twenty-second, of the entire population are so occupied. It follows that, if we should succeed in introducing an intensive form of agricidture, such as that prevaihng in Germany, the number of agri- culturists might be trebled in the whole of the United King- dom and be quadrupled in Great Britain alone. Besides, an increase in the number of our agriculturists would necessarily lead to a corresponding increase in the number of village artisans and numerous other people who, by administering to agriculturists, Hve indirectly by agri- culture. Let us now see how large a part of the German population lives in the country, in order to enable us to form an estimate how many people might live in the country in Great Britain if our agriculture be re-created. Country Population or Gbbmany in 1905 (60,300,000 Inhabitants) In villages up to 100 inhabitants ..... 850,231 „ „ from 100 to 500 inhabitants . . . 10,307,747 , 500 to 1000 „ ... 8,073,843 1000 to 2000 „ ... 6,590,660 In country towns from 2000 to 5000 inhabitants . . 7,158,685 Total country population 32,981,166 In 1905 Germany had 60,300,000 inhabitants. Of these, 83,000,000, or exactly 55 per cent., Uved in the country. BEITISH AGRICULTURE 883 Owing to the defectiveness of our statistics, similar figures can, unfortunately, not be given for Great Britain. Hence an exact comparison between the country populations of the two countries is not possible. The country population of the United Kingdom, hving in villages and in small towns up to 6000 inhabitants, comes at most to 11,000,000 or 12,000,000 inhabitants, whilst our total population is about 45,000,000. Fifty-five per cent, of 45,000,000 is 25,000,000. Assuming that German agricultural conditions prevailed in this country, we should have 25,000,000 people living on the land and by the land. There would be room for about 13,500,000 additional people on the land. The problem of town congestion would be solved. It may be objected that we cannot place so large a number of the people on the land because Great Britain is much smaller in extent than Germany. Germany has 208,740 square miles ; the United Kingdom has 121,371 square mUes. By extent of territory the two countries stand almost exactly in the proportion of 5 to 3. Measured by the size of our little country we should therefore be able to place three-fifths of the German country population, or 20,000,000, on the land. There would be room for about 8,500,000 additional people on the land. It seems clear that the re-creation of our agriculture should enable us to maintain at least 20,000,000 people on the land and to plant about 10,000,000 people, or 2,000,000 famiUes, in the country. Owing to the greater fruitfulness of our soil and the greater accessibility of our countryside, the British country should be able to nourish a denser population than the German country. At the same time it must be remem- bered that it is not easy to place our restless town population on the land. Therefore we must make not an extreme, but a moderate, estimate. It is surely a moderate estimate to assume that only one-half of the people who might make a Hving on the land can be induced to settle on the land. In that case our 384 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BBITAIN countryside has room for approximately a million families, or 5,000,000 people. That is an estimate which, I think, it will be difficult to challenge. The colonisation of rural Great Britain would make the nation healthier, wealthier, and happier, and it seems a policy worthy of a great states- man. This is surely a greater aim than to tax the landowners out of their land and to ruin incidentally our agriculture entirely. Before investigating the way by which our agriculture may be made at least as productive and as prosperous as that of Germany, we must carefully take note of a most important and significant factor — ^the different way in which land is held and worked in the two countries. Whilst British farmers mostly rent the land, which they work but do not own, the vast majority of the German agriculturists own absolutely the land which they tiU. The great difference between the land systems of the two countries may be summed up in two lines : AOBEAOB on AOEICDLTtlBAL LaND Occupied by owners Occupied by tenants In Prussia in 1907 24,422,405 heots. = 86-6% 3,780,372 hects. = 13-4% In Great Britain in 1907 . . 3,927,303 acres = 12-2% 28,284,083 acres = 87-8% In Prussia seven-eighths of the agricultural land is freehold land and is worked by its owners. In Great Britain only one-eighth of land is freehold land and is worked by its owners. The remaining seven-eighths of our land is rented by agriculturists who work other people's land. Most British agriculturists till land which they do not possess — most German agriculturists till their own land. The different way in which land is held and worked in the two countries is still further illustrated in the following table, which shows how the ownership of land is distributed in them. BRITISH AGEICULTURE 385 [Owners os Land and their Holdings In Germany in 1907 ->- In England and Wales in 1873 (last year available) Size of Holdings No. of . „„ „„ Acres Owners ^"'^^'^ Size of Holdings No. of Acres Owners Acreage Hectares Acres Less than 5 3,378,509 1,731,317 Less than 1 825,272 629,852 5 to 12i 1,006,277 3,304,872 1 to 10 121,983 478,680 [ 12J „ 50 1,065,539 10,421,565 10 „ 50 72,640 1,750,080 50 „ 125 225,697 6,821,301 50 „ 100 25,839 1,791,606 125 „ 250 36,494 2,500,805 100 „ 500 32,317 6,827,347 250 ,,1250 20,068 4,503,159 500 „ 1000 4,799 3,317,678 1250 and more 3,498 2,551,854 1000 and more 5,408 Total . . 18,695,528 Total . . 5,736,082 31,834,873 33,490.771 The difference in the way in which land is held in Great Britain and in Germany is very great indeed. In Germany, for instance, practically one-half of the land is owned by several milKons of small proprietors who possess fifty acres and less. In England considerably more than one-half of the land is owned by but 5408 large proprietors who possess 1000 acres and more. The corresponding class of large proprietors in Germany own less than one-twelfth of the soil. It will be noticed that in Germany the larger half of the land is held by 1,300,000 substantial peasant farmers who own from 12| to 125 acres. The very large number of Germans who own less than five acres are not pauper peasants, but are mostly agricultural labourers whose savings have been invested in freehold land and who as a rule possess cottages of their own. Not only practically all the farmers are freeholders in Germany, but nine-tenths of the agricultural labourers as well have a larger or smaller quantity of freehold land, and they possess as a rule besides a cow or a pig or both. Thus the entire agricultural population of Germany, farmers, peasants and agricultural labourers, are tied to the country by bonds of interest and of affection. They try to improve their property from generation to generation for the sake of their children. Every penny they dig into 2 386 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN the ground will be theirs for ever. They are sure of earning sufficient to maintain themselves and their families in comfort, and they may rise to affluence. Hence their number does not shrink hke ours, notwithstanding the great attractions and opportunities of the towns and the great rise in German town wages. A rural exodus similar to our own is not known, and need not be feared, in Germany. This is evident from the following figures : POPTTLATION OB PeTTSSIA PRINCIPAIXy EMPLOYED IN AOEICTTLTTTEB — In 1895 In 1907 Independent agriculturists Employees and labourers . Children Servants ...... 1,392,006 3,390,249 6,332,714 260,710 1,357,590 4,519,251 4,862,643 123,710 Total 11,375,096 10,863,194 The decline in the purely agricultural population of Prussia has been infinitesimal. It is significant that the number of farmers and their labourers, or the cultivators themselves, has greatly increased, whilst only that of the children has decreased. This decrease in children is caused by the fact that the peasant children who formerly used to idle about the farms are now sent to the factories by their parents. To the agriculturist it makes a world of difference whether he tills his own soil, as do the German farmer-peasants and labourer-peasants, or whether he tills somebody else's soil, as do the British farmers and the British agricultural labourers. Arthur Young, our greatest writer on agriculture, wrote a century ago : ' The magic of property turns sand into gold. Give a man the secure possession of a bleak rock and he will turn it into a garden.' Adam Smith wrote in his ' Wealth of Nations ' nearly a century and a half ago : • A BRITISH AGRICULTURE 387 small proprietor, who knows every part of his little terri- tory, who views it with all the affection which property, especially small property, naturally inspires, and who, upon that account, takes pleasure not only in cultivating but in adorning it, is generally of all improvers the most industrious, the most intelligent and the most successful.' These words are now even more true than they were at the time when they were written. In former times, when our agriculturists were many, when the openings for countrymen in our towns were few, when scarcely any agricultural labourer read the newspapers, and when travelling was slow and very expen- sive, agricultural labourers were isolated from the outer world, and they were quite satisfied with their hand-to-mouth existence. Times have changed. Agricultural labourers who have no stake in the country are not attached to the country either by interest or affection, and they cheerfully try their luck in town or over-seas. German agriculture is based on individual property, not on contract, and its success is very largely due to the fact that every man tills his own soil. The small peasant grows per acre far more corn, vegetables, fruit and eggs, and he raises far more cattle and pigs than does the large landowner. Theoretically the large landowner working in partnership with the large farmer has this advantage over the small peasant farmer, that he can employ costly labour-saving machinery which the small peasant farmer cannot afford to buy. That . difficulty has been overcome in Germany and elsewhere by co-operation. German, French, Danish and other small farmers frequently possess collectively machinery which English landowners find too costly. There is another very grave disadvantage inherent in the British land system which is based, as far as the actual cultivator is concerned, not upon possession, but upon a short and easily terminable contract. The owners of land are financially most directly interested in the welfare of the land. If agriculture flourishes rents go up. If agriculture decays 2 o 2 888 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN rents go down. The British tenant farmer has only a secondary interest in the prosperity of agriculture. Con- sequently the defence of the interests of agriculture falls not BO much to the farmer and the agricultural labourers, who number 2,000,000, but to a mere handful of landowners. The landowners, being but a few thousand, cannot resist unaided legislation which is ostensibly directed only against the landowners, but which in reality is harmful to agriculture as a whole, especially as they find httle support among their tenant farmers and their agricultural labourers. The farmers are indifferent because they know that, if the worst comes to the worst, they will demand and obtain from the landowners a reduction in their rent, and the bulk of the agricultural labourers, being landless, take only the most casual interest in legislation which is hostile and harmful to agriculture. Being landless, they are interested chieflyin their wages, and they are apt to become an easyprey to plausible agitators. At the bidding of Radical agitators, who have set them on against the landowners and the fanners, and promised them better wages, our agricultural labourers have gaily assisted the Radical politicians in crippling our agriculture to their own harm. They have supported the abolition of the com laws in the past, and they may be made to vote against every measure beneficial to agriculture in the future, until, as owners of land, they are personally interested in the welfare of the land. British agriculture could never have been immolated and destroyed by the Liberal Party if we had had 2,000,000 freeholders in Great Britain. They would have defended agriculture Uke one man. The fight which the few landowners have made for agriculture wajS magnificent, but it was bound to be useless. The foregoing should make it clear, that the first step to re-create our agriculture must be to create as many free- holders among our farmers and agricultural labourers as we possibly can. Agriculture, being represented in Parliament not by the BRITISH AGRICULTURE 389 nominees of 2,000,000 landowning agriculturists but by the representatives of a few thousand large landowners, has become a helpless prey to the Radical agitator and to his partner, the political quack. These two have now agreed to subject our agriculture to Socialistic experiments. At the bidding of our Socialists Mr. Asquith's Government has already begun to try the Socialistic doctrines on the land. Everywhere the peasant farmer has proved the strongest bulwark against Socialism. In no country in the world is the Socialist party stronger than in Germany — at the General Election in 1906 it received 3,250,000 votes ; but when a Socialist orator tries to convert a village to the socialisation of the land, he is received with pitchforks and other agri- cultural implements. Having discovered that the level-headed landowning peasants cannot by any means be persuaded to embrace the crazy doctrines of Socialism, the Socialists have become the bitterest enemies of the peasantry. Our Socialists oppose the creation of the freehold peasantry with all their might, advocating instead the nationalisation of the land. The transfer of all land from private hands to the county councils is to be the first step in that direction. They have preached that the landowners must be taxed out of existence by an Unearned Increment. Tax, an Undeveloped Land Tax, and especially by a tax upon Land Values to be rapidly increased to 20s. in the £, which of course would mean confiscation. By these means the ' community ' is to acquire cheaply all the land and to hire it out to the supporters of Socialism. Bowing to the Socialist doctrines, Mr. Lloyd George has introduced simultaneously in his Budget of 1909 all the three land taxes recommended by the Socialists. The transfer of private land to the county councils, the first practical step towards the socialisation of the land, has already commenced. When the Government introduced its Small Holdings and Allotments Act of 1907 it might Uave provided facilities for small farmers and agricultural 390 GEEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN labourers to acquire their holdings and to make themselves independents This was the poUcy which at the time was strongly, urged by the Unionists, and especially by Mr. Jesse Collings. Instead of creating such faciUties, the Act authorises the county councils to take land compulsorily from the present owners and to let it out to small holders. The Act merely effects a change of landlords. It tries to substitute the ' community ' for the private landlord and to destroy in the small holder that sense of property and of security which makes man a defender of property, and which has proved the greatest bar to Socialistic and other revolu- tionary schemers in all countries. That it is indeed the deliberate policy of the Government to prevent the people from tilUng their own soil has been confirmed by the Budget. By doubling the stamp duty on the purchase of land, the Government has greatly increased the small man's difficulty in acquiring land, and as this new stamp duty will yield only a most insignificant amount, it cannot be doubted that the duty has been doubled merely in order to prevent the people from acquiring land. It is often stated that we are threatened with Socialism. That statement is scarcely correct. Socialism threatens us no longer. It has arrived. It has been foisted upon us by the Radical Government, through both its Budget and its general legislation. SociaUsm is at the present moment attacking our land and agriculture under the auspices of the Cabinet. In a short time the country may have to choose whether it prefers the unnational Socialist poHcy of destruc- tion, or that great national policy of construction which is very inadequately termed Tariff Reform. Tariff Reform means British work for British workers, the British Empire for the British people. It is a great constructive national and imperial poUcy. The opponents of Tariff Reform sneeringly say that Tariff Reform is the same thing as Protection. They are right. Tariff Reform is Protection. It is the proteetion of British industry and BRITISH AGRICULTURE 891 of British labour in town and country. It is the protection of our natural resources, and the protection of the health and strength of the people. All earnest Tariff Reformers deplore the decline of our agriculture and the rural exodus. They are anxious to preserve and to strengthen our agricul- ture, to strengthen the physique of the race and to re-settle the countryside. They are aware that our system of land holding is a serious obstacle to the re-creation of our rural industries. Therefore they wish to reform it, and they see in Tariff Reform and Land Reform parts of an identical policy, and they think that Tariff Reform and Land Reform should go hand in hand. The Unionist Party have for a long time advocated the creation of numerous freeholders throughout the country. I would mention two very recent statements of prominent Unionists in support of this policy. Mr. Austen Cham- berlain said, in February 1909, at Shrewsbury : ' The small holder's life is an arduous one. He must be secure of all the benefits which his labour has created if you want to get the best out of the man. If you want to get the best out of a man, give him security that the fruits of his toil shall be his ; that what he has worked for by the sweat of his brow, he and his children after him shall succeed to and inherit.' Lord Lansdowne said, on the 7th of August 1909, at Bowood : ' The doctrine of making the land of the country national property is not one which the working classes of the country will in any sense or degree approve. What I believe the people desire is that the transfer of land should be cheap and easy, that it should be as widely distributed as possible, and that those who get possession of a bit of land should hold it, not as tenants from the nation, but as their own property, belonging absolutely to them. That is the ideal of the Party to which I have the honour to belong.' The problem of land reform, the problem of settling the 392 GEEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN people on the land, of converting tenants into freeholders throughout the country, is no doubt a difficult one, but difficulties exist to be overcome. The problem of creating a nation of freeholders is not a new one. It has been solved successfully elsewhere. The freehold farmers and peasants of France, Germany and all other European countries were created but recently. They are an artificial creation. Their ancestors were serfs and demi-serfs. Serfdom was extinguished in Germany only a very few decades ago. While France has shown us that landless serfs can be turned into prosperous peasants by a revolution which has caused fearful sufferings to all, Germany and various other European States have shown us that serfs and landless agricultural labourers can be transformed into prosperous farmers without bloodshed, without disorder, without injustice, and without hardship to anyone. How- ever, we need not seek for precedents in foreign lands. Our own Irish Land Act of 1903 has in five years enabled 228,938 occupying tenants to buy their holdings. Landed property worth £77,000,000 has changed hands in Ireland on terms considered fair by the representatives of land- owners and tenants at the Land Conference. What was possible in Ireland is surely not impossible in England and Scotland. Besides, the Irish procedure might be, and should be, very greatly improved upon. Space lacks to describe in detail in the present chapter the way in which our system of landholding might be reformed without injustice and to the great benefit of all parties concerned, and to consider the Urban Land Problem. It may be asked, ' Is it worth our while to re-create our agriculture ? Will it pay us ? ' People may argue : ' Even if we create numerous freehold farmers and agricul- tural labourers, we cannot raise our agriculture to the level of that of Germany without putting a heavy duty on com and meat similar to that existing in Germany. Germany's agricultural prosperity was bought at the price of great BEITISH AGRICULTURE 398 sufferings and privations of the poor, who paid with a shortage of jtheir food for the enhanced prosperity of the farmers.' These objections seem plausible, but I think they are fallacious. In the first place, the natural advan- tages of our agriculture over that of Germany in soU, climate and accessibility are so great that, I think, we shall not require a heavy tariff on agricultural produce — ^which, by the by, no Tariff Reformer is seriously contemplating. In the second place, it appears that Germany's heavy duties on corn and meat have not by any means caused those sufferings and privations among the German people which appear to exist chiefly in the imagination of British Free Trade writers. If the German tariff on corn and meat had caused great sufferings to the German workers, it could only have done so by restricting their consumption of corn and meat. According to the statistics pubUshed in the autumn, 1908, by the German Ministry of Finance, the consumption of bread-corn has increased as follows in Great Britain and in Germany since 1879, the year when Germany introduced Protection : Consumption oe Wheat and Rye pee head op Popttlation PER YEAR Average In Germany In Great Britain 1878-82 . . 189-4 kilos . . 167-7 kilos 1890-94 . . 208-6 „ . 181-9 „ 1902-04 . . 247-6 „ . 166-2 „ It wUl be noticed that the consumption of bread-corn has rapidly and steadily increased in Germany since the very time when Protection was introduced, and that Germany consumes now a considerably larger quantity of bread-corn per head of population than does this country. As there are no similar statistics in existence relating to the con- sumption of meat in Germany, I give some figures regarding the consumption of meat in Saxony, the most industrial and most densely populated part of Germany, which may be called the German Lancashire. 394 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN Consumption oi Meat pee head in Saxony Beef Pork 1860 90 kilos 13-2 kilos 1870 90 „ 13-6 „ 1880 111 „ 18-1 „ 1890 140 „ 20-6 „ 1900 15-2 „ 27-9 „ 1907 14-4 „ 27 '9 „ It will be noticed that the consumption of both bread- corn and meat has enormously increased in Germany since 1879, the very year when industrial and agricultural Pro- tection was introduced, and it can easily be shown that it has increased, not in spite of Protection, but because of Protection, by contemplating the effect which the re-creation of our agriculture ought to have upon our own people. If we should succeed in settling gradually 1,000,000 families, or 5,000,000 people, on the land, it would mean that we should enormously increase — ^that we should almost double — our entire agricultural production. That is perfectly feasible. Then British meat, vegetables, fruit, butter, eggs, cheese, &c., would become more plentiful and cheaper. Our working men in the towns would get more and much better home-grown food for their money than they do at present. The settling of 5,000,000 people in the country would relieve our congested towns, it would relieve the labour market and improve employment in every trade. People who now have to emigrate to other countries to find work might migrate to the country. Lastly, the 5,000,000 additional country people would require in every year about £50,000,000 worth of British manufactures, for which they would exchange their agricultural produce. Thus we should simultaneously extend our home market for the sale of manufactures and increase and improve our food supply. Our manufacturers and their workers would then be less dependent on foreign trade and would be less obstructed by hostile foreign tariffs. Town and country maintain one another. The country provides the town BEITISH AGRICULTUEE 395 with food and is supplied in return with clothes and manu- factures. Every countryman can feed and keep occupied a townsman. Every man who settles on the land enables another man to find work in town. Thus the re-creation of our agriculture would cause our workers to be better employed, better paid and better fed. The re-creation of our agriculture Would be beneficial to all. Countless millions lie buried in our soil. The greatest hidden treasure of Great Britain consists, not in our ungotten coal deep down in the bowels of the earth, but it Ues on its surface in our uncultivated and in our under-cultivated land. Land Reform, on the broadest national basis, should be the greatest and the most fruitful of all social reforms. It should prove far more beneficial to the people than Old Age Pensions, Poor-Law Eeform, Invahdity Insurance and Sickness Insurance combined. These benefit only the old, the maimed and the stricken. Land Reform would benefit all. CHAPTEB XVII THE RURAL LAND PROBLEM AND ITS SOLUTION Lord Rosebery stated in the autumn of 1909 at Glasgow : ' I don't think the land system is perfect. I would gladly see more people settled on the land, and ParUament has shown ample zeal in assisting the Government to settle more people on the land. I would even go further, and I should be glad to see the Government use its enormous credit to help to settle a new race of yeomanry on the land. ... I quite admit that the land system is not perfect. It will develop, and it will develop into something very different from what it is now.' Mr. Balfour said on the 22nd of September, 1909, at Birmingham : ' I have always been one of those who have ardently desired to see, and still hope to see, the ownership of agricultural land distributed in an incomparably greater number of hands than it now is. There is no measure with which I am more proud to have been connected than that which has had the effect of giving peasant ownership on a large scale to Ireland, and I hope to see a great expansion of such ownership in England. Nothing can be more desirable. Nothing can be more important. I therefore look forward with hope and eager expectation to a time when a Government may come in, not hampered, clogged, and bound by these Socialistic crotchets, and adapt to the very different conditions of life in this country what a Unionist Government has already done with such marked success for the sister island.' 396 THE RURAL LAND PROBLEM 397 Many similar opinions expressed by prominent Unionists might be quoted. The official and unofficial leaders of the Unionist Party are agreed that it is desirable and necessary to deal with the land problem in town and country ; that it is desirable and necessary to re-create our agriculture and to re-settle the land ; that it is desirable and necessary to give as many people as possible a stake in the country. Therefore the question arises : How is this great reform to be effected ? The land problem is a difficult and an intricate one. Great Britain has no surplus lands, as have her Colonies and the United States, and no vast State domains on which numerous freeholders can be settled, as have Germany and Austria-Hungary. Nearly all the land of this country is in the hands of large private owners who, in most cases, are not even absolute holders, but merely life tenants of entailed estates, which are held in trust for their children and their children's children by trustees. The nominal owners, being merely tenants for life, caimot freely dispose of their estates., Moreover, these entailed lands are let under agreements to farmers and other tenants who cannot in justice be expelled by the State so as to make room for small freeholders. The situation is undoubtedly a very complicated and difficult one. Conditions similar to those which exist at present in Great Britain used to prevail everjrwhere in Europe. Every European nation, except Great Britain, has progressed with the times, and has transformed its feudal land system, based on huge settled estates owned by a few, into a demo- cratic land system based on an immense number of small freehold properties. A democratic form of government and a feudal land system are incompatible. They cannot co-exist for a long time. The danger of an organised attack of democracy on the handful of big landowners, and the temptation to demagogues to bring about such an attack, is growing from year to year, and from year to year resistance 398 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN to such an attack will become more difficult and more hopeless. Ten thousand families could hold the bulk of the land when they held in their hands all pohtical power, but they can no longer do so when pohtical power is in the hands of 7,000,000 voters, the vast majority of whom are landless. We cannot afford to delay the reform of our land system any longer. The task of reforming our land system is undoubtedly very great, but it is not so great as it seems at first sight. Other nations have successfully overcome these difficulties, and the difficulties of Great Britain are very small indeed compared with the difficulties with which Prussia dealt a century ago. A glance at the Prussian land reform will make our difficulties appear small, and will besides furnish us with a precedent of considerable interest and value. On the 5th of November 1806 Napoleon annihilated at Jena the feudal-professional army, an army of hired soldiers officered by the landed aristocracy, which Frederick the Great had created. The loss of that battle caused Prussia's downfall. It was impossible to organise national resistance against Napoleon because Prussia was a bureaucratic and military State, not a nation. The people had no stake in the country and were not trained to arms. The peasants were the dependents, almost the serfs, of the large landed proprietors. They did not possess the spirit to make them wilhng defenders of their country. The weakness of the feudal system had been glaringly revealed. If Prussia was to survive, the first step to be taken was to raise the spirit of the people, to settle the people on the land, to give every man a stake in the country and an interest in its defence. On the 9th of July 1807 the Peace of Tilsit ended the disastrous war between Prussia and Prance. That peace deprived Prussia of exactly one-half of its entire territory and of one-half of its inhabitants. Though peace was concluded. Napoleon retained possession of Prussia by huge garrisons in the principal towns, and proceeded to THE RURAL LAND PROBLEM 399 bleed Prussia white by enormous contributions. Defeated, mutilated, impoverished and lying under the heel of the conqueror, Prussia resolved to abolish the feudal land system without delay. On the 9th of October 1807, exactly three months after the conclusion of the Peace of Tilsit, the pohcy of converting the cultivating farmers and peasants into proprietors was initiated by the issue of Stein's funda- mental Edict, which was followed by other edicts. These edicts aimed at facilitating the acquisition of absolute owner- ship by farmers and peasants. They abolished all public and private restrictions of the rights of property in land. They regulated the relation between landowners and tenants. Their guiding principle was, according to the words of the fundamental decree, ' to abolish the personal dependence of the cultivators of the soil upon the owners of the land, and thus to give the strongest incentive and the fullest scope to the ability, energy and power of every individual.' These decrees made the purchase of land easy by removing the existing public and private restrictions, and especially by limiting the obstructive rights and privileges of the landowners. They provided facilities for the division and the cutting up of large estates which hitherto had passed undivided from father to son. They encouraged large landowners to disentail and to break up their estates, by putting a special tax on entailed estates, and by enacting that they might be disentailed, and thus made reaUsable, by family agreement. They protected the property of the small cultivators against the wealthy and powerful land- owners by making the purchase and absorption of peasants' holdings into large estates illegal. The State aimed, not merely at creating as many free- holders as possible, but it strove also to make these free- holders prosperous. The Edict of 1807 and the edicts following it laid down the maxim that it was the duty of the State to promote agriculture and to increase the prosperity 400 GREAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN of the cultivators by all the means in its power. With this end in view, provisions were made for applying science to agriculture by the foundation of agricultural colleges and schools, experimental stations and model farms. Under the auspices of the State, agricultural co-operative societies and societies for mutual aid were formed. Arrangements were made to promote the construction of canals, drainage and irrigation works, roads, dykes and bridges, and the reclamation of waste land by local associations and the local authorities with the assistance of the State. Individual enterprise was not to be stifled by Government action. The farmers and peasants who, toiling on the properties of large landowners, had been unfree hitherto, were enabled to become freeholders in the following way : Landlords and tenants were given two years in which to make arrangements for converting rented land into freehold land by friendly agreement. Carefully constituted local land settlement commissions of at least five members, who were experts in practical agriculture and in law, were created to advise and assist owners and tenants and to act as referees in case of disagreement and dispute. The parties not satisfied with the ruling of these commissions could appeal to the Central Land Settlement Commission. Both landowners and tenants were entitled to call for the conversion of rented land into freehold land. A balance was to be struck between the rent paid by the tenant on the one hand, and the services rendered by the landowner to the tenant in consideration of the rent on the other hand. The balance, the net rent, was to serve in normal circumstances as basis for the amount of the compensation payable to the landowner for ceding his land to the tenant. The compensation was to amount to eighteen years' purchase in cash, or to twenty years' purchase in interest-bearing bonds. In order not to throw too great a strain upon the money market, landlords were offered a sub- stantial premium for accepting payment in paper. In cases of dispute as to the amount of the net rent, the Land Settlement THE RURAL LAND PROBLEM 401 Commission was to act as mediator and referee. To facilitate the payment of the sum agreed upon in those cases in which the freeholder could not pay the compensation money in cash, rent-charge banks were created. These banks were provincial institutions. Their solvency was guaranteed by the State. They created rent charges upon the holdings which were to be enfranchised equal to the amount of compensation agreed upon, and they compensated the land- owners with interest-bearing State guaranteed bonds of their own, which were issued against the collective security of these rent charges. The rent charges were a first charge upon the enfranchised properties of the farmers and peasants, and they were extinguished by yearly payments to the rent-charge banks. These yearly payments were spread over a large number of years, and they provided at the same time the interest on the sum advanced by the bank, and a sinking fund for the gradual extinction of the purchase price. These yearly payments were collected by the tax collectors together with the taxes, and they were treated in every way as taxes by the law. Hence they were regularly made by the enfranchised tenants, who rarely fell into arrears. A century ago the Prussian landlords were truly the lords of the land. They ruled the country districts. They owned the soil, and they almost owned the peasants as well, for these were compelled to work gratuitously for the land- owners. Resistance in case of harsh or unjust treatment was difficult, because the civil administration and the administration of justice were in the hands of the landowners. The peasants were serfs. Compared with Prussia's diffi- culties, our difficulties are small. It is clear that if bankrupt and defeated Prussia could enfranchise the cultivators of the soil, reorganise her feudal land system and re-create her agriculture at a time when the enemy's garrisons were actually in possession of the country. Great Britain is undoubtedly able, and can afford, to do so now. Whether Grea* Britain follows Prussia's precedent in 2 D 402 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN every particular, or whether she proceeds on other, and perhaps on better, lines, can be settled only by conferences of the leading experts. j^The identical proceeding is scarcely possible, because the conditions prevailing in Great Britain are very different from the conditions which prevailed in Prussia in 1807. Different problems require different treat- ment. Prussia's agriculture was carried on by a large number of small farmers, while our agriculture is carried on by a small number of large farmers. Meanwhile let us ask ourselves : (1) Is there any serious demand for freehold farms and small holdings in Great Britain ? (2) From which ranks are the freehold farmers and small holders of the future to be recruited ? (3) How and where are they to be settled on the land ? (4) What are the objections to the creation of freeholders and are these objections valid ? I shall endeavour to answer these questions one by one. Those who wish to find out for themselves whether there is a bona fide demand for small farms and holdings should study the Report on Small Holdings of 1888-90, the Report on Fruit Growing of 1905, the Report on Small Holdings of 1906, the Report on the Decline of the Agricultural Population of Great Britain of 1906, and the Annual Report on Small Holdings of 1909. I will give a few extracts. The Report of the Small Holdings Committee of 1906 states : ' A very large body of evidence goes to show that in many places more land of the kind already divided into small holdings would be taken up with avidity, especially if properly equipped and offered for hire with a reasonable security of tenure.' This statement is amply confirmed by the evidence available. Mr. 0. A. Fyffe, Estates Bursar of University College, Oxford, stated, for instance, according to the Report of 1888-90 : ' The demand for small holdings in convenient places and at moderate rents is almost illimit- able, I should say ; and I believe that if facilities for purchase :raE rueal land problem 403 were given, you would find at the present time a very large demand for them, and, as the system took root, a yearly increasing demand for them in this country.' Unfortunately it is not easy to obtain land for small holdings. On this subject Mr. Sampson Morgan, Secretary of the National Fruit Growers' League, stated, before the Committee of 1888-90 : ' The real impediment is that the people cannot get the land ; in consequence of this we have been negotiating with Sir Saul Samuel, Governor-General of New South Wales, with Mr. Braddon, Governor-General of Tasmania, and with the Governor-General of New Zealand, finding it impossible for the members of our League to get land, that is, small holdings, in this country.' The objections to small holdings come from both land- owners and farmers. The Report of the Committee of 1906 states : ' Some landowners are of opinion that the amenities of their estate are impaired by the erection of a number of houses and buildings thereon, and the facilities for the preservation of game diminished.' From the evidence of Mr. Fyffe, before the Committee of 1888-90, we learn : ' ... I do not know whether I may pause to say how extraordinarily difficult it is to get land from farmers for these small holdings and allotments. 'Q. Do you propose to give the local authority com pulsory power to acquire land 7 A. I should, myself. ' Q. Will you explain why ? A. My experience is two- fold : that, in the first place, there are some landlords who will not part with their land ; and, secondly, there are many landlords who would be willing to part with their land, but who, under present circumstances, cannot get it from the farmers. ' Q. And in your opinion there are many landlords who would welcome compulsory powers ? A. Yes ; I behave there are landlords who are very anxious to increase these small holdings, but who cannot do it on account of the farmers. I should say myself that the opposition to giving the labourer 2 D 2 404 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN a lift comes much more from the farmer than from the landlord. At the same time, I do know cases of landlords who will not part with any land at all, or allow any houses to be erected. In my own county, in Sussex, there is an owner of 15,000 acres, which is, roughly speaking, 20 square miles, who will not part with any of the land at all, or allow any houses to be erected on it. That land might just as well be in Central Africa for any connection it has with England. That means absolute stagnation over an area of 20 square miles.' The foregoing extracts show that there is much opposition to the creation of small freeholders on the part of landowners and farmers. I shall deal with their objections in due course. The British agricultural labourer leads at present a hand-to-mouth existence. He owns no land. He receives his cottage from the farmer either rent free or at the nominal rent of Is. a week. He has certainly no cause to complain of the amount of his rent. On the other hand, he has no real home, for the farmer can turn him out of his cottage into the road at any moment. This arrangement was very satisfactory to the farmer in the olden times, when agri- cultural labourers were abundant, and when surrounding farmers would not take a man dismissed by one of their neighbours. In those times the loss of his work and his cottage meant destitution and starvation to the labourer. The agricultural labourer was tied to the farm by compulsion, by the fear of homelessness and starvation. Times have changed. The agricultural labourer can no longer be tied to the land by these antiquated methods at a time when travelling is cheap, and when a healthy and strong farm hand can always find work at a moment's notice as an unskilled labourer in the nearest town. Besides, he is welcome as an emigrant in the Colonies, and is assisted to get there. Last, but not least, our agricultural labourers hate the system under which they live. They are profoundly dissatisfied with their propertylessness, their hand-to-mouth existence, and their homelessness ; and this is one of the THE RURAL LAND PROBLEM 405 principal reasons of our rural exodus. Those labourers who are too old to leave the land stay in the country and grumble, but their sons and daughters go to the towns and the Colonies. Wherever one travels in rural Britain one finds chiefly middle-aged and elderly labourers working in the fields ; and the study of the census figures reveals the ominous fact that practically the entire youth leave the country soon after they leave school. That is a phenomenon with which every rural schoolmaster is acquainted. This land flight is not caused by the dulness of our villages. Our villages have plenty of clubs, reading-rooms, institutes, and sports, which are unknown on the Continent, where the men and youths are satisfied to stay on the land. The cause of this flight lies elsewhere, as I shall presently show ; but whatever the cause, it is to be feared that our fields will be left without labour when the elder generation of rural labourers has died out, unless something is done speedily. The terrible shrinkage in the number of our agricultural labourers may be seen from the following figures : NuMBBE OF Male AoMcm-TUBAL Laboueers In England and Wales In Scotland In Ireland In the tlnited Kingdom 1851 . . . 1,097,800 1861 . . . 1,073,000 1871 . . . 902,800 1881 . . . 807,600 1891 . . 709,300 1901 . . . 683,800 1 140,200 125,900 111,000 91,800 85,100 73,800 850,100 602,200 609,700 293,300 251,700 212,200 2,088,100 1,801,100 1,623,500 1,192,700 1.046,100 869,800 The foregoing figures show that the old agricultural system — the system which was based on the compulsion of the agricultural labourer to work for the farmer in order to get food and shelter — has absolutely broken down, and that the re-creation of our rural industries will be past praying for, unless the problem of rural labour is solved quickly. Already it is extremely difficult to get ploughmen and 406 GREAT AND GEEATEB BRITAIN milkers. Very often the harvest is allowed to rot because there are no labourers to gather it. Agricultural labourers' children refuse to learn milking and ploughing, even if competitions are got up and substantial prizes offered. We may soon have to allow our agricultural land to become a desert through lack of labour. As the rural labourer can no longer be tied to the land by the fear of homelessness and starvation, he must be tied to the land by interest. He must be given a share in the land — and he would like to be given a share in the land. An agricultural labourer who has a few acres of freehold land and a freehold cottage of his own, who has a few fruit trees, a cow or a pig or two, and a few fowls, wiU not easily sell up his property and leave the country. He wiU work for the farmer during the day and look after his own Uttle property in the evening ; he will raise much of his own food, sell a little, and put by a Uttle for a rainy day. His wife and children will help him, and he will become a steady worker. He knows that, when ill or aged, he can always fall back on his few acres, and some of his children wiU stay in the country. They will have a real home, a little ancestral estate of their own. They will endeavour to make a com- petence in the country, and thus a surplus of agricultural labourers will be created. In this manner the agricultural labourers in France, Germany, the United States, and other countries are tied to the farms. It is worth noting that in Germany there is a shortage of rural labour only in the purely agricultural east, where large estates prevail, where there are no manufacturing towns, and where the labourers are landless. In the east of Germany imported Russians and Poles do much of the agricultural work. On the other hand, in the densely populated centre and west of the country, where manufacturing towns are numerous and where agricultural labourers have freehold land and cottages of their own, there is always an abundance of agricultural labourers, and there imported foreign labourers work in THE RURAL LAND PROBLEM 407 the factories and coal mines because these cannot get a sufficient supply of German labour. Where are our future freeholders to come from ? Including gardeners, woodmen, shepherds, &c., there are still about one million agricultural labourers in the country. Let us see that we do not lose these men, who are the backbone of the country, and who are irreplaceable. They are dwindling rapidly in numbers. Let us encourage and assist them to acquire freehold land and cottages as speedily as possible, and they and their children will stay on the land. It is usually believed that there are no, or practically no, small holders in Great Britain who might be converted into freeholders. That opinion is erroneous. According to the Agricultural Statistics of 1909 (Cd. 4533), the agricultural holdings in Great Britain, exclusive of Ireland, are as follows : AOBIOtTLTUBAL HOLDINQS IN GeEAT BRITAIN Owned or mainly owned Eented or mainly rented Total From 1 to 6 acres . Prom 5 to 60 acres From 50 to 300 acres . 300 acres and more 15,432 ( = 14-3%) 28,473 ( = 12-3%) 14,591 ( = 9-7%) 2,792 ( = 15-7%) 61,288 92,662 203,346 136,411 14,922 108,094 231,819 161,002 17,714 447,341 608,629 The foregoing figures are very interesting. It is significant that, if we except the very largest properties of 300 acres and more, the proportion of freehold properties is by far the largest among the very smallest holders, the men who hold from one to five acres. Of these dwarf holdings 14-8 per cent, are freeholds, and the percentage of freeholds rapidly diminishes with the increase in the size of properties. We may therefore conclude that the possession of freehold land is most strongly desired by the smallest holders, and 408 GEEAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN observation in all parts of Great Britain absolutely confirms this conclusion. The foregoing table shows that 108,094, or more than one-fifth of all the agricultural holdings, are from one to five acres, while 339,913, or exactly two-thirds of all the agricultural holdings, are from one to fifty acres. It should be noted that farms up to fifty acres which are under average cultivation can be worked by a farmer and his family without outside help, and that, in the case of such average farms, about thirty acres suffice to maintain a man and his family. Of these 339,913 small holdings and farms, 296,008 are described as ' rented or mainly rented.' Making ample allowance for residential properties included in these holdings, it appears that there are at least 200,000 farming small holders of whom many wish to become the owners of the soil which they farm. In 1907 the Liberal Government brought out a Small Holdings and Allotments Act, which came into operation on the 1st of January 1908. That Act authorises the county councils to acquire land compulsorily and to lease it in small portions to desirable tenants. This Act is exceedingly unjust to those who wish to settle on the land. Intending tenants are charged a yearly rent which consists of interest on the land rented plus an extra charge to pay off the capital cost of the land. So far the arrangement is identical with the Prussian precedent. But here the similarity ends. When the Prussian peasant had paid off the capital cost of his holding it belonged to him and his family for ever. When, under the Act of 1907, the British small holder has paid off the entire capital cost of his holding it belongs, not to him, but to the county council. The Prussian peasant was encouraged to work for himself. Taking advantage of his land hunger, the British small holder is made to work for the county council. Notwithstanding this cruelly unjust arrange- ment, which is felt to be cruelly unjust by intending tenants, and notwithstanding the fact that most small holders would much rather own than rent their land, no fewer than 23,285 THE RUEAL LAND PROBLEM 409 people applied for 373,601 acres. Of these applicants 13,202 were described as provisionally suitable, and were approved of. Out of these approved apphcants 4470, or nearly 34 per cent., were agricultural labourers. The foregoing facts and figures show that there is a serious and considerable demand for freehold farms and small holdings, and they show us the class of people from whom the freehold farmers and small holders of the future should be recruited in the first instance. It would, of course, be a wild and hopeless experiment to plant the surplus population of our towns, the wastrels and failures, in large numbers in the country. Agricultural labour is the most skilled of all labour. These town people would not be able to make a living on the land. If we wish to re-create our agriculture and to re-people the countryside, we must before all strive to preserve the existing country population and encourage it to multiply on the land. We must, in the first instance, encourage our 200,000 small landless farmers and our 1,000,000 landless agricultural labourers to become freeholders, assist them to become freeholders, and help them to become successful and pros- perous. If they should prosper on the land, cultivation will become more intensive than hitherto, more food will be grown, more labour will be wanted. Many steady town workers would like to settle on the land, and there can be no doubt that many country-bred men who at present are working in the towns will gladly return to the land and invest their savings in a few acres and a cottage, if they see a chance of doing well on the land. Besides, many of our emigrants who have saved some money will be anxious to go back to the old country when they know that they can buy with their savings a small farm which will be theirs and their children's for ever. It may be possible gradually to settle in the country a large number of town-bred men. They would have to be selected with the utmost care, and would require some training. Some should begin their 410 GEEAT AND GREATBB BRITAIN career as labourers with successful farmers. Others may perhaps at once be entrusted with a small plot of ground under suitable supervision in acclimatisation centres. The experiment is worth trying. If the first batches of town settlers should be successful, their success would bring about a great exodus from the towns to the country, which is much to be desired. Their failure would discourage town workers to go back to the country and discredit agriculture in their eyes for a generation. Although industrial workers do not take easily to agricul- ture, it is by no means impossible to turn willing industrial workers into good agriculturists, to their great material and moral advantage. From the various successful experiments I choose one reported on by Miss Jebb in her book, ' The Working of the Small Holdings Act.' She writes : ' Bel- broughton is a striking instance of the benefit conferred on a poverty-stricken district by the supply of land to small people. Here as at Catshill, most of the population had been nail makers, and were thrown out of employment by the introduction of machinery. The men were rapidly becoming demoralised through extreme poverty, and were continually before the magistrates for poaching and thieving. A very large number were on the rates, and doles of bread and soup were regularly given by the squire of the parish in winter. There were threatenings of organised strikes if something was not done. The men themselves were keen to get land, as, living in the country, they all possessed a knowledge of cultivation. ' Since the possession of land by the parish council the men appear to be all reformed characters, and those who were formerly on the rates are now contributing to them. The village schoolmistress testifies to the improved condition of the children, who are now well fed and well clothed and on a higher level of intelligence. ' Besides being of benefit to the actual tenants, this undertaking gives an impulse to other trades. A local maker THE RUEAL LAND PROBLEM 411 of small carts and lorries used by the men has already retired with a fortune. As an illustration of the demand for these, on one farm of 50 acres, which originally gave emplojonent to two men, I was told that there are now 40 horses and carts in use. ' As regards the land itself, on one farm of 35 acres a man had failed to pay any rent for two years, and the land was in a very bad condition. The council have repaired all the hedges, gates, &c., and have taken the land on a yearly tenancy with the understanding that they will not be disturbed during the present owner's lifetime. It is already in a very different state of cultivation, and is being of untold benefit to twenty tenants. ' There is such very keen competition for any land to be let in this district that the parish council has a very poor look-in ; and yet more land is very badly needed to enable those men who already have small lots to make the best use of the land itself and of their own time. It struck me that they suffered particularly from having too small an area to work to the best advantage.' If such excellent results could be achieved on hired land, it is quite clear that much better results can be achieved on owned land. A man will, after all, put forth his greatest energy only if he knows that all the fruits of his labour will be his own. Many instances of similarly great success among British small holders might be given. How are the freeholders of the future to be settled on the land? In the first instance, a non-political organisation with branches in every county should be created by the Board of Agriculture, which is trusted throughout the country, and the Board of Agriculture should be given supreme direction over this new organisation. The new organisation should, through its local committees, investigate local conditions, advise both landowners and appUcants for freehold land, act as mediatpr between both parties and as 412 GREAT AND GEBATEB BEITAIN agent in effecting the purchases and sales determined upon. They should make themselves famiUar with the agricultural aspect of their district. They should carefully ascertain the requirements of land on the part of intending trustworthy purchasers, on the one hand, and the disposition of land- owners to sell land, on the other hand. They should study the agricultural possibilities of their district, and determine the parts which are most suitable for the creation of small and medium-sized freeholds by the character of the soil and by their proximity to towns, railways, roads, water, &c. It is most important that these local committees be well chosen, that they be non-political and sympathetic. Other- wise their action will be directed rather by party-political or personal than by agricultural considerations. Experience has shown that it was a mistake to allow the county councils to carry the Small Holdings Act of 1907 into effect. Some Conservative county councils have ignored it and have endeavoured to make it a failure, while some Radical ones have spitefully used it as a means of oppression against land- owners, and have encouraged intending small holders to pick the eyes out of valuable estates. The disentailing of entailed estates might be encouraged and facilitated, and arrangements should be made for the compulsory purchase of agricultural land. Home farms of a reasonable size and parks would of course be excepted. In case of compulsory purchase, the owners should receive for their land the full value, which, in case of disputes, might be determined by referees, plus a small percentage, let us say 10 per cent., for disturbance. (The solatium for disturbance should be so small as to induce owners of estates suitable for settlement rather to sell them voluntarily than have them purchased under a compulsory plan.) The farmers sitting on a bought-up estate should have a first claim for enfranchisement. They should be given the option of buying either the whole or part of their farms, thus becoming freeholders, or of ceding their farms to intending THE RURAL LAND PROBLEM 413 freeholders. The farmers ceding their farms should receive compensation in full plus a reasonable percentage for dis- turbance. The purchasing of estates or large self-contained parts of estates — applicants should not be allowed to apply for the choicest morsels here and there to the damage of entire estates — should proceed in accordance with the demand for land. The national credit is too precious to be lightly engaged by the pubhc issue of large loans. Therefore it will perhaps be best to finance intending freeholders through private State-guaranteed land banks, empowered to pay landowners with 2f per cent, mortgage debentures, and to collect from the freeholders annual interest on the value of their purchase plus I per cent, for sinking fund. The maximum dividend on the shares of these banks should be fixed at 5 or 6 per cent., and the shares should, as far as possible, be reserved to landowners. Being proprietors and managers of these land banks, the landowners should have entire confidence in the mortgage bonds issued to them in payment for their lands. The mortgage debentures, being Government guaranteed, would range as trustee stocks, and the savings banks should be directed to invest part of their deposits in these bonds. The savings which the poor man places in the savings banks are used at present for driving up the rich man's consols. The savings of the people ought to be used for the benefit of the people. They might be used for settling the people on the land. If this were done, every savings bank depositor would be given a direct interest in the land and its welfare. It is scarcely necessary to say that our land nationaUsers and our SociaHsts would oppose this use of the savings banks deposits tooth and nail. By the organisation sketched in the foregoing, estates suitable for cutting up into small freehold farms would be acquired in every county, and, as these estates would become centres from which the freehold system would permeate 414 GEEAl: AND GRfiATEE BRITAIN every county, they ought to be made model establishments. Rome was not built in a day. It is idle to expect that all landowners will be bought out in a year or two. The movement will begin slowly and grow gradually with its success. Therefore the money market would scarcely, if at all, be disturbed by the change in ownership. The amount required for paying off the landowners need not be very large, especially as the original fund set aside for this purpose would constantly be replenished by the yearly repayments of capital made by the small holders. The cottages, agricultural buildings, tools, live stock, manure, seed, &c., required by the small freeholders could be bought with the assistance of the land settlement banks, but it will probably be wiser to create co-operative banks to deal with these matters. These co-operative banks would receive the savings of freeholders, and thus the freeholders would finance each other. Union is strength. County associations of co-operative banks should be formed, and a central bank should be created which would serve as a general credit reservoir for the county associations and for the individual county banks. The central co-oper- ative banks should be given by the Government £500,000 as a loan free of interest, which would provide, through the county associations, the working capital immediately needed by the individual co-operative banks throughout the country. The first, the easiest, and the most obvious step in the creation of rural freeholds should be brought about by the amendment of the manifestly unjust Small Holdings Act of 1907. The tenants created by that Act should be con- verted into freeholders. They should work for themselves, not for the county council. What are the principal objections to the creation of small freeholders ? Many landowners say that the present system should not be altered because it has worked well in the past. The fact THE RtJEAL LAND PEOBLEM 415 that our land system has worked ill may be seen from this, that our agriculture has decayed while the agriculture of other European countries, where freeholds are the rule, has prospered. If dual ownership, the partnership of landowner and farmer, were a success it would exist outside of Great Britain. If it made for efficiency and economy, it would either have grown up spontaneously in other countries or foreign nations would have introduced the British land system. Free Trade is no doubt largely responsible for the shrinkage of our wheat fields, but though the fact that more than 2,000,000 acres under wheat have gone out of cultivation may be ascribed principally to Free Trade, Free Trade has scarcely caused another 2,000,000 acres, which used to be under vegetables, to go also out of cultivation. The fact cannot be disguised that dual ownership has proved a failure. The landowner owns the land, which is visible. The farmer owns the ' un- exhausted improvements,' which are invisible. The claims of the landlord are substantial, while those of the tenant are shadowy. Owing to the complicated relations between landowner and tenants, the British land system in the country, and in the towns as well, is a system encouraging exploitation and mutual besting. It is a system which requires an army of expensive and unproductive middlemen, to prevent undue exploitation and besting on the part of the grasping and the unscrupulous. It encourages waste- fulness and trickery, and discourages honest work. The present system of tenancy is a premium on bad farming. A farmer who by heavy manuring, &c., has improved the land very greatly, may either have his rent raised against him by the landowner, or have part of his improvements and of his capital confiscated. Hence many ' travelling ' farmers ' skin ' farm after farm. No man will plant a tree if he does not know whether he or his successor will reap the fruit. The tenant does not care if the landowner's buildings decay for lack of attention, and he does not care 416 GBEAT AND GEEATEB BBITAIN to fix up a tile at a cost of a few minutes' work when he can send for the estate carpenter, who is paid 5s. a day. Economic and thorough cultivation must be based on ownership. The champions of the present land system say that small holders will fail because they can neither afford the costly labour-saving machinery which large landowners and farmers can buy, nor sell their produce to the best advantage. These difficulties can be overcome by co-opera- tion. They are overcome by co-operation everywhere on the Continent and in Ireland, and co-operation may be made more potent by the creation of an agricultural post. Op- ponents of small holdings say that farmers who find it difficult to make a hving out of 500 acres will find it impossible to make a living on 50 acres. Our farmers require very large farms because they grow so little per acre, and they grow so little because they have not enough hands to do the work. A few acres of roots and of cultivated fodder plants yield as much nourishment to animals as many acres of rough, stubbly grass which requires practically no labour. It is a well-known fact that most farmers could secure a much higher rate of profit by reducing their area from 300 acres to 100 acres and applying to them more labour and manure. Our farms are large, not because large farms are economical, but because intensive agriculture on farms of moderate size has become impossible in this country through lack of labour. Many agriculturists think that the creation of numerous small freeholds will deprive our farmers of their labourers, who will begin farming on their own, and that the rural labour difficulty will thus be intensified. The fact that small holdings make not for lack of labour but for abundance of labour wiU be evident by comparing rural labour con- ditions in Great Britain, where large estates prevail and the labourers are landless, with rural labour conditions in Germany, where small freeholds are very numerous. Such THE RUKAL LAND PROBLEM 417 a comparison is most instructive, and it reveals the following surprising facts : la Great Britain (exclusive of Ireland) In Germany (1907) Number of farmers (1901) Number of individual holdings (1908) . . . . Number of agricultural labourers of both sexes (1901) 277,694 508,629 724,314 2,500,974 5,736,082 7,283,471 It will be noticed that for every agricultural labourer in Great Britain there are ten agricultural labourers in Germany. With ten times the number of labourers, Germany grows exactly ten times as much bread-corn as does this country. In 1908 Germany grew 14,504,700 tons of wheat and rye, whilst the United Kingdom grew only 1,474,200 tons. Although Germany has 7,283,471 agricultural labourers, she possesses only 6,786,082 agricultural holdings. About 1,500,000 male German agricultural labourers are landless, but they will not always be landless. They are the children of small freeholders, and they work on the farms of medium and of large freeholders, until they come into their paternal property. The creation of small free- holders should not make the rural labour problem worse, but should solve it. Some landowners object to the creation of small free- holds because they do not wish the country to be converted into a wilderness of unsightly small plots, and they assert that the creation of freeholders would destroy aU rural beauty and all rural sport. I think these fears are uncalled fori In France, Germany and other countries the creation of freeholders has neither spoilt the scenery nor has it killed all sport. It has not even led to the disappearance of large estates and of large farms. This may be seen from the table of owners of land in Germany in the last chapter. As small holdings did not destroy sport and natural beauty in .2e 418 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN other countries, they should not do so in Great Britain. Besides, those landowners who oppose the creation of numerous freeholds because they might diminish their sport should ask themselves whether land exists chiefly to keep foxes and partridges, or to keep men ? The landowners as a body should rather benefit than suffer from the creation of numerous freeholdSi Most of our agricultural land is heavily encumbered and mortgaged, and most of our landowners are in embarrassed circumstances. A further fall in the value of land would lead to general bankruptcy among them. A rise in the price of land would save them. The price of agricultural land depends on the value of the produce raised on it. A more intensive cultiva- tion, a cultivation such as that prevalent in France and Germany, a cultivation which substitutes grain and vegetables for the rough grass and weeds growing wildly on our so-called permanent pasture, should double the price of the land. It is highly significant that agricultural land in Germany is on an average twice as valuable as agricultural land in Great Britain. Unless the land problem is solved speedily, it will solve itself through the complete disappearance of the rural labourers. Landowners must either create numerous free- holders, who work during part of their time on their own land, or they must allow most of the remaining agricultural land to go out of cultivation, and to become ' permanent pasture.' If they allow their agricultural land to become a prairie, it will have only prairie value, and the owners of large estates will be ruined. They must choose between a country settled by peasant proprietors and a country covered with ranches similar to the Wild West. The urban land problem also is urgent, but it is not so urgent as the rural one. In the towns, as in the country, dual ownership prevails, and it has the same result in the towns as it has in the country. Here also it makes for mutual exploitation and besting, for trickery, neglect and waste, and it requires an army of economically useless middlemen. THE RURAL LAND PROBLEM 419 Our town rents are high, not owing to the exactions of the ground landlords, but owing to the leasehold system. Men who take a house or a cottage for a short term — ^and most working people do so — treat it badly. It is, after all, not their property. Consequently repairs are heavy, and, to provide for these, owners of house property must charge 10 per cent, on the value of their houses in the form of rent. Working men can reduce their rent commonly by one-third, and sometimes even by one-half, if they own the houses they hve in. However, as a lease is a wasting security, few working men care to invest their savings in a house which ultimately becomes the property of the landlord. Our towns, like the country, consist chiefly of large estates. Their owners do not care to seU part of their holding. Besides, the purchase of a small plot of freehold land or of a freehold cottage is made almost impossible for men of small means through the intricacy and uncertainty of title, and the difficulty, waste of time, and great expense incurred in buying or selling real estate, or in raising a loan thereon. Li the case of very small properties the cost of investigatiag and transferring the title comes often to from 5 to 10 per cent, of the purchase money — a prohibitive amount. The purchase of freehold properties in town and country ought to be made easy, especially to people of modest means, not only in order to reduce their rent, but also in order to give them a greater inducement to save. Most people of small means like best to put their savings into tangible real property because paper property is speculative, and has something very unreal about it. The working man can put his savings practically only into leasehold property, which is unsatisfactory because it reverts to the landowner, or into the savings banks, which give too low an interest, or into stocks and shares, in which he becomes a prey to the company promoter and to the bucket shop. The impossibility of securing a satisfactory investment on real property is, I 2 E 2 420 GREAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN think, the chief cause of the thriftlessness of the British masses. The workers of all other nations are more thrifty than Englishmen, probably because ownership of cottages and land is usual among them. As the British workers cannot put their money into freehold land and houses, where they have the result of their thrift constantly before their eyes, they commonly spend all they earn. The enfranchisement of leases should be made easy. Respectable householders should be entitled to purchase the freehold of the house or the cottage they live in at a price approximating its market value ; and here, again, the funds of the savings banks might, under proper safeguards, be usefully employed for financing workers desirous of acquiring a house of their own. Besides, the transfer of real estate should be made less costly and cumbrous by the creation of proper land registers, which exist in all civihsed countries except Great Britain. The laws and institutions of every country favour either the distribution or the centralisation of wealth. Those of Great Britain have the latter effect. They must be altered. I advocate the breaking-up of large estates iii town and country, not only in the interests of the workers, but in those of the landowners as well. Nobody likes to pay rent, and Great Britain is a nation of rent-payers. The land is for all practical purposes a monopoly of the few. Landowners as a body are not popular. In a country such as Great Britain, in which milhons rule, the ownership of the bulk of the land cannot safely be confined to a few thousands. Our Eadical- Sociahst Government has proclaimed the nationalisation of the land by easy stages, and it has already begun to ' resume ' the land. The time for applying palliatives, such as that contained in Mr. Jesse Collings's Purchase of Land Bill of 1905, is past. Our land system is a great and genuine grievance to the people, and a great and genuine popular grievance requires a great and genuine remedy. Our land system must be reformed root and branch, and landowners THE ^URAI, LAND PKOBLEM 421 will be wise not to oppose a reform which has become inevitable. Unless they allow the Unionists to buy them out of part of their land the Eadical-Socialists will tax them out of the whole of their land. Their choice Hes between land reform and land confiscation. Under Mr. Asquith's Government Sociahsm has advanced with giant strides. It has seized the reins of power. Great Britain is the only country in the world which is ruled by a SociaHst Cabinet. The British Government is the only Government in the world which has embarked upon the policy of nationalising the land by gradual confiscation. The process of taxing the landowners out of their land has commenced. So far Socialism has met with but Uttle resistance. Its success has been easy because there are only a few thousand big landowners to oppose its progress. Their single-handed resistance to the nationalisation of the land will probably be as unsuccessful in the long-run as was the; opposition of their grandfathers to the abolition of the Com Laws. Our landowners can resist and they can defeat Sociahsm, but they can do so only if they take the people into partnership. Property owners are the natural defenders of the State and its institutions. The historic fabric of Great Britain rests on a dangerously narrow basis — a basis which sufficed in the past, but which suffices no longer. The enemy is at the gates. Rome enfranchised her slaves against Hannibal. Prussia enfranchised her people against Napoleon. We must enfranchise our people against the forces of revolution. Great Britain is in the melting-pot. TSe pohtical enfranch- isement of our people should be followed by their economic enfranchisement. Property owners are conservative. A thorough reform of our land system will be the most democratic, and at the same time the most conservative measure of modern times. CHAPTER XVIII RURAL LAND REFORM AND URBAN CONGESTION The British land problem is a great and urgent problem, and two solutions are offered for our choice. It is the avowed aim of the Liberal-Socialist Party to abolish private property in land, to make ' the community ' the universal landlord, and Great Britain a nation of lodgers. If this poUcy be carried to its logical conclusion it wiU convert the town into a collection of huge barracks and model dwellings similar to the Rowton Houses, in which cubicles may be obtained on appUcation to Socialist officials, and it will convert the country into a gigantic labour colony similar to HoUesley Bay or to the penal settlement on Dartmoor. The Unionist land policy, as laid down by Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Chamberlain, and others, is of a very different character. It strives to increase to the utmost the number of freeholders throughout the land. The Unionist Party wishes to enable the workers in town and country to acquire, with the assistance of the State, and at a reasonable price, the soil which they till and the house they live in, and their ideal may be summed up in the terse phrase : ' Every man his own landlord.' There is an urban land problem and a rural one. The Unionist solution of the urban land problem is comparatively a simple one, and it should appeal to the masses immediately inasmuch as its benefits to the people are readily understood. Most intelligent workers know that they can halve, or almost halve, their expenditure in rent if they own the house they 422 LAND EEFORM AND URBAN CONGESTION 423 live in. They know that it is worth while saving money for a house which, with the soil on which it stands, will be theirs and their family's for ever. As Lord Lansdowne put it at Plymouth on December 3, 1909 : ' It is the ambition of an Enghsh working man to own his own house and to be his own master inside it.' But many workers, and especially town workers, do not see how they will benefit if the Unionist Party should succeed in re-creating our agriculture on the basis of peasant proprietorship and settling the countryside with hundreds of thousands of small holders who absolutely own their farms. To the individual it is, after aU, of secondary importance whether the State or agriculture in the abstract will, or will not, benefit by the far-reaching land reform which the Unionist Party will introduce. At a time like the present, when unemployment and poverty are widespread, the workers' personal needs must take preced- ence before the needs of the country. Therefore it is worth while inquiring whether the creation of a large number of peasant proprietors will be of advantage to the masses of the people, and especially to our town workers. Owing to the combined effect of Free Trade and of an antiquated land system, our agriculture has utterly decayed. Millions of acres have gone out of cultivation. Grass grows untended where busy ploughmen used to work. Homesteads and villages have been abandoned and have disappeared, and the countryside has become a desolation. The magnitude of the decay of rural Britain can best be measured by comparison with another nation. Great Britain has a more fruitful soil and a better configuration than Germany. The sea which surrounds these isles makes our interior more easily accessible than that of land-locked Germany. Owing to the Gulf Stream, our climate is milder and more equable than that of Germany, where extremes of heat and cold are usual. Whilst Germany suffers frequently from drought, the moisture of the air is most helpful to the vegetation in this country. In the report on Small Holdings of 1906, we 424 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BRITAIN read on page 45 : 'In this country the soil has a productive capacity per acre greater than in France or Germany and vastly greater than in Denmark. The markets into which foreign products come in ever-increasing quantity are at our own doors. The methods which have enabled the foreign and Colonial agriculturist to get and keep control of the wholesale trade here are precisely the methods which have been applied in the United Kingdom to other branches of eo-operative work more effectively than in any other part of the world. Success in small farming here ought therefore to be not more but less difficult to attain.* Compared with Germany, the balance of natural advan- tages, as far as agriculture is concerned, is evidently on our side. Therefore, if we make due allowance for the difference in the size of the two countries. Great Britain should raise more agricultural produce per acre than does Germany. Germany has 208,740 square miles ; the United Kingdom has 121,371 square miles. By the extent of their surface the two countries compare exactly as do five and three. Let us now compare the productivity of the land in the two countries and see whether their agricultural production also stands in the relation of five to three. PRiNciPAri Items of AoRicuLTtrBAL Pbodttction in 1907-8 Germany United Kingdom 1908 Tons Tons Wheat and Rye 14,504,700 1,474,200 Barley . 3,059,900 1,396,600 Oats . 7,694,800 3,114,200 Potatoes 46,342,700 7,232,500 Sugar . 1,924,858 none Tobacco 28,839 none Acres Acres Woods and Forests . 34,569,794 3,075,000 Permanent Pasture. 6,685,574 . 21,116,838 1907 Milch Cows . 10,966,998 4,338,748 Pigs . 22,146,532 3,967,163 Sheep . 7.703,710 . 31,332,400 An examination and comparison of the two columns of figures shows at a glance how insufficiently our natural LAND REFOEM A.ND URBAN CONGESTION 425 agricultural resources are being utilised. In size Germany and Great Britain compare as do five and three. If we allow for the better soil, configuration and climate of this country, the agricultural production of Germany ought at most to be 60 per cent, larger than that of Great Britain. However, the foregoing table proves that for every single sack of bread-corn grown in this country, Germany grows ten sacks ; that for every sack of potatoes grown in this country, Germany grows seven sacks ; that for every acre under woods and forests in this country, Germany has eleven acres ; that for every two cows in this country, Germany has five cows ; that for every two pigs in this country, Germany has eleven pigs ; that Germany's crop of tobacco is equal to three-fifths of our entire consumption, or is large enough to supply 27,000,000 British people, whilst we grow no tobacco, although our climate is eminently suitable for that crop ; that Germany produces about 2,000,000 tons of sugar, which suffices for the entire German consumption and a large part of our own, whilst we produce none, although our climate is better for growing sugar beet than is that of Germany. British agriculture is superior to German agriculture only in permanent pasture, which is a euphemism for desolation, and in comparatively valueless sheep, which Hve on permanent pasture. Our superiority in sheep is dearly bought. On an acre of land on which, according to its position and character, we might produce every year a ton of wheat worth £7 10s., or two tons of sugar worth £10, or eight tons of potatoes worth £24, or a ton of timber worth £2, we produce 10s. worth of mutton and a few pounds of wool. The waste of our great resources is frightful, is criminal. The average family comprises five people. The great difference between Germany's agricultural wealth and our agricultural poverty can easiest be realised by comparing the share of every family in the agricultural production of their country. 426 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN SHABE m AGEICtJLTTJEAL WEALTH PEE FAMILY OB FlVB In Germany 1 cow 2 pigs J sheep 80 cwts. potatoes 24 cwts. bread-corn 3 cwts. sugar 5 lbs. tobacco 3 acres under woods and forests 6 fowls 16 fruit trees In United Kingdom J a cow 3 sheep i7 cwts. potatoes 3 owts. bread-corn None None J acre under woods and forests No figures available No figures available The foregoing comparison should suffice to show that our agriculture, which used to be the foremost in Europe, has utterly decayed ; that there is a vast scope for our rural industries ; that the latent and neglected wealth in our soil is enormous ; that if we only equal the agricultural pro- ductivity of Germany per acre, we can double and treble our production of bread, vegetables, meat and wood ; that we can create healthful and constant employment for milhons of Englishmen in the country, and thus reheve, or abolish, unemployment in the towns, provided it be possible to re-settle the countryside with townsmen. Before considering the question whether it will be possible to settle the redundant population of our towns in the country, let us inquire what agricultural produce we may, and ought to, raise in this coimtry. Everybody knows that the British nation lives largely on foreign food, that we pay for our daily bread with the manufactures which we send abroad, and it is frequently asserted that the larger part of our food imports consists of wheat. That widely-held belief is erroneous. According to the Board of Trade statistics, we imported in 1908 into Great Britain food to the value of £244,134,089, of which only £45,370,558, or considerably less than one-fifth, represented the value of wheat and wheat flour, and, measured by value, we import actually more meat than wheat, as will be seen in the following table. It may be LAND EEPOEM AND URBAN CONGESTION 427 true that we cannot grow all the wheat which we require, although we can undoubtedly grow far more wheat than we do grow, but we can certainly produce a very large part of the remaining £200,000,000 of imported food. This may be seen from the following items which might be raised in this country, which I have picked out from the long Ust of our agricultural imports : Some Aorioultueal Pkodtjcts impoeted in 1908 Meat £49,448,334 Lard 4,407,410 Butter 24,080,912 Margarine 2,081,245 Cheese 6,684,203 Eggs 7,183,112 Apples 2,079,703 Pears 515,924 Plums 487,353 ; Nuts 768,560 Hops 767,045 Potatoes 1,967,216 Onions 993,669 Sugar 20,003,427 Condensed milk ..... 1,544,194 The foregoing table shows that we are dependent to a very great extent on foreign countries not only for our daily bread but for practically all our food, and it shows also that a very large part of these articles, and many others which I have not enumerated, might be produced in this country by small holders. The items contained in the foregoing table, such as meat, especially pork, vegetables, dairy produce, eggs and fruit, are the characteristic productions of peasant proprietors, for they can be grown to the best advantage on small farms. Our growing dependence on foreign nations for our daily bread and for all other food is not merely regrettable, but it is dangerous. The foreigner controls not only our bakehouse — we have apparently resigned ourselves to that — but also our larder. Unless our agriculture be re- created and vigorously developed we may soon be as 428 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN dependent on other countries for our meat as we are already for our wheat. Our growing dependence on imported meat is apparent from the following figures : Meat Imports into Gbbat Britain Beef Mutton Pork Total Meat cwts. cwts. cwts, cwte. 1878 2,080,753 . . [527,450 . . 4,740,501 . . 7.934,685 1888 3,211,612 . . 1,565,520 . . 4,108,074 . . 9,484,522 1898 7,338,410 . . 3,812,095 . . 8,517,666 . . 20,258,427 1908 8,493,190 . . 4,499,374 . . 7,753,819 . . 21,646,939 During 1878-1908, thirty years, our meat imports have trebled. They have slackened between 1898 and 1908, not because our domestic meat production has increased — unfortunately it has remained stationary, if it has not declined — but apparently because industrial depression and consequent poverty have stopped the rapid increase in the consumption of meat in this country. To how great an extent the British population, and especially the people living in large towns, are dependent on imported meat may be seen from the fact that, of the meat sold in the Central Meat Market of London, four-fifths is imported meat. Four American firms which dominate the Meat Trust handle and control our entire beef supply from the United States and Canada, and they are now trying to control our most important Argentine meat supply as well. We know to our cost what it means to be dependent upon American wheat and cotton. Our workers have repeatedly suffered at the hands of American speculators who, taking advantage of the dependence of this country on American supplies, have cornered wheat and cotton and have raised their price against this country. By their nefarious opera- tions they have brought poverty and despair into many thousands of British homes. Unless we re-create our agriculture and increase our home supply we may soon be as dependent upon American speculators for our meat as we occasionally have been for our cotton and wheat. LAND EEPOKM AND URBAN CONGESTION 429 In 1908 a Committee was appointed to inquire into Combinations in the Meat Trade, and it reported in 1909 : ' It seems to be within the limits of possibility, to put it no higher, that the United States firms (of the Beef Trust) will acquire very considerable interests in Argentiae and perhaps elsewhere.' It concluded : ' In the event of their doing so, we are of opinion that the situation in regard to the beef supply of the United Kingdom might well become serious.' Since the publication of that report the American Beef Trust has strengthened its hold upon Argentina. However, even if the Beef Trust should not succeed in cornering and controlling our meat imports and in raising the meat prices systematically against the British consumer, our position is sufficiently serious. In the case of a general shortage of meat, the Beef Trust must supply in the first instance the United States market in order not to incur the hostility of the American people and legislature. There- fore the brunt of a universal shortage of meat in North and South America is bound to fall most severely upon this country in the shape of reduced supplies and increased prices. In case of a general shortage, the Beef Trust would stop or reduce the exportation of meat from the United States and Canada to Great Britain and divert the Argentine meat exports to the United States. The fact that in times of a general scarcity of meat Great Britain has to bear the brunt of high prices was clearly brought out in paragraphs 44 and 45 of the report on Combinations in the Meat Trade. Agriculture and the manufacturing industries go hand in hand. When one suffers the other suffers too. Dependence on foreign meat means also dependence on foreign leather. By allowing a powerful foreign trust to control our beef supply, we enable it to control our leather supply as well. Thus we enable a few foreign millionaires not only to lay under contribution all the meat consumers in the United Kingdom, but to ruin our leather-working industries, and especially our boot and shoe industry, as well. 430 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN It is ominous that the American Beef Trust is aUied with the American Leather Trust : that most American Uve cattle brought over here for slaughter are sold ' ex hide,' which is returned to the United States ; and that our leather manufacturers complain about the shortage and deamess of hides. Dependence on foreign meat must mean dearer meat and dearer boots for the people. Our workers have known to their cost the meaning of a cotton famine and of a wheat corner. We may, and probably will, before long, become acquainted with a leather famine and a meat comer unless we re-create our agriculture and produce a large supply of meat and leather within our own frontiers. Unless we re-create our agriculture, these isles will be at the mercy of a handful of foreign speculators. They will be starved in peace as a fortress is starved in war, and the poorest and the most helpless of our workers wiU be the greatest sufferers from the neglect of our agriculture. Experience shows that peasant proprietors raise per acre far more cattle, and especially far more pigs, than do large landowners and farmers. A small holder can easily maintain a pig on inferior produce unfit for the town market and on the scraps of the farm. It is estimated that the German peasant proprietors alone own no less than 18,000,000 pigs, a number almost five times as great as the whole number of pigs in this country. A large number of peasant proprietors should make beef, pork, and leather cheap alnd plentiful in this country. We have become as dependent on foreign eggs as we are on foreign wheat and meat. The importation of foreign eggs has increased in the following remarkable manner : Importation of Eggs into Great Britain Number of eggs Number per head Number per family imported oJ population of five 1879 766,708,000 22 110 1893 1,325,730,000 37 185 1908 2,185.208,400 50 250 LAND REPOEM AND URBAN CONGESTION 431 Whilst the landowners and farmers find poultry-keeping unprofitable owing to the heavy costs of feeding, tending and supervision involved, the small holders find it most profitable. The wife or the children look after the poultry, which are brought up largely on the scraps of the table and on the insects and worms which they pick up in the fields. Therefore a small holder can make a profit of from 4s. to 5s. per hen per year at little expense and with practically no work. Universal experience has proved that peasant proprietor- ship leads to a more intensive and thorough cultivation of the soil, that it greatly increases the production of wheat, oats, potatoes, vegetables and of fodder plants, which are converted into cattle and pigs. The old system of British agriculture, the tenancy system, has proved a gigantic failure. Therefore we must re-create our agriculture, and we must be guided in its re-creation by the universal experience of mankind, which has proved that ownership is infinitely superior to tenure. In Chapter XVII I have mapped out a detailed plan for reorganising our agriculture and placing it upon the basis of peasant proprietorship. It is, of course, com- paratively easy to effect such a change in agricultural organisation if an adequate number of people live on the land who may be converted into peasant proprietors. Unfortunately, that is not the case in Great Britain. Our great difficulty lies in this, that the country is deserted and that our towns are congested ; that agricultural labourers are scarce, and town workers are superabundant. Therefore the problem of re-creating our rural industries on the basis of peasant proprietorship involves the difficult problem of planting part of the inhabitants of our towns on the land. Socialist farm colonies of the Hollesley Bay type, in which, the experiment of converting unemployed town workers into agricultural labourers has been tried, have proved a failure. However, we cannot conclude from the failure 432 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BRITAIN of these Socialistic experiments that the policy of ' back to the land ' is a foolish and impracticable one. At first sight the idea of transplanting thousands of townspeople into the country may seem very wild and fantastic, but it is less fantastic than it seems, for three reasons : 1. The British people are a Nature-loving people ; 2. A very large number of town workers are country-bom, and many of these wish to return to the country ; 3. Many examples exist which prove that not only town workers of the carter, coachman and poHceman type, but even superannuated factory workers, may become successful agriculturists. Let us consider these three reasons one by one. It need scarcely be proved that the British people are a Nature-loving people. Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Russians, Dutchmen are satisfied to live in gardenless towns. Only in Great Britain practically every house has its garden, and nearly every householder, whether he be rich or poor, is an amateur gardener. The census returns show that practically the entire youth leaves the country for the town. They migrate to the town, not so much because town wages are higher than country wages, but because agriculture gives them at present very little scope. A town labourer, if he has some grit in him, has many opportunities of rising. He may become foreman in a factory and earn from £3 to £5 a week. If he is ambitious, he may have even a higher aim. Many a wealthy builder started as a bricklayer's labourer at 18s. a week, and many a wealthy City man began his career as a packer in a ware- house. . Pew opportunities of rising occur in the country. ' Once an agricultural labourer, always an agricultural labourer,' is on the whole a true saying, although some agricultural labourers become farmers. The ideal of the British working man may be expressed in three words : ' Competence with independence.' The agricultural labourer has neither. Our rural wages are so LAND EEFORM AND URBAN CONGESTION 433 low — ^they come on an average to about 16s. or 17s. a week — that most agricultural labourers are compelled to live in their old age on private or public charity. Young countrymen have at present excellent reasons for deserting the country. Many of the men who have migrated to our towns, and who have become acquainted with the disadvantages of town Ufe, are only too anxious to return to the country, and a good number of them do so already. The creation of peasant proprietors, the provision of State funds to enable suitable people to settle on the land, the ' magic of property,' which, as Arthur Young said, turns sand into gold, the possibiMty of exchanging dependence on a foreman and on the erratic fluctuations of the labour market for ' competence with independence ' in the country, and the hope of a peasant proprietor to become eventually a prosperous farmer proprietor — all these circumstances will imdoubtedly combine to bring about the return to the country of a large number of the best countrymen who have settled in our towns. The return of many country-bom town workers who have some knowledge of agriculture would not only provide a considerable body of promising agriculturists — our land is at present labour-starved — but it would at the same time benefit the town workers in general by creating numerous town vacancies for men who otherwise would be unemployed. A large migration of workers from the towns to the country should diminish unemployment and raise wages, and there- fore it is to the great interest of our town workers of every class to see agriculture re-created and the countryside re-settled. To those who know neither the factory workers nor the land, the idea of planting factory workers on the land will no doubt appear extremely ridiculous, and it would indeed be ridiculous to convey indiscriminately large numbers of factory workers, or of unemployed town workers of every kind, into the country, and bid them engage in agriculture, as our Socialists propose. Many of our factory workers 2 w 434 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BRITAIN ardently desire to go to the country and to engage in agri- culture, and, as they are fairly resourceful and open-minded, many of such men should make a success in working the land. As a matter of fact, numerous encouraging examples of factory workers who have gone on the land, engaged in farming, and made a signal success of it, are on record. Of the many examples which I can supply I would quote a few from the evidence given before the Departmental Committee on Small Holdings in 1906, which will show that even superannuated factory workers may become prosper- ous agriculturists. Before that Committee Mr. Jesse Marlow, the Secretary of the Desborough Co-operative Society, was examined, with the following result : ' Q. Have you dealt in land in larger quantities ? A. In 1898, finding that the savings of the members were being sent out of the town and into the Post Office Savings Bank, and believing that these savings could be more profitably employed within the limits of the parish of Desborough, our Society became the purchaser of the Hall Farm Estate. It consists of two farm premises and 408 acres of land. There are now many men who have been ousted by the introduction of machinery, vigorous, healthy men with a certain amount of agricultural knowledge, who desire to get hold of a bit of land, and, if possible, to make their living out of it. ' Q. In what quantities ? A. 1 know the case of a man being able to make a living out of even half an acre of land, if he has greenhouses, and goes in for fruit culture. Many men are able to get their living out of an acre of land. ' Q. Do you find that the demand for these small holdings or allotments comes chiefly from the older members of your Society ? A. Yes, there is now found to be a demand for larger plots by artisans who at forty or fifty years of age are ousted from their regular employment by younger labour, and by the rapid introduction of labour-saving machinery. These men are really just past middle-agej LAND EEPOEM AND UEBAN CONGESTION 435 and there is a strong and anxious desire amongst them for land. ' Q. Having got the land, can they live out of it ? A. Yes. ' Q. Do the men cultivate their land weU ? A. Eemark- ably weU. In fact, many of them have been very successful, after severe competition, both at London and provincial shows. ' Q. Are these mostly men who have had no previous knowledge of fanning ? A. Yes, that is so. ' Q. You refer to pigs. Do they sell their pig meat by retail, fresh, or do they cure it, or do they grow it for home consumption 9 A. I should think they have in Desborough a matter of 500 pigs belonging to artisans of one sort or another. ' Q. Do they sell to the Society at all ? A. Yes. • Q. Cured meat ? A. Yes. • Q. Are they skilled curers ? A. Many of them are. ' Q. Then, with regard to poultry, do they keep any special breed, or do they keep mixed or cross birds ? A. All sorts are kept. ' Q. Are the man and his wife and family better fed than they were before they became producers ? Q. It is a grand thing for them. ' Q. Are the children better reared, then, than formerly ? A. I beheve it has a grand moral effect. ' Q. Are they physically stronger ? A. Yes. ' Q. Are they morally superior 9 A. 1 believe they are. ' Q. And, taking them generally, you find that, owing to the system you have adopted, the character of your people has risen ? A. It has.' Before the same Committee, Mr. William Gutteridge, of the Eushden Permanent Allotment and Small Holdings Society, was examined as follows : ' Q. What proportion of artisans, would you say, in a busy town like Eushden, would care to have plots ? Can you form any idea of the numbers ? A. I think a very large 2 7 2 436 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN number. Of course, there are other allotments in addition to those we hold as a Society, so that there must be really a very large number of men who have allotments, or are anxious to get them. ' Q. Is it your experience that the older men find it less easy to retain their employment in factories, and for that reason there is a great demand for land ? J. It is those men who already hold a small portion who are constantly asking for an increased area, so that it may take up more of their time and be the means of supporting them. ' Q. Are they men who have ceased to be employed? A. They are usually the men who have passed the age of forty-five. ' Q. Have they ceased to be employed altogether ? A. It is becoming a very serious difficulty in the shoe trade that men of that age have to find something else to do, and they think, and in practice they find, that, if they can get a piece of land, it is nearly a means of living for them.' Town workers, who seriously wish to work on the land, can make a living on the land. They can become prosper- ous by agriculture, and, if they are the absolute owners of their land, they will be able to secure for themselves the full increase in the value of the land which their labour has brought about. Before the same Committee, the examina- tion of Mr. James Stewart, of Eattray, elicited the following : ' Q. I think your own trade was that of a shoemaker ? A. Yes. ' Q. And you found that that was not a great trade ? A. That is so. ' Q. What induced you to take up the fruit-growing ? A. The trade in hand-made shoes was dying, as shoes were being made in factories. ' Q. But you had a garden at your cottage to begin with at Eattray ? A. Yes, and then I took an acre. ' Q. You bought a certain amount of land, five acres ? A. Yes. LAND REPOEM AND URBAN CONGESTION 437 ' Q. What did you pay for that ? A. £100 an acre. ' Q. You sold half of that and retained the other half ? What did you get for the part that you sold ? A. £700. ' Q. That shows that the value had risen ? A. Yes. ' Q. In a comparatively short time you had bought five acres for £500 and sold 2| acres of that for £700, and you had as profit remaining the other 2| acres, along with £200 over ? A. Yes. ' Q. What is the total acreage of land you now occupy as owner and tenant ? A. Thirty-six acres. ' Q. Are you quite satisfied ? A. Yes. ' Q. I see you have tried both owning and renting land ? A. Yes. • Q. Which do you like best ? A. I like owning. ' Q. Do you think that would be the general opinion ? A. Yes. ' Q. With regard to the profits, I see Mr. Hodge gives in his leaflet, " Fruit Culture on Small Holdings," a net profit of £492 in nine years on one acre. That is yearly profit of £56 an acre. Do you think that is possible. A. Yes. ' Q. What is the net profit on land that you rent at £10 an acre ? A. It would depend on what I got for my fruit. ' Q. But taking one year with another, you get a good profit on it ? A. There is a profit on it — ^there is no mistake about that.' Peasant proprietors may secure for themselves not only the entire earned increment which their labour has produced, but also the unearned increment which is due to their judg- ment in bujdng, or to chance, or, as the Land Nationalisers would say, to the activity of the community. For an example of this, I return to the examination of Mr. Jesse Marlow, of the Desborough Co-operative Society : ' Q. You referred to the fact that the rateable value of the property you have sold to these people has been increased from 15s. when you made the purchase to 40s. at present. A. Yes. 438 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN ' Q. What is that due to ? The improvement at the hands of the men ? A. Yes, in the opinion of the local assessors. ' Q. Is this increased assessment due to the industry and skill of the men ? A. Entirely. ' Q. May I take it that the land has increased nearly three times in value owing to their labour ? A. The rateable value has. ' Q. I mean, has the land intrinsically increased to three times its value ? A. Marketable value, yes ; quite that. ' Q. Will you describe how the landholding business of the Society developed ? A. The land was purchased at £60 an acre, and was cut up into garden plots for allotments amongst the members. The number of applicants was so large that the land had to be cut up into small portions of one-eighth of an acre, but now the town is so rapidly growing that these plots are becoming in many cases building sites, which return perhaps in some cases 200 per cent, to those who bought them in the first instance.' The greatest increase in agricultural productivity, and therefore also in the value, of the soil, occurs when farm land which was largely under grass is taken in hand by small holders and devoted to intensive culture. In 1895 the Worcestershire County Council bought a farm of 147 acres and cut it up into small holdings. What was the result ? A farm of 147 acres maintains as a rule only the farmer and his family and a labourer or two, it is usually worked with from two to four horses, and it produces but little. In 1906 that farm was occupied by thirty-two small holders, all married men, and their families, and it was worked with thirty -nine horses. A piece of land which formerly had nourished but a single family was made to nourish a village. These thirty-two famiies make a good living out of the land without engaging in any outside occupation, such as acting as carriers, and they[form a happy and contented community. The small holders who have been settled on that farm were LAND REFOEM AND URBAN CONGESTION 439 formerly nailmakers. They had been thrown out of employment through the introduction of machinery. Poverty drove them to loafing, thieving and drunkenness. The provision of small holdings saved them from the work house or the jail and raised them materially and morally. Mr. Prank Smith, the Chairman of the Worcestershire County Council Small Holdings Committee, stated before the Committee on Small Holdings of 1906 : ' The ReUeving Officer has on more than one occasion informed me that there is not now a single able-bodied man receiving outdoor relief, and the Superintendent of Police some years ago, in his report for Quarter Sessions, stated that, in his opinion, the decrease in drunkenness was attributable to the spread of the allotments and small holdings in and around the neighbourhood of Catshill.' The re-creation of our agriculture will not only give relief to the unemployed town workers, by providing for many of them healthful work in the country and by creating vacancies in the town, but it will provide additional employ- ment in our manufacturing industries by increasing their production. The country feeds the town and is paid for its food with manufactured articles. If we double our country population and our agricultural production, and we can do both undoubtedly by the creation of hundreds of thousands of peasant proprietors, we shall also double the demand of the country people for clothes and boots, for houses and furniture, for implements and machiaery. Hence the re-creation of our agriculture will not only draw many unemployed or ill-employed workers from the town to the country, but it will also provide additional work and wages for those that are left behind. The creation of numerous peasant proprietors will re-create the health and strength of the race, which has seriously declined through the decay of our agriculture. Many weighty documents prove that the national physique has very seriously deteriorated. Our strongest countrymen 440 GEEAT AND GEEATER BEITAIN have migrated to the towns, or have emigrated to the United States and to the British Colonies. The nation has lost its best blood and kept the worst, for neither the United States nor our Colonies will take the diseased, the crippled, the lunatic and the pauper, who are left at home to perpetuate and to degrade the race. The Eoyal Commission on Labour reported in 1894 on the agricultural labourers in England : ' The efficiency of the labourers at the present time is generally, but not universally, said to be less than it was in past days, and the result is attributable to the migration of the more active and intelligent labourers. Allowing for the natural habit of depreciating the present and exalting the past, it seems reasonable to suppose that, if the class of agricultural labourers is continually drained of its best and most promising youths, it must deteriorate in character.' The same report stated with regard to the agricultural labourers in Ireland : ' There is a general complaint of the inefficiency of the labourers and their inferiority as compared with those of past days, and they are said to be less hard-working. The alleged inferiority is attributed to the emigration of the more able and intelligent of the class.' It is true that we find magnificent specimens of humanity in the towns in trades in which great bodily strength is required and in the police, but most of these are not t9wns'- men, but are country-born. The Report on Physical Deterioration of 1904 stated : ' Another factor itnilhe alleged deterioration of the people corns aggregation in towns, is said to be the withdraV^ rural districts of the most capable of the populatid the inferior types to supply their place and oontinue~1he stock, the evil being often aggravated, in the opinion of some, by the drifting into the country of the debiUtated town population which is crowded out by the inrush of more vigorous elements. There appears, on the face of it, LAND REPOEM AND URBAN CONGESTION 441 to be considerable probability that both these movements are in operation. ' After describing the splendid men to be found working as navvies, pig-iron carriers in blast furnaces, bleaching powder packers, cement workers, labourers in steel-plate mills, and steel- smelters, occupations which are not only exceedingly arduous but throw a severe strain on the powers of endurance and speedily sift out the inefficients, Mr. Wilson says : " The vast majority of these workers are country-bred and have grown to maturity in farm or outdoor work. . . ." ' For a considerable number of years it has been only the strong and vigorous that go. The old people and the weaklings remain behind in Ireland. The authorities in the United States have become particularly strict about the physical condition of the immigrants into the States. They have a stricter medical examination when the irRmi- grants land, and, if they are not found physically fit, they are sent back again. ' By the operation of these causes, the flower of the rural population is depleted, and an undue proportion of weaklings constitutes the stock from which the population of Ireland is recruited. To the effect of this, both witnesses attributed a large measure of the increase in lunacy.' Later official investigations have confirmed the fore- going. In a memorandum of Mr. Wilson Pox, appended to the Report on Agricultural Settlements in British Colonies of 1906, we read : ' The result of the conditions of hfe in great towns, especially in London, is that muscular strength and energy get gradually used up. The second generation of Londoner is of a lower physique, and has less power of persistent work, than the first, and the third generation is lower than the second. Country immigrants do not, to any considerable extent, directly recruit the town unemployed, who are, in the main, the sediment deposited 442 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN at the bottom of the scale, as the physique and power of application of a town population tend to deteriorate. ' Figures, which refer to nearly 10,000 men, certainly support the view that there is not a large proportion of country-born men among those who are unemployed, or only partially employed, in London and provincial towns.' Proceeding, Mr. Pox gives statistics from which we learn that 66 per cent, of the London Metropohtan Police, Inner Divisions, and no less than 91 per cent, of the Glasgow Police, are country-born. We have sacrificed, together with our agriculture, the health and strength of the race, and we can re-create the health and strength of the race only by re-creating our agriculture. The decay of our agriculture and the depopulation of the countryside have led to physical deterioration not only through under-breeding, through the elimination of the fittest, and the propagation of the unfittest. The health and strength of the people depend not merely on their breeding, but also on their air and food. The deteriorating physique of the nation must deteriorate still further when the vast majority of its underbred citizens live in the polluted air of our large towns, and are nourished on artificial, and largely on unwholesome, food. Owing to the decay of our agriculture, our working masses are compelled to subsist on artificial and- more or less unwholesome food from the cradle to the grave, "^ilst the number of milch cows in Germany is equal to one%)r every family, there is but one milch cow for even^Stk and a half families in the United Kingdom and on^Si^ cow for every three famiUes in Great Britain alone. Owing to our shortage of cows, milk is far dearer in Great Britain than in any other European country, and it is so scarce and dear in this country that our poor can no longer afford to buy it. Hence the children of the poor are brought up on LAND REFORM AND URBAN CONGESTION 443 preserved milk, which is devoid of its nourishing cream, or on ' slops,' whilst their parents try to maintain their strength on tea without milk. It may, or may not, be true that owing to Protection the loaf is Jd. dearer in Germany than in Great Britain. StiU, in that country the poor do not suffer from want of milk, and those who cannot afford to buy meat can at least afford to buy eggs, which the British poor find prohibitive in price. A diet of potatoes, milk and eggs, which is common among the German and French poor, is, after all, more wholesome than a diet of starchy white bread and treacle, washed down with strong tea without milk. The British masses live largely on frozen and chilled meat imported in pieces . The German masses live practically exclusively on meat produced in their own country. As it is difficult to discover disease in pieces of dead meat, imported meat can never be pronounced free from disease. In 1907 Germany imported from abroad dead meat to the value of £1,230,000. During the same year we imported from abroad dead meat to the value of £43,614,573. Measured per inhabitant, or per family, we imported exactly fifty times as much dead meat from abroad as did Germany. For every single pound of foreign meat consumed by the average German family, the average British family consumes fifty pounds, and nobody knows how much of this foreign meat is diseased. Can we hope to rear a healthy and virile race from an underbred stock living in the vitiated air of our large towns and subsisting on artificial and more or less unwholesome food ? Can we wonder that the British race, which formerly produced the tallest and the strongest men in Europe, has become stunted, narrow chested, flat footed, rotten toothed ; that chronic anaemia is a national malady, that we grow human weeds, not men ? The national wealth depends on the national health. His health and strength is the working man's pride and 444 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN his principal asset. It is his working capital and his stock- in-trade. The most priceless treasures of a nation are not its pictures and its statues and its stocks and shares, but the health and strength of the people, and these the Liberal Party has wantonly sacrificed and thrown away in the insane and heartless pursuit of a policy of cheapness for the consumer and of profits for the naiddleman. To the Moloch of Free Trade the Liberal Party has immolated our'agriculture, and with our agriculture the health and strength of the people and the very existence of the race. Tariff Reform and land reform are parts of the same great constructive national and imperial policy which strives to reserve British work for British workers and the British Empire for the British race. They are parts of that truly democratic and popular policy which strives to foster and protect with the whole power of the State not only our cotton industry, our shipping industry, and our foreign trade, but aU our manufacturing industries and our agriculture and all the workers engaged in them. The greatest interests of our workers are four in number — employment, health, strength and an assured future. Tariff Reform and land reform combined will promote all four. The land reform which the Unionists are pledged to initiate will re-create not only agriculture but will also re-create the nation. It will stimulate our manufacturing industries, improve employment, and will raise the wages of our artisans. It will enable our superannuated town workers to retire to the land and make a living on it, and it will brighten their old age. It will encourage thrift. It will provide ' a competence with independence ' for hundreds of thousands of dependent wage-earners. It will stop the drain of our best and most precious blood which enfeebles the race and impoverishes the nation. It will provide cheaper, more plentiful and more wholesome food for young and old, and, by enabling the people to live in natural conditions, it will improve the health and strength of the LAND REPOEM AND URBAN CONGESTION 445 race. Tariff Reform means the salvation of our industries and of the Empire. Land reform means the salvation of the race. The far-reaching land reform to which the Unionist leaders have pledged their party will confer the greatest benefit upon the masses of the people in town and country. It is for them to say whether they prefer the Unionist or the Socialist solution of the land problem. It is for them to say whether they will rather hve under artificial and degrading or under natural and healthful conditions. It is for them to say whether they prefer to have ' the community ' for landlord or whether they will rather be their own landlords. CHAPTEE XIX THE URBAN LAND PBOBLBM AND ITS SOLUTION Your Majesty's Commissioners would recommend generally, with reference to all kinds of dwellings, that facilities should be given to allow capital to be repaid in rent with a view to giving to tenants facilities for becoming freeholders. — Report of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Glasses, 1885, p. 44. Rates fall very much less exactly than taxes in accordance with ability to pay. Taxation according to the taxpayer's ability has long been recog- nised as a primary aim of national finance. — Report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation, 1901, p. 13. The leaders of the Unionist party have pledged themselves to solve the rural problem of Great Britain by setthng the people on the land, by creating as large a number as possible of farmer proprietors and peasant proprietors. Their poHcy may be summed up in the phrase ' Every man his own land- lord.' It is clear that a party which wishes to pursue a great national, democratic, and constructive policy must treat with equal justice the people in town and country. Hence the great Unionist land settlement pohoy cannot be confmed to Ireland and to the sparsely populated agricultural districts of Great Britain, but must be extended to the towns as well. That was probably in Mr. Balfour's nund when, on the 4th of March, 1910, he stated in the City : ' I am earnestly desirous of seeing freehold occupancy greatly increased both in town and country. ... It is a great and difficult problem, but it is one of the most important questions which can occupy our attention.' The problem of greatly increasing freehold occupancy in the towns is indeed a great and difficult problem. The 446 THE UEBAN LAND PEOBLEM 447 British nation is a nation of town-dwellers. The census of 1901 showed that 75 per cent, of the British people lived then in towns, and the census of 1911 will probably show that at least 80 per cent, of the people live in towns. Owing to its magnitude and its great intricacy the urban land problem is perhaps more difficult to solve than the rural land problem, and it requires considerable courage to tackle it. The principal social diseases connected with town hfe which claim the attention of the poUtical pathologist are poverty, overcrowding, physical deterioration, drunken- ness, immoraUty, and thriftlessness, and all these evils are caused to a greater or lesser extent by overcrowding and by expensive, insufficient, and insanitary housing accommodation. It can be demonstrated that overcrowding has a most serious effect upon the national physique. During 1905- 1906 the School Board of Glasgow had 72,857 school children measured in order to solve the question whether, and in how far, housing affects the physique of the people, and in its Report (Cd. 2637) the result of that investigation, the largest of its kind ever made in Great Britain, was summed up in the following figures : Average Weight and Height of all Childbbn (Age 6-18) Examinbd Average Weight Average Height lbs. inches Boys from one-roomed homes . 52-6 46-6 „ two-roomed 66-1 48-1 „ three-roomed 600 500 „ four-roomed 64-3 51-3 Girls from one-roomed 51-5 46-3 „ two-roomed 54-8 47-8 „ three-roomed 59-4 49-6 „ four-roomed 65-5 51-6 Commenting on these figures the Eeport stated : ' These figures show that the one-roomed child, whether boy or girl, 448 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN is always, on the average, distinctly smaller and lighter than the two-roomed ; and the two-roomed than the three- roomed ; and the three-roomed than the four-roomed. The numbers examined are so large and the results are so uniform, that only one conclusion is possible, viz. : that the poorest child suffers most in nutrition and in growth. It cannot be an accident that boys from one-roomed homes should be 11-7 lbs. Kghter on an average than boys from four-roomed homes and 4-7 inches smaller. Neither is it an accident that girls from one-roomed homes are, on an average, 14 lbs. lighter and 5-3 inches shorter than the girls from four-roomed homes.' Similar investigations made in other towns have yielded similar results. It is therefore unquestionable that over- crowding in towns leads to a serious deterioration of the national physique. It can also be proved that overcrowding in towns has a most serious effect on the health of the people. Dr. Chalmers, the Glasgow Medical Officer of Health, furnished to the Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioration the following table, which throws a lurid light on the connexion existing between overcrowding and disease : Deaths and Death-eates in Glasgow dj 1901 Census Population Deaths Death-rate per 1000 people In one-room homes . „ two-room „ „ three-room „ „ four-room „ 104,128 348,731 151,754 136,511 3405 7418 2081 1533 32-7 21-3 13-7 11-2 In Glasgow there were in 1901 three deaths in the one- room homes for every single death which occurred in the four-room homes, and consumption, the scourge of crowded homes, claimed an enormous number of victims in the former. Dr. Newman, the Medical Officer of Health for THE UKBAN LAND PEOBLEM 449 Finsbury, found that the death rate in that district was as follows in 1906 : in one-room tenements, 39-0 per 1000 ; in two-room tenements, 22-5 per 1000 ; in three-room tenements, 14-8 per 1000 ; in tenements of four rooms and more, 6-4 per 1000. In Finsbury, which contains some fearfully overcrowded and some suburban residential quarters, there were six deaths ia the one-room homes to every single death in the four-room homes. Many similar instances might be given which prove that there is an intimate connexion between overcrowding and disease. There is also plenty of material available which shows a similar connexion between overcrowding and drunkermess and between overcrowding and illegitimacy, but evidence cannot now be furnished for lack of space. Overcrowding occurs in many towns of Great Britain. The Census Report of 1901 considers as overcrowded those dwellings which contain more than two occupants in each room of a dwelling, bedrooms and sitting-rooms included. According to that definition, 2,667,606 people, or 8-20 per cent, of the inhabitants of England and Wales, were found to live in overcrowded dwellings. Overcrowding in England and Wales varies greatly in degree, as is shown by the following table, which gives some of the worst cases of overcrowding : Pbeobntagb of Population of England and Walks uving in ovbeceowdbd dwellings Gateshead South Shields . Tynemouth Newoastle-on-Tyne Siinderland Plymouth . Dudley . A glance at these figures shows that overcrowding in towns is most serious in the north of England, where practically one-third of the population lives in overcrowded dwellings. But even ija the towns with a low percentage 2P Per cent. Per cent. . 34-54 Devonport . 17-38 . 32-42 London . . 16-01 . 30-71 Bradford . . 14-62 . 30-47 Halifax . . 14-49 . 30-10 Wigan . ... . 13-38 . 20-19 Huddersfield . . 12-88 . 17-48 Birnungham . . 10-33 450 GREAT AND GEBATEE BRITAIN much overcrowding occurs in certain quarters. In London, for instance, the following high percentages of overcrowding are found : Finsbury, 35-21 per cent. ; Stepney, 33-21 per cent. ; Shoreditch, 29-95 per cent. ; Bethnal Green, 29-62 per cent., &c. The farther we go north in England the greater becomes overcrowding. The two most northerly counties of England are Durham, where 28-48 per cent, of the entire population live in overcrowded dwellings, and Northumberland, where the percentage is 32-09 for the whole county. The two most overcrowded counties are at the same time the most drunken counties of England. If we now cross the Scotch border, housing conditions become even worse. According to Housing Conditions (Scotland) (Cd. 4016), 1908, 2,042,945 people, or 45-68 per cent, of the inhabitants of Scotland, were found to live in overcrowded dwellings, and the following table gives some of the worst instances of overcrowding : Peecbntagb of Popttlation op Scotland livinq in Ovbbceowded DwBIilNGS Cilydebank Motherwell Coatbridge Port Glasgow Govan Paisley Dumbarton Per cent. Per cent. . 72-97 Kilmarnock . . . 55-94 . 71-43 Glasgow . 54-70 . 70-58 Falkirk . 54-61 . 66-42 Greenock . 54-17 . 63-77 Forfar 49-86 . 58-76 Dundee . 49-44 . 57-65 Leith 43-80 Of the Scotch population, 1,024,707, or 22-91 per cent, (almost one-quarter), live herded four and more in one room ; and the ' homes ' of 2,259,789 Scotch people, or 51-9 per cent, of the population, consist of one-room and two-room dwellings. Unionist politicians and journalists have expressed their surprise that at the General Election of 1910 the centre and the south of England, and especially the rural parts, have re- turned Unionists with enormous majorities, whilst many of the English towns, especially those in the north of England, have returned Radicals and Socialists with equally great majorities, THE UEBAN LAND PEOBLEM 451 and that the election in Scotland has had the most disappoint- ing result of all. The usual explanation is that the people in the north of England and in Scotland are too conservative to abandon Free Trade and that the rural people in England are intelligent and open-minded enough to welcome Tariff Reform. This explanation seems to be somewhat illogical. It was probably not merely a coincidence that the successes of Eadicalism and SociaUsm were, on the whole, greatest where overcrowding is greatest. The land grievance is one of the greatest grievances of the people, and it requires a remedy. I think the English counties rallied to the Unionist cause largely because the policy ' every man his own land- lord ' had been fully explained to them. On the other hand, Scotland, the north of England, and even London, greatly disappointed the Unionist expectations because there the people suffer particularly severely from high rents and overcrowding. Mr. Lloyd George had promised to settle the land problem in the towns by taxing the landlords out of existence, and the Unionists had at the time of the General Election not formulated an urban land policy of their own. A democratic Unionist land pohcy applicable to the towns is urgently required both from a national and a party-political point of view. Mr. Lloyd George has proclaimed far and wide that the urban land problem can be solved only by taxing the landlords out of their land, and that the greed of dukes and of other wealthy landowners, who have made property in land their monopoly, is responsible for the high rents and the over- crowded and insanitary conditions which prevail in many of our towns, and which inflict great sufferings upon the people. His assertions are untrue. The congestion in the British towns is due partly to the poUcy of Free Trade, which has driven the country population into the towns, and partly to our antiquated land system and to our modern, but most inequitable, rating system, which require reform. This congestion has gradually, and almost imperceptibly, 2 a 2 452 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN grown up ; and if it is due to a class it is due not to the British landowners, whom Mr. Lloyd George has unjustly held up to public execration, but to the British lawyers, and Mr. Lloyd George, as a lawyer, ought to have known it. The Unionist party has the distinction of having actively begun rural land settlement on the broadest basis in Ireland, where the need was greatest, and it has taken the preliminary steps towards effecting, for the benefit of the working classes, a similar settlement in the towns. In 1884 the Marquis of SaUsbury moved in the House of Lords for a Eoyal Com- mission to inquire into the housing of the working classes. The motion was unanimously assented to, and was considered to be of such gravity that King Edward VII, then Prince of Wales, who had himself visited some of the poorest parts of London a short time previously, supported it with a speech in the debate and became a member of the Com- mission, in which he took a most active part. To the Eeport of that Commission is appended a short Supplementary Eeport signed by a majority, consisting of ten members, among whom were Cardinal Manning, Lord Carriagton, and Mr. Jesse CoUings. It stated : ' The system of building on leasehold land is a great cause of the many evils connected with overcrowding, unsanitary buildings, and excessive rents. This appears to be conclusively proved by the evidence of Lord WiUiam Compton, Mr. Boodle, the agent of the Marquis of Northampton, Mr. Vivian of Camborne, and by the incidental evidence of other witnesses. The evidence of the two former witnesses contains a strong condemnation of the whole system of building on leasehold tenure. Those of your Majesty's Commissioners whose signatures are appended to this Supplementary Eeport are of opinion that the prevailing system of building leases is conducive to bad building, to deterioration of property towards the close of the lease, and to want of interest on the part of the occupier in the house he inhabits ; and that legislation favourable to the acquisition on equitable terms 1)HE URBAN LAND PEOBLEM 453 of the freehold interest on the part of the leaseholder would conduce greatly to the improvement of the dwellings of the people of this country.' The condemnation of the leasehold system contained in this brief report is strong and, I think, is justified. It is 'borne out by the report and the bulky evidence of the Select Committee on Town Holdings, which was appointed largely in consequence of the Supplementary Report and which, between 1886 and 1889, investigated the problem of urban land tenure in all its aspects. I shall endeavour to show, firstly, that the leasehold system is wasteful, that it is largely, if not chiefly, responsible for excessive rents, over- crowding, and the insanitary conditions prevailing in many of our towns, and for the poverty and thriftlessness of the urban population, and that it is disadvantageous both to tenants and owners ; I shall then put forward proposals for applying to the towns the Unionist ideal : ' Every man his own landlord.' The leasehold system causes wastefulness. Dual owner- ship causes friction because the interests of the co-proprietors are not identical but antagonistic. Dual ownership, as existing in the rural parts — that is, ownership divided between landowner and farmer — ^is wasteful ; but the wastefulness of divided ownership in the towns is infinitely greater, because in the towns there are frequently more than two people who have proprietary rights in the same property, and because there is no community of interest between the urban landlord and tenant similar to that existing betwee^ the rural landlord and tenant. An urban landowner who lets out his land on building lease has to supervise the builders with a staff of expensive surveyors and lawyers, and the builders have to protect themselves against the landowner with another staff of surveyors and lawyers. When, after the death of the original landowner, the property is divided between his heirs, the single landowner is replaced by a number of landowners, each of whom requires a lawyer 454 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN and a surveyor to protect his interests, and the unfortunate leaseholder may have to negotiate with several parties, often during many months, and he has to pay a number of land- owners' lawyers and surveyors besides his own, before he can make a structural alteration in his house or factory by their joint consent. The leasehold system causes shoddy building. The builder who builds on a ninety -nine years' lease has no reason to build substantial houses, because they will at the end of the term revert to the owner of the land. Besides, he wishes to turn over his money as quickly as possible. Therefore, unless he is stringently controlled, he does not build houses for wear but for sale, and he will build as cheaply as possible. He will use green timber, half-baked bricks, &c., his main object being to produce cheap and attractive houses of which he can readily sell the lease at an apparently low price to inexperienced purchasers. The cheapest houses are the dearest in the long-run. Constant expensive repairs are required to keep them in habitable condition, but no repairs can preserve for long houses which have been built of bad material. After a few years such houses are worn out, and their owners have been defrauded of their savings. Thus, through the leasehold system, a large part of the wealth of the nation is wasted. The leasehold system is a frequent cause of sharp practice and oppression on the part of landowners and their agents, and therefore it is particularly disadvantageous to business men and especially to small shopkeepers. On this point the Select Committee on Town Holdings reported : ' Although the claims of tenants to the benefit of their improvements are frequently taken into consideration by landlords or their agents in fixing the terms of renewals of leases, yet as a rule any improvements which may have been made by the tenant are regarded as the rightful property of the landlord on the termination of the lease, and in such cases rents are commonly raised in consequence of such improvements THE URBAN LAND PROBLEM 455 to the extent of either a part or the whole of the increased value they may have given to the premises. It cannot be doubted that cases of hardship do occur in connexion with goodwill, and that landlords sometimes take an undue advantage of their tenants' positions in such cases ; and it is clear that when the renewal of a lease of business premises is under discussion, the fact of the tenant having created a valuable goodwill gives the landlord considerable power to settle the terms of such a renewal in his favour.' The present law enables the landowner either to confiscate the tenant's improvements after the expiration of the lease, or to compel him to buy his own improvements. The value of a business man's goodwill often depends less on the value of the business than on the length of the lease, and the shop- keeper whose goodwill, owing to a life of labour, is worth £5000, may be able to obtain only a few hundred pounds for it if his lease is a short one. Shopkeepers as a body detest the leasehold system. The leasehold system has a very discouraging effect also on the workers, for from the same Report we learn : ' Although the legal right of the ground landlord to resume possession of the land and building at the termination of the lease is incontestable, the evidence laid before us shows that there is a widely-spread sense o injustice among lessees in having, at the end of the lease, to give up the buildings they, or their predecessors, have erected, or to pay a rent calculated on the principle that such buildings are the property of the landlord. This feeling is probably especially strong in cases where working men and others build their own houses and where, being unable to obtain land, either as freehold or long leasehold, they are practically compelled to build on leases for short terms.' The argument that shopkeepers and others can insure themselves against the lapse of their lease by creating a sinking fund is absurd. The creation of a sinking fund does not diminish the loss arising from the confiscation of im- provements, but merely distributes it over a number of 456 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN years. Besides, a small shopkeeper or a working man can really not be expected to create a sinking fund. That can be done by banks and other corporations. The leasehold system is responsible for excessive rents. Owing to the leasehold system urban land and house property is owned by the few, and the British nation is a nation of propertyless tenants. Men take good care of their own, but treat carelessly other people's property. The leasehold system causes workmen's cottages to be shoddily built, as I have shown, and as these cottages are commonly badly used by their occupants, who have no personal interest in their preservation, the owners of urban working men's cottages must charge in rent about 10 per cent, of their capital value. A working man who lives in a cottage worth £200 has often to pay about £20 a year in rent, and old working men frequently complain that they have paid for their houses several times over in rent. That is a fearful waste of the worker's money. If a working man has saved £200 and puts the money into the Savings Bank he receives only £5 a year in interest. By putting his savings into a house of his own he would save £15 a year, but then be has to do his own repairs. The repairs of a well-built and well- cared-for cottage are hght. An expenditure of about 10s. a year will prove ample in most cases, especially if the owner is a handy man mth the paint brush. The leasehold system creates the slum. The original tenant only is responsible to the landowner for repairs, &c. Towards the end of a lease the property has passed through so many hands that the landowner finds it often impossible to insist upon the necessary repairs with the tenant in possession. Moreover, as houses revert to the landowner at the end of the lease, they are built with a view to lasting no longer than the lease. At the end of their term they are worn out and not worth repairing, and he is reluctant to ask the tenants of such decaying property to keep it in good state at heavy cost. The Eoyal Commission TSS UEBAN LAND tROBLIJM 457 on the Housing of the Working Classes reported : ' The terms of the lease provide that the tenants shall keep the house in repair, but the stringent conditions of the leases fall into disuse ; the difficulty of personal supervision of the property is apt to grow greater and greater, and the relations between the ground landlord and the tenant who occupies the house grow less and less. The multiphcity of interests involved in a single house and the number of hands through which the rent has to pass, causes the greatest doubt as to who is the person who ought to be called upon to execute repairs or to look after the condition of the premises.' The leasehold system not only creates the slum, but it creates also the most oppressive form of usury, usury in housing. It creates the worst type of landlord, the house farmer, the house jobber, the house knacker, who takes up decaying private houses in densely populated districts, converts them into insanitary tenements, encourages overcrowding in them, and then extorts usurious rents from the poorest of the poor. The Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes reported : ' Tenement houses may be roughly said to be houses which are occupied at weekly rents by members of more than one family. The great majority of these houses were originally built for single families, and have since been broken up into tenements, with a family in each room, or several families in each house. Although this is a highly lucrative arrangement for the persons in receipt of the rents, the sanitary condition of these buildings is rendered worse by reason of their having been utihsed for a purpose for which they were not constructed, there being as a rule not more than one water supply arrange- ment, and only one closet, for each house. A large number of them have no washhouses, no backyards, and some no back ventilation whatever. It appears that the existence of the system of house farmers is, in some measure, owing to the preference for middlemen on the part of both the landlord and his man of business. Landlords hke to give 458 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BRITAIN short leases of decaying property, so that they may fall in when long leases expire, and the property can be dealt with as a whole more satisfactorily than it could be piecemeal. All these considerations appear to favour the middleman system, to which is attributed by Mr. Boodle the breaking up of houses built for single families into tenements, with all the evil and inconvenience attending that arrangement. This is also said to be the cause in a great measure of the enormous rents charged for the single room in tenement houses, in which it has been seen the poor chiefly live, in the worst parts of London. The house farmer is not at all anxious to encroach upon his profits, whether they are at the rate of 50 per cent, or 150 per cent., by periodical repairs. Lord William Compton stated that he shrank from calling to account the middleman for neglecting to repair, fearing that a rise in the rents would be the consequence of such a proceeding.' The Select Committee on Town Holdings reported : ' A great deal has been said with reference to the condition of leasehold houses tenanted chiefly by the working classes, held on the " fag ends " of leases, i.e. on terms that have only a few years to run. In these cases it is alleged that houses commonly get into the hands of a class of middlemen whose object is to make the largest possible profit, getting the highest rent that can be obtained for them and spending as Uttle as they can help in maintenance and repairs. Opinions have been expressed by many of the witnesses that the bad state of repair of houses so held is attributable to the leasehold system. We think there is no doubt that the holder of a " fag end " of a lease has a strong interest not to sp.end more on the repairs of his house than he is positively obUged to do. For these reasons we think that a division of ownership existing under such circumstances sometimes conduces to the bad condition in which many of the dwelhngs occupied by the working-classes in towns are found, and that it facihtates the operations of a low class of middlemen as landlords.' THE URBAN LAND PROBLEM 459 As long as we have leases with ' fag ends ' we shall have insanitary, overcrowded slums in which the poor are mercilessly exploited by tenement usurers. In those overcrowded, dilapidated and insanitary districts where the house farmer rules, the poor do not complain of structural or sanitary defects or about the usurious rent, for fear of being turned out, and to men of that kind Mr. Lloyd George has explained, at Limehouse and elsewhere, that over- crowding and excessive rents are due not to the leasehold system, which creates the slum and the house farmer, but to the greed of the dukes and of other titled and wealthy landlords. It is generally believed that the leasehold system is very advantageous to the landowners because they reap the unearned increment when the leases fall in. That belief seems to have little foundation in fact. It is true that the value of land has increased very greatly in the centre of certain towns and in other favoured positions, but it has fallen elsewhere. It must also not be forgotten that many landowners lose heavily by the bankruptcy of builders whom they habitually finance for developing their estates. However, let us make an extravagant estimate, and assume that the value of all urban land in Great Britain trebles in ninety-nine years, the ordinary length of a building lease, that a piece of land worth £100 to-day will be worth £300 ninety-nine years hence. How much profit does that increment bring to the landowner ? An annual premium of 3s. 4d. invested at compound interest by an insurance company will produce to the investor £100 in ninety-nine years. Consequently an increment of £200 produced in ninety-nine years by a site worth £100 will be equal to an additional interest of but 6s. 8d., or | per cent, per annum. In other words, the average landowner who makes 3 per cent, on his land out of ground rents will make at most 3^ per cent, by adding the unearned increment. As the management expenses of most urban estates exceed very greatly ^ per 460 GREAT Ai^D GREATEE BElTAlM cent, per annum on their capital value, it seems clear that considerably more than the entire unearned increment goes, in the form of management expenses, chiefly to surveyors and lawyers. Landowners could greatly increase their in- come by selling their town estates and investing the proceeds in mortgages and other securities. If carefully selected these should yield a higher interest than does land. They offer greater chances of increment and they can be managed with a minimum of expenditure and annoyance. Besides, such securities, being readily negotiable, are not so much exposed to confiscatory taxation and legislation as is land. This consideration is important in these days. A good investment must have a free market. Land, being not readily saleable and being exposed to peculiar and very considerable risks which formerly were unknown, is no longer a first-class security as of old, and is therefore depressed in price. Few people care to buy land in large parcels and many wish to sell it. The price of land, as that of all other commodities, is determined by the law of supply and demand. At present there are not enough buyers of land about. The cutting up of the large urban estates by the creation of numerous freeholds would bring an enormous number of small buyers into the market. The gradual enfranchisement of urban leaseholds seems, therefore, advisable on prudential and on financial grounds, and it should prove highly profitable to both landlords and tenants. The former would realise better prices for their land and obtain security for their capital and freedom from worry. The latter would be freed of the eternal friction with their landlords and obtain security for carrying on their business without disturbance and for retaining the whole value of their improvements and their goodwill. Owners of large urban estates will, I think, be wise in giving leaseholders of urban land the option to purchase the fee- simple of their houses, as the Duke of Devonshire has done on his great Eastbourne estate. Unless landowners THE UBBAN LAND PKOBLEM 461 voluntarily take the people into partnership, they may find their land an undesirable investment. One may almost say that they have the choice of being bought out of their land by their tenants at a good price, or of being taxed out of their land by the Socialists, and they should rather encourage the former than promote the latter. The possession of an agricultural domain is a pleasure whilst that of an urban estate is a burden. The rural landlord is Uked. The urban landlord is frequently hated, and the good urban landlords participate in the odium which is apt to fall indiscriminately on all urban landowners owing to the exactions of a few grasping landowners or their agents. NoUesse oblige. Great landowners will be wise in holding only residential and high-class shop property. If landlords are the owners of the soil on which are over- crowded tenement houses and hovels, they are part owners of such property and, though guiltless, are held responsible by the demagogues for the existence of the slum and of the tenement usurer. The defenders of the leasehold system say that that system has grown up naturally, that it is equitable and economic, that it stimulates building and causes builders to build well owing to the landlords' supervision. These arguments seem fallacious. The leaseholder system is neither a natural nor an equitable system, and it is difficult, with the best will in the world, to defend the confiscation of valuable improvements made by the tenant in the town, in view of the fact that the law gives the value of the unexhausted improvements to the tenant in the country. The leasehold system is not a natural system of tenure. Building lease is a word which is untranslatable because it is practically unknown in other countries. If the leasehold system was a natural, an equitable, or an economic system it would surely be found in some of the enlightened countries outside Great Britain. It is true that a builder who obtains a building lease need not buy the soil and can put his money 462 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN into bricks and mortar. Thus, the leasehold system encourages the most impecunious and the most unscrupulous builders at the cost of the substantial ones. Besides, it is not a matter of opinion but of calculation whether the leasehold system or the freehold system is more advantageous to the builder. In granting a building lease, the landowner acts as the builder's banker, and he charges an annual ground rent where the banker would charge interest on a loan or a mortgage. Hence the only question for the builder is whether the landowner's or the banker's interest is lower, and the only difference between the two systems is this, that a builder who wishes to build on freehold land must have some money or credit to provide a banker's margin, whilst he need provide no margin if he builds on the leasehold system. If it were true that the leasehold system encourages building and makes for good building, the towns should grow slowly and be badly built in those countries in which the freehold system is universal. How- ever, the incredibly rapid growth of the well-built and well-laid-out Continental towns, which are serving us for a model, shows that those arguments are fallacious. England has well-laid-out urban estates, such as the Portman and Grosvenor estates in London, but planlessly built towns filled with jerry-built houses. There must, of course, be some kind of supervision over the builders, and it is evidently better that one municipal authority should try to promote general excellence according to a common plan than that a number of landowners, each working in his own way, should create pleasing oases in a municipal desert. The foregoing should suffice to show that the leasehold system is disadvantageous to landowners, tenants, and respectable builders, to rich and poor. It is disadvan- tageous to the nation as a whole and to the municipalities, and it is advantageous only to those people who speculate in leases, to tenement usurers, to jerrybuilders, and to lawyers and surveyors. Therefore, the conversion THE UEBAN LAND PEOBLEM 463 of urban leaseholders into freeholders seems highly desirable. The leasehold system, having struck its roots very deeply, can, of course, be transformed only very gradually, and it ought to be changed largely by private initiative. It ought to be transformed to a great extent by the voluntary enfranchisement of existing leaseholds on the part of land- owners and by the provision of freehold working men's dwellings on the part of railway companies, collieries, factories, and especially of the national and municipal enterprises and services, which ought to be model employers. The Government, the local authorities, and large employers should encourage the acquisition of freehold houses by their employes. Such a poUcy will promote a better feeling between employer and employed, between capital and labour. However, these steps will favour only certain groups of workers. They will not sufi&ce to bring a freehold house within the reach of every respectable and thrifty working man. Hence the State should endeavour to make the people their own landlords by direct action, and the first beneficiaries of such action should be the workers. Most working men are unthrifty because they have Httle inducement to save. If they put their savings into the Savings Bank they get an insufficient return. If they put them into stocks and shares they may fall into the hands of company promoters and bucket shops. If they put them into leasehold houses they will go to the landlord. At present the working man is almost encouraged to spend all he earns. The most natural and the most profitable investment for a working man is a house of his own. How- ever, working men do not like to buy securities of shrinking value, and as they are not in the habit of forming sinking funds, they will rather spend their money on amusements than buy a leasehold house. The preference of working men for freehold houses is well known, and was well brought out by the examination of several witnesses before the 464 GEEAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN Select Committee on Town Holdings. For instance, Mr. John Green, a working man who had been employed during twenty-eight years at the Royal Arsenal in Woolwich, was examined as follows : ' Q. You think that the workmen have a desire to obtain the freehold of their own houses for the benefit of the families in preference to leaseholds ? A. Equally so as much as an aristocrat, because the idea of the workman is to benefit his family ; but he resents this continual drain upon the savings of his class by the ground landlord. ' Q. Then you think the workman is as proud of his little estate as the larger man of a large estate ? A. Equally so, and he would wish to hand that little estate down to his family, even if only a two-roomed cottage with a smaU bit of garden. ... In my opinion it would be a very great inducement to thrift and ecpnomy on the part of the working man, because I know there are scores of working men in the Arsenal who have money and who rightly refuse to invest it in leasehold property ; but if they could buy freehold it would have a great tendency to keep the workman away from the public-house. It would take him into his garden, his greenhouse, or his workshop.' Before the same Committee, Mr. Benjamin Jones, representing the Union of Working Men Co-operators, stated : ' We co-operators think that every man in the nation has a right to have some stake in the country, and we are trying as fast as we can to make every working man into a small capitalist. He cannot be a capitalist unless he has some means of investing his money. An enlightened, intelligent, and well-educated man may not be frightened of investing his money in all parts of the earth, but a working man naturally wants to see his money near at hand, and we say that for the public good it is absolutely necessary that the working man should have some oppor- tunity to invest his money near at home, and so induce him to be provident. , . . We object to being compelled to THE URBAN LAND PEOBLEM 465 hand over at the end of the term all the property that we have put on the land. It is impossible for me to express in strong enough terms the working men's detestation of the present system.' Many similar opinions of working men might be given. Through the spread of education and the increase of sobriety and providence the desire for freehold houses seems now to be greater than ever among the workers. Only a small part of the British workers, such as builders' men, navvies, and general labourers, lead a nomadic hf e. The employment of the large majority of skilled workers and of the vast army of clerks, post-of&ce servants, miners, railway servants, &c., is fixed, and among these men there is apparently an in- satiable demand for freehold houses. This may be seen from the fact that the assets of the British building societies amounted in 1907 to £73,371,891, and that their yearly receipts exceed £40,000,000. The working people spend every year more on the purchase of houses through the building societies than the nation spends on the Navy, and they have already bought hundreds of thousands of houses in this manner. I have corresponded with some of the largest benevolent and building societies, and from the information supplied to me it appears that the majority of houses bought through them cost about £300. They have informed me that there is a widespread and keen desire for freehold houses among all classes of workers. The Secretary of the Halifax Permanent Building Society, one of the largest provincial societies, for instance, wrote : ' I do not think that the desire for freehold houses is chiefly confined to the middle classes ; in fact, I have found it as keen amongst working men earning from 18s. to 80s. per week, even if not more so than amongst those with larger incomes.' The Hearts of Oak Benefit Society, the largest benefit society in the United Kingdom, which has a building branch, informed me that 4500 members purchased their own houses through that society at the price of about 2 H 466 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN £1,250,000, and they answered ' Yes, undoubtedly,' to my question whether the preference for freeholds among workers was so pronounced as to make legislation for leasehold enfranchisement desirable. I think the enfranchisement of working men's dwellings up to, say, £500 in value might be effected by voluntary action, with compulsion in the background, in the following way. Voluntary small committees, composed of justices of the peace, retired architects, lawyers, doctors, and oth^r gentlemen, should be formed to act as unpaid adviseifs and referees in case a tenant desires to buy his house and cannot agree with his landlord. These committees should hear both parties and endeavour to effect a settlement at a fair market price, plus 10 per cent, for disturbance, acting impartially for both parties. In the majority of cases there is no difficulty in apportioning compensation, if several parties, such as landowners, ground-rent owners, leaseholders, and sub-leaseholders, have proprietary rights in the same property. This committee might meet at the house of one of the members. If no settlement should be come to, the case should be referable to another committee fully acquainted with local conditions and values, which might perhaps be formed by the Urban District Council, and this committee also should act gratuitously as a mediator between the two parties. If again no agreement should be reached, the matter should be referable to the arbitration of a higher authority, perhaps a committee of the County Council, whose decision would be binding, but against which appeal might be made to the courts. This arrangement would work as follows. A respectable working man wishes to give for the freehold of his house £300, and the owner demands £500. If the three authorities appealed to estimate the value of the house and ground, plus 10 per cent, for disturbance, at £350, the owner will scarcely go to law, but will accept that sum. If, on the other hand, all the three bodies appraise the value at £450, the intending buyer THE tJEBAN LAND PROBLEM 467 will either withdraw or raise his offer. Thus numerous agreements should be effected without lawyers and without htigation. When the purchase price has been agreed upon the question of payment arises. Though the intending buyer may be respectable and well spoken of, and though he may have £50 at the Savings Bank, he cannot borrow privately the bulk of the purchase price except at prohibitive cost. Hence State funds should come forward and the Post Office Savings Bank might be the lender. The savings of the people are paid into the Savings Bank, and they should be invested by the State with two objects in view : firstly, with a view to safety, and, secondly, with a view to benefiting the savers. The latter object has unfortunately been lost sight of. The people's savings are used at present for driving up the rich man's Consols. Li the United States, Germany, and various other countries the bulk of the Savings Bank deposits is lent out on mortgage, and if foreign States are able to invest securely the people's savings for the people's good Great Britain ought to be able to do hkewise. As soon as the earnest money has been paid the Post Ofiioe should advance the rest on mortgage to the buyer, paying off the original owner, and the buyer should hence- forth pay his old weekly rent into the Post Office. Let us assume that the house in question cost £350, that it has previously been rented at 10s. a week, or £26 a year, and that a mortgage of £300 has been arranged by the Post Office. If the buyer merely continues pajdng his old rent into the Post Office he will pay almost 9 per cent, on his mortgage of £800. If 4 per cent., or £12 per year, should be charged by the Post Office for- interest, management expenses, and risk, the remaining £14 a year could be treated as Savings Bank deposits on compound interest. By regularly paying merely his ordinary rent into the Savings Bank, the man would become the absolute owner of an unencumbered 2 H 2 468 GEEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN freehold house in sixteen years through paying off his mortgage. If he should pay 2s. a week in excess of his rent, the house would be absolutely his in twelve years. If the buyer should wish to sell the house before the com- pletion of the purchase, he should be able to do so subject to the mortgage as reduced by his payments. If, for instance, he should sell after having paid 12s. a week during ten years, the mortgage would be reduced to about £100, and if the property had not changed in value he might get £250 for the £50 paid as earnest money when buying the house. In most cases workmen desirous of becoming freeholders would not buy an old house in which they live, but would look for a new one in the outskirts. Many builders would gladly sell freehold houses through the Post Office, the mediation of which would diminish their risk. Such purely voluntary sales should become exceedingly frequent. There would be a greater demand for freehold houses than for leasehold houses in the suburbs, and builders would hasten to supply them. The leasehold system would gradually disappear in the working-class quarters. Rents which now come to from 8 to 10 per cent, on the value of working men's houses would henceforth merely represent 4 per cent, interest on the capital of the workers invested in them. Rents would be lowered by one half. The overcrowded dwellings, the slums, and the tenement usurers would disappear. In case a respectable working man should not be able to provide a deposit sufficient for the purchase of a house, a guarantee against loss by his trade union, friendly society, or employer, or by a guarantee or insurance society, might be accepted in lieu of cash, and he also could become the owner of his house by merely paying his rent. The most formidable obstacle which at present prevents people of small means buying freehold land in town and country lies neither in the unwillingness of landowners to sell nor in the inability of the people to buy, but in the THE URBAN LAND PROBLEM 469 difficulties connected with the transfer of title. Land has been driven into the hands of the wealthy few because the cost of land transfer is prohibitive to the many. The title to land is based on the possession of deeds, and poor people who have no bank and no safe-deposit cannot keep them securely. Besides, the title to land is considered good only if it is forty years old and has a ' good root ' going back another forty years. Consequently, whenever property changes hands the history of the title is laboriously investigated, and the amount of labour is often as great in the case of a plot worth £20 as in that of an estate worth £20,000. Hence the cost of transfer is proportionately by far the highest in the smallest transactions. The Report of the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes quotes the case of the purchase by a working man of a cottage for £220 where the deeds cost £66. The ad valorem scale of 1881 has not abolished that injustice. According to that scale the rate for the sale or mortgage of property worth £100 is £6 for each party, or 10 per cent, for both, whilst the rate for £100,000 is only £296 for each party, which is equal to 6s. per £100 for each side, or to three- fifths per cent, for the two. A poor man finds the purchase of a little piece of land not only prohibitively dear, but he may have to wait many months until the investigation of the title is completed, and if he wishes to raise a mortgage or to sell his land the whole process is again gone through at the same prohibitive cost and with the same delay. These enormous charges and needless delays have made land a luxury and have made it impossible for all but the rich to own it. If land is to become, as it ought to be, the favourite investment of the people, it must be as readily negotiable as stocks and shares. Hence the title to land must not rest in mouldy deeds, but in an official register. The introduction of a national land register, which exists in most civilised countries, has been agitated for in Great Britain during more than two centuries, but the lawyers 470 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN have prevented the reform of our land system, which is a danger to the State and a burden to all. The Royal Commis- sion on the Housing of the Working Classes stated in 1885 ' It has been asserted that at present it is almost impossible for a working man to become the owner of his house without putting an enormous additional percentage of its value into the possession of the lawyers. The evidence before your Majesty's Commissioners shows that there is a wide- spread dissatisfaction, especially among the more provident of the working class and those desirous of purchasing their own houses, at the difficulty and cost cormected with the transfer of land and the belief that this expense and difficulty might be greatly diminished by a reform in the law.' The Committee on the Housing of the Working Classes Amendments Bill stated in 1906 : ' The Committee have had evidence of the relatively excessive cost attached to the present conveyancing system for the transfer of ownership in land, and are impressed with the great economy that might be effected by a system of registration of title being made universal and compulsory throughout the country. The Committee have been struck by the relatively enormous amount of solicitors' costs in comparison with the actual value of the land conveyed, which of necessity has a re- pressive effect on the free interchange of land.' Mr. Lloyd George's accusations that the landlords have robbed the people of the land are untrue. Not the landlords but the lawyers are responsible for the fact that the wealthy few own the soil of Great Britain. The reform of our medieval system of land transfer should prove the strongest factor in restoring the people to the land and the land to the people in town and country. It is the indispensable first step towards land reform. The creation of a national land register by the methods hitherto attempted and proposed — a Royal Commission is at present investigating this question — will take many years, and the solution of the land problem is most urgent. THE URBAN LAND PROBLEM 471 I would therefore suggest to simplify, accelerate, and cheapen the transfer of land in small quantities in the following way. Fraud in the transfer of land is exceedingly rare, and in the case of small transactions is practically unknown because it would not pay. Official land registers should be opened in all districts. These registers should guarantee without any investigation sales of real estate up to the value of £500 in town and country against a fee of perhaps 1 per cent. ad valorem if the seller can furnish satisfactory references. Upon application for such a guarantee the registrar should publish a notice of the sale, and if no claimant should come forward within a month the title would be considered good, and the property be entered in the name of the buyer on the register and on the Ordnance map. The title would hence- forth repose in these entries. In case the buyer should wish to raise a mortgage, the amount and the lender's name would be entered in the register and on the plan of his holding. He could effect a sale by an ordinary agreement consisting of a printed form in which the names of buyer and seller, position of property, and purchase price would be entered, and the transfer of title could henceforth be effected without any delay by the substitution of the buyer's name on the register and the map. The registrar would be liable for all mistakes, and the charge of 1 per cent, ad valorem should suffice to cover expense and risk. As intending buyers of land would prefer buying cheaply and expeditiously registered land, landowners would hasten to get their land on the register. It is to be hoped that the lawyers will no longer resist this reform, which should be highly profitable to them. The reduction of postage increased the number of letters a hundredfold. The cheapening of land transfer should have a similar result. It should not only enormously increase transactions in land, but also reduce the lawyers' working expenses when the investigation of numerous documents in archaic language has become a thing of the past. 472 GKEAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN No reform of the land system can be complete without a reform of the rating system. The British system of local taxation is a most unjust system. Rates are based not on the ratepayer's ability to pay, but on the hypothetical letting value of his house. The old Elizabethan rating system was based on ability to pay. That principle was thrown to the winds by the Free Traders. McCuUoch wrote in his book, ' Taxation and Funding ' : ' Equality of contribution is an inferior consideration. The distinguishing characteristic of the best tax is not that it is most nearly proportioned to the means of individuals, but that it is easily assessed and collected.' Other Free Trade economists have uttered similar sentiments. Rates, as at present arranged, press most severely on the poorest of the poor, because these spend proportionately by far the largest part of their income upon rent, as will be seen from the following hypothetical figures. Assuming that rates amount on an average to one- third of the rent, rates will tax income as follows : Income Bent paid (Rates -5 of rent) "Burden on Income 20s. per week £300 a year £1000 a year £50,000 a year 6s. per week £45 a year £90 a year £1500 a year 2s. per week £15 a year £30 a year £500 a year = 10 per cent. = 5 „ „ = 3 „ „ = 1 - .. Rates raise rent. The rent of the poorest of the poor is made excessively high not only by the leasehold system but by our rating system as well. The Royal Commission on Local Taxation, which sat between 1898 and 1902, acknow- ledged the gross injustice of our rating system, but failed to propose a remedy. A remedy can be found and must be found. It is indefensible that a hospital is often more heavily rated than a bank (the London Hospital pays £1500 a year in rates) ; that a castle such as Chatsworth should be rated no higher than the shop of a struggling ' THE UEBAN LAND PEOBLEM 473 tradesman ; that the poor greengrocer who requires a large shop is rated more heavily than the wealthy jeweller next door who requires a small one ; that the poor clerk with a large family is rated more heavily than a wealthy bachelor because the former requires a larger house. It is equally indefensible that the owner of building land worth £100,000, who lets it at £300 for grazing, should be rated only on that £300, and thus be encouraged to restrict the extension of the town and to increase the rent and hving expenses of its inhabitants. The British rating system, which our Free Trade economists have forced upon the country, relieves the rich at the cost of the poor. Local taxation is paid not by houses but by men, and it should be based on their ability to pay. It should be based on their income, except in cases where, by holding up building land, people can increase their capital very greatly without paying their due share of either rates or income tax. Such land should pay rates and income tax on the income which its capital value would yield when invested at 4 per cent. The Eoyal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes already recommended in 1885 the rating of vacant land as a measure of financial justice and as a measure Ukely to relieve overcrowding. The leading principle of taxation should be justice. Both Prance and Germany have solved in different ways the problem of levying local taxation in accordance with the taxpayer's ability, and my inquiries have convinced me that we can do hkewise. As the great majority of income-tax payers make income-tax returns, the difficulty of basing local taxation upon income is not insurmountable. A man who has three residences might be taxed in each on a third of his income. Besides, local authorities should be allowed to impose certain taxes which are of great municipal, social, and educational importance. They should be allowed to tax, within certain limits, amusements and entertainments, especially those of an objectionable type, vacant land, and 474 GEBAT AND GREATER BRITAIN successful speculation in land. Mr. Lloyd George's fantastic ' unearned increment tax ' is based on valuers' guesswork, and therefore grossly unjust ; but I cannot see any objection to a graduated local tax on the net profits which speculators in land have actually reaHsed. The land problem is one of our greatest social and political problems. The conditions under which a large part of the EngMsh, and half the Scottish, people, live are a danger to the race, Society and the State. Socialism threatens nation and Empire with destruction. An Empire cannot exist without an imperial race. Freeholders have ever proved the strongest defenders of law and order. The policy outlined in these pages should make the people happy and prosperous, diminish immorality, drunkenness and crime, re-create the race and lay the spectre of Socialism. CHAPTEE XX DBMOCBATIC OR SOCIALIST LAND REFORM ? Both parties have appealed to the people on the land question. Both have, promised to reform our land system and to settle the people on the land. The proposals of the two parties differ widely. Hence all Englishmen should carefully compare the two land policies which are offered for their choice. The Liberal Party has fallen under the domination of Socialism, and it can no longer be called either a Liberal or a Radical Party. The former Liberal Party has become a Liberal-Sociahst Party. It has already begun to deal with the land problem by applying the doctrines of Sociahsm to the land, and it intends to apply more Sociahsm to the land in the future. Some Liberal leaders assert that their land poUoy is not a SociaUst one. Therefore we must ask ourselves : ' What is Socialism ? What are the char- acteristics of the SociaUst land policy ? ' The leading principle of all Socialists in Great Britain and abroad is this, that all the means of production, dis- tribution, and exchange should be national,Jor social, property. They wish to make ' the community ' the universal capitalist and landlord, and they wish to begin the process of general sociahsation with the land because it can be seized most easily. The sociahsation, or nationaHsation, of the land is a fundamental principle of international Sociahsm. It is to be found in the programmes of all our SociaUst parties. The Social Democratic Federation demands in its programme 475 476 GEEAT AND GBEATEB BRITAIN ' the nationalisation of the land and the organisation of labour in agriculture and industry under public ownership and control.' The Independent Labour Party states in its programme : ' The land, being the storehouse of all the necessaries of life, should be declared and treated as public property,' The Fabian Society declares in its programme : ' The Society works for the extinction of private property in land.' How is the nationahsation of the land to be effected ? The Fabian Society proposes in its programme the expropriation of all private property in land ' without compensation, though not without such rehef to expropriated individuals as may seem fit to the community.' Mr. Bax, the philosopher of British Socialism, states in his ' Ethics of Sociahsm ' : 'To the Socialist individual possession is wrong and injustice, and confiscation is right and justice. The great act of confiscation will be the seal of the new era.' Mr. Blatchford says in his ' Merrie England ' : ' Man has a right only to what his labour makes. No man makes the land. Land is the gift of Nature. It is not made by man. Now if a man has a right to nothing but to that which he has himself made, no man can have a right to land, for no man made it.' All Socialists are opposed to private property in land. Most of them wish to make ' the community ' the universal landlord, not by purchase, but by confiscation. However, they do not intend to seize the land by force, but to tax the landowners out of their land. With this object in view they have clamoured during many years for the valuation of all land, and iai a tax on land values which is to be based upon this valuation. The tax on land values is to stand at first at a moderate rate, but it is to be rapidly raised to 2O5. in the pound. Mr. Lloyd George has introduced both the valuation of land and the tax on land values demanded by the Socialists. He has also borrowed from the Socialists the taxes on unearned increment and mineral royalties, and LAND REFORM OR SOCIALISM? 477 these the SociaUsts wish to increase in the same way as the tax on land values. On the 6th of September, 1909, Mr. Keir Hardie stated at Lowestoft : ' SociaUsts were supporting the Budget not merely because they saw in it a just measureof taxation, but rather as a first step towards the beginning of the end. Under the Budget we were to get 5 per cent, of mineral royalties and 20 per cent, of unearned increment. But under the Labour Party they would get 100 per cent.' Mr. Headlam wrote in his Christian Socialism : ' You need not kick the landlords out ; you need not buy them out ; you had better tax them out.' That phrase tersely sums up the policy of our Socialists. The agricultural policy of the Socialists is based upon their land policy, upon their hostility to private property in land. Therefore all Socialists, British and foreign, oppose to the utmost the creation of peasant proprietors. The SociaUst pamphlet, ' Socialism True and False,' says : ' No Sociahst desires to see the land of the country divided among small peasant freeholders.' The Sociahst pamphlet, ' Some Objections to Socialism Considered,' states : ' SociaUsm is hostile to small properties.' Mr. Blatchford, in ' The Pope's Socialism,' pretends to be opposed to the creation of peasant proprietors because ' nothing has been more conducive to the development of the worst side of human nature than a system of small properties.' Socialists are hostile to peasant proprietors because the peasant proprietor, hke every sensible owner of property, is opposed to Sociahsm. Mr. Kautsky wrote in ' The Social Revolution : ' The peasant has nothing else in the world but his farm, and that is one of the reasons why it is so very difficult to win him over to our cause.' Mr. Bax, the philosopher of British Socialism, frankly confessed in his 'Essays on Socialism': 'The peasant proprietor, who may now be reckoned as part of the petite bourgeoisie, is a potent factor in retarding the process of sociahsation. The experience of all countries shows that SociaUsm finds practically no adherents among the landowning peasants. 478 GEEAT AI^D GEEAT^B BEITAIi? Therefore, our Socialists insist that our agriculture should be re-created in such a way that ' the community ' should acquire all the land from its present owners and let it out to cultivating tenants. They do not inquire whether it is possible to re-create agriculture on a tenant basis. They would rather see the countryside of Great Britain turned into a wilderness than peopled by a large number of cultivating owners who would necessarily be their pohtical opponents. The Liberal Party has adopted both the land policy and the agricultural policy of our SociaUsts in their entirety. Mr. Lloyd George has preached at Limehouse the Class War, using the same arguments and the same reckless and inflammatory language against the owners of land which SociaUst street orators of the lowest type currently use before similar audiences on the neighbouring Tower Hill. Therefore it is frequently assumed that Mr. Lloyd George was the only member of the Cabinet who desired to tax the private land- owners out of their land and to make ' the community ' the universal landlord. That view is erroneous. Several of Mr. Lloyd George's most influential colleagues, and among them Mr. Asquith himself, have placed on record the fact that they are opposed to private property in land, that they are opposed to the creation of peasant proprietors, and that they support the Sociahst land and agricultural poHcy. Mr. Asquith stated at Earlston on the 3rd of October, 1908: ' There is a famous and often quoted phrase used by a cele- brated writer more than a hundred years ago, " the magic of property " ; and when I was young it was the habit among economists to quote that phrase almost exclusively in connexion with claims for the establishment of what was called peasant proprietorship. But 'Hhe magic of property," such as it is, is derived not from ownership but from security. I will not repeat to-day the arguments with which everybody in Scotland is now familiar, arguments based upon experience LAND REJ^ORM OR SOCIALISM ? 479 and upon common sense, which have led us to believe that both in England and in Scotland the most hofeful form of tenure for the small holder is not that of a •proprietor but that of an occupying tenant.' Another member of the Cabinet, Mr. Harcourt, said on the 12th of June, 1907, in the debate on the Small Holdings Bill : ' If I thought that under the Act of 1902 there was likely to be a large amount of purchasing by tenants in the future, I should be inclined to Umit rather than to extend the faciUties for that purpose, so convinced am I that, for a great national purpose such as this, tenancy under a public authority, and the acquisition of land under that authority, is the most satisfactory solution of the question.' In October 1906 Mr. Lloyd George stated with engaging frankness : ' Nationalisation of the land — that must come, but it must come by easy stages.' On the 80th of October; 1909, Mr. Lloyd George published under the title ' The Issues of the Budget ' a political manifesto in the Nation, in which he stated the ultimate aim and object of the Liberal land policy. He wrote : ' The new State valuation must be the basis for all plans of communal purchase. On this basis municipalities ought to buy the land which is essential to the development of their toums. And the State could also buy up land necessary to the policy of recreating rural life in Great Britain.' As regards its land policy and its agricultural policy, LiberaUsm has surrendered to Socialism. We know now that it is the ideal of the Liberal-Socialist Party that the State should own all the agricultural land and that the munici- palities should own all the town land — a policy which, if honestly carried out, would add £4,000,000,000 to our National Debt. The land acquired by the State and the municipahties would be let to the people. The private landlord would be replaced by the salaried ofScial. The ownership of land would become a Government monopoly. This is the very policy which the Sociahsts advocate. 480 GBEAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN Therefore the New Age,the organ of the Fabian Society, wrote referring to Mr. Lloyd George's pronouncement in the Nation on the Liberal Government's land poUcy : ' We can promise Mr. Lloyd George the support of Socialists in his attempt to secure for the community the possession of the chief means of production.' Mr. Ure, the Lord Advocate, stated at Armadale : ' These modest-looking land taxes involved a principle capable of far-reaching application, a principle which they believed to be sound and safe. What was that principle? It was this — ^that the land of the country, as distinct from the improvements made upon it, in truth belonged to the nation.' If, as Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Ure affirm, the land of Great Britain belongs to the nation — a view which is held by all Socialists — then the private people who hold the land at present have no right to their land, and the State is perfectly justified in taxing all the owners of land out of their land by raising the taxa- tion of land values as quickly as possible to 20s. in the pound. The foregoing should make it clear that the Liberal- Socialist Party, guided by Messrs. Asquith, Haroourt, Lloyd George, Churchill, and Ure, have adopted in their entirety the doctrines of SociaHsm regarding land and agriculture, and a glance at their legislative action and proposals shows that they have already begun to apply these Socialist doctrines in practice. As regards the land policy of the Liberal-Socialist Party, the process of taxing the landowners out of their land has been commenced by the imposition of particularly onerous taxes which, under Mr. Lloyd George's Budget, are put on the owners of land, but not on the owners of any other kind of property. These taxes are Ukely to compel many landowners to sell their land, and, apparently, were imposed with that object in view. Mr. Lloyd George, however, not only singled out the owners of land for special taxation, but at the same time doubled the stamp duty charged on LAND REFORM OR SOCIALISM? 481 the transfer of land, which increase tends to prevent private individuals from buying land. If a Government forces one set of people to sell large quantities of land, and, at the same time, makes it difficult for other people to buy land, it creates a deadlock which can be solved only by ' the community ' stepping in and buying up the land which is offered for sale, and which otherwise might become dereUct and go out of cultivation. In order to hasten the transfer of large blocks of land from private owners to ' the commimity,' Mr. Lloyd George furthermore introduced into his Budget provisions encouraging landowners to pay their greatly increased death duties rather in land than in money. Lastly, his Development Bill provided that 'the community' should obtain, on both sides of the new National highroads, broad strips of land which would command, and could control, all the privately owned hinterland. The chief object of the agricultural poKcy of the Liberal- Socialist is not to bring about a revival of agriculture, but to bring about the compulsory transfer of land from private hands to ' the community.' The Small Holdings Act of 1907 empowered county councils to acquire land com- pulsorily from private owners and to let it out to small tenants. Our agriculture was to be re-created in accordance with the doctrines of Sociahst schemers who write on agricul- ture without knowing the difference between a carrot and a mangel-wurzel. In 1905 the Fabian Society brought out a pamphlet entitled ' The Revival of Agriculture — a National Policy for Great Britain.' A perusal of that pamphlet will show that the Government embodied all the most important proposals contained in it in its Small Holdings Act of 1907. Hence a recent reprint of the Fabian pamphlet contains the footnote : ' Some of the proposals made in this tract have been adopted in the Allotments and Small Holdings Act of 1907.' Whilst the ideal of the Liberal-Socialist Party is that the State should be the universal landlord^ that all the 2? 482 GEBAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN people should be landless tenants, who hold their land by the goodwill of a number of Sociahst officials, the ideal of the Unionist Party is to make every man his own landlord, and their policy is to multiply the number of freeholders to the utmost, to create throughout the country the largest number possible of farmer proprietors and peasant proprietors who actually own the soil which they till. A glance at Ireland will clearly show that the traditional policy of the Unionist Party is a land policy, which may be summed up in the sentence : ' Every man his own landlord.' Since 1881, and explicitly since 1883, it has been the policy of the Unionist Party to convert the Irish landless tenants into owners, and up to 1903 more than £25,000,000 have been spent in assisting Irish tenants to buy the freehold of their land. As the preliminary experiment of creating a large number of peasant proprietors in Ireland had proved highly successful, the Unionist Government, in 1903, made provisions to make peasant proprietorship universal through- out Ireland by means of the Irish Land Bill, which was brought out by Mr. Wyndham in that year. The Unionist Party intended long ago to effect a land settlement on similar lines in Great Britain. In 1888 a Unionist Administration appointed a Committee to report on Small Holdings, in which, be it noted, Mr. Chamberlain, who had left the Liberal Party in 1886, took a most prominent part. It recommended in 1890 : ' Your Committee are strongly and unanimously of opinion that the extension of a system of small holdings is a matter of national importance. It is desirable in the interests of the rural population, to whom it offers the best incentive to industry and thrift, and it is calculated to add to the security of property by increasing the number of persons directly interested in the soil. It will undoubtedly tend to raise the character of the labouring class, and to stay that migration from the country to the towns which has already caused some deterioration LAND REPOEM OR SOCIALISM? 483 of the rural population, and has led to what has been described as 'Hhe survival of the unfittest." Your Committee believe that the intervention of the Legislature is called for by the special circumstances of the case, and is justified by considerations affecting the well-being of the whole community.' Among the conclusions of the Committee were the following : ' That the extension of a system of small holdings is a matter of national importance, both in the interests of the rural population and also as adding to the security of property generally. That it is desirable to conf&r upon local authorities fewer to purchase land for the purpose of creating small culUvati/ng ovmershi/ps. That any legislation on this subject should apply to the whole of Great Britain.' Reference to the Minutes of Evidence will show that the Commissioners desired that a large number of peasant proprietors should be created under an Act similar to the Ashbourne Act of 1885, the precursor of the great Irish Land Act of 1903. Unfortunately, the Unionist Party could not then effect this great reform through the indifference and hostihty to agriculture which have always been characteristic of the Liberal Party. In 1903, the same year in which it began the great land settlement in Ireland, the Unionist Goverrmient appointed a Committee to inquire into the fruit culture of Great Britain. That Committee reported, in June 1905, with regard to the all-important question of land tenure : ' The great majority of fruit growers, probably, are tenants, but, in the opinion of your Committee, it would be more satisfactory if they were the owners of their plantations and market gardens. . . . The ideal solution would be that every fruit grower should be the owner of the soil. Many of the witnesses before the Committee spoke of the advantages of " Small Holdings," and the great development of the Wisbech district was largely attributed to the fact that the growers had been i I 3 484 GEEAT AND GEEATER BEITAIN able in most cases to buy their holdings. . . . Several witnesses advocated a measure of State-aided purchase of small holdings on the lines of the Bill brought in by Mr. Jesse ColHngs last session.' The Committee recommended unanimously : ' That a Bill should be passed for facilitating the purchase of small holdings by tenants with assistance from public funds, somewhat on the lines of the measure brought in by the Eight Hon. Jesse OoUings, M.P., in the session of 1904.' Land settlement was in sight. To prepare the way for it the Unionist Government appointed, in 1905, another Committee, which was to inquire into Small Holdings. That Committee reported in December 1906 : ' The Committee think it hardly necessary to demonstrate that in the general interests of the community it is desirable that as large a number as possible of persons should have a direct interest in the land of the country, and that in the interests of agricul- ture and of the productiveness of the soil it is expedient that the number of those who not only occupy, but also have a permanent stake in the land, should be materially increased in order that so important an industry as agri- culture should make its voice heard in the affairs of the nation to a greater extent than is possible when, as now, the majority of the rural population have but a transitory interest in its prosperity. ... ' The Committee are of opinion that the advantages of ownership have not as a rule been sufficiently forcibly put before those who desire to cultivate land, or the terms have been such that the additional costs of purchase have been more onerous than the small holder thinks he can afford, and that under any system such as that of the Irish Land Purchase Acts, whereby the interest and instalments of purchase- money together can be fixed at a sum not greater than would have to be paid in rent, a desire for ownership might be developed among the peasantry of England and Scotland.' The Committee stated emphatically that the creation of LAND REFORM OR SOCIALISM? 485 peasant proprietorship throughout Great Britain was most desirable and necessary in the best interests of agriculture and of the country, and that the chief obstacle to the creation of peasant proprietors was the unacquaintance of the cultivators of the soil with the advantages of ownership. That trifling difficulty could easily have been overcome by a circular from the Board of Agriculture, and by suitable directions sent by that body to the agricultural instructors and lecturers in all parts of Great Britain. But, unfortu- nately, the Unionist Government was no longer in power when the Report was issued. A Liberal Government had come in at the beginning of 1906, and it hastened to abandon the Unionist land policy and to replace it by the SociaUst land pohcy. The Liberal Government came into power pledged to settle the people on the land by the creation of small holdings. I have shown that Mr. Asquith and other Cabinet Ministers were so anxious to make the ' community ' the universal landlord that they placed on record their opinion that, as Mr. Asquith put it, ' the most hopeful tenure for the small holder is not that of a proprietor but that of an occupying tenant.' An opinion deliberately expressed by a Prime Minister should command respect. However, whether agri- culture and the re-settlement of our deserted country can better be promoted by the creation of tenants or of owners is not a matter of opinion but a question of fact and of practical experience. If we wish to know whether tenancy or proprietorship is ' the most hopeful tenure ' for the small holder, we must be guided, not by the opinion of party poUticians, however eminent, but by actual experience. Universal experience proves conclusively and irrefutably the enormous economic superiority of small holders over large farmers, and of agriculture based on peasant proprietorship over agriculture based on tenancy. In proof of this I give the following table relating to German agriculture; which deserves most careful study : 486 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN Ntjmbee of Agrictjlttjeal Pboperties in Germany 1882 13D5 1907 , Small Holdings up to 5 acres „ „ from 5 up to 12^ acres ,. 124 ,. 50 „ 3,061,831 981,407 926,605 3,236,367 1,016,318 998,804 3,378,509 1,006,277 1,065,539 Total 4,969,843 5,251.489 5,450,325 Medium Holdings from 50 to 250 acres Large „ of 250 acres and above 281,510 24,991 281,767 25,061 262,191 23,566 Total 5,276,344 5,558,317 5i736,082 I have shown in Chapters XVI and XVII of this book, as well as in my book ' Modern Germany,' that practically all the German peasants are freeholders. If, as our SociaUsts and our Liberal-SociaUsts venture to assert, peasant proprietorship is uneconomical and bound to prove a failure, if, as they say, small peasant proprietors cannot possibly compete against big landowners and farmers, it would logically foUow that the German peasant proprietors ought to have been swallowed up by the large farmers and estate owners of Germany. The German^agricultural statistics are very reliable. They extend over a period of twenty-five years, and a glance at the foregoing tables shows that during the last twenty-five years the number of German small holders, who nearly aU are peasant pro- prietors, has not decreased, but has increased by almost 500,000, whilst during the same period the number of large farmers and estate owners has considerably decreased. If we now analyse the distribution of land in Germany between small holders, medium holders, and large proprietors, and look for the change which that distribution has undergone during the last twenty-five years, we arrive at the following most remarkable result ; LAND EEFOEM OE SOCIALISM? 487 Percentage of AoKiCTTLTtrEAi, Land held in Germany 1882 1895 1907 Small Holdings up to 5 acres . „ „ from 5 up to 12^ acres . 12* „ 50 „ . 5-7 100 28-8 5-6 101 29-9 5-4 10-4 32-7 Total 44-5 45-6 48-5 Medium Holdings from 50 to 250 acres . Large Holdings of 260 acres and above . 311 24-4 30-3 24-1 29-3 22-2 Total 1000 1000 1000 This table shows that the peasant proprietors, who in 1882 owned only 44-5 per cent, of the agricultural land of Germany, owned in 1895 45-6 per cent., and in 1907 no less than 48-5 per cent, of the whole of the agricultural soil of their country. And whilst the percentage of land cultivated by peasant proprietors on small holdings has steadily and considerably increased in Germany, the percentage of land cultivated in large and very large holdings by fanners and landowners has equally steadily decreased. The German peasant proprietors have not been swallowed up by the big landowners, but they have been steadily and continuously absorbing the big farmers and landowners. The peasant proprietors have shown their economic superiority not only in Germany, but in all densely settled parts of the world. If space permitted, I would furnish statistics relating to France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and other countries which confirm the German figures and which show the triumph of the peasant proprietor over the landowner and the large farmer. The fact that the peasant proprietors have triumphed over the large landowners and farmers in all civiUsed countries may be unknown to many of my readers, but it need not have been unknown, and it ought not to have been unknown, m GEEAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN to Mr. Asquith. If he had applied to the Intelligence Department of the Board of Agriculture, a most excellent institution, they could have suppUed him with the tables given above and many similar ones relating not only to many foreign countries but also to Great Britain itself, and proving absolutely that tenancy is not ' the most hopeful tenure for the small holder,' as Mr. Asquith ventured to assert, but that it is the most hopeless one. If Mr. Asquith, disregarding his of&cial agricultural experts, had applied for information on agriculture to his more inteUigent Socialist supporters, they might have informed him that Mr. Eduard Bernstein, the most scientific of German SociaUsts, wrote in ' Die Voraussetzungen des SoziaUsmus ' : ' It cannot be doubted that in the whole of Western Europe and in the Eastern States of the American Union as well, small and medium-sized agricultural properties based on ownership increase at the cost of the large ones.' And his Socialist friends might also have told Mr. Asquith that a Socialist, Mr. E. David, has proved conclusively in his monumental work, ' Socialism and Agriculture,' the superiority of the peasant proprietor over the large farmer and estate owner. However, Mr. Asquith and his colleagues apparently did not wish to be guided by facts, by expert advice, and by universal experience which condemn agriculture carried on by small cultivating tenants. They treated the agri- cultural problem merely as a political problem, and they saw in the agricultural question chiefly an opportunity of taxing the landowners — ^most of whom, it is true, are Conservatives — out of existence, and of transferring their land to ' the community.' It was apparently a matter of very minor consideration that British agriculture might be completely ruined by applying the doctrines of SociaHsm to the land. If Mr. Asquith and his colleagues had been desirous of ascertaining by the test of experience whether proprietorship or tenancy was the ' most hopeful tenure ' for the small holder, they need not have gone outside the United Kingdom, LAND REPOEM OB SOCIALISM? 489 British agriculture is based, not on ownership as it is in Germany, but on tenancy, and, according to the somewhat meagre statistics appended to the Report on Small Holdings, the number of small, medium, and large holdings has changed as follows : NtJMBEE OF AQMCTILTUEAL HOLDINGS IN GRBAT BeITAIN - 1885 1895 1904 From 1 to 5 acres . ,, 5 „ 50 „ . . . „ 50 „ 300 „ . . . 300 acres and upwards 135,736 232,955 144,288 19,364 117,968 235,481 147,870 18,787 110,974 232,476 150,050 18,084 A glance at these figures shows that between 1885 and 1904 the number of British small holdings has very seriously diminished, whilst at the same time the number of medium- sized holdings has slightly increased. A comparison of the changes which have taken place in the distribution and composition of holdings in Great Britain and in Germany is very instructive. It shows that in Germany ownership has led to a very great increase of small holdings, which have absorbed much of the land held by large farmers and landowners, whilst in Great Britain tenancy has led to a very great decrease of small holdings, which have been absorbed by large farms. These facts absolutely condemn the tenancy system, and they show that tenancy is indeed the most hopeless form of land tenure for small cultivators. The dechne in small holdings has not been universal in Great Britain. In some parts of the country the number of small holdings has very greatly increased during the last twenty or thirty years. And which are those parts ? They are those parts of the country, such as the Wisbech district of Cambridgeshire, in which small freeholds are the rule. 490 GEEAT AND GEBATER BRITAIN As regards Wisbech, I would quote the following from the evidence which Mr. CoUns Clayton, of Wisbech, gave before the Committee on Fruit Culture : ' In 1875 an estimate was made, and about 200 acres of fruit-growing land were supposed to be in the district. In 1901 the quantity was estimated at 3768 acres. The land is nearly all in the possession of small occupiers. In most cases — in nine- tenths of the cases, I might say — the occupiers are also the owners.' In Great Britain also, therefore, agricultural freeholds have proved their great superiority over agricul- tural leaseholds. The supporters of the tenancy system may argue that experiments in small freeholds made at Wisbech and else- where in Great Britain are too purely local, and are on too small a scale, to be conclusive. In order to meet this argu- ment in advance, I have studied the effect which peasant proprietorship has had in Ireland, where ownership has been introduced, not on a large, but on a gigantic, scale among the cultivators of the soil. With this object in view I sent a letter to Lord MacDonnell, Mr. Birrell, several chairmen of Irish County Councils, and others, in which I asked the following questions : ' 1. Has the Act of 1903 benefited the Irish people mdrallyl Has it made them more contented, strengthened their self- respect and their sense of citizenship ? Has it led to a reduction in crime, punishable offences, and drunkenness ? ' 2. Has the Act benefited Ireland agriculturally ? Has it led to greater exertion and better cultivation on the part of the enfranchised agriculturists ? ' 3. Has it benefited the people financially by encouraging thrift ? ' The economic statistics of Ireland make a very satis- factory showing during the last few years. I wonder whether the improvement shown is due to the land policy or to coincidence ? ' In reply. Lord MacDonnell wrote : ' I give without any LAND EEFOEM OE SOCIALISM? 491 hesitation an affirmative answer to each and all of the questions put. I consider that in the completion of the pohcy of land purchase in Ireland and the creation of a peasant proprietary there He the essential condition and the best hope of the material, moral, and political develop- ment of the country.' Mr. Birrell, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, sent me a report by Mr. W. F. Bailey, one of the Estates Commissioners, regarding the condition of Irish peasant proprietors, dated 1903, and he added in his letter, that the condition of the tenant purchasers under the earher Acts is typical of the condition of those who have purchased under the later Act. Mr. Bailey's Commission inspected sixty-five estates in. all parts of Ireland, on which 14,813 peasant proprietors had been settled, and I would quote from the report which Mr. Birrell sent me the following most illuminating passages : ' That the holdings of tenant purchasers have largely improved in all parts of Ireland as regards cultivation, treatment, and general improvement is unquestionable. ... In many districts we found that the actual carrying powers of the land were largely increased since purchase by improved management. In village districts a similar improvement is manifested in the early ploughing, in the cleaning of gripes and of fields after the crop is taken out, in the trimming of fences, and in the re-making of farm roads. Most of these things the purchasers admit that they would not have done under the old state of things. On an estate in Tyrone a tenant purchaser said that much of his farm was formerly rough and " furzy," but that he never attacked it until the place became his own. ' On many of the smaller estates in Connaught the occupiers were always industrious and hardworking. The conditions under which they hved obliged them to get as much as they could out of their land ; but even in such cases purchase has frequently made them redouble their efforts and labour with fresh energy. Thus on one estate 492 GBEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN in Mayo we foimd that since purchase the occupiera had added by reclamation from 50 to 100 per cent, to the cropping and carrying capacity of their Httle holdings. . . . ' That the houses, both dweUings and offices, of tenant purchasers have very materially improved since they bought is certain. In all the four provinces this is the general testimony. New buildings have sprung up, old ones have been repaired. On some estates, where the condition of purchase and non-purchase holdings can be contrasted, it it found that, while the houses on the first had been much improved, on the second they are in a very neglected state. ... ' On an estate in Cavan a tenant purchaser, who had reclaimed two acres of a lake shore at much cost, said : " If I had not the security of purchase, I would never have attempted the work. I have expended each year the reduction gained by purchase on making improvements." The first, and in many respects the most important, outcome of purchase is the feeling of contentment which it has given to the people. Their minds are at ease. The anxiety as to the future which formerly oppressed them has disappeared.' Mr. E. A. Anderson, the secretary of the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society, wrote to me : ' I think the Land Act of 1903 has made farmers who have purchased their holdings more industrious, more desirous of a higher standard of living, more punctual in their payments, and, generally, better citizens. Where men have bought their holdings, agrarian offences no longer are committed. As far as my experience goes, I would certainly say that the farms occupied by tenants who have purchased are better kept, better tilled, and better worked generally than those of their neighbours who still remain tenants. As time goes on, and as peasant proprietors realise that the payment of each year's annuity increases their interest in their holding, they will no doubt put forth even greater activity in the improvement and working of the land. I believe it has LAND REFORM OR SOCIALISM? 493 encouraged thrift. At all events, the deposits in the Post Office Savings Bank and in the Joint Stock Banks are steadily increasing. The general improvement ia Ireland to which you refer is not a coincidence ; it is partly due to land reform, partly to the establishment of the Department of Agriculture, but, I think, most of all is due to the co-operative agricultural movement.' Mr. P. L. O'Neill, Chairman of the County Council of Dublin, replied to me : '1. Most undoubtedly land pur- chase has exercised a powerful influence in restraining any tendency to excess amongst the discontented and irre- sponsible members of the community, and has induced aU classes to take a more serious view of life and its responsi- bilities. ' 2. Certainly. Evidence is to be seen in abundance of improved methods — the use of up-to-date implements and machinery, the introduction of intensive culture, improve- iaent in live stock, the extension of gardening, and a display of taste in keeping the homestead which indicates progress, confidence, and contentment. ' 3. Peasant proprietorship has given a new stimulus to thrift and industry. The increased revenue has not been added to capital, but to the more widely beneficial purpose of developing existing cultivation, the introduction of new methods, drainage and reclamation, and a general elevation in the mode of hfe. The next decade will see still more pronounced results.* Mr. Asquith stated that ' the most hopeful tenure for the small holder is not that of a proprietor, but that of an occupying tenant.' That statement is absolutely refuted by the experience of all foreign countries and of Great Britain. The facts and figures which I have given were not inaccessible to Mr. Asquith and his colleagues. Under these circumstances it seems clear that the Liberal- Socialist Party tried to re-create agriculture in accordance with the Socialist doctrines not because they thought 494 GEEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN the system of tenancy good, but because they wished to detach the people from the land and to make ' the community * the universal landlord. Socialism lives and thrives on general dissatisfaction and poverty. It was not in the party political interest of the Liberal-Socialist Party to create prosperity and contentment. Their land policy was directed rather by the wish to estabhsh SociaUsm than to estabhsh rural prosperity. The facts and figures which I have given in the foregoing pages show the superiority of agriculture based on peasant proprietorship over a system of agriculture based on tenancy, and they show incidentally that the doctrines of our Free Traders regarding the effect of a tariff on com and meat are wrong. According to the doctrines of Free Trade, duties on com and meat benefit the owners of large estates at the cost of the small cultivators. That assertion is untrue. Germany has had high protection on aU agricultural produce since 1879. If it were true that ' food taxes ' benefit the big grower at the cost of the small one, Protection should have enriched the big German landowners and ruined the peasants, and the former should have absorbed the hold- ings of the latter. But the figures I have given show that the small peasants are absorbing the big landowners. Hence we must conclude that agricultural protection in Germany has been more beneficial to the peasant than to the landowner. Whilst German agriculture has had Protection, British agriculture has had Free Trade. If it were true that Pro- tection is in the interest of the big grower, and Free Trade in that of the small one, it would follow that, owing to Free Trade in com and meat, large agricultural estates should have diminished, and small holdings should have increased, in Great Britain. But from the fact that the small holdings in Free Trade Great Britain have greatly diminished and have been absorbed by the large farms, it appears that Free Trade in agricultural produce is not beneficial, but LAND REFORM OR SOCIALISM? 495 fatal, to the small agriculturists. The fact that agricultural protection has been most beneficial to the German peasants gives, us reason to hope that the small duties on foreign meat and wheat which the Tariff Reformers wish to introduce will be of material assistance to the numerous farmer proprietors and peasant proprietors whom the Unionist Party wish to create. I have shown that the system of ownership, which the Unionist Party intend to promote to the utmost, is best for agriculture as a whole and best for the State, and I shall now show that it is also best for the people who cultivate the land. Men who embark upon agriculture prefer ownership to tenancy partly for sentimental and partly for practical reasons. The sentimental reasons in favour of ownership were excellently put by Mr. Balfour in his preface to Sir Gilbert Parker's pamphlet, * The Land for the People.' Jn his preface Mr. Balfour wrote : ' Multiply as you will your enactments for securing the fruits of an improvement to the man who makes it, you will never efface the distinction between ownership and occupation. It is based on senti- ment, not on finance ; and no demonstration of .profit and loss will extract from the tenant of a County Council, or Public Department, labour which he would cheerfully expend upon a holding which belonged to himself and which he could leave to his children.' As regards the practical reasons for which people prefer ownership to tenancy, I would quote a passage from the evidence given before the Committee on Fruit Culture. Before that Committee Mr. Lockhurst, Horticultural In- structor to the Derbyshire County Council, a thoroughly practical man, stated : ' At Long Eaton, where there are a lot of lace workers, there are now about 300 or 400 freehold allotments of about 600 yards each. These are the men who' plant fruit trees, and' really they do remarkably well. I go occasionally to see how they are getting on; they 496 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN arrange well, they plant right, and they prune right. They have a thorough grip of the whole thing. '■Q. As a, rule who plants the trees on these plots, the landlord or the tenant ? A. They are freehold. -' Q. Where the plots are not freehold ? ^. I find the tenants on allotments, unless they have security of tenure, will not plant. That is where the freehold comes in. ' Q. Who puts up the buildings on the freehold plots ? A. The men themselves. '■ Q. What happens in the case of allotments that are not freehold ? A. Very little is done in that way. ' Q. They have no buildings at all ? A. Very few indeed.' I could easily fill fifty pages with similar evidence showing why ownership is infinitely superior to tenancy. Every sensible man prefers the absolute ownership of the soil which he tills to tenancy, because, if he is a careful cultivator, he can make a small fortune out of the soil. In proof of this assertion, I would give the following repre- sentative instance. Mr. Jesse Marlow, secretary of the Desborough Co- operative Society, was examined before the Committee on Small Holdings with regard to the Desborough freehold plots, which are worked by superannuated factory workers, with the following result : ' Q. Do the men cultivate their land well ? A. Remark- ably well. - Q. Are these mostly men who had no previous knowledge of farming ? A. Yes, that is so. ' Q. The rateable value of the property you have dold to these people has been increased from 15s. when you made the purchase to 40s. at present ? A. Yes. ' Q. May I take it that the land has increased nearly three times in value owing to their labour ? A. The rateable value has. - Q. I mean, has the land intrinsically increased to three times its value ? A Marketable value ? Yes, quite that.' LAND REFOEM OR SOCIALISM? 497 If a small holder increases the value of the soil which he tills to three times its original value, he is clearly entitled to the additional value which he has created with the work of his hands. Our agriculture has utterly decayed. Land is going abegging. On an average it stands at less than half the price at which it stood thirty-five years ago. Agricultural land commands now only about half the price in Great Britain which it commands in Germany and Prance. There is consequently an enormous margin for a rise in British agricultural land even under extensive culture. However, land under intensive culture is far more valuable than land under extensive culture. Working small holders, who as a rule go in for intensive culture, should in many cases be able to double, treble, quadruple, and more than quadruple the value of their land. I could give numerous instances of British soil having been increased sixfold and tenfold in value by industrious small holders. There is more gold to be dug out of the land of Great Britain than out of the quartz of the Transvaal. If the Unionist land policy should be adopted, if thousands and tens of thousands of peasant proprietors are planted, whose land is theirs and their famihes' for ever, they will be able to accumulate a small fortune for themselves by improving the soil. If, on the other hand, the Socialist land policy should be adopted, the small tenant holders will not be able to accumulate a small fortune for themselves, for they will only be allowed to accumulate a small fortune for ' the community.' And as people do not hke to see the fruit of their labour fall to other people, be they private landlords, or official landlords such as county councils, our agriculturists will not do their best, and they will continue deserting the country, until the soil they tiU is theirs and their famiUes' absolutely and for all time. Small holders can enrich themselves not only by raising produce on the soil, and by improving the soil, but also 2 K 498 GBEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN in other ways. Dairying and pig raising are typical small holders' industries. They are industries which are carried on with the greatest success by peasant proprietors in all countries, and I will give a few figures which wUl show at a glance how shockingly Great Britain has fallen behind in dairying and pig raising, and how enormous a scope British peasant proprietors will have in these two branches. Dairying and Pig Raising In Great Britain in 1908 In Q-ermany in 1907 Number of inhabitants .... „ mUoh cows kept „ pigs kept .... „ miloh cows per 1000 inhabitants pigs per 1000 inhabitants . 40,000,000 2,763,780 2,823,482 69 70 62,000,000 10,966,998 22,146,532 177 357 German agriculture is based on peasant proprietorship. British agriculture is based on tenancy. In Germany, as in all other European countries, the peasant proprietors are the principal owners of milch cows and of pigs, and when we compare the stock of milch cows and pigs in Great Britain and Germany, we find that for every thousand in- habitants there are 177 milch cows in Germany and only 69 milch cows in Great Britain, that there are 357 pigs in Germany and only 70 pigs in Great Britain. Measured per thousand of the population, Germany has three milch cows and five pigs for every single milch cow and every single pig kept in this country. If we take the average family to be composed of five persons, we find that Germany possesses one mUch cow and two pigs for every single family, whilst Great Britain possesses only a single milch cow and a single pig for every three families. Under these circumstances we cannot wonder that the German people are brought up on plenty of fresh milk, that they live practically exclusively on LAND REFORM OR SOCIALISM ? 499 home-made butter and cheese, and on home-raised meat. The German race is sturdy, and we caimot wonder that we are constantly told about the physical degeneration in Great Britain when we remember that the children of the British pooE are brought up largely on foreign preserved milk, from which the fat has been extracted, imported in tins. Poor British parents cannot afford to buy fresh milk for their children, and so they raise weeds, not men, on valueless chemical substitutes, instead of giving their children their natural nourishment. Peasant proprietorship and Protection may have certain disadvantages, but so much is certain — ^that peasant pro- prietorship and Protection combined have given to the German people an abundance of cheap milk, an abundance of home-made butter, an abundance of home-made cheese, and an abundance of home-grown pork and beef ; whilst Free Trade and tenancy combined have caused mUk to be far dearer in Great Britain than in any other country in Europe, and have compelled us to rely principally on •foreign meat, butter, and cheese of doubtful quaUty. We have to go for our food to the ends of the earth. We are getting butter from Siberia, pork from China, and eggs from Russia and Morocco, though we might raise in this country aU the pork, eggs, and butter which we need. We pay more than £100,000,000 every year for foreign dairy produce, meat, fruit, and vegetables which we might raise ourselves, and there is no reason why the greater part of this immense sum should not in future go to British instead of to foreign peasant proprietors. Tariff Reform and land reform are parts of the same policy. Tariff Reform, in its agricultural aspect, intends to settle the people on the land and to give them some security of making a hving on the land, by sheltering them against undue and unfair foreign competition. Tariff Reform in its agricultural aspect should have the most beneficial effect, not only for our agriculturists, but for the 2 e2 500 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BRITAIN people as a whole. It cannot be doubted that we can treble our stock of milch cows, and quintuple the stock of our pigs. It cannot be doubted that we can create a large and prosperous country population. It cannot be doubted that we can secure a plentiful supply of the most wholesome British-grown food to the population of our towns, and so improve the health and the strength of the race. But we can do so only if we place our agriculture on the basis of peasant proprietorship and ensure its success by such protection and assistance as it may need. We have spent hundreds of millions in colonising barren wastes in other continents for the benefit of our cotton and iron industries. It is time that we should begin spending money in colonising the country parts of Great Britain. Such expenditure will prove to be a most profitable and a most satisfactory investment from the national as well as from the financial point' of view. A glance at foreign countries shows, to all who care to see, that everywhere in the world where agriculture is most prosperous it is based upon a system of peasant proprietorship. Nowhere in the world do we find a prosperous agriculture carried on on a tenancy basis. Nowhere in the world has the experiment of making ' the community ' the universal landlord even been tried. Nevertheless we are asked to make ' the community ' the universal landlord. Our Liberal-Socialists have the distinction of being the pioneers of that novel form of agricultural organisation. It is not merely foolish, but it is wicked, to treat a great nation such as the British nation as a fit subject for ignorant and fantastic Socialist schemers to experiment upon ; and to allow Socialist schemers to subject Great Britain to their crude experiments is not statesmanship, but folly and a crime. The same party which has ruined our agriculture, and which is at present ruining our manufacturing industries, bids us now re-create under the guidance of the Socialist street LAND REFORM OR SOCIALISM? 501 orator the rural industries which it has destroyed. Formerly the panacea of the Liberal Party for all economic and pohtical ills was ' Free Trade for the Bagman,' and it did not care what became of the workers. Now its panacea for all economic and political ills is ' Confiscation by instal- ments,' and it does not care in the least what becomes of the industries and of the workers employed in them. The Liberal Party took up the bagman because he possessed a conspicuous talent for raising the mob, and now it has, for the same reason, made the Sociahst street orator its ally, its partner, and its 'proUgS. Lack of space prevents me from showing that the land poHcy advocated and inaugurated by Mr. Asquith's Ad- ministration with regard to the towns is as Socialistic, as foolish, and as pernicious a policy as is that which it has already begun to apply to the country. However, the difference between the Unionist and the Liberal-Socialist land policy can be summed up in a few words. Whilst the Liberal-Socialist Party wishes to make in the towns, as well as in the country, ' the community ' the universal landlord, and to make it impossible for private individuals to own absolutely their house, or shop, or cottage with the land belongiag to it, the Unionist Party will strive to make every man his own landlord. The foregoing pages prove that the ' Liberal ' land poUcy is a purely Sociahstic one, and that it is opposed to the best interests of the British people. CHAPTEE XXI IRELAND AND HOME EULE The party system has very serious disadvantages. National government exercised by the leaders of the dominating party is apt to become government of the nation by a party and for a party. Party poUticians ought to become the trustees of the nation and of the Empire with the moment when they obtain office, but many politicians are only too apt to forget this. Hence many politicians who have become slaves to their party will lightly sacrifice great national interests to momentary party-political advantage. This evil influence of the party system has been particularly noticeable in the case of Ireland. During many decades Ireland has been misgoverned largely because one of the great parties chose to see in Ireland not a great imperial asset, but merely a counter in the party game. Home Rule is the panacea which the Liberals would apply to all the ills of Ireland. However, Home Rule has been a live issue with the Liberal Party only when it hap- pened to be dependent on the votes of the Irish Nationalist members of Parliament. Whenever the Irish Party was able to exercise a controlling influence. Liberal politicians have brought out Home Rule proposals. For some considerable time Radical politicians have been anticipating the possibiUty of seeing their party dominated by the Irish Nationalists, and they have striven to concihate them in good time by promising them Home Rule in some form or other. Mr. Asquith stated at the Albert Hall on 502 lEELAND AND HOME EULE 503 the 10th of December 1909, according to the Times : ' The solution of the Irish problem can be found only iu one way — (cries of " Home Kule " and cheers) — by a policy which, while exphcitly safeguarding the supreme and indefeasible authority of the Imperial Parhament, will set up in Ireland a system of full self-government — (loud cheers) — ^in regard to purely Irish affairs.' In parenthesis, it should be remarked that Mr. Gladstone told the House of Commons on the 8th of April 1886 that ' it passed the wit of man to draw a practical distinction between Imperial and non- Imperial affairs,' and this may also pass the wit of his successors. As some of the most influential Radical politicians — and among them Mr. Asquith himself — have pledged themselves in advance to some form of Home Rule, many Unionists have somewhat rashly assumed that the Government will immediately bring forward a Home Rule Bill ; that the House of Lords will throw it out ; that a Home Rule election will follow in six months or so ; and that it wUl have the usual fatal result to the Radical Party. As a rule, it is the unexpected which happens in politics. The Radicals will scarcely embark upon a course which would be very pleasant to the Unionists and place them in power. They will probably follow a different policy, and two possibilities must be considered. Either the Radicals contemplate seriously introducing Home Rule or they only mean to fool their Irish alhes in the usual way. They will scarcely be in a hurry to introduce Home Rule. That policy has proved too unprofitable to them in the past. It has broken up the old Liberal Party, and it may have the same effect upon the Radical-Socialist coaHtion. Political coalitions, experience tells us, go easily to pieces. Therefore it seems probable that the Liberals will try to avoid introducing Home Rule. In the improbable event that the Liberals seriously contemplate introducing Home Rule, they must first abohsh the veto of the House of Lords, for, in the words of Mr. Redmond, ' with the veto of the House of Lords will disappear 504 GREAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN the last obstacle to Home Hule.' Abolition of the veto of the House of Lords is not a very popular policy. It does not lend itself to a popular ' cry.' Standing by itself, that policy will scarcely obtain the support of the majority of the people. Therefore the Government must strive to obscure the issue, as it did in the Tariff Reform versus Free Trade controversy. It must arouse the passions of the masses. The abolition of the House of Lords must be coupled with some more popular item which will supply the. necessary aithusiasm and driving force. Before proposing the abolition of the Lords' veto the House of Lords must be put flagrantly in the wrong in the eyes of the masses, and the most Hkely step to achieve that end is, perhaps, a Bill introducing a far- reaching reform of the franchise. The rejection or amend- ment of such a measure lends itself exceedingly well to passionate misrepresentations by the Socialist street orators, who are the most active and the most valuable allies of the Radical Party, and with their aid it may be possible to raise the masses against the Upper House. Prom the countless speeches of Messrs. Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, and Ure, it appears likely that such a step is contemplated by the most active Liberal politicians. These three men have by their inflammatory speeches appealed during many months to the passions of the mob. At Limehouse and elsewhere they have striven to arouse the passions of the propertyless — though these have no votes — and by preaching the class war they have driven many wealthy Liberals out of the party and estranged the Liberal middle class. It is difficult to believe that these men have driven out many valuable voters by appeahng for the support of non-voters without a purpose. At the present moment there are 7,705,717 electors on the lists, while the male adult population is approximately 10,000,000. Conceivably Mr. Lloyd George and his followers hope to create a new revolutionary Radical-Socialist party of their own by enfranchising these 2,300,000 voteless men and rising IRELAND AND HOME RULE 505 to power with their help. If they should succeed in securing simultaneously the enfranchisement of the propertyless and the payment of members, the triumvirate could dispense with the monetary assistance and with the votes of the small group of wealthy old Liberals and their followers who now finance the Radical Party, and also with the leaders of old middle-class Liberalism, such as Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey, and the dwindling group of their supporters, who watch Mr. Lloyd George's activity with dismay. If the Radical politicians do not intend giving Ireland Home Rule, they wUl still act as above indicated. They will bring forward some popular item, such as a comprehensive Reform Bill, which is artfully devised to be amended or rejected by the Lords. They will not accept any amend- ment. Instead, they will dissolve on the joint questions of the Lords' veto and the enfranchisement of the voteless people, and if they should succeed in obtaining with this double cry a large majority they can afford to laugh at their Irish dupes. Only as long as they are weak will the Radicals dance to the tune of the Irishman's pipe. The Irish may possess the most solemn pledges of Home Rule, but political undertakings cannot be enforced in a court of law. Hence the Irish leaders can, if they are betrayed, console themselves only by writing letters to the Times and Freeman's Journal complaining that they have been tricked. The instinctive desire of the Irish Nationalists for Home Rule is a perfectly natural one. However, it seems question- able whether they are wise in continuing to pursue Home Rule as a practical policy. The policy of a nation should be based not on sentiment, but on expediency and on sound common sense. It should not pursue visionary ideals, but should endeavour to procure solid advantages for the people. A wise and patriotic statesman will try to achieve only the possible. He wiH look rather to the present and to the future than to the past. His action will be guided not by historic resentment, but by practical sense. 506 GEEAT AND GEEATBE BEITAIN Ireland has two grievances — a political and an economio one. Her people remember the tragic past of their country, and they are embittered against the Saxon invaders. They also remember that Ireland had great and flourishing manu- facturing industries, and that England destroyed them, first by prohibitions, and then by Free Trade. Looking back- wards, the Irish see in England the cause of their misery, and many Irishmen wish to cut the connexion with this country, to drive out the ' English garrison,' and to re-create their industries under the shelter of a tariff which excludes British manufactures. They desire to make Ireland independent on pohtical and economic grounds. I shall show that Home Eule is at present impossible both on political and economic grounds, and that the Irish politicians must alter their policy if they wish to obtain it. As regards the political aspect of Home Eule, many Irishmen argue that they are in common justice entitled to as much self-government as is possessed by our dominions oversea, and that they do not require the protection of the British Army and Navy because no foreign Power covets their poor island, which would prove an unprofitable acquisition. At first sight these arguments seem plausible. However, closer investigation shows that both the colonial analogy and the strategic argument are wrong. Our colonies are far away, and their strategical importance, as far as the British Isles are concerned, is almost nil. If a hostile expedition should seize the Cape or the St. Lawrence Eiver, Great Britain herself would not be in danger. Ireland, on the other hand, occupies a commanding strategical position, the defence of which is of vital importance to this country. England would never have proceeded to conquer Ireland but for the fact that Ireland's strategical position is of vital importance to this country. As soon as we begin to study our political relations with Ireland we find that political and strategical considerations are inseparably interwoven. Puring our great war with lEELAND AND HOME RULE 507 the French Republic and Napoleon it was the constant aim of Prance to attack us on the flank, and to conquer England by way of Ireland. That danger was so great that it caused Pitt to work with the greatest energy for the unification of Great Britain and Ireland. The British- Irish Union is based on military necessity. It was formed for the defence of Great Britain and of her colonies, for these islands are the Empire's citadel and naval base. This was expressly stated in the Act of Union of 1800. The Irish coast is studded with a large number of excellent harbours, which might become the haunts of hostile cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines in case of war. Liverpool, Manchester, Cardiff, Bristol, Glasgow, and their industrial hinterland, the chief seats of our trade and industries, he within easy striking distance of the Irish coast. An invasion of Great Britain could more easily be effected from Ireland than from Belgium and Holland. As, furthermore, about nine-tenths of our food and raw material reach Great Britain from the west, an attack upon Great Britain in the Irish Sea would be more dangerous, and a defeat more deadly, than one in the North Sea, especially as the Irish ports are ideally situated for cutting our trade routes and starving Great Britain into surrender. For all these reasons the integrity of Ireland is more important to Great Britain than is the integrity of Belgium and Holland, and the command of the St. George's Channel is for military and for commercial- strategical reasons as important to Great Britain as the safety of the mouth of the Thames is to London. Hence a political separation of the two countries which does not guarantee the efficient defence of Ireland is out of the question. The first condition of the separation of the countries would be this, that Ireland must be able to satisfy Great Britam that she can defend her territory against all comers. Ireland's defence must be undertaken either by herself or by another Power. Ireland is too poor to maintain the necessary forts and dockyards and a sufficient garason on 608 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN land, and to provide at the same time a sufficiently strong naval force to protect her harbours and coasts against a surprise attack. Besides, Ireland is so much divided against herself by religious and by political factions that there is not a sufficient security against treachery in case of war. It follows that Ireland would have to rely for her defence either upon Great Britain or some other Power. If she did the former, the British garrison would return, and her independ- ence would be at an end. If she did the latter, it would mean war, for no foreign Power would undertake the protection of Ireland unless it meant to make use of that island's commanding position for attacking Great Britain. Consequently, Great Britain could never aUow Ireland to become the Protectorate and appendage of a foreign State. Apart from military considerations, poHtical independ- ence is at present impossible for Ireland for other reasons. The NationaUst south of Ireland is agricultural and poor, whilst the Unionist north is industrial and rich. Belfast does not wish to be forced to finance an Irish State, and to be impoverished by a Government at Dublin. Besides, Ulstermen very logically contend that if Ireland is entitled to Home Rule because, unlike Great Britain, she is Roman Catholic and Celtic, Ulster is equally entitled to Home Rule within her own borders because, unUke Ireland, she is Protestant and Anglo-Saxon. Home Rule would make Ulster an Irish Ireland. Ulster is determined not to form part of a Home Rule Ireland, and to fight if necessary. Consequently the granting of political independence to Ireland would lead to war between Ulster and the south. Ulster would have to be subdued by force of arms either by Great Britain or by Ireland, and the Irish Nationahsts can scarcely imagine that Great Britain wiU be found ready to subdue Ulster by force of arms. Ireland would have to fight her own battles. The Irish Nationalists number about 3,000,000, the Loyahsts number about 1,300,000. However, notwithstanding their superiority in number. IRELAND AND HOME RULE 509 the Nationalists might not be victorious. Modem war is fought largely with money and machines, and Ulster has both in abundance. An improvised Ulster fleet might blockade the Irish harbours, whilst Ulster would be able to draw her supphes from outside. Unless Great Britain stepped in, made peace between the combatants, and re-created the old status, the history of the American civil war might be re-enacted in all its details, though on a smaller scale ; and in Ireland also the industrial north might prove victorious over the agricultural south, to the great surprise of the latter. Home Rule is at present impossible, not only on political- strategical grounds, but still more on economic grounds. Home Rule in Ireland presupposes Free Trade in Great Britain, for Ireland's very existence depends on her ability to sell her produce in the British market. An independent Ireland can safely exclude British manufactures as long as Great Britain cannot retaliate. As soon, however, as Great Britain has a tariff, the exclusion of British manufactures is impossible. The Unionist Party is pledged to Tariff Reform. Tariff Reform had no place in the official Unionist programme under which the election of 1906 was fought, but it has had the foremost place in the Unionist programme of 1910. Its adoption has increased the Unionist vote ia a most remark- able manner. Compared with the last General Election the votes given to the Unionists have increased by nearly 25 per cent. Practically one-half of the votes given by the British electorate have been recorded for Tariff Reform. The Tariff Reform party is at present by far the strongest single party in Parhament. Tariff Reform has taken a firm hold upon the people. Radicals have frankly acknowledged that they would have lost the General Election had it been fought on Tariff Reform alone. Therefore they took pains to confuse the electors by dragging in numerous side issues. The fact that the electorate has given about 3,000,000 votes 510 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN for Tariff Eeform shows that it is immensely popular, and foreshadows its early triumph. It may possibly be staved off by various artifices for a little while, but it is bound to come at an early date. It may be introduced by the Liberals themselves. The Irish must reckon with the fact that Free Trade is dead and that Great Britain will soon be surrounded with a customs wall. Bread is more important than glory. It may be glorious to make Ireland economically independent and to re-estabUsh the ancient Irish manufacturing industries by excluding the British manufactures, but it is not practicable. Ireland is far more dependent for her subsistence on her foreign trade than is Great Britain herself. This may be seen from the following figures, which are taken from the Eeport on the Export and Import Trade of Ireland for 1908 (Cd. 4869) : United Kingdom Ireland . Imports per head of Population in 1908 £ s. 11 10 12 16 Bzports per head of Population in 1908 £ s. d. 8 9 4 12 13 10 These figures bhow that Ireland's exports per head of population are 50 per cent, larger than are those of Great Britain. However, as the Irish people are much poorer than the English people, the relative difference is very much greater, and if we allow for this difference in wealth we may say that the individual Irishman is at least twice as dependent for his hving on foreign trade as is the individual Englishman. The bulk of the commodities which Ireland exports goes to Great Britain. The Eeport on the Export and Import Trade of Ireland for 1908 states : ' It is estimated that not more than one-fifth of Ireland's exports goes to colonial and foreign countries, the other four-fifths remaining in Great Britain.' Whilst Ireland sends four-fifths of all her exports lEELAND AND HOME EULE 511 to Great Britain, our exports to Ireland are but a fraction of our huge total. Whilst Ireland is absolutely dependent on the British market for her existence, we can easily do without the Irish market. Mutual exclusion would scarcely hurt Great Britain, but it would ruin Ireland. If we now study the British-Irish trade in detail, we find that Ireland buys from Great Britain chiefly manufactures and coal, and pays for them chiefly with agricultural produce raised by her peasants. Now, although Ireland can, by means of a tariff, exclude our manufactures, she cannot compel us to sell to her our coal and to buy her agricultural products. Why should we buy from a commercially hos- tile Ireland beef, butter, bacon, and eggs which we can buy from our colonies and from various foreign countries ? According to the official statistics (Cd. 4869), Ireland's exports in 1908 were as follow : Live stock .... 14,937,605 Bead meat, bacon, hams, &o. . 3,517,013 Eggs, poultry, butter 7,937,379 Fruit and vegetables 484,989 Grain, flour, &o. 711,259 Feeding stuffs .... 481,833 Fish 440,461 Tobacco and snuff . 1,276,840 Spirits, beer, mineral waters, &c. . 4,524,019 Various provisions . 961,929 Stone, wood, hides and other raw material 9 4,064,187 Total food and raw products . 39,337,514 Yarns and textiles .... . 13,560,289 Ships and machinery- . 3,751,940 Other manniaotured goods 1,719,557 Grand Total , . £58,369,300 The foregoing table shows that exactly two-thirds of Ireland's exports consist of food and raw produce which are raised in the Nationalist centre and south, and these are sent practically exclusively to Great Britain. The remaining one-third, consisting of manufactures, is produced chiefly in Ulster, especially in Belfast, and a large part of these 512 GEEAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN manufactures is sold abroad. Hence a British- Irish Customs war would hurt Loyalist Ulster little, but would ruin the rural industries of Nationalist Ireland. Ireland would scarcely be able to emulate our colonies and sell her agricultural produce abroad. Australian wool, Canadian wheat and timber, &c., are universally required, and are produced in huge quantities. Consequently, our colonies are able to cater for the markets of the world. The character of Ireland's trade is different. She is England's farm, and she sends us every day meat, eggs, butter, poultry, &c., in small parcels. Her purely local retail business cannot be converted into an international wholesale business. Besides, Ireland enjoys at present a special, though a disguised, protection in the British market. By far the largest of Ireland's exports is that of hve cattle. Owing to Irish political pressure the importation of Canadian and Argentine live cattle into Great Britain has been prohibited on ' sanitary grounds,' notwithstanding the protests of the Argentine and Canada. The cancellation of that political prohibition would destroy Ireland's greatest industry. Whilst, therefore, pohtical Home Eule is, at least at present, impossible on political-strategical grounds, economic Home Eule wiU, with the advent of Tariff Reform, be impossible for all time. Economic Home Eule is dead. Tariff Reform will prove the cement which will bind together not only the Empire but also the United Kingdom. Ireland wiU value the privilege of a large, open, yet protected, home market, and she will as little wish for a ruinous economic independence as does Ohio or Bavaria. Lastly, industrial Ireland suffers not so much from lack of native coal as from lack of capital, and she suffers from lack of capital largely because investors have not sufficient confidence in the stability of the country. The Home Rule agitation has frightened capital, and has inflicted great sufferings on the Irish people. At present England is Ireland's banker, and if EngUsh private capitalists do not lEELAND AND HOME RULE 513 care to put their money into Irish enterprises, she can always obtain British State funds at the cheapest rate for under- takings of national importance and utihty. But how will Ireland raise the hundreds of milhons of pounds which she requires for the extension of railways and canals, the improve- ment of harbours, &c., when she has cut the connexion ? As long as she is part of Great Britain Ireland's pubhc credit is as good as England's. As soon as she is independent her credit will be no better than that of Servia. Capitalists would refuse financial accommodation except at the most usurious termst Ireland's economic decay would become irretrievable , Ireland may obtain not merely Home Rule but the fullest measure of political independence in a not very distant future. However, to the Irish people, happiness is more important than is Home Rule. Therefore, before con- sidering the possibihty of Ireland's complete poUtical enfranchisement, let us investigate the cause of the im- happiness of the Irish people. Such an investigation will show that their present sufferings are principally due to the callous indifference and to the cold, calculating cruelty of that party which, during half a century, has shamelessly exploited Ireland, aided by Irish pohticians, whom it has duped and whose support it has bought with empty promises of Home Rule. It will show that the Liberal Party has devastated, ruined, and desolated Ireland, and has driven miUions of her best citizens into death, starvation, and exile. The Liberal Party is a party which is guided not by an aristocracy of birth but by an aristocracy of wealth, and which never ceases to boast of its virtue, its righteousness, its pure motives, and its lofty ideals. In reahty the Liberal Party is a party which has elevated political hypocrisy and cant to a fine art, and which pursues, and has always pursued, a pohcy which is directed partly by the sordid selfishness of its influential moneyed supporters and partly by the obstinate ignorance of bookish and conceited doctri- naires who supply the much needed cloak of scientific 2 I 614 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN justification for the policy of sordid Mammonism embraced by their leaders. The Liberal Party came into power with the passing of the great Eeform Bill of 1832, and soon after that date it let loose its doctrinaires upon Ireland. A very powerful Eoyal Commission on the Poor Laws had investigated the economic conditions of Great Britain and Ireland between 1833 and 1836. The Irish Eoyal Com- missioners, men of the highest standing and authority in their country, had recommended the improvement of agriculture by the reclamation of waste lands, the draining of bogs, the provision of labourers' cottages and allotments, the bringing of agricultural instruction to the doors of the peasant, the improvement of land tenure, &c., reforms which only now are being introduced. On receipt of this report Lord John Eussell, the Liberal Home Secretary, sent Sir George NichoUs to Ireland on an independent tour of investigation. Sir George stayed in Ireland only six weeks, and he sent in his report On the 15th of November 1886. He found in Ireland a system of small peasants. He had never been to Ireland before, and was quite unacquainted with Irish affairs. Nevertheless, he came immediately to the conclusion — a conclusion which may be foimd in the text-books of all the Free Trade economists — that peasant proprietorship was ' uneconomical.' Adopting their views, Sir George recommended, on the strength of his six weeks' tour, with the cocksureness of the doctrinaire, that the Irish land system should be changed ' from the system of small holdings, allotments, and sub-divisions of land which now prevails in Ireland to the better practice of day labour for wages and to that dependence on the daily labour for support which is the present conditions of the English peasantry.' With heartless cruelty he proposed to drive the Irish- peasants from their . land for the • benefit of the landlords, and to erect workhouses for them so that , they need not starve in the streets. Sir George's opinion was supported by ' another lEELAND AND HOME RULE 515 distinguished Liberal politician and doctrinaire, Sir George Comewall Lewis, who recommended in his book 'Local Disturbances in Ireland,' which also was published in 1836, ' to change the Irish peasant from a cottier Uving upon land to a labourer living upon wages,' and to enable the landlords to consolidate their estates by clearing off the peasants and preparing workhouses for the shelter of the evicted tenants. Furthermore, in August 1836, Sir George Come- wall Lewis handed to the Chancellor of the Exchequer a confidential criticism on the Report of the Irish Royal Commissioners on the Poor Laws. In that document he stated, under the heading ' Poor Law Wanted in Ibeihan £700,000 a year to the Irish County Councils, but refused to rearrange completely Ireland's taxation, a task which obviously should be performed by the party responsible for Ireland's over-taxation. The Liberals supported Ireland's 542 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN claim, hoping that, if the Unionist Government should put part of Ireland's burden on British backs, they would be able to raise the British taxpayers against them. That they acted hypocritically in supporting Ireland's claim is proved by their subsequent action. On July 4, Mr. John Redmond moved in the House the resolution : ' That the disproportion between the taxation of Ireland and its taxable capacity, as compared with the other parts of the Kingdom disclosed by the findings of the Royal Commission, constitutes a grievance, and demands the early attention of the Government with a view to proposing a remedy.' In the course of the ensuing debate Sir William Harcourt, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, described the Royal Commission as ' as competent a set of men as could inquire into the matter, a Commission repre- sented by as competent, or more competent, financial author- ities as any that could be found in this country.' A division was taken on Mr. Redmond's resolution, and it was supported by all the leading Liberals in the House. Among these were Mr. Asquith and some of his most prominent Ueutenants, such as Messrs. Birrell, Bryce, Herbert Gladstone, John Morley, J. A. Pease, and others. As all the most prominent Liberals, from Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Asquith downward, had strongly supported Ireland's claim for a reduction of her taxation. Irishmen had a right to expect that they would receive financial justice when the Liberals obtained an overwhelming majority in 1906. They did not know their Liberal friends. When, on May 1, 1906, the question of Ireland's over-taxation was raised in Parlia- ment, Mr. Asquith suavely declared : ' It will be my most earnest desire to give effect to that vote by translating it into concrete action. We intend seriously, with the best will in the world, to investigate the whole of this expenditure, and see how far it is possible to adjust on a fairer basis what I admit is the imsatisfactory and inequitable financial relations between the two portions of the Kingdom.' A lEELAND AND THE PARTIES 543 year later, on June 27, 1907, Mr. Asquith stated : ' The whole question has received and is receiving careful con- sideration from our Eight Honourable friend the Chief Secretary and myself.' Mr. Asquith was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1906 to 1908. He brought out three Budgets, but in none of them he remembered Ireland's claims and the promises of his party. In April 1908 Mr. Lloyd George took over the Exchequer, and in 1909 he brought out a Budget which imposed particularly onerous new taxes on land and spirits, but none on beer. The EngHsh worker drinks beer, whilst the Irish drinks whisky. Therefore England was again to be relieved of taxes at Ireland's cost, thus increasing her over- taxation, whilst the various new land taxes, which were supposed to fall on the dukes and other rich landowners in Great Britain, would fall with a crushing effect on the struggling peasant proprietors in Ireland. Irishmen esti- mated that the new taxes would increase Ireland's taxa- tion by £2,000,000 a year. According to the Act of Union and according to justice, Ireland should be taxed only in accordance with her taxable capacity. The Eoyal Com- mission of 1896 had found that through Mr. Gladstone's action Ireland paid in taxes 2s. for every single Is. which she ought to pay, and Mr. Gladstone and his chief supporters had acknowledged the justice of its finding. Yet Mr. Lloyd George proposed again to increase Ireland's special burden so that she would pay in taxes from 2s. 6d. to 3s. for every single Is. which she ought to pay. The Irish people protested against this flagrant injustice and breach of faith, and the Irish Chambers of Commerce and County Councils passed resolutions condemning the Budget. Their protests were disregarded. After having ' considered ' Ireland's claim during three whole years, the Liberals threw off the mask. They resolved to continue the traditional policy of fraud and exploitation towards Ireland, and they disregarded her protests. 544 GEEAT AND GEEATER BEITAIN The general election of 1910, by greatly reducing the Liberal majority, altered the political position completely. The Liberals could no longer rely on their overwhelming Parliamentary strength in dealing with Ireland's justified claims. The General Election had placed the Liberal Party under the thumb of the Lish members. The Irish held the balance of power between the two parties. They might have destroyed the Budget had they cared to do so. Yet they voted for the Budget at Mr. Eedmond's command. ^ Before the General Election Mr. Asquith had promised Ireland Home Eule, and he explained later on that he had not promised it. On the strength of the first promise Mr. Eedmond had obtained twenty or thirty seats in England for the Liberal Party by directing the Irish vote to be cast for Liberal candidates. Early in 1910, before the Budget came on, Mr. Eedmond declared that the Irish Party would vote for the Budget in exchange for the abohtion of the Lords' veto, which would be the first step towards Home Eule. Was Mr. Eedmond twice deceiving himself or was he twice being deceived ? Did Mr. Eedmond not know that pohticians in difficulties are lavish in making promises ? Mr. Asquith could as safely promise Ireland the moon as Home Eule. Did Mr. Eedmond not know that Home Eule is not in the gift of a tottering and discredited Cabinet which lives from hand to mouth on pitiful shifts and despic- able intrigues, but in that of the British people ? Mr. Eed- mond and his friends should have asked themselves : ' Are the British people hkely to give Ireland Home Eule ? Are the Liberals to be trusted, or do they merely, Hke a bad and hard-pressed debtor, or like a " long firm," wish to renew a stale and fraudulent Home Eule Bill which has repeatedly, and without success, been presented for payment, and which will never be paid, though it may frequently be renewed ? ' These are questions which now are being asked all over Ireland. Irish public opinion, as expressed by practically the entire Press, was bitterly hostile to the Budget. The IRELAND AND THE PARTIES 545 Freeman's Journal formed an exception, because it is not an Irish, but a British Liberal, joumaL Under these circum- stances, Mr. Redmond's course was perfectly plain. Had he wished to act as a statesman aad as a representative of Ireland's interests, he should have insisted that Ireland should be exempted from aU the provisions of the Budget which apply to Ireland, and that Ireland should receive besides that remission of taxation which the Liberals had promised ever since 1897. As the Liberals could not have fulfilled these demands without incurring the hostiUty of the Radical-SociaUst wing, the Irish politicians would have destroyed the Liberal Government had they insisted on financial justice to their country. The Irish Nationalists are so weak in number that they must work hand in hand with one of the great parties, and , had they destroyed Mr. Asquith's Government they would in future have received from the Liberals not even promises of Home Rule. But did it reaUy matter if the Liberals were angry with the Irish ? What have the Irish ever received froni the Liberals except empty promises and ill-treatment, and what else do they expect to receive from them in the future ? Home Rule ? Home Rule is not a practical poUcy, as the British people will not grant it unless the Irish people are happy and loyal, and the most astute Liberal pohtician cannot grant Home Rule against the wiU of the people. Why, then, not work for Ireland's real and abiding interests, for the agricultural and industrial re-creation of the country, and for the happiness and 'prosperity of its inhabitants ?^|^Have the Liberals ever tried to make Ireland happy and prosperous ? Which of the two parties has decimated the Irish people, and, after having ruined them, doubled their taxes ? Which of the two parties has tried to re-create rural Ireland by State railways and by creating peasant proprietors, and which party has resisted that beneficial policy to the utmost ? The Liberals can offer to Ireland nothing except ruinous Free Trade ^nd the delusion of Home Rule, and they offer 2 IT 546 GEEAT AND GEEATEK BEITAIN the latter with the same malice with which a man may offer a big black cigar to a clamorous little child. They offer Ireland Home Eule well knowing that Ireland will not get it, and that, if she should get it, it would make Ireland's ruin irretrievable. The policy of the Liberals towards Ireland has never altered. During more than seventy years they have exploited and impoverished her, and, whilst robbing her, they have dangled before her eyes a political bait, and when the political bait was refused they have turned to corruption and bribery. The Liberal Party has ruled Ireland largely by corrupting and bribing her politicians, and if corrupter and corrupted are equally guilty, we may say that Ireland's sufferings are quite as much due to the venality of Irish politicians as to the sordid selfishness of her Liberal exploiters. Ireland's politicians have been Ireland's curse, and they have sold their country time after time for pelf. Bought, bribed, and corrupted by the Liberal Party, the Irish politicians have voted for the repeal of the Corn Laws, against Irish State railways, and against many other measures advantageous and for many measures harmful to their country, and by putting a millstone round Ireland's neck by voting for the Budget, Mr. Eedmond and his supporters have merely acted in the traditional manner of Irish politicians. After all, why should they not foUow the footsteps of Keogh and Sadleir and other distinguished Irish patriots who have done very well — for themselves ? The policy of the Nationalists and of their official mouth- piece, the Freeman's Journal, is already suspected. On November 23, 1907, Sinn Fein gave a list of ' the leader writers of the official daily organ of parliamentarianism who have already received their reward from the British Govern- ment.' From that Ust we learn that Mr. Richard Adams, leader writer of the Freeman's Journal, had been appointed County Court Judge with £1400 per annum ; that Mr. Ennis, another leader writer of that journal, had been IRELAND AND THE PARTIES 547 appointed Registrar -with £1500 per annum ; that Mr. McDonnell Bodkin, a third leader writer of the Freeman's Journal, had been made County Court Judge with £1400 per annum ; and that Mr. McSweeney, the editor of the Freeman's Journal, had been made Local Government Inspector with £800 per annum. The coincidence of these appointments is very interesting. Irishmen may well ask themselves why the Freeman's Journal did stand alone in Ireland in defending Mr. Lloyd George's Budget, which is ruinous to Ireland, and whether the Freeman's Journal is an official Irish Nationalist or an official British Liberal publication. Unfortunately, it is not difficult to bribe the Irish Party. Most Irish members are poor men who subsist on their Parha- mentary salary, which is doled out to them only so long as they vote as they are told. Mr. William O'Brien wrote to a West Cork clergyman : ' The fact is that there is no Irish Party. They are never consulted on any subject. All they have to do is to obey the word of command of Mr. Dillon and Mr. T. P. O'Connor, who arrange everything beforehand with the Government, and Irish members are simply informed as to the lobby into which they must walk.' The poorer Irish Nationalist members do not represent Ireland. They represent no Irish interest. They do not even represent themselves. They represent only the man who holds the purse-strings of the party fund. In voting for the Budget many of the poorer Irish members did vote, not for Ireland, but for their salaries. The Boscommon Herald wrote : ' It will be open to Mr. T. P. O'Connor to say to them : " Very well, gentlemen. You can vote against the Budget, but there will be no money to keep you in London and there will be no money to pay the Sheriff's fees at another General Election." ' The Liberal Party has succeeded once more in injuring Ireland with the help of her own pohticians. It is a curious fact that the Irish people are apparently satisfied to be represented by men who vote, not for their 2 >•• S 548 GREAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN country, but for their keep, and who vote for the Liberal Party at the dictation of conspirators working in the back- ground. The Liberal Government has been five years in office, and, as usual, it has worked to Ireland's harm. It found many urgent problems demanding settlement, and it shelved them all by appointing, I think, twenty-one Commissions, on which the ablest Irishmen were to waste their time in unnecessary inquiries. Apart from making these sham inquiries the Liberals have done nothing for Ireland's benefit. On the other hand, they have deliberately stopped the purchase of land by the Irish peasants, and by their insane finance they have depreciated Irish land stock and have increased Ireland's taxes. LiberaKsm has been Ireland's curse, and it is only natural that the Press and the people all over Ireland are discussing the fraud of LiberaUsm and are arguing that it is time to break off a connexion which has brought only sorrow to their country. The Wexford Echo wrote in a recent issue : ' There are a large number of people in Ireland who would prefer to see Mr. Eedmond try his fortune with the Tories. A working agreement with Mr. Balfour offers many attrac- tions. Besides, a Britisher's Tariff Eeform will not mean all loss to Ireland. It will handicap in the British markets many of the most formidable of the Irish farmers' trade rivals. This should prove of considerable value to Irish agriculture.' The little Wexford paper expressed the views of many Irishmen. Whilst the Liberal Party has nothing to offer to Ireland except the superannuated fraud of Home Eule, the Unionist Party can offer Ireland prosperity under a tariff. The Conservative-Unionist Party is anxious to take up again its constructive National policy which the policy of heartless Liberal Mammonism has interrupted. Ireland can be given a substantial preference in the British market, either by a special tariff directed against the countries IRELAND AND THE PARTIES 549 oversea — ^why should Irishmen be compelled to eat Argentine wheat and American bacon if they wish to eat produce of their own ? — or by cheapening for her the cost of transport to Great Britain. The latter form of protection would be entirely unobjectionable. The pohcy of the Unionists is not merely a tariff policy, but a comprehensive policy of national development. They do not aim at enriching one part of the country at the cost of another part, as the Liberals have done, but at benefiting the United Kingdom as a whole. Therefore Tariff Reform will amply provide for Ireland's special needs. Solid advantage is better than empty promises. Home Rule extorted by force from an unwilling England is a dream. An independent Ireland might find the British market closed to her agricultural produce. Liberal Home Rule might prove as disastrous to Ireland as Liberal Free Trade. Mr. Redmond has been the dupe and the tool of the Radical-Socialists. The Radical-Socialist Party wishes to deprive the House of Lords of its powers, and in this policy it has had the enthusiastic support of Mr. Redmond, who, wittingly or unwittingly, has thus been working for Ireland's harm. The interests of the House of Lords and of Ireland are practically identical. Both represent agriculture and the Church. The struggle between Conservatism and LiberaUsm, between Protection and Free Trade, between Lords and Commons, has been a struggle between town and country, between the manufacturing interests and agri- culture. The town has defeated the country, with disastrous effects to Ireland, and Mr. Redmond has tried to deprive his country of its last defender by making the town absolute. By throwing out the secular Liberal Education Bill the Lords have defended the Irish Roman CathoKc schools throughout the United Kingdom. In the words of the Irish Catholic of January 8, 1910 : ' Every Irish vote cast in Great Britain for Mr. Asquith and his colleagues will be another nail driven into the coffin of definite rehgious teaching. No pohtical 550 GEEAT AND GEEATEB BEITAIN sophistry must be allowed to obscure this fact.' By throwing out the Budget the Lords have defended the Irish farmers against land nationalisation. The Lords and the Irish are equally interested in resisting Socialism and Secularism. The House of Lords is Ireland's natural defender, and the only barrier against these two evils. Hence it is in Ireland's interest to strengthen that barrier to the utmost, not to break it down. Mr. Eedmond and his party have sold Ireland's birthright for a mess of pottage. Mr. Eedmond and his followers have been working for British Eadicalism, Socialism, and Secularism, whilst pretending to work for Ireland. He and his purse-string-bound supporters have been working, not for Ireland's independence, but for her downfall. If Mr. Eedmond wishes to save his political reputation and position, if he wishes to be known to history as a statesman and an Irish patriot, let him use what is left of his power and destroy at the first opportunity that party which, ever since its origin, has duped, exploited, and defraurded his country, and join that party which has defended Ireland's interests and which means to re-create his country. Let him abandon the barren policy of Home Eule and take up a creative policy. Ireland's greatest need is not political, but economic. Let Mr. Eedmond help the Unionists in aboUshing Ireland's poverty and in developing Ireland's magnificent natural resources, which the party of exploiters has deliberately destroyed or neglected. If he is not willing to work for Ireland's good, if he prefers taking a part in the great Liberal Home Eule fraud, he may soon find himself a leader without a party. Signs are not wanting that Ireland is awakening, and that she will no longer allow her politicians to play the party game at Westminster for their own purposes. A new Irish Party is arising. Let Mr. Eedmond place himself at its head before it is too late. CHAPTEE XXIII THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN AND KING EDWARD VII The most striking feature of King Edward's reign lies, no doubt, in the remarkable change which has taken place in Great Britain's foreign policy. In consequence of that change the international political position and importance of this country have greatly altered. Foreign statesmen used to think that London lay outside the main currents of international policy. Bismarck declared that England was no longer an active factor in the affairs of continental Europe, and that he left her out of account in his political calculations. His immediate successors and some non- German statesmen showed by their actions that they shared Bismarck's opinion. England was pretty generally thought to be of secondary importance on the chess-board of European diplomacy. The London embassies were sinecures where second-rate diplomats grew grey in attending to routine work. Since 1901, the year in which King Edward came to the throne. Great Britain's political influence has mightily increased, and London occupies now a position in the political world comparable with that which Berlin occupied at the time when Bismarck was at the zenith of his power. Since 1901 London has risen from pohtical obscurity to pre- eminence. It has become the meeting-place of monarchs, and it is as much the pohtical centre of Europe and the diplomatic capital of the world as it was in the time of Chatham and of Pitt. History, which used to be made at 551 552 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN Vienna, at St. Petersburg, or at Constantinople, is now being made at London. The London embassy has become the most important embassy of foreign States. To the majority of Englishmen international politics are ' foreign affairs.' Li the words of Lord Beaconsfield, ' the very phrase " Foreign Affairs " makes an Englishman con- vinced that they are subjects with which he has no concern.' Englishmen grow up nourished on party poUtics, and party pohtics continue to be their daily bread to the end of their Uves. Foreign politics he out of the beaten track of party poUtics, and therefore do not attract the general attention which they deserve. Besides, owing to our party system, which brings successful orators and poUtical wire-pullers to the front, and which gives the highest positions in the Government, not to administrative and executive ability, but to debating skill and party influence, our statesmen are, as a rule, eminent party politicians who have neither felt the need nor had the leisure to study foreign affairs with the thoroughness which is required, for diplomacy is at the same time the highest of arts and a science of experience. Conse- quently the equipment of our statesmen for dealing with foreign questions consists often only in a small stock of estimable sentiments and elementary commonplaces which they mistake for the principles of practical statesmanship, and they are apt to treat comphcated foreign problems with two or three formulas which they use rather with consistency than with selective discrimination. Frederick the Great wrote in his Memoirs and Napoleon said at St. Helena that EngHshmen seemed to lack understanding for the realities of foreign policy. This lack of understanding, which is to be found in most democracies, is still noticeable. Hence the great changes which have taken place in Great Britain's foreign policy and international position during ICing Edward's reign have made a far greater impression abroad than in this country. Only a few Englishmen are aware how insecure the position of Great Britain used to be and how greatly it has FOEEIGN POLICY 553 improved since the foreign policy of iaertia and of aimless drift has been changed for that poUcy which has been crowned by the Eeval meeting. Let US cast a retrospective glance at the circumstances which led to the adoption of the pohcy of ententes ; let us take stock of the achievements of that policy, and let us then review the poUtical situation in Europe and in Asia, and take note of the possibilities and demands of the future. Up to 1901 Great Britain stood practically alone in the world. Our isolation was rather enforced than voluntary, and as powerful hostile coalitions directed against this country were always possible, and sometimes actually threatening, there was nothing splendid about our isolation, notwithstanding Lord Goschen's celebrated phrase. The important Powers on the Continent are divided into two groups : the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance. Before Eussia's defeat in Asia both groups were generally thought to be equally strong. The balance of power was so nicely adjusted that the risk of war seemed too great to both combinations. Peace was secure on the Continent as long as the Continent was divided into two armed camps of equal strength, and England had no reason to fear continental aggression as long as the two antagonistic combinations were absorbed in watching one another. Up to 1901 our relations with the Powers of the Dual AUiance were very unsatisfactory. Eussia, following her traditional pohcy in Asia, advanced with sap and mine some- times from the one side, sometimes from the other, upon our position in India. Great Britain met with more or less disguised Eussian opposition, intrigue and hostiHty in Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, Thibet, China, m the Yellow Sea and in the Persian Gulf. Every few years a threatened Eussian advance upon India threw the City into a panic. We were in a latent state of war with Eussia. Our relations with France were not much better. Largely owing to the skilful policy of a third Power, there was constant friction 554 GEEAT AND GEEATEE BEITAIN between France and England in Siam, Egypt, West Africa and Newfoundland, and once or twice we were on the brink of war with that country. The naval forces of France were concentrated in Toulon and Bizerta, and threatened demon- stratively Malta and our route to the East via the Suez Canal. Our largest fleet had to be kept in the Mediterranean in constant readiness for war. Under these circumstances it was only natural that the sympathies of Great Britain went towards the Triple Alliance. Whilst Great Britain was incKned to support the Triple Alliance against the Dual Alliance, the Powers of the Triple Alliance were not by any means inclined reciprocally to support Great Britain against France and Eussia. An Anglo-Eussian or an Anglo-French war, which would have weakened the Dual Alliance, was evidently advantageous to the three central-European Powers, especially to the leading one, the more so if it was long drawn out and exhaustive to both combatants. Why, then, should they exert themselves in England's favour ? However, not only could Great Britain not rely upon the active support of the Triple Alliance against France and Eussia, but she had to reckon with its possible hostility. Numerous attempts were made by Germany to arrive at a working understanding with France and Eussia in extra-European affairs, and to merge the two European alliances into a single one for action oversea. Prance and Eussia were assured that French, German, and Eussian interests were identical. French and German ships and Eussian and German ships were frequently seen side by side. The German Government was unwise enough to explain in the Eeichstag in very plain terms that the famous Kruger telegram had been sent in order to ascertain whether, under the pretext of defending the independence of the Transvaal Eepublic, an anti-British coalition embracing the Powers of the Dual Alliance and of the Triple AUiance might be formed, and that the attempt had failed because France had placed herself on England's FOEEIGN POLICY 555 side. The joint action of the united French, German and Russian fleets against Japan, which deprived Japan of the fruits of her victory over China, was a practical demon- stration of the community of interests and of the soUdarity of the two groups of Powers in transmaritime affairs, and clearly foreshadowed the possibility of similar co-operation against Great Britain. It is said that another attempt to form a pan-European coalition against Great Britaia was made at the time of the South African War, and that the attempt failed in consequence of the personal attitude of the Czar. British statesmen had to reckon with the fact that a better pretext for common action, a change of statesmen in France or Russia, or merely greater skill on the part of the most active continental statesman, might create a pan-European coalition against Great Britain. The inter- national anti-British press campaign during the South African War had shown that such a coalition would be very popular. Besides, a partition of the British Empire would have been a more tempting enterprise than a partition of Poland. During a number of years Great Britain was constantly threatened with the danger of having to fight in ' splendid isolation ' against the combined naval and military forces of practically all Europe. The British Empire could be attacked in many parts and in unexpected ways. British statesmen had, for instance, to be prepared for an expedition against India in which Russian weight of numbers would be reinforced by German intelligence, thoroughness, and foresight. The position of Great Britain and her colonies was, owing to our unskilful diplomacy and consequent isolation, one of constant tension and of extreme insecurity. Chance, not the ability of our statesmen, preserved us from a war with all Europe. Through the conclusion of the Triple Entente with France and Russia these dangers have passed. We need no longer simultaneously look after the defence of Central Asia and th© Persian Gulf, after the defence of Central Africa, the 556 GBEAT AND GREATEE BRITAIN Mediterranean, and the North Sea. We have been able to concentrate our naval forces in home waters. Our naval budgets would be much heavier were we compelled still to assert our naval supremacy at the same time in the Mediter- ranean and in the North Sea. Our ententes have enabled us to save many millions on our naval expenditure. They have enabled us to save many more millions on barren Asiatic and African expeditions designed to checkmate the advance of Prance and Russia. Our ententes have saved to the City and to our industries many millions which might have been lost in political panics, and they have given to our business men a feeling of confidence in the maintenance of peace which has induced them to enter upon fresh business. Great Britain is the citadel and the naval base of the British Empire. The security of Great Britain from European attack rests upon the preservation of the balance of power on the Contiaent. History shows that each nation which became supreme in Europe — Spain under Philip the Second, Prance under Louis the Fourteenth and Fifteenth and Napoleon the First — came into collision with this country. The reason for this phenomenon is obvious. A free English nation residing in an island citadel gives the greatest encouragement to revolt to subject nations on the Continent, and is therefore an ever-present danger to rulers such as Phihp the Second, Louis the Fourteenth, and Napoleon the First. The security of Great Britain and of the Empire is bound up with the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, and we must defend that balance of power as determinedly as did our greatest rulers and statesmen — Queen Elizabeth, Cromwell, Marlborough, Chatham, Pitt. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904 had left Russia miUtarily, financially, and morally exhausted. The country was in revolt, all bonds of discipline had been dissolved, the army had become dispirited and unreliable, there was mutiny in the fleet. Besides, the stores and men required by Russia in a European war were in Farthest Asia, the FOREIGN POLICY 557 railway service had broken do-wn, a large number of Russian field-guns were worn out, the stock of ammunition in the Russian magazines had been depleted and was insufficient for a European campaign. Russia was disarmed. Towards the end of the war Russia could not have given any effective assistance to France had the latter been attacked. The balance of power in Europe had temporarily disappeared. The danger arose that Germany might feel tempted to make use of her opportunity by taking another slice of France and make the re-establishment of the balance of power impossible. The Morocco crisis, which broke out immediately after Russia's great defeat, showed that 'Germany had at all events the desire to profit from the breakdown of the balance of power. Very likely England's support saved France from a disastrous war. The unmistakable threat uttered by Professor Schiemann, a friend of the Emperor, and by others, that in case of an Anglo-German war, even if France would remain neutral, Germany would indemnify herself for the loss of her fleet at the expense of Prance, showed that France stood in danger of a German attack. That danger is perhaps not yet past. The geographical position of Germany is a peculiar one. The most important strategical and commercial positions in Central Europe are in the hands of Germany's small neigh- bours. Denmark has excellent harbours and dominates the entrance to the Baltic. The possession of Denmark would supply the'German navy with adequate harbour space, and would make the more vulnerable half of the German sea-coast, the Baltic coast, secure from a naval attack by a Western Power. Holland is a powerful artificial fortress through her canals and inundations, and she also has very valuable harbours. Through Rotterdam and Antwerp — the latter, though situated in Belgium, is dominated by the Dutch shore which hes in front of it — flows the main stream of European commerce and the most valuable part of Germany's foreign trade. The possession of Rotterdam and 558 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN Antwerp would be invaluable to Germany's industries and merchant marine. Switzerland is a mighty natural fortress. It would supply an admirable position for the defence of Germany, and would enable her to dominate Italy and Austria. Germany must feel strongly tempted to acquire one or several of these small countries, two of which formed part of the ancient German Empire of which modern Germany is the heir. Their possession would greatly increase Germany's power and wealth, and might give her the mastery of Europe. If the balance of power in Europe is to be preserved, the independence of Demnark, Holland and Switzerland must be defended at aU costs. While the defence of Denmark and of the Belgo-Dutch shore devolves in the first instance upon the British fleet, the defence of the Belgo-Dutch main- land and of Switzerland can be undertaken only by a powerful army, and devolves therefore upon France. France is the natural defender of Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland against the Powers of the Triple Alliance ; but she cannot defend the small neutral States if she stands alone. Den- mark, Holland, and Switzerland have been the cause and scene of some of the greatest wars in the past. History may repeat itself in the future. The foregoing makes it plain that Great Britain must, for the sake of self-preservation, support France, and it may almost be said that the system of the ententes had to be instituted in order to protect France until Russia, her ally, has been nursed back to health and vigour. Great Britain must not only protect France during the critical period of Russia's convalescence, but she must also keep a watchful eye on Germany's small neighbours, especially as it is rumoured that Germany has made some very interesting secret arrangements with one of the three. Population determines fighting strength in continental countries, and in population the superiority of Germany over France is very striking. France has a population of FOREIGN POLICY 559 89,000,000. Germany has a population of 64,000,000. While the population of France increases by only 60,000 per year, the population of Germany increases by no less than 900,000 per year, or fifteen times faster than that of France. If Germany should acquire Holland or Switzerland, she would not only add several millions to her population, but she would at the same time be able to turn the defences of France. The French have made most elaborate preparations to meet a German invasion. The French frontier is closed by a number of strong fortresses which are linked together by a chain of huge detached forts. In that line of fortifications, which stretches from Belfort to Sedan, there are two gaps, comparable to the opening of huge drag-nets, which form veritable army traps. Germany would, no doubt, in case of war, find it very desirable to avoid this powerful fortified position, and would hke to take the French armies by the flank. It is usually assumed in this country that the German armies would march through Belgium upon Paris, which lies only 110 miles from the nearest point on the Belgian frontier, while it is separated by a distance of 1 60 miles from the nearest point on the German frontier. The assumption that Germany would penetrate through Belgium and march upon Paris in order to take advantage of the short cut is probably erroneous. An advance through Belgium would expose the German army and its line of communication with the arsenals and magazines at home to a flank attack from the sea. Germany need, perhaps, not seriously consider the possibility of such an attack if it was made only by 100,000 English troops, but as these might conceivably be supported by 200,000 or 800,000 Russians landed on the Belgian coast from English transports, an advance upon Paris via Belgium might prove a very risky undertakings It seems, therefore, more hkely that Germany, if she wishes to avoid the aimy traps on the French frontier, will try to invade France by the more indirect, but safer and more commodious, route upon Paris 560 GEEAT AND GREATEE BEITAIN via Switzerland and the Pranche Comte — the route which was chosen by the Germans in 1814. This route has the advantage that an army advancing upon it cuts off the capital from the south of Prance, the wealthiest part of the country, and thus deprives the centre of much of its power of resistance. It is true that Switzerland forms a powerful natural fortress, but, unfortunately for Prance, the rugged moun- tains and the fortifications of Switzerland on the Gotthard and the Furka, near St. Moritz, on the Ehone, &c., do not face Germany, but Italy and Prance. Towards Germany Switzerland is an open country, with large undulating plains and gently sloping hills. An invasion of Switzerland in the corner of Basle is almost as easy as a march through Surrey or Kent. Besides, most of the wealthy towns of Switzerland, such as Basle, Zurich, Berne, Lucerne, Lausanne, and the industrial districts of the country, with the majority of the population, lie in the easily invadable part. Under those circumstances Switzerland would fioad it exceedingly difficult to protect herself against a German violation of her frontiers. The utmost which, I am told, the Swiss officers hope to accomphsh would be to detaia a German invading army for a short time. Unless support from France should come forward immediately, the Swiss army would either have to capitulate or to retire into the vast fortified position at the Gotthard. It is asserted that the Swiss have lately made military service much more arduous and costly in view of the possibility of a Franco-German war. The Morocco affair may have given them a warning. After the end of the Napoleonic wars Switzerland and Holland were made independent and neutral States, and their neutrality and inviolabihty were guaranteed by the alUed Powers of Europe. This was done in order to confine France, who then was the great disturber of peace in Europe, within her boundaries by erecting on her frontier two inter- national fortresses which, though they were not garrisoned POEEIGN POLICY 561 by an international military force drawn from the united Powers of Europe, were meant to be defended by the united Powers of Europe against France in case of war. Up to the Franco-German War of 1870-71 Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland saw in France their more powerful and more dangerous neighbour, and in Germany their natural protector against a French attack. Consequently they inclined towards Germany. Now Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland begin to see in Germany their more powerful and more dangerous neighbour, and to look towards France as their natural protector in case of a possible violation of territory by Germany. They have begun to incline towards France. Perhaps the time will come when another European Congress will endeavour to redress the disturbed balance of power in Europe by attaching Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium in some form or other to Prance in order to create a counter- poise to Germany. Even then Germany would preserve her numerical superiority over Prance, for the joint population of France, Switzerland, Holland, and Belgium is only 55,000,000, or 8,000,000 less than that of Germany. Perhaps it would be safer to convert the Anglo-French Entente into a carefully limited public treaty of alliance approved of by the Parliament and people of both countries. Such an alliance would have the advantage of giving to each of the two Powers greater confidence in the loyal support of the other, and would enable the military and naval authorities to agree upon a plan of co-operation in case of war. Besides, third Powers, who at present may doubt the binding force of the entente and the good faith of one or the other party, may act upon the belief that the Anglo-French Entente is not to be taken seriously. Possibly a treaty of alliance, which gives a clear warning to all concerned, will be a better guarantee of the peace of Europe than a somewhat vague understanding called an entente. If Great Britain desires to see the balance of power re- established on the Continent in order to be able to withdraw 2 o 562 GEBAT AND GEBATEB BEITAIN herself from continental politics, with which she has only an indirect concern, and devote all her strength to the develop- ment and the defence of the Empire as she ought to do, she must, before all, endeavour to strengthen Russia, Praace's ally, Until Prance and Russia combined are again considered strong enough to act as a counterpoise to the Powers of the Triple Alhance. This consideration, and the fact that an Anglo-Prench Entente could not possibly endure if England should remain opposed or hostile to France's ally, led to a complete reversal of England's policy towards Russia and of Russia's policy towards England at the end of the Russo- Japanese War, and Russian and British diplomats deserve the highest praise for the skill with which they have effected a reconciliation and ra/pfrochement between the two Powers notwithstanding the century-old hostiUty and distrust which have prevailed between them. The improvement in Anglo-Russian relations and the subsequent entente found its formal expression in the Anglo-Russian agreements regarding Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet which were signed on the 31st of August 1907, and the entente was sealed by the meeting of the two monarchs at Reval on the 9th and'lOth of June 1908. The change in Anglo-Russian relations has already borne fruit. Russia might have created considerable difficulties for Great Britain in Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, and she might have added to our troubles in India, had she been so minded, as she undoubtedly would have done in similar circumstances a few years ago. During the last few years there has not been a single complaint about Russian emissaries in Asia. It must be acknowledged that Russia has behaved with the greatest correctness and loyalty towards this country. Many well-meaning Enghshmen opposed the Anglo- Russian entente, the conclusion of the Anglo-Russian agree- ments, and King Edward's visit to Reval because they were dissatisfied with the internal state of Russia and the characteB FOREIGN POLICY 563 of its government, and because the present Duma, though it is an elected assembly, is not a tnily democratic repre- sentative of the Eussian people. They therefore demanded that we should have nothiag to do with Russia and her rulers, and that we should break off all diplomatic intercourse with her until Russia had reformed herself, forgetting that the Anglo-Russian entente is not a sentimental union, but merely a business arrangement between two governments. They also demanded, as do many Russian idealists, full self- government for the Russia,n people, overlooking the fact that all progress and all reform must needs be gradual. Those who wish Russia to pass at once from absolutism to democratic full self-government aim, perhaps without know- ing it themselves, not at reform but at revolution. According to the last Russian census, of 1897, 72 per cent, of the Russians over nine years old — that is, about two-thirds of the population over school age — ^were unable to read and write. Apparently less than 10 per cent, of Russia's citizens are newspaper readers. Therefore a representative democratic Duma could be representative only of ilUteracy and ignorance. How could such an assembly govern the largest country in the world, a country inhabited by twenty different nationalities, by Christians, Mahommedans, and Buddhists ? Besides, the Russian people do not demand popular government and democratic institutions, for the excellent reason that the very words ' democracy ' and ' constitution ' are words without meaning to 90 per cent, of the inhabitants. It must also not be forgotten that it is not so very long since the Russians emerged from barbarism, and that civilisation in Russia, as in Germany, has made the greatest progress under the strongest rulers, such as Peter the Great and Catherine the Second. As the Russians are not yet advanced enough to govern themselves, they must be governed. The Russian Duma is not unlike the Prussian Diet, in which also practically the whole of the working classes are unrepresented. Russia's 2 o 2 564 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN greatest need is not a democratic government — ■which, though theoretically it might be excellent, would create anarchy and civil war — but administrative reform. The Russian people do not demand democratic institutions, about which they know nothing, but lower taxes, higher salaries and wages, a better administration of justice, &c. Russia has probably as much popular government as is good for her for the time being, and she has made substantial progress towards democracy. The direction of affairs is no longer in the hands of an absolute and irresponsible caste. Ministers have to lay their legislative and financial proposals before the Duma, in which there are many intelligent, patriotic, and independent men, and the measures they recommend are scrutinised and amended, passed or rejected, by them. The Government's Navy Bill was thrown out. Russia is developing on the model of Prusso-Germany, instead of on the model of the United States, which is apparently unsuitable for the country. She must be allowed to find her way to the light in her own way. The late King Edward concluded his toast at Reval with the remarkable words : ' I drink to the health of your Majesties, to that of the Empress Marie Feodorovna, and the members of the Imperial family, and, above all, to the welfare and prosferity of your great Empire.' These words contain an admonition and a programme. Englishmen who wish to assist the Russian people will do so more effectually by promoting Russia's welfare and prosperity than by endeavouring to press upon the country representative institutions which are unsuitable for Russia because the people are not yet ripe for them, and which would therefore only hamper the progress of the people instead of increasing their happiness. Besides, Englishmen will benefit themselves also by promoting the welfare and prosperity of the Russian Empire. ' The most necessary reforms in Russia are the improve- ment of her administration, the reform of taxation, and the ' ■ FOEEIGN POLICY 565 extension of education. These and various other reforms will cost much money. Therefore Eussia must before all develop her vast agricultural, mineral, and industrial resources in order to obtain the funds which are required for good government and reform. Eussia has magnificent resources. Her territory is twice as large as that of the United States, and, hke the United States, she can grow, raise, and produce almost everything needed by her people. Cotton, silk, tobacco, wine, rice, and other tropical and sub-tropical products are raised in South Eussia, the Trans- caspian and Transcaucasian provinces, and in Turkestan — it is not generally known that a part of Eussia several times larger than Germany lies on the same latitude as Italy — and precious stones, gold, iron, platinum, zinc, copper, naphtha, and various other minerals occur in many places. Eussia possesses the sources of varied and boundless wealth. At present agriculture is Eussia's principal industry. Eussia has a very fruitful soil, a large agricultural population, and she has excellent natural means of transport in her rivers and lakes ; but poverty and ignorance among the masses, lack of enterprise and of capital on the part of her business men, and short-sightedness and neglect on the part of the administration, have hitherto impeded the development of her agriculture. The soil is merely scratched by light wooden ploughs, the most primitive form of agriculture prevails, manuring is practically unknown to nine-tenths of her peasants, and there are hardly any roads for transporting agricultural produce to the rivers and railways. Though Eussia has much coal and iron, her industries are quite undeveloped. Her industrial backwardness may be gauged from the fact that with a territory and a population twice as large as those of the United States, Eussia produces only one- tenth of the quantity of iron produced in the United States, and that she raises only one-twentieth of the quantity of coal raised in the American EepubHc. In other words, America raises per head of population twenty times more iron and 566 GEEAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN , forty times more coal than Russia. Agriculturally and industrially, Russia is a mediaeval country. Many Russians in high official position assert that the latent wealth of Russia is greater than that of the United States, and if they are right the first task of the Russian Government should be to develop Russia's potential wealth. Wishing to reserve the whole of the national wealth to her own people, Russia has so far on the whole discouraged and stifled foreign enterprise, though M. de Witte tried to intro- duce foreign capital. Russia has as yet neither enough capital nor enough experience to open Up the country rapidly. Therefore she will be wise if she calls foreign experience and foreign capital to her assistance. If Russia throws the country wide open to foreign enterprise and to foreign capital, and if she treats hberaUy and even generously those who, wishing to help themselves, will most vigorously promote Russia's prosperity, the poverty and dissatisfaction of the masses and the penury of the Russian exchequer will soon come to an end. Russia suffers from financial anaemia and, as she may prove an Eldorado to British contractors, engineers, and investors, her financial anaemia may easily be overcome by their aid. Russia's difficulties spring chiefly from her poverty. Economic power gives social power and military power. If the Government makes Russia rich, the people will be contented. Enghshmen and Russians can co-operate in developing the country, and in promoting not only its welfare and prosperity, but also its happiness. Though Russia may find it difficult to borrow money for military and naval purposes and for building strategical railways, she wiU find no difficulty in attracting vast sums of money into the country for commercial and industrial development. She will be wise if she abstains from borrowing for unrepro- ductive purposes, for her continued borrowings must lead in the end to national bankruptcy. Russia's finances are in a bad state, and all her creditora POEEIGN POLICY 567 know it ; but her financial position has recently considerably improved. However, the Government cannot claim any merit for the improvement which has taken place. Wheat, rye, meat, and timber have risen considerably ia price. Hence she wiU find it easier to raise the necessary taxes and to pay her foreign creditors. The potential wealth of the Eussian^ State, as distinguished from that of the Eussian people, is very great. Her immense State domain is quite inadequately exploited. Her State railways are run either at no profit or at a loss. If Eussia becomes a rich agricultural and industrial State, the State domains and railways wiU rise to a fabulous value. The Eussian State will then be the richest State in the world. The Anglo-Eussian trade may be greatly increased, and it ought to increase pari passu with the increase of Eussia's population and production. Eussia exports to the United Kingdom raw products and food, such as grain, timber, eggs, butter, flax, naphtha, and she receives from Great Britain coal, machinery, hardware, cotton and wooUen goods, &c. During the last fifteen years British exports to Eussia have been absolutely stationary, but they may be very gi'eatly increased, as may be seen from the following figures : Imports into Rxtssia From Germany From Great Britain Amount Per Cent, ot Total Imports Amount Per Cent, ot Total Imports 1890^ . 1895-9 . 1900-4 . 1908 Roubles 112,542,990 195,707,851 216,518,600 320,061,000 25-3 34-4 38-5 40-5 Eoubles 106,922,825 117,252,896 109,266,200 121,043,000 24 20-6 19-4 15-3 The foregoing figures point to a very curious state of a,flms. Germany puts a heavy import duty on Eussiaq 568 GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN exports, while Great Britain allows them to enter untaxed. Nevertheless Germany has by her tariff policy succeeded in securing for her manufactures preferential treatment in the Russian market, with the result that Germany is rapidly ousting Great Britain from the Russian market, as the foregoing table clearly shows. Seventeen years ago German and British exports to Russia were equally large. Now German exports to Russia are three times as large as ours, and while our percentual participation in the Russian trade has steadily decreased, that of Germany has equally steadily increased. As the German industrial centres lie far inland, German manufactures cannot easily, under equal fiscal conditions, compete with British manufactures in Russia. Given equal fiscal conditions, the heavier cost of transport for German goods should oust German goods from the Russian market. A good commercial treaty ought, therefore, to lead to a rapid increase of British exports to Russia. Will it be possible to conclude such a treaty while, owing to our unbusinesslike fiscal system, we have nothing to offer in return for special concessions ? Why should Russia treat our manufactures preferentially if her goods receive the best treatment in the EngUsh market in any case ? While it is in the interest of Great Britain and Prance to see Russia economically, socially, and poUticaUy strengthened, it is Undoubtedly in Germany's interest |to see Russia weakened. Russia has 150,000,000 inhabitants and her population is growing by almost 2,000,000 a year, while Germany has only 64,000,000 inhabitants. Russia has room for 300,000,000 people as soon as her resources are more thoroughly exploited. A wealthy, well-organised, and powerful Russia is therefore a very dangerous neighbour to Germany. Hence Germany has endeavoured to create a counterpoise to Russia by strengthening Turkey against Russia, believing that further colUsions between Russia and Turkey are well-nigh unavoidable until the question of Constantinople is decided. She has lent to Turkey some FOREIGN POLICY 569 of her ablest officers. General Kolmar von der Goltz has served in Turkey from 1883 to 1895, and he has, during that time, together-with Muzaffer Pasha, completely reorganised the Turkish army on the German model. The military position of Turkey is a very difficult one. Leaving aside merely nominally Turkish possessions, such as Egypt, Crete, and Cyprus, Turkey has 25,000,000 inhabit- ants. Of these only 6,000,000 live in European Turkey, while by far the largest part of her population, about 18,000,000, lives in Asia. Mihtary service is compulsory on the Mahommedan Turks. All Christians and the inhabitants of Constantinople (about 1,250,000) are excluded from mihtary service. The military defence of Constantinople devolves, therefore, on about 2,000,000 Turks in Europe and about 15,000,000 Turks in Asia, who are spread all over Asia Minor, Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, &c. While the most valuable and the most vulnerable part of Turkey, Constanti- nople, with the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, lies in Europe, Turkey's military strength lies in Asia, and a large part of the population is separated from the capital by very great distances. The fact that Turkey cannot rapidly concentrate her Asiatic troops near Constantinople has greatly diminished Turkey's power of resistance in aU her wars with Russia. Though the Turkish army has nominally a war strength of 1,500,000, only a small part of that mighty host can be led against Russia owing to the absence of railways in Asia. During the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the Mosul Division on the middle Tigris required seven months to reach the theatre of war. It was therefore clear that the most effective way of strengthening Turkey agaiast Russia lay in bringing the Turkish population of Asia within easy reach of Constantinople by means of strategical railways. In the autumn of 1898 the German Emperor made a pilgrimage to Jerusalem. On his way he paid a visit to the Sultan and was his guest during four days. The outcome of the Emperor's visit in. Constantinople was a concession 70 GEEAT AND GEBATER BRITAIN the German Anatolian Railway Company to build the Jagdad railway, which, passing through Asia Minor and lesopotamia and branching out into Kurdistan and Syria, ras to connect the vast Asiatic possessions of Turkey down the Persian Gulf with Constantinople. This railway is in he first place a strategical railway, but as Germany received dth the railway concession the monopoly of navigating the Euphrates and Tigris and of mining in the zone to be opened ,p by the railway, the Bagdad railway was believed by some be a purely commercial undertaking. England was told bat she would benefit by the Bagdad railway because it rould give her an accelerated mail route to India, and she raa invited, as were Prance and Russia, to participate nancially in that undertaking, which was to cost about 24,000,000. The German promoters had proposed that the iiilway terminus on the Persian Gulf should be at Koweyt. lowever, the question of the terminus on the sea was a linor one. The principal object of the railway was not 3 carry freight to the Red Sea, but to carry Turkish troops nd reservists to Constantinople in case of war with Russia, 'herefore it has been given a kilometric guarantee by the 'urkish Government. This project was put before the British Government in 903, and it was at first favourably considered ; but [ispicions arose as to Germany's aim, EngHsh support was dthheld, and the Bagdad railway scheme was temporarily dthdrawn. On the 20th of May 1908 a Reuter telegram nnounced that the Bagdad railway scheme had been 3suscitated and that the work would be immediately ammenced. The news was correct. Germany intends ow to construct the Bagdad railway solely, or principally, ith German money. Within five years she proposes to anstrUct 500 miles of trunk line, which will reach Mardin, fc a cost of about [£9,000,000. This is the most difficult art of the Bagdad railway, as it has to pass the chain of the 'aUrus. The survey and plans are complete, and a large FOREIGN POLICY 571 tunnel at an altitude of 1456 metres is planned. This will be an engineering feat of the first rank. The Gotthard tunnel lies at an altitude of only 1155 metres. The completion of the Bagdad railway should double, perhaps even treble, the strength of the Turkish army in case of a Russian attack Upon Constantinople, but it seems not impossible that the question of Constantinople will be decided before the Bagdad railway is finished. Russia cannot help seeing in the construction of the Bagdad railway an Unfriendly act, and she must conclude that Germany either means only to strengthen Turkey against Russia or that she means to acquire a kind of pro- tectorate over Turkey. The Emperor has made the latter assumption possible by a very curious speech. On the 18th of November 1898, on his journey to Jerusalem, the Emperor proclaimed himself at Damascus as the Protector of Turkey and of all Islam. His words were : ' May the Sultan and may the 200,000,000 Mahommedans in all parts of the world who venerate the Sultan as their CaUf feel assured that the German Emperor will be their friend for all time.' That speech was much commented on at the time when it was made, but its real significance was not understood because nothing was then known about the Bagdad railway project and its ultimate purpose. Many people have been discussing the political object of the Reval visit of 1908 and its probable outcome. It was argued that some big political problem must have been discussed, because King Edward was accompanied not Only by a prominent diplomat but also by Sir John Fisher, the First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, and by Sir John French, Inspector-General of the MiUtary Forces of Great Britaia. Besides, the King had in his Reval toast expressed the hope of a ' satisfactory settlement ia an amicable manner of some momentous questions in the future.' It was assumed that the ' momentous questions ' concerned the settlement of the Macedonian problem, which had become acute. Since m GEEAT AND GREATEB BRITAIN hen the outlook in Turkey has been improved by the Turkish revolution, but it seems vain to hope that the idvent of the Young Turks has settled the Eastern Question or all time. Revolutions usually breed counter-revolutions, md it is to be feared that the Eastern Problem has not been olved, but has merely been adjourned. The attitude of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia during the settle- nent of the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina bodes ill for he peace of Europe. The two Germanic Powers have ilearly intimated to the world that they mean to control he fate of the Turkish Peninsula which, hitherto, Russia las considered her domain. During two centuries Russia has endeavoured to expel he Turks from Europe and to capture Constantinople, ihe wishes to possess, or at least to control, the Straits of ]onstantinople, because she desires to have free access to he sea for her enormous empire, and from her point of view hat wish is a reasonable and a legitimate one. Formerly, 7hen Russia was hostile to England, England not unnaturally )arred Russia's path to the Golden Horn. Times have hanged, and Great Britain may conceivably change her iews and policy with regard to the control of the Bosphorus ,nd the Dardanelles in accordance with the changed con- iitions. Great Britain would probably rather see Russia astalled at Constantinople than any other European ireat Power. Besides, it may be argued : Either Russia emains weak, and then she cannot do much harm to Great Britain even if she possesses Constantinople ; or she will lecome strong, and then she will take Constantinople in any ase. The subject is certainly worth considering in view of ecent developments in the Turkish Peninsula and in Asia linor. The German press has followed very attentively and not Itogether benevolently the gradual development of the triple Entente. While most of the Government inspired lapers have endeavoured to depict the Reval meeting of POEEIGN POLICY 573 1908 as a visit of courtesy devoid of political importance, many of the independent journals have complained that Great Britain has tried to checkmate and isolate Germany, and to hedge her in with a network of ententes in order to raise a European coahtion against her. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery. Germany could hardly complain if such were Great Britain's poUcy. However, she is mis- taken. As Great Britain is a peaceful country, it is clear that the object of the Triple Entente is not war but peace, and it must be assumed that its aim is threefold. It aims at creating a counterpoise to the Triple Alhance in order to preserve the balance of power in Europe, it aims at taking from the strongest European Power the temptation of breaking the peace, and it aims at settling, preferably by a friendly arrangement and without war, some of the great problems of Europe which possibly may come Up for settle- ment in the near future. ANALYTICAL INDEX Note. — The letter 'f ' following a page number signifies 'and following page ' ; ' fE ' ' and following pages.' A FAQB Agricultural Labourers in Great Britain and Ireland . 376, 404 ff, 417 „ „ in Great Britain and in Germany compared . 417 „ Imports into Great Britain .... 427 ff „ Production in Great Britain and in Germany compared 378 ff, 424 ff, 498 Agriculture and Tariff Eeform .... 370, 390 f, 444, 499 f and the National Physique . British, and the Liberal Party Decay of Effect of Free Trade on How ruined by Free Trade Persons employed in Be-creation of Persons occupied in, in Germany „ Neglect of, in ancient countries Alliance, Franco-British, desirable Alliances, Advantages and Limitations of „ Bismarck on . . . „ Unreliability of . Amalfi, Rise and Decline of . Amateur, Danger of rule of . America — See United States. American Colonies — See Colonies, American. Anglo-American Alliance, Why Impracticable Anglo- Japanese Alliance Anglo-Russian Understanding Anti-Corn Law League Arab Empire, Rise and Decline of Armies, Cause of superiority of National Army and Navy, Cost of British . Army, A plea for a British National Army, British, Beaumont and Fletcher on J, „ Danger of Civilian control of „ „ of Cromwell „ „ requires the rule of the Expert 575 439 S 377 ff, 389 ff. 408, 500 f . 82, 129f, 370ff 374 ff, 415. 516 ff, 534 ff . 374!ff, 416 . 376, 382, 386, 417 370 ff Great Britain and in 382 ff, 386, 417 . 7ff 292 ff . 295,297 295 ff 272 ff, 292 ff . 14 f 277 ff . 302 . 302 . 298 . 79 . 13 f . 170 ff . 64 f 159 ff . 213 . 277 f 172 f, 209 ff 237 ff 576 ANALYTICAL INDEX Army, British, Sir Edward Cecil on Army, The, of Ancient Egypt „ of Ancient Greece „ of Ancient Macedonia „ of Ancient Persia „ of Carthage „ of Constantinople „ of France „ of Germany „ of Japan . „ of Netherlands . „ of Phoenicia „ of Prussia „ of Rome . „ of Russia . „ of Spain . Army Reform is a one-man business Articles of War .... Asquith, Mr., on Home Rule „ „ on Land Reform „ „ on Over-Taxation of Ireland Athens, Rise and Decline of Austria- Hungary and Germany Fkas 210, 242 160 f 161 f 161 f 161 162 163 164 ff, 173, J75f, 243fE 164 ff, 173, 175 f, 243 fi 169, 200, 287 f, 347 S 164 162 164 S, 243 ff 162 f 169 163 f 240 ff 219 ff 503 579 f 542 f 5ff 314 ff B Bacon, Lord, Economic Views of . . . . . . 68 f, 81 Balance of Power and British Policy ... 279 fi, 307 ff, 553 fi „ „ ITrederick the Great on ... . 284, 318 „ „ Lord Chatham on ..... . 322 „ „ Maintenance of, why important to Great Britain 280 ff, 307 ff Balfour, Mr. Arthur, on Land Reform and Small Ownership 396, 446, 495 Baltic-North Sea Canal 33 Beaoonsfield, Lord, Views of, on British Empire Beef Trust .... Blake, Admiral . Boer War .... Booth, Charles, on Poverty . Brabant, Rise and Dechne of British Empire and Balance of Power . „ „ Benjamin !Pranklin on . „ „ Free Traders' views on . „ „ General Washington's views on „ „ is founded upon power . „ „ is merely a geographical expression „ „ Joseph Chamberlain's views on „ „ Joseph Howe on . „ „ London is the key to the „ „ Lord Beaconsfield's views on „ „ Lord Chatham's views on „ „ Lord Rosebery's views on „ „ Lord John Russell's views on . 83 .429f . 236 f 169, 230 f, 275, 286 112 ff . 17 f 279 ff . 94 ff . 82 f . 94 . 25 ff . 23 . 85 . 59 . 61 83 107, 109 . 84 . 83 f ANALYTICAL INDEX 577 British Empire must finance the Imperial Services „ must have Naval Supremacy „ Organisation of, Adam Smith on » ., » Benjamin Franklin on „ Joseph Howe on >' ;, >, Lord Chatham on " >, „ Why necessary „ Preearious Position of . „ Professor Seeley's views on . „ Story of the Rise of Building Societies FAQB 57 fE 24ff 75 73 f 69 73, 75 38 ff, 57 ff . 22flE . 84 f . 24 3 . 465 22, 77 Cadbury and Shann on Poverty 115 Cadiz, Expedition against ........ 210 f Canada, Unexpected consequences of Conquest of . . . . 89 £E Carthage, Armies of ........ . 162 „ Rise and DeoUne of . . . . . . . 3 ff Cattle — See Livestock. Cattshill Small Holdings 410 f, 438 f Cecil, Sir Edward, on English Army 210, 242 Chamberlain, Mr. Austen, on Land Reform . . . . .391 Chamberlain, Mr. Joseph, on Land Reform 482 „ „ „ on British Empire ..... 85 Charles I, Army of 212 fi Chatham, Lord, Imperial, Colonial, Foreign and Economic Policy of 72, 73, 75, 107, 109, 322, 325 Chinese, Political Economy of the Civil War and Cromwell's Army . Cleanliness, how promoted . Cobden, Economic Views of Colbert, Economic Policy of Colonies, American, Revolt and Secession of „ British, Contributions of the, for the Navy „ „ Interest of the, in the defence of the Empire „ „ PoUcy of Free Traders towards . „ Joseph Chamberlain towards „ Lord Beaconsfield towards „ Lord Rosebery towards „ Lord John Russell towards .' „ Professor Seeley towards Short-sighted treatment of, by England. „ „ Will they secede ? Competition, Disadvantages of International Congestion, Urban, and Land Reform . Consols, British, Cause of low return from „ „ stand at an artificial price Constantinople, Armies of . „ Rise and Decline of Corn Laws ...... Country population in Great Britain and in Germany compared 64 210 fi 205 79 fi 21 73 fi, 87 fi 59 fi 60 f 82 f 86 83 84 83 f 84f 87 fi 87 fi 4 422 ff 48 fi 60 163 12 f 79, 377, 616, 633 f 382 ff Cromwell, Army of 172 f, 209 ff 2 V 578 ANALYTICAL INDEX FAGS Cromwell, Economic Policy of . . . . • • . 70 f Crops in Great Britain and in Germany compared , . 380 ft, 424 Crusades, Economic Influence of .... . .14 D Death Duties, Effect of 44 „ „ in England and in Germany compared ... 46 Declaration of Independence ....... 86 Degeneration, Physical, and Agriculture .... 439 ff „ „ and Military Training . . . . 191 ff Deterioration, Physical 117 f, 191 ff Dreadnoughts, British and German . . . . , . 55, 60 Drink Problem 117 f Drink Taxation in England and in Germany compared ... 47 Dual Alliance and Triple Alliance . . . . 285 ff, 307 ff, 553 ff Dunbar, Battle of ........ • 223 E Economic Policy — See Policy, Economic. Economy, The, of Empire ....... .jj63 ff Edgehill, Battle of 214, 233 Education and its dangers ....... 326 ff Edward VII and the Housing Problem 452 „ „ Foreign Policy of ..... . 551 ff Eggs, Importation of, into Great Britain ..... 430 Egypt, Army of Ancient ....... 160 f Electoral Reform 504 f Emigration and Immigration, British and Foreign . . 127 ff, 138 ff Emigration, Irish 620 ff, 537 f Employment and Unemployment . . . . . 110 ff „ and wages in Germany ..... 144 ff Empire, British — See British Empire. Empire, The Economy of 63 ff Enfranchisement of Eural Tenants, how to be effected . . 411 ff „ „ Urban Leaseholders, how to be effected . 466 ff England — See Great Britain. Entente, Anglo-Bussian ..... . . 298 f „ Franco-British 290 ff Triple 553 ff F Fashoda 286 Finances, British and German compared . . . . . 45 ff „ British and Imperial ResponsibiUties . . . . 42 ff Flanders, Rise and Deohne of . . . . . . 17 £ Food, Cheapness of foreign, and gratuitous distribution of, in States of Antiquity . . . . . . . . . . 7 ff ANALYTICAL INDEX 579 _ . PAGE Foreign Policy, British, and the balance of power . 279 fi, 307 S, 553 £E France and Germany, Relations between 297 „ and Great Britain, Relations between . . . 297 ff Army of 164 ff, 173, 175 f, 243 £f „ „ „ Improvement of physique in . . . .199 „ Birth-rate in 290 „ „ „ Moltke on 290 „ Changed character of ...... . 291 „ Collapse of, in 1870 and its lesson to England . . 243 ff „ Economic Policy of . . . . . .21 „ Population of, and German population compared . . 290 Precarious position of .... 289 ff, 316, 558ff „ requires an ally ........ 291 Franchise, Reform of the 1 04 f Franco-British Understanding ...... 290 ff Franco-German War of 1870-71 . . . 173, 175 f, 243 ff, 293 f FranMin, Benjamin, Imperialism of . . . . . 73 f, 94 ff PoUoyof 105 Frederick the Great on Balance of Power .... 284, 318 „ „ on British Economic Policy .... 72 „ „ MiUtary tactics of . . . . . . 164 f Freehold — See Land ; Ownership, small. Free Trade and British Agriculture . . . . 374 ff, 415 „ „ and Irish Agriculture ..... 516 ff, 534 ff „ „ and Protection ....... 118 ff Free Trade, Rise of 77 ff Free Traders, Views of, on British Empire 82 f G Genoa, Rise and Decline of 14 f George, Uoyd-, and Ireland ....... 525, 543 ff „ „ Budget and Land Policy of . . viii, 370 ff, 451, 479 Germany, Agricultural Production in . . . .378ff, 424 ff, 498 „ Agriculture of, and British Agriculture compared 373 ff, 378 ff, 416 ff, 424 ff, 486 ff, 498 Aims and Ambitions of ..... 311 ff and Austria- Hungary and Great Britain and Holland and the Netherlands and Switzerland . and Turkey . and United States Army of „ „ Improvement of physique in British relations with . Consumption of Meat in Consumption of Wheat in Creation of Peasant Proprietors in, Crops in .... Distribution of Land in 164 ff, how effected 314 ff 28 ff, 317 ff, 557 ff 33, 35, 313 ff 33, 35, 313 ff .313f 569 ff . 34 ff, 299 173, 175 f, 192 ff .198 ff 28 ff, 317 ff . 394 . 393 . 398 ff . 380 ff, 424 380 ff, 486 ff 2p2 580 ANALYTICAL INDEX PA.aii Germany, Eoonomio Policy of . . . . . . . 31 fE Eoonomio Position of . . . . . . . 32 ff Education in ....... . 342 f Emigration from and immigration into . . . 128, 138 f Employment and wages in . . . . . 144 £E Expansionist tendencies in . . . 310 ff, 320 ff Finances of . . . . . . . . 45 ff, 56 £E Foreign PoUoy of 32 ff, 285 ff, 308 ff Import of Meat into ... . . 380, 443 Landowners in 385ff, 486ff Livestock in 378,498 National Wealth of ....... 54 Naval Policy of 33 ff Navy Bills and Shipbuilding Programmes of . . . 33 f Persons occupied in Agriculture in . . . 382 ff, 386, 417 Physical deterioration in .... . 192 ff Policy of, towards France ...... 297 Population of, and French population compared . . 290 Recruiting statistics of . . . . . . 192 ff Relations of, with United States . . . . 34 ff, 299 Savings Banks Deposits in ..... . 140 Small Ownership in 380 ff, 486 ff Strategical Position and Needs of Expansion of . 557 ff Unemployment in . . . . . . . 137 f Wages and employment in . . . . . 144 ff Wealth of 36 f Gladstone, Mr., and Ireland 522 ff Glasgow, Overcrowding in ...... . 447 ff Grantham, Battle of 232 Great Britain — See also British Empire. What will be her future ? Iff Agricultural Imports into . . . 380, 427 ff, 443 Agricultural Labourers in . . . 376, 404 ff, 417 Agricultural Production in . . . 378 ff, 424 ff, 498 Agriculture of, and German Agriculture compared 373 ff, 378 ff, 416 ff. 424 ff, 486 ff, 498 and French Entente and Germany and German Navy and Russian Understanding and Russo-Japanese War and United States . Army of . . . „ „ Sir Edward Cecil on Consumption of Wheat in Crops in . . . Distribution of Land in . Early Economic Policy of Economic Development of Electoral Reform in Emigration from . Employment in Finances of, and Imperial Responsibilities 290 ff 28 ff, 317 ff . 55 f . 298f 287 f, 290 ff . 299, 303 159 ff . 110, 242 393 Ssbff, 424, 498 380 ff, 407, 489 20, 65 ff 20, 65 ff 504 f 110 ff 110 ff . 42 ff ANALYTICAL INDEX 581 threat Bntain, Foreign Policy of, and balance of power 279 ft, 307 ff, 653 ff „ „ Importation of Eggs into 430 „ Importation of Meat into . . . 380, 427 ff, 443 » „ Industrial Position of 110 ff „ „ is living on her capital 52 f » „ is not the richest nation in the world . . . 43 ff „ „ Labour in 110 ff „ „ Landowners in 385 ff, 407, 489 „ „ Livestock in 378 ff, 424 ff, 498 „ „ Military position of . ... 159 ff „ „ must have Naval Supremacy . . . . . 24 S 1, „ National physique in .... . 191 ff „ „ National wealth of ...... 54 „ Navy of, in Cromwell's time 236 t „ „ Overcrowding in ..... . 447 ff „ „ Persons occupied in Agriculture in . . . 382 ff, 386 „ „ Poverty in 110 ff „ „ Precarious Financial Position of . . . . 36 ff „ „ Precarious PoUtioal Position of . . . . 22 ff „ „ Savings Banks Deposits in ... . 140 ff „ „ Signs of Impoverishment of . . . . 51 ff, 82 „ „ Small Ownership in. Statistics of . . 385 ff, 407, 489 „ „ Unemployment in . . . . . . 110 ff „ „ Urban Congestion in . .... 422 ff „ „ Weakness of Administration of ... . 277 „ „ Wealth of, was created under Protection . . . 76 f Greece, Army of Ancient ........ 161 f „ Political Economy of Ancient ...... 64 „ Kise and Decline of Ancient . . . . . . 5 ff Hanseatio League, Rise and Decline of . Harcourt, Mr. L., on Land Reform Holdings, Agricultural— See Land ; Ownership, small. Holland and Germany „ Rise and Decline of .... Home Rule — See also Ireland. Home Rule and Ireland ..... „ „ and the British Parties „ „ and Ulster „ ,, Mr. Asquith on Housing Problem 16 f, 20 . 479 33, 35, 313 ff 33, 35, 313 ff 502 ff 529 ff 504 f . 503 446 ff Immigration and Emigration Imports, Agricultural, into Great Britain Income, British, subject to Income-tax . Iiicome-tax in Germany ,, in Great Britain 127 ff, 138 ff 380, 427 f, 443 . 48 . 46 . 46 582 ANALYTICAL INDEX Independence, Declaration of ... . Individualism and Patriotism . . . . Industries, British, Position of . . . _ . „ „ they were created by Protection Ireland — See also Home Rule. Ireland, Agricultural decline of „ Agricultural Labourers in . „ Agriculture of, how ruined by Free Trade „ and Home Eule „ and State Railways . „ and Tariff Reform . „ and the British Markets . „ and the Liberal Party „ Emigration from „ Foreign trade of „ Mr. Gladstone and . „ How ruined by Free Trade „ Land Settlement in, Effect of „ Lloyd-George and „ Over-taxation of „ „ „ Liberal Leaders on „ Pernicious Liberal Poor Law Reform „ Possibility of Civil War in „ Potato Famine in „ Public Works for „ Strategical Importance of . „ Tobacco Culture in . „ Ulster, Home Rule and „ was Great Britain's Granary Irish Emigrants, sujSerings of Irish Nationalist Party, Attitude and Policy of Irish War of 1649 130, FAGB . 86 347 ff 110 fE . 66 ff 129f, 516fE,534fE . 376, 405 516 ff, 534 ff 602 ff 530 ff, 538 f 509 ff 510 ff 513 ff, 529 fi 140, 520 ff, 537 f 510 ff 522 ff 516 ff, 534 ff 392, 482, 490 fi 525, 543 ff 521 ff, 539 fi 541 ff 514 ff, 533 508 f 521, 535 ff 530ff, 538f 506 ff . 529 f 508 f 519, 634 f 537 f 544 ff . 227 f Japan, Army of . „ „ Improvement of physique in „ British AUianoe with „ the secret of her greatness and success Japanese-Russian War and Great Britain Jews, Political Economy of the Ancient 169, 200, 287 f, 347 fi . 200 302 fi 347 ff . 287 f . 63 f Labour, British and Labour Problems . . . . . 110 S „ Casual, in Great Britain, how created . . . 123 fi Labourers, Agricultural — See Agricultural Labourers. Land, Distribution of, in Great Britain and in Germany . . 380 ff „ owned and rented, Proportion of . . . . .407 „ Owners of, in Great Britain and in Germany . . . 385 fi „ Socialism and the ..... . 389 f, 475 ff ANALYTICAL INDEX 583 Land, Socialistic Policy towards, of the Liberal Party „ Title to, Difficulties regarding Landbanks, Necessity for and Organisation of Land Reform and Tariff Reform .... .. „ Bluebook Evidence in Support of 402, 434 ff, 446, 455 ff, 464 f, 469 f, 482 ff, 490. 491 ff, 496 f PAQB 389 f, 478 ff 468 ff . 414 370, 390 f, 444 „ Mr. Asquith on „ Mr. Balfour on „ Mr. Austen Chamberlain on „ Mr. Joseph Chamberlain on „ Mr. L. Harcourt on „ Lord Lansdowne on „ Mr. Lloyd-George on . . . viii, 370 „ Lord Rosebery on . „ Mr. Ure on . . . „ Li Germany, How effected „ Rural .... „ „ How to be carried out „ Urban .... „ „ How to be carried out Registration, Necessity of . „ Proposal for Rapid Introduction of . Lansdowne, Lord, on Laud Reform and Small Ownership Leasehold Enfranchisement — See Enfranchisement. Leasehold System, Disadvantages of 452 ff Liberal Party and Agriculture . . . . 377 ff, 389 f, 500 f „ „ and Ireland 513 ff, 529 ff „ „ Socialistic Land Policy of .... 487 ff Livestock in Great Britain and in Germany . . 378 ff, 424 ff, 498 Lloyd-George — See George, Lloyd-. Local Taxation — See Taxation, Local. Lowestoft, Capture of, by Cromwell 224 t 478 f 396, 446, 495 . 391 . 482 . 497 391, 423 ff, 451, 479 . 396 . 480 398 ff 396 ff 411 ff 418 ff, 446 ff 466 ff 468 ff 470 f 391, 423 M Macedonia, Armies of Ancient ....... 161 f Marston Moor, Battle of 234 Meat, Consumption of in Saxony . . . . . . .394 „ Importation of into Great Britain . . 380, 427 ff, 443 Meroenariea in the States of Antiquity 7 ff Model Army of England 209 ff Moltke, Leading principles of ...... . 228 Money, Cheapness of, how brought about ..... 49 Morocco Affair, The 301 f N Napoleon III on the French Army Napoleonic Wars, Economic effect of Naseby, Battle of ... • Naval Position, British, towards Germany . 253 . 21 . 234 f 55 f, 305 ff 584 ANALYTICAL INDEX Naval Supremacy, Necessity of, for British Empire Navigation Acts, British Navy, British, in Cromwell's time Netherlands and Germany . „ Armies of „ Eise and Decline of New York, Bricklayers' wages in „ Increase of wealth of „ Unemployment in „ Wages and Salaries in FAQa 24 £E, 305 ff 67, 70 f . 236 f S3, 35, 313 ff . 164 . 18 ft . 150 f . 157 .148ff . 156 Officers, how selected by Cromwell Old Age Pensions ..... Overcrowding in Great Britain .... Ownership, Small, Bluebook Evidence in support of 455 ff, 464 f, 469 f, 482 S, „ Mr. Asquith on . . . „ Mr. Balfour on „ Mr. Austen Chamberlain on „ Mr. Joseph Chamberlain on „ Mr. L. Harcourt on . „ Lord Lansdowne on . „ Lord Rosebery on . . . ,. Mr. Ure on . . . . „ Experiences of in Great Britain . „ How created in Germany „ How to be created in Great Britain „ In Germany .... „ Objections to be refuted „ Statistics of ... . . 221 f . 55 447 S 402 f, 434 ff, 446, 490, 491 ff, 495 f 478 f . 396, 446, 495 . 391 . 482 . 479 . 391, 42S . 396 . 480 . 410 i 398 ff 411 ff, 466 ff 486 ff 414, 454 ff . 385, 407 Panama Canal, Economic effects of . = .... 29 Parhament, Short-sightedness of British, caused the revolt of American Colonies 87 ff Patriotism and Individualism ...... 347 ff Pauperism — See Poverty. Peasant Proprietorship — See Ownership, Small ; Agriculture ; Land. Persia, Army of Ancient ........ 161 Phoenicia, Armies of ........ . 162 „ Rise and Decline of . . . . . . . 2 ff Physique, National, and MiHtary Training ..... 191 ff Pigs — See Livestock. Pisa, Rise and Decline of . . . . . . . . 14 f Policy Economic, British, Frederick the Great on . . . .72 of Cromwell 70 f of Lord Bacon 68 f, 81 of Lord Chatham 72, 73, 75 of Sir Walter Raleigh 69 f ANALYTICAL INDEX 585 Political Economy of Adam Smith of Ancient Jews of Chinese of Cobden ..... 22, of Greeks of Jean Jacques Rousseau of Rioardo Traditional British . Portugal, Rise and DecUne of Poverty, Causes of, in Great Britain Poverty and Pauperism in Great Britain Cadbury and Shann on Campbell-Bannerman on PAGE 75, 77 ff . 63 . 64 77, 79 S . 64 . 77 f . 79 . 65 fE . 16 3 110 ff 110 ff . 115 . Ill 112 ff . 116 113 fi Charles Booth on Extent of . Rowntree on Royal Commission of Labour on 115 Preston, Battle of 225 ff, 236 Protection and Free Trade 118 ff „ Agricultural, benefits rather Small Holders than Land- owners ........ 494 £ „ of Industries is the historic poUoy of Great Britain . 66 ff Prussia, Army of 164 ff, 173, 175 f, 243 ff R Raleigh, Sir Walter, Economic views of 69 f Rates — See Taxation, Local. Recruiting Statistics, British and Foreign .... 192 ff Rh6, Expedition against the Isle of . . . . . .211 Rhodes, Rise of .......... 8 Ricardo, Economic teachings of . . . . . . .79 Rochelle, Expedition against . . . . . . .211 Rome, Armies of Ancient ..... . . 162 f „ Rise and Decline of . . . . . . . 8 ff Rosebery, Lord, Views of, on British Empire ..... 84 „ „ „ on Land Reform ..... 396 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, Economic teachings of . . . . 77 f Rowntree on Poverty . . . . . . . . 113 ff Russell, Lord John, Views of, on British Empire . . . 83 f Russia, Army of ......... 169 „ British Interests in Prosperity and Strength of . . 561 ff „ British Understanding with .... 298 f, 562 ff „ Collapse of, has made the Triple AlUance supreme . 290, 557 „ Strength and possible future of ... 287 ff, 563 ff Russo-Japanese War and Great Britain ..... 287 f Savings Banks Deposits in Great Britain and in Germany ,, in various countries . 51, 140 ff . 62 586 ANALYTICAL INDEX PAGE Savings Banks Deposits in Great Britain and in United States 154 fi SaSony, Consumption of Meat in ...... . 394 Scotland, Overcrowding in ...... . 447 £E Sea-power and War ........ 305 ff Beeley, Professor, Views of, on British Empire .... 84 Sheep — 8ee Livestock. Shipping, British, was developed by Protection .... 57 Small Holdings — See Land ; Ownership, small. Small Holdings Act of 1907 .408, 412 Small Ownership — See Ownership, small ; Land. Smith, Adam, on Labour, Wages, and Employment . . Ill, 127 „ „ Economic teaclungs of . . . . . 75, 77 fi SociaUsm and the Land ...... 39S f, 457 if South African War 169, 230 f, 275, 286 Spain, Armies of ......... 163 f Sparta, Bise of .......... 8 States are founded upon Power . . . . . . . 25 f Stratton, Battle of 214 Suffrage, Reform of the ........ 504 f Supremacy, Naval, Necessity of, for British Empire . . . 24 fi Switzerland and Germany ........ 313 f Switzerland, Precarious Military Position of 560 Tariff Reform 118 ff Tariff Reform, Agriculture, and Land Reform 370, 390 f, 444, 490 ff Tariff Reform and Ireland 509 fi, 548 f Tariffs, Foreign, Effect of 120 ff Taxation, Local, Injvistice and Proposed Reform of Taxation, National, falls upon the whole nation ... Taxation per head in Great Britain and oth^r countries compared Tobacco Taxation in Great Britain and in Germany compared . Trade — See alao PoUoy Economic ; Free Trade ; Protection. Trade, Foreign, per head of population in various countries Trade Unionists, British 110, 114, Training, MiUtary, and National Physique Treaties, Limited validity of . . . Triple Alliance and Dual Alliance Turkey and Germany ..... „ and European Politics Two- Power Standard, Necessity of the . 472 ff 43 45 47 48 135 ff 191 ff . 295 f 285 ff, 307ff, 553ff 569 ff 669 ff 27 ff, 305 ff U and Home Rule .... 504 f standing, Anglo-Russian . . . . 298 f „ Franco-British . . . . 290 ff ployment in Germany . . . . 137 f „ in Great Britain . . . . 110 ff, 135 ff „ „ how created 121 ff ANALYTICAL INDEX 587 Unemployment in New York State United States — See also Colonies, American, and Panama Canal Army of . . . British relations with the Economic Policy of the Employment in . Immigration into the . Relations of, with Germany Savings Banks Deposits in Shipping Policy of the . Unemployment in Wages and salaries in . Ure, Mr., on Land Beform . 28 PAGE 148 fi . 29 . 201 , 299, 303 . 30 . 153 { 128, 152 34 ff, 299 154 £E . 29 .148ff . 156 . 480 Venice, Rise and Decline of . . . . . . . . 14 3 W Wages and employment in Germany ..... 144 S. „ in Great Britain ....... 110 fi Wages in Great Britain — some are kept high by the protection of labour 119 ff „ in Great Britain — some are kept low by international com- petition ........ 118 ff „ of New York bricklayers ....... 150 f War — 8ee also Army. „ and Sea-power ........ 305 ff „ Articles of 219 ff „ Beneficial influence of ....... 25 „ Civil, and Cromwell's Army 210 ff Washington, George, Imperialism of . . . . . .94 Wheat, Consumption of in Germany and in Great Britain . . .393 Worcester, Battle of ....-• • • 225 Work and Workers, British HO ff York, Poverty in 113 ff PRINTED B1 BPOTTISWOODB AND CO. 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